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Given  By 


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DIALOGUE 


CONCERNING 


NATURAL   RELIGION. 


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Entered  m  Stationers^Hall^  according  to. 
Ail  oj  Parliaments 


DIALOGUES 


C  O  N  C  E  R  N  I  N  G 


NATURAL  RELIGION. 


B     Y 


DAVID    HUM  E,     Esq^ 


^^ 


THE  SECOND   EDITION. 


LONDON 

M.DCC.LXXiX. 


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t   •  •  «        • 


DIALOGUES 


CONCERNING 


Natural    Religion* 


PAMPHILUS  to  HeRMIPPUS. 


T  has  been  remarked^  tny  Hermip-« 

PUS,  that  though  the  ancient  phi- 

lofophers  conveyed  mod  of  their 

in{lru£lion  in  the  form  of  dialogue,  this 

method  of  compofitiou  has  been  little 

A       ^  praclifed 


Dialogues    concerning 

pradifed  in  later  ages,  and  has  feldoni 
Succeeded  in  the  hands  of  thofe  who 
have  attempted  it.  Accurate  and  regu- 
lar argument,  indeed,  fuch  as  is  now 
expe(fled  of  philofophical  inquirers,  na-^ 
turally  throws  a  man  into  the  methodi- 
cal and  didadlic  ma;nner  ;  where  he  can 
immediately,  without  preparation,  ex- 
plain the  point  at  which  he  aims;  and 
thence  proceed,  without  interruptiony 
to  deduce  the  proofs  on  which  it  is 
eftablilhed.  To  deliver  a  SYSTEM  in 
converfation^  fcarcely  appears  natural } 
and  while  the  dialogue- writer  defires ^ 
by  departing  from  the  diredl  ftyle  of  / 
compoiition,  to  give  a  freer  air  to  his 
performance,  and  avoid  the  appearance 
of  Author  and  Reader ^  he  is  apt  to  run 
into  a  worfe  inconvenience^  and  convey 
the  image  of  Pedagogue  and  PupiL  Or 
if  he  carries  on  the  difpute  in  the  natu- 
ral fpirit  of  good  company,  by  throw- 
ing in  a  variety  of  topics,  and  prefer- 
ving  a  proper  balance  among  the  Speak- 
ers ; 


Natural    Religion. 

ers  ;  he  often  lofes  fo  much  time  in 
preparations  and  transitions ,  that  the 
reader  will  fcarcely  think  himfelf  com- 

penfated,  by  all  the  graces  of  dialogue, 
for  the  order,  brevity,  and  precifion, 
which  are  facrificed  to  them* 

There  are  fome  fubje6ls,  however, 
to  which  dialogue-writing  is  peculiarly 
adapted,  and  where  it  is  iliir  preferable 
to  the  diredl  and  iimple  method  of  com- 
poiition* 

AKy  point  of  do(5lrine,  which  is  fb 
obvious  that  it  fcarcely  admits  of  dif- 
pute,  but  at  the  fame  time  fo  important 
that  it  cannot  be  too  often  inculcated, 
feems  to  require  fome  fuch  method  of 
handling  it;  where  the  novelty  of  the 
manner  may  compenfate  the  tritenefs  of 
the  fubjedl;  where  the  vivacity  of  con- 
verfation  may  enforce  the  precept ;  and 
where  the  variety  of  lights,  prefented 
by  various  perfonages  and  charadlers, 
A  2  may 


Dialogues    concerning 

may  appear  neither  tedious  nor  redun- 
dant. 

Any  queftion  of  philofophy,  on  the 
other  hand,  which  is  fo  obfcure  and  un-- 
certa'm^  th^t  human  reafon  can  reach  no 
fixed  determination  with  regard  to  it ; 
if  it  fliould  be  treated  at  all,  feems  to  lead 
us  naturally  into  the  ftyle  of  dialogue 
and  converfation.  Reafonable  men  may 
be  allowed  to  differ,  where  no  one  can 
reafonably  be  pofitive  :    Oppofite  fenti- 
ments,  even  without  any  decifion,  af- 
ford an  agreeable  amufement:   arid  if 
the  fubjedi  be  curious  and  interefting^ 
the  book  carries  us,  in  a  manner,  in- 
to company;  and  unites  the  two  great- 
^ft  and  pureft  pleafures  of  human  lifc^ 
ftudy  and  fociety. 

Happily,  thefe  circumftances  are  all 
to  be  found  in  the  fubjedl  of  NATU- 
RAL RELIGION.  What  truth  fo  ob- 
vious, fo  certain,   as  the  being  of  a 

Gody 


Natural    Religion.  5 

God,  which  the  moft  ignorant  ages  have 
acknowledged,  for  which  the  moft  re- 
fined genuifes  have  ambitioufly  ftriven 
to  produce  new  proofs  and  arguments  ? 
What  truth  fo  important  as  this,  which 
is  the  ground  of  all  our  hopes,  the  fureft 
foundation  of  morality,  the  firmeft  fup- 
port  of  fociety,  and  the  only  principle 
which  ought  never  to  be  a  moment  ab^- 
fent  from  our  thoughts   and  medita- 
tions? But  in  treating  of  this  obvious 
and   important   truth ;    what   obfcure 
queftions  occur,  concerning  the  na- 
ture of  that  divine  Being;  his  attri- 
butes, his  decrees,  his  plan  of  provi- 
dence? Thefe  have  been  always  fubjec- 
ted  to  the  difputations  of  rnen:  Con- 
cerning thefe,    human  reafon  has  not 
reached  any  certain  determination :  But 
thefe  are  topics  fo  interefting,  that  we 
cannot  reftrain  our  reftlefs  inquiry  with 
regard  to  thein ;  though  nothing  but 
idpubt,  uncertainty,  and  contradiction, 
A  3  have 


10         Dialogues    concePvNing 

have  as  yet  been  the  refult  of  our  nioft 
accurate  refearches. 

This  I  had  lately  occafion  to  obferve, 
while  I  pafled,  as  ufnal,  part  of  the  fum- 
mer-feafon  with  CLEANTHES,    and 
was    prefent  at  thofe  converfations  of 
his  with  PHILO  and  DEMEA,  of  which 
I  gave   you  lately  fome  imperfedl  ac- 
count.    Your  curiofity,  you  then  told 
me,  was  fo  excited,  that  I  muft  of  ne- 
ceffity  enter  into  a  more  exadt  detail  of 
their  reafqnings,  and  difplay  thofe  va- 
rious fyftems  which  they  advanced  with 
regard  to  fo  delicate  a  fubjecfl  as  that  of 
Natural  Religion.  The  remarkable  con- 
trail in  their  characters  ftill  farther  rai- 
fed  your  expectations ;  while  you  oppo- 
fed  the  accurate  philofophicai  turn  of 
Cleanthes  to  the  carelefs  fcepticifm 
of  Philo,  or  compared  either  of  their 
diipofitions  with  the  rigid  inflexible  or^ 
thodoxy  of  Demea.     My  youth  ren^ 
dered  me  a  mere  auditor  of  their  dif-^ 

putes  I 


Natural    Religion.  ii 

putes ;  and  that  curioiity  natural  to  the 
early  feafon  of  life,  has  fo  deeply  im- 
printed in  my  memory  the  wh6le  chain 
and  connection  of  their  arguments, 
that,  I  hope,  I  fhall  not  omit  or  con- 
found any  confidcrable  part  of  them  in 
the  recitals 


4  PART 


PART        I. 


FTER I  joined  the  company,  wliom  Part 


I. 


I  found  fitting  in  Cleanthes's 
library,  Demea  paid  Cleanthes  fome 
compliments,  on  the  great  care  which 
he  took  of  my  education,  and  on  his 
unwearied  perfeverance  and  conftancy 
in  all  his  friendfhips.  The  father  of 
Pamphilus,  faid  he,  was  your  intimate 
friend :  The  fon  is  your  pupil;  and  may 
indeed  be  regarded  as  your  adopted  fon, 
were  we  to  judge  by  the  p.ains  which 
you  beftow  in  conveying  to  him  every 
ufeful  branch  of  literature  and  fcience. 
You  are  no  more  w^anting,  I  am  per- 
fuaded,  in  prudence  than  in  induftry, 
I  fliall,  therefore,  communicate  to  you 

a 


14         Dialogues    concerning 

'^^^^  a  maxim  which  I  have  obferved  with 
v-xw-f  regard  to  my  own  children,  that  I  may 
learn  how  far  it  agrees  with  your  prac- 
tice. The  method  I  follow  in  their  e- 
^  ducation  is  founded  on  the  faying  of  an 
ancient,  "  That  Jiudents  of  philofophy 
*'  ought  frjl  to  Itarn  Logics^  then  Ethics^ 
*'  next  Phyftcs^  lajl  of  all  the  Nature  of 
"  the  Gods'^y  This  fcience  of  Natural 
Theology,  according  to  him,  being  the 
moft  profound  and  abftrufe  of  any,  re- 
quired the  maturefl  judgment  in  its  ftu- 
dents ;  and  none  but  a  mind,  enriched 
with  all  the  other  fciences,  can  fafely  be 
entrufted  with  it. 

Are  you  fo  late,  fays  Philo,  in  teach- 
ing your  children  the  principles  of  re- 
ligion ?  Is  there  no  danger  of  their  ne- 
glefting,  or  rejedling  altogether,  thofc 
opinions,  of  which  they  have  heard  fo 
little  during  the  whole  courfe  of  their 
,  education  ?  It  is  only  as  a  fcience,  re- 
plied 

*  Chryfippus  apud  Plat,  de  repug.  Stolcorunip 


Natural    Religion.  15 

plied  Demea,  fubjecled  to  human  rea-  j^'^ 
Ibning  and  difputation,  that  I  poftpone  '^^^v 
the  ftudy  of  Natural  Theology.  To  fea- 
Ibn  their  minds  v/ith  early  piety,  is  my 
chief  care ;  and  by  continual  precept 
and  inftruclion,  and  I  hope  too  by  ex- 
ample, I  imprint  deeply  on  their  tender 
minds  an  habitual  reverence  for  all  the 
principles  of  religion.  While  they  pais 
through  every  other  fcience,  I  ftill  re- 
mark the  uncertainty  of  each  part;  the 
eternal  difputations  of  men ;  the  obfcu- 
rity  of  all  philofophy;  and  the  flrange, 
ridiculous  conclufions,  which  forne  of 
the  greateft  geniufes  have  derived  from 
the  principles  of  mere  -human  reafon. 
Having  thus  tamed  their  mind  to  a  pro- 
per fubmiffion  and  felf-diffidence,  I 
have  no  longer  any  fcruple  of  opening 
to  them  the  greateft  myfteries  of  reli- 
gion ;  nor  apprehend  any  danger  from 
that  afliiming  arrogance  of  philofophy, 
which  may  lead  them  to  reje6l  the  moft 
eftabliflied  doftrines  and  opinions.  / 

Your 


i6        Dialogues   concerning 

Fart  Your  precaution,  fays  Philo,  of  fea- 
^-'-rv^  foiling  your  childrens  minds  early  with 
piety,  is  certainly  very  reafonable ;  and 
no  more  than  is  requifite  in  this  pro- 
fane and  irreligious  age.  But  what  I 
chiefly  admire  in  your  plan  of  educa- 
tion, is  your  method  of  drawing  advan- 
tage from  the  very  principles  of  philo- 
fophy  and  learning,  which,  by  inlpi- 
fing  pride  and  felf-fufiiciency,  have 
commonly,  in  all  ages,  been  found  fo 
,  deftru<5live  to  the  principles  of  religion. 
The  vulgar,  indeed,  we  may  remark, 
who  are  unacquainted  with  fcience  and 
profound  inquiry,  obferving  the  end^ 
lefs  difputes  of  the  learned,  have  com- 
monly a  thorough  contempt  for  Philo-- 
lofophy ;  and  rivet  themfelves  the  fafter, 
by  that  means,  in  the  great  points  of 
theology  which  have  been  taught  them^ 
Thofe  who  enter  a  little  into  fludy  and 
inquiry,  finding  many  appearances  of 
evidence  in  dodlrines  the  neweft  and 
luoll  extraordinary,  tliink  nothing  too 

difficult 


Natural    Religion.  17 

.  dijOBcult  for  human  reafon;  and,  pre-  ^^^"^ 
fumptuoufly  breaking  thro'  all  fences,  v-orv# 
profane  the  inmoft  fan6luaries  of  the 
temple.     But  Cleanthes  will,  I  hope, 
agree  with  me,  that^  after  we  have  a- 
bandoned  ignorance,  the  fureft  remedy, 
there  is  ftill  one  expedient  left  to  pre- 
vent this  profane  liberty.   Let  Demea's 
principles  be  improved  and  cultivated : 
Let  us  become  thoroughly  fenfible  of 
the  weaknefs,   blindnefs,  and  narrow 
limits,  of  human  reafon:  Let  us  duly 
confidcr    its   uncertainty   and    endleft 
contrarieties,  even  in  fubje(5ls  of  com- 
mon life  and  pracflice:  Let  the  errors 
and  deceits  of  our  very  fenfes  be  fet 
*   before  us  5   the  inluperable  difficulties 
which  attend  firft  principles  in  all  fy- 
ftems  ;    the  contradictions  which  ad- 
here to  the  very  ideas  of  matter,  caufe 
and  efFedl,  extenfion,  fpace,  time,  mo- 
tion ;  and,  in  a  word,  quantity  of  all 
kinds,   the  objedl  of  the  only  fcience 
^at  can  fairly  pretend  to  any  certainty 

or 


C'-v>J 


18         Dialogues    concerninc^ 

Part  q^  evidence.  When  thefe  topics  are  dip 
I,  ... 

played  in  their  full  light,  as  they  are  by 

fome  philofophers  and  almofl  all  di- 
vines ;  v^ho  can  retain  fuch  confidence 
in  this  frail  faculty  of  reafon  as  to  pay 
any  regard  to  its  determinations  in 
points  fo  fublime,  fo  abfttufe,  fo  re-^ 
mote  from  common  life  and  experience  ? 
When  the  coherence  of  the  parts  of  a 
ftone,  or  even  that  compofition  of  parts 
which  renders  it  extended;  vehen  thefe 
familiar  objects,  I  fay,  are  fo  inexpli- 
cable, and  contain  circumflances  fo 
repugnant  and  contradidlory ;  with 
what  affurance  can  we  decide  concern- 
cerning  the  origin  of  worlds,  or  trace 
their  hiftory  from  eternity  to  eternity? 

While  Philo  pronounced  thefe 
words,  I  could  obferve  a  fmile  in  the 
countenance  both  of  Demea  and  Cle^ 
ANTHEsi  That  of  Demea  feemed  to 
imply  an  unreferved  fatisfacflion  in  the 
dodrines  delivered:    But,    in  Clean- 

THES'S 


Natitral    Religion.  19 

THEs's  features,  I  could  diftinguifli  an  ^^^"^ 
air  of  fincffe ;  as  if  he  perceived  fome  v^v-^ 
raillery  or  artificial  malice  in  the  rea- 
fonings  of  Philo. 

You  propofe  then,  Philo,  faid  Cle- 
A  NT  HE  s,  to  eredl  religious  faith  on  phi- 
lofophical  fcepticifm;    and  you  think, 
that  if  certainty  or  evidence  be  expelled 
from  every  other  fubjecl  of  inquiry,  it 
will  all  retire  to  thefe  tlieological  doc- 
trines, and  there  acquire  a  fiiperior  force 
and  authority.     Whether  your  fcepti- 
cifm be  as  abfolute  and  fincere  as  you 
pretend,  we  ftiall  learn  by  and  by,  when 
the  company  breaks  up :  We  fliall  then 
fee,  whether  you  go  out  at  the  door  or 
the  window;  and  whether  you  really 
doubt,  if  your  body  has  gravity,  or  can 
be  injured  by  its  fall;  according  to  po- 
pular opinion,  derived  from  our  falla- 
cious fenfes,  and  more  fallacious  expe- 
rience. And  this  confideration,  Deme  A, 
may,  I  think,  fairly  ferve  to  abate  our 

ill- 


^o        Dialogues    conckrninc^^ 

^^^^  ill-will  to  this  humorous  fe6l  of  the 
^•^^>r^  fceptics.  If  they  be  thoroughly  iu 
earneft,  they  will  not  long  trouble  the 
world  with  their  doubts,  cavils,  and 
diiputes :  If  they  be  only  in  jeft,  they 
are,  perhaps,  bad  raillers;  but.  can  ne-- 
ver  be  very  dangerous,  either  to  the 
ftate,  to  philofophy,  or  to  religion. 

Ik  reality,  Philo,  continued  he,  it 
feems  certain^  that  though  a  man,  in  a 
flufh  of  humour,  after  intenfe  reflexion 
on  the  many  contradictions  and  imper- 
feclions  of  human  reafon,  may  entirely 
renounce  all  belief  and  opinion;  it  is 
impoffible  for  him  to  perfevere  in  this 
total  fcepticilin,  or  make  it  appear  in 
his  conducft  for  a  few  hours.  External 
objedls  prefs  in  upon  him:  Paffions  fo- 
licit  him :  His  philofophical  melancholy 
diffipates ;  and  even  the  utmoft  vio- 
lence upon  his  own  temper  will  not  be 
able,  during  "any  time,  to  preferve  the 
poor  appearance  of  fcepticifm*  And  for 

what 


Natural    Religion.  21 

wiiat  reafon  impofe  on  hinxfelf  fuch  a  ^^^"^ 
violence?  This  is  a  point  in  which  it  '^^-tnj 
will  be  impofTible  for  him  ever  to  fatis- 
fy  himfelf,  confiftently  with  his  fcepti- 
cal  principles :  So  that  upon  the  whole 
nothing  could  be  more  ridiculous  than 
the  principles  of  the  ancient  Pyrrho- 
NX  ANS ;  if  in  reality  they  endeavoured, 
as  is  pretended,  to  extend,  throughout, 
the  fame  fcepticifm,  which  they  had 
learned  from  the  declamations  of  their 
fchools,  and  which  they  ought  to  have 
confined  to  them. 

In  this  view,  there  appears  a  great 
refemblance  between  the  fedls  of  the 
Stoics  and  Pyrrhoni  ANS,  though  per- 
petual antagonifts:  and  both  of  them 
feem  founded  on  this  erroneous  maxim. 
That  what  a  man  can  perform  fome- 
times,  and  in  fome  difpofitions,  he  can 
perform  always,  and  in  every  difpofitiono 
When  the  mind,  by  Stoical  refledlions, 
is  elevated  into  a  fublime  enthuiiafm  of 

B  virtue, 


22         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  virtue,  and  ftrongly  fmit  with  any  Z^^- 
v^>rvj  cies  of  honour  or  pubhc  good,  the  ut- 
moft  bodily  pain  and  fufferings  will 
not  prevail  over  fuch  a  high  fenfe  of 
duty ;  and  it  is  poilible,  perhaps,  by 
its  means,  even  to  fmile  and  exult  in 
the  midft  of  tortures.  If  this  fome- 
times  may  be  the  cafe  in  fadl  and  rea- 
lity, much  more  may  a  philofopher, 
in  his  fchool,  or  even  in  his  clofet, 
work  himfelf  up  to  fuch  an  enthufiafm, 
and  fupport  in  imagination  the  acuteft 
pain  or  moft  calamitous  event  which  he 
can  poffibly  conceive.  But  how  fliall  he 
fupport  this  enthufiafm  itfelf?  The  bent 
of  his  mind  relaxes,  and  cannot  be  re- 
called at  pleafure:  Avocations  lead  him 
aftray:  Misfortunes  attack  him  un- 
avfares:  And  the  philofopher  finks  by 
degrees  into  the  plebeian, 

I  ALLOW  of  your  comparifon  between 
the  Stoics  and  Sceptics,  replied  Phi- 
LO.     But  you  may  obferve,  at  the  fame 

timej 


Natural    Religion.  23 

time,  that  though  the  miiid  cannot,  in  ^^'^ 
Stoicifm,  fupport  the  higheft  flights  of  v-^^r^-/ 
philofophy ;  yet,  even  when  it  finks  low- 
er, it  fliil  retains  fomewhat  of  its  former 
difpofition ;  and  the  efFedls  of  the  Stoic's 
reafoning  will  appear  in  his  condudl  in 
common  life,  and  through  the  whole 
tenor  of  his  actions .  The  ancient  fchools, 
particularly  that  of  Zeno,  produced  ex- 
amples of  virtue  and  conftancy  which 
feem  aftoniihing  to  prefent  times. 

Vain  Wifdom  all  and  falfe  Philfophy. 
Yet  with  a  pleafing  forcery  could  charm 
Pain,  for  a  while,  or  anguifh  ;  and  excite 
Fallacious  Hope,  or  arm  the  obdurate  breaft 
With  ftubborn  Patience,  as  with  triple  fteel. 

In  like  manner,  if  a  man  has  accuftom- 
ed  himfelf  to  fceptical  confiderations  on 
the  uncertainty  and  narrow  limits  of 
reafon,  he  will  not  entirely  forget  them 
when  he  turns  his  refleclion  on  other 
fubjedls  ;  but  in  all  his  philofophical 
principles  and  reafoning,  I  dare  not  fay 
in  his  common  condudl,  he  will  be  found 

B  2  different 


24        Dialogues   concerning 

Part  difFerent  from  thofe,  who  either  never 
wn>  formed   any  opinions   in  the  cafe,  or 
have  entertained  fentiments  more  fa- 
vourable to  human  reafon. 

To  whatever  length  any  one  may 
pufh  his  fpeculative  principles  of  fcep- 
ticifm,  he  muft  a6t,  I  own,  and  live, 
and  converfe,  like  other  men ;  and  for 
this  condudl  he  is  not  obliged  to  give 
any  other  reafon,  than  the  abfolute  ne- 
cefTity  he  lies  under  of  fo  doing.  If  he 
ever  carries  his  fpeculations  farther  than 
this  neceffity  conftrains  him,  and  phi- 
lofophifes  either  on  natural  or  moral 
£iibjedls,  he  is  alhired  by  a  certain  plea- 
fvire  and  fatisfa6lion  which  he  finds  in 
employing  himfelf  after  that  manner. 
He  confiders  befides,  that  every  one,  even 
in  common  life,  is  conflrained  to  have 
more  or  lefs  of  this  philofophy;  that 
from  our  earlieft  infancy  we  make  con- 
tinual advances  in  forming  more  gene- 
ral principles  of  condudl  and  reafon- 

ing; 


Natural    Religion.  25 

ing;  that  the  larger  experience  we  ac-  ^^^^ 
quire,  and  the  ftronger  reafon  we  are  wn^ 
endued  with,    we   always   render  our 
principles  the  more  general  and  com- 
prehenfive;  and  that  what  we  call  phi- 
lofophy  is  nothing  but  a  more  regular 
and  methodical  operation  of  the  fame 
kind.    To  philofophife  on  fuch  fubjedls 
is  nothing  effentially  different  from  rea- 
foning  on  common  life;  and  we  may 
only  expe(5l  greater  {lability,  if  not  great- 
er truth,  from  our  philofophy,  on  ac- 
count of  its  exa6ler  and  more  fcrupu- 
lous  method  of  proceeding. 

But  when  we  look  beyond  human 
affairs  and  the  properties  of  the  fur- 
rounding  bodies  :  When  we  carry  our 
fpeculations  into  the  two  eternities,  be- 
fore and  after  the  prefent  ftate  of  things ; 
into  the  creation  and  formation  of  the 
univerfe;  the  exiftence  and  properties 
of  fpirits  ;  the  powers  and  operations  of 
one  univerfal  Spirit,  exifting  without 
B  3  beginning 


^6    -    Dialogues    concerning^ 

Part  beginning  and  without  end;  onmipo^ 
'^^vNj  tent,  omnifcient,  immutable,  infinite, 
and  incbitiprehenfible :  We  muft  be 
far  removed  from  the  fmalleft  tendency 
to  fcepticifm  not  to  be  apprehenfive, 
that  we  have  here  got  quite  beyond  the 
reach  of  our  faculties.  So  long  as  we 
confine  our  fpeculations  to  trade,  or 
morals,  or  politics,  or  criticifm,  we 
make  appeals^  every  moment,  to  com-^ 
mon  fenfe  and  experience,  which  ftreng- 
then  our  philofophical  conclufions,  and 
remove  (at  leaft,  in  part)  the  fufpicion 
which  we  fo  juftly  entertain  with  regard 
to  every  reafoning  that  is  very  fubtile 
and  refined.  But,  in  theological  rea- 
fonings.  We  have  not  this  advantage; 
while  at  the  fame  time  we  are  employ- 
ed upon  objects,  which,  we  mufl  be 
fenfible,  are  too  large  for  our  grafp, 
and,  of  all  others,  require  molt  to  be 
familiarifed  to  our  apprehenfion.  We 
are  like  foreigners  in  a  ftrange  country, 
to  whom  every  thing  muft  feem  fufpi- 

cious. 


Natural    Religion.  27 

cious,  and  who  are  in  danger  every  ^^^"^ 
moment  of  tranfgrelTmg  againfl  the  laws  ^^v-nj 
and  ciiftoms  of  the  people  with  whom 
they  live  and  converfe.  We  know  not 
how  far  we  ought  to  truft  our  vulgar 
methods  of  reafoning  in  fuch  a  fubjedt ; 
fince,  even  in  common  life,  and  in  that 
province  which  is  peculiarly  appro- 
priated to  them,  we  cannot  account  for 
them,  and  are  entirely  guided  by  a  kind 
of  inftincSl  or  necefTity  in  employing 
them. 

-  All  fceptics  pretend,  that,  if  reafon 
be  confidered  in  an  abftradl  view,  it 
furnifhes  invincible  arguments  againfl 
itfelf ;  and  that  we  could  never  retain 
any  convidlion  or  alTurance,  on  any 
fubjedl,  were  not  the  fceptical  reafon- 
ings  fo  refined  and  fubtile,  that  they 
are  not  able  to  counterpoife  the  raore 
folid  and  more  natural  arguments  de- 
rived from  the  fenfes  and  experience. 
But  it  is  evident,  whenever  our  argu- 

B  4  ments 


^8        Dialogues    concerning 

Part  ments  lofe  this  advantage,  and  run 
WN-^  wide  of  common  life,  that  the  moft  re- 
fined fcepticifm  comes  to  be  upon  a 
footing  with  them,  and  is  able  to  op- 
pofe  and  counterbalance  them.  The 
one  has  no  more  weight  than  the  other. 
The  mind  muft  remain  in  fufpenfe  be- , 
tween  them;  and  it  is  that  very  fu-- 
fpenfe  or  balance,  which  is  the  triumph 
of  fcepticifm. 

But  I  obferve,  fays  CleantheSj 
with  regard  to  you,  Philo,  and  all  fpe- 
culative  fceptics,  that  your  do(5lrine  and 
pradlice  are  as  much  at  variance  in  the 
moft  abftrufe  points  of  theory  as  in  the 
condudt  of  common  life.  Where-ever 
evidence  difcoyers  itfelf,  you  adhere 
to  it,  notwithftandiiig  your  pretended 
fcepticifm ;  and  I  can  obferve,  too,  fom^ 
of  your  fedl  to  be  as  decifive  as  thofe 
who  make  greater  profefTions  of  cer- 
tainty and  aflurance.  In  reality,  would 
not  a  man  be  ridiculous,  who  pretended 

to 


Natural    Religion.  29 

to  reje<5l  Newton's  explication  of  the  ^^^^ 
wonderful  phenomenoii  of  the  rainbow,  ^^-v^ 
becaufe  that  explication  gives  a  minute 
anatomy  of  the  rays  of  light ;  a  fubj^edl, 
forfooth,  too  refined  for  human  com- 
preheniion  ?  And  what  would  you  fay 
to  one,  who  having  nothing  particular  to 
objeifl  to  the  arguments  of  Copernicus 
and  Galileo  for  the  motion  of  the 
earth,  fhould  with-hold  his  aflent,  on 
that  general  principle,  That  thefe  fub- 
je6ts  were  too  magnificent  and  remote 
to  be  explained  by  the  narrow  and  fal- 
lacious reafon  of  mankind  ? 

There  is  indeed  a  kind  of  brutifh 
and  ignorant  fcepticifm,  as  you  well 
obferved,  which  gives  the  vulgar  a  ge- 
neral prejudice  againfl  what  they  do 
not  eafily  underftand,  and  makes  them 
reject  every  principle  which  requires 
elaborate  reafoning  to  prove  and  efla- 
blifh  it.  This  fpecies  of  fcepticifm  is 
fatal  to   knowledge,   not   to   religion; 

fince 


3t>        Dial6gues    concerning  ^ 

^'^^'^  fince  we  find,   that  thofe  who  make 

v^v^  greatefl  profeffion  of  it,  give  often  their  ] 
aflent,  not  only  to  the  great  truths  of 
Theifm  and  natural  theology,  but  even 

to  the  moft  abfurd  tenets  which  a  tra-  > 

-  -I 

ditional   fuperftition  has   recommend-  I 

ed  to  them.     They  firmly  believe  in  \ 

witches ;  though  they  will  not  believe  { 

nor  attend  to  the  moft  fimple  propofi-  | 

tion  of  Euclid.     But  the  refined  and  j 

philofophical  fceptics  fall  into  an  incon-  ] 

fiftence  of  an  oppofite  nature.     They  \ 

pufh  their  refearches  into  the  moft  ab-  '  { 
ftrufe    corners  of  fcience;     and   their 

aflent  attends  them  in  every  ftep,  pro-  \ 

portioned  to  the  evidence  which  they  ] 
meet  with.     They  are  even  obliged  to 

acknowledge,  that  the  moft  abftrule  and  \ 

remote  objedts  are  thofe  which  are  beft  -l 

explained  by  philofophy.    .  Light  is  in  j 

reality  anatomized :    The   true  fyftem  i 

of  the  heavenly  bodies  is  difcovered  and  j 
afcertained.     But  the  nourifliment  of 

bodies  by  food  is  ftill  an  inexplicable  I 

myfteryr  I 


Natural    Religion*  31 

myftery :  The  cohelion  of  the  parts  of  ^^^^ 
matter  is  ftiil  incomprehenfible.  Thefe  v.^-^^ 
fceptics,  therefore,  are  obUged,  in  e- 
very  queftion,  to  confider  each  parti- 
cular evidence  apart,  and  proportion 
their  aflent  to  the  precife  degree  of  evi- 
dence which  occurs.  This  is  their  prac- 
tice in  all  natural,  mathematical,  moral, 
and  political  fcience.  And  why  not 
the  fame,  I  afl^,  in  the  theological  and 
religious  ?  Why  muft  conclufions  of 
this  nature  be  alone  rejected  on  the 
general  pfefumption  of  the  infuiEciency 
of  human  reafon,  without  any  parti- 
cular difcuffion  of  the  evidence?  Is  not 
fuch  an  unequal  condu6l  a  plain  proof 
of  prejudice  and  paffion  ? 

Our  fenfes,  you  fay,  are  fallacious; 
our  underftanding  erroneous ;  our  ideas 
even  of  the  moil  familiar  objedts,  ex- 
tenfion,  duration,  motion,  full  of  ab- 
furdities  and  contradictions .  You  defy 
me  to  folve  the  difEculties,  or  reconcile 

the 


32         Dialogues    concerning 

^AR"^  the  repugnancies,  which  you  difcover 
y^^^n^j  in  them.  I  have  not  capacity  for  fb 
great  an  undertaking :  I  have  not  leifure 
for  it:  I  perceive  it  to  be  fuperfluous. 
Your  own  condu6l5  in  every  circum- 
fiance,  refutes  your  principles  ;  and 
fliows  the  firnieft  reliance  on  all  the  re- 
ceived ndaxims  of  fcience,  morals,  pru- 
dence, and  behaviour. 

I  SHALL  never  affent  to  fo  harfli  an 
opinion  as  that  of  a  celebrated  writer  *, 
who  fays,  that  the  fceptics  are  not  a  fe£l 
of  philofophers :  They  are  only  a  fedl 
of  liars.  I  may,  however,  affirm,  (I  hope, 
without  offence)  that  they  are  a  fe6l  of 
jeflers  or  railers.  But  for  my  part, 
whenever  I  find  myfelf  difpofed  to 
mirth  and  amufement,  I  fhall  certainly 
chufe  my  entertainment  of  a  lefs  per^ 
plexing  and  abftrufe  nature.  A  comedy, 
a  novel,  or  at  mofl  a  hiftory,  feems  a 

more 

*  L'art  de  penfer. 


Natural    Religion.  33 

more  natural  recreation  than  flich  me-  ^^^'^ 
taphyfical  fubtilties  and  abftradlions.      v-^-^nj 

In  vain  would  the  fceptic  make  a  di- 
ftindlion  between  fcience  and  common 
life,  or  between  one  fcience  and  ano- 
ther. The  arguments  employed  in  all, 
if  jufl,  are  of  a  fimilar  nature,  and  con- 
tain the  fame  force  and  evidence.  Or 
if  there  be  any  difference  among  them, 
the  advantage  lies  entirely  on  the  fide 
of  theology  and  natural  religion.  Many 
principles  of  mechanics  are  founded  on 
very  abftrufe  reafoning ;  yet  no  man 
who  has  any  pretenfions  to  fcience,  even 
no  fpeculative  fceptic,  pretends  to  en- 
tertain the  leaft  doubt  with  regard  to 
them.  The  Copernican  fyftem  con- 
tains the  moft  furprifing  paradox,  and 
the  moft  contrary  to  our  natural  con- 
ceptions, to  appearances,  and  to  our  very 
fenfes:  yet  even  monks  and  inquifitors 
are  now  conftrained  to  withdraw  their 
oppofition  to  it.     And  fhall  Philo,  a 

man 


34         Dialogues    concerning 

P^^^  man  of  fo  liberal  a  genius,  and  exten- 
v.^>^N>»  five  knowledge,  entertain  any  general 
undiftinguiihed  fcruples  with  regard  to 
the  religious  hypothelis,  which  is  found- 
ed on  the  fimpleft  and  moil  obvious  ar- 
guments, and,  unlefs  it  meets  with 
artificial  obflacles,  has  fuch  eafy  ac- 
cefs  and  admifhon  into  the  mind  of 
man? 

And  here  we  may  obferve,  con- 
tinued he,  turning  himfelf  towards 
Demea,  a  pretty  curious  circumflance 
in  the  hiftory  of  the  fciences.  After  the 
union  of  philofophy  with  the  popular 
religion,  upon  the  iirft  eflablifhment  of 
Chriftianity,  nothing  was  more  ufua!, 
among  all  religious  teachers;  than  de- 
clamations againfl  reafon,  againft  the 
fenfes,  againfl  every  principle  derived 
merely  from  human  refearch  and  in- 
quiry. All  the  topics  of  the  ancient  A- 
cademics  were  adopted  by  the  Fathers; 
and  thence  propagated  for  feveral  ages 

in 


Natural    Religion.  ^^s 

in  every  fchool  and  pulpit  throughout  ^^^'^ 
Chriftendom.  The  Reformers  embraced  ^^^^^n-^ 
the  fame  principles  of  reafoning,  or  ra- 
ther declamation ;  and  all  panegyrics 
on  the  excellency  of  faith  were  fure  to 
be  interlarded  with  fome  fevere  ftrokes 
of  fatire  againft  natural  reafon.  A  ce- 
lebrated prelate  too*,  of  the  Romifti 
communion,  a  man  of  the  moft  exten- 
five  learning,  who  wrote  a  demonftra- 
tion  of  Chriftianity,  has  alfo  compofed 
a  treatife,  which  contains  all  the  cavils 
of  the  boldeft  and  moft  determined 
Pyrrhonism.  Locke  feems  to  have 
been  the  firft  Chriftian,  who  ventured 
openly  to  after t,  th^it  faith  was  nothing 
but  a  fpecies  of  reafon;  that  religion  was 
only  a  branch  of  philofophy;  and  that 
a  chain  of  arguments,  fimilar  to  that 
which  eftablilhed  any  truth  in  morals, 
politics,  or  phyfics,  was  always  employ- 
ed in  difcovering  all  the  principles  of 
theology,  natural  and  revealed.    The  ill 

ufe 

*  Monf.  HuET. 


^6        Dialogues    concerniko 

Part  ufewhich  Bayle  and  other  libertines 
^^-v^  made  of  the  philofophical  fcepticifm  of 
tke  fathers  and  firft  reformers,  ftill  far- 
ther propagated  the  judicious  fentiment 
of  Mr  Locke:  And  it  is  now,  in  a  man-- 
ner,  avowed,  by  all  pretenders  to  rea-* 
i  foning  and  philofophy,  that  Atheift  and 
Sceptic  are  almoft  fynonymons.  And 
as  it  is  certain,  that  no  man  is  in  earneft 
when  he  profeffes  the  latter  principle; 
I  would  fain  hope,  that  there  are  as  few 
who  ferioufly  maintain  the  former. 

Don't  you  remember,  faid  Philo, 
the  excellent  faying  of  Lord  Bacon  on 
this  head?  That  a  little  philofophy,  re- 
plied Cleanthes,  makes  a  man  an 
Atheift:  A  great  deal  converts  him  to 
religion.  That  is  a  very  judicious  re- 
mark too,  faid  Philo.  But  what  I  have 
in  my  eye  is  another  pafTage,  where, 
having  mentioned  David's  fool,  who 
faid  in  his  heart  there  is  no  God,  this 
great  philofopher  obferves,  that  the  A- 

theifts 


Natural    Religion.  37 

theifts  now-a-days  have  a  double  fliare  ^^^"^ 
of  folly :  for  they  are  not  contented  to  ow 
fay  in  their  hearts  there  is  no  God,  but 
they  alfo  utter  that  impiety  with  their 
lips ;  and  are  thereby  guilty  of  multi- 
plied indifcretion  and  imprudence. 
Such  people,  though  they  were  ever  fo 
much  in  earneft,  cannot,  methinks,  be 
very  formidable. 

But  though  you  fliould  rank  me  in 
this  clafs  of  fools,  I  cannot  forbear  com- 
municating a  remark  that  occurs  to  me 
from  the  hiftory  of  the  religious  and 
irreligious  fcepticifm  with  which  you 
have  entertained  us.  It  appears  to  me, 
that  there  are  ftrong  fymptoms  of  prieft- 
craft  in  the  whole  progrefs  of  this  af- 
fair. During  ignorant  ages,  fuch  as 
thofe  which  followed  the  diiTolution  of 
the  ancient  fchools,  the  priefts  percei- 
ved, that  Atheifm,  Deifm,  or  herefy  of 
any  kind,  could  only  proceed  from  the 
prefumptuous  queftioning  of  received 

C  opinions^ 


38         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  opinions,  and  from  a  belief  that  human 
Wvj  reafon  was  equal  to  every  thing.    Edu- 
cation   had    then   a    mighty  influence 
over  the  minds  of  men,  and  was  almofl 
equal  in  force  to  thofe  fnggeftions  of 
the  fenfes  and' common  iinderftanding, 
by  which  the  moil  determined  fceptic 
muft  allow  himfelf  to  be  governed.  But 
at  prefent,  when  the  influence  of  edu- 
cation is  much  diminiilied,  and  men, 
from  a   more  open  commerce  of  the 
world,  have  learned  to  compare  the  po- 
pular principles  of  different  nations  and 
ages,  our  fagacious  divines  have  chan- 
ged their  whole  fyflem  of  philofophy, 
and  talkf  the  language  of  S  t  o  i  c  s ,  Pl  a  - 
TONisTS,  and  Peripatetics,  not  that 
of  Pyrrhonians  and  Academics.    If 
we  diftrufl  human  reafon,  we  have  now 
n6  other  principle  to  lead  us  into  reli^ 
gion.     Thus,  fceptics  in  one  age,  dog-^ 
matills  in  another;  whichever  fyflem 
befl  fuits  the  purpofe  of  thefe  reverend 
gentlemen,  in  giving  them  an  afcendant 

over 


Natural    Religion/  39 

,  -over  mankind,  they  are  fure  to  make  it  ^^^^ 
their  favourite  principle,  and  eflabliflied  ^.^ 
tenet. 

It  is  very  natural,  faid  Cleanthes^ 
for  men  to  embrace  thofe  principles,  by 
v^hich  they  find  they  can  bed  defend 
their  dotftrines ;  nor  need  we  have  any 
recourfe  to  prieftcraft  to  account  for  fo 
reafonable  an  expedient.     And  furely, 
nothing  can  afford  a  ftronger  prefump- 
tion,  that  any  fet  of  principles  are  true, 
and  ought  to  be  embraced,  than  to  ob- 
ferve  that  they  tend  to  the  confirma- 
tion of  true  religion,  and  ferve  to  con- 
found the  cavils  of  Atheifls,  Libertines, 
and  Freethinkers  of  all  denominations^ 


C  2  PART 


I 


PART         IL 


MUST  own,    Cleanthes,    faid  Part 

II. 
Demea,    that   nothing   can   more  v^^r^ 


furprife  me,  than  the  hght  in  which 
you  have  all  along  put  this  argument* 
By  the  whole  tenor  of  your  difcourfe, 
one  would  imagine  that  you  were  main- 
taining the  Being  of  a  God,  againft  the 
cavils  of  Atheifts  and  Infidels ;  and  were 
necellitated  to  become  a  champion  for 
that  fundamental  principle  of  all  religion* 
But  this,  I  hope,  is  not,  by  any  means, 
aqueftionamongus.  No  man;  no  man, 
at  lead,  of  common  fenfe^  I  am  perfua-* 
ded,  ever  entertained  a  ferious  doubt 
with  regard  to  a  truth  fo  certain  and 
ftlf-evident.  The  queftion  is  not  con- 
C  3  cerning 


42         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  cemiiig  the  BEING,  but  the  NATURE^ 
*w-vv^  of  GOD.  This  I  aiErm,  from  the  in- 
firmities of  human  underftanding,  to 
be  altogether  incomprehenlible  and  un- 
known to  us.  The  effence  of  that  Su- 
preme Mind,,  his  attributes,  the  manner 
of  his  exiftence,  the  very  nature  of  his 
duration;  thefe,,  and  every  particular 
which  regards  fo  divine  a  Being,  are 
niyfterious  to  men.  Finite,  weak,  and 
blind  creatures,  we  ought  to  humble 
ourfelves  in  his  auguft  prefence^  and, 
confcious  of  our  frailties,  adore  in  fi- 
lence  his  infinite  perfe6lions,  which  eye 
hath  not  feen,  ear  hath  not  heard,  nei- 
ther hath  it  entered  into  the  heart  of 
man  to  conceive.  They  are  covered  in  a 
deep  cloud  from  human  curiofity :  It  is 
profanenefs  to  attempt  penetrating  thro* 
thefe  facred  obfcurities :  And  next  to 
the  impiety  of  denying  his  exiftence,  is 
the  temerity  of  prying  into  his  nature 
and  effence,  decrees  and  attributes. 

But 


Natural    Religion.  43 

But  left  you  iliould  think,  that  my  ^^^'^ 
piety  has  here  got  the  better  of  iny  phi-  ^^^-^t^j 
lojrjphy^  I  ihall  iupport  my  opinion,  if  it 
needs  any  fupport,  by  a  very  great  au- 
thority. I  might  cite  all  the  divines,  al- 
mofl,  from  the  foundation  of  Chriftia- 
nity,  who  have  ever  treated  of  this  or 
any  other    theological  fubjedl:    But   I 
ihall  confine  myfelf,  at  prefent,  to  one 
equally  celebrated  for  piety  and  philo- 
fophy.     It  is   Father  Malebranche^ 
who,  I  remember,  thus  expreffes  him- 
felf  *.     '^  One  ought  not  fo  much  (fays 
"  he)  to  call  God  a  fpirit,  in  order  to 
"  exprefs  pofitively  what  he  is,  as  in  or- 
"  der  to  fignify  that  he  is  not  matter. 
^'  He  is  a  Being  infinitely  perfect :  Of 
"  this  we  cannot  doubt.     But  in  the 
"  fame  manner  as  we  ought  not  to  ima- 
"  gine,  even  fuppoling  him  corporeal, 
"  that  he  is  clothed  with  a  human  body, 
"  as  the  Anthropomorphites  aflert- 
**  ed,  under  colour  that  that  figure  was 

C  4  the 

■*"   Recherche  de  la  Verite,  \\^.  3.  cap.  9, 


44        Dialogues    concerning 

Part  «  the  moft  pcrfed  of  any;  fo  neither^ 

v.^>rO  "  ought  we  to  imagine,  that  the  Spirit 

"  of  God  has  human  ideas,   or  bears 

any  refemblance  to  our  fpirit;  under 

colour  that  we  know  nothing  more 

perfedl  than  a  human  mind.     We 

"  ought  rather  to  believe,  that  as  he 

*'  comprehends  the  perfeftions  of  mat- 

"  ter  without  being  material 

he  comprehends  alfo  the  perfections 
of  created  fpirits,  without  being  fpi- 
rit, in  the  manner  we  conceive  fpi- 
rit: That  his  true  name  is,  He  that  is; 
or,  in  other  words.  Being  without  re- 
''  ftricftion,  All  Being,  the  Being  infi- 
*'  finite  and  univerfal." 

After  fo  great  an  authority,  De  me  a, 
replied  Philo,  as  that  which  you  have 
produced,  and  a  thoufand  more  which* 
you  might  produce,  it  would  appear  ri- 
diculous in  me  to  add  my  fentiment,  or 
exprefs  my  approbation  of  your  doc- 
trine.    But  furely,   where   reafonable 

men 


u 


Natural    Religion.  45 

men  treat  tliefe  fubjedls,  the  queflion  ^^^'^ 
can  never  be  concerning  the  Beings  but  ^•-rvj 
only  the  Nature^  of  the  Deity.  The  for- 
mer truth,  as  you  well  obferve,  is  un- 
queftionable  and  felf-evident.  Nothing 
exifts  yt^ithout  a  caufe ;  and  the  original 
caufe  of  this  univerfe  (whatever  it  be) 
we  call  God  ;  and  pioufly  afcribe  to  him 
every  fpecies  of  perfedlion.  Whoever 
fcrviples  this  fundamental  truth,  de- 
ferves  every  punifhment  which  can  be 
inflidled  among  philofophers,  to  wit,  the 
greatefl  ridicule,  contempt,  and  difap- 
probation.  But  as  all  perfeiflion  is  en- 
tirely relative,  we  ought  never  to  ima- 
gine that  we  comprehend  the  ^^ttri- 
butes  of  this  divine  Being,  or  to  fup- 
pofe  that  his  perfecflions  have  any  ana- 
logy or  likenefs  to  the  perfedlions  of  a 
human  creature.  /Wifdom,  Thought, 
Delign,  Knowledge ;  thefe  we  juftly  a- 
fcribe  to  him ;  becaufe  thefe  words  are 
honourable  among  men,  and  we  have 
no  other  language  or  other  conceptions 

by 


Dialogues    CONCERNING  \ 

Part  by  whicli  we  can  exprefs  our  adoration  1 

y^,,^  of  him.  But  let  us  beware,  left  we  think^  j 

that  our  ideas  any  wife  correipond  to  | 
his  perfections,  or  that  his   attributes 
have  any  refemblance  to  theie  qualities           ,   ] 

among  men.     He  is  infinitely  luperior  I 

to  our  limited  view  and  compreheniion ;  ; 
and  is  more  the  object  of  worfliip  in  the 

the  temple,  than  of  difpucation  in  the  \ 

ichools.  1 

r 

In    reality,   Cleanthes,  continued  | 

he,  there  is  no  need  of  having  recourfe  i 

to  that  affedled  Icepticifin,  fb  dilpleafing  '  j 

to  you,  in  order  to  come  at  this  deter-  .  i 

mination.     Our  ideas  reach  no  farther  \ 

than  our  experience:  We  have  no  expe-  j 

rience  of  divine  attributes  and  opera-  \ 

tions :   I  need  not  conclude  my  {j\lo-^  '\ 

gifm:  You  can  draw  the  inference  your-  \ 

lelf.     And  it  is  a  pleafiire  to  me  (and  I 
hope  to  you  too)  that  juft  reafoning  and  \ 

found  piety  here  concur  in  the  fame 
conclufion,  and  both  of  them  eftablifh 

the 


Natural    Religion.  47 

the  adorably  myfterious  and  incompre-  ^^^^"^ 


henfible  nature  of  the  Supreme  Being. 


V-'-V-nV 


Not  to  lofe  any  time  in  circumlocu- 
tions, faid  Cle  ANTHEs,  addr effing  him- 
fdf  to  Demea,  much  lefs  in  replying 
to  the  pious  declamations  of  Philo  ;  I 
fhall  briefly  explain  how  I  conceive  this 
matter.  Look  round  the  world:  con- 
template the  whole  and  every  part  of  it: 
You  will  find  it  to  be  nothing  but  one 
great  niachine,  fubdivided  into  an  infi- 
nite number  of  leiTer  machines,  which 
again  admit  of  fubdivifions  to  a  degree 
beyond  what  human  fenfes  and  facul- 
ties can  trace  and  explain.  All  thefe 
various  machines,  and  even  their  moft 
minute  parts,  are  adjufled  to  each  other 
with  an  accuracy,  which  ravifhes  into 
admiration  all  men  who  have  ever  con- 
templated them.  The  curious  adapting  - 
of  means  to  ends,  throughout  all  na- 
ture, refembles  exadlly,  though  it  much 
exceeds,  the  produilions  of  human  con- 
trivance; 


48         Dialogues    concerning 
Part  triyaiice  ;    of  human  delign,  thought^ 

J. -!• 

v.-v-^  wifdom,  and  intelligence.  Since  there- 
fore the  effedls  refemble  each  other,  we 
are  led  to  infer,  by  all  the  rules  of  ana- 
logy, that  the  caufes  alfo  refemble;  and 
that  the  Author  of  Nature  is  fomewhat 
fimilar  to  the  mind  of  man;  though 
pofleiTed  of  much  larger  faculties,  pro- 
portioned to  the  grandeur  of  the  work 
which  he  has  executed.  By'  this  argu- 
ment a  pojlerior'i^  and  by  this  argument 
alone,  do  we  prove  a't  once  the  exift- 
ence  of  a  Deity,  and  his  limilarity  to 
human  mind  and  intelligence. 

I  SHALL  befo  free,  CLEANTHES,faid 
De  ME  A,  as  to  tell  you,  that  from  the  be- 
ginning I  could  not  approve  of  your 
conclufion  concerning  the  limilarity  of 
the  Deity  to  men ;  ftill  lefs  can  I  ap- 
prove of  the  mediums  by  which  you 
endeavour  to  eftablifli  it.  What !  No 
demonftration  of  the  Being  of  God!  No 
abftrad  arguments !  No  proofs  a  priori! 

Are 


Natural    Religion.  49 

Are  thefe,  which  have  hitherto  been  fo  Part 
much  iniifled  on  by  philofophers,  all  ^^.^ 
fallacy,  all  fophifm?  Can  we  reach  no 
farther  in  this  fubjecl  than  experience 
and  probability  ?  I  will  not  fay,  that  this 
is  betraying  the  caufe  of  a  Deity  :  But 
furely,  by  this  affected  candor,  you  give 
advantages  to  Atheifts,  which  they  ne- 
ver could  obtain  by  the  mere  dint  of 
argument  and  reafoning. 

What  I  chiefly  fcruple  in  this  fub- 
jecS:,  faid  Philo,  is  not  fo  much  that, 
all  religious  arguments  are  by  Cl e an- 
te Es  reduced  to  experience,  as  that 
they  appear  not  to  be  even  the  moft 
certain  and  irrefragable  of  that  inferior 
kind.  That  a  ftone  will  fall,  that  fire 
will  burn,  that  the  earth  has  folidity, 
we  have  obferved  a  thoufand  and  a 
thoufand  times  ;  and  when  any  new 
inftance  of  this  nature  is  prefented,  we 
draw  without  hefitation  the  accuftomed 
inference.     The  exad  fimilarity  of  the 

cafes 


50        Dialogues    concerning 

Part  cafcs  givcs  US  a  perfe6l  aflurance  of  a 
<^->r>^  fimilar  event ;  and  a  ftronger  evidence 
is  never  defired  nor  fought  after.     But 
where-ever   you  depart,    in  the  leaft, 
from  the  fimilarity  of  the  cafes,  you  di- 
minifti   proportionably   the    evidence ; 
and  may  at  laft  bring  it  to  a  very  v^eak 
analogy^  v^hich  is  confelTedly  liable  to 
error  and  uncertainty.     After  having 
experienced  the  circulation  of  the  blood 
in  human  creatures,  we  make  no  doubt 
that  it  takes  place  in  Titius  and  Mjevi- 
us  :  But  from  its  circulation  in  frogs 
and  fifties,  it  is   only  a   prefumption, 
though  a  ftrong  one,  from  analogy,  that 
it  takes  place  in  men  and  other  animals. 
The  analogical  reafoning  is  much  weak- 
er, when   we   infer  the  circulation  of 
the  fap  in  vegetables  from  our  experi- 
ence that  the  blood  circulates  in  ani- 
mals ;  and  thofe,  who  haftily  followed 
that  imperfeft  analogy,  are  found,  by 
more  accurate  experiments,  to  have  been 
miftaken. 

If 


Natural    Religion.  51 

If  we  fee  a  houfe,  Cleanthes,  we  Part 
conclude,  with  the  greateft  certainty,  ^..v^ 
that  it  had  an  architect  or  builder  ;  be- 
eaufe  this  is  precifely  that  fpecies  of 
effecft  which  we  have  experienced  to 
proceed  from  that  fpecies  of  caiife.  But 
furely  you  will  not  afErm,  that  the 
univerfe  bears  fuch  a  refemblance  to  a 
houfe,  that  we  can  with  the  fame  cer- 
tainty infer  a  limilar  caufe,  or  that  the 
analogy  is  here  entire  and  perfecfl.  The 
diilimilitude  is  fo  ftriking,  that  the  ut- 
moft  you  can  here  pretend  to  is  a  guefs, 
a  conje(!?i:ure,  a  prefumption  concern- 
ing a  fimilar  caufe  ;  and  how  that  pre- 
tenfion  will  be  received  in  the  world,  I 
leave  you  to  coniider. 

It  would  furely  be  very  ill  received, 
replied  Cleanthes  ;  and  I  fhould  be 
defervedly  blamed  and  detefted,  did  I 
allow,  that  the  proofs  of  a  Deity  a- 
iTiOunted  to  no  more  than  a  guefs  or 
conjecture.     But  is  the  whole  adjuft- 

ment 


52  .      Dialogues    concerning 

^^^"^  merit  of  means  to  ends  in  a  houfe  and  in 
'o-^-v^  the  univerfe  fo  flight  a  refemblance  ? 
The  oeconomy  of  final  canfes  ?  The 
order,  proportion,  and  arrangement  of 
every  part  ?  Steps  of  a  ftair  are  plainly 
contrived,  that  human  legs  may  nfe 
them  in  mounting  ;  and  this  inference 
is  certain  and  infallible.  Human  legs 
are  alfo  contrived  for  walking  and 
mounting;  and  this  inference,  I  allow, 
is  not  altogether  fo  certain,  becaufe  of 
the  diffimilarity  which  .you  remark; 
but  does  it,  therefore,  deferve  the  name 
only  of  prefumption  or  conjedlure  ? 

Good  God!  cried  Demea,  inter- 
rupting him,  where  are  we  ?  Zealous 
defenders  of  religion  allow,  that  the 
proofs  of  a  Deity  fall  fhort  of  perfedl 
evidence!  And  you,  Philo,  on  whofe 
affiftance  I  depended  in  proving  the 
adorable  myfterioufnefs  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  do  you  affent  to  all  thefe  extra- 
vagant opinions  of  Clea:^thes  ?     For 

what 


Natural    Religion.  53 

what  other  name  can  I  eive  them  ?  Or  ^^^'^ 

'  ^  .  IL 

why  fpare  my  cehfure,  when  fuch  prin-  v.<v>-/ 

ciples  are  advanced,  fupported  by  fiich 

an  authority,  before  fo  young  a  man  as 

Pamphilus  ? 


You  feem  not  to  apprehend,  repUed 
Philo,  that  I  a.rgiie  with  Cleanthes 
in  his  ovv^n  way ;  and  by  fhowing  him 
the  dangerous  confequences  of  his  te- 
nets, hope  at  lail  to  reduce  him  to  our 
opinion.  But  what  flicks  moft  with 
you,  I  obferve,  is  the  reprefentation 
which  Cleantkes  has  made  of  the 
argument  a  pojleriori ;  and  finding  that 
that  argument  is  hkely  to  efcape  your 
hold  "and  vanifli  into  air,  you  think  it 
fo  difguifed,  that  you  can  fcarcely  be- 
lieve it  to  be  fet  in  its  true  light.  Now, 
however  much  I  may  dilTent,  m  other 
refpedls,  from  the  dangerous  principles 
of  Cleanthes,  I  muft  allov^r,  that  he 
has  fairly  reprefented  that  argument ; 
and  I  fliall  endeavour  fo  to  ftate  the 

D  matter 


54    '     Dialogues    concerning. 

Part  niattei  to  yoUj  that  you  will  entertain 
-c-v^  no  farther  fcruples  with  regard  to  it. 

Were  a  man  to  abftrac5l  from  every 
thing  which  he  knows  or  has  feen,  he 
would  be  altogether  incapable,  merely 
from  his  own  ideas,  to  determine  what 
kind  of  fcene  the  univerfe  muft  be,  or 
to  give  the  preference  to  one  (late  or  ^ 
fituation  of  things  above  another.  For 
as  nothing  which  he  clearly  conceives 
could  be  efteemed  impoffible  or  imply- 
ing a  contradiffion,  every  chimera  of 
his  fancy  would  be  upon  an  equal  foot- 
ing ;  nor  could  he  aflign  any  juft  rea- 
fon,  why  he  adheres  to  one  idea  or 
fyftem,  and  rejecls  the  others  which 
are  equally  poffible. 

Again  ;  after  he  opens  his  eyes,  and 
contemplates  the  world  as  it  really  is, 
it  would  be  impoffible  for  him^  at  firft, 
to  affign  the  caufe  of  any  one  event, 
much  lefs  of  the  whole  of  things  or  of 

the 


Natural    Religion.  55 

the"  univerfe.     He  might  fet  his  Fancy     ^^J 
a  rambhng ;   and  Ihe  might  bring  him  v-^-^-^ 
in  an  infinite  variety  of  reports  and  re- 
prefentations.     Thefe  would  all  be  pof- 
fible  ;  but  being  all  equally  poflible,  he 
would  never,  of  himfelf,  give  a  fatis- 
fadtory  account  for  his  preferring  one    - 
6f  them  to  the  reft.     Experience  alone 
call  point  out  to  him  the  true  caufe  of 
any  phenomenon. 

Now  according  to  this  method  of 
reafoning,  Demea,  it  follows  (and  is, 
indeed,  tacitly  allowed  by  Cleanthes 
himfelf),  that  order,  arrangement,  or 
the  adjuftment  of  final  caufes,  is  not, 
of  itfelf,  any  proof  of  defign ;  but  only 
fo  far  as  it  has  been  experienced  to  pro- 
ceed from  that  principle.  For  aught 
we  can  know  a  priori^  matter  may  con- 
tain the  fource  or  fpring  of  order  ori- 
ginally, within  itfelf,  as  well  as  mind 
does;  and  there  is  no  more  difficulty 
in  conceiving,  that  the  feveral  elements, 

D  2  from 


56         Dialogues   concerning 

Part  fj-Q^i  an  internal  nnknown  eanfe,  may 
^.^vxj  fall  into  the  moft  exquifite  arrangement^ 
than  to  conceive  tha.t  their  ideas,  in  the 
great,  iiniverfal  mind,  from  a  like  in- 
ternal  Unknown   caufe,   fall  into   that 
arrangement.     The  equal  poffibility  of 
both  thefe  fuppofitions  is  allowed.     But , 
by  experience   we  find,  (according  to 
Cleanthes),  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  them.     Throw  feveral  pieces 
of  fteel  together,  without  fliape  or  form ; 
they  will  never-  arrange  themfelves  fo  as 
to  compofe  a  watch.     Stone,  and  mor- 
tar,   and  wood^  without  an  architect, 
never  erecfl  a  houfe.     Bm  the  ideas  in 
a  human  mind,    we   fee,  by   ah  un- 
known, inexplicable  oeconomy,  arrange 
themfelves  fo  as  to  form  the  plan  of  a 
watch  or  houfe.    Experience,  therefore^ 
proves,  that  there  is  an  original  prin-^ 
ciple  of  order  in  mind,    not  in  mat- 
ter.    From  limilar  effedls  we  infer  li- 
milar  caufes.    The  adjuftmeht  of  means 
to  ends  is  alike  in  the  univerfe,  as  in  a 

machine 


Natural    Religion.  57 

machine  of  human  contrivance.     The  ^^^ '^ 
caufes,  therefore,  miift  be  refembUng.  ^^^-y^ 

I  WAS  from  the  beginning  fcanda- 
lifed,  I  mnft  own,  with  this  refem- 
blance,  which  is  aflerted,  between  the 
Deity-  and  human  creatures ;  and  mull 
conceive  it  to  imply  fuch  a  degradation 
of  the  Supreme  Being  as  no  found 
Theifl  could  endure.  With  your  '^aili- 
ftance,  therefore,  Demea,  I  fliall  en- 
deavour to  defend  what  you  jullly  call 
the  adorable  myfterioufnefs  of  the  Di 
vine  Nature,  and  ftiall  refute  this  rea- 
foning  of  Cleanthes  ;  provided  he 
allows,  that  I  have  made  a  fair  repre-' 
fentation  of  it^ 

When  Cleanthes  had  aflented, 
Philo,  after  alhortpaufe,  proceeded  in 
the  following  manner. 

That    all  inferences,    ClEx^nthes,  > 
concerning  fail,  are  founded  on  expe- 

D  3  rience ; 


Dialogues    c  o  n  c  e  r  n  i  isr  Cx 

Part  rience ;  and  that  all  experimental  rea- 
v-orvj  fbnings  are  founded  on  the  fuppofition^ 
that  {imilar  caufes  prove  fimilar  efFecfls, 
andiimilar  efFedis  fimilar  caufes;  I  (hall 
not,  at  prefent,  much  difpute  with  you. 
But  obferve,  I  intreat  you,  with  what 
extreme  caution  all  juft  reafoners  pro- 
ceed in  the  transferring  of  experiments 
to  fimilar  cafes*     Unlefs   the  cafes  be 
exactly  fimilar,  they  repofe  no  p^rfedl 
confidence  in  applying  their  paft  obfer- 
vation  to  any  particular  phenomenon. 
Every  alteration  of  circumftances  oc- 
cafions  a  doubt  concerning  the  event; 
and    it   requires    new  experiments    to 
prove  certainly,  that  the  new  circum- 
fiances  are  of  no  moment  or  niipor- 
tance.     A  change    in  bulk,    fituation, 
arrangement,  age,  difpofition  of  the  air, 
or  furrounding  bodies ;    any  of  thefe 
particulars  may  be  attended  with  the 
moft   unexpedled   confequences :     And 
xmlefs  the  objedls  be  quite  familiar  to  us, 
it  is  the  highefl  temerity  to  expefl:  with 

affurance, 


Natural    Religion,  59 

alllirance,  after  any  of  thefe  changes,  an  '^^^'^ 
event  iimilar  to  that  which  before  fell  ^^^ 
under  onr  obfer^^ation.     The  ilow  and 
dehberate  fteps  of  philofophers,  here,  if 
any  where,  are  diftinguiflied  from  the    ' 
precipitate  march  of  the  vulgar,  who, 
hurried  on  by  the  fmalleft  fimilitude, 
are  incapable  of  all  difcernment  or  con- 
iideration. 

But  can  you  think,  Cleanthes, 
that  your  uflial  phlegm  and  philofophy 
have  been  preferved  in  lb  wide  a  ftep  as 
you  have  taken,  when  you  compared  to 
the  univerfe,  houfes,  fhips,  furniture, 
machines ;  and  from  their  fimilarity  in 
fome  circumftances  inferred  a  fimilari- 
ty in  their  caufes  ?  Thought,  defign, 
intelligence,  flich  as  we  difcover  in  men 
an4  other  animals,  is  no  more  than  one 
of  the  fprings  and  principles  of  the  uni- 
verfe, as  well  as  heat  or  cold,  attraction 
or  repulfion,  and  a  hundred  others, 
which  fall  under  daily  obfervation.     It 

D  4  is 


6o        Dialogues    concernikg 

^Y^  is  an  a6live  caufe,  by  which  fome  par- 
^-^v^  ticular  parts  of  nature,  we  find,  pro- 
duce  alterations  on  other  parts.  But 
can  a  conclufion,  with  any  propriety, 
be  transferred  from  parts  to  the  whole  ? 
Does  not  the  great  difproportion  bar  ail 
comparifon  and  inference  ?  From  ob~ 
ferving  the  growth  of  a  hair,  can  we 
learn  any  thing  concerning  the  gene^ 
ration  of  a  man  ?  Would  the  manner  of  a 
'  leaf's  blowing,  even  though  perfectly 
known,  afford  us  any  inftruclion  con- 
cerning the  vegetation  of  a  tree  ? 

But  allowing  that  we  were  to  take 
the  operations  of  one  part  of  nature  up- 
on another  for  the  foundation  of  our 
judgment  concerning  the  origin  of  the 
whole,  (which  never  can  be  admitted) ; 
yet  why  feleA  fb  minute,  fo  weak,  fo 
bounded  a  principle  as  the  reafon  and 
delign  of  animals  is  found  to  be  upon 
this  planet?  What  peculiar  privilege  has 
this  little  agitation  of  the  brain  which 

we 


Natural    Religion.          ,      6i  .  ; 

i 

we  call  thought^  that  we  mull  thus  make  ^^^^  ; 

it  the  model  of  the  whole  univerfe  ?  ^^-^^  J 
Our  partiality  in  our  own  favour  does                '      I 

indeed  prefent  it  on  all  occafions  ;  but  j 
found    philofophy  ought    carefully   to 

guard  againft  fo  natural  an  illuiion.  I 

So   far  from  admitting,    continued 

Philo,  that  the  operations  of  a  part  can  '  | 
afford  us  any  juft  conclulion  concerning 
the  origin  of  the  whole,  I  will  not  allow 
any  one  part  to  form  a  rule  for  another 

part,  if  the  latter  be  very  remote  from  -    ; 

the  former.      Is   there  any  reafonable  j 

ground  to   conclude,  that  the  inhabi-  ' 
tants  of  other  planets  poffefs-  thought,               ,       I 

intelligence,  reafon,  or  any  thing  limi-  ] 

lar  to  thefe  faculties  in  men  ?    When  \ 

nature  has  fo  extremely  diverfified  her  '\ 

manner  of  operation  in  this  imall  globe ;  ' 

can  we  imagine,  that  fhe  inceffantly  co-  ' 

pies  herfelf  throughout  fo  immenfe  a  i 

univerfe?  And  if  thought,  as  we  may  ; 

well  fuppofe,  be  confined  merely  to  this  , 

narrow 


62  DiALOGUESCONCERNiNG 


II. 


Part  narrow  corner,  and  has  even  there  fb 
Umited  a  fphere  of  adlion ;  with  what 
propriety  can  we  affign  it  for  the  ori- 
ginal caufe  of  all  things  ?  The  narrow 
views  of  a  peafant,  who  makes  his  do- 
nieftic  oeconomy  the  rule  for  the  go- 
vernment of  kingdoms,  is  in  compari- 
fon  a  pardonable  fophifm. 

But  were  we  ever  fo  much  alfured, 
that  a  thought  and  reafon,  refembling 
the  human,  were  to  be  found  through- 
out the  whole  univerfe,  and  were  its  ac- 
tivity elfewhere  vaftly  greater  and  more 
commanding  than  it  appears  in  this 
globe ;  yet  I  cannot  fee,  why  the  opera- 
tions of  a  world  conftituted,  arranged, 
adjufted,  can  with  any  propriety  be 
extended  to  a  world  which  is  in  its 
embryo-ftate,  and  is  advancing  towards 
that  conftitution  and  arrangement.  Bv 
obfervation,  we  know  fomewhat  of  the 
oeconomy,  aflion,  and  nouriiliment  of 
a  finifhed  animal ;  but  we  muft  tranf- 

fer 


Natural    Religion.  63 

fer  with  ereat  caution  that  obfervation  Part 

.  II. 

to  the  growth  of  a  fetus  in  the  womb,  ^^-^ 

and  ftill  more  to  the  formation  of  an 
animalcule  in  the  loins  of  its  male  pa- 
rent. Nature,  we  find,  even  from  our 
limited  experience,  pofFefTes  an  infinite 
number  of  fprings  and  principles,  which 
incefTantly  difcover  themfelves  on  every 
change  of  her  polition  and  fituation. 
And  what  new  and  unknown  princi- 
ples would  adluate  her  in  fo  new  and 
unknown  a  fituation  as  that  of  the  for- 
mation of  a  univerfe,  we  cannot,  with- 
out the  utmofl  temerity,  pretend  to  de- 
termine. 

A  VERY  fmall  part  of  this  great  fy- 
ftem,  during  a  very  fhort  time,  is  very 
imperfecftly  difcovered  to  us  ;  and  do 
we  thence  pronounce  decifively  concern- 
ing the  origin  of  the  whole  ? 

Admirable  conclufion!  Stone,  wood, 
brick,   iron,   brafs,   have  not,  at  this 

time. 


64         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  time,  in  this  minute  globe  of  earth,  an 
V-.-VXJ  order  or  arrangement  without  human 
art  and  contrivance :  therefore  the  uni- 
verfe  could  not  originally  attain  its  or- 
der and  arrangement,  without  fome- 
thing  fimilar  to  human  art.  But  is  a  part 
of  nature  a  rule  for  another  part  very 
wide  of  the  former  ?  Is  it  a  rule  for  the 
whole?  Is  a  very  fmall  part  a  rule  for 
the  univerfe  ?  Is  nature  in  one  fitua- 
tion,  a  certain  rule  for  nature  in  ano- 
ther fituation  vaftly  different  from  the 
former  ? 

And  can  you  blame  me,  Cle  anthes, 
if  I  here  imitate  the  prudent  referve  of 
SiMONiDES,  who,  according  to  the  no- 
ted flory,  being  afbed  by  Hieko^  JVhat 
God  ivas  ?  defired  a  day  to  think  of  it, 
and  then  two  days  more;  and  after  that 
manner  continually  prolonged  the  term, 
without  ever  bringing  in  his  definition 
or  defcription  ?  Could  you  even  blame 
me,  if  I  had  anfwered  at  firft,  that  I  did 

not 


Natural    Religion.  65 

not  knozv^  and  was  fenfible  that  this  fub-  ^-^^^ 
je6l  lay  vaftly  beyond  the  reach  of  my  <.^^ 
faculties  ?  You  might  cry  out  .fceptic 
and  rallier,  as  much  as  you  pleafed:  but 
having  found,  in  fo  many  other  fub- 
je6ls  much  more  familiar,  the  imper- 
fections and  even  contradictions  of  hu- 
man reafon,  I  never  lliould  expe6l  any 
fuccefs  from  its  feeble  conjectures,  in  a 
fubject  fo  fublimCj  and  fo  remote  from 
the  fphere  of  our  obfervation.  When 
tv^^o  fpec'ies  of  objects  have  always  been 
obferved  to  be  conjoined  together,  I  can 
hifer^  by  cuftom,  the  exiftence  of  one 
wherever  \Jee  the  exiftence  of  the  other: 
and  this  I  call  an  argument  from  expe- 
rience. But  how  this  argument  can 
have  place,  where  the  objecfts,  as  in  the 
prefent  cafe,  are  lingle,  individual,  with- 
out parallel,  or  fpecific  refemblance, 
may  be  difficult  to  explain.  And  will 
any  man  tell  me  with  a  ferious  counte- 
nance, that  an  orderly  univerfe  muft  a- 

rife  froin  feme  thought  and  .nrt,   like 

the 


66         Dialogues    coNc^irning 

Part  the  huinan ;  becaufe  we  have  experi- 
^^-v^  ence  of  it?  To  afcertain  this  reafoning, 
it  were  requifice,  that  we  had  experience 
of  the  origin  of  worlds ;  and  it  is  not 
fuflScient,  fnrely,  that  we  have  feen  fhips 
and  cities  arife  from  human  art  and 
contrivance. 

Philo  was  proceeding  in  this  vehe- 
ment manner,  fomewhat  between  jeft 
and  earneft,  as  it  appeared  to  me ;  when 
he  obferved  fome  figns  of  impatience 
in  Cleanthes,  and  then  immediately 
flopped  fliort.  What  I  had  to  fnggeft, 
faid  Cleanthes,  is  only  that  you 
would  not  abufe  terms,  or  make  ufe  of 
popular  exprelTions  to  fubvert  philofo- 
phical  reafonings.  You.  know,  that  the 
vulgar  often  diftinguifli  reafon  from  ex- 
perience, even  where  the  queftion  re- 
lates only  to  matter  of  faft  and  exifl- 
ence;  though  it  is  found,  where  that 
reafon  is  properly  analyzed,  that  it  is  no- 
thing but  a  Ipecies  of  experience.     To 

prove 


Natural    Religion.  67 

prove  by  experience  tlie  origin  of  the .  ^^^'^ 
iiniverfe  from  mind,  is  not  more  con-  ^^-^r^ 
trarjr  to  common  fpeech,  than  to  prove 
the  motion  of  the  earth  from  the  fame 
principle.  And  a  caviller  might  raife 
all  the  fame  obj  eft  ions  to  the  Co  per- 
nio an  fyftem,,  which  you  have  urged 
againft  my  reafonings.  Have  you  other 
earths,  might  he  fay,  w^hich  you  have 
feen  to  move  ?  Have  , , 

Yes!  cried Philo,  interrupting  him, 
we  have  other  earths.  Is  not  the  moon 
a.nother  earth,  which  we  fee  to  turn 
round  its  centre  ?  Is  not  Venus  another 
earth,  where  we  obferve  the  fame  phe- 
nomenon? Are  not  the  revolutions  of 
the  fun  alfo  a  confirmation,  from  ana- 
logy, of  the  fame  theory?  Allthe  pla- 
nets, are  they  not  earths,  which  revolve 
about  the  fun?  Are  not  the  fatellites 
moons,  which  move  round  Jupiter  and 
Saturn,  and  along  with  thefe  primary 
planets  round  the  fun  ?  Thefe  analogies 

and 


68         Dialogues    concerniks^ 

■^Yt^"^  ^i^d  refemblances,  with  others  which  I 
'^--N'v^  have  not  mentioned,  are  the  fole  proofs 
of  the  CoPERNiCAN  fyftem:  and  tQ 
you  it  belongs  to  confider,  whether  you 
have  any  analogies  of  the  fame  kind  to 
fupport  your  theory* 

In  reality,  Cl e  a  NT  hes,  continued  he, 
the  modern  fyflem  of  aftronomy  is  now 
fo  much  received  by  all  inquirers,  and 
has  become  fo  effential  a  part  even  of 
our  earlieft  education,  that  we  are  not 
commonly  very  fcrupulous  in  examin- 
ing the  reafons  upon  which  it  is  found- 
ed. It  is  now  become  a  matter  of  mere 
curiofity  to  ftudy  the  firft  writers  on 
that  fubjedl,  who  had  the  full  force  of 
prejudice  to  encounter,  and  were  obli- 
ged  to  turn  their  arguments  on  every 
fide  in  order  to  render  them  popular 
and  convincing.  But  if  we  perufe  Ga~ 
LiLJEo's  famous  Dialogues  concerning 
-  the  fyftem  of  the  world,  we  Ihall  find, 
that  that  great  genius,  one  of  the  fub- 
^  limeft 


Natural    Religion.  69 

limeft  that  ever  exiifled,  firft  bent  all  ^^^^'^ 
his  endeavours  to  prove,  that  there  s.^vxj 
was  no  foundation  for  the  diftinc- 
tion  commonly  made  between  elemen- 
tary and  celeflial  fubftances.  The 
fchools,  proceeding  from  the  illuiions  of 
fenfe,  had  carried  this  diftindtion  very 
far;  and  had  eftabliihed  the  latter  fub- 
ilances  to  be  ingenerable,  incorruptible, 
unalterable,  impaffible;  and  had  af- 
figned  all  the  oppolite  qualities  to  the 
former.  But  Galiljeo,  beginning  with 
the  moon,  proved  its  fimilarity  in  every 
particular  to  the  earth;  its  convex  fi-  )' 
gure,  is  natural  darknefs  when  not  il- 
luminated, its  denfity,  its  diftincflion  in-* 
to  folid  and  liquid,  the  variations  of  its 
phafes,  the  mutual  illuminations  of  the 
earth  and  moon,  their  mutual  eclipfes, 
the  inequalities  of  the  lunar  furface,  &c. 
After  many  inilances  of  this  kind,  with 
regard  to  all  the  planets,  men  plainly 
faw  that  thefe  bodies  became  proper  ob- 
jects of  experience  ;  and  that  the  fimi- 

E  laritv 


yo         Dialogues    concerning 

^^^'^  larity  of  their  nature  enabled  ns  to  ex- 
^v>w^  tend  the  fame  arguments  and  pheno- 
mena from  one  to  the  other. 

In  this  cautious  proceeding  of  the 
aftronomers,  you  may  read  your  own 
condemnation,  Cleanthes;  or  rather 
may  fee,  that  the  fubjecft  in  which  you 
are  engaged  exceeds  all  human  reafon 
and  inquiry.  Can  you  pretend  to  fhow 
any  fuch  fimilarity  between  the  fabric 
of  a  houfe,  and  the  generation  of  a  uni- 
verfe?  Have  you  ever  feen  Nature  in 
any  fuch  fituation  as  refembles  the  firft 
arrangement  of  the  elements?  Have 
worlds  ever  been  formed  under  your 
eye ;  and  have  you  had  leiftire  to  ob- 
ferve  the  whole  progrefs  of  the  pheno- 
menon,  from  the  firft  appearance  of 
order  to  its  final  confiimmation  ?  If  you 
have^  then  cite  your  experience,  and 
deliver  your  theory. 

PART 


PART         III. 


'-^y^W 


TTOW  the  moft  abfurd  argument,  re-  ^^^'^ 

plied  Cleanthes,  in  the  hands 
of  a  man  of  ingenuity  and  invention, 
may  acquire  an  air  of  probability !  Are 
you  not  aware,  Philo,  that  it  became 
necefTary  for  Copernicus  and  his  fir  ft 
difciples  to  prove  the  fimilarity  of  the 
terreftrial  and  celeftial  matter ;  becaufe 
feveral  philofophers,  blinded  by  old  fy- 
ftems,  and  fupported  by  fome  fenfible 
appearances,  had  denied  this  fimilarity? 
but  that  it  is  by  no  means  neceflary, 
that  Theifts  fhould  prove  the  fimilarity 
of  the  works  of  Nature  to  thofe  of  Art; 
becaufe  this   fimilarity  is  felf-evident 
and  undeniable?  The  fame  matter,   a 

E  2  like 


1 


V 


72         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  i\^q  form:  what  more  is   requlfite  to 
III.  t 

«w-v-^  fliow  an  analogy  between  their  caufes, 

and  to  afcertain  the  origin  of  all  things 
from  a  divine  purpofe  and  intention  ? 
Your  objedlions,  I  muft  freely  tell  yon, 
are  no  better  than  the  abflrufe  cavils  of 
thofe  philofophers  who  denied  motion; 
and  ought  to  be  refuted  in  the  fame 
manner,  by  illuftrations,  examples,  and 
inftances,  rather  than  by  ferious  argu- 
ment and  philofophy. 

Suppose,  therefore,  that  an  articu- 
late voice  were  heard  in  the  clouds, 
much  louder  and  more  melodious  than 
any  which  human  art  could  ever  reach : 
Suppofe,  that  this  voice  were  extended 
in  the  fame  inftant  over  all  nations,  and 
{poke  to  each  nation  in  its  own  lan- 
guage and  dialed:  Suppofe,  that  the 
words  delivered  not  only  contain  a  juft 
fenfe  and  meaning,  but  convey  fome 
inftru(ftion  altogether  worthy  of  a  be- 
nevoicnt  Being,  fuperior  to  mankind : 

Could 


Natural    Religion.  73 

Could  you  podibly  helitate  a  moment  ^^^"^ 
concerning  the  caufe  of  this  voice?  and  v,^>r%^ 
mnft  you  not  inftantly  afcribe  it  to  fome 
defign  or  purpofe  ?  Yet  I  cannot  fee  but 
all  the  fame  objec^tions  (if  they  merit 
that  appellation)  which  lie  againfl  the 
fyftem  of  Theifm,  may  alfo  be  produ- 
ced asrainil  this  inference. 


Might  you  not  fay,  that  all  conclu- 
fions  concerning  fac5l  were  founded  on 
experience:  that  when  we  hear  an  arti- 
culate voice  in  the  dark,  and  thence  in- 
fer a  man,  it  is  only  the  refemblance  of 
the  effects  which  leads  us  to  conclude 
that  there  is  a  like  refemblance  in  the 
caufe :  but  that  this  extraordinary  voice, 
by  its  loudnefs,  extent,  and  flexibility 
to  all  languages,  bears  fo  little  analogy 
to  any  human  voice,  that  wc  have  no 
reafon  to  fuppofe  any  analogy  in  their 
caufes ,"  and  confequently,  that  a  ra- 
tional, wife,  coherent  fpeech  proceeded, 
you  knew  not  whence,  from  fome  ac- 
E  3  cidental 


74        Dialogues    coNCERNiNa 

Part  cidcntal  whiftling  of  the  winds,  not 
i>-y^  from  any  divine  reafon  or  intelligence? 
You  fee  clearly  your  own  objedlions  in 
thefe  cavils ;  and  I  hope  too,  you  fee 
clearly,  that  they  cannot  poffibly  have 
more  force  in  the  one  cafe  than  in  the 
other. 


But  to  bring  the  cafe  ftill  nearer  the 
prefent  one  of  the  univerfe,  I  fliall  make 
two  fuppolitions,  which  imply  not  any 
abfurdity  or  impoffibility.  Suppofe, 
that  there  is  a  natural,  univerfal,  inva- 
riable language,  common  to  every  in- 
dividual of  human  race;  and  that  books 
are  natural  produ(flions,  which  perpe- 
tuate themfelves  in  the  fame  manner 
with  animals  and  vegetables,  by  defcent 
and  propagation.  Several  expreffions  of 
our  paffions  contain  a  univerfal  lan- 
guage :  all  brute  animals  have  a  natural 
Ipeech,  which,  however  limited,  is  very 
intelligible  to  their  own  fpecies.  And 
fis  there  are  infinitely  fewer  parts  ai)id 

left 


Natural    Religion.  75 

lefs  contrivance  in  the  fineft  compoli-  ^^^"^ 
tion  of  eloquence,  than  in  the  coarfeft  k..^ 
organized  body,  the  propagation  of  an 
Iliad  or  ^neid  is  an  eafier  fuppolition 
than  that  of  any  plant  or  animal. 

Suppose,  therefore,  that  you  enter 
into  your  library,  thus  peopled  by  na- 
tural volumes,  containing  the  moft  re- 
fined reafon  and  mofl  exquifite  beauty : 
could  you  poflibly  open  one  of  them, 
and  doubt,  that  its  original  caufe  bore 
the  ftrongeil  analogy  to  mind  and  in- 
telligence? When  it  reafons  and  dif- 
courfes ;  when  it  expoftulates,  argues, 
and  enforces  its  views  and  topics  ;  when 
it  applies  fome times  to  the  pure  intel- 
ledl,  fometimes  to  the  afFedlions ;  when 
it  colle6ls,  difpofes,  and  adorns  every 
confideration  fviited  to  the  fubjeA:  could 
you  perlift  in  alTerting,  that  all  this,  at 
the  bottom,  had  really  no  meaning  ; 
and  that  the  firfl  formation  of  this 
volume  in  the  loins  of  its  original  pa- 

E  4  rent 


y6         Dialogues    concepvNing 

Part  Ycnt  proceeded  not  from  thought  and 

^.^-rv  deiign  ?  Your  obftinacy,  I  know,  reaches 

not  that  degree  of  firmnefs  :  even  your 

fceptical  play  and  wantonnefs  would  be 

abalhed  at  fo  glaring  an  abfurdicy. 

But  if  there  be  any  difference,  Philo, 
between  this  fuppofed  cafe  and  the  real 
one  of  the  univerfe,  it  is  all  to  the  ad^ 
vantage  of  the  latter.     The  anatomy  of 
an   animal   affords   many  ftronger  in- 
ftances   of  defign  than    the   perufal  of 
LiVY  or  Tacitus:    and  any  objeftion 
which  you  ftart  in  the  former  cafe,  by 
carrying  me  back  to  fo  unufual  and  ex- 
traordinary a  fcene  as  the  firfl  forma- 
tion of  worlds,  the  fame  objection  has 
place  on  the  fuppofition  of  our  vegeta- 
ting library.     Chufe,  then,  your  party, 
Philo,  without  ambiguity  or  evafion: 
affert  either  that  a  rational  volume  is 
no  proof  of  a  rational  caufe,  or  admit 
of  .a  iimilar  caufe  to  all  the  works  of 
nature, 

Let 


Natural    Religion.  77 

Let  me  here  obferve  too,  continued  ^^^'^ 
Cleanthes,  that  this  rehgious  argu-  <^^v<^ 
ment,  inftead  of  being  weakened  by 
that  fcepticifm  fo  much  affected  by 
you,  rather  acquires  force  from  it,  and 
becoiues  more  firm  and  undifputed.  To 
exclude  all  argument  or  reafoning  of 
every  kind,  is  either  affe6lation  or  mad- 
nefs.  The  declared  profelTion  of  every 
reafonable  fceptic  is  only  to  rejeA  ab- 
ftrufe,  remote,  and  refined  arguments  ; 
to  adh-ere  to  common  fenfe  and  the  plain 
inftin6ls  of  nature ;  and  to  affent,  where- 
ever  any  reafons  ftrike  him  with  fo  full 
a  force,  that  he  cannot,  without  the 
greateft  violence,  prevent  it.  Now  the 
arguments  for  Natural  Religion  are 
plainly  of  this  kind  ;  and  nothing  but 
the  moft  perverfe,  obftinate  metaphyfics 
can  reject  them.  Confider,  anatomize 
the  eye  ;  furvey  its  ftru6lure  and  con- 
triva.nce  ;  and  tell  me,  from  your  own 
feeling,  if  the  idea  of  a  contriver  does 
not  immediately  flow  in  upon  you  with 

a 


78         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  a  force  like  that  of  fenfation.     The  moft 
\,^>rLf  obvious  conclufion,  furely,  is  in  favour 
delign ;  and  it  requires  time,  refledlion, 
and  ftudy,  to  funiinon  up  thofe  frivo- 
lous, though  abftrufe  objedlions,  which 
can  fupport  Infidelity.     Who  can  be- 
hold the  male  and  female  of  each  fpecies, 
the  correfpondence  of  their  parts  and  in- 
ftin(5ls,  their  paffions,  and  whole  courfe 
of  life  before  and  after  generation,  but 
muft  be  fenfible,  that  the  propagation 
of  the  fpecies  is  intended  by  Nature? 
Millions  and  millions  of  fuch  inftances 
prefent  themfelves  through  every  part 
of  the  univerfe;  and  no  language  can 
convey  a  more  intelligible,   irrefiftible 
meaning,  than  the  curious  adjuftment 
of  final  caufes.     To  what  degree,  there- 
fore,   of  blind   dogmatifm   muft   one 
have  attained,  to  rejedl  fuch  natural  and 
fuch  convincing  argu.ments  ? 

Some   beauties   in  writing  we  may 
meet   with,  which   feem  contrary   to 

rules^ 


'     Natural    Religion.  79 

rules,  and  which  gain  the  aiEFedlions,  ^^^"^ 
and  animate  the  imagination,  in  oppo-  s^v^ 
fition  to  all  the  precepts  of  criticifm, 
and  to  the  authority  of  the  eftabliflied 
mafters  of  art.  And  if  the  argument 
for  Theifm  be,  as  you  pretend,  contra- 
dictory to  the  principles  of  logic  ;  its 
univerfal,  its  irrefiftible  influence  proves 
clearly,  that  there  may  be  arguments  of 
a  like  irregular  nature.  Whatever  ca- 
vils may  be  urged ;  an  orderly  world, 
as  well  as  a  coherent,  articulate  Ipeech, 
will  ftill  be  received  as  an  inconteftable 
proof  of  defign  ar  d  intention. 

It  fometimes  happens,  I  own,  that 
the  religious  arguments  have  not  their 
due  influence  on  an  ignorant  favage  and 
barbarian;  not  becaufe  they  are  ob- 
fcure  and  difiicult,  but  becaufe  he  ne- 
ver aflcs  himfelf  any  quefliion  with  re- 
gard to  them.  Whence  arifes  the  cu- 
rious ftrudlure  of  an  animal?  From 
phe  copulation    of  its   parents.     And 

thefe 


8o         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  tliefe  whencc  ?  From  their  parents  ?  A 
\.,.-v->^  few  removes  fet  the  objefls  at  fucli  a 
diftance,  that  to  him  they  are  loft  in 
darknefs  and  confufion ;  nor  is  he  ac- 
tuated by  any  curioiity  to  trace  them 
farther.  But  this  is  neither  dogma- 
tifin  nor  fcepticifm,  but  ftupidity ;  a 
ftate  of  mind  very  different  from  your 
fifting,  inquifitive  difpofition,  my  in- 
genious friend.  You  can  trace  caufes 
from  effecSls :  You  can  compare  the  moft 
diftant  and  remote  objefls :  and  your 
greateft  errors  proceed  not  from  barren- 
nefs  of  thought  and  invention;  but 
from  too  luxuriant  a  fertility,  w^hich 
fiippreffes  your  natural  good  fenfe,  by  a 
profulion  of  unnecefTary  fcruples  and 
objeclions. 

Here  I  could  obferve,  Hermippus, 
that  Philo  was  a  little  embarrafled  and 
confounded  s  But  while  he  heiitated 
in   delivering  an   anfwer,   luckily  for 

him. 


Natural    R.eligion;  8i 

» 

him,  Demea  broke  in  upon  the  dif-  ^^^"^ 
courfe,  and  faved  his  countenance.         ^^^-^o 

.  Your  inftance,  Cleanthes,  faid  he, 
drawn  from  books  and  language,  being 
famihar,  has,  I  confefs,  fo  much  more 
farce  on  that  account :  but  is  there  not 
fome  danger  too  in  this  very  circum- 
ftance;  and  may  it  not  render  us  pre- 
fumptuous,  by  making  us  imagine  "we 
x:omprehend  the  Deity,  and  have  fome 
adequate  idea  of  his  nature  and  attri- 
butes? When  I  read  a  vohime,  I  enter 
into  the  mind  and  intention  of  che  au- 
thor: I  become  him,  in  a  manner,  for 
the  inftant;  and  have  an  immediate 
feeling  and  conception  of  thofe  ideas 
which  revolved  in  his  imagination  while 
employed  in  that  compoiition.  But  fo 
near  an  approach  we  never  furely  can. 
make  to  the  Deity.  His  ways  are  not 
our  vvays.  His  attributes  are  perfecfl, 
but  incomprehenlible.  And;  this  vo- 
lume of  Nature  contains  a  g:reat  and  in- 


fo^ 


explicable 


82         Dialogues    concerning 

Part  explicable  riddle,  more  than  any  intel« 
v^^  ligible  difcourfe  or  reafoning. 

The  ancient  Platonists,  you  know, 
were  the  moil  religious  and  devout  of 
all  the  Pagan  philofophers  :  yet  many 
of  them,  particularly  Plotinus,  ex- 
prefsly  declare,  that  intelle(fl  or  under- 
{landing  is  not  to  be  afcribed  to  the 
Deity ;  and  that  our  inofl  perfect  wor- 
fliip  of  him  confifts,  not  in  a6ts  of  ve- 
neration, reverence,  gratitude,  or  love ; 
but  in  a  certain  myfterious  felf-annihi- 
lation,  or  total  extindlion  of  all  our  fa- 
culties. Thefe  ideas  are,  perhaps,  too 
far  ftretchcd;  but  ftill  it  mufl  be  ac- 
knowledged, that,  by  reprefenting  the 
Deity  as  fo  intelligible  and  compre- 
henfible,  and  fo  fimilar  to  a  human . 
mind,  we  are  guilty  of  the  groffeft  and 
moll  narrow  partiality,  and  make  our- 
felves  the  model  of  the  whole  univerfe. 

Ai.L  xhefentiments  of  the  human  mind, 

gratitude^ 


Natural    Religion.  83 

gratitude,  refentmtot,  love,  friendftiip,  ^^^'^ 
approbation,  blame,  pity,  emulation,  x..^ 
envy,  have  a  plain  reference  tq  the  ftate 
and  fituation  of  man,  and  are  calcula- 
ted for  preferving  the  exiilence  and 
promoting  the  adlivity  of  a  fuch  a  be- 
ing in  fuch  circumftances.  It  feems 
therefore  unreafonable  to  transfer  fuch 
fentiments  to  a  fupreme  exiftence,  or  to 
llippofe  him  adluated  by  them ;  and  the 
phenomena,  befides,  of  the  univerfe  w^ill 
not  fupport  us  in  fuch  a  theory.  All 
our  ideas  derived  from  the  fenfes  arc 
confefTedly  falfe  and  illufive;  and  can- 
not, therefore,  be  fuppofed  to  have  place 
in  a  fupreme  intelligence:  And  as  th,e 
ideas  of  internal  fentiment,  added  to 
thofe  of  the  external  fenfes,  compofe  the 
whole  furniture  of  human  underftand- 
ing,  we  may  conclude,  that  none  of  the 
materials  of  thought  are  in  any  refpedl 
limilar  in  the  human  and  in  the  divine 
intelligence.  Now  as  to  the  manner  of 
thinking ;  how  can  we  make  any  com-  . 

parifon 


84        Dialogues    concerning 

Part  parifon  between  them,  or  luppofe  them 
\^^^  any  wife  refembling?  Our  thought  is 
flu6luating,  uncertain,  fleeting,  fuccef- 
five,  and  compounded ;  and  were  we  to 
remove  thefe  circumftances,  we  abfo- 
lutely  annihilate  its  efTence,  and  it  would 
in  fuch  a  cafe  be  an  abufe  of  terms  -to 
apply  to  it  the  name  of  thought  or  rea- 
fon.  At  leaft,  if  it  appear  more  pious 
and  refpedlful  (as  it  really  is)  ftill  to 
retain  thefe  terms,  when  we  mention  the 
Supreme  Being;  we  ought  to  acknow- 
ledge, that  their  meaning,  in  that  cafe, 
is  totally  incomprehenflble ;  and  that  the 
infirmities  qf  our  nature  do  not  permit 
us  to  reach  any  ideas  which  in  the  leaft 
correfpond  to  the  ineffable  fublimity  of 
the  divine  attributes. 


PART 


PART         IV. 


TT  feems  ftrange  to  me,  faid  Clean-  P^^t 
THES,  that  you,  Demea,  who  are  v.,.^ 
fo  fincere  in  the  caufe  of  rehgion,  fliould 
ftill  raaintain  the  myfterious,  incom- 
prehenfible  nature  of  the  Deity,  and 
Ihould  infift  fo  ftrennoufly  that  he  has 
no  manner  of  likenefs  or  refemblance  to 
human  creatures.  The  Deity,  I  can 
readily  allow,  pofTeiTes  many  powers 
and  attributes j  of  vv^hich  we  can  have  no 
comprehenfion :  But  if  our  ideas,  fo  far 
as  they  go,  be  not  juft,  and  adequate, 
and  correfpondent  to  his  real  nature,  I 
know  not  what  there  is  in  this  fubjedl 
worth  infifting  on.  Is  the  name,  with- 
out any  meaning,  of  fuch  mighty  im- 

F  portance? 


86         Dialogues    concerning 


Part 
IV. 


portance?  Or  how  do  you  MysTicSy 
who  maintain  the  abfokite  incompre- 
henfibiHty  of  the  Deity,  differ  from 
Sceptics  or  Atheifts,  who  affert,  that 
the  firft  caufe  of  all  is  unknown  and 
unintelligible?  Their  temerity  muft  be 
very  great,  if,  after  rejedling  the  pro- 
du6lion  by  a  mind ;  I  mean,  a  mind 
refembling  the  human,  (for  I  know  of 
no  other),  they  pretend  to  affign,  with 
certainty^  any  other  fpecific  intelligible 
caufe:  And  their  confcience  muft  be 
be  very  fcrupulous  indeed,  if  they  re- 
fufe  to  call  the  univerfal,  unknown  caufe 
a  God  or  Deity  j  and  to  beftow  on  him 
as  many  fublime  eulogies  and  unmean- 
ing epithets  as  you  Ihall  pleafe  to  re- 
quire of  them. 

"Who  could  imagine,  replied  Deme a, 
that  Cleanthes,  the  calm,  philofophi- 
cal  Cleanthes,  would  attempt  to  re- 
fute his  antagonifts,  by  affixing  a  nick- 
name to  them ;  and,  like  th^  common 

bigots 


Natural    Religion.  87 

bigots  and  inquifitors  of  the  age,  have  ^^f^ 
recourfe  to  inveflive'and  declamation,  \...-v>^ 
'  inftead  of  reafonlng?  Or  does  he  not 
perceive,  that  thefe  topics  are  ealily  re- 
torted, and  that  Anthropomorphite 
is  an  appellation  as  invidious,  and  im- 
plies as  dangerous  confequences,  as  the 
epithet  of  Mystic,  with  which  he  has 
honoured  US?  In  reality,  Cleanthes, 
confider  what  it  is  you  affert  when  you 
reprefent  the  Deity  as  fimilar  to  a  hu- 
man mind  and  underftanding.     What 
is  the  foul  of  man?  A  compolition  of 
various  faculties,  paffions,  fentiments, 
ideas  ;  united,  indeed,  into  one  felf  or 
perfon,  but  flill  diftinc?!:  from  each  other. 
When  it  reafons,  the  ideas,  which  are 
the  parts  of  its  difcourfe,  arrange  them^ 
felves  in  a  certain  form  or  order ;  which 
is  not  preferved  entire  for  arrnoment, 
but  immediately  gives  place  to  another 
arrangement.    New  opinions,  new  paf- 
iions,  new  aftecftions,  new  feelings  arife, 
which  continually  diveriify  the  mental 

F  2  fcene, 


88         Dialogues    concerning 

^^^"^  fcene,  and  produce  in  it  the  greateft  va- 
v^^  riety  and  inoft  rapid  fucceffion  imagin- 
able.   How  is  this  compatible  with  that 
perfect    immutability    and     fimplicity 
which  all  true  ~Theifts   afcribe  to  the. 
Deity?    By  the  fame  a6l,  fay  they,  he 
fees  paft,  prefent,  and  future:  His  love 
and  hatred,  his  mercy  and  juftice,  are 
one  individual  operation:  He  is  entire 
in  every  point  of  fpace ;  and  complete 
in  every  inftant  of  duration.     No  fuc- 
ceffion, no  change,  no  acquifition,  no 
diminution.  What  he  is  implies  not  in  it 
any  Ihadow  of  difl:in(5tion  or  diverfity. 
And  what  he  is,  this  moment,  he  ever 
has  been,  and  ever  will  be,  without  any 
new  judgment,  fentiment,  or  operation. 
He  ftands  fixed  in  one  fimple,  perfed: 
ftate  :   nor  can  you  ever  fay„  with  any 
propriety,  that  this  ad:  of  his  is  different 
.  from  that  other ;   or  that  this  judgment 
or  idea  has  been  lately  formed,  and  will 
give  place,  by  fucceffion,  to  any  differ- 
ent judgment  or  idea, 

I 


Natural    Religion.  89 

I  CAN  readily  allow,  faidCLEANTHEs,  ^^^^ 
that  thofe  who  maintain  the  perfedl  fim-  )g^-r^ 
plicity  of  the  Supreme  Being,  to  the  ex- 
tent in  which  you  have  explained  it, 
are  complete  Mystics,  and  chargeable 
with  all  the  confequences  which  I  have 
drawn  from  their  -opinion.  They  are, 
in  a  word.  Atheists,  without  knowing 
it.  For  though  it  be  allowed,  that  the 
Deity  pofTelTes  attributes  of  which  we 
have  no  comprehenfion ;  yet  ought  we 
never  to  afcribe  to  him  any  attributes 
which  are  abfolutely  incompatible  with 
that  intelligent  nature  efTential  to  him. 
A  mind,  whofe  a6ls  and  fentiments  and 
ideas  are  not  diftindl  and  fucceilive ; 
one,  that  is  wholly  fimple,  and  tot^^lly 
immutable;  is  a  mind,  v/hich  has  no 
thought,  no  reafon,  no  will,  no  fenti- 
ment,  no  love,  no  hatred ;  or  in  a  word, 
is  no  mind  at  all.  It  is  an  abufe  of 
terms  to  give  it  that  appellation;  and 
we  may  as  well  fpeak  of  limited  exten- 

F  3    ,  lion 


go        Dialogues    concerning 

Part  {^q^  without  figure,  or  of  number  with- 
w-vx-f  out  compofition. 

Pray  confider,  faid  Philo,  whom 
you  are  at  prefent  inveighing  againfto 
.You  are  honouring  with  the  appellation 
of  Atheijl  all  the  found,  orthodox  di- 
vines, almoft,  who  have  treated  of  this 
lubjedl ;  and  you  will  at  laft  be,  your- 
felf,  found,  according  to  yovir  reckon- 
ing, the  only  found  Theift  in  the  world. 
But  if  idolaters  be  Atheifts,  as,  I  think, 
may  juftly  be  afferted,  and  Chriftian 
Theologians  the  fame ;  what  becomes 
of  the  argument,  fo  much  celebrated, 
derived  from  the  univerfal  confent  of 
mankind  t 

But  becaufe  I  know  you  are  not 
much  fwayed  by  names  and  authorities, 
I  fhall  endeavour  to  ftiow  you,  a  little 
more  diflin6lly,  the  inconveniencies  of 
that  Anthropomorphifm,  which  you 
have  embraced  ;  and  fhall  prove,  that 

there 


Natural    Religion,  91 

there  is  no  ground  to  fuppofe  a  plan  of  ^^^ 
the  world  to  be  formed  in  the  divine  v^-r>-' 
mind,  confifting  of  diftindl  ideas,  dif- 
ferently arranged ;  in  the  fame  manner 
as  an  architect  forms  in  his  head  the 
plan  of  a  hovife  which  he  intends  to 
execute. 


It  is  not  eafy,  I  own,  to  fee  what 
is  gained  by  this  fuppoiition,  whether 
we  judge  of  the  matter  by  Reafon  or  by 
Experience,  "We  are  ftill  obliged  to 
mount  liigher,  in  order  to  iind  the 
caufe  of  this  caufe,  which  you  had  af- 
figned  as  fatisfacftory  and  conclufive. 

If  Reafon  (I  mean  abftrafl:  reafon, 
derived  from  inquiries  a  priori)  be  not 
alike  mute  with  regard  to  all  queftioiis 
concerning  caufe  and  effedl ;  this  fen- 
tence  at  leaft  it  will  venture  to  pro- 
nounce, That  a  mental  world,  or  uni- 
verfe  of  ideas,  requires  a  caufe  as  much, 
as  does  a  material  world,  or  univerfe  of 

F  4  obje(fts; 


92         Dialogues    conceknin6 

Part  objects ;  and,  if  fimilar  in  its  arrange- 
v-oTN-/  ment,  mnft  require  a  fimilar  caufe.  For 
what  is  there  in  this  fubjed:,  which 
Ihould  occalion  a  different  conclufion  or 
inference?  In  an  abftracl  view,  they 
are  entirely  alike  ;  and  no  difEculty  at- 
tends the  one  fuppoiition,  which  is  not 
common  to  both  of  them. 


Again,  when  we  will  needs  force 
Experience  to  pronounce  fome  fentence, 
even  on  thefe  fnbjedls,  which  lie  beyond 
her  fphere;  neither  can  fhe  perceive 
any  material  difference  in  this  particu- 
lar, between  thefe  two  kinds  of  worlds ; 
but  finds  them  to  ht  governed  by  fimi- 
lar principles,  and  to  depend  upon  an. 
equal  variety  of  caufes  in  their  opera- 
tions. We  have  fpecimens  in  minia- 
ture of  both  of  them.  Our  own  mind 
refembles  the  one :  A  vegetable  or  ani* 
m.al  body  the  other.  Let  Experience, 
therefore,  judge  from  thefe  famples. 
Nothing  feems  more  delicate,  wiih  re- 
gard 


Natural    Religiok.  93 

gard  to  its  caufes,  than  thought ;  and  as  ^^^'^ 
thefe  caufes  never  operate  in  two  per-  v^^w 
fons  after  the  fame  manner,  fo  we  never 
find  two  perfons  who  think  exa<5lly  a- 
like.     Nor  indeed  does  the  fame  perfon 
think  exa6lly  ahke  at  any  two  different 
periods  of  time.     A  difference  of  age, 
of  the  difpofition  of  his  body,  of  wea- 
ther, of  food,  of  company,  of  books, 
of  pafllons  ;  any  of  thefe  particulars,  or 
others  more  minute,  are  fufficient  to 
alter  the  curious  machinery  of  thought, 
and  communicate  to  it  very  different 
movements  and  operations.     As  far  as 
we  can  judge,  vegetables  and  animal 
bodies  are  not  more  delicate  in  their 
motions,  nor  depend   upon  a   greater 
variety  or  more  curious  adjuflment  of 
fprings  and  principles. 

How  therefore  fhall  we  fatisfy  our- 
felves  concerning  the  caufe  of  that  Be- 
ing, whom  you  fuppofe  the  Author  of 
Nature,  or,  according  to  your  fyftem 

of 


94        Dialogues    concerning 

"^^v^  of  AnthropomorpKifm,  the  ideal  world, 
V--WJ  into  which  you  trace  the  material  ? 
Have  we  not  the  fame  reafon  to  trace 
that  ideal  world  into  another  ideal  world, 
or  new  intelligent  principle  ?  But  if  we 
flop,  and  go  no  farther  ;  why  go  fo  far  ? 
Why  not  flop  at  the  material  world  ? 
How  can  we  fatisfy  ourfelves  without 
going  on  in  infnitiim?  And  after  all, 
what  fatisfa(5lion  is  there  in  that  infinite 
progreffion  ?  Let  us  remember  the  ftory 
of  the  Indian  philofopher  and  his  ele- 
phant. It  was  never  more  applicable 
than  to  the  prefent  fubjedl.  If  the  ma- 
terial world  refts  upon  a  fimilar  ideal 
world,  this  ideal  world  mufl:  reft  upon 
fome  other  ;  and  fo  one,  without  end. 
It  were  better,  therefore,  never  to  look 
beyond  the  prefent  material  world.  By 
fuppofing  it  to  contain  the  principle  of 
its  order  within  itfelf,  we  really  affert  it 
to  be  God;  and  the  fooner  we  arrive  at 
that  divine  Being,  fo  much  the  better. 
When  you  go  one  ftep  beyond  the  mun-r 

dane 


Natural    PvEligion. 


95 


dane  fyftem,  you  only  excite  an  inqui-  ^^^'^ 
fitive  humour,  which  it  is  impoffible  c-v^ 
ever  to  fatisfy. 

To  fay,  that  the  diiFerent  ideas,  which 
compofe  the  reafon  of  the  Supreme  Be-- 
ing,  fall  into  order,  of  themfelves,  and 
by  their  own  nature,  is  really  to  talk 
without  any  precife  meaning.  If  it  has 
a  meaning,  I  would  fain  know,  why  it 
is  not  as  good  fenfe  to  fay,  that  the  parts 
of  the  material  world  fall  into  order,  of 
themfelves,  and  by  their  own  nature. 
Can  the  one  opinion  be  intelligible^ 
while  the  other  is  not  fo  ? 

We  have,  indeed,  experience  of  ideas, 
which  fall  into  order,  of  themfelves, 
and  without  any  knoivn  caufe :  But,  I 
am  fure,  we  have  a  much  larger  expe- 
rience of  matter,  which  does  the  fame ; 
as  in  all  inftances  of  generation  and  ve- 
getation, where  the  accurate  analyfis  of 
the  caiife  exceeds  all  humaii  compre- 

henfion. 


g6        Dialogues    concerning 

^^•^T  henfion.  We  have  alfo  experience  of 
c^vN^  particular  fyftems  of  thought  and  of 
matter,  which  have  no  order:  of  the 
firft,  in  madnefs  ;  of  the  fecond,  in 
corruption.  Why  then  Ihould  we  think, 
that  order  is  more  eflential  to  one  than 
the  other  ?  And  if  it  requires  a  caufe  in 
both,  what  do  we  gain  by  your  fy item, 
in  tracing  the  univerfe  of  objects  into  a 
fimilar  univerfe  of  ideas  ?  The  firft  ftep, 
which  we  make,  leads  us  on  for  ever. 
It  were,  therefore,  wife  in  us,  to  limit 
all  our  inquiries  to  the  prefent  world, 
without  looking  farther.  No  fatisfac- 
tion  can  ever  be  attained  by  thefe  {pe- 
culations, which  fo  far  exceed  the  nar- 
row bounds  of  human  underftanding. 

It  was  ufual  with  the  Peripate- 
tics, you  know,  Cleanthes,  when 
the  caufe  of  any  phenomenon  was  de- 
manded, to  have  recotirfe  to  their  Jhcul-- 
ties  or  occult  qualities ;  and  to  fay,  for 
inftance,  that  bread  nourifhed  by  its  nu- 
tritive 


Natural    Religion,  97 

tritive  faculty^  and  fenna  purged  by  ^^'^ 
its  purgative  :  But  it  has  been  difco-  «w^>rv> 
vered,  that  this  fubterfuge  was  nothing 
but  the  difguife  of  ignorance ;  and  that 
thefe  philofophers,  though  lefs  inge- 
nuous, really  faid  the  fame  th^ing  with 
the  fceptics  or  the  vulgar,  who  fairly 
confelFed,  that  they  knew  not  the  caufe  ' 
of  thefe  phenomena.  In  like  manner, 
when  it  is  a&ed,  what  caufe  produces 
order  in  the  ideas  of  the  Supreme  Be- 
ing ;  can  any  other  reafon  be  affigned 
by  you,  Anthropomorphites,  than  that 
it  is  a  rational  faculty,  and  that  fuch  is 
the  nature  of  the  Deity?  But  why  a 
fimilar  anfwer  will  not  be  equally  fatis- 
fadtory  in  accounting  for  the  order  of 
the  world,  without  having  recourfe  to 
any  fuch  intelhgent  creator  .as  you  in- 
fill on,  may  be  difficult  to  determine. 
It  is  only  to  fay,  xhdxfuch  is  the  nature 
of  material  objedls,  and  that  they  are 
all  originally  polfeffed  of  a  faculty  of 
order  and  proportion.     Thefe  are  only^ 

more 


g8         Dialogues    concernikg 

Part  morc  learned  and  elaborate   ways    of 
IV.  . 

^.^^  confeffing  our  ignorance ;  nor  ^has  the 

onehypotheiis  any  real  advantage  above 
the  other,  except  in  its  greater  confor- 
mity to  vulgar  prejudices. 

You  have  difplayed  this  argumenf 
with  great  emphafis,  replied  Clean- 
THES  :  You  feem  not  fenfible,  how  eafy 
it  is  to  anfwer  it.  Even  in  common 
life,  if  I  affign  a  caufe  for  any  event ; 
is  it  any  objecftion,  Philo^  that  I  can- 
not affign  the  caufe  of  that  caufe,  and 
anfwer  every  new  queftion  which  may 
incelFantly  be  flarted  ?  And  what  phi- 
lofophers  could  poffibly  fubmit  to  fo  ri- 
gid a  rule  ?  philofophers,  who  confefs 
ultimate  caufes  to  be  totally  unknown ; 
and  are  fenfible,  that  the  moft  refined 
principles,  into  which  they  trace  the 
phenomena,  are  ftill  to  them  as  inexpli- 
cable as  thefe  phenomena  themfelves 
are  to  the  vulgar.  The  order  and  ar- 
rangement of  nature,  the  curious  ad- 

juftment 


Natural    Religion.  99 

juftment  of  final  caufes,  the  plain  ufe  P^^^ 
and  intention  of  every  part  and  or-  v.^^^^ 
organ;  alLthefe  befpeak  in  the  clear- 
ell  language  an  intelligent  caufe  or 
author.  The  heavens  and  the  earth 
join  in  the  fame  teftimony  :  The  whole 
chorus  of  Nature  raifes  one  hymn  to  the 
praifes  of  its  Creator:  You  alone,  or  al-  ' 
moft  alone,  dlfturb  this  general  har- 
mony. You  ftart  abftrufe  doubts,  ca- 
vils, and  objedlions :  You  aflc  me,  v^hat 
is  the  caufe  of  this  caufe  ?  I  know  not ; 
I  care  not ;  that  concerns  not  me.  I 
have  found  a  Deity;  and  here  I  flop 
my  inquiry.  Let  thofe  go  farther,  who 
are  wifer  or  more  enterprifing. 

I  PRETEND  to  be  neither,  replied 
Philo  :  and  for  that  very  reafon,  I 
Ihould  never  perhaps  have  attempted  to 
go  fo  far;  efpecially  when  I  am  fen- 
fible,  that  I  mufl  at  lafl  be  contented 
to  fit  down  with  the  fame  anfwer, 
which,  without  farther  trouble,  might 

have 


loo       Dialogues    coNcFRisfii'Ta 
P^^T  have  fatisfied  me  from  the  beginning. 

JL  V  •. 

v^^TN-*  If  I  am  ftill  to  remain  in  utter  igno- 
rance of  caufes,  and  can  abfolutely  give 
'  an  explication  of  nothing,  I  fhall  never 
efteem  it  any  advantage  to  fhove   off 
for  a  moment  a  difficulty,  v^hich,  you 
acknowledge,  muft  immediately,  in  its 
full  force,  recur  upon  me*     Naturalifts 
indeed   very  juftly   explain   particular 
effedls  by  more  general  caufes ;  though 
thefe  general  caufes  themfelves  fliould 
remain  in  the  end  totally  inexplicable  : 
but  they  never  furely  thought  it  fatis- 
fadlory  to  explain  a  particular  effecfl  by 
a  particular  caufe,  which  was  no  more 
to  be  accounted  for  than  the  eflFe<5l  it- 
felf.     An  ideal  fyftem,  arranged  of  it^ 
felf,  without  a  precedent  defign,  is  not 
a  whit  more  explicable  than  a  material 
one,  which  attains  its  order  in  a  like 
manner;  nor  is  there  any  more  difficul- 
ty in  the  latter  fuppofition  than  in  the 
former. 

PART 


I  'I  ~  i'  ■-■'— r   r-  Ti 


PART        V. 


T>UT  to  fiiow  you  ftill  more  incon^  ^^^'^ 
veniencieS)  continued  PhilO,  in  w->o^ 
your  Anthropomorphifin ;  pleafe  to 
take  a  new  fiirvey  of  your  principles* 
Like  effeSls  pronje  like  caufes, .  This  is 
the  experimental  argument ;  and  thisj 
you  fay  too,  is  the  fole  theological  ar- 
gument. Now  it  is  certain^  that  the 
liker,  the  effed:s  are  which  are  feen^ 
and  the  liker  the  caufes  which  are  in- 
Ferredj  the  ftronger  is  the  .argument. 
Every  departure  on  either  fide  dimi- 
nilhes  the  probability,  and  renders  the 
experiment  lefs  conclufive.  You  can- 
not doubt  of  the  principle :  neither 
ought  yoii  tQ  reje(5l  its  confequences. 

Q  Al5, 


102       Dialogues    concerning 

^^y  All  the  new  difcoveries  in  aflro- 
v-VN^  nomy,  which  prove  the  immenfe  gran- 
deur and  magnificence  of  the  works  of 
Nature,  are  fo  many  additional  argu- 
ments for  a  Deity,  according  to  the  true 
fyftem  of  Theifm:  but,  according  to 
your  hypothefis  of  experimental  Theifm, 
they  become  fo  many  objedlions,  by  re- 
moving the  efiFedl  ftill  farther  from  all 
refemblance  to  the  effedls  of  hiuiian  art 
and  contrivance.  For  if  Lucretius  *, 
even  following  the  old  fyftem  of  the 
world,  could  exclaim, 

Quis  regerc  iflimenii  fummam,  quis  habere  profundi 
Indu  manu  validas  potis  eft  moderanter  habenas? 
Quis  pariter  ccelbs  omnes  convertere  ?  et  omnes 
Ignibus  aetheriis  terras  fuffire  fcraces? 
Omnibus  in  que  locis  cfTe  00:^111  tempore  prasfto? 

If  TuLLY  f  efteemed  this  reafoning  fo 
natural  as  to  put  it  into  the  mouth  of 
his  Epicurean  :  ^libus  enm  ocidis  a- 
nimi  intueri  potuit  ^ejler  Plato  fahricaju 
illam  tanti  opens ^  qua  conjlrui  a  Deo  atqiie 

cedijicar't 
*  Lib.  xi.  I094»  f  Be  n^t.  Deor.  HB-L 


Natural    Religioh.  103 

df^difcari  mundinnfacit?  qii£  molitio?  quts  Part 
fcrrmiiaiia?  qui  ve^es?  quce  machin(e?  y^^-^ 
qui  miniftri  tanti  muneris  fueriint?  quem'^ 
admodiun  autefii  obedire  et  pafere  'uolun" 
tati  arch'itecli  aer^  ignis ^  aqiia^  terra po-^ 
tiicnint?  If  this  argument^  I  fay,  had 
silly  force  In  former  ages ;  how  much 
greater  muil  it  have  at  prefent ;  when 
the  bounds  of  Nature  are  fo  infinitely 
enlarged,  and  fuch  a  magnificent  fcene 
is  opened  to  us?  It  is  ftill  more  unrea- 
fonable  to  form  our  idea  of  fo  unlimit- 
ed a  caufe  from  ovir  experience  of  th^ 
narrow  producSlions  of  human  defign 
and  invention^ 

THE'difcoveries  by  microfcopes,  as 
they  open  a  new  univerfe  in  miniature^ 
are  ftill  objeftions,  according  to  you, 
arguments,  according  to  me.  The  far- 
ther we  pufli  our  refearches  of  this  kind, 
we  are  ftill  led  to  infer  the  univerfal 
eaufe  of  all  to  be  vaftly  diiFerent  from 
■  G  a  man- 


i04       Dialogues    concerning 

y'^  mankind,  or  from  any  objed  of  human 
experience  and  obfervation. 


ViO^V^ 


And  what  fay  you  to  the  difcoveries 
in  anatomy,  chemiflry,  botany? ---- 
Thefe  furely  are  no  objecflions,  repHed 
Cleanthes:  they  only  difcover  new 
inftanccs  of  art  and  contrivance.  It  is 
ftill  the  image  of  mind  reflecSled  on 
us  from  innumerable  objedls.  Add, 
a  mind  like  tJoe  human^  faid  Philo.  I 
know  of  no  other,  replied  Cleanthes. 
And  the  liker  the  better,  infifted  Philo. 
To  be  fure,  faid  Cleanthes. 

Now,  Cleanthes,  faid  Philo,  with 
an  air  of  alacrity  and  triumph,  mark 
the  confequences.  Firji^  By  this  me- 
thod of  reafoning,  you  renounce  all 
claim  to  infinity  in  any  of  the  attributes 
of  the  Deity.  For  as  the  caufe  ought 
only  to  be  proportioned  to  the  efFedl; 
and  the  effe<5l,  fb  far  as  it  falls  under  our 
coguifance,  is  not  infinite;  what  pre- 

tenfions, 


Natural    Religion.  105 

j 

tenfions  have  we,  upon  your  fuppofi-    ^^^ 

tions,  to  afcribe  that  attribute  to  the  di-  ^-^^^^ 

vine  Being  ?   You  will  ftill  infift, .  that, 

by  removing  him  fo  much  from  all  fi~ 

milarity  to  human  creatures,  we  give  | 

into  the  moft  arbitrary  hypothefis,  and  j 

at  the  fame  time  weaken  all  proofs  of  | 

his  exiftence.  ] 

Secondly^  You  have  no  reafon,  on  your  I 
theory,  for  afcribing  perfe<5lion  to  the 
Deity,  even  in  his  finite  capacity;  or  for 

fuppofing  him  free  from  every  error,  mi-  ^ 

ftake,  or  incoherence,  in  his  underta-  ! 

kings.  There  are  many  inexplicable  dif-  j 
ficulties  in  the  works  of  Nature,  which, 
if  we  allow  a  perfeiS:  author  to  be  proved 

a  priori^  are  eafily  folved,  and  become  \ 

only  feeming  difficulties,  from  the  nar-  \ 

row  capacity  of  man,  who  cannot  trace  ; 

infinite  relations.  But  according  to  your  ! 

method  of  reafoning^  thefe  difficulties  \ 
become  ail  real;  and  perhaps  will  be 

infifled  on,  as  new  inftances  of  likenefs  ' 

G  2>  ^'^  j 


to6      Dialogues   concerning 

■t^'^  to  human  art  and  contrivance.  At  leaft, 
y . 

^'OTN-^  you  muft  acknowledge,  that  it  is  impoi- 
fible  for  us  to  tell,  from  our  limited 
views,  whether  this  fyjftem  contains  any 
great  faults,  or  deferves  any  conlider- 
able  praife,  if  compared  to  other  pof- 
fible,  and  even  real  fyftems.  Could  a 
peafant,  if  the  jEneid  were  read  to  him, 
pronounce  that  poem  to  be  abfolutely 
faultlefs,  or  even  affign  to  it  its  proper 
Xank  among  the  produ(5lions  of  human 
wit ;  he,  who  had  never  feen  any  qther 
produdlion? 

But  were  this  world  ever  fo  perfecfl 
a  production,  it  muft  ftill  remain  un- 
certain, whether  all  the  excellencies  of 
the  work  can  juftly  be  afcribed  to  the 
workman.  If  we  furvey  a  fliip,  what  an 
f  xalted  idea  muft  we  form  of  the  inge- 
nuity of  the  carpenter  who  framed  fo 
complicated,  ufeful,  and  beautiful  a  ma- 
ichine  ?  And  w^hat  furprife  muft  we  feel, 
f!/hen  we  find  him  a  ftupid  mechanic, 

who 


Natural    Religion.  107 


^w-lio  imitated  others,  and  copied  an  art, 
which,  through  a  long  fucceffion  of  ages, 
after  multiplied  trials,  miftakes,  cor- 
reclions,  deliberations,  and  controver- 
fies,  had  been  gradually  improving  ? 
Many  worlds  might  have  been  botched 
and  bungled,  throughout  an  eternity, 
ere  this  fyftem  was  ftruck  out;  much 
labotir  loft;  many  fruitlefs  trials  made; 
and  a  flow,  but  continued  improvement 
carried  on  during  infinite  ages  in  the  art 
of  world-making.  In  fuch  fubjecls, 
who  can  determine,  where  the  truth; 
nay,  who  can  conje<5lure  where  the  pro- 
bability, lies ;  amidft  a  great  number 
of  hypothefes  which  may  be  propofed, 
and  a  ftill  greater  number  which  may 
be  imagined? 

And  what  fliadow  of  an  argument, 
continued  Philo,  can  you  produce, 
from  your  hypothefis,  to  prove  the  unity 
of  the  Deity?  A  great  number  of  men 
join  in  btiilding  a  houfe  or  fhip,  in  rear- 

G  4  ing 


Part 
V. 


to8      Dialogues    conceknikg 

Fart  {^1^  ^  city,  in  framing  a  commonwealth ; 

t.^*^^  why  may  not  feveral -deities  combine  in 
contriving  and  framing  a  world  ?  This 
is  only  fo  much  greater  fimilarity  to 
human  affairs.  By  fliaring  the  work 
among  feveral,  we  may  fo  much  far^ 
ther  limit  the  attributes  of  each,  and  get 
rid  of  that  e^tenfive  power  and  know- 
ledge, which  muft  be  fuppofed  in  one 
deity,  and  which,  according  to  you,  can 
only  ferve  to  weaken  the  proof  of  his 
cxiftence.  And  if  fuch  foolilh,  fuch  vi- 
cious creatures  as  man  can  yet  often 
unite  in  framing  and  executing  one 
plan ;  how  much  more  thofe  deities  or 
daemons,  whom  we  may  fuppoft  feveral 
degrees  more  perfedlf 

To  multiply  caiifes,  without  necef^ 
fity,  is  indeed  contrary  to  true  philofo- 
phy:  but  this  principle  applies  not  to 
the  prefeiit  cafe.  Were  one  deity  ante- 
cedently proved  by  your  theory^  who 
were  pofleflT^d  of  every  attribute  requi- 

fite 


Natural    Religion.  109 

^te  to  the  produdlion  of  the  univerfe ;  I'art 
k  woiildbe  needlefs,  I  own,  (though  not  s^^y^ 
abfurd),  to  fuppofe  any  other  deity  ex- 
iftent.  But  while  it  is  ftill  a  queftion. 
Whether  all  thefe  attributes  are  united 
in  one  fubjedl,  or  difperfed  among  fe- 
veral  independent  beings ;  by  what  phe- 
nomena in  nature  can  we  pretend  to  de- 
cide the  controverfy  ?  Where  we  fee  a 
body  raifed  in  a  fcale,  we  are  ftire  that 
there  is  in  the  oppofite  fcale,  however 
concealed  from  fight,  fome  counterpoi- 
fing  weight  equal  to  it:  but  it  is  ftill  al- 
lowed to  doubt,  whether  that  weight 
be  an  aggregate  of  feveral  diftindl  bo- 
dies, or  one  uniform  united  mafs.  And 
if  the  weight  requifite  very  much  ex- 
ceeds any  thing  which  we  have  ever 
fcen  conjoined  in  any  fingle  body,  the 
former  fuppofition  becomes  ftill  more 
probable  and  natural.  An  intelligent 
being  of  fuch  vaft  pov^er  and  capacity 
as  is  necelTary  to  produce  the  univerfe, 
«>r,  to  ipeak  in  the  language  of  ancient 

philofophy^^ 


no       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  philofophy,   fo  prodigious   an  animal^ 
^^'^r>J  exceeds  all  analogy,  and  even  compre- 
heniion. 

But  farther,  Cleanthes:  Men  are 
mortal,  and  renew  their  fpecies  by  ge- 
neration ;  and  this  is  common  to  all  li- 
ving creatures.  The  two  great  fexes  of 
male  and  female,  fays  Milton,  animate 
the  world.  Why  muft  this  circumftance, 
fo  univerfal,  fo  effential,  be  excluded 
from  thofe  numerous  and  limited  dei- 
ties ?  Behold,  then,  the  theogeny  of 
ancient  times  brought  back  upon  us. 

And  why  not  become  a  perfect  An- 
thropomorphite  ?  Why  not  affert  the 
deity  or  deities  to  be  corporeal,  and  to 
have  eyes,  a  nofe,  mouth,  ears,  &c.  ?  E- 
PicuRUS  maintained,  that  no  man  had 
ever  feen  reafon  but  in  a  human  figure; 
therefore  the  gods  muft  have  a  human 
figure.  And  this  argument,  which  is  de- 
fervedly  fo  much  ridiculed  by  Cicero, 

becomes, 


Natu-ral    Religion.  m 

feecomes,  according  to  you,  folid  and  ^^^^ 
philofophical. 

In  a  word,  Cleanthes,  a  man,  who 
follows  your  hypothefis,  is  able,   per- 
haps, to  affert,  or  conjedlnre,  that  the 
imiverfe,  fometiine,  arofe  from  fome- 
thing  like  defign :  but  beyond  that  po- 
iition  he  cannot  afcertain  one  iingle  cir- 
cumftance ;  and  is  left  afterwards  to  fix 
every  point  of  his  theology,  by  the  nt- 
moft  licenfe  of  fancy  and  hypothefis. 
This  world,  for  aught  he  knows,  is  very 
faulty  and  imperfecfl,  compared  to  a  fu- 
perior  ftandard ;  and  was  only  the  firft 
rude  eflay  of  fome  infant  deity,  who  af- 
terwards abandoned  it,  afhamed  of  his 
lame  performance:  it  is  the  work  only 
of  fome  dependent,  inferior  deity ;  and 
is  the  objedl  of  derifion  to  his  fuperiors: 
it  is  the  producflion  of  old  age  and  dotage 
in  fome  fuperannuated  deity ;  and  ever 
fince  his  death,  has  run  on  at  adven- 
irdvts^  from  the  firft  impulfe  and  adlive 

force 


ri2      Dialogues    concerning 

Part  forcc  which  it  received  from  him.  You* 
t,orL^  juftly  give  figns  of  horror,  Demea,  at 
thefe  ftrange  fuppofitions ;  but  thefe, 
and  a  thoufand  more  of  the  fame  kind, 
are  Cleanthes's  fuppofitions,  not 
mine*  From  the  moment  the  attributes 
of  the  Deity  are  luppofed  finite,  all  thefe 
have  place.  And  I  cannot,  for  my  part, 
think,  that  fo  wild  and  unfettled  a  fy- 
ftem  of  theology  is,  in  any  refpedl,  pre- 
ferable to  none  at  all. 

"  These  fiippofitions  I  abfolutely  dif- 
own,  cried  Cle anthes  :  they  ftrike  me, 
however,  with  no  horror;  efpecially, 
when  propofed  in  that  rambling  way 
in  which  they  drop  from  you.  On  the 
contrary,  they  give  me  pleafiire,  when 
I  fee,  that,  by  the  utmoft  indulgence  of 
your  imagination,  you  never  get  rid  of 
the  hypothefis  of  defign  in  the  univerfe; 
but  are  obliged  at  every  turn  to  have 
^  _  r^ecourfe  to  it.  To  this  conceffion  I  ad- 
here fteadily ;  and  this  I  regard  as  a  fuf- 
ficient  foundation  for  religion. 


PART         VI. 


TT  muft  be  a  flight  fabric,  indeed,  faid  ^^^^ 
Demea,  which  can  be  eredled  on  fo  o-v-s^ 
tottering  a  foundation.  While  we  are 
uncertain,  whether  there  is  one  deity 
or  many ;  whether  the  deity  or  dei- 
ties, to  whom  we  owe  our  exiflence,  be 
perfe<5l  or  imperfedl,  fubordinate  or  fu- 
preme,  dead  or  ahve ;  What  truft  or  con- 
fidence can  we  repofe  in  them  ?  What 
devotion  or  worfhip  addrefs  to  them  ? 
What  veneration  or  obedience  pay  them  ? 
To  all  the  purpofes  of  life,  the  theory  of 
religion  becomes  altogether  ufelefs :  and 
even  with  regard  to  ipeculative  confe- 
qucnces,  its  imcertainty,  according  to 

ydu, 


114         DlALeOUES     CONCERNING 

^  rr^  you,  mufl:  render  it  totally  precarious 
w-om/  and  unfatisfa(5lory. 

To  render  it  ftill  more  unfatisfaflory, 
faid  Philo,  there  occurs  to  me  another 
hypothelis,  which  mud  acquire  an  air 
of  probability  from  the  method  of  rea- 
foning  fo  much  inlifted  on  by  Clean- 
THES.  That  like  effedls  arife  from  like 
caufes ;  this  principle  he  fuppofes  the 
'  foundation  of  all  religion.  But  there  is 
another  principle  of  the  fame  kind,  no 
lefs  certain,  and  derived  from  the  fame 
fource  of  experience ;  That  where  feve- 
ral  known  circumftances  are  obferved 
to  be  fimilar,  the  unknown  will  alfo  be 
found  fimilar.  Thus,  if  we  fee  the 
limbs  of  a  human  body,  we  conclude, 
that  it  is  alio  attended  with  a  human 
head,  though  hid  from  us.  Thus,  if 
we  fee,  through  a  chink  in  a  wail,  a 
fmall  part  of  the  fun,  we  conclude, 
that,  were  the  wall  removed,  we  Ihould 
fee  the  whole  body.     In   fliort,    this 

method 


Natural    Religion.  115 

method  of  reafoning  is  fo  obvious  and  Part 
familiar,  that  no  fcruple  can  ever  be  ^^^ 
made  with  regard  to  its  folidity. 

Now  if  we  ilirvey  the  nniverfe,  fo 
far  as  it  falls  under  our  knowledge,  it 
bears  a  great  refemblance  to  an  animal 
or  organized  body,  and  feems  actuated 
with  a  like  principle  of  life  and  motion. 
A  continual  circulation  of  matter  in 
it  produces  no  diforder :  a  continual 
wafte  in  every  part  is  inceffantly  re- 
paired: the  clofeft  fympathy  is  per- 
ceived throughout  the  entire  fyftem : 
and  each  part  or  member,  in  perform- 
ing its  proper  offices,  operates  both  to 
its  own  prefervation  and  to  that  of  the 
whole.  The  world,  therefore,  I  infer, 
is  an  animal;  and  the  Deity  is  the 
SOUL  of  the  world,  adiuating  it,  and 
a(5luated  by  it. 

You  have  too  much  learning,  Cle- 
ANTHEs,  to  be  at  all  furprifed  at  this 

opinion, 


ti6       Dialogues   concehnikg 

Part  opinion,  which,  you  know,  was  main-* 
v:.^^^  tained  by  almoft  all  the  Theifls  of  anti- 
quity, and  chiefly  prevails  in  their  dif- 
courfes  and  reafonings.  For  though 
fometimes  the  ancient  philofophers  rea.- 
fdn  from  final  caufes,  as  if  they  thought 
the  world  the  workmanlhip  of  God ; 
yet  it  appears  rather  their  favourite  no- 
tion to  confider  it  as  his  body,  whofe 
organization  renders  it  fubfervient  to 
him.  And  it  muft  be  confefTed,  that 
as  the  univerfe  refembles  more  a  human 
body  than  it  does  the  works  of  human 
art  and  contrivance;  if  our  limited 
analogy  could  ever,  with  any  propriety, 
be  extended  to  the  whole  of  nature,  the 
inference  feems  jufler  in  favour  of  the 
ancient  than  the  modern  theory. 

There  are  many  other  advantages, 
too,  in  the  former  theory,  which  re- 
commended it  to  the  ancient  Theolo- 
gians. Nothing  more  repugnant  to  all 
Itheir  notions,    becaufe  nothing  more 

repugnant 


Natural    Religion.  117 

repugnant  to  common  experience,  than  ^^^"^ 
mind  without  body  ;  a  mere  fpiritual  >^^w 
fubftance,  which  fell  not  under  their 
fenfes  nor  comprehenlion,  and  of  which 
they  had  not  obferved  one  fingle  in- 
ftance   throughout   all   nature.     Mirid 
and  body  they  knew,  becaufe  they  felt 
both:  an  order,  arrangement,  organi-       < 
zation,  or  internal  machinery,  in  both, 
they  likewife  knew,  after  the  fame  man- 
ner :  and  it  could  not  but  feem  reafon- 
able  to  transfer  this  experience  to  the 
univerfe;    and    to  fuppofe    the   divine 
mind  and  body  to  be  alfo  coeval,  and 
m-    to  have,  both  of  them,  order  and  ar- 
rangement naturally  inherent  in  them, 
and  infeparable  from  them. 

Here,  therefore,  is  a  new  fpecies 
of  Anthropomorphifm^  Cleanthes,  on 
which  you  may  deliberate  ;  and  a  the- 
ory which  feems  not  liable  to  any 
confiderable  difficulties.  You  are  too 
much  fuperior,    furely,    to  fyjiematical 

H  prejii" 


ii8       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  prejudices^  to  find  any  more  difficulty  in 
v.,v-L  fuppofing  an  animal  body  to  be,  origi- 
nally, of  itfelf,  or  from  unknown  caufes, 
poffefred  of  order  and  organization,  than 
in  fuppofing  a  firnilar  order  to  belong 
to  mind.    Bnt  the  'vulgar  prejudice^  that 
body  and  mind  ought  always  to  accom- 
pany each  other,  ought  not,  one  fliould 
think,  to  be  entirely  negleiled ;    fince 
it  is  founded  on  ^vulgar  experience^  the 
only  guide  which  you  profefs  to. follow 
in  all  thefe  theological  inquiries.     And 
if  you  affert,  that  our  limitefi  experi- 
ence is  an  unequal  ftandard,  by  which 
to  judge  of  the  unlimited  extent  of  na- 
ture ;  you  entirely  abandon  your  own 
hypothefis,    and    muft    thenceforward 
adopt  our  Myfticifin,    as    you  call  it, 
and  admit  of  the  abfolute  incompre- 
henfibility  of  the  Divine  Nature. 

This  theory,  I  own,  replied  Clean- 
THES,  has  never  before  occurred  to  me, 
though   a   pretty    natural  one ;  ^nd  1 

cannot 


Natural    Religion.  119 

cannot  readily,  upon  fo  fliort  an  ex-  ^^"^ 
ainination  and  reflecftion^  deliver  any  ^^-r^j 
opinion  with  regard  to  it.  You  are 
very  fcrupuloiis,  indeed,  faid  Philo  : 
w^ere  I  to  examine  any  fyftem  of  yours, 
I  fhould  not  liaye  acfled  with  half  that 
caution  and  referve,  in  ftarting  objec- 
tions and  difficulties  to  it.  Hbwever, 
if  any  thing  occur  to  you,  you  will 
oblige  us  by  propofing  it. 

Why  then,  replied  Cleanthes,  it 
feeiTLs  to  me,  that,  though  the  world 
does,  in  many  circumflances,  refem- 
ble  an  animal  body;  yet  is  the  analogy 
alfo  defe(ftive  ■  in  many  circumftances, 
the  moft  material :  no  organs  of  fenfe ; 
no  feat  of  thought  or  reafon;  no  one 
precife  origin  of  motion  and  adlion.  In 
fhort,  it  feems  to  bear  a  ftronger  refem- 
blance  to  a  vegetable  than  to  an  ani- 
mal, and  your  inference  would  be  fo 
far  inconclufive  in  favour  of  the  foul  of 
the  world. 

H  2  But 


I20      Dialogues    concerning 

Part       But  in  the  next  place,  your  theory 
^.--^rv^  feems  to  iinply  the  eternity  of  the  world ; 
and  that  is  a  principle,  which,  I  think, 
can  be  refuted  by  the  flrongeft  reafons 
and  probabilities.     I  fhall  fuggeft  an 
argument  to  this  purpofe,  which,  I  be- 
lieve, has  not  been  infilled  on  by  any 
writer.     Thofe,  who  reafon  from  the 
late  origin  of  arts  and  fciences,  though 
their  inference  wants  not  force,    may 
perhaps    be  refuted   by  confiderations 
derived  from  the  nature  of  human  fb- 
ciety,  which  is  in  continual  revolution, 
between  ignorance  and  knowledge,  li- 
berty and  jflavery,  riches  and  poverty; 
fo  that  it  is  impoflible  for  us,  from  our 
limited  experience,  to  foretell  with  af- 
furance  what  events  may  or  may  not 
be  expelled.    Ancient  learning  and  hi- 
ftory  feem  to  have  been  in  great  danger 
of  entirely  perifhing  after  the  inunda- 
tion of  the  barbarous  nations  ;  and  had 
thefe  convulGons  continued  a  little  long- 
er, or"  been   a  little   mor^  violent,  we 

Ihould 


Natural    Religion.  121 

fliould  not  probably  have  now  known  ^:^Y 
what  pafled  in  the  world  a  few  cent\iries  v.^^>-» 
before  us.  Nay,  were  it  not  for  the  fu- 
perftition  of  the  Popes,  who  prefer ved 
a  little  jargon  of  Latin,  in  order  to 
fupport  the  appearance  of  an  ancient 
and  univerfal  church,  that  tongue  muft 
have  been  utterly  loft  :  in  which  cafe, 
the  Weftern  world,  being  totally  bar- 
barous, would  not  have  been  in  a  fit 
difpofition  for  receiving  the  Greek 
language  and  learning,  which  was  con- 
veyed to  them  after  the  facking  of  Con- 
stantinople. When  learning  and 
books  had  been  extinguiftied,  even  the 
mechanical  arts  would  have  fallen  con- 
fiderably  to  decay  ;  and  it  is  eafily  ima- 
gined, that  fable  or  tradition  might 
afcribe  to  them  a  much  later  origin 
than  the  true  one.  This  vulgar  argu- 
ment, therefore,  againft  the  eternity  of 
the  world,  feems  a  little  precarious. 

But  here  appears  to  be  the  founda- 
H  3  tion 


122   Dialogues  concerning 

^A^T  tion  of  a  better  argument.  Lucullus 
^-^^-^  was  the  hrft  that  brought  cherry-trees 
from  Asia  to  Europe  ;  though  that  tree 
thrives  fo  well  in  many  European 
climates,  that  it  grows  in  the  woods 
without  any  culture.  Is  it  poflible,  that, 
throughout  a  whole  eternity,  no  Euro- 
pean had  ever  paffed  into  Asia,  and 
thought  of  tranfplanting  fo  delicious  a 
fruit  into  his  own  country?  Or  if  the 
tree  was  once  tranfplanted  and  propa- 
gated, how  could  it  ever  afterwards  pe- 
rifh  ?  Empires  may  rife  and  fall ;  liberty 
and  flavery  fucceed  alternately;  igno- 
rance and  knowledge  give  place  to  each 
other;  but  the  cherry-tree  will  ftill  re- 
main in  the  woods  of  Greece,  Spain, 
and  Italy,  and  will  never  be  afFefted 
by  the  revolutions  of  human  fociety. 

It  is  not  two  thoufand  years  fince 
vines  were  tranfplanted  into  France; 
though  there  is  no  climate  in  the  world 
more  favourable  to  them.  It  is  not  three 

centuries 


Natural    Religion.       •    123 

centuries  fince  horfes,  cows,  (heep,  fwine,  ^^^ 
dogs,  coriij  were  known  in  America,  ^^^^-^t-j 
Is  it  poflible,  that,  during  the  revolu- 
tions of  a  whole  eternity,  there  never 
arofe  a  Columbus,  who  might  open  the 
communication  between  Europe  and 
and  that  continent?  We  may  as  well 
imagine,  that  all  men  would  wear  {lock- 
ings for  ten  thoufand  years,  and  never 
have  the  fenfe  to  think  of  garters  to  tie 
rhem.  All  thefe  feem  convincing  proofs 
of  the  youth,  or  rather  infancy,  of  the 
v/orld;  as  being  founded  on  the  ope-^ 
ration  of  principles  more  conftant  and 
fleady  than  thofe  by  which  human  fo- 
ciety  is  governed  and  direcfted.  No- 
thing lefs  than  a  total  convuliion  of  the 
elements  will  ever  deftroy  all  the  Fu-  ' 
ropean  animals  and  vegetables  which  . 
are  now  to  be  found  in  the  Weftern 
world. 

And  what  argument  have  you  againft 
fuch  convulfions,  replied  Philo.  Strong 

H  4  and 


124       Dialogues  ^CONCERNING 
Part  and  almoft  inconteftable  proofs  may  be 

VI  r  V 

v.,^^  traced  over  the  whole  earth,  that  every 
part  of  this  globe  has  contijiued  for 
many  ages  entirely  covered  with  water. 
And  though  order  were  fuppofed  infe- 
parable  from  matter,  and  inherent  in 
it ;  yet  may  matter  be  fufceptible  of 
-  many  and  great  revolutions  5  through 
the  endlefs  periods  of  eternal  duration. 
The  inceflant  changes,  to  which  every 
part  of  it  is  fubjedl,  feem  to  intimate 
fome  fuch  general  transformations ;  tho' 
at  the  fame  time  it  is  obfervable,  that 
all  the  changes  and  corruptions  of  which 
we  have  ever  had  experience,  are  but 
paffages  from  one  ftate  of  order  to  an- 
other ;  nor  can  matter  ever  reft  in  total 
deformity  and  confuiion.  What  we  fee 
in  the  parts,  we  may  infer  in  the  whole ; 
at  leaft,  that  is  the  method  of  reafoning 
on  which  you  reft  your  whole  theory. 
And  were  I  obliged  to  defend  any  par- 
ticular fyftem  of  this  nature  (which  I 
never  willingly  fliould  do) ,  I  efteem  none 

,     more 


Natural    Religion.  125 

more  plaufible  than  that  which  afcribes  ^^^"^ 
.  .      .  VI. 

an  eternal  inherent  principle  of  order  ^.^^^^ 

to  the  world ;  though  attended  with 
great  and  continual  revolutions  and  al- 
terations. This  at  once  folves  all  diffi- 
culties ;  and  if  the  folution,  by  being  fo 
general,  is  not  entirely  complete  and 
fatisfaclory,  it  is  at  lead  a  theory  that 
we  niuft,  fooner  or  later,  have  recourfe 
to,  whatever  fyftem  we  embrace.  How:^ 
could  things  have  been  as  they  are,  were 
there  not  an  original,  inherent  principle 
of  order  fomewhere,  in  thought  or  in 
matter?  And  it  is  very  indifferent  to 
which  of  thefe  we  give  the  preference. 
Chance  has  no  place,  on  any  hypothefis, 
fceptical  or  religious.  Every  thing  is 
farely  governed  by  fteady,  inviolable 
laws.  And  were  the  inmoft  elTence  of 
things  laid  open  to  us,  we  ihould  then 
difcover  a  fcene,  of  which,  at  prefent, 
we  can  have  no  idea.  Inflead  of  admi- 
ring the  order  of  natural  beings,  we 
flioujd  qlearly  fee,  that  it  was  abfolutely 

impoffible 


126       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  impoffible  for  them,  in  the  fmalleft  ar- 
t.^-wv'  tide,  ever  to  admit  of  any  other  difpo- 
fition. 


Were  any  one  incUned  to  revive  the 
ancient  Pagan  Theology,  which  main-^ 
tained,  as  we  learn  from  Hefiod,  that 
this  globe  was  governed  by  30,000  dei- 
ties, who  arofe  from  the  unknown 
powers  of  nature :  yon  wonld  naturally 
objedt,  Cleanthes,  that  nothing  is 
gained  by  this  hypothefis;  and  that  it 
is  as  eafy  to  fuppofe  all  men  and  ani^ 
mals,  beings  more  numerous,  but  lefs 
perfedl,  to  have  fprung  immediately 
from  a  like  origin.  Pulh  the  fame  in- 
ference a  ftep  farther ;  and  you  will  find 
a  numerous  fociety  of  deities  as  expli- 
cable as  one  univerfal  deity,  who  pojPr 
felTes,  within  himfelf,  the  powers  and 
perfections  of  the  whole  fociety.  All 
thefe  fyftems,  then,  of  Scepticifm,  Poly- 
theifm,  and  Theifm,  you  muft  allow, 
on  your  principles,  to  be  on  a  like  foot- 
ings 


Natural    Religion.  127 

ing,  and  that  no  one  of  them  has  any  ^^^^ 
advantage  over  the  others.     You  may  <.^>rij 
thence  learn  the  fallacy  of  your  prin- 
ciples. 


PART 


B 


PART         VIL 


UT  here,  continued  Philo,  in  ex-  Part 

.  VII. 

amming  the  ancient  fyftem  of  the  c^-w-; 


foul  of  the  world,  there  ftrikes  me,  all 
on  a  fudden,  a  new  idea,  which,  if  juft, 
mull  go  near  to  fubvert  all  your  rea- 
fonihg,  and  deftroy  even  your  firft  in- 
ferences, on  which  you  repofe  fuch  con- 
fidence. If  the  univerfe  bears  a  greater 
likenefs  to  animal  bodies  and  to  vege- 
tables, than  to  the  works  of  human  art, 
it  is  more  probable,  that  its  cauf^  re- 
fembles  the  caufe  of  the  former  than 
that  of  the  latter,  and  its  origin  ought 
rather  to  be  afcribed  to  generation  or 
vegetation  than  to  reafon  or  defign. 
Your  conclufion,  even  according  to  your 

own 


130   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  qy^h  principles,  is  therefore  lame  ar\c! 
v.-v^  defecftive. 


Pray  open  up  this  argument  a  little 
farther,  faid  Demea.  For  I  do  not 
rightly  apprehend  it,  in  that  eoncife 
manner  in  which  you  have  exprelTed 
it. 

y 

Our  friend  Cleanthes,  replied 
Philo,  as  you  have  heard,  aiferts,  that 
lince  no  queftion  of  fadl  can  be  proved 
otherwife  than  by  experience,  the  exifl- 
ence  of  a  Deity  admits  not  of  proof 
from  any  other  medium.  The  world, 
fays  he,  refembles  the  works  of  human 
contrivance:  Therefore  its  caiife  muft 
alfo  refemble  that  of  the  other.  Here 
we  may  remark,  that  the  operation  of 
one  very  fmall  part  of  nature,  to  wit 
man,  upon  another  very  fmall  part,  to 
wit  that  inanimace  matter  lying  within 
his  reach,  is  the  rule  by  which  Clean- 
thes judges  of  the  origin  of  the  whole; 

and 


NatuRx^l    Religiok.  131 

and  he  meafures  objedls,  fo  widely  dif-  ^^y 
proportioned,  by  the  fame  individual  ^y^w^ 
ftandard.  But  to  wave  all  objeilions 
drawn  from  this  topic;  I  affirm,  that 
there  are  other  parts  of  the  univerfe 
(beiides  the  machines  of  huihan  inven- 
tion) which  bear  ftill  a  greater  refem-r 
blance  to  the  fabric  of  the  world,  and 
which  therefore  afford  a  better  conjec- 
ture concerning:  the  univerfa.1  ori^rin  of 
this  fyftem.  Tliefe  parts  are  animals 
and  vegetables.  The  world  plainly  re- 
fembles  more  an  animal  or  a  vegetable, 
than  it  does  a  watch  or  a  knitting-loom. 
Its  caufe,  therefore,  it  is  more  probable, 
refembles  the  caufe  of  the  former.  The 
caufe  of  the  former  is  generation  or  ve- 
getation. The  caufe,  therefore,  of  the 
world,  we  may  infer  to  be  fomething  ii- 
milar  or  analogous  to  generation  or  ve- 
getation. 

But  how  is  it  conceivable,  faid  De- 
MEA,  that  the  world  can,  arife  from  any 

thing 


t^2       Dialogues    concerning 


VII. 


ART  tiling  fimilar  to  vegetation  or  genera- 
tion? 

Very  eafily,  replied  Philo.  In  like 
manner  as  a  tree  Iheds  its  feed  into  the 
neighbouring  fields,  and  produces  otl;ier 
trees ;  fo  the  great  vegetable^  the  world, 
or  this  planetary  fyftem,  produces  with-' 
in  itfelf  certain  feeds,  which,  being  fcat-^ 
tered  into  the  furrounding  chaos,  vege-^ 
tate  into  new  worlds.  A  comet,  for  in- 
ftance,  is  the  feed  of  a  world ;  and  after 
it  has  been  fully  ripened,  by  palling 
from  fun  to  fun,  and  ftar  to  ftar,  it  is  at 
laft  toffed  into  the  unformed  elements 
which  every  where  furround  this  uni- 
verfe,  and  immediately  fprout^up  into 
a  new  fyftem. 

Or  if,  for  the  fake  of  variety  (for  I 
fee  no  other  advantage),  we  fhould  fup- 
pofe  this  world  to  be  an  animal;  a  co- 
met is  the  egg  of  this  animal :  and  in 
like  manner  as  an  oftrich  lays  its  egg 


Natural    RELiGiONi         133 

Part  \^^  ^^^  fand^  which,  without  any  far- ' 
v^^o  ther  care,  hatches  the  egg^  and  produces 
anew  animal;  fo  .....  .  I  underftand 

you,  fays  De  ME  A:  But  what  wild,  ar- 
bitrary fuppofitions  are  thefe?  What 
data  have  you  for  fuch  extraordinary 
conclufions  ?  And  is  the  flighty  imagl-  \ 
liary  refemblance  of  the  world  to  a  ve-* 
getable  or  an  animal  fufficient  to  efta- 
blifl.1  the  fame  inference  with  regard  to 
both  ?  Objedls,  which  are  in  general  fo 
widely  different ;  ought  they  to  be  a 
(landard  for  each  other  ? 

Right,  cries  Philo  :  This  is  the 
topic  on  Vvrhich  I  have  all  along  inflfted. 
I  hate  flill  afferted,  that  we  hiave  no 
data  to  eftablifh  any  fyftem  of  cofino- 
gony.  Our  experience,  fo  imperfecfl  in 
itfelf)  and  fo  limited  both  in  extent  and 
duration,  can  afford  us  no  probable 
conjecture  concerning  the  whole  of 
things.  But  if  we  mufl  needs  fix  on 
fome  hypothefis ;  by  what  rule,  pray, 

i  ought; 


134   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  ought  wc  to  determine  our  choice  ?  Is 
K^^  there  any  other  rule  than  the  greater 
fimilarity  of  the  objedls  compared  ? 
And  does  not  a  plant  or  an  animal, 
which  fprings  from  vegetation  or  gene- 
ration, bear  a  ftronger  refemblance  to 
the  world,  than  does  any  artificial  ma- 
chine, which  arifes  from  reafon  and 
defign? 

But  what  is  this  vegetation  and 
generation  of  which  you  talk,  faid 
Demea?  Can  you  explain  their  opera- 
tions, and  anatomize  that  fine  internal 
flru<flure  on  which  they  depend? 

As  much,  at  leafl,  replied  Philo, 
as  Cleanthes  can  explain  the  opera- 
tions of  reafon,  or  anatomize  that  in- 
ternal flru(5lure  on  which  it  depends. 
But  without  any  fuch  elaborate  difqui- 
j&tions,  when  I  fee  an  animal,  I  infer, 
that  it  fprang  from  generation  ;  and 
that  with  as  great  certainty  as  you  con- 
clude 


Natural    Religion.  135 

chide  a  houfe  to  have  been  reared  by  ^y" 
defign.  Thefe  words,  generation^  rea-  ^^^^r^j 
fon^  mark  only  certain  powers  and 
energies  in  nature,  whofe  efFecfts  are 
known,  but  whofe  eflence  is  incompre- 
henfibie ;  and  one  of  thefe  principles, 
more  than  the  other,  has  no  privilege 
for  being  made  a  ftandard  to  the  whole 
of  nature. 

In  reality,  Demea,  it  may  reafofi- 
ably  be  expected,  that  the  larger  the 
views  are  which  we  take  of  things,  the 
better  will  they  condudl  us  in  our  con- 
clufions  concerning  fuch  extraordinary 
and  fuch  magnificent  fubjecfts.     In  this 
little  corner  of  the  world  aloTie,  there 
are  four  principles,  Reafon^  InJiinSl^  Ge^ 
Iteration^  Vegetation^  which  are   fimilar 
to  each  other,  and  are  the  caufes  of  fi- 
milar effeifts.     What  a  number  of  other 
principles  may  we  naturally  fiippofe  in 
the  immenfe  extent  and  variety  of  the 
univerfe,  could  we  travel  from  planet 

I  2  to 


1^6       Dialogues    concerning 

^^^^  to  planet  and  from  fyftem  to  fyftem, 
c.'-^v^  in  order  to  examine  each  part  of  this 
mighty  fabric  ?  Any  one  of  thefe  four 
principles  above  mentioned  (and  a  hun- 
dred others,  which  lie  open  to  our  eon- 
jecSrUre)  may    afford  us   a   theory,   by 
which  to  judge  of  the  origin  of  the 
world ;  an4  it  is  a  palpable  and  egre- 
gious  partiality,  to   confine   our    view 
entirely  to  that  principle  by  w^hich  our 
own  minds  operate.    'Were  this   prin- 
ciple more  intelligible  on  that  account, 
fuch  a  partiality  might  be   fomewhat 
excvifeable :  But  reafon,  in  its  internal 
febric  and  ftrudlure,  is  really  as  little 
known  to  \is  as  inftindl  or  vegetation  ; 
and  perhaps  even  that  vague,  undeter- 
m.inate    word.   Nature^    to   which    the 
vulgar  refer  every  thing,  is  not  at  the 
bottom  more  inexplicable.    The  efFed:s 
of  thefe  principles  are  all  knowA  to  us 
from   experience:    But   the   principles 
themfelves,  and  their  manner  of  opera- 
tion, are  totally  unknown:  Norisitlefs 

intelligible, 


Natural    Religion.  137 

intelligibk,  or  lefs  conformable  to  ex-  ^^^^^ 
perieiicCj  to  fay,  that  the  world  arofe  by  v-.v>^ 
vegetation  from  a  feed  ihed  by  another 
world,  than  to  fay  that  it  arofe  from  a 
divine  reafon  or  contrivance,  according 
t6  the  fenfe  in  which  Cleanthes  un- 
derft^nds  it. 


But  methinks,  faid  Demea,  if  the 
world  had  a  vegetative  quality,  and 
could  fow  the  feeds  of  new  worlds  into 
the  infinite  chaos,  this  power  would  be 
ftill  an  additional  arguriaent  for  deligii 
in  its  author.  For  whence  could  arife 
fo  wonderful  a  faculty  but  from  defign  ? 
Or  how  can  order  fpring  from  any 
thing  which  perceives  not  that  order 
which  it  beftows  ? 

You  need  only  look  around  you,  re-^ 
plied  Philo,  to  fatisfy  yourfelf  with 
regard  to  this  queftion.  A  tree  beftows 
order  and  organization  oh  that  trfee 
which  fprings  from  it,  without  know-^ 

I  3  i^S 


138       Dialogues    congbrning 

■^y  ing  the  order :  an  animal,  in  the  fame 
^-'N-o  manner,  on  its  offspring ;  a  bird,  on 
its  neft :  and  inftances  of  this  kind  are 
even  more  frequent  in  the  world,  than 
thofe  of  order,  which  arife  from  reafon 
and  contrivance.  To  fay  that  all  this 
order  in  animals  and  vegetables  proceeds 
ultimately  from  delign,  is  begging  the 
queftion  :  nor  can  that  great  point  be 
afcertained  otherwife  than  by  proving, 
afriori^  both  that  order  is,  from  its  na- 
ture, infeparably  attached  to  thought ; 
and  that  it  can  never,  of  itfelf,  or  from 
original  unknown  principles,  belong  to 
matter* 

But  farther,  Beme A;  this  objedion, 
which  you  urge,  can  never  be  made 
ufe  of  bv  Cleanthes,  without  re~ 
nouncing  a  defence  which  he  has  al- 
ready made  againft  one  of  my  objec- 
tions. When  I  inquired  concerning 
the  caufe  of  that  fupreme  reafon^  and 
intelligence,  into  which  he  refolves  e- 

v^erv 


m* 


\.,^ryr^' 


Natural    Religion.  139 

very  thing ;  he  told  me,  that  the  im-  ^^rt 
poflibihty  of  fatisfying  fuch  inquiries 
could  never  be  admitted  as  an  objec- 
tion in  any  fpecies  of  philofophy.  We 
mujijiopjome'wherey  fays  he ;  ntjr  is  it  e^uer 
ivithin  the  reach  of  human  capacity  to  ex- 
plain  ultimate  caiijes^  or  fhoiv  the  laji  con- 
nections of  any  objeSis^  It  is  fiifficient^  if 
thejleps^  fo  far  as  nve  go^  are  fupported  by 
experience  and  ohjer^ation.  Now,  that 
vegetation  and  generation,  as  well  as 
reafon,  are  experienced  to  be  principles 
of  order  in  nature,  is  undeniable.  If 
I  reft  my  fyftem  of  cofmogony  on  the 
former,  preferably  to  the  latter^  it  is  at 
my  choice.  The  matter  feems  entirely 
arbitrary.  And  when  Cleanthes  alks 
me  what  is  the  caufe  of  my  great  vege- 
tative or  generative  faculty,  I  am  equal- 
ly intitled  to  afk  him  the  caufe  of  his 
great  reafoning  principle.  Thefe  que- 
ftions  we  have  agreed  to  forbear  on 
both  fides  ;  and  it  is  chiefly  his  intereft 
on  the  prefent  occafion  to  ftick  to  this 

I  4  agree- 


%j^o      Dialogues    cqncerniks 

■^^T^^  agreement.     Judging   by   our'  limited 
^^or^  and   imperfed:   experience^   generation 

has  foKie  privileges  above  reafon :  For 

■we  fee  every  day  the  latter  arife  from. 

the  former,  never  the  former  from  the 

latter, 

Compare,  I  befeech  you,  the  confe-r 
quences  on  both  fides.  The  world,  fay 
I,  refembles  an  animal;  therefore  it  is 
.  an  animal,  therefore  it  arofe  from  gene- 
ration. The  fleps,  I  confefs,  are  wide; 
yet  there  is  fome  fmall  appearance  of 
analogy  in  each  ftep.  The  v^orld,  fays 
Cleanthes,  refembles  a  machine^ 
therefore  it  is  a  machine,  therefore  it 
arofe  from  defign.  The  fleps  here  are 
equally  w^ide,  aad  the  analogy  lefs  ftrir 
king.  And  if  he  pretends  to  carry  on 
my  hypothefis  a  ftep  farther,  and  to  in- 
fer defign  or  reafon  from  the  great  prinr 
ciple  of  generation,  on  v^'hich  I  infift; 
I  may,  v^ith  better  authority,  ufe  the 
fanae  freedom  to  pufh  farther  his  hy- 

pothefis,^ 


Natural    Religion.  141 

pothefis,  and  infer  a  divine  generation  ^^Y* 
or  theogeny  from  his  principle  of  rea-  ^.^ntsji 
fon.  I  have  at  leaft  fome  faint  Ihadow 
of  experience,  which  is  the  utmoft  that 
can  ever  be  attained  in  the  prefent  fub- 
jecft.  Reafon,  in  innumerable  inftances^ 
is  obferved  to  arife  from  the  principle 
of  generation,  and  never  to  arife.  from 
any  other  principle. 

-i.HESiOD,  and  all  the  ancient  Mytho-* 
logifts,  were  fo  ftruck  with  this  analogy^ 
that  they  univerfally  explained  the  ori- 
gin of  nature  from  an  animal  birth,  and 
copulation.  Plato  too,  fo  far  as  he  is 
intelligible,  feems  to  have  adapted  fmM 
fuch  nptibn  in  his  Tim^us,  -  • 

The  Bramins  affert,  that  the  world 
arofe  from  an  infinite  fpider,  who  fpun 
this  whole  complicated  mafs  from  his 
bowelsy  and  annihilates  afterwards  the 
whole  or  any  part  of  it,  by  abforbing 
it  again,  and  refolving  it  into  bis  owtk 

effencct 


? 


14^       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  effence.  Here  is  a  fpecies  of  cofmogony, 
^..vO  which  appears  to  ns  ridiculous ;  becaufe 
a  fpider  is  a  little  contemptible  animal, 
whofe  operations  we  are  never  likely  to 
take  for  a  model  of  the  whole  univerfe. 
But  ftill  hereis  a  new  fpecies  of  analogy, 
even  in  our  globe.  And  were  there  a 
planet  wholly  inhabited  by  fpiders, 
(which  is  very  pofTible),  this  inference 
would,  there  appear  as  natural  and  irre- 
fragable as  that  which  in  our  planet  a- 
fcribes  the  origin  of  all  things  to  defign 
and  intelligence,  as  explained  by  Cle- 
ANTHES.  Why  an  orderly  fyflem  may 
not  be  fpun  from  the  belly  as  well  as 
fr0m  the  brain,  it  will  be  difficult'cfer 
him  to  give  a  fatisfaclory  reafon» 

I  MUST  confefs,  Philo,  replied  Cle- 
ANTHES^  that  of  all  men  living,  the  taflc 
which  you  have  undertaken,  of  railing 
doubts  and  objeftions,  fuits  you  beft, 
and  feems,  in  a  manner,  natural  and  un- 
avoidable to  you.  So  great  is  your  fer- 
- :  tility 


Natural    Religion.        '  143 

tility  of  invention,  that  I  am  not  aftia-  ^^^ 
med  to  acknowledge  myfelf  unable,  on  o-rv^ 
a  fudden,  to  folve  regularly  fuch  out- 
of-the-way  difficulties  as  you  inceflantly 
ftart  upon  me :  though  I  clearly  fee,  in 
general,  their  fallacy  and  error.  And  I 
queftion  not,  but  you  are  y otirfelf,  at  pre- 
fent,  in  the  fame  cafe,  and  have  not  the 
folution  fo  ready  as  the  objecfhion:  while 
you  muft  be  fenlible,  that  common  fenfe 
and  reafon  are  entirely  againft  you;  and 
that  fuch  whimfies  as  you  have  deli- 
vered, may  puzzle,  but  never  can  con«- 
vince  us. 


PART 


PART         VIIL 


T^HAT  you  afcribe  to  the  fertility  Part 
of  my  invention,  replied  Philo,  ^^ 
is  entirely  owing  to  the  nature  of  the 
fubjecfl.  In  fubjects,  adapted  to  the  nar- 
row compafs  of  human  reafon,  there  is 
commonly  but  one  determination,  which 
Caries  probability  or  convi<5lion  with 
it;  and  to  a  man  of  found  judgment, 
all  other  fuppofitions,  but  that  one,  ap*- 
pear  entirely  abfurd  and  chimericaL 
But  in  fuch  queftions  as  the  prefent,  a 
hi;indred  contradi6lory  views  may  pre- 
ferve  a  kind  of  imperfecfl  analogy ;  and 
invention  has  here  full  fcope  to  ex* 
ert  itfelf.  Without  any  great  effort  of 
thought,  I  believe  that  I  could,  in  an  in- 

ftant, 


Dialogues    concerning 

^^^^  ftant,  propofe  other  fyftems  of  cofmo- 
'--^^.gony,  which  would  have  fome  faint  ap- 
pearance of  truth ;   though  it  is  a  thou- 
fand,  a  raiUion  to  one,  if  either  yours  or 
any  one  of  mine  be  the  true  lyftem. 

For  inftance ;  what  if  I  fliould  revive 
the  old  Epicurean  hypotheiis  ?  This 
is  commonly,  and  I  believe  juftly,  e- 
fteemed  the  mofl  abfurd  fyftem  that 
has  yet  been  propofed ;  yet,  I  know  not, 
whether,  with  a  few  alterations,  it  might 
nbt!  be  brought  to  bear  a  faint  appear- 
ance of  probability.  Inftead  of  luppo- 
£ng  matter  infinite,  as  Epicurus  did; 
let  us  fuppofe  it  finite.  A  finite  num-- 
ber  of  particles  is  only  fufceptible  of  fi- 
nite tranfpofitions :  and  it  muft  happen, 
in  an  eternal  duration,  that  every  pof- 
fible  order  or  pofition  muft  be  tried  an 
infinite  number  of  times.  This  world, 
therefore,  with  all  its  events,  even  the 
moft  minute,  has  before  been  produced 
and  deftroyed,  and  will  again  be  produ^ 

ced 


Natural    Religion.  147 

ced  and  deftroyed,  without  any  bounds  ^^ ^ 
and  limitations.    No  one,  who  has  a  con-  v-^-v-w 
caption  of  the  powers  of  infinite,  in  com- 
parifon  of  finite,  will  ever  fcruple  this 
determination. 

But  this  fuppofes,  faid  Demea,  that 
matter  can  acquire  motion,  without  any 
voluntary  agent  or  firft  mover. 

And  where  is  the  difiiculty,  replied 
Philo,  of  that  fuppofition?  Every  event, 
before  experience,  is  equally  difiicult 
and  incomprehenfible ;  and  every  event, 
after  experience,  is  equally  eafy  and  in- 
telligible; Motion,  in  many  inftances, 
from  gravity,  from  elafticity,  from  e- 
ledlricity,  begins  in  matter,  without  any 
known  voluntary  agent:  and  to  fup- 
pofe  always,  in  thefe  cafes,  an  unknown 
voluntary  agent,  is  mere  hypothefis  5 
and  hypothefis  attended  with  no  advan- 
tages. The  beginning  of  motion  in 
matter  itfelf  is  as  conceivable  a  priori  as 

its 


148       Dialogues    concerning 

^^^"T  its  communication  fx'om  mind  and  in*^ 
^^--vnv  telligence. 

Besides  ;  why  may  not  motion  have 
_^^_  been  propagated  by  impulfe  through  all 
eternity;  and  the  fame  (lock  of  it,  or 
nearly  the  fame,  be  ftill  upheld  in  the 
univerfe?  As  much  as  is  loft  by  the 
compofition  of  motion,  as  much  is  gain- 
ed by  its  refolution.  And  whatever  the 
caufes  are,  the  fadl  is  certain,  that  mat- 
ter is,  and  always  has  been,  in  continual 
agitation,  as  far  as  human  experience  or 
tradition  reaches.  There  is  not  proba- 
bly, at  prefent,  in  the  whole  univerfe, 
one  particle  of  matter  at  abfolute  reft. 

And  this  very  confideration  too,  con- 
tinued Philo,  which  we  have  ftumbled 
on  in  the  courfe  of  the  a,rgument,  fug- 
gefts  a  new  hypothefis  of  cofmogony, 
that  is  not  abfolutely  abfurd  and  im- 
probable. Is  there  a  fyftem,  an  order^ 
an  oeconomy  of  things,  by  which  mat- 
ter 


Natural    Religion.  ^49 

ter  can  preferve  that  perpetual  agita-  ^'^jj^ 
tion  which  feems  effential  to  it,  and  ^■"v-' 
yet  maintain  a  conftancy  in  the  forms 
which  it  produces  ?  There  certainly  is 
fuch  an  oeconomy :  for  this  is  a6lually 
the  cafe  with  the  prefent  world.  The 
continual  motion  of  matter,  therefore^ 
in  lefs  than  infinite  tranfpoiitions,  muft 
produce  this  oeconomy  or  order;  and 
by  its  very  nature,  that  order,  vv^hen  once 
eftablilhed,  fupports  itfelf,  for  many 
ages,  if  not  to  eternity*  But  where- 
ever  matter  is  fo  poized,  arranged,  and 
adjufted,  as  to  continue  in  perpetual  mo- 
tion, and  yet  preferve  a  conftancy  in  the 
forms,  its  fituation  muft,  of  neceffity, 
have  all  the  fame  appearance  of  art  and 
contrivance  v/hich  we  obferve  at  pre- 
fent. All  the  parts  of  each  form  muft 
have  a  relation  to  each  other,  and  to  the 
whole:  and  the  whole  itfelf  iiiuft  have 
a  relation  to  the  other  parts  of  the  uni- 
verfe;  to  the  element,  in  which  the 
form  -fubfifts  ;    to  the  materials,  with 

K    ,  which 


150       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  whicli  it  repairs  its  wafte  and  decay; 

^-'^N-^  and  to  every  other  form,  which  is  ho- 
ftile  or  friendly.     A  defeat  in  any  of 
thefe  particulars  deftroys  the  form ;  and 
the  matter,  of  which  it  is  compofed,  is 
again  fet  loofe,  and  is  thrown  into  irre- 
gular motions  and  fermentations,  till  it 
unite  itfelf  to  fome  other  regular  form. 
If  no  fuch  form  be  prepared  to  receive 
it,  and  if  there  be  a  great  quantity  of 
this  corrupted  matter  in  the  univerfe, 
the  univerfe  itfelf  is  entirely  difordered ; 
whether  it  be  the  feeble  embryo  of  a 
world  in  its  fir  ft  beginnings  that  is  thus 
,     deftroyed,  or  the  rotten  carcafe  of  one 
languifhing  in  old  age  and  infirniity.  In 
either  cafe,  a  chaos  enfues;  till  finite, 
though  innumerable  revolutions  pro- 
duce at  laft  fome  forms,  vfhofe  parts 
arid  organs  are  fo  adjufted  as  to  fupport 
the  forms  amidft  a  contimied  fuccef- 
fion  of  matter. 

S  u  p  p  o  s  E  5  (for  we  fhall  endeavour  to  vary 

the 


Natural    Religion.*  151 

tlie  expreffion)  that  matter  were  thrown  Part 

.  .  VIII 

into  any  pofition,  by  a  bhnd,  unguided  v.^^^ 

force;  it  is  evident,  that  this  firft  pofi- 
tion muft  in  all  probability  be  the  moft 
confufed  and  moft  dfiforderly  imagin- 
able, without  any  refemblance  to  thofe 
works  of  human  contrivance,  which,  a^ 
long  with  a  fymmetry  of  parts,  difcover 
an  adjuftment  of  means  to  ends,  and  a 
tendency  to  felf-prefervation.  If  the  ac-* 
tuating  force  ceafe  after  this  operation, 
matter  muft  remain  for  ever  in  diforder^ 
and  continue  an  immenfe  chaos,  with-* 
out  any  proportion  or  acclivity.  But 
fuppofe,  that  the  actuating  force,  what- 
ever it  be,  ftill  continues  in  matter,  this 
firft  pofition  will  immediately  give  place 
to  a  fecond,  which  will  likewife  in  all 
probability  be  as  diforderly  as  the  firft, 
and  fo  on  through  many  fiiccefiions  of 
changes  and  revolutions.  No  particular 
order  or  pofition  ever  continues  a  mo-? 
ment  unaltered.  The  original  force, 
ftill  remaining  in  adlivity,  gives  a  per^ 

K  2  petual 


152   Dialogues  concerning 

Kjj7-  perual  reftlefTnefs  to  matter.  Every  pojp 
v^>-v^  fible  fituation  is  produced,  and  inftantly 
dellroyed.  If  a  glimpfe  or  dawn  of  or- 
der appears  for  a  moment,  it  is  inftantly 
hurried  away,  atfei  confounded,  by  that 
never-cealing  force  which  adluates  e- 
very  part  of  matter. 

Thus  the  univerfe  goes  on  for  many 
ages  in  a  continued  fucceffion  of  chaos 
and  diforder.  But  is  it  not  poflible  that 
it  may  fettle  at  laft,  fo  as  not  to  lofe  its 
motion  and  adlive  force  (for  that  we 
have  fiippofed  inherent  in  it),  yet  fo  as 
to  preferve  an  uniformity  of  appearance, 
amidft  the  continual  motion  and  fluc- 
tuation of  its  parts  ?  This  we  find  to  be 
the  cafe  with  the  univerfe  at  prefent. 
Every  individual  is  perpetually  chan- 
ging, and  every  part  of  every  indivi- 
dual; and  yet  the  whole  remains,  in  ap- 
pearance, the  fame.  May  we  not  hope 
for  fuch  a  pofition,  or  rather  be  allured 
of  it,  from  the  eternal  revolutions  of 

unguided 


-  < 


Natural    Religion.  153 

unguided  matter;  and  may  not  this  ac-  |^^^y 
count  for  all  the  appearing  wifdom  and  wv-^ 
contrivance  which  is  in  the  univerfe  ? 
Let  lis  contemplate  the  fubjedl  a  little, 
and  we  Ihall  find,  that  this  adjuftment, 
if  attained  by  matter,  of  a  feeming  {la- 
bility in  the  forms,  with  a  real  and  per- 
petual revolution  or  motion  of  parts, 
affords  a  plaufible,  if  not  a  true  folution 
of  the  difficulty. 

It  is  in  vain,  therefore,  to  infifl  upon 
the  ufes  of  the  parts  in  animals  or  ve- 
getables, and  their  curious  adjuftment 
to  each  other.  I  would  fain  know,  how 
an  animal  could  fubfift,  unlefs  its  parts 
were  fo  adjufled?  Do  we  not  find,  that 
it  immediately  periflies  whenever  this 
adjuftment  ceafes,  and  that  its  matter 
corrupting  tries  fome  ne\y  form  ?  It  hap- 
pens, indeed,  that  the  parts  of  the  world 
are  fo  well  adjufted,  that  fome  regular 
form  impaediately  lays  claim  to  this  cor- 
rupted matter:  and  if  it  were  not  fo, 
K  3  could 


154       Dialogues    concerning 

^^ Y  could  the  world  fubfift  ?   Muft  it  not 
uorv^  diflblve  as  well  as  the  animal,  and  pafs 

through  new  pofitions  and  iituations ; 

till  in  a  great,  but  finite  fucceffion,  it 

fall  at  laft  into  the  prefent  or  fome  fuch 

order? 


It  is  well,  replied  Cleanthes,  you 
told  us,  that  this  hypothefis  was  fug- 
gefted  on  a  fudden,  in  the  courfe  of  the 
argument.    Had  you  had  leifure  to  ex- 
amine it,  you  would  foon  have  percei- 
ved the  infuperable  objedlions  to  which 
it  is  expofed.     No  form,  you  fay,  can 
fubfift,  unlefs  it  poflefs  thofe  powers  and 
organs  requifite  for  its  fubfiftence :  fome 
new  order  or  oeconomy  muft  be  tried, 
and  fo  on^  without  intermiflSon ;  till  at 
laft  fome  order,  which  can  fupport  and 
maintain  itfelf,  is  fallen  upon.    But  ac- 
cording to  this  hypothefis,  whence  arife 
the  many  conveniencies  and  advantages 
which  men  and  all  animals  pofiTefs  ?  Two 
eyesj  two  ears,  are  not  abfolutely  necef- 

fary 


Natural    Religion.  155 

fary  for  the  fubfiftence  of  the  fpecies.  ^^^^ 
Human  race  might  have  been  propaga-  ^^-rv^ 
ted  and  preferved,  without  horfes,  dogs, 
cows,  ftieep,  and  thofe  innumerable 
fruits  and  produAs  which  ferve  to  our 
fatisfadlion  and  enjoyment.  If  no  ca- 
mels had  been  created  for  the  ufe  of 
man  in  the  fandy  deferts  of  Africa  and 
x\rabia,  would  the  world  have  been 
diffolved?  If  no  loadftone  had  been  fra- 
med to  give  that  wonderful  and  ufeful 
diredlion  to  the  needle,  would  human 
fociety  and  the  human  kind  have  been 
immediately  extinguilhed  ?  Though  the 
maxims  of  Nature  be  in  general  very 
frugal,  yet  inftances  of  this  kind  are  far 
from  being  rare ;  and  any  one  of  them 
is  a  fufficient  proof  of  defign,  and  of  a 
benevolent  defign,  which  gave  rife  to 
the  order  and  arrangement  of  the  uni- 
verfe. 

At  leaft,  you  may  fafely  infer,  faid 
Philo,  that  the  foregoing  hypothefis  is 

K  4  fo 


156      Dialogues    concerning 

^^Y  fo  far  incomplete  and  impcrfecl;  which 
v--v^  I  fhall  not  fcruple  to  allow.  But  can  we 
ever  reafonably  exped;  greater  fuccefs  in 
any  attempts  of  this  nature?  Or  can  we 
ever  hope  to  eredl  a  fyftem  of  cofmo- 
gony,  that  will  be  liable  to  no  except 
tions,  and  will  contain  no  circumftance 
repugnant  to  our  limited  and  imperfed: 
experience  of  the  analogy  of  Nature? 
Your  theory  itfelf  cannot  furely  pretend 
to  any  fuch  advantage ;  even  though  you 
have  run  into  Anthropomorphifm^  the  bet- 
ter to  preferve  a  conformity  to  common 
experience.  Let  us  once  more  put  it  to 
trial.  In  all  inftances  which  we  have 
ever  feen,  ideas  are  copied  from  real  ob« 
jedls,  and  are  edlypal^  not  archetypal, 
to  exprefs  myfelf  in  learned  terms :  You 
reverfe  this  order,  and  give  thought  the 
precedence.  In  all  inftances  which  we 
have  ever  feen,  thought  has  no  influ- 
ence upon  matter,  except  v/here  that 
xnatter  is  ^o  conjoined  with  it  as  to  have 
an  equal  reciprocal  infliience  upon  it. 

No 


Natural    Religion,  157 

No  animal  can  move  immediately  any  ^^^^ 
thing  but  the  members  of  its  own  body ;  ^..-^^ 
and  indeed,  the  equality  of  a(5lion  and 
re-a(5lion  feems  to  be  an  univerfal  law 
of  Nature:  But  your  theory  implies  a 
contradidlion  to  this  experience.  Thefe 
inftances,  with  ma.ny  inore,  which  it 
were  eafy  to  colled:,  >  (particularly  the 
fuppofition  of  a  mind  or  fyftem  of 
thought  that  is  eternal,  or,  in  other 
words,  an  animal  ingenerable  and  im- 
mortal) ;  thefe  inftances,  I  fay,  may  teach 
all  of  us  fobriety  in  condemning  each 
other ;  and  let  us  fee,  that  as  no  fyftem 
of  this  kind  ought  ever  to  be  received 
from  a  flight  analogy,  fo  neither  ought 
any  to  be  reje<5led  on  account  of  a  fmall 
incongruity.  For  that  is  an  inconve- 
nience from  which  we  can  juftly  pro- 
nounce no  one  to  be  exempted. 

All  religious  fyftems,  it  is  confefled, 
are  fubjecl  to  great  and  infuperable  dif- 
ficulties.    Each  difputant  triumphs  in 

his 


15?   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  his  turn ;  while  he  carries  on  an  ofFen-* 

VIII. 

^.^-v^  five  war,  and  expofes  the  abfurdities, 

barbarities,  and  pernicious  tenets,  of  his 
antagonift.  But  all  of  them,  on  the 
whole,  prepare  a  complete  triumph  for 
the  Sceptic;  who  tells  them,  that  no  fy- 
ilem  ought  ever  to  be  embraced  with 
regard  to  fuch  fubjedls  :  For  this  plain 
reafon,  that  no  abfurdity  ought  ever  to 
be  affented  to  with  regard  to  any  fub- 
je(5l.  A  total  fufpenfe  of  judgment  is 
here  our  only  reafonable  refource.  And 
if  every  attack,  as  is  commonly  obfer- 
ved,  and  no  defence,  among  Theolo- 
gians, is  luccefsful;  how  complete  muft 
be j6/j"  victory,  who  remains  always,  with 
all  mankind,  on  the  ofFenfive,  and  has 
himfelf  no  fixed  ftation  or  abiding  city, 
which  he  is  ever,  on  any  occafion,  ob- 
liged to  defend  ? 


PART 


PART         IX. 


BUT  if  fo  many  diiScukies  attend  the  ^  ^^' 
axguvatnt  a  po/terion^  laid  De  me  A;  ^^-y^ 
had  we  not  better  adhere  to  that  fimple 
and  fubhme  argument  a  priori^  which^ 
by  offering  to  us  infaUible  demonftra- 
tion,  cuts  off  at  once  all  doubt  and  dif- 
ficulty? By  this  argument,  too,  we  may 
prove  the  INFINITY  of  the  divine  at- 
tributes ;  which,  I  am  afraid,  can  never 
be  afcertained  with  certainty  from  any 
other  topic.     For  how  can  an  effedl, 
which  either  is  finite,  or,  for  aught  we 
know,  may  be  fo ;  how  can  fuch  an  ef-  / 
fe6l,  I  fay,  prove  an  infinite  caufe  ?  The^ 
unity  too  of  the  Divine  Nature,  it  is 
very  diflScult,  if  not  abfolutely  impof- 

fible. 


\ 


i6o      Dialogues   concerning 

Part  flble^,  to  deducc  merely  from  contem- 
<^-^r^-f  plating  the  works  of  nature;  nor  will 
the  uniformity  alone  of  the  plan,  even 
were  it  allowed,  give  us  any  alTurance  of 
that  attribute.  Whereas  the  argument 
a  priori 


•  •  • » 


You  feem  to  reafon,  Demea,  inter- 
pofedCLEANTHFS,  as  if  thofe  advan- 
tages and  conveniencies  in  the  abftracfl 
argument  were  full  proofs  of  its  folidity. 
But  it  is  firft  proper,  in  my  opinion,  to 
detemaine  what  argument  of  this  na- 
ture you  choofe  to  infift  on ;  and  we 
fliall  afterwards,  from  itfelf,  better  than 
from  its  iifeful  confequences,  endeavour 
to  determine  what  value  we  ought  to 
put  upon  it. 

The  argument,repliedDEME  a,  which 
I  would  infift  on,  is  the  common  one. 
Whatever  exifts,  muft  have  a  caufc  or 
reafon  of  its  exiftence;  it  being  abfo- 
lutely  impoflible  for  any  thing  to  pro- 
duce 


Natural    Religion.  i6i 

duce  itfelf.  or  be  the  caufe  of  its  own  P^^*^ 

IX. 
cxiftence.     In  mounting  up,  therefore,  .^.^r^ 

from  effedls  to  caufes,  we  mufl  either 
go  on  in  tracing  an  infinite  fucceflion, 
without  any  ultimate  caufe  at  all ;  or 
muft  at  laft  have  recourfe  to  fome  ulti- 
mate caufe,  that  is  necejfarily  exiftent: 
Now  that  the  firft  fuppofition  is  abfurd, 
may  be  thus  proved.  In  the  infinite 
chain  or  fucceffion  of  caufes  and  efFe6ts, 
each  fingle  eifec?!:  is  determined  to  exift 
by  the  power  and  efficacy  of  that  caufe 
which  immediately  preceded ;  but  the 
whole  eternal  chain  or  fucceffion,  taken 
together,  is  not  determined  or  caufed 
by  any  thing ;  and  yet  it  is  evident 
that  it  requires  a  caufe  or  reafon,  as 
much  as  any  particular  object  which 
begins  to  exift  in  time.  The  queftion 
is  ftill  reafonable.  Why  this  particular 
fucceffion  of  caufes  exifted  from  eterni- 
ty, and  not  any  other  fucceffion,  or  no 
fucceffion  at  all.  If  there  be  no  ne- 
ceffarily-exiftent  being,  any  fuppofition 

which' 


1 62      Dialogues    concerning 

Part  which  Can  be  formed  is  equally  pof- 
k.^^  fible ;  nor  is  there  any  more  abfurdity 
in  Nothing's  having  exifted  from  eter- 
nity, than  there  is  in  that  fucceffion 
of  caufes  which  conftitutes  the  uni- 
verfe.  What  was  it,  then,  which  de- 
termined Something  to  exift  rather  than 
Nothing,  and  bellowed  being  on  a  par- 
ticular poffibility,  exclufive  of  the  reft  ? 
External  caufes^  there  are  fuppofed  to  be 
none.  Chance  is  a  word  without  a 
mLcaning.  Was  it  Nothing?  But  that 
can  never  produce  any  thing.  We 
muft,  therefore,  have  recourfe  to  a  ne~ 
ceffarily-exiftent  Being,  who  carries  the 
REASON  of  his  exiftence  in  himfelf ; 
and  who  cannot  be  fuppofed  not  to 
exift,  without  an  exprefs  contradidlion. 
There  is  confequently  fuch  a  Being  ; 
that  is,  there  is  a  Deity, 

I  SHALL  not  leave  it  to  Philo,  faid 
Cleanthes,  (though  I  know  that  the 
ft ar ting  objediions  is  his  chief  delight) 

to 


Natural    PvEligion.  163 

to  point  out  the  weaknefs  of  this  meta-  Part 

.  IX. 

phyfical  reafoning.     It  feems  to  me  fo  o-vO 

obvioufly  ill- grounded,  and  at  the  fame 

time .  of  fo  little   confequence   to  the 

caufe  of  true  piety  and  religion,  that  I 

Ihall  myfelf  venture  to  fhow  the  fallacy 

of  it. 

I  SHALL  begin  with  obferving,  that 
there  is  an  evident  abfurdity  in  pretend- 
ing to  demonftrate  a  matter  of  fadl,  or 
to  prove  it  by  any  arguments  a  priori. 
Nothing  is  demonftrable,  unlefs  the 
contrary  implies  a  contradi6lion.  No- 
thing, that  is  diftindtly  conceivable,  im- 
plies a  contradidlion.  Whatever  we 
conceive  as  exiftent,  we  can  alfo  con-^ 
ceive  as  non-exiftent.  There  is  no 
being,  therefore,  whofe  non-exiflence 
implies  a  contradiction .  Confequently 
there  is  no  being,  whofe  exiftence  is 
demonftrable.  I  propofe  this  argument 
as  entirely  decifive,  and  am  willing  to 
reft  the  whole  controverfy  upon  it. 

It 


164      Dialogue;^    conceuning 

Part       i^  is  pretended  that  the  Deity  is  a 
v,-ro  neceflarily-exiftent  being;  and  this  ne- 
ceffity  of  his  exiftence  is  attempted  to  be 
explained  by  aflerting,  that,  if  we  knew 
his  whole  effence  or  nature,  we  fliould 
perceive  it  to  be  as  impoflible  for  him 
not  to  exift  as  for  twice  two  not  to  be 
four.     But  it  is  evident,  that  this  can 
never  happen,  while  our  faculties  re- 
main the  fame  as  at  prefent.     It  will 
ftill  be  pofTible  for  us,  at  any  time,  to 
conceive  the  non-exiftence  of  what  we 
formerly  conceived  to  exift;  nor  can 
the  mind  ever  lie  under  a  neceffity  of 
fuppofing  any  obje6l  to  remain  always 
in  being;  in  the  fame  manner  as  we  He 
vmder  a  neceflity  of  always  conceiving 
twice   two   to   be   four.     The   words, 
therefore,    necejfary   exiftence^    have   no 
meaning  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing, 
none  that  is  confiftent. 

But  farther:  Why  may  not  the  ma- 
terial univerfe  be  the  neceflarily-exif- 
tent 


Natural    Religiok.  165 

tent  Being,  acording  to  this  pretended  ^^^"^ 
explication  of  neceffity?  We  dare  not  v.^-y-^ 
affirm  that  we  know  all  the  qualities  of 
matter  ;  and  for  aught  we  can  deter- 
mine, it  may  contain  fome  qualities, 
which,  were  they  known,  would  make 
its  non-exiftence  appear  as  great  a  con- 
tradidlion  as  that  twice  two  is  five.  I 
find  only  one  argument  employed  to 
prove,  that  the  material  world  is  not 
the  neceffarily-exiftent  Being  ;  and  this 
argument  is  derived  from  the  contin* 
gency  both  of  the  matter  and  the  form 
of  the  world.  "  Any  particle  of  mat- 
ter," it  is  faid  *,  "  may  be  conceived  to 
^'  be  annihilated ;  and  any  form  may 
"  be  conceived  to  be  altered.  Such  an 
*'  annihilation  or  alteration,  therefore, 
"  is  not  impoflible."  But  it  feems  a 
great  partiality  not  to  perceive,  that  the 
fame  argument  extends  equally  to  the 
Deity,  fo  far  as  we  have  any  concep- 
tion of  him;  and  that  the  mind  can  at 

L  leaft 

*  jDr  Clarke. 


i66      Dialogues    concerning 


Part  }^^f]-  imagine  him  to  be  non-exiftent, 
IX.  " . 

v^X/  or  his  attributes  to  be  altered.    It  muft 

be  fome  unknown,  inconceivable  qua- 
lities, which  can  make  his  non-exif- 
tence  appear  impoflible,  or  his  attri- 
butes unalterable :  And  no  reafon  can 
be  affigned,  why  thefe  qualities  may 
not  belong  to  matter.  As  they  are  al- 
together unknown  and  inconceivable, 
they  can  never  be  proved  incompatible 
with  it. 
* 

Add  to  this,  that  in  tracing  an  eter- 
nal fucceffion  of  objects,  it  feems  ab- 
furd  to  inquire  for  a  general  caufe  or 
firft  author.  How  can  any  thing,  that 
exifts  from  eternity,  have  a  caufe;  fince 
that  relation  implies  a  priority  in  time, 
and  a  beginning  of  exiftence  ? 

In  fuch  a  chain,  too,  or  fucceffion  of 
objedls,  each  part  is  caufed  by  that 
which  preceded  it,  and  caufes  that 
which  fucceeds  it.     Where  then  is  the 

difficulty  ? 


Nat'ural    RjEtiGioisr.  167 

difficulty  ?  But  the  WHOLE,  you  fay,  ^^^^ 
wants  a  caufe.  I  aniwer^  that  the  uni-  v-^-y^^ 
ting  of  thefe  parts  into  a  whole,  like  the 
Uniting  of  feveral  diftindl  counties  int^ 
one  kingdom,  of  feveral  diftincSl  mem- 
bers into  one  body,  is  performed  mere- 
ly by  an  arbitrary  a6l  of  the  mind,  and 
has  no  influence  on  the  nature  of  things. 
Did  I  fliow  you  the  particular  caufes  of 
e.ach  individualin  a  collefhion  of  twenty 
particles  of  matter,  I  fliould  think  it 
very  unreafonable,  fhould  you  after* 
wards  afk  me,  what  w^as  the  caufe  of  the 
whole  twenty*  That  is  fitfficiently  ex-- 
plained  in  explaining  the  caufe  of  the 
parts* 

Though  the  reafonings  which  you 
have  urged,  Cleanthes,  may  w^ell 
excufe  me,  faid  Philo,  from  ftarting 
any  farther  difficulties ;  yet  I  canpot 
forbear  infifting  ftill  tipom  another  to*- 
pic.  It  is  obferved  by  arithmeticians^ 
that  the  products  of  9  coinpofe  always 

L  2  ^  either 


l68         DlAIiOGUES     CONCERNING 

Part  eitkcr  9,  or  fome  leffer  produdl  of  9 ;  i£ 
u<^N-/  you  add  together  all  the  charafters,  of 
which  any  of  the  former  products  is 
compofed.  Thus,  of  18,  27,  36,  which 
are  produc5ls  of  9,  you  make  9  by  ad- 
ding I  to  8,  2  to  7,  3  to  6.  Thus,  of 
369  is  a  product  alfo  of  9  ;  and  if  you 
add  3,  6,  and  9,  you  make  18,  a  leffer 
produ6l  of  9  *.  To  a  fuperficial  ob~ 
ferver^  fo  wonderful  a  regularity  may 
be  admired  as  the  effedl  either  of  chance 
or  defign :  but  a  fldlful  algebraift  im« 
mediately  concludes  it  to  be  the  work 
of  neceflity ;  and  demonftrates,  that  it 
muft  for  ever  refult  from  the  nature  of 
thefe  numbers*  Is  it  not  probable,  I 
aflc,  that  the  whole  oeconomy  of  the 
univerfe  is  condu(!^ed  by  a  like  necef- 
fity,  though  lio  human  algebra  can 
furnifh  a  key  which  folves  the  difficul- 
ty? And  inftead  of  admiring  the  order 
of  natural  beings,  may  it  ijot  happen, 
that,  could  we  penetrate  into  the  inti- 
mate 

*  Republfqiie  des  Lettres,  Aout.  1685. 


Natural    Religion.  169 

mate  nature  of  bodies,  we  fhould  clear-  ^^^'^ 
ly  fee  why  it  was  abfolutely  impoflible  ^.^^ 
they  could  ever  admit  of  any  other  dif- 
pofition?  So  dangerous  is  it  to  intro- 
duce this  idea  of  neceflity  into  the  pre- 
fent  queftion !  and  fo  naturally  does  it 
afford  an  inference  diredlly  oppofite  to 
the  religious  hypothefis  ! 

But  dropping  all  thefe  abftracftions, 
continued  Philo  ;  and  confining  our- 
felves  to  more  familiar  topics  ;  I  fhall 
venture  to  add  an  obfervation,  that  the 
argument  a  priori  has  feldom  been 
found  very  convincing,  except  to  peo- 
ple of  a  rtietaphyfical  head,  who  have 
acciiflomed  themfelves  to  abflradl  rea- 
foning,  and  who  finding  from  mathe- 
matics, that  tlie  underflanding  fre* 
quently  leads  to  truth,  through  ob- 
fcvirity,  and  contrary  to  firfl  appear- 
ances, have  transferred  the  fame  habit 
of  thinking  to  fubjecls  where  it  ought 
aot  to  have  place.     Other  people,  even 

la     X  of 


17^       Dialogues    concerning 

F.\RT  q£  good  fenfe  and  the  bed  inclined  to 
^--w/  religion^  feel  always  fome  deficiency  in 
fuch  Jirgiiments,  though  they  are  not 
perhaps  able  to  explain  diftinelly  wh^re 
it  lies.  A  certain  proof,  that  men  ever 
did,  and  ever  will,  derive  their  religion 
from  other  fources  than  from  this  fpe-- 
cies  of  reafonine. 


PART 


I 


ir       jfi.       Xv        J  j\^ 


is   my   opinion,    I   own,    replied  ^^^"^ 
Demea,  that  each  man  feels,  in  a  ^-^W 


manner,  the  truth  of  religion  within 
his  own  bread  ;  and  from  a  confciouf- 
nefs  of  his  imbecillity  and  mifery,  ra- 
ther than  from  any  reafoning,  is  led  to 
feek  prote6lion  from  that  Being,  on 
whom  he  and  all  nature  is  dependents 
So  anxious  or  fo  tedious  are  even  the 
beft  fcenes  of  life,  that  futurity  is  ftill 
the  objedl  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears. 
We  inceflantlv  look  forward,  and  en- 
deavour,  by  prayers,  adoration  and  fa- 
crifice,  to  appeafe  thofe  unknown 
powers^  whom  we  find,  by  experience, 
fo    able    to    afflid:    and    opprefs    us- 

L  4  Wretched 


172   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  Wretched  creatures  that  we  are  !  what 
1-.-V-0  refource  for  us  amidft  the  innumerable 
ills  of  life,  did  not  religion  fuggeft 
fome  methods  of  atonement,  and  ap- 
peafe  thole  terrors  with  which  we  are 
inceflantly  agitated  and  tormented  ? 

I  AM  indeed  perfuaded,  faid  Philo, 
that  the  beft,  and  indeed  the  only, 
method  of  bringing  every  one  to  a  dvte 
fenfe  of  religion^  is  by  juft  reprefenta- 
tions  of  the  mifery  and  wickednefs  of 
meii.  And  for  that  purpofe  a  talent  of 
eloquence  and  llrong  imagery  is  more 
requilite  than  that  of  reafoning  and  ar- 
gument. For  is  it  neceffary  to  prove, 
what  every  one  feels  within  himfelf  ? 
It  is  only  neceffary  to  make  us  feel  it, 
if  poffible,  more  intimately  and  fen-^ 
fibly. 

The  people,  indeed,  replied  De  me  a, 
are  fufEciently  convinced  of  this  great 
and  melancholy  truth.     The  miferies 

of 


Natural    Religion.  173 

of  life ;  the  unhappinefs  of  man ;  the  Part 
general  corruptions  of  our  nature ;  the  ^.^^ 
unfatisfadlory  enjoyment  of  pleafures, 
riches,  honours ;  thefe  phrafes  have 
become  almoft  proverbial  in  all  lan- 
guages. And  who  can  doubt  of  what 
all  men  declare  from  their  own  imme- 
diate feeling  and  exerience  ? 

In  this  point,  faid  Philo,  the  learn- 
ed are  perfedlly  agreed  with  the  vulgar; 
and  in  all  letters,  facred  and  profane^ 
the  topic  of  human  mifery  has  been  in- 
fifted  on  with  the  moft  pathetic  elo- 
quence that  forrow  and  melancholy 
could  infpire.  The  poets,  who  ipeak 
from  fentiment,  without  a  fyftem,  and 
whofe  teftimony  has  therefore  the  more 
authority,  abound  in  images  of  this 
nature.  From  Homer  down  to  Dr 
Young,  the  whole  infpired  tribe  have 
ever  been  fenfible',  that  no  other  re- 
prefentation  of  things  would  fuit  the 

feeling 


174      Dialogues    concerning 

Part  feeling  and  obfervatioii  of  each  indivi- 
\.^-y>-^  dual. 

As  to  anthorities,  replied  Demea, 
you  need  not  feek  them.  Look  round 
this  library  of  Cleanthes.  I  Ihall 
venture  to  affirm,  that,  except  authors 
of  particular  fciences,  fuch  as  chy- 
miflry  or  botany,  who  have  no  occaiion 
to  treat  of  Vaman  life,  there  is  fcarce 
one  of  thofe  innumerable  writers,  from 
whom  the  fenfe  of  human  mifery  has 
not,  in  fome  paffage  or  other,  extorted 
a  complaint  and  confeffion  of  it.  At 
lead,  the  chance  is  entirely  on  that 
fide;  and  no  one  author  has  ever,  fo 
far  as  I  can  recolle(Sl,  been  fo  extrava- 
gant as  to  deny  it. 

There  you  muft  excufe  me,  faid 
Ph|lo:  Leibnitz  has  denied  it;  and 
is  perhaps  the    firft  *  who   ventured 

upon 

*  That  fentiment  had  been  maintained  by  Dr  King, 
and  fome  few  others,  before  Leibnitz  ;  though  by  none 
of  fo  great  fame  as  that  German  philofopher. 


Natural:.    Religion.  175 

upon  fo  bold  and  paradoxical  an  opi-  Part 
nion;  at  leaft,  the  firfl  who  made  it  >^^ 
cflential  to  his  philofophical  fyftem. 

And  by  being  the  firfl,  replied  De- 
MEA,  might  he  not  have  been  fenfible 
of  his  error  ?  For  is  this  a  fubjed:  in 
whidi  philofophers  can  propofe  to 
make  difcoveries,  efpecially  in  fo  late 
an  age  ?  And  can  any  man  hope  by  a 
fimple  denial  (for  the  fubjedl  fcarcely 
admits  of  reafoning)  to  bear  down  the 
united  teftimony  of  mankind,  founded 
on  fenfe  and  confcionfnefs  ? 


And  v/hy  Ihould  man,  added  he, 
pretend  to  an  exemption  from  the  lot 
of  all  other  animals  ?  The  whole  eartli,  ^ 
believe  me,  Philo,  is  cnrfed  and  pol- 
luted. A  perpetual  war  is  kindled  a- 
mongft  all  living  creatures.  Neceffity, 
hunger,  v^^ant,  ftimulate  the  ftrong  and 
courageous:  Fear,  anxiety,  terror,  a- 
gitate  the  vv^eak  an<J  infirm.     The  firft 

entrance 


ijS       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  entrance  into  life  gives  ajiguilh  to  the 

^..^  new-born  infant  and  to  its  wretched 

parent:  Weaknefs,  impotence,  diftrefs, 

attend  each  ftage  of  that  hfe:   and  it  is 

at  lall  finiftied  in  agony  and  horror. 

Observe  too,  fays  Philo,  the  cu- 
rious artifices  of  Nature  in  order  to 
embitter  the  hfe  of  every  hving  being. 
The  ftronger  prey  tipon  the  weaker, 
and  keep  them  in  perpetual  terror  and 
anxiety.  The  weaker  too,  in  their 
turn,  often  prey  upon  the  ftronger, 
and  vex  and  moleft  them  without  re- 
laxation. Confider  that  innumerable 
race  of  infecfhs,  which  eitner  are  bred  on 
the  body  of  each  animal,  or  flying  about 
infix  their  ftings  in  him.  Thefe  infefts 
have  others  ftill  lefs  than  themfelves, 
which  torment  them.  And  thus  on 
each  hand,  before  and  behind,  above 
and  below,  every  animal  is  furround- 
ed  with  enemies,  which  inceflantly  feek 
his  mifery  and  deftruftion. 

.-Man  ■ 


Natural    Religion.  177 

Man  alone,  faid   Demea,  feems  to  ^^^"^ 
be,  in  part,  an  exception  to  this  rule.  ^.^^ 
For  by  combination  in  fociety,  he  can 
ealily   mafler  lions,  tygers,  and  bears, 
whofe  greater  ftrength  and  agility  na- 
turally enable  them  to  prey  upon  him. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  here  chiefly, 
cried  Philo,  that  the  uniform  and 
equal  maxims  of  Nature  are  moft  ap- 
parent. Man,  it  is  true,  can,  by  com- 
bination, furmount  all  his  real  enemies, 
and  become  mafler  of  the  whole  ani- 
mal creation  :  but  does  he  not  immedi- 
ately raife  up  to  himfelf  imaginary  ene- 
mies, the  dsemons  of  his  fancy,  who 
haunt  him  with  fuperftitious  terrors, 
and  blaft  every  enjoyment  of  life?  His 
pleafure,  as  he  imagines,  becomes,  in 
their  eyes,  a  crime:  his  food  and  repofe 
give  them  umbrage  and  offence :  his 
very  fleep  and  dreams  furnifh  new  ma- 
terials to  anxious  fear:  and  even  death, 
his  refuge  from  every  other  ill,  prefents 

only 


D I A  L  O  G  U  E  S     CONCERNING 

Part  only  the  dread  of  endlefs  and  innume- 

wv^  rable  woes.     Nor  does  the  wolf  moleft 

more  the  timid  flock,  than  fuperftition 

does  the  anxious   breaft  of  wretched 

mortals. 

Besides,  confider,DEME A:  This  very 
fociety,  by  which  we  furmount  thofc 
wild  beafts,  our  natural  enemies ;  what 
new  enemies  does  it  not  raife  to  us  ? 
What  wo  and  mifery  does  it  not  occa- 
fion  ?  Man  is  the  greatefl  enemy  of  man , 
Oppreflion,  injuftice,  contempt,  con-^ 
tumely,  violence,  fedition,  war,  ca- 
lumny, treachery,  fraud;  by  thefe  they 
mutually  torment  each  other :  and  they 
would  foon  dilTolve  that  fociety  which 
they  had  formed,  were  it  not  for  the 
dread  of  ftill  greater  ills,  which  mufl 
attend  their  feparation. 

But  though  thefe  external  inflilts, 
faid  Demea,  from  animals,  from  men, 
from  all  the  elements,  which  aflault  us, 

form 


Natural    Religion.  179 

form  a  frightful  catalogue  of  woes,  they  ^^"^ 
are  nothing  in  comparifon  of  thofe  v-^-rv^ 
which  arife  within  ourfelves,  from  the 
diftempered  condition  of  our  mind  and 
body.  How  many  lie  under  the  linger-r 
ing  torment  of  difeafes  ?  Hear  the  pa- 
thetic enumeration  of  the  great  poet. 

Inteftine  ftone  and  ulcer,  colic-pangs, 
Daemoniac  frenzy,  moping  melancholy. 
And  moon-ftruck  madnefs,  pining  atrophy, 
Marafmus,  and  wide-wafting  peftilence. 
Dire  was  the  tofling,  deep  the  groans :  DESPAIR 
Tended  the  fick,  bufieft  from  couch  to  couch. 
And  over  them  triumphant  DEATH  his  dart 
Shook';  but  delay'd  to  ftrike,  tho'  oft  invoked 
With  vows,  as  their  chief  good  and  final  hope. 

The  diforders  of  the  mind,  continued 
Demea,  though  more  fecret,  are  not  per- 
haps lefs  difmal  and  vexatious.  Re- 
morfc,  (hame,  anguifh,  rage,  difappoint- 
ment,  anxiety,  fear,  dejedlion,  defpair; 
who  has  ever  pafTed  through  life  with- 
out cruel  inroads  from  thefe  tormen- 
tors ?  How  many  have  fcarcely  ever  felt 
any  better  fenfations?  Labour  and  po- 
verty. 


i8o       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  ycFty,  fo  abhorred  by  every  one,  are  the 
^---N^'  certain  lot  of  the  far  greater  number : 
and  thofe  few  privileged  perfons,  who 
enjoy  eafe  and  opulence,  never  reach 
contentment  or  true  felicity.  All  the 
goods  of  life. united  would  not  make  a 
very  happy  man :  but  all  the  ills  united 
"would  make  a  wretch  indeed ;  and  any 

^  one  of  them  almoft  (and  who  can  be 
free  from  every  one?)  nay  often  the  ab- 
fence  of  one  good  (and  who  can  pof- 
fefs  all?)  is  fufficient  to  render  life  in- 
eligible. 

Were  a  ftranger  to  drop,  on  a  fud- 
den,  into  this  world,  I  would  fliow  him, 
as  a  fpecimen  of  its  ills,  an  hofpital  full 
of  difeafes,  a  prifon  crowded  with  ma- 
lefactors and  debtors,  a  field  of  battle 
flrowed  with  carcafes,  a  fleet  founder- 
ing in  the  ocean,  -a  nation  languifhing 
under  tyranny,  famine,  or  peftilence. 
To  turn  the  gay  fide  of  life  to  him,  and 
give  him  a  notion  of  its  pleafures ;  whi- 
ther 


Natural    Religion.  i8i 

ther  Ihould  I  condudl  him?  to  a  ball.  Part 

X. 
to  an  opera,  to  court?  He  might  juftly  ^^^.^ 

think,  that  I  was  only  fhowing  him  a 

diverfity  of  diftrefs  and  forrow.    . 

There  is  no  evading  fiich  ftriking 
inftances,  faid  Philo,  but  by  apologies, 
which  ftill  farther  aggravate  the  charge. 
Why  have  all  men,  I  all?:,  in  all  ages, 
complained  inceflantly  of  the  miferies 
of  life  ?  -  -  -  They  have  no  juft  reafon, 
fays  one :  thefe  complaints  proceed  only 
from  their  difcontented,  repining,  anxi- 
ous difpofition. And  can  there  pof^ 

fibly,  I  reply,  be  a  more  certain  foun- 
dation of  mifery,  than  fuch  a  wretched 
temper  ? 

But  if  they  were  really  as  unhappy 
as  they  pretend,  fays  my  antagonift, 
%vhy  do  they  remain  in  life  ? 

Not  fatisfied  with  life,  afraid  of  death. 

M  This 


tSz       Dialogues    coxVcerning 

Part  This  IS  the  feeret  clxain,  fay  I,  that  holcl^ 
u-^x^-  lis.  ^  We  are  terrified,  not  bribed  to  the 
continuance  of  our  exiftence. 


It  is  only  a  falfe  delicacy,  he  may  in- 
fill, which  a  few  refined  fpirits  indulge, 
and  which  has  fpread  thefe  complaints 

among  the  Vvdiole  race  of  mankind. 

And  what  is  this  delicacy,  I  afk,  which 
you  blame  ?  Is  it  any  thing  but  a  greater 
feniibiiity  to  all  the  pleafiires  and  pains 
of  life  ?  and  if  the- man  of  a  delicate, 
refined  temper,  by  being  fo  much  more 
alive  than  the  reft  of  the  world,  is  only 
fo  much  more  unhappy;  what  judg- 
ment muft  we  form  in  general  of  hur 
man  life  ? 

Let.  men  remain  at  reft,  fays  our  ad- 
verfary  ;  and  they  will  be  eafy.  They 
are  willing  artificers  of  their  own  mi- 
fery . No !  reply  I :  an  anxious  lan- 
guor follows  their  repofe;  difappoint- 

ment^ 


Natural    Religion.  183 

ment,  vexation,  trouble,  their  adlivity  ^^^'^ 
and  ambition.  v>-<-^ 


I  CAN  obferve  feme  thing  Hke  what 
you  mention  in  fome  others,  repUed 
Cleanthes  I  but  I  confefs^  Lfeel  little 
or  nothing  of  it  in  myfelf ;  and  hope 
that  it  is  not  fo  common  as  you  repre« 
fent  it. 

If. you  feel  not  human  mifery  your- 
felf,  cried  Demea,  I  congratulate  you 
on  fo  happy  a  lingularity.  Others,  feem- 
ingly  the  itioft  profperous,  have  not  been 
afliamed  to  vent  their  complaints  in  the 
moft  melancholy  drains.  Let  us  attend 
to  the  great,  the  fortunate  emperor, 
Charles  V.  when,  tired  with  human 
grandeur,  he  refigned  all  his  exteniive 
dominions  into  the  hands  of  his  fon.  In 
the  laft  harangue,  which  he  m^ade  on 
that  memorable  occalion^  he  publicly 
avowed,  th^it  the  great ej}  profptrities 
^vhich  be  had  ever  enjoyed^  bad  been  mixed 

M  a  %vith 


184   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  \ji)ith  fo  many  adverfities^  that  he  anight 
\^-^  truly  fay  he  had  ne'ver  enjoyed  any  fatis- 
faBion  or  contentment.  But  did  the  reti- 
red life,  in  which  he  fought  for  fhelter, 
aflFord  him  any  greater  happinefs  ?  If  we 
may  credit  his  fon's  account,  his  repent- 
ance commenced  the  very  day  of  his  re- 
fignation. 

Cicero's  fortune,  from  fmall  begin- 
nings, rofe  to  the  greateft  luftre  and  re- 
nown ;  yet  what  pathetic  complaints  of 
the  ills  of  life  do  his  familiar  letters,  as 
well  as  philofophical  difcourfes,  con- 
tain? And  fuitably  to  his  own  experi- 
ence, he  introduces  Cato,  the  great, 
the  fortunate  Cato,  protefting  in  his 
old  age,  that  had  he  a  new  life  in  his 
offer,  he  would  rejecfl  the  prefent. 

Ask  yourfelf,  afk  any  of  your  ac- 
quaintance, whether  they  would  live 
over  again  the  lafl:  ten  or  twenty  years 

of 


Natural    Religion.  185 

of  their  life.    No !  bat  tn-e  next  twenty,  Part 
they  fay,  will  be  better:  ^' 


v^-v>«; 


And  from  the  dregs  of  life,  hope  to  receive 
What  the  firft  fprightly  running  could  not  give. 

Thus  at  laft  they  find  (ftich  is  the  great- 
nefs  of  human  mifery;  it  reconciles  even 
contradidlions)  that  they  complain,  at 
once  of  the  Ihortnefs  of  life,  and  of  its 
vanity  and  forrow. 

And  is  it  poffible,  Cleanthes,  faid 
Philo,  that  after  all  thefe  refledlidns, 
and  infinitely  more,  which  might  be 
fuggefted,  you  can  ftill  perfevere  in 
your  Anthropomorphifm,  and  affert  the 
moral  attributes  of  the  Deity,  his  ju- 
ftice,  benevolence,  mercy,  and  redli- 
tude,  to  be  of  the  fam.e  nature  with 
thefe  virtues  in  human  creatures  ?  His 
power  we  allow  infinite :  whatever  he 
wills  is  executed :  but  neither  man  nor 
any  other  animal  is  happy :  therefore 
he  does  not  will  their  happinefs.     His 

wifdom  is  infinite :  he  is  never  iniftaken 

M  3  in 


0 


lt6      Dialogues  concerning 

^^'^  in  chooiing  tlic  means  to  any  end :  but 
w^-vN-r  the  courfe  of  Nature  tends  not  to  human 
or  animal  felicity :  therefore  it  is  not 
eftablifhed  for  that  purpofe.  Through 
the  whole  compafs  of  human  knowledge, 
there  are  no  inferences  more  certain 
and  Infallible  than  thefe.  In  what  re- 
fpe(5l,  then,  do  his  benevolence  and 
mercy  refemble  the  benevolence  and 
mercy  of  men  ? 

Epicurus's  old  queftions  are  yet  un- 
anfwered. 

Is  he  willing  to  prevent  evil,  but  not 
fable  ?  then,  is  he  impotent.  Is  he  able, 
I  but  not  willing  ?  then  is  he  malevolent. 

Is  he  both  able  and  willing  ?  whence 

then  is  evil  ? 

You  afcribe,  Clean^thes,  (and  I 
believe  juftly)  a  purpofe  and  intention 
to  Nature,  But  what,<  I  befeech  you, 
is  the  objed:  of  that  curious  artifice  and 

machinery^ 


Natural    Religion.  187 

macliineiy,  which  fhe  has  difplayed  in  ^''-^'^ 
.-1.-.  ■^* 

all    animals  ?     The   prefervation  alone  ^^v-o? 

of  individuals,  and  propagation  of  the 
fpecies.  It  feems  enough  for  her  pur- 
pofe,  if  fuch  a  rank  be  barely  upheld  in 
the  univerfe,  without  any  care  or  con- 
cern for  the  happinefs  of  the  members 
that  compofe  it.  No  refource  for  this 
purpofe :  no  machinery,  in  order  mxcre- 
ly  to  give  pleafure  or  cafe :  no  fund  of 
pure  joy  and  contentment :  no  indul- 
gence, without  fome  want  or  neceility 
accompanying  it.  At  lead,  the  few 
phenomena  of  this  nature  are  over- 
balanced by  oppoiite  phenomena  of  ftill 
greater  importance. 

Our  fcnfc  of  muiic,  harmony,  and 
indeed  beauty  of  all  kinds,  gives  fatis-- 
facftion,  without  being  abfolutely  nc- 
ceiTary  to  the  prefervation  and  propa- 
gation of  the  fpecies.  But  what  rack- 
ing pains,  on  the  other  hand,  arife 
from  gouts,   gravels,  megrims,  tooth- 

M  4.  achs. 


i88       Dialogues    co^iSrCERNiNG 

^^^"^  achs,  rheumatifms ;  where  the  injury 
i-^*^v^  to  the  animal-machinery  is  either  fmall 
or  incurable?  Mirth,  laughter,  play, 
frolic,  feem  gratuitous  fatisfadlions, 
which  have  no  farther  tendency :  fpleen, 
melancholy,  difcontent,  fuperftition, 
are  pains  of  the  fame  nature.  How 
then  does  the  divine  benevolence  dif- 
play  itfelf,  in  the  fenfe  of  yoti  An- 
thropomorphites  ?  None  but  we  Myf- 
tics,  as  you  were  pleafed  to  call  us,  can 
account  for  this  flrange  mixture  of 
phenomena,  by  deriving  it  from  attri- 
butes, infinitely  perfe(5l,  but  incompre- 
henfible.' 

And  have  you  at  laft,  faid  Clean- 
THES  fmiling,  betrayed  your  inten- 
tions, Philo  ?  Your  long  agreement 
with  Demea  did  indeed  a  little  furprife 
me  ;  but  I  find  you  were  all  the  while 
eredling  a  concealed  battery  againft  me. 
And  I  mufl  confefs,  that  you  have  now 
fallen  upon  a  fiibjecS  worthy  of  your 

noble 


Natural    RELioioi^r.  189 

noble  fpirit  of  oppofition  and  contro-  ^^rt 
verfy.  If  you  can  make  out  the  prefent  ^...^y 
point,  and  prove  mankind  to  be  un- 
happy or  corrupted,  there  is  an  end  at 
once  of  all  religion.  For  to  what  pur- 
pofe  eftablilh  the  natural  attributes  of 
the  Deity,  while  the  moral  are  ftill 
doubtful  and  uncertain  ? 


You  take  umbrage  very  ealily,  re- 
plied Demea,  at  opinions  the  moft  in- 
nocent, and  the  moft  generally  received 
even  amongft  the  religious  and  devout 
themfelves  ;  and  nothing  can  be  more 
furpriling  than  to  find  a  topic  like  this, 
concerning  the  wickednefs  and  mifery 
of  man,  charged  with  no  lefs  than 
Atheifm  and  profanenefs.  Have  not  all 
pious  divines  and  preachers,  who  have 
indulged  their  rhetoric  on  fo  fertile  a 
fubjedl ;  have  they  not  eafily,  I  fay, 
given  a  folution  of  any  difficulties 
which  may  attend  it  ?  This  world  is 
but    a    point   in    comparifon    of   the 

univerfe ; 


190       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  uiiverfe ;    this    life  but   a   moment  in 

X.  . 

K.^^  comparifon  of  eternity.     The  prefent 

evil  phenomena,  therefore,  are  rec- 
tified in  other  regions,  and  in  fome 
future  period  of  exiftence.  And  the 
eyes  of  men,  being  then  opened  to 
larger  views  of  things,  fee  the  whole 
connexion  of  general  laws  ;  and  trace, 
with  adoration,  the  benevolence  and 
re6litude  of  the  Deity,  through  all  the 
mazes  and  intricacies  of  his  providence. 

No!  replied  Cleanthes,  No!  Thefe 
arbitrary  fuppolitions  can  never  be  ad- 
mitted, contrary  to  matter  of  fail,  vi- 
fible  and  uncontroverted.  Whence  can 
any  caufe  be  knov^rn  but  from  its  knov^n 
efFedls  ?  Whence  can  any  hypothefis  be 
proved  but  from  the  apparent  pheno- 
mena ?  To  eftablifli  one  hypothefis  up- 
on another,  is  building  entirely  in  the 
air ;  and  the  utmoft  we  ever  attain,  by 
thefe  conjecftures  and  fictions,  is  to  af- 
certain  the  bare  poffibility  of  our  opi- 
nion % 


Natural    Religion.  iqi 

nion ;    but  never  can  we,  upon  fuch  Part 
terms,  eftabliili  its  reality.  ^  v^^ 

The  only  method  of  fupporting  di- 
vine benevolence  (and  it  is  v^hat  I  will- 
ingly embrace)  is  to  deny  abfolutely 
the  mifery  and  wickednefs  of  man. 
Your  rep.refentations  are  exaggerated; 
your  melancholy  views  moftly  ficfli- 
tious  ;  your  inferences  contrary  to  fa(5l 
and  experience.  Health  is  more  com- 
mon than  ficknefs  ;  pleafure  than  pain  ; 
happinefs  than  mifery.  And  for  one 
vexation  which  we  m.eet  with,  we  at- 
tain, upon  computation,  a  hundred  en^- 
joyments. 

Admitting  your  pofition,  replied 
Philo,  which  yet.  is  extremely  doubt- 
ful ;  you  muft,  at  the  fame  time,  allow, 
that,  if  pain  be  lefs  frequent  than  plea- 
fure, it  is  infinitely  more  violent  and 
durable.  One  hour  of  it  is  often  able 
to  outweigh  a  day,  a  week,  a  month  of 

our 


192         t)lALOG0£S     CONCERNING 

^^^^  our  comiTLon  infipid  enjoyinents:  And 
e^->ro  how  many  days,  weeks,  and  months,  are 
pafTed  by  feveral  in  the  moft  acute  tor- 
ments ?  Pleafure,  fcarcely  in  one  in- 
ftance,  is  ever  able  to  reach  ecftafy  and 
rapture:  And  in  no  one  inftance  can  it 
continue  for  any  time  at  its  higheft  pitch 
and  altitude.  The  fpirits  evaporate ;  the 
nerves  relax ;  the  fabric  is  difordered  ; 
and  the  enjoyment  quickly  degenerates 
into  fatigue  and  uneafinefs.  But  pain 
often,  good  God,  how  often!  rifes  to 
torture  and  agony;  and  the  longer  it 
continues,  it  becomes  ftill  more  genuine 
agony  and  torture.  Patience  is  exhauft- 
ed ;  courage  languifhes ;  melancholy 
feizes  us  ;  and  nothing  terminates  our 
mifery  but  the  removal  of  its  caufe,  or 
another  event,  which  is  the  fole  cure  of 
all  evil,  but  which,  from  our  natural 
folly,  we  regard  with  ftill  greater  hor- 
ror and  confter nation. 

But  not  to  infift  upon  thefe  topics, 

con- 


Natural    Religion.  193 

continued  Phil o,  though  moft  obvious,  Part 
certain,  and  important;  I  mull  ufe  the  ^.^-v-v^ 
freedom  to  admonifli  you,  Cleanthes, 
that  you  have  put  the  controverfy  upon 
a  moft  dangerous  ilTue,  and  are  unaw^ares 
introducing  a  total  Scepticifm  into  the 
moft  effential  articles  of  natural  and  re- 
vealed theology.    What !  no  method  of 
fixing  a  juft  foundation  for  religion, 
unlefs  we  allow  the  happinefs  of  human 
life,  and  maintain  a  continued  exiftence 
even  in  this  world,  with  all  our  prefent 
pains,  infirmities,  vexations,  and  follies, 
to  be  eligible  and  defirable !  But  this  is 
contrary  to  every  one's  feeling  and  ex- 
perience :  It  is  contrary  to  an  authority 
fo  eftablifhed  as  nothing  can  fubvert: 
No  decifive  proofs  can  ever  be  produced 
againft  this  authority;  nor  is  it  polTiblc 
for  you  to  compute,  eftimate,  and  com- 
pare, all  the  pains  and  all  the  pleafures 
in  the  lives  of  all  men  and  of  all  ani- 
mals ;    And  thus  by  your  refting  the 
whole  fyftem  of  religion  on  a  point, 

which, 


194         DiALOGlTES     CONCERNING 

P-^^^T*  which,  from  its  very  nature,  muft  for 
vv-^v>  ever  be  uncertain,  you  tacitly  confefs,, 
that  that  fyftem.  is  equally  uncertain. 

But  allowing  you,  v^hat  never  will 
be  believed ;  at  lead,  what  you  never 
poffibly  can  prove;;  that  animal,  or  at 
lead  human  happinefs,  in  this  life,  ex-^ 
ceeds  'its  mifery  ;  you  have  yet  done 
nothing :  For  this  is  not,  by  any  means ^ 
what  we  expe6l  from  infinite  power, 
infinite  wifdom,  and  infinite  goodnefs. 
Why  is  there  any  mifery  at  all  in  the 
world  ?  Not  by  chance  furely.  From 
feme  caufe  then.  Is  it  from  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Deity?  But  he  is  perfectly 
benevolent.  Is  it  contrary  to  his  inten- 
tion ?  But  he  IS  almighty.  Nothing  can 
Ihafce  the  folidity  of  this  reafoning,  fo 
fhort,  fo  clear,  fo  decifive:  except  we 
affert,  that  thefe  fubjefts  exceed  all  hu- 
;  man  capacity,  and  that  our  common 
I  meafures  of  truth  and  falfehood  are  not 
I  applicable  to  them  ;  a  topic,  which  I 
^  have 


Natural    Religion.  igj 

have  all  along  infifted  on,  but  which  Part 
you  have  from  the  beginning  rejected  ^^^ 
with  fcorn  and  indignation. 

But  I  will  be  contented  to  retire  ftill 
from  this  intrenchment,  for  I  deny  that 
you  can  ever  force  me  in  it:  I  will  al- 
low, that  pain  or  mifery  in  man  is  com- 
fatihle  with  infinite  power  and  good- 
nefs  in  the  Deity,  even  inryour  fenfe  of 
thefe  attributes  :  What  are  you  advan- 
ced by  all  thefe  conceiTions  ?  A  mere  pof- 
fible  compatibility  is  not  fufficient.  You 
muft  prove  thefe  pure,  unmixt,  and  un- 
controllable attributes  from  the  prelent 
mixt  and  confufed  phenomena,  and 
frbm  thefe  alone.  A  hopeful  underta- 
king !  Were  the  phenomena  ever  fo  pure 
and  unmixt,  yet  being  finite,  they  would 
be  infufficient  for  that  purpoie.  JIow 
much  more,  where  they  are  alfo  fo  jar- 
ring and  difcordant  ? 

Here,  Cleanthes,  I  find  myfelf  at 

eafe 


19^ 


Dialogues    c o n c e r n iis-  g 


Part  eafc  ill  Hiy  argument.   Here  I  triumph. 

w>^  Formerly,  when  we  argued  concerning 
the  natural  attributes  of  inteUigence  and 
defign,  I  needed  all  my  fceptical  and 
metaphyfical  fubtilty  to  elude  your 
grafp.  In  many  views  of  the  univerfe, 
and  of  its  parts,  particularly  the  latter, 
the  beauty  and  fitnefs  of  final  caufes 
ftrike  us  with  fuch  irrefiftible  force,  that 
all  objedlions  appear  (what  I  believe 
they  really  are)  mere  cavils  and  fo~ 
phifms;  nor  can  we  then  imagine  how 
it  was  ever  poflible  for  us  to  repofe  any 
weight  on  them.  But  there  is  no  view 
of  human  life,  or  of  the  condition  of 
mankind,  from  which,  without  the 
greateft  violence,  we  can  infer  the  mo- 
ral attributes,  or  learn  that  irifinite  be- 
nevolence, conjoined  with  infinite  power 
and  infinite  wifdom,  which  we  muft 
difcover  by  the  eyes  of  faith  alone.  It 
is  your  turn  now  to  tug  the  labouring 
oar,  and  to  fupport  your  philofophical 
fubtilties  againft  the  didates  of  plaia 
reafon  and  experience. 


PART         XL 


Scruple  hot  to  allow,  faid  Clean-  ^ARf  i 

XL  '  J 

THES,  that  I  have  been  apt  to  fu-  v^^v^  ' 

fpecl  the  frequent  repetition  of  the  word  ^ 
infnite^  which  we  meet  with  in  all  theo- 
logical writers,  to  favour  more  of  pa-  { 
negyric  than  of  philofophy;  and  that  , 
any  purpofes  of  reafoning,  and  even  of  | 
religion,  would  be  better  ferved,  were  i 
we  to  reft  contented  with  more  accu- 
rate   and    more   moderate  expreffions*  \ 
The  terms,  admirable^  excellent^  fuperla-  \ 
tively  great ^  uuife^  and  holy ;  thefe  fufE- 
ciently  fill  the  imaginations   of  men;  ■ 
and  any  thing  beyond,  befides  that  it 
leads  into  abfurdities,  has  no  influence  I 
on  the  afFeflions  or  fentiments.     Thus,  j 

N  '  -       in 


igS       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  [^  |-]^g  prcfcnt  fubjcdl,  if  we  abandon 
w.'^rx-/  all  human  analogy,  as  feems  your  inten- 
tion, Demea,  I  am  afraid  we  abandon 
all  religion,  and  retain  no  conception  of 
the;  great  objedl  of  our  adoration.  If  we 
prefer ve  human  analogy,  we  muft  for 
ever  find  it  impoffible  to  reconcile  any 
"    mixture  of  evil  in  the  nniverfe  with  in- 
finite attributes ;  much  lefs,  can  we  ever 
prove  the  latter  from  the  former.     But 
fuppofing  the  Author  of  Nature  to  be 
finitely  perfe6l,   though  far  exceeding 
mankind ;  a  fatisfacflory  account  may 
then  be  given  of  natural  and  moral  evil, 
and  every  untoward  phenomenon  be  ex- 
plained and  adjufted.     A  lefs  evil  may 
then  be  chofen,  in  order  to  avoid  a 
greater:  Inconveniencies  be  fubmitted 
to,  in  order  to  reach  a  defirable  endi 
And  in  a  word,  benevolence,  regulated 
by  wifdom,  and  limited  by  neceffity, 
may  produce  juft  fuch  a  world  as  the 
prefent.  You,  Philo,  who  are  fo  prompt 
at  ftarting  views,  and  refledlions,  and 

analogies; 


NATUR.AL    Religion,  199 

aaaiogies ;  I  would  gladly  hear,  at  length,  ^^'^ 
without  interruption,  your  opinion  of  o^r-s^ 
this  new  theory  ;  and  if  it  deferve  our 
attention,  we  may  afterwards,  at  more 
leiflire,  reduce  it  into  form* 

?viY  fen timents J  replied  Philo,  are 
PxOt  worth  being  made  a  myftery  of; 
and  therefore,  without  any  ceremony,  I 
ihall  deliver  what  occurs  to  me  with 
regard  to  the  prefent  fubjecl.  It  muft^ 
I  think^  be  allowed,  that^  if  a  very  li- 
mited intelligence,  v^hom  we  Ihall  fup- 
pofe  utterly  unacquainted  with  the  uni- 
verfe,  were  afTured,  that  it  w^ere  the 
production  of  a  very  good,  wafe,  and 
powerful  Being,  however  finite,  he 
would,  from  his  conjedlures,  form  be-^ 
forehand  a  different  notion  of  it  from 
what  we  find  it  to  be  by  experience; 
nor  would  he  ever  imagine,  merely 
from  thefe  attributes  of  the  caufe,  of 
which  he  is  informed,  that  the  effect 
could  be  fo  full  of  vice  and  mifery  and 

N  2  diforder. 


200       Dialogues    concerning 

P^RT  diforder,  as  it  appears  in  this  life.  Sup- 
^--w/  poiing  now,  that  this  perfon  were 
brought  into  the  world,  ftill  afflired 
that  it  was  the  workmanihip  of  fuch  a 
fublime  and  benevolent  Being ;  he 
might,  perhaps,  be  furprifed  at  the  dis- 
appointment ;  but  would  never  retra6l 
his  former  belief,  if  founded  on  any 
very  folid  argument ;  fince  fuch  a  li- 
mited intelligence  mull  be  fenlible  of 
his  own  blindnefs  and  ignorance,  and 
muft  allow,  that  there  may  be  many 
folutions  of  thofe  phenomena,  which 
will  for  ever  efcape  his  comprehenlion. 
But  fuppofing,  which  is  the  real  cafe 
with  regard  to  man,  that  this  creature 
is  not  antecedently  convinced  of  a 
fupreme  intelligence,  benevolent,  and 
powerful,  but  is  left  to  gather  fuch  a 
belief  from  the  appearances  of  things ; 
this  entirely  alters  the  cafe,  nor  will  he 
ever  find  any  reafbn  for  fuch  a  conclu- 
fion.  He  may  be  fully  convinced  of 
the  narrow  limits  of  his  underftanding  | 

but 


Natural    Religion.  201 

but  this  will  not  help  him  in  forming  ^^y 
an  inference  concerning  the  goodnefs  «^v-v^ 
of  fuperior  powers,  fince  he  mud  form 
that  inference  from  what  he  knows, 
not  from  what  he  is  ignorant  of.  The 
more  you  exaggerate  his  weaknefs  and 
ignorance,  the  more  difQdent  you  ren- 
der him,  and  give  him  the  greater  fufpi- 
cion  that  fuch  fubjecfls  are  beyond  the 
reach  of  his  faculties.  You  are  obliged , 
therefore,  to  reafon  with  him  merely 
from  the  known  phenomena,  and  to 
drop  every  arbitrary  fuppofition  or  con- 
je6lure. 

Did  I  fliow  you  a  houfe  or  palace, 
where  there  was  not  one  apartment 
convenient  or  agreeable ;  where  the 
windows,  doors,  fires,  pafTages,  flairs, 
and  the  whole  oeconomy  of  the  build- 
ing, were  the  fource  of  noife,  confu- 
fion,  fatigue,  darknefs,  and  the  ex- 
tremes of  heat  and  cold  j  you  would 
certainly  blame  the  contrivance,  with- 

N  3  out 


202       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  q^^  n^^ij  farther  examination.  The  ar- 
w.-vrC  chitedl  would  in  vain  difplay  his  fub- 
tilty,  and  prove  to  you,  that  if  this 
door  or  that  window  were  altered, 
greater  ills  would  enfne.  What  he  fays 
may  be  flriclly  true :  The  alteration  of 
one  particular,  while  the  other  parts  of 
the  building  remain,  may  only  augment 
theinconveniencies.  But  ftill  you  would 
aflert  in  general,  that,  if  the  archi-^ 
te6l  had  had  ildll  and  good  intentions, 
he  might  have  formed  fuch  a  plan  of 
the  whole,  and  might  have  adjufled  the 
parts  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  would  have 
remedied  all  or  moft  of  thefe  incon- 
veniencies.  Kis  ignorance,  or  even 
your  own  ignorance  of  fuch  a  plan, 
will  never  convince  you  of  the  iiiipoffi- 
bility  of  it.  If  you  find  many  incon- 
veniencies  and  deformities  in  the  build-^ 
ing,  you  will  always,  without  entering 
into  any  detail,  condemn  the  archi-r? 
te(5l. 


In 


Natural    Religion.  203 

In  fliort,  I  repeat  the  queftion:  Is  ^^^'^ 
the  world,  conlidered  in  general,  and  v^v^ 
as  it  appears  to  us  in  this  life,  different 
from  what  a  man,  or  fuch  a  limited 
being,  would,  beforehand^  expedl  from 
a  very  powerful,  wife,  and  benevolent 
Deity  ?  It  muft  be  ftrange  prejudice  to 
affert  the  contrary.  \  And  from  thence 
I  conclude,  that,  however  confiftent  the 
world  may  be,  allowing  certain  fuppo- 
fitions  and  conjectures,  with  the  idea 
of  fuch  a  Deity,  it  can  never  afford  us 
an  inference  concerning  his  exiftence. 
The  confiflence  is  not  abfolutely  denied, 
only  the  inference.  Conjedlures,  efpe- 
cially  where  infinity  is  excluded  from 
the  divine  attributes,  may,  perhaps,  be 
fufficient  to  prove  a  confiflence ;  but 
can  never  be  foundations  for  any  in- 
ference. 

There  feem  to  htfour  circumflances, 

on  which  depend  all,  or  the  greateft 

part   of  the   ills,  that   molefl    fenfible 

N  4  creatures; 


4o'4       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  creatures  ;  and  it  is  not  impoffible  but 
wv>^  all  thefe  circlimftances  may  be  neceffary 
and  unavoidable.  We  know  fo  little  be-  . 
yond  common  life,  or  even  of  common 
life,  that,  with  regard  to  the  oeconomy 
of  a  univerfe,  there  is  no  conjecture,  v 
however  wild,  which  may  not  be  juft  ; 
nor  any  one,  however  plaufible,  which 
may  not  be  erroneous.   (^All  that  be- 
longs to  human  under  {landing,  in  this 
deep  ignorance  and  obfcurity,  is  to  be 
fceptical,  or  at  leaft  cautious  ;  and  not 
to  admit  of  any  hypothefis  whatever  ; 
much  lefs,  of  any  which  is  fupported 
by  no  appearance  of  probability.  )  Now 
this  I  alTert  to  be  the  cafe  with  regard 
to  all  the  caufes  of  evil,  and  the  cir- 
cumftances  on  which  it  depends.  None 
of  them  appear  to  human  reafon,  in 
the    leaft   degree,    neceffary    or    una- 
voidable ;    nor   can   we    fuppofe    them 
fuch,    without   the    utinoft    licenfe   of 
[     imagination. 

The 


Natural    Religion.  205 

The  fir  ft  clrcumftance  which  intro-  ^^^'^ 
.      .  .  XI. 

duces  evil,  is  that  contrivance  or  oeco-  v^-^ 

nonay  of  the  animal  creation,  by  which 
pains,  as  well  as  pleafures,  are  employ- 
ed to  excite  all  creatures  to  action,  and 
make  them,  vigilant  in  the  great  work  of 
felf-prefervation.  Now  pleafure  alone, 
in  its  various  degrees,  feems  to  human 
underftanding  fuiEcient  for  this  pur- 
pofe.  All  animals  might  be  conftantly 
in  a  ftate  of  enjoyment:  but  when 
urged  by  any  of  the  neceilities  of  na- 
ture, fuch  as  thirft,  hunger,  w'eari- 
nefs ;  inftead  of  pain,  they  might  feel 
a  diminution  of  pleafure,  by  which 
they  might  be  prompted  to  feek  that 
objed:  which  is  necefTary  to  their  fub- 
fiftence.vMen  purfue  pleafure  as  eager-  ._ 
ly  as  they  avoid  pain  ;  at  lead,  might 
have  been  fo  conftituted.  It  feems, 
therefore,  plainly  poffible  to  carfy  on 
the  bufinefs  of  life  without  any  pain. 
Why  then  is  any  animal  ever  rendered 
lufceptible  of  fuch  a  fenfation  ?  If  ani- 

mals 


2o6       Dialogues    concerning 

^^^  mals  can  be  free  from  it  an  hour,  they 
•--vN-/  might  enjoy  a  perpetual  exemption  from 
it ;  and  it  required  as  particular  a  con- 
trivance of  their  organs  to  produce  that 
feeling,  as  to  endow  them  with  fight, 
hearing,  or  any  of  the  fenfes.  Shall 
we  conjedlure,  that  fuch  a  contrivance 
was  neceffary,  without  any  appearance 
of  reafon  ?  and  fliall  we  build  on  that 
conjedlure,  as  on  the  moft  certain 
truth? 

But  a  capacity  of  pain  would  not 
alone  produce  pain,  were  it  not  for  the 
fecond  circumftance,  'uiz.^  the  conduct- 
ing of  the  world  by  general  laws  ;  and 
this  feems  no  wife  neceffary  to  a  very 
perfedl  Being.  It  is  true ;  if  every 
thing  were  condudled  by  particular 
volitions,  the  courfe  of  iiatvire  would 
be  perpetually  broken,  and  no  man 
could  employ  his  reafon  in  the  condu6l 
of  life.  But  might  not  other  parti- 
cular volitions  remedy  this  inconveni- 
ence ? 


Natural    Religion.  207 

ence?  Iii  fliort,  might    not  the  Deity  Part 
exterminate  all  ill,  where-ever  it  were  ^^-r^ 
ta  be  found  ;  and  produce    all  good, 
without  any  preparation  or  long  pro- 
grefs  of  caufes  and  eflFe(3:s  ? 

Besides,  v/e  muft  confider,  that, 
according  to  the  prefent  oeconomy  of 
the  world,  the  courfe  of  Nature,  though 
fuppofed  exactly  regular,  yet  to  us  ap- 
pears not  fo,  and  many  events  are  un- 
certain, and  many  difappoint  our  ex- 
peclations.  Health  and  iicknefs,  calm 
and  tempeft,  with  an  infinite  number 
of  other  accidents,  whofe  caufes  are  un- 
known and  variable,  have  a  great  in- 
fluence both  oh  the  fortunes  of  parti- 
cular perfons  and  on  the  profperity  of 
public  focieties  :  and  indeed  all  human 
life,  in  a  manner,  depends  an  fuch  ac- 
cidents. A  being,  therefore,  who  knows 
the  fecret  fprings  of  the  univerfe,  might 
ealily,  by  particular  volitions,  turn  all 
ihefe  accidents  to  the  good  of  mankind, 

and 


2o8       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  and  render  the  whole  world  happy, 
^^.^  without  difcovering  himfelf  in  any  ope- 
ration. A  fleet,  whofe  pnrpofes  were 
falutary  to  fociety,  might  always  meet 
with  a  fair  wind:  Good  princes  enjoy 
y^  found  health  and  long  life :  Perfons 
born  to  power  and  authority,  be  fram- 
ed with  good  tempers  and  virtuous  dif- 
pofitions.  A  few  fuch  events  as  thefe, 
regularly  and  wifely  conducfted,  would 
change  the  face  of  the  world  ;  and  yet 
would  no  more  feem  to  difturb  the 
courfe  of  ^Nature,  or  confound  human 
conducl,  than  the  prefent  oeconomy  of 
things,  where  the  caufes  are  fecret,  and 
variable,  and  compounded.  Some  finall 
touches,  given  to  Caligula's  brain  in 
his  infancy,^  might  have  converted  him 
into  a  Trajan  :  one  wave,  a  little 
higher  than  the  reft, by  burying  C-ESAR 
and  his  fortune  in  the  bottom  of  the 
ocean,  might  have  reftored  liberty  to  a 
confiderable  part  of  mankind*  There 
may,  for  aught  we  know,  be  good  rea- 

fons. 


Natural    Religion.  209 

fons,  why  Providence  interpofes  not  in  ^^^"^ 
this  manner  ;  bnt  they  are  unknown  to  ^.--^ 
us :  and  though  the  mere  fuppofition, 
that  luch  reafons  exift,  may  be  fuiE- 
cient  to  fave  the  conclufion  concerning 
the  divine  attributes,  yet  furely  it  can 
never  be  fufEcient  to  eftahliflo  that  con- 
ckifion. 


If  every  thing  in  the  univerfe  be  con- 
ducfled  by  general  laws,  and  if  animals 
be  rendered  fufceptible  of  pain,  it  fcarce- 
ly  feems  poflible  but  fome  ill  muft  arife 
in  the  various  ftiocks  of  matter,  and  the 
various  concurrence  and  oppofition  of 
general  laws :  But  this  ill  would  be  very  ^ 
rare,  were  it  not  for  the  third  circum- 
ftance,  which  I  propofed  to  mention, 
'viz,  the  great  frugality  with  which  all 
powers  and  faculties  are  diftributed  to 
every,  particular  being.  So  well  adjufted 
are  the  organs  and  capacities  of  all  ani- 
mals, and  fo  well  fitted  to  their  prefer- 
vatlon,  that,  as  far  as  hiftory  or  tradi- 

^  tion 


^ 


^lo       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  tion  reaches,  there  appears  not  to  be  any 
t^.-^^  fingle  fpecies  which  has  yet  been  extln- 
guiihed  in  the  univerfe.  Every  animal 
has  the  requifite  endowments;  but  thefe 
endowments  are  beftow^ed  with  fo  fcru- 
pulous  an  oeconomy,  that  any  confide- 
rable  diminution  mud  entirely  deftroy 
the  creature.  Wherever  one  power  is 
increafed,  there  is  a  proportional  abate- 
ment in  the  others.  Animals,  which  ex- 
cel in  Iwiftnefs,  are  commonly  defec- 
five  in  force.  Thofe  which  poffefs  both, 
are  either  imxperfecl  in  fome  of  their 
fenfes,  or  are  opprefTed  with  the  moil 
craving  wants.  The  human  fpecies, 
whofe  chief  excellency  is  reafon  and  fa- 
gacity,  is  of  all  others  the  moft  neceffi- 
tous,  and  the  moft  deficient  in  bodily 
advantages ;  without  clothes,  without 
arms,  without  food,  without  lodging, 
without  any  convenience  of  life,  except 
what  they  owe  to  their  own  lldll  and 
induftry.  In  fliort,  Nature  feems  to 
have  formed  an  exad  calculation  of  the 

neceffitiei^ 


Natural    Religion.  211 

neceflities  of  her  creatures :  and,  like  a  ^^^'^ 

XI. 

rigid  majler\    has   afforded  them  little  (^..-v^ 
more  powers  or  endowments  than  what 
are    ftridlly  fiifficient  to   fupply  thofe 
"  necefTities.     An  indulgent  parent  would  _--^ 
have  beftowed  a  large  flock,  in  order  to 
guard  againfl  accidents,  and  fecure  the 
happinefs  and  welfare  of  the  creature 
in  the  mofc  unfortunate  concurrence  of 
circumflances.     Every    courfe    of   life 
would  not  have  been  fo  furrounded  with 
precipices,  that  the  leafl  departure  from 
the  true  path,  by  miftake  or  neceflity,     ~ 
mufl  involve  us  in  mifery  and  ruin. 
Some  referve,  fome  fund,  would  have 
been  provided  to  enfure  happinefs;  nor 
would  the  powers  and  the   necefTities 
have  been  adjufted  with  fo  rigid  an  oeco- 
nomy.  The  Author  of  Nature  is  incon- 
ceivably powerful:  his  force  is  luppofed 
great,  if  not  altogether  inexhauflible : 
nor  is  there  any  reafon,  as  far  as  we  can 
judge,  to  make  him  obferve  this  flridl 
frugality  in  his  dealings  with  his  crea- 
tures. 


212   Dialogues  concerning 


Pa 


/ 


^^^  tares.    It  would  have  been  better,  were 
"I. 

his  power  extremely  limited,  to  have 

created  fevv^er  animals,  and  to  have  en- 
do  v/ed  thefe  with  more  faculties  for  their 
happinefs  and  prefer vation.  A  builder 
is  never  efteemed  prudent,  who  under- 
takes a  plan  beyond  what  his  ftock  will 
enable  him  to  finifh. 

In  order  to  cure  moft  of  the  ills  of 
human  life,  I  require  not  that  man 
fhould  have  the  wings  of  the  eagle,  the 
fwiftnefs  of  the  flag,  the  force  of  the  ox, 
the  arms  of  the  lion,  the  fcales  of  the 
crocodile  or  rhinoceros ;  much  lefs  do  I 
demand  the  fagacity  of  an  angel  or  che- 
rubim. I  am  contented  to  take  an  in- 
creafe  in  one  fingle  power  or  faculty  of 
his  foul.  Let  him  be  endowed  with,  a 
greater  propenfity  to  induftry  and  la- 
bour ;  a  more  vigorous  fpring  and  ac- 
tivity of  mind;  a  more  conflant  bent  to 
bufinefs  and  application.  Let  the  whole 
fpecies  poiTefs  naturally  an  equal  dili- 
gence 


^3ATURAL    Religion.  213 

gence  with  that  which  many  individuals  ^^^^ 
are  able  to  attain  by  habit  and  reflec-  c^-^vv 
tion  ;  and  the  moft  beneficial  confe- 
quences,  without  any  allay  of  illj  is  the 
immediate  and  neceffary  refult  of  this 
endowment.  Almoft  all  the  moral^  as 
well  as  natural  evils  of  human  life  arife 
from  idlenefs ;  and  were  our  fpecies,  by 
the  original  conftitution  of  their  frame, 
exempt  from  this  vice  or  infirmity,  the 
perfed:  cultivation  of  land,  the  improve- 
ment of  arts  and  manufactures,  the  exa6l 
execution  of  every  office  and  duty, 
immediately  follow;  and  men  at  once 
may  fully  reach  that  ftate  of  fociety, 
which  is  fo  imperfectly  attained  by  the 
beft-regulated  government.  Blit  as  in- 
duftry  is  a  power,  and  the  moft  valu- 
able of  any.  Nature  feems  determined, 
iuitably  to  her  ufual  maxims^  to  beftow 
it  on  men  with  a  very  fparing  hand ;  and 
rather  to  punifh  him  feverely  for  his  de- 
ficiency in  it,  than  to  reward  him  for  his 
attainments.     She  has  fo  cantrived  his 

O  frame, 


214      Dialogues    concernikg 

Part  frame,  that  nothins:  but  th^  moft  vio-* 
^v-o  lent  neceility  can  oblige  him.  to  labour; 
and  ftie  employs  all  his  other  wants  to 
overcome,  at  leaft  in  part,  the  want  of 
diligence,  and  to  endow  him  with  Ibme 
fhare  of  a  faculty,-    of  which  flie  has 
thought  fit  naturally  to  bereave  him- 
Here    our  demands    mav  be    allowed 
very  humble,  and  therefore  the  more 
reafonable.      If  we    required   the    en- 
dowments of  fuperior  penetration  and 
judgment,  of  a  more  delicate  tafte  of 
beauty,  of  a  nicer  fenfibiliiy  to  bene- 
volence and  friendfhip  ;  we  might  be 
told,  that  we  impiouily  pretend  to  break 
the  order  of  Nature;  that  we  want  to 
exalt  ourfelves  into  a  higher  rank  of  be- 
ing ;  that  the  prefents  which  we  require, 
not  being  liiitable  to  our  ftate  and  con- 
dition, would  only  be  pernicious  to  us. 
—     But  it  is  hard ;  I  dare  to  repeat  it,  it  is 
_     hard,  that  being  placed  in  a  world  fo 
full  of  wants  and  neceffities,  where  al- 
m.oft  every  being  and  element  is  either 

our 


Natural    Religion.  I15 

our  foe  or  refufes  its  afTiftance we  ^^^"^ 

fhould  alfo  have  our  own  temper  to  ^^v->-^ 
ftruggle  with,  and  fhould  be  deprived 
of  tha.t  faculty  which  can  alone  fence 
againft  thefe  multiplied  evils. 


The  fourth  circumftance,  whence  a- 
rifes  the  mifery  and  ill  of  the  univerfe, 
is  the  inaccurate  workmanfhip  of  all  the 
fprings  and  principles  of  the  great  ma- 
chine of  nature.  It  muft  be  acknow- 
ledged, that  there  are  few  parts  of  the 
univerfe,  which  feem  not  to  ferve  fome 
purpofe,  and  v^^hofe  r^emoval  would  not 
produce  a  vifible  defedl  and  diforder  in 
the  whole.  The  parts  hang  all  toge- 
ther ;  nor  can  one  be  touched  without 
affedling  the  reft,  in  a  greater  or  lefs 
degree.  But  at  the  fame  time,  it  muft 
be  obferved,  that  none  of  thefe  parts  or 
principles,  however  ufeful,  are  fo  ac- 
curately adjufted,  as  to  keep  precifely 
within  thofe  bounds  in  which  their  uti- 
lity conGfts  ;  but  they  are,  all  of  them, 

O  2  apt, 


X 


2i6       Dialogues    concerning/ 

Part  apt,  Oil  evcTj  occafion,  to  run  into  the 
w-'-Zj  one  extreme  or  the  other.  One  would 
imagine,  that  this  grand  prodticflion  had 
not  received  the  laft  hand  of  the  maker ; 
fo  little  finiftied  is  every  part,  and  fo 
coarfe  are  the  ftrokes  with  which  it  is 
executed.  Thus,  the  winds  are  requi- 
lite  to  convey  the  vapours  along  the 
furface  of  the  globe,  and  to  aflift  meii 
in  navigation  :  but  how  oft,  rifing  up 
to  tempefls  and  hurricanes,  do  they  be-* 
come  pernicious  ?  Rains  are  neceflary 
to  nourilh  all  the  plants  and  animals  of 
the  earth :  but  how  often  are  they  de- 
fedlive  ?  how  often  exceiTive  ?  Heat  h 
requilite  to  all  life  and  vegetation  ;  but 
is  not  always  found  in  the  due  propor- 
*tion.  On  the  mixture  and  fecretion  of 
the  humours  and  juices  of  the  body  de- 
pend the  health  and  profperity  of  the 
animal :  but  the  parts  perform  not  re- 
gularly their  proper  funcftion.  What 
more  ufeful  than  all  the  paffions  of  the 
mind,  ambition,  vanity,  love,  anger  ? 


Natural    Religion, 


217 


But  how  oft  do  they  break  their  bounds,  Part 

>       XT 

and  caufe  the  greatefl  convulfions  in  v.^v^l^ 
fociety  ?  There  is  nothing  fo  advan- 
tageous in  the  univerfe,  but  what  fre- 
quently becomes  pernicious,  by  its  ex- 
cefs  or  defecfl ;  nor  has  Nature  guarded, 
with  the  requilite  accuracy,  againft  all 
diforder  or  confufion.  The  irregula- 
rity is  never,  perhaps,  fo  great  as  to  ' 
deftroy  any  fpecies  ;  but  is  often  fuffi- 
cient  to  involve  the  individuals  in  ruin 
and  mifery. 

On  the  concurrence,  then,  of  thei!e 
faur  circumftances,  does  all  or  the 
greatefl  part  of  natural  evil  depend. 
Were  all  living  creatures  incapable  of 
pain,  or  were  the  world  adminiftered 
by  particular  volitions,  evil  never  could 
have  found  accefs  into  the  tiniverfe : 
and  were  animals  endowed  with  a  large 
flock  of  powers  and  faculties,  beyond 
what  flridl  neceflity  requires  ;  or  were 
the  feveral  fprings  and  principles  of  the 
O  3  univerfc 


2i8       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  univerfe  fo  accurately  framed  as  to  pre- 
v-^— Iv  ferve  always  the  jufl  temperament  and 
medium;  there  mull  have  been  very 
little  ill  in  comparifon  of  what  we  feel  at 
prefent.  What  then  fliall  we  pronounce 
on  this  occafion?  Shall  we  fay,  that 
thefe  circumftances  are  not  necelTary, 
and  that  they  might  eaiily  have '  been 
altered  in  the  contrivance  of  the  uni- 
verfe ?  This  decifion  feems  too  prq- 
fumptuous  for  creatures  fo  blind  and 
ignorant.  Let  us  be  more  modefl  in 
our  conc]uiions.  Let  us  allow,  that, 
if  the  goodnefs  of  the  Deity  (I  mean  a 
goodnefs  like  the  human)  could  be  efta- 
blifhed  on  any  tolerable  reafons  a  priori^ 
thefe  phenomena,  however  untoward, 
would  not  be  fufficient  to  fubvert  that 
principle  ;  but  might  eafily,  in  fome 
unknown  manner,  be  reconcilable  to  it. 
But  let  us  ftill  affert,  that  as  this  good-^ 
nefs  is  not  antecedently  eftabliflied,  but 
muft  be  inferred  from  the  phenomena, 
there  can  be  no  grounds  for  fuch  an 

inference. 


Natural    Religion.  219 

inference,  while  there  are  fo  many  ills  ^^Y 
in   the  univerfe,  and  while  thefe    ills  o-^^ 
might  fo  eafily  have  been  remedied,  as 
far  as    hmnan   nnderflanding    can  be 
allowed  to  judge  on  fuch  a  fubjed:.     I- 
am  Sceptic  enough  to  allow,  that  the 
bad  appearances,    notwithftanding   all 
my  reafbnings,  may  be  compatible  with 
fuch   attributes    as   you   fuppofe :    But 
furely  they  can  never  prove  thefe  attri- 
butes.    Such  a  conclulion  cannot  refult 
from  Scepticifm ;  but  muft  arife  from 
the  phenomena,  and  from  our  confi- 
dence in  the  reafonings  which  w€  de- 
duce from  thefe  phenomena. 

Look  round  this  univerfe.  What 
an  immenfe  profufion  gf  beings,  ani- 
mated and  organized,  fenfible  and  ac- 
tive !  You  admire  this  prodigious  vari- 
ety and  fecundity.  But  infpedt  a  little 
more  narrowly  thefe  living  exiftences, 
the  only  beings  worth  regarding.  How 
hoflile  and  deftrudlive  to  each  other  ! 

O  4  How 


^2o       Dialogues    concerning 

^^Y  How  infuiBcient  all  of  them  for  their 
^->sro  own  happinefs !  Hovxr  contemptible  or 
odious  to  the  fpc&intoY !  The  whole 
prefents  nothing  but  the  idea  of  a  blind 
Nature,  impregnated  by  a  great  vivify- 
ing principle,  and -pouring  forth  from 
Jh.er  lap,  without  difcernment  or  pa- 
rental care,  her  maimed  and  abortive 
children. 

Here  the  Manich^an  fvftem  oc- 
curs  as  a  proper  hypothefis  to  folve  the 
difficulty :  and  no  doubt,  in  fome  re- 
fpedls,  it  is  very  fpecious,  and  has  more 
probability  than  the  common  hypothe- 
fis, by  giving  a  plaufible  account  of  the 
ftrange  mixture  of  good  and  ill  which 
appears  in  life.  But  if  we  conflder,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  perfect  uniformity 
and  agreement  of  the  parts  of  the  uni-- 
,  verfe,  we  ftiall  not  difcover  in  it  anv 
marks  of  the  combat  of  a  malevolent 
with  a  benevolent  being.  There  is  in- 
deed an  oppofition  of  pains  and  plea- 
fur  es 


Natural    Religion.  221 

fares  in  the  feelings  of  fenlible  crea-  P^^' 
tures :  but  are  not  all  the  operations  of  v.^ 
Nature  carried  on  by  an  oppofition  of 
principles,  of  hot  and  cold,  moift  and 
dry,  light  and  heavy  ?  The  true  conclu- 
fion  is,  that  the  original  Source  of  all 
things  is  entirely  indifferent  to  all  thefe 
principles;  and  has  no  more  regard  to 
good  above  ill,  than  to  heat  above  cold, 
or  to  drought  above  moifture,  or  to 
light  above  heavy. 

There  may  four  hypothefes  be  fra- 
med concerning  the  firft  caufes  of  the 
univerfe:  that  they  are  endowed  with 
perfedl  goodnefs ;  that  they  have  per- 
fedl  malice;  /A j/ they  are  oppofite,  and 
have  both  goodnefs  and  malice;  that 
they  have  neither  goodnefs  nor  malice. 
Mixt  phenomena  can  never  prove  the 
two  former  unmixt  principles.  And  the 
uniformity  and  fteadinefs  of  general 
laws  feem  to  oppofe  the  third.     The 

fourth, 


222   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  fourth,  therefore,  feems  by  far  the  moft 
y^srL;  probable. 

What  I  have  faid  concerning  natu- 
ral evil  v^ill  apply  to  moral,  with  little 
or  no  variation ;  and  we  have  no  more 
reafon  to  infer,  that  the  redlitude  of  the 
Supreme  Being  refembles  human  re6li- 
/  '  tude  than  that  his  benevolence  refembles 
the  human.  Nay,  it  will  be  thought, 
that  we  have  ftill  greater  caufe  to  ex- 
clude from  him  moral  fentiments,  fuch 
as  we  feel  them;  fince  moral  evil,  in  the 
opinion  of  many,  is  much  more  predo^ 
nainant  above  moral  good  than  natural 
evil  above  natural  good. 

But  even  though  this  fliould  not  be 
allowed ;  and  though  the  virtue,  which 
is  in  mankind,  Ihould  be  acknowledged 
m.uch  fuperior  to  the  vice  ;  yet  fo  long 
as  there  is  any  vice  at  all  in  the  uni- 
verfe,  it  will  very  much  puzzle  you  An«- 
thropomorphites,  how  to  account  for  it. 

You 


Natural    Religion.  223 

You  rnuft  affign  a  caufe  for  it,  without  ^J"^ 
having  recourfe  to  the  firft  caufe.  But  *-^v>>j 
as  every  efFed:  muft  have  a  caufe,  and 
that  caufe  another  ;  you  muft  either 
carry  on  the  progrefTion  in  infnitiim^  or 
reft  on  that  original  principle,  who  is 
the  ultimate  caufe  of  all  things 

Hold!  Hold!  cried  Demea:  Whi- 
ther does  your  imagination  hurry  you  ? 
I  joined  in  alliance  with  you,  in  order 
to  prove  the  incompreheniible  nature  of 
the  Divine  Being,  and  refute  the  prin- 
ciples ofCLEANTHES,  who  would  mca- 
fure  every  thing  By  a  human  rule  and 
ftandard.  But  I  now  find  you  running 
into  all  the  topics  of  the  greateft  liber- 
tines and  infidels ;  and  betraying  that 
holy  caufe,  which  you  feemingly  efpou- 
fed.  Are  you  fecretly,  then,  a  more 
dangerous  enemy  than  Cleanthes 
himfelf? 

And  are  you  fo  late  in  perceiving  it? 

replied 


224   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  replied  Cleanthes.  Believe  me,  De- 
v-,-y^  ME  A;  your  friend  Philo,  from  the  be- 
ginning, has  been  amuling  himfelf  at. 
both  our  expence;  and  it  mufh  be  con- 
feffed,  that  the  injudicious  reafoning  of 
our  vulgar  theology  has  given  him  but 
too  juft  a  handle  of  ridicule.  The  total 
infirmity  of  human  reafon,  the  abfolute 
^^  incomprehenfibility  of  the  Divine  Na- 
ture, the  great  and  univerfal  mifery  and 
ftill  greater  wickednefs  of  men;  thefe 
are  ftrange  topics,  furely,  to  be  fo  fondly 
cheriflied  by  orthodox  divines  and  doc- 
tors. In  ages  of  ftupidity  and  igno-- 
rarice,  indeed,  thefe  principles  may  fafe- 
}y  be  efpoufed ;  and,  perhaps,  no  views 
of  things  are  inore  proper  to  promqte 
fuperilition,  than  fiich  as  encourage  the 
blind  amazement,  the  diffidence,  and 
melancholy  of  mankind.  But  at  pre-? 
fent ...... 

Blame  not  fo  much,  interpofed  Phi- 
LO,  the  ignorance  of  thefe  reverend  gen- 
tlemen. 


Natural    Religion.  225 

'demen.  They  know  liow  to  change  their  ^^^"^ 
ftyle  with  the  times.  Formerly  it , was  a 
mofl  popular  theological  topic  to  main- 
tain, that  human  life  was  vanity  and 
mifery,  and  to  exaggerate  all  the  ills  and 
pains  which  are  incident  to  men.  But 
of  late  years,  divines,  we  find,  begin  to 
retradl  this  polition;  and  maintain, 
though  ftill  with  fome  hefitation,  that 
there  are  more  goods  than  evils,  more 
pleafures  than  pains,  even  in  this  life. 
When  religion  flood  entirely  upon  tem- 
per and  education,  it  was  thought  pro- 
per to  encourage  melancholy ;  as  indeed, 
mankind  never  have  recourfe  to  fupe- 
f ior  powers  fo  readily  as  in  that  difpo- 
fition.  But  as  men  have  now  learned 
to  form  principles,  and  to  draw  confe- 
quences,  it  is  neceflary  to  change  the 
batteries,  and  to  make  ufe  of  fuch  ar- 
guments as  will  endure  at  leaft  fome 
fcrutiny  and  examination.  This  varia- 
tion is  the  fame   (and  from  the  fame 

caufes) 


226   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  caufes)  With  that  which  I  formerly  re-* 
u-^^  marked  with  regard  to  Scepticifm. 

Thus  Philo  continvied  to  the  laft  his 
fpirit  of  oppolition,  and  his  cenfiire  of 
eftabhfhed  opinions.  But  I  could  ob- 
ferve,  that  Demea  did  not  at  all  relifh. 
the  latter  part  of  the  difcourfe ;  and  he 
took  occafion  foon  after,  on  fome  pre- 
tence or  other,  to  leave  the  company. 


PART 


P     A     R     T         XIL 


AFTER  Demea's  departure,  Clean-  ^^^^ 
.  XII. 

THES    and  Philo    continued  the  ^^^-^ 

converfation  in  the  following  manner. 
Our  friend,  I  am  afraid,  faid  Clean- 
THES,  will  have  little  inclination  to  re- 
vive this  topic  of  difcourfe,  while  you 
are  in  company ;    and    to  tell    truth, 
Philo,  I  ihould  rather  wifli  to  reafon 
with  either  of  you  apart  on  a  fiibjedl 
fo  fublime  and  interefting.    Your  fpirit 
of  controverfy,  joined  to  your  abhor- 
rence of  vulgar  fuperftition,  carries  you 
flrange  lengths,  when  engaged  in  an  ar- 
gument ;  and  there  is  nothing  fo  facred 
and  venerable,  even  in  your  own  eyes, 
which  you  fpare  on  that  qccafion. 

I 


^2§       Dialogues    concerning 

Part       J  MUST  confcfs,  replied  Philo,  that 

XII.  . 

I  am  lefs  cautious  on  the  fubjecl  of  Na- 
tural Religiou  than  on  any  other ;  both 
becaufe  I  know  that  I  can  never,  on  that 
head,  corrupt  the  principles  of  any  man 
of  common  fenfe ;  and  becavife  no  one, 
I  am  confident,  in  whoft  eyes  I  appear 
a  man  of  common  fenfe,  will  ever  mif- 
take  my  intentions.  You  in  particular, 
Cleanthes,  with  whom  I  live  in  un- 
referved  intimacy  ;  you  are  fenfible, 
that,  notwithftanding  the  freedom  of 
my  converfation,  and  my  love  of  fingu- 
lar  arguments,  no  one  has  a  deeper  fenfe 
of  religion  impreffed  on  his  mind,  or 
pays  more  profound  adoration  to  the 
Divine  Being,  as  he  difcovers  hlmfelf  to 
reafon,  in  the  inexplicable  contrivance 
and  artifice  of  Nature.  A  purpofe,  an 
intention,  a  defign,  fli-ikes  every  where 
the  moll  (^arelefs,  the  mofl  ftupid 
thinker;  and  no  man  can  be  fo  harden-*- 
ed  in  abfiird  fyftems,  as  at  all  times  to 
reje6l  it,     77:?^^  Nature  does  nothing  in 

vain. 


Natural    Religioi^.  ^29 

^jain,  is  a  maxhn  eftabliflied  in  all  the  ^jj^ 
fchoolSj  merely  from  the  contemplation  ^-"^^^ 
of  the  works  of  Nature,  without  any  re- 
ligious purpofe ;  and,  from  a  firm  con- 
\aclion  of  its  truth,  an  anatomift,  who 
had  obferved  a  new  organ  or  canal, 
would  never  be  fatisfied  till  he  had  alfo 
difcovered  its  ufe  and  intention.  One 
great  foundation  of  the  Copernican 
fyjfiem  is  the  maxim.  That  Nature  aBx 
by  the  fimplejl  methods^  and  choojes  the  mojl 
proper  raeans  to  a?iy  end ;  and  aftrono- 
mers  often,  without  thinking  of  it,  lay 
this  ftrong  foundation  of  piety  and  re- 
ligion. The  fame  thing  is  obfervable  in 
other  parts  of  philofophy :  And  thus  all 
the  fciences  almoft  lead  us  infenfibly  to 
acknowledge  a  firft  intelligent  Author; 
and  their  authority  is  often  fo  much  the 
greater,  as  they  do  not  diredlly  profefs 
that  intention. 

It  is  with  pleafure  I  hear  Galen 
reafon  concerning  the  ftructure  of  the 

P  human 


230   Dialogues  concerning 

^Y  l^^^i^an  body.    The  anatomy  of  a  man, 
K.-y^  fays  he  *,  difcovers  above  600  different 
mufcles  ;    a,nd  whoever  duly  confiders 
thefe,  will  find,  that  in  each  of  them 
Nature  mufl  have  adjufled  at  leaft  ten 
different  circumflances,  in  order  to  at- 
tain the  end  which  fhe  propofed ;  pro- 
per figure,  juft  magnitude,  right  difpo- 
fition  of  the  feveral  ends,   upper  and 
lower  pofition  of  the  whole,  the  due  in- 
fertion  of  the  feveral  nerves,  veins,  and 
arteries :  So  that,  in  the  mufcles  alone, 
above  6000  feveral  views  and  intentions 
mull  have  been  formed  and  executed. 
The  bones  he  calculates  to  be  284:  The 
diflindl  purpofes,  aimed  at  in  the  ftruc- 
ture  of  each,  above  forty.  What  a  pro- 
digious difplay  of  artifice,  even  in  thefe 
fimple  and  homogeneous  parts  ?  But  if 
we  confider  the  fkin,  ligaments,  veffels, 
glandules,  humours,  the  feveral  limbs 
and  members  of  the  body ;  how  mull 

our 

*  De  formatione  fgetu&. 


Natural    Religion.  231 

our  ailomfhment  rife  -apon  uS)  in  pro-  ^^Y 
portion  to  the  number  and  intricacy  of  v-or>> 
the  parts  fo  artificially  adjufted  ?  The 
farther  we  advance  in  thefe  refearches, 
we  difcover  new  fcenes  of  art  and  wif- 
dom:  But  defcry  ftill,  at  a  diftancCj  far- 
ther fcenes  beyond  our  reach;  in  the 
fine  internal  flruAure  of  the  parts,  in  ^ 
the  oeconomy  of  the  brain,  in  the  fa.bric 
of  the  feminal  veifels.  All  thefe  artifices 
are  repeated  in  every  different  fpecies  of 
animal,  with  wonderful  variety,  and 
with  exa.61  propriety,  fuited  to  the. dif- 
ferent intentions  of  Nature  in  framing 
each  fpecies.  And  if  the  infidelity  of 
Galen,  even  when  thefe  natural  fci- 
ences  were  ftill  imperfecl,  could  not 
withftand  fiich  ftriking  appearances  ; 
to  what  pitch  of  pertinacious  obftinacy 
mufl  a  phitofopher  in  this  age  have  at- 
tained, who  can  now  doubt  of  a  Supreme 
Intelligence  ? 

Could  I  meet  with  one  of  thxis  fpe- 
P  2  cies 


23^       Dialogues    concerning 

^^"^  cies  (who,  I  thank  God,  are  very  rare) 
i--vrv^  I  would  afk  hira :  Suppofing  there  were 
a  God,  who  did  not  difcover  himfelf 
immediately  to  onr  fenfes ;  were  it  pof- 
fible  for  him  to  give  ftronger  proofs  of 
his  exiftence,  than  what  appear  on  the 
whole  face  of  Nature  ?  What  indeed 
could  fuch  a  Divine  Being  do,  but  copy 
the  prefent  (economy  of  things ;  render 
many  of  his  artifices  fo  plain,  that  no 
ftupidity  could  miftake  them;  afford 
glimpfes  of  ftill  greater  artifices,  which 
demonftrate  his  prodigious  fuperiority 
above  our  narrow  apprehcnfions ;  and 
conceal  altogether  a  great  many  from 
fuch  imperfedl  creatures  ?  Now,  accord- 
ing to  all  rules  of  juft  reafoning,  every 
fadl  muft  pafs  for  undifputed,  when  it 
is  fiipported  by  all  the  arguments  which 
its  nature  admits  of;  even  though  thefe 
arguments  be  not,  in  themfelves,  very 
numerous  or  forcible :  How  much  more, 
in  the  prefent  cafe,  where  no  human 
imagination  can  compute  their  number, 

and 


Natural    Religion.  233 

and  no   underftanding   eflimate   their  ^'^^ 
cogency  ?  i^>r^  j 

I  SHALL  farther  add,  faid  Clean- 
THES,  to  what  you  have  fo  well  urged, 
that  one  great  advantage  of  the  prin-  j 

pie  of  Theifm,  is,  that  it  is  the  only  fy-  '   > 

ftem  of  cofmogony  which  can  be  ren- 
dered intelligible  and  complete,  and  yet  ] 
can  throughout  preferve  a  ftrong  ana- 
logy to  what  we  every  day  fee  and  ex- 
perience in  the  world.  The  comparifon 
of  the  univerfe  to  a  machine  of  huanan  ; 
contrivance  is  fo  obvious  and  natural, 
and  is  juftified  by  fo  many  inftances  of                         j 
order  and  deiign  in  Nature,  that  it  mufl                          \ 
immediately  ftri^e  all  unprejudiced  ap^                          1 
prehenfions^  and  procure  univerfal  ap-     v                    .; 
probation.  Whoever  attempts  to  weaken                          ■ 
this  theory,  cannot  pretend  to  fucceed 
by  eftablilhing  in  its  place  any  other                           , 
that  is   precife  and  determinate:  It  is                          ; 
fufficient  for  him,  if  he  ftart  doubts  and                          i 

difficulties :  and  by  remote  and  abftra£l  ! 

i 

P  3  views  \ 


234   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  yiews  of  things,  reach  that  fufpenfe  of 
^^>rsj  judgment,  which  is  here  the  utmoil 
boundary  of  his  wifties.  But  beijdes 
that  this  flate  of  mind  is  in  itfelf  unfa- 
tisfadlory,  it  can  never  be  fteadily  main- 
tained againft  fuch  ftriking  appearances 
as  continually  engage  us  into  the  reli^, 
gious  hypotheiis.  A  falfe,  abfurd  fy- 
ftem,  human  nature,  from  the  force  of 
prejudice,  is  capable  of  adhering  to  with 
obftinacy  and  perfeverance :  But  no  fy- 
ftem  at  all,  in  oppofition  to  a  theory 
fupported  by  ftrong  and  obvious  rea- 
fon,  by  natural  propeniity,  and  by  early 
education,  I  think  it  abfolutely  impofr 
fible  to  maintain  or  defend, 

So  little,  replied  Philo,  do  I  efteem 
this  fufpenfe  of  judgment  in  the  pre- 
fent  cafe  to  be  pofTible,  that  I  am  apt  to 
fufpefb  there  enters  fomewhat  of  a  dlf- 
pute  of  words  into  this  controverfy, 
more  than  is  ufually  imagined.  That 
the  works  of  Nature  bear  a  great  ana- 
logy 


Natural    Religion. 


^2>5 


logy  to  the  produdlions  of  art,  is  evident;  Part 
and  according  to  sill  the  rviles  of  good  .^0 
reafoning,  we  ouglxt  to  infer,  if  we  argue 
at  all  concerning  them,  that  their  caufes 
have  a  proportional  analogy.  But  as 
there  are  alfd  confiderable  differences, 
we  have  reafon  to  fuppofe  a  proportional 
difference  in  the  caufes  ;  and  in  parti- 
cular  ought  to  attribute  a  much  higher 
degree  of  power  and  energy  to  the  fu- 
preme  caufe  than  any  we  have  ever  ob- 
ferved  in  mankind.  Here  then  the  ex- 
iflence  of  a  DEITY  is  plainly  afcertain- 
ed  by  reafon :  and  if  we  make  it  a  que-^ 
ftion,  whether,  on  account  of  thefe  ana- 
logies, we  can  properly  call  him  a  mind 
or  intelligence^  notwithftanding  the  vaft 
difference  which  may  reafonably  be 
fuppofed  between  him  and  human 
minds;  what  is  this  but  a  mere  verbal 
controverfy  ?  No  man  can  deny  the 
analogies  between  the  effedls:  To  re- 
ftrain  ourfelves  from  inquiring  con- 
cerning the  caufes,  is  fcarcely  pofTible: 
P  4  From 


236   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  pj^oxn  this  inquiry,  the  legitimate  con- 
corN^  cluiion  is,  that  the  caufes  have  alfo  an 
analogy :  And  if  we  are  not  contented 
with  calling  the  firft  and  fnpreme  caiif e 
a  QOD  or  DEITY,  but  defire  to  vary 
the  expreffion;  what  can  we  call  him. 
but  MIND  or  THOUGHT,  to  vv^hich 
he  is  juftly  luppofed  to  bear  a  confi- 
derable  refemblance? 

All  men  of  found  reafon  are  dif- 
gufted  with  verbal  difputes,  which  a- 
bound  fo  much  in  philofophical  and 
theological  inquiries  ;  and  it  is  found, 
that  the  only  rernedy  for  this  abufe 
muft  arife  from  clear  definitions,  from 
the  precifion  of  thofe  ideas  which  en- 
ter into  any  argument,  and  from  the 
flri(?i:  and  'uniform  ufe  of  thofe  terms 
v/hich  are  employed.  But  there  is  a 
fpecies  of  controverfy,  which,  from  the 
very  nature  of  language  and  of  human 
ideas,  is  involved  in  perpetual  am- 
biguity, and  can  never,  by  any  pre- 
caution 


Natural    Religion.  237 

caution  or  any  definitions,  be  able  to  Part 
reach  a  reafonable  certainty  or  pre-  ^^^ 
cifion.  Thefe  are  the  controverfies  con- 
cerning the  degrees  of  any  quaUty  or 
circumftance.  Men  may  argue  ta  all 
eternity,  whether  Hannibal  be  a 
great,  or  a  very  great,  or  a  fuperlatively 
great  man,  what  degree  of  beauty  Cle- 
opatra polTeffed,  what  epithet  of 
praife  Livy  or  Thucidydes  is  intitled 
to,  without  bringing  the  controverfy 
to  any  determination.  The  difputants 
may  here  agree  in  their  fenfe,  and  differ 
in  the  terms,  or  vice  'verfa ;  yet  never  be 
able  to  define  their  terms,  fo  as  to  enter 
into  each  others  meaning :  Becaufe  the 
degrees  of  thefe  qualities  are  not,  like 
quantity  or  number,  fufceptible  of  any 
exadl  menfuration,  which  may  be  the 
ftandard  in  the  controverfy.  That  the 
difpute  concerning  Theifm  is  of  this 
nature,  and  confequently  is  merely  ver- 
bal, or  perhaps,  if  pofTible,  flill  more 
incurably  ambiguous,  will  appear  upon 

the 


238      Dialogues    concerning 

Part  the  flightcft  inquiry.  I  alk  the  Theift, 
<^^vsj  if  he  does  not  allow,  that  there  is  a  great 
and  immeafurable,  becanfe  incompre- 
henlible,  difference  between  the  human 
and  the  dknne  mind  :  The  more  pious 
he  is,  the  more  readily  will  he  affent  to 
the  affirmative,  and  the  more  will  he 
be  difpofed  to  magnify  the  difference  : 
He  will  even  affert,  that  the  difference 
is  of  a  nature  which  cannot  be  too 
much  magnified,  I  next  turn  to  the 
Atheifl,  who,  I  affert,  is  only  nomi- 
nally fo,  and  can  never  poffibly  be  in 
earnell ;  and  I  afk  him,  whether,  from 
the  coherence  and  apparent  fympathy 
in  all  the  parts  of  this  world,  there  be 
not  a  certain  degree  of  analogy  among 
all  the  operations  of  Nature,  in  every 
fituation  and  in  every  age  ;  whether 
the  rotting  of  a  turnip,  the  generation 
of  an  animal,  and  the  flru6lure  of  hu- 
man thought,  be  not  energies  that  pro- 
bably bear  fome  remote  analogy  to  each 
other :  It  is  impoffible  he  can  deny  it : 

He 


Natural    Religion.  239 

He  will  readily  acknowledge  it.  Ha-  ^^^ 
ving  obtained,  this  concefTion,  I  pufli  v-.-r>-' 
him  ftill  farther  in  his  retreat ;  and  I 
alk  him,  if  it  be  not  probable,  that  the 
principle  which  firft  arranged,  and  ftill 
maintains,  order  in  this  univerfe,  bears 
not  alfo  fome  remote  inconceivable  a- 
nalogy  to  the  other  operations  of  Na- 
ture, and  among  the  reft  to  the  oeco- 
nomy  of  human  mind  and  thought. 
However  reludlant,  he  muft  give  his 
alTent.  Where  then,  cry  I  to  both 
thefe  antagonifts,  is  the  fubjedl  of  your 
difpute?  The  Theift  allows,  that  the 
original  intelligence  is  very  different 
from  human  reafon  :  The  Atheift  al- 
lows, that  the  original  principle  of  or- 
der bears  fome  remote  analogy  to  it. 
Will  you  quarrel,  Gentlemen,  about 
the  degrees ;  and  enter  into  a  contro- 
verfy,  which  admits  not  of  any  precife 
rheaning,  nor  confequently  of  any  de- 
termination t  If  you  ftiould  be  fo  ob- 
ftinate,    I  ftiould  not  be  furprifed  to 

find 


240   Dialogues  concerning 

^i^^  find  you  infenfiblv  change  fides  ;  while 
co^-v^  the  Theift,  on  the  one  hand^  exaggerates 
the  diflfimilarity  between  the  Supreme 
Being,  and  frail,    imperfedl,   variable, 
fleeting,  and  mortal  creatures  ;  and  the 
Atheift,  on  the  other,  magnifies  the  a- 
nalogy  among  all  the  operations  of  Na- 
ture, in  every  period,  every  fituation, 
and    every    pofition.      Confider    then, 
.  where  the  real  point  of  controverfy  lies ; 
and  if  you  cannot  lay  afide  your  dif- 
putes,  endeavour,  at  leaft,  to  cure  your- 
felves  of  your  animofity. ' 

And  here  I  mufl  alfo  acknowledge, 
Cleanthes,  that,  as  the  works  of  Na- 
ture have  a  much  greater  analogy  to 
the  effecfls  of  our  art  and  contrivance, 
than  to  thofe  of  our  benevolence  and 
juftice;  we  have  reafon  to  infer,  that 
the  natural  attributes  of  the  Deity  have 
a  greater  refemblance  to  thofe  of  men, 
than  his  moral  have  to  human  virtues. 
But  what  is  the  confequence  ?  Nothing 

but 


Natural    Religion.  a^i 

but  this,  that  the  moral  qualities  of  ^^^'^ 
man  are  more  defe6live  in  their  kind  ^.^w 
than  his  natural  abilities.  For  as  the 
Supreme  Being  is  allowed  to  be  abfo- 
lutely  and  entirely  perfedl;  whatever 
differs  moft  from  him,  departs  the  far- 
theft  from  the  f^ipreme  ftandard  of  rec- 
titude and  perfe(5lion  ^. 

These, 

*  It  feems  evident,  that  the  difpute  between  the 
Sceptics  and  Dogmatifts  is  entirely  verbal ;  or  at  leaft 
regards  only  the  degrees  of  doubt  and  aflurance,  which 
we  ought  to  indulge  with  regard  to  all  reafoning :  And 
fuch  difputes  are  commonly,  at  the  bottom,  verbal,  and 
admit  not  of  any  precife  determination.  No  philofophi- 
cal  Dogmatift  denies,  that  there  are  diificulties  both 
with  regard  to  the  fenfes  and  to  all  fcience  ;  and  that 
thefe  difficulties  are  in  a  regular,  logical  method,  abfo- 
lutely  infolveable.  No  Sceptic  denies,  that  we  lie  under 
an  abfolute  neceffity,  notwithftanding  thefe  difficulties, 
©f  thinking,  and  believing,  and  reafoning,  with  regard  to 
all  kinds  of  fubjeAs,  and  even  of  frequently  alTenting 
with  confidence  and  fecurity.  The  only  difference,  then, 
between  thefe  fe6ls,  if  they  merit  that  name,  is,  that 
the  Sceptic,  from  habit,  caprice,  or  inclination,  infifti 
moft  on  the  difficulties  j  the  Dogmatift,.  for  like  reafion^, 
on  the  neceffity. 


^4^       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  These,  Cleanthes,  are  my  un- 
^^^>r^  feigned  fentiments  on  this  fubje6l ;  and 
thefe  fentiments  J  you  know,  I  have 
ever  cherilhed  and  maintained.  But  in 
proportion  to  my  veneration  for  true 
reUgion,  is  my  abhorrence  of  vulgar 
fuperftitions ;  and  I  indulge  a  peculiar 
pleafure,  I  confefs,  in  pulhing  fiich 
principles,  fometimes  into  abfurdity, 
fometimes  into  impiety.  And  you  are 
fenfible,  that  all  bigots,  notwithftand- 
ing  their  great  averfion  to  the  latter  a- 
bove  the  former,  are  cominonly  equally 
guilty  of  both. 

My  inclination,  replied  Cleanthes, 
lies,  I  own,  a  contrary  way.  Religion, 
however  corrupted,  is  ftill  better  than 
no  religion  at  all.  The  dodlrine  of  a 
future  ftate  is  fo  ftrong  and  neceffary  a 
fecurity  to  morals,  that  we  never  ought 
to  abandon  or  negledl  it.  For  if  finite 
and  temporary  rewards  and  puniih- 
ments  have  fo   great  an  eflFed:,  as  we 

^  daily 


Natural    Religion.  ,        243 

daily  find  ;  how  much  greater  muft  be  P^  ^ 
expected  from  fuch  as  are  infinite  and  c^v^ 
eternal  ? 

How  happens  it  then,  faid  Philo, 
if  vulgar  fuperftition  be  fo  falutary  to 
fociety,    that    all    hiftory   abounds   fo 
much  with  accounts  of  its  pernicious 
confequences   on  public  affairs  ?    Fac- 
tions, civil  wars,  perfecutions,  fubver- 
lions  of  government,  oppreflion,  flave- 
ry;  thefe  are  the  difmal  confequences 
which  always  attend  its  prevalency  over 
the  minds    of  men.     If  the   religious 
fpirit  be  ever  mentioned  in  any  hiftori- 
cal  narration,  we  are  fure  to  meet  after- 
wards  with   a  detail   of  the  miferies 
which  attend   it.     And   no  period  of 
time  can  be  happier  or  more  profperous, 
than  thofe  in  which  it  is  nevei  regarded 
or  heard  of. 

The  reafon  of  this  obfervation,  re- 
plied  Cleanthes,    is    obvious.     The 

proper 


244   Dialogues  concerning 

Fart  proper  office  of  religion  is  to  regulate 
v.^vO  the  heart  of  men,  humanize  their  con- 
duft,  infufe  the  fpirit  of  temperance, 
order,  and  obedience ;  and  as  its  ope- 
ratioipi  is  filent,  and  only  enforces  the 
motives  of  morality  andjuftice,  it  is  in 
danger  of  being  overlooked,  and  con- 
founded with  thefe  other  motives. 
"When  it  diftinguiflies  itfelf,  and  acts  as 
a  feparate  principle  over  men,  it  has  de- 
parted from  its  proper  fphere,  and  has 
become  only  a  cover  to  faction  and  am-* 
bition. 

And  fo  will  all  religion,  faid  Philo, 
except  the  philofophical  and  rational 
kind.  Your  reafonings  are  more  eafily 
eluded  than  my  facls.  The  inference 
is  not  juft,  becaufe  finite  and  tempo- 
rary rewards  and  punifhments  have  fo 
great  influence,  that  therefore  fiich  as 
are  infinite  and  eternal  mufl  have  fo 
much  greater.  Confider,  I  befeech  you, 
the  attachment  which  we  have  to  pre- 

fent 


Natural    Religion.  245 

fent  things,  and  the  Uttle  concern  which  ^j^^ 
we  difcover  for  objedls  fo  remote  and  ^-^-^r-^ 
uncertain.  When  divines  are  declaim- 
ing againft  the  common  behaviour  and 
condudl  of  the  world,  they  always  re- 
prefent  this  principle  as  the  flrongeft 
imaginable,  (which  indeed  it  is) ;  and 
defcribe  almofk  all  human  kind  as  lying 
under  the  influence  of  it,  and  funk  into 
the  deepeft  lethargy  and  unconcern  a- 
bout  their  religious  interefts*  Yet  thefe 
fame  divines,  when  they  refute  their 
fpeculative  antagonifts,  fuppofe  the  mo- 
tives of  religion  to  be  fo  powerful,  that, 
without  them,  it  were  impoffible  for 
civil  fociety  to  fublift ;  nor  are  they  a- 
fliamed  of  fo  palpable  a  contradi(5lion. 
It  is  certain,  from  experience,  that  the 
fmalleft  grain  of  natural  honefty  and 
benevolence  has  more  effedl  oh  mens 
eonducl,  than  the  moft  pompous  views 
fuggefted  by  theological  theories  and 
fyftems.  A  man's  natural  inclination 
works  inceflantly  upon  him ;  it  is  for 

Q^  ever 


246      Dialogues    concerning 

Part  q^q^  prcfeiit  to  the  mind ;  and  mingles 
u^w  itfelf  with  every  view  and  confidera- 
tion :  whereas  rehgious  motives,  where 
they  a6l  at  all,  operate  only  by  ftarts  and 
bounds ;  and  it  is  fcarcely  poffible  for 
them  to  become  altogether  habitual  to 
the  mind.  The  force  of  the  greateft 
gravity,  fay  the  philofophers,  is  infinite- 
ly fmall,  in  comparifon  of  that  of  the 
leaft  impulfe:  yet  it  is  certain,  that  the 
fmalleft  gravity  will,  in  the  end,  pre- 
vail above  a  great  impulfe ;  becaufe  ^o 
flrokes  or  blows  can  be  repeated  with 
fuch  conftancy  as  attradlion  and  gravi- 
tation. 

Another  advantage  of  inclination: 
It  engages  on  its  fide  all  the  wit  and  in- 
genuity of  the  mind ;  and  when  fet  in 
oppofition  to  religious  principles,  feeks 
every  method  and  art  of  eluding  them : 
In  which  it  is  almoft  always  fuccefsfuL 
Who  can  explain  the  heart  of  man,  or 
account  for  thofe  ftrange  falvos  and  ex- 

cufes, 


Natural    RELiGtON.  247 

i^ufes,  with  which  people  fatisfy  them-  ^^ 
ielves^  when  they  follow  their  inclina-  ^..^-^^^ 
tions  in  oppofition  to  their  religions 
duty  ?  This  is  well  underftood  in  the 
world  ;  and  none  but  fools  ever  repofe 
lefs  truft  in  a  man,  becaufe  they  hear, 
that,  from  ftudy  and  philofophy,  he  has 
entertained  fome  fpeculative  doubts 
with  regard  to  theological  fubjedls- 
And  when  we  have  to  do  with  a  man, 
who  makes  a  great  profeffion  of  reli- 
S:ion  and  devotion ;  has  this  anv  other 
effecfl  upon  feveral,  who  p^fs  for  jpru- 
dent,  than  to  put  them  on  their  guard, 
left  they  be  cheated  and  deceived  by 
him?       / 

We  muft  farther  confider,  that  phi- 
lofophers,  who  cultivate  reafon  and  re- 
flexion, ftand  lefs  in  need  of  ftich  mo- 
tives to  keep  theiii  under  the  reftraint 
of  morals  :  and  that  the  vulgar,  who 
alone  may  need  them,  are  utterly  inca- 
pable of  fo  pure  a  religion  as  reprefents 

Q  2  thg- 


248   Dialogues  concerning 


Part 
XIL 


the  Deity  to  be  pleafed  with  nothing  but 
virtue  in  human  behaviour.  The  re- 
commendations to  the  Divinity  are  ge- 
nerally fuppofed  to  be  either  frivolous 
obfervances,  or  rapturous  ecftafies,  or  a 
bigotted  credulity.  We  need  not  run 
back  into  antiquity,  or  wander  into  re- 
mote regions,  to  find  inftances  of  this 
degeneracy.  Amongfl  ourfelves,  fome 
have  been  guilty  of  that  atrocioufnefs, 
unknown  to  the  Egyptian  and  Gre- 
cian luperftitions,  of  declaiming,  in 
exprefs  termj,  againfl:  morality ;  and  re- 
prefenting  it  as  a  fure  forfeiture  of  the 
divine  favour,  if  the  leaft  trufl  or  reli- 
ance be  laid  upon  it. 

But  even  though  fuperftition  or  en- 
thufiafm  fhould  not  put  itfelf  in  diredl 
oppoiition  to  morality ;  the  very  di- 
verting of  the  attention,  the  railing  up 
a  new  and  frivolous  fpecies  of  merity 
the  prepofterous  diftribution  which  it 
makes  of  praife  and  blame,  muft  have 

the 


Natural    Religion.  249 

the  moft  pernicious  confequences,  and  ^^^ 
weaken  extremely  mens  attachment  to  ^^--r-j 
the  natural  motives  of  juftice  and  hu- 
manity. 

Such  a  principle  of  adlion  like  wife, 
not  being  any  of  the  familiar  motives 
of  human  conducfl,  adls  only  by  inter- 
vals on  the  temper;  and  muft  be  rouzed 
by  continual  efforts,  in  order  to  render 
the  pious  zealot  fatisfied  with  his  own 
conducfl,  and  make  him  fulfil  his  devo- 
tional talk.  Many  religious  exercifes 
are  entered  into  with  feeming  fervour, 
where  the  heart,  at  the  time,  feels  cold 
and  languid:  A  habit  of  diflimulation 
is  by  degrees  contracfled  :  and  fraud 
and  falfehood  become  the  predominant 
principle.  Hence  the  reafon  of  that 
vulgar  obfervation,  that  the  higheft  zeal 
in  religion  and  the  deepeft  hypocrify, 
fo  far  from  being  inconfiftent,  are  often 
or  commonly  united  in  the  fame  indi- 
vidual characfler. 

0^3  The 


a^o      Dialogues    concerning 
^Y       The- bad  efFedls  of  fuch  habits^  even 

All, 

^-^^-^N-^'in  common  life,  are  eafily  imagined; 
but  where  the  interefts  of  religion  are 
concerned,  no  morality  can  be  forcible 
enough  to  bind  the  enthufiaftic  zealot. 
The  facrednefs  of  the  caufe  fandlifies 
every  meafure  v/hich  can  be  made  nfe 
of  tp  promote  it. 

The  fteady  attention  alone  to  fo  im- 
portant an  intereft  as  that  of  eternal 
'  falvation,  is  apt  to  extinguifh  the  bene- 
volent afFed:ions,  and  beget  a  narrow, 
contracted  felfiftmefs.  And  when  fuch 
a  temper  is  encouraged,  it  eaiily  eludes 
all  the  general  precepts  of  charity  and 
benevolence. 

Thus  the  motives  of  vulgar  fuperfti- 
tion  have  no  great  influence  on  general 
conduifl ;  nor  is  their  operation  very  fa- 
vourable to  morality,  in  the  inftances 
where  they  predominate, 

^  ■      '  u 


Natural    Religion.  251 

Is  there  any  maxim  in  politics  more  ^^-^'^ 
eertain  and  infallible,  than  tliat  both  ^^^ 
the  number  and  authority  of  priefts 
fhould  be  confined  within  very  narrow 
limits;  and  that  the  civil  magiftrate 
ought,  for  ever,  to  keep  his  fcifces  and 
axes  from  fuch  dangerous  hands  ?  But 
if  the  fpirit  of  popular  religion  were  fo 
falutary  to  fociety,  a  contrary  m^axinx 
ought  to  prevail.  The  greater  number 
of  priefts,  and  their  greater  authority 
and  riches,  will  always  augment  the  re- 
ligious fpirit.  And  though  the  priefts 
have  the  guidance  of  this  fpirit,  why 
may  we  not  expeA  a  fuperior  fanclity 
of  life,  and  greater  benevolence  and 
moderation,  from  perfons  who  are  fet 
apart  for  religion,  who  are  continually 
inculcating  it  upon  others,  and  who 
muft  themfelves  imbibe  a  greater  {hare 
of  it?  Whence  comes  it  then,  that,  in 
fadl,  the  utmoft  a  wife  magiftrate  can 
propofe  with  regard  to  popular  reli^^ 
gions,  is,  as  far  as  poffible,  to  make  a 
0^4  faving 


^5^       Dialogues    concerning 

^^^  faving  game  of  it,  and  to  prevent  their 
*--^r^  pernicious  confequences  with  regard  to 
fociety  ?  Every  expedient  w^hich  he  tries 
for  £0  humble  a  purpofe  is  furrounded 
with  inconveniencies.  If  he  admits  only 
one  religion  among  bis  fubjedls,  he  mull 
facrifice,  to  an  uncertain  profpecl  of 
tranquillity,  every  conlideration  of  pub- 
lic liberty,  fcience,  reafon,  induftry,  and 
even  his  own  independency.  If  he  gives 
indulgence  to  feveral  fedls,  which  i&the 
wifer  maxim,  he  muft  prefer ve  a  very 
philofophical  indifference  to  all  of  them, 
and  carefully  reftrain  the  pretenfions  of 
the  prevailing  fedl ;  otherwife  he  can 
expedl  nothing  but  endlefs  difputes, 
quarrels,  fadlions,  perfecvitipns,  and  gi-^ 
vil  commotions. 

True  religion,  I  allow,  has  no  fuch 
pernicious  confequences  :  but  we  muft 
treat  of  religion,  as  it  has  commonly 
been  found  in  the  world ;  nor  have  I 
any  thing  to  do  with  that  fpeculative 

tenet 


Natural    Religion,  253 

tenet  of  Theifm,  which,  as  it  is  a  fpe-  I*art 

XII. 
cies  of  philofophy,  mtift  partake  of  the  ^^w 

beneficial  influence  of  that  principle, 
and  at  the  fame  time  muft  lie  under  a 
like  inconvenience,  of  being  always  con- 
fined to  very  few  perfons. 

Oaths  are  requifite  in  all  courts  of 
judicature;  but  it  is  a  queflion  whether 
their  authority  arifes  from  any  popular 
religion.  It  is  the  folemnity  and  im- 
portance of  the  occafion,  the  regard  to 
reputation,  and  the  reflefling  on  the 
general  interefts  of  fociety,  which  arc 
the  chief  reftraints  upon  mankind. 
Cuftom-houfe  oaths  and  political  oaths 
are  but  little  regarded  even  by  fome 
who  pretend  to  principles  of  honefty 
and  religion ;  and  a  Quaker's  aiTevera- 
tion  is  with  us  juftly  put  upon  the  fame 
footing  with  the  oath  of  any  other  per- 
fon.  I  know,  that  Polybius  '^  afcribes 
the  infamy  of  Greek  faith  to  the  pre- 

valencv 

*  Lib,  vi.  cap.  54. 


254       Dialogues    concerning 

Part  valcncy  of  the  Epicurean  philofophy: 
w^^^j  but  I  know  alfo,  that  Punic  faith  had 
as  bad  a  reputation  in  ancient  times,  as 
Irish  evidence  has  in  modern;  though 
we  cannot  account  for  thefe  vulgar  ob- 
fervations-by  the  fame  reafbn*  Not  to 
mention,  that  Greek  faith  was  infa- 
mous before  the  rife  of  the  Epicurean 
philofophy;  and  Euripides  f,  in  apaf- 
fage  which  I  fhall  point  out  to  you,  has 
glanced  a  rernarkable  flroke  of  fatire 
againft  his  nation,  with  regard  to  this 
circumftance,  ' 

Take  care,  Philo,  replied  Clean- 
THES,  take  care:  pufli  not  matters  too 
far:  allow  not  your  zeal  againft  falfe 
religion  to  undermine  your  veneration 
for  the  true.  Forfeit  not  this  principle, 
the  chief,  the  only  great  comfort  in  life ; 
and  our  principal  fupport  amidft  all  the 
attacks  of  adverfe  fortune.  The  moft 
agreeable  refleiftion,  which  it  is  poffible 

for 

f  Iphigcnia  in  Tauride. 


Natural    Religion.  2^^ 

for  liuman  imagination  to  fuggeft,  is  ?^^^' 
that  of  genuine  Theifm,  which  repre-  ^^.^ 
fents  US  as  the  workmanfhip  of  a  Being 
perfedlly  good,   wife,    and   powerful; 
who  created  us  for  happinefs ;  and  who, 
having  implanted  in  us  immeafurable 
delires  of  good,  will  prolong  our  exift- 
ence  to  all  eternity,  and  will  transfer  us 
into  an  infinite  variety  of  fcenes,  in  or- 
der to  fatisfy  thofe  defires,  and  render 
our  felicity  complete  and  durable.  Next 
to  fuch  a  Being  himfelf  (if  the  compa- 
rifon  be  allowed),  the  happieft  lot  which 
we  can  imagine,  is  that  of  being  under 
his  guardianship  and  prote6lion. 

These  appearances,  faid  Philo,  are 
'moft  engaging  and  alluring ;  and  with 
n^gard  to  the  true  philofopher,  they  are 
more  than  appearances.  But  it  happens 
here,  as  in  the  former  cafe,  that,  with 
regard  to  the  greater  part  of  mankind, 
rhe  appearances  are  deceitful,  and  that 

the 


256   Dialogues  concerning 

Part  tJig  terrors  of  religion  commonly  pre- 
s.^^>rsj  vail  above  its  comforts. 

It  is  allowed,  that  men  never  have 
recourfe  to  devotion  fo  readily  as  when 
deje6led  with  grief  or  deprelTed  with 
iicknefs.  Is  not  this  a  proof,  that  the 
religious  fpirit  is  not  fo  nearly  allied  to 
joy  as  to  forrow  ? 

But  men,  when  afflicfted,  find  con- 
folation  in  religion,  replied  Cleanthes. 
Sometimes,  faid  Philo;  but  it  is  natu- 
ral to  imagine,  that  they  will  form  a 
notion  of  thofe  unknown  beings,  fviit- 
ably  to  the  prefent  gloom  and  melan- 
choly of  their  temper,  when  they  betake 
themfelves  to  the  contemplation  of  them. 
Accordingly,  we  find  the  tremendous 
images  to  predominate  in  all  religions; 
and  we  ourfelves,  after  having  employ- 
ed the  moft  exalted  expreffion  in  our 
.  defcriptions  of  the  Deity,  fall  into  the 
flatteft  contradidlion,  in  affirming,  that 

the 


Natural    Religion.  257 

the  damned  are  infinitely  fuperior  in  ^^y 
number  to  the  eledl.  ^^-^^ 

I  SHALL  venture  to  aflSrm,  that  there 
never  was  a  popular  religion,  which  re- 
prefented  the  Hate  of  departed  fouls  in 
fuch  a  light,  as  would  render  it  eligible 
for  human  kind,  that  there  fhould  be 
fuch  a  ftate.  Thefe  fine  models  of  reli- 
gion are  the  mere  producfl  of  philofo- 
phy.  For  as  death  lies  between  the  eye 
and  the  profpedl  of  futurity,  that  event 
is  fo  fhocking  to  Nature,  that  it  muft 
throw  a  gloom  on  all  the  regions  which 
lie  beyond  it ;  and  fuggeft  to  the  gene- 
rality of  mankind  the  idea  of  Cerberus 
and  Furies ;  devils,  and  torrents  of  fire 
and  brimftone* 

It  is  true,  both  fear  and  hope  enter 
into  religion ;  becaufe  both  thefe  paf- 
fions,  at  different  times,  agitate  the  hu- 
man mind,  and  each  of  them  forms  a 
fpecies  of  divinity  fuitable  to  itfelf.  But 

when 


258       Dialogues    concernikg 

pARt  when  a  man  is  in  a  cheerful  difpofition^ 
,,^,^  he  is  fit  for  bufinefs,  or  company,  or 
entertainment  of  any  kind;  and  he  na- 
turally applies  himfelf  to  thefe,  and 
thinks  not  of  religion.  When  melan- 
choly and  dejedled,  he  has  nothing  to 
do  but  brood  upon  the  terrors  of  the 
invifible  world,  and  to  plunge  himfelf 
ftill  deeper  in  affliction.  It  may,  indeed, 
happen,  that  after  he  has,  in  this  man- 
ner, engraved  the  religious  opinions 
deep  into  his  thought  and  irtiagination, 
there  may  arrive  a  change  of  health  or 
circumftances,  which  may  reftore  his 
good-humour,  and  railing  cheerful  pro-- 
ipecfts  of  futurity,  make  him  run  into 
the  other  extreme  of  joy  and  triumph* 
But  ftill  it  muft  be  acknowedged,  that, 
as  terror  is  the  primary  principle  of  re-^ 
ligion,  it  is  the  paffion  which  always 
predominates  in  it,  and  admits  but  of 
fhort  intervals  of  pleafure. 

Not  to  mention,   that  thefe  fits  of 

'  ,  _  exceffive^ 


Natural    Religion.  259 

exceflive,  enthufiaftic  joy,  by  exliauft-  ^^J" 
ing  the  fpirits,  always  prepare  the  way  ^.^v->-» 
for  equal  fits  of  fuperftitious  terror  and 
dejeilion ;  nor  is  there  any  ftate  of  mind 
fo  happy  as  the  calm  and  equable.  But 
this  ftate  it  is  impoffible  to  fupport, 
where  a  man  thinks,  that  he  lies,  in  fuch 
profound  darknefs  and  uncertainty,  be- 
tween an  eternity  of  happinefs  and  an 
eternity  of  mifery.  No  wonder,  that 
fuch  an  opinion  disjoints  the  ordinary 
frame  of  the-  mind,  and  throws  it  into 
the  utmoft  confufion.  And  though  that 
opinion  is  feldom  fo  fteady  in  its  ope- 
ration as  to  influence  all  the  adlions ; 
yet  is  it  apt  to  make  a  confiderable 
breach  in  the  temper,  and  to  produce 
that  gloom  and  melancholy  fo  remark- 
able in  all  devout  people. 

It  is  contrary  to  common  fenfe  to 
entertain  apprehenfions  or  terrors  upon 
account  of  any  opinion  whatfoever,  or 
to  imagine  th^t  we  run  any  ri£k  here- 
after 


26o       Dialogues  concerning 

^ART  after,  by  the  freeft  ufe  of  our  reafon. 

XII. 

v-^w  Such  a  fentiment  implies  both  an  abfur- 

dity  2ind  an  incon/i/lencj.  It  is  an  abfur- 
dity  to  believe  that  the  Deity  has  hu- 
nnah  paflions,  and  one  of  the  loweft  of 
human  paflions,  a  reftlefs  appetite  for 
applaufe.  It  is  an  inconfiftency  to  be- 
lieve, that,  fince  the  Deity  has  this  hu- 
man paflion,  he  has  not  others  alfo ;  and 
in  particular,  a  difregard  to  the  opi- 
nions of  creatures  fo  much  inferior. 

71?  knoTif  God^  fay3  Seneca,  is  to  ivor^ 
JJdip  him.  All  other  worfhip  is  indeed 
abfurd,  fuperftitious,  and  even  impious. 
It  degrades  him  to  the  low  condition  of 
mankind,  who  are  delighted  with  in-r 
treaty,  folicitation,  prefents,  and  flat- 
tery. Yet  is  this  impiety  the  fmalleft 
of  which  fuperflition  is  guilty.  Com- 
monly, it  deprefles  the  Deity  far  below 
the  condition  of  mankind ;  and  repre- 
fents  him  as  a  capricious  dsemon,  who 
exercifes  his  power  without  reafon  and 

without 


Natural    Religion.  ^6i 

without  humanity!  And  were  that  Di-  ^^^"^ 

XII- 

vine  Being  difpofed  to  be  offended  at  ^-v->^ 
the  vices  and  follies  of  filly  mortals, 
who  are  his  own  workmanfhip ;  ill 
would  it  furely  fare  with  the  votaries 
of  mofh  popular  fuperftitions.  Nor 
would  any  of  human  race  merit  his^^- 
ijour^  but  a  very  few,  the  philofophical 
Theifls,  who  entertain,  or  rather  indeed^^l^ 
endeavour  to  entertain,  ftiitable  notions 
of  his  divine  perfe6lions:  As  the  only 
perfons,  intitled  to  his  compajjion  and 
indulgence^  would  be  the  philofophical 
Sceptics,  a  fedl  almofl  equally  rare,  who, 
from  a  natural  diffidence  of  their  own 
capacity,  fufpend,  or  endeavour  to  fuf- 
pend,  all  judgment  with  regard  to  fuch 
lublime  and  fuch  extraordinary  fub- 
je6ls. 

I  If  the  whole  of  Nar^ral  Theology,  as 
fome  people  feem  to  maintain,  refolves 
itfelf  into  one  fimple,  though  fome- 
what  ambiguous,  at  leafl  undefined  pro- 

R  pofition. 


262       Dialogues  concerning 

Part  pofition,  That  thecaufe  or  caiifes  of  order 
v^.^,r>j  lyi  the  univerfe  probably  bear  fome  remote 
analogy  to  human  intelligence :  If  this 
propolition  be  not  capable  of  extenfion, 
variation,  or  more  particular  explica- 
tion :  If  it  affords  no  inference  that 
affedls  human  life,  or  can  be  the  fource 
of  any  adlion  ^  or  forbearance  :  And  if 
the  analogy,  imperfedl  as  it  is,  can  be 
carried  no  farther  than  to  the  human 
intelligence ;  and  cannot  be  transferred, 
with  any  appearance  of  probability,  to 
the  other  qualities  of  the  mind  :  If  this 
really  be  the  cafe,  what  can  the  moft 
inquilitive,  contemplative,  and  religious 
man  do  more  than  give  a  plain,  philo- 
fophical  affent  to  the  propolition,  as 
often  as  it  occurs  ;  and  believe  that  the 
arguments  on  which  it  is  eflablilhed, 
exceed  the  objedlions  which  lie  againft 
it  ?  Some  aftonifhment  indeed  will  na- 
turally arife  from  the  greatnefs  of  the 
object ;  fome  melancholy  from  its  ob- 
fcurity ;  fome  contempt  of  human  rea- 

fon. 


Natural   Religion.  263 

fon,  that  it  can  give  no  folution  more  ^J^J" 
fatisfacflory  with  regard  to  fo  extrabr-  v^n-^ 
dinary  and  magnificent  a  queftion.  But 
believe  me,  Cleanthes,  the  mod  na- 
tural fentiment,  which  a  well- difpo  fed 
mind  will  feel  on  this  occafion,  is  a  long- 
ing deiire  and  expedlation,  that  heaven 
would  be  pleafed  to  diiSpate,  at  l^^ft^g^^ 
alleviate,  this  profound  ignorance,  hy^ffl 
affording  fome  more  particular  revela- 
tion to  mankind,  and  making  difcove- 
ries  of  the  nature,  attributes,  and  ope- 
rations, of  the  divine  obje(!?l:  of  our  faith. 
A  perfon,  feafoned  with  a  juft  fenfe  of 
the  imperfeAions  of  natural  reafon, 
will  fly  to  revealed  trvith  with  the 
greateil  avidity:  While  the  haughty 
Dogmatift,  perfuaded  that  he  can  eredl 
a  complete  fyftem  of  Theology  by  the 
mere  help  of  philofophy,  difdains  any 
farther  aid,  and  rejecls  this  adventi- 
tious inftrudlor.  To  be  a  philofophi- 
cal  Sceptic  is,  in  a  man  of  letters,  the 
firft  and  moft  effential  ftep  towards  be- 
ing 


264      Dialogues    concerning 

^Y  ing  a  found,  believing  Chriftian;  a 
v-^rvl  propofition,  _which  I  would  willingly 
recommend  to  the  attention  of  Pam- 
PHiLUS  :  And  I  hope  Cleanthes  will 
forgive  me  for  interpofing  fo  far  in 
the  education  and  infl:ru(5lion  of  his 
pupil. 

Cleanthes  and  Philo  purfued  not 
this  converfation  much  farther :  and 
as  nothing  ever  made  greater  impref- 
lion  on  me,  than  all  the  reafonings  of 
that  day  ;  fo,  I  confefs,  that,  upon  a 
ferious  review  of  the  whole,  T  cannot 
but  think,  that  Philo's  principles  are 
more  probable  than  Ddmea's  ;  but  that 
thofe  of  Cleanthes  approach  ftill , 
nearer  to  the  truth. 


fl-.  JL  ^  «  JL  KJ» 


^^^  ^u  mr>