The development of Hungarian constitutional liberty. By Count Julius Andrássy. Translated from the Hungarian by C. Arthur and Ilona Ginever

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2007 with funding from

IVIicrosoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/developmentofhunOOandruoft

!t\*.<b

The Development

of

Hungarian
Constitutional Liberty.

BY

COUNT JULIUS ANDRASSY.

Translated from the Hungarian by
C. ARTHUR AND ILONA GINEVER.

KBtiAN PAUL. TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.

LONDON, i«)o8. / 0 ^ H ^

I

go

:3i/t/

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY,

CONTENTS,

PART I.
THE CREATION OF THE HUNGARIAN STATE.

Chapter. Page.

I. The Time of the Arpads. 3

II. The Time of the Mixed Dynasties. 38

PART II.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

III. Sources of the Royal Power. 49

IV. The First Beginnings of a Constitution in Hungary and

in England during the Eleventh and Twelfth
Centuries. 71

V. The Thirteenth Century. Steps towards Freedom in

England and Hungary. The Charters. 89

VI. The Thirteenth Century. Struggle for Political Power.
Victory of the Monarchy in England. Exaggeration
of Freedom in Hungary. The Century's Results in
the Two Countries. 102

VII. Monarchical Reaction in Hungary. The Angevins. 125

VIII. Development of the Constitution in England, 140

IX. The Development of the Hungarian Constitution from
the time of the Angevins to the Accession of Matthias,
Part i. To the Death of Sigismund (1413). 152

X. The Development of the Hungarian Constitution from
the time of the Angevins to the Accession of Matthias.
Part ii. Period of Disintegration. From the
Accession of Albert to the Death of Ladislns V. (1437). 173

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

COliiTEiiTS.- {Continued),

Chapter. Page.
XI. Reaction in favour of the Monarchy in England. The

Tudors. 198

XII. Royal Reaction in Hungary. King Matthias. 209

XIII. The Jagello Dynasty. Struggles between Nobles and

Gentry. King Wladislav II. 235

XIV. Louis II. (1516-1526), 264
XV. The Foundation of the Dominion of the Habsburgs 293

XVI. Division of the Country. 311

XVII. Efforts to restore the Unity of the Country. 332

XVIII, Rela!ive Advantages of the Eastern and Western Alliances. 345

XIX. The Growth of the Royal Power. 353

XX. Increase of Foreign Influences. 363

XXI, Resistance to Foreign Influences. 370

XXII. The Power of Resistance of the Constitution. 382

XXIII. Causes and Eff"ects of the spread of the Reformation in

Hungary. 399

XXIV. Bocskay's Insurrection. 419

XXV. Political and Religious Differences during the Reign of

Matthias II. (1608-1619). 448

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

TRANSLATORS^ PREFACE.

HE present volume is only part of the
book projected by the author, dealing
with the reasons for the preservation and
development of Hungarian constitu-
tional liberty. It treats of the period
from the entry of the Hungarians into
the country now known as Hungary, down to the end of
the reign of Matthias IL, that is to say, from 896 to 1619
A.D.

As English readers may not be altogether familiar
with the course of Hungarian history, we have compiled
a short list of dates of the most important events. It
may also be desirable to say a few words about the noble
class in Hungary, as that class differed greatly from the
English nobility. In Hungary all the members of the
clans that took part in the Conquest, and their descend-
ants, were styled nemesy noble, and their class alone was
endowed with full political rights. In course of time
others, who had displayed great military or other talents,
might also rise to the ranks of the nobility. Politically
speaking the nobles were the nation. At first all the nobles
were equal, and attempts were frequently made to maintain
this equality. No distinguishing titles were used by the

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

nobles (with two exceptions) until after 1526, their family
name being their sole distinction. All had the right to
attend the Diet, which was at first merely a mass meeting
of all who were endowed with full political rights. In
time, however, differences arose; some nobles grew more
wealthy and powerful than others, and the noble class
became divided into the class of the greater nobles or
magnates (barones et magnates), and that of the lesser
nobles or gentry (nobiles). In addition there were the
prelates of the church (domini praelati). The use of titles
becanie customary in the time of the Habsburgs. As the
law of primogeniture has never prevailed in Hungary, the
rights of a noble (including his title) descended to all his
sons.

Our best thanks are due to Sir Courtenay Ilbert,
K.C.S.I., for kindly reading through the M.S. and
checking any references to English constitutional history.

C. ARTHUR AND ILONA GINEVER.

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY

LIST OF DATES.

889. — Arpad elected leader by the tribes.

896. — The Hungarians settle in their present home.

997. — St. Stephen elected Duke of Hungary.
1001. — St. Stephen embraces Christianity and is crowned

king.
1222. — The charter known as the Golden Bull issued.
1241-2. — Invasion of the Tartars.
1301. — Extinction of the Arpad dynasty.
1308. — Ascent of the Angevins.
1342. — Coronation of Louis the Great (died 1382).
1366. — ^First war against the Turks.
1428-56. — Hunyadi's wars against the Turks.
1458. — Election of Matthias Corvinus.
1478.— Peace of Olmiitz.
1490.— Death of Matthias Corvinus.
1490-1516.— The Jagello dynasty.
1526. — Disastrous battle of Mohacs.
1527. — Ferdinand Habsburg crowned and the country

split into two parts.
1538. — Peace of Nagyvarad.

1540. — Death of John, the last national king of Hungary.
1551. — Death of Martinuzzi.

1571. — Stephen Bathory elected Duke of Transylvania.
1605. — ^Bocskay elected Duke of Transylvania.
1608.— Coronation of Matthias H. (died 1619).
1613. — Gabriel Bethlen elected Duke of Transylvania
(died 1629).

^ PART I.

%

The Creation of

the Hungarian

State.

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

CHAPTER L
THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

It was favourable to Hungarian independence from
the very first that the Hungarian invaders settled in a
country which was rendered easy of defence by its
physical formation, and that they had not to wrest it from
the German peoples but from the still undeveloped Slavish
races.

The new State was not in the way of the expanding
European powers which were then dominant. The

interests of European civilisation were closely linked with
the fate of the German races, which, after accepting Latin
culture, developed that civilisation in new directions.

The Hungarians were not powerful enough to arrest
the German advance, and any attempt to do so would
have brought defeat. Fortunately their geographical
situation was such as to allow of German expansion with-
out endangering Hungarian territory. The original
inhabitants of the country were not related to the
Germans, and they found the Hungarian rule less
burdensome than that of the Slavs. The establishment
of the Hungarians in their new home was not therefore
opposed to the tendencies of the age. On the contrary,
in the long run it actually furthered those tendencies. It
was to this fortunate circumstance that the Hungarian
nation owed the possibility of its development. But this
development was brought about not merely by a lucky
chance, but also by the exercise of great political sagacity.
The Hungarians had the good sense to be content with
the territory they had acquired, and to refrain from
attempting any further conquests. Their roving spirit
sometimes carried them far to the west, whence they
brought home rich spoils, but they made no efforts to

8

i

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

extend their borders. It was always characteristic of
them, sanguine and ambitious though they were, that
their natural impulses were kept well under control, and
yielded to the dictates of prudence. The successes of
some of their kings awoke desires which were out of
harmony with the nation's true vocation, and were in no
proportion to its strength. The Angevins in Italy, and
Matthias, after his victories over the Germans, yearned
for military adventures which could bring no enduring
advantage to the nation. But the people always saw
when their leaders were on the wrong track. Their
instinct saved them from embarking on enterprises of
mere conquest. While the Germans made the Italian
aspirations of their emperors their own, and the English
adopted the French projects of their kings, the policy of
conquest never became a national policy in Hungary.
There was, in fact, a somewhat exaggerated tendency in
the opposite direction. The enlargement of a nation's
territory is sometimes needful, even for purposes of
defence, a truth which public opinion in Hungary has
ignored even to the present day. Still, their ardent
attachment to the soil, and their indifference to new
territory has often proved advantageous to the Hun-
garians. This was especially the case at the commence-
ment of their history. From the first they seemed to
realise that they could defend themselves within their
own borders, but that if they went beyond those borders
they would fail. Where Arpad had settled down, there
they must stay, or else be broken on the wheel of historical
events. Within their own country lay their mission,
while the West was reserved for other races. The history
of the Turks shows how fortunate it was that the
Hungarians did not seek to extend their dominions. The
idea that where once they set their foot they must reign,
was the curse of the Osmans. Had they settled down in
one mass around Constantinople, within a region extend-
ing perhaps as far as the Balkans, and been satisfied with
being masters of that territory which they were well able

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

to defend, their fate would have been different, their
enemies fewer, and their power would not have been
absorbed in the task of repressing subjugated races, as it
has been to the present day.

Fortunately, the Hungarians did not challenge their
neighbours to a life and death struggle. Their numbers
were not great, but by confining themselves to a moderate
area they were enabled to maintain their control over the
subjugated races, and were thus saved from the fate which
befel the Huns and Avars. Their prudent policy kept
them from overstraining their resources, and from coming
into conflict with the predominant powers.

Another circumstance which made for peace was the
conversion of the nation to Christianity, which did away
with the gulf that had formerly separated Hungary from
her neighbours.

But all these conditions merely made their existence
possible without positively assuring it. The creation of
Arpdd and St. Stephen was lusty and promising, yet it
was threatened by many dangers. The cross itself could
not defend the Hungarians; only their sword and their
brains could do that, and even so they could only hope
to survive if the turn of events in the countries around
them should prove favourable.

Had they not embraced Christianity they must soon
have fallen, but their conversion was no guarantee of
safety, for it was not only religion and culture which
divided them from other nations. Racially also they
stood isolated between two great peoples — the Germanic
and the Slavish.

This circumstance alone w^as pregnant with danger.
Their neighbours saw in them the successors of the Huns
and the Avars, so that the Hungarians bore the burden
not merely of their own deeds but of the actions of those
races also. To the developing self-consciousness and
culture of Western peoples, the Hungarians appeared as
an Asiatic people, and an intruding barbarian element
which had no proper place among them.

5

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

During the Middle Ages race migrations were
frequent. One warlike nation attacked another, van-
quished it, and divided its territory among the conquerors,
slaughtering the inhabitants if necessary. Of such a
character, very largely, were the Norman conquests in
England, in Naples, and in Sicily, and the conquests of
the Crusaders in Constantinople, and in the same way
the Germanic races gradually pushed the Slavish races
towards the north-east. The vigour and love of action
of the young nations, the restlessness surviving from
nomadic times, the universality of warlike occupations,
and the roughness of the age, all made the existence of the
weaker insecure. The Hungarians were specially liable
to attack, because their neighbours to the east were still
nomadic. They had blocked up the path which had
always served as a highway for the Asiatic races, and
along which they themselves had travelled, and had
wedged themselves between the civilised christian West
and the wild pagan East. The Western races saw in
them barbarians who should be extirpated, while their
Eastern enemies' rage was aroused by their increasing
civilisation. When they became entirely assimilated to
the West, the East attacked them more frequently, and
with increasing fury, and in defence of civilisation and
Christianity they were constantly in danger. During the
period, however, which immediately followed the founda-
tion of the Hungarian State, it was chiefly from the West
that danger threatened.

In that age two prevailing tendencies gave a
character to history, a clinging to independence on the
one hand, and a tendency to amalgamation on the other.
The Roman Empire was invaded by the Germanic races
whose predominant characteristic was their love of free-
dom and independence. Each nation desired to live for
itself, and in accordance with its own laws and customs.

The fortune of war had brought them together, but
they endeavoured to continue their separate existence,
according to their own traditions, and without considering

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

each other. This instinct was an important factor in
that new world, and influenced largely the later develop-
ment of Europe. To this spirit of individuality and self-
assertiveness belonged the future, but only if it were to
some extent limited by sufficient community of interest to
bind these nations together. The new age and its civilisa-
tion could only be truly original and many-sided and
attain the level which has been reached, if the new factors,
while retaining their individual characteristics, were
welded together into one civilisation having a common
foundation.

This union was pow^erfully forwarded by two
agencies. The struggle of those two agencies against
the spirit of independence was the chief event of that
age, and upon the issue of that struggle the character
of the future depended.

One of those agencies was the Catholic religion. This \
had already achieved gigantic results when the Hungari-
ans first appeared in Europe. It fused together the
contending Latin and Germanic races into one mental
whole. It penetrated the tribe, the family, and the
individual mind. It regulated life in nearly all its aspects.
It gave to races, different in their inclinations and aims,
one common characteristic, which, while serving as a
bond of union between them, separated them from the rest
of the world.

Apart from this beneficent civilising work, the
Church aimed at political power over Christendom.
Nothing could be more natural than this. The Church
may have gone too far in this direction, but the tendency
was due to the consciousness of power which resulted from
the greatness of her achievements.

Supreme over men's consciences, she felt she could
be mistress of the world, and the temptation to endeavour
to become so was too strong for her. It had important
consequences for Europe that the clergy not only aimed
at power in each country separately, but embraced the
whole of Christendom in one grand conception, desiring to

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

make of it one great theocratic empire. In the Church
the Episcopal power became more and more evident, and
the whole of this power was concentrated in the hands
of the Pope. The Church being everywhere the most
influential factor, as soon as its power was concentrated
in one person, that person naturally became the first
potentate in Europe.

But the Pope aimed higher still, for the memory of
the Roman Empire gave rise to dreams of one great
world-empire in his ambitious mind. The City of the
Caesars, with its world-conquering spirit, its grand
memories and traditions, drove out Christian humility,
and the Church, in opposition to its true aim, dreamed
more and more of political supremacy. It was partly
actual power, and partly the gigantic ambitions of the
Roman world that developed the well-known pretensions
of the Papacy.

In the meantime, the Roman Empire struggled
towards the same ends. The Christian world needed
protection from the Mohammedans and Pagans. The
Pope himself was compelled to seek for aid against
the Lombards. The Byzantine Empire was not strong
enough for the task. It had no influence with the
Western Latin-German world. A power was needed
which had arisen from the elements of the new world, and
which could defend the Church and the social order by
force of arms. This task could be fulfilled by no other
^ dynasty than the Carolingian, the dynasty which proved
itself the strongest among the new powers, and which
repulsed the assault of the Mohammedans.

On the other hand, the powerful Prankish king
needed the divine sanction which could be conferred by
the Pope alone, and by means of which a ruler was
easily raised above all others. Hence was formed the
alliance between the Pope and the Carolingians.

Charlemagne conquered nearly the whole of the
Western Christian world. He was crowned Emperor by
the Pope, and hence the Carolingians, as the political

8

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

heads of Christendom, became supreme not only over all
the States within their Empire, but also over those out-
side it. The conception of the Roman Empire suggested
world-wide aims to the Emperor as well as to the Pope.
Rome, even after her fall, exercised an enormous influence
upon the whole of the known world. Up to the time of
Napoleon, imperial conceptions were derived from Rome.
In the boldest ambitions of Europe we recognise the
spirit of the Caesars. Their grand political achievement
repeatedly lured the greatest powers to attempt at imita-
tion. Its memory had an irresistible influence, specially
upon the masters of Rome.

The influence of Pope and Emperor in the direction
of union was just as necessary as those centrifugal forces
which made for independence. A healthy development
was only to be hoped for from a balance of these two
conflicting tendencies, but, naturally, this balance could
only be arrived at gradually, and as a result of great
struggles. The conflicting principles which have been
at work in shaping the history of nations have never
sought to achieve merely such a measure of success as
would be salutary. Each has aimed at absolute victory,
and has tried to realise completely the ultimate conse-
quences which must follow from it. This struggle of
extremes has resulted in compromise. No success can
be expected without such exaggerations, because it is
these which awaken that fanatical devotion to a cause
which calls forth effort. This inclination to exaggeration,
however, often hinders progress, and gives rise to
reaction. There is no principle, which, applied by itself,
would not prove fatal in its logical consequences.

That age of turmoil which we call the Middle Ages
was threatened by the exaggeration of contending parties.
Two parties fought for supremacy, both of them
indispensable, and yet the victory of either would have
endangered the welfare of Europe.

Hungary's fate was profoundly affected by that great
historical struggle. The danger which threatened her

9

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

arose from the fact that in the German-Latin world the
centripetal forces got the upper hand, and began to limit
the independence of the constituent peoples. The two
supreme rulers of the Christian world, closely bound
together, began to mould Europe into something
resembling the old Roman Empire, and this threatened
to swallow up Hungary. The purpose of the combined
effort was to establish the supremacy of one religion, one
Pope, and one Empire, over the whole of Europe.

The power wielded by those two dominant potentates,
/ Pope and Emperor, was incalculable. The greatest moral
power that had ever existed in Europe, in alliance with
the greatest military power, threatened the development
of the free States. It was difficult to withstand their
attack.

The interdict of the Pope diminished self-confidence
and paralysed self-defence, while the great material power
of the Emperor could easily finish the work so begun.
The slightest check was regarded by the Christian
soldiers as God's judgment, and this completely terror-
ised men's minds, and broke down all resistance. The
conqueror's success was sanctified by the Pope's bless-
ing. Men hardly dared to maintain that stubborn and
prolonged resistance without which the weak cannot
succeed against the strong, when they knew they were
drawing on themselves eternal punishment by resistance,
while repentance and surrender assured for them the for-
giveness of their sins. The Middle Ages furnish numer-
ous examples showing that these intellectual factors have
often given even to a weaker force victory over forces
materially much stronger. How much more could they
achieve when backed by the most redoubtable military
power of the age.

When the Hungarians entered Europe, Charle-
magne's great Empire had already been divided, but
Germany had risen again to power. The political situa-
tion, and the ideas of the Carolingians were inherited by
kings of Saxon origin.

10

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

It was a bad omen for the Hungarians that the rise
of this powerful dynasty was due to the necessity for
vigorous defence against the Hungarians. The new
Empire was not so powerful as that of Charlemagne, yet "^
it had considerable authority. It was the first power
in Europe, and it was more dangerous to the Hungarians
than the former Empire, because it was nearer to their
frontiers. Through this geographical situation it could
have annihilated the Hungarians, even if it could not
have realised its plan of a world-empire, and could only
have achieved so much as the subjugation of its neigh-
bours. In the time of the Ottos the power of the Emperors i^
was greater than that of the Popes, and the former
protected the latter. In the election of Popes, their word
was decisive. It is true that Pope Sylvester II. gave the
Crown of Hungary to St. Stephen, but only with the
Emperor's consent. He could not have acted otherwise,
for he owed his dignity to Otto III., and was the
Emperor's creature.

From this mutual understanding the two world-
rulers, but especially the Emperor, gained great power.
It was at this time that Bohemia and Poland were obliged
to recognise his supremacy. Could the Hungarians avoid ^
this fate ?

It seemed impossible. While Stephen, the wise
king, lived, the danger was not so imminent, but in the
years following his death it grew threatening, and gave
rise to a crisis which destroyed for some time the inde-
pendence of the Crown, and might easily have annihilated
it for ever.

The alliance of Pope and Emperor was certain to •
bring a conflict wath Hungary, their next neighbour.
Chance, indeed, played a decisive part in determining
when the conflict should come. Its phases were deter-
mined by individuals, and by unforeseen circumstances,
but the conflicting conceptions and tendencies were bound
to precipitate a struggle sooner or later. St. Stephen's
conception of an independent Hungarian State, and the

11

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Emperor*s determination to wield supreme power could
not be reconciled. The struggle began when the
Emperor first had an opportunity of interfering in
Hungarian affairs. When the Hungarians expelled

I King Peter, and he appealed to the Germans for pro-
tection, the conflict was inevitable. Henry III. did not
miss the opportunity of extending his sway to Hungary.
Had he acted differently he would have been unfaithful to
the ideas inherited from Charlemagne and Otto the Great.
He acted in accordance with his position, and with the
traditions which pointed out the German Emperor as the
head of the Christian world when he employed armed
force to decide the fate of the neighbouring kingdom.
He acted on the lines of his inherited policy also, by
taking the part of Peter, an Italian, who seemed to be a
more trustworthy support of western civilisation and
western religion than Aba, a descendant of Arpad, and a
thorough Hungarian. It was also natural that the Pope
should support the Emperor in the action he took. The
Pope's general policy was to side with the Emperor, and
apart from this, their aims were the same in this instance.
German supremacy over the Hungarians, whose Christi-
anity was as yet somewhat uncertain, was a matter of
common interest to them. German weapons and Papal
curse weighed heavily upon the Hungarians. German
warriors saw the hand of God in the great thunderstorm
which arose suddenly during the battle of M6nf6, and
discomfited their excommunicated foes, and from this
simple natural phenomenon the Germans gained new
strength for the continuation of the conflict. It is doubt-
ful whether the attitude of the Church had not to some
extent weakened the union of the Hungarians. Though,
perhaps, not many, yet some certainly, feared the wrath
of the Holy Father.
. Yet the final result of the contest was, after all, victory

I for the cause of Hungarian independence. The struggle
' was carried on between varying combinations, and under
changing leadership, until Germany gave up her plan,

12

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

abandoned Salamon, whom she had patronised, and never
again interfered with Hungary's independence.

What accounts for this fortunate result? What
enabled young Hungary to brave the greatest European
powers ? The danger had been very great. The nation
lived through a critical time. The battle of M^nfo, in
consequence of which Henry HI. became feudal lord of
Hungary, and the Hungarian Crown lost its indepen-
dence, might have proved a mournful day in Hungary's
history, like the days which saw the battles at Mohi plain
and at Mohdcs. But the great difference between these
two battles and Menf6, is that at Menfo the enemy was
not less but more civilised.

The victory of the Germans was likely to be fruitful in
good from the point of view of civilisation, but the
country's independence was the more endangered. Their
higher culture might have made the relation of Hungary
to Germany more constant, and might have made the
country resigned to that relation, which was impossible
in the case of Tartar or Turkish rule. But it was also to
be feared that reaction against the aggressive action of the
foreigners might endanger the recently accepted Christi-
anity, for it was natural that the people should connect
the new religion with foreign rule. The instinct of inde-
pendence favoured those who were yearning for the old
regime. Those who fought against the West and the
leaders of Christendom, had to reckon with this tendency,
and to look for support to the spirit of Paganism, if they
wished to conquer. And this is what actually happened.
Paganism revived in all its strength when the nation ^
revolted a second time against Peter, resolved to get rid
of a king imposed on it by the German Emperor and
the Pope.

If this tendency had gained the upper hand, St.
Stephen's whole work would have been undone, and the
nation's progress, and its very existence, would have come
to an end.

A future was only possible for Hungary as a constitu-

13

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ent part of Christendom, but St. Stephen had intended it
to be an independent factor. At that time it seemed as if
this policy was an impracticable one, and that the Hun-
garians must either fall beneath German supremacy, or
become Pagan again. The leading Hungarians recog-
nised the danger of Paganism, and they clung to
Christianity, not so much from devotion to it as from
motives of policy. They tolerated the ancient religion
while it was in the ascendant, but as soon as they became
masters of the situation, they restored the new religion.
They did not yield to the spirit of reaction, but clung
tenaciously to the policy of their great predecessor.

It was due to a number of circumstances, great and
small, that the Hungarians were able to resist the
Germans. It is so with every important result. This is
usually attributed to some great man, and great men
undoubtedly exercise a decisive influence over their age,
but there are in addition the general circumstances which
are conditions of even the strongest individual's success,
and which determine the direction of events. It is chiefly
these circumstances which here demand attention. Of
the events taken singly, and the part played by indi-
viduals, it is only necessary to say that the most decisive
event was the death of the gifted German Emperor,
Henry III., just when he had found in his son-in-law,
Salamon, a candidate with claims upon the Hungarian
Crown, who was inclined to subject Hungary to the feudal
supremacy of Germany. After Henry's death Henry IV.
mounted the throne in his childhood, and the importance
of this event was augmented by the circumstance that at
the same time the national cause in Hungary had gained
two popular champions in Geza and Ladislas, who were
called to the task of saving St. Stephen's work.

It was the great talent of Henry III. which had
turned the scale against the Hungarians during his life-
time, and this double change made the situation favour-
able to Hungarian independence.

Among the conditions which made self-defence and

14

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

ultimate victory possible for the Hungarians were their
warlike qualities, and the tactics they pursued of tiring
the enemy, starving them, luring them into the inner-
most parts of the country, and without ever coming to a
great decisive battle, yet proving to the Germans by
means of many small engagements that it was a difficult
enterprise to conquer Hungary. It was also favourable to
a strong resistance that Christianity had affected only a
part of the nation, and not the whole of it, so that the
Pope's word had no weight with most of the people. All
these circumstances, however, cannot by themselves
account for Hungary's final success. They enable us to
understand that the struggle must have been a long and
arduous one, and that it was not easy to bend the Hun-
garians beneath a foreign yoke, yet they were not
invincible. Peter and Salamon, with all the influence of
their royal dignity, were on the side of the Germans.
King Andrew himself, who had been raised to the throne
by the national party, was ready to recognise Henry's
supremacy in order to assure the throne to his son,
Salamon. Hungary passed critical days. Father and
son, brother and brother, contended with one another.
Christianity and Paganism, the central authority of the
State and the independence of the people, the constitution
and royal rights, private fortunes and the public purse,
all were struggling for supremacy.

Then, too, the German Empire was more powerful
than Hungary. It was greater in size, in population, in
wealth, and in culture. The valour of her warriors was
not less than that of the Hungarians. During the reign
of Henry III. all this power was at the disposal of the
Emperor.

As a matter of fact, it was not entirely the arms of
the Hungarians which decided the issue of the contest.

Throughout the war the Germans were always the
aggressors; the Hungarians never invaded German terri-
tory, and though they often repulsed the German armies
with heavy loss, yet their victories were not so

15

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

crushing as to frighten that proud nation, and compel
them to abandon their warlilie projects, and give their
policy a new direction.

The long struggle was not terminated by any one
decisive event, but gradually died out. After an
abortive invasion, Henry IV. abandoned his pretensions
to the country of his brother-in-law, Salamon, because
his attention and strength were claimed by new and
entirely different problems. The alliance upon which
his father's power had depended was dissolved, and the
great struggle began between Pope and Emperor, lasting
concord between whom must have proved fatal to
Hungary.

History had reached one of its great crises. The
split had to come sooner or later, but it was Hungary's
good fortune that it tarried no longer but came just
when the Emperor was at war with the Hungarians. If
it had not happened then, and if Hungary's struggle
with the West had lasted much longer, her whole history
might have been different. St. Ladislas and Kalman,
who brought to a conclusion the work of consolidation,
and extended their power towards the East and the South,
would have had to spend all their strength in defence.

That Pope and Emperor should come into conflict
with one another was inevitable. The two powers could
only remain in unison if one of them succeeded in sub-
ordinating the other. This subjection was only likely to
last if either the Empire assured for itself the right of
electing the Pope, or the Pope acquired the right to
dispose of the Imperial Crown. Till then, the concord
of the two had been due to the circumstance that the
election of the Popes was controlled by the Emperors.
Henry III. during the years when he was striving for
dominion over Hungary, acquired the right of speaking
the decisive word in the Papal elections. Had this rule
remained valid, vast prospects would have opened out
before the Emperor, but the whole tendency of the times
was against such a state of affairs. The progress of

16

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

Europe demanded the independent development of its
parts.

The formation of one vast central power, which
would have united the spiritual influence of the Pope over
the whole of Christendom, with the material power of
Germany and Italy, could never have been the final phase
of development. The safety of all the other Powers in
Europe would have been in danger. Moreover, the
German Empire had within it the germs of its own decay.
It had become an anachronism. It was based upon a
conception which was the natural product of a bygone age,
but was not in accord with the spirit of the eleventh
century. The idea of one Emperor, one Pope, and
one religion, was derived from the times when the fate of
Christendom depended upon the fate of one Empire, and
this was ruled by one monarch, the Roman Emperor.
When this idea was revived in the days of Charlemagne,
the state of the world somewhat resembled the ancient
conditions, and the restoration of the ancient Roman
Empire seemed practicable. But when, during the
following centuries, there was a strong and steady
development in the direction of the formation of several
independent groups within the Christian community, and
against the creation of one great empire, and when the
independence of France, England, and Hungary had
been established, the foundation on which the proud
conception of one great world-empire had been based^
entirely vanished. The claim of the Pope that he was
God's representative on earth, and that by divine
authority he regulated earthly affairs in accordance with
heavenly principles, was inconsistent with his depend-
ence on some earthly monarch. As soon as this earthly
power was not the only one, the position of the Papacy
became more endurable. If the Pope remained subject to
the Emperor, he might indeed be an Italo-German
patriarch, but by no means the head of all Christendom.
The Church could only be supreme over independent
States if she herself were independent. A great conflict

17

^

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

was, therefore, impending, and it only needed the man
who, having a sufficiently exalted conception of his divine
authority, should dare to employ to the full the vast power
at his disposal.

Such a man was Gregory VII. His fanatical

enthusiasm for the divine right of the Papacy, and his
keen political insight, were fully equal to the situation.
The combat which ensued was not fought with spiritual
weapons only.

Fanning the newly-risen desire for independence in
Italy, and in alliance with the malcontents in Germany,
the Pope was able to bring material weapons into the
war as well, and through this the German arms were
diverted from Hungary. The battle of Mogyor6d, which
put an end to the reign of the Germans' ally, Salamon,
was fought in 1074. Gregory had become Pope in 1073,
and he excommunicated Henry IV. in 1076. Thus, the
great struggle began just at the moment when a new
effort was called for on the part of the Emperor to re-
establish his supremacy over Hungary. This effort could
not be made because of the conflict with the Pope, and
so the war with Hungary ended.

Had the efforts of the Papacy been entirely success-
ful the old quarrel would have arisen in a new form.

The ambition of the Pope was not satisfied by his
own emancipation. He desired to emancipate the whole
Church from the worldly power, and place it entirely
under his own control. The great influence thus gained
would enable him to gain political as well as ecclesiastical
supremacy.

Since the election of the Pope had become the right
of the College of Cardinals, the Papacy had become
independent, and the patronage of the Emperor had
ceased. It was now desired to secure the emancipation
of the whole of the clergy from the secular power by
means of celibacy, and by depriving monarchs of the
right of investiture of bishops.

18

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

In this way the Church was to be made independent -
of kings, and free from worldly duties, and as the chief
judge of good and evil, as the master of human thought
and action, as the supreme authority to command and to
forbid, was to rise high above kings and emperors, and
become the ruler of States and peoples. Above her was
no judge, save God alone, while she stood above all and
judged all. She had the right to dispense people from
their vows and their loyalty, she could dethrone monarchs
and dispose of crowns and territories. The Emperor must
be her chief servant, who lent his arms and fought to
subdue her foes. To the immense spiritual influence of
the Church the Emperor added material force. This
omnipotence was made possible by the fanatically religious
temper of the age, and several times it seemed as if the
Popes would attain their aim. The sons of Henry IV.
abandoned their excommunicated father one by one, and
Henry V. did homage to the Pope in order to assure his
inheritance. Frederick II. was raised to the throne by
Innocent III., the worthy successor of Gregory VII. For-
tunately, however, for the Hungarians, and it might be
added, fortunately for the whole of humanity, these were
but transitory phenomena. Henry V. himself, and ^
Frederick II., became bitter enemies of the Papacy. At ?
the cost of vast struggles, the Empire maintained its inde- ;
pendence. It did not become a satellite of the Papacy,
but pursued its own course and helped to maintain the
world's equilibrium. This was the case at least until the
death of Frederick II. in 1250. Throughout that long
struggle, lasting nearly two centuries, neither Pope nor
Emperor succeeded in subduing the other, and to this fact
was due the balance of power in Europe. Even in union.
Pope and Emperor had not been able to dominate entirely
over the other constituents of Europe, and directly they
came into conflict with one another, the centripetal forces
ceased to be sources of danger in general and to the Hun-
garians in particular. So long as the two parties were at
strife, Hungary passed a time of comparative security.

19

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The wise policy of the kings of Arpad's line largely con-
tributed to this result. They were careful never to take
any part in the wars of their western neighbours, but
remained neutral. Their sympathies inclined towards the
Pope, as was natural in view of their past history and their
interests, but they never became the Pope's tools. They
never pursued such aims as were out of proportion to the
nation's strength, and would bring them into conflict with
the western nations, but followed a real national policy.
King Ladislas and King Kdlman , freed from the danger
of absorption on the west and holding themselves aloof
from western affairs, were able to devote their strength
to the task of consolidation. They and their successors
extended the borders of Hungary southward and eastward,
and this remained the policy of succeeding Arpad Kings,
and it was the only wise policy. It was fortunate that
Hungary was then at peace with the west, for there arose
new dangers which, had they occurred simultaneously
with danger from the west, might have proved fatal.

The expansion of Hungary in the direction of the
Balkan Peninsula brought the country into conflict with
the ruler of Constantinople. When Hungary's king
happened to be a minor, or when the country was weakened
by some internal conflict, the Greek Emperor Manuel made
a skilful use of the situation and gained so much import-
ance that he claimed the part formerly played by Henry
III. Had Frederick Barbarossa turned his arms against
Hungary as he desired to do, for the old designs lived on
in the hearts of the German Emperors, Hungary could
hardly have maintained her independence. At that time
Frederick was on fairly good terms with the Pope, and
it is characteristic that at such a moment his thoughts
should turn towards Hungary. His position, however,
was not sufficiently assured to allow of his carrying out
his plans. The old strife with the Pope was rekindled,
and Hungary was left alone with her southern adversary.

The Byzantine Empire was never strong enough to
conquer Hungary. Under the eminent Emperor Manuel

20

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

Byzantium was indeed a danger to Hungary, especially
when that country was ruled by weak monarchs,
but it never succeeded in establishing any permanent
supremacy. Its efforts had not been prepared for by
that effective influence upon Hungarian institutions
which lent strength to German efforts. For Hungary ^
whose civilisation was based on German institutions
and German conceptions, the German Emperor was
a much more dangerous enemy than an Eastern ruler.
All the missionaries, knights and settlers from the
west were natural supporters of the Emperor's claims,
while the Greek ruler had no confederates in Hun-
gary. Hence, the powerful arm of Bela III. easily
delivered Hungary from that danger, and moreover, after
the death of Manuel, the tottering Byzantine Empire dis-
appeared from the ranks of formidable powers. Hungarian
independence, resulting from the proportions in which the
various European powers stood to one another, gained a
fresh impetus, and even weak kings and internal dissen-
sions were not able to destroy it.

Then occurred that disastrous event which destroyed
at one blow the achievements of centuries — the invasion
of the Tartars in the year 1241. It was due to Hungary's
geographical situation that this disaster overtook her.
Living on the boundary of the civilised world, the nation
has always been exposed to barbaric invasions. The
terrible defeat which Hungary suffered was partly due to
the imperfect tactics of king and leaders, and to the panic
caused everywhere by the inhuman conduct of the Tartar
hordes, and partly to the great military skill of the Tartar
Khan and the vast numbers and excellent quality of his
army. To this it must be added that the chief pillars of /
Christianity, the Pope and the Emperor, being at war
with one another, could send no troops into Hungary.
This circumstance, which at other times was favourable
to Hungary, on this occasion proved fatal. It was due to
an internal crisis in the Tartar world that their invasion of
Hungary passed away like a summer thunderstorm.

21

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

After two years of devastation and massacre the
Tartars returned to their own land. Even if events at
home had not recalled them it is hardly likely that they
could have remained long in Hungary, for that country
was too far from their own realm and too near the centre
of the European world, and sooner or later Christian
weapons must have broken their strength. Moreover,
Hungary was too much civilised and consolidated to allow
a primitive people like the Tartars to rule over it perman-
ently. The Tartar peril proved a kind of test of Hungary*s
achievement. Defeat may have laid her low for a time,
but it was not able to destroy the State and disintegrate
the nation. The nation had grown strong enough to bear
so great a blow and survive it. When the invasion was
over, Hungary had cause to congratulate herself on the
fact that the long strife between Pope and Emperor was
still going on. The Emperor, Frederick II., would have
liked to profit by Hungary's troubles. He demanded an
oath of loyalty from the Hungarian King Bela IV., who
had lost his country and fled. If the Pope, who inter-
fered, had not dispensed B^la from his vow, and if the
Emperor had not had his hands full in Italy, Hungary
would have had a difficult time again. As it was, how-
ever, the country soon regained its position in Europe and
survived its misfortunes without having lost its indepen-
dence.

Not for long, however, was Hungary to enjoy peace.
Scarcely was the danger from the Tartars at an end when
a new danger arose.

Bela IV. was still alive when, on the death of
Frederick, the Pope gained a complete victory over his
adversary, the King of Rome, and the balance of power
in Europe was thus destroyed. If the rivalry of the two
powers had hitherto been Hungary's security, this new
situation seemed fraught with danger. The Papacy sought
worldly power as much as the Emperor did, and towards
Hungary in particular the Pope felt he had a right to con-
sider himself as a feudal lord, because it was from the Pope

22

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

that St. Stephen had received his crown. He regarded
Hungary as the fief of St. Peter, just as much as England
and Naples. This theory was originated by Gregory VH.,
and it was now to be seen whether his successor, who had
brought to a victorious issue the war begun by his great
predecessor, would not put the theory into practice and
bend Hungary to the service of foreign interests.

The attempt was made, but failed utterly, partly ow-
ing to the circumstances of the time, but partly because the
passionate desire for independence which had strengthened
the hands of the Hungarians in their warfare with the
Emperor, now fortified them against the spiritual weapons
of the Pope.

The circumstance which led to the Pope's interfer-
ence was the death of King Ladislas IV. without leaving
an heir to the throne.

The Pope refused to recognise the succession of
Andrew III., and declared that to confer the crown was
his right as feudal lord of Hungary and successor of him
who had given St. Stephen his crown, and that he should
dispose of the country in accordance with his own interests.
The Angevins had been introduced into Naples by Pope
Clement IV. in order to expel the Hohenstaufen dynasty
from South Italy. If the Pope could act similarly in
Hungary it would help him greatly in the execution of
his plans. He had no serious trouble to occupy his hands
In other quarters; the Imperial crown was under his con-
trol ; so he appeared to be acting in accordance with tradi-
tion and with his own interests in seeking to bind Hungary
closely to himself. And there was much in the situation
in Hungary which promised him success. For many
years there had been much intercourse between Hungary
and Rome, and the Pope continually exercised a kind of
guardianship over Hungary which was accorded to him
by the public opinion of the age.

The dissolute life of Ladislas IV., the part which he
allowed the half-pagan Cumanians to play, the scandalous
state of taxation, the injuries inflicted upon the clergy by

23

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

some of the powerful aristocrats, the entangled situation
with regard to the filling of high ecclesiastical posts, and
the many lawless doings which characterised that period,
all gave an opportunity to the Pope to intervene, to give
his orders and send his admonitions, partly by means of
letters and partly by legates. The Papal Government, in
fact, became the highest tribunal in Hungary. It became
the custom to give power to the Church to vindicate laws
by excommunicating those who infringed them. These
excommunications became so frequent, and such a custom-
ary means of executing justice, that the priests complained
that they were not able to comply with all the requests to
inflict them, and often they did not know the nature of the
offence committed.

The political situation in the country also served the
Pope's interests. It was at that time that the nobles began
their destructive work. Internal strife was their natural
element, and the appearance of a rival claimant to the
throne was a promising circumstance for them. They
liked to fish in troubled waters, so they were by no means
displeased that Andrew had an opponent. There were
also some political interests which made for obedience to
the Pope. The Tartars were still to be dreaded, and on
the southern frontier there were some half-pagan, or at
least heretic, races to be reckoned with. All this helped to
make the Pope's support valuable. In spite of this, how-
ever, so long as the line of Arpad lasted the danger was
avoided. The bulk of the nation kept loyally to their
elected king, Andrew III., and it is a proof of the strength
of their loyalty that the prestige of the Arpads eclipsed
even that of St. Peter's chair. National sentiment and
attachment to the dynasty were so powerful that not even
the clergy could withstand their influence.

It is difficult to estimate the intensity of the nation's

religious feeling, and its effect upon men's actions, but it

• is probable that although the people attached very great

j importance to the Pope's utterances, yet they never yielded

fhim unconditional obedience. The Hungarians have

24

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

never been so fanatical as the French or the Spaniards.
They are not much given to abstract thinking, but concern
themselves more with the manifold practical demands of
life. They have shaped their conduct more with a view
to the circumstances of this present life than to the teach-
ings of the Church concerning the future life. At
least, that is what the events of the thirteenth cen-
tury appear to show\ Hungary was, on the whole,
on the side of the Pope, but not always, and
never when political interests demanded some other
policy. St. Ladislas became an ally of Henry

IV. in his opposition to the Church. Even those kings /
who sided with Rome would not make any sacrifice for
her or do anything more than their interests allowed. The
Hungarians played a comparatively small part in the Cru-
sades, and they managed to remain at peace even with the
pagan Cumanians. They never developed that zeal in
the persecution of heretics which the Pope expected of
them. In spite of the most urgent requests to the contrary,
they tolerated the Jews in the country and did them no
harm. They were on terms of much greater amity with
the Greek Church than any other European nation was.

But in other respects the Church exercised a great
influence over the people. It compelled the Crown to
yield up some of its prerogatives in favour of the Church.
There never occurred in Hungary that embittered strife
between the sacred and the secular power which broke out
in nearly every other European State. The nation saw to
it that the Church should have its own prerogatives and
possessions, though it cannot be said that these were
always respected.

So long as the Pope's claim was opposed by the
prestige of the Arpads, his efforts were futile; but on the
death of Andrew the situation changed and became more
favourable to his plans. When there was no longer a
lawful heir to the crown many of the people were willing
to accept the A ngevin Robert Charles, who was the Pope's
candidate, and was backed by all the clergy. The opposite

25

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

party, who weie aware of the danger to the Crown's inde-
pendence, were greatly weakened by the lack of a suitable
candidate, for Wenceslas and Otto had not proved satis-
factory monarchs. All this was favourable to the Pope,
yet after all he abandoned his claim to dispose of Hun-
gary's crown. He was content that the nation, anxious
,to put an end to the strife, should elect the Pope's candi-
date without recognising the Pope's right to nomi-
nate him, and he fell in with the country's decision
to pronounce the Pope's declaration invalid and his candi-
date's coronation null and void. Robert Charles became
king, but not as a vassal of the Pope, who abandoned his
purpose of creating a second Naples in Hungary. What
led him to adopt this attitude ? History records a dramatic
scene at the Parliament held at R^kos, and tells us how
skilfully Cardinal Gentili, the Papal legate, turned his
speech when he saw how indignant the Hungarians were
at his declaration that they could only obtain a king from
the Pope. Alarmed at their anger, the Cardinal altered
his words so as to mean that a king lawfully elected in
Hungary should be confirmed in his dignity by the Pope.
But this skilful adaptation was not brought about solely
by the behaviour of the Hungarians; the general situation
in Europe had a great deal to do with it.

During the period from the year 1290, when the Pope
desired to give St. vStephen's crown to the Angevins, to
1306, when Gentili had to rest satisfied with the accom-
plishment of his practical aim, the Pope's situation in
Europe had greatly changed. It is true that he had
vanquished the Emperor, but his victory did not yield him
the fruit he had expected. In order to realise his ideal of
a world-empire he needed the help of a power strong
enough and obedient enough to enable him to crush all
opposition. Sometimes he was able to enlist the aid of
various powers, and sometimes the Christian community
took up arms in a cause indicated by the Pope. Thou-
sands, in fact such hosts as Europe never saw since the
time of the migration of peoples until the epoch of general

26

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

conscription, accepted the symbol of the Cross, but the
Pope was rarely able to make use of this power for his
own political aims. If some knights, specially devoted
to the Pope, were ready to draw the sword at his every
command, still the nations and their monarchs were only
prepared to carry his excommunications into effect when
it served their own political interests. This was fortunate
for Europe, and saved it from a one-sided theocracy. The
spirit of scepticism was still weak, and religion reigned
supreme over men's intellects. The priests were revered as
sages, and the only knowledge highly esteemed was that
drawn from the Bible. Men tried to explain the universe
and all the phenomena of nature by means of this one
book. At such a time clerical influence could only be
counterbalanced by egotism, which led men to struggle
for worldly advantages, and heedless of what the spirit of
the age demanded of them or of the conditions of eternal
bliss, go their own way without hesitation, or by that
idealism which inflamed the hearts of all who wished to
guard their country's interests and the welfare of those
entrusted to their care, and which steeled them even
against spiritual powers. Such men could not endure the
thought that the purest feelings of their heart were con-
trary to right and that the law which outraged their con-
sciences was of divine origin — that it was their duty
towards God to do what the most sacred interests of their
nation forbade. Only those powerful motives were able
to limit the power of the Church. All that was in later
times achieved by scepticism, agnosticism and enlighten-
ment, was accomplished as far as might be by the political
spirit. This was so powerful that the Pope had to reckon
with it, and to try to enlist a reliable ally strong enough
to break down all resistance. In his war against the
Emperor he had been able to group around himself great
forces, otherwise his spiritual powers would not have saved
him. The question now was whether he could enlist suffi-
cient military power to enable him to carry out his plan
of a world-empire. The Empire was apparently lying at

27

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

his feet; could he bend this power to his own uses and
thus realise the old ideal — the two swords given by God
in one hand, that of St. Peter's successor? But the trend
of events was not in that direction. It was a political com-
bination which had conquered the Hohenstaufen dynasty.
The victory had not been that of the Church over the
world, and the triumphant combination was not favour-
able to the Pope's bold schemes. The Pope could not
reckon on these allies in any attempt to extend his power.
As soon as he endeavoured to assert his supremacy the
community of interest which had formerly bound them
to him, would have vanished. The Pope could only hope
to succeed if he could obtain control over the troops of
the vanquished Empire, but it might be called the irony
of fate if it had not been the inevitable consequence of the
nature of the whole struggle, that the sword of the worldly
power was broken just as it came into the Pope's hand.

While the worldly power was strong it could not
become the tool of ecclesiastical policy. To become sub-
servient it must be broken, and then it was useless. The
kings who were raised to the throne by the Pope after
the fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty were ready to obey
him, but were unable to help him to victory. It was soon
recognised both by the Pope and by public opinion in
Germany, that the Empire had become too weak. To
strengthen it, Rudolf of Habsburg was raised to the
throne. None of the parties concerned desired to revive
in him the formerly powerful Emperor, they merely wished
to allow him power enough to be a useful ally, without
being able to pursue any independent aims or to oppress
them. But it is always difficult to limit the development
of a living force once set in motion. As soon as it is
generated it follows laws of its own without heeding the
aims of those who called it into being. The Pope soon
discovered this in the course of his relations with the
Habsburgs.

They desired to be on friendly terms with the Papacy ;

28

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

did not endeavour to oppress it, and even abandoned some
of their old rights, but they did not identify themselves
with the Pope's world-wide policy. They had but one aim,
the increase of the power of their family, and the assur-
ance of its continuance. The demands of local German
affairs and family interests became their leading motives,
and these forbade their becoming retainers of the Pope.
These circumstances could not but exercise some
influence upon the Hungarian situation also. Rudolf did
not forward the Pope's plans in Hungary, but on the
contrary tried to gain the throne for himself. In 1304,
the Pope asked Rudolf's son, Albert, to draw the sword
on his behalf, but the request was not complied with.
This in itself weakened the Pope, but at the same time
he met with still greater failure in France. After the
fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty he had made his power
more felt by those States towards which he had displayed
greater mildness during the struggle. The Vatican never
measured with the same measure. It based its claims
upon eternally valid principles, yet in practice it was
opportunist. When fighting against the Emperor, the
Pope was mild towards France and Hungary, but as soon
as his hands were free he became stern. The French
monarchy had grown more powerful in consequence of
the Pope's support. In alliance with the middle classes
and the Papacy, it had subdued the great feudal lords,
and had restored, temporarily at least, the unity of the
country. National self-consciousness had developed, and
it found expression in the kingship. It is true that this
early glory was transitory, but this happy period of
French development coincided with the revival, of Papal
supremacy, and this proved fatal to Boniface VIII. The
two conceptions — Nationalism and Roman supremacy—-
have never, and in no place, harmonised with one another.
They were bound to clash in France, as formerly imperial
ambitions had clashed with clerical aspirations. But
while the Pope had found a natural support against
imperial tendencies in Italy and centrifugal German

29

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

elements, and in the neighbouring States which feared
the Emperor, in this new strife he stood alone.

The privileged classes of France stood up for Philip
IV. National feeling and the supremacy of non-clerical
elements became so pronounced as to bring even the
French Church into line against Papal pretensions.

Surrounding States had no fear of this new move-
ment.

The French king did not threaten the whole
Christian world; it was only the Pope who could prove
dangerous to the European equilibrium. Thus it was
natural, but at the same time fatal to the Pope, that his
cause was not espoused either by the German monarch
or by any other ruler, and that in the vehemence of the
contest his former friends were torn from his side. It
became evident that without the support of a first-rate
power. Papal dominion over Europe was impossible, and
also that no such support was to be reckoned upon. The
ultimate reason of all these failures was really the changed
spirit of the times. Religion was still a powerful influence,
though not so powerful as at the commencement of the
Crusades, or at the time of the institution of the monastic
and knightly orders.

The Church was too late with its victory. It was the
everlasting merit of the German Emperors that they
defended the rights of mankind during the period in
which the Church wielded the most absolute sway over
men's minds.

Boniface VIII. was urged by his apparent triumph
to the pretensions of Gregory VII. and Innocent
III. But times had changed. The self-consciousness
of the nations had grown strong. The Pope was able
to break the imperial power just because of its excessive
claims, but he was not able to replace it by his own
power. Everyone supported the Pope against the
arrogance of the Empire, but when he himself adopted
the same policy he was abandoned by all, and met with
resistance everywhere. The same instinct which assured

30

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

to him strength against the Emperor opposed him when
he tried to found a world-empire.

The fourteenth century had done with every form of ^
imperialism, and it was impossible to place the States
under one common ruler. This lesson the Pope had to
learn during his operations in Hungary. In 1296 Boni-
face commenced war with France. In 1303 he died,
humiliated and broken in power. When Robert Charles
was crowned in Hungary, the successor of Boniface
endured further humiliations. The Pope had strained
the cord too much, and it snapped when in Hungary he
stood opposed to the same forces which had conquered
him in France, and had shattered his hopes of a world-
kingdom. He grew careful, and was glad of a partial
success.

In Hungary's struggle with the Pope there are
many features of resemblance to her struggle with
the Germans two hundred years before. In both
cases she stood opposed to a tendency which
threatened the equilibrium of Europe, and in both
cases the final result was due to a change in
the situation of the hostile power. It is worthy of remark
that if in the eleventh century Hungary had become sub- «
ject to Germany, and if the eastern part of Europe had re-
cognised the supremacy of the Emperor, his influence in
Rome would have been very different. But neither

Henry III. nor Henry IV. succeeded in consolidating his
power in Hungary, and this was one of the reasons why
Europe developed on lines different from those of the old
Roman Empire, and the Emperor's pretensions became
so entirely obsolete as to encourage in the minds of the
clergy the thought of opposing them. In the tenth
century the Saxon dynasty conquered the Hungarians /
once, and the glory of this victory to some extent
revived imperial aims.

In the eleventh century, however, when imperial ideas
soared high, their wings were broken by the dynasty's
failure in Hungary. At the end of the thirteenth century,

31

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Hungarian opposition was one of the reasons for the
failure of the Pope's hegemony. If, after the death of
Ladislas IV., Hungary had been submissive to the
Angevins, and had supported the Pope in Italy, as his
vassal, Boniface would not so readily have fallen before
the French arms.

But the great historical struggle in both cases was
not decided entirely in Hungary or by Hungary, but in
Italy, which was the centre of Europe at that time.
The two epochs resembled each other in this respect, too,
that the danger against which the Hungarians fought did
not entirely cease. The pretensions of the Popes and
the Emperors revived again and again. They pursued
the Hungarians for several centuries. After a long
interval they revived in a different form, yet the results
were similar in many respects.

When the Habsburg Emperors, standing at the head
of the Catholic reaction, waged war upon Hungary's pre-
rogatives, the country was threatened by the same great
historical tendency against which it had previously had
to defend itself.

But of this more will be said later. We have now
arrived at the threshold of a new epoch, so it will be well
to sum up what has gone before.

At the outset, the greatest danger threatening
Hungary was due to her being so utterly different in race
and religion from her neighbours, to the small number of
the Hungarians, and to the fact that in civilisation they
were inferior to the nations round about them, who,
aware of their own superiority, looked on the Hungarians
with disdain, and regarded their independence as some-
thing offensive and dangerous. The contrast was so
great that if the Hungarians had remained pagan their
state could not have endured. Conversion to Christi-
anity, however, softened this antagonism so far as to
render their independent existence possible. Their

geographical situation brought them near to the German
races, but not among them, so that unendurable contrasts

32

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

were avoided. But as they were strangers, and weaker
than their neighbours, the decisive question was whether
after having accepted the reHgion and civilisation of those
about them they should fuse with them, or whether it *''
would be possible to achieve a position of independence
in the Christian world, and live among their neighbours
with equal rights. This problem was solved during the
time of the Arpad kings. What had been a danger
became a source of strength. Because the Hungarians
were strangers, others would not mix with them, but for
the same reason they clung the more powerfully to one
another, and instinctively opposed every foreign influence.

Differing so much from others, they fought against J
them with a desperate valour like that of a tiger at bay.
This was the source of that desire for independence which
became so characteristic of them. From this, they gained
strength to fight the German Emperors. This was their
bulwark against the boundless ambitions of the Popes.

It was fortunate that for four centuries there was no /
break in the line of Arpad. This long line of Arpad
rulers was the most important internal condition which
influenced the development of Hungary. It assured to
the nation a purely Hungarian monarch, and only with
such a monarch upon the throne could the people's
passionate desire for independence be realised.

External conditions also favoured the existence of
the nation, for during those centuries the development of
Europe was in the direction of the formation of indepen-
dent States.

Out of the chaos following the downfall of the ancient y
Roman Empire, one great power tried to create a new
world-empire. Fortunately for the Hungarians, the effort
failed, and the various races maintained their indepen- ^
dence. The European order was no longer established on
the basis of one all-embracing empire, but on that of a
number of free and independent States, united only by the

33

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ties of a common religion and common civilisation. This
made it possible that amid the threatening conflicts of
those great powers which endeavoured to weld together
the whole of Europe, Hungary maintained an independent
existence, and was able to establish her own freedom
amid the wars for freedom of others, and as a defence
of others' freedom. Hungary owes her freedom to the
equilibrium of power in Europe, and her independence
became a factor and a support of that equilibrium.

The historical process reached its climax in the time
of the Arpads. When the first monarch of the Arpad
line was crowned. Pope Sylvester II. and Emperor Otto
III. were in alliance, disposing of crowns and dominating
the world. A few years before the Arpad line came to
an end, one of the great powers was lying at the feet
of its former ally. The place of the Emperor was not
even filled up, and the German monarch was merely
styled king.

A little later, the other great power was also humili-
ated, and the two swords which had threatened Europe
lost their edge for a considerable time.

When the Angevins mounted the throne, the balance
of power had been established. The Angevins and their
dominions could enjoy the fruit of the work of former
centuries. Hungary had been accepted as one of the
European States, and her independence was the natural
result of her internal strength. This happy state of
aftairs was largely due to the Arpad kings. Lender their
sway the country had passed its childhood and the critical
years of adolescence. The problem of taking a place
among the States of Europe as an independent factor had
been solved.

The nation became so strong that in time its exist-
ence came to be regarded as necessary in the interest of
Christendom and its civilisation, and of the balance of
power in Europe. In consequence of the wise policy of
her rulers, Hungary's strength did not interfere with the
development of the western powers. On the contrary,

34

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

the formation of a vigorous Christian State extended the
frontiers of the civilised world, and increased the number
of its workers and defenders by a valuable contingent.

In organising the chaotic district of Pannonia
beneath their hegemony, the Hungarians had quieted a
volcano always threatening eruption. In place of a
dangerous chaos they created a thriving State, and made
of it a strong bulwark of Christian civilisation. The
purpose which Charlemagne wished to serve by founding
the Ostmark was fulfilled more successfully by Hungary.
She defended the west against the aggression of the
east. Her weapons guaranteed peace for the work of
progress. It was in Hungary that the Tartars exhausted
their strength, and in later years still greater services were
required of her. However, all this did not prevent her
neighbours from occasionally attacking her. If weakened
by losses in defence of the post assigned to her by fate,
it was always her western neighbours who endeavoured
to profit by her temporary weakness. But, in spite of
this, the fact that Hungary performed a function
necessary for the progress of the west, became a source of
strength to her.

Aggression commenced against Hungary never re-
ceived the support on which it could have reckoned had it
been directed against a harmful or dangerous element. It
found no fuel in the common sentiment of Europe, but
remained an isolated and selfish enterprise. In this fact
and in the common interests of Christendom the nation
found its defence.

The Hungarians proved good ground for the seed of
western culture, and when the last Arpad king died,
the race which had once alarmed the Christian community
by its Asiatic habits had become civilised and wealthy,
and had entered upon the path of peaceful industry.

It was due not only to the wise policy of her kings,
but also to her people, that Hungary was able to take her
place among civilised and progressive states. Her strength

35

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

lay not only in the national sentiment, but also in the
I ability of the people to receive western culture, and adapt
I it to their own temperament. But they never played a lead-
ing part in the advance of civilisation. To some nations it
is given to stand in the van of progress, and to do exactly
the work which the age needs. Men of talent arise in
great numbers, and circumstances being favourable, and
opening up a career for such talents, they direct the
productive strength of their nation and lead it to great
results. This may last only for a few generations, yet
long enough to constitute an important step in the nation's
history — an epoch stamped with the names of the great
men who have given it its character.

Perhaps the intensity of political life in Hungary hin-
dered the setting of any distinctive national mark upon any
epoch of human civilisation. Several Hungarians inscribed
their names upon the roll of mankind's benefactors, and
it was in these heroes that the race showed of what stuff
it was made, but the nation's claim to be noteworthy must
be chiefly based upon its political achievements.

Anyone who desires to write the history of Europe
so far as regards accomplished results, must deal with
Hungary's part from one point of view^ only. He could
\^ hardly find finer examples of political judgment and the
instinct for self-preservation than in the thousand years
of Hungary's history.

The record of other nations may contain more
brilliant epochs and display greater heights of glory than
Hungary can boast of, but no nation surpasses her in
I the intensity and constancy of the national sentiment, and
' this sentiment never led to more strenuous activity and
unflagging perseverance, and was never allied with keener
political insight, and, in spite of an inflammable tempera-
ment, with quieter deliberation, than in Hungary.

Compared with her political achievements, Hungary's
contribution to European culture is microscopic. One of
her grandest future tasks will be to atone for this.

36

THE TIME OF THE ARPADS.

Keeping pace with the progress of Western Europe,
sensitive to the intellectual movements coming from with-
out, and able to adapt foreign notions to her own needs
in an organic way, Hungary became a useful member of
the States of Christendom. This was the secret of her
stability. Had the nation cut itself off from European
civilisation as the Turks did, it would have remained a
blemish to be removed. The Hungarians did not add
much that was epoch-making to the intellectual
treasures of the other nations, but by doing faithfully
what lay in their power they were of use, for devoting
as they did their particular strength to the common task,
they added a new aspect to European civilisation, which
owes its grand character just to its many-sidedness.

The race was able to develop its individuality. In
those branches of intellectual activity in which to give
up their originality would have meant their subjection to
other nations, as in their language and literature, the
Hungarians were able to retain their originality. Even
w^here they borrowed from others, they did it in such a
way as not to impair their mental independence. By
these means they saved their political freedom. When
the last Arpad king died they had already found the right ^
way. They had become Europeans, yet they remained
Hungarians. The basis of their civilisation being
common to all Europe, the reasons for conflict were
diminished and their strength for resistance augmented.

37

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER IL

THE TIME OF THE MIXED DYNASTIES.

The accession of the Angevins to the throne coincided
with an important turning-point of history. The powers
which had previously claimed supremacy had to yield
to the claims of the various States to independence. Not
only had it been found impossible to subject the European
family of nations to one central power, but the members
of that family were individually unable to maintain an
inner harmony. The great confederacies of to-day had '^
not yet been formed. The kingly power was not yet
strong enough to accomplish its great task of consolidat-
ing the nation and organising the State. Hungary was
in advance of the age, and became a centralised State at
a time when in other countries the autonomy of frag-
mentary portions was the rule. The Arpad kings kept
the country together with an iron hand, and when the
Hungarians had to fight with the Empire and the Papacy,
this circumstance made their victory possible. When the
aggressive strength of Pope and Emperor was exhausted
it was ihe well-organised condition of the country which
assured to it its position as an important power. The
country increased in importance the more because while
>/ its government was becoming more and more centralised,
the neighbouring German Empire was diminishing in
strength.

The feudal system, adapting itself to the original

inequality of the German races, had resulted in the crea-

^ tion of powerful feudatories in various parts of the

country. The Emperor was not able to control them

unless he himself possessed equal power, and even then,

38

THE TIME OF THE MIXED DYNASTIES.

contending with their jealousy, he had not strength
enough left to endanger the safety of Hungary.

Neither had any of the various princes power equal
to that of Hungary until towards the end of the Middle
ages, when the Habsburgs became powerful. Whenever ^
Hungary had an eminent king, the nation took a place
among the great powers of Europe. This explains the
glory of Louis and Matthias. A skilful hand made a wise
use of the favourable situation in the country's interest.
Several of Hungary's kings were monarchs of other
countries also, so that some of them ruled over the largest
dominions in Europe. Not seldom was the sceptre of
Germany, Poland, and Bohemia in the same hand which
held that of Hungary.

The country certainly had its misfortunes. Some-
times it crossed swords with a nation stronger than itself,
and suffered defeat, but even during the Turkish invasion
its existence was never in danger for a moment. The
distribution of power in Europe was favourable to
Hungary, as was proved by the fact that the ties which
bound Hungary to other powerful nations were never
such as to be prejudicial to her freedom. If we consider
what would have happened had the Arpad dynasty died
out a century or so before it did, and if one of the powerful
emperors — Henry III. or Frederick I. — had been elected
to the Hungarian throne, and if we remember the great
pressure which the Empire's relation to Hungary exerted
upon it a few centuries later, only then do we realise how
favourable the proportion of the powers to one another
mUvSt have been at a time when the imperial crown of
Sigismund was not able to diminish the lustre of the
independent Hungarian Crown.

The country was then enjoying the time of its greatest
security. As faithful stewards of the nation's interest,
and in skilful use of a favourable situation, no subsequent
monarch can be compared with the Arpads.

There were several eminent personalities among the
later kings, and the part they played in Europe was more

39

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

striking than that of the Arpads. They founded many
valuable and enduring institutions, and during their
reigns the country made great progress in culture and
wealth, but their policy was not based upon great and
permanent Hungarian interests as that of the great
Arpads had been.

It cannot be denied that the Arpads were Hungary's
most truly national kings, not by birth only, for Matthias
was just as much Hungarian as they, but in their policy.
The others, with Matthias among them, adopted a Euro-
pean policy. They endeavoured to win power and glory
in the west while they comparatively neglected the east.
Entangled in western problems, they did not direct suffi-
cient attention to the region in which the real national
question was to be decided, from whence the real dangers
threatened, but where their power might have been deeply
rooted. The true Hungarian policy was always the same.
Its invariable twofold principle has ever been to maintain
peace, and, if possible, an alliance with the west, or at
the worst, to remain on the defensive if fighting were
unavoidable, and to claim a leading part, and to attempt
an extension of influence only towards the east, where
Hungary represented the west and its civilisation.

It stirs regret to think how different the course of
Hungarian history might have been if the kings of the
mixed dynasties had 'taken this line. What prospects
would have opened before the Hungarian kingdom if it
had grouped around itself the Christian peoples of the
east and had fought side by side with them in the passes
of the Balkans for the defence of Europe, Christianity,
and Hungary, and if the spirit of John Hunyadi had per-
meated the whole age.

But we must not be unjust. Even if our greatest
kings left the path of sound national policy, they were
often led to do so by weighty reasons, and sometimes
again they were influenced by pardonable ambition.

The chief trouble was that none of the foreign dynas-
ties remained long in possession of the Hungarian crown.

40

THE TIME OF THE MIXED DYNASTIES.

The new dynasties brought with them their own interests, >
and these were all intermingled with western affairs.
They were also hampered by the imaginary rights ot
neighbouring monarchs, which led to continual wars.

The Arpad line had so firmly established the power
and independence of Hungary that their work endured for
centuries, but the mixed dynasties could not achieve such
a result as that. Had the later monarchs succeeded in
averting the danger of a Turkish invasion, and in defend-
ing civilisation in the Balkans, they could not only have
consolidated the work of the Arpdd kings, but could
have developed it, and raised Hungary to a pinnacle of
power she had never before attained.

But the opposite of this happened, and Hungary fell
upon evil days. From the zenith of splendour and power
the country was precipitated to ruin. The glorious age
of Matthias was followed by the mournful day of Mohacs.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were compara-
tively peaceful, but towards the end of the fifteenth
century dark clouds gathered on the horizon. The sky
became overcast, both in the east and in the west, but
the chief danger lay in the east, where the Turkish power
was increasing. In the neighbourhood of Hungary a
warlike race had established itself, whose military power
was directed by one will. At the word of one man
hundreds of thousands of fanatics were ready to die.
Their faith commanded them to fight, and the whole
nation was well organised. Islam commenced its war
with Christianity. First of all, Hungary was to be sub-
dued, for Hungary blocked the invader's path. The
conflict was inevitable, and could only be terminated by
the exhaustion of one of the combatants.

Hungary had missed her most favourable opportunity
of getting rid of her dangerous neighbour. When the
nation was powerful, and governed by great kings, the
Hungarians had occupied themselves with western prob-
lems, whereas they should have been guarding against
the danger to themselves, which lay in the increase of

41

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Mussulman power. The Turkish invasion broke upon
Hungary like a thunderstorm. At first, occasional flashes
announce its approach, then the thunder becomes louder,
the whole sky is overcast, and at length the storm breaks
out in all its fury. Just when the storm was at its highest
it found a weak child upon the throne of Hungary, and in
the nation itself, internal strife and constitutional change;
the usual accompaniments of weakness on the throne in
the Middle Ages.

That which had so often proved a lightning rod to
defend the structure of the State from such storms, the
steel sword of the Arpads, was no longer in the service
of the country. Hungary had a great jurist, but no
statesmen ; she had prerogatives but no well-equipped
forces. In these circumstances she was doomed. At
that critical epoch in her development when the blow
fell, she was called upon to resist the greatest military
powder of the day, made strong by fanaticism, and led
by the talented Sultan Soliman.

Negligence brought its punishment. The country
had not made sufficient efforts in the past, and had not
seized the opportunities for bold initiative and offensive
action .

Though the Hungarians had defended their frontiers
on the occasion of previous attacks, they had not taken
pains to utterly extirpate the danger. The Turks repeated
their attacks until the favourable moment came. That mo-
ment came with the reign of an eminent Sultan coincided
with a temporary weakness in Hungary, and this coinci-
dence led to Hungary's downfall.

That the country should be utterly crushed by a
single day's battle, however, and its strength so
diminished that an alliance with some western state
became essential to its very existence, was due to many
circumstances.

Dangers were also threatening from the west, where
powers were arising with which Hungary ought to have
come to some understanding. Europe had reached such

42

THE TIME OF THE MIXED DYNASTIES.

a point in its development that the weakened and broken
Hungary had either to become subject to the east, or else
to join her western neighbours. Hitherto the strength of
Hungary had been her ability to organise a strong State,
while in other countries local interests had benumbed the
central power. This advantage had now begun to
diminish. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were the s^
era of State building. Countries larger and more popu-
lous than Hungary, with which she had only been able
to keep on equal terms by reason of her powerful organi-
sation, began to be consolidated. The trend of events was
towards the increase of the kingly power. France was
welded together; Spain became organised, and the
strength of England became self-conscious. Hungary's
neighbours, the Habsburgs, founded their great empire. "^
European politics consisted in the marshalling of greater
forces than before. If Hungary had not been destroyed
at Mohacs, and had continued her progress, she might
have held her own in that great struggle, too. But the
situation rapidly grew worse. As during the time of the
Arpads, the nation had to fight for its independence
against the strongest power in the world, and the most
ambitious monarchs; so now, during the Turkish wars
she was called upon to defend herself against her powerful
western neighbour. But, after the sufferings and losses
inflicted by the Turks, this task became impossible of
accomplishment. After the defeat of Mohacs, and with
the Habsburgs threatening on the west, the country
could only maintain its existence by an alliance with these
neighbours.

The nation had been able to lift its head after the
Tartar invasion because there had been peace with the
west, but now this was no longer the case.

Rudolf, the founder of the Habsburg dynasty, ^
desired Hungary for his son, and his successors laid
claim to the crown.

The Habsburgs endeavoured strenuously to possess ^
themselves of Hungary, not temporarily, but as a per-

4a

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

manent hereditary possession, as if they foresaw that
Hungary was to play a great part in the history of their
dynasty, and to become the foundation stone of their
empire. Hungary was essential to European welfare.
Her vocation lay in controlling the development of the
east in accordance with the requirements of western
civilisation. As soon as her people became unable to
discharge this function her separate existence ceased to
be to the interest of the civilised world, and it became
necessary for some new pov/er to arise to fill the gap
caused by Hungary's downfall. The Habsburgs seized
the opportunity. Their own interests and shadowy hered-
itary claims urged them tc» stretch out their hands to
grasp the Hungarian crown. Only if she had been
strong enough to fight bothi east and west at once, could
Hungary have maintained Iher independence. Wedged in
as she was between the leading Christian State and the
powerful pagan realm, sh(e became an object of desire to
both. Situated as she wa;s, she acted wisely in accepting
the Habsburgs, though 'such a course brought its own
dangers with it.

A new epoch in the country's history now opened, and
the dangers which threat:ened her were different from any
she had formerly encou ntered. To the old international
struggle were added internal struggles to maintain the
constitution. Everythin^^ depended upon the way in which
the constitution would: stand the test of the dangerous
innovation. So far, t\\e country had only to dread the
foreign yoke, but now the Hungarians had cause to fear
lest they should be merZ-ged in the other peoples over whom
their monarch ruled, / and the dignity of St. Stephen's
crown be eclipsed bv'^ the greater glory of the imperial
crown. The danger/ being new, a new kind of defence
became necessary. Iwhile the fate of the country had
formerly depended u pon the chance of international con-
flicts, it now depencjled upon the relation to one another
of the various factoiis of the nation itself. Hitherto, only
the outer defences l/iad to be looked to, but now the chief

44

THE TIME OF THE MIXED DYNASTIES.

organ of the State itself threatened the nation's inde-
pendence. Absolutism meant loss of separate statehood,
and the maintenance of the constitution meant the preser-
vation of independence.

When the Habsburgs ascended the Hungarian throne
the power of the monarch was steadily increasing in every
country of Europe, owing to many favouring circum-
stances. Everywhere this increase was at the cost of
the constitution, and numerous conflicts arose where the
kingly power met w-ith an obstacle either in the nobility
or in the constitution itself. This trend of events had
an influence upon the conceptions formed by the
Habsburgs of their rights and duties, and opened new
paths for their policy.

Charles, the brother of the Hungarian king, was \^
absolute ruler of Spain, and the most powerful monarch in
Christendom. He raised the dynasty to greatness, and
the Spanish idea that the king's will must be the nation's
law, found its way into the mind of every member of it.

The power of the Habsburgs was immense. They
disposed freely of the nation's money and soldiers, re-
moving these from the sphere of popular control. They
had at command all the means which royalty can use to
extend its influence, and could reckon on many of the
sentimental motives which always strengthen the position
of the monarch. Where could anyone be more sure of
gratitude for fighting to restore the old frontiers of the
country than in Hungary, which had been robbed by *''
enemies of its faith and race, of that soil to which the
Hungarians clung as to the very source of their life?

W^here was the restoration of peace and order so
urgently demanded as in a country where, during the
Turkish invasions, so much of the fruit of years of peace-
ful work had been destroyed, and where men's family and
fortune, and bare life itself stood in need of protection ?
The fatal day of Mohacs made the nation look with differ-
ent eyes upon freedom, and to see the necessity of a strong
hand at the helm of the State.

45

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Moreover, the Habsburgs, possessing vast military
resources, naturally pursued their aim of creating a united
empire without paying much consideration to the consti-
tution of its various component States.

Simplicity of government and security against
external foes required this, and hence it is easy to realise
the magnitude of the danger which threatened Hungarian
independence.

But just at the time when the constitution was
threatened by the growing power of the monarch, and
it was to be feared that a reaction would occur favourable
to the king's aims, suddenly the constitution proved
itself to be the bulwark of the nation's life.

It is necessary to trace the origin and development of
that constitution, for only thus can we discover the
explanation of its strength and weakness. Had it become
in the course of time a part of the nation's very soul, or
was it only a showy, but adventitious appendage, unable
to perform any new services? This question takes us
back to the earliest period of the nation's history, and
brings us to the problem, the solution of which is the
second purpose of this book.

Hitherto only the reasons for Hungary's survival
as an independent State have been dealt with, and it was
possible to treat them separately, because the form of
government had not much to do with them. That the
country remained a constitutional monarchy was not one
of the circumstances which contributed to Hungary's
independence. The general rule was, the stronger the
monarch, the more secure the State's existence, but in
Hungary, from the sixteenth century the situation was
different. There, the freedom of the State was based
upon the freedom embodied in its constitution. The two
kinds of freedom were bound up together, and became
a common interest. Before dealing with that period,
however, we must trace the development of the constitu-
tion up to the time of the battle of Mohacs.

46

PART II.

The Development
of the
Constitution*

47

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

CHAPTER III

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

When the Hungarians first entered Europe they
enjoyed very great freedom. The ruling power was
divided between the elected chieftain, the leaders of the
tribes, and the warriors, that is to say, all the free members
of the nation.

Between ruler and people, reciprocal duties were
settled by a contract, and if the ruler broke this contract
he was liable to be called to account.

The nomadic peoples of that age could hardly have
been anything but free. Everything contributed to this
result. The prince or king was really an elected chief,
who led to w^ar those who were in other respects equal to
himself. The spoils of war were equally divided as the
deserts of all were equal, since victory was chiefly a matter
of personal valour. No enterprise that was not embarked
upon with the goodwill of all was likely to turn out well,
so that all plans needed to be discussed by a council. If
the ruler proved lacking in Xhe qualities expected of him,
or if he lost the nation*s confidence, then the necessities
of the people's one great pursuit — warfare, — demanded his
deposition, and the election of another chief.

Weapons were accessible to all alike. To commence
a w^ar it was enough if there were sufficient men willing
to unite for the purpose and obey a leader. To set in
motion an army was not the privilege of the leader, as it
afterwards became, nor did his position make his will
paramount. It was impossible for him to compel obedi-
ence. His followers either yielded voluntary obedience,
or became unmanageable. There was no separate army

49

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

dependent upon the ruler among a people whose every
man was trained to arms. The strength of the ruler
lay in the confidence of his followers. A strong and
permanent central authority, independent of the will of
the nation, was not needed. The discipline indispensable
in warfare was the interest of all, and the ruler who was
fit for his post could always reckon on obedience. The
people occupied a comparatively small territory, and they
were not divided by conflicting local interests. The
nation's chief was able to exercise a personal influence
upon all, and no individual was strong enough to stand
against the rest of the community. A strong and perma-
nent central authority was, therefore, not necessary, even
for the maintenance of unity. The primitive community
therefore enjoyed a very free form of government — a free-
dom natural, and due to the circumstances of a nomadic
people's life, but as soon as these conditions gave way to
others, an altered form of government became inevitable,
^lost nations gradually lost their freedom, but the
Hungarians managed to preserve much of it, though the
form of it changed.

The Hungarian constitution can be traced back with-
out a break to the freedom of nomadic times. When in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was threatened
by a grave crisis, it had become deeply rooted in the
thought and feeling of the nation.

The one great circumstance which made this
fortunate development possible was the early restriction
of the people's freedom within reasonable bounds, so that
centrifugal tendencies never became so pronounced as to
threaten disruption, and to give rise to a reaction in favour
of autocracy. The condition of affairs during the Middle
Ages favoured the development of a kingly power strong
enough to maintain the national unity side by side with
a large measure of general freedom.

Before dealing with this question of the persistence
of the people's liberty, it will be necessary to indicate the
causes of the growth of the kingly authority.

50

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER,

The constitution which met the needs of a nomadic
people became unserviceable when larger States were
formed.

As the armies settled down and spread over wide
areas, the force which had held them together became
impotent. Society was broken up and resolved into its
constituent atoms, 'i^he personal influence which had
maintained the organic unity of the warriors who lived
near one another and kept up intercourse with each other,
was not enough to bind together a nation which had
ceased to be nomadic, and had become an agricultural
people, and had mingled with the subjugated races. The
old central authority could not meet the new requirements,
and new institutions and a new constitution became
necessary.

Progress has alw^ays been most assured when the
agency which effects a necessary change can serve its
own interests at the same time as the interests of all.
The kingship was such an agency. It found its interest
and its vocation in that which the nation most needed,
and it commenced the great work of developing the
tribal system into true state life.

During the great wars which opened up new coun-
tries to the barbarians at the time of the migration of
peoples, the leader was generally surrounded with a halo.
The conquest and settlement of the new territory wrapped
him in glory. He gained still greater influence from the
circumstance that in the Roman atmosphere the con-
ception of a ruler became a new and greater one.

Two circumstances contributed to the leader*s in-
creased importance. The Christian Church was threat-
ened with destruction by the pagan invasion, therefore
she devoted all her strength to the task of converting
the barbarians. In order to succeed in this task she
endeavoured first to win over the leaders, for the con-
version of the tribe usually followed. It thus became to
the interest of the Church that the leader's dignity and

51

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAx\ LIBERTY.

authority should be increased, and so she exerted all her
influence on his behalf.

The enormous success of Christianity thus meant
strength to the monarch. This relation between Church
and ruler led to the notion of kingship by the Grace of
God. The blessing of the Church gave sanctity to the
kingly authority, and the idea was encouraged that this
V authority had some higher origin than the people's will.
The other circumstance which contributed to the exalta-
tion of the monarch was the memory of the Roman
Emperors, with the idea that they represented the nation,
and that the public will was expressed in them.

But the transformed kingship was confronted with
a colossal task, and in most cases the effort to found a
strong State led to no permanent result. The new
creation appeared to be founded on the sand, and the
work of even great personalities speedily fell to pieces.
The rivalry of the constituent parts nearly always nulli-
fied the central power, and the kingship, in spite of its
theoretical greatness, became practically impotent in most
countries. Even if certain rulers succeeded in establish-
ing their authority, and subordinating the people to
central control, yet in those States which were formed
during the great migration of peoples, sooner or later
there usually commenced a decadence.
^ Hungary was one of the few exceptions. She alone

among European States maintained her unity from the
moment of the conquest without any break, and within
almost unaltered frontiers, while retaining much of her
primitive character. After the conquest, in Hungary,
as in Germany, the retention without any modification
of the people's original liberty would soon have meant
the dissolution of the State. As the various tribes scat-
tered themselves over the conquered territory, the ancient
and loose legal ties became insufficient to bind the nation
together.

Personal intercourse became rare, and local interests
grew in power. The districts which settlers made their

52

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

permanent home linked closely together those who dwelt
within them, but at the same time separated them from
the rest of the community. The ruler, on the other hand,
represented the common interests of the whole nation.
In Hungary, as in other countries, the monarch en-
deavoured to increase his power, and with the aid of the
Church to add dignity to his office. St. Stephen adopted
Charlemagne's conception, and copied the achievement
of Charlemagne on a smaller scale, yet with more perma-
nent results.

What St. Stephen built did not fall to pieces, but
maintained itself, in spite of all those difficulties which
in other countries brought similar creations to nought.

Charlemagne died in 814, and his realm broke into
three pieces in 843. In 888, instead of these three frag-
ments we find seven. One of these, France proper, was
subdivided into twenty-nine little states, almost indepen-
dent of each other, and a century later, on the area of
this kingdom, there were fifty-five petty sovereignties. "^

How was it that while the creation of Charlemagne
proved transitory, the state founded by St. Stephen main-
tained its integrity?

It was impossible for the empire of Charlemagne to
remain a whole, and its fate cannot be compared with
that of Hungary. It was immense in area, and included
very heterogeneous elements, while the various nationali-
ties composing it all possessed the essential conditions of
independent political existence, namely, a separate terri-
tory and the feeling of community based upon common
traditions. Charlemagne's creation was a world-empire,
whose vocation was but temporary. As soon as it had
assured the triumph of Christianity in Central Europe its
fate was sealed, and it was bound to fall to pieces. But
the further dissolution of the parts formed in 843 has a
different explanation.

This explanation is to be found in the general circum-
stances of the time, which tended to split the whole of
Europe into small provinces, and almost everywhere

53

v^

V

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

destroyed national unity. The means by which kings
later on added to their dignity were not yet ready to their
hand, and circumstances were unfavourable to centralisa-
tion, and made the governing of masses of people
dwelling far from one another very difficult. The absence
of means of communication, the undeveloped state of
commerce, and the primitive level of civilisation, were
among the circumstances which prevented a feeling of
community arising among the people, excepting those
living close together. Only local interests gained promi-
nence, and this diminished the influence of remoter
interests. The nation came to have fewer common
interests, and even those which remained were not clearly
understood. All this made the king's task a very difficult
one. Even the means he employed to safeguard his
interests played into the hands of the local powers.

The officials appointed by the king emancipated
themselves from his control, and usurped the rule over
the province entrusted to them. Far from the centre their
prosperity depended upon their establishing an under-
standing with the local powers. If they were able to strike
root in the locality, they had no reason to fear the king,
while if they failed to do so, even the king was unable
to aid them. They were compelled to rely upon them-
selves, and this encouraged a feeling of independence, so
that it became almost impossible to control them.

Another circumstance contributed to the same result.
The dignity and power of such officials depended upon
their possession of land. The king was obliged to give
them estates and fortresses, or they would have been
devoid of any power to execute the king*s commands.
But as soon as they gained these advantages it was to be
feared that they would ally themselves with local interests,
and thus strengthen the resistance to the king.

The possession of estates as an essential to the hold-
ing of office, in time altered the nature of that office.

The tendency of the estates to become hereditary,
led to (*fforts to make the office also hereditary.

54

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

'here these efforts were successful, the whole system
was destroyed, the central power w^as annihilated, and
these local potentates became the real rulers of their
territories.

If they succeeded in conciliating public opinion and
in grouping around themselves the chief men of the
district, they became masters of a much more united force
than the king could command, and such a district lived
a much more truly state life than the country itself as a
whole.

Those whose task had been to organise and maintain
armies for the king, themselves became the masters of
such armies, and used them for their own purposes. The
conditions of warfare in those days favoured this indepen-
dence of the monarch. Resistance was facilitated by the
almost impregnable castles, which enabled a small force
to withstand with ease a large army. In earlier times,
when nomadic conditions prevailed, a small force could
not thus resist a large one, nor could it in later times,
when the newer weapons made it impossible.

Everything, therefore, tended to the splitting up of
large states into small ones, each of which could be easily
defended. Effective rule extended only so far as the
sword could reach.

These circumstances were present in Hungary, as in
other countries, yet they were not able to destroy the
power of the king, nor to dissolve the unity which he
represented.

Why was this ? The explanation which first suggests
itself is that since disruption occurred most frequently
where feudalism prevailed, and as in Hungary this
system never gained so firm a hold as in other countries,
it was to this circumstance that Hungary's stability was
owing. This explanation, however, is not the true one.
It conflicts with the fact that Hungary gradually accepted
feudalism, that in England it was just by means of a
rigid feudal system that the crown maintained its
authority, and also that in countries where this system

55

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

never established itself, disintegration became more and
more thorough, as in Italy, where each town became an
independent community, and in Scotland with its clans.
The maintenance of the kingly authority in Hungary
must, therefore, have had some deeper reason. Royalty
depended for its strength upon the support it found in the
common sentiment of the people.

Wise laws, good institutions, and the power of great
individuals could not permanently counterbalance the
harmful influence of a situation that was fundamentally
wrong. The history of that age shows that where the
kingship remained strong it was generally the case that
the nation had been threatened either by external or by
internal foes, so that all the people could not but see the
need for some central authority.

Some very evident danger was needed in order to
make a primitive people feel the necessity for unity.
Thus, we may notice that in Norman England, a com-
paratively small army having invaded the country, the
invaders, living in a state of perpetual strife with the
original inhabitants, instinctively sought protection in a
strong central authority. The Saxons were greatly em-
bittered against the Norman nobility, who had usurped
the rights of the Saxon franklins, in whom Saxon life had
found its chief expression.

The danger which this hostility portended to the
Norman supremacy made the Normans conscious of the
need for union among themselves. The kings made a
skilful use of the situation. Partly by promising pro-
tection to the Saxons and showing them favour, and
partly by championing Norman interests, they managed
to attach both parties to themselves. This led to the unity
of the State, and made the maintenance of such unity
possible.

In France the whole situation was different, and the
development was different also. The Prankish tribes were
so much more vigorous than the Gauls, who were long
accustomed to subjugation, and than the scattered Roman

56

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

citizens, that their supremacy was never in danger.
Neither were they threatened by any such external dangers
as would make the Franks recognise the need of a central
authority.

Charlemagne had averted external dangers. Since
his time the Franks regarded themselves as the supreme
power in Europe, and this assurance paved the way to
decentralisation. The forces which made for union fell
into the background, because they were regarded as super-
fluous, and disintegrating influences came to the fore.
The institutions of Charlemagne were unable to counter-
act this tendency, and they themselves facilitated decen-
tralisation. The feudal system which Charlemagne
wished to make the basis of union, established the local
potentates. It nourished, not the strength of the State,
but the independence of the parts. The lines of cleavage
coincided partly with racial distinctions, partly with
geographical boundaries, and partly with the hereditary
distribution of territory. The resulting division did not
represent the victory of the national principle, for there
were not so many tribes and nationalities in the country
as the parts into which it was divided.

In Hungary, the king would not have been able to
maintain his authority had not many reasons convinced
the nation of the value of unity, and had not the citizens
been so much afraid of anything that might weaken the
State as to be willing to suffer some limitation of their
liberty.

We have little positive information, but if we con-
sider the situation of the Hungarians in Europe, and
when we remember that predatory raids upon neighbour-
ing countries had hardly ceased when the monarchy was
set up, and that even in those primitive times the nation
displayed remarkable political sagacity, we cannot doubt
that the danger threatening their independence made the
Hungarians realise that they must strengthen the central
authority. Living among nations stronger than them-
selves, they found, like other nations similarly situated,

57

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

that their very existence depended upon their unity. The
Hungarians were, therefore, willing to limit their own
individual freedom, and to assist their ruler in his task
of maintaining order, at a time when other more civilised
peoples scarcely felt the need of State organisation.

Recognising their common interest, the people were
ready to abandon several of their privileges, while other
more civilised races allowed their State to fall to pieces
in order that they might enjoy greater freedom.

How was it that the Hungarians, a people of un-
bounded courage, who had never found obedience an
easy matter, endured and favoured the king's supremacy
at a time when popular sentiment was opposed to it in
other countries?

The Hungarian race was not a member of that great
dominant family amidst which it found itself. No tie of
common religion linked it with its neighbours.

The Hungarians were without kindred in the new
world which they had entered. We learn the opinion
formed of them from the Chroniclers, who speak of them
as though they were fiends and not human beings.
Their racial type, their language and customs, became a
barrier between them and their neighbours. Is it not
natural, therefore, that the Hungarians felt something of
the same antipathy towards those round about them, and
that their sense of isolation as a race strengthened the
sentiment of community among themselves, and made
them turn to one another for support as animals flock
together when danger is near ? If any of them, separated
from their fellows, became subjugated by some other
race, they suffered more than Gaul or Burgundian or
Frank, who even in such a case fell among kindred,
tribes.

The danger which threatened the whole nation
could not but be keenly appreciated by each individual.
The forces at work here were not merely abstract ideas,
the idealistic love of country, or mere sense of duty, but

58

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

the instinctive fear on the part of every man lest he
should fall into the power of those who scarcely regarded
him as a fellow-man, and whom he, on his part, could
not understand, as they differed from him in thought
and feeling and customs.

This was a powerful motive since it was based on
a natural self-regard, and it was for the same reason a
permanent one, and gave a direction to the nation's
development. The soul of every Hungarian became
keenly sensitive to the importance of national unity, since
with this was linked the interest of each individual.

Hence, at a time when other nations paid little
attention to affairs of State, in Hungary there was a
strong public opinion on the side of the monarchy. The '^
dangerous situation of the Hungarians became the source
of their finest feature, their intense national feeling. To
this they owed the maintenance of their unity at a time
when other nations were becoming disintegrated. This
sentiment made them successful in their struggles with
powers greater than themselves, and enabled them, by
preserving their autonomy for a thousand years, to build
up a State of which they may well be proud. In the
future, also, the condition of their existence will be the
preservation of this national sentiment in all its depth
and intensity, but united with humanitarian ideals, and
provided that devotion to their race does not degenerate
into that foolish chauvinism which is inconsistent with
the calm self-respect that alone can make individuals or
nations distinguished, and which is merely idle vanity,
blinding men and nations alike, making them weak as
well as ridiculous, hindering them from seeing their own
shortcomings, awakening in them the desire for danger-
ous enterprises, and alienating sympathy, since its only
aim is to offend.

One other circumstance probably had some influ-
ence in bringing home to the Hungarians the need for
a central authority. In all probability the Hungarian ^

69

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

conquerors were not very numerous, and the subjugated
races, especially in the mountainous districts where the
Hungarians did not care to settle, preserved their nation-
ality. Though not proved, it seems very likely that the
Slavs of the northern counties of Hungary are the de-
scendants of the original inhabitants. Is it not probable
that this state of affairs had the same effect upon the
Hungarians as a similar condition in England had upon
the Normans? It is true that history tells us nothing
of any revolt or disaffection on the part of those races,
and the scanty records only show that there could not
have been any organised warfare worthy of note. It
would be a wonder, however, if the indigenous races
accepted the Hungarian hegemony without a struggle.
Psychological considerations support the supposition that
they did not look kindly on the invading Hungarians,
who conquered them by force of arms and robbed them
of the inheritance of their fathers. They must have felt
bitterly, and a legacy of discontent must have been
handed down from father to son, a discontent which
doubtless manifested itself in predatory raids, in mur-
murings and threats, all which must have had their
influence upon the ideas of the Hungarians. The Hun-
garians, seeing that enemies threatened them from with-
out, while within their borders also were hostile races,
could not become absorbed in local interests, but were
almost compelled to be true patriots, realising that they
must hold together, and that the first condition of their
unity and hegemony was the kingly power. If this
indeed was the situation, and if those are wrong who say
that in the time of St. Stephen only one language was
spoken, then this situation must have had a powerful
effect upon the desire for unity, since it revealed its
influence in the more inaccessible mountainous districts,
where local independence could most easily have been
set up.

Where the Hungarians saw only their kindred
and grew up in the consciousness of their strength, there

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

the geographical conditions which would have favoured
separation were absent.

The districts in which they dwelt were easy of
access by the Court, and so it was comparatively easy to
maintain the authority of the crown.

The consolidation of the monarch's power was
partly due to the fact that the monarchy was established
at a favourable moment. The failure of their wars of
aggression had convinced the Hungarians that the old
system had become obsolete. Many realised that the
severer discipline and better organisation, the religion
and culture of the west, ought to be adopted. The
Norman kings of England found it of great advantage
that their organised army had became the leading class
in the State. On the other hand, Charlemagne saw
what a disadvantage it was that the Prankish conquerors
had lived for nearly three centuries in their acquired terri-
tory without having organised it into a whole, so that every
district of it formed a separate unit, and he met with
considerable difficulty in abolishing this condition of
affairs. St. Stephen, though his position was not so
favourable as that of William the Conqueror, was con-
fronted by an easier task than that which Charlemagne
had to face. The nation he was called upon to govern
was partly nomadic, and had not yet become firmly
attached to the soif, while the people, dwelling w^ithin a
comparatively small area, had considerable intercourse
with each other, so that local potentates could not arise.
There had not yet been developed among the conquering
Hungarians that organised hierarchy which could pro-
vide the inhabitants of a certain district with a leader and
an organisation. The tribal system was dying out, but
its place was not yet taken by any new system. The
sense of equality, inherited from the time of the migra-
tion, was still strong, and this proved a help to the king
against any would-be local rulers.

No one was willing to pay homage to an equal. If
the people had to yield obedience they would do so only

61

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to their prince, afterwards their king. The Franks also
had this same pride, but a strong monarchy had not
yet been established that could profit by this senti-
ment, and when the monarchy was instituted, the great in-
equality in wealth and the tyranny of the strong over the
weak had altered the character of the nation, and life
had taught men the lesson that the more fortunate neigh-
bour might reasonably claim obedience if, in return, he
furnished defence, which the monarch could not do.

In Hungary the sentiments and customs which
arise out of social inequality had not become traditional.
Differences in wealth and power which had continuously
increased and the discord which sprang from these
differences, inclined the bulk of the nation — the middle
class — which regarded its liberties with a jealous eye, to
support the king.

Moreover, the monarch initiated a religious and
social revolution, which, had it failed, might have led
to the downfall of the monarchy, but, as it proved
successful, became a source of strength. The two fun-
damental principles of the new age — Christianity and
the right of private property — were championed by the
monarch, who thus succeeded in attaching to himself
many powerful interests. Power becomes legitimate only
when it lays the foundation of a nation's prosperity, and
when the leading ideas of the age connect themselves
with the conception of that power.

The eyes of the whole nation were turned towards
the king, because all men felt that they needed a leader.

They also realised that, situated as they were
among foreign races, with a powerful neighbour on the
west and threatened with invasion on the east, their very
existence would be in danger if they were without some
strong central authority. Thus the monarchy became
identified with the idea of national existence. It meant
national glory and independence. At critical times, the
bulk of the nation at least always sided with the king,
since by the sceptre of the king it was protected from

62

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

foreign aggression. Further, the majority of the people
sought the king's support against the nobles. Public
opinion, therefore, was strongly in favour of the king
and of national unity, and was opposed to a feudal
nobility and system of fiefs. It was from the king that
the people looked for protection of their common inter-
ests, and not from local magnates. In the eyes of the
nation the only form of State life which could endure,
was the undivided unity of the country represented by
the monarch.

These circumstances explain the rise of the Arpad ^
dynasty, and made it possible for the kings to fulfil
their vocation at a time when the kings in other coun-
tries had comparatively little real power.

All these motives operated, sometimes weaker, some-
times stronger, until the battle of Mohacs, and gave
to the monarchy that vitality which enabled it to revive
again and again, and persist as the most distinctively
national institution in spite of many adversities. The
Hungarians became so strongly royalist as to be in this "
respect unique.

The circumstances which have been enumerated,
however, merely made it possible that in Hungary the
kingly power should be strong in spite of the many con-
ditions which, during the Middle Ages, tended to dimin-
ish that power.

Great and sustained efforts, and the co-operation of
many causes, were necessary in order that the monarch,
taking advantage of favourable circumstances, should
convert this possibility into an actuality, and should
retain the leadership of the nation for five centuries
amidst the gravest dangers, as was the case in Hungary.

The Arpad line of kings was exceptionally talented, *^
and eminently fitted to rule a warlike nation. They were
brave, and strong-willed, and were able to control the
spirits of the people. Even the weaker kings were not
devoid of talent, while in every century some great ruler

63

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

arose among them who more than atoned for the short-
comings of his less-gifted predecessors, and laid up a
store of prestige for those who followed him. St.

Stephen, St. Ladislas, and Kalman were the pride of the
eleventh century. It was fortunate for the monarchy
that at the time of its inception such great personalities
served its interests. The value of an institution has often
been augmented by the eminence of the men who have
created it, and stand identified with it in the eyes of
posterity. It was fortunate, also, that the three great
kings mentioned above were not the kind of men who
merely awaken awe but not attachment, but, on the con-
trary, won men's hearts by the charm of their person-
ality.

William the Conqueror and Henry II. were great
kings, but they have not become surrounded by such
a halo as St. Stephen and St. Ladislas. Bela III. was
^'the great Hungarian king of the twelfth century, and
vBela IV. of the thirteenth century. Even after the time
of the Arpads every century had one great king at least.
The fourteenth century had Robert Charles and Louis
the Great, while the fifteenth saw Matthias. Great men
not merely influence the politics of their own age, but give
permanence to a new conception by means of institutions.
This happened in the history of the monarchy. Great
men seized the favourable moment for the creation of
an institution that should endure. The permanence of
an institution depends upon its ability to perform the
task expected of it. As the vocation of a king was pre-
eminently the defence of the nation's independence, his
success was decided chiefly by his capacity in this direc-
tion. The king has always been the first soldier of the
State, and the head of all its military forces.

Bound by oath to protect his realm, no part of his
duty has he endeavoured to discharge more faithfully
than this.

The fate of the monarchy in Hungary was decided
by the eminent success of her first kings in organising

64

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

the nation for purposes of defence under their own
leadership.

Every free-born Hungarian was obliged to perform
certain military duties, and to serve under the command
of the king. The owners of the fortresses, which were
to be found in every district, had each some special
military task. The king had soldiers in his pay, and he
also obliged several powerful nobles to maintain a certain
number of troops in return for gifts, but the bulk of the
army consisted of the ordinary citizens.

This system established direct communication be-
tween the king and the majority of his subjects. The
military organisation of the nation became the organi-
sation of civil society as w^ell, and the centralisation at-
tained for military purposes was the highest degree of
centralisation of which society at that time was capable,
and established as complete a harmony in the State as
was to be expected.

It guaranteed power to the monarch, but at the
same time limited that power and rendered its abuse
difficult. It placed the king in such a position that if
he knew how to manage the nation he could marshal
the whole of its forces against a neighbouring State,
while it made it impossible for him to turn those forces
against the nation itself. It made ready the nation to
serve the king, yet obliged the king to act in harmony
with the wishes of the nation.

In the course of time, this organisation weakened
and the king's position became more difficult. It be-
came necessary to find a substitute for the garrisons of
the fortresses.

In the time of the Angevins, the aristocracy was led,
partly by patriotism and partly by ambition, to main-
tain troops, and the army of Louis the Great was largely
composed of the private battalions of noblemen. In his
case the arrangement worked very well, in consequence
of the intellectual superiority of the great king, but. it
contained the germs of great dangers. As a reward for

65

v'

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the *' banderia,"* a great part of the crown estates became
\, the property of the nobles, and the chief military power
was in the hands, not of the king, but of these not very
reliable noblemen. Had this become the sole military
organisation, the monarch must have lost his supremacy
over the forces of his realm, and the foundation of his
authority must have been shaken. But the monarchy
was saved by the possibility of a different system.

Its interests demanded above all things a standing
national army. Had such an army become the back-
bone of the national defence, the history of Hungary
might have been different.

It was not in accordance with the nation's traditions,

however, to entrust its defence to paid soldiers. To do

so would have involved the cessation of the nobles* im-

^ munity from taxation, and public opinion was not ripe

for this.

Not until the reign of Matthias was a standing
national army created, and before his time monarchs had
to find some other means of remaining masters of the
military forces. They reinstituted compulsory military
service on the part of the middle classes, and introduced
the system of compelling landowners to supply soldiers
in proportion to the number of their serfs.

The legislature took care that the forces raised
should be adequate to the country's needs, and that they
should remain under the influence of the king. The
banderia of most of the nobles were ranged with the
banderia of the counties, and the command was entrusted
to royal officials.

The laws could not, however, be entirely enforced,
and the kings of the mixed dynasties did not derive as
much power as the Arpad kings had from the military

* A " banderium " was a body of soldiers equipped and main-
tained by one of the powerful nobles or magnates, who was entitled
to lead it into battle under his own banner. Every magnate had
to equip euch a banderium, the size of which was proportionate
to his own wealth. There were also banderia which were equipped
by the Counties and led by the County Lieutenants.

66

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

organisation, but since even during the most critical
times there were always some national forces apart from
the armies of the nobles, the crown and the national unity
were never without a defence. The monarchy, in its
darkest day, never sank so low as it did in many Euro-

' pean States. The nation was legally compelled to exert
itself to supply the king with military forces, in a
manner scarcely paralleled in other countries. It was the
fear of the Turk which enabled the king to lay this com-
pulsion upon the nation.

This fear took the place of the motive formerly

I- supplied by the antipathy between Hungary and Western
Europe, an antipathy which had not entirely ceased, but
had become much weaker. The Turks were as much
foreigners as the Germanic and Slavish races had been,
and they awakened in the Hungarians the feeling that a
strong king was necessary.

Every man's sentiments and personal interests were
opposed to the rule of the Sultan.

Another powerful instrument in the hands of the
king was his wealth. He needed to be rich in order to

\ maintain his power, and the Arpad kings had realised
this. St. Stephen took possession of vast areas for the
crown, and the income from these dominions was the
monarch's chief revenue, to which were added certain
tolls, duties, income from the mints, and some constant
taxes. It was very important for the monarch that in
this way he gained an income independent of the nation's
will. As time went on, however, the financial position
of the monarch grew steadily worse. The bulk of the
nation approved of the policy of retaining these domin-
ions for purposes of national defence, yet in spite of
the fact that the later Arpad kings endeavoured to regain
the vast territories which their ancestors had given away,
the king's estates were continually diminishing. It was /
also disadvantageous to the Treasury that more and more
people were freed from taxation. Just at a time when the
defence of the country presented greater difficulties than

67

DEVELOPMENT OF HaNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ever, and when it was only by means of a paid army that
the king could maintain his supremacy, and when, con-
sequently, he needed money above all things, the sources
of his income were drying up. If the monarch had been
able to create new sources of revenue, and to organise
a powerful paid army, he might have aimed at absolu-
tism, as was done in many other European countries.
It had an important bearing on the nation's history that
this was not possible in Hungary, and that at a time
when the necessity for a paid army was becoming greater
and greater, the fortune of the king was so much dimin-
ished that he was driven to new and extraordinary tax-
ation. From the time of the Hunyadis the monarchy
had to depend upon war taxes voted by Parliament, yet
even then the public spirit of the people enabled the king
to discharge his proper functions.

Though his position was sometimes a very difficult
one, he was always able to maintain the nation's unity.

Besides national defence, one of the tasks of the
kings was to consolidate the new legal system which they
had introduced. The foundation of this system was laid
by the Arpad kings, who made the crown the source of
all legal rights. The county lieutenants, like the "grafs"
of Charlemagne and the vice-comites or sheriffs of
William the Conqueror, discharged both military and
administrative duties, and in both directions acted on
behalf of the king. They were nominated by the king
who ruled through them.

The Arpad kings, moreover, travelled a great deal
about the country, in order to come into personal touch
with the inhabitants of the various districts, and thus kept
their finger upon the nation's pulse. The king was
supreme arbiter in all matters, the main source of justice,
the highest tribunal, the bestower of favour, and the
support of the law.

But decentralisation struggled with uniform govern-
ment even in Hungary. Fired by foreign example, and
supported by the distribution of power, now and then

68

SOURCES OF THE ROYAL POWER.

some great nobleman endeavoured to wrest the govern-
ment of some district from the hands of the king, but
such efforts never achieved complete success. The legis-
lature, the administration, and the judicial system re-
mained on the whole uniform and subordinate to the
king. The various offices did not cease to be State
offices, and sovereign rights never came into the hands
of private persons. Many centuries elapsed before the
elective system commenced to obtain a footing, side by
side with the method of nomination, and even then it
did not endanger the king's supremacy, or the national
unity, but on the contrary it gave a part in the admin-
istration to such elements in the nation as were the
king's allies in his struggle to maintain the nation's
unity.

As already mentioned, one source of power to the
Arpad kings was the introduction of Christianity and
the royal patronage of the Church. From this source
the monarchy continued to derive strength. The func-
tions which are now performed by educational institu-
tions and by the public press, were performed during
the Middle Ages by the Church alone. The fame which
a man might expect from his contemporaries and from
posterity was settled by the priests. Popularity and
respect were gained or lost through their action.

The Church rendered a vast service to the monarchy
by the glory with which it surrounded the two sainted
kings. The conception of a monarch was so highly
exalted by the Church's blessing and championing, as no
other agency in that period could have exalted it. Not
seldom the common belief credited the king with wonder-
working powers. It was generally believed that at the
tombs of St. Stephen and St. Ladislas, the blind and the
deaf could be cured.

Concord with the Church had further direct ad-
vantages for the king. When it is remembered how
detrimental to the Empire was its quarrel with the
Papacy, it becomes evident how fortunate it was for

69

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Hungary that the Arpad kings, and subsequent mon-
archs also, maintained, on the whole, friendly relations
with the Vatican. Hungary never found it necessary to
purchase peace at the price of the surrender of royal pre-
rogatives, or of being compelled to side actively with the
Pope in his various conflicts. Hungary retained the
right of deciding upon her foreign policy in accordance
with her own interests, and in filling vacant benefices
kept a free hand for herself in a way that few States did.
Some of the rights of the Apostolic kings were occasion-
ally infringed, but they always maintained power enough
to make the Church dependent upon them. This influ-
ence of the king over the Church was the more valuable
because the Church possessed enormous wealth, and,
therefore, great power in Hungary.

The Church banderia, on which the king might
place more reliance than upon those of the nobles, as well
as the moral support w^hich the high ecclesiastical digni-
taries gave, and the temporary income from vacant bene-
fices, proved very helpful to the king at critical times.

The Arpads established the monarchy on firm
foundations. After their time, its power declined, but
was never destroyed, and the king remained the symbol
of the nation's unity and independence. The national
ideal and instinctive self-regard were the king's constant
allies. The causes which led the people to recognise the
power of the Arpads as a national necessity did not cease
to operate in after years, but continued to make it possi-
ble for the monarchy, while pursuing its high vocation,
to acquire fresh strength, and to struggle victoriously
against the decentralising tendencies of the age.

What the kings lost of their prerogative was gained
by the whole nation, and not by individual nobles or
districts.

From the almost absolute rule of the first Arpads,
the nation's constitution was gradually developed.

70

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION

IN HUNGARY AND IN ENGLAND DURING THE

ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES.

During the Middle Ages, through inevitable causes,
free institutions grew up side by side with the monarch-
ical power. It may be interesting to trace the steady
advance from age to age of the spirit of freedom, notic-
ing the circumstances amidst which it was fostered, and
it will be helpful to us, in our task, to compare the
history of Hungary with that of England. In both

countries it was the strength of the monarchy, securing
internal order and peace, which rendered progress
possible, and it is due to this fundamental similarity that
the two constitutions followed similar lines of develop-
ment. This is why a comparison between the tw^o
countries is so instructive, for it enables us to see which
phenomena in the history of both were the effects of this
common characteristic, and which traits were peculiar
to Hungary.

The first period we shall examine lasted from the
eleventh to the commencement of the thirteenth century.
Alike in Hungary and in England that period was char-
acterised by the unchallenged supremacy of the mon-
arch, yet, at the same time, we cannot fail to discern the
germs from which constitutional government has been
evolved in both countries. To so great a height had
William the Conqueror and St. Stephen raised king-
ship, that during the eleventh and twelfth centuries the
dominant power in the State was that of the king, but

71

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

even then there were a few circumstances which Hmited
that power, and formed a check upon autocracy. The
^ monarch had no separate army, neither had he the sup-
' port of a bureaucracy, and, moreover, the nation was
quite able, and on occasion willing, to put a formidable
force into the field. To govern the people successfully,
therefore, demanded an able and commanding person-
ality. The successor of a powerful monarch might
suddenly find himself impotent if he ceased to be liked or
feared. The reign of Stephen, in England, presents a
striking contrast to that of his predecessor, Henry L,
and his successor, Henry H. Stephen was as weak as
the others were powerful. In Hungary, Peter, who

succeeded the omnipotent St. Stephen, was deprived of
his throne by a revolution. No king who was unable
to lead an army, and to maintain his authority by force,
could count upon obedience. Peter, Samuel, and
Salamon were driven from their thrones by their factious
and revolted subjects, because their absolutism injured
many powerful interests, and their policy was opposed to
the current of national thought and sentiment. In Eng-
land, the rebellious barons conquered Stephen and im-
prisoned him. Many kings in circumstances such as
these, have sought relief in the concession of privileges
to the people. Magna Charta w^as granted by John
because the armies of the barons, backed by public
opinion, were stronger than the king's mercenaries.

If a king chanced to be a minor, the difficulty of his
position was aggravated. The Hungarian nobles held
undisputed sway during the minority of Stephen II. It
is no wonder that in after years, this king met with a
grave case of disobedience. On the death of Geza II.,
while his sons were still minors, it was again the nobles,
and especially the high ecclesiastical dignitaries, who
grasped the power. Archbishop Lucas was practically
supreme, and it was he who preserved the throne for
young Stephen III. As a consequence, he was bold
enough to oppose the will of the king, and even to ex-

72

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

communicate him for wasting the treasures of the Church
in warfare.

The king was terrified, and humbled himself before
the archbishop, who thereupon removed the ban. The
fruit of his influence over the young king was the first
charter dealing with ecclesiastical matters.

Henry III. was the first king after the Conquest,
who succeeded to the English throne during his minority,
and it was during his reign that the provisions of Magna
Charta became effective. Archbishop Langton was all-
powerful in the State, and during the king's minority the
government was practically conducted by him and by the
great barons. Even when the king attained his majority
the barons were not ready to relinquish the power they
had tasted during his earlier years. A minority, placing
the supreme power as it did, for a longer or shorter time,
in the hands of the nobility, always furnished an occasion
for fresh demands of concessions.

The power thus gained, and the frequent humiliations
of the monarch, had a great effect upon the relations
between king and people.

The king's position was considerably weakened by
the circumstance that the laws relating to the succession
were as imperfect as all other branches of the civil law.
During subsequent centuries the principles governing
the succession became definitely settled. The rule indi-
cated by the words : " Le roi est mort, vive le roi ! "
strengthened and assured the position of the monarch, and
by its invariableness awakened respect for the royal line.
But during the period we are now considering only the
rights of the reigning family were recognised, and it was
by no means a settled matter which member of that
family should occupy the throne. This uncertainty bred
much animosity and contention amongst the members
of the royal family, and this in turn increased the self-
esteem and power of the nobles. Many a prince owed
his crown to the favour of the people. Aba Samuel, in
Hungary, had no other right to the throne but such as

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the will of the nation gave him. St. Ladislas was prac-
tically forced by the nation to occupy the throne, although
King Salamon was still alive. Popular risings gave
Bela I. and Geza 1. their crowns. Facts such as these
were deeply impressed upon the nation's memory, and
revived the ideas of ancient freedom and the people's
sovereignty. Those who had created a king were not
ready to surrender all their authority to their creature.

Even their descendants could not forget that the
ancestors of the reigning monarch had once sought the
goodwill of their forefathers. The custom followed by
the Arpad dynasty of handing over the government of
certain parts of the country to younger members of the
reigning family, had a similar effect. The disputes be-
tween these local rulers and the king gave rise to civil
wars, or rather, perhaps, partisan conflicts, and the need
of supporters in these struggles increased the value of
the nobles in the eyes of the contending rulers, while
those who were able to fight and to bring with them a
large following, were led to estimate more highly their
own importance. In England, no sooner had the Con-
queror died than his sons contended for the crown.
William II., with the aid of the barons, excluded his
elder brother from the throne, and Henry I. also gained
his crown by violence. Certain formalities were, never-
theless, observed. There was some kind of election, and
the king, at his coronation, took upon himself certain
obligations.

Even the mightiest kings felt themselves compelled
to win the support of the nobles to the succession of their
son and heir, lest their throne should become the prey
of some of their ambitious relatives.

St. Stephen spent the last years of his life in trying
to gain the favour of the aristocracy for his heir, Peter.

Kalman the Wise used both violence and indulgence
as his instruments for assuring the throne to his son.
This one consideration alone was enough to compel the
autocrat to pay some heed to the wishes of the people.

74

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

In England it led even the strongest kings to court
the goodwill of the barons and to make concessions.
The stern Conqueror became mild and friendly when
the succession came into question, and the powerful
Henry II. became reconciled even with his great enemy,
Thomas a Becket, in order that his son*s succession might
be assured.

The king*s power was also limited, as we have seen,
by the necessity he was under of associating with him-
self in the government of the country the leading ele-
ments of society. Many institutions to which former
centuries had given birth, and which had been the organs
of free government, still survived. In England both the
Norman and the Plantagenet kings gathered the leading
men around themselves. The Anglo-Saxon customs
had not died out, and the Anglo-Saxon ideal of freedom
lived on during the time of the Norman kings. It is true
that such institutions underwent considerable change,
yet the fact that they were an organic outgrowth from
the past added greatly to their strength. The constitu-
tion of the great council of the Norman kings is not
accurately known. Very probably it was composed of
the crown's vassals alone. It had no well-defined sphere
of activity. The place of a legal constitution w^as held
by customs, and these fluctuated with the changing
political situation. The duties of the council were to dis-
cuss any great military enterprise ; to determine what taxes
should be levied ; to act in a judicial capacity, and gener-
ally to advise the king w^hat his own interests or the
power of the nobles demanded. The councils were
sometimes larger, sometimes smaller, but those always
attended whose power rendered their aid valuable and
their demands weighty. William I. and Henry II. sum-
moned a council to increase their own strength. Stephen
and John Lackland were driven to the same course by
sheer necessity. It w^as of the highest importance in its
influence on the development of the constitution that
councils met thus from time to time, and played a decisive

75

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

part in weighty affairs of State. Posterity was spurred
on by the example, and the claims of later ages found
in these councils their precedent and their legal basis.

In Hungary, events tobk a similar path. The
Arpad dynasty also maintained the institution of national
councils. These did not entirely resemble the English
councils, for they rested on broader fourwJations, and
preserved more nearly their original form. They did not
consist exclusively of the feudatories of the crown, but
comprised all the free members of the nation. All who
were strong enough to claim a share in the management
of public affairs attended. The first attempt at a system
of representation was made by B^la I. This king,
strong in the affection and esteem of the people, sent to
every town a summons to choose two men to represent
it upon the council. The pagan element of the popula-
tion, however, offered such a stubborn opposition to the
scheme that the attempt failed, and the personal attend-
ance of all free men who chose to be present remained
the rule. How many actually availed themselves of their
right, it is impossible to say. Several formulae have
come down to us which show that the councils had
not all the same composition. St. Stephen, in a letter to
his son, draws a distinction between the younger men,
whose most appropriate employment was the pursuit of
arms, but who, nevertheless, might gain admission to the
council, and the ''more valued and experienced, the
eminent and venerable elders of the nation," without
whose advice a king should determine no important
matter, and who were pre-eminently members of the
council. . One of the laws of St. Ladislas runs as
follows: — "We, the heads of the Hungarian Kingdom,
in full council assembled," and another begins: "Under
the presidency of King Ladislas, we, all the Bishops and
Abbots, together with the king's vassals, on behalf of
the whole of the clergy and people, in council assem-
bled."

When King Kalman the Wise saw the decline of

76

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

the council, and the diminishing respect for the Court
which accompanied that decay, he assembled the chief
men in the kingdom, and with the aid of the country's
whole senate, examined and revised the laws of St.
Stephen. Otto von Freisingen, speaking of the Hun-
garians in the reign of Geza II., said that "all the nobles
go to the king's court, each taking his chair with him,
and there continually discuss public affairs, and during
the inclement months of winter, they do so in their own
homesteads."

The charter in which Stephen III. granted certain
privileges to the Church ends with the words : " And all
the above privileges are to be regarded as decisions of
the Council, consisting of his Majesty's exalted mother,
the queen, the archbishops, bishops, bishops-elect,
priors, abbots, heads of counties, vassals, and others."
And in a document of the time of King Emmeric, we read
of the "Common Council of the whole nobility and
gentry of the country."

From these formulae we must conclude that there
were two kinds of councils — a smaller one, consisting of
noblemen and church dignitaries, w^hich was the chief
organ of the king's government, and was the one called
by King Stephen the Council of the Elders, and a great
national council, in which all free men, including those
W'hom King Stephen styled "the Younger," were en-
titled to take part. Sometimes the king held a conference
with the population of certain districts. The intervals
at which such meetings were convened probably de-
pended more upon the necessities of the political situa-
tion than upon any established law. It was naturally
no easy matter for a large number of people living far
apart to come together and to find accommodation in the
same town, and for this reason it happened that the
smaller council, which was probably the standing coun-
cil of nobles, met more frequently than the general
council. The latter was only convened in exceptional
cases, if, for example, the king desired to win the good-

77

DEVELOPiMExNT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

will of the multitudes, or if he were threatened by a rival
against whom he wished to gain the help of the majority;
if he desired to make such laws or innovations as he
thought would awaken interest and sympathy in differ-
ent strata of the people; if he intended to lead the assem-
bly straight against an enemy, or if some general dis-
content or rebellious spirit compelled the king to hear
the people.

The functions of the different councils were not
clearly defined. This alone made it possible for one to
take the place of the other. Probably neither had any
rights which were granted by the law to it exclusively.
vStrictly speaking, all political power belonged to the
king. The people only had so much influence as the
situation gave them, or the king was inclined to con-
cede.

The prudent St. Stephen gathered round him the
most eminent men, not because he did not feel entitled in
his ow^n right to make laws which should be binding -upon
the whole nation, but merely because, as he said, "the
discussion was useful.'* "If thou meetest with the wise,
thou shalt be wise." This was the principle of that
eminent monarch, who became the second founder of
Hungary. He saw that it was not prudent to decide
alone in all things, for it must lower the king in the
eyes of his subjects if criticism and dissatisfaction should
alw^ays be turned against his person. To his son he
gave the advice: "Judge not in person, lest when med-
dling with low concerns, thy royal dignity should
diminish." And also : "Beware of being a judge." He
appears to have wished the heads of the nation to have
a share in the responsibility of legislation, and it was
aI^^'ays in the council, therefore, that he exercised his
functions as a legislator. In the code of St. Ladislas,
the hand of the king is nowhere to be detected. It would
appear that all the laws were framed and introduced by
the nobles. In another code, the king is mentioned, but
only as president. Stephen III. ascribes the introduc-

78

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

tion and enactment of a law to certain nobles whom he
mentions.

It appears, therefore, that the final decision in im-
portant matters rested sometimes with the council and
sometimes with the king. The members of the council
discussed every question, and had a hand in all the
affairs of State, yet their co-operation was not indispen-
sable. They made laws affecting Church and State, and
administered them, but there was nothing in the con-
stitution to prevent the king from acting on his own
sole authority. King Kalman once replied to the Doge
of Venice that **the proposed peace w'ould not be binding
enough if contracted without the consent of the council."
It was not that the king had no right to decide alone, but
that he perceived his resolutions to need the Council's
approbation in order to be effective. This view of the
situation is characteristic of the times as well as of the
wisdom of Kalman. Though the king w^as under no
compulsion to summon a council, yet the political
exigencies and the actual distribution of power fre-
quently rendered such a step necessary. And in Hun-
gary, as in England, it was of the first importance to
posterity that these councils survived, even during the
period of great monarchical power, and played a decisive
part in the most important affairs, in legislation, in
problems of succession, and in political and financial ad-
ministration.

Their survival rendered it unnecessary to create them
anew in later times, as had to be done in France. They
originated when the nation first occupied its European
home, and they accompanied it along its path of pro-
gress. A halo of antiquity surrounded them, for their
institution was older than that of the crown itself, and the
nation firmly believed that the kingship owed its origin
to the free will of these councils.

The English as well as the Arpad kings, though
driven to obtain the aid of the leading men in the
government of the country, endeavoured to keep the

79

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

management of public affairs in the hands of their own
nominees. But, in spite of their efforts, they were
obliged to accept the principle of hereditary succession
and to make some part of the State's machinery indepen-
dent of central control.

The king needed the support of the nobles, and as
the gifts of estates was not a sufficient inducement, he had
to surrender some part of his political power itself. In
England, the greater dignities, with the powers and
duties attaching to them, tended to become hereditary.
The king tried to counteract the effect of this by creating
new offices and investing their holders with some of the
functions formerly exercised by hereditary and territorial
nobles. Yet, contrary to his interests, the greater earls,
especially the earls palatine, wielded almost sovereign
powers; in some cases, even the office of sheriff descended
from father to son, and the baronial courts exercised im-
portant jurisdiction. The administration thus fell into
many hands. Very often, too, the great landowners
were little less than kings within their own domains,
though their autonomy had no legal foundation.

In Hungary, similar tendencies were to be observed.
It is true that the kingdom of St. Stephen was not based
on feudalism, like that of William the Conqueror, and
it was, therefore, easier for the king to oppose the ten-
dency of dignities to become hereditary. Moreover, no
foreign country influenced Hungary by its example,
whereas the feudal system of Normandy had a well-
marked effect upon England. Yet it proved as impossi-
ble in Hungary as in England to prevent the offices at-
tached to the ownership of great properties from becom-
ing hereditary. The causes making for decentralisation
bore their fruit in Hungary too.

In the Golden Bull the king declared that the office
of lord-lieutenant of a county could not be inherited, nor
could other offices. But the monarch was often obliged
to part with his prerogatives in order to gain the help or
goodwill of some powerful family, and some of these

80

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

acquired a certain sovereignty over their serfs and re-
tainers.

But this was not the chief difficulty with which the
king had to contend. Encroachment upon the mon-
arch's sovereign rights was the exception in Hungary as
in England. Had the king been able to obtain the same
absolute control over the executive as was subsequently
gained by Louis XIV. of France, or Frederick II. of
Prussia, his power would have been enormous. But this
he could not accomplish.

The Norman kings of England had, as a rule, the
right of appointing the vice-comites or sheriffs who
represented locally the royal power. The Arpad kings
in Hungary exercised the same right over the lieutenants
of counties and the lower officials.

Nevertheless, the whole administration was pene-
trated by a certain spirit of independence, because those
who held any office carried into it their personal fortune
and authority. Moreover, distance made effective con-
trol difficult and the central management of affairs im-
possible.

The principle of election, also, was introduced. In
England, the coroners were elected in the county courts,
while in Hungary the principle came to be applied in the
case of the less important offices, in the towns, and to
the committees entrusted by the law with the performance
of certain special tasks. But it was not the mere fact
of election which bred independence in the administra-
tion. That was due partly to the character of the men
who filled the various posts, and partly also to the general
state of affairs. The king only assented to the principle
of election when the danger lest all offices should be
seized by the nobles became imminent. In England the
powers of the sheriff were curtailed, and his place was
taken by justices appointed by the king from among
the country gentry. In Hungary, the lord-lieutenant-
ship of the counties was threatened with a similar danger,
for the office was rapidly becoming the exclusive preserve

81

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of the more powerful nobles. It was favourable to the
crown, therefore, that its supporters among the lesser
gentry sjtiould be given a share in the administration.
This reform kept the post to some extent under the
control of the king, but it need hardly be said that it in
no way affected the independent spirit of those who filled
it. It was characteristic of the king's difficult position
that he was constantly obliged to seek the help of the
newly elected officials against the long-established digni-
taries.

Before the growth of the monarchical power in the
two countries, both the Hungarian and the English
peoples enjoyed a great measure of freedom. They
lived in an atmosphere which developed their self-reli-
ance and ripened in their minds the knowledge that the
shaping of their future rested with themselves. The
limited power of the monarch could not transform this
national type. The pride of the upper classes was
fostered by their consciousness of power and by the
king's need of their assistance. And kings were usually
very careful in their behaviour towards them, especially
the more powerful monarchs, for these were nearly
always clever men, who knew their own interests. St.
Stephen, in a letter to his son, urged him very emphati-
cally to treat the nobles well. "If thou art peaceable,
thou shalt be called king. If thou behavest haughtily
towards the leaders and nobles, verily the strength of
thy warriors will be turned to the destruction of thy
realm, and they will betray thy country to foreign
nations. Eminent men shall be to thee as fathers and
brothers, for it is they who defend thy land, protect the
weak, conquer thine enemies and extend thy borders."
Where a king, who might have been formidable, held
such sentiments as these because his wisdom approved
them, and where only a short-sighted monarch could so
entirely misunderstand the situation as to despise men
whose help he needed, and whose power he could not
destroy, the nobles of the country could not become ser-

82

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

vile. Several historical incidents show that in Hungary,
as in England, the king could not prevent the boldest
freedom of speech. Bishop St. Gerard scolded King
Aba harshly, and ordered him out of the church, and was
never punished. We have already seen how Bishop
Lucas treated Stephen 111. Among state dignitaries we
meet with many such defiant characters. Even the iron-
handed and powerful Kalman had to give way on one
occasion. When he made war upon his brother, his
knights assembled and said: "We do not see the reason
for this strife. If they wish to appeal to the sword let
them meet face to face and the victor shall be our lord."
They refused to shed the blood of their compatriots,
and the king was obliged to yield. In the reign of
Stephen II. a still more defiant spirit manifested itself.
The king was on foreign territory when his whole army
refused to obey him. Its leaders declared themselves
against the war, as it was injurious to the country,
and they resolved to start for home. "If the king wishes
to fight, let him do so; they will elect another king at
home." The tyrannically disposed Stephen gave way,
and took what revenge he could later.

Such was the monarchy, and such the people whose
defiant spirit restricted the king's power more than written
law. The blunt candour of the period is expressed even
in its laws. In the Golden Bull, for instance, the intro-
duction states that the nation's liberty had been threat-
ened by the tyranny of such kings as were led "either by
their own revengeful spirit," or by "evil-minded counsel-
lors." In England, Thomas a Becket openly defied
Henry II. Simon de Montfort, when the king called him
a traitor, replied that "were he not king he should pay
dearly for the insult." On the occasion of the French
War of Edward I., the Earl of Norfolk refused to follow
the king to Flanders. Edward declared that the earl
should either go or hang, but the earl replied that he
would neither go nor hang. This repartee is character-

83

ty

DEVELOPxMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

istic of the barons' haughty and defiant spirit, which the
king was powerless to crush.

Even among the humbler classes, the temper was
the very reverse of servile. The self-respect of the Hun-
garian king's soldiers had always been considerable.
Between them and the highest nobility there was never
such a gulf as separated the different classes in England
after the Conquest. They all remembered with pride
that they were the descendants of the early conquerors of
the country. The simplest Hungarian squire thought
himself superior to nobles of alien blood. The codes of
laws show how much less inequality there \Nas in
Hungary than in any other country at that time. In
other lands, not even excepting England, the punish-
ments for the different offences varied with the rank of
the injured party. This inequality before the law did
not merely affect the distribution of privileges, but set
a different value upon human life under the different
circumstances enumerated in the codes. St. Stephen,
however, had other standards. The amount of punish-
ment was not to depend upon the social status of the
person wronged, but upon that of the wrong-doer. It was
not a matter of indifference whether the criminal belonged
to the aristocracy or to one of the humbler classes. The
state was injured most by a crime on the part of those
whose duty it was to set an example.

The unlawful act of a powerful nobleman, who
possessed castles and troops, endangered many more
persons and interests than that of others, and therefore
he deserved the severer punishment.

The legislation which embodied these principles was
a splendid proof of St. Stephen's wisdom and of the
nation's precocity. The king's idea could never have
been carried into practice had any great degree of
inequality existed. This product of the king's genius
and the nation's political sagacity served to nourish the
temper which rendered it possible, and although, in sub-
sequent centuries, differences depending on rank came

84

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

to be made in the blood-wite, yet traces of the original
principle might constantly be detected.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries the
higher aristocracy in Hungary was only in course of
formation, and as it was so severely controlled it never
succeeded in winning for itself that absolute obedience
and fealty which in France raised the great feudal lords
to a position of power eclipsing that of the king him-
self. The freedom-loving instincts of the rest of the
nation, which had never borne the yoke of tyranny,
became a powerful factor in securing constitutional
liberty. King Aba counted on these classes to help him
to withstand foreign influences and the nobles. Later
on, the bulk of the gentry in their endeavour to maintain
the ancient principle of equality in the teeth of the great
feudal lords, became the natural allies of the crown.
Their class developed under the king's protection, and
this alliance increased their self-respect, until at length,
as an acknowledgment of their support, they were con-
ceded privileges from which sprang some of the most
valuable elements in the constitution.

Class differences were more marked in England.
They had their origin in Normandy, and were trans-
planted into the new country. They were accentuated by
the circumstance that class distinctions coincided with
distinctions of race. But the king's struggles with the
nobility involved the speedy emancipation of the lower
classes. The Saxon race was often flattered in order
to secure its support against Norman disobedience. If a
king was in difficulties he suddenly remembered the
ancient glories of the Saxons, armed them and led them
to battle against the revolting barons.

William II. and Henry I. acted thus, and the possi-
bility of their doing so was one of the chief props of their
power. This state of affairs increased both the self-
esteem and the political ambition of the lower ranks of
society. They could not fail to be deeply impressed by
King Henry's appeal to them for assistance, nor could

85

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

they easily forget such words as "the king fears not
the barons nor any of the Normans, so long as the
Saxons are for him." Henry gave them a charter, and
although he broke his promises, yet the promises them-
selves indicated the growth of the popular hopes and
claims.

We may say then, that the two centuries we are now
considering, owing to the political conditions which
obtained, witnessed a considerable development of the
spirit of freedom among the upper and middle classes of
both England and Hungary.

There was also a rapid increase in the number of men
skilled in the conduct of public affairs. In proportion
as the desire for freedom grew, the nation learned how
to use its freedom to advantage. As we have seen, large
numbers of the country's leading men had some part
in public administration and legislation, under the guid-
ance of the king. This fact was of immense importance.
It awakened in the nation the capacity for government
and trained them to appreciate the real sources of power.
It made them practical in their way of thought, and
taught them political self-control, adding to the passion
for freedom that measure of discipline, without which
there can be no healthy organism nor sane political life.
We have now considered the public institutions
and the general temper which developed side by side with
the royal supremacy, up to the commencement of the
thirteenth century. If we study the legal enactments we
are struck by the extent of the royal power, but when
we contemplate the real political conditions, we see that
the power really remained in the hands of the nation,
for without its aid the king was helpless; he was
obliged to govern according to the will of the nation,
provided that the nation had a will and was persistent
enough. The leading classes in the country displayed
therefore a great deal of independence, and they gained
considerable experience in statecraft. In the centre, as
well as in the provinces, the various institutions offered

THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF A CONSTITUTION.

a sphere of activity to the more capable men, and while
the institutions trained the men, at the same time the
men developed the institutions.

But neither the functions of the different institutions,
nor the rights of the various classes nor of individuals,
were defined by law. Sometimes the people broke down
all barriers and humiliated the royal power itself, while
at other times they became the victims of the king's
autocracy.

Such a state of things could not be final. Society,
as it progressed, sought instinctively to determine by law
the relations between its constituent parts. The power of
the monarch was kept within bounds by living forces.
Traditions of the past — ^the days of the Hungarian and
Anglo-Saxon chieftains — kept alive the idea of liberty.

Amongst a people whose minds were fed by such
memories, there naturally sprang up such customary
rights as the advancing nation, with its increasing
culture, desired to see converted into legal rights, as a
bulwark against kingly despotism. Men wished the
kingship, limited in its power in fact, to be transformed
into a legally restricted constitutional monarchy. Custom
had to harden into law.

This work was begun by the thirteenth century. The
spirit of liberty, inherited from the past and not crushed,
but only disciplined, by kings, revitalised, and made
fruitful those institutions which had survived as
remnants of the old autonomy, and were a defence
against absolutism. The different constituents of the
nation, aware of the actual distribution of power, en-
deavoured to bring about a corresponding distribution of
rights. They were certain to succeed, because the people
when united were stronger than the king, they were able
to make a good use of their victory, that is, they really
had the ability to govern themselves, and their claims
were natural and moral.

Those who had long shared in the responsibilities
of government were entitled to the possession of rights.

87

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Their claims were based on the common foundation of all
rights, whether of prince or people, their ability, namely,
to contribute to the common good. Their victory, how-
ever, was but one step towards the goal of a just constitu-
tion. Great ends are never achieved at a single stroke.
Nature shows no favour to hasty projects, and grants the
laurel wreath only to persevering effort which keeps fhe
end ever in view. The achievements of the thirteenth
century were but a foundation, upon which later genera-
tions had to rear the superstructure, but they were epoch-
making, nevertheless. The long-cherished ideals of
liberty and self-respect became partly realised in funda-
mental laws, and pointed out the direction of future
progress. In the thirteenth century England and
Hungary trod a new path, from which they never after-
wards deviated.

88

THE CHARTERS.

CHAPTER V.

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. STEPS

TOWARDS FREEDOM IN ENGLAND AND

HUNGARY. THE CHARTERS.

During a period of 150 years the Norman and Saxon
races became reconciled to one another through the uniting
influence of comm.on work and service. As this
reconciliation progressed the nation felt less and less need
of the monarchy, and bore its rule with less goodwill.
The different classes of the community were working
together under the leadership of the king, and a kind of
alliance sprang up between them. Common oppression
awoke the spirit of common resistance. The aristocracy
was eager to secure the support of the lower classes, while
these, on the other hand, gladly accepted the nobles as ^
their leaders. The demands of the various orders of the
community became harmonised, and led to the formation
of a national programme. The fruit of this alliance was ^^
Magna Charta. Efforts had been made before, but none
had achieved such a great result. King John was the
enemy of all classes, and in his isolation he was obliged
to yield to the demands of the nobles. In granting the
Charter, the king did not aim at creating a new consti- t^
tution, nor did he dream of transforming the existing
State in accordance with theory. He took but little
interest in the government of the country. His chief
care was to assert the rights of the individual and of )
society, according to old traditions, and to maintain the
feudal system.

The Charter defined the prerogatives of the Church.
Care was taken that the king should not be able to use

89

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

his power as a feudal lord in robbing his vassals. This
protection was extended to the subordinate vassals, and it
was of great benefit to the merchants and the towns.

Most important was the clause dealing with the
constitution of the National Council, enacting that the
chief vassals of the Crown were to be summoned
personally to the Council by royal invitation, and the
smaller vassals collectively. It was very important, too,
that the voting of taxes was placed in the hands of this
council.

The Council had existed before, and it had probably
been convened in accordance with the rules laid down
in Magna Charta. It had been consuUed when war
taxes were to be imposed, but its constitution had not
been settled by any law, nor had it possessed the legal
right of controlling taxation. The Charter provided this
legal sanction. In other matters, too, it operated in a
similar way.

It gave legal standing to customs which experience
had proved good, and which were in harmony with public
opinion.

Its aim was to protect society and its customs from
the arbitrary will of kings, and it added immensely to
personal security by establishing the principle that no
one should be imprisoned without trial.

These features gave the Charter historical importance
and made it a turning point in the history of European
liberty, for it embodied the two fundamental principles on
which personal and national freedom is based.

In Hungary the renascence of freedom was brought
about by the same causes as in England. Though the
histories of the two countries display many differences,
yet there is a great deal of similarity between them.

The need of a monarch was more keenly felt in
Hungary than it was in England after the fusion of the
two races, even if not quite so powerfully as it was before
that fusion. The efforts of the German emperors, and of the
Byzantine Emperor Manuel, to subjugate Hungary, made

90

THE CHARTERS.

the nation realise the great value of a strong and warlike
king. In England, on the contrary, the king had no
longer any special vocation.

The great kings, St. Stephen and St. Ladislas, won
such popularity for the Crown as the harder personalities
of the Norman kings were unable to acquire for it.
Consequently the struggle for rights commenced later in
Hungary than in England, and it took a different form.
In England, three despotic rulers, the powerful but cruel
Henry II., the vehement and adventure-loving Richard 1.,
rightly called Coeur-de-Lion, and the wilful, capricious
and grasping John, made the movement one directly
against the monarchy.

King John's opposition to reform forced the reform
party to place the power in the hands of the leading
nobles. The aim throughout was to prevent unlawful
acts by the king. Every article in the Charter seeks to
assure to the various classes their rights.

In Hungary, the situation was different. The Golden
Bull had been preceded by impotent government rather
than by despotism. The belief in the necessity of the
monarch had grown less strong. The nation had adapted
itself to its surroundings.

Christianity and western civilisation had become
deeply rooted, and the distribution of power among the
European states was more favourable, so that the consid-
erations which made the monarchy seem desirable had
grown weaker. Under these circumstances King Emmeric,
when engaged in strife with his brother, was unable to
maintain the prestige of the Crown.

His successor, Andrew, was of a luxurious, extrava-
gant, and vacillating character, and was quite unable to
preserve order in the State. His debts, and the unruliness
of his principal ministers, together with their utter
inability to execute the law, were the chief reasons for the
unhealthy state into which the nation had fallen.

The king himself broke the law, yet the greatest evils
were the usurpations of the powerful nobles, and their

91

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

grasping and insubordinate behaviour. A tyrant who
can prevent the unlawful deeds of others, is a less evil than
a king, who, while not himself respecting the rights of
others, is at the same time unable to force others to
respect the law.

Inequality in wealth and power between the members
of the nobility became so great that the poorer among
them saw their very freedom endangered.

Since the time of Bela III., the monarchy had become
so weak that it was quite unable to prevent the disintegra-
tion of society. Under these circumstances a twofold
reform became necessary. The nation had to guard itself
yy against the king's tyranny, but on the other hand, it had
to maintain and even to increase his power. Even the
faults of the monarch did not make the Hungarians forget
that they needed the monarchy, and that if this defence
were broken down, their country would become the prey
of their powerful neighbours. Though the danger from
abroad was not so great as in earlier times, yet the past
had left its impression upon the nation's mind, and the
racial differences between the Hungarians and their neigh-
bours kept alive a sense of the importance of national
unity.

The Golden Bull was an expression of these different
needs. It contrasts with Magna Charta in that it was
j designed to strengthen the king's power as well as to
assure to the privileged classes their rights. It determined
the rights of the nation in accordance with tradition in
respect to military service, taxation, inheritance, and the
administration of justice. All the nobles had equal rights.

While in England only the great feudal lords were
personally summoned to the Council, and while the
Charter only granted to vassals holding directly of the
Crown the right to attend the Council, in Hungary there
were no such differences, and every noble was entitled to
attend the King's Council, which had to be convened
every year.

Everyone present had the right to speak concerning

92

THE CHARTERS.

any injury he had suffered, and although the chief pur-
pose of the Council was the administration of justice, yet
it furnished opportunities for the discussion of political
questions as well. The nobles were all alike subject to
the jurisdiction of the king and the palatine, and there
was no trace of the feudal lawcourts. In short, no member
of the class of nobles had more rights than another. All
had equal right to own land, and to have a share in
political power, and were liable to the same military
service. The enormous actual inequality conflicted with
this theoretical equality, and had brought about an alliance
between the king and the bulk of the nobility, and one
of the chief purposes of the reform was to give reality
to this ideal of equality, and to oppose the exaggerated
ambitions of the oligarchs who took as their example the
nobles of other countries.

The Golden Bull established first of all the rights
of the Hungarian nobility, but its protection was extended
to their retainers, and also to foreign settlers. In this
respect the Golden Bull was not less liberal than Magna
Charta.

It did not by its form humiliate the king. The Bull
was so drawn as to appear to be a favour freely granted
by the king. It was not a contract between king and
nobles like Magna Charta, but a decree by the sovereign.

Its contents clearly show that it served to strengthen
the position of the monarch. It sought to defend the
monarchy from the greatest danger which then threatened
it, the lawlessness of the great nobles, and to ensure that
the momentary folly or weakness of the king should not
endanger the institution itself. It accomplished this by
decreeing that the title and estates of the county-lieuten-
ants should not be hereditary, thus attacking feudalism at
its very roots -

In France and Germany it was because similar
dignities were hereditary that the possessors of them
became powerful and independent princes. The Golden
Bull allow^ed county lieutenants to retain only their lawful

93

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

salary, the rest of the income had to be handed over to
the king. The king's jurisdiction extended over all, while
the English Charter recognised feudal jurisdiction, too.
Any incapable county lieutenant might be removed, and
it was unlawful for several offices to be held by one
man.

At the time of Andrew II., the power of the king was
weakened by the circumstance that preceding monarchs
had thoughtlessly given away large portions of their
estates.

Prince Bela, however, before the Golden Bull was
issued, endeavoured to regain possession of this
squandered property. His methods were violent and
offended many powerful interests, but as they served
the desired end of augmenting the power of the throne,
the Golden Bull had no word against them. The king
acted in the spirit of the Golden Bull when he examined
the various grants, and cancelled such as appeared to
him not to have been deserved, and it is characteristic that
the power to do this was given to him by the victorious
nobles.

One of the most difficult problems of statecraft is to
harmonise liberty with order. How many great nations
are still struggling with this problem, and how many
nations in the past have come to grief because of their
inability to solve it.

It is to the lasting credit of the Hungarians that as
early as the thirteenth century they were careful of this
twofold interest, and that even in the moment of victory
the nobles did not forget the interests of the State, but
endeavoured to strengthen the monarchy. In acting thus
they displayed so much wisdom and patriotism as to rise
above the creators of Magna Charta, that Charter so much
admired by the whole of Europe. Only in one point does
the Hungarian fall short of the English Charter, but that
one shortcoming had many grave consequences. Magna
Charta is superior to the Golden Bull in that it forbade the
demanding of the usual military aids without the consent

94

THE CHARTERS.

of the national council. The Golden Bull did not confer
such a right upon the Hungarian Council, and it gave the
nobility immunity from taxation. In England, the rela-
tions between the State and the various classes of the com-
munity were established upon a just foundation, and cus-
tom was replaced by definite laws, which proved the coun-
try's chief defence against the king in later times, when
the monarchical power had a regular paid army at its
command.

In Hungary, some centuries later, Count Stephen
Sz^chenyi and Louis Kossuth had to repair the defect
in the constitution, after the country had endured untold
sufferings, from which England had been saved by her
Charter.

Probably England's action in the thirteenth century
was determined not so much by the spirit of equality
and justice as by practical necessity. The Hungarian
monarchs also were strong enough to compel their
subjects to perform their duties. As we have
seen, the Hungarian nobles were in other respects
also less privileged than the English. How was
it then that in Hungary the nobles were able to shift from
their shoulders burdens which in England the most
powerful feudal lords had to bear? The main reason
was that in Hungary the State was less dependent upon
the taxes than in England. It was Kalman, one of the
greatest Hungarian kings, who abolished the tax of eight
denarii, which until his time had been paid by every
freeman. Had his situation been the same as that of
Henry I. and Henry H. of England, who reorganised
the system of taxation, and extended it to everybody, very
probably he would not have shrunk from acting similarly.
The Hungarian kings were able to dispense with some
portion of the taxes, and their military forces were better
organised than in England.

In both Hungary and England, every man was
theoretically obliged to fight in defence of his country.
The Arpad kings, however, had frequently to repel attacks,

95

/

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

so that in Hungary compulsory military service remained
a living institution, while in England it became almost
obsolete, as its enforcement was so rarely necessary.

As regards offensive operations, the Hungarian kings
had a still greater advantage. The Arpads rarely engaged
in wars of conquest, but in their retainers they had a
standing army, which could be employed even abroad.

The English kings frequently waged war in France,
yet they had no standing army at their disposal.

The aggressive wars of the Arpads were generally
brief incursions, while the Norman monarchs made con-
quests oversea, which demanded regular troops. The
English kings, therefore, had to compel some of the more
powerful nobles to supply the necessary men, and to
follow their monarch to the wars, and in return for this
assistance the nobles received grants of land.

Under these circumstances the feudal lords became
so powerful that the king could not safely rely upon
them.

If he had no money to maintain a paid army, or to
hire the troops of the nobles, he was condemned to in-
action.

The Hungarian kings were much more favorably
situated. St. Stephen did not give the dominions at
his disposal to a few great nobles, but divided them
among a number of smaller men. These dwelt near
together, and were under the eyes of the king, who could
see to it that they discharged the duties in consideration
of which they had received lands and privileges.

The bulk of the military power was supplied, not by
a few of the most powerful subjects, but by a large number
of subjects who were less influential, and less .able to
shirk their obligations. The Hungarian nation, more-
over, was less far removed from the nomadic condition
than the English, and the greater part of the people were
familiar with arms since peaceful occupations were not so
general as in England. Thus the Arpad kings were
strong, though they had not much money. Like the

96

U'

THE CHARTERS.

expenses of the royal household, and of the administration
of justice, the expense of warfare was largely met by
payments in kind. In England, on the other hand, the
king could not be powerful unless he was wealthy.

When public service is compulsory, administration
and defence can be conducted without very much
pecuniary sacrifice, but foreign warfare demands the
expenditure of large sums of money.

The different situations in the two countries demanded
different policies. The English kings needed money above
all things, and they accordingly revived the ancient rights
and customs by means of which the old Saxons kings had
raised money from their subjects, and which enabled the
great feudal lords to demand money from their vassals.
Taxation was gradually imposed upon all. The powerful
feudal nobles, who could best have offered resistance to
it, resigned themselves to the situation. They would
naturally have liked to escape the obligation, but they pre-
ferred paying a tax to carrying on warfare at their own
expense. Since the greatest nobles had to pay taxes, no
one could expect to be exempt.

In Hungary, on the contrary, the interests of the
king did not demand that taxes should be levied for the
purposes of war. The few denarii, which at first were ^
paid by all freemen, were so small a tax that the king
could remit it without embarrassing himself. Perhaps
it was even more profitable for him that the nobles should
assist him in reacquiring the estates which had been
alienated, than that the old taxes should be continued.

In any event the satisfaction to which the remission
of the tax gave rise, atoned for any financial loss.

These circumstances explain why universal taxation
was maintained in England, while it ceased in Hungary, j^
and why the right of imposing taxes was reserved to the
national council in England, and not in Hungary.

England suffered much from excessive taxation, which
bore heavily upon all orders of the community, so it was
only natural that Magna Charta should deal with it.

97

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Ancient tradition and public opinion were opposed to the
levying of taxes without consulting those who had to pay
them, and Magna Cliarta gave expression to this
opinion.

In Hungary no similar law was passed, because
taxation was more irregular, and did not fall at all upon
the more powerful nobles.

It was the different situation which made superfluous
in Hungary those enactments which the state of affairs
in England rendered necessary, and which are now seen
to be so valuable.

The detailed history of the origin of the Golden Bull
is unfortunately unknown, but from its contents we may
conclude that, as in the case of Magna Charta, all classes
combined to bring it into existence.

This is shown by the fact that the Bull defends the
interests of all, and deals with the demands of all.

It was probably the united strength of the nation
which compelled King Andrew to yield, but it is likely,
also, that the crown-prince, B^la, played a prominent part
in the transaction. Who was so well fitted as he to
harmonise with the king's interests a movement directed
against the king? His situation linked him both with the
king, and with the parties opposed to him.

Like the other princes, he was dissatisfied with his
father's rule, yearned for power, and was anxious to
ascend the throne. Having devoted all his energy to the
augmentation of the royal power, he must have found it
painful to see how his inheritance was being squandered
by his father. After the issue of the Bull, the rupture
between father and son became open.

It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that B6Ia
stood at the head of the party of reform, and this is
indicated by the circumstance that his rights are dealt
with in a separate paragraph of the Bull. In that party
it was probably he who represented the interests of the
State as contrasted with those of the various classes of
the community.

98

THE CHARTERS.

The backbone of the opposition to the king consisted
of the lesser nobility or gentry, as is shown by the
fact that the leading motive of the whole Charter is the
emphasising of their rights. Probably the higher nobles
were not opposed to the Bull, for they were possessed of
such power that had they placed themselves in opposition
to it they must have provoked a conflict which would have
left some trace. The Bull was not directed against the
nobles, it only sought to hinder some of the more powerful
of them from using their power against the public weal.

In declaring that the sons or brothers of nobles
holding high offices and dying in war, are to be ade-
quately compensated by grants of land, it openly favours
the great. There is not one clause in the Bull which
could off"end the higher nobility by conferring exceptional
privileges on the lesser nobles, as was attempted during
later class contests. On the contrary, the clause em-
powering the Palatine, the Ban, and the Court Judges of
the King and Queen to unite several dignities in their
own persons, and also the clause entrusting the Palatine
with the execution of the law, seem to indicate that the
higher nobles were powerfully represented in the move-
ment. The Palatine must have been a dominant person-
ality among the reformers, for the temper of the age
leads us to suppose that it was not any legal consideration,
but the confidence which they reposed in him, which led
the people to seek in him a support of the law. Probably
the only opposition to the Bull came from those who
profited by the king's prodigality, and who unlawfully
held some of the crown estates ; all others were driven by
community of interest into the ranks of the reformers.

Thus the Golden Bull appears to have been the fruit
of a national coalition, and in this respect also it resembles
Magna Charta, with the difference that in England the
pivot of the movement was the aristocracy, while in
Hungary it was the gentry.

The royal power had preserved the unity of the nation

99

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

during two hundred years. The various orders of the
people were united in service of the State.

They had learned to work together, and to pursue one
common aim. Thus it was possible, alike in England and
in Hungary, for a coalition embracing all classes to be
formed. This possibility was one result of the kingly
power. In France such national action was rendered
impossible by the disintegrated condition of the nation.

In England, the coalition was called forth chiefly
by the violence of the king, while in Hungary it was
due to the powerlessness of the monarch to maintain order
in the realm. But in both countries the national action
was directed to the same end, namely, the more accurate
definition of the legal relations between king and people,
and in both countries the coalition was certain to succeed,
because the united nation was stronger than the king.
The mediaeval monarchy, by maintaining the national
unity, rendered possible such an opposition to itself as it
was unable to overcome, and consequently was obliged to
acquiesce in the development of a freer constitution. The
king had to unite the various currents of the nation's
life into a single stream, or they would have been unable
to bear on their bosom the stately ship of the monarchy,
but that stream became so powerful that the vessel could
not oppose the current. Only in harmony with the
popular will could the king attain any result. He had to
reckon with the powers, which to some extent he had
himself created, and which forced him in the direction of
new aims-

The Golden Bull is a mighty national achievement,
restoring the ancient national liberty. Its plan embraces
the main interests of all the estates of the realm. In that
respect it is unique, and ranks higher than Magna Charta.
It does not disturb the harmony of national life by favour-
ing one class or interest too much. Like the English
Charter, the Golden Bull aims only at the restoration of
ancient rights.

100

THE CHARTERS.

These were great results, yet the question still
remained whether what the nation had embodied in its
laws would be realised in its life.

Both Charters summed up the achievements of the
past in the direction of freedom. Both had been made
necessary by repeated offences against the law. Whether
these offences would cease remained to be seen. How-
ever clearly the laws might be expressed, this expression
did not guarantee their execution. Doubtless, the way
was made easier to oppose injustice, but much remained
to be done in order to make the letter of the law a living
reality.

The best elements of the nation devoted themselves
to this task during the years that followed. Great
Charters consummate the work of the past, but at the
same time set new tasks for the future. As links in the
chain of ceaseless development they mean both an end
and a beginning.

101

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER VL

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. STRUGGLE
FOR POLITICAL POWER. VICTORY OF THE
MONARCHY IN ENGLAND. EXAGGERATION
OF FREEDOM IN HUNGARY. THE CENTURY'S
RESULTS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

The machinery for executing the law was primitive.
Both England and Hungary acted in the spirit of tlie
times when the emphasis was laid on the right of resist-
ance. Since in England the more powerful nobles had
extorted the Charter from John by force, and the leaders
of the nobility were the masters of the situation, it was
from their ranks that a Committee was chosen to secure
the execution of the law, and to prevent by force of
arms, if necessary, any infraction of it.

In Hungary, as all ranks had been concerned in the
movement, it followed naturally that armed resistance
became the right of every man of standing.

But neither the English nor the Hungarian method of
defending the nation's rights could answer. The English
method was dangerous because it enabled one party in
the State to stop the wheels of government at any
moment, and placed the king in an intolerable position of
subordination. The Hungarian method was also danger-
ous, because it made the individual a judge of both king
and law. Both ways were objectionable, because they
legalised civil war, and made of it, though it should be
the ultima ratio, the first means of the defence of popular
rights.

No constitution has ever been built up without resort
to arms. If this resort were absolutely impossible, free-

102

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

dom would be in danger, but it is a grave mistake to give
it legal standing, and raise it to the rank of a system.
Even during the Middle Ages it was a fault to plunge
a state into civil war.

Moreover, both methods were insufficient, the
English, because it was merely transitory, and the
Hungarian, because only the strong could employ it, and
because it made impossible any restriction of the nobles'
power as well as the restoration of the king's authority.

The unsatisfactory nature of both methods was
quickly realised. In England the clause concerning the
right of resistance was never renewed, and after a time
its place was taken by the right conferred upon the
Church of excommunicating those who broke the law.

In Hungary the Golden Bull laid upon the Palatine
the responsibility of seeing that the law was observed.
There too, in time, the clause concerning resistance was
replaced by the right of excommunication.

These means, however, led to no result. They were
either ineffectual, like the control exercised by the
Palatine, or else the power was placed in the hands of an
agency, which, while ready to stand up on behalf of its
own interests, like the Church, was not inclined to interfere
when others were wronged.

All this led to the conviction that the constitution
needed to be changed in order that the privileged classes
might govern, and it was this endeavour to reform the
constitution which shaped the history of the latter end
of the thirteenth century.

While the Charters had endeavoured to defend the
rights of the different classes against the central
authority, greater importance began to be attached to
the development of the constitution. The nation came
to see that private rights could only be secured by the
possession of effective public rights. Experience forced
Qpon both nations the need for a reform of the constitu-
tion, but just as the Charters had been somewhat different

103

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

in the two countries, so the reforms effected were differ-
ent.

In England, the Charter had been wrested from a
reluctant king, and if its provisions were not complied
with, the hindrance lay generally in the hostility and
the open or secret opposition of the monarch. John
had accepted the Charter, but tried to evade it. His
son, Henry III. wished to free himself from it. Accord-
ingly, the barons carried on an open struggle with the
king for power. It was their conviction that only through
their power could the Charter be made effective. In the
moment of victory great plans were conceived, and the
barons made an effort which greatly aided future
developments.

They endeavoured to confer all the powers of the
king upon the nobles. All that England attained to in
the nineteenth century, the barons tried to gain, not,
however, for the nation, but for themselves. The people
had not yet reached that maturity which would have
enabled them to manage the affairs of the State independ-
ently. Without a real king, the constitution could not
be defended against the nobles, either by the authority of
Parliament, or by laws, or by the economic strength of
the lower cl asses -

Progress is often checked by a power w^hich has
developed in the service of progress. Those who have
gained power in the struggle for freedom have often
used that power to extinguish freedom. This happened
in the case we are now considering. The nobles, while
fighting at the head of the nation in the sacred cause of
liberty, acquired such power as tempted them to misuse
it. Strong nations, however, can prevent the advantages
derived from the past from becoming the bane of the
future, and England would not sacrifice her liberty for
the sake of those who had formerly fought for that liberty,
but now opposed it.

Luckily, the intentions of the aristocracy were clear
enough. The nation could easily see that the humiliation

304

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

of the monarchy would not mean liberty for all classes,
but would merely establish an oligarchical tyranny.

The aristocracy was accordingly left to itself. It
was unable to achieve the end aimed at, and failed in
all that would have endangered the welfare of the country,
yet the struggle was not fruitless. Edward I. destroyed
the barons, and brought victory to the monarchy, but he
accepted such of the reforms advocated by his adversaries
as harmonised with his own interests.

In former times. Charters could be gained only in the
case of a weak ruler, so that the weakness of the king
was a piece of good fortune for the nation. But after
Henry III. the king's weakness was a misfortune, because
power was grasped by the oligarchs, and a reaction was
sure to set in which threatened all the greatest institutions.
Had the power of the monarch declined too much, the
same evils would have made their appearance as existed in
France.

Edward warded off the danger. His reign was a
fortunate thing for England. When he ascended the
throne his interests were identical with those of the nation.
His own welfare demanded that he should respect the
rights defined in Magna Charta. The king's power is
really much greater if he does not transgress the limits
assigned to him by law, and if he wins the confidence of
the nation, than if he fights for unlimited power and
estranges the hearts of his subjects.

But Edward's interests did not allow him to comply
with the extravagant demands of the barons — demands
which they had been encouraged to make by the weakness
of the king's predecessor. To yield to these demands
would have been to rob the monarchy of all reality.

The king's interests were identical with those of the
nation, while the aims of the barons imperilled the nation's
unity. Edward's great power, which brought him victory,
served also the interests of his subjects. The nation,
luckily for it, was passing through one of those rare
moments when the right man was in the right place, one

106

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of those critical moments when one man can do more
than an even greater man could do at another time.

Edward carried to completion the task of the
thirteenth century. He harmonised the aims of the two
parties which before him had stiffly oppos(*d each other.

The opposition of the monarch to the people's freedom
had placed the country in a difficult situation. Edward I.
was the first ruler who reconciled these interests, and who
raised himself above party considerations. On the one
hand, he preserved and augmented the strength of the
monarchy, without which it could not accomplish the tasks
assigned to it, while on the other hand he left room for
so much freedom as was essential to harmony.

In Hungary, as we have seen, the Golden Bull was
designed to adjust the relations of the various Estates
of the realm.

The authors of it paid due regard to the king's
authority, for they realised that freedom was impossible
in the absence of a strong king. The stubborn strife
of king against people which caused so much unrest in
England, was unknown in Hungary. There the interests
of king and nation were not opposed to one another, and
the absolute victory of the party of reform would not have
proved a blessing to the country. Everything depended
upon the question whether such institutions could be
established as should assure both the power of the monarch
and the freedom of the people.

The power of the oligarchy had to be broken, and
the rights of society guarded against the arbitrary will of
the king. One of these results could only be achieved
under a strong king, while the other seemed impossible
if the monarch was powerful.

The Bull could not accomplish what was expected of
it. It gave the king the right to take possession of the
royal estates which had been appropriated by the nobles,
but, on the other hand, it conferred upon individuals the
right of resistance to the king's orders. The privileged
classes contradicted themselves. What they created with

106

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

one hand they destroyed with the other. They gave a
mortal wound to the authority they desired to set up.
The difficult problem confronting the nation could only be
solved by a policy similar to that pursued by Edward I.

Bela IV. (1235-1270) set himself the task of finding a
solution. He threw himself with ardour into the most
urgent part of his task, the suppression of the magnates
and the restoration of the kingly power. For this great
work he possessed all the necessary qualities, and he would
probably have succeeded in warding off the danger of
the oligarchy without depriving the bulk of the people of
their rights, and in harmonising a strong rule with the
freedom demanded by the spirit of the age, had not the
Tartar invasion fallen upon the country like a thunderbolt.
The disastrous battle on the Mohi plain (1241), where the
Hungarians were utterly defeated, put an end for the tin^e
to the king*s activity.

The victory of the Tartars was largely due to the
small number of fortresses possessed by the Hungarians.

This state of things had to be altered, even at the
risk of undoing the work accomplished by the king in the
direction of reducing the magnates to subjection. When
the Tartars retired, two years later, the king built
fortresses wherever he could, or else obliged the towns or
the nobles to do so. To enable them to do this, it was
necessary to provide them with funds, so the king, who
had acquired considerable power by taking possession of
lands which former monarchs had alienated, now gave
them away again liberally. He created a powerful
nobility, which should break the power of the existing
one.

Politics often deal hardly with a man. If he desires
to achieve a certain object, and to serve the interests of
his country amid changing circumstances, he has often
to abandon his favourite ideas.

Bela granted to the Frangepans, and to the Counts
of Brebir, rights of a kind to which Hungarian public

107

y

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

opinion had always been hostile, as to something foreign
and dangerous.* The expression, '* barons of the land "
was then first introduced into the legal code. Dominion
over some counties was conferred as a permanent right
upon certain barons, who were directly responsible to
the king. Had Bela been succeeded by strong kings, this
nobility might have proved serviceable to the country ;
but the premature death of Stephen (1270-1272), and the
weakness of Ladislas IV. (1272-1290), led to a great
increase in the power of the magnates. The Csak family
and the Counts of Nemetujvdr attained a position quite
unsuitable for subjects. The unity of the nation became
endangered, while the wars and robberies of the magnates
impoverished the people, and made peaceful development
impossible.

The border counties fell entirely under the govern-
ment of some of the more powerful magnates.

This was the danger which the Golden Bull had been
designed to ward off. Now that the danger was present,
the struggle had to be begun again. The work which
had been interrupted by the Tartar invasion had to be
carried to completion. The bulk of the gentry, feeling
themselves equal to the magnates, were enthusiastic for
national unity, and placed themselves in opposition to a
development so discordant with the Hungarian genius.

The gentry, although they had of late been somewhat
kept in the background, had preserved their self-esteem
and had not abandoned their rights. Although the law
of 1267 introduced some distinctions between the lesser
nobility or gentry, and the barons, yet in regard to im-
portant rights, this law did not create any lines of division
between the various classes of nobles. The instincts of
the gentry, which had proved so useful in the early years
of the century, were still vigorous, and the king could
reckon upon finding in them a powerful ally, if he saw

♦The County of Modrus was given to the Frangepane. and the
County of Brebir to the Subics family, as hereditary poe-
seseione for ever.

108

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

clearly his task, and turned against the usurping
magnates.

Andrew III. (1290-1301) saw what he must do, and
set himself to do it. Ladislas IV. had felt the necessity
of allying himself with the gentry, but he was not suffici-
ently earnest and persevering to attain any important
result, so the task was left to Andrew — the same task
which, about the same time, was so brilliantly performed
by Edward I. in England, that, namely, of restoring the
dignity of the State. Andrew did not hesitate, but at
once revived the alliance with the gentry, and formed a
coalition directed against the oligarchs, similar to that
which had led to the issue of the Golden Bull.

The century closed amid struggles like those which
its commencement had known ; but now the difficulties
in the way of success were greater than formerly, for the
oligarchy had grown stronger. A favourable issue was
only to be hoped for if the king, gathering around him
the bulk of the nation, should make a determined assault
upon the magnates, leaving the question of extending
the people's freedom until after he had won the victory.
That was what Edward I. had done in England. His
conflict with Simon de Montfort was terminated before
he ascended the throne -

Andrew, however, was not such a resolute man as
Edward, nor had he so free a hand as the English king.
As a result of old traditions, he did not stand at the head
of a party devoted only to the king's interests. His
adherents followed in the footsteps of those who had given
birth to the Golden Bull. For many years they experi-
enced the bitter truth that the king did not respect in
practice the privileges which he had acknowledged in
theory, and they wished to remedy this as well as to
prevent the transgressions of the magnates. The diffi-
culty which had confronted the nation a century earlier
still pressed for a solution, namely, that to restore order
it was necessary to augment the king's power, and yet,
in order to defend the people's rights it w^as necessary to

109

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

restrict it. The gentry endeavoured to secure the results
they desired by the laws of 1291 and 1298, and it is worth
while to consider for a moment these achievements.

In 1291 it was enacted that counties were not to be
given away as hereditary possessions, and that the grants
which had been unlawfully made were to be revoked.
It was also declared that the lesser nobles or gentry need
not follow the barons to war without pay ; that the barons
were not to give shelter or protection to any condemned
person, and that their fortresses were to be destroyed.

In 1298 a still more severe law was passed against
the usurpers. The Parliament which passed it was held
in the absence of the magnates.

Severe penalties were attached to every infraction of
the law. Those who had wrongfully taken possession
of lands were to restore them within three months, under
penalty of confiscation of property, excommunication, and
exclusion from the ranks of the nobility. If the king
could not overcome rebels by means of the forces of the
country itself, he might apply for foreign aid. The
barons who forced any member of the gentry to render
military service were to be severely punished. Only
money coined at the royal mint was to be used, and any
persons minting money were to be deprived of their
estates.

These laws met the public needs, yet the execution
of them could only be secured by a strong central power,
for strong forces were opposed to them.

The gentry, however, either because they did not
trust Andrew, or because they were as anxious to gain
influence for themselves as to restore order, did not
increase the authority of the king, but endeavoured to
seize the executive power themselves. In 1291 it was
enacted that the king should be guided by the advice
of the noble class in the appointment of the Palatine and
the Treasurer. This attempt to gain a voice in the
appointment of prominent officials was not entirely novel,
for in 1231 it had been resolved that when the country

110

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

demanded it, a bad Palatine should be dismissed, but no
law had tied the hands of the king in the actual filling
of such posts until 1291.

This restriction of the king's power did not make his
task easier, nor did it strengthen the executive.

In England also, a voice in the election of the
principal officials had been demanded, not however, by
the king's adherents, but by his adversaries; nor did
Edward consent to the proposed reform, for he saw that
his task would be impossible of achievement if he had to
choose his instruments in accordance with the will of
others. It was unfortunate for King Andrew, and yet
only the natural outcome of the situation, that in Hungary
it was the king's allies who made the demand which in
other countries was made by the king's opponents. The
gentry began to make their influence felt in the provincial
administration also. It was proclaimed by law that
County Lieutenants were responsible to the Diet, and
that they would be rewarded for their merits, and punished
for their misdeeds.

The conception that every one concerned in the
administration should be responsible to one central power,
the king in Parliament, was great but barren. Administra-
tion could not be efficiently conducted even at the present
day if the County Lieutenants had to justify their pro*
ceedings to a Council held in the presence of the citizens
en masse. The liability to account made strong govern-
ment in those times simply impossible.

The County Lieutenant, hampered in this way, had
in addition, four noblemen appointed to attend him, whom
he w'as obliged to consult before deciding in any case
brought before him. When the Palatine travelled from
county to county to administer justice, the lieutenant and
his four nobles had to be present at his court, so that if
he should pass an unjust judgment, they might apply to
the king to annul it. They had the right of veto.

In 1298 this control was carried still further.

Ill

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Four nobles were appointed, in addition to the king's
commissioners, to investigate every case where there was
any suspicion of property having been illegally acquired.
The whole state was placed under the dominance of the
nobles. It was proclaimed that the Diet was to meet
annually, and that every nobleman had to put in an
appearance there, or incur certain penalties. The Diet's
control was extended to every member of the executive — •
even to the king himself, who could not act without the
assent of a council. It would seem as if the institution
of a responsible ministry had already made its appear-
ance, though in a different form. This Council was
entirely under the influence of the nobility, as it was from
that class that its members were elected by the Diet.

v^ The two laws of 1291 and 1298 embody principles of
very great importance. They did much to further the
cause of liberty, and were so much in advance of the age
as to awaken our admiration. Had the problem to be
solved been merely the curtailment of the royal power, and
the participation of the bulk of the nation in the work of
administration, they might have been successful.

It is interesting to compare these efforts with those
of the English barons during the period between Magna
Charta and the accession of Edward I., to compel the
king to respect the law. The English reformers also
desired to appoint a committee to control the king, but no
one was bold enough to declare that any acts of the king
performed without the consent of the committee were
invalid. Only the Hungarians conceived that plan, which
later experience fully justified. In England the members
of the committee over and above those nominated by the
king were chosen only by the barons, while in Hungary
the Diet and the entire class of nobles claimed that right.
The English committee not only took over the royal power
but stood in the place of Parliament (1258).

^ In Hungary the National Council was maintained,

and had to be convened annually. The control of the

112

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

whole administration was in its hands, so that it became
the most important institution of the State.

While the English efforts really served the aims of
the oligarchy, and placed the power in the hands of a
few families, the Hungarian laws endeavoured to estab-
lish the autonomy of the whole nation. But in Hungary
also the reformers overshot the mark, and tied the king's
hands so much that a reaction was inevitable, and the
final result was the same as in England. The constitu-
tion, founded upon the participation in administration of
the bulk of the people, was not in harmony with existing
conditions.

The law had given equal rights to all members of
the noble class, yet the actual differences in the power of
individuals were vast. How could an ordinary noble have
equal rights with a Matthew Csdk, when the one was able
to equip 8,000 soldiers and carry on war on his own
account, while the other had nothing but his sword. To
make the new constitution a reality, it was necessary that
the power of the oligarchs should be broken. This duty,
by law, fell upon the king. The country's future
depended upon whether the king could be induced to make
the effort. The theoretical excellence of the new constitu-
tion was of no avail if the oligarchy could not be crushed.
And there was little hope accordingly for the constitution,
for a king who was willing to suffer his rights to be clipped
by the people was not the man to subdue a powerful
baronage. A task which he could not accomplish when
his power had been greater, was still more difficult when
he found himself under the tutelage of the masses.

Andrew's death soon put an end even to the effort,
and now that the last of the Arpdd kings was dead, the
country was confronted by a great problem. The work /
commenced in the thirteenth century was still unfinished.
What could the country look for in the future? Could
a free constitution be harmonised with her other aims?

Before, however, going further, we must cast another
glance at the important events of the thirteenth century.

113

^xs

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

By the end of that century England and Hungary
had made great progress towards securing government in
accordance with law, but England had achieved the
greater result.

In both countries the effort had been made to give
Parliament the leading place among the organs of State
life. In Hungary the movement proceeded on lines which
were theoretically more correct than those followed in
England, and yet the result was not so satisfactory.

In England, both the king and his opponents
adopted a selfish attitude, yet it was found possible to
harmonise the conflicting interests, and reach a fortunate
denouement.

It is to be ascribed to the clear and powerful thinking
of a great man that the monarchy did not abuse its
victory, but by fulfilling the just demands of its adver-
saries, strengthened its position. The long struggle had
shown clearly that neither party could hope to gain an
absolute triumph over the other. Edward I. realised this,
and created a constitution which was of the nature of a
compromise, and which met the needs of that age, and
formed an excellent foundation for future generations to
build upon.

In Hungary the goal which king and gentry set
before them was an excellent one, but they were unable to
find the road to it. In theory they were in advance of
others, but in practice they lagged behind. Edward, above
all things, was strong enough to conquer his adversaries,
while Andrew was not, and after his victory he modified
the constitution to the extent which the state of develop-
ment of the country and the distribution of power
demanded. The Hungarians, on the other hand, created a
constitution which was too much in advance of the age
to endure. The more exalted political ideals led to less
permanent results than the compromise arrived at between
clashing extremes. Practical necessity provided a better
solution than theory.

Between the English monarch and the nobles, the

114

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

power was divided in such a way that each obtained that
tield of activity best suited to his capacity.

Edward declared that all maimers of common interest
should be decided in common, and thus accepted the
principle which is the foundation of constitutional govern-
ment. He placed the united will of king and Parliament
above his own sole will, and assigned to Parliament such
functions as, if well discharged, must make it the greatest
power in the State. It is true that in practice this theory
was often ignored, but the fact that the king had enunci-
ated it was in itself a great stride towards freedom.

Parliament had the right of voting war taxes, and
this alone was enough to give it importance. On the
other hand, Edward retained sufficient power and authority
to enable him to perform again the services which he had
rendered to the national cause in the past.

The executive power remained in his hands; the
principal offices were filled by his appointment, and he
was strong enough to keep the great nobles in order, and
to maintain peace throughout the realm.

At the end of the thirteenth century the monarch's
power could not place the achievements of Magna Charta
in jeopardy, yet it was great enough to make the country
considerable in the eyes of the outside world, and to
maintain the national unity. England had a compara-
tively free constitution, and yet the executive power had
not been weakened to such an extent as would make it
inadequate to its task.

Hungary did not reach such a favourable result.
There, two conflicting forces faced one another — exagger-
ated liberty and a strengthening oligarchy.

The great question which had been agitating all
men's minds had been that of the distribution of political^
power. In England everything seemed to turn on
whether Edward or Simon de Montfort would conquer,
while Hungary's fate appeared to depend upon whether
or not Andrew would triumph over the oligarchy. As
time went on, however, the importance of these conflicts

116

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

faded away. In England, and a few decades later in
Hungary under the Angevins, the great nobles were
forced to recognise the monarch as their master. The
wounds caused by former strife were healed, while other
events, at first regarded as of less importance, made their
influence felt more and more.

As has already been pointed out, the English reforms
led to happier results than the Hungarian efforts, but that
cannot be ascribed merely to the superior wisdom and
foresight of English statesmen. Even the greatest states-
men work for the present, and seek to meet the pressing
needs of the moment. It is rarely possible to judge
whether a law or institution which is good to-day, has
vitality enough to enable it to serve the nation's interests
centuries hence. Institutions which have struck root
deepest, and proved most permanent, have rarely been
originated with a view to the important part they were to
play. It is very largely a matter of chance whether an
institution which meets present necessities can also satisfy
the unknown needs of the future.

We have already seen that in England the more
burdensome nature of taxation led to that country's being
much more advantageously situated than Hungary in
regard to civil rights.

In Hungary the new tasks of Parliament were en-
trusted to the old organisation, while in England, largely
owing to the state of taxation, the organisation itself was
modified and improved. Magna Charta had granted to
every immediate vassal of the king the right of attending
the National Council, the more important to be summoned
personally, and the less important in general terms.

Simon de Montfort conceived the idea that other
elements of the nation should be represented in Parliament
besides the baronage, elements which had of late grown
in importance. Every borough was empowered to send
two deputies. Edward accepted this principle of repre-
sentation, and left the election of deputies to the counties
and the towns. Since that time the election of representa-

116

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

tives has remained one of the country's permanent institu-
tions. Without the necessity for any law altering any-
thing in Magna Charta, the national council was slowly
transformed, and the places of those who had been sum-
moned as vassals-in-chief of the Crown were filled by the
elected representatives of the counties.

The importance of this alteration is incalculable. The
place of the former crowd, which could never be relied
upon, was taken by a body which could be summoned
and kept together for a fairly long time, and which, on
account of its smaller numbers, was capable of serious
work. Only a body thus constituted could grow into such
a power as the English Parliament became.

The ancient system had been based upon the privi-
leges of one class, and that a class which had been
gradually losing the political importance which it
possessed in Norman times, while the new system enabled
the State to be represented by all the elements which were
occupied with the serious work of the country. The
consequences of this reform were never contemplated by
its authors. Simon de Montfort and Edward I. merely
acted under the pressure of necessity, and it was necessity
v/hich perpetuated the new system. Several classes of the
population supported de Montfort. It was his interest to
ally himself even with the poorer classes. It was impossi-
ble, however, that all of these should assemble in vast
masses, and this suggested to the Earl the idea of keeping
in touch with them by means of their representatives.
As the less important nobles among the vassals of the
Crown, who had in former times been summoned by a
general invitation to the king's council, were linked by
community of occupation to the subordinate vassals, and
to the freeholders, and as, moreover, their fortune and
education were similar to those of the latter classes, it was
natural that in the matter of the Council they should be
treated similarly, and that when representatives of these
classes were invited the general invitation to the direct
vassals of the Crown should cease.

117

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

How was it that the plan of representation, suggested
by momentary expediency, became permanent? It was
because it was found to be inevitable. The new system
supplanted the old, because it alone was adequate to deal
with the more frequently recurring need for taxation.

While the chief business of the Council was the
discussion of political and administrative matters, the old
system was fairly successful. It was quite sufficient if the
leading nobles put in an appearance, together with such
of the lesser nobles as were sufficiently interested in
politics to be willing to make the sacrifice involved in
attending, and the presence of the others was unnecessary.

But directly taxation became a pressing problem, the
whole situation changed, for the old system had long
shown itself incapable of dealing satisfactorily with it.
The council could only dispose of one part of the nation's
wealth, that namely, in the hands of the vassals of the
Crown. Public opinion was strongly in favour of the
principle that those who pay should have a voice in
determining the taxes. Magna Charta had not given the
council any right to vote other taxes than such as fell
upon their own class. It was a question also whether
those vassals who had been invited to the council, but
had not attended, were obliged to fall in with the decisions
arrived at in their absence. The council had no power to
impose taxes upon the towns, the subordinate vassals, or
the freeholders. It was frequently necessary for the
monarch, therefore, to discuss the question of taxation
separately with the various elements of the nation, in
different and sometimes distant localities

Directly these elements were represented in Parlia-
ment, the situation became much easier for the king.
Taxation could be decided upon at one and the same
time and place for the whole nation. The electoral
system created a body which could speak in the name
of all tax-payers.

The electoral system was favourable to the king, but
the noble class also was better off than under the old

118

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

regime. Every element of the nation was able to exert
some influence on public affairs, without having to bear
the burden of personal attendance at the council.

In Hungary, there were some cases of the election ^
of representatives, but, unfortunately, the system was not
able to establish itself. The reason is that the circum-
stances which made an elective system acceptable in
England did not exist in Hungary. The frequent sum-
moning of the council was not necessary, as the State
could do without its co-operation. Attendance at the
council, therefore, did not become an intolerable burden.
Nor did the bulk of the nation feel the necessity of taking
part in every meeting.

The council chiefly dealt with those great political
questions to which lesser men are generally indifferent.

Moreover, such men were not confronted in Hungary,
as they were in England, by the dilemma that if they
attended they were involved in great trouble and expense,
and if they did not attend they could not defend them-
selves against the imposition of unfair burdens. Then,
too, more men would have lost by an electoral system
in Flungary than would have gained by it, whereas in
England the reverse was the case, for in England, on^}''
the king's direct vassals were members of the council, and
when, therefore, the counties sent representatives, the
lesser vassals of the king were indeed losers, but the other
elements of the nation acquired new rights. The English
council was so constituted that only by a radical trans-
formation could it incorporate such elements as were
becoming increasingly important, for the direct vassals of
the Crown did not increase in number. In Hungary, on
the contrary, the noble class could easily be increased,
and already in the thirteenth century, it embraced the
majority of the wealthy, intelligent, and respected
members of the community. There was, therefore, an
easy access to the national council, which all members of
the nobility were entitled to attend. Without the need for
any radical change, the council could include all who

119

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

^vere worthy of a place in it. It was a result of the steadily
pursued policy of the Arpdds that the nation, so far as
intelligence and political influence were concerned, became
more and more identical with the noble class. The king
needed the support of the many against the few powerful
oligarchs, and he, therefore, extended the borders of the
nobility, giving all the better elements of society access
to it. Accordingly a system of election would have
restricted the rights of the large and important class of
the lesser nobles or gentry, as they were later called.

The transformation effected in England was possible,
because the county, with its shire-moot or county court,
was an old and firmly-established institution, which had
been taken over by the Normans from the Anglo-Saxons.
The shire or county was a unit for fiscal and military
purposes. The county court was a representative body
which exercised important functions, and brought together
the various elements of society within the county.

In Hungary, the county system had not gained so
strong a hold upon the mind of the nation, but was only
just beginning to be a centre of political life. The pro-
vinces were not sufficiently well organised to allow of their
sending strong arid really representative men to the
council.

In one other important point, also, England acted
with greater sagacity than Hungary. Simon de Montfort,
in order to acquire strength for the impending struggle,
invited to Parliament representatives of the towns which
favoured his party, and this practice persisted after his
death. Why was it that in Hungary access to the
council was not granted to the burgesses of the towns ?

In England the towns were of great importance, and
their burgesses were wealthy, and paid heavy taxes.

Under the Norman and early Plantagenet kings, the
amount of contribution from each town had to be settled
locally by discussions between the king's officers and the
towns, but when Parliament became the recognised
instrument for voting taxes, it became natural to discuss

120

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

such matters with the representatives sent by the towns.
It is true that these representatives were not at first con-
sidered equal to the other members of Parliament. They
were only invited because of the taxes they were to con-
tribute, and they had to vote these taxes independently of
the rest of the council, but in time they fused with the
others, and their real importance secured them equal
rights.

The importance of these events only became manifest
in later times. As the representatives of the counties
were sent for the same purpose as those of the towns, the
similarity of the part they had to play bound all the elected
representatives together into a group distinct from the
lords. From them the House of Commons as we know
it to-day developed. In time the conception of common
rights created a kind of unity among the middle classes.
The esprit de corps prevaiHng among the elected represen-
tatives extended to their constituencies. The power
possessed by the House of Commons was largely due to
the fact that it was backed up by a strong and united
middle class.

Of all these results but little was foreseen by the
authors of the representative system. Their desire
had merely been to get in the taxes in the easiest man-
ner. Yet the merit was theirs nevertheless. No states-
man can be expected to do more than meet the needs
of his own times. If a statesman is too much given to
hazy dreaming of the future he is not likely to accomplish
much.

Unfortunately the conditions prevailing in Hungary
during the thirteenth century did not render it necessary for
burgesses to be invited to Parliament. The comparatively
uncivilized inhabitants of the country had not founded
important cities before the coming of the Hungarian race.
Nor did the nomadic Magyars immediately do so. It was
not until the thirteenth century, and more particularly the
time of Bela IV., after the Tartar invasion, that any great
attention was given to town building. Even then only the

121

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

first steps were taken, such as had been taken by the
English as early as the reign of Henry II. All that the
settlers in the towns needed as yet were certain local
privileges. They were mostly foreigners, who took no
very keen interest in the welfare of the country, and as
the budget was not dependent upon taxation, there was no
necessity on that account for their representation in Parlia-
ment. Had there existed a politician who was able to see
with a prophet's eye the future importance of the towns,
and who endeavoured to secure a place in Parliament for
the burgesses, his effort would have been unsuccessful.
The reform of the English Parliament was brought about
by the urgent needs of every-day life. At first it was
because of the French wars that the king continually
needed new taxes, and so he gathered round him the
chosen representatives of those who paid the taxes, but in
doing this he was creating an institution eminently fitted
to safeguard the rights of the nation.

The situation in Hungary was widely different.
There was no continual need of fresh taxes. St. Stephen
did not restrict the national council so much as the Nor-
man kings did. The existing institution had not been
proved by experience to be utterly inadequate, and no
radical reform appeared to be called for. Society, again,
was not so well organised as in England, for the nation
was young.

The Normans had found a well-developed Anglo-
Saxon kingdom, and they maintained many of its social
and governmental institutions. Arpad, however, found no-
thing of that kind in the country which he conquered.
His followers were so different from the primitive inhabi-
tants that he could make no use of any existing institu-
tions, and accordingly destroyed them.

The conquerors themselves were not so civilized as the
Normans. They did not bring from Asia the customs and
traditions best fitted for a nation dwelling within well-
defined boundaries. The Hungarians had first to form the
right conception of a state, and to adapt themselves to it,

122

13TH CENTURY POLITICAL STRUGGLES.

so that during the thirteenth century they had still to create
the machinery which in England had long been working.
It was then, however, that the Hungarian counties were
formed into autonomous bodies, and the towns also began
to acquire self-government.

In this direction, the achievements of the thirteenth
century proved more important in Hungary than in Eng-
land. In the original Hungarian community there were two
important classes — the dwellers in the fortified towns, and
the free nobility. The first were subject to the county
lieutenant, who was supreme in military, judicial, and
general administrative affairs within the county. The free
nobles were quite independent. They administered justice
within their own domains, and were in no way subject to
the king's officials, the lieutenants of the counties. The
new county was built upon the ruins of this dual system.
The wealth of the community became more distributed.
The clan system gradually broke down, and the county
organisation absorbed most of the nobility. The primitive
county system had for some time been decaying. The
pecuniary and social standing of the population of the
fortress towns had become more and more unequal ; some
had sunk to the level of serfs, some again, by good luck
or merit, had risen to the ranks of the gentry or lesser
nobility. It was fatal to the old organisation that enor-
mous tracts of crown property, together with the power
they gave, had drifted into the hands of the great nobles.
The pride of the rest of the nobles, however, could not
endure this usurpation by a few great lords of power which
ought to belong to the king and the people, so king and
gentry allied themselves against the oligarchs. This was
effectuated in the provinces by the dwellers in the fortress
towns, which had formerly been the strongholds of the
great nobles, and the wealthier gentry, entering into direct
touch with the monarch, and ignoring the county lieu-
tenant. In the second quarter of the thirteenth century the
inhabitants of the counties began to gain autonomy. It
was they who made wrong-doers feel the rigour of the

123

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

law. The king invited the nobility of the counties to
discuss with him matters of local interest. These nobles
followed the king to battle under the banners of his
generals.

It was at the same time that the county began to elect
officials. The office of szolgabir6 (a kind of sheriff),
the earliest county official, dates from that period.

When the counties, or when the gentry of the coun-
ties, gained more and more influence upon the county
councils, a certain esprit de corps was certain to spring
up. An organised whole somewhat resembling the
English county was crccited, and in time this new organi-
sation was able to recreate the national council, which had
long reflected the general disorganisation of society, and
to mould it into its own likeness.

Probably the new county system was the most impor-
tant of all the achievements of the thirteenth century in
Hungary. It was brought into existence by the necessi-
ties of the moment, almost unnoticed, yet it endured for
centuries and has constantly remained the foundation stone
of the constitution.

124

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

CHAPTER VIL

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.
THE ANGEVINS.

The death of Andrew III. in 1301 put an end to a
great historical process. The efforts to achieve the
nation's freedom which the thirteenth century wit-
nessed had not yet been crowned with success
when the last Arpad king died. The power of
the monarch, indeed, had been restricted within
such narrow Hmits that it became doubtful if it
was sufficient to maintain the nation's unity, but
the magnates on the other hand, in defiance of theoretical
equaHty, had acquired such power as to become a menace
to the nation. The extinction of the Arpad line was there-
fore a tremendous blow, for it came at a time when the
national unity was again in danger. The throne had
to find a new occupant at the very time when it was least
likely that so grave a problem could be solved peacefully.
The existing order of things was tottering, and the
country's welfare needed more than ever energetic and
clear-sighted leading.

The free election of a monarch can easily give rise
to great disturbance, especially in a country where the
various elements are already in conflict with one another.

There were many related on their mother's side to
the Arpad line, as, for instance, Wenceslas of Bohemia
(1301-1304) and Otto of Bavaria (1305-1308), who were
anxious to claim the throne. Who would not be capti-
vated by the thought of wearing the crown of St. Ste-

125

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

phen ? The situation was made more difficult by the can-
didature of Charles of Anjou, which introduced a question
of principle into the contest.*

The question was not merely who should be king,
but whether the Crown should be independent of the
Pope, and there was also the important constitutional
question whether succession should be based upon in-
heritance or upon free election. The threads had become
so entangled that a peaceful denouement seemed almost
impossible.

The conflicts which occurred during the time of the
"Mixed Dynasties" are generally ascribed to the fact
that the principle of election was adhered to. It is true
that the election of the monarch often proved the spark
which set the fuel ablaze, but that was because the cir-
cumstances were so remarkably difficult. One of the
candidates for the throne was supported by the Pope and
by one of the most powerful forces in Hungary, the
national church. Such a candidate could not be slighted,
but neither could he be elected unanimously, because he
professed principles which were repugnant to the people's
strong national sentiment. The strife kindled in this way
did not die down for years. No king was able to win
the allegiance of the whole nation, and Hungary remained
without any strong controlling hand. The important
work of curbing the powerful barons was postponed.

Such of them as possessed a fortress and an armed
force, or had influence as electors, were masters of the
situation, and the rest, and particularly claimants to the
throne, sought to curry favour with them. It seemed as if
the process in which the whole nation had been concerned
since the time of the Golden Bull would end in the triumph
of the barons. The powerful national sentiment, how-
ever, warded off this danger.

Whether or not an institution is a vital part of the
national organism can only be proved in a time of adver-
■ ■- ■ ^

*See pages 25 and 26.

126

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

sity. The danger brings into activity the various forces
which have fostered the growth of the institution. The
danger in which the monarchy now found itself in Hun-
gary summoned to its aid those powerful factors of the
nation which found their interest in its w^elfare. The
Hungarians had always been alive to the necessity of
national unity, and the perception of this necessity became
the determining motive of their conduct, and led them
to give enthusiastic support to the king who had fought
most strenuously for the throne.

Their maintenance of the nation's unity preserved the
dignity of the country. They retained the right of free
election by means of a happy compromise, and at the
same time made peace with the Pope, without, however,
submitting to any humiliation, thereby giving proof of
their political sagacity.

Robert Charles (1308-1342) was left without a rival,
and then, w^ith the aid of the Church, he re-established
order. The bulk of the nation was on his side and
actively helped him. The alliance between king and
gentry which had existed in the thirteenth century was
renewed, but with one important difference. When the
alliance had sought to achieve two distinct purposes,
namely the fostering of popular liberty and the assurance
of national unity, it proved a failure. It was unable to
preserve internal order, and anarchy and lawless nobles
inflicted terrible evils upon the country. Made wiser by
this bitter experience the nation desired order and unity
above all things, and it realised that it could only obtain
them under a powerful ruler.

The gentry had been willing to support Andrew II.
and Andrew III., but only in return for privileges and
power to be conferred upon them. By the time of Robert
Charles, however, they w^ere content if the king would
only save them from the pow^erful barons, who injured
and humiliated them constantly, and wdiose tyranny was
repugnant alike to their interests and their patriotic senti-
ment.

127

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The reign of Robert Charles was a reaction against
the movement commenced in the thirteenth century in the
interest of popular freedom. Like all reactions, it was
called forth by exaggeration. Public opinion was startled
by the process of national disintegration which was taking
place, and sought safety in the power of the king,
abandoning for the time the cause of liberty. This did
not imply a permanent change in the sentiments of the
nation, and that a race passionately devoted to liberty
had been radically transformed into lovers merely of
order. Moreover, the king was not strong enough to
push his victory to the uttermost.

The strength of a reaction varies with the magnitude
of the evil which has created it. When in England,
Edward I. stopped the process of disintegration, the evil
had not grown very great. The people were attached Lo
the king, but were not prepared to support him uncon-
ditionally, for they had not come to look upon weakness
in the monarchy as a crowning disaster. They were
devoted to the rights for which they had so often fought,
and the king was obliged to treat these with respect. In
France, on the other hand, the monarch was called upon
to break powers which had made their ravages felt for
centuries; the people yearned for order and unity at any
cost, and were ready to endure absolutism.

The evil which the Angevin kings of Hungary had to
stop, had attained to larger dimensions than in England,
but was less than in France. Consequently, the reaction
brought greater authority to Robert Charles than to
Edward L, but did not make him absolute like the French
king.

The Hungarian nation temporarily lost its confidence
in the principle of autonomy. Robert Charles had no
interest in summoning Parliament and in giving the
nation a share in the management of public affairs. If
the king transgressed the law it gave rise to little dis-
content, for he could safely reckon upon the gratitude
and support of the people, if only he destroyed the strong-

128

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY

holds of the robber nobles and restored order and peace.

The king acted accordingly. He was not one of
those rare rulers who, without compulsion, offer scope for
free institutions, but he manfully grappled with the task
which confronted him.

As soon as the king had accomplished this task, the
slumbering love of liberty awoke again. Long wars were
not necessary; a short conflict was enough.

During the reign of Robert Charles the old spirit
began to make itself felt. The bishops were the first to
complain that the king did not summon Parliament. His
talented son, Louis the Great (1342-1382) understood the
temper of the people, and acting as a really great man,
forestalled the outbreak of any disaffection and established
harmony. The course of development continued its for-
mer trend. The old freedom-loving habits revived. The
nation enjoyed one of those rare periods when a great
man controlled it, not by force, but by the influence of a
remarkable personality and the increasing dignity of the
kingly office.

The king became the centre around which all else
revolved. At the present day, such an increase of the
monarch's powder would be viewed with anxiety, even
though such power, in the hands of a monarch worthy
to rule, might be beneficent. No devotion to a king would
condone the infraction of law and the neglect of institu-
tions. To-day, w^hen political violence is fraught with
such colossal danger, and when respect for the constitution
is the bulwark of a nation's liberty, the most fervent
loyalty could not tolerate contempt for the law. But
during the Middle Ages it was possible to vary the extent
of conformity with the constitution which was demanded
from the ruler, in accordance with his personality.

A really eminent king might rule despotically, but
one in whom the nation had not much confidence was
kept under the control of law^ Louis the Great helped
Hungary to develop the talents latent within her people
to the utmost extent w-hich the times rendered possible.

129

^

\^

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

During his reign Hungary became one of the first powers
in Europe.

What was the effect upon the monarchy of this
prosperity under the Angevins? Robert Charles had not
conformed to the constitution. Louis kept to the old
forms, but he had such command over men's minds that
his will always prevailed, just as had been the case with
the other great kings, K^lmdn and B^la III., who
flourished before the time of the Golden Bull. This
change was salutary, for it was essential to restore to the
monarchy its strength and dignity, without which it could
not do its work, and in the absence of which the cause of
freedom must suffer. The work of the thirteenth century
was completed by the Angevins. They brought the consti-
tution Into harmony with the requirements of that age, and
.succeeding generations dwelt beneath the structure which
the Angevins had erected. The basis of their power was
not their wealth or the military forces which were at their
disposal independently of the will of the nation ; nor was
it the conviction that royal power has a divine origin, and
that a nation's rights are merely favours bestowed by the
king, which he has a perfect right to withhold, so that
it is to the people's interest to be obedient. The nation did
not lose its self-respect, and the exaltation of the throne
was due, in the case of Robert Charles, to a conviction of
its necessity, and in the case of Louis, to the great king's
personality, his personal fascination it might be said, and
to the wisdom of his policy. The people bow'ed before
the will of the king because they saw that obedience to
wise commands led to the happiest results, and because
greatness in the monarch evoked spontaneous homage.
It is easy to see that this relation of king and people did
not mean permanent absolutism, for it could only last
while the individual retained his superiority. Absolutism
was an abnormal state of affairs during the Middle Ages.
Only exceptional individuals dared to attempt it, and
therefore it was not dangerous. It made its appearance
during the most prosperous periods of a country's history.

130

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

Those unhappy times were still far off when a contemp-
tible weakling, if crowned king, could tyrannise over a
nation and shape it into his own likeness. At the times of
which we are treating the first condition of a monarches
power was one which unluckily cannot be made perma-
nent, namely, his personal superiority. A strong king
could educate and discipline a people without rendering
it servile. The king was the first Hungarian citizen,
but not the only one who possessed rights, and his rights
were not more sacred than those of the nation. It was
the will of the nation which had raised the king to the
throne, just as, according to the common belief the
monarchy itself had been instituted by the people. Self-
respect was not extinguished. Felician Zdch avenged an
insult to his family by a royal prince with his sword. He
was not of those courtiers who w^ere so plentiful in the
days of Louis XV. of France, who left their sullied
honour unavenged if the offender wore a crown.

The Angevin kings did not fortify the constitution by
the creation of any new institutions, but they strengthened
the old ones. Louis the Great performed a great service
to the State when he revoked the laws of his father and
of Andrew III., and restored the earlier laws. The laws
of Andrew^ III. restrained the king in many ways, and a
powerful personality like Louis the Great could not brook
such restriction, but he summoned Parliament, gave the
nation a share in the work of legislation, and confirmed
the Golden Bull. That alone was a great achievement.
His glorious reign showed posterity that the ruler over a
free nation could be strong and his country flourishing.
The part which Louis played in history was similar to
that of Edward I. He carried to completion the reform
movements of the thirteenth century. He sifted the experi-
ments of earlier times, separating the laws which suited
the age from those for which the country w^as not yet ripe.
Edward and Louis both succeeded in establishing the new
order of things created by themselves as the permanent
organisation of their realm. With a few alterations

131

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

their systems endured for centuries. But Louis' achieve-
ment was less perfect than that of Edward.

As we have seen, England gave birth to better institu-
tions during the thirteenth century than those created in
Hungary. Louis did not improve the public law handed
down by his predecessors. In that field he gave no proof
of his creative power, and that is a shadow upon his
brilliant personality. For instance, he did nothing to add
to the prestige of Parliament, by drawing into it new and
important elements of the nation, or by re-organising it.

In the counties the Angevins achieved much greater
results. The various classes of the county population were
drawn more closely together and developed a keener sense
of citizenship. The county meetings were convened more
frequently. Louis used the counties as means of keeping
order. If there were any turbulent characters in the
district, such as robbers, it was to be mentioned at the
meetings of the county councils. The king encouraged a
wholesome spirit of self-government. He educated the
bulk of the gentry in politics, and gave them an organisa-
tion which enabled them to withstand the magnates.

The most original work of the Angevins was in the
direction of social and military matters. We have seen
that they broke the power of the great nobles, yet they had
no desire to create social quality. On the contrary, they
endeavoured to introduce the degrees of rank to be found
in the western countries. In place of the lawless barons
they created an aristocracy which served the interests of
the State. From the gentry they formed a new and
reliable order, and by granting them fortune and titles
attached them to the throne. The Court of the Angevin
kings became the great centre for the aristocracy, but in
return for distinctions granted the kmg required the
discharge of serious duties. The aristocracy rendered
valuable services, among others, supplying the greater
part of the military forces.

The ancient fortress system of the days of St. Stephen
was becoming obsolete, and it no longer supplied the

132

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

country's needs. The permanent duty of the gentry to
serve their king and country could not make up for the
decay of the true military class of the fortresses, because
the privileged classes in general could not be compelled
to serve abroad, and moreover, they were not accustomed
to constant military discipline. In considering the fact
that in England taxation constituted the most serious
burden upon the people, whereas in Hungary it was
military service which pressed most heavily, we found the
explanation largely in the circumstance that England
waged many aggressive wars, but w^as much less fre-
quently than Hungary compelled to defend her own
borders.

The history of the Angevin kings confirms this ex-
planation. In the case of a defensive war, every one is
animated equally by a sense of the common duty, while
in wars of aggression, the ruler has to find special means.

As Louis engaged in aggressive wars he had to adopt
the practice of the English kings. He persuaded the
aristocracy which he had created to organise its military
forces. He flattered the vanity of the magnates, and
induced them to form companies (banderia), which they
themselves should lead, beneath their own flags. Of the
army thus organised the king could dispose. He had the
right to take it abroad if necessary. All that he had to do
was to win over the magnates themselves, and he under-
stood the art of doing that better than anyone before him.

That paragon of all the virtues of chivalry knew the
weakness of the magnates, and by gratifying their am-
bitions made of them a strong support of the throne.

Beside the services which war made necessary, the
magnates also rendered valuable services in times of
peace. Louis the Great familiarised them with afi"airs of
State, and appealed to them for their advice.

Members of their class served as Palatines, County
Lieutenants, and the like. To enable them to be in a
position to discharge their various duties, and especially
to maintain their private companies of soldiers, Louis

1,^3

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

altered one paragraph of the Golden Bull, which em-
powered a man to dispose freely of his property, and
decreed that in future if any nobleman died without
leaving a direct heir, the property was to go to the nearest
branch of the same family. This law was not designed to
prevent the division of large fortunes, but to protect the
nobility as a whole by stopping as far as possible the
escheating of estates to the Crown. Under the new law
it was not until the whole family had died out that the
estates reverted to the king.

Another means by which the king wished to enable
the privileged classes to serve him better, was a new
tax called the " Kilenczed '* (the ninth part). The prelates
the magnates, and the gentry had to collect this tax from
their dependants. If anyone neglected to do so, he was
liable to the king for the amount.

We must distinguish this law from somewhat similar
laws in other countries, which empowered the lords of
certain domains to collect the taxes, for the law was not
conferring a privilege but imposing a duty. The owners
of estates who received the tax in money handed it on
to the king in the form of soldiers. The taxes they
gathered were not for themselves, but for the nation, and
they could neither alter nor forego them.

As a result the nobles worked hand in hand with the
king. This was the great merit of the Angevin kings,
that they were able to organise the nation, and to use
money and titles in the interest of themselves and of the
country without coming into collision with the people's
strong national feeling.

The reign of the Angevins left a deep and lasting
impression upon the country. It was their hands which
shaped the mediaeval Hungarian constitution, which in
its fundamental features endured for centuries. The
nobility also entered upon a new phase of its development.

Formerly the wealth of the magnates was the basis
of their power, but that power had no moral foundation,
for it was not correlated with duties. The Angevins

134

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

altered all this. By means of the banderium army system
important duties were assigned to the magnates, who thus
acquired a moral basis for theif influence.

When Louis died the outline of the future State was
ready. The filling-in depended upon the way in which
king and nobles worked together. During the reign of
Louis the Great, there was the utmost harmony in their
relations.

The future alone could show whether the like
harmony would prevail if the occupant of the throne
should happen to be a less exceptional man.

In England, it was during the reign of Edward I.
that the constitution was shaped which endured through-
out the Middle Ages, and from which the modern parlia-
mentary system was gradually evolved. That constitu-
tion in its principal features resembled that created by the
Angevins, and in both the power was divided between
the king and the nobles. The king remained at the head
of the nation ; the executive power was his, but he had
to give a share in the work of legislation to the privileged
classes. Those classes became the predominant elements
of the State. The military force at their command was
greater than that of the king.

The question was whether they could remain at peace
with one another. If each of them had had his sphere of
activity clearly marked out for him, and had confined
himself to it, they could have worked peacefully together,
but this ideal state of things was hardly possible in any
country. The Middle Ages were lacking in respect for
law, and the various fields of activity were not well-defined.
It was in defence of private rights that the reforms of
the thirteenth century were initiated, but in the realm of
political rights very much was still unsettled. In England
it was an accepted principle that the work of legislation
should be divided between the king and his Parliament.
Edward I. advocated this principle. In form, however,
the law remained the legal expression of the king's will,

135

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

and Edward even introduced some laws without consult-
ing Parliament.

The custom was that the king decreed with the advice
of the lords and commons, but it was a question whether
he was obliged to heed such advice, or, if he decided
otherwise, whether his commands would be valid.

The position in Hungary w'as still less clear, because
not even the principle that king and parliament should
participate in legislation was definitely established. In
his first law Louis conformed to that principle, but he
frequently issued decrees without the co-operation of
Parliament, and he amended existing Jaws in accordance
with the country's needs.

Edward I. solemnly acknowledged the principle that
taxes could only be imposed with the consent of Parlia-
ment, but it remained an open question whether the
custom duties came under the head of taxation, and the
king, after consulting some of his counsellors, often levied
certain dues and fines, declaring that he was entitled to
them without the consent of Parliament.

Louis I. imposed the tax called the '* Kilenczed" (one-
ninth) with the consent of the nobles, but it was problem-
atic whether this precedent was binding upon his
successors. His father had acted differently, and when
taxes came to be demanded more and more frequently,
the people found there was no law which declared once
for all that the king could not impose taxes without the
consent of the Diet.

The question of the executive power was also
calculated to engender strife. Both in England and in
Hungary the thirteenth century laws which placed the
executive entirely under the influence of the privileged
classes, had become obsolete. Edward I. and Louis the
Great, governed their realms with the aid of officials
nominated by themselves. The idea still persisted,
however, that the nobles had the right to control the
king's policy, and to call to account the officials who
governed badly. Any such interference had become

136

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

unnecessary, because king and nobles were in harmony,
especially in Hungary, where the king's personality had
created the most perfect confidence, but collisions were to
be looked for when the situation changed, for there was
no law which regulated the degree of influence which the
nobles were entitled to exert upon affairs of State.

All the time, king and nobles, obedient to their
instincts, pressed forward in the struggle to gain increased
power.

The king was the source of all rights. His power,
so he thought, was of divine origin, and opposition to
it was a crime. But this lofty conception of sovereignty
might easily prove fatal to one, who, thinking everything
lawful for him, should aim at absolutism.

Even such monarchs as have been great enough not
to lose their heads on the dizzy heights of sovereignty,
have often been urged to arbitrary action by the know-
ledge that the people needed them and their guiding hand.
Only the best monarchs fully realise that the real source
of their strength is respect for the country's laws.

The nobles had a share in the highest function of
the ruler, legislation. But those whose word is decisive
in the most important matters generally consider it their
right to be consulted in smaller details as well, and think
that they should themselves administer the laws they
make. Legislators often try to pass the limits of their
proper field of activity. Their instincts prompt them to
subordinate the executive to themselves.

Both the English and the Hungarian privileged
classes were urged by remembrance of power acquired in
former times, to endeavour to regain what they had lost
during the reign of Edward I., or of the Angevins. Their
wealth and power and princely mode of life, fed their
ambition. It was inevitable that the harmony established
by Edward and Louis should be destroyed sooner or later,
and that the strife between king and nobles should be
renewed.

137

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

A nation's future is the logical outcome of its past,
and the greatest statesman cannot divert the current of a
nation's life from the channel marked out for it by past
developments. Both England and Hungary in the

fourteenth century inherited a general situation which
rendered internal strife inevitable. The past had assured
to one party such advantages as were bound to play a great
part in determining the issue of the struggle. It was in
a sense predestined that the nobles should acquire more
and more influence. The royal power, which had been
maintained at a high level by Edward I. and Louis I., had
to struggle against so many disadvantages that its decline
was inevitable. The trouble was that the permanency of
the kingly power depended upon whether or not those
great kings had equally eminent successors. Unfor-
tunately they had not, so the inevitable happened. During
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, until the time of the
Tudors in England, and of Matthias in Hungary, the
royal power constantly diminished.
s/ In the eleventh century St. Stephen and William the

Conqueror restricted the nation's liberty. By doing this
they preserved the integrity of their realms, but their
centralised system, superimposed upon a system of free
institutions which were not abolished, was tempered by
the spirit of ancient liberty. Then chaos again threatened,
in the form of the rule of the great nobles, when all at
once Edward in England and the Angevins in Hungary
arrested the impending avalanche. They established an-
equilibrium which satisfied the requirements of the age,
and they abolished those innovations which had too
prematurely been made. But the kings were not able to
retain this dominant position. The privileged classes
acquired such rights and powers that under a mediocre
king orderly government could not be long maintained.

In both countries, in spite of their politically advanced
state, reverence for law was still so undeveloped, and the
unequal distribution of wealth and power gave such
enormous influence to a few individuals, that it was diffi-

138

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

cult to bring order, the authority of the ruler, internal
peace, and the peopIe*s freedom into harmony.

The Middle Ages were a period of chaos as regards
government. Germany, France and Italy could not
extricate themselves from it even for a little while. In
England and in Hungary the monarchs succeeded in
maintaining a uniform organisation and in breathing life
into the body politic, but the reign of some weak king,
or a political disaster or defeat in war, profoundly affected
even those vigorous states.

In the fifteenth century constitutional life in England
and in Hungary showed signs of disintegration. Both
countries were threatened with anarchy. This is the
explanation of the events of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries.

In the next chapter we shall consider how the
monarchs endeavoured to maintain their power in spite of
adverse circumstances, how some of them succeeded in
arresting the movement against them, while others pre-
cipitated a crisis by their obstinacy.

139

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER VIII.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN
ENGLAND.

It was a great advantage to the English monarchy
during the fourteenth century that since the time of
Edward I. the right of inheritance to the Crown was
recognised. The election of the monarch had ceased, and
the reign of the new king began at the death of his prede-
cessor. As against this, there were two circumstances
which favoured the privileged classes of the nation. One
was that the bulk of the military power was supplied by
those classes, and the other the fact that Parliament had
control over taxation. These two conditions placed con-
siderable power in the hands of that portion of the nation
which played a part in public affairs, for the king badly
needed both men and money for his French wars.

There was no standing army in the pay of the king,
and this diminished his authority very much. At a time
when practically everyone was a fighter, equal to the pro-
fessional soldier, no king could tyrannise over a people
so strong as the English or the Hungarians.

The king's situation became no better in this respect
after the Norman period. The service of the great feudal
lords was not unconditional. They were not willing to
serve abroad, and they considered it their duty to fight
only when the king led them in person. Accordingly,
they were not of much use to the king in his French
wars.

Still less could he reckon upon that universal
military service which was only intended for purposes of

140

THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND.

defence. The only way in which the monarch could
render himself independent of the barons was by forming
a paid army of his own, but he was not wealthy enough
to maintain a force equal to that of the nobles. Hence he
was obliged to encourage the nobles to maintain troops,
with which they could supply him at his need, but for this
convenience he had to pay a price, and that price was a
part of his power. Edward III. and Henry V. were able
to lead large armies to France, yet they had very few
soldiers of their own. They vanquished the French king,
but they had to handle their own subjects gently. For-
merly, the whole nation was ready to take up arms at the
call of the king, so that he was the natural head of a vast
army. Now, only money could procure him soldiers, and
money could only be gained with the consent of the
nobles. As the frequent wars demanded a large number of
soldiers, the control of the purse became all important.
The privileged classes realised this, and exerted them-
selves to prevent the king from obtaining money without
their consent. Originally the prevalent idea was that no
taxes should be levied save such as were offered volun-
tarily. This was gradually modified to the conviction that
with the exception of the Church, no one should give
money for State purposes, or should impose taxes, save
Parliament.

Magna Charta had been based upon the older idea.
It did not empower the council to impose taxes upon the
whole community. The council could only deal with the
taxes paid by its own members. Public opinion still
expected the king to discuss the question of contributions
with the towns or associations of merchants one by one,
and it would have condemned the imposition of a universal
tax.

Edward I. created a central body capable of speak-
ing for the whole nation, yet he did not abandon the right
of bargaining with the different elements of the nation
individually. As soon as the kings realised what power
they had yielded into the hands of the higher classes they

141

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

at once tried to revert to ancient methods of bargaining,
ignoring Parliament. Import duties were imposed, and
taxes demanded from towns built upon Crown property,
without the sanction of law, but Parliament gained more
and more control over the purse, and the monarchy found
itself unable to stem the tide. It could, however, count
upon the people's loyalty. The sacredness of the king's
person was emphasised more than ever before, and the
conception of treason was introduced into the code.

The new rules of succession abolished even the form
of election. The dynasty was linked by marriage to
powerful elements of the nation, and it had many means
of furthering individual interests and thus creating a party
devoted to it.

Yet all this did not enable the Crown to wrench the
control of taxation from the hands of Parliament. The
king endeavoured to raise money by virtue of his
prerogatives, ignoring Parliament altogether, but this
step aroused vehement opposition. The military forces at
the disposition of the community formed an ultima ratio
against the king, and made Parliament master of the
situation.

Edward II. was weak, and utterly unable to walk in
the footsteps of his great father. The efforts which had
been made during the reign of Henry III. to transfer
the executive power to the privileged classes w^ere renewed.
The king's favourite minister was impeached and con-
demned. Laws were forced through to which the king
was strongly opposed, yet he could not declare war, for Jhe
had no army, and he could not leave the country without
the consent of the barons. There was formed from his
adversaries a council without which he could not act, and
he was obliged to fill the principal offices with nominees of
the barons. But these reforms did not prove a success.
As the barons pursued only their own interests, the bulk
of the nation repudiated them and sided with the king,
enabling him to overcome his enemies. Since the king

142

THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND.

owed this victory to the support of the people he could
not use it solely for his own purposes.

By an earlier ordinance he had autocratically revoked
certain laws which were humiliating to him, but now he
had to accept the principle that whatever had been enacted
by king and Parliament could only be altered by mutual
consent.

The principles enunciated by Edward I. passed into
law^ during the reign of his son.

Edward II. soon became involved in new difficulties
in consequence of his utter weakness, and the nation
turned against him and acquiesced in his deposition.
Violence then reigned supreme, but it sought the sanction
of Parliament for its deeds, thus furnishing evidence of
the growing importance of that body. Everyone had
come to regard the voice of Parliament as the expression
of the nation's will, so that the triumphant party thought
it expedient to have their actions confirmed by legislation.
On the other hand, Parliament was still so far tractable
that its resolutions were capable of being over-ruled, so
that its existence never hopelessly conflicted with the
interests of whatever party happened for the moment to
be strongest. That is why even a violent revolution
ministered to the growth of the parliamentary institution,
whose very weakness and pliability proved serviceable in
the stage of its development which it had then reached.

The reign of Edward III. shows still more clearly
how favourable the situation was to the more influential
classes of the nation. The failure of Edward II. may
easily be attributed to his personal shortcomings, but his
s8n was one of the finest soldiers of the age. Edward III.
was a born commander, and he clung tenaciously to his
prerogatives. All his life he struggled against the in-
creasing power of the nobles, but in vain, for fresh
concessions were constantly extorted from him. The
growth of parliamentary influence in his reign was due,
not to a successful revolution, as in the case of Edward II.,
but to the use of constitutional means. The violent

143

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

methods of mediaeval times were then first replaced by a
constitutional and peaceful trial of strength. Con-
sequently, in spite of internal political conflicts, the nation
was united, and strong enough to conquer the French.

The growing importance of Parliament established to
a certain degree equilibrium between the various sections
of the privileged classes. Militarism was pre-eminently
favourable to the greater nobles and assured to them a
leading role, while the control of taxation placed great
influence in the hands of the commoners who constituted
the majority in Parliament.

It is interesting to follow the struggle between king
and Parliament, for the tactics developed were typical
phenomena of a constitutional regime.

The king's great aim was to gain money for his
French and Scotch wars, and he tried every conceivable
means of doing so without consulting Parliament. He
bargained with merchants about duties, raised loans,
demanded that the court and the army should be pro-
vided with food, clothing and other necessaries, and
endeavoured to revive compulsory military service.
Circumstances were too much for him, however; tax after
tax became necessary, and Parliament gave nothing for
nothing. The nation really purchased its political rights.
Money was not refused, but it was granted upon certain
conditions. It gradually became the custom for the nation
to lay before the king its grievances and its demands
before voting a new tax. The king had to listen, and
generally promised compliance, but he usually hesitated
to keep his promise, seeking to evade it by turning the
meaning of his words. Parliament, however, demanded a
prompt answer to its requests, and usually the king had
to give in.

In 1340 it was enacted that no new taxes were to be
imposed without the consent of Parliament. In 1362 and
in 1371, it was declared that the duty on w^ool was illegal
because it was ofi'ered by the merchants without such con-

144

THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND.

sent. In 1362 a law was passed against the abuses con-
nected with the custom of purveyance by which provision
was made for the needs of the Court. A law passed in
1852 enacted that save by consent of Parliament no one
could be compelled to render military service at his own
expense.

All these laws made it increasingly difficult for the
king to act independently. In return for money supplied,
the king even gave a share of the executive power to the
influential classes. Edward III. was compelled to retain
a minister whom he desired to dismiss. Towards the end
of his reign he had to abandon his councillors against his
will, and to see them condemned on charges brought
against them by Parliament. Even the purposes to which
the money granted was to be devoted were determined for
him, and the responsible officials were liable to be called
to an account of their stewardship.

In military and foreign affairs Edward III. volun-
tarily sought the advice of the nation's representatives,
submitting to them questions of peace and war, in the
hope that by sharing with them the responsibility he
might ensure their goodwill when money was needed.

The strength of Parliament is strikingly shown by the
circumstance that the hero of Crecy was driven to use the
weapons of the weak, such as petty mental reservations
and the breaking of promises.

The explanation of the tragic end of Richard II. lies
in the fact that he did not possess the tact of his father.
Both kings clung to their prerogatives, but Richard was
impatient and passionate, and tried to achieve more than
Edward with less talent. His obstinacy provoked serious
conflicts. On one occasion, when he was in need of
money, Parliament urged him to dismiss two of his
ministers. His haughty reply was that he would not
dismiss even a cook at the bidding of Parliament.

The king, however, was powerless to defend his
adherents, or even himself. The nobles threatened him

145

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

with deposition, propounding the theory that a king who
violated the law might be removed, and Richard, yielding
to force, dismissed his favourites; a committee appointed
by Parliament regulated the royal household and investi-
gated and reformed the whole government.

Still greater humiliation was in store for the king
when he endeavoured to put an end to these reforms by
force, for his adversaries were too strong for him and
became the real masters of the state after executing the
king's chief adherents. Richard's energy and courage
enabled him to cast off the yoke two years later, and after
his success he acted for some time with moderation. He
was content with merely dismissing those who had
humiliated him, and tolerated Parliamentary control.

He was so far indulgent that when Parliament was
summoned his ministers voluntarily sent in their resigna-
tions and desired Parliament to pass judgment upon their
government, after which they resumed office.

The king cleverly adapted himself to the situation and
thus increased his popularity to such an extent that he
became conceited, and, carried away by passion, again
aimed at absolutism. He knew that Parliament was so
strong that his only hope was to construct it out of such
materials as would be ready to surrender that power
voluntarily. Such a packed assembly could alter the
fundamental laws of the country. The king tried the
experiment, at first with success. Parliament itself
demanded the augmentation of the king's power. It voted
taxes for the whole period of his reign, and surrendered
its power into the hands of a committee. The king in
this way became absolute. But soon the whole situation
changed. The nation knew that the new laws were not
really valid.

Henry Bolingbroke had the whole country with him
in the view that Richard's Parliament did not represent
the nation, and that the king broke the law even while
observing its form. When Henry defied the king every-

148

THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND.

one joined him. Richard's absolutism collapsed and he
was deposed.

The documents relating to the king's impeachment
show that Parliament knew perfectly well what it was
doing and that it realised the significance of that trial.
It crowned the victory by abandoning the principle of
hereditary succession and by electing another king.
Parliament had disposed of the crown. That was the end
of the first act in the long conflict between king and
nobles.

When the Lancastrian dynasty succeeded to the
throne the champion of the nobles became king. This
then was the result of the long effort of the Plantagenets
to establish their own superiority over Parliament. The
advent of the house of Lancaster meant a new epoch in
the history of freedom. The new dynasty remained faith-
ful to its origin. It made no effort to suppress Parliament,
but on the contrary, tried to solve the problems of govern-
ment with its aid and in conformity with law.

The first two monarchs were successful, although
Henry IV. often found himself in antagonism to the
nobles. Those who had given him the crown made exces-
sive demands upon him. A throne gained by means of
a revolution rests on insecure foundations, for it seems to
constitute a justification of revolution. Henry's life was
not free from bitterness caused by rebellion, but his throne
remained secure, and it is a fine feature of his character
that as a king he remained faithful to the principles he
had professed when a subject. His reign was attended by
important results. In spite of the strength of Parliament
he was able to lead the nation, and he founded a strong
dynasty.

Henry V. lived in much greater harmony with the
nation. He was really an eminent ruler, and by his
striking personality, his grandly conceived foreign policy,
and his brilliant achievements on the battlefield, he won
over the whole nation. He was not jealous of Parliament,
for he could lead it in any direction he desired.

147

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Parliament was in that age so firmly established, that
both the weakness and the strength of the various kings
proved of advantage to it. The weakness of Edward II.
and Richard II., as well as the strength of Edward III.,
Henry IV., and Henry V., could but increase its import-
ance.

The capable monarchs who might have been able to
injure Parliament showed their good sense by avoiding
dangerous conflicts, and sought rather to gain influence
by befriending the institutions which safeguarded the
people's liberties, while those rulers who strove to oppose
the current of events were generally so weak as not to be
dangerous, and their attacks only strengthened the Parlia-
ment's position.

By the time of the Lancastrian kings Parliament had
reached a period of its development when it could only
be injured by itself, and when, if it used its power for the
welfare of the nation it could become invincible. The
question remained whether it would act thus. The mere
fact that it had won the victory did not prove that it would
use its victory for the benefit of the country. On the death
of Henry V. a child succeeded to the throne, and when
that child became a man he was utterly weak and
incapable, and unfit for the task of curbing the power of
the dominant classes. It remained to be seen whether
Parliament, which had successfully resisted royal tyranny,
would not be undone by its own exaggerated power. The
event showed that the weakness of the monarchy proved
fatal to the parliamentary system, as there was nothing to
keep within lawful bounds the ambitions of the nobles.

In earlier times parliamentary government was based
upon the reciprocal control of king and barons, and this
mutual restraint left a field for the third factor, the House
of Commons. While the monarchy was strong enough
to hold its own neither of the two parties could afford to
neglect constitutional forms and pursue an openly selfish
policy. Whoever wished for success had to identify his
personal aims with those of the nation. Even the most

148

THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND.

powerful nobles chose rather to fight with constitutional
weapons than to resort to force, for if their aims were too
obviously self-centred they alienated the commons and the
king was sure of victory. They sought the protection of
law even for their deeds of violence.

The great kings^ Edward III., Henry IV., and
Henry V., by the wisdom of their policy, prevented
internal struggles from crippling the country's capacity
for action, and were strong enough to prosecute vigorously
the French wars.

Rulers like Richard II., just because they attacked
the country's liberties, roused the public spirit of the peo-
ple, and provoked energetic action on their behalf.

But the decay of the royal power under Henry VI.
gave rise to a different state of affairs. The great nobles,
relieved of the salutary pressure exerted by the monarch,
felt themselves strong enough to ignore legal formalities.

Possessing all the military power, with no one able
to call them to account, they openly pursued their
individual interests, heedless of their duties to the rest
of the nation. Even during the reign of Henry IV., the
king had to contend with the personal ambitions of dis-
satisfied nobles, but their discontent did no harm under
a strong king, but rather served to strengthen the position
of Parliament. During the minority of Henry VI., how-
ever, the whole of the executive power came into the hands
of the nobles, and their mutual rivalries worked the
greatest mischief.

It is not surprising that the long struggle with France
came to so unfortunate an ending, when it is remembered
that the Duke of Bedford, who was charged with the
conduct of the war, sought to maintain the alliance with
Burgundy, while the Regent at home provoked the hos-
tility of Burgundy, in pursuit of his private interests.

Henry VI., on coming of age, tried to pursue a
peaceful policy, but failed. His defeat, which was largely
due to the excessive power of the nobles, increased the
danger of the situation by undermining the authority of

149

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the government, and heightening the general disaffection.
When the war with France came to an end, the forces
which had been occupied abroad returned to bring now
fuel to the fire of internal strife. Long-continued civil
war followed as a natural result. The nobles carried on
warfare with one another, but now it was no longer merely
for some private interest or share of political influence, as
in former times; the prize they fought for was nothing
less than the royal crown. The gentry followed the lead
of the nobility, splitting into rival parties. Parliament
sank into impotence, and became a puppet in the hands
of one or other of the parties. The victorious party con-
trolled the elections in its own interests, and thus obtained
command over Parliament. Law remained in abeyance,
and anarchy prevailed everywhere. The revolution
threatened to sweep away the Lancastrian dynasty. The
most powerful nobleman, Richard Duke of York, claimed
the throne, and after his death his son, Edward IV.,
achieved the aim which had been his father's. It is
characteristic of the situation that it was only a few of the
barons who proclaimed Edward king, and Parliament
merely endorsed their action.

The victory of the House of York was of first-rate
importance. It was due to the felt necessity of a strong
government, and signified that the nation had had enough
of the exaggerated power of the privileged classes. Until
the advent of the Tudors Parliament had been the domi-
nant factor, and it was through its instrumentality that the
strongest elements of the nation sought to control the
country's affairs. Circumstances were favourable to the
privileged classes, and their strength increased in spite of
the opposition of the Plantagenets.

While the monarch had control of the executive, the
parliamentary system worked well, but ultimately Parlia-
ment grew more powerful than was desirable, and in l'S99
entirely overthrew the monarch. This provoked a
reaction, for the very unity of the nation was seen to be
in danger, and the need of a strong government made

150

THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND.

itself felt everywhere. That great bulwark of national
unity, the monarchy, found a powerful support in the
people's instinctive desire for unity, and commenced once
more to flourish.

In history it often seems as though long ages of effort
merely lead back to the starting point of the process, but
this is only a delusive appearance. Even though there
is some apparent falling back, yet the nation is neverthe-
less advancing. In England, although the parliamentary
system broke down, yet the cause of freedom did not stand
where it had stood before the long struggle. Something
had been achieved which could not be destroyed, and
which furnished a starting point for future developments.
The parliamentary system had been firmly founded, and
had received a definite shape. Its two houses had been
created, with their respective spheres of activity clearly
defined, and the work of legislation properly divided
between them.

The House of Commons had the right of voting the
taxes, while the upper house discharged judicial functions
and took the lead in any delicate political matters.

Though Parliament had for a time diminished in
influence, it had developed such an organisation that as
soon as a new spirit awoke within it, it would again be
capable of effective action. The successes and preroga-
tives which Parliament had gained were precedents of
immense value. Several events which had seemed to be
the mere chance results of a particular situation, became
in after years the germs of such conceptions of constitu-
tional right as have formed the very essence of modern
parliamentarism. It is the course of events in the
thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries which links the days
of Anglo-Saxon liberty with modern times. The strength
of the traditions of freedom lay in their continuity.

151

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER IX.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN

CONSTITUTION FROM THE TIME OF THE

ANGEVINS TO THE ACCESSION OF MATTHIAS.

PART I.
TO THE DEATH OF SIGISMUND (1437),

It was after the death of Louis the Great (1382) that
Hungary entered upon a period characterised by the
excessive power of the privileged classes of the nation.
The movement towards liberty, which began in the
thirteenth century, was only temporarily arrested by the
Angevins, and was inevitably renewed. The reign of
Louis the Great was of an exceptional character, merely
because he himself was an exceptional personality. The
course of events in England was bound to repeat itself in
Hungary.

The energy of the nobles and the widespread love of
liberty inevitably led to the same results in Hungary as
in England. History is governed by fixed laws.

The varied personalities which play their parts, and
the infinite diversity of events, affect history in such a way
as to make every page of it seem different and every detail
full of individuality, so that it is of more absorbing
interest than the boldest creation of fancy, yet all these
individual factors taken together are unable to make a
nation deviate from the path marked out for it by its
nature and environment, or nullify the laws which make
history a science and enable us to interpret the past and
forecast the future.

152

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

The constitutional history of Hungary during the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries bears the impress of
many kinds of men and events. Many things happened
which seem' the outcome of chance, owing to human
inability to trace their causes, and it is certain that the
history of Hungary during that period was different from
that of the other countries of Europe. Yet in spite of
these manifest differences, Hungarian history was in its
main outlines very similar to that of England.

In both countries the power of the monarch was
diminishing, while that of the nobles increased. The
natural tendency of the age , which in France and Germany
reduced the monarchy to impotence, made itself felt in
Hungary also. The only difference was that there the
monarchy, pursuing aims of the first importance, and
supported by the strong national sentiment and the
national institutions, was able in some degree to control
the tendency, so that it never came into fatal collision with
the fundamental conditions of the nation's well-being.
Decentralisation was reached, not through disintegration,
but through the extension of popular freedom in Hungary
as in England. The champions of liberty, made strong
by past conflicts, were able to prevent the weakness of the
monarch from leading to the dismembering of the nation.
England and Hungary, unlike other European nations,
displayed in their development, even during that epoch,
the characteristics due to national unity. Yet though both
countries were able to avoid disintegration, they could not
prevent the nobles from attaining to a degree of power
that was mischievous and productive of chaos, and
which ultimately provoked a reaction in favour of the
monarchy.

This series of events was inevitable. Only under
exceptionally able kings was it likely that the nobility
would not abuse its power and such men are given to a
nation but rarely.

As in England, the situation in Hungary was favour-
able to the nobility, which had control over the greater

153

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

part of the "military forces. Even during the time of the
Arpad kings the strength of an armed nation was the chief
obstacle in the way of the monarch's absolutism, and
since then this force had been organised in such a way as
to make it readily available against the king.

In the banderia of the nobles the monarch found the
readiest means of obtaining troops. Even if he had to
pay for them they cost him much less than the maintenance
of a regular army would have done. The security of the
persons and property of the nobles rendered it necessary
that they should garrison their fortresses, and when they
lent their troops to the king, they were not only perform-
ing a patriotic duty, but also lining their pockets with the
money received. The military system, therefore, was
beneficial both to the king and to the nobility.

The laws relating to military matters in England and
Hungary were different, yet the military organisation took
the same form in both countries. Though universal
service in defence of the country remained the law in
Hungary, experience had shown that something more was
necessary, and companies of soldiers in the pay of the
nobles were formed all over the country and constituted
the bulk of the military force of the state. This situation
led to the same results as in England. The nobles took
the leading part, and together with military strength,
political power also came into their hands. The greater
part of the military forces owned allegiance, not to the
king, but to the great nobles, whose consciousness of their
Dwn power so stirred their ambition that they were ready
to stand against the king.

Thus the monarchy, whose authority depended upon
borrowed power, got into an entirely false position.

The king was surrounded by turbulent elements, to
control which demanded exceptional ability and strength
of character, and also favourable circumstances. In
former times, before private persons had gained so much
military power, a revolution was impossible unless some
weighty evil pressed upon the whole community, or at

154

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

least upon the inhabitants of a large district, while now,
in virtue of the altered condition of affairs, a single noblo
man might rise against the monarch. Consequently the
king needed to walk warily in order to maintain his
authority. Everything depended upon whether he could
remain at peace with the nobles. If he was on friendly
terms with the most powerful among them he might break
the law with impunity, but if he roused their animosity
his position became untenable. Absolutism was impos-
sible, because the nobility would never have supported
him in any efforts to achieve it. The country's freedom
was assured by the circumstance that the bulk of the
military power was in the hands of the nobles, who
cherished traditions of independence, and who were eager
to maintain the constitutional limitations of the royal
authority for personal reasons.

It is true that in Hungary, in consequence of the
danger of Turkish invasion, universal compulsory
military service was instituted, but even this did not make
the king predominant.

It altered to some extent the distribution of power and
improved the king's position a little, because it increased
the military power of the gentry, and the king could use
this to counteract the influence of the magnates.

In England, as we have seen, the sword w'as not the
only weapon which the nobility could use against the
king.

Instead of sanguinary revolution, the nobles often
employed constitutional means. In Hungary, however,
this was not the case. The English king could not con-
duct his war with France w-ithout the taxes voted from
time to time, and he was therefore obliged to conciliate
Parliament.

In Hungary the situation was different. The taxes
constituted but a small part of the entire budget of the
country, and if the king needed exceptional supplies of
money he pawned an estate or two, or obtained a loan.
He had a large permanent income from his estates and

155

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

from various tolls and duties. The burgesses of the forti-
fied towns also contributed regularly to the royal
exchequer. It was not the Diet, therefore, which supplied
the king with funds, and so the voting of taxes was not a
powerful weapon in the hands of the nation, as was the
case in England. Only towards the end of the period we
are considering did the control of taxation begin to acquire
importance.

The nobles were protected by their wealth. Had the
king's income been great enough to allow of his main-
taining a powerful army he would have become a danger
to the community in consequence of his independence of
the Diet. Fortunately his income was not sufficient for
that, so his power remained limited by the superior
military strength of the nobles.

One other circumstance compelled the monarchs to
respect the will of the nation, and that was the short
duration of the various dynasties which ruled over
Hungary. In England inheritance by descent had
remained the rule since the time of Edward I., while in
Hungary the right of free election of the monarch had
been coming more to the fore during the same period.
Consequently the English kings fought more strenuously
for their prerogatives and withstood the nobles more
stubbornly than the Hungarian monarchs, who pursued a
more liberal and conciliatory policy.

After these general remarks, let us consider the way
in which the influence of the nobility spread in Hungary.

The royal power which the Angevins had done so
much to augment, soon crumbled to pieces. Just as the
strong rule of Edward I. was followed by the feeble hand
of Edward IL, so the reign of Queen Mary (1382-1895)
in Hungary was in marked contrast with that of her
predecessors, and showed of how exceptional a character
was the influence exerted by them and that the nobles were
masters of the situation.

The motive of the revolt against Queen Mary is not
clear. We do not know whether it was the unlawful

156

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

character of her rule, or her weakness as a woman, or
personal wrongs suffered by a few, but the fact remains
that some of the great nobles turned against her. It was
in vain that she confirmed the Golden Bull, and sum-
moned Parliament in order that the growing disturbance
might be stopped. The malcontents invited Charles of
Naples to occupy the throne.

The queen herself owned that **a weak woman cannot
govern a proud and turbulent nation." She was right,
for even the strongest kings found it a task almost beyond
their powers. Only to a commanding personality would
the nobles, strong in their possession of estates and troops
and fortresses, yield obedience. Queen Mary was deposed,
and Charles was proclaimed king by the Diet, in the very
presence of the queen (1385). In a few weeks, however,
the nobles abandoned Charles, who was murdered by one
of the queen's adherents, and Mary regained the throne.
The " Naples'' faction was confined to the southern portion
of the country, the territory of the Horvathy family, and
it happened by chance that the queen fell into the hands
of that faction, and was imprisoned by them. But the
bulk of the magnates and the gentry were devoted to
law and order.

A vigorous people, possessing initiative and indepen-
dence, may indeed be dangerous to the monarch, but if
such a nation is loyal, it is a much more reliable support
than a servile crowd. Strength which can be destructive
is also useful for defence, as happened in this case.

The people caused the Diet to be convened. They
realised that much of their trouble had resulted from their
following bad advice, and they declared that thenceforth
members of the council must serve, not only the monarch's
interest and their own, but also that of the country and
the sacred crown. Anyone acting otherwise was to be
excluded from the council. To conciliate the gentry it was
decided that representatives of their class should sit in
the council, as well as the barons and ecclesiastical
dignitaries. The people seem to have found the revolu-

157

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

tion sufficiently justifiable to render it advisable to
proclaim a general amnesty. In the spirit of the Golden
Bull it was declared that if the queen deviated from the
terms of that charter no one need support her, but on the
contrary, she should be openly opposed.

These were interesting decisions. The nation main-
tained the monarchy, but laid down rules for its guidance.
It defended the throne, but limited its power. The same
policy was pursued on the election to the throne of
Sigismund, the husband of the still imprisoned Mary.
The object of raising Sigismund to the throne was the
restoration of order, but the dominant classes did not
forget their own interests and prerogatives.

Sigismund (1387-1437), before his election, entered
into a contract with the leaders of his party, representing
probably the most powerful families of the country, in
which he promised to defend the nation's liberty, not to
take revenge on anyone for past events, and to grant
special protection to those with whom the contract was
made; further, that no foreigners should be appointed
to offices of state, and that no member of the party should
be excluded from this compact without the consent of
the rest. If the king in any way violated the agreement,
the leaders were entitled to refuse him obedience and to
oppose him openly.

This contract is a mirror of the situation, and reveals
the spirit of the times. National liberty was based upon
the right of armed resistance. The enormous power of
the magnates is indicated by the fact that they contracted
with the king on equal terms. The same fact shows that
the king was beginning to lose the character of a
sovereign, and his position was becoming more like that
of a chosen leader of a coalition of parties than of a king
**by the Grace of God." This was a great decline from
the commanding position of Louis the Great. The turbu-
lent disposition and ambition of the magnates, curbed for
a time by Louis' personality, cast off the restraint of his
feeble successor. The magnates were entirely the masters

158

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

of the situation. First they dethroned the queen, then
they replaced her and defended her against a rival. They
would not subordinate themselves to their monarch, but
neither would they allow one part of the country to compel
them to accept a new ruler. They were so conscious of
their power that they elected a king to rule conjointly with
the queen, acting in this matter in the queen's interest, but
without her knowledge. Although Sigismund had come
to the throne under somewhat humiliating circumstances,
he was not prepared to play a spiritless part. The notion
of the divine right of the king was then becoming general,
and Sigismund, though perhaps not so firmly resolved as
Richard II. upon the restoration of the royal authority,
aimed at the retention in his own hands of the power
acquired by the aid of the magnates.

He broke his promise to make no aliens state officials,
surrounded himself with foreigners, and would have liked
to see the country entirely governed by them. Among
the many violations of his pledged word this was resented
the most by the magnates, for it hurt both their national
pride and their individual interests. The king gave deep
offence in other ways.

Although he had no claim to the throne, and owed his
crown to election, he decided about the succession in an
autocratic manner, and while the magnates who had
procured his election were all upholders of the legality
of armed resistance, he had some of the resisters beheaded,
thus making the nobility anxious for its own safety.
Furthermore, the king squandered his revenues, and once
openly manifested his absolutist tendencies by publicly
declaring invalid the laws which he had passed with the
concurrence of the nobility. Events of such a character
inevitably filled the reign of Sigismund with unrest. The
discontented nobles gathered together in the south, which
became a hotbed of revolution, and the king was soon
driven into the hands of the nobles of his party. As a
pretender had arisen, Sigismund found he could not keep
his throne without the aid of those who had raised him

159

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to it. The Hungarian nobles were naturally unwilling to
shed their blood for a ruler who damaged their interests
and threatened their liberty. They pursued the same
policy which had led them to raise Sigismund to the
throne. They had no desire to accept the king of Naples,
but they were determined that Sigismund should respect
his promises. They defended the king in many battles
against the revolted nobles, but when they saw that hi5;
rule did not protect their interests, they were quite pre-
pared to turn their arms against him. His adherents
would not allow the revolutionary party in the south to
deprive him of his throne, but when they received cause
for dissatisfaction they undertook the task themselves.

Sigismund, probably in order to create a counterpoise
to the power of the magnates, invited representatives of
the towns for the first time to the Diet, but even this step
did not help him, as the influence of the burgesses was
not very great. The king may have thought that with
the help of the burgesses, who were mostly foreigners,
he could stay the action of the magnates against his
foreign favourites, but if this was his plan it was
destined to fail. The Diet was still controlled by the
magnates, and their policy was directed against the
Neapolitan party and to the redress of old grievances.

A law was passed to the effect that no foreigner
should hold either office or estates. Within three months
every foreign courtier, with a few exceptions, was to leave
the country. Further, the Golden Bull was again con-
firmed.

The king refused to execute the law. In virtue of his
royal prerogatives he proclaimed the decisions of the Diet
respecting property invalid. The foreign courtiers did not
leave the country, but, on the contrary, the king made
grants of land to his favourites. At last the growing
dissatisfaction broke out into open rebellion. Those who
had fought for Sigismund, disgusted by his ingratitude,
took up arms against him, and resolved upon his
deposition. When they came into the presence of the

160

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

king, he received them with the words : " I am your king,
and you owe me obedience," but his words made no
impression. Simon Szechenyi replied: "We have come
to expel the foreigners. If you consent to this you may
remain our king, but if not, you are our prisoner and not
our ruler." And so it happened, for Sigismund was
thrown into prison.

The influence of the magnates is shown by the
unanimous support they received from the country.
Every municipality obeyed the new government.

It has already been mentioned that Sigismund*s
policy resembled that of Richard II. Two years after
Richard's reign was terminated by a revolution (1399).
Sigismund met with a similar fate. The arrogant
behaviour of the ruler led to the failure of the monarchy in
both countries. The magnates, possessing military forces,
and backed by public opinion, proved stronger than the
king.

Richard's failure was final because he violated the
constitution more completely than Sigismund, and was
therefore abandoned by all his subjects; moreover, in
England there was a suitable successor. Fortunately for
Sigismund, however, some powerful nobles remained his
adherents, and there was no acceptable prince to take
his place.

The victory of a pretender to the throne, who has once
been resisted by the nation, is fraught with danger,
especially to the more prominent opponents.

The new king may seek to take revenge upon them,
and the new men who reckon on the king's gratitude
because they have fought and suffered for him, may gain
the upper hand. These considerations weighed against
the claims of the king of Naples. At the same time, three
other pretenders to the throne had arisen, so that the
country was running the risk of grave internal dissensions.
The magnates saw that the only way to avoid this
disaster was by restoring Sigismund to the throne. They

161

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

had never aimed at his final deposition, and as the king
seemed to have learnt wisdom from past experience it
appeared fitting to reinstate him.

A compromise was effected through the instrument-
ality of Garai and a few other faithful members of the
royal party. The foreigners left the towns, a general
amnesty was proclaimed, and Sigismund occupied his
throne again, this time entirely by the favour of the
magnates. All depended now upon the course of action
which the king would take, and unfortunately he showed
that he had not learnt his lesson well enough. He did
not thoroughly adapt himself to circumstances, but he
took one prudent step, and that was to win over some of
the magnates to his side.

He cared as little as ever for the country's laws, but
he saw that he could not retain his position without the
support of the nation's leading men. Formerly he had
chosen his advisers from among foreigners, but now
Garai became his principal minister. His gratitude was
expressed publicly in a letter wherein he acknowledged
that he owed to Garai his escape from exile or death, and
his restoration to the throne. This is much for a king to
say, for it involves the risk of becoming dependent.

His imprisonment over, Sigismund betrothed
Barbara Cillei, Garai's sister-in-law, although he had been
engaged to a foreign princess, as it was more important
for him to stand on friendly terms with the magnates of
Hungary than to fulfil an obligation to a foreign house.
Experience had taught him that foreigners would not
defend his throne, and that the only support he could rely
upon w^as that of his own people.

Still, as already mentioned, the king had not learnt
enough. Having won the goodwill of the more powerful
nobles by furthering their individual interests, he
imagined himself strong enough to contravene the
country's laws. He promised the succession to the
Austrian duke, and mortgaged national property to
foreigners. This action of the king, together with the

162

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

efforts of the Neapolitan party, again endangered the
throne. The advent of the pretender from Naples was the
signal for a general insurrection, a considerable number
of the magnates and the gentry giving the claimant their
support. But this heavy storm passed over the head of
the king without injuring him.

It was probably favourable to Sigismund that the
cause of the Neapolitan was espoused by the Pope, whose
interference hurt the nation's pride. The slowness of
Ladislas also contributed to the failure of the attempt, but
the principal cause of Sigismund's success was the
loyalty, and the military strength, of Garai, Cillei, and
Perenyi. The danger passed away, but it left traces
behind it. The king had learned at last that he must
govern in a manner consistent with the actual distribution
of power. He grasped the fact that he could never use
the strength derived from the military force in the hands
of Garai and his other adherents, in order to establish a
system of absolutism. Any efforts in this direction could
lead to no result except his own deposition. The change
in the king's attitude was probably due in part to con-
siderations of this character, but partly also to the fact
that events in other parts of Europe occupied his time and
energy, so that he had none left for domestic disputes.
A new epoch now began in his life. Until the year 1404
he had stood in direct opposition to the magnates, and had
tried, in vain, to rule as an absolute monarch.

Luckily for him his efforts did not lead to the same
end as fell to the lot of the Plantagenets. Sigismund
escaped final failure and struck out a new path. What
in England had necessitated a new dynasty was accom-
plished by the king himself. He proclaimed a general
amnesty, and set to work to restore harmony. The
Dragon Order, which he founded, was an outward sign of
the relations existing between king and magnates, linked
as they were by common knightly duties and common
aims. Sigismund conferred this Order even upon

163

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Szechenyi, although he had attacked the king's person.
The enormous influence of the magnates was personi-
fied in Garai. As Palatine and brother-in-law to the king,
and as a statesman who had served his soverign with
perfect loyalty, he enjoyed an authority but little less
than that of the monarch. During the thirty years that
he remained Palatine he possessed a legislative and
administrative power such as no Hungarian subject before
him had known. He represented a type entirely different
from that of the most powerful nobleman of the Angevin
period, Count Matthew Csak. Csak's power was due,
not to his occupancy of important public posts, but to his
absolute possession of a portion of the country. That
type was a constant danger to the community, while the
Garai type was its defence. Csak was a destructive,
Garai a constructive, influence. When the king was
absent from the country, Garai acted for years as his
substitute, and this nobleman was the king's adviser, not
only in Hungarian matters, but also on great European
questions.

Yet Garai never tried to act as an autocrat; he was
merely primus inter pares. He settled affairs of state with
the aid of the leading magnates. The king acted always
with their concurrence. When he desired to punish his
unfaithful wife he submitted his judgment to the con-
sideration of the magnates. When he mortgaged the
towns in the district of Szepes he did it with their approval.
In the king's absence they were entitled to commence war.
The royal council had the right to gather war taxes and
to mobilise the necessary troops. Thus the magnates had
achieved the aim they had struggled so long to attain, and
had become the dominant power in the land. Sigismund
was but a figurehead.

This was not the result of any usurpation, but followed
naturally from the general situation, as is shown by the
fact that not only the king, but the nation, as well,
accepted the result with resignation. Internal wars became

164

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

less frequent, and the country struck out a path of
peaceful development.

Some historians see in the great nobles only
tyrannical oligarchs, and regard those periods only as
satisfactory during which the gentry have played the
leading part.

The gentry were the democratic element in the past,
and therefore modern democracy cannot see freedom in
any age when that class did not direct the affairs of a
country. But this is a wrong attitude. Whenever one
class is predominant and uses its power selfishly, the
government is the worst possible. The power of an
oligarchy or of an ignorant democracy led by demagogues,
is more dangerous in its extremes than an absolute
monarchy. But a predominant nobility is not necessarily
an oligarchy, just as a democracy need not be a
demagogue-led mob, nor kingly power absolutism. To
the question which class should predominate the answer
often is, the largest class, the democratical element. This,
however, is a mistake. It is not numbers which should
tell, but moral weight.

A state can only be strong if those who are its political
leaders are also able to give guidance in everyday matters
of conduct also, and when the rest are ready to follow
because they are accustomed to their leadership in moral
and material concerns. The leading part can be played
now by this class, now by that. It is in harmony with
the laws of historical development that the predominant
class should always increase in numbers.

Ultimately, the majority may deserve the leadership,
but we have not reached that yet. When once numerical
and material predominance and intellectual pre-eminence
belong to one and the same class, then the supreme power
may rightly be confided to the majority, but until that
condition is fulfilled, the rule of the majority would be
opposed to the interests of civilisation. Culture and
wealth cannot yield to poverty and lack of culture, merely
because the latter have numbers on their side.

165

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Democracy is the highest ideal because that country
would possess the healthiest organism in which every
citizen had the ability to direct the policy of his nation.

We may therefore regard as progress every step
which leads to a widening of the circle of those exercising
control, but only at the right time and when those who
attain to power know how to use it. For this reason the
rise of the burgesses to power was distinctly progress,
while the absolute rule of the masses to-day would be a
catastrophe. For the same reasons it would have been
a mistake to place the power in the hands of the middle
classes in an age when the natural predominance still
belonged to the aristocracy.

To-day the community willingly accepts the leader-
ship of the middle classes. The nobility has been put
down from its privileged position, and yet, where it has
not been exhausted by the inevitable struggle, and has
kept in touch with the nation, it is able to play a fine part
by reason of its great traditions and the circumstance that
its ambitions lie in the direction of political life, and also
by means of its wealth which renders possible the fulfil-
ment of its political duties.

The middle classes have not always occupied the
position in which we find them to-day. There were times
when the nobility had the predominance as justifiably as
the middle classes hold it now, and the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries were such a period in Hungary.

During the time of the earlier Arpad kings, differ-
ences in wealth and authority among the members of the
nation were too small to be of consequence. The higher
nobility began to arise in the twelfth century, and in the
thirteenth century this growth of a new class led to con-
flicts, for the middle classes would not tamely submit to
its ascendency. The Angevin period was a turning point
in the history of the Hungarian nobility. It was under
the Angevins that the magnates were disciplined and
shaped into a body capable of serving the state. They
then acquired an influence which their fortresses and

166

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

wealth could never give them, for while they had only
aimed at increasing their estates and ruling them like
independent princes, public opinion was against them,
but when they fought for the nation's rights and merely
sought to gain for themselves the position to which their
wealth and culture entitled them, they at once became the
nation's leaders-

The magnates had natural allies in the gentry, for
the great nobles did not constitute a distinct caste, but
were linked by the most intimate ties with the gentry.

Titles never became common even among the
magnates. Many of the greatest families had no titular^
mark to indicate their standing; their family _narnes,^
well-known to the nation, were their sole and sufficient
distinction.

They were not marked out from the rest of the
privileged classes for all time by the possession of a
hereditary title, and accordingly, if a magnate became
poor there was nothing to distinguish him from the
gentry. On the other hand, if a family belonging to the
gentry grew wealthy they were at once equal to the
magnates. Some of the Palatine Garai's relatives
belonged to ordinary gentry families. There did not
exist all those differences of rank which were to be found
in western European countries, where inter-marriage
between the different classes was made very difficult. At
one step a member of the Hungarian gentry might
become a magnate or banneret, and again, the greatest
families might become simple gentry. As the laws of
inheritance did not prevent the division of estates, great
families might easily decline in wealth, but the great
traditions were cherished by their descendants and kept
alive the aristocratic spirit within them. It is true that
in the fourteenth century a Csak might be a simple gentle-
man, but in his own eyes he was not less than a Perenyi
or Rozgonyi.

This relation between the magnates and the gentry

167

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

had many advantages. It kept the two classes in close
touch with one another. Frequently even the most
powerful noble families were unable to retain their exalted
position long enough to forget their origin, and to allow
of the development of that haughtiness which often
separates the aristocracy from other classes and makes it
unfit to lead them. Nor did men learn to measure a man's
worth by the number of his ancestors.

It was in the reign of Sigismund that the career of
Hunyadi commenced. John Hunyadi sprang from a
humble family, yet he became one of Hungary's
bannerets, and the governor of the country, while his son
ascended the throne. Such wonderful success could only
have been made possible by very great unity among the
privileged classes and it in turn served to strengthen the
sentiment of unity.

It was only natural that at that period the magnates
should play a leading part. They had wealth and military
power, and possessed the nation's confidence. From their
youth they had been trained for military command and
in the management of large estates, while at court they
came into touch with European affairs and gained political
insight. When they were unselfish enough to serve the
common interests of the country they were bound to carry
the nation with them. And at that time the magnates did
not adopt any petty policy. They formed no separate
party to further their own interests, and the lines of
cleavage between parties did not correspond with class
distinctions. Every party had magnates for its leaders,
but it also included members of the gentry and of the
burgess class. During the troubled times of Queen Mary
and King Sigismund there were opposing parties, but
the supremacy of the magnates was not endangered
whichever party won ; whether it was the family of
Horvathi or Garai, Laczkfi or Kanizsai, they still
remained the pivot of the nation's life. According to the
turn of events now this faction or district gained the

168

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

upper hand, now that, but while dynasties changed, the
leading element of the community remained the same
class.

The magnates found no necessity for establishing
their position by means of laws. Agitation for legal
reforms generally occurs only when the distribution of
political privileges is inconsistent with the actual distribu-
tion of power. This had been the state of affairs during
the thirteenth century, and was again to be the case under
the Jagello kings.

During those periods, while theoretically the king
was predominant by virtue of his prerogatives, the
magnates acquired such power as compelled king and
gentry to oppose them. Reforms were urgently
demanded, and as it was chiefly through the Diet that the
gentry obtained influence, their principal aim was to
increase its power. But at the period with which this
chapter deals, the law conferred the highest political
privileges and powers upon the class whose social and
intellectual leadership was accepted by the whole nation,
hence reform in the direction of depriving one class of its
privileges in order to confer them upon another was
unnecessary. The king himself accepted the verdict of
facts. His rights were exercised for him by the magnates,
and that is why the great nobles did not endeavour to
lessen those rights, and why the period was so barren of
legislative achievements.

This conservatism did no harm to the cause of free-
dom. During the middle ages the happiest form of
government resulted when the king remained the head of
the executive, and the magnates did more good by main-
taining this state of affairs than by struggling to acquire
new rights and to obtain sanction in form of law for the
power they actually possessed. Although the king was
head of the administration, there were in his council and
the chief offices under the state men whose independence
of character and whose military forces made them a
bulwark of the constitution, and obliged the king to listen

169

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to them with respect. Garai, and men of his type, were
faithful to the king, but they were not his tools. Garai,
when Palatine, said to a Venetian envoy that even if
Sigismund died, Venice must not reckon upon the
nation's changing its policy, as it would tolerate no other,
and any new king would have to tread the same path.
This is one of those utterances which speak volumes.
When the most devoted adherent of the king could
publicly declare to the representative of a foreign monarch
that Hungary's policy depended not upon her king, but
upon her people, whatever else might be in danger the
cause of freedom might be regarded as safe. Bishop Roz-
gonyi on one occasion openly declared his intention of
taking up arms against the monarch, a threat which he
carried out.

Ujlaki, another powerful noble, when he went to
Vienna, would not dismount from his horse even in the
presence of the Emperor, and Pope Aeneas Sylvius
(Pius II.) complained that even members of the gentry
refused to bow the knee to him.

It was to be feared that men who adopted such an
attitude as this towards their rulers, would prove tyrants
to those beneath them, yet it was not so.

The great nobles of the time of Sigismund were
enlightened enough to see what demeanour towards their
subordinates their interests demanded, and they pursued
a comparatively liberal policy. They made no attempt
to deprive the gentry of any of their rights.

Parliament, which had rarely been summoned when
the monarch was all-powerful, sat frequently during this
period. The magnates did not seek to acquire fresh
privileges, and legislation was carried on in Parliament,
where the gentry sat side by side with the great nobles.
The nation's liberty, which kings had been unable to
destroy, was not in danger from the magnates either.

The laws then passed bear witness to the harmony
which prevailed in the country. No section of the nation

170

THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION.

was hampered in its activity or fettered in any way, and
no laws sought to establish the supremacy of any one
class. No obstacles were put in the way of the nation's
free development, nor were any barriers raised which
would have to be violently broken down at a later period.

The magnates voluntarily took upon themselves
almost the whole task of the country's defence, the troops
to be provided by each magnate and church dignitary
being proportionate to his rank, and to the number of his
dependents. It was only if the king and they together
should prove inadequate to the task, that the burden of
military service was to be allowed to fall upon the gentry
and lower orders of the community. The more wealthy
magnates, over and above their assessed quota, raised
banderia from men who, while perfectly free, were induced
by their poverty to serve. The wealthy classes of their
own free will took upon themselves the double expense of
equipping troops, and also of taking part in the incessant
wars. They purchased their power with money and with
their blood.

The laws then passed relating to the defence of the
realm had a very great influence upon the developments
of later times.

It has always been a matter of profound constitutional
importance which element of the nation controlled its
military forces and discharged the duty of national
defence. The new laws which organised defence on the
lines laid down by the Angevin kings, and confirmed the
power of the magnates, were therefore very significant.

But while the military organisation strengthened the
hands of the magnates, it also added importance to the
gentry, for they, too, were organised for purposes of
defence. By means of the county banderia the old idea
of the common duty of defending the country was revived,
and political weight was given to the classes providing
them.

In England, during the same period, the militia had
171

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

lost all practical value, and the only well organised
military force was the army of the nobles.

This difference between the two countries led to
important consequences.

The military organisation established by Sigismund
unfortunately was not able to meet the country's
increasing needs. Universal military service was only
possible if a system of rigid discipline could have been
maintained throughout the whole country, but this was
rendered almost impossible for any length of time by
the general situation. Yet even this practical defect in
the execution of the law does not lessen the merit of
those who established the military organisation of the
country upon such an excellent foundation, and at the
cost of so much self-sacrifice.

Administration also received attention at the hands of
Sigismund and the magnates. To the duty of military
defence was added that of service in times of peace.

A law was passed making it obligatory upon the
magnates, under penalty, to undertake public office.

No stronger proof of the political sagacity and high-
mindedness of the great nobles, can be offered, than this
voluntary taking up of the burden of administration at
a time when there was no king strong enough to compel
them, and they were absolutely free to choose.

We cannot but pay a tribute of admiration to that
age. The magnates of Sigismund*s day were in harmony
with the nation, and wielded their power wisely.

172

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

CHAPTER X^

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN

CONSTITUTION FROM THE TIME OF THE

ANGEVINS TO THE ACCESSION OF MATTHIAS.

PART II.
PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.
FROM THE ACCESSION OF ALBERT TO THE
DEATH OF LADISLAS V. (1457).

During the short reign of the Habsburg King Albert
(1437-1439) there were few important events. Discontent
grew, but did not reach a crisis. The office of Palatine
was filled by election, a circumstance disadvantageous to
the monarch, and one which to some extent destroyed
the centralised character of the administration. This was
the first sign of approaching disintegration.

On the death of Albert a difficult time for the domi-
nant classes followed, for the sentiments of the dynasty
came into conflict with the interests of the nation.

King Albert left a widow, who had previously been
crowned queen of Hungary. Upon her husband's death
Queen Elizabeth's independent right to the crown
revived, for a law of 1439 had declared that the crown
belonged by right of birth not to the king, but to the
queen.

The nobles did not question her right, but as a
woman ruler might not prove strong enough, they were
desirous of finding for her a consort to share her throne,
as Sigismund had shared Queen Mary's, and as King
Albert had shared Elizabeth's until his death.

173

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Queen Elizabeth had never wielded the royal power,
nor had she been crowned with St. Stephen's crown, as
Queen Mary, her mother, had been. As the reign of
Albert had been quite consistent with the rights of the
queen, no offence against her prerogatives was involved
in the elevation of a second husband to the rank of king-
consort. Such a solution of the difficulty would
undoubtedly have been best for the country, and the
national council accordingly decided to elect Wladislav,
prince of Poland. Elizabeth dared not oppose the will of
the council, and her consent gave a lawful character to
their proceedings. But while the negotiations with the
Polish prince were still pending. Queen Elizabeth gave
birth to Ladislas, the posthumous son of King Albert, and
the Habsburg family deemed the child to be as indispu-
tably king as any son to be his father's heir. The nobles,
however, took a different view. They maintained that the
crown of St. Stephen was not in any sense private pro-
perty, but was the nation's most sacred possession, and
could not be claimed by anyone without the nation's
consent.

These two ideas were bound to come into collision as
soon as Elizabeth, instead of insisting upon her own
right, which everyone would have acknowledged,
advocated that of her son, and instead of requesting the
nobles to elect him, demanded to have him crowned.
Her uncompromising attitude on the question of succes-
sion led the nation to cling more tenaciously than ever to
the right of free election, and to choose rather to set aside
the dynasty than to admit its claims.

One party to this conflict saw in the Hungarian
crown a hereditary possession. The other regarded it as
the free gift of the nation to the elected monarch.

Neither party w^as entirely in the right. The Hun-
garian crown could not pass by inheritance as it does
to-day, but on the other hand, the right of election was
never so unrestricted as it became in Poland. According
to the constitution settled at Etelkoz (about 889 A.D.,

174

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

when the Hungarians first settled in their present home)
the nation was to elect its ruler from among the issue of
Arpad. This rule continued in force even after Hungary-
had become a kingdom. When the male line had died
out, the Hungarians chose their sovereign from the
descendants of female branches, on the principle that the
blood of Arpad in the veins of these descendants entitled
them to the throne. In later years, when they elected
Charles Robert of Anjou as king of Hungary, they con-
ferred the right of succession upon his family in
perpetuity.

Yet the nation contrived to harmonise the right of
election with this law of succession. Even though the
ruler was to be of the house of Arpad, the people reserved
to themselves the right of deciding which member of that
family should succeed. In practice, the king's brother
usually succeeded during the earlier centuries, while in
later times it was the son.

On the extinction of the Arpad line, the right of
election came still more to the front. When Andrew III.
died (1301), the Hungarians observed that the Angevin
claimant considered his right to the throne indisputable,
and they therefore passed him over in favour of another
claimant who was willing to submit to election. Even
when Charles Robert gained the throne, the nation laid
stress on the fact that he owed it to election. His son,
Louis the Great, was also elected to be king, and in
several documents he declared that in addition to his
hereditary right, he owed his throne to the pleasure of
the nation. He showed, too, his respect for the principle
of election by requesting the nation to elect his daughter
Mary as his successor. The people's right of election
becomes still more evident when we remember that Louis
asked the nation, in addition, to elect his son-in-law,
Sigismund, who had no hereditary claim whatever.

In spite of this, however, Mary had chosen to regard
her right to the throne as based entirely upon inheritance,
but afterwards, when involved in difficulties, she was

175

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

compelled to admit that she owed her crown to her election
by the nation.

Sigismund, although he had been raised to the throne
entirely by the people's free choice, endeavoured three
times to fix the succession autocratically, but he soon had
cause to repent his action, for it brought his throne into
danger. He was wise enough to learn by experience, and
during the latter part of his reign never again sought to
infringe the nation's right of election. In bequeathing his
possessions, he did not endeavour to dispose of the crown,
but merely begged the Hungarian nobles to be pleased
to elect his daughter and his son-in-law, and this request
was complied with.

Although, therefore, the nation had conferred the
right of succession upon a certain family, yet it retained
the right of election within the limits of that family, and
no member of the reigning house might consider himself
king until he had been duly elected and crowned. No
monarch could bequeath his right to the throne, without
the nation's consent, and even the claimant with the best
title had still to wait for the nation's decision. Though it
may have been the people's duty to elect someone, yet if
they neglected to do so, the claimant could not regard
himself as king.

In Elizabeth's day the situation was as follows:
The Hungarians had undoubtedly conferred the right of
succession upon the house of Charles Robert, and as they
no longer looked upon Elizabeth as their monarch, and as
she herself did not claim such recognition, her son
Ladislas was the natural heir to the throne, and had as
good a right to claim to be elected as Louis, Mary, and
his mother Elizabeth had possessed. When the nation,
in face of these circumstances, elected the Polish prince
Wladislav as king, it ceased to act in accordance with
tradition. On the other hand, the demands of Queen
Elizabeth were illegal. Ladislas was not king without
election, as until election there could be no Hungarian
king. The attitude of neither party to the contest was in

176

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

accord with written law, yet as the dynasty exceeded its
constitutional rights the action of the nobles was only
natural.

The nation would not have been what it was if it had
surrendered its rights. It was not merely blind devotion
to an abstract principle which induced it to cling to the
right of electing the monarch, but a clear perception of
the important interests at stake. The blend of hereditary
succession and free election exactly answered the needs
of the mediaeval community. One of the chief conditions
of national prosperity during the middle ages was that
the monarch should be talented and of full age. The
reign of a child was a far worse evil than any breach of
the rule of hereditary succession. Moreover, in that age,
even the unquestioning acceptance of the principle of
inheritance did not assure to a country that freedom from
internal unrest which it gives to-day, and which is its
chief merit. The problems of succession caused more
bloodshed in England than ever the contests attendant
upon elections of the monarch caused in Hungary. The
Wars of the Roses, and the endless strife between Eng-
land and France, were originated by disputes regarding
succession.

In that day profound veneration for legal rights was
unknown, and the right to the throne was no exception
to this rule.

It was just in connection with this highest privilege
that the right of the stronger prevailed most of all. It is
true that the right of electing the monarch is a dangerous
weapon, and furnishes opportunities of disturbance, yet
the Hungarians knew how to use it, and the frequently
recurring crises were not due to any abuse of this right,
but to the circumstance that so many kings died without
leaving any heir.

The nation realised that the retention of this right
was the best safeguard of its liberties. At this day of
firmly established and highly developed constitutions such

177

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

a guarantee is not needed, but then it was valuable as the
most effective and yet peaceful means of keeping the
monarchy subject to the nation's influence.

The king had to conciliate the people in order to get
them to elect the successor he desired, and at his election
he had to make solemn promises. The right of election
prevented far more bloodshed than it caused, especially in
a country like Hungary, where the only defence of the
constitution w-as the sword. In Hungary, among a people
which in later times has slanderously been called a rebelli-
ous nation, and where the right of armed resistance was
a main point of the constitution, the monarch dwelt in
much greater security than in England, a country which
for more than two centuries has not known civil war, and
which did not introduce into its great charter the right of
taking up arms against the monarch.

England had eight kings from the death of Edward
L to the advent of Henry VII. (1307-1435), while Hungary
had ten kings from the close of the Arpad line to the ad-
vent of the Jagellos (1301-1490).

In England, five of the eight were violently deprived
of their thrones and even of their lives. In Hungary,
three were expelled from the country, two of them, how-
ever, Wenceslas and Otto, having only been the choice
of one party, while the third, Mary, was restored. Only
one Hungarian king w'as killed, the usurper Charles the
Little. There is good reason for ascribing this compara-
tively favourable state of affairs in Hungary to the main-
tenance of the right of election. The knowledge of that
right made kings more careful and rendered armed resist-
ance to a great extent superfluous. Certain it is that the
nation clung tenaciously to the right, and had it not done
so on the occasion of the claim that the Habsburg Ladislas
should succeed, it would have suffered grave disadvan-
tages. Hungary must have abandoned its alliance with
Poland, and instead of a man, must have accepted as its
ruler a baby, at the very time when war was threatening
and w^hen a strong leader was needed above all things.

178

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

The nation saw, too, that if it surrendered to the Habs-
burgs its right of election, it could never regain it except
at the cost of untold bloodshed. Charles Robert was a
powerful king, whose strong rule was not resented by the
nation, yet even he could not induce his subjects to aban-
don this right. It is not likely, therefore, that they would
be willing to yield it to a weak woman and her foreign
relatives. The more rigid the attitude of the Habsburg
family, the more stubborn the resistance of the people.
Unlawful demand was answered by unlawful deed, and
ignoring Elizabeth's opposition, the nation crowned
Wladislav king in the year H40. It chose rather to depose
the reigning house than to brook any infringement of its
rights.

All powers and institutions are derived from the
nation, and while in ordinary times every organ of the
state has its prerogatives and recognised sphere of activity,
yet in times of crisis when the nation is likely to get into
difficulties by keeping too closely to precedent, the
supreme will is that of the people, who alone have the
right to cut out a new path and create new legal sanctions.

The ill-conceived effort of the queen and her foreign
advisers to deprive the nation of its right, simply led to
the result that the aristocracy gained the upper hand
entirely, and the royal power became absolutely dependent
upon them.

The nobles did not abuse their power, and success
did not make them forget, as had happened in many other
countries, that they could not hope for prosperity and pro-
gress without a strong leader. They had sought for a
strong king in Wladislav, and when they had crowned
him, in defiance of the Habsburgs, they did their best,
both in their own interest and in the interest of the nation,
to make his reign successful. Before his coronation, the
new king solemnly confirmed all the rights which the
nobles deemed important, but the constitution underw^ent
no change such as might have proved an obstacle to
efficient government. The nation did not surrender its

179

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

liberty but it realised that only a strong government could
protect the country from the Austrian party and success-
fully prosecute the war with the Turks.

Wladislav was the very man for the position, chival-
rous, high-minded, courageous, and entirely worthy of the
nation's confidence. The outlook seemed bright, when
suddenly the country's hopes were destroyed by the battle
of Varna (1444), where the victory was gained by the
Turks, who proceeded to take possession of a part of
Southern Hungary. That battle prevented the nation's
policy from bearing its anticipated fruit. The vigorous
king, whom the country so badly needed to reconcile free-
dom with strong government, came to an untimely end
on the battlefield. Once more the throne was vacant and
the nation confronted with the same difficult problems
that it had tried to solve four years before. The hand
of fate was indeed heavy upon Hungary. Perhaps, how-
ever, it is this constant recurrence of danger and difficulty
which accounts, at least to a great extent, for that patriot-
ism and self-reliance which have ever been characteristic
of the Hungarians and to which they owe their very exist-
ence as a nation.

The battle of V^rna was one of the most tragical
events in Hungarian history. It happened at a time
when the nation seemed on the road to prosperity, and
turned to evil efforts which otherwise would have resulted
in good.

During the Middle Ages freedom was separated by
but a narrow barrier from anarchy. Very little was required
to turn the harmonious activity of the nobles into selfish
strife one against another. A few men, owning troops
and impregnable fortresses, were so powerful that their
unbridled ambitions were enough to plunge the nation
into discord and put a stop to the country's healthy
development.

Grave dangers could arise even where the bulk of
the people remained faithful to law and order and the
government pursued the best of policies. How likely,

180

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

therefore, was it that a country should get into a lament-
able condition where a succession of disasters tended to
destroy all order, and where the very power whose task
it was to maintain order had itself to be reconstituted again
and again. In England the order of the state broke down
without such unfavourable incidents. How could Hun-
gary avoid her fate with all those unlucky events coming
one after the other ?

The aristocracy had been divided into two parties by
the election of Wladislav, the majority supporting that
prince, while some favoured Ladislas. The king was
not able, during his brief reign, to reconcile these conflict-
ing elements. Under the protection of Frederick of Habs-
burg several Hungarian and foreign nobles in the west
and north-west of Hungary, maintained their indepen-
dence of the recognised government. Unanimity was
necessary to make the policy of the majority effective and
really serviceable to the nation, but the central govern-
ment was to some extent crippled by this disaffection.

Time and national prosperity were needed to bring
about unity, and the battle of Varna threw everything
into confusion again. The child rejected in favour of
Wladislav was again the only heir to the throne. If he
were again to be slighted, party differences would grow
still more acute and internal peace be farther off than
ever. With the Turks at the door, such a policy was
extremely dangerous. Was it wise to repeat the experi-
ment which had terminated so disastrously, especially
as there was no candidate so suitable as Wladislav had
been ?

If, on the other hand, they accepted Ladislas, they
would have to abandon the principle of free election and
acknowledge as king a young boy who was almost certain
to fall under foreign influence. A child king boded no
more good to the country after Varna than before it.

Amid all these perplexities the nation fortunately
again struck the right path. It unanimously elected
Ladislas as king, in spite of the fact that the step might

181

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

involve in difficulties those who had formerly been promin-
ent supporters of Wladislav. The predominant motive
for this action was to avoid '* still greater evils resulting
from internal unrest and civil war." This resolution was
adopted without any enthusiasm, in a purely opportunist
spirit, as it was seen to be best under the circumstances.
Steps were taken, however, to defend the country's inter-
ests. Ladislas was given the title of duke; that of king
was only to be conferred after his coronation. His elec-
tion was subject to the condition that the Emperor
Frederick, who had retained the crown in his possession,
should hand it over, and should terminate his guardian-
ship of the boy. As the adherents of Ladislas agreed to
these stipulations, it was to be hoped that a settlement
would be arrived at.

But the Emperor refused to part with the crown and
to let the boy out of his keeping, and demanded an uncon-
ditional acknowledgment of the hereditary rights of the
Habsburgs. The characteristic feature of the Habsburgs,
which has enabled them to pass through many adversi-
ties and remain for centuries one of the most powerful
factors in European politics, namely, their tenacity of
purpose, their fanatical beh'ef in their vocation and the
divine origin of their authority, has at the same time in-
volved them in the gravest dangers.

What were the Hungarians to do? Surrender to the
Habsburgs, or throw over Ladislas and find another king,
electing perhaps one of themselves? Both solutions had
their advocates. Ultimately it was decided to establish a
temporary government, and while still regarding Ladislas
as king, await his coming of age and the termination of
Frederick's guardianship.

This plan was made practicable by the eminent quali-
ties of John Hunyadi, the chief adviser and confidant of
the late king. In him the nation found its natural leader
and providential support. The country had but to follow
him and it could face any danger. The gentry succeeded
in electing Hunyadi as Governor of Hungary. The class

182

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

which since the death of Andrew III. had remained in the
background now stepped to the front through this act.
During the Angevin period the gentry gave support to
the king without desiring to play a leading part or pur-
suing an independent policy. Since then they had acted
under the leadership of the magnates. Now, however,
that the great nobles endeavoured to take advantage of
the troubled situation, and began to war with one another,
the bulk of the nation determined to assert itself and
secure influence in the direction of affairs. Means were
not lacking for this. The magnates could not deprive the
gentry of their rights. The national council remained
the chief organ for realising the public will, and on that
council the gentry could always obtain a majority if they
cared to attend its meetings. A sound instinct prompted
the choice of the greatest soldier and noblest man in Hun-
gary as the nation's leader, yet in order that the step
should prove a success it was needful to place regal
powers in Hunyadi's hands, and to obey him as Louis
the Great had been obeyed. The country could only
hope for prosperity if a great man stood at its head, en-
joying full freedom of action, one who could make the
nation forget the absence of a king, could defend the
frontier against the Turks, and compel Frederick to send
Ladislas back to Hungary, to be brought up under Hun-
garian influences. Unfortunately the nation was not wise
enough and well-disciplined enough to adopt the only
satisfactory course. Party strife, that foe to Hungarian
prosperity and liberty, had not ceased, and the jealous
Estates would not give Hunyadi the power necessary for
its suppression. Many of the magnates hated the idea
of a member of the gentry attaining to such an exalted
position, some preferred an unsettled state of the country
as it offered them a better chance of furthering their indi-
vidual interests, while others, being of foreign origin, took
little interest in the welfare of the nation.

This disunion was more disastrous for Hungary than
for other countries, for it endangered the racial supremacy

183

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of the Hungarians. Powerful foreign noblemen like
Giskra or Cillei not merely were harmful to those whose
property they took by force, but tended to destroy the
sentiment of nationality. Had their influence endured
they would have created a kind of independent German or
Bohemian state on Hungarian ground.

In these troubled circumstances a strong central
power was needed. However brilliant the halo surround-
ing the name of Hunyadi, it could not altogether make
up for the lack of the monarch's traditional authority.
Not merely the magnates, but the gentry also, esteemed his
commands less highly than if they had proceeded from a
successor of St. Stephen. Greatness of character was not
quite so effective as the dignity of a king. The nation
should have done all in its power to increase the authority
of Hunyadi, but it took the opposite course. As in the
days of Andrew III. the nobles tied the hand which
should have laboured freely in the country's behalf, and
the melancholy spectacle was to be seen of a great man
devoted to lofty aims, yet deprived of the means of
achieving them.

When Hunyadi was made Governor, six " Captains
of the Realm " were appointed whose powers tended to
destroy the centralised character of the government. The
Governor was not allowed to give away any large estates.
In any case of disloyalty he could neither condemn nor
pardon the offender without the permission of the Diet.
He was not empowered to invest any ecclesiastic with the
dignity of archbishop, chief abbot or bishop, without the
advice of the Council elected to control his actions,
and it was the Diet which filled the various offices
under the State simultaneously with the appointment of
the Governor. It is evident that Hunyadi 's task was
rendered exceedingly difficult by all those restrictions.
Furthermore, his adversary Garai w^as elected Palatine,
and a still greater mistake was made by the Estates when
they decided that the Diet should elect the Governor and
the other high officials annually. This decision crippled

184

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

the authority of the government and meant practically
the immediate rule of the Estates. Fortunately the law
appears never to have been put into force, yet its very
existence was damaging to the dignity of the government.

While the Estates displayed such a grudging spirit
towards Hunyadi, they laid great stress upon their own
rights. They revived the law that military service could
only be demanded of the nation if the royal troops and
the official bande'ria were not sufficient. They also passed
a law freeing themselves from the payment of all tolls.
They increased their privileges and lessened their duties.
They secured extended political influence by a law to the
effect that one half of the Council was to be elected from
their ranks and that in the event of the death of Ladislas,
his successor was to be elected by the Diet. In short,
instead of endowing Hunyadi with large discretionary
powers, the Estates placed him entirely under the control
of the Diet, in which they had the leading place.

The aggressive behaviour of some of the magnates
stirred the gentry to resistance. It was necessary and
salutary that the gentry should come to the front, for
their aims were excellent though in their action they often
displayed little sagacity. At a time when freedom was
in no danger and when the one thing the country needed
was to become strong and united, they sanctioned laws
which tended to create division. The obstacles placed in
the path of Hunyadi were probably due to the influence
of a few great nobles, but if the gentry had understood
their own position events might have taken a different
turn. The gentry were able to increase their own power,
for they had influence enough to determine the number
to be elected to the Council from their own class. It was
due to them that the sphere of activity of that institution
was widened. One thing, however, they could not or did
not do, and that was to assure for Hunyadi as much
power as he needed.

This omission brought its revenge, for the sound
policy for which Hunyadi and the gentry stood failed of

185

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

its desired result. Hunyadi tried first to secure the
person of the young king by force, and when that attempt
failed, and when the unlucky battle of Kossovo polje
(1448) in which the Turks were victorious, had crippled
the country's strength, he adopted a fresh policy. He
entered into a contract with Frederick in which the
Emperor recognised the governorship of Hunyadi, and
it was agreed that Ladislas should remain with the
Emperor until he came of age.

This contract served the useful purpose of avoiding
the terrible calamity of the reign of a child king who was
under foreign influences, and it also assured the governor-
ship of Hunyadi for several years and helped to establish
peace on the western frontier. But still Hunyadi was not
quite master of the situation. The Estates demanded that
the young king should be sent to Hungary, and thus pur-
sued a policy in contradiction to that of Hunyadi. Either
policy might have yielded satisfactory results if consis-
tently pursued, but divided councils inevitably entailed
failure.

Had the nation unanimously adopted Hunyadi's
plan, the young king would have remained at the Court
of the Emperor Frederick and the reign of a minor would
have been avoided.

On the other hand, if the policy of the Estates had
been energetically pursued and the Emperor had been
forced to hand over the young king, a Hungarian
guardian could have been appointed and the Estates
would have had the supreme power.

As it was, the Estates made it impossible for Hun-
yadi's scheme to be carried into effect, and yet sufficient
energy was not shown to force Frederick to comply with
their demands. It was not to the Hungarians that the
Emperor confided the boy, but to Czillei, an Austrian, the
worst possible result to which the many good intentions
and efforts could have led. The misfortune of being
governed by a minor was increased by the circumstance
that the child's guardian was a hated and evil-minded

186

PERIOD OF DISLVTEGRATION.

alien. The nation liad brought this trouble upon itself
as a punishment for its treatment of Hunyadi.

Ladislas annulled the acts of Wladislav, and
reckoned his reign from the year of his birth. The
Estates ceased to claim the right of election and acknow-
ledged the validity of the Habsburgs' contention. What
had induced them to accept this worst possible solution
of the nation's difficulties and to put on one side Hun-
gary's greatest son ? It was chiefly the efforts of a few
great nobles, who were adversaries of Hunyadi. That
they could succeed so easily was due to the fact that the
nation did not ask who was to blame, itself or Hunyadi,
for the unsatisfactory situation in which the country found
itself. People demanded success, and, if success was not
achieved, they turned for help to the prestige of royalty
and were unjust even towards so great a man as John
Hunyadi. Many perhaps hoped that Hunyadi would
still remain at the head of affairs, and that he would
acquiesce in the new form of government. They knew
at least that he would not endanger the country's order.
Perhaps he himself believed that he could retain his influ-
ence.

Ladislas V. commenced his reign under favourable
auspices. Thanks to good advisers and the support of
Hunyadi the royal cause was in the ascendant. The
recent troubles had given rise to a powerful reaction in
favour of the monarchy. The Hungarians saw how in-
dispensable the royal power was, and this induced them
even to accept the king's unpopular guardian Czillei.

But the king could not make a good use of the situ-
ation. His court became a centre for intrigues and his
very presence added to the trouble. The nation was
entangled indeed among difficulties, with a selfish great
nobility, a gentry incapable of leadership, and a minor
king, intentionally spoilt and made capricious. At first,
Hunyadi tried to take the reins into his own hands, but
he found to his sorrow that the king was less trustworthy
than the Estates. Sometimes he paid no heed to Hun-

187

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

yadi's words, sometimes he intentionally offended him
and sought for allies among Hunyadi's enemies. Now it
was the king who decided about the nation's affairs, now
it was Hunyadi, and now the Diet.

Ladislas entrusted the administration to six mag-
nates, six prelates and six members of the gentry, all of
them elected by the Diet, and yet when Hunyadi appealed
against this arrangement, the king set him above those
men. Some of the magnates formed alliances and wielded
a greater influence than the lawfully constituted authority.

Fortunately the Hunyadi family had considerable
wealth and military power, and these being used entirely
for the common good, proved the bulwark of the nation.

Hunyadi endeavoured to atone for the ruler's neglect.
While the king and nobles were carrying on their intri-
gues, and in the war against the Turks never got beyond
the stage of preparation, Hunyadi acted and defended
with wonderful valour the territory and the honour of the
nation.

Unfortunately for Hungary, Hunyadi's life was
drawing near its end. He fought his last battle at Bel-
grade, where he saved his country and Christendom, and
soon after the victory he died (1456).

Hunyadi had not been able to stop entirely the disin-
tegration of the country, but he had succeeded in warding
off the chief dangers by which it was threatened. While
he lived he heroically defended his country from the in-
vader, while at home civil war was made impossible by
the fear and respect with which all men regarded him and
by his careful avoidance of any aggressive conduct.

But when he died the whole state was shaken to its
foundations. Ladislas Hunyadi stepped into his father's
place and a close alliance between him and the young
king might have saved the country. This perhaps was
hardly to be expected, for the king, who had not liked to
see the old hero at the head of the nation, was still less
likely to allow Hunyadi's son to have so much power.
Ladislas Hunyadi unfortunately was more vehement than

188

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

his father and more easily impelled to actions likely to
cause strife. The nation adored the young hero, but the
king did not trust him and gave the preference to the
alien and hated intriguer Czillei, who at least did not
endanger his crown. A conflict was inevitable. Czillei,
jealous of the people's favourite, persuaded the king that
he was seeking to gain the throne, and ultimately Ladislas
Hunyadi was arrested and beheaded. This threw the
country into an uproar and the king fled to Prague. Had
he lived, civil war would have been inevitable. Fortu-
nately, a year after Ladislas Hunyadi*s death, the king
died (1457), and Matthias Hunyadi, the brother of
Ladislas and the younger son of the great John Hunyadi,
was elected by the nation to the vacant throne.

The dreadful entanglements into which Hungary fell
were the result of weakness at the centre. Without a
strong government there can be no prosperity or advance
even in a free state. The nation which determines to be
free must keep the government under its control and
restrict the limits of the executive power, or else it may
fall into the power of its leaders. On the other hand, by
pursuing this policy too vigorously it runs the risk of
enfeebling the government and of making it the sport of
every fickle gust of public opinion. Even to-day there is
hardly any state in which the government should be
entirely under the control of the people, and where the
community should not depend at all upon the will of the
central authority for its privileges. Perhaps England is
the only country where such a state of things has
obtained; but there the problem is rendered easier by the
circumstance that the government needs less power than
is necessary in Continental states. France has been
struggling for a century to obtain liberty together with
the order which demands a strong hand, but she has not
achieved her aim. She has merely had freedom and
strong government alternately. In the first and second
Republics, the overpowering demand for freedom made
effective government impossible, so the inevitable reaction

189

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

occurred. The Republic had to give way to the absolut-
ism and centralisation of the Napoleons. The monarchy
and the third Republic made serious efforts to unite the
two great interests of the nation, but with negative re-
sults. France has not a strong government even to-day.
The successive governments fall under the influence of
small factions, whose intrigues and petty jealousies, which
they try to hide beneath the great words democracy and
equality, often shut out from power some of the nation's
finest men. Naturally such a state of affairs cannot lead to
a strong administration, nor is a strong organisation of the
army possible. Only in its matters of foreign policy can
French sentiment be united.

In Hungary also, strong government and freedom
are not yet attained, although the political education of
the people is much more advanced than in France.

The task is much more difficult in Hungary than in
England. Perhaps no country needs energetic govern-
ment more than Hungary. The general European situ-
ation, her connection with Austria, her comparative
poverty, and the mixed character of her population, all
make a strong-handed and far-sighted government neces-
sary. Hungary has not lacked such governments, but
their strength has been purchased at the cost of liberty.

Parliamentarism has been developed upon sound
lines, and perhaps no nation makes a better use of its
representative institutions. Public opinion and national
sentiment are so influential that no anti-national tendency
could ever prevail. Racial feeling is so strong that it is
impossible to imagine a Hungarian majority which would
intentionally injure the nation's interests.

Yet the degree of freedom attained is not satisfactory.
The Hungarians enjoy the privilege of freedom from
foreign domination, but as much can be said for countries
like Russia or Turkey where tyranny crushes the people.

Real freedom is still wanting in Hungary because the
-community is weak and not sufficiently independent of the
government. Statesmen saw that a strong hand was

190

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

necessary and tried to make the people dependent upon
the State. Even the economic development increased the
influence of the government. The administration became
centralised to an excessive degree. Hungary was so glad
to see that she was ruled by her own sons again and that
her cherished constitution was restored, that she was no
longer jealous of her governments and looked on quietly
while the army of oflicials grew and the economic enter-
prises of the State increased in number. In many coun-
tries such a course would have led to open or clandestine
absolutism, but thanks to the Hungarians' innate love of
liberty, their great traditions and strong political instincts,
they have been enabled to realise to some extent the idea
of true autonomy. But the nation cannot rest content
with its present achievement. It will be the work of the
future to increase the independence of the community and
to raise the general level of the nation's intelligence so
much that Parliament may gain increasing importance.

Perhaps, as a result of gradual development, a really
independent community will be evolved which can estab-
lish a government not lacking in strength and fully able
to answer the requirements of its vocation.

During the ]\Iiddle Ages it was exceptionally difficult
to strike the right path. Then more than now it was
necessary that one weighty, brilliant and imposing per-
sonality should lead; that the work of politics should be
entrusted to a few, and that the executive power should
be in one hand. The abstract notion of law and of the
State, had little hold upon the mind of the masses. Their
ruler could not be one whose dignity was borrowed en-
tirely from such abstract conceptions, but a man sur-
rounded by the visible signs of grandeur and encircled by
the halo of '' divine right." Only such a ruler could they
love and revere. To lead people then it was necessary to
impress them. That was why the Roman Church attri-
buted such importance to outward magnificence. It is
not surprising therefore that the government lost its

191

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

authority directly the king was placed in the background
by Parliament.

Government during the Middle Ages was little else
than preparation for war and the prosecution of it. Force
was the means adopted both by the disaffected and by the
government.

In internal affairs, success either for king or noble
generally depended upon the ability to act quickly and
vigorously. If a man could do this he was sure to be more
successful than a whole Parliament or similar body where
the decision rested with the many. It was for this reason
that the Diet of Andrew III. was unable to deal success-
fully with the Counts of Nemetujvdr or with Matthew
Csak, while the individual will of King Robert Charles
speedily brought them to order.

The Hungarian Diet did not possess sufficient power
to enforce its decisions, as the government was supported
only by public opinion as expressed in the Diet and not
by king or magnates. The minority were not disposed
to acquiesce loyally in the decisions to which they were
opposed, and it remained for the majority to show they
had strength enough to enforce them. If the banderia of
the king and magnates were not lent for the purpose of
executing such decisions these were apt to remain a dead
letter.

Moreover, it was very difficult to make the Diet truly
representative of the whole nation, as there were such
great inequalities in wealth and social standing. The
great noble had so many means of acquiring political
influence that it was a farce to pretend that his word car-
ried only as much weight as that of his poorer neighbour.
Accordingly the Diet has frequently fallen under the influ-
ence of a few powerful members of the community, as the
political interest of the bulk of the nation has been too
feeble and uncertain to sway the assembly. It must be
remembered, too, that many of our present institutions did
not then exist. There was no press; frequent communi-
cation between different parts of the country was impos-

192

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

sible, and there were no well-organised parties carrying
on their unceasing activities. The Diet was not suited to
the task of controlling the government and its policy, for
it had not at its back a powerful public opinion. All
governments were weak which found their chief support
in the Diet and were opposed to the king and the mag-
nates. The Diet was never able to sit for very long. To
attend for months or perhaps years meant so much ex-
pense and inconvenience as made it impossible. Succes-
sive Diets were not in any organic connection and scarcely
knew anything of each other's actions. Governments
inaugurated by the Diet were only stable so long as the
body which created them remained in power.

A government can only gain strength from perma-
nent factors of the nation's life, and the governments in
Hungary were only effective when they were in harmony
either with the crown or with certain powerful groups of
nobles. John Hunyadi owed his position to the gentry,
but he could not have maintained it if he had not been on
good terms with the magnates.

The efforts that were made to empower the bulk of
the nation to govern itself by means of the Diet and to
replace the monarchical regime by the immediate rule of
legally constituted bodies, were premature and were bound
either to collapse utterly or to cause the power to pass
into the hands of a few wealthy nobles.

For a short time this government by the great nobles
might produce good results, but in the long run it led to
disorganisation. Nobles like those of England and Hun-
gary who kept in touch with other sections of the com-
munity might for a time govern the country well in the
absence of the counterpoise of royal power, as happened
during the reign of Sigismund; but ultimately the tempta-
tions inseparable from such a condition of affairs were
certain to prove too powerful. It was inevitable that
selfishness should lead the nobles to seize the opportunity
of self-aggrandisement.

Mediaeval parliaments were able to put an obstacle in

193

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the way of unlawful action by the king and to take an active
part in the work of legislation; they could support govern-
ments or procure their dismissal, and could fix a limit to
the sacrifices which were to be demanded of the nation,
and thus gain an indirect influence in political matters;
but when they attempted more than this they failed, and
their efforts generally led to the rule of the great nobles,
which became more and more tyrannical.

This result followed both in England and in Hungary
directly the reins of government slipped from the weak
hand of the monarch. It must, however, be acknowledged,
in spite of the similarity of events in the two countries,
that the Hungarians exercised more self-restraint than the
English. In England parliamentarism only produced
good results while the personality of some great king
counteracted the unruly spirit of the Estates.

In Hungary this was not the case. The nation only
had one king who could be compared to Henry IV. or
Henry V. Sigismund and Albert only reached
mediocrity, and Wladislav, who was a great personality,
died shortly after ascending the throne. Those kings,
moreover, were not able to devote all their time and energy
to Hungary, as they possessed other dominions, so that
the efficiency of the government, while it lasted, was very
largely the merit of the Estates. What England could
only gain with the help of some great king, the Hun-
garian Estates achieved themselves. The period which
commenced with the struggles of the nobles against the
despotism of Sigismund and issued in the regime of
Garai, will always remain a proof of the nation's political
wisdom.

The moderation of the Hungarians was conspicuously
displayed on another occasion. The situation was very
much the same in England and in Hungary. In Eng-
land, when a minor ascended the throne (1422) the
avalanche descended at once, annihilating the entire
system of mediaeval parliamentarism. The nobles came

194

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

into collision with one another, and a civil war followed
without the nation trying to put an end to the trouble.

When a similar event happened in Hungary and a
child became heir to the throne (1440) the Estates used
drastic measures indeed, but with great political insight.
Instead of striving to gain unlimited power, they sought
to impose a bridle upon themselves.

They saw that they needed a strong leader and they
found him in Wladislav. If in spite of this the monarchy
grew weak the fault does not lie at the door of the Estates,
but was due to the unlucky battles of Varna and Kossovo
polje and the obstinacy of the German Emperor who
would not allow the young prince Ladislas to return to
Hungary as its elected monarch.

In England, internal disorder preceded the external
catastrophe, while in the case of Hungary blows from
without created internal weakness and disunion, and in
spite of them, the final scene of the tragedy might never
have been enacted if Ladislas V. had been as good natured
and as easily led as Henry VI. The nation realised the
danger arising from the weakness of the monarchy, and
the young king, if he had possessed tact, could have made
profitable use of the disposition in his favour.

While in England the place of the royal power was
taken by that of the nobles, in Hungary it was the gentry,
who with Hunyadi at their head, stepped into the gap and
by their devotion surrounded their country with glory in
spite of its disunited state. Their conspicuous patriotism
may be accounted for partly by the danger in which Hun-
gary stood, but partly also by the fact that circumstances
had forced the gentry class to the front and assigned to
it important duties in the counties, although in the Diet
itself it had less scope than was the case in England.

The period we are considering did not yield such last-
ing fruit in Hungary as in England. Parliament was the
chief organ by means of which the English privileged
classes asserted their will and they accordingly developed

195

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

and carried to a high pitch of excellence its internal
organisation. The Hungarian Diet, however, had not yet
taken a form which fitted it to be the organ of a highly
developed state life. Only on rare occasions were impor-
tant political questions settled in the Diet, and its proce-
dure was not perfected to the same degree as that of the
English Parliament. Nevertheless, the age, so rich in
events, left deep traces behind it.

It was at that period that the national assembly under-
went certain changes. Sigismund invited representatives
of the towns to attend its sittings and thereby gave it a
broader foundation. Still more important was the cir-
cumstance that especially since the time of Sigismund,
personal attendance of members of the noble class became
less and less frequent, and they began to exercise their
legislative rights by means of elected representatives.

The other state organ, the royal council, was still
flourishing. The king, or governor, laid all political
questions before it, asked its opinion and usually followed
its advice.

The importance of the royal council and of the Diet
was largely due to the power of a few members. A body
which comprised men like Ujlaki, Garai, and Hunyadi,
could not but be influential even if its constitutional rights
were few and it could not claim to represent the whole
nation or boast of great traditions. Such military
strength was behind them as to give weight to their
decisions.

Though the achievements of a given period may not
be of a permanent character, yet their memory lives on
as a precedent. The high position gained by the Estates
and by the Diet established in the mmd of the nation the
conviction that only a state founded upon the co-operation
of king and people could meet the country's needs.
When in later years the royal power grew too great and
kings tried to legislate for their own benefit, the nation
only regarded that constitution as lawful which was in

196

PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION.

conformity with ancient traditions. Those traditions did
not die and whatever conflicted with them, even though
the Estates gave it their assent, was deemed an infraction
of the nation's rights.

197

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER XL

REACTION IN FAVOUR OF THE MONARCHY
IN ENGLAND. THE TUDORS.

The conclusion of the Wars of the Roses was a turn-
ing point in the history of England. During the long
conflict, which had lasted for two generations, the nobles
were so powerful in consequence of the weakness of the
king, that they were not inclined to respect the law.
There was a Parliament which was adequate to the peace-
ful settlement of disputes, and there was a self-respecting
gentry, well versed in politics, which had more to lose
than to gain by civil war, but these were not enough to
confine the contests of the nobles, who possessed all the
means for carrying on war, within the limits of peaceful
rivalry.

The gentry had not the strong organisation and the
military power which could curb the ambition of the
nobles, and as the king also lacked the needful strength,
peace could not be maintained.

This experience was wholesome for the king. More-
over, his path was made easy by the long continued
anarchy. The warlike nobility was pouring out its life-
blood and many ancient families became extinct while
their estates became the property of the crown. The
weakened feudal aristocracy fell into the background, and
the gentry, which had till then been led by the nobles,
was not yet strong enough to take the place thus left
vacant in the organisation of the State. Although the
gentry had been well trained in the school of politics, and
although in Parliament and in the work of administration

198

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN ENGLAND,

it played an important part, yet it did not aspire to the
foremost place. It longed for peace and wished to carry
on its various pursuits under the protection of the king.
Formerly, the king had been surrounded by men with
an insatiable desire for pow^r, but these were now re-
placed by men who, in order to secure the satisfaction of
their more modest requirements, gladly left the leadership
to the king.

Another turn of events had a great influence upon
the internal development of the country and favoured the
cause of the monarch. During the wars with France large
military forces had to be kept in readiness and the rela-
tions of the various factors of the State and of society were
largely determined by military considerations, but as
France became stronger and the aggressive wars came to
an end, a great standing army became unnecessary.

The king's relations with the nobles had been influ-
enced considerably by the circumstance that he needed
troops and money, and that he could gain both only from
the aristocracy. The Plantagenets and the Lancastrians
defended themselves as well as they could from the exag-
gerated power of the nobles, but they could not destroy
the evil at its source by breaking the military power of
the nobility. Now even this became possible. The root
of the nobles' power withered as soon as they could not
maintain armies. Their forces consisted largely of the
knights errant who joined them voluntarily and of the
lesser nobles w'ho sought their protection. These entered
the service of some great nobleman ; they wore his coat-
of-arms and colours and placed themselves as well as their
affairs under his patronage. This system grew to such
an extent as to make the impartial administration of justice
impossible. Also, the great nobles gained thereby enor-
mous military power. The king had to submit to this
because he could not move without the troops of the
nobles. Richard II. consented to wear the colours of his
brother. But during the peaceful epoch which followed,
the situation was entirely changed.

199

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The Yorkists and the Tudors enacted severe laws
against the livery system. The armies of the barons were
disbanded, and with them disappeared the exaggerated
power of the nobility.

With the advent of peace another weapon of the
privileged classes also became powerless. An army being
no longer required war taxes had not to be levied and
consequently it was not necessary to summon Parliament.
There was no law which settled the question of Parliamen-
tary influence over the executive. The privileged classes
had not succeeded in making the royal council, that is to
say the actual government, dependent upon Parliament.
It was only occasionally that Parliament could exercise
control over the executive, generally when taxes were
required. It therefore had important consequences that
the king rarely needed taxes. The executive became in-
dependent of the privileged classes and, being strongly
organised, became the chief factor in the state. The laws
themselves did not change, yet first Parliament gained
the upper hand over the government and afterwards the
royal power became greater than that of Parliament itself.
The pivot of the kingdom was first in Parliament, which
was independent of the king, but afterwards we find it in
the person of the king and in the council dependent upon
him alone.

In consequence of the internal wars, public opinion
had veered round towards the Tudors. The feudal aris-
tocracy had become weak and had no armed forces, while
the gentry did not seek the leading part. The kings were
not dependent upon the goodwill of Parliament. All
these circumstances enabled the Tudors to acquire such
power as had not been possessed by any other English
monarchs since the time of the first Norman kings.

The great movement which had commenced in the
thirteenth century, in the direction of restricting the power
of the king, had come to an end. The monarch regained
almost all that he had lost. He rarely summoned Parlia-
ment, and even if he did, he controlled its decisions. He

200

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN ENGLAND.

influenced the very constitution of Parliament and decided
who should be elected. Proceedings for which Richard
II. had to pay dearly became the custom under Henry
VII. and Henry VIII.

The administration of justice became the function of
the royal council. The most important legal questions
were settled by the king's ministers.

The privileged classes voted the taxes for the whole
lifetime of Henry VII., and Henry VIII. secured that all
his orders should have the validity of law.

The king's power was so great that he could venture
to sever the ties which had bound the country to Rome.
Queen Mary restored the old faith to its 'former position
but Elizabeth again placed the church under the supre-
macy of the crown.

The monarchs took the opportunity of slighting the
ancient aristocracy which for centuries had defied them.
They surrounded themselves with new men who were in-
debted to them for all they possessed. Nor did they
choose their ministers from the great nobles but from a
class inferior to these in birth as well as in fortune. In-
stead of the Percies and Warwicks they turned to the
Wolseys and Cecils, in short to people who were not
bound by ancient traditions to the constitution and who
professed allegiance to the monarch alone. Wolsey knelt
to the king when asking him to alter his intentions, but if
the king clung to his decision Wolsey carried it out how-
ever wrong he may have thought it.

How differently would the Earl of Warwick have
acted. The ''kingmaker" would simply have chosen
another king.

The Tudors were surrounded by an obedient nation
and the royal power seemed unlimited. This, however,
was not the case. The king's power was limited by the
absence of a standing army. Peaceful times had made
the maintenance of expensive military forces superfluous.

The preservation of internal peace was entrusted to
the militia, which remained in such close touch with the

201

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

people that the king could not use it against the nation.

The king was not in a position to compel the bulk
of the nation to obey him by any forcible means. If he
tried to play the tyrant he was sure to fail as he had no
army. Absolutism could not be carried beyond the point
at which the opposition of the majority began.

The king could do much but not everything.
Wrongs committed against individuals did not endanger
his position because the nation was tired of civil war and
was not inclined to take up arms. Only in defence of
great common interests would it incur the risks of armed
resistance.

The Tudors well knew the limit of their power. Their
chief effort was to govern in a way that harmonised with
the feelings of the bulk of the nation. They were ready
even to revoke orders which gave offence rather than pro-
voke a contest.

It was of the utmost importance that the king's acces-
sion of power did not make an end of parliamentary tradi-
tions and that, on the contrary, the later requirements of
parliamentarism found precedents in the events of that
epoch. During the reign of Henry VII. Parliament had
very little influence. Henry VIII., however, felt himself
so entirely master of the situation that he was willing to
allow Parliament to play a part. He knew that he had
no reason to fear Parliament, while its corroboration of his
decisions would increase their importance in the eyes of
the people. By obtaining parliamentary sanction he
raised his own will to the level of the common w^ill. The
old constitutional idea that the king and the privileged
classes together were the source of law was maintained.
The important questions of religion and of succession were
settled by the king with the help of Parliament.

In former times Parliament, and especially the power-
ful nobles, took the initiative in dealing with the great
concerns of the nation's life, but in Henry VIII. 's
time the initiative was taken by the king. The situation
was entirely changed in reality, but not formally, because

202

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN ENGLAND.

Parliament retained its sphere of activity, at least in out-
ward seeming.

Respect for the rights of Parliament did not prevent
the Tudors from being all-powerful in their day, but it
made it possible that the community should exercise an
influence which it could not otherwise have gained, and
that with a change of public opinion the ancient liberty
should revive.

This was why the rule of the Tudors was not fatal
to the cause of freedom. The king's power extended far,
yet the Constitution was preserved in its ancient integrity.

The hundred years' rule of the Tudors had two conse-
quences which rather favoured the cause of freedom.

One great event of the period was the Reformation.
At first this augmented the monarch's power. All that
had benefited the king in the Catholic church remained
unchanged in the reformed church. Like the supremacy
of the Roman hierarchy, that of the king also trained the
people to obedience. On the other hand, all that was
disadvantageous to the king in the Catholic church was
absent from the reformed church. But the movement of
the human mind which had brought about the Reforma-
tion would not halt just where the king wished it to stop.
The people submissively followed the leading of Henry
VIII. even in matters of religion because their minds were
still under the powerful influence of the causes which had
led to a revolt against Catholicism and in that revolt they
found in the king their leader. But by fostering the spirit
of reform, Henry set free living forces which would not
long adapt themselves to the monarch's will, and which,
in obedience to their own laws, worked a great transfor-
mation in the mental life of the nation. The English
people, being constantly in touch with the peoples of the
continent, became imbued with doctrines which produced
an effect very different from that contemplated by the king.
The Calvinistic church was organised on the basis of
autonomy. That was the first attempt in Europe on the

203

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

part of large masses of people to govern themselves on
democratic lines.

The whole order of the world was changed. The
governing power had come into the hands of the lower
orders of the people. Dogmas were not passed down from
some priestly hierarchy to a submissive flock. It had
become a matter for every man's conscience to settle the
great problems of faith. The decisive word belonged to
the individual and not to any authority above him.

All this deprived the monarch of some part of his
influence. New modes of thinking and feeling had come
into existence, and sought to become operative in the
world of politics as well as in that of religion. They intro-
duced the spirit of democratic government into public life.

Did this guarantee liberty ? Not at all. In the name
of the sovereignty of the individual conscience men often
acted as tyrannically as they did in the name of democracy.
Nevertheless, the Reformation proved of immense import-
ance to the cause of freedom. The English Protestants
may have become tyrants, but they would not endure the
tyranny of others, and for the time being that was the
chief danger to be feared. The monarchs wished to main-
tain the episcopal system and persecuted the Puritans, so
that these were driven in self-defence to join the ranks of
the opposition. The whole mode of thought of the Pro-
testants was opposed to the notion of the king being
supreme in all matters, and if they had ever become advo-
cates of absolutism it would certainly not have been royal
absolutism.

The great differences between the royal government
and the Puritan church destined the new faith to become
a powerful support of the cause of freedom, and to put an
end to the torpid mental condition which had made the
power of the Tudors possible. The Puritan spirit created
noble defenders of the freedom threatened by the king
and raised such forces as were able to play a decisive part
in the struggles that followed.

204

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN ENGLAND.

Other effects of the royal government which checked
its subsequent transgressions were the long peace and the
increasing wealth of the country, due to a wise economic
policy, and, above all, the growing importance of the
middle classes. Under the careful hands of the royal
government the gentry became entirely transformed. The
gentry of the time of Henry VIII. and that which in the
last years of the reign of Elizabeth defied the queen her-
self, and in whose ranks we see men like Hampden and
Pym, were two different bodies. The former, though en-
dowed with political ambitions and with a certain measure
of influence, did not claim the first place in State life.
Accustomed to be led by the aristocracy and acknowledg-
ing the necessity for the increase of the royal power, it
was willing to leave the settlement of great political ques-
tions in the king's hands. But the new gentry aimed
higher. It had become rich ; the monarch sought its sup-
port; ministers were chosen from its ranks, and while occu-
pied with the duties of government it became familiar with
great affairs of State. The psychological effect of the
events of recent times was gradually cancelled and the old
traditions of freedom were revived. The character devel-
oped in a united state could not be destroyed in a few
decades. During earlier times the monarchy had never
reached such a level of impotence that the royal reaction,
when it came, should cause such an upheaval as to destroy
all the traditions of the nation. The people's self-reliance,
which had been diminished through the weakness of the
monarchy, revived. Self-respect awoke along with in-
creased capacity for government. The gentry class
became so strong that it wished to occupy the leading
position which had become vacant through the downfall
of the nobles. The burgesses of the towns, merchants
and craftsmen, attained a degree of importance in public
life of which their forefathers would not have dreamt.
The growing culture, evident throughout Europe, the
self-reliant thought and action to which the middle classes
became accustomed, fostered the idea that a leading part

205

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

in the management of the nation's affairs was due to them.

During the Middle Ages the towns had played a very
unimportant part. Influence belonged almost exclusively
to the landed proprietors. It was only at the time we are
now considering that the burgesses also claimed a part
in political life. When making this claim even the little
sphere of activity which had belonged to the representa-
tives of their class in former times proved useful. It was
then that the tree whose seed had been sown in the thir-
teenth century bore some fruit. The representatives of
the towns had sat for three centuries in Parliament, side
by side with the deputies of the counties, and the equality
of their rights and the growing feeling of solidarity made
common action possible. They sat in the House of Com-
mons not as a separate, isolated class, but as one which
was, theoretically at least, equal to the others. Parties
-therefore were formed on great political questions from the
representatives of the towns and of the counties.

The sixteenth century thus left behind it traces of
opposing tendencies. On the one hand, great examples
•of royal government were handed down to posterity, but
on the other hand the new generation inherited a more
vigorous spirit of liberty.

Such an inheritance is a dangerous thing. He whose
insight is keen can discern the transformation in process
beneath the surface. But the majority of politicians are
not thus gifted. They tread the old paths, not noticing
the abyss that has gradually been opening itself beneath
their feet, and not till they fall headlong do they realise
the presence of danger.

The success of the Tudors awakened in their succes-
sors the belief that the nation would obey them as readily
^s it had obeyed the Tudors. The royal power had van-
quished the aristocracy and stood in giddy isolation far
above the privileged classes. The king was not sur-
rounded by those dangerously powerful men who in
former times had continually reminded the monarch that
there were aims and ambitions in the community with

206

MONARCHICAL REACTION IN ENGLAND.

which he had to reckon. In his intimate council,
the king did not meet with any opposition. Further,
those round about him made him believe that he
would not find it anywhere. He saw how the monarches
authority had grown upon the continent and he aimed at
equal power. If he cherished the desire to consolidate the
practice of his immediate predecessors into a permanent
system, collision with the people was inevitable. The
nation had awakened to new life and was a formidable
antagonist. It was not controlled by the aristocracy,
which, though it sought to restrict the royal power, could
not really be opposed in principle to the kingship. The
aristocracy had formerly been an intermediary between
king and nation. Standing near the throne its ambitions
and its power could act as a restraint upon the king, and
at the same time it could lead the nation in such a way
that although the people opposed this king or that, they
were never opposed to the idea of kingship. It is true
that the nation dethroned Edward II., Richard II., Henry
VI. and Richard III., but in place of the dethroned mon-
arch it chose another.

Now, however, the influence of the aristocracy had
become unable to moderate either of the two opposing
parties. At no time until the nineteenth century was the
aristocracy so impotent as it was then. This circumstance
led to a very great divergence between king and nation.
The elements that stood at the head of the opposition
would not have objected even to the inauguration of a
Republic. Against the prerogatives of the king they set
the rights of the people and their notions found soil in
which they could strike deep root.

The great drama of the seventeenth century had been
prepared in the sixteenth century, and the Stuarts were
going to see to it that the catastrophe which had been
made possible should actually occur. They ran blindly
into the danger. The great convulsions into which they
threw the country threatened to turn the nation out of the
course of development marked out for it by past history,

207

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

and it seemed as if either the kingship or constitutional
freedom would have to be sacrificed.

The final result, however, was the triumph of the
great national traditions. Even the wrongdoings of kings
could not destroy the strong edifice which had been built
up. The work of the Middle Ages was crowned by the
new age, which solved the problem with which the Middle
Ages had grappled in vain, namely, how to make the
executive power dependent upon the people's representa-
tives without impeding its wholesome activity. In the
State there was one decisive authority, that of the majority
of the House of Commons.

But all this happened at a time which cannot be dealt
with in this present book, and we must return to the de-
velopment of events in Hungary during the fifteenth
century.

208

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

CHAPTER XIL

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY. KING
MATTHIAS.

During the second half of the fifteenth century the
course of development took different directions in Hun-
gary and in England. In previous centuries, as we have
seen, similar causes operating in the two countries gave
rise to similar consequences, and while in some respects
Hungary and England differed, yet as regards their con-
stitutional development they displayed many analogies.
The inhabitants of the Christian countries of Europe
during the Middle Ages were very much alike by reason
of the similarity of their culture, their religion, their senti-
ments and their general conception of life, but in the case
of the English and the Hungarians the resemblance was
striking and it led to a similarity in their political develop-
ment. In both countries it was the monarchy which pre-
served the national unity, and as the two nations waged
many wars with other countries, internal relations were
largely regulated in accordance with military needs.

During the fifteenth century this resemblance came to
an end, and a transformation came over the situation in
England which had not its counterpart in Hungary.
During the Wars of the Roses the English nobles waged
a destructive warfare among themselves, while Hungary
succeeded in averting civil war, and King Matthias (1458-
1490) was confronted by the magnates in their undi-
minished might. The work which fate accomplished for
the Tudors the Hungarian monarch had to take in hand
himself. England had reason to be grateful for her
geographical situation. The Norman Conquest indeed

209

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

had established so strong a link between France and Eng-
land, a connection strengthened by the ambition of kings
and the warlike proclivities of the nobles, that England,
continually engaged in foreign wars, was in a somewhat
similar situation to the purely continental country of Hun-
gary. As soon, however, as France awoke and drove
out the English, the situation was entirely altered. Defeat
proved a blessing to England and she then reaped the
advantages of her insular position.

Lasting peace followed, troops were disbanded and
military considerations were no longer paramount.

Hungary all the time was drifting into a more and
more critical position. The Turkish peril was becoming
ever more menacing. Constantinople had fallen and the
Turkish power was established near the frontiers of Hun-
gary. On the west, the country^s neighbours were look-
ing with a jealous eye upon the growing power of King
Matthias. The Gerfiian Emperor Frederick and the
Polish king considered themselves entitled to the Hun-
garian throne.

Matthias was of such stuff as conquerors are made of.
His proud and warlike spirit would brook no offence.
Every victory fed his vast ambitions and pointed out new^
aims. He had perfect confidence in himself and in the
strength of the nation and resolved to rule not only in the
east but also in the more civilised west. He was not
merely prepared to meet conflicts which were inevitable,
but himself commenced such as could easily have been
avoided. As a result, Hungary was surrounded by foes
and needed military strength more than ever before.

Here the great difference in the situation of England
and Hungary made itself felt. Hungary had avoided a
civil war like that which in England had crushed the
power of the nobility and had rendered the task of the
Tudors easy, yet in consequence of her geographical posi-
tion it was far more necessary for Hungary than for Eng-
land that her monarch should be supreme.

At this crisis the instinct of self-preservation did not

210

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

forsake the Hungarians. They saw where their interest
lay, and the accession of Matthias to the throne marked
the victory of that policy which had so often enabled the
nation to struggle manfully against great odds. Hungary
may have been guilty of many faults but she never made
the mistake of forgetting how essential was the strong
hand of the ruler to her welfare. It was the recognition
of this fact which had given power to the hand of John
Hunyadi, had paved the way for Ladislas V. and which
now proved the strong support of King Matthias. The
nation looked to him to restore internal peace and unity,
and in his dealings with outside powers, to complete the
work of his immortal father. Matthias, like the Tudors,
had to stop the process of disintegration which had set in
as a result of the decay of the royal power, but his task
was much more difficult than theirs. The English needed
no new prerogatives or new instruments in order to estab-
lish order, but the Hungarian king had to acquire the
necessary power.

It was fortunate that the question of power began at
that period to shape itself favourably to monarchs.
Standing armies were being created which possessed great
advantages over a merely armed crowd ; cannon were com-
ing into use, w'hile a general and increasing desire for
peace was smoothing the way for absolutism.

On the one hand was the problem whether Hungary
could withstand the attacks of her external foes and
whether the process of disintegration within could be
stopped, while on the other hand there was the question
whether the king of Hungary would not make use of the
circumstances in his favour against the constitution.
Was it possible for the king to strike the happy mean,
and while putting an end to freedom's exaggerations,
which were threatening the country with disruption, still
to respect its just bounds? In England, where to trust the
king with a large standing army would have jeopardised
the country's freedom, the political situation with respect
to foreign nations did not demand that the monarch

211

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

should possess any considerable military force, but in
Hungary the nation *s vital interests demanded that the
king should have control of vast forces.

How did Matthias act in this critical situation ? His
keen eye saw far and clearly, and his gaze was ever
directed to the nation's interests. He never tried to gain
absolute power but always strove to serve his country.

One of the chief points of his policy was to reserve
as much of the nation's strength as possible for operations
beyond the frontier of Hungary, and he endeavoured to
organise the community accordingly. Let every man be
strong and able to fight but let him spend his strength in
discharge of his duty to the state. Let the king be
supreme over an armed nation, not in order to weaken
his former rivals but to direct their efforts into a proper
channel.

It was the king's task to see that the rivalry of the
different sections of the community did not paralyse the
state, and that every particle of the country's strength
should serve the nation's interests.

His strong will, his proud self-reliance, and the habits
of warlike times, no doubt awakened autocratic inclin-
ations in Matthias. He wished his great abilities to be
able to work unchecked by the petty interference of others.
Was there ever a great man who did not feel as a fetter
on his genius the necessity of winning the adhesion of
small minds and selfish hearts to his schemes ? IMoreover,
Matthias was a contemporary of Louis XL, Ferdinand
the Catholic, and Ivan III. Like them he desired power.
He saw only too clearly how dangerous to the nation was
any weakness at its centre. It was an absolute duty to
restore the dignity of the monarchy, and we can well
understand that he should lay great stress upon his rights.
The great nobles, too, looked upon him as an upstart and
pricked him with their disdain. This must have wounded
his proud and ambitious soul and he therefore resolved to
be feared and obeyed everywhere.

Yet it remains true that the king did not aim at abso-

212

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

lutism. His sound practical sense overcame any inclin-
ation in that direction. He controlled his autocratic
tendencies directly he saw that they would absorb all his
strength and interfere with his foreign policy. His sane
judgment discerned the point to which he might go on the
path of autocracy, and where he must comply with the
requirements of liberty. He understood that from a
nation like the Hungarians, more was to be gained by
respecting their rights and using gentle methods, than by
some new system of government which must inevitably
arouse antipathy or by commands and compulsion. He
saw, too, that if he was to play an important part in
European politics he needed the support of the great
nobles, and accordingly he had no desire to weaken them.
He made magnates of many of his faithful adherents.
Szapolyai, Kinizsi and others, owed to him their great
wealth and high rank. He also maintained the power of
the old noble families. He pardoned even his most
dangerous adversaries, such as Garai, Ujlaki, Szildgyi,
and Vitez, when he thought that by so doing he could
win them over- His aim was to make the nobles faithful
to him, and he only punished the defiant oligarchs and
robber knights. Whenever he could he avoided violence,
and even spared Giskra, the infamous Bohemian robber
knight, and took him into his service. An incident which
occurred in the year 1471 was typical of his methods.
Archbishop Vit^z was guilty of forming a conspiracy in
favour of the king of Poland. Matthias pretended to
know nothing of the conspiracy, treated his enemies in the
most friendly way, made them grants of land, and chose
them as leaders in an expedition against the Polish king.
Of course, if the men had not feared him, had they not
known well enough what an iron hand was beneath the
velvet glove, this policy would not have succeeded.

Had the king been aiming at absolutism his actions
would have been very different. A tyrant sees a culprit
even in an innocent man and does all in his power to
remove from his path anyone who is likely to be danger-

213

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ous, but he who builds a golden bridge over which the
unfaithful may return to him, is evidently guided by other
motives than a desire for absolute power.

When in 1459 Matthias came into collision with the
Emperor Frederick, he assembled the leading nobles and
asked them whether they really wished that Frederick
should be their king, because if so, he was ready, for the
welfare of the country, to abdicate in his favour.

The loyalty which he could demand as a right, he
bargained for with the promise that he would never alter
the existing laws without the nobles* consent.

He sought the advice of the magnates on the most
important subjects and never resented a sincere word.

If necessary, however, Matthias could smite erring
nobles with an iron hand. They must respect the nation's
laws iand be ready to make sacrifices for king and country
or he would crush even the mightiest of them. He hum-
bled even his own uncle and benefactor, the powerful and
popular Szilagyi. He bestowed wealth and rank lavishly,
but the recipient must use the gifts for the benefit of the
country or let him beware. The sentence introduced by
him into the Hungarian code in 1480 : *' Those who abuse
the favours and prerogatives granted to them shall justly
be deprived of the same '* was no idle word but represented
a fundamental principle of his action. With him, right
and duty, prosperity and sacrifice, went hand in hand.

But could his policy lead to the desired results? His
power was limited owing to the circumstance that his
throne was surrounded by nobles possessing immense
wealth, strong fortresses and numerous troops. With
their ancient dignity, they preserved their old ambitions.
As Matthias himself had sprung from the ranks of the
gentry they could not regard the crown as something
beyond their reach. The friendship of powerful nobles
fike Szapolyai and Bathori was sought after by the
monarchs of other countries.

Such subjects could not be slighted even by Matthias
himself, especially as he needed their assistance for his

214

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

foreign schemes. Yet he was able to keep them in proper
subjection. He listened to their words, but it was always
he who decided.

Matthias remained true to his policy in his dealings
with the gentry. He desired to bind them to himself and
to use their strength in the service of the country, but
without depriving them of any of their rights. They were
easier to handle than the magnates. Some of the mag-
nates saw their enemy in the king, for they knew he had
been elected to counteract their influence, but the gentry
were his partner in interests. They had taken to heart
the lesson of recent times, that weakness of the ruler meant
civil war, and they therefore desired a strong king, but
they were not moved by fear to place internal peace so
far above every other consideration as to be willing to
sacrifice all else for that. They were ready to be the
king's allies but not his tools. They overlooked an occa-
sional breach of the law, but clung to the constitution.
The attitude of the Hungarian gentry towards Matthias
was different from that of the English gentry before the
advent of the Tudors. In Hungary it was the gentry
who, after the death of John Hunyadi, the father of
Matthias, defended the nation's interests most faithfully,
and it was they who saved the state from anarchy by
electing Matthias as king.

They took this step not only because they looked for
the restoration of order from him, but because he was one
of their own class and they hoped he would serve their
interests. But the question was whether the many rights
of the gentry would not restrict the power of the king.

Their first act showed that the old spirit was not dead
in them. Although Matthias was already seventeen years
of age they appointed Szilagyi, his uncle, regent for Hve
years, and they passed laws which considerably lessened
the royal power. In place of the established custom they
made it compulsory that the nobles should attend Parlia-
ment in person at its annual meetings, a measure which
sowed the seeds of disorganisation. Such a crowd could

215

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

not remain together long enough to get to understand
important and difficult questions. Serious debate and the
formation of just opinions were equally impossible. Sud-
denly, without any preparation, inexperienced men were
called upon to decide matters which even the most expert
could only settle after much deliberation. Such a crowd
must either become the tool of power behind the scenes,
or else bring the state into a condition of anarchy.

The same law condemned the king to impotence, for
while it declared that he was to defend the country by
means of his own forces, and if they proved insufficient,
was to apply to the nation, yet it prohibited him from
demanding any taxes.

Difficult as the situation w^as, Matthias saw what he
had to do. Surrounded as he was by magnates, mostly
hostile to himself, and by a gentry class, loyal but exact-
ing, accustomed to liberty and inexperienced in the great
affairs of State, he recognised it as his best policy to
restrict his ambitions. First of all he endeavoured to
satisfy the reasonable demands of the gentry. That was
his aim when he destroyed the nests of the robber-barons
and gave back stolen lands to their rightful owners, and
when he regulated the tolls. He was the first king for a
long time who had dared to punish powerful wrong-doers.
Matthias could influence the gentry as no one else could.
His popularity was greater than that of Louis the Great.
That king w-as the idol of the great nobles. He
created a high order of nobility and became the pattern
of the country's warriors, but the gentry class, influenced
by the old national spirit, could hardly feel so entirely
one with him as with Matthias. In Matthias, every Hun-
garian, and especially every member of the gentry, saw
the type of his own class. His successes were their glory,
and he shed a radiance upon the class from which he had
sprung.

To the inherited popularity of his name, and to his
undaunted valour, was added the advantage of being able
to captivate the imagination of the crowds better than any-

216

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

one else. There have been few kings who could so readily
as he find a way to the hearts of vast masses of their sub-
jects. Concessions which he was obliged to make he
granted in such a way and at such a time as gave them
the appearance of being voluntary, and created a feeling
of gratitude. He was equally downright in showing
generosity and severity. When Simon Nagy suffered a
defeat, the army trembled in anticipation of the king's
anger and of the punishments he might inflict, but the
king consoled instead of upbraiding them, and
when the occasion arose he sent them to war again under
the same leader. They repaid his trust by super-
human efforts which brought victory. In rewarding he
was most liberal, and being strong he could be forgiving,
as no one could mistake his leniency for weakness.

On the other hand, if he desired to convey a lesson
by punishment, he did not shrink from making an ex-
ample of the highest in the land. After the imprison-
ment of his own uncle, who would dare defy the king?
The smaller men saw with mingled fear and satisfac-
tion that the king dared to punish even the greatest.

The fabulous splendour of the court of Matthias, and
his artistic taste, increased his greatness in the eyes of
the people. On the other hand, they were fascinated by
the thought that the king often mingled with them in
disguise. He whom to-day they saw as a peasant among
the humblest people, appeared to-morrow in royal purple
surrounded with all the pomp of a great monarch.

Matthias not only really was a great man, but he
also knew how to make others perceive it, and appear-
ances carry more weight with most people than facts.
He was cut out for the idol of a people, and the hero of
tales and poems. Hungary never had another king of
whom the people would tell such fascinating tales as were
told of him whom they called ** the Just."

The king knew, however, that in spite of all the love
felt for him by the middle classes, it w^ould be impossible
to count upon them unless he respected their rights and

217

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

gave them an active part in the work of government.
They would have fallen out even with him had he at-
tempted absolutism, but he valued their loyalty more than
his own personal advantage.

In home policy Matthias refrained from risky enter-
prises in order to reserve undivided strength for his
foreign policy. The Diet was frequently convened.
The king tried to persuade instead of commanding. He
listened patiently to the objections of the middle classes
and suffered their most severe criticism, promised the
alterations they demanded, redressed grievances and con-
firmed the constitution.

His methods could not fail to lead to important
results. The Diet usually fell in with his plans, and he
associated personally with the nobles and won their con-
stant support. He was able to keep the powerful nobles
well in hand, because the bulk of the nation followed him
rather than them. Since the time of the Angevins the
magnates had led the gentry and the secret of their enor-
mous influence was their backing by the nation.

But when, during the reigns of Albert, Wladislav,
and Ladislas V., the unruliness of the great nobles passed
all bounds, the middle classes instinctively sought
for a new leader. Ladislas V. had not intelli-
gence enough to see that in this turn of events
fate had placed a trump card in his hands, but Matthias
at once seized the opportunity of restoring the ancient
alliance of king and gentry.

A similar transformation of the whole situation
occurred with respect to military service. Just as the
nation had voluntarily voted more taxes than ever before,
so it cheerfully took upon its shoulders a heavier burden
in the shape of military duties than it had previously
borne. It was to this readiness on the part of the nation
to make great sacrifices that Matthias owed his success,
and it was on that account that the king did not attempt
to alter the system of government. By acting in this

218

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

way he awakened love and loyalty and still gained all
that he desired.

One institution, however, the king needed to give
effectiveness to his will, and that was a standing army.
When gunpowder came into use the professional soldier
gained a decisive advantage over the non-professional.
So long as arrows, swords, and lances were the principal
weapons, and while the cavalry formed the bulk of the
army, the Hungarian gentry were the best soldiers pos-
sible, for they were familiar with horses from their child-
hood, but they did not understand the handling of
cannon and muskets, and they were not willing to serve
as infantry at all. Success in battle came to depend more
and more upon the careful training of soldiers and clever-
ness of tactics, and less upon personal valour. Matthias,
one of the greatest generals of his age, could not have
done what he did without a well-organised and carefully
trained standing army. The victory of the cause of free-
dom in England, amid the crises of the sixteenth century,
was largely due to the circumstance that the nation,
whose situation did not render a standing army neces-
sary, could easily thwart the king's efforts to create one,
as it was only too manifest that he required it for the pur-
pose of coercing his subjects.

In Hungary, the superiority of the community over
the king in respect to military strength, had hitherto
been the chief support of the constitution. What then
would happen if this position were reversed, if the king's
army were all powerful, if his cannon on the hilltops
could batter the hitherto impregnable fortresses, and if
there were not one corner of the country which the
avenging hand of the king could not reach ?

Would the constitution, based as it was upon the
right of armed resistance, crumble to pieces when resist-
ance was no longer possible?

The danger was very real, yet during the reign of
Matthias, circumstances enabled the country to steer
clear of it. The "black army*' of Matthias was not so

219

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

strong as to enable the king, while prosecuting his wars
outside the country, at the same time to establish at home
a government founded upon violence, for on Hungarian
soil violence alone could establish absolutism. The
king's army was not in itself sufficient even to meet the
requirements of the foreign wars. Matthias could not
have successfully conducted these wars and defended his
country from invasion, without the help of the soldiers
of the great nobles and of the whole nation in arms.
Had he endeavoured to use his standing army for violent
revolutions at home, he would have become impotent
abroad and have defeated his whole policy. So long as
he was dependent upon the nation's help and goodwill,
the right of resistance was still an effective weapon
against the king. If, however, it had been the only
weapon, sooner or later the king, with his standing
army, could easily have broken its point and overthrown
the constitution. The day would come when foreign
wars w^ere ended, and the troops hitherto employed
abroad, would be set free for use at home, and then the
king might devote his undivided power to the task of
strengthening his own position. That is what happened
in France. Charles VII. organized a large army to fight
the English, but when the war with England was over,
his successor, Louis XL, employed those soldiers in
crushing his opponents at home.

But the great expense of a standing army furnished
another weapon for use against aggression, and the
nation, guided by a sure political instinct, made a wise
use of this means and saw to it that the power which was
so necessary to the king should at the same time serve
the interests of the country. In this lies one great differ-
ence between the history of France and that of Hungary.

France, disintegrated by feudalism, had not strength
enough to oppose the king, reinforced as he was by his
standing army, but in Hungary events took the same
turn as they had done long before in England, and as a
result of the same public spirit. The situation of Mat-

220

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

thias was exactly the same as that of Edward I. and
Edward III., and the similar situation led to similar con-
sequences. We have seen that in England the kings
were unable to meet the expense of their wars from their
own treasury and were driven to find new sources of
income, if possible, without the necessity of obtaining
the nation's consent. As this, however, was not pos-
sible, they were forced to apply to Parliament, which
imposed the condition that no taxes should be levied
without its consent. The monarch continued to struggle
against this state of affairs but without much success.
The leading classes of the nation were sufficiently strong
and skilful to see to it that the king should obtain money^
through them alone.

A considerable time later, events took a similar
course in Hungary. Matthias found himself, after some
time, unable to cover the expense of his military opera-
tions, partly because wars were becoming more costly
and partly because the standing income of the monarch
had been diminishing. Large estates belonging to the
crown had been given away, and the income derived
from tolls had considerably decreased by reason of the
exemptions extorted by the nobles, and which extended
in some measure to their dependants. Matthias had to
increase his revenue somehow. He relieved some of the
counties of the necessity of holding their very expensive
meetings in consideration of certain money payments.
He demanded a certain amount of free labour from the
people for the building of fortresses and the provision of
food for the soldiers. Some of the great nobles were
obliged to grant loans. In order to maintain the for-
tresses the king imposed taxes on those who lived in their
vicinity. He ignored immunities from taxation, and
compelled the nation to contribute either in money or
in kind to the upkeep of his armies.

But all these shifts availed little, and Matthias was
obliged to get the nation to agree to new taxes.

Until that time, new taxes were very rarely necessary

221

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

and there was no clearly established rule as to who had
the right to impose them. Robert Charles gave offence
to some by levying a tax after having discussed its neces-
sity with the barons. Louis the Great, seeing that the
nation had not approved of his father's methods, endea-
voured to settle the matter by law. During the Turkish
wars, extraordinary taxes had been imposed in many
different ways. Sigismund often levied a tax in a
thoroughly autocratic manner. In his absence abroad,
the royal council decided the question of taxation.

In Albert's reign, some of the great nobles gathered
together in the camp at Titel and proclaimed a tax on
their own authority, declaring that they would use force
if anyone neglected to comply with their demands. In
most cases, however, the Diet had voted the taxes
although there was no law necessitating the nation's
consent.

If matters had gone as the Estates wished, the ques-
tion would not have been settled during the reign of
Matthias. They objected strongly to being taxed at all.
A law of Ladislas V. had declared that extraordinary
taxes were not to be imposed in any way or under any
title, and after the election of Matthias it was again pro-
claimed that neither king nor governor had any right
to tax the inhabitants of the country. In 1458 it was
enacted that the king should "not impose the tax of a
florin or half-a-florin, which his predecessors had deman-
ded from time to time, even in the most difficult circum-
stances." When in 1462 the king demanded the impo-
sition of a tax, the Estates made him promise that it
should not be repeated. As time went on, however,
neither king nor the Estates could oppose the force of
circumstances. Money was urgently needed and the
Estates saw that as taxation was inevitable, they could
best defend their interests by making their consent an
indispensable condition of taxation. The laws passed
between 1468 and 1471 all tend in this direction, and
Matthias had to accept the principle.

222

I

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY,

The authority of the Diet was great enough to pre-
vent Matthias from acting as the French monarchs acted,
and he, like the EngHsh kings, came under the control
of the Estates through his need of money.

Naturally Matthias tried to evade the law by round-
about ways of obtaining money, but he could never ob-
tain enough by such means, and whenever he was driven
to appeal to the nation, care was taken to put a stop to
any irregular methods. It was declared that the king
could not demand any free labour or provisions for him-
self or his army, or for the building of fortresses. Auto-
cratic methods of raising money were forbidden, amongst
others, the compulsory purchase of salt, which was a
state monopoly.

We see, then, that even a standing army could not
free Matthias from the necessity of maintaining friendly
relations with the influential sections of the commun-
ity. It increased his power and enabled him to put down
some rebellious noble, but it did not enable him to
emancipate himself from the influence of the Estates.
Time had so strengthened the constitution that Matthias
had to adapt his policy to it.

It was one of the most valuable achievements of the
past that the king found his interest lay in respecting
the liberties of his people, and it gives proof of the wis-
dom of Matthias that although not altogether free from
the despotic notions of his time, and, perhaps, inclined
by temperament to autocratic methods, he yet sought to
gain power not by any tampering with the constitution
but by winning the nation*s love and esteem.

The king was entirely successful in his aims. The
chaos which had been caused by the unbridled ambitions
of the great nobles, gave place to order. One will was
supreme throughout the land, and law ceased to be a
dead letter. Yet the cause of liberty did not suff"er. On
the contrary, new bulwarks were raised for its defence.
The royal power in Hungary did not owe its strength to

223

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the weakness of other elements of the nation, as hap-
pened in England under the Tudors.

The legal achievements of Matthias may be divided
into two classes. Some were calculated to please the
Estates, while others were designed to organise the
nation in a more practical w^ay.

Among the first class, the most important was that
which gave the Estates the right to vote or refuse taxes.
This was a fundamental right which led to many others.
Personal liberty was defended by the law that no one
should be punished for treason without the concurrence
of the barons and prelates. No one's land was to be taken,
even by the king, except by lawful process. Noblemen
could not be imprisoned save after lawful trial. The
king could not dispute the validity of any judgment law-
fully passed, and no noble could be exiled until the
matter had been brought before a council composed of
prelates, barons and gentry.

All this tended to secure the individual's person and
fortune from tyrannical action on the part of the
monarch.

Naturally, Matthias frequently infringed these laws,
but we must not measure the past by the standard of
the present. In the Middle Ages every ruler broke the
laws. T^espect for legal rights was not yet fully devel-
oped.

Matthias frequently took the law into his own hands
in dealing with his adversaries, yet he was always ready
to pacify the people with new laws and promises, so that
the nation not only defended its liberties but increased
them.

It was of great importance in its influence upon legal
development that the king frequently convened the Diet.
The want of money made it necessary that the Estates
should be convened as often as possible. As early as
the time of the Arpdds the kings were compelled by law
to hold a "law-giving day" every year, yet the rule was
not very faithfully observed until circumstances rendered

224

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

it absolutely necessary, but as soon as the same reasons
operated in Hungary as in England, to make the national
assembly important, similar consequences followed.
Matthias summoned the Estates so often that attendance
became a heavy burden. In 1471 a law was passed that
the Diet should be convened annually only if it were
absolutely necessary. Some historians see in this law a
subtle effort on the part of the king to emancipate him-
self from the control of law. Yet if we consider that in
other details of the same law Matthias set himself to
gratify the wishes of the Estates, his crown being at that
time threatened with the gravest dangers, and if we com-
pare the law with that of the following year, we are driven
to the conclusion that the proviso must have been de-
manded by the Estates.

In 1472 it w'as enacted that "as the frequent meet-
ings of the Diet are a great burden upon the country,
there shall be no meeting for two years from this date."
In spite of these laws, how^ever, the king found him-
self compelled to convene the Diet frequently, and this
had important consequences, for it enabled the nation to
obtain speedy redress of grievances. It also familiarised
the Estates with politics, for the king had to give an out-
line of his plans in order to obtain money. One law
directed that the taxes voted were only to be used for fight-
ing the Turks, and the Diet thus gained a voice in inter-
national politics. The most exalted prerogative of the
king, that of carrying on war, came under its influence.
It was in 1462 that a law was passed that "every
matter which affects the general welfare of the country
must be discussed and decided in the council of the
nation."

Matthias did not always respect this principle, for
it often happened that he contravened what had been
decided by the Diet. For example the law obliged every
noble, under penalty, to attend Parliament, yet the king
never exacted the penalty from those who absented them-
selves. It w^as forbidden by law to exempt anyone from

225

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the taxes imposed by Parliament, but Matthias exempted
Andrew Paumkirchen. These, however, were excep-
tional acts, due to the necessities of the case, and did not
alter the fact that the king accepted the principle that
whatever affected the nation should be decided with the
concurrence of the nation.

In the sphere of administration no radical changes
were made during the reign of Matthias. The Estates
found that the king would not act as their tool. His first
Diet conferred upon him the right of filling the various
offices under the state upon his own authority; it was only
decreed that foreigners should be excluded from all such
posts. The king was allowed to dispose freely of the
office of Palatine, which he bestowed upon Orszagh after
dismissing Garai,

Towards the end of his reign Matthias widened the
Palatine's sphere of activity and himself proposed that
in future the office should be filled by election. He knew
well enough that the man of his own choice would win
the election, so his influence would not diminish, while
he would be flattering the nation by keeping to the form
of the law. His great desire was that after his death,
his illegitimate son should succeed him, and he knew that
this result could best be brought about by the help of a
Palatine who had been chosen by the nobles and accord-
ingly possessed their confidence, and at the same time
was devoted to Matthias.

In 1471 it was enacted that if the king issued any
order inconsistent with the law, the order was to be
ignored. If, however, the officials themselves were guilty
of any breach of the law, they were to be summoned to
the royal courts and punished, and it was no sufficient
plea that they had acted upon the king's orders. The
law entitled the officials "the defenders of the adminis-
tration," and the expression conveys a just idea of their
vocation. It was their task to see that the laws were
executed, and it was their right and also their duty to
punish any subject who infringed them. Should unlaw-

226

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

ful commands proceed from one above them in rank, it
then became their duty to refuse to execute them.

The question remains whether the executive could
meet these demands. Judicial impartiality was not very
much in evidence. The royal courts, which stood at the
head of the administration, did not guarantee the supre-
macy of justice. Nor did the great figures in politics,
such as the Palatine and county-lieutenants, give un-
biassed judgments, and their adversaries could hardly
count on equity. But this was not expected of them.
What was expected was that they should defend the
rights of their class and in that respect the nobles might
safely trust them. Those officials were men of an inde-
pendent spirit. It is true that their appointments were
subject to the king*s pleasure, yet their immense wealth,
their social standing and political ambitions, made them
worthy defenders of their order, as they were strong
enough even to defy the king. They often gave more
glory to their office than they received from it. Their
duties were often dangerous and they had occasionally
to risk their lives. Their posts were desired not for the
sake of the salary attached to them, for they frequently
entailed considerable pecuniary sacrifice, but for the poli-
tical influence which they gave. Appointment to such
posts was rather an acknowledgment of a man's power
than the basis of it.

The law of 1471 was exceedingly important. It
established in the realm of administration the same prin-
ciple that governed legislation, namely that the joint will
of king and nation was more valid than the sole will of
the monarch. Even if this principle was not always ad-
hered to, it was a great step in advance that at so early a
period a serious effort was made to establish the supre-
macy of law, and that any despotic actions, even on the
part of the king, should be declared unlawful and deserv-
ing of punishment.

As we have said, Matthias desired to please the
people by confirming their liberties, yet he never lost

227

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

sight of his final aim of organising the nation in such a
way as to qualify it for efficient action abroad and for
healthy and harmonious life at home. He knew that his
reign could only prove of lasting benefit to the country
if he could so improve and strengthen its institutions as
to secure that law and order should prevail.

One great fault in the old system was the exemption
of the nobles and their dependants from taxation. At a
lime when the taxes furnished but a small fraction of the
income of the State, this privilege entailed no very seri-
ous consequences, but during the reign of Matthias it
meant very great loss to the Treasury. Government can-
not be carried on without money, and a scanty revenue
entails feebleness in the State. Matthias therefore, in
1467, began to widen the sphere of incidence of the taxes,
Certain dues which had been customary since the Angevin
period were abolished, as their value had greatly dimin-
ished owing to the many exemptions which had been
granted. In their place a new tax was imposed, from
which the smaller landowners and the tenants or depend-
ants of the nobles were not exempt. The Seklers, Saxons,
Jazigians, and Cumanians, who had shared the privileges
of the gentry, also had to pay the new tax.

The king adopted a similar policy in dealing with the
tolls. He introduced the "royal toll" which had to be
paid by all except the nobles, and which in that respect
was quite different from the old "one-thirtieth" toll.

It is true that the principle of universal taxation was
not established in so many words, yet as the taxes paid
by the nobles' tenants and dependants were really borne
by the nobles themselves, the new system practically
spread the burden of taxation over the whole community.
No new principle was expressed, yet the tax fund was
largely augmented through the restriction of ancient privi-
leges within narrower limits, and a decided step was
taken towards remedying the chief evil in the constitu-
tion.

Naturally, the privileged classes fought vigorously

228

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

against the innovation, which caused widespread dis-
satisfaction and even open revolt, and in 14B8 Matthias
had to exempt a number of the smaller landowners from
payment of the tax.

The king endeavoured, by means of his war taxes,
to accustom the nation to the idea of universal taxation,
and occasionally he succeeded in making the nobles pay
taxes, but it remained the rule that only their tenants
should pay.

In the case of the expenses connected with local ad-
ministration in the counties, the king was more success-
ful, compelling everyone to bear a share.

Condemnation of the system of taxation is to be met
with in a law which declares that "in consequence of the
exemption of the great, unfair burdens fall upon the gen-
try, especially the poorer among them."

The privileged classes had remained immune from
taxation because the Arpad kings had not needed their
money; and the reason why Matthias partly failed where
the English kings, in very similar circumstances, suc-
ceeded, is that centuries of immunity had generated in the
minds of the nobles the notion that the payment of a tax
was a humiliation and a mark of servitude.

Matthias succeeded better with the so-called "blood
tax," or compulsory military service. He almost doubled
the number of soldiers which landowners had to provide
in proportion to their holding. The banderia or regiments
formed in this way had to serve for three months, and if
necessary, were to serve abroad.

The rest of the military forces of the community could
only be compelled to serve within the borders of Hungary,
but on the other hand their term of service was not limited.
It was to be regretted that Matthias did not give a power-
ful organisation to these forces or inspire them enough
with the military spirit. In his foreign wars and for the
occupation of conquered territories, he relied upon regular
paid armies, and the latent military capacities of the com-
munity were not developed as much as was desirable and

229

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the bulk of the people did not learn so much in the school
of their great leader as they would if they had been led
against the Turks.

Matthias did very much in the way of compelling the
influential classes to take upon their shoulders a fair share
of the work of administration. Sigismund's law was re-
vived, and any member of the noble class who was asked
to accept the post of "szolgabir6'' (a kind of sheriff)
had to do so or incur certain penalties. Matthias ordered
every county to elect annually eight or twelve nobles who
were to hear lawsuits, examine witnesses, enrol soldiers
and to see that judgments were properly executed.

The inhabitants of the counties were obliged to take
up arms against transgressors of the law if the county lieu-
tenant or his deputy desired it. Members of the privi-
leged classes were expected to be ready to sacrifice their
wealth and their lives in the service of the state, as well as
to give their labour. What to-day is done by the police
or gendarmerie, was then done by the nobles.

Matthias took care that the administration should not
be subject to the pleasure of the public, and that its offi-
cials should be able to perform their duties without fear
or partiality, even though they were opposed by powerful
interests. Only wealthy men were appointed, so that
there might be no danger of bribery. To protect the
independence of the officials, only posts to which no salary
was attached were made elective.

Those elected were obliged to serve. Their post was
a burden and not a favour, so that they were not likely
to act with partiality in order to win the suffrages of the
public.

The office of "ispan" (county lieutenant) had no
regular salary attached to it, but the political influence
which it gave, together with the fines which fell to the
lieutenant's share, and in some counties, the landed pro-
perty which went with the post, made it so desirable in
the eyes of many that had it been elective, they might
have been willing to sacrifice their independence to their

230

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

ambitions. The king accordingly retained in his own
hands the right of nominating to that post, and the lieu-
tenant appointed the deputy lieutenant.

The officials' independence of the public was not in
itself enough to guarantee that the interests of the state
should be properly served. The county lieutenant was
generally a very influential man whom it was difficult to
control. The absence of salary in the case of the subor-
dinate posts made their holders independent in their atti-
tude towards those above them as well as those beneath
them. The central government might easily have lost con-
trol over its instruments had it not taken steps to guard
against this danger.

Matthias increased and regulated the functions of the
magistrates. Anyone opposing the lieutenant or deputy
lieutenant in the execution of their duties, was guilty of
treason. The utterance of any slander against the judges
of the law courts entailed severe punishment.

It was made the duty of the nobles to execute the
judgments of the courts. The work of the officials and of
the courts of justice increased considerably, because the
community became more and more regulated by laws,
and as culture spread the interference of the state in de-
fence of rights became increasingly necessary.

The power of the magistrates received a great acces-
sion also from a law abolishing the privileges granted in
olden times, which rendered certain noble families directly
accountable only to the king, and subjecting everyone,
the county lieutenants only excepted, to the legal authori-
ties of the counties.

This important reform, establishing equality before
the law, at once increased the work and the influence of
the administration, but the reins of that administration,
now become so powerful, must be firmly held by the king.
If the control from above is not eff'ective, officials may
easily use their power for selfish purposes, and if to the
influence of their offxe is added that of great wealth and

231

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

social standing, the danger of their becoming autocrats
within their respective territories is very great.

Matthias dealt with this problem by means of some
very severe laws. These emphasise the rights of the king
and his council as against the various officials. Should
their indolence or negligence involve the state in any loss
they could be compelled to make good the loss. They
were liable to various penalties, and every one of them,
including even the Palatine, could be dismissed from his
post, while any judgment of theirs could be appealed
against to the king.

It was in order to counteract the overwhelming influ-
ence of the county lieutenants that the king increased the
privileges of the county nobles. When new laws were
passed, it was to the nobles of the counties that they were
sent for proclamation, and as will be seen, the Parlia-
mentary representative was elected by the same classes.

It was very important from an educational point of
view that the counties had to bear their own administra-
tion expenses. Conscientious management, economy,
and a just sense of responsibility can only be learnt by
those who have to find the money which they spend.

The autonomy of the local councils inaugurated by
Matthias is an achievement of which his country may be
proud. It was based upon the same principle as the
autonomy to be found in England, which had been so
much admired by the whole of Europe.

That autonomy has been the bulwark of freedom, be-
cause the social and financial standing of the local offi-
cials, and the honorary character of many of their posts,
have guaranteed an attitude of independence towards the
higher powers.

In both countries the system of administration has
been so devised that the governing bodies have shared
the interests and sentiments of the nation, and it would
have been difficult to use them against the nation with
which they were so entirely one. They have taught re-
spect for the state and for law even to the most powerful

232

ROYAL REACTION IN HUNGARY.

sections of the community, and they have been able to
discharge their duties and give effect to the king's will,
because they were largely independent of the goodwill of
the community and were subject to central control.

The administrative system of Hungary had one ad-
vantage over the English system, in that it gave to the
intelligent classes of every county an exceedingly efficient
organisation in which they could find scope for their ad-
ministrative abilities. In local government, as in the
government of the state, there are some matters which can
be settled better by large bodies than by individuals, and
which require the co-operation of all those whose interests
are affected.

On the other hand there are man}'^ matters which can
be best dealt with by individuals. In England, the officials
tended more and more to throw into the background the
councils, until these ultimately disappeared. In spite of
the English theory that the taxes must be voted by those
who pay them, rates or local taxes were imposed by offi-
cials, while in Hungary, this awkward situation was
avoided, and the county organisation remained. During
the reign of Matthias, the two complementary elements of
the administration were in happy equilibrium. In later
times the autonomous elements in the counties gained the
upper hand, and there ceased to be uniformity in admin-
istration over the whole country.

As soon as this element became a means of resist-
ahce to central control it ceased to be efficient as a means
for securing public order.

We have now glanced at the achievements of Matthias
in the domain of public rights, and have seen that they
united the nation beneath the strong hand of the ruler
and yet confirmed the people's liberties. The king could
not prove equal to the great tasks confronting him unless
he was in perfect harmony with an independent commun-
ity. He was therefore compelled to respect the rights to
which the nation clung. He removed many inequalities
between the various classes, and made their co-operation

233

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

possible. He forced the intellectual elements of the nation
into the service of the state and developed their political
ability.

The task assigned to Matthias was that of strengthen-
ing the weakened edifice of the state. His policy was
sound, but his life was not sufficiently long to allow of
his achieving all his aims.

234

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY

CHAPTER XIII

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

STRUGGES BETWEEN NOBLES AND GENTRY.
KING WLADISLAV H.

Unfortunately the reign of Matthias, though it was
the most brilliant page of Hungary's history, could not
transform the state into a new organisation, and the times
which followed were not favourable to progress along the
lines laid down by that great king. Matthias undoubtedly
accomplished much, but he was unable to achieve
that most difficult of all aims, that of perfecting an organi-
sation which could be an adequate substitute for his own
great qualities, and could enable the state to steer clear of
danger even when guided by a smaller personality. It
was inevitable in that age that Hungary's fate should
depend very largely upon the kind of ruler she had. A
great king could urge the nation to extraordinary efforts,
while a weak personality meant disaster. It was not easy
for a successor to take up the work of the late king. To
do so demanded a personality as great as his. Matthias
had not entirely averted the dangers threatening from
abroad, in fact he did not in that respect do as much as
he might have done. Probably he had more brilliant
qualities than his father, John Hunyadi. His resolution
was firmer, he was perhaps a more skilful diplomatist and
had a wider horizon, yet he was not so great a man. The
way in which he gathered the strength of the nation into
his hands reveals a tenacity of purpose only found in men
of the strongest character. He never lost sight of his aims

235

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

and subordinated to them his own feelings. But when he
had acquired the power he did not display his father's
greatness in the use he made of it. As in the case of so
many others, the consciousness of power created within
him the desire to shine and gain renown, w-ithout giving
sufficient thought to the lasting benefit of the nation.
Many great men have shown a desire to render their names
immortal by brilliant deeds, even if such deeds were not
demanded by the country's welfare, and whenever this
feature has manifested itself in a man, it has usually les-
sened the value of his life to mankind. John Hunyadi
never yielded to any such impulses. He never attempted
anything which the prosecution of his great aim
did not necessitate. All his efforts were directed
to the averting of the danger threatened to
Hungary by the Turks, and neither desire of
glory nor of revenge could make him deviate from
his chosen path. Had Matthias acted similarly, the coun-
try might have escaped the disastrous defeat at Mohacs
(1526) and the struggle between the two neighbours might
have had a different issue. Many of his contemporaries
thought that Matthias was losing a good opportunity.
His councillors openly expressed the opinion that in order
to gratify his vanity and in defence of comparatively small
interests, he squandered money and energy when the very
future of the country was at stake. The wars against
Bohemia and Austria were so unpopular that the nation
generally voted taxes only for the Turkish wars. The
whole of Christendom recognised the fact that Hungary
was its bulwark against the Turk, and it was the common
opinion that in defence of western culture and religion
Hungary's great vocation was to stem the tide of Turkish
invasion.

In spite of this, Matthias did not pay sufficient atten-
tion to eastern matters. He missed the last chance of
successfully terminating the great struggle. Even when
Hungary was powerful she contented herself v;ith remain-

236

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

ing on the defensive, so the Turks chose always the most
favourable moment to attack. The result was that in spite
of the glorious reign of Matthias, at its close the Turkish
peril had not diminished.

The internal affairs of the country at the time of
Matthias* death demanded a successor as able as himself.
In the absence of his strong personality his system lost
much of its efficiency and freedom degenerated into dis-
order. Matthias was satisfied with being able to coerce
the great nobles into acting loyally, but what if a weak
ruler should succeed him ? The middle classes clung
tenaciously to their rights. Matthias avoided all disputes
with them and was content with his ability to persuade
them to make sacrifices for the good of the country. But
what would happen if his successor lacked his fascina-
tion ? The matter of the standing army bristled with
problems.

To Matthias the nation had voted money for main-
taining an army, but it was doubtful if it would do as
much for his successor. What was to happen if a common-
place personality, unsupported by an army, should stand
opposed to powerful sections of the community which
aimed at establishing either an oligarchical or democratic
regime ? And fate was not kind to Hungary in the matter
of successors to the great king. Matthias died without
lawful issue and the nation had to choose a king. Its
choice was an unfortunate one, and Hungary feels to this
day the evil consequences of the step then taken. Perhaps
the great successes of Matthias had diminished the
nation's consciousness of impending danger. The Hun-
garians are unfortunately apt to be optimistic, and lose
their heads more easily in prosperity than in adversity.
They thought they could do w^ithout a strong king, so of
all possible solutions to the problem confronting them,
they chose the worst, selfishly thinking that a weak and
commonplace king w^ould be the safest for themselves.
They might have elected John Corvinus, the illegitimate
son of Matthias, or Maximilian of Habsburg, and either

237

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of them would have been immensely superior to the un-
fortunate Wladislav Jagello (1490-1616). But the reign
of a very energetic king has usually provoked a reaction,
as happened on the death of Louis the Great in Hungary
and of Edward I. of England. Before Matthias, the
nobles had not had a strong ruler for a long time, and after
his death they wished for the days of unrestricted liberty
once more.

Directly Wladislav II. ascended the throne all the
great nobles were united in the belief that the more power
they could gain for themselves the better, and now it was
political power they aimed at, and not as in former days,
sovereignty over certain districts. They now tried for the
first time to modify the constitution in such a way as to
confer upon themselves additional rights. Constitutional
government had been developed, and the great nobles
found themselves with less influence over the gentry than
before, so they resolved to acquire for themselves by
means of legislation a position of greater autliority.

Recent events had shown them that the alliance of
king and gentry might easily become dangerous to them-
selves. The reign of Matthias had been hard for them to
bear. Before his time the magnates had benefited most
from the rule of weak kings, while the gentry and lower
classes had gained most consideration from Matthias, who
frequently showed severity in his dealings with the mag-
nates. This lesson was not forgotten and the great nobles
sought to prevent the recurrence of a similar state of
affairs. The first laws they passed showed what were
their aims. Their chief purpose being to assure the reign
of a weak king they sought to place all the executive power
in their own hands. They tried to secure independent
rights and powers to the council in which they were all-
powerful. They secured the passage of a law that the
king should never consult foreign advisers in Hungarian
affairs. No offices or dignities w^ere to be conferred upon
foreigners but only upon the Hungarian nobles. The
*' sacred crown" had always been surrounded by a halo of

238

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

almost religious veneration, and its custody carried con-
siderable importance with it, especially when there were
rival claimants to the throne. The magnates accordingly
demanded that the custodians of the crown should be
elected by the prelates and the barons from their own
ranks. The great national symbol was not to be taken
from them on any account, and the captain at the royal
castle of Visegrdd had to swear to its custodians that with-
out their consent he would not hand over the crown to
anyone whatever, not even to the king himself. They
made even the king's power of inflicting punishment
subject to their control when they enacted that no one
could be punished for treason save with the consent of the
prelates and barons. Without the same consent, the king
could not make grants of land of more than a certain
extent.

The magnates gained considerable influence over
foreign policy by enacting that the provinces conquered
by Matthias were not to be restored to their former posses-
sors without their concurrence. The king could not by
himself decide how these territories were to be dealt
with, and if he should restore them in consideration of a
sum of money without the consent of the magnates, the
money was to be retained by them along with the crown,
and the king should use it for the benefit of the country
in a manner to be approved of by them.

These laws meant a very considerable increase
in the constitutional powers of the council consisting of
the great nobles.

In 1498 the magnates succeeded in saving from pun-*'
ishment an official of theirs who had defended a fortr !;ss
placed by them in his charge against the king and tlhe
nation, in spite of the fact that the superior of that official
had been punished for treason. They were strong enough
to defy the law. Loyalty to them in certain cases counted
above loyalty to king and country. As such a state of
affairs, however, was likely to lead to discontent, they saw
the necessity for strengthening their position by law as

239

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

they could not count upon the confidence of the public.
During the reigns of Sigismund and Albert they had not
needed to do this. The importance of their services to the
country was then the foundation of their claim to influ-
ence, but since that time they had done much to destroy
the nation's confidence in them, and it remained to be seen
whether legal enactments could take the place of real
merit.

The reaction against them commenced in the ranks of
the gentry. The weak king who had been elected was in-
capable of any manly resolution. The powerful nobles
had found in him the puppet they had sought for. Ujlaki
called the king a brute and Szapolyai declared that Wladi-
slav, who spent his days in idleness in Buda, disgraced
the Hungarian nation, and they openly refused to obey
his commands. The king had to endure all this. He
uttered threats and took measures against one or two great
nobles, but he could not shake off the dominion of their
class.

It accordingly became the task of the gentry to break
the exaggerated power of the magnates and to defend the
national idea and the supremacy of law, and in 1495 they
formed a party in opposition to the great nobles. For
some time they too had rejoiced at being set free from the
strong hand of Matthias, but events soon made them see
the whole situation in its true light. The unlawful con-
duct of the great nobles, their acknowledgment of the
Habsburg's right of succession, the turbulence of the
'* black army," the prevailing economic distress and the
^decline of the country's dignity in the eyes of other na-
ti pns, showed the people that a weak reign did not mean a
gjolden age for them at all, but only benefited the more
powerful nobles.

' The gentry therefore resolved to gain supremacy for
/ themselves so that they might restore order in the coun-
try. They were undoubtedly endowed with great quali-
ties; they were the backbone of the nation, but they had
yet to show that they were capable of playing a leading

240

tISgtf THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

part. Their organisation was elastic enough to allow of
their welcoming to their ranks all the progressive elements
of the nation, so that they were really representative of all
that was best in the community.

They had a strong class feeling, which gave them
power for assimilation and aggressive action, and they
were thoroughly Hungarian and helped to maintain the
Hungarian character of the nation and its government.

In treating of the reasons for the preservation of the
Hungarian state it has not been necessary to speak of the
dangers due to the presence in the country of inhabitants
of foreign origin. Yet the number of such foreigners was
very great. Since the time when the Flungarians entered
their present home, a large number of the dependants of
the aristocracy were Slavs. The Arpad kings induced
many foreigners to settle in Hungary.

The tolerant nature of the Hungarians permits of their
valuing highly the good qualities of other races, and they
welcomed as settlers those who were skilled in some indus-
try. Together with these immigrants from the west there
came also nomadic tribes from the east. Thousands of
Christians of various nationalities, flying from the Turk,
also found shelter in Hungary. As a result of these events
it came about that a large number of the burgesses and
of the vassals of the nobility, were foreigners. If in spite
of this, the Hungarian character of St. Stephen's realm
was never in danger, the merit is due to the assimilative
power of the gentry. The enemies of Hungary have often
taunted her with the fact that many of her great men have
been of foreign extraction, yet that is really a sign of her
eminence.

Of talented nations there have been many, yet few
have been able to so attach to them the great men of other
races that these should cling with heart and soul to the
country of their adoption and really become her sons.

To do this demands some special quality on the part
of a nation, and this quality Hungary possessed in an
eminent degree.

241

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The gentry were not really separated by any distinct
barrier from the magnates. The two classes were in fact
so intermingled as to form practically one class. Those
of the gentry who had risen to the higher ranks of the
nobility could influence the gentry class to some extent,
and yet there was never any question of that class
blindly following the lead of the higher nobility.
They were intensely conservative, and were accus-
tomed to a position of authority even though within a
comparatively small circle. Their outlook was not wide
but they clung obstinately to certain leading principles.
They ran little risk of falling into extremes as the strength
of their traditions hindered any very violent change. Even
the poorest gentleman had the right of audience of the
king, a circumstance which made it easy for the monarch
to become acquainted with the persons and opinions of
his subjects, and to induce them to give him their willing
though not unconditional support.

We have seen that whenever the gentry entered the
field of action it was always with the twofold aim of main-
taining the unity of the nation under the supremacy of
the king, and of safeguarding the country's freedom. It
was always into the right scale that they threw their
w'eight. They chose their leaders well and were loyal to
those who deserved their fidelity. This had been the case
under the Arpdd kings, and more recently in Angevin
times when for the sake of order and unity the gentry had
decided for a strong government. In pursuit of the same
aims, they became the allies of the immortal Hunyadis,
and even during the critical times which followed the
defeat at Varna it was always the gentry whom we find
at the post of danger, zealous in the defence of their coun-
try.

But at the period now under consideration a new task
fell to their lot. The king did not lead the nation, and
the magnates were banded together in a selfish pursuit of
their own interests. The question was whether the gentry
could step forward and take the lead in such difficult cir-

242

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

cumstances. They had many of the great qualities which
are to be looked for in the well-to-do citizens of a free
state, yet they were an unorganised crowd and it was very
problematic whether they would prove equal to the task.
The effort however had to be made, and they formed them-
selves into a great national opposition. At first they fol-
lowed John Corvinus, but their serious action as a political
party dates from the time when Szapolyai became their
leader. Szapolyai 's lofty aims and Verb^czy's patriot-
ism, the great wealth and commanding position of the
former, and the oratorical powers of the latter, awakened
the utmost enthusiasm among the gentry.

The new movement left its mark on the country's
legislation. An effort was made to change the internal
organisation of the country. The law's passed embodied
two principles, which were in keeping with the traditions
of the gentry. They desired to give to the government
what by right belonged to it, but they were determined
at the same time to defend their own rights. They saw
clearly that the nation would perish if its government had
no authority. In the law of 1498 it is stated that " God has
given two means of ruling a people, weapons and rights,
the former in order to terrify the wrong-doer and to put a
limit to the boldness of men."

A law of 1514 assigns as the cause of all the country's
troubles the absence of order and that exaggerated free-
dom which had become licence. The blame is laid chiefly
upon those men who "thought more of their private ad-
vantage than of the common welfare, and through whose
actions the best laws remained unfruitful." It was these
few great nobles who abused their excessive powers,
whom it was sought to punish. A heavy blow was dealt
to the magnates by the proclamation that the lieutenancy
of the county could not be conferred upon any one for life,
and that no one could be lieutenant of more than one
county, that no ecclesiastic could hold several preferments,
and, finally, that with the exception of the Banus and the
lord chief justice, nobody could hold several of^ces. The

243

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

last rule could never be rigidly enforced, as the king re-
served to himself the right to deviate from it with the con-
sent of the barons and the prelates.

The king was entitled to summon before his courts,
not only on regular court days but at any other time, any
one who used his power in an illegal manner. He was
expected to punish those who acted "clearly and openly
in defiance of the law." If the wrongdoer were an ecclesi-
astic the king was to strip him of his preferments; if a
great noble his estates were to be confiscated and he him-
self exiled. Should the king hesitate to inflict the penalty
the county might act instead of him. If members of the
gentry were the transgressors, the duty of inflicting pun-
ishment rested with the king, and their property was to
be confiscated.

The new law confirmed the rule of Matthias that the
great lords should furnish soldiers in number proportion-
ate to the size of their estates, and that certain of them
were to equip separate banderia or companies. The inde-
pendence of the magnates was struck at by the rule that
their troops, other than the separate banderia, had to join
the national army.

The gentry strove to improve the position of the king.
All mortgaged territories were to be reconveyed to him
and he was only to pay to the lender half the interest for-
merly paid. No dominions were thereafter to be mort-
gaged by the king on his own authority alone, and if any-
one lent money on such mortgages he must lose it. In
the matter of grants of land, the king was set free from
the control of the barons and prelates, and was empowered
to make very considerable grants to Hungarian citizens.

The laws passed by the gentry aimed at restoring
order in the country, but it is easy to see in them evidences
of a desire on their part to rule. It is true that in them
the nation became self-conscious, but their class-selfishness
and inability to govern frustrated their good intentions.

They were severe in their treatment of the disorderly
nobles, and yet in the law which they passed in the inter-

244

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

est of order there was the germ of anarchy. The enact-
ment that in the event of the king's hesitation to inflict
punishment the counties were entitled to act instead of
him, struck at the root of the king's authority. Not free-
dom but licence was fostered by conferring on the coun-
ties the right to ignore the will of the monarch and to con-
fiscate the property of those whom the king was willing to
pardon.

The ambitions of the gentry grew and they began to
believe that the country could only be saved if they ruled
it. They fought not merely to settle this or that political
question in the way they deemed best, but to secure the
permanent supremacy of their own class. They used with
wonderful pertinacity every means which presented itself
of furthering their plans. They assured for themselves
the decisive word both in legislation and administration.
They made the presence of members of the noble class at
meetings of the national council obligatory, and thus
brought into prominence a question which had long been
agitating the minds of many.

We have seen that in England during the thirteenth
century the representative system began to develop
itself because frequent meetings of the council became
necessary.* In Hungary, however, at that period, no
circumstances arose which rendered reform imperative,
and so unfortunately the old system, involving the attend-
ance of great crowds instead of their chosen representa-
tives, was continued. Since that time, great changes had
occurred. The organisation of the counties was such as
to favour the evolution of a system of representation, and
it gradually became the basis of the parliamentary system.
As the need for imposing taxes upon the community grew
greater, it became increasingly necessary for the national
council to meet. The interest of every district and every
section of the community demanded that it should be pro-
perly represented, because the burdens of which the coun-

* Pages 114—122.
245

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

cil treated pressed upon all alike. As soon as affairs took
this turn the question of electing representatives came very
much to the fore, and as the situation had now become
very similar to that which in England had led to the adop-
tion of the principle of representation, a similar result
followed.

Even in the fourteenth century it had been customary
for the king to ask the counties to elect a certain number
of trustworthy men, but in one point the Hungarian prac-
tice differed from that followed in England. In the latter
country, the moment representatives were sent to Parlia-
ment, the subordinate vassals of the king lost the right to
appear there, whereas In Hungary, every member of the
noble class retained his right to attend the national coun-
cil, if he chose to do so. He was not obliged to attend,
and his interests did not demand his presence there, as he
was represented even if he did not go in person. In Eng-
land, the general assembly ceased altogether.

The reason for this difference is to be found in the
different antecedents in the two countries. In England
the lesser vassals of the crown were on the same social and
financial level as large numbers of men w^ho were not
crown vassals, and who therefore w^ere not entitled to
appear in Parliament. To have allowed that portion of
the electorate which consisted of such vassals to retain
their ancient privilege of attending Parliament would have
been to treat equal elements of the community unequally.
That equally important elements should have equal rights
was so natural that no one dreamt of perpetuating a privi-
lege which would have allowed one part of the electorate
to remain members of the legislative body while the others
were shut out, especially when such differentiation would
not have corresponded to any difference in real weight.

In Hungary, however, the maintenance of the ancient
right did not introduce any differentiation, for the right
belonged to every member of the electorate equally and
not merely to certain individuals. Accordingly it was to
the interest of the whole of the nobility that the right

246

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

should not become obsolete. It is true that there were
many objections to such a system, for example the in-
definite composition of the legislature, but such considera-
tions were not likely to weigh much against a privilege
that was popular and backed up by so many powerful
interests.

As soon as the new electoral system was inaugurated
in England, the old system had to die, while in Hungary
the introduction of the method of representation did not
terminate the right of the nobles to attend meetings of the
Diet in person. But such an arrangement could not be
final, for it was inevitable that as the nation became more
civilized and gave greater attention to the work of legisla-
tion, the most important organ of the community should
assume a more definite legal form.

As early as the time of Sigismund, the king and the
magnates endeavoured to make the national assembly a
purely elective body but their proposals did not meet with
general approval. After all, so long as the various sec-
tions of the community were in harmonious relations there
was no crying need for reform, and the state could thrive
with a very primitive organisation.

Directly, however, the gentry resolved to take the lead
in the nation, they found the existing situation unfavour-
able to their plans. They could not trust the elected repre-
sentatives, who lived permanently in the atmosphere of
the Court, and were likely either to be intimidated by the
military power of the great nobles, or won over by flattery
or favours and distinctions. Moreover, those representa-
tives were very probably chosen from the wealthiest and
most influential gentry families, and consequently stood
nearer to the magnates than to the bulk of the class whose
interests they were to serve. The only method of secur-
ing for the gentry political predominance was personal
attendance at the Diet, where their numbers would carry
the day.

This was why they objected so strongly to the system
of parliamentary representation, both during the reign of

247

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Andrew III. (1290-1301) and in the fifteenth century. It
was during the time of Hunyadi that a law was passed
compelling every member of the noble class, excepting
only those who were too poor, to attend the meetings ot
the Diet. The election of Matthias was due to the unani-
mous voice of the impassioned gentry, and after this
success it was only natural that they should attach import-
ance to the right of personal attendance at the Diet.
Matthias, however, could not look with favour upon such
a system. One so skilled as he was in the work of legis-
lation and attaching such importance to it, must have felt
it impossible to treat weighty matters satisfactorily in co-
operation with such a curiously mixed crowd, and there-
fore, after the first meeting of the Diet he appealed to the
gentry to send representatives.

As the Diet had to be convened very frequently, and
as personal attendance meant such serious personal loss
and inconvenience, the gentry became quite reconciled to
the new system when their passionate mood had sobered
down. The law of 1471 gave a free hand to the king and
put an end to government by crowds. The king was to
convene the Diet, representing the whole country, but
there was no word in the law as to the nobles having to
appear in it. The phraseology adopted enabled the king
to make the Diet representative in practice without contra-
vening the written law. Even Matthias could not achieve
more than that, and he was not able to abolish the right of
the nobles to sit in the Diet side by side with the elected
representatives if they wished to do so.

After his death even this result came into jeopardy.
When the gentry began again, under the Jagellos, to bid
fof power, they naturally revived ancient traditions. Some
institutions seem to be so closely connected with certain
situations, that when a similar situation revives, even after
a long interval, efforts are made to revive the institutions
formerly linked with it.

When the strong reign of Matthias was over, the
gentry strove to restore the institutions for which their

248

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

ancestors had fought in the times of Andrew III and of
Hunyadi, but they showed more circumspection and
tenacity.

In 1492 the Estates commenced their reforms on the
basis of the laws of Matthias. They acknowledged that
the king could invite them to the Diet "either collectively
or otherwise/' but they endeavoured to remove the obsta-
cles which stood in the path of personal attendance on the
part of the nobles, and which favoured the representative
system.

The poorer members of the gentry could not stay
long in the place where the Diet was held, therefore it was
essential that the time occupied by the sessions should be
shortened. It was decided that after the time appointed
for assembly, no members should be waited for more than
four days ; those who did not appear by then must concur
in the decisions arrived at in their absence.

In 1495 it was enacted that thenceforth the counties
should not send representatives, but that every member of
the nobility must personally attend the Diet, thus cancel-
ling the result of many well-conceived efforts of the past.
The king was to issue invitations a month before the time
fixed for the opening of the assembly. Every important
act was to be previously prepared in the council of the
barons. This prevented the magnates from delaying the
commencement of proceedings under the pretext of pre-
liminary discussions as they had frequently done.

An Act of 1498 limited the session to fifteen days. If
any member did not attend, or arrived too late, he incurred
a penalty, as did also the county lieutenant for allowing
him to neglect his duty.

These reforms made the gentry practically omnipotent
in the Diet. One thing still remained to be done, and
that was to widen the sphere of action of the Diet, or at
least to define it. In 1495, when personal attendance
had been made obligatory upon the nobility, it was also
enacted that ''everything that affected the welfare of the
country " must be discussed and settled agreeably to the

249

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

will of the Diet. This law drew practically every ques-
tion into the sphere of action of the national assembly.
Its position was strengthened, and what had formerly
been merely custom became law.

Among many other innovations there was one of
considerable importance. In 1504 the most valuable
right of the Diet, that namely of voting taxes, was
affirmed anew. Neither the counties nor individuals were
allowed to help the king with money on their own
account. If anyone paid taxes which had not been voted
by the Diet, he was to be excluded from the ranks of the
nobility.

But even an assembly thus constituted, and so
entirely under the influence of the gentry, was not suffi-
cient to assure the supremacy of that class. An assembly
which only met occasionally could not perform all the
everyday work of the State. This could only be done by
permanent bodies, and so the executive power rested with
the king and his officials. As personal attendance was
obligatory, the burden it imposed was so heavy that
although the sessions were shortened it was impossible
to hold them often. Accordingly, while in former times
the nation had demanded annual assemblies, it was now
decided that it would be sufficient if the Diet were con-
vened in every third year.

That the executive should be controlled by the gentry
was urgent. There are times when people resolve upon
the most daring courses in the hope of putting an end to
age-long evils. Such an epoch was that which in Hun-
gary preceded the battle of Mohacs (1526), The gentry
were confronted by the problem which during the Middle
Ages was solved by no country, that namely of obtaining
systematic control of the administration, a problem which
had become more pressing than ever before.

When speaking of the age of Sigismund it was men-
tioned that the community did not then feel the need
for reform, that is, a change in the relations between the
executive and the legislature, since the same factors of

250

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

the nation controlled both the Diet and the administration.
Under the Jagellos all this was changed. The gentry
with their own independent policy were predominant in
the Diet, while the executive power was in the hands of
the king and the great nobles. With a weak king like
Wladislav II., a vigorous State life was only possible if
either the powerful nobles and their party could capture
the national assembly or if the gentry could seize the
executive power. Since in 1495 the Diet was organised
in such a way that the superior numbers of the gentry
rendered them supreme, it was inevitable that the latter
attempt should be made. In respect to these efforts,
history repeated itself. If we glance back at the times of
Andrew III., Queen Mary, John Hunyadi, and Matthias,
we find the gentry continually battling for pre-eminence
in the Diet, but as the composition of that body varied in
different periods, the results of their efforts naturally
varied also. All the time, in spite of the fluctuating com-
position of the Diet, the leading part belonged to the
higher nobility. That was the state of affairs until the
accession of Wladislav II., when the gentry began by
means of the position they gained for themselves in the
Diet to get a hold over the executive. It was in 1495 that
they took the first step. Following ancient traditions
they commenced with much discretion. They were satis-
fied with the innovation that fourteen members of their
class should be nominated as assessors to the council.
These assessors merely performed the functions of judges
and took no part in the political discussions of the royal
council. They were nominated and paid by the king.
In 1498 a further step was taken. The number of
assessors was increased to sixteen, and eight of these were
entitled to attend every meeting of the council. Those
eight assessors had to promise on oath not only to judge
"without partiality" as before, but also that in the royal
council they would "discuss everything faithfully and
with an eye to the welfare of the nation." These men
were practically members of the government, and there

L

251

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

was a link between them and the Diet because they were
no longer appointed solely by the king, but jointly by the
king and the nation. Their vocation was to represent the
gentry in the king's own council, and often against him,
and accordingly they received their salary not from the
king but from the class which sent them.

In 1500 there was a further accession of influence.
All the members of the group of assessors, namely four
prelates, four great nobles, and sixteen members of the
gentry class, gained the right to attend every meeting of
the council, whatever subject might be under discussion.

This was no gain to the first two classes, because
they were already members of the council by virtue of
their rank, but it doubled the number of representatives
of the gentry in the council.

Half the number of assessors, composed of four mag-
nates and eight members of the gentry, had to live in
Buda and attend every meeting of the council. The Diet
took care that this little group should remain in constant
touch with itself. The gentry were fighting not in order
to enable a few individuals of their number to gain a posi-
tion of influence in the administration — that had always
been possible — but to secure their supremacy as a class in
the executive body. However many members of the
gentry may have had a seat on the executive council, the
result aimed at would not have been achieved unless they
had remained in contact with the bulk of the gentry, who
controlled the legislature.

In 1495 the gentry had only taken part in legislation,
but towards the end of Wladislav's reign they formed
the majority of the executive council. Only one task
remained, namely, that of subordinating the king to the
council, and in 1507 that also was achieved. It was
enacted that the king could only decide any matter with
the council, and if he issued any order without their
knowledge, it was invalid.

The gentry were not unmindful of the lesser organs
of administration, and in them too they sought to assure

252

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

their predominance. In 1495 it was enacted that the
county lieutenant, the deputy lieutenant, and the
szolgabir6s (sheriffs) should in all their administra-
tive acts be controlled by the county, and that any official
acting without the county's authority was to be punished.

In 1500 it was added that if the lieutenant of the
county should neglect his duty in the matter of incorpor-
ating private banderia with the troops of the county he
should be punished by the inhabitants. An act of 1504
took from the lieutenant the right of appointing his
deputy without the county's consent. By this law the
deputy lieutenant, who had been his chief's confidential
assistant, was changed into the county's official.

All these results had as their common source the
desire of the gentry to take the lead in all branches of
government. The roots of their power were the Diet at
the centre of the state, and in the counties the members
of their own class.

It was very doubtful whether their efforts could lead
to success, because in that age they did not form the
natural pivot of the state, and so their supremacy was
something abnormal. They were forced to the attempt,
because the natural leaders of the nation, the king and the
magnates, had sinned against it and destroyed its confid-
ence. It was a sad omen for Hungary that those powers
which could not be replaced had proved unworthy of the
part assigned to them, for it made disaster inevitable.
The gentry tried to grasp the reins of government, but
to hold them was difficult because those who had let them
fall were still powerful, and standing so much higher than
the gentry in many respects refused to obey them. It
was only a theoretical supremacy that the gentry gained.
They really aimed at the impossible.

One paragraph of the law declares that every matter
affecting the welfare of the country comes within the
sphere of activity of the Diet, and yet another paragraph
says that the assembly must not sit for a longer period

263

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

than fifteen days. But how could the Diet deal with
every affair of state in fifteen days? It was not their
fault that the gentry were guilty of this inconsistency, for
the system made self-contradiction inevitable. The
source of their influence was the Diet, and if they wished
to guide the state they must entrust to that body the
conduct of as much of the country's business as possible.
On the other hand if they desired to ensure the personal
attendance of large numbers of their own class at the
meetings of the Diet, they must restrict the duration of
those meetings. Each of these decisions was necessary
yet they were absolutely inconsistent with one another.

And this is not to be wondered at. An unnatural
state of things can only be maintained by unnatural
means, and even then only temporarily and partially.
In spite of the law% the gentry very often did not attend
in large numbers. The king frequently ordered the
counties to elect representatives and they obeyed, in
defiance of the law. Frequently, too, difficult and impor-
tant questions occupied so much time that the assembled
crowds left the assembly, entrusting the termination of
the work to a few. The demands of real life were
stronger than any written law, stronger even than the
passion which politics kindled. Consequently, the great
nobles were often able to retain and use the advantages
of which others sought to deprive them. The insecure
foundation of the power of the gentry was revealed by
the anxiety which they showed to prevent any electoral
system from gaining ground in the country. If the
middle classes were so weak that they could not reckon
upon carrying the elections, how could they hope to
retain the executive power in their hands? If the repre-
sentatives elected for only a few weeks were likely to fall
under hostile influences, how could it be hoped that the
members of the gentry who, in the royal council, worked
in permanent connection with king and magnates, should
remain loyal to their class? The question was whether
the influence which broke the power of the gentry's officials

254

I

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

would not find a means to control the crowded assembly
itself.

The anxiety of the gentry was not without cause.
The social standing, the wealth and power of the mag-
nates, were able to cause a division in the ranks even of
the solid middle-class majority of the Diet. The great
nobles had many dependants among the gentry. Those
who lived in the environs of their fortresses, and who
served the magnates in various ways, naturally followed
their lead in the Diet, and not infrequently these formed
the majority of the chaotic crowd assembled there. Can-
vassing was practised at the meetings, and bribery
was freely used. Every law was ineffectual. There were
many who were willing to sell their votes because they
attached more importance to money than to politics, while
there were some ready to purchase, because they valued
political influence more highly than money. As many
of the gentry were too poor and uncultured to understand
the entangled problems under discussion and to take up
a firm attitude in relation to them, and as, on the other
hand the power of the great nobles was still an actuality,
there was no written law powerful enough to destroy the
influence of the magnate class. Even in the very centre
of their power the gentry could not withstand the benumb-
ing influence of their enemies. On one occasion they
hung a blood-stained axe upon a tree at a meeting of the
Diet, and swore by that to kill anyone who created dis-
union among them.

If they had to take such precautions against dis-
loyalty on the part of members of their own class in
the Diet itself, it is not to be w^ondered at that in the
executive council their theoretical supremacy was still less
effective.

The laws which aimed at confiding the whole work
of administration to the council and at subordinating the
council to the gentry, were themselves imperfectly con-
ceived, and the shortcomings of a theoretical creation
became manifest on contact with reality. The king was

255

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

not in fact entirely dependent upon the council, because
the new law only declared that such acts as he performed
"without the knowledge of the council " were invalid.

When in 1490 the magnates had the upper hand,
they clearly stated that the king might not settle any
matter affecting the state — without "the clearly expressed
consent and free and voluntary decision " of the barons
and prelates, but at the period now under consideration
the matter was one not of agreement but of information
merely. It is possible that the ambiguous words were
smuggled into the text of the law by the adherents of
the court in order to defeat the purpose of the assembly.
The Diet only decided upon the general principles of a
measure and its members then dispersed, tired of their
labours, and left the matter in the hands of permanent
officials, who were under the influence of the more power-
ful nobles. It is not unlikely, therefore, that they en-
deavoured to reduce to a minimum of effectiveness the
legislative achievements of the gentry.

Even in the council the gentry were not supreme.
It is true that they constituted the majority of that portion
of the council which was obliged to be in attendance upon
the king, yet they were not bold enough to exclude from
the council the wealthy and powerful nobles, without
whose troops victory in war was very unlikely, and who
formed the natural centre of the life of the state; whose
influence was felt even by the strongest kings and to
v/hose words even Matthias had to give heed. Foreign
rulers only esteemed a contract if it were signed by the
great nobles. Their real power was so great that it was
impossible to exclude them. When in the year 1600 the
number of assessors was increased, it was also enacted
that the other councillors of the king, that is to say the
barons and bishops "who already sit in the king's coun-
cil " should always be admitted "in the usual way.'* The
law which established the principle that the council should
always be previously informed of the king's intentions
applied to the rest of the council as well as to the

256

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

assessors. The gentry therefore could not count on the
support of the majority of the whole council.

Moreover, the real organ of the executive power was
not the Council but the body of high officials, the
Palatine, Chancellor, Treasurer, Chief Justice, Banus
of Croatia, Vajda (or Seneschal) of Transylvania.
These were at the head of the administration
and it was their commands which the people were accus-
tomed to obey. The assessors, who were only elected for
a few years and who merely discussed matters but could
not command, who had no army of subordinates to make
their will effective and whose position was not supported
by ancient traditions, could only play a minor part.
What the gentry really needed was to make the adminis-
tration dependent upon themselves, for until they did this
their power could easily be torn from them. But this is
just what they could not achieve, even in theory. It was
the king who disposed of those dignities. It is true that
he had to listen to the opinion of the council, but not of
the whole nation, and even so he was not obliged to follow
the advice given. The office of Palatine was theoretically
elective, but the court party realised so clearly the import-
ance of the post that they spared no efforts to secure the
election of their own candidate and their skilful tactics
made their victory certain. Even what the gentry did
really gain was due less to their own strength than to
the alliance which they formed with Szapolyai,
the most powerful nobleman in Hungary. With-
out his support they could not give effect to
their wishes. This state of affairs contained an element
of danger, for an ally whose interests were naturally op-
posed to those of the gentry was all too likely to seek to
use them as a tool. The alliance was also dangerous for
another reason. The power of Szapolyai was great
enough to menace the throne and with the support of the
gentry he could gain the crown for himself. Hence King
Wladislav, in spite of the weakness of his will, was

257

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

driven by the instinct of self-preservation to exert himself
against the coalition. The king sided with the magnates,
who also dreaded Szapolyai, and this involved opposition
to the gentry. The question of the constitution, and
the distribution of power, became pre-eminently a dynasti-
cal problem. The gentry, although desirous of increas-
ing the king's power because of the obvious necessity of
a strong ruler, were forced in spite of themselves, to
become the enemies of the king. Szapolyai's ambition
blocked the only path which could have led to a solution
of the difficulty, an alliance, namely, between the king
and the gentry. The king and the magnates were com-
pelled to unite, and in alliance they could easily with-
stand the gentry. Formerly king and magnates had
struggled together for supremacy, and the gentry had
sided now with this party, now with that, but when the
gentry themselves tried to gain the upper hand, the for-
mer combatants joined forces and turned against the
common foe. As a result, the gentry were unable during
the reign of Wladislav II. to achieve their aim.
Although they had reformed the organisation of the state,
yet they were unable to control the administration.

After the death of Matthias there was at first a reaction
against his system. A nation usually judges its govern-
ment very unjustly, seeing chiefly its shortcomings, and
being blind to its merits. But if the succeeding govern-
ment turns out to be worse than its predecessor public
opinion veers round again, and dwells only on the merits
of the system it had formerly condemned.

A reign so unhappy as that of Wladislav could not
but show that of Matthias glorious by contrast, and when
the gentry perceived the increasing disintegration of
the wState they sought a remedy in the restoration of the
former situation. A national monarch, they thought,
would be the salvation of the country, and patriotic feel-
ing urged them to seek a king of their own race. It is
certain that a king of the same race as those he rules is
the most desirable ruler for a country, for anything which

258

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

links a king to another country is likely to cause difficulty.
But it is hard, in the absence of any recognised royal line,
or of any extraordinary circumstances which might exalt
one man far above the rest, to find a man whose rank
and antecedents would incline the whole nation to accept
him as king. To give the crown to someone quite un-
worthy of it merely because he was a member of the nation
would be a disastrous action. At a time like that which
followed the death of Matthias, with the Turks threaten-
ing on the east, and the Habsburgs on the west, strenu-
ously endeavouring to gain the Hungarian crown, the
election of a mediocrity to whom many regarded them-
selves as equal in rank, would have been especially
dangerous.

If Matthias could have bequeathed his prestige to his
illegitimate son, John Corvinus, and the nation had at
once elected him, the new king would probably have met
the needs of the situation, but as this opportunity was
missed and John Corvinus, branded with illegitimacy,
sank to the level of a subject, he became an unsuitable
candidate. At first, however, many of the nobles ranged
themselves around him, but upon his death the ambitious
Szapolyai turned the enthusiasm of the gentry concerning
a national monarch to his own account. But Szapolyai
was quite unfit to be king. Neither the past merits of his
family nor his own talents, raised him above all others;
only his wealth and ambitions w^ere kingly. The nation
would certainly not have regarded his ascent to the throne
with satisfaction.

A wiser policy was that of recognising the hereditary
rights of the Habsburgs. By pursuing this policy the
nation could avoid one great danger resulting from the
persistent resolve of the Habsburgs to seize the throne at
any moment of weakness on the part of Hungary. As
Providence did not bestow upon Hungary another Hun-
yadi, a man born to rule whatever his ancestry may have
been, the nation had to seek in other lands for a suitable
candidate, and no one more suitable could be found than

259

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the powerful neighbour whose alliance was not to be
gained except at the price of the Hungarian crown.

The gentry pursued the policy of a national ruler.
They passed a law that the envoys of foreign princes
were not to attend the meetings held for the purpose of
electing a king, and also that in the event of the dynasty
becoming extinct, any new ruler must be Hungarian by
race. The government, however, pursued a different
policy, that namely of alliance with the Habsburgs.

Wladislav, at the commencement of his reign, in
spite of the protest of the gentry, entered into a contract
with the house of Habsburg, for the purpose of securing
alliance by marriage, and before his death he arranged a
meeting with Maximilian with the object of furthering the
cause he had at heart. In spite of the wishes of the Diet
and of the council of the nobles, he made every possible
effort to cement the union with the Germans and to secure
the succession of the Habsburgs to the throne.

In 1511, that is to say at a time when the laws passed
in the interest of the nobles, were in force, another
instance serves to show that the power of the gentry was
more apparent than real. The German Emperor and the
French King invited the King of Hungary to be their
ally against Venice. Most of the nobles were in a war-
like mood, and desired to regain Dalmatia. The envoys
declared their message before the Diet. The assembly
was asked if it was to be peace or war, and the decision
was for war. Apparently, the Diet was exercising sover-
eign rights, yet in fact nothing happened in accordance
with its declared will. The Palatine and the Primate
arranged everything between themselves, and the country
took no part in the war. Public opinion had very little
weight, and the nation's policy was determined largely
by court cliques.

This was evident during the whole reign of Wladis-
lav. In spite of the written constitution, the country was
really governed by a few influential men at court, and the
lesser nobles were unable to control them.

260

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

Thomas Bakdcs, the ambitious and talented cardinal
and the leading member of the court party, was the main
spring of the government. The lesser nobles hated him
but could not break his power. They attacked him so
bitterly in 1497 that the king had to deprive him of the
chancellorship, but immediately afterwards he appointed
him Archbishop of Esztergom, and to the end of his reign
the king followed his advice.

The long struggle for supremacy between the differ-
ent classes of the state plunged the country into anarchy.
The various authorities contended so fiercely with one
another that there remained practically no authority what-
ever.

Taxes were rarely asked for and rarely voted, because
the contending parties dreaded unpopularity, yet for taxes
there was an urgent need. Even taxes which had been
voted were not collected because the country lacked all
discipline and no one was ready to obey. The king had
no great private fortune and so could not maintain an
army. The ** black army " accordingly revolted as the
soldiers could not obtain their pay. The very things
which in the hands of Matthias had been a blessing, now
became a source of danger, and the government had to
break the weapons which the nation needed more than
ever. The frontier fortresses were neglected. The mag-
nates in the provinces transgressed every law with impun-
ity, for to restrain them needed a powerful government
and the gentry could not form one.

The saddest consequence of this anarchical state of
affairs was the peasant revolt under the leadership of
D6zsa. The turbulent magnates were cruel and exacting
towards the peasants who were goaded into rebellion by
their tyranny. The peasants played a very subordinate
part in mediaeval Hungary. They had to work, to pay,
and in addition, to shed their blood in the wars, but they
had no influence upon either the central administration of
the state, nor the county.

261

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

On the other hand, they were not slaves. They had
the right to move freely about the country and to own
property. If the monarch was strong, he defended the
rights of the peasants. It was his most sublime preroga-
tive to protect the weak. He was able to maintain the
balance between the different classes of society by suc-
couring the oppressed and attaching them to himself.

But when the monarch was impotent, the situation of
the peasant was intolerable. Matthias the Just gave pro-
tection to the peasants, but also assigned to them duties.
After his death the protection ceased but the burdens
remained. What the state no longer demanded of the
peasant, the landowner claimed for himself, and the
burdens were not rendered lighter by their becoming
unlawful.

Bathory said threateningly that any man who should
try to accuse him before the king ought to have two heads,
because he would cut one off before the accuser could
reach the court. The immediate cause of the peasant out-
break was the prevailing anarchy. The weak government
could not induce the nobles to make the necessary mili-
tary preparations against the Turks, so the idea suggested
itself that the people themselves should perform the task
which their leaders neglected. It was the boundless
selfishness of the contending parties which forced the
sword Into the hands of the embittered peasants. The
constituent factors of the community were at war with
one another, all belief in authority was shaken, and the
utter overthrow of the state seemed probable. At such
a time, when disorder reigned everywhere, and bold enter-
prises were the order of the day, the peasants also con-
ceived the plan of achieving their own emancipation.
Why should they have remained the only sober class of
the community?

Hence the terrible revolution, the fruit and well-
merited punishment of the immorality of the age.

The cruelties which attended the suppression of the

262

THE JAGELLO DYNASTY.

rising also reveal the character of that unhappy time.
The nobles in their pursuit of vengeance were merciless
towards the conquered peasants. The selfishness and
vindictiveness of the conquerors were a dark spot on the
fame of Hungary and a blight upon the country.

263

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER XIV,

LOUIS II. (1616-1526).

In the reign of Louis II. the same parties were con-
tending as before, only the peasants had been silenced,
and they watched events with bitterness in their hearts.
When danger began to show itself upon the horizon the
peasants could hardly be counted upon, although the
country sorely needed the help of all her sons.

The magnates and the gentry were still at daggers
drawn, pursuing the same aims as in the days of Wladis-
lav.

At first, some kind of compromise was arrived at, but
in 1518 the magnates gained the upper hand and achieved
all that they had been in vain endeavouring to accom-
plfsh since the year 1490. The chief element in their
programme was the same as it had been in 1490, namely,
that the executive power should be in the hands of a
council of magnates and that the Diet should exercise
no control over this council. However, past experience
urged upon them the necessity of creating a more prac-
tical organisation. They formed a government of per-
sons whose number was fixed and was independent of the
king. The power was placed in the hands of a council
consisting of four barons and four prelates, in addition
to the Palatine, the Chief Justice, the Treasurer, and the
Chancellor. Taught by the past they demanded that
half of these officials should be obliged to attend the meet-
ings. Three meetings were to be held every week and the
king could only communicate with foreign powers
through the intermediation of the council. Every public
matter, even the supervision of the royal household, came

264

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

within the sphere of the councirs activity. As in 1490,
the magnates again declared that important grants of
land and ecclesiastical appointments could only be made
with their consent. In their own interest they decreed
that war taxes should be paid by the tenants of those
noblemen only who did not equip banderia. They eman-
cipated themselves from taxation when they appointed
their own officials to collect the taxes.

All these were fatal mistakes. The supremacy of any
one class in a nation can only be accepted by the other
self-respecting classes, so long as it uses its power for
the common good; as soon as it uses its influence to
further its own selfish aims it is bound to fall.

There had been a time when the great nobles recog-
nised this truth and voluntarily undertook the two-fold
burden of the equipment and taxation of their dependants
and the maintenance of separate banderia. Now their
selfishness injured themselves. The bold attack of the
gentry had not taught them that they could only
strengthen their position by taking the lead in making
sacrifices for the good of the state. They therefore
deserved the mistrust and dislike of the nation. Their
action in levying taxes at the very time when they eman-
cipated the tenants of the richest noblemen from taxation
had the nature of a challenge. The gentry moreover were
not resigned to the decisions of the nobles. These had
elaborated their scheme presupposing the consent of the
Diet. The gentry, however, withheld their consent and
met the action of the magnates by passing into law their
own programme, which remained unaltered. According
to this programme the supreme power was to rest not
with the council but with the Diet, in which the gentry
were predominant. They demanded that the council
should be subordinate to the Diet, and they pursued this
purpose more stubbornly under Louis II. than they had
done in his father's time. They were not content that
the Diet should elect the gentry members of the Council,
but insisted that it should choose the barons and prelates

265

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

as well. The majority of the council was constituted by
the gentry. The whole of the work of administration was
performed by the council, which, together with the king,
was placed under the control of the Diet. As there were
difficulties attached to administration by a body composed
of sixteen members of the gentry class, four barons and
four prelates, an effort was made to lessen the difficulties
by appointing special executive officers. Such were the
two Treasurers, who had to be elected from the nobles.
Their duty was "to carry into effect every decision
whether of recent or of earlier times'* and to "conduct
all the affairs of king and country." They had to see that
the taxes which had been voted were duly collected.
They levied troops. It was their task to retake possession
of the royal estates which had been alienated, and for this
purpose the armed forces of the counties, and even of the
whole nation, were placed at their disposal. They also
gained striking powers in the matter of proceedings
against wrongdoers.

If the king, whose duty it was, refused to execute the
law or endeavoured to hinder its execution, or if the
Palatine acted in a similar way in cases which came within
his jurisdiction, the treasurer was to carry out the law.
His right was superior to that of king or Palatine. Care
was taken that the treasurer should exercise this impor-
tant right under the control of the council, and especially
of the gentry members thereof.

The treasurer could only take action on being
requested to do so by the assessors. The assessors also
chose one of their number without whose knowledge the
treasurer could not collect revenue or allow expenditure.
Once a year a report had to be given of the state of the
royal treasury. Certain acts of negligence on the part of
the treasurer were by law punishable by death, while other
acts only involved the loss of office and possessions.

The authority of the treasurer was given a foundation
in the counties as well as in the centre. In every county
some members of the nobility were elected whose duty it

266

LOUIS IL (1516—1526).

was to ascertain the incomes and the possessions of the
inhabitants, in accordance with which the obligation of
equipping soldiers and paying taxes was determined.

But these efforts on the part of the gentry to improve
the administration were not successful. For a time they
secured to the gentry the leading part. The assessors,
upon whom the law conferred such exceptional powers,
gained considerable influence, yet they were not adequate
to their task. They were unable to establish order in the
state. In the provinces they were never very strong and in
the matter of taxation, and the equipment of soldiers, they
did not achieve more than their predecessors. Party strife
weakened the country as much as before, and no one
was able to give a strong lead to the nation.

The party of the magnates gained ground, through
the failure of their rivals. While the gentry were think-
ing of war against the Turks and were seeking help
abroad, the king, acting on the advice of the magnates,
concluded a treaty of peace with the Turks. The influ-
ence of the king was increased by this step, and when,
after the death of Perenyi, a new Palatine had to be
elected, the Court party won a decisive victory over the
gentry. It was not Szapolyai who was elected, but
Bathory. The gentry were defeated in their own fortress,
the Diet.

It is not necessary to give a detailed account of these
party contests; it is enough to say that in the following
years the royal council did not work in its new form, and
that in consequence of the jealousy between the Palatine
Bathory and Szapolyai, and also of the weakness of the
king who was not able to control them and who could
not find a military leader acceptable to those two dynasts,
the fortresses of Szabacs and Belgrade were taken by the
Turks.

Under the influence of this disaster the two parties
approached each other a little. In 1521 a law was passed
which aimed not so much at strengthening the hands of
this party or that, but at the organisation of the country's

267

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

means of defence- This meant some advance. Taxes
were imposed greater than had ever been known before.
Not only had the vassal or tenant class to pay, but every
member of the nobility without exception had to hand
over the half of his income to the treasury. All articles
of every day consumption were heavily taxed. The
money thus gained was to be used for providing soldiers.
The ancient tradition of obligatory military service was
departed from, and this departure was a sign of the
unhealthy condition of society. At a time when danger
threatened the country from every side, the nation aban-
doned its right to summon every citizen to its defence.

Following the example set by Matthias, the whole
nation should have been armed, and in addition, a regular
army formed. But this was impossible, for it would have
needed a state of discipline on the part of the administra-
tive body and of the whole community which could only
have been brought about by the energy and genius of a
Matthias.

Even he, in that troublous time, might have found it
impossible to cope successfully with the prevalent selfish-
ness. Under the circumstances it was only by recruiting
paid soldiers that a sufficient force could be brought
together. The collection and handling of the money, and
the leading of the army were not entrusted to the ordinary
administrative machinery. Two specially elected nobles
enforced payment and had to hand the money over to the
treasurers, two of whom belonged to the magnate class
and two to the gentry, in order that they should pay the
army under mutual supervision. At the head of the army
were two captains appointed by the king.

It was of ill omen that there should be so little confi-
dence in the ordinary administration. The election of the
treasurers from the two rival classes shows that neither
party could rule alone, and also that they guarded their
position jealously. The danger to the country put an
end to actual strife between the parties but it did not
establish sincere peace. Nor did the joint dominion

268

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

prove a success. Instead of the millions of money ex-
pected only thousands came in. The law remained a
dead letter. It was impossible to organise a powerful
army, and it was necessary to return to the ancient system,
imperfect as it may have been. The king lost the oppor-
tunity of restoring his prestige and guiding the develop*
ment of the country in the right direction. The patriotic
enthusiasm soon died away and party strife recommenced.
In the absence of King Louis, and while the Palatine
Bdthory was governor, the Court party again began to
act aggressively, and accordingly in the year 1523, the
gentry resolved to make a vigorous attack upon them.
When they were asked for money they replied that they
would only give it on condition that Bathory was dis-
missed from his post. It seems surprising that the gentry
did not more often use the powerful weapon of the refusal
of money.

In England when Parliament attached certain condi-
tions to the grant of money and by that means wrung
concessions from the Plantagenets and Lancastrians, the
kings had waged wars necessitated by their own ambitions
and not by the nation's interests, and accordingly the
people could refuse their support. In Hungary, however,
v/ar was inevitable; it was the gentry class which sounded
the alarm and was decidedly opposed to any truce or
peace. They could not, therefore, very well deny the
king the money necessary for prosecuting the war.

The threat of the gentry was, however, successful.
The king made Bathory resign, but soon after he re-
appointed him; he also appointed to the Archbishopric
of Esztergom the great adversary of the gentry, the
talented Szalkai, the most selfish politician of the age.

These reactionary steps brought the long struggle to
a head. A revolution broke out, and the government
deserved this disaster, for it had done everything that was
likely to lead to such a result. Then it grew frightened
and became conciliatory, but it did not keep its promises.

269

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

It could neither awaken fear nor respect, and it had taught
its adversaries that only violence could bring success.

Until the year 1525 the contest between the
embittered gentry and the jealous monarch paralysed all
law and plunged the state into misery. Twice was the
Diet dissolved without coming to any valid decisions.

The gentry were openly disobedient. They sum-
moned an armed assembly with the set purpose of
reorganising the whole state. The king summoned the
estates to another place but was not obeyed. For thirty
years the gentry had struggled to secure better govern-
ment for the country and to keep the king subject to their
influence and substitute their own supremacy for that of
the magnates, and they had not succeeded. The king
had never sympathised with their aims and the power of
the magnates was greater and more real than theirs. On
paper the gentry possessed important rights but they had
not strength to enforce them. Now they chose the
method which alone could give effect to their will. That
portion of a nation which is inferior in privileges can only
force its way to the front by means of a successful revo-
lution.

The king grew alarmed. He knew that unless he
yielded, civil war w^as inevitable, wiiile if he approached
the gentry he might moderate their action. The gentry
were sure to be ready to fight for their king if he were a
just king to them. Only a few years before, when he
dropped Bathory for their sake, they became reconciled at
once, for all Hungarians are royalists at heart. And
there were other circumstances which encouraged the king
to make the attempt. Szapolyai, the leader of the gentry,
coveted the wealth of the LTjlaki family, so there was a
possibility of bribing him.

Verboczy was peacefully disposed in consequence of
his royalist sentiments as well as his dread of a lawless
state of society and civil war. The king knew that if
he could awaken Verboczy's confidence in the sincerity

270

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

of his friendly overtures, he could count upon his friendly-
offices .

Louis therefore appeared at a meeting which he had
himself forbidden. He trusted that he could stave off the
danger by promises. Tardy yielding, however, rarely
brings the expected result. Yet all the circumstances on
which he had relied justified his confidence and smoothed
matters to a great extent. The impassioned crowd did
not abuse their power. They treated the monarch with
respect and abandoned at his request many of their
demands. They exhibited a degree of self-control rarely
found in a crowd. Yet in spite of their moderation they
compelled the king to accept more far-reaching reforms
than he had contemplated. The gentry had at length
achieved their aim and become the real masters of the
State. They exerted their influence upon the whole
machinery of government. Bathory was dismissed from
his post by the king and the gentry sought to replace him
by one who would vigorously execute the laws which they
passed. *'Let us choose a man who can sympathise with
the griefs of our class," they said, and in Verboczy they
saw the man they desired and they at once elected him.

They also wished to fill the other principal offices,
but as the appointment was an undoubted prerogative of
the king they were content that the king should select
men whom they also trusted. In this way a government
was formed from their ow^n adherents which was really
under their influence. The eight assessors elected from
their ranks had the right to attend all meetings of the
council together with the Palatine, Chancellor, Chief
Justice and Treasurer. The other magnates might attend
the meetings but they had no decisive vote. Foreigners
were not allowed to fill any office.

The provincial governing bodies were not over-
looked. The county lieutenant, w-ho was the king's prin-
cipal official, could only be appointed with the consent of
the county gentry. The leadership of the forces of the

271

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

county was entrusted to a captain chosen by the inhabi-
tants.

Th^ gentry had thus acquired as much power as the
law cGiuld confer upon them. Yet even that was not
enough. No organisation can ensure for long the rule
of the weaker over the stronger. Results achieved by
plvicky action at a suitable moment rarely endure. An
armed gentry could overawe king and magnates, but only
so long as they were actually in the field. The circum-
stance that Szapolyai was master of the situation really
told against him, for the fact of his coveting the post of
governor, and perhaps even the crown, alarmed the king
and prevented him from co-operating sincerely with the
gentry. At heart the king was hostile to the new order.
Probably even when he acquiesced in it he resolved to
overthrow it at the first opportunity, and this was natur-
ally the desire of the magnates also. Had Szapolyai
been made Palatine instead of Verboczy, his election
might not have been so faithfully in accord with the pro-
gramme of the gentry but it would have made a stronger
government possible.

Szapolyai 's palatinate would have been in harmony
with the traditions of that office. He had influence, enor-
mous wealth and a standing army, in fact all the condi-
tions of power. Verboczy, on the contrary, lacked all
these. He was a legislator, a great scholar and judge,
but no warrior. The chief defender of the country, the
Palatine, had never taken part in a w^ar. He represented
a new type in political life and one to which a warlike
people had not learned to pay obedience. His origin
was not the difficulty, for the nation never paid much
heed to such a consideration. The Hunyadis, Szapolyais
and Kinizsis, had not sprung from distinguished families
but had acquired their rank and wealth by their prowess
on the battlefield before becoming the chief dignitaries of
the country. But Verboczy remained his old self in his
manner of living, in worldly possessions and in his pur-
suits. Even when Palatine he was still only a member

272

LOUIS II. (1516—1520).

of the gentry class, while those others had become mag-
nates before filling such an exalted post. Only an iron
will and the capacity for vigorous action could have
enabled Verboczy to play his part well, and these he did
not possess. He was a just and supremely honest man,
but no politician ; a great lawyer, an excellent patriot, but
not a man of action. The Palatine should have been the
highest judge and the political leader of the country.
Verboczy could fulfil only the first of these duties. Yet
then, if ever, the country needed a commanding person-
ality and a strong political leading.

The new constitution had been created by a revolu-
tion. Only force could bring about such an upheaval as
should throw the lower elements of society to the top,
and the situation could only be maintained by the ex-
penditure of great energy.

But Verboczy would not employ any means incon-
sistent with his idealistic ways of thinking and the lofti-
ness of his aims, yet without them he could achieve noth-
ing. What would have been the result of the French
Revolution if its leaders had really acted in accordance
with the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity?
Could they have defended themselves against a re-
action if they had not employed tyrannical methods ?

As soon as the Palatine entered upon his office he
saw how difficult his work would be if the Court party
and the great nobles were against him. He did not
attempt to intimidate them ; on the contrary he followed
his own inclination when he endeavoured to win their
goodwill, and it is certainly problematic whether it was
the part of a good patriot to stir up internal strife. Per-
haps, indeed, in his soul there had occurred the same
transformation as happened to many democrats in history
when commencing to move in a new sphere. The con-
tact with the Court and aristocratic circles hardly ever
failed to make an impression upon them. Perhaps as
Palatine, Verboczy felt that duty compelled him to erect
a barrier between himself and Szapolyai, whose secret

273

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

plans went further than he could approve, and whom he
had reason to regard as the enemy of the king. In his
capacity of judge also Verboczy came into conflict with
the leader and the interests of his party. Ujlaki had left
a great fortune, which was a source of power. Verboczy
as judge decided that the fortune should belong not to
Szapolyai but to the treasury. It is hard to say what led
him to act in this manner, whether conscience or political
considerations. It is certain that his conduct created
antagonistic feelings in his party. Szapolyai retired in
a passion to Transylvania, leaving the Palatine who had
shown himself ungrateful and had hurt his interests.
The gentry themselves could not recognise the Verboczy
of former times. Although he was blood of their blood,
yet now that he was Palatine he ignored their interests
and studied those of the Court and the magnates. Yet
when they chose him they had not thought it possible
that he could resemble his predecessors.

The impotent behaviour of the government caused
further trouble. Money was scarce. The revolutionaries
had hoped to remedy this evil easily, for such men arc
usually optimistic. They thought it would be enough if
they put an end to all connection with the bank of the
Fuggers, and demanded the payment back of the stolen
fortunes, when the treasury would overflow with wealth.
But they were mistaken. The revolution had shaken the
country's credit and the situation became worse.

The new government could only obtain loans at a
ruinous rate of interest. The European rulers took the
interests of the Fuggers into their own care, and the con-
nection w^hich the people had without due consideration
severed had to be restored, although the nation did not
easily see its mistake. The taxes were not collected. In
the counties the officials, who depended upon the gentry,
did not act strictly enough, as they were afraid of dis-
pleasing their employers. Licence reigned everywhere,
and neither king nor any other authority was obeyed.

Such a state of affairs usually occurs during times

274

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

of revolution. How could the new elements which had
just come into power be expected to usher in their golden
age w ith self-sacrifice and the payment of taxes ? They
had had enough of these before. The gentry favoured a
w^arlike policy, and the king and his counsellors only
dared to cherish in secret the idea of a truce with the
Turks. Yet although inclined for war the community
was chary in supplying soldiers, and the elected captains
were not sufficiently independent of the people to employ
force. Nor could the country reckon upon the banderia
of the powerful nobles, who declared that if the gentry
governed without them and against them, they might
defend the country without them. Verboczy tried in vain
to conciliate the magnates; he could not induce them to
acquiesce in a government Avhich had been established in
opposition to them. This was the tragedy of the situ-
ation. The magnates could neither be broken nor won
over. The new government could not exist either wath
them or without them, and its fall was inevitable. The
people's trust in it was shaken and they turned from it
because it had failed to safeguard the interests of the
country or of the party which had placed it in power.
Its adversaries could not forget that it had deprived them
of their powder, and they made a vigorous attack upon it.
Among its own adherents some were angered by its
action, and some w^ere merely desirous of leaving the sink-
ing ship. Others again, aw^akened from their illusions,
tried to work for the country in other ways.

The strengthening attack and weakening defence
decided the fate of Verboczy. The reactionaries made a
clever use of their opportunity. The magnates saw that
with their programme of 1490 and 1518 they could not
defeat their adversaries, the gentry, and so they aban-
doned it. Their course was the more easy because their
rivals were in difficulties, and so, concealing their
ambitious aims, they inscribed on their banner the motto,
the restoration of the royal power, and under that banner
commenced their campaign. Their cause appealed to

275

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the majority of the people. Whereas after the death of
the strong king Matthias everyone spoke of the defence
of the people's rights against the royal power, now the
general conviction was that the royal power should be
augmented. Experience had shown that the exaggerated
power of either the gentry or the magnates was equally
bad. Each party was taught by its own failure that the
country could only be saved by a strong government,
which it was unable to form alone. The dangers
threatening from without were increasing in gravity, and
the nation turned once again to the monarchy for the
defence of the country.

The Jagello dynasty might have trod the same path
that Matthias had pursued so successfully. They could
have used the movement of the gentry for the benefit of
their own policy, but they neglected the opportunity and
left to Szapolyai the work they themselves should have
performed. King Louis, however, possessed some politi-
cal sagacity. Some years before he had tried to gain
influence over the masses. What had seemed impossible
then, with the intermediation of Verboczy and Szapolyai,
was now accomplished in spite of those leaders.

The favour of the populace has always been incon-
stant. Verboczy, who had formerly been idolised, was
dismissed, and in this moment of stress and danger, when
the ship of state lay tossing helplessly upon a stormy
sea, the nation turned instinctively to its heaven-sent
guardian, the crowned king. Louis was very young.
His idleness could easily be accounted for by his bad
education and the influence of evil counsellors, and the
people trusted that the crisis he had to pass through
would elevate him.

To this sentiment we owe the last law enacted by
mediaeval Hungary. The difficulty of direct government
by unwieldy numbers w^as so evident that the people,
excited as they were, could not fail to perceive it.

The essence of the new law was expressed by the
words "the king shall freely use his rights." The ten-

276

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

dency of former years had been to compel the king to
exercise his power indirectly, through the council, but
now he was emancipated from all such restrictions.

The king was acknowledged to have the right to
appoint all officials, save the Palatine, w^ho had to be
elected.

The king might introduce changes even in such
offices as were already filled. He might form a council
from the ranks of the barons and prelates, but ''besides
these noblemen his majesty shall choose eight members
of the gentry class who may attend the council." It was
enacted that the Diet should be convened only once a
year, as the expense of attending more frequently was
too great a burden. Not a single clause of this law made
the king's decision subject to the consent of the council.
The obstacles which had long checked the free action of
the monarch were intentionally destroyed.

But just when all the power had been entrusted to
one hand, that of the king, and the nation was hoping
great things as a result of this transformation, the disas-
trous battle of Mohacs (1526) suddenly dashed the
country's hopes to the ground. The sword of Matthias
could not be wielded by Louis II. Whether a man has
authority or not is not merely a matter of law, but
depends primarily upon the man's own personality.
Louis was not cut out for the part of a monarch and he
could make no real use of his legal rights. He w'as brave
in the battle and died for his country, but as though Fate
sought to make his end consistent with his character he
sank in a marsh, his weak body being unable to bear up
under the weight of the armour he wore. Life had dealt
hardly with Louis; it had given him an exalted position
and great vocation, but had denied him the requisite
strength.

In spite of party conflicts and the lack of money, the
rank and file of the nation cannot be blamed for the
trao-ic issue of the battle. The Hungarian army was a
large one and it was not lacking in bravery. An account

277

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of its deeds at Mohacs might appear to savour of gascon-
ade if reckless heroism in battle were not such a well-
known Hungarian characteristic. The cause of the dis-
aster was the prevalent anarchy, the absence of discipline
and strong leading. Whilst the Turkish army
approached in one solid mass, guided by the strong will
of one man, the Hungarians were disunited and the deci-
sive battle was fought with only a quarter of their army.
Contradictory and hesitating commands, and the diso-
bedience of some of the leading ofificers, were bound to
lead to a catastrophe.

Even at the last a better turn could have been given
to events if the king had commanded his army more ably,
but Louis, though entrusted with full powers, used them
so little that he submitted the leadership of the army to
election. When battle was already imminent, and when
the contending parties had humiliated one another's
candidates, Archbishop Tomori was elected as leader. It
could be wished that he had been obeyed when he ordered
a retreat, for then the country might have been saved.
It was madness to fight before Szapolyai, Frangepan
and others had joined Tomori with their troops. The
king himself saw the necessity for retreat but the reck-
lessly daring warriors scorned the idea. On the battle-
field as in the council chamber they regarded themselves
as freeborn nobles whose consent was necessary before
any step was taken. The king asked the magnates what
was to be done, instead of himself deciding and command-
ing.

The anarchy of the age reveals itself most clearly in
this event. Hungary's independence was destroyed by
that pernicious blight. The nobles did not trust their
leaders who had sinned much by neglecting the duties
of their position, and now when the fate of Hungary
depended upon the exercise of their authority their long
neglect bore its bitter fruit. The soldiers sent a deputa-
tion to the king demanding that he should at once join
battle. They knew that the king could be led, and they

278

LOUIS II. (1516— 152G).

therefore dared to demand instant attack and the death of
those who advised to the contrary. The fatal battle
followed.

The monarchy had a difficult task to discharge dur-
ing the Middle Ages, for the general situation was not
very favourable to it. The creation of powerful kings
crumbled to nothing in the hands of weak successors.
Such was the case in England after Edward I., and in
Hungary after Louis I. Decadence was stopped by the
Tudors in England, and by Matthias in Hungary. Their
rule was the outcome of necessity. Both Henry VII. and
Matthias were helped to the throne by a reaction against
the unruly magnates. But the further development was
different in the two countries.

In England, owing to many fortunate circumstances,
the monarchy retained its pre-eminence without establish-
ing absolutism. Just at the commencement of a new era,
when a king who maintained a standing army could
become much more oppressive than his predecessors, in
England fortunately the need for a large army had ceased.
Hungary, however, was not so fortunately situated, and
it was necessary that the whole nation should be trained
to arms. The task of Matthias was much more difficult
than that of the Tudors. Peaceful years, bringing wealth
and progress, enabled the Tudors to conciliate their sub-
jects and induce them to bear their rule more easily.

Matthias, on the contrary, had to demand a standing
army, to impose frequent new taxes, and to strain the
strength of his people to the uttermost. The advantages
of his reign were sadly counteracted by the effects of the
constant wars, and when he died he left no lawful heir.

The nation accordingly resolved to free itself from his
system of government. It has always been difficult to
discipline the Hungarians in such a way as to preserve
their self-respect. The secret of the progress of Prussia
was the ability of the Hohenzollerns to discipline their
people without extinguishing their primitive freshness and
vigour.

279

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Matthias made the attempt. He knew the Hungarians
and the best way to handle them, but the lifetime of one
man was not long enough to achieve a lasting result.
Some of his shortcomings, too, helped to prevent his work
from being of a permanent character. When he died,
the nation resolved that no second Matthias should rule
over it, and the period of the Jagellos was really a continu-
ation of the period before him. While in England the
long rule of the Tudors prepared the way for the modern
era, in Hungary the situation after the death of Matthias
was still entirely mediseval. The nation was still in such
a condition that weakness in the monarch might precipi-
tate a crisis and lead to political conflicts which meant
anarchy and probable annihilation. The Jagellos were
not strong enough for their task, and could do nothing to
stop the process of disintegration.

The magnates and the gentry carried on their contests
without paying heed to the king, but neither party gained
a complete victory, and the result was the impotence of the
whole State.

The internal troubles were not so grave in Hungary
as they were in England during the Wars of the Roses.
In England, when the monarchy became weak, the wel-
fare of the community was entirely subordinated to the
selfish policy of certain powerful families, whereas in Hun-
gary the struggle was carried on for the sake of common
interests. And Hungary, in striking contrast with other
countries, which have been torn with sanguinary con-
flicts during the reigns of weak kings, knew no civil wars
under the Jagellos with the solitary exception of the
peasants' revolt.

In consequence of Hungary's geographical situation,
however, the slightest fault on the part of the nation was
calculated to lead to much graver consequences than much
more serious faults in other lands. The circumstances
amid which the Hungarians live demand that they should
never forget themselves, for one false step may be enough

280

LOUIS II. (1516— 152G).

to lead to a catastrophe. And this fact Hungary must
ever remember.

At the time we are now dealing with the danger of
Hungary's situation again manifested itself. Owing to
the proximity of the Turks, the anarchy resulting from the
king's weakness was much more dangerous to the nation
than England's far more serious internal troubles were to
her. The imminence of danger awoke in the Hungarian
nation the desire to strengthen the royal power. After
Mohacs also, the many different interests of the country
alike necessitated a strong monarchy. When the Arpad
dynasty became extinct (1301) the situation had been very
similar, and had led to King Robert Charles becoming
almost an absolute monarch. After Mohacs, the danger
was still greater, and the question was whether the conse-
quences would not be graver.

The leading idea of this book has been that during
the Middle Ages it was only the monarchy, uniting and
guiding the strength of the various elements of the nation,
which could create and maintain a situation favourable to
the development of constitutional life. But under the
difficult circumstances of the time the monarchy could but
rarely discharge its functions properly. The problem was
whether, during the period of the Jagellos, the disintegra-
tion of the State had not gone so far as to destroy the
fundamental conditions of autonomy. Many more
ancient creations than the Hungarian constitution have
perished. Many mediaeval prerogatives were destroyed
by the increasing power of the monarchy. Had not per-
haps the last hour of liberty struck in Hungary?

It may be well here to sum up the constitutional
achievements in Hungary during the Middle Ages. Let
us glance first of all at the law, as modified by the legisla-
tion towards the end of the reign of Louis XL, and see if
the reaction had weakened the ancient guarantees of
liberty.

The laws of King Louis II. did not alter anything
fundamental in the organisation of the state. They left

281

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the county system untouched, together with those more
recent creations which had considerably extended the
sphere of action of the county organisation. The county
meetings, in which the gentry class was predominant, were
a power superior to the royal officials. Central adminis-
tration, which in the hands of Matthias had been powerful
and far-reaching, gradually lost its effectiveness. If the
Hungarian monarchy desired to be master, the county
system had to be reformed. The county had become a
strong bulwark against the central authority. It had
gained a wide sphere of action in military, judicial, admin-
istrative and political matters. It imposed taxes within
its own area and played an important part In the collection
of the national taxes. It exerted considerable Influence
upon the various administrative offices. It elected the
szolgabircS (sheriff), its influence was decisive in
the appointment of the deputy-lieutenant, and it had
considerable weight in the matter of the election of the
county lieutenant. In short the county organisation had
become so powerful as to be able to hinder effective gov-
ernment, a situation bristling with danger. Absolute
royal power was only possible if the whole county system
could be transformed. The various administrative offices
themselves, when held by independent and distinguished
aristocrats, were no pillars of absolutism. The officials,
according to Hungarian law, owed no blind obedience to
their head, but on the contrary were looked upon as the
guardians and executors of the law, which they had to
defend even against the ruler. As these offices were filled
by wealthy and independent members of the nobility, there
was no separate bureaucracy which the king could employ
against the nobles and the constitution. The central
power had to recognise the traditional authority of the
meetings of the Estates. It had become clear and incon-
testable that without their confirmation no law could be
passed, and that every important matter affecting the com-
munity came within their sphere. In the law of 1526 the
Estates actually empowered the king to use his sovereign

282

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

rights. Did not this mean that, if necessity should cirl.-p,
they might restrict his rights again ?

One powerful weapon in their hands was the exclu-
sive right of voting the taxes. Moreover the king was
obliged to convene the Diet once a year. Great influence
was assured to the Estates by the fact that they elected the
Palatine, the highest official of the king, who at the same
time played the part of intermediary or umpire between
king and people.

The supreme executive power, however, belonged to
the king. The very essence of the reaction was that it
ignored the reforms of the Jagello period and returned to
the ancient system, under which the king was the real head
of the government. This change was salutary, for all
contrary efforts had proved failures, both in England and
in Hungary. The reaction in favour of royalty did not
imperil the freedom of the people. In England parlia-
mentarism developed out of the royal government and it
has maintained some of its original character to the present
day. Parliamentarism is royal government placed under
the controlling influence of the House of Commons, to
which it is responsible. It may be that freedom might
have been developed under different circumstances. It is
not impossible that in a country so fortunately situated as
England an executive authority formed by means of elec-
tion would work fairly well, although not even there, nor
even at the present day, could it prove so satisfactory as
one appointed by the king.

But during the Middle Ages the elective method
would certainly have checked all healthy development as it
must inevitably have proved a failure. The English
Parliament, as early as the Middle Ages, gained a hold
over the executive without claiming the right of electing it.
By means of its right to impeach an obnoxious minis-
ter it was able to get rid of him, and if it were backed by
the nation it could compel ministers to resign even
without resorting to that right.

283

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

It was therefore impossible to govern the country
against the wishes of Parliament. Its authority and its
right of voting the taxes, made it to the interest of the
king to dismiss unpopular counsellors and to fill their
places with men approved by the people. This in time
gave rise to the idea that the ministers were responsible
to Parliament. When Parliament compelled a minister to
resign, without dislocating the constitution, it not only
met the urgent need of the moment, but also created a pre-
cedent. Such precedents gradually established parlia-
mentarism. What at first happened exceptionally and at
the cost of violent struggles, ultimately became the usual
practice. Impeachment became superfluous, and an ex-
pression of mistrust took its place.

The Hungarian Estates also preserved those rights
which in England created parliamentarism. At the time
of the Jagello kings the national assembly had such power
that it could raise its authority over the executive to the
level of a system legally established. The Estates recurred
to the elective method as the strongest means of exerting
influence. Parliamentarism like that of England could
only be developed as a result of the schooling aff"orded by
stern necessity and experience. The king could only be
resigned to it when he was made to see that his ideal of
absolute government was impossible, and Parliament, on
the other hand, could only be made content with partial
control and indirect influence over the executive by finding
that no other system worked.

Royal government under parliamentary control is a
compromise which only the lessons of practical life could
so sanctify and make so popular that it has become the
great example of a free constitution. The Estates in Hun-
gary, in their conceit, tried to extend their power beyond
healthy limits. Ensuing events annihilated their achieve-
ments but the means they had employed remained, and
these were suited to further a parliamentary development
similar to that in England, though unfortunately the situ-
ation in Hungary was less favourable than in that country.

284

LOUIS 11. (1516—1526).

It was the king who appointed all the minis-
ters, but they did not become independent of the Diet,
whose power made it advisable for the king to endeavour
to remain at peace with it. In the year 1497 the king had
dismissed the treasurer Bakacs because the Diet had de-
manded his dismissal. The reaction of 1526 occurred
within the Diet itself. It was there that Verboczy gave in
his resignation and that Bathory was appointed. It is
true that the new law condemned the practice of dismiss-
ing a Palatine without formal trial, but it maintained the
right of depriving the Palatine of his office if he were
guilty of offences involving capital punishment. At the
present day such a law would make the Palatine secure in
the event of accusations prompted by political antipathy,
but at that time the death sentence was readily pronounced
for political misdeeds. The other officials ran the same
risk. If the Diet condemned an official for unfaithfulness
in the discharge of his duty, it was entitled to dispose of
his property, his office, and even his life.

The Hungarian civil law was a strong bulwark of
national freedom at the end of the Middle Ages. No other
country had a more practical constitution. It did not give
the nation more rights than it could properly use, nor did
it give less than the nation needed. The king received
all his power from the people, and he could not therefore
possibly govern for long against the people's will, but to
govern the country was undeniably his right and his duty.

He was bound to act in harmony with the nobles but
it was his part to lead. In the matter of civil law the Hun-
garians were not behind England. The germs from which
parliamentarism developed in England were all present in
the Hungarian constitution also. In the thirteenth century
England was in advance of Hungary, but since then repre-
sentatives of the Hungarian towns had gained a place
among the country's legislators and the Diet had estab-
lished the right to control taxation. The law of 1526 led
to important changes by drawing attention to the great
burden imposed upon the poorer gentry by the necessity

285

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of attending the meetings of the Diet, for the perception
of this fact brought about a reform of that assembly which
made it a purely elective body. Only in two points was
Hungary behind England. One was the freedom of the
Hungarian nobles from taxation. As, however, they had
many heavy duties to perform, the defence of the country
falling upon them in proportion to their wealth and rank,
and as the taxes paid by the peasants fell to some extent
upon the landowners, their immunity from taxation did
not make the healthy development of the community im-
possible. It would of course have been preferable that
they should not have emancipated themselves from the
payment of taxes. Their exalted position would not have
seemed so unreasonable if they had been first in the per-
formance of duties towards their country. Doubtless, a
strong national king would have succeeded in pursuing
the policy of Matthias in this respect.

The greater evil, however, was the oppression of the
peasants. In England this class took up arms to free itself,
but was scattered by the upper classes. Yet by the end
of the Middle Ages the peasantry had become free. The
economic life of England being so much more developed
than that of Hungary, people began to see the advantage
of free labour over compulsory labour, and this perception
gradually transformed the whole organisation of society.
The growing towns also contributed to the emancipation
of the country people. As the men procured work in the
towns, they were able to free themselves from the chains
which bound them to the soil. In Hungary, undeveloped
as it was economically, the disadvantages of servile labour
were not so burdensome as to overcome the selfishness of
the aristocracy, nor did the towns possess sufficient privi-
leges to enable them to defend the poorer classes against
the aristocrats, and the life of the towns was not bright
enough to attract and keep the masses.

The oppression of the peasantry reached its highest
point at a time when the monarchy was weak, because the
strong kings regarded the protection of the oppressed as

29)^

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

their most important right. The papal nuncio wrote before
the battle of Mohacs that the oppression of the peasants
was a grave danger, because they would be ready to join
even the Sultan if he would promise them his protection,
and he added that the king did not dare stand up in their
defence because he feared the aristocracy. And the nuncio
was right. The danger of the Turkish invasion was aggra-
vated by the fact that the peasants had few interests which
bound them to the nobles. But a Christian king could
have made better use than the Turks of this mistake on the
part of the nobles, and his duty and his wisest policy was
to try to win the heart of the masses.

The chief function of the monarchy was to maintain
the integrity of the state. Any disagreement between the
magnates and the gentry could not fail to strengthen the
king's position. At the time of the Jagello kings the
various elements of the nobility were separated by marked
contrasts. The different classes fought for political
supremacy but the division did not go to the very heart
of the State and injure the national organism itself. It
was during those class contests that Verboczy was laying
down the principle of the unity of all classes of the nobility,
from the magnates to the gentry, in his great legal work
the Tripartitum.

When the magnates formed an alliance for the de-
fence of their privileges their utmost demand was that the
offices which in past time had been held by members of
their class should not be given to members of the gentry
unless it was impossible to find suitable men in the ranks
of the magnates. They did not close their ranks and pre-
vent the gentry from entering them, nor did they endeav-
our to alter the law of succession in such a way as to
ensure to their families a continuance of their privileged
position. The magnates did not claim any privileges from
which the gentry were rigidly excluded, nor any such posi-
tion as was attained at that time by the nobility in France
or in Germany. Although they were in close connection
with the nobles of the western states of Europe, and were

287

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

in opposition to the gentry party, they never acted in oppo-
sition to Hungarian traditions. They must have felt
that although their rank and splendour were less than
those of the higher German nobles, whose fortune was in-
divisible and who possessed many rights which no one
else could obtain, yet they were superior to these because
they were the real leaders of the nation and had a great
living force of public opinion behind them. At that time
they only desired to be political leaders and did not seek
to raise barriers against the incoming of new elements.
Their great mistake was that they endeavoured to main-
tain by rigid laws the political influence which their fore-
fathers had won by means of their patriotic services. In
this they failed and the troubles which followed their at-
tempt taught them the necessity of conciliating and co-
operating with the gentry. It was through the false and
selfish policy of a few individuals that the magnates had
been opposed to those whom in former times they used to
lead and who still remained one with them in heart and
soul. The ties by which the magnates now attached the
gentry to themselves achieved the desired end. The Diet
of 1526 showed that the ancient harmony between the
different elements of the dominant classes could be re-
stored, and as soon as the leading motive of the activity
of the magnates was a truly patriotic one they were able to
overthrow even Verboczy. The whole history of the age
made it evident that the differences between the contend-
ing factors were a consequence of temporary fluctua-
tions in political life and not of any deep seated antagon-
ism. Szapolyai, the most powerful noble in Hungary,
was the leader of the gentry, and Frangepan, the proudest
aristocrat, who considered his family older and more dis-
tinguished than any other, was also on their side. The
magnates were really less strict in the matter of a man's
ancestry than the gentry. If a man rose to eminence by
his merits and was inclined to side with them, they valued
his alliance however obscure his origin may have been.
Thomas Bakacs and Szalkai, the leaders of the Court

288

LOUIS II. (1516—1526).

party, were of humble stock. Curiously enough it was the
gentry who passed the law that high offices in the church
were to be reserved for those who were of noble birth.
When the Treasurer Szerencs^s attained his elevated posi-
tion in spite of his Jewish origin, the magnates found it
quite natural while it gave offence to the gentry.

An ambitious gentry and a liberal minded high
nobility can always agree easily. Even if occasionally the
crimes of some magnates during the reign of a weak king
disturbed the harmony between the different sections of
the nobility, directly the political situation changed har-
mony was speedily restored among those who depended
upon one another and whose interests were really the
same.

The great shortcoming of the mediaeval state organisa-
tion was that it excluded the humbler classes of the people
from all participation in the work of government, but on
the other hand that organisation was strengthened by the
circumstance that the governing classes were thoroughly
united among themselves, more so than in England. It
is true that later events caused a great deal of disturbance.
The nobility moulded itself on the pattern of the western
European states, and religion also erected barriers between
certain sections of the community, while the dismembered
state weakened the feeling of unity, yet all this could not
cancel the effect of old traditions and cleave the nation into
layers of different rank. It was the salvation of the coun-
try that in times of danger the highest nobles, who lived
like kings, were one in sentiment with the poorest members
of the gentry. Class hatred and jealousy, which worked
so much evil in other countries, could never destroy the
national tradition that all the members of the noble class
were one body.

At the close of the Middle Ages the Hungarian nation
was not lacking in the qualities which favoured the pre-
servation and extension of the country's freedom. But
although freedom was in no danger of decay from internal
causes, the external situation was very threatening, and

289

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

was likely to strengthen the reaction caused by the anarchy
following the defeat at Mohacs. The Sultan had absolute
power over his fanatical subjects. This explains the vic-
tory of that thoroughly disciplined nation over a much
freer one. Should not the Hungarians have copied some
parts of the governmental system of their adversaries in
order to make effective defence possible ?

It had become essential that the executive power
should become more centralised, and therefore the Pala-
tine's office was now a source of weakness. The king also
had to secure for himself an income large enough to enable
him to maintain a powerful standing army. Where would
the reaction, which all felt to be necessary, stop ? Was
not Hungary faced by the alternatives of either becoming
disintegrated like Poland through the exaggeration of the
freedom of its parts, or of becoming a prey to absolutism,
like wSpain, whose kings found a moral ground for their
autocracy in their conflicts with the Moors ? It was of
course possible that the reaction would not destroy the old
constitution and that the system of Matthias would prove
sufficient for the pi-eservation of the state, although we
know of no instance of a nation, engaged in similar long
and cruel struggles, succeeding under a constitution which
gave the community such considerable privileges as those
conferred by the Hungarian constitution. Perhaps the
political ability of the people might have enabled them to
overcome the difficulties. Transylvania almost accom-
plished a similar task. She defended herself for a long
time against the assaults of the Turks, and the German
emperors, and maintained her independence. Her gifted
princes and the great spirit of the people, made her so
strong that absolutism was unnecessary. But at last even
Transylvania had to fall. Her long resistance had only
been made possible by the circumstance that the Turks
and Germans counteracted each other, and neither could
devote all their strength to the work of conquest of a coun-
try which lay far from the chief field of battle. Tran-
sylvania chose the moment for attack which was most con-

290

LOUIS II. (1616—1526).

venient to her, and her strength was not kept permanently
strained to the uttermost, as that of an independent Hun-
gary would have been.

The situation in Hungary would have been very
different in many respects. One thing is certain, that if
the king had answered his vocation, the constitution would
have entered upon critical times; its right to exist would
have been weakened and powerful national sentiments and
interests would have stood opposed to it. On the other
hand, if the king had neglected his duty, and had tried to
destroy the constitution while using his growing power
for his own selfish purposes and not for the welfare of the
nation, the old bulwarks of the people's liberty were still
strong enough to render stubborn resistance possible. It
would have been more easy to found an absolutism that
was beneficial to the nation, but the people were armed
i!gainst this by their political sagacity and their respect
for the traditions of freedom.

The ensuing centuries were filled with events which
make up a truly wonderful history. IMany of the blows
which fell upon the nation were so heavy that even now
their effects have not entirely passed away, yet Hungary
can look back upon them with pride, for they were trials
of her strength. The explanation of the survival of the
Hungarians as a separate nation lies in the fact that the
Habsburg dynasty, which has never identified itself with
Hungarian interests and sentiments, did not enlist the
nation's instinct of self-preservation upon its own side,
but has ever struggled for absolute power. Consequently
the Hungarians have never taken the side of the Habs-
burgs but have always opposed them. This was the
reason of their freedom. A tenacious clinging to their in-
dependence has always been the mainspring of their action
and this has saved the country from disintegration under
circumstances resembling those which in other lands have
led to that result. This instinct had been causally con-
nected with the development of a free constitution dur-
ing former times, and it enabled the popular liberties to

291

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

withstand the powerful onslaught of the oligarchs. The
mediaeval constitution owed its origin to the authority
which the sentiment of the nation gave to the monarch.

This sentiment now served in all its strength the cause
of freedom. All that had previously aided constitutional
development indirectly was now directly devoted to that
end. The importance of this was increased by the circum-
stance that it happened at a time when, if the king had
identified himself with the interests of the nation, his power
might have grown dangerously great owing to the enthu-
siastic support which the nation would have given him,
more dangerous in fact to the constitution than at any time
during the Middle Ages.

To the instinct of self-preservation was added another
force, namely Protestantism, which together with the con-
stitution, defended the nation's independence.

The reformed religion began to spread in the year
following the battle of Mohacs, and as in England, it came
at the right time to throw a heavy weight into the scale of
freedom. The very nature of the Protestant faith made it
an ally of liberty.

The history of mediaeval Hungary closed amid the
indications of a titanic conflict. The elements of danger
were visible and so were the factors of resistance. Which
side would win ? Would it be the power which had for
centuries been the chief representative of absolute power
in Europe, or would the victory lie with the constitution,
whose strength lay in its great traditions, and which had
grown with the nation, as one of its vital organs, and was
defended by its most powerful instincts ? Only the future
could show.

292

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DO.MINION.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE DOMINION OF
THE HABSBURGS.

The battle of Mohdcs was a turning-point in the his-
tory of Hungary. For many a long year the unity of the
country was destroyed. New dangers raised their heads.
Whereas the nation had formerly been master of its own
fate, foreign influences then grew menacingly powerful
and it became increasingly probable that Hungary would
be subjugated by her ally. New thoughts and feelings
stirred the hearts of men, and religion became a dominant
factor in politics. On the extinction of the line of Arpdd
a succession of dynasties had occupied the throne, but
since Mohacs the crown has remained in the possession of
a single family.

The country lost a vast number of her leading men in
the battle. Never before had death wrought such havoc
in their ranks. Yet the full effects of the defeat did not
manifest themselves immediately. For a time the current
of the nation's life seemed to be running in its old chan-
nels, and men turned to face the future still influenced by
their old ideas and sentiments.

After the death of King Matthias the royal power had
steadily declined, and this decline was attended by a weak-
ening of the nation's life and had a marked effect upon the
events of the sixteenth century. We have seen that dur-
ing the entire period of the Jagello kings the country was
split into two contending parties. After the battle of
Mohacs their conflict was renewed and one of the first
results of the battle was an alteration in the relative

293

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

strengths of the two parties. Before Mohacs the adherents
of the king held the reins of government and the battle
itself was fought chiefly by them. In the array of the
counties, which belonged to the opposite party, there were
many great gaps. Szapolyai, the leader of the opposition,
held aloof with his army from the conflict, and as a conse-
quence, those w^ho fell were nearly all supporters of the
king and the national party became predominant.

This circumstance could not fail to have a decisive
effect upon the nation's future. The defeated royalists
adopted the policy of an Austrian alliance, and a marriage
was brought about which linked the Habsburgs with the
Jagellos.

While Louis II. was a child, a section of the nobility
had wished to choose a Regent from the Habsburg family,
and had endeavoured to pass a law securing to that family
the succession. But the gentry clung enthusiastically to
the idea of a national monarchy. They would have liked
to raise Szapolyai to the throne on the extinction of the
Jagello line, and they passed a law prohibiting the election
of any foreign king.

Thus the first consequence of the battle of Mohdcs
was that the only effective armed force in the land was
in favour of a national monarch.

The future of the nation rested with the national party.
For a time at least no one dared to oppose its decisions.
The only question was w^hether or not that party would
alter its policy. Possibly, if the Turks had remained in
Hungary, taking possession of some part of it, the near-
ness of danger might have driven its leading men to take
some wise steps for their country's safety. But the Sultan
quitted the crushed and humiliated country without troub-
ling to reap the natural consequences of his victory. Like
the hunter who does not pursue the stricken deer, knowing
that it must surely bleed to death, Soliman the Great left
the nation to perish from abandonment to its own worst
impulses and shattered discipline. He knew the Hungar-
ians would easily persuade themselves that peace would

294

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

endure for a time at least, and that their nation was still
capable of maintaining an independent existence. Such
hopes are apt to delude a people. Men are inclined to
believe what they desire, especially during a period of
decay, when petty selfishness reigns supreme. The illu-
sions which had partly caused the disaster of Mohacs,
were not destroyed even by that event. Men either could
not or would not see that their country's very existence
depended on their banishing all petty animosities and
working together for her salvation.

Szapolyai pursued his own selfish purposes. His one
aim was to gain for himself the crown. How different
was John Hunyadi, who, in similar circumstances, after
the battle of Varna, made no attempt to occupy the throne
though to do so would have been easy. All Hunyadi's
efforts were directed to the strengthening of the soul of the
nation, and the maintenance of its unity.

But Szapolyai was no hero. He was not worthy to
unloose the latchet of Hunyadi's shoe. The gravity of the
crisis had no power to induce him to put aside his personal
interests; it served but to increase his ambition. His
country's woes called to life no sense of duty in his breast;
he only saw^ in them an opportunity for his own advance-
ment.

One of the greatest disadvantages of a monarchical or
aristocratic rc^gime is that political power is sometimes con-
ferred by inheritance upon unsuitable men. A man whose
talent is not proportionate to the loftiness of his position,
may easily lose control over his passions and desires.

The excesses even of genius have brought many woes
upon mankind. The vast ambitions of powerful personali-
ties, however, are but natural. They are prompted by
healthy instincts and are in accordance with the sound
principle that merit should attain the first rank. But the
extravagant claims of a small man are unnatural and they
conflict with a nation's interests and with the laws of pro-
gress.

Unfortunately, Szapolyai 's ambition found a power-

295

DEVELOPxMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ful ally in the popular sentiments. The bulk of the nation
contemplated with dread the rule of a foreigner. Many
facts bear witness to the existence of considerable ill-feel-
ing towards the "Germans." This sentiment had been
called to life and fostered by the experience of centuries.
It originated in the strong opposition of the Arpad kings
to the hegemony of the German emperors. Ancient
memories were revived now that, after some centuries,
those same plans were again conceived which had formerly
threatened both the equilibrium of Europe and the inde-
pendence of Hungary. Charles V. followed in the foot-
steps of the old German emperors. Like the Hohenstau-
fens, he too resolved to play a part similar to that of
Charlemagne. The Habsburgs, moreover, had earned for
themselves a sinister reputation in Hungary. Their con-
viction that the country belonged to them by right of in-
heritance, had caused long years of conflict. They were
a source of constant anxiety to the Hungarians, who clung
to the free election of their king as the very foundation of
their liberties. The unhappy reign of Ladislas V., the
unlawful execution of Ladislas Hunyadi, and the cunning
policy of the Emperor Frederick against King Matthias,
had all increased the unpopularity of Hungary's formid-
able neighbour.

These various memories had been crystallised into
short popular sayings, which passed from mouth to mouth
until they were on the lips of the whole people.

Amongst the gentry, the prevalent and all-distorting
party animosity had increased the hatred of foreigners,
especially "Germans," and, above all, of the Habsburgs.

Szapolyai, when convening the Diet, wrote "we can-
not deny the existence of men who, under the pretence of
protecting and saving the country are really seeking to
exterminate the race and its language." He also said that
"the Germans come in order to take revenge."

The nation had already had experience of union with
foreign countries beneath a common crow-n, and had
found therein little advantage. Its kings were often

296

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

occupied with the affairs of their other dominions at a time
when Hungary alone would have furnished a powerful
monarch with work and anxiety enough.

The people felt they had little in common with a
ruler who could not speak their tongue and whose
sympathies and duties were divided amongst several
countries. The one benefit which might have outweighed
these disadvantages, the brotherly help, namely, of the
communities with which they were linked, never accrued
to them. These other nations were never sensible of any
identity of interests and accordingly never gave the Hun-
garians any effective aid. In the glorious wars of John
Hunyadi the allies contributed but a beggarly reinforce-
ment, and at Mohdcs, though the danger threatened all,
no troops from the monarch's other dominions were
present.

The advantages of the alliance were chiefly of a nega-
tive character. Hungary was enabled to live in peace
with its western neighbours. But this did not counter-
balance the positive disadvantages of having a foreign
ruler. Few men give much thought to dangers which,
because they have been avoided, are not very evident, and
the multitudes never.

Thus Szapolyai, with his party, found support in the
power of the sword, in the laws, and in the general senti-
ments of the people, and he was duly elected king in the
very year of the great battle.

The nation dreamed of reviving the glories of the
times of Matthias Hunyadi. Hungary was strong
enough, it was thought, to defend herself without being
organically connected with her neighbours. The pre-
vailing temper was far from being one of resignation or
of submission to the Turks. There was, on the contrary,
a wonderful revival of faith in the country's strength, and
it was to that, more even than to party considerations,
that Szapolyai owed his elevation to the throne. It was
long before such a revival was seen again.

297

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Szapolyai was king, but his mere election had not
changed the political situation very much. The majority
was for him, but by no means the whole nation. The old
court party had not given up hope. Some magnates
living near the Austrian frontier openly declared for a
rival claimant, Ferdinand. Others remained silent, as
open action on their part was dangerous or impossible,
but they quietly waited for an opportunity of getting rid
of the hated Szapolyai and of pursuing their old policy
of an alliance with Austria. Many of the waverers might
doubtless have been won over by a military success or by
a skilful distribution of gifts. Several had joined
Szapolyai under some such influences, and they were
likely to be won back in a similar way by his opponents.
If there had been in Szapolyai one spark of the greatness
which alone could have justified his bold venture, he
would have driven home his success by immediate activity.
The prompt and vigorous use of his power was the only
method by which he might have hoped to gain the adhe-
sion of the whole nation and to compel Ferdinand to
abandon his claims.

Had he convinced the Habsburgs of his desire to be
their ally and his ability to defend his frontiers against
the Turks, and had he by his vigorous measures inspired
them with fear, the Austrians would probably have post-
poned the execution of their plans.

That was a critical time for the Habsburgs. Vast
prospects opened out before them, but for that very reason
they were beset with grave dangers.

The problem facing them was — should they embark
on a new enterprise and lay claim to the Hungarian
crown at a time when serious difficulties might assail them
from other quarters, and if they were able to maintain
their proud pre-eminence without the additional strength
which that crown would bring?

In the course of a comparatively short time the Habs-
burgs had become the foremost dynasty in the world.
Formerly they had owed their importance to the dubious

298

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

results of the imperial elections, but since the imperial
title brought them little real power, they determined to
increase their territorial possessions. Charles V., the
head of the family, had control of vast resources. Spain
and Naples made him the first power in southern Europe.
In the north-west, the great wealth and central situation
of the Netherlands which he had inherited, enabled him
to threaten England, France, and the German Empire.
On the sea, and in the then recently discovered New
World, no Christian monarch could rival him. Shortly
before the battle of Mohacs he had brought to a successful
issue a war with France, as a consequence of which he
was very near gaining the whole of Burgundy, as the
French king, who became his prisoner, promised to cede
it to him. If Charles had once obtained Burgundy, his
hand could have reached from Spain, across Italy and
Burgundy, to the Netherlands, and the almost unbroken
line of his empire would have shut in France, separating
her from Germany.

What would have become of the equilibrium of
Europe, and of the ancient rights of the German Empire,
and the independence of some of its constituent parts, if
to this powerful group of states, dominating the south and
west of Europe, there had been added Hungary and
Bohemia? But this gigantic power was not yet suffi-
ciently consolidated, and its threatening aspect roused
those whom it menaced to activity.

The imperial family played the part of claimant in
nearly every part of the world, but it was met everywhere
with stubborn opposition. An empire's greatness usually
stands in proportion to the number of its jealous foes.
Even before the Hungarian throne of the Jagellos became
vacant, there had been a confederacy against the Habs-
burgs.

In 1526 the French king, on acquiring his liberty,
broke his promise to Charles, and formed an alliance at
Cognac with the Pope and with Venice. England also
left the party of the Emperor. Between these powers and

299

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Szapolyai there was a community of interests, and had he
made a vigorous attack upon the Habsburgs and besought
the members of the league of Cognac to aid him, he
might have been successful. But he did not do this. At
first he appears to have trusted to persuasion and fine
speeches. He endeavoured to win the friendship of the
Habsburgs and spoke of the interests of Christianity,
which forbade a Catholic monarch to attack Hungary
while she was fighting against the Turks. The Habs-
burgs placed no confidence in Szapolyai, however,
for they saw that he would sooner or later join the ranks
of their enemies.

Szapolyai then began to negotiate with the emperor's
foes, but he could not prevail upon them to turn their
arms towards the east. The Duke of Bavaria, it is true,
wished to dispute the right of Ferdinand to the crown
of Bohemia, but he was powerless to influence the elec-
tion. Szapolyai was too weak for his allies to respect
his interests or comply with his wishes. It happened
then, as it happened afterwards during the w^ars of
Rak6czy, and later still, in the time of Kossuth, that the
powers wished to make use of Hungary but were not
ready to go out of their way to help her. She was not
important enough in their eyes to modify their policy.
Her stronger allies would take no part in her struggles,
but they expected her to aid them in theirs. They made
sure of Hungary's help against Austria, but would not
defend her.

Szapolyai did not himself take the offensive. Fer-
dinand, accordingly, first gained the crown of Bohemia,
and thus strengthened proceeded to win that of Hungary.
In the year 1527, after a very little fighting, he achieved
his aim.

As the actual occupation had been preceded by cor-
ruption and armed conflict, there were many who thought
that to these alone the Habsburgs owed their success.
The nation, they believed, wanted Szapolyai as king, and

300

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

the sudden change in the situation was due to the selfish-
ness of some, and the cowardice of the majority.

This, however, was not the case. Hungary was not
a conquered kingdom and Ferdinand did not owe his
throne to violence.

Ferdinand's enterprise was the carrying out of an old
plan, at length made feasible by the turn of events.
Directly it was seen that Szapolyai made no use of his
opportunities the outlook became more promising for
those whose way had been made easy by a train of
historical events.

Those countries the possession of which Ferdinand
had coveted, had previously been beneath the sceptre of
one common ruler. Their gravitation towards one
another was no chance impulse, but finds its explanation
in the fact that they were neighbours, with very little of a
natural frontier between them. Consequently it was the
ruler now of this country, and now of the other, who tried
to take possession of the sister country, in which he would
have found little difficulty in creating a party and in
exercising the functions of a monarch.

There were other interests, too, which fostered the
tendency towards union. When a state is in constant
danger from another, it becomes very desirable to ensure
peace. It seeks an alliance, and if possible a legal union
with its neighbour, as the most efficient means of doing
this. The case was thus in the relations of the Habs-
burgs with Hungary.

The energy of the dynasty being absorbed by vital
problems in very different parts of Europe, it became in-
dispensable that they should live at peace with Hungary.
That kingdom was larger and more important than their
own hereditary provinces. Had there been any friction
between Hungary and themselves they would not have
been able to employ their possessions in strengthening
the position of the Emperor, but would have had to ask
for help from the "Holy Roman Empire," so that instead

301

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of increasing their imperial power by means of their
family property, the need of defending this would have
brought them under the power of the Estates.

This is why the Habsburgs had yearned for the
throne of Hungary since the time of Albert I. This, too,
explains the intrigues of the Emperor Frederick against
King Matthias. Hungary threatened the future of the
Habsburgs.

Hungary, on the other hand, was prompted by simi-
lar instincts. Since the danger of the Turk had grown
so threatening, the need of establishing peace on the
western frontier had been universally felt. It was for this
reason that the Hungarians accepted Ladislas V. as king,
and it was possibly the same consideration which
strengthened the ambition of King Matthias when he
endeavoured to conquer Bohemia and Austria. His ulti-
mate aim may have been to establish peace on the west,
as a preliminary to a final settlement with the Turks. If
this was his aim he was disappointed, for, like the
Emperor Frederick, he too had overestimated his strength,
and failed in his attempt to conquer Austria and then
turn his arms against the Turks.

During the period of the Jagellos, Hungary and
Austria were dependent upon one another's efforts and
this circumstance led to the adoption of a more wholesome
policy. Neither of the two neighbours wished to conquer
the other, and it was by means of a political alliance and
contracts regulating the succession that they endeavoured
to ensure present peace, and constant co-operation in the
future. Unfortunately, the day of this saner policy
dawned too late, for Hungary had not sufficient strength
left to make a profitable use in the east of the peace which
she enjoyed on the west.

In this same period a fresh interest linked the two
countries to one another. The Turks had become their
common foe. The Sultan Soliman was at that time the
rival even of Charles V. on the Mediterranean. The
greatest Christian monarch and the leading Mussulman

302

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

power could not exist peacefully side by side in Europe,
for their interests clashed at all points. Across the weak-
ened body of Hungary the hereditary dominions of the
Habsburgs felt the devastating effects of the terrible
Turkish wars. The security of Austria depended upon
the resistance of the Croatian territories, and the Jagellos
were so weak that they were glad when Ferdinand occu-
pied the fronti'er fortress.

Thus are prepared the great transformations of his-
tory. Great interests, and the ambitions they arouse,
w'ork towards certain defined aims, the organisation or
annihilation of empires. For a long time they have little
apparent result, but the labour is not lost for it lays the
foundations of the future.

When the time is ripe for some enterprise, its success
is the more easy and enduring if it is the harvest of a
series of efforts, rather than the lucky result of a single
attempt.

When the disastrous battle of Mohacs put an end to
the rule of the Jagellos, the Habsburgs saw at length
some result of their efforts. It must be remembered that
they had for their claims a certain basis of legal right,
furnished by the dynastical contracts. Moreover,
they had in Hungary a party, including most
of the magnates, which was devoted to their interests
and looked for some reward for old services, and which
hated Szapolyai. But, more important still, the interests
which linked Hungary with her neighbours and which
had powerfully influenced the trend of events in the past,
were becoming more and more vital. The great problem
which faced the Habsburgs has already been mentioned.

Situated as they were it would have been fatal to
them if the kingdom of their allies, the }agellos, had
become the possession of an enemy. The Sultan, in alli-
ance with the King of France, could easily have arrested
the growth of their power, by a protectorate over Hun-
gary. The German empire of the Austrian house could
never have become strong had not the Hungarian shield

803

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

warded off the Turkish sword. Only on that condition
could the Habsburgs count on maintaining their position
in Europe. Had the war between the Christian and the
Mohammedan worlds been waged on the Austrian fron-
tier, the imperial family could not have retained their pre-
eminence. They must have ceased from the pursuit of
their great aims, and have spent their strength in defen-
sive wars. The east would have monopolised their atten-
tion and their efforts. It was in the direction of the west
that all their ambitions lay, as they were fighting for
Italy and Germany, and it was necessary therefore to
bind Hungary to the Austrian Empire. To this end there
was but one sure means, the direct rule over that country.

In Hungary also, powerful interests demanded a
union with Austria. What had been merely desirable
while her frontier fortresses were intact, and the wars
against the Turks were chiefly waged outside her borders,
and while the strength of the nation was sufficient to
inspire respect and to grapple with the Moslem giant,
now, when all this had been changed, had become indis-
pensable.

The Turks, after their victory, reserved Hungary for
themselves, and the final reckoning was still to come.
The Hungarians could never prepare for this danger if
at the same time they had to defend themselves against a
western foe. On the contrary, not merely the neutrality,
but the positive help of Austria was necessary.

Sometimes a nation unexpectedly displays the most
admirable heroism. The perception of danger nerves it
to such a degree that it is able to stand when by all human
calculation it should fall. But the man who leads his
country into a desperate situation without real necessity is
responsible for a grave crime. He is no lover of his
fatherland who lightly endangers its safety. True hero-
ism is shown not in courting danger, but in facing it when
it threatens in spite of the utmost prudence.

Who can say whether or not Hungary would have
fallen before the Turks, even if she had received no out-

304

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

side assistance? Nevertheless, her position was so diffi-
cult and she was so much weaker than the Turks that it
was her manifest duty to seek for some support. The
European equiHbrium, the peace of central Europe, the
interests of the neighbouring German states and the
safety of Hungary, demanded that a new power should
arise against the Turks, on the eastern frontier of the civil-
ised world, and accomplish the great task which for cen-
turies the Hungarian nation had performed alone.

Of such a power the natural nucleus was the Habs-
burg family. With such a king as Szapolyai, whose
origin was as great an impediment to his authority as
was his impotence, Hungary could never draw to her aid
the neighbouring countries of the sacred empire. Poor
Szapolyai was not the man to alter the political map of
Europe, and the nation, stricken by so many adversities,
was not in a condition to achieve what it had failed of
accomplishing even in more prosperous times, to extend
its borders, namely, towards the west. Had the league of
Cognac been victorious; if the allies had been able to
procure the Bohemian and Moravian crown for the
Bavarian prince, and to conquer the hereditary Austrian
dominions, the great task of creating a power for the
defence of eastern Europe which events had rendered
necessary, could have been accomplished without the help
of the Habsburgs, and even in opposition to them. But
directly the position of the Habsburgs was strengthened
by the accession of one part of the inheritance of the
Jagellos, that family became the only likely organiser of
the force which was to be the eastern bulwark of Europe.

Thus many powerful interests favoured Ferdinand's
enterprise, and a great part of the Hungarian nation
appreciated those interests. After so great a blow as that
which the Hungarians suffered at Mohacs, it usually takes
a nation some time to see its way and to make a new
start, especially if the country is not blest with a great
man during the crisis.

305

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Philosophers do not agree in attaching to great men
the importance conceded to them by public opinion. It is
true that they cannot perform miracles and their action is
paralysed if in the nation itself there is no virtue, but their
influence is nevertheless immense. Mediocrity may, of
course, sometimes hit upon the right way, but only slowly
and after much bitter experience. But to discern
infallibly, at a moment of great peril, the right
course amidst an entangled network of new and un-
foreseen circumstances, to steer clear of the danger and
to select the sure means to a desired end, is given but to
great minds. Without great men a nation's course is
erratic and hesitating, even when, with proper guidance,
it would be capable of achieving great things. Those
who deny the importance of the individual urge that the
age itself creates the man it needs, that if some particular
great man had not stepped forward to play his role
another would have done so, and that if one hero had
fallen his place would at once have been taken by another.

Would indeed that it were so! When has the Hun-
garian nation stood in sorer need of wise leaders than
before the battle of Mohacs, when disaster might have
been averted, or after it, when genius might have healed
the country's wounds and prevented one day's misfor-
tune from throwing it back centuries? Yet the right
man was nowhere to be found. When could the
eyes of the people have more easily detected genius than
during that epoch, when the nation was wrestling with
fatal misfortunes, and the minds of all men, accustomed
as they were to autonomy, were concentra^ted on the ques-
tion of national existence, when the interests of every
individual were bound up with those of his country and
when adversity had stirred profoundly the heart of every
patriot ?

Vitality was not lacking. The fact that Hungary
had preserved her life in spite of all the buffets of fortune,
and also the events of later times, alike show that the race
was not weak or enervated.

306

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

It was an able and vigorous people that battled with
destruction. Such situations are calculated to create great
men, yet no saviour appeared.

A great man is a rare gift of Providence. Mortals
simply do not know what influences create and mould him.

After the battle of Mohacs Hungary had no worthy
leader. The people were like sheep without a shepherd
and knew not which way to take. The first impulse drove
them into the arms of Szapolyai. Some joined him from
deliberate conviction, others from selfish motives, but
the majority were guided by their unreasoning senti-
ments. One of their dominant feelings was, as we have
seen, mistrust of the Germans, and another was fear of
a foreigner's ill-will. These anxieties, however, were
relieved by the promises of Ferdinand. Though his
house claimed the throne as a right, he appealed to the
people for his election, for he was well aware that he
could not achieve his aim by conquest, but must win the
nation's good-will. Accordingly he confirmed the people
in their rights and liberties. His promises did not pro-
ceed from generosity but from a perception of the fact
that without them he could never become the ruler of
Hungary. Public opinion would never have supported
him had the nation feared for its liberty.

One of the motives which had induced the majority
to support Szapolyai was devotion to the idea of a national
monarchy, but even this was not powerful enough to
brace them for a persistent struggle. With the exception
of Matthias the rulers of Hungary had been foreigners
for some centuries, and the nation was more or less recon-
ciled to the situation. It is true that the people did not
like the rule of foreigners, but their antipathy had not
become such an ardent passion as to drive them to danger-
ous courses.

Even during the days of its strength, before it had
felt the benumbing influence of a great catastrophe, the

307

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

country was not disposed to embark on a risky enter-
prise for the sake of a king of Hungarian blood. Only
once did the Hungarians risk everything in war for the
sake of their king, but then it was the glorious name of
Hunyadi that summoned them to the battlefield.

After the battle of Mohacs the idea of a national king
aided Szapolyai, but it could not allay the anxieties
of patriots or hinder the calculations of the selfish. The
personality of Szapolyai had no power to inspire any
enthusiasm. When the people elected him king, it was
partly because they hoped he would avert the danger from
their western neighbour and establish peace with Austria,
and partly because they believed that the great European
coalition against Charles V. would crush the Habsburgs.

But in 1527 they saw clearly that they were left with-
out help and that the most powerful Christian monarch
would attack their western frontier at the very time that
the Turks were threatening them on the east. This truth
was plain and weighty and could be easily perceived by
all.

When Ferdinand marched against Hungary, the
nation realised that it would be endangering its very exist-
ence if it persisted in the demand for a national monarchy.
One of the reasons for choosing Szapolyai had been that
he was the only man with an armed force at his disposal,
but this was all changed by the arrival of the Austrian
army.

Szapolyai was not able to come to any terms with
the Turks either. In common with the whole nation he
pursued the traditional Christian policy, and desired to
be at peace with his western neighbours. As soon, there-
fore, as he was attacked by the Habsburgs his position
became an impossible one. Hungary could not support
a simultaneous attack from all sides, and when the people
saw that Austria would not leave them unhampered to
repel the Turkish onset, all confidence in the Szapolyai

308

FOUNDATION OF HABSBURG DOMINION.

regime was annihilated. The policy of Matthias was
destroyed together with its illusions. That section of the
nation which favoured a legal union with Austria grew
bolder and more energetic. Even those who still clung
to the idea of a national monarchy, and would not give
their support to Ferdinand, in spite of their antipathy to
Szapolyai and the pecuniary and other gifts of the Habs-
burgs, felt that the disunited, humiliated and conquered
nation could not long hold out against the united pressure
of east and west. Why risk life and fortune in a cause
which was doomed to fail ?

It was not the force of German arms which overcame
the Hungarian resistance. The truth is that there was no
serious resistance, for public opinion had veered round.
The only effect of the invasion was to direct the eyes of
the whole nation upon the most formidable power in the
west, a power great enough to threaten the equilibrium of
Europe, and to drive home the conviction that Hungary
would find in that power a constant foe, unless she averted
the danger by becoming its ally.

The bulk of the nation, which had often changed sides
even before the battle of ^^lohacs, changed once again,
and abandoning Szapolyai, joined the army of Ferdinand.

So long as the political situation favoured the national
party, and old illusions remained, the people supported
Szapolyai, but with the change in the aspect of affairs
public opinion changed too. The desperate condition of
Hungary convinced all men of the need for a constant
and intimate union with their powerful western neighbour.

Ferdinand, accordingly (1527-1564), became master
of the country without encountering any strenuous resist-
ance, and thus the Habsburg family achieved their long
cherished aim. Their eastern dominions, Austria and
Bohemia, were completed by the accession of a new king-
dom, and the conditions of a new European great power
were fulfilled. The first step had been taken towards the

309

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

creation of a new and powerful bulwark of Christendom
towards the east. But it was but one step. The question
still remained — would the work of the Habsburgs prove
solid and lasting ? That depended chiefly upon the Habs-
burgs themselves.

310

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY-

CHAPTER XVI

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

The career of Szapolyai, and with it the fate of
Hungary, reached a critical point. So far Szapolyai had
declared himself one in his aims with Christendom. He
spoke of the war to be waged against the Turks, and
believed that Europe would be content if he were to defend
its frontiers. As soon as he was disappointed in this
respect, only two ways were open to him ; either he must
abdicate or else form an alliance with the Turks. It was
impossible for him to contend with both Ferdinand and
Soliman, and if he fought Ferdinand he must gain Soli-
man as an ally. Two Hungarian kings fighting each
other, and yet pursuing an identical policy, would have
been an absurd situation. Szapolyai could not
adopt the policy of an alliance with the west
against Ferdinand, who was necessary as a help
against the Turks. That part of the nation which
looked to the west for aid had to join Ferdinand,
whether they liked it or not, directly he drew the
sword to enforce his claims upon Hungary. No course
remained for Szapolyai, therefore, but to come to terms
with the Turks, and for this course he was the only suitable
man. The Habsburgs might temporarily bend before the
Sultan, or maintain peace with him, but directly they came
into close touch with one another, clashing was inevitable.
The Habsburgs aimed at being the leaders of Christen-
dom ; how then could they bow before a successor of Mo-
hammed ? The '' Roman Kings " could not acquiesce in
the supremacy of Constantinople. They might indeed
admit for a time the supremacy of the Sultan so far as

311

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Hungary was concerned, because fate seemed to decree it,
but they could not surrender the independence of their
other territories without striking a blow. Germany was
far from the Turkish Empire and was strong enough to
oppose it.

The Sultan, on the other hand, would never have been
satisfied with a theoretical protectorate over Hungary if he
had to respect the independence of the other Habsburg
dominions. To do this would have meant the abandon-
ment of all thoughts of expansion in Europe, a policy not
at all acceptable to the prophet's successors. Their in-
stinct uas to conquer, and their final aim was Rome and
Germany. They could endure no other great powder in
proximity to the Sultan's empire. It w^as possible to
tolerate the existence of the more modest realm of Szapol-
yai. He would be content to receive his crown and all his
authority from the Sultan; he would become the Sultan's
vassal and adapt his policy to that of his overlord. The
Sultan could safely leave him in possession of his throne
without abandoning his own plans of conquest. The seg-
ment of Hungary over which Szapolyai ruled was not
necessarily an obstacle in the way of the Turkish advance,
but on the contrary was a base of operations. The recog-
nition of Ferdinand's rule in Hungary, and the conclusion
of peace with him would have put an end to Turkish con-
quest, whereas the rule of Szapolyai opened the w^ay for it.

Szapolyai desired to remain king, and seeing that the
only way to avoid being exiled, or becoming a mere sub-
ject, was to contract a Turkish alliance, he resolved to pur-
sue that policy. It is easy to understand that of the two
alternatives, annihilation or a crown, he should choose the
latter, but he risked losing the esteem of posterity by pur-
suing a policy which would only have been justifiable if
the interests of the nation had necessitated it.

This action on the part of King John Szapolyai
marked a turning point in the history of Hungary. The
idea of an alliance with the east, so entirely opposed to all
traditions, gained ground. Till then two kings had been

312

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

contending for the crown, but both of them stood on the
same basis. Then, however, after the victories of Fer-
dinand, Szapolyai struck out a new course, and set up the
poHcy of submission to the east as a rival of the policy of
alliance with the west. Fate once more confronted the
nation with a grave problem. The nation had to choose
not merely between rival dynasties, but between the con-
tending powers of the east and the w^est.

If the Habsburgs had managed to display sufficient
energy, the bulk of the nation would have sided with
them. The great desire of the nation was to regain that
position among the European countries which it had
occupied for centuries, and to which its traditions entitled
it. Every one felt keenly the humiliation of the country,
and remembered the glorious age of King Matthias. The
memories of that age made the darkness of the present age
still more sombre. The remembrance of the heroes who
had died fighting the pagans was like a protestation
against the new tendency. Also an alliance with the Turks
jarred on the people's Christian feelings. Hungary natur-
ally belonged to the west by its history, its civilisation, and
its faith.

In addition to all this, there was the infinitely painful
remembrance of the battle of Mohacs. How great was
the grief and humiliation and suffering endured at the
hands of the Turks which kept alive in the Hungarians the
desire to free themselves entirely from the danger of
Turkish invasion. How many valuable centres of the
nation's civilisation, and how much wealth had been des-
troyed by the Turks, and how great s.till was the danger.
Throughout the w^hole country no one could go to sleep
without fearing that he might wake amid the cries and
lamentations of his family being massacred by the Turks,
or that the dawn of a new day might be darkened by the
smoke rising from his ruined home.

The most powerful instincts of the people impelled
them to endeavour to free themselves from their terrible
situation. All that they looked for from their king was

313

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

that he should realise his vocation as their defender. If
the Habsburgs had fulfilled their expectations the cause of
Szapolyai would have been lost, and the nation would have
joined with enthusiasm the army which undertook the
defence of Hungary's integrity, of Christianity, of the
prestige of the Hungarian name, of the honour of Hun-
gary's women, the life and freedom of its inhabitants, its
wealth, and the homes of its people. As it happened,
however, events which occurred in other parts of Europe
gave a different direction to the course of development in
Hungary. The Habsburgs did not fulfil the expectations
of the people, and as a result of this disappointment the
country split into two parts at a time when it was above all
things necessary that the nation should be united beneath
the Habsburg sceptre.

The Habsburgs had the chance of becoming entirely
one with the nation, but through their own fault there
originated in Eastern Hungary a movement against them
which was destined to play a great part in the defence of
Hungarian liberty.

This result was brought about as follows. Charles
V. was the greatest ruler of the Habsburg line, and his
fortune decided the lot of all the Habsburgs in the
sixteenth century. He was not king of Hungary, yet his
influence was greater than that of the country's actual
ruler. His power and his successes were the convincing
arguments which persuaded the Hungarians to elect a
Habsburg as their king. When they raised Ferdinand to
the throne (1527), they did so because they hoped to gain
the support of Charles V. Ferdinand always called his
brother his '* royal liege." His fate, and consequently
the nation's fate as well, depended upon that of Charles.

The power of Charles V., however, seemed greater
than it really was. His empire had been built up by the
inheritance of various territories, and not by great state-
building achievements, and there were great contrasts
within it. In Spain, only Catholic rule was possible, for
the blaze of the auto-da-fe made any Protestant tendency

314

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

impossible. Religious fanaticism was stronger than the
autocratic monarch himself. On the other hand, Ger-
many and the Netherlands leaned naturally towards the
Reformation. The two great powers whose strife was to
last for centuries, joined battle during the reign of Charles
V. The realms of Torquemada and Luther were united
beneath a common ruler. In one of these dominions
Charles was almost an absolute monarch, while in the
other his power was checked by important rights. Beneath
his supremacy there were countries independently
governed, as well as powerful princes and self-governing
towns. Whatever policy he adopted, Spanish or German,
he could not avoid coming into conflict with the sentiments
of one or other of the two realms. Moreover, he was sur-
rounded by powerful enemies. In the west he was
threatened by France, which had lately been welded toge-
ther by its kings, and which, in the consciousness of its
strength, determined to increase its territory. Francis I.,
King of France, was also prompted by a desire to measure
his strength against that of Charles V., and so the
struggle for the hegemony of Europe commenced between
France and the Habsburgs. On the east, the Sultan, the
ally of France, threatened the empire of the west. All
Europe was powerfully interested in the eastern problem,
from whose dangers it had till then been saved by the part
which Hungary had played. This made the matter very
complicated. England, the Pope, and the Italian powers,
moved to and fro between the two camps, and were alter-
nately allies and enemies. The personality of Charles did
not tend to make the situation, difficult in itself, any easier.
That monarch, who had inherited a throne upon which
in former times the leaders of Christendom had sat, and
who possessed great dominions in all parts of the world,
aimed at restoring the imperialism of Charlemagne. Be-
tween the age of Charlemagne and that of Napoleon there
was perhaps no ruler with greater ambition than the frail
looking Charles. By this aim of his he created new diffi-
culties. The spirit of the age had attacked all the great

315

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

authorities of earlier times. It had just made its onslaught
upon the papacy at the very time when Charles was
dreaming of the restoration of a dignity the day for which
had gone by. He wished to make the Emperor the centre
of Germany and of the Christian world, although for cen-
turies Germany had shown a centrifugal tendency, while
in other parts of Europe great and independent powers had
been establishing themselves.

Although in the prosecution of his plans Charles was
cool and calculating, yet his boundless ambitions were
injurious to him, for his contemporaries discerned the
dangerous nature of his aims. In spite of the fact that he
united a strong practical sense with his fertile imagination,
and never undertook any task which was out of proportion
to his strength, and that he always displayed patience and
craftiness, yet the difficulty lay in his wishing to assert
his will in so many matters that he was certain to be
crushed beneath the weight of all his tasks and the power
of his various enemies. His very end was characteristic
of the man. The keen statesman saw that he could not
achieve his aim, so he did not attempt to force fate, but
his plans were so entirely part of himself that when he
found he could no longer battle for them he considered
his life useless. Rank, power, fame, had no value in his
eyes when he saw that they could not enable him to realise
his ideals, so abandoning all he retired into a monastery.

For a long time Charles was entirely successful. With
great skill he divided the power of his enemies in such a
way that he could always overcome them. In religious
matters he pursued the policy of toleration, and although
that did not entirely satisfy either party, yet neither rose
against him and often both parties helped him against the
French and the Turks. The most important circumstance
in its bearing upon Hungary was that he frequently turned
his weapons against the French.

The power and prestige of Francis prevented Charles
from becoming the indisputably first ruler in the Christian
world and from restoring the outward glory of the empire

316

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

and its supremacy in Italy. Francis could count upon
allies even in Germany, so that Charles saw that unless
he crushed the power of Francis he was not safe even in
his own realm. At times Charles waged war against the
Mussulmans, but unfortunately for Hungary he sought
a barren glory on the coasts of Africa instead of aiming a
decisive blow at the Turkish power on the banks of the
Danube. Not that the importance of doing this escaped
his notice, for on the contrary it occupied his thoughts
frequently and seriously. In the year 1544, under the
walls of Paris, he planned a Turkish campaign. The
French king promised assistance to his victorious adver-
sary. Charles was to become the champion of Christianity
against the infidel, and resemble Charles Martel, who had
stayed the advance of Mohammedanism. If the event
had realised this expectation Hungary would certainly
have joined Charles and would have freed herself from the
Turkish yoke. The whole subsequent history of the coun-
try might then have been entirely different. But events
just then took an unpleasant turn. The religious problem
became urgent.

So far Charles had contemplated the spread of the
reformed faith in a spirit of toleration, not because he be-
lieved it to be both wrong and dangerous to interfere with
religious convictions, but merely because his situation did
not render interference necessary. Gradually, however,
he came to see that the whole conception of his empire
would be shattered if the unity of Christendom were dis-
turbed. As the secular head of the Christian world he
had to indicate tlie path which the two contending parties
must walk. He wished to compel the Catholic church to
admit such innovations as would have pacified the protest-
ants, and he tried to restore the character of the religious
movement as a movement for reform of the church, where-
as it had become a breaking away. The Pope had long
refused to summon a reforming synod, but at last, in the
year 1545, Charles made his will prevail even in this
matter. The Council of Trent commenced its activity just

317

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

when Charles had brought to a successful termination his
war with France. If the Protestants had taken part in the
Council, as Charles had asked them, the I^mperor might
have been able to turn his attention to the Turks, but they
knew quite well that the Catholic hierarchy would come to
a decision unfavorable to them. They did not believe that
the Council would really permit free discussion. Charles
had to compel them by force to make concessions, but he
was obliged to see that during the period of toleration the
Protestants had increased considerably in power.

The Turkish campaign had to be postponed. Charles
had not abandoned his purpose but affairs in liis own realm
were pressing. The Habsburgs wished to perform
what they had promised to Hungary and they intended to
turn their arms against the Turks, but in their vast
empire they have often been confronted by more urgent
duties. What for Hungary was the one vital interest was
for the Habsburgs but one of many. A few years before
the events just mentioned Henry VIII. had imposed a
new faith upon his people and most of them had acqui-
esced in it. Was it possible for Charles to achieve a
similar result? Hardly. When Henry interfered with
the religious affairs of England, the authority of the Pope
in that country had been shaken although the national
antipathy to Rome had not yet become a dogmatic system.

Henry could direct the movement, but he had not to
alter strong and settled convictions. Charles, however,
would have had to eradicate a faith deeply rooted in the
souls of his people, while the English king, in breaking
away from Rome, was supported by public opinion.
Another advantage for Henry lay in his only having to
concern himself with the dwellers in his island kingdom,
whereas Charles had to reckon with the whole of Christian
Europe. He had to persuade both the Catholic world,
which felt itself strong in the possession of absolute truth,
and also the adherents of the new faith, w^ho had their own
dogmas concerning salvation, two powers that were abso-
lutely hostile to one another. Even Henry's victory

318

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

uas not complete. Protestantism indeed spread through-
out his dominions, but the old creed showed such vitality
that he was unable to establish religious uniformity.

Charles could accomplish still less than Henry. His
method was impracticable but it could only have been
conceived by an uncommon mind. Amidst the contention
of great historical powers he sought to follow an indepen-
dent line of action. Had he succeeded he would have
saved Europe much suffering and interminable strife.

Outward success was not lacking. He divided the
forces of the Protestants and conquered them, but the
religious concordat was as far off as ever and the plan he
prepared was not accepted by the Pope. His victory over
the Protestants at Miihlbach added a lustre to the
Emperor's name greater than it had known before. From
a religious point of view the victory did not bring the
result desired, but it enabled Charles to make an import-
ant political advance and to dream of governing the Ger-
man Empire in accordance with the Spanish system.

But in great enterprises the final step is often the
most difficult, and this was the case in the present instance.
Those whom Charles had so often employed as tools
joined forces against him. They saw that if he were not
checked he would crush them all. France, as well as the
(jerman princes and privileged classes, the Protestants
and the Pope, all turned against him, and the exhausted
old Emperor was overcome by his foes and the fruit of
all his efforts was destroyed. With him came to an end
the power under whose protection Hungary had placed
itself. The great empire was divided without having
fulfilled the heart's desire of the Hungarians of an advance
against the Turks.

Ferdinand, the king of Hungary, depended for his
power and success entirely upon Charles. He was really
a kind of German viceroy in Hungary, and could not
pursue either a Hungarian or an Austrian policy, but one
dictated by international considerations.

The ascent of Ferdinand to the throne of the empire

319

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

might have been expected to usher in better times for
Hungary, but it did not do so for his power was really-
diminished and he had less time than before for Hun-
garian affairs. In the division of the dominions of Charles
V. the burdens were .more equally divided than the pos-
sessions. The elements of real power remained in the
hands of the branch which inherited Spain. The most
loyal people of the whole empire, and that which fur-
nished the finest soldiers of the period, fell to the share
of Philip II., as did also the transatlantic mines, men and
money, those two great factors of power.

Ferdinand's legacy was less valuable. The title of
Emperor which he gained was a dangerous dignity. In
the past several great dynasties had been exhausted by
the duties expected of them, but although much was de-
manded from the emperors their actual rights and powers
were not very great. One of the strongest nations in
Europe expected its ruler to play the leading part in
Christendom and to unfurl the banners of the Sacred
Empire in Italy, but it did not grant him real preroga-
tives. Charles V. had tried to alter this and to make the
ruler of the Germans their real master, but he had failed.
Towards the end of his life the princes triumphed over
him, and the empire was split into hostile factions.

There is no hatred so terrible as that of rival religion-
ists. Political animosity may be tempered by the know-
ledge that its exaggeration is a crime against God and
man, but what can set a limit to the ferocity of men when
the very representatives of religion fan the flame in them
and foster in them the belief that the persecution of an-
other faith is pleasing to God.

This madness was tearing Germany to pieces and the
Emperor had to face the colossal task of holding the
empire together. In addition to the German empire,
Ferdinand had Hungary on his hands, and in that country
also much required to be done in order to restore it to its
former importance. The emperor-king took an oath that
he would defend the country's borders and reconquer the

320

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

provinces which had originally belonged to it. Yet the
very capital of Hungary, together with the greater part of
the country, was in the hands of the enemy. Like the
Emperor's crown, that of St. Stephen also brought a
great title to its wearer, but little real power. The situa-
tion in the Austrian provinces and in Bohemia was not
such as to give much support to the monarch. There also
religious animosity prevailed and divided the people into
hostile parties. The rights of the privileged classes also
checked the emperor in his actions.

The Austrian provinces, resembling a mosaic in their
manifold organisations derived from the ^Middle Ages,
formed but a weak foundation for a great power. So did
the kingdom of Bohemia, which was also divided into
factions, although it possessed national traditions and
rights.

If the Emperor was in need of aid he had to discuss
the matter with the nobles of each of his provinces. Be-
sides the German empire and Hungary, there were twelve
other powers whose consent had to be obtained, and in
such cases it was not merely the indifference of the privi-
leged classes which had to be faced, but also, since the
Reformation, the marked ill-will of the majority of them.
It was difficult to obtain the imposition of a tax, yet the
grandeur of the Court entailed enormous expense. The
ordinary income of the crown yielded by property and
tolls did not meet the ordinary expenditure.

This precarious financial situation increased the mon-
arch's difficulties, and since the crisis which put an end
to the vast ambitions of Charles V., the German branch
of the Habsburgs lost his ability to take the offensive in
consequence of its diminishing power, and the many cares
and manifold duties claiming its time, and restricted itself
to a defensive policy. Nor did it seek to take the lead in
dealing with the problems of the age. It was obliged to
leave religious matters in the state in which they found
themselves after the victory of the Protestants in 1555.

321

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The dynasty could not obliterate the effects of that defeat.
The very tolerance shown by the Habsburgs was a sign
of their weakness. r>rdinand and Maximilian oscillated
between the two religious parties although with somewhat
different personal sympathies, and their chief aim was to
maintain internal peace. In Rome and Trent it was with-
out their co-operation that the terrible events of the future
were prepared.

The weakness of the Habsburgs was bound to make
itself felt in Hungary. The great war of deliverance from
the Turks, which would have brought the nation enthusi-
astically to their side, had to be postponed. Their exist-
ence did not depend upon whether they possessed the
whole of Hungary or not. So long as the western portion
of the country was theirs to serve as a bulwark of their
German empire, the foundations of their power were safe..

That was why they tried to avoid any decisive contest,
for the possible loss seemed greater than the gain.

Their interests did not demand more than that the
Hungarian fortresses defending the German frontiers
should remain in Christian hands, and they saw no suffi-
cient reason for straining their strength in an attempt to
retake those parts of Hungary which were occupied by
the Turks. Hungary had had several weak kings; several
of her kings had been foreigners, but all alike had thrown
themselves into the work of defending the country. Now
for the first time, when Ferdinand ascended the throne,
the nation had to encounter grave perils without their
ruler, their professed defender, rendering them any assist-
ance. Ferdinand had originally made a favorable impres-
sion upon the nation. He appeared to possess much
goodwill towards Hungary, and to be a man superior
to Szapolyai, more thoughful and energetic. Unfortu-
nately he did not understand the Hungarian language,
and the nation felt considerable antipathy to his
family, and it w^as not surprising that his first popularity
soon vanished when the people, who had only accepted

322

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

him as ruler because of the assistance they expected of
him, found that he disappointed all their expectations,
that he was never one in sentiment with them and that he
was busy with other matters at a time when Hungary's
very existence was in danger.

Ferdinand was the first Hungarian king who seemed
to have more important aims than the preservation of
Hungary. The sad issue of the first Turkish w^ar (1529)
w^hen the enemy marched up to the very walls of Vienna,
Ferdinand offering but a half-hearted resistance, turned
the favour of many towards John Szapolyai.

The nation could not but doubt either the goodwill
or the power of its ruler. The executive Council itself
expressed its criticism in the sentence : '' Hungary cannot
expect deliverance from Prague."

The nobles complained bitterly. "Whal your Majesty
may have achieved during the past four years is unknown
to us, but we know that the country has not enjoyed any
fruits of your Majesty's efforts." They began to demand
the country's deliverance. '*If your Majesty cannot ac-
complish this," they said, "will you be pleased to tell us
so, candidly, before we perish, so that w^e may find means
to defend ourselves and avoid the impending danger."

Later wars with the Turks also brought bitter dis-
appointments. For example in 1566 Soliman advanced
against the fortress of Szigetvdr with an enormous army.
The forces deputed by the German Empire to defend Hun-
gary made not the slightest effort to relieve it. The soldiers
themselves must have suffered greatly as they heard the
thunder of the guns and yet were compelled to lie idle in
the camp at Gyor. They knew that the gallant resistance
had weakened the discipline and confidence of the Turks,
and that a bold and well-directed attack would probably
be successful ; yet the imperial and royal army looked on
as mere spectators at the most heroic and most tragic event
of the century, as though they did not wish to deprive pos-
terity of the thrilling story of Zrinyi's heroism.

But however glorious this memory might be, the

323

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

nation could but think with inconsolable grief of the heroes
who might have been saved if only the royal army had
moved. The events at Szigetvar long embittered the rela-
tions between king and people. The memory of that sad
time was deeply engraved upon the heart of the nation,
which could not forget the crime of those whose cold cal-
culations were in no way influenced by the grand and
moving struggle of the Zrinyis, and who pursued their
own selfish policy careless as to the fate of their brothers-
in-arms.

Szigetvar was not the only instance of this callous-
ness. Perhaps it was the most dramatic, but wherever we
turn among the events of that period we find the same
conduct repeated again and again.

The leaders of the imperial army were not prompted
by an ardent desire to conquer; they had not formed the
high resolve to deliver the country at any cost. Their
paramount desire was to ward off the attacks of the Turks
from the west, their own homes. If the heroic defenders
of Koszeg, Szigetvar and Eger could keep back the
Turks, they deemed it superfluous that any German blood
should be shed. In 1532 an imperial army of from eighty
to ninety thousand men lay idle near Vienna and moved
not a finger to deliver the fortress of Koszeg, which was so
heroically defended by Nicholas Jurisich. Only when the
Turks sent their predatory troops towards the frontiers of
Austria did Hungary's ally show any signs of life.

In the year 1542 a large German army marched to-
wards Buda to recapture it, but although the Turks were
then weaker than their opponents, these soon returned
home after a few spiritless and ill-conceived attempts.

In the following year Soliman conquered Fehervar,
the large imperial army making no effort to prevent him,
and when the Turkish leader retired the army dispersed
without having unsheathed a sword. It was then that the
Hungarians sent their king a manifesto. " If the other
subjects of your Majesty restrict their action to the defence

324

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

of their own frontiers, we shall be obliged to take other
steps in our own defence."

A still larger army was formed and placed under the
command of Prince Maurice of Saxony in 1552, but that
also accomplished nothing. While Dob6, the defender
of Eger, covered his name with undying glory, the
Prince's army lay inactive near Gyor, and as soon as it
heard of Dob6's victory, went home again.

Every event increased the bitter experiences of the
nation. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, during
the reign of the Emperor Rudolf, the war against the
Turks was prosecuted more vigorously. The armies may
have been smaller, but the spirit of their leaders was more
enterprising and more resolved on the deliverance of Hun-
gary. Several important military dignities were conferred
upon Hungarians and the fire of patriotism in their hearts
communicated itself to the foreign commanders also.
Besides Nadasdy, Palffy and Zrinyi, foreign leaders like
Alansfeld and Schwarzenberg fought heroically for Hun-
gary. Their victories tended to reunite the country; even
Transylvania supported the western alliance and the whole
nation was one in the defence of western civilisation and
its own territorial integrity. Unfortunately, however,
these excellent results were soon destroyed by the bad
government of Rudolf.

It does not appear surprising, after considering such
events as those which have been mentioned, that the Habs-
burgs failed to win the sympathies of the Hungarians.
If we remember how much the country suffered in the
course of those struggles, and from bad government, as
w^ill be indicated presently, the question arises as to how
it was that in spite of such bitter experiences, one part of
the nation at least continued to adhere to the Habsburgs.

The reason was that the alliance with the east had
proved a failure. The Turks could not beat the German
armies in a decisive battle, and could not beat down the
resistance of that element in Hungary which supported

325

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the western alliance. Their strength was exhausted by
the conquest of one fortress or another. It often happened
that they made incursions into that portion of the country
which belonged to the Habsburgs, but after a short cam-
paign they retired, leaving the various fortresses in the
hands of their former owners.

The Sultan was therefore unable to restore the unity
of the Hungarian kingdom and to make his protege ruler
over the whole country. He only increased his power in
the districts bordering on his own realm, but such dis-
tricts as he conquered he kept for himself and did not hand
over to those who had placed themselves under his pro-
tection. Nor did he spare those portions of the country
with whose owner he stood on friendly terms. Treasures
and slaves were acceptable to him though they came from
Transylvania. Poor Szapolyai grieved to see how his
ally devastated his dominions. The Sultan regarded
Hungary as his own; he chose to make a present of part
of it to Szapolyai, and afterwards to his son ; it was he who
nominated the rulers of Transylvania, and what belonged
to his servant belonged to him. It was on this ground
that the Sultan occupied the fortress of Buda. He said
that he could not allow that important stronghold to be
controlled by the weak hands of a woman and a child.
Shortly afterwards, he claimed the territory called Temes-
koz, in the south of Hungary, as well as the towns of
Becse and Becskerek.

How could the nation feel drawn towards such an
ally? Yet the alternative policy was as bad, in fact each
policy had so many drawbacks as almost to justify the
other. Even the wisest men found it impossible to decide
which was the right course for the country to take amid
such perplexing circumstances, and oscillated between the
rival policies. The mass of the people were utterly at a
loss, for while the leading men were undecided public
opinion could not take up any strong line.

The deadlock resulting from the measuring of
32G

I

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

strengths of the two contending powers ought to hav
suggested to a self-respecting people that, like Brennus,
they should throw their own sword into the scale and
strive to carve out a future for themselves. But the many
heavy blows which had fallen upon the nation had dimin-
ished both its strength and its self-reliance. The people
could not trust to their own powers; they were divided
into parties and could not be united in the service of one
leader for one common purpose. They had no Moses to
lead them out of the desert in which they found themselves.

As the nation was not attached to either of the rivals
by any strong sympathies, and as neither was able by his
actions to convince the whole nation as to which of the
two was most desirable, the old party strife was still kept
up. One party thought that after some changes in the
international situation, the Emperor could still help Hun-
gary and expel the Turks. This party stood for the western
alliance. Others did not dare to defy the Turks, even
when assisted by the German army. They were convinced
that the Turks would ultimately be victorious, and that
it would be wisest to seek their protection. These accord-
ingly adhered to Szapolyai. Neither party, however, w'as
inspired by that intense conviction of the wisdom of its
cause which could have carried all before it, and ever since
the battle of Mohacs public opinion had remained divided.

For a time one party or the other could win over the
majority of the people, but as neither ally proved satis-
factory the illusions concerning both were destroyed.

The parties w^hich during the time of the Jagello kings
had corresponded to class divisions among the people now
arranged themselves according to districts of the country.
This alteration is explained by the events which occurred.
Immediately after Mohacs the divisions remained as be-
fore, the gentry class supporting Szapolyai while the mag-
nates followed Ferdinand. This state of affairs could not
last. As soon as Szapolyai became king he could no
longer identify himself solely with the interests of the

327

DEVELOPMENT OF HUxNGARIAN LIBERTY.

gentry. Before the battle of Mohacs it was his aim, since
his interests demanded it, to increase the ambitions of the
gentry and to amend the law in such a way as to give them
the decisive word in the management of the nation's
affairs, but when he was king he could not continue this
policy. Szapolyai could not hope to be master of the
country unless he gained adherents among the magnates,
and he therefore sought to win them over, especially such
as possessed fortresses and soldiers.

On the other hand the Habsburgs could not reckon
on gaining the crown if they were only supported by the
magnates. They therefore tried to gain the goodwill of
all classes.

Each party abandoned a policy which favoured one
class too exclusively. One great question absorbed all
men's minds, as to whether Hungary should ally itself
with the east or with the west, and this question was not
one calculated to divide the different classes of the com-
munity. When the vital questions of the hour were the
constitution of the Council or the sphere of activity of the
Diet it is easy to understand that the classes found them-
selves in opposing camps for their interests were likely
to be different; but now, when the problem was where
Hungary should look for support, in the west or in the
east, class differences were irrelevant. Instead of social
standing, it was the locality in which a man dwelt and
the religion he professed which decided to what party he
would belong. If they lived in the same district and pro-
fessed the same religion, magnates and gentry could have
but one policy and had no reason for forming rival
parties. The natural links which had always tended to
unite these two classes in Hungary made themselves felt,
and the magnates again became the leaders of the gentry
of their own district.

Religion also played an important part in the forma-
tion of the new parties. The Protestants at first adhered
to Ferdinand as they hoped more from him than from

328

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

Szapolyai. Nationality also Had some influence, those
who were of German origin naturally joining the party of
Ferdinand.

But the strongest influence of all w^as that of locality.
Those who lived in the west of Hungary favoured the
western alliance, while those who lived in the east declared
for the rival policy. Although private interests doubtless
helped to determine the policy of many, yet they were
not the only motive. People generally believe in all sin-
cerity that what is best for them is also good for the com-
munity.

It is not an instance of unmitigated selfishness if, at
the present day, a farmer thinks that the salvation of the
country is to be found in the flourishing of agriculture,
while an artisan looks to an extension of manufacture.
Nor is it surprising if the member of a noble family pro-
fesses aristocratic doctrines, while a man of humble origin
is a democrat in his principles.

The circumstances of a man's life help him to grasp
certain truths more readily than others; his thoughts and
general conception of life are adapted to his immediate
environment, and he tends to regard the world only from
one point of view. It was not pure selfishness on the
part of the western portions of Hungary to desire a west-
ern alliance, while the eastern portions favoured an alli-
ance with the Turks. Those who lived towards the west
saw the power of the Germans near at hand; they knew
by personal experience the disadvantages of a war with
them and it was chiefly from this danger that they desired
to save the country.

As the parties formed themselves according to dis-
tricts these districts gradually became separate countries.
Fate, and the nation's weakness, caused the country to
drift towards separation at the very time when its interests
loudly called for unity. Since 1542 the Turks had wedged
themselves into the middle of the divided country and pre-
vented the union of the two halves. When they had pene-

329

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

trated almost as far as the northern Carpathians, and had
possessed themselves of the centre of the country, the mili-
tary and political union of east and west Hungary waij
almost impossible. The two parts were no longer divided
merely by a difference of poHcy, and their isolation de-
manded a separate political and military organisation.
Even if they had been one in policy it would have been
exceedingly difficult to carry on a united government.

This separation was made lasting by the circumstance
that Transylvania had its own traditions. Even during
the time of the Arpad kings it had been governed by sepa-
rate chieftains (vajdas) and both socially and economically
it had developed along its own lines. Geographically it
formed a well-defined territory and it would probably have
become a separate dukedom if Hungary had not created
its admirable system of centralisation during the Middle
Ages. These circumstances made Transylvania suitable
soil for the new ideas which made their appearance after
the battle of Mohacs, and the eastern portions of Hungary
naturally found in it their centre.

The development of Hungary reached a new phase.
Customs, interests and duties became clearly distinguished
in the two parts of the country. Till then both parties
had aimed at the unity of the whole country. Even after
the fall of Buda this desire for unity lived on; but actual
facts commenced to prepare men's minds for a definite
division. East Hungary did not become autonomical
because its inhabitants saw that the welfare of the coun-
try depended upon an alliance with the Turks, but because
they learnt to love independence and because a Turkish
protectorate seemed most favourable to the interests of
their own part of the country.

During the sixteenth century, however, definite sepa-
ration was not the declared policy of either party. It
merely resulted from the fact that neither party could over-
come the other, and so each established itself in that por-
tion of the country in which it had most adherents, and

330

DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.

there seized the reins of government. The separation
occurred and persisted in spite of the definite wishes of
both parties and was entirely due to the general weakness
of the community.

331

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY,

CHAPTER XVIL

EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE UNITY OF THE
COUNTRY.

One of the most interesting features of the history of
Hungary during the sixteenth century was the instinctive
revolt of the nation against partition. That traditional
clinging to unity could not reconcile itself to the new order
of things, but neither was it able to overcome the new
tendency. If the nation had one persistent desire, for it
was more a desire than a strong volition, it was for unity,
and it would be an attractive task to deal with the attempts
prompted by that honest desire. But it is not the aim of
the present book to give detailed history, so we must pass
over the honest though sometimes naive attempts of the
nobles to establish union beneath the sceptre of whichever
monarch could be of most service to the country. Nor
need we dw-ell upon the ambitions of a few men like
Perenyi and Gritti, who hoped that the nation, ignoring
the two rival kings, might raise them to the throne. The
activity of Martinuzzi (Friar George), however, deserves
consideration, as it was he who brought the hope of union
nearest to realisation.

Martinuzzi was decidedly one of the most interesting
figures upon the stage of Hungarian history, and also the
first distinguished statesman of the Habsburg era. He
was a riddle to his contemporaries, and has remained so
for posterity. But there was one thing upon w'hich his
contemporaries were all agreed, and the verdict is the same
to-day, and that was that he was a man built upon a great
scale. His intellect, his capacity for work, and his quick-
ness of decision, were equally striking. He w^as born to

332

EFFORTS TO RESTORE UxNITY.

command. Wherever he appeared he took the lead
because he was the strongest personality present. Even
those who hated him had to bend before his iron will. He
could persuade individuals or crowds with equal ease, for
he was master both of the language of calm deliberation
and of the fiery eloquence which sways the multitude.
He was great also as an administrator, and it was he who
organized Szapolyai's dominions into a well-knit whole.
He was a skilful general, an able financier, and a clever —
perhaps too clever — diplomatist. As he could make
people believe what he liked he imagined he could make
them acquiesce in everything he did, and it was this which
caused his failure. He knew men, and that was the
secret of his influence over them, but he himself remained
a sealed book to others. His contemporaries trembled
before him, and yet his superiority was one reason why
they murdered him, for those who had grounds for fearing
him only felt safe when he lay dead at their feet. He
had the gift of entering into the thoughts and feelings of
others, and so could present his opinions to others in such
a light that they could not but approve of them. He
could colour his plans in such a way as to please Austria
as well as the Turks, and for a long time he led both
powers.

Martinuzzi*s life was full of dramatic turns, and of con-
tests which enable us to estimate his greatness. We will
glance for a moment at one of these contests. In the year
1540, after the death of Szapolyai, all grounds for the par-
tition of the country ceased to exist. According to the
treaty of Varad (1538) the eastern kingdom should then
have passed into the hands of Ferdinand. That king
accordingly sent an army to take Buda. Among the
subjects of Szapolyai the desire for union with the western
kingdom had grown strong, especially as only the unity of
the whole country could save them from the rule of a
woman and a child. Previously Martinuzzi had cham-
pioned this policy and had acted as intermediary in the
matter of the treaty of Vdrad. His former supporter, the

333

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Sublime Porte, resented the conclusion of this treaty and
was angry with Alartinuzzi, and with the house of Szapol-
yai. Martinuzzi faced all these difficulties bravely. In
spite of the treaty, and of a growing public opinion, m
spite of his own promises, and the wishes of the most
powerful nobles, he resolved to place the crown upon the
head of the infant son of Queen Isabella, and he achieved
his aim, although even his most natural ally, the Queen
Regent, abandoned him.

Martinuzzi was in Transylvania when the news of
Szapolyai's death arrived, and he at once took vigorous
action. When he found that he could not win
over the Vajda (chieftain) of Transylvania, Majlath, he
contented himself with a partial success. Seeing that the
contest would really be decided at Buda, he concluded a
truce with Alajlath, and hastened thither, leaving Transyl-
vania to its fate. This decision of his reveals the great-
ness of his mind. It seemed as if he were hurrying to
destruction, whereas in truth only a bold step could lead
to success. A commonplace man would have stayed in
Transylvania, where he could have occupied a strong
defensive position, yet Martinuzzi left that place, and went
where all might indeed be lost, but where also all was to
be gained.

He must have seen that if he could keep Buda, and
those adherents of Szapolyai who lived outside Transyl-
vania, and could win over the wavering by the election of
the infant king, his rival Majlath's triumphs in Transyl-
vania would not be decisive. That district, shut off from
the armies of Ferdinand, could easily be regained, while
if the other portions of eastern Hungary were lost they
could only be recaptured by means of a Turkish war on a
large scale. The really dangerous rival was not Majlath,
the Vajda of Transylvania, but Ferdinand. That was why
Martinuzzi resolved on his daring course. He was almost
captured by the enemy, and the infant king with him, but
at length he reached Buda, having outstripped his foe.

334

EFFORTS TO RESTORE UNITY.

He convinced the Sultan of his fidelity, and enlisted
the king of Poland as his intercessor with the Habsburgs,
in order to gain time to organise his defences. He re-
stored the confidence of his diminished party, and carried
through the election of the king, and when Ferdinand's
armies reached Buda, the part of diplomatist and orator
gave place to that of the soldier. The victorious defence
of Buda was the work of Martinuzzi.

The queen-mother intrigued with the enemy, who
was at the very gates of the fortress, and jNIartinuzzi had
reason to fear treachery, but his own strong will and pre-
sence of mind defeated both the intrigues of the queen and
the attacks of the besiegers. Soon the Turkish relieving
forces appeared, and the infant king John Sigismund re-
mained master of east Hungary.

We shall not pursue further the history of that war, as
enough has been said to show- some of Martinuzzi's char-
acteristic features. He was a profound thinker, as well
as a man of action, and discerned the foundations of a
nation's strength. He might be called a social philoso-
pher. His keen eye saw that the weakest point in the
organisation of the Hungarian community was the un-
happy condition of the peasant class. He made the
defence of the weak one of the chief tasks of the king, and
if he did not achieve all he aimed at, the fault lay with the
age and not with him.

But all the qualities we have indicated are not enough
to make a man truly great ; for that, purity of motives and
loftiness of soul are needed. Had Martinuzzi these quali-
ties? His ambitions were remarkable; such powers as he
possessed made it inevitable that he should desire to lead,
but there was never anything petty in his ambition. After
the death of Szapolyai, Martinuzzi offered the governor-
ship to Perenyi, although he might easily have secured it
for himself, and when Perenyi declined the post Martin-
uzzi chose colleagues to share the power with him. In
order to avoid any jealousy he w^ould not keep the dignity

335

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to himself, although he bore the burdens of the office alone.
He received the title of cardinal with indifference, and even
after that dignity was conferred upon him, continued to
call himself simply the Treasurer. It was power that he
desired, and not any splendour or rank, but the question
is whether he did not to some extent sacrifice the common
interests for the sake of power. To find an answer to this
question it is necessary to study his policy. He saw
clearly enough that Hungary could only revive if the
Turks were driven out and the various parts of the country
were united under the protection of western and christian
Europe. A mind so great as his could not be content to
labour only for a fraction of the nation, therefore we must
believe that he was sincere when he advocated the unity of
the nation under the Habsburgs. Since the time when he
had become the chief counsellor of Szapolyai (1534) this
idea had always occupied his thoughts. Yet for sixteen
years, (1534-1550), during which his power was supreme,
he never strove to realise the idea. Why was this ? The
deplorable condition of the country must have shaped
Martinuzzi's conception of the situation as it shaped the
thoughts of all me'n. He became pessimistic concerning
the nation's strength. Like the rest of his fellow-countrv-
men he appeared to look for some outside help which
should guarantee a successful issue even without the
country's co-operation. He watched the changes in the
international situation keenly. He left no stone unturned
to persuade Charles V. to commence a war on a grand
scale for the relief of Hungary, and in such a war he would
have joined the Emperor with all his might, but he did not
believe in the possibility of the success of smaller efforts.
All the while he remained on such a footing with the Turks
that he could have thrown in his lot with them if neces-
sary.

He carefully avoided any act that might compromise
him in the eyes of Soliman. He promised to be loyal to
the Sultan, paid him tribute, and repudiated entirely the

336

EFFORTS TO RESTORE UNITY.

policy of a western alliance. The difference in his rela-
tions to the two powers lay in his urging the west to
activity, and in trying to pacify the east. It is true that
his complex personality may have urged him to this
course, the keeping two doors open in case he might have
to change his policy, but this alone cannot explain his
conduct. There were several enterprises, which, if he
had joined in them, would have certainly been successful.
Many fortresses were defended against the Turks with
such wonderful heroism as to show that if the whole
armed force of the nation had been properly organised the
greatest results could have been achieved. Martinuzzi
himself could have equipped a considerable army, yet he
let the opportunity go by although he knew his neutrality
involved grave risks. What assurance had he that the
Turks would not lay hands upon Hungary if the German
arms failed to deliver her ? Would he leave even so much
of her territory as would allow to the Hungarian nation a
precarious existence ? These were no imaginary dangers.
How was it then that Martinuzzi dreaded war with the
Turks more than this contingency? His neutral behavi-
our did not even ensure peace ; he could only save one part
of the country from direct devastation, which, however,
fell the more heavily upon the other parts. Patriotism
alone could not have prompted him to avoid war, and his
conduct is only explicable on the assumption that in addi-
tion to the common interests there was also private ones
which influenced his action. He himself often said that
he desired always to be first. Among men like Szapolyai
he was easily chief, but was it certain that this would be
the case if the Habsburgs were acknowledged throughout
the whole of Hungary? This doubt made him hesitate,
and he only served his political aim with half his heart,
and readily listened to arguments for postponing a definite
decision. His personal ambition urged him to remain
neutral. Therefore, one can hardly call Martinuzzi truly
great. One can only regret that his ambition had too
great an influence upon his conduct.

337

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

There can be no doubt, however, that he loved his
country with all his ardent soul. That sentiment which is
the most characteristic feature of the Hungarian nation
could not but have existed, on a scale proportioned to his
grand personality, in a man who united in himself the
qualities of the race in their highest degree. Martinuzzi's
ardour and inexhaustible capacity for work could not have
sprung from a soil which lacked truth. Centuries after-
wards his personality forces upon us the conviction that
his whole nature was true and sincere. His tactics may
sometimes have been artful; he used the weapons of the
time with more skill than others. His patriotism was
beyond question, but his ambition was also great, and he
thought the chief interest of his country lay in his own
rule. He was easily blinded by ambition because his soul
suffused it with the glow of patriotism. The dominance
of a man of genius is the surest means to the public wel*
fare, but the danger lies in the ease with which the convic-
tion of his necessity strengthens in a great man's mind
until he ceases to see in himself a mere means to an end,
and raises himself to the level of an end.

This happened in the case of Martinuzzi. His own
supremacy seemed the all-important thing, and he re-
mained neutral because such a course seemed most likely
to perpetuate his authority. He only abandoned his neu-
trality when his ambition rendered it advisable to do so,
and then he took action first against the Emperor, and
afterwards against the Sultan.

In 1540, as already mentioned, Martinuzzi drew
his sword against Ferdinand. He was induced
to take this step, so inconsistent with his usual
policy, by the necessity of choosing between surren-
dering Transylvania to the Emperor or defending it by
force of arms. His enemies, the queen-mother and the
Vajda of Transylvania, were quicker than he in joining the
Habsburgs, so he saw no alternative but to call in the
Turks. The curious point in all this is that it was Mar-

338

I

EFFORTS TO RESTORE UNITY.

tinuzzi himself who had most strenuously urged Charles
V. to attack the Turks and deliver Hungary. He had
failed to persuade Charles, but we cannot imagine that
this failure made him so dread a war with the Turks that
he preferred to call them in and assist them. Who would
throw himself into a river to avoid the rain ? The Turks
readily took advantage of Martinuzzi's action. They came
in force and soon captured Buda. This event surprised
Martinuzzi himself, but if he had acted only in the interest
of the country he would not have committed a fault for
which he had to pay so dearly.

The other instance of Martinuzzi's abandonment of
his neutral policy, occurred near the end of his career. In
1549 he most strenuously advocated the reunion of the
the tw^o halves of the country. He who a few years pre-
viously had done all in his power to prevent that union,
and had acted in entire opposition to the wishes of Queen
Isabella, now demanded troops from Ferdinand in order
that he might compel the queen to do what he had before
prevented her from doing.

The reason for this change of front was the danger
which threatened Martinuzzi. It frequently happens that
those who constantly put off coming to a decision till a
more suitable opportunity presents itself, are ultimately
obliged to act at the most unfavourable moment, because
then it is fate which chooses the time for action, and not
themselves. It was so in this instance. The Turks had
heard rumours of Martinuzzi's activity against them, and
had lost confidence in him. He was in the greatest dan-
ger because the Porte began to use threats. To avoid the
danger he made wonderful efforts, as vigorous as those of
1540, when also he had to fight for his very life.

Just when everything seemed lost, one quick decision
of the former Fabius Cunctator saved the situation.
Scarcely had the danger passed away wiien once again he
changed his attitude. The international situation had
become less favourable to his enterprise. The Emperor

339

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Charles V. was himself in great danger, for the king of
France had attacked him, and the discontented Germans
also contemplated a revolution against him. Martinuzzi
at once began to hope that the former state of affairs might
be revived, and even in a better form than before. He
desired to re-establish peace between the Sultan and Fer-
dinand, and to keep on such a footing with them both that
if a suitable moment came he might resuscitate the plan of
freeing Hungary from the Turks without jeopardising his
position. This seems the only explanation which can be
given of his conduct. If he had intended to hand Tran-
sylvania over to the Turks and to lay a trap for the armies
of Ferdinand, as Castaldo alleged, he should have acted
differently. If he desired to play into the hands of the
Sultan, why did he inform Ferdinand of his negotiations
with the Turks, and urge the king to increase his army ?
Moreover, why should he have wished to give the country
to which he owed his own high position, to the Turks?
On the contrary he must have known that if he adhered to
his agreement with Ferdinand, war with the Turks was
inevitable.

What then was the explanation of his constant pro-
crastination ? It could not be any shrinking from coming
to a decision in the case of so resolute a man as Martinuzzi.
His action was only worthy of his intellect if he earnestly
desired peace with the Turks, and to persuade the two
adversaries to leave Transylvania in his hands. If that
was his desire then he was right in urging Ferdinand to
strengthen his army, while at the same time he strove to
keep that army out of Transylvania, as he wished to re-
main master of the situation. The same desire led him to
avoid doing any injury to the Turks, for he knew that he
could not realise his hopes unless he possessed the Sultan's
confidence. His negotiations with the Turks could only
have had a meaning if he were paving the way for his own
schemes. Ferdinand could never have occupied Transyl-
vania peacefully, for the Sultan had often told Martinuzzi

340

EFFORTS TO RESTORE UNITY.

that he would not acquiesce in Ferdinand's rule there.
Martinuzzi made no attempt to overcome the Sultan's
objections in this respect. He merely tried to convince the
Turks that they had been misinformed concerning his
actions, and that his deeds had shown how faithful he had
been to their interests. This fidelity would continue un-
abated if the Sultan would assure to him the governorship
of Transylvania, and in that case he promised to send the
German armies away from there. These negotiations
clearly could never have resulted in the Sultan's handing
Transylvania over to Ferdinand.

Martinuzzi 's policy would probably have been success-
ful if he had not been murdered. In spite of the desires of
the two great empires between which he stood he would
have been victorious. The Sultan had actually accepted
Martinuzzi's terms. After all, it was not essential for the
Turks to conquer Transylvania ; so long as it was not hos-
tile to them they could feel secure. Ferdinand also saw
that his interest lay in being conciliatory. Had the agree-
ment with the Sultan been carried through Ferdinand must
have acquiesced in the achievement of an intellect superior
to his own. The peace that would ensue was more advan-
tageous to Ferdinand than a prolongation of the war.
Moreover, the Habsburgs were more willing to see Mar-
tinuzzi governor of Transylvania than the scion of a
princely house, a Szapolyai. The cardinal Martinuzzi,
who had already reached his three score years and
ten, would not have stood in their way so much as a young
prince, who might found a dynasty. But fate deci-
ded otherwise. Martinuzzi was murdered on account of
some ill-founded suspicion (1551). Castaldo and Pallavi-
cini dreaded Martinuzzi. They could never fathom his
mind, and they saw that he generally purposed something
other than he said. They killed him for something he had
not done, but that suspicion was generated by his past
deeds. It was the nemesis of his own intriguing nature
that thrust the dagger into the hands of his murderers.

341

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Martinuzzi sincerely favoured the policy of the union
of the country under the Habsburgs, yet fate had placed
him at the head of the opposite party. His mind became
a prey to conflicting aims, and that steadiness of purpose
which is necessary for the accomplishment of great enter-
prises, was destroyed.

In consequence of his long hesitation the favourable
moment for the nation to rise in its own strength was
allowed to pass by. It was in his time that the Turks
gained a footing in Hungary, and when Martinuzzi died
the last statesman on a grand scale whose ideal was the
deliverance of the country, passed away.

Martinuzzi then did not answer his vocation. His
intellect was keen enough to recognise the task before him,
but his character was not great enough to accomplish it.
Yet among his efforts were many which brought lasting
benefit to the country. It was he who organised the east-
ern portion of the country, and brought Transylvania into
close contact w^ith Hungary.

After his death his name never became the watchword
of a definite national policy. The great contrasts which
his tactics showed made it impossible that he should direct
the nation even from the grave, as some men have done.
He could not be a second Moses to lead the nation out of
the desert, nor could he even point the w^ay to the promised
land. But he founded a school. He set a classical
example of the policy of a weak nation in defending itself
against two stronger contending powers. Alas, several
eminent Hungarian statesmen have had to copy his tac-
tics.

The union of the country, the way to which Martin-
uzzi had rendered more easy, was effected after his death,
when the imperial army occupied Transylvania, an act
which led to war with the Turks. The murder, however,
brought no blessing, for it made unpopular the system
which it initiated. The Transylvanian Estates did not wish
to unite with the rest of the nation, and they refused to

342

EFFORTS TO RESTORE UNITY.

)ear the expense of a war commenced at such an un-
favourable time. All this prepared the way for the crea-
tion of the Transylvanian dukedom, and in 1556 the
Szapolyais returned to Transylvania.

Efforts were made to oppose this separation. The
kings of Hungary would not part w^ith Transylvania
entirely, and they plotted against John Sigismund, its
Duke. In 1570 the treaty of Speier established the rela-
tions between the two parts of the country upon a new
foundation. By that treaty John Sigismund definitely
abandoned the title of king, while retaining that of Grand
Duke, and concluded an offensive and defensive alliance
with Ferdinand's successor, King Maximilian. Thus the
contending parties made two weak crowns out of the one
strong crown of St. Stephen.

The advantage, however, lay with the Habsburgs.
Their State w^as the true successor to that of St. Stephen,
and they were recognised as kings by the whole nation.
Soon John Sigismund died, and the Transylvanian Estates
elected to the throne Stephen Bathory as their Duke
(1571), though King Maximilian would have preferred
Jasper B^k^sy, the author of the treaty of wSpeier. Bathory
pursued the policy of his predecessor, and remained the
vassal of the Sultan, although he secretly made a vow of
loyalty to the king of Hungary.

The Bathorys were no rivals to the Habsburgs.
Stephen Bathory was much superior to the Szapolyais as
a ruler, but his ambitions, so far as Hungary w^as con-
cerned, were more modest than theirs. He was attached
to the idea of national unity, and while he became king
of Poland (1575) he was content in Hungary with the title
of Vajda. He opposed the wishes of the Habsburgs in
accepting the throne of Poland, but in Hungary he recog-
nised their supremacy.

The new political formation had not, however, yet
gone through the test of the Turkish Wars. A year
before the treaty of Speier a truce had been agreed to with

343

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

the Turks and while that lasted the new situation could
easily be maintained. The Habsburgs respected it, as
otherwise the Turks would have interfered, but what
would happen when war commenced again ?

In 1593 war broke out, and then a dramatic struggle
followed, the leading actors in which were the Duke Sigis-
mund Bdthory, a man capable of great efforts but a prey
to his shattered nerves and unaccountable caprices,
Michael, the cunning Vajda of Wallachia, and the rough
Italian soldier Basta.

Individual ambitions and interests brought Tran-
sylvania into a critical condition. Simultaneously with
these internal rivalries the problem pressed for solution
as to what attitude Transylvania should adopt towards the
Turks. The final outcome was the victory of Basta and
his policy of uniting Transylvania with Hungary. The
same century which witnessed the partition of Hungary
saw its reunion. In the year 1600 all those portions of the
country which were free from the Turkish yoke again re-
cognised one sole ruler.

This union did not last long, however, for it did not
meet the requirements of the eastern parts of Hungary,
which had no desire to take part in the fruitless Turkish
wars and wished for peace ensured by its own indepen-
dent standing. How enormously important was the inde-
pendence of Transylvania which followed, will be indi-
cated in a subsequent chapter.

344

EASTERN AND WESTERN ALLIANCES.

CHAPTER XVIIL

RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE EASTERN
AND WESTERN ALLIANCES.

Ancient traditions and powerful interests equally-
urged the Habsburgs to endeavour to secure the Hun-
garian crown. The Turks, on their part, were driven by
their lust of conquest to overrun Hungary. The country
was accordingly threatened by the two greatest powers of
the known world. Being exposed to this great danger at
a time when the battle of Mohdcs had so diminished her
strength, she had to contemplate peace and an alliance
with one of those powers. All men saw this, and if there
was difference of opinion it was only as to which of the
two it would be wiser to join. Szapolyai's party thought
that the peace and integrity of the country could only be
assured by the patronage of the Turks. They hoped that
if the country recognised the supremacy of the Sultan he
would not seek to conquer any Hungarian territory, but
would, on the contrary, give back the frontier fortresses
which he had already taken. In this they were wrong.
The Turks never voluntarily abandoned any territory
upon which they had erected mosques. They would have
considered it a slight to the Prophet and a slur upon their
own supremacy to do so. Furthermore, the chief reason
why they commenced war with Hungary as soon as they
entered the Balkan Peninsula, was the circumstance that
that country blocked the path which they must tread in
order to conquer the Emperor, the first monarch of the
Christian world. How could the Turks allow Hungary to
regain her strength after they had conquered her at the

345

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

cost of such enormous efforts ? How could they success-
fully attack the Emperor while a Christian State, with con-
siderable military power, lay between them and their ob-
jective? Even if the Hungarians should allow them to
pass through their territory as allies, that would not be
satisfactory. The Sultans saw that they must either rule
over the whole of the Danube valley or else abandon all
plans of further conquest. They had indeed left Tran-
sylvania and Wallachia to enjoy a certain amount of in-
dependence, but neither of those districts lay in their path,
and they were both much weaker than Hungary. The
party of Szapolyai was misled by the circumstance that
for several years the Turks had not increased their domin-
ions in Hungary, but had carried on their warfare outside
it, against other countries. The fact was that after the
battle of Mohacs the Sultan knew that the weakened
nation could not take up an aggressive attitude against
him. He felt that he was practically master of Hungary
and that he need not hasten to complete his conquest of the
whole country. Events showed how mistaken Szapolyai
had been. The Sultan took from him even Buda, and
demanded the surrender of many other fortresses also. It
is not surprising that the Sultan held fast the Hungarian
territory which he had taken, and which was a wedge of
Islam driven into the heart of Christendom, for in that
territory he saw the foundation of his future European
realm. He was obliged to make fresh conquests continu-
ally, because the organisation of his army demanded this.
Most of the Turkish soldiers served for reward, and as a
recompense for their efforts demanded a share in the land
that was purchased by their blood.

The wars of the Turks against western Europe could
only be carried on if one part of their army were stationed
in Hungary. The fundamental conditions of the Turkish
empire rendered impossible the realisation of Szapolyai 's
hope that the Sultan would restore Hungary's integrity.
Not even peace was to be hoped for, because the lowlands

346

EASTERN AND WESTERN ALLIANCES.

of Hungary served as a battle ground for the Turkish
army. Peace was only possible if the great struggle
between the Mussulman and the Christian world termin-
ated in the victory of the former, and the scene of the
fighting were shifted to the centre of the German Empire.
But how could any good Hungarian desire that? The
semblance of Hungarian independence would have been
W'Orth nothing if the Crescent had shone upon the battle-
ments of Vienna. From that moment nothing could have
tempered the warlike instincts of the Turks.

The independence of Transylvania had only been per-
mitted because the Sultan saw considerable advantage to
himself in its opposition to the alliance between Hungary
and Germany. So long as the prince of Transyhvania
fought against Hungary, he was more useful to the Sultan
than a Turkish governor would have been.

Every interest of Turkey demanded the weakening
and not the strengthening of Hungary. The party
opposed to Szapolyai, fully convinced of this, felt that
Hungary should take up arms for Christianity against
Islam. They knew that it was to Christianity that they
owed their progress, and in his heart every Hungarian
desired the victory of the Christian powers over the Turks.
This was why they sided with the Habsburgs. After they
had elected their most powerful neighbour as king they
made it his duty to identify himself with the cause of
Hungary, and to fight for the country's deliverance. They
allied themselves with a power whose interests were identi-
cal with their own. And the alliance was calculated to
achieve the expulsion of the Turks. Community of inter-
ests, of culture and of religion, bound the allies together,
so that no alliance could be firmer. The wisdom of the
policy is not diminished by the fact that it only met with
partial success. It was not until 150 years after the battle
of Mohacs that Hungary was delivered from the Turkish
dominion, and her deliverance was thus delayed, because
the Habsburgs did not display the energy expected of them

347

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

and because certain great historical events, which were
entirely unforeseen, such as the Reformation and certain
national developments, operated as disturbing factors.
These drew away Charles V., the most powerful of the
Habsburgs, from the enterprise. The Hungarian nation
itself did not exert itself as it might have done ; it did not
unite against the Turks, and moreover, the Habsburgs
could neither satisfy nor organise the Hungarian people.
The situation did not shape itself as the advocates of the
western alliance had expected, yet their choice was the
wisest in the circumstances, and they deserve the grati-
tude of posterity.

There were many who placed it to the credit of Sza-
polyai that the Crescent did not extend its sway over the
whole of eastern Hungary. Even if they were right, it
was no justification of an alliance with the Turks. It is
possible that the Turks would have pushed their con-
quests further in the east if Transylvania had been an
adversary instead of an ally, but on the other hand they
would have had less success in the west. The whole result
must have been better if Transylvania had joined the
Christian states. The Christian army would have been
greatly augmented by this accession, for it was well-known
that Martinuzzi could command an army of 100,000 men,
and John Sigismund, Duke of Transylvania, one of
60,000. One fails to understand how it could be of any
advantage for this force to be idle instea'd of its being
employed to assail the Turks from two sides. The policy
adopted by Transylvania helped the Turks by so often
dividing the Hungarian forces. To give one instance, in
the year of the heroic defence of Szigetvar, the king*s
cleverest general, Schwendi, with a great part of the
army, was fighting against John Sigismund of Tran-
sylvania, instead of against the Turks. Who knows
whether the Christians could not have delivered Szigetvar
if only a few more men had been available ?

The Hungarian-German alliance of the sixteenth

348

EASTERN AND WESTERN ALLIANCES.

century did not throw all its strength into the scale against
the Turks. It stopped their advance, but it did not drive
them back. It was the Hungarian nation which shed the
most blood in the course of the long struggle. The valour
displayed by the Hungarians has rarely been surpassed.
Their heroes were worthy of the renown of Leonidas. To
the courage and enthusiasm of the soldiers the stemming
of the tide of Turkish conquest was due. Nevertheless the
nation as a whole did not display sufficient vigour; it was
content to act on the defensive, and did not throw itself
heartily into the work of utterly expelling the Turks, so
that Hungary's neighbours uttered reproaches instead of
words of appreciation. Those who had despatched great
armies to foreign countries looked down upon a nation
that would not equip a powerful force with the object of
regaining its own territory. They forgot the enormous
sacrifices the nation had already made, and regarded it as
dependent upon foreign aid although the truth was that
the country had defended all Europe. Hungary had
given far more than she asked, and it was her undaunted
courage which had exhausted the strength of the Mussul-
man conquerors. The king himself began to mistrust the
nation, one portion of which was his constant enemy, while
the other pursued a varying policy. The relations be-
tween king and people grew worse as time went on. The
development of the country would have taken a different
turn if the united Hungarian nation, which had saved it-
self almost entirely by its own efforts, could have made its
voice heard in Vienna, and had nursed its strength for one
great war with the Turks. Then the admiring gaze of all
Europe would have been fixed upon Hungary.

But the contest between the two halves of the country
largely neutralised the advantage resulting from the alli-
ance with the west. Still, this alliance had at least the
good result of counteracting the disadvantages of the
Turkish alliance. Hungary was not cut off from the com-
mon interests of Europe. The fraction of the country
discharged its vocation though under a terrible strain.

349

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The Zrinyis, the Szondys, and the Dob6s continued the
great traditions of the Hunyadis. Their deeds adorned an
age which would have been truly great if the leaders of the
nation could have concentrated its strength in one channel.

It is true that the fate of a nation is largely decided by
considerations of actual strength, but these are not the
only matters to be borne in mind. There are certain prin-
ciples which should not be violated on any account, while
any effort in accordance with them is salutary, even though
it is not crowned with immediate success. Such a prin-
ciple was the solidarity of Christendom. Even if the
adhesion of Hungary to the west had entailed more risk or
suffering than an alliance with the Turks, still it would
have been a wiser policy, for it would have left the roots of
the nation in a soil from which they could draw susten-
ance, while Turkey was antipathetic to the whole w^orld to
which Hungary naturally belonged. The one course
would have furnished at least the hope of a national resur-
rection, w^hile the Turkish alliance must have led to disas-
ter in the event of their Turkish allies being defeated. Who
can estimate the importance to Europe even to-day, of the
readiness of the Hungarians to fight and to suffer in
defence of Christendom ?

How much less rich in noble memories Hungary
would be if she had spent those years in opportunist trim-
ming instead of straightforward action, or had pretended
friendship with the Turks while seeking to betray them,
waiting for the time of their downfall.

Carlyle says that Shakespeare is a more valuable pos-
session for England than India. So, too, the glorious
memory of the heroes of the sixteenth century is of greater
value to Hungary than many more evident factors of her
prosperity. The nation was never in doubt as to which
party stood for the right cause. When Szapolyai and
Ferdinand determined the frontiers of their respective
realms the larger portion of the country was assigned to
the former. Until the end of the sixteenth century fortune

350

EASTERN AND WESTERN ALLIANCES.

seemed to favour the Turkish arms, while the lucky star of
the Habsburgs appeared to be setting. In the time of
Charles V. it seemed as if that monarch would found a
world-wide empire, but towards the end of the century,
when Rudolf II. ruled, the Habsburg dynasty seemed
nearer to its downfall than ever before in the course of its
varied history. The long struggles of the Habsburgs had
a weakening effect upon Hungary, while Transylvania
enjoyed more peaceful times and better government, as, for
example, under the rule of Martinuzzi and Stephen Bath-
ory. Yet in spite of all this, the western kingdom had
more attraction for the eastern kingdom, than the latter
had for the western half of the nation, so that the union of
the two portions of the country under the Habsburgs re-
mained the nation's ideal.

The defenders of the Turkish alliance were ashamed
of their policy, and felt driven to find excuses. Unfor-
tunately, they easily found them in the attitude of the
kings of Hungary, yet their souls lacked the strength
born of conviction. They spoke the truth when they de-
clared their willingness to rally round the Christian banner
if only it were able to defend them. They discerned the
vocation of the Hungarian people, but were not heroic
enough to rise to it, and consequently the nation, though
desiring unity, could not achieve it.

It was fortunate for the nation that in spite of its divi-
ded condition it could continue to exist. Life was full of
hardships for the Hungarians, but they were able to sur-
vive as a people and to preserve the foundations upon
which their subsequent development was based. By
means of their alliance with the west they saved one part
of the country from the Turks, Hungary remained a
member of the western and Christian group of nations,
and in spite of the independence of Transylvania, national
unity was not permanently destroyed. Even the policy of
Transylvania led to good results, for the strength of that
district, not being exhausted by wars, was of the utmost

351

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

value to the cause of national and constitutional develop-
ment.

We must now trace the influence of that period upon
the liberty and the constitution of that part of Hungary
which was ruled by the Habsburgs.

352

THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL POWER,

CHAPTER XIX.

THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL POWER.

The Hungarian kings have always found an inex-
haustible source of strength in the people's instinct of self-
preservation. Amid the dangers threatening them from
all sides they looked for protection to the king, and instinc-
tively sought to strengthen his hands. From this source
came the great power of the Arpad monarchs, the Ange-
vins and Matthias. When during the Jagello period the
Hungarians saw how dangerous the rule of a weak king
was, the same instinct prompted them to confer the fullest
powers upon the young King Louis H., who died at
Alohacs. After that disastrous battle the nation again
longed above all things for a strong ruler. The misery
which it had experienced since the death of Matthias had
been due very largely to the prevailing anarchy, and the
perception of this fact naturally led to a reaction in favour
of the royal authority.

Fate had allotted to the Habsburgs a splendid part.
Let them be real leaders and protectors of the nation,
let them fight for it and with it, and then it would gladly
surrender some of its rights. The military temper which
the continual conflicts had developed made the people
amenable to discipline. The internal condition of the
country also rendered it necessary that the
executive power should be strengthened. The
partition of the country and the invasions of
the Turks made the administration of justice
practically impossible. Under such circumstances crimes
sprang up like weeds. The homeless outlaws who lived
by robbery, and the powerful owners of fortresses, to whom

353

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

their money and troops assured impunity, were equally
dangerous to the community. Misery and exaggerated
power, the two great extremes, those who had nothing to
fear for, and those who feared nothing, were equally des-
tructive of the country's peace and order. Only a strong
king could put an end to such a situation. The Habs-
burgs had the great advantage of being masters of other
lands, so that they could draw^ money and troops from
them, while the impoverished Hungarian community
could not have prevented them from establishing an
absolutist regime. The nation would have voluntarily
submitted to them. But for these circumstances the Habs-
burgs would have had to pursue a purely Hungarian pol-
icy. This they did not do, for their sole policy was that
of making their own family supreme over the known
world. Hungary, like their other dominions, was for them
but a pawn in the game they played for the mastery of the
world. This game developed itself in a manner different
from their expectations. It had absorbed all their energy
and attention, and the sixteenth century saw them the
losers. In Hungary they were obliged to restrict them-
selves to defence at a time when the country looked for
energetic advance. When the frontier fortresses, so
essential to Hungary's defence, should have been retaken,
and while the disrupted nation was longing for unity, the
Habsburgs were content with merely arresting on Hun-
garian territory the blows which the Turks aimed at Ger-
many.

The internal order of the country, however, under-
went some improvement. Ferdinand subdued the most
unruly magnates and rendered harmless some of the great
robber knights. But the soldiers who effected this kept
all that the robbers had stolen, and the people found their
defenders more dangerous than the great nobles. Besides
the fugitives from the Balkan states and Hungarian adven-
turers, many turbulent and badly paid Spanish, Italian,
and German soldiers lived constantly in Hungary. In

354

THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL POWER.

time of war soldiers are generally violent and ready to
subordinate everything to their own will. They are con-
scious of their own importance to the community and their
exigencies are correspondingly great. We can easily
understand that this was still more the case in the sixteenth
century. To the soldiers of that day nothing was too
sacred; their nature, hardened by constant killing, shrank
from no deed of cruelty* When they were not properly
paid or fed they plundered the country, to which they were
attached by no ties.

Side by side with these were the very scum of Asia
and Africa, the Turkish, Tartar, Arabian and Negro
troops, who all lived by plundering, who kept slaves and
saw a merit in killing Christians. Hungary was devas-
tated by the locusts from three parts of the world. Not
only did the Turks regard Hungary as a legitimate prey,
but even the troops of her own king looked upon some
parts of the country in the same light. The sufferings
of the people were greater than those of the nations of the
Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' war. As
we read in the laws of that period: "the peasants have
nothing but their own naked bodies, and those tortured
by cruel blows." The Corpus Juris is full of bitter com-
plaints. It is sadder to read than any tragedy, for it is a
memorial of the times written with the blood and tears of
a nation. Appeals were often made to the king to con-
trol his army and to place at its head Hungarian leaders
who would have an interest in defending their homes.
The monarchs were not devoid of goodwill, but they were
unequal to their task. Their greatest dif!iculty was the
lack of money wherewith to pay their troops.

Another great evil was the extravagance of some of
their kings. Rudolf, for example, spent several millions
upon his palaces and in purchasing works of art. The
wealth and population of Hungary were gradually dimin-
ishing and its vitality ebbing away, and the nation laid
the responsibility for this upon the king. Only by success
could the monarch gain popularity among the people, but

355

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

not one of the Hungarian Habsburgs was a great soldier.

Ferdinand had never seen a battle. Maximilian
clearly showed during the siege of Szigetvar that he was
no general. Rudolf II. was weak, nervous, almost a luna-
tic, and utterly unfit for camp life. Even within
the strong walls of the Bohemian king's palace
of Hrasdin he trembled for his life. The Hun-
garians, who had been accustomed to see their kings at
the head of the army, always where the danger was great-
est, now never saw their monarch in a battle. While they
themselves were enduring terrible privations in the camp,
they heard continually of the luxury of the Court. It was
a great misfortune that the relatives of Charles V. had no
share of his spirit. The weak and suffering body of that
monarch at once became elastic and energetic as he donned
his suit of mail and heard the sound of battle. He shared
in the vicissitudes of war with his soldiers and frequently
gave proofs of his talent as a leader. In this respect the
Hungarian Habsburgs were utterly unlike him, yet though
they could do nothing for the nation they endeavoured to
increase their authority. Everywhere in Europe at that
time the kingly power was in the ascendant. It was from
that power that the cause of progress could expect the
greatest support. The first condition of a nation's cul-
ture, internal peace and unity, was the rule of a strong
king. The leading nations were those in which the power
of the monarch had become great, namely, Turkey, France
and Spain. England also owed her success in interna-
tional policy to the strength of the Tudors.

In the German territories of the Habsburgs the rights
of the monarch were greatly curtailed by class privileges.
Of all the states beneath their sceptre, Hungary had the
most highly developed constitution. The kings therefore
instinctively tried to overthrow that constitution and to
remove the obstacles in the way of the growth of their
own power. They lessened the rights of a nation that was
already dissatisfied with its rulers. They tried to
achieve results which the nation would" have

356

THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL POWER.

cheerfully acquiesced in if they had but succeeded in
winning its heart, but as they did not attempt to do this,
king and nation never became really one. Fortunately
the kings did not go too far in their demands, at least until
the time of Rudolf H., so that no violent collision hap-
pened until the insurrection of Bocskai (1604). It was
Charles V. who set the example of this careful attitude.
His opportunism checked his absolutist inclinations. If
the nobles were willing to supply him with men and
money, and did not interfere w^ith his international policy,
he did not seek to curtail their privileges. His relatives,
the Hungarian kings, had still more reason to avoid any
exaggeration in their claims. Ferdinand and Maximilian
never endeavoured to abolish the rights of the Estates in
Hungary or in their other dominions. They subordinated
even their conscience in religious matters to their oppor-
tunism.

The Estates on their part show^ed great self-control.
Under the first Habsburg rulers they did not seek to ex-
tend their constitutional rights. In view of the gravity of
the country's situation all the best elements could have
but one desire, namely that the executive should be strong
enough to restore order. There was no party that sought
to restrict the prerogatives of the crow-n. If the king could
have won the people's hearts, he could have done what he
liked with the constitution. As it was, the people did not
become so strongly royalist as they might have been, yet
they endured more than they would have borne under
other circumstances. An opportunist king and a nation
desirous of a strong government could find a modus
Vivendi even if there were no fundamental harmony be-
tween them, and this generally happened until the end of
the sixteenth century. One great check upon the Habs-
burgs was the nation's right of freely electing its mon-
arch.

In Bohemia Ferdinand used the events of 1547 to
make the people ** accept " his son as king w'ithout any
real election. It is not surprising that he made the same

.357

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

attempt in Hungary, as many of his predecessors had
done. The first success achieved in this direction was in
1547 when the nation proclaimed that it would accept not
only Ferdinand but his descendants as well.

In acting thus it was not deviating from the old
custom which conferred a right to the crown upon the
king's descendants, but an election had always been
necessary to decide which of the members of the family
should ascend the throne and no coronation could take
place without such an election. Ferdinand desired to
remove this restriction upon his freedom of action and he
so far succeeded that election was dispensed with and
Maximilian was "nominated and acknowledged king'*
(15G3). Even then the coronation had to be arranged with
the consent of the nobles. During the reign of Maxi-
milian further concessions were made to the king. At the
request of the nobles Maximilian nominated his son
Rudolf as his successor, and as regards the coronation the
aristocracy were only to concern themselves with its actual
carrying out. If this mode of procedure became perman-
ent the desire of the Habsburgs would be accomplished.
The head of the family would always be king and there
would be no need to gain votes by dangerous concessions,
while an end would be put to the harmful rivalry of the
royal princes in regard to the vacant throne.

Another aim of the Habsburgs was to fill the chief
executive offices with their adherents so that they might
retain the power in their own hands. In 1547 Ferdinand
abolished the right of the Bohemian nobles to choose their
highest officials.

In Hungary the power of the elected Palatine was
a great check upon the king, who naturally disliked the
office though he did not dare to suggest its abolition.
Ferdinand merely induced the Estates to acknowledge
that it was lawful to allow the post of Palatine to remain
unfilled, and he then entrusted the duties of the office to
creatures of his own appointment.

358

I

i HE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL POWER.

According to Hungarian law the Palatine was the
substitute of the king in his absence. This function was
assigned to a nominated governor (1536 and 1542) who
also exercised most of the other rights of the Palatine.
The military forces were placed under the command of
an officer who was also an important member of the exec-
utive, as it was his duty to enforce judgments and to settle
questions of military expenses and of recruits. The judi-
cial duties of the Palatine were discharged by the new
vice-Palatine, nominated by the king. The Estates were
not pleased with this arrangement and frequently re-
quested the king to arrange for the election of a Palatine,
but it was a proof of their conciliatory attitude that they
passed laws which enabled the king to ignore their wishes.
Both king and nation made concessions and thus avoided
coming into collision, but the king always gained the
most as the compromise increased his power. Not only
did the king gain his point in the matter of the Palatine,
but he also succeeded in making the royal council depen-
dent upon his nomination.

It is true that in 1536 and 1543 the Estates made a
condition that six judges of appeal should be elected by
the Diet and that these judges should sit in the council
according to ancient custom and should join in the dis-
cussion of certain matters, but these legal dignitaries
played no greater part than had been assigned to them
before the great reform movement in the time of the Jagel-
los. The Council was entitled to make its decisions even
in their absence, and they were in no organic connection
with the majority of the Estates. The functions of the
royal council itself became less important, for not one of
the king's decisions needed the council's consent. It was
no more than it had been in the days of Louis the Great
and of Matthias, namely, a body whose duty it was to give
information to the king.

The other organs of the central government were
equally tools in the hands of the monarch. Financial
matters were settled by a chamber organised by the king.

359

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The former Treasurer, who acted on his own responsi-
bility, was replaced by a body of obedient officials. A
bureaucracy began to be formed which was much more
subservient to the king's wishes than the former indepen-
dent dignitaries.

The most influential members of the executive were
ecclesiastics. The king preferred them because the holders
of impoverished benefices, who owed everything to the
king, were more docile instruments than the wealthy
nobles.

In 1601, the royal council consisted of fourteen
bishops and only six lay members. The governor and
the chancellor were always ecclesiastics. The king fre-
quently conferred high ecclesiastical dignities upon the
sons of peasants. It was of these that Bocskay said :
*' being of humble origin they are naturally of a servile
spirit."

Another desire of the Habsburgs was to make the
taxes permanent. Such a course would no doubt have
been of some advantage to the country. It was impossible
to maintain a regular army, and to build towns and keep
them in good order, if the king had no definite income
upon which he could reckon. But the Estates, conscious
of the fact that the king was not really one with the
nation, and fearing lest he should at some time turn his
power against it, guarded jealously their right of con-
trolling taxation. They made many concessions but would
not surrender this peaceful means of making their influ-
ence felt. In 1545 Ferdinand, ignoring the Estates,
sought the advice of the prelates and the magnates, but
as they pointed out that taxes could only be voted by the
Diet he convened that assembly. Also, in the year 1558,
in accordance with the advice of the Palatine Nadasdy»
the king abandoned his contention that he could order
taxes to be levied even if they had not been voted.

King Maximilian saw still more clearly that he could
not abolish this right of the nation. In 1566, when certain
statesmen advised him to ask the Diet to empower him to

360

THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL POWER.

collect such taxes as had been voted for one year, every
succeeding year until the Diet was convened again, he
replied that such an attempt would promote discontent
and excitement.

In the year 1603, when the proposal was made that
King Rudolf should demand from the counties the money
he needed, the king's Viennese Treasurer replied that this
step would lead to no result, because it was not probable
that all the counties would comply with the demand, and
if a few refused to do so the others would withdraw their
consent.

In 1559 the king asked that taxes should be voted
for six years, but the Diet refused to vote them for more
than one year, alleging as its reason that if the king had
a permanent income very probably he would not convene
the assembly.

The king was generally content with less than he
asked for. In 1569, for example, he needed a million
florins, but his German counsellors told him that he could
not deal with the Hungarians as he did with the Austrians,
and that as the Hungarians would probably give less than
was demanded of them, the king should ask for a million
and a half.

There was one other matter concerning which king
and nation came into collision, and in this case too the
king was the aggressor. Before the time of the Habs-
burgs the members of the national assembly used
to appoint a few of their number to record in
Avriting the decisions arrived at. This work was
done after the members had dispersed to their
homes, and those who were chosen for the task
performed it in concert with the king, who had very great
influence upon the result, because so much depended
upon the actual wording of the acts. Moreover it
sometimes happened that the members, anxious to
bring the session to a close, departed without hav-
ing chosen anyone for the task, which was ac-
cordingly performed by the king's own officials.

3B1

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Sometimes the Diet had passed resolutions concerning
matters which the king was entitled to decide alone.
Sometimes its proceedings had taken the form of a peti-
tion to the king. In all such cases the king made such
alterations in the record as he thought fit, without exceed-
ing his rights. The Habsburgs took advantage of these
precedents. Ferdinand I. was not even present at the
Diets of 1543, 1545, 1547 and 1554, nor was Maximilian
present in 1566, but when, after the dissolution of the
assembly, these kings did not agree with certain points
in the memorandum, they made alterations on their own
authority. This proceeding did not have very serious con-
sequences as the kings never ventured to act thus in any
vital matter, so the nation raised no violent protest against
their action -

Actions which had formerly been occasional autocratic
illegalities on the part of the monarch, and which under
different circumstances the Diet would have gradually ren-
dered impossible, tended to become settled custom in con-
sequence of the nation's diminished power of resistance to
encroachment upon its rights. The situation was emin-
ently favourable to the monarch and greatly increased his
authority. He acquired more complete control over the
executive than the monarch had ever possessed before, and
exercised a greater influence over legislation than was
given to him by the right of sanctioning and vetoing
measures.

Bfi2

INCREASE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

CHAPTER XX

INCREASE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

The growth of the royal power was in itself salutary
for the nation, and the evils which made their appearance
might not have arisen if the kings had pursued a thor-
oughly Hungarian policy. Unfortunately foreign influ-
ences grew stronger simultaneously with the increase of
kingly authority and the independence of the country be-
came endangered. The very power to which the nation
looked for defence seemed likely to destroy it. There is
no reason for thinking that the first Habsburg rulers
wished to subordinate Hungary to their other dominions,
or to form one united state of all their territories, for it
was quite unlike them to sacrifice present peace for the
sake of some remote aim. Nor did they desire to German-
ise Hungary. Of the first three Habsburg kings only
Maximilian was German at heart. Ferdinand's mother
tongue was Spanish and in all his thoughts he was nearer
to Spain than to Germany. Rudolf spent his youth at the
Court of Philip II. of Spain and remained entirely under
Spanish influences. Germany was not pleased with these
kings on account of their Catholicism and consequent oppo-
sition to the new faith. If those monarchs did not pursue
a German policy even in Germany itself, what was there
to induce them to do so in Hungary ? In that age politics
were largely dominated by considerations of religion. The
unity of states was secured by community of religious
beliefs rather than by kinship of race.

Moreover the Habsburgs were less likely than any
other rulers to identify themselves with the interests of
one nation alone. They governed many peoples and a

363

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

pronounced national character would have made their
position very difficult.

Historical truth often suffers through historians attri-
buting to the past ideas current in their own times.
Ferdinand tried loyally to do his duty to Hungary.
Probably he had little love for the Hungarian constitu-
tion or the Hungarian character, and no doubt the dis-
organised community had few attractive features, yet in
all likelihood the king was actuated by no ill-will when he
laid the foundations of the system which jeopardised the
country's independence. He was probably led by a real
desire to facilitate good government and to place military
matters on a better footing, and it is possible that he did
not altogether trust the people, whom he knew so little.

The chief cause of the increase of foreign influence
was the circumstance that the struggle against the Turks
was one in which all the dominions of Ferdinand were
concerned and not only Hungary. The fraction of the
country which acknowledged the Habsburgs could not
defend itself effectively.

The Hungarian Estates often acknowledged this and
asked for foreign military aid or for money. Ferdinand's
hereditary provinces voted large sums yearly for the
Turkish wars. The German Empire often gave assist-
ance, while the Pope and the Spanish relatives of the king
sent money. Some Hungarian fortresses were maintained
by foreign money and many of the troops, both foreigners
and Hungarians, were similarly paid.

Lender the successors of Ferdinand the situation re-
mained the same. During the sixteenth century the non-
Hungarian dominions of the Habsburgs contributed more
money towards the expense of the war than Hungary.
Foreign troops did not operate independently of the Hun-
garian soldiers but side by side with them. Sometimes in
the same fortress there were Austrians, Germans, Hun-
garian royal and county troops, private troops of the great
nobles, and also soldiers paid by several foreign rulers.
Necessity demanded that the troops should be sent wher-

Bfi4

INCREASE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

ever the call for them was most urgent, and it could not
be considered whether this intermingling was legally
correct or not. It w^as also essential that these varied ele-
ments should be under a single chief, otherwise discipline
would have been impossible. The vital interests at stake
made legal considerations of secondary importance. The
efficient conduct of the war necessitated unity of control.

Since war had to be conducted in common, the means
of war became a common concern, and accordingly the
finances of the various countries had to come under com-
mon management.

Foreign affairs also became a matter in which all the
Habsburg dominions were equally interested. Questions
relating to the Turks, for example, were primarily Hun-
garian questions as they concerned Hungarian territory,
but they affected Austria too since the Austrians had to
bear their share of the burden of war, and such affairs
could not be separated from the general European policy
of the Habsburgs.

Naturally, in such an entangled situation the monarch
sought the advice of those whom he most trusted, and as
his power and the future of his dominions w^ere at stake,
no legal scruple kept him from turning to those from
whom he expected most, who w^ere usually foreigners.

Ferdinand was a middle-aged man when he ascended
the throne of Hungary. He had had his own confidants
and his own principles of government, and he w^as then
obliged to become accustomed to new ones and to share
the life of a nation practically unknown to him.

The Habsburgs were used to the rigid etiquette of the
Spanish Court and kept themselves aloof from their sub-
jects, while at the Hungarian Court such stiffness was
unknown.

The Hungarian kings had been powerful ; their person
and their exalted position had been regarded with venera-
tion : yet they had lived the life of the nation and had not
been surrounded by many formalities. Hence there was

365

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

such a contrast between the ideas of Ferdinand and his
Hungarian subjects as made co-operation difficult.

The Habsburg kings were often kept far from Hun-
gary by their imperial duties. They could not go to Hun-
gary so often as the nation would have liked, but unfortu-
nately they were less frequently there than they might
have been. If they had sacrificed some of their comfort
they might have done much to win the affection of the
people. As it was they never got to know them. Spend-
ing always the shortest possible time in the country, they
never learnt to adapt themselves to its customs. When
at long intervals, during the sittings of the Diet, they
visited Hungary, they observed certain details in the life
of the people to which they and their fastidious courtiers
were not accustomed.

Naturally that age so full of vicissitudes was not
favourable to culture, and the people's manners were not
such as were fashionable at the Escurial. Also, the politi-
cal fluctuations of some of the country's statesmen, inevit-
able in a country so divided as Hungary then was, weak-
ened the king's confidence in the nation. The first few
years especially embittered Ferdinand. Several great
nobles openly threatened to go over to the opposite party,
and the Diet itself passed laws which appeared to deal
with such action as though it were quite pardonable. It
is true that such cases of disloyalty were often due to the
king's own behaviour, his impotence and the great suffer-
ings of the people.

But what king could see that the fault lay with him-
self, or could forgive disloyalty however accounted for?
The Habsburgs saw in such conduct the manifestation of
a spirit utterly repugnant to them, the spirit of the Golden
Bull, which declared that loyalty was only obligatory upon
subjects while it was beneficial to the country. This
theory of conditional loyalty was abhorrent to the repre-
sentative of Spanish ideas, and certainly any king's confi-
dence would be shaken by the idea that his subjects were
to judge whether he had fulfilled his duties or not. More-

366

INCREASE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

over, the policy of Martinuzzi was enough to shake the con-
fidence of foreigners in Hungarian statesmen.

Unfortunately the king looked unfavourably not only
upon the nation's faults, but also upon its best characteris-
tics. For example, the strong national sentiment, which
w^as the nation's most valuable quality, and had enabled it
to retain its place among the surrounding nations, awak-
ened nothing but antipathy in the heart of the ruler. The
Habsburgs governed countries which did not form an or-
ganic whole, and which had very varied interests. They
could not identify themselves entirely with any one of
those countries. Their one aim was to assure for themselves
a position worthy of their imperial title. The crown of
Hungary w^as to them only a means to that end, and not
at all the only one or the most important one in their pos-
session. For Hungarian politicians, on the other hand,
their country was naturally the highest and final aim.
They might be loyal subjects to their king, but a great
part of his interests was a matter of absolute indifference
to men who cared not what influence he exerted on the
Rhine or the Po. Any Hungarian frontier fortress was
much more important to them. The Habsburgs judged
matters of vital importance to Hungary from the point of
view of their wider interests, while Hungarians judged
international politics according to their influence upon
Hungary. Hungarian statesmen saw that their interest
lay in defending the privileges of Parliament. They con-
stantly dwelt on constitutional rights, while it was from
these constitutional rights that the king w^as trying his
utmost to free himself. In 1558 the king declared that he
was "unwilling to hear" his Hungarian subjects speak of
" rights and privileges " when he asked their advice con-
cerning the common w^elfare. His opinion was that men
should not attach more importance to freedom than to the
common good, but his Hungarian counsellors, on the
other hand, could not see how the idea of the common good
could be separated from that of freedom. The country
had sought both freedom and prosperity under the protec-

367

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

tion of the Habsburgs, and mutual estrangement was sure
to result if the king infringed the nation's laws. The
Habsburg kings never treated the leading members of the
Hungarian Estates as their confidential advisers, but turned
for counsel to their officials in Austria or in the German
Empire, who served the dynasty itself, and not this or that
country. It was this class accordingly that had most in-
fluence over the monarch. Ferdinand said that it was
'* with consternation he heard " the Hungarians speak
about *' some election '* when he asked them how he could
have his son, and *' by the grace of God his heir," crown-
ed. Distrust grew between monarch and counsellors,
and that distrust extended even to those who deserved the
ruler's perfect confidence. Nicholas Palffy, the great con-
queror of the Turks, had given the most perfect proof
of his loyalty, yet it was only in the company of a Ger-
man councillor that the king allowed him to go and treat
with the excited Estates. Very often questions arising be-
tween the king and his Hungarian counsellors were treated
as though the two parties were hostile powers. An interest-
ing case happened in the year 1587. Rudolf II. sent the
Archduke Ernest to Parliament with instructions not to
come to any decision without consulting his German
advisers. The instructions were superfluous, as the Arch-
duke would have acted in that way without them, but he
followed them to the letter. When the Hungarians asked
an audience of him, he first asked his German advisers
whether he should grant it, and when the members of the
deputation had arrived and made their requests, he sent
them into an adjoining room while he discussed what
answer he should give.

Even these trifling details show what a gulf existed
between ruler and people. And this mistrust operated to
the disadvantage of Hungary in military matters. Mili-
tary interests demanded that foreign officers should not be
debarred from holding command, and that sometimes
Hungarian fortresses should be garrisoned and officered
by foreigners, but the monarch continually appointed for-

B68

INCREASE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

eign officers to a far greater degree than military interests
rendered necessary. This course of action could only
have been prompted by his distrust of the Hungarians.
Very soon these foreign officers tried to make their hold
upon the Hungarian fortresses permanent. Just as in
later times the Dutch tried to establish a military frontier
against the French in Belgium, so the Austrians endeav-
oured to hold the Hungarian marches against the Turks.
In these efforts they were supported by the king. Instead
of standing above both parties as an impartial judge, the
monarch did all in his power to help the Austrians to get
the fortresses of the Hungarians into their own hands.
Under cover of this attempt of the Austrians the king
really sought to obtain the fulfilment of his own wishes.
In 1588 the Archduke Ernest said that " it had always
been of great importance that the frontier fortresses should
be held by foreigners, but in consequence of the nation's
disposition this had now become doubly important." This
expresses the real views of the dynasty. Its desire was
that there should always be foreign armies in the country
which in case of need might be used against the Hun-
garians themselves. As a result Hungary lost more and
more of her independence, while foreign influences be-
came predominant even in the most vital matters of the
vState. He who should have guarded the people's liberties
strove to curtail them.

In this result the nation could not acquiesce. The
Hungarians were not averse to an augmentation of the
king's power, but they could not allow that power to be
wielded in a hostile spirit. Resistance was inevitable, and
the people saw with sorrow that danger threatened from
the very quarter to which they had looked for protection.
On the one hand they beheld the weapons of the Turks,
while on the other hand was the danger of annexation.

369

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY

CHAPTER XXL

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

During the sixteenth century Hungarians fought
against the danger of annexation only with constitutional
weapons. They endeavoured to ensure their independ-
ence by legislation. In military matters the one great aim
of Hungarian legislators was to place all Hungarian fort-
resses, and all soldiers living in the country, whether
Hungarians or foreigners, under Hungarian commanders.
This aim they were unable to achieve. Those who solicit
help cannot fix the conditions of that assistance, and as
the Hungarians had been compelled to ask for foreign aid
they could not impose the condition that their allies should
only send private soldiers.

The king made such use of this favourable circum-
stance that in 1536 and 1552 he returned no answer to the
nation's requests, and in 1563 he openly refused to sanc-
tion the decisions against the foreign commanders. The
Estates registered the declaration, characteristic of the
times, that although they must submit to this refusal, yet
as the question was a vital one, they would renew their
request again and again. In 1548 and 1553 a law was
passed to the effect that all foreign officials, captains of
fortresses and others, were to leave Hungary, and their
places to be filled by Hungarians. But the law remained
a dead letter because it attempted too much, and was just
as much opposed to the military interests of the country as
to the wishes of the king and of the foreign allies. The
king did not observe the law, even to the degree that would
have been consistent with his own interests.

370

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

From 1546 to 1563 the Estates commenced to adopt a
more practical policy. Recognising the fact that they
could not gain foreign military assistance and foreign
money without foreign officers, they sought at least to
regulate the actions of those officers. They demanded
that all foreign officers should obey the orders of the Hun-
garian Chancellor ; that in the fortresses the officers should
confine themselves to the work of defence; that revenue
was not to be handled by them ; that they should be sub-
ject to the Hungarian judges and be dealt with according
to the laws of the land ; and that they should not be allow-
ed to fix the price of provisions.

All these laws, while imposing certain restrictions
upon the foreigners, indirectly acknowledged that they
might be employed in Hungary. A strong effort was
made to secure at least that foreign commanders should
not lead Hungarian troops. Naturally this was not al-
ways feasible, as the soldiers could not always be grouped
according to their nationality, but the principle was sound.
Yet the king violated the principle even when it was not
necessary to do so. The law ran that " the head captains
of the country must be Hungarians,'* yet even this was
not observed although to do so would not have run coun-
ter to the necessities of war. The Commander-in-Chief
had been a foreigner from the very beginning. The sup-
remacy of this *' Captain-General " over the national
army was acknowledged by the law of 1547. The Hun-
garian Captain-General divided his command, and the
Estates only imposed the condition that he should reside
in the country. But in 1552 the desire arose for indepen-
dent action even in connection with the common war. In
that year a general mobilisation was planned, under the
leadership of the king or his son. The Estates demanded
that the support promised to the king should be given by
Hungarian soldiers led by Hungarian officers, and that
if the army should be divided, Hungarian commanders
should be appointed to the Hungarian part of the army,
with the same rank and powers as the foreign captains

371

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

enjoyed. The purpose of this law was to reconcile unity
of command with the country's independence, but those
who purposed this were not equal to the difficulties of their
task, and their aim was not achieved. Strategy would
have been hampered by the circumstance that the distri-
bution of the army was connected with legal conditions,
nor did the law make the Hungarian army independent,
for it did not provide that the royal council should be com-
posed'of Hungarians. As the Estates did not dare to force
the king to dismiss his foreign generals, so they did not
impose the condition that there should be Hungarian offi-
cers in the Council. They only decided that in case one
or other of the generals should be unable to discharge his
duties, a Hungarian should be appointed in his place to
the command of the Hungarian troops during the war. In
the following year the law was passed that on questions of
war the king should seek the advice of his Hungarian
Council. In 1555 the most vigorous effort was made to
secure independence. The Palatine was given back his
rights as Commander-in-Chief. He was placed over all
the troops, both Hungarian and foreign, and the Hun-
garians had entire control in military matters. But this
solution could not be final.

It is not right that the head of the army should be
elected for life, and not be removable from his post ex-
cept at the cost of grave complications. It is opposed to
the principle that the ablest and most suitable men should
command. It is equally opposed to the principle of the
division of labour that the same man should be entrusted
with military and political supremacy. Also how could
the nation expect that the king would willingly trust the
army which he had raised at so much expense, and with
so much trouble, to a man chosen by Hungarian legisla-
tors, and would hand over his power to someone entirely
independent of him ? How could foreign countries be
expected to supply troops again and again, if the law
always subordinated them to a politician who may have
given no proof of his military ability? The law never

872

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

became really effective. A year after the king sanctioned
it, he organised a permanent military Council in Vienna,
and thenceforth guided himself by the opinions of
that body. That foreign Council became omnipo-
tent in Hungary, and even the Palatine could not
prevent the king from acting according to its
advice. The situation created in this way was sanc-
tioned by the law of 1669, which allowed the control of
military matters to remain in the hands of the mili-
tary Council in Vienna. The only influence of the Hun-
garians over that Council was secured by the arrangement
that two Hungarian councillors, a magnate, and a pre-
late, should live at Court permanently in order that the
king might ask their advice. The law made a clear dis-
tinction between essentially Hungarian and common aff-
airs. Financial, military, and foreign affairs were con-
trolled by the Court, and the councillors of the dynasty,
and over these matters the Hungarians had little influence.
Common affairs were not under common management,
but were in the hands of an imperial Council which in-
cluded no Hungarian members.

Such a situation as this, however sanctioned by law,
could not be other than offensive to any nation. The Hun-
garians did not think it was lawful, although the Diet
had permitted it, and they constantly protested against it.
In the eighties there was a powerful revulsion of feeling
against the law of 1569, and an effort was made to erase
from the code the product of temporary weakness. In
1680 the Diet was dissolved without accomplishing any-
thing, because the legislators demanded the restoration of
the former freedom and of " independent government," as
otherwise they were not inclined to vote any taxes, while
the king would rather lose the taxes than alter the law of
1669. In 1682 and 1683 the parties drew a little nearer
together. The need of money was so urgent that the king
promised to restore the nation's rights, while the Estates
were so conciliatory that they voted the money asked for
in return for a mere promise. The king did not keep his

373

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

word, and until 1588 he governed without any revenue
from taxes. At length the time came when he could no
longer do without financial aid, and was obliged to con-
vene the Diet. In the course of the discussion which fol-
lowed, the king declared that his military Council in
Vienna was in his eyes the supreme authority in military
matters. He was not disposed to dismiss the foreign com-
manders, as such a step would offend the German and
Austrian legislators, who had voted military assistance,
and who had made it a condition of such support that their
troops should serve under their own officers. The king
promised, however, that he would not slight the Hun-
garians, and pointed out that he had chosen several cap-
tains from their ranks. The Diet, on the other hand,
demanded that the king should discuss military matters
only with Hungarian councillors, and that the command-
ers of all troops in Hungary, including the foreign sol-
diers, should be Hungarians. It was quite willing that
the king should listen to the advice of foreigners also in
very important matters, and that he should employ some
foreigners as officers, if they were eminent soldiers. The
Hungarians sought to allot to the foreigners the subordin-
ate part which the king had intended for themselves. One
party strove to make a Court affair of the common military
interests of the Habsburg dominions, while the other party
endeavoured to treat them as a purely Hungarian affair.
After much discussion a compromise was arrived at. The
nation did not gain all the influence which its legislators
had claimed, but only a *' due amount of power which the
situation rendered necessary." The law enacted that the
king or the archduke might discuss military affairs with
the whole of the Hungarian council, or with such of the
councillors as had to be near the king, but he was not
obliged to do so. The Imperial Council was not forbid-
den to meddle with the Turkish wars, nor did Parliament
settle anything concerning the separation of the Hungar-
ian and the foreign troops. Common affairs were left as
they had been before, except that they were placed under

374

I

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

two co-ordinate authorities. These authorities were not
really equal because the judge who stood above them both
was not impartial. The Imperial Council was a body of
military experts, while the Hungarian Council was a
political body, a fact which told to its disadvantage.

The efforts of the Hungarians to secure some con-
trol in military matters took a new direction towards the
end of the century, during the long war. They passed no
more laws to give Hungary the leading part in military
operations, but they endeavoured to define the sphere of
activity of the Hungarian Council in matters outside actual
warfare, such as the compulsory labour engaged in build-
ing the frontier fortresses, the provisioning of the army,
and the supply of ammunition. Otherwise everything
remained in ' statu quo.' Sometimes the advice of the
Hungarian Council was listened to, but the highest mili-
tary authority was the Council in Vienna. The combined
armies on the field of battle were under a single comman-
der, who was either an archduke or a foreign officer. The
Hungarian legislators were modest in their demands.
They had abandoned the request that the supreme com-
mand should be given to a Hungarian, and only asked
that soldiers who were paid with Hungarian money should
be divided into units under Hungarian officers. A law
was passed enacting that the three district commanders
should be Hungarians.

The armies equipped by the country were to be led
by Hungarian captains, and if they went to war they were
to go in county regiments under the county banners.
With regard to the Hungarian troops that were paid from
the king's personal income or with foreign money, the
only condition enforced was that they should be subject to
Hungarian courts-martial if need should arise. The de-
fence of the frontier fortresses might be entrusted to for-
eigners without reserve, Parliament abandoning its for-
mer objections in this respect. During the long wars,
Hungary added several large bodies of troops to the
army, and the nation would have been satisfied if their

375

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

immediate officers had been Hungarians, yet even this
result was not attained for the district captains themselves
were not always Hungarians.

Especially in the northern parts of Hungary the
Imperial Government dreaded Hungarian commanders,
because their duty there would have been to act against
Transylvania, and it would have been folly to set one Hun-
garian against another. It was impossible to keep all the
Hungarian soldiers together, so numbers of them came
diiectly under foreign officers.

The Estates strove to avoid the joint management of
foreign affairs. They demanded that negotiations should
not be carried on with the Turks without consulting the
Hungarian Council, because the Hungarians understood
the Turks best (1546). Hungary also negotiated a peace
treaty with Poland in 1596. The Estates frequently de-
manded the restoration of all the rights of the Council,
the Palatine, and the whole nation (1536, 1548, 1552, 1553,
1554, 1563, 1564, 1588), but the laws passed failed to
secure influence to the Hungarians.

A third point for which the legislature contended was
financial control. The money requisite for the Turkish
wars was contributed by all the States interested, and it
was handled by two bodies, the Vienna Court Treasury,
and the Hungarian Treasury at Pozsony, and as the for-
mer body was in the immediate proximity of the Emperor
and disposed of larger sums than the other, the supreme
control gradually passed into its hands. The Hun-
garian Treasury, as a subservient bureaucratic body, was
reconciled to this position of inferiority. The Estates,
however, frequently spoke of the independence of the
Hungarian Treasury (1552, 1553, 1554), and declared that
all officials concerned with the revenue must be subject
to that body, and take their instructions from it, and not
from the Viennese Treasury. But in 1569 the king car-
ried his point in this matter also. In 1588 the efforts at
reform extended to financial matters, but the Estates were
less successful here than in military affairs. The king

376

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

was empowered to determine the limits of the activity of
the Hungarian Treasury. The king was to hear the
opinions of the Hungarian Council if he thought it desir-
able.

The canker of foreign influence affected even the most
obviously internal affairs of the country. The Court
Chancery had put the Hungarian Chancery into the back-
ground. The foreign body, which enjoyed the king's con-
fidence, and was near his person, usurped the right of
hearing the petitions of private persons, and of issuing
orders in Hungary. The foreign soldiers and officials
appealed to it even in matters relating to Hungary. In
addition, several noblemen's estates which had become
crown property, were given by the king to foreigners ; so,
too, were many county lieutenancies and bishoprics. Be-
fore the time of the Habsburgs this had been forbidden by
law. The Hungarian nobles were very indignant at such
action, and the king could not refuse to undo the wrong.
The laws of several years (1536-1588) treated of these
offences, and their termination. Nevertheless, violations
of the law were frequent, a state of affairs which under-
mined that respect for law which has ever been the strong-
est support of the royal authority. During those troub-
lous times respect for the law was none too strong, and
transgressors made the excuse that the king himself did
not observe the laws of the land. The king set the bad
example, but he himself suffered most in the end.

The sixteenth century passed away without the king
and nation having become one in spirit. That century
did not bring the crisis in the nation's affairs to a head,
but it fostered dissatisfaction, embittered feeling, and a
sense of grievance, which were harbingers of dangerous
events. The dynasty did much harm to itself as well as
to the nation by its policy.

The nation's susceptibilities were cruelly hurt by the
spread of foreign influence, and the efforts made to destroy
the country's independence. The method of successful
annexation is always to attach the people to the conquer-

377

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ing power by the thread of interest. Ancient Rome and
Great Britain attached the inhabitants of the annexed pro-
vinces to the mother country by opening to them careers
which they could not hope to enter upon as citizens of an
independent country. The Habsburgs also could have
employed this means, but they did not.

To the Austrian nobles the high rank of their Sove-
reign was advantageous, and in time they became a real
Court aristocracy. They devoted themselves entirely to
the Habsburg empire, and forgot their smaller fatherland.
The Hungarians, on the other hand, only experienced the
disadvantage of being linked to a great empire. Many
advantages and posts of honour which they had formerly
enjoyed, were taken from them, and those which remained
had diminished in importance. They had much less op-
portunity than before to obtain distinction and wealth.
They could not become absorbed by the idea of the Habs-
burgs' glory or decline, for the one object of their
thoughts was Hungary.

The dynasty lost much by not striving to win the
Hungarian nobles to the support of its international pol-
icy. Without counting the ' damnum emergens,' the
wound inflicted upon the nation, the * lucrum cessans '
was by no means unimportant. At that time Hungary
was rich in men of talent. In addition to those immor-
tal leaders, Zrinyi, Dobo, Jurisics, and the rest, than whom
no nation and no age has produced better soldiers, the
country had eminent statesmen, such as Martinuzzi, Bath-
ory, Bocskay, and Bethlen. The Batthyanys, Perenyis,
Nadasdys, Thurz6s, and Illeshdzys, would have been the
pride of any Court. Yet in the Council of the Hungar-
ian king they played a subordinate part. Men of talent
found scope only in Transylvania, and accordingly they
all drifted thither. How much more attractive the rule of
the Habsburgs would have been if they had opened to
Hungarians the broad field of Europe. A system of
government which does not discover and foster talent is
always weak. This omission was the more disastrous as

B78

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

the Habsburgs sadly lacked eminent fellow workers. At
a time when France produced the Guises, Henry IV. and
Sully, and the Netherlands, William of Orange ; when in
England Queen Elizabeth was surrounded by such men
as Burghley, Drake, and Raleigh, and Spain had a
Charles V. and a Don John of Austria, the Habsburgs
had not one really great statesman or soldier. It is true
to a certain extent that in the wars against the Turks unity
of command was essential, yet the devotion of the Hun-
garian nation was still more necessary. Why did not the
Habsburgs give the Hungarian officials some part in the
management of common concerns, or why did they not
treat matters of common interest at joint meetings of the
two Councils? At least they might have given some
place among the Court dignitaries to eminent Hungar-
ians. By so doing they would have alleviated the embit-
tered feeling of the nation. It would not have been diffi-
cult for the king to organise the joint executive in such a
way that its Hungarian portion consisted of men to his
taste, and that the final decision always rested with him-
self. The sympathy of the nation could so easily have
been won. The Hungarians were grateful even for empty
phrases. In 1593 the archduke Matthias exercised a con-
siderable influence upon the decisions of the Diet by the
mere statement that his name was a sign of his sympathy
with the Hungarians. A few trifling details, a Hun-
garian costume, or a few Hungarian words, would have
done much to remove friction and suspicion. Men can
easily be led captive by their vanity, and of that quality
the Hungarians had a full share, yet the Habsburgs made
no effort to flatter it, perhaps because they themselves were
too conceited. Henry IV. said on one occasion that Paris
was worth a mass. The love of the Hungarians would
not have been bought dearly by the Habsburgs at the cost
of the abandonment of a few of their prejudices, and the
adoption of a conciliatory attitude. The kings frequently
made it a pretext for their conduct that the Hungarian
statesmen were not trustworthy. In certain cases this

379

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

may have been true, yet amid such unhappy circumstances
as those of Hungary, where every step meant danger,
where could the dynasty look for absolute and unselfish
devotion ? Was Germany or Bohemia more trustworthy
during that period? The Hungarian nation had this
valid excuse for its conduct, that Ferdinand could not suc-
cessfully defend the country, and that after one feeble
attempt to drive out the conqueror of Mohacs, he left the
vanquished and terrified nation to its fate.

The king should not have visited the faults of a few
upon the whole nation, nor have responded to those faults
with still graver ones. The Habsburgs could and should
have fostered the loyalty of the nation, and their mistrust
was the reason why the accusation of disloyalty became
more and more justified. The disaffection displayed dur-
ing the first few years of Ferdinand's reign was the fault
of the nation, but that it persisted was the fault of the
dynasty in missing the favourable opportunity of attach-
ing the nation to itself.

The Hungarian legislature did not on its part attempt
to reconcile uniform military command with the indepen-
dence of the country. It protested against any applica-
tion of the principle of joint control. In its opinion
everything that concerned Hungary or was connected with
the war being waged on Hungarian territory, was an ex-
clusively Hungarian affair. The nation's ideal was a
purely Hungarian kingdom managing its own affairs in
perfect independence, but the first condition of the attain-
ment of that ideal was the ability of the nation to stand
on its own feet, and this condition was absent. When
the demands of a great war absorbed the strength of Hun-
gary, and blended it with that of the king's other domin-
ions, an independent policy became impossible. Demands
which did not adapt themselves to actual circumstances
remained a dead letter, and had not the slightest influence
upon the development of the State. The reality was that
Hungary was reduced to the level of a province, and
affairs of State were settled without the nation being con-

380

RESISTANCE TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES.

suited. A foreign- government had established its supre-
macy over the government of Hungary, and exercised
control over Hungarian affairs. If the nation submitted to
this, the fault lay not with the Estates, but with the king.
It was the king's duty to lead the nation, because the deci-
sive power rested with him, and his therefore was the re-
sponsibility. The Estates could not force the king in the
direction of reform, but he could have realised most of
their wishes. The king could only gain by placing com-
mon interests upon a proper footing, while the nation was
likely to lose much.

The question was whether the fraction of a weakened
nation could maintain its control over the Hungarian
statesmen who were occupied with the management of
those affairs in which Hungary was jointly interested with
the other dominions of the Habsburgs. Would not those
statesmen, dwelling in the atmosphere of the Court, be-
come strangers to their country ?

They naturally had to deal with matters which the
majority of the nation could not understand, and accord-
ingly were peculiarly open to suspicion. In the absence
of a strong Constitution this community of affairs might
easily lead to the yielding of the most important defences
of the nation's independence into the hands of the foreign
powers. Instead of an improvement of the situation there
might have occurred a w^eakening of the nation's power of
resistance.

381

DEVELOPxMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER XXIL

THE POWER OF RESISTANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

The monarchial power in the age we are contemplat-
ing was in Hungary a foreign power, because the wearer
of the crown did not regard himself as a Hungarian, and
trusted foreigners more than Hungarians, while his non-
Hungarian interests and ambitions were more important
in his eyes than those connected with the realm of St.
Stephen.

This foreign power did not pursue a distinctly anti-
Hungarian policy, so that the Hungarian constitution was
not threatened with entire abolition, but the monarch
might change his attitude at any moment, and it was
doubtful what would become of the country's freedom in
the event of such a change, and if the powers which had
not been able to unite should clash.

Two forces had always dominated Hungarian poli-
tics. One was enthusiasm for the strength and security
of the State, a sentiment which could sometimes be over-
shadowed, but could never be eradicated. The other was
the people's intense love of liberty. The nation had
always been accustomed to shape its own course, and was
ever ready to take up arms in defence of its prerogatives.
Before the sixteenth century the strong national sentiment
and the desire for glory were powerful supports of the
monarchy, but since the advent of the Habsburgs the
whole situation had changed. Patriots felt a growing
anxiety lest the royal power should itself endanger the
country's independence. It remained for the king to show

382

I

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION.

that he would defend the country and to disperse the na-
tion's anxiety. He could no longer reckon upon the en-
thusiastic loyalty of his subjects and could only count
upon a cold perception on their part of the most prudent
course. Opportunism took the place of enthusiasm. It
was no longer the united prompting of heart and mind
which urged to loyalty, as had been the case in the time of
the Arpads, or of Louis or Matthias, for heart and mind
were now in conflict with one another. The love of free-
dom found nourishment in considerations which had for-
merly checked its exaggeration. The class privileges of
the Estates of the realm came to serve an interest which
they had previously endangered, that namely, of national
independence. The nation began to believe that its exis-
tence could only be assured by securing the rights of the
privileged classes, and it therefore set itself to defend those
rights. It remained to be seen whether there was still
sufficient vitality in the constitution and in the nation to
oppose the king, or whether he had not undermined the
strength of the constitution.

As we have seen the Diet had preserved its most valu-
able rights, the voting of troops and money. The king
could not avail himself of the nation's strength without
the consent of the Diet. Unfortunately, the Habsburgs
were to a great extent independent of the Hungarian
taxes, and the sums they obtained from this source they
spent on their Hungarian wars. The taxes were really
more needed by the nation than by the king. If the taxes
were refused, the nation suffered. The king could obtain
men and money from other sources, and the nation asked
him to use them for the benefit of Hungary. Herein lay
a great danger to the country's independence, for what
would be the fate of Hungary if its defence were entrusted
entirely to foreign forces ? Legally the Estates could
determine the extent of the sacrifices which the nation was
to make, but the actual situation prevented them from
exercising that right. What was legal was practically
impossible. The principal means of the peaceful defence

383

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of their rights was in the hands of the people, but the peo-
ple were too feeble to use effectively this weapon. The Diet
had lost that influence upon the executive which it had
possessed under the Jagellos. Bureaucracy had begun
its work. It had led to the creation of officials who were
trained to obey, and who expected everything in life from
their office. But bureaucracy only spread among the
higher official circles. It never gained a hold over the
provincial government, as it did in France. And even in
the centre it only extended to certain bodies. The high-
est authority, the Hungarian Council, was one with the
nation, and it was composed of the leading members of
the Estates. The bureaucratic bodies, moreover, had less
influence than the authorities which they displaced, be-
cause of their recent formation. They lacked the author-
ity which only ancient traditions can give. The wearer
of the sacred crown, whose predecessors had been in close
touch with the nation, and whose prestige had lent author-
ity to their representatives, was far from the country. The
machinery whose mainspring was in a foreign country
commenced to slacken. If the Habsburgs had realised
how important Hungary was to their future career, they
would have spent more time in the country. They de-
sired to increase their power, but omitted to take the step
that would have led them to their goal. The king*s in-
fluence over the executive was greater than it had ever
been before, but the influence of the executive over the
country was less.

The power of the executive government was lessened
by decentralisation. The establishment of the Turkish
power in the centre of Hungary, from whence it could
threaten every part of the royal territory, had hastened the
process of decentralisation, which since the death of
Matthias had been rapid. Many of the counties held
united meetings, and gradually an instrument of auto-
nomy was developed, which stood between the Diet and
the inhabitants of the counties. The importance of these
meetings increased. They decided upon general arma-

R84

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION.

ment, and imposed war taxes, although this function had
been made the monopoly of the Diet by a law passed in
the time of the Jagellos. The meetings were usually con-
vened by the Palatine, the County Lieutenant, or the dis-
trict captains, but on occasions of urgent necessity the
representatives of a threatened district assembled without
being officially summoned, merely at the call of some
nobleman.

The king saw that these uncontrollable assemblies
might become dangerous, and frequently expressed his
displeasure with them. In 1597 he even prohibited them,
but necessity proved stronger than the king. A govern-
ment which is unable to defend the country cannot pre-
vent the various districts from taking measures for their
own protection.

Even the kings were glad of the money and men that
the counties offered them, and overlooked the unlawful-
ness of the source from which the supplies came.

The nobles of the various districts of the country
became accustomed to new centres, and to an authority
independent of the central government. The organisa-
tions which had been formed for the purpose of fighting
the Turks w^ere likely to become the organs of a war for
freedom. The different districts lived an independent
political life, and they gradually prepared the way for an
attack upon the royal power.

The autonomy of the separate counties also increased.
It was in 1548 that the law was passed which made the
post of deputy county lieutenant subject to election. The
sphere of activity of this official had been considerably
enlarged. In former times he had been a mere tool in the
hands of the county lieutenant to whom he owed his ap-
pointment. Since 1542 the law had assigned to him
many important duties and privileges. The county lieu-
tenant frequently exercised authority over several coun-
ties, or held other offices, or was away at the wars, or in
charge of some frontier fortress, and could not devote so
much time and energy to a single cownty as the deputy

385

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

lieutenant, who always resided there, could give. In
1536 the county had gained the right to control the lieu-
tenant. In the event of complaint by the county, the
king was obliged to dismiss the lieutenant, the only county
official whom he had appointed, and to appoint in his
place someone acceptable to the inhabitants. The county
officials maintained peace and order; they punished mur-
derers, and all other kinds of law-breakers, re-occupied
stolen territory, and prosecuted the turbulent and preda-
tory soldiery.

Even the important functions of recruiting soldiers
and collecting taxes were discharged by the county itself.
The central executive had no scope for its activity in the
counties, while these gained an important influence in
the centre. We have already seen that even before the
time of the Habsburgs practical considerations had made
it desirable that representatives should be sent to the Diet
instead of the whole nobility appearing there. The
gentry tried without avail to oppose the new methods, but
after the battle of Mohacs all attempts to revive the old
system ceased. The gentry, who had formerly received
a general summons to attend the Parliament, now elected
representatives at the county meetings. The general
situation explains this reform. The nobles could not
leave their homes in great numbers because they feared an
attack by the Turks. Travelling was dangerous and
costly, while life in the centre was expensive. Money was
scarce, and what could be got was needed for the sol-
diers, or for repairing the fortresses.

The adoption of the electoral system furthered decen-
tralisation. Those who formerly had taken a part per-
sonally in the work of legislation now sought to secure
more influence upon the legislature than the mere right of
voting at an election. They gave directions to their re-
presentative. They not only chose the individual who
was to wield their rights, but determined the policy he was
to pursue. The county organisations sought to make
their united influence felt from a distance. Had the direc-

386

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION.

tions given to the representatives been obligatory, so that
a vote contrary to them would have been invalid, the in-
fluence of the counties would have been supreme, but
things never went quite so far. The instructions given
carried no compulsion, though they exercised a certain
pressure. Only in very important cases, and after thor-
ough study of the changing political situation would a
representative venture to ignore the will of the county to
which he was attached, not merely by the tie of his tem-
porary mission, but by all his interests and associations.
The Diet remained the centre of the community, but it
came under the moral influence of the county organisa-
tions. The directions received by the representatives did
not prevent the transaction of business, but they increased
the Diet's power of resistance to the exaggerated demands
of the king. The members frequently declared that they
could not discuss the proposals of the Government be-
cause the instructions they had received said nothing on
the matters in question, or sometimes they said that they
were not in a position to assent to the king's proposition
as if they did so they would come into collision with their
electors. Those who hold the power in their hands are
no friends to this system of giving directions. Gabriel
Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania, requested the counties
not to give such instructions to their representatives.
As he aspired to the throne he was afraid he would
find it more difficult to influence the counties than the
representatives.

The organisation of the Diet was such as to render it
more difficult to influence than it had formerly been. The
mixed crowds, with many uneducated persons among
them, which had constituted the national assembly under
the Jagellos, were susceptible to the commonest canvas-
sers' tricks, and could be easily led, but now the Assembly
was smaller in number and consisted of richer and better
educated men, specially selected for their task. Also,
while in former times the Diet was easily accessible to the
ruling powers if they desired to influence it, now the Gov-

387

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ernment had either to free the representatives from the
control of the counties or else had to influence the coun-
ties themselves, which possessed a strong political organ-
isation, were frequently situated far from the centre, and
in which the government had hardly any representatives.
The constitutional development of the sixteenth century
may be summed up in a few words. The central govern-
ment and the nation became more independent of each
other. The influence of the Diet upon the crown and the
central administration grew less and less, and vice versa.
This state of things did not promise a brilliant career for
the nation. Great achievements can only be looked for
when all the factors of a State act harmoniously. On the
other hand, it was this very looseness in the relations be-
tween king and people which alone enabled the weakened
nation to preserve its independence under a monarch who
relied upon his foreign resources. It was only the exag-
gerated decentralisation which made it possible for the
Hungarians to defy even their own government. Internal
unity of the State would have given the crown absolute
power.

As it was the monarch could not compel obedience.
He might go his own way, but he could not kill the soul
of the people. In this connection it was of the utmost
importance that practically the whole nation was armed.
Whereas in other countries peaceful occupations claimed
the majority of the inhabitants, and the work of defence
was entrusted to a class of professional soldiers, in Hun-
gary military service was universal. Besides the duty
imposed upon the aristocracy of personal service in the
wars, they had also to equip and maintain a certain num-
ber of soldiers in accordance with the extent of their pos-
sessions, and this burden rested upon them even when
the" country was at peace. All classes of the community
were accustomed to warfare. The camp was their real
home, and they could defend the constitution with the skill
they had acquired on the frontier. Resistance to the king
was made easier by the division of the army according to

888

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION^

counties. The county troops served under the county
banner and were led by a captain appointed by the county.
While in former times the bulk of the army had consisted
of the banderia of the great dignitaries standing near the
throne, now, when there was no Palatine, when the Vaj-
da of Transylvania had become an independent ruler and
the district of the former Banus of Temes, a Turkish pro-
vince, and when most of the ecclesiastics had lost all their
property, the county troops filled the vacant places, and
from being a reserve force became the fighting line. The
banderia of the less powerful nobles had also become
fewer-

It is true that every noble had the right to make a
separate banderium of his soldiers, but few exercised the
right. Even those who could have collected sufficient sol-
diers from their various estates rarely did so, because they
preferred the men to remain as a garrison in their fort-
resses. In 1595 it was forbidden by law to collect sol-
diers from different counties into one banderium, and con-
sequently the county troops, instead of forming private
banderia, became the nucleus of the national army, and
the independence of the counties created independence in
the army.

The scattered nature of the fighting had a similar con-
sequence. The whole country was eager for an attack
upon the Turks (1604). This favoured the concentration
of all the armed forces in the country in one line of battle,
and a united advance against the enemy at a time when
most of the Turkish forces were far away from Hungary.
But the men and the money necessary to make this for-
ward movement effective were rarely obtainable, so that
the country had to be satisfied with acting on the defen-
sive, and the defence could only be carried on by the
several districts. The Turks occupied the area between
the Danube and the Tisza, and from there they could
threaten every point on the Hungarian frontier, so the
Hungarian troops had to be dispersed over the long line
of fortresses. It was not one great army that defended the

389

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

country, but several small armies. The political conse-
quence of this localisation of the defence was the increas-
ing independence of the national army. Troops voted by
the Diet were generally placed under Hungarian officers,
and only came indirectly into communication with the
foreign commanders. When the whole of an army is
together in one camp the military chiefs can make their
authority felt more easily, and had this been the case the
foreign leaders would have had more influence. As it
was, most of the Hungarian soldiers were accustomed to
obeying Hungarian officers, and in this circumstance lay
one strong defence of the nation against the encroach-
ments of the king. But neither was the king defence-
less. His position in the provinces was better in
military matters than it was from a political point of view.
He always took care to have non-Hungarian forces in the
country, even in opposition to the law. His foreign sol-
diers were under foreign leaders, and the Hungarian sol-
diers, who were paid out of the king's personal income,
were also mostly led by foreigners, and all these, toge-
ther with the foreign commanders, placed over the national
army in contravention of the law, could be used against
the nation. The conflict between king and people might
easily have become a conflict between the different sections
of the army.

The great need of the nation was a strong standing
army, for only by such a force, well paid and well dis-
ciplined, could the Turks have been conquered. One of
the reasons which prevented its formation was the mutual
distrust of king and people. In 1595 the Estates proposed
that a standing army should be created, but the king
would not assent to the proposition. His Viennese Coun-
cil feared lest such an organisation might be turned
against the king. In 1604 it was the king who, acting on
the advice of Thurz6 and Pethe, tried to persuade the
Estates to establish a standing army, but then the Diet
was afraid either of the expense or of the preponderance
which the army might give to the royal power. Neither

390

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION.

party was sure which would become master of the pro-
posed army, and this doubt stopped all action in the
matter. The plan would certainly have involved great
expense. To maintain a permanent army perpetual taxes
would have been necessary, and an army maintained by
taxes which the Diet could not refuse to grant, and led
by foreign commanders, would have meant the end of the
nation's freedom. The power of resistance of a commun-
ity depends largely upon the degree of its internal har-
mony. As we have seen, Hungary's pre-eminence among
the countries of Europe was due to the perfect unity of its
nobility. Even to-day this is a source of its power. It
was to this circumstance that the community owed its con-
stitution, and at the commencement of the seventeenth
century this unity enabled the Hungarians to equip con-
siderable forces for the defence of that constitution.

Just before the battle of Mohacs the nobility appeared
to be threatened with disintegration, the magnates and
the gentry drifting apart, but the events which followed
that catastrophe put an end to the process. Many great
noble families became extinct and families belonging to
the gentry were elevated to their place, and these could
not forget their origin.

The course of development of the sixteenth century
was determined by the Turkish danger and the work of
defence which that danger entailed. The necessity for
united action could not fail to foster the esprit de corps
of the aristocracy. The magnates and the gentry had to
defend their fatherland together or die together. The
owner of a fortress became again the natural defender of
a district and the leader of its forces. The Diet was no
longer a battleground for the various sections of the nobil-
ity. Sometimes, indeed, there occurred vehement scenes
between the bulk of the gentry and certain of the great
nobles, but these were not due to class differences; often
they were attacks upon some local despot.

The difference between the magnates and the gentry
was that the former were more apt to make concessions

391

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to the king than the latter, but even this did not spring
from class selfishness. It was the magnates who suffered
most from the increase of foreign influence. The domin-
ions and military dignities granted to foreigners and the
small importance of the Hungarians hurt the feelings of
the proud magnates. It was in the service of the state that
they had grown great. If foreigners supplanted them
their future advancement was made impossible. If the
magnates were more conciliatory to the king than the
rest of the nation it was because of their opportunism, a
quality usually more in evidence among those who have
much to lose than in the masses of the people, who are
generally intransigent. This was so in Hungary, and if
we remember that the Court took much more pains to win
the great nobles than to conciliate the others, we can
easily understand why their opposition to the king was
less pronounced.

The value of the unity between the different strata of
the nobility was enhanced by the circumstance that the
Habsburgs then commenced to distribute titles. Within
the Hungarian nobility there began to be established such
gradations of rank as existed in the other European coun-
tries. The magnates, who were in frequent communica-
tion with the nobles of the western states, became accus-
tomed to use their titles. In former times only a few of
the noble families had titles, and those who had, rarely
used them. Now great changes were to be observed in
both these respects, and in the new graduated nobility
the title belonged not only to the head of the family, as
in England, but to all its members, in the continental
fashion.

These outward signs corresponded to inner changes.
It was at this period that the gentry ceased to play a direct
personal part in the work of legislation. This develop-
ment did not affect the rights of the magnates, who were
individually invited to the national assembly. They had
the means to attend the meetings of Parliament, and their
word was so weighty that their presence was desirable.

392

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION.

They alone remained in possession of their ancient rights
because only they could bear the burden of them. It was
fortunate for the nation that the harmony between the
various classes of the nobility still remained undisturbed
and that to political and religious disintegration there was
not added class discord.

Intermarriage, too, was frequent between the magnates
and the gentry. The leading factors of the nation came
into no collision, and they did not seek the support of the
crown against one another; they were still capable of
common action for a common aim, the country's freedom.

Unfortunately, the weaknesses of the old Hungarian
community also remained. The bourgeoisie did not live
in harmony with the nobility. The county and the town
were drawing closer together in legal respects but not in
sentiment. Unlike the magnates, both county and town
elected parliamentary representatives, and they frequently
took counsel together. They became accustomed to work-
ing side by side. The link which became noticeable in
England after the thirteenth century, and which played
an important part there in creating the united middle
classes, was forged in Hungary also. But the bourgeoisie
was of foreign origin and it had maintained its foreign
character. The towns excluded the Hungarian and titled
elements from their ranks, and left them no share in the
administration. In most towns they were not even allowed
to buy houses. In official life the German language was
used, and the bourgeoisie being foreign was attached to
the foreign king. The monarchs therefore desired to in-
crease the number of those "free royal towns" which sent
representatives to the Diet, but their efforts met with great
opposition on the part of the nobility.

If the nobility were opposed to the king, the towns
were driven by their interests into the royal camp, and a
clever king could have turned this situation to very great
account.

The other weak point of mediaeval Hungary was the
discontent of the peasants. These were not attached by

393

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

any ties to the free men of the country. The system under
which they lived demanded great sacrifies on their part.
They had to serve as soldiers and to work at the building
of fortresses; it was their forced labour and their taxes
which supported the state, the landowner and the church.
Their rights, however, had been reduced to a minimum.
They were bound to the district where they were born.
They could not leave their master however tyrannical he
might be, and the constant wars threatened their little
property and even their life. It was their class that paid
the greatest tribute in blood and money to the war, and
yet had the least profit from victory. They could not
fight with enthusiasm for such a system. Sometimes em-
bittered feeling carried them so far that they were ready to
help the Turks against the community that sucked their
blood, but as a rule they were still more afraid of the
pagans than of their Christian masters and therefore they
did not hamper the work of defence. Yet it was easy to
guess that the serf class would look with perfect indiffer-
ence upon the struggle for privileges between the Hun-
garian nobility and the king. He who enjoys no rights
whatever cannot be enthusiastic about the rights of some
other class.

In the eyes of the serf the landowner represented the
state. It was to him that they paid their taxes. He admin-
istered punishment and enforced the " blood tax." His
selfishness had deprived their class of its rights. On the
other hand, what protection they did enjoy came from the
landowners. If there was anyone desirous of maintain-
ing the working strength of the peasants it w-as their
master, because of his own interests. In case of need it
was the landowner wfio fed them, and although there were
some who treated their serfs cruelly, many were humane
towards them and took good care of them.

The king was more remote from the peasant class.
No direct responsibility for their fate lay with him, and
consequently he rarely came into collision with them.
He tried to ease their lot. As far as he could he pro-

394

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF COxNSTITUTION.

tect^d the weak and at the same time served *his own in-
terests by winning over the people, who strengthened his
arm against the nobility. But no great results came of
his efforts in this direction, for he could not overcome the
resistance of the Estates. The right of free migration of
the serfs, in particular, was not to be carried through, prin-
cipally because of the gentry, who, as they provided the
least defence to the peasants, were most afraid that their
workers would leave them and would move to the neigh-
bourhood of the strong fortresses, commanded by the
powerful nobles or by the king.

The execution of the law was entrusted to the gentry,
that is, to the very masters of the serfs, so the peasants
received little benefit from the king's activity. And even
though the king tried to increase the rights of the peasants
yet it was he who dealt their class the heaviest blows.
His soldiers were the cause of their most serious griev-
ances, and it was the king who tried to increase their taxes
in spite of the Estates, and who exacted their forced
labour, and further, it was the king in whom the peasants
saw the cause of the constant wars.

For the peasants, therefore, there was little to choose
between king and nobles and neither party could reckon
upon their devotion. Although some landowners had
gained the affection and loyalty of their peasants, while
some were hated by them, the large majority of the serfs
looked with perfect indifference on the struggle. The
fate of the state and the constitution did not interest
them, but, naturally yielding to the strong, they did not
refuse their support to either of the contending parties.
They joined neither party willingly yet with compulsion
either could dispose of them.

It was specially dangerous to the Hungarians that one
large class of the nation should remain entirely indifferent,
because the king could always count upon support from
abroad.

At the time of Bocskay's insurrection (1604) King
Rudolf was advised to free the peasants and lead them

395

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to war against the nobility, and although the king did not
dare to adopt this course, yet the possibility of such advice
showed that the condition of the peasants constituted a
grave danger to the national cause.

The fault of the situation lay with the nobles and they
had to bear the evil consequences. It was no fault of the
king that he could not win over the peasants, upon whose
lot he had hardly any influence, but it showed culpable
negligence on the part of the nobility, which was in close
touch with them, that it could not gain them for its cause.
The fault was, of course, the prevalent fault of the times
in all countries.

The strength for resistance of the Hungarian state
was due even then to the unity of the whole of the nobility.
The nobles had passed through a difficult period, but it had
disciplined them. They discharged their manifold duties
courageously and one might say that they were the state.
Their love for freedom was invincible and they themselves
were energetic yet prudent; they did not seek a conflict,
but neither did they avoid it. It was evident that they
would not surrender their freedom, which meant their
whole existence with all its interest for them, without a
great struggle.

In spite of the circumstances which were so favour-
able to the monarch, yet in consequence of the attitude
which he adopted he could only have established absolu-
tism with foreign help. But violent methods would have
been resisted not only by the Hungarians beneath the
Habsburg sceptre, but also by Transylvania. It was cal-
culated to increase the nation's strength that the eastern
and larger portion of the country had an organisation
independent of the Habsburgs.

It is true that constitutional freedom and respect for
law were not more strongly established in Transylvania
than in Hungary. Political violence, political executions
and coups d' ^tat were more frequent in Transylvania
during the time of Queen Isabella and Sigismund Bathory
than in w^estern Hungary until the time of Basta.

396

POWER OF RESISTANCE OF CONSTITUTION.

Yet in spite of that, the independence of Transyl-
vania gave a powerful support to the constitution of
western Hungary. All the discontented elements
found shelter at the Court of the Szapolyais. The
knowledge that he had a rival compelled the Habs-
burg king to be careful lest his subjects should go
over to the enemy. And although laws and rights were
not more respected in Transylvania than in the west, the
position of the Hungarian element was certainly stronger.
Transylvania was not a sovereign state while the kingdom
of the Habsburgs was. Hungary was not subordinate
to the German Empire; it was merely the person of the
ruler that brought the country into connection with the
hereditary provinces of the Habsburgs. Neither was it
subject to the Turks, although for a long period (1547-
1606) it paid a yearly tribute. This tribute was paid to
preserve peace, but the Porte acknowledged the independ-
ence of the Habsburg kingdom. Transylvania, however,
was really the Sultan's property, to which he conceded a
certain measure of autonomy. He could compel Tran-
sylvania to take part in his wars. It was the Sultan who
confirmed the ruler of Transylvania in his dignities and
who could also deprive him of them at will. Yet Tran
sylvania possessed a freer internal government than Hun-
gary, because in Hungary the king wielded his power in
accordance with the advice of foreigners and the interests
of his empire, while Transylvania was governed by Hun-
garians in their own interest. The Sultan only interfered
w^ith the internal affairs of the country in exceptional cases.
If they paid him and Avere obedient, his contemptuous
tolerance assured his subjects a large share of autonomy.
So Transylvania could easily serve as a defence
against the foreign influence which endangered the inde-
pendence of Hungary. The bulwark of Szapolyai*s
power was largely the fear of German influence in the
breasts of many Hungarian patriots. It was this fear
which had raised Szapolyai to the throne. In spite of the
partition of the country there was much community of

397

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

sentiment, as though there had been one soul in two
bodies. The traditions of centuries counteracted the effect
of partition. It is true that east and west Hungary had
not yet found a way of striving in common for the achieve-
ment of great national aims. During the sixteenth century
Transylvania took no part in the conflicts round the Con-
stitution, but in the unity of feeling we see one of the
conditions of common action.

And it was evident that if the prevailing discontent
were to burst into flame, the political frontier between the
eastern and western portions of the country would not
limit the conflagration. Moreover, at the end of the six-
teenth century even that frontier disappeared. Sigismund
Bathory caused Transylvania to become again a part of
the Habsburg realm. Transylvania shared the lot of west-
ern Hungary. Its separate organisation ceased, but a
state which for seventy-five years had received the people's
obedience and to which the people clung, could easily be
revived.

We have pointed out that the division of the country
had very grave consequences, but we cannot fail to see
that some beneficial results flowed from it, which grew to
great importance in the seventeenth century.

The division which was a great disadvantage to the
country in its dealings with the Turks, perpetuated the
distrust between king and people and made the country's
resistance to efforts at annexation more effective.

During the sixteenth century Hungary's freedom was
threatened by many dangers, but the nation did not sur-
render it. Even the growth of the royal power did not
destroy the resisting power of the Constitution. The coun-
try became weaker and poorer, but its people were still
able to fight for its freedom. They clung tenaciously to
their rights and the Constitution survived in spite of all
the storms which threatened its existence.

398

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY,

CHAPTER XXIIL

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE SPREAD OF
THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

We have been considering the political changes which
followed the battle of Mohacs and we must now glance at
the religious life of the times.

The Reformation spread rapidly in Hungary because
the country was in such close touch with the land which
had given birth to the reformed faith. The new doctrines
were first carried to Hungary by the German members of
the Court of Louis II., and the numerous German soldiers
living in Hungary helped to spread them. The seed thus
sown in people's minds were developed by the German
schools of the neighbouring countries. It was especially
the German bourgeoisie that welcomed eagerly the pro-
ducts of German thinking. But the influence of the Ger-
man genius upon the Hungarians could not by itself ac-
count for the success of the new faith. The Reformation
found a suitable soil in Hungary. That great intellectual
revolution was brought about in Germany by forces which
were also active in Hungary.

The sixteenth century was an age of great transforma-
tions. For many centuries before the Reformation the
Latin and Germanic worlds had lived their own more or
less isolated lives, and had formed, under the government
of the Church, strongly organised systems. The very
ideas prevalent in those worlds were supplied by those who
^m also directed their every-day life. They knew no other
^B ideas than their own and consequently were harassed by
H no doubts. But the time came when men grew acquainted
H with a whole world of new ideas, when the crusades gave

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

a powerful impetus to their thoughts, and when the Chris-
tian communities came into contact with people of so
different a way of thinking as the Mohammedans.

Still more important were the consequences of the
widening of men's minds in two different ways. The
beautiful relics of classical antiquity showed men that a
world very different from their own could also be magnifi-
cent, while the discovery of America introduced a host of
new ideas and of doubts respecting their former beliefs.
The Church soon found that the medic-eval man had under-
gone an entire change since knowledge had become more
widely distributed. During the Middle Ages everything
came from the Church and led back to it. Now what man
learnt from Nature was different from the teachings he
received from the Church. His self-consciousness began
to grow and the place of exaggerated humility was taken
by freedom of thought and the consciousness of human
dignity. Naturally, the Church was bitterly opposed to
the new movement which has become immortalised under
the name of the Renaissance. The freed soul of humanity
turned to the cult of beauty.

The prestige of the Church suffered whenever she
encountered the new ideals. Bitter satirical attacks galled
her as cruelly as she had tortured humanity with her fires.
Criticism was the more fatal because the Church was
guilty of heinous faults. The higher ranks of the priest-
hood had become unbelieving in the atmosphere of the
Renaissance and were the slaves of worldly pleasures,
while the lower ranks were blighted by their narrow for-
malism and low dissolute life. The Church, which had
lost all its moral influence, yet still wished to dominate,
was bound to become the object of ardent hatred. The
attitude of the world towards the Church can hardly
ever be that of indifference. Her vocation is so high
that if she answers it she must waken enthusiasm, while
if she becomes unfaithful to her own ideals she is pecu-
open to attack.

At the close of the Middle Ages this was the situa-

400

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

tion of the Church. It has ever been a social necessity
that the masses should have religion. Order is destroyed
if the people lose their ideals. It was to the interest of all
mankind that the Church should awaken to new life and
give new nourishment to the minds of believers. It was
this historical necessity w^hich gave birth to the Reforma-
tion. The German mind, inclined to speculation and to
thoroughness, was the first to revolt against the supersti-
tion which was at that time called Catholicism. Side by
side with the Renaissance and the growth of Rationalism,
religious feeling also awoke and gained ground. It re-
volted against the scandals of the Church and tried to
find for itself new organs of expression.

The home of the Renaissance was the highly cultured
country of Italy. The Reformation, on the other hand,
originated in Germany, where belief was stronger and
where even the thinkers did not cast off all the old tradi-
tions. In Hungary, it was the religious movement which
gained the upper hand, although later than in Germany,
because the Hungarian mind, not being given to abstrac-
tion, did not adapt itself so readily to transcendental truths
as the German mind.

If the brilliant era of Matthias had lasted longer it
would probably have been the spirit of the Renaissance
which would have become predominant, but cruel Fate
put an end to that time of progress, and later generations,
which lived in misery, adversity and the fear of death,
w^ere.more open to doctrines telling of the compensations
of a future life. Missionaries proclaimed the new gospel
to all peoples in their own tongues and thus found an
entrance into their hearts. They impressed the Hun-
garians as much by their sermons as by their books and
schools. As the Protestants were in a minority they de-
veloped a greater activity, and as they stood in great
danger they were fervent and true.

Before the battle of Mohacs, one of the great mis-
takes of the Church was that in conferring dignities it was
largely governed by political considerations. The highest

401

DEVELOPMENT OF HUxNGARIAN LIBERTY.

posts in the Church were distributed among the influen-
tial aristocratic families. Such dignities were looked upon
as the preserves of the Court party. One and the same
person often held several ecclesiastical appointments. Ht
spent the incomes of them all but neglected the duties
attached to them. In many cases mere children were made
bishops. Per^nyi was hardly a youth when he became
bishop, and Hippolytus of Este was actually a child when
the dignity of archbishop of Esztergom was conferred
upon him.

At that time bishops were obliged to take an active
part in the defence of the country. It was not surprising
that the nation, being in imminent danger, concerned
itself more with the ability of the bishop to perform his
military duties than with his ecclesiastical qualifications.

Tomorl, the valiant soldier-priest, became archbishop
in order to be, not a spiritual, but a military leader. The
better men among the priests were occupied with military
duties, while the worse lived loose immoral lives and used
the disciplinary power of the Church to make money in
unlawful ways. After the battle of Mohacs, discipline
and order were still more destroyed. The priests fled,
the churches were in ruins and the congregations were
abandoned. The disintegration of the State helped to
disintegrate the Church.

Naturally the new generation did not look to such a
Church for its salvation, but turned to the Reformed
Church, which pointed to the country's many misfortunes
as the signs of God's wrath. The condition of the Church
helped the cause of her adversaries in Hungary as in other
countries.

The Reformation, however, was not merely a revival of
the religious temper. Along with this the German spirit
shook off the dominion of the Latin spirit. This explains
why the Reformation triumphed more easily in Germanic
countries than among the Latin nations. The new faith
did not establish another centralised Church ; on the con-

402

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

trary, it decentralised the Church and in this way contri-
buted to the independence of the various nations.

This circumstance made the Reformation popular in
many countries besides Germany, amongst others in Hun-
gary. One of Hungary's vital principles was that of inde-
pendence. Even during the supremacy of the Catholic
Church the nation guarded jealously its own Church from
the despotism of Rome. It was only natural that the Hun-
garians should welcome a movement which promised to
serve their aims.

Some time before the battle of Mohacs the Popes had
clone more for Hungary than any king. They had helped
the nation sometimes with advice and sometimes with
money and soldiers. But of course the nation was entitled
lo this help in its struggles on behalf of Christianity, m
fact It had a right to expect still more effective support
from the head of Christendom. Failing this support, the
nation began to feel abandoned, the more so when, after
Mohacs, the attitude of the Popes towards Hungary was
solely dictated by cold political considerations. Ferdin-
and's adherents took offence at the ill-will shown towards
them by the Pope, and the adherents of Szapolyai again,
at the Pope's refusal to do anything on their behalf. The
Pope even threatened these latter with excommunication
because they had yielded to the superior power of the
Turks. From a distance the Pope was ready to add to
their heavy burden, although he had only contributed his
blessings and his prayers during a war which had cost the
nation its last penny and untold lives. Hungary, the
bulwark of Christianity, laid the blame at the Pope's door
for her being left without any real assistance.

In spite of the growing dissatisfaction, Rome imposed
taxes upon the country in the shape of sums demanded
for absolutions and for Peter's pence. The grandeur of
the Renaissance life at the papal court had to be paid for
by the whole of Christendom, and the sums which were
gained by outraging the religious feelings of the nations
were often spent by the mistresses and the families of the

403

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Popes. This situation created bad feeling everywhere but
above all in Hungary, where money was lacking even for
such purposes as the maintenance of the palace of Mat-
thias. It is interesting to observe that a movement so
essentially mental as the Reformation was largely helped
on its way by the grasping nature of the Popes.

Another factor was the hope of sharing in the spoil
of the Church. In those days of economic crisis the
hope of making money became a powerful spring of
action. In the spread of Protestantism selfishness played
a part, as it generally does in all successful movements.

The absence of celibacy in the Reformed Church was
also a pow^erfuf motive. It was a great mistake on the
part of the Catholic Church that she did not at first fight
for the principle of celibacy with all her might, and that
when the law was put into force many priests were actually
married. The wives and children naturally became ad-
herents of the new faith.

Another great advantage to the Protestants was that
they sought to emancipate the individual from the do-
minion of any established authority. The complex doc-
trinal problems, too, were all more simply explained by
the new Church.

The very organisation of the Reformed Church em-
bodied the idea of freedom. The hierarchical and central-
ised power of the priesthood was replaced by the autonomy
of the congregations. Those who in the Catholic Church
had played the part of an obedient flock, gained new
power, for even their pastors were elected by them.

All these considerations were bound to endear the
new faith to the Hungarians. The nation, which so dearly
loved independence, welcomed the spread of autonomy in
the Church, especially in the sixteenth century, when the
importance of local government was increasing, since it
served as a defence of the national existence.

At first Luther*s doctrines became popular in Hun-
gary, but soon the Calvinistic teaching won more adher-

404

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

ents, especially among the purely Hungarian elements.
The German burgesses in Hungary remained Lutheran,
but the gentry, in spite of the frequent communication
with the Germans, joined the adherents of Calvin and
Zwingli. The faith in which the love of freedom was
most pronounced, and which had rendered the greatest
services to the cause of freedom, was sure to gain the
most adherents. By the end of the sixteenth century the
great majority of the nation had abandoned the old faith.

Let us now look at the consequences of the Reforma-
tion.

Its first effect naturally was to bring religious ques-
tions to the front. The period whose commencement had
seen the laity take the intellectual leading into their own
hands, and seek their ideals among the creations of the
pagan world with so much fervour as to appear to lean
towards paganism even in their beliefs, suddenly began to
reveal the influence of religion. The Renaissance was
overshadowed by the Reformation, and theology became
the all-absorbing interest. How did this happen ?

Protestantism by its very novelty impressed men more
powerfully than Catholicism had done during the last
period Of its undisputed supremacy, and at the time of the
Reformation the ancient creed itself was rejuvenated.
Rivalry braced up the Catholic Church. When she had
to struggle for her existence she suddenly regained her
vigour. Catholicism began to employ the same weapons
that its opponent was using. It adapted itself to the re-
quirements of the age. In religious fervour the Catholic
Church overtook her rival and in organisation surpassed
it. Her ability to subordinate the most contradictory ele-
ments to one common will fitted her to play a leading part
in Europe. After the first defensive attitude the Catholic
Church took the offensive. That great power stepped
forth in full armour to the battle, using intellectual and
material, political and economic weapons, persuasion
and compulsion, verbal and written controversy. This

405

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

titanic struggle overshadowed all other interests, while
involving them all.

State life and religious life had been carried on side
by side for centuries. In the Middle Ages the State was
an organisation of people of one religion with certain
secular aims. The State had been organised under the
influence of the Church. Even the dignities of the
Church were State dignities. The priesthood was an
order of the State invested with special rights. The
State, along with its own aims, served also those of the
Church. One of its chief duties was to maintain the
supremacy of Catholicism, and to punish heretics. Even
those monarchs who for political reasons were at war
with the Pope himself, did not refuse their support to the
Catholic faith. They defied the temporal power of the
Church, but they maintained the authority of her dog-
mas. Within the limits of the State there was only room
for the one religion ; as soon as any other made its ap-
pearance the State persecuted it because Catholicism was
one of the foundations on which the State rested. The
peaceful co-operation of several denominations was an
unheard-of notion, and it would have been contrary to
the mediaeval conception of the functions of a State.

The Reformation was bound, therefore, to cause a
tremendous revolution even in State life. Some States
favoured the revolution proceeding within the Church.
They tried to solve anew the problems of ecclesiastical
power and wealth. But their ideas as to the relation
between State and Church remained unaltered; they
merely substituted a new faith for the old one, and still
aimed at assuring the supremacy of one faith.

Other States again sided with the old religion. Any
attack upon this was regarded by them as disloyalty to
themselves, which they could not tolerate even for politi-
cal reasons.

So throughout the whole of Europe religious perse-
cution was carried on even by the most enlightened rul-
ers, because they were afraid that if any other faith than

406

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

the one established in their dominions were to flourish, it
might menace the monarches authority. Religious uni-
formity was really a political interest.

This struggle between the rival creeds was made
passionate by the intolerant spirit everywhere prevalent.
The Catholic Church had long regarded heresy as the
worst of sins. Spiritual perfection included implacable
hatred of heretics. And although among the Protestant
dogmas there was none concerning their own infallibil-
ity, yet it was one of the convictions of Protestants that
the adherents of the wrong faith were doomed to eternal
punishment.

The harshness of the opposing Churches was aug-
mented by selfishness. Each hoped to increase its power
by the employment of violence.

Faith is a condition of the soul, independent of the
will. Fear and self-regarding wishes can only move the
will. External means can neither create nor eradicate
any real conviction. Still, brute strength, if it is ready
to kill and does not slacken in its ruthless work, if it is
not afraid to destroy the soul as well as the body by com-
pelling it to lie and play the hypocrite, can extinguish
whole communions-

We often hear it said that the martyrdom of those
who die for their religion, wins new converts to the perse-
cuted faith. This is only true, however, when the per-
secuting power does but half of its work, and the blind
hatred and fanaticism which prevailed in mediaeval
society enabled the persecutors to do their cruel work
completely.

To-day the whole situation is, of course, different.
The very effort to extinguish any denomination or
nationality would now be a great political blunder, be-
cause being opposed to the spirit of the age it would
inevitably fail, and would cause a reaction, even if the
persecution were to be incomparably milder than it was
during the Middle Ages.

Violence is most terrible when even good men share

407

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY,

in its deeds. While only contemptible motives prompt
to the work of destruction, reaction must come sooner or
later, because there has hardly ever been a time when the
good entirely lost their power. In the Middle Ages reli-
gious persecution was so deadly because it was a sense of
duty and a certain idealism which kept it alive. This
explains its success, and also why it could become the
source of so much injustice and calamity.

When religious uniformity was destroyed a struggle
inevitably ensued which affected the whole traditional or-
ganisation of Christendom as well as the internal order of
all the various States. All the links which for centuries
had maintained the unity of Europe became loose, and
new ties of interest and feeling were created.

The international relations of Europe and the inner
life of the States were determined by religious considera-
tions. During the sixteenth century, in most of the
States, such a degree of persecution was reached as
amounted to nothing less than religious warfare. In
Spain and in Italy the new religion was entirely extir-
pated by the old, which in those countries was supported
by powerful political interests. In England, after several
crises which brought many to the scaffold and the stake,
the Reformation proved victorious. It triumphed in
Sweden also after less violent conflicts than in England.
The Netherlands were torn into two parts in consequence
of the impossibility of reconciling the new faith with the
old, and with the Spanish government. The eastern por-
tion, after superhuman exertions, formed an independent
State, and assured the supremacy of the new faith.

The religious struggle acquired an international
character. The Spanish Habsburgs, counting on the
support of the Latin world, and encouraged by the
Popes, made an effort to reconquer the whole of Christen-
dom for Catholicism. They spent enormous sums of
money, and poured out the bFood of their subjects in the
interests of Rome. Spain was exhausted by internal
violence and the strain of her colossal efforts, and lay

408

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

ruined by the fanaticism of her rulers and people.

In the international conflict the northern German
powers became the antagonists of the southern Latin
world, and the champions of the new faith. France and
Germany were the battle ground for the strife. In the
sixteenth century the unity of France was almost des-
troyed by the violent conflicts between the Huguenots and
the Catholics. In Germany, the religious question did
not bring on a crisis until later. State life in Germany
w^as so loosely organised that the greatest contrasts could
exist side by side within the limits of the Empire. The
attitude of the German Habsburgs, also, was such as to
render it unlikely that a religious war should break out.
They tried hard to find a compromise between the two
conflicting views.

It was the great political ambition of Charles V. and
the comparative w^eakness of his successors, which led
the emperors to avoid the spreading of a Catholic reac-
tion in the German Empire. It is true that towards the
end of the reign of Charles V., there were two w^ars,
caused by the steps which that monarch had taken in the
interest of religious uniformity, but a final reckoning
could still be postponed. It became the right of the
various provinces of the Empire to regulate their own
religious affairs, and the Empire split into sections hos-
tile to one another. Each of them had long had political
and dynastical interests opposed to those of all the rest,
and to these was now added religious animosity.

The Empire was threatened by very grave dangers.
The imperial government, which was unable to settle the
most vital questions, lost its authority. Alliances were
formed on a religious basis, and foreign support was
sought by the provinces against one another. Only a
spark was needed to set the whole of Germany in a blaze.

The seventeenth century provided that spark, and
Germany became devastated by religious strife.

What eflFect had this crisis, the gravest which had
occurred since the migration of peoples, upon Hungary ?

409

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Hungary could not remain unaffected by the prevail-
ing religious animosity, but it is pleasing to remember
that religious hatred never became so virulent there as it
was in other countries. Religious prosecution was compara-
tively mild and never developed into a religious war, and
the Hungarians shed less blood than other nations in
attaining a state of religious toleration. Although pre-
viously to the battle of Moh^cs the old Church had tried
to turn all its forces against the heretics, the severe law,
which w^as entirely in keeping with the spirit of the times,
was never enforced. Perhaps there w^ere a few execu-
tions, but far fewer than in any other country. After
Mohacs, no attempt even was made to renew the law. In
1548 the country's legislators stood up for the old
Church, but they employed milder methods than w^ere
usual, and it was above all the reform of the priesthood
itself that was urged by them ; in this they saw the right
way of putting an end to heresy. They pursued the
policy of Charles V. and asked for a general synod in
order that the differences of opinion might be discussed
there. They did not require the Lutherans to be pun-
ished, except their preachers, who met with some severity
of treatment. The law was sterner towards the weaker
sects of the Calvinists and Anabaptists, and ordered the
confiscation of the estates of all members of these deno-
minations. Later on (1550, '53, '54, '56, '57, '59 and
'63), even this harshness was moderated. The Calvin-
ists were no longer included among those who were to be
banished, and the more severe laws were only renewed
against the Anabaptists, who fell into exaggerations dan-
gerous to the common peace and security.

In 1559, however, even the Anabaptists were only
punished by the imposition of a special tax. The actual
situation was even more favourable than that indicated
by the law, because the law was not enforced. Lutherans
and Calvinists all enjoyed tolerant treatment. They had
their churches, in which they were allowed to hold their
services. There were no martyrs among them.

410

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

By the end of the sixteenth century the great major-
ity of the nation professed the reformed faith. It is a
noteworthy fact that neither party tried to force a settle-
ment of the religious question. The Catholics, when they
were the stronger, did not insist upon the execution of
the law, as happened in other countries, and the Protest-
tants, when they were the more powerful, did not demand
anti-Catholic legislation, or claim any exclusive rights.
They were satisfied with the tolerance which they had
gained.

Neither did public life show the effects of any very
powerful religious animosity. The mind of the nation
was governed by political considerations. The division
of the country did not take place along denominational
lines, but along political lines. The western and the
eastern portions were both mixed as regards the religion
of their inhabitants. The parties were always political,
and not religious. In 1554 the Diet, the majority of
whose members must have been Catholics, elected the
Protestant Nadasdy as Palatine. In the royal council
there sat several Protestant nobles who had a voice even
in the election of the Catholic bishops. It was a Protes-
tant nobleman, Illeshazy, who recommended the fer-
vently Catholic priest Szuhay as bishop. Those coun-
ties in which the inhabitants were all Protestants paid
tithe to the Catholic Church without demur.

It is difficult to pursue a tolerant policy in an intol-
erant country. In such a country the government which
hesitates to join either one or the other of the two hostile
camps must fail. Political systems which stand far above
the ideas of their time can rarely be lasting. Statesmen
who are in advance of their age can only render good
service to their country if they are content to moderate
the faults in which the community is apt to see a merit.
The forcing of principles upon a societv which is not yet
ready for them, generally leads to reaction and defeat.

The tolerant system of King Maximilian became the
test of the liberality of Hungary, and of the neighbour-

411

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ing countries. In Austria and in Bohemia it did not
prove good or usefuL Neither of the rival communions
was satisfied with the ruler. The Protestants expected
one who had shown them sympathy to establish their
supremacy. In one instance they went so far as to ask
the king that the Catholics might be forbidden to hold
their services. The Catholics, on the other hand, were
not inclined to agree to so much tolerance on the part of
the monarch as he had shown to the Protestants. His
moderation made Maximilian unpopular, and as he made
Protestantism stronger without annihilating Catholicism,
but only embittering its adherents, he only made the in-
evitable struggle more fierce when it did come.

In Hungary the situation was different. It was a
sign of the nation's good sense that in Hungary Maximi-
lian could be tolerant without creating resentment. The
nation did not urge him to decide the denominational
question, for it regarded political and military questions
as more important.

In Transylvania the triumph of the national idea
over the denominational one was still more pronounced.
There the instinct of the nation was not disturbed by the
international political situation, and so the people passed
a law of toleration.

The Habsburgs, although they did not blindly serve
the interests of the Catholic reaction, yet identified them-
selves to such an extent with the Catholics that they could
not openly proclaim religious liberty. Maximilian did
not dare to assume this attitude, although he was inclined
to do so, for he was afraid of offending the Spaniards
and the Pope, as well as the Catholic electors of the
Empire.

The government of Transylvania was free from such
considerations, and could give free play to the national
instincts. Martinuzzi himself, although a Catholic priest
and a fervent defender of his Church, never went so far
as to persecute any other communion. After his death
a still more liberal attitude was adopted; the new deno-

412

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

minations were all legally acknowledged, and no efforts
were made to assure the supremacy of one faith over
another. The Protestant legislators, although forming a
majority, voted for Stephen Bathory, a Catholic, as their
ruler.

In most other countries tolerance was at length prac-
tised, because of the dreadful results of intolerance, while
Hungary had to pay comparatively little for the lesson
she learnt as to the better course.

True tolerance is seldom found even to-day in ardent
souls. Tolerance in matters lo which men are indiffer-
ent, or where they see no great contrasts to their own
ideas, is frequent enough, but where conviction is strong
and great contrasts involved, the virtue is very rare.
It can only be cultivated by those who can see in the
convictions of others the natural outcome of a whole men-
tal history, a result for which nobody can be held respon-
sible, and who would regard it as a crime to exercise
force or compulsion upon anyone's conscience, and are
lenient even in the case of errors, because they do not con-
sider themselves infallible.

Tolerance can have a firm and broad basis only where
men feel that to punish erring thought means to
block the path to truth, since truth can only be
approached by means of free thinking, which can never
be secure from the possibility of error. But this idea
could only gradually banish the belief current in the
Middle Ages that it was pleasing to God to persecute
those professing a different creed.

Tolerance is often due to mere concessions to the
requirements of practical life, and to a compromise be-
tween conscience and the spirit of opportunism. In the
sixteenth century tolerance was due only to such a com-
promise. Only a few exceptional men grasped the
principle itself. No whole nation anywhere had become
truly tolerant. Hungary w^as not so enlightened as
many other nations which pursued, nevertheless, a much
more intolerant policy. Rationalism was more advanced

413

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

in some nations which in respect of Liberalism were
behind Hungary. While in Italy, France, and Germany
religious wars were being waged, and the adherents of
the different faiths could not live side by side in peace, m
Hungary the various denominations found a ' modus
Vivendi.' The strength of the national sentiment and
the consciousness of the nation's danger, tempered reli-
gious intolerance.

The nation's political instinct achieved more than
culture did in other countries, because more of the lead-
mg men were guided in Hungary by that instinct than in
other countries were influenced by enlightenment.

That powerful political instinct which tempered the
people's intolerance was the same that had given
strength to the monarch at times when the monarchy in
other lands was helpless before the nobles, and that
assured the unity of the government when in many coun-
tries it was broken to pieces.

The tolerant spirit displayed by the Hungarians was
of the utmost value, for it was able to save the nation from
extinction, though, naturally, religious animosity was
not entirely banished.

The stronger sects, which could endanger the peace
of the country, met with very fair treatment, but the
weaker ones did not. Toleration was accorded to the
various communions gradually, as they became stronger,
first to the Lutherans and then to the Calvinists; but the
Jews, the Greek-orthodox Church, the Unitarians, and
the Anabaptists, were exposed to strong attacks. Multi-
tudes of the peasants were debarred from the free exercise
of their religion, as they were at the mercy of the squires.
The existence of the smaller denominations was very pre-
carious. Although no religious war broke out, yet fre-
quently in private and social life religious interests
clashed. Sometimes there were scenes of violence,
natural enough during a time of anarchy. The powerful
landowner propagated his faith with the aid of armed
force. Churches were frequently taken by the represen-

414

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

tatives of one creed from those of another. It was not
intolerance which in that age wore a mask, as is the case
to-day, but tolerance. The priests inculcated hatred of
their opponents, and a protestant student openly declared
that the people should be led, not against the Turks, but
against the Catholics, for they were the more dangerous
foe.

Naturally, Hungary could not escape the religious
strife which occupied the whole of Europe. Both halves
of the country were troubled by the religious problem.
The government of the western half was in the hands of
a Catholic dynasty. Legally, Catholicism was supreme
there, but actually the Protestants were the stronger
party. This state of affairs was calculated to rouse the
Catholics to vigorous action. The Habsburgs were
urged on every side to attack the Protestants. The toler-
ance which was possible in Hungary was impracticable
in their other dominions. The Catholic reaction began
to drive back Protestantism everywhere. The question
was how long the political sagacity of the Hungarian
nation would resist this powerful counter movement
which had the king's sympathy. Among the Hungar-
ian priests a decidedly uncompromising spirit manifested
itself. Some fanatics began to speak of compulsory
Catholicism. Under these circumstances it seemed as
if the Protestants might have to demand some modifica-
tion of the laws in order to protect themselves from the
growing danger.

At the commencement of the seventeenth century,
when in the whole country there were only three hun-
dred Catholic priests, and the great majority of the popu-
lation was protestant, the greater part of the royal coun-
cil was composed of Catholic bishops. Such a situation
could not last.

The dynasty and the nation were under the sway of
two directly opposite ideas. Religious differences, which
at that epoch could divide whole nations into hostile
camps, and armed men against their own kindred, still

415

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

further estranged king and nation, already embittered
against each other.

At the end of the sixteenth century Transylvania
had again a Catholic ruler, but most members of the
leading classes were Protestants, so that a violent out-
break seemed probable. And as the legal organisation of
one half of the country was based upon Catholicism,
while the other half showed Protestant tendencies, differ-
ences of creed were likely to make the two sister States
real enemies. The fuel for an impending conflagration
had already been stored up, and now religious antagon-
ism added to the heap. Internal peace was only ensured
by the weakness and the dangerous situation of the king
and nation. State life, both in religious and in political
respects, meant only a compromise of opposing forces,
and not their harmonious co-operation.

What effect had the religious situation upon the
balance of power? Was it likely to strengthen the king
or the people ?

The Catholics were in the minority, but the Protes-
tants were not united. If the Catholic reaction had forced
the conflict to a life and death struggle in which all the
Protestants would have been obliged to unite, the bulk of
the Hungarians would have been on the side of the Re-
formed Churches, but the strength of the Protestants was
greatly diminished by the circumstance that the burgesses
of German origin were Lutherans, while the gentry were
Calvinistic, a situation of which a skilful policy could
easily have made use.

Protestantism was strengthening the spirit of liberty.
It was especially the Calvinistic Church which waged war
against the authorities whose supremacy conflicted with
the rights and liberties of the individual. As the legal
authorities persecuted the Calvin ists, naturally the idea
that tyranny might be resisted even forcibly spread more
and more in the Calvinist ranks. The spirit which had
inspired the Golden Bull gained new strength.

416

THE REFORMATION IN HUNGARY.

If the ruling power identified itself with the Catholic
reaction, and if the strengthening of the royal authority
endangered even a man's conscience, the resistance to
the king w^ould have a new motive, as one more great
interest required defence. The nation's existence, the
people's freedom, and the religious life of the majority,
were equally threatened. When the Catholic and abso-
lutist movement unfurled its banners, at once all
classes of the nation sprang to arms and assembled in one
common camp.

One other foundation of the nation's existence and
independence was strengthened by the Reformation,
namely, the national language. It was through the reli-
gious controversies and sermons that Hungarian became
a literary tongue.

A language is the outcome of a nation's individual-
ity, and of its peculiar qualities. If one nation speaks
differently from another it is because its whole history,
its soul and body, have been different. On the other
hand, this very difference betw-een the nations is in-
creased by the linguistic difference which springs from
it. The more exclusively a language prevails within a
community, the more isolated that community will be
from others, and the less will be the effect upon its
thoughts and feelings of the surrounding countries. It
will become national in its whole being.

In the Middle Ages culture was essentially Latin.
National languages were driven into the background by
that one international tongue. The Reformation was in
one aspect a revolt against this. It was in harmony with
the logic of facts that the movement which tended to free
the nations from the influence of Rome should set the
national languages above the Latin tongue. The fervent
apostles of the new faith cultivated the national languages
because by their means they could get nearer to the hearts
of the people. The Catholic Church could not neglect
this movement, for she could only keep pace with her

417

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

rival if she also could speak to the masses in their own
tongue.

Thus all over Europe a great revival of the national
idioms was to be observed. With the development of
the Hungarian language the conviction grew strong in
the nation that it was an isolated race, which must be
independent if it desired to thrive.

The Reformation then affected the fate of the Hun-
garian State in two different ways. It disturbed its in-
ternal harmony, and increased the number of causes of
collision between king and people, but, on the other hand
it augmented the powers which were on the side of the
nation in the conflict. The Reformation helped to bring
matters to a crisis, it estranged king and nation, and
stimulated absolutism to an attack, but at the same time
it gave means to the nation for an energetic defence
against that danger. Absolutism would have been more
harmful, and therefore more hateful at that time than at
any other.

418

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION

CHAPTER XXIV*

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

The sixteenth century appeared to have multiplied
the divergencies between king and nation. The king
was a Catholic, while the majority of the people were
Protestants. Feeling hampered by the privileges of the
nobility the monarch tried to increase his own preroga-
tives, ignoring the question of the independence of his
dominions. The Hungarians, on the other hand, were
enthusiastic defenders of their country's independence,
and the king, seeing that they paid homage to the Sultan
as well as to himself, trusted them less than his other
subjects, and withheld from them the part to which they
were entitled. In all its relations with the other Habs-
burg dominions the king tried to make Hungary occupy
a subordinate position.

The fact that the nation desired to make a vigorous
attack upon the Turks, whereas the king acted only on
the defensive, was another source of friction, and when
at last the misery and the hopelessness of the long war
had exhausted the nation, and made it long for peace,
Rudolf insisted upon a continuance of the war. The
king had no money for war upon a large scale, yet he was
not willing to make peace.

The dynasty came into collision with the wishes of
the people through its divergent interests and its errors,
while the wrongs suffered created in the nation such a
disposition as offended the king.

It was a great disaster that at such a critical time the
throne of Hungary was occupied by a man who was
entirely devoid of self-control, and lacking in political

419

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

insight, and was a prey to those prepossessions which
had brought his forerunners into collision with the nation.

Rudolf would be an interesting study for the
psychologist. He had talent and a keen sense of beauty.
He took a great interest in the culture of his time, and
was a connoisseur in art and an astronomer. He did not
lack kindly feeling, but he had not a well-balanced mind.
He was nervous and unable to come to a decision. His
moods fluctuated from day to day. Now he was passion-
ate about something, while the morrow found him per-
fectly apathetic. He would have liked to command
everybody, though he could not command himself
enough to keep from striking his ministers. He jea-
lously guarded his power, but could not use it. He tried
to tie everyone's hand, but he himself was unable to act.
He was full of warlike thoughts, yet timid in time of dan-
ger. Although he wished to have a standing army he
spent his money in luxury, in this respect forming a
great contrast to his contemporary Henry IV. of France,
who dressed shabbily in order to spend the money thus
saved upon his troops. Rudolf wished to exclude the
most suitable elements from a share in the work of
government. He was jealous of all the State dignitaries
and of his own relatives, but he did not shrink from lis-
tening to the secret news conveyed by his confessor, or
even by his footmen. He wished to decide the most vital
questions, and yet he could not work hard enough to
manage even the simplest private affairs. The talents he
possessed inclined him to meditation, while for practical
life he seemed to have no qualifications whatever.

But just as extreme cold and extreme heat produce
in some respects similar results, so remarkable strength
and extreme incapacity sometimes lead to similar conse-
quences. Both prompt to daring actions. The strong
man faces danger because he loves to brave it, while the
other is simply unaware of the danger. Rudolf dis-

420

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

played the same mental symptoms as Napoleon, especi-
ally when his nervous illness was upon him, but that
which was caused in the soul of the great emperor by
the intoxication of success, in Rudolf was due to the lack
of sound judgment. He seemed designed to make abso-
lutism ridiculous, and to reduce it to an absurdity. He
wanted to be one to hew out new paths, although he was
unable to walk securely even in the beaten track. His
whole activity was calculated to Ian smouldering discon-
tent into flame. In every one of his dominions the
monarch had been forced to concede a share in the work of
government to the privileged classes, but Rudolf wished
to rule without them, and to do what none of his prede-
cessors had dared to attempt. He was full of Spanish
ideas of government, and had an exaggerated notion of
the royal dignity. He desired to control the affairs of
his various dominions from a distance, where he dwelt in
seclusion, seeing and knowing little of men. At
the same time, he threw himself into the Catholic
reaction, becoming a tool in the hands of a power whose
aims were not identical with his, a power that worked for
itself only, and aimed at universal dominion, never
caring what became of its instruments.

A ruler who is the slave of his whims, and yet thinks
himself a superior being, can easily become by reason of
his vanity the tool of a crafty person who approaches him
with skilfully rendered homage. It was natural that the
Jesuit influence should triumph over Rudolf. How could
those who always watched so keenly the rulers of the
various States, miss such an opportunity as presented
itself to them in the king's want of mental balance ? Such
consummate students of human nature had an easy task
with Rudolf. They thought their aim was a lofty one,
and this deafened them to the voice of conscience, and
even to the appeal of their own dignity. When neces-
sary they flattered the king and bore patiently his whims
and outbursts and disdainful behaviour. They were so
successful that the unhappy monarch declared himself

421

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

ready to restore the supremacy of Catholicism. After
having aroused the political passions of his subjects he
placed himself in opposition to their consciences. This
he did in all his dominions at once. The policy he pur-
sued in Hungary was only part of his general policy.
His enterprise was directed not against the Hungarians
but against Protestantism, and popular rights. He fol-
lowed no well-thought-out plan, but was simply carried
away by his inclinations, which had been fostered by
flattery and skilful treatment. His fanaticism and his
tyrannical tendencies left no room for the action of sound
judgment.

The effects of the morbid mental condition of this
king were first felt in Transylvania. As he had taken
possession of that country in 1600 by force of arms, he
felt that he owed no respect to the country's laws. He
simply cancelled the Constitution, and those who had
formerly exercised the rights of legislators now could
only come to their master with petitions. Transylvania
was placed under an executive council composed of
Germans who acted in accordance with instructions
received from Court.

This would have involved the substitution of bureau-
cratic and military control for the autonomy of the
nobility. Transylvania, separated from the Hungarian
State, w^ould have come entirely under the power of the
ruler, and an absolutist regime would have begun.

This policy demanded that the people's capacity for
resistance should be utterly destroyed. The power of
the nobles, no longer protected by the Constitution, w^as
to . be broken, a result which could best be secured by
organising great German settlements in Transylvania.

The community, mortally hurt in its rights and its
national feelings, had also to be attacked on the side of
its wealth in order to be entirely conquered. Basta, the
cruel governor appointed by Rudolf, declared that the

422

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

right of conquest put an end even to the possessory rights
of the individual, and that it was an act of mercy if he
left untouched the property of such as did not displease
him. Every right of the individual was dependent upon
the will of the monarch. Taxes were imposed on the
towns and on the individual for the alleged purpose of
maintaining the army. What was saved from official
rapacity was the prey of the unruly and greedy troops.
The army, which had no regular pay, exhausted that un-
fortunate country by its orgies and plunderings.

To all this misery was added distress of mind due to
the propagation of Catholicism by violent means.

After Transylvania the turn of Hungary had to fol-
low. In Hungary there was no pretext for the alteration
of the existing system, so that absolutist efforts could not
be made with such brutal openness as in Transylvania,
but the tendency was the same. First there came an attack
upon the wealth of the nobles by means of trumped-
up lawsuits. In this way the ruler sought to destroy
one source of the nation's strength, and at the same time
to gain money for the treasury. Then a new principle
was established which at one stroke gave enormous
wealth to the king. It was declared that lands recovered
from the Turks would not be restored to their former
owners, but would belong to the crown.

The Court party tried to destroy the dominant race
in Hungary and Transylvania, because it was not suffi-
ciently Catholic or sufficiently obedient. The monarch
alleged that the towns were his property and that he was
entitled to fix their religion as the landowner fixed that
of his serfs.

A beginning was made with the town of Kassa.
General Belgiojoso took possession of the Protestant
Church there, and gave it to the Catholics. The Pro-
testant pastors and teachers were driven away, tlie Pro-
testant service was forbidden, and the town's property
w^as seized (1604). When the leading men of the town
protested against this treatment, Rudolf bade them cease

423

DEVELOPMExNT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

to complain and renewed the laws against heretics.
After the Diet was dissolved, Rudolf, on his own
authority, introduced this renewal among the decisions
of the Estates.

We have already seen that even in earlier times the
kings occasionally altered the decisions of the Diet, but
what had previously passed almost unnoticed was now
done by Rudolf in such a way that the danger involved
could not be overlooked. Rudolf dealt mortal blows to
the legislative system by his increasingly unconstitu-
tional action. Whereas at first he had merely modified
in accordance with his own ideas a law actually passed by
the Diet, he now frequently inserted in the code laws
which the Diet had never dealt with. In this way he
created precedents which tended to place legislation en-
tirely in the hands of the king.

Rudolf's tyranny became more and more open. He
decided in matters which were entirely beyond his powers
and he claimed the validity of law for his decrees. He
affected the religious situation in such a way as to work
enormous injury to the great majority of the nation.
The king destroyed the freedom and the privileges of
the Diet by forbidding it to discuss the religious ques-
tion.

History is full of blunders, the dire results of which
dynasties and nations have had to bear, but rarely has
any statesman been guilty of so many mistakes as were
made by Rudolf and his advisers. They seemed bent
on rousing all the factors of the empire. The towns in-
clined to the king rather than to the aristocracy, yet it
was to the towns that Rudolf dealt the severest blow^s,
thus driving them into the arms of their former oppon-
ents. The king was not even clever enough to make use
of the rivalry between the various religious denomina-
tions. It is possible that the German Lutherans, who had
enjoyed toleration longer than any other Protestant sect,

424

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

might have been willing to leave the Calvinists to the
mercy of the Catholics, yet Rudolf began his work of
conversion among the Lutherans. Just when he was
trying to prepare the way for German supremacy in Hun-
gary, he roused the anger of the Germans by persecuting
their faith. It was the result of the king's policy that
burgesses and nobles, Calvinists and Lutherans, Germans
and Hungarians, w^ere all united against him.

Rudolf also neglected to conclude peace with the
Turks, although he knew that he had been at war with
them for thirteen years, without any result. The
government was impotent, vacillating and corrupt. The
lack of money had become very serious. Some time
before every thoughtful statesman had protested against
the continuance of the Turkish war because of the empti-
ness of the treasury. Much of "the money extorted from
the people found its way into the pockets of the officials.
The other countries ruled by Rudolf were in a similar
condition.

The unfortunate policy of the ruler had brought
Hungary face to face with a grave crisis, and had placed
the adherents of the western alliance in a difficult posi-
tion. If they remained faithful to their policy they could
only do so at the expense of their freedom, their national
existence, and their religious convictions. Even those
who hated and feared the Turks, and who saw that Hun-
gary could only hold her place in alliance with the neigh-
bouring Christian power, could not endure the unlawful
conduct of Rudolf, which almost amounted to insanity.

One ancient chronicler wrote of the Hungarians that
they hated the Turks so long as the Germans did not
anger them. This statement is very near the truth.
The Hungarians had alwa^^s hated their pagan enemies,
but when the Germans began to threaten them, body and
soul, they were inclined to seek the protection of the
Turks.

Rudolf had brought the nation to a state of utter
desperation. The people had nothing more to lose, and

425

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

they acted accordingly. The time of caution and deh-
beration was past, and the nation risl^ed everything be-
cause it could no longer tolerate the existing situation.
The Hungarians had borne much because they felt that
they needed the protection of the Habsburgs, but now
the protecting hand was strangling them. A continu-
ance of Rudolf's tyranny would have meant certain
death, so, although the struggle involved terrible dan-
gers, yet it gave at least the hope of deliverance.

Dramas are generally built up on the basis of a con-
flict between a good and an evil element. In this case
real life provided such a conflict. Rudolf was the evil
element, whose actions had made a sanguinary contest
unavoidable, and Bocskay was the hero who sSaved the
situation and killed the Hydra.

Bocskay may justly be considered a great man in
the fullest sense of the word. He possessed strength
and self-control, the talent necessary to achieve success
and to make use of the success when gained, pure inten-
tions and a great mind, calm deliberation, and prompt-
ness in action. He could be severe when necessary. He
had a strong will, and was not dependent upon the advice
of others, yet he saw so clearly the advantages of freedom
and understood so well the requirements of his own part
that as a ruler he was thoroughly constitutional. He
discussed every question with the Diet. In many mat-
ters he did not even express an opinion in order to waken
the sense of responsibility in the Estates. He is un-
doubtedly one of the most striking figures in Hungarian
history. All the great results w^hich he achieved were
due to his own merits. His successes were at the same
time the successes of the nation. He fought for a sacred
cause, and he fought for it with decision, with power and
with success. In a critical time, among grave dangers,
he kept at his post, and saved his country.

The circumstances of Bocskay's life helped to
develop his talents as a statesman. He had large
dominions, the management of which was the best pos-

426

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

sible training for the work of government in such a rest-
less age. At that time the great landowners had to per-
form military, administrative, judicial, and diplomatic
duties. Being uncle and councillor to Sigismund Bathory,
Bocskay became acquainted with the eastern portion of
the country, and with its traditions. He was also ac-
quainted with Rudolf's Court, and could study the
governments in Vienna and Prague. He had possessions
both in Transylvania and in Hungary. He was no par-
ticularist, and his view extended beyond provincial
bounds over the whole of Europe. He lived for the
whole Hungarian nation.

When speaking of Szapolyai we mentioned the great
disadvantage of an aristocratic organisation, the possibil-
ity, namely, that an important part might fall to a man
not great enough for it. On the other hand much good
may result from a privileged position. If it falls to the
lot of a suitable man he can achieve greater and better
results than would otherwise be possible. He can
develop his talents more easily, can become many-sided,
and can acquire the art of leading men more completely
than he could under different circumstances. It was
certainly a great advantage to his nation that Bocskay
was born in the purple.

Bocskay repeated in himself the history of the nation.
He had suffered much and long, and only took up arms
when the tyrant began to threaten his very existence
(1604).

Does this indicate selfishness ? Did he risk his own
welfare for that of the country, or his country for his own
interests? Unfortunately, history often shows us men
Avho bear everything so long as they themselves are in
danger, but who, as soon as their own interests are
threatened, try to set everything on fire. Was Bocskav
such a man ? Before the imperial armies attacked him,
Bocskay was in communication with the persecuted Hun-
garians, as well as with the Turks. He felt that the
situation was unbearable, and was thinking of resistance.

427

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

But he was not the man to invite danger. He was in
favour of the western alliance, and an enemy of the
Turks. He did not believe that the Hungarians could
give him any help, he had much to lose, and he thought
that so long as he was not deprived of his castles and
dominions he might safely watch the development of
events. He was no revolutionary by nature, and was
only made so by circumstances.

To all the previous offences of which Rudolf was
guilty, a new wrong was added. The imperial army
attacked Bocskay on the ground of mere suspicion, with-
out any pretence of judicial proceedings, but just like a
band of robbers. Bocskay was justified in saying that
it was the king's own troops and guns that forced him to
be disloyal.

The moment chosen by Bocskay to unfurl his banner
does not therefore give any indication of selfishness.
Like the nation itself he had a hundred reasons to abstain
from war, and he only took up arms when the situation
began to prove threatening to his power, which was the
most important means of national resistance to the royal
tyranny.

In the struggle between Rudolf and Bocskay it was
Rudolf who took the offensive, while Bocskay maintained
politically as well as physically a defensive attitude.

If insurrection is ever justifiable then the rising of
Bocskay was so. It was right because it had become
a national necessity, and because it only sought what was
attainable, and was able to moderate itself. It was legal
too, since it was in accordance with the Golden Bull, and
was a resistance to attacks made upon the Constitution
and upon the rights of individuals.

What was the policy of Bocskay ? The fundamental
principle to which he adhered was that of Hungary's alli-
ance with the west. He had always advised Sigismund
Bathory to unite with the west in resistance to the Turks.
His first military laurels were won in a war against the

428

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

Turks in Wallachia. He achieved great successes. The
Sultan offered him the Hungarian crown, and the most
warlike among his adherents also wished to raise him to
the throne. It would have been easy to win public sup-
port for the conception of a national monarchy, as the
nation had begun to see that it could never thrive under
the Habsburgs. Rudolf was not thought fit to rule even
by the members of his own family. His own brothers
tried to take away his crown. Why should the Hungari-
ans have been more loyal ? Yet Bocskay did not wish
to dethrone Rudolf. He refused the crown offered
him by the Sultan. It was a pure and lofty political aim
for which he fought, and not rank or any other personal
advantage. He was ambitious, like Marti nuzzi, but his
ambitions were lawful and useful. He never broke
through the restraints imposed by the public interest. He
did not vary his aims in accordance with the fluctuating
fortunes of war ; neither by men nor by events did he allow
himself to be driven hither or thither; his increasing suc-
cesses did not augment his ambitions or his demands,
and every action was directed towards his final aim. Even
the prospect of the crown did not make him swerve from
the path which he had chosen. He knew that if he
accepted it he would have to throw in his lot definitely
with the Turks, and this he considered inadvisable. He
looked for the future welfare of the nation to the w^estern
alliance, which, under the circumstances, could only be
assured by accepting the Habsburgs as rulers. On
the other hand he clung tenaciously to the idea
of an independent Hungarian State, and to the law which
assured that. His attack was directed not against Ru-
dolf only, but against the whole system which had been
threatening Hungary ever since the battle of Mohacs.
He did not desire to deprive the Habsburgs of the
crown ; he only sought to compel them to pursue a policy
w^hich would satisfy the reasonable demands of the Hun-
garians. He endeavoured to establish a Hungarian
State which should have the support of the other Habs-

429

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

burg dominions but which should be entirely autono-
mous. He devised no new legal scheme to solve the
problem of community of interests between Hungary and
the other Habsburg territories. His was the traditional
Hungarian standpoint. He wished to place the common
efforts under Hungarian leadership.

Bocskay's other great aim was to win religious
liberty. While in his politics he was dominated by a
conservative idea and fought for ancient Hungarian
rights, in the matter of religion he took a great step to-
wards the ideas of a later age, and abandoned the
demand for religious uniformity. It is to his lasting
credit that he did not seek to establish the supremacy of
Protestantism, but inscribed the word toleration on his
banner. He himself was a zealous Calvinist, and the
majority of the nation was also Protestant, yet he did not
persecute the Catholics even in the hour of his victories.
He may have belonged to the few who even in that age
grasped the truth that in matters of conscience even mis-
takes deserve our respect, and that to inflict punishment
for them is cruelly unjust. He also realised that the
nation could only endure if the different denominations
dwelt together in peace. As a politician Bocskay saw
that the cause of national freedom needed the help of
every citizen.

The royal party complained that Bocskay and his
followers tried to attach both Catholics and Protestants
to themselves, that they questioned no man as to his
religion, and passed no laws against anyone's creed, and
that Bocskay gave letters of protection even to Catholic
priests. Could there be a more splendid testimonial to
Bocskay and the nation than this complaint?

How different w^as the attitude of another champion
of Protestantism, William of Orange. He lost the
Catholic portions of the western provinces, which accep-
ted Spanish rule again, because the Dutch sought to
found an exclusively Protestant State. The Hungar-
ians showed much more tolerance than the Dutch, al-

430

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

though the latter were famous for their enlightenment,
and although at first Catholics and Protestants had
fought side by side against tyranny.

Bocskay sought to place the great interests for
which he fought under the protection of law. He wished
the increasing foreign influence to be stopped by law
and that religious liberty should have some better safe-
guard than mere promises. Only on such conditions
was he ready to make peace.

Law, by itself however, could not defend the nation's
interests. Living powers were needed to enforce the
law. Such a power Bocskay sought in the indepen-
dence of the eastern portion of the country, the creation
of Martinuzzi and Stephen Bathory. Bocskay really
had no free choice in this matter. As soon as he un-
furled the banner of insurrection his programme could be
nothing else than the autonomy of Transylvania. His-
torical development had determined the path which it
was necessary to take. Although the independence of
Transylvania had for some time been in abeyance, it was
bound to revive. All the misery that followed the union
with the western portion of the country woke a yearning
for separation in the hearts of the inhabitants during
Basta's reign of terror.

The protection of the Sultan promised more certain
peace than could be expected from Rudolf. The union
of the two parts of the country would only have been
natural if the Turks had been conquered, but the nation
did not dare to hope for this after the long and unsuccess-
ful war. The first condition of Turkish support was the
separation of Transylvania from the dominions of the
Habsburgs. The Hungarian Constitution w^as a matter
of indifference to the Turks; their aim was to take away
as great a part of Hungary as possible from the Habs-
burgs. They were only ready to fight on behalf of a
sovereign Transylvania under their protection. They
would not have allowed its union with western Hungary.
Until the reign of terror of Basta, Bocskay does not

431

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

appear to have been in favour of the separation of Tran-
sylvania. He had negotiated the contract by which Sig-
ismund Bathory resigned his principaHty in favour
of Rudolf. Bocskay wished to unite the nation, which
was still free, in the service of one common aim. He
now set a new aim for the common effort. Instead of
war against the Turks, it was the defence of the Constitu-
tion to which he desired to devote all the nation's
strength, and the accomplishment of this aim demanded
not the union of the two parts of the country, but that
Transylvania should be separate, protected by the north-
ern districts, and enabled to pursue a national policy.

This idea was clearly expressed in Bocskay 's will.
** While the Hungarian throne is occupied by a power-
ful foreign ruler, Transylvania must be governed by a
national ruler in order to defend Hungary and religious
liberty. Let Transylvania remain in connection with
the realm of St. Stephen, let it be complementary to that
realm, but it must have independent military and politi-
cal power in order that it may throw its sword into the
scale in the interest of the Hungarian nation.**

Bocskay prepared a great future for Transylvania.
He fitted it to fulfil a great national mission. He wished
it to live not for itself only but also for the other portions
of the Hungarian nation, and to be a counterpoise to Vien-
nese influence. In his will, so full of wisdom, he wrote
"that they (Transylvania and Hungary) should stand
by one another in every emergency, it being a well-
known truth that by discord even great empires are
ruined, while by unity small ones become great.**

This was why he attached so much importance to
the throne of Transylvania, considering its maintenance
as the sine qua non of peace. He also accepted the duke-
dom of Hungary (1605), but only temporarily in the in-
terest of the war; he never attempted to retain it on the
conclusion of peace.

Bocskay recommended Homonnay as his successor
upon the throne of Transylvania, because he trusted that

432

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

as Homonnay came from Hungary he would try to main-
tain the co-operation of the two parts of the country.

The policy of Bocskay had a decisive influence upon
the development of the Hungarian Constitution. It was
Bocskay who, after the long torpor which followed the
battle of Mohacs, roused the Hungarians, and led them
to war against royal tyranny. The struggle did not,
however, seem calculated to be of much service to the
Constitution. Its purpose was the defence of national
independence, and not the establishment of a new gov-
ernmental system. What was demanded was that the
old laws should be enforced, and not that a new consti-
tution should be created. If among the difficult cir-
cumstances of the time the nation could assure its inde-
pendence it would achieve more than it dared to hope.
What the nation desired was to exist, not to modify the
relations of the various factors of the State. Bocskay's
policy did not demand the increase of the power of the
Diet. It was the diplomatic and military action of
Transylvania that could save the country, and not the
influence of the legislators of Hungary proper upon the
government.

The situation would have been quite different if the
old united State had been maintained. If Bocskay had
been not Prince of Transylvania, but a nobleman of
Hungary, and if Transylvania had been a part of the
Hungarian State, the war would have raised the Diet
above the king, and Bocskay could only have made the
results of his victory secure by increasing the authority
of the Diet.

Bocskay had to abandon his former policy with
regard to the Turks. As soon as he drew his sword
against Rudolf he had to join the Turks, even though
he regarded them as his enemies. He cannot be re-
proached for this, because he acted under the pressure of
necessity; moreover, he considered his alliance with the
Turks as a passing episode, and he so shaped his policy
that he could easily free himself from them. Even when

433

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

allying himself with the Turks Bocskay did not lose
sight of the interests of the Hungarian race. He had
changed his attitude but not his aims, and still sought to
serve his race by his Transylvanian policy. He was
careful above all to preserve the nation from any harm
that such an alliance might cause. He inserted in the
treaty the condition that the Turks might attack only the
non-Hungarian dominions of the Habsburgs, and might
not take any Hungarian territory. In this way the Turks
could compel Rudolf to make peace without shedding
Hungarian blood.

The Sultan did not keep to his promise, but con-
tinued his wars in Hungary, and Bocskay had to be
satisfied with the declaration of the Sultan that he would
only annex the fortresses near the Austrian frontier, and
such parts of Hungary as had formerly belonged to him.
In addition to this, Bocskay had to promise to hand over
the towns of Jeno and Lippa.

The inherent fault of an alliance with the Turks had
always been that he who needed their help had to pay for
it with the soil of his country. This alone was enough
to urge Bocskay to bring about a compromise with the
king. He had always been an enemy of the Turks. As
long as he could he fought against them, and when he
could do so no longer he became an advocate of peace,
because peace alone could prevent the internal crisis of
which the Turks would assuredly have taken advantage.
What Bocskay insisted upon was that peace should not
be concluded without him. He demanded from Rudolf
that he should not treat of peace with the Turks without
his intermediation. He also exacted a promise from the
Porte not to confer in his absence with the king*s pleni-
potentiary.

Bocskay also tried to find allies in the west, and to
place the Constitution under international protection.
Rudolf's tyranny, as well as the Catholic reaction, had
created unrest in all the dominions of the Emperor. The
leading elements in the hereditary Habsburg territories

434

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

felt sympathy with the aims of Bocskay, who therefore
tried to use their support on behalf of the compromise to
be effected. He wished to see freedom defended by an
alliance of all the peoples beneath the sceptre of the
Habsburgs.

It is not surprising that this policy brought the various
nations into Bocskay 's camp. With the exception of a
few individuals everybody joined him, magnates, gentry
and burgesses alike. The Protestants were his adher-
ents, and so were some of the Catholics, because of the
strength in them of the national sentiment. The few
great nobles who still sided with the king knew so well
that public opinion w^as against them that they asked to
be protected by foreign soldiers.

Rudolf could not reckon upon the Austrians or
Bohemians. They also were glad to see the downfall of
a system which they hated. The Spaniards were occu-
pied in France and in the Netherlands, while in the Ger-
man Empire the Protestants were as strong as the Catho-
lics, so that Rudolf could not expect much help from
these sources. Success against Bocskay and the Turks
was therefore impossible. While the impotent person-
ality of Rudolf paralysed even the forces that were at his
disposal, Bocskay was an excellent organiser. The in-
habitants who had been expelled by the Turks, and who,
in consequence of their misery, lived by robbery, he
received under his banners, and by giving them land he
attached them again to the country from which they had
almost drifted away. By raising them to the ranks of
the gentry he made them defenders of the Constitution.
He gave inhabitants to the abandoned districts, and
houses to the wandering outlaws, and found the way to
transform the enemies of order into its defenders. His
splendid talents, as well as circumstances, helped Bocskay
to victory, and when victory w^as gained he pointed
the way to peace. He kept to the path of moderation,
that path w^hich it is so difficult to tread in times of revo-
lution. Bocskay experienced to the full its difficulty.

435

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

From two sides he was attacked by his own adherents,
and he had to have a few of his brave soldiers executed
in order to defend peace from those who lived by war.

lU^shazy was called a traitor and a German hound
by the extremists, who wished to kill him because he did
not side with those who thought themselves the only
true patriots, and looked upon moderation as unpatriotic.
Bocskay, however, honoured I116shdzy with his confi-
dence, and entrusted him with a prominent part in the
negotiation of a peace treaty. He did not withhold his
favours even when he found that Illeshdzy had been too
conciliatory, because he knew that he had done good
work, but he did not allow himself to be led even by that
powerful and wise adherent of his party, and he declared
that the conditions of peace as laid down by lUeshazy
were not acceptable.

Bocskay considered peace so important that for its
sake he would have been satisfied even with less than he
actually achieved. He felt the truth of the remark that
** if we fight too much for our freedom there will be no
country left for the purpose.*' This was why the great
Prince Bocskay was more conciliatory, more *' German '*
than the majority of his party. He who had most to
gain by inconsiderately using his successes for his own
benefit was the most moderate in his hour of triumph.
He only demanded what he thought essential to the
defence of great national interests, and therefore he
attained his aim.

The Habsburgs themselves could not but see that
the conditions demanded by Bocskay were less dangerous
to themselves than a continuance of the war, although
those conditions limited their power. The dynasty itself
urged Rudolf to come to terms. The peace of Vienna
and that of Zsitvatorok (1606) gav^e to the nation and to
Bocskay all that they had been fighting for.

The Vienna treaty guaranteed Hungary's indepen-
dence and religious liberty, and Bocskay's rule over
Transylvania and northern Hungary. The fulfilment of

436

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

these conditions was guaranteed by the Austrian Estates.
The peace treaty Avith the Turks was the best that the
king of Hungary had concluded since Mohacs. The
yearly tribute was stopped, and the Sultan and the king
figured in the treaty as parties of equal standing. The
arrangement between Bocskay and the dynasty was in-
cluded in the treaty with the Turks, so that the Sultan
became a guarantee of its being carried out.

Bocskay was not destined to enjoy the fruit of his
labours. Hardly was his work completed when he died
(1606). Those whom he had either conquered or kept
under restraint, revolted against the new order, the
strongest support of which had fallen, and the task fell
to Rudolf of upholding all that he had wished to destroy.

Rudolf's faults had paved the way to Bocskay's suc-
cess, and now his new^ mistakes helped the people to fur-
ther victories. Hungarian liberty has hardly ever had
worse enemies than Rudolf and his Court, yet scarcely
anyone has been of more service to the cause than they.

Rudolf was not inclined to comply with the terms of
the peace treaty. Bocskay's soldiers feared for the safety
of the great national privileges which the treaty had
guaranteed on account of Rudolf's ill-will, so they re-
turned to their extreme policy of separation, a tendency
from w^hich they had only been diverted by the strong
hand of Bocskay.

The Turks also prepared for war. Rudolf's mad-
ness was likely to set the whole country on fire again,
and thus serve the aims of the extreme revolutionary
party. If they had to fight again it was doubtful whether
the desire for separation would not outweigh all other
considerations. Rudolf himself stood in opposition to
the vital interests of the Habsburg dynasty. The strong
instinct of self-preservation to which this family owed its
position, banished all considerations of subordination or
relationship, and the Habsburg archdukes began to
think of the defence of their dynastic interests.

Even in Bocskay's time peace had been brought

437

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

about through the intermediation of some of the arch-
dukes. Now they stood up in defence of their own
achievement, and under the leadership of the king's bro-
ther, the archduke Matthias, they formed an aUiance
with the Hungarian Estates. The Austrian Estates had
manifested sympathy for the Hungarian cause in the
past, for Bocskay had fought against the same evils that
afflicted them. Rudolf's new acts of aggression empha-
sised this community of interests still more, and an alli-
ance with the archduke Matthias, and with the Hungar-
ians, awoke in them great hopes of acquiring for them-
selves all that the Hungarians had fought for. Thus an
alliance of the Austrian, Moravian and Hungarian Es-
tates was concluded under the leadership of Matthias in
defence of the Vienna and Zsitvatorok treaties.

The alliance was directed against Rudolf, and it
won an easy victory. Rudolf abdicated the thrones of
the countries which had become his enemies, and they
elected Matthias in his stead (1608).

The Hungarians were the first to make Matthias
their king. Matthias II. could not resist the current of
events which had carried him to the throne. He had to
reap the consequences of his situation. Events had made
him the champion of Protestantism and of the Estates.
He had acted against his own convictions and desires,
but he had taken the only possible way of saving the
dynasty. Now he had to pay for the advantage he had
gained, and to make such concessions as put an end not
only to Rudolf's illegalities, but also destroyed the re-
sults of the policy which his predecessors had followed.
Protestantism and the Estates won a complete victory
over Catholicism and Absolutism.

What the king had to concede to the Hungarians
he had also to grant to his other dominions. Bohemia
alone remained faithful to Rudolf, but even that country
demanded very great concessions in return for its loyalty.

Let us glance at some of the results which had been
achieved.

438

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

The Vienna peace treaty and the Diets of Matthias
II. meant the close of an epoch which had lasted for
seventy-five years, and the commencement of a new era.
The most important event of the moment was the substi-
tution of Matthias for Rudolf on the throne of Hungary.
Even legally this result was very important, as it meant
a victory over the dynasty. The symbol of power, St.
Stephen's crown, was brought back to Hungary. Reli-
gious liberty had triumphed. It was declared that in
filling the various public offices, religion was not to be
considered. Every denomination was to be controlled by
its own governing body, and the right of free religious
worship was granted even to the serfs. An effort was
made to save the government from being too much in-
fluenced by the Catholic priests. The national welfare
demanded this. The excessive influence of a denomina-
tion which constituted a minority of the people was harm-
ful and abnormal. The events of recent years had shown
that the priesthood could not be trusted in the matter of
the people's liberties. Several of the bishops w^ere ex-
cluded from the royal council, and a law was passed to
the effect that the treasurer should always be a Protes-
tant.

At first the extreme Protestants made excessive
demands, but more moderate counsels ultimately pre-
vailed. Against the Jesuits, however, the Protestants
showed some rigour. The order lost the right of hold-
ing landed property in Hungary. It is not surprising
that the Hungarians were less tolerant tow^ards the Jesuits
than to other religious bodies. It was most important
from a national point of view that those highly cultured
and untiring apostles of Catholicism, who were not at all
scrupulous as to the means they employed, should not
arouse in the Catholics of Hungary the aggressive spirit
with which they themselves were animated. Hostility
to them was demanded not alone by the interests of Pro-
testantism, but by those of the harmony of the whole
religious world. Toleration and liberty can sometimes

439

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

be defended only by means that are contradictory to the
spirit of tolerance and freedom.

Another result was that after forty-five years the
nation again elected a Palatine. During the time of
the Habsburgs in Hungary, the country had only once
had a Palatine, and now that the election took place, even
in that event religious equality w^as exemplified. It was
arranged that the king should select two men from the
Catholics, and two from the Protestants, and then the
Estates were to elect as Palatine one of the four candi-
dates. In this way the king could prevent any one of his
decided adversaries from becoming the head of the execu-
tive, and yet the Palatine would receive his dignity at the
hands of the Estates.

The standing of the Palatine was what it had been
before ; he was to be at the head of the government. Side by
side with him the royal council was to retain all its rights.
The Banus of Croatia also was to retain his former powers.
In control of the country's finances a treasurer was to be
appointed in place of the former bureaucratic body. The
independence of the State was further secured by the law
that public offices should only be given to Hungarian citi-
zens. All affairs of State were to be managed by a Hun-
garian government, and in dealing with those matters the
king should only be advised by Hungarians; no
foreigners were to interfere with the country's affairs. The
nation's finances were to be quite independent of the
Austrian Treasury. None of the country's revenues were
to be handled by foreigners. Chancellor and Treasurer
were to be elected from the king's Hungarian council.
This assured the influence of the Hungarian Estates posi-
tively, whereas the exclusion of a foreign council merely
acted negatively. The growing foreign influence which
had proved so injurious to the country was destroyed.

Much harm had also resulted from leaving unfilled
many important public posts. This neglect was now for-
bidden by law.

The most difficult problem was the satisfactory settle-

440 '

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

ment of military matters. One circumstance, however,
made the work of legislators somewhat easier, namely, the
peace concluded with the Porte. The foreign troops
were sent home so that the difficult task of reconciling
their presence with Hungarian interests was at an end. A
law was passed to the effect that the king might not com-
mence war without the consent of the Estates, nor might
he call in foreign troops, so that the situation of the
foreign soldiers did not constitute a problem of practical
politics.

The question of the frontier fortresses was more diffi-
cult. Foreign pecuniary support was necessary, yet the
Hungarians were afraid of the foreign garrisons, because
they were not so trustworthy as Hungarian troops as
regards foreign enemies, while the internal foes of Hun-
gary could have no stronger support than the foreign
troops. Legislators, therefore, w^ould have liked to use
the foreign money for the maintenance of Hungarian
garrisons, and it was a great proof of their capacity that
on paper at least they actually attained this result. A
law was passed that the captains of the fortresses must
be Hungarians, with the exception of the captain of Gyor,
but even he must have a Hungarian lieutenant. The
garrisons also must be Hungarians. In spite of this,
pecuniary help towards the payment of the soldiers and
the maintenance of the fortresses was demanded. The
captains were to be chosen by the Hungarian council.
The one foreign officer, the commander of Gyor, was
placed under the direction of the Palatine.

The king was to reside in the country, or if he were
obliged to leave it, the Palatine and the Council were to
have full powers.

The organisation of the Council remained unaltered.
No effort was made to place the executive in a position of
dependence upon the Estates. The aim was rather to
make the Estates independent of the king. This was
shown by the laws passed concerning the election of the
Palatine, and also by the paragraph relating to the ques-

441

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

tion who were entitled to take part in the meeting of the
Estates. This had not been clearly settled before. Now
the omission was rectified, and the king's hands were
bound more strongly than they could have been by mere
custom. The laws passed embodied no new principles,
but merely confirmed the existing order. It was declared
that the country had four orders, the prelates, the barons,
the gentry, and the burgesses of the free towns. The
king must summon these to the meetings of the Diet.
Others, however, he must not summon. This shows
clearly that the formation of the legislative body was not
a prerogative of the king, and could only be decided by
law. The system of two houses was accepted.

Questions of individual liberty were not neglected.
Nobody could be condemned without lawful trial, or was
obliged to obey any illegal command.

One more decision is worth mentioning, that was
intended to put an end to a great fault in the existing law
which acted very disadvantageously to the Hungarian race
and the national cause. The new law opened to the Hun-
garians the "free royal towns," and granted them the
right to own houses in the towns, and to become mem-
bers of the municipality. It was only then that members
of the dominant race attained equality with the foreign
burgesses in their own country.

All the problems which had arisen during the Habs-
burg regime were solved in a manner favourable to the
nation.

Before continuing the narration of events, let us
review the principal causes of the great results secured, as
thisbook seeks to give the reasons for Hungary's freedom.

The fate of a country is often powerfully influenced
by the political situation of its neighbours. Foreign
events often determine the course of development of in-
ternal affairs. This was the cause with Hungary. Every
event was influenced by the circumstance that in the six-
teenth century the Habsburg dynasty had to grapple with

442

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

ever increasing difficulties. The power of the dynasty
which, in the time of Charles V., appeared to be growing
to enormous dimensions, began to decrease even during
the lifetime of that monarch. At the commencement of
the century the dynasty had aimed at the leadership of the
whole of Europe, while at the end of the same century its
enemies were looking forward to its final downfall.

This situation of the dynasty was the chief cause of
Hungary's freedom. The Habsburgs, in their difficult
position, were compelled to abandon many of their plans
and to be satisfied with the defence of what was absolutely
indispensable to their future welfare. It was not very
important to them what happened in Hungary. Their
dynastic interests merely demanded that St. Stephen's
crown should remain in their possession, together with so
much Hungarian territory as would suffice to ward off
Turkish attacks. They need Hungary merely in order to
defend Germany and the west. Their interest and their
duty alike demanded that the Turks should be driven out
of the country, but they did not dare to embark on this
enterprise with the energy which alone could promise
success.

With regard to the Protestants their attitude was the
same.

It was to the interest of the monarchs to refrain from
exerting themselves in order to destroy the Hungarian
Constitution. They objected strongly to many privileges
of the Estates which hampered their own freedom of
action. They would have liked to make use of the money
and the armed forces of Hungary in such ways and in
such places as their aims required, but the Habsburgs
would have committed a great political blunder if they
had risked an open conflict on this account.

The Hungarian nation had become weaker, but it
had preserved its love of liberty, and events had even
strengthened that sentiment. The king could not affect
the internal organisation of the country, and the general
trend of events had increased the decentralisation which

44B

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

had previously been considerable. As the monarchy
could not win the heart of the nation, its victory could
only have been won in open conflict with the people.
Absolutism could only have been achieved with the aid of
foreign forces which should effect the subjugation of the
Hungarians. This would have meant a violent conflict
in which the Habsburgs were more likely to lose than to
gain, since the nation might have turned its whole power
against them. The war that would have resulted could
only have benefited Transylvania, and the Sultan under
whose protection that principality stood. Thus the Sul-
tan, the worst despot in the world, was involuntarily
the safeguard of the Hungarian Constitution. The abso-
lutist efforts of the Habsburgs were moderated by
anxiety lest a violent regime would make the Crescent
supreme over Hungary. If the Habsburgs had tried to
annihilate the Hungarian Constitution they might easily
have lost the whole country, and have been driven to
such straits to defend themselves as would have made
their western policy impossible. Against the Turks or
the Protestants they could have reckoned on foreign assis-
tance, but who would support them in a struggle against
the privileges of the leading classes in the nation ? Cer-
tainly not the Austrian Estates, who sympathised with
the Hungarians. The kings realised that although the
Constitution was disadvantageous to them they must not
seek to destroy it by violent means. None of them made
the attempt until Rudolf became king.

Rudolf was the first Habsburg king of Hungary who
was blind to his own interests, but even this blindness
proved favourable to the Hungarian cause. At the time
of Bocskay's rising the nation felt that it would lose all
if it submitted ; the dynasty, on the other hand, saw that
it would lose much more by not giving in than it could
possibly hope to gain. This made the triumph of the
Hungarians comparatively easy, especially as they did
not demand separation, and were moderate even in the
moment of victory. The dynasty was divided, and the

444

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

weak-minded Rudolf was isolated. The good sense of
the Hungarians awoke the good sense of the rest of the
Habsburgs, and it became possible to defend the Consti-
tution without breaking the dynasty*s power. The nation
did not need to embark on such desperate struggles as
would ha\'e been inevitable if the Habsburgs had threat-
ened its very existence.

The policy of the earlier Habsburg kings was more
dangerous than the open violence of Rudolf. They
ignored many of the laws; matters connected with war,
foreign policy, and finance, had been entrusted to foreign-
ers; but otherwise they showed goodwill towards the
nation. They refrained from violent actions, and if they
had been more skilful in managing the Hungarians, and
had spent more time in the country, if they had made a
wiser use of the Hungarian elements of the nation, yield-
ing them some part on the stage of European politics, per-
haps in time they might have changed the disposition of
the nation, and made it accept their system. The Turkish
danger was so great that no one would have dared to
destroy, by taking up arms, what little security the terrible
enemy had left to the nation. The people would gradu-
ally have become accustomed to the absolute power of the
Habsburgs. It was Rudolf who saved the nation from
this fate by presenting absolutism in its most repulsive
aspect. The nation suddenly perceived towards what an
abyss it was moving. It was roused from its apathy, and
this happened at a time when the Habsburgs were least
able to wage the war to which they had forced the nation,
while Hungary possessed eminent statesmen.

Wiser policy and better leadership gave the advan-
tage in the struggle to the Hungarians.

The sixteenth century had not brought final disaster
to Hungary, but the nation *s power of resistance had been
diminishing. Annexation was not actually accomplished
but the way was prepared for it. In the first decade of
the seventeenth century, however, freedom was saved by
the ill-judged attack of a luckless hand. When resis-

445

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

tance became necessary the nation did not once transgress
the limits of lawful action, and it was victorious because
it did not seek to break the power of the dynasty, which
it needed, and the downfall of which would have dragged
the nation itself to destruction.

The name of Basta will ever remain odious on account
of the man's mean and brutish cruelty in Transylvania.
His bad fame made more difficult the situation of those
who afterwards served the same cause as he had served,
although with different convictions and different inten-
tions. That the impression should be still greater, fate
had placed beside the hateful Basta the radiant figure of
Bocskay, the new type of a national hero. Next to the
great conquerors of the Turks, Zrinyi and Dob6, or rather
in their place, we see the heroes who fought for freedom.
These begin to occupy the thoughts of the people.
National idealism finds its nourishment in the struggles
for freedom instead of in the wars against the Turks.
Patriotism came to be more and more identified in the
minds of the people with belonging to the party of oppo-
sition. In every wrong step of the dynasty they seemed
to recognise the system of Basta and Rudolf IL Confi-
dence in the occupant of the throne steadily diminished.
The foreign origin of the dynasty and the fluctuating
policy of the nation had made impossible from the begin-
ning that co-operation which was so necessary to both
parties.

Rudolf's absolutist and romanising attempts,
which stirred the nation's soul to its depths, brought on
the ultimate collision. Basta, and in later times, Caraffa
and Haynau, have done the dynasty far more harm than
Bocskay, Rak6czi, and Kossuth.

At the commencement of the seventeenth century the
nation faced a very uncertain future. The path of pro-
gress was likely to open before it only if the nation could
become one with its ruler, and if, in hearty co-operation
with him, it first regained its lost territory, and then
turned its attention to the country's internal affairs.

446

BOCSKAY'S INSURRECTION.

Was there any hope of such a development ? The
question was whether the peace concluded in Bocskay's
time was a sincere peace, and such as could form the start-
ing point of a new career of progress for the nation. Upon
the answer to this question the fate of Hungary depended.

447

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

CHAPTER XXV.

POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES
DURING THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

(1608-1619).

The nation's leaders, after the death of Bocskay, were
Ill(^shazy and Thurz6. One followed the other in the
Palatinate, and they were both thoughtful, circumspect,
and just men. It was not their fault if they did not
achieve success.

At the commencement of his reign Matthias was
much troubled by the Austrian Protestants, who appealed
to the Hungarians for support. The interests of the Pro-
testants in both countries were common, but neither
Illeshazy nor Thurz6 wished the Hungarians to turn
against their king for the sake of a foreign people. Both
men were true statesmen in their wise moderation. They
saw that the greatest interest of their nation lay in a
good understanding with the king, and in defence of this
interest they were ready to risk their popularity.

As we have seen, some of Bocskay's adherents
turned against Illeshdzy, thinking him too royalist to be
a good patriot. His very life was in danger. Later on,
he stood up for King Matthias, and advocated his corona-
tion. But he was not by any means servile. He was a
loyal subject of his king, yet he w^as ready to take up
arms against him when the king thought himself free
from his constitutional obligations. He told the king
that he must be careful to retain the sympathy of his
subjects, for they could easily find another ruler whereas
he could not find another country. He strongly con-

448

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

demned the unlawful deeds of Matthias. He had
defended the king before the nation, but he also defended
the nation before the king.

Thurz6 was a man of the same stamp. He also
played the difficult part of mediator. He had not been
entirely one with Bocskay. His dominions lay near the
Austrian frontier, and therefore, like Illeshazy, he had to
take thought concerning his own interests. But even in
the Emperor's camp he truly served the nation. He was
its safeguard from the excesses of both ruler and people.
Therefore, he was assailed on all sides, but in spite of
this both nation and ruler needed him, and found it wise
to follow his advice.

Illeshazy and Thurzo were model Hungarian states-
men in that sad time when people and ruler were not
united, although their interests demanded that they should
be, yet they could not achieve their aim. They should
have governed Hungary, together with the king, entirely
excluding foreign influences. Their duty, their deepest
desire, the principal aim of their policy, was the restoration
of an independent Hungarian government. This pur-
pose, however, clashed with the intentions of the king.

Illeshazy had been the first to conceive the idea of
elevating Matthias to the throne. He was the man to
whom Matthias owed most, yet the king did not entirely
trust even Illeshazy. Naturally, religion was a barrier
between them. The king's real minister was Khlesl, who
knew the king's thoughts, and directed his actions.
Matthias managed even Hungarian affairs according to
the advice of Khlesl, although that prelate was not
attached to Hungary either by blood or by his office.

Like his predecessors, the king regarded the Court
Council as his real governing body. This explains why
his policy had not a national basis. Matthias did not
seek the guarantee of his power in the contentment of his
Hungarian subjects, but in the increasing number of
foreigners living in Hungary, The Hungarians had
voluntarily invested him with his royal dignity, yet he

449

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

did not trust them. His fundamental ideas are clearly
expressed in his actions and his letters. When, in the
year 1614, he seemed to wish to make war with the
Turks, he wrote to the Archduke Albert that the Turkish
war was a mere pretext, but " the service of God and the
maintenance of our dynasty are the main reasons." 1'he
war would have given him an opportunity of bringing a
foreign army into Hungary, and so of confirming his
rule. When this ^scheme was frustrated he began to
approach the Turks, hoping w ith their help to achieve his
aim. It was the Sultan who suggested that Matthias
should place foreign soldiers in the fortresses instead of
Hungarians. On this subject Matthias wrote to the
Archduke Ferdinand, and his words give some insight
into his ideas, and explain better than volumes could do,
the tragedy which is called the history of Hungary.

The interesting letter begins with the statement that
the offer of the Turks is an insult to the whole nation.
We see then that although Matthias thus regarded the
offer he was ready to accept it. He says that he sees
th(^ hand of God in the circumstance that the Sultan him-
self wishes to abolish the laws passed in Bocskay's time.
" In this way the German nation, upon which the Hun-
garians look down so much that they will not suffer Ger-
man soldiers in their country even for the purpose of their
own defence, will be raised again to the dignity due to
it." This alone would be reason enough for using this
"excellent opportunity." "The Hungarians," he con-
tinues, "invent such harmful devices in order to ensure
free election everywhere, that we cannot use better means
than the substitution of Germans for Hungarians. The
Hungarians are now poor and w-eak, and they cannot
expect help from other countries, so they will have to sub-
mit." Then he goes on to say that he could not rule over
Transylvania unless he had German troops near its
frontiers.

It is only with an aching heart that a Hungarian
statesman can read these lines. Every word explains

450

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

some of the unspeakable sufferings which the nation has
had to endure, and reveals the fundamental principles of
a fatal governing system.

Cuvier could reconstruct the whole body of an animal
from a single bone. Similarly, the whole system of
Matthias could be reconstructed with the aid of this letter.
The man who wrote of the Hungarians that **they invent
harmful devices" could not intend to carry out the laws
which placed the power in their hands, and could but rely
upon foreign support.

Matthias was placed by his political convictions in
opposition to the nation and its rights. He made promises
which he did not regard as justifiable. He could
not really approve of the concessions which he
had made. If he sided with the nation against his own
brother it was because he thought that a better future
awaited his dynasty, and if he could content the nation
and the Protestants it was solely because he thought it
advisable to submit to the inevitable.

Seemingly the Vienna treaty was the foundation of
a union stronger than had previously existed, because
Matthias, before being crowned, had fought for the new
order against the head of his house, the Emperor, and
it was to the triumph of the new order that he owed his
throne. But in reality even this new compact was just
like the former one. The nation's victory had created
a very difficult situation for the dynasty. The Habs-
burgs could not maintain their prestige if their dominions
were ruled not by them but by the Estates, who in many
respects pursued an entirely different policy from their
own.

The attitude of the Hungarians explains much of the
anxiety of Matthias. The majority of the nation adhered
to the new faith while the king himself was a Catholic.
Also, one part of the nation was under the protection of
the Turks, yet it was in frequent communication with the
other part, to which it felt attached by a strong sense of
solidarity.

451

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

This may explain tlie policy of Matthias, but it
does not justify it. The king sought his support in the
foreign troops. His aim was to establish his rule with
their aid. As we have seen, he was ready to commence
war with the Turks solely in order that he might have
some pretext for bringing a foreign army into Hungary.

He did not wish to conquer Transylvania because he
knew that he could not retain it unless he also overcame
the Turks, but he wished to place it under a ruler who
would serve his aims. First he intrigued against one of
the Transylvanian rulers, Gabriel Bathory. He attacked
Bdthory but was defeated. When afterwards, partly in
consequence of the intrigues of the Viennese Court, but
chiefly through his own fault, Bathory fell, the Court
carried on the same intrigue against his successor.

In opposition to Bethlen the Court party tried to raise
Homonnay, a Catholic magnate, to the throne of Tran-
sylvania, but they made him promise that if the king
desired it, he would admit foreign troops. From Bethlen
the king demanded that he should allow German troops
to enter the fortress of Nagy Vdrad.

In every Diet that the king convened, he tried to gain
permission to call in foreign troops. His argument was
that foreign powers would not give money for military
purposes unless the laws excluding foreign troops were
repealed.

Besides this constant effort on the part of the king, he
sought to free himself from the Palatine. When I116shazy
died the king appealed to the Estates not to maintain the
expensive office of Palatine, and when the Estates would
not fall in with the king's wishes, he tried at least to
modify the form of the election. He said that not the
king, but the Estates, should nominate four candidates,
and the king should choose from them the one he pre-
ferred. But even this result he could not accomplish.

After Thurz6's death the king tried to hand over the
duties of the Palatine to an executive council appointed

452

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

by himself, but he soon found that he could not effect his
purpose and accordingly abandoned it.

In 1618 Matthias requested the king of Spain to give
him support in money and men, so that he might put an
end to the system of free election. In Bohemia
he had succeeded in making the nation acknow-
ledge the hereditary right of the dynasty and he
now demanded of the Hungarians that they should accept
the Archduke Ferdinand as his successor. His aim was
to place the dynasty in the position which it had occupied
before the crisis precipitated by Rudolf.

The king's efforts, however, were fruitless. He failed
in his attempts to begin war with the Turks. The Hun-
garians openly declared that they were for peace when
the Estates of all the dominions of Matthias were assem-
bled at Linz. Nor were the Austrians inclined to give
their support for such a war. It was a cruel idea to urge
a nation into a war, the issue of which was most uncer-
tain, and to demand its money and its blood, in order to
use this sacrifice for the purpose of destroying the nation's
Constitution. This nefarious scheme richly deserved the
speedy and utter defeat with which it met.

In 1618, Matthias had also to abandon, on the advice
of his Hungarian council, the plan of leading Spanish
troops into Hungary.

As regards Transylvania the Viennese policy met
with no better success. The Court undermined the posi-
tion of Gabriel Bathory, but he was succeeded by the
more talented and therefore more dangerous Gabriel
Bethlen.

Bethlen, embittered by the intrigues against him,
sought an alliance with the Turks. The northern part
of the country also felt some anxiety on account of the
struggle of the Court with Transylvania, and this feeling
kept alive in the nation the sense of solidarity with that
principality. The value of Transylvania's independence
was made increasingly evident by the attacks made
upon it.

453

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The king desired that in place of free election the
nation should merely ** accept" the new king whom he
himself should nominate. But the majority of the Estates
demanded that the Archduke Ferdinand should be subject
to an entirely "free election," meaning by that expression
that if the nation chose, it was entitled to elect a king from
some other dynasty.

At last the king and the nation compromised upon a
certain kind of election which both parties understood
differently. The king was convinced that there was only
freedom of choice within the limits of the Habsburg
family, while the Estates thought that their right of elec-
tion was entirely unrestricted. It is certain, however,
that the king had abandoned some of his pretensions,
because instead of a mere *' acceptance " of his successor,
the ** election" of one was the final result of the long con-
troversy.

The careful behaviour of Matthias was due to the
political situation. Matthias was weaker than his pre-
decessors. The great storm roused by Rudolf did not
pass away without leaving serious traces. The royal pre-
rogatives were everywhere limited. Decentralisation and
the authority of the Estates prevailed. If Matthias had
tried to carry his point by force he would have received
no support from any quarter. Every one of his countries
wished to live its own independent life. All were jealous
of each other and the only common feeling among them
was fear of the imperial power. In 1613 Matthias
himself wrote, after having discerned the political ten-
dencies of Bohemia, Moravia and Upper Austria, that all
his provinces were drifting away from the centre and that
after his death the monarchy would fall to pieces. Only
in defence of their religion and of the authority of the
Estates were the various dominions of the Habsburgs
ready to form an alliance. If the king had attacked their
independence, the alliance which had broken the power
of Rudolf would have sprung to life again.

The most eminent Austrian statesman of that period,

454

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

Zierotin, sought to give a permanent organisation to that
alliance. He wished to create a body from the Estates of
the various countries which could exercise a decisive
power at the centre, and could counteract the imperialist
policy. But Matthias dreaded so much the idea of his
various dominions acting in concert that when in 1614
he summoned their representatives to Linz in order to
plan the Turkish war, he did not hold a joint meeting of
them all, but asked them to give their opinions in writ-
ing.

It was due to the victories of the Hungarians and to
the diplomacy of Hungarian statesmen that the king
could not count on support from any of his countries
against the new order, which had been built up by the
alliance of the Estates, and remained under their joint
protection .

The state of his relations with the rest of Europe
also compelled Matthias to maintain peace. The
Emperor's title was a mere empty sound. The German
Empire was a body without any soul to control its vari-
ous members. The league of Protestants known as the
Union became the deadly enemy of the Habsburgs.

The situation of Matthias was made still more diffi-
cult by the animosity between himself and Rudolf, who
shrank from no means of revenge that presented itself,
and who sought to rouse the Estates against Matthias.

On the west, Henry IV. of France for some time
threatened the Habsburg dynasty. The French nation
had witnessed the horrors of a religious war, and had
welcomed Henry IV. as its saviour. That great
man won for France a most favourable position. He
stood at the head of a united people, and he wished to
employ its strength in war against the Habsburgs. It
looked as though the world was on the eve of a revival
of the great war which had been commenced by Francis
T. and Charles V., except that now the parts were
reversed.

Henry was the aggressor, and the more formidable

455

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

of the two opponents. He was organising his armies
with the view of breaking the power of the Habsburgs,
and of transforming the map of Europe, when a fanatic
murdered him (1610).

The Habsburgs had escaped the danger from the
west, but on the east the Sultan's sword was still drawn
against them. Every conflict between king and people
would have benefited the Sultan, and would have helped
to make him master of the country.

In Hungary itself the king's situation did not
improve. In consequence of the peace treaty with the
Turks there were fewer foreign soldiers in the country
than formerly. Since the time of Bocskay the Hungarian
government had become very much stronger. The
king's schemes made a very bad impression upon the
members of the government, and were opposed even by
those who stood nearest to the king. One powerful
defence of national freedom was the prevailing decen-
tralisation. The counties lived an active and independent
political life, and were vigilant defenders of the Consti-
tution and of Protestantism. It was their action that
checked the intrigues of the Viennese Court, and frus-
trated the attacks upon Transylvania. They made war
upon Homonnay, who served the aims of the Viennese
Court. They defended Transylvania, which subse-
quently repaid them bountifully for their help. Tran-
sylvania became a factor which forced the Court to be
conciliatory. It was like an obstacle in the king's path
which he strove in vain to remove.

The temper of the Hungarians was less conciliatory
during the reign of Matthias than it had been before.
Rudolf's action had increased their distrust. They were
not inclined to part with any of their rights, and they
refused peremptorily any demand of the king in that
direction. The Diet repeatedly confirmed what the king
desired to be cancelled. Since Bocskay's insurrection
the Hungarian Constitution could only be maimed by
violent means, but the king did not dare to employ them.

456

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS H.

That is why all his efforts remained fruitless, and the
bulwark erected by Bocskay in defence of the Constitu-
tion remained intact.

But although Matthias could not change the legal
situation to his advantage, and the laws which made his
position more difficult than that of his successors re-
mained unrepealed, he was more successful in his mani-
pulation of the existing laws. He could not regain what
the legislators had acquired for themselves, but he could
hinder them from reaping any benefit from it.

Hungarian affairs should have been managed
exclusively by Hungarian councillors. And yet, just as
before, the Court Council was the supreme government.
Even the negotiations concerning a new peace with the
Turks were carried on by Khlesl.

Matthias knew well enough that Thurz6 or Illdshazy
would have served his interests much better than Khlesl
as regards the defining of the frontiers, because for them
to surrender a portion of Hungarian territory would have
been like giving their very life blood, but they would not
have supplied the king with an opportunity of restoring
the Germans to their " former dignity " in Hungary.

Military matters were controlled by the Court Coun-
cil, and when the Hungarian Council complained, the
answer was that it would be impossible for the Court
Council not to have the control since the frontier fort-
resses were maintained by Austrian money, and in order
to pacify the Hungarians the king was advised by his
council to nominate Hungarians as members of the
various Court Councils. But the king did not
do even this, and the country's military affairs
were entirely managed by foreigners in Vienna.

According to Hungarian law financial matters also
should have been entirely in Hungarian hands, but they
were not. The office of Hungarian Treasurer was not
filled, the custom officials were largely foreigners, and the
mining towns were governed from Vienna. The Palatine
complained, but in vain.

457

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

The law decreed that all foreign soldiers should be
removed from the country, but how could Matthias carry-
out the law when his great aim was to bring into the
country as many foreign soldiers as possible? The
commanders of the fortresses were foreigners, the Banus
did not recover his authority, and the Croatian and Sla-
vonian fortresses were under the direct command of the
Archduke Ferdinand, of Gratz, while their garrisons were
German.

The king had a strong argument against the legisla-
tors in the circumstance that Hungary had often appealed
to the neighbouring countries for money. The German
soldiers themselves said that they would not leave the
Croatian fortresses because they belonged to Ferdinand
as much as Gyor belonged to the German Empire. The
weak point in Hungary's position from the beginning of
the Habsburg regime had been the inability of the coun-
try to supply its own needs. Legal independence could
not become effective because financial dependence did
not cease even in times of peace.

The final result of the reign of Matthias was a weak-
ening of the State. The king could not compel the
Estates to submit to a maiming of the Constitution, but
on the other hand the Estates could not compel the king
to respect the laws. Both parties were strong enough for
purposes of defence, but neither was able to win a com-
plete victory over the other. This situation was just as
disadvantageous to the king as to the nation. The king's
attitude was unquestionably wrong. Without mention-
ing the moral aspect of the question, even from the point
of view of expediency, a policy which yielded such fruits
was to be condemned. The king lost the nation's sym-
pathy, and gained little real power in exchange. His
rule retained its foreign character, and, in spite of a fav-
ourable beginning, proved just as unpopular as that of
Ferdinand I. or Maximilian. Moreover, it was weaker
than theirs had been, for Matthias himself had helped to
ro-build those constitutional bulwarks which had been

458

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

battered by his predecessors. The foreign soldiers
remained in the country and embittered public feelings
while they were not sufficiently numerous to put down the
opposition aroused by their presence.

This policy was the more foolish on the part of
Matthias, because if he had respected the country's inde-
pendence he could have considerably increased his power
as king of Hungary. The religious situation would have
given him an excellent opportunity.

During the reign of Matthias the religious affairs of
the nation were in a still more critical condition than
political matters. The king was just as much opposed to
religious liberty as to political liberty. When the Aus-
trian Estates demanded religious privileges from him he
complained bitterly that he would be unhappy whatever
his decision was, for he would lose either his crown or
his salvation.

Yet it was not the king who disturbed the peace of
the religious world; that was the work of the Church.

Protestantism had by that time become very strong.
Matthias was not fanatical ; he was rather a man of half
measures. He wished to assure both his throne and his
salvation, and accordingly refrained from energetic perse-
cution, but whenever and wherever he could injure the
new faith, contrary to the law, he did so. He thus made
the Protestants his enemies, yet he did not content the
Catholics-

What Matthias did not dare to do, was brought about
by the spirit of the times. Catholicism was inspired with
new ardour. The most important feature of the reign of
Matthias II. was the attack made by the Catholics upon
Protestantism.

The Jesuits began to develop great activity, and
among the higher priesthood also an intransigent spirit
manifested itself. They did all in their power to stir the
people out of their tolerance and indifference.

In Hungary, Archbishop Peter Pazmany was the
most powerful representative of the new tendency. In that

459

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

country he personified the Catholic reaction. Pazmdny
was a man of eminent talents, a great orator, a clever logi-
cian whose arguments were sharp as a sword, and a con-
summate artist in the use of Hungarian literary prose. He
was no apostle of Christian love and charity, such as
might be admired as much by members of other deno-
minations as by his own. Yet he deserved respect, for he
was entirely sincere. He persecuted the Protestants from
no other motives than those supplied by religious fanati-
cism, and although he was of a warlike disposition, and
masterful, yet he was not so implacable as many other per-
secutors of his time. It was chiefly by impressing men's
minds that he attained his great successes. He wished to
win real adherents to the Church, and he knew he could
not do that by violent means. He therefore relied on
arguments, on the exemplary conduct of the priests, on
the influence of schools, and on awakening real convic-
tions. When in 1608 the king asked him whether it was
compatible with the duty of a Christian to sanction reli-
gious liberty, Pazmany replied that one should not only
consider what one ought to do, but also what was pos-
sible, and the violent suppression of Protestantism would
certainly drive the Hungarians to seek the protection of
the Turks.

Pdzmany's predecessor, Forgach, and several of
his successors, were harder and more indomitable
than he. He did not try to alter the laws of
the country to the advantage of the Catholics, but in
social life he advocated forcible methods in religious
matters. He was glad if a landowner compelled his pea-
sants to accept Catholicism, or if churches were taken by
force from the Protestants.

At a time when religion and politics were so closely
bound together, Pazmany could not keep aloof from poli-
tics, especially as he wielded so much power as Arch-
bishop of Esztergom. He had many enemies. As a
man who fought passionately for his convictions and
his party, he was hated by many. During his lifetime

460

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS 11.

there were several who doubted his patriotism, and after
his death the accusations were repeated. These accusa-
tions, however, deserve no credence. It may be that
patriotism was not the mainspring of his actions; he
was probably a Catholic first and a Hungarian after-
wards; but as far as anything outside his religion could
interest him he lived for his country. In his letters he
always spoke with heartfelt warmth of his country. We
can believe those letters. To be a good patriot is a racial
quality with the Hungarians, and a man who cultivated
the national language with so much love, who was so
versed in national lore, who was so proud of his noble
descent, and was such an eminent personality, could not
have been indifferent to the sufferings of his country.
And just because he loved that country he wished it
to follow ** the only true faith.'* He looked for the sup-
port of that faith to the dynasty. The religious salvation
and political welfare of the nation he expected from the
same source. That was why he was a more fervent adher-
ent of the dynasty than most of the Hungarians.

In 1616 Pazmany wrote: ** It is impossible for Hun-
gary to remain entire between those two powerful
empires ; either we must be swallowed up by the pagans,
or else we must seek protection beneath the wings of the
neighbouring Christian power.*' He therefore approved
of many things to which the majority of the nation
objected, and was ready to yield such power to the king
as made the nation fear for its Constitution. When the
nation clamoured for the unrestricted right of electing its
king, he declared himself in favour of the undisputed suc-
cession of the Habsburgs. When the Diet demanded
the election of a Palatine, Pazmany was willing to leave
that office unfilled. He did not look with friendly eyes
at the enormous power of the Palatine. He would have
preferred a state of affairs in which the head of the Hun-
garian Church, the Archbishop of Esztergom, that is to
say, himself, could play the leading part.

When public opinion turned against the dynasty

461

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

Pazmany even approved of the introduction of German
troops into Hungary, because it was in the king's armed
forces that he saw the defence of the rehgion and the
policy which he favoured. He realised that the salvation
of both king and country depended on the existence of a
good understanding between them, and he endeavoured
to induce the nation to adopt an attitude that might
awaken the king's confidence, while on the other hand,
he sought to give such a tendency to the king's policy as
would serve the interests of the nation. He often recom-
mended that Transylvania should be ruled by an inde-
pendent Hungarian prince, who would be supported by
the Turks, but it is doubtful whether he was sincere in
offering this advice.

An independent Transylvania, protected by the
Turks, was entirely opposed to the interests of Catholi-
cism, and to the policy of Pazmiiny, who favoured the
western alliance. It is hard to believe that Pazmdny
would have raised his voice on behalf of the maintenance
of the rule of Bethlen and Rak6czy in Transylvania if
he had had any hopes of their being conquered. As that
was not likely, Pazmany thought that peace was the most
advisable policy.

Every action of Pazmany was inspired by the con-
viction that the Turks and the Protestants were equally
dangerous, and that the nation's earthly welfare and
future salvation alike demanded the strengthening of the
Habsburgs' power. Royalism was stronger in Pdzmdny
than in most of his contemporaries.

The bad policy of the dynasty was the cause of all
the mischief. He who really approved of the Habsburg
system of government could hardly be a good Hungar-
ian. The man, however, who merely acquiesced in that
system, in spite of its defects, because he thought that
the interests of the country demanded that the dynasty
should be supported, may have been as true a patriot as
the nation possessed.

Pdzmany's work was epoch-making. Success could

462

THE REJGN OF MATTHIAS H.

not fail to attend his efforts. Catholicism began to drive
out Protestantism everywhere. In the last Diet convened
by Matthias the Catholics among the magnates were
more numerous than the Protestants. The political life
of the nation gained a new factor. There was a powerful
new political and religious party

What was the effect upon the nation of the revival of
Catholicism? It became a link between king and nation.
The Catholic dynasty and the Catholic nation had at least
a few points in common. They learned to look at events
from the same point of view. Mutual confidence and
harmonious co-operation at least became possible.

But did not this new state of affairs endanger the
country's freedom? If the trustworthiness of the Hun-
garians had induced the king to govern Hungary with the
help of Hungarians, and to put an end to the foreign
regime, the nation would have entered upon a new and
happier epoch. The mission of the Catholic party was
to influence the dynasty in favour of the nation and the
importance of this mission was incalculable. But if the
Catholics did not succeed, there was danger lest the
foreign spirit of the Court should draw the Catholic party
under its spell, and if the crown should continue to pursue
a wrong policy, like that of Rudolf, the division of the
people into rival denominations would weaken the nation's
power of resistance.

The situation contained both good and bad possibili-
ties. During the reign of Matthias II. the Catholic re-
action did more harm than good. Pazmany and his fol-
lowers succeeded in eliminating certain wrong features in
the governing system of Matthias, and they also created
a somewhat more conciliatory spirit among the Estates,
but they could not control the actions of the Court.
Matthias would have gained much if he had drawn nearer
to the Hungarians, but he remained so foreign that even
the Catholics could not conciliate the nation, but only
drew its mistrust upon themselves.

In the sixteenth century, when Protestantism com-

463

DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN LIBERTY.

menced to spread, Catholicism was in a weakened condi-
tion in Hungary, and as the Protestants adopted a very-
moderate attitude a severe conflict was avoided. But
now the Catholic reaction found a strong and well-organ-
ised Protestant party. Steel clashed with steel. The
denominational spirit was stronger than before, and it
gave rise to a conflict which eclipsed even national consi-
derations. Now there were no longer opposing parties,
but downright enemies. The spirit of intolerance grew
rapidly. Pdzmdny complained that there were still some
who thought that good Protestants might be saved. Un-
fortunately those who believed this became more and
more scarce. Pdzmany took care that such an opinion
should be eradicated. The intransigent archbishop spoke
with indignation of the circumstance that there were
churches in which diff'erent denominations held religious
services, but he soon destroyed the spirit that had made
this possible.

The Protestants did not remain inactive. Hitherto
they had formed an immense majority of the nation, and
they had used their power temperately, but now, seeing
the danger which threatened them, they did not shrink
from using violent means. The chief problem was that
of the churches. It is true that the law granted reli-
gious liberty even to the peasants, but the churches them-
selves belonged to the landowners, and consequently Pro-
testant villages belonging to Catholic landowners re-
mained without churches-
Protestant landowners could of course use the same
weapons as their opponents, but as the Catholic faith had
spread most among the nobles, the Catholics gained most
advantage from the situation. The Protestants were,
therefore, anxious to secure the use of the churches for
the peasants. The struggle was carried on with argu-
ments as well as with violence, in the Diet and outside it.
Denominational differences were added to political
animosities, and the reign of Matthias ended in party con-
flicts, discontent, and disorder. The peace which had

464

THE REIGN OF MATTHIAS II.

prevailed when Matthias ascended the throne had dis-
appeared. Only a spark was needed to kindle a great
conflagration, and to make Hungary, that long suffering
country, once more the scene of war and desolation.

THE END.

Printed by the Bexhill Publishing and Printing Co., Ltd., Bexhill-on-Sea.

465

JN

Andrdssy, Gyula
2055 The development of Hungarian
^54 constitutional liberty

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY