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lALOGUES 


O     F 


PLATO 


VOLUME     HI. 


LONDON: 

PRINTED     FOR      THE      AUTHOR> 
M  DCC  LXXIX. 


P   H   I   L   E   B   U   S, 


A 


DIALOGUE 


-CONCERNING 


The    chief    GOOD   of   MAN. 


THE    FIRST    PART. 


LONDON: 

PRINTED     BY     R.     HETTj 

and  sold  by  t.  payne  and  son,  at  the  mewse  gate. 

m  dcc  lxxix. 

[price  eighteen  shillings.] 


,3TA0  327/^1-1    CtHT    TA 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 


DIALOGUE 


CONCERNING 


The    chief    GOOD    of    MAN. 


T      O 
THE     HONOURABLE 

Mr.      rOJFNSHEND, 

AND    TO    HIS  SONS,    (WORTHY    OF 
THEIR    FATHER    AND    THEIR    NOBLE    ANCESTRY,) 

The  Right  Hon.  Mr.  Thomas  Townshend, 

AND 

Charles  Townshend,    Efq; 

This     TRANSLATION     of 

The    PHILEBUS     of    PLATO 

I   s 

MOST    RESPECTFULLY    OFFERED 
B    Y 

their  much  obliged, 

and  mofl  obedient  Servant, 

Floyer  Sydenham. 

At  neque  nos  agere  hsec,   patriai  tempore  iniquo, 
Poffiimus  a^quo  animo ;   neque  Memmi  clara  propago, 
Talibus  in  rebus,  communi  d'effe  faluti. 


U-  YftT£( 


[   s   ] 


THE 


ARGUMENT 


^  i    H  E  proper  Subjedl  of  this  Dialogue  is  The  Chief 
Good  of  Man  :    the  Defign  of  it  is  to  fjew^   that 
Mans  chief  Good  is  Moral  Virtue The  Subjefi  is  intro- 
duced, hy  fati97g  the  different  Opinions  of  Socrates  and 
Philebus,  concernijig  the  Nature  of  That  Good^  wherein  the 
Happinefs  of  Man  is  to  be  fou?td\ — Opinio7iSy  which^  it 
fee7ns^  they  had  jufi  before  feverally   avowed. — Philebus, 
a  Man  firongly  prepoffeffed  with  the  DoSirine  ^Ariftippus, 
had  afferted^  that  this  Good  was  Pleafure, — meani?tg  Plea- 
y^r^i^/i?  Senfation,  or  Pleafure  felt  thro  the  outward  SenCcs. 
On  the  other  hand^   Socrates  had  fuppofed  the  Sovereign 
Good  of  Man  to  be  placed  in  Mind,   and  iji  the  Energys 
of  Mind  071  Me7ital  SubjeBs. — Philebus,   in  fuppo?-t  of  his 
own  Affertion^  had  been  hara7igui77g^  for  a  long  Tijne  toge- 
gether^   after  the  Man7ier  of  the  Sophifls ;    until  he  fou7id 
his  Spirits  and  hiiagination.^  or  perhaps  his  Stock  of  plau- 
fible  ArgtmientSi  quite  exhaufed.      He  had  therefore  de- 

fred 


6  The    A  P.  G  U  ]M  E  N  T. 

fired  his  friend  Protarchus,  a  young  Gentleman^  who  ap- 
pears to  have  been  a  Follo'wer  of  Gorgias,  to  take  up  the 
Controverfy^  and  carry  it  on  in  His  Stead  a/id  Behalf 
Protarchus  had  confeitted^  and  had  engaged  himfelf  fo  to 
do.  Immediately  on  this  Engagement^  at  this  very  point 
of  time^  tlye  prefent  Dialogue  commeiices  :  accordingly^  it 
is  carried  o;z,  chiefly  betisceen  Socrates  and  Protarchus. 
Butj  as  Philebus  is  the  Principal  Perfon^  whofe  Opinion 
cofnhats  againfl  That  of  Socrates, — a?id  as  no  higher  a 
CharaSler  is  given  to  Protarchus,  than  That  of  AcceiTarj", 
or  Second  to  Philebus,  i?i  this  argumentative  Cofnbat^  the 
Dialogue,  now  before  us,  very  properly,  and  conflfle7ttly 
with  the  Rule  ',  which  Plato  feems  to  have  laid  down  t9 
himfelf  in  naming  his  Dialogues,   hath  the  Name  given  it 

of  Philebus. In  all  the  printed  Editio?is  it  is  in  tit  led 

A  Dialogue  concerning  Pleasure.  The  general  Account 
of  it,  jufl  now  given,  pjows,  that  with  equal  reafon  it  might 
be  intitled  A  Dialogue  concerning  Mind.  Bt/t,  in  truths 
neither  Pleafure,  nor  Mind,  (confdered  as  intelligent,)  is 
the  principal  SubjeB,  herein  treated  of .  Inquiry  i?ideed  is 
made  into  the  nature  (?/" Pleafure,  and  the  nature  of  '^1\nd  ; 
but  this  is  do?ie  with  no  other  apparent  or  profejfed  View^ 
than  to  make  it  evident,  that  Neither  of  them,  fingly,  and 
fepdrately  from  the  Other,  can  ever  co?tflitute  the  Happi- 
nefs  of  fuch  a  Compound-Being  as  Man.     Not,  that  the 

^   See  the  Synopfis,  or  General  View,  page  22. 

Drift 


The    argument.  7 

Drift  of  thefe  Inquiry s  is  ;//^^r/y  Negative,  or  tends  07ily  to 
JJjow,   What  is  not  the  Chief  Good  of  Man.      For  thz  In- 
fuffLcic72Cy  of  eitherMmd  alo?.'e^  or  Pleafiire  aloite^  to  Human 
Happinefsy    beijig  'in  the  comfe   of  the  Dialogue  acknow^ 
leged   by  Both  Partys,    naturally  leads  them  to   inquire 
into  the  efTcntial  nature  of  that  Chief  Good  ; — and  What 
it  is,   which  either  conftitutes  or  produces  the  Happinefs  of 
Ma?i. — If  then  this  Inquiry    appears  to  be  made  ijt  the 
Philebus,   a77d  if  the  Dialogue  is  found  to  end  with  the 
Refult  of  fuch  Inquiry^  we  prefmne^  that  the  Title,  given 
to  it  in  this  7ra72flation,  is  the  fttefl^  and  the  7nof  worthy 
of  it,  as  hei?ig  expreffve  of  the  principal  Subjed',   therein 
treated  of.     Ficinus,  however,  i7ititles  it  de  Summo  Bono, 
concerni72g  the  Sovereign  Good,   (abfolutely  a72d  univer- 
fally,)   without  fpccifying  its  particular  reference   to   the 
Human  Nature.      And  it  jnujl  be  ad7nitted,  that  he  is 
very  excufable  ifi  fo  doing.      For  the  Principle  of  T'hat 
which  will  appear  to  be  the  Chief  Good  of  Man,  will  ap- 
pear alfo  to  be  the  Effence  of  Good,  G(?(7(^Univerfal,  and 
the  Good  of  Every  Being  in  Nature. — Be  it  obfe7'-ved,  how- 
ever, that,  if  the  properTixX^  of  this  Dialogue  beThat,  which 
is  given  it  by  Ficinus,   it  will  follow,   that  the  peculiar 
Defign  of  it  is  to   i7ivefligate   the  Divine   Nature;   a7id 
to  foi7U  out  to  us,  in  What  the  Eflence  of  the  Supreme 
Being  co77ftfl,s.     But  This  is  the  great  Defign  of  Plato  in 
all  his  Writi7tgs  :  every  One  of  them  hath  This  End  ulti- 
mately 


8  The    ARGUMENT. 

mately  in  View  ;  and  All  of  them  confpire  together  to 
accomplijfj  it.  Perhaps  indeed  The  Philebus  contributes 
more  to  it  thaji  any  Oite  other  Dialogue.  For  in  IVhat 
Part  of  Nature^  in  What  Rank  of  Things^  thro  What 
Medium,  doth  the  Divi?ie  Being  appear  fo  co7ifpicuous^  as 
he  does  in  the  Mind,  Heart,  aiid  Life  of  a  wife  and  good 
Man  ?  No  other  Beings  (with  whom  We  are  acquainted 
here  on  Earth,)  hejides  Man,  appears  to  partake  of  thofe 
pure  Forms,  the  OhjeSis  of  the  Divi7ie  Mind  :  720  other 
Beiiigy  than  Man,  appears  to  be  endued  with  Confcience, 
— that  is,  with  a  Feeli7ig  of  God  within  him,  or  i7i  his 
own  Heart :  arid  the  Life  of  no  other  Particular  Bei7igy 
befdes  an  honeft  and  good  Man,  is  a  vifibk  D  if  play  of 
thorow  Integrity  and  univerfal  Benevolence.  By  purify- 
ing our  Ideas,  we  are,  in  fo7ne  i/ieafure,  united  to  the 
Divine  Mind  ;  by  purifying  our  Hearts,  we  are  tmited  to 
the  Divine  Will ;  and  by  the  Purity  of  our  Lives,  led  in 
the  conflant  PraSlife  of  Univerfal  Juftice,  we  partake  of 
the  Divine  Goodnefs,  and  e7ijoy  the  Happinefs  of  that 
Participation.  Thro  Wifdom  and  thro  Virtue,  thus  it  is, 
that  a  Ma7i  k7iows  and  feels  within  hinfelf  Truth  and 
Good,  never  ceajing  tofpri7ig  up ;  and  thus  he  not  only  draws 
from,  but  co7itinually  drinks  at  their  pure  Foimtai7t.  — 
Now  'tis  well  known,  that  the  rational  and  ufual  way  of 
difcovering  the  Virtue  of  fo7ne  particular  River-waters, 
and  how  far  they  are  corrupted  by  any  extraneous  Filth, 
6  gathered 


The    argument.  9 

gathered  ift  their  Courfe,  is  to  take  out  fome  of  the  Water ^ 
and  to  let  it  fettle  ;  then  to  draw  or  pour  it  off  from  the 
Sedi9nent  it  has  depofed;  and  then  to  frain  or  filter  it, 
Whejt  all  this  is  do?2e,  hut  not  before,  jiifl  Rxperiinents  may 
he  made,  to  prove  W.hat  are  its  inherent  Qualitys.  And 
thefe  Qualitys  being  thus  fairly  afcertained,  if  afterwards 
we  ca7i  trace  the  River  upward  to  //j  Source,  we  7nay  then 
difcover,  how  fnuch  of  its  original  and  native  Spirit  the 
derived  Streai}t  has  lof  ;  a?id  we  may  then  reafonably  con- 
clude, that  fome  fubtle  Particles  (p/*  Earth  and  K\v  were  fo 
inti?nately  mingled  with  it  in  its  dowjiward  Flow,  as  not  to 
be  feparable  from  it  by  the  known  Methods  of  Purification. 
In  like  7namter  we  are  firf  to  becojne  acquainted  with  the 
Virtue  of  our  own  peculiar  Nature,  its  proper  End,  and 
true  Good, — by  feparati72g  in  our  Minds  and  viewing  it 
apart  from  thofe  foul  Dregs  is/'Evil  which  are  mixed  with 
it, — before  we  can,  in  the  ordijiary  way  of  Re af on,  find  the 
Fountain,  frof?t  which  our  own  Virtue,  Good,  and  Knd, 
are  derived  ;  and  before  we  can  difcover  the  nature  of  its 
everlivijig,  pure,  and  uftdefiled  Water. Hence  it  ap- 
pears, that,  however  the  remote  ajid  ultimate  Defign  of 
this  Dialogue  may  be,  (and  ?nof  willingly  we  ack?iowlege 
that  it  is,)  to  lead  us  to  a  difcovery  of  That  which  is  abfo- 
lutely  and  u7iiverfaUy  The  Sovereign  Good,  yet  the  proxi- 
mate and  immediate  Defign  ought  to  be,  and  is,  to  make  us 
acquainted  with  the  Nature  and  Rffence  of  That  which  is 

B  the 


10  The    a  R  G  U  M  E  N  T. 

the  Chief  Good   to  Us. It  remains  farther  to   he  oh- 

fervedy  on  the  Subjecl  of  this  Dialogue^  that  the  Inveftiga- 
tioii  of  the  Chief  Good  of  Man  rightly  fets  out  with  the 
co77f  deration  of  Plea fu  re, — a  Good,  which  prefents  itfelf  tO' 
our  View  the  very  Firft ;  as  it  is  the  vioft  obvious  of  a?iyy 
common  to  all  Sentient  Beings^  and  the  only  Good  felt, 
even  by  Such  of  them  as  are  Rational,  before  the  Dawn  of 
Reafon. — Our  Searches  are  the?z  naturally  led  thro  eveiy 
Order  of  Good.,  which  hath  a?iy  Prete?ifions  to  be  of  the 
Final  Kind,  or  Good  for  its  own  fake.  TVe  meet  with 
All  of  thefe  in  this  Dialogue ;  and  find  their  Values^  re- 
lative to  Man.,  feverally  afcertained.  Viewing  the  Phile- 
bus  in  this  light .^  we  may  intitle  it., ,  not  i?nproperly^  a 
Dialogue  concerning  Good, — that  is.,  Good  in  general. 
Mr.  J.  Petvin  has  accordi7igly  given  it  that  Title.,  i?i  his 
Letters  on  Mind,  page  17.      A?id  in  our  Synopfis,  page 

18,   we  have  followed  his  Example. 'Thus  much  may 

fuffice  concerni?ig  the  Name,  the  Title,  the  Subjed,  ajid 
the  Defign  of  this  Dialogue  :  and  if  the  Account,  thus 
given,  of  thefe  Articles  of  it  be  true,  the  wonderful  Pro- 
priety of  the  Introdudlory  Part,  —  as  relative,  not  oitly  to 
the  Subject  a?id  Delign,  but  alfo  to  the  larger  and  argu- 
mentative Parts,  the  Body  of  it,  and  to  the  concluiive  or 
finifhingP^r/,  the  iVTiT^iX^ci  and  the^o\A  of  it, — willjuflly 
be  admired. — But  no  mail  can  form  a  right  judgment  of 
any  Work,  before  the  Work  is  fnijljed;   unlefs  he  has  feen 

3  i^^^ 


The    argument.         it 

the  Plan  or  Model  of  it ;  or  U72lefs  he  has  been  otherways 
informed  of  the  Purpofes,  to  which  all  the  Parts  of  it  are 
meant  to  ferve.  'Tis  ?iecejfary  therefore  to  a  jufl  Difcern- 
7nent  of  the  Excellence  of  this  Dialogue,  in  the  maflerly 
Compoftio7i  of  it,  that  a  Reader,  to  whom  it  may  be  quite 
new,  fbould  be  ntade  acquaijited,  beforehand,  with  fo  much 
of  the  Conclufion,  as  willpow  the  Connedlion  of  the  larger 
Parts,  and  alfo  of  their  Sub- divisions,  a7td  the  Reference 

which  they  all  have  to  the  principal  D^^ign. Li  the  Con- 

cluiive  Part  theji  of  the  Dialogue,  all  the  Kinds  of  Good, 
which  are  pur fu able  as  Ends,   (a7id  07ie  or  other  of  which 
is  aBually  purfued,  as  Such,  by  Every  jnan,  in  the  general 
Courfe  of  his  Life,)  are  e7iu7nerated  in  Order,  according 
to  the  relative  Value  of  Each  of  thetn  to  Man  ^-—an  Order, 
fettled  by  Socrates,  /;2  co7ifequence  of  his  whole  preceding 
Arguf7tentation. — Firfl:  i7i  Rank,  a7jd  alone,  y?^;;<^j  Meafure, 
— the  Eflence  of  all  Good,  and  the  Principle  of  all  Moral 
Virtue; — runni72g  thf^o  every  Kind  andS^^ec\Qs  of  it',  and 
guardi7ig  every  Moral  Adtion  fro7n  thofe  Excefles  07i  the 
one  fide,  and  thofe  Defeds  on  the  other,  which  it  is  ever  in 
da7iger  of.— In  the  Second  Ra7ili  of  Goods  appear  Symmetry 
^7?<3(' Beauty, — the  Symmetry  of  a  Ma7i  s  whole  Condud  as 
ruled  by   Meafurc,    and  the   Beauty   the72ce   refidting;— 
together  with  Sufficiency   and  Fulnefs, — a  fufficient   and 
full  Pojfeffion  of  all  thiiigs  requifite  to  Pradic  Virtue.  — 
The  Third  Place  is  held  by  Mind,    (co7fdered  as  Intelli- 

B   2  gent,) 


12         The    A  R  G  U  MEN  T. 

gentj)   and  Wifdom   (confidcred  as  Speculative). The 

Fourth  Place  is  filled  by  Sciences,  and  Arts,  a7id  Right 
Opinions.  —  /;/  the  Fifth  Ra7'ik  ^vse  fi.nd  the  Pleafures, 
which  ive  feel  from  Things  Corporeal,  thro  the  outward 
Senfes  of  Sight,  Hearing,  ^WSmelling; — F\ca.kiVQ&j  which 
are  7ieither  preceded,  accompanied,  nor  followed  by  any 
Pain,  cither  of  the  Soul,  or  of  the  Body.  —  hi  the  Sixth 
a7id  lajl  PlacCy  far  behind  all  the  other  Goods,  we  dif cover, 
in  a  tumultuary  Group,  the  Pleafures  e77Joyed  by  A7iimals  of 
all  Kindsy — the  Pleafures  of  the  Tafte  and  of  the  Touch  ; 
— Pleafures,  attended  all  of  them,  with  Pain,  either  pafl, 
prefent,  or  to  come. — Now  thefe  Six  Kinds  of  Goo<^,  valued 
often  for  their  ow7i  Sakes,  without  regaYd  had  to  any  far- 
ther Benefits,  expc&ed  to  accrue  from  them,  are  reducible 
to  thofe  Three,  the  Exajnining  of  which  co7tfitutes  the  Body 
of  this  Dialogue,  —  Virtue,  Knowlege,  and  Pleafure.  — 
T'his  threefold  Rxaminatio7i  is  fet  07i  foot,  by  fuppofmg  a 
Contef  to  have  happened  between  Socrates  and  Philebus, 
€0ncer7iif7g  Pleafure  and  Knowlege,  —  Whether  of  thefe 
Two  was  the  Chief  Good  of  Man. — For  7ieither  Sophifts 
Tior  Philofophers,  in  that  age,  fee7n  to  have  thought  of 
Virtue,  as  a  fit  Cojnpetitor  with  Either  of  the  Tsvo  for  fa 
high  a  CharaSler,  until  the  Superiority  of  Virtue  to  Both 

the  Others  was  fijown  by  Socrates. The  Co7itefl  is  fup- 

pofed  to  have  conti7iued  for  fo7ne  time,   a7id  to  remai7i  at 
lafl  undecided  j  as  every  cofitefed  Point  for  ever  fnufl,  ■  if 

it 


The    argument.  13 

//  be  cont7~ovcrted  in  a  declamatory  'way ;  tmlefs  the  co7i- 
tending  Pariys  are  bou7id  to  abide  by  the  Decifioii  of  fome 
Authoritative    Judge  ;     or    tmlefs    they   will  fubmit^    by 

Agreement,   to  fome  Referee    or  Umpire.  'The  Mode 

therefore  of  Difputation  is  here  changed^— frotn  the  Dog- 
matical, pof  lively  afferti77gj  and  flatly  contradi&i?jg^ — to 
the  Dialedlic,  quefioning  and  anfwer'ing  :  for  in  this  So- 
cratic  way  of  arguing^  the  Refpondent,  if  in  the  wroitg^ 
may  be  confuted  out  of  his  own  mouth. — To  effeSi  this 
Cha^tge,  it  was  necejfa?y  to  change  the  Perfon  alfo  of  the 
Advocate  for  PleaJurey—fro7n  Philebus,  a  peremptory  a7id 
ferce  Dog7natifl^ — to  Protarchus,  who  was  candid^  and 
gentky  and  could  hearke7t  coolly  to  the  Reafoning  of  a7t 
Adverfary.  This  Change  of  Perfon  gives  occafo7i  for  a 
frefj  Stating  of  the  Controverfy.  And  fuch  a7t  Occafo7t 
was  neceffary  to  be  contrived ;  becaufe  it  was  neceffary  for 
the  Readers  of  the  Dialogue^  to  be  i7ifor7ncd^  %vhat  Poi7its 
were  to  be  debated  on.  The  like  7iecejfity  occafoned  mofi 
of  the  ancient  Dramatic  Pieces  to  be  i7itroduced  by  Pro- 
logues ;  in  which  the  Audience  were  7nade  acquainted  with 
the  Foundation  of  the  Fable,  the7t  to  be  reprefe7ited.  But 
in  this  Dialogue,  to  ftate  the  Controve7fy,  after  //  had  been 
long  on  foot, — to  propofe  the  Points  diflinSlly  and  at 
large,  as  at  the  fi}fl  Opening, — to  make  this  Repetition 
appearnatural  and  proper,  required  i7iuch  /.^^r^  Addrefs, 

than  to  make  a  Prologue,  giving  only  a  ft/tple  Narrative 
3  •  ./ 


14         The    ARGUMENT. 

of  what  had  pajfed  previous  to  the  Drama.      From  thefe 
obfervatiofts,  a  judicious  Lover  of  Dialogue-CompoJitio7is  . 
will  have  pleafure  tJi  perceivings   with  what  Art  Plato, 
the  greatejl  Mafler  in  this  Kind  of  Writ i fig ,   has  intro- 
duced his  Diale&ic  Inquiry  into  the  nature  of  Pleafure 
a?id  the  nature  of  intelligent  Mind,    Two  of  the  Three 
Things  to  be  examined. — With  no  lefs  Art  has  he  opened 
a  Way  for  inquiring  into  the  ?jature  of  the  remaifting 
Third,  Moral   Virtue ;    ajid  for  manifefling  the  fupe- 
rior   Value    of   This,     compared   with    Knowlege    and 
with  Pleafure.      For,   however  the   clear    Reafojmtg   of 
Socrates    might   be  alone  fujficiefit   to  make  that  Supe- 
riority   appear    evidefit     to    Pe?fons    attentive    to    his 
Reafonifig, — -yet  no  little  Skill  or  Addrefs  were  requifte 
to  raife  a  proper  Degree  of  Attention   to  an  Hypothejts 
fo  paradoxical, — as  it  muft  fee7n  to  the  Company,   then 
around  Socrates, — the   Freque?7ters    of   the    Lyceum  ; 
None  of  whom,    "'tis  probable,   had  ever  confidered  any 
of  the  Moral  Virtues,    otherwife  than  as  Means,  fub- 
fervient  to    the  acquiftio?i    of    Knowlege,     or    the  en^ 
joyment    of    Pleafure.       Btit    the    Introdudlion   to    the 
Dialogue  procures    their   Atte7ttion,     a77d    C07ifeque77tly 
prepares  the  Way  to  the  Reafoni7Jg  of  Socrates  07i  this 
additional  Third  SubjeEi,    by  fuggefling   a  Poilibility, 
that    the    Chief   Good   of  Ma7i    might    co7ififi    neither 
177  Knowlege  7ior  in  Pleafure,   but  in  fo?jte  Other  Thii7g 

(770t 


The    argument.  15 

(not  naming  it^)  hitherto  perhaps  iinthought  of.  T'he 
PoJftbiUty  of  'This^  being  tacitly  admitted,  raifes  their 
RxpeSiation  of  fame  new  plaufble  Hypothefs,  and  ferves 
for  a  fufficient  Grotind  to  a?i  Inquiry,  at  that  time, 
new  to  the  World. — On  comparing  the  particular  Ac- 
count, now  given,  of  the  Iiitrodu6tion  to  this  Dialogue, 
with  the  Extract,  given  jiifl  before,  of  the  Coiiclufion, — 
every  good  Critick  will  adjnire  the  fttgular  Art  of  our 
Author,  in  the  Conjlruclion  of  the  Whole.  For  he  will 
perceive,  that  the  Beginning  regards  the  End,  and  is 
conneSied  with  it,  by  thofe  ijitermediate  Lijtks,  that  form 
all  the  Middle  Part,  the  Argumentative.  And  ?jow 
indeed  'tis  high  time  to  give  the  Reader  a  Foretafle  of  the 
copious  F.ntertai?iment,  he  may  expeSl  in  this  rich  Repaft. 
— The  Argumentation  is  divided  into  Three  Parts,  like 
Three  plentiful  Courfes  at  a  bounteous  Table  ;  Each  bei?ig 
compofed  of  a  w  ell- co? for  ting  Variety.  For  tho"  the 
7iature  ip/Tleafure,  a?idthe7iatureof]s,imd,  are  fever  ally 
confidered  in  the  Firft  Part,  as  well  as  in  the  Second  ; 
yet  i7t  the  Second  Part  only  is  Pleafure  accurately  and 
thorowly  exatnined :  the  principal  SubjeSi  of  the  Firft 
Part  is  Mind  ;  which  great  SubjeSi  is  there  treated  of 
in  fuch  a  man7ter,  as  to  infiimate,  unperceived  and  fe~ 
cretly,  what  in  the  fdort  Concluiive  Part  of  the  Dialogue 
will  appear  openly, — that  "  Mind  is  both  the  Caufe  afid 
the  Principle  of  that  Befl  of  human  things.  Moral  Virtue. 

---The 


i6         The    ARGUMENT. 

— TToe  Firft  of  the  Argumentative  Parts  of  the  Dialogue 
layeth  the  Foundatio7i  of  thefe  Inquiry s  in  the-  SamenefTes 
and'D\f^QrQ.ncQ^of'Thi?igs.    i^or  Samenefs  /3:W  Difference 
are  found  together  in  all  things  \ — Difference  of  Species, 
where  a  Samenefs  is  of  the  Kind, — Accidental  Differ- 
ence^  (or  perhaps^  fometimes^  o^z/y  Numerical,)  where  a 
Samenefs  is  of  the  Species.      "The  Philofopher  s  Defign^  in 
layi7ig  this  Fouftdatiofi^    feems   to  be  none  other ^    than  to 
confute  the  Opinion  i?/' Philebus;  who  made  7io  difference 
between  any  one  Pleafure  of  Senfe  and  any  other ^   except 
what  arofe  from  their  differing  in  Degree  ;  that  is,  from 
the  More  a?id  the  Lefs  of  Pleafure  :  as  tho  "Things^  agree- 
ing in  fome  Genus,  differed  only  in  Magnitude  or  Quan- 
tity,  One   of  the  Accidental  Differences,    belongifig  to 
Individuals  of  the  fame  Species.      But  a  much  greater 
Differe?ice  than  "This^   bei7ig  fjow72  by  Socrates^    betweeit 
'Things  differi7ig  i7i  their  effential   Qualitys,    (as  being 
of    different    Genera,     tho    perhaps    agreeing    in  fome 
higher  Genus,)  prepares  the  way  for  that  clear  Diflinc- 
tioji^     7nade    afterwards^     between    the    Fifth    a72d    the 
Sixth  Rank  of  Goods^  —  between  the  pure  a72d  harmlefs 
PleafureSf   and  Thofe  to  which  is  an7iexed  always  Pain, 
and  freque7ttly  Dcftrudion. — 777^  principal Z)^^/^?/,  how- 
ever^  of  beginning  the  Ar^u77ie7itatio7i  i7i  this  way,   is  to 
Ufifold  the  7iature  of  Intelligence   (or  i7itellige7it  Mind) 
a7id  Science,    (or  real  Knowlege,)  by  revealing  at   once 

their 


The    argument.         17 

thei?'  Principles :  from  which  it  will  appear  at  the  fame 
time^  how  much  the  Sources  of  Pleafure  differ  from  thofe 
^Mind. — Now  the  Principles  of  Mind  are  by  the  Py- 
thagoreans termed  Unity  a?2d  Number.  Plato  in  this 
Dialogue,  by  the  words  One  and  Many,  7nea7is  the  fafne 
Prijiciples :  he  means  One  divifble  into  Many,  Each  of 
which  Ma7ty  is  One  ;  juft  as  every  Number  is  divifble 
into  Unites :  and  he  means  Many  united,  or  combi?jed  in 
One  ;  jufl  as  a  certain  ^^uantity  of  Unites  combined 
together  makes  fome  One  certain  Nuniber.  But  neither 
Infinite  N'umber^  nor  Indefinite  Multitudes^  are  ObjeBs 
of  the  Mind  ;  they  are  but  obfcure  OhjeEls  (?/"  Imagination 
which  is  boimdlefs^  or  (j/'Senfation  blind  and  undiflinguif- 
i?ig. — Senfe  perceives^  clearly  and  diflinBly,  One  Thing  or 
Being  at  a  time,  and  no  more  \ — a  One,  which  is  not 
divifble  i?ito  M^ny  OnQs,  Each  of  them,  by  its  felf  a  whole 
i7itire'Thing  or  Being; — but  a  One,  divifble  only  into  Parts, 
not  One  of  which  Parts  is  a7jy  Thing  or  Being,  independa?itly, 
or  fubffing  by  its  felf — But  'tis  the  nature  <9/^Mind,  to 
perceive,  at  one  and  the  fa7?ie  ti7ne,  Many  Things  or  Bei7tgs 
comprifed,  all  of  the77i,  in  One. — Individual  Beings  there- 
fore, of  whatever  Species  and  Kind  they  are,  —  bei7ig 
infinite,  a7id  divifible  07dy  m/o  Parts,  and  thofe  agai7i  into 
Parts  ffialler,  ad  infinitum,— ^is://  tmder  the  Perceptio7i 
(s/"  Senfe  Q7ily,  and  not  tmder  the  Cog7jiza7ice  of  the  Under- 
ftanding.  The  ObjeSls  ^Mind  are  //6o/^  Univerfals  which 
run  thro  all  things',  and,  befdes  thefe,  if  y6^  Genera  and  the 

C  Species 


i8         The    ARGUMENT. 

Species  of  things:,  a  Genus,  together  with  all  its  Species, 
numbered  by  the  Mind  '^ — a  Species,  common  to  all  the 
Individuals  of  it,  Many  Ones  without  Number  ;  to  which 
numberlefs  Many  no  Mind  defcends  :  for  Mind  dwells  for 
ever  in  the  Region  of  Numbers  definite  and  certain.  It 
is  only  by  knowing  thefe  Principles  of  Mind,  One  ^;?(^Many, 
or  Unity  a7td  Number,  that  we  can  diftinguifh  between 
Mind  and  Senfe,  or  betwee?^  Science  and  Senfation  :  and 
'tis  jjecejfary  ^  to  the  right  underflanding  of  this  Dialogue^ 
accurately  to  fettle  /i"^  Bounds  between  them.  What  thefe 
Bou7ids  are,  appears  from  the  Accomit  above  given.  It 
appears,  that  in  Man  Mind  a7td  Intelleftion  begi7tfro7n,  and 
end  with,  the  leaft  One  and  Many, — the  /ow^  Species, — 
'That,  which  borders  on  Infinity :  and  it  appears,  that 
Senfation,  and  the  Ufe  of  the  Organs  o/"  Senfe,  begin  with 
the  Infinity  of 'Things  individual,  and  never  e?id,  but  with 
the  Extin&ion  of  all  outward  Senfe. — Mind,  fays  Ariflotle, 
is  the  Beginning  or  Principle  of  Science  \  //  mufl  be  foy 
if  the  very  EfTence  of  Mind,  confdered  as  intelligent,  is 

1  For  the  fake  therefore  of  Readers  unacquainted  with  Plato,  we 
have  gone  a  little  out  of  our  way ;  by  inferting,  in  this  fummary 
Account  of  the  Matters,  contained  in  The  Philebus,  and  of 
their  Order,  an  JLlucidation  of  Plato's  Dodlrine  concerning  the 
difference  between  aiSsyrroi  Things  Senfible,  and  powra  Things  intelli- 
gible; whereas  the  proper  place  of  it  would  be  among  the  Explana- 
tory Notes  to  the  Second  Part  of  this  Dialogue. 

3  htyoi  vyv,  a^^m  gVifj-j/ft^^*  Analyt:  Pojler:  L.  i,  C.  23.  and 
again,  Nas  aV  i'm  iirK^riiAyii  oi^'x^'  L.  2,  C.  1 9. 

One 


The    argument.         19 

One  and  Many  united. But  the  confideratio7i  of  Mind, 

as  One  and  Many,    reaches   not  to  th^  whole  7iature  of 
Mind  \  not  JJjowing  it  to  be  the  Caufe  ^7;;<3^  Principle  of 
Virtue.      After  This  therefore^  the  great  Philofopher  takes 
a  wider  Scope^  for  the   Ground.,   on  which  to   build  his 
Inquiry  s  \  fo  as  that  all  the  Kinds  of  Good ^  enjoyed  by  Man, 
may  be  therein  included.      He  proceeds  to  coifder  7iextj 
the  nature   of  the  whole  Univerfe,   as  divifible  into  Four 
Sorts  of  Things. — Of  the  First  Sort  are  all  Such,   as 
are  ObjeEis  of  a7ty  of  the  Five  Senfes,  or  which  a7ty  way 
affeB  the  Senfitive  Soul ; — the  Qualitys,  a7id  Quantitys, 
and  all  other  Attributes  of  Corporeal  Subftances,   conf- 
dered as  they  are  i7t  the77f elves,  ^ipzrX.fro7n  thofe  Subftances, 
of  which  they  are  the  Attributes.      And  becaufe  the  Na- 
ture of  all  thefe  Attributes  of  Body  is  indefinite  and  ge- 
7ieral,  Each  admitting  an  infinite  Nu7nber  of  Degrees,  (as 
may  appear  fro7n  the  inflances  ofYioX.  and  Cold,  Soft  a72d 
Hard,   Great  a7id  Little,   High  and  Low,)  this  Firft  Sort 
of  Things  is  te7yned\nvi-iiiT^.     To  this  Sort  belong  all  the 
Materials,  e7nployed  by  Plaftic  Nature,  in  the  Generation, 
Growth,    a7id  Mai7itenance  of  all  Natural  Beings  ; — 7iot 
G7jly  Such  of  thofe  Materials,  as  are  Particles  of  the  Four 
Elements  of  all  Co7?7pou?2d-Bodys,  but  Such  alfo,   as  are 
7iii7iute  Mixtures  of  thofe  Ele777e7itary  Particles.     Amo7ig 
the  Lifinites  are  alfo  to  be  ranked  all  the  Materials,   77iad& 
if e  of  by  Man,  iti  afiy  of  the  Worh  of  KiX.'^  whether  tha 

C  2  Materials 


zo  The    argument. 

Materials  are    take^i  fro7n   Natural    or  from    Artificial 
Forms,  yr^/;^  Such  of  either  Ki7]d  as  are  dejlroyed^  ^whether 

by  Violence  or  by  lime. "Things   of  the  Second  Sort 

are  thofe  Bounds,    ivhich  are  fet  by  Plaftic  Nature,    and 
Thofe  alfo  by  Artifl-Man,  to  the  infinite  Materials  above- 
mentioned  \ — by  Nature,  ijt  the  creating  of  Her  Beings., — 
by  Man,    in  the  framing  of  His  Works : — Bounds,  fet  to 
thofe  Primary  Quality s   of  Body^   Hot  and  Cold,    Moift 
and  Dry,  by  mixing  Part  of  Each  of  the  Four  Elements 
with  its  Contraiy^  in  a  degree  proportioned  to  the  nature 
of  That  Form.,  which  is  intended  to  be  made : — Bounds, 
fet  to  thofe  other  Qualitys  of  Body .,  termed  Secondary,   by 
mea?is   of  Compound-Mixtures,   in  ftcch   Proportions   to 
each  other.,  as  accord  to  the  jiature  of  the  whole  Compound- 
Body  : — Bounds,  fet  to  Quantitys,  by  definite  Numbers : 
— Bounds  to  the  Adivity,  Paffivenefs,  and  other  relative 
Attributes  of  Corporeal  Subfa7ices,  by  intermingling  thefe 
Subfances  in  certain  Quantitys,  adapted  to  the  Natures^ 
Ufes^  or  Ends  of  the  i?it ended  Corporeal  Forms. — To  this 
Second  Sort  of  Thijtgs  is  given  the  general  Term  Bound, 
hecaufe  Bound  is  common  to  them  all :  and  to  This  Sort 
belong  the  Genera,  or  Gefieric  Powers,   of  all  corporeal 
Beings  ;    afid  their   Species,    or   Specific   Forms  j — thofe 
Powers  and  thofe  Forjns,  by  which  the  Nature  of  each  of 
thofe  Beings  is   determined, — by   which  it   is   effentially 
diftinguifiied  from  all  others  of  differefit  Kinds  or  of  dif- 

5  ferent 


The    argument.         21 

ferent  Species^ mtd  from  isohich  the  Be'mg  receives  its 

true  Definition  and  proper  Denomination. But  thefe 

Genera  aiid  Species,  thefe  Numbers  arid  Proportions, 
which  every  where,  in  the  Senfible  World  <?/' Nature,  bound 
the  Infinitude  of  7'hi?igs,  we  are,  07i  the  07te  hand,  not  to 
cojtfound  with  thofe  Intelligible  Forms,  the  eternal  Ideas 
of  the  Divine  Mind',  a?id  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  to 
feparate  the?n  Xoycd  (or  co7ifder  them  apart)  from  the 
Individual  Beings,  which  are  endued  with  any  of  thefe 
General  Powers,  and  invefted  with  any  of  thefe  Specific 
Forms.  For  the  Archetypal  Fonfts,  the  Divine  Ideas, 
belong  to  the  Fourth  Sort  of  "Things  ;  as  we  Jjope  to  mahe 
appear  i?i  Note  167  :  and  the  Individual  Beings  of  Nature, 
copied  from  thofe  original  and  eternal  Fonns,  belong  to  the 
Sort  of  Things,  to  be  mentioned  7iext. — For  /i*^  Third  Sort 
co77iprehends  all  For7ns  Corporeal ;  the  Subftratum  or 
Subftance  of  wJjich  Fonns  is  the  Firft  or  CoT7i77io7i  Matter, 
— That  Infinite,  which  is  the  Grotmd  of  Inf7iity  in  All 
of  the  Firjl  Sort  of  Things  \  the  Bounds  to  which  Infinite 
are  every  where  fet  by  the  great  Mind  of  Nature  : — it 
co7nprehe7ids  all  the  Beings  of  Outw^ard  Nature,  produced 
into  'Ezu^tncc  ficcejjively  i7i  Tifne,  flourifljing  for  a  while, 
and  the7i  peri^mtg ;  a72d  all  the  Beauty,  fpred  over  thefe 
temporaty  Bei77gs,  varying  and  changi7tg,  as  the  Forms  of 
thefe  Bei7igs  are  cha7iged  or  vary  : — it  C07np)rehe7ids  all' 
the  Performances,    Operations,  a7id  Works   of  Hu77ia7i 

Artifts, 


22         The    argument. 

Artifts,  making  ufe  of  Such  of  thofe  mf7iite  Materials  above- 
fnentio7ied^  as  are  within  their  Power  \  to  form  or  fafJjion 
irregular  Figures  according  to  their  own  Minds ;  to  give 
Meafure  to  Motions,  Harmony  to  Sounds,  and  Meaning 
to  Voices  articulate;  or  to  amend  the  decayed  hut  mendahle, 
and  recover  the  hurt  but  recoverable^  Wo7'ks  of  Art  or 
Nature.  And  rightly  are  all  things  of  this  Third  Sort, 
placed  by  Plato  after  thofe  of  the  Firft  and  Second  So7-ts  ; 
for^  i7t  the  Order  of  Nature,  they  aElually  come  after : 
Infinitude  a7id  Bound  77mjl  be  prefuppofed  in  Nature, 
before  any  te77iporary  or  trajifiejit  Fortn,  where  Infinitude 
receives  a  Bound,   can  be  gefierated^  p7-oduced,   or  7nade.. 

Beings  of  the  Fourth  Sort  are  Si-^ch,  as  give  Exift- 

ence  to  Thofe  of  the  Third  Sort ;  to  the  external,  change- 
able, and  te7nporary  Fo7yns ; — na7nely,  the  Mind  of  Na- 
ture, to  Nature's  Works ; — and  the  Minds  of  Men,  to  ths 
ProduBions  of  Human  Art. — To  //'/j- Fourth  Sort  of  Beiftg 
Plato  gives  the  general  Denomination  of  Cause  :  concer7i~ 
ing  which  it  fnay  at  prefe72t  fuffice  to  fay,  that  the  Final, 
//'^Formal,  «W /^^  Efficient  Caufes  of  allTlmigs  exifting 
are  cotnprehended  therein  :  for  a  7nore  explicit  a7id  parti- 
cular account  of  it,  we  refer  the  Reader  to  Note  167  ;  i7i 
which  Note  fo7ne  Reafons  alfo  are  afftgned,  to  Jhow,  why 
Caufe  is  fpoken  of  the  Laft  of  the  Four  Sorts  of  Beings,  or 
things,  in  the  U?iiverfe  ;   alt  ho  in  the  Order  of  Nature  // 

is  evidently  the  Firf!:.  Our  Philofophers  Deftgn,   in 

I7iakin^ 


The    argument.  23 

making  this  Divifion  of  Thiiigs^  is  to  lay  before  us  the 
nature  of  Pleafure,  the  nature  of  Intelligent  Mind,  and 
the  nature  of  Moral  Virtue  : — //  is  to  fhow,  that  all  the 
Pleafures  of  Senfe  belong  to  the  Firft  Sort  of  Things^  the 
Infinite  ; — all  the  Energys  of  Mind,  to  the  Fourth  Sort^ 
Caufe  ; — and  all  the  Virtues  peadiarly  Human.,  the  Moral 
Virtues.,  belofjg  to  the  Second  Sort,  Bound  ; — a7id  that 
Man,  the  SubjeFi  at  once  of  Moral  Virtue.,  Knoivlege, 
and  Pleafure,  belo7igs  to  the  Third  Sort  ;  as  Man  is  One 
of  the  Beings  of  Nature,  /;z  Every  one  of  whofe  Beings 
the  Infinity  of  Matter  is  bounded  by  Form  ;  but  of  thefe 
Beings  Man  is  the  Only  one,  capable  of  efijoyijig  all  the 
'Three  Kinds  of  Good,    Pleafure,    Knowlege,  and  Moral 

Virtue. Here  it  mufl  be  obferved,  that,  if  the  Firfl 

of  the  Argumentative  Parts  of  this  Dialogue  has  beefi  now 
reprefented  rightly,  and  the  Drift  of  the  Argumentation 
^^^;^w^// explained,  noCojtclufions,  regarding 'Pleafure,  can 
be  drawn  from  it,  befde  thefe  ; — fnfl,  that  Pleafure  is 
infinite  in  its  own  nature', — and fecondly,  that  "'tis  divi- 
lible  into  Many  -, — but  whether  thefe  Many  are  ma^iy 
different  Kinds  and  Sorts  of  Pleafure,  as  Socrates  had 
intimated  before  ;  or  whether  they  are  an  infinite  7iumber 
of  particular  and  diftindl  Pleafures,  differing  07jly  in 
^ia72tity,  or  Degree  of  Pleafure,  but  alike  in  This, — 
that  All  of  thefn  are  good,  a7ul  conducive  to  the  Happinefs 
of  Man,    as  Philebus    had  afferted,  — -  hath  not  as  yet 

^  appeared^ 


24         The    A  R  GU  M  E  N  T. 

appeared. The  Second  Argumentative  Paj't  of  the 

Dialogue,  m  making  a  particular  a7id  minute  Inquiry 
into  the  nature  ofPleafure,  diftinguiflies  all  thofe  agree- 
able Seiifations,  called  by  the  general  naine  of  Pleafure, 
i?2to  certain  Sorts,  veiy  different,  one  from  another. 
But,  previoufy  to  the  7naki?ig  of  any  DifinBion  ijito 
Sorts,  in  order  to  fjow,  that  fuch  a  DiflinBio7i  is  founded 
in  Nature,   Three  Points  are  propofed  to  be  confidered. 

The  Firfl  is, — of  what  Kind  the  Beings  are,   which 

are  fufceptible  0/ Pain,  as  well  as  i?/"  Pleafure.  Now  on 
this  Head,  'tis  evident,  that  all  fuch  Beings  are  Amvazls', 
that  is,  Beings  Corporeal,  anijnated  by  Sentient  Souls  ; 
but  whofe  Bodys  are  generated,  gradually  grow  to  their 
mature  State,  lafl  for  a  ti7?ie  by  means  of  Nourifliment, 
a7id  at  le7igth  decay  a7id  are  diflolved  ; — Bodys,  which, 
all  the  ti77ie  they  lajl,  undergo  co7itinual  Cha7iges  of  their 
State,  thro  the  alternate  E77iptinefs  and  Repletio7i  of  their 
i72ward  Receptacles  or  Veffels,  which  co7itai7t  the  Matter  of 
their  Nourifj7nent ;  —  Bodys,  which  require  freque7Jt 
Supplies  of  Food,  to  fill  the  place  of  what  paffes  away 
fro7n  the7n,  in  7iatural  Excretions,  by  various  Outlets. — 
The  Second  Co7ifideratio7t  is, — at  what  Times  fuch 
Ani7nals  feel  Pleafure,  and  at  what  Times  they  feelVdiin. 
And  on  this  Head,  '//V  evident  frofn  our  own  Experience, 
(f.or,\  Man  is  an  A7iimal  of  this  Kind,)  that  a  Rete7ition 
qf  whatever  ought  to  be  excreted  and  thrown  off,    (as 

for 


The    a  R  G  U  M  EN  T.  25 

for  htjiance,  internal  Air  and  other  perfpirable  Fluids, 
after  they  have  been  duly  circulated  thro  the  Body^J  is 
always  followed  by  Pain  or  Uneafinefs ;  and  that  every  due 
Excretion,  and  every  jiatural  Evacuation,  is  attended 
by  a  total  Ceflation  of  Pain,  or  by  a  Relief  and  Eafe, 
fo  agreeable  to  nature^  as  to  be  ofteji  termed  a  Pleafure. 
Again  ;  from  the  Emptinefs,  confequent  to  thefe  Excre- 
tions and  Evacuations,  we  feel  Uneafinefs  and  Pains 
arif7tg  in  the  Body  ;  and  on  the  other  hand^  we  feel^ 
that  Pleafure  accompanys  the  timely  taking  of  nutri- 
me?2tal  Food,   by  which   all   the   empty  Vejjels  are  re- 

plenifhed. Thirdly, — f?ice  every  A7mnal  confifts  of 

a  Body  and  of  a  Soul, — atid  fnce  the  Soul  in  Animals 
of  the  more  perfeSl  Kinds ^  chicfy  ifi  Man,  is  the  Seat  of 
Imagination,  Memory,  Pafiions,  and  Affedlions,  as 
well  as  (j/'Senfation, — it  is  co7ifidered^  i7i  what  Part  of  its 
Compofition  fuch  a7t  Anif7tal  feels  Pain  a7id  Pleafure. 
And  on  this  Head^  ^t is  found  alfo  fro77i  Experie7jce^  that 
the  Body,  a7ti7nated  throughout  with  Sentient  Souly 
may  feel  either  Pain  or  Pleafure,  and  yet ^  the  Memory 
and  Imagination,  the  PafTions  ^,W  Affections  of  the  Soul, 
may  all  the  while  lye  dormant  and  unmoved  ; — that,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Soul  may  feel  either  Pain  or  Plea- 
fure, when  the  Body  is  fenfihle  of  neither,  and  eve7i 
when  the  Organs  o/"  Senfation  are  totally  untouched : — 
that  fo7neti7nes  the  Soul    a7id  the  Body  are  pained   or 

D  delighted, 


26         The    ARGUMENT. 

delighted,  Both  of  them  together  ; — and  that  again^  at 
other  times,  oppoiite  Feelings  at  once  prevail,  Pleafure  in 

the  One,  ivhile  Pain  is  in  the  Other. Thefe  Conjtdera- 

tions  are  made  the  Groimd  of  many  Diftindions,  laid 
down  by  Socrates,  between  the  fever al  Pleafures,  which  ws- 
receive  from  external  Things,    by  means  oj  our  outward 

Senfes. The  Firfl  Difi728iio7i  is  betiveen  the  Pleafures, 

which  are  perfeEily  pure,  unmixed  with  any  Pain,  either 
fubfequent  or  precedent, — and  the  Pleafures  on  the  other 
hand,  whofePrefence  is  preceded  <^  Pain,  ift  proportion  to 
their  Mag7iitude,  or  which  at  their  Departure  leave  a 
Sting  behind  them,  a  Regret  of  their  Abfence  and  a  Lsong- 
ing  for  their  Return.  —  After  this,  other  Differences^ 
equally  wide,  are  f3ow?i  by  Socrates,  and  admitted  by 
Protarchus  to  be  real,  between  the  harmlefs  Pleafures  afid 
the  hurtfull ;  between  the  gentle,  and  the  fierce  ;  the  true 
Pleafures  and  the  falfe ;  the  right  Pleafures  and  the 
wrong  ;  Thofe  which  are  confifent  with  Rational  Delights, 
and  Thofe  on  the  other  hand,  %vhich  exclude  for  a  time,  and 
at  length  bajiifj  for  ever,  ^//Mental  ObjeSls,  and  all  Self '- 

Ejtjoyment. When  the  Pleafures   of  Senfe   have   been 

thus  ffted ',   and  a  Scparatiofi  has  been  made  of  the  pure 

from  the  impure  ;   Di(lind:ions  are  laid  down  between  the 

different  Arts,  exercijed  by  Man,  as  they  are  more  or  lefs  built 

on  Science  j   a7id  as  they  have  more  or  lefs  t;/' Certainty  in 

3  their 


The    argument.         27 

their  Perforf?ia7iccs  :  fome  Arls  dependi7ig  chiefly  qii 
Sagacity  and  Experience  ;  while  others  proceed  with  the 
affurance  of  Truth  in  all  their  Operations.  ^Diflindlion 
is  alfo  take?z  between  fsme  Sciences,  a7id  others  bearing  the 
fame  Name  ; — a  DiJlij-iSiion,  with  refpeSl  to  the  difference 
of  the  Subjedls,  i7i  which  they  are  co7iverfant ; — as^  for 
infla7tce^  between  the  Arithmetick  o/"  Mathematicians,  the 
SubjeB-Matters  of  which  Science  are  invariable  Numbers, 
Each  co7iflfli77g  o/"  Monads,  all  of  the7ny  equal, — ^W,  on 
the  other  ha7id,  the  Arithmetick,  which  is  ifed  in  Co7rm707i 
Speech^    and  applied  to  Things  Corporeal,  Each  of  the77i 

One,   btct  variable,   a7id  of  unequal  Value.- By  thefe 

DiflinSlions  the  Philofopher  leads  Protarchia  to  rccog72ife 
the  fuperior  Excellence  of  the  Science  of  Mind  above  ali 

others^ a  Scie7ice^    C07ive7fant  in   thofe   SubjeSis   only^ 

which  are  the  fame  for  ever.  And  thus  alfo  are  we  led 
to  a  difcovery  of  the  iiature  f?/'  pure  Mind,  as  it  is  the  Seat 
£/"  eternal  Truth,  and  the  Foimtai72  of  all  real  Science,  of 

all  true  Art,  and  o/'^// Right  Opinions. In  the  Third 

atid  laj}  Argumentative  Part  of  this  Dialogue^  thofe  Moral 
Truths  are  fljown,  which  it  is  the  whole  Intent  of  it  to 
flDow,  i7i  the  followi7ig  Order  : — the  Firfl:  /x,  that  neither 
Pleafure    alo7ie.    nor   Theoretical   Wifdom   or  K7iowlevc 

alone,   is  fuffxient  for  the  Happinefs  of  a7iy  Man. The 

Second  is,  that  the  befl  and  happief  of  all  hu77ian  Lives  is 
That  Life,    iii    which   the   befl    and  highefl  Scicftce,    the 

D   2  Knovvkse 


28         The.    ARGUMENT. 

Knowlege  of  True  Good,  produceth  into,  habitual  and  con- 
Jla?it  PraBife  the  Moral  Virtues ;  Each  of  them ^  attended 
hy  a  ■peculiar  Satisfadion  ;  a?id  All  of  them,  embraci7ig 
Juch  purer  Pleafures  of  Senfe,  as  Outward  Nature  pre- 
fents  to  them  07i  every  Quarter,  and  for  which  "They  alom 
have  a  true  unadulterated  Tafte  :  —  a  Life,  in  which 
the  Prime  Science,  jufl  7iow  me?ttioned,  rightly  ejlimatijig 
the  Value  and  the  UJe  of  every  other  Science  and  of  every 
Htiman  Art,  entertains  them  all,  together  with  their 
concomitant  Delights  ;  ajftgning  to  Each  his  proper  Place, 
and  'Time  of  Exhibition  ; — receiving  alfo  frequefjt  but 
JJjort  Viftts  frotn  the  grofl'er  Pleafures  of  Seiife, — -from 
Such,  as  are  necejfary  to  the  fupport  of  Life  and  Health 
ajid  Strength  ; — but  ccnfa7ttly  refufing  ever  to  ad77iit 
Such,  as  i7iterrupt  and  hi72der  the  Arts  i7i  their  Exercifes ; 
Such,  as  drive  the  Sciences  i7Jto  Oblivio7i ;  Such,  as  impair 
the  Health  of  the  Body,  a77d  dimi7tijh  eve7y  Faculty  of  the 
Soul ;   Such,  as  profefs  Erwiity  with  fober  Reafo7i,  and  are 

utterly  i7iCQ77ipatible  with    the  Science  of  'True  Good. 

The  Third  Moral  Truth  is  this,  that  in  a  Life,  where 
Pleafure  and  Knowlege  are  thus  a77ticably  joined,  and 
operate  together  for  the  Good  of  the  whole  Man, — a  Life^ 
where  all  the  Parts  of  it  are  exaEily  proportioned  and 
fitted  to  each  other, — Symmetry,    Harmony   a7id  Beauty 

appear   throughout. The  laft  a7id  highefl  Truth,   no 

lefs  Theological  than  Moral,    is  This,  that    the  Caufe  of 
3  the 


The     argument.         29 

the  Happinefs  found  iti  fuch  a  Life^  is  the  Same  with 
the  Caufe  of  Harmonyj  Symmetry,  a?id  Beauty  thro 
the  Univerfe  ;  a?id  the  Same  with  the  Prineiplc  a?id 
EfTence  of  Moral  Virtue  ; — iia^nely^    Measure  its  Self 

a7id  Truth   its  Self the  Idea  of  Good,    the  great 

ObjeB  of  the  Divine  Mind ; — in  which  Univerfal  Idea 

the  True  M.t^^\uQs  of  All  things  are  contained. Thus 

have  we  ejtdeavoured  to  point  out  the  Method  of  this 
Capital  Dialogue,  the  Philebus ;   and  the  Series,  Order, 

and  Connection  of  its  Argumentative  Farts. As  to 

the  Epilogus  or  Concluiion  of  it,  where  the  Particular 
Matters,  reafoned  in  it,  are  fummed  up  and  reca- 
pitulated, enough  has  been  faid  before,  for  the  Purpofe 
of  this  Argument. — The  apparent  Form  of  the  Dialogue 
is  Dramatic  ;  the  Genius  of  it,  Didadic  ;  and  the 
Reafoning,  for  the  mofl  part.   Analytical  '^. 


♦  See  the  Synopfis,   page  7. 


PERSONS 


PERSONS  OF  THE  DIALOGUE, 


S  O  C  R'A  T  E  S, 

PROTARCHUS, 

PHILEBUS\ 


SCENE, 


The      LYCEUM  ^ 


'  For  the  Charadlers  oi  Protarchus  zn6.Philebus,  fee  the  Argument 
of  this  Dialogue,    pages  5,  6,  and  13. 

*  See  Note  on  the  Scene  of  the  Greater  Hippias. 


[     31     } 


P    H    I    L    E   B   U   S. 


SOCRAT  ES. 

CONSIDERS  now,  Protarchus  I  What  the  Doc- 
trine of  Philebus  is,  which  you  are  taking  upon 
yourfelf  to  fecond  and  fupport ;  and  What  things,  faid 
by  Me,  you  are  going  to  controvert,  if  they  fhould  be 
found  Such  as  are  not  agreeable  to  your  Mind  ".  Will 
you  permit  me  to  ftate,  in  a  fummary  way,  the  differ- 
ence between  My  Pofitions  and  thofe  of  Philebus  ?. 

Protarchus. 
By  all  means. 

^  The  Beginning  of  this  Dialogue  fuppofes,  that  much  Converfa- 
tion  had  paffed,  immediately  before,  between  Socrates  and  Philebus : 
concerning  which  Converfation,  or  rather  Controverfy,  the  Reader 
4S  referred  to  the  Argument,  page  5. 

=*  The  reftridive  Claufe,  which  concludes  this  Sentence,  is  per- 
haps intended  to  fuggeft  a  Thought,  that  Protarchus,  when  he 
undertook  to  controvert  the  Pofition  of  Socrates,  had  not  examined 
k  fufficiently ;  nor  had  confidered,  whether  he  was,  or  was  not, 
of  the  fame  Opinion  Himfelf.  The  PofTibility  of  fuch  an  Intention 
may  appear  from  the  Two  next  Notes. 

Socrates.. 


32  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

SOCRAT  E  S. 

Philebus  then  fays,  that  The  Good  of  all  Animals  is 
Joy,   and  Pleafure,   and  Delight  \    and  whatever  elfe 

is 

3  This  Part  of  the  Sentence,  to  give  it  a  literal  tranflation,  runs 
thus, — t&af  ' tis  good  for  all  Animals  to  rejoice,  and  (to  feel)  Pleafure 
and  Delight,  &c. — But  in  tranflating  it,  we  chofe  to  give  it  That 
Meaning,  which  is  rightly  prefumed  by  Socrates  to  be  agreeable  to 
the  Sentiments  of  Fbilebus  :  for  otherwife,  there  would  be  no 
opfofition  between  the  Opinion  of  Philebus  and  his  own.  Pleajure 
might  be  a  good  thing  ;  and  yet  Knowlege  might  be  a  better. — But 
from  what  follows  in  this  Dialogife  it  appears,  that,  in  the  Opinion 
oi Philebus,  Pleafure  and  Good 2ir&Ttvra?,fy}ionymous,  and  fignify  the 
fame  Thing  :  the  Confequenccs  of  which  Opinion  are  thefe  j — 
that  all  Pleafure  is  good;  and  that  no  other  thing  is  good,  befde 
Pleafure.  See  Note  35. — Now  Socrates  knew,  that  the  Term 
Pleafure  had  a  vague  Meaning  :  that  often  it  meant  fome  agreeable 
Scnfation,  felt  by  the  Soul  from  Things  Corporeal,  thro  the  medium 
of  her  own  Body  and  its  Organs  of  Senfation, — whenever  any  fuch 
Organ,  either  of  the  Sight,  Hearing,  Smell,  Tafe,  or  Feeling,  meets 
with  an  Objedl  fuitable  to  it ; — whether  the  Senfation  refrejloes,  or 
exhilerates,  ot  fooths  \.\\t  Animal-Spirits ;  and  whether  it  irritates^ 
or  convulfes,  or  Jof tens  the  Whole  or  any  Part  of  the  Nervous  Frame  ; 
he  knew  that  every  one  of  thefe  different  Senfations  in  the  Soul, 
by  mea}2s  of  the  Body,  was  termed  Pleafure : — that  the  fame  Term 
often  figoiiied  an  agreeable  PaJJion,  felt  by  the  Soul  immediately, 
and  arifing  in  her  thro  her  ov/n  Faculty s  oi  Memory  and  Imagination, 
whenever  thefe  Facultys  exhibit  to  her,  as  \i  prefent,  zny  future 
Objed:,  fuited  to  thofc  Bodily  Organs  of  Senfe,  thro  which  flie  has 
heretofore  received  any  Pleafure,  of  the  Kind  before-inentioned. — 

He 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  33 

is  congenial  to  them,    and  harmonifes  with  all  other 
Things  of  the  fame  Kind.      And  what  I  contend  for  is, 

that 

He  had  heard  the  Term  Pkafure  fometlmes   ufed,  to  exprefs   a 

delightful  Senfation,   felt  by  the  Human  Soul,  when  fome  Objedl, 

fuited  to  her  higher  Facultys  ol  Reafon  and  U?iderjlandi?ig,  prefents 

itfelf  to  her  View ; — any  Truth  of  Science,  whether  Speculative  or 

Pradic  ; — any  Regularity  or  Order  in  the  Works  oi  Art,  or  in  thofe 

of  Nature. — He  had  heard  the  fame  word,  Pkafure,  ^made  ufe  of  at 

other  times,  to  exprefs  the  heart-felt  SatisfaSlio?i,  enjoyed  by  All  of 

Human   Kind,   and   by  Many  of  the   Brutal,    in  gratifying   their 

natural  and  focial  AffcSlions  : — and  not  infrequently,   to  exprefs  a 

Kind  of  JLxultation,  felt  by  Virtuous  Souls,  on  reading  or  hearing 

the  recital  of  noble  and  generous  ASlions,    performed   by  Any  of 

,  their   own   Species  :— or   to  exprefs   certain  Feelings  of  the  fame 

Kind,  but  finking  deeper,  and  difFufed  thro  the  whole  Soul,  from  a 

Confcioujhefs  of  her  own  Right  ConduSl,   in  adting  bravely  and  ho- 

neflly,    or  in  benefiting  Thofe  with  whom  fhe  is   connedled. — 

He  had  heard  the  Term,  Pleafure,  applied  by  Some  to  That  Chcer- 

fiilnefs,  —  That  fober  and    innocent  Gaiety  of  Spirit,  —  naturally 

flowing  from  a  focial  and  benevolent  Difpofition  of  Mind  : — and 

by  Others  perhaps  in  His  time,  as  afterwards  it  was  applied  by 

Epicurus,  to  the  conftant  Serenity  and  Tranquillity  within  every  Soul, 

confcious  of  no  Injuftice, — freed  from  all  permanent  Pafllons,— 

unmolefled  by  her  own  Body,  as  well  as  by  Things  which  concern 

that  Body, — and  at  liberty  to  enjoy  her  Self. — Nay,  'tis  probable, 

that  in  That  philofophic  Age  and  Country,   as  well  as  elfewhere 

iince,    Thofe  rapturous  and   elevated  Sentiments   were   fometimes 

termed  Pleafures, — Thofe,   which  the  Soul  feels  but  rarely,   and 

only  for  a  few  precious  Moments  of  time, — when,  infenfible  of  her 

E  Body, 


H 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Body,  and  of  the  IForld  ivithouf,  flie  is  retired  to  that  fecret  and 
facred  Place  within  her  Self, — where,  with  her  Eye  clear,  and 
brightened  by  the  Light  of  Univerfal  Mind,  there  prefent,  flie 
beholds  and  converfes  with  thofe  fair  and  perfedl  Ideas,  which 
That  Li?ht  enables  her  to  fee, — and  where  (he  finds  her  Self,  for 
the  time,  in  fo  godlike  a  State,  as  to  ivaiit  Nothing  to  compleat 

her  Happinefs. •  Now   it  may    be   reafonably   fuppofed,   that 

Arijlippus,  the  Firfl:  celebrated  Teacher  of  the  Dodlrine  efpoufed. 
by  Philehis,  did,  at  different  times,  ufe  the  Term  P/eqfure  homo- 
nymoufly,  to  mean  thefe  different  Enjoyments, — viz.  Saijiia/,  Ra- 
tional, Moral,  Social,  IntellcBiial,  and  That  alfo  which  approaches 
to  Divine  Happinefs ; — by  fuch  a  fallacious  and  fophiftical  Variation, 
endeavouring  to  fupport  his  favourite  Doflrine,'  ■"  that  Plcafure 
was  the  only  Good  of  Man,  eligiUe  for  its  own  fake,  and  therefore 
to  be  propofed  as  his  o}ily  End." This  Suppofition  feems  pro- 
bable, becaufe  the  Epicureans  afterwards,  who  adopted  for  their 
own  That  Dodrine  of  Arijlippus  and  his  Followers,  (from  the 
Country  of  their  Founder  termed  Cyre?iaicks,)  were  fo  unfettled  in 
their  ule  of  the  word  Fleafiire,  as  to  attribute  to  it,   on  different 

occafions,    thofe   feveral    Meanings   above-mentioned. To  be 

convinced  that  the  Epicureans  were  thus  unfettled,  we  have  only 
to  compare  the  Epijile  of  Epicurus  to  Mena'ceus,  with  fome  other 
Sentences  of  that  Founder  of  the  Epicurean  Seft,  recorded  by 
Laer tilts,  but  more  fully  by  Cicero  in  Difputat:  Tufculan:  L.  3, 
§.  18.     See  alfo  Seneca  in  his  Treatife  de  Vita  Beatd,   Cap:  6,  12, 

15,  and  19.  and   his  Epijilcs  66  and  78. But,    whatever  Ex- 

prelTions  were  ufed  by  the  Cyrenaicks,  we  fee,  that  Socrates,  in  the 
Sentence  now  before  us,  to  prevent  all  Ambiguity  and  all  Preva- 
rication, ufes  other  Terms,  befide  Pleafure ;  he  couples  with  it 
Joy  and  Delight ;  and  by  the  Words,  "  lohatever  elfe  is  congenial,"' 
we  prefume  he  means  Cheerfulnefs,  Eafe,  'Tranquillity,  Complacency,, 
and  Self-Satisfaciion.      Thus   he    allows   the   utmoil  Latitude  of 

•  Meaning 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  35 

Meaning   to   That  Hypothefis,    which  Pi-otarchus  undertook    to 
vindicate;    and   gives   all    poffible    Advantage    to   his   Adverfary's 
Caufe.     For,  though  it  might  fairly  be  fuppofed,  (what  afterward 
appears,    more  than  once,    in   the  courfe   of  this  Dialogue,)   that 
Fhilebus  had  principally  in  his  view  Senfual  Pleafiires,  of  the  grojfer 
Kinds, — the  word  Delight   is   added  by  Socrates;   becaufe  it  is   a 
Term,  generally  applied  to  the  Pleafiires  we  receive  thro  our  Kyes 
and  Ears:  and   the   word  Joy   is   put  firfi,    becaufe  of  its   more 
extenfive  Meaning;  as  it  includes  every  Feeling  attendant  on  the 
Soul's  Perception  of  Objedts  agreeable  to  her  Nature :   and  if  we 
underftand   the   words, — "  whatever  elfe  is  congejiial" — to   mean 
fuch  Feelings  as  Mental  'tranquillity,  and  Self-SatisfaSiion,  we  have 
then   all  thofe  feveral   Meanings,    in   which   we   faid   the  Term 
Pleafiire  was  homonymoujly  ufed. — Farther;  that  Plato,  in  the  latter, 
the  et  C(etera-Part  of  the  Sentence  now   before  us,   had  a  View 
to  thofe  Sentiments  or  Feelings  lafl:  mentioned,  thofe  of  a  truly 
philofophic  Soul,  is  probable  from   a  paflage  in  his  Cratylus, — a 
Dialogue,   in  which  is  taught  the  Nature  of  Things,  as  well  the 
permanent  as   the  tranfient,    by  a  fuppofed  Etymology  of  Names  and 
Words-, — in  that  Dialogue,   (pag:   419  of  AS'/f/i/)wj''s  Edition,)    he 
'briefly  recites   and  explains  all  the  agreeable  Senfations  or  Affec- 
tions of  the  Soul.     The  Three  firft,  there  enumerated,  are  the  very 
fame   whicii    are   here   fpecified, — -nSovi),    X'^l^^'    tb'^4'^> — Pleafiire, 
Joy,  Delight :  the  Fourth  he  there  terms  eu^p^oc-iiin,    Cheerfulncfis, — 
a  Word,  which,  according  to  the  Genius  of  that  Dialogue,  he  fup- 
pofes  a  contraSlion  of  evcpspoavvTi^  and  derived  a.iro  iSev  toIs  ■n-pa.yixa.at 
a))V  -^u^riv  aufjitpsos^ai^  firom  the  eafiy  Flow  of  the  Soul,  ivhenjl^e  is  ami- 
cably carried  along  with  the  natural  courfic  of  thir.gs. — Now  in  this 
giJcf)^0TuV>?,   this  Checifiulnefs,   all  the   remaining  good  Affections  or 
Feelings  of  the  Soul,  before  mentioned,  we  prefume  to  be  included ; 
not  only,  becaufe  Cheerfiulnefs  arifes  naturally  in  the  Soul  from  a  Con- 
fcioufnrfis  of  her  having  and  enjoying  the  natural,  rational,  and  focial, 

E   2  •  Affcdlions, 


36 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


that  thofe  Things  are  not  the  Beft ;   but  that  to  dif- 
jcern,    and  to  underftand  %    and   to   remember  %    and 

whatever 

Affections, — but  alio,  becaufe  a  conjiant  Cheerfulnefs  can  never  be 
maintained  without  frequently  enjoying  fome  or  other  of  thofe 
godlike  Feelings. 

*  The  Hypothefis,  here  fet  up  by  Socrates,  in  oppofition  to  the 
Sentiments  of  Philebus,  feems  to  be  the  fime  with  the  Dodlrine, 
faid  to  have  been  taught,  an  age  or  two  afterwards,  by  Herillus  of 
Carthage.  For  this  Herillus,  who  had  been  a  Difciplc  of  Zeno  the 
Citeaan,  Founder  of  the  Stoic  Secft,  -is  reported  by  Cicero,  (whether 
juftly  or  not,  may  well  be  queflioned,)  to  have  held,  that  Science 
or  Knowlege  was  the  Chief  Good  of  Man.  But  whatever  was  the 
Meaning  oi Herillus,  when  he  fet  fo  high  a  Value  on  Science,  it  will 
foon  appear,  that  Socrates  himfelf  entertained  no  fuch  Notions  on 
this  Subjeft.  It  will  appear  afterwards,  that  this  Hypothefis, 
which  he  here  gives  out,  as  if  it  were  his  own,  is  introduced  by 
him  for  the  fole  purpofe  of  explaining  rightly  that  ancient  Dodtrine, 
— *•  that  Mind  is  the  Highefl  and  the  Bejl  of  Things," — by  fuggefting- 
to  our  thoughts  the  Diftmdtion,  mentioned  in  our  Argument  and 
Notes  to  the  Firji  Alcibiades,  between  Mind  Intelligent  and  Mind 
Intelligible.  And  laftly  it  will  appear,^  that  Mind,  in  this  latter 
Senfe,  is  Good  its  ^elf,  and  Beauty  its  Selfj  the  Caifcy 
f Final  ■iS  well  2^5  Formal}  oi  Beauty,  Harmony,  and  Good,  through- 
out the  Univerfe ;  and  in  Man,  who  partakes  of  it,  the  Principle 
and  Caufe  of  his  Chief  Good,  which  is  Moral  Virtue.  —  The 
Terms  made  ufe  of  in  this  place  by  Plato,  are  very  remarkable  i 
they  are — not  tp'^avmts  xa.)  jw, — the  former  of  which  frequently 
means  Moral  Wifdom,  or  Prudence,  the  Habit  of  difcerning  ivhat  is 
Good  in  all  Moral  Adlions,  That  Habit,  which  ib  the  Leading  or 
Prime  Firtue, — and  by  the  latter  frequently  is  meant  li'lind  Intelli- 

giblcy 
6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  37 

gihlc.  That  which  is  the  Fountain  of  Good,  the  Cattfc  of  Beauty,  the 
Meafure  of  all  things,  and  the  io\t  Principle  of  Virtue :  now,  here  he 
can  neither  mean  Virtue,  nor  the  Principle  of  Virtue;  becaufe  we 
Ihall  find,  in  the  Conclufion  of  this  Dialogue,  that  he  rates 
Thefe  above  all  other  Goods : — his  words  in  this  paflage  are — 
TO  9^oiw  jca)  TO  )'o«)', — that  is, — the  aSlual  Difcernment  ox.  Knowlcgc 
of  what  is  the  beft  way  of  a£ling  in  any  Affair  under  immediate 
deliberation, — and  the  a£lual  Perception  of  any  Truth,  then  pre- 
fented  to  the  Mind. — Nor  does  it  invalidate  the  Juftnefs  of  this 
Remark,  that  in  repeating  the  Hypothefis  propofed  by  Socrates,  the 
terms  (^^ovmn  and  )«5  are  fometimes  ufed  by  Socrates  himfelf,  as. 
well  as  by  Protarchus.  For,  the  Hypothefis  being  once  dated  in 
precife  and  unambiguous  Terms,  and  its  Meaning  confequently 
fettled,  and  equally  well  underitood  by  Both  the  Partys,  they  might 
thenceforward  fafely  indulge  themfelves  in  a  Liberty  of  changing 
the  Terms  for  Variety *s  fake,  and  of  ufmg  fuch  others,  as  often 
conveyed  the  fame  Meaning. — It  is  well  known  by  the  learned  in 
the  Writings  of  ancient  Greek  Philofophers,  that  by  the  term  vm 
they  mean  the  IntelleSl,  the  intelligent  or  percipient  Principle  in  the 
Soul,  more  frequently  than  they  mean  Mind  Intelligible  and  EternaL 
— And  as  to  the  other  term  f^ona-ts,  omitting  many  PalTages  ia 
Plato's  Phcedo,  where  it  Ggnifies  the  Energy  of  the  Mind  in  dif- 
ceming  what  is  Good,  we  need  only  refer  to  Two  Paffages  in  his 
Firfi  Akibiades  ;  in  the  former  of  which,  the  term,  ufed  hy  Plato, 
is  TO  (f^Qvfiv,  which  we  have  tranflated  by  the  word  Intelligence^ 
page  320  of  that  Dialogue i  in  the  latter,  Plato's  term  is  (ppo'i'«o-(5. 
Ours  is  Wifdom,  page  321  ;  which  vv'ord  we  have  there  chofen, 
becaufe  the  Intelligence,  there  fpoken  of,  is  That  of  the  Dii^ine 
Mind. 

5  To  remember  does  not  here  mean  a  retaining  of  the  Impreffions 
made  by  Senfble  Objects  in  the  Imagination ;  as  it  may  feem  to  do 
from  what  is  faid  of  the  Memory  hereafter  in  this  Dialogue.     For 

the 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

whatever  Is  of  Kin  to  them  ^,    Right  Opinions',    and 
True  Reafonings  \  are  better  things  than  Pleafure,  and 

more 

tlie  Souls  of  Brute  Animals  have  this  retentive  Faculty,  as  well  as 
t\\o{&  oi Men.     The  Padage  now   before  us  hath  relation  only  to 
the  Human  Mind.     Here  therefore  is  to  be  underflood  the  Mind's 
retaining    thofe  Mental  ObjeBs  only,   which   flie   had   before  con- 
ceived,   by  learning  from  Others,  or  thro   her   own  Force   and 
Virtue,  as  Minerva  was  faid  to  have  been  born  of  "Jupiter  alone. 
This    account   is   agreeable   to   the  Definition,    given   us   by   the 
anonymous  Writer  of  the  Life  ofPythagoras  In  Photius.     Miti'/^h  jxit 
Zv  gV'  tri^mii  Sv  g/x.aS'g  Tis.     N'oiv  Memory,    fays  he,   is  a  Keeping  of 
thofe  'Things  which  a  Man  has  learnt :    And  ftill  more  does  It  agree 
with  that    oi  Porphyry,   in    his  'K(^o^fjLa.\,    §.  i6.    'H  ;w.jk7^"  «>^  ^V' 
cpccvTaaiuii'  aajmotcc-,  aAAa   jj.iKir-n'^ivTODv.     The  Memory  is  not  a  Pre- 
fervation  ofFancys,  or  the  Traces  of  Senfible  Objefts  left  in  the 
"imagination,   but  of  Things  tvhich  have  been  jiudied,  or  to  which  the 
Mind  has  before  applied  her  felf.     Arijlotle  includes   both  Senfble 
and  Mental  Objedts  In  the  account  which  he  gives  oi  Menwry :   and 
his  account  of  it  we  fliall  endeavour  to  explain  and  judify,   in  a 
Note  to  that  Paflage  of  the  prefent  Dialogue,   above  referred  to: 
for  we  think  It  a  Subjeft  of  the  laft  Importance  to  a  Knowlege  of 
the  Soul  of  Man. 

^  That  is,  of  Kin  to  a  Difcermnent  of  what  Is  jiift  and  7-ight  in 
Morals,  founded  on  v.-hat  Mr.  Tlutchcfon  tcrins  the  Moral  Senfe  ;— 
of  Kin  to  a  Perception  of  what  Is  true  In  Metaphyficks,  founded  on 
the  Principles  of  Knowlege ;  and  of  Kin  alfo  to  a  Memory  of  what  the 
Mind  has  either  of  Ixer  Self  difcerned  thro  her  own  natural  Feelings, 
— or  has  of  her  'titM  perceived  \}i\xo  her  own  Principles,  the  Principles 
of  Knowlege, — or  has  learnt  from  Others,  who,  for  the  Redlltude 
,6  and 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


39 


and  the  Truth  of  what  they  taught,  muft  have  fecretly  appealed  to 
thofe  natural  Feelings  and  to  thole  untaught  Principles. 

7  What  the  Kindred  is  between  real  Knowlege  and  Right  Opinion, 
■ — in  What  they  are  ali/cc,  and  in  What  they  dijj'er, — is  fl^iovvn  by 
Plato  himfelf,  near  the  conclufion  of  his  Meno. 

*  That  true  Reafonings  are  of  Kin  to  Knowlege,  no  Man  needs 
to  have  it  proved  to  him.  They  are  the  ordinary  Means,  by  which 
every  Art  receives  Improvement ;  altho  the  firft  Invention  of  it  may 
be  owing  to  Sagacity,  or  Chance :  and  they  are  the  only  Means  of 
advancing  in  any  Science,  after  the  firft  Principles  or  Axioms  of 
it  are  eftablifhed. — Having  explained,  fufficiently,  (it  is  hoped,) 
for  the  prefeiit,  the  Hypothefis,  propofed  by  Socrates,  in  which  he 
enumerates  the  principal  AffeBions  of  the  Fluman  Mind;  (for  we 
know  not  by  what  other  common  name  to  call  the  Imprefjions, 
made  on  the  Mind  by  Mental  Objeds, — the  Depth  and  Duration 
of  thofe  Impreflions, — and  her  own  Energys,  or  the  Motions  within 
her  Self,  to  which  thofe  ImprelTions  give  Rife  j)  we  prefume,  that 
our  philofophical  Readers  will  not  be  difpleafed  at  flopping  here 
a  while,  to  obferve  the  jufl  Order  of  the  Parts  in  this  Pafl'age. — 
In  the  firfl  place  are  ranked  the  dijcerning  of  what  is  right,  and  the 
perceiving  of  what  is  true :  and  thefe  are  the  Mind's  primary  and 
chief  Affections ;  whether  they  fpring  up  fpontaneoufly  therein  from 
Natural  Feelings  and  Firfl  Principles,  thro  Mental  Introverfion, 
Self-Refledion,  and  untaught  Reafon,  —  or  whether  they  are 
raifed  by  due  Culture  of  the  Mind,  good  Difcipline,  and  wife 
Inftrudtion. — In  the  next  place  ftands,  what  cannot  be  in  the  Mind- 
till  after  the  two  former,  the  retaining  or  remembring  of  what  we. 

have  fo  difcerned  and   felt,    fo  perceived  and  underftood.- After 

this,  come  Right  Opinions :  for  thefe  are  founded  on  remembring 
v/hat  we  have  heretofore  difcerned  and  perceived,  of  Good  and 
Truth,  when  this  remeinbrance  is  applied  rightly  to  A(ftions,   or 

Things,   of  which   we   have   no  certain  Knoivlege. Laftly  are 

placed. 


40  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

more  eligible  to  all  Beings  univerfally,  that  is,  to  Such 
as  are  capable  of  receiving  the  participation  of  them  '  ; 
and  that  to  all  Beings,  which  have  that  capacity,  the 
adual  Partaking  '°  of  them  is  of  all    things   the   moft 

advan- 

placed  True  Keafonin^s :  and  rightly  are  they  placed  the  laft  in  this 
Lift  of  Mental  AfFeftions.  For  tho  the  JiiJInefs  of  all  Reafoning 
depends  immediately  on  the  felf-evident  Principles  of  Mind  and  of 
all  Science,  yet  the  Truth  of  what  we  reafon,  or  prove  by  reafoning, 
depends  on  the  Truth  of  the  Prejnijfes  laid  down.  For  be  our 
Concltjjions  ever  fo  juftly  drawn,  yet  the  Fremijfes  being  always 
Propojitions, — and  thefe  Propofitions  being  always,  except  in 
Geometrical  Reafoning,  nothing  more  than  Opinions  exprefled  in 
Words,  the  Truth  of  which  is  not  yet  proved,  and  only  taken  for 
granted, — the  Truth  of  the  Reafoning  depends  on  the  ReSlitude  of 
l\\ok Opinions. As  to  the  two  Mental  Affedlions,  here  firft  men- 
tioned, the  Difcernment  of  what  '\sjuf,  and  the  Perception  of  what 
is  true.  Whether  of  thefe  Two  is,  in  the  Order  of  Things,  of 
fuperior  dignity  to  the  Other,  will  appear  in  the  concluding  Part 
of  this  Dialogue. 

9  Or,  of  receiving  a  Share  in  them;  for  the  words  oi  Plato  in  this 
place  are, — auruv  Swclto.  {/.iraXa^av. 

'°  Or,  the  aSiual  holding  of  a  Share  ;  for  the  word,  ufed  here  by 

Plato,  is, — y.i'ra.<)(fiv. Ficinus  is  the  only  one  of  the  Translators 

from  the  Greek,  who  has  interpreted  this  Paflage  rightly.  Cor- 
narius,  it  feems,  difcerned  no  difference  between  the  meaning 
of  /xeraAa/Soy,  and  that  of  {/.iroii^eiv.  So  that  His  tranflation 
reprefents  Plato  as  guilty  of  a  moft  infipid  Tautology  in  this  Sen- 
tence. Which  Error  of  his  fcems  to  have  been  the  confequence  of 
another,  committed  by  him,  in  his  referring  the  word  //,fTaj^/«^  to  the 

preceding 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  41 

advantageous '", — not  only  to  thofe  Beings  which  are  '% 
but  to  Thofe  alfo  which  are  to  come.-^Do  we  not,  O 
.  '  Philebus ! 

preceding  word  ,^uvccToTi.  It  is  true,  that  the  Verbal  AdjeSiive 
S^wixroii  governs,  as  the  Grammarians  fpeak,  a  Verb  of  the  Lifinithe 
Mood:  but  the  Verb,  governed  by  it  here,  is  [jLSra.Ax0Hv,  a  word 
to  be  underftood  from  the  preceding  Part  of  the  Sentence.  The 
Injinkive  ixeTcc^e^v,  in  this  latter  Part  of  the  Sentence,  hath  the 
Office  of  a  Noun  Siihjla7itive  in  the  Nominative  Cafe ;  juft  as  fapere 
has  in  this  Verfe  of*Horace. 

Scribendi  redie,  fapere  eji  &  principium  &  fons. 
and  the  mark   of  a  comma  fliould,  in  like  manner,    be  printed 
immediately  before  it  in  the  next  Edition  ol  Plato. 

"  Whatever  is  good,  is  certainly  advantageous  to  the  Being 
which  enjoys  that  Good.  But  no  Good  can  yield  any  JLnjoymeJit , 
or  be  of  any  Advantage,  to  the  Being  to  which  it  reaches,   unlefs 

fuch  Good    be   agreeable    to  the    Nature  of   that    Being.  

Farther  ;  Whatever  is  agreeable  to  the  Nature  of  any  Being  intelli- 
gent and  fentient,  —  that  is,  to  any  of  its  Powers  of  Perception  or 
Senfation, — is  an  ObjeB  of  inflindlive  Love  or  De/ire  to  the  Being 
pofTeffed  of  fuch  Powers.  If  then  the  Ways,  thro  which  fuch  an 
ObjeSi  reaches  to  fuch  a  Being,  are  free  and  unobftrudted, — that  is, 
if  the  Mediums  of  Perception  or  Senfation  are  in  a  State  of  ngree- 
ablenefs   and   fitnefs   to  That  Being,  which  is  the  Subjecl  of  this 

LoVe   or   Defire,  as  well  as  to  That  which  is  the  ObjeB, thro 

thefe  Ways,  and  by  thefe  Means,  the  Defre  and  the  ObjeSl  of  it 
meet  together,  fuited  to  each  other, — the  One,  difpofed  to  be  gra- 
tified and  to  enjoy, — the  Other,  to  gratify  and  to  be  enjoyed. — If 
the  Object  alfo  of  the  Defire  be  either  intelligent  or  fentient,  as  well 
as  the  Being  which  is  the  SubjeB  of  that  Defire,  in  this  cafe  Both 

F  the 


42  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

the  Beings  feel  that  natural  Delight  or  Pleafure,  which  arifes,  thro 
all  Nature,  from  the  Congrefs  of  congenial  and  correfponding 
Beings,  if  they  are  either  intelligent  or  fentient. — What  we  prin- 
cipally aim  at,  in  making  this  laft  General  Obfervation,  will  eafily 
be  feen  in  our  Notes  to  the  finifliing  Part  of  this  Dialogue.  Our 
immediate  Drift  at  prefent  is  only  an  Appeal  to  the  Expe7-ience  of 
intelligent  Readers,  for  the  proof  oijoys  or  Delights  purely  Mentaly 
fuch  as  have  no  relation  or  reference  to  the  Body ;  and  in  which 
no  Corporeal  Feeling,  prefent,  paft,  or  future,  has  any  Share.  We 
have  the  affurance  alfo  oi  Reafon,  that  it  muft  be  fo,  and  cannot  be 
otherwife.  For,  as  every  Animal,  or  Se?itient  Soul,  naturally  defires, 
purfues,  and  catches  zX  Senfible  Good,  fo  the  Rational  Soul  o£  Man, 
when  difentangled  from  Senfe,  and  freed  from  PafTion,  naturally 
loves,  follows  after,  and  embraces  when  found,  every  Truth,  every 
Intelligible  or  Mental  Good :  becaufe  Truth  is  no  lefs  agreeable  to  the 

Rational  Nature,  than  Senjible  Good  is  to  the  Animal. If  then 

Protarchus,  when  he  took  upon  himfelf  to  be  an  Advocate  for 
Pleafure,  had  included,  in  his  Meaning  of  that  word,  all  fuch 
Pleafures  as  zvq purely  Mental,  his  Opinion  fairly  and  rightly  under- 
llood,  could  not  have  been  different,  in  the  main,  from  This 
which  Socrates  here  profeffes, — that,  in  every  particular  cafe,  to 
dij'cern  what  is  Beji  in  Adliony  and  to  perceive  what  is  True  in  Spe- 
culation, is  the  Chief  Good  of  Man;  unlefs,  indeed,  it  fhould  after- 
wards come  into  queflion,  whether  of  the  Two  Kinds  of  Pleafure, 
the  Senfual,  or  the  Mental,  was  to  be  preferred.  For  if  it  fliould 
appear,  that  in  This  Point  they  were  Both  of  the  fame  Mind,  the 
Controverfy  between  them  would  be  found  a  meer  Logomachy, 
or  Contention  about  Words  j  fuch  a  one,  as  the  JLpicureans  pretended, 
(and  perhaps  with  reafon,)  was  between  Them  and  the  Stoicks, 
when  They  (the  EpicureansJ  maintained,  that  the  true  Happinefs 
of  Man  was  placed  in  that  foy  or  Pleafure,  (for  they  make  ufe  of 
Both  thefe   words,)  which    arifes  from  the  habitual  Pradiice  of 

Virtue, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  43 

Virtue,  and  Infeparably  attends  it  j  while  the  Stoicks  infifted,  that 
it  lay  in  Virtue  only,  abftraded  from  all  its  natural  IfTue  and  all  its 
conftant  Retinue.  See  Seneca,  \n  Epiji:  6,  and  13. A  conten- 
tion This,  of  the  fame  Kind,  as  That  would  be  between  Two 
Perfons,  One  of  whom  aflerted,  that  to  a  Mufical  Ear  the  proper 
and  true  Good  was  Harmony ;  while  the  Other  contended,  that  the 
Good  lay  not  in  the  Harmony  its  felf,  but  in  the  Pkafure  which  the 

Mufical  'Eo.v  felt  from  hearing  it : And,  to  add  another  Simile, 

which,  as  well  as  the  former,  tends  to  illuftrate  the  concluding 
Part  of  this  Dialogue,  fuch  a  Contention  is  like  a  Controverfy 
amongft  Three  Perfons,  One  of  whom  having  aflerted,  that  to 
all  Animals,  living  under  the  Northern  Frigid  Zone,  the  Sun  in 
Cancer  was  the  greatefl  Blefling, — and  Another  of  them  having 
aflerted,  that  not  the  Sun  was  that  chief  Blefling  to  thofe  Northern 
Animals,  but  the  Warmth  which  he  afforded  them, — -the  Third 
fliould  imagine,  that  he  corrected  or  amended  the  two  former 
Aflertions,  by  faying,  that  thofe  Animals  were  thus  highly 
blefl:,  neither  by  the  Sun,  nor  by  the  Warmth  which  his  Rays 
afforded  them,  but  by  the  y^y  ox  Pkafure  which  thty  felt  from 
the  Return  of  the  Sun  and  Warmth.     For 

Wits,  juft  like  Fools,  at  War  about  a  Name, 
Have  full  as  oft  no  Meaning,  or  the  fame. 
See  Sir  William  Temple,  on   the  Gardens  of  Epicurus,  in  his  Mif- 
fellanys.  Part  a**. 

*^  All  intelligent  and  rational  Beings  are  here  plainly  meant. 
By  Thofe  ivho  are,  we  fuppofe  are  meant  Such  as  are  immortal, 
and  always  are.  Such  as  in  Pagan  Language  are  called  Gods  :  and 
by  Thofe  who  jhall  be,  we  underfl:and  Men,  Such  rational  Beings 
only,  as  are  born  Mortal.  See  the  Sixth  of  Mr.  Petvins  Letters 
concerning  Mind.  What  occurs  hereafter  in  this  Dialogue  con- 
firms the  truth  of  our  Suppofition. — If  then  we  are  not  miflaken 
in   the  Senfe  of  the  PaflTage  now  before  us,  it  means,  that  thoie 

F  2  AffeSlions 


44  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Philebus !    Yon  and  I,  feverally  lay  down  fome  fuch 
Hypothefes  as  Thefe  ? 

Philebus. 
Exadlly  fuch,    O  Socrates  ! 

Socrates. 
And  will  You,  Protarchus !  take  up  the  Controverfy, 
as  I  have  juft  now  ftated  it  ? 

Protarchus. 
Of  necefllty  I  muft.     For  Philebus,    the  Champion 
of  Our  Side,   is  tired  and  gives  out.  . 

SOCRATE  s. 

Now  it  is  right  and  proper  for  us  to  difcover,  by 
all  means  pofTible,  the  full  Force  and  Meaning  of  Both 
thofe  Hypothefes  ;  and  not  to  give  over,  till  we  have 
determined  the  Controverfy  between  them. 

Protarchus. 

AffeBions  of  the  Mind,  before  mentioned,  are,  above  all  other 
things,  good  and  advantageous, — not  only  to  the  Gods,  who,  being 
inverted  with  Bodys  uncompounded,  and  fi.ibje<fl  to  no  Change 
or  internal  Motion,  feel  neither  Pain  nor  Pleafure,  in  which  the 
Body  hath  any  Share, — but  likewife  to  Meti,  fufceptible  of  Pain 
and  Pleafure  corporeal. — The  firll  Part  of  this  Propofition,  That 
J  concerning 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S.  45 

Protarchus. 
I  agree  with  you,   it  is  ^K 

Socrates. 
Let  us  agree  in  This  too,   beiides. 


Protarchus. 


In  What  ? 


Socrates. 

That  we  fliould,  Each  of  us  '%  endeavour  to  fet 
forth,    what  State  and  what  Affedlion  '^  of  the  Soul  is 

able, 

concerning  t/je  Gods,  we  fliall  find  agreeable  enough  to  the  Sen- 
timents of  Socrates,  on  the  fuppofition  of  any  fuch  Beings  as 
are  above  defcribed  :  but  the  latter  Part,  That  concerning  Man, 
will  foon  appear  to  be  exprelTive,  not  of  his  real  Opinion,  but 
of  an  Hypothefis,  introduced  by  Him  into  the  Field  of  De- 
bate, to  combat  againft  the  oppofite  one  oi  Philebiis ;  that  Both  of 
thofe  Hypothefes  being  defeated,  each  by  the  other,  a  Third 
might,  without  any  Oppofition,  affert  a  jufter  Claim  to  the  Matter 
in  Difpute,  the  Charadler  of  being  the  Chief  Good  of  Man. 

'3  Ufe  is  made  of  this  Firfl  Preliminary  Article,  afterwards  in 
the  Courfe  of  the  Dialogue,  both  by  Socrates  and  by  Protarchus. 
The  Foundation  of  it  we  fhall  find  anon  to  be  a  prior  En- 
gagement, entered  into  by  Socrates  himfelf,  during  his  Difpute 
with  Philebus. 

'■*  The  Greek  of  this  Sentence,  in  all  the  Editions  of  Plato,  is 
cLvrMv  iKoi'Ti^oi.  But  all  the  Tranilators  interpret,  as  if  they  read 
in  the  M.SS.  jj^wf  iKXTi^oi;  a  Reading,   which  is  clearly  agreeable 

to 


46  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

to  the  Senfe  of  the  PafTage,  and  fnakes  it  eafier  to  be  underftood. 
In  the  printed  Reading  the  word  avtm  muft  refer  to  Ai^wc, 
which  is  more  remote,  and  has  been  rather  implied  than  exprelfed  ; 
cLVT^v  indTscoi  will  then  mean  i/je  Argument  of  Each :  but  to 
fay,  t/.'e  Argument  poidd  endeavour,  is  in  a  Stile  too  figurative  and 
bold,   to  be  ufed  by  any  Profaic  Writer. 

'5  In  the  Greek, — l%iv  x>^  ^ioi'Sriaiv. — All  the  differences  between 
||<5  and  S'lci'Sriiii  are  accurately  fliown  hy  AriJ}otIe,  in  his  Categorys, 
Cap.  8.  and  in  his  Metaphyficks,  Lib:  4.  §.  19.  In  the  Sen- 
tence now  before  us,  the  difference  between  them  is  this  ; — S'lolSrea-n 
■^u^rls,  an  AffeBion  of  the  Soul,  is  the  Soul's  prefent  but  tranfient 
State  J — i^ti  \^^i,  a  State  of  the  Soul,  is  the  Soul's  permanent 
Affection. — Thus  we  fay  of  a  Man,  that  he  is  in  a  joyous  State 
of  Mind,  when  the  Joy,  with  which  he  is  affeSled,  is  of  fome 
Jianding,  and  is  likely  to  continue :  but,  of  a  Man,  in  whofe  Soul 
"Joy  is  juf  now  arifen,  we  fay,  that  he  is  feized  (that  is,  af- 
filed fuddenly)  with  Joy.  And  thus  again  we  fay,  that  the 
Mind  is  in  a  thoughtful  State,  when  it  has  been  for  fome  time 
adtually  thinking,  and  is  not  eafy  to  be  diverted  from  thinking 
on :  but  when  a  Thought  arifes  fuddenly  within  us,  in  an  un- 
thinking State  of  Mind,  and  amidfl;  the  wandrings  of  Fancy,  we 
fay,  that  a  Thou^X.  Jirikes  us,  that  is,  fuddeiily  affe5is  our  Mind. 
— It  muft  not,  however,  be  concealed,  that  ||/5  and  i^id^san, 
which  v/e  have  here  tranflated  by  the  words  State  and  AffeSlion, 
ufually  mean  Habit  and  Difpoftion.  But  the  aitinity  between 
This  their  ufual  Meaning,  and  That  which  they  have  in  the 
Paffage  now  before  us,  will  appear,  from  confidering, — that,  as 
the  Soul  acquires  certain  Habits  of  a£ting,  thro  frequently- 
repeated  A£ls  of  the  fame  Kind, — fo  flie  is  fxed  in  fome  certain 
State,  thro  frequent  LnpreJJions  made  on  her  where  fhe  is  pajjive, 
or  thro  frequent  Energys  of  her  own  where  (lie  is  aSlive,  —  a 
State,   to  which  thofe  ImpreJJions  from  without,  and  thofe  Energys 

5  within. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  47 

able,  according  to  our  different  Hypothefes,  to  pro- 
cure for  every  Man  a  Happy  Life.  Is  it  not  our 
Bulinefs   fo  to  do  ? 


Protarchus. 
Certainly  it  is  '\ 


Socrates. 


within,  gradually  lead  herj — and  alfo  that,  in  like  manner  as 
fome  certain  previous  Difpofition  of  the  Soul  is  neceffary  to  every 
fingle  AB  which  is  'volimtary,  fo  is  it  alfo  neceffary  to  the  re- 
ceiving of  every  ImpreJJion  from  without,  and  to  the  performing 
of  every  Energy  within. — Thefe  Obfervations  will  perhaps  be  of 
Ufe  to  us,  in   the  conclufive  Part  of  this  Dialogue. 

'*  This  other  Preliminary  Article  fets  the  Two  Hypothefes 
,  in  fuch  a  Light,  as  to  make  it  eafy  to  compare  them  together  j 
and  contradts  the  Controverfy  between  them  to  this  fingle 
Point, — What  is  the  Beji  State  of  a  Man's  Soul,  and  in  What 
Manner  it  is  Bejl  for  him  to  be  affeEled ;  —  in  other  words, 
with  What  Habit  and  Difpojition  of  Soul  a  Man  is  happiejl -, — 
whether  with  That  Habit  and  That  Difpofition,  which  the  En- 
joyments, fo  highly  extolled  by  Phikbus,  create  and  form  within 
him ;  or  whether  with  Thofe,  which  he  acquires  and  pofleffes 
through  the  Mental  Exercifes,  recommended  by  Socrates.  That 
this  is  the  true  Light,  in  which  alone  the  Subjed:  can  be 
rightly  viewed,  will  be  found,  by  confidering, — that  Happinefs 
can  only  confift  in  a  certain  State  or  Habit,  and  in  a  certain 
JffeBion  or  Difpofition,  of  the  Soul;  and  that  Whatever  placeth 
the  Soul  in  this  State,  or  produces  in  the  Soul  this  Habit, — 
Whatever  affecis  the  Soul  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  contributes  to 
bring    it    into  this   State,   or  to  maintain  it   therein, — Whatever 

difpofetb 


48 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


difpofeth  the  Soul  to  acquire  eafily  this  Habit,  or  advanceth 
the  Progrefs  of  the  Soul  towards  it, — Every  fuch  Thing  is  to 
be  ranked  in  the  number  of  a  Man's  Greatejl  Goods.  Whether 
Happinefs  be  to  be  found  in  Speculative  Wijdom,  or  in  PleafurCy 
or  in  feme  other  PoJJ'eJjion  or  Enjoyment,  it  can  be  feated  no  where 
but  in  the  Soul.  For  Happinefs  has  no  Exiftence  any  where, 
but  where  it  is  felt  and  known.  Now  'tis  no  lefs  certain, 
that  only  the  Soul  is  fenfible  of  Pain  and  Pleafure,  than  it  is, 
that  only  the  Soul  is  capable  of  Knoivlege,  and  of  thinking 
cithtv  foolifily  or  wifely.  To  determine  therefore  the  Controverfy, 
whether  Specidative  Wijdotn  or  Pleafure,  conftitutes  Human  Hap- 
pinefs, or  is  a  Man's  Chief  Good,  it  muft  be  thorowly  confidered 
and  known.  How,  or  in  What  manner,  the  Soul  is  affecfled  by 
fpeculating  or  thinking  wifely, — and  How,  by  enjoying  Pleafure  ; — 
to  What  Habits  thefe  different  Affedions  feverally  difpofe  and  lead 
the  Soul ; — and  alfo,  into  What  State  the  -Soul  is  brought  by 
a  Life  of  }neer  Speculation ;  and  into  What,  by  a  Life  of  meer 
Pleafure.  Unlefs  thefe  Points  are  examined  and  fettled,  the 
Controverfy  coucerning  a  Man's  Chief  Good,  can  never  be 
determined :  which,  it  was  agreed  in  the  Firft  Preliminary,  was 
right  and  proper  to  be  done.  For,  without  the  fettling  of  thefe 
Points,  every  Man's  Opiiiion  of  Good  will  be  governed  by  his  own 
Sentiments,  or  by  what  He  himfelf  takes  a  Fancy  to,  and  not  by 
the  Sentiments  or  Fancys  of  any  Other  Man.  Difference  of 
Opinion  indeed  on  every  Moral  Subjedl  muft  be  endlefs,  with- 
out fome  Standard  of  Moral  Truth  be  fixed  :  and  on  this  Sub- 
jedl,  of  Human  Happinefs,  there  can  be  no  true  Standard, 
which  agrees  not  with  the  Common  Senfe  of  all  Men,  and 
with  Univerfi;!  Experience.  To  Common  Senfe  therefore  and  the 
Experience  of  all  Mankind  an  Appeal  is  to  be  underftood,  and 
tacitly  is  made,  in  the  whole  following  Inquiry, 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  49 

Socrates. 
Well  then  ;    You  fay,    that   'tis  That  of  rejoicing; 
We,    that    'tis   That  of  underftanding   and    thinking 

rightly. 

Protarchus. 
True. 

Socrates. 

But  what  if  there  fhould  appear  fome  Other  ^\ 
preferable  to  Both  of  thefe,  but  more  nearly  of  Kin 
to  Pleafure  ?  fliould  we  not,  in  this  cafe,  be.  Both 
of  us,  confuted,  and  obliged  to  yield  the  Preference 
to  a  Life,  which  gives  the  ftable  PofTeffion  of  thofe 
very  Things  '%   wherein  you  place  Human  Happinefs  ? 

^^  That  is, — fome  other  Life,  or  fome  other  State  of  the  Soul 
■throughout  Life,  preferable  to  That  o'i  Specidatmi,  as  well  as  to 
That  of  Pleafure;  —  fome  other  Affeclion  alfo  of  the  Soul,  pre- 
ferable to  any  of  her  'Energys,  exercifed  in  meer  'Tbmking,  as 
well   as   to   any  Senfation,    which   (lie  feels,    of  meer  Pleafure. 

'^  The  laft  Five  words  in  our  Tranjlation  of  this  Interrogatory 
Sentence,  we  acknowlege  to  be  not  authorifed  by  any  words 
in  the  Greek.  We  have  added  them,  by  way  of  explaining, 
what,  in  our  apprehenfion,  Plato  means  by  txiitx,  thefe  things. 
For  we  fuppofe  them  to  be  the  very  fame  things,  mentioned 
by  him  before,  in  reprefenting  the  Opinion  of  Philebus.  And 
our  fuppofition  is  founded  on  this  reafoning :  — Since  Pleafure 
is  generally  tranfient  and  of  JJ^ort  duration,  a  Life  the  moil 
jiearly  of  Kin  to  2.  Life  of  Pleafure,  but  preferable  to  it,  muft 
in  all  probability  be  Such  a  Life,  as  will  fx  the  Inf  ability  of 
Pleafure,  and  fcure  its  Continuance. 

G  How- 


50  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

However,  at  the  fame  time  it  muft  be  agreed,  that  a. 
Life  of  Pleafure  would  be  found  more  eligible  than,, 
a  Life  of  Knowlege  or  Intellection,, 

Protarchu  s,^ 
Without  doubt. 

Socrates. 
But  if  that  Better  State  of  the  Soul  ''  fhould  appeal- 
to  be  more  nearly  allied  to  Knowlege,  in  that  cafe,. 
Knowlege  would  be  found  to  have  the  advantage  over. 
Pleafure,  and  Pleafure  muft  give  place.  Do  ye  not: 
agree  with  Me,  that  thefe  things  are  fo  ?  or  how 
otherwife  fay  ye  that  they  are  ? 

'9    The    Reader  will   be   curious   to  know,    what  this  Third; 
Kind    of  Life,    or   State  of  the  Soul,    is,    which   Socrates  here 
fuppofes   may  be   found  preferable  to   the  other  Two  Lives,    to- 
a  Life  of  Speculation,  and  to  a  Life  of  Fleafure.     And  fince  our 
Author,   after   he  has  raifed   this  Curiofity,    delays  to   gratify  it; , 
till  he  proves  the  Truth  of  this  Third  Hypothefis  j   which  is  not. 
done,    till  we  arrive    at   the   laft  Part   of   the  Dialogue ;    we  are 
willing    to  prevent   the  Reader's  Impatience,    that   he  may    not 
gallop   over    all   that    is    between  ^   by    letting  him    know    thuS;. 
long  beforehand,   that  'tis  a  Life  of  PraBic  Virtue,   but  yet  pre- 
ceded by  Speculative  WiJ'dom ;  and  that,  in  fuch  a  Life,   the  State,. 
which   the  Soul  is  in,    is  the  Habit,  (or  having)  of  Virtue,  and. 
a   conjlant  Dijpojition    to    adl   with   Honefly   and   Goodnefs;    and. 
conftantly  attended  hy  Joy,  Delight,  ov  Pleafure,   of  fuch  a  Kind, 
as  is  ftable  and  durable,    as  being  rational  and  virtuous. 


Pro 


TARCHUS.. 


P  H  I  L  E  B  U  S.     51 

Protarchus. 

To  Me,   I  muft  confefs,    they  feem  to  te,    as  you 

reprefent  them. 

Socrates. 

But  to  Philebus  how  feem  they  ?    What  fay  You, 

Philebus  ? 

Philebus. 

To  Me  Pleafure  feems,  and  will  always  feem  to  be 
the  Superiour,  whatever  it  be  compared  with.  And 
You,  Protarchus,  will  be  at  length  convinced  of  it, 
your  felf, 

Protarchus. 

After  having  religned  to  Me  the  Management  of 
tlie  Debate,  You  can  no  longer  be  the  Mafter  of  What 
fliould  be  yielded  to  Socrates,   and  What  fhould  not, 

Philebus. 
You   are  in  the  right.      But,    however,    I  have  dif- 
charged  my  Duty  ^°  j  and  I  here  call  the  Goddefs  her 
Self  to  witnefs  it. 

^°  In  defending,  to  the  tstmoft  of  his  Power,  That  Caufe, 
the  Defence  of  which  he  had  undertaken, — the  Caufe  oi Pleafure ; 
which  he  here  dignifies  with  the  name  of  the  Goddefs,  whom 
he  fuppofed  to  prefide  over  it,  that  is,  Venus.  From  hence  it 
is  evident,  what  Kind  of  Pleafure  Philebus  meant. 

G   2  Protarchus, 


52  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
We  too  are  Witnefles  of  the  fame  ;.  and  can  teftrfy 
your   making   of  the  Aflertion,    which   you   have  juft. 
made  ".     But  now,  as  to  that  Examination,  O  Socrates ! 
which  is  to  follow  after  what  You  and  I  have  agreed  in, 
whether  Philebus  be  willing  to  confent,   or  however  he 
may  be  difpofed,  let  us  try  to  go.  thro  with,   and  bring 
to-a  Conclufion"., 

Socrates. 
By  all  means,   let  us  ;   beginning  Vv^ith  ^^  that  very 
Goddefs,   who   according  to  Him  is  called  Venus,  but 
whofe  true  name  is  Pleafure  "^. 

Protarchus. 
Perfedly  right. 

S'OCRATES., 

^'  A  flroke  of  Raillery,  tHis,  on  the  folemn  manner,  in  which 
Thilebm  had  invoked  Pleafure  as   a  Goddefs. 

"  That  is, — to  go  thro  with  an  examination  o£-  the  Thre^ 
Hypothefes,  propofed  before ;  and  thence  to  draw  our  Con- 
clufions,  and  demonftrate  —  Which  of  the  Three  Lives  is,  in 
the  order  of  things  good  and  defirable  as  Ends,  the  Fiifl, — 
and  Which  of  them  is  the  Second. 

*3  That  is, — examining  in  the  firft  place  the  Hypothefis  of 
Philebus,  by  inquiring  into  the  nature  of  Pleafure. 

^^  The  ancient  Greek  Poets  had  great  authority  with  all  the 
People  of  Greece,  but  with  None  a  greater  than  with  the  Sopbijis : 
for  it  was  no  fmall  part  of  the  bufinefs  of  thefe  Men,  to  pleafe 

aiidi 
3- 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  53: 

and  flatter  the  People,  by  fupporting  their  Prejudices  or  pre- 
conceived Opinions. — Intelligent  Readers  of  Homer  need  not  be 
told,  that  Venus,  in  his  Iliad,  the  Deity  who  prefides  over  the 
Myjleries  of  Love,  is  that  Power  in  Nature,  which  attradts  the 
Two  Sexes  to  each  other,  couples  them  together,  and  produces 
mutual  Pleafure  from  their  mutual  Embraces. — Some  of  the  Poets-, 
who  came  after  Homer,  mean  by  Venus  the  fame  attractive  Power  |. 
as,  for  inftance,  Sappho  in  her  elegant  Ode  to  that  Goddefs,  and 
JLurtpides  in  his  Hippolytus. — Others  of  them  perfonify,  by  the 
n2.m.&  oi  Venus,  the  (tvpho-icc,  the  Veneral  Congrefs  its  felf,  or  the 
meer  Pleafure  felt  therein ;  as,  for  inftance,  M/'mn-ermus  in  thefe. 
celebrated  Verfes  of  his, 

TLi^vocm'}   ore  /j-oi  fJi-iptSTi  tocvtx  /-cgAfv. 
Tn  citing  which  lines,    fome  ancient  Authors  give  us   the   woru' 
jS/o?,    inflead   of  ^cc^a.     To  include    the   Meaning  of  Both   thefe 
words,  we   have  thus   paraphrafed  the  Diftick  i — 

Where  grows  a  Pleafure,   ?20t  in   Venus'  Reign  ? 
Where  fmiles  a  Grace,   not  One  of  Venus    Train  ? 
In  Venus'  Blefings,  when  I  lofe  my  Share, 
Let  me  not  live-, — Life  is  not  worth  my  Care; 
It  is  not  Life,   to  live  unblejl  by  Her. 

This  latter  Ve?ius,  this  Goddefs  of  Phikbus,  was  by  the  Roman 
People  worfbipped  under  the  name  of  Venus  Volupia:  and  ac- 
cordingly Lucretius,  in  the  beginning  of  his  fine  Poem,  where  he 
imitates  the  firft  Lines  in  Homer  s  longer  Hymn  to  Venus,  invokes 
that  Goddefs,.  as  hominufu  divumque  voluptas  j  and  in  Lib.  2^ 
V.  172,  hails  her  dux  viler,  dia  voluptas. — And  indeed,  thus 
to  deify  Senfual  Pleafure,  is  not  difagreeable  to  the  Orphic  Svfem 
of  Theology ;  one  Part  of  which  attributed  Divinity  to  every 
Virtue,  Force,. ox  Power,   whether  adlive  or  paflive,  in  every  Being 

throiighout- 


54 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


throughout  nature,    whether  ratlonaU    animal,     or  meerly  vilal-y 
calling  them   all  eyKoa-fJUGi  S-goI,  Mundane  Deity s,   tho  of  different 
Ranks    and    Orders,     according   to    the    natural   Dignity    of    the 
Being,  foffejfed  of  fuch  Forces,  Powers,  or  Virtues.      The  other 
Part   of  this  ancient    'Theological  Syftem  of  the  Univerfe   (for  the 
bed  way  to  underftand  thorowly  all  Parts  of  it,   is  to  divide  it  firft 
into  Tivo,)  confidered,   as  more  eminently  and  in   a  higher  fenfe 
Divine,  thofe  things  only  which    are  divine  by  7iature,   inafmuch 
as    they    are    eternal,     and    the    Caufes  of   thofe    feveral   Virtues, 
Powers,    and  Forces,    which   are   poflefled    by   all  the  Individuals 
of  every  Sort  and  Kind,   in  their  natural  and  found  State.     Thefe 
Ji-cine  Catifes  were  called   by  the  Orphic  Theologers  C7rs^y.ccrfjf.ioi  S-eo), 
Supra- Mundane  Deitys,  ranked  according  to  the  Dignity   of  thofe 
Virtues,   Poicers,  or  Forces,  of  which  they  are   the  Caufes,     And 
oconfidering   farther,    that   all    thofe    Caufes,    whether  Foj'mal  or 
Ejficie7it,  whether  Intelligible  or  IntclleSlive,  meet  together  and  con- 
centre in  The  One    univerfal    and   divine  Mind,   they  held   the 
JJnity   of  this  Supretne  Caufe  of  All  things. — But,    as   they  fup- 
pofed  or  pretended,   that   the   Bulk  of  Mankind    or   the   Multi- 
tude,  being   under   a  neceffity  of  living   a  Life  wholly  outward 
and    fenfual,    without    leifure    to   look    into    Themfelves,    were 
little  capable  of  apprehending   the  nature  of  thofe  Divine  Caufes, 
— and  ftill  lefs   fo,   the  nature  of  that  Caufe  of  Caufes,  the  /jlitpov 
jj.eTfSv,    xa)  ev  ivBv  irccrTx  la.  Ivia,   Mind  its   Self, — they    declined 
troubling  the  Vulgar  with  th&^t  Myjleries  of  Nature;   and  framed  a 
Religion,  fuited    to  Vulgar  Apprehenfions ;    exhibiting  to  them, 
for  Objefts   of  their  Worfhip,   Images  and    other  Reprefentations 
{Some,  proper  and    naturally  expreffive.  Others,  figurative,  fym- 
bolical,   or   allegorical)   not  only  of  thofe  .external  things  which 
they  faw,    heard,    and   felt,    and   of   whofe    Powers   and   Virtues 
they  had  experience,  —  but   even    of  thofe  truly  Divi?je  Caufes, 
the  eternal  Ideas  of  the  Supream  Mind,  inconceivable  (as  perhaps 

.6  They 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  55 

They    might  imagine)   by  the  Senfual  Populace,    who    feem  to 
have   no    communication    with    them,    and    know    of    no    Ideas 
fuperior  to   thtir  own. — In  evidence  of  this,   it  will  be  fufHcient 
to  cite    the  I'eftimony   of  Varro,    the  moft    learned    of   all   the 
Romans  :   his  words  are  thefe;  — Apud  Samothraccs,   multis  indiciis 
collegi,    in    fimiilachris  ahud  J/gnificare   ccclum,   aliud  terrain,    aliiid 
exempla   rerum,    qiias    (1.    qus)    Plato   appellat   ideas,     coelum   eiiim 
'Jupiter,    terra    'Juno,   Idece   Minerva  intelligitur :    cirlum,    quo  fiat' 
aliquid;    terra,  de  qua  Jiat ;   exemplum,  Jecundum  quod  Jiat.     Thus 
Varro    apud    Augujlinum    de  Civ.  Dei,    L.  7.    Cap.    28. — 'Tis 
indeed   highly  probable,     that   the   Chief   Priefls   of   the   Orphic: 
Religion,   thro    whofe  Hands    in   fucceflion    were  tranfmitted   the 
Secrets   of  it,    communicated    thofe  Secrets    to    a    few    Others; 
chiefly     to     the    Governors   amongft    the    People,    Such    as    they 
deemed    worthy    of    being    TgAfe«'>    perfefled  in   the  Myjleries   of 
Nature,    and    inftrudted    in    the    deep  Meaning  of  the    \sqo\  hoyoi,-, 
and  the  other    Orphic  Verfes.     But  the  reft  of  the   People,    the 
Governed,     were    all    the  while  kept  in  the  moft  brutifh  igno- 
rance of  the  Divine  Nature  by  their  Priefts  and  Stateimen,  whof«." 
Political  Maxims   in   point   of  Religion   are   exprefled    by   Varro 
in   thefe  words,    as   they   are  delivered    to   us   by   the-  old  Bifliop 
of  Hippo   in   his  work   above    cited; — Midta  Junt  vera,   qiice  non: 
mcdo  vulgo  fcire  non  eji  utile,  fed  etiam,   tanietji  falfa  Jint,    aliter 
exijlimare  popidum  expedit.     Et  idea  Grceci  teletas,  ac  myjleria, .  ta- 
citurnitate  parietibufque  clauferunt. — "  Many  things   are   true    (in 
"  nature)  which  it  is  not  only  of  no  ufe  to  the  Vulgar  to  have. 
**  the  Knowlege  of,    but  even  tho   they  (i.  e.   the  common  Opi-» 
"  nions   concerning  them)    fhould   be  falle,   it  is  expedient  that 
**  the  People    fliould   believe   them    true.     And    for   this   reafon 
"  have    the   Greeks  concealed   their   fecret    dodlrines    iii   filence, 
"  and   inclofed  with  walls   their  religious  myfteries."  —  To   the 
Orphic  Divines   fucceeded   ihc  Pythagorean  Philojophers ;    who,   as 

they 


56 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


•they  followed  the  former  In  their  Tenets,  purfued  a  like  Me- 
thod of  handing  down  thofe  Tenets  to  Pofterity  ;  in  delivering 
them  to  all  their  Difciples  at  firft  thro  Symbols  and  JEnigmas,  and 
jn  revealing  afterwards  the  naked  T'rut/j  to  a  cbofen  Few,  Such 
as  they  deemed  fit  to  be  entrufted  with  it. — But  Socrates  ufed 
a  Method  of  teaching,  quite  different,  a  Method,  fuitable  to 
his  Mind,— fimple,  yet  comprehenfive,  Wkt  the  Mind  of  Nature, — 
plain  and  clear,  tho  fublime  and  deep,  like  thofe  (pajg^wTara  ttcIptuv, 
the  Firjl  Principles  of  Things.  He  neither  concurred  with  the 
■Political Priefis  and  the  Statefmen,  in  keeping  the  People  ignorant 
of  thofe  truly  Divine  Things,  which  of  All  things  it  mofl 
concerns  All  men  to  be  acquainted  with ;  nor  did  he  follow 
the  example  of  the  Orphic  Theologers  and  the  Pythagoreans,  in 
delivering  his  Dodrine,  explicitly  indeed  to  Some,  but  figu- 
ratively and  obfcurely  to  a  much  greater  Number.  His  Dif- 
quifitions  were  carried  on  openly,  in  Places  ihe  moft  frequented 
hy  the  Publick,  to  be  heard  by  every  Man  who  chofe  to  hear; 
and  the  Subjects  of  them  were  always  either  Such,  as  related 
immediately  to  Morals  and  Politicks,  or  elfe  Such,  as  laid  the 
only  folid  Foundation  of  thofe  Sciences  in  the  Science  of  Mind, 
that  is,  in  the  Science  of  Things  eternal  and  divine.  Laying 
ahde  all  Inquirys  into  Nature,  confidered  meerly  as  Corporeal, — 
or  into  the  Mechanical  Forces,  by  which  fome  Bodys  attract  or 
repel,  move  forward,  retard  or  turn  afide,  generate,  nourilh  or 
deftroy,  change,  vary,  or  in  any  way  affedl  Other  Bodys,  —  as 
being,  if  rightly  confidered,  all  of  them  only  pajjive,  meer  in- 
jiruments  in  the  hands  of  adlive,  intelligent,  and  deigning  Nature^ 
whofe  fecret  way«,  after  all  our  Searches,  are  pafl:  finding  out, — 
2.nA  many  of  them  being  alfo //^rwwfw/j  in  the  hands  oi  Huvian 
j^rtijls, — he  did  not  acknowlcge  U wo.  Divinity  in  any  of  thefe  Bodys 
or  Natural  Things  thcmfelves,  nor  in  any  of  thofe  blind  Powers 
or  Forces,  with  v/hich  they  are  invefted  by  the  Laiffs  of  Nature. 

Now 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates. 


57 


The  Fear  ^^,  which  I  have  always  in  me,  concerning 
the  proper  Names  of  the  Gods  ^^,   is  no  ordinary  Kind 

Now  feeing  that  One  of  thefe  Powers  in  Things  corporeal, 
the  Objedrs  of  Senfe,  is  That  of  producing  Senfual  Pleafure  in 
Sentient  Beings,  on  the  occafions  mentioned  in  Note  ii,  Socrates 
could  not,  confidently  with  himfelf,  admit  fuch  a  Pleafure,  or 
the  Power  which  immediately  produced  it,  to  be,  either  of  them, 
truly  Divine. 

*5  Meaning  poflibly  That  Kind  of  Fear,  which  always  at- 
tends on  Reverential  ylwe, — the  Fear  of  doing  or  faying  any  thing 
wrong,  in  the  opinion  of  Thofe  whom  we  honour. — But  we 
rather  think,  it  means  That  rational  or  prudential  Fear,  which 
is  neceflary  to  guard  us  againft  Evils  in  our  own  Power  to 
prevent,  by  ufing  due  Care  and  Precaution.     See  the  next  Note. 

'^^  That  is.  Names,  fignificant  of  their  Natures. — It  is  indeed 
pofhble,  that  Socrates  might  here  allude  to  that  vulgar  Superfli- 
tion,  Inftances  of  which  occur  often  in  the  ancient  Poets, — a 
Fear  of  difpleafmg  the  Gods,  in  giving  them  Names  or  Titles 
ofFenfive  to  them.  But  the  Philofopher's  own  Mind  was  far 
fuperior  to  fuch  religious  Fancys :  and  yet  he  appears  to  be  very 
ferious  in  this  Sentence.  We  prefume  therefore,  that  he  means 
a  Fear  of  mijlaking  the  Divine  Nature:  for  to  have  right  Notions 
of  This,  is  of  the  utmoft  importance  to  Private  as  well  as 
Public  Virtue  :  to  entertain  any  Error  concerning  it,  ditninifhes 
the  Happinefs  of  Human  Life  :  and  if  the  Error  be  Capital,  as 
it  is,  if  what  is  oppofte  to  the  Divine  Nature  be  taken  for  it, 
fuch  an  Error  is  utterly  deftruSlive  of  all  Virtue  and  all  Hap- 
pinefs. 

H  •  of 


58 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


of  Fear  ^^ ;   it  furpaileth  the  greateft  Dread  '*,  to  which 
the  Soul  in  any  other  cafe  is  fiibjed.      Hence  in  the 

prefent 

*7  That  is,  —  not  tifiial  or  common  amongft  Mankind,  —  not 
incident  to  ordinary  Men. — ^to.'Dv.  Forjier's  \^  Index  to  his 
Edition  of  Fhe  Dialogues  of  Plato,  where  he  cites  this  very 
Paffage. 

^^  For  the  Objedls  of  Fear  to  ordinary  Men,  fuch  as  are  of 
meaner  Rank,  and  governed  by  their  Paffions  and  ignorant  of 
their  true  Selves,  are  only  things,  u-hich  threaten  Evil  to  their 
Bodys,  chiefly  Death,  extreme  Poverty,  and  great  Corporeal  Pain, 
To  Thofe  of  higher  Rank,  the  great  Vulgar,  governed  moftly 
by  a  Senfe  of  Honour,  but  as  ignorant  of  Themfelves  as  the 
meaner  Sort,  the  Objefts  of  Fear  are  not  only  Such,  as  are  juft  now 
mentioned,  but  alfo,  and  principally,  the  Lofs  of  that  Honour 
which  is  given  to  them  by  Others ;  becaufe  on  this  Honour 
depend  all  the  Advantages,  which  they  have  beyond  the  Vul- 
gar, in  Outward  Life.  But  as  all  thefe  Advantages,  together 
with  the  Life  itfelf  in  which  they  are  found,  appeared  in  the 
eyes  of  Socrates  but  Trifes,  when  compared  with  Mental  or  with 
Moral  Good,  fo  he  confidered  the  Lofs  of  them  as  comparatively 
but  a  trifling  Lofs.  He  knew,  that  all  Mental  and  all  Moral 
Good  depended  on  the  Stability  of  Knowlege  and  of  Virtue ; — 
that  the  Stability  of  Virtue  depended  on  the  Knonvlege  of  Good 
and  Evil ; — and  that  the  Stability  of  all  Knoivlege  depended  on 
the  Principles  of  Mind,  the  Caufe  of  all  Truth  and  of  all  Good  i 
— that  thefe  Principles  therefore  were  of  all  things  the  mojl  Di~ 
•uine; — that  confequently  to  err  concerning  Thefe,  was  to  err 
concerning  the  Divine  Nature ;  and  that  an  Error  of  this  Kind 
muft   be  fatal  to   the  Mind  of  any  Man,    to   all  his  Knowlcge 

and 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


59 


and  to  all  his  Virtue.  Such  Errors  were  the  fole  Objcds  of 
p'ear  to  the  Mind  oi  Socrates. — Farther;  as  i\\Q  Vehemence  of  any 
Man's  Fear  mufl  always  be  in  proportion  to  his  SenJ'e  of  the 
Importance  of  its  Obje6t  \ — and  as  no  Objedl  of  the  Multitude's  Fear 
can,  even  to  Them,  appear  of  Importance  equal  to  That  of 
the  Obje<5t  of  the  Philofopher's  Fear,  as  it  appeared  to  Him, 
— Flato  ufes  no  Exaggeration  or  Hyperbole  in  the  Sentence  now 
before  us. — The  Accuracy  of  the  principal  'Ferms,  or  Nouns,  in 
this  Sentence,  is  alfo  very  remarkable.  The  former,  which  we 
have  tranflated  Fear,  in  the  original  is  S-ioi :  the  latter,  which 
in  our  tranflation  is  Dread,  in  the  original  is  (po'/Sos.  Now  (po'/Sos 
always  means  an  Irratmial  PaJJlon,  feizing  the  Inferior  Soul,  with- 
out being  authorized  by  Reajbfi  fo  to  do.  And  accordingly,  the 
Stolcks  number  it  amongft  the  Pajjlons  or  Perturbations  of  the 
Soul,  and  define  it  by  aMyoi  sx-xAiais  Irrational  or  blind  Aver- 
Jlon.  See  Mr.  Harris's  Note  48.  to  the  Third  of  his  Three 
Trcatlfes.  At'05  is  by  fome  old  Grammarians  diftinguiliied  from 
(po^oi  in  this  point  only, — that  the  latter  means  a  Fear  which 
Jiidde7ily  felzes  the  Soul,  on  the  Opinion  of  Evil  imminent  or  at 
hand;  and  the  former,  a  conjlant  ox  fettled  Fear  o£  Evil  remote. 
This  we  believe  a  true,  but  not  the  only  true,  diftindtion 
between  ^c'/So;  and  S'sa.  For,  befides  their  difference  with  re- 
fpedl  to  their  length  of  time,  and  to  the  apparent  dlfmice  of 
their  Objects,  they  feem  to  differ  in  the  nature  of  their  Objects, 
and  in  the  nature  alfo  of  the  Beings,  fubjeti  to  ihofe  Paffions. — 
— The  ObjeBs  of  (prl(^oi  are  whatever  things  we  imagine  to  be 
evilf  or  from  which  we  may  receive  Evil,  whether  they  be 
animate,  as  Sharks  and  Tygers,  Banditti  and  Tyrants,  or  inani- 
mate, as  Fires  and  Earthquakes,  Famine  and  Pejlllence.  The  ObjeSls 
of  S'ioi  are  Beings  whom  we  deem  fiperlor  to  our  felves,  either 
in  Wlfdom,  or  in  Kuoivlcge,  or  in  Authority.  In  proof  of  this, 
fee  the  Paffages,  cited  out  of  Homer  by  Plutarch  in  Vita  Cleomenls, 

H  2  pag: 


6o  P    H     I     L    E    B    U    S. 

pag:  1482,  Edit:  H.  Steph:  So,  in  Plato's  Theatetus,  pag:  189, 
i'i^icoi  is  oppofed  to  xaTccf^cvaJv.  —  The  SiibjeSls  of  (fofioi  are  all 
Brute  Animals,  and  Man  alfo,  in  as  much  as  he  partakes  of 
Soul  irrational.  The  Subjeds  of  cTfe'cs  are  Human  Beings  only  j 
unlefs  there  be  in  fome  Brute  Animals  an  Inflind:  equivalent 
to  Reafon,  fo  far  as  to  infpire  them  with  a  Kevermcc  for  Man-, 
as  a  Being  by  nature  Superior  to  them  in  Sagacity  and  Counfel. 
This  Kind  of  Fear,  or  reverential  Awe,  we  fee  in  Children  to- 
ward their  Parents,  in  the  Younger  toward  the  Advanced  in  Age, 
in  Difsiples  toward  their  Majlers,  in  SubjeSfs  toward  their  Ma- 
giftrates  and  Princes,  and  in  the  People  of  all  Countrys  toward 
the  Objedls  of  their  religious  Worjloip.  Of  this  rational  Kind  was 
the  Fear,  which  Socrates  fays  he  had  in  him  continually  :  but 
of  all  the  ratio}2al  YAndi,  This  o^  Socrates  was  the  mojl  rational,  — 
as  not  only  deriving  its  Jirji  Origin  irom  Reafon,  or  the  Rational' 
Principle  within  him,  which  he  had  cultivated  more  rightly 
perhaps  than  any  other  Man, — but  as  having  alfo  the  SanSiion 
of  that  cultivated  Reafon  to  approve  it,  —  and  indeed  taking 
its  imfnediate  Rife  from  a  jufl:  Sentiment  of  what  is  really  evil  to 
the  Soul  of  Man,  together  with  a  Senfe  of  the  great  Danger 
of  a  Man's  falling  into  it, — a  Senfe,  produ(flive  of  that  Caution, 
which  efFeftually  fecures  a  Man  againft  it  j  becaufe  Real  Evil 
is  always  in  a  Man's  own  Power  to  avoid.  This  Kind  of 
Fear  the  Stoicks  defined  by  svAoya  ty.y.Ximi  Rational  Aver/ion;. 
but  to  avoid  ufing  the  word  Fear,  they  termed  it  Caution ;  thus 
confounding  the  Caufe  with  the  EffeSl,  or  the  Sentiment  with  the 
Energy  which  it  produces. — What  confirms  the  Account,  given  in 
this  Note,  of  the  S^ioi  of  Socrates,  is  the  Definition,  given  us  by 
Andronicus  of  Rhodes  in  his  Treatife  -mpi  ira^m,  of  One  of  the 
Two  Species,  into  which  he  divides  eJAa'/3aa  Caution  -,  from 
which  it  appears  to  be  the  very  fame  with  the  Sioi,  here  profefi[ed 
by  Socrates :  for  it  is  this, — euAa^ax  tZv  tsqi  S-eoV  a/^a^TH/AaVwy, 

Caution 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  61 

prefent  cafe  with  regard  to  Venus "',  whatever  Name 
be  agreeable  to  the  Goddefs,   by  That  would  I  chufe 

to 

Caution  to  avoid  Errors  about  God.  If  it  be  objedled,  that  by 
ccfx.a.^T7}fji.ocTcov  in  this  definition.  Speculative  Errors  concerning  the 
Nature  of  the  Divine  Being  are  not  meant,  but  PraSlical  or 
Moral  Offences  againfl:  God  ; — we  reply,  Firll,  that  the  very  Dif- 
tindlion,  made  in  this  Objedlion,  is  founded  on  One  of  the  mod 
Capital  Errors  concerning  the  Divine  Nature.  For  that,  on  this 
Subject,  there  is  no  Opi?iion,  which  is  meerly  Speculative,  or  which 
has  not  a  ncceffary  Injluejtce  on  PraSlife  y  as  we  hope  to  make 
apparent  in  our  Notes  to  the  latter  Part  of  this  Dialogue.  — 
And  farther  we  reply,  that  this  continual  Fear,  this  con- 
flant  Apprehenfion  of  Danger,  in  the  Mind  of  Socrates,  had  a 
View  to  nothing  but  the  Integrity  of  his  own  Life  and  Manners. 
For  if  ever  any  Man  was,  Socrates  was  One  of  the  peccare  ti- 
vientes,  —  Thofe  who  fear  to  do  amij's, — fpoken  of  by  Horace,  in 
Epifl:  ad  Pifones,  v.  197.  Indeed,  'tis  evident,  that  he  feared 
nothing  elfe  :  and  he  knew,  that  ts  S'Ua.m,  the  7iature  ofUni- 
verfal  Jujiice,  was  materially  the  fame  thing  with  to  ta-iov, 
the  nature  of  SanBity,  or,  &s  Andronicus  terms  it,  dyvsix.  Purity; 
agreeably  to  This  of  Sophocles, — svaeTrrov  ayveixv  Koycav,  "Egyov  rs 
■jroiviMv  —  Religious  Purity  of  all  my  Words,  and  Actions.  Soph,  in 
Oedip:  Tyr:  v.  884. — Thofe  of  our  Readers,  who  are  converfant 
with  Plato,  well  know,  that  he  frequently  puts  oaiov  y.x\  S'lxxwv 
together  in  the  Mouth  o{  Socrates,  See  likewife  Notes  287,  and 
301,  to  iht  Firji  Alcibiades. 

'9  What  the  Orphic  Theologers  meant  by  the  allegorical  Deity 
of  Venus,  is  explained  towards  the  End  of  Note  94  to  the  Ban- 
quet.    And   how  highly  Socrates  Himfelf  thought  of  this  Venus, 

the 
5 


6a  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

to  call  her.  But  as  to  Pleafure,  how  vague  and  va- 
rious a  thing  it  is,  I  well  know.  And  with  This,  as 
I  jufl  now  faid.  ought  we  to  begin  ;  by  confidering  and 
inquiring  into  the  nature  of  Pleafure,  firft.  For  we 
hear  it  called  indeed  by  One  fingle  Name,  as  if  it 
were  One  Umple  Thing  :  it  affumes,  however,  all  forts 
of  Forms,  even  Such  as  are  the  moft  unlike,  one  to 
another  ^°.  For  obferve  ;  we  fay,  that  the  Intemperate 
Man  has  Pleafure  ;  and  that  the  Temperate  Man  has 
Pleafure  alfo, — Pleafure  in  being  what  he  is,  that  is, 
Temperate.  Again  ;  we  fay,  that  Pleafure  attends  on 
Folly,  and  on  the  Man  who  is  full  of  foolifli  Opinions 
and  foolifh  Hopes ;  that  Pleafure  attends  alfo  on  the 
Man  who  thinks  wifely, — Pleafure  in  that  very  Mental 
Energy,  his  thinking  wifely.  Now  any  Perfon,  who 
would  affirm  thefe  Pleafures  to  be  of  limilar  Kind, 
would  be  juftly  deemed  to  want  Underflanding. 

Protarchus. 
The  Pleafures,    which  You   mention,    O   Socrates  ! 
are  indeed  produced  by  Contrary  Caufes ;   but  in   the 

the  Beauty  of  Nature,  in  its  perfedl  Original  at  lead,  —  in  That 
Mind,  of  which  Outward  Nature  is  (as  it  were)  i\\G  Image, — 
appears  from  what  he  fays  in  the  Perfon  of  Diotima,  page  1 60 
of  that  Dialogue, 

3°  See  general  Proofs  of  This,  near  the  beginning  of  Note  3. 

c  Plea- 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  63 

Pleafures  themfelves  there  is  no  Contrariety.  For 
how  fhould  Pleafure  not  be  fimilar  to  Pleafure,  its  Self" 
to  its  Self,  the  moft  fimilar  of  all  things  ^'  ? 

SOCRAT  E  s. 

Juft  fo,  Colour  too,  my  Friend,  differs  not  from 
Colour,  in  this  refpedl,  that  'tis  Colour,  All  ^\  And 
yet  we,  All  of  us,  know,  that  Black,  beiides  being 
different  from  White,  happens  to  be  alfo  its  dired: 
Contrary.       So    Figure    too    is .  all   One   with  Figure, 

after 

3'  This  was  the  very  Language,  or  manner  of  expreffion, 
ufed  by  a  Seft  of  Philofophers,  called  Cyrenaicks,  from  Cyrene, 
the  native  City  oi  Arijiippus,  their  Mafter,  For  the  Cyrenaicks 
held,  fays  Laertius,  fjLvi  S'lctfe^nv  ■nS'ovrtv  JicTocns,  that  Pleafure  differs 
not  from  Pleafure.  Whence  it  appears  probable,  that  Pbilebus 
derived  his  Notions  and  Expreffions  on  tliis  Point  from  Some 
of  the  Difciples  of  Arifippus,  if  not  from  Arijiippus  himfelf. 
For  this  Philofopher,  after  he  had  for  fome  time  converfed  with 
Socrates,  for  the  fake  of  whofe  Converfation  he  came  to  Athens^ 
departed  thence,  and  went  to  JEgina;  where  he  profeffed  the 
Teaching  of  Philofophy,  and  where  he  refided  till  after  the 
Death  of  Socrates. 

3*  That  is, — as  the  Tranflations  of  Ficinus  and  Cornarius  rightly 
explain  it, — every  Colour  is  [a]  Colour.  For  Colour  is  a  General 
Thing,  a  ^ality  of  all  Bodys  vifble,  the  Nature  of  which 
Quality  All  the  Species  of  Colour,  and  the  infinite  Degrees  and 
Mixtures  of  them  All,  partake  of.  See  Notes  14  and  26  to  the 
Me.no. 


64  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

after  the  fame  manner,  in  the  General.  But  as  to  the 
Parts  of  that  One  General  Thing,  Some  are  dire6lly 
Contrary  to  Others  "^  ;  and  between  the  reft  there 
happens  to  be  a  Kind  of  infinite  Diverfity.  And  many 
other    things    we    fhall   find    to   be    of   this    Nature. 

CD 

Believe  not  then  this  Pofition,  that  Things  the  moft 
Contrary  are  all  of  them  One  ^*.  And  I  fufpeft,  that 
we  fliall  aifo  find  Some  Pleafures  quite  contrary  to 
Other  Pleafures. 

Protarchus. 
It  may  be  fo.      But   how  will  That  hurt  My  Side 

of  the  Queftion  ? 

Socrates. 

3  3  See  Note  31  to  the  Mem, 

31-  Socrates  had  here,  probably,  a  View  in  general  to  the  Doc- 
trine of  the  old  Phyfiologers,  All  of  whom,  fays  Arijlctle,  held 
that  the  World  was  compofed  from  Contrary  Principles;  —  not 
fuch  Principles,  as  Form  and  Matter:  for,  to  fpeak  properly. 
Matter  is  not  contrary  to  Form,  but  is  quite  otherwife,  eafily 
recipient  of  all  Forms,  and  gives  not  the  leaft  oppofition  to  any 
Form  whatever.  That,  which  is  often  called  the  StjMornnefs  or 
Untradlablenefs  of  a  SiihjeSi-Matter  is  in  fadl  the  Stubborn nefs 
of  fome  adhejive  Form,  which  then  inverts  it,  and  is  not  eafily 
made  to  quit  its  Hold,  and  give  way  to  Another,  a  new  Comer: 
— not  fuch  Principles  neither,  as  thofe  of  Dcmocritus,  Solid  Body 
and  Empty  Space ;  which  are  no  otherwife  oppofed  to  each  other, 
than  as  Something  is  oppofed  to  Nothing,  or  Being  in  general   to 

Non-. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  6^ 

Non-Bcing :  as  may  appear  on  comparing  what  Arijlotle  fays  of  tlicm 
in  his  Phyficki,  Lib.  i.  Cap.  6,  where  he  is  pleafcd  to  call 
them  Contrarys,  with  his  own  account  oi  Contrarys  in  his  Trea- 
tife  on  xSxQ.  Category s,  Cap.  ii.— Nor  yet  hy  Contrary  Principles 
did  the  more  ancient  Phyfrologers  mean  Identity  and  Diverjity  ; 
for  Thefe  are  fo  far  from  contending  with  each  other,  as  Con- 
trary Things  do  when  they  meet,  that  they  exift  amicably  to- 
gether always  in  every  For?n  of  Nature,  and  together  conflitute 
the  very  Effence  of  Mind :  inafmuch  as  without  Both  of  them 
united,  no  Particular  Forms  ever  could  exift-,  nor  could  Mind,  or 
Form  univerfai,  whether  confidered  as  Inte/ligeJit,  or  as  Intelligible, 
ever  have  a  Being.  —  By  Contrary  Principles  they  plainly  meant 
Contra7'y  Powers  in.  \htl:^dituxQ  of  Things  j — Powers,  perpetually 
at  Variance,  but  controlling  Each  of  them  its  Contrary,  and  Each 
of  them  by  its  Contrary  controlled :  thro  which  mutual  Conteft, 
and  Equality  of  Strength  in  the  contefting  Powers,  every  Part 
was  kept  in  Equilibrium,  and  the  Whole  preferved  firm  and  intire. 
Now  this  Whole,  confifting  thus  of  Contrary  Parts,  they  call'd 
One  'Thing',  how  juftly  we  {hall  fee  anon,  when  we  are  led  by 
Plato  more  deeply  into  the  Subjedl.  —  But  the  prefent  PafTage 
feems  to  have  an  efpecial  reference  to  certain  Pofitions  of  He- 
raclitus  in  particular.  For,  \i  Ariftotle  has  given  a  juft  repre- 
fentation  of  them,  they  were  fuch  as  thefe ;  —  that  the  Same 
Definition  fuited  Contrary  Tlmigs  ;  and  that  ContradiBory  Propofi- 
tions  were  Both  of  them  true :  —  that  therefore  Contrary  Things 
had  one  and  rhs  fame  Effence;  and  Contrerietys,  or  Contrary  Qua- 
litys,  belonged  to  one  and  the  fame  Thing : — whence  it  followed, 
that  one  and  t\\Q  fa?ne  Thing  might  be  both  Good  and  Evil;  and 
farther,  that  Good  and  Evil  were  the  Same  Thing.  See  Ariftot: 
Phyfic:   L.  1.    C.  3.    Topic:    L.  8.    C.  5.    &;  Simp  lie:    Comment:  in 

Phyfic:   fol:  18.  a. And  that  P/<?/o  ^^^  Arijlotle   may  not   be 

.thought   to   have    mif-reprefented    any    Sentences    or  V/ords   of 

I  Heraclitus, 


66  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Heraclitus,  expreffive  of  Notions  fo  abfurd,  if  underftood  ftridiy 
and  literally^  it  is  certain,  that  thofe  abfurd  Notions  were  attri- 
buted to  Heraclitus  by  Many  Perfons  ;  as  we  leara  from  Sextus: 
'E.mpmciis,  pag:  53.  Edit.  Lips:  For  this  able  Advocate  for  the 
Doftrine  of  Pyrr-ho  mentions  it  as  a  main  Objedion,  made 
againft  that  Dodlrine,  that  it  led  the  way  to  the  Dodtrine  of 
Heraclitus ;  as  if,  from  perceiving  in  t be  fame  Thing  thofe  Contrary 
Appearancesy  which  render  the  real  Efe?ice  of  it  and  the  Truth 
concerning  it  uncertain,  it  was  an  eafy  Tranfition  to  pronounce 
dogmatically,  that  in  the  fame  Thing  Contrarietys  really  met,  and 
Contradidlory  Pofitions  were  Both  of  them  indubitably  true.  Now 
it  feems  ftrange,  how  any  man,  not  wholly  unacquainted  with 
the  Charadter  of  Heraclitus,  which  fufficiently  appears  from  his 
Epi/lles  extant,  could  ever  imagine  him  to  have  held  Tenets,  fo 
inconfiftent  with  the  Principles  of  Wijdom  and  Goodnefs :  mucli 
lefs  can  we  think  it  poffible,  that  Plato  and  Arijiotle  io  greatly 
miflook  the  true  Meaning  of  his  obfcure  Writings.  However,, 
we  think  it  probable,  that  the  Authority  of  thefe  Two  great 
Philofophers  led  into  this  Miftake  many  Perfons,  who  underftood 
not  Their  Manner  of  teaching,  from  a  want  (perhaps)  of  fuch 
a  Greatnefs  of  Soul,  as  begat  and  formed  in  Them  tliat  Manner, 
Both  of  them  appear  infpired  with  the  Love  of  Truth  alone  ;. 
fuperior,  on  the  one  hand,  to  a  />//«//  Reverence  for  Thofe  who 
preceded  them  in  the  Study  of  Wifdom, — fuperior  alfo,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  that  Spirit  of  Detra£iion,  (however  often  they  have 
been  accufed  of  it,)  thro  which.  Men  of  Little  Souls  aim  at 
cftablifiiing  their  own  Reputation  on  the  Ruin  of  that  of  Others. 
Accordingly  they.  Both  of  them,  fpeak  with  great  Refpedl  of  all 
the  prior  Philofophers  j  afluming,  and  tranfplanting  into  their 
own  Syftems,  the  Dodrines  which  originally  fprang  from  Them  j 
at  the  fame  time,  that  they  treat  their  inaccurate  Expreflions 
and  crude  Conceptions  with  great  Freedom,  to  guard  their  own 

Dilciples 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  €7 

Difciples  from  being  mis-led  by  the  authority  of  Great  Names. 
Happy  had  it  been  for  the  philofophiling  Part  of  mankind,  had 
their  SuccefTors  followed  them  in  this  their  Manner. — For  Proof 
•of  this  in  the  Cafe  now  before  us,  we  refer  to  a  Dijfertatmi  on 
the  DoBr'pie  ofHeraclitus,  lately  publiflied. — But  howev£r  probable 
it  is,  that  Plato  in  this  Va^igQ  alludes  to  the  common  Dodlrine 
of  all  the  ancient  Phyfiologers,  or  to  the  fuppofed  Notions  oi Hera- 
clitiis  in  particular,  yet  there  is  reafon  to  think,  from  what 
follows  in  the  introduftory  Part  of  the  Dialogue,  that  he  had 
more  immediately  in  his  View  certain  Logical  SophiJ'ms,  intro- 
duced among  the  Athenian  Youth  by  fome  of  the  Scholars  of 
Zeno  the  Rleatick,  Such  as  Fythodorus  and  Callias.  For  Parme- 
nides  of  Ekay  having  difcovered  the  Principles  of  all  Reafoning 
to  be  Unity  and  Multitude,  Samenefs  and  Difference ;  and  having 
thus  raifed  the  Theory  of  Reafon  into  a  Scietice ;  imparted  his 
Difcovery  to  Zeno  his  Countryman.  And  Zeno,  being  a  Man  of 
a  mofl:  acute  and  fubtle  Wit,  on  That  Science  built  the  Art  of 
Logick  or  DialeSiick.  He  contrived  Rules,  according  to  which 
all  Rational  Argumentation  ought  to  proceed ; — Rules,  to  re- 
gulate Logical  Debates, — to  reftrain  a  wandering  from  the  Sub- 
jccft, — to  keep  clofe  to  the  very  Point  in  Queftion,  by  diftin- 
guifliing  the  nature  of  it  from  other  things,  which  in  fome 
refpeds  refemble  it,  and  may  be  eafily  miflaken  for  it, — to 
guard  aginft  the  being  deceived  by  Fallacys  and  all  erroneous 
Argumentation,  whether  wilful  or  undefigned,  on  the  Part  of  the 
^lejiioner, — and  on  the  Part  of  the  Refpondent,  to  make  his  Anfwers 
with  Simplicity,  and  Striftnefs,  and  without  Prevarication.  Thefe 
Rules  were  afterwards  augmented  and  improved  by  ASfPcr^/t'j,  in  his 
daily  Exercife  of  coniserfing  on  philofophical  Subjefts,  either  with 
Sophijls  or  with  his  own  Difciples,  Plato  has,  in  his  Dialogues,  ex- 
anplified  thefe  Rules,  and  appears  to  hzvQ  prdSlically  brought  them  to 
Perfedion  :   and  Arijlotlc  has,  in  his  Logical  Treatifes,  methodically 

I  2  and 


63  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
In    that    Tou    call    them,    difTimilar'^  as    they    are^ 
by  another  "  Name ;    (fhall  we   fay  ?)    for  all  phafant 
things  You  call  good.     Now  that  all  pleafant  things 
are  pleafant,  admits  of  no  Difpute*     But  tho  many  of 

them 

and  fcmittfically  committed  them  to  Writing,  with  the  utmofi: 
Subtilty,  Acutenfs  and  Precifion,  yet  at  the  fame  time  with  the 
moft  compleat  Comprehenfivenefs,  and  all  the  Perfpicuity  which 
fo  abftradled  a  Subjedl  will  admit  of. 

35  In  the  Greek, — hi^cp  (pmofjuv  ovo/jlccti.     That  is, — by  mwthr 
Name,   common  to   them   all,   bejide  That  of  Pleafure. — The  word 
(pmouizv, — fiall  we  fay  ? — is,  without   reafon,    as  it  feems  to  Us, 
fufpedled  by  H.  Stephens  and  many  Others  not  to   be   genuine. 
We  fuppofe  it   ufed  here  interrogatively,   and  implying  a  Doubt 
in  the  Mind  of  Socrates,   whether  Protarchus  would  call  the  Term 
Good  a  Name  or  Noun  Subjlantive,   (that  is  to  fay, — a  Noun,  de- 
noting  a  Subflance,)  as  well  as  the  Term  Pleafure;   or  whether 
he  ufed  the  Term  good  as  an  Epithet  ox  Attributive  only,  denoting 
an  Attribute  of  fome  Subfance.     In  order  to  underiland  the  Dif- 
ference, on  which  this  feeming  Doubtfulnefs  is  founded,  it  may 
be  ufeful   to  obferve,   in   the  firft  place,   that  Attributes  of  Sub- 
Jhances,  or,  in  other  words,  the  Propertys,  Accidents,  Conditions, 
and  Circumflances  of  Beings,  are  found  in  Every  one  of  the  Nijie 
Category s,  into  which  is  divided    (as  Mr.  Harris  very  juftly   fays, 
in  his  Philofophical  Arrangements,    B.    i.     Ch.   2,)    Attribute  in 
general.  —  For  inftance;  the  Attributes,  pleafed,  delighted,  joyous, 
denote   certain    Feelings,    Senfations,    or   Sentiments,    attributed. 
Some  of  them,  to  Beings  vc\t.tv\y  Scntie?Tt,  Others,  to  Beings  which 
are  alfo  Rational i   and  the  Attributes^  denoted  by  thofe  Terms, 

rank. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  6^ 

rank  under  the  Category  of  PaJJion ;  for  they  are  Attributes  of  a 
Soul,    moved  or  offered  in  a  particular  manner.     But   the  Attri- 
butes, plea/ant,  delightful,  and  others  of  like  Kind,  denote  certain 
Facultys  or  Powers,    belonging  to  Things  not  within  our  Selves, 
often  to  Things  Inanimate  ^ndi  meerly  Corporeal,  as  Colours,  Sounds, 
and  Odours, — fuch  Powers  in  Them,  as  are  able  to  excite  delightfiil- 
or  pleafing  Senfations  in  all  Sentient  Beings  :    now  thefe  Poivers, 
which  we  rightly  attribute  to  thofe  External  Things,  rank  under 
the  Category  oi  ^lality. — Let  it  be  obferved,  in  the  next  place,, 
that   every  Attribute  of  Subftance,    under   whatever  Category   it 
ranks,  every  Property,   Accident,   Condition,  or  Circumftance  of 
Being,  by  abjlra^ing  it  in  our  Minds  from  the  SubjeB  to  which, 
it  is  attributed,   (to  borrow  the  elegant  expreffion  of  Mr.  Harris 
in  his  Hermes,   B.  i.   Ch.  4,)    we  convert   even   into   a  Subjlance. 
Thus    from   every    pleafing    Senfation,    Sentiment,    Feeling,    or 
Affedlion,   by  a  Creation  as    it   were  of  our  own,    arifes   in  our 
Minds    the  abJlraSi  Form  of  fame  particular  Pleafure.     And   from 
many  particular  Pleafures,  of  whatever  Kind  or  Kinds  they  may 
be,    as    many  as  we    have   conceived    the  Notions   of,    affembled 
together   and  united   in   our  Minds,    we  form   a  general  Idea   of 
iS-ovri,  Pleafure.     And  thus  again,  we  abftradl  the  Powers  o{  exciting 
Delight,  or  Pleafure,  from  the  Things  inverted  with  fuch  Powers, 
and  comprehend  them   in  One  General  Idea,    to  which  we  givs 
the  Name  of  ro  i^S'v,  or  aa  Te^Trvov,  The  Pleafant,  or  T^he  Delight- 
full. — In   applying  the  obfervations  above  made,    and  the  Inftance 
juft  now   produced,    to    the  Attributive   Term  good,   we   are  to 
i-emark,    that  this  Term   has  a   double   fignification.     For   it   is 
often   ufed   to  denote   fome  ^lality  in   the  Sub/lances  or  Things 
themfelves,    to  which   it  is   attributed,  whether  they  be.  natural 
or  artificial, — a  Quality,  refpeding  the  Endiov  which  they  were  de- 
figned  \-YNatureoT  hy  Man.   In  natural  SuhHancQS,  good  Corn  isCorn 
good  for  Food i  a  good  Harfe  is  a  Hcrfe  good  to  carry,  or  to  draic; 

and 


70  P    H    i    L    E    B    U    S. 

and  a  good  Man  is  a  Man  endued  with  ^lalkys,  fitting  him  for 
the  Ends  of  his  Being  :  in  Things  artificial,  good  Bricks  are  Bricks 
good  for  building ;  and  a  good  Houfe  is  a  Houfe  fit  for  the  habita- 
tion of  Thofe,  for  whofe  habitation  it  was  built.  The  fame 
Attributive  Term  often  alfo  denotes  a  ^tality  or  Power,  in 
Outward  Things,  by  which,  when  they  are  poffefTed,  ufed,  or 
enjoyed  by  Us,  they  contribute  to  our  Well-Being, — a  Power, 
with  which  they  are  inveiled,  thro  a  Fittiefs  of  Their  Nature  to 
fome  Part  of  our  own.  Now  fuch  S^alitys,  Poivers,  and  Fitneffes 
in  Them,  are  by  Us  called  good,  with  refpeft  only  to  our  Selves  j 
as  They  are  the  Means,  the  Mediate  or  Inftrumental  Caufes,  of 
fomething  defirable  to  Us. — Taking  the  Attributive  Term  good  in 
the  former  of  thefe  Two  Significations,  and  abjiraBing  the  ^ality, 
denoted  by  it,  from  the  SubjeB  in  which  the  Quality  inheres,  fuch 
■Quality,  thus  abftradled,  we  term  Goodnefs,  —  the  Goodnefs  of 
That  Being,  to  which  we  afcribe  it : — And  if  the  Subjedt  be  a 
Living  or  Aclive  Subflance,  fuch  Abftraft  Quality  is  alfo  termed 
Virtue.  —  Note,  that  in  all  thefe  cafes,  by  the  Terms  Goodnefs 
and  Virtue  is  meant  the  jiatural  or  7'ight  and  proper  State,  Habit, 
or  conftant  Difpofition  of  fome  Particular  Being.  And  becaufe  the 
natural  and  right  State  of  a  Mans  Soul  is  a  conftant  Difpofition 
to  embrace  Truth,  to  aft  honcftly,  and  to  do  Good  to  All,  Evil 
lo  None,  fuch  a  Difpofition  is  the  Virtue  or  Goodnefs  of  a  Man. 
— From  the  Goodnefs,  by  which  Individual  good  Beings  are  good, 
— a  Goodnefs  relative  only  to  the  Defign  and  End  of  each  Par- 
ticular Nature, — a  Goodnefs  confined  and  partial, — we  attain,  thro 
Induftion,  to  fome  Idea  of  Goodnefs  abfolute,  extenfive  as  Being 
its  Self,  and  univeffal.  —  But  if  we  take  the  Attributive  Term 
good,  in  its  other  Senfe, — in  That,  which  it  evidently  prefcnts 
to  us  in  the  Pafiage  now  before  us,  namely,  for  a  ^lalify  or 
Power,  not  in  our  Selves,  but  in  Other  Beings  or  Subjlanccs, 
ivhedicr   they   be    natural,   artificial,    or  abfiraB,    (of  the   latter 

of 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  71 

©f  which   three  Kinds   is  Plcafure,)  —  a  Quality  or  Power,    by 
which  they  arc  conducive  to  our  Well-Bcing, — this  Quality  of 
Theirs,    confidercd   in    its  Firft  AbJiraSl,    or  as    immediately  fepa- 
rated  by  the  Mind   from  the  Being  or  Subftance  to  which  is  is 
attributed,    is    not   our   Good   m   the  general ,    neither   is    it   our 
Greateft   or  Chief  Good ;    but  fiinply  a  Good,  that  is,    fome  Parti- 
cular Thing,    conducive  to  our  Well-Being. — It  is   from  Many 
of  thefe   Particular   Things,    which   are    Gaod  for  Us,    colIed:ed 
together  and  united  in  our  Minds,   that  we  acquire  the  Idea  of 
etir  own  Good  in  general, — an  Idea,   in  which  are  comprehended 
all  the  Kinds  of  Good  relative  to  our  Selves  :    It  is  from  com- 
paring together  thefe  different  Goods  relative  to  our  Selves,  that 
we  form  a  fiidgment,    Which  of  them  all  is  our  Greateft  Good,. 
or    the    Bejl   for  Us,    according    to    the  Experience  we    have  of 
thofe  feveral  Goods,  joined  to  the  Knowlege  we  have  of  our  own. 
Nature. — Good  therefore,    in  the  AbJiraS-,   confidered   as  relatione 
only   to  our   Selves,    fignifys    either   fome  one  Particular  Species 
of  what  is  good  for  us, — or  the  Whole  of  our  Good,  comprehend- 
ing all  its  Species, — or  That,   amongfl  the  feveral  Species  of  our 
Good,   which  is   the  Chief  and  Greateji. — Now  the  Firjl  or  im- 
mediate AbfraEl  of  any  ^ality   or    other  Attribute,   being   only 
the  Attribute,   confidered   {hoyu)   apart  from   its  SuhjeEl,    has   the 
very   fame  Meaning  with   the  Attribute,   coniidered,   as  adually 
it  is,   in  its  SubjeSi. — Admitting  therefore,    that   the  Quality   or 
Attribute    good   belongs    to   Pleafure    in    general,    (and   This   is 
acknowleged  by  Socrates  himfelf  before  the  End  of  the  Dialogue,) 
if  we  confider  this  Attribute  of  Pleafure  in  the  Abftraft,  we  find, 
that  'tis   only  one  Particular  Good,    namely,  Pleafm:ey — a   Good, 
relative   only   to.  the  Senftive  Soul,  which  is   only  a  Part  of  the 
Human  Nature.     Since  there  is  then  no  real  Difference  of  Mean- 
ing between  good  the  Attributive  Term,  and  Good  thp  Suhftantive, 
whea  ufed  in  this  Senfe,  Socrates  could  have  no  Objedion  to  the 

6  Ulfi 


7a  P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

Ule  of  either  indifferently  en  this  occafion.  But  if  by  the 
Noun  or  Subjlantive  Term  Good  in  this  place  we  underfland 
either  the  Chief  Good  of  Man,  or  his  Good  in  the  general,  the 
Whole  Genus  of  Human  Good,  it  makes  a  great  Difference, 
v.hether,  in  calling  Pleafure  Good,  we  ufe  the  Attributive  Term, 
or  the  Subjianti-vc.  For  if  by  the  Subflantive  Good  the  Whole  of 
Human  Good  is  meant,  if  Socrates  here  doubts  whether  Fro- 
tarchus  meant  it  fo,  and  if  Protarchus  fliould  avow  This  to  be 
his  Meaning,  it  follows,  that  in  His  Opinion,  the  Terms  Pleafure 
and  Good  might  be  ufed  reciprocally,  and  that  Either  might  be 
afhrmed  of  the  Other ;  for  that,  to  Man  Pleafure  is  Good,  and 
Good  is  Pleafure.  But  whether  the  Whole,  or  the  Chief -^.n^  Greafeft, 
Good  of  Man  be  meant  by  Protarchus,  the  Article  to.  The, 
fhould  here,  as  well  as  before  in  ftating  the  Matter  in  Difpute, 
to  flate  it  rightly,  have  been  prefixed  to  the  Subjlattfive  Term 
-Good.  This  is  a  juft  Remark,  made  hy  Ar if  otle :  for  he  feems 
to  have  had  this  Dialogue  in  view,  in  his  Prior  Analy ticks,  L.  r. 
C.  40,  where  he  obferves,  that  the  Terms  dyx'^Qv  and  ts  oLyaJSrov, 
Good  and  The  Good,  in  fyllogifing,  ought  not  to  be  ufed  indif- 
ferently; but  that,  Which  foever  of  the  Two  conveys  the 
Speaker's  Meaning,  That  alone  fliould  be  made  ufe  of  and  ad- 
hered to.  See  Part  of  this  Paflage  in  Arifotle,  to  which  we 
refer,  cited  by  Mr.  Harris  in  his  Hermes,  B.  2.  Ch.  i.  We  do 
not,  in  feconding  this  Remark,  mean  to  charge  Plato  with 
a  want  of  Precifion  or  Accuracy  in  this  refpedj  neither  do  we 
think  that  Arifotle,  in  making  the  Remark,  had  any  fuch  In- 
tention. We  apprehend,  on  the  contrary,  that  Arifotle  was  in- 
debted, for  fo  juft  a  Criticifm,  to  his  thorow  Acquaintance  with 
Plato  %  manner  of  Dialogue-writing.  He  well  knew,  that  this 
Great  Mafter  in  that  Species  of  Compofition,  always  attributed 
to  every  Perfon  in   his  Dialogues  whatever  was  proper  and  pe- 

.culiar  to  the  Charader, 

6  Redden 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Reddere  per/once  fcit  convcnientia  cuique. 
Skill' d  to  ajjign  the  Suitable  to  'Each, 


73 


not  only  in  the  Sentiments,  but  even  in  the  DiElion.  He  mufl 
have  perceived,  that,  in  the  prefent  cafe,  'tv/as  the  intention  of 
Plato  to  charge  Philebus,  and  Others  of  the  fame  Sedl,  with  a 
loofe  and  fophiftical  way  of  reafoning  on  the  Subjedt  of  Good. 
For  they  appear  to  have  ufed  the  Fallacy  of  cha-nging  a  Particular 
Term  for  a  Term  which  is  Univerfal,  or  vice  verfd,  by  the 
Jly  infertion  or  oniijjion  of  the  definite  Article  T^he  before  the  word 
Good.  With  this  View  has  Plato  in  the  Beginning  of  this  Dia- 
logue, where  Socrates  ftates  the  Opinion  of  Philebus  concerning 
the  Chief  Good  of  Man,  omitted  the  Article  to,  'The,  before  the 
word  Good;  as  appears  from  a  literal  tranflation  of  that  Paflage, 
to  be  feen  in  Note  3.  That  'twas  omitted  purpofely,  to  imitate 
Philebus,  and  to  reprefent  him  as  having,  in  his  Panegyricks  on 
Pleafure,  made  the  fame  omiffion  fallacioiijly ,  appears,  we  think, 
from  the  very  word,  which  has  given  occafion  for  this  long 
Note.  The  Interrogative  (^^aofjuv -,  Jhall  ive  fay  ?  fliows,  that  6*0- 
crates,  difcovering  the  Fallacy  oi  Protarchus,  tried  to  bring  him 
to  declare  openly  his  fecret  Meaning,  and  to  avow,  that  Pleafure 
was,  in  his  Opinion,  to  a'^o-S-oV  The  Good  of  Man,  that  is,  either 
the  Whole  of  his  Good,  or  his  Chief  Good.  For  the  Article,  to.  The, 
prefixed  to  an  Attributive  Term,  is  always  equivalent  to  the 
AbjlraSl  Subftantive,  in  its  General  Idea ;  it  means  the  Ideal  Per- 
feSiion  of  the  Attribute,  or  the  Excellence  of  it  in  its  own  Kind. 
Thus,  The  White  means  either  Whitenefs  its  Self,  ox  purely  white: 
The  Round  means  either  Roundnefs  its  Self,  or  perfeBly  round  : 
The  Beautiful  means  either  Beauty  its  Self,  or  ahfolutcly  and  com- 
pleatly  beautiful :  and  ta.ya'h'ov.  The  Good,  without  a  particular 
reference  to  Man,  either  means  Good  its  Self,  comprehending 
all  the  Kinds  of  Good,  or  elfe  it  means  pe-rfe^ly  and  purely  good, 

K  %vithout 


74  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

them  are  evil  ''^^  and  many  indeed  good"'%  as  I  readily 
acknowlege,  yet  All  of  them  You  call  Good ;  and  at 
the    fame    time,    you    confefs   them  to   be    diilimilar 

in 

without  deficience,  and  widiout  the  leafl  mixture  of  any  Evil. 
(In  how  fublime  a  Senfe  the  Platonicks  ufe  the  word  rdya'^ov, 
and  indeed  Plato  himfelf  in  his  Republic  and  elfewhere,  we  fhall 
have  occafion  to  obferve  in  the  Notes  to  the  latter  Part  of  the  prefent 
Dialogue.)  By  Analogy  therefore,  in  this  Dialogue,  (where,  as 
ProcluSy  in  his  Commentarys  on  Plato's  Republick,  pag:  426,  rightly 
obferves,  it  is  obvious  for  Every  one  to  difcern,  that  the  Sub- 
jedt  of  Inquiry  is  not — to  airXtoi  dyx^oy.  What  is  Jimply  or  abfo- 
lutely  The  Good;  but  to  eV  i\\Mv  ecy  0.^01;  IVhat  is  the  Good  of  Man  y-^ 
TO  fJLS^iKTov  dyx^Qv,  'The  Good,  which  Man  partakes  q/-,)  the  Sub- 
llantive  Noun  Good,  tho  fpoken  abfolutely,  means  either  the 
Whole  of  Human  Good,  or,  at  leaft.  That  which  fo  greatly  excells  the 
refi  of  Human  Goods,  as  to  be  juftly  filled,  by  way  of  eminence, 
The  Good,  i.  e.  relative  to  Man.  —  It  will  appear,  however,  in 
the  laft  Part  of  this  Dialogue,  that  The  limply  and  abfolutely 
Good,  Good  its  Self,  is  the  Caife  of  Good  to  every  Being, — is  the 
Good  of  the  whole  Univerfe, — and  is  the  Sovereign  Good  of  Man 
in  particular.  It  will  appear  likewife,  that  this  Good  its  Self, 
this  Caufe  of  all  Good,  this  Good  Vnroerfal,  co-incides  with  The 
Good  in  the  firft-mentioned  Meaning  of  the  word  Good;  for  that 
'tis  Goodnefs  abfoliite  and  perfccl.  Goodness  its  Self  ;  that  'tis 
the  Caife  of  whr.tever  Goodnefs  or  Virtue  any  Particular  Being  is 
endued  with  )  in  fine,  that  'tis  Goodness  Universal,  as  ex- 
tenfive   and  comprchenfive   as  Universal  Beinq. 

3*    Socrates  here,  by  the  words  evil  and  good,  evidently  means  evil' 
and   good  to    the   Whole  Man.      For,    that  Pleajure  is   the    only 
Good,  and  Pain  the  only  E^vil.  of  all  Animals,  conlidered  meerly 
3  as. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  75 

in   their  natures '%    when    a  man    forces   you   to  this 

confeilion.     What  then  is  That,   the   Same  in  every 

Pleafure,   in  the  evil  Pleafures  equally  with  the  good, 

from  which  you  give  to  all  Pleafures  the  denomination 

of  Good ''  ? 

Protarchus. 

What  is  That,   O  Socrates !    which  You  fay  ?    Do 

You  imagine,   that  any  perfon,    after  having  afferted, 

that  Pleafure  is  the  Good  ^'  of  Man,   will  admit  your 

Suppofition  ?    or  will  fufFer  it  to  pafs  uncontradidted, 

that  only  Some  Pleafures   are   good,   but  that   Other 

Pleafures  are  evil  ? 

Socrates. 

as  Benjitkie  Beings,  cannot  be  queftioned.  And  thus  is  deteded 
another  Fallacy  of  Philebus,  in  this  Pofition  of  his,  —  that  the 
Good  of  all  Animals  is  Pleafure,  &c.  in  which  he  confounded  the 
Nature  ol  Man  with  That  of  Brute-Kn\m^\s ;  Thefe  being,  in 
all  appearance,  capable  of  no  higher  nor  happier  a  Life,  than 
the  Life  of  Senfc ;  whereas  the  Point  in  controverfy  between  Socrates 
and  Philebus  regards  Human  Life  only,  or  Man^  confidered  in  the 
Whole  of  his  Nature. 

37  In  the  Greek  it  is — Koyo)' — that  is,  according  to  the  Defi- 
nition or  Account  of  them,  before  given.  For  Protarchus^  in  his 
Anfwer  to  the  Sentence,  wherein  Socrates  gave  an  Account  ot 
their  different  Natures,  did  in  efFe(5t  admit  That  to  be  a  true 
Account :  ice  Page  44. 

3^   ^Qt  Plato  de  Republicd   Lib:  6.    pag:  505.    'Ed'iV.  Sfeph: 
39  In  the  Greek, — rii^onv  elvxi  rdya^ov, — literally — that  Pleafure 
is  the  Good. — At  length  Protarchus,  finding  that  his  Fallacy,  taken 

K  2  Notice 


7<5 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates. 

However,  you  will  ackiiowlege,   that  Pleafures  arc 

unlike,   one   to   another,    and   fome  even  contrary   to 

others. 

Protarchus. 

Notice  of  in  Note  35,  was  detedled  by  Socrates,  here  explicitly 
avows  his  Meaning  to  be, — that  Pleafure  is  the  fole  Good  of  Man, 
"oaliiabk  for  its  oivn  Sake,   by  ufing  in  this  Sentence  the  Subftan- 

tive  Noun  ra.ya.'^ov. A  learned  Reader  mull:  have  perceived, 

that,  in  tranflating  this  Sentence  into  English,  we  have  made  no 
icruple  to  add  the  two  words — of  Man.     This  addition  is  authorifed 
iy  what  was  obferved  near  the  End  of  Note  35,    agreeably   to 
the  obfervation  of  Prochts,  there  cited. — 'Tis   worth   remarking, 
on  this  occafion,   that  Eudoxus,  a  celebrated   Aftronomer,   about 
ten  Years  Junior  to  Plato,  tho  he  entertained  the  fame  Opinion 
with  Arijlippus   on   this   Point,    yet    appears  not    to    have  preva- 
ricated, like  the  Cyrenaicks  ;    but   to   have  exprelled  his  Meaning 
in   plain  Terms,    when  he  aflerted  -fiioynv  eiva.i  rdya^oy  sA?^cym'  kuI 
ctAdycav,   that  Pkafiire  was  the  Chif  or  Supreme  Good  of  all  Ani- 
mals   whether    Rational  or   Irrational.     For,    that    by    the   word 
laytL^Qv    he   meant   the    Chief  Good,   is   evident    from    the   other 
Attributes  which  he  affigned  to  Pleafure  ;  thofe  of  jwa'Ai^a  ai^iror,, 
and  xpccTK^ov,  of  all  good  things  themojl  eligible,  and  the  jnoji  excellent. 
St&  Arijlotle,   in  Ethic:  Nice /n:    L.  10,  C.  2.     The   fame  Author, 
ia    the   fame   accurate  Treatife,   L.  i,  C.  12,    fays  of  him,  that 
/)e  pleaded  hatidfomely,   xa?>.w5  awnyu^ma  ttso]   ixv  a^i^ftwc  t»   niov^y 
for  giving  Pleafure  the  Preference  to  all  other  Good  Things.     This 
fmgular  Ingenuoufnefs   oi  Eudoxus  was   very  laudable,    but  is  eafy 
to   be  accounted  for :    fince  we  learn  from  Arijlotle,    that  he  was 
a  Good  Man,  and  a  Lover  of  Truth  •,  and  Diogenes  Laertius  reports 
5  of 


P    FI    I    L    E    B    U    S.  77 

Protarchus. 

By  no  means;  fo  far  as  they  are  Pleafures,  every  One 
of  them. 

Socrates. 

We  are  now  brought  back  again  to  the  fame  Pofi- 
tion,  O  Protarchus  !  There  is  no  Difference  between 
Pleafure  and  Pleafure  ;  all  Pleafures  are  alike,  we  muft 
fay  :  and  the  fimilar  Inftances,  juft  now  produced  % 
in  Colours  and  in  Figures,  have  had,  it  feems,  no 
Effedl  upon  us.  But  we  fhall  try,  and  talk  after  the 
manner  of  the  meanefl  Arguers,  and  meer  Novices  in 
Dialeclick. 

Protarchus. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

of  him,  that  after  he  had  been  a  Scholar  oi Archytas  the  Pytha- 
gorean, he  became  an  Auditor  oi  Plato  &  Ledures.  It  is  probable 
therefore,  that  he  had  been  favoured  with  the  reading  of  Plato's. 
Phikbus;  or,  if  not,  yet  that  he  had  heard  the  Divine  Philofopher 
explain  the  Force  of  the  Article  to  prefixed  to  dyaJ-rov,  by  which,, 
this  Word,  of  its  Self  a  meer  Attributive,  becomes  an  AbJlraB. 
Noun ;  and  it  is  diftinguiflied  as  Such,  in  the  Dialogue  now  before 
us,  where  the  Sophiflry  of  the  Cyrenaicks  is  thus  detedted. 

+"  See  above  in  Page  63. — In  the  Greek  of  this  Sentence,  we 
are  inclined  to  read  cTwra,  (one  word,)  inftead  of  cf>j  ra,  in  Stephens  % 
Edition  and  the  B(^fll,  or,  (what  is  much  worfe)  Set.  ra  in  Ahiius. 

Socrates* 


78  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

I  mean,  that  if  I,  to  imitate  you,  and  difpute  with 
you  in  your  own  way,  fliould  dare  to  affert,  that  Two 
things,  the  mod  unlike,  are  of  all  things  the  moft 
like  to  each  other,  I  fliould  fay  nothing  more  than 
what  You  fay  :  fo  that  Both  of  us  would  appear  to  be 
rawer  Difputants  than  we  ought  to  be  ;  and  the  Subject 
of  our  Difpute  would  thus  flip  out  of  our  hands,  and 
get  away.  Let  us  refume  it  therefore  once  more  :  and 
perhaps    by   returning  to   Similitudes'^',    we   may   be 

induced 

'^'  The  Senfe  and  the  Reafoning  require  a  fmall  alteration  to 
be  here  made  in  the  Greek  Copys  of  Plato,  by  reading,  inftead 
of  Toii  ofJLoicci, — Ta5  ofjcoioTnra?,  Similitudes,  or  rather  la,  ajj-oia.  Similes. 
— Similes,  of  the  Kind  here  meant,  are  by  Arijhtle,  in  his  Art  of 
Rbctorick,  L.  2,  C.  20,  Edit:  Du  Vail,  juftiy  fliled  loi  Swjt^aTixa, 
Socratic,  becaufe  frequently  etnployed  by  Socrates.  They  are 
not  fuch  as  Thofe,  for  which  the  Imagination  of  a  Poet  fkims 
over  all  Nature,  to  illuftrate  fome  Things  by  fuperficial  Pefemblanccs 
to  them  in  0/v6fr  Things :  neither  are  they  Such,  as  the  Memory 
of  an  Orator  ranfacks  all  Hijlory  for,  to  prove  the  certainty  of 
fome  doubtful  Fadi  by  Examples  on  Record,  which  agree  with  it 
in  a  iz^^  Circumftances :  but  they  are  Such,  as  ^t  Reafon  of  an 
accomplitlied  AJjJier  of  Dialediick  choofes  out  from  Subjecfts  near 
■at  hand,  to  prove  the  Truth  of  fome  uncertain  or  controverted 
Poftion,  by  the  Analogy  it  bears  to  fome  other  Truth  which  is 
obv;oi;:-,  and  clear,  and  v»'ill  be  readily  admitted-  Such  a  Simile, 
bearing  the  plainefl  and  mofl   flriking  Analogy  with  what  is   to 

be 


PHILEBUS. 


79 


induced  to  make  fome  Conceflions,  Each  of  us  to  the 
Other  ^\ 

Protarchus. 

Say  how. 

Socrates.  - 

Suppofe  Me  to  be  the  Party  queftioned ;  and  fup- 
pofe  Yourfelf,  Protarchus,  to  interrogate  Me. 

Protarchu  s» 
Concerning  what  ? 

Socrates-. 
Concerning  Prudence,  and  Science,  and  Intelligence, 
and  all  the  reft  of  thofe  Things,   which  in  the  begin- 

be  proved,  is  adlually  produced,  immediately  after  this  preface 
to  it,  by  Socrates.  But  not  a  Word  is  there,  in  what  follows, 
concerning  Similar  Pleafures ;  and  to!?  ofxolca,  alike  or  fimilar,  cannot 
be  joined  with,  or  belong  to,  any  preceding  Noun,  befide  v^ovdi. — 
As  to  the  word  returning  in  the  prefent  fentence,  it  refers  to  thofe 
Similes,  produced  before,  of  Colour  and  of  Figure. 

'^'''  For,  by  the  following  Simile,,  'Protarchus  might  be  rationally 
brought  to  concede  to  Socrates,  that  Some  Pleafures  were  evil  -, 
and  that,  confequently,  not  all  Pleafure  was  good;  and  Socrates 
himfelf,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  obliged  to  own,  that  Some 
Kinds  of  Knowlege  alfo  were  evili  and  confequently,  that  he 
muft  yield  up  the  Hypothefis  for  which  he  had  hitherto  pleaded, 
and  confefs,  that  Knowlege  was  not  That  Sovereign  Good  they, 
were  in  fearch  of.. 

ning- 


8o  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

ning  of  our  Converfation  I  faid  were  good,  when  I  was 
afked  what  Sort  of  a  Thing  Good  was  '^^ ;  muft  I  not 
acknowlege  Thefe  to  be  attended  with  the  fame  Cir- 
cumftance,  which  attends  thofe  Other  things,  ce- 
lebrated by  You  ? 

Protarchus. 
What  Circumftance  ? 

+5  From  this  Paflage  it  appears,  that  the  unwritten  Altercation 
between  Socrates  and  Fhilebus,  immediately  previous  to  this 
Dialogue,  began  with  fome  luch  Queftion  as  This, — "  What  is 
the  Chief  Good  of  Man  ?" — a  Queftion,  propofed  to  Socrates  by 
Fhilekis  as  bluntly  and  as  pertly,  as  That,  propofed  to  him  by 
Menoy  which  opens  the  Dialogue,  called  after  Meno\  Name. 
Hence  we  infer,  that  the  Scene  of  the  Philebus,  as  well  -as  That 
of  the  Mem,  is  laid  in  the  Lycccum.  See  Note  i .  to  the  Meno. 
A  Critical  Reader  of  Plato's,  Dialogues,  who  knows  that,  in  con- 
verfation between  Man  and  Man,  to  put  a  philofophical  Queftion 
fuddenly  and  abruptly,  with  a  view  of  exhibiting  the  Know- 
lege  of  the  Queftioner,  is  a  diftinguilhing  Mark  of  Sophifts, 
and  of  Pedants  in  Philofophy, — a  Reader,  who  knows  and  con- 
fiders  This,  will  obferve,  that  Plato,  tho  in  the  Mejio  he  has 
thrown  a  ftrong  Light  upon  this  ungracious  Charadteriftick,  by 
placing  it  in  the  Front  of  that  Dialogue,  yet  in  the  Philebus,  one 
of  his  Capital  Performances,  he  has  judicioully  withdrawn  it 
from  full  View  into  the  Back- Ground  ;  by  which  Conduit  and 
Difpofition,  the  Commencement  of  this  Dialogue  is  more  polite 
and  elegant  than  That  of  the  Meno,  where  the  Subjedt  is  intruded 
on  us  without  any  Kind  of  Introdudion. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  Si 

SOCRATE  S. 

The  Sciences,  viewed  all  of  them  together,  will  feem 
to  Both  of  us  not  only  Many  and  of  Diverfe  Kinds,  but 
Diflimilar  too.  Some  to  Others.  Now  if,  befides,  there 
fhould  appear  '^'^  a  Contrariety  in  any  way,  between 
Some  of  them  and  Others,  fhould  I  deferve  to  be  dif- 
puted  with  any  longer,  if,  fearful  of  admitting  Con- 
trariety between  the  Sciences,  I  were  to  affert,  that  no  one 
Science  was  DifTimilar  to  any  other  Science  ?  For  then 
the  Matter  in  Debate  between  us,  as  if  it  were  a  meer 
Fable  which  has  no  Foundation,  would  come  to  No- 


^■^  The  Sciences  differ,  according  to  die  difference  of  their 
Subjefts.  So  that  Two  Science's,  whofe  refpedive  SubjeSls  arc 
contrary,  each  to  the  other,  are  Themfelves  alfo  Two  Contrarys. 
If  then  Mind  and  Body,  the  Subjeds  of  Two  different  Sciences, 
commonly  called  Mctaphyficks  and  Phyficks,  are,  in  any  way,  con-- 
trary  to  each  other,  thofe  Sciences,  of  which  they  are  refpedively 
the  Subjeds,  muft  be  contrary  to  .each  other,  in  the  fame  way. 
'Tis  certain,  that  no  Contrariety  happens  between  Mind  and 
Body,  confidered  as  Two  different  ktaleci,  Beings,  or  SiihJ}a7ices -, 
becaufe  no  iaU,  no  Siihjlance,  or  Being,  is  contrary  to  any 
other  sQix.  But,  on  account  of  the  contrary  ^alitys  of  Mind 
and  Body, — as  the  one  is  eternal  and  invariable,  the  other 
variable  and  perifl:iable, — Mind  and  Body,  confidered  in  this  way, 
are  Two  Contrarys :  and  therefore  the  Sciences,  of  which  they 
are  the  Subjeds,   are  contrary  alfo,    each   to  the  other, 

L  thins: 


82  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

thing  and  be  loft ;  while  We  faved  our  Selves  '^^  by 
an  Illogical  Retreat.  But  fuch  an  Event  ought  not 
to  happen,  except  this  Part  of  it,  —  the  Saving  of  our 
Selves  ''^.  And  now  the  Equality,  which  appears  thus 
far  between  Your  Hypothefis  and  Mine,  I  am  well 
enough   pleafed   with.      The   Pleafures   happen   to   be 

45  That  is,  —  faved  our  felves  from  being  openly  defeated,  by 
running  away  from  the  Argument,  and  retiring  into  the  im- 
pregnable Fort  of  a  Truth  not  to  be  contradided  :  and  Such  a 
Truth  is  This, — that  Science  differs  not  from  Science,  confidered 
in  the  gena-al,  or  fimply  as  Science. — For  when  Things,  of  any 
Kind  whatever,  are  contemplated  in  their  Genus,  where  they  are 
united,  they  lofe  all  their  Specific  Differences,  and  appear  to  the 
Mind  as  One  Thing.  Now  of  Science  in  general  the  Subject  is 
Being  in  general,  that  is,  all  Kinds  of  Being,  taken  together, 
united  in  the  Mind,  and  contemplated  as  One.  The  Divifion  of 
Science  attends  the  Divifion  o^ Being;  the  feveral  Kinds  and  Sorts 
of  Bei?2g,  when  Being  is  divided  naturally  and  rightly,  diflinguifli 
the  feveral  Kinds  and  Sorts  of  Science;  and  our  diftinguifhing 
juflly  one  Kind  or  Sort  of  Science  from  another,  depends  on  the 
Diflinclions,  made  by  Nature,  between  the  feveral  Kinds  and 
Sorts  of  Being. 

*>^  This  Phrafe, — "  the  Saving  of  our  felves," — feems  here,  with 
an  elegant  facetioufnefs,  turned  to  another  Meaning,  than  it  bore 
in  the  preceding  Sentence  :  for  it  here  fignifies  the  Saving  of  our 
felves  from  Fal/hood, — not  by  flying  to  Paralogifms  and  Sophifms, 
— nor  by  ftriving  to  fland  our  Ground  longer  than  it  is  tenable 
thro  found  Logick, — but  by  yielding  up  Both  our  Hypothefes 
to   Right   Rcafon   and  Truth,    if  Thefe   fhould    happen    to   be 


again fl  us. 


found 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  83 

found  Many   and   Diflimilar ;    Many  alfo  and  DiveiTc 
are  the  Sciences.      The  Difference,   however,   between 
Your  Good  and  Mine,   O  Protarchus  !    let  us  not  con- 
ceal'^^;   but    let  us    dare   to    lay  it  fairly   and   openly 
before  us  Both  ;  that  we  may  difcover  '^*,  (if  Thofe  who 
are  clofely  examined  will   make  any  Difcovery,)  whe- 
ther Pleafure  or  Wifdom  ought  to  be  pronounced  the 
Chief  Good   of  Man,    or  whether  any  Third  Thing, 
different   from  Either  :   fince   it  is  not,    as  I  prefume, 
with  This  view  that  we  contend  '^%  that  My  Hypothecs, 
or  that  Yours,    may  prevail   over   its  Antagonift  ;    but 
That,  which  hath  the  Truth  on  its  Side,  we  are  Both 
of  us  to  contend  for  and  fupport. 

Protarchus. 
This  is  certainly  our  Duty. 

» 

Socrates. 

But  this  Point  farther  we  fhould.  Both  of  us  toge- 
ther,  fettle  on  the  fureft  Ground. 

Protarchus. 

*7  That  is — let  us  not  have  recourfe  to  Subterfuges  and  Eva- 
fions,  as  Protarchus  had  hitherto  fophiftically  done. 

+^  Or,  —  let  us  be  bold,    in  not  concealing,   but  laying  it  doivJi 

fairly   between    us  Both.  —  In    the  Greek,  —  jx)]  oc7roK^v7rIofJi.em, 

y.xrari^iPTei  S'e  en  to  fjnaov  ToKyMjxiv,   ccv   td?  iAiy^o jjuvoi  fj-nmaoKTi, 

ttots^ov  jc.  t.  a.     Cornarius   and   Stephens  were  of  opinion,    that 

L  a  this 


84  P    H    I    L    E    B   U    S. 

Protarchus. 
what  Point  do  you  mean  ? 

Socrates. 

That  which  puzzles  and  perplexes  all  Perfons,  wha 
choofe  to  make  it  the  Subje6t  of  their  Converfation  ; 
—-nay  fometimes  fome  Others,  who  have  no  fuch  in- 
tention,   are  led  to  it  unawares,    in  Converfation  upon 

other  Subjeds  ^\ 

Protarchus, 

this  Paflage  wanted  Emendation,  to  make  it  Intelligible.  But  if 
we  fuppofc  the  two  former  Participles  ufed  inftead  of  Gerunds, 
or  inftead  of  the  Infinitive  Verbs  to  which  they  are  paronymous, 
there  is  no  neceffity  for  any  alteration.  And  to  juftify  our  fuppofi- 
tion,  we  need  only  cite  a  fimilar  Enallage,  in  the  Oration  of 
L)j'ias  TTS^]  T ^oLv fJicLTos  ix.  TT^ovoiai, — yy.  ui^upirai  [fays  he  of  his 
Profecutor]  T^at>/y.a'  5/g  ovoy.diX,uv  to.  u-Koiiria.,  be  is  not  aJJ^amed  to 
call  [or,  he  is  not  aJJ.vimed  of  calUng\  a  few  black  and  blue  fpofs 
under  the  eye  a  Wound.  —  Granting,  however,  that  thofe  two 
Participles  have  no  other  Place  or  Power  in  the  confi;rud:ion  of 
this  Sentence,  than  Such  as  Participles  ufually  have,  yet  the 
printed  Text  is  flill  found,  if  we  fuppofe  an  Ellipfis  of  the 
word  fj.tivueiv,  (governed  of  loAfj-oifxiv,)  immediately  after  the 
word  jU)!iJo-wo-«,  from  which  the  word  ^«i'J«r  is  to  be  fupplied. — 
Concerning  words,  not  expreffed,  but  tacitly  underftood  from 
the  word  immediately  preceding,,  fee  Leijncr  in  Prafat:  ad  Bos 
in  Ellipfes  Gracas. 

*»    By  thefe    lad  Perfons  Plato   means    Men    of   good   natural 
Abilitys   of   Mind,     tho    not    readily   difpofed    to   philofophife. 

For 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  85 

Protarchus. 
Exprefs  what  you  mean  in  plainer  Terms. 

Socrates. 
I   mean  That,    which   fell    in    our    way,    but   juf! 
now  ^°,   the  Nature  of  which  is   fo   full   of  Wonders. 
For  that  Many  are   One,   and  that   One  is  Many,   is 

For  when  Aich  Mea  are  debating  calmly  and  rationally  on  any 
Point  whatever,  in  weighing  the  Force  of  each  other's  Argu- 
ments, they  cannot  help  now  and  then  recurring,,  by  way  of 
Appeal,  to  thofe  Principles  of  Re aj on,  from  which  all  juft  Ar- 
gumentation depends,  and  to  which  it  owes  all  the  Force  it 
has.  Now  the  tiature  of  thefe  Principles  of  Reafon  is  the  very 
Point,  coming  on   to  be  confidered. 

5°  The  Analogy,  juft  ht{orc  JJjoivn,  between  Science  and  Pleafiire, 
in  the  Divifibiliiy  of  Each  of  them  into  Many  Species,  and  alfo  in 
the  Dijimilarity  between  the  feveral  Species  of  Each,  muft  fljcre 
fcem  pointed  out  by  Socrates,  meerly  to  illujlrate  what  he  had 
£iid  of  different  and  dilTimilar  Pleafures.  He  there  indeed  pro- 
feffed  nothing  more.  But  we  here  find,  that  the  principal  De- 
fgn  of  that  Simile,  or  Comparifon,-  was  to  lead  the  way  to  the 
Difquifition,  we  are  now  entering  into,  concerning  the  nature 
of  One,  comprehending  tnany,  and  of  Many,  comprehended  all  of 
them  in  One  ; — a  Difquifition,  neceffary  to  the  Knowlege  oi  Mind. 
For  the  nature  of  Mind  cannot  be  known  without  the  Know- 
lege of  fuch  a  Comprehenfive  One :  and  until  the  nature  of  Mind 
be  known,  it  cannot  be  determined,  whether  the  Chief  Good 
of  Man  is  placed  in  the  Energys  of  Mind ,  or  whether  we  are  to- 
Ifook  for  it  fomewhere  elfe, 

wonderful 


S6  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

wonderful  to  have  it  faid;  and  Either  of  thofe  Pofitions 

is  eafy  to  be  controverted  ^'. 

Protarchus. 

5'  The  following  Difqulfition  concerning  One  and  Ma?2y  feems 
to  have  been  firft  fet  on  foot  by  Fythagoras,  and   to  have  arifen 
in   His    Mind   from  His   Speculations    on  That  Part   of  Nature 
which  hjlabk  and  invariable.     His  Difciples  tranfinitted  what  he 
taught  them  on  this  Head,  together  with  all  his  other  Dodrines, 
to  Their  Succeflors  in  teaching,    under   the    Seal  of  Secrecy,   as 
They  had  themfelves  received  it.     In  this  manner  the  Philofophy  of 
Pythagoras,    or  his  Way  of  confidering  the  Nature   of  Things, 
was  for  a  confiderable  time  kept,  as  if  it  were  facred,  amongft 
his  Followers,  intirely  hidden  from  all  other  Men.     During  the 
time  of  this   very   referved  Conduft  of  the  Pythagoreans,   it    ap- 
pears thcit  Diocet as,   aPhilofopher  of  That  Sedl,   made  no  Secret 
of  their  Dodtrine  to  Parmenides,  a  Man   of  an  illuftrious  Family 
and    ample  Fortune    at  Elea   in   Liicania.     Parmenides   had   been 
before  inftituted  in  the  Knowlege  of  Nature  by  Xenophanes,   who 
then  lived  at  Zancle  in  Sicily:    and  he  is   faid  to  have  attended 
the  Ledlures   of  that  Philofopher  there,    (as  it  was  but  a  fhort 
Voyage  from  Elea  to  Zancle,)  until  he   became  acquainted  with 
Diocetas  above-mentioned  ;   whom  he  took  into  his  own  Houfe 
at  Rlea,  together   with  Aminias,  who    in    all  probability    was    a 
Pythagorean  alfo ;   efpecially,  if  what  is  reported  of  him  be  true, 
that  His  Advice  and  Arguments  determined  Parmenides   never   to 
engage    in   Public    Affairs.      From    thenceforward    thefe    Three 
Philofophers  led  the  Pythagorean  Life  together,   in   a  Community 
of  Studys,  and  of  all  external  Commoditys.     This  Circumftance 
in  the  Life  of  Parmenides  correfponds   to   what  is   by  Some   re- 
ported oi  Xenophanes,  that  he  was  a  Pythagorean  himfelf  at  firft, 
and  lived  in  Community  with  Parmenifcus  and  Orejiades  •■,  but  that 
he  afterwards  quitted  their  Society,    and  proceeded  to  fpeculate 

6  on 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  S7 

on  Nature  by  Himfelf  in  his  own  Way.  And  this  Report  con- 
cerning Xcnophancs  is  confirmed,  and  made  highly  probable,  by 
the  Agreement  of  His  Philofophy  with  That  of  the  Pythagoreans, 
in  the  General  Reprefentation  which  it  gave  of  Nature  :  for  in 
Both  was  taught  the  JJnity  of  all  things ; — in  Both,  the  Principle 
of  this  Unity,  TO'  'EN,  The  One;— in  Both,  the  EJfejice  of  this 
One,  hoyo^,  vSi  Ka)  (p^snio-/;,  Reajon,  Mind,  and  Wifdoni.  That  this, 
was  the  Dodlrine  of  Pythagoras,  is  clear  from  Porphyry's  Life  of 
that  Philofopher  :  and  that  it  was  no  lefs  the  Dodtrine  of  Xeno- 
phanes,  may  be  fairly  gathered  out  of  Cicero,  Laertius,  and  Sextus 
Empirictis. — But  whoever  v/as  the  immediate  Mafler  oiParmenides, 
in  the  Pythagorean  Dodtrine  of  Nature,  this  great  Philofopher  of 
JE/t'tf  feems  to  have  flrengthened  the  Foundation  of  it,  by  con- 
fidering  the  Mind  of  Nature  as  the  only  True  Being,  —  The  One 
imj7iovable, — the  fole  Principle  and  Caufe  of  everlafting  Stability  and 
Samenfs  to  all  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  ;  and  the  fole 
Fountain  to  all  Particular  Minds,  of  their  Ideas.  For  thefe  Ideas 
of  Theirs  are  no  other  than  their  mental  Perception,  Intelligence, 
or  Apprehenfion,  of  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  which  are  in 
Nature.  As  therefore  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  are  ever  the 
fatne  in  Nature,  the  fame  alfo  are  the  Ideas  of  them  in  Human  Minds, 
thro  all  fucceflive  Ages.  On  good  Grounds  therefore  Parmenides 
-feems  to  have  imagined,  or  rather  we  may  fay  to  have  divined,  that. 
Whatever  was  the  Immediate  Caufe  of  our  Ideas,  and  whatever  was 
their  Nature,  they  owed  \h.z\x  Immutability,  and  ^)c\t'n  Samencfs  in  all 
Particular  Minds,  to  the  fame  Principle  and  Primary  Catfe,  to  which 
were  owing  the  Conjlancy  and  everlafting  Samenefs  oi Nature  in  all  her 
ordinary  Produdlions.  It  mufl  be  confeffed  however,  that  the  more 
ancient  Pythagoreans  appear  to  have  philofophifed,  no  lefs  than 
the  Eleaticks,  concerning  the  Species  and  the  Kifids  of  natural 
Things  :  which  Kinds  and  Species,  or  rather  our  Ideas  of  them> 
they  termed  Monads.  They  confidered  them  as  leading  to  the 
Knowlege  oi  Univ erf al  Nature ; — feeing,  that   in  This  all  thofe 

Kinds 


S8  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  are  comprehended  j— and  to  the 
Knowlege  alfo  oi  Nature  s  Caufc ;  which  they  juflly  prefumed  to 
be  One  all-forming  Mindt  —  One  Great  Idea,  in  which  the 
o-Treg^aTixol  Ao'701,  ot  Embryo  Forms  of  All  things  were  included,— 
One  all-efficient  Soul,  pregnant  with  the  Powers  and  Virtues  of 
every  Kind  of  Being,  to  which  it  imparts  Soul  or  only  Life. — 
But,  as  fome  very  important  Points,  relative  to  thefe  Pythago- 
rean Monads,  are,  foon  after  the  Paffage  now  before  us,  brought 
into  Queflion,  —  Points,  which  have  been  litigated  ever  fmce, 
and  remain  unfettled  to  this  day, — it  may  not  be  improper  to 
affign  the  reafon  of  thofe  Names,  by  which  they  are  now  com- 
monly called.  Genus  and  Species;  and  at  the  fame  time  to  give 
fome  account  of  their  Natures,    io  far  as   all  Partys  are    agreed 

concerning  them. It  cannot  be  doubted,  but  that  Men  always 

have  obfcrved,  of  the  Beings  around  them, — as  well  of  Thofe 
which  move  freely  from  Place  to  Place,  as  of  Thofe  which  are 
fixed  by  Nature  to  one  Spot  of  Ground, — that  they  live  and^ 
flourifh  only  for  a  time  j  and  that,  whilfb  Some  of  thefe  Beings 
are  perifhing,  or  decaying.  Others  of  them  are  rifing  into 
Form,  or  growing.  They  muft  alfo  always  have  obferved,  that 
thefe  New  Beings  refetnbled  the  Old  ones,  from  the  Seeds  of 
v/hich  they  were  generated  or  fprang,  in  the  outivard  ix.x\xQ.wxQ 
of  their  Frame,  in  the  vijible  Difpofition  of  the  Parts  of  thaf 
Frame,  and  in  the  apparent  Powers  and  Ufes  of  thofe 
Parts.  They  muit  have  always  knoivn  and  dijiiytguiped  thefe 
Beings,  Some  from  Others,  by  certain  charaSleriJiic  Features, 
which  are  continued  the  fame  from  Generation  to  Generation. 
For  different  Features,  Figures,  and  Appearances,  continued  on 
thus  for  ever  with  the  fwie  Differences,  evidently  denote  different 
Sorts  of  Being.  Now  thefe  different  -Sor/j  o/'iJw/g-,  thus  eafy  to 
be  diflinguiHied  by  the  Eye,  the  Pythagoreans  termed,  in  a  pccu- 
Jiar  and  eminent  Senfe,  o/j;,  Forms,  (a  Word,  derived  from  uSay, 
/.o  fee  ;)   becaufc  their 'Z'^y'/'/Vf  Fi-r;;/,  or  Afpcd,  Ihows  at  frjl  fght, 

io 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.'  89 

to  all  Perfons  who  have  before  feen  any  Others  oi  ftmilar  Form, 
to  What  Sort  of  Beings  they  belong,  and  from  What  Race  they 
are  defcended. — An  Oak-Tree,  for  inftance,  fprung  from  an  Acorn, 
refembles  not  only  The  Oak,  that  produced  The  Acorn  from 
which  it  fprang,  but  alfo  all  Other  Oaks,  fo  greatly,  as  to  be 
known  at  Jirjl  Sight  to  be  an  Oak,  by  every  Perfon  who  has 
obferved  the  conflant  Differences  between  Oaks  and  Other  Trees, 
in  their  external  and  fuperficlal  Form.  The  Difference  between 
One  Oak  and  Another,  in  the  Height  or  Largenefs  of  the  Tree, 
or  in  the  Size,  Intervals  and  Number  of  its  Branches  or  of  its 
Leaves,  never  occafioned  any  Perfon  to  miftake  an  Oak-Trce 
for  a  Tree  of  fome  Other  Sort.  The  Form  therefore,  peculiarly 
belonging  to  an  Oak,  being  conflantly  and  invariably  the  Same 
in  All  Oaks,  was  called  by  thofe  Philofophers  the  e^Tos  of  an 
Oak.-— — In  a  few  Ages  after  That  of  Pythagoras,  the  Grecian 
Philofophy  travelled  to  Rome,  affumed  a  Rofnan  Garb,  and  fpake 
the  Latin  Language.  In  this  Language,  every  fuch  ^tTos  or 
Form,  as  we  have  juft  now  endeavoured  to  delineate,  —  every' 
Form,  common  to  Many  Individual  Beings,  to  All  of  the  fame 
Sort,  and  of  a  Jimilar  Appearance, — took  the  Name  of  Species ;  a 
Name  given  to  it  with  the  fame  Propriety,  with  which  in 
Greece  it  bore  the  Name  of  eiS'oi ;   the  Word  Species  being  derived 

from  the  old  Latin  Word  Jpecere,  to  behold. Thus  much  for  the 

Ttxxx\  Species',  and  thus  much,  at  prefent,  as  to  the  Nature  of 
thofe  everlafting  Forms  or  Beings,  to  which  That  Name  is  now 
generally  given.— — As  to  the  Other  Name,  given  by  the  Pytha^ 
goreans  to  their  larger  Monads,  That  of  yivQi,  or  Kind,  we  pre- 
mife,  after  the  fame  manner  in  which  we  began  our  account  of 
Species,  that  Men  in  all  Ages, — fuch  Men  as  made  Obfervations, 
ever  fo  flight,  on  thofe  Produdions  of  Nature,  which  occurred 
daily  to  their  Eyes, — muft  have  obferved  farther,  of  thofe  &H, 
thofe  Species  or  Forms  of  Natural  Things,   (Each  of  them  common 

M  .  to 


90  PHILEBUS. 

to  7nany  Individual  or  diftind  Beings,)  that,  tho  they  differed 
outwardly,  or  to  the  Eye  of  Senfe,  One  Species  from  Another, 
yet  Several  of  them  were  alike  accompanied  by  feme  unfeen  Poiver 
•within  them,— ra  Po'wer,  which  enabled  fuch  Individual  Beings, 
as  were  inverted  with  certain  Specific  Forms,  to  perceive  Sen- 
fible  Objeds  around  them,  and  to  move  of  Themfelves  from 
Place  to  Place,  Some  on  Earth,  Others  in  Water,  and  Others  in 
the  Air.  Appearing  therefore  to  operate  alike  within  them  all, 
fo  as  to  beget  in  them  a  Capacity  of  perceiving  external  Ob- 
je£\s,  and  a  Capacity  of  Self-Motion,  (tho,  in  Beings  of  different 
Species,  with  different  Degrees  of  Motion  and  Perception,)  it 
could  not  but  appear  to  be  One  and  the  Same  invifible  Power,-— 
an  inward  Principle  of  Senfe  and  Local  Motion, — a  Principle,  every 
where  called  Anima,  that  is,  Soul.  And  thence  the  Beings,  which 
partook  of  it,    were  called  Animals,    as  having  Each  of  them  an 

Anima,  or  Soul. Men,   who  were  difpofed  to  make  fuch  Ob- 

fervations,  mull  have  alio  taken  notice  of  feveral  Other  Beings, 
produced  by  Nature,  differing  in  their  &S'i\,  Species,  or  outward 
Forms,  and  all  of  them  apparently  void  of  Soul,  but  all  of  them 
agreeing  with  all  the  Species  of  Animals,  in  having  a  Power 
within  them,  as  invfible  as  Soul ; — a  Power,  which  enables  them 
to  receive  Nourijhment,  and  thence  to  grow,  or  encreafe  in  Size, 
and  in  the  Virtues  refpedlively  belonging  to  their  feveral  Species; 
(unlefs  their  Growth  be  obllruded  by  fome  Accidental  Caufej) 
but  which  Power  gives  them  not  thofe  Capacitys  of  Perception 
and  Self-Mction,  with  which  Animal-Forms  only  arc  endued.  — 
This  Power  in  them,  this  Principle  of  their  Growth,  was  com- 
monly called  Life,  and  all  thofe  Species  of  Being,  which  were 
obferved  to  partake  of  this  Power  only,  and  not  of  Soul  alfo, 
were  called  fimply  (fura,  Vegetables,  or  Sprouts  oi Nature. — Thus  it 
was  difcovered  by  ordinary  Obfervation,  that  all  the  ^coa,  ox  Living 
Things,  with  which  Man  is   acquainted,   are   divifible  into  Two 

Sorts, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  91 

Sorts,  efji.-^v^a  and  a-^u^x,  that  is,  into  Such  as,  beJidesLife,  par- 
take of  Soul,  and  Such  as  partake  of  Life  oiily,  and  not  of  Soul; 
each  Sort  being  Ow,  comprehending  Majiy  diftinift  Species ',  in  the 
fame  manner,  as  each  Species  is  One,  comprehending  Ma?iy 
diftin<Sl  Individuals. — We  mention  thefe  Two  comprebenfi-ve  Sorts  of 
Being,  the  Animal  and  the  Vegetable,  as  an  undifputed  Inftance  of 
different  Beings,  the  Effential  Difference  between  which,  tho  ob- 
vious to  be  marked,  lyes  deeper  than  the  Difference  between 
their  Outward  Foiins. — In  Each  of  them  there  appears  to  be  a 
Series  of  regular  Gradations, — in  the  Animal  Sort,  rifing  to  Souls 
Rational,— in  the  Vegetable,  or  meerly  Vital,  defcending  to  Minerals 
ox  Foffils ;  for  Thefe  alfo  (in  their  native  Beds)  feem  to  partake 
oi  Life. — But  to  fettle  the  Bounds  oi  Soul,  or  thofe  oi  Life,  in 
the  feveral  Species  of  Being,  is  foreign  to  the  prefent  Subjedl. 
Thus  much,  however,  we  may  fay  with  Propriety,  as  well  as 
with  Certainty, — that  different  Degrees  of  Life,  Self-Motion,  and 
Perception,  diftinguifli  different  Sorts  of  Being; — that  Each  of  thefe 
Sorts  is  One,  apart  by  its  Self,  and  diftin(5t  from  Others ;  — 
and  that  in  Each  of  thefe  Ones,  Many  Species  or  different  Out- 
ward Forms  are  comprehended. — Now  to  thefe  larger  and  more 
comprehenfive  Ones  or  Monads,  which  are  diflinguifhed,  each  from 
others,  by  a  different  Degree  of  fome  internal  Power,  apparent 
only  from  its  Effefts,  —  (a  Power,  which  it  communicates, 
thro  each  of  its  Species,  to  the  multitude  of  Individuals  in 
thofe  feveral  Species, — )  to  thefe  Monads  the  Pythagorean  Phi- 
lofophers  gave  the  Name  of  'yivt\.  Kinds ;  and  the  Romans  after 
them,  accordingly,  the  Name  of  Genera  ; — Names,  which,  in  a 
proper  Senfe,  fignlfy  diftindt  Familys,  defcended  from  Ojie  com- 
mon Ancefor,  like  fo  many  Branches,  fprouted  forth  from  One 
common  Stock  ; — Tribes  alfo,  in  Each  of  which  are  comprehended 
Many  fuch  out-fpred  Familys-, — and  Nations  alfo  or  People,  Each 
comprehending  Many  .vich  Tribes^    The  Names  therefore  of  yivt^ 

M  2  and 


92 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


and  Genera  were,    in  a  figurative  Senfe,  applied  to  thofe  compre- 
henfive  Sorts  of  Being  j   becaufe  every  One  of  them,   like  a  large 
and  widely-extended  F^/;;//k,  "Tribe,  ox  Nation,  is  diftinguirtied  from 
Others,   not    thro  any   external  Marks,    vifible  to  Senfe, — but  by 
being  known,  thro  Reafon  and  Experience,  to  contain  Many  fub- 
ordinate  0?:es,   of  Kin  to  each  other,    thro   fuch   a  Community  of 
Kind,  as   it  were  a  Rife  from  One  Root  in  Nature,   common  to 
them  All. — Such  feems   to  have  been  the  Origin,  and  fuch  the 
Meanfng,  of  the  Terms  Genus  and  Species,   when   they  are  ufed 
in  a   philofophical  Senfe,   or  applied   to  the  Forms  produced  by 
Nature.       Only   a   little   more   remains   neceffary    to   be   faid   on 
this  Subject  J  and  we  fliall  refume  it  in  the  fame  way,  in  which 
we  began  and  proceeded. — After  that  Men  in  all  Ages,    fuch  Men 
efpecially  as   were  given  to  make  Obfervations,  had  once  beguji 
to   fpeculate  concerning   the   Species   and    the  Kinds   of  Natural 
Things ;    (for    now    that    we    have    explained    the  philofophical 
Meaning  of  thefe  Terms,  we  fliall  not  fcruple  to  ufe  them   in 
that  Senfe,-) — when  they  had  obferved  of  many  Individual  Beings , 
—of  Such   as  were  diftinguiflied,  one  from  another,  not  by  any 
effential  and   confiant  Marks,    and    only    by  Differences  afterwards 
termed   accidental,  —  that  they  wore  One  and   the  Same  Specifig 
Form,  in  viewing  which  Form  all   thofe  little  Diflindions   were 
difregarded,  funk  and  loft ; — ^when  alfo  they  had  obferved,   that 
many  different  Species  were  of  One   and  the   Sa7ne  Kind,   in   coti- 
fldering  which  Kind  all  Difference  between  them  difappeared ; — 
they  were   naturally    led   to^  carry  their  Speculations    farther   on 
Both   thofe  Points.      In   making   nicer  Obfervations   on    the   va- 
rious Produdlions  of  Nature,  and  on  the  more  minute,  yet  con- 
ftant  and  everlafling.  Differences  of  Form  in  thofe  Produdions, 
they    increafcd   the    Number    of  Forms   Specific:     what    they    at 
firft  looked  on  as   a  peculiar  Species,  which   admitted  no  effential 
Difference  between   the  Individuals  that  partook  of  it,  they  per- 
ceived. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  93 

celved  to  have  the  nature  of  a  Genusy  or  general  Kind,— in  this 
refpedl,  that  'twas  common  to  tnany  different  Species:  and  after- 
wards, on  nearer  and  nicer  infpedtion,  difcovering  every  one  of 
thefe  different  Species  to  be  divided  into-  }na7iy  Subordinate  Specier, 
or  to  contain  different  Forms,  the  Same  always  from  generation 
to  generation,  and  always  with  the  Jhme  Specific  Difference  from 
each  other,  they  called  thefe  Forms  jnore  Jpecial ;  and  to  Thofe; 
which  comprehended  thefe,  they  gave  the  Name  of  Genera,  or 
Kinds,  with  regard  to  the  Species  contained  in  them,  and  the 
Name  of  Species  ftill,  with  regard  to  the  Kinds,  in  which  they 
were  theml'elves  contained.  As  Children  firfl  diftinguifh  Birds 
from  other  j4nima/s,  by  their  Flight,  the'w  Wi?2gs  and  Feathers  : 
afterwards,  by  degrees,  they  acquire  the  Knowlege  of  the  feveral 
Species  of  Birds ;  they  learn  to  diftinguifh  Hawks  from  Doves, 
&CC.  while  only  Men,  from  Study  or  Experience,  know  the  dif- 
ferent Species  of  Hawks,  and  thofe  of  Dt>ves,  6cc.  —  But  the 
amufing  work  of  diflributing  the  Forms  of  Nature  into  proper 
Claffes,  according  to  Genus  and  Species,  the  Pythagoreans  and 
Eleaticks  feem  to  have  left  to  the  curious  SpeSiators  of  outward 
Forms,  To  Such  Objeds  (however  beautiful  be  their  AfpeEl,  of 
however  wife  contrivance  be  their  Frame,  and  however  good  the 
Fnds,  to  which  their  Frames  are  fitted,)  thofe  Philofophers  pre- 
ferred the  Study  and  Contemplation  of  an  Objed:'  by  far  the 
faireft,  noblefl,  and  mofl  divine.  Nature  s  Self;  deeming  lefTer 
Objedls  unworthy  of  their  View  or  Attention,  farther  than  as 
ufeful  and  perhaps  neceffary  for  the  Diredtion  or  Guidance  of 
Men's  Minds  to  the  Knowlege  of  the  JJnivetfe,  or  Whole  of  Tubings. 
For  they  contemplated  77'^  ^//,  to  '^a.v,  z%  One  Thing,  ov  Being, - 
sv  ov,  involved  in  whofe  Principles  lye  all  the  Kinds  and  Species- 
of  Things ;  which  from  thofe  Principles,  as  from  their  Root,, 
arife,  flioot  forth,  and  are  expanded.  They  viewed  it  alfo  as 
tlie  Great:  Whole,  tv  oAqv,  whofe  PartSi  taken  together,  contain. 
1  tha 


94 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Protarchus. 
Do  you  mean  fuch  Portions,  as  This, — that  I  Pro- 
tarchus,   who    arn    by    nature    One  Perfon,    am   alfo 

the  numbcrlefs  Individuals  of  all  thofe  Kinds  and  Species.  They 
confidered,  that  from  the  Subjiance  of  the  Univerfe,  all  thole 
Individuals  derived  the  Subjiance  of  their  Particular  Beings  j  — 
that  into  That  Subjlajice  Lhiiverfal,  when  they  fell  to  pieces,  all 
their  Parts  returned  and  were  refohed;  and  that  out  of  thefe 
Fragments  of  Being,  new  Beings  continually  were  compofed, 
framed  and  formed,  by  an  all-efficient  all-forming  Caj/Je  in 
Nature, — fieiu  Beings, — yet  ftill  t/je  fame  in  their  Kinds  and  Species^ 
endued  with  the  fame  Degrees  of  Life,  the  fame  Kinds  of  Souh 
the  fame  Limits  of  Reafon,  and  the  fame  over-clouded  Minds, 
with  the  Beings  which  preceded  them.  —  Hence  they  argued, 
that  from  this  Great  Caufe,  thus  full  of  ever-adive  Virtue,  and 
thus  for  ever  energifing  in  the  fame  way,  all  Beings  received, 
not  only  their  outward  Forms,  and  inward  Frame  of  Parts,  but 
alfo  whatever  Kind  of  Soul,  or  Degree  of  Life  was  in  them  ;  in 
a  word,  all  the  Pavers  and  Capacitys,  whether  aSlive  or  pajive, 
with  which  they  were  feverally  endued  :  and  hence  they  argued 
farther,  that  this  Caufe  of  all  things  was,  Himfelf,  Univerfal 
Life,  Univerfal  Soul,  and  Univerfal  Mind-,  imparting  Himfelf,  and 
his  own  eternal  Forms,  together  with  the  Powers  which  attend 
them,  vital,  aSlive,  fentient,  and  intelligent,  in  various  Degrees,  ta 
all  the  Parts  of  Nature.  So  that,  according  to  thofe  great  Phi- 
lofophers,  the  right  Theory  of  Nature,  and  of  Nature's  Forms,  is, 
at  the  bottom,  a  Theory  of  Mifid,  a  Theory  of  One  and  Many, 
Same  and  Different:  and  thefe  Principles  oi Mind,  and  of  Mental 
Forms  eternal,  are  alfo  the  Principles  of  Nature,  and  of  Her 
ever-lajling  Forms,   the  Species  and  the  Kinds  of  Things. 

Many  ? 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  95 

Many  ?  and  fuch  as  thefe  Others, — that  my  Self,  and 
other  Perfons  the  reverfe  of  Me, — the  Great  alfo  and 
the  Little,  the  Heavy  and  the  Light,  are  One  and  the 
Same  ?  with  a  thoufand  Pofitions  more,  which  might 
be  made,  of  like  Kind  ? 

Socrates. 

The  Wonders,  O  Protarchus !  which  You  have  now 
fpoken  of,  relating  to  the  One  and  Many,  have  been 
hackneyed  in  the  Mouths  of  the  Vulgar  ;  but  by  the 
common  agreement,  as  it  were,  of  all  men,  they  are 
now  laid  alide,    and   are   never  to  be  mentioned  ^' : 

for 

'-  It  was  obferved  in  Note  50,  that  the  Difquifition,  now 
upon  the  carpet,  concerning  One  and Ma?iy,  is  introduced  for  the 
fake  of  unfolding  the  nature  of  Mind.  And  this  Purpofe  it  na- 
turally effeds  J  becaufe  Mind,  confidered  as  unmixed  with  Bodjy 
and  confequently  as  unconneded  with  Senfe,  is  ^vltq  Intelligence -, 
and  the  only  Objedis  of  pure  Intelligence  are  thofe  Intelligible 
Beings,  Genus  and  Species,  or  every  One  and  Many.  And  hence 
it  is,  that  Mind,  being  the  Highejl  Genus,  or  the  Fir/I  One  and 
Many,  is,  in  its  Self,  its  own  primary  and  proper  ObjeSl,  in 
which  all  other  Intelliglbles  are  comprehended.  For  Mind  its- 
Self,  confidered  as  Intelligeiit,  is  the  intelligent  Cojnprehenfion  of  thofe 
higher  Genera,  in  which  are  included  all  the  fubordinate,  quite 
down  to  the  loweji  %  and  in  which  loweft  are  virtually  contained 
all  ftj^jj,  or  Forms,  as  well  the  more  as  the  lefs  Specific 
Rightly  therefore  does  Flato  begin  this  Inquiry,    by  tlirowing 

I  out 


9^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


for  they  are  confidered  as  childifli  and  eafy  pbjec- 
tions,  and  great  Impediments  alfo  to  Dialedic  Rea- 
foning  on  the  Subjecl.  —  'Tis  now  alfo  agreed,  never 
to  introduce  into  Difcourfe,  as  an  Inftance  of  One 
and  Many,  the  Members  or  Parts,  into  which  any  fingle 
Thing  may  be  confidered  as  divilible.  Becaufe,  when 
a  Refpondent  has  once  admitted  and  avowed,  that  all 
thefe  \_Members  o?^  Parts~\  are  That  One  Thing,  which 
is  thus  at  the  fame  time  Many^  he  is  refuted  and 
laughed  at  by  his  Queflioner,  for  having  been  driven 
to  aflert  fuch  monftrous  Abfurditys  as  thefe, — that  a 
Single  One  is  an  Infinite  Multitude,  —  and  an  In- 
finite Multitude,    only  One  ". 

Protarchus. 

■out  of  the  way,  as  foreign  to  the  Subjed,  all  thofe  Things, 
which  are  not  Objedls  of  the  Mind,  but  meerly  of  the  Seyifis 
or  Imagination ;  —  in  the  firft  place,  all  Individual  PerfonSy 
whether  confidered  fingly,  or  compared,  Each  with  Other  j 
—in  the  next  place,  all  thofe  Attributes,  which  belong  only 
to  Things  Corporeal,  fuch  as  their  Magnitude,  and  their  Senjible 
Slualitys,  compared  with  Thofe  of  other  Things  of  \}citfame  Species; 
and  laftly,  all  Wholes,  confifting  of  Parts,  none  of  which  are, 
themfelves,  diftinft  Beings,  —  Parts,  infinite  in  Number  j  — and 
fuch  a  Whole  is  every  Individual,  or  diflindl  aVia,  whether  Ani- 
mate or  Inanimate,  the  Siihjiance  of  which,  or  the  Siibjlratum  of 
whofe  Form  is  Matter;  becaufe  Matter,  if  not  adlually,  yet  in 
thought  or   imagination  at  leaf!:,    is  injinitely  divijible. 

53  The  Abfurdity  of  reprefenting  the  Body  of  any  Animal,  and 
its  Members,  as   an  inftance  of  One  and  Many,    is   heightened  by 

confidcring 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  97 

Protarchus. 
what   other  Things    then,    not  hackneyed  among 
the  Vulgar,   nor  as  yet  univerfally  agreed  on,   do  you 
mean,   O  Socrates  I   relating  to  this  Point  ? 

Socrates. 
I  mean,  young  Man  !  when  a  Thing  is  propofed  to 
be  confidered,  which  is  One,  but  is  not  of  the  Num- 
ber or  Nature  of  Things  generated  and  periftiable  ^^. 
For  as  to  the  Ones  of  this  latter  Sort,  'tis  agreed, 
as  I  juft  now  faid,  to  reject  them,  as  unworthy  of 
a  ferious  confutation  -^     The  Ones,    which   I  mean, 

arc 

confiderlng  the  Members  themfelves,  not  as  Memk'rs,  but  as 
Parts  only,  of  the  Boify  to  which  they  belong :  becaufe  as  in- 
tire  Members  or  Limbs,  they  are  noty  what  they  are  as  Corporeal 
Parts,  —-  that  is,  inji/jite  in  Number.  Accordingly,  Plato's  own 
words,  in  the  firft  part  of  this  Paragraph,  are, — />ig'Aw  xal  a^a  jjii^r) 
•—Members,  ivhich  at  the  fame  time  are  Parts,  &c. — But  we  have 
tranflated  the  words  y.iK-n  and  jlc?^>}  disjimBively ;  fo  as  to  com- 
prehend, not  only  all  Animals,  whofe  Members  are  dijjimilar  and 
heterogeneous,  but  alfo  all  other  Things  Individual  and  Corporealy 
whofe  Parts  are  fimiiar  and  homogeneous  j  following  herein,  as  we 
apprehend,  the  Intention  of  our  Author,  rather  than  his  Words ; 
as  indeed  we  generally  do,  when  a  literal  tranflation  would  not 
fully  and  clearly  exprefs  his  Meaning. 

5*  This  excludes  all  Lidividuals  of  every  Kind  and  Species. 

55  That  is,  when  they  are  propofed  in  converfation,  as  In- 
Jian-ces  of  Things   which   are,    Kach   of  them.    One  and  Many, 

N  whether- 


98  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

are  fuch  as  Man,  Ox,  Beauty,  Good  ^\  When  Thefe^ 
or  Such  as  thefe  ^\  are  prapofed  for  Subjeds  of  Debate, 

much 

whether  they  are  propofed  as  ObjeSiions  to  the  Truth  of  the 
Doftrine,  or  as  Exceptions  to  the  IJniverfality  of  it  j — and  whether 
they  are  meant  to  try  the  Ingenuity  of  the  Refpondent,  in  'dif- 
tinguiiliing  rightly  between  thefe  falfe  Inflances  and  the  triiey 
—or,  as  the  Sophijis  meant  them,  to  fliow  the  Propofer's  own, 
Knowlege  and  Skill  in  making  the  right  Diflindlion,  and  to  ex- 
pofe  the  Ignorance  of  Such  as  wanted  that  Skill ; — or  whether 
with  a  view  of  guarding  the  Dodlrine  againft  Error,  Fallacy, 
and  Mifapprehenfion  ;  and  indeed  this  lafl  feems  to  have  been 
the  laudable  Defign  of  Zeno  the  Eleatick,  who  firft  taught  the 
Art   of  detefting  all  Sorts  of  Sophifms. 

5*  Of  the  Four  Inflances,  here  brought,  the  fj-J}  Two  are  ta- 
ken from  among  fuch  Species,  as  admit  of  no  Divifion  into  any 
Jubordinate  Species,  and  are  divifible  only  into  Individuals:  and 
and  the  latter  Two,  (in  the  Greek,  to  kolKov,  and  Tclya.^oy,)  arc 
the  Chief  among  fuch  Univerjals,  as  are  moft  properly  fo  termed. 
Such  as  extend  to  ^/l  things,  and  of  which  All  the  Works  of 
Nature  participate,  whatever  be  their  Kind  or  Species.  For  the 
Charm  oi  Beauty  \^  fpred  over  all  the  Face  oi  Nature ,  thro  the 
Order  and  Harmony  of  all  its  Parts ;  and  the  Power  of  Good  is 
infujcd  into  all  Beings,  by  means  of  their  mutual  Fitnejs,  for  the 
Supply  of  each  other's  Wants. 

5'  In  the  Meaning  of  thefe  Words  are  included  &11  thofe  Species 
and  Kinds  of  Things,  v.'hich,  in  the  Order  of  Univerfality,  lye 
between  For7ns  the  mofl:  Specific,  fuch  as  Man,  and  Ox,  (for,  witli 
relation  to  their  feveral  Individuals,  thefe  Forms  are  alfo  Univerfals), 
and   thofe  abj'ohite  Univerfals,   fuch   as  Beauty  and  Good,  which 

accompany 


PHILEBUS.  99 

much  ferious  Attention  is  given  them  ;  and  when  they 
come  to  be  divided,  any  One  of  them  into  Many,  much 
Doubt  and  Controverfy  arife. 

Protarchus. 
Upon  what  Points  ? 

Socrates. 
In  the  firft  place.    Whether  fuch  Unitys  5*  fhould 
be  deemed  to  have  true  Being  ^'.     In  the  next  place, 

How 

accompany  the  Principles  of  the  Unlverfe,  penetrate  the  inward 
Effences  of  all  Beings,  and  pervade  all  outward  Nature. 

5^  Thefe  Monadsy  fo  termed  by  the  Pythagoreans  (as  appears 
from  Plutarch:  de  Placit:  Philos:  L.  i.  C.  3,  and  from  the  Anony- 
mous Life  of  Pythagoras  in  Photius,)  are  here  by  Plato  termed 
ivdt^ei,  becaufe  in  Each  of  them  Ma?2y  meet  and  are  united.  In 
the  next  Sentence,  however,  the  Pythagorean  Term  is  made  ufe 
of. — They  were  named  MovoLS^a,  either  becaufe  they  lye  in  the 
(Human)  Mind,  v-cnTctfjiovai,  feparately  ^si^fmgly ;  or  becaufe  Each 
of  them  always  ^k^vh  remaifis  That  One  which  it  is. 

59  Democritus  held,  that  the  only  Things  which  were  true,  (or 
had  True  Being,)  were  Atoms  and  Vacuum.  This  we  are  told  by 
Sexfus  Empiricus,  pag:  399,  Edit:  Fabricii.  And  to  confirm  it, 
he  cites  the  following  words  from  that  great  Philofopher's  own 
Writings, — sV*  xara  a'A«S"«ar  ra  aro^a  fioivv,  xou  to  xeroV.  What 
Democritus  meant  by  True  Beifig,  will  be  inquired  into  on  a  fitter 
occafion.     But  his  manner  of  expreffing  himfelf  in  That,    and 

N  2  fuclv 


100 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S, 


fiich  other  Sentences  of  his,  feems  to  have  given  the  firft  occa- 
fion  of  q^ueflioning  the  Reality  of  Things  Univerfal.  For  then 
began  the  Controverfy,  flated  by  Porphyry  in  thefe  words,  —  Trggl 
•yivMV  t£  Jtal  €iSuy,  6<t£  v(pi(^vx£i',  etrS  iv  fji.6va.ii  -^iXxii  iTrivolcm  xarou. 
Whether  they  have  real  Siibjijlencey  or  ivhether  they  have  their  place  in 
nicer  Notions  only.  Porphyr.  I/agog.  Cap.  i.  This  Controverfy 
lafted,  until  Rehgious  Faith  put  an  End  to  all  Philofophical  Doubts 
and  Inquirys.  New  Controverfys  of  a  different  Kind  then  fuc- 
ceededj  and  the  only  Subject  of  thefe  was  the  Meaning  of  fe- 
veral  Articles  of  that  Faith.  And  when  thefe  Controverfys  were 
fifenced  by  the  prevailing  Party,  armed  with  Power  to  fupprefs 
all  Oppofition  ta  its  own  Decifions,  the  Ghojl  of  Philofophy  arofey 
and  in  his  Train  appeared  the  Shadows  of  old  philofophic  Con- 
troverfys ;  for  the  ruling  Powers  permitted  no  free  or  fair  In- 
quiry into  the  Foundation  of  'Truthy  or  the  Principles  of  Things, 
—Inquirys,  which  are  the  Life  and  Soul  of  Philofophy,  rightly  fo 
called.  Accordingly,  in  thofe  days,  the  Followers  of  Dr.  ^o-^^ 
'D'untze,  oiMerton  College  in  Oxford,  (commonly  called  Duns  Scotus,) 
and  the  Followers  oi  William  of  Okehatn,  were  divided  on  this  very 
Subjed,  —  whether  JJniverfal's  were  Real  Beings,  or  whether  they 
were  only  Names,  and  denoted  nothing  but  what  was  meerly 
notional.  Creatures  of  the  (Human)  Mind. — A  Difpute  fomewhat 
llmilar  to  This,  happened,  toward  the  Clofe  of  the  laft  Century, 
between  Mr.  Locke  and  Bp.  Stillingfleet .  —  And  Difputes  of  this 
Kind  never  will  have  an  End,  till  it  be  fettled  and  agreed. 
What  is  True  Being,  and  What  is  the  Efience  of  Mind  and  Reafonr 
for  till  then  it  cannot  be  afcertained,  whether  any  and  what- 
Share  of  True  Being  is  to  be  allowed  to  Entia  Rationis -,  or  whe- 
ther the  Truth  of  Being  belongs  noti  rather,  to  Them  only,— 
to  Such  of  them,  we  mean,  as  are  the  Same  in  Evoy  Mind. 

How 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  lor 

How  it  is,  that  thefe  Monads,  every  One  of  them 
being  always  the  Same,  and  never  generated,  nor  ever 
to  be  deftroyed,  have,  notwithftanding,  One  and  the 
Same  Stability,   common  to  them  all  *°.     And  laftly, 

Whether 

^°  This  Second  Queftion  fuppofes   the  F/rJi  Queftion  decided, 
in   favour  of  the  True  Being  of  the  Monads.     For,   if  Univerfcils 
are  held  to  be   only  Names,   invented   to   denote    unreal  Fancysy 
or  faftitious  Notions,   it  is   trifling   and    idle  to  inquire,    whence 
they  derive  Stability  j  This  being  an  AffeSlion,  or  Property,  of  ReaV 
Beings  only, — unlefs  it  be  as  meerly  nominal,  notional,  or  fantajlic,. 
as  thofe  Things  are,  to  which  it  is  attributed. — The  Sentence^ 
now  before  us,  in  the  Greek  is  printed  thusj —  Tras  aZ  raimxi,. 
fjilxv  t%ae^w  eaccv  ccet  mv   auT«;',   xai  ^>jTg  yeveaiy  fjinre  oAi^i^ov  Tr^oa- 
S'ixofA.iiw,  o/xeoi  ma,i  /SgjSa/oTWTa  fj-Mv  tolvtyw.     The  Greek  Text  muffc 
here  be  faulty;  and  to  make  good  Senfe  of  it,   'tis  neceflary  to 
make  a  fmall  alteration  or  two, — by  reading  l-^f^eiv  inflead  of  &mt,. 
and  ^  a.\jTfiv  inflead   of  rauTm-     In  tranflating  this  PafTage,   we^ 
have  prefumed,   it  ought  to  be  fo  read;   and  the  Meaning,  in- 
tended to  be  conveyed  by  it,  we  fuppofe  to  be  This ; — "  it  muit 
"  needs  feem   ftrange,    that  difiinSi  Beings,   not  generated.   Some' 
*'  of  them   by  Others,  but  All   equally  eternal,   without  Inter- 
*'  community  or  Interchange  between  them,  fliould,  neverthelefs, 
"  have  one  and  the  fame  Nature,    That  of  Monad  or  Unity,  and' 
*'  one  and  the  fame  Property  of  their  Being,  That  oi  Stability. "-~^- 
In   this  place,   the  Queftion  is  only  ftated,    and  the  Reafon  of" 
Doubting    fhown :     but    the  Doubt   is    eafily    folved,    and    the' 
Queftion   anfwered,.  on  the  Principles  of  that  Philofophy,  which* 
we  are  endeavouring  to  illuftrate,   becaufe  it  feems  to  illuftrate^ 
all  Nature.     For  it  follows  from  the  Principles  of  it,  laid  down' 


i02 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


whether  we  fhould  fuppofe  every  fuch  Monad  to  be 
difperfed,  and  fpred  abroad,  amongft  an  Infinity  of 
Things  generated  or  produced,  and  thus,  from  being 
One,  to  become  Many ; — or  whether  we  fliould  fup- 
pofe it  to  remain  intire,  its  Self  by  its  Self  ^',  feparate 
and  apart  from  that  Multitude.  But  of  all  Suppofi- 
tions,  This  might  appear  the  moft  impofTible,  that 
One  and  the  Same  Thing  fhould  be  in  a  fingle  One 
and  in  Many,  at  the  fame  time  ^%     Thefe  Points,   O 

Protarchus  ! 

in  this  Dialogue,  that  all  the  feveral  Monads  of  different  Orders, 
that  is,  all  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things,  whether  more  or 
lefs  general  or  fpecial,  derive  their  Beings  from  Otie  its  Se/f, 
the  great  Mind  of  Nature,  by  the  Pythagoreans  called  emphati- 
cally The  Monad  ; — and  that  in  this  Mind,  being  Univerfal, 
They,  being  all  of  them  Univerfals  alfo,  tho  of  different  Extent 
and  Comprehenfivenefs,  lye  as  it  were  inveloped ;  and  confe- 
quently  are  exempt  from  all  Motion,  Alteration,  and  DefVrudlion. 

*'  In  the  Greek  we  here  read,  —  aJruV  awTMS  %w^/?-  But  'tis 
prefumed,  that  we  ought  to  read, — aviw  i(^'  aJw  X'^^^^' 

*-  If  the  Monads,  fo  much  fpoken  of  in  the  time  of  Socrates, 
fliould  have  been  admitted  to  have  both  a  friie  and  a  JiaMe  Being, 
by  any  Difputants  who  were  unacquainted  with  the  Ground  of 
their  Reality  and  Stability,  for  the  fake  only  of  a  thorow  In- 
quiry into  their  Nature,  in  that  Age  of  philofophical  Inquirys, 
—  a  Third  Queflion  is  then  afked,  the  right  Anfwer  to  which 
muft  put  an  End  to  all  Doubts  concerning  the  Nature  of  the 
Monads, — Where  is  their  Place  of  Refidcnce  ?  or.  Where  are 
they  to  be  found  ? — And   the  firil  Doubt,  which,  in  confidering 

tills 


PHILEBUS. 


103 


this  Queftion,  naturally  occurs  to  all  Minds  uninformed  in  the 
Tr'mciples  of  'Tbings,  is  This,  —  Whether  the  Monads  exifl:  only 
in  Outward  Nature,  that  is,  in  the  refpecftive  Individuals  of  eacli 
Kind  and  Species, — either  by  being  divided  amongfl:  them,  (as 
it  muil  be  fuppofed,  if  every  Individual  is  only  participant 
of  fome  Species  and  of  fome  Genus,)  or  by  being  multiplied 
into  Many,  (which  muft  be  the  Cafe,  if  in  Each  Individual  be 
found  the  ivhole  in  tire  Species  and  Kind,  to  which  it  belongs,) — 
or  whether  they  are  feated  only  in  the  Human  Mind,  being  placed 
there  by  her  Self,  thro  a  Power  which  flie  has  of  colleding 
the  Images  of  thofe  fcattered  Individuals  into  Jeparate  Ajfemblages, 
according  to  their  Agreements  and  Difagreements ; — or  elfe,  whe- 
ther each  Monad  exifts  in  a  Multitude  of  Individuals,  at  the  fame 
time  that  the  Whole  of  it  hath  its  Seat,  apart  from  thofe  Indi- 
viduals,   and  alone    by  its   Self,    in   the  Human  Mind. That 

there  is,  in  Nature,  fome  invariable  Caufe  of  That  invariable 
Agreement  between  all  the  Individuals  of  their  refpedlive  Kinds 
and  Species,  cannot  be  doubted  by  any  Perfon,  who  knows  that 
no  Thing  exifts  without  an  adequate  Caufe  of  its  being  What  it 
is.  Neither  can  any  fuch  Perfon  doubt  of  there  being,  in  all 
Human  Mi?ids,  fome  One  uniform  Caufe  of  That  confant  Uniformity 
in  them  All,  thro  which.  All  of  them  in  the  fame  Manner,  and 
with  equal  Facility,  tho  not  perhaps  with  equal  Quicknefs,  affemble 
together  and  unite  iWj;?)' Individuals  in  One  Species,  and  Ma?iy  Species 
in  One  Genus. — Now  it  is  moft  certain,  that  the  Human  Mind  is  not 
the  Caufe  of  any  Similitudes,  or  Agreements,  between  the  Individuals. 
Nor  is  it  lefs  certain,  that  the  Individuals  themfeives  are  not  the  Caufe 
of  their  own  Union,  or  even  of  their  Afj'emblage,  in  the  Human 
Mind. — The  Platonic  Philofophy  profefies  to  obviate  this  Doubt,  by 
teaching,  that  the  Caufe  of  all  the  Similitudes  and  Agreements  be- 
tween Individuals,  in  Outward  Nature,  is  the  Caufe  alfo  of  their 
Aifemblage  and  of  their  Union,  in  Human  Muds ; — that  this  Com- 
I  nioa 


I04  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

raon  Caufe  of  Both  Is  The  OneM/Wand  5o«/of  the  Unlverfe,  fram- 
ing AWThifigs  together,  fitted  to  each  Other',  framing  the  Organs  of 
Senfi',  in  All  Animals,   fitted  to  Outivard  Things,    fo   as    to  tranf- 
mit  all  necejfary  Notice  of  them  to  the  Seat  of  Seiifation;  framing 
the   fairy   Grounds   of  Imagination,    fitted   to  receive,    hold,   and 
retain  their  Images ;  framing  the  deep  Cells  of  Memory,  fitted  for 
Her  Office,    which   is    to    roi{/i   thofe   Images    from   their   dark 
Dormitorys,    and    call   them   up   to   be  reviewed  when  Occafion 
offers ;  endowing  alfo  Some  Beings,  over  and  above  Others,  with 
Powers   to  fi:gregate,  congregate,  and  unite  thofe  Images,  that  is, 
with  Minds    fitted  to   the  Monatls :  —  by  teaching  farther,   that 
thefe  Monads  have  their  true,   their  fiable,   and  eternal.  Being,  in 
pure  Mind  alone.   The  Mind  of  Univerfal  Nature,  whofe  Ideas  they 
are,   and  in   whom   they   are  pure,  and  unmixed  with  Body  :— 
that  the  Refemblances  of  thefe  Ideas  are  formed  in  Matter  by  the 
Prefence  of  That  Great  Mind  throughout  Matter,   inverting  every 
Portion  of  it  with  fuch   a  Form,   that   is,    with  the  Refemblana 
of  fuch  an  Idea,  as  That  Portion   of  Matter  is  pre-difpofed  to 
receive  :    (for  pre-difpofed  it  is,  in  fome  certain  way,  by  its  being 
the  Relicks  or  the  Corruption   of  fome  preceding  Form,  which  is 
departed ;  or  by  its  being  the  Flower  and  Farina  of  fome  elder 
Form,  which  is  ftill  living,  and  arrived  at  its  Maturity :) — that 
the  Images  of  thofe  Outward  Forms,    with    which   Matter  is  in- 
vefted,   entering  into  Himian  Imaginations,  are   there  aflembled  in 
fiparate  Parcels,   according  to  their  Similaritys  and  DiJJimilaritys ; 
aifemblcd  thus  dijlinSlly  by  tl've  Human  Mind,   thro  her  Power  of 
feeing  the  Samenefes  and  the  Differences   of  Things ;    (a  Power, 
This,  ejfential  to  her  Nature ;  becaufe  SameneJ's  and  Difference  are 
the  Principles   of  all  her  hitelligence   and  Knowkge,    whatever  be 
the  Objedts  of  itj) — and  that   the  Came  Mind,    afterwards,  com- 
bines together  and   unites   the  Similar  Images,   thro  that  unifying 
Power,  which  alfo  is  effcntial  to   her  Nature,  for  that  She  her 

Self 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         105 

Self  Is  a  Monad. — Thro  thefe  her  native  Powers  it  is,  (accord- 
ing to  this  ancient  Dodrine,)  that,  in  beholding  Each  of  thole 
diJlinSl  Affcmblagest  fhe  fees,  arifing  in  her  Self,  the  Idea  of  a 
Species,  from  which  all  Accidental  Differences  are  excluded ;  — 
and  that,  whilft  flie  beholds  together  all  congenial  Species,  there 
is  at  once  prefented  to  her  the  Idea  of  a  Genus,  in  which  all 
Specific  Differences  difappear ;  tho  they  are.  All  of  them,  in  that 
Genus  virtually  contained. — Thro  the  fame  comprehending  and 
unifying  Powers  it  is,  that,  by  degrees,  flie  comes  to  view 
within  her  Self  the  larger  Monads,  the  more  general  Ideas ;  to 
contemplate  even  her  Self,  and  her  own  Being,  in  which  all  her 
general  Ideas  are  united:  the  Human  Mind  may  therefore  pro- 
perly be  called  her  own  mojl  general  Idea,  or  the  Idea  of  all 
her  Other  Ideas ;  thefe  being  feen.  All  of  them,  in  One,  feen  in 
her  Self,  thus  found  to  be  a  Monad.  —  Hence  it  may  appear, 
that,  tho  the  Human  Mind  feems  to  forrn  or  create  her  own 
Ideas  Special  and  General,  by  comparing  together  Things  more 
or  lefs  fimilar,  and  hy  overlooking  or  not  attending  to  their 
Diflimilaritys,  yet  She  no  more  creates  them,  than  fhe  creates 
her  Self;  and  that  her  feeming  Powers  of  creating  are  only,  in 
reality,  her  Powers  of  energfing,  dormant  in  her,  till  awakened 
and  roufed  by  Outward  Objedls. — The  original  and  eternal  Seat 
therefore  of  all  Ideas  can  only  be  That  Univerfal  Mind,  which  is 
never  dormant,  but  for  ever  is  and  mufl:  be  in  Energy.  For, 
confidered  in  his  own  fimple  Effence,  abfraSlcd  xdyu  from  the 
Univerfe  which  he  fills,  and  from  the  Matter  of  it  which  he 
forms.  He  himfelf  is  Wifdom,  the  aSlual  IntclleBion  of  Himfelf, 
that  is,  of  the  fair  Ideas,  involved  in  the  prolifc  Unity  of  his 
Effence  J  and  aSlual  Intelledlion  is  the  Energy  of  IntelleB  : — con- 
fidered, as  he  is  the  Efficient  Caufe  of  all  Outward  Forms,  crea- 
ating  them  after  thofe  his  own  fair  Ideas,  it  is  evident,  that  he 
never  ceafes  operating,  from  the  never-ending  Effeds  of  his  Opera- 

O  tion  : 


io6         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

tion  :  —  and  confidered  again,  as  being  •within  every  Particle 
of  Matter,  and  intimately  frefent  to  every  Living  Fornix  fup- 
porting  it  in  Being  for  a  convenient  time,  and  healing  the  Breaches 
made  in  it  by  Mifchance,  he  is  the  E?iergy,  the  Life  and  the 
Soul  of  the  pr/jok  World;  the  Fountain  of  all  Particular  Souls  and 
Lives,  with  their  blind  or  unconfcious  Energys ;  the  Fountain 
alfo  of  all  Particular  Minds,  with  their  Ideas,  and  all  their 
Energetic  Powers, — namely,  the  Power  of  perceiving  thofe  Ideas, 
and  their  Relations  to  each  other,  —  the  Power  of  comparing, 
joining,  and  dividing  them, — the  Power  of  raifing  up,  or  difcover- 
ing.  Some  by  the  means  of  Others, — and  the  Power  of  compre- 
hending and  uniting  all  of  them  in  her  Self.  —  Thus  is  to  be 
folved  the  Doubt„  or  Queftion,  propofed  in  the  Sentence  now 
before  us  i  and  the  feeming  Abfurdity,  mentioned  in  the  latter 
Part  of  it,  is  thus  to  be  reconciled  to  Truth  and  Nature.  For 
every  Genus,  and  every  Species  of  Things,  is,  in  the  Divine  Mind, 
each  of  them,  a  Monad,  its  Self  by  its  Self,  feparate  and  apart 
from  the  Multitude  of  its  Kefemblances  or  Copys  in  Outward  Na- 
ture, to  all  of  which  it  is  the  fole  Original. — By  thefe  Copys 
the  Monad,  the  Ideal  Form,  is  as  it  were  tnultiplied:  but,  as  it  is 
multiplied  in  Matter,  —  a  Subjedl,  not  only  in  its  Self  incapable  of 
perfeB  Form,  but  alfo,  in  many  Particles  of  its  Mafs,  (the  Dregs 
and  Drols  of  fome  prior  Forms,)  repugna?it  often  to  the  Ad- 
miffion  of  any  new  Form,  or  rcfufing  to  affimilate  and  unite 
with  any  Neighbour-Form  to  which  it  is  conveyed, — it  becomes 
like  a  fine  Pidlure,  copied  upon  a  rough  Ground,  and  with  coarfe 
Colours ;  the  Daubing  fatisfies  only  vulgar  Specftators,  who  never 
faw  better  Painting. — In  the  Human  Mind,  the  Idea  returns  again 
to  \\%  Monad-Nature ;  tho  ftill  falling  fliort  of  Perfedion;  be- 
caufe  it  is  there  mixed  with  fome  (at  leaft)  of  thofe  Corporeal 
Images  from  iinthout,  by  which  it  was  firft  excited  in  that  Mind. 
Notwithftanding  which  impure  Mixture,  it  proves  fo  fair  a  Copy, 
\  as 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  107 

as  to  have  been  miftaken   for  an  Original  by  Some  Perfons  who 
pafs  for  Connoijeurs.     Indeed,  the  more  that  a  Human  Mind  is 
converfant  with  abJlraSl  Science,  which  rejeds  thofe  Images,  the 
nearer  Approaches  do  her  Ideas  make   toward  Purity  and  Perfec- 
tion,— toward  an  exa£i  Likenefs  of  their  true  Originals.     For  every 
Particular  Mind  partakes  of  the  Whok  Eflence  of  Vniverfal  Mind, 
from  whom  fhe  is  derived :  but,  being  derived  into  Body,  the  Ac- 
tivity of  her  Powers  is  fupprefled  ;   and  flie   is,  at  firft,   only  in 
Capacity,   what  the  Fountain-Mind  is   in  "Energy,   that  is,   contem- 
plative of  her  own  Ideas,   and  operative  outwardly   according  to 
thofe  Ideas ;    thefe   being    the    only  Patterns   fhe    has,    to  copy 
after  in  her  Works,    and    the   only  Rules   fhe  has,   to   direct  her 
Operations. — In  fine,  to  conclude  our  fummary  Comment  on  this 
PafTage,  regarding  the  Seat  of  thefe  Monads,  the  Kinds  and  Species 
of  Things,  —  it   appears,  that  the   original  Monads,   and  the  Two 
feveral  Sets  of  Forms,    copied  from  them,    the  Corporeal  and  the 
Mental,  muft  have  Three  different  Seats,  where  they   feverally  re- 
Jide,  fuitable  to  their  different  Natures :  —  that   the  Seat  of  the 
Originals  is  Inivard  Nature,  or  the  True  Intelligible  World,  Univer~ 
fal  Mind;  in  whofe  Unity  all  thefe  Monads  are  eternally  touted: — 
that  the  Seat   of  their  Corporeal  Copies  is  Outward  Nature,    or  the 
Senfibk  World,  the  Image  of  the  Mind  within,  impreffed  on  Mat- 
ter ',  thro  the  emanant  Virtue  of  which  Mind,  this  Vifible  World 
is  a  Whole,    and   all  the  Parts  of  it,    th"o  inceflantly  interchanged 
in  their  Forms,  are  everlajii?igly  held  together : — and  that  the  Seat 
of  the   Mental  Copies   of  the  original   Monads  is   the  World  of 
each  Particular  Mind,  opening  to  Each  of  us  gradually,  as  our 
Reafon  travels  on,    by  the  Light  of  Intelledl :    but   that  the  Seat 
of  what  are  now  commonly  called  Our  Ideas,   (which  ought   to 
be,  and  by  nature  are,  true  Copies  of  the  Original  and  true  Monads) 
is  the  World  of  Imagination  and  Opinion ;  a  Private  World,  to  every 
Man  /?is  own;  a  World,  whofe  Parts  are  all  unconne^ed,  without 

O  2  any 


io8         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus !  which  regard  Such  Inftances  as  I  have 
mentioned,  and  not  Such  as  were  mentioned  by  You, 
they  are  Thefe,  which,  for  want  of  being  rightly  fet- 
tled, create  all  the  Difficultys  and  Doubts  we  meet 
with  in  Dialectic  Inquirys,  but  when  once  they  are 
fettled  rightly,  they  clear  the  Way  with  Eafe. 

Protarchus. 
Then,  it  {eems,  we  are  to  labour  thefe  Points  firfl. 

SOCRATE  s. 

I  fliould  think,  we  ought. 

Protarchus. 
And   that  We    confent  to   it,    you    may    take    for 
granted, — all  of  Us  here.     Philebus   indeed   'tis    beft 
perhaps,  at  prefent,  not  to  difcompofe,   by  afking  him 
Queftions,  now  that  he  is  quiet. 

any  fixed  "Bounds,  and  without  any  Principle  of  Unity  or  Stabilityy 
—until  our  Minds  rcSfify  their  wrong  Opinions,  and  ejlablijh  on 
a  firm  Foundation  fuch  as  are  rigJjtj  by  frequently  withdraw- 
ing from  the  Objedls  of  Senfe  that  croud  the  Fancy,  and  from 
the  Din  of  Rumours  that  fiun  the  IJnderJlanding,  to  vifit  the  Re- 
gions of  Science ;  where  all  is  ftill  and  quiet ;  and  where  every  Idea 
is  for  ever  fettled,  diftindl  and  clear;  being  inlightened  by  That, 
which  throws  Light  on  all  intelligible  Things,  That  intel- 
Itftual  Sun,  in  whom  the  Fountains  of  Being,  of  Identity^  and 
of  Diverfity  are  all  united. 

Socrates, 
I 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         109 

Socrates. 
Very  well :  but  in  What  way  fliall  we   begin  the 
DIfcuflion  of  thefe  Points,  in  fo  wide  a  Field  of  Con- 
troverfy  ?    Shall  we  begin  thus  ? 

Protarchus. 
How? 

So  CRATE  Si 

We  fay,  in  fpeaking  of  thefe  Monads,  (Each  of  which 
is  One,  but  on  a  Logical  Examination  of  it,  appears  to 
be  divifible  into  Many,)  that  they  run  throughout 
every  Sentence  in  our  Difcourfe,  every  where  and 
always  ^^ ;    and  that,  as  their  Being  fhall  never  have  an 

Endy 

^3  On  this  PafTage  we  can  give  no  better  Comment,  than 
what  Mr.  Harris  has  written  in  his  Hermes,  B.  3,  Ch.  3.  concerning 
Words,  the  Symbols  of  general  Ideas :  to  which  therefore  we  refer 
every  Reader,  who  is  inquifitive  into  the  Truth  of  Things,  re- 
prefented  by  JVords  in  every  Language  j  and  fhall  only  add  This 
Obfervation,  —  that,  zltho  Particulars  are  often  the  Subjedls  of 
our  Difcourfe,  yet,  in  every  thing  we  Jay  of  them,  we  ufe  General 
Terms  j  appealing  to  thofe  General  Ideas,  which  are  the  fame  in 
the  Minds  of  All  men,  of  the  Speakers  and  of  Thofe  to  whom 
they  ipeak  :  for  'tis  only  thro  general  Ideas,  that  the  Hearers  can  un- 
derftand  What  Relations,  ^alities,  ABions,PaJfio7is,  or  extrinfic  Cir- 
cumjiances,  are  attributed  to  the  Particular  Perfon  or  Thing,  fpoken- 
of. — The  Reader  is  here  defired  to  take  notice, — that  in  this  Note^ 
and   elfewhere,    by  General  Ideas  we  mean  all  Ideas  commonly 

called 


no         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

find,  fo  neither  does  It  firft  begin  in  the  prefent  age  ^*. 
Now  this  perpetual  Attendant  upon  all  Speech  pro- 
ceeds, as  it  feems  to  Me,  from  Something  immortal 
and  undecaying  within  our  Selves  ^^  And  hence  it  is, 
that  the  Youth  every  where,  when  they  have  thus  had 
a  Tafte  of  it,  are  overjoyed  at  their  having  thus  found 
a  Treafure  of  WIfdom.  Tranfported  therefore  with 
the  Delight  it  gives  them,  they  apply  it  to  every  Subject 
of  Difcourfe  :  fometimes  they  colledl  Particulars  from 
all  Quarters,  and  roll  them  into  One ;  then  they  unroll 

called  Vynverfdi  comprehending  Ideas  Special,  as  well  as  Thofe 
which  are  General,  and  Thofe  alfo,  which,  not  being  li- 
mited to  any  One  Species  or  Genus  of  Things,  deferve  to  be 
alone  fliled  Vniverfal :  to  one  or  other  of  which  Three  Orders 
belongs  every  Idea  in  our  Minds:  for  oi Individuals  we  have  only 
Images  iu  our  Imaginations. 

*■'■  This  perhaps  is  added,  to  prevent  any  Perfon  from  fivr- 
mifing  it  to  be  a  new  Creation,  or  even  a  new  Difcorjery  of 
Zef2o's. 

®i  Meaning  t/je  Mind.  For  Speech  is,  for  the  mort:  part,  an 
Exhibition,  or  outward  Difplay,  not  of  Images  in  the  Fancy,  but 
of  Ideas  in  the  Mind,  which  are  Copies  of  Tubings  eternal.  And 
even  thefe  Originals  of  our  Ideas  may  very  properly  be  faid  to 
be  within  us  -,  inafmuch  as  they  are  the  Ideas  of  That  great 
Mind,  whofe  intimate  Prefence  to  Our  Minds  continues  their 
Being ;  preferves  to  them  their  Principles  of  Samenefs  and  Dif- 
ference united ;  and  fupports  their  Powers  of  feeing  Ma}iy  in  One^ 
and  One  in  Many. 

them 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  Ill 

them  again,  and  part  them  afunder  ".  After  having, 
in  this  way,  puzzled  Themfelves  in  the  firfl  place, 
they  queftion  and  puzzle  the  Perfon  next  at  hand,  whe- 
ther he  be  their  Equal  in  Age,  or  Younger  than 
themfelves,  or  Older,  iparing  neither  Father  nor  Mo- 
ther, nor  Any  one  elfe  who  will  attend  to  them, 
fcarcely  other  Animals,  more  than  Man ;  it  is  cer- 
tain, they  would  not  exempt  Any  who  fpeak  a  Foreign 
Language  only,  could  they  but  find  fomewhere  an  In- 
terpreter ^\ 

Protarchu&» 

**  Sec  Note  62,  not  far  from  the  beginning. 

*7  This  Paflage,  on  a  flight  reading  of  it,  feems  to  mean  no- 
thing more  than  This,  —  to  rally  the  Athenian  Youth  on  That 
contentious  Manner  of  difcourfing,  and  that  immoderate  Love 
of  arguing  and  difputing,  with  which  the  Logick  of  Zeno,  then 
newly  introduced  into  Athens,  had  infpired  them;  —  a  Manner 
and  Difpofition,  of  like  Kind  with  thofe  which  have  been  often 
obferved  of  Young  Logicians  in  Modern  Univerfitys. — But  on  a 
little  carefull  examination,  the  Whole  PafTage  will  be  found  to  have, 
befide  this  jocofe  Raillery,  a  ferious  and  philofophic  Meaning. 
It  will  be  found  to  convey  thefe  Truths,  —  that  General  Ideas 
are  not  peculiar  to  Perfons  who  philofophife,  nor  to  Nations 
which  are  civilifed  or  enlightened  3  and  that  no  lefs  do  they 
attend  the  unlettered  Vulgar  and  \X\t  Savage : — that  they  neither 
firfl:  come  into  the  Human  Mind,  when  her  Facultys  arrive  at 
their  Maturity;  nor  depart,  when  thofe  Facultys  decay;  but  that, 
as  they  are  ejfential  to  all  Mind,  (for  What  is  Mind  without  Ideas  f) 
they  fpring  up  naturally  in  every  Mind,  as  foon  as  the  Rational 

Soul 


112         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 

Do  you  not  fee,  O  Socrates !  how  numerous  we  are, 
and  that  All  of  us  are  Young  ?  and  are  you  not  afraid, 
that,  if  you  rail  at  us,  we  fliall  All  join  Philebus,  and 
attack  you  jointly  ?  However,  (for  We  apprehend  your 
Meaning,)  if  you  can,  by  any  Means  or  Contrivance**, 
ealily  rid  us  of  thefe  Perplexitys,  which  hinder  the 
Progrefs  of  our  Inquiry,  and  can  devife  fome  better 
way  of  managing  the  Argument,  do  You  but  give  your 
Mind  to  the  profecution  of  it,  and  We  (hall  do  our 
utmoft  to  follow  and  attend  you.  For  the  prefent 
Debate  is  of  no  trifling  Concern,  Socrates  ! 

Soul  begins  to  energife;  at  lateft,  a  little  fooner  than  Speech  is 
formed  and  iflues  from  the  Mouth.  For  General  Ideas  may  be 
£aid,  in  a  metaphorical  Senfe,  to  be  the  Souls  of  all  Human  Speech  : 
from  Them,  much  more  than  from  Senfible  Images,  it  is,  that 
Articulate  Sounds,  the  SiibjeSl -Matter  of  Speech,  receive  their 
Form  or  Meaning :  and  thro  Them  it  is,  that  the  Meaning  paffes 
from  One  Mind  into  Another. — A  Hint  alfo  is  given,  in  a  Part 
of  the  PalTage  now  before  us,  that  Novices  in  Philofophy  are  apt 
to  imagine  Some  Brute  Animals  not  totally  void  of  General  Ideas. 
—The  Satyric  Humour  which  appears  in  this  PalTage,  and  the 
grave  Meaning,  couched  under  that  Appearance,  were,  we  find 
from  what  Protarchus  fays  next,  Both  of  them  difcerned  by  the 
young  Gentlemen  of  the  Lyceum,  Auditors  of  the  Converfation. 

t. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  113 

Socrates. 
Indeed  it  is  not,  Children  I  as  Philebiis  called  you. 
No  better  Way  then  is  there,  nor  can  there  be,  than 
That,  which  I  am  always  a  great  Lover  of'^'^;  but 
often  before  now,  it  has  flipt  away  from  my  Sight, 
and  has  left  me,  as  it  were,  in  a  Defcrt,  at  a  Lofs 
whither  to  turn  me. 

Protarchus. 
Let  us  but  know,  What  Way  you  mean. 

*^  In  the  Greek, — jwjj^aijf, — perhaps  alluding  to  a  Device,  fome- 
times  ufed  by  the  bell  'Tragic  Poets  of  Greece.  For,  when  their 
Ingenuity  was  at  a  Lofs,  how  to  difentangle  the  Perplexitys  of 
their  Plot  or  Fable,  by  any  ordinary  and  Human  Means,  they 
introduced  the  Perfon  of  fome  Deity,  appearing  in  the  Scene 
gV  jw>);^ai'n«,  (that  is,  by  fome  fuch  Piece  of  Machinery,  as  hath 
been  exhibited  on  our  modern  Stage  in  many  of  our  Pantomimes  {) 
cither  to  unfold  thofe  Intricacys  of  the  Drama,  occalioned  by  the 
Mifapprehenfions  and  Errors  of  the  principal  Perfons  therein,— 
or  to  bring  about  a  Cataftrophe,  not  to  be  accomplifhed  without 
fome  Divine  Interpofition, — or  to  pacify  and  filence  all  Partjs, 
by  announcing  the  Will  of  Heaven.  —  In  this  Theatrical  Senfe 
the  Word  /w«;:^a,i'/!  is  ufed  by  Plato  in  his  Cratylus,  pag:  425.  But 
our  chief  Reafon  for  thinking,  that  he  meant  an  Allufion  to  it 
in  the  place  now  before  us,  is  This, — that  he  is  here  aftually 
preparing  to  introduce  True  Divinity,  as  the  only  Means  of  clear- 
ing  away  the  prefent  Difficultys   about  the  Monads. 

<'9  The  W~ay,  which  the  Philofopher  means,  is  the  ajcending 
to  the  Principles  of  All  things. 

P  Socrates. 


114  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
To  point  out  the  Way,  is  not  very  difficult ;  but  to 
travel  in  it,  is  the  moll  difficult  of  all  things.  For 
all  fuch  human  Inventions,  as  depend  on  Art,  are,  in 
this  Way  '%  difcovered  and  laid  open,  Confider  then 
the  Way,  which  I  am  fpeaking  of ''. 

Protarchus. 
Do  but  tell  it  us  then. 

Socrates. 
A  Gift  of  the  Gods  to  Human  Kind  ^%    (as  appears 
plain  to  Me,)    it  was  of  old  brought  from  Heaven,   by 
fome  Prometheus  ",    along  with  a  Fire    the   moft  lu- 
minous. 

'^°  For  the  only  Way  of  explaining  any  TVorh  of  Art  fully 
and  clearly,  is  to  lliow  the  Pri?iciples  of  their  ConJlruBion.  And 
the  only  right  Way  of  teaching  any  Art,  is  to  begin  from  the 
'Principles  on  which   the  Art  is  founded. 

"'  Thefe-  re-iterated  Delays  in  Socrates  are  evidently  intended 
to  augment  the  Curiofity  of  his  Audience,  and  to  heighten  their. 
Expedlations  of  fomething  very  important. 

7^  What  is  fliid,  in  Plato's  Timeus,  pag:  47,  of  Philofophy  in 
general,  that  'twas  a  Prefent  from  the  Gods  to  Human  Kind,  feems 
to  be  here  faid  particularly  of  that  Bafs  of  Philofophy,  the  Doc- 
trine of  the  Principles  of  the  TJniverfe,  which  are  the  fame  with 
thofe  of  Mi?id. 

73  The  fabled  Prometheus  is  faid  to  have  brought  down  fire  from 
Heaven,    to   animate   the  Man,   whom  he   had   made   of  Mud  or. 

Clay ; 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S.  ir; 

minous  "*.  From  the  Men  of  ancient  Times,  Men, 
better  than    We    are,    and    dwelling    nigher    to    the 

Gods, 

Clay ;  that  is  the  Human  Body,  compofed  (as  Clay  and  Mud  are) 
from  the  Elements  of  Earth  and  Water. — Concerning  the  allego- 
rical Prometheus,  fee  the  next  Note. 

7+  We  prefume,  that  the  Lummous  Fire,  here  fpoken  of,  means 
the  Fire  truly  Mtherial,  the  immediate  Seat  of  Mind  -,  —  That 
Fire,  which  is  termed  by  the  Stoicks  voi^lv,  Intelleclive ;  and  by 
Heraclitus,  Sretov,  Divine,  (p^ewT^es,  the  Vehicle  ofWifdom,  and  Koynov, 
pregnant  with  the  xlyoi,  the  ejjential  Forms  (or  Ideas)  of  all  things, 
— In  the  Paflage  now  before  us,  it  is  evidently  implied,  that 
the  original,  principal,  and  proper  Place  of  this  Luminous  Fire  is 
Heaven,  or  the  Upper  Sky ; — an  Opinion,  which  has  in  all  ages 
every  where  prevailed.  For  All  7nen,  Barbarians  as  well  as  Gre- 
cians, fays  Arijlotk,  in  his  Treatife  de  Ccelo,  L.  r,  C.  3,  nov  aVw- 
Ta'rw   Tw   S-ft'ii)   ToVoc    diro^iS'oa.&i,    ajjign    the   highejl   Place    [in    the 

Univerfe]  tol'hat  ivhich  is  Divine. Agreeable  to  this  univerfally 

received  Opinion,  concerning  Heaven,  is  an  Account  of  the  alle- 
gorical Perfon  of  Prometheus,  given  us  by  Cornutus,  the  Stoic 
Philofopher,  in  his  Treatife  de  Natiird  Deorum,  C.  18,  apud 
Opufcula  Mythologica,  pag:  179;  and  by  Julian,  the  Platoniling 
Emperor,  in  the  Sixth  of  his  Orations,  where  he  explains  the 
prefent  PalTage  of  Plato.  For  according  to  Their  Interpretation 
of  this  Fable,  Prometheus  is  an  Allegorical  Perfon,  reprefenting 
That  divine  ir^ofxri^eicx.,  or  vr^^lvoicc,  which  forms  and  orders  the 
lower  Parts  of  the  Univerfe,  the  mutable  and  mortal;  continually 
creating  the  various  Forms  of  Bodies ;  and  difpenfing  to  the 
Bodies,  newly  created,  Lfe,  Soul,  and  Mind,  in  different  Portions, 
fuited    to    the    Capacity    of    each    Form.      The    more    ancient 

P  2  Theologer^, 


ii6  P    H    i    L    E    B    U    S. 

Theologers,  however,   the    Orphic,    feem  not  to   have   made    any 
Diftindtion   between  ras,  or  ixrnn,  and  ir^oioict,  or  7rpo^v!S-«a.     And 
we    muft   confefs    that    thefe    different  Names   are    very    properly 
given  to  One  and    the  '^wxi^  Supreme  Being;  but   they   are  proper 
in   different  rcfpeBs.      When    he    is    confidered    abjlra&edly  from 
Outward  Nature,    and    as   converfant   only   with   Things  Eternal, 
(the  fole  Objedls  of  pure  Mind,)  -n-^ovoia.  Providence,   or  Tr^o'/wnS-fto. 
Forethought,  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  Him  ;  becaufe  as  no  Eter- 
nal Things    are  pajl.   To  none   of  them   are  yet  to  come;   and    in 
pure  Mind   there  is   neither  a  before  nor  an  after,   but  all  Ideas 
are  «'«  ajua  xai  o'j.h,  together  ahvays  prefent.      On  the  other  hand, 
when   he  is  confidered  as  the  Creator  of  'temporary  Things,   His 
Being  is  prior   to  Their  Exigence  ;  His  Ideas,   confidered  as   the 
Orii^inals  and  Models  of  Their  Forms,   are  before  the  Copies ;  and 
his  Creative  Mind  is,   with  refped:  to   thefe  his  Creatures,    Fore- 
Thought,   Providence,   Contrivance,   and  Dejign. — Now  this  Divine 
Protnetheus,  being  ih.&  Soul  of  the  Univer-Je,  and  injpiring  into  [lower] 
Nature,    fays  Julian,    irviZua.  h^e^f^ov  a  Spirit  full  of  Warmth,  or 
warm  Life,   imparts  to  Animals,  Vegetables,  and  Foffls,   fo  much  of 
Soul,  or  of  meer  Iffe,  as  their  feveral  Frames  are  fitted  to  receive. 
But  fince,  in  lower  Nature,  only  the  organifation  of  the  Human 
Frame  admits  of  Mind,  only  to  Human  Beings  is  Mind  communi- 
cated,  in   -^V-sxiicXQ.  oi  ^\zt.  Mtherial  Subjlance,   which,    according 
to  Plato  and  Arijlotle,   is    the  firjl   and  fintji,    the   only  pure  and 
Jimple,   Body,    or  Corporeal    Form ;    and   is    therefore    the    fitteft 
of  all  Bodys  to  be  the  immediate  Vehicle  or  Seat  of  Mind ;  filling 
thofe  boundlcfs  Trafts  of  iEther,    which,  if  the   old  /Egyptian  or 
Eajhrn  Dodlrine   be    true,    are    peopled    with   Immortal   Beings, 
whole  Bodys  confift  of  that  Mtherial  Subjlajice,   and  whofe  Minds 
approach  neareft  to  i\\c  Supreme.. 

Gods, 


PHILEBUS.  117 

Gods  ^',    this  Tradition    of  it   hath   defcended   to  Us, 
— that  thofe  Beings,   faid  to  be  for  ever  ^'^,   derive  their 

EfTence 

75  We   apprehend,    that,    by    thefe  Better  Men,    thefe   ancient 
Inhabitants    of   the    mountainous  Parts    of  the   Earth,    (many   of 
which   rife  above  the  Clouds,)   our  Author  here  means  the  fame 
Perfons,  of  whom   he   writes   in   the  Beginning  of  his  Third  Book 
of  Laws,  —  Thofe,   who   efcaped    tlie  \aii  General  Deluge,   which 
had   laid   all    the  low  Lands  under  Water,    and   had  drowned  all 
their  Inhabitants.     For    thofe   few  Survivors  were,  as  Plato  with 
great   probability    there    fuppofes.    Such   as  led   the  Pafloral  Life 
on  the  bighejl  Downs,  and  with  the  natural  Produce  of  their  own 
■Flocks   fed   and  cloathed   their   own  Familys;  —  "  People,    fays 
He,  of  more  Simplicity  and  Candour,  more  Sobriety  and  Manlinefs, 
and  m.ortUniverJal  Jujlice,    than  the   prefent   Race   of  Men."  — 
Such  People  were   likely   to    preferve,    and    to    deliver    down    to 
their  poflerity   thofe   accounts    of  Beings,    either   Divine,     or   at 
leaft   fuperior   to  Human,    which   the  Philofophy   of  Ages,    prior 
to  the  Deluge,  had  difcovered  and  taught  the  World. — But  who 
elfe    may    poffibly    here    be    meant,    fee     in    the    latter    Part    of 
Note  78. 

7^  By  thefe  Lnmortal  Beings,  may  be  meant  either  thofe  invi- 
fible  JEtherial  Beings,  mentioned  in  Note  74,  or  elfe  thofe  lijible 
Celejlial  Bodys,  (as  they  are  commonly  called,)  the  Sun,  toge- 
ther with  the  Planets,  primary  and  fecondary,  and  alfo  the  Fixt 
Stars;  all  of  which  in  Greece  at  that  time,  and  indeed  all 
along  from  the  time  oi  Orpheus,,  were  vulgarly  deemed  to  have. 
Each  of  them,  a  dijlindi  Intelligence  or  Mind,.  Whichever  of  thefe 
Two  is  Plato's  Meaning  in  this  Sentence,  it  may  well  feem 
ftrange,  that  he  fliould  derive  the  Nature  of  the  Monads  or  Ideas,. 
•J  of. 


ii8         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Effence  from  One  and  Many  "^ ;   and   therefore   have, 
in    ThemfelveSj    Bound    and    Infinity,    connatural    to 

them  : 

of  which  he  is  now  dilcourfing,  (Beings  not  intelligent,  but  in- 
telligible,) from  the  fame  Principles,  from  which  the  ancient 
Tradition,  here  perhaps  referred  to,  derived  the  Nature  of  thofe 
intelligent  Beings  immortal  and  undecaying. — But  we  fliall  ceafe 
to  wonder  at  this,  if  we  confider,  that  an  exad:  Analogy  muft 
always  fubfift  between  all  intelligent  Beings,  (of  whatever  Order,) 
and  their  Ideas.  The  fame  degree  of  Purity  or  Perfeftion,  which 
they  have,  Themfehes,  the  fame  will  be  in  their  Ideas:  for  in 
proportion  to  the  Grofsnefs  or  Finenefs  of  the  Bodys,  with  which 
they  are  inverted,  will  their  Ideas  be  more  or  lefs  accompanied 
or  mixed  with  corporeal  Images,  and  confequently  will  be  more 
or  lefs  imperfeSl ;  becaufe  Matter,  one  of  the  Principles  of  Body, 
admits  not  of  perfeSl  Form;  and  becaufe  no  Particular  Minds, 
(Minds,  in-je/ied  with  Bodys,)  can  have  any  Knoivlege  of  any  Thing 
out  of  Them/elves,  but  thro  corporeal  Images.  To  this  argument 
it  may  be  added,  that  Being  Intelligent  and  Being  Intelligible  are 
not  only  Correlatives,  but  are  fo  in  their  very  EJfences ;  Neither 
of  them  can   be  at   all,    without  the  Being  of  the  Other. 

"7  That  all  particular  Minds,  even  thofe  of  the  Higheft  Order, 
derive  the  Nature  of  their  Beings  from  One  and  Matty,  is  moft 
certain.  For  whatever  Particulars  ftand  together  in  the  fame 
Rank  of  Being,  they  partake  of  One  and  the  Same  Univerfal ', 
and  all  Uni'verfality  fuppofes  Unity,  or  Onenefs,  as  a  Principle  of 
Things.  On  the  other  hand,  \{  Multitude  were  not  originally  in 
Nature,  as  another  Principle  of 'Things,  there  could  be  no  Parti- 
culars of  any  Univerlal  ;  becaufe  every  Particularity  infcrrs  an 
indefinite  and  a  polfible  infinite,  Multitude  of  the  Kind.  —  This 
3  Argumentation 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  119 

them  ^*  : — that,  being  in  the  nriidft  of  Things  fo  con- 
ftituted  as  they  are,  we  ought  to  fuppofe  and  to  feaich 
for  fome  One  Idea  in  every  Thing  around  us  ;  for  that, 
lince  it  is  there,   we  fliall  on  fcarching  be  fure  to  find 

it: 

Argumentation  not  only  relates  to  thofe  /Ethereal  Beings  before 
mentioned,  (Such,  as  are  termed  by  Proclus  voi^oi  S-goi  IntelkBive 
Deity s,^  and  to  Such  al fo,  as  are  their  ObjeSls,  (thofe  eternal 
and  divine  Ideas,  termed  by  the  fame  Proclus  vomo\  S-eo)  hitelUgible 
Divi?2itys,) — but  'tis  applicable  no  lefs  to  the  Heavenly  Bodys,  vilible 
to  the  Eye  of  Senfe,  —  to  all  Such  of  them,  at  leaft,  as  feem 
to  be  of  the  fame  Nature,  —  the  Sun  and  the  Fixt  Stars.  For 
Thefe  have,  according  to  the  Orphic  and  Pythagorean  Docftrine,. 
as  it  is  reported  by  lamblichiis  de  Vita  Pythag:  C.  28,.  N°,  151, 
ncc  -TravT^  t«V  (pueriy  xa.]  tw  (jf-opip-nv  ofj.oixv  a  Nature  and  a  Shape,  like 
to  That  of  the  Univerfe ;  that  is,  they  are  Mtherial  in  their  EJfence- 
or  Nature,  and  Round  in  their  external  Form  or  Shape;  as  the 
fame  Dodtrine  fuppofed  the  Univerfe  to  be,  which  may  therefore 
be  confidered  as  That  Univerfal  One,  of  which  They  are  the  Par-- 
ticidar  Many. 

7^  This,  as  well  as  the  preceding  Part  of  the  Defcription,  here 
given  us,  of  certain  Beings,  faid  to  continue  for  ever,  equally 
agrees  to  the  nature  of  thofe  intelligent  Beings  Mtherial,  above 
mentioned,  and  to  the  nature  of  iht  Celejlial  Orbs.  For  all  In- 
dividual Beings  "iiXt  Corporeal ;  and  Corporeal  Beings,  be  their  Bodys 
ever  fo  fine,  coniift  oi  Matter  and  ai  Form,  ^ow  Matter,  con- 
fidered (I'o'Sw  T/17  7\lyoo)  by  its  Self,  is  infinite ;  tho  'tis  every  where, 
bounded,  becaufe  it  is  every  where  formed:  for  the  Form  of  every 
Portion  of  Matter  is  its  Bound. — By  the  Form  of  it  we  mean,  not  the 

Figure,:, 


120         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Figure,   but  the  cjj'ential  Nature,  That  Genus  and  Species,  of  which 
it  is  an  Individual. — For  neither  doth  the  Nature  of  any  Corpo- 
real Being,   nor  do   any  of  its  Effential  ^alitys,   arife   from   the 
Figure,  Fofition,  or  Scituatio?i  of  its  Parts,  as  the  ancient  Atomijls 
ftrangely  imagined  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  from  the  Nature,  the 
FJfential  Form,  of  every  fuch  Being,  arifeth  the  Figure,  which  is 
proper  to   that   Effential   Form, — 'To    this   Interpretation   of  the 
Paffage  now  before  us, .  which  attributes  Bound  and  Iiififiity,  Both 
of  them,   to  Such  Beings   only   as   endure  for  ever,    it   may  rea- 
fonably   be  objedied — that  Ltfinity  znd  Bound  are.   Both   of  them 
together,    eJJ'ential  to   the  Nature   of  all  Body  or  formed   Matter, 
and  connatural  therefore  to  every   Corporeal  Form.     But  to    this 
Objeftion  it  may  be  anfwered,  —  that  Fonn  is  no  where  Jiabkt 
and  confequently  that  Bound  is   no  where  f,xt,   in   any  Corporeal 
Beings,  Other  than  in  Such  as  are  permanent  and  endure  for  ever  ; 
and  None   can   be  Such,    excepting   thefe  Two  Kinds ;  —  One  of 
which  is  xhc  purely  Mt her eal : — for  Beings   of  This  Kind,    being 
iincompounded  and  uniform,   have   within  them  no  Principle  of  Dif~ 
folution;    (efpecially   if  their  Parts,    all   of  which   zrc  fmilar  and 
homogeneous,    are   held    together    by    an    unifying  Principle   within 
Themfelves,  a  Particular  Mind,  or  Intelligence  of  their  oivn ;)    nor 
from  without  can  there  come  to  them  Any  Subftance,  finer  than 
their  own,    (for   None   can   be   finer  than   the  purely  ^Ethereal,) 
fo  as  to  penetrate,    divide,    and  feparate  their  Parts  : — The  other 
Kind   of  Corporeal  Beings,  permanent  thro  all  ages,   comprehends 
all  Such  as  are  indeed,  like  temporary  Beings,  compofed  of  Parts 
di[jimilar  "iiYiiS.  heterogeneous ;  and    in   the   Frame   of  whofe  Bodys, 
juft  as   in   the  Frame  of  Theirs,  different  Elements  are  mixed   to- 
gether,   and   are   continually   changing.    Each    into  Other; — yet, 
becaufe   they  are  Spherical  in   their  Figure,  and    are  preflod  every 
where  frotn  without  by  the  Circumambience  of  an  equal  and  un- 
varying v^ther,— and    becaufe  all    their  Parts  gravitate   within  to 

Qne 


PHIL    E    B    U    S.  121 

'One  Central  Point,  —  and  alfo,  becaufe  they  are  inceflantly  in 
•rapid  Motion,  turning.  Each  of  them,  around  its  own  Axis,  and 
wheeling  their  Courfe,  in  unrefifting  /I'^ther,  x'\Il  of  them,  around 
one  Common  Center, — all  thefe  Caufes  operate  together,  fo  as  to 
prevent  their  Frame  from  ever  falling  to  Pieces. — Of  this  latter 
Kind  is  our  own  Terraqueous  Globe,  with  its  furrounding  At- 
mofpbere ;  and,  reafoning  from  Analogy,  we  may,  with  great  pro- 
bability, refer  to  the  fame  Kind  all  the  celcftial  Planeta7y  Bodys, 
whether  of  primary  or  of  fecondary  Order  ;  as  appears  from  the 
moft  ingenious  Theory  oi  Huygens  in  his  Cofmotheoros.  —  Of  the 
fortner  Kind  is  generally  deemed  the  Sun,  That  common  Center, 
to  the  Earth  and  to  all  the  vilible  Planets,  of  their  circularly 
progrejji'ue  Motion.  To  the  fatne  Kind  are  referable,  according  to 
the  moft  probable  and  received  Opinion,  thofe  Celeflial  Bodys, 
called  the  Fixt  Stars :  and  the  Quality  of  being  Fixt  is  attri- 
buted to  them,  becaufe,  tho  it  be  rcafonable  to  conclude  from 
Analogy,  that  they  move  around  their  feveral  Axes,  yet  they  flill 
maintain  the  Jame  Places  in  the  Heavens;  that  is,  the  fame  Sci- 
tuation.  Each  of  them,  relatively  to  all  the  Others.  To  this 
Mthereal  Kind  of  corporeal  Forms  belong  alfo  whatever  Intelligent 
Beings  there  may  be  throughout  infinite  ^Ether,  invifible  to  Us 
on  Earth,  on  account  of  the  Finenefs  and  Minutenefs  of  their 
Spheres,  or  the  Immenfity  of  their  Diftance. — But,  as  to  thefe 
Diviner  Beings,  iafi:  mentioned,  tho  Plato  himfelf,  during  his 
Abode  in  Egypt  might  have  been  well  informed  of  the  Eaflcrn 
Notions  concerning  them,  yet,  fmce  it  appears,  that  Socrates 
never  intermeddled  in  fuch  Speculations,  we  deem  our  Author 
too  ftrid:  an  Obferver  of  Propriety,  to  give  the  leafl:  Hint  of 
them,  as  coming  from  the  Mouth  of  his  great  Mafter.  It  fcenis 
more  probable  therefore,  that  the  Beings,  fpoken  of  in  tiie  Paf- 
fage  now  before  us,  are  Thofe,  ufually  flyled  by  Aftronomcrs 
the  Celejlial  Bodys.     And  what  encreafes  the  Probability  of  it,   is 

Q^  '        This, 


122  F    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

This,  —  that,    according  to   the   Orphic  DoSirinc,   thele  Celeftlal 
Bodys  are  infinite  in  Number; — that  Some  o\  them  -s^v^  fixed  im- 
movably.    Each    in     the    Center    of    fome    Planetary  Syfiem ;  — 
and  that  the  Motions  of  fuch  Others,   as  tnoije  around  them,   are 
confined  within  Bounds  inipa[fable.     Now  we  cannot  fuppofe,    that 
Socrates,    fo  well   acquainted  as  he  was  with  all  the  Mathematical 
and  Philofophical  Learning  of  Greece,  could  have  been  a  Stranger 
to  the  Beginning    of  it   all,    the  Philojophy   of  Orpheus.     For  the 
Orphic  Do<5lrine,  defcending  from  the  Mountains  of  Thrace,  where 
the  Mufick  of  it  had  foftened  in  fome  meafure  the  favage  Manners 
of  the  Thracians,  foon  fpred   itfelf  over  all  Greece,   by    means  of 
the    Firft   Followers   of  it,    Mifc?us,   Linus,   Thamyris,    "Rumolpus, 
and  many  Others;   carrying  with  it,  not  only  a  Social  Spirit  and 
the  Rudiments  of  Legifiation,  but  alfo  a  Knoivlege  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Univerfe,   veiled   under   the   Rites    of  Religious  Myfterys :    and 
Thefe,   fo  long  as  they  remained  uncorrupted,  were  found  to  be 
the    firmed:    Support    to    Legal   and   Juft   Government,    and   the 
flrongeft  Barrier  againfi:  the   lawlefs  and   boundlefs  Spirit  of  In- 
juftice. — But   now,   after   all   the  Pains  we  have  taken  to  inter- 
pret this  whole  Pafiage  \n  Plato,  as  if  it  refpefted  Indlvidtial  Beings, 
Such  of  them  as  endure  for  ever, — yet,   if  we  may  fuppofe,  that 
either  the  Philofophy   of  Orpheus,  or  the  Traditional  Dodtrine  of 
the  more   ancient  Mountaineers,   reached   fo  far   in   the  Knowlege 
of  JJniverfal  Nature,  as    to   fee,  that   all    the  Kinds  and  Species   of 
Being  are  comprehended  in  Being  its  Sef,  —  in  One  eternal   and 
univerfal  Mitid,  —  in  One  itiiaard  or   intelligible  WorLi,  —  in    like 
manner,  as  the  Individuals  of  all  thofe  Kinds  and  Species  are  com- 
prehended  in  One  fe7ifible  and  outward  World, — on   fuch  a  Suppo- 
fition,    we   fliould   be    apt   to   tiiink,    that   Plato,    in    fpeaking   of 
Beings,  f aid  to  endure  for  ever,  meant  thofe  very  Kiitds  and  Species 
of  Being.     For   'tis  evident,    that   in   this  Part   of  the  Dialogue, 
he  hath  Thefe   principally  in  his  View ;  and   that   the  Mention 

3  ,  ctl"- 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  123 

it  ^' : — that,  after  we  have  found  it  ^°,  we  are  next,  in 
this   One  to  look   for  Two,   if  Two  only  are  next  ^'; 

otherwife 

of  any  Individual  or  Particular  Beings,  which  endure  for  ever, 
could  be  introduced  for  no  other  Purpofe,  than  to  illuftrate,  in 
the  way  of  Analogy,  the  pej-manejit  Nature  of  thofe  Kinds  and 
Species. — In  this  cafe,  however,  they  are  not  to  be  confidered 
as  pure  Ideas,  or  as  having  their  eternal  EJfences  only  in  the  Mind 
of  Nature :  for  Infinity  enters  not  into  the  Compofition  of  Any 
thing  there,  where  f  he  Bounds  of  All  things  are  invariably  fixt, 
and  where  the  Nature  of  every  One  [that  is,  of  every  Monad\ 
is   always  the  Same:    but   to   the   Beings,   here  fpoken  of,  Flato 

fays   that  Infinity  is  connatural. If  then,    by  thefe  Beings,   we 

are  to  underftand  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  to  be  meant, 
they  are  here  to  be  looked  on  in  no  other  Light,  than  as  having 
an  everlafiing  Exifience  in  Outivard  Nature,  thro  an  ever-lafting 
Succeflion  of  Individuals  and  Particulars,  their  Copys  or  PUJiurest 
the  Ground  of  which  is  the  Infinity  of  Matter.  See  Note  164,  in 
which  is  confirmed  this  Interpretation  of  the  Paffage  now  be- 
fore us. 

'9  **  All  Nature  (fays  Plato  in  his  Epinofnis,  near  the  End) 
beareth  the  Stamp  of  Genus  and  Species." — Every  Form  in  Outward 
Nature  is  zn  Individual  of  feme  One  Species,  zmong^  Many ;  to 
which  Many,  One  Kind  of  Being  is  common. — Nor  is  This  true 
only  of  the  EJfential  Form  of  every  thing,  from  which  Form 
the  Thing  receives  its  Denomination ;  no  lefs  true  it  is  of  every 
accidental  and  variable  Reality,  Condition,  or  Circumfiance,  which 
the  Form  admits  within  its  Self  j  or  which  may  invefi,  or  encom- 
pafs,  or  attend,  or  any  way  afeoi  its  Being.  See  Notes  26  and 
28  to  the  Me  no. 

0^2  ^°  In 


124         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

■^^  In  the  two  Fii-fl  Editions  of  Plato,  Aldus  %  and  JVaUers, 
we  here  read  ju£TaAa'/3<w^«j;',  a  Word,  which  the  Senfe  of  this 
Paffage  ablblutely  condemns.  We  therefore  hope,  that  future 
Editors  o^  Plato  will  here  M\o\y  Stephens's  Edition,  where  we 
read  xaTaAa/Swusi'. 

S'  That  is, — if  the  Higheft  Genus  (or  mofl  General  Nature)  of 
the  SiibjeSl  of  our  Inquiry  be,  in  its  Firil  Divifion,  divifible  only 
into  Two  Kinds,  immediately  fubordinate  to  That  Higheft. — We 
fiiall  exemplify  the  Divifion  of  Things,  recommended  to  us 
here  by  Plato,  in  the  following  Table :  it  is  adapted  to  Each  of 
thofe  Three  Meanings,  in  which  that  ancient  Tradition,  con- 
cerning Immortal  Beings,  may  be  underftood  ;  as  appears  in  Note 
77  and  the  Two  which  follow  it. — The  Divilion  oi  Animals,  Ve~ 
getables,  and  FoJJils,  into  their  feveral  Kinds, — and  the  Divilion  of 
Each  of  thefe  Kinds  into  the  Species,  peculiar  to  it,  —  are  the 
entertaining  Studys  of  the  curious  Naturalijl,  or  minute  Obferver 
of  the  lower  Works  of  Nature. — But,  in  this  Table,  we  are  far 
from  pretending  or  defigning  to  make  a  juft  or  complete  Divi- 
fion oi  Being:  we  mean  nothing  more,  than  to  give  an  Exatnpky 
or  Specimen,  of  the  Method  of  dividing  Koya,  or  logically.  Things 
(with  regard  to  their  EJJences)  into  their  feveral  Kinds  and  Species,, 
—  a  Method,  which  is  perhaps  the  only  Way  of  proving  any 
fuch  Subjedt  to  have  been  juftly  analyfcd. — For  when  we  are  analyjing 
any  individual  Complex-Form  of  Nature,  —  that  is,  when  we  are 
inveftigating  its  Principles, — (from  which  Principles  only  we  can 
difcQvec,.  What  it  is,  or  in  What  the  EJfence  of  it  confifts,)  we 
tread  unfurely  in  every  Step  we  take;  becaufe  we  tread  all 
along  in  the  Vv^ay  ol  InduSton  i'com  Jimilar  Forms;  until  we 
arrive  at  our  End,  the  Principles  we  are  in  fearch  of. — But  when 
we  are  once  arrived  at  this  End,  we  are  able  with  Certainty 
and  Eafe  to  return,  thro  every  Step  of  the  Road, — that  is,  thro 
every  Degree  in  the  Derivation  (or  Procefs  in  the  Compofiiion) 
3  of 


REAL. 


Transient,  or  Mutable. 


r  Lower  Ele- 
^BodySjF/rf, 
ater.  Earth. 


Bodys  Mtxt  of  the 
Four  Lower  Ele- 
ments. 


It; 
Is. 


Senfelefs. 


Vegetables.      Fojjlls. 


Mixed  with  the 

Four  lower  Elements  I 

The  Planets. 


imary ;  Secondary ; 

)artby  &c.         The  Mooriy  &c. 


BEING. 


Incorporeai; 
Eternal  Ideas  in  the  Divine  Mind. 


Corporeal. 


Permanent. 


Transient,  or  Mutable. 


The  Kinds  and  Species 
of  Things,  exhibited 
in  Outward  Nature. 


Elementary  Light, 
or  ^ther. 


Intelligent ; 
Of  whofe  Specific  Divifion  we  are  quite 
ignorant :  but  among  Thofe  of  Lower 
Order,  we  may  venture  to  place  the  Ra- 
tional Soul  of  Man,  the  immediate  Seat 
of  That,  which  farticipates  of  what  is 
Incorporeal  and  Eternal. 


Mtherial  Beings 
Indi-oidual. 


The  Four  Lower  Ele-         Bodys  Mixt  of  the 
mentary  Bodys,  Fire,  Four  Lower  Ele- 

Air,  Water,  Earth.  ments. 


Unintelligent ; 
The  Cekjlial  Bodys. 


Sentient ; 
Animals. 


Senjelefs. 


Vegetables.     FoJJils. 


Simply  Mtherial,  or  com- 

poled  oi JEther  chiefly; 

The  Sun  and  the  Fist  Stars. 


Mixed  with  the 

Four  lower  Elements  i 

The  Platuts. 


Primary ;  Secondary ; 

The  Earth,  &c.         The  Moon,  ice. 


[To  be  placed  facing  page  124.] 


r> 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  125 

otherwife  Three,  or  fome  other  Number  :  again,  that 
Every  One  of  this  Number  we  are  to  examine  in  like 
manner  ^' :  until  at  length  a  man  not  only  perceives, 
that  the  One,  with  which  he  began  ^\  is  One  and  Many 
and  Infinite  \  but  difcovers  alfo  how  many  it  contains  ^^: 
— for,  that  a  Man  never  fliould  proceed  to  the  Idea  of 
Infinite,    and    apply    it  immediately  to  any  Number, 

of  that  particular  Complex-Form,  whofe  Effince  we  defirc  to  know  j 
— in  defcending  from  Principles  to  Kinds,  from  Kinds  the  leaji 
General  to  Sorts  or  Species,  and  among  Thefe  to  that  very  Specific 
Form,  which  had  before  been  the  Subject  of  our  Analyfis.  — 
Accordingly  Plato,  in  his  Dialogues,  employs  Analyjis  and  Induc- 
tion for  the  inquiring  after  and  the  difco'vering  of  any  Truth, — 
Synthejis  and  Divifion,  for  the  proving  and  the  teaching  of  it, 

^-  In  the  above  drawn  Table  it  appears,  that  Being  its  Self 
is  One,  comprehending  immediately  the  vioji  General  Kinds  of 
Being;  and  thro  Thefe,  the /^/i  Gt^/^^r^/and  fubordinate,  in  their 
feveral  Gradations  ',  —  and  more  remotely,  the  numerous  Species 
of  all  the  leaji  General  Kinds :  it  appears  at  the  fame  time,  that 
Each  of  thefe  Kinds  and  Species  is  alfo  One,  comprehending  Many. 

^3  That  is,  —  the  Highejl  Genus  of  the  Subjecl,  which  he  is 
examining, 

^+  The  Many,  comprehended   in  every  loweft;  Species  of  Being, 
are  Beings  Individual  and  Corporeal :  and  Thefe  are  infinite  in  Num- 
ber ^  becaufe  Matter  is  One  of  the  Principles  of  their  Exiftence  j 
and  Matter  is  infinite,  in  Extenfion,  Divifibility,  and  Duration  thro, 
all  Ages  of  Time, 

^5  The  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  muft  be  of  a  definite  and 
(T^r/tf/;;  Number :  for  otherwife  there  would  be  no  Science  of  then%.. 

before 


126.       P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

before  he  has  fully  difcovered  all  the  definite  Number, 
which  lyes  between  the  Infinite  and  the  One "  :  but 
that,  having  compleated  this  Difcovery,  we  fhould 
then  finifli  our  Search  ;  and  difmifling  into  Infinity 
Every  One  of  all  thofe  Numbers,  we  fhould  bid  Fare- 
well to  them  ^^  The  Gods,  as  I  before  faid,  have 
given  us  to  confider  Things  in  this  way,  and  in  this 
way  to  learn  them,   and  teach  them  one  to  another  ^^ 

But 

'^  That  is, — diat,  after  fome  General SiihjeSi  of  our  Speculation  has 
been  confidered  by  us,  and  divided  into  its  feveral  A/Wj',  we  fhould 
not  defcend  to  the  confideration  of  the  Particulars  or  Individuals 
of  thofe  Kinds,  untill  we  have  confidered,  and  are  able  to  enume- 
rate, all  the  fubordinate  Kinds,  Species,  or  Sorts,  intermediate ;— !- 
if  we  would  attain  to  true  Science,  or  to  full  and  perfed:  Know- 
lege,  in  the  Subjeft. 

^7  Individual  Beings  are  the  Objeds  only  of  the  Outward  Senfes, 
or  of  the  Imagination :  but  where  Senje  or  Imagination  begins, 
there  Science  ends.  SenJe  reaches  to  Individuals,  the  Multitude  of 
which  is  injinite.,  and  the  Diverfity  unbounded :  for  Seti/e  is  in  its 
Self  injinite;  and  in  Animals,  or  Senfible  Beings,  is  bounded  only 
by  Defeds  in  the  Organs  of  their  Senfation  :  but  Science  defcends 
no  luwer  than  to  Species. 

**  For  this  mythological  Tradition,  fee  Note  72.  But  in  its 
Myjlic  or  Philofophic  Meaning,  it  imports, — that  every  Particular 
Mind,  having  a  Faculty  of  perceiving  Every  one  of  h&r  Ideas,  (every 
Kind  and  every  Species  of  Things)  to  be  both  One  ^nd  Many, 
derives  that  Faculty  from  the  fame  Fountain,  from  which  flie 
derives  her  Being, — namely,  from  'Tljc  Mind  Utiiverjal  and  Divine, 

For 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         127 

But  the  Wife  Men  of  thefe  days  take  any  Monad  what- 
ever,  and  divide  it  into  Many  with  more  Concifenefs 

For  Unity  and  [definite]  Multitude  are   the    very  Trincipks  of  all 
Mind. — Of  Mind,  confidered  as  the  Seat  of  Intelligibles,  or  as  the 
SubjeSi  of  Intelligence y  Unity  is  the  Principle  :  and  of  Mind,  con- 
fidered   as    the  OhjcB  of  its    own  Intelligence,    [definite]  Multitude 
is  the  Principle. — On  Unity  and  Multitude,  joined   together,   de- 
pend  all   Order  and  Proportion,   all  Harmony  and  Beauty.     With- 
out Number  pre-fuppofed,  there  could  be  no  Place  for  Agreement, 
no  Place  for  Meafure :    neither  would  it  be  pofllble  without  Num- 
ber, for  any  Truth,  or    any  Good   to  have    a  Being.  —  But   thefe 
two  Principles,    Unity  and  Midtitude,  or  One  and  Many,   may   be 
confidered,   [Xoyui,')    not  only  as  they  are  together  in  Mind  and  in 
every  Idea,   but  as  Principles  difiinSi  from   each   other  :   and  thus 
confidered,   they  are  feverally  the  Firfi:  or  mofi:  General  Objeds 
of  the  Two   higher  Facultys    of  the  Mind,    IntelleB  and  Reafon. 
By  h^T  Reafon,   the  Mind  comprehends  Afi^/?}',   and  defines  them,, 
all   and    every    of   them  ;    which  Every  of  thofe  Many,    by    her 
highefi:  Faculty,   That  oi  Intclle£i,    Ihe   fees   to  he.  0 tie, — and  ^// 
of  them   together,    to  be   united,    and   to   be  One,    in   her  Self — 
And  as  One  and  Many  are  together  the  Principles  of  every  Mind, . 
fo  Satne  and  Different  are  together  the  Principles  of  all  the  Mind's 
Intelligence  and  Knoinlege ;    and  may,   in    like  maimer,    be  confi- 
dered Xoya  as  Two  diJliuB  Principles,    and  feverally  the  Objedls- 
of  thofe  Two  difiindt  Facultys,  LitelleSl  and  Reafon.     By  her  Reafon,. 
the  Mind  compares  one  Idea  with  another,   and  difcerns  the  Df- 
ference  between  them  j — a  Difference,   which   by  hevIntelleSl  (h&- 
annulls, — that   is,   fees  an  Agreement  between  different  Species  in. 
the  Samenefs  of  their  Kind,    and  between  different  Kinds  in  fome 
higher  Samenefs. 

than, 


128         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

than  they  ought,  and  with  more  Prolixity  too,  flnce  they 
never  come  to  an  End  ^'  :  for  immediately  after  the 
Monad,  they  introduce  Infinity,  overlooking  all  the 
intermediate  Numbers ;  the  exprefs  Mention  of  which, 
or  the  Omillion  of  them,  diflinguiflies  fuch  dialectical 
and  fair  Debates,  as  Ours,  from  fuch  as  are  contentious 
and  fophiflical. 

Protarchus. 

Part  of  what  you  fay,  Socrates,  I  feem  to  apprehend 
tolerably  well  :  but  the  Meaning  of  Some  Things, 
which  you  have  now  faid,  I  fliould  be  glad  to  hear 
you  exprefs  in  plainer  Terms. 


So 


CRATES. 


The  Whole  of  what  I  have  faid,  Protarchus,  is 
evident  in  Letters.      In   Thefe   therefore,   which  have 

^5  For  inftance,  let  the  General  Idea  of  Science  be  the  Monad 
propofcd  ;  and  let  the  Nature  of  this  Monad  be  made  the  Sub- 
jedt  of  Inquiry;  as.it  is  in  Plato's  T'heatetiis :  if  a  Man,  prefuming 
that  he  knew  its  Nature,  fliould  begin  to  give  an  account  of  it, 
(as  'Thecetetus  does  in  pag:  146,  Edit:  Steph:)  by  enumerating 
icxerzl  Objects  of  Ktjowlege,  the  account  never  would  be  finiOied ; 
becaufe  particular  Objedls  of  Knowlege  are  infinite.  —  In  like 
manner,  if  the  Nature  of  FlcaJ'ure  in  general  be  inquired  into, 
as  it  is  in  the  prefent  Dialogue,  it  would  be  endlcfs  to  enumerate 
the  various  Things,  in  particular,  from  the  application  of  which 
to  fome  Part  or  otiicr  of   us  we  feel  Pleafure. 

been 


P    H    I    L   E    B    U    S.  129 

been  taught  you  from  your  Childhood,  you  may  eafily 
apprehend  my  Meaning. 

Protarchus. 
How  in  Letters  ? 

Socrates. 
Voice,  that  ifTues  out  of  the  Human  Mouth, 
may  be  conlidered  as  One  General  Thing,  admitting 
of  an  infinite  Number  of  Articulations,  not  only 
in  all  Men  taken  together,  but  alfo  in  every  Individual 
Man. 

Protarchus. 
Without  doubt. 

Socrates. 
Novi^  we  are  not  made  knowing  in  Speech,  or  Sound 
Articulate,  thro  the  Knowlege  either  of  the  Infinity 
or  of  the  Onenefs  of  its  nature  :  but  to  know  how 
Many,  and  What,  are  the  Parts,  into  which  it  is  na- 
turally divided,  This  it  is,  which  makes  any  of  us  a 
Grammarian,  or  ikilled  in  Grammar. 

Protarchus. 
Mofl  certainly* 

Socrates. 
And  farther.    That  by  which  a  Man  comes  to  be 
fkilled  in  Mufick,  is  This  very  Thing, 

R  Protarchus. 


130  P    H    I    L   E   B   U    S, 

Protarchus. 
How  fo? 

SoCRATES^. 

Mufical  Sound  '°,  which  is  the  Subjed-Matter  of  this 
Art,  may  be  confidered  in  its  Self  as  One  general  Thing.. 

Protarchus. 

5*^  In  the  Greek,  the  Term,  ufed  here,  as  well  as  juil  before,, 
(where  this  Tranflation  hath  the  word.  Voice,)  is  (^mv.  It  there- 
{ign'idcd  udriicu/aU'd  VocaX  Sound,  ov  Speech :  —  It  here  fignifies 
iVf^iTrt/ Sound  of  the  Voice,  ox  Vocal Mujick. — We  fee  then,  that 
(^m-A  Human  Voice  is  by  Plato  fuppofed  to  be  a  Common  Genusy 
divifible  into  thofe  Two  Sorts  or  Species.  It  is  exprefsly  fo  laid 
down  by  Nicomachiis,  [Harmonic:  Enchird:  pag:  3.  Edit:  Amjl.") 
in  thefe  words  ; — T^s  dy'^^wirmi  (pm'iis  ot  aVo  Ta  TLv^ccyo^iKS  cTi/ct- 
iDcaAeia  ^vo  i(pciaKot',  ui  ivoi  yst'BS,  eiS^n  vrrd^^eiv.  xxt  to  f/.iv  avvi^i^ 
Ulmi  (ivQU-aZoV  TO.  (Ts  ha.^^iifjia.iixdv.  Such  [Writers  concerning 
Mufick,]  as  came  out  of  the  Pythagorean  School,  fay,  that  of  Human 
Voice  [in  general],  as  of  One  Genus,  there  are  Two  Species.  One 
of  thefe   Two  they  properly  named  Continuous ;   the  Other,  Difcrete. 

. Thefe  two  Technical  Terms  he  afterward  explains,  by  fliow- 

ing  us,  that  the  Continuous  is  That  Voice,,  which  we  utter  in 
Difcourfng  and  in  Readitig;  (and  therefore  by  Arijloxenus  and  by 
Euclid  termed  (pcui?i  Ao^ixn')  and  that  the  Difcrete  is  the  Voice, 
iflued  out  of  our  Mouths  in  Singing ;  (and  thence  termed  cpwy^. 
fjiiXaS ly.rt')  for,  in  this  latter  cafe,  every  fingle  Sound  is  dijiin- 
giiiOoed  by  a  certain  or  meafured  Tone  of  the  Voice.  The  fame- 
Divifion  of  (pwoi  is  laid  down,  and  a  fimilar  Account  of  it  is 
given,    by  Arijloxenus,    in   Harmonic:  Element:    pag:  8  cc  9,-  Edit: 

Ani^i 


PHILEBUS.         i^i 

PROTARCHUS. 

Without  difpute. 

Socrates, 
And  let  us  fuppofe  Two  Kinds  of  it,  the  Grave  and 
the  Acute,  and  a  Third  Kind  between  thofe  Two,  the 
Homotonous,  or  how  otherwife  ''  ? 

PROTARCHU  S. 

MuHcal  Sound  in  general  is  fo  to  be  diflinguifhed. 

Socrates, 

Amjl:  —  The  Dodrine,  implied  in  the  Paflage  now  before  us, 
will  affift  in  the  explaining  of  a  Difficulty  in  the  latter  Part  of 
this  Dialogue. 

5'  Homotony  of  Sound  is  made,  v/hen  a  String  of  fome  flringed 
Inflrument  of  Mufick,  having  xh^  fame  degree  oi  Tenfwn  with  a 
fimilar  String  of  fome  Other,  yields,  in  conjunElion  with  it,   the 
Jame  Mujical  'Tone ; — or  when  Two   different  Voices  utter,    at  the 
fame  time,   Mufical  Sounds,   Neither   of   which   is  more  Acute, 
or  more  Grave,    than    the  Other. — In  Both  cafes,   the  Samenefs 
of  the  Sound  is  alfo  termed  ofAos^mia.'.  for  ^m'li  Voice  is  (metapho- 
rically)   attributed   to    all  Mufical  Infrmne?its ;    (fee  Nicotnachus, 
pag:  5  and  6.)  as  on   the   other  hand,   Tone  is   (by  an  eafy  Me- 
taphor)   attributed   to   the  Human  Voice,   modulated    by   the  Will 
in  the  Trachea,  or  Afpera  Arteria  :  for  this  natural  Wind-Inflrument, 
in  Engliili    aptly  named   the  Wind-Pipe,  while  it   tranfmits  the 
Air  breathed  out  from  the  Lungs,    receives  any  degree  of  Ten- 
£on  it  is  capable   of,    at  the   pleafure  of  the    Mind.  —  In  like 

R  2  manner. 


1^1         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

manner,  a  Repetition  of  the  fame  Tone  from  a  fingle  Human 
Voice,  as  well  as  from  a  fingle  Motiochord,  is  termed  a  Monotony. 
——In  the  Paflage  of  Plato,  now  before  us,  we  may  obferve  far- 
ther,— that,  tho  Mufical  Sounds  Homotonoiis,  confidered  by  them- 
felves,  may  be  either  of  an  Acute  Tone,  or  of  a  Grave,  indif- 
ferently J  in  like  manner  as  Perfons,  who  read  or  fpeak  in  a 
MoTictony,  (where  the  fame  Tenfion  is  continued  in  the  Organs  of 
the  Voice,)  7nay,  in  Expiration,  draw  their  Breath  either  from 
low  down,  or  from  higher  up;  (indeed  all  Mufical  Sounds  muji  be 
either  Acute  or  Grave  on  every  Scale  of  Mufick ;)  yet  we  here 
find  Homotonous  Sounds  feparated  from  both  the  Acute  and  the 
Grave,  and  fuppofed  to  form  a  'Third  diflindl  Kind.  —  To  fet 
them  thus  apart  by  Themfelves,  is  agreeable  to  that  Account 
of  Grave  and  o^  Acute  Sounds,  in  Compofition,  which  is  given  us 
by  the  old  Greek  Writers  on  Mufick.  For,  according  to  Them, 
every  Mufical  Sound,  called  either  Acute  or  Grave,  is  fo  called 
relatively, — either  refpedling  the  Sound  which  immediately  pre- 
cedes it,  if  ifTued  from  the  fame  Voice  or  Inftrument,  —  or  re- 
fpedling  a  Sound,  ifTued  at  the  faiJie  time  from  another  Voice  or 
Inftrument.  —  And  this  perhaps  may  be  one  Reafon  among 
others,  why  Grave  and  Acute  Sounds,  in  Mufick,  are  by  thofe 
Writers  faid  to  differ  koctx  tottov  with  regard  to  Place.  From  a. 
Grave  Sound  to  an  Acute,  and  from  an  Acute  Sound  to  a  Grave, 
a  Step  or  a  Tranfition  is  made  j  (a  Step  to  either  of  the  neareji 
Mufical  Sounds,  a  Tranfition  to  any  one  that  is  remote :)  oSoi,  fays 
^icomachus,  pag:  8,  olitq  ^ctpvjrnoi  en  o^vryiTot,  «  dvd.Ta.Xiv.  But 
Homotonous  Sounds,  even  tho  fucceflive,  remain  (as  it  were)  All- 
in  one  and  the  fame  Place,  to  the  Hearing  of  the  Ear  -,  as  the 
fucceffive  Waters  of  a  running  Stream  do,  in  their  Appearance 
to  the  Eye. — 'Tis  from-  that  Neutrality  or  Indifference  of  Mufical 
Sounds  Homotonous,  with  refped:  to  both  the  Grave  and  the  Acute,. 
and   not  from  their  partaking  of  Both  Thefe,   that  Bacchius  and. 

d  Arifidei. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  133 

Arljl'idcs  ^iint'il:  fay,  they  are  joteVat  Middle  Sounds,  between  Both 
the  Others.  See  the  former,  in  his  IntroduB:  Mujk:  pag:  1 1  ; 
the  latter,   in  his  elegant  Treatife  Trg^l  fjLmiwji  concerning  Mufick, 

pag:  235  oi  the  Amjlerdam  Edition,  Both. Very  different  from 

thefe  Homotojious  Sounds  are  Others,  to  which  is  given  the  fame 
Epithet  of  jj.i(jcxji; — the  (pwiw,  or  Vocal  Sowid,  in.  Cathedral  Cbaunt- 
ing  ;  —  That  of  the  zncx&ni  Rhapfodijts  in  reciting  Poems; — and 
the  Recltatlvo  in  modern.  Operas ;  —  a  ipmri.  Each  of  them,  be- 
tween the  Continuous  and  the  Dlfcrete,  (that  is,)'  between  Reading 
(or  Speaking)  and  Singing, — a  Cotnpofitlon  or  Mixture  of  them  Both, 
and  thence  denominated //.sV)).  S&c  Arljildes,  pag:  7,  and  Martlanus 
Capella,   Lib:  9.     To   fpeak   or   to   read   in   fome    fuch   manner, 

Nlcomachus,  pag:  4,  terms  f/.&?\.sci^eiv. No  lefs  different  from  the 

Homotonous  is  That  ^S-oV^os,  or  Mnfical  Sound,  which,  lying  in  the 
Mid-Way  between  the  JTraV?)  and  the  vni-n,  the  Two  Extreams  on- 
the  moft  ancient  and  fimple  Scale,  is  accordingly  there  marked 
as  the  \i.inY),  or  Middle.  See  Nlcomachus,  pag:  9.  —  There  is  a 
Paffage  in  "Theons,  Mathematlca,  (pag:  76,  Edit.  Parif:)  where 
/t/teVsj  (pS-oVfoi  Middle  Sounds  are  to  be  underftood  in  a  Senfe,  fimilar 
to  That  lafl-mentioned.  It  begins  thus,  —  Twr  ^S-o'^fwy  0/  f/,iv 
ii^Hi,  01  ^s  ^cc^ai,  o<  cTg  fj-icaC  Of  Miijlcal  Sounds,  Jbme  are  Acute,, 
fome  are  Grave,  and  others  are  Middle :. — Now  this  Divifion,  being 
in  almoft  the  fame  'Terms  with  Plato's  Divifion  now  before  us,. 
may  eafily  be  fuppofed  to  have  the  fame  Meaning ;  efpecially  fince 
this  Work  of  Theo?t\  is  profefledly  a  Comment  on  the  Mathema- 
tical Paffages  in  Plato,  But,  as  Theon  proceeds  to  explain  his 
own  Meaning,  in  thefe  words,  —  o^as  ^ugV  01  iZv  vnrm,  jSageTs  Je- 
oi  Twr  viraroov,  jxiaoi  S'e  01  jj-iTcc^u  —  he  is  fo  far,  we  find,  from 
meaning,  by  his  Middle  Sounds,  Sounds  Homotonous,  (the  Epithet 
given  by  Plato  to  His  Third  Kind  of  Sounds,)  that  he  muft  be 
underftood  to  mean  different  Mufical  Sounds  from  the  fime  Voice 
or  Inflrument, — all'  thofe,  which,,  on  the  mod  enlarged  Scale  of 

Mufick^ 


154         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

But  with  the  knowiege  of  This  Diftindion  only, 
you  would  not  yet  be  Skilled  in  Mufick  ;  tho  without 
knowing  it,  you  would  be,  as  to  Mulick,  quite 
worthlefs. 

Protarchus. 

Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

But,  my  Friend,   when   you  have  learnt  the  Inter- 
vals''' between  all  Mufical  Sounds,  from  the  more  Acute 

to 

'Mufick,  lye  between  the  feveral  Kjjxai  and  oVaraj,  in  thofe  feveral 
Syftems,  the  Cotyo'med,  the  Disjoined,  and  the  ExceJ/ive; — for  which, 
fee  the  Diagrams,  drawn  by  Mcibomius,  in  his  Edition  of  Alypiiis. 
In  a  Senfe,  fomewhat  of  Kin  to  this  of  Theon's,  a  Tenor-toned 
Voice  or  ftringed  Inflrument  is  fometimes  called  /ueV)),  as  being 
the  Mean,  or  Middle,  between  a  Treble  and  a  Bafe,  when  all 
the  Three  are  joined  in  Concert.  Were  the  word  Homotonous 
capable  of  fuch  a  Senfe,  we  fliould  not  fcruple  to  affign  this 
Senfe  to  it  in  the  PafTage  of  Plato  now  before  us. 

5-  An  Interval  is  the  Dijlance  [or  Difference  xaxa  toitov  with  re^ 
gar d  to  Place,  mentioned  in  Note  91,]  between  any  Two  Mufical 
{sounds,  (between  That  which  is  Acute  relatively  to  the  Other, 
and  That  Other  which  is  relatively  a  Grave,)  however  near 
together  they  may  be,  or  however  remote  from  each  other,  on 
any  Scale  of  Mulick.  In  proportion  to  the  Nearnefs  or  Remote- 
ncjs  of  thcfe  Two  Sounds,  the  Interval  between  them  is,  in 
Mathematical  Language,  fiid  to  be  fmall  or  great ;  that  is,  it 
is,  Jiiort  or  long.     So  that  diiferent  Mufical  Intervals,  like  all  other 

different 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


135 


to  the  more  Grave,  how  Many  they  are  in  Number  *', 
and  into  What  Sorts  they  are  diftinguifhed  '* ;  when  you 

have 

different  Diftances  from  Place  to  Place,  ejfentially  differ^  one  frora 
another,  in  Magnitude  or  Length.  And  on  this  ellential  Differ- 
ence are  founded  all  the  other  Diverfitys  of  the  Intervals ;  as 
will  be  feen  in  Note  94. 

53    The  Number    of   Intervals,    between    fuch   Sounds    as    are 
definite    and    certain,    muft    depend    on    the  Nwnbcr    of    thofe 
Sounds;    in  like    manner    as    the   Number   of  Dijlances    between 
Citys,  or  other  certain  Places   In  any  Country,  depends  on  the 
Number  of  thofe  Places.      No  other  Things,    than   fuch   as  arc 
definite  and  certain,    is    it   poffible  to   number:    and   no  Sounds 
are  Such,    except  the  Mujical. — For  Sound  in  general,   confidered, 
not  as  a  Senfation,  but  as  a  Thing  'External,  is  nothing  elfe  than, 
a  Percujion  of  the  Air  y    and  Air,    being   an  Elementary  Body,    is 
indefinite  in  Extent,  and  infinitely  divifible.     Sound  in  general  there- 
fore muff  have  the  like  Nature,   and  admits  of  no  Litnit, — none 
to  its  Extenfivenefs,  Depth,  or  Greatnefs, — none  to  its  Subtility, 
Shrillnefs,  or  Minutenefs.  —  But  the  Organs  of  the  Human  Voice 
are  limited  in    their  Power    of  firiki?ig   the  Air ;   fo  as  that  they 
cannot  produce  Sounds,    either  above  or  below  a  certain  Pitch. — 
Limited  alfo  are  the  Organs  of  the  Pliiman  Ear,  in  their  Power  of 
trarifmitting   Sounds  to   the  Seat  of  Senfation.      But  Nature  has 
given  to  thefe  Auditory  Organs  a  Power  -more  extenfive  than  fiie  has 
given  to  the  Vocal ;    becaufe,    tho   the  Equality    of   their  Extent 
would  be  fufficient  for  mutual  Converfe,  and  for  the  other  Enda- 
of  Social  Life,  yet  'tis  neceffary  for  Man,  who  is,  by,  means  of  his 
Body,  connected   with  all  lower  Nature,   to  hear  many  Soundis, 
very  different  from  the  Voices  of  his  own  Species. — The  Co7npaJs, 
liowever,  of  tlie  Voice  in  uttering  Articulate  Sounds,  or  Speaking, 
4  tho 


136 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


tlio  it  be  narrower  than  That  of  the  Ear  in  Hearing,  yet  can 
never  be  afcerta'med :  the  extreme  Boundarys  of  it.  Either  way, 
in  Height  or  in  Depth,  cannot  be  fettled;  neither  can  it  be  di- 
vided into  zwy  Jixt  or  tneafiirable  Parts.  The  Voice  of  Grown 
Pcrjins  is  Jlronger,  and  confequently  of  larger  'Extent,  than  That 
of  Children.  It  is  deeper  in  the  Male  Sex,  than  in  the  Female: 
in  the  Female,  on  the  other  hand,  it  rifes  higher,  than  in  the 
Male.  In  ivarm  Climates,  the  Organs  of  Speech  are  capable  of 
greater  degrees  of  Tenfio7i,  nor  lefs  of  'Relaxation,  than  they  are 
in  colder  Climates,  where  they  are,  like  the  Air,  rigid  as  well 
as  contraSled. — But,  in  Singing,  the  Human  Voice  hath  no  fuch 
Latitude. — For  Mufical  Sounds,  uttered  by  Perfons  of  either  Sex, 
at  any  Time  of  Life,  and  in  any  Climate,  have  the  fame  Eff'eSt 
on  a  Mifical  Ear,  —  on  that  inward  Ear,  which  perceives  Har- 
mony ;  —  uttered  by  Voices  the  moft  different,  they  hold  the 
fame  Proportion,  fiach  of  them  to  the  reft ;  and  in  uttering  them, 
all  Voices  have  ih.^  fame  Degree  ofT^enfion,  relative  to  the  Powers 

of  their  refpedtive  Organs.- The  Caufe  of  all   thefe  Sameneffes 

lyes  in  the  Nature  of  Things,  —  in  That  Part  of  Nature,  which 
immediately  correfponds  with  Mind  Eternal  and  ever  the  Same. — 
To  this  Part  of  Nature  belong  all  Particular  Minds,  all  Beings 
intelligeiii  and  rational.  With  the  Nature  of  all  fuch  Beings 
the  Nature  of  Hartnony  is  cofigenial.  For  Harmony  and  Mind 
are  con-ruxtural :  v/hatever  Beings  therefore  partake  of  Either, 
partake,  at  the  fame  time,  of  Both. — Hence  it  is,  that  Mufical 
Sounds,  uttered  by  Human  Voices,  or  ilTued  from  any  Mu- 
fical Inftrument  of  Mans  Contrivance,  proceed  from  what  is  of 
Divine  Origin  within  him;  and  the  Force  of  them  is  felt  only 
by  what  is  of  the  fame  Origin  in  Others,  namely.  Harmony  and 
Mind.  —  Sound  is  nothing  more  than  the  vKn  or  Suhjedl- Matter 
mi  Mufick,  in  the  partial  and  modern  Meaning  of  the  word 
Mufick :   it  is  Harmony,  which  gives  Form   to  this  Matter,    and 

makes 


P    FI    I    L    E    B    U    S.  137 

makes  Sounds  to  he  Mufical. — Now  it  is  the  Nature  oi  Form  in 
general,  to  fet  certain  Limits  to  every  Portion  of  Matter,  which 
it  inverts.  The  Compafs  or  Extent  therefore  of  Mufical  Sound  in 
general  mufl:  of  necellity  be  limited;  and  every  Mufical  Sound 
within  that  Compafs  mufl:  ht  fixed  to  a  certain  Point.  If  their 
Extent  be  limited,  there  muft  be  then  a  Higbejl  and  a  Lowefi, 
their  extreme  Boundarys :  and  if  every  one  of  them  be  fixf,  the 
feveral  Di/iances,  or  Intervals,  between  Each  and  every  Other, 
muft  be //wzV^i  alfo,  and  certain.  0{  iheCc  Intervals,  there  muft 
alfo  then  be  a  Greatefi  and  a  Leaji.  The  Greateji  or  Longeji  Interval, 
between  any  Two  of  thefe  Sounds,  is  evidently  That  between  the 
Higheji  and  X.\i&  Lowcfi :  and  'tis  agreed  on  by  all  the  Ancient 
Writers  on  this  Subjedr,  that  the  Leajl  or  Shortcjl  Interval  is  the 
(TiWis  iva^jjJvioi,  or  farter-Tone  in  the  Enharmonic  Melody.  Now 
the  Knowlege  of  a  farter-Tone,  or  of  any  larger  Part  of  a 
Tone,  implies  the  Knowlege  oi  a.  Whole  Tone ;  and  the  Knowlege 
of  This  infers  a  Knowlege  of  all  the  Other  Intervals,  in  refped: 
of  their  Magnitude  or  Length ;  for  they  are  all  meafured  by 
To7ies,  or  definite  Parts  of  Tones  :  tho  fome  indeed  fail  of  fo 
exadl  a  Meafure,  fome  Space  remaining  over,  which  is  called  a 
Pyeifji/Jix,  If  then  all  the  Intervals  of  Mufical  Sounds  are  latoivab-le, 
no  lels  knoivable  is  the  Nimber  of  them  :  For  Things  of  any 
Kind,  when  they  are  all  known,  are  eafy  to  be  nwnbered.  None 
indeed,  but  Such  as  are  dfinite,  fixed,  and  certain,  are  ever  to 
be  known  ;  and  Such  only  are  Thofe,  which  (to  ufe  our  Author's 
own  expreffion)  lye  between  the  Infiinite  and  the  One.  In  the  pre- 
fent  Subject,  Mufical  Bound  in  general  is  That  One ;  and  Thofe 
Irfinite  are  the  Mufical  Sounds  from  imiumerable  Voices  and  In- 
firuments  of  Mufick. 

9+  The  ancient  Writers  on  this  Subjedt  enumerate  Five  Sorts 
of  Diverfitys,  in  which  the  Intervals  difi'er.  Some  of  them  from 
Others.     The  Firfi  Sort  has   been   mentioned   in   the  preceding 

S  Note, 


13S         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Note, — namely.  That,  relative  to  their  Mcignitude. — This  prmary 
Difference  between  them   is    (as   it  were)  the  natural  Ground,  out . 
of  which,    when    it    was    cultivated   by    the   clofe    Attention    of 
Good    Ears,   Another   Sort    of  Difference    was   perceived   arifing 
between  the  Intervals  j — a  Difference,  from  which  anciently  were 
framed  ^bree  different  yivrt  t>7s  }j.iXuS'ia.i  Kinds^  of  Melody,    (as  they 
are  called  by  Arijlides,  pag:  19,)   the  Diatonic,  the  Chromatic,   and 
the  EnhartJionic.  —  The  ftnallejl  Interval  in   the  Diatonic  Melody 
was  a  Half-'Tone :  the  Enharmonic  defcended    to   a  ^/arter-T'one : 
the   I'lvo  fmalkjl  in   the  Chromatic  were   between   the   Half-Tone 
and  the  Quarter-Tone  ; — namely,  a  Third  Part  of  a  Tone,  in  one 
Species  of  the  Chromatic  j  in  another  Species  of  it,  a  ^.arter  atid 
Half-^iarter  Tone,  as  One  fimple  Interval.  —  Thofe  Three  Kinds 
of  Melody  had  alfo  Seven  Other  fimple  Intervals,  feverally  pecu- 
liar to  each  Kind.     The  Diatonic  had  an  Interval  of  a  Whole  Tone; 
another  Interval  of  a  Three-^iarter  Tone ;  another,  of  a  Tone  and  a 
garter:  in  xht  Enharmonic,   there  was  an  Interval  oi Two  Tones: 
and  in  the  Chromatic,   was  an  Interval   of  a  ToJte  and  Half-Toue 
and  the  Third  of  a  Tone ;    another,   of  a  Tone  and  Three  garters  j, 
another,   of  a  Tone  and  Half  a  Tone.     Thefe  Eleven  peculiar  In- 
tervals,  the  Four  fmaller  and   the   Seven  greater,  were  called   by 
the  Names  of  thofe  Three  different  Kinds  of  Melody,   to  which 
they  refpedively  belonged, — the  Diatonic  Intervals,  the  Chromatic^ 
and  the  Enharmoiiic ; — and  thus  arofe  a  DiJlinSlion  of  the  Intervals 
xaTct  yivoi,    in  refpeSf  of  Kind.  —  The  Speculation   of   thefe   Two 
Sorts  of  Difference   betweeen   the   Intervals, — their  Difference   in 
Magnitude,  and  their  Difference  in  Kind, — eaiily  produced  a  Third 
Sort;  according  to  which,   they  were  diflinguiflied  by  the  oppo- 
fite  Attributes,  Co?7ipounded  and  XJncompoiwdcd. — The  uncompounded 
Intervals  are    thofe,.  which    are    7iot  divifible  by   any  intervening 
^"^oyUi,    or  Mufical  Sound,    on   the   fame  Scale,    or   in  the   fame 
Kind  of  Melody :  the  compounded  UQ  Such,  as  over-leap  fome  inter- 
6  mediate 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


139 


mediate  Mufical  Sound  or  Sounds,  by  which  they  may  be  divided, 
and  into  which,  as  into  their  Elements,  they  arc  rejohable. 
Thus  we  find,  this  Third  Sort  of  Difference  between  the  Intervals 
to  be  grounded  in  the  Firji  Sort, — That,  which  regards  their  feveral 
Magnitudes, — but  not  difcernible,  until  the  Ear  had  nicely  dif- 
tinguijloed  all  the  peculiar  Intervals  in  the  Three  Kinds  of  Melody. 
— Farther  ;  when  the  Ground  had  received  an  additional  Cultivation 
from  Mathematical  Science,  —  when  the  Greater  Intervals  in  each 
Kind  of  Melody  came  to  be  meafured, — a  Fourth  Sort  of  Differ- 
ence was  difcerned  between  them  :  for  Some  were  found  to  be 
completely  meajured  by  fome  Smaller  Interval  in  the  fame  Kind  of 
Melody:  Others  were  found  to  exceed,  or  X.o fall jhort  of,  any 
fuch  certain  Meafure  multiplied  :  Thofe  were  diftinguiflied  by 
the  Epithet  pxa ;  while  Thefe  were  called  oiAoya; — Mathematical 
Terms,  both  of  them  ; — the  former  was  applied  to  thofe  ^tantitys, 
which  had  a  certain  Name,  becaufe  they  were  divifible  into  Parts 
of  known  Proportion  ;  the  latter  Term  was  applied  to  ^lantitys, 
the  Parts  of  which  were  not  in  any  certain  Proportion  to  each 
other,  and  were  therefore,  as  well  as  the  Wholes  which  they 
compofed,  undefinable  and  jiatnelefs :  the  Epithet,  now  given  to 
Quantitys  of  this  latter  Sort,  is  the  Term  Surd.  —  Of  the  Four 
Sorts  of  Difference  between  the  Intervals,  hitherto  mentioned, 
the  Fii-fl  Sort  we  called  metaphorically  the  Ground  of  the  other 
Three;  andThefe,  the  Pr(j^z/<??j- of  that  Ground,  arifing  from  learned 
and  heedfull  Culture.  —  The  Fifth  Sort  of  Difference  is  That, 
by  which  the  aviJ.(pm'oc  Confonant  Intervals  differ  from  S'i!x.(pMi'cc 
the  Difonant.  Now  this  laft  Diftindtion  (to  continue  the  Me- 
taphor) fprings  up  fpontaneoujly  from  the  fame  Ground-,  having 
been  fown  therein  by  Universal  Mind,  the  Caufe  of  Harmony : 
the  Difcernment  or  Senfe  of  this  Diftindion  needs  only  the  Warmth 
of  Genius,  to  raife  it  higher  and  higher  towards  Perfedion.  For 
a  Particular  Mind,  or  Getilus,  difpofed  to  Harmony  and  Mufick, 

S  2  is 


I40  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

have  alfo  learnt  the  Bounds  ^^  of  thefe  Intervals,  and 
how  many  Syftems  '^  of  Sounds  are  compofed  out  of 


th 


em 


is  (as  it  were)  the  Air  iinthhi,  warmed  by  the  Rays  of  the  Intel- 
leSfual  Sim; — Rays,   which   refine   the   Mental  Facultys ;  quicken 
the  Difcernment  oi Sumetiefs  and  Differefice  in  all  Things;  Iharpen 
the  Senfe    of  Order,  Harmony,   and  Proportion,    in   the  JVorks  of 
Nature  ;  and  form  a  fine  as  well  as  a  juft  Taile  of  whatever,  in  the 
Works  or  Operations  of  Art,  is  agreeable  to  thofe  Outward  Copys 
of  the  Mind  of  Nature.  —  Thro  this   innate  Senfe   of  Harmony, 
livelieft  in  the  fined  Genius,  it  was  difcovered,   that  the  fmallejl 
Interval   oi  Confonance  was  the  Diateffdron ;  for  that  every  Inter- 
val, fmaller  than  This,  was   dijfonant.     Thro  the  fame  Senfe,    a 
farther  Difcovery  was  alfo  made,  of  Seven  more  Intervals  of  Con- 
fonance.    Each  greater   than   the   preceding,    when   placed   in    the 
Order   now   to    be  exhibited; — the  Diapente ;    the  Diapa/on ;    the 
Diateffaron  added  to  Diapafon,  as  One  Interval  ;   the  Diapente  added 
to   Diapafon,    in   like    manner;    the   Difdiapafon ;    the   Diatejjaron 
added  to  Difdiapafon,  as  One  Interval ;    and  the  Diapente  added  to 
Difdiapafon,    in  like  manner:    Every  Interval  between  any  Tivo  of 
thefe  Eight  was  perceived  to  be  an  Interval  of  Difonance. 

93  The  Bounds  of  each  Interval  are  thofe  T^wo  Mufical  Soiindsy 
from  Either  of  which  there  is  made  an  immediate  Step  or  I'ran- 
fition  to  the  Other.  Of  all  Mufical  Sounds  the  Three  principal 
were  yirdTrt  the  ?noJl  Grave,  rmn  the  moji  Acute,  and  jugcrM. 
the  Middle  between  thofe  other  Two,  on  the  moft  ancient 
Scale  of  Mufick ;  which  confifled  of  only  Seven  Sounds,  pro- 
duced by  ftriking  on  the  fame  number  of  Strings,  all  of  dif- 
ferent Lengths.  We  account  thofe  Three,  juft  now  mentioned,, 
the  principal,  becaufe  the  firft  and  eaileft  Divifion  of  any  Quan- 

tity> 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  141 

thy,  whetlier  it  be  continuous  or  difcrete,  is  into  Two  equal  Parts, 
er  Halves ;  the  mo{l  dijihiguifljable  Points  or  Bounds  of  it  there- 
fore, however  it  be  afterwards  fubdivided,  are  the  Tivo  Extreatns 
and  the  Middle.  Accordingly  FlatOy  in  his  4th  Book  de  Repub- 
licd,  pdit:  Cantab:  pag:  314,  fpeaking  of  the  rsaT)?,  the  uVaT};, 
and  the  /^fV«,  the  Uighejl,  the  Loweji,  and  the  Middle  Sound  in 
Mufick,  calls  them  o^as  r^fTs  d^fAovia?,  the  Three  Bounds  of  Har- 
mony; and  likens  to  them  the  Three  mo  ft  evidently  dijiinguijhed 
Parts  of  the  Soul, — the  Rational  Part,  the  Higheft, —  the  Concu- 
fijcibk,   the  Loweft, — and  the  Irajcibk,  between  them  Both» 

9^  A  Syjlem  is  a  Compofitioji  of  Three  or  more  Mufical  Sounds  j  or 
(what  amounts  to  the  lame  thing)  it  is  an  'Extent,  comprehend" 
ing  Tivo  or  more  Intervals. — Of  thele  Syftems  the  general  Diver- 
Jiiys  are  laid  down  by  Arijiides,  pag:  15,  5c  feq.  But  in  HhDe- 
fnition  of  a  Syjicm,  (as  it  is  printed,)  an  important  Error  de- 
fer-ves  Notice.  T'or  we  there  read  —  'Trhc-idvuiv  n  ^voiv,  —  tnore  than 
Two  : — inftead  of  which,  we  ought  to  read — S^mlv  /t  irXeiovoiv,  Tivo 
er  more;  or  elfe — TrAeiovoov  >j  gVo?,  more  than  One:  which  laft  are 
the  very  words,  ufed  by  Arijloxenus,  Euclid,  and  Gaudentius,  in 
Their  Definitions  of  a  Syjlem.  The  Error  probably  arofe  from, 
fome  Manufcript  Copy  oi  Arifiides,  happening  to  be  not  eafily 
legible  in  this  place.  The  Tranfcriber  of  it  therefore,  we  fup- 
pofe,  confuited  Baccheius  ;  who  in  His  Definition  of  a  Syfiem,  ufeth 
the  words  —  ttX^ovkv  yi  Suoiv'  —  thefe  words  are  right  indeed  in 
Baccheius,  bccaufe  they  are  by  Him  applied  to  (f'^oy^wv  Mufical 
Sounds,  agree,  bly  to  Our  Firfi  Definition;  but  they  would  be 
wrong  in  Arifiides,  where  he  is  fpeaking,  not  of  Of^iy^m,  but  of 
^ictq'Yifjiccriov  the  Intervals  oj  thoj'e  Sounds,  agreeably  to  our  Second 
Definition. — On  the  many  Diverfitys  and  Variations,,  to  be  made 
in  fo  large  a  Field  of  Syfiems,  are  founded  thofe  many  different 
Forms,   Figures,   or  Modes,  of  HarmonV;    or  Sorts  o{  Tunes,    (the- 

Greek. 


142         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

them  ;  (which  our  Predeceflbrs  having  difcovered, 
-delivered  down  to  Us,  who  come  after  them,  by  the 
•name   of  Harmonys  ^" ;    and    having   difcovered   other 

fuch 

'Greek  Writers  call  them  nh),  y-'jopxi,  ^jj^ara,  t^Jxch,  and  roroi 
ttofjiorioi.?)  the  general  Kinds  of  which,  according  to  Ai-ijlides,  pag: 
25,  are  Thefe  —  \\it  Dorkk,  xht  Pbrygia?!,  and  the  Lydtan :  if 
tins  be  true,  all  the  other  Modes  are  to  be  confidered  as  fiib- 
■ordinate  to  thefe  Three ;  and  indeed  they  feem.  Some  of  them, 
lo  be  Intenfw7is,  Others  to  be  Remiffwns,  and  Others  to  be  Mix- 
iures,  of  Thofe  the  more  moderate  and  fimple. 

57  The  word  cl^f/.Qvicc,  Harmony,  was  ufed  in  different  Senfes 
bv  the  old  Grecian  Writers.  We  learn  from  Nicomachus,  that 
the  moft  ancient  Writers  on  Miijick  gave  the  name  oi  Harmony 
•to  that  n:ion:  perfedl  Confonance,  the  Diapafon. — Ariftoxenns  and 
Euclid  mt2ir\,  by  the  Term  Harmony,  That  Kind  of  Melody,  which 
is  called  Enharmonic.  —  Plato  and  Arijlotle,  when  they  fpeak  of 
Harmony  in  the  fmgular  number,  without  the  addition  of  an 
Epithet,  denoting  the  Sort,  mean,  by  that  Term,  the  Idea,  which 
is  commonly  nowadays  expreffed  by  the  Term  Miifick ;  —  pro- 
bably, becaufe  it  was  the  Firft  difcovered  oi  thofe  Sciences,  as  well 
as  the  Firft  ijiventeJ  of  thofe  Arts,  which  were  anciently  com- 
prehended together  in  Otie  general  Idea,  expreffed  in  One  Word, 
and  termed  Mufck.  What  Sciences  and  Arts  were  included  in 
the  Meaning  of  that  general  Term,  it  will  be  more  opportune 
to  fpecify  in  the  next  Note. — But  when  the  fame  great  Philo- 
fophers  fpeak  of  Harmonys  in  the  plural  number,  they  mean  thofe 
difTerent  Forms  or  Modes  of  Harmony,  whofe  Specific  Differences 
depend  on  the  different  Syjlcms,  or  on  the  different  Order  of  thofe 
Syllems,   of  which  they  are   fevcrally  compofed. — To  the  Term 

Harmony 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  143 

fuch  Affeclions  "*  in  the  Motions  of  the  Body,    and  in 
Words  '',    meafuring    thefe    by   Numbers,    they    have 

taught 

Harmony  ia  this  latter  Senfe  only,  (as  it  fignifys  a  Mode  of  Har- 
mony,) agrees  the  following  Definition  of  it,  given  us  by  Tbeo, 
and,  long  after  him,  by  Pfelha ;  —  'A^jxovla.  sq-i  a-vc^i^ixclTcov 
cvvToc^ii.  A  Harmony  (not.  Harmony  in  general)  is  a  Compofitlon 
(or  an  Ordering  together)  of  Syjlems. — On  this  Definition  Boiiillaud 
in  his  Notes  to  'Theo,  pag:  2i;o,  judicioufly  thus  obferves, — 
Vacat  hie  Har?noniam,  quos  alii  appellant  TodTrm  feu  To'ras.  —  On 
this  Subjeft  we  fliall  only  obferve  farther,  that  the  Synthefs  of 
Harmony,  prefented  to  us  by  Plato  in  the  whole  Paflage  now 
before  us,  beginning  from  fimple  (f'^oyfoi  or  Mifical  Sounds, 
(which  are  the  Ele?nents  or  primary  conflituent  Parts  of  Har- 
mony,) is  exadlly  the  fame,  and  proceeds  in  the  fame  Order, 
with  That  Synthefis,  which  is  taught  by  all  the  ancient  Greek 
Writers  on  Mufick  :  One  Proof  among  Many,  This,  of  Plato  z 
Knowlege  in  the  Theory  of  Mufick.  Agreeably  to  which  obfer- 
vation,  Plutarch,  in  his  Treatife  xg^l  jicacrixflf,  informs  us,  that 
Plato  applied'  his  Mind  clofely  to  the  Science  of  Mufick ;  having 
attended  the  Lectures  of  Draco  the  Athenian,  and  thofe  o^  Me- 
tellus  of  Agrigentum.  Or  if  we  fuppofe,  that  Plato,  in  this  Part 
of  the  prefent  Dialogue,  did  no  more  than  faithfully  record  the 
Dodlrine  of  Socrates,  our  fuppolition  is  very  jufi:ifiable_j  for 
Socrates,  in   his  Old  h"^^,   fludied  Mufick  under  Connus. 

9^  That  is,  • —  fuch  Relations  and  Proportions,,  (or  to  make  ufe 
of  Mufical  Terms)  fuch  Steps  and  Tranfitions,  Interiials  and 
Bounds,  Syjiems  i.n^Compofitions,  in  the  ikTo/zW  of  the  Body,  and  in 
Words,  as  are  analogous  to  \\\q  Aff'eBions  of  Mifical  Sounds,  called 
by  thofe  very  Names.  —  The  Greek,  word,,  which  we  have  ren- 
dered. 


144 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


dered  into  Englifli  by  the  word  AffeBions,  in  the  Paffage  of 
Plato  now  before  us,  is  7ra.'9->?,  and  tranflated  literally,  fignifys 
PqfJJons.  For,  whatever  Situation,  Condition,  or  Circumftance, 
any  Being  or  Thing  is  placed  in  by  fome  Other, — or  by  its  Re- 
lation to  fome  Other,  —  in  whatever  way  it  is  a(fled  on,  or 
afFeded  by  that  Other,  —  fuch  Situation,  Sec,  of  the  Being  or 
Thing  fo  placed,  io  aEled  on,  or  fo  affected,  was  by  the  Greek 
Philofophers  termed  a  xa'5'05,  a  PaJJion  of  fuch  Being ;  becaufe, 
in   that  refped,    the  Being  is  pajjive. 

59  In  the  printed  Greek  of  this  Paflage  we  read  only,  — 
%vTe  TxTi  y.iviiaea-iv  au  ry  c-w'/xaTos  —  immediately  after  which,  — 
'tvre  'p)if/.a.aiv,  —  ought  to  follow,  but  is  omitted.  This  will  be 
rendered  probable,  at  the  leaft,  by  the  two  next  Notes  ;  to 
which  we  fliall  here  prefix  the  following  Obfervations. — The 
ancient  Grecians,  in  their  Idea  of  Mufick,  comprehended  the 
Sciences  of  Harmony,  Rythm,  and  Metre;  —  that  is, — a  pexfedt 
Theory  of  Sounds,  Mujical  and  Harmonic, — oi  Motions  of  the  Body, 
regular  and  well-proportioned,  —  and  of  Words,  the  Meaning  of 
which  (and  perhaps  the  Sound  alfo,  when  thofe  Words  are  properly 
pronounced,)  agrees  with  thofe  Mujical  Sounds,  and  thofe  Rythmic 
Motio?2s ;  all  Three  joining  to  produce  One  great  Effed  on  the 
Souls  of  the  Hearers  and  Speftators. — On  the  Principles  of  thofe 
three  Branches  oi  Mujicul  Science  were  of  old  founded  the  Arts 
of  Focal  and  Injlrumental  Harmony,  Dancing,  and  Poetry; — Arts, 
which  advanced  nearer  and  nearer  to  Perfedion,  as  the  Minds 
of  Men  became  more  and  more  refined  and  poliflied,  thro  the 
Study  of  Mufick.  —  We  are  furniflied  indeed  by  Nature  with 
fufficient  Powers  to  produce  the  feveral  Materials  for  thofe  Arts, 
or  their  SubjeSl -Matter  ;  namely, — inarticulate  Sounds, — voluntary 
Motions  of  our  Bodys,  or  of  its  Limbs, — and  Speech  in  general, 
or  Voice  articulated. — Nature  has  alfo  taught  us  to  exprefs,  by 
thofe  feveral  Signs,  the  Paffions,  Affedions,  and  Sentiments  of 
6  our 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  145 

our  Souls.  But  flie  has  left  to  Us  the  harmonifuig  of  thofe 
Sounds,  the  regulating  of  thofe  Motions,  and  the  modulating  of 
our  Speech, — not  only,  fo  as  to  attract  and  charm  the  attention 
of  Thofe  who  fee  and  hear  us, — but  farther,  fo  as  to  raifc  in 
them  fuch  Sentiments,  Paflions,  and  Affcdlions,  as  we  feel,  or 
feign  to  feel,  our  Selves,  and  think  it  good  to  impart  to 
Others.  To  accomplifli  this  End,  were  the  Mufical  Arts  in- 
vented ;  and  Rules,  and  Syftems  of  Rules,  were  compofcd  and 
framed,  for  the  teaching  and  learning  of  thefe  Arts.  But  the 
Sciences,  on  whofe  Principles  thefe  Arts  are  founded,  have  their 
foundation,  Themfclves,  in  iiniverfal  Nature,  —  in  That  Part  of 
it,  which  is  everlaftingly  the  Same, — in  the  Harmony  and  Sym- 
metry of  Things,  which  are  the  outward  ExpreJJions  of  Thofe 
harmonious  and  jufUy-meafured  Forms,  the  Ideas  of  Univerfal 
Mind;  whofe  all  -  comprehenfive  Intelligence,  or  Wifdom,  is 
Measure  its  Self,  —  T\\&  Meafure  of  All  things.  —  For  thefe 
Ideas  are  the  Oj'iginals  of  that  Symmetry  and  that  Harmony,  which 
appear  exemplified  in  the  Forms  of  Outward  Nature  :  and 
Thefe  their  Exemplifications,  the  copied  Forms,  imperfedl  as 
they  are,  ferve  Us  for  the  Foundations  of  our  Science  j  which 
Science,  in  all  its  Compartments,  we  begin  to  build,  as  foon 
as  our  Minds  are  excited  by  thofe  external  Forms,  fo  as  to  look 
within  Themfelves,  and  to  contemplate  there  the  more  exadV, 
tho  faint,  Copys  of  the  fame  divine  Originals. — Now  the  In- 
ternal Forms  of  Symmetry  and  Harmony,  {pbfcured  by  thofe 
Corporeal  Images  which  excite  them,  yet  ftill  bright,  \\\  pro- 
portion to  the  Brightnefs  of  the  Mind  where  they  arife  to 
View,)  are,  as  we  conceive,  meant  by  the  Mtfcs,  thofe  fuperior 
Beings  in  the  old  Mythology,  from  whom  the  whole  Science 
and  Art  of  Mufick  took  its  Name.  For  they  were  fuppofed  td 
infpire  Men,  Such  as  they  favoured,  with  a  juft  Senfe  or  Tafte 
of  Harmony,  Rytbm,  and  Metre ;  and  with  a  Genius  for  thofe  Arts, 

T  which 


146 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


taught  us  to  call  tbem  Rythms  '"  and  Metres  '°'  ;  bid- 
ding us  to  infer  from  hence,  that  Ev^ery  One-and-Many' 
eu^ht  to  be  fearched  into  and  examined  in  the  fame 

way  ;) 

which  are  founded  on  that  natural  Scnfe^  improved  by  Science. 
— The  fame  allegorical  Perfons,  the  Miifes,  are  alfo  fabled  to  be 
the  Daughters  of  Mj'jj.uoo-Jd)  Memory,  begotten  by  'Jupiter..  And, 
if  the  Platonic  Philofophy  be  true,  our  conception  of  What 
were  meant  by  thofe  Mufes,  rightly  explains  the  Allegorical 
Fable  of  their  Parentage.  For,  if  all  Particular  Minds  are  de- 
rived from  XJni'vcrJal  Mind,  the  Mind  of  Nature,  then  mufl  T^heir 
Ideas  be  derived  from  the  Di'vine  Ideas,  as  having  been  im- 
planted or  /own  in  them  by  their  proper  and  true  Sire :  and 
when  thefe  Embryon-Ideas  are  born,  or  Jpring  up  in  any  Far- 
ticular  Mind,  they  are  fo  natural  to  her,  that  ilie  is  apt  to 
take  them  for  her  oion  Produ6lions,  her  own  long-loft  and  long- 
unthought-of  Offspring ;  and  to  recognife  them  for  Such,  as  if 
thro  her    own   adlual  Reminijcence. 

'°°  Bythm,  in  general,  is  an  Order  of  hofnogeneous  Motions, 
meafured  by  I'ime.  Motions  homogeneous  we  call  all  fuch  Mo- 
tions, as  are  made  in  i\i&  fame  way.  and  manner ;  whether  they 
are  made  by  one  and  the  fame  'Thing,  as  for  inftance,  by 
the  Foot  or  Hand  in  beating  Time  to  a  Tune ;  or  whether 
by  different  Things,  as  for  inftance,  by  all  the  Four  Feet  of 
a  Horfe,  one  after  another,  in  walking  or  in  galloping.  — 
Now  all  Order  infers  DiJVmSiion,  ' —  a  Diflindion  of  the 
Parts  of  fome  Whole.  And  where  the  Whole  confifts  in 
Motion,  as  doth  a  Dance  for  inftance,  all  the  Parts  of  it  are  fo 
many  diftiriB.  Motions,  and  all  thefe  Motions  are  homogeneous. 
Every  diftindl  Motion  hath  its  Bounds,  —  a  Beginning  and  an 
Tending  ;  —  Bounds,    which    are  feparated  by  Intervals   of   both 

Space 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


H7 


space  and  Time.  For  forne  Part  of  Space  muft  be  between  the 
Place  from  which  the  Thing  in  motion  began  to  move,  and 
the  Place  to  which  it  moves,  and  where  That  Motion  of  it 
ends:  fome  Portion  of  Time  alfo  muft  elapfe  during  fuch  Mo- 
tion, if  no  Motion  can  be  quite  inftantaneous,  or  without  a 
Lapfe  of  Time.  Two  diJlijiB  Motions  of  one  and  the  fame 
Thing,  as  of  the  Human  Body  for  inftance,  require,  at  the 
leaft,  a  Point  of  Time.,  for  an  Inter'val  between  them.  Three 
or  more  fuch  Motions,  having  Intervals  of  Time  both  within 
and  between  them, — Intervals  unequal,  but  well-proportioned, 
— make  a  Syjiem  or  Compofition  of  Motions, — an  Integral  Part 
of  fome  Dance:  ^nd.  Many  of  thefe  Syjiems  (Each  of  them  be- 
ing, in  the  Times  of  its  Intervals  taken  together,  equal  to  every 
one  of  the  reft,)  compofe  a  whole  Dance;  all  the  Parts  of 
which  o-ui'ToiTlsTcti  are  ordtj'ed  together,  and  are  proportioned. 
Each  to  Other   and   to   the  Whole. 

'°'  In   the  Greek,  —  //g'r^a.  —  The    term   fxerpov,   in   common 

acceptation,    fignifies   Meafure  in   general.     But    the   manner,    in 

which    that  word   is   introduced  by  Plato    in    the  Sentence   nov/ 

before   us,   fhows,    that   'tis    here    ufed   in   That    peculiar   Senfe, 

given    it    by   the    ancient   Greek  Grammarians,    in    teaching  the 

Art   of  Verfification.     Accordingly,    the   Romans,    who  derived 

all    their   Skill    in    that   Art    from    the   Grecians,    retained   the 

word  ixiT^ov,    in  Latin   Characters   metrum,    as'  a  Technical  Term, 

appropriated   to  Poetical  Meajure  folely,    the  Meafure   of  Syllables 

in    a  Verfe.  —  Our  old  ILngliJlo  Poets   indeed   fometimes,    by    the 

word   Meafure,     mean    a  Dance;     (probabl)'-    becaufe    our  Britijh 

Anceftors    ufed   to   dance  to  the  Verfes   of  their  Bards;)   but  we 

venture   to    affert,    that   the    old   Grecians,    by    the   word    fAerpx, 

Meafiires,  never  meant  Meafures  in   tht  Motiotis  of  the  Body ;  for 

Such  they  exprefs   only  by   the  term  pt;3-/>to)  Rythms.     This  Con- 

fideration    firft   led   us   to    fufpedl   the   prefent  Paflage    to  be,    in 

fome  Part  or  other  of  it,  wrong  printed  :   and   the  Tranflations 

T  2  of 


i4§ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


of  it,   made  by  Ficinus,  Grynceus,   and  Serranus,   confirmed   us  in- 
this  Sufpicion.      For  they  tranflate,   as  if  in  the  MSS,  made  ufe 
of    by    Them,    next    to    the    words  —  g*'    Tt   Ta?s    y.maemv  aZ   ra 
GMfj-ciToi, — they  found   written, — ev  re  i^^ixaciv — tho  indeed    erro~ 
neoufly  fo  written,   inftead  of — gV  ii  p)y.aaiv, — as  in  this  Englifli 
Tranflation    we   have    not    fcrupled  to    take   for  granted.     The- 
Miftake  is   only  of  the  Letter  p,    to  which    the   erroneous  Cha- 
radler    has    a   very    near    refemblance :     it    was    committed    the 
more  eafily,    becaufe    ^y)j^a.^cc,    in   Platos    own    Writings,     fre- 
quently   fignifys    any   Figures,    dej'cribed    by   the  Motions   of  the 
Body  in  Dancing.     So  in  AriJlotle%  Poeticks,  Cap:  i,  (>^y.a.TiZo]jLivoi 
pv^fjLGi  fignify  the  meafured  Motions  of  Dancers,  imitating,   by  the 
various  Figures  which  they  dejcribe,  the  various  Manners,  Affec- 
tions,   and  Adions  of  Human  Kind.     But  Plato,   in   the  prefent 
PafTage,  is  fpeaking  of  the  SubjeB- Matter  of  Rythms  or  Meafures 
in  Dancing, — namely.    Motions  of  the  Body, — and  not  of  Figtires,. 
which  are  defcribed  by  thofe  Motions,   and  conflitute  the  Struc- 
ture of  the   Dance; — in  like   manner,    as   he   had  juft   before 
fpoken  of    the   SubjeSt-Matter   of  Harmonys,  —  namely,   Mufical 
Sounds,  from  which   thofe  Harmonys  were  compofed,   or  confti- 
tuted :     and    in    the    fame  fcientific   way,    'tis   highly    probable, 
that  he  fliould  fpeak  of  the  SubjeB-Matter  of  Metres, — namely. 
Words,  —  before    he   mentioned  Metres   themfelves,.    which    are, 
framed    by    a    fit   Choice   and  Compolition    of    thofe    Words. — 
To   this    prefumptive   Argument   for    infcrting — gV  re  pyifj(.a.a-iv,—- 
we.  fhall  add  an  Obfervation,  of  weight  with  all  learned  Criticks  j. 
One  of  whofe  Rules,   in  judging  of  the  Corrednefs  of  dubious 
PafTIigcs   in  any   ancient.  Author,  is   to  compare  them   with   his 
Style    and   Language    in   other    PafTages    on    the    fame  Subjed : 
our     Obfervation     is    This,  -r—  that     where    P/ato    is     fpeaking 
of  the  Subjcti- Matter  of  the  Poetic  Art,   tho  fometimes  he  calls 
it    Ao'^os    Speech,    and    fometimes    At'^is   DiSlion,    yet     in    other 

places,^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  149 

phaces,  particularly  in  his  Writings  de  Lcgibtis,  pag:  660,  800, 
and  812,  Edit:  Stepb:  he  expreffes  the  llmie  Thing  by  the 
Term  pjyocara  Words:  and  thefe  Three  Terms  are  ufed  with 
equal  Propriety ;  for  all  Speech  and  DiSJion  coniin;  in  Words. 
—  Perhaps  the  old  Greek  Grammarians  ufe  a  flrider  Ac- 
curacy, when  they  lay,  that  Syllables  are  the  SubjeB- Matter 
of  Metres,  or  of  the  Feet  which  compofe  them  :  fee  the  Scholia' 
to  Hephejiion,  pag:  76,  Edit:  Paw:  and  again,  pag:  79,  lin:  ult: 
for  it  is  certain,  that  a  good  Verje  depends  on  the  juft  and 
precife  Meajure  of  each  Syllable  in  every  Word  of  it.  But 
an  Account,  fo  minute,  as  This  the  lafl:  mentioned,  would 
have  been,  not  only  futile  in  Plato,  but  quite  foreign  to 
his  more  important  Ends  in  treating  of  this  Subjed;.  Not  the 
StruBure  of  Verfes,  but  the  Sentiments,  conveyed  by  the  Words 
which  they  confift  of,  had  He  under,  his  confideration,  when- 
ever he  wrote  concerning  Poets  or  Poetry,  except  in  the 
PafTage  now  before  us.  For  he  has  here  in  View,  as  we 
imagine,  a  Jiill  more  important  End,  to  be  difcovered  in  the 
latter  Part  of  the  Dialogue  :  and  if  in  This  we  imagine 
rightly,  an  Exadnefs  too  minute  would  have  lefs  become  him 
here,  than  any  where  elfe. — Since,  however,  the  apparent  and 
profefled  Subjed  of  the  prefent  PalTage  is  Miijick,  —  and  fince 
the  Mnjick  of  every  Verfe  depends  on  the  Quantity  of  the  Syl^ 
lables  which  compofe  the  Words  of  it,  meafured  by  Time, — 
we  are  here  to  underfiand,  by  the  term  Words;  their  com- 
ponent Syllables.  —  Viewing  the  Paflage  in  this  Light,  we 
may  foon  perceive,  that  Words  are  attended  by  AffeSlions  Ijmilar 
to  Thofe,  which  attend  Miifical  Sounds  and  Motions  of  the-  Body. 
'Tis  eafy  to  perceive,  that,  as  every  diJilnB  Syllable,  which 
enters  into  the  compofition  of  a  Word,  is  compoled  o^  Letters, 
the  Elements  of  all  Speech,  it  muft  have  Two  Bounds, — namely, 
the  Firjl  Letter  of  it,  and  \X\q  Lajl :  'Tis  eafy  to  apprehend, 
3  that 


150         P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

that  an  Interval, — not   an   Interval   of  Place,    (Such  as    there  is 
in  Mufical  Notes,    marked  on   a  T)i<igram ;    or  Such,    as   in  Mu- 
fical    Sounds,    iffuing    from    the   Organs  of  the  Voice;)  —  72ot   an 
Interval  of  Space,    (as   there   is    between    the  Beginnmg  and    the 
Ending  of  every   diftind  Motioti  of  the  Body  {)   but  an  Interval  of 
'Time  only,    between  the    pronunciation   of  the  Firft  Letter   and 
the    pronunciation    of  the   Laft,    muft  intervene.      'Tis  eafy   to 
difcern,    that   an  Interval  of  Time  alfo,   in  fpeaking,   muft  divide 
every  Tiao  Syllables  of  a  Word,  as   well    as   every   Tivo  Words,    if 
pronounced    difinSlly,     let    the    latter   of   them    ever    fo    rapidly 
follow   the  former. — Nor  is  it  difficult  to   conceive,   that  thofe 
other  Affeclions  of  Mtifcal  Sounds,   mentioned   in  Note  98,    may 
be  attributed  to  Words  or  Syllables,  with  no  lefs  Propriety,    than 
to  Motions  of  the  Body.      From  What  Brinciples,    in  What   gra- 
dual Formation,   the  ancient  Writers  have  adtually  attributed  fuch 
AffeElions   to    the   Syllables    of  Words    in    Metre,    we    fliall    now 
endeavour  to  delineate. — The  Mafters  of  Metrical  Science,  mea- 
furing  Syllables   by   certain  or   definite  ^lantitys  of  Time,  adroit 
of   only   Two  fuch    Quantitys   in   Metre,    One  JJ:ort,    the   Other 
Jong  i    the    latter    of  which   is   twice   the  length    of   the    former. 
A  long  Syllable   therefore  is  analogous   to  a  Whole  Tone   in   the 
Scale   of  Mufick ;    as   a  Jliort    Syllable  is   to  a   Semito7ie.      The 
Interval  of  Time,    between  the  pronunciation  of  the  Firji  Let- 
ter  of  a   Syllable,    and    the   pronunciation   of    the  Lafl   Letter, 
afcertains    the  Sluantity  of  that  Syllable.     From    one  Syllable  to 
another    Syllable,    a  Motion    mull   of    neceffity    be    made :    and 
the   quickejl  Motion   is    made    from    a  Jhort  Syllable    to   another 
fuch ;    the  fowejl,    from   a  lo?ig  Syllable    to   fuch   another.      Two 
or  7nore  Syllables,    let  together  as  One  certain  Meafurc,   whether 
the    Syllables  be   fhort   or   long,   are  called  a  Foot.     Every  Foot 
is    One   progrefive    Step;    and    confifts  of  Two  Parts, — an   ol^o-ti 
and   a  'i^eijn,   an   elevation  and   a  depreffion  of  the  Voice  in  pro- 
nunciation. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


^5i 


nunciatlon.  Now  thcfe  Two  Parts  have  an  evident  Analo^v 
to  the  Two  Sounds  in  a  Mufical  Interval,  the  relatively  Acute. 
and  the  relatively  Grave:  they  are  alfo  exactly  liinilar  to  the 
Liftihg  lip  and  the  Setting  doivn  of  the  Foot,  (in  the  proper 
fenlb  of  the  word)  ncceflary  to  every  Step,  in  all  progrejjivc 
Motions  of  the  Body,  From  thefe  very  Motions  indeed  are  the 
tenns, — Arfis,  The/is,  and  Foot, — taken,  and  metaphorically  ufed, 
in  fpeaking  of  Metres  in  Poetry.  Hence  alio  a  Verfe,  when 
the  Feet  or  Steps  of  it  are  either  even  or  regularly  uneven,  is 
faid  to  run  'well;  when  they  are  uneven  without  any  Rule  or 
Law  of  Metre,  the  Verfe  is  called  lame,  and  is  faid  to  Jliimbk. 
—  In  fome  Sorts  of  Verfe,  T^'wo  Feet,  coupled  together,  and 
thence  called  a  av^vyla.,  form  the  Metre,  or  Meafure  of  the 
Verfe.  A  certain  Number  of  Metres,  whether  they  be  Jingle 
Feet,  or  av^vyicci  Pairs  of  Feet,  being  coUefted  and  compofed. 
together,  conftitute  either  a  <r''%o5  a  Verfe,  or  a  larger  Syjiem  of 
Metres, — an  Integral  Part  of  a  Poem:  for  a  Poem  is  a  Cofu- 
foftion  of  many  fuch  Verfes,  or  of  many  fuch  larger  Syfems. 
— Where  the  fingle  Feet  are  regularly  uneven,  or  where  the 
Combination  of  Feet  (which  is  alfo  called  the  Figure)  varys  in  a 
Verfe,  or  in  fome  larger  Syjiem  of  Metres,  there  is  evidently  a 
'Tranftion  from  one  Kind  of  Metre  to  another;  and  the  Metres 
are  then  faid  to  be  ToKuc^^piJ.dTic^cc  varioifly  figured.  See  Hephef- 
tion\  Enchiridion,  efpecially  in  pag:  63,  65,  and  59,  together 
with  the  Greek  Scholia  thereon.  —  Our  Aim,  in  giving  this 
fummary  account  of  Verffication,  is  to  fhow, — not  only,,  that 
the  fame  Aff'e6lions  are  incident  \.o  Mi fical  Sounds,  to  Motions,  of  the- 
Body,  and  to  Words  fpoken ;  —  but  alfo,  that  in  all  the  Three 
Mufical  Arts,  whofe  refpediive  Subjects  are  thefe  Three  feveral. 
Sets  of  Materials,  thofe  AfFcdions  are  expreifed  by  the  fame 
'terras:  And  if  we  have  not  miffed  our  Aim,  the  Meaning, 
which  we  have  attributed  to  the  word  jt/.g'x^a,  at  the  end  of  the 
3  prefent. 


152         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

prefent  Paflage  in  this  Dialogue,  feems  to  be  fufficiently  con- 
firmed. —  Now  if,  on  good  grounds,  we  have  fuppofed  the 
Greek  of  this  whole  Paflage  to  be,  in  fome  Part  of  it  or  other, 
faulty  or  imperfedl,  —  if  we  have  rightly  conjedured.  Where 
the  Fault  or  Imperfedion  lay,  —  and  if  we  have  not  ill  fuc- 
ceeded  in  our  Endeavours  to  corredl  and  perfedl  it,  —  then 
have  we  before  us  three  diftind  Inftances  oi  One  and  Many,  in 
the  Three  Mufical  Sciences,  thofe  of  Harmony,  Rythm,  and 
Metre  j  —  Sciences,  which  are  by  Plato  in  many  other  places, 
and  by  Arijlotle  in  his  Poeticks,  fpoken  of  together,  becaufe 
Mufical  Science,  in  the  general,  naturally  fpreads  or  divides  itfelf 
into  thefe  Three  Branches.  But  that  Each  of  them  alone,  is 
a  diflindl,  proper,  and  compleat  Inftance  of  One  and  Many, 
will  appear  by  confidering  Each  in  That  refped  only.  —  For 
Mufical  Sounds,  the  Subjed-Matter  of  Harmony,  being  alfo  the 
Elements  from  which  every  Form  of  Harmony  is  derived,  by 
Mixture  of  their  different  Intervals  in  different  Proportions, 
they  are  to  be  confidered  as  One  comprehenfive  Genus,  divifible 
into  Many  Kinds  and  Species  of  Plarmony. — In  like  manner,  thofe 
Motions  of  the  Body,  which  are  the  Subjed-Matter  of  Rythm, 
being  alfo  the  Elements  of  Rythm,  they  virtually  comprehend 
the  feveral  Forms  and  Figures  of  Rythmic  Motion ;  for  Thefe  all 
arife  from  thofe  Motions  and  their  different  Tranfitions,  mea- 
fured  by  proportioned  Parts  of  Time.  Hence  are  they,  as  it 
were,  fome  extenfive  Monad,  comprehending  every  Kind  and 
Species  of  Dance. — Nor  otherwife,  the  Syllables  of  Words,  being 
not  only  the  Subjed-Matter  of  Metre,  but  the  Elements  alfo, 
from  whofe  different  Compofitions  refult  the  various  Forms  of 
it,  may  juflly  be  confidered  as  a  mod:  ample  Monad,  pregnant 
with  all  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Metre. — Thus  we  find,  that 
Each  of  the  Mufical  Sciences,  taken  by  its  Self,  is  One  and 
Many. — Now  it  appears  from  the  whole  Tenour  of  the  Argu- 
mentation 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U     S. 


153 


mentation  of  this  Part  of  the  Dialogue,  that  Plato,  in  bring- 
ing fo  many  Injlances  of  One  and  Many,  meant  to  illuflrate  the 
following  Dodtrines;  —  that,  when  the  Subjed:  of  Dilpute,  or 
of  rational  Converfition,  is  fome  Gefieral  Idea^  containing  a 
definite  Many,  (that  is,  a  certain  number  of  Kinds  or  of  Species,) 
it  cannot  be- known  clearly  and  thoroivly,  without  a  Knowlege 
(n't  All  thofe  Af<27{y,  which  it  contains:  —  that  no  One  of  thofe 
Many  can  be  known  fundamentally,  (or,  as  derived  from  its 
Principles,)  without  a  Knowlege  of  that  Firjl  One,  v,\\ich  heads 
All  the  Many,  and  from  which  they  are,  All  of  them,  derived: 
—and  that  thofe  Many  muft  be  accurately  diftinguifhed  from 
each  other,  and  their  Specific  Differences  precifely  marked,  by 
all  Perfons  in  difcourfing  together,  if  they  would  avoid  the 
Error,  which  Protarchus  had  fallen  into,  in  his  account  of 
Pleafure,  That  of  confounding  One  Kind  or  Species  with  Another 
quite  different  from  it  ;  an  Error,  owing  to  This  Suppofition, 
—  that  Two  Things,  which  bear  the  fame  General  Name,  as 
having  the  fame  General  Nature,  mufl  therefore  be,  in  their 
whole  Effences,  the  Same. — To  illuflrate  thefe  Dodrines,  Harmony, 
Rythm,  and  Metre,  feem  to  be  the  fitteft  Inftances  of  One  and 
MaJiy,  among  all  that  could  be  chofen  at  the  Time  of  this 
Dialogue,  For  a  compleat  and  full  Difcovcry  of  the  whole 
Science  of  Miifick  was  made  but  a  fliort  time  before  :  the  Pro- 
feffors,  in  Each  of  the  Three  large  Branches  of  it,  were  then, 
but  not  till  then,  thorow  Majlers  of  what  they  refpedively  pro- 
fefled  :  it  was  now  ftudied  by  All  of  the  Athenian  Youth  who 
had  a  Liberal  Education  ;  Many  of  whom  were  Auditors  of  the 
Converfation  here  related.  Whenever  Inftances  are  to  be  brought, 
for  the  Proof  or  the  lUuflration  of  any  Doctrine,  delivered 
from  the  Mouth  of  Socrates,  Plato  is  always  accurately  careful 
to  choofe  Such,  as  are  the  moil  adapted  to  the  Underilanding, 
Tafte,  and  Charaders,  of  his  Audience.     But  in  his  Choice  of  the 

U  Inflances, 


T54         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

way  '°* ;)  when  you  have  learnt  all  thofe  things,  and 
comprehend  them  in  this  ample  manner,  with  all 
their  feveral  Diverlitys  and  Diftindions,  then  are  you 
become  Skilled  in  Mufick.  And  by  confidering  in 
the  fame  way  the  Nature  of  any  other  Kind  of  Be- 
ing, when  you  thus  fully  comprehend  it,  you  are 
become,  in  that  refped:,  intelligent  and  wife.  But 
the  infinite  Multitude  of  Individuals,  their  infinite 
Variety,  and  the  infinite  Changes,  incident  to  Each, 
keep  you  injinitely  far  off  from  Intelligence  and  Wif- 

dom  : 

Inftances,  now  before  us,  we  imagine  that  he  had  a  more 
important  End,  than  meerly  the  Obfervance  of  fuch  a  Pro- 
priety. We  imagine,  that  in  This  he  intended  to  give  his 
,Re3ders  (of  That  Age,  at  leaft,)  a  Hint  of  what  is  to  come  in 
the  latter  Part  of  the  Dialogue ;  where,  in  eftabliiliing  the 
Order  of  Things  good,  he  fets  in  fo  high  a  Rank  all  Thofe, 
the  Principle  of  which  is  Measure.  We  imagine,  that  to 
prepare  them  for  this  Dodrine  it  is,  that  he  railes  up  in 
their  Minds  afrefh  the  well-known  Ideas  of  Harmony,  Sym- 
metry, Rythm,  Numbers  and  Proportion  j  and  thus,  obfcurely 
at  a  dirtance,  anticipates  the  Decifion  of  the  prefent  Contro- 
verfy  concerning  the  Chief  Good,  by  reminding  them  of  Things 
better    and    more   valuable  than    either  Pleafure  or  Ktiowlege. 

'"*  This  long  Parenthefis  renders  the  Sentence,  in  which  it 
is  inferted,  fomewhat  obfcure  and  difficult.  'Twould  have  been 
eafy  for  us  to  avoid  the  Parenthefis  altogether,  by  breaking 
the  Sentence,    and   out  of  One  making  Many.      But   we  have 

chofea 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  155 

dom  '°' :  and  as  they  make  you  to  be  behind  other 
Men  in  every  path  of  Knowlege  '"%    they   make  you 

incon- 

chofen  to  follow  the  Steps  of  our  Author  all  along,  as  clofely 
as  we  are  able.  For  we  aim  at  prefenting  him  to  our  Fellow- 
Countrymen,  as  he  is ;  only  clothing  him  in  Englifli  Garments ; 
but  in  his  Make,  his  Gait,  his  Air  and  Afpedt,  throughout 
unchanged,  with  all  his  Blemi flies,  no  lefs  faithfully,  than 
with  all  his  Beautys.  Succefsful  fhould  we  think  ourfelves  in 
this  our  Aim,  could  we  exhibit  his  Beautys,  as  fairly  and  as 
fully  as  we  can  his  Bkmijhes.  And  long  Parenthefes  are,  with- 
out doubt,  great  Blemiflies  in  deliberate  and  cool  Writings. 
But,  as  in  Converfation  they  are  cullomary,  and  in  the  warmth 
of  Oral  Argumetttation  are  fcarcely  to  be  avoided,  perhaos  our 
Author  purpofely  introduced  Such  a  one  here,  to  give  his  Dia- 
logue more  the  Air  of  a  real  Converfation.  Perhaps  alfo,  by 
inclofing  Two  of  the  Three  Mufical  Sciences  in  This  Paren- 
thefis,  wherein  the  natural  Connedtion  and  the  Similarity  of 
all  Three  are  fliown,  he  would  have  us  take  them,  all  the 
Three,  for  One  fingle  Inftance  of  One  and  Many :  intimating  to 
us,  in  this  way,  that  All  things,  the  Excellence  and  very  EJfence 
of  which  depend  on  Measure,  naturally  are  allied  together, 
as  being  congenial',  juft  as  afterwards  he  fhows,  how  nearly  re- 
lated and  how  connatural  they  are.  All  of  them,  to  Mind. 

'°3  In  the  Greek, — ctireH^ov  tS  fpoitiv. — Mons'.  Grou  (to  whom 
the  French  Nation  are  greatly  obliged  for  their  having  the  Phi- 
lebus  and  other  of  the  finefl  Dialogues  of  Plato  in  their  own 
Language,)  rightly  obferves,  that  in  this  PafTage  there  is 
a  Playing  ivith  Words.  We  are  not  furprized,  however,  to 
find   no  jeux  des  mots  in  his   French   Tranflation    of  it.       This 

U  2  Sort 


^5^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


inconf.derable  '°^,  and  of  ^o  account,  not  to  be  num- 
bered amongft  the  Knowing  in  any  Subjeft  '°^  j  be- 
canfe  you  nev^r  confider  any  thing  thorowly,  and  are 

unable 

~5ort  of  Wit  is  indeed  impoffible  to  be  preferved  in  a  Meta- 
phrafe,  or  ftridl  Verlion  from  One  Language  into  another,  if 
the  two  Languages  greatly  differ  in  the  Words  by  which  they 
exprefs  the  fame  'Things.  The  Utmoft  that  can  be  done,  in 
fuch  a  cafe,  is  to  imitate  the  original  Puns,  by  making  new 
ones,  as  like  to  them  as  poflible.  But  'tis  very  difficult  to  make 
fuch  Puns  in  either  French  or  Latin.  Is  it  not  therefore  a 
little  uncandid  in  the  French  Tranflator,  to  accufe  the  Latin 
ones  of  not  underftanding  the  Puns  in  this  Paffage  ?  and  is  it 
not  more  probable,  that  they  All  equally  found  the  Puns  too 
difficult  for  Them  to  imitate,  as  well  as  impoffible  to  tranflate 
verbally  ?  But  to  imitate  thofe  Puns  in  Englijh,  we  find  a 
a  matter  of  no  difficulty  at  all :  the  reafon  of  which  is,  we 
prefume,  This — that  the  Fnglijli  Language  approaches  nearer  to 
the  Greek,  in  Copioufnefs  of  Words,  and  Variety  of  Meanings, 
than  doth  the  Latin,  or  any  of  its  Defcendants  now  living. — 
Some  of  our  Readers,  after  all,  may  perhaps  condemn  us,  for 
attempting  to  imitate  a  meer  Sporting  with  Words :  or,  if  they 
admit  the  Plea,  put  in  by  us  very  lately  on  Another  occafion, 
to  be  extendible  to  This,  and  acquit  us  as  being  only  Copiers, 
they  may  perhaps  condemn  our  Author ;  deeming  fo  ludicrous 
a  Sentence,  efpecially  at  the  Conclufion  of  this  Speech  of  So- 
crates, to  be  beneath  the  Dignity  of  a  Dialogue  fo  deeply 
philofophical  as  The  Philebus.  But  befides  what  we  have  to 
fay  in  general  on  this  Subjedt  in  a  Note  foon  to  follow,  we 
imagine,  tliat  the  great  Philofopher  plays  upon  words  with  a 
1  particular 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  157 

unable  to  give  a  true  Account  of  it,  never  looking 
at  the  definite  Number  which  it  contains  '°^ 

Protarchus. 
Excellently  well,   O  Philebus  !  as  it  appears  to  Me, 
has  Socrates  fpoken  in  what  he  has  now  faid. 

Philebus. 
It  appears  fo  too  to  Me  my  Self.     But  how  does  all 
this  Speech  of  his  concern  our  Controverfy  ?  What  was 
the  Defign  or  Drift  of  it  ? 

particular  view  in  this  place, — to  keep  Philebus  in  Good  Hu- 
mour :  for,  by  afTuming  a  jocofe  Air,  he  foftens  the  Severity 
of  the  Cenfure,  which,  tho  in  appearance  pointed  at  Protarchus, 
he  here   throws  obliquely  on  the  conceited  Sophift. 

^°*  In  the  Greek, — Ueie^ors. 

'°5  OJjc  fAXoyifjiov,  in  the  Greek. 

"'^  OJt'  ivoc^i^jjiioy.  Alluding  to  this  Verfe  of  Homer,  in 
Iliad.    L.  2.    ver.  202.       Oure    ttot*    ev    TroXifJLCi}  fvapi!i[ji.iof,     aV   ivi 

'°7  Protarchus  is  to  be  here  confidered  as  the  Reprefentatlve 
of  every  Man,  who  has  not  arranged  and  claffed  the  Subjedl- 
Matters  of  his  Speculation,  or  the  Beings  with  which  he  has 
to  do,  their  diverfe  Propertys  and  Accidental  Affedlions,  under 
diftinft  Heads  juftly,  by  referring  them  to  their  feveral  Kinds 
and  Species  according  to  Nature  j  for  Thefe  are  Things  inva- 
riable, and  among  the  Objedis  therefore  of  Kno'wlege.  See  Note 
26  to   the  Meno. 

Socrates. 


158         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

A   very  pertinent  Queftion,    O  Protarchus !    This, 

propofed  to  us  by  Philebus. 

» 

Protarchus. 

Indeed  it  is  :    and  by  all  means,   give  it  an  Anfwer. 

Socrates. 

That  will  I  do,  as  foon  as  I  have  gone  thro  the  Little 
yet  remaining  of  the  Subjedt,  on  which  I  have  been 
fpeaking.  For,  as  the  Man,  who  applies  himfelf  to 
the  confideration  of  any  Kind  of  Things  whatever, 
ought  not,  as  I  have  faid,  to  throw  his  Eye  at  once 
upon  the  Infinite,  but  upon  fome  definite  Number  in 
the  firft  place  ;  fo  on  the  other  hand,  when  a  Man  is 
obliged  to  fet  out  from  the  Infinite  '°^,    he  ought  not 

to 

""^  The  Divifion  of  any  Being,  or  Attribute  of  Being,  Into 
Its  Kinds  and  Species,  defcending  from  the  moji  Gejieral  gra- 
dually to  the  mojl  Special,  is  (as  we  have  feen)  the  Method, 
recommended  by  Socrates,  for  teaching  and  for  learning  any 
Science,  heretofore  difcovered.  See  page  126  of  this  Dialogue. — 
The  great  Mafler  of  DialeSlick  proceeds  to  fliow  the  Method, 
by  which  every  Science  was  difcovered  Jirjl ;  and  to  recommend 
the  fame  Method,  for  advancing  the  Dfcovcry  of  any  Science, 
and  for  reBifying  fuch  Errors  in  the  teaching  and  learning  of 
it,  as  muft  have  arifen  from  a  Divifion  originally  wrong  or 
1  incomplcat. 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S.         159 

incompleat.  —  Now  this  latter  Method  is  diredly  contrary  to 
that  Other,  which,  beginning  from  One,  defcends  to  Many  by 
Divifion  and  Stibdivifions  :  for  This  begins  from  the  Infinity 
of  Particulars,  colleding  them  into  Many  diflindt  Species ;  goes 
on,  to  comprife  Many  feveral  Species  in  a  few  diftindl  Genera 
or  Kinds ;  and  thus  gradually  afcends  to  fewer  ftill,  and  more 
General  i  till  they  are,  all  of  them,  difcovered  to  have  One 
common  Nature,  in  which  they,  all  of  them,  agree.  —  An 
Example  of  this  afcending  Method  is  here  given  us,  in  the 
Invention  of  Letters,  thofe  Elements  of  all  Language.  In  this 
Example  the  Afcent  is  Ihorter,  than  perhaps  in  any  other, 
poffible  to  be  given.  For  it  confifts  of  only  Three  Steps; 
wonderful  of  Contrivance  in  the  Mafter-Builder  j  but  when 
built,  very  eafy  of  Afcent;  fo  well  have  they  been  fmoothed 
by  good  Workmen  in  this  Elementary  Part  of  Gi-ammar.  For 
this  very  reafon,  indeed,  anoong  others,  we  prefume  it  was, 
that  Socrates  chofe  it  for  his  Inftance  of  the  congregating  and 
uniting  Method,  in  the  attainment  of  Science :  as  he  before 
chofe  it  for  his  Firjl  Injlance  of  One  and  Many,  becaufe  it  was 
the  moft  eafy  to  be  apprehended  by  his  Audience; — a  reafon, 
which  he  Himfelf  gave  them,  when  firft  he  mentioned  Sounds 
Articulate. — His  Second  Inftance  of  One  and  Many,  That  in  Mufick, 
would  certainly  have  been  alone  fufficient;  becaufe  all  his 
Audience  were  verfed  in  Miifick,  no  lefs  than  they  were  in 
Grammar:  but  he  began  with  the  mention  oi  Sounds  Articulate, 
for  the  fake  of  introducing,  regularly  and  fcientifically,  the 
rnention  o{  Harmony.  Fof  the  Firft  Divifion  oi  Vocal  Sound,  in 
general,  (as  we  obferved  in  Note  90,)  being  into  Articulate  and 
Mujical,  {Articidate  Sound,  the  Subjed:-Matter  of  Language,  — 
Mufical  Sound,  the  Subjecft- Matter  of  Harmony,^  —  Articulate 
Sound  ought  to  ftand  Firjl  in  Order;  becaufe,  tho  Mzz/^i:^/ Sound, 
with  refped  to  Univerfal  Nature,  muft  be  acknowleged  prior  to 

Articul.it& 


i6o         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

to  mount  up  immediately  to  the  One ;  but  to  fome 
certain  Number,  in  Each  of  whofe  Ones  a  certain 
Multitude  is  contained  ;  and  thus  gradually  rifing  from 
a  greater  to  a  lefs  Number,  to  end  in  One.  As  an 
Inftance  of  what  I  have  now  faid,  let  us  refume  the 
confideration  of  Letters. 

Protarchus. 
In  what  way? 

Socrates. 

Whoever  it  was,  whether  fome  God,  or  fome  Divine 
Man,  (the  Egyptian  Reports  fay,  that  his  name  was 
Theuth,)  who  firft  contemplated  the  Infinite  nature 
of  the  Human  Voice,  He  obferved,  that,  amongft  the 
Infinity  of  the  Sounds  it  uttered,  the  Vowel  Sounds  '°' 

Articulate  in  Dignify ;  yet  'tis  equally  certain,  that,  with  refpedl 
to  Man,  Sounds  Articulate  are  not  only  prior  in  lime  to  Sounds 
Mufical,  (on  every  Scale  of  Mufick,)  but  in  Value  alfo  are 
pre-eminent :  becaufe  Language  is  neceflary  to  Man's  Social  Life, 
and  perhaps  even  to  his  continuance  in  Being ;  whereas  Mujick 
is  ufeful  only  to  the  Purpofes  of  Civil  Life,  and  contributive 
only  to  Man's  Well-Being. 

'°5  That  is, — Sounds  purely  Vocal;  whence  the  Letters,  by 
which  they  are  diftinguiflied,  are  called  Vowels;  in  tlie  utterance 
of  which  Sounds,  the  Voice  folcly  is  employed,  whillt  the  other 
Organs  of  Speech  remain  inadive. 

were 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         i6i 

were  more  than  One,  they  were  Many.  Again, 
Other  Utterances  he  obferved,  which  were  not  in- 
deed Vowels  "°,  but  partook,  however,  of  fome  Kind 
of  Vocal  Sound  '"  ;  and  that  of  thefe  alfo  there  was 
a  certain  Number  "\  A  Third  Sort  of  Letters, 
alfo  he  fet  apart,  Thofe,  which  are  now  called  Mutes 

"°  In  the  Greek  of  this  Paflage,  as  it  is  printed  by  Aldus 
and  by  Stephens,  we  here  read — ipwi^s  f/.iv  a,  (pS-J^fo  <rg  jjc^Ti^ovrd 
Tivoi'  —  a  Reading  which  may  be  tolerably  well  Supported  by 
what  foon  follows.  But  the  Marghi  of  the  Firft  Bajil  Edition 
of  Flato  has  fuggefted  to  us  a  Reading,  in  which  appears  a 
Diftinftion  more  obvious  and  plain,  than  there  is  between 
<fm-n  and  q^'^oy'^Qi,  Voice,  and  Soimd  of  the  Voice.  For,  in  that 
Margin,  we  are  diredted  to  read  the  word  oira  (found  perhaps 
in  fome  Manufcript  Copy  of  Plato,)  immediately  after  the  word 
(fuvni,  and  before  the  words  fjiiv  «,  in  this  Sentence.  Now 
thefe  Two  words,  (prnvm  ovTct,  put  together,  very  little  differ 
from  foofnei'To.,  a  word,  which  gives  to  this  Part  of  the  Sen- 
tence a  Meaning  quite  agreeable  to  the  Tenor  of  the  Whole 
of  it,   and   to  the  Language  of  all  Grammarians. 

"'  Thefe  were  by  the  old  Grammarians  called  })/j.l(p(ai'x  Sev2i~ 
Vowels;  becaufe,  in  their  very  formation  by  the  Organs  of 
Speech,  they  are,  of  neceffity,  fo  far  accompanied  by  the  Voice^ 
as  to  give  -  a  Hal/- Vocal  Sound,  without  the  open  Aid  of  any 
Vowel. 

"-  The  Greek  Grammarians  enumerate  Eight  of  thefe  Semi- 
Vowels. 

X  by 


i62  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

by  Us  "'.  After  this,  he  diftinguifhed  Every  one  of 
Thefe  Letters,  which  are  without  any  Vocal  Sound, 
whether  perfect  or  imperfect  "'^ :    the  Vowels  alfo,  and 

thofe 

"3  Socrates,  by  exprefling  himfelf  in  this  manner,  concern- 
ing the  general  Name  of  this  Third  Sort  of  Letters,  as  if  it 
were  then  neisly  given  them  at  Athens,  feems  to  difapprove  it. 
Perhaps  the  ancient  Term,  o-J^.(p(wva  Confo7iants, — a  Term,  ap- 
plied by  the  new  Grammarians  to  the  -^fxlfcava.  Semi-Vowels,  as 
well  as  to  the  a'lpwfa  Mutes, — was^  in  His  Judgment,  properly 
applicable  to  Thofe  Letters  only,  which  yield,  of  themfelves> 
no  Sound  at  all.  For  Mutes,  as  they  are  called,  cannot  be 
pronounced,  even  imperfecStly  and  obfcurely,  as  Semi-Vowels 
can,  without  the  Concurrence  of  fome  Vowel,  fome  Sound  per- 
feSlly  Vocal. 

''+  In  the  Greek,  ■—  aip^-oyrx  xa]  a<pMva.'  —  evidently  meaning 
Such,  as  are  neither  Vowels  nor  Semi-Vowels.  It  fliould  feem 
therefore,  that  by  (fuvn  Plato  meant  a  perfeSl  and  clear  Vocal 
Soundj  Such,  as  we  utter  in  pronouncing  a  Vowel  fingly  ;  and 
that  by  ^S-t^fc?  he  meant  That  imperfetl  and  ohjcure  Sound  of 
the  Voice,  made  in  the  forming  and  pronouncing  of  a  Semi- 
Vowel,  unaided  by  a  Vowel.  Now  if  This  be  true,  then  may 
the  printed  Reading  of  that  Parage,  to  which  belongs  Note- 
iio,  be  juftified.  Arijlotle,  however,  who  treats  of  this  Sub- 
jedl  in  his  Pceticks,  Cap.  20,  recognifes  not  any  fuch  diflinc- 
tion  between  <fMvn  and  ^S-oQ-H/f;  iov  he  attributes  c^mri  axaTw,  a 
Vocal  Sound,  fuch  as  may  be  beard,  to  the  Semi- Vowels, .  no  lefs 
than  to  the  Vowels;  and  ftates  the  Difference  between  thefc. 
Two  Sorts  of  Letters  thus; — the  Voice,  in  uttering  the  Vowels,, 
proceeds  aVeu  tt^oct/SoAws,  that  is,  it  makes  no  Allijion  againjl  any 
t  Parts 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  163 

thofe  of  Middle  Sort,  every  One  of  tliem,  He  diftin- 
guiilied  in  the  fame  manner :  and  when  he  had  dif- 
covered  how  many  Letters  there  were  of  Each  Sort, 
to  every  One,  and  to  All  of  them  together,  he  gave 
the  Name  of  Element.  But  perceiving,  that  None 
of  us  could  underfland  any  One  of  them,   by  its  Self 

Pafts  of  the  Mouth,  thole  upper  Organs  of  Speech,  fo  as  to  be 
hnpeded  \\\  its  free  and  full  Exit :  but  the  expreffing  of  the  Semi- 
Vowels  is  ^.gTo!  7r^oo-,'2cA/7?,  the  Voice,  in  uttering  them,  makes  fuch 
Allijmi,  and  meets  with  fome  degree  oi Refijlance :  by  i\\Q  A/lifion  it 
is  indeed  articu/ated i  hut  hy  the  Re///lancc,  the  Paflages  thro  the 
Mouth  being  ftraitened,  it  becomes  weaker,  and  is  diminifl-ied; 
— except  it  be  in  fome  Syllable;  for  here  a  Foiir/  will  nevef  fail 
to  aflift  in  the  Delivery,  by  giving  '  the  Voice  a  free  Paffage 
into  the  Air.  —  Now  Arijlotk  is  indifputably  right,  in  attri- 
buting to  a  Semi-Vowel,  by  its  Self,  <3fiav/\v  Vocem,  a  Vocal  Sound : 
but  his  learned  Commentator,  ViSlorius,  is  equally  right,  ia 
giving  to  this  Vocal  Souiid  the  Epithets  ohfcura,  temiis,  & 
exilis ;  fmce  it  is  but  Half  oi  the  full  and  whole  Vowel- Sound : 
and  Flaio  may  fairly  be  allowed  to  diftinguhh  the  Half-Sound 
by  a  particular  Name,  and  to  call  it  f^dyfo?.  But  we  know 
not  how  to  agree  with  him,  if  he  fays  that  a  Semi-Vowel  does 
not  partake  of  the  Vowel  Sound;  becaufe  the  Half  of  any 
Thing  whatever  feems  to  partake,  to  be  a  Part,  or  to  have 
a  Share  of  its  Whole.  For  this  reafon  it  is,  that  we  incline 
to  That  Emendation  of  the  printed  Greek  Text,  propofed  in 
Note  1 10. 

X  2  alone, 


164 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


alone,  without  learning  them  All  "^^  he  confidered, 
that  this  Connexion,  or  common  Bond  "^  between 
them,  was  One ;  and  that  all  thefe  Letters  made  in 
a  manner  but  One  Thing  "^ :  and  as  he  thus  in  One 

Idea 

"5  No  Man  can  know.  What  Share  any  Letter  of  a  kno'wn 
Word   has    in   the  pronouncing   of  that  Word, — nor  how   much 
any  of  the  Three  Sorts   of  Letters    are   able    to   contribute  to- 
wards  the  formmg  of  a  new  Woi'd,  —  unlefs  he  knows.    What 
Letters  may  be   founded  or   pronounced.    Each  of  them,  fingly- 
and  alone,  —  What  Letters,  joined   together,    have   One   Simple 
Sound  Articulate,  —  What  Letters   eafily  Aide   into   each   other, 
and  coalefce   together  in  One  Complex  Sound  Articulate,  —  and 
What  Letters  refufe  all  combination  immediate,   and  require  the 
intervention  of  fome  Third  Letter,    (a  Letter  of  a  certain   Sort,) 
for  a   common  Link   between    them,    to  produce    any    Sound   at 
all.     See    Plato  %    Dialogue,    named    Sopbijla,    pag:  25-3,    Edit:. 
Steph. 

"°  The  Paffage,  referred  to  in  the  preceding  Note,  attributes 
the  Virtue  of  this  common  Ljink  to  the  Vowels  i^iafs^oi'Tco?,  chiefly 
or  eminently, — and  noX.  Jblely;  becaufe  the  Semi-Vowels  are  not 
quite  deftitute  of  this  conneSling  Virtue',  a  Semi- Vowel  may  be 
interpofed  between  a  Mute  Confonant  and  a  Vowel,  or  between 
a  Vowel  and  a  Mute  Confonant,  to  connedt  them  Both,  in  the*, 
fame  Syllable. 

"7  This   Paffage    may   be  illuftrated  by  confidering   any  One- 
of  the  Elements  of  outward  Nature.     Every  Portion,  every  Part 
and  Particle   of  fuch  Element,    whatever   be   its   Size,    whether 
large    or    fmall,    is    not   only  One,   diftinguifhable,    by   its   Local 
Situation,  from  all  other  congenial  Parts,  Particles  and  Portions  of: 

1  the 


F   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  165 

Idea  contemplated  them  All,  he  perceived  the  Science 
of  them  All  to  be  but  One  Science ;  and  naming  it 
from  its  Subjeft-Matter,  he  called  it  the  Science  of 
Letters  "*. 

Phi  LE  BUS-. 

This,   which  Socrates   now  fays,   O  Protarchus  !    I 
underftand  ftill  more  plainly,    than  what  he  faid  jufl 

before  ;; 

the  fame  Element,— but  alfo,  when  it  enters  into  any  Com- 
pound-Body, it  becomes  One  of  the  Elements  of  That  partkidar 
Body:  and  yet  all  the  Portions,  Parts,  and  Particles  of  this 
Element  which  is  diffufed  throughout  the  Univerfe,  dijlin- 
giiijhabk  as  they  are  from  each  other  locally ,  and  feparated  as^ 
they  are  by  entering  into  different  Compound-Bodys,  are  ftill 
but  One  Element,  One  of  the  Elements  of  all  Corporeal  Nature. 
What  farther  Meaning,  enigmatical  and  profound,  we  apprehend 
to  be  conveyed  in  this  whole  Sentence,  may  be  feen  near  the 
conclufion  of  the  next  Note. 

"^  In  the  Greek — y^a.if.iKa.Tiv.yw  li-xyw,  that  is,  (tranflated  intcf 
EngliQi  literally,)  the  Grammatical  Art.  As  to  the  latter  of 
thefe  words.  Art,  we  are  to  obferve,  that  Plato  here,  and  fre- 
quently elfewhere,  ufeth  the  term  Art  inftead  of  Science,  in 
fpeaking  of  Sciences,  which  begin  not  with  Firji  Principles,  the 
Principles  of  All 'TAings ;  and  no  Science  except  I'&at  of  Mindi 
rightly  called  by  Ariftotle  v  ir^Mrn  fiXoaoflcc  the  Firjl  Philojophy, 
begins  with  laying  down  THoefe  for  its  own  Principles  :  the 
Maxims  and  Axioms  of  every  inferior  Science  take  thefe  Prin- 
ciples for  granted ;  and  fuch  a  Science  fet's  out  on  a  fuppofi- 
lition   of  their  being  known  to  All  men.     One  of  thefe  infe- 

riov 


i66         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

rior  Sciences,  depending  on  the  Scie?ice  of  Mind,  is  That  of 
Grammar;  — a  Science,  which,  ever  fince  it  was  fully  difco-- 
vered,  and  efpecially  now,  when  it  has  been  lately  illuftrated  from 
the  Light  of  true  Philofophy  by  our  Etiglijh  Hermes,  appears 
to  extend  itfelf  to  all  the  Words  of  every  Language,  poffible 
to  be  devifed. — The  other  of  the  two  words,  the  term  Gram- 
matical, is  here  ufed  by  Plato  in  its  original  Meaning.  For 
the  Jirjl  Openings  of  this  Science  were  confined  to  the  Know- 
lege  of  Letters, — to  the  knowing  how  to  Jpell  Words,  that  is, 
how  to  refolve  them  into  their  Elementary  Parts,  Letters; 
Thefe  being  the  Elements  of  all  Syllables ;  and  Syllables  being 
either  the  conjlitiiejtt  Parts  of  Words,  or  lahole  Words,  them- 
felves. — But  the  fmgular  Propriety  of  mentioning  the  Invention 
(or  Difcovery)  of  Letters,  as  an  Inftance  of  afcending  from  In- 
fnite  to  One,  cannot  be  apprehended  perfedly,  without  making 
ufe  of  that  Kind  oi  Analyfis,  by  which  the  Wifeft  of  the  an- 
cient Sages  inveftigated  the  Firji  Frinciples  of  All  things  j — 
That  general  and  concife  Analyfis,  which  refolves  every  Indivi- 
dual Being  or  Thing,  whether  natural  or  artificial,  into  the 
Matter  of  it  and  the  Form. — 'Tis  probable,  that  this  Analyfis 
began  in  the  Minds  of  thoughtful  Men  from  their  obferving, 
how  the  Works  of  Art  were  compofed  and  framed.  They  had 
feen  the  Materials  of  thefe  Works,  totally  -joid  of  the  Forms, 
which  afterwards  they  faw  created  by  the  Workmanfliip  of 
Man.  They  knew,  that  thofe  Materials  had  once  been  Farts 
of  fome  of  Nature's  Living  Forms,  out  of  which  all  Life,  whe- 
ther Animal,  Vegetable,  or  Plaftic,  was  departed.  Furniflied 
with  this  previous  Knowlege  by  Obfervation,  when  they  came 
to  philofophife,  —  that  is,  to  inquire  into  the  Frinciples  and 
Caufes  of  Natural  Takings,  —  reafoning  in  the  way  of  Atialogy, 
they  inferred,  that  thefe  Subjefts  of  their  Inquiry,  Things 
Natural,    were   the  Works  of  Nature,   Creatures  of  her  formings 

from 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  167 

from  Materials  which  every  where  lay  before  her.  They 
were  confirmed  in  the  Truth  of  this  Inference,  by  obferving,, 
that  thefe  Natural  Beings  either  grew,  or  gradually  were 
augmented,  from  very  fmall  Beginnings  to  a  much  larger  Size; 
and  from  the  meer  Rudiments  of  fome  Form,  attained  nearer 
and  nearer  to  the  Perfedion  of  it;  by  means  of  frequent  Sup- 
plys  of  fit  Matter  from  without,  partly  Solid  and  partly  Li- 
quid :  whence  it  appeared,  that  this  extraneous  Matter  furnifhed,, 
at  leaft,  the  grower  and  the  bulky  Part  of  thofe  Materials,  from 
which  the  Buildings  of  Nature  were  raifed  up  and  enlarged' 
to  their  due  Size. — It  was  argued  alfo,  that,  whatever  Life  thefe 
Materials  had  once  pofiTefTed,  whether  a  Life  of  their  own,  or  whether 
only  as  they  had  been  connedied  with  Other  Subftances,  per- 
vaded by  a  Life  Common  to  them  all,  as  Members  of  fome 
Great  Body,  —  if  it  was  a  Life  of  their  own,  it  muft  have  de- 
farted  out  of  them, — or,  if  it  was  fome  General  Life  only,  the 
GonneSliofi  between  them  and  their  Fellow-Members  muft  have 
been  broke?i  off,  and  the  Life,  Common  to  them  all,  muft  have 
faffed  by  them,  —  before  any  freJJo  Lfe  could  enter,  fo  as  to 
form  them  anew;  or  before  they  could  again  partake  of  any 
General  Life,  by  new  Vital  Connexions  with  foreign  Sub- 
ftances. —  It  was  obferved  farther,  that  to  all  Such  Beings  as 
poflefled  a  Life  of  their  own,  (whether  a  Life  of  meer  Vegeta^ 
tion,  or  of  Senfation  fuperadded,)  befides  a  conftant  Supply  of 
folid  and  of  liquid  Food,  fov  Aliment  to  their  Frames,  Warmth^' 
alfo  and  Coolnefs  from  without  were  neceffary,  to  fupport  the- 
Life  and  Strength  within  them  : — and  that,  as  to  thofe  Produc- 
tions of  Nature,  which  feemed  to  have  no  f  articular  and  fri- 
vate  Lfe,  —  thofe  various  Subftances,  which  are  difcovered  in 
the  Bowels  of  the  Earth,  or,  on  being  ejeded  from  beneath, 
are  (cqj^.  upon  its  Surface, — they  were  found  by  experience  to 
be  forous  throughout,   and  permeable  by  Fire   and  by  Air;    and- 

that; 


i68  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

that  Fire  and  Air  did  adually  penetrate  and  pervade  all  the 
Earth,  was  evident,  from  the  Heat  and  Cold  felt  low  down 
imthin  the  Earth,  —  from  the  hot  Steams  and  cold  Vapours 
arifing  out  of  the  Earth,  —  and  from  the  vifible  Eruptions  of 
Subterraneous  Fire,    and    the   alarming  Sound  of  Subterraneous 

Thunder. From  all  thefe  Obfervations   and  Reafonings,  con- 

fidered   together,  Philofophers   foon  came   to   thefe  Conclufions, 
—  that  Earth    and  Water,   Air  and  Fire,    were  the   component 
Fkments  of    all    vifible   and  known  Corporeal  Beings,    and  the 
Materials  of   all    the  Works  of  operative   and  plaftic  Nature :  — 
that    to   thefe    Corporeal  Beings   additional  Subjlance   came   from 
the  Elements   oi  Earth  &nd  Water ;    (perhaps,  from  Earth  only, 
if  Water  ferved  but  as  the  Vehicle  of  Earthy  Matter  to  every  Part 
of   every   fuch   Being;)    but    that  Life   was    conveyed   to    them 
thro  the  Elements  of  Air  andFzVr:  [if  Fire  was  not  rather  the  folc 
Vehicle  of  Life ;  and  if  Air  ferved  but  to  fan  the  Fire,   and  to  pufli 
forward  the  grofler  Fluid  Matter:) — thzt  Lfe,   being  thus  con- 
veyed to  every  Part  of  every  Compound-Being,  was  continually 
operating,    to  apply  and   adjoin   thereto  the  newly  arrived  Mat- 
ter;   converting  this  Matter  into  a  Suhjlance  of   the    fame  Form, 
or  Nature,    with   That   of  the  Part    to   which   it    was    applied; 
and    thus    fitting    it    for    the    Growth    or   Increafe,    as    well    as 
Aliment,   of  the  Part : — that  Life  had   thefe  Powers,    the  Power 
of   transforming    all    Terreftrial    Subftances,    together    with    the 
Powers    of    conjoining    the   Separate,    and    uniting    the   Diftindt, 
becaufe    it   was    full   of  Mind:    for   it  evidently  appeared,    that 
Mind  was  the  Caife  of  Form  to  all   things  formed   by  Man,  and 
the  Caufe  of  Union   or  ConjunBion  to   all   things   united  or  con- 
ioined  by  Art :   and  from  no  Icfs  Evidence,  That  of  Experience, 
it  appeared,   that  Mind  could   form  New  Fabricks  from  the  Ma- 
terials   of   Such    as    were   demolifhed  ;    could   even   change    the 
Nature  of  fome  of  thefe  Materials,    and  give  them   other  Con- 
jjcdions    and    other  Unions    than   Such    as    they    had    before.  — 

But 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  169 

But  farther;  the  Contemplators  of  the  Nature  of  Things,  in 
continuing  to  make  Obfervations  and  Inquirys,  found,  that  the 
Elements  o^  Air  and  i^/rt-,  in  their  vigorous  and  rapid  Motion, 
were  inceilantly  bufied  in  abrading  from  all  Compound-Bodys 
many  Particles  of  their  yS//i/ and  earthy  Subftancej  in  extraBing 
alfo  from  the  fame  Bodys,  and  in  fucking  up  from  all  Bodys 
of  Water,  many  aqueous  or  humid  Particles  j  and  m  freeing,  and 
carrying  aumy  with  them,  many  of  the  Aerial,  and  many  of 
the  Igneous,  from  all  Bodys  wherein  Air  and  Fire  were  confined; 
for  Any  Particles  of  Thefe  Elements  were  ready  to  join  with 
them,  as  being  congenial  to  Themfelves  :  —  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  fame  Adive  Elements  did  continually,  in  their  Palllige 
along  and  through  all  Compound-Bodys,  depofitc,  and  leave  be- 
hind them,  many  of  thofe  Earthy  Particles  of  various  Natures, 
and  many  of  thofe  Aqueous,  which  they  had  compelled  into 
their  Marching  Company ;  and  that,  wherever  they  met  with 
Bodys,  wherein  Air  and  Fire  were  found  to  circulate.  Some  of 
their  own  Race  fiopped  there,  and  for  a  while  took  up  their 
Abode  within  thofe  anitnated  Bodys.  For  it  appeared,  that  Life 
was  imparted  to  every  Compound-Body,  fo  framed  as  that 
Air  and  Fire  could  remain  therein  and  circulate;  and  that 
'twas  this  very  Life,  (imparted  by,  or  from,  a  Life  more  ge- 
neral and  extenfive,)  which  enabled  any  Portion  of  Fire  and 
Air  a6tually  fo  to  remain  and  circulate. — Farther,  it  appeared 
from  the  Evidence  of  the  Senfes,  that  the  Earthy  Particles  of 
various  Kinds,  fo  abraded,  fo  carried  off,  and  afterwards  fo  depo- 
fited,  as  before  mentioned,  did,  by  this  Change  of  their  Places 
and  immediate  ConneSlions,  fuffer  a  Change  alfo  of  their  Forwj  j 
but  that,  notwithftanding  thefe  continual  Changes  and  Varia- 
tions, abfolute  as  well  as  relative,  in  all  Corporeal  Beings,  yet 
the  Bulk  of  them  All,  taken  together,  continued  always  the 
Same.  —  Thefe  Appearances  brought  on,  of  neceffity  in  reafon- 
ing  Minds,  This  natural   Conclufion, — that  One  and  the  Same 

Y  Subftance, 


170 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Subflance,  namely,  the  Element  of  Earth,  was  iht  SiihjeB- Matter 
of  all  this  Variety,  and  underwent  all  this  'Transformation.  — 
Wider  Obfervations,  and  deeper  Refearches  into  the  Secrets  of 
Nature,  led  thofe  fagacious  Inquirers  to  deem  it  probable,  that 
Earth,  That  Element  evidently  fo  variable,  and  thofe  other 
Three  Elements  feemingly  invariable.  Water,  Air,  and  Fire,—^ 
however  they  might  eflentially  differ,  all  the  Four,  Each  of 
them  from  the  Others,  —  yet  exchanged  their  whole  efjhitial 
Forms  or  Natures,  One  with  Another,  thro  a  reciprocal  Ex- 
change of  their  Situations  znd  Connexions : — and  that  a  frequent 
Intercourfe.  and  mutual  Commerce  adually  paffed  between 
Earth  and  Water,  between  Water  and  Air,  and  between  Air 
and  Fire,  was  vifible  to  the  Eyes  of  All  men.  Now  if  This 
was  rightly  judged, — "  that  all  thofe  Four  Elements  were  fub- 
jedt  to  a  Total  Transformation,  by  an  Interchange  of  their 
Forms," — the  following  Confequences  of  this  Pofition  are  ra- 
tional and  juft:  —  In  the  firfl  place,  that  thofe  Four  Elements,. 
the  Ingredients  of  all  Compound-Bodys,  (from  the  varioufly- 
proportioned  Quantitys  of  which  Ingredients  all  the  Variety, 
of  thofe  Bodys  probably  arifes,)  have,  all  of  them.  One  and- 
the  Same  Subjlance, — a  Subftance,  capable  of  receiving  Formi — 
its  Self,  confidered  abftradedly  from  any  Form,  (and  fame  Form 
or  other  Every  Portion  of  it  muft  always  wear,)  being  only, 
the  SubjeSi-Matter  of  all  Forms, — of  all  fuch  Forms  as,  together- 
with  That  Subftance,  (formlefs,  immeafurable,  and  boundlefs  ini 
its  Self,)  conftitute  all  Bodys,  whether  Elementary  or  Com- 
pounded: —  Secondly,  that  all  the  various  Forms,  received  by 
this  Subftance,  the  Subjedl  of  them,  are  introduced  into  it  by 
One  and  the  Same  Life,  —  a  Life,  pervading,,  animating,  and 
moving  it  throughout :  —  and  Thirdly,  that  this  One  and  the 
Same  Life  of  that  Subftance  is  the  Efficient  of  all  thofe  Forma 
therein,  by  its  being  the  Energy  of  One  and  the  Same  Mind:. 
\^  for, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         171 

for  Mini},  being  feated  every  where  ivithin  That  Sub/lance^ 
and  ever  contemplatitig  within  Himfelf  thofe  eternal  Forms ^  his 
own  Ideast  or,  in  other  words,  energifutg  within  Himfelf,  (for 
aftual  Contemplation  is  the  Energy  of  Mind,)  muft  be,  by  the 
neceifity  of  his  own  Nature,  the  ever-rifing  Fountain  of  Forms 
to  a  Suhjlance  capable  of  receiving  them,  but  incapable  of 
retaining  them;  and  the  firft  Spring  of  Motion  to  thofe  Forms 
which  for  ever  muft  be  in  Motion^  for  ever  changing  the  Places 
of  their  Abode,  becaufe  of  the  Poverty  and  Imbecillity  of  the 
Matter  which  receives  them.  —  Thus  much,  for  the  prefent, 
concerning  the  Elements  of  Outward  Nature;  and  concerning 
Matter  and  Form,  their  conftituent  Principles,  ever  united;  as 
alfo  concerning  their  Efficient  Caife,  the  Energy  of  Mind  within 
the  Matter  ;  and  their  Formal  Caufe,  or  Exemplar,  the  Ideas 
within  the  Mind.  —  What  is  foon  to  follow  in  this  Dialogue, 
will  give  us  Occafion  to  refume  thefe  Subjeds  :  we  have 
bandied  them,  as  yet,  no  farther  than  feemed  neceflary,  for  in- 
veftigating  the  Grounds  and  Principles  of  the  Invention  (or 
Difcovery)  of  Letters,  and  for  fhowing,  with  what  Propriety 
our  Author  has  chofen  This  Inftance,  to  illuftrate  the  Analy- 
tical Method  of  afcending  from  Infinite  to  Qyie.  —  For  if  the 
SuhjeSi-Matter  of  all  Outward  Nature  be  infinite,  in  Extent  as 
well  as  in  Divifibility,  —  and  if  no  Portion  of  this  infinite 
Matter  can  fuhfi/l,  or  de,  without  fome  Form,  (united  with 
which  it  is  called  Body,  or  Corporeal  Form,)  —  it  follows,  that 
Thofe  Bodys,  or  Corporeal  Forms,  of  which  all  other  Bodys  are 
compojcd,  are  infinite  in  like  manner,  that  is,  infinitely  divfible^ 
and  infinitely  extended.  Air  is  One  of  thefe  Elementary  Bodys, 
and  therefore  muft  be  infinite. — Now  Air  is  the  Subject -Matter 
of  Sound',  if  Sound  be  confidered,  not  as  a  certain  Senfation 
in  Sentient  Beings,  but  as  fomething  External,  the  Caufe  of 
that  Senfation.      Soimd   in   general,    fo   confidered,    is  A.'r,    pjat 

Y  2  into 


172         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

into  preternatural  or  unufual  Motion,  by  the  Impulfe  of  grofler 
Body?,  whether  Elementary  or  Compounded  ;  which  Bodys 
are,  themfelves,  impelled  againll:  it.  Bodys,  differing  in  Degree 
of  Force,  give  it  different  Degrees  of  Impulfe.  Some  of  thefe 
Air-impelling  Bodys  are  the  Limgs  of  fuch  Animals  as  breathe. 
For  to  the  Air,  which  they  breathe  out  to  mix  with  Common 
Air,  an  Impulfe  is  given  by  their  Lungs;  and  the  Lungs  arc 
impowered  to  impell  the  Air,  which  is  in  their  Air-VeJJels,  by 
the  Life  which  is  in  their  Blood-Vejfcls ;  it  being  neceffary  that 
the  heated  Air  within  fhould  be  breathed  out,  and  that  Coni- 
mon  Air  from  without  fhould  be  drawn  in,  to  refrefli  the 
Life,  to  cool  the  Blood,  and  to  invigorate  the  Arterys.  The 
Impulfe  is  fo  fmall  in  ordinary  Expiration,  that,  if  the  Paf- 
fages  for  the  Air  be  quite  unobftrudted,  little  or  no  Sound  can 
be  heard.  The  Impulfe  is  increafed  by  whatever  increafeth 
the  Force  and  Velocity  of  the  Blood;  and  the  Expiration  is 
then  very  audible.  The  Souls  of  Brute  Animals,  flrongly 
moved  by  their  Appetites  and  PaiTions,  give  a  proportionate 
degree  of  Vehemence  to  that  Impulfe ;  and  are  inftruded  bj 
Nature  to  exprefs  thofe  different  Emotions  by  different  Sounds, 
which  are  formed  by  widening  or  ftraitening,  more  or  lefs, 
the  Air-Paffages  in  Expiration.  It  appears  from  this  account, 
that  every  meer  Animal-Sound  confifts  oi.  Matter  and  of  Form: 
the  Matter  of  it  is  Air;  and  the  Form  of  it  is  the  Kind  of 
Sound,  that  is,  the  ^lality  and  the  ^antity  of  it,  —  a  Form, 
which  it  receives  (as  to  its  ^mntky)  from  the  Lungs,  and  (as 
to  its  ^ality)  from  the  Contradiion  or  Dilatation  of  xhc  Larynx. 
-—But  thefe  Parts  of  the  Body,  \n  forming  thofe  Sounds,  are 
meer  Organs  or  Infruments<,  employed  by  the  Soul. — The  Soul 
of  the  Animal  hath  this  forming  Power  from  the  Soul  of  Na- 
ture; and  this  Univerfal  Soul  has  it  from  being  full  of  Mind, 
the  Fountain  of  all  Form  and  of  all  Efficient  Power.— But  the 
6/  Soul 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  175 

Soul  of  Ma}t  partakes  of  the  Mind  of  Nature,  as  well  as  of 
her  Soul.  And  from  this  Vmverjal  Mind  it  is,  that  a  natural 
Senfe  and  Love  of  Harmony  is  in  the  Soul  of  Man.  To  gratify 
a  Sejife,  greatly  fuperior  to  Thofe  Senfes,  the  Objeds  of  which 
are  Corporeal,  (.and  Such,  is  fimple  Sound,  the  Objedt  of  the  exter- 
nal Senfe  of  Hearing,)  and  to  favour  a  Love,  greatly  fuperior 
to  Thofe  Loves,  the  Obje6t  of  which  is  .Se'«/«^;/ Pleafure,  —  a 
Love,  leading  to  the  Enjoyraent  of  Things  Divine,  —  Nature 
has  endued  Man  with  a  Power  of  modulating  his  Voice,  and 
of  giving  to  his  own  Breath,  (which  he  can  impell  with 
more  or  lefs  Force  at  his  own  pleafure,)  the  Fonn  of  Harmony. 
This  Power  (he  has  given  him,  by  having  framed  his  Refpi- 
ratory  Organs,  (efpecially  the  Glottis,  or  Mouth  of  the  Larynx,) 
of  a  Subftance  much  more  yielding,  contradile  and  dilatable,, 
than  That,  which  fhe  has  employed  in  framing  the  like  Or- 
gans of  any  other  Animals,  equal  in  Size  to  Man.  In  all 
Animals  then,  (Man  included,)  the  Soul  is  the  immediate  and 
fpontaneous  Former  of  thofe  indefinite  Sounds,  unmodulated  and 
inarticulate,  which,  may  properly  be  faid  to  iffuc  from  the  Voice 
oi  Nature  animated  3ir\d  fentient :  in  Man  alone,  his  Mind  is  the. 
immediate  and  voluntary  Former  of  thofe  Mtfical  Sounds;  in 
which  he  may  figuratively  be  faid  to  imitate  the  Voice  of 
Nature  univerfally  operative  and  forming.  For  Nature's  Self  (as 
it  were)  fngs  continually  whilfl  fhe  operates;  putting  Rythm 
into  her  Motions,  Meafure  into-  her  Materials,  and  Harmony  into 
all  her  Forms;  tempering  the  lulling  Smoothnefs  of  Concords 
v;ith  the  rouflng  Roughnefs  of  well-timed  Difcords ;  framing, 
many  Syjiems,  correfpondent  to  each  other  j  and  compofmg  all  of 
them  together  in   One  flupendous  Whole  7r1x.va.pfji.onov,    comprehen- 

five  of  all  Harmonic  Numbers .— But  farther;  the  Human  Nature, 

by  partaking  oi  Mind,  partakes  01  Truth,  as  well  as  oi  Harmony.. 
Eor  indeed  Both   are  connatural,  to  all  Mind,^  and  congenial  to 

each; 


174         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

•each  other  ;  as  they  will  be  found  to  'be  from  the  latter  Part 
of  this  Dialogue.  But,  natural  as  Truth  and  Harmony  are  to 
Man,  he  partakes  of  them  in  no  other  Way  from  Nature,  fhan 
as  he  partakes  of  General  Ideas;  and  That  is  by  the  Power, 
which  he  naturally  has,  of  perceiving  them  when  offered  to  his 
Mind.  For  in  the  Human  Mind,  only  the  Principles  of  Mind, 
-properly  fpeaking,  are  innate.  By  the  Principles  of  Mind  we 
mean  the  TranJ'cendental  and  truly  Univerfil  Ideas  of  Unity  and 
Multituxie,  Identity  and  Diverjity :  Thefe  are  the  native  Light  of 
the  Mind,  —  That  Light,  by  the  Medium  of  which  (lie  fees 
whatever  flae  attains  at  any  time  to  fee,  of  Species  or  of  Genus, 
of  Sa?nenefs  amongft  the  Dijferent,  or  of  Unity  am'iJrt  the  Many. 
"Without  thefe  Principles,  inherent  in  all  Mind  tffentially,  Man 
would  be  incapable  of  acquiring  any  the  leaft  Part  of  any 
'Science ;  becaufe  he  could  never  have  any  General  Ideas  j  and 
without  General  Ideas,  he  cx)uld  never  attain  to  view  any 
Truth  Vv'hatever.  For  a  Truth  of  the  moft  fmple  Kind  is  only 
the  mutual  'Relation  of  Two  General  Ideas  ^  and  a  Truth  of  the 
-inoft  complex  Kind  is  nothing  more  than  the  Agreement,  the 
Syftem  and  Harmony,  of  Many  of  them.  —  Anv  Tisoo  General 
Ideas,  which  are  in  Harmony  together  ivithout  the  Medium  of  a 
a  Third,  are,  to  a  Mind,  in  which  her  native  Light  fhines 
unobfcured  and  clear,  what  T-wo  Mujical  Sounds  in  Confonance 
are  to  a  Mufical  "Ear;  if  they  offer  themfelves  Both  at  the 
fame  time,  fuch  a  Mind  is,  of  herfelf,  fenfible  of  their  Har- 
jnony,  or  Agree?nent ;  and  underftands  the  Relationjl.yip  between 
them,  without  being  taught,  What  particular  Truth  is  the 
•refult.  But  a  Man  can  receive  no  Inftruftion,  nor  can  his 
Mind  be  informed  with  any  Truth,  new  to  her,  if  the  Terms, 
in  which  that  Truth  is  delivered,  apply  not  to  certain  Ideas 
>m  his  Mind.  Previous  Ideas  are  neceflary  therefore  to  the 
iPerception    of  the  plaineft  Truth.  —  Now   'tis   certain,   that  no 


juaii 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


IS 


man,  from  his  own  acquaintance  with  the  Objeds  of  Senfe, 
can  havg  his  Mind  Jlored  with  the  Ideas  of  All  'Things.  For,  in. 
that  cafe,  a  Man  mufl  have  had  all  thofe  Ideas,  at  different 
times,  aSiually  frefent  to  his  Mind.  But,  iliould  the  poffibility- 
of  that  c\{q  be  admitted,  the  whole  Time  of  Man's  Life 
would  not  fuffice  for  the  longefl  Liver  to  conpare  Each  of 
thofe  Ideas  diflindly  with  eve7y  Other:  and  yet  This  is  the 
only  Way,  in  which  all  Truths  can  ever  be  difcovered.  A 
Difcovery  therefore,  fo  ample  and  compleat,.  is  impoflible  to 
be  made  by  any  One  Man.  In  fadt,  One  Man  alone  can  ad- 
vance but  a  very  little  way  towards  it.  And  yet  every  Man, 
who  is,  what  Nature  made  him,  fpeculative  and  free,,  has,, 
when  his  Bodily  Wants  are  all  of  them  fupplied,  fuch  an 
infatiable  Defire  of  K?iowlege,  and  fuch  a  flrong  Tendency  of 
Will  towards  Truth,  as  that,  after  he  has  attained  ever  fo  much, 
ftill  they  urge  him  on  to  the  Purfuit  of  more.  To  indulge  a 
Defire  fo  rational,  and  to  gratify  a  Love  fo  godlike,  with  as 
much  Enjoyment,  as  the  Human  Mind  can  bear,  and  to  as 
great  an  Extent  as  her  Powers  can  reach,,  the  providential 
Mind  of  Nature  has  contrived  the  Means,  how  Each  Man's 
fmall  Stock  of  Knowlege  and  Truth,  of  his  own  acquiring, 
may  be  communicated  to  Others,  without  Lofs  to  Himfelf^  and 
farther,  how  it  may  be  placed  in  a  Common  Treafury,  which, 
(hould  be  exhaujllefs,  for  every  Man  to  draw  from  thence  whatever 
his  Occaiions  or  Inclinations  may  require.  Thefe  Ends  are 
known  to  be  accompliilied,  —  the  firft  of  them,  by  Speech,- — 
the  latter,  by  Writing  and  publifhing  what  is  written.  —  For 
all  the  Words,  fignificant  of  Things  or  of  the  Attributes  of 
Things,  in  every  Language  fpoken  by  Men,  are  the  Reprefen- 
tatives  of  Ideas:  and  "AX  I^etters  written,  or  Charadters,  are  the. 
Reprefentatives  of  Words  fpoken. — Now,  with  regard  to  Speech, 
it  is  admitted,,  that  every  partiatlar  Language,  fpoken  by  Some 

Men 


3  7<^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S: 


Men  and  not  by  Others,  was  invented  by  the  Firft  Speakers  of 
k :  for  they  muft  have  been  unanimous,  and  by  Signs  tacitly 
have  agreed,  that  certain  arbitrary  Sounds  Articulate,  (that  is. 
Words,)  uttered  from  their  Mouths,  fhould  reprefent  or  fignify 
■the  Species  of  thofe  Objedls,  to  which  they  pointed.  But,  not- 
withftanding  This,  it  muft,  on  the  other  hand,  be  granted, 
that  Language  in  general,  or  Speech,  was  derived  from  Nature ; 
as  Nature  is  employed  by  the  Giver  of  all  Good  in  the 
diftribution  of  his  Corporeal  Gifts.  From  Nature  it  is,  that 
Man  hath  this  Faculty  of  Speech,  this  Power  of  articulating  his 
Voice,  and  of  giving  it  an  infinite  Variety  of  dijlin^l  Sounds,  at 
his  own  Will  and  Choice.  For  Nature  has  provided  him  with. 
:the  Injlr.uments,  by  which  he  fo  articulates.  It  is  She,  who 
has  formed  the  Human  Mouth  and  Tongue,  to  be  much  more 
,pliant,  moveable,  and  flexil,  than  the  fame  Parts  in  other  Ani- 
mals. She  it  is,  who  has  furniflied  thofe  immediate  Organs 
of  Speech,  in  Man,  with  peculiar  Mufcles ;  by  which  he  can 
give  to  his  Mouth  any  Degree  of  Aperture  and  Curvature ;  and 
to  his  Tongue,  any  Kind  of  Flexure  that  he  pleafes,  with  an 
Application  of  this  agile  Member  to  any  Part  within  its  Sphere 
of  Motion,  —  With  regard  to  Letters,  confidered  as  Chara6lers 
or  Marks,  reprefenting  Words  fpoken,  they  are  well  known  to 
be  of  Invention  meerly  Human ;  as  being  arbitrary,  without 
any  natural  relation  either  to  Words  or  to  Things,  and  figni- 
iicant  only  by  Common  Agreement • — Again  ;  if  Letters  are  con- 
fidered as  the  Elements  of  all  Language,  and  the  indivijible  Parts 
of  all  Words,  (in  which  Senfe  they  are  confidered  here  hy 
Plato,)  'tis  but  fair  to  acknowlege  them  to  have  been  difco- 
vered,  or  found  out,  by  Man.  Plato  indeed  feems  to  make  it 
a  Queilion,  whether  the  Difcovery  was  not  rather  owing  to 
fome  Being  fuperior  to  Man.  Wbat  the  Philofopher  means  in 
,raifing  this  Doubt  will  prefently   be  fhown.     But,  to  whatever 

Being 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


177 


Being  we  are  obliged  for  the  Difcovery,  we  have  great  Reafon  to 
rejoice  in  its  being  made;   This  being  of  all  Difcoverys,  by  far  the 
niofl:  important.  —  For,  in  the  firft  place,  if  a  Difcovery  had  not 
been   made,  that  the  articulated  Sounds  of  the  Voice  (or  Words) 
were  almoft  all  of  them  complex,  and  divifible  into  Such  as  zxtfimple, 
— that   is,   into  Such   as  are  formed.    Each  of  them,    by    a  finale 
Motion   of   only  One  Organ   of  Speech,   accompanying   the  Voice; 
— and   that  the  fimple  Articulations,   into  which   the  infnite  Num- 
ber   of   Sounds   Articulate    (or  Words)     may    be     divided,    were. 
All    of    them    together,    but    a  Ft'ii;    in   Number;  — we   fay,    if 
thefe  TLlementary  Articulations    had    not    been    found    out,    every 
different  Word  mufl   have  had  a  dijiincl  Mark   or  Charader,    ap- 
propriated  to   it,   in  Writing  or  Engraving;   for  no  Reader,  not 
even  the  tnoft  fagacious,   could  have  been  always  certain.  What 
particular   Word   was    meant    to    be   reprefented   by  a  Mark   or 
Character,   fignifying  jjiore  Words   than  one.     But  a  Multiplicity 
of   CbaraSters,    equal    in   Number    to     the    Words,    would     have 
rendered    the    learning   to  read  a  Language  the  Work  almoil:    of 
the  Life  of  any  Man  who  fpake  it. — In   the  next  place,   with- 
out this   Difcovery   of  Letters,    all   Language   would  have    been 
very  defeftive ;    it  would   have  confifted  only   oi  Subjlantives  and 
Attributives,    Such    as   are   the  Symbols   of    corporeal  and    vijible 
Subftances,  and  of  iht'iv  fenfible  Qualitys,  Adions,  and  Atfeflions  : 
for  to  Thefe   things  only  could  the  Inventors  and  Firfl:  Speakers 
of  Words  have  pointed,    fo  as   to  be   certain,   that   they  meant 
the  fame  Things   by   the   fame  Words.     Inftead  of  Definitives  and 
thofe  Conneciives  ufually  termed  Prepofitions,  they  muft  have  ufed 
the    natural    Expedient    of  Manual  Signs  and  Gejlures :    but,    for 
thofe  ConneBive  Words,    ufually  termed  ConjunSlions,    fo  neceflary 
in  all   rational  Converfation,    they  mufl  have  been  wholly  at  a 
Jofs.     Labouring  under   this  Poverty   of  Expreffion,    they  could 
have   fpoken    only   in   very    {hon    and    unconneded   Sentences} 

Z  not 


17^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


not  with  any  Series  oi  Argumentation,  nor  with  any  Thread  of 
Dijcoiirfe;  endeavouring  to  fupply  their  want  of  Words  by 
various  Motions  of  their  Eyes,  Arms,  Hands,  and  Fingers,  and 
by  many  Gefticulations  and  Poflures,  properly  now  called  antick, 
becaufe  in  antique  days  Some  of  the  Kind  were  pradlifed  per- 
haps in  every  Country,  during  the  Infancy  of  its  Language. — 
But  what,  mofl  of  all,  renders  the  Difcovery  of  Letters,  thofe 
Elements  of  Speech,  valuable  to  Man  as  a  rational  Being,  is 
This, — that,  without  it.  Language  would  have  had  no  Words 
for  any  other  Obje£ts  than  thofe  of  Se>7je ;  none,  for  thofe  of 
Mind  ov.  ItitelleSl,  confidered  abftraSledly  from  Senfe.  Now  it  is 
true  indeed,  that  Men,  before  they  had  Words  for  thefe  intel^ 
ligible  Things,  might  have  communicated,  or  made  known,  one 
to  another,  what  they  had  obferved  feparately,  concerning  the 
different  Natures,  Property s,  and  Ufes  of  the  different  Species 
of  Things  they  faiv  :  but  they  could  not  have  communicated, 
or  imparted,  one  to  another,  any  General  Ideas,  which  might 
have  arifen  in  their  private  Minds ;  they  could  not  have  con- 
verfed  together  on  any  Subjedl  beyond  the  reach  of  their  out- 
ward  Senfes :  and  we  prefume,  that  a  Man  even  of  the  quickeft 
and  moft  penetrating  Genius  would  make  as  fmall  a  Progrefs 
in  the  AhJiraSi  Sciences,  as  he  would  in  the  Knoivlege  of  Outivard 
Nature,  without  being  aided  and  fupported  by  the  Converfation 
of  other  Men,  or  without  being  (as  it  were)  lifted  up  and. 
carried  on  by  their  Writings.  We  prefume,  that,  if  Socrates. 
himfelf  had  not  ftudioufly  perufed  the  Writings  of  many  Phi- 
lofophers  before  him,  he  would  not  have  excelled  them  all 
in  the  Knowlegc  of  Things  the  moft  important  to  be  known, 
namely, — What,  in  the  Order  of  Caufes,  ought  properly  to  be 
deemed  the  Firji  Caufe  of  All  things,  —  What,  in  the  Order  of 
Goods,  is  abjhlutely  the  Bejl,  —  and  What  is  the  Chief  Good,, 
relatively   to  Man.      Wc  prefume    alfo,    that,    if  Flato   had  not 

ftudioufly 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  179 

iludioufly  attended  to  the  Converfations  and  Difcourfes  of  Socrates 
on  thefe  Subjedls,  he  could  not  have  written  this  divine 
divine  Dialogue,  the  Phikbus ;  to  which,  all  fubfequent  Philo- 
fophers,  who  have  thought  rightly  of  thefe  Points,  feem  to  Us 
to  be  indebted  for  fuch  their  right  Opinions. — Indeed,  to  this 
Difcovery,  which  appears  fo  trivial,  if  taken  by  its  Self,  This 
of  Letters,  the  meer  Eleme?its  of  Speech,  confidered  as  the 
primary  Means  of  Knowlege,  we  may  afcribe  juftly  whatever 
t)f  Philofophy,  Science,  or  jdrt,  is,  or  ever  was,  amongft  Men. 
For  when  Letters  were  univerfally  once  known,  and  pronounced 
difl:in(5tly,  nothing  was  more  eafy  than  to  invent  CharaSlers  or 
Marks  betokening  them  ;  nor  was  it  lefs  eafy  to  learn  or 
to  remember  thofe  CharaSlers,  when  they  were  feen  to  be  fo 
feiv.  The  Letters  being  alfo  diftinguiflaed  into  Three  Sorts, 
into  Vowels,  Confonants,  and  Semi-Voioels,  as  foon  as  it  became 
commonly  known.  What  Share  each  of  thofe  Sorts  contributed 
to  the  pronunciation  of  Words,  it  was  the  eafy  Province  of 
Any  Man  to  combine  Letters  into  Syllables,  and  to  join  Syllables 
together  in  framing  longer  Words;  for  it  feems  probable,  that 
the  Firjl  Set  of  Words,  exprefiive  only  of  Senjibk  ObjeSls,  were 
all  of  them  Monofyllables.  —  It  was  always  the  Inclination  of 
Every  Man  to  exprefs  the  Ideas  of  his  own  Mind,  and  to  learn 
thofe  of  pther  Men.  So  that  when,  by  their  acquaintance 
with  Letters,  all  Men  were  enabled  to  frame  Words  expreilive 
of  their  General  Ideas,  the  Objeds  of  their  Minds,  it  is  pro- 
bable, that  the  Second  Set  of  Words  exprelfed  thofe  Ideas,  whicli 
naturally  rife  in  all  Minds,  and  are  comtnon  to  All  men.  But 
while  Men  were  thus  opening  their  own  Minds,  One  to  An- 
other, they  enlarged  Sit  the  fame  time.  Each  of  them  the  Other's 
Mind  ;  and  Ideas,  latent  before,  were  Jlricken  out  between  them, 
as  it  were,  by  Collijion.  To  exprefs  thefe  Ideas,  new  to  them, 
it  was   expedient,   in   fome   Cafes,    to  alTign  Figurative  Meanings 

Z  2  to 


i8o  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

to   many  Words,    which   until    then   fignified    certain   ObjeSfs  of~ 
Outward  Senji :    it  was    fufficient   in   fome  Other  Cafes,    to  co77i- 
pound  Words,   which   had   before    fignified   Ideas   co7nmon   to   All 
men  :    on  many  Occafions  it  became  neceffary  to  frame  Words 
intirely  ?!e'w :     and  in    this   way    the   Improvements    of  Language 
kept    even    Pace    with    the   Advancements^    made    in   Knowlege. 
Every  lavention  of  a  new  Art,   every  new  Difcovery  in  Science, 
introduced    a    new   Set   of  Terms  and  Pbrafes,    Technical  or   Sci- 
ential.     And  when,    at  length,    the  Sciences   oi  Mind,  oi  Morals, 
and  of  Politicks,    (the  Knowlege   of  the   Divine  Nature,   and   the 
Knowlege   of  the  Human,)    were  carried  as  far  as  Human  Abi- 
litys  could   reach, — it  well   deferves   Notice,    that,  nearly  about 
the    fame    Time,    the    Knowlege    of  Speech,    in   all    its   Powers, 
and  with  regard  to  all  its  Ufes, — Declarative,   DidaBic,  Demonjlra- 
tive.   Entertaining^   and   Perfuafive, — attained    the   Summit  of  its 
Perfedlion. — But  the  remarkable  Coincidence  of  thefe  Two  great 
Events   will  appear,   not  cafual,-  but  quite  natural,   if  we  confi- 
der    the  Nature  and   Origin  of  Human  Rcafon    and    of  Human 
Speech,    as   they   are   mutually   related.  —  The   Correfpondence   of 
their  Natures  will  appear  by  confidering,  that,  on  the  one  hand, 
all  Words,    (except     Such    as     reprefent    Particular    Pcrfons    and 
Particular  Places,)    are    Exhibitions   of    General  Ideas  y    and    that 
Many    of   thefe   Ideas    lye  as    it   were    donnant    in    our  Minds, 
till,    being   thus  exhibited  to   us  from  without,    by  Words  either 
heard  or  read,    they   are  awaken'd  and    roufed  within   us  for  the 
firft   tim-e :  —  that,    on   the   other   hand,    thofe  Ideas,    which   are 
thus   excited   in   us  by  Words  either   fpoken   or  written,   have  fo 
much    the     appearance    of    being    the    meer    Offspring    of   thofe 
Words  which    excite    them,    that   Some   Perfons    have    imagined 
all   General  Ideas  to    derive  from  Names  and  Words  all  the  Being 
which    they  have  ;    as    if   Sounds    and    Chara^ers  could  generate 
or  create  Ideas  in  the  Mindy  inftead  of  being  themfelvcs  created 

by 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  i8i 

by  fome  Mind  or  other,  to  facilitate  the  intercourfe  of  Ideas 
between  Man  and  Man.  The  Grecians  therefore,  who  were 
fenfible  of  this  natural  and  near  Relationfhip  betv/een  Reafon 
and  Speech,  gave  the  fame  Name,  that  of  xlyoi,  to  them  Both. 
For  the  Word  Koyoi  is  taken  in  different  Senfes,  fevcrally  to 
be  determined  by  the  difference  of  the  Subjeft-Matters  fpoken 
of:  fometimes  it  fignifies  the  Sentence  of  the  Mind,  pronouncing 
'Within  her  Self  her  Judgment  (or  Opinion)  concerning  the 
Agreement  or  Difigreement  of  any  Two  (or  more)  of  her  Ideas, 
on  viewing  them  together:  on  other  occafions,  it  means  the 
like  Sentence  of  fome  Particular  Mind,  pronounced  in  Words  out- 
wardly ;  which  indeed  feems  to  be  the  proper  and  Primary 
Senfe  of  the  Word  Xoyoi;  the  Other  being  metaphorical,  and 
therefore  Secondary.  The  fame  Word  is  ufed  by  Some  of  the 
Pythagorean  and  Platonic  Philofophers,  in  a  Third  Senfe  more 
figurative  flill,  to  fignify  That  efential Form,  which  is  Common 
to  all  the  Individuals  of  any  One  Species;  fuch  Form  being  (as 
it  were)  the  outfpoken  Sentence  of  the  Sovereign  Creative  Mind, 
determining  or  defining  the  Nature  of  thofe  Individuals,  and 
pronouncing  it  to  be  Such  as  he  ivills.  Again,  fince  every  Spe- 
cific For?n  in  outward  Nature  is  copied  from  fome  Idea  withia 
the  Divine  Mind,  the  Seat  of  all  Original  Ideas,  on  this  ac- 
count the  Word  Koya,  when  the  Epithet  S-aos  divine  is  annexed 
to  it,  is  by  thole  Philofophers  ufed,  in  a  Fourth  Senle,  to 
lignify  That  very  Divine  Mind,  confidered  as  viewing  all  thofe 
his  Ideas,  with  the  true  Relations  of  Each  to  Every  Other,  and 
therefore  pronouncing  juftly  within  Himfelf,  concerning  their  Same- 
nejjes  and  their  Differences.  So  that  Aoyoi,  to  begin  with  the 
lafl  and  moft  fublime  Senfe  of  the  V/ord,  and  thence  to  go 
backward  to  the  firfl  and  lowefl,  ilgnifys — Divine  Reafon, — the 
Exprefion  of  Divine  Reafon  by  the  Forms  of  Nature,  —  Huma?i 
Reafon, — and  the  Exprfficn  of  Human  Reafon,  by  Human  Speech,, 

or 


i82  P    H    i    L    E    B    U    S. 

or  Words  fpoken. Thus  are  thefe  Four  Things  dvx  Xoyov  juft 

Proportionals :  for  Words  fpoken  have  the  fame  relation  to  Htmian 
Reafon,  as  the  Forms  of  Nature  have  to  Divine  Reafon  ;  they  iare 
exprefs  Images,  or  outward  Reprefntations  of  Things  invifible. 
And  the  Proportioii  holds  good  itaXXcc^  alternately :  for  Human 
Speech  hath  the  fame  relation  to  That  Divine  Speech,  Outward 
'Nature,  as  Hmnan  Reafon  has  to  Divine  Reafon ;  it  is  only  fo  far 
right  and  true,  as  it  agrees  with  That,  from  which  it  is  de- 
rived,  and    to    which    indeed   its    immediate  Birth   is    owing. 

With  regard  to  Speech, — it  has  been  before  fliown  in  this  Note, 
that  Speech  is  derived  to  Man  from  Nature.  Now  whatever  is 
fpoken,  concerning  General  Things,  in  agreement  with  the 
genuine  Appearances  of  Nature,  muft  be  true ;  becaufe  all  fuch 
Appearances  are  I'ranfcripts  of  i\\e  Divine  Ideas  and  of  their 
Xi'Wi.tVidX  Relations,  which  are  eternal  'Truths;  tho  the  Tranfcripts, 
it  muft  be  confefled,  fall  far  fhort  of  the  Perfedion  of  their 
Archetypes :  but  thofe  Ideas,  when  they  arife  in  the  Mind  of 
Man,  being  obfcured  by  hnagcs  of  Corporeal  Things,  and  be- 
ing afterwards  blended  with  falfe  Fancys,  the  Offspring  of  thofe 
Images,  Man  is  apt  to  miftake  the  real  Nature  of  Things,  to 
have    his    Mind   filled    with  falfe   Opi?2ions,   and  confequently,    in 

fpeaking  his  Mind,  to  fay  what  is  not  true. With  regard  to 

Reafon, — it  will  prefently  be  feen,  proved  by  Plato,  that  Reafon 
in  the  Human  Mind  is  immediately  derived  from  Reafon  in  the 
Divine  Mind :  and  this  Original  Reafon  is  the  only  ]ui\.  Standard 
of  ReElitude  and  Truth ;  whether  we  confider  Reafon  as  an  ObjeSl 
of  Mind,  or  as  the  Power  of  viewing  fuch  Objedl:.  Confidcred 
as  the  ObjeB,  Reafon  is  the  relation  of  fome  One  Idea  to  fome 
Other;  —  and  accordingly,  on  the  Subjeil  o^  S>uantity,  fuch  a 
relation  is  by  the  Greek  Mathematicians  termed  Xoyoi,  and  by 
the  Latins  Ratio.  Now  in  pure  Mind  Vniverfil  fuch  Reafon  or 
relation  is  an  Eternal  Truth.     On  the  other  hand,  if  we  confider 

Reafon 
5 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         183 

Reafon  as  a  comprehenfive  Poioer,  by  which  the  Mind  views  Two 
or  more  Ideas  at  once,  compares  them  together,  and  difcerns 
how  far  they  agree,  and  in  what  refpecfts  they  diff'er,  this  Dif- 
cernment  is  clear  and  unerring  in  That  Mind  alone,  all  whofe 
Ideas  ^XQ  pure  and  perje5l, — whofe  Power  is  conftant  Energy,  — 
and  whofe  Eye  is  IntelleBual  Light  its  Self,  unobftrucfled, 
unbroken,  and  unclouded  by  any  of  its  Objeds,  being  prefent 
to  them  all  without  the  intervention  of  any  Medium.  But 
the  Eye  of  Miins  Reafon,  how  fliort-fighted  and  how  weak  it 
is,  —  thro  what  a  Mediwn  of  falfe  Colourings ,  and  with  what 
interrupted  Glances,  it  difcerns  the  few  Objeds  to  which  it  is 
direded, — and  how  frequently  therefore  and  how  greatly  Man  s 
'Judgment  errs,  —  is  well  known  to  every  fair  Mind,  who  has 
had  Experience  of  her  particular  and  private  Self,  and  has  con- 
verfed  with  Univerfal  Mind,  with  Truth  and  Right  Reafon,  inti- 
mately as  with  Friends,  yet  modeftly  as  a  Difciple  with  his 
Teachers,    and   fmiply    as    a   Child  with    his  Natural  Paretits,    to 

whom   he  owes  his  Being  and  his  Nurture. Hitherto  we  have 

confidered  Human  Speech,  as  very  diftantly  related  to  the  Truth 
of  Things  and  to  Right  Reafon  ;  thro  the  dtfeSlive  Medium  of 
Corporeal  Nature,  from  which  the  Faculty  of  Speech  is  derived  j 
and  thro  the  iinfettled  Medium  of  Man's  Private  Reafon,  with 
which  every  Sentence  fpoken  by  Man  is  coloured.  In  Either  of 
thefe  Vi^ws,  Human  Speech  appears  infinite ;  fo  various  are 
Men's  feveral  Minds  and  Meanings ;  and  as  to  Words,  or  Sounds 
Articulate,  they  are  known  to  be  without  Number.  —  We  fhall 
now  confider  Speech,  as  an  Objed:  of  higher  Dignit}', — as  imme- 
diately related  to  the  Divine  Mind,  the  Author  of  all  Corporeal 
Nature,  and  the  Father  of  all  rational  and  intelledlual  Light. — 
For  Letters  arc  analogous  to  tlie  Elements  of  Body.  As  all  Cor- 
poreal Forms  are  compofed  from  thefe  Elements  by  Plaftic  Na- 
ture, thro  various  Mixtures   and  Unions  of  the  minute  Particles 

o£ 


184 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


cf  Each,    Each   being   infinitely    divifible ;  —  fo   in   every   Lan- 
guage all   the  Words  are   by  Ma'n,   their  immediate  Maker,   com- 
pofed  from  Letters,   in   like   manner,   thro  various  Combinations. 
—  As;ain ;     as   Phjiic  Nature    is     but    an    hijlrumental  Agent  in 
making   her   Compofitions ;    and  as   She   can   make   no  iiew  E/?- 
mtnts  of  Body,    nor    any   way   cha?7ge   the    Eflential   Forms,    or 
^lalitys,    of  the  Few  flie   has  to  work  on  ;    for  they  are  delivered 
into   her  hands,   ready  made   by   the  great  Creative  Mind;    who, 
in  making   tliem,   dcfigned  all   thofe  Forms,  made  out  of  than  by 
Plajlic  Nature;    and   in    purfuance   of   that   Defign,    imprcffes   on 
her  continually  his   own  Ideas   for  the  Exemplar-Patterns  of  her 
Forms  :    whence   it  is,    that  the  Kinds  and   Species  of  the   innu- 
merable,   the    infinitely    varying    Individuals,    are    all    numberedt 
afcertained,   zv\d.  Jixt,    according   to  the  Divine  Ideas : — juft  fo  is 
it   with    the  IVords  of  Mans    making,    the  Elements    of  them  are 
Few,  and    no   Man,     thro    the    Power   of   his  Will,    is    able    to 
increafe    the   Number   of    thefe   Elements,    by   making  any   new 
fimple   Articulations.       The   Animal  Soul   has     here    no     forming 
Power ;   no  Paflions  or  Affedions   of  this   Soul  vary   the  Motions 
of  the  articulating  Organs :    and    tho  thefe   Organs    are  corporeal, 
and    therefore    come    within  the    Province    of  Plajlic  Nature  to 
frame  them  ; — and   tho  her  Power,   in  framing  the  Organs  of  the 
Voice,    (or  of   the  Sound  ifluing   from   the  Mouth    of  any  Animal 
whatever,)     is  bounded  only   by  the  Ejj'ential  Form   (or    Specific 
Nature,)   of  each  Animal,  and  has  a  Latitude,   which  is  perhaps 
infinite,   in  varying  the /^o/f^j,  O":  Animal  Sounds,   oi  Individuals  % — ■ 
yet  has    ilie    no    more   Power    over   the   Organs   of  Articulation, 
than  (he  has  over  the  Elements  of  all  Compound-Body s .     Whether 
the  Voice  be  flrong  or  weak,   rough    or  fmooth,    deep  or  flirill, 
the  Articulation  of  it,  made  by  Every  one   of  the  Human  Species 
in   the  pronouncing  of  any  Letter,   is   the  fame,    and    performed 
by  the  fame  Motions  of  the  Mouth   and  Tongue.  —  Confidering 

5  then. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  185 

then,  that  neither  the  Rational  nor  the  Anii?ial  Part  of  Man's 
Soul  can  vary  the  fimple  Articulations  of  his  Voice,  —  that  A'^- 
tiirCt  in  framing  the  Organs  by  which  they  are  performed, 
has  not  her  ufual  Scope  and  fportive  Licence  granted  her, — 
and  that  nothing  is  here  left  to  Chance, — we  cannot  but  con- 
clude as  follows ;  —  that  thofe  Organs,  by  which  every  Jingle 
Letter  is  pronounced  diJlinBly,  are  as  much  the  Work  of  the 
Siipream  Intelligent  Creator,  as  Letters  engraved  are  the  Work 
of  the  Engraver :  —  that  Nature,  confidered  as  adling  without 
Intelligence  and  Defign,  has  in  This  cafe,  as  well  as  in  That 
of  the  Elementary  Bodys,  no  other  Office  than  that  of  a  vieer 
Injlrument,  or  Tool,  in  the  direding  hands  of  Mind  and  Wif- 
dom : — that  thefe  Elements  of  Speech  were  given  originally  to 
Man,  ready  made,  as  Materials  for  Him  to  work  up  into  Words; 
fo  that  with  regard  to  Letters,  the  Elements  of  Speech,  Man 
has  no  other  Office,  than  to  difcover  this  admirable  Work  of 
profound  Defign  in  the  Great  Creator ;  to  diftingiiijh  it  from  his 
own  Work,  the  Formation  of  Syllables  and  Words;  to  find  out 
the  Power  of  Each  of  thefe  Letters,  fo  as  to  perform  That 
Work   of  his    own    the    better ;     and    to   pronounce  every  Letter 

carefully  and  plainly,    fo    as    to    be   underflood    with    eafe. 

Confidering  farther,  that  from  Letters  arofe  Words,  expreffive  of 
Men's  Ideas,  and  that  from  Words  of  various  Sorts  arofe  Lan- 
guage; — x^i-M  Language  and  Men's  ideas  improved  gradually  to- 
gether;—  that  from  Both  thefe  Improvements  arofe,  in  time, 
the  Inventions  of  every  Art,  the  Difcoverys  in  every  Science, 
and  laftly,  the  Firfi  Philojbphy,  or  the  Knowlege  (as  far  perhaps 
as  attainable  by  Man)  of  the  Caujes  and  Principles  of  Things; 
— and  that  all  thefe  noble  Edifices  are  conllruded  from  thofe 
Primary  Materials,  the  Ekfnents  of  Speech,  and  are  the  natural 
Confequences  of  Man's  having  iht  Faculty s  of  Speech  md  Reajbn, 
which   are    infeparable  Companions.; — we  cannot  but  conclude 

A  a  firther. 


i86         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

farther,  that  Man  was  defigned  for  Sciences  and  Arts  i-^'m  thff 
firfl  place,  for  thoie  of  Speaking  and  Reafoning,  the  F oundations 
of  all  the  reft  i — and  laftly,  for  thofe,  the  Firft  in  Value,  and 
the  Crown  of  them  all,  the  Science  of  Good  its  Self,  and  the 
Art,  thereon  founded,  of  leading  a  happy  Life.  For,  in  pur- 
fuance  of  thefe  Defigns,  the  gracious  Dejigner,  being  prefent 
Awithin  every  Particular  Mind,  undraws  the  Curtain  of  Senfe  from 
before  the  Mental  Eyes  of  all  the  real  and  difinterefted  Lovers- 
oi Science,  and  exhibits  to  them  the  pure  Ideal Oh]c&.i  of  their  Love. 
Thus,  for  inftance,  we  may  find,  near  the  End  of  this  divine 
Dialogue,  that  he  revealed  to  Socrates,  (who,  being  perfedly  free 
from  every  lower  Attachment,  was  a  thorowly  fmcere  Lover  of 
pure  Truth,)  the  very  and  true  EJence  of  the  Beautiful  and  the 

Good. It  (liould  feem,  that  Orpheus,  and  thofe  allegorical  Poets 

and  myflic  Theologers,  who  followed  his  Doftrine,  reafoned 
after  feme  fuch.  manner,  and  concluded  the  Origin  of  Letters 
to  be  Divine,  when  they  taught,  that  Hermes  Vv'as  the  Son  of 
fupiter,  and  was  appointed  by  his  Father  to  the  Office  of 
conveying  his  Mind  to  favoured  Mortals,  io  far  as  it  concerned 
them.  For  by  this  Fable,  we  prefume,  they  meant  to  infi- 
nuate, — that  the  Divine  Ideas,  and  thofe  Relations  between  them. 
Eternal  Truths,  are  conveyed  from  the  Mind  Univerfal  and  Divine, 
to  fuch  Men  as  will  receive  and  honour  them,  by  the  means 
©f  Human  Reafon  and  Human  Speech.  For  Both  thefe  Fa- 
cultys,  being  naturally  connefted,  were  perfonified  together,, 
under  the  Name  of  Hermes,  by  the  Grecians ;  and  by  the  Egyp- 
tians, under  the  Name  of  Theuth.  But  the  People  lafl:  men- 
tioned, thro  extream  Veneration  for  their  ancient  Princes,  Le- 
gifators,  and  7iational  Benfa£lors,  gave  them  fevcrally  the  fame 
Names,  which  they  had  before  given  to  their  Gods,  the  perfo- 
nified Parts  arid  Powers  of  Nature ;  attributing  to  them  feverally 
the  fame  Divine  Excelkncys,  according  to  the  Virtues  for 
6  which 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         187 

which  they  were  renowned.  Thus  to  One  of  their  remote 
Anceftors,  renowned  for  Arts,  and  efpecially  for  Eloquence,  they 
afcribed  the  Invention  of  Letters,  and  gave  him  the  Name  of 
Theuth.  From  this  Part  of  the  Egyptian  Archeology,  the  Athe- 
nian Philofopher,  who  was  well  acquainted  with  it,  took  oc- 
cafion    to    propofe    his   pretended    Doubt   concerning   tlie    Origin 

of  Letters,  whether  it  was  Divine,   or  wliether  it  was  Human. 

And  now  in  full  Light  may  appear  the  fingular  Propriety  of 
this  Inflance,  the  Difcovery  of  Letters,  for  the  Purpofe  of  fhow- 
ing  the  Progrefs  of  the  Mind  from  Infinite  to  One. — For  if  we 
refolve  Speech,  or  Sound  Articulate,  into  the  Matter  of  it,  and 
the  Form,  we  find  Human  Voice  to  be  the  Matter,  and  the 
Articulation  of  that  Voice  to  be  the  Form.  If  we  begin  our 
Progrefs  from  farther  back,  we  find  Human  Voice  its  Self,  infi- 
nite as  it  is,  refolvable  into  Matter  2.nd  Form ;  l\\fi  Matter  of 
it  being  Air,  ilTuing  from  the  Lungs,  and  formed,  or  modified, 
by  the  Larynx.  If  we  advance  forward,  we  find,  that  Speech, 
the  Compound  of  Voice  and  Articulation,  is  infinite  in  its  Self; 
but,  that  Words  fet  Bounds  and  give  Forms  to  it,  different  iu 
different  Countrys,  and  among  different  People.  If  we  pro- 
ceed farther  fi;ill,  and  refolve  Words  (which,  like  the  Individual 
Beings  of  Nature,  cannot  be  numbered,)  into  their  Matter  and 
their  Form,  we  find  the  Elementary  Parts  of  Speech  to  be  the 
Matter,  from  which  Every  Word  is  compofed,  and  the  Mean- 
ing of  Each  particular  Word  to  be  the  Form  of  that  Word, — 
a  Form,  however,  which  is  not  fettled  and  permanent,  till  it  be 
looked  on  as  the  Reprefentative  of  fome  Idea  which  is  common 
to  all  Minds.  —  Thus  we  find,  that,  in  fearching  after  the  na- 
ture of  Speech  and  La?iguage,  we  go  on,  juft  as  we  do  in  our 
Inquirys  into  any  Part  of  Outward  Nature ; — we  travel  all  the 
Way  thro  Infinitude,  till  we  arrive  at  thofe  Borders  of  the  Land 
■of  Science,   where  we  have  a  ProfpeB,   on   the  one  hand,   of  the 

A  a  2  component 


i88  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

before  "^ ;    and  am   at  no  Lofs   to  apprehend,   What 
relation   Each   of  the   Subjeds,    about   which    he   has 
fpoken,,  has    to   the   Other  "'.      But  as    to   that   Ar- 
ticle, 

component  Elements   of  Things,  —  on   the   other   hand,    of   their 
Species   and  Genera  -,  —  a  Profpeft,    terminating    in    that   Higheji 
Genus,  Universal   Mind, — the  {o\c  Cauje  of  the  Common  Bond 
or  Connexion  between  yf//  t/jings,  —  or,   to  fpeak   metaphorically, . 
(and   perhaps    it    is    impoflible    to    fpeak    othervvife    of  Things 
Divine,)  the  UbiquJtajy  Center,,  in  which  the  feveral  Virtues  and 
Powers  of  Nature  meet;  as- from  thence  continually  they  iffue. 
forth,    extending    around-  thro    All    things,    uniting    All,     and 
making   t/jem   to  he  in.  a  mamier  One  only  Tubing.     But    thefe  great. 
Truths  we  fliall  iee  reprefented  by  Metaphors  the  moft  adequate 
perhaps  and  juft,    in   the  latter  Part  of    the  prefent    Dialogue. 
—Our  Readers,   we   prefume,    will    now  think  it   high  Time  to 
put  an  End  to  this  Note;  for  the  exorbitant  Length  of  which 
we   have  no  better  Appology  to  make,  than   by  alluring  them, 
that  'twill  leffen  the  Number  of  Notes   to  follow,  and  ferve  to  • 
explain,    as    well   as  we  are  able,   many   fubfequent  Paffages   in 
this  Dialogue  :   to  This  Note  therefore,   when  we  come  to  thofe 
Paffages,    'twill  be  fufficient  to  refer. 

"'  Philebus,  it  feems,  did  not  comprehend,  ho-w  Mujical  Sound 
was  07ie  and  Many,  io  clearly,  as  he  underftood,  how  Speech  was 
One,  tho  Words  were  Infinite. — The  illiberal  and  ungentle  Manr 
ners  of  the  Sophijis,  in  Plato's  Dialogues,  fliow  them  not  to  have 
had  the  moft  liberal  Education  :  and  perhaps  the  intention  of 
this  Paffage  is  to  confirm  that  Faft. 

"°  The  Connexion  between  the  Science  of  Miifick,  and  the 
Science  of  Grammar^  may  be  fcen  in  Not€  90.  The  Mean- 
ing 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  189 

tide,  in  which  his  Argument  on  the  Firfl  of  thofc 
Subjefts  appeared  to  Me  to  be  defe<ftivej  I  am  at  a 
Lofs  ftill '". 

Socrates. 

To  know,  What  thofe  Inftances  are  to  the  Pur- 
pofe  '" ;    is  not  This  your  Meaning? 

Philebuis. 
Juft   fo.      This  very  Thing  it    is,    that    Protarchus 
and  my  Self  are  all  this  While  in  fearch  of. 

S'b  CRATES. 

In  fearch  ftill,  do  you  fay,  when  you  are  juff  now 
arrived  at  it  ? 

ing    of  this   Paflage    may    include   alfo   the   relation.,    which   the. 
Words  of  an  Ode,  or  Poem  fung,  have  to  the  Miijick ;  that  is,  to  the 
Harmony  and  the  Me  a  fur  e :  for  all  Ears,  tolerably  good,  are  fen- 
fible  that  the  Miifick    and   the  Dillon   ought   to   be  adapted    to 
each   other. 

'^'  For  Socrates  h'xd,  not  fliown,  What  ;t/(///c??  Either  of  thoic 
Subjedts,  Miifick  ■s.n^  Grammar,  has  to  the  Point  in  controverfy. 
See  before,  in  Page  1 57. 

'^-  In  the  Greek, — tJ  tt^o's  sVos  Taur'  eV'  >  What  is  all  T'his  to 
the  Verfe? — a  Saying,  which  feems  to  have  grown  into  a  Pro- 
verb,  from  its  being  frequently  repeated  by  fome  of  the  People, 
on  finding  the  Harangues  of  the  Rhapfodifts,  in  their  Inter- 
pretations of  the  Verfes  of  Ho!ner,  fo  frequently  quite  foreign 
to   the  Poet's  Meaning, 

Pjiileeus. 


ipo         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Phile  bus. 
How  To  ? 

Socrates. 
Was  not  the  Point,   originally  in  Difpute  between 
us,  This, — whether  Wifdom  or  Pleafure  was  the  more 
eligible  ? 

Philebus. 
■Certainly  it  was. 

Socrates. 

And  do  we  not  admit,  That  Each  of  them  is  One 
Thing  ? 

Philebus. 
Without  doubt. 

Socrates. 

Now  then  muft  come  this  Queflion,  arifing  natu- 
rally from  what  was  faid,  a  little  before  the  mention  of 
Muiick  and  Grammar  "', — In  what  way,  (or  by  what 
divilion,)  are  Wifdom  and  Pleafure,  each  of  them. 
One  and  Many  ?  or  how  is  it,  that  Neither  of  them 
breaks  into  infinite  multitude  diredly  ;  but  that  Each 
contains  fome  certain  Number,  before  it  pafs  into 
Infinity  ? 

'^3  See  before,  in  Pages  82,    and  83. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


ipr 


Protarchus. 
Upon  no  trivial  Qiieftion,  O  Philebus !  on  a  fudden 
has  Socrates,  after  having  led  us  a  large  round- 
about way,  I  know  not  how,  thrown  us.  And  now 
confider,  Which  of  Us  Two  fliall  anfwer  to  the 
Queflion  he  has  propofcd.  'Twould  be  ridiculous 
in  Me,  who  have  undertaken  the  fupport  of  your 
Argument,  to  make  an  abfolute  Revolt,  on  account  of 
my'Difability  in  regard  to  the  prefent  Queftion  ;  and 
fo  to  remit  over  again  to  You  the  Tafk  of  giving 
an  Anfwer  to  it :  but  I  think,  'twould  be  much 
more  ridiculous,  for  Both  of  us  to  fail.  Confider 
then,  what  we  fliall  do  in  this  cafe,  where  Socrates 
feems  to  interrogate  us  concerning  the  Species  of 
Pleafure ;  —  whether  it  is  divilible  into  different 
Species,  or  not ;  and,  if  it  be,  what  is  the  Number 
of  thefe  Species  ;  and  how  they  differ  in  their  Na- 
ture :  and  the  like  Queftions  he  feems  to  put  to  us,, 
concerning  Knowlege  and  Intelligence. 

Socrates. 
Your    Conjedure     is    perfectly    right,     O    Son    of 
Callias !    And,   if  we   are  not  able   to  anfwer  to  thefe 
Queftions  upon  every  Monad  "%    as  to  its  Likenefs  "^j 

'-+  Meaning  every  Subordinate  Genus,  and  every  Species,   in  any 
Subjecfl:,    taken  in  hand  to  manage,    or  to  fpeak  on. 

Samenefs^ 


192 


F     H     I     L    E    B    U 


Samenefs ':%  and  Contrariety  ''%  —  unlefs,  I  Aiy,  we 
can  do  This,  —  the  Inftances,  juft  now  produced, 
have  {hown,  that  None  of  us,  in  any  Matter  we  had 
to  handle,   would   ever  he  of  any  Worth  at  all  '■\ 

Protarchus. 

The  Cafe,    O   Socrates  !    feems    indeed    to    be    not 

very   different  from  Your  Reprefentation    of  it.  

Well,  'tis  certainly  a  Fine  Thing  to  know  'All 
things,  for  a  AVife  and  Prudent  Perfon  '''  :  but,  I 
think,     the    Beft    Thing,     next    to     That,     is     for    a 

Man 

'-5  The  Likentfs  of  O^ne  Monad  to  ylnother  regards  their  Com- 
mon Genus ;   for  thro  This   it  is,  that  They  are  alike. 

'-^  The  Edinenefs  of  any  Monad  regards  the  Species  of  it,; 
for  'tis  in  Every  one  of  Thefe,  that  the  Genus  is  the  Sa^ne. 
To  fee  Likenefs  in  all  the  Species  of  any  Genus,  and  a  Samenefs 
running  thro  them  all,  fliows  a  Knowlege  of  that  Genus,  which 
in  common  they   partake  of. 

''"  The  Contrariety  of  any  Monad  to  Sojne  Other  regards  only 
One  certain  Species  under  the  Ja/ne  Genus; — a  Species,  from  which 
k  diflers  more,  than  it  differs  from  ^ny  Other  of  the  fame 
Genus.  To  fee  therefore  fuch  a  Contrariety  between  any  T'wo 
Species,  implys  a  Knowlege  of  All  the  Species  co-ordinate. 

"^  See  before  in  Page  156. 

'-9  That  the  word  Every,  in  what  Socrates  faid  lad,  concern- 
ing the  nccefiity  of  thorow  Knowlege,   regards  all  the  Subjeds 

6  of 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  193 

Man  not  to  be  ignorant  of  Hlmfelf  '^°.  With  what 
Defign  I  have  now  faid  This,  I  fhall  proceed  to 
tell  you  '^\      This  ConveiTation,  O  Socrates !  you  have 

granted 

of  Knowlege,  taken  diJlijiSfly, — that  is,  atiy  One  particular  Subjeft 
whatever,  —  is  evident  from  the  very  ftrong  Expreffion,  with 
which  he  concludes  that  Sentence.  And  the  immediate  Affent 
to  it,  given  by  Protarchus,  fliows  that  he  underftood  it  rightly. 
But  prefently  after,  ludicroufly  affedling  to  mifapprehend  it,  he 
fuppofes,  that  the  word  Every,  in  that  Sentence,  was  meant  to 
include  all  the  Genera  and  Species  oi  All  things.  In  confirming, 
therefore,  the  fuppofed  Judgment  of  Socrates,  and  extolling 
JJniverfal  and  perfedl  Knoivlege,  he  fubjoins  very  juftly  the  Ke- 
JiriSiion,  which  occafions  the  prefent  Note ;  htciuiQ  Kfiowlege,  if 
not  accompanied  with  Moral  Wifdom  and  true  Prudence,  is  often 
hurtful.  (See  the  Second  Alcibiades,  page  82.)  The  Reftridtion 
alfo,  in  this  place,  ferves  Two  particular  Purpofes  ;  it  prepares 
us  for  the  being  told  of  Something  more  valuable  to  Man 
than  Knowlege;  and  it  connedls  what  Socrates  had  been  faying, 
on   That  Subjed,   with  what  is  next   to  follow. 

'3°  The  Excellence,  fpoken  of  by  Protarchus  in  this  Sentence, 
as  the  higheji,  is  either  the  incommunicable  Property  of  the 
Supreme  Mind;  or,  if  it  be  imparted  to  any  Particular  Minds,  it 
can  only  be  to  Such,  as  are  greatly  fuperior  to  the  Human. 
Whether  it  be  indeed  the  higbeji  Excellence  (or  Befl:  Thing)  ab- 
folutely,  or  whether  it  be  inferior  to  fome  Other,  is  offered  to 
our  confideration  afterward  :  but,  fince  the  profelTed  Subject  of 
this  Dialogue  extends  no  farther,  than  to  inquire  Wliat  is  Beft 
relatively  to  Man,  Plato  Aides  again  into  his  Subjecfl  by  this 
ejfy  and  gentle  Way  :   at  the  fame  time  it  gives  him  an  opportunity 

B  b  of 


X94  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

granted  to  us  all,  and  have  given  your  felf  up  to 
us,  for  the  Purpofe  of  inveftigating  What  is  the  Beft 
of  Human  Goods.  For  when  Philebus  had  faid, 
that  it  confifted  in  Pleafure,  and  Delight,  and  Joy, 
and  all  things  of  the  like  nature.  You  oppofed  him 
on  this  Point,  and  faid,  it  conlifted  not  in  Thefe 
things,  but  in  Thofe,  which  we  often  repeat  the 
Mention  of;  and  we  are  right  in  fo  doing,  that 
the  Opinions  on  each  fide,  being  always  frefh  in  our 
Memory s,  may  the  more  fairly  be  examined ''-.      You 

then, 

of  infinuating  This  Truth, — that  the  Knowlege  of  our  Selves,  and 
the  Knowlege  of  our  Chief  Good,  are  infeparable.  See  Note  208 
to  the  Firji  Alcibiades. 

'3"  Protarchus  fays  This,  becaufe  he  is  fenfible,  that  his  high 
Commendation  of  Self-Kno'wlege  might  feein  to  be  introduced  im- 
properly, and  without  a  fit  occafion :  In  thefe  Days  it  may 
feem  fo  ftill,  nctwithftanding  the  Account  he  gives  of  his  De- 
fign  in  it.  For  the  Relation,  which  it  has  to  the  Subjedl  of 
this  Dialogue,  can  be  difcovered  by  Thofe  only,  to  whom 
the  great  Truth,  mentioned:  at  the  end  of  the  preceding  Note, 
readily  occurs.  But  in  that  philofophic  Age  and  Country, 
the  Connexion  was  perhaps  eafily  fcen  :  Socrates,  to  whom  Pro- 
tarchus addicfled  his  Speech,  mufl  have  underflood  the  allu- 
lion  therein  to  a  ^irincipal  Doftrine  of  his  own  :  and  'tis  pro- 
bable, that  all  the  younger  Part  of  the  Company  had  before 
heard  Socrates  difcourfing  on  that  very  Subjedi. 

'3*  It  was  neceffary,  that  Plato,  in  this  Dialogue,  fliould,  for 
the  fake  of  his  Readers,  ftate  the  Points  in  controverfy  between 

Socrates 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         195 

then,  it  feems,  fay,  what  I  fhall  be  right  in  again 
repeating,  that  Mind,  Science,  Underftanding,  Art, 
and.  whatever  is  allycd  to  them,  are  better  Things 
than  Pleafure  with  Her  Allys ;  and  therefore,  that 
the   Poireffion,    not  of  Thefe,    but    of  thofe   Greater 

Socrates  and  Fhilcbus.     And   yet,    on  the  other  hand,    the  doing 
of  this   neceffary  Thing,    muft  feem,    at   beft,    fuperfluous    and 
idle,   to  Thofe  who  confider  this  Dialogue  as   the  Author  of  it 
would  chufe  to  have   it  confidered,  as  the  Tranfcript   of  a   real 
Converfation,       For    it    commences    immediately    after    a    long 
Difpute  between  thofe  very  fame   Perfons,    Socrates  and  Philebus, 
on  the  very  Points,  here  litigated.     To  this  Reafon,  for  leaving 
out  a  Recital  of  thofe  Points,    it  may  be  added,    that    the  Dif- 
pute  had    been    carried    on    hitherto,    in   a  dogmatical  way,    by 
prooflefs  and    bare  jljjertions,    and  that  in  Thefe   the  Sentiments 
of  each  Party  muft  often   have   been   repeated ;   fo  that,  to  pro- 
pofe   the  Queftion  over  again,    at   full  length,  in  this  argume?7ta- 
ttve  Part   of  the  Converfation,    muft  be   troublefome   and    tire- 
fome  to  the  fuppofed  Audience  of  the  former  Part,  the  aJJ'ertive^ 
Plato  therefore,    to  give  the  necejfary  Information  to  his  Readers, 
without  violating  the  Decorum  of  the  Dialogue,  has  contrived  to 
make    a  Repetition   of    the   Sentiments    of  Socrates    and  Philebus 
appear  not  iinnecejfary ,    by  introducing    a  7^10  Antagonift  to  So- 
crates,   and  thus   beginning   the  Difpute  de  novo.     Not  content 
with  This,   he  has  found  means,   in   the  Paflage  now  before  us, 
to  ftate  the  Queftion  once  more,  for  the  fake  of  renewing  it  in 
his  Reader  s  Mind,   after  a  long  feeming  Digreffion,  and  at  the 
fame  time  to   make  a  fufficieftt  Apology   for  it   to    the  fuppofed 
Auditors  of  the  whole  Converfation. 

B  b  2  Goods 


196         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Goods  ought  to  the  Objccl  of  our  Aim.  Now  thefe 
Pofitions  being  laid  down  feverally  on  each  fide,  as- 
Subjeft-Matters  of  our  Debate,  We  in  a  jocofe  way- 
threatened,,  that  we  would  not  fufTer  you  to  go  home 
quietly,  before  it  was  brought  to  a  fair  Determina- 
tion. You  complied,  and  promifed  us  to  contribute 
all  you  could  towards  the  accomplifliment  of  that 
End  '".  We  infift  therefore,  that,  as  Children  fay, 
you  mufl  not  take  away  again  what  is  fairly  given. 
But  in  the  prefent  Inquiry  forbear  proceeding  in  your 
ufual  way. 

'33  Plato,  in  this  Paffage,  which  has  a  RetrofpeSl  to  the  fup- 
pofed  prior  and  unwritten  Part  of  the  Converfation,  imitates  the 
Condudt  of  Tiramatick  Poets  in  their  Tragedys.  For,  a  well- 
formed  Tragedy  being  the  mimetic  Reprefentation  of  fome  Jingle 
important  Adtion,  if  this  Adlion  was  conneSled  with  any  antece- 
dent Circumflances  of  Things  or  Perfons,  it  was  necelTary,  that 
the  Poet  fliould  give  a  Narration  of  thefe  Circumflances,  in  the 
TTooTccati  or  Fir/i  Part  of  his  Drama,  to  make  the  Whole  of  it 
eafily  intelligible.  And  the  mofl  artful  Way  of  doing  this,  — 
a  Way,  taken  by  every  good  Dramatic  Poet,  —  is  to  put  that 
Narration  into  the  Mouth  of  fome.  Perfon  of  his  Dra/na ;  by 
making  an  Occafion  for  him  to  reconyit  what  he  had  done,, 
and  to  repeat  what  he  had  iaid,  previous  to  the  Opening  of 
the  Scene  then  prefent.  Plato  has  taken  the  fame  Way,  and 
with  fo  much  Art,  as  to  make  this  Recital  of  the  Engagement, 
entered  into  by  Socrates,  to  appear  quite  natural.  And  the  Re- 
cital is  neceffiiry,  becaufe  That  Engagement  is  laid  down  as  the. 
Foundation,  or  Occafion,  of  this  Dramatic  Dialogue. 

3  Socrates., 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  197 

Socrates. 
What  way  do  you  mean  ? 

Protarchus. 

Bringing  us  into  Straits  and  Embarraffments  '^'^;  — 
propounding  Queftions,  to  which  we  fhould  not  be 
able,  on  the  fudden,  to  give  a  proper  Anfvver.  For 
we  are  not  to  imagine,  that  our  prefent  Inquiry  is 
brought  to  a  Conclufion,  meerly  becaufe  All  of  Us 
are  at  a  Lofs  what  to  anfwer.  If  therefore  We  are 
unable  to  extricate  our  Selves  from  thefe  Difficultys  '^^, 
You  muft  help  us  out ;  for  fo  you  promifed.  Con- 
fider  then  what  to  do  on  this  occafion  ;  whether  to 
diftinguilh  Pleafure  and  Knowlege,  each  of  them,  into 
their  proper  Species;  or  whether  to  pafs  it  by,  if  you 
choofe  to  take  a  different  Way,  and  can  find  fome 
other  Means  of  deciding  the  Matter,  now  controverted 
between  us.. 

Socrates. 

No  Harm  then  need  I  be  afraid  of,  any  longer,  to- 
my    Self,    fince    you    have    faid   This  '''\       For    your. 

'3+  See  i/je  Meno,  page  98.. 

^3  5  Thofe  concerning  the  Species  o^  Pleafurs  and  oi  Knoisolege^ 
^5*  Alluding  to  thofe  jocular  Threats,   employed  by  the  young 
Gentlemen,  then  in   the  Lyccrutn,  and  gathered  around  SocrateSi 
to  engage  him  in  this  Dialectic  Inquiry.     See  page  112. 

leaving; 


198         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.. 

leaving  to  my  own  Choice,  what  Ways  and  Means 
to  make  ufe  of,  frees  me  from  all  Apprehenfions  on 
my  own  private  account.  But,  to  make  it  ftill  eafier 
to  me,  fome  God  '^%  1  think,  has  brought  Things  to 
my  remembrance. 

Protarchu  s. 

How  do  you  mean  ?    What  Things  ? 

Socrates. 
Having  formerly  heard,  either  in  a  Dream,  or 
broad  awake  ''^,  certain  Sayings,  I  have  them  now 
again  prefent  to  my  Mind  ; — Sayings  concerning  Plea- 
fure  and  Knowlege,  that  Neither  of  them  is,  of  its 
Selfj  Good,  but  fome  Third  Thing,  diflferent  from 
Both  of  thofe,  and  better  than  Either.  Now  if  This 
fhould  difcover  itfelf  to  us  clearly,  Pleafure  is  then 
to  be  difmiffed  from  any  Pretenfions  to  the  Vidory. 
For  we  fhould  then  no  longer    expert  to  find,    that 

'37  See  the  Greater  Hippias,  Note  70.  and  the  Firji  Alcihiadest 
Notes  268  and  269. 

'3^  That  is,  —  whether  he  had  only  had  a  vifionary  Notion, 
or  fanciful  Conceit,  of  what  was  the  Chief  Good  of  Man,  — 
or  whether,  freed  from  Senfe  and  Imagtnatmi,  (by  which  the 
"Judgment  is  fettered,  no  lefs  than  the  Outward  Senfes  are  by 
Sleep,)  his  Mind  was  then  thorowly  awakened  to  the  Confciouf- 
nefs  of  her  real  Self,  and  of  her  true  Nature,  when  the  Idea  of 
True  Good  firft  arofe  within  him. 

Pleafure 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  109 

Pleafure  and  Good  are  the  Same  Thing :    or  how  fay 

You? 

Protarchus. 
Juft  fo. 

Socrates. 

We  fliall  have  no  Occafion  then,  in  My  opinion, 
for  diftinguifhing  the  fcveral  Species  of  Pleafure. 
And  in  the  Progrefs  of  our  Inquiry  'twill  appear 
more  evidently  ftill,  that  I  am  in  the  right. 

Protarchus. 

Having  Begun  fo  happily,  proceed  and  finifli  with, 
the  fame  Succefs. 

Socrates. 
Let  us,    firft,    agree  upon  a  few  little  Points  be- 

fide. 

Protarchus. 

What  are  Thofe? 

Socrates. 

In  what  Condition  or  State  of  Being  is  the  Sovereign 
Good  '"  ?  Muft  it  of  neceflity  be  perfedl '+°  ?  or  may 
it  want  Perfection  ? 

'^9  In  the  Greek,  —  Ta^aS-oV.  —  concerning  which  Word,  fee 
Note  35,  toward  the  End. — Three  CharaSieriJlicks  of  the  Sovereign 
Good,   whatever  it  be,   are  afcertained  in  what  now  follows. 

0.  Protarchus.- 


2,00 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Protarchu  s. 

of   all    things,     O  Socrates  !     it   is    the   moft   Per- 

fed  '^'. 

Socrates. 

'+°  In  the  Greek , — TeAeoV.— the  word  is  here  ufed  in  a  pecu- 
liar and  philofophical  Senfe,  to  be  explained  only  from  the 
ancient  Divifion  of  Good  'Things  into  T'lso  Kinds, — into  Such,  as 
are  good  on  their  oivn  account,  or  eligible  for  their  own  fakes ; 
of  which  Kind  is  Health  of  Body ; — and  Others,  which  are  good 
only  as  they  conduce  to  the  attainment  of  thofe  Goods  of  the 
Firft  Kind  J  of  this  Latter  Kind  are  Medicines  for  th.Q  fake  of 
Health.  —  A  Third  Kind  of  good  Things,  (namely.  Such  as  are 
defirable  on  their  own  account  as  Ends,  and  at  the  fame  time 
are  defirable  as  Means  to  attain  farther  Good,)  feems  to  have 
been  added  by  Some  of  the  ^Pythagoreans :  but  this  Addition  was 
net  received  by  Plato,  nor  by  Aryiotk.  And  indeed  thefe  middle 
Goods  (for  fo  they  may  be  called,  as  they  partake  of  the 
nature  of  Ends  and  the  jiature  alfo  of  Means,)  make  not  a 
diflinB  Kind,  but  are  comprehended  in  the  Firjl  Kind  ;  as  will 
appear  from  confidering  the  Anfwer  of  Protarchus  to  the  ^tef- 
tion,  here  put  to  him  by  Socrates. 

'*'  In  the  Greek, — TfAewTaTor.  —  To  this  Sovereign  Good  alone 
tlie  Stoicks  allowed  the  Attribute  of  rgAaor,  —  a  word,  which 
Cicero  very  juftly  interprets  by  the  Latin  word  abfolutum;  — 
accordingly,  to  this  Sovereign  Good  alone  they  gave  the  Name 
of  TgAos  End,  as  being  the  only  End  of  Man  xara  (pmtv  acccord- 
ing  to  his  nature:  and  to  be  thorowly  confiRent  with  them- 
felves,  and  to  avoid  all  partial  Objcdlions  to  their  Doftrine, — 
all    Objediuns,    which    attacked    not   the  iDhole  Syfiem   of  it    at 

once. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


201 


once — they  denied  even  the  Attribute  of  good  to  all  things  com' 
monly  called  good,  if  mferioiir  to  this  Good  Supreme ;  at  the  fame 
time,  however,  allowing  them  the  Preference  to  things  contrary^ 
and  admitting  them  to  be  eligible  of  themfelves;  as  Health, 
Peace,  Liberty,  perfonal  and  civil  :  to  thefe  Things,  which  are 
commonly  confidered  as  compleat  Ends  abfolutely  defirablc,  the 
Stoicks,  who  were  of  all  Philofophers  perhaps  the  moft  confiflent 
in  their  'Tenets,  and  the  moft  accurate  in  their  Therms,  gave  the 
Name  of  vTroTiXlS'si,  that  is.  Subordinate  Efids,  or  rather,  Obje£ls 
of  Purfiiit  in  fuborditiation  to  the  End.  'Tis  eafy  to  perceive, 
that  the  difagreement  in  this  cafe,  between  Plato  and  the 
Stoicks,  is  meerly  verbal;  as  it  is  indeed  in  moft  other  Points 
wherein  they  feem  to  differ  :  at  the  fame  time  'twill  be  ad- 
mitted, that,  if  the  Stoicks  ufe  expreffions,  philofophically  more 
accurate  than  Plato,  this  Philofopher  fpeaks  more  intelligibly  to 
common  Apprehenfions.  Arijiotle  herein  follows  his  Mafter's 
manner  of  exprelTing  himfelf:  for,  on  this  very  Subjecft  of 
things  good,  he  fpeaks  of  Ends  a  TgA«a  i??}perfeSl ;  he  fpeaks 
of  Etids,  purfuable  for  their  own  fakes,  as  being  reXaorepcc 
more  perfeSl,  than  the  purfuable  for  the  fake  of  fomething 
elfe;  and  he  fpeaks  of  That  End,  which  is  ^eXeiorccrov 
the  mojl  perfeSi  of  all.  By  Andronicus,  the  Paraphrajl  of  his 
Nicomachean  Ethicks,  This  is  called  to  loj^x^ov  niXQ<i  the  Ultimate 
End;  by  Eiifiratius,  the  Greek  Commentator  on  that  Treatife, 
it  is  called  TroLvTiXeiov  all-perfeB ;  and  by  Cicero  it  is  called  finis 
bonorum,  —  boiioriim  idtimum,  —  extremum,  — fummum.  —  To  this 
all-perfeB  End,  the  Sovereign  Good,  the  Pythagoreans  and  Arifto- 
tle  gave  the  Name  of  gjj^af^ov/o,  Happinefs :  for,  that  the  Ancients 
underftood  This  to  be  the  Meaning  of  that  Term,  appears  from 
this  Paffage  of  Stobceus,  in  Eclog:  Ethic:  Cap.  3.  Tw  euS'a.ifxorla.v 
cuvmv/xw  Ta  TeAe-t  y^iyaaiv  [fc.  ol  a.^^aAot'\.  euS'a.tfJLovlot,  <f'  gV'  to 
a^K^ov  iv   Tw   /3/'so,    71   TO   {Aiyic^Qv   tZv   dycc^wv,   ri  ro   x^dri^ov.      They 

C  c  .  [the 


202  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
Well  ;   and  is  it  alfo  fufficient  '"^^  ? 

Protarchus. 

Without  donbt  :    and.  in   this   refpedl  it  excells  all 

other  Things. 

Socrates. 

But  "fiirthcr  ;  This  alfo,  I  prefumc,  is  of  all  things 
the  moft  neceffary  to   fay  of  it,   that  Every  Being,    to- 

[the  Ancients]  Jay,  that  Happinefs  and  the  [ultimate]  End  are 
jynonimotis  Serins.  Now  Happinefs  u  the  Beji  'Thing  in  [human] 
Life  J  or  the  Greateji  or  mojl  Excellent  of  Good  Things-.  —  And 
concerning  this  Firfl  CharaSleriJlick  of  the  Sovereign  Good, 
Arijlotle  himfclf,  in  Ethic:  Nicom:.  L.  lo,  C.  6,  thus  writes, 
— airavra,,  ws  flVftf,  gVg^s  "XJ^^'V  at^yf^e^cc,  ttXw  tJTs  ai'J^ai^or/as* 
TgAos  yxp  conn.  E'very  thing,  as  I  may  fay,  except  Happinefs,  we 
choofe  for  the  fake  of  fomething  elfe :  for  [of  all  our  x^ims]  Hap- 
pinefs is  the  End. 

"^^  That  is,  fujicient  to  make  tliofe  Beings  happy,  who  par- 
take of  it. — This  Attribute  of  the  Sovereign  Good,  this  Second 
CbaraSlcriflick  of  it,  is  recognifed  as  fuch  by  Arifiotle  in  thefe 
words,  —  TO  Tg'Aaoy  a'^aS'&j'  auTa^;:^e«  eivan  (Toxft*  The  perfe6i  [or 
final]  Good  is,  we  think,  fef -fufficient.  Ethic:  N:com:  L:  i,  C.  7  j- 
and  The  felf-fnffcient  is  prefcntly  afterwards  defined  to  be,  •— 
0,  fJi.ovtifJt.evcv,  ccpy.Lcv  xat  at^erov  Troiei  lov  fiiov,  %a.i  /jinS'Svoi  -evS'sa,' 
that  which,  unaccompanied  and  left  alone,  fifficcs  to  make  Life 
eligible  a7id  in  want  of  nothing  :  —  a  Definition  exa<5tly  agreeable 
to  the  Senfe,  in  which  Flato  here  ufes  the  word  iwaj-or,  as  will 
prefcntly   be  feen. 

3  whom 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         203 

whom  it  is  known  '*',    feeks  it  intently  ;    as  chooling 
the  poirefTion    of  it    above    All    things  ;    and   indeed 

caring 

''^3  The  'Third  and  laft:  CharaSicriJlick  of  Good,  here  mentioned, 
— namely,    that   'tis   the  chief  ObjeSi  of  Dcfre, — is   to  be   under- 
flood   in    a   Senfe  different   from   what   is   meant   in    the  ancient 
Def nit  ion  oi  Good, — that  'tis  That,  which  All  things  [all  Beings,  in 
all  their  Adions  and  Operations]  aim  at. — For  in  this  Definition, 
Good  is    to    be    taken  in  a  general  and  indefinite  Senfe  j    the  aiming 
at  it  is  attributed  io  All  Beings,  whatever  be  their  Nature;    and 
the  Good,    which    they  feverally   aim   at,    is   of  different  Kinds., 
refpedively  fuited  to  their  federal  Natures.     But   in   the  PafTage 
of  Plato,    now   before    us,   the   ainimg  at   Good   is    attributed    to 
fuch  Beings   only,   as  have  the  Knoivlege   of  it ;    and   the  Good, 
profefTedly  here  meant,    is   the   Chief  Good  of  One  only  Kind  of 
Being,    namely,    the  Rational.  —  Ariftotk,   in   like   manner,   attri- 
butes   the   capacity    of  being    happy  to    no   Beings    but    Such   as 
are    endued   with   Rational  Soids.     For  Happinefs,    in   His  Judg- 
ment,  is  feated  only  in  Souls,    energifmg  [that  is,  moving  within 
themfelves,    and    operating    without]    coiformably    to   That  Virtue 
which   is   the  moft   excellent    in  Human  Life ; — namely,    the  Virtue 
of  Man,    as    he  is   a  rational  and  focial  Being.  —  Thus    we   may 
obferve, — that,   in  giving  us  the  Three  Charaderifticks  of  Good, 
here  noted,    Plato  and  Arifiotle  are  agreed.     We  make   this  Ob-  . 
fervation,    to  pave  tlie  Way  for  more  fuch   in   fome  of  the   fub- 
fequent  Notes,    ferving    to   prove   how   well    thefe    great  Mafters 
in    the   Science  of  Good  agree  in   all  their  Notions   concerning  it, 
however   they   may   differ  in   their  P^xprcffioJis .     For  thofe    three 
Charadlerifiicks  of  the  Sovereign  Good  are  not  the  only  peculiar 
Propertys   of  it ;   fcveral   others  have  been  juftly  enumerated  by 

C  c  2  Mr. 


2,04         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

caring  for  no  Other  Things, — except  Such  as  are  con- 
ftantly  attended  with  the  Enjoyment  of  that  Supream 
Good  '-^ 

Protarchus. 

Mr.  Harris,  in  his  fine  Dialogue  conceitiing  Happinefs ;  and  fomc 
others,  difFering  in  Terms  at  leaft,  will  be  noted  by  P/aio 
himfelf  in  the  latter  Part  of  t/j;s  'Philebus.  But  the  Three,  juft 
now  pointed  out,  are  deciiive  enough  to  Ihow,  that  neither 
K?io'wlege  nor  Pleafure  can  be  the  Sovereign  Good  of  Man,  be- 
caule  they  are  Both  wanting  in  every  one  of  thofe  charafteriftick 
Marks  j  and  to  prove  This,  is  all  which  is  aimed  at  in  this 
Part  of  the  Dialogue. 

'+*  Plato's  own  Words  are  thefe, — ttAjiV  tmv  dTroreXnixitcov  cLix.«. 

dyxSroTi    [fc:    aVoTgAajttgj'OJs]. — The   ccTroTiXecrucc    iZv  dycd^uv    Con~ 

fummation  of  all  Good,  meant  in  the  Laffc  Words  of  this  Paffage^ 
is  the  Sovereign  Good  or  Happinefs  of  Man :  and  if  this  So- 
vereign Good,  according  to  Plato,  confift  in  Virtue,  it  follovvs> 
that  thole  dwoTihiifJiSva.,  which  are  meant  in  the  Firft  Words  of 
this  PafTage,  muft  be  inrtuous  (honeft  and  good)  Actions  per- 
formed, and  virtuous  Defgns  aecomplified.  For,  jufl  fo,  Thofe 
who  place  their  End,  the  Confummation  of  all  Good,  in  Plea- 
fire,  have  no  Concern  or  Care  for  any  Thing  befide  j — ex- 
cepting thofe  Things,  or  thofe  Defigns,  the  poilelTing  or  tha 
accomplifliing  of    which    is    accompanied    with    the   Attainment 

of  This  their  End. Ar'flotle,   in  Ethic:  Nicom:   L.  i,    C.  8^, 

writing  on  this  very  Subjed:,  giveth  the  fame  Meaning  to  the 
word  aVcTgAm',  which  is  here  given  it  by  Plato. — If  then  we 
have  interpreted  the  prefcnt  Paflage  rightly,  —  and  if  only 
Virtue  can  juftify  her  Claim  to  thofe  Charadlers  of  the  Sovereign 
Good,  which  are  before   noted  as  Marks   to  afcertain   it, — 'twiU 

be 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.       '205 

be  found,  that  Plato  placeth  a  Man's  Poffcffion  of  this  Good  in 
his  being  poffejjcd  of  Virtue, — in  having  his  Mind  furniihed  with 
Virtuous  Habits,  naturally  produdive  of  Virtuous  ASfions, — Actions, 
growing  up,  and  attaining  their  full  Ferfedlion,  d7rori?^h!y~evoc, 
together  with  thofe  Habits.  —  We  take  this  occafion  to  obferve, 
that  Arijlotk,  when  he  placeth  the  Eflence  of  all  and  every 
Virtue  in  Habits  of  the  Soul,  (that  is,  in  the  Soul's  firm  and 
fure  holding  or  pojjejing  of  Virtue,)  exadlly  agrees  with  Plato: 
for,  according  to  Arijhtle,  virtuous  Habits,  acquired,  as  they  are, 
only  by  virtuous  Etiergys  and  Actions,  become,  after  they  are 
acquired,  Caifes,  in  their  turn,  of  all  the  virtuous  JLnergys  and 
ASlions,  performed  in  future,  and  then,  but  not  till  then,  per- 
formed with  petfecl  Eafe.  See  Ethic:  Nicom:  and  the  excellent 
Greek  Paraphrajl  thereon,  in  L.  2,  C.  2. — On  this  occafion  alfo 
we  may  obferve,  that  Arijiotle's  Definition  of  Happinefs  fuppofes 
Virtue  to  be  the  Sovereign  Good  of  Man.  For  on  this  Sup- 
pofition  depends  the  Validity  of  his  Reafoning,  to  prove  that 
Human  Happinefs  confifls  in  energifing  agreeably  to  [the  Rules  of] 
Virtue:  becaufe  no  other  Thing  than  the  aSlual  Enjoyment  of 
Man's  Sovereign  Good,  whatever  it  be,  can  conftitute  a  Man's 
Happinefs.  If  then  Man  s  Sovereign  Good  be  Virtue, — if  Virtue  be 
always  operative, — and  if  fhe  always  operates,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Moral  Wifdom,  to  the  confcientious  and  afFedionate 
Difcharge  of  all  Moral  Dutys,  unimpeded  by  Pain  or  Pleafure, 
— it  follows,  that  the  free  Energy  of  Man's  Rational  Soul,  whilil 
he  is  aSiually  employed  in  difcharging  thofe  Dutys,  is  the  ac- 
tual Enjoyrnenf  of  his  Sovereign  Good,,  gives  him  pure  Pleafure,. 
unmixed  with  Pain,  and  alone  makes  his  Happinefs.  For,  to  add 
one  obfervation  more,  on  this  fole  account  it  is,  that  Arijiotle 
deems  a  moderate  Share  in  the  Goods  of  Fortune  neceffiry  to  the 
perfeBion  of  human  Happinefs,  —  'tis,  that  they  furnifli  Good  Men 
3  with. 


2o6         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
There  is   no  poffibility  of  contradiding  This. 

SOCRATE  s. 

Now  then,   let  us  confider  and  judge  of  the  Life 

of  Pleafure,    and   the  Life   of  Knowlege  :    and  to  do 

this  the  better,    let  us  view  them.    Each  apart  from 

the  Other. 

Protarchus. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

SoCR  AT  ES. 

Thus  ;  let  us  fuppofe  a  Life  of  Pleafure,  unac- 
companied by  Knowlege  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  Life  of  Knowlege,  unaccompanied  by  Pleafure. 
For,  if  Either  of  them  be  the  Sovereign  Good,  it 
muft  be  compleat  and  fufficient,  in  want  of  no  Aid 
from  any  other  Quarter.  But,  if  Either  of  them 
fhould  appear  to  be  Indigent  of  aught,  or  Infuffi- 
cient,  we  are  no  longer  to  imagine  This  to  be  that 
Real  and   True  Good  we  are   in   fearch  of. 

Protarchus. 
In   fuch  a  cafe,    how  could  we  ? 

with   the  Means   of  difcharging  every  Duty,    and   of  prad^ifing 
every   Virtue:    as  may  be  feen  in  Etbic:  Nico?/i:  L.  lo,   C.  8. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  207 

Socrates. 
Shall  we  then  examine  their  Pretenflons   thus  fe- 
parately,   making  your  own  Mind   the  Judge  ? 

Protarchus. 
With  all  my  heart. 

SOCRATE  S. 

Anfwer  then  to  My  Queftions. 

Protarchus. 
Propofe  them. 

Socrates. 
"Would  You,  Protarchus,    accept  the  Offer,  were  it 
made   you,    to  live  all   your  Life  with   a  Senfe    and 
Feeling  of  Pleafures  the  mofl  exquifite  ? 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly.     Why  not  ? 

Socrates. 
Suppofe  you  were   in  full  poffelTion  of  this   Good, 
would  you  not  think,   that  Something  beiide  was  ftill 
wanting  to  you  ? 

Protarchus, 

I  certainly  fhould  not. 

Socrates. 


2oS         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

SOCRATE  S. 

Confider  now,  whether  you  would  not  want  to  have 
a  juft  Difcernment  of  Things  in  which  you  are  inte- 
refted,  and  to  have  true  Notions,  and  to  reafon  on 
them  rightly,  and  to  exercife  other  Powers  of  the 
Mind  '*^,  near  of  Kin  to  thofe  ;  at  leaft,  whether 
you  would  not  want   to  fee   fomething. 

Protarchus. 

why  fhould  I  ?  when  I  had,  in  a  manner.  All 
things,   in  having  continual  Joy  ? 

Socrates. 
Living  thus  then  continually   all  your  Life,    would 
the  moft  exquifite  Pleafures  give  you  any  Joy  ? 

Protarchus. 
Why  not  ? 

Socrates. 

Having  neither  Mind,  nor  Memory,  nor  Knowlege, 
nor  true  Opinion  '*'^,  —  in  the  firft  place,  of  this  very 
thing,   your  havmg  of  Joy,   you  muft   of  necefTity  be 

■"^5  Memory,  and  right  Opinions,  or  juft  Thoughts  of  Things, 
are  particularly  meant  in  this  place  ;  as  will  appear  from  what 
immediately  follows ;  and  alfo  by  comparing  this  PafTage  with 
the  profcfled  Hypothefis  of  Socrates,  as  ftated  by  himfelf  in 
the  Beginning  of  this  Dialogue.     See  Pages  36  and  38. 

ignorant. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


209 


ignorant,  and  unable  to  fay  whether  you  then  had  any 
Joy,  or  ;?(?/,  being  void  of  all  jufl  Difccrnment  or 
Knowlege  of  things  prefent. 

Protarchus. 
I  muft. 

Socrates. 

Being  alio  void  of  Memory^  'twould  be  impoflible 
for  you  to  7'ei7ieinber^  that  you  ever  had  any  Joy  ;  or 
to  preferve  even  the  leaft  Memorial  of  a  Joy  thejt 
prefent  :  wanting  alfo  right  Opinion,  you  could  not 
fo  much  as  think  you  had  any  Joy,  tho  in  the  midft 
of  it  :  unable  alfo  to  reajon  or  draw  confequences, 
you  could  not  pofTibly  conclude,  that  ever  you  jhould 
have  any  Joy  to  come.  Thus  you  would  live  the  Life, 
not  of  a  Man,  but  of  a  Sea-Sponge,  or  of  an  Oyfter, 
Are  thefe  things  fo  ?  or  ought  we  to  think  Other- 
wife  concerning  them  ? 

146  YYe  have  followed  Fichius  and  Grynaus  in  attributing  this 
Speech  intirely  to  Socrates.  With  this  agrees  the  Firft  Bafil 
Edition  of  the  Original.  Aldus,  however,  and  Stephens  break 
the  Sentence  juft  in  this  place,  and  put  the  word  a'A«S->7  trtt: 
in  the  mouth  of  Protarchus.  Who  are  in  the  right,  appears 
from  the  neceffity  of  adding  to  the  word  S'o^xv  either  the 
Epithet  aAnS-jj,  as  in  the  next  Sentence  of  Socrates,  or  the 
Epithet  Qo^riv,  as  in  the  Beginfiing  of  the  Dialogue :  for  no 
man  ever  fuppofed  it  a  Good  Thing  to  have  a?iy  fort  of  Opinion's, 
or  any  other  than  fuch   as   are  right  and  true. 

D  d  Protar- 


2.IO         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
A  Life   of  meer   Pleafure  muft   be  Such,    as  You 
have  defcribed  it. 

Socrates. 
Do  we  think  then,  that  fuch  a  Life  is  eligible  ? 

Protarchus. 

The  Defcription  of  it,  O  Socrates !   has  /ilenced  me 
intirely  for  the  prefent. 

Socrates. 

Nay ;  let  us  not  fhrink  fo  foon  from  purfuing 
our  Inquirys ;  but  proceed  to  the  confideration  of  that 
other  Life,   the  Life  of  Mind. 

Protarchus.. 
What  Kind  of  Life  is  That  ? 

Socrates. 

Let  us  confider,  whether  Any  of  us  would  choose 
to  live  with  a  juft  Difcernment,  and  a  right  Under- 
ftanding  of  things,  and  with  Science,  and  a  perfed:  Me- 
mory of  all  things;  but  without  partaking  of  Pleafure, 
whether  great  or  fmall  ;  and  on  the  other  hand,, 
without  partaking  of  Pain  ;  wholly  exempt  from  all 
Feelings  of  either  Kind. 

Pro TAR- 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  an 

Protarchus. 
To  Mc,  O  Socrates !  Neither  of  thefe  Lives  appears 
eligible  ;   and  I  think  never  would  appear  fo  to  any 
other  man. 

Socrates. 
What  think   you   of  a  Middle  Life,   where  Both  of 
them  are  mixed  together — a  Life,    compofed  of  the 
other  Two  ? 

Protarchus. 
Compofed   of  Pleafure   do  you    mean,    on   the  one 
hand,  of  a  right  Underftanding  alfo  and  a  juft  Dif- 
cernmentj   on  the  other  hand  } 

SOCRATE  S. 

Juft  fo :    fuch  a  Life  do  I  mean. 

Protarchus. 

Every  man  would  certainly  prefer  Such  a  Kind   of 

Life  to  Either  of  the  other  Two  '"^^ 

Socrates. 

'■^7  This  Sentence,  in  the  Greek,  is  followed  by  thefe  words,— 
—  >ca)  TT^oi  leToi?,  e^  o  fjiiv,  o  S"'  e.  "  a?2j  bejide  this,  'tis  not 
that  One  man  would  (prefer  it),  and  Another  not."  —  But  thefe 
words  neither  illiijlrate  nor  Jirengthen  thofe  which  precede,  nor 
convey  any  additional  Meaning:  we  have  therefore  taken  the 
liberty   of   omitting  them,   as   erroneous    and    corrupt.       Where 

D  d  2  the 


:ii2         F   H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

SOCRAT  ES. 

Perceive  we  now,  what  the  Refult  is  of  our  d'lC- 
courfing  thus  far  on  the  Subjedt  now  before  us  ? 

Protarchus. 

Perfectly  well ;  'tis  This  ;  that  Three  Lives  have 
been  propofed  for  our  conjfideration,  and  that  Neither 
of  the  Two  firft-mentioned  appears  fuflicient,  or 
eligible,    for  Any  one,    whether   of  Human  Kind,    or 

of  a  Kind  fuperior  to  the  Human  ''^^. 

Socrates. 

the  Error   lies,    and    how   it    may  be    reftified,    is    in   the    next; 
Note   conje(flured.  —  Ficmus  and  Serranus  deem   it    an   hnperfeSi' 
Sentence;    but   the  words,  added  by  Them,   to  make  it  perfiB, 
by  no  means  amend  the  Fault  here  cenfured,   making  this  latter 
Sentiment   a  meer  Repetition   of  the   former  in   other  Words. 

'*^  In  the  Greek,  —  »t£  ^wwr  aj^gw.  "  Jior  to  any  other  Animal 
'whatever."  —  But  This  could  not  be  written  with  a  view  to 
Brute  Animals;  becaufe  Brutes  are  not  only  incapable  of  par- 
taking of  any  Good,  befide  the  Pleafurcs  of  Senfe,  or  what  is 
referable  to  thofe  Pleafures,  but  are  alfo  incapable  of  knoiving. 
What  Good  belongs  to  Mind,  —  inafmuch  as  they  are  unable 
.  ever  to  conceive,  that  there  is  any  fuch  Being  as  Mind  any 
where  in  Nature. — Now  the  having  of  thofe  Capacitys,  or  latent 
Powers,  and  the  having  of  that  Knowlege,  (or  rather,  thofe 
Pre-conceptions,  the  Principles  of  that  Knowlege,)  are  exprefsly 
faid  by  Socrates  to  be  requifite  to  the  Choice  and  Piirfuit,  as  well 
as    to    the   Enjoyment,     of   Mental    Good.  —  See  Notes    9,    10, 

and 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates.. 


213 


Is  it  not  evident  then,  with  regard  to  the  Point 
in  controverfy,  that  Neither  of  thofe  Two  Lives  can 
give  the  Pofleffion  of  the  Sovereign  Good  ?  for  Which- 
ever of  them  had  fuch  a  Power.  That  Life  would  be 
fufficient,     perfedt,     and     eligible     alfo    to    all     thofe 


and    143,    to    this  Dialogue,   and    the  Paflages,    to   which   thofe 

Notes  belong. Thefe  confiderations  have  induced  us  to  think, 

that,  in  the  Paffage  now  before  us,  we  fliould  either  read 
S^Mv  inftead  of  (^mmv,  or,  at  leaft,  fliould  underftand  the  word 
^uMv  to  have  refpedl  to  other  Rational  Beings  in  other  Parts  of 
the  Univerfe.  For  all  Thefe  are  exprefsly  called  ^wa.  Animals, 
by  Plato  in  his  Tinueus.  And  this  Thought  fuggefted  the  fol- 
lowing Alteration  of  the  Paffage,  which  in  Note  147  we  have 
fuppofed  to  be  erroneous  and  corrupt;  —  xa)  tcos  tstoh,  bk 
arS-^wTai  jufV,  S-fo)  cT'  o'  that  is,  "  Nay,  and  farther,  not  only 
Men,  but  the  Gods  alfo."  This  Reading  gives  great  Propriety 
to  the  words  tpo?  t8toi5,  x.  t.  A.  For  thefe  Additional  words 
confiderably  add  to  the  Force  of  this  Paffage;  as  they  exprefs,, 
much  more  fully,  than  the  words  preceding  them,  the  flrong 
Senfe,  which  Protarchus  had,  cf  the  Infufficiency  of  a  Lfe, 
either  meerly  pUajurahk,  or  purely  mental,  for  the  Happinefs  of 
any  Being,  in  whofe  Body  dwells  a  Rational  Soul. — It  may  well 
be,  that  the  Paffage  was  at  firfl:  wilfully  corrupted,  from  a  fuf- 
picion  of  Lr.piety  in  the  Sentiment  therein  expreffed.  But 
the  Weaknefs  of  fuch  a  Sufpicion  will  prcfently  appear  from 
what  follows    in  the  Dialogue. 


£3 


Animals, 


^14 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.. 


Animals  '",  who  are  capable  of  living  in  the  conti- 
nual enjoyment  of  the  Good  all  their  Lives.  And 
whoever  of  Us  fhould  give  any  Other  Life  the  pre- 
ference to  That,  would  make  his  Eledion  contrary 
to  the  nature  of  the  truly  Eligible,  tho  not  will- 
ingly, becaufe  thro  Ignorance,  or  fome  unhappy  Ne- 
ceility  '^°. 

Protarchu  s. 
"What  you  fay,   is  highly  probable  indeed. 

'45  In  the  Greek, — ■n-a.ai  (puioli  y.tx.\  ^JoiS,  to  all  Plants  and  Ani- 
jfials.  —  But  are  Plants  capable  of  living  a  Life  of  Senfual  Plea- 
fur  c  f  ov  Brute  Animals,  a  Life  of  Science  and  Underjlanding  f  — 
We  are  therefore  inclined  to  think,  that  Plato's  own  Words 
were  Tracri  roh  I^mou'  for  immediately  he  fubjoins  an  Explanation 
of  liis  Meaning,  and  limits  the  word  Trao-/,  all,  to  Such  only, 
as  are  endued  'with  Rea/bn ;  (fee  Note  148  ;) — and  that  the  word 
(fiv  was  written  in  the  Margin  of  fome  Manufcript,  oppofite  to 
the  w^ords  vrscai  roTi,  by  a  Reader,  aftonilhed  at  the  Boldnefs  of 
the  Expreflion,  TraVi  to'jI;  ^caon,  and  not  fufficiently  attentive  to 
the  qualifying   words  fubjoined. 

'5°  What  this  unhappy  Neceffity  is,  fee  ia  Argument  to  the 
Leffer  Hippias,  page  7.  —  The  happy  Necefllty  is  That,  which 
obliges  every  Mind,  freed  from  the  Power  of  the  unhappy 
Neceffity,  and  enlightened  by  Divine  Reafon,  to  affent  to  what- 
ever That  Reafon  {hows  her  to  be  true,  and  to  ivill  whatever 
the   fame  Rcafun   fliows  her  to   be  good. 

Socrates^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


2.15 


Socrates.- 

That  we  ought  not  then  to  think  That  Goddefs  oF 
Philebus  '^'  to  be  the  fame  thin^  with  the  Sovereip-n 

CD  O 

Good,  has  been  Ihown,   I  think,    fufficiently. 

Philebus. 
Neither  is  that  Mind  of  Yours,   O  Socrates  ''-  !    the' 
Sovereign  Good  ;   for  ^twill  be  found  deficient  in   the 
fame  refpeds  '". 

Socrates. 

Mine   perhaps,    O   Philebus  !    may  ;    but  not  That 
Mind  which  is   Divine  and   True  '-"^ ;    for   'tis    other- 
wife, 

'5'  Socrates  here  alludes  to  that  pompous  Invocation  of  cccppoS'iTo 
TTCLvi^nfJLos,   or  Fe/7us  Volupia,   made  by  Philebus  in   page  5  i . 

'5=  Philebus  here  evidently  means, — Mind,  fo  much  extolled  by 
Socrates,  who  had  placed  the  Soverign  Good  in  Mind  and  Mental 
Etiergys. — This  Retort  is  very  fair;  for  the  Argument,  brought  by 
Socrates  to  confute  the  Pofition  o^  Philebus,  is  equally  conclufive 
againfl  the  Hypothelis,   oppofed   to   it  by  Socrates. 

'5^  The  next  Editor  at  Plato,  we  hope,  will  be  more  carefiol 
than  the  former,  all  of  whom  have  in  this  place  printed  Tauro. 
inflead  of  rayra. 

'^^  Socrates  here  willingly,  joins,  his  Adverfary  in  rejecting 
the  Hypothecs,  hitherto  efpouled  by  him, — That,  which  affirms 
Mind,  or  Intelligence,    to   be  the  Chief  Good  of  all  Beings,    who 

6'  are 


2i6  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

are  endued  with  Mind  or  Reafon, — with  an  exception  of  One 
only  Being,  the  Divine  Mind  ;  if  He  can  properly  be  called  an 
Exception  to  that  Doflrine,  He,  who  doth  not  fartake  of  Mind, 
but  is,  Himlelf,  Mind  Unherfal. — For,  as  the  Pofition  of  Phi- 
lebus  cannot  be  true,  in  as  much  as  Man  partakes  of  Mind, — 
'io  neither  can  the  Hypothefis,  oppofed  to  it  by  Socrates,  be 
true,  inafniuch  as  the  Rational  Soul  of  Man,  and  every  other 
Particular  Mind,  is  inverted  with  a  Body;  becaufe  the  Good  of 
every  Being  muft  be  of  fuch  a  Kind,  as  intirely  agrees  to  the 
whole  Nature  of  that  Being  whofe  Good  it  is.  Socrates  there- 
fore, by  intimating  his  Hypothefis  to  be  flill  true  of  the  Di- 
vine Mind,  intimates  at  the  fame  time,  that  the  Divine  Being 
..fllone  -is,  in  his  ivbole  Effence,  True  Mind,  —  that  is,  perfeB 
and  ^z/r^  Mind,  exempt  from  Body.  For,  as  z\\  Corporeal  Forms 
are  not  only  fleeting,  but  imperfeB  alfo,  untruly  reprefenting 
thofe  Originals,  of  which  they  are  but  tranfient  Copys,  —  fo  all 
Particular  Minds,  being  inverted  with  Bodys,  are  too  intimately 
converfant  with  thofe  Corporeal  Forms,  and  too  clofely  con- 
neded  with  the  Out'ivard  Senfes,  to  have  any  of  their  own 
Ideas,  or  Mental  Forms,  perfect,  and  pure  from  Images  of 
Ihitigs  Senjibk.  But  Fure  Mi}id  is  eTriic&vx  7»i  (pvaeuf,  tran- 
fcendeth  [all  Corporeal]  Nature,  and  confequently  is  free  from 
all  thofe  Feelings  and  Sentiments,  thofe  Pafiions  and  Affec- 
tions, to  which  embodied  Minds  are  liable,  on  account  of  the 
Bodys  to  which  they  are  united. We  have  here  only  to  re- 
mark farther,  that  Socrates,  in  this  modeft  Reply  of  his  to 
the  tart  but  juft  Obfervation  of  Philebus,  aftefts  to  underrtand 
jthe  word  Tours  in  a  Senfe,  widely  different  from  the  evident 
Meaning  of  that  Sophirt,  on  purpofe  to  introduce,  as  it  were 
by  the  Bye,  the  Mention  of  this  Tranfcendant  Being,  Pure  Mind; 
—  and  that  we  imagine  this  Mention  to  be  here  introduced  by 
Plato,  with  a  view  to  excite  the.  Curiofity  of  his  Readers,— 
(■>  to 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S. 


217 


wife,  I  prefume,  with  This.  However,  I  do  not 
contend  for  the  Chief  Prize  of  Victory,  in  behalf  of 
the  Life  of  Mind,  againft  the  Middle  or  Mixed  Life. 
But  what  to  do  with  the  Second  Prize,  and  which 
Life  to  beftow  it  on,  is  next  to  be  ccnfidercd.  For 
the  Caufe  of  that  HapDinefs,  which  the  Mixed  Life 
affords,  One  of  us  perhaps  may  afciibe  to  Mind, 
the  Other  of  us  to  Pleafure.  And  thus,  Neither  of 
thefe  Two,  would  be  Man's  Sovereign  Good  '^^j  and 
yet  One  or  Other  of  them  may  perhaps  be  fuppofed 
the  Caufe  of  it.     Now  on  this  Point,   I  would  flill 

to  prepare  them  for  feeing  this  Divine  Subje(ffc  more  opened 
in  what  is  foon  to  follow,  —  and  perhaps  alio  to  give  them 
the  firfl  Openings  of  an  Infight  into  the  Ultimate  Defign  of 
the  whole  Dialogue  j  for  it  ends  with  fliowing  us,  that  Mind, 
confidered  not  as  hitelJigcrit,  but  as  Intelligible  Being,  the  Obje£i 
of  Intelligence,  is  tciya^ov  The  Sovereign  Good  abfolutely, 
originally,  and  fupereminently ;  —  abjolutely,  or  independently,  as 
having  all  Good  iinthin  Himjelf;  —  originally,  as  being  the  fole 
Principle  or  Fountain  of  Good  throughout  Nature  3 — zxiA  fnper- 
eminently,  as  being  the  fole  Caufe  of  Good  to  all  Beings  who 
partake  of  Mind,  —  producing  Good  to  them  even  from  the 
Corporeal  Fart  of  their  Frame,  and  from  all  Outward  'Things 
within  the  Sphere  of  their  Enjoyment.  See  Note  35,  near  the 
Conclufion  of  it. 

'55  In  Stephens's  fine  Edition  oi  Plato,  by  a  flrange  Error  of 
the  Prefs,  rZ  jwgV  ciyxSrov  is  here  printed,  inilead  of  to  y.si? 
ctya^QV. 

E  e  more 


zi8         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

more  earneftly  contend  againfl  Philebus, — that  not  Plea- 
fure,  but  Mind,  is  the  neareft  allied,  and  the  moll  fimilar 
to  That,  whatever  it  be  '^%  by  the  PoflefTion  of  which, 
the  Mixed  Life  becomes  eligible  and  good.  And  if 
this  Account  be  true,  Pleafure  can  never  be  faid  to 
have  any  juft  Pretenfions  either  to  the  Firft  or  to  the 
Second  Prize  of  Excellence.  Still  farther  is  fhe  from 
coming  in  for  the  Third  Prize  '"^  if  any  Credit  may 
be  given  for  the  prefent  to  that  Mind  of  Mine. 

Protarchus. 

*56  Thofe  of  our  Readers,  to  whom  the  prefent  Dialogue  is 
intirely  new,  are  to  be  informed,  that  Moral  Virtue  is  here 
meant ;  This  being  the  mojl  nearly  of  all  things  allied  to  Mind. 
For  it  is  the  Offspring  of  imparted  Wifdom  j.  and  Wijdom  its 
Self  is  That  Mind,  which  alone  is  Divine  and  True,  confidered 
as  contemplating  and  energifing  on  his  own  Ideas,  and  their 
mutual  Relations.  —  Again ;  Moral  Virtue  is  of  all  things  the 
moji  fimilar  to  Mind.  For  the  very  Effence  of  it  confifts  ia 
Meafure;  and  the  Principle  of  all  Meafure  is  Mind;  the  pure 
and  perfedt  Ideas  of  the  Divine  Mind  being  the  Meafures  of  all 
the  Forms  of  Ozif/w^r^  Nature,  and  the  Standards  of  their  Truth, 
Reditude,  and  Goodnefs. 

'57  Before  this  Dialogue  Is  ended,  'twill  appear,  that  in  the 
Order  of  fuch  Things,  as  are  good  and  valuable  to  Man  for 
their  oiun  fakes,  and  not  as  Means  only  to  fome  farther  End, 
the  Third  Rank  is  affigned  by  Socrates  to  Mind;  (fo  far  as  the 
Term  Mind  fignifies  a  Perception,  Intelligence,  and  Difcernffient  of 
Things  abjlracledly  confidered;)  that  is,  to  mcer  Theory  unap- 
5  plied 


P   H    r    L    E    B    U    S.  219 

Protarchus. 

Indeed,  O  Socrates  !  it  feems  to  Me,  that  Pleafure 
is  now  fallen :  Your  Reafons  '^^  have  been  like  fo 
many  Blows  given  her  ;  under  the  Force  of  which,, 
fighting  for  the  Mafter-J'rize,  flie  lyes  vanquifhed. — 
But  I  think  however,  that  we  muft  fay,  'twas  pru- 
dent in  Mind  not  to  contend  for  that  Prize ;  for 
She  would  otherwife  have  met  with  the  fame  Fate. 
Now  if  Pleafure  fhould  alfo  lofe  the  Prize  of  Second 
Value,  as  already  fhe  has  loft  the  Higheft,  fhe  muft 
intirely    fall    into    Difgrace   with    her    own    Lovers : 

plied  to  Pradice  and  the  Condudl  of  a  Man's  own  Life.  — 
Now  Contemplations  and  Speculations,  terminating  in  the 
Mind,  and  not  referred  to  any  Enjoyment  or  Ufe  of  things 
external  and  corporeal,  are  of  all  things  the  moft  remote  from 
Bodily  Pleafure ;  they  are  indeed  oppofite  to  it,  inafmuch  as 
abflradted  Mind  is  oppofed  to  Body :  whereas  Moral  Virtue,  and 
the  Principle  of  it,  (Both  of  which,  in  the  Order  of  Human 
Goods,  we  fhall  find  placed  by  Socrates  in  higher  Rank  than 
abJiraSled  Mind,)  have  no  Exillence  but  in  the  JJjiion  of 
Mind  with  Body,  and  in  the  Relation  which  the  Mind  bears 
to  all  external    things  by  means  of  that  Union. 

'5S  The  P/«r^/ Number  is  here  ufed,  becaufc  Pkafure  being 
proved  deficient  in  all  the  T^hree  Charadleriflicks  of  Man's  So- 
vereign Good,  Each  of  thofe  Three  Defers  may  be  underftood 
to  furnifh  a  diflina  Reafon,  or  Argument,  againll  Her  Claim 
to   that  Charaflier. 

E  e  2  for 


220         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

for  even  to  Them  flie  would  no  longer  appear  to  merit 
fuch  Honour,  as  they  had  paid  to  her  before  '^^. 

SOCRATE  s. 

Well  then ;  is  it  not  the  better  way,  to  difmifs 
her  now  diredlly  "^° ;  and  not  give  her  Pain,  by  in- 
fpedling  into  her  too  nicely,  and  difcovering  all  her 
Imperfedlions  ? 

Protarchus. 

What  you  now  fay,    goes  for  nothing,  Socrates  1 

Socrates. 
Do  you  mean,    becaufe  I   fuppofed   an    impoflible 
thing,  when  I  fuppofed,  that  Pain  might  be  given  to 
Pleafure  ? 

^59  Protarchus  feems,  in  This,  to  hint  at  the  Honours  given 
to  Venusy — that  is,  in  plain  words,  the  'Encomiums  made  on  Senfual 
Pleafure,  —  by  Mhnnermus,  and  other  ancient  Greek  Poets,  the 
Writers  of  e^cariKct   or  Love-Poems. 

'*°  The  Reader  will  obferve  the  Argument  to  be  here 
interrupted  by  a  little  of  the  Socratic  Humour,  a  feeming 
to  decline  the  continuation  of  the  Debate.  The  Reafon  of 
this,  and  fuch  other  fhort  Interruptions,  in  the  moft  argumen- 
tative Parts  of  Plato's  Dialogues,  is  given  in  Note  151  to 
t/je  Banquet :  and  the  Reafon  there  affigned,  is  no  where  ex- 
emplified better,  than  it  is  here.  For  Plato  is  now  preparing 
to  condud  his  Readers  up  to  the  Heights  of  real  Philofophy, 
to  the  Principles  of  the  VnivcrfCf  and  to  the  Cause  of  Out" 
•ward  Nature, 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         221 


Protarchus. 

Not  on.  that  account  only,  but  becaufe  you  are 
fenfible  '®',  that  None  of  Us  will  give  you  a  Dif- 
charge,  before  you  have  brought  thefe  Arguments  '^^ 
to  a  Conclufion. 

Socrates. 

Ah  !  the  copious  Matter  of  Argument,  O  Protar- 
chus,   ftill    behind  !     and  fcarcely  is   any  Part  of    it 

*^'  In  the  Greek  we  here  read  —  dyvoeii.  —  But  before  that 
word,  we  prefume,  the  Negative  a^  ought  to  be  inferted ;  be- 
caufe Socrates  could  not  be  ignorant  of  what  Protarchus  here 
tells  him.  For  he  had  not  only  at  firft  engaged  himfelf,  by 
a  voluntary  Promife,  to  difcourfe  on  this  Subject  in  his  ufual 
Dialediic  Way,  till  the  Controverfy  was  decided,  —  but  he  had 
alfo  very  lately  been  reminded  of  that  Engagement  by  Protar- 
chus.— iee  the  Palfage,  to  which  belongs  Note  133. — Protarchus 
therefore,  apprehending,  that  Socrates  either  modeftly  or  jocofely 
endeavoured  to  evade  the  profecution  of  the  Subjeft,  here  charges- 
him  with  a  Confcioufnefs  of  his  Promife;  and  tells  him,  that^ 
on  that  very  account,  his  Evafion  will  not  pals  or  be  ac- 
cepted. 

'^^  If  the  future  Editors  of  Plato  will  compare  the  prefent 
PaiTage,  with  That  to  which  the  preceding  Note  refers  them, 
probably  they  will  agree,  that  we  ought  to  read  —  Tarwc  tc^v 
^oyctiv — here  as  well  as  there^ 

5  ^^^r 


222         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

very  manageable  on  the  prefent  occafion  ^^\  For 
whoever  ftands  forth,  as  the  Champion  of  Mind,  to 
win  the  Second  Prize  for  Her,  muft,  as  it  appears 
to  Me,  take  another  way  of  combating,  and  has  need 
of  other  Weapons,  different  from  thofe  Reafons  I 
before  made  ufe  of:  Some,  however,  of  the  Same 
may  perhaps  be  of  ufe  again.  Muft  we  then  pro- 
ceed in  that  Manner  ? 

Protarchus. 
By  all  means. 

SOCRATE  S. 

But  let  us  begin  cautioufly,  and  endeavour  to  lay 
down  right  Principles. 

■    •     i  -.J      a 

Protarchus. 
What  Principles  do  you  mean  ? 

'*5  Aldiis's  Edition  of  Plato,  by  omitting  the  word  ^H  in 
this  Sentence,  gives  a  quite  contrary  Turn  to  it.  Stephens,  in 
His  Edition,  has  inferted  the  8<f  g :  and  this  Reading  we  have 
preferred  to  the  former;  becaufe  it  makes  much  better  Senfe, 
and  is  .igreeuble  alfo  to  Ficinus's  Tranflation  from  the  Mcdicean 
Mannfcrlpt.  'Tis  flrange,  that  Grynaus,  who  undertook  to  re- 
vife  that  Tranfl;ition,  (hould  depart  from  it  here,  where  it  is 
evidrnily  right,  to  follow  ihe  erroneous  Reading  in  the  Aldine 
"Ediilon.  Cornarius,  Serranus,  Bcmboy  and  Grou,  were  not  fo 
mis-led. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        223 

Socrates. 

All  Things,  which  are  now  in  the  Univerfc '%  let 
us  divide  into  Two  Sorts,  or  rather,  if  you  pleafe, 
into  Three. 

Protarchus. 

You  fliould  tell  us,  What  Difference  between 
Things  it  is,  with  refpedl  to  which  you  make 
that  Divifion. 

^^+  Among  the  Things,  now  in  the  Univerfe,  Plato  means  not 
here  to  include  thofe  Originals  of  Things,  thofe  Ideas,  which  are 
in  the  Divine  Mind  no%v  and  for  ever,  having  there  an  Eternal 
Being:  for  thefe  Ideas  neither  mix  with  Matter,  neither  is 
Infinity  a  Friiicipk  of  their  EfTence.  Soon  after  this,  however, 
thefe  realleft  of  all  Beings  will  fall  under  our  confideration, 
—From  Plato's  Meaning  in  this  place  are  alfo  to  be  excluded 
all  the  Doings  and  Efteds  of  Chance;  and  all  fuch  Operations 
and  Works  oi  Man,  as  are  "ooid  oi  Rule  and  o£  De/ign-,  — the 
mif-fhapen  Rudiments  alfo  of  Nature's  intended  Forms ;  and  the 
crude  £^_yj  of  Art  in  its  Infancy  or  Novitiate  ^  —  the  Carcajjes 
alfo  and  the  Ruins,  the  Pieces  and  the  Fragjnetits,  of  regular 
Forms,  once  exifting,  whether  Natural  or  Artificial : — for  None 
of  Thefe  can  properly  be  called  Forms,  or  Figures,  or  indeed 
Things  of  any  Kind  now  in  Being :  if  they  are  at  all  to  be 
confidered,  as  having  any  Concern  in  the  Paffage  now  before 
us,  it  can  only  be,  as  they  are  feveral  Portions  of  the  'Tr^utn 
vA»  That  infinite  Subfiance,  which  furniflies  Materials  for  all  the 
Works  both  of  Nature  and  of  Man. 

SOCR  ATE  S, 


2.24         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


>OCR  ATES. 


Some  Things,  which  have  been  already  mentioned, 
let  us  re-aflume. 


Protarchus. 


What  Things  ? 


SOCRATE  s. 

The  Gods,   we  faid,   have  fhown  us,   the  Infinite  of 
Things,  and  alfo  their  Bound  '^^ 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

Socrates. 

Let  us  take  Thefe  for  Two  of  the  Sorts  of  Things ; 
and  for  a  Third  Sort  let  us  take  That,  which  is 
compofed   of  thofe  Two  mixed   together  '".      But  I 

'*5  See  the  PafTage,  to  which  belongs  Note  78,  and  the  Ex- 
planation of  it  in    the  latter  Part  of  that  Note. 

'"  Plato  himfelf  will  foon  explain,  what  he  means  by  Each 
of  thefe  Three  Sorts  of  Things.  It  will  then  appear,  that  his 
Third  Sort  comprehends  all  the  Fonm  of  Nature,  together  with 
all  the  Works  and  Ferformances  of  Art ; — and  that  his  Firji  and 
Second  Sorts  are  the  Two  immediate  Principles  of  thofe  Forms, 
and  of  thofe  Works  and  Performances.  At  prefent,  we  fliall 
only  premife  the  following  Obfervation,  as  preliminary  to  the 
next  Note ; — viz.  that  the  FirJl  of  thefe  their  immediate  Prin- 
ciples is  the  necelTary  Confcquent  oi  Matter ;  —  and  that  the 
Other  is  the  natural  Effedt  of  Mind, 

deferve, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         225 

deferve,  methinks,  to  be  laughed  at  for  pretending 
thus  to  diftinguifh  Things,  and  to  enumerate  their 
feveral  Sorts. 

Protarchus. 

Why  fo,  my  good  Friend? 

Socrates. 

A  Fourth  Sort  appears  to  have  been  omitted  by 
me. 

Protarchus. 

Say,  What. 

Socrates. 

Of  that  Commixture,  the  Combination  of  the  for- 
mer Two,  conlider  the  Caufe  :  and  bejGide  thofe  Three 
Sorts  of  Being,  fet  me  down  this  '^^  Caufe  for  a 
Fourth. 

Protarchus. 

'^7  Socrates,  when  he  juft  before  divided  All  Things,  now 
in  the  Univerfe,  into  Three  Sorts,  had  refpedl  only  to  Things 
external.  But  there  is  another  befide  Thefe,  a  different  Sort 
of  Things,  which  alfo  i7ow  are.  For  befides  a  Floiving  Noio, 
called  the  'Time  prejhit,  in  which  exifl  the  prefent  Indi'viduals 
of  every  Ge72us  and  Species,  (prefent,  with  regard  to  their  Pre- 
deceflbrs  in  Time  paji,  and  their  SuccefTors  iti  Time  to  come,) 
there  is  alio  a  Stable  Now,  which  has  no  relation  to  Time,  or 
to  any  Beings  exifting  fuccejjively,  or  in  Time,  whether  pad, 
prefent,  or  to  come.     This  Stable  Now  is  Eternity -,  the  Image  of 

F  f  which. 


226         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

which,  Plato  fays,  Is  'Time,     And   very  juftly  may  Time  be  faid 
to   be    the  Image  of  Eternity,    becaufe  the  Beings,    which  exift 
?//  Time,    are  bat  Images,    or  PiBures,    of  thofc  original  and   real 
Beings,  the  Ideas  of  the  Divine  Mind,  which  have  no  relation  to 
Time,    their   EJenae    being  Jiable    and    eternal.       For   as   much 
therefore   as  thefe  are,    in.  the  Dignity  of  their  Being,   fo  much 
above    thofe   temporary    and    tranfient    things,    their  Images    or 
■fainted  Copys,    they    are    by  Socrates    fet    apart    by  Themfelves, 
as  not   to   be  ranked   or   numbered  amongft  thofe  Others.     'Tis 
on.  this  account  perhaps,   that   he  here  feigns   to  have  forgotten 
them  at  firit,    and   now    at  length  to   recolleB  them. — We  may 
fuppofe   alfo,    that  Socrates  intended,    by    thefe  means,    to    re- 
prefent   the  manner,   in  which  a  man   arrives,   if  ever,   at  fome 
faint  View  or  imperfeft  Knowlege  of  thefe  Ideas,    namely,   bv 
'RecoUeBion    as    it    were ;     which    he    elfewhere    terms    diidfjivti<rti 
Reminifcence ; — and    to  iignify  farther,    how   late   this  Knowlege 
is  acquired    by    thofe   Few   of  us,    who    do    in   time   attain   to 
it.     If  this  lafl  Suppofal  of  ours  be  not  improbable,   it  prefents 
us   with    a  fair   Opportunity  of  offering  our   Conjetlures,    con- 
cerning this   Fourth   Sort   of  Being,    here  fpoken    of,     Caife   in 
general, — and  concerning  the  Steps,    by  which  Socrates  attained 
to   as   much  Knowlege   of  it,   as    perhaps   is  attainable  by  Man. 
With    regard    to  Caiife  in  general; — as   every  Caufe  is   re- 
lative   to    its    own    Effecfl,     the   Divifons     of    Caufe    in    general 
Qught    to   correfpond  with    the  Divifons   of    that   whole   Third 
Sort   of  Being,  —  That,  which  is  effeSled  or  produced.     If  That 
therefore   was    rightly    divided    into    the  Forms    of  Nature  and 
tlie   Forms  of  Art^  Caufe  in  general    ought    to   be   divided   into 
Two    Kinds,    refpedively    correfponding    with    the   Two    Kinds 
of    Produdion     or    Eifedl  :     and    thus    all    Caufe     is     referable 
either  to  Nature  or  to  Art.  —  Now   'tis  evident,   that  Art  ad.s 
with  Contrivance  and   with  Deftgn ;    and   that  Thefe   arc  featcd 
3  in 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 


227 


in    the   Mind    of    the   Artift.      Evident    therefore   is    the   clofe 
Alliance  between  Mind,   and  That  Kind  of  Catife  which  is  termed 
Art.     If  Contrivance   and   Dtjign    appear    alfo    in    the   Forms   of 
Nature,    it   follows   by  Analogy,    that  Nature,    confidered   as    an 
Agent,    or   Efficient   Caufe,    adts    agreeably    to    certain    Rules    or 
Laws,    given    her    by   fome   Intelligence    or  Mind,    the   Defigner 
and  Contriver  of  all   thofe  Forms  which   flie  produces ; — a  Mind, 
as  much  fuperior  to  the  Human,   as   the  Produftions  or  Works 
of  Nature  are  fuperior   to  thofe  of  Art,   in    the  Wijdom  of  their 
Contrivance,    and   the  Goodnefs  of   their  Dejign.      Here   alfo   by 
Analogy   we   may  conclude    an  intimate   Conntdiion   between   this 
mofl   excellent  Mind  and   that   Kind  of  Caufe  which  is   termed 
Nature.  —  Farther;    whatever   is    effeded    or   done   by  Art,    is 
framed,   according  to   certain  Ideas  in   the  Mind   of  ihc  Artijl ; 
and  whatever   is  effedted  or    produced   by  Nature,   we   mufl   by 
Analogy   conclude,    that    'tis    formed   according    to  certain   Ideas 
in   the  Mind   of  Nature.       In    both   Cafes    then.    Ideas   are   the 
Rules   of    the    Operation,    the  Models    of    the  Work,     and    the 
Caufes  of  its    having  Such  a  Form   as   it  has ;    that  is,   in  other 
words,    they    are    the    leading    or   direBing,     the   Archetypal  and 
Formal,   Caufes,    of  it.  —  Farther  flill,    in  Nature's  Produdlions, 
the   Divine  Mind,    and  in  the   Produdions    of  Art  the  Human 
Mind,  always  intends  fome  End;  and  this  intended  End  always 
is   fome  Good:    the  attainment  then  of   this  Good   is   the  Fi?ial 
Caufe  of  the  Produdlion. — Thus  we  find,  that  every  Effedl  or 
Produdion,   whether  of  Art   or  of  Nature,   acknowlegeth  Three 
Caufes,    properly   fo  called,  —  the  Efficient,   the  Formal,   and   the 
Final.  —  Of  thefe  Caufes  the  Firf  in  Dignity  is  the  Final,    if 
Good  be   of  all   things  the  moft  vahmble :    in  the  Inventions   of 
Art,    the  E7td,    as    it  is  in  the  Mind  originally,    is  Firf  alfo   in 
point   of  lime:    for  the  Good,    fought   by    the  Invention,    muft 
firft  be  in  Contemplation,    before  the  Mind   fets  about  the  Con- 

F  f  2  irivancc^ 


228  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

trivance. — Second  in  Dignity  is  the  Formal  Caufe,  if  Contrivance, 
Defign,  or  Art,  which  form  the  original  Idea  of  the  future 
Work,  be  more  honorable  than  the  meer  Copys  of  that  Idea,  the 
Works  of  the  Efficient  Caiife.  For,  altho  this  Third  Caufe  be 
That,  which  executes  the  Defign,  and  accompUjhes  the  End,  yet 
the  Workman  is  praifed  only  for  his  Art,  and  the  Work  is 
valued  only  for  its  End.  Suppofe  a  Deed,  ever  fo  beneficial  to 
us,  done  by  feme  other  Perfon :  if  no  Good  was  intended  for 
us  by  the  Doer,  we  feel  no  Senfe  of  Gratitude  toward  him  for 
his  Deed.  And  fuppofe  an  Action  or  Performance  ever  fo  ad- 
mirable :  '\?  Art  or  Skill  had  no  Share  in  it,  we  yield  our  Ad- 
miration,   not   to   the  Perjor/ner,    but    to    Chance  or    fome    other 

foreign  Caufe. The  Diftindion    between    thefe  Three  Caufes, 

the  Final,  the  Formal,  and  the  EJficient,  is  io  real,  that,  in  the 
Works  or  Produftions  of  Man,  the  Three  may  feverally  belong 
to  Three  different  Perfons.  For  One  Perfon  may  conceive  and 
propofe  fome  End;  Another  Perfon  may  contrive  the  Means', 
and  a  Third  Perfon  may  ife  or  employ  thofe  Means.  But  'tis 
otherwife  with  the  Operations  and  Produdlions  oi  Nature :  fuf- 
ficient  for  thefe  is  One  and  the  Same  Caufe;  in  which,  ho\vever> 
all  the  Three  Caufes  concur; — and  That  x^JJniverfalMind. — 
This  Vvill  appear,  if  we  confider  this  Great  Mind,  in  the  firft 
place,  as  it  is  the  Formal  Caufe  of  all  Corporeal  Things.  And 
wc  may  confider  it  in  this  way.  —  Effential  to  all  Mind  is 
Intelligence  or  Thinking  :  and  accordingly  intelligent  or  thinking 
Being  is  not  a  very  imperfedt  Definition  o?  Mind.  In.  thinking, 
every  Mind  muft  have  an  ObjeSi ;  the  Mind  muft  think  of 
Something:  and  the  only  OhjeSls  of  Mind  not  immerfed  in  Body, 
but  pure  and  alone,  are  pure  Ideas,  —  Forms  unmixed  with 
Matter,  and  unattended  by  Senfible  Images  j — pure  Truths  alfo, 
the  Relations  between  thofe  pure  Ideas.  Mind  is,  as  wc  ap- 
prehend,   a  Perception    and   a  Comprehcnlion   of  Ideas  and   of 

Truths  t 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


229 


Truths:  and  the  Mind  Unherfal  and  Divine  is  the  Comprchenfioa 
of  all  pure  Ideas  and  of  all  pure  Truths  in  One, — in  the  Unity 
of  his  'own  eternal  Efence.  Now,  if  tliefe  piire  Ideas  are  the 
Originals  and  Archetypes  of  all  the  Forms  which  are  mixed 
with  Matter,  they  are  the  Formal  Caufcs  of  all  Corporeal  Beings: 
and  the  Union  of  all  thofe  Ideas,  —  the  Divine  Mind,  —  is  thus 
XhQ  Formal  CaiiJ'e  of  the  who\Q  Corporeal  World,  which  is  there- 
fore One,  and  in  which  all  Corporeal  Beings  are  united.  — 
In  the  next  place,  Univerfal  Mind  is  to  be  confidered  as  the 
Ffficient  Caufe  of  all  external  Things  in  the  following  way.  — - 
All  Thinking,  all  Comparing  of  Ideas,  and  all  Reafoning,  — 
the  inferring  of  fome  General  Truth  from  many  Particulars, 
—  the  deducing  of  One  Truth  from  Another,  —  and  the  re- 
folving  of  any  Compound  Truth  into  its  Principles,  —  every 
one  of  thefe  things  is  an  Ettergy  of  the  Mind :  and  every 
determinate  Thought,  every  Judgment  or  Sentence  of  the  Mind,. 
every  fettled  Inference,  Conclufion,  or  Refult,  is  an  A£l  of  the 
Mind,  energifing  within,  or  ading  on,  her  Self,  It  is  acknow- 
leged,  that  the  Mind,  in  perceiving  any  Truth  or  any  Idea,  feems, 
and  is  indeed  in  fome  refped,  fajjive;  as  flie  cannot  help 
perceiving  what  flie  does  perceive :  but  the  direSling  of  her 
Eye  to  That  Truth  or  to  That  Idea  in  particular,  and  the 
keeping  of  her  Eye  open,  to  continue  in  the  adlual  Perception 
of  it,  may  be  juftly  filled  Energys,  or  inward 'A5i ions,  of  the 
Mind.  We  here  fpeak  of  Particular  Minds,  fuch  as  the  Hu- 
man.  For  the  Eye  of  the  Divine  Mind  is  always  open,  and 
is  always  viewing  in  Himfelf  all  Ideas  at  once,  without  com- 
paring, compounding,  or  dividing  them,  —  all  Truths  at  once,, 
without  inferring,  or  deducing,.  Some  from  Others,  —  and  the 
Principles  of  Ail  things,  without  Analytical  Inveftigation. — 
Thus  the  Divine  Mind  is  always  in  Energy,  and  therefore 
always    in   Motion,  —  fuch   Motion,    as    belongs   to  Mind;    for 

without 


230  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

without  Motion,  of  one  Kind  or  other,  there  can  be  no  Energy, 

neither  of  Soul,    nor   yet  of  Mind. Now,   the  Energy  of 

Univerfal  Mind,  being  within  and  throughout  the  Infinity  of 
Matter,  (call  it,  if  you  pleafe,  Extenjion,  or  Place,  or  the  Re- 
ceptacle of  Forms ;  fee  Arijlot:  Phys:  L.  4,  C.  4,)  and  This 
being  external  to  Mind,  the  Energy  becomes  Outward  ASfioti ; 
znd  Mind,  energifing  only  on  Mental  Forms,  imprejjeth  them  on 
Matter,  Mind's  ubiquatary  Throne :  thus  are  produced  Forms 
ivithout,  the  ExpreJJions  of  thofe  Forms  within.  In  like  manner. 
Mental  Thought,  or  Energy,  being  Mental  Motion,  is,  we  pre- 
fume,  the  Spring  of  Motion.,  or  the  Firji  Mover,  to  the  whole 
Corporeal  Univerfe, — to  Matter  invefted  every  where  with  Form. 
Aud  the  Motion  of  this  Great  Body  is  perpetual,  becaufe  the 
moving  Mind  is  eternal:  juft  as  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  all 
Corporeal  Things  are  continued  invariably  the  Same  in  all  fuc- 
ccffive  Individuals,  becaufe  their  Archetypes  are  invariable  and 
the  Same  for  ever.  Thus  Univerfal  Mind  is  found  to  be  the 
Efficient   as  well   as   the  Formal  Caufe  of  All   Corporeal   Things 

thro  infinite  Ages. It   remains    to    be   confidered,    in   what 

refpedt  Univerfal  Mind  is  the  Final  Caufe  of  All  things.  — 
Invariable  are  the  Objedls  of  the  Divine  Mind  ;  fo  are  thofe  Objedts 
of  the  Human  Mind,  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  in  Na- 
ture, —  yet  the  Individuals  of  each  Species  and  of  each  Kind 
are  never  in  a  fettled  State,  but  are  continually  varying  in 
their  Appearances,  and  either  increafing  or  leffening  in  their 
Powers.  Hence  arifes  a  real  Diftindion  between  Being  inva- 
riable and  Being  variable.  Mind  is  invariable,  and  Body  is  va- 
riable :  but  Being  is  common  to  them  Both  ;  for  Both  of  them 
/ire.  In  this  View  it  fliould  feem,  that  Being  is  more  compre- 
henfve  and  more  univerfal  than  Mind.  But  when  we  refleft, 
that  thefe  variable  Individuals  derive  from  Mind,  not  only  their 
Particular  Forms,   and   confequently   their   being   what  they  are, 

but 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  231 

but   alio   their    having    any   Form    or    Being    at   all,    it    fhould 
feem,    that   in  Mind  theie   is   Something  Superior  even    to  thofe 
invariable   Beings,    thofe   eternal  Forms,    the  Mental.  —  Again  i 
if  we   conlider    the   Good   enjoyed    by  All  Animals,     in   general, 
and  the  Good,    enjoyed   by  Rational  Animals  only ;    that  they  are 
Goods    of    quite   different  Kinds;    the    former    being    the    Good 
of  SeJife,  the    latter,    That   oi  Mind;    (for   we   can  judge  of  the 
Enjoyments  of  both  Mind  and   Senfe,  as    of  Both   we   are  Par- 
takers ;)   from  this   confideration  it  may   feem,    that  the  nature 
of  Good  is  more  ample  and  extenfive,   than  the  nature  of  Mind. 
But    if   we    confider,    on    the    other    hand,    that    all    Animals 
receive  the  Good,  which  the  Mind  of  Nature  intends  for  them,, 
partly   by  means   of  their  own  Organs  of  Senfation,   and  partly 
by  means  of  Things  abroad,   the   Strudlure  of  whofe  Frame  is 
correfpondent   to  the  Structure   of  thofe  Animal- Organs  ; — and, 
that    thefe  joint  Means   of  Animal-Good    are    provided   by    one: 
and  the  fame  forming  Mind  of  Nature ^  who  conftrudts  all  Cor- 
poreal Things   together,   adapted  to  each  other,   according  to  the- 
mutual  Relations  and  Harmony  of   his  own    Ideas ;  —  and   if  we- 
confider  alfo,   that  'tis  only  by  partaking  of  Mind,   that  Rational 
Animals  are  capable  of  enjoying   the  proper  Good  of  Mind ;   and: 
that  Mind  alone    beflows    on    them    this    Good,    in    prefenting 
them  with  Truth; — when  all  This  is  confidered,   'twill  appear,^, 
that  Whatever  is  Good  to  all  Animals  enters  together  with  Form,. 
(proceeding.  Both  of  them,  from  Mind,)  into  Outward  Nature;. 
and  that  Truth  enters  together  with  Mitid^   (and  Both  of  them^ 
in    the  fame  Proportion   and  Degree,)    into   the  Rational  Soul  of 
Man.  —  It   fhould    feem    then,    that    the  Idea   of  Good  is  That 
Univerfal  Idea,   which   the  Divine  Mind,    in  energiiing,   always^ 
beholds ;   and   in  beholding  which,  he  enjoys   Supream   Happi- 
nefsi — that,  as  Mind  is  the  firfl  Spring  of  Motion  to  Body,  fo  the 
Idea   of'  Good   is    the    firil   Spring   of    the  Mind's   own   internal' 

Mottonss 


232         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Motions,  or  Energys; — and  that.  In  ading  outwardly,  that  is, 
in  producing  Outward  Forms,  Unwerfal  Mind  has  no  other  End 
in  View,  than  Univerfal  Good. — In  this  way  we  conceive,  that 
Vniverfal  Mind  may  rightly  be  confidered  as  the  Final  Caufe  of 
All  things,  the  Idea  of  Good  being  no  where  but  in  Mind :  and 
hence  it  is,  that  every  Particidar  Mind  partakes  of  T'hat  Idea, 
is  moved  by   it  in   all   her  Energys,    and   prompted  by  it  in   all 

thole   Adions    of  the   Soul,    which   She    diredls. To  thefe 

confiderations  if  we  add  the  following  ; — that  not  only  every  Thing 
which  hath    its   Being  in   the  World  of  Mind,    and   every  Thing 
which  proceeds  ixom  Re af on, — but   every  Ihing   alio  which  hath 
its   Being  in   the  World  of  Nature,    and  every  Thing  which   of 
neceflity  follows  from  Nature,    is  good;  —  that    the  Connexion 
between  Being  and  Good  is  fo  infeparable,   that  whatever  is  Good 
to  any  Particular  Being,   tends  to  the  Prefervation  of  that  Being ; 
and  that  whatever   is  Evil  to  it,   tends   to   hi  DeJiruBion ; — that 
as  foon  as  the   inherent  Good  of  any  Natural  Being  wholly  forfakes 
it,  and  frefli  Recruits  of  con-natural  Good  ceafe  to  flow  into  it  from 
Outward  A^^/wrt',  theDiffolution  or  End  of  That^tv/?^  immediately 
enfues  i   but   that  fo   long  as  the  Being  retains  any  of  its  native 
Good,  with  Strength  fufficient  to  receive   a  frefh  Influx,  Nature 
will,    to    prolong    the  Being,    heal   the  Evil  incidental    to    that 
Being,    and   even   convert  it   into  Good;  —  that,    in    the  Rational 
Soul  of  Man,    Divine  Reafon    hath    the   like  Influence,    the   like 
healing  Virtue,    and  the    like  converting  Power;    which,    if   the 
Soul    be  willing.    He    exerts    for    the   prefervation    of  a   Being, 
whofe  Continuance  depends   on    its   retaining  a  Love  of  its   own 
proper   Good,    and   z  Will  to   enjoy  it; — from  hence  it  mull:  ap- 
pear,  that  every  Thing,    fo   far  as  it   partakes  of  Being,   partakes 
of  Good, — a  Good,  belonging  to  its  Being,  and  without  which  Good 
it  can  no  longer  be  ivhat  it  is.  —  To  venture  a  Step  farther  in  our 
inquiry   into   the    nature   of  the   Caufe  of  All  things :    it   appears 

3  "o 


P    I-I    I    L    E    B    U    S.  233 

■no  lefs  abfurd  than  impious  to  fuppofe,  that  Evil  has  any  Place 
in  the  Divine  Mind.  For  the  Idea  of  Being,  or  That  of  Good^ 
is  the  fole  Objedt  of  the  MindUniverfal:  and  this  Idea  comprehends 
every  Kind  of  Being,  and  the  Good  belonging  to  each  Kind ; 
but  excludes  whatever  is  totally  void  of  Being,  and  of  Good. 
And  fince  no  Mind  has  any  Idea,  which  is  not  derived  from 
the  Mind  Univerfal,  it  follows,  that  of  Evil  there  is  no  General 
Idea-, — that  Evil  has  no  pojitive  Ejj'ence ,  and  that  like  meer 
Matter,  it  admits  of  no  other  Definition,  than  Such  as  is  in- 
tirely  Negative.  As  77ieer  Matter  then  is  only  a  Negation,  a 
total  Defed:,  of  Being,  —  in  like  manner,  abj'olute  Evil  is  no- 
thing more  than  a  Negation,  a  total  Defeft,  of  Good.  If  this 
Reafoning  be  right,  Evil  is  either  the  fame  thing  with  Matter^ 
or  'tis  at  leaft  the  moft  extenfive  of  thofe  Infijiites,  which  are 
faid,  in  Note  166,  to  be  the  neceJJ'ary  Confcquents  of  Matter  :  but, 
mixing  with  all  Individual  Beings,  it  is  bounded  in  every  One 
of  them  by  Form,  and  controuled  in  every  One  of  them  by 
'Good.  Now,  it  is  from  necefity,  that  Evil  mixes  v^dth  them 
all :  for  no  Individual  of  any  Species,  no  Particular  of  any 
Univerfal,  can  be  perfeBly  good  in  its  Kiiid.  —  No  one  of 
them  can  polTefs  all  the  Good  belonging  to  its  Eflence,  or 
Ideal  Form,  becaufe  of  the  Mixture  of  this  Form  with  Mat- 
ter:  and  This  Mixture  is  necelTary  to  conftitute  the  Exijl- 
gnce  of  every  Particular  Being :  it  is  neceflary  for  producing 
Diverfity  out  of  Samenefs,  and  Multitude  out  of  Monad;  for 
without  Matter,  All  would  be  One  and  the  Same  folitary  Beings 
— happy  perhaps  in  Himfelf,  (if  Want  of  Nothing  be,  as  Some 
have  faid,  fufficient  to  make  Happinefs,) — and  ahfolutely  perhaps 
good,  but  the  Caife  of  no  Good  at  all.  It  feems  reafonable 
therefore  to  conclude,  that,  however  abfurd  it  is  to  fuppofe 
Matter  to  be,  properly  fpeaking,  a  Caufe  of  Being,  or  Evil  to 
hs.?iCaife  of  Good, — yet,  as  without  Matter  there  would  be  only 

G  g  One 


234         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

One  Being, — fo,    •without  Evil    no  Good  would  be  pojfejfed  or   en- 
joyed,  but  by  I'hat  One. Upon  the  whole,   it  appears,   that 

Evil  is  as  necsffary  to  the  univerfal  DiiFufion,  and  the  endlefs 
Communication  of  Good,  as  Matter  is  to  the  Evolution  of 
Univerfal  Form,  and  to  the  endlefs  Communication  of  Being. 
It  appears  alfo  at  the  fame  time,  that  Good  bears  the  fame 
relation  to  Being  as  Evil  bears  to  Matter  ;  and  that,  as  Evil  either 
is  the  fa-me  Thing  with  Matter,  (the  fame  Nothing  rather,  if 
Matter  be  a  total  DefeSl  of  Being,  as  Evil  is  a  total  DefeSl  of 
Good,)  or  of  neceffity  attends  on  Matter  in  every  Mixture  of 
Form  with  it, — fo.  Good  either  is  the  fame  Thing  with  Beings 
or  conftantly  attends  on  Being,   and  follows   the  Divifions  of  it 

into  Variable  and  Invariable,  —  Temporary  and  Eternal. Thus 

much  concerning  Caife  in  general,  (the  Fourth  Sort  of  Being, 
fpoken  of  in  the  prefent  Paflage  of  this  Dialogue,)  and  the 
different  Meanings  of  the  word  Cazfe ;  as  it  is  properly  ufed 
to  fignify,  not  only  the  Efficient,  by  which,  or  by  whom, 
—but  the  Pattern  alfo,  according  to  which, — and  the  End-, 
for  the  fake  of  which  any  Thing  is  made  or  done.  —  We  have 
endeavoured  to  fliow,  that  thefe  Three  Meanings  are  together 
applicable  to  the  One  Caife  of  All  Things,  The  Divine  Being, 
and  to  Him  alone.  In  philofophical  Language,  however,  the 
word  Caufe  is  fometimes  applied  to  Matter,  as  a  Caufe  in 
which  All  things  are  made, — or  out  of  which  they  were  at  fn-ft 
made, — or  without  which  they  could  not  be  made. — Now  That, 
without  which  a  Thing  cannot  be  made,  is  either  a  concurring 
Caife,  or  an  Irflrument  neceflary  to  be  ufed  in  the  making,  or 
feme  Means  neceilary  to  be  employed  by  the  Maker,  and 
different  from  Flimfelf.  But  Matter  and  Mind  are  not  con- 
curring Caufes  J  nor  is  Matter  an  hifirumental  Caufe;  neither 
is  it  a  Mediate  Caufe  :  for  Univerfal  Mind  is  all-futiicient,  and 
has  no  need  of  either  Co-adjutors  or  Injlruments,  or  Means. — — 
6  Farthers 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  235 

Farther; — That,  out  of  ivbicb  a  Thing  is  made,  rnufl  be  Some- 
thing antecedently  exijiing;  it  muft  have  fome  Form  and  fome 
Figure:  and  indeed  the  Materials  of  every  Human  Work  have 
fome  Form  and  Figure  of  their  own,  before  they  become  the 
Subjects  of  the  future  Work.  But  the  Common  Matter  of  all 
corporeal,  external,  and  particular  Things  is  without  either 
Form  a  Figure ;  it  has  indeed  no  real  Being  at  all.  And  This 
is  That,  in  which  the  Divine  Mind  energifes,  and  energifing 
operates,  and  operating  produces  all  the  Forms  of  Nature,  All 
things  to  which  belong  both  Form  and  Matter.  As  therefore 
thefe  variable  and  temporary  Beings,  with  refpedt  to  their 
Forms,  derive  their  Origin  from  Being  invariable  and  eternal,  — 
fo,  with  refped:  to  the  SubjeB-Matter  of  their  Forms,  they 
may  be  faid  to  have  their  Origin  in  That  which  in  reality  is 
Nothing,  —  not  fo  much  as  the  Image  or  Shadow  of  any  real 
^hing.  —  We  apprehend,  that,  on  this  head,  we  fpeak  the 
Senfe  of  the  Pythagoreans,  the  Flatonicks,  and  the  Peripateticks, 
Some  of  them  at  leaft ;  for  'tis  highly  probable,  that  Thefe 
are  the  Ancients,  meant  by  Porphry,  in  his  'A^oofjix),  pag:  226, 
Edit:  Cantab:  where  he  fays,  that  the  Propertys  of  Matter,  ac^ 
cording  to  the  Ancients,  are  thefe  ;  —  It  is  incorporeal ;  for  it  is 
different  from  Bodys :  it  is  Uf clefs  ;  for  it  is  neither  Mind,  jior 
Soul;  nor  a  Living  Thing  is  it,  of  its  Self:  it  is  formlefs,  fubjeSl 
to  Diverfty,  infinite,  powcrlcfs :  wherefore  it  is  not  Being,  but  Non- 
Being  ;  not  fiich  Non-Being  as  Motion,  (for  Motion  is  Motion  of 
Something  ;)  but  truly  and  really  (aAwS-n'oi?)  Non-Being  (^}j  oV) 
that  is, — Nothing.  —  If  then  the  above-given  Account  be  true, 
we  find  the  Origin  of  Things  to  be,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
Plenitude  of  Univerfal  Being,  the  Caufe  of  Good  to  all,  —  on 
the  other  hand,  a  total  Vacuity  of  Being,  Infinite  Matter,  the 
Caufe  of  all  Evil.  —  The  Readers  of  Plato  will  readily  ex'cufe 
the  XiCngth  of  this  Account,  when  they  are  informed,   that  the 

G  g  2  Defig?i 


236 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Tiejign  of  it,  partly,  is  to  illuflrate  Two  PaiTages  in  "Plato  ; — One 
in  his  Tifnates,  vol.  3,  pag:  52,  Edit:  Steph:  concerning  the 
Firji  Matter ; — the  Other  in  his  Phcedo,  pag:  260,  &c.  Edit: 
Oxon:  concerning  Final  Caiifes ;  —  but  chiefly,  to  free  from 
all  obfcurity  Two  other  Paffages  j  —  One,  in  his  Republick, 
vol:  2,  pag:  70,  Edit:  Cantab:  concerning  the  Idea  of  Good; — 
the  Other,  xgpl  t«;  tb  ttowts  (piicrscoi  concerning  the  nature  of 
The  First,  (or  The  Siipream,)  in  the  Second  of  his  Epijlles, 
pag:  312,  Edit:  Steph:  where  he  profeffes  to  conceal  his  Mean- 
ing purpofely,  in  this  Enigmatical  Sentence ;  —  tts^)  toV  ttoLvtoiv 
^cc.(Tihioe,     TTctvT     iq'i,     xai    ixmva    ivi'itcc     TravTx,    x.ai     ey.eivoi     ahiov 

id  r^iTx.  All  Beings  are  attendant  on  the  King  of  All ;  for  His 
fake  are  All  things  -,  and  of  all  Beautiful  Things  He  is  the  Caufe : 
on  the  Second  attend  Things  cf  the  Second  Order :  and  en  the 
Third  attend  Things  Third  in  Order.  —  This  lafl  Enigmatical 
PalTage  is  to  be  explained  from  what  was  faid  concerning  the 
Three  Caufes  of  All  things.  For  the  First,  (or  Supream  in- 
Dignity,)  the  King  of  all  Beings,  (the  Law  to  All,)  is  raya^ov, 
EJJintial  Good,  the  Final  Caufe  of  All  things,  and  the  Fountain  of 
thok  fairejl  of  things,  Meafure  and  Moderation,  Unity  and  Harmony,, 
fujiice  and  Goodnefs,  Symmetry  and  Beauty,  the  PerfeBion  of  each. 
Kind,  and  t\\Q  Sta7idard  of  whatever  in  its  Kind  is  excellent:-—'- 
the  Second  (in  Dignity)  is  Vniverfal  Mind,  the  Formal  Caife 
of  All  things,  and  the  Foiintairi  of  all  Ideas  and  all  Truths,. 
Intelligence  and  Knoivlege,  Sciences  and  Arts,  and  Right  Opi- 
nions: — and  the  Third  (in  Dignity)  is  Univerfal  Soul,  the  Eficient 
Caufe  of  All  things,  and  the  Fountain  of  all  Setfe  and  Life, 
Love  and  Afeilion,  Sytnpathy  and  Attraction .  —  So  that  all 
Beings  whatever  depend  on  the  Supreme  for  their  very  Be- 
ing, fince  without  partaking  of  Good  they  could  not  be:  —  in: 
6  like: 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         257 

like  manner,  all  Intelliget^t  Beings  depend  en  the  Second  for 
tht'w  Intelligc7ice :  —  and  all  Sentient  and  all  Vital  Beings  are, 
for  their  Scnfes  and  their  Lives,  dependant  on  the  Third. — 
We  have  only  to  add  This  farther ;  —  that,  immediately  after 
the  Paflage  above  cited,  the  Myflerioufnefs  of  which  is  fairly 
apologifed  for  by  Plato  himfelf,  he  fpeaks  of  the  Human  Soul, 
and  of  her  natural  Dejire  to  be  made  acquainted  with  thofe 
Things,  (meaning  the  fair  Streams,  that  ilow  from  thofe  Three 
Fountains,)  becaufe  flie  is  of  Kin  to  them,  and  has  them  but 
imperfeftly  and  defedively  in  her  Self.  Then  follows  the 
Mention  of  that  important  Problem,  —  "  What  is  the  Caufe 
of  all  Evils  ?" — which  Point,  he  fays,  whoever  cannot  clear 
up  to  his  own  fatisfaflion,  will  never  attain  to  a  real  Know- 
lege  of  the  Truth.  And  as  This  is  the  laft  of  the  Philofophi- 
cal  Points,  ftated  in  that  Epijile ;  and  as  it  compleats  the 
Subjedl  of  thofe  Inquirys,  made  by  Dionyjius,  concerning  the  Caujis 
of  1'hi?7gs ;  we  Ihall  here  finiih  this  iliort  EJay  on  the  fame 
Subjedl  J  (too  ihort  for  a  detached  Di//ertaf ion ;  tho  too  long, 
coniidered  as  Part  only  of  a  Note;)  and  proceed  to  invefligate 
the  Steps,  by  which  Socrates  attained  to  his  great  Knowlege 
in  it.  This  Invefligation  alfo  will  be  long;  but  we  hope, 
that  'twill  not  be  tedious  to  the  Admirers  of  Socratic  Wifdom-,. 
as  it  leads  to  the  Dodrine,  taught  firft  by  Socrates,  —  the 
Dodtrine  of  thofe  Univcrfals,  which  are  the  Principles  of  Moral 
and  Political  Science,  and  are,  Themfelves,  immediately  de- 
rived from  the  Firji  Caufe  of  All  things.  With  this  Hope,. 
and  this  defirable  End  in  View,  we   thus   begin  our    Inveftiga- 

tion. That  a  Man's  FirJi  Step  to  any  Kind  of  Knowlege  is 

by  means  of  his  Senfations,  was  never,  we  believe,  queflioned 
by  any  Perfon,  v;ho  confidered,  with  a  fober  and  unprejudiced 
Mind,  the  nature  of  Human  Knowlege. — As  foon  as  Infants 
are  feparated  from   the  Womb,    and    are   become  intirely  diftin6i 

Beings,. 


■38 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Beings,  furrounded  Immediately  with  the  external  Air,  they 
appear  to  be  fenfiblc  of  their  own  extream  Weaknefs  and  Indi- 
gence :  and  as  foon  as  they  find  their  Weaknefs  helped,  and 
their  Indigence  relieved,  by  Something,  which  is  not  within 
Themfelves,  nor  is  in  their  own  Power  to  procure,  (and 
which,  by  a  natural  Inftind,  they  generally  folicit  to  obtain 
by  Crying,)  they  feem  thereupon  to  have  an  obfcure  Senfe  of 
Something  external,   in    refpedl  of  their  own  Beings, — Something, 

which   is    no  Part  of  T^hemfches. It  appears   alfo,    that  they 

have,  at  the  fiime  time,  Senfations  of  thofe  Primary  Qnalitys 
of  external  things,  Moijlure  and  Drynefs,  Cold  and  Heat,  fo  far 
as  they  feel  themfelves,  on  the  one  hand,  hurt  or  incommoded 
by  the  Excefs  of  any  one  of  thefe  Qualitys,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  benefited  or  eafed  by  a  Quality  which  is  co7i- 
trary.  Thefe  are  called  the  Pritnary  ^alitys  of  Body,  becaufe 
Thefe,  and  none  Other,  belong  to  thofe  Primary  Bodys,  the 
Four  Elements  of  all  Bodys  which  are  Mixt,  or  compofed  of 
different  Ingredients:  and  'tis  worthy  of  Remark,  that  thefe 
primary  Qualitys  are  the  Firfl,  by  which  new-born  Infants 
appear  to  be  affected ;  excepting  perhaps  a  Glimmering  of 
Light:  concerning  which  we  fliall  liave  occafion  to  fay  more 
in  a  fubfequent  Note.  To  proceed  at  prefent  with  an  account 
of  the  progrefs  of  our  Senfations:  for  only  by  means  of  Thefe 
have   we   any  apprehenfion  of  Outicard  Thitigs,  or  of  their  Sen- 

fible   ^lalitys : Next  after   thofe   Firfl  Senfations,    produced 

in  us  by  an  application  of  the  Primary  ^lalitys  of  Body  to 
our  Organs  of  'Touch,  we  foon  feel  various  other  Senfations, 
from  thofe  various  Qualitys  of  Body  which  are  called  Secondary, 
becaufe  they  are  found,  not  in  the  Primary  or  Elementary 
Bodys,  but  in  Mixt  or  Compound-Bodys  only ; — Some,  which 
affect  the  Touch,  as  Hardnefs  and  Softnefs,  Roughnefs  and 
^moothnefs;  —  Others,    which    affcdt   the   Tajle,    as   Sweetnefs, 

Sournefs^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         239 

Sournefs,  Bitternefs,  &cc ;  —  together  with  Odours,  which  aftcd: 
the  Smell;  —  Sounds  alfo,  which  ftrike  theE^r;  and  Colours^ 
falling  on  the  £}/<?. — The  Senfations  of  thefe,  and  of  fuch  other 
Qualitys  of  things  external,  as  afTedl  any  of  our  outward 
Senfes,  are  all  of  them,  either  pleafiirable  or  painful,  more  or 
lefs  :  and  the  Pleafiires  and  Vains,  which  attend  them,  are 
purely  Corporeal;  as  being  produced  by  Bodys,  or  Particles  of 
Body,  when  thefe  meet  with  Bodys  animated  by  Sentient  Souls. — 
Now  the  Pleafures  and  the  Pains  of  this  Kind  are  firft  felt, 
whilfl;  the  Kational  Soul  lyes  intirely  dormant,  and  even  before  any 
Facultys  of  the  Animal  Soul,  except  That  of  Senfe,  are  iliong 
enough  to  exert  themfelves.  All  this  while,  tho  the  Infant- 
Senfations  grow  more  and  more  lively,  as  the  Organs  of  Senfe 
ftrengthen,  yet  None  of  the  ObjeBs  of  Senfe  appear  diJlinSlly ; 
or  the  Mind,  newly  pent  up  in  Body,  and  clogged  with  Matter,. 
is  yet  too  weak  to  take  Cognifance  of  any  of  them  in  the 
Senforium:  even  there.  None  of  them  make  any  durable  Im.- 
preiiion ;  All  vanifli,  with  the  Senfation  which  they  produce: 
and  in  their  prefent  appearances.  All  of  them  belong  to  that 
Firfl:  Clafs  of  Things,  by  Socrates  termed  the  Infinite.  —  Not 
long  afterwards,  however,  the  Mind  begins  to  expand  herfelf  ^ 
and  Children  then  begin  to  difiinguifi  outward  Things,  one 
from  another;  to  difiinguijh  alfo  the  Parts  of  a  Corporeal  Fi- 
gure, one  from  another,  and  from  the  Whole.  And  as  foon  as 
Imagination  and  Memory,  thofe  Facultys  of  the  Animal-Soul,  are 
able  to  receive  and  to  retaiii  the  Images  of  Corporeal  Forms, 
the  Mental  Powers  are  excited,  by  which  the  Mind  views  them 
together  and  compares^  them ;  fees  "Similarity  and  Difiimilarity 
amongft  them ;  congregates  the  Similar,  and  fegregates  the  Difil- 
milar;  and  in  the  Similar,  be  they  ever  fo  Majty,  fees  a  cer- 
tain Samenefs,  which  intitles  them  to  be  called  by  one  and  the 
fame  Namey  as  having,  All   of  thero,  one  and  the  fame  Nature.. 

—It: 


240         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

—  It  feems,  that,  next  after  This,  the  Mind  difcerns  fome 
accidental  ^uilitySf  Conditions,  and  Circiimjiances,  —  fuch  as  Co- 
lour, Size,  Motion  or  Reft,  Adlion  or  Inadlion, — wherein  the 
moft  fimilar  Beings  or  Subftances  differ,  one  from  another:; 
and  that,  difcerning  This,  flie  feparates  thofe  differing  ^lalitys^ 
&c.  from  That  Nature,  Avhich  is  the  Same  in  them  All :  for, 
notwithftanding  her  difcernment  of  thofe  Accidental  Differences., 
ilie  continues  to  give  to  All  of  them  the  Same  Name.  —  Soon 
after  this,  the  Mind  feems  to  perceive  flirther,  that  ^alitys, 
&c.  of  the  Same  Sort,  are  the  Attributes  of  many  Subftances 
or  Beings  different  in  thier  Names  and  Natures;  and  hence 
flie    readily    affigns    to  Each    of    thofe   Attributes   one   and   the 

fome  Name,  as  denoting  one  and  the  fame  Thing,  commo'n  to 
via7ty  Beings  of  different  Natures.  —  Thus  far  even  Children, 
when  they  can  fpeak,  or  underftand  what  is  fpoken,  concern- 
ing   Objedls    with    which    they   are    converfant,   are    carried   by 

.Common  Senfe,  aided  by  the  Principles  of  Reajon,  in  perceiving 
the  Sameneffas  and  Differences  of  Things.  And  the  Multitude, 
or  Bulk  of  Mankind,  being  wholly  employed  in  providing  for 
their  comfortable  Subfiftence,   feldom  go  any  farther. — Now,  to 

j)erceive  Samenefs  and  Difference  together,  in  Objeds  of  Senfe, 
whether  thcfe  Objects  are  Subjlantial  Beings,  or  Attributes  of 
fuch  Beings,  is  to  have  Ideas  of  the  Species  of  Things,  and  of 
their  Specific  Differences.  To  have  fuch  Ideas,  in  every  One  of 
which,  many  Particulars  are  mnverfolifcd,  {ina7iy  Objeds  of  Senfe 

.being,  by  the  ikf/Ws  Eye,  viewed  in  Onr^Special  Idea,)  is  na- 
tural to  the  Human  Mind,  when  her  dormant  Powers  are  firft 
awakened  :  it  is  the  Pirjl  Stage  on  the  Road  to  Science,  (pro- 
perly  fo  called,)    the   Knowlege  of    things  Jlable,    and   the  fome 

for  ever: — and  it  is  fo  neceflary  to  the  Formation,  Knowlege, 
and  Ufe   of  Language,    that    the  Words,    which   feem   to   have 

•been  the   firft  invented  in  every  Language,   if  it  be  original  or 

underived 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         241 

underived,  are  the  Symbols  (or  Reprefentatives)  of  thofe  Spe- 
cial Ideas.  Indeed  the  Thing?,  which  Men  had  always  the 
moft  immediate  Occafion  to  fpeak  of,  One  to  Another, 
were  Senjibk  Ohje^s  in  their  Species,  not  This  or  That  Indii)idual 
or  Particular ;  as  appears  from  the  Pronoun-Words,  probably 
the  next  invented,  to  ferve  inflead  of  dun:ib  Dircftions  by 
the  Eye  or  Finger,  pointing  to  fome  Individual  Being  or 
Particular  Thing,  either  remote  or  near.  For  this  reafon  we 
prefume  it  is,  that  Nature  has  not  given  the  Organs  of  Speech 
to  Brute  Animals,  not  even  to  thofe  of  the  livelieft  Senfe 
and  the  moft  generous  Spirit  ;  'tis  becaufc  they  conkl  be 
of  no  Ufe  to  an  Animal,  the  higheft  Faculty  of  whofe  Soul 
was  a  Monory  of  particular  ObjeSls  of  Senfe,  without  univer- 
Jalifmg  any  of  them,  or  conceiving  an  Idea  of  zny  Species :  for' 
without  fucb   Ideas    at   Icafl:,    there    can    be    neither   Speech,    nor 

Underjlanding  of  what    is   fpoken. But    to    proceed    with   our 

prefent  Subjeft,  the  natural  Progrefs  of  Human  Knowlege, 
until  it  arrives  at  the  Caufe  of  All  things.  —  When  the  In- 
vention and  the  Improvement  of  ufeful  Arts  had  more  and 
more  abridged  the  Labours  of  Human  Life,  and  had  procured 
with  facility  the  means  of  comfortable  Living,  the  Lovers  of 
Knowlege  had  then  Leifure  to  fearch  deeper  into  the  Nature 
of  Things.  In  this  Search  they  foon  came  to  feparate  the 
Properties,  feverally  ejfential  to  each  Species,  from  thofe  acci- 
dental  Circumftances,  which  diverfify  the  Individuals,  and  ferve 
to  diftinguifh  them.  One  from  Another.  In  the  next  place 
they  found,  that  fome  of  thofe  eJJ'ential  Propertys  were  common 
to  many  Beings  of  different  Species :  and  hence  they  acquired 
a  Knowlege  of  the  Genera,  or  Kinds,  as  well  as  of  the  Species 
of  Things.  In  the  fame  manner  they  went  on,  generalifing 
more  and  more,  as  they  found  more  a«d  more  Kinds  of  Being 
to  agree  in   fom.e   of  their  effential  Propertys ^  —  until  at  length 

H  h  they 


242         P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

they  attained  to  fee,  that  Beifig  its  Self,  accompanied  with  the 
Propertys  eflential  to  all  Being,  was  Common  to  than  all,  and 
abfolutely  Univerfal ;  inafmuch  as  it  comprehended  all  the 
Kinds  and  Species  cf  Being,  together  with  the  Propertys  ejen- 
tial,  and  the  Circumjlances  incidental,  feverally  to  Each. — In  the 
mean  time,  for  the  fake  of  communicating  this  gradually  in- 
creaiing  Knowlege,  it  was  necelTary,  all  along,  to  invent  new 
Terms  for  all  newly-difcovered  Things.  And  thus  the  Lan- 
guage of  that  People,  amongft  whom  thefe  Difcoverys  were 
■made  with  the  moll  Accuracy,  became  at  length  richer  than 
any  other  Language,  not  only  in  Siibjlantive  Words,  but  in 
Attributi'ves  alfo ;  to  exprefs,  not  only  all  the  different  Kinds  of 
Things,  but  alfo  their  difierent  Propertys  and  Potmers,  Energys 
and  ylBions,  with  the  Effects  of  thefe  laft  on  other  Things,  and 
the  Relations  of  One  Bei?ig,    or  Attribute  of  Being,    to  Another. 

But  the  Knowlege  of  Nature  was  far  from  being  as  yet  com- 

pleated.  Nothing  can  be  known  perfedly  well,  without  the 
Knowlege  of  its  Caufe.  It  remained  therefore,  to  fearch  out 
the  Caufe  of  thofe  Same?jefes  and  Differences,  which  appear 
together,  in  all  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Being; — in  the  different 
St>ccies  of  each  Kind,  the  Caife  of  Samenefs,  as  to  their  Kind ; 
— and  in  each  Kind,  the  Caufe  of  Difference  between  its  Species : 
-^  how  Being  comes  to  be  divided  into  certain  Kinds  and 
Species ;  and  how  thefe  Kinds  and  Species  come  to  be  conti- 
nued   the    Same    for   ever,     amidft    the    unceafing    Change    and 

Variation   of  all    things  throughout  Nature. The  Speculators 

cf  Outward  Nature  feemed  to  think,  that  they  gave  a  futficient 
account  of  thefe  Phenomena,  in  faying, — that  the  Multitude  of 
Individual  Beings,  in  every  Age,  were  produced  from  different 
Seeds, — generically  different,  Some  of  thefe  Seeds, — Others  fpeci- 
Jically, — and  Others  with  a  Difference  meerly  numerical; — Seeds, 
which     conveyed     to    every    fucceffive    Generation     the    Specific 

Forms 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


2-43 


Forms    and     the    Generic   Powers   of    thofe    Beings    from    whom 
they  fprang.      And   if  thefe  Naturalifls    were  afked,     from  ivhat 
Caiife  came  any  Difference  at  all,   other  than   numerical,   between 
the  produdtive  Beings,    or  between  the  Seeds   which  they  feverally 
produced  ;  —  and   from    whcit   Caufe  had   thofe  Seeds    the   Power 
of    continuing    on,     from    Generation    to   Generation,    the   fame 
Differences,    both    Generic    and   Specific,  without  Addition,    Di- 
minution,    or    Alteration  f  —  Some    had     no    better    Anfwer    to 
make    than   Tliis;  —  "Things   had   always    gone   on   after    this 
manner;   Hens  produced  Eggs;  from  Eggs  came  forth  Chicken; 
Chicken  grew  up   to  be  Hens,,  and  produced   other  fuch  Egg? 
as    thofe   from  which    they   came."  —  But  "  Which  were   Firfl., 
Birds    or   Eggs  ?     for    it    does    not    appear,    that    an    Egg    could 
ever    have    exifted    without    a  Bird    previous   to  it;    nor    that    a 
Bird   could,    without    a    previous  Egg." — To    this   Quedion   it 
was   thus   anfwered;  —  "  In  Nature  there  was  no  Firji,   no  Bc- 
gimiing    of  Things  :    'Time   is    infinite,    the   pajl   as    well    as    the 
future;    and    the    fuccefTive    Generations    of    all    the    Beings    of 

Nature  roll,    along  with  Time,   beginninglefs  and  endlefs" . But 

"  you  thus  prefent  to  our  Imaginations  a  Chain  without  a 
Firll  Link, — an  orderly  March  without  a  Leader, — an  infinite 
Succeflion  of  Beings,  Every  one  of  which  is  an  ILffecl  of  fome 
prior  Being,  as  well  as  it  is  a  Cavf  of  fome  pojlerior.  Muft 
there  not  have  been,  before  Nature,  fome  Caufe  of  it  ?  or  at 
leaft   in    Nature    muft    there    not    have    been    always    Scmethin?, 

which  is  a  Caife,  v/ithout  being  alio  an  EffeB  ?" Thefe  Qj^ef- 

tions  drew  from  thofe  ancient  Phyfiologers  the  following  Ac- 
count of  the  Univerfe.  They  admitted,  "  'twas  neceffary  that 
Something  Ihould  have  exifted  always,  from  infinite  Time  paft, 
to  be  the  Caufe  of  that  infinite  SerieS  of  Generations,  —  fome 
Being,  which  involved  in  its  Scf  its  own  Caufe,  and  exifted  by 
the    necejjity    of   its    own  Nature :" — "  but   this    neceiiary    felf- 

H  h  2.  exiftent: 


244         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

exiftent  Being,  they  laid,  was  Nature  her  Self,  the  Nature  of 
the  Univerfe,  which  continued  the  Same  for  ever:"  they  far- 
ther faid,  that  "  to  this  Nature  belonged  inceffant  and  everlafting 
Motion,  by  the  fame  mccjjity, — a  Motion  of  the  whole  Univerfe, 
and  a  Motion  of  every  Part  and  Particle  of  it :" — that  "  what- 
ever  Change  happens  in  any  Part  of  the  Univerfe,  it  is  occa- 
fioned  only  by  a  Removal  of  Particles  from  one  Place  to  an- 
other:"—  that  "Particles  of  a  limilar  Sort  often  ineet  together, 
and  afterwards  feparate  again  :" — and  that  "  what  we  call  Ge- 
neration, is  only  a  Meeting  together  of  thefe  Particles ;  and 
what  we  call  Death,  or  Corruption,  is  only  a  Pai'ting  of  them  afiin- 
der,   followed    by    a   Dilfolution  of  that   Being    which   they  had 

compofed." Other    Phyfiologers     gave     a     quite     contrary 

Account  of  the  Caiife  of  Nature.     For  they  faid,    that  "  Nature 
was   not   eternal,   but   began   in  Time :" — that  "  the  Beginning   of 
it  was  from  Seeds,   but  not   from    any   fuch  Seeds,   as  by  natural 
necejjity  produce   Beings  of  any   certain  Kinds  j    the  Seeds   of  All 
things  being  an  infinite  Number  of  minute  Bodys  ;    Some  indeed 
more  minute  than  others,    but   All   of  them  indiifible,    and   All 
of  them  eternally  in  iVIotion  by  a  Necefjity  oi  their  onvn,  antecedent 
to   That   of  Nature;  for  Nature   as  yet  was    not:" — that    "    the 
Figures  of  thefe  minute  Bodys  were  infinitely  various ;    and  their 
Motions   in    no   determinate    Direction :"     that    "   by   this   vague 
Motion,     like    that    of   Motes     in    a    Sun-Beam,     their    relative 
Situation     was    continually   changing:     and    by    Ariking     againft 
each    other,    their    Pojiure   continually  varied  ;"    that    "    the   ir- 
regular  Curvatures   in   the  Figures   of  Some,    like  Hooks,   hap- 
pening   to    take    Hold    of  thole   of   Others,     thenceforward   they 
wandered   on    together ;    and   in    their   way,    gathering   up   more 
by   the    fame    means,    they   fometimes    inclofed,     amongfl:   them, 
Bodys    the     inoft    minute    and    fubtile,    of    a  Spherical    Figure, 
and   moving  with    the  greateft  Celerity, — the  Seeds   of  Life  and 
Senfe    and   Undei landing:" — that   "  hence    they    grew   together 

into 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  245 

into  the  various  Beings  of  Nature,  endued  with  Life  in  va- 
rious Degrees,  proportioned  to  the  Number  and  the  Finenefs 
of  the  inclofed  Vital  Particles  :" — that  *'  a  Being,  thus  framed, 
mufl  have  endured  as  long  as  any  Vital  Atoms  remained  with- 
in it ;  and  fome  or  other  of  Thefe  always  remained,  as  long 
as  the  Lifelefs  Atoms  had  a  Strength  of  Coherence,  fufficient  to 
retain  them  :" — for  that  **  as  the  irregular  component  Particles 
of  every  Being  were  eternally  in  Motion,  they  mufl:,  fooner 
or  later,  have  quitted  their  Hold  of  each  other;  and  the  Be- 
ing, which  they  had  compofed,  mufb  have  then  come  to  Dif- 
folution ;  the  Vital  Particles  within,  which  had  vitally  con- 
ne(fted  them,  being  then  let  loofe,  mufl;  have  taken  V^ing,  and 
fled  away  :" — that  "  as  foon  afterward,  as  thefe  Seeds  of  Life, 
thefe  Vital  Particles,  All  or  Any  of  them,  met  with  fome 
Vital  Being,  Animal  or  Vegetable,  newly  compadled,  or,  at 
lead,  open  enough  to  receive  and  ftrong  enough  to  retain 
them,  they  entered;  and  were  followed  from  time  to  time  by 
More  fuch  ,  until  the  Being  was  faturated  with  Life  :" — that, 
*•'  from  That  time,  all  fuperfluous  Vital  Particles,  which  had 
entered,  found  their  way  out,  together  with  Fragments  and 
Shreds  from  every  Part  or  Member  of  the  full-grown  Being; 
and,  together  witli  them,  became  the  Seeds  of  a  new  Being, 
Such  a  one,  as  That  from  which  they  either  fprang  forth 
fpontaneouOy,  or  were  emitted  by  the  Defire,  Will,  or  Con- 
fcnt  of  the  Parcnt-Beiu" :" — for  that  "  Some  of  the  original 
or  Firfl:  Beings  happened  to  be  fo  finely  compofed,  that  the 
Vital  Atoms  could  run  thro  every  Part  of  their  fubtile  Frame  ; 
and  in  thefe  Beings  the  Abundance  of  Life  produced  Senfe, — a 
Senfation  of  Pain  from  Supeifuitys,  as  well  as  from  Emptinefs, 
— and  a  Senfation  of  Plcafure  in  the  unbiirtbening  themfelves  of 
Superfluitys,  as  well  as  in  ihc  filing  of  any  Part  empty,  or  not 
iutficiently    full;  —  fuch    Senfations    produced    Dfire;     Defire 

formed 


2^6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


formed  Comiexions  and   mutual  Relations  between  fimilar  Beings, 
for   the    fake   of  yielding   mutual    Relief,    or  of  fupplying    mu- 
tual  Wants :" — that  "  from   thefe  Caufes,    every   where  afting, 
at  length,    out  of  That   boiindlefs  Ocean,    the  Infinity  of  Space, 
wherein   ^hz  Seeds  of   all  Being    \\z^  fwam   to  and   fro   from    all 
Eternity,  arofe  Venus,  That  Order  and  Courfe  of  Nature,   which 
in    every   Age    produceth  Beings    fimilar  to  Thofe   of   the    Age 
preceding  :" — and  that  "  in   fine   this   conftant   Continuance    of 
the  fame  Similaritys  and  Diffimilaritys,  which  appeared   between 
the    various    Original    Beings, — thofe   Firft  Afl'emblages    of  fuch 
Atoms   as   could  hold  together  for  a  Time, — giveth  us  the  No- 
tion o^  Kinds  and   Species  in  Natural  Beings." — It  appears   then, 
that,  according  to  Both   the   Accounts,    given   by  thefe   ancient 
Pyfiologers,    the   Caiift'   of   this   Commixture  of  the   Infnite  with 
Bound,    (fo   called  in  the  Paffage   now  before   us,)    or   in   other 
words,   the  Caufe  of  Bounds  fet   to  infinite  Matter,   is   unintelli- 
gent  and   blind  NeceJJity ;    whether  it  be   eternal,   or  whether   it 
arofe    in   lime    from    the    cafual    Concourfe    of    eternal  Atoms. 
From   the   latter    of    thefe   Two   Accounts,    the  Hypothefes   of 
other  ancient  Phyfiologers,  mentioned  in  Note  93  to  the  Greater 
Hippias,    and   in  Note  83   to   the  Banquet,    did    not  differ   fun- 
damentally.     For   All    of  Thefe  fuppofed    infinite  Matter,   eter- 
nally  in   Motion,    to   be    the  fi)le  Principle   of  All   things ;    and 
this    Motion,     whether    it    was    determined    by    coeval    Necef- 
fity,   or  whether  it  was   formerly  vague  and   fortuitous,  to  have 

been    originally    their  fole  Caufe. But  T^binking  Ferfijns,    who 

indulged  their  Imagination  lefs,  and  exercifed  their  Reafon  more, 
than  thofe'  Mechanical  Naturalifis,  gave  a  more  rational  Account 
of  the  Caiife  of  all  Natural  Things.  Thefe  fober  Thinkers, 
in  their  Speculations  of  Nature,  obferved  every  where  the 
evident  Marks  of  Defign;  —  in  the  various  Inanimate  Beings, 
(Each  having  all  its  Parts  fimilar,)  they  obferved  the  Regu- 
larity 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  247 

larily  and  Beauty  of  their  feveral  Forms ; — in  all  Living  Beings, 
(confining  of  Parts  dijjmilar,)  ihey  perceived  a  Beauty,  pecu- 
liar to  each  Kind,  yet  diverfified  in  each  of  the  Species  of 
that  Kind ;  they  obferved  the  Proportion,  Harmony,  and  Cor- 
refpondence  of  their  Parts ;  and  the  Fitnefs  of  thefe  Parts  for 
the  preferving  of  the  whole  13eing,  and  for  the  generating  of 
its  Like.  From  fuch  Obfervations,  they  reafoncd  eafily  to  the 
confideration  of  fome  defigning  Minds  invifible,  the  Catifes  of  all 
thofe  vifible  Forms.  —  Then  widening  their  View,  to  behold 
the  beauteous  Spectacle  of  all  Nature,  they  compared  thefe 
Forms  together ;  and  finding,  how  exadly  the  Living  Indivi- 
duals of  the  fame  Species  were  fitted.  Each  to  Other;  every 
Species  alfo,  and  every  Kind  of  Being,  fitted  to  other  Species 
and  Kinds ;  and  the  Elements  of  Nature,  fitted  to  them  All  ; 
fo  as  to  conneB  all  the  Parts  of  this  vifible  World  together, 
forming  One  great  Whole  ;  and  fo  as  to  preferve  this  Whole  for 
ever,  found  and  intire,  in  undccaying  Vigour  and  in  youthful 
Beauty  J  they  difcovered  Unity  of  Dejign  in  the  Frame,  and 
Uniformity  of  ConduSi  in  the  Adminif ration  of  Nature;  and 
hence  concluded,  that  either  One  Intelligeiit  Being  was  the  fole 
Defigner  and  perpetual  Diredlor  of  all  Nature's  Motions,  or, 
\i  Many  fuch  Beings  were  the  Defigners  and  the  prime  Movers, 
(which  was  more  eafy,  tho  lefs  philolbphical,  to  conceive,) 
yet    fuch    a  Harmony  and  Union   was  between    them,    that  One 

Mind  mufi:   be  in  them   all. Now  when  thefe   better  Phyfio- 

logers  drew  from  their  Difcoverys  this  rational  Conclufion, — that 
One  Mind  w^as  the  Caife  of  all  Nature's  Forms,  —  they  could 
not  but  difcern  at  the  fame  time,  that,  for  this  Caufe  to  a£}, 
'twas  neceflary  to  fuppofe  fome  SiibjeB  for  it  to  aB  in  or  upon, — 
fome  Matter  for  it  to  form, — fome  Principle  of  Things  without 
a  Will  of  its  own,  but  meerly  pajjive,  and  pafiively  obedient 
to  the  V/ill  of  aBive  Mind.  For  they  confidcred,  that  if  Mind 
6  encrgifed 


■48 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


energifed  'within  its  Self  only,  and  had  no  other  Subjed,  upon 
or  'within  which,  it  might  a£t,  —  the  Aftivity  of  Mind  could 
produce  no  External  Form;  nothing  but  Mirid  could  have  any 
Being  at  all;  but  yf// would  htMind;  —  Conclufions,  contrary 
to  Senfe  as  well  as  to  Reafon,  but  eafily  admitted  by  thofe 
few  Perfons,  who  deny  the  exiflence  of  an  External  World. — 
This  Realbning  gave  rife  to  the  Notion  of  T'wo  Principles  of 
Things,  —  a  Notion,  greatly  corrupted  in  After- Ages  by  attri- 
buting to  Each  of  thofe  Principles  a  Will  of  its  own, — to  the 
One  a  baiign  Will,  prefervative  of  Health  and  Soundnefs  in 
every  Part  of  the  Univerfe;  and  reflorativc,  whenever  any  Part 
of  it  was  difordered  by  the  Other  Principle :  for  to  this  Other 
was  attributed  a  malignant  Will,  mifchievous  and  dellrudlive  to 
Nature,  and  to  all  her  fair  Forms.  But  what  the  ancient 
Dodrine  was  concerning  this  Other  Principle,  and  how  it 
came  to  be  corrupted,  will  fall  under  confidcration  properly 
in  the  Note  next  after  This.  Our  Bufmefs,  at  prefent,  is  to 
proceed  in  confidering  Mind,  as  the  Caiifc  of  the  External 
World  J  in  which.  Bounds  are  fet  to  Infinity;  or,  as  Plato 
fpeaks  in  the  Pafiage  now  before  us,   the  Infinite  and  Bound  are 

every  where  mixed  together. Already  it  has   been  fliown,  \\\ 

the  Differtation  on  the  Do5lrine  of  Heraclitiis,  page  29  &  feq: 
v/hat  crude  Notions  of  Alind  were  conceived  and  brought 
forth  in  the  earlier  Ages  of  Philofophy.  Thefe  Cruditys,  in 
travelling  abroad,  engendered  many  a  falfe  and  impious  Con- 
ceit of  the  Divine  Nature,  in  the  Brains  of  Enthifafic  Poets, 
in  thofe  alfo  of  the  Snperfitious  Vulgar,  and  in  thofe  of  Pritfs 
intereftcd  to  encourage  both  Enthufiafm  and  Superflition.  Lit- 
tle or  no  Ground  was  gained  in  the  Knowlege  of  this  Divine 
Caufe  of  all  things,  Mind,  until  the  time  of  Socrates,  except 
by  the  Pythagoreans,  and  a  Colony,  which  came  out  of  Their 
Schools,  \.\\^  Eleaticks.  —  The  former,  in  their  Doftrine  of  the 
6  Principles 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


249 


Principles  of  Natural  Tubings,  taught, — that  Matter,  confidered  by 
its  Self,  was  totally  void  of  Form,  and  therefore  indefinable;  but 
that  of  every  Form  it  ■w^%  fufceptible  -, — and  that  the  xiyoi,  the  Forms 
or  E fences,  by  which  the  fcveral  Sorts  of  Things  are  defined,  con- 
fidered by  Ihemfelves,  as  feparate  from  Matter,  were  eternal 
and  immutable.  —  They  faw,  that  thofe  Forms,  the  Place  of 
which  was  Matter,  flay  but  for  a  time,  and  pafs  away;  and 
that,  during  their  Refidence,  wherever  they  refide,  they  never 
ceafe  changing  or  varying.  Eternity  therefore,  and  Immutability, 
not  being  found  any  where  in  Corporeal  Nature,  thofe  Philo- 
fophers  concluded,  that  the  Forms,  to  which  thofe  Attri- 
butes belong,  were  only  to  be  found  in  Mind.  From  the 
Truth  of  This  Conclufion,  thus  eftabliHied,  the  fame  juft 
Reafoners  argued  to  this  Other,  —  that  thofe  immutable 
and  eternal  Forms,  the  Mental,  were  Trx^a.Sayfjia.-Toc,  Exemplar- 
Patterns  of  the  temporary  and  changeable  Forms,  the  Corporeal. 
Accordingly,  they  called  thefe  Corporeal  Forms  o,uo(w'/AaTa  and 
fixoVgs,  Similitudes,  Images,  or  Copys  of  thofe  Originals.  And 
fmce  it  was  necellary,  for  the  denoting  of  newly- difcovered 
Things,  that  cither  new  Names  fhould  be  affigned,  or  that  old 
Words  fliould  be  ufed  in  a  jicw  Senfe,  they  appropriated  to 
every  one  of  thofe  Koyoi  daMfxaToi  Incorporeal  Forms,  thofe  Ar- 
chetypes of  the  Corporeal  e^S-n,  the  Term,  Idea.  That  Such 
were  the  Reafonings,  Sentiments,  and  Exprefiions  of  the  Py- 
thagoreans, we  refer  for  Proof  to  all  the  extant  Remains  of 
their  Phyfiological  Treatifes ;  in  particular,  fee  Ocellus  Lucanus, 
in  Gale's  Opufcula  Mytholog:  pag:  519,  Edit:  Amfi:  Tiinceus  Locrus, 
in  the  fame  Colledion,  pag:  544 ;  and  Archytas,  in  Stobaus\ 
Eclogue,  pag:  92,  Edit:  Ant:  Thefe  Ideas  then  being  difco- 
vered to  have  their  Seat,  or  Place,  no  where  but  in  the  Great 
Mind  of  the  IJjtiverfe ;  and  being  found  alfo  to  be  the  Originals 
of   all  Nature's  Forms;    it    was    juftly    concluded    that  Matter, 

I  i  the 


250         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

the  Subjedl  of  all  Formation,  was  formed,  (or,  as  we  com- 
monly fpeak,  the  World  was  created,)  according  to  thefe  eternal 
Ideas,    or  Exemplar-Forms ;    and    that  Mind  was  ^Sq^  eiS^evroiSy, 

iki^  forming  Form  of  All  things. In    profecuting  the  Study  of 

Principles  and  Caufesy  the  Eleaticks  conceived,  that  all  thefe- 
Ideas,  or  Intelligible  Forms,  are  united  in  One  moft  general 
Idea,  Mind:  —  that  this  Mind  is  eternally  united  ^'\i\\  Matter-, 
and  in  confequence  of  this  Union,  continually  imprints  on 
Matter  all  fuch  Forms  as  are  comprehended  in  its  Self:  — 
that  thefe  imprinted  Forms  are  the  Objeds  of  Sevfe  -,  as  thofe, 
the  archetypal,  are  the  Objects  of  Mrnd : — that  the  Objeds  of 
Senfe  are  variable;  thofe  of  Mind,  invariable: — that  Se7ife  and 
Mind,  with  their  refpedtive  Objects,  the  variable  and  the  in- 
variable, are  conneSled  together  throughout  the  Univerfe,  both 
in  the  One  and  in  the  Many : — that,  tho  in  reality  the  Univerfe 
is  but  0?ie,  "EN  "ON,  Mind  in  Matter,  immoveable  and  immu- 
table ;  and  tho  all  the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  are  as- 
Jlable  as  their  Ideas,  and  appear  fo  to  the  Eye  of  Mind ;  yet  to 
the  Eye  of  Senfe,  fmce  all  Things  are  continually  varying  their 
Appearances,  all  Things  feem  to  be  in  continual  Motion, 
and  to  change  Places,  each  with  other;  whereas  they  are 
only  flitting  Shadows ;  or  a  fucceflion  of  Images,  beheld  in  a 
tranfcnt  Glafs. — Thus  arofe  the  Diftindion  between  v.oaiJioi  voyitos, 
the  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World,  and  xoarfJLOi  ai^nroi,  the  Scnfiblf 
World;  (for  which  fee  Note  94  to  the  Banquet ;) — ■2i  Difindlion,. 
meerly  logical,  and  without  any  other  Difference,  than  Such 
as  there  is  between  a  real  Man,  and  the  Likenefs  of  that  Man, 
tainted  or  printed  upon  a  changeable-coloured  Silk.  And  hence 
may  eafily  be  reconciled  the  feeming  Contrariety  of  Doitrine 
between  Xenophanes  and  Parmenides,  refpedling  the  Infinity  of 
the  Univerfe  J — That  alfo  between  Parmenides  and  his  Difciple 
Zeno,   refpeding  its  Mobility; — and  That   between  Melifus  and 

Himfelf,. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


^5^ 


Hlinfelf,  refpedling  the  InJlabUity  and  Dejlru5libUity  of  all  things. 
—  The  two  forfner  Contrarietys  are  well  known  to  the  Learned  j 
and    for    the   latter,    fee    Dr.  Davis,    in    his  Notes    on   Cicero's 

Academicks,  pag:2i8. Before  we  proceed  farther  in  this  brief 

account  of  the  Progrefs,  anciently  made,  in  the  Firft  or  Chief 
Philofophy,  the  Knowlege  of  the  Principles  and  Caufes  of  all 
Natural  Tubings,  we  fliall  prefume  on  the  Reader's  Indulgence . 
for  a  few  Words,  in  defence  of  the  ancient  Doftrine,  con- 
cerning thofe  eternal  and  Mental  Forms,  termed  by  the  Py- 
thagoreans, who  firfl:  reafoned  up  to  them,  Monads  and  Ideas: 
tho  we  fhould  not  have  imagined  a  Defence  of  that  Dodrine 
neceflary  for  Any  Perfons,  who  acknowlege  immutable  and  eter~ 
nal  Mind  to  be  the  Caife  of  Outward  Nature,  were  it  not,  that 
Many  in  modern  Ages  feem  to  think  fuch  an  Acknowlege- 
ment  very  compatible  with  a  Suppofition,  that  the  World  was 
created  by  the  all-wife  Author  of  it  on  a  Plan  not  eternal, 
but  contHved  and  executed  in  'Time,  for  fame  unknown  Pur- 
pofes,  ex  mero  arbitrio  ;  —  a  Plan  therefore,  changeable  at  plea- 
fure,  and  in  Time  perhaps  to  be  quite  aboUflxd. — But  we  de- 
fire  Thofe,  who  entertain  Opinions,  fo  inconfiftent  with  their 
profefled  Belief  concerning  Mind,  to  confider,  that  the  Being 
oi  Mind  inferrs  the  Being  of  Ideas,  and  that  the  Being  of  a 
Mind  eternal  and  immutable  inferrs  the  Being  of  eternal  and 
immutable  Ideas ;  —  that  on  Ideas  of  the  Mind  every  Plan  or 
Delign   is   built  j — and  that  Such  as    are   the  Ideas,    Such   will 

always    be  the  Plan. The  Nature   alfo  of   eternal  Ideas,    con- 

fidered  as  the  Foundation  of  the  Plan  of  Outward  Nature, 
may  be  argued  from  the  Analogy,  which  they  bear  to  Human 
Inventions. — They  are  Mental  Forms  alike  j  and  they  are  alike 
capable.  Each  fingle  Form  of  either  Sort,  of  being  multiplied, 
or  becoming  Many,  in  the  external  Copys  of  it  :  but  in  This 
refpeft   they   differ,    in  that   eternal  Ideas,    being   original   Con- 

I  i  2  ceptions 


252,         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

ceptions  of  an  all-perfeSl  Mhid,  are.  All  of  them,  brought  into 
Outward  Light  continually,  thro  the  continual  Operations  of 
Nature  J  whilft  Human  Inventions,  being  conceived  in  the  im- 
perfedl  Minds  of  Men,  Many  of  them  perifli  in  their  Embryo- 
State.  Since,  however.  Such  of  them,  as  come  to  Light,  and 
for  a  Time  remain,  are  the  Originals  of  all  the  Works  of  Art, 
v/e  perceive  This  Analogy  between  Divine  Ideas  and  Human 
Inventions, — that  the  farmer  are  to  the  Works  of  Nature,  what 
the  latter  are  to  the  Works  of  Art,  —  namely.  Formal  Caifes, 
Exemplar-Forms,  and  Archetypes.  —  Now,  we  are  well  aware, 
that  Thofe  Perfons,  who  have  been  ufed  to  confider  every 
Species,  or  Specific  Form,  as  an  AbJlraSi,  made  by  the  Human 
Mind,  from  a  Colledlion  of  fimilar  Images  in  the  Im.agination, 
may  objedt  to  this  Analogy,  that  the  very  Foundation  of  it 
fails  :  for,  tho  it  were  granted,  that  fome  Sort  of  Similitude 
fubfifted  between  the  Divine  Mind  and  the  Human,  or  be- 
tween the  Ideas  of  the  One  and  the  Ideas  of  the  Other;  yet, 
that  the  Works  of  Art  are  made  from  Images  modelled  in  Alen's 
Imaginations,  and  thence  generally  copied  firft,  and  drawn  on 
Paper ;  and  that  thefe  Images  are  compofed  from  Parts  of 
many  other  Images,  thofe  of  Senfible  ObjeSls,  whether  Natural 
or  Artificial,  trcafured  up  in  iSxz  Memory ;  but  that  \\\e,  Works 
of  Nature,  planned  by  the  Divine  Mind,  are  not  made  after 
any  previous  Models  or  Images  of  them  ;  for  that  pure  Mind 
excludes  Imagination,  and  is  prior  to  all  Senfible  or  Outward 
Objedts. — To  thefe  Objectors  we  believe  it  fufHcient  to  an- 
fwer,  that  they  are  miftaken  in  That  Part  of  their  Objedion, 
on  which  depends  the  validity  of  the  Whole :  for  in  the 
Works  of  Art,  tho  their  immediate  Model,  or  Exemplar  to  be 
followed,  be  delineated  perhaps  on  Paper,  perhaps  only  rough:- 
drawn  in  the  Imagination  of  the  Workman,  yet  the  Defign 
origbiates    in  Mind;,   the    deftgning  Mind    of  fome  Artiji   forms 

the. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S,  253 

the  Image  in  his  own  Imagination  firft,  and  transfufcs  it 
thence  into  That  of  the  Workman,  (if  a  different  Perfon,)  by 
fuch  Words  or  Draughts,  as  explain  it  to  his  Underjianding.  — 
Thus  much  for  the  prefcnt,  concerning  the  Divine  Ideas,  com- 
prehended, all  of  them,  in  One,  —  in  the  Divine  Pviind,  con- 
sidered as  Intelligible,  or  the  ObjeB  of  his  own  Intelligence, 
and  as  the  Archetype  or  Formal  CauJ'e  of  the  Senjible  World,  and 
of  all  the  Forms  of  Outward  Nature.  —  And  thus  much  in- 
deed is  at  prefent  neceilary ;  becaufe  on  the  Reality  of  thofe 
Ideas  will  depend  the  Truth  of  what  we  have  to  fay  farther, 
in  the  profecution  of  our  Subjedl. If  then  the  ancient  Doc- 
trine, concerning  the  Caiife  of  all  Natural  Things,  be  admitted 
to  be  true,  fo  far  as  we  have  already  proceeded  in  the  Hiftory 
of  that  Dodtrine,  it  appears,  that,  before  the  Time  of  Socrates, 
Mind  and  Matter  were  difcovered  to  be  the  Two  Principles 
of  all  external  Things  j  and  that  Mind  alone  was  difcovered 
to  be  their  Formal  Cause,  as  well  as  their  Efficient.  ~ 
In  this  State  flood  Human  Knowlege,  with  refpedl  to  the 
prefent  Subjedt,  the  Caufe  of  this  Outward  World,  at  the 
time  when  Socrates  the  Athenian  made  his  Appearance  in  it, 
—  a  Man,  whofe  Wifdom  and  Virtue  were  the  greateft  Ho- 
nour to  his  Country,  and  the  Manner  of  whofe  Death  there- 
fore was  an  indelible  Reproach  to  it.  —  Thus  we  preface  the 
following  Summary  of  the  Moral  Dodlrine  of  Socrates;  becaufe 
the  well-tried  Integrity  of  his  whole  Life  feems  to  have  been 
founded  on  the  Wifdom,  which  to  this  Day  fhines  in  his 
Dodrine  of  the  Supream  Mind,  as   the  Fountain  of  Wifdom  and 

true  Virtue. Of  Socrates    then    it   is    thus    faid   by  Arijlotk, 

(who  never  was  fufpefted  of  Partiality  in  favour  of  any  prior 
Philofophers,) — Sm  i^iV,  a,  th  av  ccTroS'CfJn  "Eoox^ccTei  S'lttaicoi,  t85t' 
gVa>tT()t85  Aoyai,  -iccu.  ro  o^i(^i^(Xi  xaS-oAa.  rxvTcc  yoi^  i(^iv  aiJifea 
TTggJ   a'p^Jii'   £Vi<j;«'/A)j5.  —  'A^'^w   £7r/ir/ijW«5  AgQ/w   vSy.       "  There  are 

Tmaj 


2-4         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Two  Things,  (meaning  either  Two  Difcoverys  in  the  Science  of 
Mind,  or  Two  Improvements  in  the  Manner  of  teacliing  that 
Science,)  which  may  jujlly  be  attributed  to  Socrates,  viz.  Reqfon- 
ing  by  Indiiciion,  and  to  define  things  from  Univerfals :  (that  is, 
in  giving  a  Definition  of  any  thing,  to  afcend  to  That  Uni- 
verfal,  which  the  Thing  to  be  defined  partakes  of:)  now 
Both  of  thefe  (Difcoverys,  or  Improvements,)  regard  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Science. — By  the  Principle  of  Science,  I  mean  Mind. — 
Arifot:  Metaphyf:  L.  ii.  C.  4.  fecundiim  Du  Vail:  &  Pofier: 
Analytic:  L.  i.  C.  33.  —  What  immediate  reference  Both  of 
-thofe  Difcoverys  or  Improvements,  made  by  Socrates,  have  to 
Mind  or  IntelkB,  may  be  thus  fliown. — As  to  the  Firft;  to 
reafon  by  Induolion,  is  to  conclude  the  Being  or  Truth  of 
fome  Univerfil,  fome  comprehenfive  One,  from  all  its  Particu- 
lars which  are  Many  :  fuch  Reafoning  therefore  brings  us 
diredly  up  to  Mind,  by  whofe  Eye  alone  can  be  feen  Orie 
in  Many,  And  as  to  the  Other  j  Every  right  Definition,  in 
afcending  to  That  which  is  inore  General  than  the  Thing  de- 
fined, brings  us  One  Step  nearer  to  the  Highefi  Genius  of  Things, 
the  7nof  Univerfal,  the  moft  comprehenfive  0?ie,  that  is,  Uni- 
VKRSAL  Mind.  Such  Definition  alfo  fets  together  a  Samenefs 
and  a  Difference, — the  Samenefs  of  fome  Genus  in  all  its  Species, 
or  Kinds  fubordinate,  —  and  the  Difference  of  the  Thing  defined 
from  all  collateral  Kinds  or  Species  :  —  the  Samenefs  and  the 
Difference  are  thus  exhibited  together  to  the  Mind  or  IntelleB, 
which  alone  can  behold  them  Both  in  One  View.  —  In  this 
manner,  and  by  thefe  few  and  eafy  Steps,  did  Socrates  lead  his  Fol- 
lowers to  thofe  Prime  Ideas  of  Mind,  reaching  to  all  things, — and 
comprehending  all  things, — One  in  Many,  and  Samenefs  a}?2id Differ- 
ence: — from  whence  it  was  obvious  to  draw  thefe  Conclufions, 
ttiat  'U?iity  and  Number,  Samenefs  and  Difference,  were  the  Firfi  Vni- 
verfals,    were   of  the  Fffence  of  Mind,  and,   (as  it  were)  Mental 

Principles ; 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


2-55 


Principh's;  and  that,  in  viewing  Thefe,  the  Mind  views  /cr 
Self.  See  Note  82  to  the  Mem.  In  this  way  of  thinking 
Socrates  perhaps  was  helped  and  forwarded  by  the  Converfation, 
which  \i\  his  early  Youth  he  had  with  Farmenides  and  Zeno. 
But  of  himfelf  he  feems  to  have  applied  thefe  Principles  to 
other  Things  the  7noJl  Univerjhl,  ra  xaS-oAa  y-fixtq-a.,  (next  after 
the  Principles  themfelves;)  being  Univerfal, — not  as  eveiy  Genus. 
is,  with  regard  only  to  its  own  Species,  nor  as  every  Species 
is,   with  regard  only  to  its   own  Individuals, — but  ahfolutely,   and 

without    any    reJiriSlion,    Univerfal. The   moft    obvious    and 

flriking  of  thefe  is  Beauty :  and  This  he  faw  was  fpred  over 
the  Face  of  ylll  things,  (beheld  in  One  View,)  the  whole 
Countenance  of  Nature ;  he  faw  it  inverting  every  Kind  and' 
Species  of  Things,  (taken  fingly,)  the  feveral  Features  of  that 
lovely  Face ;  he  faw  it  accompanying  Form  in  all  its  Journeys- 
from  one  Portion  of  Matter  to  another,  and  attendant  on  all 
its  Changes  and  Variety  of  Appearances  :  and  he  confidered, 
that  Samenefs  in  Forms  is  Uniformity ;  that  Difference  in  Forms- 
is    Variety  ;     and    that  Uniformity    amidft    bounded  Variety   is    the 

Effence  of  Beauty. Not  lefs  univerfal  than  Beauty,   appeared  to 

Him  the  Conjiituents  of  it, — Harmotty,  or  the  mutual  Fitnefs. 
and  Correfpondence  of  Parts  in  any  Whole, — Symmetry,  or  the 
Menfurability  of  thofe  Parts  by  one  common  Meafure,  —  and 
Mediocrity,  or  a  juft  'Temperament  in  any  Mixture  of  different 
Ingredients.  For  in  the  Frame  of  every  diftindl  Being  in 
Nature,  as  well  as  in  the  complex  Syftem  of  the  Univerfe,  he 
found  Harmony  and  Symmetry  combining  all  the  Solid  Partf^ 
and  Mediocrity  running  thro  all  the  Fluids.  And  having  learnt- 
the  Science  of  Geometry  from  Theodorus,  he  knew,  that  Har- 
mony.  Symmetry,  zud.  Mediocrity,  are  all  meafured  hy  Proportion ; 
—  that  Proportion  is  either  between  Things  the  fame  in. 
Kind,  but  different  in  Magnitude  or  in  Multitude,  or  elfe  be- 
J,  tweeni 


256         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

tween  many  Farts  of  one  Whole ;  —  that  all  Proportions  are 
meafured  by  Numbers ; — and  that  every  Number  confifls  of  tnany 
Units  conjoined,  or  rather  united. — The  penetrating  Genius  of 
Socrates  feems  alfo  then  to  have  difcovered,  that  thofe  Univerfals, 
Ha7-mony,  Symmetry,  and  Mediocrity,  are  the  immediate  Efficients 
of  Good,  no  lefs  than  they  are  of  Beauty,  feeing  that  Inajii- 
mate  Beings  owe  to  Them  the  Coherence  of  their  Parts,  and 
the  Soundnefs  and  Permanency  of  their  feveral  Frames ;  —  that 
Vegetables  maintain  their  jiourijhing  EJlate,  and  the  Duration  of 
their  Forms,  only  fo  long  as  thofe  Caufes  of  Union  continue 
with  them;  —  that  all  the  Pleafures  of  Senfe,  which  Senjitive 
Beings  feel  from  external  Things,  (fuch  as  are  adapted  to  their 
Senfes,  and  commenfurate  with  their  Organs  of  Senfation,)  they 
are  indebted  for  to  thofe  Principles  in  Nature,  which  comieSl 
them  with  external  Things ;  —  that  Beings,  who  partake  of 
Mind,  derive  the  ferene  Pleafures,  enjoyed  in  contemplating 
the  Truths  of  any  Science,  from  the  natural  Correfpondence 
and  Harmony  between  the  Mind  and  Truth ; — that  thofe  Sciences 
only,  which  the  Capacity  of  a  Man's  Underftanding  is  adequate 
to,  and  as  it  were  commenfurate  with,  are  to  Him  delightful 
in  learning  and  acquiring,  or  in  recolleding  and  reviewing  the 
Theorems  which  they  contain  ;  —  and  that  in  exercifing  his 
rational  Facultys,  whether  on  the  Subjects  of  Science  or  on 
thofe  of  Art,  however  natural  and  agreeable  to  all  Mind 
fuch  Exercife  may  be,  yet  for  Human  Minds  no  more  Exercife 
than  what  is  7noderate,  and  fiifficient  to  maintain  their  Strength, 
is  beneficial ;  and  that  all,  beyond  the  juft  Meafure,  is  perni- 
cious, is  a  weakening  and  a  wearing  of  them  out. In  con- 
templating Mind,  the  Seat  of  Science,  Socrates  difcovered  an- 
other Univerfal, — a  Univerfal,  of  all  the  moft  Divine  ; — he  dif- 
covered the  Being  of  Truth.  He  perceived,  that  all  the  mu- 
tual Relations  between  the  Ideas  of  Mind  partake  of  this 
1                                                                                      Univerfal 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S,  257 

Univerfal  Being  ;    thefe  Relations   being  indeed   no   other  Things 
than  Particular  Truths,    the  Truths    of  each    refpedlive    Science. 
He  perceived   that  Each   Idea  in    the   Mind,   taken   by  its  Self, 
lyes  fingle  and  apart  from   all   the  reft; — that  the   mofl  obvious 
and  fimple  Truths  are  the  Relations   of  thefe  Jingle  Ideas,    one  to 
another  ; — that  Truths  more  rcnjote,  more  general  and  comprehen- 
Jive,  are  more  extended  Relations  between   thofe  Ideas  ; — and  that, 
as  all  Ideas   are  comprehended  in    that  moft  general  one,  Utiiver' 
JalMind;    (of  whofe  etermil  Being  Ezch   of  them   partakes;)    fo, 
all  the  Relations  between    them,     that   is,    all  Truths,    are    com- 
prehended   in    Univerfal  Truth;     which    imparts    its    own   Jlable 
Eternity  to  every  Particular  Truth.     He  perceived,  that  not  only 
by     their    own    Nature    they     are     linked    together,     (Each    of 
them    drawn    on    by   fome   Other,     and    drawing    after    it  many 
More,)   but  farther,  that   in  Truth  its  Self  they  are,   all  of  them, 
united. — Thus  the  philofophic  Genius   of  Socrates  condudled   his 
Speculations    and    his   Reafonings    to   that   fublime   Place   within 
the    Soul,    which    Plato    terms    ro«To5,    intelligible,    as    being    the 
Place  of  ^uvc  Ideas ; — a  Place,    enlightened    by   the  Principles  of 
Science,    One  and  Many,  Same  and  Different ; — Principles,    which 
throw   Light    on    all    the     Obje^s    of    Mind,     to     make    them 
vijible   to    the    Mind's  Eye,    and  at    the   fame   time,    pour  Light 
into  that  'Eye,   to  fee  thofe  Objefts. — In   this  Place,   and  by   this 
Light,    Socrates  difcovered,    that   thofe  Univerfals,    Good,   Truths 
and  Beauty,    were    cfential,     all    of   them,    to  Mind;     or    rather, 
that   Each    of    them   was    the  Energy    of  Mind,    and    therefore 
the    Same   Thing    with  Mind,    whofe   very  Efjhice  is  Energy ; — 
that    the   Difference    between    thefe   Encrgys   lay   meerly    in   the 
DifTerence   betv/een    the    eats  or  Subjects  of   the  Mind's  Energy  ,• 
—  that  Ti-uth   was   the  Energy   of  Mind,   confidered  ahfraSledly 
from   Matter,   and   cnergifing    on   its    own   Ideas  imithin   its  Self; 
and   that   Beauty  and   Good   were    the  Energys    of  Mind    within 

K  k  Matter^ 


258  P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

Matter,  —  Beauty^  pouring  its  Self  over  and  throughout  the 
Forms,  which  the  Mind,  as  their  Efficicjit  Cmife,  creates,  —  and 
Good,  pouring  its  felf  into  and  throughout  thofc  Forms,  as  the 
Caufe,  or  JLnd,  for  wliich  they  were  created. — He  perceived 
accordingly,  that  the  Principles  of  Mind,  which  are  One  mid 
Many,  Same  and  Different,  were  the  Pri?iciples  of  thofe  Univer- 
fdls.  Harmony,  Symf?ietry,  and  Mediocrity,  thofe  Conflituents  of 
Truth,  oi Beauty,  and  oi  Good.  For  he  perceived,  that  Every  Kind 
oi  Harmony  was  like  That  Kind  of  it,  the  Subje£l  of  which  is 
Sound,  —  a  Kind,  called  Symphony,  —  produced,  as  Nicomachus 
fays  in  his  Enchirid:  Harmonic:  pag:  25,  when  Sounds  of  dif- 
ferent Magnitudes,  or  Tones,  are  fo  mingled  together,  as  to 
generate  a  Sound  ivoen^ri,  uniform,  xal  <aov  f/Jav,  and  as  it  were- 
One.  (See  a  Paffage  of  the  fame  Tenour,  in  Gaudentius,  pag: 
lie.)  He  perceived,  that  Synnnetry  was  produced,  when  many 
Things,  of  the  fame  Kind,  hut  fpecifically  different,  are  mea- 
fured  by  one  common  Meafure.  And  he  alfo  perceived,  that 
Mediocrity,  in  any  Attribute  of  any  Subflantial  Being,  is  a 
definite  and  certain  (always  one  and  the  fame)  Degree  of  fuch 
Attribute,  in  the  midft  of  ftiany  Degrees  of  it,  infinitely  va- 
rious and  uncertain ;  and  that  on  thefe  Excefies  and  DeficEls  the 
very  Being  of  Mediocrity  depends.  In  this  divinely  intelligent 
Part  of  the  Soul  he  then  difcerned,  that  Mind,  in  governing 
Matter,  was  Mediocrity,  or  Meafure,  the  Caufe  of  Good ;  and 
that   Matter,    efcaped    for    a    while    from    the   Government    of 

Mind,    was   the  Caife  of  infinite  Evil. But  the  fame  Godlike 

Genius,  which  had  thus  raifed  Socrates  to  a  View  of  Things 
Univerfal  and  Divine,  condudled  him  down  again  to  Hu?nan 
Subjedts.  His  Mental  Eye  being  then  filled  with  Light,  from 
that  original  Light,  the  Principles  of  Reafon  and  of  Science^ 
he  applied  thefe  Principles  to  the  Sciences  of  Morals  and  Po- 
liticks;    or    rather,    by  eftablilliing  Moral    and  Political  Truths 

on 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  259 

on  their  only  firm  Bafis,  the  Being  and  Nature  of  the  Human 
Mind,  he  united,   and  formed  into  Sciences,  what  before  lay  fingle 

and   fcattered,    being  but  Right  Opinions. He   perceived,  that 

the  Conftituents  of  Private  Moral  Virtue  are  thefe  which  fol- 
low;—  in  the  Mind,  (the  governing  Part  of  the  Soul  by  na- 
ture,) Prudence,  founded  on  WiJdo>n,  the  Knowlege  of  Moral 
Right  and  Wrong;  —  in  ihc  Affccl ions  of  the  Soul,  Symmetry \ 
the  Human  Nature,  confidered  as  Social,  in  the  various  Rela- 
tions of  Human  Life,  being  the  true  Meafure  of  them  all ; — 
in  the  PaJJlons  of  the  Soul,  (fuch  as  are  implanted  in  every 
Animal,  for  the  avoiding  or  the  oppofing  of  whatever  is 
noxious  to  it,  and  fuch  alfo  as  impel  it  to  the  Purfuit  of 
what  is  any  way  needful  or  beneficial  to  it,)  Mediocrity,  or  a 
juft  Degree  of  each  Paflion,  ,pj'oportioned  to  the  others  ;  the 
proper  Office  of  Each  being  afllgncd,  and  the  due  Bounds  of 
Each  being  fixed,  by  the  Ejids  of  Nature,  the  Prefervation  and 
the  Well-being  of  the  Individual,  and  the  Continuation  of  the 
Species  J — in  the  'whole  Soul,  Harmony,  whilft  all  the  Parts  of 
it.  Rational  and  Irrational,  rightly  difcharge  their  proper 
Fundlions,  flriking  upon  the  Nerves,  and  uttering  the  Voice, 
in  Confonance  and  Symphony,  one  Part  of  the  Soul  with  an- 
other.  Homogeneous  and  correfponding  with  this  Perfonal  or 

Private  Virtue,  which  is  the  Excellence  of  every  Human 
Being,  appeared  the  Virtue  of  a  Kingdom  or  Common  Wealth. 
For  he  perceived  This  alfo  to  confifi:  of  IViJdom  in  the  Law, 
which  is  the  Mind  as  it  were  of  the  whole  Body  of  the  People ; 
and  Prudence,  joined  with  Vigour,  in  the  Execution  of  that  Law  ;— 
in  every  Member  of  the  Community ,  an  Attachment  to  that  Law 
which  is  Common  to  them  all,  and  to  that  Conjlitution  by 
which  they  are  all  united ; — in  the  People,  a  Reverence  for  the 
Adminiftrators  of  Jurtice  according  to  the  Law ;  and  a  Refpedl, 
full  of  Gratitude,    to   the   faithful    Guardians    of  the  Conflitu- 

K  k  2  tion; 


26o  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

tion  J  —  in  the  Deliberative  Part  of  the  State,    Courage,    mixed 
with  CaufioH,  to   guard   againft   Evil  ;    and   in    the  Military  Part» 
Valour   to  encounter  Danger,    and  Magnanimity   to  endure  Toils  : 
—  in    "Every _  one   of    the  People,    an    afliduous    application   of    his 
Facultys,    Mental    and    Corporeal,     to    fome    particular  Employ, 
conducive   to    the   Well-being   of  All;    and    a  juft   attention   to 
the   Gain,    ariiing   from    that  Employ,    to   Himfelf  in   the  firfl 
place,    for   his   own    and   his   Family's  Maintenance   and  Profit,, 
but   ultimately  redounding  to    the  Support  of  the   Government,. 
the    Magiftracy,    the    Military^    and    whatever    Orders    of  Men. 
befide   are  deemed   necelTary   to    fupport   the   whole   Fabrick  of 

the   State. With    this  Public  Virtue,   Socrates    perceived   the 

Virtue  of  a   private  Family   to  be    eflentially   the   Same.     For  he 
confidered    a    fmgle   Family,     with    a   Father  and  Majler    at  the 
Head   of  it,   as    a  petty  Kingdom ;    and  a  Civil  State,   as  a  more 
extenfive  and  widely  fpred  Family.     The  Virtue  of  Each  of  them 
was,  he  faw,  conftrudled  on  the  fame  Principles  with  the  Virtue  of 
the  Other  :   and  the  feveral  Parts  and  Members  of  the  one,  with 
the  diftinft  Offices  of  each  of  thofe  Parts,   were,   he  faw,   analo- 
gous to  the  Parts,  and    their  Offices,    in   the  other.  —  He  under- 
ftood  Political  Union    to    be   as   natural  to   Human   Kind   as   the 
Conjugal:  for  he  perceived,  that,  however  fufficient  the  Parental 
'Tye  might  be,    to  relieve   their  earlieji  Wants ;    and   the  Conjugal 
'Tye,    thofe   of   their    riper  Years ;  —  Tyes,    created    by  Natural 
AfficBion,   and   by   the  Natural  Paffiion  between   the  Two  Sexes ; 
— yet  the  Continuance  of  thefe  Tyes,   or,   at  leafl,   of  their   na- 
tural Effects,  is  ^far^".  only  in  Civil  Society ',  and   that  only  there 
is    to   be   found    a   Supply  of    thofe    numerous    Wants,    arifmg 
afterwards  from,  an   Increafe   of  Family ;    and  only  there  to  be 
met   with    is    a   Gratification   of  other  Social  Affi'fSiions,    and  of 
other  SclJiJ}}  Difires,    not   lefs   natural  than  the  former,   tho  lefs 
viqlcnt  by  naturcj^- — thofe  which  arife.wheii  the  Rational  Facility 

is- 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  26r 

is  grown  more  mature,  and  the  Underflanding  becomes  en- 
larged. —  He  confidered,  that,  as  the  Domejiic  State  and  the 
Political  are  alike  founded  on  Human  Indigence,  —  on  the  In- 
fufiicience  of  the  feveral  Members  of  Either,  feparately  and 
fingly  to  fupply  their  own  Wants,  —  fo  are  they  alike  alfo 
formed   by  CompaB,   either  exprefled,    or  tacitly  implied,  ■  a 

Compaft,   which  creates   an   Obligation,    inforcing    on   them    the 
Calls  of  Nature,    and   the   Counfels  of  Reafon,   to    continue  in   a 
State  of  Union,  thro  Harmony  and  Concord. — He  confidered,   that, 
in    the  Marriage-ContraSl,    either   the   Conditions   of   it   are  ex- 
prefTed  formally    in    Words    before  Witneffes ;    or   the  Defeit  of 
fijch   Form  is   fupplied   by  mutual  Confidence   according    to   the 
Law  of  Nature  ;   or  fome  other  Form  is  authorifed  by  the  Lav/ 
ef  Cuftom,    which    adapts    the   Law   of  Nature   to   the  peculiar 
Circumftances    of    each   Country :; — that,    in   a  Compact  between 
the  Majler  of   a  Family    and   his   Domejlicks,    the   Conditions   of 
k    are   wont   to    be    made    in    exprefs  Terms,    where    the   Do- 
mefticks    ferve    for  Hire, — but    are    implied    in    the  Nature   and 
Reafon    of   Oeconomical    Relation,     (the   End   of    which    is    the 
Good   of    all    the   Partys,.)    where    the    Domefticks    are    born    in 
Servitude : — that  the  Terms  of  Agreement  between  many  Heads 
of   Families,    to    unite     together    in    Civil    Society,     and     to    be 
fubjedl    to  One  Perfon   or    to  More    amongft  them,   are  expref- 
fed   in   the   Laws,    made    by  Themfelves,    for   the  Maintenance 
of  their   Union  : — that    the    Conditions  alfo   of  Civil  Government 
and   SubjeSlion    are    ufually    exprefled    in   EleSlivc   Kingdoms,    and 
wherever   the  People  chufe    their  own  Magijirates ;    and    that   the 
fame   Conditions    are    tacitly    underAood,     from    the  Nature  and 
Reafon  of  Civil  Government,    in  Kingdoms   and  Ariftocracys  He^ 
reditary.  —  He  fiw,   that   in   all    thefe  Cafes,    the  common   Weal, 
or  Good    of    the  whole    State,    whether   Civil    or  Domeftic,    is 
the  End  intended;    and   that   a  faitliful  Difcharge  of  their  pro- 
a  per 


262         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

per  Dutys,  by  all  the  Members  of  either  State,  the  feveral  Partys 

to  the  Contraft,  is  the  only  Way  leading  to  that  End. Thus  it 

appeared  to  Socrates,  that  all  Combinations  in  the  Moral  World,  as 
well  as  in  the  Natural,  were  maintained  only  by  Union,  or  by  Agree- 
ment,— by  the  Union  of  many  Parts  in  fome  Whole,  or  by  \}o.t  Agree- 
ment of  Things,  the  fingle  Powers  of  which  were  different : — he 
was  fenfible,  that  fuch  Union  or  Agreement,  between  any  rational 
and  facial 'Rtings,  could  be  maintained  only  hy  Univerfal  Jujlice, 
that  is,  by  thorow  Honejly  and  Goodnefs ;  —  and  as  he  knew, 
that  every  Thing  is  fupported  only  by  the  continuing  Effi- 
cacy of  the  fame  Caufes  which  produced  it,  he  conceived, 
that  the  Great  Mind  of  Nature,  being  full  of  Truth,  Equity 
and  Goodnefs,  was  the  Fountain  of  every  fuch  Union  or  Agree- 
ment, —  the  combining  and  uniting  Caufe,  —  without  the  co7i- 
tinual  Infuoice  of  which,  no  rational  or  moral  Society  can 
fubfift. — And  it  feems,  that  in  this  way,  he  difcovered  Univerfal 
fujlice  to  be  the  La^w  of  all  rational  and  focial  Beings  j  by 
faithful  Obedience  to  which  Law,  they  continue  to  be  what 
they  are,  that  is,  Rational  and  Social;  and  by  Rebellion  againft 
which  Laiv,  they  forfeit  That  their  Effeniial  Form  or  Nature. 
He  difcovered,  that  every  Being,  which  partakes  of  Mind,  and 
confcquently  is  Rational,  is  at  the  fame  time  Social :  —  that 
whatever  Soul  lofeth  her  Sociability,  at  the  fame  time  lofeth  her 
Rationality,  or  Capacity  of  Reafon,  her  Mental  Principles,  or,  as 
our  great  Poet  very  platonically  exprelles  it, 

T!be  Divine  Property    of  her  Fiif  Being : 

— and  that  every  AB  cf  Injnfice,  and  even  every  NegleSi  of  any 
Social  Duty,  is  a  Step  toward  that  total  Lofs.  —  He  concluded 
therefore  rightly,  that  every  Being,  which  partakes  of  Mind, 
is,  thro  fuch  Participation,  fubjed:  by  its  nature  to  that  Law 
of  Univerfal  fiijlice,    for    the    fame    reafon,    that  a   Child  is    by 

nature 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         263 

nature  fiibjedt  to  the  Will  of  an  AfFtrftiona'.e  Parent,  namely, 
for  its  own  Good :  for  he  appreliendcd  That  Law  to  be  the 
Will  of  the  gxc'^X.  Parental  Mind,  or,  to  fpeak.  more  accurately, 
to  be  That  very  Mind,  conlidered  as  governing  the  Moral 
World,  and  imparting  to  all  thofe  Beings,  whom  he  forms 
for  Rational  Society,  (by  enduing  them  with  Reafon  and  a 
Social  Difpofition,)  tht  Principles  oi  Moral  ReSiitiide,  Equity,  and 
Goodnefs :  for  thefe  Principles  are  indeed  none  other,  than 
the  Principles  of  Mind  and  Reafon,  applied  to  all  the  feveral 
Relations  in  Social  Life. — - — When  Socrates  had  arrived  at  a  full 
Difcovery  of  this  Caufe  of  Good  to  all  Beings,  v/lio  are  at  the 
fame  time  Rational  and  Social,  —  this  Beauty  of  the  Moral 
World,  —  this  Fountain  of  all  Moral  Virtue  and  Excellence,  — 
(and  to  Socrates  juftly,  as  it  feems,  may  be  attributed  fo  full  a 
Difcovery,  thro  his  Know^lege  of  the  Principles  of  Mind,)  from 
that  time  to  the  End  of  his  Life,  he  made  it  his  fole  Bufi- 
nefs  to  difcourfe  concerning  Morals  and  Politicks,  fundamentally 
and  univerfally ;  reafoning  to  the  Principles  of  thofe  Sciences 
by  Dialedtic  Queftions  and  Inquirys  :  for  this  was  the  Method 
which  he  took,  in  teaching  them  to  his  Difciples  :  in  this 
way  he  produced,  out  of  Men's  own  Mouths,  their  natural 
Notions,  and  the  Firji  Priyiciples,  common  to  them  All,  on 
thefe  Subjeils :  and  in  this  way  he  convinced  of  Error  many 
Perfons,  who  had  been  feduced  by  Sophiftry  to  depart  from, 
the  Principles  of  Reafon  znd  Nature.  T\\q  Philebus  oi  Plato,  now 
before  us,  exhibits  to  our  View  Socrates  converfing  with  fome 
of  thefe  Perfons  ;  refcuing  them  from  the  Errors  into  which 
they  had  been  drawn,  concerning  the  Chief  Good  of  Man  j, 
and,  from  their  natural  Pre-conceptions,  reafoning  them  into 
the  Truth  on  this  Subjed:.  Not  till  toward  the  Conclufion  of 
the  Dialogue,  ought  therefore  the  Reader  to  expedl  a  Proof  of 
what,  to  gratify  his  Curiofity,  we  have  in  this  Note  antici- 
3,  pated^ 


2,64         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 

Will  you  not  want  a  Fifth  Sort  too  '^\    for  a  Caufe 
•of  Difunion  and  Separation  ? 

Socrates. 

pated,  —  namely,  the  Difcovery,  made  by  Socrates,  that  the 
fame  Divine  Bci?ig,  who  is  the  Cuii/e  of  Outward  Nature,  that 
is,  of  the  Commixture  of  Form  and  Matter  in  the  Corporeal 
World, — He,  who  is  at  once  the  Dejigner,  the  Formiiig  Form, 
and  the  Beginning,  or  AStive  Principle, — is  alfo  the  End,  or  Filial 
Caufe  of  all  things ;  his  Meaning,  or  Dejign,  being  Univerfal 
Good:  —  that  confequently  his  Mind,  that  is.  He  Himfelf,  is 
Goodnefs  its  Self, — That,  by  which  he  is  eternally  happy  within 
Himfelf;  and  That,  by  which  He  is  the  Sovereign  Good  of  all 
Such  Beings,  as,  having  a  rational  and  facial  Nature  given  them, 
are  capable   of  participating  in  that  Supreme  Felicity. 

'6s  "Twas  obfcrved  in  Note  167,  that  prior  to  Socrates,  other 
Philofophers  had  eflabliflied  the  Dodlrine  of  Two  Principles  of 
all  things.  Mind  and  Matter.  Protarchus,  in  his  prefent  Quef- 
tion,  evidently  alludes  to  the  latter  of  thefe  Two,  in  a  genteel 
and  facetious  way,  between  Jeft  and  Earneft;  doubting  per- 
haps, whether  this  Principle  ought  to  be  numbered  amongft 
tlie  different  eiS'i)  twc  ovtmv  Sorts  of  Things  or  Beings,  as  One 
of  them ;  or  whether,  by  its  Self,  it  had  no  true  or  real 
Eflence  at  all  ;  for  fince  it  was  defined  by  Negative  Words, 
fuch  as  txveiS'ioi  without  Form,  afjiopipoi  Jljapele/s,  a^ttfjioirtq'cs  void 
of  Figure,  Sec.  it  feemed  to  imply  a  Negation  of  every  Kind  and 
Species  of  Being.  'Tis  evident,  we  fay,  that  Matter  is  here 
meant  :  for  Protarchus  fpeaks  of  a  Contrary  to  the  Fourth  Sort 
X){  Being,  a  Contrary  to  Mi/id,  which  is   the  ASlive  Principle  in 

the 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         265 

the  Univeife,  the  Plenitude  of  Mental  Forms,  the  Creator  of 
all  Forms  Corporeal,  and  the  Caufe  of  Good  lo  All  things.  — 
Now  the  dired:  Contrary  to  A£iive  is  Paffwe ;  and  meerly  Such 
■is  Matter,  as  it  poflcfles  no  Sluality  whatever,  except  that  of 
being  PaJ/ive,  in  receiving  any  Sort  of  Form. — Again;  the  diredt 
Contrary  to  Plenitude  of  Forms  is  thorow  Indigence  of  all 
Form;  and  in  this  Condition  nothing  is  befide  meer  Matter. 
Farther ;  the  direft  Contrary  to  the  Creator  of  all  Corporeal 
Forms  is  the  Dejlroyer  of  them  all ;  and  This  only  Matter  is, 
thro  its  utter  Impotence,  and  Inability  to  retain  any  Form 
imprefied  on  it :  for,  tho  it  be  the  Seat  of  All  external  Forms 
by  turns,  'tis  a  Seat  for  ever  finking  under  every  One  of 
them. — Again;  the  diredt  Contrary  to  the  Cat fe  of  Goad  is  the 
Cmfe  of  Evil ;  and  this  can  be  none  other  than  Matter:  for 
in  the  Intelligible  or  Mental  V^ox\A, — the  World  oi  pure  Forms, 
unmixed  with  Matter,  and  exempt  from  Body, — all  the  Forms, 
and  all  the  Connedions  or  Relations  between  them,  are  eter- 
nally true,  good  and  perfc^i ;  and  no  Form,  partaking  of  thefe 
Attributes,  can  ever  be  tlie  Caufe  of  Evil: — on  the  other 
hand,  in  the  Senjible  or  Corporeal  V^oxld,  every  Individual  Thin* 
confifts  of  {ome  Particular  Form,  and  of  i'ome  Portion  of  Matter :  and 
€very  One  of  thefe  Particular  Forms  partakes  of  Good  only  :  for  it  is 
an  Image,  however  impei'fedt,  of  fome  eternal/y  true  Form,  in 
which  there  is  no  Evil  nor  Imperfection  ;  and  it  is  produced 
by  Nature,  whofe  Mind  is  Goodnefs  its  Self;  in  as  much  as  the 
Whole  of  this  World  of  Outward  Forms  is  the  Image  of  that 
all-perfecl  Mind ;  and  every  Production  of  Outward  Na- 
ture,    an    Effeft    of    the   Energy    and    Operation    of    that     all- 

perfeSl    Goodnefs. Seeing    then,    that    no    Forms,     nor    any 

Combination  of  Forms,  whether  they  be  o?-iginal  or  copied,  can 
caufe  Evil,  we  muft  conclude,  that  the  fole  Cdufe  of  Evil  is 
either  Matter,  in  its  Self  void  of  Form ;  or,  at  leaft,  fome 
Portion  of  this    formlefs    Matter.  —  But  Matter   is   not    divided 

L  1  into 


266         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

into  Parts  or  Portions,   until  It  be  formed. — It  remains  therefore 
part:   a   Doubt,   that  hifinite  Matter  is   to   be   confidered,    as    the 
fole   Caiife   of  Evil  to    all    Corporeal    Beings.  —  Accordingly,    it 
brings   Death    to    all  Such  as    are  Vital,    thro    its   Contrariety  to 
all  Life,  and   to  all  Form.      For,    by   breaking   the  Continuity  of 
thofe  Parts    of  every  Vital   Being,    thro   which   the  Life   circu- 
lates, it   flops  that  Circulation,   by   which  the  Life  is  carried  orr 
throughout    the  Frame ;    and,    by    breaking  the   Connexions    be- 
tween  all    the  Parts   of   that   Frame,    it    brings   the  Form,    the 
Being  itfelf,   to  Dlffohition.  —  To    all   fuch  Corporeal  Beings,    as- 
are   Sentient  as    well   as  Vital,    it  brings  Pain,   thro  preternatural 
Diflenfions,    Stri6lures,    Wounds,    and    other    Evils,    incident   to- 
the    Corporeal    Organs    of  Senfation,     and    caufed   by    extraneous 
Bodys,   whofe  outward  Invafion  or  inward  Intrufon   is  unfriendly 
and  noxious.      But,    if  any   Corporeal   Form    were  perfeSt,    and 
could,    as  long  as   it  lafted,   be   kept   intire  znd  found,   it   would 
feel    no  Pain    from    the   Stroke   or  Prcfure   of  any    other  Bodys, 
beyond    the   infant    Time    of    fuch    Stroke    or    Preliure,       And 
Body  can    fufter  no  Pain   except  from  Body,   and  only   by  means 
of  the  Material  Principle,    which   is   common    to   all   Bodys   what- 
ever.— Nor  is  Matter  lefs  mifchievous  to  Reafon   and  Intelligence,. 
in    all    thofe   Corporeal   Beings,    to    whofe   Vital    and    Sentient 
Form,   or  Effence,  Mind  is   fuperaddcd.     For   by  the  Predomi- 
nance   of    the  Material  Principle    in   their  Bodys,    their  Rational 
Facultys    are    weakened,    or    their   life  of    them  is   impeded;    'tis 
That,     which    throws    a    Cloud    over    their   Under/landings,    and 
obfriiBs   the  Light  of  Divine  Reafon   witliin   them  ;    and   hence 
the  Paffions,    having  their  Origin   from   the  Body,    and  their  Seat 
in  the  Irrational   Part   of    the    Sold,    gain    the    A_fcendant   over 
the   Rational  Part,     fupprefs    the     connatural    Principles    of    true 
Virtue,     (the   fame   with   the  Principles  of  Mind,)   and  lead   the 
Will  blindfold  into   all  Moral  Evil.  —  Such  and    fo  great  being 
the    Mifchicfs,    occafioned    by    the   Mixture    of  Matter    in    all 
6  Corporeal 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         267 

Corporeal  Forms,  even  in  Thofe  to  whom  Mind  is  imparted, 
we  cannot  wonder,  if  the  Ignorant,  who  are  always  prone  to 
Superflitious  Fears,  when  they  heard,  that  all  thefe  Evils  were 
by  the  Wife  and  Learned  afcribed  to  Matter,  imagined  a  ?>2a- 
levolent  Mind  within  it,  powerful  to  burt  and  to  dtjiroy ;  in 
oppofition  to  the  benevolent  Mind  of  the  Author  of  all  Good, 
whofe  Power  was  always  exerted  either  to  blcj's  or  to  fwue. 
When  they  heard  it  alfo  faid,  that  Matter  was  laithout  Form 
or  Beauty,  they  fuppofed  it  to  be  a  monjlroiis  Being,  deformed 
and  ugly.  Indulging  their  Fancy  farther,  they  imagined  a 
Multitude  of  Particular  Beings,  misfhapen  Portions  of  Matter; 
infpired,  all  of  them,  with  Malice  by  that  Fvil  Spirit,  which 
reigned  in  formlefs  M^//t'r ;  and  adlively  contending  againft:  a 
INIultitude  of  beautiful  and  good  Beings,  Some  of  whom  they 
fuppofed  to  be  the  invifible  Protestors  of  whole  Nations,  — 
Others,  of  inferior  Sort,  the  Patrons  of  private  Family s,  —  and 
Thofe  of  tlie  lowed  Order,  the  Guardians  of  Individual  Pcr~ 
fons. — Thefe  Opinions  were  favoured  by  crafty  Men,  of  whofe 
Authority  and  Dominion  it  was  the  Intereft,  to  cultivate  Su~ 
perjiition,  and  to  draw  the  Minds  of  the  People  away  from 
the  Religion  of  Re af on — the  rational  and  fentimental  Worfhip  of 
One  Supreme  Mind,  who  is  the  fole  Giver  of  all  good  Things, — 
to  the  Worfhip  of  Many  fancied  Deitys  ;  whofe  refpedtive  Priefts 
alone  were  fuppofed  to  know,  What  Kind  oi  Worfhip  was 
the  mofl  pleafing  to  Thofe,  in  whofe  Temples  they  feve- 
rally  ferved.  —  Agreeable  to  this  Account  of  the  Origin  of 
Dcemon-Woi'Jlnp  from  Philofophical  Truths  niis-underflood,  and 
perhaps  purpofely  mis-reprefented,  are  the  Records  of  ancient 
Hiftory  :  for  we  learn  from  Thefe,  that  a  Belief  of  Good  and 
Evil  Daemons,  interfering  in  Human  Affairs,  prevailed  mofl 
in  Countrys,  anciently  the  moft  celebrated  for  Knowlcge  phi- 
iolbphical   and   political ;     but    in   which  Countrys   One   Set   of 

L  1  2  Men, 


268         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Perhaps  I  may ;  but  not,  I  believe,  at  prefcnt. 
However,  fliould  there  be  occafion  for  it,  you  will 
pardon  me,  if  I  go  in  purfuit  of  fome  Fifth  Sort  of 
Being  ''\ 

Protarchus. 
Certainly. 

Socrates, 

Men,  from  Generation  to  Generation,  confined  all  That  Know- 
lege  to  Themfelves  and  their  own  Familys ;  being,  by  Here- 
ditary Succeflion,  and  a  peculiar  Education  which  was  denied 
to  all  Others,  their  only  Priejls,  Statcfmen,  and  Philofophers. 
Thus,  in  all  probability,  did  the  ancient  Dodrrine  concerning 
the  Two  Prhiciples  of  All  things,  —  One  the  Caufe  of  all  Good, 
' —  the  Other,  of  all  Evil,  —  degenerate  into  Dcemonifm,  mixed, 
in  fome  Countries,  with  Folytheijm,  in  others,  with  Theijm 
itfelf:  and  thus  did  even  the  pureft,  fmipleft,  and  eafieft  Re- 
ligion, by  Nature  diftated  to  all  Rational  Beings,  become 
corrupted,  bedawbed,  and  loaded,  with  numberlefs  and  grofs 
Supcrllitions. 

'^»  Altho  the  main  Subjeft  of  Inquiry,  in  the  Thilebus,  we 
acknowlege  to  be  This,  —  What  Kind  of  Life  is  the  hap- 
piefl  for  Man, — yet  we  muft  obferve,  that  the  Subject  imme- 
diately before  us,  in  this  Part  of  the  Dialogue,  regards  not  the 
Kinds  of  Human  Lif,  but  the  Kinds  of  Being  in  the  Univerfe. 
It  is  furprifing,  therefore,  that,  in  all  the  Editions  of  the 
Greek  Original,  we  here  read  Trg'^TrToi'  jS/'oc,  a  Fifth  Life;  and 
that  None  of  the  Tranflators  of  it  into  other  Languages  ap- 
pear to  have  fufpedted  of  Falfity   a  Reading,    fo  foreign  to  the 

6  Purpofe, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  269 

Furpofe,  and  fo  abfurd.  What  makes  it  the  more  abfurd,  is, 
that  only  Three  Kinds  of  Life  are  taken  notice  of  any  where 
in  the  Dialogue, — namely,  a  Life  oi  Pleafure,  a  Life  of  Sp;.- 
culatioUy  (the  Objeft  of  which  is  the  Knoiclege  of  Truth,)  and 
a  Life  of  PraSlic  Virtue.  Lideed  only  thefe  I'hree  Things, 
Plcafurey  Knoivlege,  and  Virtue,  are  loved  and  purfiied  by  any 
Man,  purely  for  their  own  fakes,  as  Ends,  or  ultimate  Objects 
of  his  Defire.  For  all  other  Things,  which  many  Men  fcem 
to  be  wholly  intent  on  the  attainment  of,  they  confider  but 
as  Ways  and  Means  to  fomething  elfc,  which  they  cannot 
otherwife  obtain.  Now  this  Dialogue  hath  for  its  SubjeB,  not 
the  Means  of  being  Plappy,  but  the  End,  Elappinefs  its  Self:. 
and  the  ObjeB,  which  it  hath  in  view,  is  to  ihow,  that  this 
End  can  never  be  obtained,  either  in  a  Life  of  Speculation,  or 
in  a  Life  oi  tleafure ;  and  only  in  a  Life  oi  Virtue.  For  this 
reafon  Plato,  in  his  Philebus,  takes  no  notice  of  Two  other  Ge- 
neral Kinds  of  Life,  totally  different  from  any  of  the  Three, 
ferutinifed  in  this  Dialogue  j  notwithftanding  that  they  engrofs 
the  whole  Attention,  Time,  and  Cares,  of  far  greater  Numbers- 
of  Men,  than  doth  the  Pleafiirable  Life,  the  SpecuLitive,  or  the 
Virtuous :  on  which  account,  they  are  by  Arijlotle  of  old,  and 
m  our  own  days  by  Mr.  Harris,  very  properly  ranked  amongft 
thofe  different  Great  Roads  of  Life,  along  one  or  other  of 
which  all  Men  travel  : — by  thefe  Two  Other  Lives,  we  mean 
the  Lucrati've  and  the  Political. As  to  Men,^  who  lead  a  Lu- 
crative Life,  that  is,  the  Bulk  of  Mankind,  they  are  generally 
bred  to  it  by  their  Parents,  or  their  particular  Guardians,  or 
by  that  General  Guardw^n  of  all  the  People,  the  Government 
in  each  Civil  State  :  and  they  are  fo  bred,  for  the  Purpofe  of 
procuring  them  a  comfortable  Siibfjlence,  either  by  means  of 
their  Manual  or  Bodily  Labour,  or  by  their  exercifmg  oi  Arts 
beneficial    to    the    Publick:    Thx)fe    alfo    of  riper    Years,    who 

commence 


270         P    H     I    L    E    B    U    S. 

commence   in  any  of  the  Liic?'ati've  Ways  of  Life,   are  led  to   it 
generally    by   the    fame   Motive.     When  Any  of  thefe   Perfons, 
whofe    ordinary    Views    are    confined    to    an     acquiring    of    the 
NecelTarys    and   Conveniencys    of  Life,    think  of  enjoying  Hap' 
pinefs,   (and   fiich  a  Thought  muft  fometimes  occur  to  the  Mind 
of  every  Thinking   Being,)    they   commonly    extend   their  Views 
and   Hopes  beyond  this  Earth   and   the  preferit  Life,   to  an  Here- 
after    in   fome   better   Place.     The   Utmoft,    which   they   ufually 
hope    for    here,    is   Rejl   from   Labour   and   from    Cares  in    thnr 
Old   Age.      We   except,    however,    a   Few    Perfons,    who,    after 
they    have   acquired  a  competent  Provifion    for    the   Remainder 
of  their  Lives,    continue    their  Labour,    (if  it    be   not   toilfome,) 
from   Habit,    or  from  not  knowing  how    to   employ    their  Time 
otherwife;    but  n^ii\\QV  Habit  nor  Igfiorance  is  2i  Rational  Motive : 
and    Some,    who    continue    in     the     fame   Way    of   Life,    thro 
Avarice;    but  this  Motive  is  irrational:   Some  alfo,  becaufe  they 
i'uppofe     it     conducive    to    their    Health,    as    a    proper    and    ac- 
cuftomed  Exercife   of    the   Body ;     but    no    Man    propofes    fuch 
Exercife,    or  z\qx\- Health,    as    his  ultimate  End:    and   Some,    we 
doubt   not   but   there   are,   who  proceed  in   a  Lucrative  Way  of 
Life,   to  acquire  the  Means   of  benefiting  Others  ;   but   this  End 
belongs    only    to    the    Good  Man,    and    to    the   Life   of  Virtue. 
Cefides   thefe,    we  except    a   Few   Perfons    more,    who   continue 
in    the   Pradllfe    of  Arts,    which    they    are    Mafters    of,    meerly 
from  their  Love  of  thofe  Arts,   and  the  Delight  they  feel  in  the 
Pradife ;  —  if  indeed    fuch  Perfons,    having   no   Lucre   in    their 
View,    can    be    deemed   Exceptions,    and    are   not   rather  to   be 
ranked    between    the  Lovers   of  Speculation,    and   the  Lovers   of 
thofe  Pkafures,    which  Plato   in    the   laft   Part    of  this    Dialogue 
denominates  pitre  Pleafures,   unmixed  with  Pain ;    and   which,   he 
Vliys  in   his  Gorgias   and  Greater  Hippias,   are   innocent,    and  good, 
und    attendant   on    a   Senfe  of  Harmo'ny  and  Beauty.      Of  thefe 

Perfons 


P    H    r    L    E    B    U    S.  271 

Perfons  it  may  be  farther  obferved,  that,  as  the  natural 
Difpofitions  of  their  Souls  are  generally  found  to  be  the 
very  fame,  which  Flato  in  the  Sixth  Book  of  his  Repiiblick 
deems  requifite  to  the  Study  of  Philofophy,  namely,  the  de- 
cile and  the  retentive,  the  magnanimous  and  the  generous,  and 
above  all  other  things  loving  Truth,  the  Parent,  and  neareft 
of  Kin  to  Harmony,  Symmetry,  and  Beauty,  —  fo  tliey  generally 
lead  a  Life,  the  neareft  to   the  truly  pbilofophical,  or  compleatly 

JVifeiLnd  Virtuous  Life, — a  Life  oiHoncJly  and  Goodnefs. Neither 

is  the  Political  Life  chofen  for  its  own  fake,  more  than  is  the 
Lucrative.  For  moft  of  the  Perfons,  whom  we  fee  in  the 
loniier  and  middle  Stations  of  it,  have  undertaken  the  Offices, 
belonging  to  thofe  Stations,  meerly  with  a  View  to  Gain. 
Thefe  are  therefore  to  be  numbered  amongft  Such,  as  live  a 
Lucrative  Life.  And  Thofe  who  occupy,  or  who  aim  at  oc- 
cupying, the  higher  Pofts  and  Offices  of  State,  generally  have 
in  View,  as  their  immediate  End,  Honour,  that  is,  the  Repu- 
tation of  Wifdom  and  Virtue.  This  Reputation  they  take  De- 
light in,  becaufe,  as  Arijiotle  obferves  with,  his  ufual  Acutenefs,. 
it  perfuades  them,  that  'tis  their  Due,  and  that  they  really 
poffefs  the  V/ifdom  and  the  Virtue  afcribed  to  them; — z  De- 
light, which,  as  the  fame  great  Genius  finely  remarks,  argues 
an  inward  Senfe  and  Acknowlegement,  that  Wifdom  and  Virtue 
are  the  Bell  Things ;  and  that  a  Life,  according  to  them,  is 
the  Bell  Life. — Belide  the  Motives  of  Profit  and  of  Honour,  by 
the  one  or  the  other  of  which  Thofe  who  live  a  Political  Life 
are  ufually  aduated,  a  Few  we  believe  there  are,  who  engage 
in  it  purely  from  Motives  oi  Virtue; — with  a  View  to  blefs  or 
to  benefit  the  Publick ; — to  refcue  the  State  from  bad  Manage- 
ment ; — to  free  their  Country  from  domeflic  Tyrants ; — or  to 
fave  it  from  foreign  Foes : — but  fuch  Undertakings  and  Em- 
ployments are  fo  far  from  conftituting  a  Kind  of  Life  different 
from  That  which  is  Virtuous,  that   they  are    the  nobleft  Efforts 

and 


272 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


SoCRATE  S. 

Of  tlicfc  Four  Sorts  then,  in  tlie'  hrft  place,  di- 
viding ''"  the   former  Three  '"',    and   perceiving,    that 

Two 

and  Exercifes  of  a  truly  Heroic  Virtue . Seeing  then,   that  no 

Man  chiifes  either  of  thefe  'Tivo  Kinds  of  Life,  the  Lucraihe 
or  the  Political,  for  its  own  fake,  or  without  fome  farther  End 
in  View;  —  feeing,  that  the  other  Three  Kinds  of  Life,  the 
Fkafurable,  the  Speculative,  and  the  Virtuous,  are  Thofe  only, 
which  are  .embraced  by  any  Man,  with  Expedtations  of  finding 
his  Happinefs  therein ;  and  are  Thofe  only,  which  the  prefent 
Dialogue  treats  of,  or  fo  much  as  mentions  j  —  feeing  alfo, 
that  every  Life,  led  by  Man,  is  included  in  one  or  other  of 
thck  Five  Kinds ',  we  prefume,  that,  notwithdanding  they  hap- 
pen to  be  juft  Five  in  Number,  every  Intelligent  and  Learned 
Reader  will  agree  with  Us,  to  rejedl  the  Reading  of  Tey^Trlov 
.^lov  in  the  Greek  of  this  PaiTige ;  and  inftead  of  it,  to  read 
'Trifxirlav  tj  ov'  conformable  to  which,  we  have  made  our 
Xranllation. 

^'°  In  the  Greek,  —  eTigAo'i'Tes.  But  Ficinus  here  tranflates,  as 
if  in  the  Manufcript,  from  which  he  made  his  Tranflation,  he 
read  g'^gAoVTe*.  that  is,  taking  out,  or  JeleBing:  Mons'.  Grou 
has  given  the  fame  Senfe  to  it,  in  his  Erench  Tranflation. 
The  Sentence  is  indeed  thus  made  eafier  and  plainer,  at  firft 
View.  But  we  have  tlioug-ht  it  befl  to  adhere  to  the  Reading, 
printed  in  all  the  Editions  of  Plato;  becaufe  it  gives  a  Senfe, 
more  agreeable  to  what  follows,  -than  the  other  Reading  does ; 
and  mucli  more  agreeable  to  the  Defign  of  this  Paflage ; 
which  leads  to  fliow.  What  Things  they  are,  which  are  ca- 
pable of  a  Divijion;    and  This,    chiefly  with  a  View  to  the  irifinite 

Divcrjitys 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  273 

Two  of  thefe,  when  Both  are  divided,  and  their 
Divifions  feparated,  are,  Each  of  them.  Many  '^* ; — 
then,  gathering  together  the  Many  of  Each,  and 
uniting  them  again,  let  us  endeavour  to  underftand, 
in  what  manner  Each  of  them  is,  at  the  fame  time, 
One  and  Many. 

Protarchus. 

Would  you  but  exprefs  your  Meaning  more  plainly, 
I  might  perhaps  apprehend  it. 

DiverJJtys  of  Pleafure,  as  to  their  Kinds,  as  well  as  to  their 
Degrees,  —  in  oppofition  to  That,  which  is  fimply  Otic,  and 
indivifihle. 

'7'  We  acknowlege  to  have  no  authority  from  the  Greek, 
where  we  read  only  t*  rolcc,  the  Three,  for  inferting  between 
them,  the  wovd.  fonner :  but  'tis  added,  to  lellen  the  Obfcurity 
of  this  Paffage,  at  the  firft  Entrance.  —  The  Three  Sorts  of 
Being,  mentioned  together  before  the  Fourth,  (which  was  then 
pretended  to  have  been  forgotten,)  are  here  again  fpoken  of 
together  i  becaufe  Each  of  thofe  Three  is  divifible  mXo  Mar:y ; 
and  what  is  to  follow,  relates  only  to  Things  which  are  thus 
divifible:  the  Fourth  therefore,  which  is  Mind,  the  Caufe  of  All 
things,  is  here  omitted  ;  becaufe  Mifid  its  Self,  in  the  Simplicity 
and  Samenefs  of  its  own  eternal  Effence,  confidered  apart  from 
Matter,   is  One  only,    and   not  divifible  into  Many. 

^T^  The  infertion  of  the  word  e's  before  -jvoKKa.,  propofed  by 
Stephens,  feems  not  fo  neceffary  as  the  learned  Printer  thought 
it. 

M  m  Socrates. 


274         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

I  mean  then,  by  the  Two,  which  I  propofe  to  be 
now  confidered,  the  Same  which  I  mentioned  at  the 
firft, — One  of  them,  the  Infinite,  —  and  the  Other, 
the  Finite.  —  That  the  Infinite  is,  in  fome  manner, 
Many,  I  will  attempt  to  {how :  and  let  the  Finite 
wait  a  while. 

Protarchus.. 
It  fhall. 

Socrates. 

Give  me  now  your  attention.  It  is,  I  confefs,  a: 
difficult  and  doubtful  Thing,  That,  which  I  would 
have  you  to  confider.  Confider  it,  however.  Firfl:,, 
with   regard  to  Hotter   and  '^^  Colder,   in  things,    fee 

if 

'"  The  Inftances,  here  brought,  the  Hotter  and  the  Colder , 
fufficiently  diltinguifli  the  hifinite,  now  fpoken  of,  from  that 
infinite  and  formlefs  Matter,  by  ProtarcLiis  called  a  Fiftb  Sort_ 
of  Being.  For  to  this  latter  belong  no  Slualitys  whatever,  no 
Powers;  and  only  a  bare  Capacity  of  receiving  Figure  and. 
Form,  with  their  attendant  Qualitys  and  Powers  :  whereas  the 
prefent  Inftances  are  taken  from  the  Primary  Slualitys  of  Body, 
that  is  of  Matter  which  hath  received  Form.  —  The  Primary 
Qualitys  of  Body,  which  are  Heat  and  Cold,  Drynefs  and 
Moijiiire,  belong  feverally  to  the  Four  Elements  of  all  Corporeal 
Nature.  The  former  Two  Qiialitys  are  Contrary  to  each, 
other  i  as  alfo  are  the  Two  latter.  —  The  Pythagoreans,  fol- 
6  lowed. 


H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


^75 


lowed  by  PLito  \n  his  'Timaiis,  hold,  that  the  Four  Elements 
differ  only  in  Shape  or  Figure:  the  Particles  of  Elementary 
Earth  being,  as  they  fuppofe,  Cubical;  thofe  of  Elementary 
Fire,  Pyramidical ;  thofe  of  Elementary  Air  having  Eight  equal 
Sides;  and  thofe  of  Elementary /^<j/^r,  '■Twe?ity.  And  if,  as  it 
is  prefumed,  thefe  Elementary  Bodys  are  endued  with  n9 
other  Slualitys,  than  the  Four  Primary ;  —  in  other  words,  if 
their  Forms  or  EJfcnces  differ,  one  from  another,  in  Figure  only, 
and  in  no  other  refpedti  —  it  follows,  that  then  Figures  make 
their  Eff'ential  Forms,  —  that  is,  make  them  to  be  Jlich  Beings 
as  they  are,  and  to  hive  fuch  ^lalitys  and  Powers  as  they  have, 
— Now,  as  fome  Particles  of  all  the  Four  Elements  enter  into 
the  compofition  of  every  Compound-Body,  Thofe  Compound- 
Bodys,  which  have  more  of  Fire  in  them  than  Other  Bodys  of 
the  like  Kind,  Magnitude,  and  Denjity,  are,  in  themfehes,  hotter 
than  thefe  Others  ;  they  communicate  more  Heat  to  all  Bodys 
adjacent,  by  tranfmitting  fome  of  their  igneous  Particles  i 
and,  if  the  adjacent  Bodys  happen  to  be  Sentient,  they  caufe 
in  them,  by  the  flime  Means,  a  greater  Senfation  of  Heat.  — 
Jufl:  fo,  a  greater  Sluantity  of  any  other  Element  in  Some 
Compound-Body,  than  is  found  in  Other  Bodys  Jiniilar  to  it 
iii  Kind,  and  equal  to  it  in  Magnitude  and  Denjity,  gives  it  a 
greater  Degree  of  the  Sluality,  belonging  to  that  Element.  — 
And  in  every  Compound-Body,  the  Degrees  of  That  elementary 
Quality,  which  happens  to  prevail  over  its  Contrary,  are  iiTJi- 
nite ;  becaufe  Matter  is  infinite  in  Extent,  and  is  every  where 
formed.  For  hence  it  follows,  in  the  firft  place,  that  the 
Primary  Bodys,  the  Elements  of  all  Others,  are  infinite  alfo  :  it 
follows  next,  that,  notwithftanding  the  fixed  Number  of  the 
Kinds  and  Sorts  of  Things  in  Nature,  (fixed  in  the  Mind  of 
Nature,  tho  perhaps  not  knowable  by  Man,)  yet  the  Indivi- 
duojs  of  each  Kind  and  Sort  are  innumerable  and  infinite :   and  fince 

M  m  2  Individuals 


276  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Individuals  of  the  fame  Kind  and  Sort  infinitely  d'lfer  in  Mag- 
nitude J  and  Such  of  them>  as  happen  to  agree  in  This  refpedt, 
Aill  differ  infinitely  in  refpecl  of  their  Denfdy  and  Weighty 
(Differences,  caufed  by  a  lefs  or  greater  Quantity  of  the  T^ivo 
heavier  Elements,  in  proportion  to  That  of  the  'Tivo  lighter, 
in  their  Frames  3)  and  fince  the  Frame  of  each  Individual 
admits  of  infinite  Changes  ;  it  alfo  follows  from  theie  inji- 
nite  Differences  between  one  Body  and  another,  and  in  the 
fame    Body    at    different    times,     that    the  Primary  Slualifys    of 

Compound-Bodys  infinitely  differ  in  Degree. In   this  Clafs    of 

Infinites,   produced   by  the  Infinity  of  Matter, — in   this  firfi  Sort 
of  Things,    fo   placed    by    Socrates,     becaufe    (tho   of  the   Four 
Sorts  of  Things,    into    which    he  divides    all  Being,    thefe   Infi- 
nites   are   indeed  the  Lafi  and  of  loweft  Dignity  in  Nature,  yet) 
to  Man   they  are   the  Firjl,    the   firfl   in   point   of  Time,    to    his 
Feelings    and  Apprchenfion,  —  among  thefe  Infinites  —  are   to   be 
ranked  all   the  Secondary  ^lalitys    of  Compound-Bodys,   as   well 
as  the  Primary.     For  no  lels  infinite  is    the  Difference  of  Every 
one   of  Them,    in   different  Bodys,    with    refpedt   to   its  Degrees: 
and    this   infinite  Difference  of  theirs    arifes    out   of  That  funda- 
mental Infinite,   which  is   One  of  the  Principles  of  all  Outward 
Nature.      This    appears    from    confidering,    that,    befide    That 
infinite    Difference    of     Compound-Bodys,     already     mentioned,    — 
That   between    the    comparative    ^lantitys    of    each    Element    in 
their   Frames,  —  the    minutefl    and    invifible   Compound-Parts  of 
thefe  Bodys   have    dilfcrent  Figures,   according  to  their  different 
texture,,  the    different   Pofiitions   of  the  Elementary   Particles    in- 
each   of   thefe   minuter    Parts,    and    the   diflerent  Places  therein, 
occupied    by    thofe     different    Particles,     with    refpcdt    to    each 
other.  —  The  Confi.giirations  alfo   of    thefe    minute  Parts,    whofe 
Figures  fingly  are   invifible, — Configurations,    made,    when  they 
are  affemblcd  together,  and  combine  to  make  Parts  of  the  whole 
6  Frame* 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


277 


Frame»  large   enough   to   be    vifible,  —  are  infinitely  different    in 
different  Bodys,    and   in    the  dijjiniilar  Parts  of  one  and  the  fame 
Organic   Body,    becaule  of  the    infinite  Difference  of  their  Con- 
texture.     And   if  all   the  Secondary  SOualitys   of  Bodys,    and   all 
their   A(ftive   and   Paffive  Powers,    arife,    as    it   is    probable   they 
do,    from    the  Configurations  of  their  Parts,    the  infinite  Diverfity 
of    thefe    Configurations    mufl     produce    infinite  Diverfiity    in    the 
Degrees  of  thole  Qualitys   and  Powers. To  this  Clals  of  Infi- 
nites,  the  Offspring  of  mfi.nite  Matter,    referable   alfo  are  all   the 
Kinds,    Courfes,    and   Degrees,   oi  Motion.      For  Motion    belongs- 
only   to    Bodys;     that    is,    to   Portions    and    Particles     of  Matter 
hounded   by  iow\Q  Figure :    zx\A.  Motion,    of  fome   Kind   or  other,, 
belongs  to  all  Bodys, — not,  by  reafon  of  the  Figures  which  bound 
the  Matter  of  thofe  Bodys, — but  by  reafon  of  the  Matter  which 
is  bounded  by   thofe  Figures.     For  Matter,   being  the  prime,   the 
original    and    perpetual.  Infinite,   cannot   be  confined  within   fixed. 
Bounds:    no  Portion    of  it    can  retain   any   particular  Fcrw  j   and. 
of  Inanimate  Bodys  the  only  Forms  feem  to   be   their  Figures,  toge- 
ther with  the  ^lalitys  and  Powers  thence  arifing.     Motion  there- 
fore,  whicli    is    effential   to  Body,    or  Matter   formed,    is   no   lefs 
infinite  than  Matter.     The  Degrees  of   its   Celerity  are  as   infinite 
as   Time:    the  Kinds  of   it,  among  which  are   the  tremulous,  the 
wavy,    and    the  fipafimodic,    are  as   infinite   as   the  Figures  of  mixt 
Elementary    Particles    in    Co?npound-Bodys :     and    the    Courfies    of 
Bodys,    in    motion,    are   as    infinitely   various,    as    the   Deviations 

from  a  Right  Line,    or  from  a  Circular, Laftly,    'tis   evident 

from  what  has  been  already  fiid  in  this  Note,  that  to  the 
Clafs  of  Infinites,  fpoken  of  by  Plato  m  the  Pafiage  now  be- 
fore us,  we  are  to  refer  all  the  various  Senfations,  which  we 
feel  ;  whether  thofe  Senfations  are  caufed  by  Bodys  extraneous^. 
operating  on  the  Bodys  which  are  Ours,  according  to  the  Fi- 
gures,   ^.alitys.    Powers,    and  Motions   of  the   extraneous  Bodys,, 

and 


278  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

if  you  can  think  of  any  Bound.  Or  would  not  the 
More  and  the  Lefs  ''+,  reiiding  in  the  Kinds  them- 
felves  -of  Things,  hinder,  fo  long  as  they  refide 
there,    an  End  from  being   fixed   to   them  ?      For,    if 

and  the  PuJJhe  .^lalitys  of  our  orjn ;  —  or  whether  they  are 
cauled  by  Either  of  the  Two  ASlive  Elements,  operating  upon 
or  within  the  Fibrous  Part  of  our  Frame ;  —  or  by  all  the 
Elements,  varioufly  mixed,  and  varioufly  flowing  in  our  Blood  and 
Humours.  —  Now  all  our  Senfations  are  either  pleaj'urahle  or 
painful,  more  or  lefs,  —  in  Degrees,  proportioned  to  the  Force 
of  the  Caiifcs  which  produce  them,  and  to  the  SenJibUity  of 
our  Organs  of  Senfe.  And  for  as  much  as  thefe  Organs  of 
ours,  as  well  as  the  efficient  Cmifcs  of  the  Pleafure  or  Pain 
we  receive  by  Their  Means,  are,  all  of  them.  Corporeal,  and 
admit  therefore  of  injitiite  Diverjtty,  it  follows,  that  the  Degrees 
of  Pleafure  and  of  Pain,  the  Effects  of  thofe  Caufes  operating 
by  thofe  Means,  are  no  lefs  itifinite.  —  Thus  we  find,  tliat 
Pleafure  belongs  to  That  Sort  of  Being,  which  is  infinite,  and 
which  derives  the  Infinity  of  its  Nature  from  the  Infinity  of 
Matter ; — a  Conclufion,  which  Plato  intended  lliould  be  drawn 
from  This  Part  of  the  Dialogue;  as  may  appear  from  the 
Argument   of  it,    in  Page  23. 

'74  The  More  and  the  Lefs  of  any  Scnfible  Quality,  in  differ- 
ent Compouhd-Bodys,  relate  to  a  Comparifon,  made  between 
thofe  Bodys,  in  refped  of  That  Quality,  which  they  Both  par- 
take of,  in  different  Degrees.  —  In  the  Greek  of  this  Sentence, 
we  ought  to  read  o'lK^vre,  the  Dual  Number,  inllead  of  o/xar, 
the  Singular.  The  Verbs,  being  in  the  Dual  Number,  put 
This  out  of  all  Doubt. 

ever 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


279 


ever  they  receive  an  End,    to  an  End  alfo  arc  then, 
come   their    very  Beings. 

Protarchus, 
Moft  certainly  true^ 

Socrates. 

And  in  fpeaking  of  either  the  Colder  or  the  Hotter 
of  any  Tw^o  Things,  we  conftantly  attribute  to  them, 
the  More  and  the  Lefs^ 

Protarchus, 

We  do. 

Socrates. 

Reafon  then  conftantly  fuggefts  to  us,  that  the 
Colder    and     the   Hotter    have    no   End :     and    beinp- 

o 

thus   without    any  End,    they    are  altogether  Bound- 
lefs  ''K 

Protarchus, 

'75  'End  is  fometimes  ufed  as  a  word  of  lefs  extcnftve  fignifi- 
cation,  than  the  word  Bound.  'ExaVw  ta)  «'p^'i  "«'  t/Aos  Tre'pas 
xccXeiToci.  lamblichus  in  Nicom:  pag:  ii.  Of  every  thing  the  Be- 
ginning, as  well  as  the  End,  is  called  its  Boimd.  But  in  the 
preTcnt  Paffage  of  Plato,  the  word  End  feems  to  be  ufed  in 
the  larger  Senfe  ;  as  when  we  fay,  in  fpeaking  of  Things 
which  are  motionlefs,  and  have  a  bounded  Length,  —  "  Every 
thing  has  Two  Endsj"  —  and  the  woxd  Bound  is  to  be  taken 
in   a    more    confned    Senfe ;    as   when,    fpeaking    of  Things    in 

Motion  i. 


28o  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
1  am  ftrongly  inclined  to  agree  with  Yon,  Socrates ! 
in  this  Point. 

S  o  c  P  A  T  E  s . 

Well  have  you  anfwered,  my  Friend  Protarchus ! 
and  well  have  you  reminded  me,  that  the  Strongly^ 
which  you  mentioned,  and  the  Family^  have  the 
fame  Power  as  the  More  and  the  Lefs.  For,  where- 
ever  they  refide,  they  fuffer  not  any  thing  to  be  juft 
So  Much  ;  but  infufmg  either  the  more  hiteiife^  or 
the  more  Remifs  ''*,  into  every  Adion,  they  always 
produce  in  it  either  the  Mo7^e  or  the  Lefs ;  while 
the  jufl:  So  Much  flys  away  and  vaniflics  from  before 
them.  For,  as  it  was  juft  now  obiervcd,  were  they 
not  to  drive  away  the  juft  So  Muchy  or  did  they 
permit  This,  and  the  Moderate,  to  enter  into  the 
Regions  of  the  More  and  the  Lefs  "■^,  or  of  the  In~ 
tenfe  and  the  Remifs  '"',  thefe  very  Beings  muft  quit 
their  ov»-n  Places  :    becaufe,  if  they  admitted  the  juft 

Motion,  and  of  fetting  Bounds  to  them,  we  mean  the  putting  a  Stop 
to  their  Motion.  For  thofe  Things  only,  which  are  always  in 
CJoange  and  Motion,   are  here  fpoken  of. 

'■''  Inteiifenefs  and  RemiJJion  relate  to  the  More  and  the  Lefs 
of  any  Senfible  Qjjality,  in  one  and  the  fame  Compound-Body, 
at  different  '^limes. 

So 


PHIL    E    BUS.  281 

So  Much,  the  Hotter  and  the  Colder  would  be  gone. 
For  the  Hotter,  and  in  like  manner,  the  Colder,  is 
always  advancing  forward,  and  never  abides  in  the 
fame  Spot :  but  the  juft  So  Much  ftops,  and  flays, 
having  finifhed  its  Progrefs.  Now  according  to  this 
Reafoning,  the  Hotter  muft  be  boundlefs  ;  and  fo  muft 
alfo  be  the  Colder. 

Protarchus. 

So  it  appears  indeed,  Socrates  !  But,  as  you  rightly 
faid,  'tis  not  eafy  to  apprehend  thefe  Things.  Quef- 
tions,  however,  relating  to  them,  again  and  again 
repeated,  might  perhaps  fhow,  that  the  Queftioner 
and  the  Rcfpondent  were  tolerably  well  agreed  in 
their  Minds  concerning  them. 

S  o  C  R  AT  E  s . 

You  fay  well  :  and  we  fliould  try  fo  to  do.  But 
at  prefent,  to  avoid  lengthening  out  this  Argument 
by  enumerating  Every  Infinite,  confider,  whether  we 
may  take  This  for  the  character iftic  Mark  of  the 
Nature  of  all  Infinites. 

Protarchu  s. 
What  Mark  do  you  mean  ? 

N  n  Socrates. 


282         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates. 

Whatever  Things  appear  to  Us  to  be  increafing  or 
diminifliingj  or  to  admit  of  Intenfenefs  and  Remif- 
lion,  or  the  Too  Much^  and  all  other  fuch  Attri- 
butes, we  ought  to  refer  all  Thefe  to  that  Sort  of 
Being  which  is  Inhnite  ;  collcding  as  it  were  All  of 
them  in  One ;  agreeably  to  what  was  before  faid, — 
that  whatever  Things  were  divided  and  feparated, 
we  ought  to  aflemble  together  and  combine,  as  well 
as  we  are  able,  affixing  to  All  of  them  the  Mark 
of  fome  One  Nature ; — if  you   remember.. 

Protarchus, 
I  remember   it  well. 

Socrates. 

Every  Thing  then  '",  which  rejeds  all  fuch  At- 
tributes,   and    admits    only     fuch    as    are    quite    the 

Contrary, 

'"  It  was  obferved,  in  Notes  i66  and  173,  that  the  Firjl 
Sort  of  Beings,  the  Infinite^  is  the  Progeny  oi  Matter,  which, 
in  its  Self,  is  without  Bound  or  Meafure.  This,  the  Secojid 
Sort  of  Being,  Bound,  is  the  Progeny  of  Mind.  For  pure 
Mind,  being  Meafure  its  Self,  and  Bound  its  Self,  contains  within 
its  felf  virtually  all  the  Meafures,  which  fet  Bounds  to  all  the 
6  Portions.: 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  2S3 

Portions  of  infinite  Matter ;  Bounds,  which  conflitute  their 
Effcntial  Forms;  inafmuch  as  they  inveft  them  with  thofc 
Figures  and  Shapes,  that  give  birth  to  their  difTcrcnt  ^alitys 
and  Powers,  and  difpofc  them  for  different  Kinds  of  Motion. 
—  The  Principles  of  all  Meafiire,  and  of  all  juft  Bound,  are 
Numbers  :  on  the  Proportio?is  of  Numbers,  in  Thivgs  contimmis, 
fuch  as  have  Shape,  or  Figure,  depends  Symmetry ;  on  the  Pro- 
portions of  Numbers  in  Things  feparate,  as  Sounds  and  Motions 
are,  depend  Harmony  and  Rythm :  on  the  Proportions  alfo  of 
Numbers  in  any  One  compounded  Thing,  in  whofe  Compofition 
are  mixed  Many  Things  poffefled  of  contrary  Qualitys  and 
Powers,  depends  Mediocrity,  in  which  thofe  Contrarys,  injimte 
in  themfelves,  are  equally  and  juftly  bounded.— Thus  have  we, 
in  doing  our  Beft  to  illuftrate  tlie  prefent  Paflage  of  Plato, 
found  ourfelves  obliged  to  anticipate  a  little  of  what  is  to 
follow;  and  to  fpeak  of  Things  belonging  to  the  Third  Sort 
of  Being,  in  which  all  the  hifmites  are  bounded;  the  better  to 
explain  what  is  here  meant  by  the  Second  Sort  of  Being,  — 
pound.  For  it  is  neither  obvious  to  fee  of  one's  Self,  nor 
•eafy  to  affent  to  Another  telling  us,  that  Numbers  and  Meajiires, 
with  their  feveral  Relations  and  Proportions,  are  real  Beings, 
independant  of  Things  numbered  or  meafiired. — The  Multitude,  or 
Major  Part  of  Mankind,  are  converfant  with  no  other  GbjeSls 
than  thofe  of  Se^i/e,  and  are  apt  therefore  to  confider  thofe  of 
Mind,  or  IntelleB,  as  imaginary  and  unreal,  whenever  they  hear 
them  mentioned.  Accordingly,  ideal  and  imaginary  are,  with 
Them,  attributive  Terms  equivalent.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
look  on  the  Firfl  Sort  of  Things,  the  Infinites,  as  real  Beings, — 
Jo  real,  that,  when  they  hear  Philofophers  fpeak  of  the  Se?7fible 
.^lalitys  of  Bodys,  as  not  being  really  in  thofe  Bodys,  and  only 
iienJatio7is  in  our  Sehes,  with  no  little  difficulty  it  is,  that  they  are 
perfuadexi  to  believe  them. 

N  n  2 


284         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Contrary,  — in  the   firfi  place,    the  Equal  and  Equa- 
lity ''^,     and,    after    the    Equal,    the   Double  '"%    and 

every 

''^   The    Ratio   of  Eijun/i^y,    or    the    Relation    between   Equal 
Numbers,  —  as  3  +  2  =  5,    5-2  =  3,   and   2  +  3  =  1+4,  —  is  here 
mentioned    in    the  firft  place,    becaule,    in    the   words   of  Thcon, 
Cap.  51,    psg'.   168,    O    T))5    icroTi^roi  Koyoi,    a.p'^-nyoi   ttai   iroanos    iq-t 
xai     <7'o/vaoi'     ttcci'tooi'     toov     ei^nf/svuv     Koyxiv,      itai     tmv     v.xt      avjui 
dvcLXoyiccv.     'The  Ratio   of  Equality  is  the   Pritne  Leader,    and   the 
Element   of  all  the  other  Relations  [between  Numbers],  and  of  all 
the  Proportiots  nvhich  depend  on  thofe  Relations.     The  fame  Doc- 
trine is   taught  by  'Jamblichiu,   in  Nicomachian,    pag:  61,    in  thefe 
words, — 'Ao^ks   Xoyov    e^a  >?    laoini    T^oi    mv    avtaoTtiTX.      Equality, 
with  rfpe5i  to  Inequality,    hath   the   nature   of  a  Principle.      We 
prefume,   that  famblichus   means    a  Principle   \\\    the   fame   man- 
ner,   as   a  Unite   is    the  Princple  of  Number.     For  he  had   ob- 
lerved  juft  before,    that   the  Relation  of  Equality  is  as  it  were   a 
SamencJ's    and    a    Oncnefs.       H    t«5    /o-othtos  f^go-i?,    uaccvei   t«uto't»* 
iq-t    5ta'  eVoTHS.     And  the  Caufe  of  this  we   may  learn  from  the 
fame  Trcatife    of  that  Philofophcr,   pag:  1  10,    where   he  fays, — 
'Ap^w  yelp  Tiov   'i'auv    to    ev  xoct    »    fj.6vai,   eiye   to   laov  iv  T^oi    ev    iq't, 
xcci   Ta    T(jcc   xaS-'   ersc   xdy^v  e<riv  Tax.     One   and  Monad   [that   is. 
One  in  Things   numbered,    and   Unite  in    abftratl  Numbers']  is  the 
Principle  of  Equals ;   in  as  much    as  the  Relation  of  One  to  One  is 
that  of  Equality,   and  Equals  have  One   and  the  fame  Relation   [to 
each   other].      It   is    otherwife   with  Unequals :  for  Two   to  Four 
hath   the  Relation  of  a  Half;     Four   to  Two,    the  Relation    of 
Double. 

'79  After   the  Equal,    next    in   order  comes    the  Double.     For, 

fince    the   Number,    to  which    fome   Other  Number    bears   thg 

6  Relation! 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         285 

every  other  Relation,  which  one  Number  bears  to 
another,  and  one  Meafure  to  another,  —  all  Thefe 
Things,  I  Tay,  in  fumming  up,  and  referring  them 
to  that  Other  Sort  of  Being,  Bound,  think  you  not 
that  we  fhould  do  right  ?    or  how  fay  you  ? 

Protarch  us. 
Perfedlly  right,    O  Socrates  \ 

Socrates. 
Well  ;    but  the  Third  Sort  of  Being,    made  up   and 
confifting    of    the    other  Two.     what    Charaderiftick 
fhall  we  afiign  to  This  ? 

Protarchus. 
You,     as   I  prefume,    will  fliow  it   to  me. 

Socrates. 

Some  God  may  ;  if  any  of  the  Gods  will  hearken 
to  My  Prayers  '^°. 

Protarchus, 

Relation  of  Doubk,  bears  to  this  Otlier  the  Relation  of  Half, 
it  is  Equal  to  the  remaining  Part  [the  other  Ha/f]  of  this 
larger  Number ;  which  is  thus  divided  into  Equals,  that  is,  into 
Two  Equal  Parts. 

'^'^  To  every  Reader,  who  is  a  tolerable  Judge  of  Style,  the 
Whole  of  this  Paflage  muft  have  an  appearance  of  the  Falje 
Sublime,    at    the  firft  time   of    his   reading    this   Dialogue.      He 

will 


2.86  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Make  your  Prayers  then,    and  look  within  your  Self 
fo7'  a7i  anjhve}'-  to  them  '^-'. 

Socrates. 
I  am  doino;  fo  :    and  fome  God,   O  Prctarclius  !    is 

CD 

now,    methinks,   become  favourable  to  us. 

Protarchus.. 

will  think,  .that  the  iiUroducing  of  Gods  and  Pmyers  here, 
with  lb  much  Pomp,  is  far  above  the  Dignity  of  the  pre- 
fent  Subjed,  the  Third  Sort  of  Being.  For  This  will  feem 
to  him  to  be  nothing  more  than  Corporeal  Being,  or  the 
External  World,  where  Injinite  Matter  is  bounded  every  where  by 
Form.  But  'twill  partly  appear  foon,  and  more  evidently  be- 
fore the  Dialogue  concludes,  that  whatever  is  mofl:  lovely  and 
moft  defirable  in  Human  Life, — in  particular,  the  Sovereign  Good 
of  Man, — his  Virtue,  —  the  right  Ufe  and  the  true  Enjoyment 
of  all  External  Goods, — is  to  be  found  only  in  this  Third  Sort 


of  Being. 


'^'  In  the  Greek, — o-jtoVa.  —  The  words  of  the  tranflation^ 
^vhich  are  printed  in  Italic  Charadters,  are  added,  by  v/ay  of 
illuflration.  For,  if  we  underftand  this  PalTage  rightly,  it 
alludes  to  the  ancient  way  of  Divination  by  o\m'Qrjy.oiri<x.,  called 
by  the  Latins  Augury.  A  Diviner  in  this  way,  after  offering 
Sacrifice  (which  implied  a  Mental  Prayer')  to  the  Gods,  went 
to  the  GKcTTiix,  or  c-xoVfAos,  a  Seat  on  the  Summit  of  fome  liigh 
Mountain  ;  from  whence  he  had  an  open  View  of  the  Hemif- 
phere  above.     There  he  Itood,    looking    out   to  all  Quarters  of 

it. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  287 

PROTARCHU  S. 

How  do  you  mean  ?  and  what  Sign  do  you  know 
it  by  '''  ? 

S.O  CRATE  S. 

I  will  tell  you  in  plain  Words  •.  but  let  your  Mind, 
follow  them  clofely. 

it,  in  expeftation  of  fome  Sign,  or  Token,  of  the  Divine  Will 
in  Anfwer  to  his  Prayer.  For  a  Sign  from  Heaven  it  was 
believed  to  be,  whatever  Appearance  in  the  Air,  or  the  ./Ether, 
firft  prefented  itfelf ;  —  fuch  as  a  Brightnefs  more  than  ufual, 
Flafhes  of  Lightning,  Clouds  riling  or  gathering  together,  and 
the  Flights  of  certain  Kinds  of  Birds  in  any  particular  Quarter 
of  the  Sky  J  —  from  which  laft  Sight,  as  being  the  nioft  or- 
dinary,   this    whole  Art  of  Augury   was   called  o'lwi'oo-jtoTrjx;). 

'^*  In  the  Greek, — t/'w  tsjc^wo/iij  %^«;  —  This  Queftion  abun- 
dantly confirms  our  Opinion,  that  Frotarchus,  in  what  he  faid 
juft  before,  alluded  to  Divination  by  Augury.  For  to  know 
how  to  interpret  thcfe  Signs  from  Heaven,  is  thus  exprefled  by 
Xenophon,  in  his  Cyropced:  Sreion n^/j.eiQti  ^^i)<xi-cct, — and  in  his Memoriiir 
fjiacvrr/.n  ^^r.^xi. — The  fame  Kind  of  Divination  feems  to  have 
been  alluded  to  frequently  by  Socrates,  in  faying,  that  the 
Dceinon  ivitbin  him  was  wont  an/j^atmy  to  give  him  Signs.  And 
we  fulpeft,  that  Flato,  in  the  prefent  Paflage,  had  refped  to 
that  known  Saying  of  Socrates ;  meaning  hereby  to  intimate 
to  us,  that,  if  Socrates  attained  to  a  Knowlege  of  the  Sovereign 
Good,  'twas  by  confulting  the  Divine  Genius  within  him,  — ■ 
that  is,  by  Self-Intuition,  and  by  his  frequent  Converfe  with 
Ideal  Excellence  and  Ferfe6lion,. 

Frotarchus, 


288  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Protarchus. 
Do  You  but   fpeak  them. 

Socrates. 

We  mentioned  juft  now  the  Hotter  and  the  Colder  i 
did  we  not  ? 

Protarchus. 
We  did. 

Socrate  s. 

To  Thefe  then  add  the  Dryer  and  the  Moifter  ; 
the  more  Numerous  and  the  Fewer  ;  the  Swifter  and 
the  Slower  ;  the  Larger  and  the  Smaller ;  and  what- 
ever Things  befide,  in  our  late  account  of  them,  we 
ranked  under  one  Head, — That  Part  of  Nature,  which 
admits  of  the  More  and  the  Lefs. 

Protarchus. 
You  mean  the  Infinite. 

Socrat  es. 

I  do  :  and  mingle,  together  with  This,  That  which 
we  fpake  of  next  afterward, — the  Race  of  Bound. 


Protarchus. 
What  Race  do  you  mean  ? 


Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  289 

Socrates. 
Thofe  things,  which  we  did  not  (as  we  ought  to 
have  done)  affemble  together  under  One  Head,  in  the 
fame  manner,  as  we  affembled  together  the  Race  of 
the  Infinite.  But  you  will  now  perhaps  do  what  was 
then  omitted.  And  when  Both  the  Sorts  are  affem- 
bled, and  viewed  together,  the  Race  of  Bound  '^^  will 
then  become  manifeft. 

Protarchus. 
What  things   do  you  fpeak  of?    and  how  are  they 
to  be  affembled  ? 

'^5  The  Rules  and  Menfures,  bounding  thofe  Injmitts  which 
are  mentioned  in  Note  173,  are  perhaps  impolTible  to  be  dif- 
covered  by  the  Facultys  of  the  Human  Mind,  wholly  abftradled 
from  \{\t  Outivard  SenJ'cs.  Tho,  Numbers,  for  inftance,  by  which 
are  conftituted  Harmony  in  Sounds,  and  Rythm  m  Motions, 
cannot  perhaps  be  afcertain'd,  (whatever  Some  of  the  Pythago- 
reans imagin'd)  by  the  Abjlract  Science  oi  Mufick, — that  is,  with- 
out the  afliftance  of  the  Ear  and  Eye,  among  whofe  ObjeEls  are 
thofe  Sounds  and  Motions.  But  the  Numbers,  in  Sounds  harmo-' 
nious,  and  in  Motions  rythinical,  are  by  the  Mind,  thro  the  Ear 
and  Eye,  naturally  and  therefore  eafily  perceived.  Accordingly 
P/atQ,  fenfible  of  This,  proceeds  to  mention  fome  of  the  fine 
Effecls  oi  Bound  fet  to  thofe  Infinites  before  mentioned,  in  the 
Human  Body  and  in  Outward  Nature, — hinting  alfo  at  Others  in 
the  Soul, — without  the  farther  confideration  (for  the  prefent)  of 
Bound  or  Meafure,  as  a  Principle  in  the  Inward  Nature  of  Things, 
— the  Principle  of  all  Good  to  all   things, — Good  its  Self. 

O  o  Socrates. 


apo  P    K    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

SoCRATE  S. 

I  fpeak  of  That  Nature,  in  which  are  comprifed 
the  Equal  and  the  Double  ;  and  whatever  elfe  puts  an 
end  to  Conteft  between  contrary  Things ;  and  in- 
troducing Number  '*%  maketh  them  to  be  commen- 
furate  one  with  another,   and  to  harmonife  together. 

Protarchus. 
I   apprehend  your  Meaning   to  be,   that,    from  the 
Commixture  of  thofe  Two  Sorts  of  Being,    a  certain 
Progeny  will  arife  between  them  in  Every  one  of  their 
Tribes> 

SoCRATE  S» 

You  apprehend  me  rightly. 

Protarch  u  s. 
Relate  then  the  Progeny  of  thefe  Commixtures, 

Socrates. 

In   Difeafesj    doth    not    the    right   Commixture   of 

thofe   Two   Sorts  of  Being   produce    the    Recovery    of 

Health  "^  f 

Protarchus. 

'*+  That  is, — Numbers  definite  and  certain. 

'^5  All   internal   Difeafes    of  the  Body,    (when  they   are    not 

caufed   by   the   admiffioa    of  Things  foreign,    and  noxious  to   it, 
6  even 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  291 

even  in  their  fmallcft  ^lantitys,)  have  their  Foundations,  ac- 
cording to  Hippocrates  and  Plato,  in  the  improper  and  ill-pro- 
portioned 'sluantitys  of  the  Tour  Elements  of  Nature,  mixed  together 
in  the  Human  Body ;  or  from  (what  is  the  fame  Thing,  but 
more  obvious  to  Senfe, )  a  Difproportion  therein  of  the  Primary 
^lalitys  of  all  Body,  —  Heat  and  Ccld,  Drynefs  and  Moijlure. —  . 
For  the  Four  Elementary  Humours  of  tlie  Human  Body,  —  Red 
Blood,  Phlegm,  and  the  Tu'o  Biles,  the  Yellow  and  the  Black, — 
are  feverally  produced  by  the  Mixture  of  One  of  the  Four  Pri- 
mary Qualitys  with  Another,  ?iot  being  its  Contrary,  —  namely, 
by  Heat  or  Cold,  mixed  with  either  Drynefs  or  Moijlure.  —  Now 
the  Predominance  of  any  One  of  thofe  Four  EJementary  Humours, 
— a  Predominance,  caufed  by  the  Excefs  of  any  One  of  the 
Primary  ^lalitys,  either  in  the  Whole  or  in  any  Part  of  the 
Human  Body,  —  deftroys  that  juft  Equilibrium  between  their 
different  Powers,  on  which  depends  the  Regularity  of  the  fe- 
veral  Secretions  and  Excretions,  neceilary  to  preferve  the  Health 
and  Soundnefs  of  the  Frame. Farther;  as  the  Secon- 
dary ^lalitys  ot  ail  Compound- Body s  are  produced,  in  various 
Degrees,  by  the  various  Combinations  of  tlie  Four  Elements 
of  Nature,  —  fo,  from  the  various  Mixture  of  the  Four 
Elementary  Humours  in  different  Parts  of  the  Human  Body,  is 
produced  a  variety  ot  Secondary  ^alitys  in  the  mixt  Humours, 
— Fluidity,  Glutinojity,  Sweetnefs,  Bitternejs,  and  many  Others, 
—  any  One  of  which,  in  any  immoderate  Degree,  introduces 
Diforder,  immediately  into  that  Part  of  the  Human  Body 
where  it  hath  its  Seat,  and  thence  into  the  Whole.  —  Novs^, 
fince  the  Immoderate,  whether  it  be  Too  Much  or  Too  Little, 
knows  no  Bound,  the  Degrees,  as  well  as  the  Kinds  and  Species, 
of  Difeafes  mufl;  cf  courfc  be  infinite.  In  every  Difeafe  there- 
fore of  the  Eudy,  to  rcftore  Mediocrity  in  all  the  Humours,  by 
taking  oft  the  ExctJ's  and  fupplying  the  Dejicience  of  the  Secondary 

O  o   2  ^lalityst 


292.  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Protarchu  s. 
Intirely   fo. 

So  CRATE  s» 

And  in  the  Acute  and  the  Grai:c^  in  the  S^.vift 
alfo  and  the  Siow^  which  are,  all  of  them,  infinite, 
doth  not  the  Other  Sort,  received  among  them,  and 
begetting  Bounds,  conftitute  the  Pcrfeciion  of  all  the 
Mtifes    Art  '''f 

Protarch  us. 
Certainly  fo. 

Socrates. 

And  in  Weather  excefTively  either  Cold  or  Hoty 
doth  not  the  Entrance  of  that  Other  Sort  of  Being 
take  off  the  Excefs,  the  Vehement,  and  the  Infinite, 
— generating,  in  their  ftead,  not  only  the  Moderate 
and  the  Meafured,  but  Symmetry  alfo  and  Correfpon- 
dence  between   their  Meafures  '^''  ? 

^lalitys, — to  regulate  the  Secretions  and  tlie  'Excretions  according 
to  the  Nature  of  a  Sound  and  Healthy  Body, — and  to  recover 
the  Equilibrium  between  the  Four  Ele/nentary  Humours,  —  is  to 
recover  the  Body  from  Difeafe,  and  to  reftore  to  it  Health  and 
Soundnefs.  See  P/j/o's  Timceus,  pag:  82,  6cc,  Edit:  Steph:  and 
the  Banquet,  page  77  of  the  Englidi  Tranflation.     See  alfo  Galen 

TTiqi     TOOV      iTTTOy-pCCTHi      X,Xt    IlAaTCOJ'OS      S'oyfJ.O.TUI]',      L.   8.  Idem     TTigt 

i^oi^eiuv,    L.  2.     and   xe^i    (pucixMif   ivyduaaiy,    L.  2. 

'"  See   the  Banquet,   page  79. 

'-^"  See  Banquet,  page  81. 

Priotarchus,. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         293 

Protarchus. 
Without  Difputc. 

Socrates. 
And  do   not  propitious  Seafons,    and  all  their  fair 
Produt^lionSj   arife    to  us   from  hence,    from    the  Mix- 
ture of  Things  which  are  infinite,    with  Things  whicK 
have  a  Bound  ? 

Protarchus. 
Pall  all  Doubt. 

SOCRAT  E  S. 

A  thoufand  other  things  I  forbear  the  fpeaking, 
of;  as,  for  inftance,  Strength  and  Beauty,  the  At- 
tendants upon  Health  of  Body  ;  and  in  the  Soul 
other  Excellencys,  very  many  and  very  noble.  For 
Venus  her  Self,  O  good  Philebus  !  obferving  lawlefs 
Luft  and  all  manner  of  Vice  every  where  reigning, 
the  Love  of  Pleafure  being  in  all  Men  boundlefs,  and 
their  Defires  of  it  infatiable.  She,  her  Self,  eftablifhed. 
a  Law  and  an  Order,  fetting  Bounds  to  Pleafure  and 
Defire.  This,  you  faid,  was  to  lelTen  and  to  impair 
Pleafure  ;  but  I  maintain,  that,  on  the  contrary,  it 
preferved  Pleafure  from  Decay.  And  You,  Protar- 
chus !    v/hat  think  you  of  it  ? 

Protarchus. 
For  My  part  I  am  intirely  of  your  Mind,   Socrates.. 

Socrates. 


294 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates. 
I  have  fhown  you  then  thofe  Three  Sorts  of  Being  j 
— if  you  apprehend  my  Meaning. 

Protarchus. 
Partly,  I  fuppofe,  I  do.  By  One  of  thofe  Three, 
I  fuppofe,  you  mean  the  Infinite :  by  Another,  the 
Second  Sort,  you  mean  That  which  in  All  Beings  is 
the  Bound  :  but  What  you  mean  by  the  Third  Sort, 
J   have  no  fcrong  Apprehenfion  of. 

Socrates. 
Becaufe  the  Race  of  that  Third  Sort,    my  Friend  I 
has  amazed  you  with  its  Multitude  '*^      And  yet,   the 

Inhnite 

'^^  In  this  Third  Sort  of  Being  are  comprehended  not  only 
all  the  Works  of  Art,  but  all  thofe  Beings  alfo,  which  are  the 
ProdiiSllom  of  Nature;  when,  having  arrived  at  their  Maturity, 
found  and  intire,  they  have  arrived  at  the  utmoft  Bounds  of 
their  feveral  Beings,  and  have  attained  to  the  PerfcBion  of  their 
feveral  Forms,  as  nearly  as  the  SiibjeSf- Matter  of  their  F'orms 
allows  them  to  proceed  to.  For  tho  Nature,  in  producing  and 
raifing  .them  to  a  mature  State,  always  aims  at  abjolute  Per- 
fedliofi,  (intending  to  make  every  One  of  her  Works  a  perfect 
Copy  of  fome  Form  Archetypal,)  her  good  Intention  is  every 
where  unavoidably  obftruded,  and  her  right  Aim,  in  fome 
m.eafure,  frurtrated.  Befidc  the  Incapacity  oi  Matter  in  general 
to  receive  perfed:  Form,  or  fixed  Bounds,  by  reafon  of  its  own 

thorow 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


^9S 


Infinite  alfo  appeared  to  contain  many  Tribes  :  but 
as  they  were,  All  of  them,  ftamped  with  the  Charadler 
of  More  and  Lefs,   they  were  fecn  clearly   to  be  One. 

P  K  O  T  A  R  C  H  U  S . 

True. 

SoCR  ATE  S. 

Then,    as  to  Bound;   That  neither  contained  Many, 
nor  found  we  any  difficulty  in  admitting  the  Nature 

of  it  to  be  One. 

Protarciius. 

thorow  Weaknefs    and  abiblute    Infinity  ;  —  and  hefide  the  par- 
ticular Pravity   of   Inch   a  Portion    of  Matter,    as    ordinarily   oc- 
curs  to  or  lyes   hdovc  Nature,    to    be    formed   anew  j    (for    thefe 
Portions   ufually  confill   not  of  fmiple  Elementary  Particles,   but 
of   mixed    and   mis-fliapen  Fragments,    and    the  Relicks  of   prior 
Beings,    not  yet  refolved  into  their  pure  Elements  ;) — be/ide  this 
Vicioufnefs    of    the    Firft    Materials,     to     be    ufcd    by    Nature; 
which  are  like  bad  Bricks,  often   neceffary,   for  want  of  better, 
to    be   ufed  by   the  Brick-layer,,  in    building   of  a  Houfe  ;  —  we 
fay,    hejide   thefe    primary    Obflacles    to    tlie  Defigns    of  Nature, 
when     fhe    is    laying    the   Foiindatioii    of    fome    new    Form,   — 
continual  Acceffions    of    new    M.itter   no   better   than    the   Firft, 
to    be    emploied   by    her    in   raifmg  up   the  Building,    are  farther 
Obftacles   to  the  compleat  Execution   of  her  Dcfigns.     A  Jupcr- 
abundant  ^antity   of   any   One    of    the   component  Elements,   or 
the   Failure    of  a   ^antiiy  fi/Jicient,  —  nay,    even    a  very  fmall 
Excefs   or  DefeSi   of  any  ^lality   effential    to   the  Form,    will    in 
fome   degree    marr  the  Beauty    of   that   Form,    and    injure    the 
Delicacy  or  the  Strength  of  it,  while  growing ;  more  of  Either  will 
prevent  the  Groivt/j  of  it;  and  very  Much   of  Either  will   im- 
maturely   dellroy  the  Being.       The  Virtues   alfo    and  Poi:'crs    of 

every 


.96 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


■every  Being  of  Nature  depend  on  Mediocrity :  for  they  arlfe 
from  a  certain  ^antity  of  Each  of  the  Elementary  Ingredients 
ill  its  Frame,  from  the  due  Mixture  alfo  of  thefe  Ingredients,  and 
a  proper  Degree  or  Meafure  of  the  ^alitys  belonging  to  that 
Alixture.  See  Note  173.  —  The  Foint  indeed,  exaftly  in  the 
Middle  between  Excefs  and  Defect,  cannot  be  known  by  Man, 
•in  any  other  Things  than  Such  as  he  can  number,  "weigh,  or 
meafure ;  but  a  Middle  Point  there  is,  the  Point  of  PerfeBion, 
in  every  Thing  which  is  compounded,  whether  hv  Art  or 
Nature  ;  tho  I'uch  a  Point  is  known  only  by  That  Mind, 
who  is  th.e  Efficient  Caufe  of  the  Compofition ;  or  by  That 
Mind  who  was  the  Dcfigncr  of  it,  and  mull:  therefore  have 
viewed  it  beforehai^d  in  its  Elements  ;  —  unlcis  there  be 
any  Other  iVIinds,  which  are  connected  with  Scnfes  able  to 
penetrate  into  the  Inmoll:  of  Things,  and  which  therefore  can, 
by   means  of  thofe  Senfes,   number  all  the  Elementary  compo- 

•nent  Particles. But  not  only  the  Powers  and  Excellencys  of 

the  Human  Body,  and  thofe  of  its  feveral  Members  and  Internal 
Parts,  depend  on  Mediocrity ;  no  lefs  depend  on  it  the  Powers 
and  Excellencys  of  Man's  Irrational  Soul:  for  This  alfo  is 
Corporeal,  as  well  as  the  Souls  of  all  other  Animals :  it  is 
alfo,  like  Theirs,  fuitable  to  the  Frame  of  that  groffer  Body, 
which  it  pervades  ;  having  its  natural  Appetites,  Pufjions,  and 
•blind  Affections,  Such,  and  in  fach  a  Degree,  as  the  Frame  of 
That  requires.  As  therefore  the  beft  State  of  the  Body  confifts 
in  a  jiifi  Temperament  of  the  Four  Elementary  Humours,  mixt 
•together; — and  as  This  depends  on  tht  Mediocrity  of  Each,  and 
its  ijoell-nnmbered  Proportion  to  the  Others ; — fo  the  befi;  State 
.of  the  Animal-Soul  confifts  in  the  right  Temper  of  it ;  and  This 
.depends  on  having  the  PaJJions,  Appetites,  and  blind  Affctlions  of 
it,  bounded,  moderate,  and  ivcll- balanced ;  and  thefe  Qualities  they, 
/Jl  of  them,  pofTefs,  when  the  Strength  and  Weight  of  Eacii 
6  is 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U     S. 


297 


is  fuitable  to  the  Importance  of  its  Objed,  with  refpctfl  to 
the  Nature  and  End  of  the  Being,  therewith  indued. — Now,  if 
the  Animal-Soid  of  Man  be,  as  we  have  prefumed  it  to  be. 
Corporeal,  it  fcems  neceflary  to  fuppofc  a  Ftjth  Corporeal  Ele- 
me?tt,  finer  than  the  fineft  of  the  Four,  which  compofe  all 
Vegetable  and  Fojil  Subftances ;  None  of  Thefe  being,  like 
Animals,  capable  of  Self-Motion,  or  Motion  from  an  Impulfe 
meerly  within  them.  And  if  this  fiippofitiori  of  ours  be  true, 
'tis  poflible,  that  the  Soul  of  every  Animal  may  be  a  Portion 
of  that  Fifth  Element ;  the  Particles  of  which,  like  thofe  of  the 
other  Four,  being  infinite  in  Number,  the  Motions  of  the  Irra- 
tional Soul  of  Man,  as  well  as  the  Motions  of  other  Animal- 
Souls,  are,  with  refped  to  their  Livclinefs,  (which  is  attended 
ufually  by  a  ^dcknefs  and  Strength  of  Senfatiori)  in  a  Degree 
proportioned  to  the  Number  of  thofe  enlivening  Particles.  All 
other  Differences  betvv'een  Soul  and  Soul,  in  Animals  of  the 
fame  Species,  feeni  to  depend  on  the  different  Temperament  of 
their  Bodys ;  that  is,  on  the  different  Proportions  of  their  Ele- 
mentary Humours:  and  the  greater  Differences  between  the  Souls 
of  fuch  Animals  as  differ  in  their  Kinds  or  Species,  {t&m  to 
depend  on  the  different  Frame  and  Organifatio7i  of  their  Bodys. — 
Thefe  Things,  however,  mufl  be  looked  on  as  Subjedl-Matters 
of  Hypothefes,  founded  on  Opinion  or  meer  ConjeBure ;  and  they 
are  treated  as  Such  by  Plato  on  all  occafions.  But  That  Me- 
diocrity, (or  Medium  httviccn  ExceJJes  ^ndDefeSls,)  in  wiiich  the 
Excellencys  or  Virtues  of  Man's  Ratiojial  Soul,  or  Mind,  con- 
fift,  —  and  the  Proportions,  Meafures,  and  Numbers,  on  which 
thofe    Excellencys   depend,  —  are  Matters   of  Science,  Things   as 

certain  as  the  Subjeds  of  Arithmetick,   Geometry,    and  Mufick. 

For,  to  begin  with  the  confideration  of  pure  Mind,  .and  abftradl 
Science:  —  it  appears,  from  what  has  been  already  fhovvn, 
that  every  Idea   is  2i  Monad,  or  One  Mental  Being, ;  —  that  every 

P  p  General 


298 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


General  Idea,  the  Idea  of  a  Kind,  is  a  large  and  cowprehenjive 
Monad,  divifible  into  a  certain  Number  of  Jmallcr  Monads ;  — 
and  that  every  Idea,  properly  called  Special,  the  Idea  of  a 
Species,  indivifible  (or  at  leafl  hitherto  undivided)  into  any 
fmaller  Monads,  virtually  comprehends  an  indefinite  Number  of 
Beings,  outwardly  exifting  in  any  given  Time,  and  a  Multitude, 
abfolutely  infinite,  of  fuch  Beings,  along  infinite  fucceffive  ^^^j ; 
— unlefs  the  Species  fliould  happen  to  fail  in  Outward  Nature ; 
for,  in  that  cafe,  the  Idea  of  it  would  be,  and  remain,  folely, 
in  her  own  Eternal  Mind. — Seeing  then,  that  all  the  Larger 
Monads,  the  mod  General  Ideas,  contain,  Each  of  them,  a 
definite  or  certain  Number  oi  fmaller  Monads;  Every  One  of 
which  contains  a  certain  Number  of  ^Aon'^ds  fiill  fjnaller ',  (in 
like  manner,  as  the  Prifne  T)ii:ifions  of  Mathematical  Numbers 
are  to  h^  fub-divided ;)  we  mull  conclude,  that  in  Ideas  are  to 
be  found  all  the  Relations,  and  all  the  Proportions,  between  definite 
Numbers,  united  or  conjoined  with  Being.  And  fince  eternal 
Truths  are  the  Relations  between  different  Ideas,  it  is  natural  to 
conclude,  that  the  Connexions,  which  are  between  all  eternal 
Truths,  confift  in  Proportions,  —  that  is,  in  fmiilar  Relations. — 
—  With  regard  therefore  to  Mental  Beings,  we  fee  the  Truth 
ef  that  celebrated  Saying  of  Pythagoras, — dot^fjcaj  ttcIit'  e7rt01y.it', 
— that  is,  as  Some  underftand  it,  "  All  things  are  to  be  likened 
to  Numbers  ;"  or,  as  it  is  interpreted  by  Others,  "  All  things  are 
Juitable  to  Numbers."  The  Saying,  in  Either  Senfe  of  it,  is  true. 
Accordingly,  the  Being  TJiiiverfal  and  Divine  was  by  Pythagoras 
fymbolically  termed  'Ev,  One; — MoVas,  Monad,  kcct  e^o^iiv,  in 
the  mofl:  eminent  Senfe ; — and  d^i^fjLoi  aQi^/xuv,  the  Number  of 
Numbers, — with  the  fame  Meaning,  as  he  was  by  Other  Philo- 
fophers  defined  to  be  aJos  e<Vwi',  the  Form  of  Forms ;  that  is, 
Form  Univerfal, — the  Great  One,  who  comprehends  within  Him- 
felf  All  the  Monads  or  Ideas,  All  the  defhiite  Numbers. — But  let 
it   be   obferved   concerning  thefe    Ideas,    Each   of  wliich  is  One 

certain. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  299 

certain  Number, — a  Definite  Ma?iy, — that  they  admit  of  no  Excefs 
or  DefeSi  in  any  degree  ;  and  that  conlequently  Their  Perfec- 
tion is  not  a  Perfedion  oi  Mediocrity ;  (for  This  Sort  of  Per- 
fedlion,  being  only  relative  to  Excefs  and  DefeSl,  belongs  only 
to  the  Infinites  or  Innumerables,  when  they  receive  Bounds  or 
certain  Numbers:)  abfiolutely  perfedt  are  the  Monads;  for  Thefe 
are  the  archetypal  and  eternal  Numbers,  imperfedl  Images  of 
which  are  all  the  Mediocritys,  —  the  tranfient  Excellencys  of 
tranfitory  Beings. — One  of  thefe  Monads  is  the  Human  Species 
in  its  perfe5l  Idea:  included  therefore  in  This  are  all  the  Ex~ 
celleticys,  to  which  a  Man,  a  Being  compofed  of  Body,  Soul, 
and  Mind,  is  capable  of  attaining.  By  Soul,  we  here  mean 
Soul  Irrational;  for  Such  is  every  Soul,  in  which  Mind  and 
Reafion  dwell  not :  and  of  all  Earthly  Beings,  to  Man  alone  are 
the  Principles  of  Mind  imparted.  By  partaking  of  thefe  Prin- 
ciples it  is,  that  he  hath  the  Faculty  of  Reafion,  and  a  Capa- 
city of  Reafioning.  For  by  Reafion,  we  mean  the  Perception  of 
Mental  Objedts,  or  the  Intelligence  of  Ideas,  —  of  Kijids  and 
Species,  and  of  every  Vniverfial,  properly  fo  called  :  —  and  by 
Reafioning  we  mean  a  perceiving  of  the  ConneSlions  betv\een 
different  Ideas,  the  remote  as  well  as  the  near;  a  perceiving, 
in  What  Relations  they  ftand,  Each  to  Other ;  —  and  a  per- 
ceiving, that  Some  of  thefe  Ideas  are  included  within  Others  ; 
and    thefe    larger    Ideas    alfo   within    Others    ftill     more    compre- 

henfiive. In    fearching    therefore     into    the    Nature    of    any 

Thing  within  one  of  the  fimaller  Inclofures,  —  to  look  whether 
it  be  contained  alfo  in  the  larger,  and  next  outer  Inclofure, 
is  to  reafon  rightly ;  and  the  Mind's  comprehenfiive  View,  in 
feeing  the  Subjedl  of  its  Search  contained  within  Both  thofe 
Inclofures,   the   inner  and    the   outer,   is   very   properly    termed   a 

Con-clufiion. Now,   as  foon  as  the  Principles  of  Mind,  like  Seeds, 

begin  to  open, — and  when  the  Faculty  of  Reafon,  which  be- 
fore lay,   like   an  Embryo,   dormant  in   the  Mind,    comes   to    be 

P  p  2  awakened 


300  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

awakened  by  the  furrounding  Objedts  of  Senfe, — the  Mind  has  an 
actual  Perception  of  thofe  Ideas,   which  hnmediately,  and  the  frjt, 
arife  from  the  univerfal  Principles  of  Mittd. — As  the  Human  Mind 
o-radually   dilates,    and  is  inlarged,     as    it  were,    for   the  reception 
of  more  and    more  Ideas,    the  Faculty  of  Re af on  is  exerted  more 
and  more :   fo  that  Ideas  lefs  and   lefs  General  are  excited  in  the 
Mind,     by   her    being  converfant,    thro   the  Senfes,    with   many 
Objeds     of    the    fame  Kinds  and    Species ;  —  excited,  in   pro- 
portion   as    flie    yields    her   attention    to    thofe   Objecls,    and    at 
every  Turn   introverts  and  looks    within  her  Self. — But    the  Ca- 
pacity   or    latent    Power    of  Reafoning    cannot    begin     to    energifey 
till    the  Mind    is    fufficiently    enlarged,    fo    as    to    comprehend   a 
Genus   and    its    Species    at   the   fame    time  j     that    is,    to  perceive, 
not  only  Many  Ideas,   but  Many  comprifed   in  One.     The  Capa- 
city  of  Reafoning,    thus  grown    up   to  be  a  Power,  is   improved 
and  ftrengthened  hy  Exercife ;   efpecially,  in  learning  the.  Sciences, 

firft,   the  Mathematical,   and   then  DialeBick,   and  the  Science  of 

Mind. Now,   xiReafon,   or  the  Perception   of  Ideas, — Sciencey 

or  the  Knowlege  of  eternal  Truths, — and  Nas  or  Mind,  confi- 
dered  as  Intelligent  of  its  Self,  and  of  its  own  Principles, — if 
thefe  Things  are  acknowleged  to  be  the  mofl:  excellent  of  All, 
which  any  Particular  Mind  is  capable  of  attaining  to,  — 
(and  we  prefume,  that  no  Rational  Being,  except  a  Phi- 
kbits,  a  Lover  of  Senfual  Pleafure  above  all  other  Things, 
would  ever  deny  or  even  doubt  their  Superiority,)  —  it  may 
feem  ilrange  and  inconliftent,  that  Mediocrity,  in  thofe  very 
Things  of  acknowleged  Excellence,  fliould  meet  with  Praife -, 
or  that  Moderation  in  the  Purfuit,  and  Temperance  in  the  Enjoy- 
ment of  them,  fliould  be  deemed  Virtues. — And  indeed,  were 
Man  a  Being  defigned  by  nature  for  Knowlege  and  Contemplation. 
only,  the  more  ajjiduous  any  Man  was  in  the  Purfuit  of  Know- 
lege,   the  greater  Praife  he  would  deferve  -,    the   more  Knowlege 

he 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  301 

he  attained  to,  the  nearer  would  he  be  to  the  Perfection  of  his 
Nature;  and  the  more  he  enjoyed  the  Objecfts  of  his  Knowlcge, 
in  a  conftant  Contemplation  of  them,  the  more  would  he  fulfill 
the  Ends  of  his  Being,  by  enjoying  the  Kappinefs  for  which 
he  was  defigned.  But  from  every  Part  of  Human  Nature  'tis 
reafonable     to    infer,     that    the    wife    and     good    Mind    of  All 

Nature  had  quite  other  Ends     in    the    Formation    of  Man.' ■ 

The  Human  Body  is  evidently  framed  for  Motion  and  for  Ac- 
tion, —  fo  compleatly  framed  for  thefe  Purpofes  of  JVifdo?n,  as 
to  be  a  juftiy  fit  Infirumeiit  of  the  aftuating  and  moving  Soul 
within,  in  all  her  Operations. — This  Soul,  which  by  Nature  is 
united  with  and  pervades  that  Body,  is  by  Nature  alfo  prompt 
to  Appetites  and  Pafions ;  and  Thefe  impell  her  to  give  various 
Motions  to  the  Body  and  all  its  Members,  and  by  thefe  means, 
to  perform  by  turns  all  the  various  An\vc\z\- Anions.  —  The 
Connexions,  which  every  Man  has  from  Nature,  with  other 
Individuals  of  his  own  Species,  infufe  into  him  Natural  Af- 
feStions ;  and  Thefe  alfo  incite  his  Soul  to  ASfion,  as  feelingly 
and  as  forcibly,  as  do  thofe  Appetites  and  PaJJions  which  arife 
in  her  from  the  Wants  and  Sufferings  of  the  Body.  —  And  the 
Civil  and  Social  Connexions,  which  are  formed  by  Man,  of 
his  own  free  Will,  tho  by  Nature  led,  and  by  the  Feeling 
of  his  own  Indigence  urged  to  form  them,  Thefe  alfo  engage 
him  in  Affairs  peculiar  to  Man,  and  properly  therefore  ftyled 
Human ;  putting  his  Soul  into  At'lion,  more  or  lefs,  as  Atiion 
is  more  or  lefs  necefiary  for  maintaining  thofe  voluntary  and 
yet  necefiary  Connedions.  —  It  feems  evident  therefore,  from 
the  Atlive  Life,  which  the  Frame  of  Pvlan's  Nature  obliges  him 
to  live,  that  he  was  defigned  for  a  Life  of  AElion ;  and  not 
to    be   employed    in    the    Purfuit  of  Specidative  Knowlege,    or  in 

the  Enjoyment   oi  Conteftiplation. But  an  obvious  Objedion    to 

This  will  naturally  here  offer  itfelf ;   and  the  following  Q^eftions 

may 


302  P    H    I     L    E    B    U    S. 

may  reafonably  be  propofed  ; — "  Why  has  Nature  infufed  into 
Man  a  ftrong  Fropenjity  to  learch  into  the  Caiifes  of  all  Natural 
Things  ?  Why  has  Ihe  infpired  him  with  a  Love  of  Specula- 
tive Truth  '?  and  Why  has  llie  given  him  a  Sentiment  of  Satisfac- 
tion and  Delight  in  the  Perception  of  pure  Ideas  and  their 
mutual  Kelations  ?    In    a  word,    to   what   Purpofe   is  Mind  fuper- 

added    to    his   Soul? To    thefe  Queftions    the   right   Anfwers 

will  not  only  fliow,  what  Bounds  we  ought  to  fct  to  our 
Purfuits  of  Kfiowlege,  —  what  Parts  of  Knowlege  are  the  moft 
valuable  to  Man,  —  and  how  fir  he  may  laudably  indulge  his 
Mind  in  the  Delights  of  Contemplation; — but  alfo  they  will  at 
the  fame  time  point  out,  What  are  thofe  Excellency s  or  Virtues 
of  the  Human  Soul,  principally  meant  by  Socrates,  where  he 
commends   io  highly    the  Mediocritys,    which    arife    from    a  juft 

Commixture  of  Infinity   and  Bound. W^e  have  only  to   premife 

this  fair  Poftulatum,  —  "  Whatever  Part  of  Nature  is  obfcure 
to  us,  or  not  readily  underftood  by  us,  cannot  be  explained  or 
made  clear,  but  from  what  we  know  of  other  Parts,  thro  Senfe, 
Ohfervation,  and  Experience.'^ — Now  we  know,  thro  Thefe,  that 
the  Appetites  and  Paffions  of  all  Animals,  except  Man,  are 
confined  by  nature  within  thofe  narrow  Limits  that  circum- 
fcribe  their  feveral  Ways  of  Life ;  namely,  their  natural  and  few 
Bodily  Wants,  and  their  accidental  and  fliort  Bodily  Sufferings. 
We  find,  that  their  Appetites  are  raifed  only  by  the  Feeling 
of  their  prefent  Wants,  and  are  quite  fatisfied  with  the  Supply 
of  thofe  Wants  ;  and  that  the  Paffions  of  their  Souls  are  roufed 
only  by  the  Feeling  of  their  prefetit  Sufferings,  and  fubfide  as 
foon  as  thofe  Sufferings  are  ended.  But  the  Appetites  and 
Paffions  of  Man's  Soul  are  infinite  by  nature  :  the  Caufe  of 
which  we  find,  from  Experience  of  our  Selves,  and  from 
the  Obfcrvations  made  on  other  Animals,  to  be  This, — that, 
tho  the  Human   Organs  of  Senfation   are,     every    One  of  them, 

5  i" 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  303 

in  Quicknefs  and  in  Strength,  inferior  to  thofe  of  fome  other 
Animals,  yet  the  inner  Facultys  of  Man's  Soul,  his  Imagination, 
his  Memory,  and  his  Forejight,  are  greatly  fuperior  to  the  Fa- 
cultys of  the  fame  Kind  which  are  in  Brutes. — The  Imagina- 
tion of  Man  is,  of  its  Self,  boundlefs  in  extending,  enlarging, 
varying,  and  compounding  the  minute  Images,  imprefled  on  it 
by  thofe  External  I'hings,  which  have  occurred  to  his  Sight,  or 
have  been  perceived  by  him  :  his  Memory  of  Things  paft  hath 
a  Reach  backward  to  the  remotejl,  both  in  Time  and  Place : 
and  his  Forejight  reaches  forward,  along  the  Infinity  of  Time, 
to  future  Things  contingent,  and  even  to  the  barely  poffible.  — 
Now,  amongfh  the  Multitude  of  External  Things,  which  every 
day  ftrike  the  feveral  Organs  of  our  Senfes,  from  Some  we  feel 
Fleajiire  and  Delight,  Fain  or  Offence  from  Others;  and  to 
all  the  reft  our  Souls  are  quite  indifferent.  Thefe  therefore  of 
the  latter  Sort  very  flightly  affecft  us,  and  are  foon  forgotten. 
Thofe  of  the  other  Sorts  make  lafting  Impreffions  on  the 
Imagination,  proportionable  to  the  Pain  or  Pleafure  felt.  The 
Painful  give  to  the  Soul  thofe  Emotions  which  are  properly 
called  PaJJions.  The  Pleafurable  excite  in  the  Soul  Defires  of 
enjoying  Pleafures  of  the  fame  Kind  again  ; — Defires,  in  their 
beginning,  weak  or  ftrong,  in  proportion  to  the  Depth  of 
thofe  Impreffions.  But  afterwards,  when  exaggerating  Reports 
of  greater  Pleafures  of  the  fame  Kind,  enjoyed  by  Others, 
reach  our  Ears,  (and  whether  the  Reports  be  true  or  falfc, 
it  matters  not,  if  they  are  credited,)  Imagination  always  aiding' 
and  improving  thofe  Reports,  the  Impreffions  deepen  ;  and  the 
Defires,  which  they  had  raifed,  flrengthen.  In  the  fame  Cafe 
are  all  the  other  Natural  Defires, — Thofe  for  inftance,  oi  Pro- 
perty and  PoJJi'Jions,  —  of  Praife  and  Honour,  —  o^  Freedom  from 
Subjedion  to  the  Will  of  Others,  —  and  of  Power  to  induce 
Their  Wills  to  agree  with  Ours :  —  the  Defires  increafe  by- 
being 


304 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


being  gratified  -,   and  what  we  fee,   or  hear,  or  fancy,   of  greater 
Heights    of    fuch    Gratifications,     attained    to    by    Others,    and 
imaeined   to    be   within   our   own  Reach,   fwell  the  Defines    be- 
yond   all   Meafure. — Nor   is   it    otherwife   with     the  PafTions    of 
Gritf,  Refentment,  Hate,  and  F^^r, — PafTions,   naturally  raifed  in 
us  by  the  hofs  of  fome  Good, — by  Injuries  received, — by  Objedls 
painful  and  prefent,    or  tnifchievous   and   to  come;  —  whether   the 
Lofs,    Injury,    or   Mifchief   be    real    or   imaginary,   whether   the 
Pain  be  great  or  little,   whether  the  Fear  be  well  or  ill-founded. 
Human  Imagination,  if  free  Scope  be  given  it,  magnifies  the  Evil, 
and  heightens  the  PafTion  ;   and  the  Paf^ion,  in  its  turn,    gives,  if 
it  be  indulged.  Strength  and  Laflingnefs  to  the  Fancy.     As  foon, 
therefore,   as  Report  has  filled  a  Man's  Imagination   with  Images 
of  Things,   v/hich    he   never   faw ; — or  Hlfiory,   with  Reprefenta- 
tions   of   Fads,    which   happened  Ages    lince ; — or  Poetic  FlSllon, 
with  FaJicys    of   Things,    which    neither    have,     nor   ever   had, 
any  Exiftence ;  — Images,    as   well-framed,    as   if  the  Subftances 
Themfelves    were    before     his    Eyes ;  —  Reprejentatlons,    no    lefs 
clear    to    him,    than    if  Himfelf    had    been   Eye-Witnefs   of  the 
the  Fadts  ; — Fancys,   no  lefs  lively,  than  if  they  had  been  drawn 
from   Realitys,    or  anfwered    to  Things    true    in   Nature; — thefe 
Objeds  of  the  Man's  Imagination,    thefe   Reprefentatives    of  the 
Perlbns    and    Things    he    reads    or   hears    fpoken    of,     (tho    un- 
knoien    to    Him,     or    uncertain,    or    meerly    fabulous,)     immedi- 
ately   beget  Love  or  Averjion  in  his   Soul,    according  as  they  are 
agreeable  or  dlfagreeable  to    his  Nature,   or  to  his  prefent  Temper. 
To   thefe  Perfons   and  Things,   afterward,   he  likens  Such    as    he 
Himfelf  has  {qgw,    or   knows    adually    to   exift.       And    tho    the 
Refemblance  be  generally  partial,  or    imperfed,   and  often   only 
fancied,     he   transfers    his    Love     and     his    Averfion,     from    the 
dlflant,  the  long  pafl  or  deceafed  Objedls  of  them,  to  the  Objefts 
which   at  prefent  are   in  Being.     Of  Thefe,   Such   as   appear  to 

5  ^i"^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  305 

him  dtfagreeable,  and  to  which  he  now  contrails  an  Avcfjion, 
of  neceflity  he  fhuns  and  endeavours  to  avoid :  but  Such  as 
are  agreeable  to  his  Fancy,  and  which  he  now  conceives  a 
Love  of,  he  cannot  but  defire  and  purfue.  In  this  latter  cafe. 
Love,  and  the  Defire  of  imagined  Good,  urge  him  to  the 
Purfuit ;  and  the  hopeful  Purfuit  increafeth  his  Defire  :  in  the 
other  cafe,  Averlion,  and  the  Fear  of  imagined  Evil,  make  him 
careful  to  avoid  it  ;  and  thro  this  troublefome  Care,  his  Averfion 
rifes  to  Hatred,  and  his  Fear  rifes  to  a  Dread.  —  By  thefe  and 
other  the  like  Means  it  is,  that,  in  Man's  hnagination,  num- 
berlefs  falfe  Fancys  fpring  up  continually  j  and  that,  fince  it 
is  unbounded,  there  is  ftill  Room  for  more.  On  thefe  Fancys 
the  Defires  and  Pajfions  feed,  and  grow  to  an  enormous  Sizej 
by  thefe  they  are  inflamed,  and  frequently  break  forth  in  all 
Kinds  of  foul  Mifchief,  —  efpecially  to  the  Perfons  them- 
felves,  who  are  tortured  with  thofe  Feverirti  Diftempers  of 
the    Soul ;    and   often,   by  Contagion,    they   fpread    the  Calamity 

thro  whole  Familys,   Tribes,   and  Nations. To  prevent  thefe 

Mifchiefs  and  cure  thefe  Difeafes,  to  cool  the  Pafljons  and 
moderate  the  Defires,  to  baniih  the  exorbitant  or  over-abounding 
Fancys,  and  to  reftrain  the  Wildnefs  of  Imagination,  —  we 
may  reafonably  prefume  to  be  the  chief  Ends,  (at  leaft,  the 
more  immediate  Ends,)  for  which  the  Principles  of  Mind  and 
Reafon  are  imparted  to  the  Human  Soul.  For  'tis  only  thro 
Mind  and  Reafon,  that  thefe  Ends,  at  prefent  the  mofl  de- 
firable  to  Man,  are  poflible  to  be  accomplillied.  And  we  pre- 
fume, that  no  Doubt  will  be  made  of  This,  on  confidering 
what  we  have  now  to  offer:  —  If  it  be  true,  that  Ideas,  un- 
mixed with  Images  of  any  Senfible  Things, — and  eternal  Truths, 
the  Relations  between  thofe  pure  Ideas, — are  the  only  proper 
Objefts  oi  hitelleSl  and  Reafon;  —  if  they  are  alfo  connatural  to 
all   Mind,    and    are   therefore    by  all  Mind   naturally    beloved  the 

Q^q  moA 


3o6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


moft  of  all    things; — it  follows,    ihzi  pure  Science,    the  Know- 
lese  of  thofe  Ideas  and  of  their   mutual  Relations,   mufl  be  of 
all   things   the   moft  delighlful  to   a   Soul  wherein  Mind  is  fown, 
as    foon    as    flie    is    converlant    and    becomes    acquainted    with 
them.       So    that   if   the   Human   Soul   were   not,  firjl,    intimate 
with    Objects    of    the   Outward  Senfes,    and    delighted    with    the 
Plenfures  which   they  yield, — if  the  Remembrance  of  thefe  Plea- 
fures  did  not  continue  to  attract  her, — if  the  Wants  of  her  Body  did 
not  compel  her  to  attend  to  them, — and  if  \\tx  Natural  Affections. 
did    not   forcibly  draw  her   to  a  Regard   for   the  ObjeSls  of  fuch 
Affections,  —  her  whole  Attention   would  be  engaged   by  Thofe 
her   new    Mental   Acquaintance;     (poilibly    indeed    ancient,     but 
long   loji    to    her,    -^^n^  forgotten  i)    and    fhe    would    then    live — 
not   a  Human  Life,    a  Life  oi  Action, — but   a  Life,   peculiar    to 
Beings    more   purely    Litelledlual    and    Rational   than    Man,    the 
higher  Life  of  Conte?nplation. — On  the  other  hand,   many  ObjeSls. 
of  Senfe   are   fo   engaging.   Many   are    fo   enchanting,    and   their 
Charms  are   fo  heightened   by  Imagination,  —  the  Witchcraft  of 
Senfual  Pleafure   is    fo  powerful, — and  the  higher  Faculty's  of   the 
Soul    are    held,    as    it   were,   in    Chains,    fo    flrongly   by  thofe 
Magicians,  the  Fancys,  Appetites,  and  Faffions, — whilft  the  lower 
Facultys  drudge,  like  Bond-Slaves,   in  the  Service  of  thefe  their 
Defpotic  Lords, — that  only  the  fuperior  Charms  of  Science,   the 
more    potent    Spells    of   true    Fhilofophy,     and   Tiiat    all-mighty 
.Magick    of  'Truth,    which,   in  refpedl  of  Outward  Nature,    may 
not  improperly  be    termed  Supernatural,  have  Power  to  free  the 
Mind  from   the  Force  of  thofe   ordinary,  corporeal,  and   natural 

Enchantments.  Thus   it   is,    that   the  Irrational  Part  of  the 

Human  Soul,  and  the  Rational,  according  to  the  Idea  of  Man 
in  the  defigning  Mind  of  Nature,  counter-balance  Each  the 
Other.  The  Weight  of  the  Irratio7ial  lyes  in  Mechanical,- Cor-' 
poreal,  and  Natural  NeceJJity ;    thro   which,    all   Bodys,    whether 

Inanimate 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


307 


Inanimate  or  Animated,  arc  paffively,  unrefiftingly,  and  blindly 
moved,  attradted,  or  impelled  :  the  Weight  of  the  Rational  Part 
depends  on  Rational  znd  Moral  Necejity;  thro  which,  all  intelli- 
gent Beings  freely,  willingly,  and  gladly,  embrace  known  Trutht 
and  adhere  to  known  Good.  The  former  Necefllty  weighs 
alone,    and    without    a    Counter-poife    in    the    Soul,     during    the 

Infancy  ofReafon. To  fupply  this  Want  of  an  Inward  Prijic'ipJe 

in  Children,  powerful  enough  to  fave  them  from  the  many 
Evils,  into  which  they  would  be  driven  by  their  Fancys,  Ap- 
petites and  Paffions,  Nature  has  placed  them  under  the  Care 
and  Management  of  their  Parents-,  in  Defed:  of  their  own 
Reafon,  giving  them  the  Reafon  of  Others  for  their  Teacher  and 
Governor.  To  fecure  this  Government  from  being  abufed,  to 
the  Detriment  of  Thole  who  are  born  in  Subjedlion  to  it. 
Nature  has  implanted  in  the  Souls  ol  Parents  a  c^-ocyn,  ov  Love 
to  their  Offspring,  ftronger  than  any  other  Love,  in  all  Souls 
governed  by  their  Natural  ^ffe^ious.  And  to  make  this  Sub- 
jedion  eafy  to  the  Children,  Nature  has  made  them  depen- 
dant on  their  Parents  for  ail  the  Good  which  they  receive; 
enduing  them  with  a  Senfe  of  their  own  thorow  Weaknefs, 
and  with  a  fimple  and  intire  Confidence  in  their  Parent's  Care. 
— The  Excellencys  therefore  of  a  Child's  Soul  are  —  Appetites, 
mild  and  governable, — PaJJions,  gentle  and  fubmijjive  to  Refraint, 
— Affeciions,  proportioned  to  the  relative  Nature  of  their  Objeds, 
—  a  ^licknefs  of  Apprehenfion,  fufficient  to  receive  Inftrudions, 
fuited   to  the  Firft  Openings   of  the  Mind, — counter-balanced  by 

a  Strength   of  Memory,  fufficient    to    retain    them,  .  Thus    we 

find  that  the  Moderate,  the  jujl  Degree,  and  the  Suficierit,  are 
the  Bafis  and  the  Eflence  of  all  which  is  amiable  or  admira- 
ble  in   the  Souls  of  Children. When  the  State  of  Childhood 

is  patlj  when  the  Body  has  attained  a  futHcient  degree  of 
Strength,    to  difcharge   many  of  the  adive  Offices  and  Employ- 

f^  q  2  ments 


3o8 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 


ments  of  Human  Life ;   and  when  the  Mind  is  enlarged  enough 
to   colled  Ideas   from    all    the    Senfible   Objedts   with   which   llie 
is   converfant,    and    ftrong    enough    to    7-cafon    concerning    their 
various    Powers    and    Ufes ;  from   Effeds    arguing   backward    to 
Caufes,   and   from   Caufcs   arguing  forward    to   EfFedts ;     we   fee, 
that   the   Bull;   of  Mankind   ftill,    and  for  ever  throughout  Life, 
continue   in   a   State  of  Infancy,    with    refpedl  to   the   Objedis  of 
IntclkSl ;    employing   their   whole  Time  and  Care,   their  Faculty 
of  perceiving,     and   their   Power    of  reafonifrg,    as  well    as    their 
Memory    and  Imagtnatioii,    folely  in    the    Service   of   their  Bodys : 
fo    that    all    their    Views   terminate    in    the    fecure    PofTeffion    of 
Things  convenient   to  the  Body;    all   their  Ideas  of  Good  are   in- 
vefted   with  Images    of  Thefe   Things  ;     and    Thefe  Things   are 
the  only   Subjeds,    on    which    they   delight    to   think,    to   reafon 
by    Themfelves,    or    difcourfe   with    Others.       It    appears    then, 
that    the   far   greater   Number   of  Human  Beings,    for   want    of 
Weirrht  in  the   rational  Part  of  their  Souls,   fufficient  to  counter- 
balance That  of  the  irrational  Part,   live,   all  their  Lives,  under  the 
abfolute    Dominion    of   Corporeal    Neceffity,    obedient    to    the 
Impulfe  of  their   Animal-Appetites,   Paffions,    and   blind   Affec- 
tions ;   and  that,  as  Thefe   are   of  the   fame  Kind  in  All  Men, 
differing  only  in  Degree,    All   Men   would,   thro    the   neceflliry 
Operation   of   thefe  Caufes,   if  not   counteraded   by  Caufes  con- 
trary,   be    for   ever  at  Variance,    and    for    ever    in    a    State    of 
War,    until   the   whole   Human   Species  were  deftroyed.     Now, 
as    fuch   a  Deflruftion   would  be   againfl   the    plain  Intention  of 
Nature,    whofe    Providential    Care    is   direded    to    the    Continu- 
ance   of  every    Species    in    the   Outward  World,    we   mull   con- 
clude,  that    the  Majority  of  Mankind   were   intended  to  live  in 
Subjection    to    Government ;     not    in    a  Jlavijh   Subjedion     to    the 
arbitrary  Government    of  Men,   who   are,   Themfelves,   governed 
by  their  own  boundlefs  Appetites  and  Paffions ;  their  own  par- 

tiaL 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


309 


tfal  and  extravagant  Affecflions;  not  in  ^forced  or  an  ignorant  Obe- 
dience to  the  Mandates  or  Decrees,  iffued  by  fuch  Men  ;  nor  yet  in 
perpetual  Bondage  to  any  CuJIoms,  Injlitutions,  or  Ordinances,  proved 
to  be  pernicious ; — but  in  a  voluntary  and  free  Submiflion  to 
Laios,  made,  folely  for  their  Good,  by  Men  v\'irer  and  better  than 
Themfelvesj — Laivs,  found  from  Experience  to  be  the  befl 
Maintainers  of  Civil  Society,  Public  Concord,  and  Domeftic 
Union ;  to  be  alfo  the  befl:  Guardians  of  every  Man's  Perfon, 
and  the  befl;  Protestors  of  his  Property  ;  —  La-ius,  harmonifing 
with  the  Laws  of  all  Nature,  with  Thofe  by  which  the  Ra- 
tional World,  as  well  as  the  Corporeal,  inwardly  is  governed, 
— the  Corporeal  Wor]d,  thro  the  jzatural  Co7ine£iions  between  all 
Outward  Tilings, — the  Rational,  thro  Jiatnral  Cotifcience,  the  fecret 
ConneElion    of   every  Mind    with    eternal    Truth,     which    is     the 

Fountain     of     Univerfal    Juftice. From    this    Account     'tis 

eafy  to  perceive,  that  the  Excellencys  of  Soul,  in  the  major  Part, 
of  Mankind,  — in  Thofe  who  are  not  qualified-  to  be  their 
own  Mafl;ers, — are  Such  as  follow, — viz.  to  have  fuch  a  Degree 
of  Strength  in  the  lower  F acuity s  of  their  Souls,  as  gives  them  a 
Capacity  of  acquiring  That  Kind  of  Knowlege,  which  is  ne- 
ceffary  to  their  afting  well  the  Parts  in  Social  and  Civil 
Life,  allotted  to  them  by  Providential  Fate  j — to  have  fuch  a 
Meafure  of  Attention  in  their  Minds,  as  fuffices  them  for  the. 
adlual  Attainment  of  that  Knowlege ;  —  to  have  Indufiry,  fuffi- 
cient  to  prad^ife  what  they  have  learnt,  for  the  benefit  of 
Themfclves  and  of  Thofe  who  need  the  aflifl:ance  of  their  Art,, 
Skill,  or  Labour  -,  —  to  have  a  Temper,  mild  enough  to  fuffer 
their  Appetites  and  Paffions  to  be  reftrained  by  wife  and  good 
Laws ;  yielding  enough  to  fubmit  their  Wills  to  be  diredled  by 
Men  knowing  in  thofe  Laws ;  and  compliant  enough  to  follow, 
in  their  Fancys  and  Ways  of  living,  fuch  Public  Cuftoms  and 
Manners  as  are  not  mifchievous  or  inconvenient  to  Themfelvesj 
6.  —at:. 


3IO         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

— at  the  fame  time,  to  have  a  Spirit,  Jloiit  enough  to  rife  up 
againfl:  Oppreffion  j  brave  enough  to  reiift  all  Attempts  to  en- 
flave  them  J  'valorous  enough  to  defend,  not  only  Each  his 
own,  but  alio  each  other's  Perfon,  Liberty,  and  Property, 
againft  Foreign  Enemys  and  Home-Invaders;  and  77iagnanimous 
enough  to  maintain  thofe  Libertys  of  their  Country,  and  thofe 
Laws,  Vv'hich  fecure  to  them  every  Bleffing  they  enjoy.' 
Here  alfo  we  find,  that  the  Moderate  and  the  Meafured,  the 
due  Degree  and  the  juji  Enough,  conftitute  thofe  Excellencys  in 
the  Souls  of  Some  of  the  Populace  in  every  Country,  by 
•which   they  become  Worthy  Men   and  Worthy  Members   of  the 

Commonwealth. We  are   laftly   to   confider  of  thofe   higheft 

Exce/kncys,  to  which  the  Soul  of  Man,  in  her  prefent  State, 
is  capable  of  attaining,  and  to  which  the  Souls  of  Some  Per- 
fons  acftually  attain.  For  to  the  End,  that  fuch  good  and  truly 
Legal  Governments  may  be  eftabliflied  among  Men,  as  are 
necelTary  to  their  living  a  rational,  focial,  and  happy  Life, — 
fuch  Governments,  as  are  intended  for  them  by  Nature,  (who 
always  intends  what  is  relatively  the  Bed  for  every  Species  of 
her  Creatures,)  —  a  Few  Men  there  are  in  every  Age,  and  in 
every  civilized  Nation,  born  with  Intelledual  Facultys  fupe- 
ricr  to  thofe  of  the  Multitude,  —  exempted  alfo,  by  the  good 
Fortune  of  their  Progenitors,  from  the  neceffity  of  toiling  for 
the  Body,  —  and  favoured,  by  their  own  ftill  Better  Fortune, 
with  That  which  is  termed  by  P/ato  Sretx  fjioi^a,  the  having 
had  their  Minds,  in  early  Life,  cultivated  by  true  Science,  and 
timely  initiated  in  the  Studys  of  Univerfal  Nature  and  of  the 
Human.  Thefe  Men,  thus  defcended,  thus  born,  and  thus 
prepared  by  a  proper  Education,  are,  we  fay,  defigned,  and  as 
it  were  marked  out,  by  the  Providential  and  Creative  Mind 
•of  Nature,  to  govern  Thofe,  who  are  unable  to  govern  Them- 
felves    fo  as   to  hz    happy.       The  Excelkficys  of  Soul   therefore, 

in 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


311 


in    this    higher  Order  of  Men,    arc    thofe  Endowments,    which 
fit  them   for   anfwering   this   End    of  their    Being; — in    particu- 
lar; fo   much  Knowlege  of  the  Great  Dc/igner,   as    will   ferve    to 
acquaint   tliem   with   the  Wifdom  and  GoodneJ's  of  his  De/ign  ;  —  a 
Knowlege,    to  be   acquired   only    thro    the  Study  of  his  Works ; 
-^—fo   much  Knowlege  of    the  Laws,    by    which    the   Rational   or 
Moral   World    is    governed,     as,    in    the    firit   place,     will   fliow 
them,    how    they    muil    govern    Themfelves    if   they   would    be 
happy,    and  in   the  next  place  will  furnifli  them  with  a  Pattern 
to   copy   after   in    their  Government  of  Others ;  —  and   fo   much 
Knowlege   of  Human  Nature,    of  the   feveral   Appetites    and   Paf- 
fions  in  All  Men,    and  of  the  Difference  of  Temper  and  Degree 
of   Underflanding    in    Different   Men,    as    to    know,    that   Some 
mufl  be   driven    to  the  Right  Conduft  of  their  Lives   by  Fear;, 
and    that    Others    are   to    be    drawn    or    led    on   by   Hope ;     tliat 
Some    ought    to    be    deprefled,    or    kept    down ;     Others,    to   be 
raifed   up,    or  fupportcd  j    that,    in    managing    or   treating    with 
the    more    intelligent    and    better    Sort    of    the    People,     'tis    the 
better   Way    to   addrefs    Arguments    to    their    natural  Reafon  and 
Confcicnce;    but   that   above  all   things  it    is   Beif,    (the   Beft    for 
all   Sorts    of  People,)    to   inftill  gradually   and  gently,   thro  Civil 
and    Religious    Injlitutions,     (and    more    efpecially    the     Laws    of 
Education,)    the  Principles   of   Right  Reafon,    of    Honejly    and    of 
Goodnefs,   into    the   Minds   of  all   Such   as   can   imbibe   them.  — 
We  have   here  attributed   the  nobleft  Excellency's    of  Man's  Soul 
to  Such    a  Knowlege  of  Univerfal   Nature    and   of    the   Human, 
as   of  necefiity  infers    a  Condudl  and  Behaviour,   on   all  Occafions, 
agreeable  to  that  Knowlege.     For  no  Man    can   have   the  Know- 
lege  of   what    is  Bcjl    for    him    to    do,     aftually    and    habitually 
prefent    to   his    Mind,    without    feizing    evei-y    Opportunity    and 
embracing   every   Occafion    of    doing    it.       More  Knowlege  than 
This,  on  thofe  Subjeds,  fuppofmg  it  to  be  acquirable  by  Man, 
6  (a  Suppo-i- 


312. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


(a  Suppofition,  the  Truth  of  which  may  well  be  doubted  of,) 
would  be  lifelefs  to  thofe  Perfons,  of  whom  we  are  now  fpeak- 
ing,  in  the  Parts  of  Human  Lite,  allotted  for  Them  to  a6t 
in  J  befides   that  the  Endeavour  to  acquire  7nore  Knowlege  would 

be  an  Impediment  to   their  well-performing  of  thofe  Parts. 

Here  then  we  again  meet  with  the  juji  Jo  Much,  —  no  more 
than  is  ujeful  to  Man, — as  the  proper  Boundary  of  that  Kind  of 
Knowlege,  which  (however  admirable  in  its  Self,)  yet,  if  ex- 
tended farther,  belongs  not  to  Man ;  tho  it  may  perhaps  be 
the  Chief  Excellence  of  fome  Superior  Beings.  —  It  cannot  be 
denied,  that  Injinnitys  from  Old  Age  or  other  Natural  Caufes, 
and  Difabilitys  from  various  Accidents  to  v^hich  Human  Life  is 
Jubjecft,  oblige  Both  Orders  of  Men,  the  Higher  as  well  as  the 
Lower,  to  abftain  or  to  retire  from  all  Public  Othces  and 
Adive  Employments.  Such  Perfons,  without  doubt,  may  al- 
lowably and  commendably  employ  as  much  Time  as  they 
pleafc,  in  the  pure  Contemplation  of  Nature  and  her  Divine 
Caufe  ; — in  .the  Speculation  of  Human  Affairs,  without  taking 
any  Share  of  the  Bufinefs  or  of  the  Management;  — in  ab- 
ftrafted  Sciences,  without  applying  them  to  the  Arts  founded 
thereon  ;  —  in  Arts,  whether  Liberal  or  Mechanical,  without 
profeffing  the  Pradice  of  them  ; — or  in  fearching  into  the  Pro- 
pertys  of  Natural  Things,    and  their  immediate  Caufes,    without 

•a   reference    to  their  own   private  Emolument. But  What  we 

are  to  think  of  this  Contemplative  WiJ'dofn,  this  Speculative  Knoiv- 
iege,  thefe  'Rational  Amufements,  thefe  Searches  and  Difquifitions, 
fo  delightful  to  the  Mind, — and  in  What  Degree  of  Efleem  we 
are  to  hold  them,  according  to  Plato  s  Dodlrine, — will  appear, 
from  the  Rank  which  be  afligns  to  Each  of  thofe  IntellcSlual 
■Goods,  near  the  End  of  the  prefent  Dialogue ;  where  All  Things, 
Vvhich  are  Good  on  their  own  Account,  arc  placed  in  fuch  an 
Order   as    tliey   merit,    from    their  relative  Value   to   Man,   con- 

fidered 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         313 

Protarchus. 

How  could  we  ? 

Socrates. 

'Twas  not  at  all  pofTible  indeed.  Of  thofe  Two 
Sorts  then  all  the  Progeny, — all  the  Things  produced 
into  Being  thro  thofe  Meafures,  which  are  effedled  in 
the   Immoderate,   when   Bounds    are   fet   to   the   Infi- 

fidered  in  the  whole  Nature  of  his  Being.  —  Thus  much,  in 
the  mean  time,  falls  in  our  way  at  prefent  to  obferve,  that, 
if  the  higheft  Excellency  of  Man  be  Wifdom  to  govern  Him- 
felf,  and  Thofe  who  are  under  his  Care,  according  to  Right 
Reafon,  Univerfal  Juftice  and  Goodnefs,  the  Lanv  of  the  whole 
Rational  and  Moral  World, — and  if  this  Laiv  be  Measure  its 
Self,  intelligent  of  its  Self,  and  of  all  thofe  Things,  of  which 
it  is  the  Meafure,  —  and  diflributing  equally  to  AH  of  them 
their  feveral  Dues  according  to  their  Natures, — to  each  Being, 
That  Share  of  Good,  to  which  it  hath  a  Right,  conferred  on 
it  by  Nature, — it  follows  from  thence,  that  a  Man's  Kiio'wlege 
of  the  Bounds  and  Meafures,  proper  to  be  fet  to  all  things 
under  his  Guidance  and  Diredion, — a  Knowlege  of  the  Moderate, 
the  Sujicienf,  and  the  Equitable,  in  the  Condudt  of  his  Life, 
with  regard  to  himfelf  and  to  Others, — is  Man's  Wifdom; — and 
that  a  ConduSt,  agreeable  to  fuch  a  Knowlege,  is  Mans  true 
Virtue,  and  Mans  Highef  Good.  —  In  the'  Greek  of  the  Sentence 
now  before  us,  the  word  (paa)  is  evidently  erroneous.  Stephens 
conjeftures,  that  oT^ex.  is  the  Right  Reading.  Cornarius  would 
have  us  read  i^w :  and  his  Opinion  is  authorifed  by  Ficinus's 
Tranflation.  But  the  Emendation,  propofed  by  M,  Grou,  which 
is  (pK^i,  varys  leaft  from   the   printed  Text. 

R  r  nite. 


314  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

nite  '", — in  fumming  up  All  thefe  Things  together, 
and  comprehending  them  in  One,  underftand  me  to 
mean,   by  the  Third  Sort  of  Being,   This  One. 

Protarchus. 

I  underftand  you. 

Socrates. 

Now,  befides  thefe  Three,  we  are  farther  to  con- 
iider,  What  Sort  of  Being  That  is,  which  we  faid  was 
the  Fourth.  And  as  we  are  to  coniider  it  jointly, 
fee  whether  you  think  it  neceffary,  that  all  Things, 
which  are  produced  into  Being,  fliould  have  fome 
Caufe  of  their  Production. 

Protarch  us. 

I   think  it  is :    for,   without  a  Caufe,    how  fhould 

they   be  produced  ? 

Socrates. 

The  Nature  then  of  the  EiEcient  differs  from  the 

Caufe  in  nothing  but  in  Name :   fo  that  the  Efficient 

and   the  Caufe  may  be   rightly  deemed  One. 

Protarchus. 
Rightly. 

Socrates. 

So  likewife,  the  Thing  effedled,  and  the  Thing 
produced  into  Being,  we  fhall  find  to  differ  in  the 
fame   manner,    in  nothing  but  in  Name,    Or  how  ? 

Protarchus^ 


P   H    I   L    E    B    U    S.  315 

Protarchu  s. 
Juft  fo. 

Socrates. 

In  the  Nature  of  things,  does  not  the  Efficient 
lead  the  way  ?    and  does  not   the  EfFed  follow   after 

it  into  Being  ? 

Protarchus. 
Certainly. 

Socrate  s. 

Caufe  therefore  is  not  the  Same  Thing  with  That 
which  is  Subfervient  to  Caufe  in  the  producing  of 
its  Effedl,   but  a  Thing  different. 

Protarchus. 
Without   doubt. 

Socrate  s. 

Did  not  the  Things  which  are  produced  into  Be- 
ing, and  the  Things  out  of  which  they  are  all  of  them 
produced,  exhibit  to  us  the  Three  Sorts  of  Being  '^'  ? 

Protarchus. 
Clearly. 

Socrates. 
That    then,    which    is    the  Artificer    of  all   thefe^ 
the  Caufe  of  them,  let  us  fet  down  for  a  Fourth  Sort 

of 

'^5  That  is, — all  the  Produdions  of  Nature  and  of  Art,  and 
their  Two  immediate  Principles.     See  Note  166. 

R  r  2 


3i6         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

of  Being ;   as   it   is  fully  fhown   to   be  different  from 
thofe  other  Three  ''°. 

Protarchus. 
Be  it  fo. 

Socrates. 
But    the   Four  Sorts    having   been  now  defcribed, 
every  One  of  them  diftindly,   we  fhould  do  well,   for 
memory's   fake,   to  enumerate  them  in  Order. 

Protarchus. 
No  Doubt  of  it. 

'9"  On  this  PafTage,  which  concludes  a  Summary  Account 
of  the  whole  Univerfe,  we  have  only  to  offer  the  following 
£hort  but  important  Obfervation  ; — Socrates  here  plainly  diftin- 
guiflies  the  Alind  of  the  Vniverfe,  or  Internal  Nature,  the  Caufe 
of  All  things,  [in  every  proper  Senfe  of  the  word  Caiifei\-— 
from  the  Corporeal  Uttiverfe,  or  External  Nature,  the  Effedl  or 
Produdion  of  that  Great  Caufe, — of  that  Vni'verfal  Mind,  who, 
by  conftantly  energifing  within  every  Particle  of  Matter,  and 
thus  continually  forming  and  re-forming  it,  produces  and  re- 
produces every  Natural  Body.  —  The  great  Athenian  Philofo- 
pher  does  not  confound  the  Corporeal  and  Senjible  World  toge- 
ther with  the  Mental  and  IntelkSlital  Caufe  of  it  j  as  Some 
Philofophers  have  very  injudicioufly,  or  very  inaccurately,  done 
in  their  Expreflions,  fpeaking  of  them  as  One  and  the  Same 
Subflance  or  Being :  nor  does  he,  on  the  oppofite  hand,  fe- 
parate  them,  like  fome  Others ;  fo  as  to  make  a  Third  Sub- 
Aance  or  EfTence,  di/linSi  from  Either  of  Thofe,  —  a  Soul  of  the 
World,    or  other  fubordinate  Divine  Being,— neceff'ary,  by  way  of 


a  connedling  Medium   between  them. 


Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  317 

Socrates. 
The  Firfl:  then  I  call  Infinite  ;  the  Second,  Bound  ; 
the  Third,  That  which  is  generated  or  produced  into 
Being  from  the  Mixture  of  thofs  Two  :  and  in  fay- 
ino-  ">\  that  the  Caufe  of  this  Mixture  and  this  Pro- 
dudion  is   the  Fourth,    fhould  I  fay  aught  amifs  ? 

Protarchus. 
Certainly,   not. 

SOCRATE  s. 

Well  now  ;  What  is  next  ?  How  proceeds  our 
Argument  ?  and  with  What  Deiign  came  we  along 
this  Way  ?  Was  it  not  This  ?  We  were  inquiring. 
Who  had  a  Right  to  the  Second  Prize  of  Victory ; 
whether  Pleafure  had,   or  Wifdom  :    was   it  not  fo  ? 

Protarchus. 
It  was. 

Socrates. 

Now  then,  fince  we  have  laid  down  thofe  Dif- 
tindlions  between  the  feveral  Sorts  of  Being,  may  we 
not  haply  form  a  more  finifhed  Judgment,  concern- 
ing  both  the  Very  Beft,   and  the  Second-Befl:  of  thofe 

'9'  The  Edition  of  P/afo  by  Aldus,  and  That  by  Stephens,  in 
this  place  erroneoufly  give  us  to  read  AeV^,  inflead  of  the 
evidently  Right  Reading,  which  is  Xiym,  exhibited  in  the  Bafil 
Editions. 

Things, 


3i8  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Things,    which    originally   were    the  Subjedls  of  Dif- 
pute  between  us  ? 

Protarch  u  s. 
Perhaps  we  may. 

SOCRATE  s. 

We  made  no  difficulty,  I  think,  of  fetting  down 
for  Conqueror,  the  Mixt  Lite,  the  Life  of  Pleafure 
and  Wifdom  together.      Was  it  not  fo  ? 

Protarchus. 
It  was. 

Socrates. 

We  perceiv^e  then,  of  what  Sort  the  Mixt  Life  is, 
and  to  which  Sort  of  Being  'tis  to  be  referred. 

Protarchus. 
Evidently. 

Socrates. 
And  I  think  we  fhall  agree,  that  'tis  Part  of  the 
Third  Sort.  For  the  Mixt  Life  is  not  to  be  referred 
folely  to  any  One  of  the  Infinites,  mixed  with  fome 
One  only  of  the  Bounds  :  it  is  a  Life  of  All  fuch 
Things  together,  as  are  Infinite  in  their  own  nature, 
but   arc   under    the   Reftraint   of  Bound  '5\      So   that 

the 

191  We  cannot  explain  the  Meaning  of  tliis  whole  Sentence 
in  a  better  Way,   than  by  giving  a  few  Inftances  to   prove   the 

5  Truth 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


319 


Truth  of  It. — Cold  has  been  mentioned  before,  as  One  of  the 
hijinites :  a  ctxX.^\x\  Degree  oi  Heat,  mixed  with  it,  is  a  Boimd 
fct  to  it  :  this  Infinite  and  this  Bound,  together,  produce  Cool- 
nejs :  now  the  agreeable  Senjation  of  Coohicfs,  felt  by  any 
Sentient  Being  throughout  Life,  cannot  be  the  Mixt  Life,  here 
meant ;  becaufe  Mind,  or  Wifdotn,  has  no  Share  in  it. — In  like 
manner.  Speech,  as  we  have  alfo  feen  before,  is  One  of  the 
Infinites:  a  certain  Fonn  is  given  to  it,  as  a  Bound  fet  to  it, 
by  Mind  and  Reafon :  this  Infinite  and  this  Bound,  together,  pro- 
duce Language,  or  Speech  Intelligible  j  the  Intelligence  of  which, 
in  daily  Converfation  throughout  Life,  be  it  ever  fo  agreeable 
to  the  Mind,  cannot  be  the  Lfe,  where  Pleafiire  and  Wifdom 
are  blended  and  unite  together;  becaufe  Body,  the  Outward 
Senfes,  and  the  Animal-Soul,  have  no  Share  in  the  Enjoyment. 
—  Neither  is  fuch  a  Life  to  be  found  in  any  One  Other  of 
the  Infinites,  tho  mixed  with  its  proper  Bound;  not  even  where 
the  Animal-Soul  and  the  Rational  have.  Each  of  them,  a  Share 
in  the  Enjoyment  of  that  Particular  Mixture.  Thus,  for  in- 
ftance,  Pleafiire  thro  the  Senfe  of  Tafie  is  One  of  the  Infinites, 
m  which  the  Animal-Soul  alone  has  a  Concern  :  Meafures  are 
prefcribed,  or  Bounds  fet,  to  her  Enjoyment  of  this  Pleafure 
by  Mind  and  Prudence  :  and  hence  arifeth  the  Virtue  of  Tem- 
perance in  Rating :  but  as  this  Particular  Virtue  is  compofed  of 
One  only  of  the  Infinites,  and  of  One  only  of  the  Bounds,  it  is 
but  a  fmall  Part  of  that  happicfi  of  Human  Lives,  where 
Pleafure  and  Prudence  meet,  and  go  on  together, — That  Life, 
which  according  to  Socrates,  in  the  Sentence,  to  which  we 
have  made  this  Note,  embraces  |J^xayTa  aVe^a  All  the  Infi- 
nites, (All,  which  offer  themfelves,)  confined  within  the  Bounds 
of  Moral  Wifdom,    and  the  Meafures  of  Univerfal  Jufiice. 

the 


320         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

the  Mixt    Life,    this   Winner    of  the   Prize,    may    be 
rightly  faid  to  be  a  Part  of  the  Third  Sort  of  Being '". 

Protarchus. 
Moft  rightly. 

Socrates. 

'Tis  well.      But   that   Life   of  yours,    O  Philebus  ! 
a  Life  of  Pleafure  {imple  and  unmixed,   to  Which  of 
the  Three  Sorts  may  we  rightly  fay   that   it   belongs? 
But    before  you   pronounce,   anfwer  me,   firft,    to  this 

Queftion. 

Philebus. 

'"  The  Idea  of  the  Mixt  Life,  fo  highly  extolled  here  by 
Socrates,  is  included  in  the  Idea  of  Ma?! :  and  Man  is  one  of 
Nature's  Forms,  —  a  Part  of  That  Nature,  the  Third  Sort  of 
Being,  in  which  all  the  Infinites  are  bounded.  —  For,  in  the 
Ideal  or  Perfedl  Man,  the  Acqiiifition  and  the  PoJfeJJion  of  all 
thofe  Things,  which  may  be  of  any  Ufe  to  him,  are  bounded 
by  Honejly  and  Goodnefs ;  the  Ufe  and  the  Enjoyment  of  them  are 
bounded  by  Prude?ice ;  and  the  Appetites  and  Pafjions  of  his  Soul 
are  bounded  by  tht  Particidar  Virtues :  the  Nature  ofT/jings  he 
makes  the  Meafure  of  his  Fancys  and  Opinions:  and  the  Meafure 
of  his  Ideas,  eternal  'Truth. — And  we  beg  Leave  to  obferve  by 
the  Bye,  that  Arifotle  hath  this  very  fame  Meaning  in  his 
Nicomachean  Ethicks,  where  he  fays,  in  his  concife  way  of  ex- 
prefling  himfelf, — jj.iT^ov  »  doirri  xa)  o  cTrylxToi, — Virtue  and  the 
truly  good  Man  are  the  Meafures  of  every  Man's  Moral  Conduft. 
—  At  the  end  of  the  Sentence  now  before  us,  in  the  Greeky 
we  fufped,  that  /Jyon'  «.V  fliould  be  read,  inflead  of  ylyivn'  a,v. 
5  The 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  321 

P  H  I  L  E  B  U  S . 

Propofe  it  then  '^+. 

Socrates. 
Concerning  Pleafure  and  Pain  ;    have  they  in  their 
own  nature  any  Bounds  ?   or  are  they  '"  among  Thofe 
things  which  admit  the  More  and  the  Lefs  ? 

Philebus. 
Pleafure,  O  Socrates !  to  be  fure,  admits  the  More. 
For  it  would  not  comprehend  every  Good  in  it,  if  it 
were  not  by  nature  Infinite,  with  refpedl  to  the  Multi- 
tude which  it  contains,  and  the  Increafe  which  it  is 
capable  of. 

The  words  of  Socrates  in  his  next  Qneftion  juflify  our  Sufpi- 
cion  :  on  which  account  we  recommend  it  to  the  confideration 
of  future  Editors. 

'S""-  Aldus,  in  his  Edition  of  Plato,  gave  thefe  words  to  Pro- 
tarchus;  though  nothing  is  more  plain,  than  that  Plato  meant 
them  for  Philebus.  The  Bafil  Editors  rellored  them  to  the  right 
Owner :  and  'tis  ftrange,  that  Stephens  either  knew  it  not,  or 
did  not  acknowlege  it. 

'55  In  all  Editions  of  the  Greek,  we  here'  read  ic^\,  in/lead 
of  it^Qv.  We  are  ignorant  of  any  authority  for  ufing  fo  flrange 
an  Enallage ;   and  therefore  we    fuppofe   it  an   erroneous  Read- 


ing. 


Socrates. 


52Z         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
Nor  can  Pain  be  imagined,  O  Philcuus  !  to  com- 
prehend every  Evil  '°^  So  that  we  mull:  conlider  ol 
feme  Other  Thing,  different  from  the  nature  of  the 
Infinite,  for  the  imparting  of  any  Good  to  Pleafures. 
—  It  is  admitted,  that  your  Life  of  Pleafure  is  the 
Iffue  of  Things  unbounded,  and  belongs  therefore  to 
That  Sort  of  Being.  But  to  Which  of  the  Sorts  be- 
fore mentioned,  O  Protarchus  and  Philebus !  may  we 
refer  Wifdom,  and  Science,  and  Mind,  without  being 
guilty  of  Impiety  ?  For  I  imagine  that  we  incur  no 
trifling  Danger,  in  anfwering  the  prefent  Queftion, 
whatever  be  our  Anfwer,   whether  right  or  wrong  ''^ 

'5^  This  Sentence  in  the  Greek  feems  to  be  fomewhat  im- 
perfedl.  For  we  apprehend  the  Reafoning  in  it  to  be  This  : 
— Philebus  had  acknowleged,  that  Pleafure  (meaning  the  Plea- 
fure of  Senfe)  had  fio  Bounds  in  its  own  Nature ;  and  had 
made  That  very  Infinity  an  Argument,  to  prove  every  Good  to 
be  included  in  it.  This  Argument  is  confuted  by  Socrates,  in 
remarking,  that,  by  the  fame  way  of  reafoning,  it  might  be 
argued,  that  Pain  (the  Pain  of  Senfe)  included  every  Evil;  Pain, 
as  well  as  Pleafure,  being  infinite:  But  all  men  acknowlege 
other  Evils,  befide  the  Evil  of  Pain :  It  was  therefore  a  pro- 
bable Conclufion,  that  other  Things  were  good,  befide  Pleafure. 
The  hifinity  of  One  particular  Species,  which  is  fubordinate  to 
fome  Genus,  (as  Pleafure,  for  inftance,  is  only  One  Species  of 
Good,)  does  not  prove  That  particular  Species  to  include  all  the 
co-ordinate  Species,  or  to  be  as  comprehenfive  and  univerfal  as 
their  Common  Genus. 

Philebus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  323 

Philebus. 
You  magnify  that  God  of  yours,    O  Socrates !   very 
highly,  methinks. 

So  CRATE  S. 

So  do  You,  my  Friend  !  That  Goddefs  of  Yours. 
The  Queftion,   however,   ought  to  be  anfwered  by  us. 

Protarchus. 
Socrates   fays  what  is  right,    O  Philebus !    and  we 
muft  do  as  he  fays  we  ought. 

Phil  e  bus. 
Have   not  You,   Protarchus  !    taken  upon   your   felf 
My  Part  in  the  Debate  ? 

Protarchus. 

'Tis   true,   that   I   have.      But  in  the  prefent  cafe  I 

find  myfelf  much  at  a  Lofs,  how  to  anfwer.      I  muft 

therefore   requeft,     O  Socrates !    that   You,   your   Self, 

will  take  the  Office  of  Prophet  ''^  to  us ;    left  by  fome 

Miftakc, 

'"  All  Readers  of  this  Sentence  muft  be  furprized  at  the 
Paradoxical  Conclufion  of  it,  till  they  have  read  a  little  far- 
ther on;  where  Socrates  fairly  confcfles,  that  he  mixed  a  little 
of  his  Jocofe  Humour  with  the  Solemnity  of  the  Sentiment,  here 
expreffed.     See  Note  26. 

'9^  The  Poet  in  the  Temple  at  Delphi,  whofe  Bufinefs  it  was 
to   deliver  in  Verfe   the  Oracular  Refponfes  to  Thofe  who  con- 

S  s  2  fulted 


3M 


P    H     I     L    E    B    U    S. 


fulted   the   Oracle,   was  fiippofed   to  be   hifp'ired  by  Apollo,    and 

had   the  Title   of  Prophet  given    to   him.      (See   Note  44   to   the 

lo.)      Protarchus   here    alludes    to     that    Office   of    the    Delphic 

Poet,   when  he   delires   Socrates  to   undertake    the   like  Office  of 

Prophet,     by    delivering    the  Di£lcites    of  Divine  Wifdom    to    the 

Company  aflembled  there   to   hear  him.     This   is  Plato's    ufual 

Manner : — before  he  enters  on  any  Subjedl  of  Importance  more 

than  ordinary,   he  founds 

fome  folemn  Note 

Of  Preparation,  —  to  engage  his  Readers  to  a  more 
than  ordinary  Degree  of  Attention.  In  the  prefent  PaiTage,. 
he  ufes  great  Propriety  in  his  way  of  giving  them  this  No- 
tice. For  it  precedes  a  Dodrine,  to  be  delivered  at  large  foon 
afterwards,  —  a  Dodrine,  truly  Oracular,  derived  immediately 
from  the  Fountain  of  Wifdom  into  the  Minds  of  Such  as 
Socrates, 

And  'Tirefias,  and  Phinciis,  Prophets  old', 

if  thefe  Prophets  were  Such  as  they  are  defcribed  by  ancient 
Poets.     For   of  Phineus   they  tell    us,    that  He,    (like  Socrates,) 

Fearlefs  and  Jirm,  had  Bold)iefs  to  reveal. 
Oracularly,  Jove's  own  hidden  Mind 
To  Mortals, 

X^ft'wv    dr ^fA.iui   lipov    roov  dvSr^uTroicri. 

Apollonius  Rhod:  L.  2.  v.  181. 

As  to  Tirefias ;  on  What  account  we  have  here  likened  Him 
to  Socrates,  will  eafily  be  difcovered  by  a  judicious  Reader,  on 
perufing  Note  242  to  the  Meno, 

Miftake,: 


F    H     I    L    E    B    U    S, 


3^S 


Miftake,  I  jfhoulJ  ofFend  the  Combatant  "-"  whom  You 
favour,  and  by  finging  out  of  Tune,  fhould  fpoil  the 
Harmony  "°^ 

Socrates. 

You  muft  be  obeyed,  Protarchus  !  Indeed  there 
is  nothmg  difficult  in  your  Injundions.  But,  in  afk- 
ing  you,  to  What  Sort  of  Being  Mind  and  Science 
were  to  be  referred, — when  I  was  magnifying,  as  Phi- 
lebus  fays,  the  Subjed;  of  my  Queftion, — the  Joke, 
which  I  intended  to  foften  the  Solemnity  of  it,  con- 
fufed  your  Thoughts,    I  find,   in  good  Earneft. 

'99  This  evidently  is  a  Metaphor,  taken  from  the  Co?7tefitmis, 
ufual  at  that  time,  between  Dramatic  Poets,  during  the  Feajli 
of  Bacchus,  for  the  Fame  of  Superiority  in  their  Art.  For  the 
Grecians  of  thofe  days  had  an  Emulation  to  excel  in  the 
Miifical  'Entertainments  of  the  Mind,  as  well  as  in  the  Gym- 
nic  Exercifes  of  the  Body.  To  infpire  them  with  that  Emu- 
lation, Combats  in  Poetry  and  Mufick,  as  well  as  in  Gym- 
najlick,  were  inflituted  by  their  Legiilators  :  and  the  Contenders 
in  either  Kind  were  alike  termed  dymi^'^'h  Combatatits.  —  The 
Metaphorical  Combatants,  meant  by  Protarchus,  are  Mind  and 
Pleajure. 

''°°  In  continuing  the  Metaphor,  taken  from  Theatrical  Con- 
tefts,  Protarchus  likens  Himfelf  to  One  of  the  Chorus  in  a 
Tragedy  or  Comedy,  and  Socrates  to  the  Ko^vf^cuoi  or  Xopvtyoii 
the  Chief  or  Leader  of  the  whole  Band.  For  in  the  Chorus- 
Songs,  it  was  the  Office  of  the  Chief  or  Prefident,  to  lead  the 
Vocal  Mifick,  keeping  it  in  Time  and  Tune  with  the  Inji-ni- 
mental:  and  in  the  Dialogue-Scenes,  wherever  the  Chorus  bore  a- 
Party  their  Prefident  fpake  alone,  for  them  all, 

PilOTARCHUe, 


326         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Very  thorowly  fo,   I  confefs,   O  Socrates  ! 

Socrates. 

And  yet  'twas  an  eafy  Queftion.  For  on  this 
Point,  there  is  a  Confent  and  Harmony  among  all  the 
Sages,  dignifying  thus  Themfelves,  —  that  Mind  is 
King  of  Heaven  and  Earth  "'.  And  This,  which 
they  fay,  is  perhaps  well  faid  "^.  But  let  us,  if  You 
are  willing,  confider  the  Nature  of  this  Univerfal 
Being  more  amply,   and  not  in  fo  concife  a  manner. 

Protarchus. 
Conllder  it  in  what  manner  you  think  beft,   with- 
out regarding  the   Length    of   the   Inquiry  :    for   the 
Length  will  not  be  difagreeable  to  Us. 

"^'  The  unanimous  Agreement  of  all  the  ancient  Philofophers 
in  this  Dogma,  —  that  Mind  governs  throughout  the  Univerfey— 
feems  to  be  introduced,  as  a  Frefumpt'ive  Argument  in  its  fa- 
vour; to  procure  a  ferious  attention  to  \hz  Indu5i tonal  Reafoni7ig, 
which   is  foon   to   follow,    as  a  Rational  Proof  oi  it. 

"*  The  word  perhaps  is  here  ufed  by  Socrates,  not  becaufe 
he  was,  Ilimfelf,  doubtful  in  this  cafe,  but  becaufe  the  Opinion, 
or  Dogma,  of  an  Univerfal  Mind,  tho  authorifed  and  patronifed 
by  Perfons  the  mofl:  refpedlable,  is  flill  but  an  Opinion,  till 
it  is  fhown  to  correfpond  with  all  the  Pha;nomena  of  the 
Univerfe  ;  (fee  Note  204,)  and  till  it  is  proved,  moreover,  to 
be  founded  on  the  Principles  of  Science  and  of  found  Reafoning. 

c  Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         327 

Socrates. 

Fairly  fpoken.  Let  us  begin  then,  by  propofing 
this  Queftion. 

Protarchus. 
What  ? 

SOCRATE  S. 

Whether  fliall  we  fay,  that  the  Pov/er  of  the  Irra- 
tional Principle  governs  all  things  in  the  whole  Uni- 
verfe,  fortiiitoiifly  and  at  random  "^  ?  or  fhall  we,  on 
the  contrary,  agree  with  our  Anceftors  and  Prede- 
ceflbrs,    in   affirming,    that  fome  Mind   and   Wifdom, 

*'3  The  Atheijlk  Hypothejis,  here  fpoken  of,  was  broached  at 
Athens  by  Critias,  one  of  the  Thirty  Oligarchic  Tyrants.  In- 
deed we  cannot  find  it  to  have  made  its  appearance  in  Public 
any  where,  till  a  fhort  time  before.  For  it  muft  be  dijlinguijl^ed 
from  the  Hypothefis  of  thofe  ancient  Phyfiologers,  who  fup- 
pofed,  —  that  All  things  originally  were  in  Dijorder ;  and  that 
Mind,  thro  the  Infinity  of  Time  pafl:,  was  either  involved  in 
Chaos  among  the  reft  of  Things,  or  elfe  lay  dormant,  or  in- 
aSiive,  fomewhere  above,  or  fome  how  apart  from,  that  wild 
Abyfs, — The  Womb  of  Nature  ; — but  that,  when  at  length  ikf/W 
was  extricated  out  of  Chaos,  by  a  cafual  Co-incidence  of 
Things  Jimilar  to  each  other,  and  a  cafual  Separation  of  dijfi- 
milar  Things,  —  or  when  Mind  awoke,  or  began  to  energife,  — 
immediately  an  Infant-World  of  Beauty  burft  forth  from  the 
Womb ;  Order  every  where  took  place  of  Diforder ;  and  the 
Government  of  Mind,  throughout  the  Univerfe,  fuperfeded  the 
Anarchy   of  Chaos. 

wonderfully 


328  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

wonderfully   Great,    orders   All  things  together,    and 
governs   throughout  the  Whole  ? 

Protarchus. 

Alike  in  nothing,  O  Socrates  !  are  thefe  Two  Te- 
nets. That,  which  you  mentioned  juft  now,  is,  in 
My  opinion,  impious.  But,  to  hold,  that  Mind  dif- 
pofes  All  Things  in  a  beautiful  Order,  is  agreeable 
to  That  View  which  we  have  of  the  World,  of  the 
Celeftial  Bodys,  and  of  the  whole  Circumvolution  of 
the  Heavens  ^°'^.  For  my  own  part,  I  fhould  never 
fpeak  nor  think  any  otherwife  on  this  Subjed:. 

Socrates. 

^"'t-   The   Firft  Argument,    here   brought,    in   confirmation   of 

this  ancient  Dogma,  —  "  that  Mind  prefides   over   and  governs 

the  Univerfe,"  — ■  is   the   natural  Conclufion,    drawn   by  Common 

Reafon,    from   the  Evidence  of  Comtnon  Senje.      For  Who,    that 

fees 

This  univerfal  Frame,    thus   wondrous  fair, 

but  muft  infer  the  Caufe  of  it  to  be  full  of  wondrous  Beauty  ? 
Who,  that  obferves  ever  fo  {lightly  That  Conjlancy,  which  is  in 
the  Motions  of  the  Planets,  and  in  the  Rifings  and  Settings  of 
the  Fixt  Stars,  can  pofiibly  imagine  the  Inconjlancy  of  Chance 
to  be  the  Mover?  What  Man,  not  difordered  in  his  own  Mind, 
can  fuppofe  any  Other  thing  than  Mind  to  be  the  Caufe  of 
that  everlafting  Order,  which  appears  in  the  regular  Interchanges 
of  the  Elements,  and  the  circling  Returns  of  the  fucceffive  Sea- 
fons? — This  fliort  and  obvious  Reafoning  fcems  alone  to  have 
J  fatisfied 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


3^9 


Socrates. 
Is  it  then  your  Pleafure,  that  we  add  Our  Voices 
to  thofe  of  the  Ancients,  and  openly  avow  that  Te- 
net to  be  Ours ;  —  not  contenting  our  felves  with 
a  bare  repetition  of  the  Sayings  of  Others,  in  hopes 
of  efcaping  Danger  to  our  Selves ;  but  refolvcd  to 
run  all  Rifque  together,  and  to  fhare  in  undergoing 
the  Cenfures  of  fome  Great  and  Formidable  Man,  when 
He  aflerts,  that  in  the  Whole  of  Things  there  is  no 
Order  "^  ? 

Protarch  us. 

How  can  I  do   otherwife,   than  join  with  you   in 
This  ? 

fatisfied  all  the  old  Phyfiologers  and  earlieft  Philofophers :  here 
therefore  it  is  very  properly  put  into  the  Mouth  of  Protar- 
chiis,  vvhofe  Education,  we  may  prefume,  made  him  acquainted 
with  this  their  chief  Dodlrine.  The  more  diffufe  and  copious 
Proof  of  it  by  InduStion  is,  with  equal  propriety,  referved  for 
Socrates.  For  this  great  Mafter  of  Dialedlick,  we  are  told  by 
Arifiotle,  was  the  Firft  who  made  ufe  of  the  Indu^ional  Me- 
thod of  Reafoning  in  his  Philosophical  Converfations. 

^°5    That    the  Perfon  here  alluded    to,    is   Critias,    cannot   be 
doubted   of  by  Thofe  who    are  acquainted  with   his  Character, 

and   the    injurious  Treatment    he    gave    to   Socrates. A  con- 

fiderable  Fragment  of  his  Atheiflick  Poetry  is  extant  in  Sextus 
EmpirictiSi  pag:  562. 

T  t  Socrates. 


330 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 


Socrates. 
Attend  now  to  the   Argument,    which    comes   on 
next  to   be  confidered. 

Protarchus. 
Propofe  it  then. 

SoCR  ATE  S. 

In  the  Bodys  of  all  Animals  fomehow  we  difco- 
ver,  that  Fire,  Water,  and  Air,  muft  be  in  their 
Compofition  by  nature  ;  and  Earth,  which  gives 
Support  to  the  other  Ingredients  in  their  Frame,  we 
fee  plainly  :  as  Mariners  fay,  when  they  are  toffed 
about  in  a  Thunder-Storm  at  Sea,  and  defcry  Land 


206 


Protarchus. 

"^  This  Simi/e  prefents  to  our  Imagination  a  Scene,  in  which 
the  Four  Ele?nents  are  by  Sailors  kti\  diflindtly  at  the  fame 
time  ;  —  the  Watery  Ocean,  upon  which  they  fail, — the  Expanfe 
of  Air,  over  their  Heads,  —  The  Fire  of  Light?iing,  flafliing, 
around  them,  and  Land,  at  a  Diftance  within  their  Sight. — In 
Animal-Bodys,  we  have  only  the  Earthy  Part  of  their  Frame 
before  our  Eyes :  the  Fire,  the  Air,  and  the  Water,  which  are 
within  them,  we  difcover  by  fome  other  ways.  That  they 
have  Fire  in  them  when  ali've,  we  perceive,  by  feeling  their 
Warmth  in  handling  them :  when  we  hear  their  Voices,  we 
know,  that  Air  iffues  out  of  them,  and  muft  therefore  have 
been  within  tiiem  :  and  when  we  feed  on  them  dead,  we  find, 
that  Moifiure  is  in  them,  by  our  Tajle ;  for  This  Senfc  is  not 
5  affedted. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  331 

Protarchus. 

True  :  and  tofled  about  indeed  are  We  too  in  thefe 
Difcourfes ;  but  for  a  Port,  to  anchor  in,  we  are  in- 
tirely  at  a  Lofs 


207 


affeded  by  any  Thing,  which  is  totally  deprived  of  its  native 
Liquid.  —  However ;  we  do  not  imagine  the  Simile  to  be  here 
introduced,  for  the  purpofe  of  fliowing,  that  we  have  Ocular 
Demo7iJlratio7i  of  the  Exijlence  of  the  Four  Elements  :  but  the 
Exhibition  of  thofe  Jeparate  and  larger  Parts  of  Each  of  them, 
prefented  to  us  in  the  Simile,  is  perhaps  intended  to  prepare 
us  for  that  vaft  View,  which,  immediately  after  This,  opens 
itfelf  on  our  Minds,  in  confidering  Each  of  thofe  Elements  as 
XJniverfal,   or  rather  Infinite. 

*°7  Protarchus,  by  ufing  the  Plural  Number,  means  Himfelf 
and  his  Young  Companions.  — —  The  frefi  SiibjeSl,  jufl  now 
ftarted.  This  of  the  four  Elements  of  Outward  Nature,  oc- 
cafions  him  to  renew  his  former  Complaint,  mixed  with  Pka~ 
fantry,  in  the  name  of  all  the  Younger  Part  of  the  Affem- 
bly.  We  have  here  a  remarkable  Inftance  of  our  Author's 
fine  Judgment  in  the  compofition  of  his  Dialogues.  For,  be- 
ing aware,  that  Some  of  his  Readers  are  probably  diffatisfied 
with  this  feeming  Digreflion  from  the  Subjeft,  propofed  to 
be  confidered, — viz.  "  to  Which  Sort  of  Being  Mind  belonged," 
—he  has  contrived  to  intimate  to  them,  in  this  Socratic  way 
of  Humour,  that  he  is  pufliing  forward,  however  he  may 
appear  to  deviate ;  and  that  he  offers  to  them  this  feemingly 
new  Matter,  only  as  a  Vehicle  to  convey  them  the  fooner 
to  their  Journey's  End.  We  conceive  this  to  be  his  Purpofe, 
from  the  firft  words   of  Socrates  in  Reply. 

T  t  2  Socrates. 


33^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 


SOCRATE  S. 

Let  us  proceed  then  :  —  Concerning  Each  of  thofe 
Elementary  Ingredients  in  our  Frame,  underftand 
This. 

Protarchus. 
What  ? 

SoCRATE  S. 

That,  which  there  is  in  Us,  of  each  Element,  is 
fmall  and  inconfiderable  ;  no  where  in  any  Part  of 
our  Frame  have  it  we  at  all  unmixed  and  pure ; 
neither  has  it  in  Us  a  Power,  worthy  of  its  na- 
ture ""^  Take  One  of  them  for  a  Sample,  by  which 
you  may  eftimate  all  the  reft.  Fire  in  fome  manner 
there  is  in  Us :  Fire  there  is  alfo  in  the  Univerfe, 
throughout. 

Protarchus. 

Moft  certainly. 

Socrates. 

Now  the  Fire,  which  is  in  Our  compofition,  is 
weak  and  inconfiderable :  but  That,  which  is  in  the 
Whole  of  Things,  is  admirable  for  the  vaft  Qviantity 

^"^  For,  in  the  Bodys  of  all  Animals^  the  Four  Elements 
are  fo  intimately  mixed  together,  and  (as  it  were)  united, 
that  the  natural  Quality  of  Ecic/j  Element  is  rcjlrainedy  and  the 
inherent  Force    of  it  is  cramped,   by   the   other  Three, 

of 


P   H    I    L   E    B   U    S,         333 

of  it, — for  the  Beauty  which  it  exhibits  ''°', — and  for 
every  Power  and  Virtue  which  belongs  to  Fire  "°. 

Protarchus. 
Perfedly  true. 

Socrates. 

Well  then  ;  is  the  Univerfal  Fire  generated,  fed, 
and  ruled  by  the  Fire  which  we  have  in  Us  ?  or, 
on  the  contrary,  does  My  Fire,  and  Yours,  and  That 
of  every  other  Living  Thing,  receive  its  Being,  Sup- 
port, and  Laws,   from  the  Fire  Univerfal  ? 

Protarchus. 
This  Queftion  of  yours  does  not  defcrve  an  Anfwer, 

Socrates. 
Rightly  faid.      And  you  would  anfwer  in  the  fame 
manner,   I   fuppofe,    if  your  Opinion  was  afked  con- 

*°9  For  Fire  Is  not  only  luminous,  its  Self,  and  therefore 
agreeable  and  pleafing  to  the  Sight,  —  but  alfo  enlightens  all 
Outward  Forms,  and  renders   their  Beauty  vifible  to  Senfe. 

-'°  The  Power,  for  inflance,  of  pervading  all  Bodys,  whe- 
ther Elementary  or  Mixt,  with  the  mofl  rapid  Motion ;  —  the 
Power  of  rarefying  all  Fluids  and  expanding  all  Solids  j  —  the 
Power  of  fufing  Metals  and  other  FolEls ; — the  Power  of  pro- 
ducing  or   increafmg  Vegetation; — and   the  Power    of  caufmg 


a  Senfation  of  Heat  or  Warmth  in  all  Sentient  Beings. 


cernmgi: 


334 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


cerning  the  Earthy  Part  of  every  Animal  here,  com- 
pared with  the  Earthy  Subftance  Univerfal  :  and  juft 
fo,  concerning  the  other  Elementary  Parts  of  Animal- 
Bodys,   mentioned  before. 

Protarchus. 

What  Man,  who  made  a  different  Anfwer,  would 
ever  appear  to  be  of  Sound  Mind  ? 

Socrates. 

Scarcely  would  Any  man.  But  attend  to  what 
follows  next.  Wherever  we  find  thefe  Four  Elements 
mixed  together  and  united,  do  we  not  give  to  this 
Compofition  the  name  of  Body  ? 

Protarchus. 
We  do. 

Socrate  s. 

Apprehend  the  Same  Thing  then,  with  regard  to 
This,  which  we  call  the  World.  This  fliould  be 
confidered  as  a  Body  in  the  fame  manner,  being  com- 
pofed  of  the  fame  Elements. 

Protarchus. 
You  are  pcrfedly  in  the  Right. 

Socrates. 


PHILEBUS. 


335 


Socrates. 

To  the  Whole  of  this  Great  Body  then  does  the 
Whole  of  that  Little  Body  of  Ours  owe  its  Nourifh- 
ment,  and  whatever  it  has  received,  and  whatever  it 
poffefTes  ?  or  is  the  Body  of  the  Univerfe  indebted  to 
Ours  for  all  which  it  is,   and  has  ? 

Protarchus. 

There  is  no  reafon,  O  Socrates  !  for  making  a 
Queftion  of  This  Point  neither. 

Socrates. 
Well ;   What  will  you  fay  to  This  Point  then  ? 

Protarchus, 
What  Point  ? 

Socrates. 

Muft   we   not    afErm   thefe    Bodys    of  ours    to    be 
animated  with  Souls  "'  ? 

'"  All  which  Socrates,  in  his  prefent  Argument,  has  faiJ 
concerning  Body,  regards  the  Bodys  of  all  Animals  in  general, 
and  not  the  Human  Body  in  particular ;  agreeably  to  his  own 
words,  when  he  entered  on  this  Subjedl :  fee  in  Page  330'. 
The  Souls  therefore  of  all  Animals  in  general  are  meant  in  tha 
Sentence  now  before  us,  and  not  Souls  Rational  or  peculiarly 
Human:  the  Rational  Soul,  ox  Mind,  is  not  brought  into  con- 
fideration  by  Socrates,  until   after  his   next  Sentence. 

PrOTARCHUSo. 


536         P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Tis   evident,   that  we  muft. 

Socrates. 

But  from  whence,  O  my  Friend  Protarchus !  fhould 
Our  Bodys  derive  thofe  Souls  of  theirs,  if  that  Great 
Body  of  the  Univerfe,  which  has  all  the  fame  Ele- 
ments with  Our  Bodys,  but  in  much  greater  Purity 
and  Perfection,  was  not,  as  well  as  Ours,  animated 
with  a  Soul  "'  ? 

Protarchus. 

"'-  Unlefs  Sou/  was  infufed  throughout  the  Body  of  the  World, 
every  Meynber  of  this  Great  Body,  every  Fart  and  Particle  of 
the  Corporeal  Univerfe,  could  not  be,  as  it  is,  in  perpetual 
Motion.  For  the  immediate  Caufe  of  all  Corporeal  Motion  is 
cither  out  of,  or  ivithin,  the  Body  moved,  Caufes,  which  are 
out  of,  or  exterior  to,  the  Body  moved,  are  ot/jer  Bodys,  ading 
on  it  by  Impulfe,  Attra5lion,  Repuljion,  &c.  Caufes  within  are 
either  Mechanical  or  Vital.  The  Mechanical  are,  when  the  Firjl 
Spring  of  Motion,  tho  it  be  within  the  Body  moved,  is,  its 
Self,  Corporeal;  and  tho  it  be  a  Part  of  the  Machine,  mufl: 
have  been  wrought  feparately,  and  inferted  afterwards.  The 
Vital  are  when  the  Firjl  Spring  of  Motion  is  Incorporeal ; 
when  'tis  not  only  within  but  throughout  the  Body  which  it 
moves ;  when  'tis  thorovvly  united  with  it,  holding  all  the  Parts 
of  it  together,  and  making  it  to  be  One  Being,  without  con- 
fideration  had  of  any  End  for  which  it  may  have  been  de- 
figned. — Where  the  Caufe  of  Motion  is  External,  there,  on  the 
removal  of  the  Caufe,  or  on  its  ceajing  to  a(ft,  the  Motion, 
5  which 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         337 

Protarchus. 
'Tis  evident,  O  Socrates !  that  from  no  other  Origin 
could  they  derive  them. 

SOCRATE  S. 

Since  therefore,  O  Protarchus !  we  acknowlegc  thefe 
Four  Sorts   of  Being, — Bound, — Infinite, — the  Com- 

which  it  gave,  gradually  leffens,  and  at  length  intirely  ftops. 
Where  the  Caufe  of  Motion  is  Mechanical  there  the  Spring  of 
it  has  ever  and  anon  need  to  be  wound  up,  and  will  in  time 
be  quite  worn  out ;  when  the  Motion  muft  of  courfc  ceafe  for 
ever.  But  where  the  Caufe  is  Fital, — where  Sou/  is  united  with 
Body, — Life  ceafes  not  within  that  Body,  till  the  Body  is  worn 
out,  or  dejiroyed;  or  till  the  principal  Parts  of  it  are  fo  injured, 
as  to  be  incapable  of  being  held  together  by  One  Life,  or  of 
prefcrving  their  Union  with  the  Soul.  This  Priticiple  of  their 
Life  then  departs ;  and  either  pajfes  immediately  into  the  Seeds 
of  fome  other  Body,  or  is  refolved  into  That  Great  Soul, 
which  animates  the  Univerfe.  For  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe, 
that  a  Vital  Principle,  the  very  EJfeiice  of  which  is  Life,  gi- 
ving Life  to  all  Bodys  where  it  enters  and  abides,  can  ever 
dye;  no  lefs  abfurd,  than  to  fuppofe  it  polTible  for  any  Beifig 
whatever  to  be  annihilated,  or  to  become  a  No7i-Bcing.  —  Now 
in  the  Corporeal  Univerfe  all  Bodys  are  included:  there  is  710 
exterior  Body  to  aft  on  it,  in  Any  one  of  thofe  ways,  in  which 
Body  aBs  on  Body.  Neither  can  the  Motion  of  this  Great  Body 
be  mechanical;  for  it  needs  no  Renovation  or  Repair  from  any 
Foreign  Hand,  but  is  equable  and  everlajiing.  The  Motion 
therefore  mufl  be  vital:  and  on  this  account  the  Befl:  of  the 
ancient    Philofophcrs    held,    that    the  World  was   Zwov  a  Living 

'Thing. 

U   u  pound 


358  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

pound  of  Both  Thofe,  —  and  Caufe,  —  to  be  in  all 
Bodys ;  and  fmee  wc  find,  that  in  this  Part  of  the 
Univerfe,  to  which  We  belong,  there  are  Beings  of 
that  Fourth  Sort, — Caufes,  v/hich  produce  Souls,  build 
up  Bodys  for  thofe  Souls  to  dwell  in  ^-'\  and  heal 
thofe  Bodys  when  difeafed  "* ;  Caufes  alfo,  which 
create    and    frame    other   Compofitions,    and    amend 

-'3   In    the  Greek  of  this   Paflage  we   read, — 4^'^*"'   '^^   Trtt^i^ov 
5ca)    cMfj^a.  cKioiv   e f^ToiSv.  —  Ficinus  tranllates  the  two   laft  words 
of  it  thus,—"  dum  imprimit  timbram."     But  This  being  obfcure, 
an  Error  in   the  Greek  Mamifcripts  was  juftly  fufpeded    by   the 
lubfequent   Tranflators,    Cornarhis   and  &  err  anus ;    the    former   of 
whom  propofes,  inftead   of  trxiaV,  to  read  vyii<nv\  and  the  latter 
imagines,     that    we    fhould     read    o-&)jw.acrx/«i',     as    One    Word. 
Grynceus  and  Bembo  never  attempt  an  Emendation  of  the  printed 
Greek,  even  where  it  is  moft  apparently  erroneous.     And  Mons' 
Grou  has    taken   the    eafy  way    of   not   tranflating  the  two  laft 
words.     But  all  the  Difficulty  vanifhes,   if,  inftead  of  o-xiaV,   we 
read    awnos,    a    Tabernacle,    or    Tent,  —  a    word,    metaphorically 
ufed  by  the  Pythagoreans,   to  fignify   the  Human  Body,    as    being 
but   a  Jlight  temporary  Divelling    for   the   Soul.     See  Tlmaus  the 
Locrian,    in    feveral   Paflages  ;    and    a  Fragment    of  Ocellus   the 
Lucanian,   de  Lege,  in  Stobaus's  Eclogce  Phyf:    cap:  i6:      See  alfo 
JEfcbines  the  Socratk,   pag:  128,    Edit:   Horrei ;    the  Greek  Index- 
to  which    will    furnifli    the   learned    Reader    with   Examples   of 
the    fame    Metaphor,    ufed    by    feverul    Greek  Writers    in    the 
fucceeding  Ages. 

-"4  The  Caufes  here  meant,  we  denominate  Natural.;  and  their 
EJfcdis  we  call  Works  or  Operations  of  Nature. 

them 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


them  when  impaired  *'^, — Caufes  thcfe,  to  Every  one 
of  which  we  gave  a  particular  Name,  betokening  a 
particular  Kind  of  Wifdom  or  Skill ;  —  fince,  I  fay, 
we  are  perfuaded  of  thefe  things,  furely  we  can  by  no 
means  think,  that  the  whole  Heaven,  in  the  larger 
Parts  of  which  "^  are  the  fame  Four  Sorts  of  Being, — 
and  Thefe,  undepraved  and  pure, — can  have  any  other 
Caufe,  than  a  Being,  who  is  full  of  Contrivance  and 
Defign,  and  in  whofe  Nature  the  moft  beautiful  and 
noble  "''  Things  all  unite. 

Protarchu  s. 
It  would  not  be  at  all  reafonable  to  think  it  can. 

Socrates. 

If  this  then  be   abfurd,    we  may  the  better  affert, 

as  a  Confequence   of  our  Reafoning,   that  in  the  Uni- 

verfe  there  are,   what  we  have   feveral  times  repeated, 

Infinite  in  great  quantity,   and  Bound  fufficient ;   and 

="5  Thefe  Forms,  Strudlures,  and  Compofitions,  we  denominate 
Artificial :  for  Human  Arts  of  various  Kinds  are  known  to  be 
their  Cnitfes. 

*'*  That  is,  the  Heavenly  Bodys.  In  the  fame  manner  Tbco- 
phrajlus  fpeaks, — oAos  y^avo?,  y.cci  e-Ax^x.  ruv  fjn^uv.  and  Plotinus, 
—oKqv    hpcti'ov,    3ca;    too    y.ootcc    avru   Tct    ccq'^a.    Pag:  99. 

^'7  In  the  G}'cek,  ——  tuv  tc/)v  %a7\.7\.l<:^c>3v  -x-oci  iiy.Kjdta.Tuiv  (^liT-iv,— 
The  Things  here  meant  are  Truth  and  Good,  Mind  and  Wifiionii 
to  which  in  many  other  PafTages  of  Flato  thofe  Attributes  are 
given. 

U  u   2  be/ides 


340  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

befides  thefe,    a  Caufe,   not  inconfiderable  or  mean  ^''', 

which,    by  mixing   them  properly  together,   marfhalls 

and  regulates  the  Years,  the  Seafons,  and  the  Months, 

— a  Caufe  ^'',    which  with  the  greateft  Juftice  we  may 

term  TVifdom   and  Mind  "'°. 

Protarchus. 

*'^  That  is, — a  Caufe  the  jnojl  excellent ;  according  to  a  Fi- 
gure of  Speech,  by  the  Mafters  of  Rhetorick  termed  A/toW, 
'Extenuation ;  —  a  Figure,  which  is  fometimes  ufed,  as  it  is 
here,  to  amplify  the  Senfe,  by  conveying  a  Suppofition,  that 
Language  affords  no  pojitive  Epithet,  of  Force  fufficient  to 
exprefs  tlie  Greatnefs  of  our  Meaning.  —  This  Figure  is  fo 
employed  by  Homer,  in  his  Iliad,  Lib:  15,  v.  11  ;  where  jijax, 
the  Jlrongejl  of  all  the  Grecians,  is  fpoken  of  only  as  not  the 
iveakeji,  aV  a^augoTaros.  And  juft  fo,  to  fignify  the  Height  of 
the  Indignation,  Grief,  and  Reluctance,  felt  by  Achilles,  when 
Agamemnon  fent  his  Heralds  to  demand  Brifeis,  the  Poet  fays 
only, — aS"    a^a  tw^s    i'cTwv    yn^natv    A^iAAfvs. 

T^befe,   'when  Achilles  Jaw,  no  Joy  he  Jelt^ 

See  Hermogenes  tte^)  y.iSro^y,    Cap:  ult: 

="•'  That  this  Cati/e,  to  the  Speculation  of  which  we  are  at 
length  conduded,  is  Cau/e  Univerjil,  —  rayx^ov.  Good  its  Self, 
the  Firjl  Spring  of  all  Motion,  —  will  evidently  appear,  if  we 
look  back  on   the  Procefs   of  Reafoning,   along  which   we  have 

travelled. In    the  firft   place,   the  Element  of  Fire  was    offered 

to  our  View,  and  perceived  to  be  Vniverjal.  Then,  by  an 
eafy  and  plain  Analogy,  proceeding  to  the  other  'Three  Elements 
of  all  Mixt  Bodys,  we  perceived  Them  to  be,  in  like  manner^ 
Univerjal.  The  next  Step  in  our  Progrefs  opened  to  us  a.  View 
3  o£ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


341 


of  all  vifible  Corporeal  Nature,  in  which  all  the  Four  Elements 
are  combined  together ;  the  Irifin'ity  of  Each  being  every  where 
bounded,  and  the  Vehemence  or  Mightinefs  of  Each,  every  where 
rejlrained  and  tempered,  by  mixing  with  its  Contrary.  In  pro- 
ceeding farther,  we  found  it  a  fliort  Step  from  the  Univerfa- 
lity  of  Body  to  the  Univerfality  of  Soul,  the  Life-giving  i  nd 
actuating  Principle  in  Univerfal  Nature.  Next  appeared  the 
Univerfality  of  Mind,  within  the  Univerfal  Soul:  it  appeared 
from  the  Regularity  and  Order  of  the  Motions,  given  by  this 
Great  Soul  to  every  Part  of  its  Great  Body.  And  now,  in 
the  laft  place,  'unthin  this  Univerfal  Mind  appears  t!ie  Idea  of 
Good,  as  the  Firji  Caufe  of  All  things.  For  it  appears,  from 
the  Share  of  Good,  which  every  Being  pofTellcs,  and  -  hich 
every  Sentient  Being  enjoys,  (a  Good  attendant  on  its  Nafnre,) 
that  univerfal  Good  was  defigned  in  the  wife  Order  of  all  the 
Vital  Mundane  Motions; — in  the  Motions  of  \.\\q  Celcjlial Bodys, 
in  the  firfl  place;  —  next,  in  fuch  Motions  of  the  Elementary 
Bodys,  as  are  governed  or  influenced  by  thofc  Primary  and 
Leading  Motions  ;  —  and  laftly,  in  Thofe  of  all  Mixt  Bodys, 
Animal,  Vegetable,  and  Foffil,  whofe  Natural  Motions  depend 
on  the  Motions  of  the  Elements ; — an  Order,  which  is  there- 
fore wife,  becauie  it  is  good,  and  produces  all  the  Good  pofli- 
ble  to  be  enjoyed  by  Temporary  Beings,  in  their  feveral  Kinds 
and  Degrees  of  Capacity,  according  to  the  Divine  all-comprifing 

Idea. This  Fountain  of  Good,   the  Fitial  Caufe  of  All   things, 

is  exprefsly  termed  Wifdom  and  Mind  in  the  Sentence  of  Socrates 
now  before  us  :  by  which  the  ellential  and  undivided  Vnity  of 
the  Supreme  Being  is  plainly  acknowleged.  And  yet,  imme- 
diately after  This,  we  find  Socrates  difinguifing  the  Caufe  of 
All  things  from  Mind,  the  Exemplar  of  them  all,  —  and  from 
Soul,  their  Efficient,  —  by  ftiling  it  peculiarly  and  eminently 
Caufe:    for   the   governing  Mind   and  Soul  of  the  Univerfe    are 

fpoken. 


342- 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 


fpoken   of   In   the   next  Pofitive   Sentence    except   one,    as   go- 
verning   in    virtue   of  this  fole  Cauje    of   All    things.      But    the 
diftindlion,    there  meant,    is    not  real,    as   if  it  were   made  be- 
tween Two   different  Beings ;  —  'tis    meerly  Logical,    like  That, 
which  is   made  between  Litelligible   and  IntelleSl,    in   the  Argu- 
ment of  the  Mem,  page  9.    and  repeated    in   the  Notes   to   other 
Dialogues.     For  this  'Triad  of  Divine  Caufes  (concerning  which, 
fee  Note  167)   is  One    and    the  Same  Mind  Univerfal.       'Tis  of 
excellent   Ufe,    however,    to   Us   Men,    to   confider   the   Divine 
Mind  as  thus  diftinguijl:able  Koyu  :    it  furniflies  our  Underfland- 
ings  with   as   full    and   clear  a  Conception  of   the  Government  of 
the  Univerfe,    as    it   concerns  Us    to  have.      For  with   this  Dif- 
tinSlion,   we  contemplate  the  Divine  Being, — firfl,   as  he  pojefes 
in  Himfelf  the  ultimate  End  of  Being,  perfect  Beatitude,   dyxS-ov 
air^oaSsii,    to   'which  no  Good  is  wantitig.     We  contemplate   him 
again,    as  hie  enjoys  this   all-comprehenfive   Good   by   energifng, 
that  is,   by   an  adlual   voncrii,  View   or   IntelleBion,    of  Hinfelf  as 
'Tixya.'^Qv  Good  its  Self,   or  Being  univerfal  and  all-comprehenfive. 
We  contemplate  him  farther,   as  aSling  outwardly,    in  this  View, 
and  with   this  Intellcdlion  ; — continually  difplayitig  the  fair  Forms 
comprehended    in  Himfelfj    and  thus  creating   an  infinite   num- 
ber  of  Individual  Beings,    of  all   Ki}ids  and    Species,    throughout 
the  Immenfity  of  the   Univerfe;  —  ^iffnf>'^g  through  all  Nature 
every  Kind  of  Good,    ad.ipted  to  every  Kind  of  Being  -,    and   thus 
providing   a  fufficient  Relief  to   the   natural  Wants   of  them  All  ; 
—  into   Multitudes    of    thofe    Beings,     of    different    Kinds    and 
Species,   infpiring  Sentient  Souls,    a  diftinft    Soul   into  each  Indi- 
vidual,   with    a  Power    of  Self-Motion  ;    thus    creating  Animals, 
endued   with    a  Senfe  of  their  proper   Good   and   Evil, — Fleafurc 
and  Fain ;  —  endued   with   a  Scnfe  of  their    own  WaJits,  an  Im- 
piitfe  to    feek   Relief,     and    an    infinitive   DireBion,    pointing    to 
the  Means;   —  endued    with  a    llrong  Fropenfty   to  produce    an 

Offspring 


/>  /I  « 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  34 

Offspring  from  Themfelves ;  with  the  flrongeft  AffeElion  alfo  for  that 
Offspring;    and  with  as  much  AJjetlion  for  All  of  their  own  Spe- 
cies, as  may  be  neceffary  to  the  Prefervation  of  that  Species,  and 
to   the  Good  of  other   Beings    interefled    in    its   Prefervation.  — 
We   perceive   all   theie  Animals   no   lefs   endued   with   a  Dijcern- 
ment  of  whatever  is  naturally  hoftile  or   noxious  to  them  ;   and 
with  a  Forejight   of  their  Danger   at  diftance,    for   their  avoiding 
it: — we  perceive  Fear  implanted  in  the  Weak,  for  their  efcaping 
Danger    at   hand    by   i  light;    Boldnefs    in    the  Strong,    for   their 
encountering   and   repelling   it;    and   in   All,    an  Apprehenjion   of 
the  Means,    afforded  them    by  nature  for  thofe  Purpofes,   Swifts 
nefs  for  Flight,    Armour    for   Self-Defence,    and  Arms   for  Com- 
bating :    for   flight  Wounds,   given    them   by  their  Enemys,    and 
for   other   Mifchiefs    incident    to    them   from   without,    we    dif- 
cover  them  to  have  a  Balm  within  them,   a  felf-rejioring  Nature: 
and  for  the  inward  Maladys,    to  which  they  are  liable,  we  dif- 
cover  in   them  an  inmate  Pbyfician,    direding  them   to   the   pro- 
per Remedys. — In  this  View,    we  contemplate   the  Great  Author 
of  All,    as   Univerfal  Soul,   full    of  Goodnefs,    and  full    of  Wij'dotn, 
continually  putting   in  Motion  the  whole  Animal-World,   through 
Appetites,   FaJJions,    zndi  Affe^ ions ;  —  from    which   are  produced 
all  Animal-Adions,  and  all  Animal-Enjoyment. — In   this  man- 
ner then  is   the  World  of  Animals  governed   by  Univerfal   Mind, 
the  King  of  All,     The  fole  End  of  the  Government  is  the  Good 
of  thofe   Beings,    which   are   the  Subjeds  of  it;    'tis   adnimijlered 
by  the  Wifdom  of  the  Kingly  Mind;    the  Law,   or  Rule   of  the 
Adminiftration,    is    comprifed    in    that    Idea,     with    which    the 
Kingly  Mind  is   fraught, — the    Great  Idea  of  Univerfal  Good;  — 
and  the  Executer  of  this  Law  is   the  Agency  of  the  fame  Mind, 
confidered    as    Soul,    adive    thro    all    the    Sefttient   Part    of   his 
Univerfal  Kingdom. —— But  farther;    this   Logical  Divifion   of 
Univerfal  Mind,    the   One  fole  Caufe  of  All    things,    into  Three 
0  Caufes, 


344 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Caufes,  the  Fi7ial,  the  Formal,  and  the  Efficient,  (as  if  they  were 
Three  different  effential  Propertys,  inherent  in  One  and  the 
Same  Subjedl,)  difcovers  to  us  the  Frame  and  the  Origin  of 
our  own  Souls;  and  That  Difcovery  opens  to  us  the  myfterious 
manner,  in  which  the  Rational  and  Moral  World  is  governed 
by  the  Supreme  Governor  of  all  Beings.  For  by  help  of  the 
DiJlin£lion  above-mentioned,  between  the  'Three  Caufes  concurring 
in  One  Univerfal  Mind,    we   may  perceive    the  Rational  Soul  of 

Man   to  be    as    it  were   an  Imprefs  of  that  Divine  Triad. In 

the  firfl:  place  ;  our  Notions  of  Vniverfality  ;  —  our  Ideas^  or 
Conceptions  of  all  the  Things  we  are  acquainted  with,  (whe- 
ther Subflances  or  Attributes,)  in  their  Genera  and  Species,  where 
Many  are  comprifed  in  One ; — our  Perception  of  Truths,  the 
mutual  Relatiofis  between  thofe  Ideas  -, — and  our  Powers  of  Rea- 
foning  from  07ie  Truth  to  another; — all  thefe  Forms  and  Energys 
of  the  Human  Mind  bear  the  Stamp  of  the  Original  Ideas, 
and  of  their  Union  in  the  Divine  Mind,  whofe  Intelledl  com- 
prehends All  of  them  together  in  One  eternal  View. In  the 

next  place  J  our  conftant  Wipes  iov  Happinefs ;  our  unavoidable 
Defires  of  whatever  we  deem  conducive  to  it ; — our  Attachment 
to  Life,  fo  long  only  as  it  promifes  more  Good  than  Evil  to 
us ; — the  Horror  we  feel  at  the  Thought  of  Annihilation,  as  it 
deftroys  all  Hopes  of  any  future  Good  at  all ; — our  Love  of 
Reality  and  Truth;  and  the  Delight  we  take  in  Order,  Har- 
mony, and  Beauty,  as  con- natural  to  us,  and  congenial  with 
o\i.x  Being; — all  thefe  inward  Motions,  or  Energys,  are  indeli- 
ble Marks  of  our  Defcent  from  Him,  the  Sovereign  Good, 
whofe  perfect  Beatitude  confifts  in  his  Idea  or  Intelligence  of 
Himf'lf,    as    the  Fountain   of    thofe   Divine   Univerfals,    juft   now 

mentioned,   and   the  CauJ'e  of  Good  to  All. In   the  laft  place; 

the  whole  Bufinefs  of  Human  Lfc,  properly  fo  termed,  (in  the 
account   of    which   we  are   not   to  reckon    thofe   Hours,    when 

our 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         345 

-our  Thinking  Part   is  employed  alone,  like  Beings  of  higher  Or- 
Jer,    in   the  contemplation  of  Nature  and   of  Nature's  Caufe,  — • 
nor   that   larger   Portion   of  our   Time,    which,   of  neccflity,    is 
devoted  wholly,    like  the  Life  oi  Brute- Animab.,   to    the  Service 
of  the  Body,)    all   the  Adions,   peculiar  to  Man,    thofe  of  deli- 
berate Choice,    or  of  free  Will,   with   every  Study,    and    every 
Amufement,  in   which  the  Mind  makes   ufe  of  the  Body,   as  her 
Injlrument,  —  Eyes,    or   Ears,     or  loco-motive    Members ;  —  all 
thefe   Employments    of  our  Time    (in   fome   or  other  of  which 
we   are   occupied  continually,   except  when   we  defcend  to  meer 
Animal-Life,   or  rife  to  the  Mental  and  Divine,)   fliow   the   reft- 
lefs  Aiftivity  of  the  Human  Soul  in   purfuit  of  fome  Good,   which 
is   peculiarly   Human.      For    wherever   the   Mind   and    the   Body 
are  employed,    Doth   together,    it    is  always    fioni  an  Expeclation 
of  Something,    good   for   the    ivhole  Man,     to    be    found    in   the 
"Employ   its   Self, — or  to  follow  it,    as  a  Confequence,  —  or,   as  an 
EffeSl,    to   be   produced   by   it. — And   this  Expedlation    is    raifed 
in    us   by   Opinion;    the   Foundation   of  which  is    either  Experi- 
ence, or  natural  Sagacity,   or  Fancy,   or  Faith    in   the   Fancys   and 
Opinions  of  other  Men.     So   that,    in   all   thefe  cafes,    the  Acli- 
iiity   of  a  Man's  Soul,    (whether  it   be  exerted   in   his  oivn  Body 
only,    without    any    farther   Operation,     or   whether    it    be    ex- 
ercifed     on    external  Suhjecis,    by   means    cA     his    Body,)     always 
operates  agreeably  to  the  Thoughts  or  Opinions  of  his  Mind,  with 
a  View   to    the  Benefit  of  his  whole  Compound-Being.     Hence  it 
follows,  that  the   Soul  peculiar   to  Man,   if  this  Account  of  it  be 
true,    is   no   other   than    the    adive  Spirit   of    the  Human  Mind, 
encrgifing    within     a    Huma?i    Body ;     in    confequence    of   whofe 
effeElive  Energys,    the  Body,    which    it  iniiabits,    is,    in  all   thofe 
Motions   which    depend   on   a   Man's   Self,    moved    according   to 
the   Will    of    his    own   Private  Mind:    in    like   manner,    as    the 
Great   Body    of   the    Univerfe   is    aduated,     and    the  Motion     of 

X  X  every 


34^ 


F   H    I    L    E    B.  U    S 


every  Part  of  it  diredled,  by  the  energetic  and  efficacious  WilP 
o£  the  Sovereign  Af/W  Univerfal.  And  in  like  manner,  as  this 
Divine  Mind,  by  energifing  within,  throughout,  and  upon  the 
Firjl  Matter,  is  the  Efficient  Caufe  of  the  Outward  World — of 
all  thofe  corporeal  and  iiatural  Forms,  which  it  confifts  of, — 
and  of  all  the  Changes  and  Variations  of  thefe  Forms,  thro 
Motion;  (with  relation  to  which  EffeSls,  the  great  Author  of 
them  is  ftyled  the  Mind  of  Nature,  and  the  Soul  of  the  World, 
or  Mind  and  Soul  Univerfal;)  —  fo  the  Human  Mind,  energifing 
ivithin  and  throughout  her  own  Body,  comes  to  be  the  Soul  of 
this  Body  of  hers,  fo  as  ta  move  and  govern  it  as  She  wills ; 
and  being  alfo,  by  means  of  this  moveable  Body,  able  to 
operate  upon  fuch  Forms  of  Nature  as  lye  within  her  Reach,, 
and  within  her  Power  to  move,  change,  and  manage  at  her 
pleafure,  (he  becomes  the  Efficient  Caufe  of  artifcial  Forms 
in  every  Art  which  flie  has-  learnt.  —  Now  if  Arguments  from 
Analogy  have  the  Weight  of  Proofs  in  any  Subject  at  all,  the 
many  concurring  Analogys,  above  fliown,  between  the  Soul  of 
the  Vniverf'  and  the  Soul  of  Man,  are,  we  venture  to  fay, 
abundant    Proofs    of  the   ExtraSfion  or  Derivation   of  the   latter 

from  the  former. Againft  this  Dodtrine  of  the  Pythagoreans^ 

of  Socrates,  and  of  the  chief  Philofophers  who  came  after  him,. 
except  Epicurus,  many  Objedlions  have  been  made:  an  Anfwer 
to  the  moft  formidable  of  them  will  ferve  to  eftablifli  the 
Dodrine  more  firmly;  and  at  the  fame  time  will  inflrutt  us 
in  That  Part  of  the  Knowlege  of  Nature,  which  it  concerns^ 
every  Man  to  be  thorowly  well  vccfcd  in, — That,  relating  to 
the  Divine  Government  of  Man y  with  a  View  to  his  Happitiefs. 
— It  has  been  argued  by  the  Objedlors,: — that,  if  One  only  Be- 
ing governs  the  whole  World,  his  Government  muft  be  abfolute,. 
his  Power  unlimited,  and  his  Will  irrefjlible :  and  that,  if  the 
fame  Being,    who  governs    the  World,    was   the  Creator  of  iti, 

and 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


347 


and  the  Author  of  Unherfal  Nature,  It  follows,  that  the  Ef- 
fential  Form  or  Nature  of  every  Kind  of  Being,  and  the 
Propertys,  or  inherent  Qualitys  belonging  to  fuch  Form,  are, 
to  every  Individual  of  the  Kind,  the  Laws  by  which  it  is 
and  muft  be  governed, — a  Declaration  of  the  Will  of  the  Su- 
preme Governor.  —  And  the  FadV,  they  fay,  is  indifputablc 
throughout  Inanimate  Nature:  for  'tis  well  known,  that  all 
Bodys  whatever,  in  all  their  Motions,  uniformly  obey  the  Ge- 
neral Laws,  impreft  on  all  Corporeal  Being  by  its  Creator. 
Nor  is  the  Fadt  lefs  evident,  fay  they,  in  the  ^lalitys  of  all 
Bodys,  than  it  is  in  their  Motions:  the  Elemefits  of  Nature, 
for  inftance,  adl  and  are  ad:ed  on,  according  to  the  ASlive  and 
PaJJivc  Powers,  with  which  they  are  feverally  inverted  by  The 
All-powerful :  and  every  Mineral  and  every  Vegetable  operates 
according  to  the  Virtues,  with  which  the  Eflential  Form  or 
Nature  of  it  is  endued :  for  whatever  is  certain  in  any  of 
the  Arts,  the  Mechanical  and  the  Military,  in  Agriculture  and 
Navigation,  or  in  Chemiftry  and  Medicine,  depends  on  the 
conftant  the  unfailing  Effedl  of  thofe  Laws,  Powers,  and  Vir- 
tues.  And  this  Foundation  of  our  Adverfary's  Argument  un- 
doubtedly is  true.  For  all  Bodys,  and  every  Particle  of  Body, 
whether  Elementary  or  Mixt,  not  endued  with  Senfe,  having 
no  Particular  Souls  of  their  own,  are  as  it  were  in  the  Hands 
of  their  Creator,  to  be  moved  and  managed  ifnmediately  by 
Him.  Their  Motions  therefore,  and  the  Operations  and  Effeds 
of  their  feveral  Powers,  muft  of  courfe  be  as  conjlant  and  as 
unerring  as  That  impowering  Mind  who  moves  thetn,  as  being 
the   Soul   of   the  Univerfe,    the    only    Soul,    which    thofe  Bodys 

have. The   Objediors    to    the   ancient   Dodrine    concerning 

Human  Nature  proceed,  and  tell  us,  that  all  Beings,  animated 
with  Souls,  no  lefs  uniformly  obey  the  Laws  implanted  in 
ibeir  Nature, — the  Laws  of  Senfe, — being   governed  in   all  their 

X  X  2  Adions 


348  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Anions  by  a  Feeling  of  prcfent,  or  an  Apprehenfion  of  future 
Pain  or  Pleafure:    for   'tis  only    thro   thefe   thtix  Animal-Feelings 
and  Apprehenjions,  lay  they,   that  we    are  able   to  tame  many  of 
the  Wild    by   nature,    and   to   make    the  naturally  Tame  fubjeft 
to   our  Will.  —  This   alfo   is  readily  admitted.     For  all  Souls, 
not    endued    with   Reafon,    having  no  Particular  Minds   of   their 
own,    are  guided   in  the  Motions   which    they  .give   their  Bodys, 
by  the  governing  Mi?id  of  the  JJni-'cerfe :   and  his  General  Direc- 
tions,  in   what  Way  they  are    to    go,    are  given   them    thro   na- 
tural Imptil/es  or  Injlin^s :   but  Thefe  being   infufficient   to  guide 
them    aright,    in    a    World    where    all    things    are     fubjed;    to 
Change  and    Motion,    Particular  DireSlians   are   fuperadded  con- 
tinually thro  Senfe  and  Memory, — Senfe  of  the  prefent,   and  Me- 
mory of  the  paji.'     ■■Thus  far  then  the  Defenders  and  the  Oppofers 
of   the    original    and   native  Divinity    of   Man's    Intelieclual  Soul 
are  agreed  in  their  Notions   concerning  Nature,  and  the  Goverti- 
ment  of  the  World.     But   here   they  divide.      For    the  Degraders 
of  Human  Nature,    proceeding  on   the  Ground  of  thofe  fettled 
Preliminarys,    affert,    that  the   Divine   Government  is    alike   over 
all  Creatures,    uniformly    abfoliite,    and  defpotic;    and   that  Maa 
adls  from  Necejjity,   as   well  as  all    other  Animals,   being  guided 
by    the    fame    irrefiAible    Law   of  Senfe,    implanted    in    all    the 
Sentient    Part    of   Nature.      That   Faculty    in    Man,    which   is 
commonly   called  Reafon,    is,    according  to  Them,    only  a  larger 
Compafs   of  Imagination,    and   a  Memory   more    amply    furniilied, 
than    other  Animals   are   poffeffed    of.     And   Maji   enjoys    thefe 
fuperior  Advantages,    fay  They,    from  his    acquaintance  with  a- 
greater  Multitude  of  Scnfible  Objeds ;   into  which   acquaintance 
he    is    brought    by    the   greater    number    of    his   Wants.       For, 
being   left    by   Nature    lefs   defended,    than  any    other  Animals,, 
from    the    frequent   Inclemencys    of  the   Air,     and    lefs    able    to 
refill   the  Attacks   of   an  Enemy ;    being    alfo   fubjed   to   more. 

internal 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  349 

internal  Maladys,  and  to  more  accidental  Mifchiefs  from  without; 
he  is  naturally  led  to  feek  for  Protedion  and  Defence,  Relief 
and  Remedy,  from  all  the  Body:  around  him,  the  Inanimate,  the 
Vegetable,  and  the  Animal;  and  for  thefe  Purpofes,  to  fearch 
out  their  Occult  ^alitys,  that  is,  fuch  Propertys  and  Poivers 
in  them,  as  are  not  obvious  to  Senfe.  In  the  beginning  of 
this  Search,.  Man  has  no  other  Guides,  fay  They,  than  his 
own  Five  Senfes,  together  with  the  Scnjibk  ^alitys  of  thofe 
Bodys.  Afterward,  as  his  Knowlege  of  Nature  increafes  with  his 
Searches  and  his  Experiments,  his  Memory,  fay  They,  affifts  him 
with  Similitudes  and  Analogy's ;  and  Thefe  fupply  his  Imagination,. 
(which  his  Wants  keep  in  continual  Exercife,)  with  copious 
Matter  for  the  Invention  of  Arts.  Thofe  Arts,  fay  They,  which, 
are  the  moft  boafled  of,  as  Proofs  of  Human  Wifdom,  and 
of  a  Divine  Principle  in  Man,  derived  from  the  Legijlator  and 
Governor  of  the  Univerfe, — the  Arts  of  Govertinient  and  Legijla- 
tion, — prove,  that  Man  is  no  more  a  Rational  Animal,  than  Such 
as  he  is  pleafed  to  term  Brutes.  For  the  necefTity  of  making- 
Penal  Laws,  and  of  governing  by  Compuljion,  fliows,  fay  They, 
that  Men  are  not  to  be  reftrained  from  following  their  In- 
clinations,, Appetites,  and  Paffions,  otherwife  than  by  Fear  o£ 
fufering  what  is  painful,  or  of  loftng  what  is  pleafurable  to  the 
Senfcs.  And  they  pretend,  that  all  inrtituted  Religions  are  built 
on  that  very  Ground:  for  that  the  Sanations  of  their  Prohibi- 
tions and  Injundions  fuppofe  Men  to  be  governable  only  thro 
the  fame  Principles, — Fear  of  Serifible  Pain,  and  Ilope  of  Sen- 
Jible  Pleafure,  in  fome  Future  State  of  Being.  Now,  fay  They, 
if  the  Principles  of  Reafon,  of  Juftice,  and  Goodnefs,  were 
ejjhitial  to  the  Soul  of  Man,  (as  they  would  be,  if  the  EJfence 
of  it  was  Divine,  or  of  Divine  Original,)  —  if  Man  could  na- 
turally difcern  between  Juji  and  Unjujl, — and  if  his  Nature  led 
him  to  adhere  to  the  former,  and  to  fhun  the  latter, — Human 
6  Laws> 


35^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Laws,  and  Human  Governments,  would  be  then  unneceffary 
for  the  diredion  of  Man's  Moral  Condudl :  Univerfal  Jujlice 
would  be  his  Natural  Law ;  to  which  he  would  be  fubjeft, 
as  irrefillibly,  as  all  other  Beings  are  to  the  Laws  of  Their 
refpedive  Natures. — But  fince  the  Cafe  is  quite  otherwife,  being 
as  above  flated,  it  fliould  feem,  fay  They,  that  the  Soul  of 
Man  is  derived  from  fomc  other  Source  than  the  Divine  Mind, 
the  Fountain  of  Wifdom, — namely,  from  Matter,  tht  Root  of  Evil ; 
■ — and  that,  like  the  Souls  of  all  other  Animals,  it  is  Corporeal 
and  Mortal:  —  that,  as  the  ^rtj  of  Building  were  invented  by 
Men,  to  n^elter  them  from  foul  Weather  and  fierce  Animals, 
fo  Religions,  Goz'ernments,  and  Laws,  were  contrived  and  framed 
by  Men,  to  proteft  and  fecure  them  againft  Thofe  of  their  own 
Species,  who  excelled  in  Bodily  Strength;  as  it  was  to  be  feared, 
-that,  without  thefe  Inventions,  the  Men  of  Might  would  feize 
on  all  the  Bountys  of  Nature  for  the  fole  Ufe  of  Themfelves 
and    their    own   Familys ;    and    would    rob   and   defpoil,    injure 

and   deflroy  Others   at   their  pleafure.  To  thefe   and   other 

fuch  Arguments,  in  which  the  Rational  and  the  Animal  Natures 
are  confounded  together,  and  the  Soul  of  Man  is  put  on  a  Level 
,(as  to  Kind)  with  the  Souls  of  Brutes,  it  is  anfwered,  —  that 
Mind,  or  the  Faculty  of  perceiving  Mental  ObjeBs,  differs  from 
Senfe,  or  the  Faculty  of  perceiving  Senfible  ObjeSls,  as  much, 
as  Monad  differs  from  Multitude,  or  as  Univerfal  differs  from 
Particular.  —  By  the  Mind  or  Rational  Faculty,  i7iany  Senfible 
Objedls,  of  one  and  the  fame  Kind,  (or  rather  all  of  the 
Kind,  how  few  of  them  foever  may  have  fallen  under 
the  cognifance  of  the  Serfes,)  are  viewed  together  as  One,  by 
an  inftantaneous  A5i  (as  it  were  a  Glance)  of  the  Mind;  in 
which  ffie  fecms  to  throw  her  Eye  over  the  whole  Senfible 
Univerfcj  and  immediately  to  fort  out,  colledt  together  and 
unite,  uill  the  Individuals  of  fome  One  Kind, — not  only  All,   then 

fxijiin^f 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         351 

exijiing,    but    all    Thofe    alfo    which    are   paj,    and    all    Thofc 
which   are   to    come;  —  as   if  all  Places,    and   all  Ages    were  at 
once  prcjent   to   her  View.      So  full   and  complete  a  Tranfcript 
of  iovsxt  Fart  of  Eternal  Being,   is  This   and   every  oiher  Mental 
OijeSl,    in  every  Particular  Mind !  —  By    the  Senfe,    or  Senfitive 
Faculty,    Senfible  Objeds   of   the    fame  Kind   are   perceived  Je- 
parately  and  dijliri&ly.  Each  of  them   apart  from    the  reft  :    and 
tho   they   may   be,    afterwards,    aflembled   together   in    the  Me- 
mory or  Imagination,  yet  they  ftill  continue  feparate,   as  fo  many 
diJiinSl    Ones;    and    ftill    they    admit    tnore    of   the    fame   Kind. 
For  Imagination    is   indefinite,    as    well    as    Senfe;    the   Obje£h  of 
Each    are   infinite   in  Number ;    and   to  every  Infinite   in   Number, 
enumerate   as  many  as  you  will.   More  may  be  for  ever  added  ; 
fo  far  doth   the  ^xt-i.U.'^  Multitude  fall  fliort  oi  All  I   and   fu  dif- 
ferent  a   Thing    is  Infinity    from    Univerfality  I    not    lefs    far    do 
Senfible   Objeds   fall   {hort  of  Mental ;    and   not   lefs    different   is 
Senfe  from  Mind,  in  Comprehcjifivenefs,   as   well   as  in  Purity    and 
Perfe6lion.     The  Difference  between  them  would  eafily  be  feen, 
were    they    not    fo    clofely    conneded,    as   they  are,    in    Human 
Souls:    for   in   Thefe,    on   the  one  hand,    ObjeBls  of  Serf e   natu- 
rally excite   Ideas;    on    the    other  hand.   Images  of  Senfible  Ob- 
jeds    never    fiiil    to   obtrude   themfclves   on  every  Idea;     nor   do 
they   ever  fail  to   narrow  and  abridge,   as  well  as  to  vitiate  and. 
deprave,  every  Idea,    which    they   mix.  with. — Man   is   an  Ani- 
mal,   to  whofe   Sentient  Soul  is    fuper-added   a  Mind;    or  rather, 
perhaps,    in    whofe   Soul'  are    implanted    the  Principles   of  Mind 
and  Science.     In  Some  happy  Souls,   thefe  Principles   take  deeper 
Poot,    than  they  do   in  Others  of  the  Kind.     Some  alfo   are  fo 
fortunate,    as   to  meet   with   a   better  Cultivation   of  that  divine 
Plant,   than  Others.     In  Some   Places,   it   is  JJjeltered  from   the 
Storms,    raifed    by   Malice   and   Ignorance  j    it    is    enlivened    by 
the   opening   V/armth    of   Liberty    and   Independance  j    and   is 
6,  firengthened. 


55^ 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 


lircwrthcned  by  the  Breath  of  cool  Controverfy  and  ingenuous 
Debate:  in  Other  Places,  it  is  expofed  to  the  Tempefts  of  Ty- 
ranny ;  blajled  by  the  biting  Airs  of  Oppreflion,  Penury,  or 
Superilition  ;  or  'tis  dryed  up  and  withered  by  the  Heat  of  re- 
li'MOUS  Enthufiafm.       Some  Kinds  of  Science,    efpecially  if  im- 

to  ... 

planted   in  generous  Souls,    as    it   were   in   Soils   fitted   to   receive 
them,    {hoot    up   quickeft,    or  fpread    wideft,    in    the   Sun-fliine 
of  Praife    and   Glory:    other    Kinds,     the    mod   abflraded    from 
Body,    if  implanted    in   Souls  the   nobleft  of   all,    as   it  were  in 
the   richefl:  Soils  of  the   hottefl  Climates,    thrive  perhaps   better 
in   the   Shade;    tho    in    Souls    lefs   noble,    the  Saplings    of   thefe 
Kinds   are    apt   to    dye    the    fooneft  of  any,    if   thofe   animating 
Rays  from  without  do  not  reach  them.     To  thefe  and  the  like 
Caufes    are   to   be   afcribed    the  different  Degrees   of  Knowlege, 
Wifdom,  and  Virtue,  and  of  their  Contrarys  alfo,  found  amongft 

]\Ien. Wi/do7n,    Virtue,    and  Knowlege,    are    feated  in  the  Ra~ 

tional   Part   of   the    Soul  :    their  Co7itrarys  poffbfs    the  Irrational 
Part,    in    a  Degree  proportioned   to   the  Want  of  thofe   Qualitys 
in    the  Rational.      Nor    only    do  Men    differ  greatly,    One  from 
Another,    in    thefe    refpeds ;    but    alfo  the  Same  Man,    at   dif- 
ferent  times,    as  greatly   differs   from  Himfelf.       For  fometimes 
.we  follow  the  Rules  of  Reafon,  Wifdom,  and  Virtue  :   at  other 
..times  -we  fuiier   our  felves,    in   violation   of  thofe  Rules,    to   be 
led   by  Senje,   and    the  PaJJions  of  the   Animal-Soul  :    and  Thefe, 
tho  regular  and   bounded   in    all  Brute-Animals,   yet  in  Man  are 
Jawlefs    and    infinite ^     becaufe,     Man's    Imagination    being     un- 
bounded. Whoever  has  not  the  Knowlege  of  True  Good  habi- 
tually  prefent  to  his  Mind,    and  the  Attainment  of  it  always  at 
his  Heart,    is    apt    to    employ    his   Memory,     and     his    Rational 
Powers,    in   the  gratification    of  his  Defires ;    and   a  Man's  De- 
fires,   limited  as  they  are  by  Nature,   and   born  of  limited  Senfe, 
yet   feeding  on  the  Fancys,    firctch   and   grow   to   a  Size  beyond 

all 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  553 

all  Bound  and  Meafure. Seeing  then,  that  Man  is  (o  va- 
rious and  vague  a  Being,  we  cannot  fuppofe,  that  he  is  to 
be  governed  well  in  any  one  certain  way.  Accordingly,  in 
the  Divine  Government  of  the  World,  Good  and  EvI/  Men, 
the  Wife  and  the  Foo/i//:,  are  led  towards  That,  which  is  the 
End  of  Man,  thro  different  Roads;  and  Philofophy  Hands,  as  a 
Mercury,  to  point  them  out.  —  Now  the  nature  of  what  is 
•good  is  then  moft  confpicuous,  when  viewed  in  the  moft  per- 
JeB  State  of  it,  unmixed  with  Evil :  and  the  nature  of  what 
•IS  evil  is  not  difcerned  clearly,  unlefs  it  be  carried  to  Extrc- 
jnity,  unmixed  with  Good.  Let  us  therefore,  on  one  fide, 
fuppofe  a  Man,  intelligent  and  confcious  of  the  Divine  Principle 
within  himfelf ;  and  wife  in  knowing,  from  What  Fountain  he 
derives  the  Superior  Part  of  his  Soul:  Such  a  Man  muft  have 
his  Inward  Eye  fleadily  fixed  on  the  Princely  Ideas,  prefiding 
in  that  Part,  —  namely,  to  i^lxatov,  to  -kocKov,  kc.\  raya^oi', 
"The  yujl,  The  Beautiful,  and  Tbc  Good, — Ideas,  which  compre- 
hend the  whole  Choir  of  Particular  Virtues,  every  Species  of 
Beauty  and  Lovelinefs,  and  every  Kind  of  Things  conducive 
to*  real  and  permanent  Felicity:  and  Such  a  Man  cannot  fail 
of  keeping,  in  every  Walk  of  Human  Life,  along  that  un- 
broken Line  of  "Truth  and  Moral  RcBitude,  or  IJniverfal  fii/iice, 
every  Step  of  which  is  ftrown  with  Heart-felt  Delights,  and 
the  End  of  which  is  the  Height  of  Human  Happinefs.  For 
Q.  Man  cannot  but  fx  his  Eye  on  That  which  he  admires,  if 
he  continues  within  Sight  of  it ;  he  cannot  but  admire  Beauty, 
if  he  perceives  it ;  he  cannot  but  perceive  the  Beauty  which 
lie  looks  at,  if  he  hath  a  Senfe  of  Beauty ;  and  if,  having  this 
Senfe,  or  Tajle,  he  perceives  any  thing  beauteous,  and  continues 
to  look  at  and  admire  it,  he  cannot  help  having  a  Love  of  it, 
proportioned  to  the  degree  of  its  Beauty.  Farther ;  whatever  a 
Man  knows  beneficial  to  him,  he  cannot   but  prefer  it  to  every 

Y  y  thing 


354         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

thing  which  he  knows  hurtful  to  him,  or  lefs  beneficial  :  if 
the  Good,  fo  preferred,  is  not  in  his  PojJcJJion,  or  within  his 
Power  of  poflefTing  it,  he  cannot  but  dejire  and  furfue,  till  he 
obtains  it;  and  if  he  is  already  pqffe/Jed  of  it,  he  cannot  refift 
an  Impulfe  or  Defire,  which  he  feels,  to  hold  it  faji.  The 
Man  therefore,  who  knows  Himfelf,  his  Better  Self,  and  his 
Origin,  —  the  Man,  who  perceives,  that  'Truth  and  Univerfal 
yiijiice  are  abfolutely  the  faireji  and  the  ^_y?  of  Things,  and 
to  Man  the  moft  beneficiaU  —  or>  in  Platonic  Language,  that 
TO  S'tKctiov  The  "Jiiji  is  the  Same  with  to  jckAoV  xai  T'a>a3-oV  The 
Beautijul  and  The  Good,  —  He  can  never  lofe  Sight  of  them  j 
his  Heart  and  Mind  are  fixed  on  the  Obje^  of  his  Love  and 
Defire;  and  as  far  as  he.  has  it  in  Pojfejjlon,  every  A£lion  of  his, 
moving  from  that  Love,  ftrengthens  the  Habit,  or  Hold,  which 
he  has  of  the  ObjcSi  of  it.  Now  the  State  of  fuch  a  Man's 
Mind  muft  be  attended  with  as  much  Happinefs,  as  the  Human- 
Mind  is  capable  of  enjoying.  For,  if  the  Beatitude  of  the 
Supre?ne  Being  confifts  in  the  Contemplation  of  Himfelf, — and 
if  thofe  Ideas,  of  all  the  moft  comprehenfive.  Beauty,  Truths 
and  Good,  are  Himfelf,  —  his  Mind,  —  the  eternal  ObjeSl  of  his 
Contemplation, — it  follows,  that,  in  imparting  thofe  Lleas,  he 
imparts  Himfelf,  and  his  own  Beatitude; — on  which  Participation 
is  founded  all  the  Happinefs,  enjoyed  by  any  Particular  Mind. 
i^In  the  Mind  of  Man,  indeed,  even  of  the  Wifeft,  thefe  //«- 
farted  and  derivative  Ideas  muft  ever  fall  fliort  of  the  Totality, 
Purity,  zr\A  PerfeSlion  of  the  Divine  Originals:  but  Man,  how- 
ever, has  a  Power  of  purifying  his  Mind  more  and  more,  and 
of  continually  advancing  it  nearer  to  Perfection,  by  direding 
his  Mental  Eye  to  that  Place  within  the  Soul,  (as  Plato  fpeaks 
in  his  Firfi  Alcibiades,)  where  the  Divine  Mind  is  always  pre- 
fent ;  where  he  governs  with  Paternal  Authority,  by  making 
his  Prefence  perceived  and  feltj  and  where  he  diredls,  infallibly 
6  aright. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U     S.         355 

aright.  That  Private  Mind,  which  diredls  every  Adion  of 
the  Man.  Here  then  the  Wife  and  Good  Man  finds  at  the 
fame  time  the  perfeft  Rule,  to  direcl  his  ConduB, — and  the  Pa- 
rental Guardian  of  his  Mind,  to  preiient  his  Mif-apprebenfton  of  that 
Rule,  by  redifying  his  Ideas  depraved  by  Setife  and  Imagina- 
tion. So  fimple,  uniform  and  eafy,  is  the  Divine  Government, 
when  the  Subjedls  of  it  are  Such  happy  Souls  as,  to  ufe  the 
Words  of  our  admirable  Poet,   are 

. Belf-kno'wing,  and  from  thence 


Magnanimous,  to  cor  re/pond  with  Heav'n  ; 

Milton,  Par:  Loft,  B.  7. 

Such,  as  are  bleft  alfo  with  a  ConfcioJifnefs  of  that  Correfpondence, 
and  with  a  Certainty  of  having  their  Conduit  approved  by  the 
Author    of  their  Being   and   Happinefs,    in    their   knowing   it  to 

be   agreeable   to   his   own   Mind, We  may  farther  imagine, 

that  the  ConditioJi  of  the  Man,  whom  we  have  been  fuppofing, 
is  attended  with  a  certain  Circumftance, — Such  a  one,  as  lets  in 
the  firongefl  Light,  every  Article  of  the  Subjedl  immediately 
before  usj — Such  a  one,  as  clearly  fhows,  ift,  the  wide  Dif- 
ference between  Senfe  and  Reajon,  —  2dly,  the  Divine  Origin  of 
\ht  Rational  Part  of  the  Human  Soul, — 3dly,  the  peculiar  Hap- 
pinefs of  a  Man,  the  whole  Conduit  of  Vv'hofe  Life  is  under 
the  Guidance  of  This  his  better  Principle  of  Adtion,  —  and 
laftly,  the  manner  of  That  Governraent,  in  which  the  Father  of 
all  Minds  fuperintends,  fupremely  bleffes,  and  lifts  the  nearefl: 
to  Perfeolion,  (the  nearefl  to  Ilimflf,)  the  moH:  excellent  of  his 
Offspring.  The  Circumftance,  here  meant,  is  the  Enjoyment  of 
pure  and  perfect  Friendftoip.  That  our  Suppofitlon  of  this  Cir- 
cumftance hath  a  Foundation  in  Nature,  and  is  not  meerly 
imaginary,  appears  from  its  being  the  deepeft  Bofom-Wifh  of 
every    Soul,    fufceptible    of    fo    godlike    an    AfTedtion,    to    meet 

Y  y  2  with 


35^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


with  that  Enjoyment.  Now,  If  fuch  a  Wifli  be  natural  to 
the  Bed  of  the  Human  Species,  the  Enjoyment  of  it  muft  be 
fuitable  to  their  Nature;  and  if  fo,  it  proves  inconteflably 
the  Four  Points,  above  recited  :  as  will  appear  from  the  fol- 
lowing fummary   account  of  the  Nature   and  Caufe  of  pure  and 

perfeft  FriendJJnp. All  Bene'voknce,  Love,  or  AffeSiion,    from 

the  lowefl  to  the  highefl  degree  of  it,  feems  to  be  founded 
on  feme  real  or  fuppofed  Similitude, — Samenefs  of  Kiiid,  inferring- 
many  general  Similitudes,  attrads  Men,  one  to  another,  and 
alTociates  them  together. — Samenefs  of  Country,  by  Birth  and 
Education,  producing  a  Similitude  between  Men  in  their  out- 
ward Manners  and  Cujioms,  conciliates  a  greater  degree  of  Be- 
nevolence, than  is  felt  by  Strangers  to  each  other.  —  Samenefs 
of  Injlitiition  in  matters  of  Difcipline  or  Teaching,  as  it  pro- 
duces a  Similitude  of  Notions,  and  often  of  Opinions  alfo,  in  the' 
Mind,  engages  a  degree  of  mutual  Benevolence,  greater  than 
what  arifes  from  being  born  and  bred  in  the  fame  Country. 
—Farther;  any  Two  Perfons,  who  have  a  Knowlege  of  their 
Tiefcent  from  one  common  Ancejlor,  conceive  an  Aifcdion  for 
each  other,  more  or  lefs,  in  proportion  to  the  Degree  of  their 
Propinquity  in  Blood,  from  a  natural  prefumption  of  fome  Si- 
militude in  their  Tempers  and  Difpojitions,  which  they  fuppofe  to 
be  derived  from  the  fame  Fountain.  —  A  Stmilitude  of  Mind, 
between  Thefe  or  any  other  Two  Perfons,  perceived  by  Them- 
felves  thro  an  Acquaintance  with  each  other,  draws  on,  by  de- 
grees, a  mutual  Intimacy  and  Familiarity,  with  a  free  Communi- 
cation of  their  Sentiments  and  Thoughts  on  every  Subjedl.  — 
An  Amiablenefs  of  Temper,  Mind,  and  Moral  CharaBer,  in  v/hich 
any  Two  Perfons  are  alike,  combines  them  in  mutual  Amity, 
"Ejleem,  and  Love.  And  as  the  Lleas,  Sentiments  and  Manners, 
above  mentioned,  are  of  all  things  the  fairejl  and  the  moft 
amiable,    fo    they    conciliate    the    moil    intire  Love    and   Amity 

betvveeiv 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


357 


between  Perfons,  who  have  their  Minds  filled  with  thofe  Ideas, 
pregnant  with  thofe  Sentiments,  and  viiiblc  to  each  other  in 
thofe  Manners. — But  nothing  befide  AJJurance,  in  Each  of  the  Per- 
fons fo  combined,  of  the  Continuance  of  that  amiable  Temper, 
Mind,  and  Moral  Charadler  in  the  Other  Party,  can  unite 
them  in  a  perfeSi  FriendJJnp,  as  durable  as  their  Beings. 
And,  altho  a  particular  Temperament  of  Body,  in  which  fome 
one  Humour  ftrongly  predominates  by  nature,  may  perhaps 
ififiire  (in  fome  meafure)  a  permanent  Temper  in  the  Soul ;  (an 
Infurance,,  rendered  very  fallible  by  the  Changes,  to  which  r.ll 
Corporeal  Things  are  liable;) — 'tis  certain,  that  the  only  firm 
Ground  of  Dependance  on  a  Conjiancy  of  Mind  and  a  Conjijlency 
of  Manners,  whether  in  one's  Self  or  in  any  other  Perfon,  is 
XkiQ  Science  oi  Mind,  with  which  That  oi  Morals  is  immediately 
conned:ed  : — nor  is  it  lefs  certain,  that  the  perma?ient  Abode  of 
any  Science  in  any  Human  Mind,  (fo  apt  to  be  forgetful  as  the 
Mind  of  Man  is,)  depends  on  frequently  recurring  to  the 
Principles  of  that  Science.  Now  the  Principles  of  all  the  Scieticcs 
are  contained  in,  and  flow  from,  the  Principles  of  Mind :  and 
thefe  Univerfal  Principles  in  their  Purity,  free  from  all  Images 
of  Corporeal  Things,  are  no  where  to  be  found  but  in  Mind 
Univerfal ; — in  That  Divi?te  Light  which,  enlightening  all  Par- 
ticular Minds,  enables  them  to  fee  whatever  Truth  is  adlually 
by  Them  ken  ; — That  pure  Light,  in  which  eternally  dwell  all 
pure  Ideas ;  and  in  which  (we  may  prefume)  live  for  ever  all 
fuch  Minds,  as  are  entirely  purfed  from  Senfe,  and  divejied 
of  every  the  lead  Relick  of  Senfble  Things :  and  from  thefe 
Premifes  it  follows,  that  an  ample  Security  for  perfect  Friend- 
Jhip,  (the  Permanence  of  mutual  Love  and  Amity,  founded  on. 
Moral  Science,)  is  to  be  obtained  by  Thofe,  and  by  Thofe 
only,  who  are  under  the  immediate  Influence  and  Guidance  of 
the  great  Parental  Mind, — the  fole  Bond  of  perfe£l  Union  between 
6  his 


'X:;S  P     H     I     L     E    B     U     S. 

his  Offspring. Thus   have  we  attempted   to  give  a  Sketch   of 

the  CharadUr  and  the  Condition  of  thofe  godlike  Souls,  who 
may  properly  be  faid,  in  every  Senfe  of  the  Expreffion,  to  be 
governed  hy  Divine  Love.  Whether  the  CharaBer  does,  or  ever 
did,  or  indeed  can,  exifl:  on  Earth,  in  fo  high  a  degree  of 
Excellence  as  we  have  fuppofed,  is  not  our  Bufinefs  now  to 
examine:  its  Ideal  Effe?ice,  and  the  pofibility  of  its  Exijlence, 
fuffice  to  the  prefent  Argument  :  but  the  aclital  Exijlence  (at 
leait   for  any    confiderable    time)    of   a   Chara5ler,    the   reverfe  of 

it,   appears   much   more  doubtful. For  if,   on  the  other  fide, 

we    fuppofe   a  Man,    wholly  blind    to    the   Ideas    of  Truth,    Ho- 
ncfty,  and  GoodneJ's,  —  unconfcious  of  any  Principle  within   him, 
of  hio-her   dignity   than  the  Power   of  Senfation,    we    muft  fup- 
pofe   him    under    the    abfolute    uncontrolled    Dominion    of    the 
Paffions,  which    arife  from   external  Things    magnified   by  Ima- 
gination ;  —  v/e  muft   fuppofe  ConJ'cience,   or  the   innate  Senfe  of 
Juji   and  Unjtijl,    and   every   Feeling   alfo  of  Natural  and   Socia^ 
JffeSlion,    quite    flupefied,    if   not   extitiB,    in    him  ;    for    fuch    a 
Senfe  and  fuch  a  Feeling  always  awaken  thofe  Ideas  in  every  Soul, 
where  they  have  a  Place,   as  it   were,  but  lye  dormant :  —  we 
muft   fuppofe   him   therefore   to    adl   counter   to    the  Nature  of 
a  Rational   and    Social  Being,     by    violating    the    Laws    of  juft: 
Bound  and  equitable  Meafure,  whenever  they  oppofe  the  bound- 

lefs    Demands    of    his    immoderate    Paflions. Such    are   the 

chief  Outlines  of  a  CharaSler,  too  hateful  to  be  dwelt  on.  — 
As  to  the  inward  Condition  of  fuch  a  Man,  if  fuch  a  Man  there  be, 
'tis  evident,  that  he  muft  ever  be  without  the  Complacency  and 
Satisfatlion,  the  Delights  and  Joys,  which  attend  thofe  Ideas  and 
Sentiments,  thofe  Affedlions  and  ASiions,  belonging  to  the  Cha- 
rafter  above  delineated. — 'Tis  no  lefs  evident,  that,  being  ig- 
norant of  his  own  true  Being,  and  the  native  Independance 
of  it  on  all  Exterior  Things,    he   muft  be,  firft,  a  Slave   to  his 

Deli  re 


P    H    I    Iv    E    B    U    S.  359 

Defire  of  Uicfe  Things,  for  want  of  knowing  any  better  ;  and 
he  will,  then,  c^fily  become  a  Slave  to  Thofe  of  his  own 
Species,  who  feem  to  have  them  in  their  Power  to  beftow, 
— efpecially,  to  fome  One,  who  affumes  a  Power,  which  of 
right  belongs  to  None  but  the  Supreme  Governor  of  the 
World, — the  Power  of  giving  and  taking  them  away  as  He 
thinks  fit  : — fo  that  the  wretched  Mortal,  we  are  here  fup- 
pofing,  not  only  never  enjoys  any  of  the  Sweets  of  his  na- 
tive  Liberty,    but    has   neither  Inclination    nor  ReliOi    for   them, 

perhaps    not   the  leaft  Notion   or  Thought   of  them. It   is 

evident  farther,  that,  being  ignorant  of  his  Relation  to  the  great 
Parental  Mind,  (to  his  natural  Dependence  on  whom,  he  owes 
his  natural  Independence  on  all  Other  things)  he  can  never  feel 
That  Freedom  from  all  anxious  Care,  That  Serenity  and  Cheer- 
Julncfs  of  Soul,  which  can  only  be  infpired  by  a  Filial  Conji- 
dence  in  Paternal  Wijdom   and  Goodnefs,   together  with  a  Confciouf- 

nefs  oi  Filial  Gratitude. And  farther  ftill,    'tis  evident,  that, 

being  ignorant  alfo  of  the  Brotherly  Relation,  which  his  Mind 
bears  to  the  Minds  of  other  Rational  Beings,  he  can  never  en- 
joy the  pure  and  fincere  Delights  of  rational  and  fecial  Con- 
verje:  nor,  abflraded  from  Selfifh  Views,  can  he  take  Pleafure 
in  the  Company  or  Sig/.^t  of  Any  of  his  Species  ;  for,  confcious 
of  no  Benevolence  towards  them  in  his  own  Heart,  he  fup- 
pofes  none  to  be  in  the  Plearts  of  Others :  ftill  lefs  is  it  pof- 
fible,  that  he  (hould  ever  tafle  of  the  refined  Pleafures  of  per- 
feft  Friendjbip  and  pure  Love ;  fince  he  is  utterly  incapable  of 
either  being,  or  having,  a  true  Friend.  —  Thus  much  for  the 
Condition  of  his  Mind,  —  a  Condition,    which   any   Other,    thaa 

Such   a  Man,    would  deem   iiifupportable   to  a  Man's   Self.  

As  to  his  Condition,  next,  with  regard  to  his  Fellow-Men,  iit 
the  Midil  of  whom  he  lives  :  to  Thefe,  whatever  be  his  Rank 
amongft  them   in  Outward  Life,   he  mufl:  be  wholly  infupport- 

able> 


36o         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

able,  if  he  afts  according  to  his  own  Will  and  Pleafure.  For, 
ading  thus,  if  he  be  an  Al-jolute  Monarch,  he  will  be  foon 
flain  by  his  own  Soldiery :  if  he  be  a  King  or  Supreme  Ma- 
gi ftrate,  being  condemned  by  Laws  univerlally  knoivn,  his  own 
Subjects  will  become  his  Executiojicrs :  if  he  be  a  Private  Per- 
fon,  a  fpeedy  End  will  be  put  to  his  lawlefs  Life  by  the 
Magijlracy  of  his  Country.  But  if,  living  under  a  Legal  Go- 
vernment, fuch  a  Man  is  retrained  by  the  La'uis  from  openly 
acting  as  he  would,  'tis  becaufe  the  Pafiion  of  Fear  is  the 
predominant  Paflion  of  his  Soul.  For  if,  under  this  Reftraint, 
he  happens  to  be  a  Private  Perfon,  he  will  ule  Fraud  inflead 
of  Violence,  for  the  Means  of  accompliihing  his  Ends,  and  of 
efcaping,  at  the  fame  time,  the  Punilliment  threatened  by  the 
Laws  :  and  if  he  happens  to  be  ^7;/^,  he  will  employ  all  his 
■Cunning  to  get  rid  of  the  Reflraint,  by  fecretly  and  gradually 
acquiring  an  Authority  with  the  People,  fiiperior  to  That  of  the 
JLiaivs,   or  a  Power  which  may  put  him  above  their  Reach. 

Telle  periclum, 

'Et  vaga  profiUet  frcenis  natura  remotis. 

JJorat:  Sat: 

The  Thread  and  Danger  gone,  he  gives  a  Loo/e 
To  his  loi/d  Genius ;    like  the  Mountain-Colt, 
Set  free  from  Bit  and  Bridle,  fir  ait  he  bounds 
Exulting ;  fpurns  at  Man  ;    and  high  o'erleapsy 
Indignant,   every  Barrier  Man    can  raife. 

But,  when  this  Slave  to  his  own  PafTions  hath  ufurped  an  ah- 
foliite  Do7}iinion  over  the  Perfons  and  Propertys  of  the  People, 
and  hath  aflumed  an  uncontrolled  or  arbitrary  Sway  in  all  their 
Public  Affairs,  if,  after  This,  he  abilains  from  the  commifllon 
of  any  Piece  of  Injuftice,  to  which  his  Pajjions  urge  him,  and 
from    wliich    (by   our    Hypothefis)    no    inward   Senfe  of  Jujlice 

witholds 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         361 

^Itliolds  him, — in  fuch  a  fuppofed  cafe,  we  may  fairly  con- 
clude, that  Fear,  to  which  every  Tyrant  mufl  be  always  fub- 
jeft,  operates  in  his  Soul  more  forcibly,  than  the  rert  of  his 
PafTions,  be  they  ever  fo  violent.  On  the  other  hand,  if  ever 
he  performs  an  Aiflion,  the  Motives  to  which,  in  Other  Men, 
would  be  Cenerojity  and  Goodnefs,  or  Equity  and  Humanity,  'tis 
not  uncandid  to  prefume,  that  His  fole  Motive  is  to  leflen 
the  Odium  and  the  Danger,  which  he  is  fenfible  that  his  nu- 
merous Adls  of  Cruelty  and  Opprejfion  muft  have  drawn  on  him, 
from  the  People  whom  he  flill  dreads. — And  laftly,  as  to  his 
Condition  with  regard  to  the  Supreme  Governor  of  the  World: 
being  (by  the  Hypothefis)  without  the  leaft  Senfe  of  true  Re- 
Jigion,  or  of  the  rea/ly  Divine  Nature,  his  Fears  will  make 
him  prone  to  embrace  any  Stcperjlition,  which  is  fuitable  to 
his  own  impious  Fancys.  For  he  will  be  apt  enough  to  fuf- 
pedl,   that  Gods   there  may   be, — 

Gods  partial,  changeful,  pajfionate,  unjujl ; 
Whofe  Attributes  are  Rage,  Revenge,  and  Luji : 
Such,    as  the  Souls  of  Cowards  may  conceive  j 
And,  form'd  like  Tyrants,    Tyrants  can  believe. 

But  now,  as  no  erroneous  Notions,  no  Ignorance  of  the  Truth 
of  Things,  can  exempt  any  Man  from  being  a  Subje£i  of  the 
Divine  Government,  this  Government  over  Him  is  exercifed 
thro  his  Fear ;  by  which  he  is  made,  maugre  all  his  Malevo- 
lence, fometimes  to  abftain  from  doing  Injurys ;  and,  notwith-*" 
{landing  his  total  nvant  of  Bejievolence,  fometimes  to  do  Good  ;  for* 
the  avoiding  or  foftening  of  the  Punifliment  which  he  dreads. 
Such,  with  refpetft  to  God,  to  Mankind,  and  to  Jfimfelf,  is  the  Con- 
dition of  the  Man  whom  we  have  fuppofed, — a  Man,  if  he  may  be 
fo   termed,    thorowly  impious,  unfocial,    and  imjnjl, — incapable  of 

Z   z  being 


362 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


being  governed,  like  a  Rational  and  Social  Being,  thro  Reafotir 
Kindnefs,  and  Love ;  and  incapable  of  tbe  Happinefs,  defigned  for 
fuch  a  Being;  becaufe  he  is,  by  our  Hypothecs,  dead  to  all 
Senje  of  it.  Yet  this  Wretch,  irrecoverably  loft  as  he  is  to 
Goodnefs  and  Honefty,  is  found  to  be,  by  means  of  \\\^  Fearsy 
fubfervient,  tho  in  a  low  degree,  to  the  Ends  of  the  Divine 
Providence ;  whofe  Views,  in  his  Government  of  Man,  are  thefe,. 
—  to  oblige  every  Man  to  do  Good  to  Others,  and  to  rejirain 
every  Man  from  doing  to  Others  any  Evil,  —  fo  far  as  fuch 
Obligation  and  Rejlraint  are  compatible  with  Choice  and  voluntary 
ASlion,  or  with  Mani  being  what  he  is, — a  Moral  Agent.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  this  PafTion  of  Fear  ceafes  to  be  effedual  for 
thofe  Purpofes,  in  governing  Him  who  is  wholly  Seljijlo  and 
XJnfocial,  the  fame  Divine  Providence  removes  him  from  amongll 
Men,  —  either  thro  the  natural  Operation  of  the  fame  Paflion 
of  Fear^  implanted  in  All  men  for  a  Guard  againft  impending 
Evils,  —  or  thro  the  natural  Effects  of  their  Rifentmcnt  of  the 
groffeft  Injuftice,    and   heavieft  Injuries,  —  or  thro  the  Prudence 

of   the  Civil  Magiftrate,   and  the  JVifdom  of  Good  Laws. If 

this  Charader,  the  purely  Selfijl?,  is  not  a  meer  Creature  of 
Man's  Imagination;  —  and  if  the  other,  the  purely  Rational  and 
Social,  hath  any  Bcijig,  befides  its  Ideal  Being  in  Mind,  —  'tis 
certain,  however,  that  the  Exijlence  of  Either  of  thofe  Cha- 
radlers,  on  this  Earth  of  ours,  is  extremely  rare.  The  real 
Charadlers  of  Human  Mortals  are  to  be  found  between  thofe 
Two  Oppofites ;  Some,  wavering  between;  Some,  iticlining Jlrongly 
yet  varioufly  to  Both  by  turns ;  but  the  greateft  Multitude, 
pending  more  or  lefs,  and  approaching  fafter  or  flower,  towards 
^the  One  or  the  Other.  'Tis  obvious  to  perceive,  that  this 
dubious  or  mixt  Charader  muft  be  governed,  if  governed  well, 
by  the  mixt  Motives  oi  Love  and  Fear; — by  Each  of  them,  in 
proportion    to    the    degree    of    Power    and    Prevalence,    which 

either 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         363 

■either   the  Faculty  of  Reafon,    or    the  Faculty   of  Senfe,    obtaia 
in  the  Soul   of  any  Man  :    for  the  former  of  thofe  Principles   in 
the    Human   Soul   is    always  followed    by  the   Social  AffeElionsy 
and   the  latter,   by   the  ScIJijl)  Pajfions.     Accordingly,  the  Divine 
Caufe   of  Uarviony   in    the  Moral  World,    as   well   as  in  the  A^^- 
tiiral,   employs   Both    of   thofe   Means,    hove   and  Fear,    in   the 
Government   of  Human  Kind ;  —  Love,    for   the   maintenance    of 
Cordial  Agreement  amongfl:  Men, — and  Fear,  for  the  prevention 
of  Mifchiefs,   fo  great  and   fo  extenfive,   as   would,    in   time,  be 
deftrudive   of  the  Species. — Now   if  the   CharaSier  of  a  Man, 
who    is    governed   thro  Love,    be    cojitrary    to  That   of   a  Man 
governed   thro  Fear ;  —  if  the  ObjeSis  of  Love,    which   are   the 
Beautiful    and  the  Good,    be  contrary   to  thofe  of  Fear,    which 
are   the  fame  with   thofe  of  Hatred,   the  Ugly  and  the  Evil ; — 
if  the  Caufe  of  Concord,   and  true  Love  or  Friendfhip,   between 
one  Perfon   and   another,    be  That  Congeniality   and  Similitude  of 
Minds,   Tint   conflant  Agreement  in  their  Sentiments  and  Ideas, 
the  fole  Fountain  of  which   is  Univerfal  Truth,   and  Right  Reafon, 
in    the  great  Parental  Mind;    and  if  the  Caife  of  Hatred    and 
Fear    be    of   a    quite  contrary    Nature,    namely,    the    Oppofition 
between    one    Man    and    another,    on    account    of    the    Rival- 
Appetites  in  Both,    the  Fountains  of  which  are  Senfe  and  Imagi- 
nation;— it  follows,  that  Mind,  or  xhQ  Rational  Part  oi  the  Soul, 
is    fo    far  from   being   the  fame  thing   with   Senfe,    or  the  SeJift- 
tive  Part   of   the   Soul,    as    the  Dodrine  of  Democritus  affirms, 
that    'tis  quite    the  Contrary.     And   thence   it   is,    that  Mind  and 
Senfe,    taken   apart.    Each   from  the  Other,    produce   quite  con- 
trary  EffeSis,  —  contrary  Difpofitions,   Sentiments,    Adlions   and 
Habits.     And   thence  alfo  it  is,  that   in   the  Human  Soul,  where 
they  are  joined  together,    they  are   often  found   to  be  Impedi- 
ments to  each  other.     We  find  the  Energys  of  our  Intelleftual 
and  Rational  Powers   interrupted  and  retarded,    or  an  End  put 

Z  z  2  to 


c 


364 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


to  them  for  a  time,  by  the  intervention  of  external  ObjeflSj^ 
fuch  as  ftrike  any  of  our  outward  Senles  flrongly.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  find  the  Livelinefs  of  our  Senfations  deadened 
or  weakened  by  a  concomitant  Attention  of  the  hlind  to  her 
own  p'oper  Objedls. — Farther;  it  has  been  obferved  by  Some,. 
that  Men  of  Athletic  Strength  of  Body  are  generally  weak  in- 
their  Mental  Facultys :  and  that  Men  of  JJjiderJIanding,  greater 
than  is    ordinary,    are  wont   to  be  more  infirm  or  tender   than 

ordinary,   in   their  Bodily  Frame  and  Confiitution. Thefe  Ob- 

fervations,  if  they  are  juft,  added  to  the  before-cited  Expe- 
rience of  us  all,  confirm  the  Truth  of  thefe  Platonic  Dodrines, 
— that  Mind  alone  is  the  Caiife  of  Good  and  Happinefs  to  that 
Compound-Being,  Man;  and  that  his  Body,  one  of  the  Principles 
of  which  is  Matter,  (the  General  Caufe  of  Evil,)  is,,  on  that 
very  account,  the  Caiife  of  That  E.'vil  which  is  to  Man  pe- 
culiar. 

^"  'Tis  evident,  that  the  word  Mnd,  in  this  Sentence, 
means  the  Mind  Univerfal  and  Divine:  the  preceding  word. 
Wijdom  therefore  is  here  ufed  in  its  only  true  and  proper  Senfe, 
to  fignify  That  Wijdom,  which  is  peculiarly  efiential  to  the 
Divine  Mind.  But  as  it  is  here  dijlinguijhed  from  Mind  nomi- 
nally, we  are  to  obferve,  that  <ro(p/a  Wijdom  has,  in  this  place, 
the  fame  Meaning  with  (pjoViwis  in  the  Firjl  Alcibiades,  page 
321  ;  and  fignifys,  as  it  is  explained  in  \}i\^  Note  to  that  Paf- 
fage,  the  Divine  vown  IntelleSlion ; — or  the  Divine  Mind,  ener- 
gifing  inwardly,  and  intelligent  of  Jiimfclfy  as  being  rSs  i'oxtos  Mind 
Intelligible,  as  well  as  j-as  voggos  Mind  Intelligent,  —  and  thus 
viewing  in  Himfclf  the  Originals  of  all  things  in  all  their  Beauty, 
and  difpofed  in  perfed;  Order, — commenfurate  and  juflly  con- 
gruous Each  with  Other,  and  every  One  of  them  with  the 
Whole, — for  i\\t  fujicient  Good  of  every  Part,  and  for  compleat  Good 
Univerfal,  flowing  from  Him,  as  He  is  r'ayx^cv  Good  its  Self'. 
= — Arijlotle,  in.  Etbic:  Nicom:  L.  6,   C.  7,  defines  Wijdom,  or  coflct,. 

which. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  365 

which  he  fays  is  d-noi^ie^drn  toov  iTi<^yi/ui.coy  The  mojl  accurate  of 
the  Sciences,  thus, — iTic^-Jifx-n  5^  vhi  rwv  rifj.iwrciTMv  The  Science  aiid 
Intelligence  of  thofe  Things  which  are  highejl  in  Dignity ; — mean- 
ing (as  appears  from  his  own  words  in  Mag:  Moral:  L.  i,  C, 
35,)  Things  divine  and  eternal;  the  chief  of  which  are  thof&: 
Ideas  which  are  the  moO:  Univerfal,  The  Juji,  The  Beautiful, 
and  The  Good,  —  and  thofe  Principles  of  all  Ideas,  One  and 
Many,  Same  ?iX\d  Different. — Plotinus,  in  Ennead:  i,  L.  2,  dif- 
tinguiflies  Wifdom  from  Mind  thus,  —  w  aoo^la,  Iv  ^iispla.  Sv  vSi 
s^et.  Wifdom  confifts  in  the  Contemplation  of  thofe  Things,  which 
Mind  (or  Intelled)  pojj'ejj'es. lamblichiis,  in  Vita  Pythag:  de- 
fines Wifdom  thus, — c-o(pia.,  -/)  T«  oi'T/  eTTtq'rifAn  ti?,  ri  Tre^t  to!  xaAct 
TTOMTcc,  Kcti  ^etci,  —  ojv  juSTO^n  Kx\  Tcc.  aAAct  civ  eiiroi  tj?  xaAa. 
Wifdom  is  in  truth  a  certain  Kind  of  Science;  it  is  That  (Science,) 
the   OhjeBs   of  which    are  thofe   Origi?2al    and  Divine  Beautys,    by 

partaking  of  which,    other  things  may  be  called  beauteous. The 

Author  of  the  Life  of  Pythagoras  in  Photius  thus, — ao(f'io(.,  iirlq'niJL^i- 
TMv  TTpaTMV  ct'iTtMv.  Wifdom  is  the  Knowlege  of  the  Firf  Caufes. 
Pfellus,  in  his  tTtAva-i?,  or  Explication  of  the  Six  (old)  Definitions 
of  Philofophy,  fpeaics  thus  concerning  Wifdom,  —  «'  eV'  ir^ovoia, 
fv^Qvori  v.cl\  a-o(pi'cx,  iq'i,  S'l  «s  7r^oyo«Ta»  0  S-go's.  If  there  is  a  Pro- 
vidence (in  the  Divine  Being),  'tis  manifefl,  that  Wifdom  alfo  is 
(in  Him)  ;  for  thro  Wifdom  it  is,  that  God  provides,  (providet,.) 
or  views  in   Himfelf,   before   the   Generation,  of  Each   temporary 

Being,    what  is  good   for    fuch    a  Being. We   have   made 

thefe  Citations  from  Philofophers,  who  lived  in  different  Ages,, 
and  were,  all  of  them,  well  verfed  in  Plato's  Writings,  the 
more  fully  to  confirm  our  Explication  of  Plato's  Meaning  in 
the  Sentence  now  before  us.  Hence  alfo  we  may  perceive,, 
on  what  account  Wifdom  is  here  placed  before  Mind:  'tis  be- 
caufe  Mind,  ftridly  fpeaking,  is  converfant  only  with  Pirfl- 
Principles;  or  rather,  thofe  Principles  Themfelves  confiitute  Mind,. 
6;  and;,. 


S66 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


and,  taken  together,   are  Mind,   when  IntclleB  only  is    fignified 
by  that  word  :    but  to   the  IntelleBion   of  thofe  Principles  WiJ- 
dom  adds  the  Knowlege  of  thofe  Divine  Univerfals,   which,    toge- 
ther with  the  Knowlege  of  them,  are  derived  from  thofe  Prin- 
ciples ;  as  the  Parmenides  will  afford  Occafion  to  fliow.     Rightly 
therefore    is   it    obferved    by  Eujlratius,   in   commenting   on   the 
PalTage   of  Arijlotle,    above  cited,  —  that  IntelleB,    taken   by  its 
felf,    Trii  xccra.  <js(pla.v  XeiTTiTca  TeAfloTWTM  Jails  Jl:ort  of  the  Perfec- 
tion  which  it  hath   in  Wifdom,    where   it   flands    at  the  Head  of 

Science. Nothing  farther    remains    on    the    prefent   Subje6l, 

unlefs    it    fliould   be    thought  neceffary    to  juftify  Plato,    in    his 
ufing  the  Terms  f^dymn  and  cotIx  indifferently,   as  if  they  were 
fynonymous ;    tho   only  croi^Ice.   denotes   the  Whole  of  JVifdom,   and 
hath  for  its  Objedl  all   eternal  Truth;   whereas   (poovtiati  lignifies 
at  the  moft  nothing  more  than  Moral  Wifdom,  is  peculiar  to  the 
Human    Species,    and    regards    only    what    conduces    to  Human 
Good   in   Human   Adion,    and    therefore    is  properly   tranflated 
into  Englifh   by  the   word  Prudence.      If   this  Objedlion   fhould 
occur   to   any  Man's  Thoughts,   it  may   be  obviated,   by  confi- 
dering,  that  when  (p^o'vmis  is  attributed   to  the  Supreme  Being,  it 
is    the    fame    with    a-o(pia,    becaufe   God   is   both  Truth    its  Self, 
and  Good  its  Self:    his  Intelledion  of  Himfclf,    or   his  Intellect 
in  Energy,  while   he  contemplates  all  Ideas,   and  all  Truths,   in 
the  Archetype   of  Univerfal  Nature,    contemplates    at   the  Same 
time  all  Good,  and  knows  what  is  Bejl  for  the  Great  Whole  and 
for  every  Part  of  it;   and  his  Outward  ABion,  for  ever  accom- 
panying his  Inward  Energy,  produceth  That  Bef,  and  mofl  con- 
ducive to  the  Good   of  all   and  every  Being,    thro  all   luccefTive 
Ages.  —  The    learned  Porphyry  appears    to   have   had    the   fame 
Notion  of  thofe  Terms,  qo<^'l<x.  and  (p^ovnan,  when  applied  to  the 
Divine  Caif  of  outward  Nature.     For,  in  his  Treatife  de  Antra 
Nympharum,   fpeaking   of   the   Scnfible  World,    he    fays, — xdafjLoi 


P    H    I    L   E    B    U    S.         367 

Protarchus. 
With  the  greateft  Juftice,   indeed. 

SOCRAT  ES. 

But   farther  ;    Wifdom   and  Mind    could   never   be 
be  without  Soul  "'. 

Protarchus. 

6f<  <p ^ovnerscai  S-ea  x«l  von^ai  (1.  voi^rm)  (pucrecos  ctTToiihscrfxa.'  it  is 
the  Eff'eSl  of  the  'Divine  Frudcnce  and  of  Mental  Nature :  (meaning 
the  "Divine  Ideas:)  pag:  131,  Edit:  Romr  and  a  little  afterward, 
his  words  are  thele,  —  bjc  g'^  avTofjux-rto-fjiu  to  oKov  tbto,  xal 
(f.  aS'i)  rup(iji  aAo'^y  i^yov  yiyoviv'  aAAa  (pvaeooi  voepixi  xcti  croflxi 
aVoTg'Aeo-fca.  'This  Whole  (or  Univerfe)  was  not  produced  from 
Automat ifm,  (or  Self-Motion,)  neither  was  it  the  Work  of  For^ 
tune  deiioid  of  Reafon  ;  but  'tis  the  EfeSl  of  IntelleSiual  Nature  and 
of  Wifdom. 

^"  This  Sentence  ftrongly  militates  againft  the  Opinion  of 
thofe  Pfeudo- Plato Jiijis,  who  imagine  the  account,  given  of  the 
Creation  of  the  World  in  Plato's  Timceus,  to  be  Plato\  own 
DoSlrine;  gravely  taking  in  a  Literal  Senfe  what  is  no  lefs 
Poetically   there  written,    tho   in   loofer  Numbers,    than    is    the- 

Seventh  Book,   of  Milton's  Paradife  Loji. The  Formation  of 

Matter  from  infinite  Time  pafi, — a  Creation  without  a  Beginfiing, 
— an  FffeB,  co-eval  with  its  Caufe, — are  Things  inconceivable 
to  Vulgar  Underftandings.  But  no  lefs  inconceivable  to  Such 
are  Eternity  —  the  Being  of  eternal  Mind,  and  of  thofe  pure 
Objedls  of  Mind,  Ideas. — The  greateft  Part  of  Mankind  cannot 
apprehend  any  Mental  ObjeSl  to  be  real,  unlefs  it  appears  in 
their  Imaginations,  inverted  therein  with  the  Image  of  fome 
0Sje5l  of  Senfe,  They  have  therefore  no  conception  oi  Eternity, 
6  but 


368 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 


but  thro  its  Image,  'Time  ;  and  of  This,  only  by  Portions ; — no  con- 
ception oi  Ideas,  but  thro  their  Images  in  Things  Senfibk  ; — no  con- 
ception of  M/Wits  Self,  devoid  oiBody,  Bulk,  and  Figure. — As  little 
can   they  conceive    of  Infinity,    or   of  any  Infinite  Thitigs,   One  of 
which    is   Time.  —  It  is    thro  Reafan    alone,    to    a  Few  Perfons, 
who  are   able   in    fome    meafure    to   remove    every  Senfible  Image 
from   their   Contemplations,    that  Eternal  Beings   are    known    to 
be,   and  even   to   be    the    only  Things   truly  knowable,    or   indu- 
bitably certain.     And  only  thro  Reafioning  it   is,    that    the  Series 
-of  Effeds,   continually  produced  by  thofe  eternal  Beings,   which 
are  always  in  Force,    (the  Divine  Mind   energifimg  always    within 
the  Snh'^tCt- Matter  of  Outward  Forms,)    is  concluded   never  to 
have  an  End. — But  of  Time,   confidered  as   infinite,  or  of  Infijiity 
in   general,    there   is  neither   an  Idea,    nor   anZ^;^^^;  —  no  Idea 
of  it   is   to   be  found  in   the  nature  of  Mind;  no  Image  of  it  is 
to   be   framed    in    the  Human   Imagination :    it   is    but   obfcurely 
knowable  to  have   any  Sort  of  Being  at  all,    thro  Conclufions, 
remotely   tho   rationally   drawn    from   the  following   Confidera- 
tions :  —  The    Caufes    of    corporeal   Things,    being   eternal  and 
always    the    Same,     mufi:    have    always    been    followed    by    their 
Effefts ;    and   mufl:  for   ever  continue    to    be    fo   followed : — All 
thefe   Effeds    are   produced   in    Outward    Nature,    and   exift   in 
Time: — of   Such,    as    are    temporary    and   tranfiient,    there    mult 
have   been,    and    everlaftingly   mufl    be,    a   never-failing    Sucef- 
fion,    if  the   Same  Caufes   always    produce    the   Same  Effects : — 
and    Such,    as    are   permajient,    are    everlaflingly   in   Motion,    a 
Motion  periodical : — thefe  periodical  Motions  are   the  Meafures  of 
Time  to   each  other,   and  to   all  Beings  which  are  tranfiient :  — 
the  Periods  of  their  Motions   are   the  larger  Parts  or  Portions  of 
T'ime  ;    and  being  vifible,   become   Objects  of  Imagination  : — Ima- 
gination   can    divide    thefe    Parts   ad  infinitum ;    and    borrowing 
)from  Mind  whatever  abflradted  or  pure  Nmnbers  flie  pleafes,  can 

add 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         369 

ni^d  one  Portion  of  Time  to  another,  and  muliiply  any  Por- 
tion of  it,  without  End.  —  Now  as  Number  is  Infinite^  the 
beft  Notion,  that  can  be  gathered,  of  Infinite  Time,  is  thro  its 
jf\nalogy  to  Infinite  Number.  But  as  \ht  Notion  of  Infinite  Nunri- 
ber  is  meerly  Negative,  and  confifts  in  the  rejeSling  of  every 
Bound  that  can  be  fet  to  Numbers  by  the  Mind,  our  beft  No- 
tion of  Time,  confidered  as  Infinite,  is  no  better  than  our  No- 
tion of  Infinite  Number,  that  is,  meerly  Negative.  Juft  fuch 
another  Notion  is  That  of  the  Infinite  Firfi  Matter, — a  Notion, 
framed  in  like  manner,  by  rejecting  every  Bound  that  can  be 
fet  to  Subfiance,  and  every  Pofitive  Attribute,  except  the  bare 
Capacity  of  receiving  fome  Form  or  other  into  any  imaginable 
Portion  of  it.  Another  fuch  is  our  Notion  of  Infinite  Space  -, 
for  it  is  acquired  by  rejefting  all  Fonn  and  all  Subfiance  too,— 
Mind  as  well  as  Matter, — from  our  confideration  of  it.  Hence 
it  may  be  juftly  faid  of  I? finite  Space,  and  of  Infinite  Time  alfo, 
the  Same  which  Plato  fays  of  the  Firfi  Matter,  that  'tis  ii.oyii 
■jri^ov  fcarcely  credible.  Thofe  Perfons  indeed,  who  duly  confi- 
der  of  thefe  Infinites,  Matter,  Space,  and  Time,  are,  by  the 
facred  Laws  of  Reafoning,  and  the  Neceffity  of  admitting  the 
truth  of  rational  Conclufions  from  undeniable  Premifes,  com- 
pelled to  believe  in  them,  meerly  Notional  as  they  are,  and 
Objeds  of  neither  IntclleB,  nor  Reafion,  nor  Soifie,  nor  Ima- 
gination ;  becaufe  they  are  found  necejfary  to  the  Fxifience  of 
thofe  Corporeal  Forms,  both  the  permanent  and  the  tranfient, 
which  are  the  necejfary  and  everlafiing  EfFeifls  of  necejfary  and 
eternal  Caufes.  But  becaufe  fuch  Notions,  founded  on  fuch 
Confiderations,  enter  into  the  Heads  of  None  but  Speculative 
Perfons,  it  was  deemed  proper,  by  the  wife  Legillators  of  antient 
Ages,  to  induce  the  unphilofophical  Multitude  to  a  Belief 
(Such,  as  they  are  capable  of,)  in  the  Divine  Caujes  of  all 
Things  which   affedt  their  Senfes,   by  reprefenting  thofe  Caujes, 

A  a  a  as 


370         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

as  prior   in  Time   to   the  whole  Vifible  Univerfe.     They  afligned 
therefore    to    the    endlefs    Motion,    Change,    and   Succeflion   of 
all    Bodys   whatever,     a    certain    Beginning    in    Time;     and     thus 
rendered   the  Creation   of  this    ever-moving,    ever-changing,  and 
ever-flowing  Scene  of  Things   a  conceivable  Objedl  of  Religious 
Faith. — In   the   mean   time,    however,    the   philofophical  Truth, 
on   this    Subject,    was    not    witheld    from   Any,    whofe   natural 
Genius,   favoured   by  a  Liberal  Education,   and   by  a  competency 
of  external  Means,    inclined   them   to    the  Study   of  Nature  and 
of  fimple  Truth,    regardlefs    of  Popular  Opinion.       Accordingly, 
Men   who  profeffed  a  Knowlege    of  Nature,    and  of   the  Caufcs 
of  Natural  Things,   were  not  only  tolerated  by  all  Wife  States^ 
but   were  even  encouraged  to    affift   Others   in   their  profecuting 
of  thefe    Studys,    to    fit    them    the    better   for    a   Share   in    the 
Government,    fhould  they  ever  be  called    to   it.      For   a  Know- 
lege   of   the  Truth,    undifguifed  by  Fables,    was   deemed   one   of 
the  neceflary  Qualifications  of  a  Governor;    becaufe  if  he  knew 
not  the  Reafon  and  the  real  Foundation  of  Popular  Opinions  and 
Public    Eflablifliments,    he    could    not    know,    which   of  them 
were    proper    to    be  fupported,    or   improved,    and    which    to    be 
corrected,  or  quite  aboliJI:ed. — Hence  arofe   the  Two-fold  DoBr'ine 
of    Thofe,    who    were    both    Legijlators    and    Philojophers,    con- 
cerning this  Point.     An   Inftance  of  This   we  have  in  Orpheus. 
and   his   Followers.      For    in    thofe    Fragments    of   the    Orphic 
Theologers,    recorded   by  Proclus,    we    read    an    Account    of   the 
Origin    of   Things,      very    different     from     that    Poetical     Tale, 
(authorifed    by    a    Tradition,     probably    derived    from    Orpheus 
Himfelf,)    with    which  Apollonius    of  Rhodes    feigns    Orpheus    to 
have  amufcd  the  Argonautic  Mariners.     Another  Inftance  is  the 
feeming    Difference    between    the  Pythagoreans    on    this  Subjetft. 
For  Ocellus,    in    whofe  Country,    which   was  Lucania,   his  Bro- 
thers  of  the  Italic  School   had    never   employed    their   Skill    in. 

Legijlationt, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         371 

Lcgljlation,  teaches,  as  exprefsly  and  plainly  as  Aiijhtle  Himfclf 
does,  that  Time  and  temporary  Things  always  were ;  the  World 
being  co-eval  with  the  Principles  and  Caufes  of  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  Tiincrus,  a  Citizen  of  Locris,  (in  which,  and  \i\ 
many  neighbouring  Citys  of  Italy,  Timaratus  and  other  Pytha- 
goreans had  inftituted  Civil  Laws,)  feconds,  in  his  Treatife 
Tip)  -^v^oii  y.otTjJiO}  concerning  the  Soul  of  the  World,  the  eftabliflicd 
Opinion,  that  the  World  was  created  in  Time  out  of  a  Chaos 
of  pre-exifting  Particles  of  Matter.  Perhaps  alfo  That  illuftri- 
ous  Pythagorean  Philofopher  and  Didadic  Poet,  Empedocles,  at 
the  inconiiltency  of  whofe  Writings  Mr.  Harris  exprefles  a 
very  juft  Surprize,  may  be  reconciled  to  Himfelf,  if  we  fup- 
pofe,  that  he  wrote  his  Poem  vrg^l  tpvaecas  concerning  Nature, 
like  Parmenides,  for  the  Ufe  of  Philqfophers  only ;  and  that,  like 
Hejiod,  he  wrote  another  Poem,  entitled,  xoafAoToi'lcc  the  Creation 
of  the  World,  (cited  by  Arijlotle  in  his  Phyficks,  Lib:  2.)  fuit- 
able  to  the  Tafte  of  the  People,  and  favourable  to  that  Article 
of  their  Faith,  founded  by  Orpheus, — the  Creation  of  the  World 
out  of  a  Chaos.  For  Such  a  Creation  is  by  all  its  Advocates 
fuppofed  to  have  been  gradual,  one  Part  of  it  after  another. 
— But,  whatever  was  the  meaning  of  Empedocles  in  his  Cofno- 
pceia,  certain  it  is,  that  Plato,  in  his  Timceus,  delivers  not 
the  Sentiments  of  Socrates.  That  whole  Dialogue  is  only 
a  copious  and  elegant  Commentary  on  the  above-mentioned 
Treatife  of  Timceus  the  Pythagorean,  who  is  there  reprefented 
as  the  principal  Speaker,  expatiating  on  his  own  Doftrine.  It 
is  therefore  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that  in  That  Dialogue 
the  Soul  of  the  World  is  faid  to  be  created;  and  yet  that  in  the 
prefent  Sentence  of  the  Philebiis,  which  afferts,  that  "  Mind 
can  never  be  without  Soul,"  the  Co-eternity  of  That  Soul  with 
the  Divine  Mind  is  evidently  implied ;  for  this  Sentence  is 
fpoken  by  Socrates.      He  had,   before,    fhown  the  Truth  of  it, 

A  a  a  2  by 


372  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

by  this   Argument; — every  animated  BoJy   infers    an    animating 
So:i/i    and   every   Sou/,    whofe   Aftions   and  Operations   are,    all 
of  them,    direSfed  wifely    for    the   Good  of   that   Body    which    it 
animates,    infers   a    directing  Mind   within,    intelligent  of  Good, 
and   of   the    heft  Means   to  obtain   it   for  That    which   is   under 
its  Government  and  Care.     So    that,    to  explain  the  nature   of 
the  Univerfe,   according  to   the  Dodtrine  of  Socrates   and  PlatOy 
we  are  to   begin   thus  ;  —  Good  is   in    the  Mind,    as    the    motive 
Principle   of  Mind's  Dejign ;  —  Miiid  is  in   the  Soul,    as   the   di- 
re£ling   Principle  of   the  Soul's  Operations ; — and  Soul  is    in    the 
Body,   as  the  moving  Principle  of  all  the  Body's  Motions. — But  an 
attentive  Reader    muft  have   obferved,    that  Socrates  divides  his 
Argument    in    proof   of   a   governing    Soul   of  Nature,    in   the 
following  remarkable  manner ; — Firfl,  he  leads  us  to  the  con- 
templation   of    it,    by    confidering    the  External  World  as    One 
great  Body,    in  which   all   the   Elementary  Parts    of  Nature  are 
united  j    and    afterwards,    in    the   Sentence   now   before   us,    he 
brings   back  our  Thoughts  to   it  again,    thro  the  confideration 
of  the   wife  and  good  Government   of   that  World,    and    the    ne- 
ceffity  of  fuppofing   a  Soul,   for  That  Wifdom  and  That  Goodnefs 
to  rejide  in.     By  this   way  of  arguing, — firft,  from  Body,   which 
is  inferior   to   Soul,  —  and   afterwards,    from  Mind  and  Wifdom, 
which  are    at    the  Head  of   all  things,  —  it    fliould    feem,    that 
Socrates    confidered    the    Soul  of  the   World,    as    the    intermediate 
Link,   connedting  the  Divine  Mind  with  Outward  Nature,     This 
Opinion    was    certainly    entertained    by  Thofe,     who,    for    the 
wife  Ends    above    mentioned,     wrote    Poetical   Hiftorys    of   an 
original  Creation   of    the  World    at    a   certain   Time,   but    to    en- 
dure for  ever  -,  and  by  Thofe  like  wife,   who  framed    an  Hypo- 
thefis,    fomewhat   different,    of  a  periodical  Defru£lion   and  Re- 
novation of  All   things  alternately  for   ever.      For   the  Philofo- 

phers^ 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  373 

phers,  who  favoured  Either  of  thefe  Syilems,  very  confidently 
held,  that  the  Soul  of  the  World  was  a  'Temporary  Being,  co- 
eval with  That  World  which  it  animates.  The  Eleaticks  alfo, 
'tis  probable,  in  aflerting  the  Unity  of  All  things,  confidered  the 
Soul  of  the  World  in  the  fame  manner,  as  the  conneSling  Medium 
between  things  intelligible  and  things  fenfible.  For  fuch  fecms 
to  be  the  true  Senfe  of  this  Verfe  of  Parrnenides,  cited  in  Notes. 
to  the  Banquet y   page  1 1 4, 

where,  by  ufing  a  Relative  Pronoun  Feminine,  we  prefume 
that  he  means  »  4"'^"  ^^^  governing  Soul  of  the  Univerfe. 
—Agreeably  to  this  Explication,  when  the  fame  great  Philo- 
fopher  faid,  tw'  4'^/C''''  ''*'  '^°^  ''^'^  tccutov  etvcci,  that  the  Soul  and 
the  Mind  ivere  the  Same  Thing,  he  meant  not  to  confound  Se?fe 
and  Intelligence  together,  as  Democritus  did  afterwards :  he  feems 
to  have  had  the  fame  Meaning  with  Socrates  and  Plato,  —  that 
XJniverfdl  Soul  was  effentially  the  Same  Being  with  Utiiverfal  Mind; 
but  that,  confidered  with  regard  to  the  Senfible  World,  He  is 
the  Animating  Soul,  —  with  regard  to  the  Intelligible,  he  is  the 
Intelligent  Mind.  It  fl:iould  feem  alfo,  that  Socrates,  in  proving 
the  Exiftence  of  an  Univerfal  Soul,  from  the  beneficial,  fa- 
lutary,  and  reftorative  Operations  of  fome  univerfal  Adtive  Caufe 
in  and  throughout  Nature,  —  after  he  had  already  proved  it,, 
in  the  fame  way  of  arguing  by  Analogy,,  which  he  had  ufed 
in  proving  the  Exiftence  of  the  Four  Elements  of  Nature 
and  their  Mixture  in  One  Corporeal  World,  —  took  this 
Two-fold  way  of  inflrudling  his  Difciples  in  the  true  Doftrine 
of  07je  Divine  Soul  of  the  Univerfe,  on  purpofe  to  prevent  their 
falling  into  That  Error  concerning  Souls,  which  perhaps  was- 
I  the- 


74 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 


the  principal  Ground  of  PoJytheifm,  —  the  attributing  to  every 
Element  and  to  every  Compound-Being  of.  Nature,  to  every  M/- 
neral  and  every  Vegetable  Form,  as  well  as  to  every  Animal,  a 
Particular  Soul,  a  Soul  of  its  own ;  intelligent  to  govern  the 
Corporeal  Form  which  it  animates,  and  concerned  for  the 
Interefls  of  that  Form  j  careful  to  defend  it  againft  the  Dan- 
ger to  which  it  is  naturally  expofed,  and  ftudious  to  heal 
whatever  Mifchief  it  receives  from  the  Violence  of  mightier 
Beings.  But  Socrates,  as  we  have  juft  now  feen,  afcribes  the 
wonderful  Powers,  with  which  all  Natural  Forms  are  endued 
for  their  own  Prefervation,  to  the  Wijdom  of  One  Mind,  dwell- 
ing in  One  Soul,  adlive  thro  all  Outward  Nature.  It  appears 
therefore,  that,  in  the  Opinion  of  Socrates,  all  fuch  Forms  of 
Nature,  as  fliow  no  Signs  of  their  being  endued  with  any 
Pre-fenfation  of  Danger  incident  to  them,  or  with  any  Senfe 
of  Pain  from  Mifchiefs  befallen  them,  having  no  Souls  of  their 
own,  are  afted  on  immediately  by  the  Great  Soul  of  the  Uni- 
verfe;  that  from  His  conjoining  and  afjimilating  Virtue  they  re- 
ceive fufficient  Nourilliment,  juft  Growth,  and  the  Faculty  of 
propao-ating  their  Species  j  and  that  from  the  Providence  of  His 
Mind  they  receive  a  natural  Defenfive  Armour,  innate  Strength 
to  bear  up  againft  ordinary  Oppreflions,  and  Remedys  within 
Themfclves  againft  ordinary  Maladys. — From  this  Dodrine  it  is 
argued,  in  the  way  of  Analogy,  that  all  thofe  Beings,  which 
are  evidently  endued  with  Senfe,  but  fhow  no  Signs  of  having 
Reafon  or  zny  'Ujiiverfal  Ideas,  —  fuch  Beings,  as  derive  from 
Nature,  thro  an  inftindtive  Perception  of  their  Make,  cer- 
tain Trpoh.r)\M,  or  previous  Apprehenfions  of  their  native  Poivers, 
long  before  they  are  able  to  exert  them,  —  infpired  alfo  by 
Nature  with  a  Dread  of  their  natural  Enemys,  the  firft  time 
they   fee  them,    and   with    an  Appetite  for    their   natural  Foody 

the 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


375 


the  firfl:  time  it  is  offered  to  any  of  their  Senfcs,  —  deriving 
their  Apprehenfion  of  future  Things  contingent,  meerly  from 
their  Memory  of  Jimilar  Things  paft,  without  magnifying  or 
adding  to  them  in  their  Imaginations,  —  that  fuch  Beings, 
rightly  termed  Brute  Animals ,  are  under  the  Rule  and  Govern- 
ment of  the  Soul  of  Nature,  in  all  their  ABions,  as  immediately 
and  as  abfolutely  as  the  Paliive  and  the  Adlive  Elements  of 
Body,  and  as  all  FoJJil  and  Vegetable  Forms  are,  in  all  their 
Motions.  For  this  Univerfal  Soul,  from  whom  the  Particular 
Souls  of  all  Animals  are  derived,  (and  by  whofe  Influence  every 
Animal-Soul  is  fupported,)  being  full  of  Providential  Wifdom, 
directs  the  Energys  and  the  Adtions  of  each  Particular  Soul,  by 
giving  it  con-natural  hiJimSls  and  occafional  Impiilfes  to  energife 
and  aft  as  it  ought; — in  other  words,  by  exciting  in  it  thofe 
Pre-Senfations  and  Pre-Conceptions,  thofe  Appetites,  PaJ/icns,  and 
Affeclions,  by  which  alone  it  is  impelled  to  Adion,  for  the  Good 
of  the  Body  which  it  animates,  and  for  accomplifliing  the  Ends 

of  Divine  Goodnefs  in    the  formation   of  that  Body. It  is 

farther  argued,  from  the  like  Analogy,  that  thofe  Beings,  who 
are  rightly  termed  Rational  Animals,  to  whofe  Souls  are  fuper- 
added  the  Principles  of  Mind  and  the  Faculty  of  Reafoning,  — 
altho  they  derive  their  Souls,  like  all  other  Animals,  from  the 
Great  Soul  Univerfal,  —  yet  derive  their  Mental  Principles  and- 
Rational  Faculty s  immediately  from  the  Mind  of  that  Great  Soul, 
Mind  Univerfal:  —  that,  in  confequence  of  this  High  Birth  of 
their  Nobler  Part,  they  are,  by  nature,  free  from  an  abfolute 
Subjedion  to  the  Power  of  Corporeal  Necejity -,  and  that,  for 
the  Condudl  of  their  Lives,  they  are,  by  nature,  committed. 
to  the  Guidance  and  Government  of  their  own  Reafon,  as  foon. 
as  the  Seeds  of  Univerfal  Ideas  within  them  are  fufficiently 
developed,  their  Minds  amply  enough  expanded,  and  their 
Powers  of  Reafoning  matured;  —  that,  till  then,  during  the 
I.  Ion" 


-^^6  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

long  time   of  their    Infancy   and   natural   Nonage,   they  are,  by 
nature,    and    the  fuperintendant   Care  of  Divine   Providence,    in- 
truded   to    the    immediate    Care    and  Government    of  their   Pa- 
rents ;    and    that    when    this   Parental  Care    is    naturally    fuper- 
feded,    and  they  are  delivered  over   to  their  own   free  Will,   to 
choofe,   whether  they  will   fubje(fl  Themfelves  and  their  Adlions 
to    the    Rule  of   the   inferior  Part   of   their  Souls,    and   to    the 
Dominion  of   blind  Neceffity,  or  whether  they   will   fubmit   to 
the  Laws  of  their  fuperior   Part,    whofe  Government   is  perfe(ft 
Freedom,   and   whole  Leading  condudts  Such  as  follow  it,    (not 
blindly,    but    with    their    Mind's    Eye    open    and    clear    to    fee 
every  Step   they  tread,)  to  That  End  which  they  have  in  view, — 
Happinefs.      For    if  they  make   it   their  Choice    to  live  under 
the   Government    of   Reafon,    the   Force    of  their  own   Reafon, 
too  weak   of  its   Self  to   refift    their  PaJ/ions,    (ftrengthened,   as 
thefe   are,   by    the    fubtle   Sophiftry   of  Imagination,)    is    always 
aided    and  fupported    effeflually  by  That  Sovereign  Reafon,  That 
unconquerable  T/«//',  ever  prefent  within  every  Particular  Mind: 
with    which   Standard-l'ruth,    and    unerring  Reafon,    a    conftant 
Communication,    free    and    unobflrudted,    is    neceffary  to    prevent 
any  Mind,    inhabiting  a  Human  Body,    from   falling   into  Error, 
and  miftaking  Fallhood  for  Truth;  perhaps,    to  prevent  it  from 
finally  relinquifhing   its    immediate   Seat,    the  Soul:  no   lefs  ne- 
ceflary  is  it,  than  a  conftant  Conimunication  with  the  Vniv erf al  Soul 
is   neceffary   to  preferve   any  Particular  Soul  from  fickening  and 

drooping,    and   falling    from   its    Seat,    the  Body. Now,    if 

the  above  Arguments  are  valid,  and  if  thefe  Conclufions  are 
rightly  drawn,  —  namely,  that  neither  Intelligence  nor  Senfe, 
neither  Mind  nor  Soul,  is  imparted  to  the  fimple  Elements  of 
Body,  nor  to  Fofjils,  nor  even  to  Vegetables ;  and  that  no  De- 
gree of  Mind  or  Reafon  is  imparted  to  any  Animals,  known  by 
Us, — to  any  Compound-Beings,  having  Souls  of  their  own,  or  a 

Principle 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


'^11 


Principle  of  Self-Motion  within  Themfelves,  —  except  to  Thofe 
of  the  Human  Species; — it  may  reafonably  be  concluded  farther, 
that  no  Portions  of  the  fimple  Elements,  no  Fojil  nor  Vegetable 
Forms,  are  capable  of  receiving  or  retaining  any  Sentient  Soul 
within  them ;  and  that  the  Souls  of  no  Brute  Atiimals  are  ca- 
pable of  receiving  or  retaining  the  Principles  of  Mind  and  Rea- 
fon :    for   the  Divifie  Goodnefs   never   witholds   from   Any  of  his 

Creatures  any  Good,   which   they  are  capable  of The  Caufe 

of  thofe  Incapacitys,  which  attend  the  Beings  above-mentioned, 
feems  to  be  the  Stru<flure  of  their  Frames.  It  feems  ne- 
cefTary  to  the  Being  of  every  particular  Sentient  Soul,  that  it 
be  feated  and  circulate  within  a  Body,  compounded  of  all  the 
Four  Elements.  For  Fire  and  Air,  the  Active  Elements, 
are  the  only  fit  Vehicles  o£  the  Soul,  in  her  quick  and 
vigorous  Motions  :  Eartlj  and  IVater,  the  Paffive  Elements,  are 
the  Receptacles  of  Fire  and  Air ;  none  of  whofe  Particles  could 
be  detained  in  any  certain  Place,  otherwife  than  by  Portions 
of  Earth  and  Water  inclofing  them.  Again ;  the  moijl  and  fluid 
Element  is  a  neceflary  Vehicle  for  Air  and  Fire,  jointly  to  per- 
form their  regular  Circuits  throughout  the  Body  :  the  dry  and 
folid  Element  is  neceflary  to  the  compofition  of  circulatory 
'J^ubes  for  the  conveyance  of  the  Fluid:  the  hot  Element  is 
necefllary  to  preferve  the  Fluidity  of  Water  from  being  deftroyed 
by  Air :  and  this  cold  Element  is  neceflary  to  cement  together 
the  Particles  of  Earth  -,  (by  the  Mediiwi,  we  prefume,  of  Watery 
Particles,  congealed  by  Cold  ;)  for  intenfe  Heat  totally  diflx)lves 
the  ftrongefk  Cement,  made  by  Air  and  Water,  and  defl:roys  all 
Cohefion.  It  feems  neceflTary  too,  that  a  Body,  inhabited  by  a 
Sentient  Soul,  fliould  not  only  be  compounded  of  all  the  Four 
Elements,  but  fliould  alfo  be  organifed,  for  the  fake  oi  Motion, 
as  well  as  of  Senfation.  For  we  prefume,  that  Organs  of  Scnfe 
are  neceflary  to  Senfation;  which  Faculty  not  only  would  be 
ujelefs,  without  the  Power  of  moijiug  towards  what  is  felt  agree- 

B  b  b  able 


378 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


able  and  good  to  the  Sentient  Being,  but  would  alfo  be  incon-^ 
venient,  without  the  Power  of  moving  away  from  what  is  felt 
difagreeable  and  evih  and  thefe  Powers,  we  prefume,.  they  could 
not  have,  without  having  Organs  of  Motion,  Now  FoJJils,  which 
are  by  nature  fixed  within  the  Earth,,  and  Vegetables,  which 
are  therein  rooted,  being  thus  denied  the  Power  of  Local  Mo- 
tion, have  no  oecafion  for  Orga?is  neceffary  to  the  Exertion  of 
fuch  a  Power,  —  a  Power,  ablblutely  neceffary  to  their  Well- 
being,  had  they  Senfe,  And  as  to  the  fimple  Elements,  they 
are  evidently  moved  only  by  the  Laws  of  Mechanical  NeceJJttyy. 
—Laws,  implanted  in  all  Bocfy  by  the  Soul  of  the  Univerfe,  and 
put  in  Force  continually  by  that  Great  Soul  Himfelf.  —  Thus 
it  appears,  that  only  Animals  are  fo  framed,  as  to  be  capable 
of  Sentient  Soul  and  Self-Motion,  or  of  the  Pajions  and  Appetites, 
which  arife  in  the  Soul  from  her  Senfations,  and  excite  her  to 
all  her  Outward  Actions. — The  internal  and  immediate  Organs 
of  Senfationt  as  well  as  of  Motion,  are  the  Nerves ;  which  have 
their  Origin,  All  of  them,  either  in  the  Brain,  or  in  that 
Produftion  of.  the  Brain,  the  Spinal  Marrow.  In  thefe  Glan- 
dular Parts  is  fecreted  from  the  Blood  a  Fluid,  which  is  called 
the  Nervous  Fluid,  becaufe  it  is  conveyed  to  the  External 
Organs  of  Senfation,  and  to  Thofe  of  Motion,  thro  the  Nerves ^ 
—a  Fluid,  probably  compofed  of  the  fineft  and  pureft  Lymph, 
and  of  thofe  Portions  of  Air  and  Fire,  in  which  the  Animal- 
Soul  immediately  is  feated,  and  which  are,  on  that  account, 
not  improperly  termed  Animal-Spirits.  The  Nerves  have  their 
Fibres  more  elafic,  than  are  the  Fibres  of  any  other  Parts  of 
the  Body  j  and  their  Coats  more  folid,  and  lefs  porous ,  than 
any  other  Me?nbranes.  Their  Elafiicity  perhaps  is  owing  to  th'e 
Purity  of  thofe  Particles  of  Air,  which  they  convey  :  and  their 
Solidity  (which  feems  neceffary  to  prevent  a  Lateral  Efcape  of 
the  Fire  which  they  convey,)  is  perhaps  owing  to  the  ftrong 
3  Cementt 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


579 


Cement,  given  to  all  their  component  Earthy  Particles,  by  thofe 
Aerial  and  Lymphatic  Particles  together,  which  the  more  rapid 
J^w^c^o^^ave  behind  them,  there  depofited.  It  feenis  there- 
fore,' that  the  Saitient  Soul,  tho  feated  univerfally  in  the 
Animal  Spirits,  and  carried  throughout  the  Body  in  the  Nervous 
Fluid,  yet  hath  her  Chi(f  Seat,  and  as  it  were  the  Metropolis 
of  her  Dominion,  in  the  Head.  The  Irafcible  Part  of  this  Soul, 
•TO  ^uixoetHi  TYii  aAoyn  ■]''JX^^>  ^^  ^Y  '^^^^'^"^  (whom  Plato  follows 
in  his  Dialogue  of  the  fame  Name,)  held  to  have  its  Ce?itral 
Seat  in  the  Heart :  the  Ground  of  which  Tenet,  we  prefume, 
is  This  J  —  that  to  the  Cavitys  of  the  Heart,  as  to  fome  great 
Sea  or  Receptacle  of  Waters,  all  the  fmall  Veins,  like  Rivulets, 
which  in  their  Progrefs  unite  and  form  large  Rivers,  are  conti- 
nually tranfmitting  the  whole  Mafs  of  Blood  thro  the  great  Veins-, 
whilft  the  Artery s,  like  fubterraneous  Pajfages  from  the  Sea, 
continually  convey  the  Blood  again  from  the  Heart  to  the  Ca-- 
fillajy  VeJJels,  v^hwch  are  as  it  were  the  Fomitains  of  the  Venous 
Blood:  now  the  Motion  of  the  Heart,  and  confequently  of  the 
Blood  in  all  its  V«ffels,  is  differently  affeifted  by  all  the  PaJJions 
of  the  Soul,  but  chiefly  by  thofe  which  arife  in  her  from  her 
Eenfe  of  prejenf  Injuries,  Mifchiefs,  or  Misfortunes,  or  from 
her  ExpeSlation  of  any  fuch  to  come,  or  from  her  Pemembrance 
of  the  paji. — The  Appetitive  Part  to  liTib\j\xAniv.oii  of  the  Atiimal- 
Soiil  h^iih,  according  to  the  Dodlrine  of  the  fame  T/V/z^r/j,  xhc  Liver 
for  its  Center :  —  and  this  Dodtrine  is,  we  prefume,  founded  on 
the  follov/ing  Difcoverys  in  the  Animal  Oeconomy; — that  from 
the  Blood,  which  is  a  Mixture  of  various  Humours,  that  is, 
©f  various  Combinations  of  the  Four  Elements  in  different 
Proportions, — Combinations,  differently  figured,  or  endued  with 
different  Qualitys,  for  the  various  Purpofes  of  Nature  in  the 
Animal,  —  thefe  Huviours  are,  to  fcrve  thofe  Purpofes,  fecreted 
h^   diiferent   Glands,    feverally   appropriated    to    the  feveral    Se- 

B  b  b  2  cretionsi 


38o 


PHILEBUS. 


eretions;  — that  One  of  Thefe  Glands  is  the  Lher-,  which  rs> 
appropriated  to  the  Secretion  of  the  Bik,  —  a  Humour,  con- 
taining a  large  Proportion  of  Jixt  Fire,  combined  with  a  grofs. 
muddy  Earth ;  —  that  the  Bi/e,  after  its  Secretion,  is  the  Soul's: 
principal  Inftrument  in  her  Work  of  digejling  the  Food ;  —  and 
that,  before  its  Secretion,  whilft  it  circulates  in  the  Blood,  but 
more  efpecially,  when  Part  of  what  had  been  fecreted  is  re- 
abforbed  into  the  Blood,  uncorrupted  and  exalted,  it  is  the  chief 
Stimulus,  to  excite  all  the  Appetites  which  are  natural.  —  Thus 
much  feems  fufficient  to  £how,  from  What  natural  Incapacity 
it  is,  that  Sentient  Soul  is  communicable  only  to  Thofe  Cor- 
poreal Beings,   in  whofe  compounded  and  crgani/'ed  Bodys  Air  and 

Fire  continually  circulate  together. ^What  is   wanting   in    the 

Compofition  of  all  known  Animals,  except  in  Thofe  of  the 
Human  Kind,  to  enable  them  to  partske  of  IntelleB  and  Reafoni 
is  much  more  difficult  to  be  difcovered.  It  feems  inconceivabia 
indeed  in  any  other  way,  than  by  recurring  to  the  very  an- 
cient Docflrine,  (efpoufed  by  Plato  in  his  Epinomis,  and  hy  Arif' 
totle  in  his  Treatife  de  Ccelo,)  concerning  a  Fifth  Element,  finer^ 
than  the  fineft  of  the  commonly  known  Four,  and  having  its 
proper  Place  in  the  Heavens,  or  JEther;  above  that  Region  of 
Air  and  Fire,  the  Atmojphere.  But  the  difficulty  quite  vaniihes^ 
on  fuppofltion  of  the  Truth  of  that  Doflrine  -,  the  rEtberial 
Fire  being  thus  dijlinguijl:ed  ixQVCv  That  F'xtt,  which  is  One  of 
the  Ingredients  in  all  natural  CompoundrBodyg>  either  Jixt  in 
them  as  in  Fojjils,  or  pajfing  thro  them  as  in  Vegetables  from  a 
warm  Air,  or  continually,  circulating  within  them  as  in  Animals, 
—For  the  Maintainers  of  this  Diftindtion  teach,  that,  as  the 
Senjitive  Soul  has  her  immediate  Seat  in  a  Portion  of  Air  and 
Fire,  in  like  m.anner  the  immediate  Seat  of  the  Rational  Soul 
ef  Man  is  a  Portion  of  univerfal  ALther ;  and  that  no  otlier 
known  Animals  have,  in  their  compofition,  any  Particles  of 
3-  ^^^s 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         381 

tliis  fineft:  of  all  the  Elemeatary  Bodys,  unobftruded  and  difin- 
eumbered  :  whether  it  be,  becaufe  their  Blood  is  too  grofs,  and 
the  Lymph  of  it  charged  with  too  many  Earthy  Particles,  not 
to  deprcfs,  clog,  or  overwhelm  a  fmall  Quantity  of  fo  delicate 
a  Subftancej  (for  Human  Blood  is  lefs  impure  than  the  Blood 
of  any  Brute  Animals;)  or  whether  they  want  Glands  in  the 
Brain,  Jine  enough  to  fecrete  the  i^therial  Fluid,  and  to  free  it 
from  the  other  Elements ;  or  whether  it  be,  that  the  Mem^ 
branes  of  their  Vejj'els  in   the  Brain,  however  thick  they  may  be, 

are   yet   too   porous   to   prevent    the    Lateral    Efcape   of  it. ■ 

Such  of  the  ancient  Philofophers,  as  admit  not  of  a  Fifth 
Element,  recognifing  only  Four,  hold,  that  the  Two  lightefl  of 
them.  Air  and  Fire,  are  no  where  pure,  but  in  the  Heave?2s  or 
JEther;  for  that,  in  all  the  Space  between  the  Heavens  and  Earthy 
they  are  mixed  with  Particles  of  the  Two  heavier  Elements,— 
with  Vapours  ariling  from  the  Waters  of  this  Terraqueous  Globe,. 
and  with  Efflwvia  from  the  Earth  and  all  Earthy  Bodys. — Ac- 
cording to  this  Account,  it  fhould  feem,  that  the  Fire  of 
Heraclitus,  and  the  Stoicks,  is  no  other  Element  than  the  Mther 
of  Plato  and  Arijlotle,  Thefe  Two  Hypothefes  are,  indeed, 
effentially  fo  much  alike,  that  'tis  doubtful,  to  which  of  them 
Virgil  alludes,  in  the  Two  following  PafTages  of  his  Poems  j 
One,  in  the  ^ixth  Book  of  his  JEneid;  where  he  imitates  Plato 
in  efpoufmg  the  Eaftern  Dodtrine  of  a  Purgatory,  in  which 
Human  Souls,  departed  from  their  Bodys,  and  not  doomed  to> 
Tartarus,    are  confined, — 

JDonec  longa  dies,  perfeBo  temporis  orle, 
Concretam  exemit  labem,  piirumque  reliquit 
Mtherium  fenfum,  at  que  aural  fimpUcis  ignein. 

A  Paraphrafe  of  which  Verfes,    by  way  of  a  Comment  therer- 

on,  we  have  attempted  thus,— 

. Their. 


38a         P   H   I   L   E   B   U   S 

•'Their  periodic  'Time 
Till  Ages  have  compleated;  and  the  Stains, 
Sunk  in   the  Soul,   (when  erji  in  Body  plu?igd. 
She  founderd  in  the  Mire  of  earthly  Life,) 
Now  purg'd  away,    th'  atherial  Senfe  is   left 
Pure  i    and  the  Soul,    in  pure  celejlial  Fire 
Seated,  again  inhales  th'  untainted  Air 
OfMther. 

The  other  PafTage  is  in  his  Fourth  Georgick;  where,  having 
produced  feveral  Proofs  {Signs  and  Injlances  the  Poet  himfelf 
calls   them)  of  the  wonderful  Injli^idls  of  Bees,  he  adds,— 

His  §luidam  fgnis,  at  que  hcec  exempla  fecuti, 
EJfe  apibus  partem  divina  mentis,  &  haujlus 
Mtherios  dixere  :■•    — 

Of  this  Sentence  alfo  we  have  attempted  an  Explanatory  Para* 
phrafe,   as  follows,—— 

Hence  'tis  faid  by  Some^ 

That  from  pure  lEther,    Particles  of  Air 

Mtherial,  fraught  with  Mind,   on  Bees  defend. 

Thus,  as  they  breathe,  their  little  Beings  inhale 

Senfe  IntellcBual,   of  the  Mind  Divine 

A  Portion^     ■   ■ 

But,  as  we  juft  now  obferved,  the  difference  between  the  Doc- 
trine of  Plato  and  That  of  the  Stoicks,  concerning  the  fineft  of 
all  Corporeal  Subftances,  feems  to  have  been,  like  the  differences 
between  their  Moral  Dodtrines,  meerly  nominal.  For  the  Ele- 
ment, peculiarly  termed  /Ether  by  Plato  and  Arijiotle,  (to  dif- 
iinguifj  it  from  the  Element  of  Fire,)  was  by  Hcraclitus,  (with 

whom 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  383 

whom  in  his  Doftrine  concerning  Nature  the  Stoic  Philofophers 
agreed,)  termed  Fire  and  /Ether  indifferently;,  as  being,  with 
Him,  words  of  the  fame  Iiiiport,  when  applied  to  the  Fird 
corporeal  Principle  of  Things,  or,  z.%  Arijlotle  more  juftly  terms 
it,  the  Firji  Body.  Anaxagoras  alfo  is  cenfured  by  Arijiotle  in 
Mcteorolog:  L.  i,  Q.  '7^.  b:  de  Ccelo,  L.  3,  C.  6,  for  his  promif- 
cuoiis  ufe  of  the  terms  Mthcr  and  Fire,  in  fpeaking  of  th.e 
Heavens;  whereas,  in  all  former  Ages,  they  had  been  rightly 
diftinguified,  and  applied  to  different  Parts  of  the  Univerfe. — 
But,  that  all  thefe  Philofophers  had  the  fame  Meaning,  is  put 
beyond  a  Doubt  by  the  Dodlrine  of  Chryjippus,  a  genuine  Stoick, 
on  this  Point.  For  Chryjippus,  ufing  the  word  /Ether,  jufl:  as 
we  ufe  the  word  Sky  in  Englijh,  to  fignify  all  that  immenfe- 
Tradl  of  Space,  which  is  (to  Us)  higher  than  Our  Atmofphere, 
afferted,  in  his  Treatife  concerning  Providence,  that  to  xa3-«pw'- 
m^ov  tS  aiSrs^oi  the  piireji  Part  of  /Ether  was  the  Seat  of  70, 
jjV^/^ocixoV  to  xoVjUB  T^hat  which  governs  in   the  World,    meaning. 

Mind. The  Nature   of   this   fine  Subftance  was    generally. 

fuppofed  to  be  the  fame  with  That  oi  Light',  and  void  of  all  Se7i- 
fible  ^aliiys',    (fome  or  other  of  which  belong  to  all  Bodys  be'- 
fide,  to  the  Elementary,   as  well  as  to  the  Mixt-,)  for  Light,  tho 
it  gives  Viftblity  to    the    External  World,    its'  Self   is    invifible : 
and  the  Motion  of  it  was  generally  held  to  be  fwifter  than  That 
of  the  rapid  Lightning  %    for  Lightning   is   a   Colledtion    of  Fire 
mixed  with  ^?r,  let  loofe  from  its  Confinement  in  that  Region- 
of   impure   Vapours,,    the  Atihqfphere,      But    the    pureft  /Ether 
was  univerfally  deemed  to  be   the  Seat  of  thofe  Beings,   who  in- 
the  Vulgar  Syftem   of  Religion  were  ^iled  Gods   of  the  highejl 
Order:    whence-  the   Populace    readily  imagined    that    the  Bodys, 
of   thefe   Deitys    were   \N\\o\hj   luminous ;    (the  Soul  or  Mind   of 
Each    being   inverted   with    no   other  Body,    than    a  Portion  of: 
Light   or   pure  /Etherf)  and   readily   embraced   the  Worfhip  of/ 

ihsL 


584         P    H    I    L    E    B   U    S. 

the  Celejlial  Bodys,   as  foon  as  It  was  propofed  to  them  by  thofe 
Legiflators,    who   feemed   to   think,    that  'wifible  Objeds    of  Re- 

ligious  TVorfiip   were   the   propereft   for  the  People. That  the 

truly  Divine  Being  himfelf,  the  Mind  Univerfal,  the  Father  of 
all  thofe  Particular  Deitys,  hath  his  Capital  and  Chief  Seat 
rrm  ctvooTolTco  kx)  7r^ur;iv  U^xv  in  the  highejl  Heaven,  or  pureft 
JEther,  was  a  Dodrine  of  the  mofl  remote  Antiquity,  and 
univerfally  received;  as  we  are  affured  by  the  ancient  Writer 
of  the  Treatife  7n^\  v.o(jfJLB,  who  (if  he  was  not  Arijlotk  Him- 
felf) followed  in  this  Point  Arijlotle's  Judgtnent.  See  his 
Treatife  de  Ca^/o,  L.  1,  C.  3.  And  we  are  told  by  Porphyry , 
in  Vita  Pythag:  pag:  41,  Edit:  Ktijier: ,  that  Pythagoras  em- 
braced this  DotSrine  of  the  Perfian  Magi,  which  he  had  learnt 
from  them, — tS  S-g?  (for  the  word  170.00.,  which  precedes,  ought 
to  be  omitted,) — iomeycct  to  /juv  aujJicc  (puTi,  tw  Si  -^^XW  aXv^aa, 
•^that  the  Supre??ie  Being  has,  for  his  Body  as  it  were,  the  Light; 

and  for  his  Soul,  Truth. But  farther;  —  the  ^mo. /Ether 

%vas    fuppofed    by    the  Ancients    not  only   to    be   the  Abode   of 
Celejlial  Beings,  but  to   be   alfo   the  Native  Place  of  all  Rational 
Souls  whatever.     See  Note  74  to   this   Dialogue.     Indeed  on  no 
other   Foundation,    than  Such   an  Hypothefis,    could  have  been 
rationally    built    many    ancient    Opinions,    almoft    univerfally   re- 
ceived,   and    remaining    to    this    day ;  —  Some,    concerning    the 
Lapfe,    or    the   Defcent    of   Rational    Souls    from   Heaven    into 
Human  Bodys;    (to   account   for   which  Degeneracy,   many  Alle- 
gorical Fables,  and  Myflic  Parables,  were   of  old  fpred   amongft 
the    Eaflern   Nations;) — concerning   the    Return    alfo    of    the 
Hwnan     Soul,     after    its    Departure    from     this     "Earthly    Body, 
and  travelling  thro   divers   Regions   or    States   of  Purijication,    to 
her  native  Country,   the  pure  JEther ; — Others,  agreeable  to   the 
Dodrine   of  the  Stoicks,  as  well  as  to  That  oi  Plato,  concerning 
a   di/lin£t  and   feparate  Exijlcnce  of   the  Souls   of  ii-ife  end  good 

Men, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  385 

Men,  until  a  certain  Period  of  Time,  when  they  will  have 
attained  to  Inch  a  degree  of  WifJom  and  inherent  Virtue,  as 
may  qualify  them  for  being  eff'ential/y  and  fiibJicuUio.Uy  united 
to  the  Univerfal  and  Divine  Mind. — But  Proofs  of  the  near 
Neighbourhood  between  the  Philofophers  of  the  Torch  and  Thofe 
of  the  Academy,  in  their  Notions  of  Man's  Rational  Soul,  have 
their  proper  Place  in  Notes  on  the  Phcrdrus  and  the  Phado ; 
the  Subjedl  of  Both  which  Dialogues  is  the  Superior  Soul  of 
Man.  Such  Reafonings  belong  not  immediately  to  Annota- 
tions on  the  Fhilebus ;  the  Subject  of  which  is  much  more 
Divine, — the  Mind  and  Soul  of  the  whole  Univerfe.  However, 
fince  in  the  Firji  Part  of  this  Dialogue,  the  Frame  of  Man's 
Nature  is  divided  into  its  Two  mofl  General  conftituent  Parts, 
Body  and  Soul,  —  his  Body,  analyfed,  and  the  Elements  of  it 
fhown  to  be  the  Same  with  the  Elements  of  all  Corporeal 
Nature, — his  Soul  diftinguiHied  into  Senfitive  and  IntelleBive, — 
— the  former  of  which  he  has  in  common  with  Brute  Ani- 
mals,— the  latter.  His  fole  Prerogative,  no  Brute  Animal  be- 
ing able  to  receive  and  to  retain  it; — fince  alfo  it  appears, 
that  the  Senfitive  Soul  is  feated  in  ylir  and  Fire;  and  the 
JjitclleSlive  Soul,  in  an  i^therial  Body,  a  Portion  of  Univerfal 
JEther; — it  may  be  pertinent  in  this  place  to  obferve,  on  the 
Subjed  of  thefe  Two  Souls,  (evidently  found  to  be  thus  dif- 
tind,)  that,  tho  they  are  united  together  in  the  upper  Part 
of  Man's  Body,  his  Head,  their  common  Manfion,  (agreeably 
to  the  Notions  and  perhaps  alfo  to  the  Confcioifnefs  of  all 
Mankind,  as  well  as  to  the  Do&rine  of  Tifnaus,)  yet,  at  the 
Diffolution  of  this  Compound-Body,  when  all  the  Elementary 
Parts  of  it  return  to  their  feveral  univerfal  Elements,  'tis 
highly  probable,  that  the  Rational  Soul  and  the  Senfitive  Soul 
feparate  again ;  unlefs  a  Man's  Reafon  and  IntelleB  were,  before 
that  time,  quite  abforbed  in  Seyife,    and  the  Rational  Soul  funk  and 

C  c  c  lofl 


386         P  ,  H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Protarchus. 

By  no  means. 

Socrates. 

You  will  affirm   then,    that  in    the  nature   of  Ju- 
piter -"  there   is  a  Kingly  Soul   and   a  Kingly  Mind, 

thro 

.loft  in  tke  meer  Animal^  for  that,  ot'herwife.  Each  Soul  would 
be   carried   b.y  Nature   to   her  Native  Place. 

^-^  That  is, — ///  the  internal  nature  of  the  \Jniverfe.  —  In  the 
Orphic  Verfes,  the  name  of  fupiter  is  fometimes  given  to  the 
Whole  JJni'verfe, — including  both  Worlds,  nov  votiTov  xa)  tcV  alSrnTav 
.the  Intelligible  and  the  Sen/ible ; — including  all  Caufes  and  zWEff'eSis; 
— including  the  Firji  Principles  of  Things,  Mind  and  Matter,  aLfxi- 
■cK^av  oV/ar  kxi  fy.iotc^m  the  (adually)  hidivifible  EJfence  and  the  (actu- 
ally) Divijible ; — and  including  the  immediate  Principles,  Bound ^nd 
Infinite,  together  with  to  Rrta/vc«.  the  Mixture  of  them  Both. — But 
generally  in  thofe  Verfee,  the  Term  Jupiter  is  reftrained  to  fignify 
■the  Mind,  Soul,  and  Life  of  the  Univerfe ;  or,  in  other  words,  the 
P arming  Form  Univerfiil,  aSling  ivith  Intelligence.  And  accordingly, 
\\\t  Corporeal'^ or\A  is  there  ftyled  Z«j'o's  aooy-ct  ih.Q  Body  of  Ju- 
piter, and  iiu.xs  ^xa-iA&ov  the  Kingly  Body. The  Verfes,  termed 

Orphic,  —  as  containing  the  Traditional  Dodtrine  of  Orpheus^ 
and  as  being  accommodated  to  thofe  Religious  Myfterys,  of 
which  He  was  the  Founder,  —  obtained  fo  great  an  Authority 
throughout  Greece,  that  the  Name  of  Jupiter  was  received  and 
ufed  in  the  fame  Meaning,  which  it  bore  in  thofe  Verfes, 
by  all  the  philofophical  and  learned  Poets  of  that  Country. 
Even  when  they  pcrfonify  the  Supreani  Being,  and  reprefent  him 
as   fome  Particular  Deity,   by  placing   his  Throne  in  Heaven,  — 

6  where 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         3S7 

thro  the  Power  of  Caufe ;  and  that  to  the  other 
Gods   belong  other   Excellencys,    whatever    they   arc, 

where  he  overlooks,  mfpeBs  into,  and  governs  All  things, — they 
draw  this  reprefentation  from  the  Analogy  between  the  Divine 
Mind  and  the  Human.  For  the  Mind,  or  Rational  Soul,  of  Man, 
is  univerfally  deemed  to  be  feated  in  the  Head;  where  it  takes 
cognifance  of  all  things  within  reach  of  the  Senfes ;  and  from 
whence   it  dircdis  and  rules  the  Motions   of  every  Member  of  the 

Body. Nor   did    only    the  philofopbic  Poets   give   the   name  of 

"Jupiter  (not,  like  the  Vulgar,  to  an  imaginary  Being,  whom 
they  fuppofed  to  be  thundering  in  his  Wrath,  when  they  heard 
Thunder  in  the  Air,  but)  to  the  true  God,  —  the  Creator  and 
Governor  of  All  things,  —  the  Fountain  of  all  Intelligence,  Senje, 
and  Life : — even  the  befi:  Fhilofophers  fometimes  gave  him  the 
fame  poetical  and  popular  Name.  Of  This  we  have  an  In- 
flance,  now  before  us,  in  Socrates,  recorded  here  hy  Plato :.  and 
the  Authority  of  Seneca  we  deem  fufficient  to  vouch  for  all 
the  reft.  For  of  all  Thefe  Seneca  thus  writes,  in  Natural: 
Sluajl:  Lib:  2,  C.  45. — SapientilTimi  viri  —  eundem,  quern  nos, 
Jovem  intelliguiit ;  cuftodem  redoremque  Univerfi,  animum  ac 
fpiritum ;  mundani  hujus  operis  dominum  &  artificem ;  cui 
nomen  omne  convenit.  Vis  ilium  Fatum  vocare  ?  non  errabis: 
Hie  eft,  ex  quo  fufpenfa  funt  omnia;  caufi  caufarum.  Vis 
ilium  Providentiam  dicere  ?  redle  dices  :  Eft  enim,  cujus  con- 
filio  huic  mundo  providetur ;  ut  inconfufus  eat,  &  adus  fuos 
explicet.  Vis  ilium  Naturam  vocare  ?  non  peccabis :  Eft  enim, 
ex  quo  nata  funt  omnia  ^  cujus  fpiritu  vivimus.  Vis  illuni 
vocare  Mundum  ?  non  falleris  :  Ipfe  enim  eft  totum  quod 
vides ;  totus  fuis  partibus  inditus,  &  fe  fuftinens  vi  fua.  ■ 
Compare  this  Paftage  with  another  of  the  fame  Writer,  in  his 
Treatife  de  Benefciis.  L.  4,    C.  7. 

C  c  c  2  by 


^S8  P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 

by  which  their  Deitys  love  to  be  diftinguillied,  and 
from  which  they  delight  in  taking  their  refpedlive 
Denominations. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  I  lliall. 

Socrates. 
The  Difcourfe,  we  have  now  had  together  on 
this  Subject,  O  Protarchus !  think  it  not  idle,  and 
to  no  Purpofe.  For  it  fupports  That  Dodrine  of 
our  Anceftors,  that  the  Univerfe  is  for  ever  go- 
verned by  Mind. 

Protarchus. 
Indeed  it  does. 

Socrate  s. 

And  befides,  it  has  furnifhed  us  with  an  Anfwer 
to  My  Queftion, — to  What  Sort  of  Being  Mind  is 
to  be  referred ;  in  making  it  appear,  that  Mind 
is  allyed  to  That,  which  we  faid  was  the  Caufe  of 
All  things.  One  of  our  Four  Sorts  of  Being.  For 
now  at  length  you  plainly  have  our  Anfwer. 

Protarchus. 
I  have ;   and   a  very  full  and  fufficient  Anfwer  it 
is  :    but  I  was  not  aware,  What  you  were  about. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         389 

Socrates. 

A  Man's  attention  to  ferious  Studys,  O  Protarchus  ! 
Is  fometimes,  you  know,  relaxed  by  Amufements  "^ 

Protarchus. 
Politely  faid. 

^-3  In  the  Greek,  — «  Tra.iS'ioc,  Play  or  Sport.  —  For  Socrates^ 
with  his  accuflomed  Irony,  fliunning  the  invidious  Charadler 
of  a  great  Pbilojopber,  is  pleafed  fo  to  term  his  Difquifition 
concerning  the  Divine  Nature :  and  thus  he  makes,  at  the 
fame  time,  a  pohte  Apology  for  Protarchus,  to  prevent  the 
young  Gentleman  from  being  afliamed  of  his  not  difcover- 
ing  the  Defign  of  Socrates  in  that  Difquifition.  —  Compare 
alfo  what  Socrates  fays  in  the  Middle  of  the  Page,  immediately 
preceding  This,  with  what  he  faid  before  in  Page  325.  —  And 
perhaps  this  prefent  Turn  in  the  Difcourfe  of  Socrates,  from 
the  Serious  "and  the  Grave,  at  once  to  the  Eafy,  the  Familiar 
and  Jocofe,  is  defigned  by  him  to  recreate  the  Minds  of  Protar- 
chus and  his  other  Auditors,  by  giving  them  'an  occalion  to 
unbend  a  little  the  Stridlnefs  of  their  Attention :  —  for,  as 
Arijiotle,  in  his  Nicomachean  Rthicks,  obferves,  UvaTravaB  hiTcev  >»* 
Tra.iS'icc,  Play  fern) es  as  an  Interval  of  Rejl  (from  Labour). — In  faft, 
if  this  whole  Dialogue  be  fuppofed  intirely  fidtitious,  the  prefent 
Turn,  at  the  fame  time  that  'tis  quite  agreeable  to  the  ufual 
manner  of  Socrates  in  converfation  with  his  Friends,  is  con- 
trived by  Plato,  according  to  his  confummate  Art  in  this  Kind 
of  Compofition,  to  refrejh  the  Minds  and  relax  the  Attention 
of  his  Readers,  before  they  enter  on  the  Second  Argumentative 
Part  of  the  Dialogue :  for  nothing  now  remains  of  the  Firji 
Part,  but  to  fum  up  the  Capital  Dodrines  of  it,  in  a  brief 
Recital  of  the  Two  Conclufive  Propolitions,   therein  proved. 

6  Socrates. 


390 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates. 
And  thus,     my  Friend  !     to  Which  Sort  of  Being 
Mind   belongs,    and  What  Power   it   is   pofieffed    of, 
has  been  now  fhown  tolerably  well  for  the  prefent. 

Prqtarchus.. 
It  has  indeed. 

Socrates. 

And   to  Which    Sort  alfo  belongs  Pleasure,    ap- 
peared before. 

Protarchus. 

Very  true. 

Socrates. 

Concerning  thefe  Two  then,  let  us  remember 
thefe  Conclufions  ; — that  Mind  is  allyed  to  Caufe  ; 
and  is  as  it  were  congenial  with  it  :  —  and  that 
Pleasure  is  infinite  in  her  own  nature  ;  and  be- 
longs to  That  Sort  of  Being,  which,  of  it  Self, 
neither  has,  nor  ever  will  have  in  it,  either  a  Begin- 
ning, or  a  Middle,  or  an  End. 

Protarchu's. 
We  fhall  not  fail  to  remember  them  Both. 

SoCRATESo. 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 


DIALOGUE 


CONCERNING 


The    chief   GOOD    of    MAN. 


THE    SECOND    PART. 


LONDON: 

PRINTED      BY     R.     HETTj 

AND    SOLD    BY    T.    PAYNE    AND    SON,    AT    THE    MEWS    GATE, 

MDCCLXXX. 

[price    THIRTEEN    SHILLINGS.] 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  391 

Socrates. 

Now  we  ought  to  confider  next,  in  Which  Sort 
of  Being,  Either  of  thofe  Two  Things,  Intelligence 
and  Pleafure,  is  found  to  have  a  Seat ;  and  in  what 
State  or  Condition  thofe  Beings  muft  be,  in  whom 
Either  of  them  is  produced,  at  the  time  of  its  Produc- 
tion. And  firft  in  the  cafe  of  Pleafure  :  for  as  we 
inquired,  to  which  Sort  of  Being  She  belonged,  before 
we  coniidered,  of  which  Sort  was  Mind  ;  fo  with 
regard  to  the  Points  alfo,  now  propofed.  She  is  the 
firft  to  be  examined  "^  But  feparately  from  the 
confideration  of  Pain,  we  fhould  never  be  able  fully 
to  explore  the  nature  of  Pleafure. 

PROTARCHU  S. 

Well  y  if  we  are  to  proceed  in  this  way,  let  us  then 
in  this  way  proceed  "^ 

^^4  Cornarius  and  Stephens,  Both  of  them,  perceived  the  Greek 
of  this  Sentence  to  be  erroneous.  But  the  Emendations,  pro- 
pofed by  Them,  appear  infufficient.  Ficwus's  Tranflation  from 
the  Florentine  M.S.  helps  to  reftore  the  right  Reading  thusj — 
Ati  in, li'eiv  7ifA.a.i'    Kcct    tt^utov  Tre^i    iny  riS'ovriv,    cuaTreo — erw  xal 

"5  In  the  Edition  oi  Plato  by  Aldus,  and  in  That  alfo  by 
Stephens,  this  Sentence,  by  a  flrange  Miftake,  is  printed  as  if 
it  were   fpoken   by  Socrates. 

D  d  d  Socrates. 


392.         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Socrates. 

Are  You  of  the  fame  Opinion  with  Me,  concerning 
their  Rife  and  Produdion  ? 

Protarchus. 
What  Opinion  is  That  ? 

SOCRAT  E  S. 

Pain  and  Pleafure  appear  to  Me,  Both  of  them, 
to  arife,  according  to  nature,  in  the  Middle  "*  Sort 
of  Being. 

Protarchus. 

*^*  In  the  Greeks — v.wov.  Common.  But  this  attributive  Term, 
in  Englijh,  is  never  applied  to  any  Thing,  confidered  as  be- 
tween 'Two  other  Things,  and  partaking  of  them  Both;  whicii 
is  the  cafe  of  that  Sort  of  Beings,  meant  in  the  prefent  Paf- 
fage.  In  a  Paffage  before,  where  the  fame  Word  v.oivov  oc- 
curred in  the  fame  Senfe  it  has  in  This,  it  was  rendered 
into  'Englijh  by  the  Term,  Compound;  and  in  a  Paflage  prior 
to  That,  the  Term,  Commixture,  was  chofen  to  reprefent 
■KoivuinoL  in  the  Greek:  in  all  the  other  Paflliges  on  this  Subjedt, 
Plato  ufeth  the  Terms  //iktcV  or  fjLif^iyiJiivov,  and  fxl^n. — Now  it 
is  eafy  enough  to  perceive,  that  Bounds,  fet  to  Things  which 
are  infinite  of  themfelves,  are  together  with  (or  as  it  were 
mixed  with)  thofe  hifinites.  But  the  Terms,  xoivov,  and  xon'orix, 
Common,  and  Communication  or  Communion,  when  applied  to  thefe 
Mixt  Beings,  feem  to  require  fome  explanation.  —  By  thofe 
Terms   then    it    is    here    fignified,    as   we    apprehend,    that    all 

6  fuch 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


393 


fuch  Beings,  all  Natural  and  Artlfidal  Things,  partake  of  Form, 
and  partake  alfo  oi  Matter :  —  that,  on  the  one  hand,  Form  is 
derived  to  them  from  Mind;  — fuperficial  Form,  derived  to  the 
Works  and  Performances  of  Art,  from  the  Minds  of  Human 
Artifts ; — internal  and  ejfential  Form,  derived  to  the  Works  and 
Operations  of  Nature,  from  the  Divine  Mind,  for  ever  form- 
ing or  reforming  Nature's  Materials,  the  Subftance  of  all  Na- 
tural Beings :  —  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Siibfance  of 
all  External  Beings  whatever,  the  Subfratum  of  their  Forms, 
the  SubjeSl- Matter  of  Formation  both  to  Nature  and  to  Art,  is 
derived   from    the   Firjl  Infinite,    the   common  Matter   of   them 

all. It  feems  alfo  to   be  implied  in  thofe  Terms,  y.oivQv  and 

icotvoovlcc,    that    the   Elements    (or  Elementary    Forms)    of  Nature 
have  for  their  immediate  Subjed:   this  Firfi  or  fundamental  Mat- 
ter,  and  communicate  with   it  continually :    as  it  is    certain,    that 
they   do;  for  they  would  not  elfe  be  tranfmutable   diredly  into 
each   other :  —  that  Such   of  the  Works  of  Nature,   as  are  com- 
pounded of  the  Four   Lower  Elements,   receive  from   thefe  Ele- 
ments   the    firft   Seeds    of    their   Being ;    and    that   Particles    of 
their  Suhfiance   are  continually   departing    from    them  into    thefe 
Elements ;  from    whence    they    receive    a    continual    accejpon   of 
frejh  Particles   in  their  turn ;    thus  keeping   up  a   conftant   mu- 
tual Communication :  —  that,   of  thefe  Compound-Beings,   Such,    as 
have  Sentient   Souls,     render    them    up,    at   their   Death,     to    the 
great  Soul  TJniverfal,  from  whom  they  at  firfl:  received  them; — and 
that,   from   the  time  of  their  Birth    to  the  time  of  their  Death, 
nothing,     but    His     continued    Conifnunication    with    them,     by 
means    of  the   Adive  Elements,    enables   them    to  retain   thofe 
Souls  of  theirs,  or  to  live. On  this  Point,  we  farther  thus  aro-ue 

O 

from  Analogy  ;  that,  of  thefe  Sentient  Beings,  Such  as  have 
Mind  and  Reafon  fuperadded  to  their  Souls,  by  the  Divine  Mind 
immediately,  preferve  That  their  Rational  Part,  only  by  maintain- 

D  d  d  2  ing 


394 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


ing  its  Union  and  Communion  with  its  immediate  Sire,  —  who 
Himfelf  is  Right  Reafon  and  Truth,  The  fupremely  Fair  and  the 
fovereignly  Good,  —  fo  as  to  receive  from  him  his  continual 
Influence  and  Aid :  for  that  'tis  impoflible  for  the  Mind  of 
Man,  or  Human  Reafon,  otherwife  to  be  preferved  in  a  found 
State :  wanting  its  fole  Support,  of  necefl'ity  it  muft  become 
contrafted,  vitiated  and  corrupted,  a  Slave  to  the  Paffions 
of  its  Partner;  until-  finally,  having  loft  all  its  govern- 
ing,   comprehending,    and     uniting    Power,     the    Utiity    of    its 

own  Being   be   deftroyed,  and   for  ever  loft  in  Multitude. But 

befide    this  Vital  Intercourfe    and  Communication    between   all   the 
Compound- Beings  of    Nature,    on   one  fide, — and   thofe  Eleme)2ts, 
from  which  they   derive   their  component  Parts,    on    the  other 
lide; — and  befldes  the  Continuity,    throughout   the  Univerfe,    of 
the  Firjl  Matter,    the  Subjiratum    of    all  external  Forms,    thro 
which  Continuity    the  Vital  Intercourfe    between    them    is   main- 
tained ; — there   is   alfo   an  Occajional  Correfpondence,   either   cafual 
or  voluntary,    carried    on,    thro    the  Continuity   of  the  Elements, 
between    the  Senjes  of   all   Senfitii^e  Beings,    on   one  fide,  —  and 
the  ^alitys  or  Powers  of  the  Elements,    fimple   or  combined,    on 
the  other  fide ; — from   which  arife  adtual  Senfations,   either  plea- 
furable    or  painful,    in  thofe    Senfitive   Beings. This  Corre- 
fpondence is   divided  into  Five  Branches,   according   to  the   num- 
ber   of  the   outward  Senfes,   and   the   number   of  the  Elements  of 
outward  Nature. — The  Senfe  of  Seeing,    by  the  means   of  Light 
•within  the  Eye,   which   is  the  Organ  of  that  Senfe,   correfponds 
with    the  Light  without ;    thro    the    Continuity   of  which   Lucid 
Element,    reaching    to   the  inmoft  Membrane  of  the  Eye,    the 
Soul  can  take  cognizance  of  Compound-Bodys  at  diftance  from 
her  own,  as  to  their  Colour,  Figure,  and  Magnitude, — The  Senfe 
of  Hearing,     by    means    of  Air   within    the  Ear,    which    is    the 
Organ   of    that   Senfe,    correfponds    with   the  Air  without,    the 

only 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


395 


only  Vehicle   of  Foice  and   of   all    other   Sounds;    thro  the  Con- 
tinuity of  which   Elementary    Air,    reaching   to  the  Membranes 
of   the  Ear,    the   Soul    receives   Notice    of  Vocal  and   other  So- 
norous   Beings,    afar    off    as    well    as    near.  —  The     Senfe    of 
Smelly     by    means    of    the   Igneous   or  /Ethereal  Fluid,    contained 
in    the  Nervous  Membranes   of   the  Nofe,    which  is   the  Organ 
of   that    Senfe,    correfponds    with    the  fame  Fluid  without:    for 
this    Element    flows    in    a    continual    Stream   from   Bodys  which 
emit    many    Particles    of    it,     combined    with    Particles    of    the 
other   Elements,    (Effluvia   from    the   fame  Bodys,)    and   reaches 
home   to    that   Organ   of  the  Smell.  —  The  Senfe   of  Tajle,    by 
means  of  the  Moijlure,    fupplied   plentifully  from    the   Blood    to 
the  Organs  of   Tafte    within    the  Mouth,    correfponds    with    the 
Humid  Elemeftt    in    Exterior    Things,     whenever    any    of    thefe 
Things   are   applied   immediately   to  thofe   Organs.     For  Particles 
of   all     the   Lower   Elements    being    intimately   combined    toge- 
ther   in     every    Compound-Body,    the    Soul,     by    means    of    the 
Humid  Element,    is   fenfible   of   the   Hot    or   the    Cold,    if  either 
of  Thefe    Elements    hath   the   afcendance    over    its    Contrary    in 
the  Compolition.     By   the  Degree  of  Moijiure   therein,    the  Soul 
perceives,    how    much    it    partakes    of   the  Dry  Element.     And, 
by    the    means    alfo    of    the  Moijlure,    fhe    perceives    Such    of 
thofe   Qualities   of  the   Elements   combined,   called   Secondary  ^la- 
litys,   as   affect   the   Senfe    of  Tajle.  —  The   Senfe  of  Feeling,    by 
means   of  the   Solid  or  Earthy   Part  of   our   Frame,    correfponds 
with    the  Dry   ElemeJit  of  Earth    in     all    exterior    Solid    Bodys, 
whenever   any   of  Thefe   are    applied    immediately    to    any   Mem- 
branous  Part   of  our  own    Body,    whether    an    inward  Part,    as 
the   Coats  of  the   Stomach,    or  outward,    as    the  Skin.     For    only 
by  the  Degree  of  Drynefs   or   Solidity,   felt  by  the  Soul   in  thofe 
Mi.\'t  Bodys,  which   are  in  Contadt   with  her  own,   is  (he  fen- 
fible,  in    what  Degree   they   partake   of  the  Moiji  Element :   only 
by   the  ContraBion  or  Dilatation  of  fome  Membranous  Fart  of  her 

owa 


D 


96  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


own  Body,  is  the  Soul  fenfible  of  either  Cold  or  Heat,  whe- 
ther in  Things  outwardly  or  inwardly  applied  to  it,  or  in  the 
Atmofphere  immediately  furrounding  it  :  and  only  by  the 
different  Effects,  wrought  in  fome  Mefnbrane,  by  the  Appulfc 
or  Application  of  different  Exterior  Bodys,  is  the  Soul  fenfible 
of  their  Rongbnefs,  or  Hardnefs,  or  any  other  of  their  Secon- 
dary Qiialitys,    which  affefl  the  Senfe  oi  Feeling. This  whole 

Correfpondence  between  the  Five  Elements,  fimplc  or  combined, 
and  our  Five  Animal-Senfes,  by  means  of  the  Membranous 
Organs  of  thefe  Senfes,  is  as  it  were  a  Commerce  with  foreign 
Countrys,  from  whence  the  Commoditys  of  thefe  Countrys  are 
conveyed  to  our  own  Ports.  For,  as  all  the  Membranes  of  the 
Body  are  more  or  lefs  replete  with  Nerves,  the  Sentient  Soul, 
whofc  immediate  Seat  is  the  Mthereal  Fluid  in  the  Nerves, 
feels  and  perceives,  thro  thefe  Nervous  Membranes,  What  ex- 
terior Things   are   benign   and   friendly   to  her  Body,    and  What 

are    mifchievous   and  hoflile.' A    more   intimate  and  immediate 

Correfpondence,  without  the  intervention  of  Exterior  Bodys,  like 
a  Home-Trade  without  newly-arrived  Imports  from  abroad, 
is  carried  on  between  ^oiil  and  ^oid  in  our  own  Species.  The 
Pafjions  and  Affections  of  the  Soul  are  communicated  from  one  Perfon 
to  another,  thro  inarticulate  Sounds,  and  thro  the  vifible  Impreffions, 
unavoidably  and  naturally  made  by  thofe  Paffions  and  Affcdlions, 
on  the  Countenance,  Gefures,  and  Behaviour,  of  the  Party  firft  im- 
paffioned  or  affeded.  Sentiments,  Notions,  and  Opinions,  are  com- 
municated  from  one  Perfon  to  another,  thro  the  winged  Conveyance 
by  Words,  underftood  in  the  fame  Senfe  by  the  Speaker  and  the 
Hearer.  Every  Art  alfo,  and  every  Particular  Science,  may  be  and 
often  is  communicated  from  one  Mind  to  another,  the  fame  way ; 
and  from  the  Writer  alfo  to  the  Reader.  —  Now  in  all  this 
interior  Commerce,  excepting  That  of  the  Sciences,  it  may  be 
obferved,  that  the  Articles  of  it,  as  they  are  derived  from 
Things   the   Nature    of    which    is    if/finite,    are  Themfelves    alfo 

infinite ; 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         397 

infinite ;  and  that  Bounds  are  fet  to  them  only  by  Mind, — tlic 
Mind  of  the  Communicator,  the  Mind  of  the  Participant,  or 
the  Minds  of  Both,  according  to  the  degree  of  their  Know- 
lege,  their  Wijdom,  and  their  Virtue. — So  that  thro  Sympathy, 
mutual  AffeSlion,  and  the  Intercourfe  of  focial  Converfation,  or 
by  the  Medium  of  Writings,  That  Mixture  of  the  hrjinite  with 
Bound,  which  is  in  Each  particular  Soul  and  Mind,  becomes 
common  to  'Two  or  to  Maiiy :  and  thus  a  Community  of  Souls 
and  Minds,  a  perfect  Pythagorean  FriendJJnp,  may  be  formed, 
and  extended  to  as  many  Perfons,  as  have  All  of  them  equally, 
a  Social Senfe  of  Things,  and  a  Delight  in  communicating ;  —  All  of 
them.  Sentiments  agreeable  to  Hmnan  Nature,  the  Nature,  common 
to  all  Men  ; — and  Notions   agreeable    to   that  Divine  Reafon,    of 

which    all    Men    naturally  partake. For   it    is    the    natural 

Perfeftion  of  all  Particular  Minds,  to  hold  a  Communion,  the 
moft  intimate  and  the  moft  immediate,  with  the  Sovereign 
Mind,  ihe  Parent  of  their  Beings;  who,  as  he  is  Truth  its 
Self,  is  the  out-radiating  Centre  of  Union  to  all  Minds  :  as 
he  is  alfo  Good  its  Self,  amply  fufficient  for  all  Beings, 
in  Him  the  Defires  of  all  Such,  as  know  what  is  True 
Good,  meet,  concentre,  and  unite:  and  as  he  is  the  Universal 
Soul,  ihe  combining  Principle  to  all  the  Beings  of  Nature,  he  in- 
fpires  the  Spirit  of  Communio?z,  Concord,  and  Amity,  into  the 
Souls  of  all  Rational  Beings,  who  are  not  fully  pre-poffcffed 
with  the  Contrary  Spirit,  That  of  Selnfhnefs,  of  Dilcord  and 
Enmity,  but  are  open  to  receive  That  which  is  Divine  or 
Godlike.  Thus  it  appears,  that  Man,  who  is  of  all  Com- 
pound-Beings the  mod  compounded,  and  to  whom  Socrates,  in 
fpeaking  of  this  T^hird  Sort  of  Being,  principally  had  a  View, 
has  Communication,  remote  or  near,  mediate  or  immediate,  with 
all  external  and  internal  Nature.  His  Body,  being  compounded 
of  the  Elements  of  Outward  Nature,  communicates  with  the 
hifinity  of  thofe  Elements, — with  the  hifnity  of  the  ^lalitys  and 

Po'v^ers 


398 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Powers  of  all  the  Mixt  Bodys  and  Compofitions  which  fur- 
round  him, — and  with  the  Infinity  of  the  Comtnon  Matter  of 
them  all.  His  Mind,  if  he  fludys  to  improve  this  nobler 
Part  of  his  Being,  by  pure  Science,  abftrading  his  Ideas  from 
the  Images  of  things  Senfible, — or,  in  other  words,  removing 
thefe  Images  from  his  Ideas, — converfes  with  thofe  Eternal  Monads, 
thofe  Original  Numbers  and  Proportions,  which  fet  Bounds  to  all 
the  Infinites  in  the  Compound-Beings  of  Nature.  And  his 
whole  Soul,  being  partly  Senfitive  and  partly  Rational,  holds  as 
it  were  a  Converfe,  and  feels  as  it  were  a  Sympathy,  with  all 
Things,  in  which,  (as  in  her  Self,)  the  Infinites  receive  Bound 
and  Form,  Number  and  Meafure.  She  delights  to  dwell  with 
Symjnctry  in  Buildings,  Rythm  in  Motions,  and  Plarmony  in 
Sounds  :  and  thro  intimate  and  long  Converfe  with  Thefe, 
(he  acquires  the  Art  of  giving  to  the  like  Infinites  the  like 
beautiful,  graceful,  and  captivating  Forms.  If,  after  a  thorow 
acquaintance  with  her  own  Body,  flie  choofes  to  make  This  the 
Subjedl  of  her  Art,  flie  co-operates  with  the  Great  Soul  of 
Nature,  in  regulating  and  harmonifiing  the  dificordant  Humours  of 
that  Body ;  the  Irregularitys  of  which  Humours,  in  Kind  as 
well  as  in  Degree,  are  infinite.  And  if,  after  a  thorow  ac- 
quaintance with  her  own  Nature,  flie  makes  her  Self  the 
Subject  of  her  Art,  flie  co-operates  with  the  Suprcam  all- 
harmonifing  Mind,  the  great  Phyfician  of  Souls,  in  eftcfting 
Harmony  between   all    her   Parts,    and  in    procuring  Health  and 

Soundnefis  to  her  whole  Frame. Thus  have  we  endeavoured  to 

explain  the  Attributive  Term  v.omv.  Common,  as  here  applied 
to  all  Beings  fenfiible  of  Pain  and  Pleafure ;  but  particularly  ap- 
plicable to  Man;  and,  as  we  prefume,  meant  by  Socrates  to  be 
fo  applyed :  for  only  Alan  has  Communion  with  All  things, 
whether  Senfible  or  Intelligible;  and  only  in  the  befi  and  mofi 
perfe5l  State  of  Man's  Being,  all  the  Infinites,  as  well  thofe  in  his 
Soul,  as  thofe  in  his  Body,  meet  with  their  proper  and  jufl;  Bounds, 

6  Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         399 

Protarchus. 
Remind  us,    Friend  Socrates  !    which   of  the   Sorts 
of  Being,    mentioned   before,    is    meant  by   the   term 
Middle  "^ 

SOCRATE  S. 

What  you  defire,  young  Gentleman !  fliall  be  done, 
— ae  far  as  My  Power  reaches  "^ 

Protarchus. 

*-^  Socrates  had  before  explained,  what  he  meant  by  the 
Term,  Mixt,  when  applied  to  his  Ihird  Sort  of  Being  -,  and 
Protarchus  was  quite  fluisfyed  with  that  explanation.  It  feems 
therefore,  that  nothing  but  the  Term,  ytoivcv,  could  puzzle  him, 
or  make  him  at  a  Lofs  for  the  Meaning  of  Socrates,  at  this 
time.     See  from  Page  54  to  Page  60  inclufive. 

^-^  'Tis  obfervable,  that  Socrates,  in  this  Reply,  feems  uncer- 
tain, whether  he  was  able,  or  not,  to  explain  to  Protarchus 
the  nature  of  this  Third  Sort  of  Being  ;  and  yet,  that  he  had, 
juft  before,  without  any  hefitation,  difficulty,  or  ill  fuccefs, 
undertaken  the  Office  of  Expofitor  on  this  Subjedt.  The  Thingt 
to  be  explained,  is  the  very  Same :  the  only  Difference  lyes  in  the 
changing  of  the  Term,  Mixt,  for  the  Term,  ■koivov,  Common.  We  are 
therefore  to  fuppofe,  that  Socrates  deemed  Protarchus  incapable  of 
apprehending  the  Philofophic  Senfe  of  the  Word,  ymvIv.  In- 
deed, as  this  Young  Gentleman  had  not  been  initiated  in  the 
Dodtrine,  by  which  alone  That  Senfe  of  the  Word  could  be 
explained,  to  Him  it  was  not  in  the  Philojophers  Power  to  ex- 
plain it.  None  but  his  own  Difciples,  who  were  his  conjlant 
Auditors,  were  able  fully  and  clearly  to  apprehend  his  Mean- 
ing in   this  Expreffion  :    the   reft  of  his  prefent  K.\x^\^\'\QZ,  how- 

E  e  e  ever. 


400         P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Fairly  faid. 

Socrates. 

By  the  Middle  Sort  of  Being  then,  we  are  to  under- 
ftand  That,  v/hich,  in  recounting  the  Four  Sorts,  we 
reckoned  as  Third. 

Protarchus". 
That,    which   you   mentioned   next  after   Both   the 
Infinite   and   Bound  :  —  That    in  which   you   ranked 
Health,    and  alfo,   as   I  think.   Harmony 


229 


SOCRAT  ES- 

ever,    and   among   them  Protarchus,    might  be   fet  on  thinking,, 
afterwards   when  alone.    What   he    could    mean   by    the  Term, 
v-oivov,  on  this  occafion. 

"9  Man,  and  his  Chief  Good,  Moral  Virtue,  are  not  only  the  Stil?~ 
jeSls  of  this  whole  'Dialogue,  (as  in  the  Argument  is  endeavoured  to 
be  fhown,) — but  they  are  alfo,  (amongfl  the  Multitude  of  Things, 
in  which  Infinity  and  Bound  are  mixed  together,)  the  ultimate 
ObjeSls  of  our  Author's  View,  in  delineating  his  Third  Sort  of 
Beiug.  It  is  indeed  only  with  a  View  to  Ma;?,  to  Human> 
Virtue,  and  to  Human  Good,  that  he  makes  a  Divifion  of 
Being  into  Kinds  or  Sorts.  And  it  fcems,  that  Health  and 
Harmony  are  here  chofen  for  Inftances  of  the  Nature  of  this 
'Ihird  Sort  of  Being,  becaufe  Health  and  Harmojiy  in  the  whole 
Human  Soul  are   the  firft,    the  internal   and   immediate,    Efteds 

of  Moral  Virtue.      See   alfo   the   latter  Part   of  Note  226. 

Aldus  and  Stephens,  in  their  Editions  of  our  Author,  and  Bcmbo 

i  in 


P    FI    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


401 


Socrates. 
Perfedly  right.       Now  give    me   all    poiTible    At- 
tention. 

Protarchus. 
Only  fpeak. 

Socrates. 
I  fay   then,    that   whenever    the    Harmony    in    the 
Frame   of    any   Animal    is   broken,   a   Breach   is  then 
made  in  its  Conftitution,    and  at  the   fame  time  Rife 
is  given  to  Pains. 

Protarchus. 
You  fiy  what  is  highly  probable. 

Socrates. 
But -when  the  Harmony  is  reftored,  and  the  Breach 
is  healed,   we  fhould   fay,    that   then  Pleafure  is  pro- 
duced :    if   Points    of    fo    great  Importance    may  be 
difpatched  at  once  in  fo  few  Words. 

Protarch  u  s. 
In  my  Opinion,   O  Socrates  !    you  fay  what  is  very 
true  :    but  let  us  try,    if  we  can  fhow  thefe  Truths  in 
a  Light  ftill  clearer. 

in  his  Tranflation,  afcribe  the  Speech,  now  before  us,  to 
Socrates:  but  \.\\q  Bafil  Editions  agree  with.  Ficmus  and  Corna- 
rius,  in  reftoring  it  to  Protarchus,  the  right  Owner;  as  they 
likewife  do,  in  transferring  the  two  next  words, — "  Perfectly 
*•  right," — from  Protarchus  to  Socrates,  in  whofe  Mouth  alone 
thofe  words   are,   in  this  place,   proper, 

E  e  e  2  Socrates. 


402  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Socrates. 
Are  not   fuch  Things,    as   ordinarily   happen,    and" 
are   manifeft  to  us  All,    the   mofl:  eafy   to   be  under- 
flood  ? 

Protarchus. 
what  Things  do  you  mean  ?' 

SOCRATE  S. 

Want  of  Food  makes  a  Breach  in  the  Animal-Syftenr, 
and  at  the  fame  time  gives  the  Pain  of  Hunger.. 

Protarchus. 
True. 

Socr  AT  E  s. 

And  Food,  in  filling  up  the  Breach  again,  gives  a 

Pleafure. 

Protarchus. 
Right. 

Socrates. 

Want  of  Drink  alfo,  interrupting  the  Circulation  of 
the  Blood  and  Humours,  brings  on  us  Corruption, 
together  with  the  Pain  of  Thirft  :  but  the  Virtue  of 
a  Liquid,  in  moiftening  and  replenifhing  the  Parts 
dryed  up,  yields  a  Pleafure.  In  like  manner,  preter- 
natural fuffocating  Heat,  in  dili'olving  the  Texture  of 
the  Parts,  gives  a  Painful  Scnfation  :  but  a  Cooling 
again,   a  Refrefhment  agreeable   to  Nature,,  affects  us 

with  a  Senfe  of  Pleafure. 

Protarchus.. 


P  H  I  L  E  B  U  S.    403 

Protarchus. 

Moft  certainly. 

Socrates. 

And  the  Concretion  of  the  Animal-Humours  thro 
Cold,  contrary  to  their  Nature,  occafions  Pain:  but 
a  Return  to  their  priftine  ftate  of  Fluidity,  and  a 
Reftoring  of  the  natural  Circulation,  produce  Pleafure. 
See  then,  whether  you  think  this  general  Account  of 
the  matter  not  amifs,  concerning  That  Sort  of  Being 
which  I  faid  was  compofed  of  Infinite  and  Bound, 
— that,  when  by  nature  any  Beings  of  that  Sort  be- 
come animated  with  Soul,  their  Paffage  into  Corrup- 
tion, or  a  total  Difl'olution,  is  accompanied  with  Pain; 
and  their  Entrance  into  Exiftence,  the  Affembling  of 
all  thofe  Particles  which  compofe  the  nature  of  fuch- 
a  Being,   is  attended  with  a  Senfe  of  Pleafure. 

Protarchu  s. 

r  admit  your  Account    of  this  whole   matter  ;    for 

as   it   appears   to  Me,     it   bears    on    it   the    Stamp    of 

Truth  ''°. 

Socrates. 

Thefe  Senfations  then,  which  affe6l  the  Soul  by 
means  only  of  the  Body,  let  us  confider  as  One  Species 
of  Pain  and  Pleafure. 

^3°  As  it  correfponds  with  Nature  and  Experience. 

I-  Protarchus  ». 


404         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Be  it  fo. 

SOCRATE  S. 

Confider  now  the  Feelings  of  the  Soul  her  Self, 
in  the  Expedlation  of  fuch  a  Pain  or  of  fuch  a  Plea- 
fure, — antecedent  to  the  Pleafure  expedied,  an  agree- 
able Feeling  of  Hope  and  Alacrity,  —  antecedent  to 
the  Pain  expeded,   the  Uneafinefs  of  Fear. 

Protarchus. 

This  is  indeed  a  diiferent  Species  of  Pleafure  and 
Pain,  independant  of  the  Body,  and  produced  in  the 
Soul  her  Self  thro  Expectation. 

SoCRATE  S. 

You  apprehend  the  matter  rightly.  Now  the  con- 
iideration  of  thefe  Feelings  of  Pain  and  Pleafure, 
which  immediately  affed:  the  Soul  her  Self,  (and  fcem 
to  be  produced  in  her,  Each  of  them,  unmixed  and 
genuine  -'',)  will,  as  I  imagine,  clear  up  that  Doubt 
concerning  Pleafure,  —  whether  the  whole  Kind  be 
eligible, — or  whether  a  particular  Species  of  it  be  the 
proper  Objcd  of  our  Choice'^'. — And  in  the  latter  cafe, 
Pleafure  and  Pain,   (in  general,)   like  Heat  and  Cold, 

-3'  That  is, — Pleafure  without  Pain,  and  Pain  without  Pleafure. 
*5i  Meaning  That  Pleafure  which  is  pure  and  unmixed  with 
Pain. 

and 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         405 

and  all  other  things  of  this  Sort  "'%  will  defcrve 
fometimes  to  be  embraced,  and  at  other  times  to  be 
rejedled ;  as  not  being  good  in  themfelves,  but  admit- 
ting the  nature  of  Good  '^*  to  be  fuper-added  to  them 
only  at  fome  times  ^",  and  Some  of  them  only  ^"'^ 

Protarchus. 

You  are  perfectly  in  the  right.  It  muft  be  in  fomc 
fuch  way  as  This,  that  we  ought  to  inveftigate  the 
Things  we  are  in  purfuit  of  ^". 

Socrates. 

If  then  what  we  agreed  in  be  true, — that  Animal - 
Bodys  feel  Pain,   when  any  thing  befalls  them  tend- 

^"  That  is  —  fuch  ^alttys  and  Powers  of  things  corporeal, 
as,  when  thefe  things  are  applied  to  Senfitive  Beings,  raife  iu 
them   Senfations,    different  and   even   contrary  in  Kind. 

^34  In  What  the  nature  of  Good  confifts,  and  What  are  its 
proper  and  conftant  Attributes^,  we  learn  from  the  latter  Part 
of  this  Dialogue. 

^35  That  is,' — on  certain  occafions,  when  they  tend  to  the 
produftion,  prefervation,  or  recovery  of  Life,  Health,  or  Strength. 

236    What   Sorts   and    Degrees    of  Pleajiire,    flridtly    and    pro- 
perly  fo  called,    are   at   all   times  incompatible   with   the  Enjoy- 
ment of  true  Good,    'tis   the  chief  Objed:    of   this  Second  Part, 
of  the  Dialogue,    to   fliow. 

=•37  See  before,    in  Page  391. 

ins 


4o6  P    K     I    L    E    B    U    S. 

ing  to  their  Deftrudion, — Pleafure,  when  they  are 
iifing  the  means  of  their  Prefervation,  —  let  us  now 
confider,  what  State  or  Condition  every  Animal  is  in, 
when  it  is  neither  fuffering  anght  that  tends  to  its 
Deftrudionj  nor  is  engaged  in  any  allien,  or  in  the 
midft  of  any  circumftances,  tending  to  its  Prefervation. 
Give  your  earnefl:  attention  to  this  Point ;  and  fay, 
whether  it  is  intirely  neceffary,  or  not,  that  every 
Animal  at  that  time  fliould  feel  neither  Pain  nor  Plea- 
fure,  in  any  degree,   great  or  fmall. 

Protarchus. 
It  is  quite  neceffary. 

Socrates. 

Befides  the  Condition  then  of  an  Animal  delighted, 
—  and  befides  the  oppofite  Condition  of  it  under 
Uneafinefs, — is  not  This  a  different,  a  Third,  State  or 
Condition  of  an  Animal  ? 

Protarchus, 
Without  difpute. 

Socrates. 
Be    careful    then    to    remember   this    Judgment    of 
ours.      Por,  on  the  remembring  of  it,   or  not,   greatly 
will  depend  our  Judgment,    concerning  the  nature  of 

Pleafure. 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         407 

Pleafure  '^*.      But,    to  go  through  with  this  Point,    let 
us,   if  you  pleafe,   add  a  fhort  Sentence  more. 

Protarchus. 
Say  What. 

Socrates. 

You  know,  nothing  hinders  a  Man,  who  prefers 
the  Life  of  Wifdom,  from  living  all  his  Life  in  that 
State  ^39. 

Protarchus. 
-  In  the  State,   do  you  mean  of  neither  Pleafure  nor 
Uneafinefs  ? 

Socrates. 

I  do :  for,  when  we  compared  together  the  dif- 
ferent Lives,  it  was  fuppofed,  that  whoever  fhould 
choofe  the  Life  of  Mind  and  Wifdom,  was  not  to 
have  Pleafure  either  in  a  great  or  in  a  fmall  de- 
gree '+". 

^3«  Stephens,  in  the  Marginal  Notes  to  his  fine  Edition,  too 
rafhly  rejedts  the  Prepofition  ts^)  in  this  Sentence  j  not  confi- 
dering  that  it  governs  the  Participles  SicK^y&o'iiJiivMv  and  aia- 
c(Jlofjiiv(jov,  tho  it  be  placed  after  them :  it  fliould  therefore  be 
accented  thus, — Trg'pi, — as  it  is  in  the  Aldhie  and  Bajil  Editions : 
a  Comma  fliould   alio  be  fubjoined   to  it,   in  the  Pointing. 

^55  See  again  the  Paffage,  referred  to  in  Note  237. 

^^°  For  he  is  free  from  the  Senfations  both  oiPain  3ind  P/eafurc ; 
Either  of  which,  during  the  continuance  of  it,  is  a  Hindrance 
to  the  Energys  of  the  Mind,   the  Mind's  only  EnjoymcTits. 

F  f  f  Protarchus. 


4o8         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

PROTARCHUS* 

That  was  the  Suppoiition. 

Socrates- 
He  muft  live  therefore  fuch  a  Life  **'.     And  peit- 
haps  it  is  by  no   means  abfurd,   to  deem  That  Life 
to  be  of  all  Lives  the  moft  Godlike. 

Prota.rchus. 

It  is  not  indeed  probable,  that  the  Gods  feel  either; 
the  pleafurable  Senfation,  or  its  Oppofite.. 

Socrates.. 
Highly  indeed  is    it  improbable.       For   neither   of" 
them    is    confident    with    the    Divine    Nature.       But 
we  fliall   conflder    farther    of    this    Point    afterwards,, 
if  it  fhould  appear  to  be  of  any  fervice  to  Our  Argu— 

*4i    See    before^     in     Page    210.      In    the    Greek,     the     firft: 
Words    of  this    Sentence    of   Socrates,    and   the   firft  Word  alfo^ 
of   the    next    Sentence,    fpoken    by  Protarchus,    ought    for    the- 
future    to    be   printed    thus,  — "Oldcbi-.  —  and   not  0\iv.Zv.  —  The; 
wrong   Accentuation    of    thefe    Paffages,    in    all    the   Editions,, 
feems   owing  to    the   error  of  Ficinus,     who    miftook    Both    the 
Sentences    for  Interrogations :    and   the   Miflakes    are    continued 
by  Grynaus.     Serranuss   Tranflation   is  guilty  of  the  fame  Mif- 
takes:    but  in    thofe   of  Cornarius,   Bembo,    and   Grou,    they  are 
corredted. 

mcnt ; 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


409 


nient ;  and  fhall  apply  it  to  the  Purpofe  of  winning 
the  Second  Prize  for  Mind,  though  we  fliould  not  be 
able  to  make  ufe  of  it  fo  as  to  win  for  her  the  Firft  **\ 

Protarchus, 
Very  juftly  faid. 

Socrates. 

Now  That  Species  of  Pleafure,  which  we  faid  is 
proper  to  the  Soul  her  Self,  is  all  produced  in  her 
by  means  of  Memory, 

Protarchus, 
How  fo  ? 

Socrates. 

But,  before  we  confider  of  this  Point,  I  think  we 
fliould  premife  fome  account  of  Memory,  What  it  is : 
and  ftill  prior  to  an  account  of  Memory,  fome  men- 
tion too,  methinks,  ought  to  be  made  of  Senfe  ;  if 
we  are  to  have  this  Subjed  appear  tolerably  plain  to 
us  *«. 

Protarchus, 

Explain  your  Meaning. 

*♦*  In  the  eflimating  of  Human  Goods. 

="+5  The  Greek  of  this  Paffage,   it  is   prefumed,    ought   to    be 
read  thus,— «V£g  /AgAAfl  t^uSt'  rjJAv  x.t.A. 

F  f  f  2  Socrates. 


4IO  P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Of  thofe  things,   which  are  incident  to  our  Bodys-. 
in  every  Part,    coming  from  all  Quarters   around  usy 
and  affecting  us   in  various  ways,  —  Some   fpend  all 
their  Force  upon  the   Body,    without   penetrating   to 
the  Soul,  leaving  This  intirely  untouched  and  free  '•^; — 
Others  extend  their  Power  thro  the  Soul,    as  well  as 
thro   the   Body  ;    and  Some  of  this    latter  Sort  excite- 
a  vehement  Agitation  in  them  Both,  jointly  and   fe— 
v.erally.     Do  you  admit  This  ? 

Protarchus. 
Be  it  admitted. 

Socrates. 

If  we  fhould   fay   of  thofe  Things,    the   Power   of* 
which  is  connaed  to  the  Body,   and.  reaches  not  the 

'•^'^  Such  as,  for  inflance,  a  Temperate  Air  immediately  ftir- 
rounding  us,  inhaled  in  every  Breath,  and  entering  at  every 
^ore,  without  our  feeling  it, — if  our  Eodys  happen  to  be  in 
the  fame  Temperament ,    that  is,    in  ■^  Medium   between  Hot  and 

Cold. Such  alfo   is   \k\t  Nutriment al  Vzxt  of  our  Food,   when,, 

after   it   has    been    converted    into   C/jy/e,    and   mixed    with   the 
B/cod,   it    is    aElually    employed   in   nourifhing   every    Part   of  our- 
Bodys,   in-,  augmenting  and   flrengthening  the  Young,   in  main- 
taining  the  Bulk  and  Vigour   of  the  Mature,    and   ia  rendering- 
the  Decays   of  old  Age  How  and  imperceptible. 

Soul,, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        411 

Soul,  that  the  Soul  is  deprived  of  knowing  them  ^*^  ;; 
but  of  other  things  which  befall  us,  and  have  a  Power 
to  pervade  both  the  Body  and  the  Soul,  that  of  Thefe 
the  Soul  hath  the  Knowlege ;  fhould  we  not  thus  fay 
what  is  moft  true  }: 

Protarchus,. 
Without  difpute. 

Socrates. 

But  when  I  fay,   that  the  Soul  is  deprived  of  know- 
ing the  former  Sort,   do  not  fuppofe  my  Meaning  to 

^^''  In  the  Greek — tw  •Il'^w  KxvS-ccmv — f^af  f Be  Soul  hath  not  the 

Knowlege  (or  Perception)  of  tbein. In  what  follows,  the  Noun 

^»'3-».  Oblivion  is  luppofed  to  have  been  derived  from  A£'A«3'a, 
the  Preterit  Tenfe  of  the  Verb  Ka.v'^civm,  (or  rather  of  the 
obfolete  Verb  A>?3-«r').  —  To  preferve  the  Allujion,  taken  from 
this  fuppofed  EtyjKo/ogy,  we  have  been  obliged  to  vary  a  little 
from  the  fimple  and  juft  Tranflation  above  given.  —  But  we 
can  imagine  no  reafon,  why  Socrates  here  makes  fucli  an 
Allufion,  (fince  it  is  of  no  fervice  to  his  prcfent  Argumenta- 
tion,) unlefs  he  meant  by  it  to  remind  his  Difciplcs,  who 
were  a  Part  of  his  Audience  at  this  time,  of  the  Dodrine 
which  he  had  taught  them,  —  "  that  all  our  true,  and  certain 
Knowlege,  That  which  enters  not  into  the  Soul  thro  the  out-- 
ward  Senfes,  but  is  purely  Mental  and  Ideal,  is  Raninifcence,  a 
Recovery  of  fome  Knowlege,  which  the  Mind  loft  in  Oblivion,. 
when  fhe  became  Particular,,  by  her  being  united  to  a  Human. 
Body." 

he^. 


412         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

be,  that  Oblivion  happens  to  her  in  this  cafe.  For 
Oblivion  is  the  Departure  of  Memory.  But  of  the 
Accidents,  now  fpoken  of,  the  Soul  never  had  a  Me- 
mory. And  of  That,  which  neither  is,  nor  ever  was, 
it  is  abfurd  to  fay,  that  any  Lofs  can  happen  to  us. 
Is  it  not  ? 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

Only  then  alter  the  Terms. 

Protarchus. 
In  what  manner  ? 

Socrates. 
Inftead  of  faying,  that  the  Soul  is  deprived  of 
knowing  what  the  Body  fuifers,  when  flie  is  not 
affefted  by  any  Motions  produced  in  the  Body,  by 
thofe  ordinary  Occurrences,  —  what  we  termed  a 
Privation  of  Knowlege,  let  us  now  term  Infenfibi- 
lity. 

Protarchus. 

I  apprehend  your  Meaning. 

Socrates, 
But  when  the  Soul  and  the  Body  are  affeded.  Both 
of  them  in  common,  by  any  of  thofe  Occurrences,  and 

in 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


4^3 


in  common  alfo  are  moved  or  agitated  ^'^''',  —  in  giving 
to  this  Motion  the  name  of  Senfation,  you  would 
not  fpeak.  improperly. 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

Socrates. 

Now  then  do  we  not  apprehend,  What  it  is,  whicHi 
is  commonly  called  Senfe  or  Senfation? 

Protarchus^ 
What  fhould  hinder  us  ? 

Socrates. 
And  of  Memory,  if  one  fhould  fay,  that  'twas  the 
Retaining  of  Senfations,    it  would  not  be  ill  defined, 
in  my  opinion. 

Protarchus. 
I  think   fo  too. 

'"t-*  In  the  Greek  of  this  PaiTage,  inflead  of  yiyvo/juvov,  the 
Farticiple  Singular,  agreeing  with  aufjia.,  we  ought  to  read 
yi-yvQix.ivoL,  the  Plural,  agreeing  with  the  T^ivo  preceding  Sub- 
ftantives,  ^^'xj'w  and  <rw//.a,  coupled  together  y  according  to  a  Rule,, 
the  fame  in  the  Grammars  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  Languages, 
For  the  Words  of  this  Sentence,  placed  in  the  Order  of  their 
Grammatical  Conftruftion,  are  thefe> — Ta  xoiyf  -Kiv^Sron  riv  ^f-t';yw 
xa.1  TO  (TMfxcc,  ■KoniTi  yiyvojAivct  ey  en  irci^ei, — tavTrw  tw  ttlvmiV" 
X.  T.  A. — If  Stephens  had  perceived  This,  he  would  not  have; 
adopted  Cornarius's  Alteration  of  the  Text, 

3  S0CRATE&.. 


414  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Socrates. 
Do  we   not  hold,    that   Memory  differs  from  Re- 
membrance ? 

Protarchu  s. 
Perhaps  it  does. 

Socrates. 
Do  they  not  differ  in  This  refped  ? 

Protarchus. 
In  What  refped  ? 

S0CRJiTES« 

When    the   Soul    alone,    unaided    by    the   Body  *+% 

recovers     and     refumes     within     her    Self,     as    much 

as  poffible,    the  State    "which    heretofore  (he   was    in, 

when    fhe    was    affe-ded   jointly    with    the    Body  ^'^^ 

we  fay,    that   the  Soul    then  remembers  '"^^       Do   we 

not? 

Protarchus. 

**'  That    is, — by  xht  Corporeal  Organs  of  Senfatlon. 

°*^  That  is,  —  when,  by  means  of  thofe  Corporeal  Organs 
of  Senfation,  flie  adually  felt  and  perceived  any  external  Ob- 
jeds   at   the  time   of  their  being  prefented   to   her. 

^*5  "^It.  Locke  juftly  fliys  oi  Remembrance,  that  'tis  Sl  Secondary 
Perception.  For  the  Notice  which  the  Soul  takes,  and  the 
clear  Difccrnment  which  flie  has,  of  any  Senfible  01>je£i,  when 
the  Image  of  it  Jirji  enters  the  Senforiiim  Commune,  (the  Com- 
mon Seat   of  all   the   Senfes,)    may  very  properly   be   ililed,   as 

3  it 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  415 

Protarchus. 

V 

Certainly  wc  do. 

SOCR  AT  ES. 

So  we  do  alfo,  when  the  Soul,  after  having  lofl 
the  Memory  of  fomething  which  flie  had  fenfibly 
perceived,   or   of   fomething  which  fhe  had  learnt  ^'\ 

recalls 

it  is  by  Mr.  Lode,  a  Perception  —  to  diftinguifh  it  from  thofe 
meer  Senfatmis,  which  indeed  fenfibly  aSl  on  or  affeSl  the  Cor- 
poreal Organs,  but  which  the  Soul  is  inattentive  to,  and  lakes 
little  Notice  of  3 — or  which  are  confiifed  or  indijlindi,  when  caufed 
by    Objedls     too    remote,     or    when    the    Medium    or    PafTage 

is    obflrudted     or    obfcured. The    Images     of    thofe     Sen- 

fible  Objeds,  which  the  Soul  has  once  perceived  clearly, 
are  retained  within  her  by  a  certain  Power,  termed  the  Me- 
mory.— Now  of  thefe  Images,  Such,  as  the  Soul  frequently  re- 
views, flie  hath  the  Power  of  calling  into  her  Prefence,  as 
often  as  fhe  pleafes ;  and  Such,  as  have  lain  by,  within  her, 
for  a  long  time  negledred  and  forgotten,  fhe  hath  the  Pov/er 
of  recalling  to  her  Remembrance :  and  this  latter  Power  flie  ex- 
erts, when  of  her  Self  flie  fearches  after  and  traces  them  out, 
thro  Images  familiar  to  her,  and  connecled  with  thofe  flie  feeks ; 
—or  when  fhe  is  reminded  of  them  by  other  Perfons  in  Con- 
verfation,  or  by  new  Senfible  Objeds,  fuch  as  nfmble  the  for- 
gotten Images,  or  fuch  as,  being  dirtdtly  oppofte  to  them,  re- 
mind her  of  them,   as  Contrajls. 

^5'^  We  may  obferve,  that  Objeds  of  Science,   as  well   as  Ob- 
jeds of  Senfe,   are  included   in    this   Sentence ;    as   they   are    by 

G  g  g  Arijiotk 


4i6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Arijiotk  alfo,  in  the  Firfl;  Chapter  of  his  Treatife  on  this 
very  Subjedl.  An  Account  of  Memory,  thus  comprehen- 
five,  is  agreeable  to  the  ufual  way  of  fpeaking :  for  Both 
thofe  Sorts  of  Things,  the  Intelligible  and  the  Senfible  are,  alike, 
commonly  fpoken  of,  as  Objedls  of  the  Memory.  It  feems, 
however,  on  the  one  hand,  very  different  from  the  Account 
of  Memory,  given  in  the  preceding  Note ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  to  contradidt  the  Account  of  it,  given  by  the  Pythago- 
reans, as  cited  in  Note  5  ; — unlefs  we  have  Two  different  Sorts 
of  Memory  in  our  Souls, — 07ie  of  them,  a  Repofitory  for  the 
Images  of  Things  Senjible,  —  the  Other,  for  Intelligible  Truths, 
conceived  by  the  Human  Mind,  in  learning  any  Science.  —  For 
nciihtx  Ideas,  nor  confcquently  hitelUgible  Truths,  are  Images  of  any 
Senfible  or  Cor/>!3;Vi?/ Things  :  on  the  contrary,  all  Corporeal  and 
external  Things,  whether  Natural  or  Artificial,  Themfelves  and 
their  Qualitys,  Powers  and  Relations,  axe  Images  of  Ideas; — Na- 
tural Things  being  Images  of  Ideas  in  the  Divine  Mind;  Arti- 
ficial Things,  Images  of  Ideas  in  the  Minds  of  Men. — But  v/e  are 
to  confider,  that  all  Ideas  in  every  Fluman  Mind  are  cloathed 
with  Images  of  external  and  Senfible  Things ;  and  that  all  the 
Relations  between  thofe  Ideas,  all  the  Truths,  which  we  either 
conceive  of  our  Selves  or  learn  from  Others,  arife  in  our 
Minds  either  cloathed  with  Words  heard  or  written,  (that  is, 
with  Sounds  Articulate,  or  with  Letters  and  Syllables,)  or,  if 
the  Truths  are  Mathematical,  they  arife  cloathed  with  Mathema- 
tical Figures  or  Symbols  of  fuch  Figures,  or  with  the  Symbols 
oi  Numbers :  now  all  thefe  things, — Images  and  Figures,  Sounds 
of  any  Kind  whatever.  Letters,  Syllables  and  Words,  witii  all 
other   Symbols,    arc    Things    external,    and    Objedts    of    outward 

^e;/!',;, As    often    therefore    as     we    recollect   Truths    of    any 

Kind,    heretofore   conceived   or   taught   us,    they  return  to   our 

Mindsj, 
i 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         417 

Minds,  cloathed  with  the  Relicks  of  thofe  Veftmcnts,  in  which 
they  firfl  appeared  to  us.  Nay  farther;  it  fccms,  as  if  'twere 
only  by  thefe  decayed  Vejlments,  that  we  are  able  to  lay  bold  of 
thofe  truths  again,  or  to  recogtiife  them  as  Some  of  our  old 
Acquaintance.  Indeed,  when  they  are  thus  recognifed,  every 
Mind,  well  informed,  can  diftinguifh  between  her  old  Friends 
and  their  Apparel :  for  their  Apparel  flie  overlooks ;  tho  it 
was  the  Medium,  thro  which  fiie  recovered  her  Knowlcge  of 
them.  Their  fiimfy  Drefs  they  keep,  however,  always  on 
them;  nor  ever  appear  they  to  any  Human  Mind,  unattired 
and  naked.  It  concerns  us  therefore  much,  if  we  fet  a  juft 
Value  on  fimple  Truth,  not  to  confound  thefe  Mental  ObjeSls, 
which  are  eternally  the  Same,  tho  clad  in  a  variety  of  Corporeal 
Vejlments,  with  thofe  Images  of  Senfible  OhjeBs,  which  have  no- 
thing intelligible,  nothing  invariable,  within  them:  (all  t.hQ.'\v  Sub- 
Jlance  being  meer  Matter:)  leaft  we  fliould  fancy,  (as  Some 
fanciful  Philofophers  have  heretofore,  and  Some  again  in  mo- 
dern times,)  that  the  IntelleStive  and  Rational  Powers  of  the 
Soul,  are  not  to  be  diftinguiflied  from  the  Senjitive  and  Ima- 
ginative;—  that  the  Underjianding  is  but  a  finer  Senfe,  and  a 
more  inlarged  Imagination ; — that  Science  is  nothing  more  than 
the  Refult  of  Senfe;    and   that  Af/W  arofe  always   out  of  Body. 

Now  if,  on  the  contrary.  Mind  and  Body  are  Beings  eflen- 

tially  dijlincl ;  —  if  IntelleEl  and  Reafon  are  different  from  Seiife 
and  Imagination ;  —  if  the  only  ObjeBs  of  IntelkSi  and  Reafon 
are  thofe  Intelligible  Beings,  Ideal  Forms  and  the  Truths  o^  Mind 
and  Science ;  and  if  the  only  OhjcSls  of  Senfe  and  Imagination  are 
thofe  Senfible  Forms,  Corporeal  Subflances,  together  with  their 
Attributes,  the  Senfible  ^lalitys  of  Body  ; — it  feems  to  follow, 
that  the  Memory  of  Mental  or  Intelligible  Objetfls  hath  the  fame 
relation  to  thofe  ObjeBs,  as  hath  the  Memory  of  Corporeal  or 
Senfible  Objeds  to  Thefe  the  Objedts  of  it.  And  if  this 
Analogy  be  juft,   it  certainly  follows,   by   the  Rules  oi  Alternate 

G  g  g  2  and 


4i8 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


and    of  Inverfe   Relations,    that    the  Memory   of  Senjible    Objedls 
hath    the   fanie   relation   to    the  Memory   of  Intelligible  Objcifts,  as 
the   OhjeSls    themfelves    of   the  former  Sort  have    to    the  Obje&s 
of  the  latter  Sort.     But  the  Analogy  is  not  exaftly  jujl :   for  the 
Relations  (the  "Terms  of  it)    are   not    in   all    refpeds  Analogous. — 
The  Memory    indeed  of  Senfible  Objedts    is   a  Retaining   of   their 
Images,    or  other  Impreflions  made  by  them,   in  the  Soul:   and 
That  which  is  called  Memory  oi  Intelligible  Objedls  is  a  Retaining 
of  Thefe  alfo  in  the  Soul.     But  the  Places  in  the  Soul,  where  thefe 
very  different  Sorts  of  Objedts  are  feparately  retained,  very  widely 
differ, — as  widely  as  their  refpedive  ObjeSls. — The  Places  or  Recep' 
fades  of  thofe  Images,  and  of  all  other  Imprejjions  made  in  the  Soul 
by    her    Senfation    of   external    things,    are    the  Common  Senfory 
and    the   PaJJive  Imagination  ;   of  which  Places   the    latter   is   alfo 
made    their    Store-Room    by     the    Memory.       Now    Memory    and 
PaJJive  Imagination   are    temporary    and    tranfient    Powers    of    the 
Soul,    granted    to    many    Brute   Animals,    as    well    as    to   Man; 
and    confequently    they   are  Powers,    with    which    meer  Body   is 
capable   of  being  endued  ;    (if  the  Souls   of  Brute  Animals  are 
meerly  Corporeal;)    no   lefs  than  it  is   capable  of  receiving  the 
Power    of   Gravitation,     common     to    all  Bodys,    or    any    other 
Paffive  Powers,    internal    and    invifible,   given   to  Bodys  of  pecu- 
liar Kinds.  —  But     the    proper   Place    of  Intelligible    Objefts    is 
pure  Mind,   their   native  Seat,    of   the   fame  nature  with  Them- 
felves,   incorporeal  and  eternal.     Into   this    high    and   holy   Place 
no  Images    can   enter  j    nor  even  Ideas,    unlefs  they   are   diverted 
of  all   Remains    of  Images,    with    which   Human  Ideas    are    wont 
to    be   apparelled. — Yet,   as    the  Soul    of  Man  partakes  of  Mind, 
his    Soul    hath    alfo    a  Place  within    her,    a   certain  Ground,    (as 
the  Principles   of  Science   may   be   fitly   called,)    the  natural  Soil, 
for  Ideas   and   the  Truths   of  Science  to  arife  in.      Plere   accord- 
ingly   they  do  in  fadl   arife   and  fpring   up ;    but    impure,    dif- 

guifed. 


P    H     I    L    E    B    U    S. 


419 


gulfed,    and    covered    over    with   Images   from    the   neighbouring 
Soil    of   Lnagination,    which    is    over-run    with    thefe    flowering 
and   light-flying  Weeds.     Every  Soul,   however,    whofe  Difpofi- 
tion    is    truly   philofophic,    is   fludious    to  purify  her   Ideas,     by 
Jiripping  them  of  all  Images  \   as  fhe  longs  to  behold   the  naked 
Truth  and  Reality  oi  Thmgs ;    of  which  flie  has,   by  her  Origin, 
a   native  Pre-conception,    ainioft    as   flrong,    as    if   Ihe   had    theni 
adually  in  View  or  in  Remembrance. — From   this   caufe  probably 
it    is,     that    a   learning   of    the  Axioms   and    flmpleft  Theorems  of 
any   Science,    feems   like   a   recolleSling    of  them ;     and    that   all 
our  Progrcjs    In   Science   is    by   Plato    (metaphorically    perhaps,) 
termed  Reminifcence. — But,   whatever   be    the    Caufe  of   that  Fa- 
cility, Complacency,  and  Delight,   with   which   a   truly   philofophic 
Genius    acquires    Science  j — and  whether  We   have   rightly   con- 
jedtured  the  Whole   of  Plato's  Meaning   In    his  Dodrine   of  the 
SonVs  Reminifcence;  — or    whether    he     meant    to    intimate   far- 
ther,   that    every   Human   Mind  had,     before    its   defcent   into   a 
Human    Body,    an  Ideal  Ef/ence    in    the    Divine    Mind, — as    an 
Intelligible   Idea,     with     refpeifl    to   Him    who  contains    all    Ideas 
within  him, — but  at   the   fame   time,   in   its  Self,    a  pure  Intelli- 
gence,   an    Idea    intelligent,    more   general  than    any  general  Ideas 
which  are  unintelligent  and  only  intelligible-,  comprehenfive  there- 
fore  of  Thefe,     tho   in    a    manner    infinitely    Ihort   of    the    Di- 
vine   All-Intelligence  J — or   whether  PA/Zo   thought   fit   to  favour 
the     Notion    of     the    Pre-exiflence    of    every     Human    Soul    in 
fome  other  Body,   either   celeftial    and  atherial,.  or  pneumatic  and 
aerial;  —  without  entering,  into    an    examination  of    thefe    Doc- 
trines,   probably    fabulous    and    allegorical,   as   being    of  Eaftern 
Extradlion, — This  we  may  be  certain  of  from  Reafon, — "  that  to 
Mind   iiniverfal  and    eternal,    all  Things   in    their   Effences    are 
always  really  prefent ;'    and    therefore    we    muft    conclude,    that 
neither.  Memory  nor  Reminifcence  can  be  attributed  to  the  Divine 

Being  .• 


420 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Being :  for  Memory  is  only  of  things  paji,  things  abfenf  in 
reality,  and  prefent  only  by  their  Reprejentatives,  their  Images  j 
and  Reminifcence    is   only    of  things,    the  Memory   of  which    the 

Mind    had   lojl,    and   hath    again   recovered. As    to  Memory, 

the  Souls  of  many  Brute  Animals  have,  as  we  before  obferved, 
this  Power  of  retaining  in  their  Imagi?iation,  the  Images  and 
ImpreJJions  of  Things  External.  And  we  find  from  experience, 
that  they  often  retain  them  for  a  longer  Time,  and  with 
lefs  Impair,  than  orduiarily  doth  the  Soul  of  Man.  —  But  as 
to  Reminifcence,  or  Re-colleSlion,  no  Irrational  Soul  hath  this 
Power  :  it  can  belong,  as  Arijiotle  has  jullly  obferved  of  it, 
to  no  Animal  we  are  acquainted  with,  except  Af^« ;  if  it  be, 
what  the  fame  great  Philofopher  fays,  o-tyAA/'j  ;<r/w.o5  tj;,  a  Sort 
cf  Syllogi/ing. — And  indeed  'tis  a  ColleSling  of  Some  things  from 
Other  things,  thro  an  accidental  Connexion  between  them  —  a 
Connexion,  which  arifes  either  from  the  Samemfs  of  the 
Times  when,  or  of  the  Places  ivhere,  they  made  their  firft 
Impreffions  on  the  Soul,  —  or  from  other  Proximitys  or  Agree- 
ments meerly  external,  and  ftill  fubfifting  between  them,  tho 
latent,  in  the  Memory  ; — ^juft  as  Syllogi/fical  Reafoning  is  a  Col- 
leSting  of  Some  Truths  from  Other  Truths,  thro  the  necejfary 
Connexion  between  them,   as  being,  all  of  them.  Parts  of  Truth 

Univerfal,  xht  Intelligible  World. We  re-colle^fr,  re-call,  or  raife 

up  again  to  our  Remembrance,  Senjible  things  paft,  by  invefti- 
gating  them  thro  the  Remains  of  their  conneSled  Images,  —  or 
by  following,  in  a  Series  of  Steps,  the  Tracks  of  their 
ImpreJJiois :  —  and  in  the  fame  manner.  Intelligible  thijtgs, 
(fcemingly)  forgotten,  we  recolleft  —  not,  thro  that  natural 
ConneSlion  between  all  Truths,  by  which  we  firlt  acquired  the 
Knowlege  of  them,  (for  This  would  be  like  a  learning  of 
them  anew,)  —  but  thro  the  artificial  Combination  of  Words, 
(Articulate    Sounds,)    formerly    heard,    or   of   Chara&ers,     (the 

filent 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


421 


filcnt  Symbols  of  thofe  Sounds,)  formerly  feen ;  (efpcclally  if 
the  Comhinatmi  be  Metrical;)  where  One  Word  remembered 
draws  after  it  Another,  meerly  by  the  Concatenation  of  thofe 
Senfible  Iwprcjfwns,  which  the  Memory  retains  in  the  Imagination. 
—  Here  however,  an  intelligent  Mind,  being  within  every 
Human  Soul,  perceives  and  takes  notice  of  them;  and,  by  the 
Medium  of  thofe  remaining  Senfible  Images  or  Imprejjions,  regains 
that  Knowlege,  which  fhe  had  formerly  acquired  by  the  Me- 
dium of  Sounds  or  CharaSlers,  the  Objefts  of  Hearitig  or  of 
Sight.  —  Arijhtle  accordingly,  in  his  fliort  Treatife  concerning 
Memory  and  Rcminifcence,  having  hrft  faid  of  Memory,  that  'tis 
<p<tvrxo-ijt.ix,roi,  on  eixovos  a  cpxvTcco-[ji.cc,  t^n,  the  pojjejjing  (or  re- 
taining) of  fome  Phavta/m,  as  an  Image  of  that  Thing,  of  ivhich 
it  is  the  Phantafn,  —  afterwards  fays  of  Remifiifcefice,  that  'tis 
^w'tho-js  iv  Toibiru  (pa.vTccafj'.ciTi,  a  Searching  for  what  we  have  loft 
the  Memory  of,  thro  (or  by  means  of)  fuch  a  Fhantafm.— 
Having  alio  obferv'd,  qti  vom  e'jc  te^iv  aVgu  (pavrda-juLccTos,  that  ive 
cannot  perceive  or  apprehend  any  thing  in  our  Minds,  (not  any 
Intelligible  Truth,  nor  any  Idea,)  ivithout  a  Phantafm,  (that  is, 
unlefs  it  be  clothed  with  the  Image  or  Imprefjion  of  fome  Sen- 
fble  ObjcB,) — farther  on  he  fays,  that  the  Metnory  of  Intelligible 
Things   is   tiot  ivithout   a  Phantafn    (or   Image). — 'H  fJt.vrtfA.n  «  imv 

rotniov    a)c    avev    (pccvrncdtJictToi    i<j'iv. Nov/,    if  the    Common 

Senfory,  and  the  Pafiive  Imagination,  are  the  Places  of  all  thofe 
Phantafms,  internal  Images  and  Imprefjions,  which  are  true, 
(that  is,  which  are  true  Reprefeni.-tives  of  external  Things 
affedling  our  Senfes,)  as  well  as  they  are  the  Places  of  a 
much  greater  Multitude  which  are  falfe,  (that  is,  which  re- 
prefent  extern::il  and  fenfible  Things  untruly,)  whether  the 
Phantafms  of  Either  Sort  are  frcf;}  arrived,  or  whether  they 
have  refded  there  a  long  time,  and  are  either  ready  at  hand,  or 

hidden 


42.2 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


hidden  in  fomc  deep  Hole  or  remote  Corner, — if  alfo  Intelligent 
Mindy     or     the    Intelleftual    Power    of    the    Soul,     is    the    only 
Place  of  Intelligible  Forms.  —  a  Doiftrine,    in   which  Arijlotie  and 
Plato  Both   agree,  (as  appears   in  Arijlotle's  Treatife  on  the  Soul), 
L.  3,  C.  5,    together  with   the  Commentary   oi  Philoponus  there- 
on,)   we   fay,     if    the   Powers   or  Facultys   of  the  Human    Soul, 
regarding   her   different  Objeds,    are    rightly    thus   di:lingui(hed, 
the    following    Confequences    alfo    are     rightly    drawn ;  —  viz. 
that    the    iinmediate    OhjeSls   of    all  Memory,     and    c-f    all    Remi- 
nijcence,     whether    it    be   That    of  Things    Senfible,    or    ']  hat    of 
Things  JntelUgible,    are   only  Images   or   Phantaf.iKS     the   true  as 
well   as    the  falfe :  —  that   what   we   call   a  Memory    of  Ideas,    or 
of  the   Truths   of  Science,    is    the  Mind's    continuing   in   poffrjion 
of  them  all  along,    from   the  time   when   they   firll  arofe  in   her, 
excited   (as    it   were)    by    the  Images    of   things   Senfible :  —  and 
that  what  is   termed  a  Reniinifcence,  a  Remembrance,  or  Recollection 
of  them,    is    in    truth   a    Re-furredlion   or  Re-fufcitation    of  them 
in    the   Mind,     by    (or    thro)    the    fame    Images,     again    making 
their  appearance   in   the  Imagination,    and   again   there   beheld  by 

the  Mind's    intelleitive   and   comprehenfive  Eye. From   thefe 

Conclufions  it  appears,  that  the  Terms  Memory  and  hemem- 
hrance,  —  Terms,  which  are  ufed,  not  only  in  fpeaking  of 
external  and  fenfible  things,  as  the  Objeds  of  thofe  Facultys 
of  our  Souls,  but  alfo  in  fpeaking  of  things  tncntal  and  only 
intelligible, — on  thefe  Subjedts,  effentially  fo  different,  are  ufed 
homonymoujly  j — with  (Irift  propriety,  in  fpeaking  of  the  former 
Sort  of  Things;  h\ii  figuratively,  in  fpeaking  of  the  latter. — 
—  For  we  find,  en  the  one  hand,  that  Memory,  or  Mindfuhefs 
of  External  Cbjeas,  is  the  holding  faji  of  their  volatile  Images 
in  the  Imagination ;  and  that  a  Remembrance,  or  Reminifcence  of 
the  fame  Obje^.s,  is  a  Recovery  or  Re-infiating  of  their  Images  in  the 

I  fame 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  423 

fame  Place,  from  whence  they  had  difappeared,  and  were 
fuppofed  to  have  ilipt  away :  fmce  it  is  known  from  experi- 
ence, that  the  Imagination,  a  Power  of  the  meer  Animal- Soul, 
gradually  decays,  and  lofes  by  little  and  little  its  retentive 
Strength ;  and  that,  even  while  it  remains  in  full  Force,  it 
confines  None  of  the  Images,  arrived  there  thro  the  Senfes, 
nor  any  Others,  created  by  the  Adive  Imagination  of  Man 
cut  of  thofe  prior  Images,  except  Such  as  have  made  a  deep 
Impreflion  there,  and  Such  alfo  as  the  Percipient  Power  of 
the  Soul  frequently  revifits. — On  the  other  hand  we  find,  that 
the  Objeds  oi  IntelleB,  and  Thofe  oi  Reafon,  being  feated,  all 
of  them,  within  the  Mind, — a  Seat,  for  ever  permanent  and  un- 
decaying,  —  (to  which  nothing  ever  comes  from  without,  — 
from  which  nothing  ever  departs,  to  return  again,  —  and  no- 
thing is  for  ever  loft,)  abide  there  eternally:  tho  Human 
Minds  are  not  able  adually  to  behold  more  than  One  of  them 
at   a  time;    and   tho   the  Minds   of  None   but  Men   of  Science 

look   at   all    at  Any   of  them   ever    in    their  Lives. Thus  it 

appears,  that  neither  Memory  nor  Remembrance,  to  fpeak  pro- 
perly and  ftridly,  belongs  to  the  Rational  Soul,  or  to  any  of 
her  Powers  or  Facultys.  So  that,  when  the  Term  Memory  is 
applied  to  the  Mind's  reviewing  of  Z'/Z^/Z/V/^^  Objeds,  it  fliould 
be  confidered  as  a  Metaphor,  taken  from  that  Power  of  the 
Animal-Soul,  which  retains  the  Images  of  Senfible  Objeds  in  the 
Imagination.  In  like  manner,  when  the  Terms  Renmnbrance 
and  Reminifcence  are  applied  to  the  like  Intelledtual  or  Rational 
Review,  they  are  to  be  confidered  as  Metaphors,  taken  from 
that  Adive  Power,  which  is  only  in  the  Soul  of  Man  —  That 
of  regaining  Images  lojl,  by  tracing  them  out  thro  their  Con- 
nedions. But  the  great  difference  between  Mind  and  Me- 
mory, or  between  underjlandiug,  (which  is  always  of  Things 
prcjhit  to   the  Mind,)  —  and   tlie  imagining  of  Things  pajl,   (tho 

H  h  h  formerly 


424  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

formerly  prefent  to  the   outward  Senfes,)     will   beft   appear   froin 
the   very  different  Nature  and  Origtji    of  their   refpedive  OhjcSts. 

Images  and  Phantafms  are  referable  only  to  Things  external : 

and    to   Thefe    do    they     fo    much    owe    their  Origin,    as   that 
isoithout   them    they    never    could   have   had   any   Being   at   all. — 
But  farther;     the  Things,    from  which    all    Images    and    Phan- 
tafms   within    us    take    their  Rife,    muft   not   only   be  external-,. 
they   muft  alfo  be   corporeal.      For   with   refpedl   to  our  Selves^ 
the  Minds   of  Others  are  external:    and    of  Minds   there   are    no 
Images,    nor  Phantafms :    the   fole  foundation   of   Thefe   is  Body  t 
and    of    all  Body  the    fole  Subftratum,    or  Subjiance,    is    the  Com- 
7non  Matter.  —  Nor  lefs  neceffary   to   the   produdtion   of  Images 
and  Phantafms  in  our  Souls  are  the  Organs  of  Senfation,  which 
are    in    our    own   Bodys.      For   only  thro    thefe   Organs  are   the 
Images    of    external   Things     tranfmitted    to    their    proper    Place 
within    us. — And    farther;    when    our    Imagination    is  furnilhed. 
with  a  multitude    of  Images,    fo   tranfmitted  j    if  afterwards  we 
meet   with  Relations    of  foreign   Countrys,    or  with  Memorials, 
and  Records    of  paft  Ages,    they  pour  into  that  vaft  Receptacle 
of     Images    a    much     greater    Multitude,  —  Images    of   Things 
exifting    in    thofe  Countrys,    or    of  Things    formerly   in   Being, 
but   now   extindl;  — fuch  Things  being  always    reprefented,    as 
fimilar    or    analogous    to    fome  prior   [mages,     with    which    our 
Imagination    is  pre-pofeffed.  —  To    thefe  Things,    all    of   which 
are    Objeds    of    the    Outward  Senfes,    and    thence   come  to    be 
Objeds  of  Imagination,   of  Memory  and  Remembrance ; — the   Sub- 
jefts   alfo    of    all   Dcjcription,    whether  in  Painting   or    in  Sculp- 
ture,  in  Hijiory  or  in  Poetry  ; — to    thefe  Things    quite   contrary, 
in    their  Nature,     are     the    Objeds   of  Mind  or    IntelleSlion,     the 
Subjcds     of    Science    and    found  Philofophy. — This   will    appear 
highly   probable,    if  we  confider,    that   all   Human   Beings    from 
their    Birth,    for    a    long    time    after,    converfe    wholly    with 
•J  external 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  425 

external  and  Seufibk  Objecls,  and  the  Offspring  of  thefe,  their  Images 
and  Phantafms: — that  the  Few  Perfons,  who  attempt  afterwards  to 
travel  in  the  only  Road  to  real  Science,  That  along  General 
Ideas,  are  obliged  to  fet  out  from  Things  particular  and  fcn- 
Jible : — that  prefently  they  perceive  all  fuch  Ideas  inveloped  with 
the  hnagcs  of  thofe  fenfible  Things,  from  which  they  had  de- 
parted : — that  if  the  Traveller's  Genius  be  philofopbic,  he  will 
find  thefe  Images  to  retard  his  Progrefs ;  like  violent  Winds 
full  againft  him,  as  if  they  ftrove  to  blow  him  back  again  to 
the  Objeds  he  left  behind : — that,  on  the  other  hand,  if  his 
Difpofition  be  unfavourable  to  the  Journey  undertaken,  his 
Genius  will  prove  like  a  reflive  Horfe,  or  like  a  Jade  mind- 
ful only  of  her  accuftomed  Manger,  refifting  his  continuance 
in  the  road  onward,  and  pulling  backward  to  tlie  Stable  and 
the  Straw. — Befide  thefe  Remoras  and  Impediments,  which  a 
Man  brings  along  loith  him,  or  carrys  about  him,  in  travelling  to- 
ward Truth  and  real  Science,  he  is  encountered  ever  and  anon 
by  new  Senfible  Objeds  unthought  of  j  and  Thefe,  if  they 
do   not  altogether    block  up  his    way,     never   fail   of   'mterrupting 

his   Progrefs    for  a  while. Seeing  then,    that  all   this  Oppofi- 

tion  to  the  Science  of  Mind,  and  of  Things  intelligible,  comes 
from  Body,  from  Things  corporeal,  and  their  Images, — we  infer 
a  natural  Oppofition  between  Body  and  Mind, — a  natural  Repug- 
nance of  the  Animal-Soul  to  the  Rational, — a  natural  Inconjijlency 
of  all  vehement  Senfation,  and  of  all  firong  Phantafy,  with  any 
prefent  IntelleSlion,  or  any  Exercife  of  the  Reafoning  Faculty, 
■ — and  a  natural  Contrariety  between  the  Objefts  of  Senfe  and 
the  Objeds  of  Reafon  and  IntelleSi. — Thefe  v.'ideft  of  all  pofTi- 
ble  Diverfitys,  between  Things  o-f  different  Kinds,  are  owing 
to  the  very  different  Origin  of   the  Human  Mind  from  That  of 

the  Human  Body,   and  That  of  the  Animal-Soul. The  pajjive 

and  maternal  Pd^vcnt  of  all   Body  is  mecv  Matter:   c^nd  Body s,  or 

H  h  h  2  Things 


426 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Things  corporeal,    (Portions    of  Matter  formed,)    and    the  Images 
of   thefe   Things,    are   not   only    the    Objecls,    but    alfo   the   im- 
mediate Agettt-Caufes,    of  all   Setifatiofi,   of   all  Imaginatim,    and 
and    of  -sW  Memory :    and  the  organical    Parts  of  organifed  Bodys, 
endued  with  Animal-Souls,  are  the  inftrumental  Means,  by  which 
thofe  Caufes   aft. — On   the   other  hand,    &\qx^  Particular  Mind;. 
or  Rational   Soul,    is   derived, — not   from   S-efiJation,  Imagination,, 
or  Memory,  —  but   immediately   from    the   Great    univerfal  Mind- 
alone,    its   fole  Parent:    being   by  Him    infufed  into   a  Body   ca- 
pable   of    receiving    it,     and     united    with    a    Soul    capable    of 
being   governed   by    it.      Into   Such   a  Body,   animated    by   Suclv 
a  Sold,  are  infufed,  together  with  Mind,  the  Priitciples  of  Science; 
the   fame   being   the  Principles    oi  Mind,    and  to-  all  Mind  effen- 
tial :  and   thefe  Principles  are   the  iiative  Light,   by  which  every 
Mind   is    enabled   to   perceive   One  and  Many   at   the    fame   time 
[Samenefs    and  Difference   together)    in  All    things.  —  Thus    are 
thefe    Principles    the  Seeds  cf  Science ;    opening    by   degrees   into 
all   Ideas,     General    and    Special,    as    widely    as    a   Mind,    pent 
up  in  a  grofs  and  peridiable  Body,,  can   flioot    forth    and  extenci 
itfelf.     For  in  the  Principles  of  Mind  latent,  or  virtually  included, 
are  all  fuch   Ideas;    like  Buds  and  Flowers   within    the  Seed  of 

foine  Plant. Now,    as   every  Particular  Mind  is   an  Offspring, 

and  as  it  were  an  Image  in  Miniature,  (how  imperfecft  a  one- 
foever  it  happens  to  be,)  of  the  Divine  Mind, — ^in  like  man- 
ner, thofe  Ideas,  the  0.bjeSl.s  of  a  Particular  Mind,  are  Defcendants, 
and  as  it  were  Copys-  ©r  1'ranjcripts  (how  diminutive  and  faint 
ibever  they  may  prove)  of  the  Divine  Ideas :  from  Thefe  are- 
They  derived:  to  Thefe  only  are  They  to  be  referred:  and' 
only  in  and  thro  Thefe  have  They  an  eternal  Being;  immor- 
talifing  the  Soul  in  which  they  dwell;  when  all  the  (^.^ing  I})3ages- 
of  temporary  Things,  all  Memory  and  Remembrance  of  Senfiblo 
Objcdls  in  the  lower  World  of  Senfe,   are  vaniihed  away. 

3 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U     S.         427 

recalls  and  recollects  the  Memory  of  It  again,  her  Selt 
within  her  Self:  and  all  This  we  term  Remembrance,, 
and  a  Recovery  of  things  flipt  out  of  our  Memory  '^'.. 

Protarchu  s. 
Very  true. 

Socrates.. 

Now  the  End,  for  the  fake  of  which  we  have  been 
coniidering  thefe  Facultys   of  the  Soul,    is  This. 

*5'  In  the  printed  Greek  we  here  read, — a.vcx.ii.vYi(j€<i  y.a\  fjn-Jifjioti. 
— So  that  Memory  and  'Re7nembrance  are  now  confounded  toge- 
ther;  and  the  difference,  but  juft  before  made  between  them, 
is  annulled.  —  It  is  therefore  apprehended,  that  we  ought  to 
read — dvctfjivtueii  k(x.\  f/.v)ijj.ni-  av(fx.rm&ti. — Probably  the  Tranfcriber 
of  fome  ancient  Manufcript  omitted  the  lafl  word,,  if  read  to 
him  by  another  Perfon,  (as  ufual,)  on  account  of  the  fimili- 
tude  of  its  Sound  with  That  of  the  word  clvafxrYia-en ;  —  or  on 
account  of  the  fimilitude  between  the  Letters  of  thole  two 
words,  if  he  read  with  his  own  Eyes ; — or  becaufe  he  fuppofcd 
it  to  be  a  corrupt  Reading,  inftead  of  aycty.r,lcretf,  and  to  have 
been  inferted,  into  the  Manufcript  which  he  was  copying, 
from  the  Margin  of  fome  M.S,  flill  more  ancient. — In  Farinus, 
— arct/jLymii  is  defined  to  be — fj.nlfJLtif,  g^iTwAa  yivoj^iwi,  amxTwHt 
the  regaining  of  a  departed  Memory  (that  is,  of  a  Notion  or  a 
Phantafm,  departed  out  of  the  Memory). — Cicero  tranflates  dvdixvmn 
into  Latin  by  the  v/ord  Keminifcentia.  But  to  the  EngliHi  word 
Reminifcence  we  have  preferred  the  word  Remembrance,  (a  word, 
more  in  Common  Ufe,)  after  the  example  of  Mr.  Locke,  by 
whom    it    is    rightly   ufed,    to    exprefs    a  Revival   of  (what  He 

calls)    an  Idea  in  the  Memory. 

Protarchus.. 


428         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
For  the  fake  of  What  ? 

Socrates. 
That  we  may  apprehend  *'%  as  well  and  as  clearly  as 
we  are  able,  What  is  Pleafure  of  the  Soul  abftra6led 
from  the  Body  ^",  and  at  the  fame  time,  may  ap- 
prehend alfo.  What  is  Defire.  For  the  nature  of  Both 
thefe  things  feems  to  be  difcovered  in  fome  mea- 
fure,    by   fhowing    the    nature    of    Memory    and    of 

Remembrance. 

Protarch  us. 

Let  us,  then.  O  Socrates !  now  explain,  how  fuch 
a  Difcovery  follows  from  perceiving  the  nature  of 
thefe  Facultys  of  ours. 

SOCR  AT  E  S. 

In  treating  of  the  Rife  of  Pleafure,  and  of  the  va- 
rious Forms  which  fhe  affumes,  it  will  be  necellary  for 

^^^  'All  the  Editions  of  Plato  give  us  here  to  read, — "ha.  fjiri — 
?,c(.(ioifjt.ii'  y..  T.  A.  From  this  Sentence,  thus  abfurdly  printed, 
Conicirius,  in  his  marginal  Lemmas,  extracfted  the  following 
curious  Precept, — "  Voluptas  be  cupiditas  animas,  abfque  cor- 
pore,  vitanda."  Pleafure  and  Defire  in  the  Soul  her  Self,  ab~ 
f  railed  from  the  Body,  are  Both  to  be  avoided. — The  French 
Tranflator  has  judicioufly  rejected  the  Negative  Particle  in  this 
Sentence. 


'55  That  is, — Pleafure,  in  which  the  Body  has  no  Share. 


us, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         ^29 

us,  I  believe,  to  confider  a  great  variety  of  things. 
But  before  we  enter  on  fo  copious  a  Subjedl,  we  fliould 
now,  I  think,  in  the  firfl  place,  confider  the  nature 
and  origin  of  Defire. 

Protarchus. 
Let  us  then  :   for  we  muft  not  lofe  Any  thing. 

SoC  RATE  S. 

Nay,  Protarchus  I  we  fhall  lofe  One  thing,  when 
we  fhall  have  found  the  Objeds  ot  our  Inquiry  ;  we 
fhall  lofe  our  Uncertainty  about  them  ''^^ 

Protarchus. 

^54  This  jocofe  Turn,  which  is  intirely  agreeable  to  the 
ufual  Facetioufnefs  and  evT^aTnXlce.  of  Socrates,  (on  whofe  Mind 
the  graveft  Subjedls  of  Difcourfe  fat  eafy,  becaufe  familiar  to 
it,)  is  here  thrown  in  by  P/ato  very  opportunely,  jufi:  at  the 
time  of  rtarting  frefli  Matter.  For  we  imagine  it  a  Contri- 
vance of  his,  purpofely  to  prevent  the  Patience  of  his  Reader 
from  being  tired  out  by  a  longer  Delay  of  the  principal  Piir- 
fuit.  Such  a  Purpofe  is  anfwered  by  an  Intimation  here 
given,  that  Frotarchus  was  right  in  fuppofing  this  fcemingly 
new  Subject  to  make  a  Part  of  the  propofed  Inquiry,  or 
effentially  to  belong  to  it  j  and  that  Socrates  would  put  an 
End  to  all  Doubts,  concerning  the  Pkafures  of  the  Animal- 
Soul,  by  fliowing  to  what  Caufe  the  Motions  or  uiffeBions  of 
this  Soul  were  to  be  referred,  and  to  what  End  they  tended. 
—Some  Hope  alio  is  perhaps  here  meant  to  be  given  us,    that 

the 


430  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Protarchus. 
You  are  right  in  your  Repartee.      Proceed  we  then 
to  what  is  next. 

SOCR  AT  ES. 

Was  it  not  jufl  now  faid,    that  Hunger,   and  Thirft, 

and   many    other    things   of   like   Kind,    were  certain 

Defires  ^"  ? 

Protarchus. 

the  Philofopher  will,  in  the  Sequel  make  the  greater  Goods 
of  Mind,  of  IVlJdotn  and  of  Science,  to  appear  manifell:,  by 
fhowing,  in  like  manTierj  the  more  internal  Motions  and  Affec- 
tions of  a  Rational  Soul,  the  Tendency  of  thefe  Motions,  and  the 
ObjeSls  of  thefe  Affedlions. 

*55  This  is  evidently  implied,  tho  not  expreffed,  in  what 
Socrates  had  faid  before  concerning  Animals, — that  "  Want  of 
Food,  to  fill  up  a  Vacuity  or  Breach,  made  in  the  Bodily 
Frame,  by  the  pafling  away  of  many  folid  Particles  of  it,  is 
always  attended  with  the  Pain  oi  Hunger."  —  See  page  402. 
For,  as  all  Sentient  Beings,  whenever  aught  is  wanting  to  the 
Soundnefs  of  their  Frame,  are  made  fenfible  of  it,  by  feeling 
fome  Pain  or  Uneafinefs,  —  and  as  Nature  has  given  them  an 
Averjion  io  Pain,  —  and  ?\\  Averfion  is  of  neceflity  attended  by 
a  Dejire  of  having  the  ObjeSl  of  it  removed  aicay, — the  Pain  of 
Hunger  muft  infer  a  Dejire  of  being  freed  from  it  by  Food; 
an   inftindtive  Appetite  to   which,    on  that    occafion,    is   given   to 

every  Animal    by  Nature. But  befide    the  Pains   of  Hunger 

and  Thirjl,  Socrates  had  fpoken  of  the  Uneafinefles,  arifing  in 
the  Body  from  excefiive  Heat  and  Cold;  as  Inftances  of  the 
general  Pofition,    he   was    then  eflablilhing,  —  This,    "  that  all 

things, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  431 

PROTARCHUS. 

Without  Doubt. 

SOCRATE  S. 

what  is  it  then,  which  is  the  Same  in  all  thefe 
things, — That,  with  refpedt  to  which  we  give  to  All 
of  them,  notwithftanding  the  great  difference  be- 
tween them.    One  and  the  Same  Appellation  ^^^  ? 

Protarchus. 
By  Jove,  Socrates  !    it  is  perhaps  not  eafy  to  fay  : 
it  ought,  however,  to  be  declared. 

Socrates. 
Let  us  refume  the  mention  of  That,    with  which 
we  began  the  confideration  of  this  Subject 


'37 


Protarchus. 
Of  What  in   particular  ? 

things,  which  have  a  Tendency  to  deflroy  the  Anlmal- 
Oeconomy,  or  diffolve  the  Corporeal  Harmony,  produce  Pain:' 
and  fuch  things  are  here  meant  by  the  many  other  things 
of  like  Kind.  For  every  Pain  or  Uneajinefs,  in  the  fame 
manner  as  Hunger  and  Thirji,  inferrs  a  Dejire  of  having  it  7v- 
moved. 

^5«  That  o^  Dtfre. 

*57  Meaning  —  a  Breach  of  the  Harmony  in  the  Conflitutioa 
of  any  Animal.     See  page  401. 

I  i  i  Socrates. 


432         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Socrates. 
Do  we  not  often  fpeak  of  being  thirfty  ? 

Protarchus. 
We  do. 

Socrates, 

And  do  we  not  mean  by  it  fome  Kind  of  Emp.tL- 
nefs  ? 

Protarchus,-. 
Certainly. 

Socrates*. 

Is  not  Tliirfl:  a  Defire? 

Protarchus.. 
It  is. 

Socrates.. 

A  Deiire  of  Drink  is  it  ? 

Protarchus.. 
Of  Drink. 

Socrates. 

Of  being  repleniflied  by  Drink  :    is   it  not  ^^^  F 

Protarchus. 
I  fuppofe  it  is. 

*52  A  future  Editor   of  Plato  may  confider,    in  the  Greek    of:' 
this  Sentence,    whether   Sioi   ftiould  not    be    infcrted    before   the 

word      TTOlLXTOi, 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         433 

Socrates. 
Whoever  of  us  then  is  emptied,    delires,   it  feems, 
a  Condition  the  Reverfe  of   what    has  befallen  him. 
For  whereas  he    is    emptied,    he    longs    to    be   filled 


agam. 


Protarchus. 
Moft  evidently  fo. 

Socrates. 

Well  now  ;  is  it  poflible,  that  a  Man,  who  at  the 
firft  ^^^  is  empty,  fhould  apprehend,  either  by  Senfe  or 
by  Memory,  what  it  is  to  be  full, — a  Condition,  in 
which  he  neither  is,  at  the  time,  nor  ever  was,  here- 
tofore ? 

Protarchus. 
How  can  he  ? 

Socrates. 

We  are  agreed,  that  the  Man,  who  defires,  has  a 
Defire  of  Something. 

Protarchus. 

Without  Difpute. 

Socrates, 

Now  it  is  not  the  Condition  in  which  he  is,  that 
he  defires.  For  he  fuffers  Thirft,  that  is,  an  Empti- 
nefs  :   but  he  defires  to  be  full. 

=59  That  is,   at  the  Beginning  of  his  Senfitive  Life. 

Ilia  Protarchus. 


434   _P  H  I  L  E  B  U  S. 

Protarchus. 
True. 

Socrates. 

Something  therefore,    belonging  to  the  Man  who  is 

thirfty,   muft  apprehend   in  fome  manner  What  it  k 

to  be  full. 

Protarchus» 

It  muft,  of  neceffity. 

Socrates, 
But  'tis  impoflible,    that  This  fhould   be  his  Body  i 
for  his  Body  is  fuppofed  to  fuffer  Emptinefs. 


Protarchus. 


Right. 


Socrates, 
It  remains  therefore,  that  his  Soul  apprehends  Whatt 
it  is  to  be  full,   by  means  of  her  Memory. 

Protarchus... 
Plainly  fo. 

So  CRATES'. 

For  indeed   by  what  other  Means  could,  his   Soul' 
Eave  fuch  an  Apprehenfion  ? 


Protarchus. 
Hardly  by  any  other,. 


Socrates.. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  435 

Socrates. 

Perceive  we  now,  what  Confeqiiencc  follows  from 
this  Reafoning  of  ours  ? 

Pr.otarchus.. 
What  Confequence  ? 

Socrates. 
It  proves,   that  Defire  doth  not  arife  in  the  Body.. 

Protarchus. 
How  fo  ? 

Socrates. 
Becaiife  it  fhows,    that  the  Aim  and  Endeavour  of 
every   Animal,    is    to   be   in    a  Condition   oppoiite   to 
the   Feelings,    with  which  the   Body  is   at  that   time, 
affeded. 

Protarchus-. 
It  certainly  fhows  This. 

Socrates.. 
And   the   Inclination,    by   which    it    moves   toward; 
this  oppofite   Condition,     fhows   the   remembrance  cf 
a   Condition    oppolite  to    thofe   prefent   Feelings    and 
AfFedions. 

Protarchus, 
Clearly. 

3.  SeCRATESi 


436         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
Our  Reafoning  then,  in  proving  that  Memory  leads 
us  toward  the  Objedls  of  our  Delire,  fhows  at  the 
fame  time,  What  is  the  general  Inclination  and  Defire 
of  the  Soul  ^^° ;  and  What  is  the  Moving  Principle  in 
every  Animal. 

Protarchus. 
Perfedrly  right. 

SOCRAT  ES. 

Our  Conclulion  therefore  will  by  no  means  admit  of 
an  Opinion,  that  the  Body  fufFers  Hunger,  or  Thirft, 
or  is  affeded  with  any  other  fuch  Defire. 

Protarchus, 

Mofl   true. 

Socrates. 

Let  us  obferve  This  alfo  farther,  regarding  thefe 
very  Subjects  now  under  confideration.  Our  Rea- 
foning feems  to  Me,  as  if  it  meant  •^'  to  exhibit,  in 
thofe   v^ery  Things,   a  certain  Kind  of  Life. 

Protarchus. 

**°  Namely,  —  to  have  the  Wants  of  her  Body  relieved,  and 
her  own  Being  perfetR:ed.  For  the  moving  Principle  in  every 
Animal  is  a  Defire  of  that  Good,  which  is  agreeable  to  its  Nature. 

*^'  That  is,  —  Socrates,  in  explaining  the  Nature  and  the 
Caufe  of  thofe  Defires,  incident  to  the  Souls  of  Sentient  Bein<rs, 
meant  it  as  introductory  to  a  View  of  Tliat  Life,  in  which 
there   is   a  Mixture   of  Fain  and  Pleafure,  ——  In  the  Greek  of 

this 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


437 


Protarchus. 
What  Things  do  you  mean  ?     and  what  Kind  of 
Life  do  you  fpeak  of? 

Socrates. 
I  mean  the  being  filled  and  the  being  emptied, 
and  all  other  Things  tending  either  to  the  Prcferva- 
tion  of  Animal  Life,  or  to  the  Deftrudion  of  it ;  and 
whatever  Things  ordinarily  give  Pain,  —  yet,  coming 
in  a  Change  from  things  Contrary,  are  fometimes. 
grateful  '^% 

Protarchus. 
True. 

Socrates. 

But  what,    when  a  Man   is  in  the  Midft  of  thefe 
Contrary  Conditions,  and  is  partaking  of  them  Both  ? 

Protarchus. 
How  do  you  mean  in  the  Midft  ? 

this  Sentence  we  here  read  (SyMvs^cct.     But  'tis   prefamed,  that: 
we   ought  to  read  (iyM^ar — a  Reading,  which  is   confirnied   by 
the  Medlcean  and   the //^t';///d'/«  Manufcripts  ;    as  appears   in   that 
Ficimis  and  Cornarius  render   it   into  Latin   by   the  word  vel/e. 

^^^  Such,  for  inftance,  as  a  cold  or  a  hot  Air;  Both  of  which 
are  very  difagreeabk  to  many  Perfons;  but  they  are  quite 
otherwife,   when  Either   of   them   fucceeds   to  Air  of   a  contrary 

^ality  in  a  high  Degree. In    the   Greek    of  this   Sentence,. 

TToTg  (Tg  (and  not  to'ts  S'e)  x°^k">  '^^  perhaps  the  right  Read- 
ing. We  may,  however,  read  totb  Si  ;^a/^«,  if  we  are  per- 
mitted to  change  the  word  riy.m)f  juft  before,   into  oVg  y.iv. 

3  SocRATxai. 


438  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
When  he  is  afflicted  with  an  anxious  Senfe  of  his 
prefent  bad  Condition,  but  at  the  fame  time  has  a 
Remembrance  of  pad  Delights  ;  he  may  enjoy  an 
IntermifTion  of  his  Pain,  without  having  as  yet  the 
Caufe  of  it  removed  ""^^ ;  now  do  we  affirm,  or  do 
V7e  deny,  that  he  is  at  that  time  in  the  Midfh  of  Two 
contrary  Conditions  ? 

Protarchus. 
It  muft  be  affirmed. 

Socrates. 
Is  he  afflided  or  delighted  wholly? 

Protarchus. 
By   Jove,    he  is  in  a  manner  afflicted  doubly  ;     in 
his   Body,    from  his  prefent  Condition  ;    in   his  Soul, 
from  a  tedious  Expedlation,    longing  for  Relief. 

'^5  Thus  have  we  rendered  into  Englirti  the  Greek  of  diis  Sen- 
tence, ns  it  is  printed.  But  we  are  much  inclined  to  adopt  the 
Emendation,  y.x\  irauiTcct  jjAv,  propofed  by  Stephens  in  the  Margin 
of  his  Edition  :  only  changing  ^  into  j?.  If  our  learned  Readers 
are  of  the  fame  Opinion  -,  and  think  with  Us,  that  Two  different 
Cafes  are  here  flated  by  Socrates;  in  Botb  of  which  there  is  a 
Mixture  ol  Anxiety  and  Delight,  but  not  a  Mixture  of  the  fame 
Kind;    then,   inftcad  of — he  inay  enjoy,  —  the  Tranflation  fliould 

be — or  when  he  enjoys,    6cc. 

Socrates. 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 


439 


Socrates. 
How  is  it,  O  Protarchus  !  that  you  fuppofc  his 
Afflidion  to  be  doubled?  Is  not  a  Man,  whofc 
Stomach  is  empty,  fometimes  in  a  State  of  Hopeful- 
nefs,  with  AlTurance  of  having  it  filled  ?  and  on  the 
contrary,  is  he  not,  at  other  times,  in  a  Condition 
quite  hopelefs  ? 

Protarchus. 
Certainly. 

SOCRATE  S. 

Do  you  not  think,  that,  when  he  is  in  Hopes  of 
being  filled,  he  is  delighted  with  the  remembrance 
of  Fulnefs  ?  and  yet,  that,  being  empty  at  the  fame 
time,   he  is  in  Pain  ? 

Protarchus. 
He  muft  be  fo. 

Socrates. 
In  fuch  a  State  therefore,   Man  and   other  Animals 
are  at  the  fame  time  afflided  and  delighted. 

Protarchus. 
It   feems  fo  to  be. 

Socrat  es. 
But  What  think   you,   when  a  Man  is  empty,    and 
hopelefs  of  obtaining  Fulnefs  ?    muft  he  not,    in  fuch 

K  k  k  a  Con- 


440  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

a  Condition,  fufFer  Double  Pain?  with  a  view  to 
which  particular  Condition  it  was,  that  juft  now  you 
fuppofed  the  Memory  of  paft  Delight,  in  All  Cafes,  to 
double  the  prefent  Pain. 

Protarchus.- 
Mofl  true,   Socrates ! 

Socrates. 
.    Now  of  this  Inquiry   into   thefe  Feelings   of  ours 
we  fhall  make  This  Ufe. 

Protarchus. 
What  Ufe? 

Socrates. 

Shall  we  fay,   that  all  thefe  Pains  and  Pleafures  are 

True  ?   or  that   they  are  all  Falfe  ?    or    that   Some    of 

them   are  True,   and  Others  Falfe  ? 

Protarchus. 
How  rhould  Pleafures  or  Pains,  O  Socrates!  be  Falfe? 

Socrates. 
How  is  it  then,    O  Protarchus !    that  Fears  may  be 
either  True  or  Falfe?   that  Expectations  may  be  True, 
or  not  ?      Or   of  Opinions,    how  is  it,    that  Some  arc 
True,   and  Others  Falfe  ? 

Protarchus.. 
Opinions,    I  admit,    may  be   of  Either  Kind  :    but 
I  cannot  grant   you  This   of  thofe  Other  Feelings. 

Socrates. 


P    FI    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


441 


SoCRATE  S. 

How  fay   you  ?    We  are   in    danger   of  ftarting   a 
Difquifition  of  no  fmall  Importance. 

Protarchus. 
That  is  True. 

Socrates. 

But    whether   it    has   any   relation    to   the   Subje6ls 

which  have  preceded,    This,    O  Son  of  an  illuftrious 

Father  ^^* !    ought  to  be  conlidered. 

Protarchus, 

2(54  We  cannot  conceive,  to  what  Purpofe  this  Compliment 
to  Protarchus  is  here  introduced,  unlefs  it  be  by  way  of  a 
Simile ;  to  reprefent  the  Dignity  and  Excellence  of  the  Mat- 
ters before  difcufTed  j  and,  by  reminding  Frotarchus  of  his 
illuftrious  Birth,  to  fignify  to  him, — that,  as  He  ought  not  to 
degenerate  from  his  Anceftors,  fo  neither  ought  any  New 
Matters  to  be  brought  upon  the  Carpet,  if,  in  their  Weight 
and  Value,  they  fall  fliort  of  Thofe  which  have  preceded.  — 
Perhaps  alfo  an  Intimation  is  thus  given  by  Flato  to  his 
Readers,  that  one  of  the  Subjecfls  of  Inquiry  juft  now  men- 
tioned by  Socrates,  —  That  concerning  Opi7iio72s,  —  immediately 
related   to   that  Other  concerning  Pkajures,   as  to  their  Truth   or 

Falfliood.  . In   the   Greek    of    this   Faftage,    it   is    probable, 

that  the  printed  Reading  tcma  tb  avS^U  is  erroneous;  and 
that  Plato  wrote  5cA«Ta  dvS'^ci ;  —  but  that,  in  after  ages,  a 
Reader  of  fome  Manufcript  Copy  of  this  Dialogue,  where, 
inftead  of  >cAe<Ta,  was  written  3cA«ry,  (and  Hefychius  interprets 
jcAaras  by   the  more  ufual  Terms   gcJ^o^os,  cvs//.a<ro5,)  on  collating 

K  k  k  2  it 


442.         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Perhaps  indeed  it  ought. 

SOCRATE  S. 

Tell  me  then  :  for,  as  to  my  felf,  I  am  continu- 
ally in  a  ftate  of  Wonderment  about  thefe  very  Dif- 
ficulty s,  now  propofed. 

Protarchus. 
What  Difficultys  do  you  mean  ^ 

Socrates. 

Falfe  Pleafures  are  not  True ;    nor  True  Pleafures 

Falfe  '-'^ 

Protarchus. 

it  with  another  M.S.  Copy,  where  he  found  KKciis  written, 
wrote  Ta  in  the  Margin  of  the  former  Copy,  oppolite  to  the 
Syllable  ra  with  which  perhaps  a  new  Line  began ;  that  af- 
terwards a  Tranfcriber  of  this  Copy  received  tS  into  the  Text 
of  his  own  Tranfcript,  jufl  before  acj^pos,  fuppofing  it  to  be  a 
word  cafually  omitted  in  the  former  Copy ;  —  and  that,  lafl: 
of  all,  when  xAwia  Ta  a.vS'^oi  was  difcovered  to  be  a  Solecifm 
in  the  Greek  Syntaxis,  xAaia,  a  word  very  uncommon,  was 
eafily  changed  into  KftVa,  and  the  Conftrudtion  was  thus  pu- 
rified. 

**5  In  the  Gt'eek  we  read  only,  —  ■\iui^i,  «/  J'  dXyj^ui  a'lt 
«V)c  rjci'di. — All  the  Tranflators  of  P/ato  into  other  Languages 
juftly  fuppofe  this  Sentence  to  be  imperfe(5l  in  the  Begin- 
ning  of  it  :     but    in   Their     way    of     fupplying     the    Words 

omitted, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  443 

Protarchus. 
How  is  it  poffiblcj   they  fl^ould  ? 

Socrates. 

Neither  in  a  Dream  then^  nor  Awake,  is  it  pof- 
fible,  as  You  hold,  not  even  if  a  Man  is  out  of  his 
Senfes  thro  Madnefs,  or  has  loft  the  Soundnefs  of  his 
Judgment  any  other  way,  is  it  pofTible  for  him  ever 
to  imagine  that  he  feels  Delight,  when  he  is  by  no 
means  fenfibly  delighted ;  or  to  imagine  that  he  feels 
Pain,  when  adtually  the  Man  feels  none  '". 

Protarchus. 

omitted,  'tis  nothing  more  than  a  Repetition  of  the  ^lejlion  pro- 
pofed  before,  without  any  new  additional  Matter.  (See  in  Page 
440.)  —  Socrates  in  fadl  is  now  enteritig  on  a  Proof  of  tlie 
Diltindion  between  the  'True  Pleafures  and  the  Fa/fe :  and  we 
prefumc,  that  he  here  builds  his  Proof  on  That  prime  Axiom, 
on  which  is  founded  all  Demonjiration,  —  viz.  "  Things  can- 
not be  what  they  are,  and  yet  different  from  what  they  are,  at 
the  fame  time.  —  In  the  Paflage  therefore,  now  before  us,  it 
feems  probable,  that  the  Sentence,  to  be  made  agreeable  to 
the  Senfe  of  it,  is  to  be  compleated  thus,  —  ' AM^iii  «/  /-itV 
■^■ivSiii,  ■\iuS'e<i  ai  ^^'  etM^tis,  'Jx  aVly  rii'ova.i — The  Error  of  omit- 
ting  the   firft  Words  is   eafy   to   be   accounted   for. 

-^*  Thofe  Perfons,    who   are    evidently  in    a  State    of  hfanity 

of  Mind,    imagine   many  Things    which   have   no  Exiftence,    and 

entertain    a  firm  Belief  of   their  Reality.      Some   of    thefe  unreal 

Fancys,    meerly    the    Objects  of  Imagination,    atFecl  fucii  Perfons 

3  with, 


444 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Protarchus. 
All    of   us,     O  Socrates  !     conftantly  fuppofe  thefe 
Fadls  to  be,   as  You  have  now  ftated  them. 

Socrates. 
But  is  it   a  right  Suppofition  ?    or  fhould  we  ex- 
amine,  whether  it  is  right  or  not  ? 

Protarchus. 
We  ought  to  examine  it,    I  niufl:  own. 

Socrates. 
Let  us    then    explain    a    little    more   clearly  what 
was    jufl;    now     faid    concerning    Pleafure    and    Opi- 
nion.      Do  we  not  hold  the  Reality  of  our  Having 

an  Opinion  ? 

Protarchus. 
Certainly. 

with  'joy  or  Grief,  as  ftrongly,  as  if  they  were  Objefts  of  the 
SenfeSy  and  did  really  produce  in  them  pleafurable  or  painful 
SeJifatio?zs.  —  That  tliis  is  often  the  Cafe  of  Dreams  in  Sleep, 
every  one  of  us  hath  ample  Experience.  —  And  Philofophers 
fay,  that  Such,  as  are  under  the  Power  of  PaJJion,  and  confe- 
quently  under  That  of  boundlefs  Imagination,  —  nay,  that  All 
Perfons  who  think  not  juftly,  (that  is,  not  agreeably  to  Na- 
ture and  to  Right  Reafon,)  —  dream  waking;  and  are  affedled 
with  Joys  and  Griefs,  which  ha^e  no  better  a  Foundation,  than 
have  the  Fancys  of  Madmen,   or  the  Dreams  of  Men  afeep. 

%  Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         445 

Socrates. 
And  the  Reality  of  our  having  Pleafure  ? 

Protarchus. 
To  be  fure. 

Socrates. 
Farther ;    it  is  Something,  That  which  is  the  Oh- 
je6l  of  our  Opinion* 

Protarchus. 
Without  doubt. 

S  OCRATES. 

And  Something  alfo  That  is,  with  which  Whatever 
feels   a  Pleafure  is  delighted. 

Protarchus» 
Mofl   certainly. 

Socrates. 

In  the  Having  then  of  an  Opinion,  whether  we 
are  right  or  wrong  in  entertaining  that  Opinion,  the. 
Reality  of  our  having  it  abides   ftill. 

Protarchus. 
How  can  a  Man  lofe  an  Opinion  whilft  he  has  it  ? 

Socrates*. 


446  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
In  the  enjoying  alfo  of  any  Pleafure,    whether  we 
do  right  or  wrong  to  enjoy  it,   'tis   certain,   that  the 
Reality  of  the  Enjoyment  flili  remains. 

Protarchus. 
To  be  fure,    thefe  things  are  fo. 

Socrates. 
On  what  account  is  it  then,  that  we  are  ufed  to 
call  Some  Opinions  True,  and  Others  Falfe ;  yet  to 
Pleafures  only  we  allow  the  Attribute  of  True ;  not- 
withftanding  that  Pleafure  and  Opinion,  Both  of 
them,   equally  admit  Reality  in  the  Having  of  them  ? 

Protarchus. 
This  oua;ht  to  be  confidered. 

Socrates. 

Is    it    that    Falfhood    and  Truth    are     incident    to 

Opinion  ?     fo    that,     by    the    fupervening    of   one     or 

other   of  Thefc,    Opinion   becomes   Something   befide 

what   in    its    Self  it   is  ;     and    every  Opinion   is   thus 

made    to  have   the   Quality   of  being  either   Falfe   or 

True.      Do   you   fiy,    that  This    ought   to    be   confi- 

dered } 

Protarchus. 

I  do. 

Socrates. 

And   bc{ide  This  ;    fuppoling,    that   Opinions   uni- 
vcrfaily  do  admit   of  Attributes   and   Qi^ialitys  ;    whe- 
ther 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


447 


thcr  only  Pleafure  and  Pain  are  what  they  are  in 
Themfelvcs  fimply,  and  never  admit  any  Quality  to 
arife  in  them ;  ought  we  not  to  fettle  this  Point 
alfo  by  agreement  between  us  ? 

Protarchus. 
'Tis  evident,    that  we  ought. 

SOCRATE  S. 

But  'tis  eafy  enough  to  perceive,  that  Thefe  alfo  admit 
the  acceflion  of  Some  Qualitys.  For  of  Pleafures 
and  Pains  we  agreed  a  while  fince,  that  Some  are 
Great,  Others  Little ;  and  that  Each  Sort  admits  of 
Vehemence  and  of  Intenfion  ^^^ 

Protarchus, 

Very  true. 

Socrates. 

And  if  either  to  any  Pleafure,  or  to  any  Opinion, 
there  be  added  the  Quality  of  Evil,  fhall  we  not 
affirm  the  Opinion  thus  to  become  Evil,  and  the 
Pleafure  Evil  in  the  fame  manner  ? 

Protarchus. 
Without  doubt,    O  Socrates ! 


~*7  See  before  in  Pages  280,   and  321. 

L  1  1  Socrates. 


44S  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
And  What,  if  Re6litude,  or  the  Oppofite  to  Rec- 
titude *^%  accede  to  any  of  them,  fhali  we  not  fay, 
that  the  Opinio?t  is  Right^  if  Rectitude  be  in  it  ?  and' 
fhall  we  not  afcribe  the  fame  Quality  to  Pleafure.,  orx 
the  fame  fuppofition  ?• 

Protarchus. 
Of  neceffity  we  muft. 

SOCRAT  ES. 

And  if  the  Obje6t  of  our  Opinion  be  miftaken  by 
ns,  muft  we  not  in  fuch  a  cafe  aeknowlege,  that  our 
Opifiiofi  is  eri'oneous,  and  not  right ;  and  that  We  are 
not  right,  our  felves,  in  entertaining  fuch  an  Opi- 
nion ''^  ? 

Protarchus* 

Certainly  we  muft. 

Socrates. 
But  What,  if  we  difcover  our  felves  to  be  miftaken  in 
the  Objedt   of  our  Grief  or  of  our  Pleafure  *^°,    fhall 

**^  That  is,  Pravity. 

*^9  For  inftance,  if  we  miftake  a  Friend  for  an  Enemy,  or  aa 
Enemy  for  a  Friend. 

*7°  As  for  inftance,  if,  miftaking  our  Enemys  for  Friends  to 
us,  we  rejoice  at  their  profperous  Succefs,  or  grieve  at  their 
Difappointments. 

we. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  449 

we  give  to  this  Griefs  or  to  this  Pleafirre.,  the  Epi- 
thet of  right,  or  good,  or  any  other  which  is  fair 
and  honourable  ? 

Protarchus. 

We  certainly  cannot,     where    a  Miftake    is  in  the 
Pleafure. 

Socrates. 
And  furely  Pleafure    is    apt    to    arife   in  us  often- 
times,  accompanied,    not  with  a  right  Opinion,    but 
with  an  Opinion  which  is  falfe, 

Protarchus. 
Indifputably    fo.      And  the  Opinion,    O  Socrates  1 
then    and    in    that    cafe,    we    fhould  fay  was  a  falfe 
Opinion.      But  to  the  Pleafure  its  felf  no  Man  would 
ever  give  the  appellation  of  falfe. 

Socrat  e  s. 

You  are  very  ready,   O  Protarchus  !    at  fupporting 
the  Plea  made  \i(q  of  by  Pleafure  on  this   occafion. 

Protarchus. 
Not  at  all  fo.     I  only  repeat  what  I  have  heard. 

L  1  1  2  Socrates. 


43  o 


P     H    I    L    E     B     U    S. 


SOCRATE  S. 

Do  we  make  no  difference,  my  Friend  !  between 
Such  a  Pleafure  as  comes  accompanied  with  Right 
Opinion  or  with  Science,  and  That  Kind  of  Pleafure 
which  often  arifes  in  every  one  of  us  at  the  fame 
time  with  falfe  Opinion  or  Ignorance  ^^'  ? 

Protarchus. 
It  is  probable,    I  own,    that  no  little  difference  is. 
between  them, 

Socrates. 
Let    us   now    come   to  the  conjdderation  of  What 
the  Difference  is. 

Protarchus. 
Proceed  in  whatever  way  you  think  proper.. 

Socrates. 
I  fhall   take  This  way  then. 

*7'  Stephens's  Edition  of  Plato  agrees  with  all  the  prior  Edi>- 
tIons»  in  giving  us  to  read  aVo/as  in  this  place :  but  that 
learned  Printer,  in  his  latter  Annotations,  pag:  j ^,  juftly  ob- 
ferves,  that  inftead  of  aVo/as  we  ought  to  read  dyvoloti.  That 
Emendation  was  made,  before  Stephens,  by  Cornarius  in  his 
'EchgiC,  pag:  333.  Ignorance  is  here  oppofed  to  Knowlege ;  as 
Falfe  Opinion  is  oppofed  to  True.  —  The  Medicean  Manufcript 
exhibits    the   right  Readings    as   appears  from   the  Latin  of  F/- 

cinus, 

Protarchus-. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        451 

Protarchus. 
what  way  ? 

Socrates. 
Some  of  our  Opinions  are  falfe,   and  others  of  them 
are  true  :    This  is  agreed. 

Protarchus. 
It  is. 

Socrates. 
Pleafure  and  Pain,  as  it  was  jufl:  now  faid  ^^%   often- 
times attend  on  Either  of  them  indifferently  ;  on  Opi- 
nions,  I  mean,  either  true  or  falfe  ^^^ 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  fo. 

Socrates. 

Is  it  not  from  Memory  and  from  Senfe  ^^%  that  Opi- 
nion is  produced  in  us,  and  that  room  is  given  for  a 
Diverfity  of  Opinions  on  every  Subjed  ''^  ? 

Pr'otarchus, 
»7*  See  Note  266. 

*"  They  attend  on  falfe  Opinion,  in  that  inftance  which  is 
mentioned  in  Note  270  : — they  attend  on  true  Opinion,  when 
we  have  juft  reafon   to  grieve   or   to  rejoice. 

*74  That  is,  —  from  a  Memory  or  Remembrance  of  Things 
heretofore  feen,  or  heard  of;  and  from  a  iienje  or  a  Percep- 
tion  of  Things  prefent. 

*75  For  the  Diverjity  between  Things  prefent  is  hifiiiite ;  as 
is    the   Diverfity    of  P/aces    where    the    Things    are:    and    the 

Diverfity 


452         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Moft  undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 
I  afk  you  then,  whether  or  no,  as  to  thefe  Things^'*, 
we  deem  ourfelves  to  be  of  neceflity  afFedied  thus  ? 

Protarchu  s. 
How  ? 

Socrates. 

Oftentimes,  when  a  Man  looks  at  Something,  which 

he  difcovers  at  a  great  diftance,    but  does  not  difcern 

very  clearly,    will  you  admit,     that  he  may  have  an 

inclination  to  judge  of  what  he  fees  ? 

Diverfity  between  many  pajl  Things,  feen  or  heard  of  by  dif- 
ferent Perfons  now  in  Being,  is  indefinite ;  as  is  the  Number 
of  tljoie  Perfons.  Befide  all  this  Diverjity  of  Things,  both  pre- 
fent  and  paft,  different  Pa-fons  are  affected  differently  (at  the 
leafl  in  differeiit  Degrees)  by  the  Same  Things.  What  an  infi- 
finite    Diverfity    of  Opinions  muft   all    thefe  Diverfities   occafion, 

or    rather,    of   neceflity,    produce ! The  word   S'la.S'o^cc^eiv,    in 

the  Greek  of  this  Paflage,  being  perhaps  a  axa^  Myifj^ivov, 
feems  not  to  have  been  underftood  by  any  of  the  Tranflators,  ex- 
cept Ficinus.      It  is    plainly  analogous    to   the    words,   S-ix(fmfit, 

S'locfi^iSrat,     S'ta.ToXtTive^cti. 

'■'^  Meaning  —  our  Opinions;    together  with  thofe   Sentiments 
of  Gri(f  and   Joy,    or    thofe    Fancys    (or   fancied    Feelings)     of 
Pain  and  Pleafure,   which   attend   on   our  Opinions. 
2 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         453 

Protarchus. 
I  do  admit  the  Cafe. 

SOCR  ATE  s. 

Upon  this,   would  not  the  Man  queflion  himfelf  in 

this  manner  ? 

Protarchus. 

In  What  manner  ? 

Socrates. 
What  is  That,  which  appears  as  if  it  was  ftanding 
under  fome  Tree  by  the  Cliff  there  ?  Do  you  not 
fuppofe,  that  he  would  fpeak  thofe  words  to  himfelf, 
looking  at  fome  fuch  Appearances  before  him,  as  I 
have  mentioned  ? 

Protarchus.. 
No  Doubt  of  it. 

Socrates. 

Hereupon,    might  not    this  Man    then,    making   a 

Conjedlure,.   fay  to  himfelf,    by  way  of  Anfwer, — It  is 

a  Man  ? 

Protarchus. 
Certainly. 

Socrates. 

But  walking  on,    perhaps  he  might  difcern  it  to  be 

but  the  Work  of  fome  Shepherds,  and  would  fay  again 

to  himfelf, — It  is  only  a  Statue. 

Protarchus*- 


454  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Moft  certainly  he  would. 

Socrates. 
And  if  he  had  any  Companion  with  him,  he  would 
fpeak  out  aloud  what  he  had  firfl:  fpoken  within  Him- 
felf,  and  repeat  the  very  fame  words  to  his  Compa- 
nion :  fo  that,  what  we  lately  termed  an  Opinion, 
would  thus   become  a  Speech. 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

Socrates. 

But  if  he  were  alone,   this  very  Thing  would  be  a 
Thought   ftill   within  him  ;   and  he  might  walk   on, 
keeping  the  fame  Thought  in  his  Mind,  a  confiderable 

Way. 

Protarchu  s. 
Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

Well  now;   does  this  Matter  appear  to  You  in  the 

fame  Light  as  it  does  to  Me  ? 

Protarchus. 
How  is  That  ? 

Socrates. 

The  Soul  in  that  Cafe  feems   to  Me  to   rcfemble 

fome  Book, 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         455 

Protarchus. 
How  fo  ? 

Socrates. 

The  Memory  *",  co-inciding  with  the  Senfes  "'*, 
together  with  thofe  PafTions  of  the  Soul  which  attend 
this  Memory  and  the  prefent  Senfation  '^%  feem  to 
Me  as  if  they  concurred  in  writing  Sentences  at  that 

*77  That  is, — a  Memory  or  Remembrance  of  other  fuch  Sta- 
tues, formerly  feen  by  him, — the  £^^j-  of  Men,  wrought  by 
Carpenters    and  Mafons. 

*7^  For  his  Senfes  exhibit  to  him  an  External  Objeft,  co- 
inciding with  Thofe  in  his  Memory,  which  he  remembers  to 
have  been  the  Works  of  Human  Artifts. 

*79  As  long  as   the  Objeft  appeared  to   be  a  real   and  living 
Man,   the  Appearance  mufl  have  been  attended  with  Pleafure  in 
the    Soul    of    the    Spectator,    if   a   Perfon    of    a   benevolent   and 
facial  Difpofition ;    for   fuch  Perfons   are   pleafed  with  feeing  the 
Fellows    of   their  Kind :    but   quite    contrary   Sentiments   would 
have    arifen    in    his    Soul,    were    he   a  Mifanthrope,    or   afflifted 
with    a  Redundancy    of  Black  Bile;   for   to   fuch  unhappy   Per- 
fons   the   Sight   of   a    Pluman   Being  gives   a  Pain.      Agen  j    as 
foon    as    the    Objedl   is    difcovered    to    be,    what   really   it   is, 
the   wooden   Effigy    of    a    Man,    carved    by   fome   Shepherd,    a 
good-natured  Spedlator    of   it   would   be  pleafed  with  the   Shep- 
herd's Ingenuity  and   Induftry  :    but  if  the  Beholder  happens  to 
be  a  Churl,   or   an  Admirer   of   nothing  but  what  procures  Mo- 
ney,  he  will  refledl   on_  the  Shepherd    ;is   an    idle  Fellow  or  un- 
profitably    employed,    and    will    feel   the  Pain   of   his   own   ill- 
natured  and  i///^^r^/ Reflection. 

M  m  m  time 


456  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

time  within  our  Souls.  And  when  the  Scribe  writes 
what  is  True,  true  Opinions  and  true  Sentences  are 
by  Him  produced  within  us :  but  when  our  Scribe 
writes  what  is  Falfe,  then  what  we  think,  and.  what 
we  fay  to  our  Selves,  is  contrary  to  the  Truth. 

Protarchus. 

I   heartily  agree  to  Your  Account  of  this  Matter^ 
and  acknowlege  thofe  joint  Scribes  within  the  Soul. 

Socrates. 

Acknowlege    alfo    another  Workman    within    us^ 
operating  at  that  time* 

Protarchus* 
What  is  He? 

Socrates. 
An  Enp-raver,    who  follows  after   the  Scribe ;    en-- 
graving  within  the  Soul   Images  of  thofe   Thoughts, 
Sentences,  and  Sayings, 

Protarchus,. 
How  and  when  is  This  done  ? 

Socrates. 
It  is,   when  That  which  a  Man  thinks  and  fays  to 
Himfelf,    concerning  the   Objedl  of  his  Sight,    or  of 

any 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  457 

any  ^^^  other  Outward  Senfe,  he  feparates  from  the 
Senfation  which  he  has  of  it ;  and  views  fomehow 
within  Himfelf  the  Image  of  that  Thought,  and  of  that 
Saying  ''^'.  Or  is  there  no  fuch  Thing  as  This  ever 
produced  within  us  ? 

PrOI  ARCHUS. 

**"  In  this  Dlsjundlve  Particle  of  the  Sentence,  the  Senfe  of 
Hearing  is  chiefly  meant.  For  what  we  hear  from  Others 
often  makes  an  Impreflion  in  the  Imagination  as  flrong  as 
what  we  fee  with  our  own  Eyes  j  nay  fometimes  a  ftronger  : 
for  in  feme  cafes,  the  Imagination  of  the  Speaker,  in  report- 
i/ig,  is  apt  to  mag7iify  what  he  has  feen ;  and  the  Imagination 
of  the  Hearer  to  magnify  what  he  hears  reported. 

'^^  The  Images  of  external  and  fenfible  Things  are  undoubt- 
edly fixed  for  a  time,  and  as  it  were  engraven  in  the  Imagina- 
tion, by  that  Faculty  or  Power  of  the  Soul,  termed  the  Me- 
vtory.  But  it  muft  found  llrange  to  a  modern  Ear,  and  per- 
haps it  may  be  deemed  a  Solecifm,  to  fay, — the  Image  of  an 
Opinion,  —  or,  the  Image  of  a  Sentence.  Yet,  on  due  confidera- 
tion,  it  will  be  evidently  perceived,  that  an  Opinion,  'Judgment, 
or  Sentence  of  the  Mind,  concerning  "  any  particular  Thing, 
Perfon,  or  Aftion,  is  a  Combination  of  Images  in  the  Imagina- 
tion ;  —  the  Image  of  That  Particular,  which  is  the  Subjedi  of 
our  Opinion,  combined  with  fome  prior  Image  within  us, — with 
Juch  an  Image,  as  habitually  invejls  or  accompanys  that  Idea, 
which  our  Imagination  now  connects  with  her  prefent  SubjeSi, 
and  attributes  to  it,  or,  in  Scholaftic  Lp.nguage,  predicates  of 
or  concerning  it; — whether  the  Idea,  thus  attributed,  be  any 
Quality,  Condition,  or  Circiimjiance,  which  the  Subjeft  may  be 
fuppofed  capable  of,  or  liable  to, — or  whether  it  be  any  Species 

M  m  m  2  or 


45  8 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.. 


or  G<;/ais,    to  which   the  Subjedl    may   pofiibly   belong  :  —  as    in 
the  Inftance,   juft  before   brought    by   Plato;    where    the   walk-« 
ing  Speculator   combines  the    Internal  Image  of  that  ObjeSl  of  his 
Sight,  which   is   the  SubjeSi  of  his  'Thought  or  Opinion,   with  his 
own  pre-conceived  Notion   or  Lka  of  a  Man  in  general ;  and  no 
Ideas  ever  prefent  themfelves   to  a  Human  Mitid  naked,  or  ftript 
of  all  Imagery^ — Agen  j   if  the  SitbjeSi  of  our  Opi?iion  or  Thought,. 
and   what  we  deem   or   think  relative  to  that.  Subjedl,   be.   Each 
of  them,  2.  General  Idea,   their  concomitant  Images  will  be  coni" 
bined    in    the    Imagination,    and    a    Complex   Image    will    thence 
arife.  —  As,   for  Inftance,   if  we  think  concerning  Man,  that  he 
is  naturally  mild  and   gentle,    as    being    a   rational  and    a  Jocial 
Animal,    endued   with   a    natural    Senfe   of  Equity  and  Juflice-, 
and   in   Matters   of   Indifference,    eafily    fubtnitting   the  natural 
Freedom    of    his   Adions    to    Laws    and    Government    for    the 
Common  Good, — or  if,   on   the  contrary,    we  think  him  to  be 
an   Animal    naturally    fierce    and    cunning,    felfifli    and   lawlefs, 
and  governable  only  by  Force  or  Fear; — the  Subjed  of  Either 
of  thefe  Thoughts  is  Human  Kind,   or  the  General  Idea  of  Man  j 
and  this  Idea  we  connect  in  our  Mind   either  with  the  General 
Idea    of  B-ational  Sociability,    or   with    That    of  Brutijh  Ferocity 
mixed  with  Cunning:    (for  we  attribute  one   or   other  of  thefe 
Qualitys    to   that  Beijig    who  is    the  Subject   of  our   Thought:) 
now  in   thefe    cafes,    fome   of  the  external  and   vijible   Signs   of 
the  ^lality  io  attributed  will  be  imagined,  and  as  it  were  painted 
within    our  Soul,    in  combination   with   an    obfcurely   or    imper- 
fedly    imaged  V^xion   o£  ^Man^,  and   probably,   particular  Per- 
fons,  mild  or  fierce,  Friends  or  Enemys,   (that  is,    the  internal 
Images  of  them,)  will   then  occur   to   our  Remembrance. — -Thefe 
Cafes    will    alfo    fervc    as    Inftances    to    lliow,    that  Pain   and 
Pleafure  of  the  Soul  attend  our  Thoughts  and  Opinions   on  Some 
Subjeds  which  are  General.     For  the  Opinion  unfavourable  to 

Humaa, 

4 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  459 

Protarchus* 
Nothing  is  more  certain* 

Socrates. 
The  Images  ^^'  of  true  Thoughts  and  true  Sentencesj, 
are  They  not  true  ?   and  the  Images  of  thofe  which  are 
falfe,   are  they  not  Themfelves  alfo  falfe  ?. 

Protarchus. 

Human  Kind,  fills  the  Heart  with  Jealoufy  and  Diftrufl, 
Mifanthropy  and  Malevolence,  Sentiments  and  Paffions  painful, 
we  prefume,.  to  all  of  Nature's  Children.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  contrary  Opinion,  the  benign,  while  it  cultivates  in  the 
Heart  univerfal  Benevolence  and  Philanthropy,  fown  there  by 
Nature,  yields  at  the.  fame  time  a  calm  Pleafure  con-natural  to 
the  Soul,  conduces  to  Eafe  and  Tranquillity  of  Mind  and  to 
Health  of  Body,  infpires  a  Cheerfulnefs  of  Temper,  and 
leads  to  the  livelier  Pleafures  of  Civil  Life  and  Social  Con- 
verfe,  and  the  delightful  Dearneffes  of  difinterefted  Friendihip 
and  perfedl  Love. 

*^^  It  muft:  he  acknowleged  by  all  thinking  Perfons,  that  the 
Philofopher  was  right,  in  diflinguifhing  between  That  Poicier 
in  the  Soul,  by  which  fhe  receives  fenfible  Impre//io?2s  from  ex- 
ternal things, —^  and  another  Power  of  hers,  by  which  ihe  re- 
tains Such  of  thofe  ImpreJJioni  as  fhe  attends  to  : — for  different 
Names  are  given,  to  thefe  different  Powers :  the  Firfl  is 
termed  Senfe  ;  the  latter,.  Memory. — But  we  fufped:,  that  many 
of  our  P.eaders  will  think  him  wrong,  in  dillinguifhing  fo 
greatly  between  the  ImpreJJion  which  is  received,  and  the  Im- 
freJjiQn   which,  is    retained^    as    to   call   this  latter  the  Image  of 

the. 


4^0 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


the  former.  For  it  Is  well  known,  that  in  Vifion,  (or  the 
ASl  of  feeing,^  the  Imprefjioriy  made  on  the  Retina  of  the  Eye, 
by  the  Rays  which  are  extended  to  it  from  the  ObjeB,  and 
viewed  there  by  the  Senfitive  Soul,  is  the  Image  of  that  Ob- 
jedl :  and  it  may  reafonably  be  afked,  —  "  Whence  is  it,  that 
the  Obje6V,  v.hich  is  long  fmce  (perhaps)  out  of  Sight,  is 
often  remembered  as  if  prefent  to  the  View,  unlefs  it  be  thro 
the  impreji  Image  of  it,  ftill  7'emaming  f" — To  this  we  anfwer, 
that  the  Prefence  of  any  Objedl  of  the  Sight  always  accompanys 
the  ImpreJJion  which  it  makes;  and  that  the  Image,  impreft:  by 
it  on  the  Retina,  remains  there  no  longer,  than  while  the  Objedt 
is  within  Sight  and  adlually  beheld:  but  that  the  Soul,  if,  in 
viewing  the  Objedl  by  means  of  its  concomitant  Image,  (he 
beflows  on  it  any  degree  of  her  Attention,  withdraws  this 
Image  into  her  Imagination,  and  there  reviews  it  abJlraSled  from 
its    Archetype,    the  external    Objedl,    when   this    Objecft  is   va- 

niflied   from  her  Sight. The  Image   therefore   in  that   inner 

Membrane  of  the  Eye,  called  the  Retina,  is  like  the  Image  in 
-a  Mirror ;  it  departs,  on  the  departure  of  the  Objedl  which 
created  it.  —  But  the  Image  within  the  Soul  her  felf,  being 
derived  from  that  Image  which  flie  beheld  in  the  Retina,  is 
nothing  more  than  a  Copy  of  it,  the  Image  of  an  Image.  Yet 
this  Copy,  imperfedl  as  it  is,  and  lefs  like  to  the  Original, 
being  by  the  Memory  as  it  were  engraven,  remains  after  the 
difappearing  of  the  Firji  Image:  and  abides  in  the  Imagination 
for  a  fliort  or  a  longer  time  in  proportion  to  the  Depth  of  the 
Engraving ;  and  This  is  ufually  proportioned  to  the  Strength  of 
the  AffcBion    or  PaJJion,    raifed   in   the    Soul   by    that    tranfient 

Image, The  Cafe  is   the  fame  with   regard   to  Thoughts   or 

internal  Sentences,  and  to  their  attendant  Pains  or  Pleafures  of 
the  Soul.  For  the  Cognifance,  which  the  Soul  takes,  of  any 
Senfibk   Object,    thro    its   Image    in    the  Retina,    is    immediately 

followed 
4 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         461 

followed  by  a  thought,  of  What  Kind  or  Nature  the  Objedl 
may  be  :  the  Thought  or  internal  Sentence  on  this  occafion, 
whatever  it  be,  is  a  Combination  of  Images ;  as  we  obferved  in 
the  preceding  Note :  and  the  Mind's  AJfeiit  to  the  Thought 
makes  it  an  Opinion. — Now  this  Thought,  or  this  Opinion,  may 
be  as  tranfient  as  the  OhjcB  of  it,  and  vanifli  together  with  it. 
But  if,  after  the  Objedt  is  away,  the  Soul  dwells  on  that 
Combination  of  Images,  (or  rather  that  Complex  Image,)  the 
Thought  or  Opinion,  fhe  views  it  now  in  no  other  manner, 
than  as  it  is  engraven  in  her  Lnagination,  together  with  the 
Pain  or  Pleafure,  which  flie  there  feels  attending  it.  In  that 
Seat  the  Opinion  and  the  Feeling  will  remain,  (if  the  Memory 
and  the  AffeBion  or  PaJJion  are  ftrong  enough  to  retain  them,) 
how  fafe  foever  the  Foundation  of  them  may  be, — until  from 
an  improved  Underftanding  and  a  Mind  enlightened,  a  truer 
Opinion,  and  a  jufter  Senfe  of  Things  come  and  drive  them 
out.  And  farther;  fliould  the  Opinion,  firfl  engraven,  be  in- 
tirely  true, — and  the  Pain  or  Pleafure  which  attends  it,  intirelj'- 
jufi, — (that  is,  fliould  they  be  quite  agreeable  to  the.  Nature  of 
Thiiigs,: — )  yet  fhould  the  Mind,  or  Rational  Soul,  who  enter- 
tains that  true  Opinion,  and  feels  that  jufl  Sentiment,  arrive 
afterwards  at  Science,  —  the  Science,  to  which  belong  thofe 
General  Ideas  contained  in  the  Opinion, — fhe  inftantly  removes 
the  Opinion  out  of  the  Imagination,  which  is  the  only  Scat  of 
all  Opinions,  into  her  own  Territorys, .  where  all  true  Opinions 
become  Parts  of  Knowkge.  ——  What  pleafmg  Sentim£?2is,  abftracfted 
from  all  Senfation  by  means  of  Body,  attend  the  Rational  Soul 
into  her  own  proper  and  retired  Place  of  Abode,  are  briefly 
mentioned  in  Note  3.— But  whether  the  Firfi  Opinion  be  true^ 
ov  falfe, — and  whether  the  Beginning  of  it,  the  Thought,  origi- 
nally fprang  from  a  Man's  oivn  Imagination,  or  was  fuggefled  to 
him  firil  by  fome  other  Perfon,   it  makes   no  difference  in  the 

Depth: 


46a  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

Now  if  we  have  pronounced  thus  far  rightly,  let  lis 
proceed  to  the  confiideration  of  one  Point  farther. 

Protarchus. 
What  is  That? 

Socrates. 

Whether  all  the  Operations  of  this  Kind,  fuch  as 

are  naturally  performed  within  our  Souls,  regard  only 

Things  prefent  and  Things  paft,    but  not  Things  to 

come  ;   or  whether  any  of  them  have  a  Reference  to 

tliefe  alfo. 

Protarchus. 

Difference  of  Time   makes   no  difference  in  thefe 
Matters. 

Socrates. 

Did  we  not  fay  before,  that  Pleafures  and  Pains  of 
the  Soul,  by  her  Self,  arife  in  us  prior  to  thofe  Plea- 
fures and  Pains  which  affedl  the  Body  ^^'  ?  fo  as  that 
we  feel  antecedent  Joy  and  Grief  in  the  Profped;  of 
things  to  come  hereafter. 


t>" 


Depth  or  Durablenefs  of  the  Engraving. — What  the  difference 
is  between  true  and  falfe  Opinions,  or  Thoughts,  fee  in  Page 
421. 

*^3  See  Page  404. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  463 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

Socrates. 

Thofe  Writings  then,  and  thofe  Engravings,  which, 
as  we  held  juft  now,  are  performed  within  us,  do  they 
refpedl  the  Paft  and  the  Prefent  Time  only  ?  and  have 
they  no  concernment  with  the  Future  ? 

Protarchus. 
About  the  Future  very  much  are  they  concerned, 
and  chiefly. 

Socrates. 

In  faying  This,  do  you  mean,  that  all  thefe  Things 
'^^'^  are  Expectations  of  the  Future ;  and  that  we  are, 
All  of  us,   throughout  Life,  full  of  Expedlations  ? 

Protarchus. 

-H  By  t^e/e  Thmgs  are  to  be  underftood  our  Thoughts  and 
Opinions  concerning  what  we  have  jio  Knoivlcge  of.  For  of 
Jenfible  things,  prefent  to  our  Senfes,  we  have  an  adlual  Percep- 
tion,— fuch  a  Sort  of  Knowlege,  as  Senfe  furnifbes : — of  Jenfible 
things,  pafl  or  abfent,  we  have  only  a  Remembra?ice : — of  intel- 
ligible things,  when  prefent  to  our  Minds,  we  have  a  Certainty, 
the  Certainty  of  Science  or  perfetfl  Knowlege. — None  of  Thefe 
Things  then  are  Subjeds  of  Opinion. — Our  Thoughts  or  Opi- 
nions, therefore,  as  they  I'clate  to  Things,  of  which  we  have 
neither  a  Scnfe  nor  a  perfed:  Knoivlege,  are  either  of  Things 
not  yet  exifting,  but  to  come', — or  of  Things,  which  never  did 
nor   ever  li'ill  exift,    the    meer  Creatures   of  Imagination : — or  if 

N  n  n  the 


464  P    FI    I    I.    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus, 
The  very  Thing  I  mean, 

SoCRATE  S. 

Now  then,   fince  we  are  thus  far  agreed,   anfwer  to 
this  farther  Queftion. 

Protarchus. 
What  is  it? 

Socrates. 

A  Man  who  is  juft  and  pious  and  intirely  good,  is 
lie  not  beloved  by  the  Divine  Being  ? 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

And  What  of  the  unjuft  and  intirely  bad  man  ?   is 
not  the  Reverfe  of  it  true  of  Him  ? 

the  Subjedts  of  our  Opinions  are  Things  in  nature  7tow  exijling^ 
—or  Things  which  have  an  eternal  Being  in  the  Divine  Mind  j— 
our  Perception  of  Thoje  is  ftill  to  come, -^2.nd  the  Knowlege  of 
Tbefe  we  are  not,  as  yet,  arrived  at :  (o  that  the  SubjeBs  of 
meer  Opinion  are,  to  the  Mind  which  entertains  any  Opinion, 
all  of  lYitm  future :  of  fuch  a  Future,  the  Thought  or  Opinion 
begets  an  ExpeSfation;  and  every  Expedation  is  attended  either 
with  Hope  or  with  Fear,  proportioned  to  the  Pleajure  or  the 
Difpleafure,  which   it  gives   to  the  Imagination, 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        465 

Protarchus. 
How  can  it  be  otherwife  ? 

Socrates. 
Now  every  Man,  as  we  faid  jufl:  now,  is  full  of  a 
multitude  of  Expedations. 

Protarchus. 
True. 

Socrates. 
Sayings  there  are,   written  within  every  one  of  us, 
to  which  we  give  the  name  of  Expedlations. 

Protarchus. 
There  are. 

Socrates. 
And  Phantafys  alfo,  engraven  in  us.  Thus,  for  in- 
ftance,  a  Man  often  fees  in  Imagination  plenty  of 
Money  flowing  in  to  him,  and  by  that  means  many 
Pleafures  furrounding  him  ;  and  views  Himfelf,  engra- 
ven within  Himfelf,  as  highly  delighted. 

Protarchus, 
That  often  is  the  cafe. 

Socrates. 

Of    thefe    Engravings,    fhall    we    fay,    that    Good 
Men,    bccaufe  of  the  Divine  Favour,    have   generally 

N  n  n  2  thofe 


466 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S, 


thofe  which  are   True  ^^^ ;    and   Bad   Men,    generally 
thofe  of  the  Contrary  Sort  ?    or  fliall  we  deny  it  ?. 

Protarchus. 
It  cannot  be  denied. 

-^^'  The  prefent  Reafoning  depends  on'  thefe  Principles  :  viz. 
that  the  Divine  Being  is  Vniverfal  Truth,  Truth  its  Self:— > 
that  from  Him  are  derived  to  Man  not  only  General  Truths, 
tliole  of  Mind  and  Science,  but  the  Truths  of  Senfe  alfo^  for 
Thefe  confift  in  the  conftant  Harmony  of  all  Nature,  and  in  That 
Agreement  between  the  Senfes  and  their  Objects,  of  v\'hich  He 
is  the  fole  Caufe : — that  from  a  clear  Perception,  or  a  true  SevJ} 
of  Senfible  Objedls,  joined  to  fuch  a  Knoivlege  of  Intelligible 
Objeds,  or  General  Truths,  as  a  found  Mind  and  an  upright 
Heart  never  fail  of  producing,  arife  all  true  Opinions,,  and 
whatever  in  Man's  Imagination,  whether  pleafurable  or  painful, 
accords  with  Reality  and  the  Truth  of  Things : — that  the  Stan- 
dard! of  this  Reality  and  Truth  is  the  Book  of  Nature,  open  to 
every  Man,  and  by  the  Author  of  it  Himfelf  explaijied  t3 
every  Man,  who  with  a  Mind  unprejudiced  will  attend  to  the 
Divine  Interpreter  v.'ithin  him :  —  and  that  all  falfe  Senti-f 
nients.  Thoughts,  and  Opinions,  all  imaginary  Pleafures  and 
Pains,  all  groundiefs  Hopes  and  Fears,  fpring  from  thofe  un- 
bounded Appetites  and  Pafiions,  and  thofe  extravagant  Affec- 
tions, which  aie  apt  to  fill  a  human  Soul  undifciplined, 
whofe  Mind  is  mis-informed,  or  its  Attention  drawn  away 
from  its  only  faithful  and  unerring  Governor  and  Preceptor^ 
the  Fountain  of  all  Truths — From  thefe  Principles,  the  Pojitions 
here  laid  down  by  Socrates,  in  his  ufual  way  of  querying,  are 
clearly  deducible,  and  need  not  any  farther  Proof  or  Illuftra- 
Cion. 

4  Socrates, 


P   H    I    L    E    B   U    S.         467 

Socrates. 

Bad    Men    then    have    Pleafures    engraven    within 
Them  alfo ;.  but  Thefe  are  of  the  Falfe  Sort, 

Protarchus... 
No  Doubt  of  it.. 

Socrates* 
Wicked  Men  therefore  delight  moftly  in  Falfe  Plea- 
fures I   the  Good,  in  Pleafures  which  are  True. 

Protarchus. 
It  muft  of  neceflity  be  fo. 

Socrates. 
According  to  this  account,   there  are,   in  the  Soub 
of  Men,    fuch  Pleafures   as   are  Falfe ;    tho  in  a  moft 
ridiculous  manner  they  imitate,   and  would  fain  pafs- 
for,    True  Pleafures :    Pains  alio  there  are,   with  the 
like  Quality s. 

Protarchus. 
Such  Pleafures  and  fuch  Pains  there  arc, 

Socrates, 
May  not  a  Man,  who  indulges  Fancy  at  random,  and 
embraces.  Opinions    of.  any    Kind    whatever,    always 

reallv 


468         P     H    1    L    E     B     U    S. 

really  ^"  think  and  believe  fome  Things  to  be,  which 
neither  are,  nor  ever  were,  and  fometimes  fuch  as 
never  will  be  ? 

Protarchus, 

Certainly* 

Socrates. 

And  they  are  the  Falfe  Semblances  and  Seemings  of 
thefe  unreal  Things,  which  produce  in  him  thofe  Falfe 
Opinions,  and  occalion  him  to  think  thus  falfly.     Are 

they  not  ? 

Protarchus. 
They  are. 

Socrates. 

Well  then  ;  fhould  we  not  fay  of  the  Pains  and 
Pleafures,  felt  by  thofe  Bad  Men,  that  their  condition 
correfponds  with  the  cafe  of  Falfe  Opinions  ? 

Protarchus. 
How  do  you  mean  ? 

^^^  In  the  Greek  of  this  Sentence,  before  the  word  «'«,  we 
ought  to  read  oirooi  inftead  of  outcos.  This  appears  from  a  Sen- 
tence foon  after,  concerning  a  Man  rea/Ij  delighted  with  the 
Thoughts  of  things  unreal.  Both  the  Sentences  refer  to  what 
was  faid  in  Page  444.  where  the  fame  Word  is  ufed  in  the 
fame  Senfe  as   it  is  here. 

Socrates. 


F    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        469 

Socrates. 
May  aot  a  Man,  who  courts  and  embraces  Pleafure 
at  random,  Pleafure  in  general,  of  any  Kind  whatever, 
may  not  fuch  a  Man  always  really  feel  Delight  from 
things  which  are  not,  and  fometimes  from  things 
which,  never  were,  often  too  and  perhaps  the  mofl; 
frequently,  from  things  which  will  never  be  ? 

Protarchus. 
This  mull  of  necellity  be  granted.. 

SOCRATES.- 

Should  not  the  fame  be  faid  of  Fears  and  Defires^ 
and  all  things  of  the  like  Sort  '^%  that  Thefe  alfo  are 
fometimes  Falfe  ? 

Protarchus^ 
Certainly. 

Socrates. 
Well  now  J   can  we  fay  of  Opinions,   that  they  are 
Bad,   or   that  they  are    Good,   any  otherwife   than   as 
they  prove  to  be  Falfe,  or  prove  to  be  True  "''^  ? 

Protarchus. 

=^^7  Meaning — every  fuch  Tajfion  of  the  Soul,  as  hath,  for  the 
Obje£l  of  it,  the  appearance  of  Good  or  the  appearance  of  Evil, 
either  prefent  or  to  comej  from  the  Falfehood  or  the  Truth  of 
which  Appearance,  the  PaJJioii  its  felf  is  denominated  either 
Falfe  or    True. 

'^^    It   is   obferved  by  Cornarms,    tliat   after    the  word  -Ifu/ar 

in  the   Greek  of  this    Sentence,    all   the    printed   Editions  omit 

4;.    '  the 


470         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Protarchus. 
No  othervvife. 

Socrates. 

And  I  fliould  think,  that  Pleafures  too  we  appre- 
hend not  to  be  Bad  on  any  other  account,  than  as  they 

are  Falfe. 

Protarchus^ 

Quite  the  contrary,  O  Socrates !  For  hardly  would 
any  Man  put  to  the  Account  of  Falfhood  any  of  the 
Evils  brought  on  by  Pain  and  Pleafure  ;  fince  many 
and  great  Evils  accede  to  them  from  other  Quarters. 

Socrates. 
Pleafures,  which  are  Evil,  thro  the  Evil  they  oc- 
cafion,  we  fhall  fpeak  of  by  and  by,  if  we  fhall  con- 
tinue to  think  it  requifite  :  but  we  are  now  to  fpeak 
of  a  multitude  of  Pleafures,  felt  by  us,  and  frequently 
arifing  in  us, — Pleafures  which  are  falfe  in  yet  another 
way  *^'.      And  this  other  way  of  confidering  Pleafure 

the  words  kx]  aA-n^ets:  the  Sefijl'  evidently  demands  them;  and 
they  are  not  wanting  in  the  Medicean  M.  S.  as  appears  from 
Ficinus's  Latin  Tranflation.  See  alfo  Stephens^  Annotationsy 
page  jt^. 

*^9  That  is,  —  in  a  way  different  from  That,  mentioned  be- 
fore, in  which  the  Pleafurable  ObjeSl  was  unreal  and  imaginary; 
and  on  that  account,  the  Pleafure,  felt  from  it,  was  conlidered 
as  a  Falfe  Pleafure. 

wc 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


47r 


we  fliall   have  occafion  perhaps   to  make   ufe  of,    in 
forming  a  right  Judgment  of  the  feveral  Sorts  of  it. 

Protarchus. 
By  all  means  let  us  fpeak  of  Thefe,   if  any  fuch 
Pleafures  there  are. 

Socrates. 
And  there  are  fuch,   O  Protarchus !   in  My  opinion. 
But  as  long  as  this  Opinion  lyes   by  us  unexamined, 
'tis  impoflible  for  it  to  become  certain  or  inconteft- 
able. 

Protarchus. 
Fairly  faid. 

Socrates. 

Now  therefore,   let  us  advance  to  this  other  argu- 
ment,  like  Champions  to  the  Combat. 

Protarchus. 
Come  we  on  then. 

Socrates. 
We  faid,  if  we  remember,  a  little  while  fince  *'% 
that  as  long  as  the  Wants  of  the  Body,  which  are 
dalled  Deiires  in  us,  remain  unfatisfied,  the  Body 
all  that  time  will  be  affeded  diftindly,  and  in  a 
different  manner,   from  the  Soul. 

*9°  See  from  Page  435   to  Page  440. 

O  o  o  Pro- 


472         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
We  remember,  that  'twas  fo  held. 

Socrates. 
In  fuch  a  Cafe,  That  within  us,  which  defired  '^'^ 
would  be  the  Soul,  defiring  to  have  her  Body  in  a 
State  contrary  to  its  prefent  Condition ;  and  That, 
which  felt  Uneafinefs  or  Pain  from  the  Condition  it 
was  in,  would  be  the  Body  ^'\ 

Protarchus. 
Things  would  be  thus  with  us. 

So  CRATES. 

Now  compute  thefe  things  together,  and  confider 
the  Amount. 

*9'  We  are  to  underftand  the  Defire,  In  this  Cafe,  to  be 
accompanied  with  Hope ;  agreeably  to  the  Cafe,  flated  in  Page 
439.  For  the  Soul  is  here  fuppofed  to  {tt\  Pleafure -,  and  the 
Bodyy  at  the  fame  time,  to  feel  Pain :  but  a  Defire  hopelefs  would 
add  Pai?i  of  the  Soul  to   that  of  the  Body. 

^92  The  Senfitive  Part  of  the  Soul  is  joined  fo  immediately 
to  (or  united  with)  the  Body,  that  to  all  Human  as  well  as 
other  Sentient  Beings  the  Body  feems  to  be  the  Seat  and  the 
SubjeSl  of  all  Senfual  Pain  and  Pleafure.  But  Defire  is  univer- 
fally  acknowleged  to  belong  to  the  Soul  only,  as  diJliuSl  from 
the  Body.  And  by  the  word  Soul,  in  the  prefent  Paffage,  only 
the  jippetitix^e  Part  of  the  Soul  is  meant. 

4  Protarchus. 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  473 

Protarchus. 
Say,  What. 

Socrates. 

In  fuch  a  cafe,  it  c6mes  out,  that  Pains  and  Plea- 
fures  are  placed  together,  each  by  the  other's  fide ; 
and  that  together,  each  by  the  other's  fide,  arife  in  us 
a  Feeling  of  Emptinefs,  and  a  Defire '"  of  its  contrary, 
Fulnefs  :  for  fo  it  has  juft  now  appeared. 

Protarchus. 
'Tis  indeed  apparent. 

Socrates. 
Has  not  This  alfo  been  faid  ?  and  does  it  not  re- 
main with  us  a  Point,  fettled  between  us  by  agree- 
ment ? 

Protarchus. 
What? 

Socrates. 

That  Pain  and  Pleafure,  Both  of  them,  admit  of  the 
More  and  of  the  Lefs ;  and  that  they  Both  are  of  the 
Infinites. 

Protarchus. 

It  was  fo  faid  and  agreed  ''*. 

Socrates. 
=53  See  Note  291. 

*9+  In  the  Greek, — «^))Ta'».  —  to  which  are  added  thefe  two 
fliort  words,  —  t/ jw)i»' ;  —  without  difpute -, -^  zxi   expreflion,  fre- 

O  o  o  2  quently 


474         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Is  there  not  then  fome  Way  ''^,  in  which  we  may- 
judge  of  Pain  and  Pleafure  rightly  ? 

PROTARCHUS, 

quently  occurring  in  all  fuch  Dialogues  of  Pinto  as  are  of  ther 
Inquifilive  or  Inquiring  Kind,  particularly  in  This;  and  very 
proper  in  the  Mouth  of  the  Party  qiiefiiotied,  where  the  SiibjeSh 
of  the  Qtieflion  aiked  is  an  Opinio)!  univerfally  received.  But 
where  the  Subje^  of  the  Queftion  is  a  Matter  of  FciB  well 
known,  or  a  Thing  faid  but  juft  before,  and  agreed  in  by  Both 
the  Partys,  (as  in  the  prefent  cafe,)  the  cxpreffion  is  unufual, 
and  if  not  quite  improper,  is  at  leail:  fuperfiuous.  Here  there- 
fore we  fufped:  an  Error  in  the  Textj  and  fhall  endeavour  to 
account  for  and  rectify  it  irx  the  next  Note. 

*95  In  the  Greeks — T/s  Zv  ix.-n'xsi.vi  x,.  t.  A.  W/jai  JVay  then  can 
he  contrived,  &c. — Cornarius  and  Grouy  in  tranflating  the  Sluef- 
tion,  here  put  by  Socrates,  adhere  to  this  Reading  of  it.  But, 
if  This  were  right,  then  the  next  words  of  Protarchus,  inflead 
of  being  an  Anjwer  to  the  Qucftion,  would  amount  to  nothing 
more  than  a  retorting  of  the  fame  Queftion  back  again  to  So- 
crates.— Ficinus  and  Serranus,  together  with  Grynaus  and  Bembo, 
make  this  Sentence,  not  Interrogative,  but  Pojitive,  thus,  — 
"  There  is  then  fome  Way,  &c."  —  But  the  Greek  Words  ad- 
mit not  this  Interpretation;  for  the  Indefinite  t]s  (Some)  ne- 
ver, we  believe,  begins  a  Sentence. — Yet  as  the  Paflage  (lands 
at  prefent,  it  fccms,  that  every  Interpreter  muft  of  neceffity 
adopt  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  thefe  wrong  Interpreta- 
tions. But  Botli  of  them  may  be  avoided  by  a  very  (light 
alteration  of  the  Greek  Text;  that  is,  by  taking  from  PrO" 
tarchus  the  words  t<  (jlw,  and  transferring  them  to  Socrates, 
4  with 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  475 

Protarchus. 
what  Way,  and  how  do  you  mean  ? 

Socrates.     , 

In  judging  of  them,  are  we  not  wont,  in  every  cafe, 
readily  to  try  them  by  thefc  marks, — Which  of  them 
is  the  Greater,  and  Which  is  the  Lefs,  —  Which  of 
them  hath  the  Nature  of  its  Kind  the  moft, — and  Which 
is  more  Intenfe  than  the  other,  —  in  comparing 
either  a  Pain  with  a  Pleafure,  or  one  Pain  with  an- 
other Pain,  or  one  Pleafure  with  another  Pleafure  ^^^  ? 

Protarchus. 
Such  Comparifons  are  often  made;    and  from  thefe 
Comparifons  we  are  wont  to  form  our  Judgment  and 
our  Choice. 

with  the  omiffion  only  of  the  lad  Letter  In  /-t«V.  The  Sen- 
tence will  then  ftand  thus  i — Tl;  /tx^iVis  Sv  ^w;^ar»;  x.  r.  A.  IFe//, 
is  there  not  then  fome  Way,  &c. 

*9^  This  Sentence  may  be  either  taken  as  Interrogative,  ac- 
cording to  all  the  Tranllations  of  it  into  Latin,  French,  and 
Italian; — or  it  may  be  taken  as  Conditional:  in  the  latter  cafe, 
at  the  beginning  of  it,  a  few  words,  conneding  it  with  what 
precedes,  are  to  be  underflood  ;  as  thus  3 — {*' The  Way  appears 
plain,)  if,  in  judging  of  them,  ive  are  wont,  in  every  cafe,  readily 
to  try  them,  &c." — And  indeed  thtis  the  Sentence  more  eafily 
is  feen  to  be  what  it  really  is,  —  an  Anfwer  to  the  Queftion 
of  Protarchus, — than  it  would  be,,  were  it  a  new  Interrogatory. 

SOCKATES. 


476         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Well  now  ;  in  the  cafe  of  Magnitudes,  does  not  the 
Diftance  of  vifible  Objeds,  Some  of  which  are  ken 
remote  and  Others  near,  render  their  real  Magnitudes 
uncertain,  obfcuring  the  Truth  of  things,  and  pro- 
ducing falfe  Opiriions  ?  and  does  not  the  fame  thing 
hold  true  with  regard  to  Pains  and  Pleafures  ?  is  not 
the  fame  EiFed  produced  by  the  fame  Means  in  This 

cafe  alfo? 

Protarchus. 

Much  more  feelingly,  O  Socrates  I 

SOCRATE  S. 

But  in  This  cafe,  it  happens  contrary  to  what  was 
in  the  cafe,    mentioned  a  little  before  ''^ 

Protarchu  s. 
What  happens,  fay  you  ? 

Socrates. 
In  that  cafe,    the  true  and  the  falfe  Opinions,    en- 
tertained by  us,  impart  to  the   Pains  and   Pleafures, 

*97  See  In  Page  451.  —  Stephens's  Edition  follows  That  of 
Aldus,  in  attributing  this  Sentence  to  Protarchus ;  an  Error, 
the  more  inexcufable,  in  that  the  Two  Bqfil  Editions,  Both  of 
them  prior  to  That  of  Stephens,  agree  with  Ficinus  in  afcribing 
it  to  Socrates,  to  whom   it  undoubtedly  belongs. 

which 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S.         477 

which  attend  them,   their  own  Qualitys  of  Truth  and 

Falfhood. 

Protarchus» 

Very  right* 

Socrates. 

But  in  the  cafe,  which  I  am  now  fpeaking  of,    the 

Pains  and  Pleafures,    being  viewed   afar  off  and  near, 

continually  changing    [their  Afpe6ls  with  their  Dif- 

tances],    and    being   fet    in    comparifon    together,    [it 

happens,    that]    the    Pleafures    [at   hand],     compared 

with  the  [remote]  Pains,    appear  greater  and  more  in- 

tenfe   [than   they   really  are],    and  [that]    the   Pains, 

compared  with  the  Pleafures,     [have  an  appearance] 

quite  the  contrary  ''^ 

Protarchus* 

^98  The  Pains  and  Pleafures,  meant  in  the  former  cafe,  arife 
in  us  from  ctn2\n  Notions  ox  Opinions :  that  is,  certain  Notions 
or  Opinions  there  are,  which  give  us  Uneafinefs,  Grief  and 
Sadnefs ;  and  from  certain  Other  v/e  receive  Comfort,  Joy,  and 
Delight.  If  therefore  the  Opinion,  on  which  entirely  depend 
any  Pains  or  Pleafures  of  the  Soul,  be  fafe,  thofe  Pains  or 
Pleafures  muft  be  falfe  themfelves,  as  being  meerly  imaginary. 
But  in  the  cafe  now  put  by  Socrates,  the  Pains  and  Pleafures 
are  fuppofed  to  be  real  in  a  certain  degree,  and  from  a  natural 
necelTity  muft  be  felt  in  a  fhort  or  a  longer  time  to  come. 
Thefe  Pains  however  and  thefe  Pleafures,  being  by  the  Imagina- 
tion exaggerated  beyond  their  real  Magnitude,  or  diminified  to 
a  Size  below  it,  are  fo  far  falfe,  as  they  either  exceed,  or  fall 
Jhort  of,  the  reality  of  the  Feeling,   when   it  comes  to   be  pre^ 

fenU 


478  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Jent.      So    that    the   Pains    and    the  Pleafures,    here   fpoken    of, 
are  yi^',  as   well   as  thofe   in   the  Jorwer   cafe;    but  their  Falfity 
is  of  a   different  Nature,  and  proceeds  from  a  different  Caufe.— 
Thofe  are   falfe    hit'irely    and    eJj'entmUy :    'Thefe    are   only  falfe    in 
their  apparent  Magnitude. — The   Caufe  of  that    total  Falfity    in 
the  Jormer   is    an  Error   of  our   own  Judgement  concerning  the 
Subjects   of   our    Opinion  :    the    partial    Falfity    of    the    latter    is 
owing  to  the  nearnefs    or  remotenefs  of  that  Dijlance  from   our 
Sehes,   at  which   we  view   the  Pleafurc  and  the  Pain,   Each  of 
them    feverally,     in    our    Imagination,     whenever    we     chufe    to 
fet   them  in    comparifon    together :    for    they    are    there   placed 
at  different  Dijiances,  not  by  Forefight  and  Prudence,   but  by  De^ 
fire   and  Fear,    according   to   the  prefent  Predominance   of  either 
of  thefe  Paffions.      And    as    the  Strength  or  Weaknefs   of  the 
Paffion  creates  the  imaginary  Dijiance  of  its  Obje£t,   fo  the  near- 
nefs  or  remotenefs   of  this  Dijiance  creates   the  imaginary  ^an- 
turn  of  the  Objedl;   and   the   ieemmg  Magnitude  of  This  is   ftill 
more    increafcd,    or  its    feeming  Minutenefs    is   ftill   more   dimi- 
nifhed,    by   the  comparifon,   made    with   its  Antagonift.  —  The 
Inftance   of  this,    here   brought   by  Plato,    is   when  Pleafure  ap- 
pears   to  be  at  hand,   and  Pain  to  be  remote,  rather  than  in  the 
contrary    appearances   of   Both,    for  this  reafon,  —  becaufe   the 
Falfity  of  fome  Kinds  of  Pleafure   is   the    immediate  Subjedt  of 
this  Part  of  the  Dialogue.      The  Conclufion,   however,    drawn 
from    hence,    in    the    next   Sentence    of    Socrates,    includes    an 
imaginary  and  fafe  Magnitude  of  both   Pain   and  Pleafure. — The 
learned  Reader,   if  he  compares  tiie  Sentence,   now  before  him, 
with   the   Greek,    will  obferve    it   to   be    fomewhat   enlarged    in 
the   Englif.       The    additional    Words,     inclofed    within   Hooks, 
\vere   left   by   Plato    to    be   fupplyed    by   his  Reader's   own   Un- 
derftanding.     But,    as  our   modern  Style  of  Compofition  admits 
pot  of  fuch  FJlipJ'cs,   the  Words,  omitted  in   the  Greek,  are  in- 

ferted 


P    FI    I    L    E    B    U    S,  479 

Protarchus. 
Such  appearances  muft  of   neccffity  arifc  by  tlicfc 
means. 

SOCRATE  s. 

As  far  therefore  as  the  Pains  and  Plcafures  appear 
lefs  or  greater  than  they  really  are,  if  from  the  Re- 
ality you  feparate  this  Appearance  of  what  Neither  of 
them  is,  and  take  it  by  its  Self  thus  feparated,  you  will 
not  fay  that  'tis  a  Right  Appearance  ;  nor  will  you 
venture  to  aflert,  that  this  Additional  Part  of  Pain 
and  Pleafure  is  rig-ht  and  true. 

o 

Protarchus, 
By  no  means. 

Socrates. 

After  thefe  difcoverys,  let  us  look,  if  we  can  meet 
with  Pleafures  and  Pains,  ftill  falfer,  and  more  remote 
from  truth,  than  thofe  already  mentioned,  which  are 
not  only  in  Appearance  what  they  are  called,  but  are 
felt  alfo  by  the  Soul 


299 


ferted  in  the  Englifli  Tranilation  for  the  fake  of  Perfpicuity. 
For,  that  thefe  Words,  or  others  of  like  Import,  are  to  be 
underftood  as  if  they  were  exprefled  in  this  Sentence,  may 
appear  from   the  prefent  explanatory  Note. 

'99   Felt  in  the  ImaginatwJt,  or  Imagmaiive  Part  of  the  Scul. — ■ 
See  Page  469. 

P  p  p  Protarchus, 


4^0  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

Protarchus. 
what  Pleafures  and  Pains  do  you  fpeak  of? 

Socrates. 
We  have  more  than  once  faid,  that  when  the  Frame 
©f  any  Animal  is  on  its  way  to  Diffolution,  thro 
Mixtures  and  Separations,  Repletions  and  Evacuations, 
the  Increafe  of  fome  and  the  Diminution  of  other 
Parts  of  it,  that  in  fuch  a  Condition  of  its  Body,  Pains, 
Achs,  and  Oppreflions,  with  many  other  uneafy  Feel- 
ings to  which  are  given  various  Names,  are  wont  to 
arife  in  us  '°\ 

Protarchus. 
True ;   this  Obfervation  has  been  again   and  again 

repeated. 

Socrates. 

And  that,  when  all  things  in  our  Bodily  Frame  re- 
turn to  their  natural  and  found  State,  together  with 
this  Recovery,   we  receive  fome  Pleafure   from  within* 

our  Selves.- 

Protarchus.. 
Right. 

Socrates. 

But  how  is  it,  when  none  of  thefe  Changes  are 
operating  in  our  Bodys  ? 

3?°  See  Pages  401,   and  431,   &c. 

PROTARCHUSi 
2. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        481 

Protarchus. 
At  what  times,   O  Socrates !   may  This  be  ? 

Socrates. 
The  Queflion,   O  Protarchus !  which  you  have  now 
put  to  me,  is  nothing  to  the  Purpofe, 

Protarchus. 
Why  not? 

Socrates. 

Becaufe  it  will  not  hinder  me  ^°'  from  putting  again 

My  Queflion  to  You. 

Protarchus. 
Repeat  it  then. 

Socrates. 
I  fhall  put  it   thus  :    If  at  any  time,   none  of  thofe 
things  were  paffing  within  us,    What  condition  fliould 
we  of  neceffity  be  in,  as  to  Pleafure  and  Pain,  at  fuch 

a  time  ? 

Protarchus. 

When  no  Motion  was  in  the  Body  Either  way,   do 

you 


mean  '°*  ? 


3°'  In  the  Greek,  to  read  xojAuVct  feems  preferable  to  the 
printed  Reading,    which   is   KcaAucrea. 

3°*  That  is, — when  the  Body  is  neither  in  fuch  a  condition 
as  tends  to  its  Diflblution, — nor,  on  the  other  hand,  in  fuch 
a  condition  as  tends  to  the  recovery  of  its  Health  and  Sound- 
nefs,  after  they  have  been  injured. 

P  p  p  2  •  Socrates, 


482  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Socrates.. 
Exactly  Co. 

Protarchus. 

It  is  plain,   O  Socrates !  that  we  {Lould  feel  neitlier 
any  Pleafure,    nor  any  Pain,  at  fuch  a  time. 

Socrates. 
Perfedly  well  anfwered.  But  now  in  Your  Ques- 
tion I  fuppofe  You  meant  This, — that  fome  or  other 
of  thofe  things  were  of  neceffity  pafling  within  us, 
continually  at  all  times ;  agreeably  to  this  Saying  of 
the  Wife, — "  that  all  things  are  in  perpetual  Flow,_ 
going  upward  and  downward  ^°^ 

Protarchus. 
So  they  tell  us  :    and   this  Saying  of  theirs,  is,    me- 
thinks,   worthy  of  Regard. 

Socrates. 
Undoubtedly  it  is:   for  'tis  faid   by  Men,   who  are 
worthy,    The.mfelves,    to    be    regarded  ^°*.       But    this: 

33  See  the  D'ljfertation  concerning  the  DoSirine  of  Her  adit  iis^ 
Page  17. 

3"*  It  is  affirmed  hy  Socrates,  mVl-MosThcetetus,  page  152, 
Edit:  Stcph:  that  the  Wife  Men,  (that  is,  the  Philofophers.) 
in  a  continued  Succeffion,  All  except  Parmenides,  (who  ftands 
for  the  whole  Eleatic  Stdi,  of  which  He  was  the  Founder,) 
^gree  in  averting  the  Injlability  of  all  things  -,  that  is,  of  all 
things  in  the  Corporeal  Worlds    or  Outward  Nature. 

Subjedlj. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  483 

Subject,  which  we  have  thus  lighted  on,  I  would 
willingly  decline.  Now  I  have  it  in  my  thoughts  to 
avoid  it  This  way  ;   but  You  muil  accompany  me.. 

Protarchus. 
What  way  ? 

Socrates. 

Be  it  fo  then,  let  us  fay  to  thefe  Wife  Men  :  but 
You  J  Protarchus !  anfwer  me  to  This  Qiieftion  :  Do 
Animals  feel  all  the  Alterations  which  they  conti- 
nually undergo  ?  or  whilft  we  are  growing,  or  fuf- 
fering  in  any  Part  of  cur  Bodys  any  other  Change,. 
are  we  fcnllble  of  thefe  internal  Motions  ?  Is  not  quite 
the  contrary  true  ?  for  almoft  every  thing  of  this  Kind^ 
pafling  within  us,   pafles  without  our  Knowlege. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  fo. 

Socr  ate  s. 
It  was  therefore  not  right  in  us  to  fay,   as  we  did 
juft  now,    that  all    the  Alterations  which  happen   to 
our  Bodys,    and   all   the  Motions  within    them,    pro- 
duce either  Pains  or  Pleafures. 

Protarchus.. 
Certainly  not  right. 

S-O  CRATES... 


484        P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S. 

Socrates. 

And  it  would  be  better,  and  lefs  liable  to  Cenfurc, 
to  lay  down  this  Pofition. 

Protarchus, 
What  Pofition  ? 

Socrates. 
That  Great  Changes  within  give  us  Pains  and  Plea- 
fures ;   but   that  Such   as  are  Inconfiderable,    or  only 
Moderate,   produce  neither  Pleafures  nor  Pains. 

Protarchus. 
This  is  more  juftly  faid,   than  the  other  Sentence, 

indeed,  Socrates ! 

Socrates. 

If  then  thefe   things  are  fo,   we  meet  with  the  Life, 
mentioned  before,   recurring  to  us  here  again. 

Protarchus. 
What  Life  ? 

Socrates. 

That  which  is  exempt  from  all  Senfations  both  of 
Pain  and  Pleafure  ^°^. 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

3°5  See  Page  408. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         485 

Socrates. 

Hence  we  find,  there  are  three  Kinds  of  Life  pro- 
pofed  to  our  confidcration ;  One  of  them,  full  of 
Plcafure  ;  Another,  full  of  Pain  ;  the  Third,  Neutral, 
and  free  from  Both.  Or  how  otherwife  would  You 
determine  upon  thefe  Points  ? 

Protarchu  s. 

No  otherwife  I  for  My  part :  for  Three  different 
Kinds  of  Life  appear  to  Me  in  what  has  been  faid. 


Socrates. 

tl: 
as  to  have  Pleafure» 


To  have  no  Pain  therefore  cannot  be  the  fame  thing: 


Protarchus. 
Certainly  it  cannot* 

Socrates, 

But  whenever  you  hear  a  man  fay,  that  'tis  the 
mofi:  pleafurable  of  all  things,  to  live  all  one's  Life 
free  from  Pain,  What  do  you  take  to  be  His  Thought 
and  Meaning  ? 

Protarchus. 

He  means  and  thinks,  as  I  take  it,  that  'tis  a  Plca- 
fure not  to  have  any  Pain,. 

Socrates,. 


aS6  P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 


SOCRATE  S. 


Well  now  ;  let  there  be  any  Three  Things  what- 
ever ;  to  inftance  in  Things  of  honourable  name,  let 
us  fuppofe  One  of  them  to  be  Gold,  Another  to  be 
Silv^er,   and  the  Third  to  be  neither  Gold  nor  Silver. 

Protarchus. 
We  fliall  fuppofe  fo. 

Socrates. 
That  which  is  Neither,   is  it  poflible  for  it  any  way 
to  become  either  Gold  or  Silver  ? 

Protarchu  s. 
Bj  no  means* 

Socrates. 

The  Middle  Life  therefore,  if  'twere  faid  to  be 
pleafurablc,  or  if  'twere  faid  to  be  painful,  would  not 
be  fpoken  of,  in  either  way,  rightly  and  agreeably  to 
the  true  Nature  of  Things  ;  nor  would  any  Perfon, 
who  entertains  Either  of  thofe  Opinions  concerning 
it,   think  rightly. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  not. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B   U    S.         487 

Socrates. 
And  yet,  my  Friend !  we  find  that  there  arc  Per- 
fons,  who  ad:ually  fpeak  and  think  thus  amifs  ^°^ 

Protarchus. 

3°^  Hence  it   appears,    that    In    the   time    of   Socrates,    when 
Men   of  Leifure    began    to  be    much  addidled   to   Philofophical 
Studys  and  Difcourfes,    in   many  Grecian   Countrys,  and   parti- 
cularly at  Athens,   the   chief  Seat  of   all   Philofophy   for    feveral 
Ages,   from  that  time,   Perfons  there  were,  who,  like  Epicurus, 
tho    long  before   him,    held,    that    between   Pleafure    and   Pain 
there  is  no  Medium ;  for  that  to  be  free  from  Pain,    is  not   only  a 
Pleafure,    but   the    very  Height    and   Confummation    of  Pleafure: 
as    may  be  feen  from  the  Reafoning  of  'Torquatus  an  Epicurean, 
in    Cicero    de   Finibus  Bon:    &  Mah   L.  i,    §.  11.  —  But  Who 
were  the  Perfons,    alluded   to   here  by  Socrates,  and  What  Se6t 
of  Philofophers   in   His    time  held   fo   paradoxical   a  Tenet,   or 
rather,   ufed  the  Term  Pleafure  in  fo  new  and  ilrange  a  Senfe, 
we  are  at  a  lofs   to  conjedlure, — unlefs    they  were  Some  of  the 
sCyrenaicks.  —  And    yet   we    learn    from    Cicero    in    his    Treatife 
above  cited,   from  Laertius   alfo  in  L.  2,  §.  89,   and  from  SeX' 
,tus  Empiricus,    pag:  411,    that   the    Cyrenaicks  thought   like   So- 
xrates    on    this   Subjedl;    and    fpake    of   it   in   Terms,    fuch    as 
thofe  which   had   been    ufed   by  Him. — Sextus  delivereth    their 
Sentiments  in  thefe  words  j — TraVxwi'  Tm  oWwi',   no.  ■jtd.'b-n  y.^i7-Jiot(x. 

i(^t  xa.1  TgA»*  TOiV  TTd^UV  TO.  fJiiV  i<^tv  iiS'scc'  TX  S'e,  oiAyBva,'  rcc 
jfg,  fAira^v.  Ta  fjisv  aXyava.,  xaxa  (pxatv  eivxt'  rcc  S'i  n^icc,  dyx^x' 
Tx  tSe  fxera^v,  are  aya^cc,  are  xxy.x.  And  again  ; — are  ayxpov, 
are  y.ay.oy,  TxSros  gT'  fcera^u  iiS'ovrs  v.x\  ccAyyiSovoi.  The  Pafjions 
of  Man  (or  the  Feelings  of  his  Soul)  are  (to  Him,)  the  Cri- 
terions  and  Boundarys  of  the  Good   and  Evil    of  all  things.     Of 


488 


P    H    r    L    E    B    U    S. 


tJoe  Pajions  (or  Feelings  of  the  Soul)  Some  are  fleafurabk  '^. 
Some,  painful;  Others,  between  Both.  The  painful,  fay  They,  are 
evil;  the  pie  a  fur  able,  good;  thofe  betiveen  Both  are  neither  good 
nor  evil.  And  the  Condition  of  a  Man  between  Both,  in  which 
he  feels  7ieither  Pkafure  nor  Pain,  is  neither  good  nor  evil. — 
Laertius,  fpeaking  of  their  Opinions,  fays,  —  »'  tS  dXy^vToi 
VTre^ccipecrti  SoKst  auTois  p.»  e.va.i  -n^o^rt,  aSs  vj  ccuS'oi'icc  a.Xyy]S wV  tv 
Kivmet  ydp  en'aj  ccufoTl^cc'  [j.i)  Bam  t>i«  ccttoi'Iccs  h  Tui  anfoyiai 
xnricricios'  gV«  n  etTovloc  oiavei  xaS-jJ/ocTos  £^j  y.ce.TX(^ce.(ni. — fx.i(Ta.i  t£ 
xaT«iraVfi5  uvofJLOL^ov  dmfovltxv  v.a.\  ecTTOflccv.  The  Removal  of  That,, 
which  gives  Pain,  they  deem  not  to  be  Pkafure ;  nor  the  Priva^ 
Hon  of  Pkafure  deem  they  to  be  Pain :  for  that  Pkafure  and 
Pain  Both,  fay  they,  confjl  in  Motion  .•  but  the  Abfence  of  either- 
Pain  or  Pkafure  is  not  any  Kind  oi  Motion.  The  Abfence  of 
them  Both  is  like  the  State  of  a  Man  foundly  ajleep.  This  there- 
fore they  termed  a  Middle  or  Indifferent  State  of  Beitig. — Now 
concerning  this  Middle  or  Neutral  State  of  the  Soul.  —  a  State^ 
of  pure  Tranquillity,  and  perfedlly  y^rt';^^,  —  That  State,  which, 
according  to  Socrates  in  this  Dialogue,  page  408,  is  the  moil 
Divine,  —  That,  in  which  Hieronymus  the  Rhodian .  '^\zcedi  the- 
Sovereign  Good,  and  which  Epicurus  deemed  to  be  the  Highejl  of  all 
Pkafures,- — we  are  told  in  general  by  Cicero  and  by  Sextus,  as  we. 
have  juft  now  acknowleged,  that  the  Reality  of  this  State  is  held 
by  the  Cyrenaicks :  but  'tis  obfervable,  that  hy Laertius  it  is  recorded 
among  the  Tenets  of  Thofe  only  of  the  Cyrenaicks,  who  continued  in 
the  IJlitutes  of  Arifippus,  eir]  tws  aycoyrii  tws  'Apie^iTna-a  fAeivccvra,- 
and  were  alone  peculiarly  and  properly  termed  Cyrenaicks.  For^ 
though  the  Difciples  of  this  celebrated  Cyrenean  perfifted,  all  of 
theni  alike,  in  his  Capital  Dodlriue,  —  that  "  Pkafure  is  the. 
fole  Good  and  End  of  Humaa  Life," — yet,  as  they  differed,  one 
from  another,  about  forae  of  the  Means  fit  for  the  procuring, 
of  this  End,  (One  Party,  for  inftance,  admitting  the  Studya 
of  hogick   and  Phyfcks,    Others  reje<5ling  them  ;  and  One  Party 

recommending. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  489 

recommending  FriendJJjip  and  Patr'iotifin,  Others  renouncing 
themj)  fo  'tis  probable,  that  the  different  Partys,  into  -which 
they  were  divided,  ufed  the  Term  Pkafure  in  different  Senfes; 
and  that,  while  it  was  confined  by  Some  to  fignify  Senfiid 
Pkafure  only,  which  is  common  to  all  Animals,  Others  in- 
larged  its  Meaning,  fo  as  to  comprehend  all  thofe  Enjoyments^ 
which  are  peculiar  to  the  Soul  of  Man,  and  are  mentioned 
in  Note  3. — Certain  it  is,  that  in  the  Life-time  of  Plato,  the 
Cyrenaicks  were  divided  into  Four  Partys,  feverally  named  from 
their  immediate  Heads  or  Leaders, — the  Theodorians,  from  Theo- 
dorus, — the  Hegefiacks,  from  Hegefias, — the  Annicerians,  from  An- 
niccris, — and  the  genuine  Cyrenaicks,  who  were  flridt  followers 
of  Arijlippus,  the  Founder  and  prime  Leader  of  all  the  Four. 
—This  their  partial  Difigreement  ga^re  occafion,  perhaps,  to  the 
Charge,  brought  againft  them  by  Some  Perfons,  as  we  are  in- 
formed by  Bextus,  pag:  372,  —  the  Charge  of  Inconfancy  or 
Inconffejice.  For  the  different  Partys  retaining,  but  for  a  fliort 
time  only,  the  particular  Names  by  which  they  were  diftin- 
guiflied,  foon  became.  All  of  them,  included  in  their  general 
and  original  Name,  Cyrenaicks.  In  all  likelyhood,  they  either 
bid  afide  or  loft  thofe  Names  of  Diftindion,  by  uniting  ia 
the  Defence  of  that  Doilrine,  common  to  them  all,  —  the 
fupreme  Uappinefs  of  enjoying  Pkafure, — againft  thofe  formid- 
able Enemys  of  theirs,  the  Stoicks,  whofe  Sedt  arofe  foon 
after  the  death  of  Plato.  But  however  This  may  have  been, 
'tis  certain  that,  in  a  ftiort  courfe  of  time,  all  the  Cyrenaicks 
were  eafily  abforbed  in  the  wide-fpreading  Sed,  founded  by 
'Epicurus.  For  the  Principles  of  his  Dodrine,  in  Et hicks, 
agreed  entirely  well  with  Theirs :  and  his  amiable  Manners 
attracted  to  him  all  the  Grecian  Youth,  whofe  Genius  led 
them  to  Pbilofophy  i  but  whofe  Love  of  Eafe  deterred  them 
/rom  undergoing   the   rigid  Difcipline  of  feverer  Moralifts ;    or 

Qj3  q  2  whofe 


490         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    ^ 

Protarchus* 
It  is  very  evident. 

Socrates. 
Do  thefe  Perfons  really  feel  Pleafure  5*%  whenever 

they  are  free  from  Pain  ? 

Frotarchus.. 

whofe  humbler  T^houghts,  confined  to  Body  and  the  Corporeal 
World,  afpired  not  to  contemplate  the  nature  of  Mind  and 
Science,  or  to  inveftigate  the  Principles  of  all  Kinds  of  Rea^ 
foning.  —  The  'Epicureans  alfo  were  not  lefs  unfettled  in  their 
Notions  of  Pleafure,  than  the  Cyrenaicks  had  been ;  as  we  ob- 
ferved  in  page  34  of  the  prefent  Dialogue.  But  this  Incon- 
ftancy  never  broke  the  Harmony  of  the  Epicurean  Sedlj  the 
reafons  of  which  probably  were  thefe ;  —  that  from  the  time 
of  its  Beginning,  it  always  had  to  combat  with  the  Sioicks ;—' 
and  that  All,  who  adhered  to  it,  were  Worfhippers  of  the 
fame  Deity, — the  multiform  Deity  o^.  Pleafure, — as  the  fole  Caufe 
(the  Efficient,  Formal,  and  Final  Caufe)  of  all  Good  to  Man. 
Accordingly,  all  the  Epicureans,  without  Diftindlion,  are  by 
Ammonius  and  Simplicius,  in  their  Comments  on  the  Categorys, . 
ftyled  vj-ottxc),  Voluptuarys  (in  Theory) ; — an  Appellation,  very 
properly  given  long  before  by  Cebes,  in  his  PiSlure  of  Human 
Life,  to  all  \.\\^.  Cyrenaicks,  tho  at  that  time  they  were,  divided 
into  Partys. 

307  We  have  ventured  to  fuppofe  an  Error  in  the  Greek  of 
this  Paffage  ;  and  that  we  ought  to  read  ;ya/^acr/r  oZtoi,  inflead 
of  the  printed  words, — ^xlpeiu  olovrocu.  ¥ot  without  fuch  an 
alteration,  Socrates,  in  his  next  Sentence,  (where  thefe  very 
words — x^k^^   olovTOii — appear   again,    and   where   they    are  very 

proper,) 


F  H  I  L  E  B  U  S.    491 

Protarchus. 
So  they  fay. 

Socrates. 

They  muft  imagine  then,  that  they  are  pleafed ;  for 

otherwife  they  would  not  fay  fo, 

Protarchus,- 
They  do,  it  feems,  imagine  it, 

Socrate  s. 
They  have  a  wrong  Opinion  then  of  Pleafure  ;    if  it 
be  true,  that  Pleafure,   and  Freedom  from  Pain,   have 
Each    a   diftind  Nature,    different   from  that  of  the 
Other. 

Protarchus. 
Different  indeed  we  have  concluded  them  to   be. 

Socrates. 
And  are  we  willing  to  abide  by  our  late  Conclufion, 
that  the  Subje6ls,  ftill  under  examination,  are  Three 
diftindt  Things  ?  or  do  we  choofe  to  fay,  that  they 
are  only  Two  ?  do  we  now  fay,  that  Pain  is  Man's 
Evil,  and  that  Deliverance  from  Pain  is  Man's  Good, 
and  is  That  to  which  is  given  the  appellation  of  Plea- 
fure ? 

proper,)  Is    guilty   of  meer  Tautology;    and   his   argumentation' 

proceeds  not  the   lead  Step,    but  halts  during  that  whole  Sen- 
tence. 

%-  Protarchus*. 


492,         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 

How   come  we,    O  Socrates  !    to  propofe   tliis  Point 

to  be  reconlidered  by  us,  now  ?   for  I  do  not  apprehend 

your  Drift. 

Socrates. 

In  fadl,  O  Protarckus !  you  do  not  apprehend,  Who 
.are  the  diredt  Enemys  to  Philebus. 

Protarchu  s. 
Whom  do  you  give  that  Charadler  to  ? 

Socrates. 
Perfons,  who  are  faid  to  have  a  profound  Knowlege 
of  Nature :    and  thefe  Perfons  fay,    that   Pleafures  ^°* 

have  no  reality  at  all. 

Protarchus. 

3°*    Meaning    abfolute    and    pofitive    Pleafures,     independant    of 
Pains. — Wc  have  no  doubt,   but   that  the  Perfons,   here  meant, 
were  Antifthenes  and   fome   of  his  Difciples,      To   this   Opinion 

we    have  been  led   by  the  following   confiderations. In   the 

firfl:  place,  the  Perfons,  fpoken  of,  are  charadlerifed  by  their 
averfion  to  Pleqjiires -,  that  is,  to  Thofe  Pleafures,  which  are 
preceded  naturally  by  Pains;  for  only  Such  anfwer  to  the  De- 
fcription  here  given.  And  indeed  the  Pleafures  of  this  Sort, 
whether  thofe  of  the  Body  and  Soul  jointly,  or  thofe  of  the 
Soul  alone,  are  always  great,  in  proportion  to  the  greafnefs 
of  the  Pains  preceding  them.  As  therefore  vehement  Pains  are 
/elt  by  the  Soul,   when  her  Body  fufifers   in  a  high  degree  any 

fuch 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         493 

uich  Alterations,  as  are  mentioned  before  in  page  401,  &c.  ; — 
proportionably  'vehement  are  the  Pleafures,  which  attend  the 
Deliverance  from  thofe  Pains,  thro  contrary  A-lterations  in- the 
Body.  —  And  as  the  Soul  is  alfo  tormented' hy  her  own  ima- 
ginary Wants  and  immoderate  Defires,  —  the  Removal  of  that 
Torment,  by  a  Supply  of  thofe  Wants,  or  a  Gratification  of 
thofe  Defires,  is  apt  to  affecfl  her  wifh  io- tumultuous  ^  y'oy,  as 
fometimes  to  overwhelm  her  Reaforu — In  the  former  cafe,  thofe- 
extravagant  Pleafures  of  Senfe,  which  fucceed  to  Senfible  PainSy 
tend  to  relax  the  Nerves,  and  to  weaken  the  Vigour  of  the 
JBody.  —  And  in  the  latter  cafe,  extravagant  "Joys,  fucceed- 
ing  to  high  Pajfions  of  the  contrary  Kind,  have  a  tendency  to 
weaken  the  Underftanding,.  and  to  loofen  (as  it  were)  the  Joints 
of  the  whole.  Soul. — When  Both  thefe  cafes  concur,  as  they 
fometimes  do,  all.  Strength  of  the  Mind  is  wont  to  be  dif- 
folved,  the  Power  of  Judgment  totally  to  fail,  and  every  Fa- 
culty of  the  Soul  to  become  engaged  in  the  Purfuit  of  the 
like  Pleafure  and  tiie  like  Joy  for  ever  after.  —  Such  Pleafures 
and  Such  Joys  as  Thefe,  we  prefume  that  Antijlhenes  had  a  view 
to,  in  This  celebrated  Saying  of  His, — jwa^aV  ^aAAoi/  w  »'^rV, 
/  had  rather  have  my  Soul  feized  with  Madnefs,  than  pojfejjed  by 
Pleafure.  The  Severity  of  the  Sentiment,  and  the  Harfhnefs  of 
the  Exprefiion,  are  quite  agreeable  to  the  rigorous,  Difcipline, 
the  rugged  Manners,  and  the  rough  Language  of  the  Cynic 
Seft,  founded  by  Antifbenes :  nor  lefs  exactly  do  they  correr 
fpond   with    what  Socrates  fays,   prefently   after,    of  the   Perfons 

whom   he    is   here  fpeaking  of. The   great  RfpeSl   which   he 

foon    profeffes   for   them,    and    the    high   CharaSler  which   he   is 
about   to  give  them,    in   likening   them   to  Men   itifpired  by  the  ■ 
God  of  Wifdom,    arc   farther  Reafons    for    our  Suppofition.      For 
between  Socrates   and  Antijlhenes    fubfifted    the    Xxwt^i. .  F.riendJloi% 
That  which   is   built  on   the  Similarity  of  Two  Minds,   wholly 

devoted.,. 


494 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


PROTARCHUS. 

What  do   they  mean  ? 

Socrates. 
They  fay,    that    all  thofe  things,    which   Philebus 
and  his  Party  call  Pleafures,  are  but  Deliverances  from 
Pain. 

devoted.  Each  of  them,  to  the  Search  of  T^7-uth,  the  Study  of 
Wifdom,  and  the  Pradlife  of  every  Virtue  neceffary  to  the  Kap' 
pnefs  of  Private  Life,  and  to  the  very  Being  of  Civil  Society. 
Hence  it  was,  that  Antijihenes  recommended  to  his  own  Dif- 
ciplesy  to  become  Followers  and  Hearers  of  Socrates;  ingenu- 
oufly   profefling  himfelf  to  have   been  advanced  in  Wifdom  by 

His   Converfe. Our  lafl  Argument  to   prove,    that  Socrates 

meant,   by  the  Adverfarys  of  Pleafure,  his  great  Friend,  and  the 
peculiar  Difciples    of   this  Friend,    is    the  Defcription   which   he 
gives  of  them,    in  the  Sentence  now  before   us, — that  they  are 
Perfons,  cTwoi  ?\eyo fjLSvoi  to.  tts^I  (pvaii',  fid  to  be  profound  in   the 
Knowlege  of  ISlature.     For,  that  Antijihenes  anfwered  to  this  De- 
fcription,   better    than    any    other  Athenian   contemporary   with 
Socrates,    or   than   any  Foreigner  who  in  that  age   philofophifed 
at  Athens,    mufl   be    acknowleged    by    all    true  Theifts,    if  they 
are  verfed  in  the  Hiftory   of  Philofophy ;   and  if  alfo  they  have 
read  the  only  remaining  Fragment  of  the  Treatife  of  Antijihenes, 
-Trip)  (pvaeooi,    as   it  is   tranflated  by  Cicero    in   his   Firft  Book  de 
Naturd  Deorum,    §.  13, — "  populares  Deos  effe  multos,  jnatura- 
lem    effe   unum,"  —  that  the  Gods  of  the  People  are  many,    the 
God  of  Nature  is  only  One. 

Protakchus. 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         495 

Protarchus. 
Is  it  Your  Advice  then,  O  Socrates !  that  we  fKould 
hearken  to  thefe  Perfons  ?  or  how  otherwife  ? 

SOCRATE  S. 

Not  fo ;  but  to  confider  them  as  a  Kind  of  Di- 
viners, who  divine  not  according  to  any  Rules  of 
Art  ^°' ;    but  from  the  Aufterity  of  a  certain  Genius 

ii^ 

3°9  The  various  Modes  of  Divination,  pradifed  anciently  in 
Greece,  are  rightly  comprehended,  all  of  them,  in  Two  Kinds, 
the  Artifcial  and  the  Enthiijiajiic.  Of  the  Fi?jl  Kind,  were  the 
Infpeftors  of  the  Entrails  of  Beafts  facrificed,  the  Obfervers 
of  the  Flight  of  certain  Birds,  the  Interpreters  of  Dreams, 
and  many  other  Sorts  of  Artiji-Diviners;  All  of  whom  prog- 
nofticated  future  Events,  from  the  Rules  of  their  feveral  Arts, 
taught  them  by  Human  Majlers.  The  Diviners  of  the  Second 
Kind,  ih^  Enthujiafiic,  are  diftinguiflied  into  Two  Sorts  i  ~— into 
Thofe,  who  delivered  the  Oracles  of  the  Gods,  given  in  their 
Temples,  —  and  Thofe,  who  were  infpired  by  fome  God  within 
Them/elves.  Mention  is  made  of  Both  thefe  Sorts  in  the 
apology  of  Socrates,  where  they  are  called,  the  former  Sort 
^^■nafJLtuS'o'i,  the  latter  ^eofjiavTfii.  Socrates  there  likens  to  them 
the  Poets ;  for  that  Thefe  compofe  their  Poems  s  acxp/a,,  not 
from  any  Wifdom,  or  Skill  in  the  Suhjefts  on  which  they  write, 
aAAa  (puVe*  nivi  v.a.\  ei^mricc^ovTei,  but  from  a  Kind  of  'Natural 
Getiius,  aided  by  Enthufafin.  And  he  here  likens  to  thofe  En- 
thufiaflic  Diviners,  efpecially  to  Thofe  of  the  latter  Sort,  An^ 
tijlbenes  and   his  Difciples,    for   much    the   fame   reafon ;    Thefe 

l^^   I'  I'  not 


49^  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

not   having    learnt    their   Doctrine   from   any  Human  Majler   of 
Science.      For,    if  they    had,    they   would    have    been    taught   to 
make    a    more   Sciential  and   accurate   DiJlinSlion    between   Tain 
and    Pleafure :    they    would    have    known    them    Both     to    be 
equally   Senfations,    (if  in   the   Body,)    or   Sentivients,    (if  in    the 
Soul  only,)    but  of  two   contrary  Kinds :    they   would   not   have 
confounded    the  Feeling   of  Pleafure   with    the  Deliverance   from 
(a  meer  Abfence   of)   the  contrary  Feeling,    that  of  Fain :   they 
would  have  placed,  bet'ween  Pain   and  Pleafure,  as  Socrates  had 
done,   an  hifenfibility  to  Either :  They  would  alfo,   like  Socrates, 
have  afligned  the  Caujh   of  thofe  contrary  Feelings ;    and   have 
defcribed    the    Alterations    made  in    the   Body    at    the    time   of 
Each,  and   the  Tendency  of  thofe  Alterations. Now,   to  con- 
firm   the  Judgment  of  Socrates  concerning   the   Cynicks,  —  that 
they  philofophifed  b  ri^vYi,  not  from  Art,   or  zny  Human  Teach- 
ing,— we   are   informed,   in  the  Emperor  Julian's  Sixth  Oration, 
that  the  Cynicks  difowned  Antijlbenes,  Diogenes,  and  every  other 
Man,    as   the   a^^nyos  Firjl  Leader    of    their  Sedl,    or   Founder 
of  their  Difcipline ;    acknowleging  no  Teacher,  befide  the   God 
of  Wifdom  ',     and    affirming,     that   He   it   was,    who    prefcribed 
the  Way  of  Life  peculiar  to  them,    in  this  Symbolical  Precept, 
—^iru^oL-^oLgcL^ov    TO    vo}ji.i<riJ.a.,    "  Efface    the    current    Coin:"  —  by 
which  it  was  fignified,   that  Whoever  would  attain  to  Wifdom, 
mufl    not    conform    his   Notions    to   Fopular    Opivions,    nor   the 
Condudl  of  his  Life   to  Public  Manners,   or  the  Fafiionable  way 
of  Living;    but   fhould  erafe   out    of    his    Mind    all  Impreffions, 
made   by    any  Teaching,    except    the   Teaching   of  That  Oracle 
within   Himfelf,    which    is   Divine.       They   owned  therefore  the 
Divinity  of   the  Delphic  Sentence,  —  fj-Js-i  crexvTov,    "  Know  thy 
Self,"  —  only   becaufe   God,    they    faid,     didtated    to   Them    the 
fame   Precept. But  befides    their  own  difclaiming  of  all  Hu- 
man Injirudlion,    the   learned  Emperor,    (to  whom   we   are   in- 
debted 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        497 

in  them  not  ignoble  ''°,  have  conceived  an  Averfion 
to  the  Power  of  Pleafure  ;   and  deem  Nothing  in  her 

to 

debted  for  this  Piece  of  Information  concerning  their  above- 
mentioned  peculiar  Maxhuy)  taking  upon  bimfelf  the  Office  of 
Advocate  for  them,  cites,  in  Their  Behalf,  tlie  well-known 
Saying  of  Heracliiiis, — TroAvfj^x^rm  vqov  h  S'lS'da-x.H,  *'  Muc/j  Learn- 
ing doth  not  teach  good  Senfe." What  Socrates   meant  farther, 

in  ftyling  them  Prophets  or  Diviners,  may  appear,  from  confi- 
dering  the  confequences  of  what  he  faid  before  in  this  Dia- 
logue,— viz.  "  that  a  Life  of  Infenfibility  to  Pain  and  Pleafure 
is  of  all  Lives  the  mofl:  Godlike:  — for  thence  it  follows, 
that  fuch  a  Life  is  the  Portion  of  thofe  Beings,  whofe  Nature 
is  nearefl:  to  That  of  The  Supream ;  and  that  'twill  alfo 
be  hereafter  the  Portion  of  all  Thofe,  who  may  perhaps,  iu 
time,  arrive  at  a  State  fo  exalted. — The  Cy^/c  Philofophers 
aimed  at  fuch  a  State  of  Life  here  on  Earth.  And  indeed, 
could  a  Man  live  well  and  happily,  independant  on  Domejiic 
and  Civil  Society, — did  not  his  natural  Inftindts  and  Affedions 
ilrongly  incline  him,  and  his  natural  Wants  forcibly  impell 
him,  to  a  Conjugal,  Social,  and  Civil  Life,  —  were  he  not  a 
Political  as  well  as  a  Rational  Animal,  —  and  were  the  Cynical 
Life  a  Life  defigned  by  Nature  for  any  Human  Being,  —  we 
(hould  make  no  Scruple  of  pronouncing  it  the  happiejl  of  all 
Human  Lives.  —  For  a  well-drawn  Sketch  of  it,  we  refer  the 
learned  Reader  to  Maximus  the  Tyrian  his  thirty-Jixth  DiJJerta- 
tion,  as  numbered   by  Dr.  Davis. 

■5'°  Meaning — a  Genius  the  moji  noble. — Concerning  this  Fi' 
gure  of  Speech,  fee  Note  218.  —  It  is  remarkable,  that  Julian 
ufeth   the    fame  Figure,   in    writing  on   the   fame  Subjedt.     For 

R  r  r  2  bis 


498  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

to  be  Solid  ;  but  all  her  attradive  Charms  to  be  meer 
Illufions,  and  not  [true]  Pleafure.  It  is  thus  that  we 
fhould  regard  thefe  Perfons,  efpeeially  if  we  confider 
their  other  harili  Maxims.  You  fhall  in  the  next 
place  hear,  What  Pleafures  feem  to  Me  to  be  True 
Pleafures :  To  that,  from  Both  the  Accounts,  com- 
pared together,  we  may  find  out  the  nature  of  Plea- 
fure, and  form  our  Judgment  of  her  comparative  Va- 
lue. 

Protarchus.. 
Rightly  faid. 

Socrates.. 

Let  us  then  follow  after  them,  as  our  Allies,  where- 
ever  their  Auflerity  fhall  lead  us.  For  I  fuppofe,  they 
would  begin  their  Argument  with  fome  General  Prin- 
ciple,   and   propound  to   us  fome    fuch    Queftion    as 

his  account  of  the  Cynk  Philofophy,  in  his  Sixth  Oration,  is 
ufhered  ia  by  this  general  Charadler  of  it, — ZS'oi  pXoaotpias  eri- 
eauAoTaTO)',  vii  aTijJ.ora.Tov,  aAAa  TOti  y.^a.Tiq'cii  ivafjuKXov, — that 
'tis  none  of  the  meanejl  or  tnoji  ignohle  Species  (or  Seds)  of  Philo" 
fophy,  but  comparable  to  (or  a  Match  for)  the  mofl  excellent.—' 
In  which  Sentence,  the  beautiful  Contrajl  between  the  Two 
Parts  of  it  is  very  fuitable  to  the  florid  Style  of  a  Declama- 
tory Dijfertation ;  as  all  the  Xoyoi  oi  Julian  are;  (Compofitions 
very  fafliionable  in  thofe  days;)  but  like  other  Gorgiafms,  it 
would  much  enervate  the  proper  Style  of  Dialogues,  fuch  as 
Plato's;  the  Energy  of  which  confiils  in  Metaphors,  and  other 
ilrong  Figures  of  Speech^  laconically  expreffed,  and  unexplained 
by  the  Write?. 

This;; 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         499 

This ; — ^Whether,  if  we  had  a  mind  ^"  to  know  the 
Nature  of  any  particular  Quality  of  things,  for  in- 
ftance,  the  nature  of  the  Hard,  whether  or  no  we 
fhould  not  comprehend  it  better,  by  examining  the 
hardeft  things,  than  we  fliould  by  fcrutiniling  a  va- 
rious multitude  of  the  lefs  hard.  Now,  Protarchus  !* 
you  mufl;  make  an  Anfwer  to  thefe  auftere  Perfons,  as 
if  you  were  making  it  to  Me.. 

Protarchus. 

By  all  means :  and  I  make  this  Anfwer  to  them, — 
that  to  examine  fuch  Bodys,  as  exceed  all  others  in, 
Hardnefs,  is  the  better  way. 

SocraYes. 

In  like  manner  then,  if  we  had  a  mind  to  know 
the  nature  of  Pleafure  in  general,   we  are  not  to  con-^ 

3"  In  all  the  Edltians  of  the  Greek,  we  here  read — /SaAw, 
S'flwjwgj',— but  the  Senfe  of  this  PaiTage  will  diredl  us  to  read. 
— /SaAflS-ft'jjjwei'  (one  word) : — and  It  appears  to  have  been  fo  un- 
derftood  by  Ficinus,  Gryneeus,  and  Serraitus,  as  well  as  lately 
by  M.  Grou  j   tho   otherwife   by  Cornarius  and  Bembo.  ■  This 

Obfervation,  with  many  Others  of  like  Kind  in  the  Courfe  of 
our  Notes  to  Flato,  we  offer  to  all  Readers  of  the  Greek 
Original;  but  more  efpecially  to  Thofe,  who  may  oblige  fome 
future  age  with  a  more  accurate  Edition  of  it,  than  has  yet- 
been  given. 

lider 


500        P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S. 

fider  the  multitude   of  little  or  mean  Pleafures,    but 
thofe  only  which  are  called  extream  and  exquillte. 

Protarchus. 

Every  man  would  grant  you  the  truth  of  this  your 
prefent  Argument  ^^\ 

Socrates. 
The  Pleafures  which  are  always  within  our  Reach, 
thofe  which  we  often  call  the  greateft,  do  they  not 
belong  to  the  Body  ? 

Protarchus. 
There  is  no  doubt  of  it. 

Socrates. 

Are  the  [Bodily]  Pleafures,  which  are  produced  in 
thofe  Perfons  who  labour  under  Difeafes,  greater  than 
the  Pleafures  [of  the  fame  Kind]  felt  by  Thofe  who 
are  in  Health  ?  Now  let  us  take  Care  not  to  err,  by 
making  too  precipitate  an  Anfwer. 

Protarchus. 
What  danger  is  there  of  erring  ? 

3'*  In  the  Greek  of  this  Sentence,  all  the  Tranllators,  ex^ 
cept  Serranusy  feem  to  agree  with  Us,  in  reading  TaJra,  and 
not  (as  printed  in  all  the  Editions  of  Plato,)  TauVw. 

6  Socrates. 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S.        501 

Socrates, 

Perhaps  we  might  pronounce  in  favour  of  Thofe 
who  are  in  Health. 

Protarchus. 
Probably  we  fbould. 

Socrates. 

But  What  ?    are  not   thofe  Pleafures  the  moft  ex- 
ceffive,  which  are  preceded  by  the  ftrongeft  Defires  ? 

Protarchus. 
This  cannot  be  denied* 

Socrates. 
The  Afflidled  with  Fevers,  or  with  Difeafes  of  kin 
to  Fevers  ^'^,  are  they  not  more  thirfty  than  other 
Perfons  ?  do  they  not  more  fhake  with  Cold  ?  and  fuf- 
fer  they  not,  in  a  greater  degree,  other  Evils  '^"^  which 
the  Body  is  fubje6t  to  ?  do  they  not  feel  their  Wants 
more  prefling  ?    and  feel   they  not  greater  Pleafures, 

3'3  Meaning,  as  we  prefume.  Such  as  are  attended  ufually 
with  a  Kind  of  Fever, — as  Gouts  and  Rhemuatijht  Putrid  Ma- 
ladys,    and  ObJlruSllons  of  the  Vifcera. 

3'*  Viz.  Inappetencyt  Jndigejiion,  Cojihenefs,  &c. 

when 


502         P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 

when  they  have  thofe  Wants  fupplyed  ^'^  ?   Or  fhall  we 
denj  all  This  to  be  True  ? 

Protarchus. 
Your  reprefentation  of  thofe  cafes  clearly  is  right. 

Socrates. 
Well  then  ;  fhould  we  not  be  clearly  right  in  fay- 
insf,  that  Whoever  would  know  What  Pleafures  are 
the  greateft  ^"^,  muft  not  go  to  the  Healthy,  but  to  the 
Sick,  to  look  for  them  ?  Be  careful  now,  not  to 
imagine  the  Meaning  of  my  Queftion  to  be  this, — 
whether  the  Sick  enjoy  Pleafures  more,  in  Number, 
than  the  Healthy :  but  conlider  me  as  inquiring  into 
high  Degrees  of  Pleafure  ;  and  by  what  Means,  and 
in  what  Subjects,  the  Vehemence  or  Extreme  of  it 
always  is  produced.  For  we  are  to  find  out,  we  fay, 
What  the  Nature  is  of  Pleafure,  and  What  thofe 
Perfons  mean  by  Pleafure,  who  pretend  that  no  fuch 
thing  as  Pleafure  has  any  Being  at  all. 

Protarchus. 
Tolerably  well  do  I  apprehend  your  Argument. 

^'5  In  all  the  Editions  of  the  Greek,  we  here  read  a'-ro- 
-TrXii^Hfjiivuv'   but  certainly  we  ought  to  read  aVo7rA«ea,ue''o'- 

3'^  We  are  to  obferve,  that  the  Philofopher  is  here  fpeak- 
ing  only  of  Pleafures  belonging  to  the  Bot/y :  Pleafures  of  the 
Saul  he  will  examine  afterwards. 

^  Socrates. 


P    H    i    L    E    B    U    S.  503 

Socrates. 
And  poflibly,  O  Protarchus !  you  will  equally  well 
(how  the  Truth  of  it.  For  tell  me ;  in  a  Life  of 
boundlefs  Luxury  fee  you  not  greater  Pleafures,  (I  do 
not  mean  more  in  Number,  but  more  intenfe  and 
vehement,)  than  thofe  in  the  Life  of  Temperance? 
Give  your  Mind  to  the  Queftion  firft,  and  then  an- 
fwer. 

Protarchus. 
I  apprehend  what  you  fay  :  and  the  great  fuperiority 
of  the  Pleafures,  enjoyed  in  a  Luxurious  Life,  I  eafily 
difcern.  For  Sober  and  Temperate  Perfons  are  on 
all  occafions  under  the  Reftraint  of  That  Maxim,  now 
become  a  Proverb,  which  advifes  them  to  avoid  the 
Too  Much   of  Any  thing  ^'^ ;   to  which  Advice  they 

are 

3'7  In  the  Greek — MncTsV  ayxv. — This  moft  excellent  Saying, 
which  recommends  Moderation,  or  due  Meafure,  to  be  obferved 
in  all  things,  is  numbered  among  the  Grecian  Proverbs  by 
Erqftnus  and  by  Schottus.  The  Author  of  it,  according  to 
fome  ancient  Writers,  was  Solo?i;  Others  attribute  the  Origin 
of  it  to  'Thales ',  and  Ar'tjlotle  is  generally  underftood  to  have 
afcribed  it  to  Chilo  :  but  perhaps  Arijlotle,  by  calling  it 
XiAwi'aoi',  as  he  does  in  his  Art  of  Rhetorick,  Lib:  2,  only 
meant,  that  'twas  a  Saying  frequently  in  the  mouth  of  ChUo. 
Indeed  'tis  probable,  that  only  on  the  like  account  the  Ho- 
nour   of   it    was    given    to    Any   of    the    old  Grecian   Sages   in 

S  s  s  par- 


504  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

are  obedient.  But  an  Excefs  of  Pleafure,  even  to 
Madnefs,  polTefling  the  Souls  of  the  Unwife  and  In- 
temperate, as  it  makes  them  frantic,  it  makes  them 
confpicuous,  and  famed  for  being  Men  of  Pleafure. 

Socrates. 

Well  faid.      If  this  then  be  the  cafe,   'tis  evident, 
that    the    greateft    Pleafures,     as  well  as  the  greateft 

particular.  For  the  Antiquity  of  it  feems  to  have  been  much 
earlier  than  the  Age  of-  the  celebrated  Seven.  See  Erafmtis's 
learned  Explication  of  the  ancient  Adages.  And  'tis  reafonable 
to  fuppofe,  that  the  firft  Speeches  of  Philofophy,  in  her  Infant- 
State,  were  fhort  and  fententious,  comprehending,  in  a  very 
few  energetic  Words,  very  deep  or  fublime  or  extenfive  Mean- 
ings. Now  'tis  certain,  that  no  Sentence  can  be  Jhorter,  than 
the  Sentence  now  before  us :  for  it  confifls  only  of  T'luo  Words. 
And  no  Sentiment  can  be  more  comprehenjive,  more  profound, 
or  more  fiiblhney  than  the  Sentiment  conveyed  in  thofe  Two 
Words  :  for  it  not  only  extends  its  regulating  Influence  to  all 
Human  E^nergys  and  ASlions,  —  as  it  fets  the  proper  Bounds  to 
them,  refpedting  the  Rnd  and  Dfign  of  Each, — but  alfo  it  is 
the  Laiv,  obfcrved  by  Nature  in  the  forming  of  all  her  Works: 
it  hath  its  Foundation  therefore  deep  in  the  Nature  of  Things : 
and  it  lifts  up  our  Thoughts  071  high  to  Nature  s  Caufe,  —  to 
the  great  Legijlator  of  the  Univerfe : — all  which  Excellencys  it 
will  be  found  to  have,  when  we  fliall  be  led  to  the  conli- 
deration  of  it  again,  in  the  latter  Part  of  this  moral  and  di- 
vine Dialogue. 

Pains, 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         505 

Pains,  are  produced  in  a  morbid  and  vitious  Difpo- 
lition  of  the  Soul  or  of  the  Body ;  and  not,  when 
they  are  in  their  found  and  right  State. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  fo. 

Socrates. 

Ought  we  not  then  to  inftance  in  fome  of  thefe 
Pleafures,  and  to  conlider  What  Circumftances  at- 
tend them,  on  account  of  which  it  is,  that  they  are 
ftyled  the  Greateft  ? 

Protarchus. 
That  muft  be  done. 

Socrates. 

Coniider  now  What  Circumflance  attends  the  Plea- 
fures, which  are  produced  in  certain  Maladys, 

Protarchus. 
In  what  Maladys  ? 

Socrates. 

In  thofe  of  the  bafe  or  indecent  Kind ;  —  Plea- 
fures, to  which  the  Perfons,  whom  we  termed  Auftere, 
have  an  utter  Averfion. 

S  s  s  2  Protarchus, 


5o6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Protarch  us. 
what  Pleafures  do  you  mean  ? 

Socrates.. 

Thofe  which  are  felt  in  curing  the  Itch  ^'',  for 
inftance,  by  Fri6lion ;  and  in  other  Maladys  of  like 
Kindj    fuch  as  need  no  other  Medicine  ^''. 

Now  the  Senfation,  thence  arifing  in  us,  in  the  name 
of  the  Gods  What  fhall  we  fay  of  it  ?  Pleafure  is  it  ? 
or  fliall  we  term  it  Pain  ? 

3'*  Hippocrates,  in  his  Trcatife  Trg^i  iroiSruv,  accounts  this  Dif- 
order  among  thofe,  which  are  ai'^j)  fjLa,Xhov  »  vii(r>i[jt.a.ra..  And 
Foefiusy  in  his  Note  on  that  Paflage,  cites  the  following  Sen- 
tence ixoxa  Avicenna ; — "  Ifls  cutis  afFediones,  ciim  morbi  non 
ilnt,  fed  cutis  faeditates  potius  &  opprobria,  morbis  tamen 
annumerantur." 

3 '9  This  is  to  be  underftood  of  Cafes,  in  which  thefe  Dif- 
orders  are  meerly  fuperjicial,  and  afFed;  not  any  Parts  of  the 
Body  deeper  than  the  Skin.  Such  Cafes  freq^uently  happened, 
in  the  fine  Climate  of  Greece,  to  Bodys  not  perfedly  free  from 
ill  Humours,  at  the  Spring-time  of  the  Year.  For  then  the 
Humours,  which  had  been  condenfed  and  driven  to  the  Inte- 
rior Parts  by  the  Cold  of  Winter,  are  attenuated  and  rarefied, 
and  tend  toward  the  Surface.  See  Galen  in  Hippocratis  Aphor- 
rifmosi  §.3.  Aph:  20. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S.         507 

Protarchus. 

A   mixt  Sort   of  Senfation,    O  Socrates  !    feerns  to 

arife   from  this  Malady,   partaking  of  both  Pain  and 

Pleafure. 

Socrates. 

It  was  not,  however,  for  the  fake  of  Philebus  5'^, 
that  I  brought  this  laft  Subjedl  into  our  Difcourfe  : 
'twas  becaufe  we  fhould  never  be  able  to  determine  the 
Point  now  before  us  ^^',  unlefs  we  had  taken  a  view  of 
thefe  mixt  Pleafures,  and  of  Others  alfo  which  depend 
on  thefe.  Let  us  proceed  therefore  to  confider  Such 
as  have  an  Affinity  with  them  ^". 

3"  Meaning,  —  it  was  not  for  the  fake  of  confuting  thofe 
Cynicks,  the  Enemys  of  Pleafure  and  of  her  Advocate,  Philebus, — 
Thofe,  who  held  Senfual  Pleafure  to  be  nothing  more  than  a 
Deliverance  from  Pain,  —  that  he  produced  this  Inftance  of  a 
Malady,  in  which  there  is  found  a  Mixture  of  Pain  and  Pleafure. 
See  Page  494. 

3-'  The  Point  of  Inquiry  is  this,  —  whether  all  and  Every 
Sort  of  Pleafure  is  defirable  for  its  own  fake  ;  or  whether  One 
Sort  only; — viz.  the  pure,  and  unmixed  with  Pain.      See  Page 404. 

322  -^g  have  followed  Ficimcs  and  Gryruvus  in  afcribing  this 
laft  Sentence,  —  "  Let  us  proceed  &c", — to  Socrates :  the  next 
Interrogative  Sentence,  —  "  Such  do  you  mean,  &g", — to  Pro- 
tarchus:  and  the  (hort  Anfwer,  following  it,  to.  Socrates:  though 
contrary  to  all  the  Editions  of  the  Greek ;  in  which,  as  well 
as  in  the  reft  of  the  Tranflations,    the  Perfons  of  Socrates  and 


Protarchus   are  interchanged. 


Protarchus. 


5o8         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 

Such  do  you  mean,  as  partake  of  Pleafure  and  Pain 
by  means  of  their  Commixture  ? 

Socrates. 
That  is  my  very  Meaning.  Of  thefe  mixt  Feelings 
then.  Some  belong  to  the  Body  ;  and  in  the  Body 
are  thefe  generated.  Others  are  of  the  Soul  ;  and 
thefe  have  in  the  Soul  their  Reiidence.  We  {hall 
find  alfo  Pleafures  mingled  with  Pains,  where  the 
Soul  and  the  Body  have,  each  of  them,  a  Share.  Now 
thefe  Mixtures  [tho  compofed  of  Contrarys,]  are,  in 
fome  cafes,  termed  only  Pleafures  ;  in  other  cafes, 
only  Pains. 

Protarchus. 
Exprefs  yourfelf  more  fully. 

Socrates. 

When  a  Man,  whether  in  a  found  or  in  a  decaying 
State  of  his  Body,  feels  Two  contrary  Senfations  at 
the  fame  time  ;  as  when,  chilled  with  Cold,  he  is 
warming  himfelf;  or  fometimes,  when  over-heated, 
he  is  cooling  himfelf  ;  with  a  view,  I  fuppofe,  to 
his  enjoying  One  of  thofe  Senfations,  and  to  his  de- 
liverance   from    the    Other :     in   fuch  cafes,    what   is 

called 


P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S.        509 

called    the    Bitter-Sweet  ^^\    thro    the    difficulty   met 
with    in    driving    away    the    Bitter    Part,    caufeth    a 
Struofo-le  within,    and    a    fierce  Meetino;    together    of 
oppofite  Qiialitys    and  Senfations. 

Protarchus. 
It  is  perfedly  true,   what  you  have  now  faid. 

Socrates. 

Are  not  Some  of  thefe  Mixt  Senfations  compofed 
of  Pain  and  Pleafure  in  equal  Proportion  ?  and  in 
Others  is  not  one   of  them  predominant  ? 

5*3  In  the  Greek,— -TO  Aej/o'/^tsroc  ttocow  yXvx.u  ix.ifjilyjj(.ivov. — But, 
if  we  are  right  in  our  Conjedlure,  the  three  latter  words  tt.  y.  ^. 
originally  were  a  Marginal  Glofs,  meant  only  to  explain  the  term 
yXvitu-7ny.^ovt  found  in  the  firft  and  unadulterated  Copys  of  the  Dia- 
logue. For  this  lingle  word — yX\JW7n-x.^ov — was  to  Myouavov,  the 
common  Saying,  to  exprefs  Pleafure  and  Pain  mixed  together,  but 
moft  commonly  was  applyed  to  the  Paffion  oi  Love. — A  Paflage  in 
Plutarch,  Sympojiac:  L.  5,  C.  7,  at  the  fame  time  that  it  proves 
this  Ufe  of  the  Word,  explains  it  exaftly  in  the  fame  manner  as 
it  is  explained  by  our  fuppofed  GlofTographer  ;  and  may  ferve 
therefore  to  fupport  our  conjedlural  Reading  of  the.  Sentence 
in  Plato  now  before  us.  —  In  that  Paffage  of  Plutarch,  Lovers, 
when  they  look  at  the  Objedls  of  their  Paflion,  are  faid  to 
langutjli  y.i^'  yi'S'ovvs  cchynS'dvi  fjisfjuyfjiep^s,  jjV  aJxo)  rATKTniKPON 
ovopf.d.(^iiaiy.  With  a  Pleafure  mingled  with  Pain,  and  termed  by  them- 
Jelves  a  Bitter-Sweet. 

3  Protarchus. 


510  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Without    doubt. 

Socrates. 

Among  Thofe  then,  in  which  there  is  an  Over- 
plus  of  Pain,  I  reckon  That  of  the  Malady  termed 
the  Itch,  and  all  other  Pruriencys  and  Itchings, 
when  nothing  more  than  a  flight  Fri(Stion  or  Motion 
is  applyed  to  them,  fuch  as  only  diffipates  what 
Humours  are  at  the  Surface,  but  reaches  not  the 
Fermentation  and  Turgefcence  of  thofe  Humours 
which  lye  deep  within.  In  this  condition,  the  Dif- 
eafed  often  apply  Heat  ^^"^  to  the  Parts  which  pain 
them,  and  then  the  oppoflte  Extream  ^'"5,  thro  Im- 
patience, and  Uncertainty  which  Way  to  take.  Thus 
they  excite  inexpreflible  Pleafures  firft,  and  then  the 
contrary,  in  the  Interior  Parts,  compared  with  the 
Pains  felt  in  the  Exterior,  which  yet  are  mixed  with 
Pleafures,  according  as  the  Humours  are  driven  out- 
wardly or  inwardly.      For  by  violently  difperflng   the 

^^■^  In  the  Greek, — (pi^ovrei  ft's  ttv^  xvtoc.  By  which  probably 
are    meant    (Farm   Fomentations   by   the  Fire-Side. 

3=5  Meaning  probably  the  -^v^^oAmlcti  or  Immerfwns  In  the 
coldejl  Waters.  —  Concerning  the  cold  Embrocations,  and  cooling 
Unguents,  ufed  in  fuch  cafes  afterwards  by  Themifon  and  the  Me- 
tbodijls,   fee  Ccelius  Aurelian.  de  Morbis  Chron:    L.  4,  C.   i. 

Morbific 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 


5" 


Morbific  Matter  where  it  is  colleded,  and  by  com- 
pelling it  together  from  Places  where  it  lyes  dif- 
perfed,  Pleafures  and  Pains  are  at  once  excited,  and 
arife  by  each   other's  Side  ^'^ 

Prota  rchu  s. 

Mojfl:  true. 

Socrates. 

Now  wherever,  in  any  cafe  of  this  Kind,  a  greater 
quantity  of  PIcafure  is  mingled,  the  fmaller  quantity 
of  Pain  creates  but  a  flight  Uneafinefs,  no  more 
than  what  ferves  to  tickle  :  whilft,  on  the  other 
hand^'%  the  great  Excefs  of  Pleafure,  fpred  through- 
out, convulfeth  the  whole  Frame,  and  fometimes 
caufeth  involuntary  Motions  ;  operating  alfo  every 
Change  of  Colour  in  the  Countenance,  every  Variety 
of  Pofture  in  the  Limbs,  and  every  different  degree 
of  Refpiration  ;  —  and  within  the  Soul  it  energifes  in 
Tranfports,    uttered   madly  in  Exclamations. 

Protarchus. 
Intirely  fo. 

3=^  External  Warmth  relaxes,  attrads,  rarefys,  and  difperfes: 
external  Cold,  on  the  contrary,  conftringes,  repells  to  the  in- 
terior   Parts,    gathers  together,    and   condenfes. 

3^7  In  the  Greek,  as  it  is  printed,  we  read,  —  to  i-aui^i 
v^Qvni.  —  but   we  fhould   choofe   to   read,  —  to  i'  aZ  tw5  >?. 

T  t  t  Socrates. 


512  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

SoCRATE  S. 

Farther  ;  a  Man  in  fuch  a  Condition,  O  my  Friend  ! 
is  apt  to  fay  of  himfelf,  and  Others  are  apt  to  fay 
of  him,  that  he  is  dying,  as  it  were,  thro  Excefs 
of  Pleafure.  From  this  time  for  ever  after,  he  is 
wholly  intent  on  pnrfuing  the  like  Pleafures  ;  and 
the  more  fo,  the  more  he  happens  to  be  intem- 
perate, and  lefs  under  the  government  of  Prudence. 
Thus  he  calls  thefe  Pleafures  the  greateft,  and  ac- 
counts Him  the  happieft  of  Men,  who  fpends  his 
whole  time,  as  far  as  pofiible,  in  the  enjoy  meat  of 
them^ 

Protarchus. 

You  have  defcribed  all  This,  O  Socrates  !  jufl;  as 
it  happens  to  the  Bulk  of  Mankind,  according  to 
their  own   Senfe    and   Opinion.. 

Socrates. 

But  all  This,.  O  Protarchus !  relates  only  to  Such 
Pleafures  mixed  with  Pains,  as  arife  folely  in  the 
Body,  in  its  Superficial  parts  and  Interior  parts  al- 
ternately. And  as  to  thofe  Feelings  of  the  Soul  ^'^^ 
which   meet  with  a  contrary  Condition  of  the  Body, 

3-^  In  the  Greek,  of  this  PafTage,  immediately  after  the  word. 
■\^X^y  ^^  prefume,  that  the  word  oVai',  or  cJs  in  the  fame  fenfe,. 
was  dropt  by  fome  ancient  Tranfcriber. 

^  wheii. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  513 

when  Pleafure  in  the  One  is  mixed  with  Pain  in 
the  Other,  fo  as  that  Both  are  Ingredients  in  One 
Compoiition,  we  fpake  of  Thofe  before  "^''  ;  fuch  as 
a  Deiire  of  Fulnefs,  under  a  Senfe  of  Emptinefs  in 
the  Body  ;  when  Hope  adminifters  Delight,  while 
the  Emptinefs  gives  a  Pain.  We  did  not  indeed  con- 
fider  them  at  that  time,   as  Evidences  of  the  prefent 

Point ;  but  we  now  fay,  that  in  all  thofe  Cafes, 
(and  the  number  of  them  is  infinite,)  where  the 
Condition  of  the  Soul  is  different  from  That  of  the 
Body,    a   Mixture   of   Pain   and  Pleafure   happens  to 

be  produced. 

Protarchus. 

You  are,    I   believe,   perfedlly  in  the  right, 

Socrates. 
Among  the  Mixtures  of  Pain  and  Pleafure,    there 
is  a  Third  Kind  remaining,    yet  unmentioned.  . 

Protarchus. 
What  Kind   is  That? 

Socrates. 
That,    where   fuch  Pleafures  and  Pains  as  we  faid 
arife    frequently  in    the    Soul   herfelf  by  her  Self  ^'% 
are   mixed  together. 

3^9   See  before,  in  Page  439,    and  again  in  Pages  471   and  3. 

T  1 1  2  Protarchus. 


514         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
In  what  Cafes,  fay  we,   are  Thefe  Mixtures  found  ? 

Socrates. 
Anger,    Fear,  and  Defire,  and  Lamentation,  Love, 
Emulation,    and   Envy,    and    all   other   fuch   PafTions 
of  the  Soul  her  felf,  do  you  not  fuppofe  them  to  give 
Pain  and  Uneafinefs  to  the  Soul  ? 

Protarchus» 
I  do. 

SOCRATE  S. 

And  fhall  we  not  find  thefe  very  Paffions  fraught 
with  wondrous  Pleafures  ?  In  the  Paffions  of  Re- 
fentment  and  Anger,  do  we  need  to  be  reminded  of 
what  the  Poet  fays  "',  —  that 

tho  Refentment  raif& 


Cholcr,   like  Smoke^   in  eve?i  the  prudent  Breajl ; 
'The  lufcious  Ho7iey  from  its  waxen  Seat 
Dijlills  7Wt  half  fuch  Sweetnefs.  

And   do  we  not  remember  in  Lamentations  and  Dc- 

33°  That  is,  without  the  concurrence  of  any  Senfation,  plea- 
furable  or  painful,  by  means  of  the  Body.  —  See  before  in 
Pages  409   and  428. 

33>   Homer:,  in  the  Eighteenth  Book  of  his  Illcid,   108,  &c. 

^  fires  J 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  515 

fires,    the  Pleafures  we  have   felt,   mingled   with   the 
Pains   which   thofe  Paflions   produce  ? 

Protarchus. 
'Tis  true  ;    our  Paflions  do  affedl  us  in  the  manner 
You  have  mentioned,    and  no  otherwife. 

Socrates. 

And  have  you  not  obferved,  at  Tragic  Spectacles 
prefented  on  the  Stage,  with  how  much  Pleafure 
the  Spedators   £hed  Tears  ? 

Protarchus. 
I   certainly   have. 

Socrates. 
But  have  you  attended  to  the  Difpofition  of  your 
Soul    at    the  adling    of  a  Comedy  ?     Do   you   know, 
that   there  alfo  we  feel  Pain  mixed  with  Pleafure  ? 

Protarchus. 
I   do  not   perfedly  well  comprehend  That» 

Socrates. 
It   is    not   perfedlly   eafy,    O    Protarchus  !     at   fuch 
a   Time,    to   comprehend  what   mixt  PafTions    poffefs 
the   Soul   in  every  Cafe   of  that  Kind. 

Protarchus 


5i6         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Not  at   all  eafy,    I   believe. 

Socrates. 
However,  let  us  confider  What  our  Feelings  are 
at  that  time ;  and  the  more  attentively,  on  account 
of  their  Obfcurity  ;  that  we  may  be  able  to  dif- 
cover  with  the  greater  eafe,  what  Mixture  there  is 
of  Pain   and    Pleafure   in   other   cafes. 

Protarchus. 
Say  on   then. 

Socrates. 
The  Paflion,    known  by  the   name   of  Envy,   will 
you   fet  it  down  for  a  fort  of  Pain  in  the  Soul,   or 
how  ? 

Protarchus. 
Even  fo. 

Socrates. 

And  yet  the  Man,  who  envys  another,  will  plainly 
appear  to  be  delighted  with  the  Evils  which  befall 
him. 

Protarchus. 

Clearly  fo. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         517 

Socrates. 
Now,    Ignorance  "^  is    an   Evil  ;     and   fo    is  what 
we  term  Want  of  Senfe. 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

From  thefe  PremilTes  you  may  perceive,  what  is 
the   nature  of  Ridicule  and    the  Ridiculous. 

Protarchus. 
You  mufl  tell  me.   What   it  is, 

Socrat  e  s. 

Every  particular  Vice  takes  its  Name  from  fome: 
particular  Bad  Habit  in  the  Soul.  But  total  Vici- 
oufnefs,  the  Habit  of  Wickednefs  in  all  refpeds,  is 
the  dired:  Contrary  of  That  Habit,  which  the  Delphic 
Infcription   advifeth   us    to  acquire, 

Protarchus. 

That  of  knowing  one's  Self  do  you  mean,  O' 
Socrates  ! 

33*  Among  the  various  Readings  of  the  Greek  Word  in  this 
place,  —  viz.  ar/a,  avoicc,.  and  ayroia  —  vve  have  made  no  doubt 
of  giving  the  Preference  to  the  latter,  from  the  authority 
of  FiciNus's  Tranflation  ;  which  is  followed,  herein,  by  all  the 
fubfequent  TranflatorSj   except  Serra/ms,   who   preferred  ama,. 

Socrates-.. 


5i8  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
I   do.       And   the    Contrary   to  this   Advice  of  the 
Oracle  would   be,  —  Not  to   know  one's  Self  in  any 
refpedl   at   all. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  it  would. 

Socrates. 
Try   now   to    divide    this    Ignorance   of  our   Selves 
into   Three   Kinds. 

Protarchus. 
How,    fay  you,    fhould    this    be    done  ?     for  I   am 
not  able  to  do    it. 

SoCR  at  E  S. 

Do   you  fay,   that  I  fhould  make  this  diviiion,   in 
Your    Stead  ? 

Protarchus. 
I  not  only  fay  it,    but  defire  you  fo  to  do. 

Socrates. 

Well  then ;  Whoever  is  ignorant  of  Himfelf,  mufl 
he  not  be  thus  ignorant,  in  one  or  other  of  thefe 
Three  Rcfpedls  ? 

Protarchus. 
What  Three? 

Socrates. 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  519 

Socrates. 
Firft  ;    with  refpedl  to  External  PofTefllons,  in  ima- 
gining himfelf  wealthier  than  he  really  is. 

Protarchus. 

Many  Perfons  there  are,  who  labour  under  this 
Sort  of  Ignorance. 

Socrates. 
Yet  more  numerous  are  They,  in  the  next  place, 
who  imagine  themfelves  handfomer  in  their  Perfons, 
nobler  in  their  Air,  or  graced  with  fome  other  Cor- 
poreal Advantage  in  a  higher  Degree,  than  adually 
they  are. 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

SOC  RATES. 

But  the  Number  is  by  far  the  greateft,  I  prefume, 
of  Such  as  are  miftaken  in  themfelves,  with  refpe(St 
to  the  Third  Kind  of  Excellence,  That  which  be- 
longs to  the  Soul,  by  fancying  themfelves  pofTefTed 
of  more  Virtue  than  in  truth  they  have. 


Nothing   is   more   certain. 


Protarchus.    . 
:ain. 
U  u  u  Socrates 


520 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 


Socrates. 
Among  the  Virtues  and  Excellencys  of  the  Soul, 
is  not  Wifdom  That,  to  which  the  Generality  of 
Mankind  lay  Claim  with  the  greateft  Earneftnefs,  and 
in  regard  to  which  they  are  full  of  Contention, 
Opinionativenefs,   and  falfe  Notions  ? 

Protarchus. 
Evidently  fo, 

Socrates. 
Now  the  Man,  who  ftiould  fay  that  Ignorance  and 
Error,    in   any  of  thefe  refpeds,    were   Evils,   would 
fay  what    is    true. 

Protarchus. 
Very  right. 

Socrates. 
But  we  are  to  make  ftill  another  DiviHon  of  this 
Ignorance  of  a  Man's  Self,  O  Protarchus  !  if  we 
would  difcover  the  odd  Mixture  of  Pain  and  Pleafure 
in  that  mirthful  Envy,  which  is  excited  by  Comedy, 
—  a  Divilion  into  Two  Sorts. 

Protarchus. 

Into  what  Two  Sorts  do  you  mean  ? 

Socrates. 


P  ,H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         521 

Socrates. 

To  thofe  PerfonSj  who  fooliflily  entertain  any  fucli 
falfe  Opinion  of  themfelves,  it  neccfTarily  happens, 
as  it  docs  to  all  Men  in  general,  that  Strength  and 
Power  attend  on  Some  ;  while  the  Fate  of  Others 
is   quite   the   contrary. 

Protarchus. 
It    muft    be    fo. 

Socrates. 

According  to  this  Difference  then  between  them, 
diftinguilh  thofe  ignorant  Perfons  into  Two  Sorts. 
And  all  Thofe,  whofe  Self-Ignorance  is  attended 
with  Weaknefs,  and  with  a  Want  of  Power  to  be 
revenged  on  Such  as  laugh  at  them,  you  may  juftly 
fay,  that  they  are  open  to  Ridicule,  and  may  call 
their  Charaders  properly  Ridiculous.  But  as  to  the 
Others,  who  have  Power  to  take  their  Revenge,  if 
you  fhould  fay,  that  Thefe  are  to  be  dreaded,  as 
being  powerful  and  hoftile,  you  would  give  a  very 
right  account  of  them.  For  fuch  Ignorance,  armed 
with  Power,  is  powerful  to  do  Mifchief ;  and  not  only 
its  Self  is  hoftile  and  hurtful  to  all  Perfons  within 
its  Reach  ;     but  fo  likewife  are  all  its  Images  "^  and 

333    Critias,   in   particular,    is   perhaps  here   alluded    to.      See 
Notes  203  and  205. 

U  u  u  2  Repre- 


522         P    H    I    L    E    B    U  -S. 

Reprefentatives.  But  Self-Ignorance,  without  Strength 
and  Power,  is  to  be  ranked  among  the  Things  which 
are  Ridiculous,  and  is  a  proper  objedl  of  Ridicule. 

Protarchus. 

There  is  much  of  Truth  in  what  you  fay.  But 
I  do  not  as  yet  perceive  clearly,  what  Mixture  there 
is  of  Pain  and  Pleafure  in  our  Feelings  on  fuch 
occafions. 

Socrates. 

You  are  in  the  firft  place  to  apprehend  the  Force 
of  Envy  in    thefe  cafes. 

Protarchus. 
Show  it  me  then. 

Socrates. 
Is  not  Sorrow,    on  fome  Occafions,    felt  unjuflly  ? 
and  is  it  not  the  fame  cafe  with  Joy  and  Pleafure  ? 

Protarchus. 
No  doubt  can  be  made  of  it. 

Socrates. 

There  is  neither  Injuftice,   nor  Envy,  in  rejoicing 
at  the  Evils  which  befall  our  Enemys. 

Protarchus* 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         523 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  there  is   not. 

Socrates. 

But  if  at  any  time,  when  we  fee  an  Evil  happening 
to  our  Friends,  we  feel  no  Sorrow,  —  if  on  the  con- 
trary we  rejoice  at  it,  —  are  we  not  guilty  of  In- 
juftice  ? 

Protarchus. 
Without  Difpute. 

Socrates. 

Did  we  not  fay,  that  'twas  an  Evil  to  any  Perfon, 
to   be  ignorant  of  Himfelf? 

Protarchus. 
We  did,   and  juftly  too. 

Socrates. 
If  there  be  in  any  of  our  Friends  a  falfe  Conceit 
of  their  own  Wifdom,  or  of  their  own  Beauty,  or 
of  whatever  elfe  we  mentioned,  when  we  divided 
Ignorance  of  one's  Self  into  Three  Kinds,  is  not 
this  Conceit  an  Objedl  of  Ridicule,  where  'tis  at- 
tended with  Impotence  and  Weaknefs  j    but  an  Ob- 

jedt 


SM 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


jed;  of  Hatred,  if  Power  and  Strength  "-^  are  joined 
with  it  ?  or  do  we  deny,  what  I  juft  now  faid,  that 
the  having  of  fuch  a  falfe  Opinion,  if  it  be  not 
hurtful    to   Others,    is   an    Objed;   of   Ridicule  ? 

Protarch  us. 
You    faid    what    is    intirely   true. 

Socrates. 

And  do  we  not   acknowlege   this   falfe  Conceit  to 
be   an   Evil,    as   being  built  on   Ignorance  ? 

Protarchus. 
Moft    heartily. 

Socrates. 

Whether  do  we  feel  Delight,  or  Sorrow,  when  we 
laugh  at  it  ? 

Protarchus. 

'Tis  plain,  that  we  feel  Delight. 

Socrates. 
Did    we    not    fay,    that  whenever  we  feel  Delight 
from   the  Evils  which   happen    to   our  Friends,    it  is 
Envy  which  operates  in  us  that  unjuft  Delight  ? 

3^'^  It  is  hoped,  that  no  future  Editor  oi  Plato  will   be  either 

fo  abfurd,    or   fo  carelefs,    as  to  follow  all  the  former  Editors, 

in  printing  jia^   (inftead   of  w  »)   €ppoo[Aii'x,  in   the  Grcf/i  of  this 

PafTage. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S.        525 

Protarchus. 

It  muft  be  Envy. 

Socrates. 

Our  Reafoning  then  fhows,  that,  when  we  laugh 
at  what  is  Ridiculous  in  a  Friend,  mixing  thus  De- 
light with  Envy,  we  mix  together  Pleafure  and  Pain. 
For  we  acknowleged  long  ago,  that  Envy  gives 
Uneafinefs  and  Pain  to  the  Soul  ;  and  we  have  ad- 
mitted, that  Laughing  yields  Delight.  Now  in  thefe 
Cafes  they  arife.  Both  of  them,  at  the  fame  Time. 

Protarchus. 
True. 

Socrates. 

We  fee  then  from  the  Concluiion  of  our  Argu- 
ment, that  in  mournful  Spedacles,  and  no  lefs  in  Co- 
medys  "^,  —  not  only  as  they  are  adted  on  the  Stage, 

but 

355  Every  philofophic  Admirer  of  the  Comedys,  of  old  written 
by  'Terence  and  Flaiitiis,  or  of  Some  in  modern  days,  written 
by  Poets  of  our  own  or  of  the  Frettcb  Nation,  —  if  he  happens 
to  read  this  Dialogue,  and  is  unacquainted  with  the  Hijiory  of 
the  Athenian  T^heatre, — muft  be  furprized  at  the  Severity  of  the 
Cenfure,  palled  on  Comedy  in  this  Part  of  the  Dialogue ; 
where  the  Pleafure,  felt  by  the  Spectators  and  Readers  of  a 
Comedy,  is  attributed  to  E?ivy ;  and  reprefented  as  a  rnaUcious 
Joy,  at  feeing  the  ridiculous  Faults  of  our  Neighbours,  Fellow- 
Citizens,   and  Countrymen,   expofed  to  Public  View.     But  the 

5  Condudt 


526 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 


Ccndu(a:  and  Manners  of  the  Comic  Mufe  at  Athens,  In  the 
time  of  Socrates,  are  a  full  Juftification  of  his  Cenfure.  For 
the  time  was  not  long  before  his  Death,  when  a  Lans}  was 
made  in  that  City, — ^jj  y.to/jf.uS'eTv  ovofJLa.q-\  to.  -tt^oumttx,  that  the 
i/lclors  of  a  Comedy  Jlooidd  perfonate  fione  of  the  Citizens  by  name. 
And  fuch  a  Law  was  neceffary,  becaufe  the  Comic  Poets  were 
ufed  to  gratify  Such  of  the  People,  as  were  envious  and  ma- 
licious, by  prefenting  to  Ridicule,  on  the  Public  Stage,  living 
Charadlers  by  their  naf?ies,  and  even  Some  of  the  greateft  Worth  : 
as  Socrates,  for  inftance,  was  perfonated  by  name  in  the  Clouds, 
a  Comedy  of  AriJ}opha72es,  to  pleafe  Anytus  and  the  reft  of  the 
Cabal,  formed  for  the  deftrudtion  of  that  moft  excellent  Man. 
— About  the  fame  time,  on  the  fame  account,  was  fuppreffed, 
iK\  all  the  Athenian  Comedys,  the  Chorus ;  many  of  whofe  Speeches 
were  abufive,  either  on  particular  Perfons,  or  on  whole  Orders 
of  Men,  Parts  of  the  Commonwealth;  and  whofe  Language 
was  often  very  fcurrilous :  for  this  Chorus  commonly  reprefented 
the  Athenian  Populace  ;  and  it  was  indeed  a  juft  Reprefentative 
or  Lnage  of  the  Sentiments  and  Style  of  that  loweft  Order  of 
tlie  People  in  every  Free  State.  To  this  Rabble  of  a  Chorus 
/ucceeded  the  Comic  7rcc^df2xaii :  in  which  the  Poet  himfelf  in 
Perfon  (or  his  Reprefentative,  the  Spokefman  or  Foreman  of 
the  old  Comic  Chorus,)  Trapi^uivi,  quitting  his  place  at  the 
Back-Part  of  the  Stage,  came  forward  to  the  Front ;  and  after 
addrefllng  the  Audience,  and  courting  their  Favour  to  him 
as  Author  of  the  Drama,  indulged  their  Love  of  Contumely, 
by  vilifying  Foreign  Nations,  or  by  carping  at  the  Beft  Poets 
of  former  Ages.  And  to  fliow  farther,  in  how  fmall  a  degree 
the  Licentioufnefs  of  the  Athenian  Comedy  was  reftraincd  by 
the  Law  abovementioned,  againft  perfonating  on  the  Stage  any 
Citizen  by  name,  we  are  told  by  feveral  ancient  Writers,  that 
fuccefsful   Attempts   frequently  were  made   to    elude  that   Law; 

5  fometimes. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         527 

fometlmes,  by  the  Adlor's  wearing  a  Mafic,  refembling  the  Face 
of  the  Citizen  who  was  meant  to  be  expofed  and  vilified ; 
fometimes,  by  pointed  Allufions  to  certain  Accidents  of  his  Life, 
or  Particulars  in  his  Charader,  well  known  to  the  whole  City ; 
and  fometimes  by  a  fmall  Alteration  of  his  Name,  —  as,  by 
calling  him  'Ajw-t/Via?  Amynias  in  the  Drama,  when  his  real  Name 

was  'Ajot/cias. In  this  State  remained  the  Comic  Miife  at  Athens, 

vmtil  Menander  rofe,    who   taught  her  to    philofophife  :    for   he 
taught  her  to   paint,    in   Moral   Poetry,    the   General  CbaraSfers, 
by  which  All   of  the  Pluman  Race   are   to   be  diftinguiflied  in- 
ternally,   or   according    to   their    Souls    and   Minds,    Some   from 
Others.  —  He  had    learnt  Moral  Pbilofophy,    himfelf,   under   an 
excellent  Mafter,  Tbeophrrjlus :    he  had  learnt  from  His  Ledlures 
the   feveral  Pajjions  of    the  Human   Soul ;     the  Predo7ninance    of 
any  One    of  which    over   the   reft,    in    the  Whole  of  a  Man's 
Life,   is  the  plaineft  of  thofe  Marks  which  charaBerife  the  Man. 
Of  thefe  General  Differences  he   had  learnt   from  Him   the   or- 
dinary CauJ'es ;  —  a    difference   of   Natural  Temper  in    the   Soul, 
arifing   probably  from    a  different  Mixture  of   the  fundamental 
Humours  in   the  Body  ;  —  a  different  Education  ;   or  a  difference  of 
Notions  early  imbibed,    and   of  Habits  early  contraded  ; — a   dif- 
ferent   Way   of  Life  ;    a  difference    of    the   ObjeSls,    engaging   a 
Man's   ferious   Study,    or  continually   prefented   to   his    View; — a 
difference    of  Converfation,     of  Examples  cafually  met  with,  or  of 
Advice   from    Perfons   whofe   Judgment   we  efteem.  —  He  muft 
have  learnt  farther,   (for  Theopbrajlus,  who  taught  him,  had  far- 
ther learnt  from  Ari/lotle,)    how  to  diftinguifh  different  Nations  j 
not,    by  thofe   Marks,    fo   obvious    to   every  Eye  and  Ear,    and 
fo  eafily  counterfeited, — their  Attire  and  La?iguage, — but   by  the 
difference   of  their   National  Manners,    owing   to   the   differences 
of  Climate   and    Soil,    of   Government    and   Laws,    and    of  Public 

Cujloms,  whether  Civil  or  Religious. Menander,  being  thus  pro- 

X  X  X  vided 


5^8 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


vided  with  a  large  Stock  of  Pv'Ioral  and  Political  Knowlege, 
adapted  his  Comedys, — not  to  the  bad  Pqffions  of  fome  Athe- 
nian Citizens,  —  hut  ti)  the  common  S-e/ife  oi  all  Mankind:  — 
fecretly  appealing,  for  the  Truth  of  his  Charadlers,  to  everv^ 
Man's  Experience  of  Human  Nature  in  Himfelf  and  Others, — 
to  every  Man's  Feeling  of  fuch  Sentimejits,  as  are  common  to- 
Perfons  of  his  own  Rank  and  Nation,  his  own  Age,  Temper, 
Way  of  Life,  &c. — and  to  every  Man's  Knoivlege  of  the  Sen- 
timents  of  fuch  Perfons,.  as  differ  from  him  in  any  of  thofe 
Circiunjlances  which  are  common  to  Many. — So  that  the  Perfons 
of  the  Drama,  in  Comedy,  were  no  longer,  vvhat  they  had 
formerly  been,  Caricature-Portraits  of  the  Manners  oi particular 
real  Perfons  ;  but  they  were,  like  the  Characfters  in  an  Epic  Poem, 
Pictures  of  the  Poet's  own  General  Ideas :  for  they  reprefented, 
according  to  the  Beft  of  the  Author's  Knowlege  and  Fancy 
joined  together,  whatever  appeared  to  Him  moft  flriking  in  the 
Moral  Charaders  and  Behaviour  of  the  feveral  Kinds  and  Sorts 
of  Perfons   in    the  various   Stations,    Conditions,    and  Accidents, 

of  Human   Life. Such,    as  we  have  here  delineated,  was  the 

New  Comedy,  introduced  by  Menander,  and  followed  by  all  the 
Greek  Comic  Poets,  his  Contemporarys  and  his  Succeffors.  The 
licentious  and  abufive  Kind  of  Comedy,  in  Vogue  until  the 
making  of  the  Law  above-mentioned,  was  then,  and  for  ever 
after,  flyled  the  Old  Cotnedy :  and  that  Kind,  which  fucceeded  to 
the  Old,  and  obtained  univerfally,  till  Mejiander  had  reformed 
the  Comic  Mufe,  took  the  denomination  of  the  Middle  Comedy. — 
But  fo  powerful  is  the  Force  of  Truth  and  Nature,  and  fo 
amiable  are  Decency  and  Good  Manners,  (efpecially  when  Eniy 
and  Malice  lurk  not  under  that  fair  Covering,)  that,  in  all 
Country s,  to  which  the  Greek  Language  extended,  the  Neiv 
Comedy  met  with  a  much  more  general  Approbation  than  Either 
of  its  Prcdecedors  :  and  perhaps  it  contributed,  more  than  any 
2  other 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


5^9 


other  thing,  (except  That  Part  of  Pbilofophy,  from  which  it 
fprang,)  to  refine  the  Public  Tq/ie,  and  to  civilize  the  Public 
Manners,    wherever  Grecian  Literature   was   held   by  the  Publick 

high  in  their  Eftimation. From  the  fame  Caufes  it  was,   that 

a  i<i,vj  Ages  after,— when  the  Romans,  having  brought  all  Greece 
under  their  Dominion,  received  from  their  Grecian  Captives 
the  Philojophy  and  the  Poetry,  together  with  the  particular 
Sciences,  and  the  reft  of  the  fine  Arts,  of  that  mofl  ingenious 
and  poliflied  Nation, — x\\q  Rotnatt  Poets  prefently  applied  them- 
ifelves  to  imitate,  or  tranflate  into  their  own  Language,  the 
New  Comedy  of  the  Grecians.  Thus  Menander  and  Apollodorus 
were  tranflated,  or  clofely  at  leaft  imitated,  h'^j 'Terence ;  Dipbilus 
and  Philemon,  (Two  other  Greek  Writers  of  the  New  Co- 
medy,) by  Plautus ;  tho  it  muH  be  confefled,  that  Plautus 
for  fome  time  chofe  to  tread  in  the  Steps  of  Epicharmus,  who 
wrote  Greek  Coinedys  before  the  Reformation  of  the  Comic 
Stage.  Nor  was  it  long,  before  this  Reformed  or  New  Kind 
of  Comedy  grew  to  be  the  favourite  Entertainment  of  the  Pa- 
tJ-icians  and  the  Eqiiites  or  Cavaliers,  (that  is,  of  the  Roman 
Nobility  and  Gentry,)  and  of  other  dignified  Citizens:  and  the 
Satyr  of  the  more  ancient  Romans,  with  the  Ribaldry  of  the 
Fefcennine  and  Atellatie  Verfes,  (which,  in  Perfonal  Abufivenefs, 
refembled  the  Old  Comedy  of  the  Grecians,)  by  degrees  became 
antiquated,  and  utterly  difufed.  Some  time  after  this,  the 
Whole  Body  of  ancient  Grecian  and  Graeco-Roman  Literature 
fickencd  and  languiflied,  and  lay  as  it  were  dead  for  many  Ages  : 
the  greateit  Part  of  it,  'tis  to  be  feared,  has  irrecoverably  pe- 
rifhed  :  a  confiderable  Part,  however,  at  length  revived,  and 
rofe  op  into  Light  again.  Among  tliofe  long-loft  Writings, 
which  had  been  happily  preferved  and  were  recovered,  there 
appeared  fome  Comedys  of  Arijlopbanes,  of  Terence,  and  of 
Plautus.      And  here   we   find   a  freOi   Inftance   of  the   truth   of 

X  X  X  2  our 


530         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

but"  as   they   are    prefented    to    us    alfo    in    the   Tra- 
gedy  and   the  Comedy  of  real  Life,    and  in  a  thou- 

fand 

our  obfervatlon,   concerning  the  Preference,   given  by  all  civilzed 
Nations    to    the   Neiv   or    lateft  Kind    of  Gfecmn    Comedy :    for 
the  Caufes  of  that  Preference   have,    ever  fince  the  Revival  of 
ancient    Literature    and    Politenefs,    operated    again    with    their 
former  Force  :   and,  notwithflanding  the  infinite  Wit  of  ^r^o^>6(3:- 
nes,  notwithftanding  the  Mufical  excellence  of  his  Verfes,  and  not- 
withftanding  the  licentious  Difpofition   of  the  lower  Orders  of 
the  People,    and   the   Delight   they  take   in   feeing    their   Supe- 
riours  defamed  or  ridiculed, — yet  we  find,  that  Terence,   and  fo 
much   of  Plautus   as   exhibits   General  CharaElers,    thofe   efpeci- 
ally  of  Perfons    in  the    middle   Stations    of  human    Life,    have 
ever  fince  been  the  Models   of  Comic  Poetry,   and  Patterns   to 
all   fuccefsful  Writers  of  Comedy.     And  hence   it   is,    that  the 
mod  admired  of  our  modern  Comedys,  however  faulty  in  other 
refpefts,    yield    no  Food    for   that   TLnvy  and   Malice,    fo  juftly, 
and  yet  fo  gently,   fatirifed  in   this  Part  of  the  Philebus.     The 
Comic    Mufe   now  performs    her   proper  Office ;    which   is,    to 
exhibit  to   all   People,   of  whatever  Country,   who   are   between 
the  Great   and  the  meer  Rabble   in  Civil   Society,  thofe  habitual 
Faults,     which     are    cominon    to    MaJiy    Perfons    of    nearly   equal 
Condition,  in  their  Behaviour,  Commerce  and  Converfation  with 
each  other,    on   the    ordinary   Occurrences    of    Private    or   Do- 
meftic  Life; — fliowing  every  fuch  Perfon  to  Himfelf,    as   in  a 
clear  Mirrour  placed   in  the  ftrongeft  Light; — painting  in   the 
liveliefl;  Colours  whatever  is  ridiculoufly  wrong  in  his  Charafter 
and   Condu<5t;  —  and    holding   clofe   to   his   Eyes    as   it  were   a 
MagniJ'yiyig  Glafs,  the  more  eafily  to  perceive  his  Faults,   initead 
of  the  Micro/cope,   thro  which  he  had  been  ufed  to  view  them, 

2 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         531 

fand    intermediate    Occurrences,.   Pains    and   Pieafures 
blended   together. 

P  R  O  T  A  R  C  H  U  S . 

'Tvvould  be  impolTible,  O  Socrates !  for  a  Man 
not  to  acknowlege  This,  were  he  ever  To  zealous 
an   Advocate   for   the    oppofite  Side. 

SOCR  A  TE  S. 

When  we  entered  on  the  prefent  Subjedl,  we  pro- 
pofed  to  confider  Anger,  Defire  and  Grief,  Fear  and 
Love,   Jealoufy  and   Envy,    and  fuch  other  Paflions  "^ 

of 

33^  That  is,  —  not  any  Such  Feelings  either  of  Pain  or  of 
Tleafurey  as  belong  to  the  Senjitive  Part  of  the  Soul,  —  or  to 
that  meerly  Pajjive  Power  in  the  Soul,  by  which  flie  feels  what- 
ever immediately  afFeds  her  Body  in  any  important  degree, — 
but  fuch  Agitations  and  Efiiotions,  as  are  peculiar  to  the  Ima- 
ginative Part  of  the  Soul,  —  or  to  that  Power,  (Pajjive  like- 
wife,)  by  which  the  Soul  imagines  tliat  fhe  feels  prejcnt  Good 
or  Evil,  or  remembers  the  Good  or  Evil,  felt  by  her  in  time 
■pajl,   or  pre- conceives  fome  Good   or  Evil,    to   be   felt   by  her  in 

time  to   come. For   imagined  Good  or   TLvil   (Good    or   Evil   in 

Opinion)  is  the  OhjeSi  of  all  thofe  Pajji:ns  of  the  Soul,  which 
are  here  meant  :  —  and  the  Ground  of  them  all  is  that  general 
Love  or  Defire  of  Good,  eflential  to  the  Soul  of  Man.  —  For 
JLove  infers  the  Hate  of  whatever  is  repugnant  or  oppofite  to 
the  Objeifl  of  that  Love  ;  in  like  manner,  as  the  Inclination- 
of  a  byailed  Bowl  to  one  Side  of  the  Green,  in  Bowling,  in- 
fers a  Declination  from  the  Side  oppojite.  And  out  of  thefe 
Two  con-natural  Difpofitions   of  the  Soul,  Love  and  Hate,  arife 

all. 


532         P    H    i    L    E    B    U    S. 

all  Such  of  her  Pqfions,  as  are  abftraded  from  any  Bodily 
Feelings; — fuch  as  Joy,  when  the  loved  Object  is  attained; — 
Grief,  when  it  is  lofl ;  and  Hope,  when  it  is  expeded  ;  Averjion, 
where  the  Objedl  of  Hate  is  prcfent ;  Fcnr,  when  the  Approach 
of  it    is    apprehended  ;     and  Anger  at    x\\t    fuppofed   intentional 

^Caufes   of   its    Prefence   or   Approach. Now    thefe    and    all 

other  fuch  Paffions  of  the  Soul,  —  that  is,  all  Such  as  have 
either  Good  or  £w7  for  their  Objeft, — are  governed  by  Imagi- 
vation  and  a  falfe  Ophiion  of  Good  and  Evil.  For  fmce  the 
Knowlege  of  True  Good,  and  of  its  Contrary,  is  feated  in  the 
JntelkBiial  Part  of  the  Soul,  the  Mind,  where  no  Paffion  finds  an 
entrance,  it  can  neither  be  accompanied  nor  followed  by  any 
'Pajfwn,  E?notion,  or  Agitation  whatever  :  the  only  Attendants 
on  it   are    a   limple  Furjutng  of  the   known   Good,   and   a  fimple 

A"Joidi7ig  of  the  known  Evil. Farther ;    the  adual  K?2oii/ege 

of  true  Good,  as  far  as  the  human  Soul  is  capable  of  a  Know- 
lege fo  divine,  infers  an  adual  Foffeljion  of  it,  proportioned  to 
the  degree  of  that  Knowlege  ;  fo  that  no  room  is  left  for 
Grief:  —  the  Expedation  of  attaining  more  of  this  Good,  by 
continuing  the  Purfuit  of  ir,  is  never  liable  to  Difappointfjient  -, 
and  this  precludes  all  Fear: — a  conflant  Pofleflion  of  the  pre- 
fent,  and  a  continual  Attainment  of  more  and  more  by  eafy 
degrees,  admit  of  no  Emotions  of  Joy:  —  and  the  impoffibility 
of  fuffering  real  Evil  from  any  Perfon,  without  the  Soul's  own 
Confent,  cuts  off  all  occafion  of  Anger. — The  Knowlege  there- 
fore of  true  Good  is  accompanied  with  no  other  Sentiments  or 
Feelings  than  thofe  oi  Fleafure ;  (if  the  Term,  Fleafure,  may 
befit  the  mod  internal,  intelledual,  and  godlike  SatisfaSlion ;) 
in   None   of    them   is    any   Mixture   of  Fain   ever   to    be    fouiid. 

. But  with   the  Fajfions  of  the  Animal-Fart  of  the  Soul  it   is 

quite  otherwife.  For  if  we  confider  the  nature  of  each  Pafiion 
feverally,    after  having   divided   them  All   into  Two  Kinds,   the 

Fkafiwabk 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         533 

of  the  Soul ;  promifing  ourfelves  to  find  in  Them 
thofe  Mixt  Feelings,  which  again  and  again  we  had 
been    fpcaking   of :    Did   we    not  ? 

Protarchus. 
We    did. 

Socrates. 
Do   we  perceive,    that  we  have  difpatched   already 
all  which  relates   to  Grief,   and   Envy,   and  Anger  ? 

Protarchus. 

Pleafurabk  and  their  Contrarys,  the  Painful,  (according  to  thofe 
Inftances   in  each   Kind,    brought   by   the   Poet, 

Love,  Hope,  and  Joy,  fair  Pleafures  fmiling  'Train  -, 
Hate,  Fear,  and  Grief,  the  Family  of  Fain ; 

Pope's  EJfay  on  Man,  Ep.  2d.)' 

we  fhall  perceive,  that  every  Paffion,  of  Either  Kind,  has,  for 
an  infeparable  Companion,  fome  one  of  the  Co7itrary  Kind. 
Thus  Anger  and  Refcntnient,  no  pleafing  inward  Agitations,  are 
always  coupled  with  an  Exidtation,  or  felf-applauding  Elation 
of  the  Imaginativ.e  Soul  : — the  Pain  of  Grief,  at  the  Lofs  of  an 
imagined  Good,  is  always  joined  with  a  pleafing  Remembrance 
of  the  paft  Enjoyment : — the  pleafurabk  Hope  of  obtaining  is  always 
combined  with  a  painfid  Fear  of  Difappointment ;  and  Defre 
is  pleafurabk  in  proportion  to  fuch  a  Hope,  and  at  the  fame 
time  painfid  in  proportion  to  fuch  a  Fear. — Sympathy,  or  Pain 
felt  at  the  feeing  or  hearing  of  Another's  Woe,  is  mixed  with  the 
pleafurabk  Exercife  and  Feeling  oi  facial  AffeSlion  : — and  in  the 
Inflance,    produced  juft   now  by  Socrates,   the  Delight,    felt,  by 

the  J 


534  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
We  perceive  it  clearl}^. 

Socrates. 
But  there  is  much  yet  remaining, 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

Socrates. 

For  What  reafon,  principally,  do  you  fuppofe  it 
was,  that  I  explained  to  you  the  mixt  Feeling,  which 
a  Comedy  occafions  in  us  ?  Do  you  not  conceive, 
that  'twas  to  fhow  my  felf  able  to  explain  to  you,  with 
much    more    eafe  "%    the   like  Mixture  of   Pain  and 

Pleafure 

the  Spedlators  of  the  old  wittily  abufive  Comedy,  was  mixed  with 
the  Fain  either  of  Indignation,  or  of  Pity,  or  with  the  greater 
Fain  of  Envy. 

337  That  any  Pain  is  felt  in  the  Soul,  amidft  the  Merriment 
which  a  laughable  Comedy  excites, — a  Pain,  occafioned  by  the 
very  SubjeSi  of  that  Merriment, — muft  have  feemed  to  Protarchus 
paradoxical,   and   difficult  to  be  conceived,    before   Socrates  had 

unravelled    the  difficulty,    and   explained   the   Paradox. It  is 

probable,  that  the  greater  Part  of  that  multitude  of  Speflators, 
prefent  at  one  of  the  Old  Comedys,  were  iinconfcious  of  any  Envy, 
lurking  within  them  at  the  time.  The  Wit,  with  which  many 
of  thofe  Comedys  abounded,  might  eafily  hinder  Any  man 
who  was  in  a  Humour  only  to  indulge  Mirth,  from  a  ReJieStion, 

that 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  535 

Pleafure  in  Fear,  in  Love,  and  in  the  other  Pailions  ? 
and  that  after  you  had  feen  the  truth  of  it  in  One 
Inftance,  you  might  difcharge  me  from  the  ncccflity 
of  proceeding  to  the  reft,  or  of  lengthening  out  the 
Argument  any  farther ;  but  might  receive  it  for  a 
Truth,  without  limitation  or  exception,  that  the 
Body  w^ithout  the  Soul,  and  the  Soul  without  the 
Body,  and  Both  together  likewife,  are,  in  many  things, 

which 

that  he  was  laughing  at  the  Reprefentathe  of  fome  particular  Perfon, 
to  whom   he   had   not  the  leaft  Envy  or   lU-Will,    but   on  the 

contrary  perhaps  was  a  JVell-wifier  and  a  Friend. As  to  fuch 

Bad  Men,  as  knowingly  and  wilfully  indulge  "Envy  or  Malice  in 
their  Souls,  They  are  fo  intirely  occupied  with  the  Pleafure, 
which  they  receive  from  gratifying  thofe  Selfjh  Pajions,  as  to 
be  wholly  inattentive  to  the  painful  Wounds,  given  to  the  Social 
Part  of  their  nature  by  that  gratification. — For  Efzvy  is  pro- 
duced from  an  Opinion,  that  the  Good,  fuppofed  to  be  enjoyed 
by  the  Perfons  envied,  whatever  it  be.  Power,  Wealth,  Pleafure, 
Fame,  or  Honour,  is  incompatible  with  the  Envier's  own  Good 
of  the  fame  Kind. — Hatred  and  Malice  fpring  from  an  Opinion 
of  Evil,  expeded  to  be  done  to  a  Man's  Self  by  Others  who 
are  the  Objeds  of  thofe  Paflions,  unlefs  they  are  rendered  in- 
capable   of    doing    fuch   Evil,     by    fome    Evil   befallen   Them- 

felves. The  Social  AffeSlions,  on    the  other  hand,   inftindively 

and  fpontaneoufly  prompt  us  to  rejoyce  at  the  Good,  and  to  be 
forry  for  the  Evils,  which  happen  to  Any  of  our  Kind,  efpe- 
cially  to  Such  as  are  conneded  with  us,  either  by  Confan- 
guinity,  or  by  Domeftic,  Civil,  or  Fcederal  Tyes,  or  by  the 
more   indiflbluble   Bands  of  true  Friendlhip  ; — and   to   be  thus 

Y  y  y  alfeded 


536  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

which  affedl  them  feverally  or  jointly,  full  of  a  Senfe 
of  Pleafures  mingled  with  Pains.  Say  then,  whether 
you  will  difmifs  me,  or  make  it  Midnight  before  we 
finifh.  But  I  imagine,  that,  after  I  fhall  have  added 
a  few  things  more,  I  fhall  obtain  from  you  my  dif- 
miflion  :  for  I  fhall  be  ready  to  give  you  an  ac- 
count of  all  thefe  things  at  larg;e  to  morrow  ;  but 
at  prefent  am  delirous  of  proceeding  to  what  re- 
mains on  this  Subject  ;  that  we  may  come  to  a  De- 
ciiion  of  the  Point  in  Controverfy,  as  Philebus  hath 
injoined    us. 

Protarchus. 

affeded  with  Joy  or  Grief,  abftraded  from  the  confideration  of 
any  Good  or  Evil,  which  haply  may  refult  to  our  Particular 
Selves  from  what  has  befallen  thofe  Others. — Hence  it  is,  that, 
where  the  SelJiJJj  PaJJions  predominate  in  the  Soul,  thro  the 
Weaknefs  of  the  Social  AffeBions,  there  Envy  and  Malice  ufually 
are  found,  either  profefled  or  latent  :  —  that,  where  the  Social 
jiffe5lio7is  are  felt  ftrongly,  tho  the  Soul  fliould  happen  not 
to  have  the  Knowlege  of  True  Good,  there  the  Seljijh  PaJJions, 
the  Seeds  of  Envy  and  of  Malice,  are  eafily  kept  under,  and 
yield  to  the  Didlates  of  the  Social  AffeSiions,  even  to  Thofe 
of  a  Kind  naturally  cooler  and  weaker  than  the  reft, — Common 
Humanity,  and  a  general  Benevolence,  implanted  in  the  Human 
Nature  : — but  that  the  Grounds  of  Malice  and  of  Envy  are  quite 
dejlroycd  in  fuch  happy  Souls  only,  as  have  attained  in  fome 
degree  to  know,  and  in  fome  mcafure  to  enjoy,  Good  compleat, 
Jtijicient  for  Happinefs,  Jlable  znd  pe)'?nanent :  for  only  Thefc 
know,    that  None  can   deprive   them   of  any  Subftantial  Good: 

their 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        537 

Protarchus. 

You  have  well  fpoken,  O  Socrates  !  and  as  to 
what  remains,  go  thro  with  it  in  whatever  way  is 
agreeable   to  your   Self. 

Socrates. 
Well   then  ;     after   the   Mixt  Pleafures,    we   are   to 
proceed,    by  a  Kind  of  natural  neceffity,    to   the  fe- 
veral  Pleafures   which   are   unmixt  and   pure  "^ 

Protarchus. 

their  Social  AffeElions  therefore  have  free  Scope,  and  large  Room 
to  operate ;  and  their  natural  Inclination  to  Private  Good  in- 
terferes  not  with   the  Good  of  any  other  Perfon. 

35^  To  tranflate  literally,  we  fliould  here  ufe  thefe  Tivo  Ex- 
preflions, — According  to  Nature,  and  by  fome  Kind  of  NeceJ/ity, — 
For  in  the  Greek  they  are  divided  and  diJlinB. — But  we  prefume, 
that,  in  uniting  them,  we  have  not  deviated  from  our  Author's 
Meaning ;  which,  as  we  apprehend,  is  This  j  —  that,  for  the 
Mixt  Pleafures  to  precede,  and  for  the  Pure  Pleafures  to  come 
after  them,  is  agreeable  to  the  Order,   eftabliflied  by  Nature,  on 

the  Bafis  of  Corporeal  NeceJJity. For  the  Pleafures,   which  are 

mixed  with  Pains,  are  thofe  of  the  Tafe  and  of  the  Touc/j. 
Now  thefe,  according  to  Nature,  -  are  preceded  by  fuch  Bodily 
Wants,  as  create  an  Appetite  for  the  Enjoyment  of  them  :  and 
after  the  Enjoyment  is  pafl,  they  are  apt  to  leave  a  Sting  be- 
hind them,  in  Souls  not  othcrwife  employed,  creating  a  new 
imaginary  Appetite, — a  Defre  of  enjoing  the  like  again,  without 
waiting  for   the  Calls  of  Nature. — Appetites  and  Delires,  while 

Y  y  y  2  they 


538  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
Perfedlly    well    faid. 

Socrates. 
The  nature  of  Thefe  I  fliall  endeavour  to  explain 
to  you,  by  converting  to  my  own  Ufe,  with  a  little 
Alteration,  what  is  faid  of  them  by  Others.  For  I 
do  not  intirely  give  Credit  to  thofe  Perfons  who  tell 
us,  that  All  Pleafure  conlifts  in  a  Ceffation  from 
Uneafinefs  and  Pain  J'^.  But,  as  I  faid  before,  I 
make  Ufe  of  thefe  Perfons  as  WitnefTes  ^'^°,  in  con- 
firmation  of  This  truth, — that  fome  things  there  are, 
which  feem  to  be  Pleafures,  but  by  no  means  are  fo 
in  reality  ^*'  j     and  of  This   alfo,  —  that   fome   other 

Pleafures 

they  remain  unfatisfied,  raife  fuch  Fajfions  and  Commotions  in  the 
Soul,  as  either  blunt  her  ReliJJ:)  for  the  Fure  Pleafures,  or  at 
leaft  dijlurb  her   whilft  Ihe  is  enjoying  them. 

339  According  to  Their  Dodlrine,  all  Pleafures  would  be  equally 
puret  and  unmixed  with  Pain,  contrary  to  the  Dodrine  of 
Socrates. 

3*°  Our  Tranflation  of  this  PafTage  fuppofes,  that  the  word 
fjid^Tvaiy  in  the  Greek,  is  no  erroneous  Reading.  It  muft  how- 
ever be  acknowleged,  that  fjcccvrea-t  is  the  word,  ufed  before,  in 
the  Sentence  to  which  Socrates  here  refers,  and  where,  in  tranf- 
lating  it,   we  have   ufed   the    word  Diviners. 

34'  Por  Pleafure  is  not  Indolence,  Rejl,  or  Eafe ;  but  a  real 
and  a£lual  Feeling, — the  Reverfe  oi  Pain. — Thofe  meerly  feeming 

Pleafures 
2 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         539 

Pleafures  there  are,  many  and  great  in  Imagination, 
accompanied  with  Pains,  but,  at  the  fame  time,  with 
Relief  ^*^  from  Greater  Pains,  amid  the  Diftreffcs  ^*^ 
of  the  Body  and  of  the  Soul. 

Protarchus. 

But  What  Pleafures  are  thofe,  O  Socrates !  which 
a  Man  would  deem  rightly  of,  in  fuppofing  them  to 
be  True  ? 

SOCRATE  s. 

The  Pleafures,  which  are  produced  in  us  from  feeing 
beauteous  Colours  and  beauteous  Figures  ;  many 
Pleafures  alfo  of  the  Smell,  and  many  Others  arifing 
in  us  from  the  hearing  of  Sounds ,  in  a  word,  what- 
ever Pleafures  we  feel  from  perceiving  the  Prefence 
of  any  thing,  whofe  Abfence  we  are  infenfible  of, 
or  at  leaft  occafions  no  Pain  in  us,  all  Thefe  are 
unmixt  and  pure. 

Pleafures  are  therefore.   In  Page  479,   cdMtd  falfe  Pleafures,  and 
the  moft  remote  from  truth  or  reality. 

3+*  In  which  Relief  confifled   the   Pleafure  its  Self,    according 
to  thofe  Cynicks. 

343    In   the  Greek,    aLiro^iaa.      See   before  in   Page  510. 

Protarchus. 


540         P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
How  do  you  explain   this  general  account,   O  So- 
crates ! 

Socrates. 

The  Meaning  of  it  indeed  is  not  diredly  obvi- 
ous :  but  we  mufl:  endeavour  to  make  it  evident.  I 
mean  then,  by  beauteous  Figures,  not,  as  moft  men 
would  fuppofe  I  meant,  the  Beauty  of  living  Forms, 
or  their  Statues  ;  but  the  Strait  and  the  Round, 
whether  in  Surfaces  ^+%  or  in  Solids  ^"^^  ;  according 
to  which  are  fafhioned  the  Turner's  Works,  and 
thofe  of  the  Carpenter  by  means  of  his  Rules  and 
Angles.  For  the  Figures  which  I  mean,  if  You  ap- 
prehend me,  have  no  Relative  Beauty,  like  thofe 
other  beauteous  Forms  ''^^ ;  but  in  their  own  nature, 
feparately  conlidered,   are  always  abfolutely  Beautiful  j 

3'^+  That  is,  —  ReSiilJ?iear  Plane  Figures,  —  fuch   as  Triangles, 
ReSlangles,   and  Circles. 

3*^5  Such  as  Pyramids  and  Cubes,  Spheres,   Cylinders  and  Cones. 

3+^  Tlie  Parts  of  every  Mathematical  Simple  Figure,  whether 
it  be  right-Hned  or  circular,  are,  all  of  them,  fimilar  and  commen- 
furable.  —  The  Beauty  of  Figure,  in  all  Aniinals,  on  the  con- 
trary, arifes  from  the  Proportions  of  dijfimilar  Parts,  meafured, 
not  by  any  Common  Mcafure,  but  by  the  refpeciive  Ends  and  Ufes, 
for  which    they  were   fcverally   defigned   by  Nature. 

and 


P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S.        541 

and  the  beholding  of  them  gives  us  certain  peculiar 
Pleafures,  not  at  all  limilar  to  the  Pleafures  excited 
in  us  by  any  Kind  of  Motion.  And  as  to  Colours, 
I  mean  Such  as  bear  the  like  Stamp  of  Abfolute 
Beauty  '*%  and  yield  alfo  Pleafures  ol  a  peculiar  na- 
ture.      But  do  we  apprehend  thefe  things  ?    or  What 

fay  we   to   them  ? 

Protarchus. 

I  endeavour,  O  Socrates !  to  comprehend  your  full 
Meaning :  but  endeavour  You,  your  Self,  to  explain 
thorowly  the    whole   of   it. 

Socrates. 
As  to  Sounds,    I  mean  Such  as  are  fmooth,    clear 
and  canorous,    conveying  fome   pure  and  fimple  Me- 
lody '"^^j  without  relation  to  any  other  Sounds  ^'^%    but 

fmgly 

3*7  Such  as  the  beautiful  Colours  of  many  F lowers ;  or  as 
thofe  of  a  clear  Morning  or  Evening-Sky :  not  fuch  as  the  Co- 
lour of  a  Complexion, — the  TinSiure  of  a  Skin,  —  in  the  Human 
Species, — a  Colour  belonging  only  to  that  Species,  and  relatively 
agreeable,  as  it  indicates  Health  of  Body,  and  a  Purity  of  the 
Blood  and  Humours. 

5'!-^  Such  is  That  of  many  Species  of  Birds,  whofe  WhiJlUng 
is  all  Monotonous.  Such  alfo  is  That  of  the  JEolian  Harp,  on 
which  the  Vibrations   are  made   folely  by  the  Air  in  Motion. 

3+9  Exclufive  therefore  of  all  Harmonizing  Sounds.  — For  the 
Eflence   of  even    the   fimpleft;   Harmony  confifls    in    an   Interval 

o£ 


54^  P    H     I     L    E    B    U    S. 

of  Confonance  between  Two  Mufical  Sounds  j  —  that  is,  in  the 
Mufical  Relation  between  the  Two ; — whether  One  of  them  be 
fubfequent  immediately  to  the  Other  ;  or  Both  be  produced 
together  from  different  Parts  of  one  and  the  fame  Stringed  In- 
llrument ;  or  Both  iffue  at  07ice  from  different  Voices  or  In- 
ftruments,  as  in  a  Concert.  —  The  Jingle  Mufical  Sounds,  here 
fpoken  of  by  Socrates,  are  merely  Objeds  of  the  Outicard  Senfe 
o^  Hearing :  but  the  Harmony  of  Mulical  Sounds,  harmonifing 
together,  is  an  Objedl  only  of  the  Mind;  and  gives  Delight 
only  to  that  Superior  Part  of  the  Human  Soul.  As  much 
therefore  as  Mind  is  more  excellent  than  Outward  Senfe,  in  the 
fame  degree  are  Mental  and  Rational  Delights  more  excellent  in 
themfelves,  and  more  valuable  to  all  Intelligent  and  Rational 
(tho  Sentient)  Beings,  than  any  Fleafurable  Senfations. — Indeed, 
the  difference  is  fo  great  between  thofe  Delights  and  thefe 
Senfations,  that,  tho  in  fome  Modern  Writings  we  read  of  In- 
telleSlual  and  of  Moral  Pleafures,  —  of  the  Pleafures  of  the  Un- 
derjlandi?tgy  the  Pleafures  of  Reafon,  and  the  Pleafures  of  Virtue^ 
—and  tho  Arijlippus  introduced  the  like  Phrafes  into  the  con- 
verfation  of  thofe  Young  Gentlemen,  who  philofophifed  at  Athens 
in  the  time  of  Socrates, — yet  Socrates  Himfelf,  and  all  the  other  An- 
cient Philofophers,  to  the  beft  of  our  Knowlege,  except  the  Cy- 
renaicks  and  the  Epicureans,  ufually  meant,  by  the  term  Pkafuret 
Pleafure  of  Senfe,  or  Pleafure  of  Imagination  ;  and  the  Vulgar,  we 
believe,  in  all  Ages,  fignify  by  it  always  one  or  other  of  thefe  Two 
Meanings. — To  this  General  Obfervation  we  are  to  add,  with 
regard  to  the  particular  Paffage  now  before  us,  that  the  difference 
between  Harmony  and  the  fweeteft  Single  Sounds  will,  from  the 
Concluflve  Part  of  this  Dialogue,  appear  to  be  fo  great,  that, 
in  the  Order  of  Goods,  there  eftabliflied,  the  Enjoyment  of  any 
Kind  of  Harmony  is  placed  as  near  to  the  Highejl  or  Chief  Good, 

as 


PHILEBUS. 


543 


fingly  of  Themfelves  Mufical :     of  Such  I  fpeak,  and 
of  the  con-natural  Pleafures  which  attend  them. 

Protarchus. 

That    Such  Pleafures  alfo  there  are,    I  readily  ac- 
knowlege. 

Socrates. 

The  Pleafures,    felt  by  us  from  certain  Odours  ^^\ 

as  the  Pka/ure,  received  from  any  Single  Sounds,  apppoaches  to 
the  Goods  of  Lowejl  Rank. 

35°  Not  any  Odours,  the  Pleafure  of  which  hath  refped:  only 
to   the  Caufes   they  proceed  from,   the  Odour-emitting  Bodys, 
and  confifts  wholly  in  the  profpedt  of  enjoying  Senfual  Pleafure 
of  a  grofler  Kind ;  —  fuch   are   thofe   Odours,    by  which  every 
Animal  difcerns    its  natural   and  proper  Food ;  —  fuch   alfo  are 
thofe,  which  are  connedled  by  a  Man's  Imagination  with  Pleafure 
of   the    Palate,    which    awaken    a   dormant  Appetite,    tempt   a 
luxurious  one,   or  create  a  preternatural  one: — for  Odours  of 
the  former   fort,  to  give  Pleafure,   muft  be  preceded  by  a  pro- 
portionate Pain  of  Hunger  j    and    thofe   of  the  latter  Sorts  are 
followed    either    by  the  Pain   of  unfatisfied    Delire,    or  lead  to 
the   many  Paifis   which  attend   Luxury  and   Indigeilion.  —  The 
only  Odours,   meant  in  this  Paffage,  are  fuch  as  we  receive  from 
the  Fragrancy  of  many  Flowers,  Herbs,   and    Shrubs :    for  the 
Pleafure,   given  us  by  Thefe,  is  confned  to  the  Senfe  of  Smelling ; 
and,  if  the  Nerves,  the  Organs  of  all  Senfation,  are  in  a  found 
"State,  the  Pleafure  is  attended  with   no  Pain  or  Mifchief. 

Z  z  z  are 


544         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

are  indeed  of  a  Kind  lefs  divine  ''^'  than  the  Plea- 
fures  juft  now  mentioned  ;    but    in   refped:    of  their 

being, 

35 «  Pure  Pkafures  of  the  Smell  arc  here  faid  to  be  lefs  divine, 
than  Pleafures  of  the  Sight,  or  thofe  of  the  Hearing;  and  the 
Truth  of  this  Sentence  may  be  evinced  from  Two  Argu- 
u^ents  : — One  of  Them  is  This  j  that  the  Organ  of  the  Senfe 
of  Smelling  prefents  us  with  nothing  better  than  Pleafurable 
Senfations  ',  while  the  Organs  of  the  Sight  and  Hearing  not  only 
prefent  the  Senjitive  Soul  with  Jimple  Figures,  Colours,  and  Sounds  -y 
but  thro  thefe  Organs  are  perceived  alfo  fuch  complex  Figures* 
fuch  conjunSlions  or  juxta-pofitions  of  different  Colours,  and  fuch 
combinations  or  fequences  of  different  Sounds,  as  excite  in  the 
Rational  Soul,  or  Mind,  her  firfl  imperfedl  Ideas  of  things  fo 
divine,  as  Symmetry,  Order  and  Proportion,  Harmony  and  Beauty, 
——Our  other  Argument  for  the  fo  much  higher  Charafter, 
here  given  to  the  Senfes  of  Sight  and  Hearing,  is  derived  from 
the  following  ancient  Dodlrines  in  Natural  Philofophy  :  —  that 
the  SubjeSl- Matter  of  Colour,  which  is  the  general  Ohje&  of 
the  Senfe  of  Seeing,  (for  the  Figures  of  all  Bodys  are  exhi- 
bited by  Colour,)  is  (according  to  the  hypothcfis  of  a  Fifth- 
Elementary  or  Simple  Body)  Light  in  E?2ergy  -,  whether  it  be 
reJleSled  from  diverfly  opaque  Bodys,  or  6.\vtxi[y  refraSledin  paffing 
thro  different  tranfparent  Bodys,  or  whether  it  be  diverfly  co- 
loured by  Effluvia  from  Bodys,  where  the  Four  Elements  are 
diverfly  mixed,  and  where  the  Quantitys  of  thofe  Elements 
are  in  different  Proportions  : — that  the  SubjeSl- Matter  of  Sound, 
which  is  the  general  ObjeSi  o(  the  Scnk  o(  Hearing,  is  ^ir  in  Mo- 
tion: — that  the  SubjeSi- Matters  of  all  Odour,  which  is  the  general 
Object  of  the  Senfe  of  Smelling,  are  fubtle  Effluvia,  (termed  by  the 
Cbymifts  volatile  Oyls  or  Sulphurs,)  from  thofe  Bodys,  in  whofe 
3  compofition 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


545 


compofition  Fire  is  the  Principal  Ingredient,  but  is  mixed  with 
the  fineil  Particles  of  a  Moijiened  Earth :  —  that  the  SubjeEl- 
Matters  of  all  Flavour,  which  is  the  general  Object  of  the  Senfc 
of  Tajie,  are  thofe  grofler  Juices,  (termed  by  the  Chymifls 
Jixed  Oyls  or  Sulphurs,)  in  which  the  Aqueous  Particles  predo- 
minate over  the  Igtteous  and  the  Earthy : — and  that  the  SubjeSl- 
Matters  of  all  Solidity,  which  is  the  general  Obje^  of  the  Feeling 
or  Senfe  of  Touch,  are  only  the  Earthy  Parts  of  Compound- 
Bodys ;  for  that  none  Other  refift  the  Touch: — that,  in  this 
way  and  manner,  the  Five  outward  Sejifes  of  the  Soul  correfpond 
with  the  Five  Elements  of  outward  Nature  : — that  accordingly, 
in  the  Firfl  place,  (to  begin  with  the  grofleft  of  thofe  Senfes, 
and  the  loweft  of  thofe  Elements,)  when  the  Earthy  Part  of 
the  Body  communicates  with  the  Element  of  Earth  abroad,  either 
by  ContaB,  or  by  a  large  Admittajice  within  of  Earthy  Particles 
from  without,  the  Soul  perceives  the  communication  by  her 
Senfe  of  Touch  externally,  or  of  internal  Feeling ;  the  nervous 
Organs  of  this  Senfe  being  difpred  thro  every  Membranous  Part 
of  the  Body,  as  well  as  throughout  the  Sh'n,  that  Covering  of 
the  Whole:  —  Secondly;  when  the  Juices,  or  Humid  Parts,  of 
any  Extraneous  Bodys,  received  into  the  Mouth,  mix  with  the 
Saliva,  which  is  engendered  in  the  Blood,  and  thence  by  the 
Salival  Glands  continually  flows  into  the  Mouth,  the  Soul  per- 
ceives thofe  foreign  Juices  by  means  of  the  Organs  of  Tajle, 
the  Gujlatory  Nerves,  there  feated  :— Thirdly  j  when  the  Igneous 
Particles,  which  are  fecreted  from  the  Blood,  by  the  Glandular 
Veflels  of  the  Brain,  and  thence  rapidly  fly  thro  the  Nerves, 
meet  with  any  invifible  Igneous  Effluvia  from  Extraneous  Bodys, 
ftriking  the  Membranes  of  the  Nofe,  where  the  OlfaBoty  Nerves, 
the  Organs  of  the  SmelJ,  are  feated,  the  Soul  perceiveth  thofe 
foreign  Effluvia  by  means  of  thefe  Organs  : — Fourthly ;  when 
the  External  Air  in  Motion,   (Such  a  Motion  as  produces  Sound,) 

Z  z  z  z  ftriking 


546  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

being  equally  pure,    and   not,     of    neceflity,    mixed 
with  Pains,    I  rank  them  All  under  the  fame  head.. 

ftriking  againft   the  Auditory  Nerves  of  the  Ear,    communicates 
with  the  Aerial  Part  of  the  Nervous  Fluid,    the  Soul  perceives- 
the  communication   of  the    Sound,    by  means    of  thofe  Organs 
of  the  Hearing: — and  Laftly;    when  Light  from  without,  fall- 
ing   on    the  Eye,    that    tender  Organ   of   the    Senfe    of  Seeing^, 
communicates    with   Particles    of   the    fame  Element    there   re- 
fiding,  the  Sentient  Soul  adlually  then  feels  the  exiftence  of  that 
fineft  of  all  Bodys,   Light ;    and   perceives  whatever   Co/our   the 
Light,  fo  communicated,    is   tinged  with,    and  whatever  Figure 
it   exhibits.  —  To    thefe   Dodrines   we   are  to  add,    that  Light 
alone  anciently  was   deemed   to  be  the  immediate  Seat  of  every 
Particular  Mind;  —  Fire   and  Air,    to  be   the   only  immediate 
Seats    of  Soul  —  and   thus  Earth  and  Water,   to  be  farther  re- 
moved from   Life  and    Senfe,    and    farther    ftill    from    what    is 
incorporeal,   eternal  and  divine.  —  Now,   the  Elementary  Fire  be 
finer  than  the  Element  of  Air,   and  more  nearly  allyed  to  Light, 
(as    appears   not   only  from    the    greater   Velocity  of  its  Motion, 
but  alfo  from    its    being   luminous,   till   it   be    overpowered    and 
fupprefled   by  Air,^ — ^and  the  it  be  the  principal   Ingredient  ia 
all  odoriferous  Effluvia,  —  yet,    fmce    in    thefe   it   is   mixed    and 
clogged  with  Aqueous  and  Earthy  Particles,   it  becomes  lefs  fine 
than  Elementary  Air,   the  pure  Vehicle  of  Sound,   not  deadened 
by  Particles  of  the   grofler  Elements. From  thefe  Two  Ar- 
guments,  taken   together,   we  may  conclude  juftly,   that  the  Ob- 
jeBs  of  the  Sight  and  Hearing,  and  thefe  Senfes  alfo  themfelves, 
have  a  much  nearer  Affinity  to  Mind,   than  any  other  Outward 
Senfe  or    the    ObjeSi  of  it ;    and   therefore  that   the  Pleafures  of 
thofe  fnejl  Senfes,    are   the  neareft,   of  any  Senfibk  Pleafures,   ta 
the  godlike  Enjoyments  and  Delights  of  Mind^ 

For 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  547 

For  in  whatever  Pleafures  there  happens  to  be  found 
this  Quality  of  intire  Freedom  from  Pain,  all  thefe 
I  oppofe  to  thofe  other  Pleafures,  with  which  Pain  js 
complicated.  Now,  if  you  obferve,  we  ha.ve  already 
fpoken   of  Two    different   Kinds  of  Pleafure 


35» 


Protarchus. 
I  do   obferve   it* 

Socrates^ 

To  thefe  let  us  now  add  the  Pleafures,  taken  in 
the    Mathematical    Sciences  "^  j     unlefs    we    are    of 

Opinion, 

35*  Both  thefe  Kinds  of  Pleafure  are  Senfual;  that  is,  they 
are  Pleafures  either  of  Senfation  immediately  prefent,,  or  of  Lna- 
gination  and  Memory  derived  from  Senfattons  paji^  For  Senjible 
ObjeSis  are  the  only  Sources  of  the  Pleafures  of  Either  Kind, 
the  Mixed  with  Pain,  and  the  Unmixedy  hitherto  fpoken  of;, 
the  Organs  of  the  Five  outward  Senfes  of  the  Soul  are  the  only 
Conveyances  of  Any  of  thofe  Pleafures ;  (no  Faculty  of  the 
Mind  ever  being  employed  in  that  Office ;)  and  only  the  meer 
jinimal-Vzxt  of  the  Soul,  (That  which  is  Senjitroe  and  Imagi- 
natwe)   ever  enjoys  any  of  them. 

353  From  the  Pleafures  of  Senfe  our  Philofopher  proceeds  to 
fpeak  of  the  Pleafure,  which  the  Rational  Part  of  the  Sou^l 
takes  in  Science  j  —  a  Pleafure  which,  tho  it  be  of  a  higher 
Kind  than  the  Pleafures  of  the  Sight  and  Hearing,  he  here 
confiders  only  as  it  is,  like  Thofe,  pure  and  unmixed  with  Pain. 
Thus  he  afcends  gradually  from  the  loweji  Rank  in  the  Order  of 
3  Goodsj^ 


548         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Opinion,  that  luch  Pleafures  are  of  neceffity  pre^ 
ceded  by  a  Thirft  of  learAing  them ;  and  that, 
when  tafted  and  enjoyed,  they  raife  a  Thirft  of  more 
and  more ;  {o  that,  from  our  beginning  to  learn 
them,  they  are  all  along  attended  with  Uneafinefs. 

Protarchus. 
I  think,  that  fuch  Uneafinefs  is  not  at  all  neceflary. 

Socrates, 

Well  ;  but  fuppofe,  that,  having  attained  to  full 
Pofieflion  of  them,  we  happen  afterwards  to  lofe 
fome  Part  thro  Forgetfulnefs,  do  you  fee  no  Uneafi- 
nefs arifing  hence  ? 

Protarchus. 

Goods,  the  Pleafures  of  'Tq^e  and  T^ouchy  to  the  Goods  of  higheji 
Rank,  and  to  the  Head  and  Leader  of  them  all:  and  from 
Thefe  he  afterward  defcends,  in  the  fame  gradation  inverted, 
down  again  to  the  loiveji. — But  concerning  the  Goods  fuperiour 
to  thofe  of  Scicncey  we  fhall  not  anticipate,  needlefsly,  what 
is  to  come  in  the  remainder  of  this  Dialogue  :  and  fhall  only 
obferve,  at  prefent,  that  Socrates,  in  the  Sentence  now  before 
MS,  allows  the  name  of  Pleafures  to  the  Delights  of  Science; 
unwilling  perhaps  to  engage  in  a  Difputc  with  the  Difciples 
of  Arijiippus,  about  the  Propriety  of  a  Name,  when  they  agreed 
in  meaning  the  fame  Thing.  'Tis  for  the  like  rcafon,  as  we 
prefume,  that  in  the  Republkk,  L.  9.  pag:  255,  Edit:  Cantab: 
i'peaking  of  the  Delights,  which  the  fuperiour  Part  of  the  Soul 

takes 


P   H    I    L    E   B    U    S.         549 

Protarchus. 
None  at  all  from  the  nature  of  the  Thing  its  felf : 
but  when  the  Knowlege  is  wanted  to  be  applyed  to 
fome  Ufe  in  human  Life  ;     then  a  Man  is  unea fy  at 
having  loft  it,  on  account  of  its  Ufefulnefs» 

Socrates. 

And  we  are  at  prefent,  my  Friend !  adlually  con- 
cerned about  thofe  Feelings  only,  which  arife  in  us 
from  the  nature  of  the  Knowlege  its  felf,  without 
any  regard  to  the  Ufefulnefs  of  it  in  computing  or 
Iiieafuring, 

Protarchus, 

You  are  right  then  in  faying,  that,  in  Mathe- 
matical Knowlege,  a  Forgetfulnefs  frequently  befalls 
us,  without  giving  us   any  Uneafinefs, 

takes  in  Philofopby,  he  gives  them  the  appellation  of  Pleafures : 
it  is  becaufe  he  is  there  fpeaking  before  a  mixt  Company, 
confifting  of  three  Sons  of  Cepbalus,  two  elder  Brothers  of  Plato, 
befides  other  Athenians,  and  two  Foreigners  then  at  Athens,  All 
of  them  ufed  to  the  Language  of  the  Multitude,  and  probably 
Some  of  them  at  leaft  tinged  with  the  Dodlrine  of  ArijUppus. 
—Perhaps  the  like  Apology  may  be  juftly  made  for  thofe  im- 
proper Phrafes,  frequently  met  with  in  fome  Modern  Writers 
of  great  Merit,  which  are  mentioned  in  Note  349.  They  wrote 
to  the  prevailing  Epicurean  Tafte  of  their  times  ^  and  there- 
fore ufed  the  fafliionable  Epicurean  way  of  expreiTing  their 
Ideas. 

Socrates. 


550  P   H    I    L    E    B   U   S. 

Socrates. 

Thefe  Pleafures  therefore,  the  Pleafures  of  Science, 
we  muft  acknowlege  to  be  unmixed  with  Pains.  But 
thefe  Pleafures  belong  not  to  the  vulgar  Multitude, 
being  enjoyed  only  by   a  very  Few. 

Protarchus. 
All  This  muft  certainly  be  acknowledged. 

Socrates. 

Now  then,  that  we  have  tolerably  well  diftinguifhed 
between  the  Pure  Pleafures,  and  Thofe  which  are 
rightly  called  Impure,  let  us  farther  add  Thefe  Dif- 
tindlions  between  them, — that  the  Vehement  Pleafures 
know  not  Moderation  nor  Meafure  ;  while  Thofe  of 
the  Gentler  Kind  admit  of  Meafure  and  are  mode- 
rate : — and  that  Greatnefs  and  Intenfenefs,  and  the 
contrary  Qualitys,  the  Frequency  alfo  and  the  Rare- 
nefs  of  Repetition,  are  Attributes  of  Such  Pleafures 
only,  as  belong  to  the  Boundlefs  Kind  of  Being, — 
to  Thut  which  is  perpetually  varying  in  its  Quan- 
titys  and  Motions  thro  the  Body  and  thro  the 
Soul  '^*, — while  the  Pleafures,  to  which  the  like  Va- 
•riations  never  happen,    belong  to  the  contrary  Kind 

€f 

334  See  pages  321,  and  410. 


F   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  551 

of  Being  '",    and    are    allyed    to  all  things  wherein 
Symmetry  "'^  is  found. 

Protarchus* 
Perfectly  right,  O  Socrates  L 

S  o  C  R  A  T  E  s . 

The  Pleafures,  befide  thefe  AfTortments  of  them, 
are  to  be  farther  diftinguifhed  thus, 

Protarchus., 
How  ? 

Socrates,. 

We  fhould  confider,  whether  the  Purity  and  the 
Simplicity  of  Pleafures  ferve  to  difcover  what  True 
Pleafure  is :   or  whether  the  Truth  of  Pleafures  may 

beft 

355  That  is,  —  Bound  and  Meafure. 

^s**  In  the  printed  Greek  we  here  read  iy.uiiTPuv,  Th'vgs  m 
Meafure, — Now  if  this  Reading  were  right,  our  Author  would 
have  been  guilty  of  an  evident  Tautology.  For  the  t/^,ugT§/« 
of  the  Gentler  Pleafures  had  been  already  mentioned  in  the  Firfi: 
Part  of  this  Sentence,  where  it  is  oppofed  to  the  a'^usr^/a 
of  the  Vehement  Pleafures.  But  'tis  highly  probable,  that  the 
word  cujJLfjLtT^uv  is  the  right  Reading :  this  probable  Conjecture 
is  confirmed  by  the  Medicean  M.  S.  as  appears  from  the 
faithful  Verfion  of  Fkinus ;    who  renders   it   into  Latin   by  the 

A  a  a  a  words — 


552  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 

beft  be  known  from  their  Intenfenefs,  their  Multi- 
tude,  their  Greatnefs,  and  their  Abundance  2". 

Protarch  us. 

what  is  your  View,    Socrates  !    in  propoUng  This 
to  be  considered  ? 

Socrates. 
To  omit  nothing,  by  which  the  Nature  of  Plea- 
lure,  and  That  of  Knowlege,  may  be  fet  in  the 
cleareft  Light  ;  and  not  to  leave  it  undifcovered, 
whether  or  no  Some  Kinds  of  Each  of  them  are 
pure,  while  Other  Kinds  are  impure  '^^  :    that  thus, 

what 

words  —  commenjiirati  genus.  —  And  according  to  this  Reading, 
the  whole  Sentence  will  be  found  agreeable  to  what  we  read 
before  in  Page  292  j  where  g/xjwgTga  the  Meafurable,  and  cvfjt.iu.ST^cc 
the  Commetrfurate,  are  exprefsly  diftinguiflied  from  each  other. 
See  alfo  Page   290. 

357  In  the  Greek,  this  lad;  word  is  Ikxvov, — a  word,  which, 
every  where  elfe  in  this  Dialogue,  means  Sufficient :  but  it  cannot 
have  that  Meaning  here,  where  it  is  attributed  to  Pleajures  of 
the  Infinite  Kind.  For  as  Siifficiency  implys  Bound  and  Meafure, 
it  belongs  only  to  That  Kind  of  things,  which  is  contrary  to 
the  Infinite.  We  fufpcd:  therefore  the  Greek  Text  in  this  place 
to  be  corrupted    and   erroneous. 

35^  It  has  been  already  feen,  that  Purity,  when  'tis  attributed 
to  Pleafure  of  fome  certain  Kind,  means,   that  Fleaiure  of  fuch 

a  Kind 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        553 

what  is  pure  and  fimple  in  Each  being  brought  be- 
fore us  to  be  judged  of,  You  and  I  and  all  this 
Company  may  the  more  eafily  form  a  right  Judg- 
ment. 

Protarchus. 
Very   rightly   faid. 

Socrates. 
Well   then ;    all  thofe  Kinds  of  things,  which  we 
commonly  fay  are   pure  ^",     let    us    conlider    of,     in 
the  following  way  ;    but  firft  let  us  choofe  out  fome 
One   among   them  for  an  Inftance  to  consider  of. 

a  Kind  is  free  from  any  Mixture  with  what  is  contrary  to  the 
general  7iature  of  Pleafure,  that  is.  Fain.  In  like  manner, 
when  Purity  is  attributed  to  fome  certain  Kind  of  Knowlege,  it 
means,  that  the  Knowlege,  whereto  fuch  an  Attribute  belongs, 
is  not  mixed  with  any  thing,  the  nature  of  which  is  contrary 
to  the  nature  of  Knoivlege ;  —  not  with  things  uncertain,  the 
Objedts  only  of  Imagination  or  Opinion  ; — not  with  things  fubjedt 
to   Change   or    Motion,   the   Objed:s   only   of  outward  Se?ife. 

5'9  The  Epithet  "pure"  is  given  to  many  things;: — to  Virgin- 
Earth  or  Mould  ;  —  to  all  Metals,  leparated  from  their  Drofs ; 
and  to  the  richer  Metals,  feparated  from  their  Allays  j  —  to 
Fountain-Vv'ater  and  Rain-Water; — to  the  pure  Virgin-Snow, 
fays  our  Poet  Thomjbn  ; — to  u4ir  upon  the  Tops  of  high  Moun- 
tains; —  to  a  cloudlefs  and  clear  iEther; — to  uncompounded 
or   fimple  Colours ;    and  to   unmixt   or    fimple   Flavours. 

A  a  a  a  2  Protarckus 


5S4         ?    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
which  would  you  have  us  choofe  ? 

SOC  RATES. 

Among  the  principal  of  thofe  Kinds,  let  us,  if 
you  pleafe,   coniider   the  White  Kind  of  things. 

Protarchus. 
By   all    means. 

Socrates. 

In  What  way  then  might  we  have  any  thing, 
which  is  called  White,  with  the  moft  perfe<5t  and 
pure  Whitenefs  ?  whether  by  having  the  greateft 
Number  of  things  which  are  White,  and  the  largeft 
of  the  Kind  in  Size,  or  by  having  what  is  White 
in  the  higheft  Degree,  and  not  tinged  with  the  lead 
Degree   of  any  other   Colour  ? 

Protarchus. 

Evidently,  by  having  what  is  of  the  moft  fimple 
and    unmixed   Whitenefs. 

Socrates. 
Rightly  faid.     Shall   we  not  then  determine,    that 
this  Pure  White  is  the  Trueft,   and  at  the  fame  time 
the   moft    Beautiful    of  all    Whites ;     and   not    That 

which 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S,        555 

which   is  of  the  largeft  Size   and  whofe  Number  is 
the  greateft  ? 

Protarchus. 
Moft  certainly  we  fhalL 

Socrates. 

In  pronouncing  then,  that  a  Little  of  Purely 
White  is  Whiter,  and  of  a  more  Beautiful  and  True 
Whitenefs,  than  a  great  Quantity  of  the  Mixt  White, 
we    fhall   fay  what   is   intirely  right. 

Protarchus. 
Without    the    leaft    Doubt. 

Socrates. 

Well  then ;  I  fuppofe,  we  fhall  have  no  occa- 
fion  to  produce  many  fuch  Inftances,  to  prove  the 
truth  of  our  conclufion  concerning  Pleafure  :  the 
Inftance,  already  brought,  feems  fufBcient  for  us,  to 
perceive  at  once,  that  a  Little  of  Pleafure,  pure,  and 
free  from  Pain,  is  more  pleafant,  more  true,  and 
perfed:,  as  well  as  more  comely,  than  Pleafure  where 
Pain  is  mingled,  be  there  ever  fo  much  of  it,  or 
be  it  ever  fo  vafl;  and  vehement. 

Protarchus. 


556         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 

By  all  means  :  the  Inftance,  you  gave  in  White- 
nefs,  is  an  argument  from  Analogy,  fufficient  for 
the  Proof  of   it. 

Socrates. 

But  What  think  you  now  of  This  ?  Have  we  not 
heard  it  faid  concerning  Plcafure,  that  'tis  a  Thing 
aUvays  in  generation,  always  produced  anew,  and 
having  no  Stability  of  Being,  cannot  properly  be 
faid  to  Be  at  all  ?  For  fome  ingenious  '^°  Perfons 
there  are,  who  endeavour  to  fhow  us,  that  fuch  is, 
the  nature  of  Pleafure  ;  and  we  are  much  obliged 
to  them  for  this  their  account  of  it. 

Protarchus. 

Why  fo  ? 

Socrates. 

I  fhall  recount  to  you  the  Whole  of  their  Rea- 
foning  on  this  Point,  my  Friend  Protarchus  !  by 
putting  a  few  Queflions   to  you. 

5*"  In  the  Greek,  —  y.ou.-i^o\,  neat  and  trim,  that  is,  in  their 
Reafonings  and  Difcourfes  j  —  fubtle  Argiiers,  or  fine  Lo- 
gicians i — a  Charadler,  Vv'hich  diftinguiHied  the  School  of  Zeno 
the  Eleatick. — It  will  prefently  be  feen,  that  the  Perfons,  here 
fpokcn  of,  philofophifed  on  the  Principles  of  the  Eleatic  Sedl, 
and  probably  were  Some  of  the  fame  Zeno's  Athenian  Difci- 
ples.      See  Note  34. 

Protarchus,- 


P    H    I    L    E     B     U    S.        557 

Protarchus. 
Do   fo ;     and    begin  your   Qiieflions. 

SOCR  ATES. 

Are  there  not  in  Nature  Two  very  different  Kinds 
of  Things  ;  This,  in  its  Self  alone  compleat ;  That, 
defirous   always   of  the    Other  ^^'  ? 

Protarchus. 
How  do   you   mean  ?    and    what    Things    do    you 
fpeak   of?  ' 

Socrates. 

One  of  Them  is  by  nature  always  of  high  Dig- 
nity and  Value  ;  the  Other,  falling  far  fhort  of  it, 
and   always   indigent  '^\ 

3^'  The  Firft  of  thefe  Kinds  is  Form;  the  Other  is  Matter. 
—By  Things  of  the  Firfl  Kind,  we  are  to  underfland,  —  not 
thefe  Senjible  Forms,  which  every  where  inveft  Matter,  and  are  for 
ever  changing  and  pafiing  away, — but  thofe  Intelligible  and  Ideal 
Forms,  which  are  the  Originals  of  the  Other.  —  Again  ;  by 
Things  of  this  other  Kind,  are  meant  the  Parts  of  Matter, 
confidered  —  not  abftraftedly,  or  as  negatively  oppofed  to  all 
Form, — but  as  it  were  folliciting  the  Embrace  of  every  Ideal 
Form  which  prefents  itfelf,  and  vainly  as  it  were  endeavour- 
ing to  retain  the  Image  of  every  fuch  Form,  as  it  paffeth  thro 
them. 

3"^  See  Note   123   to  the  Banquet. 

Protarchus. 
2 


5s8         P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S, 

Protarchu  s. 
Exprefs    your   felf  a  little   more   clearly. 

Socrates. 
Have   we    not    feen    Some    of   the    Fair  Sex,   who 
excelled  in  Beauty  and  in  Virtue  ?    and  have  we  not 
fccn  their  Lovers  and  Admirers  ? 

Protarchus.. 
Often. 

Socrates. 

Analogous  then  to  thefe  Two  different  Sorts  of 
Perfons,  fee  if  you  cannot  difcover  Two  different 
Kinds  of  Things,  to  One  or  Other  of  which  different 
Kinds  belongs  Every  Thing,  commonly  faid  to  have 
a  Being  ;    The  Third  be  to  the  Saviour  ^'^\ 

Protarchus. 

5*^5  This  whole  Sentence,  in  all  the  Editions  of  the  Greek,  is  thus 
pnntedj — Tbtoh  toivw  ioiKOTO,  S'uoTv  tsat,  Su  a AAa  ^>it«,  Jcara  iroivrx  oace, 
?\.iyoij.ev  M'xt  TO  T^'nov  ere^co. — A  Sentence,  quite  unintelligible  to 
us  !  —  Monf.  Groii  very  juiUy  apprehends  fome  Error  in  the  Text. 
We  prefume,  that  this  fenfible  and  elegant  Tranflator  never  faw  the 
Emendation,  propofed  by  Coniarius ;  for  that,  otherwife,  he  would 
have  embraced  it,  and  have  made  His  Verfion,  as  We  have 
Ours,  agreeable  to  that  Emendation  :    which  is  no  more  than  a 

Change  of  the  lafl:  word — gVe^ai — into  aurri^i. The  Sentence, 

thus  amended,  concludes  with  this  Proverbial  Saying, — T/jc  Third 

to 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S.         559 

Protarchus. 

Speak  your  Meaning,  O  Socrates!   in  plainer  Terms. 

Socrates. 

to  the  Saviour.  —  It  was  a  Form  of  words,  anciently  ufed  at 
the  Feafl;  of  every  Viflor  in  the  Olympic  Games,  when  he 
made  an  accuftomed  Libation,  out  of  the  Third  Cup  or  Glafs,  AiJ 
cctiTTipi,  to  "Jupiter  in  his  Gharadler  of  Saviour  in  all  Diffi- 
cultys  and  Dangers.  —  A  Speech,  fo  well  known  to  all  the 
Grecians,  eafily  paffed  into  a  Proverb  :  and  it  is  alluded  to, 
as  Such,  by  Plato  in  his  Charmides,  pag:  167J  in  his  Rcpublick, 
P^g-  5^3  »  ^^^  *"  ^^is  Seventh  Epijllc,  pag:  334.  In  the  Re~ 
fubl'ick,  he  applys  it  to  the  Bejl  and  Happiejl  of  Human  Lives ; 
when  Two  inferiour  Ways  of  Life  had  been  already  mentioned. 
—  In  the  Charmides,  he  applys  it  to  a  'Third  and  more  pro- 
found Inquiry  into  the  Meaning  of  that  Delphic  Sentence, 
"Know  thy  Self;"    after  it  had  been  Twice  confidered  fuper- 

ficially. In   the  7th  Epijile,    he   applys   it   to   the   making  of 

a  Third  Attempt ;  after  Two  had  been  made  by  him  without 
Succefs. — ^^And  in  the  Sentence  now  before  us,  he  applys  it  to 
this  Third  "Explanation  of  his  Meaning,  in  hopes  of  its  beino- 
found  fully  fufficient;  the  Two  former  having  been  intended 
only  as  introductory  to  This.  —  But  in  all  thefe  applications 
of  the  Proverb,  'tis  to  be  obferved,  that  the  feveral  Cafes,  to 
which  it  is  applyed,  are  of  the  mod  important  and  intereftino- 
Kind,  —  Cafes,  in  which  it  was  proper  to  implore  the  Divine 
Afllflance. — For  the  Subjedl  of  that  Cafe,  in  the  RepuMick,  is 
the  Happinefs  of  thofe  Perfons,  who  poflefs  true  Virtue,  or 
Vniverjal  Jujlice.  The  Subjedt  of  that  Cafe,  in  the  Charmides, 
ic  the  nature  of  true  Prudence,  or  Mans  highejl  Wijaom,  The 
Aim  of  Plato,  in  that  Part  of  his  Seventh  Epijfk,  is  to  con- 
vince the  Chief  Men  among  the  Sicilians,   that  'tis  Beft  for  every 

B  b  b  b  City 


560 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 


<j» 


Socrates. 
I  mean  nothing,  O  Protarchiis  !  but  whalf  is  very- 
fimple  and  eafy  to  be  feen.  But  our  prefent  Ar- 
gument is  pleafed  to  fport  itfelf  ^*^  However,  it 
means  no  more  than  This  ;.  —  that  there  is  a  Kind: 
of  Things,  which  aie  always  for  the  fake  of  fome. 
Other ;  and  there  is  alfo  a  Kind  of  Things,  for 
whofe  fake  always  is  produced  whatever  hath  any 
Final  Caufe  of  its  Produdlion  ^^^. 

PHOTARCHUS-. 

City  and  Community,  not  to  ho.  fuhjeEi  to  the  Will  of  Men^ 
but  to  the  haws  only  3  and  that  all  Violation  of  the  Laws  iS: 
equally  pernicious  to  the  Governors  and  the  Governed.  And 
the  Defign  of  this  prefent  Part  of  l\\Q  Philebus,  is  to  open  the 
Way  to  a  difcovery  of  the  nature  of  Mind,  by  unfolding  the 
nature  of  the  Lhiiverfe,  and  diftinguiflilng  this  outward,,  muta- 
ble, and  tranfient  World,  in  which  alone  arifes  Senfual  Plea- 
fure, — from  That  World,  which  is  intelligible,  immutable  and 
eternal,  where  all  Wifdom,  Law,  Virtue  and  Happinefs,  are 
feated ;  and  from  which  they  are  derived,  tho  la  Streams  pol- 
luted   as   they   run,    into   and  through   this   Other. 

2**  Meaning, — in  the  Simile,  taken  from  that  Courtfliip  which, 
is  paid  to  the  Fair  by  their  Humble  Lovers. — The  Speech  of. 
Socrates,  in  the  Banqmt,  abounds  with  Metaphors,  taken  from, 
the   fame  Subje(!t. 

i''^  All  the  Works  of  Man  are  for  the  Jake  of  Man,  who  is 
their  Efiicient  Caufe  :  the  Good  of  Man  therefore  is  their  Final 
Caufe,    or  £«</.  —  Thofe  Works  of  Nature,   which .  are  inferiour 

in 


P   H    I    L   E    B    U    S.         561 

Protarchus. 
I    find    it    difficult    to    underftand   your  Meaning, 
after  your  many  Explanations  of  it. 

Socrates, 
Perhaps,  Young  Man  !    'twill  be  undcrftood  better, 
as  we  proceed  in  the  Reafoning  on  this  Subjed:. 

Protarchus. 
I  make   no  doubt   of  it. 

Socrates, 

Let    us    now    make    another    Divifion    of    Things 
into  Two  different   Kinds. 

Protarchus, 
What   Kinds    are   They  ? 

in  Dignity  to  other  of  her  Works,  are  for  the  fake  of  Some 
of  thofe  which  are  nobler :  the  Good  of  Thefe  therefore  is  the 
'Bndt  or  Final  Caufe,  of  the  lefs  noble.  The  nobleft  of  all 
her  Works  are  for  the  fake  of  That  Higheft  Good,  which  only 
They  are  able  to  partake  of:  this  Highejl  Good  therefore  is 
the  Final  Caufe  of  their  Being,  and  their  End.  And  the  whole 
Outward  Univerfe,  the  World  of  Nature,  is  for  the  fake  of 
Univerfal  Good  :  Univerfal  Good  therefore  is  the  End,  or  Final 
Caufe,    of   the  whole  Creation. 

B  b  b  b  2  Socrates. 


562 


P    H    r    L    E    B    U    S. 


Socrates,  . 
The    Generation    of   all    things    is    One    Kind    of" 
Things  ;  and  the  Being  of  all  is   a.  different  Kind '". 

PiROTARCHUS. 

566  ^Yg    aj-e   now    brought   to   thofe  Do6trines    of  the  Ekatic . 
Phjlofophers,    on   which    the  Whole    of  the   prefent  Reafoning 
is   founded:    as  in  confequence  of  Their  Tenets  it-'W-ill  appear,- 
that    Pica/lire   has    no    permanent    or   ftable   Being,    and   belongs 
only   to   the   unfteady  and   vague   Appearance  of  Things    always- 
in   Flow  J — an  Appearance,   which  is    but  for  the  inflant  Now, 

and  glides  away  from  the  Beh-older,   like  a  Shadow.- For  the 

£A'j//c  Philofophers  fuppofed  One  ovAy  Principle  of  the  Uni- 
verfe, — Mind, — One  and.  the  jS^we.  for  ever.-^But  they  did  not' 
fuppofe  this  fole  Principle  to  be  Such,  as  an  Arithmetical  One, 
or  as  the  abftraft  Idea  of  U?iity :  Neither  did  they  fuppofe  it 
to  be  Such  a  Ofie,  as  empty  Spacer  or  as  formlefs  Mdtier  -,  ..not 
to  be  like  abfolute  Darknefs,  or  like  total  Ignorance:  for  the 
continual  Samcfiefs,  or  fimple  Onenefs  of  all  Thefe,  is  nothing 
Pojitive,  nothing  more  than  a  Vacancy  or  Want  of  Form  and 
Being;  an  Ahfcnce  of  Light,  cc  oi  Intelligence ;  a  Negation  oi 
the    Means    or  of  the    Power   of  diJlinguiJJnng  one    thing    from 

another. -On   the  contrary,    they,  held   this   Pri-nciple,-  Mind, 

to  be  Porm  and  Being  Univcrfal,  comprehending  and  uniting  all 
true  Beings,  -^X  .Forms  eternally  the  Same,  all  pure  Ideas;  in- 
telligent o^  ■sM,  ihvo  SelJ^Confcioufnefs ;  contemplative  of  all,,  thro 
Self-Contempktiott,  and  viev:ing  them  all.  by  his  oivn  Light,  the 
Light  0^  Intelligence,,  ihc  Principles  themfelves  of  Minp,    Identity 

and   Diver/ity.  For,    as    every    General  Idea   is   g'c  >;«)  ttoAAo! 

One  and  Many,  they  held,  ,that  Univerjlil  Mind,  comprehenfive 
of  all  General  Ideas,    is  gV  >cal  Tofira  One  and  AH  things,  —  the 

whole 


F   H    I    L    E   B    U    S;  563 

Protarchus. 

I  admit   your  difFerence   between   Being   and'  Ge* 
neration* 

Socrates^ 

%v4iole  Ideal  or  Intelligible  World, — the  Ttue  All. — They  held, 
that  this  Great  One- All  is  determined,  iixt,  and  immutable : 
for.  that  every  Chajige  infers  a  Diverfityy  without  a  Satnenefsy 
in  That  which  is  fubjeB  to  the  Change;  and  it  inferrs  a  M«/- 
titude  of  the  Principles  of  that  Change,  or  Two  at  leaft,  with- 
o-ut  a  t/w/ijx  between  them:  but  This,  they  prefumed,  could 
not  be  the  Cafe  of  Mbid;  becaufe,  as  in  every  General  Idea, 
fo  in  Mi?id,  the  Head  of  them  all,  Samenefs  abides  throughout ; 
Diverfity,  and  Multitude  is  furrounded,  embraced,  and  bound 
together  by  Unity.  To  the  EJential  nature  of  ikf/W  they  deemed 
it  owing,  that  every  Idea  therein  is  exempt  from  all  Change, 
and  liable  to  no  Generation  or  Corruption,  no  Addition  or  Dimi- 
7iution. It  fhould  feem  therefore,  that  Matter,  (which,  ac- 
cording to  Plato  a:>d  Ariftctle,  is  another  neceff'ary  Principle  of' 
Things,)  was  confidered  by  the  Eleatic  Philofophers,  either  as 
Empty  Space,  the-xeroi',  the  Ina7ie  of  Democritiis  and  Epicunis,  cr  as 
Something  very  different  from  real  Being,   and  as   much  a  Non- 

Entity,  as  that  imaginary  Vacuum.^ Accordingly  they  held,  that 

all  Change  of  Fvrins  was  only  in  Appearance;  —  that  only  the 
Semblances  o(  Form  fuffered  Corruption ; — and  that  Generation  was 
but  the  Arifmg  of  new  fallacious  Semblances  to  the  a.ay.oirov 
c>ix[i.a.,  the  ineonfiderate  Eye  of  Senfe,  followed  by  ficoruv  ^o^a<, 
aXi  idK  en  Trlq^ii  ccAn'^ih,  the  uncertain  Judgment  of  Muman  Opi^ 
7iions : — that  yet,  as  much  a  Non-Entity  as  Matter  h,  it  is  This 
only,  in  which  thofe  Semblances  of  Farm  arife,  and  out  of  which 
they  are  continually  produced.;  infnite  Matter  h^'ing  as  it  were 
th^'iv  Matrix,  or  native  Bed,  all-capaciou-s,  and  common  to  them 


564  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Socrates. 

Ymi  are  perfe<flly  in    the   Right.      Now,    Whether 

of  thefe   Two   is   for   the   fake   of   the   Other  ?    Shall 

we   fay,   that    Generation   is   for  the   fake   of   Being  ? 

or    Ihall    we    fav,     that    Beino;    is    for    the    fake   of 

Generation. 

Protarchuso 

all. The  Eleaticks  therefore,  conceiving  Matter  to  be  thus  in- 

tirely  pajjive,  and  Mind  to  be  the  only  aSiive  and  generative  Power 
in  the  Univerfe,  deemed  Matter  unworthy  to  be  ftyled  a  Principle 
of  Things;  and  deigned  this  Title,  —  a  Title  of  fo  high  and 
univerfal  Import, — to  Mind  alone.  On  the  fame  account,  thofe 
Philofophers  denyed  the  Appellation  of  Beings  to  Senfible  Forms, 
the  imperfedl  and  fliort-lived  ProdiiBs  (or  rather,  Mifcarriages^ 
of  Matter,  their  ineffedually  nurfing-Mother  :  looking  on  them 
as  only  the  Shadoivs  of  Siibjla?itial  Forms.  Accordingly,  they 
held  Mind  to  be  the  only  Place  of  Forms,  and  Matter  to  be 
the  Place  but  of  their  Shadows :  agreeably  alfo  to  this  Tenet, 
and  in  purfuance  of  the  fame  Metaphor,  they  held  this  Shadowy 
Place  itfelf,  this  unreal  and  meerly  nominal  One,  to  be  but  the 
indefinite    and   indeterminable    Shadow    of  Univerfal   Form,    the 

real  zudi  ejfential  07ie. From  thefe  Confideratlons,  they  taught, 

that  this  Outward  World,  the  World  of  Se?jfe,  is  mutable,  in- 
finite, uncertain,  and  untrue;  coninwiiWy  new -created,  as  it  were, 
in  continual  new  Generations ;  and  tho  ever  aiming  at  Being, 
unable  to  attain  to  it :  for  that  Beifig  and  Generation  are  fo 
Intirely  diftindt,  and  incompatible,  that  of  Things  in  Being 
there  can  be  no  Generation,  nor  can  Things  continually  in  Ge- 
neration ever  have  what  can  properly  be  called  a  Being.  —  See 
page  250  of  this  Dialogue. 

Protarchus. 


P   H   I   L   E   B    U   S.         565 

Protarchus, 

Whether  or  no  That,  which  is  termed  Being  ^^\ 
is  what  it  is,  for  the  fake  of  Generation,  is  This 
your  prefent  Queftion  ? 

Socrates. 
Apparently   it  is. 

Protarchus. 
In    the    name  of  the  Gods,    how  can   you  aflc  (o 
ftrange  a  Queftion  ? 

Socrates. 

My  Meaning  in  That  Queftion,  O  Protarchus !' 
is  of  fuch  a  Kind  as  this  Other  ;  —  whether  you 
would  choofe  to  fay  that  Ship-building  is  for  the 
lake  of  Shipping,  rather  than  you  would  fay,  that 
Shipping  is  for  the  fake  of  Ship-building  :  and  all. 
other  Things  of  like  Kind  5^^,  O  Protarchus  !  I 
include    in    the  Queftion  which  I  afk.  you. 

Protarchus. - 

3*7  Brctarchus  feems,  in  This,   rightly  to  apprehend,   that  So^ 
crates  means   Form   by  the   terni  Being, 

3^^  That  is,  —  whether   all   Stru£}ures,   and    all    other   Forms, . 
intended   to   be   made,    are  intended  for  the    fake   of   the   CoH'- 
JiruSiion   or  Formation-,  —  the    meer    Operation   of  conJiriiSling    or. 
forming  them; — or  whether  this  Operation  h  not  rather  for  the 
fake  of  the  intended  Form% 


c66         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 
But  for  what  reafon,   O  Socrates  !  do  you  not  give 
an  Anfwer  to   it,    your  Self? 

Socrates. 
I  have    no    reafon   to  refufe  that  Office ;    do  You 
but    go  along  with  me  in  my  Anfwer. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  I  fhalL 

Socrates. 
I  fay  then,  that  for  the  fake  of  Generation,  it  is 
true,  that  Medicines  are  compofed  ;  the  Inftrumental 
Parts,  prepared  by  Nature,  and  all  the  Materials  of 
it,  provided  ^*' :  but  that  every  Ad  of  Generation 
is  for  the  fake  of  fome  Being;  Generation  in  every 
Species,  for  the  fake  of  fome  Being  belonging  to 
that  Species ;  and  univerfally,  all  Generation,  for  the 
fake   of  Univerfal   Being  '^°, 

Protarchus. 

.3^9  Socrates  here  again  is  pleafed  to  temper  the  Gravity  of 
his  Reafoning,  and  the  Dignity  of  his  Subjedl,  with  that  urbane 
Facetioufnefs,  ufual  to  him,  and  very  becoming  him,  in  the 
Mixt  Company  of  thofe  pohte  Athenian  Youths,  who  frequented 
the  Lycaum. 

37°  It  is  here  intimated,  that  the  Defign  or  End  of  that 
Qeneration  or  Produ(5tion  of  all  jiatural  Things,  which  is  con- 
tinued 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  567 

Protarchus. 
Mofl  evidently  fo. 

SOC  RATES. 

If  Pleafure  then  be  of  fuch  a  nature,  as  to  be 
generated  always  anew,  muft  not  the  generating  of 
it  be  always  for  the  fake  only  of  fome  Being  ? 

Prot  archus. 
Without   doubt. 

Socrates. 
Now  That,    for   the   fake  of   which  is  always  ge- 
nerated whatever  is  generated  '^'  for  fome  End,  muft 

tinued  on  for  ever,  is  to  communicate  Form  and  Being,  as  far 
as  poflible,  to  innumerable  Individuals  of  every  Kind  and  Species, 
throughout  the  Univerfe,  in  everlafting  fuccefiion.  Now  this 
End  is  impoflible  to  be  accomplifhed,  without  the  Dijfolution 
of  all  thefe  Individuals,  fucceflively,  for  the  fake  of  continual 
new  Generations  j  as  every  Generation  is  for  the  fake  of  Being. 
— Thus  it  is,  that,  Generation  keeping  even  Pace  with  Dijjo- 
lution,  the  Univerfe  is  always  full:- — the  external  World,  is  no 
lefs  full  oi  formed  Matter,  than  Matter  is  full  of  Mind,  or  than 
Mind  is  full  of  thofe  eternal  Forms,  or  true  Beings,  wrapt  up 
in  One  Univerfal  Being,  for  whofe  fake  all  created  Things  are 
generated  and  difTolved. 

37'  The  Greek  word,  to  yiyvofxeuov,  here  fignifys  whatever  is 
produced,  formed  or  created,  whether  it  be  by  Nature,  or  by 
Human  Art, 

C  c  c  c  be 


S68 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S 


be  in  the  Rank  of  things  which  are  Good  ''^^  :  and 
That,  which  is  generated  for  the  fake  of  any  Other 
thing,  mufl  of  neceflity,  my  Friend  !  be  placed  in 
a  different  Rank  of  Things. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  it  mufl. 

Socrates. 

Shall  we  not  be  right  then,  in  placing  Plea- 
fure  in  a  Rank  of  Things  different  from  That  of 
Good  "'  ; — if  it  be  true,  that  Pleafure  has  no  ftable 
Being,   but  is  always   generated  anew  ? 

Protarchus. 

"^  Hence  it  Ihould  feem,  that  thofe  philofophical  Perfons, 
whofe  Reafoning  on  the  prefent  Subje6t  is  here  delivered  to  us 
by  Socrates,  denied  the  Attribute  of  Good  to  all  Inftrianental  and 
all  other  Means  of  Good  %  deeming  it  to  belong  only  to  Final 
Caufcs   or  Eyids,  and  to  Beings  who  pojfefs  and  enjoy  thofe  Ends. 

3"5  It  is  plain,  tliat  the  Perfons,  here  fpoken  of,  by  the 
term  Pleafure  meant  Pleafure  of  the  Outward  Senfes  only.  The 
fame  Term  is  ufed  in  the  fame  Meaning  by  Socrates,  in  the 
Conchijive  Part  of  this  Dialogue,  where  he  fpeaks  only  his  own 
Sentiments.  He  agrees  alfo  with  thofe  Perfons,  in  attributing 
the  Quality  of  Good  to  no  other  things  than  fuch  as  are  pur- 
fuable  for  their  own  fakes :  (fee  the  Argumetjt  of  this  Dialogue, 
page  II.)  but  he  differs  from  the  fame  Perfons  in  this  Point, 
that  he  there  places  the  Pleafures  of  Senfe  in  the  order  of  things 
Good;    affjgning,    however,   the   laft  and  lowefl   Place   to    thofe 

5  Senfual 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         569 

Protarchus. 
Perfedly   right. 

Socrates. 

Senfual  Pleafures,  which  are  of  the  groJJ'er  Kinds  and  are  mixed 
with  Fain ;  and  a  Place  next  above  the  loweft,  to  Such  as  arc 
more  refined  and  pure. — Now  perhaps  Both  thefe  Partys,  Socrates^ 
and  the  Perfons  whom  he  fpeaks  of,  may  well  be  juftified  in 
their  oppofite  Expreflions  on  this  Point ;  as  they  meant  Two 
Things  very  different  from  each  other,  but  very  confiftent  to- 
gether.  Socrates,    in    the  prefent  Dialogue,   profefledly  treats 

of  Hu?nan  Good  folely.  Now  if  Man  be  confidered  as  a  Senfitive 
A?iimaly  Pleafure  is  T^he  Good  of  Man  :  and  if  Man  be  confidered 
in  the  Whole  of  his  nature,  in  all  the  Parts  of  it  taken  to- 
gether,   Pleafure    is   flill   a  Good  to   Him  ;  —  it   is    One   of  the 

Goods,   altho  the  meaneft,  which  he  enjoys. On  the  other 

hand,  the  Studys  of  the  Eleatic  Philofophers  (and  Such  we 
imagine  to  be  the  Perfons,  here  fpokeh  of,)  were  confined  to 
the  uppermoft  Regions  of  Phflofophy :  they  fpent  their  time, 
partly,  in  contemplating  the  Nature  of  the  Univerfe,  and  the 
Caufes  of  All  things ;  and  partly,  in  fearching  out  the  Princi- 
ples of  Mind  and  Science,  and  in  building  on  thofe  Principles 
the  Art  of  Reafoning,  commonly  called  Logick.  Whenever  they 
condefcended  to  cafl  an  Eye  on  the  Senfible  World,  they  looked 
on  it,  like  the  Pythagoreans  from  whom  they  fprang,  no  other- 
wife  than  as  having  a  reference  to  the  Intelligible  World,  true 
Being,  of  whicli  it  is  an  outward  Reprefentation  or  PiSiure : 
and  confequently,  they  muPc'  have  confidered  all  Pleafure  of  thd 
Senfes,  only  as  one  of  the  Means,  intended  by  the  Providential 
Mind  and  Wifdom  of  Nature,  to  frejben  the  fading  Colours  of 
this  Pidlure,    or  to  lay  Such   as  are  fimilar  to  Thofe  which  are 

C  c  c  c  2  faded 


57Q         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Therefore,  as  I  Taid  in  beginning  this  Argu- 
mentation ^"%  we  are  much  obliged  to  the  Perfons 
who  have  given  us  this  account  of  Pleafure,  —  that 
the  EiTence  of  it  confifts  in  being  always  generated 
anew,  but  that  never  has  it  any  Kind  of  Being. 
For  'tis  plain,  that  thefe  Perfons  would  laugh  at  a 
Man,  who  afferted,  that  Pleafure  and  Good  were 
the  fame  Thing. 

Protarchus.. 
Certainly  they   would.. 

SOCRATE  S-. 

And  thefe  very  Perfons  would  certainly  laugh  afe 
thofe  Men,  wherever  they  met  with  them,  who  place 
their  Chief  Good  and  End  in  Generation. 

Protarchus. 
How,  and  what  Sort  of  Men  do  you  mean? 

faded  quite  away.  —  To  Ma}i  therefore  the  Pleafures  of  Senfe 
may  be  in  the  Rank  of  Ends ;  altho  in  Nature  they  have  only 
the  Rank   of  Means. 

37+  See  Page  556,  and  Page  498, 

SoCRAXESi. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         571 

Socrates. 

Such,  as  in  freeing  themfelves  from  Hunger,  oi- 
Tliirft,  or  any  of  the  UneafinefTes  from  which  they 
are  freed  by  Generation,  are  fo  highly  delighted  with 
the  adiion  of  removing  thofe  UneafincfTes,  as  to  de- 
clare, they  would  not  choofe  to  live,  without  fuf- 
fering  Thirft  and  Hunger,  nor  without  feeling  all 
thofe  other  Senfations,  which  may  be  faid  to  follow 
from  fuch  Kinds  of  Uncafinefs  "^ 

Protarchus^ 

Such  indeed  there  are,  who  feem  to  be  of  that" 
Opinion. 

375  Socrates  very  juftly  here  diflinguifhes  between  thofe  Philo- 
fophers  in  His   time,    fuch  as  Arijiippus  on  the  one  hand, — who^ 
held   that   Pleafure   was    Good,    and    that   Good    was    Pleafure ;, 
for   that  Pleafure   and  Good  were   the  fame  thing; — and  thofe 
tmphilqfophical  Voluptuarys    in    every  age,    on    the    other   hand, — 
who,    becaufe    they  have    but    little  Tafte   for    any  other  Good- 
than   Senfual   Pleafure,   and  confequently  have  but   little  Enjoy- 
ment   of   any  other,    imagine,    that   either    SenfuaL  Pleafure    in 
general,  or  fome  one  Species  of  it,   is  the  Higheft  human  Blifs. 
— Socrates   therefore,    in    fpeaking  of  thefe  Two  different    Sorts 
of  Perfons,  fpeaks  of  each  Sort  diftindly, — of  this  common  Sort, 
in  the  prefent  Sentence, — of  the  philofophical  Sort,  in  the  Sen- 
tence preceding. 

Socrates.. 


572         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
Would  not  all  of  us  fay,   that  Corruption  was  the 
Contrary  of  Generation  ? 

Protarchus. 
It   is   impofTible  to  think  otherwife. 

Socrates. 

Whoever  then  makes  fuch  a  Life  his  Choice,  mufl 

choofe    both    Corruption    and    Generation  ^^*,     rather 

than   that   Third   Kind  of  Life,    in  which   he   might 

live  with  the   cleareft  Difcernment  of  what  is  Right 

and   Good,    but  without   the  Feeling  of  either  Pain 

or   Pleafure  ^^^ 

Protarchus. 

Much  Abfurdity,  as  it  feems,  O  Socrates  !  is  to 
be  admitted  by  the  Man,  who  holds  that  Human 
Good   confifts   wholly   in   Pleafure. 

3""'  For  it  is  with  the  Human  Body,  as  it  is  with  all  other 
Natural  and  Corporeal  things ;  not  only  every  Part  is  conti- 
nually in  Motion  and  Mutation,  but  aifo  every  Condition  of  it 
is  followed  by  its  contrary  Condition ;  and  every  the  floweft 
Motion,   or  moft  minute  Change,  in  each  Part,  is  a  Step  toward 

that   contrary  Condition. Thus   there  is   a  continual  Viciffi- 

tude  of  Repletion  and  Inanition, — Augmentation  and  Diminution,"^ 
Growth   and  Decay, — Corruption   and   Generation. 

377  See  Pages   210  and  485. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S.        573 

Socrates. 
Much  indeed.      For  let   us   argue   farther   thus. 

Protarchus. 

How  ? 

Socrates. 

Since  no  Good  nor  Beauty  is  in  Bodys,  nor  in 
any  other  things,  befide  the  Soul  "^  ;  is  it  not  ab- 
furd  to  imagine,  that  in  the  Soul  Pleafure  fhould 
be  the  only  Good  ;  and  that  neither  Fortitude,  nor 
Temperance,  nor  Underftanding,  nor  any  of  the 
other  valuable  Attainments  of  the  Soul,  fhould  be 
numbered  among  the  Good  things,  which  the  Soul 
enjoys  ?  Farther  too  ;  is  it  not  highly  irrational  to 
fuppofe,  that  a  Man,  afBidled  with  Pain,  without 
feeling  any  Pleafure,  fhould  be  obliged  to  fay,  that 
Evil  only  and  no  Good  was  with  him,  at  the  time, 
when  he  was  in  Pain,  tho  he  were  the  Beft  of  All 
men  ?  And  is  it  not  equally  abfurd,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  fuppofe,  that  a  Man  in  the  Midft  of 
Pleafures  muft  be,  during  that  time,  in  the  midjft 
of  Good  ;     and    that  the  more  Pleafure  he  feels,    the 

37*  For  only  the  Soul  is  capable  of  enjoying  any  Good,  or  of 
ferceiving  any  Beauty :  and  Good  is  nothing,  unlefs  it  be  en- 
joyed-y  nor  Beauty,  unlefs  it  be  perceived:  jufl;  as  Pleafure  is 
nothing,   if  not  felt ;    Harmony,   nothing,  if  not  heard. 

more 


574         P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 

more  Good   he  is  filled   with,    and    is   fo    much  the 
Better  Man  ? 

Protarchus- 
All    thefe    fuppofitions,    O   Socrates !    are   Abfurdi- 
tys   in  the  higheft  degree   poffible. 

■SOCRATE  s. 

'Tis  well.  But  now,  let  us  not  employ  our  felves 
wholly  in  fearching  into  the  nature  of  Pleafure  ;  as 
ii  we  indufirioufly  declined  the  examination  of  Mind 
and  Science  :  but  in  Thefe  alfo  if  there  be  any  thing 
putrid  or  unfound,  let  us  have  the  Courage  to  cut 
it  all  off,  and  throw  it,  afide  ;  •  till,  coming  to  a 
Difcovery  of  what  is  intirely  pure  and  found  therein, 
the  Difcov^ery  may  be  of  ufc  to  us,  in  comparing  the 
trueft  Parts  ''^  of  Mind  and  Science  with  the  trueft 
Parts  of "'  Pleafure,  and  in  forming  our  Judgment 
concerning  the  Superiority  of  Either  from  that 
Comparifon.  ^ 

Protarchus. 

Rightly  faid. 

3"9  The  trueft  Parts  of  Mmd  are,  where  li/eas  are  unmixt 
with  Images:  the  trueft  Parts  of  Science  are,  where  the  Objefls 
of  Science  are  unmixt  with  Objefts  of  Senfe :  and  the  trueft 
Parts  of  Pleafure  are,  where  the  Pleafure  is  pure,  and  unmixt 
with  Pain. 

?  Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         575 

Socrates. 

Do  we  not  hold,  that  Mathematical  Science  is 
partly  employed  in  the  fervice  of  the  Mechanic  Arts, 
and  partly  in  the  liberal  Education  and  Difcipline 
of  Youth  ?     or   how   think   we   on   this  Subjedl  ? 

PROTARCHUS. 

Exadly   fo. 

Socrates. 
Now,  as  to  the  Manual  Arts  ^^%  let  us  confider 
in  the  firft  place,  whether  Some  of  thefe  depend 
not  on  Science,  more  than  Others  ;  and  whether 
we  ought  not  to  look  on  thofe  of  the  former  Sort 
as  the  more  pure,  and  on  thefe  Others  as  the  more 
impure. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  we   ought. 

Socrates. 

And  in  Each  of  thefe  we  fhould  diftinguifh,  and 
feparate  the  Leading  Arts,  from  the  Arts  which  are 
led    and  governed   by  them. 

3*°  In  the  Greek  of  this  PaiTage,  it  is  prefumed,  that  we  ought 
to  read  ^ei^ore^^vtan,  and  not,  as  it  is  printed,  ^eiporexvitcaTs,— 
and   alfo   to   read   gV'>  inflead   of  en. 

D  d  d  d  Protarcus. 


576         P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 

Protarchu  s. 
what  Arts  do    you    call    the  Leading   Arts  ?    and 
Why  do  you    give   that   Epithet  to   them  ? 

Socrates. 
I  mean  thus  :  from  all  the  Arts  were  a  man  to 
feparate,  and  lay  aiide,  thofe  of  Numbering,,  of 
Meafuring,  and  of  Weighing,  what  remained  in 
every  One  of  them,  would  become  comparatively 
mean  and  contemptible  ^*'.. 

Protarchus. 
Contemptible    indeed. 

Socrates. 
For  room  would  be  then  left  only  for  Conjedlure, 
and  for  Exercife  of  the  Senfes,  by  Experience  and 
habitual  Pradice ;  and  we  fhould  then  make  ufe 
of  no  other  Facultys,  befide  thofe  of  GuefTmg 
and  Aiming    well,    (to  which   indeed  the  Multitude 

3*'  Praifcs,  ftill  higher  than  This,  are,  in  Plato's  Epmomis, 
pag:  977,  afcribed  to  the  Knowlege  of  Numbers.  But  indeed  a 
Science  more  divine,  than  Mathematical  Arithmctick,  feems  to 
be  there  meant ;  —  namely,  the  Knowlege  of  thofe  Numbers, 
(fo  termed  by  the  Pythagoreans,  and  by  Plato  termed  Ideas,) 
which  are  the  true  Meafures  of  All   things. 


give 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         577 

give    the    name   of  Arts,)    iiicreafing  the  Strength  of 
thofe  Facultys   by  dint  of  Afliduity  and  Labour. 

Protarchus. 
All,   which  you  have  now  faid,   muft  of   nccefTity 
be  true. 

Socrates. 

The  Truth  of  it  is  evident  in  all  Mufical  Per- 
formances throughout.  For  in  the  firfl:  place,  Har- 
mony is  produced,  and  one  Sound  is  adapted  to 
another,  not  by  Meafuring,  but  by  that  Aiming  well, 
which  arifes  from  conftant  Exercife.  It  is  evident 
too  in  Mufical  Performances  on  all  Wind-Inftru- 
ments  :  for  in  thefe  the  Breath,  by  being  well 
aimed,  as  it  is  blown  along,  fearches  and  attains 
the  Meafure  of  every  Chord  beaten  ^^\  So  that 
Mufick  has  in  it  Much  of  the  Uncertain,  and  but 
a  Little  of  the  Fixt  and  Firm. 

3^*  It  feems  doubtful,  whether  we  ought  not,  in  the  Greek 
of  this  PafTage,  to  read  (pe^ofxirn,  inftead  of  (pi^oj/.iv^;.  In  this 
Doubt,  we  have  endeavoured  to  adapt  our  Tranllation  to  Either 
of  thofe  Readings  :  and  fhall  only  obferve,  that,  if  the  printed 
Reading,  by  which  that  doubtful  word  is  made  to  agree  with 
;^ogJH?,  be  right,  it  carrys  with  it  a  probability,  that  the  Flute 
was  ufed  by  the  Ancients  to  accompany  the  Lyre ;  as  the  Hu- 
man Foice,  in  modern  days,  often  accompanys  the  Harpfi- 
chord. 

D  d  d  d  2  Protarchus. 


578         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarchus. 

Very  true. 

Socrates. 

And  we  fhall  find  the  Cafe  to  be  the  fame  in 
the  Arts  of  Medicine  and  Agriculture,  in  the  Art  of 
Navigation  alfo,    and  the  Military  Art. 

Protarchus, 
Moft  clearly  fo. 

Socrates. 
But  in  the  Art  of  Building  we  fhall  find,  as  I 
prefume,  many  Meafures  made  ufe  of,  and  many 
Instruments  employed  ;  by  which  it  is  made  to 
furpafs  in  Accuracy  many  things  which  are  called 
Sciences. 

Protarchus. 
How  fo  ? 

Socrates. 

It  is  fo  in  Ship-building,  and  Houfe-building, 
and  in  many  other  Works  of  Carpentry.  For  in 
thefe,  I  think,  the  Art  ufeth  the  Strait-Rule  and  the 
Square,  the  Turning-Lathe  and  the  Compalles,  the 
Plummet  and  the  Marking-Line. 

c  Protarchus. 


P   H    I    L   E    B   U    S.  579 

Protarchus. 

You  are  intirely  right,  O  Socrates  !  it  is  fo  as 
you  fay. 

Socrates. 

The  Arts  therefore,  as  they  are  called,  let  us 
now  diftinguifh  into  Two  Sorts  ;  —  Thofe,  which 
Mufick  is  at  the  Head  of,  as  they  are  lefs  accurate 
than  fome  Others,  —  and  thefe  Others,  which  par- 
take of  Accuracy  the  moft,  at  the  Head  of  which 
is  Architedure. 

Protarchus. 
This  Diftindion  is  allowed  of. 

SOC  RATE  S. 

And  let  us  fet  down  thofe  Arts  for  the  moft  ac- 
curate, which  we  lately  faid  were  the  Prime  or 
Leading  Arts. 

Protarchus. 

You  mean,  if  I  miftake  not,  Arithmetick,  and 
thofe  other  Arts  which  you  mentioned  together  with 
it  but  juft  now  ^^\ 

3^3  Namely, — Menfuration  and  Staticks, 

Socrates, 


58o  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

The  very  fame.  But,  O  Protarchus !  mud  we 
not  fay,  that  Each  of  thefe  Arts  is  Twofold  ?  or 
how  otherwife  ? 

Protarchus. 

What  Arts  do  you  fpeak  of? 

Socrates. 
Arithmetick  in  the  firft  place.  Muft  we  not  fay 
of  This,  that  the  Arithmetick  of  the  Multitude  is 
of  One  Sort,  and  that  the  Arithmetick  of  Thofe 
who  apply  themfelves  to  Philofophy  '^'^  is  of  Another 
Sort  ? 

Protarchus. 
What   is  the  Difference,    by  which   the   One  may 
be  diftinguifhed   from  the  Other  ? 

Socrates. 
The  Difference  between  them,  O  Protarchus  !  is 
far  from  being  inconfiderable.  For  the  Multitude, 
in  numbering,  number  by  Unequal  Ones,  put  to- 
gether ;  as  Two  Armys  of  unequal  Force ;  Two 
Oxen  of  unequal  Size  ;    Two  things,   the  fmalleft  of 

3^+  Meaning  the  Students  in  Mathematicks.  For  the  Study  of 
the  Mathematical  Sciences  was  deemed  by  Plato  the  heft  Intro- 
diiBion  to   the   Knowlcge  of  Intelligible  Things. 

All,— 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  581 

All, — or  Two,  tlie  grcateft, — being  compared  with 
Others  of  the  Same  Kind.  But  the  Students  in  Phi- 
lofophy  would  not  underftand  what  a  Man  meant, 
who,  in  numbering,  made  any  Difference  between 
Some  and  Other  of  the  Ones,  which  compofcd  the 
Number  ^^K 

Protarchus. 
You  are  perfedly  right,  in  faying,  that  no  incon- 
fiderable  Difference  lyes  in  the  Different  Manner  of 
fludying  and  uUng  Numbers  ;  fo  as  to  make  it  pro- 
bable, that  Two  different  Sorts  there  are  of  Arith- 
metick. 

Socrates. 
Well ;    and  What  of  Calculation  ^^^  in  Trade,  and 
of  Menfuration  in  Building  ?    does  the  latter  of  thele 

Arts 

3^5  See   Plato  Je   Repid/ka,   L.  7.    pag:    112,   Edit:   Cantab: 

386  The  yirt  of  calculating,  computing,  and  accounting,  {Aoytq^Doi 
in  Greek)  is  here  mentioned  as  an  Art  different  from  Arith- 
metic k ;    tho  by  many  Greek.  Writers,   and  hy  Plato  himfelf  elfe- 

where,    no  DiJiinSiion  is   made  between  them. To  know,   in. 

what  refpedls  they  differ,  and  whence  it  is  that  the  Difference 
is  often  overlooked,  may  be  of  ufe  for  the  right  underftanding 
of  the  Science  of  Mind.  For  in  this  Higheft  Part  of  Philo- 
fophy,  the  Terms  anciently  made  ufe  of,  were  borrowed  from 
the  Mathematical  Sciences :  the  reafon  of  which  was  This,— 
that   the  pure  Objc5fs    of  thefe    Sciences   are,    in    fome    degree, 

ahjlraSled. 


582 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Arts  not  differ  from  Mathematical  Geometry  ?  nor 
the  other,  from  Calculations  ^^^  made  by  the  Students 
in  pure  Mathematicks.      Shall  we  fay,   that  they  are, 

Each 

cbJlraEled  from  Body  ; — being  abflraded  from  Matter,  and  from 
all  the  Scnfibk  ^alitys  of  Body,  except  Figure  ; — and  are  there- 
fore  allyed,   more  nearly  than   Corporeal  Objedls  are,   to  Objedls 

purely   Intelligible. Now   Mathematical  Arithtnetick,    in   the 

llria    Meaning  of  that  Word,    is   the  Art   of  Numbering, — that 
is,   of  adding  Units  to  Units,  fo  as  to  compofe  or  augment  fome 
certain   Number, — and  alfo  of  fubtraSling  Units   or  fmall  Num- 
bers from  greater,  fo  as  to  de-compofe  or  lejfen  the  greater  Num- 
bers : — for   as    to    the  Rules,   which   direft  how   to   midtiply  and 
divide  Numbers,   they    depend   immediately  and   intirely  on   the 
Rules   for  adding  and  JubtraBing ;    and  on   thefe  Four  Rules  de- 
pend all   other   Operations   in   Pradical  Arithmetick. — The  Pri- 
mary   SubjeSis  therefore  of  this   Art  of  Numbering,    are  Units, — 
fuch   Ones    as    are   all  of  them  equal,  —  as   Socrates  jufl:   before 
obfervedj — and  the   Secondary  Subjedls   of  it  are  Numbers,   com- 
pofed  from   thofe   Ones,    and   confidered   meerly  with   rcfpedl   to 
That  their  Frame  or  Compofition,   without  regarding  any  of  their 
Propertys,   or  any  of  their    mutual  Relations. — But   as  Geometry, 
in   the  larger  fignification  of  the  word,    is   the  Science  of  Mea- 
fures,    on   which    Science    is   founded    the    Art  of  Menfuration,) 
and   includes   Stereometry,   or  the  Art  of  meafuring  Solids ;    altho, 
in    a    more   confined    fenfe.   Geometry  fignifys    only   the  Art  of 
ineafuring  Surfaces,  and  is  then  diftinguillied  from  Stereo?netry  -, — 
in  like   manner.    Mathematical   Arithmetick,    in    the   larger    fenfe 
of  the  word,   is   the  Science  of  Numbers,   and  of  all    their  Pro- 
pertys,  Powers,    and   Relations  :    thus    it  includes   Logijlick,    or 

the 


P    H    I    L    E.  B    U    S.  583 

Each  of  them,  but  One  Art  ?  or  fhall  we  fct  down 
Each  of  them  for  Two  ? 

Protarchus. 

the  Knowlege  of  Accounts ;  the  Suhjeci  of  which  Knowlege  (ac- 
cording to  the  definition  of  it  in  Plato's  Channides,  pag:  166,) 
is  That  Property  of  Numbers,  by  which  they  are,  all  of  them, 
divided  into  Two  Sorts,  Eve?i  and  Odd',  and  thro  the  Know- 
lege of  which  Subjedl,  the  nature  of  Both  thofe  Sorts  is  known, 
whether  confidei-ed,  each  in  its  Self,  or  as  they  (land  related  to 
each  other.  So  that  the  Primary  SubjeSls  of  Logijlick  are — not 
Units,  —  but  Numbers,  compofed  of  Units  ;  and  the  Secondary 
Subjedls  of  it  are  the  Equalitys  and  Inequalitys  of  different 
Numbers,  compared  together,  —  and  in  Unequals,  the  precife 
^lantity,  by  which  the  One  exceeds  the  Other.  For  the  ObjeSl 
and  End  of  this  Art  is,  in  all  Calculations,  Computations,  and 
Accounts,  to  judge  rightly  of  Equals  and  Unequals, — and  between 
Unequals,    to  afcertain    the  ^aiitum  of  the   Difference. 

3^7  The  Logijlick,  ufed  in  Merchant's  Accounts,  hath  the  fame 
Analogy  to  Mathematical  Logiftick,  as  the  Arithmetick,  ufed  in 
Buying  and  Selling,  has  to  the  Arithmetick  of  Mathematicians. 
For  it  is  only  the  Mathematical  Science  or  Art,  applyed  to 
things  Senfible  and  Corporeal.  As  Arithmetick  teaches  to  reckon 
up  the  Number  of  any  fuch  Subjeft-Matters  of  Exchange,  in 
Trade  and  Traffick, — fo  the  Accountanf s  Art  teaches  to  afcer- 
tain their  Comparative  Value,  when  the  Abfolute  Value  of  Each 
Article  is  firft  fettled,  and  when  afterward  they  are  all  com- 
pared together.  —  Accordingly,  in  Plato\  Politicus,  pag:  259, 
the  Office,  affigned  to  Logijlick,  is — ra  yvKSskvia.  v.^va.i,  to  judge 
of  things  known,  — thzt  is,  to  judge  of  their  refpedlive  Values, 
and  to  pronounce  what  the  Difference  is  between  them.     And 

E  e  e  e  occafion 


sH 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S 


Protarchus. 
For  My  part,    I   lliould   give   my  Opinion,   agree- 
ably  to   your  DiviHon   of  Arithmetick  ;     and   iliould 
fay,    that  Each   of  Thefe  Arts  alfo   was   Twofold. 

Socrates, 

occafion  is  hence  taken,  prefently  after  in  that  Dialogue,  to 
apply  the  name  of  this  Art,  AoQ/«j-i3t}),  in  a  figurative  fenfe,  to 
the  Science  of  Magiflratest  Kings,  Commanders  of  Armys,  and 
Politicians.  —  In  Flato^  Republick,  L.  7.  pag:  525,  it  is  again 
fo  applyed  :  but  the  figurative  application  of  that  term  7\.oyi(^ixrt 
is  there  carried  flill  higher ;  it  is  there  applyed  to  the  Science 
of  Mind,-^z  Science,  peculiar  to  the  true  Philofopher.  For  the 
yvu&ivTcc.  to  Him,  the  proper  Objeds  of  His  Science,  are,  according 
to  Socrates,  Truth  and  Being  j — in  which  are  included  all  Ideas 
lefs  general  than  Mind  or  Being  its  Self,  and  all  'Truths  fubordinate 
to  Truth  its  Self.-^-Now  every  fingle  Idea  is  perceived  and  known  by 
the  Firfi:  of  all  the  Mind's  Energys,  commonly  termed  by  Logicians 
Simple  Apprehenjion.  And  all  Pofitive  Truths,' — the  Relations  be- 
tween Ideas, — are  perceived  and  known  by  That  Energy  of  the  Mind^ 
which  the  Logicians  rightly  term  judgment ;  becaufe  the  perceiv- 
ing of  any  of  thefe  Relations  implys  not  only  a  Knoivlege  of  the 
Ideas  fo  related,  and  a  Difcernment  of  fome  Difference  between 
them,  but  alfo  a  right  Judgment  of  What  the  Difference  is. 
This  right  fudgmcnt  therefore  of  the  Mind  concerning  Mental 
Things,  perfeftly  thus  kfiown,  agrees  to  the  above-mentioned 
Definition  of  Logijlick  in  Plato's  Politicus :  and  according  to 
this  Definition,  the  name  of  Logijlick  is  applicable  to  the  Mind's 
perception  of  Truth,  in  the  fame  figurative  fenfe,  as  the  name 
of  Arithmetick  is  given,  in  the  Epinomis,  to  the  Mind's  per- 
ception of  her.  Firft  Objedts,   the   moft  fmple  of  pure  Ideas. 

Now. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         5^5 

Socrates. 
You  would  give  a  right  Opinion.     But  with  what 
Defign   I  brought  thefe  Diftindions    on   the  Carpet, 
do   You   conceive  ? 

Protarchus. 

Now  to  diftinguifh  between  Arithmetick,  (in  the  flri(5t  fenfe  of 
that  word,)  the  Art  of  Numbering^  —  and  Logijiick,  the  Art  of 
Accounting,  —  and  again,  to  comprife  them  Both  in  One,  — 
namely,  in  the  Science  of  Numbers,  {Arithmetick,  in  its  larger 
fenfe,) — may  help  us  to  difcern  the  Logical  Diflindlion  between  yas 
Mind  and  Xoyoi  Reafon, — and  to  perceive,  at  the  fame  time,  how 
they  are  aSlually  infeparable,    and   are  Both  comprehended  in  the 

larger   meaning   of  the  word  Mind. — For   this    term  Mind, 

in  its   ftricfter   fenfe,  denotes  the  Intelledl,  — That  Power  in  the 
Soul,   by  which   all    our  Ideas,    but  efpecially  the  Principles  of 
Knowlege,   are  perceived.   Each  feparately  and  fingly. — The  term 
yys   is    fo    ufed    by  Arifiotle,    in    his   Pojlerior  Analyticks,   L.   i, 
C.    33.    where    he  fays, — y^iyoi  iw,    a^^^v  i-Tn^n^ni,    by  Mind  I 
mean  the  Principle  of  Science :  —  and   again,    in   his  Nicomacbean 
Et hicks,    L.    6.    C.    6.    he   fays, — vhv  &vou  rw  o^^^uf,   that  Prin- 
ciples are  ObjeSls  of  the  Mind. — By  Kpicharmus  alfo   the    term  cas 
is   ufed,    to  fignify   the  Perception  of  Simple  Ideas,    in   that  Verfe 
of  his,   which   is  cited  in  Note  228  to  the  Banquet,   page  240: 
for   the  Platonijls  agree  in  opinion,    that  the  Outivard  Senfes  are 
meant,    in    that    Verfe   by    icLkKo.    other   things.      See   Maximus 
Tyrius,  in  Differtat:   i,   or  17,    §   10,   and  the  Authors  cited  by 
Heinfms  and  Davis  in  their  Notes  thereon. — But  the  term  Mind, 
in  its  larger  meaning,   includes  Peafon ;    whether  Reafon  be  con- 
fidered   as    the  Relation  between   Ideas,    or    the    Poioer  of  per- 
ceiving  that  Relation:     (fee    before    in   pages   182,    3.)    and   in 

E  e  e  e  2  this 


SS6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 


Protarchus. 
Perhaps  I  do.      But  I  could  wifh,   that  You  your 
Self  would  declare,   What  was  your  Defign. 

Socrates. 

this  fenfe  is  the  term  jw  ufed  by  Arijlotle  In  his  Treatife  de 
Animdy  L.  3,  C.  5.  "hiyta  vhv,  fays  he,  w  ^lavoetTai  XXI  uVo- 
XajuL^ccvei  h  ■{vx"'  -^7  M'md  I  7nean  That  [Power)  by  which  the' 
Soul  thinks  and  cofijeBures.  —  Now  One  fingle  Idea  is  not  the 
Objed:  of  a  Thought,  nor  of  a  ConjeSlure :  Two  Ideas  (at  the  leajl\ 
are  neceffary  in  the  forming  of  it.  For  a  Thought  and  a  Speech 
are  the  fame  thing  ;  (fays  Plato  in  his  Sophijla,  pag:  263.)  ex- 
cept that  the  former  is  aVsu  ywri??  without  Voice,  being  only  in 
the  Mind;  (fee  pages  453,  4.  of  the  prefent  Dialogue ;)  and 
a   Speech    is    a   combination    of    (at    /^^)    T'too   Terms,    fignifying 

Two  /rt'^^j. — Thefe  Samenelles  and  Differences, — on  the  one 

hand,  between  Arithmetick  and  Logijiick, — on  the  other  hand, 
between  Mind  and  Reafon, — as  flightly  as  we  have  now  touched 
on  them,  muft  appear  to  be  fo  greatly  alike,  that  the  A7ia~ 
logys  between  the  fortner  Two,  and  the  latter  Two,  are  eafily 
difcovered.  —  The  Analogy  between  ?ydyoi,  Reafon,  and  XoyK^iy-v, 
the  Knowlege  of  Accounts,  is  fo  obvious,  that  the  Rational  Part 
of  the  Soul  is  termed  hy  Plutarch  in  his  Sympofiacks,  L.  3,  C.  8. 
no  Aoyic^ixovt  the  Accounting  Part :  and  in  our  own  Language, 
the  fhowing  of  a  rational  ConneSlion  between  the  Moral  Adlions 
of  any  Perfon,— ror  a  probable  Coiicatenation  of  Hiftorical  Fadls, 
— the  affigning  alfo.  of  a  reafon  for  any  One  moral  Adion,  or 
hiftorical  Fadt, — is  often  expreffed  by  this  Phrafe,  "  the  giving 
of  an  Account.'' — The  other  Analogy,  That  between  the  Science 
of  Mind  and  the  Science  of  Numbers,  is  fo  juft  and  exadl,  that 
the  Pythagoreans,  who  were  great  Matters  in  Both  thofe  Sciences, 

confiderinw 

o 


PHILEBUS.         587 

Socrates. 

Thefe  Diftindions  feem    to  Me  to  have  fhown  to 
us,     that    in    Science    there    is    That    very   Circum- 

ftance 


confidering  Ideas  as  fo  many  fingle  Oiies,  termed  them  ivaJ'cts- 
Units ;  —  again,  confidering  Each  of  them  as  One  Many,  or 
Many  contained  in  Oi:e,  they  gave  them  the  name  of  Numbers  : 
and  This  indeed  they  feem  to  have  had  in  their  confideration, 
when  they  taught,  that  the  Soul  of  Man  was  compofed  of  Numbers : 
for  fuch  was  their  general  or  fummary  Dodlrine  concerning 
the  Soul.  But,  (to  flep  out  of  our  way  for  the  fpace  of  a 
few  Lines,  on  this  curious  and  interefting  Point,)  when  they 
taught  in  particular,  that  the  Soul  of  Man  was  Harmonically 
conftituted,  or  compofed  of  Numbers  in  Harmonic  Proportion, 
they  meant  to  infinuate  (as  far  as  We  apprehend)  a  very  high 
Dodrine,  founded  on  the  deepefl:  Refearches  into  the  nature  of 
the  Univerfe,  — This,  —  that  the  feveral  Parts  or  Powers,  both 
the  ASli've  and  the  PaJ/ive,  of  the  Human  Soul,  with  all  their 
EfFedls  and  Confequences  in  Human  Life,  ought  to  be,  and  ac- 
cording to  nature  were,  like  the  Energys,  Operations  and  Pro- 
dudions,  of  the  great  mundane  Soul,  all  harmonifing  together ; — 
viz.  in  general,  the  IntelleSiual  and  the  Senfitive,  the  Rational 
and  the  Imaginative,  the  Affectionate  and  the  Pafjionate,  the  Ap- 
petitive and  the  Averfative,  the  Nutritive  and  the  Generative. 
—- — — From  the  Digreflion  of  thefe  few  Lines,  we  return  to 
the  Subjed  of  our  prefent  Note;  and  (hall  finifli  it  in  Lines 
not  many  more,  but  of  much  more  comprehenfive  Import. 
For  if  we  inquire  into  the  Foundation  of  thofe  Refmblances  and-  of 
<;  thofe 


588 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 


fiance  attending  it,  which  we  had  before  difcovered 
to  be  in  Pleafure  ;  the  One  thus  anfwering  to  the 
Other.  For,  having  found,  that  fome  Sort  of  Plea- 
fure \yas  purer  than  fome  Other  Sort,  we  were  in- 
quiring, whether  the  fame  Difference  was  to  be 
found  with  regard  to  Science  ;  and  whether  One 
Sort  of   This    alfo  was  purer  than   fome  Other. 

thofe  Analogys  above-mentioned,  we  fliall  difcover  It  to  lye  In 
the  Ftrji  Principles  of  all  Form  and  Being; — in  thofe  Princi- 
ples of  Mind  its  Self,  as  well  as  of  Outward  Nature,  —  One 
and  M^ny,  Same  and  Different :  —  thefe  being  alfo  the  Principles 
of  Numbers ;  —  the  Principles  of  their  feveral  Ratios,  or  of  the 
Ratio  of  Each  Number  to  every  Other  j — and  the  Principles  of 
every  Proportion,  how  varioufly  foever  the  'Terttis  of  it  change 
their  Places, — For  Things  which  have  nothing  in  Common,  no 
Samenefs  between  them,  have  no  Relation  to  each  other :  and 
Samejiefs  of  Ratios,  or  Relations,  is  the  very  Effence  of  all  Pro- 
portion. On  the  other  hand,  to  every  Ratio,  or  Relation,  Dif- 
ference is  neceffary  J  to  iht  Rath  of  perfect  Equality,  Difference 
numerical:  for  every  Relation  is  between  T'lvo  tilings,  at  the 
fewell :  and  equal  Ratio's,  Two  at  the  fewefl;,  conflitute  Propor- 
tion.— Again  ;  One,  and  More  than  One,  are  effentially  necefiary 
to  every  One  Number ;  and  every  One  large  Number,  contain- 
ing many  lefs,  contains  many  Ratios  and  many  Proportioiis :  every 
Ratio  is  0/ie  Ideal  Thing  j  but  Two  Ideal  Things  are  neceffary 
to  compofe  it:  and  every  Proportion  is  but  One  Thing  in  Idea; 
yet  Tl?ree  Things,  or  Numbers,  are  the  fewefl  Materials,  to 
which    that   Ideal  Form   is  or  can  be   given, 

c  Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B     U    S.        589 

Protarchus. 
'Tis    very    manifeft,    that    your    Diftin(ftions    be- 
tween the  leveral  Arts   were  introduced  for  this  very 
Purpofe.    . 

Socrates. 
Well  then  ;    have  we  not  difcovered,    in  what  has 
been  faid,    that   Some  Arts  are   clearer   than   Others, 
having    more   Light  within    them  ;     and  that  Others 
are    more  involved    in   Obfcurity  and   Darknefs  ? 

Protarchus.. 

Evidently  fo. 

Socrates. 

And  has  not  the  courfe  of  our  Argument  led 
us  to  take  notice  of  fome  Art,  bearing  the  fame 
Name  with  fome  Other  Art ;  and  firft,  to  fuppofe  them 
Both  to  be,  as  they  are  commonly  imagined,  but 
One  Art ;  then,  to  confider  them  as  Two  different 
Arts ;  to  examine  Each,  with  regard  to  its  Clear- 
nefs  and  Purity  ;  and  to  inquire,  which  of  the  Two 
has  in  it  the  moft  Accuracy,  whether  That  which 
is  cultivated  by  Students  in  Philofophy,  or  That 
which  is   exercifed   by   the  Multitude  ? 

Protarchus. 
Our  Argument  feems  to  bring  on  this  Inquiry. 

SoCRATESi 


590         P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S, 

Socrates. 

And    what    Anfwer,     O    Protarchus  !     fliould    we 
make  to  fuch  a  Queftion  ? 

Protarchus. 
O   Socrates !    we   are   now  advanced  fo   far,    as  to 
difcover   an   amazingly   wide   Difference   between   the 
Parts   of  our   Knowlege   in   point   of  Clearnefs. 

Socrates. 
It   will   therefore  be  the  eafier   for  us,    to  anfwer 
to  that  Queftion. 

Protarchus. 
Without  doubt.  And  let  us  affirm,  that  thofe 
Leading  Arts  greatly  excell  the  Others  with  regard 
to  Clearnefs ;  and  that  Such  of  thofe  brighter  Arts 
themfelves,  as  are  ftudied  by  real  Students  in  Phi- 
lofophy,  difplay,  in  Meafures  and  in  Numbers,  their 
vaft  fuperiority  to  all  other  Arts,  with  regard  to  Ac- 
curacy and  Truth  ^^^ 

Socrates. 


3«g  This  whole  Sentence,  beginning  with  the  words  "  And 
let  us  affirm,"  is,  in  Stephens's  Edition,  very  improperly  given 
to  Socrates  ,  and  confequcntly  the  Sentence  following,  with 
equal  impropriety  to  Protarchus.  The  Bajil  Editions  are  Both 
right  J    the  Aldine  not   clear. 


P   H    I    L    E   B    U    S.         591 

SOCTIATES. 

Granting  thefe  tilings  to  be  what  You  fay  they 
are,  let  us,  on  the  Credit  of  what  you  have  faid  ^^\ 
boldly  anfwer  to  thofe  Perfons,  who  are  fo  formi- 
dable in  argumentation,    thus. 


389  Protarchus  was  not  fenfible,  that  he  had  fald  any  thing, 
bcfide  what  refulted  plainly  from  the  Reafoning  of  Socrates  jufl 
before.  He  knew  not,  that,  in  the  lad  words  of  his  Anfwer, 
he  had  gone  a  Step  farther,  than  he  was  authorifed  by  That 
Reafoning.  And  becaufe  this  Step  exceeded  the  Bounds  of 
Truth,  in  praife  of  Arithmetick  and  Geometry,  for  this  reafbn  it 
is,  that  Socrates  here  does  not  confirm  the  Anfwer,  made  to  his 
Queftion  by  Protarchus,  but  proceeds  to  examine  it. — In  fo  eafy 
and  natural  a  way,  is  the  brighteft,  the  purefb,  and  the  higheft 
Science, — That  of  Mind, — coming  on  to  be  introduced.  Indeed, 
without  fome  fuch  contrivance,  the  Mention  of  that  Science 
would  have  feemed  abrupt :  and  yet,  to  treat  of  it,  fo  far  at 
leaft,  as  to  delineate  the  nature  of  it,  is  no  lefs  effentially  ne- 
ceflary  to  the  SubjeB  of  this  Dialogue,  than  to  mention  it, 
next  after  Geometry  and  Arithinetick,  is  neceffary  to  the  Order, 
obferved  in  this  Second  Part  of  the  Dialogue,  regarding  the 
Conclufion.  For,  having  been  conduced,  thro  a  View  of  the 
grojfer  Pleafures  of  Senfe,  to  the  View  of  Such  as  are  Jiner  and 
pure  from  Pain ;  from  Thefe  we  proceeded  to  fpeculate  the 
Arts  and  Mathematical  Sciences :  from  Arts  and  thofe  lower  Sci- 
ences, we  now  rife  to  the  confideration  of  Mind,  as  it  is  in- 
telligent, the  Intelligence  of  Firft  Principles,  and  the  Science  of 
Univerfals, 

F  f  f  f  Protarchus, 


592         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

PROTARCHUS. 

How  ? 

Socrates. 

That  there  are  Two  Sorts  of  Arithmetick ;  and 
that,  dependant  on  thefe,  there  is  a  long  Train  of 
Arts,  Each  of  them,  in  like  mannerj  Twofold  under 
One  Denomination. 

Protarchus. 

Let  us  give  to  the  Perfons,  whom  you  call  for- 
midable, That  very  Anfwer,  O  Socrates  1  with  a 
confidence  of  its  being  right.. 

SoCRATE  S. 

Do  we  then  afErm,  that  in  thefe  Sciences  there 
is  an  Accuracy,   the  higheft  of  all, 

Protarchus^ 
Certainly.  , 

Socrates. 

But  the  Power  of  Dialeilick,  O  Protarchus  !  if 
we  gave  to  any  other  Science  the  Preference  above 
Her,   would  deny  that  Superiority. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         593 

Protarchus. 

what  Power  is  it,    to  which  we  arc  to  give  that 
name  ? 

Socrates. 
Plainly  That  Power,  O  Protarchus  !  by  which 
the  Mind  perceives  all  that  Accuracy  and  Clearnefs, 
of  which  we  have  been  fpeaking.  For  I  am  intircly 
of  opinion,  that  all  Perfons,  endued  with  even  the 
fmalleft  Portion  of  Underftanding,  mufl  deem  the 
Knowlege  of  the  real  Effence  of  Things,  —  the 
Knowlege  of  that  Kind  of  Being,  whofe  nature  is 
invariable, — to  be  by  far  the  moft  certain  and  true 
Knowlege.  But  You,  Protarchus  !  to  What  Art  or 
Science  would  You  give  the  diftindlion  of  Pre- 
eminence ? 

Protarchus. 
As  to  Mc,  O  Socrates !  I  have  often  heard  Gorgias 
maintaining  in  all  places,  that  the  Art  of  Per- 
fwafion  has  greatly  the  Advantage  ov^r  all  other 
Arts,  in  over-ruling  all  things,  and  making  all  Per- 
fons fubmit  to  it,  not  by  Conftraint,  but  by  a  vo- 
luntary Yeilding ;  and  therefore  that  of  all  Arts 
it  is  by  far  the  moft  excellent.  Now  I  fhould 
not  choofe  to  contradidl  or  oppofe  either  You  or 
Kim. 

F  f  f  f  2  Socrates. 


594         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
As    much   as   to    fay,    if  I  apprehend  your  Mean- 
ing rightly,   that  you  cannot,   for  fhame,   defert  your 
Colours  ''\ 

Protarchus. 

Let  Your  Opinion  of  thefe  matters  now  prevail ; 
and  the  Ranks  of  the  feveral  Arts  be  fettled,  as 
You  would  have  them., 

So  C  R  A'T  E  s .. 

Am  I.  now  to  blame  for  Your  making-  a  Miflake.? 

Protarchus.. 
What  Miftake  have  I  made  ? 

S  OCR  AT  E  s.. 
The  Queftion,  my  Friend  Protarchus  !'  was  not". 
Which  Art,  or  Which  Science  is  fuperiour  to  alii 
the  reft,  with  regard  to  Greatnefs,  and  Excellence, 
and  Ufefulnels  to  Us  ;  but  of  Which  Art  the  Ob- 
jedts  are  the  brighteft,  the  morl:  accurate  and  true, 
tho  the  Art  its  Self  brought  us  little  or  no  Gain  : 
This  it  is,    which  is  the  prefent  Subject  of  our  In- 

'90  In  this  Metaphor  it  is  implyed,  that  P/v?/^r^>&«j  had  been 
as  it  were  inlijied  under  the  Leading  and  the  Difcipline  of 
Gorgias, 

quiry,. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  595 

quiry.  Obferve  then  ;  Gorgias  will  have  no  Qiiarrcl 
with  you  :  for  you  may  ftill  allow  to  His  Art  the 
Preference  above  all  others,  in  Point  of  Utility  and 
Profit  to  Mankind.  But,  as  I  faid  before  concern- 
ing White,  that,  be  there  ever  fo  little  of  it,  fo  it 
be  pure,  it  excells  a  large  quantity  of  an  impure 
White,  with  regard  to  the  truth  of  Whitenefs  "^''  ; 
juft  fo  is  it  with  the  Study  which  I  have  been  com- 
mending J  it  excells  all  others,  with  regard  to  Truth 
its  Self.  And  now  that  we  have  confidered  this. 
Subjed:  attentively,  and  difcuffed  it  fufficiently,  lay- 
ing afide  all  Regards  to  the  Ufefulnefs  of  the  Sci- 
ences and  Arts,  as  well  as  to  the  Reputation  which 
they  bear  in  the  world,  and  thorowly  fifting  them 
to  find  out  the  Purity  of  Mind  and  Wifdom,  — -  if 
there  be  in  the  Soul  any  Faculty  of  lovino-  Truth 
above,  all  things,  and  of  doing  whatever  fhe  does,, 
for  the  fake  of  Truth,- — let  us  confider,  whether  it 
is  right  to  fay,  that  we  have  this  Faculty  improved 
chiefly  by  Dialedick,  or  whether  we  muft  fearch 
for  fome  other  Art,  fitter  for  that  purpofe,  and 
making  it   more   her  proper  Bufinefs. 

PrOT  ARCHUS. 

Well,    I  do   confider   the   Point   propcfed  5,    and   I 
imagine  it   no  eafy  matter  to  admit,    that  any  other- 

39'  See  in  Pages  454,  5,,- 

Science: 


596  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Science  or  Art   feeks  and   embraces  Truth   To  much 
as   This. 

Socrates. 
Say    you    this,    from   having    obferved,    that    many 
of   the   Arts,     even    fuch   as   profefs    a    laborious   In- 
quiry after  Truth,    are   in   the    firft  place  converfant 
only   with    Opinions,    and   exercife    only   the    Imagi- 
nation ;     and    that    methodically,     and    according    to 
a  fet   of  Rules,    they  then  fearch  into  things  which 
are    the   Subjeds    only   of  fuch  Opinions  "'  ?    and   do 
you    know,     that    the    Perfons,     who    fuppofe    them- 
felves    to    be    inquiring    into    the    Nature  of  Things, 
are,    all  their  Lives,    inquifitive   about   nothing   more 
than    this    Outward   World,    how   it    was   produced, 
what    caufeth    the    Changes    which    happen    therein, 

39^    Meaning,    as    we   prefume.    Such    as    the  Philofophers   of 

the    Ionic   Sedl,    by  Arijlotk  ftyled   (puo-j^co)  Naturalijis.      For  we 

learn  from  D.  Laertius,   that  Arcbelaus,  a  Difciple  oi  Anaxagoras, 

and   the   lafh  ProfefTor   and   Teacher   of    the  Dodrine   of    thofe 

Philofophers,    did,   in  the  \!\vi\^  oi  Socrates,   introduce  into  y^/,^^«j 

Their  Way    of   philofophifing ;     which  was    none    other,    than 

That,   fpoken  of  in   this  Paflage.     It  feems   therefore  probable, 

that   the  Athenian    Scholars    of  Arcbelaus  are    the   very    Perfons, 

whofe  Studys   are  here  fhown  to  fliU  fliort  of  attaining   to  the 

Knowlege  of  Truth,    or  the  true  Nature  of  Tubings. — The  fame 

Judgment  of   Socrates,   concerning   thefe  Ionic  Phyfiologers,   v/e 

find  recorded   by  Xenophon,    in  Mcmorabih   L.    i,    C.   i,   §  ii. 

6  and 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  597 

and  how  thofe  Changes  operate  their  EfFcds  ?    Should 
we  acknowlegc  all  This  fo  to  be,  or  how  otherwife  ? 

Protarchus. 
Juft  Co, 

Socrates. 

Whoever  of  us  then  addicfls  himfelf  to  the  Study 
of  Nature  in  this  way,  employs  his  time  and  care, 
not  about  the  Things  which  always  are  in  Being, 
but  about  Things  which  are  either  newly  come  into 
Being,  or  which  are  to  come,  or  which  have  been 
already  and  are  paft, 

Protarchus. 
Very  true. 

Socrates. 

What  Clearnefs  therefore,  what  Certainty,  or  exadir 
Truth,  can  we  exped;  to  find  in  thefe  Things,  none 
of  which  had  ever  any  Stability  or  Samenefs  in  them, 
nor  ever  will  have  any,  nor  have  fuch  of  them  as 
now  exift,   any,   even  during  their  exigence  ? 

Protarchus^ 
How  can  it  be   expedted  ? 

S0CRATES» 


59^  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Concerning  Things,  in  which  there  is  not  the 
leaft  Stability,   how  can  we  form  any  ftable  Notions  ? 

Protarchus. 
I  fuppofe  it  not  pofTible. 

Socrates. 

Of  thofe  Things  then  there  is  neither  Intelligence, 
nor  any  Sort  of  Science  to  be  acquired ;  at  leaft, 
not  fuch  as  contains  the  higheft  degree  of  Certainty. 

Protarchus. 
It  is  not  probable,   that  there  is. 

Socrates. 

We  ought  therefore,  both  you  and  I,  to  lay  afide 
the  conlideration  of  what  Gorgias  or  Philebus  faid, 
and  to  eftablifti  on  a  firmer  Bafis  this  Truth. 

Protarchus. 
What    truth  ? 

Socrates. 
This  ;  —  Whatever   is   in  us  of  ftable,    pure,    and 
true,   it  has  for  the   Objeds  of  it — either  the  Beings 
which   always    are,     and    remain    invariable,     intirely 

pure 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  599 

pure  and  unadultcrate  ^'^\ — or  [if  Tlicfe  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  Our  Sight]  then  Such  as  are  the  ncareft 
allyed  to  them,  and  are  Second  in  the  Ranks  of 
Being  "'^  :  for  all  other  Things  come  after  thofe 
Firft   Beings, — Second,    and    fo   on   in   Order  "'. 

Protarchus. 

39  5  Meaning  the  eternal  and  immutable  Ideas  of  the  Divine 
Mind.  For,  inafmuch  as  the  Divine  Being  is  the  Creative 
Caiife  of  all  Corporeal  Things,  He  himfelf  (who  is  pure  Mind) 
muft  be  unmixed  with  any  thing  Corporeal:  and  confequently, 
the  Ideas  of  his  Mind,  all  of  which  are  eternal  and  immu- 
table, the  Formal  Canfes  of  all  things  Corporeal,  muft  be  per- 
fectly pure  and  unmixed  with  Images :  becaufe  Images  in  the 
Soul  are  only  in  the  Soul's  Imaginative  Part,  are  only  of  Cor^ 
foreal  things,    and   are   themfelves  alfo  Corporeal. 

391-  Thefe  Beings  of  Second  Rank  are  the  Ideas  of  all  Par^ 
ticular  Minds ;  and  Such  are  not  only  Ours,  the  Human,  but 
all  Other  Minds,  inferior  to  the  Divine.  For,  whatever  Ra- 
tional Beings  there  may  be  in  the  infinite  number  of  Orbs, 
and  vaft  Regions  of  the  Univerfe,  unknown  to  Us, — and  how 
greatly  foever  Some  of  thofe  Beings  may  excell  Man  in  the 
higheft  Powers  of  his  Soul,  IntelkB  and  Reafon, — yet  the  Mind 
of  Every  One  of  them  muft  be  Particular ;  becaufe  it  is  united 
with  only  a  Part  or  Portion  of  formed  Matter,  a  Body,  how 
fine  foever  J  to  the  Soul  of  which  Body  fuperadded  is  a  Mind. — 
Now  by  means  of  this  Body  it  is,  that  the  Soul,  which  ani- 
mates it,  not  only  receives  from  external  Things  the  Imprejions, 
which  are  made  in  her  Senfory,  the  proper  Seat  of  all  her  Senfa^ 
//owj,— but  receives  alfo  the  Images  of  thofe  Things  into  Their 

G  g  g  g  proper 


6oo  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    Sv 

proper  Seat,  her  Imagmation : — and  by  means  of  this  Soul  it  is,, 
—  by  means  of  thofe  ImpreJJions  and  thofe  Images  which  flie 
receives, — that   the   fiiper-added   Mind  hath   its   con-natural  Ideas 

at   the   firH:   excited. In   other  words;     eflentially  ?iatiiral  it 

is  to  all  particular  Minds,  to  univerfalife  every  Objedt,  prefented 
to  them  by  Senfe  and  Imagination,  —  to  rife  from  every  Indi- 
iiidual,  which  by  thofe  means  they  take  cognifance  of,  to  the 
Species, — thence  to  the  Kind,  and  to  thofe  higher  Vniverfals,  of 
which  every  Individual   partakes,   whatever  Kind  and  Species   it 

belongs  to. But  whilft  the  Mind  is  thus  rifing  from  Beings 

of    lower     Order   to     thofe    of   Higher,    it    is,     all     the     time, 
fo   clofely   joined    to   Senfe  and   Imagination,    that    the   Images   of 
things   Senfible,    not  only  reach  it   thro  the  Organs  of  Senfe,  but 
are  retained  alfo   in   the   Memory ;    and  with   Memory  and  Imagi" 
nation    the   Mind  is  for  ever   converfant,   even  when   the  Organs 
of  Senfe  are  obflrudled  totally  in  Sleep  :    fo  that  Images  are  mixed 
v/ith   all  Our  Ideas,    and  render  them   lefs   pure    and  clear,    lefs 
true  and   certain,    than    the   Divine   Ideas,    their  Archetypes.—— 
In   thefe  Divine  Ideas,    the  Seat  of  which   is   the  Divine  Mind, 
and   only  in   Them,    is   to    be   found   what  Socrates,   in  Plato's. 
Phcedo,    (pag:    266,   Edit:   Oxon:)    ftyles   «   dh'n^aa.   tmv  oinuv  the 
Truth   of  Things,    or   True   Being.       For   he    there   tells    to    his 
Difciples,   who   were  attendant    on  him  in  thofe  laft  Hours  of 
his   Life,   that  he  had  formerly  fought  to  find  that  Truth   gV  to?s 
ioyoii  in   the   Works  of  Nature:     (This   was   at  the  time,    whea 
he   admired  Ariaxagoras,   and  lludied  the  Writings  of  that  great 
Phyfiologer  :)    but   that,   meeting  only  with  Difappointments  in 
this   way  of  philofophifing,    (for   that  neither  Outward  Nature,, 
nor  Thofe   who   wrote   concerning  it,    fhowed  him   the   funda- 
mental  Caufes  of  Things,    or  their  real  EJJenccs,    but  the  Images- 
of  them   only,)     he    applyed  himfelf,    from   that    time,    to    the 
Search   of  Truth  gV  tois   hoyon  in  Reaforrngs,  —  in    the    inward 
5  Speeches 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         6oi 

speeches  of  his  own  Mind,  and  in  Logical  or  Dialeclical  D!/- 
courfes.  —  But  he  plainly  enough  intimates,  at  the  fame  time, 
that,  in  Human  Minds,  the  U/iherfals,  the  Subjeds  of  thofc 
Speeches  and  Difcourfes,  are,  like  the  t^yoc  Works  of  Nature, 
only  &y.ovii  Images  or  Copys  of  true  Beings,  tho  fji.aK?,ov  more 
nearly  refembling  the  Originals  or  Realitys.  See  Note  62  to  the 
prefent  Dialogue,  Pages  106,  7;  and  Note  118,  Page  181. 
■Very  willingly  therefore,  and  very  confiftently  with  him- 
felf,  does  Socrates,  in  Plato?,  Parmenides,  (pag:  22,  24,  and  26 
Edit:  Oxon:)  acknowlege,  that  eternal  Ideas, — Forms  fubfifling 
hy  Themfelves,  auVas  jcaS-'  aJras,  apart  from  all  external  and 
fenfible  Things,  are  not,  and  cannot  poffibly  be  in  Us ; — that 
Beauty  its  Self,  or  Good  its  Self,  in  its  own  pure  Eflence,  is 
not  an  Objedl  of  Our  Knowlege  ; — and  that  an  accurate  Science 
of  the  Truth  of  Things  is  in  God  alone; — for  that  Science  in 
Man  reaches  not  to  Any  Thing  which  is  Divine.  —  All  thefc 
Inferences,  drawn  by  Partne?iides  from  the  Dodrine  of  Ideas, 
(on  which  depends,  according  to  that  Great  Philcfophcr,  the 
Power    of    Dialedick,)    Socrates   lays,     are   intirely  agreeable    to 

his  own   Mind. Arifotle,    on    this    SubjedV,   feems   to    have 

been  of  a  different  Opinion.  He  feems  either  to  have  fup- 
pofed  that  Our  ro;i,uaT«,  or  Notions  of  the  Kinds  and  Species  of 
Things,  were  poffible  to  be  divfled  of  all  the  Images  of  Senfible 
Objeds ;  and  that  Our  Minds  were  capable  of  becomintr  as 
pure  and  fmple  as  Mitid  its  Self; — or  elfe  to  have  deemed  thofe 
Kinds  and  Species  of  Things  as  they  exift  in  outward  Nature, 
all    the   Similitudes    and   DiJJimilitudes   of  Corporeal  Forms,    to    be 

Objeds   of  the  Divine   Mind  as  properly  as    of   the   Human. 

Indeed  he  never  departs  from  the  Doftrine  of  Plato  concern- 
ing the  Principles  of  Knoxclege,  or  concerning  thofe  Univerfals, 
the  Kinds  and  Species  of  Things ;  rightly  arguing,  that,  with- 
out them,    no  Definition   could    be   given   of  any  thing  j  —  that, 

G  g  g  g  2  without 


6o2  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

without  them,   there  would   be  no  Demonftrative  or  Syllogiftic 
Reafonlng,    no  General  Condujion    could   be   drawn  from  any  FrC' 
r/iiJJ'es  ; — and  that,    without  them,  we  fliould  only  have  SenfatioJis, 
or  Perceptions  of  Senjible  Things,    but   no  Science.-  ■     -And  thus 
far  the   acute   and  learned  Stagyrite  confirms  the  Sentiments  of 
his   great  Mafter.     But,   in   many  Paffages   of  his  Writings,   he 
argues  againft    the  Being  of  any  Univerfals,   confidered  as  lying 
feparate   or   apart   from    the   Forms  of  Nature,   with   which   our 
SenJ'es  are  converfant.      For  it  is    from   thefe  Individual  and  Ex- 
ternal   Forms,    that   the   Human   Mind  is   by  Him   fuppofed   to 
gather  up  as   it  were  thofe  Univerfals,   and  to  colleB  them  within 
her  Self,    by   ahJlraBing    them    Xoyoj)  from   that  uAw  or   Common 
Matter,    with   which   all   Form  is  united.      On   this   fuppofition, 
rejedled   are    the  Forms    of  higher  Order,  —  the  Forms,    original 
to   thofe   of  outward   Nature ;  —  and  v  the  Great  Mind  Univerfal 
differs    not   from  any  Particular  Mind,   except   by  being  aBually, 
what   every   particular   Mind    by  nature   is   only  S'wa.iJim,    or  has 
a   bare  Capacity  of  being,   viz.    the  place  of  Forms  Intelligible,  of 
abJlraSi  Forms,    unmixed  with    Matter  j  —  and  except  alfo,    by 
comprifing    at    once,    in    One   eternal  View,    all    the  Forms   of 
Nature :    whilft   every  Mind  Particular,   even  the  largeft   and  the 
moft  comprehenfive,   is  obliged,    in  all  her  Speculations,    if  they 
are  diflindl  and  accurate,    to  view   One  Form  only  at  a  time; 
and    in    the  Procefs  of   all  her  Reafonings,    to  make  a  tranfitioa 
jfrom  One  Form  to  Another ;    either  from  one  Species  to  another 
and    fo    on,    as    in    reafoning   by  hiduSlion ;    or   from   Genus   to 
Species,   and  back  again    to  Genus,    as   in   reafoning  Syllogiftically, 
or  from  Compound  Forms   to  their  Elements  and  Principles,  in 
reafoning  Analytically. 

395  The  feveral  Perceptive  Poiz-crs  of  the  Soul  have,  for  their 
refpedive  Objeds,  all  the  feveral  Kinds  of  Form  or  Being.  The 
primary  Forms,    or  thofe  of  higheil  Dignity,    are,   according  to 

5  Socrates 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         603 

Protarchu  s. 
Perfedly  right. 

Socrates. 
The    nobleft    therefore    of    the  Names,     given    to 
Things  of  this   Kind  ^^\    is   it  not  perfedly  right  to 
aflign  to  Thofe  oi  this  Kind,  which  are  the  nobleil  ? 

Protarchus. 


Socrates  and  P/afo,  pure  li^eas,  the  Obje£ls  of  tlie  Divine  Mind, 
and  the  SubjeBs  of  Divine  VVifdom. — Ideas  probably,  which  ths 
higheft  Power  in  Man's  Soul,  his  IntelleB,  has  but  a  bare  Ca- 
pacity of  viewing,  in  their  genuine  Purity,  or  as  they  are  in 
Themfelves. — The  Forms  oi  fecond  Rank,  as  they  are  rightly 
deemed  by  Socrates  in  the  prefent  Sentence,  are  Ideas  in  the 
Human  Mind,  of  thofe  Divine  Forms  original  the  Mental  Copys, 
the  natural  and  proper  Objects  of  Man's  Reafon,  and  the  Sub- 
jeSis  of  his  Keafoning  and  of  all  his  Science. — 'Third  in  Dignity 
are  the  vital  Forms  of  Nature,  the  ObjeSls  of  the  Senjitive  and 
Imaginative  Powers  of  the  Soul,  and  the  SiibjeSls  of  Opinion  and 

Hypothejis. Lafl;    and    loweft    in    the   Ranks    of   natural  Beijig 

are  things  inanimate,  the  intirely  paffive  Subjects  of  Human 
Art;  OhjeBs  of  Se?ife  and  Imagifiation  thefe  alfo,  but  not  of 
Opinion., 

39*  In  this  expreffion,  [things  of  this  Kind)  are  meant  to  be 
included  all  the  perceptive  Powers  or  Facultys  of  the  Soul, 
as  well  as  all  the  Objects  of  Perception,  mentioned  in  the  pre- 
ceding Note.  For  every  perceptive  Power,  is  united  with  its 
ObjeSl,  by  adually  perceiving  it.  —  The  Seiifitive  Power,  thro 
adual   Senjation,    is    united   with    its   prefent    Obje*5t,    fo   far   as 

that 


604 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


P  R  O  T  A  R  C  H  U  S  . 

'Tis  reafonable,    (o  to  do. 

Socrates. 

Are    not  Mind  and  Wifdom    the  nobleft  of   tliofe 
Names  ? 

that  Objeft  \%  fenfible  or  an  Objed:  of  Senfe :  —  the  Iinaginathe 
Power  of  the  Soul,  in  imagining,  is  united  with  an  Objedl  of 
Imagination  : — the  Rational  Power,  in  the  adl  of  rea/oning,  be- 
comes One  with  an  Objedt  of  Reajon,  the  prefent  Subjed;  of 
its   reafoning:  —  and  the   Intelle£live  Power,  in  aftual  Intelleclion, 

is  One  with    that   intelligible  Form,    its   prefent  Objed. In 

reality,  both  Mind  and  Senfe  are  formed  by  their  ObjeSls.  Mind 
without  intelledion  of  any  Ideas,  and  Se?ife  without  a  fenfatioa 
of  any  ObjeSls  of  Senfe,  are  nothing  more  than  vhxi  the  Matter 
of  their  refpedtive  Forms;  like  the  uAjj  or  common  Matter  of  all 
corporeal  things,  confidered  Koya  as  void  of  Form.  For  Mind 
is  the  Place  or  Refidence  of  Ideas,  and  Se77fe  is  the  Receptacle 
of   Senfations ;    juft   as   external  Matter  is   the  Receptacle  and   the 

Place  of  external  Forms.  No   lefs    true   is  it,    on   the   other 

hand,  that  —  as  there  would  be  in  Nature  no  external  Forms, 
if  That  cotnmon  Matter,  which  is  the  Subjedt  of  them  all,  were 
away,  —  fo,  none  of  thefe  Forms,  confidered  as  Scn/ible,  or  as 
Objeds  of  Senfe,  could  have  any  Exiftence,  if  there  was  not, 
in  Beings  of  a  certain  Kind,  viz.  in  all  Animals,  the  Power 
of  Setfation ;  nor  could  there  be  in  the  Soul  any  Images  or 
internal  Reprefentatives  of  external  Forms,  if  there  was  not  in 
the  Soul  a  Power  of  Imagination :  neither  would  any  Intelli- 
gible Forms,  any  Ideas,  have  a  Being,  was  there  not,  in  the 
internal  Nature  of  the  Univerfe,  the  Power  (in  Man  perhaps, 
and  in  fomc  other  Beings,  at  the  firft,  a  bare  Capacity)  of  Mind 
or  Intelledl. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B     US.        605 

Protarchus» 
They  are. 

Socrates. 
Rightly  then  are  thefe  Names,   in  accurate  Speech, 
appropriated    to    the  Intelligence  and  Contemplation 
of  Real  Being  "^ 

Protarchus. 

Certainly  fo. 

Socrates. 

And  the  Things,  for  the  excellency  of  which  I 
at  the  firft  contended,  are  the  very  Things,  to  which 
we    give    thefe  Names. 

Protarchus. 
Clearly  are  they,    O  Socrates  ! 

Socrates. 

Well  now ;  were  a  Man  to  fay,  that  the  nature 
of  Mind  and  the  nature  of  Pleafure  lay  feverally 
before  us,  like  Two  different  Sorts  of  Materials  be- 
fore fome  Workman,  for  Him  to  mix  or  join  to- 
gether, and  from  them,  and  in  them,  to  compofe 
his    defigned   Work,  —  would  he    not    make   a   fair 

397    See  Page  240  of  this  Dialogue. 

Comparifon^ 


6o6  P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S, 

Comparlfon,   fuitable   to  the  Tafk  which  our  Inquiry 
has    engaged  us   in  "^  ? 

Protarchus. 
A  very   fair  Comparifon. 

Socrates. 

Should  we  not  then,  in  the  next  place,  fet  about 
mixing   them   together  ? 

Protarchus. 
"Why   fhould  we  not? 

See  rates. 

Would  it  not  be  our  befl  way,  to  begin  this 
Work  by  recolleding  and  repeating  thofe  things  over 
again  ^"  ? 

39?  See  Page  211,  and  317;  and  the  Arginnent  alfo  of  this 
Dialogue,  Page  27.  —  According  to  the  Divijion  of  it,  propofed 
in  that  Argument,  the  Third  and  laft  Part  of  it  begins  with  the 
Sentence  now  before  us.  For  the  nature  of  Mind  having  been 
confidered  in  the  Firjl  Part,  and  the  nature  of  Pleafure  in  the 
Second  Part,  the  nature  of  that  greater  Goody  which  confifls  in 
the  right  Mixture  of  Mind  and  Fkafure^  is  the  only  remaining 
Subjedl  of  Inquiry. 

"9  See  Note  132. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S.         607 

Protarchus. 
What  things  ? 

Socrates. 
Thofe,   we  have  often  mentioned  before  *°°.     For, 
I  think  the  Proverb  fays  well, — "  Again   and  again 
That  which  is  right,    by  repeating  it,    to  recall  into 
our  Minds  ^°'." 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly. 

Socrates. 

*°°    In   the  Greek  of   this  Sentence,    as   it    is    printed,    there 

feems  to  be  an  Omiflion  of  the   neceflary  word  ■KoKKa.v.a,     See 

Stephens^  Edition  of  Plato,  vol:  2,  pag:  19,  D.  i.  or  Page 
194   in   this   Tranflation. 

'^"'  The  Proverb,  here  mentioned,  is  recorded  by  Zenobius 
and  by  Suidas  thus,  —  A/?  jca)  T^i«  to  xaXov.  And  indeed  the 
Whole  of  it  feems  to  be  contained  in  thofe  few  words;  and 
the  reft  of  the  Sentence,  now  before  us,  feems  added  by  Plato, 
to  explain  and  illuftrate  the  true  Meaning  of  that  Proverbial 
Saying. — Michcid  Apcftolius,  however,  at  firft  Sight  may  fee m  to 
report    the   Proverb   more  fully  and   perfedlly   in   thefe  words, — 

L^ii    V.Oil    TPli     TO     XaAOV        TO     ds     XaxOV     8j'      CCTTO.^. 

Again,  and  yet  again,  'whateer  is  good: 
But  what  is  evil,  not  fo  much  as  once. 

We  have  tranflated  the  Sentence  laft  cited,  thus  into  Englifh 
Metre,  becaufe  we  apprehend  it  to  be  a  Verfe  of  fome  ancient 
Sentimental    Poet,    poffibly  Euripides,    reciting   the  Proverb,    and 

H  h  h  h  adding 


6o8  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
In  the  name  of  Jupiter,  then  come  on.     The  whole 
of  our  Controverfy  began,   I   think,   with  ftating  the 
Point  in  queftion,    to  This  Effecl. 

adding  to  it ;  efpecially  if,  inflead  of  to  Sl  Kaxov,  the  right 
Reading  be,  as  probably  it  is,  to  S"'  aia^^ov.  For  the  Sentmetrf, 
tho  very  laudable,  is  not  JiJigle  enough,  nor  is  the  Sentence 
concife  or  brief  enough,  for  a  Proverbs  If  our  Suppofition  be 
well  founded,  —  that  'tis  a  Ferfe,  containing  in  the  Firft  Half 
of  it  the  Proverb,  and  in  the  Latter  Half  a  Thought,  how  jufl: 
foever,  yet  foreigyi  to  the  Proverb, — this  additional  Thought  io 
much  agrees  with  That  of  Sophocles,  in  his  Oedipus  TyraJimis,. 
ver.    1423, 

Bejl,    not  to  /peak  of  ivhat  'tis  ill  to  a5l, 

that  we  are  apt  to  imagine  it  thence  derived.  However  this 
be,  the  Proverb,  as  we  have  it  delivered  to  us  by  thofe  old 
Grammarians,  firft  cited,  and  no  more,  is  alluded  to  by  Plato, 
in  his  Sixth  Book  de  Legibus,  pag:  754,  C.  2.  and  again  in 
his  Gorgias,  pag:  498,  lin:  ult:  where  he  attributes  to  it  the 
fame  Meaning  as  in  the  prefent  PalTage^  but  in  other  Words. 
Zenobius  alfo  interprets  the  Proverb,  agreeably  to  Plato's  Senfe 
of  it,  as  meaning — not  to  applaud  the  frequent  Doing  of  good 
ABions, — (for  the  frequent  Repetition  of  Thefe  is  too  evidently 
right,  for  the  Praile  of  it  to  pafs  into  a  Proverb, — )  but  mean- 
ing to  juflify,  or  at  leafl:  to  apologize  for,  the  Repetition,  over 
and  over  again,  of  the  fame  Words  and  Sentences,  exprcfiivc 
of  the  fame  Thoughts,    if  thofe  Thoughts   are  jufl:  and  true. 

6  Protarciiu3^ 


P  H  I  L  E  B  U  S.    609 

PROTARCHUS. 

How  ? 

Socrates. 
Philebus   affirms,    that  Plcafure  is  the  right  Mark, 
fet  up   by  Nature,    for  all  Animals  to  aim  at  ;     that 
they  all    ought    to    purfue  Pleafure ;    that  the  Good 
of    them    all    is   this   very  thing,   Pleafure ;    and  that 
good  and  pleafajity   thefe   Two  Attributes,   belong  but 
to    One    Subjedl,     as    they  Both    have    but  One   and 
the     fame     Nature  :      on    the     other    hand,    Socrates 
denys   This  to  be  true  ;    and  maintains,    in  the  firft 
place,    that    as  the  Two  Names,    good  and  pleafant, 
are    Two    different    Names,     different    alfo    are    the 
Things  fo  denominated  '^^  ;    in  the  next  place,    that 
the  Nature   of   Good   differs  from  that  of    Pleafure  ; 
and  that  Intelligence,   or  Mind,   partakes  of  the  Pro- 
perty s     of    Good    more    than  Pleafure  does,     and    is 
allyed  nearer  to  its  Nature  *°^      Were  not  fome  fuch 
Pofitions    as     Thefe^     O    Protarchus !     feverally    laid 
down  by  us  ? 

Protarchus. 
They  were. 

+"  See  Pages   68   and  74,    and  Note  35. 
4^3  See  Pages   50  and  218. 

H  h  h  h  2  Socrates. 


6io         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

But  was  not  This  Point  agreed  on  between  us  at 
that  time,  and  do  we  not  ftill  agree  in  it  ? 

Protarchus. 
What  Point  ? 

Socrates. 
That  the  nature  of   Good  its  Self   is  more  excel- 
lent   than    the    nature   of   any  other  Thing,    in  this 
refped:. 

Protarchus* 
In  what  refpect  ? 

Socrates. 

This, — that  whatever  animal  Being  hath  the  con- 
flant,  intire,  and  full  Pofl'eflion  of  Good  its  Self,. 
fuch  a  Being  has  no  want  of  any  thing  befide, 
having  always  a  moft  perfed:  and  compleat  Suffici- 
ency ^°^.      Is    it    not    fo  ? 

Protarchus. 
It    certainly   is. 

Socrates. 
Have    we   not    endeavoured    to   confider   feparately 
a  Life    of   Pleafure    and    a    Life    of    Undcrflanding, 

404    See  Pages  200  and   202* 

Each 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  6ii 

Each  unmixed  with  the  Other,  —  a  Life  of  Pleafure 
without  Underftanding,  and  in  like  manner,  a  Life 
of  Underftanding  without  the  fmalleft  degree  of 
Pleafure  ? 

Protarchus. 

We  have. 

Socrates* 

Did  Either  of  thofe  Lives  appear  to  Us,  at  that 
time  ^°^y  to  be  fufEcient  for  the  Happinefs  of  any 
Man  ? 

Protarchus. 
How   was    it    pofTible  ^°^  ? 

Socrates. 

But  if,  at  that  time,  any  Miftake  was  committed, 
let  it  be  now  revifed  and  rectified.  In  order  to 
which,  let  us  take  Memory,  Knowlege,  Underftand- 
ing, and  Right  Opinion,  comprehending  them  all 
in  One  Idea,  and  confider  whether  any  Man,  with- 
out having  fomething  of  that  Kind,  would  ac- 
cept of  Pleafure  were  it  offered  to  him,  either  in  the 
greateft  abundance,   or  in  the  moft  exquifite  degree  j 

^''J  That  is,  —  when  they  were  feverally  the  Subjects  of  our 
confideration. 

'*''*  See  Pages   206  and  212. 

6  whether 


6i2  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

whether  indeed    he  would   regard  the  having    or  the 
receiving  of  any  thing  whatever  ;    as  he  would  not, 
in    that    cafe,    have   a  right  Thought  or  Opinion  of 
his    having    any    Pleafure ;     neither  would    he   know 
VvHiat    he    felt    or    had    at    prefent ;     nor   would    he 
remember,    in    what    condition    or   circumftances   he 
had    been    at    any  time   before  '^°''.       In   like   manner 
concerning    Intelleclion    or   Underftanding,    conlider, 
whether    a    Man   would    chufe    to  have  it  without  a 
mixture  of  any  Pleafure  in   the  leaft,   rather  than  to 
have  the  fame  Underftanding  attended  with  Pleafures 
of    certain    Kinds  '^"^  ;     and    whether    a    Man   would 
prefer  the    having    of  all    poflible   Pleafures,   without 
Underftanding,    to  the  having   of  them  accompanied 
with  fome  degree  of  Underftanding. 

Protarchus. 
It   is  impoflible,    O  Socrates  !    for  a  Man  to  make 
any    fuch  Choice   as   you   have  fuppofed.      And  there 
is    no   occafion  to   repeat  thefe  Queftions   again   and 
again  *°'. 

■♦"^    See  Page  209. 

408   What  Kinds   are  here  meant,   will  foon  appear. 

''"'i   This    feems    to    refer  jocofcly  to   the  Proverb,    cited  juft 
before.      See  Note  401. 

Socrates. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  613 

Socrates. 
Not  Pleafure   then,    nor    Underftanding,    either  of 
them    alone,     can    be    the    perfed;    and    confummate 
Good,   eligible   to   all  men,    That  which  We  are  in- 
quiring  after. 

Protarchus, 
Certainly,   not. 

Socrates. 
Of   this   Good    then    we   are   to    give   a   clear   and 
full   Defcription,    or  at   leafl:  fome   Sketch ;     that  we 
may   know,    where    the  Second   Prize   of   Excellence, 
as   we   called   it,    ought   to   be   beftowed  '^'°. 

Pr  ot  archu  s. 
Perfectly  right. 

Socrates-. 
Have    we    not   then    taken    a   Way,    by  which    we- 
may  find   out   our  Chief  Good  ? 

Protarchus-. 
what  Way  do  you  mean  ? 

SOCRAT  E  s. 

As,    if  we.  were   in   fearch  of  any  particular  Man^ 
and   were  already  well  informed  of  the  place  of  his 

'♦"  See  Page  217. 

Abode,. 


6i4         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Abode,    we   fliould   have    made  a  great  Progrefs  to- 
ward finding   the  Man  himfelf. 


Protarchus. 
Without   doubt. 

Socrates. 

And  our  Reafoning  has  now  declared  to  us  clearly, 
what  it  pointed  to  before,  that,  not  in  the  Unmixt 
Life,  but  in  the  Mixt,  we  are  to  feek  for  Happi- 
nefs. 

Protarchus. 

Certainly    (o. 

Socrates. 

But  in  a  proper  and  well-tempered  Mixture,  we 
may  reafonably  hope  to  difcover  what  we  are  in 
fearch  of,  with  more  certainty,  than  we  could  by 
an   ill-made   compolition. 

Protarchus. 
With    much    more. 

Socrates. 
Let  us    then    fct   about    mixin":      and    makino-  the 

D'  t> 

Compofition,     firft    praying    to    the    Gods    for    their 
afliftance  ;     whether    it    be    Bacchus    or    Vulcan,    or 

fome 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  615 

fome    Other    of   the    Gods,    who    prefides    over    the 
Mixture  of  thefe  Ingredients  ^". 

Pr-gtarchus. 
Let  us,  by  all  means,   do  fo- 

So  C  RATES. 

And  now  as  it  were  Two  Cifterns,  or  Vafes,  arc 
fet  before  us  ;  the  Vafe  of  Pleafure,  as  of  Honey  ; 
and  the  Vafe  of  Underftanding,  cool  and  fober,  as  of 
fome  hard  and  healthful  Water  '^'\  Thefe  then  we  are 
to  mix  together  in  the  beft  manner  we  are  able. 

Protarchds. 
With  all   my   Heart. 

Socrates. 
Come  then  :     but  firll  fay,   whether,   by  mingling 
all  Sorts  of   Pleafure  with  all  the  Kinds   of   Know- 

*"  Bacchus  is  here  mentioned  In  particular,  becaufe  the  Greeks, 
in  drinkingt  ufually  mixed  Water  with  their  Wine :  and  Vulcan 
in  particular,  becaufe  of  the  Mixture  of  different  Metals  by 
Fufion,  as  compofing  together  the  beft  Matter  of  many  Vtenfils 
in  common  Life. 

*'*  This  Allegory  feems  to  be  derived,  in  the  way  of  Imitatiofj^ 
from  Homer's  Allegorical  Fable  of  the  Two  Chejls,  (in  his  Iliad, 
L.  24.  ir.  557-) — One,  filled  with  things  Good, — the  Other,  filled 
■WiXh.  Evils ; — like  the  Allegory  in  Plato's  Gorgias,  pag:  493. — 
See  Porphyry,  in  his  Treatife  de  Antra  Nyf?iph/irum,  pag:  129. 
Edit:  Rom: 

I  i  i  i  lege 


6i6  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

lege    and    Underllanding,    we    may    beft    obtain    out 
End,   the  having  of  a  proper  and  due  Mixture. 

Protarghus»- 
Perhaps  we  might. 

Socrates. 

But  'tis  dangerous  to  make  the  Experiment.     AndJ 

I  believe,  that  I  can  point  out  a  way  to  mix  theni 

with   more  Safety. 

Protarchus- 

Say,    What  way. 

Socrates. 

Concerning  Pleafures,  I  think,  we  held,  that  Some 
more  truly  deferved  that  name,  than  Others  o£ 
them  "^'^ ;  and  of  Arts,  that  Some  were  more  accur- 
rate  and  exad,    than  Others  ''^'^ 

Protarchus. 
Undoubtedly  fc 

Socrates. 

And  that  the  Sciences  alfo  differed,  one  from 
another,  in  like  manner :  for  that  Some  Kinds  of 
Science  have  for  their  Objedls  only  fuch  things,  as 
arife    into    Being    and    afterwards    perifli  ;    whereas 

'♦'3  See  Pages  479  &  feq, 
4'4  See  Page  589, 

Another 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        617 

Anotlicr  Kind  dired:s  its  View  to  things  which  are 
neither  generated  nor  deftroyed,  but  always  are  in 
Being,  always  have  the  fame  Propertys,  and  prefcrve 
always  the  fame  Relations.  And  this  Kind  of 
Science,  with  regard  to  the  Truth  of  it,  wc  deemed 
more  excellent  than  the  other  Kinds  *'K 

Protarchus. 

Intirely  right, 

Socrates. 

In  the  firfl  place  therefore,  mixing  together  the 
pureft  Parts  of  Pleafure  and  of  Knowlege,  when  they 
have  been  thus  diflinguifhed  from  the  lefs  pure,  if 
\ve  view  thofe  pureft  Parts  of  Each  in  combination, 
are  they  not,  thus  combined,  fufEcient  to  furnifh 
out,  and  prefent  us  with,  an  ample  View  of  That 
Life  which  is  moft  deiirable  ?  or  is  any  thing  far- 
ther, any  Ingredient  of  a  different  Kind,  wanting 
to   perfed:   the   Compofition  ? 

Protarchus. 

So  as  You  propofe,    and  only  fo,   it  feems  to  Me 
neceffary  for   us    to  do. 

^'5  See  Pages  593  &  feq: 

I  i  i  i  2  Socrates. 


6i8  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

Let  us  then  fuppofe  a  Man  to  have  in  his  Mind 
the  Idea  of  Juftice  its  Sel'f,  fo  as  to  know  What 
it  is  in  its  own  Effence,  and  to  be  able  to  give 
an  Account  of  it  m  confequence  of  that  Know- 
lege.  Let  us  alfo  fuppofe  him  to  have  the  Hke. 
Knowlege   of   all    other   Beings  *'*., 

Protarchus^ 
Be  fuch  a  Man  fuppofed.. 

*'^  Tmv  ovtccv,  in  the  Greek  of  this  Paflage,  fignifys  ovtm  ovtuv 
, Things  which  really  and  truly  are,  as  having  fome  precife  and 
dejinable  Being,  Each  of  them  j  and  Such  only  are  Thofe,  which 
are  Jiable  and  invariable ; — Ideal  Forms,  unmixt  with  Matter ; — 
the  Subjects  of  pure  Science-,  and  the  Qbje5ls  of  IntelleSl,  of 
Mind  and  Rcafon,  but  not  of  Senfe  ot  Imagination.  —  Of  thefe 
Intelligible  or  Mental  Objedts,  the  Higheji  are  thofe  Umverfah, 
which  are  the  effential  Propertys  of  the  Supreme  Being;  One 
of  which,  viz.  Jiijllce  Its  Self,  is  brought  for  an  Inftance  of 
Mental  Kn<nvlege,  in  the  Paflage  now  before  us. — In  the  next 
Sentence  of  Socrates,  an  Inftance  of  the  fame  Kind  of  Know- 
lege is  taken  from  the  Loweji  of  Mental  Objeds,  as  the  Sub- 
jefts  of  the  Mathematical  Sciences  are  juftly  deemed  by  Plato  r 
for  on  this  account  it  was,  that  he  recommended  to  All,  who 
were  defirous  of  attaining  to  know  the  true  Nature  of  Things, 
to  begin  their  Studys  with  thofe  Sciences ;,  which  he  confir 
dered  as  the  firft  Step,  in  afcending  to  the  Heights  of  true 
Philofophy, — to  the  Contemplation  of  thofe  Things,  which  alone, 
are   truly  univerfal   and  divine.. 

S0CRATES^.. 


P    H    r    L    E    B    U    S.         619 

Socrates. 

Will  this  Mau  now  be  accompliflied  fiifEciently 
in  Knowlege,  by  knowing  the  nature  of  the  Circle 
its  Self,  and  oi  the  Sphere  its  Self,  whofe  Nature 
is  Divine  ;  whilft  he  is  ignorant  of  That  Sphere 
and  of  Thofe  Circles,  with  which  the  Eyes  of  Men 
are  converfant  ?  Will  that  KnoM'lege  of  his  be  fuf- 
ficient  for  his  Ufe,  in  Building,  and  in  other  Arts, 
where  Lines  and  Circles  are  to  be  drawn  ■^'''  ? 

Protarchus. 

Ridiculous  we  fliould  call  the  condition  of  our 
Minds  here,  O  Socrates  !  if  our  Knowlege  were 
thus   confined  to  things  Ideal  and  Divine.. 

S0CRATES», 

How    do  you  fay  ?     Arts,   which  are  neither  cer- 
tain   nor   pure,    ufing   untrue  Rules,    and  converfant 

■*'7  In  the  Study  of  pure  Mathematicks,.  the  Mini  ought  to 
cbjiradl  her  Ideas,  as  much  as  poffible,  from  all  their  Images 
or  Figures,  defciibed  ufon  any  vifible  Subflance,  fuch  as  Paper 
and  Slate, — or  in  any,  as  in  Wood  or  Stone.  For  the  Subjedis 
of  Mathematical-  Science  are — not  things  fenjihk,  or  perceivable 
by  any  of  the  outward  Senfes, — but  things  intelligible  to  Mind, 
and  definable  to  Reafon.  And  the  AbJlraBion  from  all  Figures, 
even  thofe  in-  the  Imagination,  is  abfolutely  neceffary  for  the 
apprehending  of  any  Mathematical  'Truths;  becaufe  no  other- 
Faculty  in  the  Human  Soul,  than  that  of  Reajbn,  is  capable 
of  feeing   the  Dcmonjlration  of  them,. 

-1  with. 


620         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

with  untrue  Circles,  are  we  to  throw  fuch  Arts  into 
the  Compolition,  and  mix  them  with  the  other  In- 
gredients ? 

Protarchus. 

It   is  necefiary  for  us ;  —  if,  whenever  we  are  any 

where  abroad,    we    are    defirous  of   finding  our  way 

liome. 

Socrates. 

Are  we  to  add  Mufick  too  ? — an  Art,  which,  not 
long  fince  we  faid,  is  wanting  in  Purity,  as  being 
full  of  Conje6lure  and  Imitation  "^'^  ? 

Protarchu  s. 
Of  neceflity  we  muft,   as  it  appears  to  me,  if  the 
Life,    which    we    are    to  lead,    fhall    ever  deferve  to 
be  called  Life,   or  be  at  all  worth  the  having. 

Socrates. 

Would  you  then,  like  a  Door-keeper,  when  he 
is  puflied  and  preft  by  a  Throng  of  People,  yield 
to  them,  fet  the  Doors  wide  open,  and  fuffer  all 
Kinds  of  Knowlege  to  rufh  in,  the  lefs  pure  ming- 
ling themfelves  among   the  perfedly  pure  ? 

Protarchus. 

I  fee  not,  O  Socrates  !  for  My  part,  how  any 
Man  would    be   hurt  by  receiving  into  his  Mind  all 

4'8  See  Page   k^-jj, 

the 


P     H    I    L    E     B     U    S.         621 

the  other  Kinds    of  Knowlege, — if  he  was  already  in 
pofleflion   of  the  Fiift    and   Highefl. 

Socrates. 

I  may  fafely  then  admit  them  All  to  come  pour- 
ing in,  like  the  Torrents  of  Water  in  that  fine 
poetical  Simile  of  Homer's,  rufhing  down  into  a 
Valley  from    the  Mountains   which  furround   it  '^'^. 

Protarchus. 
By  all   means,    let  them  be   All   admitted. 

Socrates. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  Vafe  of  Pleafure.  For 
when  we  thought  of  mixing  Pleafure  and  Know- 
lege together,  the  purer  Parts  of  Pleafure  did  not 
prefent  themfelves  immediately  to  our  Minds  :  but, 
from  our  affectionate  regard    to  Knowlege,    we   fuf- 

*'9  This  Sentence,  which  alludes  to  a  Simile  in  Hcfneri 
Eiad,  L.  4,  f.  453,  we  have  tranflated  into  Englifli  paraphrafti- 
cally,  for  the  fake  of  fitting  in  a  clearer  light,  than  we  could 
by  a  meer  Metaphrafe,  the  juft  application  of  it  to  the  prefent 
Purpofe  of  our  Author  :  for,  if  we  miftake  him  not,  he  here 
means  to  infinuate  to  us,  —  that  Philofophical  Knowlege  de- 
fcends  into  a  Man's  Mind  from  above,  thro  his  Itudious  Ob- 
fervation  of  all  the  Parts  of  Nature  which  lye  before  him,  and 
thro  his  fair  and  honeft  Reafoning  thereon, 

fered: 


622         P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 

fered^  all    Kinds    of  it   to    croud    in,    before  any  of 
the  Pleafures. 


Protarchus. 


Very  true. 


Socrates. 
It  is  now  time  for  us  to  confult  about  the  Plea- 
fures ;    whether  we  fliould  let  them  All  come  throng- 
ing   in,    or   whether   we   ihould   admit   thofe  of  the 
True  Sort  firft. 

PROTARCHUS. 

It  makes  a  great  difference  in  point  of  Safety, 
to   let  in,    the   firft.    Such  only  as  are  True. 

Socrates. 

Let  Thefe  then  be  admitted.  But  how  fhall  we 
proceed  ?  Muft  we  not  do,  as  we  did  with  the 
feveral  Kinds  of  Knowlege,  admit  as  many  Pleafures 
alfo,   as   are   of   the   neceffary   Sort  ? 

Protarchus. 

Without  doubt,  the  neceffary  Pleafures  alfo,  by 
all   means. 

Socrates. 
But   now,    as   we   held   it    both   fafe   and    advanta- 
geous,    in    going   thro   Life,    to    be   acquainted  with 

every 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         623 

every  Art ;  —  if  we  are  of  the  fanie  Opinion  with 
regard  to  Pleafurcs,  —  if  we  hold  it  conducive  to 
our  Good,  and  at  the  fame  time  harmlefs,  to  enjoy 
every  Sort  of  Pleafure  in  the  courfc  of  our  Lives, 
— in  this  cafe,  we  are  to  intermix  all  Sorts  of  Plea- 
fure   with   all    the   Kinds   of   Knowlege. 

Protarchus. 
What    fay   we    then    as   to   this   Point  ?     and    how 
ought  we  to   adt  ? 

SoCR  ATE  S. 

This  Queftion,  O  Protarchus  !  fliould  not  be  put 
to  Us.  But  the  Pleafures  themfelves,  and  the  Other 
Affembly  alfo,  That  of  the  Sciences  and  Arts,  are 
to  be  examined,  each  Party  concerning  the  other, 
in  this   manner. 

Protarchus. 
In  What  manner  ? 

Socrates. 

Friends  !  we  fhall  fay,  \addrejfmg  our  iluefiio7i  to 
the  Pleafures  jirji^'\  whether  we  ought  to  call  you 
Pleafures,  or  whatever  is  your  right  Name,  would 
ye  choofe  to  live  in  the  fame  place  with  all  Kinds 
of  Knowlege   and  Difcernment,    or    to   live   without 

K  k  k  k  knovvino; 


624  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

knowing  or  difcerning  any  thing  whatever  ?    To  this 
Interrogatory,  they  muft,   as  I  imagine,   anfwer  thus. 

Protarchus. 

How  ? 

Socrates. 

That,  feeing,  as  was  faid  before  '^'-°,  were  Know- 
lege  and  Pleafure  to  be  left.  Each  of  them,  alone, 
fingle,  and  deftitue  of  Aid,  neither  of  them  would 
have  any  Virtue  or  Power  at  all,  nor  would  any 
Advantage  arife  from  Either, — we  deem  it  beft,  that 
all  the  Kinds  of  Knowlege  fhould  dwell  with  Us, 
One  Kind  of  Knowlege  with  Each  of  us.  One  who 
is  fuitable  to  the  peculiar  nature  of  its  Companion, 
and  is  perfedlly  acquainted  with  Her  Power  and 
Influence. 

Protarchus. 

And  well  have  ye  now  anfwered.  We  fhall  fay  to 
Them. 

Socrates. 

After  this,    we   are   to  demand    of    Knowlege  and 

Underftanding,    in  the  fame   manner,    thus ;  —  Have 

ye    any  occaflon    for  Pleafures    to    be    mixed   among 

you  ?  —  On  the  other  fide,    we  may  fuppofe  Know- 

410  See  Pages  611,   12. 

lege 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         625 

lege  and  Underftanding  to  interrogate  Us ;  and  What 
Sort  of  Pleafures,  they  would  perhaps  fay,  is  it  that 
ye  mean  ? 

Protarchus. 
Probably    they  would. 

SOCRATF.  S. 

And   to  this   Queftion   of  theirs   our  Anfwer  would 
be   This  :  —  Belide    thofe   True   Pleafures,   we    Hiould 
fay,    do    ye    farther    want    the    IMeafures    of    the    in- 
tenfe     and    exquilite    Kind    to    dwell    with    you  ?  — 
How   is    it    pofTible,    O   Socrates  !     they    would    then 
perhaps    fay,    that   we    fliould    want    Thefe  ? — Thefc, 
who    give    a    thoufand    Hindrances    to    all    our    Pro- 
ceedings ;     and  who,    by  their  Fury  and  Madnefs,  are 
always   creating    Difturbance    in    the   Souls   where  We 
dwell  ; — Thefe,   who  had  they  been  there  firft,   would 
never    have    fuffered    Us    to    have    admittance  ;     and 
who  intirely  fpoil  our  Children,  there  born,  by  lettino- 
Forgetfulnefs    in    upon    them,    for    want    of  Care    to 
guard   the  Dwelling-place.      But  the  Other   Pleafures, 
mentioned    by    you,     the    True    and    the    Pure,     you 
are    to   know,     that    They    are    nearly   related    to    us, 
and    belong    to  our   Family  :     and   beiide   Thefe,    the 
Pleafures    who    are   accompanied    by   Health    and    So- 
briety ;    Such  alfo,  as  are  the  Followers   of  all  Virtue, 

K  k  k  k  2  like 


626  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

like    the    Train    of   fome    Goddefs,    every   where    at- 
tending her  ;    let  All  of  thefe  come  and  mix  amongft 
us.      But   thofe  Pleafures.    who   are   always   found   in 
Company  with   Folly,    and  with   all   Kinds    of  Vice, 
it    is   very  abfurd   for  a   Man    to   mingle  with  Mind, 
— if  he  deiires   to   fee   a  Mixture,    as    clear,    untrou- 
bled,   and   well- attempered,    as   poflible  to   be  made; 
—  and    if    he    would    from    thence    try   to    difcover, 
what  the   nature  is  of  Good,    not  only  in  Man,    but 
alfo    in    the   Univerfe  ;     from    which   difcovery   fome 
Notion   is  to  be  gained,   by  a  Sort  of  Divination,   of 
What  the  Idea   is    of  Good   its  Self. — Shall   we   not 
fay,   that  Mind  and  Science,    in  thus  anfwering,   have 
fpoken    prudently  and  conllftently  with  *-'  themfelves, 
pleading  in   their   own   Caufe,    and  at  the  fame   time 
in  behalf  of  Memory   and   Right    Opinion. 

Protarchu  S- 
By  all   means,  ought  we. 

Socrates. 

**'  This  Sentence,    in    the   Greek,    begins    thus  j — -'A^'  ax  ifjL- 

(DOOVUi    IoZtO.    XCCl    e^OVTOli     ioLUTOV     TOV     VdV  (p«lTOf*gf  aTTOK^WOC^Ul Henry 

Stephens  imagined  a  grofs  Error  in  this  Reading  of  the  Paffage^ 
and  he  attempted  a  Corredlion  of  it,  by  tranfpofing  the  t^ovTcci 
vSv,  (fo  as  to  read  vyt'tx°'"^^^  '"  °"^  word,)  and  by  rejeding 
intirely  the  two  intermediate  words,  ictviov  toV.  —  But  in  this 
bold  Alteration,  the  words   toV  vav  will   be  found  wanting,    the 

they 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  627 

Socrates. 
But    in    our  Mixture    it    is   neceffary  to   add  This 
alfo  y    for  without   it  no  One  Thing  could  ever  be, 

Protarchus. 
What  is  That? 

SOC  RATES. 

Whatever  has  not  Truth  mixed  with  it,  in  the 
compofing  of  it,  can  never  be  produced  into  true 
Exiftence ;  or,  could  it  be  produced,  it  never  can 
be  lafling. 

Protarchus. 
How  is  it  pofTible,   that  it  fhould  ? 

they  are  neceflliry  to  precede  the  word  ccTroK^lvetS^xi  in  the  Con- 
flrudlion  of  the  Sentence. — Many  Years  fince  therefore,  fup- 
pofing,  with  Stephetis,  the  Greek  Text  in  this  Paffiige  to  be 
erroneous,  we  imagined,  that  it  might  be  amended,  by  chang- 
ing e^ovToK  savTov  into  t^ofjievcci  gayra  (or  sauraj)  agreeable  to 
which  we  made  our  tranflation.  But  having,  fince  that  tirne^ 
read  and  confidered  the  judicious  Monf.  Grou's  Note  to  his 
French  tranflation  of  this  Palfage,  we  fee  no  neceflity  for  any 
Alteration  to  be  made,  either  in  the  Greek  Original,  or  in 
our  EngUp  tranflation  ;  efpecially,  if  it  be  true,  what  is  faid 
by  ConJhiJitme  in  his  Lexicon,  that  i^ovrooi  vw  is  fometimes 
ufed  for  vuvi^lvrui. — Cornarius  alfo,  in  tranflating  exovroyi  eccvrsv 
into  Latin  thus, — pro  fui  dignitate,  —  feems  to  have  undcrl'tood 
thofe  words  in   the   fame  fenfe   with   Monf.   Grou. 

6  Socrates. 


628  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 
Certainly  no  way.  Now  if  any  thing  farther  be 
yet  wanting  to  perfed  our  Compofition,  declare  it, 
You  and  Philebus.  For  the  Mixture,  which  we 
have  now  made  in  Speculation,  appears  to  Me  to 
have  been  as  perfedly  well  compofed,  as  if  it  were 
fome  incorporeal  Order  '^",  meant  for  the  good  Go- 
vernment  of  an   Animated   Body. 

Protarchus. 


4-^  The  Mixture,  now  made  in  the  fpeculation,  reprefents 
the  happy  State  of  a  Man  truly  virtuous.  Mind,  in  fuch  a  Man, 
is  That  incorporeal  Order,  That  Law,  which  governs  his  whole 
Condud:  agreeably  to  Truth  and  Re<5litude :  and  his  animated 
Body,  (his  Animal-Soul  and  Body,  joined  together,)  enjoys  thole 
Pleafures,  which  his  Nature  makes  him  capable  of,  and  his 
Fortune  offers  to  him, — all  Such  Pleafures,  as  are  admitted  and 
authorifed  by  Mind  and  Reafon, — all  Such,  as  are  confident  with 
an  Acquifition  of  the  Sciences  and  Arts,  and  with  a  Retention 
of  them  in  the  Memory,  —  and  are  not  repugnant  to  a  Right 
Opinion,    concerning  the  relative   Value  of  every  thing  to  Him- 

felf.  — The  Greek   word   in    this   place   is  y.oa-f/.o(,  —  a  word, 

which  often  fignifys  Order,  and  is  accordingly,  in  this  Tranflation, 
fo  rendered  into  EngliJJj ;  —  but  often  alfo  it  fignifys  World;  and 
this  latter,  this  fecondary  and  philofophical  Senfe  of  the  word  is, 
by  all  ihe  other  Interpreters  of  this  Dialogue,  attributed  to  it  in  the 
prefent  Sentence. — Perhaps  they  confidered  Man  as  ^  Microcojm,  and 
his  Nature  as  partaking  of  the  Two  moft  general  Kinds  of  Being  in 
the  Univerfe, — viz.  the  incorporeal,  intelligible,  and  invariable, — 
and   the  corporeal,   fenfible,  and  variable.  —  Indeed,  we  have  no 

6  Doubt 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  629 

Protarchus. 

And    be  affured,     O  Socrates !     that  to  Me  it  has 
had   the  fame  appearance. 

Socrates. 
Might    we    not    then    rightly    fay,     that    we    were 
now    arrived    at    the   Dwelling-place    of    Good,    and 
were  flanding  in  the  very  Entrance  of  his  Houfe  ? 

Protarchus. 
I  think,  we  might. 

Socrates. 

And  now  What  fhould  we  deem  to  be  the  greateft 
Excellence  in  the  Compofition,  and  to  be  alfo  the 
chief  Caufe,  that  fuch  a  Mixture  muft  be  grateful 
to  All  ?  For  when  we  fhall  have  difcerned  What 
this  is,  which  is  fo  grateful  and  fo  excellent,  we 
{hall  then  confider  to  which  of  the  Two,  to  Plea- 
Doubt  of  our  Author's  having  in  his  Mind  the  laft-mentioned 
Senfe  of  the  word  noafAoi,  when  he  wrote  this  Sentence.  We 
have  no  Doubt,  but  that  he  intended  to  give  us  a  Repre- 
fentation  of  the  Um'verfe,  and  (at  the  fame  time)  of  Man,  as 
he  is  by  nature  an  Image  of  it  in  Miniature, — an  animated  Body, 
under  the  Government  of  a  Mind. — This  Intention  will  per- 
haps appear  more  plainly  in  the  Conclujive  Fart  of  this  Dia- 
logue,   to  which  we   are  now  approaching. 

fure 


630         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

fure  or  to  Mind,  it  is  related  the  moft  nearly,  and 
familiar  the  moft  intimately,  in  the  Conftitution  of 
the  Univerfe  '"'K 

Protarchu  s. 

Right:  'twill  be  of  the  greateft  fervice  to  us,  in 
determining  this  Point. 

SOCRAT  E  s. 

And  there  is  indeed  no  difficulty  in  difcovering 
the  Caufe,  why  Some  Mixtures  are  moft  valuable, 
and  Others  good  for  nothing. 

Protarchu  s. 
Explain  your  Meaning. 

Socrates. 
No  Perfon  is  ignorant  of  This. 

Protarchus. 
of  What  ? 


4^3  The  words  of  Plato  are — gV  tul  iravr)  <rwi<^miv.  Compare 
this  Faflage  with  a  fimilar  one  in  page  626,  line  10.  Both 
the  Paflages  perhaps  are  to  be  explained  by  the  latter  Half  of 
the  Note  preceding  this. 

Socrates. 


P    H    r    L    E    B    U    S.  631 

Socrates. 

That  in  every  Mixture,  whatever  it  be,  and  what- 
ever be  the  Quantity  of  it  ^-^j  if  Meafure  pervades 
it  not,  and  if  thence  it  obtains  not  Symmetry  and 
Proportion,  all  the  Ingredients  muft  of  neceffity  be 
fpoilt,  befides  the  fpoiling  of  the  whole  Compofition. 
For  in  fuch  a  cafe,  no  One  thing  is  really  tempered 
by  any  Other  thing  ;  but  a  confufed  and  diforderly 
AfTemblage  is  made,  of  various  Things  jumbled  to- 
gether ;  which,  like  a  Concurrence  of  bad  Accidents 
in  Life,  is  a  real  Misfortune  to  the  Perfons  who 
are  to  ufe  it  '^'^ 

Protarchus. 
'Tis  very  true. 

•♦-'^  In  all  the  Editions  of  the  Greek,  we  here  read  oirwfjwy 
**  hoivevei'  it  be  made."  But  this  is  contradiftory  to  the  Mean- 
ing of  the  Sentence;  for  the  Meaning  is  this,  —  that  "every 
right  and  good  Mixture  muft  be  made  in  one  certain  wanner 
only,  viz.  by  Meafure." — We  may  fairly  therefore  prefume,  that 
Flato  wrote,  not  oTrcoayv,  but  oVoo-aS)',  (or,  by  Elifion,  oVoo-ai-) 
with  a  view  to   the  infinite  Ex.te?it  of  the  Univerfe. 

**5  In  the  Greek,  cvfj.rpo^a, — a  word,  which  has  Two  different 
Meanings,  not  to  be  exprefied  by  One  fingle  word  in  Englijl}. 
A  Parapbrafe  therefore  was  found  neceffary,  for  conveying 
(agreeably  to  our  Author's  Intention,)  Both  Meanings  toge- 
ther,   to    the  Readers   of  this  tranflation. 

L  11  1  Socrates. 


632  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

The  Power  of  the  Chief  Good  then  is  transferred, 
we  find,  into  that  Province,  where  dwells  the  na- 
ture of  the  Beautiful.  For  every  where,  from 
Meafure  and  Mediocrity,  and  from  Symmetry  and 
Proportion,    arife    Beauty   and    Virtue. 

Protarchus. 
Certainly  fo. 

Socrates. 

And  we  faid  before,  that  Truth  alfo  was  an  In- 
gredient  in   the   Compofition. 

Protarchus. 
We  did. 

Socrates. 
If  then  we  are  not  able  to  difcover  the  nature 
of  Good  its  Self  in  One  fingle  Idea, — yet,  taking  it 
in  Three  Ideas  together,  in  Beauty,  Symmetry,  and 
Truth,  we  may  conceive  it  as  One  Thing  ;  and 
mod  juftly  attributing  to  it  the  Caufe  of  whatever 
is  graceful  or  agreeable  in  the  Compofition,  we 
may  moft  truly  fay,  that  by  means  of  This,  as 
being  Good  its  Self,  the  Whole  proves  to  be  Such 
as  it   is,   thus  agreeable,    and   thus   graceful. 

Protarchus. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        633 

Protarchus. 
Moft   truly  indeed. 

SOCRAT  ES. 

Now  then,  O  Protarchus  !  any  Perfon  may  be  a 
competent  Judge  between  Pleafure  and  Underftand- 
ing,  to  decide,  Whether  of  the  Two  is  neareft  allyed 
to  the  Supream  Good,  and  of  higher  Value,  than 
the  Other   is,    both   to  Men    and    Gods  *'^ 

Protarchus. 
What  the  Dccilion  muft  be,    is  clear.      However, 
it    is    the   better  way   to   go  thro   the  Recital  of    it, 
in  explicit  Words. 

Socrates. 
Each  of  thofe  Three  Ideas  then  let  us  compare, 
feverally,  with  Pleafure,  and  again  with  Mind.  For 
we  are  to  fee  and  determine.  Whether  of  thefe  Two 
it  is,  that  Each  of  thofe  Three  Ideas  is  moft  con- 
genial to,    and  to  give  Sentence  accordingly. 

Protarchus. 
Do  you  fpeak  of  Beauty,  and  Truth,  and  Medio- 
crity ? 

4-'  See  Pages  627,  8.   and  Note  422. 

L  1 1  1  2  Socrates. 


634  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Socrates. 

I  do.  Now  take  in  the  firft  place,  O  Pro- 
tarchus  !  Truth  ;  and  look  at  all  the  Three  together. 
Mind,  Truth,  and  Pleafure  :  and  after  you  have 
confidered  them  a  fufficient  time,  fay  whether,  in 
Your  opinion.  Mind,  or  whether  Pleafure  is  the  nearer 
of  Kin   to  Truth. 

Protarchus. 

what  need  is  there  of  Time,  to  confider  of  this 
point  ?  for  I  prefume,  that  very  great  is  the  differ- 
ence between  Mind  and  Pleafure  in  this  refped:. 
Of  all  things  in  the  world,  Pleafure  is  the  moft 
addided  to  Lying  :  and  it  is  faid  ^-\  that  in  the 
Pleafures  of  Venus,  which  feem  to  be  the  greateft, 
even  Perjury  is  pardoned  by  the  Gods  ;  it  being 
fuppofed,  that  Pleafures,  like  Children,  have  not 
the  leaft  Underftanding  in  them,  to  know  what  they 
fay.      But  Mind  is  either  the  fame  thing  with  Truth, 

or 

'•-'^  Plainly  alluding  to  the  Proverb, — 'A(f^oS'i'(jioi  o^xoi  ax.  g'/A- 
To/iijoto?; — in  which  words  it  is  delivered  to  us  by  the  Collediors 
of  the  ancient  Greek  Proverbs.  But  we  imagine,  that  the  Pro- 
verb, in  common  ufe,  confided  of  only  the  Two  Firfl  of  thofe 
Words,  and  that  the  latter  Two  were  added  by  fome  Gram- 
marian, to  explain  their  Meaning.  For,  befides  that  to  leave 
out  this  Explanation  is  more  agreeable  to  the  Spirit  as  well 
as   to    the  Brevity  of    a  Proverbial  Saying,    the    word  i/j.Tomfjt.of 

5  « 


P    H    I   L    E    B    U    S.         635 

or  it  is  of  all  things,  the  mofl  like  to  it,  and  the 
trueft  ^'\ 

Socrates. 
Next   then   confider  Mediocrity  in  the  fame  man- 
ner '^''  ;     and    fay  whether    you  think,    that  Pleafure 
poffefTes  more  of  it  than  Underftanding,   or  that  Un- 
derftanding  poffefTes  more  of  it  than  Pleafure. 

Protarchus. 

This,   which  you  have  now  propofed  for  a  Subjedl 

of    confideration    is    not    lefs    eafy  than    the    Other. 

For    there    cannot,    in    my    opinion,     be    found    any 

thing  more  immoderate,   in  its  nature,   than  Pleafure 

is  not  found  in  P/iZ/(j's  Sympofiiimy  (pag:  183  Edit:  Steph:)  where 
this  Proverb  is  cited  :  tho  it  muft  be  confefTed,  that  the  very- 
learned  and  judicious  Erafmia  was  of  opinion,  that  the  word 
ilj.-7rolvifjiov  is  erroneoufly  omitted  in  that  PafTage.  See  the  Banquet, 
Page  66.  However  this  may  be,  the  Proverb  feems  to  have 
been  always  underftood  in  that  Senfe,  in  which  it  is  ufed  by 
Plato.  And  in  all  probability,  Tibiilltis  from  hence  borrowed 
that  Sentiment  in  his  Elegys,  L.  2,  El:  6,  — perjuria  ridet 
amantum  'Jupiter, — exprefl;  after  him  by  Ovid  in  the  very  fame 
words. 

4^*  See  Pages   256,  7.    and   Syfiopjis,    Page    14. 

^••^9  Cornarius,  and  Stephens  after  him,  rightly  obferve,  that  in 
the  G}-eek  of  this  Sentence,  we  ought  to  read  ooaccvTooi,  and 
not,    as  it  printed,    as  arc^. 

and 


6^6         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

and    extravagant    Joy  ;      nor    any    thing    which    has 
more  of  Meafure   in   it,   than  Mind  and   Science  *^°. 


Socrates. 
You  have  well    faid.      But   proceed   farther  now  to 
the   Third   Idea.       Do   you   fay,    that  Mind    partakes 
of  Beauty,    more    than   any  Species   of  Pleafure   par- 
takes  of  it  ?    and   that  Mind   is  more  excellent  than 


43=  Every  ferfeSl  Idea,  every  Idea  in  the  Drcine  Mind  Uni- 
verfal,  is  the  true  Meafure  of  every  Idea,  J'ynoJiynious  with  it, 
ill  all  Particular  Minds.  Nor  is  it  lefs  the  Meafure  and  the 
archetypal  Standard  of  Rectitude  and  'T7-uth  to  every  Copy  or 
Image  of  it,  impreft  on  any  Part  of  Nature's  Works,  or  imi- 
tated in  the  Works  of  Art.  —  Thus,  for  inftance,  perfeSi 
Reolitude  in  the  Government  of  the  World,  the  great  Idea  of 
the  Divine  Mind,  is  the  Meafure  of  all  Moral  and  Political 
Reclitude  in  Man :  thus  alfo,  the  Ideal  perfedt  Animal,  of  any 
Kind  and  Species  whatever,  is  the  Meafure  of  Rectitude  ia 
the  Frame  and  Difpofition  of  every  Individual  of  that  Kind 
and  Species  :  and  thus  alfo,  the  Ideal  true  Circle  is  the  Mea- 
fure of  every  circular  Shape  or  Figure,  whether  natural,  or 
artificial.  —  Thefe  Meafures  of  All  things  the  Divine  Mind  is 
full  of:     and   whatever  is  immeafurable,    or  immenfe,   is  not  an. 

Objed   of  any  Mind   whatever.  Farther  -,    every    Truth    in 

every  Science  is  bounded  by  thofe  Ideas,  the  mutual  Relation 
of  which  conjiitutes  that  particular  Truth  :  and  thefe  Ideal  or 
Sciential  Truths  are  the  Meafures  of  Redlitude  to  every  Pofi- 
tion  or  Hypothefis,  laid  down  by  any  man,  and  to  every  in- 
ternal Sentence,   or   Opinion,   of  any  man's   Mind. 

Pleafure 


v/ 


P     H    I    L    E     B     U    S.        637 

Pleafure   in   This   refped  ?     or   that    the  Contrary   is 
true  ? 

Protarchus. 
Did  ever  Any  man  then,  O  Socrates  !  whether  awake 
or  dreaming,  fee  or  imagine  Underftanding  and  Mind 
to  be,  in  any  Matter,  or  in  any  Manner,  imhand- 
fome  or  Unbecoming,  whether  in  refleding  on  the 
Faft,  or  in  perceiving  the  Prefent,  or  in  looking 
forward  to  the  Future  ? 


Socrates. 


Right. 


Protarchus. 
But  whenever  we  fee  any  Perfon  immerfed  in 
Pleafures,  in  Thofe  Pleafures  too,  which  are  of  all 
perhaps  the  greateft '^''', — when  we  behold,  what  a 
ridiculous  Figure  the  Man  makes  in  the  very  aft 
of  enjoying  them,  —  or  view  what  is  of  all  Spec- 
tacles the  moft  unfeemly,  the  confequence  of  his 
Enjoyment,  —  we,  our  felves,  are  afhamed  "^^^  ;  and 
all  fuch  things,   as  far  as  polfible,   we  conceal,  veil- 

^^3'  For  the  Nature  of  every  Thing  is  moft  apparent  in  That, 
which  is   the  greateft   or   moft  excellent  of  the   Kind. 

43*  Either  aftiamed  y^r  hiniy  or  afhamed  of  that  Part  of  our 
Nature,  by  which  we  are  fubjedl  to  what  appears  to  ourfelves 
fo  unfeemly. 

5  ins 


638 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


ing    them   with    Night   and  Darknefs,    as    not    being 
fit  Objedls  for  the  Light  to  look  on. 

Socrates. 

Every  where  '^^'  then,  O  Protarchus  !  you  will 
declare,  fpeaking,  your  Self,  to  all  Perfons  about 
you,  and  publifliing  abroad  by  Meffengers  *^%  that 
the  polfeflion  of  Pleafure  is  neither  of  Supream  nor 

^''^  The  Greek  word  in  this  place,  as  it  is  printed,  is  TraVrw. 
Ficinus,  by  tranflating  it  "  curMis,"  feems  to  have  read,  in  the 
Medicean  Manufcript,  Travri,  to  every  Per/on.  But  'tis  a  matter 
of  indifference.  Which  of  thofe  Readings  we  prefer.  For  in 
this  Dialogue  we  are  taught,  that,  to  every  Ferfon,  in  what- 
ever Region  of  the  Earth  he  lives,  all  thofe  Kinds  of  Things, 
which  are  good  on  their  own  account,  and  not  meerly  for  the 
fake  of  fomething  elfe,  are,  when  compared  together,  more  or 
lefs  'valuahk,  in  That  very  Degree,  which  is  afllgned  to  Each 
of  thofe   Kinds   in    the  following  Sentences   of  Socrates. 

'^H  ]By  Me/Jengers,  we  pre  fume,  that  Books  or  Writings  are 
here  meant. — And  we  may  well  prefume  farther,  that  Socrates, 
in  this  Speech  of  his,  feemingly  direded  only  to  Frotarchus, 
aimed  obliquely  at  recommending  to  his  Difciples,  then  around 
him,  the  Propagation  (both  Or'al  and  Scriptural)  of  the  Truths, 
he  is  about  to  utter, — Truths,  which  he  deemed  of  the  higheft 
Importance  to  every  Man  to  be  prefented  with,  and  which  he 
made  the  fole  Bufinefs  of  his  own  Life  to  fludy  and  to  pro- 
mulgate. —  If  Flato  was  of  the  Audience,  it  feems,  that  he 
took  the   Hint,    and    wrote   the  Fhilebus. 

of 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         639 

of  Secondary  Vv^orth  :  but  that  '^"  Whatever  is  of 
all  things  the  moft  excellent  and  valuable,  is  to  be 
found  in  Meafure,  in  the  Moderate,  and  the  Sea- 
fonable,  and  in  all  '""'''  things  of  That  Kind,  whofe 
Nature   and  ElTence  we  ought  to  deem  Eternal  '^". 

Protarchus. 

435  This  is  the  Firji  of  the  Six  Concliifions,  here  drawn 
from  the  Three  Argumentative  Parts  of  this  Dialogue,  taken 
together.  But  in  the  Third  Part  only  is  the  Subjedt-Matter 
of  the  Tivo  Jirjl  Concliifions  particularly  treated  of:  the  Third 
and  Fourth  Condnfions  relate  chiefly  to  the  FirJi  Part,  whence 
they  are  efpecially  derived  :  and  the  Two  lajl  Conclujions  arife 
principally  from  the  Second  Part,  where  the  Subject  of  them 
is  accurately  confidered.  —  In  proof  of  the  Concliijion  now  be- 
fore us,  fee  particularly  Page  420.  — Why  it  hath  the  place 
of  Preeminence,  and  in  What  refpedt  the  SubjeB  of  it  hath 
the  Preference  to  the  Subjedl  of  the  Second  Conclufion,  will 
be   feen   in  Note  438. 

436  Monf.  Grou  has  obferved  very  juftly,  that  the  word 
c<'pwc&a<,  in  the  latter  Part  of  this  Sentence,  is  an  Error  in  the 
Text :  and  inftead  of  it,  he  propofes  the  word  YipYi^ai.  Gry- 
nceus,  the  Corredor  of  Ficinus\  Tranflation  of  Plato,  feems,  in 
his  rendering  the  Greek  word  in  this  place  into  Latin  by  the 
words  fortita  effe,  [to  have  obtained  an  allotment  of)  either  to 
have  read  e^Xrix^'^i  in  fome  Manufcript,  or  elfe  to  have  thus 
amended    the  Text  by   a  happy  Conjedlure  of  his  own. 

437  Of  this  Kind  are  the  pure  and  perfed:  Ideas  of  the  Di- 
vine Mind  JJniverfal,  and  Ideal  Truths,  the  mutual  Relations  of 
thofe  Ideas. — If  there  be  alfo,  befde  that  Great  Mind,  any  other 

M  m  m  m  Minds, 


640  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Protarch  u  s. 

Their  fupreme  Excellence  appears  from  what  has 
been  faid  and  proved. 

SoCRATE  s. 

And  that  the  Next  in  Value  are  Symmetry  and 
Beauty,  the  Compleat  and  the  Sufficient,  and  what- 
ever elfe  is  congenial  to  thefe  '^'\ 

Protarchus* 

Minds,  or  Mental  Beings,  in  whom  any  of  thofe  Ideas  and 
Ideal  Truths  are,  and  will  for  ever  be,  pure  and  perfed, — if 
any  Ideas  within  the  Divine  Mind  are  roscal  ufj.a.  ytal  rc;»Tai, 
intelligent  as  well  as  intelligible,  (as  Proclus  feems  to  have  ima- 
gined,)— Thefe  alfo  may  properly  be  faid  dhrix^'^i  {«>  have  ob- 
tained for  their  Allottnent,)   an  eternal  Nature. However  this 

may  be,  'tis  certain,  that  the  Divine  Ideas  and  their  mutual 
Relations,  being  eternal  and  immutable,  are  the  true  Meajures 
of  all  Human  Notions  and  Opinions  in  all  ages  and  in  all  places  : — 
it  is  certain,  that  only  by  the  Divine  Ideas  are  Bounds  and 
Meajures  fet  to  any  of  the  Injinites,  in  the  natural  production 
or  generation  of  Corporeal  Forms,  every  one  of  which  is  thus 
limited  in  its  EfTence  ;  —  that  only  by  the  Divine  Ideas,  imprefl: 
on  Outtvard  Nature,  is  the  regular  Courfe  of  her  Motions  main- 
tained, amidft  their  various  accidental  Cha?iges ; — that  only  thus 
is  the  Predominance  of  the  lov/er  Elements,  which  are  often 
prevalent  by  turns,  fubdued  and  tempered  in  feafonable  time,  fo  as 
to  prevent  the  preter-natural  or  untimely  Diflolution  of  every 
Compound-Frame  on  Earth; — and  that  only  by  the  Divine 
Ideas,   imparted  to   the  Rational   Soul   of  Man,   are  hh  natural 

Appetites 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         641 

Protarchus. 
So  it  feems. 

Socrates. 

Appetites   and   PafTions  moderated^  and    reflralned   from   any  un- 
Jeafonabk  or  "vehement  Emotions. 

'^3S  The  Forms  and  the  S>ualitys,  fpecified  In  the  prefent  Sen- 
tence, —  namely,    Symmetry   and   Beauty,    the   Cotnpleat   and   the 
Siifficient, — are,  in  feme  prior  Paflages  of  this  Dialogue,   fpoken 
of  together  with  Meafure ;    as  if  they  were,   in  all  refpeds,   equal 
to  Meafure   in   Dignity   and  Value.      Indeed   they    have    a   Re- 
lation  to   the   fame  Kind    of  Being,  —  to  That,    in    which   the 
Infinites  are  mixed  with  Bound.  —  In  this  place,  however,  where 
the  Order  of  Things,   abfolutely  Good,   is  fettled  with  the  nicefl 
accuracy,    they   are   diftinguijhcd  from   Meafure.       In    this    place, 
Meafure,    with    the  Attributes  efjential  to  it,    and   infeparably  at- 
tending it,  is  mentioned  fingly  and  alone;    becaufe,  in  the  natural 
Order  of  Things,   it  is   the  Firfi  and  Highefi  of  all  abfolute  or 
final  Goods.  —  For,    according    to    fuch   Order,    Caujes  are  prior 
and  fuperior  to   their  Effe£ls  -,    and  Principles  are  higher,  and  of 
more   dignity  than  any  of  their  Derivatives,    as  having  a   more 

extenfive   Power. Now,   'tis  Meafure  which  is  the  Firfi  Caufe 

of  every  Good,  enjoyed,  by  any  Animal-Beings,  whether  Sentient 
and  Rational,  or  meerly  Sentient:  —  'tis  Meafure  alfo,  which  is 
the  Firfi  Caufe  of  every  Good  inherent  in,  or  poiTeffed  by,  any 
Senfelefs  or  Lifclefs  Beings,  —  a  Good,  to  be  felt,  reliOied  and 
enjoyed  —  not  by  Themfelves,  —  but  by  Such  Beings  only,  as 
are  made  for  the  Enjoyment  of  it.  —  'Tis  Meafure,  which  is 
the  Firfi  Principle  of  thofe  Goods,  celebrated  in  the  prefent 
Sentence:  for  Meafure  is  the  ima:!ediate  Principle  of  Syfnmetry ; 
on    Symmetry    is    founded    all   Proportion  ;     on    Proportion    are 

M  m  m  m  2  founded 


642  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

founded  all  Bemify  in  Figures,  and  all  Harmony  in  Sounds  : 
and  to  any  Outward  Form,  in  which  are  found  thefe  Excel- 
lencys,  nothing  is  'u:anting  to  make  it  an  Objedl  moft  delightful 
to  all  Rational  Animals,  whofe  Eyes  or  Ears  convey  to  them 
the  Image  of  that  Form  :  fuch  a  Form  is,  to  Senfe,  compkat 
in  all  its  Parts,  and  poffeffes  all  the  PerfeBion,  which  it  is  ca- 
pable of  by  nature. Full  of  thefe  Excellencys  is  the  Frame, 

or  outward  Form,  of  the  Univerfe  -,  becaufe  the  Architectonic 
Alind  ivithin  —  the  Forming  Form,  —  is  Measure  its  Self,. 
comprifing  all  the  Kinds  of  Meajure  :  and  fmce  Meafiire,  of  feme 
Kind  or  other,  is  the  Caiife  of  whatever  Good  is  either  enjoyed 
or  pofTefTed  by  any  Kind  of  Being,  it  follows,  that  the  Great 
Univerfal  Being,  in  whom  all  thofe  Caiifes  of  Good,  thofe  Mea- 
fiires  of  every  Kind,  are  comprifed,  is  the  Caufe  of  All  Good, — 
is  Good  its  Self. — On  this  account  efpecially  it  is,  that,  in 
the  Firji  Condufion  from  all  the  Reafoning  of  this  Dialogue, 
Measure  {lands  by  its  Self,  fingk  and  alone;  it  is  becaufe 
the  word  Meafiire,  in  an  eminent  Senfe,  as  ufed  by  Plato,  fig- 
nifys  That  Sovereign  Being,  who  is  the  Sovereign  Good, 
— That  Stipreatn  Beauty,  which,  in  the  exprefllon  of  our  divine 
Philofopher  in  the  Banquet,  is  auio  xacr'  axno,  fjn'-r  aJxa,  /y.o- 
roft/gj  a«  or,    Alone  by  its  Self,  ivith  its  Self  converfng,  is  eteriially 

Sole  and  Single  in  its  EJfence. But  we  are  here  to  confider 

the  Goods  mentioned  in  this  Second  Conclufon,  with  a  view  par- 
ticularly to  Man :  for  the  Good  of  Man  in  particular,  and 
not  the  Good  of  the  whole  Univerfe  is  the  proper  Subje6l  of 
this  Dialogue. — It  has  appeared  from  the  Reafoning  of  it,  that, 
as  Man  is  a  Being,  partly  Rational,  and  partly  Senfitive,  his 
Happinefs,  or  higheft  Good,  cannot  be  placed  either  in  Know- 
lege  alone,  or  in  Pleafure  alone :  K7ioivlege  being  the  Good  of 
only  One  Part  of  his  Nature,  the  Rational;  and  Pleafure,  tlie 
Good    of   the   other  Part   only,    the   Senfitive:     it   has   appeared, 

that 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  643 

that  Mans  Happmefs  muil:  confift    in    the   Good  of  Both  Parts 
of  his  Compound-Nature,    taken    together,  —  the  Good   of   the 

W/jole  Man.      And  this  Good  is   Moral   Virtue, For 

the  Senfitive  Part  of  every  Man  is  an  Animal-Soul,  united  with 
a  Human  Body:  and  his  Rational  Part  is  a  Particular  Mind. 
The  Animal-Soul,  as  well  as  the  Body,  of  every  Man,  with 
all  thofe  Appetites,  PaJJions,  and  AffeSlions,  to  which  that  Soul 
of  his,  thro  its  union  with  Body,  is  fubjedl,  belongs  to  the 
Firjl  Kind  of  Being,  That  which  is  Lifinite }  and  every 
Particular  Mind,  by  its  nature,  belongs  to  the  Second  Kind 
of  Being,  That  which  Sets  a  Bound  to  every  Infinite;  as  in 
the  Body  of  this  Dialogue  has  been  fliown  at  large :  (See 
from  Page  274  to  the  End  of  the  Firji  Part.)  The  Ra- 
tional  Part  of  Man,  his  Mind,  is  the  proper  Seat  of  Mo- 
ral Virtue  ;  and  Moral  Virtue,  the  peculiar  Excellence  of 
Man,  belongs  to  the  Third  Kind  of  Being,  —  to  That,  in 
which  all  the  Infinites  are  bounded,  or  mixed  with  Bound.  (See 
particularly  in  Pages  293  and  297;  and  in  Notes  180  and 
193.)  In  the  Man  therefore,  whofe  Mind  is  accompliflied  with 
Moral  Virtue,  all  the  inward  Propertys  and  Powers  of  his 
Animal-Soul,  which  in  their  own  nature,  and  left  to  themfeh-es, 
are  immoderate  and  boundlefs, — and  which,  cutivardly  flowing, 
influence  all  his  x'^duions, — receive  Bound  and  Meafure :  and  this 
Blefling  they  receive  from  Prudence  or  Moral  Wifdom,  —  the 
Prime  Excellence  of  the  Human  Soul, — and  the  Virtue  of  Maji's 
Rational  Part,    refpeding    the    Good  of   the    Whole  Man,    as   a 

Being   compofed    of  Body,   Animal-Soul,    and   Mind.  — The 

Excellencys  of  the  Body  are  well  known  to  All  men ;  and  are 
wont  to  be,  by  Moft  men,  over-valued:  they  are  thefe  Six; 
— — Health, — Strength, — Agility, — Finenefs  of  the  Organs  of  out- 
ward Senfe,  —  ivell-proportioned  Features  of  the  Face,  —  and  the 
ComelineJ's    of   thofe  Parts  of  the  Body  where  any  of  the  other 

Excellencys 


644  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Excellencys    appear  vifible.  —  Of   the   Four    firft-mentloned   the 
Extreams  are  generally  admired,    and  are  often  celebrated   with, 
high  Encomiums.     But  the  Maflers   of  Medical  Science  know, 
tliat  Excejfive  Health  is  the  Forerunner  of  Dijeafe ; — that  Athletic 
Strength   is   unfavourable    to   the   Powers  of  the  Rational  Soul ; 
— that  extream  Agility   is  injurious    to   the  Firmnefs  of  Strength 
and   to  Robiijlnefs ;  —  and   that    extreatn   Finenefs    of  the  Organs 
of   outward   Senfe    borders    on    Delicacy,     Tefidernefs,    and  Weak- 
nefs. — But  let  us   fuppofe  Thefe   and   the  other  Corporeal  Excel- 
lencys   to    be   poflefled   in    fuch   a  Degree,    and   fo   well  tempered 
together,   as  to  be  durable,  and  conjijlent  with  each  other,  and,  in 
no   refpect,    detrimental  to  the  nobler  Part  of  Man  ; — yet,  if  their 
Owner  knows   not,  when,    and  ivbere,   and  hoiv  to  employ  them, 
— the  Ufe  o(  them  will  be  often  turned  into  an  Abi/Je ;    and  they 
will   then    prove    mifchievous    or    dangerous    to    the  Welfare   of 
the  whole  Man. — No    lefs   necellary  to    their   being   beneficial  to 
Man   is    the   Meafure    of   their  Exhibition   or  Exertion.      For,   if 
the   Exercife,    given    to   any   Members  of   the   Body,    be   defeclive 
and  injiifficient,  they  will   htcomc  Jluggijh  and  unapt  for  Motion ; 
if    it   be   immoderate   and    excejji've,    they   will    grow   languid  and 
heavy,   and   prematurely  be  worn  out.  —  In  ufmg   the  Organs  of 
our  Five  outward  Senfes,    it   is  no  lefs   necellary   to  the  natural 
Duration  of  their  Livelinefs,   that  we  apply  them  always,   as  far 
as  lyes  in  our  own  Choice,   only   to  thofe  Obje&s,  whofe  Qua- 

litys  and  Powers  are  moderate. For,   to  begin  with  the  Senfe 

of  Seeing,  to  look  at  Objefls  too  dijlant,  or  too  minute,  drains 
the  Eye  j  and  the  looking  only  at  large  and  near  Objeds, — 
as  for  inftance  the  conftant  Ufe  of  Convex  Glafles  in  read- 
ing,—  incapacitates  the  Eye  in  time,  for  the  fight  oi  fmaller : 
in  viewing  any  Objedt  whatever,  too  weak  a  Light  too  much 
dilates  the  Pupil  of  the  Eye;  and  ioo  Jlrong  a  Light  too  much 
contrads  it :  Colours  too  faint,  or  too  glaring,  produce  the  like 
Z  Effedls. — 


F    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  645 

Effeds.  —  The   Senfc    of  Hearing,    by    an    attention    to   Sounds, 
either  dying,    thro    the    remote  diftance   of   their  Caufe,    or   too 
fmall,    however    near   to    their   Beginning,     is    apt    to    be    over- 
llrained ;     and    by   Sounds    too   loud,   'tis   apt   to  be  ftunned  aiid 
deafened. — The  Senfes  of  Smelling   and  Tajling,   by  too  frequent 
a  ufe  of  pungent  Odours  and  poignant  Flavours,   are  either  dead- 
ened,  or  rendered  too  impotent  to  ferve  the  Purpofes,  for  which 
they   were    defigned    by  Nature  :     on    the   other    hand,    if    they 
are  wholly  confined   to   things    of  mildejl   Smell  and    Tafte,    they 
become  wholly  indifpofed,.   or   even   utterly  unable,    to   bear  the 
meeting  with  Jlrong  Scents  and  high  favoured  Viands,  tho  fome- 
times  unavoidable.  —  It  is  the  fame  with  the  Senfe  of  Feelings 
if  habituated    to    no   other  T^ouch   but  the  fmooth,    the  fqft,   and 
the  gentle,    it  is   pained   by   the  rough,    the  hard,    and   the  vio- 
lent:    on   the  other  hand,   if  it  be  converfant  with  only  Thefe, 
the  violent,    the   hard,    and   rough,    its  Senfibility  will  be   weak- 
ened, and  finally  be  quite  deftroyed. — So  that,   to  retain  what- 
ever Corporeal  Excellencys  a  Man   polTeffes,  —  and   to  preferve  in 
their   bell   State   all  thofe  Parts  of  his  Body,   which  are  inftru- 
mental  either  to  Motiofi  or  to  Sozfation,   it   is  requifite  for  him  to 
be  moderate  in   the  exercijing  and  employing  of  thofe  Parts,   even 
in    their   natural    and    ordinary   Fundions ;     it    is    requifite   alfo, 
that    he   fhould  chcofe,     for   the    SubjeSls   of    their    Employment, 
Such  as  have  Mediocrity  in    their  ^alitys  or  Powers,    relative  to 
the   Vfe  of  Man.  —  Now   this   moderate   Exercife,    (if  voluntary,) 
and   this   Choice  of  things  tnoderate,    {li  free,)   are   ovv'ing   to   the 
Virtue   of  Prudence.      Thofe  Infnites    then,   which  immediately 
concern    the    Body,    are    bounded    by    this    Virtue ;     and    Senfual 
Pleafure  is  thus  combined  with  Underfanding  and  right  Judgment. 
■The   Excellence  of  fuch   a  Combination   will   appear  far- 
ther,   from   confidering   the    Four    natural    Facultys   or   Pov.ers 
of  Man's  ylnimalrScul,  —  Infinol,    Senfe,   Memory,  and  Imagina- 
tion.—- 


646  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

f^Qfi^ — By  Thefe  are  generate^/  Appetites  and  Defircs,  which  arc 
excited  by  every  Appearance  of  any  Senjible  Good;  whether  fuch 
Good  appears  to  Frefent  Senfe  joined  with  InJlinSl,  or  to  hna~ 
gination  joined  with  Memory. — By  the  fame  Facultys  or  Powers 
are  generated  thofe  PaJJioiis  of  the  Soul,  which  are  put  in  mo- 
tion by  every  Appearance  of  Setijible  Evil,  whether  prefent,  paft, 
or  future.  —  Befides  all  thefe  Inhabitants  of  the  Soul,  Others 
there  are,  who  may  properly  be  called  Natives  of  the  Soil,  as 
they  fpring  up  and  grow  from  innate  InJiinSi  :  thefe  are  Such 
ki?td  Affections,  as  are  ?iatiiral  peculiarly  to  Man ;  being  of  much 
laro-er  extent,  than  Such  as  are  in  the  Souls  of  any  Brute- 
Animals.  Thofe  in  Us  reach  backward  to  remoteft  Anccjlors, 
long  fince  deceafed;  for  we  naturally  revere  their  Memory,  and 
delight  to  tread  in  their  Footfteps  :  forward,  they  reach  to 
Pojlerity  unborn  ;  for  **  nati  naioriim,  &  qui  nafcentur  ab  illis," 
are  embraced  in  Imagination  by  Us,  and  have  a  Share  in  our 
moft  benevolent  Wifhes  :  fideways,  they  fpread  to  all  our  col- 
lateral Kindred;     for  we   confider  our  Selves   and  Them  together, 

as  derived  from  One  common  Anceflor. But  thofe  Facultys 

or  Fowers  of  the  Soul,  and  all  this  Progeny  of  theirs,  the  Ap- 
petites and  Defires,  the  Fafjions  of  a  contrary  Sort,  and  the  kind 
Affe5lions,  being,  in  their  own  nature,  infinite, — as  belonging  to 
that  Part  of  the  Soul,  which  is  corporeal,  irrational,  and  blind, 
— mull:,  to  be  ufeful  and  beneficial  to  Man,  have  certain  Bounds 
and  Meafures  affixed  to  them ;  they  niuft  alfo  be  commcnfiirate. 
Each  with  the  Others ;  and  they  mufi:  be.  All  of  them,  pro- 
portioned to  their  refpcdtive  Ends. Now   in  Man,   as  well 

as  in  all  other  Animals,  Infiindis,  or  inftinftive  Inclinations  and 
Avoidances,  are  by  Nature  thus  bounded;  are  by  Nature  thus 
in  Harmony  together ;  and  are,  each  of  them,  by  Nature,  thus 
proportioned  to  the  Degree  of  Man's  natural  Wants  and  Weak- 
nefs.       The  Utility   of    thefe   Pre- conceptions    of  Good    and   Evil 

2  to 


P    H    1    L    E    B    U    S.         647 

to  the  Animal-Nature,  meafured,  as  they  are,  by  the  natural 
NeceJJitys  of  the  Animal,  and  being,  as  they  are,  in  jufl  pro- 
portion to  them,  is  always  confirmed  by  After- Feeling  and  Ex- 
perience.— The  Senfes  alfo  are,  in  all  Animals,  commenj'urate  by 
Nature  with  their  refpedive  ObjeSls.  The  internal  Images  of 
external  Objedls  arc,  in  every  Animal,  proportionate  to  its  Sen/a- 
iion  of  thofe  Objeds  :  and  the  Memory  of  them  is  always  pro- 
portionate to  the  LnpreJJions  they  have  made  on  the  Imagination. 
—  All  of  this  Good  then  is  the  Work  of  Nature.  And  the 
Appetites  and  Pajjions,  raifed  by  thofe  External  ObjeBsy  and  by 
their  Images  imprefl:  on  the  Memory,  may  juftly  be  deemed  na- 
tural like  wife  :  and  accordingly,  Thefe  alfo,  in  all  Brute- Animals, 
have  the  fame  Bounds,    and   the  fame  Meajiires,   with   the  innate 

Injlin5ls. But  in  Man  the  Appetites   and  Pajjions  are  immea- 

Jurable  and  boundlefs.  For  Man  hath  the  Power  of  extending  his 
Imagination  to  Infinity;  and  the  Images  therein  are  not  limited, 
in  their  ^alitys  or  in  their  Number,  by  the  prefent  or  the 
paft  Objects  of  his  Senfes,  nor  indeed  by  any  Things  any  where 
in  Nature.  Every  Man's  Imagination  hath  the  Power  of  joining 
or  dividing,  aflbciating  or  fevering,  the  Images  of  thofe  natural 
and  real  Objedls,  at  his  own  Will, — or  at  the  Will  of  Thofe, 
whofe  Words  and  Speeches  have  Power  over  Another  Man's 
Imagination. — Thus  are  created  neio  Fancy s,  innumerable,  un- 
limited, and  endlefs  :  and  thus  thofe  Defires  and  Averfio7is,  Hopes 
and  Fears,  which  are  apt  to  be  raifed  in  a  Man's  Soul  by  every 
Appearance  of  Good  or  Evil  in  his  Imagination,  are,  by  thefe 
preter-natural  and  falfe  Fancys,  enlarged  and  lengthened,  infi- 
nitely beyond   the   Bounds,   prefcribed   to    them   by  Nature;  for 

whatever  is   beyond  thefe  Bounds,   is   infinite. It  is  the  Work 

of  Moral  Wijdom,  (in  Man,  termed  Prudence,)  to  corrcdl  all 
thefe  Evils,  arifing  from  the  nature  of  Infinity :  for  all  the 
Infinites,   if  left  to  follow  their  own  nature,  produce  much  Ev^l. 

N  n  n  n  It 


648 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


It  is  the  Work  of  Prudence,  in  the  firil  place,  (taking  then  the 
Title  of  aui'^oo(jvvn  Sobriety  of  Mind,)  not  to  entertain  or  har- 
bour any  Faticys  of  the  foije  and  infinite  Kind,  to  which  No- 
thing in  Nature  is  correfpondent ;  but  on  the  contrary,  to  drive 
them  away,  as  often  as  they  return,  by  rational  Studys,  vir- 
tuous Employments,  or  innocent  Amufements  ;  giving  no  Credit 
to  Notions  or  Opiniojis,  fuggefted  by  our  own  or  other  Men's 
Imaginations,  without  a  previous  itriiil:  Inquiry,  whether  they 
agree  with  'Experience-,  with  the  Truths  of  Nature,  and  with 
the  Truth  of  Facts.  And  to  this  End,  it  is  neceflury  to  have 
our  Minds  ftored  with  a  competent  Knowlege  of  Nature,  with 
a  Knowlege  alfo  of  our  Selves,  and  of  other  Men;  having  firft 
prepared  our  Minds  with  Sobriety,  and  our  Hearts  uith  the 
Love  of  'Truth  above  all  things ;  fo  as  to  make  a  right  Ufe  of 
our  Knowlege,  and  to  reafon  judicioufly  thereon.  When  the 
extravagant  Fancys  and  unreafonable  Notions  are,  by  thefe  means, 
either  baniflied,  or  fo  far  fubdued,  as  to  be  without  the  Power 
of  railing  any  immoderate  Pafjion  or  Affedtion,  —  when  Imagina- 
tion is  confined  within  the  Bounds  of  Nature  by  the  La-ivs  of 
right  Reafon,  —  the  remainder  of  the  Work  of  Moral  Wifdom 
is  Q':^{'^  for  her  to  execute.  All  irregular,  immoderate,  and 
wild  PaJJions,  and  AffeSiions,  unfupported  by  the  Fancys,  are 
eafily  reduced  to  Rule  and  Meafure,  fubjedled  to  Reafon,  and 
become  tame.  The  natural  Appetites  are  then  excited  only  by 
the  prefent  Wants  of  the  Body;  and  only  in  proportion  to  the 
Senfible  Evil  of  thofe  Wants,  and  to  the  Se?i/ible  Good  experi- 
enced in  relieving  them.  The  natural  Defire  (in  every  Man) 
of  thofe  External  Goods,  which  afford  a  probable  Security  againft 
all  Bodily  Wants  for  the  future,  is  then  moderated  by  conlider- 
ing  the  precarious  nature  of  fuch  Securitys,  the  Difficulty  of 
obtaining  them,  and  the  Danger  of  lofing  Greater  Goods  iii 
the  Purfuit.  The.  natural  PaJJions,  ready  to  be  roufed  at  the 
2  Sight 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  649 

Sight  of  Evil    prefent   or  approaching,   or   at  the  well-grounded 
Apprehenfion  of  Evil   to  come,    arc  then  alfo  proportioned  to  the 
real  Quantity  of    the    Evil,     and    to    the  Value  of    that  Good, 
which   a  Man  is  deprived  of  by  fuch  Evil.     And  by  the  fame 
Virtue   of  Prudence    governing    the   Fancys,     are    all    thofe   kind 
Affections  which    are  natural  to   Man,  felt  in   a   Degree  propor- 
tioned to  the  Degree   of  Corifanguinity  with   the  ObjeSls  of   thofe 
Affedions,    without    Partiality   or   ill-grounded    Prejudices,    and 
with    no    other  Difference    felt   between    them,    than   what  the 
Laws   of  Nature  and  of  Reafon  authorife  the  feeling  of.     The 
Natural    Affedions    being    thus  Jpred,    as   widely   as    they  ougbty 
and    the    Meafure    of  Each    being    fettled  proportionately  to   the 
Others,    the   PolTeflbr   of  them  is   delighted,   when   he  feels   in 
his  own  Heart  a  due  Degree  of  Kindnefs   toward  All,   in  whom 
he    candidly  and  naturally   fuppofes   a  Feeling  of  Kindnefs   to- 
ward Him  in  the   fame  Degree.     And  this  natural  and  candid 
Suppofition    is    another   plenteous    Source    of  Pleafure    to   every 
Perfon,    who,    without   expeifling    or    defiring    from    Others    any 
Adions   of  Beneficence  to  Him,   can   feel  a  Pleafure  in  believ- 
ing himfelf  to  have  a  Share  in  their  benevolent  Affe5tions. 

Thus  it  is,  that  all  the  Facultys  or  Powers  of  a  Man's  Animal 
Sold,  with  all  the  natural  Motions  and  Emotions  of  it,  are  only 
then  benejicial  to  him,  when  they  are  moderate, — when  they  are 
bounded  by  the  Offices,  fcverally  ajigncd  to  them  by  Nature, — 
and  when  they  are  exerted  or  employed.  Each  in  proper  Seajhn, 
and  Each  on  fuitable  Occajions. — But  'tis  not  fufficient  for  the 
perfedion  of  the  Animal  Soul,  that  Each  of  thofe  Propertys  of 
it,  t^kan  Jingly,  be  fo  bounded  and  fo  meafured :  to  perfedt  and 
to  blefs  that  Part  of  the  Human  Nature,  they  mull  be.  All 
of  them,  commenfurate  and  vicW-proportioned  to  Each  Other. — 
This  will  appear  more  fully,  when  we  fhall  have  confidered 
the  Capacitys,  Powers,  and  Attainments  of  Man's  Rational  Soul: 

N  n  n  n  2  and 


650         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

and  we  are   now  arrived   at  the  place,  where  properly  they  fall 

under    confideration. • — The  Creator  of   the  Uni-verfe,    in   the 

Diftribution  of  his  various  Gifts  to  the  various  Kinds  of  Being, 
imparts  Himfelf  and  his  own  Happinefs,  in  different  Degrees, 
to  All.  In  imparting  Mind,  XJnderJlanding,  and  Keafon,  he  deigns 
to  beftow  a  Share  of  thefe  noblefl:  of  his  Gifts  on  Man  here 
on  this  Earth.  But  as  Man,  during  his  Infancy,  is  utterly 
incapable  of  enjoying,  in  the  leaft,  thofe  great  Endowments, 
nothing  more  of  them  is  given  at  firft,  than  a  Capacity  of  ar- 
riving at  them  gradually  in  time.  However,  a  Foimdation  for 
them  is  laid  in  Man's  Soul,  from  the  beginning,  by  infufing 
into  it  the  Principles  of  Mind,  the  fame  which  are  the  Prin- 
ciples of  all  Reafoni?ig  and  of  all  Knoii'kge, — the  Ideas  of  One 
and  Manyy  Same  and  Different.  For  indeed  'tis  only  by  means 
of  thefe  principles,  —  thefe  Primary  Ideas,  —  which  are  no  lefs 
innate  than  Ammzl- I?ijli7icfs,  —  that  every  Man  is  born  with  a 
Capacity  of  Reafon, — a  Capacity  of  imiverfalifmg  all  the  Objedts 
of  his  Senfes,  or  of  perceiving,  with  his  Mental  Eye,  General 
Ideas. — It  is  by  means  only  of  thofe  Principles,  that  Man  hath 
a  Capacity  of  comparing  together  the  Ideas  which  he  views ; 
and  of  perceiving,  by  that  comparifon,  the  Truths  concerning 
them.— Thro  the  fame  Principles  it  is,  that  Man  hath  a  Ca- 
pacity of  reafoning;  or  of  difcovering,  by  the  Media  of  thofe 
Truths  which  he  perceives  already,  other  Truths  unperceived  by 
him  before. — Thefe  Capacity s  in  time  grow  up  into  Powers, 
and  thefe  Powers  are  kept  in  conflant  Exerci/e,  by  the  conti- 
nual Occurring  of  new  Senfible  Objefts,  and  the  perpetual 
ASlivity  of  the  Mind,  energifing  on  the  Ideas  excited  by  thofe 
Objedts.  Hence  it  is,  that  more  and  more  Ideas  make  their 
appearance  in  the  Minds  that  more  and  more  Truths  are  dif- 
covered  ;  and  that  more  and  more  Knowlege  is  acquired.  Hence 
it    is,    that    Syflems    of  the   feveral   Sciences    are   framed,    aug- 

roented. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  651 

mented,   and  amplified ;    and   hence   are  various  Arts  invented, 
improved,   and    perfedted.  —  Such,   and  fo  great,    ate  the  Capa- 
citys.   Powers,    and  Attainmc7its,    of  the   Rational   Soul  of  Man. 
—  But   excellent   as    they  are,   yet,    if  they  exceed   the  Bounds 
of   Mediocrity,    or  if    their   Energys    and    inward   Workings    are 
not    rellraincd    by  Moderation,    they   arc   always   dangerous,    and 
often  prove  fatal,    to  their  PofTeffors.       Any  of  thofe  innate  Ca- 
pacitys  of  Mind,  juft  now  iiientioned,    if  they  pufh  unfeafonably 
forward,  either  weaken  the  Body,  or  drop  and  perifli,  Themfelves, 
before   they   have   time   to   ripen. — Where   they  arrive  at  their 
Maturity,    and    actually    become    Powers,     'tis    certain,     that    a 
Sluicknejs  of  Perception,   and   a  Readinefs  of  Appreherjion,   when- 
ever  new   Ideas   and    new  Truths  are   offered   to    ihc   Mind,    are 
Excellencys    to    be    admired.       But    if   that    ^licknefs    and    that 
Readinejs   be  immoderate,     the   Perception  of  thofe    Ideas  will   not 
be    clear,    nor  will  any  fajl  Hold   be   taken   of  thofe  Truths. — 
In  like   manner,   a  moderate  Slownefs,    thro   Patience,    in   reafon- 
ing  to   Generals   from    the  InduSiion  of  Particulars,    is  more  fa~ 
tisfaSlory  to   the  Mind,    than   too   precipitate    a    Hafte.      And  fo 
much    Delay,     as    is    requifite   for  Reflexion,     leads    to   Certainty 
and  Truth,   in  the  drawing  of  Syllogijlical  Conchtjions. — To  main- 
tain   the   Powers  of  the  Rational   Soul   in   their  befl   State,    'tis 
no  lefs  requifite,    that   Moderation   be  obferved,    in   the  Quantity 
oi.Exercife,   given   them  j  —  that  Mediocrity  be   attended    to,    in' 
the   Choice    of  SubjeBs,   to  which  they  are  applyed  ;  —  and  that 
Bounds  be  fet  to  the  Multitude  of  Particulars,   in  whatever  Kind- 
of  Subjedl   may  be  chofen. — For  too  much  Exercife  fatigues  and 
weakens    the    Mental    Powers  ;     and    with    too    little    they    lan- 
guifh,  and  are   indifpofed  for  ready  Ufe  on  fudden  Occalions. — 
If  they  are  too   converfant  with   SuhjeEls  infignificant  and  jnean, 
they  become  Triflers,    and    unfit    for  handling  Subjeds   of  Im- 
portance :    if,   on  the  contrary,   they  reach  at  Subjedts  too  ?;//^>6/;7 

for: 


652  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

for  their  Manngemcnt,  they  efrcd  nothing,  and  their  Strength 
is  exhaufted  idly.  —  In  too  great  a  Number  of  Particulars,  tlicy 
are   apt    to   be  bewildered  5     in   too  Jmall  a  Number,    they   want 

the    enlivening  Pleafure   of  Variety. Man   has,   before  him,    . 

all  Nature — the  whole  World,   with   which  he   is   furrounded, — 
for    the   ObjeB   of  his  Vieia,    and   the  Subjc5l  of  his    Confidera- 
tion.     But   his  Mind  can  by  no  means  conceive  the  Mechanifm 
of  fo  vafl   and   complicate   a  Strudure.      No   Experiments   can 
fliow  him    the    internal   Frame   of    any    One   Part.       The  com- 
ponent   'Elements  of   it   efcape   his   Sight,    thro  their   Minutcnefs : 
And   the   Heavenly  Bodys,    be  they  ever   fo  large,    are  too  remote 
for  his  IntrofpeBion.     No   other  Eye,   than   the  Divine,    is  equal 
to    the   View  :     and    no    Mind,    lefs    than    That   of    the    Great 
Defigner,    is  able   to   perceive,    with  perfe£b   Clearnefs,    the   Uni- 
formity  of  the  Defign,    amidfl   the  vaft   Variety  of  Parts,  which 
are,    in    all    outward    appearance,    fo    thorovvly   difjim'tlar  and    fo 
heterogeneous. — The  V/orld  therefore,   with   all   the  Beautys  of  it, 
tho    vifible   to   us  All,    hath    ever    been    the   Objedl   of  Amaze- 
ment to  Mod,  —  of  Admiration   to   the   Speculative   Few  :  —  the 
Formation  alfo  or  Compoftion   of   it,    and   the  EJfence    or   Nature 
of    it,    are,     after    all    our    Searches,     ftill    the   Subjedls   only   of 
Hypothifs,    ConjeSlure,   and  Opinion.  —  Seeing    then    thefe   things 
to  be  fo  tranfccndently  fuperiour  to  the  Utmofl:  of  Our  Reach, 
and   the   Knoivlege   of  them    fo   impoflible   for    the    Powers    of 
Human  Rcafon  to  attain  to,   the  Wifeft  Men  in  all  ages,   Socrates 
for  inftance,    have    always    confidcred    fuch   Studys  and   Contem- 
plations,    as    intirely  ufehfs  to    a  Life  properly  Human-,    but  yet 
of  the  greateft  Benefit  to  Man;    as   they  tend   to  elevate  his  Soul 
above    all    the    Objedis    of  Human   D  fires    and   Hwjian  Pafjions ; 
and  thus,   in  begetting  Magnanimity,   lay  the  firmefl:  Foundation 
for  a  Happy  Lfe,   and  afford  the   flrongeft  Security  for  its  Con- 
tinuance  until  the  End. — To  this  confideration  it  fccms  to  have 

been 


P    H    r    L    E    B    U    S.  653 

been  owing,  that  the  ancient  Majlers  in  all  the  Parts  of  Phi- 
lofophy  ufed  to  Initiate  their  Difciples,  early,  in  Cofmography, — 
fo  far,  as  to  lift  their  Thoughts  up  to  the  Divine  Caufe  of 
all  the  Beauty  which  they  beheld,  and  of  all  the  Good  which 
they  enjoyed.  For  at  that  time,  the  previous  Studys  of  all  the 
well-bred  Youth,  in  Arithmetick,  Geometry,  and  Mujick,  had 
brought  them  into  an  intimate  acquaintance,  not  only  with 
Beauty  and  Harmony,  but  with  the  Principles  alfo  of  thofe  de- 
lightful Forms. — The  Students  in  Philofophy,  being  thus  pre- 
pared and  qualified  to  make  rational  lieficdions,  were  led,  in 
the  next  place,  to  take  a  Survey  of  thofe  Parts  of  Nature, 
which  every  where  exhibit  ample  Proofs, — Evidences  to  Senfe 
and  Reafon  in  conjunction,  —  of  the  Truth  of  x.\\zt  foioid  Thca- 
logy,  taught  them  immediately  before. — 1  iieir  Speculations  were 
pointed  to  the  Animal,  the  Vegetable,  and  the  FoJJil  Bodys 
within  the  compafs  of  their  View  and  Examination. — But  this 
Survey  was  general  and  too  ciirfory  to  be  exadt.  For  an  accu- 
rate and  nice  fcrutinifing  of  thofe  ijiferiour  V^'ls  of  Nature 
was,  in  thofe  days,  deemed  unworthy  of  a  Mind  truly  philo- 
fophical  :  it  was  found  to  plunge  a  Man's  Thoughts,  and  his 
Inquirys,  into  a  boundlefs  Ocean  of  minute  Particulars -,  and  to 
prevent  or  leflen  his  attention  to  a  SubjeSl,  the  rnoft  important  to 
his  Happinefs. — This  Subject  is  Himfdf,  as  he  is  a  Man, —  an  Ani- 
mal, partaking  of  the  nature  of  Body,  partaking  too  of  the  nature  of 
Mind,  and  thus  as  it  were  placed  in  the  Middle  between  them  Both.  - 
So  that  the  jjature,  peculiarly  Human,  is  That  very  Subjedl,  of 
Middle-Rank, — That  which  is  neither  above  the  Reach,  nor  be- 
neath  the  Dignity  of  Human  Speculations. — In  confidering 

this  Subject,  nothing  is  more  obvious  to  perceive,  than  This, — 
that  Man  is  of  all  Animals  the  fartheft  from  Self-Sufficience. 
Indeed,  he  is  the  only  Animal,  totally  unable,  when  arrived  at 
Maturity,    to    provide    for  itfelf   the  neceflary  Means  oi  Siibjijh 


654 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


ence.  Much  lefs  is  any  One  Man,  alone,  able  to  procure  for 
himfelf  thofe  Conveniencys  of  Life,  and  thofe  Delights  of  Setife, 
which  the  Goodnefs  of  Divine  Providence  feems  to  have  de- 
figned  for  him.  For  of  the  Beings  Inanimate,  which  Jill  the 
Earth,  as  well  as  cover  it,  —  Beings,  inconceivably  various  m 
their  Kinds  and  Species,  and  All  of  them  in  vafl  Abundance, — 
the  Greateft  Part  are  of  no  other  apparent  Ufe,  than  to  fur- 
nifli  out  a  Plenty  of  Materials  for  thofe  Convenitncys  and  thofe 
Delights. — It  appears  then,  in  the  firft  place,  that  the  Author 
of  all  Nature  has  laid  Me7i  under  the  Necejfity  of  aJJ'ociating  to- 
gether in  Aggregate  Bodys,  (more  or  lefs  numerous,  in  pro- 
portion to  the  Fertility  of  that  Region  of  the  Earth  which 
they  inhabit,)  for  the  fake  of  procuring  the  Means  of  ?nain- 
taining  Life,  thro  their  joint  Labour  and  Induftry  ;  for  mutual 
Defence  alfo  againft  the  Attacks  of  wild  Beads,  who,  perhaps, 
on  Their  fide,  were  created  for  this  very  End,  to  compel  Man- 
kind into  Ajjhnblys  and  Confederacys.  —  Farther  ;  as  Men,  by 
Nature,  defire  and  feek,  not  meerly  Places  o^ Rcfl  and  Abode,  but 
Such  as  are  commodious  and  delightful;  — and  as  by  Nature  they  have 
Ingenuity  to  contrive  Buildings  for  their  Flabitation,  Cloathing 
for  their  Bodys,  Utenfils  for  the  Preparation  of  their  Food, 
and  various  other  Conveniencys  for  living,  in  all  refpedts,  with 
Eafe  and  Satisfadion  ; — as  Nature  has  alfo  plentifully  fupplyed 
Men  with  Materials  for  all  thefe  Fabricks  ;  —  and  as  a  great 
Number  of  Hands  are  requifitc  for  the  ConfruBion  of  fuch  a 
Variety;  —  (few  Perfons  having  Abilitys  to  acquire  Skill  and 
Adroitnefs  in  more  than  One  Kind  of  Art  or  Workmanfliip ;) 
—it  appears,  that  Men  are  infligated  by  their  natural  Defires, 
and  by  the  Profpedl  all  around  them  of  attaining  the  Objeds 
of  thofe  Defires,  to  form  themfelves  into  large  Societys. — Now 
in  every  large  Society  of  Men,  —  tho  they  have,  All  of  them. 
One  common  Interejl, — That  of  the  whole  Society, — yet,  as  Every 
2  •  '  Member 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         655 

Member  of  it  hath,   befide  That,   ^  fcparate  Interejl  o{  his  own, 
—  thefe  feparate  Interefts  are  apt  frequently  to  clafh.     And  as 
FaJJions    of  the  fame  Kind   are   in    the   Souls  of  All   men,    the 
PafTions  of  One  man  often  meet  and  encounter  with  their  Equals, 
the  like   Paffions  of  Another  man. — Hence  appears,    in   the  next 
place,     the   NeceJJity  of   appointing    Arbiters,    or    Judges   autho- 
rifed   by  the  Community,  to  decide   the  Controverfys  and  Con- 
tefls    between   Man   and   Man.      Farther   ftill ;    in    every   large 
Society  of  Men,   Many  a  one  there  is,   who  aims  at  taking  the 
Lead,    uneleded    by  the   reft ;  —  Many  a  one,   who   endeavours 
to  get  more  than  his  due  Share  of  the  Good,   procured   by  the 
joint  Induftry  of  All : — Some  are  found,   who  without  any  ho- 
neft  Art  or  Labour,    and  either  by  Stealth,  or  Rapine,   feize  on 
the  Pofleffions   and    Property   of  their   neighbours  : — and  fome- 
tlmes  ftart   up  Others,    who,    by  Fraud,   or  Addrefs,    or  Foreign 
Force,    aim   at   getting  All    into   their   Power,    the   Pofleffions, 
Libertys,   and  Lives  of  All. — Hence  other  NeceJJities  arife;  — 
the  Neceffity  of  conflituting  and  eftablifliing  Civil  Governments, 
—  the  Neceffity  of  ordaining    and    ratifying   Civil  Laws,  —  the 
Neceffity   of  creating  Judicial  Magijlrates,   to  fupport  the   Con- 
ftitution  or  efliablifhed  Frame  of  Government,   by  public  Judg- 
ments according    to   the   Laws    ordained, — and    the  Neceffity  of 
creating  Executive  Magijlrates,    to   protedl  the  Common-Wealth 
effedlually,    by  putting   thofe   Laws   into   Execution.  —  And,   as 
the  Neceffity s,  Jirjl  mentioned,  are  indifputably  natural;    (for  they 
appear  evidently  to  flow  from  the  nature  of  Man;)    fo  we  may 
venture  to  pronounce,   that  Civil  Societys  alfo,    and   the  Confe- 
quences   of   them,  juji  now  me7itioned,    are    no   lefs  natural  and 
necejjary ;    becaufe   they  are   the  only  fure  Prefervatives  and  Re- 
medy s    againft    the    Injurys,   which    Men    are,     from    their    na- 
ture,  liable  to  fuffer.    One    from   Another. Many    various 

Doings  of  Nature  confpire  in  the  accompliffiment  of  One  great 

O  o  o  o  Defign 


6s6 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


Defign.     Accordingly,   her  Providential- Mind^   the  fole  Defigner, 
having   thus  pre-dejUned  Men    to    a    Social    and    Civil   Life,    he 
has   io  prepared  and  pre-difpofcd  them   for  it,    that  they  feem  to 
enter  into  it,    not   of  Neceflity,    but  of  their  own  free  Will  and 
Choice. — He  has   infufed   into  their  Souls  ftrong  Inclinations  to 
affemble   together.  —  He  has  given   them  to  feel  Delight,   whea 
they  meet   One   with  Another,   tho   intire    Strangers    before,    if 
no  Harm  be  apprehended   on  either  fide  to  arife  from  the  Meet- 
ing. —  He  has    imbued    them    with   Sympathetic  AJf'eBions,   from 
which   they  rejoice  7iaturally  at    the   Good,   and  grieve  naturally 
at   the  Evil,   befallen   to  any  Human  Being,   without  confidera- 
tion  of  Advantage,   or  Difadvantage,    to  accrue  from  it  perfonally 
to   Themfelves.  —  He  has   provided    them   with   natural  InJlinSls 
to    give    immediate    y^Jifiance,    to   Such,     as    are    accidentally  ia 
immediate  Need  of  it. — He  has  endued   them  with  natural  Pro- 
pe77jitys  to  relieve  Thofe  whom  they  fee,  or  hear  of,   in  Diflrefs, 
if  they  are  able  ;    or,   if  not,    to  endeavour  to  obtain  Relief  for 
them  from   Others. — He  has  infpired  them  with  a  Promptitude 
to    perform    the    common    Offices    of  Humanity   to   All  ;     and> 
on    any  Emergency,    fpecial  Ads    of  Kindnefs    to   Any   of    the 
Human    Species,   without    expeftation    of  Recompence   or   Re- 
quital.— And,   for  every  fuch   Office   or  A6t  of  Kindnefs,    done 
to  Themfelves,   he  has  fown  in  their  Hearts   the  Seeds  of  G)'a~ 

iitude. But    of   all    our   inborn   Preparations,    for   leading   a 

Social  and  Civil  Life, — That  Life  which  is  properly  and  pe- 
culiarly Human,  —  the  moft  efficacious  and  the  moft  unerring 
are  the  Ideas  of  Right  and  Wrong,  Jujl  and  Unjujl,  Good  and 
Eivil  in  Moral  ASlions ;  —  Ideas,  which  arife  naturally  in  our 
Minds,  as  foon  as  we  are  able  to  apply  thofe  Arithmetical  Ideas, 
thofe  Propertys  of  Numbers,  —  Equal  and  Unequal, — to  the  /«- 
tercourfe  between  Man  and  Man,  and  to  their  Behaviour  to- 
ward   Each   Other ;  —  more  clearly,   however,  in   Such  Minds, 

5  a* 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.        657 

as  are  able  alfo,  from  their  innate  Principles,  the  Principles 
of  all  Mind,  —  Otie  and  Many,  Same  and  Different,  — to  infer 
-the  Certainty  of  One  Univerfal  Law,  the  Same  Rule  of  Con- 
du(ft  to  all  Rational  Beings ',  (Reafon  being  One  and  the  Same 
in  them  All,  how  much  foever  they  may  differ  in  other  Re- 
fpedls, — in  other  Parts  and  Propertys  of  their  feveral  Compound- 
Forms.— —From  this  Point  of  View  may  be  feen  the  won- 
drous Beauty  of  Moral  Virtue ;  by  which  all  the  Parts  of  a 
Human  Soul,  as  they  are  united  by  Nature  in  One  Being,  (o 
they  confpire  as  it  were  together  in  a  Moral  Union,  under 
the  government  of  Mind  and  Reafon,  for  the  Good  of  the 
Whole  Man. From  the  fame  Point  of  View,  but  extend- 
ing our  Sight  more  widely  around  us,  we  may  behold  the 
Beauty,  no  lefs  admirable,  of  a  well-conftituted  Kingdom,  or 
true  Commojiivealth;  the  multitude  of  whofe  conftituent  Parts, 
all  of  them  in  continual  Motion,  and  all  feverally  moving  in 
lines  of  different  diredion,  are  fo  controlled  by  the  Law, — 
the  governing  Mind,  and  as  it  were  the  Reafon  of  the  Whole 
State,  —  that,  maugre  all  their  continual  Thwartings,  frequent 
Jarrings,  and  incidental  Clafliings,  their  Political  Union  is  pre- 
ferved  :  Each  feparately  contributes,  and  All  jointly  confpire, 
tho  Moil  of  them  un-intentionally,  to  promote  the  Weil-Being 
of  the  Head,    the  Chief  Part,    and    of  all    the  Members   of  the 

Whole  Community. Now  all  this  Beauty,  both  the  Moral  and 

the  Political, — all  this  Good,  both  the  Private  and  the  Public, — 
is  the  Refult  of  Sy77wietry,  the  Symmetry  of  various  Parts  com- 
merijurable,  and  adlually  meafured  by  One  common  Measure, 
One  Law,  One  Reafon,  running  thro  the  Whole.  —  This  Good 
and  Beauty  then,  (fince  the  Good  of  Senfe  and  the  Good  of 
Mind, — Pleafure  and  Wifdom, — meet  here  together  and  unite,) 
is  fifficient  to  fatisfy  all  the  Indigencys  of  Human  Nature  :  the 
Happinefs  of  Man,    coniidered   in   his  Private  and   Public   Ca- 

O  o  o  o  2  pacitys 


<5S8 


P    H    I    L    E   B    U    S. 


Socrates. 
In    the  Third  Degree    of   Excellence,    if  I  divine 
aright,    you  would  not  greatly  miftake  the  truth,  if 
you  were  to  place  Mind  and  Underftanding  '^^'. 

Protarchus. 

pacltys  together,  is  here  perfecfl :  and  thus  in  this  Second  Con- 
clufion  we  find  delineated  Mans  Sovereign  Good.  —  But  in  this 
place,  it  becomes  necelTary,  for  the  juftification  of  the  Firji 
Conclufion,  to  repeat  what  was  obferved  in  the  Beginning  of 
this  Note,  —  viz:  that  Meajure  is  the  Fri7iciple  and  the  Caufe 
of  all  this  Good, — For  to  thofe  Perfonal  Virtues,  which  confift 
in  governing  well  the  Appetites  and  Defires,  Paflions  and  Af- 
fedions,  of  the  Animal-Soul,  abfolutely  eJJ'ential  are  Moderation 
in  their  Ufe,  and  Seajonablenefs  in  the  Time  of  ufing  them : 
now  the  Principle  of  thofe  Quality s,  fo  eflential  to  thofe  Virtues, 
is  no  other  than  the  Being  of  Meqftire. — Of  the  Virtues,  which 
confift  in  regulating  a  Man's  Condudl  toward  Others  in  the 
various  Relations  of  Social  and  Civil  Life,  (all  of  which  Virtues 
are  comprehended  in  Univerfal  yujiice,)  That  Meafure,  accord- 
ing to  which  diftributed  are  to  All  their  jiiji  Dues,  is  the  very 
EJfence :  and  of  This  and  of  all  Otljer  Meafures  Measure 
ITS  Self,  that  is.  Good  its  Self,  the  Meafure  of  All 
things    in    the    Univerfe,   is  the  fole  Caufe. 

^^^  In  fome  of  the  ISlotes  a  little  preceding  This,  as  well 
as  in  the  Argumejit  of  the  Dialogue,  we  have  willingly  ad- 
mitted, that  the  SubjeSl  of  it  hath  a  refpedl  to  the  Divine 
Naturef  the  Sovereign  Good  of  the  Univerfe ;  tho  it  hath  a 
more  immediate  and  profelTcd  View  to  the  Nature  and  Good 
of  Man.      In  the  prefent  Sentence,  however,  it  is  moft  evident,. 

that 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  659 

that  the  word  Mind  cannot  be  underftood  to  mean,  even  re- 
motely, the  Divine  Mind.  For  the  Sentence,  with  fuch  a 
Meaning,  would  exprefsly  contradidt  the  Declaration  of  Socrates 
himfelf,  in  Page  215,  as  may  appear  from  Note  154. — Befidesj 
the  Divine  Mind  hath  been  already  fpoken  of:  This  was  meant 
in  the  Firjl  Conclufion  3  the  word  Meafure  being  there  ufed  in 
that  fupereminent  tranfcendental  Senfe,  in  which  it  fignifys  Mca- 
Jure  its  Self,  Meafure  univerfally ;  for  the  Divine  Mind  alone 
is  full  of  thofe  Ideas,  the  moft  truly  Univerfal  and  Divine, — 
The  Good,  The  Beautiful,  and  The  Jzijl ; — Ideas  which  extend, 
to  all  the  Forms  of  Nature;  penetrating,  and  wherever  they 
penetrate,  adorning,  thofe  Forms  both  inwardly  and  outwardly  > 
afhgning  to  Each  of  them  its  due  Meafure;  affixing  to  the 
Infinites  within  them,  the  Elements  of  their  Frame,  Bounds, 
which  they  cannot  pafsj  tnoderating  the  Intemperature  of  the 
Elementary  Infinites  without  ;  and  caufing  Nature  to  operate 
the  Viciffitudes  of  thefe  Elements  xa/^/ws  feafonably,  and  oppor- 
tunely for  the  Good  of  all  the  Forms,  which  their  different 
Mixtures  compofe  and  preferve,  by  being  -wtW-tempered — rela- 
tively to  thofe  different  Forms. In  the  Sentence  therefore 

now  before  us,  the  word  Mind  muff  fignify  the  Mind  of  Man: 
and  indeed  'tis  Man,  whofe  Good  is  the  diredt  and  proper  Sub- 
je<a  of  this   Summary  or  Conclufive  Part,    as    well    as    of   the 

reft    of  the  Dialogue. Now  the   Human  Mind    reaches 

not  ordinarily  to  fee  any  Mental  Objedis,  higher  than  the  Kinds 
and  Species  of  external  Things.  That  every  Perfon  fhould  per- 
ceive Thefe,  is  abfolutely  necefary  to  Human  Society  :  becaufe 
Whoever  was  without  Such  General  Ideas  could  not  converfe 
with  any  other  Perfon ;  nor  could  the  Affairs  of  Social  Life 
be  carried  on.  And  fuch  a  Degree  of  natural  Vnderfandiiig, 
as  capacitates  a  Man  for  the  Perception  of  Such  Ideas,  is  fuj- 
Jicient, — not  only  for  the  Purpofes  of  Common  Life, — but  alio 

5  ^^' 


66o         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

for  the  acquifition  of  that  Kind  of  Knowlege,  which  is  termed 
the  Knowlege   of  'Natural  Hijiory. — A  greater  Degree  of  natural 
Vnderjlanding   is    neceffary    for    the    Perception    of   Thofe  Ideasy 
which  are,  with   more  propriety  than  any  General  Kinds  of  things, 
ftyled  Univerfal ;  —  Such   we   mean,   as   are   the  Subjeds  of  the 
Second  Conclufion, — Symmetry  and  Beauty, — FerfeClion  of  Form, 
(comprehending  the  Perfedions  peculiar  to  Each  Kind  of  Form,) 
— and  Sujicience  of  all  things  contributive   to   that   Perfedlion. — 
Perfons   of  this   Genius,    beyond  what    is    ordinary,    differ    alfo. 
One    from    Another,     in    the   natural    Byas  or    'Tendency  of    this 
Genius   toward  fame  Kinds   of    Senfible   Objefts,    more   than   to- 
ward other  Kinds,  tho  equally  apt  to  excite  in  them  thofe  Univerfal 
and  Divine  Ideas.     And  to  this  Diverjity  of  Genius  are  owing  the 
natural  Inclinations   of  different   Perfons   to  different  Arts. — Nor 
is    the   Difference   lefs,    amongft    different  Perfons,    with  regard 
to  the  Extenji'venejs  of  this  finer  Genius,  when  it  is  diredled  to- 
ward the    Sciences :    and   Sciences  are   the  propereft  of  all   Sub- 
jedls,    for  the  Exercife  of  it  j    becaufe  they  are  farther  removed 
from    Corporeal   Things,    than    are    the    Arts,    and   confequently 
approach   nearer   to  Ideas,    or  Fortns  purely  Mental. — Some   Per- 
fons,  who  partake  of  this  finer  Genius,  reft  in  the  Mathematical 
Sciences,    the  Objedls  of  which   are  indeed   Symmetry  and  Pro- 
portion,   Harmony  and  Beauty,   but  in   no  higher  Subjeds,   than 
Numbers,   Figures,    and   Sounds.  —  Other    Perfons,    who   feem    to 
have  a  Genius   equal    to   the  Genius    of  the  former,   returning 
back  again  to  the  Corporeal  World,  with  a  View  of  benefiting 
Human    Life    by    an    Improvement    of    the   Ufeful    Arts,    apply 
Mathematical  Theorems    to  groffer  Bodys  only,    to  Such   as  may 
be  iveighed  or  handled. — In  fome  Perfons,    their  Genius  extends 
to   thofe  Sciences,    in    which  the  Divine  Univerfals   are  beft  ex- 
emplifyed,  —  the    Science  of  private  Morals,    and   the   Science 

of 


P     H    I    L    E     B     U    S.        66i 

of  Government  and  fiiblic  Laws.     And   in  a  Few,   their  Genius 
reaches  to  That  Science,   in  which  are  contained  the  Principles 

of  all   the  reft — DialeSiick,   or  the  Science  of  Mind. Wife 

Men  have  obferved,  with  great  truth,  that  the  intrinjic  Worth 
of  Every  Man  is  to  be  eftimated  by  the  real  (not  the  imaginary) 
Value  of  thofe  Things  which  he  moft  admires,  Jliidys,  and  de- 
lights in.  —  No  lefs  true  is  it  of  Every  man's  Mind,  that  the 
Dignity  of  it  is  in  proportion  to  the  Dignity  of  its  Objects: 
and  that  the  Greatnefs  and  Extent  of  Every  man's  JJnderJland- 
ing  are  in  proportion  to  the  Greatnefs  and  Extent  of  the  Siib- 
je6is,  which  it  comprehends. — In  reafoning  then  from  Analogy, 
it  follows,  that  were  it  poffible  to  feparate  (even  KoyJ)  the 
Divine  Mind  from  the  Divine  Ideas,  as  in  The/nfelves  they  are, 
and  as  of  that  Great  Mind  they  are  the  conftant  ObjeSls,  it  is 
neither  abfurd  nor  prefumptuous  to  fay,  that  the  Divine  Ideas 
have  the  Higheft  Place  in  the  Divine  Nature ;  and  that  the 
Divine  Mind  is,  on  this  very  account,  pure  and  perfect,  univerfal 
and  eternal,  becaufe  Such  is  the  Nature  of  the  Divi?ie  Ideas. — 
See  Note  274  to  the  Firji  Alcihiades. — But  the  Infeparability  of 
Mind  and  Ideas  feems  to  be  peculiar  to  the  Divine  Nature.  For 
only  the  Divine  Mind  is  always  in  E?iergy,  always  energifing  on 
his  own  Ideas ;  or  rather  he  is  thofe  very  Ideas,  on  which  he 
energifes  :  —  Himfelf  is  univerfal  Good  and  Beauty,  —  univerfal 
Truth  and  ReSiitude, — univerfal  Jujlice  and  Goodnefs. — From  thefe 
Ideas  therefore  the  Divine  Mind  cannot  be  feparated,  fo  much  as 
merely  AoVwj  or  be  conjidered  as  diJiinSl.  Nay  perhaps  thefe  Divine 
Ideas  are,  in  Themfelves,  but  One  and  the  Jame  Idea, — and  only 
by  Hwnan  Minds,  (Such  as  partake  of  this  Univerfal  and  Divine 
Idea,)  are  confidered  as  Many  and  Different,  from  the  Differ- 
ence of  its  Appearances  to  Them,  as  they  apply  it  to  Different 
Subjedls;  or  to  the.  Sat7ie  Subject,  viewed  in  different  lights:  as 
the   Same    Thing  is   often    both   good  and  beautiful;    the  Same 

Adioa 


662  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Adion  both  good  and  jujl. — We  dare  not  affirm,  that  Chalcidius 
had  in  view  That  Unity  of  the  Divine  Mind,  fpoken  of  lafl ; 
but  we  obferve,  that,  in  his  Commentary  on  Plato  z  T^imceus,  pag: 
431,  he  ufeth  the  Singular  Number,  in  fpeaking  of  the  Divine 
Ideas  thus,  —  "  naturam  vere  exijientem,  conjlantem,  eandemque 
femper,  iiimirum  Ideam,  quce  iJitelleSlus  Dei  ceterni  ejl  ceternus"— 
Poffibly,  this  Platonic  Writer  meant  only  the  Divine  Ideas  in 
the  General.  Be  that  as  it  may,  his  words  are  plainly  ex- 
preffive  of  an  Union  of  the  Divifte  Mind  with  its  Obje5ly  whe- 
ther One  or  Many — an  Union  ijifeparable,  becaufe  eternal. 
We  fliould  not  have  dwelt  on  fo  clear  a  Point,  had  not  feme 
Learned  Men  imagined,  that  Ideas,  according  to  the  Dodrine 
of  Plato,  are  Bei?igs,  fiibjijling  by  I'hetiifehes,  apart  from  the  Di- 
'vine  Mind; — and  that,  befide  the  Two  Caufes  and  Principles  of 
all  things,  according  to  the  Pythagorean  Dodlrine,  God  and  Ne~ 
cejjity,  or  Mind  and  Matter, — Plato  introduced  a  Third  Princi- 
ple and  Caufe, — Ideas,  the  Originals  or  Exemplars  of  all  Senfibh 
Forms.  —  a  Principle,  as  diftindt  from  God,  or  Mind,  as  from 
NeceJJity  or  Matter,  —  rightly  therefore  rejecfted  by  Arijlotk,  as 
unnecefTary,  notional,  and  groundlefs. — But  D.  Laertius  tells  us, 
plainly,  that  Plato  afferted  Two  Principles  of  all  things,  God  and 
Matter,  Svo  rZv  ttxptuv  cc-m^-nviv  dp'^a.i,  B-sov  x.ai  vAvv,  and  that 
to  God  he  ( Plato)  gives  the  appellations  of  Mitid  and  Caife,  9-goV 
jta)  vm  TT^ocrxyo^eijet  y.at  uiriov.  Laertius,  Lib:  3,  §.  69.  Edit:  Amf: 
and  afterwards  in  §.  76,  refuming  the  fame  Subjed:,  he  fays, — 
a^j^^as  &va.i  xoti  aniac  rd  Xex^ivrot,  S'uo  tmv  ovtuv  (as  M.  Cafaubon, 
like  a  Man  verfed  in  Manufcript  Abbreviations,  and  the  Errors 
thence  arifing,  hath  taught  us  to  read  this  Paffage,)  Tra^acTft^'^a 
ToV  S-gov  V.OU  Tr\v  vMv,  that  the  Caufes  and  Principles  of  things  are 
the  Two  which  have  beeii  tnentioiied,  God  the  Exemplar  of  them,  and 
Matter:  in  which  Sentence,  the  word  ira.^d.S'eiyjj.cc  Exemplar  means 
Idea,    as    appears    from    §.    64,    agreeably    to    the    Pythagorean 

Dodrine. 


P   H    I   L    E   B    U    S.         663 

PROTARCHUS. 

Perhaps   I   fliould   not. 

Socrates. 
And  is  not    the  Fourth  Rank  due  to  thofe  things, 
which  we  afligned  to  the  Soul  herfelf  "^^  as  her  own 

proper 

Do<n:rIne.  See  before  in  this  Dialogue,  Page  249.  ■ 
But  the  Human  Mind,  the  Subjedl  of  the  Sentence  now  before 
us,  ought  to  be  dijlinguijhcd  from  her  own  Ideas  i  becaufe  flic 
has,  at  firft,  but  a  bare  Capacity  of  perceiving  them ;  or,  in 
other  words.  She  is,  at  firft,  in  Capacity,  every  Idea,  which 
arifeth  in  her  afterwards,  —  whether  excited  by  Senjible  ObjeSls, 
or  by  learning  any  Art  or  Science,  or  by  energifing  within  her  Self 
on  her  Ideas  already  fo  excited.  The  Human  XJnderJlanding  is, 
in  like  manner,  to  be  dijlinguijhed  from  thofe  SubjeSls  of  any 
Art  or  Science,  which  are  made  ObjeEls  of  the  Human  Under- 
flanding,  by  the  receiving  of  fuch  Art  or  Science  from  Human 
Mafters,  or  their  Writings,  or  from  the  internal  and  univerfal 
Teacher  of  all  Knowlege.  —  Accordingly  here,  where  only  the 
Human  Mind  and  the  Human  Underftanding  are  meant, — and  in 
general  &\Co,  including  all  Degrees  of  Capacity,  or  natural  Under- 
ftanding, in  different  Human  Minds, — Mind  and  Utidcrfumding  are, 
as  appears  from  the  next  Sentence  of  Socrates,  (the  Fourth  Con- 
clufion,)  diftinguiflied  from  Sciences  and  Arts  and  right  Opinions  i 
notwithftanding  that  neither  Opinions,  nor  Arts,  nor  even  Sci- 
ences, (fo  called  by  Men,)  have  place  in  any  other  Minds  than 
Such   as   are  the  Human. 

4+°  Meaning  the  Rational  Soul  or  Mind  of  Man.  —  PJato, 
throughout  the  Argumentative  Part  of  his  Phirdo,  ufeth  the 
word  Soul,   in  fpeaking  of  Man,    to  fignify  the  Mind.     For  the 

P  p  p  p  Argument:;, 


664 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 


proper  Goods,  Sciences,  and  Arts,  and  Right  Opi- 
nions '''^'i  a  Fourth  Order  of  Goods,  following  next 
after   the    iirft  Three  ?    ought    we  not  here  to  place 

them, 

Arguments,  there  made  Ufe  of,  to  prove  the  Immortality  oi  the 
^oiil,  amount  to  nothing  more  than  Proofs  of  the  Etertiity  of 
all  Mind.  It  may  therefore  reafonably  be  inferred,  that  Flato 
held  the  Soul  of  Man  to  become  immortal  only  by  partaking  of 
Univerfal   Mind,   which   is   abundantly  fliown   to  be  eternal. 

4+'  Arts  are  here  placed  in  a  Rank  inferioiir  to  that  of  the 
Human  Mind,  becaufe  Human  Minds  were  the  Inventors  of 
them ;  and  the  Inventor  mufl  be  allowed  fuperiour  to  the 
Invention,  as  being  the  itttelligent  and  defigni?ig  Caufe  of  it. 
Indeed,  'tis  Human  Mind,  who  is  the  Artijl :  and  every  Artijl- 
Mind  is  only  a  Human  Mindy  adting  on  Subjefts  of  fome  cer- 
tain Kinds,  according  to  a  fet  of  Rules,  invented  by  her  Self 
cr  by  other  Human  Minds.  -  Even   the  Sciences,   fo  far  as 

they  are  known  hitherto,  are  placed  in  this  inferiour  Rank,  be- 
caufe the  Capacity  of  the  Humayi  Mind  reaches,  we  prefume,. 
to  much  greater  Heights  of  Science,  than  Man  hath  as  yet  actually 
afcended  to. — Many  Theorems  in  every  Science  remain  undif- 
covered  :  many  a  Simple  Truth,  the  mutual  Relation  of  Two 
Ideas, — the  Power  (as  it  were)  of  thofe  Two  Ideas  in  combi- 
nation,—  lyes  in  them  ftill  latent:  and  many  ^  Complex  Truths 
the  Refult  of  Simple  Truths,  —  a  more  extenlive  Power  (as  it 
were)  of  Ideas, — lyes  hidden  yet  deeper.  But  how  far  foever 
extended,  the  Power  of  Ideas  may  be  heareafter  found,  by 
complicating  and  compounding  Truths  known  before  ; — how  great 
a  Multitude  foever  may  arife  out  of  a  Few,  by  DeduSlions,  In- 
ferences, and  Corolhirys  3 — every  Mind  is,  by  nature,  capable  of 
3  fuch. 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         665 

them,  if  they  are  more  nearly  related  to  the  Chief 
Good  '^^^  than  they  are  to  Pleafure  ? 

Protarchus. 
Perhaps   we  ought. 

Socrates. 
Then  follow,  Fifth  in  Order,  the  Pleafures  of 
That  Sort,  which  we  defcribed  to  be  unmixed  with 
Pain,  and  denominated  Pure,  fuch  as  Thofe  con- 
fequent  to  Senfation,  but  belonging  to  the  Soul  her 
Self,   when  fhe  is  engaged  in  the  Sciences  '^^K 

Protarchus, 
It  may  be  fo. 

Socrates. 

fuch  Advancement,  as  to  be  able.  In  time,  to  follow,  to  ap- 
prehend, and  to  comprehend  them  all :  and  confequently  the 
Human  Mind  is  fuperiour  to   the  prejent    (or  any  ghen)    Stage 

of  any   Science. In   what  refped,   Rig/jf  Opmio?u  merit   a 

Place  in  the  fame  Rank  with  Sciences  on  fome  occafions,  — 
efpecially  at  prefent,  when  they  are  confidered  as  Things  ab- 
folutely  and  always  Good,  relative  to  Man,  —  may  be  feen  in 
the  Meno,  Pages  232,  3;  and  246.  —  In  what  refped:,  Right 
Opinion  is  inferiour  to  Science,  appears  in  the  intermediate  Pages 
of  that  Dialogue. 

44^  For  all  the  Objeds  of  Art,  or  of  Science,  or  of  Right 
Opinion,  being  every  One  of  them  boimded,  partake  of  the 
Chief  Good, — Meafure. 

443  In  the  Greek  of  this  Sentence,  the  word  gV/g-^'/xas  ought  to 
be  either  quite  expunged,   or  changed  for  the  word  w/oras,  or  im- 

P  p  p  p  2  mediately 


(,(,6  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Soe  R  AT  E  S. 

With   the  Sixth  Race (fays  Orpheus) 

Clofe  we  the  fitiiJJfd  Series  of  our  Sofig  '^^. 
Our  Difquifition  too  feems  to  be  novy  finiflied,   and 
to  clofe  with  paffing  our  Sixth  Sentence.      After  all 
This,    nothing  remains  for  us  to  do^    but  to  affix  a 
Head  as  it  were  to  the  whole  Body  of  our  Inquiry. 

Protarchus* 

mediately  preceded  by  the  Prepofition  t«^J.  See  Page  547.  — 
The  piirejl  Plcqfures,  thofe  of  Science,  are  certainly  not  Sciences, 
themfelves. 

'^^  This  Verfe  of  Orpheus  we  meet  with  again  in  Plutarch's 
Treatife  concerning  the  Delphic  Injcription  ET,  and  in  no  other 
ancient  Author,  whom  We  are  acquainted  with.  It  is  intro- 
duced by  Plutarch  no  otherwife,  than  as  a  Part  of  the  prefent 
Paflage  in  Plato,  which  is  there  quoted  j  and  not  fo,  as  to 
give  us  any  light  into  the  Poet's  own  JVIeaning  in  that  Verfe.. 
But  if  we  may  form  a  probabk  Conjedure  from  Plato's  ap- 
plication of  it,  'twas  the  End  of  a  Defcription  of  Five  different 
Ages  of  the  World,  with  regard  to  Men's  Manners  and  Ways- 
of  Life.  For  Men  are  generally  fuppofed  to  have  departed, 
more  and  more,  from  their  primaeval  Purity,  Simplicity,  and 
Innocence  ;  and  each  fucceffive  Age  to  have  been  lefs  virtuous 
and  honed  than  the  preceding. — The  Poet  Ovid,  in  his  Meta- 
morphofesy  writes  of  Four  Ages,  gradually  degenerating  in  that, 
manner ;  in  the  laft  of  which  Four,  he  fays,  the  Giants  made 
War  againfl  the  Gods.  The  Fable  was  very  ancient  j  and  in 
Ovid's  Days,  a  long  Time  had  elapfed  fince  the  fuppofed  Age 
©f  it. — The  Poet  Hejiod,  in  his  "E^ya  aat  'HyJ^ai,  fays,  that  he 
Hin:ifelf  lived  in  the  Fifth  Age..  And  'tis  highly  probable, 
3.  that 


P   H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  667 


Protarceiu;s. 
'Tis  fit  that  we  fliould. 


Socrates. 


Come  then  ;    the  Third   to  the  Saviour  ^*'  ;    let  us 
commemorate  Him,    vvhofe   Aid    brought    the    Aro-u- 

that  Onomacritus,  an  Athenian  Poetj  who,  long  after  the  time 
of  Hejiody  tho  long  before  the  time  of  Socrates,  wrote  a  Poem^ 
(afcribing  it  to  Orpheus,)  intitled  "E^'ya  v.<x\  'H/>tg'^ar, — to  imitate 
or  to  rival  Hejiod's  on  the  fame  Subject,  —  briefly  defcribed 
therein  the  different  Manners  of  thofe  Five  Ages  ;  as  ILfiod  had 
done,  with  regard  to  the  firft  Four:  but  that,  corning  to  the 
Sixth  Age, — That,  in  which  he  Himfelf  lived,  he  flopped  fliort,, 
like  Hefiod.  For  the  Mufes,  in  thofe  days,  were  modeftj  and 
did  not,  as  they  did  afterwards,  exhibit  in  their  Songs  the 
moll  offenfive  Objedls»  Two  Fragments  of  that  Poem,  feigned 
to  have  been  written  by  Orpheus,  are  yet  remaining,  given  us^ 
by  Tzetzes,  in  the  Proem  to  his  Commentary  on  Hefiod,  pag:  4., 
And,  in  One  of  thofe  Fragments,  mention  is  made  of  ^C'Vum^ 
ytvsn  the  Golden  Age,  when  Men  employed  therafelves  wholly 
in  Agriculture  and  Planting. 

'>'>''  For  an  account  of  this  Proverb,  the  Reader  is  referred 
to  Note  363.  —  Mind  and  Right  Reafon  are  here,  as  well  as  in 
the  Paflage  to  which  That  Note  belongs,  meant  by  the  Saviour,. 
—the  only  protedting  and  pceferving  Deity,  in  Cafes  where 
all  other  Protection,  Aid,  or  Remedy,  is  infufHcicnt.  This  is- 
alfo  the  Meaning  of  the  lafl:  Sentence  of  Sirnplicius,  in  his 
•excellent  Commentary  on  the  Manual  of  Epi^etus,  where  he 
alludes   to  the   fame  Proverb, 

m.ent 


66S  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

ment  to  a  Conclufion  ;     calling  Him  to  witnefs  the 
Truth  of  it. 

Protarchus. 
Whom  do  you  mean  ? 

Socrates. 
Philebus   laid   down  this  Polition, — that  the  Good 
of   Man  was  all  and  every  Kind  of  Pleafure  in  full 
Abundance. 

Protarchus. 

By  commemorating  the  Saviour,  it  fcems,  then, 
Socrates !  you  meant,  that  we  fliould  refume  the 
original  Argument  of  our  Inquiry. 

Socrates. 

Well  :  but  let  us  obferve  what  followed.  I,  view- 
ing with  Diflike  that  Pofition  juft  now  mentioned, 
— the  Tenet,  not  of  Philebus  only,  but  of  Thou- 
fands  befide  in  all  ages, — on  the  other  hand  afferted, 
that  Mind  was  a  thing  far  better  and  more  bene- 
ficial to  Human  Life,    than  Pleafure. 

Protarchus. 
That  was  Your  Pofition. 

Socrates. 

But   then   fufpedling,    that  many  other  things  had 
Pretenfions  to  the  fame  Charafler  of  being  the  Good 

of 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.  66^ 

of  Man,  I  engaged,  if  Something  ^■^''  fliould  appear 
Better  than  Both  of  Thofe,  to  combat  for  the  Se- 
cond Prize,  in  behalf  of  Mind,  againft  Pleafure  ;, 
that  Pleafure,  in  her  Claim  to  fo  much  as  This> 
might   be   defeated. 

Protarchus. 
You   did   engage   fa  to   do. 

Socrates. 

Afterwards,  on  Trial,  it  was  very  fufficiently  proved, 
that  Neither  of  our  Favourites  anfwered  the  Cha- 
radler   of  compleat    Good. 

Protarchus. 
Perfedly  true. 

Socrates* 
Mind  therefore  and  Pleafure  were,  Both  of  them, 
quite  difmiffed  from  having  any  thing  to  do  in 
the  Controverfy  concerning  Good  its  Self;  as  Each 
of  them  wanted  Self-Sufficience,  and  that  Power 
which  attends   the   Compleat   and.  Perfed:^ 

++^  All  the  Editions  of  Flato  give  us  to  read  to  inftead  of 
m  in  this  Sentence.  Ficinus,  however,  tranflates,  as  if  in  the 
Medicean  Manufcript  he  read  t),  which  undoubtedly  is  the 
true  Reading  J  and  herein  he  is  followed  by  all  the  Tranfla- 
tors  who  came  after  him, 

Frotarchus* 


670         P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S, 

Protarchus. 
Very   right* 

Socrates. 
But  after  we  had  difcovered  a  Third  Thing  pre- 
ferable to  Either  of  thofe  Two,  we  found  the  na- 
ture of  Mind  to  approach  nearer  to  the  nature  of 
this  Conqueror,  and  to  be  much  more  familiar  with 
his   Form,    than  Pleafure. 

Protarchus. 
We   certainly"   did. 

Socrates. 

The  Sixth  "^"^^  and  lowejl  Place  then,  according 
to     the    Judgment     now     given,     as     the    Refult    of 

447  A  very  grofs  Error  has  infesfled  all  the  Editions,  and  all 
the  Tranflations  of  Plato,  in  this  place.  For  in  all  the  Edi- 
tions we  read  TriixTrfov  the  Fifth,  inftead  of  gWoj/  the  Sixth.  Now 
the  Fifth  Rank  was  before  affigned  folely  to  the  pure  Pleafures. 
The  Sixth  and  lad  Rank  therefore  remains  to  Pleafure,  one  of 
the  Three  great  Subjeds  of  this  Dialogue  j — to  Pleafure,  pre- 
tending to  be  the  only  or  the  chief  Good  of  Man,  and  by 
Pbilebus  avowed,  and  contended  for,  as  Such  j — Pleafure  in  ge- 
neral and  undiflinguillied  ; — Pleafure  at  random,  from  whatever 
Quarter  it  comes  ;  —  in  Plato\  own  words,  vol:  2,  png:  40, 
Edit:  Stcph:  iTa^d.Tra.v,  oTaiadv,  xa)  bjcm  ^xipetv.  —  But  the  very 
next  Sentence  of  Socrates  puts  it  beyond  all  Doubt,  that  Pleafure 
of  Senfe, — Serfual  Pleafure, — is  here  meant. 

this 


P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S.         671 

this     Inquiry,     belongs     to    the    Power    of    Pleafurc 
unbounded, 

Protarchus. 
So    it    appears. 

Socrates. 

But  the  Firft  Place  belongs  to  her,  as  ^'^^  Bulls 
would  fay  and  Horfes  ''*^',  and  all  Beafts  what- 
ever of  the  Savage  Kind  :  for  it  appears  fo  from 
the  manner  in  which  they  purfue  Pleafure.  And 
on  the  Credit  of  thefe  Animals,  jufl:  as  the  Judg- 
ment   of   Diviners    depends    on    the   Flight   of  Birds, 

'>+^  In  the  Greek  of  this  Sentence,   we  prefume  that  the  word 
Bjc  ought   to   be   changed    into   w;. 

449  Porphyry,  in  his  Treatife  Trg^l  aVo^^w?  e^^J^^^wr,  Lib:  3,  §.  i. 
writes  thus  ; — SwjcpaTJjs  ir^oi  T85  YiS'ov^w  Sia.ix<^ia(iY)'iiiVTXi  ^vcci  to  TgAo?, 
eS^  dv  •jra.vTii,  iCpn^  cua  xctf  Tpayci  mroj  avvciiroiiv,  Treia^vtre^ou  ccv  ec 
Tw  r)Si^M  TO  euS'a.ifjiov  vfJioov  viei^aty  £<j-  dv  vm  iv  tou  iraai  sc^arvi. 
'To  certain  Pcrjhns,  li^ho  were  difputing  on  this  Poi?Jt,  —  whether 
Pleafure  was  the  Ultimate  End  of  Man, — Socrates^  /aid,  that,  were 
all  the  Swine  and  Goats  in  the  world  to  joyn  in  applauding  this 
Man,  (the  Advocate  for  Pleafure,)  yet  he  fldould  never  be  per- 
fwaded,  that  Human  Happinefs  confijlcd  in  being  pleafed,  Jo  long 
as  Mind  excelled  and  prevailed  in  all  thiiigs.  —  If  Porphyry,  \\\ 
This,  alluded  to  the  very  emphatical  PafTage  in  Ploto,  now 
before  us,  he  feems  to  have  improved  the  Force  of  it  not  a 
little; — unlefs,  in  His  Copy  of  this  Dialogue,  he  read  o-Jgs  sea] 
^poiyoi,    inflead  ot  jS&'fs  v.%i  /T-«70i. 

Q^q  q  q  Sentence 


672  P    H    I    L    E    B    U    S. 

Sentence  is  pronounced  by  the  Multitude,  that  Plea- 
fures  have  the  greateft  Power  in  making  our  Lives 
happy.  For  the  Loves  and  Joys  of  Brute  Animals 
they  deem  a  flronger  Evidence,  and  litter  to  be 
credited,  than  the  Sayings  of  Men,  prophetically 
uttered  in  all  places,  thro  Infpiration  of  the  Phi- 
lofophic  Mufe. 

PrOT  ARCHUS. 

That  You  have  faid  what  is  moft  agreeable  to 
Truth,   O  Socrates  1    we  are,   All  of  us,   now  agreed. 

Socrates. 
Now  then  ye  will  difmifs  me. 

Protarchus. 

There  is  a  little,  O  Socrates !  ftill  remaining  to 
be  conlidered.  For  you  muft  not  quit  the  Com- 
pany, before  it  breaks  up  :  and  I  will  put  you 
in  Mind  of  what  you  have  left  unfaid. 


THE      END. 


The  Reader  is  defired  to  corred  the  following  Errors ;    and  any 
other,   which  may  have  efcaped  our  Notice. 

Page  53,  Line  10 ;    ior  Veneral,  read  Venereal. 

Page  68,   in  the  Notes,  Line  2 ;    for  Acutenfs,  read  Aculenefs, 

Page  257,  Line  4  from  the  bottom  ;    for  eats,  read  Seats. 

Page  317,  End  of  the  Note;    for  the  Bafd  Editions,  read  the  fir Jl  Bafil  Edition. 

Page  321,  Note  195,    for  all,  read  mojl :    and  to  the  End  of  the  Note  add   thefe 

words, — The  2d  Bafil  Edition  confirms  our  Opinion. 
Page  407,  Line  i,  for  238,  put  239.  and  in  a  few  Lines  after,  blot  out  239.— Note 

238  belongs  to  page  406,  Line  3. 


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