The Digest of Justinian

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duukA

THE

DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN

ZottOoii: C. J. CLAT Ain> SONS,

CAMBBmGE UNIYEB8ITT PBBSS WABEHOUSE,

ATE BfABIA LANE,

AHD

STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED,
119CAHD 190, GHANOEBT LANE.

•lugotv : 80, WELUNCKTON BT&BBT.

%tinigi F. A. BBOOKHAUB.

#ito forit: THB ICAOMILLAN COHPANT.

ItontaB snU ffilattte: MAOMILLAN AND Oo., Ltd.

[All rights rsierved.']

THE

DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN

TRANSLATED

BY

CHARLES HENRY MONRO, M.A

FELLOW or GONVILLE AND CAIU8 COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE

BARRISTER AT LAW

VOLUME I

• • • •• •^••••^ ••<*'•.•• •

Cambridge

At the University Press

1904

*^

PBINTBD BT J. AND 0. F. GLAT,
AT THB UNIVSBSITT FBB88.

• • • • •

B *

PRBPAOB.

THIS Volume is an instalment of a Translation of the Digest
of Justinian, and, if circumstances are favourable, I hope
it may be finished in the course of a few years, either by the
present writer or by another. A few words have to be said
as to the general design and method of the work. Something
is always gained and something lost by the use of a translation.
The gain is the obvious saving of time and trouble for those
whose knowledge of the original language is imperfect, indeed
even for others ; the loss is that of the tone and spirit of the
original This at least and at the best; but tiiere is also the
possibility of the translation being incorrect, while all clue to the
true meaning is effiu^ed. A translator must hope to obviate these
dangers as best he may by taking care ; but there is one source of
embarrassment which requires to be treated with special tact and
judgment, I mean the occurrence of technical expressions. How
are these to be rendered? There are several ways of deaUng with
them.

Fnrst, they can be left untranslated and simply given in the
original ; and, if one universal method is to be followed through-
out, I believe this to be the best. Secondly, the Latin expression
can be translated by the name of the nearest corresponding
institution in English law, and this plan, on the same supposition,
I believe to be the worst Thirdly, the Latin term may be

vi Preface

interpreted, i.e. rendered by a kind of explanatory Babetitute.
This is very common in the German translation edited by
Otto, Schilling and Sintenis, fieur the best^ I believe, existing; in
which, however, to give one example, the Latin word ado/ptofre
is constantly rendered ' an kindes statt annehmen,' to take on the
footing of a child; a kind of version which leaves the reader
with a peculiar sense of unsatisfied want. There is yet another
method; an English expression may be used, but it is felt at
the same time that it is not to be taken as a translation at all,
strictly speaking; it is meant to represent the Latin word in a
more convenient form, not to interpret it One very simple
example of this occurs where the original is somewhat lengthened
or shortened or otherwise modified, in a way which often gives
rise to a recognised English word, though not always; take the
terms inofficious, agnate, compensation. The last is no doubt an
English word, but it does not translate the Latin word firom
which it is derived. This procedure is a fertile source of inaccuracy
and misunderstanding, but we cannot afford to discard it; we
must, of course, bear in mind, to take an example, that, where the
English word ^ heir ' stands for Aere^, it is not used in its ordinary
sense. No rule, I should say, ought to be followed exclusively ;
on the whole, however, the plan which I have preferred is to
go chiefly by the firsts so far as to give the Latin expression,
though to a considerable extent following the third also ; but it
will be desirable to add a Glossary of the Latin technical terms
used at the end of the present work.

As hinted, a certain freedom should always be maintained;
even the second of the above methods need not be absolutely
excluded ; as, for instance, where the institution named is one
whose precise nature is immaterial to the main subject under
discussion, or the corresi>ondence is really exact

It need perhaps hardly be said that anyone who wishes
thoroughly, or as fiir as he can, to understand the Digest requires
a great deal more information than can be supplied by the best

Preface vii

poflfiible translation* Many passages are difficult to comprehend,
or indeed are incomprehensible^ because the reasoning is involved
and abstruse, or the text is corrupt, or there is an interpolation
made by an incompetent w iU-advised person. With these matters
the translator as such has very little concern. If the reasoning is
complicated or hopelessly obscure, his aim should be to make the
English version present precisely the same obscurity and to pre-
serve as well as he can such means of removing it as the passage
itself in his judgment presents. Where the text is corrupt^ he
should call attentiim to the fact, unless the corruption is too
insignificant and the sense is plain ; and it will often be advis-
able to offer some more or less conjectural reading by way of
emendation. The best Editor of the text, I mean Mommsen,
has suggested many such readings, most of which are adopted,
ie. mentioned, in the following pages. It should perhaps be here
noted that although emendation proposed by a competent person
is commonly of value as an expression of opinion as to the
meaning of the true text, which it purports to supply, still an
emendation which introduces, say, half-a-dosen words arrived at
by conjecture, however wori;hy of attention, is in many cases,
perhaps in most, very unlikely to be the true reading. The
subject of interpolations has been treated with ability and to
good effect by recent writers, Gradenwitif and others, and is
of considerable interest ; but an interpolated passage is still an
integral part of the Digest, and has to be translated accordingly.

This leads to the question what is the text here translated ; to
which I have merely to say that it is, as may be supposed, taken
from Mommsen, and almost entirely from his later single colunm
edition, with, at the foot of the page, the greater number of the
corrections or emendations suggested by him. These are marked
in a note with the letter M, where the Editor expresses no doubt^
the expression '^ Cf. M." signifying that he shows some hesitation.
I have ventured occasionally to suggest my own emendation, with-
out adding any explanatory mark.

Prefdct

I hare translated what may be called Jnstiniaii's pre&ceB, three
m number, which describe the scheme and occasion of the Digest
and other works, as well as the Emperor's plan of education for
legal students; they consbt of three ' C!onstituti<mes ' or enact-
ments, commonly distinguished by their respective initial Latin
words. The third of them, the C<m«tUutio T<mta, appears to be a
free Tendon of a Greek text, which itself is also presenred. This
last I have not thought it necessary to translate ; a modem Latin
▼ersion is given in Mommsen's stereotype or double column edition.

I have to thank Mr Buckland of Caius College for a number of
iasefiil hints vouchsafed during the course of the work.

I cannot close this prefiu^ without expressing my sense of the
immense debt owed by all those who concern themselves with the
things of Ancient Rome to the illustrious scholar, legist and
historian who has lately been taken from us, Theodor M ommsen.

a a MONRO.

Oaxkbidos.

Aprils 1904.

CONTENTS.

PAGB

The fonnation of the Digest

Gonstitutio '* Deo anctore " xiii

GoDstitatio ** Omnem " xviii

The oonfirmation of the Digest

Gonstitutio "Tanta" xxv

I.

L On justice andlaw. {DejiutUiaetjure,) 3

II. On the origin of law and of the different magistracies, as well as

the succession of those learned in the law. {De origine

juris et omnium magiitrixtuum et succeisione prudeiitium,) 6

III. On statutes, decrees of the Senate and long usage. {De legibtm

SencUuique contuUit et longa comuetwHne,) ... 19

lY. On Imperial enactments. {De coMtitiUionibtu principum.) 23

V. On status. (De stcUu hominum.) 24

VI. On pe»ons iid juris and alietii juris, (De his qui sui vel

aMeni juris sunt,) 28

VIL Gonceming adoptions and emancipations and other methods by

which potestas is dissolved. (De adoptionibus ei emanci-

paHonibus et aliis modis quHms potestas soMtur,) 31

YIII. On the division of things and their respective natures. (De

divisione rerum et qtuUitate.) 39

IX Goncerning Senators. (De Senatoribus,) 42

X. On the office of GonsuL (De officio Consulis.) .... 45

XI. On the office of Prsefectus Prsetorio. (De officio Pratf'ecti

Pratorio.) 45

XII. On the office of Praefectus UrbL (De officio PratfeOi Urbi.) . 46

XIII. On the office of Quaestor. (De officio Qucsstoris,) ... 48
XI Y. On the office of the Praetors. (De officio Proftorum,) 49
XY. On the office of Prsefectus Yigilum. (De (fficio Pra^ecH

Vigilwm.) 50

XYI. On the office of Proconsul and Legate. (De officio ProconsuLis

ei Legati,) 51

XYIL On the office of Prsefetetus Augustalis. (De officio Pra^ecti

Augustalis,) 56

XYIII. On the office of Praeses. (De officio Prmsidis.) ... 56

XIX. On the office of Imperial Procurator or Rationalis. (De officio

procuratoris Cwsaris vel Bationalis.) 62

a 6

X Contents

XX. On the office of Jnridicua. {De qficio JuridicL) ... 63

XXI. On the office of one to whom jurisdiction is delegated. (De

officio ^iu cui mand(Ua MJurudictio.) .... 63
XXIL On the office of assessora. {De qfficio AMteMorum.) ... 65

11.

I. On Jorisdictio. (De JurUdictione.) 66

II. A man to be dealt with after the like rule to that which he

maintained against another. {Quod quieque juris in
aUerum staiuerit ut ipse eodem jure utaiur,) 70

IIL Where a man refuses obedience to the magistrate exerdsing

jurisdiction. {Si quis jus dieenti non dbtemperaverit.) . 72

IV. On citation. {De in jus vocando,) 73

V. Where one who is cited fails to appear ; also where a man cites
one whom, according to the Edict, he has no right to cite.
{Si quis in jus meatus non ierUy site quis eum vocawrit
quern ex Edicto non debuerii.) 79

VI. Persons cited bound to appear or else give a guarantee or an

undertaking. {In jus mcoH ui eant aut satis vel eautum
dent.) 79

VII. No one to release bj force a man who is cited. (Ne quis eum

qui in jus vooabitur ti eximat.) 80

VIII. What persons respectively are compelled to give a guarantee or
promise on oath or are remitted to a simple promisa {Qui
satisdare cogantur vet jurato promiUant vd sum promis-
sioni ccmmiUantur,) 82

IX. Nature of the undertaking given in the case of a nozal action.

{/^ ex noxali causa agatur quemadmodum caveatur.) 88

X. On one who contrives that a defendant shall not appear. {De

eo per quern facium erit qucminus quis in judicio sistat.) 90

XL Where a man fails to observe an undertaking to appear to an
action. {Si quis eautionibus in judicio sistendi causa
/aetis non obtemperabit) 92

XII. On feast-days, adjournments and different seasonsw {De feriis

ei dilationibus ei diversis temporibus,) .... 98

XIII. On statement of particulars and discovery of documents etc.

{De edendo,) 101

XIV. On pacts. {De paetis,) 108

XV. On compromising and compounding. {De transactionibus.) 130

IIL

I. On motions. {De postulando,) 139

II. On those marked with if^amia. {De his qui notantur if{famta,) 144

III. On "procurators" and '* defensors." (De procuratoribus et

defensoribus.) 163

CotUents xi

PAOB

IV. On proceedings taken on behalf of any corporation or against
the same. {Quod cmfiucumgue univerntatis nomine vel

contra earn agatur,) 172

V. On negotia gsita (▼oluntary agency). {De negotiis gestU,) 175

VI. On yexations actiona {De ealumniatoribui.) .... 197

IV.

I. On restitutions in integrum, (De in integrum rettUutionibue,) 201

II. Acts done throogh fear. {Quod metue eauea gestum erit.) 203

III. On dolus mahu, {De dolo malo,) 215

IV.' On persons under twenty-five. {J>e minoribus viginti quinque

annit.) 226

V. On capitis minutio. {De caxnte minutis,) 253

VI. Grounds on which restitution in integrum is allowed to pers(ms

over twenty-five yean of age. {Ex quibus causis mqfores
tiginii quinque annis in integrum restituuntur,) 256

VII. On transfers made for the purpose of varying the conditions of a

trial. {De alienaiione judicii mutandi causa facta.) 270

VIII. On matters referred; on persons who undertake arbitrations

with a view to pronouncing an award. {De reeeptis; qui
arbitrium receperint ut sententiam dicant) 274

IX. Seamen, innkeepers, stablekeepers to restore what they receive.

{NatUm caupones stabularii ut recepta restitumnt,) . 294

V.

I. On trials at law; as u> where a man ought to take proceedings

or be sued. {De judiciiSy ubi quisque agere vel conoeniri
debeat,) 300

II. On inofficious testaments. {De inofficioso testamento,) . 320

III. On the action for recovery of an inheritance. {De hereditatis

petiHcme,) 335

IV. On suits for parts of an inheritance. {Si pars hereditatis

petatur.) 365

V. On the possessory petitio hereditatis, {De possessoria heredi-
tatis petitione.) 370

VI. On the fidei-commissary petitio hereditatis. {De Jidei-eom-

missaria hereditatis petitione,) 370

VL

I. On specific vindications. {De rei vindicatione,) 371

II. On the Publidan action tnr^m. {DePublieiana in rem actions,) 393

III. On actions to recover vectigalian — ^that is emphyteutic— land.

{Si ager veettgalis^ id est emphyteuticariusj petatur.) 399

ERRATA.

p. 13, 1. 17 fxom boUom of page, for entitled read intitled.

p. 26, II. 3, 5, for seven months read in the seventh month.

p. 45, 1. 4, for [ ] read ( ).

p. 67, 11. 9, 21, do.

p. 76, 1. 6, do.

p. 83, U. 8, 10, do.

p. 112, 1. 17 from bottom of page, for Mavitu read Mtevius.

p. 161, L 10 from bottom of page, for 6 read b,

p. 175, 1. 14, for [ ] read ( ).

p. 195, L 18, for Javolemu$ read Javolenus,

p. 219, U. 6, 7, for and so my case is read so as to have the application,

p. 219, 1. 11, after collusion insert {si eoUueum est).

p. 220, 1. 8, for prescriptis read prascriptis.

p. 222, 1. 19, del. that.

p. 229, 1. 11 from bottom of page, insert comma at end of line.

p. 255, 8. 8, del. the first two oonmias.

p. 276, 1. 14, for both sides read each side,

p. 880, U. 6, 7 from bottom of page, del. oommas*.

p. 331, 1. 16, del. mark of interrogation.

p. 354, 1. 7, after vendor insert mark of interrogation.

p. 888, 1. 6, after bequeaths, for the read a.

• ••

xm

ON THE PLAN OF THE DIGEST.

CONSTITUTIO DEO AUCTORE.

7%6 Emperor Ccesar Flavitis Justiniaams purus happy
renowned conqueror and trivmpher ever Avgmlus
greets TribomaniM his qtuEHor.

GoYERNmo under the authority of Qod our empire, which was
delivered to us by His Heavenly Majesty, we prosecute wars with
snocess, we adorn peace, we bear up the firame of the State, and we
so lift up our minds in contemplation of the aid of the omnipotent
Deity that we do not put our trust in our arms, nor in our soldiers,
nor in our leaders in war, nor in our own skill, but we rest all our
hopes in the providence of the Supreme Trinity alone, from whence
proceeded the elements of the whole universe, and their disposition
throughout the orb of the world was derived. 1. Whereas then
there is in all things nothing found so worthy of respect as the
authority of enacted law, which disposes well things both divine
and human, and expels all iniquity, and yet we find the whole
course of our statutes, such as they come down from the foundation
of the dty of Rome and from the days of Romulus, to be in a state
of such confusion that they reach to an infinite length and surpass
the bounds of all human capacity, it was therefore our first desire
to make a beginning with the most sacred Emperors of old times,
to amend their statutes, and to put them in a clear order, so that
they might be collected together in one book, and, being divested
of all superfluous repetition and most inequitable disagreement^
mi^t aflbrd to all mankind the ready resource of their unalloyed
character. 2. This wori^ being accomplished and put together in
one volume under our own brilliant name, hastening as we do to
lift ourselves above scanty and somewhat unimportant matters and
to arrive at the foil and supreme amendment of the law, so as to
amend and rearrange the entire Roman jurisprudence and to present

xiy ConstUutio Deo auctore

in one volume the scattered books of a number of authors, a thing
which no one ever dared to hope or to desire, the task appeared to
us to be one of great difficulty, indeed to be impossible* However,
we lifted our hands to Heaven, and, praying for the Eternal aid,
we embraced this enterprise in our minds, trusting to Qod, who is
able in the magnitude of His goodness to grant and complete
achievements well-nigh desperate. 3. Hereupon we bethought us
of the excellent service of your wholehearted character, and com-
mitted to you before others this additional work, having received
proofs of your ability from the composition of our Code, and we
ordered you to choose as companions in your labour whomsoever
you thought right out of the number of the accomplished pro-
fessors as well as of the most eloquent of the robed men of the
forum, men of the most honourable position. The above persons
being accordingly got together and having been introduced into
our palace and accepted favourably by us on the strength of your
testimony, we have entrusted to them the execution of the entire
plan, it being however understood that the whole should be carried
out under the management of your most watchful mind. 4. You all
therefore have our order to r^^ and to work up the books dealing
with Roman law left by the learned of old time to whom the most
sacred Emperor aUowed the privilege of writing and interpreting
rules of law, so that the whole substance might be taken from
them, all repetition and all discrepancy being as &r as possible got
rid of, and hereupon a single and sufficient result might be pre-
sented in the place of the scattered materials which preceded.
Whereas, on the other hand, other authors have written books
dealing with law, but their writings have not been received or used
by any later authorities, we ourselves are not concerned to let
their works affect our resolution. 5. The above matter being
composed under the Supreme indulgence of the Deity, it is only
right to set it forth in a work of great beauty, consecrating thereby
an apt and most holy temple of Justice, and to distribute the
whole law into fifty books and distinct titles, in imitation of our
C!ode of Imperial enactments and also of the Perpetual Edict, as
far as this may prove in your opinion to be the more convenient
course, so that there may be nothing left outside the above-men-
tioned compilation, but the entire ancient law, in a state of confusion
for some fourteen hundred years and now by us made clear, may
be, so to speak, enclosed within a wall and have nothing left outside
it; all legal authors enjoying the same rank and no superior
authority being kept for any one of them, since it cannot be said

CoMtUutio Deo auctore xv s

that any of ihem are either better or worse in all respects, but only
particular writers in particular respects. 6. You must however,
when comparing a number of authors, not pronounce upon the
work of one as better and juster, as it is possible for the opinion of
one writer, and that one of inferior merit, to be preferable in some
points to many and even better authors. For this reason opinions
which are^ dted in the notes to iEmilius Fapinianus, taken from
TJlpianus and Paulus, not to speak of Marcianus, which once were
allowed no weight in consequence of the honour due to the most
renowned Papinianus, ought not to be at once rejected, but if you
see that anything taken from them is necessary to supplement the
labours of Papinianus of supreme genius or to interpret his writings,
you must not hesitate to set it down as being as good as law ; so
that aU those most learned authors whose work is embodied in this
book may have as much authority as if their lucubrations were
derived from Imperial constitutions and had been uttered by our
own divine mouth. We are justified in ascribing everything to
ourselves, seeing that it is from us that all their authority is
derived; and one who amends anything which is done widi a
want of exactness deserves more credit than the original author.
7. There is another thing of which we wish you to make a special '^
object ; if you find anything in old books which is not well placed,
anything superfluous or wanting in finish, you should get rid of
unnecessary prolixity, fill up what is deficient, and present the
whole work in apt form and with engaging appearance. Tou
should at the same time further observe this ; if, in the ancient
statutes and enactments which old writers cited in their books, you
find anything expressed incorrectly, you must rectify it and put it
in proper form, so that whatever is chosen and set down by you
may be deemed genuine and the best version and be treated as
if originaUy written, and no one is to take upon him by reference
to the ancient text to argue that your version is faulty. Con-
sidering indeed that by an ancient enactment^ the so-caUed Lex
BeffiOf all legal authority and all power vested in the Roman people
were ts-ansferred to the Imperial Government, and we do not
attribute our collective legislatorial sway to this and that source,
but desire that it should be all our own, how can antiquity interfere
with our legislation ? In fact^ we desire that all the law referred
to, when once set forth, should be so ftilly in force, that where
anything was put in one way by the old writers, but appears to

^ del antta, M.

V

xvi CanBtittUio Deo atietare

bear the opposite sense in our work, no fault should be found with
the former, but the whole should be set down to our will and
pleasure. 8. By this means, in all parts of our aforesaid Code
there is to be no place allowed to any antinomy — such is the name
used from old time, taken from the Greek language — ^but there
must be full agreement, full consistency, and no one is to raise any
dispute on the question. 0. Repetition too, as already said, we
desire to be absent from a compilation such as this ; and any
provisions that have been made by the most sacred ordinances,
which we have inserted in our Gode, we do not allow to be again
set down as parts of the old law, seeing that the fiat of Imperial
enactment is quite enough to give them authority ; unless indeed
this should be done by way of contrast or of supplement or for
more complete exactitude ; but even then it must be done very
sparingly, lest, if this kind of exception is allowed, a certain amount
of thorns may spring in such a meadow. 10. Again, if any rules
included in the old books have by this time fiUlen into disuse, we
by no means permit you to set them down, as we wish such rules
only to be maintained as have been put in force in the most usual
course of judicature, or have been approved by the long usage of
this revered City, in accordance with the work of Salvius Julianus,
which points out that all cities ought to follow the usage of Rome,
the head of the world, and not Rome follow that of other cities.
And by Rome we should understand not merely the old city, but
our own royal city too, which, with the favour of God, was built with
the best auguries. II. We therefore order that everything should
be governed by those two books, one that of Imperial enactments,
the other that of the law consolidated and amended (ju$ enudeaium)
and put together with a view to a book to be made ; adding any-
thing else that may come to be published by us to serve the use of
an educational work (instUtUianes)^ in order that the immature
mind of the student, being supplied with simple principles, may be
the more easily brought to the comprehension of the higher learning.
12. Our complete work, such as it will be composed by you with
God's assistance, we command shall bear the name of Digest or
Pandects, and no person learned in the law shall at any time
venture to add any commentary thereto and upset by his own
language the concise method of the said book, as was done in old
time, when, by the contradictory opinions of expositors, the whole
law was Uttle short of being thrown into confusion: let it be
enough to make some few corrections of it by notes and an
ingenious use of titles, avoiding the occasioning of anything to be

Constitutio Deo auctore xvii

complained of that might arise from the habit of interpreting.

13. Lest moreover the writing itself should hereafter give rise to
any ambiguity, we command that the text of the book shall not
be written with the use of the trickery of ciphers and compendious
<x>nundrum8y such as directly and by their mischievous character
have occasioned many instances of antinomy, even where what is
intended to be signified is the number of the book or some similar
matter; even such things we do not allow to be shown by
special numerical figures, they must be set out in ordinary letters*

14. All these things your Wisdom must, with the favour of God,
endeavour to accomplish, together ^th other most able men, and
bring it to a well-conceived and most speedy close, that the com-
plete book, digested into fifty heads, may be put before us in strong
and eternal memory of tibie matter in hand, in proof of the pro-
vidence of Almighty God, to the glory of our rule and of your
service. Given on the eighteenth day before the Calends of January
at C!onstantinople ; in the consulship of the most honourable

ius and Orestes*

XYIU

CONSTITDTIO OMNEM.

The Emperor Coesar Flavins Jvstiniarvus Alamannicus
Oothicus Frandcus Germanicus Anticus Alanicus
VandcMcus Africcmus pious happy renowned eon--
qaerar and- triumpher ever Augustibs to TheophUus
Dorotheus Theodoras Tsidorus Anatolitis Thalekeus
and Cratinus honourable men professors and to
SaiJUmdnius most eloquent man professor greeting.

That the whole law of oar State is now reformed and arranged
partly in four books of institutes or elements, partly in fifty of
digests or pandects, and further in twelve of Imperial enactments —
who knows better than you do? and now indeed everything which
it was requisite either to order at the beginning or to pronounce
upon when aU was complete, with willing acknowledgment of the
fitct, has been fuQy done by our speeches made both in the Greek
tongue and in that of the Romans, which speeches we wish to be
eternal. Whereas however you, being appointed professors of legal
knowledge, ought to be acquainted with this too, what it is that we
hold necessary to be conveyed to students and at what times, to
the end that they may thereby be made most worthy and most
learned, we therefore opine that the present divine address ought
to be directed to you especially, so that your Wisdoms, and also
other professors who may choose at any ftoiture time to follow the
same course, may, by observing our rules, tread the distinguished
path of legal erudition. Now it is without doubt necessary that
elementary works (instittUiones) should in all studies claim the
first place, supplying as they do the first step in every branch of
knowledge in a short form. Then, of the fifty books of our
Digest, we hold that six-and-thirty alone are sufficient both for you
to expound and for youthful students to use for the purpose of
their education. But we ought in our opinion here to set forth
the order of arrangement and the method which has to be followed,
and to remind you of the things which you used to deliver of old, also,

Constitutio Omnem

with regard to our recent compilation, to state the way of applying it
and the proper times, so that nothing relating to this duty may be
left unknown. 1. Some while ago, as your Wisdoms are aware, out
of all the immense multitade of rules, reaching to two thousand
books and three million lines, students, under instruction from
their teachers, generally made use of no more than simply six
books, and those ill composed and containing very little law
of any importance, everything else being disused and in &ct
inaccessible to everybody ; these six books included the Institutes
of our master Gains and four separate books, one on the old
law of dotal gifts, another on guardianships, and a third, indeed
a fourth, on testaments and legacies; and even these they did
not use throughout ; there were large portions of them which they
passed by as being superfluous. To students of the first year this
work was not given in accordance with the order observed in the
Perpetual Edict, but the subjects were arranged anyhow and all
in confusion, matters practical and unpractical being mixed up, in
&ct the unpractical matters were allowed the larger space. In the
second year the order adopted went the wrong way about, they
were given the first part of the legal rules, some particular titles
being left out, as it was an absurd thing after the Institutes to read
anything else than what is placed first in the law and deserves
to be called the first subject; but after these titles had be^i
gone through, though even these were not read from the beginning
to the end, but a selection was made, and that for the most part of
unpractical pieces, there were other titles set before the students,
partly from that division of the law which is called jWicia (actions
at law), — ^these again not being taken from the beginning to the
end, but only so as to afibrd a meagre catalogue of practical points,
all tiie rest of the book being treated as of no consequence, — ^partly
fit>m that division which is called Things, consisting of seven books,
in which once more a great many chapters were set on one side out
of the way of the students, being regarded as unsatisfiictory and
not very well fitted for educational purposes. In the third year
they had to take up such subjects in both works, I mean the
book on Things and the book on Actions, as had not been given
them in the second year, the two works being taken alternately;
this furnishing an introduction which led to the most excellent
Papinianus and his Responsa, which Besponsa, taken all together,
extend to nineteen books ; but of these they only took eight books,
and not the whole contents even of these eight books ; out of a
great number of rules expressed in ample detail, they were confined

Conrtiiutio Omnem

to a few short extracts, so that they had to close the task with
their thirst unslaked. The above being all which was given them
by their teachers, the students used to read the Responsa of
Paulus for themselves, not taking the whole of them, but adopting
a fragmentaiy series which a bad custom recommended. Such
was, up to the fourth year, all that was done towards acquiring
a knowledge of ancient law, [and if] ^ any one wishes to consider
what were the things which they read, he will find, on reckoning
them up, that in that immense multitude of legal rules there were
scarcely sixty thousand lines on their subject which they read
through, all the rest being left remote and unknown, and being
only held worthy of attention to some very small extent when
either it was required in the course of an action, or you yoursdves,
masters in the law, made a point of reading them, so that you might
have something better to show in the way of knowledge on the part
of your pupils. The above then sets forth the method of education
in old days, as is fiilly shown by your report 2. We however,
observing this meagre provision of rules of law, and deeming it a
very miserable state of things, propose to display the treasures of
law to such as desire to behold them, so that^ when your Wisdoms
have in some wise turned them to due account^ your pupils may
become amply endowed legal pleaders. Accordingly in the first
year they must [to begin with] take in our Institutes, derived
as these are from almost the whole body of the old institutional
works and conducted into one clear reservoir out of all their muddy
sources by the ag^icy of Tribonianus, that most distinguished man
and magistrate, ex-qusastor of our sacred palace and ex-consul,
also by the agency of two of your number, Theophilus and Doro-
theas, most able professors. For the rest of the year we order, in
accordance with a very good principle of arrangement^ that there
should be given them the first portion of the law, which is called
by the Greek name ir/oon-a, tiiere being nothing before it^ as, in
hct, whatever is Jirst cannot have anything else preceding it.
Such, we lay down, is to be the beginning and the conclusion of
the first year's education; and we think proper that those who
take it shall not be called by the silly and ridiculous name of Two-
pounders (dupondu) ; they are to be styled New Justinians,
which appellation, so we decree, is to be used for all time to come,
so that those persons who, while yet untaught, aspire to the know-
ledge of law and choose to accept the enactments of the eariier
year may take our name, seeing that the first book is to be giv^i

1 Cf. M.

Con^iiutio Omnem

to them at once, which was published by our authority. The name
they used to bear was in keeping with the ancient state of con-
fusion in which the law used to be, but now that it is clearly and
distinctly presented, so that it can be easily conveyed to their
minds, it seems requisite that they should eiyoy distinction under
another name. 3. In the second year, for which another name has
been already given them by a decree, and one of which we approve,
we ordain that they should take either the seven books on Actions
or the eight on Things, according as the alternation of time allows,
which alternation we wish to be maintained untouched. They
must take these books, both of Actions and Things, from beginning
to end, and in their proper order, none of them being omitted,
as everythmg is invested with an elegance unknown before, and
nothing unpractical or obsolete is to be found in them. To each
of these books, whichever is taken, the one on Actions or the one
on Things, we desire should be added for the second year's course
(bur works in one book each, which we have chosen out of the
whole compilation of fourteen books, one being taken from the
larger woil: in three books compiled by us on the subject of
s^v/ do8f one from the two books on guardianships and curatorships,
one from the work in two parts on testaments, and, from the
seven books on legacies Bsxd Jideicammis^a (testamentary trusts)
and subjects connected therewith, again one only. Thus those four
books which we have put at the head of the particular compilations
named above are the only ones which we wish you to put before
them ; the other ten you must keep back for a convenient occasion,
as it is impossible, indeed the second year is too short a time, for
the study of these books to be instilled into them by a master's
instruction. 4. After this the course of the third year is to be as
follows. Whether it happens to the pupils, as the turn comes, to
read the book on Actions or the book on Things, there must be
taken at the same time the threefold arrangement of books on law,
each being on one subject; in the first place there is to be one
separate work on the hypothecarian formula, which we have put
in the best place for it, namely in the part where we deal with
hypotheks, so that, competing as it does with actions on pledge,
which come in the books on Things, it may not shun their vicinity,
both of them really dealing with much the same subject After
this separate work another similar one is to be put before them,
compiled by us on the Edict of the jEdiles, on the Bedhibitorian
action, on actions for recovery of property, and lastly on the stipu-
lation for double tiie price, seeing tiiat whereas legal provisions

*

,^ M. J.

ConHitutio Onmem

relative to purchase and sale are oonspicaous in the books about
Things, but all the definitions, as we called them, were placed in the
last part of the former edict, we were obliged to transfer them to
the earlier position, lest they should wander further away from the
neighbourhood of Sale to which they are, so to speak, ancillary.
To these three books we have joined the study of that most acute
lawyer, Papinianus, whose works students used to take in their
third year, though they did not go through the whole series, but,
here as well as before, had a few examples given them out of
many, selected here and there. With you however that excellent
author himself will be open for perusal, not only in respect of his
Besponsa, compiled in nineteen books, but also in the thirtynseven
books of questions, the two books of definitions, besides the book
on adultery, in fietct in pretty well the whole of his dissertations
throughout the entire array of our Digest in which he excds in
his own special portions. Tlien, lest the third-year students, the
F^pinianists, as they are called, should seem to lose their author's
name and grace of expression, he has again been introduced for
the third year by a most exquisite method, as the hock about
hypotheks is one which we had filled throughout with passages
from the same excellent Papinianus, so that the pupils may take
their name from this foct and be called Papinianists, and may
rejoice in memory of him, observing the festal day which they used
to celebrate when they first took his rules of law, and even by this
means the memory of that most sublime prsafectorian may abide
for ever, and the course of study for the third year may hereupon
close. 5. Next, seeing that it is usual for the students in the fourth
year to go by the conventional Greek name Xvrot, they can, if
they like, keep this title ; but instead of the Besponsa of the most
learned Paulus, which at one time they used to take in barely
•eighteen books instead of twenty-three, reading them in the con-
fused way already mentioned, let them now turn all their attention
to the ten separate works which remain out of the fourteen which
we have already described, by which they will acquire a store of
knowledge much larger and fuller than they ever got from the
Besponsa of Paulus. By this means the whole compilation of
separate books put together by us and divided into seventeen will
be taken home in their minds, such as we have set it down in two
parts of the Digest, the fifth and sixth, according to the division
into seven parts ; and what was said at the beginning of my address
will be found to be true, the object being to make the youths
perfect after studying the thirty-six books as well as equipped for

ConstUvtio Omnem xxiii

every legal purpose and not unworthy of our days. Two other
parts of our Digest, the sixth and seventh, which are arranged in
fourteen books, must be laid on one side, so that they can at a
later time both study them and display their knowledge of them in
Court If they studiously imbue themselves with these and take
pains both to read and thoroughly to understand the Code of
Imperial statutes by the end of the fifth year, in which they are
called prolytcdj they will want for nothing in legal knowledge, but
will embrace the whole of it from the beginning to the end in their
minds, and, though this is the case with no other of the branches
of learning, the number of which is infinite, however worthless any
may be, this study by itself will be carried forward to an admirable
conclusion which it now receives at our hands. 6. Accordingly, when
all these legal secrets are disclosed, nothing will be hidden from
the students, and, after reading through all the works put together
by us by the hands of the eminent Tribonianus and the others,
they will turn out distinguished pleaders and servants of justice,
and, both for contending in cases and for deciding them, they will
be the ablest of men and successful in all times and places.
7. These three works which we have composed we desire should
be put in their hands in royal cities as well as in the most fisdr city
of Beiytus, which may well be styled the nursing mother of law, as
indeed previous Emi>eror8 have commanded, but in no other places
which did not eigoy the same privilege in old times, as we have
heard that even in the brilliant city of Alexandria, and in Csesarea
and others, there have been ignorant men who, instead of doing
their duty, conveyed spurious lessons to their pupUs, and such aB
these we desire to make desist from that attempt by laying down
the above limits, so that, if they shonld hereafter be guilty of such
conduct and carry on their duties outside the royal cities and the
metropolis Berytus, they may be punished by a fine of ten pounds
of gold and be expelled from the city in which instead of teaching
the law they transgress the law. a There is another thing which
we mentioned, both in the address which we delivered on first
appointing commissioners for the compilation of this book and also
in another ordinance issued by our Divinity after its completion,
and which we may suitably issue now, namely that no one of those
who compose these books is to venture to make any private ciphers
in them, nor, by way of saving time, to throw difficulty in the way
of the interpretation and compilation of the rules, and I wish all
clerks who may at any time in future commit such an offence to
know that^ besides incurring the criminal fine, they will be com-

62

xxLY ConstUutio Omnem

pellable to pay twice the value of the book to its owner, if they
hand it to an innocent person, seeing that the very purchaser of
such a book can set no toIuo on it> as no judge will allow anything
to be quoted from it, but will order that it should be treated as
non-existing. 9. Next there is a very necessary order which we
make by way of very strong prohibition, that none, either in this
renowned city or in the jRur town of Berytus, among those who are
prosecuting legal studies, shall perpetrate unworthy, indeed most
offensive, or I should rather say slavish, jokes, to carry out which
is an illegal act, either against the professors themselves or their
companions, and still more against those who attempt the study of
law when fresh to the work. How indeed can the word 'joke ' be
used of what leads to criminal acts ? Such conduct we do not by
any means allow ; and this whole branch of the matter we put
under strict rule for our own days and transmit it to all ftiture
time, as it is right that our souls should be educated first, and then
our tongues. 10. All the foregoing, so &r as this most prosperous
dty is concerned, the eminent man who is prefect of this genial
city must take care both to observe and to enforce, according to
what is required by the nature of the offence in the case both of
students and writers ; in the dty of Berytus this duty feMs both
on the illustrious governor of the Punic shore and the most blessed
bishop and the legal professors of that city. 11. Begin now there-
fore to deliver to the students legal learning under the governance
of Ood and to open up the way found by us, so that they may
become the best ministers of justice and of the State, and that the
greatest possible honour may attend you for all ages to come ; the
fact being that in your day there has been devised an exchange of
law such as we read in Homer, that originator of all virtue, to have
been mutually made by Qlaucus and Diomedes when they ex-
changed two unlike things,

Gold for brass, a hundred kine

The worth of what was given for nine.

All this we order shall be in force for ever, to be observed by all,
both professors and students of the law and clerks, by these and
the judges likewise. Given on the seventeenth day before the
kalends of January at Constantinople, our master Justinianus ever
Augustus being consul the third time.

ON THE CONFIRMATION OF THE DIGEST.

CONSTITDTIO TANTA.

In the name of our Lord Ghd Jesus Christ.

The Emperor Coesar Flavivs Justinianvs Alamannicus
Gotihicus Francicus Oermamcus Anticus Alanicus
Vandaiicus Africanus pious happy renowned con-
queror €md triumpher ever Augustus to the Senate
and to all peoples.

So great in our bebalf is the foresight of Divine Humanity that
it ever deigns to support us with eternal acts of liberality. After
the Parthian wars were hushed in eternal peace, after the nation
of the Vandals was destroyed S and Carthage, nay rather all Libya,
was again taken into the Roman Empire, then I contrived also that
the ancient laws, already bowed down with age, should by my care
reach new beauty and come within moderate bounds ; a thing
which before our command none ever expected or deemed to be
at all possible for human endeavour. It was indeed a wondrous
achievement when Roman jurisprudence from the time of the
building of the dty to that of our rule, which period well-nigh
reaches to one thousand and four hundred years, had been shaken
with intestine war and infected the Imperial legislation with the
same mischief, to bring it nevertheless into one harmonious system,
so that it should present no contradiction, no repetition and no
approach to repetition, and that nowhere should two enactments
appear dealing with one question. This was indeed proper for
Heavenly Providence, but in no way possible to the weakness of
man. We therefore have after our wont fixed our eyes on the aid
of Immortality, and, calling on the Supreme Deity, we have desired
that Qod should be made the originator and the guardian of the
whole work, and we have entrusted the entire task to Tribonianus,

^ For ereptam read peremptam^ M.

ComtittUio Tanta

a most distingaished man, Master of the Offices, ex-quaestor of our
sacred palace and ex-consul, and we have laid on him the whole
service of the enterprise described, so that with other illustrious
and most learned colleagues he might fulfil our desire. Besides
this, our Majesty, ever investigating and scrutinizing the composition
of these men, whensoever anything was found doubtful or uncertain,
in reliance on the heavenly Divinity^ amended it and reduced it to
suitable shape. Thus all has been done by our Lord and God
JesuB Christ, who vouchsafed the means of success both to us and
to our servants herein. 1. Now the Imperial statutes we have
already placed, arranged in twelve books, in the Code which is
illuminated with our name. After this, undertaking a very great
work, we allowed the same exalted man both to collect together
and to submit to certain modifications the very most important
works of old times, thoroughly intermixed and broken up as they
may almost be called. But in the midst of our careful researches,
it was intimated to us by the said exalted person that there
were nearly two thousand books written by the old lawyers,
and more than three million lines were left us by them, all of
which it was requisite to read and carefully consider and out
of them to select whatever might be best lliis, by the grace of
Heaven and the &vour of the Supreme Trinity, was accomplished
in accordance with our instructions such as we gave at the outset
to the exalted man above mentioned, so that eveiything of great
importance was collected into fifty books, and all ambiguities were
settled, without any refractory passage being left We gave these
books the name of Digest or Pandects, for the reason that they
have within them all matters of question and the legal decision
thereof, having taken to their bosom things collected from all sides,
so that they conclude the whole task in the space of about one
hundred and fifty thousand lines. We have divided the books into
seven parts, not incorrectly nor without reason, but in regard of
the nature and use of numbers and in order to make a division of
parts in keeping therewith. 2. Accordingly, the first part of the
whole frame, which part is called irp&ra^ after the Greek word,
comes by itself in four books. 3. The second link has seven books,
which are called de judiciis (on trials at law) . 4. In the third
group we have put all that comes under the title de rebus (on
things), the same having eight books assigned to it 5. The fourth
place, which amounts to a sort of kernel of the whole compila-
tion, takes eight books. This contains everjrthing that relates to
hypothek, so that the subject does not differ very much from the

ConstUtitio Tanla xxvii

actio pigneratitia (action to redeem^ eta), and another book is
inserted in the same yolume which has the Edict of the Edile and
the Bedhibitorian action and the stipulation for returning double
the price receivedy which is matter of law in case of an emctio
(recoTeiy of property on the ground of ownership), the fact being
that these matters are connected with the subject of purchase and
sale, and the aforesaid actions were always closely attendant on
those last topics. It is true that^ in tibe scheme of the old Edicts
they wandered off into out*of-the-way places widely apart from
one another, but by our care they are put in the same group, as it
18 only right that discussions on almost identical subjects should be
put dose together. Then another book has been deyised by us
to follow the two first to deal with interest on money and with
trqfeetitia peeimia (bottomry loans), also on documents of title, on
witnesses, on proof, and therewith on presumptions, which three
separate books are placed dose to the portion dealing with things.
Aft^ these we have assigned a place to the rules laid down any-
where as to betrothals, marriages, and dowries, all which we have
set forth within tliree Yolume& On guardianship and curatorship
we have composed two books. This framework, consisting of eight
books, we haye set down in the middle of the whole work, and it
contains all the most practical and best expressed rules collected
fiT>m all quarters. 6. We then come to the fifth artide of our
Digest^ to which the reader will find consigned whatsoeyer was
said of old time on the subject of testaments and codicils, both of
ordinary persons and soldiers ; this article is called '^On Testaments.''
Next comes the subject of legades BS^dJideieomfnissa (testamentary
trusts), in books five in number, ^a. And as there is nothing so closely
bound up with anything else as an account of the lex Fakidia
with legades, or of the SenaitwoonmUfum TrebeUianum with./Ec2et-
eommissc^ we appropriate two books to these respectiye subjects,
and thus complete the whole fifth part in nine books. We have
not thought proper to put anything besides the SenatuaeonstUifum
TrdfeUianvm^ because, as to the stumbUngblocks and obscurities
of the 8enatu9cani8iMum Pegadanum^ which the yery andents
themsdyes were disgusted with, and thdr nice and superfluous
distinctions, we desire to be rid of them, and we have induded
all the law we lay down on the subject in the TrebeUicmum.
66. In all this we have said nothing about caduca (escheats), lest a
head of law which, in the midst of unprosperous courses and bad
times for Rome, grew in importance with public distress, and drew
strength from ciyil war, should remain in our day when our reign

xxviii ConstUuiio Tanta

is strengthened by Divine favour and a flourishing peace and placed
above all nations in the matter of the perils of war, and thus a
melancholy reminiscence should be allowed to cast a shadow on a
joyful age. 7* Next we have before us the sixth part of the
Digest, in which are placed all kinds of banariMn posgeasiOy whether
they relate to freebom persons or freedmen, and herein the whole
law concerned with degrees of relationship and with connexion by
marriage, also statutable heritage, and succession cA intestoJto in
general and the Sena;(MSC(m9uitum TertvXliomwm, or OrJUianumy
which respectively regulate the succession of children to their
mother, and mothers to their children. We have assigned two
books to all the varieties of htmarum possesdo and reduced the
whole to a clear and compendious scheme. 7a. After this we take
the things laid down by old authors as to operis novi nunticUdo
(notification of novel structure), as to the damntMn if^ee^wm
(apprehended mischief), also for the case of the destruction of
buildings or the same being threatened, also as to the keeping off
of rainwater ; further we take whatever we find provided by statute
relating to publiccmi as well as to the making of voluntary gifts
both inter vivas and mortis causa, aU which we have put in a
single book. 7b. For manumissions and trials as to liberty, these
are the subject of another book,* (7c) and again on questions as to
property and possession there are many discursive passages put in
a single volume, (7d) while a further book is assigned to the subject
of persons who have suffered judgment or have confessed in jure
(in the pleadings), also of detention of goods and sales thereof (for
insolvency), and as to the preventing of frauds on creditors. 7e.
After this. Interdicts are dealt with in the lump, then come
excqf^tiones (pleas), and there is again a separate book embracing
the subject of lapse of time and obligations and actions ; the
result being that the above-mentioned sixth part of the whole
volume of the Digest is kept within eight books. 8. The seventh
and last division of the Digest is made up of six books, and all
the law that is met with as to stipulations or verbal obligations, as
to sureties and mandatores (persons who request an advance to be
made to another), also novations, discharges of debty formal receipts
and prsetorian stipulations is set down in two volumes, which it
was impossible so much as to reckon among the number of ancient
books. 8a. After this we have put two terrifying books on the
subject of private and extraordinary offences and also of public
crimes, in which are described the whole severe treatment and
awful penal measures applied to criminals, mixed with which are

CoMtittUio Tanta xxix

the proyisioiiB which have been made as to incorrigible men who
endeaTonr to conceal themselyes and who resist authority, also the
matter of penalties such as are imposed on condemned persons, or
remitted, and the subject of their property. 86. Next we have
demised a separate book on appeals from judgments delivered by
way of deciding either civil or criminal cases, 80. and whatever
else we find devised by the ancients and strictly laid down for
municipal authorities or with relation to decurions or to public
offices or public works or ntmdincB (right of market), or promises or
different kinds of trials or assessments or the meaning of words,—
all these are taken into the fiftieth book, which doses the whole
compilation. 9. The whole of the above has been completed by the
agency of the eminent man and most learned magistrate Tribonianus,
ex-qu8Bstor and ex-consul, a man adorned alike with the arts of
eloquence and of legal science, as well as distinguished in practical
life, and one who has no greater or dearer object than obedience to
our commands : other brilliant and hardworking persons have co-
operated, such as Gonstantinus, that illustrious man. Count of
the Sacred Largesses and Master of the Office of Libels and Sacred
inquiries, who has long deserved our esteem from his good repute
and distinction ; also Theophilus, an illustrious man, a magistrate
and learned in the law, who wields admirably the best sway in the
law over this brilliant dty ; Dorotheus, an illustrious man, of great
eloquence and qusestorian rank, whom, when he was engaged in
delivering the law to students in the most brilliant city of Berytus,
we, moved by his great reputation and renown, summoned to our
presence and made to share in the work in question ; again,
Anatolius, an illustrious person, a magistrate, who, like the last^
was invited to this work when acting as an exponent of law at
Berytus, a man who came of an andent stock, as both his fitther
Leontius and his grandfather Eudoxius left behind them an excellent
report in respect of l^al learning ; also Cratinus, an illustrious
person, Count of the Sacred Largesses, who was once a most efficient
professor of this revered dty. All these were chosen for the above-
mentioned work, together with Stephanus, Mena, Prosdodusy
Eutolmius, Timotheus, Leonides, Leontius, Plato, Jacobus, Con-
stantinus, Johannes, most learned men, who are of counsel at the
supreme seat of the Prsefecture, which is at the head of the eastern
prceUniay but who derive a testimony to their excellence from all
quarters and were chosen by us for the completion of so great a
work. Thus, all the above having met together under the guidance
of the eminent Tribonianus, so as to accomplish this great work in

XXX Constitntto Tanta

pursuance of our commission, the whole was by Divine fayour com-
pleted in fifty books. 10. Herein we had so much respect for
ancient authority that we by no means have suffered them to con-
sign to oblivion the names of those learned in the law ; everyone
of the old lawyers who wrote on law has been mentioned in our
Digest ; all that we did was to provide that if, in the rules given
by them, there appeared to be anything superfluous or imperfect
or of small importance, it should be amplified or curtailed to the
requisite extent and be reduced to the most correct form ; and in
many cases of repetition or contradiction what appeared to be better
has been set down instead of any other reading and included under
one authority thus given to the whole, so that whatever has now
been written may appear clearly to be ours and to be composed by
our order, none being at liberty to compare the andent text with
what our authority has introduced, as in fact there have been many
very important transformations made on the ground of practiced
utility. It goes as far as this, that where an Imperial enactment is
set down in the old books, we have not spared even this, but
resolved to correct it and put it in better form ; leaving the very
names of the old authority, but preserving by our emendations
whatever the real sense of the statutes made suitable and necessary.
Hence it came to pass that where of old there was any matter of
doubt the question has now become quite safe and undisturbed,
and no room for hesitation is left. II. We saw however that the
burden of all this mass of knowledge is more than such men are
equal to bearing as are insufficiently educated and are standing in
the vestibules of law, though on their way towards the secrets
thereof, and we therefore were of opinion that a further compendious
summary^ should be prepared, so that, thereby tinctured and so
to speak imbued with the first elements of the whole subject, they
might proceed to the innermost recesses thereof and take in with
eyes undazzled the exquisite beauty of the law. We therefore
summoned Tribonianus, that eminent man who had been chosen
for the direction of the whole work, also Theophilus and Dorotheus,
illustrious persons and most eloquent professors, and commissioned
them to collect one by one the books composed by old authors in
which the first principles were to be found, and thereupon, what-
ever they found in them that was useful and most to the purpose
and polished in every point of view and in accordance with the
practice of the present age, all this they were to endeavour to grasp
and to put it into four books, so as to lay the first foundations and

^ mediocrU emencUUio, Gr. /icrpia tlfraytyyri.

CanstUutio Tanta xxxi

principles of education in general, and thns enable young men,
supported thereon, to be ready for weightier and more perfect
rules of law. We instructed them at the same time to bear in
mind our own Constitutions as well, which we have issued with a view
to the amendment of the law, and, in composing the Institutes, not
to omit to insert the same improTement, so that it should be clear
both where there had been any doubt previously, and what points
had been afterwards established. The whole work, as accomplished
by these men, was put before us and read through ; whereupon we
received it willingly and judged it to be not unworthy of our mind,
and we ordered that the books should be equivalent to enactments
of our own, as is more plainly declared in our own address which
we have placed at the beginning of the whole. 1 2. The whole frame
of Roman law being thus set forth and completed in three divisions^
viz. one of tibe Institutes, one of the Digest or Pandects, and lastly
one of the Constitutions, all being concluded in three years, whereas
when the work was first taken in hand it was not expected to be
finished in ten years, we ofibred this work too with dutiful intent
to Almighty God for the preservation of mankind, and rendered
fiiU thanks to the Supreme Deity who vouchsafed us successful
waging of war and the enjoyment of honourable peace and the
giving of the best laws, not only for our own age, but for all time,
both present and future. Therefore we saw it to be necessary that
we should make manifest the same system of law to all men, to the
end that they should recognise the endless coniusion in which the
biw was, and the judicious and lawful exactitude to which it had
been brought, and that they might in future have laws which were
both direct and compendious within every one's reach, and of such
a nature as to make it easy to possess the books which contained
them. Our object was that people should not simply be able by
spending a whole mass of wealth to procure volumes containing a
superfluous quantity of legal rules, but the means of purchasing at
a trifling price should be oflered both to rich and poor, a great
deal of learning being procurable with a very small outiay.
13. Should it chance that here and there, in so great a collection
of legal rules, taken as it is from an immense number of books,
some cases of repetition should occur, this no one must be severe
upon ; it should rather be ascribed first of all to human weak-
ness, which is part of our nature, as indeed it belongs rather to
the Deity than to mortal man to have a memory for all things
and to come short in nothing, as indeed was said of old. It
should also be borne in mind that there are some rules of exceeding

xxxii ConstUiitio Tanta

brevity in wliich repetition may be admitted to good purpose, and
it has been practised in accordance with our deliberate intent, the
foct being that either the rule was so material that it had to be
referred to under different heads of inquiry, because the two
subjects were connected together, or else, where it was involved in
other different inquiries, it was impossible to exclude it from some
passages without throwing the whole into confusion. And in these
passages, in which there were well-reasoned arguments set forth by
the old writers, it would be altogether an unlawyerlike proceeding
to cut out and get rid of something that was inserted in one after
another, as it would confuse the mind and sound absurd to the
ears of anyone to whom it was presented. 14. In like manner,
where any provision has been made by Imperial enactment, we
have by no means allowed it to be put in the book of the Digest,
as the reading of such enactments is all that is wanted ; save where
this too is done for the same reasons as those for which repetition
is admitted. 15. As for any contradiction occurring in this book,
none such has any claim to a place in it, nor will any be found, if
we consider nicely the grounds of diversity ; some special differential
feature will be discovered, however obscure, which does away with
the imputation of inconsistency, puts a different complexion on the
matter and keeps it outside the limits of discrepancy. 16. Again
should anything happen to be passed over which, among so many
thousand things, was, so to speak, placed in the depth and lying hid,
and being fit to be so [placed], [still] was covered with darkness
and unavoidably was left out, who could with reason find fault
with this, considering in the first place how limited is the mind of
mortal man, and secondly the intrinsic difficulty of the case, where
the passage, being closely bound up with a number of useless ones,
gave the reader no opportunity of detaching it from the rest ? It
may be added too that it is much better that a few valuable
passages should escape notice than that people should be
encumbered with a quantity of useless matter. 17. There is one
very remarkable fact which comes to light in these books, namely,
that the old books, plraitiful as they were, are found to be of smaller
compass than the more compendious supply now open. The fact
IB that the men who carried on actions at law in the old days, in
spite of the number of rules of law that had been laid down, stiU
only made use of a few of them in the course of the trial, either
because of a deficient supply of books, which it was out of their
power to procure, or simply owing to their own ignorance ; and
cases were decided according to the good pleasure of the judge

Constitutio Tanta

rather than by the letter of the law. In the present compilation,
I mean in our Digest, the law is got together from numerous
Yolumesy the very names of which the men of old could not tell, or
rather had never heard ; and the whole has been composed with
an ample supply of matter in such sort that the ancient plenty
appears defective while our own compendious collection is very
rich. Of this ancient learning Tribouianus, most excellent man,
has furnished us with a very large supply of books, a number of
which were unknown even to the most erudite men ; these were
read through, and all the most valuable passages were eictracted
and found their way into our own excellent work. But the authors
of this composition did not peruse those books only from which
they took the rules they have set down ; they read a great deal
more, in which they found nothing of value or nothing new which
they could extract and insert in our Digest, and which accordingly
they very reasonably rejected. 18. Now whatever is divine is
absolutely perfect^ but the character of human law is to be con-
stantly hurrying on, and no part of it is there which can abide for
ever, as nature is ever eager to produce new forms, so that we fiilly
anticipate that emergencies may hereafter arise which are not
enclosed in the bonds of legal rules. Wherever any such case
arises, let the August remedy be sought, as in truth God set the
Imperial dispensation at the head of human affitirs to this end,
that it should be in a position, whenever a novel contingency
arrives, to meet the same with amendment and arrangement,
and to put it under apt form and regulations. We are not
the first to enunciate this, it comes of an ancient stock ; Julianus
himself, that most acute framer of statutes and of the Perpetual
Edict, set down in his own writings that wherever anything
should turn out defective, the want should be supplied by Imperial
legislation. Indeed not only he but the Divine Hadrianus, in
the consolidated Edict and the Senatusconsultum which followed
it, laid down in the clearest terms that where anything was not
found to be set down in the Edict, later authority might meet the
defect in accordance with the rules, the aims and the analogy
thereof. 19. Now therefore, conscript fathers and all men in the
whole world, render fullest thanks to the Supreme Divinity, who
has kept so greatly beneficial a work for your times : in truth, that
of which those of old time were not in the Divine judgment held
to be worthy has been vouchsafed to your age. Worship therefore
and keep these laws, and let the ancient ones sleep ; and let none
of you so much as compare them with the former ones, nor, if

xxjdr OoMtUutio Tania

there be any discrepancy between them, ask any question^ seeing
that, whatsoever is set down here, we desire that it alone should be
observed. Moreover in every trial or other contest, where rules of
law have to be enforced, let no one seek to quote or maintain any
rule of law save as taken from the above-mentioned Institutes or
h our Digest or Ordinances such as composed and promulgated by
us, unless he wish to have to meet a charge of forgery as an
adulterator, together wifch the judge who allows such things to be
heard, and to suffer most severe penalties. 20. Lest however it
should be unknown to you what those books of old lawyers are
from which this composition is taken, we have ordered that this
likewise should be set down at the beginning of our Digest, so that
it may be quite clear who are the authorities and which are the
books written by them, and how many thousands of these there are
on which this temple of Roman jurisprudence has been constructed.
20a. Of legal authorities or commentators we have chosen those
who were worthy of so great a work as this, and whom older most
devoted Emperors did not scorn to admit ; we have given all of
them one pinnacle of rank, and none is allowed to claim any pre-
eminence for himself. Indeed, seeing that we have laid down that
the present laws themselves should be equivalent to enactments
issued by us, how should any greater or less importance be
attributed to any amongst them, where one rank and one authority
is vouchsafed to all? 21. One thing there is which, as it seemed
good to us at the very beginning, when with the Divine sanction
we commissioned the execution of this work, so it seems opportune
to us to command now also ; this, namely, that no man of those
who either at this day are learned in the law or hereafter shall be
such shall venture to append any commentary to these laws, save
so far as this, that he may translate them into the Greek tongue
with the same*order and sequence as those in which the Roman
text is written, or, as the Greeks call it, tcard TroSa, or, if he likes to
make any notes for difficulties in the various titles, he may compose
what are commonly called iraparirTia. Any further interpretations,
or rather perversions, of these rules of law we will not allow them
to exhibit, for fear lest their long dissertations cause such confusion
as to bring some discredit on our legislation. This happened in
the case of the old commentators on the Edieium perpetwum, for,
although that work was composed in a compendious form, these
men, by extending in this way and that to divers intents, drew it
out beyond all bounds so as to bring aknost all Roman law into
confusion ; and, if we do not put up with them, how can we ever

Canaitfiilo Tanta

allow room for the vain dispateB of future generatioDS f If any
fthould yenture to do such thingB, they will tiiemaelvee be liable to
be prosecuted for forgery, but their books will be altogether set at
nought. But if| as before said, anything should appear doubtful,
this must be by the judges referred to the Imperial Migesty, and
the truth be pronounced on the Augustal authority, to which alone
it belongs both to make and to interpret laws. 22. We lay down
also the same penalty on the ground of forgery for those persons
who at any future time should venture to write down our laws by
the occult means of ciphers. We desire that everything, the names
of authors as well as the titles and numbers of the books, should
be plainly given in so many letters and not by means of marks, so
that anyone who gets for himself one of these books in which
there are marks used in any passage whatever of the book or
volume will have to understand that the codex which he owns
is useless ; if anyone has these objectionable marks in any part of
a codex such as described, we decline to allow him to cite any
passage therefrom in Court ; and a clerk who should venture to
write such marks will not only be punished criminally, as already
mentioned, but he will also have to give the owner twice the value
of the book, if the owner himself either bought such a book or
ordered it to be written without notice. This provision has already
been issued by us both in a Latin enactment and in Qreek and sent
to the professors of law. 23. These our laws, which we have set
down in these books, I mean the Institutes or Elements and the
Digest or Pandects, we desire should be in force from, and after
our third most happy Consulship, on the third day before the
Kalends of January in the present twelfth Indiction, laws which
are to hold good for all time to come, and which, while in force
together with our own ordinances, may display their own cogency in
the Courts in all causes, whether they arise at some future time or
are still pending in the Court, because they have not been settled
by any judgment or terms of arrangement Any cases that have
been disposed of by judicial decree or set at rest by friendly
compromise we do not by any means wish to have stirred up again.
We have done well to make a point of bringing out this body of
law in our third Consulship, as that Consulship is the happiest one
which the fieivour of Almighty Ood and of our Lord Jesus Christ
has given to our State ; in it the Parthian wars were put an end to
and consigned to lasting rest, moreover the third division of the
world came under our sway, as, after Europe and Asia, all Libya
too was added to our dominions, and now a final completion is

• "•

- •• •

^ •

T • .• ."•

1. • .*.

On Justice and Law.

Ulpianus (InstittUes 1) When a man means to give his
attention to law (Jtis), he ought first to know whence the teim jus
is derived Now jtis is so called from justitia ; in feet, according
to the nice definition of Celsus, jus is the art of what is good
and fair. 1. Of this art we may deservedly be called the priests ;
we cherish justice and profess the knowledge of what is good and
iair, we separate what is fair from what is unfair, we discriminate
between what is allowed and what is forbidden, we desire to make
men good, not only by putting them in fear of penalties, but also
by appealing to them through rewards, proceeding, if I am not
mistaken, on a real and not a pretended philosophy. 2. Of this
subject there are two departments, public law and private law.
Public law is that which regards the constitution of the Roman
state, private law looks at the interest of individuals ; as a matter
of fact, some things are beneficial from the point of view of the
state, and some with reference to private persons. PubUc law is
concerned with^ sacred rites, with priests, with public officers.
Private law has a threefold division, it is deduced partly from the
rules of natural law, partly from those of the jus gentium, partly
from those of the civil law. 3. Natural law is that which all
animals have been taught by nature ; this law is not peculiar to
the human species, it is common to all animals which are produced
on land or sea, and to fowls of the air as weU. From it comes the
union of man and woman called by us matrimony, and therewith
the procreation and rearing of children ; we find in fact that
animals in general, the very wild beasts, are marked by acquaint-
ance with this law. 4. Jus gentmm is the law used by the various
tribes of mankind, and there is no difficulty in seeing that it falls
short of natural law, as the latter is common to all animated
beings, whereas the former is only common to human beings in
respect of their mutual relations ;

^ For conititit read eomUtit,

1—2

Il

4 \\ On Justice and Law [booei

m

2 PoMPOixrQB'\(En4Airidi(m) take, for example, religion as
observed towards God ; or the duty of submission to parents and
country':.'---'

3 FiidKBNTiNUS (Institutes 1) or the right of repelling
Tiojence and wrong; it is in fact by virtue of this law that
whatever a man does in defence of his own person he is held to do

, '!. lawfully ; and Nature having made us in a certain sense akin to
'^;''xme another, it follows that it is a monstrous thing for one man to
* / lie in wait for another.

4 Ulpianus (Institutes 1) Manumissions also are comprised
in the jus gentium. Manumission is the same as dismissal from
ma/nvs (hand), in short the giving of liberty ; as long as a man is
in a state of slavery he is subject to ma/nus and potestas (control),
by manumission he is freed from control All this had its origin in
the^t^ gentium^ seeing that by natural law all were bom free, and
manumission was not known, because slavery itself was unknown ;
but when slavery came in through the jus gentium, there followed
the relief given by manumission ; and whereas people were once
simply called by the one natural name of ^man,' by the jus
gentium there came to be three divisions, first freemen, then, as
contradistinguished from them, slaves, and then, in the third place,
freedmen, that is persons who had ceased to be slaves.

6 Hermogekianus (Epitmn/es of law 1) It was by this same
jus gefnJtiwfn that war was introduced, nations were distinguished,
kingdoms were established, rights of ownership were ascertained,
boundaries were set to domains, buildings were erected, mutual
traffic, purchase and sale, letting and hiring and obligations in
general were set on foot, with the exception of a few of these last
which were introduced by the civil law.

6 Ulpiantts (InstiivAes 1) The civil law is something which
on the one hand is not altogether independent of natural law or
jfus gentium, and on the other is not in every respect subordinate
to it ; so that when we make addition to or deduction from universal
law (jus commun£), we establish a law of our own, that is, civil law.
1. Now this law of ours is either ascertained by writing or with-
out writing ; as the Greeks say, r&v v6fiwv ol §kkv iyypa^v oi Be
&fpail>oL — (of laws some are in writing and some are not in writing).

7 Papinianus (Definitions 2) The civil law is the law which is
derived from statutes, plebiscites, decrees of the senate, enactments
of the emperors, or the authority of those learned in the law.
1. Prsdtorian law is that which was introduced by the praetors in

TFT. i] On Justice and Law 5

order to aid, Bupplement^ or amend the civil law, with a view to the
public advantaga The same is also called ' honorary law/ after the
honor (public office) of the protors.

8 Mabcianus {Institutes 1) In &ct honorary law itself is the
liying voice of the civil law.

9 Gaius {InstUtUes 1) All nations which are governed by
statutes and customs make use partly of law which is peculiar to
the respective nations, and partly of such as is common to all
mankind. Whatever law any nation has established for itself is
peculiar to the particular state {civitas), and is called civil law,
as being the peculiar law of that state, but law which natural
reason has laid down for mankind in general is maintained
equally by all men, and is called jus gentiumy as being the law
which all nations use.

10 Ulpianus {Rtdes 1) Justice is a constant, unfailing disposi-
tion to give every one his legal due. 1. The principles of law are
these: Live uprightly, injure no man, give every man his due.
2. To be learned in the law (JurisprudenHa) is to be acquainted
with divine and human things, to know what is just and what is
uiyust

11 Paitlus {on JSabinus 14) The word jw is used in a number
of different senses : in the first place, in that in which the name is
applied to that which is under all circumstances fitir and right, as
in the case of natural law ; secondly, where the word signifies that
which is available for the benefit of all or most persons in any
particular state, as in the case of the expression civil law. With
equal correctness the term jus is applied in our state to honorary
law. We may add that the praetor is said to administer the law
even when he gives an unjust judgment^ the word referring not to
what the praetor did in the particular case, but to what it is his
business to do. The term jtis is applied in another sense to the
place in which law is administered, the name being transferred
from the thing done to the place where it is done. What place
that is may be stated as follows : whatever place the praetor fixes
upon in which to dispense justice, so as he maintain unimpaired
the dignity of his own authority and the customs of our forefathers,
that place is properly termed^.

12 Marciaktjs {InstittUes 1) We sometimes apply the word jus
to the tie of a personal connexion, for example a man may say ' I
have a jus cognationis or affinitatis* (I am connected by blood or
marriage) with such a one.

On the Origin of Law [book i

IL
On the Origin of Law and of the different Magistracies,

AS WELL AS THE SUCCESSION OF THOSE LEARNED IN THE Law.

1. Gaius {on the Law of the Twelve Tables 1) Having
undertaken to give an exposition of ancient statutes, I have as a
matter of course thought it right to go back for my account of the
law of the Roman people' to the foundation of the city ; not that I
have any desire to write unduly verbose commentaries, but because
I observe that in all subjects a thing is only perfect when it is com-
plete in all its parts, and undoubtedly the most essential part of
anything is its beginning. Besides this, if with men who are
arguing cases in the forum it is, so to speak, a monstrous thing
to set the matter forth to the judge, without first making some
introductory statement ; how much more unsuitable must it be
for one who has undertaken to give an exposition to disregard the
beginning and omit reference to historical causes, and so to take
up at once with unwashed hands, if I may use the expression, the
subject-matter which has to be expounded ? The &ct is, so it
strikes me, that some introduction such as I have mentioned
makes people more willing to approach the study of the matter
in hand, and, when they have got so far, causes the subject itself
to be more easily comprehended.

PoMPONius {Enchiridion) Accordingly it seems requisite
to set forth the origin and development of law itselC 1. Now
at the time of the origin of our state the citie^is at large
(popidus) undertook at first to proceed without fixed statutes or
any fixed law at all, and everything was regulated by the direct
control of the kings. 2. After that, the state being more or less
enlarged, the tradition is that Romulus himself divided the body
of the citizens into thirty parts, which parts he called curicB, for
the reason that he exercised his care {cura) of the commonwealth
in accordance with the opinions of the parts referred to. Accord-
ingly he himself proposed to the people certain curiate statutes,
and the kings that succeeded him did the same thing ; all which
statutes exist in writing in the book of Sextus P&pirius, who was

^ For pritti read PRius (populi Romanijus). M.

TTT. n] On the Oriffin of Law 7

contemporary with Superbns the son of Demaratos of Ck»rinth, and
was one of tiie leading men. That book, as above mentioned (fiie),
is caUed the Papirian dvil law ; not that Papirius inserted anything
in it of his own composition, but because statutes which had been
passed in an unsyst^atic way were (therein) reduced by him to a
single body of law. a The kings being subsequently expelled by
a tribunidan statute, the above statutes all went out of use, and
the Roman people came once more to live by loosely ascertained
law or by mere custom rather than by any formal statute, to which
condition it submitted for about twenty years. 4. Afterwards, in
order to put an end to this state of things, it was determined that
ten men should be appointed by the authority of the state through
whom application should be made for statutes to Greek cities, and
the Roman state should be put on a statutable foundation. The
laws so obtained they wrote on ivory tablets, and set them up
before the rostra^ to the end that they might be the more clearly
perceptible, and supreme authority in the state was given f(»r that
year to the officers mentioned, their duty being to amend the
statutes, where necessary, and also to expound their meaning, and
there was to be no appeal from their dedsions as there was from
those of magistrates in general They, however, themselves took
note of certain defidendes in the original statutes just referred to,
and, accordingly, in the course of the ensuing year they added two
more tables to those already existing ; hence the statutes taken all
together were called the statutes of the Twelve Tables. It has
been stated by some writers that the passing of these laws was
suggested to the Tenmen by one Hermodorus, an Ephesian, who
was living as an exile in Italy. 5. These statutes being enacted,
it thereupon followed that discussion in the forum (disputatio
fori) became a necessity, as in fact it naturally must be the case
that correct interpretation requires the guidance of those learned
in the law. [The results of] such discussion, and the rules of that
particular law which is composed by the learned and established
without the use of writing, are not called by any spedal wxme} like
the other parts of the law which have their respective designations ;
Hhey are both comprised under the general appellation of civil
law. 6. After this there were at about the same time various
forms of actions devised, founded on the above statutes, by which
people in general might carry on litigation ; and in order to prevent
the dtisens from bringing their actions in any way they pleased,

^ parte must be a slip of the pen. We are obliged to read appeUatione. v. M.
* daiis propriU nominibui C€teri$ partHnu deL HaL

8 On the Origin of Law [book i

the Tenmen required that they should be in set and solemn form.
This branch of the law is ca&ed that of statute-actions {kgii
actiones), in other words, statutable actions (leffUinue aetumes).
Accordingly, these three branches of law arose at about the same
time, that is to say, the statute of the Twelve Tables was first
passed \ these tables gave rise to the civil law, and in accordance
with the same were devised the statute-actions. But, in connexion
with all these statutes, the knowledge of the way to interpret them
and the conduct of actions founded upon them was left to the
College of Pontifices, and it was laid down by order which of these
should superintend private causes every year; and the people
continued to conform to this usage for about a hundred years.
7. Afterwards, Appius Claudius having propounded and reduced
to form the actions above mentioned, Gnieus Flavins, his secretary,
the son of a freedman, purloined the book and put it in the hands
of the people at large, at which service the people were so much
gratified that he was made a tribune of the plebs as well as a
senator and a curule sedile. The book itself, which contains the
forms of action, is called the Flavian civil law, on the same principle
as that on which a book already mentioned is called the Papirian
civil law, for On. Flavius, like Papirius, inserted nothing in the
book of his own composition. As the Roman state increased,
certain kinds of appUcation not being available, after no long time
Sextus iElius composed additional forms and presented to the
people the book which is known as the iElian civil law. 8. Here-
upon, there being in puUic use the statute of the Twelve Tables
and the civil law, and also the statute-actions, it came to pass that
discord arose between the plebs and the fitthers, whereupon the
former seceded and established laws for itself, which laws are called
plebiscites. Soon after, on the pkbs being induced to return, a
great deal of disagreement arose in connexion with these plebiscites,
in consequence of which it was enacted by the lex Hortensia that
they should be observed as if they were regular statutes. The
result of this was that the difference between a plebiscite and a
statute consisted thereafter in the formal method of enactment, but
the force of the two was the same. 9. Next, seeing that the plebs
found in course of time that it was diflScult for them to meet
together, and the general body of the citizens no doubt found it
much more diflScult stUl, considering the vast increase of their
numbers, the very necessity of the case caused the administration
of the commonwealth to be put in the hands of the senate ; hence

^ Inser. kUaqtts before lege. M.

TTT. n] On the Origin of Law 9

that body came to take a new part in the management of aflSurSy
and whatever it enacted was observed as law, the enactment being
called a sefn^Uus-conrndtunu 10. At this time, besides the above,
there were magistrates who administered justice, and in order that
the citizens might be aware what kind of pronouncement the
officer would make in any given case and take their measures
accordingly, the magistrates published edicts. The edicts of the
praetor constituted the honorary law, the name honorary being
derived from the public office (hanoa) of the prsetor. 11. Lastly,
in accordance with the growing uniformity in the methods of
creating law which [the state] was found to have already adopted
bit by bit, as the occasion required, it came to be a matter of
necessity that the business of providing for the public wel&re
should be in the hands of one man, as it was impossible for the
senate to carry on with the same ddigence every department of the
administration ; accordingly a head of the state was established,
and he was entrusted with power to the effect that whatever he
laid down should be held valid. 12. Hence in our state [the
sources of law are as follows: — ] a rale may depend on law
properly so called, that is, on a statute ; or there is the special
and particidar civil law which is established without writing by
mere interpretation on the part of the learned ; again, there are
the statute-actions, which give the proper formalities to be used
in pleading, or there may be a pldmdtwm^ which is enacted
without the authority of the fiithers ; furthermore there are the
edicts of the magistrates, from which is derived the honorary law,
or there is a aenaJhis-coTisfidtum which takes its force simply from
the fact of being enacted by the senate, though there is no statute
strictly so caUed ; or, [lastly,] there is an imperial ordinance, the
law being that whatever is enacted by the Emperor himself must
be observed as if it were a regular statute.

13. Now that we are acquainted with the origin and progress
of the law, the next thing is to note the titles of the various
magistrates and the origins of their respective offices, since, as
we have already shown, it is through those who preside at the
administration of justice that practical results are secured. What
advantage is there in the existence of law in the state, if there
are no officers to conduct its administration ? After that we will
treat of the succession of learned authorities, as there can be no
consistent body of law at all, unless there are persons acquainted
with the law by whom it can irom day to day be advanced and
improved. 14. With regard to magistrates, there is no doubt

10 On the Origin qf Law [book i

that in the earliest times of the Roman state all power was in
the hands of the kings. 15. It is clear that there was also in
those days a tribunus cderum ; he was the officer who was at the
head of the horsemen, and he may be said to have occupied the
first place next after the king ; such an officer was Junius Brutus,
who took the lead in the matter of expulsion of the king. 16. After
the kings were expelled, two consuls were established, and it was
provided by statute that they should exercise supreme authority ;
their name was derived from the fact that they above all others
' consulted ' the interest of the commonwealth. Lest however they
should lay claim in all respects to the power that had been
wielded by the kings, a statute was passed which provided that,
there should be an appeal from their decisions, and that they
should not be able to inflict capital punishment on a Roman
citizen without the order of the people: all that was left them
was the power of summary coercion (ut coercere pos9ent\ and of
ordering persons to be imprisoned in the name of the state.
17. After this, as the business of conducting the census required
a longer time, and the consuls were not equal to this in addition
to their other duties, censors were appointed. 18. Then, as the
nation increased in numbers and frequent wars arose, including
some of considerable severity waged against Rome by bordering
tribes, it was sometimes resolved, when the case required it, that a
magistrate should be appointed endowed with exceptional powers ;
accordingly dictators were instituted, from whom there was no
appeal, and who even had conferred upon them the right of in-
flicting capital punishment But it was not held right that such
a magistrate, wielding as he did supreme power, should be retained
in office for more than six months. 19. The dictators were required
to have mo/gigtri eqidtwra (masters of the horsemen) just as the
kings were to have tribvm cderum (officers of cavalry) ; the
office was very much the same as the present office of prce-
fectvs prcetoriot still the holders were considered statutable
magistrates. 20. About the same time the plebs^ which had
seceded from the patrea some sixteen years after the expulsion
of the kings, created tribunes for themselves on the Sacred Mount
by way of plebeian magistrates. They were called tribunes because
at one time the whole body of the citizens was divided into three
parts, and one tribune was created from each part; or because
they were created by the votes of the tribes. 21. Moreover, in
order that there should be officers to superintend the temples,
in which the plebs used to deposit all their enactments, two

TTT. n] Chi the Origin of Law 11

members of the pld>s were appointed who were called aediles.
22. Afterwards, when the national finance had come to be on a
larger scale, in order to provide officers to preside over it, quaBstors
were appointed to superintend money matters, so called because
Uiey were created for the purpose of inquiring into [the state of the
treasury] and guarding the money. 23. And whereas, as has been
mentioned, the consuls were not permitted by law to hold a court
for trying a Roman citizen in a capital case without the leave of
the people, for this reason qusestors were appointed by the people
to preside in capital causes; they were called qtuBStoresparricidii;
these are in fact mentioned in the statute of the Twelve Tables.
24 It being also resolved that a body of statutes should be passed,
it was proposed to the people that all the magistrates should go
out of office in order that Tenmen [should be created for the
purpose of drawing up statutes. Accordingly the Tenmen^] were
appointed for one year ; but whereas they contrived to prolong
their office, and were guilty of oppressive practices, and declined,
when the time came, to appoint their successors in office, their
object being that they themselves and their faction should keep
the government in their own hands without interruption, they
brought matters to such a pass by their harsh and tyrannical
domination that the army deserted the state. The author of the
secession is said to have been a certain Yerginius, who found that
Appius Claudius, contrary to the rule which he had himself taken
from the old law and inserted in the Twelve Tables, had refused to
give him the interim custody of his own daughter [pending the
trial of the question of her status] and had granted it to a man
who had been set on by the judge himself to claim her as his slave ;
so that, carried away by his desire for the girl, he, the judge, had
upset all rules of right and wrong. Yerginius, finding this, so it
was said, and indignant at such a departure, in the case of his own
daughter, from a very long-established rule of law (the fact being
that Brutus, the earliest consul at Rome, had allowed interim
liberty in the case of Yindex, the slave of the Yitellii, whose in-
formation had brought to light a treasonable conspiracy), Yerginius,
I say, who deemed' the honour of his daughter more precious than
even her life, snatched a knife from the shop of a butcher and killed
her with it, his object being that the girl's death should preserve
her from the dishonour of suffering foul outrage, and thereupon,
fresh from the deed, before his daughter's blood was dry, he took

^ The portion in brackets was probably omitted by mistake. 9. M.
' Read pukms for ptUaret M.

1 J On the Origin of Law [book i

refiige with the ranks of his fellow-soldiers. The legions were at
that time at Algidum, on a military expedition, but the whole army
at once abandoned their actual leaders and carried the standards
to the Aventine mount, soon after which the pUhs of the city
betook themselves in a body to the same spot, and by the common
consent of the citizens [the Tenmen] were [some of them driven
into exile and^] some put to death in prison ; whereupon the
commonwealth returned once more to its previous condition.
25. Next, several years having elapsed after the passing of the
Twelve Tables, a contest arose between the pleba^ and the pcttreSy
the former desiring that the consuls should be chosen' out of their
own body as well as from the patres, to which the latter reftised to
consent ; whereupon it was resolved that military tribunes should
be created with consular power, being taken parUy from the plebs
and partly from the patres. The number of these oflScers varied
from time to time, sometimes there were twenty, sometimes
more, occasionally not so many. 26. Afterwards, it having been
resolved that the consuls might be taken from the plebe itself, they
came to be appointed from both bodies ; whereupon, by way of
allowing the patres some kind of precedence ^ it was resolved that
two officers should be appointed from their number [to superintend
the games'], and this was the origin of the curule sediles. 27. Again,
as the consuls were called away by wars on the border, and there
was thus no one left to administer justice at home, it came
to pass that in addition to them a prsetor was created who was
called the prcRtor wrbantis, because he administered justice in
the city. 28. Some years after this, as this praetor was not equal
to the discharge of his duties, in consequence of the excessive
crowding of actual foreigners into the city, another praetor was
created in addition, called the prcetor peregrinnSy because his chief
duty was to administer justice to the peregrini (foreigners).
29. Again, it was necessary that there should be some magistrate
to preside* at the court of the hasta ; accordingly the ' Tenmen for^
determining causes' were appointed. 30. About the same time
were also appointed the ' Fourmen to take charge of highways '
and the ' Threemen of the Mint ' who melted bronze, silver, and
gold ; also the * Threemen for capital cases ' who were to have the

^ Words in brackets probably omitted by mistake. M.

* Read cum pott {Uiquott annos quam duodeeim tabulm lotas sunt pMs. M.
' Read ereari for creare, M.

* Read plusjurU for plurii. M. * M.

^ Read praseiset for prcBe$»ent, M. ' DeL in, HaL

TFT. n] On the Origin of Law 18

care of the priBon, bo that, when punishment was to be inflicted, it
might be done by their agency. 31. And as it was unsuitable for
the magistrates to be engaged in public afiairs in the evening, there
were appointed the Fivemen for the hither side and the other
side of tiie Tiber who might act in the place of the magistrates.
32. After this, Sardinia being annexed, then Sicily, also Spain, and
next the province of Narbo, so many additional praetors were
appointed, corresponding to the number of provinces which had
come under the Roman sway, some of which praetors had to super-
intend home, and some provincial affairs. Later on, Cornelius
Sylla instituted State inquisitions (qticestiones pvbUcce)^ for ex-
ample, for forgery (jie f(dso\ for parricide, for stabbers ; and he
also created four additional prsetors. Next Qaius Julius Caesar
appointed two praetors and two aediles to preside over the distri-
bution of com, who^ were to be called Cereal, from the goddess
Ceres. Thus there were created twelve praetors and six aediles.
After this the Divine Augustus appointed sixteen praetors. Then
the Divine Claudius added two more praetors to hold courts on
questions of testamentary trusts {de Jideieommisso)^ but one of
the two was suppressed by the Divine Titus ; and the Divine
Nerva added a judge who should adjudicate on cases between
the fiscus and private persons. This makes the number of persons
who administer justice in the state eighteen. 33. All the above
holds good as long as the magistrates are at home ; but whenever
they leave the dty, one is left to administer justice who is entitled
prctfectas wrbi. He used at one time to be appointed when the
others took their departure', afterwards he may be said to have
been regularly instituted on account of the Latin festivals, and
the appointment is made every year. The fact is that the pre-
fect of the com supply and the prefect of the watch {pra^ectvs
a/nnavuB and proefectua mgiltun) are not magistrates, they are
extraordinary officers appointed in the interest of the public. At
the same time the Cistiberes above referred to (tribunes for the
hither side of the Tiber) were by a decree of the senate after-
wards made aediles. 34. On the whole then, as it appears by
the above, there were ten tribunes of the pld)Sf two consuls,
eighteen praetors and six aediles exercising jurisdiction in the city.
35. The knowledge of dvil law has been professed by a great
number of distinguished men ; we will at present mention such of
them as held the first rank in the estimation of the Roman people,
so as to set forth the names and characters of those who originated

I Read st dkerentur. CI M. * Bssy^prqf&au ii$ fox prctfechu. Cf. M.

14 On the Origin of Law [book i

and handed down our roles' of law. Of all those who acquired
systematie knowledge, no one, so the tradition is, made a public
profession of it before Tiberius Coruncanius ; all those who
preceded him either desired to keep the civil law in the back-
ground, or else' were in the habit of bestowing their time on such
as consulted them, rather than putting themselves at the disposal
of persons who wished for systematic instruction. 36. One lawyer
of pre-eminent learning was Publius Papirius, who drew up a
consolidated version of the Royal statutes {leges regies). After
him came Appius Claudius, one of the Tenmen, who had the chief
voice in the composition of the Twelve Tables. After him another
Appius Claudius of the same fitmily possessed the greatest know-
ledge of the law ; he was called the hundred-handed, he laid down
the Appian road, he made the aqueduct for the CSaudian water,
he voted that Pyrrhus should not be admitted into the city ; and
he it was, according to tradition, who first wrote forms of action
for cases of interruption to possession, but his book is not extant.
The same Appius Claudius devised the letter 12, a consequence of
which seems to have been that Valesii was turned into Valerii and
Fusii into Furii*. 37. A man of very great learning after these
was Sempronius, whom the Roman citizens called a'o<f>d<: (the wise),
and no one else either before or after him received that surname.
[Then there was] Gaius Scipio Nasica, who was called by the senate
'the Best'; in addition to which he was presented by the state
with a house in the Via Sacra, so as to make it more easy to consult
him. Next came Quintus Mucins ; he was once sent as envoy to
Carthage, where, two dice being laid before him, one for *peace'
and the other for *war,' he was given the choice between them and
requested to take back to Rome whichever he preferred ; where-
upon he took up both, saying that the proper course was for the
Carthaginians to ask for whichever of the two they would rather
receive. 38. The above were succeeded by Tiberius Coruncanius,
who, as already mentioned, was the first public professor of law ;
there is however no written work of his to be met with, though his
formal opinions were numerous and noteworthy. After him Sextus
iElius and his brother Publius iElius and also Publius Atilius dis-
played very great learning as public teachers, so much so that the
two iElii were in iact made consuls, and Atilius was the first person

^ Perhaps read pel solebant for solumque. r. M.

^ Read idem A. C, B literam invenit videturque ab hoe processisse ut etc.
for idem A. C. qui videtur ab hoc processisse R literam invenit ut etc., which
is absurd. (Muret.)

TIT. n] On the Origin of Law 16

to whom the people gave the title of Sapiens. Indeed Sextus
^lius is mentioned by EnniuB, and there exists a booi( of his
bearing the title TripertUay containing a sort of cradle of the law ;
it is called TripertUa because in it we have first the statute of the
Twelve Tables, this is followed by an exposition, and lastly the
work concludes with the statute-actions. There are three other
books which are said to be by the same author, though some
persons maintain that this is not the case ; these latter have been
to some extent followed by Cato. We next have Marcus Cato, the
head of the Porcian family, and some books ai*e extant written by
him ; but there are a great many by his son, and it is on these
last that the subsequent works are founded. 39. After these were
Publius Mudus and Brutus and Mauilius, who were the founders
of the civil law. Of these P. Mucins left as many as ten treatises,
Brutus seven, Manilius three ; and written rolls of Manilius
are preserved ^ The two former were of consular rank, Brutus
had been praator, P. Mucins had been even Pontifex Maximus.
40. Pupils of these were Publius Rutilius Rufus, who was consul
at Rome and proconsul of Asia, Paulus Verginius and Quintus
Tubero, the well-known Stoic, who studied under Pansa and was
himself consul Sextus Pompeius, the paternal uncle of Gnseus
Pompeius, lived at the same time, and so did Cselius Antipater, an
author of historical works, but a man who bestowed more pains on
the art of public speaking than on legal learning ; there was also
Lucius Crassus, brother to Publius Mucins, who was called Munianus,
this last is said by Cicero to have been the best speaker of all
jurisconsults. 41. After these Quintus Mudus, the Pontifex
Maximus, son of Publius, was the first who made a digest of the
dvil law, which he arranged under heads in eighteen books.
12. Mudus had a great number of pupils, but those of most
authority were Aquilius Gallus, Balbus Lucilius, Sextus Papirius,
and Gains Juventius ; of these Gallus is reported by Servius to
have had most authority with the people at larga They are how-
ever all cited by Servius Sulpicius ; but no origmal works of these
men are extant of such a character as to be in general demand ;
indeed their writings are not in frequent and general use at all»
though Servius' constantly made use of them in compiling his own
books, and it is owing to his writings that they themselves are held
in remembranca 43. Servius Sulpicius, at a time when he occupied
the chief place as a pleader of causes, or, at any rate, the next
after Marcus Tullius [Cicero], is said to have gone to Quintus

* Del. monumentcL M. ' After Servius insert its.

16 On the Origin of Law [book i

Mucius for his advice about an affair in which a friend of his was
concerned, and to have very imperfectly understood an answer
which Mucius gave him^ on a point of law. Hereupon, as the story
is, he asked the question again, and received an answer from Mucins,
which he still failed to comprehend, which drew upon him a severe
reproach from Mucius ; it was disgraceful, he said, that a patrician,
a member of a family of distinction and a pleader of causes,
should be unacquainted with the law in which his business lay.
Stung with this taunt, so to call it, Servius took pains to learn
the civil law, and received a great deal of instruction from teachers
above mentioned ; he was taught by Balbus Ludlius, and helped on
his way a great deal by Oallus Aquilius who lived at Cercina ;
hence it comes that a great many works of his now extant were
composed at that place. Servius died in the course of serving as a
legate, whereupon the Roman people erected a statue to him before
the roBtray which is to |>e seen at this day in front of the rostra
of Augustus. A number of rolls of his works are in existence ; he
left behind him nearly a hundred and eighty books. 44. Many
lawyers derived instruction from him, among whom the following
were the chief writers : Alfenus Varus [Oaius*], Aulus Ofilius, Titus
Caesius, Aufidius Tucca, Aufidius Namusa, Flavins Prisons, Gains
Ateius, Pacuvius Labeo [Antistius], the father of Labeo Antistius,
Cinna, Publicius Gellius. Of these ten, eight wrote books, the
matter of the whole of whose existing works was arranged by
Aufidius Namusa in a hundred and forty books. Among the above*
mentioned pupils [of Servius] those of greatest authority were
Alfenus Varus and Aulus Ofilius ; Varus attained the consulship,
Ofilius always kept his equestrian rank. He was on very intimate
terms with the Emperor, and he left a large number of books on
civil law which were intended to serve as a groundwork in every
part of the subject He was' the first author to write about the
statutes relating to the five per cent duty ; he was also the first
to make a careful arrangement of the matter of the praetor's edict
so fitr as it bore on jvrUdictio ; though before him Servius left
two very short books addressed to Brutus bearing the title On the
Edict 45. An author of the same day was Trebatius, he was a
pupil of Cornelius Maximus ; there was also Aulus Oascellius, a
pupil of Quintus Mucius Volusius^ in fact in honour of his instructor,

^ Read reipondentem for retpondiue. v, M.

^ The names in brackets may perhaps be omitted, v, M.

' Read corucripnt for eomcribit.

^ I read QuitUi Mud for Q^%ntu9 Muctut^ but the text is hopeless.

TIT. n] On tiie Origin of Law 17

he made Mudns^B grandson Publius Mucius his heir. He was a
nian of qufiestorian rank, and he did not care to rise higher, though
Augostos himself offered him the consulship. Among the three last-
named, Trebatius, it is said, had more practical acquaintance with
law than Cascellius, but Caacellius surpassed Trebatius in eloquence,
while Ofilius exceUed both in learning. No works of Cascellius re-
main, except a single book of '^ good sayings." There are a good many
books of Trebatius, but they are not much used. 46. After these
came Q.^ Tubero, who studied under Ofilius ; he was a patrician,
and he gave up the business of a pleader for the study of the dvil
law, his chief reason for this being that he had prosecuted Quintus
Ligarius before Gains Csesar without success. Quintus ligarius
was the man who, being in command on the African coast, refused
to allow Tubero to land when he was ill, or to take water, on
which Tubero prosecuted him, and Ligarius was defended by Cicero ;
Cicero's oration is preserved, and may fairly be called a very fine
one; it is entitled Dtfence of Quintus Ligarins. Tubero was
accounted most learned in public and private law, and he left a
great many books on both subjects, but he affected antique language
in his writing, and for that reason his books are not popular.
47- After him very great authority was allowed to Ateius Capito,
who followed Ofilius, and Antistius Labeo, who studied under all
the above (sic) ; though he was espedally instructed by Trebatius.
Of these two, one, Ateius, was consul ; Labeo, when the same office
was offered him by Augustus, the holding of which would have
made him interim consul (consul suffectus), declined to accept it,
but he bestowed great pains on legal studies. In the prosecution
of these he divided the year into two parts, so as to pass six
months at Rome with his pupils, and for the remaining six months
to be absent and give himself up to writing books. In the end he
left four hundred volumes, many of which are in constant use.
These two men may be said to have founded two schools respec-
tively ; Ateius Capito adhered to the doctrines which had reached
him by tradition ; Labeo, who was gifted with original ability and
relied on his own learning, having given attention to many other
branches of knowledge, undertook to make a good many innova-
tions. 48. In connexion with this distinction, Ateius Capito was
succeeded by Massurius Sabinus, and Labeo by Nerva ; these two
in fact widened the difference between the two schools above
mentioned. Nerva was on very intimate terms with the Emperor.
Massurius Sabinus was a member of the equestrian order, and was

^ Read Q. for quoque. Of. M

18 On the Origin of Law [book i

the first to give opinions in the public interest (pnbiioe) ; tthe &ct
being that after this priTilege had come to be given, it was allowed
to him by Tiberius Csesart.^ 49. It may be observed in passing
that before the days of Augustus the right of d^vering opinions
in the public interest was not granted by the head of the state,
but any persons who felt confidence in their own learning gave
answers to such as consulted them ; moreover they did not always
give their answers under seal ; they very often wrote to the judge
themselves, or called upon those who consulted them to testify to
the opinions they gave. The Divine Augustus was the first to lay
down, in order to ensure greater authority to the law, that the
jurisconsult might deliver his answer in pursuance of an authoriza*
tion given by himself ; and from that time such an authorization
was asked for as a favour. It was in consequence of this that our
excellent Emperor Hadrian, on receiving a request from some
lawyers of praetorian rank for leave to give legal opinions, answered
the api^cants that this privilege was not usually asked for but
granted [or that there was no leave asked for this practice, it was
simply carried out], consequently, if any one were confident of his
powers, he (the Emperor) would be much pleased to find that^ he
took steps to qualify himself for delivering opinions to the citizens.
50. Accordingly leave was given to Sabinus by Tiberius Csesar to
deliver opinions to the citizens. Sabinus himself was admitted into
the equestrian order at an advanced time of life, in fact at about
the age of fift^. He was not a man of ample means, but he was
maintained to a great extent by his pupils. 51. Sabinus was suc-
ceeded by Qaius Cassius Longinus, the son of a daughter of Tubero's,
who herself was grand-daughter to Servius Sulpidus : whence
Cassius speaks of Servius Sulpicius as his great-grand&ther.
Cassius was consul along with Quartinus in the time of Tiberius ;
he possessed very great influence in the state down to the time
when the Emperor expelled him. 52. He was banished to Sardinia,
but he lived to be recalled by Vespasian. Nerva was succeeded
by Proculus. There lived at liie same time another Nerva, the son ;
there was also another Longinus, who bdlonged to the equestrian
order; he afterwards attained to the office of prestor. Proculus
however had the greater authority, in fact he had very great
influence. The members of the two schodis were called respectively
Cassians and Proculians, the distinction between the schools having
taken its start from Capito and Labeo. 53. Cassius was succeeded

> I have put nam posteaquafn for potteaque: tandem for tamen. Of. M. :
reading very doubtfuL

* si inser. after »e. Of. M.

ViCt^ TIT. n] On the Origin of Law 19

by CsBliuB Sabinus, who had very great inflaence in the days of
Vespasian ; Procnlus by Pegasus, who was at tlie same period
Prefect of the city ; Caelius Sabinus by Prisons Javolenus ;
Pegasus by Celsus; Celsus the father by Celsus the son and
Prisons Keratins ; both the last mentioned were consuls, Celsus
indeed was twice consul; Javolenus Priscus was followed by
Abnmius Yalens and Tuscianus, also by Salvius Julianus.

m.

Ok Statutes, Decrees of the Senate, ajstd Long Usaob.

1 Papinianus (D^nitiofis 1) A statute {lex) is a command of
general application, a resolution on the part of learned men, a
restraint of offences, committed either voluntarily or in ignorance,
a general covenant on the part of the state.

2 Mabciaktjs {Institutee 1) The orator Demosthenes him-
self gives this definition: 'A law (vofio^) is the following: —
something which all men ought to obey for many reasons, and
chiefly because every law is devised and given by God, but resolved
on by intelligent men, a means of correcting ofiences both intentional
and unintentional, a general agreement on the part of the community
by which all those living therein ought to order their lives. We
may add that Chiysippus the philosopher, a man who professed
the highest wisdom of the Stoics, b^ns his book called irepl
vofiov (on law) as follows : — ''Law is the king of all things, both
divine and human, it ought to be the controller, ruler and com-
mander of both the good and the bad^ and thus to be a standard
as to things just and unjust and'' [director of] ''beings political by
nature, enjoining what ought to be done and forbidding what
ought not to be done."

3 PoBffPONnrs {on Sabinus 25) Laws ought to be laid down,
as Theophrastus said, in respect of things which happen for the
most part, not which happen against reasonable expectation.

4 CELStrs {Digest 5) Rules of law are not founded on possi-
bilities which may chance to come to pass on some one occasion,

5 The same {Digest 17) since law ought to be framed to meet
cases which occur frequently and easily, rather than such as very
seldom happen.

6 PAtTLtrs {on Plavtius 17) What occurs once or twice, as
Theophrastus says, lawgivers pass by.

2—2

20 On Statutes, Decrees, Long Usage [book i

7 MoDESTraus {Rules 1) The use of a statute is as follows :
to command, to prohibit^ to permit^ to punish.

8 Ulpiakus {on Sabintu 3) Rules of law are not laid down
with respect to particular individuals, but for general application.

9 The same {an the Edict 16) Nobody questions that the
senate can make law.

10 JuLiANUS {Digest 59) Neither statutes nor decrees of the
senate can possibly be drawn in such terms as to comprehend
every case which will ever arise ; it is enough if they embrace such
as occur very often.

11 The same {ibid. 90) Consequently, when a rule is laid
down in the first instance, a more precise provision has to be
made, either by interpretation or else by direct legislation on the
part of the most excellent Emperor.

12 The same {ibid. 15) It is impossible for every point to
be expressly comprehended in statutes or senatorial decrees;
still if, in any case that arises, the meaning of the enactment is
dear, the presiding magistrate ought to extend the rule to ana-
logous cases to the one expressed and lay down the law
accordingly.

13 Ulpiakus {on the Edict of the Curtde MdHes 1) For, as
Pedius says, whenever this or that is provided by statute, there is
a fair opening for any further rule which involves the same bene-
ficial principle being supplied, either by interpreting the statute in
that sense or, at any rate, by the ruling of the presiding magistrate
{jfwrisdictio).

14 Paulus {on the Edict 54) But where a rule has obtained
force which is against legal principle, no analogous extension thereof
should be made.

16 JuLiANUS {Digest 27) In cases where anything has been
laid down which is against legal principle, we cannot follow the
rule of law [so laid down].

16 Paulus (Spedal law) Special law (jus singulare) is law
which contradicts the ordinary course of legal principle, but has
been introdaoed for the sake of aome particairbLeficbl operation
in virtue of the authority of those who laid it down.

17 Celsus {Digest 26) To know the statutes does not mean
to have got hold of the actual words, but to be acquainted with
their sense and application.

TIT. m] On Statutes^ Decrees, Long Usage 21

18 The same {ibid. 29) Statutes ought to be interpreted
indulgentlyy so as to preserve the intention.

19 The same (Und. 33) Where a word in a statute is obscure,
the meaning which ought rather to be adopted is the one which
inyolves no absurdity, especially considering that it is possible by
applying that principle to arrive at the intention of the statute.

20 JuLiANUS (Digest 55) It is impossible to assign the prin-
ciple of every rule of law laid down by our fore&thers ;

21 Neratitjs {PoTchmewtB 6) consequently the reasons for the
law laid down ought not to be inquired into ; or else a great many
rules already established will be upset

22 UiiPiANUS (on the Edict 35) Where a statute gives an
exemption in respect of what is past^ it maintains the prohibition
for the futura

23 Paulus {on Plautiua 4) Where a particular interpretation
has always been received, there ought to be no change made.

24 Celsus {Digest 9) It is not like a lawyer to take hold of one
particular portion of a statute and found a judgment or opinion
upon it without examining the whole statute.

26 MoDESTiNUS {Responsa 8) It is inconsistent with all prin-
ciples of law and with all rules of indulgent construction founded on
juistice that where any provision is happily introduced for the
benefit of mankind, we should interpret it so harshly as to make it
an aulhority for severe dealing to the prejudice of those for whose
sake it was devised.

26 Paulxts {Questions 4) There is nothing new in earlier statutes
being made use of in interpreting later ones.

27 Tebtullianxjs {Questions 1) It being the case that the older
statutes are usually made use of for interpreting the newer, it
ought always to be understood that it is, so to speak, of the essence
of a statute that it should be applicable to any persons or things
which may at any time be similar to those specified.

28 Patjltjs {on the lex Julia et Papia 5) But in like manner the
later statutes are relevant for interpreting the earlier, unless they
contradict them, as may be shown in a number of cases.

29 The same {on the lex Ci/nda) A man who does what a statute
forbids transgresses the statute; a man who contravenes the
intention of a statute, without disobeying the actual words, commits
a fraud on it

22 On Statutes, Decrees, Long Usage [book i

SO UiiPiAiirxjs (on the Edie^ 4) A fraud is committed on a
statute when something is done which the statute desired should
not be done, but did not actually forbid ; the difference between
fraud on the law and transgression of it is the same as that between
speech and mtention.

31 The same {on the kx Julia et Papia 13) The Emperor is
not bound by statutes. The Empress no doubt is bound, at the
same time the Emperor generally gives her the same ezceptioDal
rights as he eigoys himself.

32 JuLiANUS {Digest 84) In any kinds of cases in which
there are no written laws the rule which ought to be observed
is that which has come to prevail by use and custom; and
should there in any case be no such rule assignable, then what
comes nearest and answers to one ; if even this cannot be found,
then we ought to go by the law in use in the city of Roma
1. Immemorial custom is observed as a statute, not unreason-
ably; and this is what is called the law established by usage.
Indeed, inasmuch as statutes themselves are binding for no other
reason than because they are accepted by the judgment of the
peojde, so anything whatever which the people show their approval
of, even where there is no written rule, ought properly to be equally
binding on all ; what diiference does it make whether the people
declare their will by their votes, or by positive acts and conduct ?
On this principle it is also admitted law, and very rightly so, that
statutes are abrogated not only by the voice of one who moves to
repeal them {mffragio legislatoris), but also by the feet of their
falling out of use by common consent.

33 Ulpianus {on the office of Proconsul 1) It is the practice
for custom of long standing to be observed for law and statute in
all such matters as are not regulated by written rules.

34 The same {ibid. 4) Where anyone is found to be confident
as to the custom of a dty or province, I am of opinion that a
question which ought to be asked first of all is this : Haa the
custom ever been confirmed by a judicial sentence delivered after
objections were heard ?

36 Hermogbnianus {Epitomes of law 1) We may add that
rules of law which have the sanction of long-established custom
and have been kept up for a great number of years, may be treated
as being the subject of a tacit agreement on the part of the citizens
in general, and are as fully maintained as those which exist in
writing.

TFT. m] On Statut0$9 Decrees^ Lang Usage 23

36 Paui^us {on Sabinus 7) In feuct eBpecial weight is allowed
to a rale which has met with such approval that it was not
neeessary to embody it in writing.

37 The samb (QtiesHons 1) If a question is raised as to the
interpretation of a statute, we must first inquire what was the rule
of law which the state observed previously in cases of the same
kind ; custom is the best interpreter of statutes.

38 Callistbatus {Queitions 1) In fact the reigning Emperor
Severus laid down that where doubts occur owing to the wording
of a statute, in such a case custom or the authority of constant
dedEdons given to the same kind of effect ought to have the force
of a statute.

39 Celsus (DigeH 23) When some rule has been introduced
which was not arrived at by any legal principle, but was founded
on a mistake and subsequently maintained by mere custom, it is "'
not to be applied to similar cases.

40 MoDESTiNxrs {Rules 1) Accordingly all rules were either
made through agreement or established by necessity or fixed by
custom.

41 Ulpianus {Institutes 2) Now all law is concerned with
^acquisition or preservation or restriction of right, as what is in
question is either how a thing becomes a mau*s property or how a
man can preserve some thing or right which he already has, or how
he can transfer it to some one else or cease to have it.

IV.
Ok Impbbial Enactments.

1 UiiPiANUS (In^Uutes 1) What the Emperor has deter*
mined has the force of a statute ; seeing that^ by a 2e^ regia which
was passed on the sulgect of his sovereignty, the peo^de transfer
to him and confer upon him the whole of their own sovereignty
and power. 1. Accordingly whatever the Emperor has laid down
by a letter with his signature, or has decreed on judicial investiga-
tion^ or has pronounced out of courts or enacted by an edict,
amounts beyond question to a statute. The above are cases of
what are commonly called constitutions. 2. No doubt some of

1 Read ccmnttU for eamHiU.

24 On Imperial Encustments [book i

these are of special application, and are not drawn into a pre-
cedent ; wherever the Emperor shows indulgence to anyone on the
ground of his merits, or imposes a penalty on anyone, or gives
him relief in a way not practised theretofore, this applies only to
the particular person.

2 Ulpianxjs {Fideicamfnissa 4) Where any new ordinance
is made, there ought to be a very clear case of beneficial
operation to allow of a departure from the law which has been
held just for a long time past

3 Javolenus {Epistles 13) An indulgence vouchsafed by the
Emperor, which proceeds in &ct from his divine clemency, ought
to receive the most extensive construction possible.

4 MoBESTiNUS (Excuses 2) Later enactments have more force
in law than those which precede them.

V.

On Status.

Gaius {Institutes 1) All law in force amongst us deals with
either persons, or things, or actions.

Hebmogeniakus (Epitomes of law 1). Seeing then that all
law has been established for the sake of mankind, we will discuss
first personal status, and then the remaining subjects, following
the arrangement of the Edictmn perpetuvm^ and joining to the
above the titles next in order and connected therewith, so far as
the nature of the subject allows.

Gaius (Institutes 1) Now the main division of the law of
persons is this, that all human beings are either free or slaves.

FLORENTmus (Institutes 9) Liberty is the natural power
of doing what anyone is disposed to do, save so fietr as a person is
prevented by force or by law. 1. Slavery is a creation of the jvs
^en^itmi, by which a man is subjected, contrary to nature, to ownership
on the part of another. 2. Slaves are called servi because military
commanders commonly sell their captives and so preserve them
instead of killing them ; 3. they are called numcipia, because they
are taken by the hands of their enemies.

Marcianus (Institutes 1) Now all slaves have one and
the same legal condition ; of fi*ee men some are ingenui, some are
Ubertini. 1. Slaves become subjects of ownership either by the

TIT. v] On Status 26

dTil law or by the jfus ge/nJtium ; by the civil law, a man over
twenty years of age becomeB a slave by allowing himself to be sold in
order to have a share in the purchase-money ; by the jfm gentium^
people own as slaves those who are captured from their enemies or
who are bom from their female slaves. 2. Persons are mgenui
who are bom of a free mother ; it is enough that the mother should
be free at the moment when the child is bom, though she should
have been a slave at the time of conception. Even in the converse
case, where she is free at conception, but a slave at the time of the
birth, the law is that the child is bom free ; and it matters not
whether the mother conceived in lawful wedlock or in random
intercourse; the mother's ill fortune ought not to prejudice the
unborn child. 3. Hence arose this question : — if a slavewoman is
manumitted, being with child at the time, and after that is reduced
to slavery again, or sent into banishment, and then gives birth to a
child, is the child free or a slave ? However, the view which has
found deserved favour is that the child is bom free, and that it is
sufficient for the unborn child that the mother was free at some time
or other during the period of pregnancy.

6 Gaius (Institutes 1) Idbertini are those who have been
manumitted out of lawful slavery.

7 Paulus (on the portions oMowed to children of condemned
persons). An unborn child is taken care of just as much as if it
were in existence, in any case in which the child's own advantage
comes in question ; though no one else can derive any benefit
through the child before its birth.

8 Papdoai^us (Questions 3) The Emperor Titus Antoninus
laid down that the position of children is not prejudiced by the
terms of a badly dravm instrument

9 The same (Und. 31) There are many points in our law in
respect of which women are in a worse legal position than men.

10 Ulpiakxjs (on Scdmrns 1) The question has been asked : —
according to which sex are hermaphrodites to be treated ? but I
should say on the whole that they ought to be treated as having
the sex which predominates in them.

11 Paulus (Responsa 18) Paulus gave the opinion that where
a boy was conceived in the lifetime of the fietther [of his mother], but
without such father being aware of the connexion formed by his
daughter, then, even though the boy should be bom after the death
of such grand&ther, he is not to be held to be the lawful son of the
man who begot him.

26 On Status [book i

12 The same (ibid. 19) It is now generally admitted on the
authority of the very learned physician Hippocrates that a com-
pletely formed child may be bom in seven months (s^fHtno
menae) ; it may be therefore held that a boy who is bom in lawful
marriage in seven months is a lawful son.

13 Hermooeniaxus {Epitomes of law 1) Where a slave is
given up by his owner to the fortune of a trial at law in a capital
case, though he should be acquitted^ he does not become free.

14 Paulus (Sentences 4) We cannot apply the word * chil-
dren' [liberi] to offipring which is bom &shioned in some way
which is contrary to the normal form of the human species ; for
instance^ where a woman is delivered of something monstrous or
portentous. But any offspring which exceeds the natural number
of limbs used by man may in a sense be said to be fully formed,
and will therefore be reckoned among children.

16 Tbtphoninus (Controversies 10) A testator ordered that
Arescusa should be free if she bore three children. On her first
delivery she had one child, on her second three children. The
question was asked whether any of the children were bom free,
and, if any, which. [Answer] The condition on which freedom is
to turn in this case is one which the woman has to fulfil ; but there
can be no doubt that the child last bom is bom free. Nature does
not allow that two children should issue from their mother's womb
at the same time by one movement, and thus that the order of
birth should be uncertain, and it should not be clearly apparent
which of two children is bom a slave and which free. Accordingly,
the condition being fulfilled at the moment when the [last] delivery
begins, the result is that the child thereupon bom is the child of
a free woman ; just as if any other condition on which the freedom
of the woman was to turn had been fulfilled at the moment when
she was delivered ; or suppose, for instance, she had been manu-
mitted on condition that she gave ten thousand to the heir of the
testator, or to Titius, and at the mom^it of her delivery she ful-
filled the condition by an agent ; in that case it would have to be
held that she was already a free woman when she gave birth to
the child.

16 Ulpianus (Controversies 6) The same would follow if
Arescusa in the case mentioned first bore two, and then brought
forth twins : the rule to lay down is that it cannot be said that
both the twins are bom free, but only that the one bom last is
free. The tmth is it is rather a question of fact than of law.

TIT. v] On Status 27

17 Thb SiiME {on the Edict 22) By an enactment of the
Emperor AntCNoinus all those living in the Roman world were
made Roman dtiflens.

18 Ths same {on Sabmus 27) The Emperor Hadrian laid down
in a rescript to Pnblicius Marcellus that if a free woman were con-
demned to the extreme penalty^ being with child at the tune, her
child would be bom free, and that the custom was to keep the
woman until she was delivered of the child. We may add^ that if
a woman, after conceiving in lawful wedlock, is forbidden fire and
water, her child is bom a Roman citizen and is under the potestaa
of its father.

19 Celsus (Digest 29) When lawful marriage has taken place,
the children follow the father; the child of random intercourse
follows the mother.

20 Ulpianits (on Sabinus 38) A man who has become a
lunatic is held to retain the same status and rank that he had
before, as well as any magistracy or authority, just as he retains
ownership in his property.

21 MoDESTiNUS (Rules 7) If a free man sells himself for a
slave, and is afterwards manumitted, he does not recover his
original status which he renounced, but takes the condition of a
liberUnus.

22 The same {Besponsa 12) Herennius Modestinus laid down
that if a slavewoman is delivered of a child at a time when, by
the terms of the donation by which she was acquired, she ought
to have been manumitted already, then, seeing that the Imperial
enactment makes her free at once, her child is freebom.

23 The same (Pcmdects 1) The expression ' conceived at ran-
dom ' {mdgo conceptus) is applied to anyone who cannot point out
who is his &ther, or who can, but his fitther is one who cannot be
his fether lawfrdly. Such a one is called ^spurius^ from tnropd
(generation).

24 Ulpiantjs {on Sabinus 27) This is a rule of nature : who-
ever is bom out of lawful wedlock foUows his mother, unless some
special statute provides otherwise.

26 The same {on the lex JvMa et Papia 1) We must take the
term ' ingenuus ' to include one who is judicially pronounced free-
bom, though he should really be a freedman ; what is judicially
decided is deemed to be the fact

^ Read ei after eed. Hal.

28 On Status [book i

26 JuiiiANTJS (Digest 69) Unborn children are in almost every
branch of the civil law regarded as already existing. They are
allowed to take statutable inheritances ; and if a woman with child
is taken prisoner by the enemy, and a child is bom, it comes under
the law of postlimifdtim, moreover it follows the condition of its
fietther or its mother [as the case may be] ; lastly, if a slavewoman
who is with child is stolen, then, although she should be delivered
when in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, the child will be
regarded as stolen good% and consequently ownership in it will
not be acquired by ums. Again, on the same principle, after the
death of a patron, so long as a son of the deceased can possibly be
bom, a freedman is in the same legal position as one whose patron
is living.

27 Ulpianus {fipinions 5). When a man confesses that he is a
freedman, his patron cannot give him freebom status even by
adopting him.

VI.
On Persons md jfmis and dlieni jwris.

Gaius {InstUmtes 1) We next have another division of the
law of persons ; some persons are sm juriSf and some are subject
to the legal authority of others. Let us consider the case of
persons who are subject to the authority of others ; when we see
who such persons are, we shall thereby understand who are mi
jfwris. Let us then take the case of those who are under the
potestas of others. 1. Now slaves are under the potestas of their
owners, and this potestas is part of iSiejus gentium^ in teict we may
observe among all nations alike that slave-owners have the power
of life and death over their slaves, and whatever is acquired
through the slave is acquired to the owner. 2. At the present
day however no persons living under Roman rule are at liberty to
deal cruelly with their slaves to an excessive extent or without
some ground recognised in the statutes, as, by an enactment of the
Divine Antoninus, a man who kills his own slave without due cause
is to be just as much punished as one who kills the slave of
another. Indeed even excessive harshness on the part of slave-
owners is restrained by an enactment of the same Emperor.

TIT. Yi] Persons sai juris and alieni juris 29

2 UiiPiAiajs (an the office of Proconsul 8) If an owner

treat his slaves with cruelty or compel them to commit lewdness
or submit to indecent outrage^ the proper course for the Prseses to
take may be plainly seen from the rescript of the Divine Pius to
iElius MarcianuSy the Proconsul of Baetica. The words of the
rescript are as follows: '^The power which owners have over
their slaves ought not to be interfered with, and no human being
ought to be debarred from exercising his legal rights ; still it is
in the interest of owners themselves that slaves who make just
complaint should not be refused aid against violence or starvation
or any insufferable wrong. You must therefore listen to the
complaint of those slaves of the household of Julius Sabinus who
fled for refuge to the statue, and if you find that they have been
treated with improper severity or subjected to infamous wrong,
order them to be sold on terms which shall secure that they shall
not be brought back into the hands of their present owner ; and
should such owner endeavour to evade my enactment, let him
understand that I will visit his behaviour very severely." Moreover
the Divine Hadrian relegated one Umbricia^ a lady of good sodal
position {matrona), for five years, for treating her female slaves
with extreme cruelty on very trivial grounds.

8 Gaius (InstittUes 1) Again, a man has under his potestas
any children that he has begotten in lawful wedlock : this rule of
law is peculiar to Roman citizens.

4 Ulpianus (Institutes 1) A Roman citizen may be a

patefrfamilias or a JUiurfamilias or a materfamiUas or a JUior
fa/mxli43a. A palerfamilkis is a man who is in his own potestas,
whether of mature age or not ; a similar definition applies to a
materfamilias ; a JUiusfcmdlias or JUicifcmdliM is under the
potestas of some one else. A child who is bom from the union of
me and my wife is under my potestas ; and one who is bom from
the union of my son and his wife, in other words, my grandson or
granddaughter, is equally under my potestas, so is my great-
grandson or great-granddaughter, and so on of more remote
descendants.

6 The same {on Sabinus 36) Grandsons through a son on the
death of the grandfieither regularly come under the potestM of the
son, that is, of their own lather : similarly great-grandchildren and
remoter descendants either come under tiie potestas^ of the son, if
he is living and has remained in the fiunily, or else under that of

^ KetuA poteitatem for pote9tate. Hal.

30 On PerMns 8ui juris [book i

Bome ascendant who preceded them in the group snbject to patestiM.
This rule applies not only where the children are such by nature
but where they are adopted.

6 The samb (ibid. 9) The definition of ' son ' (JUius) is
^ the male child of a man and his wife.' If however we suppose a
case where a husband was absent, let us say, for ten years, and, on
coming home, found in his house a child one year old, we agree
with the opinion of Julianus that the child is not [to be deemed in
law] the son of the husband. Still, according to the same writer, a
man is not to be listened to who, after constantly living with his
wife, refuses to acknowledge her son, as not being his own. I should
say however, and this is the opinion of ScsBvola, that if it is shown
that the husband passed an interval of time without knowledge of
his wife, owing to bodily infirmity or any other reason, or a pater-
familias was for physical reasons unable to beget children, then a
child bom in the house, though the &ct of birth was known to the
neighbours, is not [to be deemed in law] the son of the husband.

7 The same (ibid. 25) There is no doubt that a grandson
steps into the place of a son where his [La such grandson's]
father is visited with some punishment which causes him to lose
his citizenship or become a penal slave.

•

8 The same (ibid. 26) If the father is a lunatic, his children
remain none the less under their father's potestot8\ the same
rule applies to any paterfamilicLS who has children under his
potestas. The right of potestas was established by custom, and a
man cannot cease to have persons under his potestas except by the
occurrence of the regular circumstances by which children become
free, consequently there can be no admissible doubt that in the
above case the children remain subject to potestas. Accordingly,
he will have in his potestas not only those duldren whom he begot
before his lunacy began, but also such, if there be any, as were
conceived when he was sane, but were born after he became a
lunatic. Indeed if his wife should conceive at a time when he is a
lunatic, it is a feir question whether his child will not come under
his potestas by birth ; a lunatic, it is true, cannot contract a
marriage, but he can remain a party to a marriage already
contracted ; and this being the case, [it follows that] his son will
be under his potestas. Similarly, if the wife is a lunatic, a child
which she may have conceived previously will be bom in [the
husband's] potestas ; and if it be conceived when she is a lunatic,
but the husband is sane, there is no doubt that it will be bom

TIT. Yi] and atieni juris 31

under patestaSy since the marriage remains good. We may add
that if both husband and wife are lunatics, and, that being the
case, the wife conceiyes, the child will be bom under the potestas
of its &tiier, some remnant of intention being assumed to remain
in the parties in spite of their lunacy ; since the marriage holds
good where one party is a lunatic, it will do so equally where both
are in that condition. I. So true is it that a &ther who is a
lunatic retains the ri^t of poteskuif that in fact the benefit of
anything which the son gains is acquired by the father.

9 POMPOKITTS (em Quintus Mucius 16) A JUiua/amilias is in
matters of pubUc law on the same footing as a paterfamilias ; so
that he is able, for example, to discharge the office of magistrate,
or to be appointed a guardian.

10 Ulpiajojs (on the lex JtUia et Papia 4) If the Court
should declare that a child is to be reared or maintained, it must
be held that inquiry is open on the question of fietct whether the
diild is or is not a lawful son ; a decision as to maintenance is not
allowed to prejudge the above question of fiact

11 MoDESTiNUS {Pandects 1) Natural or emancipated children
cannot be brought under patria potestas against their will.

VIL
CoNOERNrao Adoptions and Emancipations and other

METHODS BY WHICH potestOS IS DISSOLVED.

1 MoDESTiNtrs (Rules 2) The position of JUiutfamilias is
acquired not only by nature but by adoption. 1. The word
adoption is a general term, and embraces two kinds of cases, of
which one is again called adoption, the other arrogation. Adoption
is of 9i filiurfamiKaSy arrogation of one who is sui juris,

2 GAins (InstvbuJies 1) Now adoption, in the comprehensive
sense of the word, is performed in two ways, that is, either by
the authority of the Emperor or by the order of a magistrate. By
the authority of the Eknperor a man adopts such as are mi jfwris ;
which kind of adoption is called arrogation, because the person
adopted is asked, that is, interroj^a^, whether he desires that
the prison whom he is intending to adopt should become his
lawftd son, and the person who is being adopted is asked whether
he is wil^g that this should take place. A man adopts by

32 Adoptions and Emancipations [book i

order of a magistrate persons who are under the potestas of a
paterfamilias, whether they are issue in the first generation, as
sons or daughters, or in a lower generation, as grandsons or grand-
daughters, great-grandsons or great-granddaughters. L One rule
applies equally to both kinds of adoption, Tiz. that men who are
incapable of begetting children, such as those who are impotent,
are able to adopt. 2. But the following rule applies only to the
kind of adoption which requires application to the Emperor, viz.
that if a man who has children under his potestas allows himself to
be arrogated, not only is he brought under the potestas of the
arrogator himself, but his children too come under the potestas of
the same person, so as to be, as it were, that person's grand-
children.

3 Paxtlus (an Sabinus 4) Where a consul or the governor of
a province is a JUitL^OffnMias, it is recognised law that he can be
emancipated or given m adoption in his own court

4 MoDBSTiNUS {Rules 2) It is held by Neratius that any
magistrate who can take legis aetiones can emancipate his children
or give them in adoption in his own court

6 Celsus {Digest 28) In case of adoption it is only persons
who are sui jwris whose consent is asked ; but where children are
given in adoption by their father, the will of both parties has to be
considered, [which may be made known] by express consent or by
the &ct of no objection being made.

6 Paulus (on the Edict 35) When anyone is adopted for
grandson as through a particular son, the son's own consent is
required ; this is said by Julianus himself.

7 Celsus (Digest 39) There is no need, in case of an adoption,
for concurrence on the part of those with whom the person to be
adopted will come into agnatic connexion.

8 MoDESTiNUS (RtUes 2) The rule once in force that in a case
of arrogation the concurrence of a curator should not be inter-
posed has been very properly altered by the Divine Claudius.

9 Ulpianus (on Sabinus 1) Even a blind man can adopt or
be adopted.

10 Paulus (on Satmms 2) If a man who has a son in his
potestas should, with the consent of that son, adopt anyone into
the position of grandson through that son, this will not make the
party adopted sfiius heres to his [adoptive] grand&ther, seeing that
if the grand&ther dies, he falls into the potestas of the person who
is, so to speak, his fether.

TTT. Yn] Adoptions and JEmandpcUions 33

11 The aAMDB {Und. 4) If a man who has a son should adopt
some one into the position of grandson, as though he were
the son of that son, but the son himself has not concurred in the
adoption ; then, on the death of the [adoptive] grandfother, such
grandson wiU not be under the potestas of the son.

12 TTlpiakits {on 8aJbinus 14) When a man has been set free
from patria potestas^ he cannot afterwards come again under
potestas in any creditable way, save by adoption.

13 Papikianus {Qtiestions 36) In almost every legal aspect of
the case, when the potestas of an adoptive father is terminated,
there is no trace left of the preceding state of things ; in short
the very dignity of father acquired by adoption is laid aside when
the relation is ended.

14 PoMPONius (on Sabinvs 5) Even a grandson through a[n
adopted] son, though conceived and bom in the household of the
father of such adopted soh^ loses his whole legal position on
emancipation.

16 Ulpiae^us (on Sahinus 26) When a paterfamUias is
adopted, everything which belongs to him and all his rights of
acquisition pass tacitly to the person who adopts him ; in addition
to this, any children who are in his potestas go with him, moreover
such children as subsequently return under the law of postliminium,
or were conceived but unborn at the moment of arrogation, will
equally come under the potestas of the party arrogating. 1. If a
man has two sons and a grandson through one of the two, and he
wishes to adopt his grandson so as to put him on the footing of son
of the other son, he can do so by first emancipating him and then
readopting him as son to such other son. In &ct he does this last
just as if he were any stranger, and not as grandfather, and, on
whatever principle he could adopt a person whom he treated as
the son of a stranger, on the same principle he can adopt one
whom he treats as the son of his own other son. 2. In a case of
arrogation one point to inquire into is whether the party arrogating
chances to be under sixty years of age, because, if he is, he ought
rather to think of begetting children ; unless it so happen that
there is some disease or infirmity in the case, or there is some other
good ground for an arrogation, as, for example, where he wishes to
adopt a person with whom he is connected. 3. Moreover a man
ought not to arrogate more than one person without lawful cause,

^ Read adopt€Ui for adoptatum. Cf. M.
M. J. 3

34 Adoptions and Emaneipaiions [book

nor some one else's freedman, nor a person who is older than
hunself ;

16 Javolenus {extracts from Camus 6) as the adoptive re-
lation is only allowed between those persons between whom the
natural relation might by possibility have existed.

17 Ulpianus {on Sabinns 26) A man is not allowed to arrogate
a person to whom he has been an acting guardian or curator, so
long as the person whom it is proposed to arrogate is under
twenty-fire, (because otherwise his object in arrogating him might
be to avoid submitting his accounts. Moreover there ought to be
an inquiry as to whether or not the case is one in which the
arrogation is desired on some dishonourable ground. 1. ^Only
those children under the age of puberty are allowed to be
arrogated in whose case the reason for the arrogation is either
blood-relationship or some perfectly genuine affection, in all other
cases leave must be refused, lest it should be in the power of the
guardians to put an end to the guardianship, and at the same time
to bring to nothing a testamentary substitution which may have
been made by the father of the ward. 2. Accordingly an estimate
must be made first of the ward's means and also of the means of
the person who proposes to adopt him, in order to ascertain by
comparison of the two whether the adoption can be considered
beneficial to the ward ; next an inquiry must be made into the
manner of life of the man who wishes to make the ward a member
of his family ; thirdly, as to his age, so as to ascertain whether it
would not be better for him to think about begetting children for
himself, rather than bringing some one under his potestas who is
taken from another man's fomily. 3. It should further be con-
sidered whether, when a man has one or more children of his own,
he ought to be allowed to acquire another by adoption ; as the
result might be that either those children whom he begot in
lawful wedlock would have a worse prospect of the kind which all
children acquire who are dutiful to their parents, or the ward
himself so adopted would gain less by the adoption than he ought
under the circumstances to get. 4. Sometimes a yoorer person
will even be allowed to adopt a richer, if he is clearly a man of
frugal habits, and his motives are honourable and well-known to
be such. 5. However it is the practice in such cases for security
to be given.

^ The passage seems corrupt: the sense most be as above. Read his for
eorum^ ceterii for ceterorum^ and delete hi$ where it occurs.

TIT. yn] Adoptions and Emancipations 86

18 Mabcbllus {Digest 26) In iact, when a man wishes to
arrogate a ward, if he establishes a good case for it in other
respects, his application should only be granted on the terms of
his giving an undertaking to a government slave that he will make
over any property of the ward's that comes to his hands to those
persons to whom such property would have gone if the ward so
arrogated had remained as he was.

19 ULPIANT7S {on Sabinns 26) It is beyond doubt that, in the
form of the undertaking which the arrogator has to give, where
there occur the words ^' those who have a right thereto," this
reference includes the case of any manumissions which are con-
tained in the secondary testament, and most especially that of a
slave being made substitutional heir, also the case of legatees.
1. If the arrogator should fail to give the security in question, an
fUiUs actio is allowed against him.

20 Mabcellus (Digest 26) This undertaking comes into force
where the ward dies under age. It may be observed that the law
speaks of a male ward, but the same practice has to be observed in
the case of a girl ;

21 Gaius {Rules) as females may be arrogated by imperial
rescript as well as males.

22 IJLPiAiaJS {on Sabinus 26) If an arrogator dies leaving an
adopted son who is under age, and soon after that this latter
himself dies, will the iieirs of the arrogator be liable to the action ?
The proper answer is that the heirs will be equally bound to hand
over the property of the adopted son, and the quarter in addition.
1. Here the question has been asked whether the arrogator can
appoint a substitutional heir to the adopted son under age ; but I
am of opinion that such a substitution is not allowed, unless it be
simply in respect of the quarter which he gets of the arrogator's
property, and the substitution must turn on an earlier event
than that of the adopted son reaching the age of puberty. But
if he should leave the property in question to the adopted son
upon trust to hand it over at some date chosen at large, such
a trust ought not to be admitted, because the quarter does
not come to the son by an exercise of the testator's will, but
by the Emperor's provision. 2. All the above applies equally
whether a man arrogates a boy under age as a son or as a
grandson.

3—2

36 Adoptiona cmd Bmaneipcaiom [book i

23 Paitlus (an the Edict 35) When a person is given in
adoption, he becomes cognate to every one to whom he becomes
agnate, and he does not become cognate to any one to whom he
does not become agnate ; adoption does not create the tie of blood,
bat the tie of agnation. Hence, if I adopt a son, my wife is not in
the place of mother to him ; he does not become agnate to her,
consequently she does not become cognate to him; again, my
mother is not in the place of grandmother to him, as he does not
become agnate to those who are outside my family ; but any male
whom I adopt [as a wm] does become brother to my daughter, as
my daughter is in my fomily : and of course the two are not allowed
to marry.

24 UiiPiAKtrs (Controversies 1) No one can be arrogated in his
absence or without his own consent

26 The same (Opinions 5) On the death of a daughter who
has been living as an independent woman as if in consequence of a
lawful emancipation, and who before her decease appointed heirs
by testament, the fitther is not allowed to take proceedings calling
in question the validity of his own act, on the alleged ground that
the emancipation was not made according to law nor in the
presence of witnesses. 1. A man cannot adopt or arrogate any
one without being present, nor can he execute the required
formalities by an agent

26 JuLiANirs (Digest 70) A person whom my emancipated son
adopts will not thereby become my grandson.

27 The same {ibid. 85) According to the dvil law the son of
an adopted son acquires the same position as if he were himself
adopted.

28 Gaitjs (Institutes 1) Any one who has in his potestds a son
and a grandson through that son is at full liberty to dismiss the
son from his potestas and retain the grandson ; or, conversely, to
retain the son in his potestas, and emancipate the grandson ; or to
make both sui juris : similar rules must be held to apply in the
case of a great-grandson.

29 Callistratus (Institutes 2) Where a natural fieither is
unable to speak, but is able to make plain by some other method
than speech that he desires to give his son in adoption; the
adoption is as fully upheld as if it had been effected with proper
legal formality.

TTT. vn] Adoptions and Emcme^^aUons 87

80 ' Paulus {Rules 1) Even a man who has no wife can adopt
a son.

81 Marcianus {Rvles 6) No son who is in the potestas of a
father, whether by nature or adoption, can in any way compel his
father to let him be free from potestas.

32 Papinianus {Questions 31) In some cases, however, where
a boy under age has been adopted, he has a right to be heard, if,
on arriving at full age, he desires to be emancipated, and the judge
will have to decide after hearing the casa (1. The Emperor
Titus Antoninus laid down that where a man is guardian to his
stepson he must be allowed to adopt him.)

38 Mabciaihts {Rules 5) And if, on arriving at the age of
puberty, the boy can show that it was not to his advantage that
he should be brought under the party's potestas^ the just course is
that he should be emancipated by his adoptive father, and so
recover his original legal position.

34 Paulus {Questions 11) The following question has been
raised. If a son is given you in adoption on the understanding
that after, say, three years you will give the same son in adoption
to me, is there any right of action s^ainst you ? As to this, ikbeo
holds there is no right of action ; as it is not in accordance with
our customs that a man should have a son for a prescribed time.

86 The same {Responsa 1) The operation of an adoption is not
to lower a person's station, but to raise it Consequently, even
where a senator is adopted by a plebeian, he remains a senator ;
in the same way a man will remain the son of a senator.

86 The same {ibid, 18) It is recognised that a son can be
emancipated by his father in any place whatever, so as thereupon
to be freed from patria potestas. 1. The law is that the act of
manumitting or of giving in adoption can be executed before a
proconsul, even in a province which has not been allotted to the
proconsul in question.

87 The same {Sentences 2) A man can adopt a person as
grandson even when he has no son. 1. When a man has once
adopted any one, then, if he should emancipate him or give him in
adoption, he cannot adopt him again.

88 Marcellus {Digest 26) An adoption not made in proper
legal form can be made good by the Emperor ;

39 Ulpiakus {on the office of Consul 3) this appears by the
following rescript of the Divine Mareus to Eutychianus : — * The

88 Adoptions and BfMmeipatums [book i

judges will consider whether your application ought to be granted
after hearing the parties who have objections to make, that is to
say, those who would suffer if the adoption were confirmed.'

40 MoDESTiKXJS (Differences 1) On the arrogation of a pater-
familias the children who were under his potestas become grand-
children to the arrogator, and fall under his potestas along with
their own &ther. The same result does not take place in an
adoption [in the narrower sense of the word] ; the children of one
who is [so] adopted remain under the potestas of their natural
grandfather. 1. Both where a man adopts, and also where he
arrogates, he ought to be older than the person whom he makes
his son by adoption or arrogation, and that by the period of full
puberty ; in other words, he ought to be in advance of the age of
the other by eighteen years. 2. One who is impotent can by
arrogation acquire for himself a suns heres ; his physical defect is
no obstacle.

41 The same {Rtdes 2) If a man who has in his potestas a
grandson through a son emancipates his son, and after that adopts
him again, on his death the grandson does not come under the
potestas of his father. Similarly the grandson does not come under
the potestas of his &ther [on his grandfather's death], where his
grandfather keeps him under potestas on giving his son in adoption
and subsequentiy readopts the son.

42 The same (Pandects 1) Even an infant can be given in
adoption.

43 PoMPONius {on Qvmtus Mucius 20) Persons may be adopted
not only for sons but even for grandsons, so as to cause whoever is
adopted to be deemed in law a grandson through a son, and not
even necessarily any particular son.

44 Pboculus [EpisUes 8) If a man who has a grandson through
a son adopts some other person into the position of grandson
[simply], I should say that on the death of the grandfather there
will be no legal tie of consanguinity between the grandsons. But
if he adopts him in such form' as to make him as much his grand-
son by law and statute as if he had been bom the son, say, of
Lucius the adopting party's son and of Ludus's lawful wife, I should
hold the contrary ^

45 Paxjlus {on the lex Jtdia et Papia 3) The legal obligations
of a person who is given in adoption pass to the adoptive father.

^ Read, for tU etiam..,qtumy ttti tarn jure lege nepoe tutu eeeet quam n. Ct
M. and AuL GelL 5. 10. 9.

TIT. yn] Adcfptions and Emancipations 39

46 UiiPiAinjs (an Oie lex Jidia et Papia 4).' A son begotten
by me when I was in a condition of alayery may be brought under
my pote^as by the &your of the Emperor : but there is no doubt
that such a son will still be of libertine status.

VIII.
On the Divisiok of Things and their resfbctive natxjbe&

1 Qaius (InstUuies 2) The main division of things ranges
them under two heads ; some things being subjects of divine law,
some of human. Subjects of divine law, for instance, are things
sacred and religious. Things under a sanction (res aanctce), more-
over, as for example, walls and gates, are to a certain extent
subjects of divine law. A thing which is of divine law is no man's
property ; but a thing which is of human law is for the most part
the property of some one or other; still it is possible that it should
be no man's property, we know that things comprised in an
inheritance, until some one becomes heir, are no man's property.
Such things as are subjects of human law are either public or
privata Things that are public are held to be no man's property,
they are in fact regarded as belonging to the whole community ;
things are private that are the property of individuals. 1. Again,
some things are corporeal, some incorporeal Corporeal are such
as can be handled, for instance, land, slaves, raiment, gold, silver,
and innumerable things besides ; incorporeal are those that cannot
be handled, of which nature are such as consist of a rights for
instance, an inheritance, a usufruct, an obligational claim, however
acquired. It is beside the purpose to say that there are corporeal
things contained in an inheritance ; as it is equally true that
produce which is taken from land [in exercise of a usufruct] is
corporeal, and anything owing to a man in pursuance of an obli-
gation is for the most part corporeal, such as land, or a slave, or
money ; still the bare right of succession to an inheritance and the
right of usufruct and the right involved in an obligational claim
are all incorporeal. To the same class also belong rights attached
to urban and rustic tenements, or, as they are also called, servitudes.

2 MASCIANT7S {IngtiiiUes 3) Some things are by natural
law common to all, some belong to a community {tmiversitM),
some to nobody, most things belong to individuals; and they

i

42 On the Division of Things [book i

it be not consecrated to God, and sometimes it is added in the
terms of the sanction itself that whosoever offends in respect of
the object in question shall be capitally punished. 4 The wails of
a municipal town are not even allowed to be repaired without the
authority of the Emperor or the Prseses, nor may anything be
united to them or laid upon them, save on the same condition*
5. A sacred thing cannot have a money value put upon it

10 PoMPONitrs (Extracts from PlavMus 6) According to Aristo,
just as anything built into the sea becomes private property, so
anything over which the sea encroaches becomes public.

11 PoMPONius {Various parages 2) If any one trespasses on
the walls, he suffers capital punishment ; for example, if he climbs
over them by the use of ladders, or by any other means : citizens
of Rome are only allowed to leave the city by passing through the
gates ; taking any other way is the act of an enemy, and of evU
omen. In fact Remus, the brother of Romulus, was put to death,
so tradition says, because he desired to climb over the wall

IX.

CONOEBNING SENATORS.

1 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 62) All agree that a man of consular
rank always takes precedence of a woman of consular rank. But
it is a point to consider whether a man of prsefectorian rank takes
precedence of a woman of consular rank. I should hold that he
does, because the male sex deserves the greater honour. 1. By
a woman of consular rank is meant the wife of a man of consular
rank ; or, as Satuminus adds, even the mother ; but for this last
there is no express authority and it has never been admitted in
practice.

2 Maeicellus {Digest 3) Cassius Longinus holds that when
a man has been removed firom the senate for disgraceful conduct,
and has not been reinstated, he ought not to be allowed to sit as
judge^ nor to appear as a witness ; since this is against the Ux
Julia on extortion.

3 MoDESTiNUS {RtUes 6) A senator who is removed from the
senate does not thereby suffer capitis diminutio, indeed the Divine
Severus and Antoninus allowed him to live in Rome.

TIT. ix] Coneernmg Senators 43

4 PoMPONius {Various passages 12) When a man is un-
worthy of the lower rank he is still more unworthy of the
higher.

6 Ulpianus {on the lex Julia et Papia 1) By the expression
' son of a senator ' we must understand not only one who is son in
the course of nature, but an adopted son as well ; nor will it make
any difference who it is that he was adopted from, nor what was
the manner of his adoption. Nor is it material whether the party
adopting was already of senatorial rank at the time of the adoption
or only attained to that rank afterwards.

6 Paulus {on the lex Julia et Papia 2) The expression
' son of a senator ' applies to one whom the senator has adopted,
but only so long as he remams in the senator's fiunily ; if he should
be emancipated, then by the emancipation he loses the name of
son. 1. If the son of a senator is given in adoption by his father
to a man of inferior rank, he is still regarded as being the son of a
senator ; the rank of senator is not lost by an adoption proceeding
from an inferior rank, any more than a similar adoption would
make the party adopted cease to be of consular rank.

7 ULFiAirus {on the lex JvUa et Papia 1) If a man is
emancii>ated by his fether who is a senator, the law is that he
should be treated as if he were the son of a senator. 1. Again,
Labeo lays down that even one who is bom after the death of his
&ther who was a senator is on the footing of son of a senator.
But where a man was conceived and bom {sic) after his &ther was
removed from the senate, then, in the opinion of Proculus and
Pegasus, he is not on the footing of son of a senator ; and in this
they are quite right ;— a man cannot properly be called the son of
a senator where his father was removed from the senate before his
birth. No doubt if he was already conceived, before his father's
removal from the senate, but bom after his &ther's loss of rank,
the better opinion is that he must be regarded as the son of a
senator ; as most authorities hold that it is the time of conception
that has to be considered. 2. If a man's father and grand&ther
were both senators, he is regarded as on the footing both of son of
a senator and grandson of a senator. But if the father lost his
rank before the person in question was conceived, it may be asked
whether he ought not to be regarded as on the footing of grandson
of a senator in spite of the foct that he is not regarded as son; and
the better opinion is that he ought^ so that his grandfitther's rank

44 Concerning SenoUars [book i

is to his advantage rather than his fether's loss of rank to his
disadvantage.

8 The same (Fiddcommissa 6) Women who are married to
men of honourable^ rank (fikmasiim) are included under the term
honourable. Daughters of senators are not comprised under the
expression honourable women [after marriage], except where they
have found honourable husbands ; husbands give honourable rank
to their wives, but parents only do so to their daughters unless
and until the latter marry plebeians; accordingly a [married]
woman is ^' honourable " only when she is the wife of a senator, or
of any honourable man, or, if she has come to be separated from
such a husband, has not married any one else of lower rank.

9 Papiniakus {Reyfxmsa 4) Where the daughter of a senator
affects to marry a freedman, loss of rank on the part of her fiither
does not make her a lawful wife ; as [, conversely,] the rank which
a man has once communicated to his children will not be taken
away by the feet of the father losing his status by removal from
the senate.

10 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 34) By the expression children of
senators we must understand not merely the sons of senators, but
all those persons who are shown to be the children of senators or
of their sons, whether the senators' sons whose children they are
shown to be were sons by nature or by adoption. But where a man
was the child of the daughter of a senator, what we ,have to look at
is the rank of his father.

11 Faulus (on the Edict 41) Though senators are said to have
their domicile in the dty, still they are also regarded as having
their domicile in the place of their birth ; their rank is held rather
to give an additional domicile than to give a new one in place of
the o]d.

12 Ulpianus {on registration 2) Women once married to men
of consular rank may procure leave from the Emperor, though it is
very sparingly given, enarbling them, if they contract subsequent
marriages with men of lower rank, to retain their consular rank all
the while. I know, for instance, that Antoninus Augustus accorded
this privilege to his cousin Julia Mammasa. 1. The term senators
we must understand to imply persons descended from patricians
and consuls or any illustrious [iUvstres] men ; as in fact such
alone have the right to speak in the senate.

^ See Gibbon c 17.

TIT. x] On the office of Consul 45

X.

On the office of Consul.

Ulpianus (an the office of Consul 2) It is the duty of the
consul to appoint a board [consilitmi] for persons who propose to
execute a manumission* 1. Individual consuls can manumit by
themselves ; but no one who enters the names with one consul can
manumit before another; every manumission is confined to the
court of one consul. It is true that it has been laid down by the
senate that if one of two colleagues is for any reason unable to
manumit, because he is hindered by illness or any other sufficient
cause, the other can take the manumission. 2. There is no doubt
that a consul can manumit his own slaves in his own court Should
it however happen that the consul is under twenty years of age, he
cannot manumit in his own court, as he is the very person on
whom the decree of the senate casts the duty of examining the
ground for requiring a board, but he can manumit in the court of
his colleague, if the ground is held to be established.

XL

On the office of Prcefectus Prcstorio.

1 AuBELiTJS Abcadius Chabisius master of the Itbelli {on the
office of Prcefectus Prcetorio) It is requisite to state briefly
what was the history of the original creation of the office of
Prefect to the Pnetorium. We are informed by certain writers
that prefects to the Prsetorium were anciently established in the
place of the Magister Eqaitum ; for whereas, in the days of our
fore&thers, dictators were from time to time entrusted for a
definite period vnth supreme power, and used thereupon to choose
Magisbi EquUum who were joined to them as partners in their
duties in connexion with military matters S and occupied the next
place of authority under them, it came to pass that, when power in
the state was transferred to permanent Emperors, prefects to the
Prsetorium were appointed by the head of the state on the model
of the Maguin Equitum. These officers were entrusted with
ampler powers with a view to the improvement of public discipline.

^ Read ad curat for curof acL Cf. M.

46 On the office of Prsefectus Prsetorio [book i

1. Such being the origin of the authority of the prefects, it sub-
sequently obtained so great an extension that no appeal can be
made from them. In &ct, though it once was a question whether
an appeal from these prefects was admissible, which in strict law it
was, and cases were on record of appeals being made, still, by an
imperial order which was subsequently rehearsed in public, the
right of appeal was taken away, the Emperor being of opinion that
men who were called to the exalted station conferred by this office
in consequence of their special assiduity and upon proof of their
being men of honesty and character, would, considering the wisdom
and enlightenment which went with their rank, pronounce similar
decisions to those which he would have given himself. 2. The
preetorian prefects enjoyed another privilege as well ; minors were
not allowed to get a restitutio in integrum after one of their
judgments in the court of any magistrate who was not a prsetorian
prefect himself

XII.
On the office of Prc^ectue UrbL

Ulpianus {on the office of Prrfect of the City) As declared
in an epistle of the Divine Severus addressed to Fabius Cilo,
prefect of the city, the jurisdiction claimed by that magistrate
embraces all criminal oflfences of every kind, not only such as are
committed within the city, but also [some] which are committed^
in Italy, though without tiie city. 1. Where slaves flee to statues
for refiige, also where they have been bought with their own
money with a view to manumission, the prefect will hear their com-
plaints against their owners. 2. He will also entertain applications
by impecunious patrons who complain of their freedmen, especially
where they allege that they are in ill health and desire that their
freedmen should support them, a He has the power of relegation
and deportation into any island which the Emperor may prescribe.
4. The opening words of the epistle referred to are these: — *as we
have entrusted our dty to your care ' : consequently any ofience
that is committed within the city must be held to be a matter
for the prefect Besides this, any oflTence committed within the

^ Intra Italiam must be incorrect or a clumsy interpolation ; v. subs. 4 : to
help the sense I have inserted *some\

TTT. xn] On the qffiee of Prsefectus Drbi 47

hundredth milestone is a matter for the prefect ; if it is beyond
the milestone, it lies outside his jurisdiction. 5. If a man's
complaint is that his slave has committed adultery with his wife,
the case may be brought before the prefect 6. He may also be
applied to for an interdict quod vi atU dam or unde m\

7. Moreover guardians and curators are brought before the
Prefect of the City where they act corruptly in respect of their
guardianships or curatorships, and the case requires such severe
treatment that it is not adequately met by the infamy consequent
on de »u8p€cto proceedings ; for instance, where it can be shown
that a man got into a guardianship by bribery, or was himself
bribed into taking measures to prevent some ward having a proper
guardian appointed, or that, when called upon to disclose the
amoimt of the property, he deliberately understated it, or that
he disposed of the wiu^'s goods with plainly fraudulent intent

8. With regard to the above statement, that the prefect will
hear complaints by slaves against their owners, we must not
understand this to mean that slaves may bring criminal charges
against their owners, (this a slave is by no means to be allowed to
do, except in certain recognised cases,) what is supposed is that a
slave makes a respectful representation ; slaves may, for example,
bring before the prefect cases of cruelty or harsh treatment or
insufficient sustenance which they have had to suffer, or indecent
assaults to which they are or have been compelled to submit The
Divine Severus imposed this further duty on the Prefect of the
City that he should protect slaves from compulsory prostitution.

9. Furthermore, the prefect will be bound to take measures to
secure that moneychangers conduct themselves honestly in all
branches of their business, and forbear unlawful practices. 10. If
a patron alleges that he is slighted by his freedman, or complains
that his freedman is insolent to him, or that he or^ his children or
his wife has had to put up with abusive language from him, or
makes any similar charge ; the proper course is to apply to the
Prefect of the City, who will punish the freedman according to the
misbehaviour complained of. The usual way of dealing with the
offence is to warn the man or to order him to be beaten, or to
take still stronger measures in the way of punishment ; as a matter
of fact, freedmen are liable to punishment in a great many cases.
There is no doubt that if the patron can show that his freedman
brought a criminal charge against him, or conspired against him

^ Read ant unds vi adiri for unde vi audire. Of. M.
' Read -ve for -qtu. Cf. M.

48 On the office of Prsefectus Urbi [book i

with his personal enemies, be ought even to be condemned to
labour in the mines. 11. The duties attached to the prefed/s
office comprise the supervision of the whole of the meat trade, so
as to enable him to secure that meat shall be supplied at a
reasonable price, accordingly the pigmarket is under this officer's
care ; in &ct the business of a similar supply of cattle and herds
generally is a matter for him to superintend. 12. Further it is
held to be part of the duty of the prefect to see that the public are
unmolested, and to maintain order at public exhibitions ; indeed
he ought to have police {mUites stationa/ru) stationed at various
points in order to secure that the public shall not be disturbed
and to keep himself informed of all that goes on. 13. The prefect
may require any one to keep away from the dty, or from any one
of the regular districts, and forbid him to carry on any business or
profession, or the vocation of pleader or practitioner, either for
a time or altogether; he may even exclude a man from public
exhibitions, and, if he banishes any one fi^m Italy, he can remove
him from his own province as well. 14. The Divine Severus laid
down in a rescript that persons who are alleged to have formed an
illicit association should be prosecuted in the court of the prefect

Paulits {on the office of the Prefect of the City) Application
may be made to this officer, in virtue of an epistle of the Divine
Hadrian, either by or against bankers, and generally in pecuniary
cases.

Ulpianus (on the Edict 2) When the prefect goes beyond
the bounds of the city, his authority is at an end, but he can
appoint a judex outside the bounds.

XIII.
On the office of Qu.£STOR.

Ulpianus (on the office of QwBstor) The original occasion
of creating quaestors is extremely ancient, the office was almost the
earliest magistracy instituted. In fact Gracchanus Junius in his
seventh book entitled 'on Authorities' {de potestatibus)^ tells us that
Romulus and Numa Pompilius themselves had each two quaastors
whom they appointed to the office by taking the vote of the people, and
not by their own selection. And however doubtful it may be whether
there was any qusestor in the reign of Romulus or Numa, still it

TIT. xm] On tiie office of QuoMor 49

k o^iain that such offioera existed duiiDg the reign of Tullus
Hostilius ; indeed the opinion held by most of the old authorities
was that Tullus Hostilius was the first to introduce quaestors into
the administration of the state. 1. We find set down in Junius,
Trebatius and Fenestella that they were originally called qusestors
from the method of their inquisition. 2. Of these quaestors some
had their particular provinces assigned them by lot, in pursuance
of a decree of the senate passed in the consulship of Dedmus
Drusus and Porcina. No doubt the assignment of provinces by lot
was not the practice in the case of all quaestors, as the Emperor's
candidates were excepted ; these have nothing to do but to read
the imperial missive in the senate. 3. At the present day the rule
has come to be that quaestors can be taken indifferently from the
patrician and plebeian orders ; the post amounts to a kind of
commencement and first step in the discharge of public offices and
in exercising the right of voting in the senate. 4 Of these officers
there are some, as already mentioned ^ who got the name of
Emperor's candidates, and who have to read the Emperor's epistles
before the senate.

XIV.
Ok the office of the Pr^ttors.

1 ULPiAiniS {on SabinuB 26) Where the praetor is a JUiu9-
famiiias his &ther can manumit in his court

2 Paulus {on Sabiwus 4) Indeed the law is that he can be
emancipated or given in adoption in his own court

3 Ulpianus {on Sabinvs 38) Barbarius Philippus, being at
the time a runaway slave, was a candidate for the praetorship
at Rome, and became praetor designate. Here, according to
Pomponius, the fact of his being a slave did not stand in his way,
so as to prevent him from being praetor : as a matter of lact, he
did discharge the office. However, let us consider the question.
Suppose a slave has kept his legal position a long time unknown,
and has so discharged the office of praetor, — what are we to say ?
will everything that he enunciated by way of edict or decree be
null and void ? or will it be [upheld] for the sake of those persons
who took proceedings in his court in pursuance, say, of a statute or

^ Read diximus for dicimui. Cf. M.
M.J. 4

A

&0 On ^ office of the Prastarg [book i

on some other legal ground? My own opinion is that nothing would
be set aside, and this is the more indulgent view ; the Roman
people was quite competent to confer the authority in question,
even on a slave ; and, if they had known that he was a slave, they
would have given him his liberty. Much more must this power be
held good in the case of the Emperor.

Ulpiakits {on all the Courts 1) A prsetor cannot appoint
himself to be guardian, or to be judex in some particular case.

XV.
Ok thb office of Prarfectus Vigilvm.

Paultjs (on the office qf Prcrfectvs Vigilum) In old days
the business of preventing fires was superintended by the Threemen^
who, because they kept watch at nighty were cadled Triumviri
noctumi; sometimes aodiles and tribunes of the plebs took a part
in the service. There was a body of government slaves stationed
about the gate and the walls, who could be called out if necessary ;
and besides them there were gangs of slaves belonging to private
owners whose duty it was to put out fires, either for pay or
gratuitously. Lastly, the Divine Augustus thought proper to have
the mischief dealt with by a provision of his own,

Ulpiantts (on the office o/Prc^ectus Vigilum) a number of
fires having, on a particular occasion, occurred in one day.

Paulus (on the office of Preefeetus Vigilum) As the business
of looking after the public safety was, so he held, suited for no one
so well as the Emperor himself, nor was any one else equal to the
duty, he therefore stationed seven detachments in suitable places,
each detachment to protect two districts of the city ; they were to
be commanded by tribunes, with an o£Scer at the head of them all,
of the class of spectabilea, caUed the prefect of the watch. 1. This
prefect deals with cases of incendiaries, housebreakers, thieves,
robbers, harbourers of thieves, unless in any particular instance
the ofiender is a person of such ruflianly and in&mous character
that the case is sent on to the prefect of the city. Conflagrations
in most cases may be attributed to the negligence of occupiers,
accordingly, where persons have paid innufficient attention to their
fires, the prefect either orders them to be beaten, or else he remits
the beating, but gives the parties a severe warning. 2. House-
breaking is for the most part committed in blocks of chambers, or

TET. XV] On the office of Prs&fectus Yigilum 61

in warehouses where people store the most Taluable part of their
property, and the housebreaker breaks open a storechamber or a
closet or a chest ; in which case punishment is generally inflicted
on the caretakers, and this agrees with a rescript of the Divine
Antoninus to Erudus Clarus. The Emperor tells him that, if his
warehouses were broken into, he can examine by torture the slaves
who had to guard them, even though the Emperor himself should
be a part-owner of the slaves. 3. It should be mentioned that the
prefect of the watch is bound to be up the whole night and to go
the rounds with his men, wearing the proper shoes, 4. and pro-
vided with hooks and axes, and they are to take care to warn all
householders to see that no case of fire arises through want of
attention. Moreover he is ordered to remind every one to have a
supply of water ready in his upper room. 5. He has also judicial
authority over the boxmen (capsarii), who engage for hire to take
charge of people*s clothes at the baths, so that if they should be
guilty of any malpractices in connexion with the above duty this
magistrate deals with the case.

Ulpianus {on the office of Pro^eettis Urbi) The Emperors
Severus and Antoninus sent a rescript to Junius Buflnus the
prefect of the watch in the following terms : — '' if occupants of
blocks of chambers or other persons carelessly omit to attend to
their fires, you can order them to be beaten or scourged ; as for
any who may be proved guilty of wilful arson, you may send them
on to my friend Fabius Cilo, the prefect of the city; runaway
slaves you must hunt up and send back to their owners.'"

XVI.
On the offices of Prooonsttl and Legate.

Ulpianus (Controversies 1) The proconsul may display
anywhere the insignia of his oflSce as soon as he is outside the city,
but he only exercise^ authority within the actual province which
has been assigned to him.

Mabgianus (Instittites 1) All proconsuls can exercise

jurisdiction as soon as they have left the city, not however
contentious jurisdiction, but only volimtary; for example free
persons [can be emcmdpated] and slaves can be manumitted in
their court, and adoptions can be executed there. 1. No one can

4—2

&2 On the i^fficei of Proconsul and Leffole [book i

manuniit in the court of the procoBsuFs legate, as he has not the
requisite jurisdiction ;

Ulpiatots {on SoMnus 26) nor can a man adopt before
him : in short, the legate cannot take statute actions at all.

The same {on the office of Proconsul 1) The proconsul
ought to be careful not to be burdensome to the province in the
matter of providing quarters, so the present Emperor and his
iather laid down in a rescript addressed to Aufidius Severianus.

1. No proconsul is at liberty to have his own grooms ; instead of
these, in the provinces, soldiers discharge the service required.

2. It is better that the proconsul should set out without his wife ;
still he can have his wife with him, if he likes, only he must under-
stand that the senate held, in the consulship of Cotta and Messala,
that if any offence were committed by the wife of a man who went
out to occupy an official position, account and satisfaction would
have to be demanded from the husband himself 3. Before
crossing the boundary of the province assigned to him, the
proconsul ought to issue a proclamation announcing his arrival
and containing some kind of recommendation of himself, by
reference to any persons living in the province with whom he
may be acquainted or connected, and above all the proclamation
should excuse^ the inhabitants from coming to meet him either
publicly or privately, on the ground that it is most suitable that
any persons who received him should do so in their own country.
4 He win be acting correctly and in accordance with the proper
order of proceeding if he sends an announcement to the retiring
proconsul to inform him on what day he will make his entry ; very
often events of this kind, if they are unexpected and uncertain as
to time, are distracting to the provincial population, and interfere
with business. 5. When he enters he ought to take care of the
following point too; — he should make his entry into the province
at the particular spot at which it is customary to do so, and
whatever city he first arrives at, either by land or sea, he should
attend to what the Greeks call the '' epidemise " or the " cataplus "
(places of stay and port of arrival) ; as the provincial people are
sure to set great store by the observation of customs and privileges
of this kind. Some provinces have this particular distinction, that
the proconsul always arrives by sea ; one of these is Asia, in fact it
has gone so far that the present Emperor Antoninus Augustus, in
answer to a request on the part of the Asiatic provincials, announced

' Read eateuMons for $»cu$antii. Of. M.

TFT. ZYi] On H^ officer i^ Procomul cmd Legate 53

by rescript that the proconsul was absolutely bound to arriye at
the province of Asia by sea, and land at Ephesus first of all the
metropcditau cities. 0. After this^ having made his entry into the
province, he ought to ddegate hk judicial powers to his legate, but
he must not do so before he has entered ; as it would be highly
absurd if before he had acquired the jurisdiction himself, — ^and as
a matter of &ct he is not competent to exercise it before his
entry, — ^he were to assign it to some one else, not having got any
jurisdiction to assign. However if he should assign it before entry,
and then, after entry, continue of the same mind, it would probably
be held that the I^ate had the jurisdiction, not, that is, from the
time when it was delegated, but from the time at which the
proconsul entered the province.

6 PAPiNiAKtrs (Qttesiions 1) Sometimes a proconsul can
del^ate his judicial powers though he should not have yet come
into the prorince ; suppose, for instance, he should be unavoidably
delayed on his journey, whereas the legate vras in a position to
reach the province very early.

6 Ulpianus (on the office qf Proconsul 1) It is usual for the
proconsul to assign to bis legates the office of examining prisoners,
the object being that they should first hear what the prisoners
have got to say, and then send them on to him, they themselves
releasing any innocent prisoner. But a delegation of this kind is.
irregular ; as, when a man has had given him the power of life and
death, or of infiicting any inferior punishment, he cannot transfer
it to another, and it follows that he cannot transfer the right of
discharging accused persons, where that other is not qualified to
hear the charge against thenu 1. The proconsul being free to
assign his judicial powers or not to assign them at his own
discretion, so too, after assigning them, he has a right to recall
the assignment ; still he ought not to do so without consulting the
Emperor. 3. A legate ought not to consult the Emperor; he
should go to bis own proconsul, and this latter is bound to give an
answer to any legate who consults him. 3b A proconsul is not
obliged to make an absolute point of declining presents, but he
must use moderation ; in short, he need not be so scrupulous as to
decline them altogether, but he must not be so grasping as to
accept them to an excessive amount This matter is put very w^
in a letter of the Divine Severus and the present Emperor
Antoninus, in which they set down the limitations to be observed
in this matter; the words are as follows: — '^With r^ard to

54 On Ihe offices of Procanstd and Legate [book i

presents, what we hold is this, — there is an old saying, 'Not
eyerything, nor every day, nor from everybody ' ; of course it is
very discourteous to accept no presents at all, but it is a very
contemptible thing to accept them indiscriminately, and to accept
all is absolutely sordid/' With regard to the injunction contained
in the proconsul's instructions, that neither he nor any other oflScer
is to accept any gift or present or make any purchase except of
supplies for everyday subsistence, this does not apply to trifling
gifts, but only where the amount is beyond what is required for
ordinary consumption. Still, on the other hand, presents must
not be taken to such an extent as to make them amount to
positive largess.

7 The samb {ibid. 2) If the proconsul arrives at some^
populous city, or at the chief town of the province, he must
allow the place to be formally commended to him, and show
no impatience at receiving a complimentary address, as the
provincial population claim the right of doing these things
as an honour to themselves; he ought also to allow holidays in
accordance with the customs and usages theretofore in vogue.
1. He ought to go round the temples and public works in order
to examine whether they are in proper repair or require to be in
any way restored, and, if there are any which are only in course of
construction, he ought to see that they are completed, so &r as the
resources of the municipality admit ; he ought also to appoint in
the regular form careftil superintendents of the works, and, if
necessary, provide military attendants to support them. 2. As
the proconsul has plenary judicial authority, he unites in himself
the attributes of all those who administer justice at Rome either as
magistrates or in virtue of extraordinary powers :

8 The same (on the Edict 39) so that he has the highest
authority in the province after that of the Emperor,

9 The same ((m ths office of Proconmd I) and no legal
matter can arise in the province which he is not competent to
dispose o£ It is true that if a pecuniary question is raised which
concerns the revenue and comes within the province of the imperial
procmutoTf he will do well not to meddle with it. 1. Where a
[judicial] decree is required, the proconsul cannot dispose of the
matter by ' libeUus * ; matters which require that a case should be
entertained judicially cannot be so disposed of. 2. The proconsul
ought to be patient with pleaders, but he must maintain his

^ Read aliquam for aiiam quam. Ct M.

TIT. xvi] On the offices of Proconsul and Legate 56

character^ so as not to appear abject, and be ougbt not to sbrink
from saying what he thinks, if he finds that there are people who
trump up cases or buy titles, nor should he allow any one to make
a motion before him, except those who have a right to do so
according to the terms of his own edict 3. Some kinds of cases
the proconsul can dispose of out of court (de piano) ; he can in
this way order that members of a family shall show proper
deference to their pcUer/amilias, or freedmen to their patrons
and patrons' children ; he may admonish and put in dread out of
court a son who is brought before him by his father on the
alleged ground that he is leading an improper life ; in the same
way he may correct an insolent fVeedman either by reprimand or
by beating. 4. He is bound therefore to take care that applications
are made to him in some regular course, so that, in short, every one
who has a request to make may get a hearing, lest it come to pass
that, if concession is made to the rank of one applicant or the
importunity of another, persons in a humble position, who either
have not secured the assistance of advocates at all or else have
only found such as are inattentive and men of no station, will be
unable to state their claims. 5. It will also be his duty in most
cases to allow the assistance of counsel to women or persons who
are under age or otherwise helpless, or to such as are out of their
mind, if any one asks for it on their behalf ; or, if no one asks, he
ought to aJlow it of his own accord. Again, if any one should
declare that he is unable to get counsel, owing to the power of his
opponent, in this case too the proconsul ought to find him one. It
is not allowable that any one should be borne down by the power
of his opponent; in &ct it tends to bring odium on the ofiicer
himself who is at the head of the province, if there is some one
who behaves with so little self-restraint that nobody will venture
to undertake to appear as a pleader in opposition to him. 6. The
above observations apply to all governors equally, and they ought
to be attended to by others as much as by the proconsul.

10 The same (ibid. 10) It must be borne in mind that until the
new proconsul arrives, the retiring proconsul is bound to go on
discharging all duties ; the proconsulship is one continuous office,
and the interests of the province require that there should be
some one there by whose action the provincial inhabitants can
get their business disposed of: accordingly he is bound to ad-
minister justice until the new proconsul arrives. 1. Dismissal
of his legate before he leaves the province himself is a thing

J

66 On the offices of Proconsvl and Legate [book i

which he is warned against doing by the lex Jvlia on extortion and
also by the rescript of the Divine Hadrian to Calpumius Rufos,
the proconsul of Achaia.

11 Vbnuleius Saturndhts (o» (he qffice of Proconsul 2) If
any offence is committed which requires specially severe punish-
ment, the legate ought to have the case removed to the court of
the proconsul : he has not himself the right to put to death or
imprison or inflict a severe flogging.

12 Pattlus (cm the Edict 2) A legate who exercises jimsdiction
in pursuance of a delegation has the power of appointing a judex.

13 PoMPONius {on Quintus Mudus 10) Legates of the pro-
consul have no authority of their own, so long as no jurisdiction
has been delegated to them by the proconsul.

14 Ulpiaihjs (on the lex J^dia et Papia 20). A proconsul does
not have more than six fasces.

15 LiciNKius RuFiKus (Rides 3) The proconsul's legates can
themselves appoint guardians.

16 Ulpianus (on the Edict 2) As soon as the proconsul passes
the gate on entering Rome he lays aside his imperium.

XVIL

On the office of Prcefeetus Augustalis.

Ulpianits (on the Edict 15) The prefect of Ejgypt does not
divest himself of the prefectship, or the right of imperitim given
him by statute under Augustus on the model of the proconsulship,
until his successor has actually entered Alexandria, even though
the latter should have arrived at the province ; this is set down in
the prefect's instructions.

XVIII.
On the office of Presses.

Macer {on the office of prceses 1) The title of presses is a
term of general signification, consequently proconsuls and imperial
legates and governors of provinces in general, though they diould
be senators, are called prassides ; the term proconsul is of special
application.

TIT. xvm] On the office of Prceses 57

2 UiiFiANUS (on Sabinus 26) A prceses can adopt in his own
court, jnst as he can emancipate a son or manumit a slave.

3 Paulus {on Sabinus 13} The prceses of the province has
a right of imperium over the men of his own province only, and he
has the right only while he is in the province ; if he leaves it he
becomes a private person. Sometimes he has imperium even over
outsiders^ if they commit any active offence; it is part of the
instructions given by the Emperor that the governor of the
province shall take measures for ridding the province of evil-
disposed persons, and no distinction is made as to the place from
which such persons come.

4 Ulpiaiotb (on the Edict 39) The prceses . of the province
has the highest authority in his province after that of the Emperor.

6 Thb same (on all the Courts 1) The prceses of the province
cannot appoint himself guardian any more than he can make
y^meelt judex in a particular case.

8 The same {Opinions 1) The prceses of the province is
bound to put a check on unlawful demands and such as are made
with duress, also to the practice of making persons contract sales
and execute assurances by putting them in terror, or by promising
money which then is not paid. The prceses is also to see that no
one makes gain or suffers loss uivjustly. 1. The acttOd truth is
not affected by a mistake of gossiping reporters^ ; the prceses
should follow whatever is the proper course considering established
facts. 2. The prceses of the province should make it matter of
conscience to see that persons of influence and resource do not
inflict any wrong on those in humbler station, and do not pursue
such as take up the cause of these latter with vexatious chaiges
where they are innocent 3. The prceses of the province ought to
take care to keep down unauthorized offerers of aid who, on
pretence of a desire to support oflBcers in military command,
proceed to alarm the public ; and, where any such are found, he
should repress them ; he should also prevent unlawfiil exactions
being made on pretence of levying taxes. 4. The prceses should
make it a matter of particular concern that no one should be
prohibited from carrying on any lawful business, and also that
nothing that is prohibited should be practised, and that no penalties
should be imposed on innocent persons. 5. The prceses of the
province will take care that men of small means shall not suffer

^ Read g€$torum for ffettarum. Of. M.

68 On the office of Prceees [book i

the wrongful treatment of having their sole light or their 'scanty
furniture taken from them for the use of others on the ground of
the arrival of official attendants or soldiers. 6. The prceaes of the
province must see that nothing is done on the alleged behalf of
soldiers which does not serve their general needs, by some of the
number who put forward an unfair claim for some advantage
confined to themselves. 7. The event of death ought not to be
laid to the account of the physician ; but it is equally true that he
ought to be held answerable for any mischief which he has
occasioned by want of skill ; the wrong done by one who gives
incorrect advice at a dangerous crisis ought not to be set down to
human frailty and so treated as no oiBTence at all. 8. Officers who
rule whole provinces have the power of life and death, and they
have authority given them to send offenders to the mines. 9. Where
the prceaes, after imposing a fine, discovers that it cannot be
discharged out of the present means of the persons whom he has
ordered to pay it, he must check improper eagerness on the part of
the official who has to demand the money, and relieve the party
from pressure^ for payment When a fine is remitted by the
governor of the province on the ground of poverty, it ought not to
be exacted.

7 The same {ibid. 3) The proesea of the province ought to
inspect buildings, and, on sufficient cause appearing, compel the
owners to repair them, and, in case of refusal, he should employ
lawful means for remedying the unsightly condition of the premises.

8 JuLiANtrs {Digest 1) I have often heard the present Em-
peror declare that where a rescript says "You can apply to the
officer who is at the head of the province," this does not put the
pi*ocon6ul or his legate or the prceses of the province under the
necessity of undertaking to hear the case, he must consider whether
he ought to hear it himself or appoint sl judex.

9 Callistbatus {on judicial inquiries 1) As a general rule,
whenever the Emperor issues a rescript by which he refers a matter
to the prceses of a province ; for example, where he says " You can
apply to the officer who is at the head of the province," perhaps
adding " he will consider what steps he ought to take," the pro-
consul or the legate is not put under the necessity of undertaking
to hear the case ; but' even if the words " he will consider what

^ Read neee$Htati for necessitate, Cf. M.

' eed inserencL before qucanvU^ deleucL before U atst. deb, Gf. M.

TFT, xvm] On the office of Prceees 69

BtepB he oaght to take '' are not added it is his duty to consider
whether he ought to hear it himself or appoint a judex.

10 Hermooenianus {Epitomes of Law 2) In all cases which
are heard at Rome by the prsBfect of the dty, or the prntorian
prefect, or, again, by the consul, or the prsdtor, or any other
Soman magistrate, the proper tribunal in the provinces is that of
the corrector or the proeses.

11 Mabcianus {Instttutes 3) In the provinces all kinds of
applications come within the competency of the presses, though at
Rome they are made to a number of different judges :

12 Pboculus {EpisOes 4) But although the officer who is at
the head of the province has to occupy the place and discharge the
duties of every Roman magistrate, still it is his duty to consider
not so much what is done at Rome as what the case requires.

18 XJlpianxjs (on the office of Proconsul 7) It may be expected
from any presses of character and conduct that he should take care
that the province which he governs shall be settled and orderly.
This he will have no difficulty in bringing about, if he studiously
aims at securing that the province shall be clear of bad characters,
and he accordingly seeks them out; in feet he is bound to seek
out persons guilty of sacrilege, highway robbers, manstealers and
thieves, and punish them according to their respective offences ; he
should also restrain those who give them shelter, as without such
assistance a highway robber cannot long escape detection. I. In
the case of lunatics whom their friends cannot keep under control,
the presses ought to apply a remedy, viz. that of confining them in
prison. This was laid down by the Divine Pius. It is true that
the Divine brothers held that, in the case of a man who was guilty
of parricide, an inquiry should be made as to whether he was
feigning madness when he committed the deed, or was really and
truly out of his mind, so that if he was feigning he might be
punished, but, if he was insane, he might be detained in prison.

14 Macer (on criminal trials [judida publico] 2) The Divine
Marcus and Commodus issued a rescript to Scapula TertuUus in
these words : " If you have clearly ascertained that iElius Priscus
is in such a state of insanity that he is permanently out of his
mind and so entirely incapable of reasoning, and no suspicion is
left that he was simulating insanity when he killed his mother, you
need not concern yourself with the question how he should be

60 On the office qf Prceeee [book i

punished, as his insanity itself is punishment enough. At the same
time he must be closely confined, and, if you think it advisable^
even kept in chains ; this need not^ be done by way of punishment
so much as for his own protection and the security of his neighbours.
If however, as is veiy often the case", he has intervals of sounder
mind, you must carefully investigate the question whether he may
not have committed the crime on one of these occasions, and so
have no claim to mercy on the ground of mental infirmity ; and, if
you should find that anything of this kind is the feet you must
refer the case to us, so that we may consider, supposing he
committed the act at a moment when he could be held to know
what he was doing, whether he ought not to be visited with
punishment corresponding to the enormity of his crime. But when
we learn by a letter from you that his position in respect of place
and treatment is such that he is in the hands of his friends, even if
confined to his own house, your proper course will be, in our
opinion, to summon the persons who had the charge of him at the
time and ascertain how they came to be so remiss, and then
pronounce upon the case of each separately, according as you see
anything to excuse or aggravate his negligence. The object of
providing keepers for lunatics is to keep them not merely from
doing harm to themselves, but from bringing destruction upon
others ; and if this last-mentioned mischief should come to pass,
it may well be set dovm to the negligence of any who were not
sufficiently assiduous in the discharge of their ojffice.^'

16 Maboianus {on criminal trials 1) One point requires
attending to : the officer who governs a province must not pass the
boundary, save for the purpose of discharging a vow, and even
then he must not spend the night beyond the border.

16 Mager (cm the office of Praises 1) It is provided by a decree
of the senate that actions must be entertained very sparingly
on any questions arising upon contracts made by provincial
governors or their suite or their freedmen before they came into the
province, it being understood that where any such person forbears
to bring an action in consequence of this rule, the right of action
will be restored to him after he leaves the province. But if any-
thing happen involving no act of his own, — for example, he is the
victim of some injuria or theft, — ^the court will so &r entertain his
case as to let him proceed to litis contestaiio, and then an order
can be made that any property stolen should be produced and

^ Read quod non for quoniam. Gf. M. ^ Ht ioaerend. alter taniort.

TTT. xvm] On the office of Proeses 61

deposited, or that a promise should be given with security that
the party should appear to the action or that the thing will be
produced.

17 Cmsvs {Digest 3) If the preeses of the province should
happen to manumit or appoint a guardian before he has had notice
that his successor has arrived, these acts will be held valid.

18 MoDESTiKUS (Rides 6) It is provided by plebiscite that no
prasses shall accept a gift or present^ save one of eatables and
drinkables for a few days' consumption.

19 Callistratus (on- judicial inquiries 1) The magistrate
who dispenses justice should take care to be quite ready to entertain
applications, but he should not let anyone treat him with disrespect
Accordingly it is inserted in the instructions given to the govemoiiB
of provinces that they are not to allow the provincials to be on a
footing of easy familiarity ; as intercourse on equal terms is apt to
lead to rank being disrespectfully treated. 1* Again, when the
governor is hearing a case judicially, he should not fire up against
persons of whom he has a bad opinion, nor ought he to be moved
to tears by the entreaties of those in distress ; a man is not
behaving like a firm and good judge who^ allows his countenance
to betray his feelings. To put it in a few words, the judge should
so administer justice as to allow the impression produced by his
personal character to enhance the authority of his rank.

20 PAPiNiAlfUS (Besponsa 1) The imperial legate, that is, the
prceses or corrector of the province, does not by resigning his office
lose his right of imperium.

21 PAPiNiAKtrs (on the office of (Assessors) Where the prceses
has before him a case of a slave being corrupted, or a female slave
being debauched, or a male slave being unnaturally assaulted,
then, if the slave alleged to be corrupted is the overseer of some
absent' person, or is in such a position that, over and above any
loss in respect of property, the mischief amounts to the ruin of the
owner's whole establishment, — he ought to inflict very severe
punishment on the ofTender.

^ ctf/itf perhaps slipshod in the author quoted : ti ct^iu would he more gram-

maticaL

* Read abtentit for agentii. Of. M.

62 On the (^ffice of Imperial Procurator [book i

XIX.
On the office of Impebial PftocuRATOR OB Rationalis.

1 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 16) Any acts and deeds of the
imperial procurator are acknowledged [1 eomprobantur] by the
Emperor as if they were the Emperor's own acts^ If the
imperial procurator should deliver something belonging to the
Emperor as if it were his own, I should say that he does not pass
the property in it ; he only passes the property when he is acting
in the Emperor's behalf and delivers with his consent In fitct if
he does any act by way of effecting a sale or a donation or a
compromise of matters in dispute, it is void ; as it is no part of his
duty to dispose of tihe Emperor's property, but to administer it
carefully. 2. The following is a special attribute of the imperial
procurator ; a slave of the Emperor can enter on an inheritance by
bis order, and, if the Emperor should be appointed heir, the
procurator can himself, by intermeddling with a rich inheritance
make the Emperor [complete] heir.

2 Paulus (Sentences 5) But if the property in respect of
which the Emperor is appointed heir is insufficient for the debts,
then, when the fact is ascertained, the course is to consult the
Emperor ; since when a question arises as to entering on or declining
such inheritances, it is the person appointed heir whose wishes
should be ascertained.

3 Callistbatus (on judicial inquiries 6) Imperial pro-
curators' have not the power of deporting ; this is a punishment
which they are not competent to inflict 1. But if they should
forbid any one access to land belonging to the Emperor on the
ground that his behaviour tended to a riot or was otherwise a
wrong to the imperial tenants, the party is bound to keep away ;
this is laid down in a rescript of the Divine Pius to Julius. 2. It
may be added that the procurator is not able to give a man [who is
deported] leave to return, and this is laid down in a rescript of the
present Emperors Severus and Antoninus written in answer to an
application by one Hermias.

^ Sentence hopeless.

' Read procurators for curatorei. Gf. M.

TIT. xx] On the offiee of Juridicm 63

On the office of JwridicuB.

1 ULPiAinis {an Sabinvs 26) A man can execute an adoption
in the court of ihei jfwridicusy as the latter is allowed to take statute
actions.

2 The same (jSbid. 39) The juridicua who holds office at
Aleicandria is allowed by an enactment of the Divine Marcus to
appoint guardians.

XXL

On the office of one to WHOH jurisdiction is DELEOATSa

1 Papinianxjs (Qtiestiona 1) Wherever any powers are con;
ferred specially by a statute or a decree of the senate or an
imperial enactment^ if the officer delegates his jurisdiction, such
powers do not pass ; but powers which he possesses in right of his
magisterial office can be delegated. Hence those magistrates are
clearly in the wrong who having the power to hold a criminal trial
conferred upon them by a statute or a decree of the senate^ such
as the lex Jtdia de advlteriiSy or any other similar enactment^
thereupon proceed to delegate their jurisdiction. A very strong
argument in support of the above is the following : — in the lex
Julia deviitiB expressly provided that the judge on whom there
falls the duty of holding the inquiiy can delegate it if he goes
away ; so that he has a right of delegation only in case he should
be absent, whereas in general jurisdiction can be delegated equally
well by a magistrate who remains on the spot Should the case to
be tried be that of a man being murdered by his own slaves, the
praetor will not be at liberty to delegate the power of holding a
trial, deriving it as he does fi*om a decree of the senate. 1. When
a man has undertaken a jurisdiction which was given him by
delegation, he has no original powers of his own, he only exercises
the jurisdiction of the officer who delegated. The better opinion
is that according to long-established practice ^^jtmsdiciio " may be
transferred, but the right of mere command (meimm imperium)
which is given by a statute will not pass ; hence no one holds that
the legate of the proconsul has the power of inflicting punishment

64 On Jvrisdiotion Delegated [book i

when he takes the proconsurs jurisdiction by delegation. (Note
by Paulus : the better opinion is that when jurUdictio is delegated
the right of direct command which is bound up with jurisdictio
passes too.)

Ulpianus (on all the Courts 3) Where the prasses delegates
his jurisdiction, the person to whom it is assigned cannot summon
a board (cotisUivm). 1. Where guardians and curators wish to
sell land [in those respectiTe capacities] the praetor or presses can
give permission on sufficient cause shown ; but if he delegates his
jurisdiction, he can by no means thereby transfer the right of
holding the requisite inquiry.

JULIANUS {Digest 5) Even where the person who carries on
another man's jurisdiction is himself a prsetor, still so long as he is
discharging the office of the other, he is not acting in virtue of his
own powers^ but is administering justice in the place of the officer
by whose delegation be sits.

Maceb (on the office of Prceses 1). The right of holding
inquiiy into the case of a guardian who is 'suspected' can be
delegated. Indeed it has been laid down by rescript, with a view
to the benefit of wards, that, where jurisdiction is delegated in
general terms, the above right is included ; the words are as
follows: — ''The Emperors Severus and Antoninus to Braduas,
Proconsul of Africa. As you have handed over your own juris-
diction to your legates, it follows that they can hold an inquiry
into cases of guardians who are suspected.'' 1. Delegation can be
validly made of the power to grant possessio bonoruniy the power
to make an order granting possession in case an undertaking
against damnum infectum should not be given to one who applied
for it, to admit a woman into possession on behalf of an unborn
child, to admit a legatee into possession for the purpose of pre-
serving legacies.

Paulus {on Plautius 18) It is quite clear that [a man] to
whom jurisdiction is delegated cannot delegate it over to another.
1. When jurisdiction is delegated to a private person, the delegation
is held to include imperium as well, such as does not amount to
merum imperium ; there is no such thing as jurisdiction not
involving authority to inflict some slight punishment

TET. xxn] On the ojffiee of Assessors 65

XXII.
On the office of Assessors.

1 Paulus (on the office of Assessors) The whole office of an
assessor, — one, it may be said, in which the skill of those learned
in the law comes into play, — is exercised in cases which are pretty
much such as follow : judicial inquiries, motions, applications by
libel, edicts, decrees, epistles.

2 Mabjcianvb (on onmifuU trials 1) A freedman can be
an assessor. As for persons under infanda, there are no statutes
forbidding them to act, but in my opinion they are not qualified to
discharge the duty of assessor, and in fact there is said to be an
imperial enactment to this eiBTect.

3 Maoer (on the ofice qf Presses 1) If some one jHrovinoe
comes to be divided and the two parts are put under two prcesides
respectively, as we see in the cased of Germania and Mysia, a native
of either part can be an assessor in the other, and he is not held
to be acting in his own provinca

4 Papinianus (Besponsa 4) On the decease of an Imperial
legate his attendants (comites) have a right to their pay for the
rest of the period for which the legate appointed them to serve,
provided always that they do not act as attendants to any one else
during the time. A different rule is applied where the legate made
way for a successor before the regular termination of his office.

5 Paulus (Sentences 1) A member of a board \ while acting
as assessor, is by no means at liberty to adjourn the matter into his
own audience chamber, but he is allowed to take it into the
chamber of some one else.

6 Papinianus (Besponsa 1) Where a municipal curator sum-
mons a board, a man of the same munidpium is not debarred from
acting as assessor, as he is not in receipt of official pay.

^ Read ootmliario for cansiliari. G£ M.

JuU J.

SECOND BOOK

I.

On Jurisdictio.

1 Ulpianxts (Rules I) The office of one who exercises juris-
dictio is most comprehensive ; he can grant [an order for] honorwn
possessio and put persons into possession, he can appoint guardians
to children under age who have none, he can nominate a judge
to parties in litigation.

2 Javolbnus {extracts from Cassius 6) When an officer is
given jtirisdictio, he is also clearly allowed those powers without
which jurisdictio cannot take its due course.

3 Ulpianus (on the office of Quoestor 2) Imperium is either
simple (merum) or mixed Simple imperium is where an officer
is in possession of the power of the sword for the purpose of
punishing^ evildoers ; when it is also called potestas. Mixed im-
perium, which in fact includes jurisdiction is that which is evinced
in granting bonorum pos^essio ; jurisdictio extends to the power
of nominating a judge.

4 The same (on the Edict 1) The power of ordering an under-
taking to be given by a praetorian stipulation, and of putting
persons into possession, belongs more to imperium than to juris-
dictio.

6 JuLiANUS (Digest 1) By the custom of our fore&thers it
has been brought to pass that an officer who can delegate his
jurisdictio can only be one who possesses it in his own right and
not by the gift of another ;

6 Paulus (on the Edict 2) because [in the latter case] the
jurisdictio would not be given him directly, and the jurisdidio

^ in mserend. after anvnuidwrtendum.

TIT. i] On jurisdictio 67

which he has by d6l^;ation is not bestowed by the statute but
only oonflrmed by it. Hence if an officer who delegated his jwrU-
dictio dies before the person to whom it was delegated has b^un
to execute the matter in hand, then, according to Labeo, the
delegation is annulled, in accordance with the rule in ordinary
cases [of m€mdatum\.

7 Ulpianus (on the Edict 3) If any one should maliciously
destroy a notice which is made in the [preetor's] albtmiy or on
paper [cha'rtd]^ or any other substance, such notice being relative
to the praetor's standing jurisdiction, and not dealing with a special
occasion, an action is allowed against the offender for five hundred
aurei, in which any one may sue {poptdare est).

1. The words of the Edict include slaves and sons under potestaSj
moreover the praetor refers to both sexes alike. 2. Should the
damage be done while the notice is being put up, or before it has
been put up, no doubt the words of the Edict will not apply, but,
according to Pomponius, the principle of the Edict ought to be held
to go fitr enough to include this case. 3. In the case of slaves,
where their owners do not undertake their defence, and in that of
persons destitute of means, bodily torture is to be used. 4. The
words of the Edict include the term "maliciously" [dolo malo];
because, if any one should act in the way described through
ignorance, or want of education, or by the prsBtor's own order,
or by accident, he is not liable. 6. The Edict extends to the case
of one who carries the written matter away, though he should not
damage it ; and it applies equally whether the party commits the
offence with his own hands or instigates another to commit it
If one man did the act without malice, but another induced him
with malice, the one who induced will be liable ; if both act with
malice, both will be liable; certainly, if several join in the act,
whether they do damage or instigate to it, they will all be liable ;

8 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 1) and it goes as far as
this — that it is not enough for one of the parties alone to pay
the penalty.

9 Paulits {on the Edict 3) If a household of slaves should
damage the album, the Edict does not deal with the case in the
way in which it does with theft, by providing that if the owner^
assuming that he chose to defend the action, pays on behalf of one
of such slaves as much as the man would pay himself if he were
free, then no action is to be allowed in respect of the others : the
reason for this may be that, in the case we are considering, the

6—2

68 On jurisdictio [book n

object is to redrefw a dight offered to the dignity of the prsatorian
office, and it is regarded as a case of so many distinct acts ; just as,
whea a number of slaves have committed an if^wria or have done
damage to property^ [the same rule is observed,] on the ground
that there are several distinct ad», and not one only as in the case
of theft. Octavenus says that the slave-owner ought equally to be
relieved in the case under discussion; but this can only be said
where the slaves maliciously contrive that some one else shall destroy
the album, as in that case there is one common plot, and not a num-
ber of distinct acts. Pomponius makes the same remark (lib. X.).

10 Ulpiaktts {on the Edict 3) The officer who presides at the
administration of justice ought not to administer it for his own
case nor for that of his wife or his children, nor for his freedmen
or any others whom he has about him.

11 Qaius {on (he provincial Edict 1) If the same plaintiff
brings a number of actions against the same defendant, and the
amount sued for is low enough in every separate case to bring
it within the jurisdiction of the judge, but the aggregate amount
of all taken together exceeds the limits of his jurisdiction, Sabinus,
Cassius and Proculus hold that the action can be carried on before
the judge in question, and this opinion is confirmed by a rescript
of the Emperor Antoninus. 1. Again, if there are reciprocal rights
of action between two parties, in respect of which one asks for
a sum below the limit, and the other for one above it, the one who
asks for the smaller sum must proceed before the same judge,
so that it may not be in the power of my opponent, if he is
disposed to act vexatiously, to say whether I shall be allowed to
argue my case before the same judge or not 2. If a single action
is brought in which a number of persons are plaintiff at the
same time, as, for instance, an action for dividing an inheritance
{/amilice erdsaumdce), for partition of common property {communi
dividundo), for settling boundaries {finium regundorum) — ought
we, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the judge who takes
the case, to consider the value of the separate shares, which is
what Ofilius and Proculus maintain, on the ground that each
person is a party to the suit in virtue of his own particular share,
or ought we rather to consider the value of the whole property,
because the title to the whole is brought in question at the trial,
and the whole may possibly be adjudged to one party? This last
view is held by Cassius and Pegasus, and there is no doubt their
opinion is reasonable.

TFT. i] On jttrisdictio 69

12 Ulpianits (on the Edict 18) A municipal magistrate is not
allowed to visit a slave with severe punishment, but he cannot
be denied the right of inflicting moderate chastisement.

18 The same (on Sabirms 51) The officer who orders any one
to act as judex must be a magistrate. 1. Magistrates, or persons
who are invested with any official authority, such as proconsuls,
or praetors, or governors of provinces in general, cannot order a
man to act as judge on a day by which they will themselves have
returned to private life.

14 The same {on the Edict 39) It is established law and is
in accordance with actual practice that where an officer of higher
or equal rank submits to the jurisdiction of another, the juris-
diction may be exercised either for or against him.

15 The same {on all the Courts 2) If parties by mistake go
before one prsetor, intending to go before another, the proceedings
so far are void. No one can be allowed to say that the parties
agreed upon the particular presses, since, as Julianus says, where
persons are under a mistake there is no agreement : what indeed
can be more inconsistent with agreement than a mistake which
is a proof of ignorance?

16 The same {on all the Courts 3) It is the practice of the
prsator to delegate his jurisdiction, and he either delegates it
altogether, or with reference to a particular case; whereupon the
person to whom the jurisdiction is delegated acts in the place of
the officer delegating, and not in his own character.

17 The same {Opinions 1) Just as the prsetor is able to delegate
bis entire jurisdiction to another, so he is able to delegate it with
reference to particular persons or a particular case, especially
where he has a sufficient reason in the fact that he himself under-
took the advocacy of one of the parties before he was a magistrate.

18 Africantjs {Qy£Stions 7) If two parties should agree that
some other prsetor should exercise jurisdiction than the one to
whom it regularly belongs, and, before application were made
to the preetor agreed upon, there should be a change of mind, —
it is beyond doubt that no one could be compelled to abide by
such an agreement

19 Ulfiantjs {Mdeicommissa 6) An unmarried w^man was
defendant to an action which was brought before a judge who
was competent to hear it, and judgment was given against her;
after which she became the wife of a man who was subject to a

70 On jurisdictio [book n

different jurisdiction, and the question arose whether the order
of the original judge could be carried out. My answer was that
it could, as the order was already made ; but in fact I should hold
the same if the marriage had taken place after the hearing had
begun, but before judgment was given ; so that the decision would
properly be given by the original judge. A similar rule ought
to be observed in all cases of this kind. 1. Whenever a question
arises as to whether the amount which determines jurisdiction is
reached or not^ the point to inquire into always is how much
is sued for, not what is the amount of the debt

20 Paulus (on the Edict 1) An officer who exercises juris^
diction outside his local limits may be disobeyed with impunity.
The same rule holds where he affects to exercise jurisdiction wiUi
reference to an amount beyond his competency.

IL

A MAN TO BE DEALT WITH AFTER THE LIKE BULE TO THAT
WHICH HE MAIKTAIKED AOAIKST AKOTHEB.

Ulpianus (on the Edict 3) This Edict is one of perfect
fairness and can give no reasonable occasion of protest to any one :
indeed, how can anybody complain of having the same law applied
to his own case that he applied or caused to be applied to other
people? 1. "If a man who holds any magistracy or authority
should establish any new law to the prejudice of another, he must
himself at any time thereafter, on the application of an opponent
of his own, be dealt with in accordance with the same rule ; again,
if a man should procure the application of any new law in the
court of one holding some magistracy or* authority, judgment
must at any time thereafter, on the application of his opponent,
be given against him in accordance with such new law," so that^
in short, whatever a man himself deemed to be just in the case
of another, he must suffer the same to be held good in his own
case too. 2. The words ** whatever the officer who presides at the
jurisdictio establishes '* are understood by reference to the result ;
we must not confine ourselves to the words ; consequently, if the
officer should wish to establish something for law, but should be
checked, and his judgment should not take effect^ the Edict does

^ Read f>e for que.

TFT. n] After the like rtde etc. 71

aot apply. The word ''statuit" (establishes) implies that the
matter is completed^ and the wrong is oonsummated, not merely
begun. It follows that if a man exercises jurisdiction between
parties between whom he is not competent to exercise it, then,
seeing that the proceeding is treated as null and void, and there is
in fact no decision at all, we must hold that the Edict does not
apply ; how indeed could there be any harm done by the attempt^
where the illegality produced no effect?

2 Paulus (on the Edict 3) By this Edict what has to be
punished is malice in the person exercising jurisdiction ; if the
law has been laid down otherwise than it ought, owing to an over-
sight on the part of the assessor, the ill consequence ought to fall
on the assessor himself, and not on the magistrate.

8 UiiPiAirus (on the Edict 3) If a man has procured for
himself the benefit of an ui^just rule being applied to an opponent,
he will be dealt with according to the same rule himself only
where the thing was done on his own application ; if it was not
on his application, he will suffer no penalty. But if he got the
order, then, whether he put the rule in force or only obtained
leave to put it in force without doing so, he will be punished
under this Edict. 1. If it was my procurator who made the
application, the question arises who it is that will be dealt with
according to the same rule ; Pomponius holds that it is myself
only, at any rate, if I specially instructed the procurator , or subse-
quently ratified what he did. But if a guardian or the curator
of a lunatic or minor made the application, he is punished under
the Edict himself. The same course must be followed with a
procuraJtoT too, if he was made ^procurator on his own behalf.'
2. The penalty is laid down against every one who comes within
the terms of the Edict, on the application not only of the party
who was injured by him, but of any person whatever who takes
proceedings at any distance of time. 3. Suppose a person for
whom you are surety obtains an order forbidding some debtor
of his to plead [a particular] exeeptio against him, and, after that,
you desire to plead [a similar] exeeptio in respect of your engage-
ment as surety, neither you nor the principal debtor himself can
get leave to do so ; even though in the meantime this should entail
a wrong on you if your debtor is insolvent But if you yourself
are hit by the Edict, the principal debtor can still plead the
exceptiOy but you cannot, so that the penalty incurred by you
[the surety] will not affect the principal debtor; aocordingly you

^

72 After the like rule ete. [book n

will have no right of action on numdatmn against him. 4. If mj
0on in the exercise of a magistracy incurs the penalty of the Edict,
will the Edict apply in respect of such actions as I bring in his
right ? My opinion is that it will not, or eke my relation to him
will put me in a worse legal position. 5. With regard to the
praetor's declaration that a person in the case mentioned is to
be dealt with ''after the same rule/' will the liability to this
penalty pass to his heir as well? Julianus informs us that not
only the person himself loses the right of action^ but his heir does
too. 6. He adds this, which is not unreasonable, that he is
exposed to the penalty in question not only in connexion with
such rights of action as he had at the time when he brought
himself within the terms of the Edict, but in connexion also with
any that he may acquire subsequently. 7* The principle under
discussion (so Julianus holds) will not allow money already paid
to be recovered, as there was still ground for the payment in
natural law, and that fact bars the recoyeiy.

4 Gaitjs (on the provincial Edict 1) The prsetor makes one
rather nice reservation, in these words :-^" save always where
one of the above persons [against whom relief is promised] had
acted to the prejudice of some one who had himself done similar
prejudice to another." This reservation is perfectly sound, as
otherwise a magistrate who seeks to uphold the Edict, or a
litigating party who desires to ei\joy the benefit conferred by the
Edict, might himself incur the penalty which the very Edict
imposes.

III.

Where a man refuses obedience to the magistrate

exercising jurisdiction.

Ulpianus (on the Edict 1) All magistrates, save only
duumvirs, are allowed, in accordance with the rights appertaining
to their rospective authorities, to protect their administration of
justice by means of penal sentences. 1. A man is held to refuse
obedience to the magistrate exercising jurisdiction when he declines
to comply with the final direction given in tlie course of the magi»*
trate's administration of the law; for example, where he refuses
to allow moveable property to be made the subject of a vindication
against him, but does allow it to be driven or carried away [, it is

TIT. m] Where a man refuses obedience 73

keld that he obeys] ^; but» if he reeiats even these subeequent
measureB, then it is held that he does not obey. 2. If a proewrator
or guardian or curator refuses obedience to the officer exercising
jurisdictimi, the otknde^ is himself punished^ not the principal
or the ward. 3. This Edict, so Labeo says, applies not only to
a defendant who disobeys, but to a plaintiff as well. 4. The action
is not for an amount representing the plaintiff's interest in the
matter, but is confined to the direct loss ; and, as it proyides a
penalty simply, it is not allowed to be brought after a year nor
against the heir of the wrongdoer.

IV.

On Citatiok.

1 Paulus (on the Edict 4) To cite a person to appear
is to cite him for the purpose of a trial at law.

2 Ulpiaitus (cm the Edict 5) No citation can be made of
a consul or a prefect or a praator or a proconsul or any other
magistrate who possesses imperiurnj and who consequently can
exercise coercive powers and order persons to be put in prison ;
nor of a pont^ex while be is performing sacred rites, nor of such
as cannot stir from the spot where they are, because of the
religious character attached to the place, nor, again, of one who
is riding on his way in the service of the government on a horse
which is state property. Furthermore a man must not be sum-
moned who is in the act of being married, nor a woman in the like
case ; nor a judge who is at the moment hearing a case ; nor a man
who is pleading before the praetor ; nor one who is conducting the
funeral of a member of his own household, or is performing due
rites to the dead;

3 Callistratus (jvdicicU inqtiiries 1) nor persons who are
attending a funeral ;— and this rule we find is confirmed by a
rescript of the Divine Brothers : —

4 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 5) nor any one who is compelled
to appear in court or in some particular place in order to take part
in a trial ; nor lunatics nor infant children. 1. The praetor says
''No one is to dte to appear without my permission a parent^
a patron or patroness, or the children or parents of a patron or

^ obtemperMM InaereDcL M.

74 On Citation [book n

patronees." 3. The word {wtrent must here be taken to be applied
to both sexes, but whether it includes all ancestors, however
remote, is a question. Some say that the term parent is applicable
up to the fifth degree in the ascending line (tisqus ad tritavum),
and those more remote still are called majores ; this, according to
Pomponius, was the view of the old lawyers ; but Gains Cassius
applies the word to all ancestors, however remote; this makes it
a more honourable appellation, and the usage has very properly
been adopted 3. The term parent, in the opinion of Labeo, may
be applied to those who have become fathers and mothers in
slavery, and is not confined', so Severus said, to cases in which
the children are legitimate, so that even where a son is the ofi"-
spring of random intercourse, he cannot cite his mother,

5 Paulus (on the Edict 4) because the mother is always an
ascertained person, even though she conceived in random inter-
course; but the father is the person pointed out as such by the
marriage.

6 The same {Sentences 1) No one can cite his natural
parents, the same unvarying tokens of respect are to be observed
towaixis all parents.

7 The same {on the Edict 4) A man may cite with impunity
the parents of his adoptive father, because they are not his own
parents, as he can only become cognate to those to whom he
becomes agnate.

8 Ulpianus {on the Edict 5) A man cannot dte his adoptive
father as long as he is in his potestas, though this depends
more on the law of potestas than on the Edict of the prsetor ;
except in the case of a son who has eastrense pectdiumy as in such
a case leave will be given on cause shovm. But a natural parent
cannot be cited even by a son who is in some other fitmily by
adoption. 1. The Edict has *^ patron or patroness '^ : the term
patron must be here held to comprise persons who have manu-
mitted out of slavery, and to apply where a man had exposed
a decision in fitvour of free birth procured collusively ; also where
any one is pronounced a freedman in a ^ prejudicial ' action on the
question, when, in fiict, he was not one, or where I swear that
a man is my freedman ; just as, conversely, I am not held to be
patron if the decision is against me, or I tender the oath and the
man swears that he is not my freedman. 2. But if I compelled

^ Read tatUum for tam&n, Cf. M.

TIT. IV] On Citation 76

my freedman or freedwoman to take an oath not to marry, he
or she may cite me with impunity. Celsus indeed says that
in the case of a freedman in this position the immunity [forfeited
by me] cannot pass to my son in my lifetime ; but Julianus gives
the contrary opinion; and most authorities agree with Julianus's
▼iew. If this is correct, the result will be that in this case the
patron may be cited to ai^>eary but the son, being regarded as free
of offence, cannot be cited.

9 Paulxjs (on the Edict 4) Again a man who manumits a
slave in pursuance of a fideieommissfum cannot be cited [by the
person manumitted] though he might have been cited in order to
compel him to manumit.

10 Ulpiantts (on the Edict 5) But if I bought the slave on
the express understanding that I should manumit him, and he
acquires his liberty through the enactment of the Divine Marcus,
tiien, seeing that I am his patron, he cannot cite me. If, on
the other hand, I bought him with his own money, and then
broke fidth with him, I shall not be deemed to be his patron.
1. Where a woman is compelled to prostitute herself contrary to
the conditions of sale, the vendor wUl be her patron, assuming
that she was sold on the terms that if she were compelled to
prostitute herself she should become free. But if a vendor in
the same case reserves the right to lay hands on the woman [so
as to recover possession of her, in the same event], and, having
done so, he himself compels her to prostitute herself, then, inasmuch
as she still becomes free, she acquires her fi^eedom through the
vendor, but it is not right that any honour should be paid to him:
Marcellus himself gives this opinion (Digest 6). 2. A man is
understood to be called patron even if he should have suffered
capitis dimintUio, or his frecKiman should have suffered it, if it
is a case where the arrogation was effected in an underhand way ;
for, seeing that by the very act^ of getting himself arrogated, the
freedman conceals his condition, it is not the ostensible object
of the proceeding that he should become ingenuus. 3. Even* if
he has been given the right to wear gold rings (jtia anuUynmi)^
I should say that he ought to show respect to his patron, though
he is qualified for all the frinctions attached to free birth. It is
different where he is re-established in the position of one fi^ee
by birth ; the act of the Emperor makes him ingemms. 4. A man
who is manumitted by a corporation or a guild or a city can

^ For quo read quod. Cf. M. ' After $€d read $t.

76 On Citation [book n

cite any individual member of the corporate body; as he is
no freedman of the individuals. But he is bound to treat the
municipality {re$ publico) with deference, and if he desires to go
to law with a municipality or a corporation, he must apply for
permission under the Edicts though he should intend to cite
one who is appointed agent for the body [acUn']. 5. The terms
'^ children" and '^parents'' of the patron and patroness we must
regard as including both sexes. 6. If the patron is reduced to
peregrine condition by a sentence of deportation, then, in the
opinion of Pomponius, he loses his privilege. But if he should
be reinstated he will recover the full benefit of this Edict as well.
7. The expression " parents of the patron " confers the exemption
even on adoptive parents; but only so long as the adoptive
relation lasts. 8. If my son is given in adoption, he cannot be
cited by my freedman ; neither can my grandson, where he
was bom into the adoptive family. But if my son, after
emancipation, adopts a son, such a grandson can be cited
[by my freedman], as he is a stranger to me. 9. The word liberi
(children), according to Cassius, is applied in a way corresponding
to the use of the word parent, that is, even beyond a descendant
in the fifth degree. 10. If a freedwoman has a child by her
patron, she and her son are forbidden to cite each other.
11. But if the children of a patron should have brought a capital
accusation against their father's freedman, or have taken proceed-
ings to have him judicially pronounced a slave, no honour need
be shown them. 12. The preetor says:— ''No one is to cite
without my permission," eta He will give permission if the action
brought against a patron or a parent is not one which involves
infamy or which wounds his honour. But in every case he ought
to act on cause shown ; as in some cases, in the opinion of Pedius,
he ought to allow a patron to be cited by his freedman, even
where the action involves infamy, where, for instance, he has
done the freedman some outrageous wrong, say, he scourged him.
13. The honour in question is alwajrs to be paid to the patron,
even though he is concerned as a guardian, or curator, or voluntary
defendant on behalf of another (d^ensor), or as an agent (actor).
But where a guardian or curator of the patron is concerned,
such a person can be cited with impunity, according to Pomponius,
and this is the better opinion.

11 Paulus {on the Edict 4) Although the praetor does not
proceed to say that he will allow penal proceedings [only] on
sufficient cause shown, still, according to Labeo, his jurisdiction

TFT. iv] On Citation 77

must be exercised Bulgect to some lindtation ; suppose, for example,
the freedman should thiuk better of his intention and abandon the
action, or the patron, although cited, should not appear, or he
should have no objection to being cited ; although the language of
the Edict does not admit the above construction.

12 UiiPiANUS {an the Edict 67) If a freedman should, in
contravention of the prrator's Edict, cite a son of his patron
whom that patron has under his potestas ; the proper view to take
is that^ in the absence of the father, the son under potestas ought
to get relief, and he has a good penal action in factum against
the fireedman ; viz. one for fifty anreL

13 MoDESTiNus (Pandects 10) The general rule is that those
persons to whom deference ought to be shown cannot be cited
without the leave of the praetor.

14 Papinian^xjs {Besponsa 1) Where a freedman is put on his
trial by his patron, and, with a view to his defence, makes a
number of applications to the praises of the province in his
courts he is not held to be thereby citing the patron who accuses
him.

16 Paultjs (Questions I) A freedman presented a petition to
the Emperor against his patron in which he did not conceal the
&ct that he was his freedman ; assuming that he obtains a rescript
such as. he prays, is it held to follow that the penalty due under
the Edict is remitted ? My answer was this : — I do not think that
the prsetor's Edict applies to such a case; a man who presents
a petition to the Emperor or the presses is not held to be citing
his patron.

16 The same (Besponsa 2) The question was asked whether
a guardian could cite his own patroness without the leave
of the prsetor, when acting on behalf of his ward. I answered
that the person in question, while acting on behalf of his ward,
might go so far as to cite his own patroness without the leave
of the prsetor,

17 The same (Sentences 1) Where a man has given an under-
taking at the magistrate's office that he will produce any one,
he is compellable to do so. Moreover a man who has promised
by enrolled assurance that he will produce any one, even though
he give no undertaking at the office, is still compelled to pro-
duce him^

^ This is clearly the meaning intended ; the wording is uncertain.

78 On Citation [book n

18 Oaius {on the Ttcehe Tables 1) Most writers hold that
it is DOt lawful to cite any person from his own house ; a man's
house, they say, being his most secure shelter and retreat, so
that any one who should dte him out of it must be held to be
using violence ;

19 Paulus (an the Edict 1) and, if such person is undefended
and he keeps out of the way, it is clear that he suffers quite
sufficient penalty by the fact that the other party is put in
possession of his property. But if he makes himself accessible
or he can be seen from any public place, then, according to
Julianus, he can be properly dted.

ao Oaius (on the Twelve Tables 1) There is no doubt that
a man can lawfully be dted from his housedoor, or the baths,
or the theatre.

21 Paulus (on the Edict 1) Still, though a man who is in his
house can sometimes be cited, no one ought to be dragged out of
his own dwellinghouse.

22 Gaius (the Twelve Tables 1) Again, one is not allowed to
cite a girl under the age of puberty, who is subject to some
one else's potestas. 1. Where a man is cited, two cases may
occur in which he must be excused from attending ; one where
some one undertakes his defence in his place, and the other
where, before they have come into Court, the parties agree to
compromise the matter.

23 Marcianus (InstittUions 3) When a man is freedmau to
several patrons in common, he is still bound to ask the prtetor
for leave to cite any one of such patrons in particular, or else he
will incur the penalty prescribed by the Edict

24 Ulpianus (on the Edict 6) If any one contravenes the
above regulations, an action is allowed against him for fifty aurei ;
but this will not be given to the heir [of the patron], nor against
the heir [of the freedmau], nor after the lapse of a year.

26 MoDESTiNUS (on penalties 1) If a freedmau should cite
a patron without getting permission under the Edict, then, on
complaint made by the patron, he either has to pay the above-
mentioned penalty, viz. fifty aureif or else he is chastised by order
of the prefect of the city as failing in respect, that is^ if he is
ascertained to be devoid of means.

TEP. v] Where one who is cited faUs to appear 7»

V.
Where one who is cited fails to appear ; also where

A MAN cites one WHOM, ACCORDING TO THE EdICT, HE
HAS NO RIGHT TO CITE.

Ulpianus {on the Edict 1) Where any one who is cited
offers as a surety for his appearance at the trial a person
who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the judge before whom
he is himself cited, such a surety is not regarded as offered at all,
unless he expressly renounces his privilege.

Paulus (on the Edict 1) A man who is cited on

whatever ground before the pr»tor, or any other oflScer who
presides at the administration of justice, is bound to attend for
the purpose of having the very point ascertained whether the
officer in question really has the jurisdiction or not 1. Where
one who is cited declines to attend, he will be ordered by
the proper judge to pay such fine as it comes within the juris-
diction of that judge to impose ; but on sufficient cause shown,
as allowance must be made for the man's want of education;
moreover if the plaintiff has no interest in the other party appear-
ing at that precise time, the pnetor remits the penalty ; for instance
on the ground that the day was a holiday {dies /eriatus).

Ulpianus (on Sabinus 47) Where a man promises to appear
at a trial, but does not go on to name a penalty which he will pay
in case of non-appearance, the clear rule is that an action can
be brought for unliquidated damages to an amount equivalent to
the plaintiff's interest ; and so says Celsus himself.

VI.

Persons cited bound to appear or else give a
guarantee or an undertaking.

Paulus {on the Edict 1) It is provided by the Edict that^
when a surety is offered that a person will appear in answer to a
summons, the surety so offered must be of sufficient means, regard
bdng had to the station of the defendant, except where the surety
is a near connexion of the defendant, in which case any kind of
surety must be accepted ; suppose, for example, a man is offered
as surety for his parent or patron.

80 Persons cited hound to appear [book n

Callistratus {on Oie monitory Edict 1) or, agaioy for his
patroness, or his own children, or his wife or his daughter-in-law.
In these cases any kind of surety has to be accepted \ and where
the plaintiff refuses to accept a surety, knowing that it is a case of
a close connexion such as above mentioned, there is a good right
of action for fifty aureif

Paulus (on the Edict 4) since in the case of persons closely
connected any surety is deemed and taken to be of sufficient mean&

Ulpianus {on the Edict 58) Where a man has promised
that two particular men should appear at the trial, and thereupon
he produces one but not the other, he cannot be held to procure
them to appear in fulfilment of his promise, seeing that one of the
two was not produced.

VIL

No ONE TO RELEASE BY FORCE A MAN WHO IS CITED.

1 Ulpianus {on ike Edict 5) The prsetor published this
Edict in order that he might keep in check by fear of punishment
such as forcibly release persons who are cited. 1. Indeed we
read in Pomponius that where the offender is a slave, a noxal
action must be given, unless the slave did the act with his owner's
knowledge; in that case his owner must submit to the action,
without being allowed the alternative of surrender for noxa.
2. Ofilius holds that this Edict will not apply where a person has
been released who was never legally liable to be cited, for
instance, a parent, or a patron, or one of the other persons men-
tioned ; and this seems to me the sounder opinion. Certainly
where it was a wrong to cite the party it was no wrong to
release him.

2 Paulus {on the Edict 4) Both, no doubts contravene the
Edict, the freedman who cites his patron, and the other party
who forcibly releases him ; but the freedman is in the worse
position, if he acts the part of plaintiff where his own wrong is just
as great The same equitable consideration applies in the case of
one who was cited to a place to which he was not liable to
be dted ; but here the observation may be made more strongly
still that a man who has a right to decline to be sued at that
place, cannot be alleged to be released with violence^

^ quivii inserend. after accipitur. M.

TPT. vn] No (me to release by force etc. 81

3 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 6) Where a man sets free a slaye
who was cited, Pedius holds that the Edict does not apply,
because the slaye was not a person who oould legally be cited.
That being the case, it conies to this ; there will have to be an
action for prodnction. 1. If a man should set free some one
who is dted before a subordinate judge (Judex pedanem), the
penalty mentioned in the Edict will not be incurred. 2. With
r^ard to the rule laid down by the praetor in the words ** release
with violence*' (m), does it apply where simple force is used, or
must there be malice (dolus maius) as well ? Release by force is
enough, though there should be no malice.

4 Paulus {on the Edict 4) The word 'eximere' (release),
so Pomponius says, is a comprehensive term. ' Eripere ' means to
take out of a man's hands by actual seizure ; ' eximere ' is to set
free in any way whatever. Suppose for instance one should
not positively seize a man, but contrive some hindrance in order
to prevent him from coming to the magistrate's court, so as to
cause the regular time for bringing the action to expire, or the
property at stake to be lost by lapse of time ; the party would be
held to have released the person in question, though there should
be no physical release. Similarly if any one, without taking a man
away, detains him where he is, he is liable under the same words.

1. If a man releases some one who is cited on a vexatious
pretence, there is no doubt that he is liable under the Edict.

2. The praetor says '^and he is not to contrive maliciously to
procure him to be released." Of course it is possible that the thing
should be done otherwise than maliciously, for instance, when
there is good ground in law for a release.

6 Ulpiakits {on the Edict 5) If a man releases some one
through the agency of a third person, he comes under these words,
whether he is himself present or absent. I. Where a man effects
a forcible release, an action in fouiium is allowed against him, in
which the measure of damages is not the actual amount of loss
suffered, but the value set by the plaintiff on the subject-matter of
the [original] litigation. This rule is expressly added to make it
dear that where a plaintiff has brought a vexatious action, still he
can recover the damages referred to. 2. He must however show
that the result of the release was that the defendant was not
brought before the court If he really was brought after all, there
is no penalty, the words only apply where the act made a real
difference. 3. The action is in fousttm^ and, if there are more

M. J. 6

82 No one to rdectse hy force etc. [book n

offisnders than one, ea4;h may be sued separately, moreover the
party released remains still as much liable aa before. 4. Heirs
have a right to bring this action only where they have an interest
in doing so ; but no action is allowed against an heir, nor after the
lapse of a year.

6 The same {on the Edict 36) Where a man who has
released a defendant debtor by force pays the damages, this does
not extinguish the debtor's liability, as the party simply pays
damages for his own act

VIIL

What pebsons bespectivelt are compelled to give a
ouabantee ob promise ok oath ob are bemitted to
a simple pbomise.

Oaius {on the provincial Edict 5) The term satisdatio
(giving a guarantee or security) arose in the same way as scUisfactio.
Just as people are said to give satisfaction to one with whose wish
they comply, so they are said to make "satisdation" to the opposite
party when they give him such security^ in respect of the subject-
matter of his suit that by furnishing sureties they relieve him from
all risk involved in it

Ulpianus {on the Edict 6) A surety who is given for the
appearance of a defendant is regarded as substantial not merely
by reference to his means, but by reference also to the facilities
there may be for suing him. 1. If a man should give a surety for
his appearance to a suit brought by any one of the class of persons
legally incapable of bringing it this giving of a surety is of no
force. 2. The prsetor says,— ''If any one cites bis parent,
his patron or patroness, the children or parents of his patron or
patroness, or his own children, or some one whom he has under
his potestaSy or his wife, or his daughter-in-law, any kind of surety
for the appearance of the defendant is to be accepted." 3. Where
the praator says '' or his own children," we must understand this
to include grandchildren descended through women : and we
must allow the privilege in question in the case of parents not only
where they are sui juris, but equally where they are under any
man's potestas : this is in t^ct said by Pomponius. Moreover a son
can become a surety for his lather, even where he is under some one

^ Read cum...ca9etur for qui,..€amL M.

TFT. vm] WhcU persons compelled to give a guarantee 83

else's potestas. Daughter-in-law we must take to include grand-
daughter-in-lawy and so on in remoter generations. 4. Where the
prsetor says ^* any kind of surety is to be accepted/' this refers to
the surety's means, it signifies, in short, even if the surety is not
substantial. 5. Where the praetor allows an action against a surety
who promised that some one should appear, it is given for such
amount as the matter is worth ; but as for whether that means the
actual loss in fact incurred, or a definite amount [cm vero qtumU-
taiem] settled beforehand, this is a point to consider. The better
opinion is that the surety is liable for the actual amount [in neram
quantita£em]j unless he became surety for a specific sum^

5 Gaius (on thepromncicU Edict 1) Whether the action was
for double or treble or fourfold damages, it is held that one and the
same surety is liable for whatever the amount was, without further
discrimination, as that is the amount which the matter is taken to
be worth.

4 Paulus (on the Edict 4) If a defendant who has furnished
a surety for his appearance should die^ the preetor ought not to
order him to be produced*. Should the prsetor order him to be
produced, in ignorance of his death, or should the defendant die
after the order is made, but before the day on which he was to be
produced, no action can be allowed. Should the party on the other
hand die or lose his citizenship after the day on which he was to
be produced, an action may be brought with good efiect.

6 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 1) But if a man is surety
for one against whom judgment has already been given, and the
latter, being in that position, dies, or loses Roman citizenship, this
will not prevent an action being properly brought against the
surety. 1. Where a plaintiff declines to accept some surety offered
for tiie appearance of the other party, though he is beyond all
doubt a substantial person, having regard to the condition of the
defendant, or, if there was any doubt, is shown to be such, an
action for injuria can be brought against him, as it is certainly no
every day ir^uria that a man who offers a thoroughly sufficient
surety should be brought up summarily in person. Indeed the
surety himself whom the party declined to accept may take pro-
ceedings as for an ifyv/ria done to himself.

6 Paitlus (on the Edict 12) If in any case there is some flaw
in the undertaking or the guarantee given, it is held that there is
no imdertaking at all.

1 The passage most be corrupt. ' Read exkSberi for exhibere. Of. M.

6—2

84 What persons compelled to pive a guarantee [book n

7 Ulpiaiius {on the Edict 14) I^ without the soffioieQcy of
the snrety being denied, it should be alleged that he has a right
to object to the jvrisdiction, and the plaintiff should be apprehensiye
t^at he will raise a plea founded on the alleged right, — ^let us see
how the law stands. As to this point, — so we are informed by
Pomponius in his book of Epistles, by Marcellus (Dig. 3) and by
Papiniaxius (Questions 8) — the Divine Pius laid down, in a rescrqit
addressed to Cornelius Procnlus, tiiat a plaintiff was quite justified
in reftising to aooept such a surety, but that, if no other surety oaa
be procured, the one who is offered must make a declaration that^
if he is sued, he will not avail himself of his privilege. 1. Where
the finding of a surety is obligatory, but the defendant has a
difficulty in finding one on the spot where he is sued ; then, if he
offer to find one in some other city of the same province, his
proposal may be entertained. But where the defendant offers
a surety without being obliged to do so, he is not allowed to change
the place ; a man has no claim to consideration of this kind where
he of his own choice put himself under the necessity of finding
a surety. 2. If guarantee for appearance has not yet been
furnished, where the trial relates to some moveable, and the person
who is required to find a surety is not thought trustworthy, the
property should be deposited at the Office [Q^/um], if that is
agreeable to the judge, until either a surety is found or else the
case is concluded.

8 Paulus {on the Edict 1 4) Commonly the parties to the action
agree as to the mention of a day in the stipulation. In default of
such agreement, Pedius holds that the promisee may choose the
day, subject to some limitation as to the time ; this point is to be
decided by the judge. 1. A man who offers a woman as a person
to guarantee his appearance, is not held to find a surety at all ;
indeed, soldiers and persons under twenty-five are not to be
approved of, except where such persons are sureties in their own
behalf, as, for example, where they are sureties for their own
agents. Some indeed hold that where an action is brought to
recover dotal land by a husband, the wife may be surety in her
own behalf. 2. If a person who before issue was joined was surety
that the judgment would be complied with [judiccUjwm solvi] is
found to be a slave, the plaintiff has a claim to relief, and a fresh
undertaking must be made. Relief must also be given to one
under twenty-five, and perhaps to a woman, on the ground of
inexperience. 3. If one who is surety that the judgment will be

TTT. Tm] Whatpersans compelled ta give a guarantee 86

oooqilied with becomes heir to the person ,to whom the assurance
was given, or vice vergd, fresh assurance will hare to be giyen.
4b A guardian or curator, when he has to undertake that property
shall be preserved for the ward, may have an order that he shall
come to the municipal town, because the guarantee is compulsory ;
the same rule holds as to a guarantee for a man giving up to the
bare proprietor property in which a usufruct has been created ;
and a legatee is in the same position with reference to his giving
security that, if the inheritance should be recovered by action
[from the present assumed heir], be will give up any legacy paid
him, including anything which, having regard to the lex Faidduz^
was paid in excess ; moreover, an heir has a right to be heard on
an application to be sent to the municipal town for the purpose of
giving security for payment of legacies. It is true that if a legatee
has once been put in possession of the property bequeathed him
in a case where it was the heir's own &ult that he omitted to find
a surety, and the heir thereupon requests that the legatee may
give up i>OBsession, and dedares that he is ready to find a surety in
the municipal town, he will not be entitled to permission to do sa
But it is a different case where the legatee is put in possession
through no negligence or wilful misconduct of the heir. 5. A man
[who desires to give security in the tiumicqnvm] is ordered to
deny on oath any vexatious intention, for fear lest he should really
be seeking to annoy his opponent, and should have had that main
ol^ect in calling upon him to come to the munieipium, when
perhaps he is able to find a surety in Rome ; stiU some persons
are excused the oath referred to in disavowal of vexatious intention ;
for instance, parents and patron& A man who gets the order
authoriidng him to go to a munieipium is bound to swear as
follows : — that he is unable to find a surety in Rome, but that he
can find one at the place to which he requests to be sent, and that
he does not make the application with any vexatious intent But
he is not compellable to swear as follows : — that he cannot find
a surety in any other place than the one named :— because if,
though unable to give security in Rome, he is able to give it in any
one of several other places, this would amount to compelling him
to commit peijury. 6. The leave in question will only be obtained
where there is shown to be lawful cause. Suppose, for instance,
the defendant was in the munieipium on a previous occasion, and
then refused to find any surety; in such a case the permission
ought not to be given him, as it was his own &ult that he did not
find a surety at the place to which he now desires to go.

86 WhatperMns compelled to give a guarantee [book n

9 Gaiub {an the provincial Edict 6) Where an arbitrator iB
appointed to try the sufficiency of proposed sureties, if his decision
appears unjust^ relatiTely to either party, there is an appeal allowed
from him, just as there is from a regular judge.

10 Paulus {on the Edict 75)^ If sureties are approved of by
the arbitrator, they are to be deemed substantial persons ; seeing
that a complaint may be made before the proper judge ; who can,
on sufficient cause shown, reject sureties approved by the arbitrator,
or, it may be, approve those rejected. 1. Much more may we say
that, where a man of his own freewill accepted sureties that were
offered him, he is bound to be content with them. If, however, in
the meantime some notable calamity should overtake the sureties,
or, say, severe loss of means, then, on sufficient cause shown,
sureties must be found over again.

11 Ulpian {on the Edict 75) Julianus has the following:
having no mandate as yet from me to bring an action to recover
land, you still intend to bring the action, and you accordingly take
the requisite guarantee, after which I give you the mandate and
you institute proceedings in pursuance of it; in this case the
sureties are bound.

12 The same {on the Edict 77) All writers are agreed that
where a man is appointed heir on condition, then, if he is in
possession of the inheritance while the condition is pending, he
must give an undeiiaking to the substitutional heir to hand over
the inheritance, after which, if the condition fails, the substitute,
assuming that he chooses to enter as heir, can bring the herediJtatis
petitio, and, if he succeeds therein, the undertaking can be sued
on. Very often indeed the praetor himself, before the condition
comes to pass, and before the time has arrived for the hereditatis
petUiOy will, on due cause shown, order the stipulation to be made.

18 Paulus {on the Edict 76) And if there are several substi-
tutes, an undertaking must be given to each separately.

14 The same {Reaponea 2) A son under potestas undertakes
the defence of his father, who is absent : I wish to know whether
he is bound to give security by sureties that the judgment will be
obeyed. Paulus replied that any one who undertakes to defend an
action on behalf of an absent person, even if he is a son or a father,
is bound, according to the terms of the Edict, to give such security
to the person who is bringing it.

^ On division of sections at this point cfl M.

TFT. vin] Whatpersam compelled to give a guarantee 87

15 Magbb {on appends 1) It must be borne in mind that
defendants in possession of immoveable property are not com-
pellable to find sureties. 1. By possessor is to be understood
a person who possesses land in the country or a town, whether
solely or in respect of a share. We may add that a man
is considered possessor just as much when he has an ager
weUgalia^ that is, an emphyteutic estate. Furthermore, a man
must be regarded as possessor when he has the bare owner-
ship. But where he has only the usufruct, we have Ulpian's
authority that he is not possessor. 2. A creditor who has taken
a thing in pledge is not ' possessor,' although he should have got
possession, whether the thing has been delivered to him or he has
allowed it to be held on preeaHwm by the debtor. 3. If land is
given by way of dos^ both husband and wife are, in regard of theur
actual possession of such land, considered possessors. 4. A man
who has a right of action in penonam for the delivery of land
is in a different legal position. 5. Guardians are treated like
possessors, whether their wards are in possession or they are so
themselves ; indeed, the construction is the same even where only
one of the guardians is in possession. 6. If you bring an action
against me to recover land which I possess, and judgment being
given in your fitvour, I thereupon appeal, am I still possessor of
the land? The proper view to hold is that I am possessor, as
I have still got possession ; and it makes no difference that my
possession can be taken away from me by course of law. 7. When
the question arises whether a man is possessor, the time to be
considered [for the present purpose] is that at which the under-
taking is given ; for just as a man who sells the possession after
giving the undertaking is in no worse position, so one who takes
possession after giving it is in no better position.

16 Paulus {on the Edict 6) Where a man promises on oath
to appear at the trial, he is not held to commit peijury if he fails
to appear on some recognized ground.

88 Nature of the undertaking given [book n

IX.

NaTUBB of THB UNDERTAKINO OIVEK is the CA8B OF

A KOXAL ACTION.

ULPiAinas (an the Edict 7) If a man has promieed that
some slave who is the subject of a noxal action shall be produced
at the trial, he must, so the prsetor says, be ready to produce^
him in the same Ic^ plight [catMa] in which he is at the time
while joinder of issue is still pending. L What is meant by the
expression ^* the same legal plight " is a point to consider ; but
the true view, I should say, is that a man must be held to present
the slave in the same plight where he does not put the plaintiff
in a worse legal position with reference to the action which he
brings. Should the slave in the meantime cease to be the pro-
misor's property, or the plaintiflTs right of action be lost, then,
according to Ijabeo, the slave cannot be held to be presented in
the same legal plight ; the same may be said where a plaintiflf who
was in as good a position (as the defendant) for purposes of litiga-
tion comes to be in a worse position by some change of place or
of party. Thus where the slave is sold to some one who cannot
be sued in the same court as the promisor could, or is transferred
to a man who is a more formidable antagonist, the same authority
considers on the whole that he cannot be said to be produced in
court in the same legal plight Again, if the slave should in the
meantime be surrendered for naa^Of Ofilius holds that he cannot
be produced in the same plight, as> in his opinion, surrender
for noxa does away with all noxal actions on the part of other
persons.

Paulus (an the Edict 6) However, the present practice is
different ; when a slave is surrendered for nasca he is not dis-
charged from all antecedent l^gal predicaments ; in fietct naaca still
follows the guilty subject just as much as if he had been sold.
1. If some one is in a position to bring a noxal action in respect
of a slave, and the slave is absent, then, according to Yindius, if
the owner does not deny that the slave is under his control, he
can be compelled either to promise that he shaU be produced in
court, or to join issue, or else, if he does not choose to undertake
the defence, he must give an undertaking that he will produce the
slave as soon as he is able : but, if he denies falsely that he is

^ debere inserend. after eaMbers, M.

TTT. ix] in the erne of a noxal action 89

under his control, he must take up the case without the altematiye
of surrender for noxe^ Julianus says the same, even where the
owner contrives fraudulently that the slave shall not be under his
control But, if the slave is present and the owner is absent, and
nobody defends the slave, the prsotor will order that the plaintiff
may carry the slave off; at the same time the owner will be
allowed, on cause shown, to defend the case afterwards, so
Pomponius and Vindius say, so as to prevent him from losing
by his absence; consequentiy the plaintiff himself can get an
order giving him back his ri^t of action, which he was deprived
of by the &ct that when the slave was taken off he became his
(the plaintiff's) property.

5 Ulpianus {on the Edict 7) If a noxal action is brought
against one who has a usufiruct in a slave and he declines to
defend him, the praetor will not allow an action at law on his part
to recover the usufruct

4 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 6) If a noxal action is
brought against one of two co-owners, is the defendant bound
to find a surety in respect of the share of his fellow owner?
Sabinus says he is not, because, being obliged to take up the
defence for the whole claim, he is in a way defending the entire
man as if he were his own property, and he will not be listened to
if he offers to defend in respect of a share only.

6 Ulpianus {on Sdbinvs 47) A man promises to produce
a slave in court in the same plight^ but the slave gets his liberty
and then appears ; here, if the question to be tried concerns this
particular man in connexion with capital proceedings or on the
ground of it^uria which be is charged with committing, this is
not a good appearance ; as f one kind of penalty is applied with
a freeman by imposition of, it may be, pecuniary damages, and
another is used with a slave by inflicting severe punishment, and,
in the case of injuria^ the slave is beaten by way of satisfaction f\
But, so far as other grounds of noxal proceedings are concerned,
the former slave may in fact be held to have got into a better
plight [for the plaintiff].

6 Paulus (on Sabinus 11) However, if a promise was given
that a statu liber should appear, he is held to appear in the
same plight though he should be a free man when be appears,
as the chance of liberty was an element in his legal position
originally.

^ Truupose 9enx>...$aii^ and iib0ro...pscumaria.

90 On one who contrives [book n

On onb who oontbives that a defendant shall not

APFEAB.

1 Ulpianus (on the Edict 7) The praetor held it to be
thoroughly just to put a check on the ill practice (dolus) of such
as take measures to prevent a man from appearing to a trial.
1. A man is held to have acted with malice [dolus mcdus], not
only where he kept the defendant back with his own hands or by
the instrumentality of persons in his service, but also where he
engaged others to keep him back or get him out of the way so
that he should not appear, whether such persons were aware
or not of his design. 2. According to the meaning put on the
expression * dolus mal/uSy if any one should address words of evil
omen to some one who is on his way to the court which should
oblige him to give up going to the trial, the party would be liable
under this Edict : though indeed some hold that the other would
have himself to blame for being so easily imposed on. 3. If the
defendant fails to appear, owing to the contrivance {dolus) of the
plaintiff, such defendant will not have any right of action against
the plaintiff in virtue of this Edict, as he may well be content with
an exceptio^ supposing he should, in consequence of not appearing
at the trial, be sued for the penalty on his formal undertaking to
appear. The case is different if he should be hindered by some
third person ; then he would have a right to bring the action in
question. 4. If several are guilty of contrivance, all are liable ;
but if one of them pays the penalty, the rest are discharged, as
the plaintiff has no further interest. 5. All are agreed that in
such a case a noxal action must be brought in respect of a slave.
6. The action is allowed equally to the heir of the party wronged,
though only for a year : but against the heir of the wrongdoer
I should say an action will only be so far allowed as to prevent
such heir from making any gain through the contrivance of the
deceased.

2 Paulus {on the Edict 6) If a slave of the plaintiff, with
the knowledge of his owner, and without such owner attempting
to prevent him, though able to do so, should use contrivance so as
to prevent me fi^m appearing to the action, then, according to
Ofilius, I shall have a right of exceptio to an action by the owner,
lest the latter should profit by the ill contrivance of his slave.

TTT. x] that a defendant shall not appear 01

Bat if the slaye should do this without the consent of the owner,
Sabinus holds that I ought to be allowed a noxal action ; the act
of the slave, he says, ought not to prejudice' the owner except so
far as to cause him to lose the slaye, seeing that he did no wrong
himself.

3 JuLiANUS {Digest 2) In pursuance of this Edict, where
a man has maliciously contrived that some one who was cited
should not appear to the action, there is a good right of
action in factum against him for an amount equivalent to
the interest the plaintiff had in the defendant appearing. In
this action the inquiry wUl embrace the question what loss the
plaintiff suffered in consequence of the non-appearance ; for in-
stance, where the defendant in the meantime acquired ownership
in the subject-matter of the suit by effluxion of time or was
discharged from liability to an action. 1. No doubt, if the party
who contrived that the defendant should not appear is insolvent,
it is only just that a fresh action should be allowed against the
original defendant himself, lest he should make gain and the
plaintiff suffer loss by another man's ill practice. 2. If the
promisee and the promisor in the stipulation are both prevented
from appearing in the action, one by the contrivance of Titius
and the other by that of Msevius, each may bring an action
in factum against the person by whose contrivance he was hin-
dered. 3. If the promisee is prevented from appearing by the
contrivance of the promisor and the promisor by that of the
promisee, the praetor ought not to give any relief to either of
them ; the two cases of dolu^ may be set off one against the other.
4. If I stipulate with the surety for fifty in case the defendant
&ils to appear to the action, where the amount that I am suing
for is a hundred, and the defendant is prevented from appearing
by the ill contrivance of Sempronius, I can get a hundred from
Sempronius. This is in fact what my interest is held to amount
to, because, if the defendant had appeared at the trial, I could
have proceeded on a valid right of action which I had against him,
— or, say, his heir, — for a hundred, although the amount which the
surety engaged to pay were not so much.

92 Whei^e a man faih [book n

XL

Whbkb a man fails to obsbbvb an undbbtaking to

appeab to an aotion.

1 Qaius (on the provincial Edict 1) [With regard to the
time within which appearance is to be made] the prsBtor lays down
that one day should be given for every twenty thousand paces of
distance, in addition to the day on which the undertaking is made,
and the day on which the party is to appear. Certainly where the
time is calculated with reference to the distance on the above scale,
there is no hardship inflicted on either of the litigating parties.

2 Ulpianus {on the provincial Edict 74) The law does not
require that a defendant should appear to the action where the
matter in connexion with which he promised to appear is com-
promised ; but this is only so where the compromise is made before
the day on which the party was bound to appear; at the same
time, if it is made afterwards, an action on the promise ought to be
met by an exceptio of dolus: indeed, who would ever take any
trouble about the promise of a penalty when the matter has been
compromised ? The fact is any one would suppose that the mere
exceptio of 'compromise made' would be a good plea, on the
ground that the compromise included the liability to penalty itself
unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise. I. If a man fails
to appear to an action in accordance with his promise, without any
ill contrivance of his own, owing to some hindrance connected with
the discharge of a municipal office, it is quite right that he should
be allowed an exceptio. 2. On the same principle he ought also
to be relieved if he was not able to present himself at the trial
because he was required elsewhere as a witness. 3. Where a man
promises to appear to an action, and is unable to do so because he
is prevented by ill-health or a storm or the strength of the current
in a river, he has a good excq[>tio ; which is very reasonable, as
such a promise require personal attendance, and how was it
possible for a man to appear who was hindered by bad-health (etc.)?
For this reason even the Twelve Tables lay down that if the judge
or either of the litigating parties should be hindered by a serious
illness, the day of the trial is to be put oIL 4. If a woman &il to
appear, not on the ground of ill-health, but because she is expecting
her confinement, according to Labeo, she ought to be allowed an
exceptio : but if she keeps her bed after the birth of the chUd, it

TFT. xi] to observe an tmderUMking 98

ought to be shown that she is preyented by what amounts to ill-
health. 6. A similar rule holds where a defendant becomes
insane ; a man who is hindered by insanity is hindered by ill-health.

6. With regard to the above statement that a man is relieved even
where his failure to appear is owing to a tempest or the force of
a current, we must understand the word tempest to apply equally
whether it is by land or sea ; it is, in short, such a tempest as
prevents either a land journey or navigation, as the case may be.

7. The force of a current does not inq>ly a tempest ; but the expres-
sion applies as well where the breadth of a river constitutes the
impediment, whether the bridge is broken down or the ferry-boat
is not to be found. 8. Suppose, however, a man had had it in his
power to avoid encountering a tempest or a strong stream by
starting earlier or making tlie voyage at a suitable time^ but he
created his own dilSculty, are we to say that he will get nothing
by an exceptio ? This point is one to be decided on cause shown.
The rule cannot be^ laid down so strictly on the one hand that he
can be asked why he did^ not set out a long time before the day
which was mentioned in the promise ; nor on the other hand can
he be allowed to excuse himself on the ground of tempest or the
force of a stream if his delay was at all his own &ult Suppose^
for instance, a man who was at Rome at the very time when he
made the promise to appear at the trial should, without any urgent
need, have gone off to a provincial town to amuse himself : how
will he be the better for such matter of exceptio ? or how if there
was a storm at sea, but the party was able to come by land ; or, in
the case of the stream, to make a circuit so as to avoid it ? Here
again we must say that the exceptio will not be open to him as
a matter of course ; unless indeed the want' of time was such that
he could not accomplish the journey by land or avoid the stream in
the respective cases. Of course, if the stream overflowed to such
an extent as to flood the whole place where he had to appear, or
some unforeseen disaster wrecked the place, or made it dangerous
to approach it, then too the excepiio must be allowed him on
principles of fairness and justice. 9. In the same way an exceptio
is allowed to a defendant who desired to come to the trial, but was
detained by a magistrate, such detention being without any ill
contrivance (dolus) of his own ; if he took steps to this very end,
or gave occasion for it, the exceptio will not serve his turn, but his

* For tit read ett.

* For M < read nt,

* After nin read tmnpcrit. M.

94 Where a man fails [book n

own dolus will prejudice him, though he will not be prejudiced by
dolvs on the part of any one else, by whose contrivance he was
kept back. Still, if he is kept back by a private person he wUl get
nothing at all by an exoq)Ho founded on the drcumstance ;

3 Paulus (on the Edict 69) but he is allowed an action
against the person who kept him back for an amount corresponding
to the loss it occasions him (id quod interest).

4 Ulpianus (on the Edict 74) Again, if a man was not able
to appear at a trial because he had already been condemned on
a capital charge, in that case he is excused, and with reason. By
condemnation on a capital charge we must understand a case
where a man is punished by death or exile. It will perhaps be
said — what is the use of this exceptio to a man who is condemned ?
But the answer is that it is required by his sureties ; it is also of
use in case he has gone into exile without losing his citizenship, as
then the exceptio will be available for any one who takes up his
defence. I. One point must be remembered, that a man who
failed to appear because he was arraigned on a capital charge is in
that legal predicament that he cannot avail himself of the exceptio ;
the case in which it is allowed is where he is condemned. It is
true that if the reason why he felled to appear was that he was pre-
vented by imprisonment or mOitary arrest, in that case his position
is one in which he can have the exceptio. 2. We may add that if a
man fails to come because he is hindered by a funeral in his family,
he ought to be allowed the exceptio. 3. Again, if a man is in
bondage in the hands of enemies, and for that reason fells to appear,
he must have the benefit of the exceptio. 4. The question has been
raised whether an agreement can be made to the effect that no
exceptio shall be pleaded at all, where a man breaks an engagement
which was intended to secure that he would appear to an action ;
but Atilicinus holds that such an agreement is void. For my own
part, I should say that the agreement is valid, provided express
mention is made of the particular grounds of exceptio, and the
promisor undertook voluntarily not to rely on them. 6. Again,
this question is asked : suppose a man who was not bound to find
sureties for appearing to an action nevertheless promises with
sureties, will his sureties be allowed an exceptio 'i I should say
that the essential question is whether such a promise with sureties
was given owing to a mistake, or in pursuance of an agreement ; if
it was owing to a mistake, the sureties ought to be allowed the
exceptio ; if in pursuance of an agreement, they certainly ought not.

TIT. xi] to observe an wndertaking 96

Julianus himself sajB : — '^ if a man by way of asBuranoe that he will
appear to an action promises through ignorance a larger sum than
is laid down, an exceptio ought to be allowed " ; but if a promise
is made of the same sum in pursuance of an agreement, then,
says Julianus, the exceptio will be neutralized by a replieatio of
" terms agreed upon."

6 Paulus (on the Edict 69) There are two co-promisees, and
the debtor promises one of them under a penalty that he will appear
to an action, but the other hinders him from doing so. In this
case no exceptio will be allowed in bar of an action by the first,
unless the two are partners; but it will then, for fear lest the
result of the fietct of partnership should be that the one [who does
the wrong] profits by his own ill-practice. 1. Again, if there are
two co-promisors, and one, on being sued, declines to appear at the
trial, in disregard of the promise he made to secure his appearance,
whereupon the plaintiff demands firom one the thing which is the
subject of the litigation, and the penalty for non-appearance from
the other ; the action for the penalty will be barred by an exceptio.
2. On the same principle if a promise is made by a father to the
effect that he will appear at the trial, where an action is brought
on his son's contract, and, after that, the plaintiff sues the son on
the contract, he wiU be met with an exceptio if he then sues the
father on his promise : and there is a corresponding rule in the
converse case if the son promises to appear and the plaintiff then
sues the fiither in an action de pecuiio.

6 Gaius (on the Twelve Tables 1) Where a man finds a surety
and then fails to appear, for the reason that he is absent on public
service, it is not just that the surety should be bound on another
man's behalf, so as to have to appear to a suit where the other
himself is free not to appear.

7 Paxtlus (on the Edict 69) If a man promises that a slave,
or any one who is in the potestas of another, shall be produced to
meet an action, he has every exceptio that he would have had, if
he had been surety for some one who was free or mi juris, except
an exceptio alleging that the slave was absent on the public service,
as a slave cannot be absent on public service. Setting aside this
exception, all the others, being of general application, are available
both in the case of a free man and in that of a slaye ;

8 Oaius (on the provincial Edict 29) and if, in three or five
or more days after the defendant was to have appeared, according
to his promise, he gives the plaintiff an opportunity of proceeding

96 Where a man faUe [book n

against him, and the latter's legal position is none the worse for
the defendant's default^ it follows that he must be held to hare
a good defence by way of exoepUo.

Ulpiakus {on the Edict 77) If a slave promises to appear
to an action, the stipulation cannot be sued on either against the
slave or his sureties. 1. If an engagement is made by one
stipulation in respect of several slaves to the effect that they shall
all be produced to meet an action, the whole penalty is incurred,
according to Labeo, though only one should fail to appear, because
it is a lact that they were not all produced ; still, should a pro-
portionate penalty be offered for the one slave, Labeo holds that if
an action is brought on the stipulation, the defendant will have an
exceptio dolu

10 Paulus {on Plcmtius 1) If I promised that a partioalar
man should appear to an action who is alleged to be already dis-
charged from liability by lapse of time', an action must be allowed
against me to call upon me either to produce this man or else to
defend the action on his behalf, in order that an inquiry may be
made into the facts. 1. A slave for whose production a promise
had been made died before the day by the ill^xnitrivance of the
promisor: it is in accordance with ascertained practice that the
penalty cannot be demanded before the day arrives ; as the whole
stipulation is held to be referred to that day. 2, A man who
desired to bring an action for injuria, stipulated that the other
party should appear to the action, bu<^ fulfilment of the promise
having become due, the promisee died before joinder of issue*. It
was held that his heir had no right to an action on the stipulation,
because stipulations of that kind were only had as subsidiary to
the main action, and an action for injuria is not open to the heir
of the party wronged. In short, although the benefit of a stipulation
such as named, which is made for securing the appearance of some
one to an action, does pass to the heir, still in this case the action
ought not to be allowed ; the deceased himself, if he had chosen
to drop the action for ir^vriaj and yet to sue on the stipulation,
would not have been allowed to do so. A similar rule, it was held^
would apply if I proposed to bring an action for injvria and the
defendant died after the time had arrived for suing on the stipula-
tion, as I have no right of action on stipulation against his heir; and

^ quia,„tend>(Uiir delend. M.

^ Put antB L e. after commi$$a tUpfdoHone. M.

TFT. xi] to observe an undertaking 97

with this JulianuB agrees. Accordingly it is equally true that^ if
sureties were given, no action will be allowed against them after
the death of the principal. Pomponius says the same, provided
the death does not take place a long time after, because, if the
deceased had appeared, the plaintiff might have carried the suit
as &r as joinder of issue.

11 Ulpianus {an Sabinus 47) If a man promises that anyone
shall appear to an action, he ought to procure that he appears in
the same legal position (caum). To procure him to appear in the
same position is to make him so appear that the plaintiff is not in
a worse situation for carrying on proceedings, although he may
find it more difficult to get the redress which he demands. For
even if there should be greater difficulty in this last point, still the
rule is that the promisor is held [in such a case] to have procured
the party to appear in the same position ; even if he should have
contracted a fresh debt or have lost his money, he is still held to
appear in the same position, from which it follows that, even where
a man appears after he has become a judgment debtor to someone
else, he is held to appear in the same l^gal position.

12 Paulus (on Sabirnu 11) But where a man is enjoying some
fresh special immunity (novum primlegmm), he cannot be held to
appear in the same position. 1. One thing must be borne in
mind, that any estimate of the amount of the plaintiff's interest
must be made with reference to the day on which the defendant
was bound to appear, not to the day when the proceedings com-
mence, although by that day the plaintiff should have ceased to
have any interest

13 JcLiANUS {Digest 55) If at any time a slave should, as if
he were proceeding to litigate on his own account, either stipulate
with another for appearance at the trial or make a promise to appear
himself, the stipulation confers no right of action, nor are the
sureties bound, as a slave cannot be either defendant or plaintiff
in an action.

14 Nebatiub {Parchments 2) If a man stipulates as procurator
for another tiiat the promisor shall simply procure the appearance
of whoever it is that is the subject of the engagement, but does not
go on to stipulate for a penalty in case that person should not
appear, such a stipulation can hardly be said to be of any value at
all, because the procurcitor, so far as he is himself personally
concerned, has no interest in the party's appearing. As however
he is acting on someone else's behalf in making the stipulation, it

M. J. 7

"T

98 Where a mcmfaHs to observe an undertaking [book n

may very well be ai^ed that the person whose interest onght to
be considered in the matter is not the procunxtor but the principal
on whose behalf he acts, so that, if the defendant fails to appear,
there should be payable to the procwraJtor^ in pursuance of the
stipulation, an amount equivalent to the interest which the prin-
cipal in the case had in the party appearing. The same rule would
apply, indeed it would apply still more strongly, if the procuraU/r
should have stipulated in such words as these '* whatever is adequate
compensation {quanti ea res erU)*^ so long as we understand this
form of words to relate not to the procurator's own concern in the
matter, but to that of the princii>aL

15 Papikiai^us {Questions 2) If a guardian promises to appear
to an action and does not observe his promise, and in the meantime
the ward becomes of full age, or dies, or even is made to renounce
an inheritance [on which the action was founded], no action will
be allowed on the stipulation* Indeed, if an action had been
brought on the main question, and judgment therein given against
the guardian, and then any one of the above events were to happen,
it is established law that no action on the judgment would be
allowable against the guardian.

XII.

On FEAST-DATS, ADJOUBNMBNTS, AND DIFFERENT SEASONS.

1 Ulpianus {on all the Courts 4) It is set forth in an address
of the Divine Marcus that no one is to compel his opponent to
attend to stand a trial at the season of harvest or vintage, as men
who are engaged in agricultural matters ought not to be compelled
to come to the forum. 1. If however the prsetor, through
ignorance or stupidity, should persist in summoning such persons,
and they choose to come, then, if he delivers judgment in the case,
they being there present and voluntary parties to the action, the
judgment will be good in law, although the magistrate who ordered
them to attend were wrong in doing so; should they however
throughout keep away, and the prsetor pronounce judgment in
spite of their absence, it follows from the above that we must hold
the judgment to be of no validity, as the law cannot be set aside
by the act of the prsBtor; accordingly the decision will, without
any appeal, be held of no account 3. Certain circumstances
however there are in which there is an exception to the rule, in

TTT. xn] On feast-days^ adjournmefnts, etc. 99

the case of which persons may be compelled to come before the
prsator, even at a time when harvest and vintage are going on ; for
instance, where the subject-matter of the suit would be lost by
lapse of time, that is to say where lapse of time would take away
the right of action. No doubt whenever the matter is pressing,
persons are compellable to come before the praetor, but they can
only be compelled to attend so iar as to join issue, and this is set
forth in the very words of the address: indeed, if either party
should after joinder of issue decline to proceed with the action, the
address allows him to have the case adjourned.

2 The same {an the Edict 5) The Divine Marcus enacted,
reciting the above address in the senate, that the pr»tor might be
applied to in some further cases, even on holidays : for instance,
for the appointment of guardians or curators ; to admonish persons
who neglected their duties ; to hear excuses ; to order alimentaiy
provisions; to ascertain persons' ages; for orders that possession
might be taken on behalf of unborn children {ventris nomine)^ or
for the sake of preserving property, or by way of security for the
payment of legacies or Jidei-conrnmsa, or in cases of damnum
in/ectum; also for orders for discovery of testaments; for the
appointment of curators of the property of persons as to whom it
is uncertain whether there will be an heir to succeed them or not ;
for orders for the maintenance of children, parents, or patrons, or
for making entry on inheritances suspected to be insolvent, or for
ascertaining by ocular proof the extent of an aggravated injuria,
or ^ executing fide-commissary manumissions.

8 The same {an the Edict 3) Again, where property is likely
to be lost by lapse of time or by death, the practice is for justice to
be administered even in the season of harvest and vintage. The
loss to be feared may be by death, as where the action is for theft ;
mischief (daminum injuria), or aggravated injuria ; or in cases
where any one is alleged to have committed robbery at a fire, or
the fall of a house, or a shipwreck, or after violent capture of
a boat or a ship; and similar cases. The same holds where the
object of the proceedings would be lost by lapse of time, or the
period within which an action may be brought has nearly expired.
1. Moreover inquiries as to whether a man is free or a slave can be
heard to the end at all times of the year. 2. Similarly justice will
be administered at all times in a case against a man who accepts

^ After vel ina de, and for HbertOM read libertate. Of. M.

7-2

100 On feoM'^ys, odjaummentB, [book n

anything as the price of market-day feasts {nundmcvrvm ncndne)
contrary to public policy,

4 Patjlus (on the Edict 1) The prceses of a province asually
lays down what are to be the days^ of harvest and vintage in
accordance with the custom of the particular locality.

6 Ulpiantjs (on the Edict 62) On the last day of December
the magistrates are not accustomed to administer justice, or even
to hear any applications at all.

6 The same (on the Edict 77) With regard to judgment
being given on a holiday, it is laid down by statute that there is to
be no trial had on such a day except by consent of the parties, and
that if any judgment is given in contravention of this rule, no one
is bound to do any act or make any payment in pursuance of such
judgment, and no officer in whose court any application is made in
the matter is to compel obedience to the judgment

7 The same (on the office of consul 1) It is no doubt set down
in the address of the Divine Marcus that an order giving further
time for the production of documents is not to be had more than
once ; at the same time, for the convenience of litigating parties, on
cause shown, a second order for further time is commonly granted,
whether the documents are in the same or a different province,
subject to regulations depending on situation ; and this is especially
done in the case of some unforeseen occurrence. The foAowing
point is a fair matter for consideration ; whether, where a deceased
person got an order for further time for production of documents,
similar leave should be given to his successor also, or are we to
say that, leave having been once given, no further extension ought
to be iJlowed? But the better opinion is that on cause shown
leave should be given to the successor as welL

8 Patjlus (on Sabinns 13) According to the Roman custom the
day begins at midnight and ends at the middle of the next night
Consequently, whatever was done during those four-and-twenty
hours, that is two half nights and an intervening period of daylight^
is treated exactly as if it had been done at any hour of daylight

9 Ulpianus (on the office of proconml 7) The Divine Tngan
laid down in a rescript to Minicius Natalis that holidays occasion
cessation of judicial business only, but matters pertaining to military
discipline must be carried on even on holidays ; and this last wiU
include inspection of prisoners.

^ Before t0mp%u del eaua<i, M.

TET. xn] Olid different HOMh^''^ 101

. >

10 Paitlus {Sentences 5) In all pecuniar/.-causes only one
adjournment can be allowed in each separate ^^^^\ in capital
cases three adjournments may be given to the accused' and two to
the accuser; but> on both sides, only on cause shown." ][•;/.

* ••

XIII.
On statement of pabtioxtlaks and disoovert op

DOGUliENTSy ETa

UliPiANUS (on the Edict 4) Whaterer action a man desires
to bring he is bound to give a statement of the nature of it ; it is
perfectly just that a man who is going to bring an action should
state the nature of the particular action, so that the defendant may
thereupon know whether he ought to give way or to maintain the
contest, and, in case he thinks proper to maintain it, may not
address himself to the matter without being sufficiently equipped
for carrying it on by being acquainted with the kind of action
which is being brought against him. 1. The word 'edere' (to
state etc.) includes also enabling the defendant to take a copy, or
expressing the whole matter in a written' statement iJ,ibeUnB)y and
handing it to him ; or dictating it Labeo adds that a man states
the nature of his action when he takes his opponent up to the
prsetor^s album and points out the form which he is going to
dictate ; or he may do it by mentioning the form which he wishes
to use. 2. These statements should always be made without day
and consul, lest, if these are given, some document should be
concocted and drawn with an earlier date. But the pr»tor meant
to bar the day and consul which give the date at which an
instrument was executed, not that at which, in accordance with its
terms, payment was to be made; as the day of payment is
practically the most important thing in a stipulation* But when
accounts are produced, the day and consul should be given, as
a credit and debit account cannot be set out to any purpose unless
day and consul are given. 3. Everything ought to be discovered
which the party means to produce before the judge ; but the rule
does not go so iar as to compel a man to produce documents which
he is not going to use. 4. A man is not held to make discovery of
a stipulation when he does not discover the whole of it 5. Persons
who fidl to make proper discovery, owing to some blunder caused

102 On' statement of particulars, [book n

• » -

by age, or waptr-P^ education, or by sex, or any other sufficient
cause, will bcr-r^evecL

2 PAULU&(/(<m the Edict 3) In an action for a legacy, the
prsetor d^ki^' not require the precise words of the testament to
be giv^''[6y the plaintiff], the reason of which perhaps is that the
heir .commonly has a copy of the testament.

S ,.;-3lAnRiGiANns {on penalties 2) The senate decreed that no
^ J^tson against whom an action is brought on behalf of the Jiscus
'•ihould be compelled to discover to the informant any other docu-

'/•ments than such as relate to the case in connexion with which the

' applicant declared himself to be informant

4 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 4) The prsBtor says :— A man who
keeps a banker's table is bound to produce [to a customer] the
account in which he is concerned, adding day and consul 1. This
Edict is founded on a thoroughly just principle ; the banker makes
up the accounts of eveiy separate customer, consequently it is only
right that books which he kept for me and^ documents which might
almost be said to belong to me should be produced for my inspec-
tion. 2. The above words comprehend the case of the banker
being one under patria potestaSy so that even a person in that
position is compelled to produce accounts; whether his &thw
is bound too is a question. Labeo says that the father is not
bound, unless the banking business is being carried on with his
knowledge ; but Sabinus very properly laid down that this liability
must be admitted where the son accounts to his &ther for his
gains. 3. If, on the other hand, the business is carried on by
a slave, — which it may be, — then, says Labeo, if the slave carries
it on with his owner's consent^ the owner can be compelled to
produce accounts, and an action is allowed against him, just as
much as if he carried on the business himself. But if the slave
acted without his owner's knowledge, it is enough for the owner
to swear that he has not got the accounts asked for. If the slave
carries on the banking business with his peddinm^ the owner is
liable de peculio or de in rem verso ; but if the owner has got
the account and declines to produce it, he is liable for the whole.
4. Even a man who has ceased to carry on the business of banker
is compellable to produce documents. 5. As to place, a man is
compellable to produce at the spot where he carried on the busi-
ness ; this is distinctly laid down. In fact, if he has the books
relating to the banking business in one province, and the manage-

^ For meum read memmqus. Of. M.

TET. xm] and disawery of documents 103

ment was in another, I should say he can be compelled to make
discoyery at the place where he carried the business on ; he was
in the wrong to begin with in taking the books away somewhere
else ; and if he carries on his business in one place and is called
upon to disclose in another, he is by no means compellable to
do it : unless you desire copies at the spot where you make the
application ; of course at your own expense :

6 Paulus (on the Edict 3) and in this case he must have
time allowed him for bringing the accounts to the place.

6 UiiPiANUS (on the Edict 4) Should any banker, as often
happens, have got his books at his country-house or in a store-
house, he must either take you to the place or else give you a copy
of the account& 1. The successors to the banker's estate are
equally compellable to produce the account If there are several
heirs, and one has got the account, he alone is compellable to
produce it If all have accounts, and one produces, all the others
can be compelled to produce too; as the one who produced
might be some obscure person of no consideration, so that any
one might reasonably be in doubt as to the good faith of the
production. Accordingly, to enable the different accounts to be
compared, the others are bound to produce as well, or, at any
rate, sign the account produced by the one. A similar rule
applies to the case of there being several differ^it bankers from
whom production is required ; there is no doubt that, if several
guardians managed a guardianship together, they must either
all disclose or sign the account disclosed by one of them. 2. The
person, however, who applies for the order on ihe banker is
required to swear that he does not ask for production with vexa-
tious intent ; otherwise he might ask for accounts which he does
not require, or which he has got already, in order to give trouble
to the banker, a An account, Labeo says, is a statement of
mutual transactions of payment and receipt of credit and debt^
for the purpose of incurring or discharging obligations, and no
account can begin simply with the bare payment of a debt
Moreover, where a party takes a pledge or [security by way of]
fncmdcUunif he is not compellable to make discovery of the fact^
as these lie outside the account But a banker is bound to
disclose any payment which he engaged for by constittUnm ;
this is included within the scope of the business of a banker.
4 An action lies in pursuance of this Edict for the amount of

^ After eredendi int. debeneH, M.

104 On statement of particulars^ [book n

the plamtiflTs interest ; 6. from which it is clear that the Edict
only applies where the account is one in which the plaintiff is
concerned ; and an account may be said to concern me when you
keep it at my request But if my agent made the request in my
absence, will it have to be disclosed to me on the ground that
it concerns me? The better opinion is that it wUL Moreover,
I have no doubt that, where a man has an account for me, he
must produce it to my agent, as one that concerns him ; and the
latter must undertake that I will ratify his act, if I gave him no
mandate. 6. If where the books begin there is a date, and in
such books Titius's account is written, and this is followed by my
account without day and consul, I can ask to have day and consul
given for me too ; as the day and consul put at the beginning
apply to the whole of the account. 7. Production of an account
is dictating it or delivering a written statement or showing an
account-book. 8. The pr»tor says :— " I will order discovery to
be made to a banker, or to one who asks for discovery a second
time, only on cause shown." 9. The reason why he objects to
discovery being made to a banker is that he himself has the
means of being fully informed by his own professional papers,
and it would be absurd that the very man whose position is such
that he is bound to produce documents should make an applica-
tion to have documents produced As to the question whether
discovery of documents cannot be demanded even by the heir of
a banker, this is a point to consider; but the answer is that
where the books of the business have come to the heir's hands,
he has no right to discoveiy, but, if not, the order will be made
on cause shown. Indeed, on sufficient cause, the account must
be discovered to the banker himself; for instance, if he proves
that he has lost his accounts by shipwreck, or by the fall of
a house, or by a fire, or some similar accident^ or that he has
them at a great distance, for instance, beyond seas. 10. Again,
the prsetor will not order production on a further application,
except on cause shown :

Paulus (on the Edict 3) for example, where the applicant
shows that he has left in foreign parts the account already fur-
nished, or that discovery was insufficiently made, or where the
accounts are some which he lost by unavoidable misfortune, but
not by his own neglect 1. If he lost them by some mishap
which is excusable so far as he is concerned, fresh discovery wiD
be ordered. The above expression ''further" {iterum) has two

TTT. xm] and discovery of documenis 105

significations ; one in which it refers to the second time^ which the
Greeks express by Mrepovy while the other comprehends subse-
quent times as well, for which the Greeks use the word itoKavj
which is treated as equivalent to 'whenever it is necessary.' It
may come to pass that a man loses an account which has been
furnished to him twice, and in this case the word iterum is taken
to mean ' time after tima'

8 Ulpianus [on the Edict 4) Where a banker is called
upon to discover his accounts, he is liable to be punished if he
maliciously contrives to avoid producing them, but he is not
answerable for negligence, unless it comes very near malice.
A man declines discovery maliciously both where he produces
{sic) accounts with a sinister object and where he declines to
produce them at all. 1. Where a man offends against this Edict
he has to pay by way of damages an amount equivalent to the
interest I had in having the account produced at the time when
the order was made by the praetor, not the interest I have now ;
consequently, if my interest has ceased altogether, or has come
to be less or greater, the right of action will' [still exist, and it
will] be for neither more nor less than if my interest had been
unchanged.

9 Paulus {on the Edict 3) There are some persons who are
bound to discover accounts, but who nevertheless are not com-
pelled to do so by the pr»tor in virtue of this Edict For example,
where an agent has managed some one's afbirs or accounts, he is
not compelled by the prsetor to produce an account on pain of an
action in factum ; because, in short, the same end can be arrived
at by an action on mandixtum. Similarly, where a partner has
managed the partnership affitirs dishonestly, the praetor does not
interfere in pursuance of the above words ; because there is
the action pro socio open. Again, the prsetor does not compel
a guardian [under this head] to furnish an account to his ward ;
but the practice is to compel him to furnish it by the action on
ttUeku 1. It makes no difference whether the successor or the
pater/amilias or the owner of the banker, [if the banker is a slave,]
is of the same profession himself or not ; seeing that, as they step
into the place of the banker and his legal position, they are bound
to discharge his liabilities. But a person to whom the banker may
have bequeathed his account-books cannot be held to be included,
as the words only point to one who succeeds to his legal position ;

> After habdni read minut et habMt. Gf. M.

106 On rtatement of particul(ir8, [book n

a legatee is no more included' than he would be if the banker
had given him the books in his lifetime. In fact, the heir him-
self will not be bound, supposing he does not possess and has
not maliciously contrived to avoid possessing; still if, before he
delivers them to the legatee, he should be warned not to deliver
them [until the application is heard], he will be liable, [if he does
deliver them,] as for malicious contrivance ; he is also liable so
long as he has not delivered them. If the heir has delivered them
without malicious intention, then, on cause shown, the legatee can
be compelled to produce them. 2. Money-changers too {nummt^
laru)f as we read in Pomponius, may reasonably be compelled
to fiimish accounts, as money-changers keep accounts just like
bankers ; they receive money and they pay money out, so much
at a time ; and the evidence of their receipts and payments is
chiefly to be found in their written entries and account-books,
moreover reliance is constantly put upon their good fidth. 3. As
a fact, the prtetor orders discovery to be made to all persons who
apply for it of such accounts as they are concerned in, an oath
being taken by the applicants that they do not make the appli-
cation with vexatious intent 4 A man is concerned in an
account^ not only where he is himself party to the contract^ or
has succeeded to one who was a party, but also where some one
subject to his potestas is such a party.

10 Oaius (on the provincial Edict 1) A banker is ordered to
produce accounts ; and it matters not whether the case in which
the application is made is one to which the banker is a party
or not 1. The reason why the prsstor compels only bankers to
produce their accounts, and not other persons engaged in a busi-
ness of a difierent kind, is that their duties and services are
discharged in the interest of the public, and their most essential
function is that of keeping a careful account of their proceedings.

2. An account is regarded as produced if it is produced from the
commencement (a capite) ; unless an account is examined from
the commencement, it cannot be understood ; this of course does
not mean that everybody is to be free to inspect and copy the
whole of a man's book of accounts and all his parchments, but
only that that particular portion is to be inspected and copied
which serves to give the applicant the information required.

3. The measure of damages in the action being an amount
equivalent to the interest which the plaintiff has in the account
being produced, the result is that, whether the applicant suffers

TIT. xm] and discovery of documents 107

adverse judgment in an action brought against him, or he is
unsuccessful in an action which he brings, for want, in either
case, of the accounts by which be might have supported his case,
he will recover in this action whatever is the extent of his loss.
Let us consider, however, whether this is really a practical rule :
as a matter of fact, if the plaintiff can prove before the judge who
hears the case between him and the banker that [if he had been
furnished with the account] he would have been successful in the
action which he lost^ then he must have been in a position to
prove his point in that action itself [without the account]; so
that, if he did not prove it, or he proved it, but the judge did
not attend to the proof, he has only himself to blame, or else
the judge. However, this argument is not sound. It may well
happen that by this time [, when he sues the banker,] he has got
hold of the accounts, either from the hands of the defendant
himself, or in some other way, or he may be able to prove, by
means of other documents, or of testimony, which for some reason
or other he was not able to bring forward on the former occasion,
that he would have been able to succeed in the former action [if
he had had the accounts]. It is precisely on this principle that
a man has a condictio or an action for damnwn injuria if a
written assurance is stolen or destroyed ; because, though persons
may have been unable to prove some matter or other at firsts
owing to an assurance being abstracted, and consequently have
lost their case, they may be able to prove it now by means of
other documents and testimony which they could not make use of
on the previous occasion.

11 MoDESTlNXJS {Rides 3) It is established law that copies of
documents can be properly produced without the signature of the
party who produces them.

12 Callistbatus (oh the monitory Edict 1) Women are held
to be excluded from the functions of a banker, as that business is
one for men.

13 Ulpianus [on the Edict 4) This action is not allowed after
the lapse of a year, nor against the heir [of the banker], except in
virtue of some act of bis own. It is allowed to an heir.

108 On Pads [book n

XIV.
On PAora

1 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 4) The joBtice of this part of the
Edict is founded on Nature: what indeed can be so much in
accordance with mutual trust among men as the principle of
abiding by what persons have agreed to ? 1. Pcusttim is derived
from pactio — the word pcuc comes from the same origin — 2. and
pcustio means the consent and agreement of two or more persons
to the same effect 3. The word ' convewbio * is a comprehensive
term applying to all matters about which persons who have
dealings with one another agree by way of forming a contract
or compromising a dispute ; for just as men are said ' convenire '
(to come together) when they are brought together and come
from different places to one place, so too, when men, starting
from different inclinations of the mind, make some common
agreement, in other words, have come to arrive at one resolu-
tion [, the same word may be usedj^J So true is it that the term
' convention ' is of general application that Pedius makes the nice
observation that there is no contract and no obligation, whether
concluded by act or by set words, but it involves a convention ;
even a stipulation, which is made by a set form of words, is null
and void, unless it involves agreement. 4. Most conventions how-
ever come to be classed under some special head, such as that of
sale, letting, pledge or stipulation.

2 Paulus (pn the Edict 3) Labeo says a convention' may be
made by act or by letter or by a messenger ; in fact, he says, it
can be made with an absent person. Moreover it is understood
that a convention may be by agreement, even when made tacitly ;
1. accordingly, if I return to my debtor a written undertaking
which he gave me, it is held that there is a convention between
us that I shall not sue him, and the law is that> if I do, he vdll
have a good eooceptio founded on the convention.

3 MoDESTiHUS (Rides 3) When, however, an article pledged
for debt is restored to the debtor, then, if the money is not paid,
there is no doubt that an action can be brought for the debt,
unless it is expressly proved that the contrary was intended.

^ For eofwenire read conteniri.

TIT. xiv] On Poets 109

4 Paulus (an the Edict 3) Again, as valid conventionB may
be formed tacitly^ it is held that where dwelliug-houses (urbance
habUatianes) are let^ the landlord has a hypothek on things ''borne
in and brought in " (invecta et illata) even where no express cou-
yention was mada 1. According to this, even a dumb man can
make a ^ptiCtumJ 2. One illustration of the above is the case
of a stipulation made for giving dos ; there is no right of action
for the do8 before the marriage takes place, any more than if this
had been expressly provided, and should the marriage not take
place at all, the stipulation becomes inoperative without more
(ip80 jure). Julianus holds the sam^. 3. This lawyer was once
consulted on the following case which occurred. An agreement had
been made that^ so long as interest was paid [on money lent], no
action should be brought for the principal, but the stipulation had
been drawn in absolute terms. Julianus held that the stipulation
was subject to a condition, just as if this had been expressly
provided.

6 Ulpiakus (an the Edict 4) Of conventions there are three
kinds. The occasion of making them is either public or private,
and a private convention either is statutable or is founded on
the jtis gentitmu A case of a public convention is that of one
which is made to conclude peace \ military commanders having
come to such and such terms with that object

6 Paulus {on the Edict 3) A statutable convention is one
which is made binding by some statute. Accordingly, in some
cases a right of action is created or taken away by a pact, that
is, where this construction is supported by a statute or a decree
of the senate.

7 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 4) Of conventions founded on the
ju8 gentium some give rise to actions and some to exceptions.
1. Those that give rise to actions are not simply referred to
under the name ' convention,' they have come to be classed under
the special designations appropriate to the particular contracts
respectively, such as purchase and sale, letting and hiring, partner-
ship, loan, deposit and similar names. 2. Even if the matter does
not come to be assigned to some special class of contract, still if
there is a sufficient additional ground (catufa)y then, according
to Aristo's well expressed reply to Celsus, there is an obligation
formejd. For example, I gave you one thing on the understanding
that you should give me anotiier, or I gave you a thing on the

^ JElead pro pace. Of. IL

110 On Pacts [book n

understandiDg that you should do something; this, says Aristo,
amounts to a ^ synaUagmay and a dvil obligation will arise upon
it Accordingly I should say that Julianus was rightly taken to
task by Mauricianus in reference to the following case : — I gave
you Stichus on the understanding that you should manumit
Pamphilus, and you manumitted Pamphilus ; but Stichus was
recovered by some third person in virtue of superior title {evio-
tua). Julianus tells us that the prsdtor must aUow you an action
m factvm [against me], but the other says that your case is met
by a civil action for an unliquidated amount {dvUis ineerH acHo\
that is to say, an action in set terms {prceacriptis veHns), as there
is a contract formed, or, as Aristo calls it^ * synaUoffma,' and upon
that this action arises. 3. If a promise is made with reference
to some illegal act as an inducement to abstain from committing
it, on such an agreement no obligation can arise. 4. If there is
no additional ground (catcsa), in that case it is certain that no
obligation can be created, [I mean] on the mere agreement; so
that a bare agreement (trndum ptictmn) does not produce an
obligation, it only produces an eaoeeptio. 6. To be precise, it
does sometimes give its shape even to an action, as in bona fide
cases ; it is a common saying that agreements by way of pact
{pada canventa) are embodied in bona fide actions. But this
must be understood to mean that if the pact foUows as part of
one continued transaction, it is included in the agreement so as
even to give ground to an action; but, if it follows after an
interval, it is not included, nor will it be of any force, so far as
relied on by the plaintiff, as otherwise we should have an action
founded on a pact. Suppose, for example, after a divorce, an
agreement is made that the do8 shall not be given up [to the
woman] at the end of the regular time for which it may be held
over, but at once ; this agreement will be of no force, or else
there would be an action founded on a pact Marcellus tells us
the same thing. Again, suppose an agreement is made with refer-
ence to an action on guardianship that interest shall be paid in
excess of the established rate, this will produce no effect, else
there will be an action founded on a pact ; whereas the pacts
which are embodied in the agreement are those which make the
very terms of the contract, that is, which were made when the
contract was originally foimed. This was declared to my know-
ledge by Papinianus, who added that if, subsequently to a purchase,
some agreement is made after an interval which goes beyond the
natural character of the contract^ no action ex empto [purchaser's

TTT. xiy] On Poets 111

action) can be bronght thereon, owing to the same role, viz. that
no action is to be founded on a pact. The same must be said in
respect of all kinds of bona Jide actions. But on the side of the
defendant the pact has force, because, according to the ordinary
practice, pacts give ground to exceptions, even where they are
interposed subsequently. 6. So true is it that pacts ^ which are
made subsequently, and which are connected with the contract
in question, are included in it, that it is recognised law that
in purchases, and indeed in bona fide cases in general, so long
as nothing further has been done, the purchase may be aban-
doned. But if it can be abandoned altogether, why should
not a part of it be altered by a pact? This is in fact what
Pomponius tells ns is the case (on the Edict 6); and, that being
so, a pact will produce an effect even on the side of the
plaintiff, and will constitute good ground for an action, where
nothing further has been done ; this on the above principle :
why indeed, if the whole contract can be set aside, should it not
be recast? The result will be that there is in some sort held to
be a fresh contract

There is something ingenious in this view ; consequently I am
equally disposed to approve of a view which Pomponius supports
in his books of Lectiones, that it is possible by means of a pact
for a purchase to be abandoned in part^ on the view that the
purchase of [the whole is revoked, and then that of] a part is
made anew. On the other hand, there was a case where a pur-
chaser died leaving two heirs, and the vendor made a pact with
one of them that the purchase should be abandoned; here,
Julianus says, the agreement was good, and the purchase was
avoided as to a share, seeing that in the case of any other
kind of contract one of the heirs might procure an exceptio by
making an agreement Accordingly both views are received law
and yery properly, I mean the opinion of Julianus and that of
Pomponius too.

7. The pr»tor says: — ''Pacts agreed on, where they are not
made with malicious intent^ nor contrary to statutes, plebiscites,
decrees of the senate, or imperial edicts, and there is no fraud
ifraus) on any of these, — I will uphold." 8. Of pacts some are
in rem some in personam. They are in rem wherever I agree
generally that I will not sue ; in personam where I agree that
I will not sue a particular person, e.g. that I will not sue Lucius
Titius. The question whether a pact is made in rem or in per-

^ For excepHones read pacHonei, Qt M.

112 On Pacta [book n

aanam is to be ascertained not more* from the words of the
parties who made the agreement than from their intention ; yery
often, as Pedius says, the name of a person is inserted in the
pact, not in order to make the pact personal, but in order to
make it plain who is a party to it 9. The pr»tor says he will
not uphold a pact made with malicious intent {dolo nudo). Dolus
malus is committed by cunning and deceitfulness, and, as Pedius
says, a pact is made with dolus malvs whenever, in order to entrap
the other party, a man aims at one thing and pretends that he aims
at something else.

10. As for pacts which appear to be made so as to involve
Jratts (prejudice), the prsetor does not proceed to refer to them ;
in fact, Labeo makes the discriminating remark that, if he did
so, this would either be unjust or else superfluous. It would
be unjust if, by the aid of it, a creditor who had once [by such
a pact] given his debtor a bona fid^ release should after that
endeavour to nullify it ; but if the creditor were deceived into
giving the release, the inclusion of fram would be superfluous,
because [such] fraus is included under dolm. 11. Whether the
pact was made with dolus malus originally, or, after the pact was
concluded, something or other was done with dolus mcduSy there
will be a good replication (exceptio) in both cases alike ; this is
secured by the words in the Edict — "and there is no frausP
12. With regard to the clause commonly inserted at the end of
a pact, — "Titius asked, Mavius promised,** — these words are not
understood as only making a pact, but as making a stipulation
equally well, consequently an action ex stiptdcUu arises on them,
unless the contrary effect is expressly proved, that is, that the
words were used with the intention of making a bare agreement,
and not a stipulation. 13. If I make a pact with a man that no
action shall be brought on a judgment debt', or no action for
burning a house, such a pact is valid. 14. If I agree that I will
not proceed upon a " notification of novel structure '' {operis novi
ntmtkLtio)y some hold that the agreement is not vsJid, on the
ground that this is a matter in which the pra&tor's right of com-
mand {imperium) comes in ; but Labeo makes this distinction, —
if, he says, the " notification of novel structure " is made in respect
of private rights, the agreement can lawfully be made ; if it is
made in connexion with state afiairs, it is not lawful ; and this
is a sound distinction. Accordingly the law is, as to matters of
any kind embraced by the praetor's edict, that where they do not

^ For minui read magii. * Del pro.

TIT. xiv] On Pacts 118

involve any question of injury to the public, but only concern
private rights, a pact may be lawfully made; in fact the statute
permits a pact to be made by way of compromising an action for
theft 15. Again, a pact not to sue in an action on depodtum is,
according to Pomponius, a valid agreement, and, similarly, where
a man [sc. the depositee] agrees in a case of depositum to under-
take the whole risk, this Pomponius says is a valid agreement^
and is not to be set aside as being contrary to the rule of law:

16. in short, to put it in general terms, in any case in which the
pact lies outside every-day law it ought not to be observed ; t nor
can any inhibition be imposed by legacy to a similar effect, and
if an engagement not to sue should be made by way of oath, it
need not be keptf*, so Marcellus says {Dig. 2); and if recourse
is had to a stipulation in a case where a pact is unlawful, the
stipulation is not legally binding, but must be absolutely resdnded.

17. If a man [nominated heir] should, before entering on the in-
heritance, agree with the creditors that they should take less than
their debts, the pact will be valid. 18. But if it is a slave who
makes the agreement, before acquiring freedom and with it the
inheritance, having been appointed heir subject to. a condition,
then, so Yindius tells us, the pact will be of no avail ; but
Marcellus holds {Dig. 8) that a smus heres and a slave who is
compulsory heir, both being appointed unconditionally, if they
make the pact before intermeddling with the goods, make it with
effect, and this is sound. He says the same of an extraneous
heir; and, if he should enter at the request of the creditors,
Marcellus holds that he has in fact an action on mandatum.
If however, to take the case mentioned above, a man made the
pact while he was a slave, Marcellus holds that it cannot be
pleaded, because it is not the practice that a man should, after
acquiring liberty, get any advantage from what he did in a state
of servitude; which cannot be denied as to the exceptio founded
on a pact, but whether the law goes so far as to refuse an
exceptio founded on dclvs is matter of question. Marcellus in
cases of the same kind allowed the exceptio doliy though at one
time he was in doubt about it ; for instance, take this case :—
a filiusfa/mUias who was appointed heir made a pact with the
creditors [that they should take a percentage], he was then eman-
cipated, and he entered on the inheritance : whereupon Marcellus
says he could have an exceptio doli. He maintains the same view
even where a sen makes a similar agreement with his father's

^ The words within f t are hopeleBBly corrupt^ or some part of them.
M. J. 8

114 On Poets [book n

creditors in the lifetime of his fietther ; there too, he says, the
exc^tio doli will be allowed ; and the real trath is an exeeptio
doll ought not to be held inadmissible even in the case of
a slave. 19. At the present day, however, no agreement of this
kind bars the creditors, unless they meet together and declare
in pursuance of a general agreement what is the percentage of
their debts that they are content to accept ; subject to this, that if
they cannot agree, then the prsetor must interpose, who will make
a decree in accordance with the will of the majority.

8 Papiniantjs (Responses 10) Majority is held to mean
majority in respect of amount of debt, not in number of persons.
But if the two sides are equal in respect of the aggregate of debt,
then the majority in number is to be preferred. If the number of
creditors is equal [too], the praetor will go by the will of that one
among them who has precedence in station, but if there is absolute
equality between the two sides in every respect^ the praetor must
choose the terms which are most humane ; this being what may be
gathered Irom the rescript of the Divine Marcus.

9 Paulus (on the Edict 62) If there are a number of creditors
who have one common right of action, they are treated as one
person. For instance, suppose there are several co-creditors by
stipulation, or several bankers who all gave credit to the debtor at
the same time ; the co-creditors in each case count for one, there
being only one debt And if the contract was made with several
guardians of a creditor who was under age, they count for one,
because they agreed on behalf of one ward. Moreover if one and
the same guardian agrees on behalf of several wards who claim in
respect of one debt, it is held that he is to be treated as one single
creditor, since it is difficult to see how one man can act the part of
two. In fact even a man who has several distinct rights of action
is not allowed, in competing with a man who has only one, to stand
for more than one person. 1. Aggregate amount of debt may be
estimated by adding a number of different sums ; for instance, one
man may have owing to him minute sums amounting altogether to
a hundred aureii where another claims one sum of fifty av/rei ; in
which case we must look at the amount which is made up of several
sums, because these, when added up together into one sum, exceed
the other. 2. We must however reckon interest as making part
of the sum.

10 Ulpiaitus (on the Edict 4) According to the terms of the
rescript of the Divine Marcus, all the creditors have to attend the

TEP. xiv] On P(Mis 116

meeting. How then if some are absent ? will those who are absent
be bound to go by the example of those present? Again, one nice
question raised is whether the agreement will be a bar to pre-
ferential creditors who are absent; assuming that the agreement
is one which is binding on absent persons as well as present
I remember that^ before the above regulation was laid down by
the Divine Marcus, the Divine Pius declared by rescript that the
Jisctts itself, in cases where it was not secured by hypothec, and
preferential creditors in general, would have to be bound by the
example of ordinary creditors; as all the above regulations must
be held to be in force with respect to unsecured creditors. 1. If
to the pact there be added the stipulation of a penalty, it is
a question whether the proper course is to plead the pact by way
of exceptio, or to sue on the stipulation. Sabinus holds that the
person who stipulated can take either course at his pleasure ; and
this is the better opinion ; but if he has recourse to an exceptio
founded on the pact, it will be lair that he should give a formal
release of the stipulation. 2. A thing very commonly said is that
an excepHo founded on dolus S& subsidiary to an exceptio founded
on a pact; in short, as Julianus says, and a great many others
agree, that in some cases, where an exceptio pcicH cannot be had,
an exceptio doli will be allowed ; for instance, if my procurator
makes a pact, I shall have a good eocceptio doli, so Trebatius thinks ;
his view being that, just as a pact made by my procurator bars an
action by me, so too I can plead one to an action against me :

11 Paulus (on the Edict 3) seeing indeed that he can give
a good receipt to my debtor.

12 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 4) That it does bar my action is
certain, whether I instructed him to be a party to the pact or he
was my procwrator for all purposes ; as indeed Puteolanus tells us
(Adses9oria 1), seeing that it is established law that [in the latter
case] he can join issue on my behalf.

13 Paulus (on the Edict 3) But if the procurcUor was only
made such for the purpose of bringing an action, an agreement
made by him does not bar his principal, just as he is not competent
to give a receipt 1. If, on the other hand, he has been made
^procwraJtor on his own behalf,^' he is treated like a principal, and
for that reason his own concluded pact must be upheld.

14 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 4) Similarly it is ascertained law
that the pact of the magister of a company is good both for and
agamst the company.

8—2

116 On Pacts [book n

16 Paulus (on the Edict 3) Moreover, as Julianus says, the
pact of a guardian can be pleaded on behalf of the ward.

16 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 4) If a pact is made by the
purchaser of an inheritance [with a debtor to the same] and the
vendor of the inheritance brings an action, he can be barred by an
exceptio doU ; for, after the rescript of the Divine Pius which laid
down that the purchaser must be allowed to bring an tUUia actiOj
it is only proper that a debtor to the inheritance should have an
excqptio doli when sued by the vendor. 1. It may be added that
if it was agreed by the owner of a thing sold and a purchaser that
the property purchased, — say, a slave, — should be given up, then,
if the person who sold as owner sues the purchaser for the price,
he can be met by an exceptio doli.

17 Paulus (on the Edict 3) If I give you ten, and agree with
you that you shall owe me twenty, no obligation arises for more
than ten ; no obligation can be contracted of the class formed re
(by act) save to the extent of what actually passed. 1. Some
rights of action are taken away by means of a pact in direct law, as
a right of action for injuria or theft. 2. In the case of a pledge
there is a right of action founded on a pact, in virtue of jus
honorarium, and it is nullified by an exceptio, if the party at any
time agrees not to sua 3. If a man makes a pact to the efiect
that no action shall be brought against himself, but only against
his heir, the heir will not have the exceptio. 4. If I make a pact
that no action shall be brought against either me or Titius, this
cannot be pleaded by Titius, even if he should become my heir, as
such a pact cannot be made available by a subsequent event
Julianus gives this rule with reference to a case where a father
made a pact to the efiect that no action should be brought against
him or his daughter, and the daughter became heiress to her
father. 5. An agreement by pact made with a vendor, if it is
made in rem, can, so a good many authorities hold, be pleaded by
the purchaser too ; and such, Pomponius says, is the present law ;
but, in the opinion of Sabinus, even where such a pact is expressly
in personam, it can be pleaded against the purchaser as well [as
against the vendor] ; and Sabinus holds that the rule is the same
even where the succession to the property is by donation [instead
of sale]. 6. Where the pact is made by a man who has taken
possession of an inheritance to which he has no right, then, the
opinion held is that» if the real heir should recover the property,
the pact cannot be pleaded either by such heir or against him.

TET. xivj On Pacts 117

7. Where a son or a slave makes a pact that no action shall be
brought against the father or the owner, [as the case may be,]

18 Gaius (on the pramncial Edict 1) then, whether the pact
relates to a previous contract made with such person himself or
with his father or owner, he [, such son or slave,]

19 Paulus (on the Edict 3) acquires a good exceptio. A similar
rule applies to a ft*ee man who is held to service as a slave in good
&ith. 1. Moreover if a JUitts/amiluM makes a pact to the effect
that no action shall be brought against him, this will give him
an exceptio, and so it will to his father, if he should be sued
depeculio,

20 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 1) or de in rem verso, or if
he should be sued as one who takes up the defence in behalf of
his son, if this is what he prefers to do.

21 Pattlus (on the Edict 3) It can also be pleaded by the
&ther's heir as long as the son lives ; but in case of the son's death
it cannot be pleaded either by the father or his heir, because the
pact was in personam. 1. . If a slave makes a pact that no action
shall be brought against him, it will be inoperative [, if pleaded as
such] ; as for an exceptio doli, let us consider the point As to
this, if the pact he made was in rem, the exceptio founded on
a concluded pact will avail both the owner [of the slave in question]
and his heir, but if the pact was expressly in personam, then the
owner still has an exceptio doli, 2. Again, a man cannot, by
making a pact, enable someone else to plead it who is subject to
his potestas, but he can plead it himself, according to Proculus, if
he should be sued in the name of the person so subject, and this
is perfectly sound, provided always that it was so understood when
the pact was made. But, if I make a pact that you shall not sue
ntius, and then you bring an action against me in his name,
I cannot have an exceptio of pact concluded ; what is not open to
Titius himself will equally littie avail for one who defends his case.
Julianus himself says, — if a father makes a pact that no action shall
be brought against himself or his son, the better opinion is that
tiie ^fiUusfamilias is not allowed to plead the pact by way of exceptio,
he can only plead dolus, S. A woman under potestas can make
a pact that she will not sue for her dos when she comes to be «ta
juris\ 4. and a man under potestas can make a good pact with
reference to a legacy which has been left him on a condition.
5. Where a number of persons have a concurrent right to ask for
the same entire sum of money as co-creditors, or are co^lebtors of

118 On Poets [book n

the same sum, the question has been raised as to how far an
eooceptio paeti [founded on an agreement made by one of them] is
available against or for the others also. As to this, a pact made
in rem is ayailable in defence of any co-debtor of whom you can
say that the party who made the pact had an interest in such
co-debtor being free from liability. Consequently an agreement
made by the principal debtor that he shall not be sued will be
a defence to his sureties,

22 Ulpianus {an the Edict 4) unless the understanding was
merely that the principal should not be sued, but the surety might
be ; as in that case the surety will not have the exceptio.

23 Paulus {on the Edict 3) But an agreement made with the
surety will be no defence to the principal debtor, because the surety
has no interest in the principal debtor not being sued for the
money. Indeed it will not be a defence even to his co-sureties.

1. The defendant to an action cannot as a matter of course plead
an agreement made [by the plaintiff] with another^, irrespective of
the kind of interest he has in doing so ; he can only do so where,
the exceptio being allowed him, the real benefit goes through him
to the party with whom the agreement was made ; as in the case of
a principal promisor and those who are bound as sureties on his
behalf.

24 The same {on PlatMvs 3) But if the surety guaranteed the
debt on his own behalf, in that case the surety must be treated as
the principal debtor, and an agreement made with him is held to
be made with a principal.

26 The same {on the Edict 3) The same rule applies to two
co-promisors, or two bankers, if [, in the respective cases,] they are
partners. 1. A personal pact, according to Labeo, does not affect
a third person, as . indeed it does not even the heir of a party.

2. But although a pact made with the surety cannot be pleaded
by the principal debtor, still, in most cases, so Julianus tells us,
the principal debtor will have an exceptio doli;

26 Ulpianus {on the Edict 4) that is to say, where the
intention was that even the principal debtor himself should not be
sued. The same principle applies to co-sureties.

27 Paulus {on the Edict 3) If [two] bankers are partners and
one of them makes a pact with a debtor, will the other be barred
by an excqptio'i Neratius, Atilidnus, and Proculus say that the
other will not be barred, even if the first made his pact in rem;

^ Read alio.

TIT. xiv] On Pacts 119

the only established rule being, so he says, that the other can sue
for the whole debt. Labeo says the same; in fact one partner
cannot, he says, even novate the obligation, though valid payment
can be made to him ; and in the same way, where persons under
potestas lend anything, valid repayment can be made to them,
though they cannot novate the obligation. This is quite true, and
the corresponding rule applies to two co-creditors by stipulation.

1. If an agreement is made with a debtor not to sue for a given
time, this will not protect either the debtor or his surety for any
further time. But if the principal debtor, without naming himself,
enters into a pact that the creditor shall not sue his surety, some
hold that this will not protect the surety, though the principal
debtor has an interest in its doing so; for the reason that no
eoDceptio ought to be open to a surety which is not open to the
principal debtor too. The view I have always maintained is that
tins exceptio does protect the surety ; it would not be a case of the
surety acquiring a right through a free person, but rather of
provision being made for the person himself who makes the pact ;
and this seem to be in accordance with the present practiced
2. A man made a pact that he would not sue, and afterwards
agreed that he might sue ; here the first pact will be nullified by
the second; not indeed in direct law, in the way a stipulation is
annulled by a subsequent stipulation, where such is the intention,
because the operation of a stipulation is a matter of law, in the
case of an informal i^reement all turns upon fact; accordingly, in
the case referred to, the exeepHo is rebutted by a replicatio. In
accordance with this principle it may happen that the first pcustum
will not protect the sureties. But where the pact agreed upon was
of such a kind that it took away the right of action itself, take, for
instance, the case of an action for injurtce^ the party cannot enable'
himself to bring an action by making a subsequent pact to the
effect that he may bring it, because, in this case, the original right
of action was taken away, and the subsequent pact is ineffectual,
as a means of conferring a right of action ; an action for iifyimm
cannot be founded on a pact, but only on the commission of
offensive conduct. The same thing may be said as to bona fide
contracts, where a pact agreed upon nullifies the whole contract^
as in the case of a purchase ; the operation of a fresh pact is not
to revive the old obligation, it will only serve to form a new
contract Where however an agreement was made subsequently,

^ For videmur etc. read tidemurgue eojure uti, M.
' BstAfacere for agere. Of. M.

120 On Poets [book n

not in order to take away the whole contract^ bat only to reduce
its terms, there a second pact may operate so as to reestablish the
original contract This may very well occur in the case of an action
for dos. Suppose a woman were to make a pact to the effect that
her dos should be handed over to her at once, and, after that, were
to make a second pact that it should only be given at the time laid
down for it by statute ; in that case the dos will thereupon revert
to its regular legal condition. We have no right to say in such
a case that the position with respect to dos is made worse by
means of a pact ; as wherever the right of action for dos reverts to
those legal implications which were made part of its nature by
statute, [or, which nature's own law gave it^] the woman's l^al
position in respect of dos is not made worse, it resumes its regular
character. My master Scsevola is of the same opinion on this
point 3. One thing there is which cannot be provided by any
pact, namely that a man shall not be answerable for dolus ; though
indeed if a man agrees by pact that he will not bring an action on
depositum, the direct consequence seems to be that he agrees not
to bring an action for dolus ; no doubt such a pact as this can be
pleaded. 4. Pacts which create a position contrary to sound
morals ought not to be observed; as, for instance, where I agree
not to sue you for theft or injuria, if you should commit such
offences ; because it is desirable that people should go in fear of
the penalties attached to theft and irywria ; but such a pact may
very weU be made after the offence is committed. SimUarly a man
cannot make a pact that he will not sue out an Interdict unde vi,
assuming that it touches some matter of state concern. To sum
up the matter, where the agreement made by pact is outside the
scope of private rights and obligations, it cannot be upheld; as
care must above all things be taken that an agreement made as to
one matter or with one person shall not produce an ill-effect in
another matter or in the case of another person. ' 6. If you owe
me ten, and I agree with you that I will forbear to sue you for
twenty, the law is that you have a good exeeptio of pcidum
eonverUum or of dolus as to ten. Again, if you owe me twenty,
and I agree not to sue you for ten, the result of your meeting my
demand with an exeeptio wiU be that I am only at liberty to
require you to pay the odd ten. 6. But if I stipulated for ten or
Stichus, and make a pact with you as to ten, after which I sue
you for Stichus or ten, you can plead ^pactum eonventum,' which
will bar my whole suit; for just as payment or an action or

^ 6, 6 and 7 are absurd, and much of the Latin is barbarous.

TET. xiv] On Pads 121

a formal release applying to one thing would discharge the whole
obligation, so too, if there is an agreement interposed by pact
not to sue for one thing, the whole obligation is got rid of.
But if our agreement was understood to be that I should not have
ten given me, but Stichus, then I have a good right of action for
StichuB, and there is no exceptio that can bar me. A similar rule
holds as to an agreement not to sue for Stichus. 7. But if you are
bound to give me, generally, a slave, and I thereupon agree that
I will not sue for Stichus, then, if I sue for Stichus, I may be met
with an exeepHo of pact, but if I sue for some other slave, there is
no objection to the action. S. Again, if I agree not to bring
a hereditatis petUio against you, and then I sue for specific things
as heir, you can have an eooceptio of pactum convenium drawn to
suit your case, founded on the intention^ of the agreement in
question, just as if I were to i^gree not to sue for a piece of land,
and I were to sue for the usufruct in it, or not to sue for a ship or
a building, and I sued for particular distinct portions of them, after
the whole had been broken up; provided always there were no
express understanding to a different effect. 9. Where a formal
release given is void, it is held to amount to a tacit agreement to
the effect that no action shall be brought 10. A slave who is part
of an inheritance cannot make a valid pact on the express behalf
of the person who eventually enters as heir, as that person is not
yet owner of the slave ; but if the pact concluded is made in remiy
the heir can acquire the benefit of it.

28 Oaius {on the provincial Edict 1) Pacts which are con-
cluded in contravention of the rules of the civil law are not held
valid ; as, for instance, where a ward agrees without his guardian's
concurrence that he will not sue his debtor, or that he will not sue
for a given time, say five years: in fact> he can not even give
a valid receipt for money due, except with the concurrence of his
guardian. On the other hand if a ward agrees that something
which he owes should not be sued for, the pact so concluded is
upheld, because it is open to him to improve his position even
without the concurrence of his guardian. 1. If the cwrator of
a lunatic or prodigal makes a pact that no action shall be brought
against such lunatic or prodigal, it is more than equitable that
such an agreement of the curator should be supported ; but the
converse does not hold. 2. If a son under poteetas^ or a slave,
makes a pact that he will not himself bring an action, the pact is

^ For p€Ktum read actum. Of. M.

122 On Pacts [book n

inoperatiye. But if either of the last-nsined makes a pact in ren^
that is, that the money in question shall not be sued for, this pact
will be held good in bar of an action by the &ther or the owner,
provided the son or the slave had free management of his pecuUvmj
and the matter about which he made the pact concerns the
pecidium. Even then there is some further qualification; for,
seeing that it is quite true, as Julianus holds, that however much
a slave may have the management of his peeuUum allowed him,
still he has no right to give it away, — ^the consequence is that if he
deliberately makes a gratuitous pact that the money shall not be
sued for, the pact so concluded ought not to be upheld ; should he
however as a consideration for such an agreement receive something
which is worth as much as what he gives, or possibly more, then
the pact must be upheld.

29 Ulpi ANUS {on the Edict 4) Again, if a slave lends his owner's
money, then, according to Celsus, any pact which he made at the
time of the loan is valid.

30 Gaius (on the provindcU Edict 1) StiU, as to a JUiusfcmir
lias, we may well ask whether it is not sometimes the case that,
even where he agrees that he will himself forbear to sue, the
agreement is valid ; as, in some cases, a ^ii^famiKoui has a right
of action ; for instance, he has one for injurite. However, as the
&ct is that where an injuria is committed on a son, the fietther
himself has a right of action, there is no reasonable doubt that,
if the father wishes to sue, he will not be barred by the son's
agreement 1. Where a man stipulated with a slave for the pay-
ment of a sum of money which Titius owed him, the question has
been asked whether, supposing he then sues Titius for the money,
his action can be and ought to be barred by an eosceptio of paetvm
conventum, on the ground that he must be held to have made a
pact that he would not sue Titius. Julianus tiiinks there would be
no bar to the stipulator's action, except where he has a good right
of action de peculio against the owner of the slave, in other words,
where the slave had sufficient ground for intervening, for example,
because he (the slave) owed Titius the same sum : but if the slave
only intervened as surety, in which case no action de peculio would
be allowed, then the creditor ought not to be prevented from suing
Titius ; and it is equally true, in the opinion of Julianus, that he
ought by no means to be prevented if he took the slave for a free
person. 2. If I stipulate with you, subject to some condition, to
the effect that you will pay me a sum which Titius owes me uncon-

TIT. xivj On Poets 128

ditionallyy is it the case^ supposing the condition fiuls, that, if I sue
Titius, I may and ought to be met by an easceptio of pcustiwm con-
ventnmi The better opinion is that no such excepHo can be used.

31 Ulpianus (on the Edict of the Curule ^diies 1) It is per-
fectly admissible to make an agreement not to take advantage of
the Edict of the iEdiles, whether the agreement should be made in
the course of contracting the sale or subsequently.

32 Paulus (on PlauUus 3) With regard to the rule above
mentioned, that, if a pact not to sue is made with the principal
debtor, this gives a good exceptio to the surety as well ; this rule
was adopted for the debtor's own sake, to prevent his being sued
by the surety on the vMmdaJbwn^ consequently, if no action on
mamdatwia was open, if, for example, the surety guaranteed the
debt by way of bounty, the proper view to take is that the surety
will not have the excepHo.

33 Celsus (Digest 1) A man promised a dos on behalf of
a woman who was his granddaughter through his son, and made
a pact that no action should be brought to recover the dos
against either himself or his son. If after that the action is
brought against one who is heir to him along with his son, such
coheir cannot protect himself by an exceptio founded on the
agreement, but the son can very well avail himself of it ; since
the law allows a man to take thought for his heir, and there is
nothing to prevent his providing for one of his [expectant] heirs
in particular, on the chance of his becoming heir, and taking no
thought for the others.

34 MoDESTorus (Rules 5) It is the opinion of Julianus that
the legal tie of agnation cannot be renounced by a pact» any more
than a man can be allowed to say that he does not wish to be
a suus heres.

36 The same (Bespansa 2) Two brothers and a sister, Titius,
Msevius and Seia, divided amongst them an inheritance which
they shared in common, and executed instruments by which
they declared that they had made a partition of their maternal
inheritance, moreover they gave mutual assurances that nothing
remained undivided. Afterwards, two of them, that is MsBvins
and Seia, who had been absent at the time of their mother's
death, ascertained that a sum of money in gold coins had been
abstracted by their brother, of which sum no mention was made
in the instrument of partition. I wish to know whether, the

126 On Pacts [book n

if the guardian brought the other creditors down to a percentage
on their debts, he was bound to put up with a similar reduction
himself.

46 Hermogeniaitds {Epitomes of law 2) An agreement for
partition, unless it takes formal effect by a delivery or a stipula-
tion, will, being a bare pact, afford neither party ground for an
action.

46 Trtphoninus {Disputations 2) An agreement made between
heir and legatee to the effect that the former need not give security
is recognised to be valid, as there is an enactment of the Divine
Marcus enrolled in the Semestria to the effect that the will of
the deceased shall be binding on this point as well as any other.
Moreover, where the heir has been released by the legatee by
means of an agreement to that effect from the duty of giving
security, the latter cannot be allowed to change his mind and
revoke the release, as it is quite open to a man to alter for the
worse his means of enforcing his rights at law or his expectation
of realising his claims at some future time.

47 So^^rvoLA {Digest 1) A purchaser of land gave an under^
taking that he would pay twenty, and promised the same by
stipulation; after this the vendor gave an undertaking to the
effect that he had agreed that he would be content with thirteen,
and that he should receive payment of that sum within a specified
time. The debtor, on being sued for the latter amount, agreed
that> if it were not paid within a further specified time, he should
be liable to be sued on his original undertaking. The question was
asked whether, on failure on the part of the debtor to fulfil the
later^ agreement, the whole debt could be demanded in pursuance
of the original undertaking. I answered that, taking the foots as
stated, it could. 1. Lucius Titius, having a complicated account
with Qaius Seius, a moneychanger {mensutarius), comprising a
number of receipts and payments, made Seius his debtor, and the
latter handed him a written document in the following terms: —
'' Whereas you have had a moneychanger's account {ratiA) mensce)
with me, I have in my hands at this time, as the balance resulting
firom a great number of transactions included in the said account^
three hundred and eighty-six [aurei], and the proper interest
thereon. As for the sum of aurei which I hold to your credit
without express agreement, I engage to repay it If any instru-
ment issued, that is, written, by you is remaining in my iiands for

1 For poiteriore read pottsriorL Of. M.

;

TET. XIV] On Poets 127

whatever reasoD, whatever the amount may be, it is to be held
void and treated as cancelled.'' The following question arose.
Some time before this instrument was made Lucius Titius had
requested Seius the moneychanger to pay the former's patron the
sum of three hundred ; must we say that, considering the terms
of the above letter, by which aU written engagements connected
with whatever contract were to be held void and treated as
cancelled, neither Seius nor his sons can be sued in respect
of the last-mentioned matter? I answered that if the account
mentioned only included the receipts and payments made, all
other debts remained as they were.

48 Oaius (an the Twdve Tables 3) It is perfectly clear that
any pact that is made on a delivery of property is valid.

48 Ulpianus (on 8abmus 36) If a man lends money and ''

makes a pact that he will only sue the debtor for payment to

the extent of what the latter is able to pay, is this a valid

. agreement? The better opinion is that it is; there is nothing

^ .^ dishonest in a man desiring to be sued for payment to such extent

only as his means allow.

60 The same (on Sabmus 42) On a contract of deposit, or
a loan for use, or a locatio, or any other similar contract, I should
say that there is nothing inadmissible in an agreement such as the
following: ''You must not make my slave a thief or a runaway";
in other words, ''Tou must not incite him to become a thief or
a runaway, you must not be so negligent in providing for him as
to cause him to take to stealing.'' Just as there may be an action
brought for corrupting a slave, so too, on the same principle, there
may be such an agreement as the above, which aims at preventing
the corruption of slaves.

61 The same (on the Edict 26) If you believe [erroneously]
that you are bound in pursuance of a legacy to agree with
a debtor that you will not sue him, and accordingly he enters
into such a pact^ the debtor will not be released in strict law,
nor can he bar your action by pleading the agreement by way
of exceptiOy so Celsus informs us (lib. xxX 1. The same writer
adds the following: — If you believe erroneously that you have
to pay a legacy to Titius, and you instruct your debtor to pay
it, and the debtor who is already a creditor of Titius, agrees
with him that he will not sue him, this will not put an end
to your right of action against your debtor, nor to his against
his debtor.

128 On Pacts [book n

62 The same {OpinionB 1) A letter by which a man pledged
himself that such a one was coheir jointly with himself will not
give the latter any right of heredUcUis pebUio against persons
who are in possession of assets of the deceased. 1. Land being
pledged as security for debt, an agreement is made between the
debtor and a person who purchased from the pledgee, professing
to do so on the debtor's behalf, that the profits already received
should be set ofT against what was owing, and the balance
should be paid, and thereupon the land should be restored to
the debtor; — ^in this case, [on the death of the purchaser,] his
heir is bound to observe the agreement entered into by the
deceased. 2. If an agreement is made that any sums already
paid by a pledgee of land in discharge of the land tax (tributum)
due from the estate subject to the pledge should be recoverable
from the pledgor (d^itor\ and future sums payable out of the
same land should be paid by such pledgor, this is a lawful
agreement and must be upheld accordingly. 3. Certain persons
threatening to bring the plaint for an inofficious testament made
by their iather, the heir agreed that they should receive a specified
amount as long as he lived. A claim was made to have this pact
treated as making a perpetual obligation, but it was laid down by
rescript that by no law or principle of justice could such a demand
be entertained.

I 63 TEns SAME (Opinions 4) There is no harm in advancing to

/, a person engaged in litigation the expense of his action; but an

agreement to the efiect that instead of the amount expended for

the purpose of the action being returned with lawful interest, the

half of whatever is gained by the suit shall be handed over is an

[^ unlawful bargain.

64 Sc^rvoLA (notes to Julian Digest 22) If I had a right
to ask for Stichus and I agree not to sue for him, it cannot be
said that my debtor is in default ; and, if Stichus dies, I do not
think the defendant is liable, if he was not in default before the
pact was made.

66 JuLiANUS (Digest 35) If a debtor has a usufruct in a slave,
and the slave who is the subject thereof enters into a pact to the
effect that the debtor shall not be sued, by this pact he improves
the debtor's position. Again, if the creditor had the usufruct in
a slave, and made a pact that he would not sue, but the slave in
whom he had the usufruct thereupon agreed that the creditor

TIT. xiv] On PaeU 129

might sue, the creditor might perfectly well claim to be allowed to
sue in virtue of the pact interposed by the slave.

66 The same {on Minidus 6) If it is agreed that a landlord
shall forbear to bring some action against a tenant, and the agree-
ment is made on sufficient grounds, there is nothing in this to
prevent the tenant from bringing an action against the landlord.

67 Florentikus (In^tutions 8) A man who accepto interest
from his debtor in advance is held to make a tacit pact that he
wiU not sue for the principal before the time by which the interest
would have been payable. 1. If a pact is expressed in such terms
that it is i7i rem with respect to one party and is in personam
with respect to the other, as, for example, where the terms are
that I will not sue or [and?] that you shall not be sued, then my heir
will have a good right of action against all of you, (i.e. you and
your heirs,) and all of us, (i.e. I and my heirs,) wfll have a good
right of action against your heir.

68 Neratius {Pardimewts 3) In cases of purchase and sale,
letting and hiring, and any similar contracts, it is undisputed that,
so long as nothing further is done, the parties who are bound to
one another can by mutual agreement withdraw from the contract
Aristo's opinion went ftirther: if, he said, I have done for you all
that I was bound to do as vendor, and thereupon, the purchase-
money being still owing, you and I agree that you shall restore to
me everything connected with the thing sold which you received
from me, and that you shall not pay the purchase-money, and you
accordingly restore everything, you will thereupon cease to owe
me the money, because, according to the received view as to
bona JideSf which affords the guiding principle in all such cases,
the agreement in question is a bona fide convention. It would
make no difference whether, before anything were done in pur-
suance of our respective obligations, we agreed to abandon the
contract or you first restored to its original position everything
that I had given you, and then we agreed that you should not
give me anything in pursuance of the contract. One thing there
is which certainly cannot be effected by any agreement concluded
with the object of making void a previous arrangement; you
cannot be compelled in that way to give me back what I have
once given you; were this the case, our operations would consist
not so much in getting rid of our old contract as in creating
between us fresh obligations of some kind.

180 On Poets [book n

69 Paulus (Rules 3) Whereyer a man can acquire any right
through a stipulation made by another, the law is that his podtton
can be improved by pacts agreed on by the agency of the same
person.

60 Papirius Justus (Imperial encLdments 8) The Emperor
Antoninus laid down in a rescript to Avidius Cassius that, if the
creditors of a deceased person are willing to take a percentage on
their debts out of the estate, though it were from an heir who is
a stranger, those akin to the deceased should be first considered,
if substantial persons.

61 PoMPONius (on Sabinus 9) No man can by means of a pact
deprive himself of the right to consecrate (dedicare) his own
ground, or to bury a dead body on his own land, or to dispose
of his estate without his neighbour's consent

62 FuRius Anthianus (on the Edict 1) A debtor, after first
agreeing that he shall not be sued for the debt, the result of which
pact is that his surety is protected as well, makes another agree-
ment that he may be sued : the question has been raised whether
the surety thereupon loses the benefit of the former agreement The
better opinion is that when the surety has once acquired a right
to an exceptio founded on a pact, it cannot after that be wrested
fix)m him against his wilL

XV.

On gompromisikg and compounding.

1 Ulpianus (on the Edict 50) When a man compromises
a case (trcmsigit), the subject of compromise is some question at
issue which he treats as doubtful, and the result of the trial as
uncertain, the case not being concluded. But one who comes to
terms (padseitur) gives up gratuitously and by way of bounty
something distinct and undisputed.

2 The same (on the Edict 74) For a man to agree to a com-
promise there need not be any Aquilian stipulation added, it is
enough that terms are agreed upon by way of pact

8 SconroLA (Digest 1) The Emperors Antoninus and Yerus
issued the following rescript : '' It is beyond question that private
agreements cannot impair the rights of those who are not partiea

TFT. xv] On Compromising and Compounding 181

to them. Cionsequently whatever oompromise has been made
between the heir and the mother of the deceased, the testament
cannot be held to be rescinded by it, and legatees and manumitted
slaves have not lost their rights of action ; so that whatever they
wish to sue for in pursuance of the testament, they must bring
their action against the person who is named therein ; who, when
he compromised the question of inheritance, either took measures
for his own protection in respect of the burdens which fisJl on the
heir, or, if he did not, has no right to allow his own neglect to
prejudice other persons." 1. A compromise being made [between
the above parties] in respect of a Jldei commissum [made in favour
of the mother], and afterwards the ^'codicils" themselves being
found : I desire to ask, supposing the mother of the deceased has
received less in pursuance of the compromise than was properly
due to her, whether she has a right to get the difference in virtue
of the ^dei eommissum. The answer was Yes. 2. A secured
creditor having sold the property pledged [and died], the debtor
agreed with one Msevius, — who gave himself out as the statutable
heir of the creditor, — ^to terms of composition very advantageous
to the latter ; after which, the creditor's testament being produced,
it turned out that his real heir was Septicius. Hereupon these
questions were asked: if the debtor sues Septicius in an action
on the pignuSy can the latter have an exeeptio founded on the
composition which the plaintiff [debtor] made with MsBvius, who
was not really heir under the testament?^ and will Septicius
have a cofidictio to recover from Msevius the money which the
debtor paid Msevius under the impression that he was heir, on
the ground that Meevius received it on the pretence of being
heir? The opinion given was that on the above statement of
fact the answer was No [to both questions]; as Septicius was
not himself a party to the compromise with the debtor, and
when MsBvius received the money he was not acting on behalf of
Septidua

4 Ulpianus {on Sabinns 46) The Aquilian stipulation abso-
lutely supersedes and annuls all preceding oUigations, and it is
itself annulled by the (zeeq^Hiatio ; this is the present practice.
Consequently even bequests which are made on a condition come
within the scope of the Aquilian stipulation.

5 Papinianus {Definitions 1) When an Aquilian stipulation
is employed, given, that is, on agreement, any actions at law which

^ For tempore read ieetamenia, G£ M.

182 On Cimipriyimring and Compounding [book n

the parties did not have in their minds remain unaffected. Those
learned in the law have adopted a method of interpretation which
will defeat any release made insidiously.

6 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 17) Where disputes arise
out of a testament there can be no compromise nor any inquiry
into the facts made without inspecting and taking note of the
words of the testament itself.

7 Ulpianus (IHsptUations 7) A compromise is valid even
after judgment if an api>eal has been made or can still be
made. 1. A surety was sued and judgment given against him;
after which the principal debtor compromised matters with the
successful plaintiff. The question is asked whether the compro-
mise is valid. I should say that it is, and that every previous
ground of claim is taken away as against either the principal
debtor or the surety. If however the surety made the compro-
mise himself after judgment was pronounced against him, then,
although the compromise does not annul the judgment, still the
obligation incurred under the judgment ought to be considered as
discharged to the extent of anything that was given in pursuance
of the compromise. 2. So true is it that whatever was given,
though not to be taken in discharge of the compromise, is still
so much off the judgment debt, that on the fidth of this construc-
tion it has been held, and indeed embodied in a rescript^ in a caae
where a compromise was made, without the leave of the prsetor,
of an obligation to furnish an alimentary provision, that what
was given in pursuance of the compromise was a good part
performance of the duty to furnish the provision ; the whole
result being that whatever might still be owing by way of such
provision would have to be supplied, but credit must be allowed
for what was given already.

8 The same {on ail the Courts 5) It being observable that
persons for whom an alimentary provision had been made by
testament were very ready to compound their claims, and were
satisfied to take a small sum in immediate payment, the Divine
Marcus provided, in an address which he recited in the Senate,
that no composition as to an alimentary provision should be
upheld, except where made on the prsetor's authority. Accord-
ingly the practice is for the prsetor to interpose and decide, as
between the parties to the agreement, whether any composition
ought to be admitted, and, if so, what shall be the terms of it
1. Whether the subject of the bequest is a provision for lodging,

TIT. xy] On Compromising and Compounding 138

or dress, or for maintenance charged on land, in all cases the
same prsetor holds an inquiry as to the composition to be made.
2. The Emperor's address deals with maintenance left by testament
or by codicils, whether the codicils are supplementary to a testa-
ment or there was no testament The same rule holds equally where
the provision was made by a donatio mortis cauaa^ or is a charge
on a person to whom a don<itio mortis causa was made: and
where the proTision is made by way of fulfilling a condition, the
rule is still the same. No doubt, where the gift of maintenance
is unconnected with the death of the giver, the composition
may be made without the leave of the prsetor. 3. Accordingly,
whether the gift provides for monthly, daily or annual payment,
the Emperor's address applies; and the same is the case where
the provision is not to be perpetual, but for a specified number
of years. 4. If a capital sum of money is left a man by testa-
ment, for him to live on the interest and restore the whole sum
at his death, the address still applies, although it cannot be held
that such a bequest is one which provides for annual payments.
5. However, if a sum of money or some specific thing should be
left to Titius, on the understanding that he is to provide Seius
with maintenance out of it, the better opinion is that Titius can
compound for it, as the provision for Seius is not reduced by
Titius's composition. The same holds too if the legatee^ is charged
with maintenance by way oi Jidei eommissum. 6. The kind of
composition which the Emperor's address is directed against is
one which is made in order to enable a man to spend the present
value of a provision given him. How would it be then if he were
to make an arrangement, without the praetor's authority, to the
effect that whereas a provision was left him, payable yearly, he
should receive it monthly, or, where it was payable monthly, he
should receive it daQy? or how if he had a right to^ receive it
at the end of the year, and he arranged that he should have it at
the beginning ? I should say that any such agreement is valid, be-
cause, in the case of arrangements such as mentioned, the person
to be provided for improves his position; what the Emperor's
address aimed at preventing was compositions being made so as
to cut short alimentary provisions. 7. It is a matter of indif-
ference whether the beneficiaries in these cases are freedmen or
freebom, also whether they have an independent competency or
not 8. The points which the decree requires to be investigated
in the praetor's court are these: firsts what is the motive for
^ Before Ugatario ina a. CC M. ' Del vi, M.

134 On Campromiaing and Compounding [book n

making the composition, secondly, what is the scale of payment^
thirdly, what are the personal characters of the parties. 9. As to
the motive, the question to inquire into is what reason there is
for making a composition at all; the praetor will not listen to
one who desires to compound without good ground. The reasons
generally given are very much as follows: — ^that the heir lives in
one place and the beneficiary in another ; or that one of the two
intends to change his place of abode; that there is some urgent
reason for having a capital sum of money in hand ; or that
a provision for maintenance has been charged on several heirs,
and it is a troublesome thing to have to apply for a number of
small sums of money to different persons; or whatever other
reason there may be among the many which constantly occur
for inducing the praetor to allow a composition to be made.
10. The amount of money which is the subject of the arrange-
ment has also to be considered, in short, the sum for which the
composition is to be made: this very question of amount may
help to estimate the good faith of the transaction. The amount
should be fixed according to the age of the party who accepts
the composition and the state of his health, it is obvious that the
terms would vary according as the party were a boy, or a young
man, or an old man ; as of course a provision for maintenance
comes to an end on death. 11. Regard must also be had to the
character of the parties, that is to say, it must be considered what
are the habits of life of the persons to whom the provision is left,
whether, for example, they are persons who are prudent in their
habits, and can maintain themselves independently, or are of a
lower type, and have to depend on the provision. With regard
to the person on whom the provision is charged, the points to
look at are these: — what are his means, what is his way of life,
what reputation has he? These will make plain whether he has
any wish to defraud the person with whom he proposes to make
the composition. 12. When a man makes a composition about an
alimentary provision, he will not be held to be therein making one
about a provision for lodging or for dress, as the Divine Marcus
had an eye to compositions being made in respect of these matters
too, independently of the case first mentioned. 13. It may be
added that where a man enters into a composition on the subject
of alimony, he will not be bound to proceed to do the same with
reference to a provision for lodgings or anything else against his
will; so that he can either make the composition as to all these
matters at once or as to one or more in particular. 14. Shoe-

TFT. xv] On Compromising and Compounding 185

money too can only be compounded for in pursaanoe of the prsBtor's
judgment 15. If land is left to one or more persons by way of
provision, and they wish to sell it, a decision of the praetor must
be had as to the sale and the terms of the composition connected
with it Again, if land is left to seyeral persons by way of
alimentary provision, and they make a composition among them*
selves, the composition cannot be upheld if made without the
leave of the praetor. The same holds if landed security is given
for a provision, as, even where a mortgage is made with this
object^ the property cannot be released without application to
the praetor. 16. It is more than plain that whether the compo-
sition relates to the whole of the provision or to a part of it
only, the decision of the praetor is required for it 17. If, when
application is made to the praetor, he allows the composition to
be made without any inquiry into the circumstances, the arrauge-
ment will be null and void; the afl&ir was put into the praetor's
hands for him to inquire into it, not for him to neglect it or give
it away. Even if he fails to extend his inquiry to every point
which the Emperor^s address enjoins, via. the motive, the amount
proposed and the character of the parties, then, although he
should inquire into some points, still the rule is that the arrange-
ment is void. 18. Moreover, in this matter, the prceses of the
province, or the praetor, is not at liberty to delegate his authority.
19. A composition on the subject of an alimentary provision can
be made before the Imperial procurator ; for instance, where the
provision is claimed from the Fiscus ; consequently a composition
can be equally settled before the Praefectus iErarii. 20. If an
action is pending relative to a provision, but the action is com-
promised, the compromise cannot be held good without application
to the praetor, because otherwise the Emperor's address might be
evaded ; as it would be possible for a feigned action to be brought,
in order that a composition might be made without the praetor's
leave. 21. Should it happen that an alimentary provision is left
to a person, and, in addition to this, a legacy to be paid at once,
and then a composition is made without the sanction of the
praetor, any money already paid will be first appropriated to the
legacy which was to be payable at once, and anything over and
above to the provision. 22. If a man compounds in respect of
a provision, without the praetor's leave, anything paid [in pursu-
ance of the composition] will go in discharge of arrears of the
provision. It matters not whether the amount of such arrears
was exactly what was paid or less or more ; even if it was less.

136 On Oompromising and Compounding [book n

still what was paid must be appropriated to the arrears of the
provision. It is true that if the party who compounded about
a provision which he was to receive is the richer by the payment
made, it will be perfectly fair that an action shoidd be allowed
against him to recover the amount by which he is the richer, as
he has no right to be enriched by another man's loss. 23. If
a fixed annual allowance should be left to some one in a superior
{honestior) position, say, for instance, there is a gift of a yearly
pension, or a usufruct, then a composition may be made without
application to the prsetor ; but if a small usufruct is left by way
of maintenance, I should hold that in such a case a composition
made without the prsetor's sanction is null and void. 24. If what
is left a man as a provision is not money, but com or oil or any
other necessary of life, he is not at liberty to compound in respect
of them, whether the allowance was annual or monthly. If how-
ever he makes an arrangement without the prsetor's leave to the
effect that, instead of some provision such as above mentioned,
he should receive a payment in money every year or every month,
and, in so doing, he does not alter the day or the amount, but only
the nature of the provision ; or should he, to take the converse
case, agree to take his provision in kind, where it was left him
in money, or say he arranges to have wine instead of oil, or oil
instead of wine, and so on, or he changes the place, so as to take
the provision in a municipal town or a province, when it was left
him in Rome, or vice versa ; or he changes the person chargeable,
so as to take at the hands of one only what he had a right to at
the hands of several, or to accept the liability of one person in the
place of that of another; — ^in all these cases the prsetor must
exercise his judgment^ and the question ought to be considered
from the point of view of the interest of the beneficiary. 25. If
a fixed annual sum is left for lodging, and an arrangement is made
without the prsetor's leave to the effect that actual lodging shall
be given, this is a valid composition, as the party gets the benefit
of a lodging, though it is true that the lodging^ is liable to be
lost by collapse or fire. Again, in the converse case, where the
parties agree that, instead of a lodging which was left^ a fixed
sum shall be givefi, the arrangement is good, even without the
pnetor's leave.

The sabce {Opinions 1) A man sued his guardians in
respect of such liability as they had incurred in the course of

^ Del. tramaeiio. M.

TIT. xy] On Oompramiaing and Compounding 187

their admiiustrafcion as goardians to himself alone, and compro-
mised the action. If after that he brings a similar action as
representative of his brother, whose heir he is, against the same
defendants, they cannot bar it by pleading the compromise made
{preacriptione transactianis factce). 1. Wherever a compromise
is made, it is considered to apply to those points only on which
the parties really came to an agreement. 2. Where a man who
was, through the fraud of a coheir, in ignorance of all the real
&cts of the case, executed an instrument of compromise without
the Aquilian stipulation, you cannot say he has made an agree-
ment; rather he is defrauded. 3. Where a man who has not
yet ascertained that he has a right to bring a plaint to set aside
his father's testament has made an agreement to compromise
other matters with adverse claimants, fthe agreement so con-
cluded will only bar his action in respect of those matters which the
parties are shown to have had in their minds ^ ;t though the person
who consented to the compromise was over twenty-five; for as
for anything for which it only becomes known subsequently that
he had a right to bring an action at all, it is not right that he
should lose through the agreement what the parties are not shown
to have been thinking about

10 Thb same (fie8pon»a 1) Where a fitther compromises the
rights of sons who were not under his potestas, the law by no
means allows them to be prejudiced by it

11 Thb samb (on the Edict 4} After judgment has been given,
although no appeal has been lodged, still, if the fhct of judgment
having been given is disputed, or it is possible for a party to be
ignorant whether the &ct is so or not^ then, as there is some
possibility of a trial being held, a compromise can be mada

12 Celsus {Digest 3) No indulgence must be shown to a man
who, after making a compromise as to bequests in general made
to hjm, proceeds to found some claim on the alleged feet that he
was only thinking about what was left him at the beginning of
the testament, and not what was left in a subsequent part as welL
But if codicils are produced afterwards, then I should say he may
very honestly tell me that he was only thinking about what was
contained in the text of those testamentary papers which he knew
of at the time.

^ The phrase between 1 1 is repeated in the text with some Tariation by a
blunder ; I omit the second Tersion. v. M.

188 On Ccmpromiimg and CotiyMunding [book n

13 iEMiLius Mageb {on the Jhe per cent gtoMe m to inherit-
ance 1) None of the Imperial procurators are allowed to com-
promise an action without first consulting the Emperor.

14 ScMVOLA (Besponsa 2) A dispute arose between the
statutable heir and a person named heir in the testament^ and,
an arrangement having been made with the creditors, the dispute
was settled on certain specified terms. I wish to know who it
is that the creditors can sue. The answer was, if the creditors
were themselyes parties to the arrangement, then what has to be
followed with reference to the debts is whatever the terms were
that they agreed upon ; but if the creditors [on whose behalf you
ask] were not parties, then, owing to the doubt existing as to
who it was that was really heir to the deceased, the two parties
mentioned will be liable to tUUea a/stiones to the extent of the
shares in the inheritance which they both agreed in the arrange-
ment that they should respectively take.

16 Paulus {Sentences 1) A pact agreed upon is commonly
followed by an Aquilian stipulation, but the better conceived
plan is to add a penal stipulation as well, because, if the pact
should chance to be rescinded, the penalty can be sued for in an
action on the stipulation.

16 Hermogenianus {Epitomes of law 1) Where a man breaks
faith in respect of a lawful compromise, he is not only liable to
be barred by an exceptio, but he may be compelled to pay any
penalty which he has promised to pay in proper form on stipula-
tion, in case he should commit a breach of the agreement while the
pact was still in force.

17 Papinianus {Questions 2) The vendor of an inheritance,
after assigning his rights of action to the purchaser, made a com-
promise with a debtor to the inheritance who was not aware of
the sale; if the purchaser of the inheritance should take steps
to enforce the debt, the debtor must be allowed in virtue of
his ignorance to plead by way of easceptio that the matter was
compromised. A corresponding rule must be laid down for the
case of a man who takes an inheritance in pursuance of a Jidei
eommisstmiy if the heir-at-law compromises matters with a debtor
who is unaware of the facts.

THIRD BOOK.

I.

On motions.

1 Ulpianus {on the Edict 6) The praetor published this
title by way of taking measures for keeping up his dignity,
and also for maintaining a becoming order, desiring to prevent
motions being made before him at random and without dis-
crimination. 1. With this object he established three classes ;
some persons he would not allow to move the court at all,
others he allowed to make motions on their own behalf, others
again he allowed to move for particular kinds of persons
only, and also for themselves. 2. To move {postulare) is to
set forth one's own request or that of one's friend in court
to the magistrate who presides, or to oppose a request made
by the other party. 3. The prsdtor begins with those who
are forbidden to make any motion at all. Here the grounds of
exclusion given are childhood and accidental defects. As for
childhood, the Edict forbids any one to move the court under the
age of seventeen, that is, if he has not completed that number
of years, as the praetor considered that that time of life was too
early for any one to come forward in public; though it is said that
Nerva the son actually gave opinions on legal questions when he
was of that age or a little older, to any who consulted him. As for
accidental defects, the praetor forbids motions to be made before
him by persons who are deaf, i.e. such as cannot hear at all ; it
would in fitct have been impossible to allow a man to make a
motion who was unable to hear the praetor's decree; indeed, it
would have been dangerous to the man himself, because, if he did
not hear the decree, he would be liable to be punished for
contumacy, on the ground that he did not obey the order of the
court 4. The praetor's words are : — ** if they have no advocate

140 On Motions [book m

I will give them one." It is not the prsetor's practice to show
this indulgence to the above mentioned class only, he extends
it to all alike who for specific reasons, such as machinations or
intimidation on the part of their opponents, fail to find counsel
5. Under the second head the Edict deals with persons who are
forbidden to moye on behalf of others : here the prsator excludes
on the ground of sex and accidental defect, he also puts a mark on
persons who deserve one for bad character. With regard to sex,
he forbids women to move on behalf of other persons. The prin-
ciple of this prohibition is that of preventing women from mixing
themselves up with other people's afiairs contrary to the modesty
which becomes their sex, or discharging oflSces proper to men ;
the first case that gave occasion to the prohibition was that of
one Carftmia, a most pertinacious woman, who so worried the
magistrate with shameless applications as to give ground for the
rule laid down in the Edict As to accidental defect, the prsetor
debars a man who has lost the sight of both eyes ; such a man
being unable to see the magisterial badges of office and so pay
them due respect. Labeo tells us that in a case where one
Publilius, a blind man, father of Asprenas Nonus, wanted to make
an application to the court, Brutus turned his seat round and
refused him a hearing. However although a blind man cannot
move on any one else's behalf, still he retains his senatorial rank,
and he can discharge the office of judex. It may be asked
whether he is able to hold magisterial offices : this point must be
considered. There is an instance of a blind man bearing such an
office ; indeed Appius Claudius the Blind took part in public
debates, and pronounced a very harsh view in the senate in the
matter of the prisoners taken in the war with Pyrrhus. However
the best rule to lay down is that such a man is at liberty to keep
any magistracy which he has already begun to exercise, but is
absolutely forbidden to be candidate for another ; and there are
plenty of precedents to confirm this view. 6. The prsetor also
debars from moving on behalf of others any man who has been
used like a woman against nature. But a man who has suffered
this outrage by force from brigands or enemies ought not to have
a stigma put upon him, and this is said by Pomponius. A man
who has been condemned on a capital charge is not allowed to
move on behalf of others. Moreover there is a decree of the
senate by the terms of which a man who has been condemned on
a criminal charge for false accusation {calumnia) is not allowed to
make a motion even before a subordinate judge (Jtuiesc pedaneus).

TTT. i] On Motions 141

Again a man is excluded who hires himself out to fight with beasts.
In applying the word beasts (Jbestice) we most consider the savage-
ness of the particular animal rather than the question of its
species ; the creature might for example be a lion, but a tame
lion, or some other animal with fangs, but still tame. It appears
from the above that it is simply a man who makes the engagement
that has a mark put on him, whether he actually fights or not^ and
if he should fight without having hired himself out to do so, he
will not be liable ; the man who is liable is not one who has fought
with beasts but one who has hired himself out to do so. We may
add here that we learn from old writers that persons who fight
without pay by way of displaying their prowess are not liable,
unless indeed they allow themselves to receive a distinction on the
ground ; whoever does that does not, I should say, escape a mark
of censure. If a man engages his services to hunt wild beasts, or
to encounter, otherwise than in the arena, a wild beast which is a
plague to the neighbourhood, he incurs no mark. In short where
persons have fought with beasts without their object being to
display their prowess, the praetor allows them to appear on their
own behalf, but forbids them to do it on behalf of another. Still
it is perfectly right that where any such persons are exercising a
guardianship or a curatorship, they should be allowed to make
applications on behalf of those who are under their charge. If any
one is shown to have behaved in the way mentioned, he is not only
debarred Irom making the motion prohibited on behalf of another
person, but, in addition to that, he will be punished by a pecuniary
fine in virtue of the extraordinary powers of the court to an
amount assessed by the judge. 7. As was mentioned at the
beginning of this title, the pnetor divides those who have not
full right to make motions into three classes, of which we now
come to the third, comprising those persons to whom he does not
deny the right of moving altogether, but only says that they are
not to move for whomsoever they please ; thus treating them as
less open to objection than those who are subject to a mark under
the preceding heads. 8. The prsetor^s words are: — "whatever
persons are forbidden by any statute, plebiscite, senatorial decree,
edict, or imperial enactment to move otherwise than on behalf of
particular kinds of persons, none such are to move in my court on
behalf of any other than such persons as the law allows." These
words comprehend all those remaining i)er8ons who are set down
as of bad fame {j/nfamt^ in the praetor's edict; and all such are
forbidden to move except in behalf of themselves and particular

142 On Motions [book m

classes of persons. 9. Then the prsetor proceeds: — ''whereyer
any one of all those persons mentioned above shall not have been
restored to his original position {in integrum re8titutu8\ such a
one etc." The words ^' any one of all those persons mentioned "
must be taken to apply only to a person who is one of those
comprehended in the third clause in the Edict and is only allowed
to move for particular classes of persons ; in a case within either
of the previous clauses, an order for m integrum restitutio would
hardly be granted. 10. But to what kind of restitution is the
preetor referring ? does he mean restitution by the Emperor or by
the senate ? Pomponius asks this question, and he holds that the
restitution meant is the one given by the Emperor, or the one given
by the senate, without distinction. It has however been asked
whether the prsetor can make an order of restitution himself, and
my opinion is that no such order made by a praetor should be
observed, except where the praetor gives relief in virtue of his
magisterial authority, as he commonly does on the ground of
youth, or where a party has been deceived, and in other cases
which we shall have to go through under the head of restUvJUo in
integrum. This view is supported by the fact that if a man on
whom judgment is passed in a case entailing infomy should get the
judgment set aside by restitutio in integrum^ he thereupon, in the
opinion of Pomponius, is cleared of the infamy. 11. The prsetor
next adds : — '^ Such persons are not to move the court save on
behalf of a parent, a patron or patroness, or the children or parents
of a patron or patroness " : about which persons we have already
spoken more fully under the heading ''on citations.'' He also
adds ''or their ovm children or a brother, sister, wife, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother,
stepson, stepdaughter, or ward of either sex, lunatic of either
sex,

2 Gaiits {on the provincial Edict 1) or imbecile of either
sex," — as such persons have curators appointed, as well as
others, —

3 Ulpiaihts {on the Edict 6) "where the guardianship
or curatorship of any such person was given to the party who
desires to move the court by a parent of the person under care or
by a resolution of a majority of the guardians' or by a magistrate
who had the requisite authority thereta" 1. When we speak of
"aflSnity" we must not take this to mean such connexions by

^ hUorum : but probably it shoald be trilmnorum^ c£ Qwu l 186. M.

TTT. i] On Motions 148

marriage as may have existed some time before but only such as are
existing now. 2. Pomponios adds that the terms daughter-in-law,
son-in-law, &ther-in-law and mother-in-law are meant to include
remoter degrees of connexion such as are usually distinguished [in
Latin] by the use of the prefix pro ; 3. and that in speaking of
curators the praetor should have added the curators of dumb
persons or of any others to whom curators are commonly given,
that is, deaf persons, spendthrifts, and those under twenty-five,

4 Paultjs (on tJie Edict 5) as well as any to whom the
praetor is in the practice of giving a curator on the ground of
infirmity,

6 UiiPiANUS (on the Edict 9) and such as are incapacitated
by some incurable disease from managing their own afiairs.

6 The same (on the Edict 6) I should say however that any
persons who are not discharging the office of their own free will
but of necessity can make a motion without trangressing the Edict,
even where they belong to the class of persons who [as it is laid
down] can only move on their own behalf. Where a man is
prohibited from acting as an advocate, if this means the court of
the prohibiting magistrate, for such time as the latter continues
magistrate, in accordance with the ordinary practice, I should say
the person prohibited can afterwards practise before the magistrate
who succeeds to the office.

7 Gaixjs (on the provincial Edict 3) Any one whom the
praetor forbids to move in his court he forbids absolutely, even
though the opposite party should be willing to allow him to move.

8 Papiniakus (Qtiestions 2) The Emperor Titus Antoninus
laid down by rescript that where a man was debarred by interdict
from practising as an advocate for a period of five years, there was
nothing to prevent his making motions after the lapse of the five
years for whomsoever he pleased. The Divine Hadrian too laid
down that a man was qualified to make applications after his
return from exile. No distinction is admitted in connexion with
the nature of the offence for which the party was forbidden to
speak or exiled, otherwise a penal period which was definite as to
duration might be further prolonged, in contradiction to the terms
of the judgment

9 The same (BesponM 1) When a man is forbidden to move
on behalf of others on some ground which does not entail infamy,
and consequently does not deprive him of the right to move on

144 On Motions [book m

behalf of others in every case, he is only disabled from moving on
behalf of others in the province in which the magistrate who
pronounced the prohibition was proeses ; the prohibition does not
extend to any other province, though it should bear the same
name.

10 Paulus (Rules) Advocates of the Fiscus are at liberty to
appear on their own behalf or on behalf of their sons or parents
or of wards in whose guardianships they are acting, and even to
appear against the Fiscus. As a matter of fact members of a
municipal curia are forbidden to appear in a case against their
own municipality, except such persons as are above mentioned.

11 Tbyphoninus (I^iaptUaHons 5) A rescript of the present
Emperor lays down that a guardian is not forbidden to be of
counsel for his ward in a matter in which he has already acted as
pleader against the ward's father. Not only so, but the guardian
may plead the cause of his ward against the Fiscus, even though
he previously acted for the Fiscus in the same matter against the
ward's father. 1. As for the question what persons are included
under the term infameSy the answer to that will be set forth in the
next title.

II.

On those w^o abe marked with in/amia,

JuLiANXJS (on the Edict 1) The preetor's words are: A man
is marked with infamy who is dismissed from the army by way of
disgrace, either by the commander or by the officer who has the
power of pronouncing on the matter ; or a man who appears on
the stage in exercise of the calling of a player, or in order to
recite ; or carries on the trade of procurer ; or is pronounced in a
criminal trial to have committed any act by way of false accusation
or in coUusion with the accused ; or has had judgment given
against him in an action for theft, robbery, injurioy dolus nudus or
fraud, where he was a party to the action on his own behalf^ or to
have compromised any such action ; or has had judgment given
against him in an action pro socio or an action on guardianship,
mcmdatum or deposituniy to which he was a party on his own
account, such action not being an actio contraria ; or who, having
a [mctrried] woman under his patestas^ did on the death of his
son-in-law, and with knowledge of the feet of his death, before the

Trr. n] On those marked wUJi inftmia 145

expiration of the time which it is customary for a widow to take to
complete her mourning for her deceased husband, give such woman
in marriage before she had completed the mourning; or who
should, with knowledge of the facts, take to wife a widow in the
case above mentioned, without being ordered to do so by the man
in whose potestcLB he was himself ; or who, haying a man undw his
potestciSj should allow him to take to wife a woman situated as
above mentioned ; or who should, either on his own behalf, but not
by order of the person exercising potestcu over him, or on behalf
of a man or a woman over whom he was exercising potestaSy have
two betrothals or two marriages on foot at the same time.

Ulpianus {on the Edict 6) Whereas the praetor says " who
shall be dismissed from the army," the word dismissed must be
taken to refer to a soldier who wears the military boot, or any
other soldier who is dismissed, including a centurion, or the
praefect of a cohort, or wing, or legion, or the tribune of either a
cohort or l^on. Pomponius says, in addition to the above, that
the officer who is in command of the army, though he may display
the badges of the consular office, if dismissed by the Emperor by
way of disgrace, is branded with this mark ; accordingly, even if a
general is dismissed when in command of an army ^ — ^if the Emperor
dismisses him, and adds, as for the most part he does add, that he
dismisses him by way of disgrace, — there need be no doubt that the
general is also marked with infamy in pursuance of the prsator's
Edict; but this is not the case where a successor is appointed
without any displeasure on the part of the Emperor. 1. The word
army (exercitua) does not mean one cohort, or one wing, but a
large body of troops ; thus we may say that a man is in command
of an army, when he is at the head of a legion or several legions,
with the corresponding auxiliary troops which have been entrusted
to him by the Emperor ; but here too, when a man is dismissed
from any particular division, this must be treated as equivalent to
dismissal from the army. 2. '^Dismissed by way of disgrace.''
The reason why this was added is that there are several different
kinds of dismissal. There is honourable dismissal which is accorded
by the Emperor when a man has completed his time of service, or
sooner, there is dismissal for sickness (cafMaria\ which releases a
man from the labour of military service on the ground of ill-health ;
there is dismissal in disgrace. Dismissal in disgrace occurs when-
ever the person in authority who dismisses adds expressly that he

^ Del. fwtatur ei. M.

M. J. 10

146 On those marked imth infamia [book m

does 80 by way of a disgrace; he is always bound to give the
reason for which a soldier is dismissed. Eren where a man is
cashiered) that is where his badges of service are taken away from
him, this makes him in/cMniSy though the authority should not go
on to say that he is cashiered as a mark of disgrace. There is yet
a fourth kind of dismissal, which occurs where a man has subjected
himself to military service in order to avoid discharging some
office ; but dismissal in this case does not affect a man's character,
as has been very often laid down by rescript 3. A soldier who is
condemned under the lex Jvlia de aduUeriis is so distinctly
infamis that the very judgment itself releases him from the oath
of service as a mark of disgrace. 4 When soldiers are dismissed
in disgrace they are not at liberty to stay in the city or in any
other place where the Emperor is. 5. The prsator says : ^' A man
is in&mous who appears on the stage.'' The stage {8ccena\ ac-
cording to Labeo's definition, is something which is set up for the
purpose of performances in any place in which a man stands or
moves about to exhibit himself to spectators, whether it be in
public or in private or in a street, so long as it is some place to
which people are admitted as spectators promiscuously. In fetct
all such as take part in contests for gain and all who appear on
the stage for reward are declared by Pegasus and Nerva the son to
be of bad repute.

3 Gaius {on ike pramndal Edict 1) Where a man hires out
his services by way of agreement to appear in the calling of a
player, but does not actually appear, he is not marked; the
profession in question is not disgraceful to such a degree that the
very intention should deserve to be punished.

4 Ulpianus (on the Edict 6) Athletes, so Sabinus and
Cassius laid down, do not exercise the calling of players at all ;
they act as athletes only to display their prowess. In fact, as a
general rule, everybody holds, and it seems a sound rule, that no
members of an orchestra, or porch-athletes, or chariot-drivers, or
washers-down of horses, or any other attendants of such persons as
make it their business to act in the sacred contests, should be held
to incur ignominy. 1. Umpires, whom the Greeks call "brabeufee,"
do not practise the calling of players, as Celsus shows ; in fact,
they do not act as players, they discharge a service ; and the post
is one which at the present day is given by the Emperor as no small
favour. 2. The prsator says ''who carries on the trade of pro-
curer.'^ A man practises the trade of procurer who keeps slaves

TIT. n] On those marked with iafamiH, 147

who bring in a profit in this way ; and if a man makes a similar
speculation with free women, he is in the same position. Moreover,
whether he makes this his main business, or has some other kind
of business as well, — for instance, suppose he is an innkeeper or a
tavemkeeper, and has slaves of this kind who wait on travellers,
and use the opportunity so afforded to make gain in the way
described, or he keeps baths, and, as is done in some provinces,
he has slaves at the baths whom he hired to take charge of the
clothes of customers, and these carry on the above practices at the
bathing establishment, — ^in all these cases he will be liable to the
penalties inflicted on procurers. 3. According to Pomponius, even
where a man who is himself a slave makes this use of female slaves
who are part of his peculimn, he will be marked with infamy after
gaining his freedom. 4. A man who commits ccdvmnia (taking
proceedings in bad faith) is only marked if judgment is given
against him thereupon, it is not enough that be should have been
in feet guilty; and a prevaricator is in a similar position. A
prevaricator is, as it were, a ^'varicator" (straddler), a man who
betrays his own case and helps the other side ; the name, according
to Labeo, is derived from varia certaUo (varying contention), as a
man who prevaricates has been standing on both sides, in short, he
has stood on the opposite side to his own. 5. Again if a man
suffers judgment or makes a compromise in an action for theft,
robbery, injuria^ or doltis nudtia to which he was a party on his
own account, he incurs infamy in the same way,

5 Patjlus (on the Edict 5) as a man who compromises a
charge is regarded as confessing it

6 Ulpianus {on the Edict 6) The word "theft" must be
understood to include both fwrtwm mamfestum and fmtwm nee
fnanifestmn, 1. But if a man, after judgment against him in an
action for theft, or any other action involving in&my, appeals,
then, pending the appeal, he is not regarded as infamous, but if
the whole period within which he can bring the appeal should be
allowed to lapse, he is held infamous by relation back from the
time of the original adverse judgment ; though, at the same time,
if his appeal is rejected, I should say he is marked as from that
day only, not from the original time. 2. If a defendant suffers
adverse judgment as representing some one else, he is not branded
with in&my; consequently any agent of mine, or person who
volunteered to take up my case {d^ensoT\ or my guardian or
curator or heir will not be marked with infamy on adverse

10—2

148 On those marked with infamia [book m

•

judgment in an action for theft or any similar offence [committed
by me], nor shall I myself, if my case was conducted aU through
by means of an agent 3. The Edict proceeds — ^^^or makes a
compromise." Compromise must be taken to mean compromise
for some pecuniary consideration, whatever the amount ; otherwise
a man will be marked even where he induced the other party by
earnest entreaty to abandon the action, and no account will be
taken of cases of forbearance ; but this is inconsistent with humanity.
Where a man compromises an action by the prrotor's order on
pecuniary terms, he is not marked. 4. Add that if a man, on an
oath being tendered him, swears that he did no wrong, he will not
be marked ; he has in a way established his innocence by oath.
5. As to the reference to adverse judgment on numdixtum, the
language of the Edict pute a mark not only on the i)arty who
undertook the mandate, but on any one who &ils to keep feith
where the other relied on his doing so. For instance : I was
surety for you, and had to pay ; if I get judgment against you
in an action on the mcmdatumj it makes you in&mous. 6. There
is of course this to be added, that sometimes the heir himself
suffers judgment on his own account, and so becomes in&mous,
viz. where he acted dishonestiy in connexion with a deposit or a
mandate ; in respect of a guardianship or partnership the heir
cannot suffer judgment on his own account, because an heir does
not succeed to the position of guardian or partner, he only
succeeds to the liability for debt contracted by the deceased.
7. Adverse judgment in an actio contraria does not entail infisimy ;
and this is as it should be, as in such actions no question of bad
&ith is at issue, but the point ^ commonly decided by the court
is a question of computation.

7 Paulus (on the Edict 5) In actions founded on contract,
even where they should involve infiEumy, and parties who suffer
adverse judgment be marked, still one who makes a compromise
is not marked. This is quite right, as a compromise is not so
dishonourable in these cases as in those above mentioned.

8 UiiPiAivus {on the Edict 6) The words occur ''on the death
of his son-in-law." The prsetor very rightiy adds " he being aware
of the feet of the death,'* so as to prevent his ignorance being
punished. As however the period of mourning admits no interval,
it is right that it should, as it does, begin to run from the day of
the husband's death even where the death is unknown to the

^ Dele qw. M.

TIT. n] On tho9e marked mth in&mia 149

widow ; 80 that^ if she only becomes aware of it after the expiration
of the prescribed period, then, according to Labeo, she can put on
mourning and lay it aside on the same day.

9 Paulus (on ihe Edict 5) Men are not compelled to mourn
for their deceased wives. There is no mourning for a betrothed.

10 The same (on the Edict 8) It is in accordance with the
present practice that a widow should get leave from the Emperor
to marry again within the prescribed period. 1. When a woman
completes the period of mourning for her deceased husband, she
incurs no censure for having been engaged in the meantime to
marry again.

11 Ulpianus (on the Edict 6) Mourning for children or
parents is no impediment to marriage. 1. Even where the
deceased husband was some one for whom, by established custom,
a woman ought not to observe mourning, stul the widow cannot be
given in marriage before the expiration of the statutable time ;
the prtetor looks at the day on which mourning for a deceased
husband would terminate, and the object of making it a practice
to complete the period is to avoid confusion of blood 2. Pom-
ponius holds that a woman who bears a child within the prescribed
time may at onoegiTe herself in marriage, which, I should say, is
sound. 3. It is not the practice, so Neratins says, to observe
mourning for enemies, or for persons oondenmed for perdudUo
(treason), or those who hang themselves, or lay violent hands on
themselves from a bad conscience and not from weariness of life;
still if a widow ^ where the husband has died under any such
circumstances, should give herself in marriage [within the period],
she will be marked with infamy. 4. A mark is also set on the
man who takes to vdfe such a widow, that is, if he knows the &ct ;
ignorance of law Sa not excused, but only ignorance of fact A man
who should make such a marriage by the order of one who has
potestas over him is excused, and the mark is put on the person
himself who suffers him to make the marriage. Both these rules
are sound ; the party who complied deserves indulgence, and the
one who allowed him to make the marriage may fitly receive a
mark of ignominy.

12 Paxtlus (on the Edict 5) When a man marries by the order
of his father [under the circumstances mentioned], if he keeps his

^ For H quU read or understand H qwL

150 On those marked mth infbmia [book m

wife after he is set free from his father's potestaSj he is not on that
account marked.

13 Ulpianus {on the Edict 6) How then if the father did not
give the son leave to marry, but ratified the marriage after it was
made? suppose for instance he was unaware originally that the
circumstances of the woman were such as described, but afterwards
found it out : in this case he will not be marked, as the prs^tor
looks at the time when the marriage took place. 1. Where a man
contracts two betrothals on some one else's behalf, he is not
marked, unless he concludes them on behalf of some man or
woman whom he has under his potestas ; of course it must be held
that a man who allows his son or daughter to contract a betrothal
may be held to have in a way contracted it himself. 2. Where
the praetor says ''at the same time," we must not take this to
mean the actual betrothals being contracted at the same time,
but to apply equally where the periods to any extent coincide.
3. Again if a woman is betrothed to one man and married to
another she is punished by the rule given in the Edict 4. And
as it is the party's own act which entails the mark of infietmy, it
follows that, even where the woman with whom a man contracts
marriage or betrothal is one whom he cannot marry legally, or
cannot marry consistently with religious principle (Jiui)^ he will
still be marked. 5. [The award of] a person made arbitrator by
mutual compact does not lay a party under in&my, as such an
award is not in every respect the same thing as a judgment.

6. As &r as the question of in&my is concerned, it makes a great
deal of difference whether in the case before the court the judge
made his decision after a r^ular hearing, or something was uttered
independently, in the latter kind of case no inftimy is inflicted.

7. Where a penalty of undue severity is imposed beyond the terms
of the statute, the character of the party is not affected ; this has
been enacted, and also laid down by regpansum. Suppose for
instance the prsBses should relegate a man who ought only to have
been mulcted in a part of his property, the proper view to take is
that by suflfering so severe a sentence the accused person has
compounded for the retention of his character, and accordingly he
is not infamous. At the same time, if, in a case of Jnrtum nee
manifestumy the judge makes an order for payment of four times
the value, then the extra penalty laid on the defendant is no doubt
a grievance, as, where the fwrtwm is not mamfe^nium^ he ought to
have been sued for the double value only ; still this fiu^ does not

TIT. n] On those marked with in&mia 161

prevent the loss of his character; whereas, if the penalty which
the judge inflicted in excess had not been of a pecuniary kind, the
party would be held to have compounded. 8. A charge of
eteUiofmtus imposes infiuny on the party on whom judgment is
passed, though this is not a subject for a ptiblicum judicium.

14 Paulub (on the Edict 5) Where an owner defends a noxal
action brought in respect of his slave, and after that emancipates
the same slave by testament, and appoints him heir, if the latter
should then himself suffer judgment in the action, he does not
become infamous, because he does not incur judgment on his own
accouBt, 88 he was not a party to the original joinder of issue.

16 UiiPiAiaTS (on the Edict 8) A woman is marked who gets
an order for possession on behalf of an alleged unborn child on
fidse pretences (per €alvmmam\ that is, by declaring that she is
with child,

16 Paulus {on the Edict 8) when in reality she is not, or is
with child by a man who was not her husband;

17 Ulpianus {on the Edict 8) as a woman who deceives the
praetor ought to be punished. But a woman who acts as above
mentioned is only marked where she does so without being at the
time subject to poteatas.

18 Gatcts {on the provincial Edict 3) Where a woman was
under a delusion in the matter, she cannot be held to have been
in possession on false pretences,

19 Ulpianus {on the Edict 8) and no woman is marked save
one as to whom it is judicially declared that she got the order for
possession by means of false pretences. The law will apply equally
to a father who procures by false pretences that a daughter whom
he had under his potestas should get an order for possession on
behalf of an alleged unborn child.

20 Papiniantjs {Beeponsa 1) A man to whom these words are
addressed in the judgment of the prseses of a province— " You
seem to have used a cunning contrivance to set some one on to
bring an accusation'' is rather put to shame than, as far as appears,
laid under ignominy; the fact is a person who incites another does
not positively act in the way of giving him a mandate.

21 Paulus {Responm 2) Lucius Titius preferred a charge
against Gains Seius alleging that he had suffered wrong at his

162 On those marked unth infamia [book m

hands, and read a written testimony in support of his case before
the Praefectus Pr»torio. The prsefect did not put any fiuth in the
deposition, and declared that Lucius Titius had suffered no wrong
at the hands of Gains Seius. My question is this: — are the
witnesses whose testimony was rejected classed with infamous
persons on the ground of felse testimony? Paulus's answer was
that no ground* was stated which would make it right that those
about whom the question was asked should be classed among
infomous persons, seeing that it was not right that where a judg-
ment, whether just or not, is given in iavour of one person, another
person should be prejudiced by it.

22 Mabcellus (ptMica 2) The infliction of a beating does
not entail infamy, what does is the ground on which the party
incurred the punishment, assuming that the ground in question is
one which imposes iniamy on a man who is condemned to it
A similar rule is laid down as to other kinds of punishment

28 Ulpianus (on the Edict 8) Mourning ought to be observed
for parents and children of both sexes, and other agnates and
cognates as well, agreeably to the dictates of family affection and
to the extent to which any particular person is ready to assume it ;
but a person who does not complete the regular period of mourning
in such cases is not marked with infamy.

24 The same {an the Edict 6) The Emperor Severus laid down
by rescript that the character of a woman in respect of if^fcmUa
was none the worse for the fact that her owner made [immoral]
gain by her means when she was a slave.

26 Papikianus (Qvcstians 2) It has been held right that even
a disinherited son should observe mourning in memory of his
father, and a similar rule applies in the case of a mother whose
inheritance does not pass to her son. 1. When a man is killed in
battle he must be mourned for, even though his body should not
be found.

TFT. in] On *' ProcwratOTB'' and "D^emars"* 168

III.

Ok " procuratobs " akd "defensors.'*
(Agents, whether appointed or voluntary.)

1 Ulpianus (on the Edict 9) A procurator is a man who
manageB another person's aflSurs m pursuance of a mandate from
his principal 1. A procurator may be appointed for afiairs in
general or for one aflbir in particular, and either at an interview
or by a messenger or by letter ; though some hold, so Pomponius
says (b. 24), that a man is not a procurator where he undertakes
a mandate with respect to a single affidr, just as a man is not
called a procurcUor in the strict sense who undertakes to cany
a thing or a letter or a message. But the better opinion is that
a man is a procuroUor even when he is appointed for a single
aflair. 2. The employment of procurators is absolutely necessary,
in order that persons who are unwilling or unable to look after
their afiairs themselves may be able to bring or defend actions by
the intervention of others. 3. A man may be appointed procurator
even in his absence,

2 Patjltjs (on the Edict 8) provided always that the person
who is understood to be appointed is ascertained, and he himself
ratifies the appointment I. A lunatic must not be deemed in the
same position as an absent person, as he is devoid of intelligent
will, so that he is unable to ratify.

3 Ulpianus (on the Edict 9) A procurator can also be
appointed for a future trial, or for a future day, or on a condition,
or until a particular day,

4 Paulus (on the Edict 8) or for an indefinite time.

6 Ulpianus (on (he Edict 7) A man is said to be present
even when he is in the pleasure-grounds,

6 Paulus (on the Edict 6) or in tiie forum, or in the city, or
somewhere within the space over which buildings extend from the
dty without a break :

7 Ulpianus (on the Edict 7) so that his procurator is held
to be the agent of one who is present.

8 The same (on (he Edict 8) A JUiu^miUas can appoint
^procurator for bringing an action, where the action is one which
he could have brought himself; and that not only when he has

164 On '"Prowrator^" and ^'D^ensors" [book m

CMtrense peoulium ; any Jilius/amiHaa can do it For example, if
he has suflfered an ityuria he can appoint a procurator to bring
an actio ivj^riarumj supposing, that is, that his father is not
present and no procwrdtor for his father chooses to take the
proceedings, and such appointment of a procvrator by the JUius-
famUioA himself will be valid. Julianus goes further ; if, he says,
a JUivsfamilias has himself a son who is subject to the same
potestM as he is, and an injuria is done to him in the person of
that son, the paterfamilias not being present, he, the ^t^familias
first mentioned, can appoint a procurcUor to get satisfaction for
the if^tma inflicted on the grandson of the absent man. kfiUm-
familias can also appoint a procfwrator to defend an action. We
may add that a filiafamiliaB can equally appoint a proewriUor to
bring an action for injfwria ; for, as for the fiaict that, in the case of
an action to recover do8j the daughter joins with her fother in
appointing a procwrtxtorj this, according to Valerius Severus, is
quite unnecessary, it being enough that the &ther should appoint
at the daughter's request. I should say however that if the father
should chance to be absent, or to be a man of doubtful moral
character, in both which cases the practice is for the daughter to
be allowed to bring the action herself, it is open to her to appoint
a procurator. 1. It is not the practice that a man should be
appointed procwrator against his wiU ; and we must understand
the appointment to be against his will not only where he objects,
but even where it is not shown that he consents. 2. Veteran
soldiers can be appointed procu/rators ; but soldiers on service
cannot be appointed, even with the consent of the other party to
the action, unless by some accident the matter was overlooked at
the time of joinder of issue : and excepting always the case of
a soldier being made procurator on his own behalf, or undertaking
to prosecute or defend an action in which all the men of his
detachment {numerus) are interested alike, in which case he is
allowed to be procwrator, 3. '^ Where a man has been appointed
procurator for defending a case on whose behalf the principal has
with his consent furnished an undertaking that the order shall be
complied with (Judicatum solvi)^ then," such are the pr8Dtor's
words, '' I will compel him to undertake the case." However, on
sufficient cause shown, he ought not to be compelled ; suppose for
instance a deadly quarrel arises in the meantime between the
procwrator himself and the principal ; in such a case, so Julianus
tells us, the action cannot be allowed against the procwrixtor. The
same result ensues if some position of rank should be acquired by

TIT. ni] Oh ''Proeuratara'" and "" Defensors" 165

ihe proctrnztaTj or he should have to be absent on government
service,

9 Gahts {on the promnoial Ediet 3) or he can show ill-health
or nrgent necessity for going to a distance ;

10 TlLPiAifUS (on tfie Edict 8) or he is busy about an in-
heritance which has come to him ; or there is any other sufficient
excuse. Besides all this, the procurator ought not to be forced
[to take up the case] when his principal is present,

11 Paulus (on the Edict 8) provided, that is, the prindpal
himself can be compelled to do so.

12 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 3) Other grounds too it is
said are sometimes sufficient for compelling a procurator to take
joinder of issue ; suppose, for example, the principal is absent, and
the plaintiff maintains that lapse of time would cause the matter
at stake to be lost.

13 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 8) However, such grounds ought
neither to be allowed without discrimination nor yet peremptorily
set aside, tiie matter should be ordered by the praetor after he has
heard the &ot&

14 Patjlus (on the Edict 8) If, after the appointment of a
procuToiory deadly enmity arose [between him and his principal],
the prociMrator must not be compelled to take issue, and he does
not become liable under the stipulation on the ground of default
in defending the case, as the circumstances are not the same.

16 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 8) If the principal dies before
joinder of issue, having already given an assurance on stipulation
on behalf of his procfwraJtor that the judgment shall be obeyed, the
procuroJtor can be compelled to undertake the case, but only
where the principal gave the assurance with the knowledge of the
prociiratOT and without the latter making any objection. Should
the fact be otherwise, it is thoroughly contrary to legal principle
that tiie procwroJtor should be liable where he had no knowledge ;
stm an action can be brought on the words of the stipulation on
the ground of de&ult in defending the action. 1. Where a man
is appointed procurator for an action communi dividundo, he
must be held to be appointed to act both as plaintiff and defendant,
and a double assurance must be given.

16 Paulus (on the Edict 8) Up to joinder of issue the principal
is free either to appoint another procurator in the place of the
first, or to take joinder Of issue himself.

166 On ''Procurators" and ''Defensors" [book m

17 Ulpia^us {on the Edict 9) Bat after joinder of issue a
defendant who has appointed a procurator may change his pro-
curator or make himself party to tiie case as long as ihe proewnxtor
is liying, even if he is living in the dty ; but this only on cause
shown. 1. This permission is given not only to the party himself
who appointed the procurator^ but to his heir and any other
successor. 2. When the application is heard the essential points
taken into account are not merely those mentioned above as to the
law not compelling a procurator to undertake the case, but in
addition to them the question of his age,

18 MoDESTiNus {Pandects 10) and any claim to relief founded
on reUgious grounds.

19 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 9) Again, if the procurator is of
doubtful moral character, or is in prison, or in the power of enemies
or brigands,

20 Paulus {an the Edict 8) or is detained by a criminal or
civil trial, or by ill-health, or urgent private afibirs,

21 Qaius {on the provincial Edict 3) or is in exile, or is keeping
out of the way, or he has a misunderstanding with the principal
which arose subsequently to the appointment,

22 Paulus {on the Edict 8) or he comes to be connected with
the other party by marriage, or succeeds to him as heir,

23 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 9) or he is hindered by a long
absence in distant parts, or by any other ground of the same kind,

24 Paulus {on the Edict 8) in aU such cases the procurator
ought to be replaced by another person, even if he makes the
application himsel£

26 ULPLiKUS {on the Edict 9) All these rules have to be
observed not only on the side of the defendant, but also on that of
the plaintiff himself. If however the other party, or the procurator
himself, should declare that the principal is telling a lie about the
matter, this question must be settled by the praetor. A man is not
to be tolerated as procurator who makes an independent claim
of his own to be procurator, as l^e throws doubt on his own fitness
by the very fact that he is endeavouring to thrust his services
on some one who does not want them; unless indeed his object
was not so much to carry on the procwratorsMp for its own sake as
to clear his character in the fiu^e of un&vouraUe comment And
he will have a right to a hearing If he should declare that he

TIT. in] On '^ ProiMratars" and ^^ Defensors'' 167

IB quite ready to be reliered of the office, provided this can be
done without iiyury to his reputation ; in any case, so iar as he is
endeavouring to clear his own honour, every allowance must be
made for him. No doubt if what he alleges' is that he has been
made procu/ralor on his own behalf, and he can show this, he ought
not to be debarred from prosecuting his own cause. Add that if
he wishes to avail himself of some right of retention, it will be
difficult to take the conduct of the case away from him,

26 Paulus (on the Edict 8) unless the principal is willing to
pay him what is owed him.

27 Ulpianus {on the Edict 9) On the hearing of the case
another point of importance will be this : — ^it is only allowable that
the conduct of the trial should be taken away from the procurator
where the party is ready to take away the whole of the case ; if he
desires to take away a certain portion and leave another portion in
the procwrator^s hands, this is a piece of inconsistency to which
the latter may properly decline to submit All this is on the
assumption that the procmnxtor brought the action on the mandate
of the principal. But if no mandate was given, then, seeing that
the procurator brought nothing to trial, and you [the principal]
did not ratify the proceedings, anything done without your consent
cannot prejudge your case, so that you do not require to have the
case transferred into your own name, [in fact you had better decUne
such transfer,] in order to avoid the burden of another man's acts.
Applications such as mentioned for dismissal of a procurator must
be made to the prsator. 1. If a transfer of the proceedings is
made on the part of the plaintiff, it is held that the stipulation
entered into by the defendant, viz. that he will comply with the
judgment, will be binding ; this is approved of by Neratius and
Julianus, and such is the present practice; assuming, that is,
that the undertaking was given to the principal. Indeed, even
if it was the procwrator to whom the undertaking by stipulation
was given, and then the principal is made party to the suit
in his place, the better opinion is that the stipulation can be
sued upon, and that the right of action upon it is transferred
from the procwrator to the principal Again, even if a procwrator
should be made party to the suit in the place of the principal,
or in the place of a previous procuratOTy there is no doiibt,
according to Marcellus, that the stipulation can be sued upon, and
this is perfectly sound* In &ct, if the right of action on the
stipulation should have vested in the procwrator^ nevertheless an

168 On "" Procurator'' cmd "^ Defensors'' [book m

o/cdo utUis on the Btipulation must be allowed to tfae principal, the
direct right of action being taken away altogether.

28 The same {diymtaiiona 1) If my procwratar has had
security given him that the judgment will be obeyed, I have an
a4^io tUilis on the stipulation, just as an custio utilis on the
judgment is conceded to ma Indeed, even where my procurator
has sued on the stipulation without my consent, still this will not
prevent an action on the stipulation being granted me. The
consequence of this is that if my procwraJbor sues on the stipulation,
he can be barred by an exceptio^ just as he may where he sues on
the judgment, assuming that he was not appointed procwraJtor
on his own behalf, or with a view to his bringing the very action.
But, to take the converse case, if my procurator [is defendant and]
gives an undertaking that the judgment will be complied with,
no action on the stipulation will be allowed against me. And if
my defensor [voluntary agent for the defence] gives the under-
taking, the action on stipulation is not allowed against me, because
I cannot be sued on the judgment itself.

29 The same {on the Edict 9) If the plaintiff would rather sue
the principal than the person who is procurcUor on his own behalf,
the rule is that he has a right to do so.

30 Paultjs (Sentences 1) A procurator for a plaintiff, [ie. one]
who was not made procurator on his own behalf, may claim, in
order to meet the expense which he incurred in the trial, that
he should be satisfied out of the money recovered in the action, if
the principal in the case is not in a position to pay.

31 Ulpianus (on the Edict 9) If a man, after judgment is
given against him in a suit which he defended as procurator^
becomes heir to his principal, he cannot disclaim his liability to an
action on the judgment This is the rule where he is sole heir.
If he is co-heir along with others, and he pays the whole judgment
debt, then, if it was expressly included in his original mandate
of agency that he should pay, he will have a good action on the
mandate against his co-heirs; if it was not part of his mandate,
he has an action on negotia gesta : and this last is equally the case
if the procurator does not become heir at all, but still pays.
1. There is no law against several procurators being appointed for
one trial on behalf of several persons respectively. 2. Julianus
says that wh^^ a man appoints two different procurators at

TIT. m] On ^'PracuroOan" and **Defensori'* 169

different times, by appointiDg tbe second he must be held to have
revoked his appomtment of the first.

32 Paulus (an the Edict 8) Where a number of different
persons are appointed procurators at the same time, each for the
whole matter, the one who proceeds first will be in the better
position, so that one who comes later will not be procurator as to
anything about which another has got before him and is suing
ahready.

33 Ulpianus (on the Edict 9) It is said that even a slave or
9^JUiu^amiltas can have a procurator. As far as thejfUit^famUias
is concerned, this is true; as to the slave, I should demur.
It is allowed that a person should carry on a slave's transactions
for him where they depend on his pecuUumy and so far be his
procurator^ and this is Labeo's opinion, but it is not allowed that
he should bring an action. 1. There is no doubt, however, that
a man who is a party to proceedings about his status can have
a procurator not only in connexion with the management of his
afl^rs, but for such judicial proceedings as may be taken either on
his behalf or against him, whether he is living as a slave or as
a free man^ Conversely too it is clear that he can be appointed
procurator for another. 2. It is a matter of public policy that
absent persons should be defended by some one or other ; even in
capital trials defence is allowed on behalf of an accused person.
Accordingly, wherever judgment could legally be pronounced
against a man in his absence, it is just that any one should have
a hearing who chooses to speak for him and argue in favour of his
innocence, and it is the regular practice to allow it ; indeed tiiis is
shown by a rescript of the reigning Emperor. 3. The prsBtor
says:— ''Where a man requests that an action should be allowed
him on behalf of another, he must defend his principal to the
satisfitction of an impartial arbitrator ; and he ought, subject to
similar arbitration, to give security^ to the person against whom
he brings an action on behalf of another that the person concerned
as principal in the matter will ratify what is done.'* 4. It was
thought just by the preetor that where a man takes proceedings as
procurator on behalf of another, he should also [be ready to]
undertake the same person's defence. 5. If a man tsJces proceedings
as a procuratar on his own behalf, the rule still is that he is bound

^ Text confused aod probably an interpolation : the above appears to be the
meaning.

* For quo read qtioeum alUriui, Of. BL

160 On Troeuratars'' mkd "^ Defensars'* [book m

to defend [the person who appointed him], except where that
person had no choice as to appointing him.

34 Qaius (on the provincial Edict 3) Where a man sues in the
character of procurator on his own behalf, for instance, where he
is purchaser of an inheritance, wiQ he be bound conversely to
defend his vendor? The rule is that if the transaction was
concluded in good faith, and with no intention to prejudice persons
who might desire to sue the vendor on their part» he will not be
obliged to defend him.

36 Ulpianus {on the Edict 9) However, procwrators of the
following classes will be bound to defend their principals, being
persons who are at liberty to sue without a mandate, viz. children,
though subject to potestaSy also parents, brothers, persons con-
nected by marriage and freedmen. 1. A patron can proceed
against his fireedman for ingratitude by a procurator and the
freedman can meet the charge by a proewraUyr. 2. Not only
where what tiie procwra;tOT asks for is an action properly so called,
but also where it is a prayudieium (preliminary inquiry) or an
interdict, or where he applies for an order to give an undertaking
for payment of legacies or for security against da/nrntim if^ectum,
will he be bound to defend his principal in his absence, before any
competent courts [that is,] and in the same province. Of course
it would be oppressive that he should be called upon, in order to
defend him, to leave Rome and go to a province ^ or tiie converse,
or to go from one province to another. 3. To defend implies
doing what the principal himself would do in reference to the case,
and giving a sufficient guarantee, and the position of the procurator
ought not to be made more burdensome than that of the principal
. would be, except in the matter of giving security. Setting aside
the giving security, it is clear that the procura>tor is held to defend
only where he proceeds to joinder of issue. Hence the question is
raised in Julianus's treatise, whether he is compellable to join issue,
or it is enough that, the case not being defended, an action can be
brought on the stipulation. Julianus says {Dig* 3) that he is
compellable to join issue, unless, after inquiry, he should decline
to proceed at all, or should on sufficient grounds be removed.
A procwrator is regarded as defending a case even where he allows
the other party to take possession, where the party has applied
for an undertaking against dammmt ivfectu/m or for the payment
of legacies,

^ For promneia resd pnmneiam, Gt M.

TIT. m] On ''Procurators'* and ''Defensors'* 161

86 Paulus (on the Edict 8) or in a case of operia navi
nuntiatio. And even where he allows a slave to be taken off by
the plaintiff in a noxal action, he is held to defend the case ;
provided in all these cases he gives an undertaking that the
principal will ratify.

37 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 9) But he must defend his principal
in respect of all actions, even those which are not allowed against
the heir. 1. Accordingly the question has arisen whether, sup-
posing the other side brings several actions, and there are different
defensors forthcoming (voluntary agents for the defence) who are
ready to undertake the respective cases, the party \a properly
defended ; Julianus holds that he is ; and such, according to
Pomponius, is the present practice.

38 The same (on the Edict 40) Still we must not go so far as
to hold that if an action is brought for ten thousand, and there are
two defensors forthcoming who are ready to defend for five
thousand each, they ought to be allowed to appear.

39 The same (on the Edict 9) A procwrator is not bound to
defend merely in actions and interdicts and by entering into
stipulations, but in connexion with interrogatories too, so that,
when examined in the magistrate's court, he may answer in all
cases where the principal would have had to answer himself. He
will therefore be bound to answer as to whether an heir is absent ;
and, whether he answers or holds his tongue, he may be liable.
1. A man who brings an action of any kind whatever on another's
behalf is bound to give an undertaking that the party concerned
will ratify what is done. Sometimes, indeed, even where a pro-
cwrator takes proceedings on his own behalf, he will still be bound
to give an undertaking that his principal will ratify, so Pomponius
tells us (6. 24). For example, take this case. The defendant tenders
in return an oath to the procwrator\ and the latter swears that
something or other is due to an absent principal ; hereupon the
action which he brings is brought as if he were principal, because
of his own oath ; (as in fact this action could not possibly be open
to the real principal ;) still ih% procurator must give an undertaking
for ratification. Again, suppose an assurance is given to the
procwrator in the form of constU/atvm, and he brings an action in
pursuance of it^ it is beyond question that this is a proper case
for giving an undertaking for ratification, and this we read in

^ After rettulit ins. adtersaritu^ et is. M.
M. J. 11

162 On Trocuratars'' and ''Defensors'^ [book in

Pomponiua 2. In Julianus we find this question : — ^is the pro-
cwraJbOT bound to guarantee that the principal alone will ratify, or
that the other creditors will do so as well? to which what that
author says is that the undertaking need only refer to the principal,
and that the expression 'Hhe person concerned in the matter '^
does not comprehend the creditors, seeing that the principal
himself was not bound to give such an undertaking. 3. If a father
sues to recover dos [on behalf of his daughter], he is bound to give
an undertaking that the daughter will ratify; moreover he is
bound to defend an action against her ; Marcellus himself has this.

4. If a Neither brings an action for injwria on behalf of his son,
then, as there are two actions allowed, one by the father and
one by the son, there is no undertaking given for ratification.

5. If a procurtxtor contests a question of sIcUms with anyone,
whether it is a case where someone who passes for a slave institutes
proceedings against him to establish his liberty, or he himself
brings an action to establish the servitude of someone who passes
for free, in both cases he is bound to give an undertaking that the
principal will ratify the matter. This appears by the words of
the Edict, so that the procurator is treated as if he were plaintiff,
on whichever side he contends. 6. There is one case in which
a man has to give an undertaking both for ratification and for the
judgment being obeyed, in respect of one and the same action.
The case is this. Application is made for a hearing with a view
to a restihUio in integrum on the alleged ground that undue
advantage has been taken of some one under twenty-five in the
matter of a sale, and on the other side the party is represented by
a procurator ; here the procurator is bound to give an undertaking
firet, that the principal will ratify the matter, — because otherwise
the principal might come forward later and desire to raise some
claim, — and, secondly, that the judgment will be obeyed, so that
if eventually something has to be given to the minor in consequence
of his getting the restitutio in integrum, it may be accordingly
given. All this may be read in Pomponius {on the Edict 25).
7. This writer also says that if an application should be made to
remove a guardian, any one who undertakes the case for the
guardian ought also to give security for ratification, lest his
principal should come forward and claim to set aside what has
been done. However, the case could hardly arise of a guardian
being complained of through a procwraJUyr, as it is a question
involving infamy ; unless it should appear that the guardian gave
instructions to the particular procfwraZor eipressly, or else the

TTT. m] On *' Procurators'' €md ''Defensors'" 168

praetor were proceeding to hear the case in the guardian's absence,
and so treated it as undefended.

40 The same {on the Edict 9) Pomponius tells us that it is
not every kind of proceeding that a man can institute by means of
a procwrator ; for example, a procwrator cannot ask for an interdict
to enable him to take off with him children whom he alleges to be
under the potestas of some absent person, except, as Julianus says,
upon due cause shown, in other words, unless he has been specisdly
instructed to do it, and the father is prevented by ill-health or
some other sufficient reason. 1. If a procurator stipulates in
respect of damnv/in infeetwm or legacies, he is bound to give an
undertaking for ratification. 2. Moreover, a man who is sued as
d^ensor in an action in rem is bound to give an undertaking for
ratification in addition to the regular guarantee that the order
will be obeyed. Else what is to be done, if the result of the trial
should be that the property is declared to be mine [the plaintiff's],
and then the person for whom the defensor acted comes forward
and claims to recover the land? will he not be treated as if he had
not ratified the decision ? Of course if there had been a regular
procurator, or the principal had personally conducted his own case
and lost it, then, if he sued me to recover the property, he would
be barred by an exceptio of res judicata^ and this is said by
Julianus {Dig. 50) ; as where the judge declares that the property
belongs to me he declares at the same time that it does not belong
to the other. 3. A guarantee of ratification is required to be
given by a procwrator before litis contestatio: the rule is that
when issue is once joined he cannot be compelled to give the
undertaking. 4. But in the case of those persons who are not
required to have a mandate, the proper rule is that, if it should be
clear that they are taking proceedings against the will of those on
whose behalf they profess to act, they must be refused a hearing.
Accordingly what is required is not that they should have the
consent or the instructions [of their alleged principals], but that
it shall not be shown that they are acting against such alleged
principals' wishes, even though they should offer to give an under-
taking for ratification.

41 Paulus {on the Edict 9) Women are sometimes allowed
to sue on behalf of parents, on due cause shown, for instance
where the parents are prevented by illness or old age, and have no
one to act on their behalf.

42 The same {on the Edict 8) Although a procurator cannot

11—2

164 On ''Procurators*' a/ad ''Defensors'' [book m

be appointed in a popular action, still it is very reasonably held
that^ where a man is bringing an action about a public right of way
and would suffer some private loss or damage by being precluded
from bringing it, he cau appoint a procurojtor as though it were
a private action. Much more may a procurator be appointed to
bring an action for violation of a sepulchre where the principal is
a person who has the requisite concern in the matter. 1. A pro-
curator may be appointed to bring an action for it^uria under
the lex Cornelia; it is true this action is employed with a view
to the public advantage, still it is a private action. 2. The
obligational relation which exists for the most part between a
principal and procurator is one which gives rise to an action on
mandcUtim. However in some cases no obligation founded on
mandatum is contracted ; one such case occurs where people
make some one procurator on his own behalf [sc. as defendant],
and promise thereupon that the decree shall be obeyed; if they
pay anything in pursuance of this promise, they cannot sue the
procurator on a ma/ndatmn, but as vendor, assuming, say, that it
is a case of sale of an inheritance ; or on the ground of some
original numdatwrn^ as is the case where a surety appoints as
procwrator the principal debtor. 3. When an inheritance has
been handed over to any one in pursuance of the Senatusconsultum
Trebellianum, he can lawfully appoint the heir procurator.
4. Similarly a creditor can lawMly appoint procurator in the
Servian action the [debtor himself who is] owner of the property
pledged for the debt. 5. Add to this that if a constUtitum has been
given to one out of several co-creditors, and iie appoints another
of the number procurator to sue on the consdtvtvmft, it cannot be
said that this is not a valid appointment Again, where there are
two co-promisors, one may appoint the other procurator to defend
an action. 6. If there are several coheirs and an action familioe
erdscimdcB or communi dividimdo is brought, it must not be
allowed that different principals should appoint the same pro-
curatory because, if it were, it would be impossible to arrange
the whole scheme connected with vesting orders and decrees for
payment; no doubt such an appointment must be allowed where
one coheir dies and leaves several coheirs who succeed him. 7* If
the defendant to an action skulks, after litis contestatio, his sureties
can only be held to defend his case where one of the number
defends him in respect of the whole case, or else all or several^
appoint one of the number to take over the case.

^ For qui read quidam, Cf. M.

TEP. raj On "* Profmratara'' and ""D^ensars'' 166

43 The same (on the Edict 9) A deaf or dumb person is not
precluded Ifrom appointing a procwratar in any way in which it
can be done; perhaps such persons might be appointed for a
similar office themselves, not, that is, for taking proceedings, but
for transacting business. 1. When the question arises whether
any particular person is at liberty to employ a procwratoTj the
point to consider is whether he is precluded from appointing one,
as this is a prohibitive Edict. 2. In popular actions, where a man
takes proceedings merely as one of the public, he is not compellable
to undertake the defence like a procurator. 3. If a man applies
for a curator to be appointed to some one who is present, his
application will not be entertained, unless the minor consents;
but if the minor is absent, the applicant will have to give security ^
that he will ratify. 4. Where a procurator declines to act in
defence, the penalty is that he is not allowed to sue. 5. If
a procwra^tor brings an action, and there is present a slave of the
absent principal, then, according to AtOicinus, the undertaking
ought to be given to the slave and not to the procurator.
6. Where a man is not compelled to defend some one who is absent,
nevertheless, if he has given security that the decree shall be
obeyed, in pursuance of his intention to defend him, he must be
compelled^ to undertake the case, because otherwise he would
be deceiving the person t6 whom he gave the security, as persons
who are not compelled [originally] to defend a case are compelled
after they have given the above security. Labeo holds that
allowance may be made on special grounds, and that the rule is
that, if the plainti^ is put to a disadvantage by the lapse of time,
the other ought to be compelled to undertake the case ; but where
some connexion by marriage is broken off in the meantime, or th&
two men have quarrelled, or the property of the absent man has
come to be taken possession of,

44 Ulpianus {Disputatwns 7) or he is going to be at a great
distance, or any other lawful ground occurs,

46 Paulus (on (he Edict 9) he [the other] ought not to be
compelled. Sabinus however holds that it is no business of the
Prsetor to require the party in question to undertake the defence,
but that an action ex stipulatu can be brought on the ground
that the case is not defended, and if, on the other hand, he has
lawful grounds for declining to join issue in the action, his sureties
are not liable, because no impartial arbitrator would decide that

^ For dare read Mtudare, Gt M. * Del procurtUormn, M.

166 On "* Procuraiton'* and *" Defensors'' [book m

a man ought to be compelled to defend a case where he had a
lawful excuse. Even where the party gave no security, but he
was trusted on his simple promise on stipulation, the rule is the
same. 1. Any persons who take proceedings in a public matter,
under such circumstances that they are protecting some interest
of their own as well, are allowed to appoint a proewrator on cause
shown, and any one else who takes proceedings after that can be
barred by an exceptio. 2. If an operis novi ntmtUUm (notice of
novel structure) has been served on a procwralor and he resorts
to the Interdict which says that '^ no force is to be used with him
in respect of his building, '^ then, according to Julianus, he is in the
position of a d^ensor^ and is not required to give security that
his principal will ratify, and if he should give such security,
I cannot see, says Julianus, in what event the undertaking could
be sued upon.

46 Gaius (pn the provincial Edict 3) Where a man joins issue
on his own behalf with a plaintiff, if he should thereafter wish to
appoint a procwratar^ so that the plaintiff might accept the latter
as defendant in his place, his application ought to be heard, and
he ought to furnish security in proper form on^ the procura/tor's
behalf that the judgment will be obeyed. 1. A man who defends
some one on whose behalf he does not sue is at liberty to confine
his defence to some one particular matter. 2. A man who takes
up the defence of another is compelled to give security; as no one
is regarded as an adequate defensor in another man's case without
giving security. 3. It is a^ked further, where a defensor under-
takes the case, and the plaintiff gets an order for restitution in,
wtegnmij whether the defensor will be compellable to undertake
to defend the renewed case ; but on the whole it is held that he
will. 4. A procurator is bound, as in connexion with the general
management of business on behalf of a principal, so in connexion
with the bringing or defending of actions as well, to account for
everything in good faith; hence whenever he acquires anything
by means of an action, whether he does so directly in discharge of
the very claim he made in the action, or indirectly as the result
of it, he is compellable to hand it over by an action on the
nuindatvmy so that, in feet, if, owing to mistake or illegality on
the part of the judge, he should get what was not due, still he
must give up that toa 5. Again, in the converse case whatever
the procurator pays in pursuance of a judgment^ he ought to

^ After pro ins. so. Cf. M.

TTT. in] On ''Procurators^ and ''Defensors'* 167

recover by means of an action in counter-claim on numdatuMi;
should he however have paid any penalty in consequence of some
unlawful act of his own, this he has no right to recover. 6. If
any costs of litigation have been incuired in good fiuth by the
procurator of either plaintiff or defendant, justice requires that
they should be made good to him. 7* Where two persons are
entrusted by mandate with the management of a man's aflhirs,
and one of them is a debtor of the person who gave the mandate,
can the other properly sue such debtor? No doubt he can ; he is
not to be regarded as any the less a procurator because the person
whom he sues is a procurator himself.

47 JxjLiANUS (on Urseius Ferox 4) Where a man has left two
procurators of all his affairs, then, unless he expressly laid down
that one was to sue the other for money, he cannot be held to
have given such a mandate to whichever chooses to assume it

48 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 3) Accordingly, where he
has given such a special mandate, it follows that if one of the two,
on being sued by the other, should meet the demand with an
exceptio such as this : '' if no mandate to proceed against debtors
was given to me,'' the plaintiff may have a repUcatio in the words :
''or a mandate was given to me to sue you."

49 Paxjlus {on the Edict 54) A principal ought not to be put
in a worse position by an act of his procurator of which he has no
knowledge.

50 Gatus {on the provincial Edict 22) If your procurator is
discharged from my demand, in any way whatever, you ought to
have the benefit of it

61 Ulpianus {on the Edict 60) If a person under the age of
twenty-five should be a d^enmr^ he is not a good defensor in any
matter in which he has a right to an order for restitutio in inte-
grum^ because such an order releases both him and his sureties.
1. ^As the position of defensor carries with it the same liabilities as
that of principal defendant, no order ought to be made [at the suit
of a wife] on the defensor of the husband beyond what the husband
can perform. 2. When a man has undertaken to defend an action
on another's behalf, then, though he should be of abundant means,

62 Paulus {on the Edict 57) or of consular rank,

53 ULPiAirrrs {on the Edict 60) still he is not held to be
defending, unless he is ready to give security.

^ Del Urnnm. M.

168 On "* Procurators^ and ''Defensors'* [book in

64 Paulus ipn the Edict 50) Women, soldiers, persons who
are about to be absent on goyemment service, or are afflicted mth
incurable illness, or are about to enter upon a magisterial office,
or who cannot be made parties to judicial proceedings against
their own will, are not held to be good dtfensors. h Guardians
who have managed the affiurs of their wards in any particular
place must be defended in the same place.

66 Ulpiantjs (an the Edict 65) When a man is appointed
procurator on his own behalf his principal will have no prior claim
to prosecute the action or to receive money [paid by the other
side] ; since where a man has an available right of action in his
own name he is the proper person to institute the proceedings.

66 The same (on the Edict 66) A man who is appointed
procwratoT to sue for recovery of some movable has a good right
to bring an action for production.

67 The same (on the Edict 74) Where a man appoints a
procwrator to take proceedings at once, he must be regarded as
allowing him to prosecute the suit at a later time too. 1. A man
who abandons an exceptAo founded on an objection to ih& procurator
cannot afterwards change his mind and raise it.

68 Paulus (on the Edict 71) A procurator who has been
entrusted generally with the free management of his principal's
aflbirs may call for the payment of debts, novate contracts, or
exchange one thing for another;

69 The same (on PlauUus 10) and he is also treated as having
a mandate to pay creditors.

60 The same (Besponsa 4) A general mandate does not involve
the right to compromise a matter by way of final settlement;
consequently if after such a mandate the party who gave it declines
to ratify the compromise, he is not debarred from exercising his
original right of action.

61 The same (on PkmUus 1) Plautius says this: — ''all are
agreed that, when judgment is pronounced against a procurcUor,
he cannot be sued [in an cictio judicati], unless either he was
appointed on his own behalf, or else he put himself forward [to
undertake the defence] knowing that security had not been given.''
The rule is the same even where he puts himself forward to
undertake the case as a d^ensor and gives security.

TFT. m] On ''Procurators'' and ''Defensors*' 169

62 PoMPONius (Extracts from PlavUus 2) If a man who is
appointed jyrocurator to recover a legacy should sue out an
Interdict against the heir for production of the testament, he
cannot be met with an eocceptio founded on an objection to the
procurator on the ground that the application for the interdict
was beyond his mandate.

63 MoDBSTiKTUs {Differences 6) A procwrcUor as to property in
general {totorwn bonorum) who has a mandate to manage his
principal's affairs cannot dispose of property, either moveable or
immoveable, or slaves, without a special mandate from his principal,
except fruit or other things such as easily spoil.

64 The same (Rides 3) If, before joinder of issue, the person
on whose behalf some one appears as defensor should himself
come forward and apply for leave to conduct the case on his own
behalf, his application should be considered, on special ground
shown.

66 The same (heurematica) Where a procurator is absent,
and his principal desires to relieve him from the necessity of giving
security, this latter should address a letter to the opposing party
informing him who it is that he has appointed to act as procurator
against him, and in what matter, adding that he will himself ratify
anything done to which such procurator is a party ; as, after this,
the letter being admitted, it will be held that the person mentioned
appears as procurator for a present principal. Accordingly, though
the principal should afterwards change his mind and desire that
the person should not be procurator, still the proceedings in which
the person acted in that character must be held good.

66 Papikianxjs (Que^ions 9) A man stipulates to have de-
livered to him either Stichus or Damas, the choice to be with
himself; iP thereupon Titius brings an action as procurator to
recover one of the two, and the principal ratifies his doing so, the
result is that the Court is possessed of the question, and the
stipulation is superseded.

67 The same (Responsa 2) If a procwraJtor pledged his own
fidth so as to warrant the title to land which he sold, and after
that he ceases to manage his principal's afiairs, he still wiU not be
relieved by the aid of the prsetor from the burden of his obligation ;
where a procwroitor undertook to be bound by an obligation on

^ Del. et before raium, Ot M.

170 On "Procurators'* and "^ Defensors'' [book m

behalf of his principal^ there is no use his declining to bear the
burden.

68 The same (Besponsa 3) Where a procwrcUor stipulates for
something on his principal's behalf, consistently with the terms of
his mandate, the principal cannot^ sue to recover it without the
procu/rcUor's consent

69 Paxjlus {Responsa 3) Paulus laid down that even where
a man has appointed a pi'Oiyurator to undertake his defence in an
action^ he is not precluded from appearing in support of his own
case.

70 Sc^nroLA {Responsa 1) A father appointed one Sempronius,
his creditor, a guardian to his son, a boy under age ; who, after
discharging the duties of guardian, died, leaving his brother his
heir ; after this, the brother himself died, having bequeathed to
Titius by way of fideitxyramissum the debt owed by the father,
whereupon the heirs [of the brother] assigned their right of action
to Titius by nwmdatwni. I wish to ask this: — seeing that the
liability to tiie actio tuteke and the right to sue for the money lent
were both derived from Sempronius's inheritance, is it [not] the
case that the right of action acquired by assignment is only given
on the terms of the assignee (Titius) undertaking the defence of
the heirs by whom the assignment was made? My answer was that
Titius was bound to undertake the defence mentioned.

71 Paulus {Sentences 1) An absent defendant can state the
grounds of his absence through a procurcutor.

72 The same {Hcmdbooks 1) The agency of a procurator is
not merely a method of acquiring a right of action, it sometimes
enables a man to keep one alive ; for example, where the procurator
sues a debtor within the statutable time, or where he notifies
against a novel structure being made, so as to make available the
Interdict qtiod vi aut dam^ as this is equally a case in which a
procurator keeps an ancient claim on foot for his principal.

73 The same {on the office of assessors) If the defendant is
ready before litis contestaHo to pay the sum demanded, what is
the proper course, where the action is brought by a procurator ?
It would be unfair that the defendant should be compelled to go
on with the defence where the result may be that he will pass for
a person of doubtful character, because he did not ofier the money

^ Before poteit ms. non. Of. D. .41. 2. 49. 2.

TIT. m] On "" Procurators'' and ''Defensors^ 171

when the principal plaintiff was there. Perhaps at that time it
was not in his power to pay the money ; ought he in that case to
be compellable to defend the action? perhaps it may even be one
which involves infemy. However one thing is clear, viz. that
before litis contestatio the prasses may order the money to be
deposited in a consecrated building ; in fact this is what is done
in the case of the money of a pupiUus. If litis contestatio has
already taken place, the whole question is one to be settled by the
judge of his own authority.

74 Ulpiai^us (Opinions 4) Even the officer acting on behalf
of a city corporation [civitatis actor) cannot transact civil business
by means of bl procurator.

76 JuLiANUS (Digest 3) A having purchased and taken pos-
session of land, B undertook in his absence to defend an action
brought against him [to recover the land], and joined issue with
the plaintiff on his behalf, but after that B requested the vendor
of the land to take the defence upon himself; the vendor asked
that B should give security that the purchaser would ratify the
proceedings ; I should say that B is bound to give him security for
such ratification, because, if he [the vendor] makes over the land
to the plaintiff, there is nothing to prevent the principal. A, suing
for the property and the vendor being compelled to defend over
again.

76 The same (an Minicius 5) Titius, having undertaken to
defend an action for an absent person, gave the regular security,
and, before he had joined issue in the action, his principal became
insolvent, whereupon the defensor [Titius] objected to issue being
joined against himself as defendant. I wish to know whether his
refusal ought to be allowed. Julianus replied: — as soon as the
defensor has given security he is to be treated as a principal.
Moreover if the prrotor declines to compel him to submit to joinder
of issue, the defensor will not gain much by it ; as recourse can be
had to his sureties, and whatever they pay they can recover from
hiuL

77 Paulus (on the Edict 57) Whenever a man's case is de-
fended by another it must be defended to the satis&ction of an
impartial arbiter:

78 Afrigakus (Questions 6) and a man cannot be held to
defend a case to the satisfaction of an impartial arbitrator who
puts the plaintiff off in such a way as to prevent a decision being

172 On *" Procurators'' and ''D^ensors'' [book in

come to on the question. 1. If a proewrator is appointed to bring
an action for two things, and he brings an action for one, no
exceptio on that ground will be admissible in bar of the action, and
the matter will be properly before the court

IV.

On pbooeedinos taken on behalf of ant corporation

or against the same.

Gaius {on the pramncial Edict 3) Associations and guilds
and similar corporations are not allowed to be formed by all
persons without discrimination; this is a thing which is kept
within certain limits by statutes and decrees of the senate and
imperial enactments. It is only in very few kinds of cases that
such corporate bodies are allowed ; for example, the power of
constituting a corporation is permitted to partners in government
vectigcUia, as well as in gold mines, silver mines and salt mines.
Moreover there are at Rome particular guilds whose corporate
character has been established by senatorial decrees and imperial
enactments, such as the guilds of bakers and of some others, also
guilds of shipowners, and these last exist in the provinces as welL

1. Where any persons are permitted to constitute a corporation in
the way of a guild or a company or any other body, they have the
special right to have, like a municipal body, common property,
a common chest, and an actor or sffndieiM by whose agency
anything that has to be transacted and done on the general behalf
can be transacted and done accordingly, as in a municipal body*

2. If nobody defends any action at law against the society, the
proconsul declares that he wiU order such common property as
they have to be taken into possession, and if, after due notice
given, they do not bestir themselves to defend their case, he will
order such property to be sold. It is moreover held that there is
no actor or syndicua even when the actor is [only] absent or
detained by ill-health or is incapable of acting. 3. If a stranger
is disposed to defend the case of the corporation, the proconsul
will allow him to do it, in accordance with the rule as to defending
private persons, because, where this is done, the position of the
corporation is improved.

TIT. iv] On proceedings on hehdlf of a corporation 1 73

2 Ulpianus {on the Edict 8) If the members of a municipality
or if any corporation appoint an actor to take legal proceedings,
we must not say that this officer is to be treated as though he were
appointed by a number of individuals ; he appears on behalf of the
dvic community or the corporation, not on behalf of the constituent
members separately considered.

3 The same (cm the Edict 9) No one is allowed to take
proceedings at law on behalf of the body of citizens or of the
cwria, except one who is allowed by some statute, or, in default of
a statute, is authorized by the members of the curia themselves,
two-thirds at least of their number being present

4 Paulus {on the Edict 9) No doubt to make up the number
of two-thirds of the decurions the person himself whom they
appoint may be reckoned in.

6 Ulpianus {on the Edict 8) One thing Pomponius says must
be borne in mind, that a father's vote will be allowed on behalf of
his son and a son's on behalf of his father,

6 Paulus {on the Edict 9) and so will the votes of persons
under the same potestaSy as everybody gives his vote as a decurion
and not in the character of a member of the household. A similar
rule ought to be applied in the case of a candidature for a public
office, unless it is precluded by some municipal regulation or
ancient custom. I. If the decurions have ordered that legal
proceedings should be set on foot by whomsoever the Duumvirs
elect, that person is held to be chosen by the body, so that he can
take the proceedings ; it makes very little difference whether the
choice is made by the body of decurions itself or by some one
whom the same body authorized to make it. But if they were to
make a resolution to this effect, that, whenever any occasion for an
action should arise, it should be the business- of Titius to sue in
connexion with it, such a resolution is at once null and void,
because it cannot be held that a resolution can give the right to sue
with reference to a matter which is not yet in dispute. However,
at the present day the practice is for all matters of this kind to be
managed by means of syndics, in accordance with the customs of
the respective localities. 2. Suppose a man appointed actor
should afterwards be set aside by a resolution of the decurions,
would an action by him .be barred by an exceptio ? I should say
myself that the way to deal with this question is to say that
permission to sue can only be held to be valid where such
permission once given is continued* 3. If the a^stor of a corpora-

174 On proceedings on behalf of a corporation [book m

tion brings actions^ he is bound to defend actions too, but he is not
bound to give a guarantee for ratification. Still sometimes, if
there is doubt whether the order appointing him was made,
I should say that a guarantee for ratification oi:^ht to be given.
It follows that the actor in question performs the function of a
procurator, and the Edict does not give him an action on the
judgment, unless he is appointed on his own behalf. He can also
accept a constittUu/m. The right to change an actor exists in the
same cases as that to change a procurator. Even a JUins/amilias
can be appointed actor.

7 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 10) Just as the pr»tor allowed an
action on behalf of a municipality, so too he thought with great
reason that the edict should be made to refer to actions against
one. I should say too that where a legate has spent money on
some concern of the municipality, he ought to be allowed an action
against the municipal body. 1. What is owed to the corporation
is not owed to the individual members, and what the corporation
owes the individual members do not owe. 2. In the case of
decttrions and corporations in general, it is of no consequence
whether the individuals all remain unchanged, or a part only
remains or all are changed. If the number of corporate members
comes down to one, it is still held on the whole that this one can
sue and be sued, as the legal position of the whole number has
devolved on one person and the appellation of corporation still
remains.

8 Javolenxjs (extracts from CassivA 15) If town communities
fail to be defended by those persons who manage their property,
and there are no corporeal effects belonging to the corporation of
which possession can be taken by creditors, satisfaction ought to
be given to the parties suing out of the debts due to the town.

9 PoMPONius {on Sabinus 13) If you are coheir to some one
along with a municipality, you and the body will have good mutual
rights of action for division of the inheritance {familice erciscundoe).
The same may be said of an action to determine boundaries, or to
avert rain-water.

10 Paulus {Handbooks 1) An actor may be appointed further
for an operis novi ntmtiatiOy and to enter into stipulations, for
instance a stipulation for payment of legacies, for making good
damnv/m infectmn, for one that a decree shall be obeyed, although
it is true that the assurance should rather be given to a slave of

TFT. iv] On proceedings on behalf of a corporation 176

the dvic conunimity ; stiU, if it is given to the otetoTy the manager
of the property of the community will have an utiUs actio.

V.
On negotia gesta (yoltjktabt aoenct).

1 Ulpianus (on the Edict 10) This edict is indispensable,
as it deals with a matter of great importance to absent persons, the
object being to secure that they shall not, in consequence of actions
against them being undefended, have their property taken into
possession or sold to pay their creditors, or pledges sold that
they have given for debt, or have actions brought against them
to enforce payment of penal damages, or lose their property
wrongfully.

2 Gaitjs {on the provincial Edict 3) Where a man volunteers
to manage the aflairs [negotia gerere] of another in his absence,
even without the party's knowledge, whatever money he spends to
good purpose on the affiiirs of the other, indeed whatever obligation
he incurs towards any one in the interest of the other during his
absence, he has a right of action on the strength of it ; accordingly,
in the case in question, mutual rights of action arise which are
called actions on negotia gesta. And, certainly, just as it is
reasonable that the party himself who managed for the other
should give an account of his proceedings, and, wherever he
managed the afbirs in any respect nnproperly, or kept back any
profit which he made in the course of the proceedings, should be
ordered to make compensation in that behalf, so, conversely, it is
fair also, where he has managed to good purpose, that there should
be made good to him any loss which he incurred or will have to
incur in the matter.

3 Ulpianus {on the Edict 10) The prsetor says : — '' If a man
volunteers to manage aflSurs in which another is concerned, or
affidrs in which another was concerned at his death, I will grant an
action thereon.'' 1. The words 4f a man ' may be taken thus ^if a
man or a woman,' as it is settled that women too can bring actions
on negotia gesta or be sued in such actions. 2. The word 'affairs'
is to be read as applying to one affidr or to severaL 3. There

176 On negotia gesta {vcluntary agency) [book m

follows the word 'another/ and this also applies to both sexes.
4 There is no doubt, if a ward '' manages affiiirs/' that after the
rescript of the Divine Pius he can in fistct be sued to the extent of
the amount to which he is enriched ; of course, if he himself sues,
he must allow his liability on the management to be set off. 5. If
I manage affidrs for a lunatic, an action for negotia gesta lies
against him in my favour; and, according to Labeo, the curator
of a lunatic of either sex will have an action allowed him against
the lunatic. 6. The words '^ or manages affairs in which another
was concerned at his death" refer to cases in which the party
manages after a man's death; it was necessary that the Edict
should refer to such cases, because he cannot be said to have
managed afiairs for the testator who was already dead, or for an
[appointed] heir who had not yet taken up the inheritance. If
there has been any accession of property after the death, for
instance, there are children of female slaves, or young of cattle, or
vegetable or other produce or proceeds, or any acquisitions made
by slaves ; though none of these cases are embraced in the words,
still they ought to be regarded as included. 7. As this action is
founded on management executed {negotium gestum), the right as
well as the liability descends to the heir. 8. If a person who is
appointed by the praetor to execute a judgment in connexion with
my afiairs should deal fraudulently with me, an action will be
allowed me against him. 9. Labeo tells us that in the action on
negotia gesta sometimes the only material point is the question of
'dolus'; if, for instance, you volunteer to act in my afl^rs, simply
on the strength of your goodwill to me, to prevent my property
being sold to pay my debts, it will be absolutely just, he says,
that you should answer for 'dolus' alone, and this is not an
unreasonable view. 10. A man is liable to this action not only
where he meddles with somebody else's afiairs and acts in them of
his own accord, without being driven to it by any pressure, but
even where he is driven by some pressure or acts on the notion
that there is pressure put upon him. 11. The following question
is raised in Marcellus (Dig. 2). Suppose I have already made up
my mind to volunteer to manage something for Titius, and, that
being the case, you give me a mandate to do the same thing ; can
I have both actions ? To this I should say myself that both ^tions
will lie. This is exactly like what Marcellus himself says in
reference to the case of my proposing to manage some one else's
afiairs and thereupon taking a surety ; in this case too, according
to him, an action will lie against both.

TFT. y] On netgotia geeta {volu/ntary agency) 177

4 Thb bame (an Sabmus 45) Howeyer, whether in this case
the surety would not haye some right of action is a question to
consider, but the true rule is that he can bring an action for
n^atia gestOy unless he became surety out of pure bounty.

6 The same {on the Edict 10) Add that, if I managed for you
under the belief that I had a mandate from you, this again will be
perfectly good ground for an action on fiegotia gesta^ and the
action on manddhjum will not lie. A similar rule applies where
I become surety for a debt owed by you in the belief that I
had a mandate from you. 1. And if I managed under the idea
that the affikir concerned Titius when it really concerned Sem-
pronius, Sempronius alone is liable to an action at my hands on
negotia gestd.

6 JuLiANUS says :—(IHg. 2) If I manage afl^drs of your ward
without any mandate from you, but to save you from liability on
the actio tutdcBy this wiU make you liable at my hands on negotia
geskiy and so it will your ward, provided, that is, he is enriched by
it 1. Again, if I lend money to your procwrator on your account^
for him to pay off your creditor with it or to redeem your pledge,
I shall haye a right of action against you on viegotia gesta, but
I shall have none against the man with whom I made the agree-
ment Suppose however I take a promise from your procurator
by stipulation ; it may be said that I still have an action against
you on negotia ge^a, because I added the stipulation in question
out of extra caution. , 2. If a man receives money or anything else
to bring it to me, then, as he acted in my business^ I have a good
right of action on negotia gesta against him. 3. We may add that
if a man has managed my affitir with no thought of me, but for the
sake of gain to himself, then, as we are told by Labeo, he managed
his own aflbir rather than mine (and, no doubt^ a man who inter-
venes with a predatory object aims at his own profit and not at my
advantage) : but none the less, indeed all the more, will such a one
too be liable to the action on negotia ge^a. Should he himself
have gone to any expense in connexion with my afiairs, he will
have a right of action against me, not to the extent to which he is
out of pockety seeing that he meddled in my business without au-
thority, but to the extent to which I am enriched. 4 If a man has
gone to work in such an unintelligent way as to act in his own
interest in respect of his own property, fancying he was acting
in mine, there is no ground for an action on either side, in fact
good faith itself is against there being any. If he acts in his

M. J. 12

178 On negotia gesta {voluntary agency) [book m

own afiair and mine too^ thinking it is only mine, he will be
liable in respect of mine ; as, even if I give him a mandate to
act in my interest in a matter in which you and I had a joint
concern, the rule is, according to Labeo, that if he acted in your
interest too, with his eyes open, he is liable to you on negotia
gesta. 5. If a man acts in my interest as if he were my slave, when
he is really my freedman or is freebom, he will be allowed an action
on negotia gesta. 6. But if I act in the interest of your son or
your slave, let us see whether I have not an action on negotia
gesta against you. For my own part I agree with a distinction
made by Labeo and approved by Pomponlus (b. 26) to the effect
that if I acted in some matter connected with [your son's or
your slave's] peculinm on your account^ you are liable to me ;
but if I did it out of friendship for your son or your slave, or
on their account, an action ought to be allowed against the father
or the owner to the extent of the peaUiv/m only. The same rule
holds even where I thought the person was sui juris. For example,
if I buy for your son a slave which he does not require, and you
ratify, your ratification, so Pomponius says in the same passage, is
inoperative^ to which he adds that, in his opinion, even though
there should be nothing in the pecuUvm, because it is exceeded by
the amount owing to the father or owner, still an action ought to
be allowed against the father himself to the extent to which he is
made the richer by my management 7. If, however, I managed
affitirs on behalf of a free man whom you had in your service bona
fide as your slave, then, according to Pomponius, if I did it thinking
he was your slave, I shall have a good action on negotia gesta
against you in respect of so much of his peculium as has to remain
in your hands, but, in respect of so much as he has a right to carry
away himself, I have no action against you, but only against him.
Indeed, if I knew he was free, I still have a right of action against
him in respect of so much of the peeuHtmi as he can take away,
and against you in respect of so much as has to remain with you.

8. According to Pomponius, if I think that a slave belongs to Titius
who really belongs to Sempronius, and I give money to prevent his
being killed, I have an action on negotia gesta against Sempronius.

9. The following question is raised in Pedius (b. 7) : — I ask Titius,
without bringing any action, to pay me money, fancying he is your
debtor, and he pays, though really he is not your debtor, after which
you hear of the fact and ratify the payment;— can you sue me
on negotia gesta ? On this point Pedius says there may be some

^ For agitur read agi tua. Ct M.

TIT. y] On negotia gesta {voluntary agency) 179

doubts because no afiair of yours was transacted, Titius not haying
been your debtor. The ratification however, he says, makes the
affidr yours ; the man from whom the money was received has a
right of action to recover it fi*om the one who ratified [that is you],
and in the same way the latter will after the ratification have a
good right of action against me. Thus ratification will make an
a&ir yours which originaUy was not yours, but only managed on
your account 10. The same writer has this. Suppose I think that
you are heir to Titius, whereas the real heir is Seius, whereupon
I sue a debtor of Titius [on your behalf], and I recover the money,
after which you ratify ; there are then mutual rights of action on
negotia gesta between you and me. You may say the afiair trans-
acted was none of yours but some one else's ; but this is made good
by your ratification, the result of which is that the afiair transacted
must be treated as in your interest, and there will be a good here-
ditath petUio against you. 11. How then, asks Pedius, if I, thinking
you are an heir, repair a block of chambers belonging to the
ioheritance, and you ratify, do I have a right of action against
you? To this his answer is No ; by such an act of mine another
man is enriched, and the thing done is a direct service to some
one else, and it is impossible that where the act is a direct
advantage to another this should be held to be a case of manag-
ing your afiair. 12. Let us consider the following case. Suppose
a man who is carrying on a course of management for another
has taken steps in respect of some afisdrs and neglected others,
but^ in consequence of his action, some one else forbore to attend
to the affairs last mentioned, whereas, all this while, a really
diligent man, — and this is what the party acting may be required
to be, — would have managed the other affairs too, — ought we
to say that the party is liable in an action on negotia gesta
even in respect of the matters which he did not manage ? This,
I should say, is the more correct view. Certainly if there is any-
thing for which he was bound to call himself to account, he
will beyond doubt be charged with it Granting indeed that it
cannot be laid to his change that he omitted to sue other debtors,
because it was not in his power to sue them at law, seeing
that he could not bring any action at all, still he will be charged
with omission in not getting in his own debt ; and if that debt
should chance to be one that carried no interest^ interest at
once begins to be due; — so the Divine Pius informed Havius
Longinus in a rescript, — ^unless, as the Emperor proceeds to say,
the principal had released the party from the payment of interest,

12—2

180 On n^gotia gesta {voluntary offeney) [book m

7 Paulus (on the Edict 9) As the office of Hie judex has just
the same force in bona fide cases as question [and answer] have
in a stipulation expressly made to the same effect

8 Ulpianus {on the Edict 10) But if the person who carried
on the aflBsdrs was a person of such a kind that he would not be
required to show any mandate, he might be called to account for
not ofiering to give the debtor a guarantee of ratification, and so

' suing him, assuming that there was no difficulty about giving the
guarantee. At any rate there is no doubt whatever about debts
due from himself; consequently, if he was indebted on some
ground which would cease to operate at the end of a fixed
period, and he was discharged [as debtor] by lapse of time, he
will none the less be liable to an action on negoiia geeta. A
similar rule applies to a case where the heir of a deceased
debtor would not be liable, as Maroellus tells us. 1. Again, if I
bring an action to recover land belonging to you or to a city,
in which I use underhand means, but I am acting in your interest
or in that of the city, and I get by the action a larger sum by way
of mesne profits than I ought to have got, I shall be bound to
make over the whole amount to you,'--or to the city authorities,
as the case may be, — ^though I had no right to sue for it 3. If
it comes to pass in any way that the judex takes no account of
some ground of set-off, an (zctio contraria can be brought ; but
if the set-off is considered and rejected, the bettor opinion is
that no ocfto contraria can afterwards be brought, for the reason
that the case is decided, and the plaintiff would in that case be
met by an exceptio of res judicaJtcu 3. Julianus (b. 3) discusses
this case. There are two partners of whom one forbids me to
carry on the management and the other does not forbid me ;
shall I have a right of action on negi^ia gesta against the one
who did not forbid me ? His difficulty is this, that if an action
is allowed against this latter, it is impossible that the one who
forbade should not be implicated too: however, it is equally
uiyust in his opinion that the one who did not forbid should
through the act of his co-partner escape liability, seeing that
supposing I were to lend money to one of two partners where
the other partner forbade me to do so, I should at any rate
acquire a legal claim on the former. Accordingly I hold that
the proper view is that of Julianus, that there wUl still be a
good action on negotia gesta against the one who did not forbid,
it being always understood that the one who forbade is not to

TTT. y] On negotia gesta {vohmtary agency) 181

incur lorn to the Blightest degree either through his partner or
directly.

9 SCuEVOLA {Qveations 1) Pomponius says, — ^if you manage
some afi&ir of mine, and I approve of what you did, though you
managed it badly, still you are not liable to me on negotia gesta.
A point to consider wiU accordingly be, [as he thinks,] whether it
is not the case that, so long as it is doubtful whether I am going to
ratify or not, the right of action on negotia gesta is suspended ;
indeed, how is it possible for a right of action which has once
accrued to be put an end to by the bare will [of the party who
has it]? However, he thinks that the above rule is only true
where you are clear of all doltis mains. Here Scaevola adds :
I should rather say that even where I approve, I still have a right
of action on negotia gesta^ and where it is said that you are not
liable to me, this only means that I cannot disapprove of what I
have once approved of; and just as anything which has been
managed to good purpose must needs be treated as if it were
ratified, when it comes into court, so in like matter must anything
which the party has himself approved of. Indeed if it is true that
where I have approved I have no right of action on negotia, gesta,
how will matters stand if the other receives money from my debtor
and I approve? how am I to recover it fit)m him? Or say he
sells something of mine; or, again, he lays out money on my
behalf, how is he to recoup himself? In any case there is no
mandatum that he can sue on. It is clear therefore that even
after ratification there will be an action on negotia gestou

10 Ulpianus {on the Edict 10) Does the law however go so
fitr as to bestow on me a right of action for the expense I have
incurred ? I should say I have a good right of action, unless it
was expressly agreed tiiat neither party should have an action
against the other. 1. But when a man sues on negotia gesta he
will have the action not only where the management led to some
result^ but it is enough for him if he acted beneficially, even if it
finally led to no result Accordingly, if he repaired a house that
was in danger of fiedling, or cured a sick slave, he will have a good
action on negotia gesta, even if the house is now burnt or the
slave is dead: this Labeo approves of. However, according to
Oelsus, ProculuB says in a note on the passage in Labeo that the
action need not always be allowed [even if the work was effective].
Take the case, for instance^ of a man repairing a house whidh the
owner had abandoned because he could not afford the expense of

182 On negotia gesta {vclu/ntary agency) [book m

it^ or one which he did not think he required. In such a case,
says Proculus, he is laying a burden on the owner, if we adopt
Labeo's yiew, as everybody is at liberty to abandon hier property,
even though it be to escape liability for damnum infectv/m.
However, this opinion of Proculus is rather neatly held up to
ridicule by Celsus. A man, he says, to have an action on negotia
gesta must have managed the afiair beneficially, but he does not
manage it beneficially, where he undertakes something which is
not wanted or which would lay a burden on the householder.
Similar to the above rule is a remark we meet with in Julianus,
viz. that a man who has repaired a house or cured a sick slave has
an action on negotia gesta, if he did it beneficially, though no
eventual advantage should be realized. I should like to ask this :
suppose he thought he did it beneficially, but the householder was
not really the better for it, how does the matter stand ? I should
say that in this case he will not have the action on negotia gesta ;
as granting that we do not consider the ultimate result, anyhow
the act ought to be beneficial at the outset.

11 PoMPONnis {on Quintus Mucins 21) If you manage the
aflalrs of an absent man without his knowledge, you must answer
for negligence as well as deliberate misfeasance. Proculus indeed
says that sometimes you must answer even for accidents ; for
example, where you manage on behalf of an absent man some new
kind of afiair which the other was not in the habit of doing
himself; for instance buying untrained slaves in the market, or
entering upon any more or less complicated business ; the rule
being that if any loss results from the business, it will fall on you,
but gain will go to the absent principal ; however, if, taking the
whole transaction, gain is made in some things and loss incurred
in others, the absent principal is bound to set off the gain against
the loss.

12 Ulpiakus {(m the Edict 10) This action must be allowed to
the successor of a man who died in the hands of the enemy, the
deceased being the person whose affairs are in question. 1. More-
over if I acted on behalf of some son under patestas, a soldier, who
died after making a testament, an action must be allowed on the
same principle : 2. and just as in respect of the management of
the aflhirs of the living, it is enough that such management was
beneficial, so it is also in respect of the property left by persons
deceased, even though the ultimate result should be other than was
intended.

TTT. y] On n^otia gesta {voluntary agency) 188

18 Paulus (on the Edict 9) A debtor of mine who owed me
fifty died, I undertook to be curator of his estate and I spent (as
curator) ten. After this one hundred were realized by the sale
of a portion of the property which he left on his deaths and I put
that sum by in a chest; but the money was lost without any
negligence on my part The question arose whether, on an heir
eventually! coming forward, I had a right to sue him, either for the
sum of fifty which I had originally lent, or for the ten which I
spent Julianus says that the essential point to consider is whether
I had reasonable ground for putting by the hundred, because,
assuming that what I ought to have done was to pay off what was
owing to myself and the other creditors who had claims against
the estate, then I ought to bear the risk of not only the sixty
{tdd) but also of the forty that remained ; however, I might stiU
retain the ten which I spent ; in other words I need only make
good ninety. But if there was reasonable ground for keeping the
whole sum of one hundred by me, for example, there was a danger
lest land of the deceased should be forfeited for a government
debt, or, money having been borrowed on a sea-risk, the penal
sum payable on failure of the condition should be increased, or
payment should be demandable in pursuance of an arbitration, —
then, says Julianus, I can recover from the heir not only the ten
which I spent to preserve the estate, but in addition to that my
original debt of fifty.

14 XJlpianus {<m the Edict 10) Where the case is that a
JUivsfamiliaa managed afl^rs, it will be perfectly just that an
action should be allowed against the father himself, whether the
son has a pecutiunif or he acted so as to improve his father's
estate ; and if the party was a female slave the principle is the
same.

15 Paulus (on the Edict 9) Pomponius says (b. 26) that in
negotia gesta you must always look at the condition^ of the party
[whose afibirs are managed] as it is at the outset Suppose, for
instance, he says, I begin to manage afiairs for a boy under age,
and before I have finished he becomes of age; or I manage
affidrs. for a slave or a ^ittsfamiUaSy and in the course of the
management he becomes free or sui juris as the case may be.
I have myself always laid down that this is the sounder view,
except m a case where a man undertakes the matter intending
to manage a single piece of business, but afterwards undertakes

^ Del temp<ni$. M.

184 On negotia gesta (voluniary iJigency) [book m

a second coarse of management with a distinct intention at a
time when the other party is ah-eady become of fall age or free or
mi juris : in this case yon may say that there are so many different
acts of management, so that the action will be governed and the
terms of the order to be made be acyasted in accordance with the
statas of the party.

16 The same {on Plautivs 7) Still, where a man manages
affiurs of mine, there are not a number of different afiairs, bat one
single contract^ unless he undertook one particular affair with the
intention, when he had finished that, of going no further ; in such
a case aj9 that, if he should alter his mind and proceed to address
himself to another affair as well, there is a fresh contract

17 Ulpiaktts {on the Edict 36) Where a man has carried on a
particular course of management while a slave, he is not bound to
give an account of it after he is manumitted. It is true that if it
is mixed up [with the subsequent matter], so that it is impossible
for the account of what was done daring slavery to be separated
from that of what the party did in a state of liberty, then as a
matter of course the case on fMmd€Uum or on negotia gesta will
comprise what was done during slavery as well as the rest For
instance, suppose a man while still a slave buys a site for building
and builds a block upon it, and the block collapses, after which
he is manumitted and leases the ground to a tenant, the action on
negotia gesta will embrace nothing more than the lease of the
ground, as no portion of the course of management carried on
during the preceding time can be brought into the case, unless it
be sometliing without which it is impossible to get at a clear
account of the aflGurs carried on while the party was free.

18 Paulus {on the Edict 9) Proculus and Pegasus say that a
man who began a course of management while he was a slave is
bound to act in good faith, and that, consequently, whatever sum
he would have been able to realize, if some one else had been
managing on his behalf, he must now, as he did not make himself
pay it, make the same sum good to his principal, if sued on negotia
gesta, if he had so much in his pecfdium that by retainer of the
same the amount could have been realized. With this Neratius
agrees.

19 The same {on Neratitia 2) However, even if he had nothing
in his pecidiumf still he was indebted by way of natural obligation,
and, if he afterwards had anything, he was bound to pay himself

TFT. v] On negoUK gesta {voluntarp agency) 185

out of it [as agent], if, [when firee] he continued to carry on the
same course of management ; just as a man who was liable to an
action which would be barred by lapse of time is compellable^ even
after the period of limitation expires, to make the amount good [to
the principal], if sued on negotia gesta. 1. Our friend Scsavola
says that in his opinion the remark of Sabinus that the account
ought to be given from the beginning must^ be understood to mean
that it ought to appear what the available balance was when the
party managing first became free, not that he is to hold himself
liable for what is attributable to malice or negligence of which he
was guilty while a slave ; so that even if it should be discovered
that when he was a slave he spent money improperly, still he will
not have to account for it. 2. If some free man serves me as a
bona fide slave, and I commission him to do something, then,
according to Tjabeo, I have no action on Tnanda/tuvn against him, as
he did not execute the commission of his own free will, but under
the impression that he was compellable as being a slave; ac-
cordingly there will be an action on negotia gesta, because it really
was his desire to act in my interest, and, as a matter of fact, he was
capable of contracting a legal obligation towards me. 3. Being
engaged in managing my affairs in my absence, you bought me
unawares something that was my own property, and you became
owner by tistis without knowing it ; you are not under any obliga-
tion to give it up to me enforceable by an action on negotia gesta.
But if, before the usuca/pio is complete, you ascertain that the
thing belongs to me, you ought to find some one to sue you for it
on my behalf, so that he may recover the thing for me, and enable
you to enforce against your vendor the stipulation against recovery'
by the owner (evictio) ; and you are not held to be guilty of any
dolus mains in finding some one to bring the action, as the reason
why you have to do it is that you may avoid liability on the action
on negotia gesta. 4. In the action on negotia gesta the defendant
has to make good not only the capital but the interest too which
he derived from the other's money, and even the interest which he
might have derived. On the other hand by means of this action
he can recover interest which he has paid, or which he might have
drawn fix>m money of his own which he spent on the other party's
aflhirs. 5. Titius being in the hands of the enemy, I carried on his
business, and afterwards he returned. I have a good action on

^ Transfer dAber$ to the place before quodL Cf M.
' After rmn read mdpud, M.

186 On negotia gesta {voluntary agency) [book m

negotia gesta, although at the time when the aflyrs were being
managed, there was no principal in respect of them.

20 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 10) But if he dies in the hands of
the enemy, both the direct action and the counter action on negotia
gesta will be available respectively for and against his successor.

21 Paulus (on the Edict 9) This is illustrated by an opinion
given by Servius, as reported by Alfenus (Dig. 89). Three men
were taken prisoners by the Lusitani, one of whom was released on
the understanding that he should bring back a ransom for all three,
and that, if he did not return, the two others should give a ransom
for him as well as themselves. On these facts Servius declared that
justice required that the Praetor should allow an action against
him. 1. When a man manages afiSsiirs pertaining to the estate
of a deceased person, he may be said to impose on the inheritance
an obligation towards himself, and himself to incur one towards the
inheritance ; accordingly, it makes no difference if the person who
eventually takes up the inheritance should even be a boy under
age, as the debt in question will devolve on him along with the
other burdens on the inheritance. 2. If I have begun to carry on
Titius's afllairs in his lifetime, I have no right to let them go at his
death, but I am not obliged to begin any fresh ones, what I am
bound to do is to carry through matters already entered upon, and
to keep hold of any advantage gained. A rule of this kind is applied
when one of two partners dies ; as whenever anything is done for
the sake of winding up some previous affiiir, it is of no consequence
how long it takes to conclude it, the question is when it was begun.
3. Lucius Titius managed afiairs of mine in pursuance of a mandate
from you ; so far as he managed any of them badly, I can bring an
action against you on negotia gesta, to compel you not only to
assign your rights of action against him, but also to make good
to me whatever harm I may have suffered through his neglect,
on the ground that you selected an agent without knowing his
character.

22 Qaius {on the provincial Edict 3) Where a man manages
afiairs in the interest either of an inheritance or an individual, and
buys some article because he finds it necessary to do so, then, even
if the article should be destroyed, he can recover what he spent by
an action on negotia gesta ; suppose, for example, he gets com or
wine for household slaves, and by some accident it comes to be
destroyed, say by fire or the fall of a house. But of course this rule
only applies where the &11 or the fire itself takes place without any

TFT. y] On negotia gesta {voluntary agency) 187

firalt of his ; if he is himself liable to an adverse judgment on the
ground of the very faU or fire, it would be absurd that he should
recover anything in connexion with things lost in the way de-
scribed

23 Paulus {an the Edict 20) If a man who is managing afiairs
for another gets in money which was not due, he is compelled to
hand it over ; and with regard to any payment which he makes
of what was not due, the better opinion is that he must hold him-
self accountable for it.

24 The same {on the Edict 24) If I give money to a procu/rator
with the intention of making the actual money thereby the property
of my creditor, the property in it does not pass to the creditor by
receipt on the part of the procurator ; still the creditor can, by
ratifying the act of the procurator, make the money his own, even
against my will, because the procurator in receiving the money was
acting on behalf of the creditor only ; accordingly ratification on
the part of the creditor discharges me of the debt

26 The sake {on the Edict 27) If a man who is managing
afiairs for another spends more than he ought, what he can recover
from his principal is the sum which he was obliged to give.

26 MoDESTiKUS {Resptmsa 1) A man ordered in his testament
by 9k fideicomnmsfwni that his inheritance should be handed over to
a particular dty ; whereupon the magistrates appointed Titius Seius
and Gains as trustworthy agents in respect of the property ; after
which these agents divided the duties of management amongst
them ; and this they did without the sanction or consent of the
magistrates. After some time the testament by which the inherit-
ance was left in trust to be handed over to the city was proved in
Court to be void, the consequence being that Sempronius was
recognised as the statutable heir ab inteatato of the deceased ; but
one of the above-mentioned agents died insolvent and left no heir.
My question is this : — if Sempronius brings an action against the
agents for this property, on whom is the risk to fall occasioned by
the want of means of the deceased agent ? Herennius Modestinus
replied : — ^whatever cannot be recovered in an action on negotia
gesta from any particular one of the agents in respect of the
matters which he carried on alone will be so much to the loss of
the person who acquired the statutable inheritance.

27 The same {JResponsa 2) There wero two brothers^ one of
whom was of fiill age and the other was under twenty-five. They

188 On negotia geeta (vduntafy agency) [book m

shared in oommon land on which there stood no houses, but the
elder brother erected extensive buildings on a waste which they
[also] held in common, on which waste there were dwelling-houses
standing which had belonged to their father; and on making a
partition with his brother of the waste in question, he claimed to
be compensated for his outlay, on the ground that he had improved
the property ; his younger brother having by that time arrived at
statutable aga Herennius Modestinus laid down that where an
outlay was incurred without pressing need but by way of luxury,
the brother on whose behalf the question was asked had no right
of action. 1. Where Titius maintained his sister's daughter out of
natural affection, I gave it as my opinion that this afforded no
ground of action against her.

28 Javolenus {extra4st8 from Cassim 8) Where any one has
managed affairs of Seius in pursuance of a mandate given by Titius,
he is liable to an action on nuindaium at the hands of Titius, and
damages must be assessed at an amount representing the interest
of Seius and Titius in the matter ; moreover Titius's interest is
measured by whatever sum he has to pay Seius, towards whom he
is himself bound on the ground of numdatwm or negotia gesta.
But Titius has a good right of action against the person to whom
he gave a mandate to manage another person's affiiirs, even pre-
viously to his making any payment himself to [that other, that is]
his own principal, because he may be held to be already the poorer
to the extent of ^ the obligation which he has incurred.

29 Callistratus (monitory Edict 3) If a father appoints by
testament a guardian to a postumous son, and, pending the birth,
the person so appointed manages the property as guardian, but
eventually no son is bom; in such a case, the proper action
against the guardian is not on tutday but on negotia gesta ; but,
should a postumous son be bom, there will have to be an action on
tiUeUiy and this action will embrace both periods of management^
vi2. the one which ends with the birth of the child, and the one
subsequent to it

30 JuLiAKUS {Digest 3) A question was asked on a statement
of &ct as follows. A man was appointed cfwratOTy by a resolution
of a municipal body, for the purchase of wheat ; and another man,
who was appointed to be under him as a subordinate curator^
spoilt the wheat by mixing something else with it so that the price
of the wheat was charged on the curaiory it being bought for the

^ For quo read qii4)d. Of. M.

TTT. v] On negotia gesta {vohmtarif agency) 189

municipality. The qucNirtion was what was the action which the
euTOtor coidd bring against the mbearatar so as to recoup himself
for the loss which he suffered through him. The answer given by
Valerius Severus was that a guardian has a right to an action on
negotia gesta against his fellow-guardian ; and he added that one
magistrate is given the same action against another, only however
where he is not himself privy to the malpractice ; from which it
follows that the same rule applies equally in the case of a mith
cwraior.

31 Papikiakus {Bespansa 2) A man gave a mandate to a
freedman or a friend to borrow some money. The lender, on the
fiuth of the written instructions [which constituted the mandate],
entered into the contract, and repayment was guaranteed by a
surety. Here, although the money was not spent on behalf of the
party first mentioned, nevertheless the lender or the surety will be
allowed an action against him on negotia gesia, modelled, in fact,
on the actio i/nstUorian 1. Amongst aflBadrs of Sempronius which a
particular person managed was one in which Titius was interested,
which the person in question managed without being aware of this
foct He will be liable to Sempronius in respect of that particular
matter too, but he has a right to an order, on mere motion, for an
undertaking to indemnify him in case he is sued by Titius, as the
latter can claim a right of action. A similar rule applies to a
guardian. 2. A case being ready for trial, but the defendant
foiling to appear, a friend of the defaulter volunteered to take it
up, stating to the Court some reason for the other^s absence. The
friend will not be held guilty of n^ligence for not appealing if the
case is decided against the absent man. Note by Ulpianue : this is
correct, as the judgment was against the defaulter ; at the same
time, if the friend, when he defended the absent person, had had
judgment given against himself, and then were to sue on negotia
gestOj he might be called to account for not appealing when he
had an opportunity. S. Where a man manages another person's
affidrs, he is required to pay interest^ that is, on the balance which
he has after discharging necessary expenses. 4. A testator desired
that certain freedmen should be paid a specified sum with a view
to the expense of erecting a monument ; if any outlay is made
beyond this amount, it cannot be lawfully claimed fVom the hdr in
an action on negotia gestOy nor yet on the ground of fideiconrndsefumj
as a limit to the outiay was laid down by the testator's expressed
intention. 5. The heir of the deceased guardian of a gurl being his

190 On n^;otia gesta {voluntary ageMy) [book m

son and under age, he is not liable in respect of bis own guahiian's
management of any affairs of tbe female ward of bis fatber, but the
boy's guardian can be sued in bis own name in an action on negotia
gesta. 6. If a mother should be led by natural affection to manage
the affairs of her son in accordance with the will of his father, still
she will not have the power to appoint an agent at her own risk to
take legal proceedings, since she has herself no right to sue on
behalf of her son, nor can she dispose of any part of his property,
nor can she give a dischai^ to any debtor of the boy by receiving
payment of the debt 7. One of several [alleged] co-owners of a
water-course defended a case in which the right to water was in
question, and judgment was given in favour of the [owner of the
alleged servient] tenement, still the party who defrayed such
expense as was necessarily incurred and was reasonable in respect
of the common interest has an action on negotia gesta.

32 The samb {Besponsa 3) A surety, owing to a mistake which he
made, took over [by assignment fix)m the creditor] certain pledges
or hypotheks referring to a different contract in which he was
himself not concerned, but he paid both debts to the creditor,
thinking that he could provide for being indemnified by consolidat-
ing his landed securities [against the debtor]. It would be useless
thereupon [for the debtor] to sue him on manda;tu/ni^ and equally
so for him to sue the debtor ; but each of the parties must have
recourse to an action on negoUa gesta against the other ; on the
trial of which negligence alone need be taken into account, not
accident as well, as the surety cannot be held to be a depredator.
The creditor cannot on the ground of the above be held liable to
an action founded on pledge [at the hands of the debtor], for
restoration of the property pledged, as he appears to have sold his
own legal position. 1. A mother took presents made to her daughter
by the man who was betrothed to her, and that without the know-
ledge of the girl : as in this case the daughter has no action on
fMmdatum or deposUvm^ she can sue on fiegotia gesta.

33 The same (Bespansa 10) The heir of a deceased husband
cannot bring an action against the widow for despoiling an inherit-
ance {compUatoi hereditaJtis^ where during the marriage she had
the husband's property in her possession. Consequently his wisest
course will be to bring an action against her for production {ad
exMbendam) and on negotia gesta^ supposing she really managed
her husband's affidrs.

TFT. y] On negotia gesta {voluntary (xgency) 191

84 Paxtlxjs {Qtiestians 1) Nesennius Apollinaris sends greeting
to Julius Paulus. A woman managed afiairs for her grandson^ and
the grandmother and grandson being both dead, the heirs of the
former were sued by the heirs of the latter in an action on negotia
ge^dy but the heirs of the grandmother claimed to set off mainten-
ance given to the grandson. To this it was replied that the grand-
mother had furnished the maintenance out of her own property in
compliance with the demands of natural affection ; as she never
applied for an order to settle the amount to be given for mainten-
ance, nor was any such order made. Besides this it was said that
there was an express rule that where a mother supported her child
she could not sue to recover the cost of maintenance which her
natural affection had induced her to provide at her own expense.
To this it was answered on the other hand that this rule would
fully apply wherever it was shown that the mother afforded the
support out of her property ; but, in the present case, where the
grandmother carried on her grandson's aflfiadrs, the chances were
that she had supported him out of his own property. The question
was entertained whether the expense should be held to have been
defrayed out of both properties. I wish to know what you think is
the fairest conclusion. My answer was as follows. This whole
question turns on matters of feet Indeed I should say that
even the rule laid down for the case of a mother is not one to
be observed without exception. Suppose, for instance, she made a
formal declaration that she was maintaining her son with the
express intention of bringing an action against himself or his
guardians. Or take the case of the father dying abroad, and
the mother, in expectation of his return home, supporting the
son and the household slaves ; in which case the Divine Antoninus
Pius laid down that an action should be allowed against the boy
himself on negotia gesta. Accordingly, the question being one
of fietct, the grandmother or her heirs have, I should say, a good
right to be heard on an application for leave to set off the cost of
the maintenance, especially if it appears that the grandmother
actually entered the items in the account of expenditure. With
regard to the view that the expense might be held to have been
incurred out of both properties, that, I should say, is altogether
inadmissible.

35 SoJSTVOiiA {Questions 1) A divorce having taken place, the
[former] husband managed aflSurs on behalf of the [former] wife ;
in this case the woman can recover her dos not merely by an action

192 On negotia gpesta {vohmtafy agency) [book m

for doa, hnthj 9Xk B/iMon on negotiage^a: that ia» always proyided,
in the caae of the latter action ^ that the husband had enough
means to be able to hand over the dos during the time of his
management; if not^ he cannot be made accountable for not
charging himself with it However, even after the loss of his means^
there will still exist a foil right of action against him on negotia
gestctj though if the husband should be sued in an action for dos^
the case must be dismissed. But some limit has to be observed in
the action on n^j^ro^ta gesta^ that is to say, the action which asks for
relief ''to the extent of the defendant's means, though he after-
wards lost them''' is only admissible where he was able to pay
throughout the time of management ; as he was not at once guilty
of any shortcoming in respect of his duty because he did not
immediately sell his property to realize the sum required ; in shorty
[to make him in de&ult^] some interval must be allowed to elapse
during which he appears to have done nothing. If, in the meantime,
before the party has completely discharged his duty of management^
the dotal property is lost, he is as little liable [for it] on negotia
gesta as if he never had been able to hand it over at all. Indeed
even if the husbands means are sufficient^ the action on iMgotia
geeia is [liable to be] disallowed, because there may be a danger of
their ceasing to be sufficient*. 1. But we do not admit the pro-
position that a man who manages affiurs of his debtor is bound
to restore property pledged to himself for debt where the money
is still owing, and he has not got enough in his hands [in pursuance
of the management] to be able to pay himself. 2, Again a case of
redhibition is not merged in the right of action on negotia geeta ;
consequently the actio redhibitoria is lost at the end of six months,
if he [, the vendor who managed the affiurs of his purchaser,] did not
find the slave sold amongst the property of the other, or, supposiog
he did find him, did not find, and so did not recover, such additional
property as went with the slave by way of accession, or whatever
was necessary to make up for any fall in the value of the slave, or
any acquisitions through the slave otherwise than out of the pro-
perty of the purchaser, there not being enough realized out of the
actual affitirs of the purchaser under management for the vendor
to recoup himself at once. 3. At the same time if the person
managing the affidrs is debtor to the principal on some other
ground, and the obligation is not liable to fSedl by lapse of time,
and he has ample means, he cannot be charged with default for not

^ Transfer n to the place after gstHt. Ct M.
s Inverted oommas after M. > After faoars ina. poue, IL

TIT. yj On negotia gesta (voVmOary agency) 198

paying this debt, at any rate so long as the daim that he shonid do
so is not founded on any ground connected with the question of
interest The rule is diflferent where a guardian was debtor to
his ward, as there the ward has an interest in the earlier debt
being paid, so as to put present debt on the right of action on

tutela.

»

36 Paulus {Questions 4) If a free man who is serving me in
good faith as a slave borrows money and bestows it to my advantage,
let us consider what is the action by which I can be compelled to
restore the money so spent to my advantage ; as the man did
not manage the matter on my behalf as if I were his Mend, but as
if I were his owner. However the proper action to allow is that on
negotia gesta, and this ceases to be available as soon as the money
is paid to the lender.

37 The same {Sentences 1) Where affiiirs of a ward have been
managed without the concurrence of his guardiw, [and the party
managing brings an action,] an inquiry is commonly made at the
time of liUs contestatio as to whether the ward is £he richer by
the matter in respect of which he is being sued. 1. Where a man
manages for another some pecuniary affidr, he is compellable
amongst other things to pay interest, and to bear the risk of all loss
on such demands as he has acquired by any contracts he made
himself, save where, owing to accidental circumstances, the debtors
have become so destitute of means that at the time of litis con-
testatio in the action against him they are not able to pay.
2. Where a father has managed property of his son which the son
acquired by free gift from the fether himself, he will still be liable
to the son in an action on negotia gesta.

38 Teyphoninus {DisptUations 2) A man who owed money
without interest managed afiairs for his creditor. The question was
asked whether in an action against him on negotia gesta he could
be made to pay interest on the money referred to. My answer
was, — ^if it had been his duty [as representing his creditor] to get
payment of the money from himself [as debtor], then he would be
bound to pay interest ; but if the time for paying the money had
not arrived during the period of his management of his creditor's
afiairs, he would not be bound to pay interest ; still, if, the day for
paying having past, he did not debit himself in the accounts he
gave to the creditor whose affiurs he carried on with the sum of
money which he owed him, he would in justice have to pay interest^
being sued in a bona fide action. Let us consider then what the

M. J. 13

194 On n^gotia geeta {vohmloury ageney) [book m

scale of interest will be. Will it be the rate which the creditor
himself could have got by lending the money at interest to someone
else, or must he pay on the highest scale? the &ct is that where a
man appropriates to his own uses money belonging to someone to
whom he is guardian or whose affairs he is carrying on, or, say, a
municipal magistrate does the same with the funds of the munici-
pality, he has to pay interest on the highest scale, as has been
enacted by Divine Emperors. Still it is a different case where the
party did not possess himself of money which was derived from the
management which he was engaged in, but had borrowed it from
his friend before he undertook the management of that friend's
afl^i*s. The persons to whom the above enactments refer were
bound to exercise good fidth without any remuneration, at any rate
good faith which was absolute and without any profit to themselves,
consequently, where ^ they are found to abuse their opportimities,
they are compellable to pay interest on the highest scale by way of
inflicting on them some Idnd of penalty ; but the person whose
case we are discussing received money by way of loan from the
other in a straightforward way, and the reason why he may be
ordered to pay interest is simply that he did not pay the principal,
but not that he appropriated money which was derived from the
business which he was managing. On the other hand it makes
a great deal of difference whether money has just begun to be owed
or the claim on the debtor is of some standing, the latter circum-
stance being enough to make a debt bear interest which otherwise
would not bear it

89 Gaius (on verbal obligations 3} Anyone who pays on

another's behalf discharges the debt^ even where the other refuses
to consent or is unaware of the payment : but money which is
owing to one man cannot be legally demanded by another without
the consent of the first In fact both common sense and legal
principle establish that you may make another man's condition
better even without his knowledge or against his will, but you are
not at liberty to make it worse.

40 Patjlus {on Sabinus 10) If I have a house in common with
you, and I give a neighbour security against da/nmvm infedmn in
respect of your share, the proper view is that if I have to pay
anything, the action I can bring against you is rather that on
negotia geata than eommuni dimdtmdo, because it was in my

^ For ^ua read quia. Gf. M.

TIT. y] On n^otia gesta (volimtary otgency) 196

power to defend my oi¥n share without being obliged to defend
thatofmyfeUow-owner.

41 The same (on the Edict 30) A man who defends my slave
in a noxal action without my knowledge or in my absence, can sue
me on negoUa getfta for the whole amount, not merely to the extent
of the slave's peeuUum.

42 The same {on the Edict 32) You undertake afiairs of mine
at the request of my slave. If you do this merely at the suggestion
of my slave, there will be an action on tiegotia ge9ta between you
and me ; but if you do it as on a mandate from my slave, there is
authority for saying that you can bring an action de pecuUo et de
in rem verso against me.

43 Labbo {Posteriora abridged by Javolemus 6) Whereas
you paid money on behalf of a man who gave you no mandatum
to do so, you have a good action on negotia gesia, as the result of
the payment was that the debtor was released from his creditor ; —
unless indeed the debtor had some interest in the payment not
being made.

44 tJLPiANUS {Disputations 6) . Where a man out of friendship
for the father applies to have goardians appointed to the children
under age, or takes proceedings for removing guardians of doubt-
ful chai*acter, he has no action against the children, according to
the enactment of the Divine Severus.

46 The same {Opinions 4) Where an outlay is made [by a
voluntary agent] on anyone's aflhirs, with beneficial result^ which
outiay comprehends expense honourably incurred for the acquisi-
tion of public oflBices such as are taken by successive steps, the
money may be recovered by an action on negotia gesta, 1 . Persons
who have received their liberty by will unconditionally are not
compelled to render an account of a course of management which
they carried on in the lifetime of their previous owners. 2. Titius
paid money to the creditors of an inheritance under the impression
that his sister had succeeded as testamentiuy heir to the deceased
Although his notion in doing so was that he was managing the
affidrs of his sister, whereas, as a matter of fact, he had acted in
the interest of the sons of the deceased, who were sui heredes to
their fistther, as soon as the testament was out of the way ; still, as
it is only just that he should not be exposed to loss, it was held
that he could sue for the amount in an action on negotia gesta
[against the latter].

13-^2

196 On negotia gesta {voluntary agency) [book in

46 Africaktjs {Qv^sUons 7) You commissioned my son to bay
land for you ; and being made aware of this fact, I bought it for
you myself. It is, I should say, an essential question what was my
intention in buying it If the case was that I made the purchase
for the sake of supplying you with something which I knew you
required, and I also knew your mind to be such that you would be
glad to have the land as purchaser, then we have reciprocal rights
of action on negotia gesta, just as we should have, supposing either
there had been no mandate given in the matter, or you had given
a mandate to Titius, and I, thinking I could carry the business
through more conveniently than he could, had purchased it mysel£
But if my object in purchasing was to prevent my son being liable
to an action on mandoUumy then I should say on the whole that I
could, as representing my son, bring an action on mandatnm
against you, and you in the same way would have an action against
me de pecnMo; since, even if Titius had undertaken the commis-
sion, and, to save him from liability in respect of it, I had made
the purchase myself, I could sue Titius on negotia ge^a, and you
and he could sue one another on mandatvm. The case would be
the same if you were to give my son a mandate to be surety for
you, and I were to be surety for you myself. 1. If the case
suggested is that you gave Titius a mandate to be surety for you,
and that, whereas he was from some cause or other hindered from
being surety, I, in order to relieve him of his promise, became
surety, then I have a good right of action on negotia gesta.

47 Paulus iSeifUences 1) The action on negotia gesta is given
to whoever has an interest in taking proceedings in that particular
form. 1. Whether the action which is brought by or against the
party is direct or vtUis is of no importance, since in the extra-
ordinary procedure, where the drawing up of formulas is not now
practised, there is no occasion for such niceties, especially con-
sidering that both kinds of action are of the same force and
produce the same effect

48 Papinianus {Questions 3) If a brother, even without his
sister's knowledge, by way of acting in her interest, stipulates with
her husband for dos, he can be legally sued by her in an action on
negotia gesta to compel him to release the husband.

49 Africantjs (Questions 8) If a slave whom I sell steals
something from me, his vendor, thereupon the purchaser sells the
thing, and, subsequently, it ceases to exist, an action on negotia

TIT. y] On negotia gesta {volimtary agency) 197

gesta must be^ allowed me for the price^ just as it would have to
be allowed, supposing you had managed some aflhir thinking you
were acting in your own interest whereas you really acted in mine ;
or just as, conyersely, you would be allowed an action against me,
if you fended that some inheritance belonged to you as heir which
really was mine, and you had accordingly handed oyer to someone
else property of your own which the testator had bequeathed;
seeing that I should thereby be released from the obligation of
some time or other ^ making the transfer thereof.*

VI.

On vexatious actions.

Ulpianus {on the Edict 10) Where a man is alleged to
have received money in order that he should give trouble or
forbear to give trouble with a vexatious intent (ealumnice causa)
there is a good right of action in factum against him during one
year for fourfold the sum of money which he is allied to have
received ; and a similar action after the expiration of the year, for
the actual sum. 1. According to Pomponius, this action is not
only good in pecuniary cases but applies to criminal {publico)
charges too, especially considering that a man who takes money
for giving or forbearing to give trouble with vexatious intent is
liable to proceedings under the lex rep^v/nda/nmn, 2. A man who
has received money is equally liable whether he received it after
joinder of issue or before. 3. Moreover an enactment of the
present Emperor, addressed to Cassius Sabinus, forbids the giving
of money to the judex or to the other party, whether the case is
public, private, or fiscal, and, where such an act is done, it lays
down that the right to proceed is lost It is no doubt a fair question,
supposing the other party took the money by way of compromising
the case and not vexatiously, whether the enactment still applies ;
and I should say it does not, just as the above action itself is gone ;
there is no prohibition of compromises, but only of vile acts of
extortion. 4. A man will be deemed to have received money
even where he received something else instead of money.

1 For $it road eti. Cf. M.

' For quandoqtM read quando quidem. Of. M.

198 On veoMtious anions [book in

2 Paulus (on the Edict 10) Moreover where a man is released
from an obligation, this may be regarded as a case of receiving
money, similarly where money is lent him without interest, or
property is let or sold under its value. And it is immaterial
whether he receives the money himself, or requests that it should
be given to some one else, or ratifies the acceptance of it by some-
one else on his behalf

3 Ulpianus (on the Edict 10) Speaking generally, this rule
applies to all cajses where a man gets any benefit at all with a view
such as described, whether he receives it from the other party or
from someone else. 1. Accordingly, where he took money that
he might give trouble, he is liable whether he gave trouble or not,
and equally so where he took it that he might not give trouble,
though he gave trouble. 2. The Edict applies also to a man
who has made a ^depedtmn^ which word means a dishonourable
pct4Avm (agreement). 3. One point to be noted is this. A man
who has given money in order that someone should be put to
trouble has no action to recover it himself, because his own conduct
was dishonourable ; the action is allowed to the person with respect
to whom the money was given with a view to vexatious con-
sequences to him. Consequently if anyone has money given him
by you as an inducement to give me trouble, and by me as an
inducement not to do so, he will be liable to two actions at my
hands.

4 Qaixts {on the provincial Edict 4) This action is not open
to the heir, because it ought to be enough for him that he has an
action to recover the money which was paid by the deceased :

6 Ulpianus (on the Edict 10) but it is good against an heir

to the extent of whatever has come to his hands. It is in fa^t
settled law that heirs can be compelled to give up dishonourable
gains as well as the receivers, though criminal charges would be
too late ; for example, anything given as an inducement to falsifi-
cation {ohfal9vm)y or given to a judge to procure a partial decree
the heir can be compelled to give up, as he may anything else
acquired in a fiagitious manner. 1. Besides the above action there
is also a good right of condictio, assuming that the only dishonour-
able behaviour in the case is that of the party who receives ; if the
party who gives is equally guilty, then the one in possession is in
the better case. Supposing then the money is recovered by a
condictio, is the action above mentioned taken away, or is it to be

TIT. Yi] On vexatioits actions 199

allowed for threefold the amount, or is the action for fourfold
allowed and the condietio too^ as in the case of a thief? I should
say howeyer that one or other of the two actions by itself is
enough. But where the condicUo is open, there is no occasion to
allow the action infacifum after the expiration of a year.

6 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 4) With regard to the year,
in the case of a persiMi who gave money to prevent an action being
brought against him, it begins to run from the day on which he
gave the money, provided he then had the power of suing to
recover it. But in the case of a person in respect of whom another
gave money to procure proceedings being taken against him, it
may be a matter of question whether the year ought to be reckoned
from the day when the money was given, or whether it ought not
rather to be fit>m the day when the party in question knew it was
given ; since a man who does not know of the ground that there is
for taking proceedings cannot be held to have the power of taking
them; and the better opinion is that the year is reckoned from
the day when he first knew.

7 Paulus {on the Edict 10) If a man has money given him
by another as an inducement not to give me trouble, then, if it
was given in pursuance of a mandate from me, or by my general
procurcUoTy or by someone who volunteered to act on my behalf
and whose act was ratified by me, I am deemed to have given it
myself. But if the other did not give it on my mandate, even
though he did it out of concern for me to prevent the trouble, and
I have not ratified, then it is held that the party who thus paid
can recover the money and I have the action for fourfold.
2. Where a pvMtcanus retained a man's slaves, and money was
paid him which was not lawfrdly owing, he too is liable to an
action in factvm on the above clause in the Edict.

8 Ulpianus {Opinions 4) If it should be thoroughly proved
to the proper judge in the case that money was taken ftx)m a
person who was innocent, on pretence made of some criminal
charge which was not established against him, the judge must
order the sum thus illegally extorted to be restored, in accordance
with the terms of the Edict dealing with the case of such persons
as are alleged to have received money as an inducement to give
trouble or to forbear from giving it ; and he must infiict a penalty
on the guilty party proportionate to his offence.

200 On vexaHims actions [book m

9 Papiniakus {on advUeries 2) Where a slave is accused, if
application is made, he is examined by torture ; and, if he is
acquitted, the accuser is ordered to pay the owner double the
value of the slave ; besides which an inquiry is made as to vexa-
tious proceeding on the part of the accuser, apart from any
estimate of the slave's value ; as the charge of vexatious conduct
is independent of any question of the loss incurred by the owner
in respect of the slave in consequence of the torture.

FOURTH BOOK.

I.
On RESTiruTiONS in integrum.

1 tlLPiANus {on the Edict 11) The practical character of this
title need not be dwelt on, it is plain in itself. Under this title the
praetor gives relief on a number of different occasions to persons
who have made a mistake or have been circumvented, whether they
were put to a disadvantage by intimidation, or craft, or their youth,
or their absence,

2 Paulus (Sentences 1) or a change of status, or excusable
error.

8 MoDESTiNUS {Pandects 8) Wherever restitution in integrum
is promised by the praetor it is always on cause shown, so that he
may examine into the sufficiency of the causes alleged, and see
whether the particular case^ is of a kind in which he gives relief.

4 Callistratus {monitory Edict 1) I know it is the practice
of some magistrates not to listen to one who asks for restitution
in integrum in respect of any very trivial matter or amount, if this
would prejudge the case of some matter or amount of more
importance.

6 Paulus {on the Edict 7) In any case in which the prsetor
promises that he will give anyone restitution in integrumj no one
is held to be barred ffrom proceeding in the matterf (nemo videtur
re exdusus).

6 Ulpianus {on the Edict 13) Restitution in integrum may
be given to the successor on the death not only of a minor, but of
a man who had been absent on business of the State, indeed of any-

* For verw read vere ea. Cf. M.

202 On occasions of restUtUion in integrum [book iv

one who could himself have got such restitution : this has very
often been laid down. Accordingly whether the applicant is an
heir, or is a person to whom an inheritance has been handed over
[in pursuance of a Jideicommismim]^ or is successor to a JUuis-
famiiiaa who was a soldier, he can get restitution. On the same
principle where minors, male or female, are reduced to slavery,
their owners will be granted restitution in iwtegruniy subject always
to the limitation laid down as to time. Indeed, if it should happen
that a minor, under the above circumstances, had been put to a
disadvantage in respect of an inheritance upon which he had
entered, then, as we learn from Julianus {Dig. 17)» his owner will
be allowed to repudiate, not merely in consideration of his youth
but even without there being his youth in his favour; the &ct
being that patrons of freedmen may have put their statutable rights
in practice not with a view to acquiring the inheritance themselves,
but in order to punish the freedmen.

7 Marcellus {Digest 3) The Divine Antoninus, in a rescript
addressed to Marcius Avitus the praetor on the question of relieving
a man who had lost property through absence, expressed himself
as follows: ''It is true that no variation should be made lightly
from the regular practice ; still relief ought to be given where plain
justice requires it If therefore the party failed to appear when
called upon, and thereupon judgment was given in the usual form,
but he, very shortly afterwards, applied in Court before you had
risen, it may be supposed that his previous default was not due to
his own negligence, but to the fact that he did not thoroughly hear
what the officer said; accordingly he can have the order for
restitution." 1. Aid of this kind is in fact not confined to cases
such as mentioned ; relief ought to be given to any persons who are
deceived without fault of their own, especially where there is some
fraud in the case on the part of their opponents, as there is always
a good right of action for dolus mcUus, and it is the part of a good
preetor rather to allow a new trial {restUtiere litem), as both reason
and justice require, than to compel the party to bring an action
involving infamia, a resource to which recourse should be had only
where the case is one which admits of no other remedy.

8 Macer {on appeals 2) There is this difference between the
case of minors under twenty-five and that of persons absent on
State business, that minors, even where they were defended by
their guardians or curators, may still get restitution in integrum
against the State (rem ptMicam), of course on due cause shown ;

TIT. i] On occasions of restUution in integrum 20a

bat with regard to persons who were absent on State business, and
any others who are put upon the same footing, if they were defended
by their procu/rators, the practice is that they are only so far
relieved by way of restitution in integrum as to be allowed to
appeal

IL
Acts doke thbough fkab.

1 Ulpianus (on (he Edict 11) The prsator says: "Where an
act is done through fear I will not uphold it" The old terms of
the Edict were *^/orce or fear." The word force {vis) was introduced
to express compulsion applied in opposition to the party's will;
fear (metus) was held to mean mental trepidation on the ground of
urgent or apprehended danger. But afterwards the mention of
force was left out for the reason that anything which is done by
unmitigated force may be held to be done through fear too.

2 Paulits {Sentences 1) Force (vis) is an attack by some over-
powering agency such as cannot be withstood.

3 Ulpiakus {on (he Edict 1 1) This clause therefore comprises
both force and intimidation, and where a man has done any act
under forcible compulsion he can get restitution by this Edict
1. But by force we understand force which is outrageous and such
as it is against good morals to use, not force which is rightfully
applied by a magistrate, that is to say, in pitrsuance of established
law, and the right attached to the office which he bears. Neverthe-
less, if a magistrate of the Roman people or the governor of a
province has in any case acted illegally, then, according to
Pomponius, this Edict will apply to the case; suppose, he says,
a magistrate should extort money from anyone by threatening him
with death or stripes.

4 PavIjVB {on (he Edict 11) I should say myself that the fear
of enslavement or any similar evil must be included.

6 Ulpiakus {on (he Edict 11) Fear, according to Labeo, must
be understood to mean not simply any apprehension whatever, but
fear of some evil of exceptional severity.

6 Oaius (on the provincial Edict 4) The fear which we must
hold to be referred to in this Edict is not the fear felt by a weak-

204 Acts done thrtmgh fear [book iv

minded man, but such as might reasonably occur even in the case
of a man of thorough firmness of character.

7 Ulpianus (on the Edict 11) Pedius says (b. 7) that this
Edict does not comprise apprehension of in/amiay and that no fear
of annoyance affords ground for restitution under the Edict
Similarly where some nervous person is under groundless appre-
hension of what is really nothing at all, he will not get restitution
under this Edict, as no act has been done with force or intimidation.
1. Again, if a man who is detected in the act of theft or adultery, or
any other outrageous offence, either gives away property or binds
himself in any way, Pomponius says very truly (b. 28) that the case
is within the purview of the Edic^ as the man was in fear of death
or imprisonment It is true that it is not always lawful to kill
an adulterer or a thief, unless he defends himself with a weapon ;
still there was a possibility that such offenders might be killed,
even though it were not lawful, and so their fear might be well
grounded. Again, if such a one should part ¥rith his property to
avoid information being given by someone who detects him, it
is held that he may have the benefit of this Edict, because, if
information were given, he might be exposed to the penalties above
mentioned.

8 Paulus {on the Edict 11) In such a case the party who
detects no doubt comes under the lex JtUia, as he accepted some-
thing [as hushmoney] for a detected act of adultery. But the
praetor is bound to step in to compel restitution as well ; as the act
of the party receiving is against good morals, besides which the
praetor does not concern himself with the question whether the
man who gave is an adulterer or not, he only looks at the feet that
the other acquired by putting a person in fear of his life. 1. If a
man takes money from me by means of a threat to deprive me of
the written evidence of my status if I refuse to pay, there is no
doubt that this is an extreme case of intimidation ; at any rate, if
proceedings are already pending to establish that I am a slave, and
there is no possibiUty of my being pronounced a free man if the
documents in question are gone. 2. If a man or a woman makes
a gift to avoid stupruniy the Edict applies, inasmuch as to persons
of character such a fear ought to be worse than that of death.
3. In the above cases which I said came under the Edict it makes
no difference whether a man is apprehensive on his own account or
on behalf of his children ; indeed parental affection makes people
feel stronger alarm on their children's behalf than on their own.

TIT. n] Acts done through fear 206

9 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 11) We must take fear to mean
present alarm, not the surmise that intimidation may be exercised ;
this we find in Pomponius (b. 28) ; what he says is that we must
understand the meaning to be fear excited~-in short a case where
apprehension has been excited by some person. Following this
up, he discusses this case: Suppose I abandon my land on the
report that someone is coming to attack me with arms, is this
a case where this Edict will apply ? To this Labeo, he says, holds
that it is not ; nor is it a case for the interdict unde vi ; I cannot
be held to be ejected by force, as I did not wait to be ejected, but
took to flight It would be a difierent case [so, he says, Labeo
holds] if I only took my departure after an entry was made by
armed men ; that would really be a case for ^e Edict He
[Pomponius] also says that if the case which occurs is that you
get together a band of men and build on my land by force, then
the interdict quod vi atU dam and the Edict under discussion will
both apply ; because, in short, what makes me allow you to do it is
that I am put in fear. Again, if I deliver up i>os8ession to you,
owing to the use of force, this^ Edict, according to Pomponius, will
apply. 1. It should be observed that in the Edict the prsetor
speaks in general terms and in rem; he does not go on to say by
whom the act is supposed to be done : consequently, whether it is
a single individual who excites the fear, or a mob, or a municipal
body, or a guild, or a corporation, it will be a case for the Edict
At the same time, though the praetor includes the case of any use
of force, no matter by whom, still Pomponius says, with some nice
discrimination, that if I accept something from you or induce you
to bind yourself to something as a consideration for protecting
you against the violence of enemies or brigands or a mob or
procuring your liberty, I ought to be amenable to the Edict only
where I was myself the author of the violence in question ; but, iT
I had nothing to do with the violence, I ought not to be amenable ;
I ought rather to be held to have simply received a consideration
for my services. 2. Pomponius says further that it is weU held by
some that the act of manumitting a slave or of pulling down a
house, where it is done on compulsion, is one which comes within
the scope of the restitution provided by this Edict 3. Where the
prrotor says that he will not uphold the set, let us consider how
this exactly applies. Now a transaction may in the first place be
incomplete [in itself], though the party was put in fear; for
instance, take a case where a stipulation is made to repay a loan,

^ Read huic for hoe. Cf. M.

206 Acts done through fear [book iv

but no money is thereupon advanced; or, Becondly, it may be
complete, aB where, on the stipulation being made, the money is
advanced, or a debtor who puts his creditor in fear gets thereby a
formal release of his debt, or there is some similar act which com-
pletes the transaction. Hereupon Pomponius tells us that where
the transaction is complete, the party sometimes has a good right
to use either an eooeeptio or an action, but where it is incomplete
he can only have an exoeptio. However, I know of an actual case
in which certain Campanians by putting a man in fear extorted
from him a written promise to pay money, and a rescript was made
by the present Emperor to the effect that the party could apply to
the prsetor for a restitution in ifUegrum; whereiq)on the prsBtor
declared, I being present myself, in the character of assessor, that
if the applicant chose to bring an action against the Campanians,
such an action was regular, or, if he preferred pleading an exceptio
to an action brought by them, it could be had. We may gather
from this pronouncement of the Emperor, that whether the act
is complete or incomplete, an action and an exceptio are both
equally available. 4. Moreover, if the party wishes, he can have
an action in rem or in personamj the formal release, or whatever
kind of discharge he gave, being rescinded. 5. Julianus {Dig. 3)
expresses the opinion that when a man has procured delivery of a
thing by putting in fear, he is compellable not only to give it back,
but to give a formal undertaking guaranteeing absence of dolus.
6. Although however we hold that an action m rem must be
allowed, because the thing delivered belongs to the party to whom
force was applied, still it is not unreasonably held that^ if a man
sues for fourfold damages, there is an end of the right of action
in rem ; and the converse holds too. 7. The restitution, that is
in integrum^ to be ordered in pursuance of this Edict by the judge's
authority is on this wise : — ^where delivery of anything was made on
compulsion (vi), the thing must be redelivered, and, as already
said, an undertaking by stipulation given against dohtSy to provide
for the case of the thing having been deliberately damaged ; and,
if there was a discharge given by way of formal release, the original
contractual relation will have to be re-established ; in &ct, it goes
as &r as this, that^ according to Julianus {Dig. b. 4), if it was a case
of money being owed, and a formal release was procured by force,
then, unless either the money is paid or the position of debtor and
creditor is re-established and in pursuance thereof issue is joined
in an action, the party must be ordered to pay fourfold. Again, if
I was compelled by force to promise by way of stipulation, there

TIT. n] Acts done through fear 207

will have to be a formal release of the stipulation. Similarly, if
any usufruct or [real] servitude is lost, it will have to be re-
esteblished. 8. We may add that since the right of action we are
discussing is expressed in rem^ and does not lead to any coercive
measure being applied to the person himself who exerdsed force,
but the praetor's intention is that where anything is done by means
of intimidation the right should be re-established against all alike,
there is much reason in a remark made by M arcellus on a passage
in JulianuSy where the latter writer says that, if a surety uses force
to extort a discharge of the debt by formal release, there will be
no restitution granted of the right of action against the principal
debtor, but the surety must be ordered to pay fourfold, unless
he himself re-establishes the creditor's right of action against such
principal debtor. Here MarceUus's remark is the more sound in
law ; the right of action, he says, will be good even against the
principal debtor, as it is expressed in rem.

10 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 4) The following point is
clear, that if the sureties are formally released through the act of
a principal debtor who puts [the creditor] in fear, an action may
be brought against the sureties themselves to make them renew
their liability. If I give you a formal release of a stipulation,
being compelled thereto by your putting me in fear, it is within
the discretion of the judge before whom proceedings are taken
under the Edict not only to order the obligation to be renewed in
your individual person, but to make you furnish sureties, viz. either
the same as before or others no less substantial, and besides this
renew any pledges which you gave in the same matter.

11 Paulus {Digest of Jtdiantis 4 makes this note :) If a third
person, without any sinister collusion on the part of the surety, has
used force to procure that a formal release should be given to such
surety, the latter will not be liable to renew the obligation of the
principal debtor as welL

12 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 11) The other side must restore
the children of female slaves, the young of cattle, and produce
generally, and all accessions (causa) ; this is not confined to produce
already taken, as, if I could myself have realised more, and I was
prevented by intimidation, he must make this good too. 1. The
following question may be raised: suppose the party who used
force himself should have [in return] force used towards him,
is it the intention of the prsetor that restitution should be ordered
at his suit under this Edict of those things the property in which

208 Ads done through fear [book iv

he transferred to another? PomponiuB says (b. 28) that the prcetor
ought not to assist him : force, he remarks, may be lawfully met
with force, and thus he suffered the same thing that he inflicted.
Accordingly, if a man compels you by threats to make him a
promise, and then I compel him by threats to give you a formal
release, there is no case for restitution at his suit 2. Julianas
says that a man who uses force to make his debtor pay him a debt
is not liable under this Edict, on account of the nature of the
action founded on putting in fear, which requires that loss should
have been inflicted ; although it cannot be denied that the creditor
in question comes under the terms of the lex Jnlia de vi and has
lost his right as a creditor.

18 Callistbatus (on judicial inquiries 5) There is extant a
decree of the Divine Marcus in these words : " The best course for
you is, if you think you have any legal demand, to bring it to the
test of an action." Here, on Mardanus saying, '^I used no violence"
{vis\ the Emperor replied, ''Do you think there is no violence
except where people are wounded ? It is just as much a case of
violence wherever it happens that a man who thinks he has a right
to something demands to have it given up without going to the
Court Accordingly, if anyone is shown to me to be in possession
of or to have taken — ^recklessly and without judicial authority —
anything belonging to his debtor, or money which was owing him,
where it was not given him voluntarily by the debtor, and so to
have laid down the law for himself in the matter, — ^he shall forfeit
the right of a creditor.'^

14 Ulpianus {on the Edict 11) Again, if I have a perpetual
exceptio which protects me against your demand, and, that being
the case, I compel you to give me a formal release, this Edict does
not apply, because you have lost nothing. 1. If the party refoses
to make the restitution, the praetor promises to allow an action
against him for fourfold : that is to say, four times the whole value
which ought to have come by way of restitution. The praetor deals
indulgently enough with the party in giving him an opportunity to
make restitution, if he wishes to avoid the penalty. After a year
he allows an action for the simple value, and that not as a matter
of course, but only on cause shown ; 2. an essential point being, in
the matter of showing cause, that this action is to be allowed only
where no other is available, and, certainly, considering that, in
a case of iryuria inflicted by putting in fear, the right of action
lapses in a year, that is, a year reckoned with allowances {utUis\

I

TIT. n] Acts done through fear 209

there ought to be some enibstantial ground to justify this action
being still available after the expiration of the year. One example
of there being some other right of action is the following : suppose
the party to whom force was used is dead ; then his heir may have
the heredUaiia petitio, seeing that the party who used force is in
possession ''as possessor," and, that being so, the heir will not have
the right of action founded on putting in fear; true as it is that^
if the year were still running, then the heir himself could bring
proceedings for the fourfold damages. The reason why the action
is given to successors is that it includes indemnity (rei habet
perseeuHonem). 3. In this action the question is not whether
the party who put in fear is the defendant or someone else ; it is
enough for the plaintiff to show that threats or force were used to
him, and that the result was that the present defendant^ although,
it may be, no charge can be brought against him, still made gain.
The truth is that fear prevents a man from realising the fitcts ;
so that it is with good reason that he is not compelled to point
out who it was that employed threats or force ; accordingly all that
the plaintiff is compelled to do is this: he must show that
intimidation was practised with the object of maldng him give
someone a formal release for a debt, or deliver property, or in short
do something or other. And it ought not to strike^ anyone as
unjust that one man should be condemned to pay fourfold in
consequence of an act done by another, because the action is not
for fourfold at the outset ; it is only so where restitution is refused.
4. This being an '' arbitrarian " action, it is open to the defendant
to make restitution of the thing at any time before the CMrbiter
gives his judgment, in accordance with what has already been said,
and, if he declines to make it, it is agreeable to law and justice
alike that he should pay fourfold. 5. Sometimes however, even if
the case is one of intimidation being practised, the arbiter's dedsion
allows the defendant to get off. Suppose Titius used threats with-
out my privity, and prc^rty acquired by such means came into
my hmds, but it is now, through no illpractice of mine, no longer
in existence ; will not the judge on motion let me go free ? Or
suppose the property is a slave, and he runs away from me ; if the
judge makes me give an imdertaking that^ should the slave get
into my power, I will give him up, then equally I ought to be
dismissed from the action, on motion to this effect Accordingly,
some hold that a bona fide purchaser who acquires from the party
who used force is not liable, nor a donee or a legatee of the

' For videtur read videatwr, Qt M.
M. J. 14

210 Acts done through fear [book iy

property. Howeyer^ Viyianus maintainR very correctly that persoxus
in these positions are bound just as much, as otherwise I should
be put to a disadvantage in law by the fiBM^ that I was put in fear.
Pedius too (b. 18) says that the judge's authority in a case of
restitution is such that he may make an order for restitution on
a party who used force, though the property has come to the hands
of another, or on the man to whose hands it has come, though the
intimidation proceeded from another ; because no man must be
allowed to derive a benefit from the fiict that anotiier put someone
in fear. 6. Labeo says that if a man is compelled by being put
m fear to contract an obligation, and he furnishes a surety who
undertakes the office freely, then he and the surety can both be
dischaiged ; whereas, where the surety alone made the undertaking
under threats, and not the principal, the surely alone will be
discharged. 7. What is given fourfold is the value of the matter
in hand, including produce and all accessions {omaim cavsa).

8. If a man engages imder duress to appear to an action, and then
finds a surety, the surety will be discharged as well as the i^arty.

9. If, on the other hand, a man constrains another by duress to
make him a promise and, on refusing to execute a release, he is
ordered by the judge to pay fourfold, then, if he sues on his
stipulation, and is met with an exceptiOj JuUanus holds that he
has a good replication because the fourfold which the defendant
got includes the simple value. Labeo, however, laid down that^
even after [he had paid the damages on] the action for fourfold,
the party who imposed the duress would none the less be barred
by the exceptio ; but as this appears^ harsh, it must be so fieur
qualified in practice that he is liable to the penalty of being ordered
to pay threefold, and is also in any case compelled to give a formal
release. 10, With regard to the above statement that the fourfold
damages include the simple value, the principle on which the
different amounts are assigned is that the order to pay fourfold
of course embraces the matter itself, and thus restitution thereof
is effected, but the penalty is maintained to the extent of threefold.
11. How will it be if [the property e.g.] a slave is lost or destroyed
without any malice or n^ligenoe in the party who used the duress
and on whom judgment was passed ? In such a case, if the slave
dies before an action can be brought on the judgment, there will
be the less strictness observed as to enforcing the order, for the
fitct that the defendant is compelled to give satisfaction for his
offence by a threefold penalty. But in the case of a slave who

^ Bead videaiur for videbatur. Of. M.

TTT. n] Acts done through fear 211

appears to have taken to flight, the defendant must be forced to
give an undertaking that he will pursue the man and give him up
without &il ; and even then the party who suffered duress will
retain to the full his right of action in rem^ or for production, or
whatever right of action he may have for recovering the slave, so
that, if [he] such owner should by any means get the slave back,
then, if the other party should be sued in pursuance of the under-
taking, he has an exceptio which is a complete protection* All this
applies where adverse judgment is already given ; but should the
slave die before the decision without any malice or negligence in
the defendant, the latter will still be liable^ ; this follows from the
words of the Edict, [" If eta] and such property is not restored in
pursuance of the judge's pronouncement." Accordingly, if the
slave has taken to flight without any contrivance or negligence
in the defendant to the action, he will have to undertake in
pursuance of the order of the judge that he will follow up the
slave and hand him over. It must be added that even where
the property is gone through no negligence of the defendant to the
action, stiU, if it would not have been lost at all, supposing he had
not got it from the other by putting him in fear, he will be liable ;
this agrees with the practice in the case of an Interdict tmde m or
qtwd vi aut dam. Hence it sometimes happens that a man will
recover the price of a slave who is then dead, where, if he had not
suffered duress, he would have sold him. 12. A man who uses
duress to me, seeing that he gets possession by my act» is not a
thief ; though a man who takes by force is a thief with circum-
stances of aggravation ; so Julianus holds. 13. Where a man
puts in fear, it is clear that he is liable for dolus too — Pomponius
says the same thing; moreover whichever action is flrst brought
would be a good bar to the other, if pleaded by way of exceptio
in factmn. 14. Julianus says that the unit which is multiplied
fourfold is simply the interest which the plaintiff had, so that if a
man who owed forty in pursuance of a fdeicomndssfum should
promise under duress to pay three hundred and should pay it^
he will recover four times two hundred and sixty, as this is the
sum with reference to which the duress was really operative.
16. It would follow from this that if several put in fear and an
action is brought against one only, then, if the latter makes
restitution without further compulsion before judgment, they are
all discharged ; but> in fitct, even if he does not do this, but pays

^ For tenehxtur—mVi be liable — some would read non Unebitur—'mSL not be
liable. Of. M.

14—2

212 Acts done through fear [book iy

fourfold in pursuanoe of the judgment^ the better opinion is that
in this case too the action founded on putting in fear is at an end
as against the others ;

16 Paxjlus {on the Edict 11) or an action will be allowed
against the others for the amount by which what is recovered from
the one fells short of the whole sum due.

16 TJlpianus (on the Edict 11) As for what was above said
in reference to the case of several persons putting in fear, a similar
rule holds where the property is transferred to one, but it was
another that put in fear. 1. Where slaves put in fear, there will
be a noxal action in respect of the slaves themselves, but an
[ordinaiy] action can be brought against an owner [of the slaves] ,
into whose hands the property comes ; and if, upon being sued in
this action, he either gives up the thing, or, in accordance with
what has been said, pays fourfold, this will relieve the slaves toa
If however, on being sued in a noxal action, he prefers to surrender
the slaves for noxa, this will be no bar to an action against him in
his own person, if the thing has come to his hands. 2. This action
is allowed to the heir of the party wronged, and to his successors
generally, since it is an action for indemnity. It is allowed against
heirs or successors in general to the extent of what has come
to their hands ; which is reasonable, for though the liability to
a penalty does not pass to the heir, still an advantage gained by
dishonourable or outrageous means ought not to be a source of
profit to the heir ; indeed there is a rescript to this effect

17 Paulus {Qtiestiona I) Let us here consider this point
Where the heir, after something obtained as above has come to his
hands, consumes what has so come, will he cease to be liable, or
will the fieict that the thing once came make him liable once for
all ? and, if he dies after consuming it, is there a good right of
action against his heir, without further distinction, because he
succeeded to a heritable indebtedness, or will no action be allowed
because nothing came to the hands of the second heir ? The better
opinion is that in any case the right of action holds against the heir
of the heir ; it is enough that the thing once came to the hands of
the original heir, and the right of action thereupon becomes perma-
nent On any other principle we shall have to say that the very
heir who consumes what has come to him will not be liable to an
action.

18 JuLiANUS (Dig. 64) Where the actual thing which came to
the party's hands is lost or destroyed, he is not, in the language

TIT. n] Acts done through fear 213

of the law, enriched, but if it is converted into money or some
other kind of property, there is then no further inquiry to be made
as to what finally ensues, but the man is held to be enriched once
for all, though he should after that lose what he got The Emperor
Titus Antoninus himself, in a rescript addressed to Claudius Fron-
tinus on the valuation of things comprised in an inheritance, declared
that he might very well be sued in a heredUoitis peHtio on this
very ground, that, although the things which were originally in-
cluded in the estate were not in his hands, still, the mere^ value
received for the things, seeing that the receipt made him the richer,
however often a conversion might have taken place in respect of
the individual objects, boimd him just as much as if the actual
things were still there in their original form.

19 Qaius {on ihe provincial Edict 4) With regard to the &ct
that the proconsul promises an action against the heir to the extent
only of what comes to his hands, we must understand this to refer
to the allowance of a perpetual right of action.

*

20 Ulpianus (on the Edict 11) On the inquiry how much has
come to the hands of the heir, we must consider the question with
reference to the time of joinder of issue, supposing it to be clear
that anything has come at alL It is the same where something
so passes into the general bulk of the property of the party who
used the unlawful force that it is certain that it will come to the
heir; in short, where a debtor is released.

21 Paulus (on the Edict 11) Where a freedwoman after being
guilty of ingratitude towards her patron, knows that this is the
case, and, being thus in peril in respect of her status, gives or
promises something to the patron, to avoid being reduced to slavery
again, the Edict does not apply, because such a case of being put in
fear is the woman's own act 1. Where any act is done under
intimidation, the praetor will not treat any lapse of time as a ground
for upholding it 2. Where the applicant delivered possession of
land which was not his own, the unit of which he will recover four-
fold or the simple amount, as the case may be, with the proceeds,
is not the value of the land but the value of the possession of it ;
the subject of valuation is whatever has to be restored, in short,
what the applicant is kept out of, and that is, here, the bare
possession with the produce. Pomponius agrees with this. 3. If
a do8 is promised under intimidation, I should say that no obli-
gation arises, there can be no doubt that such a promise of do8

^ For quo read quoqite, Cf. M.

214 Acts done through fear [book iv

n the same as none at alL 4. If I am compelled tfafrough fear to
give up a purchase or a loeatio, it is worth considering whether the
transaction is null and void, so that the original contract remains,
or the case is to be treated like that of a formal release, on the
ground that one cannot in such a case rely on any bona Jide^ obli-
gation, any such being lost and so ended ; but the better opinion is
that the case is like that of a formal release, consequently there
is ground for a praetorian action. 5. If I am compelled by fear
to enter upon an inheritance, I should say that I become heir,
because, although I should have declined if I had had liberty of
action, still, being compelled, I had the will to do it ; howeyer I
ought to get an order of restitution from the prsator, and to be
given the power to abstain. 6. If I repudiate an inheritance
under compulsion, the prsBtor offers me two kinds of relief; he
either allows utUes fwtiones in which I am put on the footing of
heir, or else the action founded on putting in fear, so that it is
open to me to adopt whichever course I choose.

22 Paulus (Sentences 1) Where a man thrusts someone into
prison in order to extort something from him, whatever act in the
law is done under the circumstances is of no force.

23 Ulpiaktjs {Opinions 4) It is not likely that a man would
pay in the dty under compulsion and unjustly a sum which he did
not owe, if he showed that he had the rank of illustrious, inasmuch
as he could appeal to the law of the land, and apply to someone
endowed with authority, who would at all events have prevented
him from having to submit to violence. The above presumption
is so plain that in order to have it set aside he must' show the
clearest possible proofiai that violence was used. 1. If a man,
under weU-grounded terror of a judicial inquiry to which a powerful
opponent threatens to bring him in chains, sells, on such compulsion,
something which he could have lawfully retained, the matter will
be restored to its rightful position by the governor of the province.
2. If a money-lender keeps an athlete in unlawful confinement,
BO as to prevent him from engaging in his professional contests,
and thus compels him to undertake to pay a larger sum of money
than he owes, the proper judge will, on proof of these fects, order
the matter to be restored to its rightful position. 3. When a
man is forcibly compelled, by the employment of the officers of
the prcesesj without any judicial proceedings first held, to pay a
sum of money to one who claims under an assignment from a

^ For bona fidd read hona fide, Cf. M.

TFT. n] Acts daue through fear 215

person to whom the man first mentioned never owed the money,
the Court will order the sum illegally extorted to be restored by
the party by whom the applicant^ was wronged. But if he dis-
charged his actual debts on a bare requisition being made and not
in consequence of judicial proceedings, then, although the other
ought to haye recoyered the money in the way prescribed by law,
and not in an irregular manner, still it is not according to legal
principle to reverse transactions which led to the party paying
amounts which he owed.

III.
On Dolus maius.

1 UiiPiAKTJB (on the Edict 11) In this Edict the praetor gives
assistance against shifty and deceitful people who use some kind
of craft to the prejudice of other persons, his object being to
secure that the former shall not profit by their cunning and the
latter shall not be losers by their simplicity. 1. The words of
the Edict are as follows : — " where acts are allied to be done with
dolus malvSy then, if there is no other action available in the case,
and there appears to be sufficient cause, I will grant a triaL''

2. Dohis maltM is defined by Servius as follows : — ^a contrivance
for the purpose of deceiving someone else in which one thing is
pretend^ and another thing is aimed at. Labeo however says
that it is possible, even without any pretence, for a man to aim
at circumventing his neighbour ; and it is possible, he thinks, even
without dolus maluSf for one thing to be aimed at and another
pretended, as is done by such as seek to promote or protect their
own or other people^s interests by the use of this sort of conceal-
ment. Accordingly his own definition of dolus malm is that it is
any craft, deceit, or contrivance, employed with a view to drcumvent,
deceive, or ensnare other persons. Labeo's definition is correct.

3. The prsetor was not' content merely to say doltiSy he added the
word mcdus (bad), because the old lawyers used to speak of good
dolus as well as bad, applying this expression as equivalent to that
of "ingenious device," especially where anything was contrived
against an enemy or a brigand. 4. The prsBtor's words are : —
^' if there is no other action available in the case." The prsetor
does well to offer this action only where no other is open, as an

* For rei read ei. Of. M.

216 On Dolus malus [book iv

action involying infiBtmy ought not to be lightly ordered by the
prsetor if a civil or prsatorian one is available by way of which the
party might proceed ; so true is this that Pedius himself says (b. 8)
that even where there is an Interdict given which a man can sue
for, or there is some exceptio by which he can protect himself, this
Edict will not apply. Pomponius says the same thing (b. 28), and he
adds this : — even where a man is secured by means of a stipulation,
he cannot have the action on doha ; suppose, for example, there
were a stipulation against doltis. 5. The same writer says further
that where no action at all can be granted against a man, for
example, where he has been induced by dolus maltia to promise on
stipulation under circumstances so dishonouring to the promisee
that no magistrate would allow an action in pursuance of the
stipulation, the promisor need not trouble himself to ask for an
action on dolus mains, because no magistrate would allow an
action against him. 6. Pomponius also reports that it was the
opinion of Labeo that even where a man can get a restitution in
integrum^ the present action ought not to be open to him ; again,
that if some other right of action is lost by lapse of time, still the
present action ought not to be allowed, as a man who omits to
take proceedings in time has himself to blame for it ; unless
indeed the dolus modus was committed with the very object of
causing the lapse to take place. 7. Where a man who has some
dvil or prsdtorian right of action merges it in a stipulation and
then puts an end to it by formal release or by any other means,
he can take no proceedings on dolus, because he had a right of
action of a different kind ; unless indeed it was by means of dolus
mains that he lost the right of action. 8. It is not only where
there is giome other kind of action admissible against the party
whose alleged malicious practice is the subject of inquiry,

2 Paxjlus (on the Edict II) or where the matter in hand
can be secured by some means or other against him,

3 Ulpianus (on the Edict II) that this Edict Mis to apply,
this is equally the case where some other party

4 Paulus (on the Edict II) is liable to an action [which
will meet the case], or where the matter in hand can be secured
for me by proceedings in which the opposing party is someone
else.

6 Ulpianus (on the Edict II) Consequently, if a ward is
cheated by Titius, the fact being that his guardian acted in collusion
with Titius, the ward ought not to have any action on dolus against

TFT. m] On Dolus malus 217

TitiuBy because he has the action on tiUela against his guardian,
by means of which he can recover an amount equivalent to his
interest No doubt if the guardian is insolvent, the proper view
is that the ward can have the action de dolo ;

6 Gaius {on the provincicU Edict 4) as a man cannot be said
to have an action open to him at all, when owing to the other
party's want of means his action is worthless.

7 TJiiPiANXTS (on the Edict 11) Pomponius somewhat acutely
interprets the exception signified by the words 'Mf there is no
other right of action '' as expressing tiie case of its being impossible
ibr the matter in hand to be preserved for the person whom it
concerns in any other way. It cannot be held that there is any-
thing inconsistent with this view in what is laid down by Julianus
(b. 4) that where a minor under twenty-five is induced by the
fraudulent advice of his slave to sell him with his pecuHumy and
the purchaser manumits him, the minor is allowed an action de
dolo against the man manumitted, as we must understand the case
to be that the purchaser is free from dolus, so that he cannot be
held liable on his contract ; or that the sale is null and void,
assuming that the minor's consent to the sale itself was procured
by fraudulent manoeuvres. The &ct that in this case the vendor is
supposed to be a minor is no ground for a restitution in integnmiy
as no such relief is allowed to be given against a manumitted
person. 1. It follows from the above that where a man can
take measures to save himself harmless by an action for damages,
the rule to lay down is that the action de dolo does not apply.
2. Pomponius indeed says that even if there is only an actio
popularis, the action de dolo is not available. 3. L^beo holds
that the action de dolo ought to be allowed not only where there
is no other action, but even where there exists a doubt whether
there is another action or not He mentions the following cases.
A man who owes me a slave, in pursuance, say, of a sale, or a
stipulation, makes the slave take poison and then delivers him ;
or he owes me land, and pending delivery, he imposes a servitude
on it, or pulls down buildings, or cuts down or roots up trees ; in
all these cases, according to Labeo, whether he gave me an under-
taking against dohu or not, an action de dolo is admissible, because,
even if he did give such an undertaking, it is doubtftd whether
there is a good right of action on the stipulation. However the
true view is, that> if an undertaking was given against dohca, there
is no action de dolo, because there is an action ex stiptdatu ; if

218 On Dolus maluB [booki7

no such undertaking was given, then, in the case of an acti(m ex
emptOf there is no action de dolOy because there is an action ex
emptOy but in the case of an action esc stipulatu the action de ddo
is required. 4. If the bare proprietor of a slave in whom
someone else has an v>8U8 kills the slave, then, besides the action
on the lex Aquilia, there is an action for production as well,
supposing the bare proprietor was in possession when he killed
the man ; consequently the action de dolo does not apply. 5. Again,
if a slave is bequeathed by testament^ and the heir kiUs him before
entering on the inheritance, then, seeing that the slave was de-
stroyed before he became the property of the legatee, there is no
action under the lex Aqtdlia; but there is no action de dolo^
at whatever time he killed him, because there is a good right
of action ex testamento. 6. If your beast does me a damage
owing to the doltis of a third person, the question arises whether
I have a good right of action de dolo against the latter. For my
own part I am satisfied with what we read in Labeo, viz. that^
if the party who owns the beast is not solvent^ the action de dolo
ought to be allowed, although, if due surrender was made for noxa,
I do not think the action ought to be allowed, even for the differ^ice.
7. Again, Labeo asks this question : — If my slave is in fetters and
you loose him so as to enable him to run off, have I an action de
dolo against you ? To this Quintus says in a note on Labeo, — if
you did not do it out of compassion, you are liable for furtumy if
you did, the proper action is in factum. 8. A slave produces to
his owner a person who undertakes to be responsible for the
performance of the agreement which the slave makes in cpnsider-
ation of acquiring his freedom, on the understanding, that when
the slave becomes free, the liability is to be transferred to him ;
but on being manumitted the [quondam] slave declines to allow the
liability to be transferred. Pomponius says tjiis is ground for an
action de dolo. But if it is the patron's own fault that the obli-
gation is not transferred, then, he says, the proper view is that
the guarantor has a good exceptio to bar an action by the patron.
A difficulty I have is this : how can an action de dolo be given,
seeing that there is another action open ? It will however perhaps
be said that inasmuch as, if the patron proceeds against the
slave's guarantor {retui)y the action will be barred by an exceptio, the
correct view must be that an action de dolo ought to be ordered,
on the ground that a right of action which can be defeated by an
exceptio is no right of action at all ; at the same time the patron's
action is only barred by the exceptio because he does not choose

TIT. m] On Dolus malus 219

to accept the manumitted man hiinself in the place of the guarantor.
Of course the man who promised in the place of the slave ought to
have an action de dclo allowed him agamst the manumitted man^
or if the promisor in question should not be solvent^ the original
owner will be allowed such action. 9. If my procurator maliciously
allows my opponent to get the better in an action, and so my
case is dismissed, the question may be asked whether I have a
good right of action de dolo against the party who thus gained the
day. I should say that I have not, so long as the latter (jreua) is
willing to take over the defence of the case, reserving this exception
'* unless there was no collusion " [with the procurator] ; but other-
wise an action de dolo must be allowed, assuming, that is, that it is
impossible to proceed against the procurator, in consequence of his
insolvency. 10. Again, Pomponius reports that the pr»tor CsDcidi-
anus reftised to allow an action de dolo against one who had
declared that a particular person to whom a sum of money was to be
lent was a substantial person ; and in feet the prsstor was justified
in refosing, as no action de dolo ought to be allowed save in a
case of gross and plain overreaching.

8 Gaitjs (on the provincial Edict 4) Where however, knowing
that the party was in an impecunious condition, you, with a view
to your own gain, declared to me that he was a substantial person,
an action de dolo will very properly be allowed against you, as you
gave an untrue recommendation of a person with the intention of
deceiving me.

9 TJlpianus (on the Edict 11) Where a man declares that
some inheritance is of very small value, and thereupon buys it from
the heir, there is no action de dolo, as the action ex vmdUo will
suffice. 1. But if you persuade me to repudiate an inheritance, on
the alleged ground that it will not pay the creditors, or to choose
some particular slave [in pursuance of a legacy], on the ground
that there is no better slave in the household, then, I should say,
an action de dolo must be allowed, supposing you do this with
intent to deceive. 2. Again, if a testament is kept concealed for a
long time, in order to prevent its being set aside as inofficious,'
but it is produced one day after the death of the [testator's] son,
the son's heirs can take proceedings against the parties who con-
cealed it, both under the lex Cornelia and by an action de dolo.
3. Labeo says (PoBteriora, b. 37)> if Utius should maintain that oil
bdongs to him which as a matter of fact is yours, whereupon you
deposit the oil with Seius for him to sell it and to keep the purchase-

220 On Dolus malus [book rr

money until the quertion is decided between yon and Titius which
of the two the oil belongs to, after which Titius refuses to jcnn
issue in the action, — in this case, seeing that you cannot sue Seius
either on manda;tiim or as stake-holder, the condition subject to
which the goods were put in his hands not having come to pass,
there will be a good action de dolo against Titius. However
Pomponius says (b. 27) that the stake-holder can be sued in an
action pre^criptis verbis^ or, if he should not be solvent^ Titius can
be sued de dolo, and this appears to be a sound distinction. 4. If
in pursuance of the judge's intimation in a nozal action you
surrender to me a slave whom you had hypothecated to someone
else, and accordingly you go free ; still you are liaUe to an action
de dohy it being made clear that the slave was really pledged.
4 a. This action de dolo is nozal, accordingly Labeo says {Prastar
peregrinus, b. 30) that, where an action die dolo is granted in
respect of a slave, it is sometimes de pecuUo and sometimes noxaL
If the matter in connexion with which the dolus was committed is
one for which an action would be given de pecuUo^ then an action
depecidio will be given in the present case ; if it is one for which
the action would be noxal, this action will be noxal too. 5. The
praetor was quite right in inserting the mention of cause to be
shown ; such an action is not one to be allowed without discrimina-
tion ; for instance, to begin with, if the amount is small,

10 Patjlus (on the Edict 11) that is, not more than two aurei,

11 TJlpianus (on the Edict 11) the action ought not to be
allowed ; 1. moreover there are particular classes of persons to
whom it will not be allowed, for example, children or fireed-
men who desire to sue their paterfamilias or patron, the
reason being that it involves infamia. Nor will it be allowed
to a person of low estate against one of superior rank, for
example, to one of plebeian stai/us against a man of consular
rank and acknowledged dignity, nor to a person who is dissipated
and extravagant, or in any way of small account, against a man
who leads an irreproachable life. Such is Labeo's own opinion. In
short, it comes to this, in the case of the persons mentioned,
the proper view is that an action should be allowed in faxshmi^
worded carefully, so as to include a reference to bonajidea,

12 PAUiiUS (on the Edict 11) because otherwise the persons
above-mentioned might gain by their own dolus.

13 TJlpianus (on the Edict 11) But the action de dolo will be
granted to the heirs of the persons excluded, as well as against the

TIT. m] On Dolus malus 221

heirs [of the wrongdoers]. 1. We may add that; according to
Labeo, one thing held essential when the case is inquired into is
that no action de dolo is to be allowed against a ward, unless he
should be sued in the capacity of heir. In my judgment he can be
sued even on the ground of his own dolvSj supposing he is very
nearly of the age of puberty, especially if he is enriched by the
transaction ;

14 Paulus {on the Edict 11) suppose, for instance, he should
prevail on the plaintiff's proiyurator to let the action against him
be dismissed, or should obtain money from his guardian on lying
pretences, or should be guilty of any similar fraud which requires
no elaborate contrivance.

15 Ulpianus (on Ike Edict 11) I should say too that an action
ought equally to be allowed against a ward on the ground of doltis
committed by his guardian, if he (the ward) is enriched by it ; just
as in the same case an easceptio is allowed [to an action by the
ward]. 1. Whether an action de dolo is allowed against a muni-
cipal body is not clear. I should say that no such action can be
allowed on the ground of dohis on the part of such a body ; how
indeed can a municipal body be guilty of doliM ? Still if anything
comes to the municipality through the dolus of the agents who
manage its affairs, then I should say the action ought to be allowed.
But proceedings de dolo founded on dolus in the members of a
curia are allowed against the individual members themselves.

2. Again, if anything comes to the hands of a principal through the
dolus of his procurator f an action de dolo is allowed against the
principal to the extent of what comes to him ; of course there is
no doubt that the procurator is himself liable for his own doltts*

3. In this action it ought to be specified whose dolus it is by which
the thing was done which is the subject of the proceedings, thou^
in a case of putting in fear it is not required.

16 Paulus {on the Edict 11) The prsetor also requires that the
plaintiff should describe what it is that was done with dolus malus;
the plaintiff i^ bound to know what is the business in respect of
which he was overreached, and not to shift his ground in making
such a serious charge.

17 Ulpiaiojs {on the Edict 11) If several persons act with
dolus, and one alone makes restitution, all alike are discharged ;
and if one pays an amount equivalent to the damage suffered,
I should say so far that the rest are discharged. 1. This action is

222 Ofh Dolus malas [book w

allowed against the heir and Bnccessors in general only to the
extent of what has come to their hands.

18 PAUiiUS (on the Edict II) Moreover in this action the
discretion of the judge comprises a right to order restitution ; and
if restitution is not made judgment is thereupon given for an
amount representing what the matter is worth to the plaintiff. Hie
reason why no definite limits are laid down as to amount either in
this action or in the action for putting in fear is that it is desired to
make it possible, where the defendant is contumacious, that the
damages which he is ordered to pay should be assessed at the sum
which the plaintiff declares on oath to represent the amount of his
interest in the matter ; though, in both cases, the oath may, on
motion to the judge, be kept within limits by taxation of the
amount. 1. However, it is not always the case in this action that
the restitution of the property has to be left to the discretion of the
judge ; suppose for instance it should be manifest that no restitu-
tion can be made, — as in a case where a slave was transferred to
the defendant through dolus malvs on his part, and then died, —
and accordingly that the defendant ought to be at once ordered to
pay a sum representing the amount of the plaintiff's interest in the
matter. 2. Where the usfh^fnict in a block of chambers was left to
a legatee and the bare proprietor sets fire to the block, there is no
action de dolo, because such a case would be a ground for actions
of other kinds. 3. In the case of a man who knowingly lent false ^
wdghts for a vendor to weigh out goods with to a purchaser,
Trebatius allowed an action de dolo. Here, nevertheless, if the
weights lent were heavier than they were supposed to be, the
vendor has a condieUo to recover the amount of goods which he
handed over in excess ; if they were too light, the purchaser can
sue on his contract to have given him the amount of goods still
due; unless indeed the goods were sold on the express under-
standing that the amount to be delivered should be determined by
thosQ actual weights, the lender having declared with fraudulent
intent that his weights were correct 4. Where a man contrived by
dolus that a right of action should be lost by lapse of the statutable
period, Trebatius said that an action de dolo ought to be allowed,
not in order that restitution might be made in pursuance of the
judge's intimation, but that the plaintiff might get damages to an
amount representing the interest he had in the right of action not
being lost ; because if the practice were different, it would be a
jfraud on the statute. 5. Where you promise me a particular slave,

^ After pondera read intqtta. M.

TiT« m] On Dolus malus 223

and a third person kills him, it is graerally held, and very rightly,
that an action on dolw mfdus is allowed [me^] against the third
person, because you are discharged from my demand ; for which
reason no action will be granted you on the lex Aquilia.

19 Pawniakits (Questions 37) If the surety for a promise to
deliver some beast kills it before de&ult on the part of the pro-
misor, then, according to opinions given by Neratius Prisons and
Julianus, an action de dolo ought to be granted against him,
because, as the debtor is discharged, it follows that the surety is
freed also.

20 Paulus {on the Edict II) Your slave owed you money, but
had not wherewithal to pay it, whereupon on your instruction he
borrowed money from me and paid it to you. Here Labeo holds
that an action for dolrn malus will be granted against you, as, on
the one hand, the action de pecidio is inapplicable, because there is
nothing in the peculium, and it cannot be said that there is anything
spent to the owner's profit {in rem versum), because the owner
received it in discharge of a debt 1. If you make me believe that
you had no partnership with the person to whom I am heir, and I
consequently allow an action against you to be dismissed, according
to Julianus I shall have a right to an action de doJo.

21 Ulpianxjs {on the Edict 11) If, on my tendering an oath,
you swear that you are not liable, and you are let go free, but after
that you are proved to have committed perjury, then, says labeo,
an action on dohia must be allowed against you ; but Pomponius
thinks that the view to hold is that the use of the oath amounts to
a compromise, which opinion is upheld by Marcellus {Dig. 8) : if
you appeal to a man's conscience, you must abide by it {start
religioni debet).

22 Paulus {on the Edict 11) In fact the penalty affixed to
peijury is enough.

23 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 4) If a legatee whose legacy
is in excess of what the lex Falcidia will allow him to retain
should, while the heir is still uninformed as to the amount of the
assets, induce him to beUeve, either by volunteering to swear or by
some other deceitftd contrivance, that the testator's estate is amply
sufficient for paying the legacies in full, and should by that means
get his own legacy paid in fidl, an action is allowed de dolo.

24 Ulpianus {on the Edict 11) If it is contrived by the dolus
of a man who acts as spokesman in behalf of someone who has

1 M.

224 On Dolus maluB [book iv

instituted proceedings for having his freedom established in law,
that a dedision which the Court makes in &your of liberty should
not be given in the presence of the other party, I should say that
an action de dolo can be allowed against him at once^ because a
decision once pronounced in favour of liberty is not allowed to be
reconsidered.

26 Paulus (on the Edict 11) I brought an action against you
for payment of money, and issue was joined accordingly, whereupon
you induced me to believe, contrary to the fact, that you had paid
the money to my slave or my procurator^ and by that means you
procured that the case should be dismissed, with my consent The
question being asked on my side whether there would be an action
de dolo allowed against you, it was held that such an action could
not be allowed, because I can have another remedy ; as I can have
a fresh trial, and if I am met with the exceptio of res judicata, I
shall have a lawful repUcatio.

26 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 4) The proconsul promisea
to allow the action in question against the heir to the extent of
what comes to his hands, that is to say, the extent to which the
inheritance is the richer by the matter in hand when it comes
to him,

27 Paulus (on the Edict 11) or would have been, except for
his use of dohis malus to prevent it

«

28 Gaius (on the protmidal Edict 4) CSonsequently if a formal
discharge is given you [by means of your own doltui], there will be
a good action against your heir without more. But if property was
delivered to you, then, if the thing delivered is existing at the time
of your death, there will be an action against your heir, if it is not
existing, there will not However the right of action against the
heir will be, in any case, without limitation of time, as he must not
be allowed to profit by another man's loss. And it is in keeping
with this that as against the person himself who acted with dolus
an action infcustum must be allowed without limitation of time to
the extent to which he is enriched.

29 Paulus {on the Edict 11) Sabinus holds that the heir is
sued rather on the principle of making good a deficiency (fiolcuU
rations) than on the ground of malfeasance, and, in any case, he
does not incur infamy ; consequently that his liability ought to be
without limitation of time.

TFT. m] On Dolus maluB 225

90 UI4PIAN17S {on the Edict 11) And where the action is asked
for against the heir, no special cause need be shown.

31 Procxjlus {EpisUes 2) If any one induces my slaves to
abandon possession of property, possession is not lost, but the
party is liable to an action de dole mcUo, if I incur any damage.

32 ScMVOLA (Digest 2) A legacy per prcBceptionem of a slave
was made to a son of the testator, with a request that he would
manumit the slave after a specified interval, if he should have in
the meantime handed in his accounts to such son and his brothers
who were coheirs with him. Hereupon the legatee (Le. the son)
gave the slave his liberty by manumission, viz. by vindictdf
before the day mentioned, and before the accounts were rendered.
The question was asked whether the legatee was liable on the
fdeicommissfum at the suit of his brothers to send them in the
accounts which concerned them corresponding to their respective
shares in the inheritance. My answer was that as the legatee
had actually set the slave free, he was not liable on the ground
of fideicommisswm ; but if he had hurried on the manumission
with the object of avoiding sending in accounts to his brothers,
they could have recourse to an action de dolo against him.

33 Ulpianus {Opinions 4) A man being in possession of pro-
perty which he was offering for sale, his opponent instituted
proceedings against him to determine the question of ownership,
and, after having thus prevented him from closing with a purchaser
to whom the property might have been sold, abandoned the action.
It was held that the party in possession had in virtue of these facts
a good right of action infcictu/m to indenmify himself.

34 The same {on Sabinus 42) If you give me leave to quarry
stone on your land, or to dig for chalk or sand, and I thereupon go
to expense in the matter, but you refuse after that to let me take
anything away, the only action that will apply in the case is that
on dolus mains.

36 The same {on the Edict 30) Where a party in whose custody
a written testament is deposited mutilates or spoils it in any way
after the death of the testator, the person named heir will have a
good action de dolo against him. Indeed the persons to whom
legacies are given will have similar rights of action.

36 Mabgianus {Rtdes 2) If two parties both practise dolus
they cannot thereupon bring actions against one another.

M. J. 15

226 On persons nnder twenty-Jive [book iv

37 UiiPiANUS (on Sabiims 44) A thing said bj a render by way
of puffing his goods is treated as not said, and as constitatiiig no
engagement ; and if the vendor said it in order to deceiye the
purchaser, still the proper construction is that no right of action
results in regard to anything said or promised, but only an action
de dclo.

38 The same {Opinions 6) A debtor causes a letter to be sent
to his creditor purporting to come from Titius, in which the request
is made that he (the debtor) may be released, whereupon the
creditor, being deceived by the letter, releases the debtor by means
of an Aquilian stipulation and a formed discharge. If after this the
letter is shown to be forged or beside the purpose, a creditor over
twenty-five will have an action de dolOj one under that age will get
a restitution in integrum,

39 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 37) If you oflbr yourself to
litius [as defendant to an action which he brings] about a thing
which in reality you do not possess, your object being that some one
else may acquire it by tisu8y and you give security that the decree
shall be obeyed, then, even though the action against you should
be dismissed, still you will be liable for d(dus mains ; this is held
by Sabinus.

40 FuRius Aetthiakus {on the Edict 1) A man who deceives
someone else in order to induce him to enter on an inheritance
which will not pay the charges on it will be liable for dolns^ unless
it so chance that he was a creditor himself and the only one ; in
that case it is enough that there is an eonceptio of dohis mains in
bar of any action on his part

IV.

On Persons under Twenty-five.

Ulpianus (on the Edict 11) This Eklict the Praetor pro-
pounded in deference to natural justice, undertaking by means of
it the protection of persons of immature age. All are agreed that
the judgment of persons of that time of life is deficient in soundness
and strength, and exposes them to be taken at a disadvantage in
many different ways^ ; and for this reason the Praetor promises
them his support in the present Edicts and his assistance against

^ Dele mtdtorum intidiU expoiUwn. M.

TIT. iv] On persons under twenty-five 227

imposition. 1. The words of the Edict are : — '' in the case of any
transaction which I hear to be executed with one under twenty-five
years of age^ I will deal with it according to the circumstances of
the particular case.'' 2. It appears then that the Pr»tor promises
assistance to those under twenty-five ; of course after that age it is
well-known that manly vigour has reached maturity. 3. Accordingly,
at the present day, up to that age young men are under the guidance
of curators, and they will not be allowed to take in hand the
management of their own afiairs, even though they should be such
as conduct them well.

2 The same {on the lex Jidiu et Papia 19) Even the &ct of
having children will not enable minors to get^ the control of their
afiairs out of the hands of their curators at an earlier time. As for
what is laid down in sundry statutes that a year is remitted for
every child, this, as the Divine Severus declares, refers to capacity
for holding a public office, not to the question of a minor acquiring
control over his a&irs.

3 The same (an the Edict 11) Moreover the Divine Severus
and the present Emperor have construed decrees of consuls or
p^'cesides resembling the above statutes as being made with a
private* object of their own, these Emperors themselves having
very rarely used their exceptional powers to indulge minors with
permission to manage their own affidrs ; and with this the present
practice agrees. 1. Where a man makes a contract with a minor,
and the contract takes effect at some time subsequent to that of the
minor reaching fiill age, do we look at the beginning of the trans-
action or the end ? The rule is, indeed it has been so enacted, that
if a man, after reaching full age, confirms what he did when
under age, there is no case for restitution in ifUeffrum. Accord-
ingly it is with a nice attention to legal principle that Celsus
{Epistles b. 11 and Digest b. 2) lays down the law on a i>o]nt raised
by a statement of fact as to which he was consulted by Flavins
Bespectus the Prsetor. A person under twenty-five years, let us
say aged twenty-four, had commenced proceedings in an action on
ttitela against the heir of his guardian ; and what happened there-
upon was that the action against the heir, as the case was stated,
was dismissed, the plaintiff having, before the trial was finished,
already reached the full majority of twenty-five years ; whereupon
a restitution in integrum was asked for. Upon this Ceteus gave his
opinion to. Bespectus to the effect that the qu(mdam minor in

^ Read r&cipiatU for nc^noL Of. M.

15—2

228 On periona under twenty-five [book iv

question ought not, as a matter of course^ to get restitution in
integrum ; it ought only to be given if it were shown that the
defendant had cunningly contrived to get himself discharged firom
the action at a time when the plaintiff had already reached fuU
age ; " and it was not/' he said, '* only on the last day of the trial
that the minor was deceived in this case, but the whole of the other
party's proceedings were a contrivance for securing that he should
be discharged from the action only after the plaintiff reached full
age." But Celsus goes on to admit that if there are only slight
grounds of suspicion that the other party has acted with dolus in
the matter, the plaintiff ought not to get restitution in integrum.
2. I know also that there was such a case as the following. A man
under twenty-five had intermeddled with his Other's inheritance,
and, having reached full age, he had accepted payment from certain
debtors to the estate; after which he applied for an order of
restitution in integrum, in order to be able to renounce the inherit-
ance. It was urged on the other side that after reaching full age
he had confirmed the step which he took when he was a minor ;
however we held that he ought to get restitution in integrum,
having regard to the commencement ; and I should hold the same
where a minor entered on the inheritance of a stranger. 3. A point
to consider is whether we ought to say that a person is under
twenty-five years of age even on his birthday before the very hour
at which he was bom, so that if he should be imposed on he may
get restitution. As to this, since up to that time he has not
completed the age in question, the rule is that we must reckon the
time from moment to moment Similarly if he is bom on a day
which is doubled by intercalation (bisaexto), Celsus tells us that it
makes no difference whether he is bom on the earlier or the later
day ; the two days are treated as one, and it is the latter of the two^
which is held to be intercalated. 4. We may next consider whether
relief ought to be given only to persons 9ui juris or to persons
under potestas too. What causes some hesitation is that if it
should be said that the Court must go so far as to relieve one
under potestas in respect of a matter which regards his peadium^
the result will be that through him we shall be relieving a person
of full age as well, that is the party's fether, a thing which the
Praetor by no means intended ; the Edict promises aid to persona
under age, not to those of ftill age. However I should say myself
that the most correct opinion is that of those who hold that a
filiufifamiUas who is under age may have restitution in integrum

^ Bel. kalendarum. Cf. M.

TFT. iv] On persons v/nder twenty-five 229

in thoBe cases only in which he has an interest of his own,
as for example where he is himself bound by some obligatio.
Accordingly, if he contracted an obligation by his other's order,
then his father of course can be sued for the whole amount ;
and, as for the son, seeing that he can be sued himself, though
he should be living under jiofeato^— or, even after he should be
emancipated or disinherited, to the extent of his ability to pay, —
and, in &ct, that when he is liying under potestas, he can be
sued upon a judgment even against the will of his father, [ — con-
sidering, I say, all this,] he will have a good claim to an order
for relief, if he should be sued himself. Still, whether this relief
will at all benefit the fitther himself, — for example in the way in
which the practice sometimes is to make it a benefit to a surety for
the son, — is a question to consider ; my own opinion is that it will
not Accordingly, if the son is sued, he can ask for relief,
(though if the creditor sues the fitther, no relief is given,) except
in the case of a loan ; if the son received money by his fiskther's
order for this object, i.e. by way of loan, he is not relieved.
Similarly, if the son made the contract and was put to a disadvant-
age, then, if the father is sued de peculiOy the son will not have a
right to restitution ; but if the son himself is sued, he can get
the order. I attach no weight to the foct that the son may be
said to have an interest in possessing a peeulium ; the fact is
the fiskther has a greater interest in it than the son, although
there may be a case in which the son has a direct concern in
it; for example, where his father's property is taken possession
of by the revenue department for a debt ; in which case, by the
enactment of Claudius, the peevMum is to be separated for the
son's benefit [from the general property of the fitther]. 5. In
accordance with the above, even if a filic^amUias should be taken
in in respect of her dos^ because she consented to her father's
stipulating, some time after giving the das, for the return of it
or finding someone else to stiptdate for it, I think she ought to
get restitution, because the dos is the peculiar patrimony of the
daughter hei*self. 6. Where a man under twenty-five has pro-
cured himself to be arrogated, but he now allies that he was
imposed upon in the matter of the arrogation, — suppose, for
instance, that he was a person of means, and was arrogated by
someone whose object was plunder, — I should hold that his ap-
plication for restitution in integrum ought to be entertained.
7. Where a legacy is given or 2k fideicammissum left to 9^ films-
fcumUias under age, [payable] after his fitUier^s death, and he

230 On pet9ons under twetUy-Jive [book iv

sufRars a disadvantage, in consequence^ let us say, of consenting
to the act of his fiEtther in agreeing [with the heir] that no action
shall be brought for the legacy, it may &irly be said that he has
a right to institution in mtegrunif seeing that he has an interest
of his own on account of his expectation of the legacy, which he
has a right to receive after his fitther's death. We may add that
if a legacy is left him which is personal to himself, for instance,
a legacy of a militaiy appointment^ the rule is that he can get
restitution in integrum, as he has an interest in not being dis-
appointed in respect of it^ seeing that he does not acquire it for
his father, but has it for himself. 8. Where a minor is appointed
heir on condition that his father emancipates him within a hundred
days, whereupon he ought to inform his father, but he omits to do
so, though quite able to do it^ whereas his &ther would have
emancipated him if he had been aware of the facts, — ^the proper
view is that he can get restitution in integrtim, if his father is
ready to emancipate him. 9. Pomponius adds that in any case in
which a JUit^familiaa would get restitution in respect of a matter
which regards his pecuMumf the fitther himself can on the same
grounds, in right of the son, get leave to be heard after the son's
death, as if he were heir to his son. 10. But in the case of a
JUituifamilias who has a coMrense peculium, there is no doubt
at aJl that, in respect of matters which touch the castrense
peculivmj he has a right to restitution in inteffrumy on the ground
that it is his own patrimony in regard to which he has been put to
a disadvantage 11. A slave under twenty-five cannot get restitu-
tion under any circumstances, as it is the person of his owner that
is taken into consideration, and the latter must reckon it his own
folly, if he entrusted the matter to one under age. Hence even if
he contracts through a boy under the age of puberty, the same rule
applies, as Marcellus himself says (Dig. 2). Again, if a slave under
age should be allowed the free disposition of his peculiimi, an
owner of full age will not on the strength of that fact get
restitution.

Africai^tjs {Questions 7) The reason is that whatever the
slave transacts under these circumstances he is to be regarded as
transacting with the consent of the owner. This will come out
more clearly if the question arises in connexion with an institorian
action, or the case is one in which a person over twenty-five years
of age commissioned a minor to transact some piece of business
and the party so commissioned was deceived in the matter.

TiT« iv] On persons under twemty-Jive 231

6 UiiPiANUS {on the Edict 11) If however the slave was one
who had a daim to immediate manumisBion in pursuance of a
fideiammissumy and he is taken in, then, seeing that default is
made in the matter to his pngudice, it may very well be said that
the prsdtor is bound to oome to his aid.

6 The same {on the Edict 10) Persons under twenty-five
years of age are relieved by restitution in integrvm, not only
where they suffer some loss of property, but also where they
have a personal interest in not being worried with litigation and
expense.

7 The same {on the Edict 1 1) The prsetor^s words are, " any
transaction which I hear to be executed." The word " transaction "
{gestvm) is applied irrespective of the precise circumstances, it
may be a case of contract^ or of something else. 1. Accordingly,
where a minor buys, or sells, or enters into a partnership, or borrows
money, if he is put to a disadvantage he wiU get the assistance.
2. Again, if money is paid him by a debtor, either of his fiither^s
estate or his own, and he loses it, the proper view is that he will
get the relief, on the ground that the transaction was with himself.
Accordingly, if a minor sues a debtor, he ought to have curators
with him, if he wants to have the money paid him ; otherwise the
defendant will not be compelled to pay it him. However, the
present practice is for the money to be deposited in a temple, as
Pomponius mentions (b. 28), (for fear lest either the debtor should
be burdened with the payment of excessive interest, or the creditor
who is under age should lose his money), or else for payment to
be made to the curators, if there are any. There is in ftu^t
Imperial legislation on the subject which allows a debtor to compel
a person of immature age to apply to have curators appointed.
However, what is to be said in case the preetor orders the money
to be paid to the minor without curators, and the party pays?
will the latter be sure of protection? This point \a not quite
clear ; however, I should say that if he was compelled to pay after
alleging that the other was under age, he cannot be made respon-
sible any fiirther ; unless indeed it is suggested that the proper
course for him is to appeal on the ground that the praetor's order
was a legal wrong. But I do not believe that if a minor asked for
restitution in i/ntegrum under these circumstances the prsotor would
give him a hearing. 3. A minor is not relieved in the above cases
only, but also where he intervenes as a third party, for instance,
where he binds himself or pledges his property in ^e character of

232 On persona under twenty-five [book it

surety. On this point Pomponius appears to agree with those
who distinguish between the case of the person in question being
approved of by an arbiter appointed for the special purpose of
judging of proposed sureties and the case of his being simfdy
accepted by the other party. But I should say that a person
ought to get relief irrespective of this distinction, if he is really a
minor, and shows that he has been overreached. 4. ReUef is also
given in connexion with trials at law whether the party who
suffered a disadvantage was plaintiff or defendant 5. Again, if
a minor has taken up an inheritance that is more unprofitable than
he thought, aid is given him so as to enable him to renounce it ; as
this is a clear case of being put to a disadvantage. The same
rule applies to a honorum possess'io or any other form of succession.
Not merely a son who has intermeddled with his father's estate,
but any member of the household whatever who is under age can
get an order of restitution ; for example, a slave who should be
appointed heir and given his liberty ; the proper view being that,
if he intermeddled, he can be relieved in consideration of his
immature age, and so be enabled to keep his own property separate.
Of course, when a person gets restitution after he has entered on
the inheritance, he is bound to make good any part of the estate
which he can follow into his own property and which has not been
lost or destroyed through his youth and inexperience. 6. According
to the present practice it is well established that minors are relieved
even where they are disappointed of profit. 7. Pomponius indeed
says (b. 28) that if a man declines a legacy, even without ill-
practice on any one's part^ or is unlucky in respect of the legacy
of an option, because he chooses the worse of two things, or
promises someone to give him one or other of two things, and
thereupon gives the one which is the more valuable, he has a
right to relief; and as a matter of fact relief ought to be given.
8. In consequence of the view being held that minors have a
claim to relief even where they are disappointed of profit, the
question has been asked whether, supposing something belonging
to the minor is sold, and there is a person forthcoming who is ready
to make a better offer, the minor will get restitution in integrvmiy
in consideration of the gain which he missed. As to this it is
quite a common thing for the praetor to grant the order, so as to
allow the biddings to be opened ; and he does the same thing in
the case of property which ought to be kept unsold in the interest
of minors. But it should be done with circumspection ; otherwise
no one would have anything to do with purchasing the property of

TIT. iv] On persons under twenty^five 233

wards, even if the sale were in good fiuth. And it is a rule which
deserves thorough approbation that, in respect of things which are
exposed to unforeseen nuschief, a minor has no claim to relief
against a purchaser, unless a case of corrupt behaTiour or clear
partiality is shown on the part of a guardian or curator. 0. If,
after getting the order, he intermeddles with the inheritance, or
enters on one which he had declined, he can thereupon get an
order once more to enable him to give it up ; there are rescripts and
responses to this effect. 10. But with regard to the remark of
Papinianus (Besp. 2) to the effect that if a siaye is substituted to
a minor as compulsory heir, then, if the minor declines the inherit-
ance, such slave will be compulsory heir, and, if the minor after
that gets an order for restitution, will notwithstanding remain free,
but, if the minor enters on the inheritance and then gives it up,
the slave who was appointed substitute to him, with liberty, cannot
become heir nor be free,— this is not altogether accuiute. If the
inheritance will not pay the debts, and the heir [appointed in the
first place] declines to take it, then the succession goes to the
substituted compulsory heir, as both the Divine Pius and the
present Emperor laid down by rescript ; speaking, as a matter of
fishct, of the case of a boy under fourteen being appointed heir who
was a stranger to the fiEtmily. When Papinianus goes on to say
that the qwmdam slave remains free, this seems to imply that he
does not remain heir too, — [I am spc^Jring of the case] where the
boy under age gets an order for restitution after once dedining the
inheritance ; — ^the iact being that, seeing that the boy does not
become heir, but only has utUes acHones, there is no doubt that the
man who once became heir will remain heir. 11. Again, if a minor
did not appeal within the proper time, he is aided so &r as to
be enabled to appeal ; it may be assumed that this is what he
desires. 12. Similarly he is aided in case of adverse judgment
against him for default of appearance. However, it is undoubted
law that men of any age can have a new trial after judgment in
default, if they show that they were absent with good ground.

8 Hbrmogbnianus {Epitomes of law 1) Even where judgment
is pronounced against a minor on the ground of contumacy, he can
ask for the relief of restitution in integrum.

9 Ulpianus (pn the Edict 11) 11^ in pursuance of a judgment,
goods of a minor are taken in execution and sold, and after that
he gets restitution against the decree of the PrsBses or Imperial
procurator, it is worth considering whether the things which were

234 On persons under twenty-five [book iv

sold ou^t not to be recovered ; it is quite certain that "where his
money was paid in pursuance of the judgment it will have to be
restored. In truth, the minor has an interest in recovering the
goods themselves rather than their value, and I should say that
this must sometimes be allowed, that is if the minor would other-
wise suffer serious loss. 1. A married woman too is relieved in
respect of the amount of her dos, if she has been inveigled into
giving more than her means will bear, or perhaps has given her
whole property. 2. We may next consider whether minors are
relieved only where they are put to a disadvantage in respect of
contracts, or it applies equally where they commit delicts ; for
instance, suppose a minor was guilty of some dolus in connexion
with a deposit or a loan or any case of contract, will he be relieved
if nothing comes to his hands by it ? As to this the law is that
minors will not get relief in respect of delicts ; so that none is
given in the cases mentioned. As a matter of fact, if a minor
commits a theft or does damage to property, he will not be relieved.
Still, if, in a case where after committing damage he could have
avoided payment of double damages by confession, he chose to
deny his act, restitution wilP be allowed him so far only as to
enable him to be treated as if he had confessed. On the same
principle, if it was in his power to settle for the loss he occasioned
as thief so as to avoid an action for twofold or fourfold damages,
he will be relieved 3. If a married woman, after being divorced
through her own fault, desires this relief, or a husband does the
same, I should say no restitution can be had, as the case is one
of a serious offence ; in fact, the law is that if adultery is committed
by a minor, the relief is not given. 4. Papinianus says that if
a person over the age of twenty but under twenty-five allows
himself to be sold into slavery, that is, if he shares the price, it
is not the practice to grant restitution ; this is perfectly right, as
the case does not admit of restitution, the status of the party being
changed. 5. If a minor appears to have incurred a forfeiture for
non-payment of duty, there will be an order for restitution in
integrum. But this must be understood to be on the assumption
that there is no wilful misconduct in the case on the part of the
minor; otherwise the restitution will not be granted. 6. Add
that it is inadmissible that a minor should be relieved by the
prsstor against the acquisition of liberty by his slave,

10 Paulus {on the Edict 11) except where he obtains this
indulgence from the Emperor on very special grounds.

^ Read est for tit, Ct M.

TIT. iv] On persons under twerUy-five 235

11 Ulpiakus {fm the Edict 11) But there will be an action
de ddh or an uiMia actio for an amount representing the interest
which the minor had in the slave not being manumitted ; accord-
ingly whatever would have been his if he had not executed the
manumission will have to be made good to him. Moreover, in re-
spect of such things as the manumitted slave made away with, but
which belonged to his owner, there are good rights of action against
him for production, or for theft, by way of candictio, for the reason
that he 'handled' them after he was firee ; but where the delict
was committed during the time of slavery, the owner has no right
of action for it against the thief after the latter has acquired his
freedom : this is comprised in a rescript of the Divine Severus.
1. How are we to deal with the case of an owner under the age
of twenty-five but over twenty selling a slave on the understanding
that he is to be manumitted? I say over twenty, because it is
stated by Scsevola himself {Qfiestions b. 14), and it is the better
opinion, that the rule laid down in the rescript of the Divine
Marcus addressed to Aufldius Victorinus does not embrace this
case, I mean that of a minor^ over twenty. We have to con-
sider then whether relief is not given to one over twenty years
of age ; and the answer is that if he asks for restitution before the
slaveys freedom is acquired, his application will be entertained,
but if he only does so afterwards, it cannot On the other hand
it may be asked whether where the party himself who purchases
on the above understanding is a minor, he cannot get restitution.
Here again, if the slave's freedom is not yet acquired, the proper
view is that he may be relieved ; but if he only applies after the
day agreed upon has arrived, then the intention of the vendor,
if he is himself more than twenty years* of Bge, carries the gift
of freedom. 2. A question was asked on a statement of &ct as
follows. Certain young men under twenty-five had received as
curator a man named Salvianus ; who, after discharging the duties
of the curatorship for some time, came to be appointed a city
procurator by the gift of the Emperor, and after that obtained
an order from the praetor in the absence of the minors releasing
him from the curatorship. Hereupon the minors applied to the
prsetor and asked for restitution in integrum against Salvianus, on
the ground that he had been released contrary to l^slative enact-
ments on the subject It was not the practice, so they maintained,
for persons to be relieved of guardianships which they had once

^ For minorem read majorenL Of. M.
2 After mofiorU read vigitUi annis. M.

236 On persons under twenlty-five [book, n

undertaken, except such persons as were beyond seas on business
of the state^ or were employed in the direct service of the Emperor,
an example of relief given on such a principle being the case of
Menander Arrius the eansUia/rius ; nevertheless Salvianus had
been excused his duties, so that they the minors had been put to
a disadvantage, and accordingly they claimed to get restitution
in integrum from the prsetor. Jstrius Severus was in doubt how
to deal with the application, and referred it to the Emperor Severus,
who, being thus consulted, sent a rescript to Venidius Quietus, the
successor of JBtrius, to the effect that there was no case for the
pnetor^s interference, it not being stated that any contract had
been made with a person under twenty-five ; but the usual course,
he said, was for the Emperor himself to interpose, and order the
party to resume the duties of curator, where he had been wrong-
fully excused by the praetor. 3. I must not omit to say that
minors are not relieved as a matter of course, but only on cause
shown, in a case where it appears that they have been put to a
disadvantage. 4. Moreover, if a man, after carrying on his affitirs
in a judicious manner, asks for restitution in consequence of some
loss which took place not through his own heedlessness, but by
unavoidable accident, he will not get the order ; it is not the mere
occurrence of loss that procures a man the indulgence in question,
but his want of heed and caution. This is the same as what
Pomponius says (b. 28). Accordingly there is a note by Marcellus on
Julianus as follows : if a minor buys a slave that he is in need o^ and
after that he [the slave] dies, the minor has no claim to restitution ;
he was not put to any disadvantage about the purchase of a piece
of property which he could not possibly do without, though no
doubt the slave was mortal. 6. Where a man becomes heir to
someone of ample means, and the estate of the deceased un-
expectedly goes to ruin, for example there are farms which are
destroyed by a landslip, houses are burnt down, or slaves run
away or die, — Julianus uses language (b. 46), implying that if the
heir is a minor, he will get restitution in ifUegntm ; but Marcellus
in his notes to Julianus declares that restitution would not be
given ; as the party was not taken in in any way owing to the
heedlessness of youth when he entered on a rich inheritance, and
the accidental mishaps that took place might very well have been
experienced by any householder of full age, however carefuL But
a minor might have a claim to restitution in such a case as this :
suppose he entered on an inheritance containing a number of
pieces of property liable to be lost by death, or, say, containing

TIT. iv] On persons imder twenty-Jive 237

land with buildings on it, but on the other hand subject to a
heavy debt ; and he did not anticipate any probability of its
coming to pass that slaves died or buildings fell in ; or he was
not sufficiently quick in selling such things as are exposed to
different kinds of accidents. 6. A further question is this : — is
the application of one minor to be entertained where he asks for
restitution against another? In Pomponius the answer given is
simply No ; however, my own opinion is that the praBtor ought to
inquire which of the two was put to disadvantage, and if both were,
for example, one minor lent money to another and the latter lost
it, in that case, according to Pomponius the one who borrowed the
money, and then squandered or lost it, has the better claim.
7. No doubt, if a person under age contracts with a JUit^famUias
of full age, then, according to the opinion expressed by Julianus
(Diff. b. 4) and Marcellus {Dig* b. 2) he can get restitution in
integrum, so that the rule about age is more attended to than the
Senatusconstdttim [Mdcedoniannm].

12 Oaius (on the provincial Edict 4) If a woman intervenes
to make herself liable at the suit of a minor in the place of some
third person, no action will be allowed the minor against the
woman, he will, in &ct, like anyone else, be barred by an exception
for the reason that the ordinary law gives him restitution in respect
of his right of action against the original debtor. This is on the
assumption that the original debtor is solvent, otherwise the
woman cannot avail herself of the benefit of the SenatasoonsuUum
[ Vdleianum\

13 Ulpianus {on the Edict 11) An essential point to consider
when cause has to be shown is whether relief should be given to
the minor alone or it is to be extended to others who are bound
along with him, for instance, sureties ; the truth is that if I knew
the party was a minor, and I did not feel that I could trust him,
but you were surety for him, it is not just that the surety should
be relieved and I be ruined, rather the surety himself ought to
be refused the action on mamdaium. The short rule is that it
will be for the prsator to weigh well the question which of the two
he is most bound to relieve, the creditor or the surety ; as for the
minor who suffers disadvantage, he will be liable to neither. There
is less difficulty in saying that relief should not be given to a
mcmdaJbor^ as you may say that his assertions and encouragement
procured the contract to be made with the minor. Tliis may well
lead to the question whether a minor ought to ask for restitution

238 On persons under twenty-Jive [book it

in integrum agaioBt the creditor or against the surety toa The
safer course would, I should say, be to ask for it against both ;
the question of ordering restitution in integrum should be weighed
on cause shown and in the presence of the parties, or in their
absence where such absence is wilfuL 1. Sometimes the Court
goes so far as to give a minor restitution in renij that is, against
the man who is in possession of his property, though he was not
party to any contract For instance, you purchased something
from a minor and sold it to a third person ; here the minor has
a right in some cases to ask for restitution against the person
in possession, lest he should lose his property or go without his
property, the course followed being that either the pnetor hears
the case, or else the transfer is set aside and an action in rem
is allowed. Pomponius telb us (b. 28), that in Labeo's opinion,
where a person under twenty-five sells and delivers land, and the
purchaser transfers it on to a third person, then, if the second
purchaser was aware that the &ct8 are as stated, restitution will
be ordered against him ; but if the second purchaser was not
aware, and the first purchaser is solvent, the order will not be
made ; if the first purchaser is not solvent, the fairer course is
to relieve the minor even to the prejudice of a second purchaser
who had no notice although he purchased bona fide.

14 Paulus {on the Edict II) No doubt aa long as the party
who purchased firom the minor, or the heir of such party, is a
substantial person, no decree should be made to the prejudice of
the bona fide purchaser of the property, and this is laid down by
Pomponius himself.

16 Gaius (on the provineicU Edict 4) Of course, where resti-
tution is granted, a subsequent purchaser can come upon his own
vendor, and a similar rule holds if there are several successive
purchasers.

16 Ulpianus {on the Edict 11) A further point to consider,
when the case comes on, is this, whether there may not be some
other kind of action open short of one for a restitution in integrum ;
because if the party is sufiiciently protected by the ordinary
remedies and by direct law, he ought not to be allowed extra-
ordinary relief; take, for ^instance, the case of a contract bdng
made with a ward without the concurrence of the guardian, where
the ward is not the richer by it 1. Again, it is stated in a book of
Labeo's that if a minor is inveigled into contracting a partnership,

TTT. iv] On persons tmder twenty-five 289

or even where he affects to assume the position gratnitouslyy
no real partnership is contracted, nor would there be any eyen
if the parties were of full age, and consequentiy there is no case
for the prsetor's intervention. Ofilius too lays down the same
rule ; because the party is sufficiently protected in direct law.
2. Again Pomponius has the following (b. 28) : an heir was
required to hand oyer sundry things to his brother's daughter
[a minor], subject to the condition that, if she died without
children, she should restore them to the heir, and, the heir dying,
she undertook to restore them to his heir : on which facts Aristo
held that she had a right to restitution in integrum. But Pom-
ponius goes on to say this, that the undertaking given could be
made the subject of a condicUo incerti even by a person of full
age ; in point of fact the person, he says, ei\)oys security not
at once without more, but by means of a candietio. 3. In short
the general rule must be held to be that where the contract itself
is invalid the prsetor ought not to interfere in respect of a matter
which is clear in law. 4. Pomponius further says that in purchase
and sale the contracting parties are free to take advantage of one
another about the price, upon principles of natural law.

5. We may next consider the question who can grant orders for
restitution in integrum. Restitution may be granted by the prefect
of the dty and by other magistrates so far as this corresponds with
their general jurisdiction, relief being thus given against their own
decisions as well as in other cases.

17 Hebmooeniaktjs {(^ntomes of law 1) The prcrfeetus prastorio
can also give restitution in integrum against his own decision,
although there is no appeal from his court The reason why this
distinction is made is that an appeal amounts to a complaint that
the decision is unjust^ but in an application for restitution in
integrum the party is really asking to be relieved from the conse-
quence of his own want of judgment, or alleges that he has been
overreached by his opponent

18 ULPiAKtTS {an the Edict 11) But an inferior magistrate
cannot give restitution against the dedsion of a superior : 1. and if
the Emperor has pronounced a decision, he very rarely allows resti-
tution, or permits a man to be introduced into his council-chamber
to say that he was put to a disadvantage owing to youthful want of
judgment^ adding, it may be, that grounds which were in his fiEkVOur
were not brought forward^ or complauiing that he was betrayed by

1 For dicta non aUegat read dieai non alUgaiay M.

240 On persons nnder Uioenlbyifi/w [book iv

his counsel For example, the Diyine Seyerus and the Emperor
Antoninus refused to listen to Glabrio Adlius, who, without ailing
any special grounds, asked for an order of restitution against his
brother after the case had been heard to the end in the Imperial
chamber. 2. Nevertheless, when Percennius Seyerus asked for
restitution^ in iniegrum in opposition to two decisions already
giyen, the Diyine Seyerus and the Emperor Antoninus allowed
both matters to be made the subject of an inquiry before them.
3. The same Emperor informed Licinnius Fronto by rescript that it
was not usual for any one except the Emperor himself to giye
restitution in integrum after a decision pronounced on appeal by
a judge who took the Emperor's place. 4. Moreoyer, if the case
has been heard by a judge assigned by the Emperor, restitution
can only be giyen by the Emperor, who himself appointed the
judge. 5. Restitution in iwtegrtmt is granted not only to minors
but to the successors of minors as well, though they should them-
seiyes be of full age.

19 The same {on the Edict 13) Sometimes howeyer the suc-
cessor of the minor will be giyen a longer time than the year for
taking proceedings, as the Edict itself says, if his own age chance to
furnish ground for it ; as after the age of twenty-fiye he will haye
the regular period ; he may indeed be said to haye been put to a
disadyantage in respect of the &ct that whereas he had a claim to
restitution within the time which was giyen with reference to the
deceased, he did not apply for it No doubt if the deceased had
[only] a short portion remaining of an amnus utUis [366 ayailable
days], his^ heir, if under age, will be allowed for the purpose of
getting restitution, after the completion of his own twenty-fifth year,
not the whole of the time laid down [sc. a year], but only so much
time as the minor to whom he is heir himself had remaining.

20 The same {on the Edict 11) Papinianus says {JResponm 2)
that when a man comes home from exile he ought not to be
allowed any prolongation of the time laid down for restitution
in integrum ; because while he was absent it was in his power to
apply to the prsetor through a procuratory but he said nothing ;
or he could haye applied to the praises in the place where he was.
Where howeyer this writer goes on to say that the pai-ty has
forfeited all claim to relief by reason of the punishment inflicted
on him, this is incorrect ; what connexion is there between criminal

^ After ruiitui insert desiderante, eoi re#. M.
* Read ht(iui for hide. CI M.

TFT* iv] On persons tinder twentp^ve 241

ocHiduct and an escose given on the ground of youth ? 1. But if
a person who k oyer twenty-fiye «houId witbhi the period laid
down for restitotion carry his suit on as &r as litis oorUestcUiOj and
after that discontinue the proceedings, the liiia contesiaiio wiD
not be of any use to him towards procuring restitation in integrum;
this is laid down in a great many rescripts.

21 The same {an the Edict 10) However, a man is not held
to discontinue a matter when he merely postpones further steps^
but only when be abandons the case i^together.

22 The same (on the Edict 11) Where restitution is asked for
90 as to revoke an entry on an inheritance on the part of a miuor,
the minor will not have to refund any portion of the estate which
he has spent in discharge of legacies, or the value of slaves who
may have acquired their liberty by means of his entry. Similarly,
in the converse case, where a minor gets restitution for the purpose
of making an entry, then any transactions executed by the curator
of the goods appointed by the Prsetor's order in due form of law for
the purpose c^ making the proper sales must be upheld, according
to the rescript of Severus and Antoninus address^ to Calpumius
Flaccus.;

23 Patjltts (on 0ie Edict 11) Where ^ jOmsfofonlias carries on
business in pursuance of a mandate from his ftither, he cannot
have the benefit of restitution, in fkct^ even if the mandate bad
been given him by a stranger, he would not have this relief, because
the result would be that the person whose interest was chiefly
promoted would be a person of fall age, who would have been the
one exposed to loss in the matter. Where however the fact is
that the loss will eventually MI on the minor, because he is unable
to recoup himself for such expense as he incurs by having recourse
to the person whose business he carried on, on the ground of that
person's insolvency, then, no doubt, the Prsetor will interpose.
But should the principal himself be under age and the procu/rator
be of fall age, the principal will not easily get a hearing, except
where the transaction is carried on by his mandate, and he cannot
indemnify himself by having recourse to his procurator. Hence we
may add that if a minor is imposed upon when acting as procwratoTy
the principal ought to bear the loss, as it was his own folly that
he put his af^rs in the hands of such an agent This is Marcellus's
own opinion.

M. J. 16

242 On perso9is ti/nder twenty-five [book iy

24 Patjlus (Senieneea 1) But if a minor meddles of his own
accord with the aflbirs of a person of full age, he can get resti-
tution, so as to preyent loss happening to the latter. But if he
declines to do this, then, if he should be sued on negatia ffestOy he
will have no restitution against the action; indeed he may be
compelled to assign to the principal any right that he has to relief
by way of restitution in integrum [against a third party] so as to
make the principal ^^procuratar on his own behalf/' in order to
enable him by that means to make good the loss which he incurred
through the minor. 1. However, transactions carried on with
minors ought not to be as a matter of course rescinded, they ought
simply to be put on a footing of fiumess and justice ; or else
persons of that unadvanced time of life would be put to great
inconvenience, as no one would conclude any contracts with them,
and they would virtually be under an Interdict as to all dealings
with property. Consequently, the Prsator cannot interpose unless
they have been clearly overreached, or have acted with extreme^
carelessness in the matter. 2. Our master Scaevola used to say
this : where a man, owing to the thoughtlessness of youth, neglects
or declines an inheritance or a bonamm possessio, then, if every-
thing remains as it was, his application for the order ought by all
means to be entertained ; but if, after the inheritance is sold and
the Jiflhirs wound up, he comes and asks for the money which has
been got in by the exertions of a substitute, he must be refused a
hearing ; and in such a case the court ought to be much stricter
atUl about giving restitution to the heir of a minor. 3. If a
slave or 9^ JUiusfamUiaa should impose on a minor, the owner —
or the &ther — ought to be ordered to restore whatever comes to
his hands ; what does not come to his hands he must make good
out of the peculium : if neither of these two resources is found
sufficient, and there is wilful misconduct in the case on the part
of the slave, the latter should either be punished with stripes, or
surrendered for noxa. We may add that if the JUitis/amilias is
equally guilty, he is liable to have judgment pronounced against
him on the ground of his misconduct 4. Restitution ought
to be so carried out that everybody recovers his legal position
unimpaired. Accordingly, where a person gets restitution who
was imposed upon in respect of a sale of land which he made, the
Prsetor will order that the purchaser should restore the land with
mesne profits, and that the purchase-money should be returned

^ For tam read admodum. Cf. M.

1

TFT. iy] On persona under twenty-five 243

hiniy — ^unless he paid it knowing that the applicant would get rid
of it^ as a man does in the case of money which is lent for the
borrower to spend ; but the relief is less readily given in connexion
with a sale, as the purchaser pays the vendor a debt, which |

he is compellable to pay him, whereas nobody is compellable to
lend money ; and, even admitting that the circumstances under
which the contract was made were such that it is liable to be set
aside, stiU, if payment of the price could be compelled, there is no
reason why the purchaser should be exposed to loss as a matter
of course. 6. This Edict gives rise to no special action or under-
taking, the whole thing depends on the pr»(or's estimate of the
fects.

25 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 4) There is no doubt about
this point, that if a minor pays something which he does not owe,
under circumstances which give him no' claim by civfl law to
demand to have it returned, he has a right to an utilis actio to
recover it; seeing indeed that the practice is to give an action
for recovery, if sufficient grounds are shown, even to those over
twenty-five. 1. In the case of a young man who has a good right
to restitution, it ought to be given on his own application, or given
to his procurator, where the latter has received an express mandate
for the purpose ; but where the applicant only avers that he has a
general mandate for carrying on his principal's afl&irs of every kind,
he ought not to be heard.

26 Paulus {on the Edict 11) But if there is any doubt about
the special mandate, when the party applies for restitution, he can
put the matter on a satisfactory footing by means of a promise by
stipulation that the principal will ratify the proceeding. 1. And
in case of the absence of the party who is alleged to have taken
advantage of the minor, any one who takes up his defence will have
to give security that the judgment will be obeyed.

27 Gaius {on the promndeU Edict 4) Restitution ought in any
case to be granted to a fiither on behalf of his son, though the son
himself should be unwilling to have it, because the Other's interest
is at stake through his liability to an action de peeulio. From this
it is clear that relations and relations-in-law in general are in a
different position, and that they have no right to be heard, except
where they apply for the order with the consent of the minor,
or where the manner of life of the minor himself \& such that

^ Some would read deneganda for dandd. Of. M. This would alter no daim
into a claim.

16-2

244 On permms under twenty-five [book iy

W interdict may reaflonably be issu/ed teldhig from kim the
management of bia property. 1. If a minor borrows money
and then squanders it, the Proconsul is bound to refuse to grant
his creditor an action against him. But if the minor lends it to
some one vho id in circumstances of destitution, nothing further
ought to be done than to order the young man to assign to his own
creditor such rights of action as h^ has against the person to whom
he lent the money. Agam, if ho should spend the money in the
purchase of land at a higher price than it ought to cost, the way to
arrange the matter will be to order that the vendor shall restore
the price and take back the land, so that the creditor himself who
lent the money to the minor may recover what is due to him without
loss to any one else. By this example we learn in fact what the
practice ought to be where the minor buys somethiug with his own
money at a higher price than it ought to cost; only it must be
remembered that both in this and the above caAe the vendor who
gives back the price must pay in addition whatever interest he got
or might have got for the money he received, and will have a right
to recover mesne profits so far as the minor is the richer by them.
And, conversely, if the minor sells for a lower price than the
property ought to fetch, the purchaser must be ordered to restore
the land with mesne profits, and the minor must give back so much
of the price as represents the extent to which be is the richer by
having received it. 2. If a person under the age of twenty-five
gives his debtor a formal release without any consideration {sine
causa), he will get restitution of his right of action not only against
the debtor himself but against the sureties and in respect of any
securities that were given hun. If he had two correal debtors, and
he gave a formal release to one, his right of action will be restored
against both. 3. By this we learn that if he should novate his
contract to his own loss, for example, by transferring the liability,
by way of novation, from a substantial debtor to a person of no
means, he can get restitution so as to recover his right of action
against the former debtor. 4. Restitution ought to be granted
even against those persons on whose dolus no action is allowed to
be brought, except so fiir ba some persons are exempted by a
special statute.

28 Celsus {Digest 2) Where a person under twenty-five gets
restitution against one whom he sued in an action on tiUeta, it
does not follow that the guardian himself will have restored to him
the right to the counter action on ttUela.

TFT. it] Oftper§€M under twmXy-five 24S

29 MoDBSTiNus (Besponm 3) Where a ward can be shown to
have been put to a disadyantage, eten if it was with the concurrence
of his father, who is also his guardian, [it is held that] if he after^
wards has a curator given him, there is nothing to prevent this
latter asking for restitution in ifUegirum on the boy's behalf.
1. A female ward, having had judgment given against her in an
action founded on curatorship, desired to get restitution with
reference to one particular point in the decree, whereupon, seeing
that she appeared to have been successful as to the remaining
points in the case as tried, the plaintiff, who was a person of full age,
although he at first acquiesced in the judgment, now maintained that
there ought to be a new trial altogether. Hereupon Modestinus's
opinion was, that if the particular matter as to which the ward
desired restitution in integrum was independent of the other
matters comprised in the case, there was nothing in the case
entitling the plaintiff to a hearing, in respect of his prayer that
the whole judgment should be set aside. 2. Where a party gets
restitution in integrum by reason of his minority and in virtue
thereof repudiates his father's inheritance^ but none of the fekther^s
creditors are present or are summoned by the Prseses to take any
proceedings, it is a fidr question whether the restitution can be
held to have been properly granted. Modestinus's opinion was that
as it was part of the case that an order of restitution in integrum
was given without the creditors being made parties, the order was
no t^tr to an action by the latter.

30 PiiPiiriAKtTS {Qnesti&ns 3) An emancipated son omits to ask
for passessio contra UdmlaSy and, after having commenced the
requisite proceedings for restitution, sues for a legacy under his
&ther's testament, being then over twenty-flvew Hereupon he is
regarded as abandoning the case ; since, even supposing the period
for procuring banorum paeseeaio were still running, still, after he
has elected to go by the will of the deceased, the indulgence held
out by the prsBtor must be regarded as rejected.

81 The same (Eesponea 9) Where a woman, after becoming
heir to a deceased person, got restitution on the ground of her
youth in order to enable her to decline the inheritance, I gave it as
my opinion that any slaves forming part of the estate whom she
had in due form manumitted in pursuance of a Jldeieommissum
would retain their freedom ; they would not, I added, be compelled
to pay twenty tmrei as the price of retaining it, as they had acquired
freedom in a thoroughly legal way. The &et is that even if some

246 On persons under ttoentp^ve [book iy

of the creditors had recovered their money from her before she got
the order of restitution^ no claim on the part of the others against
those so receiving payment^ with a view to having the money shared
amongst them, would be held admissible.

32 Paulus {Questions 1) A person mider the age of twenty-five
applied to the Presses, and satisfied him by his personal appearance
that he was of full age, contrary to the &ct ; but his curators,
knowing that he was a minor, continued to manage his afikirs.
Some time after the above decision as to his age, but before he had
reached the age of twenty-five, money that was owing to the youth
was paid him, and he spent it unprofitably. I wish to ask who
bears the loss ; and supposing the curators themselves had laboured
under the same misapprehension, ever since the decision was arrived
at, that is, they thought that he was of full age, and they had
accordingly relinquished the management, and, in tacty sent in their
accounts as curators, — ^in such a case, would they have to bear the
risk of the period which elapsed since the moment when the minor
was [falsely] assumed to be of full age? My answer was : — as for
the persons who paid their debts, they were released by direct law
and cannot be sued over again. There is no doubt that curators
who knew the party to be under age, and still continued to execute
their office, ought not to have allowed him to receive the debts
owing to him, and they are liable to an action in respect of it
If however they gave credence to the decision of the PrsBses, and
ceased to carry on the management, or even went so fiu- as to
submit their accounts, they are in the same position as any other
debtors, consequentiy they are not liable to be sued.

33 Abubnitts Valens {Fideieommissa 6) If a person under
twenty-five is requested [in a testament] to manumit a slave of his
own, who is, as a matter of fact, worth more money 4;han the amount
which is left the minor by way of legacy in the same testament,
and the minor accepts the legacy, then, according to a responsum
of Julianus, he is not compellable to give the slave his liberty,
if he is prepared to return the legacy ; so that just as a man of
fun age is free to decline the legacy, if he is unwilling to manumit,
so the party in question is excused from the duty of manumitting
if he returns the legacy.

34 Paulus (Sentences I) If a person under twenty-five lends
money to a JUit^famiUas who is also under age, the one who
spends the money is in the better position, unless [he] the borroww
is found to be the richer for the loan at the time of litis eaniestaiio.

TFT. iv] On persons tmder tweniy-Jive 247

1. Where minors have arranged to eabmit their case to arbitration
by a giyen judge, and have stipulated for performance of the award
with the concurrence of their respective guardians, they have a
good right to ask for restitution in integrum against the obligation
so contracted.

86 Hebmogenianus {Epitomes of law 1) Where property is
knocked down to a minor but he is outdone by means of a better
offer made by another person, the minor will be heard on an
application for restitution in integrum^ if it is shown that he had
an interest in becoming the purchaser, for example because the
property in question once belonged to his ancestors; but this is
only on condition that he himself gives the vendor the amount of
the excess on the fresh offer.

36 Paxjlxts {Sentences 5) A person under twenty-five who has
omitted to make some averment can recover the opportunity of
making it by the help of a restitution in integrum.

87 Tbyphoniktjs {DisputcOions 3) The relief consisting in
restitution in integrum was not provided for the purpose of en-
forcing penal damages, consequently where a minor has once
omitted to bring an action for it^uria, the opportunity cannot be
recovered by this means. 1. Again, in a case where the sixty
days are passed within which a man can accuse his wife of adultery,
by the right of the husbdrUd, without the proceeding being
vexatious, restitution in integrum will be refused: indeed, if he
were now to seek to recover the right of which he had omitted to
avail himself, how would this differ fi*om a request to be excused
the commission of a delict, namely that of vexatious proceedings ¥
And inasmuch as it is an ascertained rule of law that the prsetor
ought not to give any relief in respect of delicts or for the benefit
of vexatious litigators, the restitution in integrum will not be
granted. In the case of delicts a person under twenty-five will not
get restitution in integrum; ^t any rate in. the case of aggravated
delicts, except to this extent, that sometimes consideration for
youth may induce a judge to Inflict a milder penalty. But, to
eome to the provisions of the kx Julia for punishing adultery,
a man who confesses that he has committed that oflence has no
right to ask for a remission of the penalty on the ground that
he was under age; nor, as I have added, [will any remission be
given] where he commits any of those offences which the statute
punishes in the same way as adultery ; as, for example, where he
marries a woman who was convicted of adultery, he knowing the

248 On penons tmder twenty-five [book iv

fecty or where his own wife was detected in adultery, and he declines
to dismiss her, or where he makes a profit of her adultery, or
accq>ts a bribe to conceal illicit intercourse which he detected, or
lends his house for the commission of adultery or illicit intercourse
therein ; youth, as I said, is no excuse in the face of plain enact-
ments in the case of a man who, though he appeals to the law,
himself transgresses the law.

S8 Paulus {Decrees 1) iEmilius Larianus bought from Oyinius
the Rutilian plot, subject to a lex cammissoria (conditional avoid-
ance, i.e. on non-payment by such a day), and paid part of the
price, the understanding being that if within two months from the
purchase he should not have paid half the balance of the purchase
money, the sale should be rescinded, and again, if, within another
two months, he should not have paid over the amount then
remaining, the sale should equally be rescinded. Before the
expiration of the first two months Larianus died and was succeeded
by Butiliana, a girl under twelve, and her guardians &Ued to make
the required payment within the time. The vendor, after repeated
reminders to the guardians, when more than a year had passed,
sold the property to [one] Claudius Telemachus; whereupon the
ward applied for a restitution in irUegmm, and having been un*
successfiil, both in the Praetor's Court and in that of the City
Prefect, she appealed. My own opinion was that the judgment
she appealed from was right, because it was her fether who made
the contract^ and not she herself ; but the Emperor was influeuced
by the consideration that the day when the sale was to be rescinded
arrived in the girl's time [Le. after the Other's death], and it was
by her own deJEetult that the terms of the sale were not observed.
I suggested that a better ground for allowing her restitution was
the fact that the vendor by reminding the guardians after the day
on iniiich it was agreed that the sale might be rescinded, and asking
for his purchase-money, might be said to have abandoned the
condition in his fitvour ; but I said I did not attach any weight to
the &ct that the time had lapsed after the death of the fother, any
more than I should to the feyd of the creditor [of a minor] selling
an article pledged where the time for payment had lapsed after
the death of the debtor. However, as the Emperor did not like the
lex commisiOTiaj he decreed restitution in integrum. There was
another consideration which wdghed with the Emperor, namely
that the original guardians who had omitted to ask for restitution
had been pronounced untrustworthy (mspecti). 1. With regard

TTT. iv] On persimB trnder tweniff-Jive 249

to the alleged rale that it is not usual for relief to be given to
a JUu^fitmiUaa after be ia emancipated, supposing he is still under
age, in respect of n^ect attributable to him wliile under poUsta^f
this is only the case wh^re the result might otherwise be that he
would acquire for the b^iefit of his &flier*

39 SoJBVOLA {Digest 2) Within the ayaQable time for asking for
restitution, certain minors applied for the order before the Praeses
and satisfied the judge as to their age. The question of age
being decided in their &vour, the opposing parties, in order to
prevent further prosecution of the case in the Court of the Preeses,
appealed to the Emperor ; and the Prsases, pending the result of
this appeal, postponed the further hearing. Thereupon the question
arose ; — ^if, when the inquiry on appeal in the Emperor's court is
terminated, the appeal is dismissed, and the minors are found to
have by that time passed the age of minority, can they proceed to
finish tiie case [in the Court below], it not having been their fault
that the matter was not brought to a coDclusion ? My answer was
that, taking the facts as stated, the case would go on just as if the
applicants were still under age. 1. A plot of land belonging to
a minor being put up for sale by his curators, one Lucius Titius
was purchaser, who remained in possession for six years, and made
the property far and fkr away better than it had been ; my question
is whether thie minor has a right to restitution in integrum against
the purchaser Titius, his curators being substantial persons. I
answered that, taking the whole of the facts stated, the minor could
hardly have restitution, unless he chose to make good to the
purchaser all the expense which the latter could prove that he
had incurred in good faith, especially considering that he was
provided with a resource ready to hand, as his guardians were
persons of substance.

40 IJi^iASVQiOpinionB 6) Aperson under twenty-fiverecovered
judgment to the effect that hjidecomndsmry legacy should be paid
him ; whereupon he gave an acknowledgment that he had received
it, and the [heir as] debtor gave him an undertaking to pay it^ as if
he had borrowed the money. In this case the minor can get
restitution in integrum ; he had acquired a right to sue for mon^y
in pursuance of a judgment, and now, by means of a fresh contract^
he has converted that right into a claim to originate proceedings
in a different kind of suit. 1. A person under twenty-five made
over without sufficient r^ection land of his father's in discharge
of debts incurred by the latter which appeared in the accounts

260 On persons under twenty-five [book iv

relating to his management of the affidrs of third persons to whom
he had been guardian. In this case matters must be restored to
an equitable footing by a restitution in iwtegrwm ; the transferee
being credited with the interest due for the money which appears
to be payable in connexion with the guardianship, and the amount
being set off against the profits which he derived from the land.

41 JuLiAKUs {Digest 45) Where a minor has been imposed
upon in respect of a sale of land, and the judge orders that it shall
be restored to him, and that he shall give back the price to the
purchaser, but the minor changes his mind and declines to avail
himself of the order for restitution in integrum pronounced in his
favour, then, if the purchaser sues for the purchase-money, as it
were on the ground of a judgment, the minor will be allowed a
good exceptio in bar of the action, since everybody is at liberty
to disregard what was introduced for his own benefit The pur-
chaser^ will have no cause for complaint if be is put back into the
position in which he was placed by his own act, and which he
could not have altered if the minor bad not prayed the aid of the
PrsBtor.

42 Ulpiakus (on the office of Proconsul 2) The Preeses of a
prgvince can give restitution in iTUtegrum even against his own
decree or that of his predecessor in office ; because minors obtain
by reason of their youth the same advantage which is given to
persons of full age by allowing them to appeal.

43 Marcellus {on the office of Presses 1) The age of a person
who alleges that he is over twenty-five must be ascertained by
a formal inquiry, because the investigation may be a bar to an
application for restitution in integrum by the person in question,
as weU as to other proceedings.

44 Ulpiakus {Opinions 5) It is not every kind of transaction
by persons under twenty-five which is liable to be upset, but only
those which on inquiry turn out to be such that^ the applicant
was overreached by some one else, or deluded through his own
credulity, and so either lost something which he possessed, or
missed the opportunity of making some gain which he might have
made, or laid himself under the burden of some obligation which
it was open to him to decline to undertake.

^ For venditor read emptor. Of. M.

* After dtpr^wtua 9unt iiuert tU (Raecker).

HT. iy] On pen&M tmder twefdy-fhe 261

46 Callistratus (Maniiorp Edict 1) Even where an unborn
child fails to sucoeed to prc^rty owing to some one acquiring it
by asus before the child's birth, according to Labeo, he can get
restitution of his right of action. 1. The Emperor Titus Anto-
ninus laid down by rescript that where a minor alleged that his
opponent had been dismissed from a suit owing to the fraud of his
(the applicant's) guardian, and he desired to take fresh proceedings
against the same defendant, it was open to him to be^ by suing
his guardian.

46 Paulus {BeyHmsa 2) Where a man volunteers to take up
the defence of a minor in a trial, and judgment is pronounced
against him, he can be sued on the judgment, and the youth of
the person whose defence he took up will not constitute any case
for getting restitution, as judgment is a ground of action to which
he cannot demur. From this it appears that the minor himself,
in whose behalf he suffered the adverse judgment, cannot pray the
relief of restitution against the decision.

47 QoJEVQLA (fiespansa 1) A guardian who was pressed by
creditors sold property of his ward in good fidth, but the mother
of the ward addressed to the purchasers a protest against the sale.
I wish to ask, seeing that the property was sold under pressure
from the creditors, and no reasonable allegation can be made of
corrupt dealing on the part of the guardian, whether the ward can
possibly have restitution in integrvm. My answer was that this
must be determined by judicial inquiry into the circumstances, but
that if there were [otherwise] sufScient grounds for restitution,
such relief ought not to be refrised simply because the guardian
was* guilty of no misconduct 1. The curator of certain minors
sold pieces of ground of which he himself and the youths whose
curator he was were owners in common ; I wish to know, supposing
these youths get an order from the Prsetor for restitution in
integruniy whether the sale will be rescinded only to the extent
of their shares in the common property. My answer was, that it
would be rescinded only to that extent ; unless, indeed, the purchaser
desired that the whole contract should be abandoned, on the
ground that he would not have bargained for a share only. A
ftirther question I wish to ask is this : would the purchaser have
to recover his money with interest from the wards, Seius and
Sempronius, or from the heir of the curator ? I replied that the
heirs of the curator were liable, still actions would be allowed
against Seius and Sempronius to the extent of the shares which

262 On persofhs w^der tmeni/y-five [book iv

they had in the land, at any rate if the purcha«e*money which had
been received had come to their hands to a corresponding amount.

48 Paxtlus (Sentences 1) If a minor gets restitution in inr
tegrum in respect of some suretyship which he undertook, or a
mandate which he gave, this does not release the principal debtor.
1. A minor seUs a female slave ; if the purchaser manumits her,
the minor cannot thereupon get restitution in integrum, but he
will have an action against the purchaser for the amount of his
interest 2. Where a woman under the age of twenty-five finds
her position made the worse by an agreement to give doih and she
has in &ct entered into an agreement such as no woman of foil
age would ever enter into, which she therefore wishes to rescind,
h^ application ought to be entertained

49 Ulpianus {an the Edict 36) If property of a ward or a
minor is sold, there being no statute forbidding the sale, the sale
is valid ; at the same time, if it involves a serious loss to the
ward or the minor, even though there was no collusion in the
case, the sale may be rescinded by restitution m integrum.

60 PoMPONius {Letters cmd various potssages 9) Junius Dio-
phantus greets his friend Pomponius. A person undw twenty-five
intervened with the intention of novating a contract [by substi-
tuting himself as debtor] on behalf of an existing debtor, this
latter being liable to an action which would be extinguished by
lapse of time, and as to which there were then ten days more to
run ; after which the minor got restitution in integrum ; — will the
renewed right of action, which is given to the creditor against the
original debtor, be for ten days or for a longer time? What I
have maintained is that so much time ought to be given, reckoning
from the day of the restitution in integrum, as had been remaining
originally. I wish you would let me know in writing what is your
own opinion. The answer was : — I certainly think that what you
held with reference to the limited right of action in respect of
which a minor intervened, is the better opinion, and consequently
the security which the former debtor gave will also remain available.

TIT. y] On capitis miAutio 2B&

V.

On eapUia minuHo.

1 Oaius (on the provmeial Bdic^ 4) Capitis minutio is a
chaoge of status.

2 Ulpiantjs (on the Edict 12) This Edict refers to such cases
of capitis d^minutio as occur without affecting a man's right of
oitilceDship: when a capitis demnviio occurs which involves loss
of citizenship or loss of liberty, the Edict will not apply, and the
person concerned cannot be sued in any kind of action ; of course
an action will be allowed against persons into whose hands the
property of those in question has passed. 1. The Praetor says : —
** Whatsoever man or woman, after becoming party to any contract
or transaction, shall appear to have suffered capitis dendrmtio^
I will allow an action against him or her, just as if such capitis
demitmtio had not taken place." 2. Persons who suffer capitis
denUmUio will still remain sulgect to a natural obligation in respect
of such grounds as occurred before the capitis demmiUio; but if
the grounds occurred afterwards, it ia the other party's own folly
for entering into a contract with the person in question, so fiir as
the words of this Edict are concerned. There are cases, however,
in which an action wiU be allowed where a contract was made with
a person after he suffered capitis demintUio ; and, in &ct, if it is a
case of arrogation, no difficulty arises, as the party can contract an
obligation just as much as any [other] JUius/amUias. 3. No one
can get rid of his delicts, in spite of undergoing capitis tnirmtio.

4. Where a man arrogates his debtor, the right of action against
the debtor will not be renewed on the latter becoming sui juris.

5. The right of action above given is not subject to limitation, and
the right and the liability pass to the respective heirs.

3 Paulus (an the Edict 11) When dbildren go with their
paterfamilias on the latter being arrogated, it is held that they
suffer capitis denUwutiOy as they come under some one else's potestas
and they change their £unily. 1. When a son or any one else
[under potestas] is emancipated, he clearly incurs capitis demiwutiOy
because no one can be emancipated without first being reduced as
a matter of fcmn to a servile canditioQ : this is very different from

2fi4 On capitis miniitio [book iv

the case of a slave being manumitted, because a person in bondage
has no legal position at all, consequently none can be altered ;

4 MoDESTnoTS (Pandects 1) in fact he only begins to have
any status on the occasion itself.

6 Paulus (on the Edict 1 1) Loss of citizenship amounts to a
capitis minutiOy as in the case of ** Interdiction of fire and water."
1. Persons who make 'defection" incur capitis demintdio: (de-
fection is said to be made by such as withdraw themselves from
those under whose command they are, and bring themselves into
the category of enemies ; also by those whom the Senate has pro-
nounced to be enemies, or [has made such] by means of a special
statute :) at any rate such persons so fa^v suffer capitis deminutio
that they lose their citizenship. 2. We may now come to the
question what it is that is lost by capitis deminutio ; and we may
first of all take that capitis deminutio which occurs without
affecting a man's citizenship, and by means of which it is acknow-
ledged that a man's position in matters of public law is not taken
away. For instance, it is certain that a man will remain a magis-
trate or a senator or a judge.

6 Ulpianus ion 8abinus 51) In fact any other office which
the party holds under government continues as before; as [this]
capUis deminutio puts an end to a man's private rights and those
connected with his family position, not tiiose connected with
citizenship.

7 PAtTLTJS (on the Edict 11) Guardianships too are not lost
through capitis deminutio, except such guardianships as come to
persons living under some one else's potestas. Accordingly guardians
appointed by testament, or in pursuance of a [modem] statute, or
a senatorial decree, will remain guardians in spite of the capitis
deminutio: whereas statutable guardianships founded on the
Twelve Tables are annulled on the same principle as statutable
heirships resting on the same foundation, both being conferred on
agnates, who cease to be agnates when their families are changed.
But both heirships and guardianships founded on recent statutes
are for the most part given in such terms that the persons to
receive them are pointed out by describing their natural position ;
for instance, there are senatorial decrees which confer the inheritance
on mothers and sons as such. 1. Obligations founded on injuria,
and in fact any which give rise to actions ex ddicto, are attached
to the individual 2. If a capitis deminutio occurs involving

TFT. y] On capitis minutio 265

loss of liberty, no renewal [of a right of action] is admissible as
against the dave, because, even as a matter of prsdtorian juris-
diction, a slave cannot be under an obligation so as to be liable to
be sued ; but, as Julianus tells us, an utilis actio will be allowed
against his owner, and, if the owner does not choose to defend the
case for the whole amount claimed, there must be an order enabling
the plaintiff to take possession of such property as the slave had
[when he was free]. 3. Similarly where citizenship is lost, there
is no acknowledged principle of justice allowing restitution against
a man when he loses his property and leaves the city and so goes
into exile destitute.

8 Oaius (on t?ie provincial Edict 4) Obligations, the fulfilment
of which is regarded as a matter of natural law, it is obvious cannot
be avoided by capitis demintUio, as no civil principle can entail the
destruction of natural rights. Accordingly the right of action for
do8f which is framed with express reference to principles of right
and justice, will still hold good even after a capUis d^rdrmtio ;

9 Paulub (on the Edict 11) so that if a woman comes to be
emancipated, she may. still one day bring the action.

10 MoDKSTlKus (Differences 8) If a legacy is left^ of a sum to
be paid every year or every month, or there is a l^;acy of a
habitaJtiOf it &lls through on the death of the legatee, but on the
occurrence of a capitis demimUio it will continue uninterrupted ;
for the reason that a legacy such as named depends on fisMst rather
than law.

11 Patjlus (on Sabinus 2) There are three kinds of capitis
deminutio, the greatest, the middle, the least; seeing that there
are three positions a man may have, liberty, citizenship, and femily
status. Accordingly where men lose all these three, that is, liberty,
citizenship, and family status, it is always held that this amounts
to the greatest capitis dendntUio ; where they lose citizenship but
retain liberty, it is the middle, and where liberty and citizenship
are both retained, but femily position alone is changed, it is
understood to be the least capitis deminutio.

^ For legatum..,relictum read kgato^.^rdicto, 0£ M.

266^ Restitution aflw pweniy-Jive [book ly

vi;

Grounds on which restitution in integrum is allowed to

PERSONS over twenty-five YEARS OF AGE.

Ulfianub (on the Edict 12) No one will reftise to admit
that this Edict is founded on very sufficient grounds ; where a
man^s legal po8itk>n has been affected to his detriment at a time
when he was attending to the service of the State, or was involved
in some misfortune, there is a remedy given ; on the oth«* hand,
relief is given against persons so circumstanced, in order that
what has come to pass may have no effect to their advantage or to
their disadvantage. 1. The words of the Edict are as follows : —
"Where any part of any one's property appears to be lost by non-user,
when he is absent owing to fear, or, without fraudulent contrivance,
in the service of the State, or is in prison, or in slavery, or in the
power of the enemy ; or subsequently^ to such circumstances ; or it
a|ypears that any one's right to bring an action is barred by time;
also where a man has acquired ownership of something by ugus^ or
has acquired anything which has been lost' by want of ti^te^, or has
been released from liaUlity to an action by reason of the right of
action of the other party being barred by time, the Jbct being that
the person in question himself was absent and undefended, or was
in prison, or had provided no means by which he could be sued, or
there was some legal obstacle to his being cited to appear against
his will, and no one took up the case in his place; also where
it shall appear that, after an appeal was made to a magistrate or
some one with the powers of a magistrate^ the right of action was
lost by delay without any ill contrivance on the appellants own
part; — in all these cases — I will order restitution m inJtegrmn of
the right of action [at any time] within a year after it was first
possible to make an application on the subject ; and further, if any
other just ground shall be shown me, I will give the same relief,
so &r as the order shall be in accordance with statutes, plebiscites,
decrees of the Senate, and edicts and ordinances of the Emperors."

Callistratus {Monitory Edict 2) This Edict— so iar as* it

applies to those persons who are mentioned therein — ^is not now in

• • • • ■

^ After potestctte read posteave tion tUendo demintUvm esse. M.
^ For ofnisit read amissum est or sit. Of. M.

• For sive cut pro read prove. Of. M.

* Read quoad for gtuxi.

TTT. Yi] Be^tOion after twenty-five 257

frequent use^ as justioe is administered in the case of such persons
by procedure extra ordinem in pursuance of decrees of the senate
and imperial constitutions. 1. The section we are considering
first relieves those persons who were absent through fear; provided,
that is to say, the fear causing their absence was not mere ground-
less alaruL

3 ULPiANtJS (em the Edict 12) A man is held to be absent
through fear who is absent because he is reasonably in terror of
death or bodily torture^ and this must be judged by seeing what is
his actual state of mind ; but it is not enough that the alarm which
kept him away should be simply any state of terror^ — ^the matter
has to be investigated by the judge.

4 Callistbattts {Monitory Edict 2) [The Edict relieves]
secondly those who have been absent^ without dolus mailus, on the
service of the State. The fact of d(^fis maluSf as I understand it,
afiects the application of the rule in this way, that where a man
was able to come back and declined to do so, he is not relieved as
to anything that happened to his pr«)judice during his absence;
if, for example, he deliberately took means to be absent in the
service of the State for the sake of securing some other particular
advantage^, the privilege in question is withheld;

6 UiiPiAiajs (on the Edict 12) or suppose he contrived to be
absent by taking pains for the purpose, even without an eye to gain,
or set out earlier than he needed, or managed to be absent on State
service in order to improve his position as a litigator. The proviso
as to dolits mahts applies to those who are absent on State service,
it does not extend to such as are absent through fear ; in fact^ if
there is any dolu8^ it is not a case of fear. 1. Persons who are
acting on State service in Rome itself are not absent on State
service;

6 Paulus {on the Edict 12) for instance, magistrates.

7 Ulpianus {on the Edict 12) It is true that soldiers quartered
in Rome are treated as being absent on State service.

8 Paulus {Short notes 3) A legate of a municipality is also
relieved in pursuance of the ordinance of the Emperors Marcus and
Commodus.

9 Callistbatus {Monitory Edict 2) Belief is also given to a
man who was in chains. This expression does not refer only to
a man who is confined in the way of legal imprisonment^ but

I et dd. Hal
M. J. , 17

268 Regtiiutian after ttcenipifive [book iv

indudes the case of one who is kept in duress by robbers or
brigands or any applicaticm of overpowering foroe. The word
chains is to be ^en in a wide sense; it is held that even persons
who are merely in confinement^ e.g. in the stone-quarries^ are to be
considered " in chains " ; it makes no difference whether a man is
kept in durance with walls or with fetters. However Labeo holds
that the word imprisonment must be taken to mean only imprison-
ment in due course of law.

10 Ulpianus (on the Edict 13) Those persons are in the same
position who are under the surveillance of soldiers or officers of the
magistrate's court or attendants of the municipal authorities^ if it
\& shown that they were unable to look after their own allairs.
Persons are understood to be in chains who are to that extent
bound that they cannot appear in public without discredit

11 Callistratus (JtawUory Edict 2) Belief is also given to
one who is in a state of setvitude, whether he is a free man who
is kept in good fiiith as a slavCi or is simply coerced.

12 UliPiANUS [on the Edict 12) When a man is engaged in
litigation on the question of his status, his case ceases to be within
the purview of the Edict as soon as the proceedings are com-
menced ; accordingly he is regarded as being in a state of slavery
so long only as there is no trial begun of the kind mentioned

15 Paulus {on the Edict 12) Labeo says quite rightly that a
man is not comprised in the Edict who has simply been appointed
heir with a gift of freedom, before he actually becomes heir, because
till then he has not really got any property, moreover the Praetor
only speaks of persons who are free. 1. I should say, however,
that a JUius/amiliaSf as far as his castrense pecuUvm is concerned,
is within the terms of the Edict.

14 Callistratus {Monitory Edict 2) Furthermore, relief is
given to a man who has been in the enemy's power, that is to say,
taken prisoner by the enemy ; but deserters cannot be supposed to
derive any benefit from the Edict, as they are refused the right of
postliminium. Persons in the power of the enemy might however
be held to be included in that part of the Edict in which it refers
to those who have been in slavery.

16 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 12) Relief is given in the case of
persons taken by the enemy if they return under the conditions of
postliminitim, or die in the enemy's hands, as they cannot have
the services of a procurator ; whereas other persons such as above-

TIT. Yi] Restitution after twenty-five 269

mentioned can perfectly well get help through a procurator,
except those who are kept in a state of slavery. My own opmion
however is that assistance can be had even on behalf of a man who
has fallen into the enemy's hands, if there is a curator appointed
for his property, as there commonly is. 1. Relief is given just as
much^ to one bom in the hands of the enemy, if he has the right
of postiiminiumy as to one taken by them. 2. Where a man is put
in possession of the house of a soldier on the ground of dammim
infectumf if the Prsetor granted the order for possession in the
soldier's presence, he will get no restitution, but if it was in his
absence, the rule is that he must be relieved. 3. With regard to
the provision in the Edict in making which the Prsator uses the
words '^ or subsequently " without more, it must be understood to
amount to this, that if occupation on the part of the bona fide
possessor began before the absence [of the owner], but the period
expired after his return, the relief consisting in restitution is
admissible, not, that is, at any distance of time, but only where
application is made within a short time after the party's return,
viz. not beyond the time he takes to hire a lodging, get his effects
together, and look out for an advocate : but a man who puts off
applying for restitution, Neratius tells us, ought not to have a
hearing;

16 Paulus {on the Edict 12) as relief is not given to persons
who are remiss, but only to such as were hindered by stress of
circumstances ; and the whole matter will be one to be arranged
by exercise of the Praetor's discretion, that is, in accordance with
the principle of only giving restitution where a party was unable
to join issue in the action not through remissness, but because
time pressed.

17 Ulpianus {on the Edict 12) Julianus says (b. 4) that a
soldier will be relieved not only against the possessor of an inherit-
ance, but even against purchasers from the possessor, so that» if
the soldier accepts the inheritance, he can recover what is con-
tained therein by a vindieatio ; but, if he does not accept it, there
may be a construction by way of relation back to the effect that
usticapio took place. 1. Again if a legacy is left a man in such
words as these : — '^ or so much for every year which he shall pass
in Italy,'' the legatee may get restitution to enable him to receive
the annuity as if he had been in Italy, so Labeo says, and Julianus
(b. 4) and Pomponius (b. 31) express their approval ; [which is a

^ For minui read magU,

17—2

ado Re^tUfuUon after twenty-fivB [book iy

frefih point,] as it is not a case of the right of action being barred
by time in which the aid of the Prsetor would be required, but the
matter turns on a condition.

18 t^AtJLus (on the Edict 12) It must be borne in mind that
the law gives persons of fiiU age the relief of restitution only in
cases where they sue in order to recover property or debts, not
where the relief which they seek to have given them would enable
them to make a profit by means of penalty or loss inflicted on some
one else.

19 PAFiNiANtJS {QuestioM 3) Add that if a purchaser, before
acquiring a thing by 'usugj is captured by the enemy, it is held that
the interruption of possession is liot cured by poMimininm\
aoquisiti<hi by ums is not talid without possession ; but possessidn
is almost entirely a state of fiict, and matter of fiict is without the
scope of postU/mirvium.

20 The same {Qtiestians 13) Nor ought the purchaser to be
allowed an vtUis actio, as it is very ui\just to take a thing away
from an owner, where there was no usti8 that took it away; a
thing cannot be regarded as lost, where it was not taken out of the
hands of the party who is said to have lost it.

21 UiiPiAirus (on the Edict 12) ''Also," the Edict s&ys, ''where
a person has acquired ownership of something^ by vsuSy or has
acquired what had been lost by want of usus, or is released from
liability to an action by reason of the right of action of the other
being barred by time, the fact being that Che person in question
himself was dbsent and undefended '' (etc.). The t^setor inserted
this clause in order that, just as he comes to the aid of persons in
the positions above described to protect them from suffering a dis-
advantage, so he may interpose^ in opposition td them tb prevent
them from causing a disadvantage to other people. 1. It should
be observed, moreover, that the Prsetor's language is more compre-
hensive where he gives restitution in opposition to these persons
than it is where he comes to their aid ; thus, in the words before ns,
he doe6 not specify the different classes of persons whom he relieves
against, as in the previous case, but he inserts a general clause
which comprises all such persons as are absent and undefended
2. Restitution in this case is granted, whether those thus absent
and undefended acquired by usm in tiieir own persons, or by the

^ After quif read quid, M.

' Read tticcurrat for tuccw^U HaL

TFT. Yi] Restitution oiftear tweinty-five 261

agency of others who )?ere in their potestMj but only where there
was no one to defend the case on their behalf; if there was a
procuroUor^ then, as you [the present applicant] had sono one to
sue^ the other [who has now acquired by tMus] ipust be left un-
molested. But if there was no one to defend the case on behalf of
the other party, it is perfectly bir that you should get the relief
under discussion, especially considering that, in the case of people
who are undefended, if they are purposely keeping out of the way,
the Prsetor promises to give possession of their property, to the
further intuit that, if the icase requires it, it may be sold ; but if
they are not keeping out of the way, thpugh they ari3 undefended,
he simply promises to give possession of their property. 3. A man
is not regarded as being defended simply where some one puts him-
self forward to d^end him of his own motion, but only where there
is some one called upon by the plaintiff himself who is prq»red to
follow up the defence to the end ; and the defence will be held to
be complete where such person does not shirk the trial, anfl
security is given that the judgment will be obeyed.

22 Paulus {on the Edict 12) It must be understood then that
this Edict only applies where the friends of the party were asked
whether they would undertake the defence, or there was no friend
who could be asked. In hfA, the only case in which it can be held
that an absent person is undefended is where the complainant
comes forward on his own part with an express challenge, and no
one offers to undertake the defence ; and the complainant ought to
make an attestation specifying these facts. 1. On the whole then,
the Praetor, while he does not wish the persons we are speaking of
to suffer loss, is equally unwilling to allow them to make positive
gain. 2. Tbis Edicts according to Labeo, applies to the case of
lunatics, infant children, and town corporations.

23 Ulpianus {on the Edict 12) The PrsBtor says further : '' or
was in chains, or had provided no means by which he could be
sued." He had good reason for proceeding to mention persons in
these positions, as it was quite possible for a man to be in chains
and yet be present, whether he were put in chains by state autho-
rity or by a private person ; and there is no doubt that a man who
is in chains, as long as he is not in a state of slavery, can acquire
property by tuus. However, even where the p^y is in chains,
still. If therjd jis some one to defend him, np restitutlpn wiU be
/(;»rdej^. 1. But a man cannot acquire anything by tims when he
is in the ];i^nds of the enemy, and, if the time of possession hfu9

262 RegtUution after twevUy-five [book it

begun to run in his faTOur, he wiU not be able to complete it whilst
he is in the enemy's hands : moreover, even if he returns under
the conditions of postiiminium, he will not be able to pursue the
acquisition of ownership by usus. 2. Again, Papinianus says that
where a man has lost the possession of land, or the quasi-possession
of a usufruct in land, in consequence of being taken prisoner, he
ought to be relieved, and the profits too which another person has
gathered from the usufruct in the meantime he thinks ought in
fisdmess to be handed over to the returning captive. 3. There is
no doubt that those who were in the potestas of the [person since
made] captive can acquire property by usus by means of their
possession of it as part of their peddivm ; and it will be &ir that
the assistance prescribed by this clause should be given to persons
who are present, that is, who are not in captivity, if anything of
theirs was acquired by usua by some on^ else, where they were un-
defended. On the other hand, if the time for bringing an action
which the party had a right to institute against a captive has
expired, relief will be given him against the captive. 4. The
Praetor then proceeds to say — '^ or provided no means by which he
could be sued,'' so that restitution may be granted [against him],
if, while he is in course of making such provision, the acquisition
by U8VS [on his part] should be completed, or some other event
should happen of those mentioned above. This is quite reason-
able ; an order enabling the applicant to take possession of the
property is not always a sufficient remedy, as the circumstances
may very well be such that it is impossible to give possession of
the property of a person who is keeping out of the way, or
that the party is not keeping out of the way ; take a case, for
instance, in which, while the other is endeavouring to procure legal
assistance, or the trial is for some other reason being delayed, the
right of action is barred by lapse of time ;

24 Paulus {on the Edict 12) but the words will equally apply
to the case of persons who, when sued, elude the complainant and
contrive by various shifts and subterfuges to evade the action ;

26 Oaius {(m the Promndal Edict 4) and we may fairly say
that they apply in a similar way to the case of a man who keeps
out of reach, not with any intention of eluding a suitor, but because
he is hindered by the multitude of his engagements.

26 Ulpianus (on the Edict 1 2) Again, restitution will be vouch-
safed where the Praetor was himself in fiiult 1. Restitution,
according to Pomponius, against a man who is relegated will be

TIT. Yi] Itegtitution after twenty-Jive 263

ordered in virtue of the general clause in the Edict ; but none will
be granted in his &Tour, because he coxdd have appointed a
procurator ; still I should say that on special cause shown the order
would even be made in his &vour. 2. The Praetor proceeds : —
'^or there was some legal obstacle to his being cited against his
will, and no one took up the case on his behalf." These words
apply to those persons who, in accordance with ancient custom,
cannot be cited without offence, such as the Prsator, the Consul,
and any magistrate who is invested with some right of command or
authori<7. But the Edict does not comprise under these words
persons whom the Prsdtor does not allow to be dted without his
own express permission ; because, if he had been applied to, he
might have given the permission ; take the case of patrons
and parents. 3. The Edict then has the words— '^and no one
took up the case on his behalf' ; this applies to all the cases above
mentioned, except that of a person who has acquired something by
tisus while absent; the reason for excepting this case being that
it has been already fully provided for. 4. The Prsetor next
says : — ** also where it shall appear that a party's right of action
was lost by the fault of the magistrates without ill contrivance
of his own." What is the object of these words? It is to
secure that in case a right of action should come to be lost in
consequence of delays on the part of the judge, restitution should
be ordered. Moreover where there was no magistrate accessible
to whom to apply, in that case also, according to Labeo, restitution
should be granted. By ''the fault of the magistrate'' we must
understand such a case as that of a magistrate declining to enter-
tain the matter, but if he simply, after hearing the application,
refused to allow the action, there is no case for restitution : with
this Servius agrees. Again it is a case of the fault of the magis-
trate, if he declines to entertain the application out of favour to
the defendant or for a corrupt motive ; in which case not only the
clause in question will apply, but a former one too, viz. "or the
party provides no means by which be could be sued," as in fitct
the party took special measures to prevent his being sued, by
corrupting the judge. 5. By a right of action being lost we must
understand to be meant the party ceasing to be able to bring an
action. 6. The words are added ''without any ill contrivance of
his own," the object being that, if there should be some ill con-
trivance on his part in the case, he should receive no assistance ;
the Praetor gives no relief to such as are themselves delinquents.
Accordingly, if a man desires to bring his case before the next

264 Ee^Uutian after twenty-j^ve [book it

PrsBtor, and, with that object, deliberately misBee the preeent
opportunity^ he will not be relieved. Or again, if he refused
obedience to the Prsetor^s directiouB, and, for that reason the
Prsetor declined to deal with his case, according to Labeo, he will
get no restitution, and the rule is the same if the Praetor refused
him a hearing on any other ground. 7* If special holidays should
be ordered, on the ground, it may be, of some national success, or
in honour of the Emperor, and the magistrate for that reason
should decline to sit, Qaius Cassius announced expressly in his
edict that he would grant restitution, because this must be held to
be a case of the fault of the Prsetor ; the regular holidays he said
ought not to be taken into account^ because the complainant was
able to see when they were coming, and was bound to do so, so as
not to run against them. This is no doubt the better opinion, and
CelsuB says the same {Dig. b. 4). However, when time lapses
owing to holidays, restitution ought to be granted only of the
actual days lost, not of the whole period from the beginning.
This is said by Julianus (Dig. b. 4) ; what he tells us is that where
vsucapio is set aside, the proper order is for restitution of as many
days as those on which the comi^Lainant was ready and willing to
take proceedings, but was hindered by the occurrence of the
holidays. 8. [This rule applies] in any case in which a man by
his absence hindered another's action for something short of the
whole period required to bar the right; suppose, for example,
I was in possession of something belonging to you for less by one
day than the period laid down for acquiring by nsus, and then
I began to be absent on State service, in that case restitution ought
to be ordered against me for one day. 9. '^And further,'' the
Prsetor continues, ^^if any other just ground shall be shown me,
I will order restitution in integrum" It was necessary to ins^
this clause in the Edict, because cases of a great many Idnds might
occur which would give a claim to the relief of restitution, but
which could not be specifically enumerated, so that whenever
restitution is called for by the justice of the case, recourse can be
had to the above clause. Suppose, for instance, a man has dis-
charged a legation on behalf of a city, it is perfectly just that
he should get restitution, though he was not absent in the service
of the State ; and it has been often laid down that he ought to
get relief, whether he had a procurator or not I should say
the same where be has been summoned from some province to
come up to the city or to come brfore the Emperor in order to be
a witness ; there have been a great many rescripts to the effect

TIT. Yi] Ee^Uution QjfUr twen^five 266

that this is a case for relie£ Again, relief has been given to persons
who have been abroad in c<Hinexion with some judicial enquiry or
appeal. In short, as a general rule, wh^nerer persons have been
absent unavoidably and not by their own choice^ the proi>er view
is that they ought to be relieved ;

27 Pattlus (on the Edict 12) and whether a man loses some-
thing or is disappointed of some expected gain, an order for
restitution should be made, though there should be no loss of any
portion of his property.

28 Ulpiakus (on ^Ae Edict 12) Agaui, where a man has been
absent on defensible grounds, the PrsDtor should consider whether
it is a good case for relief — suppose, for instance, the party claims
on the ground that he was prosecuting studies, and say his pro-
curator was dead ; — the object in such a case being to secure that
he shall not lose his expectations in consequence of absence on
some very reasonable ground* !• Again, if a man is not confined
or in chains, but has given security with sureties for his ^)pearance
somewhere, and, being in consequence unable to absent himself,
has suffered some disadvantage, he will get an order of restitution ;
and similarly an order may be made against him. 2. ''So far"
the Prsdtor continues ''as such order shall be in accordance with
statutes, plebiscites, decrees of the Senate and edicts and ordi-
nances of the Emperors." This clause does not lay down that the
Praetor will give restitution if the statutes permit it, but if they
do not forbid it 3. Where a man has been absent in the service
of the State several times, Labeo holds that the period allowed
him for applying for an order of restitution should be made to run
from the day of his last return. But if all his absences put
together amount to a year, and each separately to less than a year,
a &ir point to consider is whether he has a whole year given him
to ask for restitution, or only so much time as that for which his
last absence lasted : but I should say a whole year. 4. If, when
your place of abode is in the province, you^ happen to be in the
City, will time run against me, on the ground that it is in my power
to sue you? Labeo says it will not. I should say however th^ this
is only true where the other side has a right to an order to have the
action removed into the provincial Court ; but, if be has not^ it
must ^be held that it is in my power to bring tibe actiop, because
I am able to have issue joined in Borne just as welL 5. A ^Mm who
has been absent on State service has a good exception icorrespoi^djng

266 Mestiiutian after twenty-Jive [book iv

to his right of action to rescind ; suppose, for instance, he should
have got possession of the property [which he lost], and a vindir
caMo is brought against him to recover it 6. In an action to
rescind which a man has a right to bring against a soldier,
Pomponius says it is perfectly just that the defendant should
account for the profits attributable to the period during which he
was absent and undefended ; consequently such profits must be
handed over to a soldier [in the converse case] ; there are similar
rights of action on both sides.

29 Afrioanus (Qtieatione 7) The object being that the discharge
of a duty to the State should be no loss or gain to any one.

80 Paulus (an the Edict 12) Where a soldier who was in
course of acquiring something by usus dies, and his heir completes
the period required for acquisition, it is agreeable to justice that
the acquisition ensuing thereupon should be liable to be rescinded,
the same legal construction being maintained {eadem servanda
sint) in the persons of the heirs who succeed to the prospect
of acquiring by nsus [as was observed in the person of the
deceased] ; the fact is that the possession eigoyed by the deceased
descends to the heir as it were united to the inheritance, indeed
very often the title is completed before the inheritance has been
entered upon. 1. Where a man who was absent on State service
has acqiured something by tims, and after that disposes of it to
another, restitution may be granted [to the former owner], and,
though the absence and the acquisition by tisus should be with no
ill contrivance (dohis), the party must be debarred from making a
gain by them. Similarly restitution must be made in all the other
cases, as if judgment had been given against the party.

31 Thb same (on the Edict 53) Where a man whose property
has been acquired by tisus by some one else who was absent on
State service gets into possession of the property so acquired,
then, even if he should subsequentiy lose it, his right of action to
recover it is not subject to be barred by time, but is perpetual.

32 MoDESTiKtJS (Bides 9) A man is regarded as absent on
State service as soon as he has started from the City, though he
has not yet reached^ the province ; and, when he has once departed,
he remains absent till he returns to the City. This rule applies to
Proconsuls and their legates and to those [legates] who are at the
head of a province, also to imperial procurators who are employed

1 For excenerit read aeou9erit Gf. M.

TET. vi] Restit/uiion after twenty-Jive 267

in the proTinceB, as weU as military officers {tribuni) and prefects
and assessors of l^^tes whose names are sent in to the aercmnmy
or the particulars relative to whom are entered^ in the Imperial
Gazette {eommentarius principia).

33 The same {an coms unravelled) Among those who are
relieved in virtue of the general clause is included the Advocate
of the JiBcaa. 1. Those persons who take down the pronounce-
ments of the Praeses are certainly not absent on State service.
2. Military doctors, inasmuch as the duty they discharge is in the
public interest and ought not to expose them to any kind of dis-
advantage, have a right to ask to be relieved by restitution.

84 Javolenus {Extracts from Cassins 16) A soldier who has
come home on furlough is not held to be absent on State service.
1. A man who gives his services in connexion with State dues
which are farmed out for revenue purposes is not absent on State
service.

36 Paulus {on the lex Jtdia et Papia 3) Men who are sent to
take out soldiers or bring them back or to superintend' recruiting
are absent on State service. 1. And so are such as are sent to
congratulate the Emperor. 2. So is an Imperial procv/ratoTy find
not only one who is entrusted as proawraJtor with the affairs of a
particular province, but one who has to manage some of such
affikirS; though not all. Consequently a number of procurators
of different respective departments in the same province are all
regarded as absent on State service. 3. The Prefect of Egypt is
also absent on State service, and so is an officer who in any other
capacity leaves the City in the discharge of public duty. 4. The
Divine Pius laid down the same rule for soldiera who serve in the
Urban Cohorts. 5. The question has been raised whether an
officer who is sent to put down malefactors is absent on State
service ; and it was held that he was. 6. We may add the case
of a civilian who joins an expedition by the order of an officer
of consular rank and is killed in action ; in which case the relief
under discussion is granted to his heir. 7. A man who has gone
to Rome on State service is held to be absent on State service.
Again, if he should depart from his own country on State service,
even if he is free to go through the City, he is absent on State
service. 8. Similarly, in the case of a man who is in some
province, from the moment of his leaving his house, or, where he

1 For ddcUi read rdati. Gf. M.

' For ewrareni read curam ctfferent Of. M.

268 jReHUution n^ber ttoeni^Jlve [book iv

has taken up his abode in his own proyinoe in order to act as a
govermnent official, from the moment of his beginning to transact
public business, — ^he is treated like a person who is absent 9. A
man is absent on State service on his way to the camp and on his
way back, as one who is going to discharge the duties of a soldier
must go to the camp and return from it According to Yivianus
it was laid down by Proculus that a soldier who is away on furlough
is absent on State service as long as he is on his way home or on
his way back, but whilst at home he is not absent

36 Ulpianus {on the lex JuUa et Papia 6) We regard people
as absent on State service only when they are absent on no affiurs
of their own, but under compulsion.

37 Patjlus {on the lex JvMa et Papia 3) Persons who act as
assessors in their own province beyond the time allowed by
Imperial enactments are not regarded as absent on State service.

38 Ulpianus (on the lex Jvlia et Papia 6) Where a man is
allowed by the Emperor to act as assessor in his own province by
way of special indulgence, I should say that he is absent on State
service ; but, if he acts in the same way without pennission, we
are bound to say that, as in so doing he commits an offence, he
does not ei\]oy the privileges of those who are absent on State
service. 1. A man will be regarded as absent on State service
for so long as he is occupying some official post ; but as soon as
his official duties are discharged, he at once ceases to be absent on
State service ; however, the law will allow him for his return a
certain period of time to be reckoned from the moment when he
ceases to be absent on State service, viz. so much time as he
required in order to return to the City ; and it will be keeping
within bounds to allow him the same period as the statute in that
behalf allows to ^prasses^ who is returning. Consequently, if he
goes out of the way for some object of his own, there can be ^o
doubt that the time so spent will not be given him over and above ;
the time will be reckoned within which it is in his power to return,
and as soon as it is ended it will be said that he has ceased ]to be
absent on State service. No dpubt if he is prevented from con-
tinuing his journey by reason of sickness, something will be allowed
to considerations of humanity, just as some account is taken of
severe weather, or difficulties of navigation, or any other accidental
hindrance.

^ After revertm^ibu^ read prasiidibui, Cf. M.

TIT. Yi] JReatituiion after twenty-Jive 269

39 Paulus (Sentences 1) Where a man who is going to be
absent on State serrioe leaves a procurcUar who is able to defend
an action on his behalf, no application that he makes for restitution
in integrum will be entertained.

40 Ulpianus {Opinions 5) If a soldier is in a position to take
criminal proceedings at a time when he is acting in the service of
the State, he does not lose the power to take them. 1. Where a
man has been detained on an island in pursuance of a penal
sentence in respect of which he has obtained restitution in inte-
grumj and it is shown that during his detention some other person
has taken possession of a portion of his property of which he was
not deprived by the sentence, what is so taken must be restored so
ad to put him in his old position with referehce to it

41 JuLiANUS {Digest 35) A man leaves a legacy to litius, pro-
vided Titius should be in Italy at the testator's death, or he leaves
him so much a year, so long as he should be in Italy. If Titius
gets the aid of the Prsetor on the ground that he was excluded
from the legacy owing to Ins being absent on State service ; he is
compellable to make good any fdeicommissum which is left at his
charge. Note bp MarceUus. Can any one doubt, indeed, that
where an inheritance is restored to a soldier which he had lost
owing to absence on State service, the title to legacies and ^fidei-
eammissa will not be impaired ?

42 AiiFEKUS {Digest 5) A man cannot be said with truth to be
absent on State service, when he has undertaken a legation with a
view to ills own private business.

48 Africantts {Questions 7) If a man stipulates for so much a
year so long as he or the promisor sh^l be in Italy, and after that
it happens to one of the two to be abseht in the service of the
State, it is the duty of the Praetor to give an vJtUis custio. The rule
is the same if the stipulation were in such terms as the following :
" if such a one should be at Rome for the next five years," or " if
he should not be at Rome, do you promise to pay a hundred ? "

44 Paulus {(m Sabinus 2) A man who is absent on State
service will not get restitution if he suffers hurt in any matter in
respect of which he would have incurred loss even if he had not
been absent on State service.

45 SciEVOLA {Rules I) Soldiers in general who cannot leave
their standards save at their own peril are held to be absent on
State service.

270 EestitfUian after tuberOy-five [book iv

46 Mabcianus {Rules 2) A man who was absent on State

fiervioe will have a right to restitution even against one who was
himself also absent on State serYioe, if he has good reaaon to com-
plain that he has suffered a loss.

VII.
On transfers made fob the purpose of varying the

CONDITIONS of A TRIAL.

1 Gaius (an the promncicU Edict 4) The proconsul does all
he can to secure that no man's legal position shall be prejudiced
by the act of another ; and, being aware that the course of a trial
often gives a man a great deal more trouble where he has to deal
with a different opponent from the one he began with, he took
measures to prevent this mischief by laying down that, if any one
should tranfer the property in dispute to another so as to put
some one else in his own place as a party to the suit with the
deliberate purpose of prejudicing his opponent, he should be liable
to an action in factum in which the measure of damages would be
the interest the other litigant had in not having a substituted
opponent to deal with. 1. Accordingly a party will be liable if he
brings in as opponent some one who belongs to a different province
or is a person of superior resources ;

2 Ulpianus (on the Edict 13) or any one who is likely to
give trouble to the other side :

3 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 4) because, if I take pro-
ceedings against a man who belongs to another province, I am
obliged to do so in his province, and no one can contend on equal
terms with a person of superior resources. 1. Again, if the de-
fendant manumits a slave who is the subject of the action, the
plaintiff is put in a more disadvantageous position, because the
Prsetor always favours liberty. 2. Again, if you transfer to another
a piece of ground on which you have made some structure exposing
you to an Interdict qtiod vi ant dam [at my hands], or to an
action to keep off rainwater (aqwB pluvice arcenda^), this is recog-
nised as putting me in a disadvantageous position, because, if my
proceedings had been taken against you, you would have had to
remove the structure at your own expense ; but, as it is, my action
has to be brought against a different person from the one who did

TIT. yn] Tram^w to vary trial 271

the act, and, consequently, I am oompeUed to remove the Btnicture
at my own expense ; the law being that whenever a man is in
possession of something which was constructed by a third person,
he is only liable to the proceedings in question so &r as to be
compellable to allow the structure to be removed. 3. If I give
you a notification of novel structure {opus novum\ after which
you dispose of the spot, and the purchaser completes the work, it
is held that you are liable to the action under discussion, on the
ground that I cannot take proceedings in pursuance of the notifi-
cation of novel structure against you, because you have not con-
structed anything, nor can I against your alienee, because I did
not give him the notification. 4. From all this it is clear that^
whereas the Proconsul promises to grant restitution in integrum^
when the action is thereupon brought^ it will be the duty of the
judge on motion to let the plaintiff have by way of damages an
amount^ representing the interest which he would have had in not
having to deal with a substituted opponent ; he may, for example,
owing to there being such a substitute, have gone to some expense
or suffered some other inconvenience. 5. Suppose however the
party against whom the action in question can be brought is ready
to submit to an utiUs actiOj so as to put the plaintiff on the same
footing as if he (such defendant) were still in possession ? In that
case it is very reasonably held that the action founded on this
Edict will not be allowed against hiuL

UiiPiANUS {on ike Edict 13) Again, if the property comes
to be acquired by turns by the person to whom it was transferred,
so that no action can be brought to recover it from him, this Edict
applies. 1. Moreover it may happen that a man's possession is
terminated without any dclvs maluSy but still the change was
effected in order to alter the conditions of the trial ; and there are
many other cases of the same kind. On the other hand a man
may cease to be in possession, and that with dolus maltis, and
yet he may not have made the change with a view to altering the
conditions of the trial, so that he incurs no liability under the
terms of the Edict : as a man does not transfer property who
simply abandons possession. However the Praetor does not find
&ult with the behaviour of a man who shows this anxiety to be rid
of property, where his object is to avoid being exposed to constant
litigation about it, — indeed such a very unassuming resolution,
proceeding as it does from the party's hatred for actions at law, is

^ For tantum judicis read judicU tarUum. Cf. M.

272 Transfer to varp trial [book iv

not a thing to be censured, — ^the Pr»tor only deals with the case
of one whOy without hating any wish to lose the property^ trans-
fers the defence to another, so as to give the plaintiff, as oppo-
nent instead of himself, some person who will give him trouble^
2. Pedios (b. 9) declares that this Edict deals not only with trans-
fers of ownership, but transfers of possession too ; otherwise, he
says, if the defendant to an action in rem assigns the possession to
some one else, he will avoid liability. 3. But where a man's reason
for putting another in his place as party to the action is bad healtii
or old age or urgent business, this is not a case in which he ia
liable under this Edict, as the Edict refers expressly to dolus
malus (malidous contriyalice) ; indeed otherwise it would amount
to prohibiting the rery pradice of carrying on litigation through
procurators, as the property is generally transferred to them, if
the occasion requires it 4. llie Edict comprises the case of real
servitudes, provided the transfer is made with Ai^ mo^tiA 6. The
measure of damages in this action is the extent of the plaintifTs
interest; consequentiy, if he was not really owner, or the slave
tranferred died without any ftult of the transferor's, the action
cannot be brought, unless the plaintiff had some interest on inde-
pendent grounds. 6. The action is not for vindictive damages, it
is an action to recover property or debt in pursuance of the
judge's intimation ; hence it is allowed to the heir ; but agidnst
the heir,

6 PAULT78 (on the Edict 11) or any one similarly placed,

6 Ulpiakus (on (he Edict 13) o^ after the lapse of k year, it
is not allowed,

7 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 4) because it is meant for
the recovery of property, though, at the same time, it may be said
to be founded on a delict

8 Paulus (on the Edict 12) A man is liable under this Edict
even where he produces a thing on being called upon, if he does
not, on the intimation of the judge, put the case at law on its
original footing. 1. The Prsetor says : '' or any transfer made for
altering the conditions of a trial " ; this refers to the conditions of
a future trial, not of the one already proceeding. 2. A man is
regarded as transferring a thing even where he sells what belongs
to some one else. 3. But if he makes the transfer by appointing
an heir or bequeathing a legacy, the Edict will not apply. 4. If a
man transfers something and then takes it back, he will not be
liable under the Edict 5. A man who makes his vendor take

TTT. vn] Tranter to vary trial 278

back what he sold, by way of redhibition^ is not held to get rid of
property in order to alter the conditions of a trial

9 Paulus {on the Edict of the curule Ediles 1 ) Because, when
the slave is given back by way of redhibition, everything is put on
its former footing ; so that the party who returns the thing is not
held to have disposed of it in order to vary the conditions of a
trial, — unless, indeed, the party restores the slave in this manner
with the very object in question, and, except for that, would not
have restored him at alL

10 XJLPiANtrs (on the Edict 12) Indeed even if, where you
desire to sue me for something at law, I deliver it to another in
pursuance of an obligation in that behalf, the Edict will not apply.
I. If the guardian of a boy under age, or the agnate [curator] of a
lunatic transfers the property, there is an tiHlis a>ctio open, as the
parties themselves under guardianship or curatorship are incapable
of entertaining the fraudulent intent.

11 The same (Opinions 6) Where a soldier applied for leave
to bring an action in his own name for landed property which he
declared to have been given him gratuitously, he was answered
that if the gift was made in order to vary the conditions of a
trial, the action ought to be brought by the previous owner, so as
to let this latter have the credit of bestowing the actual property
on the soldier, and not a mere right to sue some one.

12 Marcianus (Institutions 14; If a man should dispose of
[his share in] a piece of property in order to avoid having to defend
an action commtmi dividtmdo, he is forbidden by the Lex Licinnia
to bring an action of the same kind himself; his object might,
for instance, be to contrive that some purchaser in a commanding
position should make a bid for it, and get the property for a low
price, so that by that means he might afterwards recover it himself.

' After this if the party who transferred his share should desire to
bring an action communi dividtmdo, he will not get a hearing ;
and if the purchaser should wish to take proceedings, he is pro-
hibited doing so under that head in the Edict in which it is
provided that a man shall not transfer property in order to vary
the conditions of the trial.

li. J. 18

274 On arbUratioM [booki?

VIIL

Ok hatters beferred: ok febsoks who ukdebtakb abbi-
tbatioks with ▲ view to pbokoukcikg ak awabd.

1 Paulus {on the Edict 2) Arbitration is framed on the model
of judicial trials, and its object is to put an end to litigation.

2 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 4) An arbitration is held not to
give ground for an exceptio^ but for an action for a penalty.

S The same {on the Edict 13) According to Labeo, where a
matter is referred to arbitration, and an award is given by means of
which a person is to be released by a youth under twenty-five from an
action on guardianship, the Prsetor ought not to uphold the award,
and no action will be allowed to recover the penalty due in puiv
suance thereof. 1. However true it is that the PrsBtor does not
compel any one to undertake an arbitration, since such an office
is optional and at will, and there is no obligation to exercise
jurisdiction ; nevertheless, where a man has once undertaken the
duty of arbitration, the Ptietor holds that the matter is a proper
subject for his care and close attention ; not merely because the
Praetor is anxious that disputes should be set at rest, but because
it is not right that people should be disappointed who have chosen
that particular person to decide between them under the impression
that he was an impartial judge. Suppose that after the case had
been already once or twice gone into, the private affidrs of both
parties laid bare, and secret features of the matter disclosed, the
arbitrator were, out of partiality for one side, or because he was
influenced by corrupt motives, or for any other reason, to decline
to give an award : can any one say that in such a case it would not
be perfectly just that the Prsetor should have to interpose, so as to
make the arbitrator discharge the office which he had undertaken ?
2. The Prsetor says '^A man who undertakes arbitration after
mutual submission with promises to pay money,*' etc. 3. Let us
consider the personal position of arbitrators. There is no doubt
that, whatever an arbitrator's rank may be, the Prcetor will compel
him to discharge thoroughly the office he has undertaken, even
if he is a consular person, unless he should be placed in some
magisterial or other authority, such as that of consul or prsetor, as
the Prsetor has no power over those in such positions;^

1 For hoe read ho9. Of. M.

TET, vm] On arbitrations 276

4 Paulus (on lAe JEriiu^ 13) there being no way in which
magistrates can be coerced who are of higher or equal authority
[as compared with the officer who seeks to coerce them], nor does
it matter whether they undertook the office during their tenure
of their present magistracy or befora Inferior officers can be
compelled to act

6 Ulpianus {on the Edict 13) Indeed, even a son under
potestas can be compelled.

6 Gaius {on the promnciai Edict 5) Moreover, it is said that
a son under potestas can be arbitrator in a concern of his own
fitther's ; in fact, the common opinion is that he can even be
a judge.

7 Ulpianxts {on (he Edict 13) Pedius says (b. 9) and so does
Pomponius (b. 33) that it is a matter of small account whether an
arbitrator is freebom or a freedman, whether he ei\joys an un-
blemished reputation or is marked with ignominy. Labeo says
(b. 11) that a reference for arbitration cannot be made to a slave ;
and this is true. 1. Hence Julianus says that, if a reference is
made to Titius and a slave, then Titius himself cannot be compelled
to give an award, because he undertook the arbitration jointly
with some one else, although, he adds, there is no such thing as
the arbitration of a slave. But how will it be if Titius pro-
nounces an award 7 In that case the penalty will not become due,
because he does not pronounce the award under the conditions he
engaged for.

8 Paulus {on the Edict 13) But if the terms of the submission
were to the effect that the award of either party singly should be
valid, then Titius, he says, can be compelled to act

9 Ulpianus {on the Edict 13) Again, if the reference is made
to a slave, and he pronounces an award after he has obtained his
freedom, I should say that if he acts with the consent of the
parties when he is a free man, it is valid. 1. But a reference
should not be made to a boy under age, or a lunatic, or a deaf
man, or a dumb man, — so Pomponius says (b. 33). 2. When a
man is a judge, he is forbidden by the lex Julia to undertake an
arbitration in the same matter that he has before him as judge, or
to order a reference to himself; and if he should pronounce an
award, no action for the penalty will be allowed. 3. Other cases
might be added of persons who are not compellable to make an
award, for instance, those in which the arbitrator is clearly corrupt

18—3

I

276 On ixrhitraiions [book iv

or acts 00 some dishonorablo niQtiye. 4 JuUaaus says, if both the
ccmtending parties give the proposed arbitrator a bed name, the
Praetor ought not to dispense with his services as a matter of
course, but only on cause shown. 6. According to the same
writer, if the parties treat the arbitrator's authority with contempt
and go to the Court

10 Paulus {on the Edict 13) or to some other arbitrator,

11 Ulpianus {on the Edict 13) and after that come back to
the first arbitrator, the Prsetor ought not to compel him to go into
the case, the parties having put such a slight upon him as to reject
him and go to some one else. 1. The arbitrator, he says, is not to
be compelled to pronounce an award, unless a regular submission
was made. 2. Where the Praetor speaks of " mutual engagements
to pay,'' this must not be understood to imply that there is on both
sides a promise of a penal sum of money, to be payable if either
party should refuse to abide by the arbitrator's award ; but to
include the case of anything else being promised by way of a
penalty ; we find this in Pomponius. Suppose then goods are
placed in the hands of the arbitrator, on the understanding that
he is. to give them to the successful party, or that» if either party
should refuse to obey his award, he is to give such goods to the other,
will he be compelled to pronounce an award ? I should say that
he will. A similar rule holds where a specific quantity [of things
determined in kind] is left in his hands with the same object.
On the same principle therefore where, in the stipulations made,
one man promises a thing and another money, the submission is
complete, and the arbitrator will be compelled to pronounce his
award. 3. In some cases, as Pomponius tells us, the mutual
promises can be very well made by bare agreement ; for example,
where the two parties are mutually indebted, and they agree that
if either of them should refuse to obey the arbitrator's award, he
shall not sue for what is owed him by the other. 4. Again Julianus
says that the arbitrator is not to be compelled to give an award, if
one party makes the promise and the other does not 5. He holds
the same where the submission involves the promise of a penalty
under a condition, for instance, " so many thousands, if such a ship
comes back from Asia" ; as the arbitrator cannot be compeUed to
pronounce an award until the condition is fulfilled, for fear lest his
award should have no efiect, through the failure of the condition.
Pomponius has the same thing {on the Edict 33).

12 Paulxjs {on the Edict 13) In this case perhaps the only

TFT. vm] On arbttrations 27T

thing giving ground for an application to the Prsetor will be
the desire that, if the time appointed in the reference can be
enlarged, an order may be made accordingly.

18 Ulpiantts {on the Edict 13) Pomponius says that if one
party has a formal release given him of the penal sum agreed
upon, the arbitrator ought not to be compelled to give an award.

1. The same writer says also that if the submission is of my claims
only, and I stipulated for a penal sum to be paid by you, it is a
point worth considering whether this is any submission at all.
But I do not see myself what is his difficulty ; if his point is that
the agreement only refers the claims of one of the parties, there is
no reason in his remark, as it is quite open to parties to refer one
single question ; but if it is that the formal promise is only made
on one side, this is to the purpose. At the same time if the
promisee in this stipulation is the party who eventually sues, it
may be said that there is a good submission, because the party
who is sued has a sufficient drfenoe ; for example, he can plead
the pa>ctum by way of ewc^io ; as for the party who sues, if the
arbitratcHr's award is not obeyed, he has got the formal promise
to rely upon. However, I do not think this aigument is sound ;
granting that the party has a good excepUo^ this is not a sufficient
reason for the arbitrator being compellable to deliver an award.

2. A man is held to have undertaken an arbitration, so Pedius says
(K 9), when he has assumed the duties of judge and promises to
give a decision which shall finally dispose of the matters in disputa
But where, the same writer proceeds, the supposed arbitrator only
intervenes so far as to try whether the parties will allow their
dispute to be disposed of by his advice and authority, he cannot
be held to have undertaken an arbitration. 3. A man who is
arbitrator in pursuance of a submissicui is not compelled to pro-
nounce an award on those days on which a judge is not compelled
to deliver judgment, unless the time agreed upon in the submission
is on the point of expiring and it cannot be enlarged. 4. Similarly,
if he should be pressed by the Prsdtor to pronounce his decision,
it is perfectly just that he should have some time allowed him for
doing so, if he declares on oath that he has not yet formed a clear
opinion about the matter.

14 Pomponius {on Q. Mucins 11) If the fdrmal reference is
made without a day being assigned, it is absolutely necessary that
the arbitrator should appoint a day, I mean subject to the consent
of the parties, and that the cdde should be gone into accordingly ;

278 On arbitrations [book iy

if he omits to do this, he can be compelled to give his decision at
any time.

16 Ulpianus (on the Edict 13) Though the Pretor should in
his Edict declare absolutely that he will compel the arbitrator to
give a decision^ still, in some cases, he ought to listen to what he
has to say, and allow his excuses, on due cause shown ; suppose,
for instance, the parties give him a bad name, or there comes to
be some deadly enmity between him and the parties or one of
them, or he can claim to be excused the duty on the ground of his
age, or a fit of illness occurring to him after the reference, or the
necessity of attending to his private aflbirs, or urgent occasion to
go to a distance, or the duty of some Goyemment office : all this is
in Labeo.

16 Paulus (on the Edict 13) Or the reason may be any othar
difficulty in which he is put after assuming the arbitration. But^
in a case of ill-health or similar grounds of excuse, he may be
compelled to postpone the matter, on sufficient cause shown.
1. Where an arbitrator is engaged in a case of his own, whether
of a public or private nature, he ought on that ground to be
excused from adjudicating on the matters referred to him, at any
rate where the time agreed cannot be enlarged ; if it can, why
should not the Prsetor compel him to enlai^ge it, as he is able to do
BO? This is a thing which may sometimes be done without any
inconvenience^ to the arbitrator. If again both parties wish him
to give the award, must we not say that, although no undertaking
was given as to enlarging the time, still the arbitrator can only
get an order relieving him of the necessity of proceeding, on the
ground of his own case, on the terms of his giving his consent to
the matter being referred to him afresh ? I assume in all this that
the time is on the point of expiring.

17 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 13) Again if one of the parties
executes a ^cessio honorwm^ (assignment for the benefit of his
creditors) Julianus informs us (Dig. b. 4) that the arbitrator cannot
be compelled to give an award, because the party in question can
neither sue nor be sued. 1. If the parties come back to the
arbitrator after a long interval of time, then, according to Labeo
he is not compellable to give an award. 2. Again, if there are
more than one who undertook the arbitration, no single one can
be compelled to give an award ; it must be either all or none,
a Hereupon Pomponius asks the following question (b. 33) :—

1 Read diitrictums for duHnOione. 0£ M.

HT. vm] On arhUratiam 279

Suppose a reference to arbitration is made in such terms that what-
ever commends itself to Titius as examiner, Seius is to pronounce
accordingly, which of the two is compellable to act ? I should say
myself that such an arbitration is invalid, being one in which the
arbitrator has not free power of pronouncing his opinion. 4. If
the terms of the submission are that the parties shall abide by the
award of Titius or Seius, then, as Pomponius says, — and our opinion
is the same, — ^the reference is valid ; but the arbitrator who wiU
be compelled to give the award is whichever the parties agree
upon. 5. If an agreement is made to refer the question to two
persons, on the terms that, if they should disagree, they are to add
a third, I should say that such a submission is void ; because they
may disagree as to whom they shall add. But if the terms are
that the third person so added is to be Sempronius, this is a good
submission, because they cannot disagree as to whom they shall
add. 6. But let us take a more general question, viz. this. If
a reference is agreed upon to two arbitrators, must the Praetor
compel them to give a decision ? The &ct is that, considering how
prone men are by nature to disagree, the matter referred is hardly
likely ever to be settled. Where the number is odd, the reference
is upheld, not because it is likely that all tiie arbitrators will agree,
but because, even if they disagree, there is a miyority whose
decision can be adhered to. However the common practice is to
refer the matter to two arbitrators, and then the Praetor is bound
to compel them, if they disagree, to choose some third person
whose authority can be obeyed. 7. Celsus says {Dig. b. 2) if the
reference is to three, then it is enough for two to agree, provided
the third person is present as well : but, if he is not present, then,
even though two agree the decision is void, because the reference
was to more than two, and, if the third had been present, he might
have brought the two over to his own opinion :

18 Pomponius (Epistles cmd various passages 1 7) just as, where
three judges are appointed, a judgment given by two who agree
together in the absence of the third is invalid, because the judg-
ment given by the majority of the judges is only upheld where
it is clear that every one gave some judgment or other.

19 Paulus (cm the Edict 13) What kind of decision it is that
the arbitrator gives is a question with which the Praetor is not
concerned, so long as his decision is in accordance with his real
opinion. Accordingly if the matter was agreed to be referred,
on the understanding that the arbitrator should pronounce some

280 On arbitratiane [book iv

particular dedsion, this, says the same writer, is no
at all, and according to Julianas (Dig. b. 4) the arbitrator cannot
be compelled to give any decision. 1. An arbitrator is considered
to give a decision when, in making his pronouncement, he intends
that there should be an end of the whole dispute in pursuance
of it. But where he has undertaken to arbitrate on a number of
different points, then, unless he deals conclusively with all the
matters in dispute, no award can be said to be given, and he will
still have to be compelled by the Pre&tor to act 2. This being
the case, a fair question to consider is whether he cannot alter his
decision ; and in fact it has been discussed as an independent
question, supposing an arbitrator first orders something to be
handed over and then forbids it, whether one ought to abide by
his order or by his prohibition. Sabinus was of opinion that he can
alter his decision. Cassius makes a good defence of his master's
opinion, and says that Sabinus was not thinking of a decision which
concludes an arbitration, but of an order made in the course of the
case being got ready for trial ; suppose, for instance, he ordered
the parties to attend on the calends (first day of the montii), and
afterwards told them to come on the ides (thirteenth or fifteenth) ;
then (Cassius said), he has a right to change the day. But if he
had passed judgment cm the defendant or dismissed the plaintiff's
case, then, as he would cease to be arbitrator, he could not alter
his djecision,

20 Oaius (on the provincial Edict 5) as the arbitrator cannot
correct his decision, even though he should have made a mistake in
pronouncing it.

21 Ulpianus {on the Edict 13) Suppose however he was
appointed to decide several matters in dispute which were entirely
independent of one another, and he has given a decision as to one,
but not, so &r, as to any other ; has he ceased to be arbitrator ?
Let us consider whether he cannot alter his award as to the first
question in dispute on which he has already pronounced. Here it
makes a great deal of difference whether it was part of the agree-
ment for reference that he should pronounce as to all the questions
taken together, or it was not : if it was, then he can make an
alteration, as he has not yet given his award ; but if he was equally
at liberty to deal with the various questions separately, you may
say that there are so many different references, so that, as &r as
the particular question is concerned, he has ceased to be arbitrator.
1. If an arbitrator should express his award thus : that it appeared

TIT. vm] On arbitrations 281

to him that Titius did not owe anything to Seius; then, even
though he should not proceed to forbid Seius to sue for the money
he claimed, still if Seius did sue, he must be held to act against the
arbitrator's award : this was laid down by Ofilius and Trebatius.
2. I should say that an arbitrator can appoint a particular day for
payment^ and this seems to be Trebatius's opinion too. 3. Pom-
ponius says that where an arbitrator gives an award in terms which
are not specific, it has no force ; for instance if he were to say : —
" you must pay him what you owe him/' or '^ the division you have
made must be adhered to/' or ''you must accept the same pro-
portion of your demand that you have paid your own creditors.^
4. Again if the arbitrator declares that no penalty is to be sued
for in pursuance of the agreement for reference, I find it is said
by Pomponius (b. 33) that this has no force ; and this is quite
reasonable, as the question of i)enalty was not the subject of tiiie
reference. 5. According to Papinianus {Qitegiiiona b. 3), where the
day for hearing the question referred has passed, but the parties
arrange for a later day and agree upon a fresh reference to the
same arbitrator, but he declines to undertake the arbitration on
the second reference, he cannot be compelled to undertake it,
provided it was not owing to any default of his own that he did
not discharge the duty before : but, if the delay was his own fitult,
it 18 perfectly just that he should be compelled by the Pk*8etor
to undertake the fresh arbitration. This all holds upon the
assumption that no undertaking was given in the first agreement
as to enlarging the time ; if any such was given, and he himself
enlarged the time accordingly, then he remains arbitrator. 6. The
expression ''full reference '' is employed to describe a refiurence
which is expressed to be arranged "in respect of matters and
questions in dispute"; this will comprise all disputed points. But
if only one matter is really in dispute, though the agreement should
have been so made as to bespeak a "fiiU reference," still all rights
of action are saved which depend upon other grounds : the only
real subject of a reference is whatever it was agreed to refer*
However the safer plan is, where a man only desires an arbitration
on one point, to specify that particular point in the agreement
to refer and no other. 7* The parties are not bound to comply
with the award, where the arbitrator orders them to do something
dishonorabla 8. If the parties come before the arbitrator within
the time agreed upon, and he then orders them to come again after
the time, no penalty will be due [from a defaulting i>arty]. 9. If
one of the parties should fail to appear because he is hindered by

282 On arbitrations [book iv

ill-health or by absence on State servioe, or by having to act as
a magistrate, or for any other good reason, then, according to
Proculos and Atilicinus, the penalty becomes payable ; still, if he
is prepared to make a fresh agreement for reference to the same
arbitrator, an action against him will be disallowed, or he can
defend himself by an excepUo. This however is only true wh^re
the arbitrator himself is prepared to undertake the fresh arbitration,
since, as Julianus very properly says {Dig. b. 4), he is not to be com-
pelled to undertake it against his will ; but in any case the party
himself is freed from liability to a penalty. 10. If the arbitrator
orders the parties to come before him, say, in some province, whereas
the submission was made in Rome, it is a question sometimes asked
whether he cannot be disobeyed with impunity. The better opinion
is that expressed by Julianus (b. 4), that the place implied in the
agreement to refer is whatever place the parties intended their
engagements to apply to, consequently the arbitrator may be
disobeyed with impunity if he orders the parties to attend at some
other place. How then if it does not appear what place the parties
did intend ? The best rule would be that the place implied must
be held to be the place where the agreement was made. Suppose
however he should require them to attend in some part of the
suburbs : Pegasus admits that this is valid. My opinion is that
this is only so where the arbitrator is a man whose standing and
repute allow of his dischai^ging his office habitually in out-of-the-way
places, and the parties can easily get to the place. II. But if he
should call upon them to come to some low place such as a tavern
or a brothel, then, as Vivianus says, he can beyond all doubt
be disobeyed with impunity ; and Celsus confirms this opinion
{Dig. b. 3). Thereupon the latter writer raises this nice point:
suppose the place assigned is one in which one of the parties
cannot appear consistently with self-respect, but the other can;
whereupon the one who could come without disgracing himself
fails to come, and the other, whose self-respect is injured by his
coming, does come,— will the penalty agreed upon by the terms
of reference be payable on the ground^ that the act which was
promised was not executed? Here Celsus is very properly of
opinion that the penalty is not incurred ; it would be absurd, he
said, that the order should be good as applied to one of the parties
and not as applied to the other. 12. We may next consider,
supposing a party should decline to hand over what the arbitrator
orders, how long must he be in default for an action on the stipu-

^ Dele an. M.

TFT. ym] On arbitrations 288

lation to be admissible ? As to this, if no day was named, then,
as Celsus says {Dig. h. 2\ some moderate interval of time is implied ;
and, when this has passed, the penalty can be sued for at onoe ;
still, he says, if the party complies with the award before joinder
of issue in the action on the stipulation, that action cannot be
proceeded with ;

22 Paitlus {an the Edict 13) unless indeed the plaintiff in the
action had some particular interest in the money to be awarded
being paid immediately.

23 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 13) Celsus tells us that if an arbi-
trator orders something to be given by the first of September, and
it is not given, then, even if it is offered subsequently, still, the
penalty contracted for having once become due, the right of action
in pursuance of the submission is not lost> since it remains a &ct
that the thing was not handed over before the first of the month :
but, he adds, if the party accepted it when it was tendered, he
cannot sue for the penalty, as he can be barred by an exceptio
dolt. It is a different case where the order simply was to give
[without mention of time]. 1. The same author says that if the
arbitrator orders me to pay something to you, and you are pre-
vented from receiving it by ill-health or on some other sufBcient
ground, then, in the opinion of Proculus, the penalty cannot be
sued for [by you], even if you are ready to receive the money after
the first of the month, and I decline to pay it However, he him-
self holds very rightly that there are two orders made by the
arbitrator, one to pay the money and the other to pay by the first
of the month ; consequently, that even if you do not incur the
penalty by not paying by the first of the month, because it was
not your fault, still you do incur a penalty with respect to the
other part by not paying at all. 2. The same author says that
abiding by an award cannot be anything else than taking measures,
so far as it depends on one*s self, to procure that the award shall
be complied with. 3. Celsus says further that if the arbitrator
orders me to pay you a sum of money on a particular day, and you
on that day decline to receive it, it may fiedrly be argued that as a
bare matter of civil law the penalty is not incurred ;

24 Paulus (/or the Edict 13) but nevertheless, he adds, if,
subsequently to that, you are ready to receive it^ I cannot with
impunity decline to pay it, as up to that time I have not paid.

26 Ulpiakub {on the Edict 13) Labeo says that where it was

284 On arbUrattom [book it

provided in the agreement for reference that the arbitrator should
prononnce his award on all points on the same day, and that he
should be at liberty to enlarge the time, then, if such arbitrator,
after pronouncing an award on some points and not on otheiB,
enlarges the time, the enlargement is valid, and the award he has
pronounced can be disobeyed with impunity. This view of Labeo
is approved of by Pomponius, and I hold the same opinion, as he
has not discharged his duty in respect of the award. 1. These
words '^ [he may] enlarge the time for arbitration '* give the arbi-
trator no power beyond that of postponing the day of decision ;
consequently he cannot reduce or alter the scope of the original
reference, so that he wiU be bound to consider the other points too,
and give one award as to the whole. 2. If in the original agree-
ment for reference the promises were made with a surety, then,
according to Labeo, the deferred hearing must be on the same
terms. However, Pomponius is in doubt whether the sureties
must be the same or may be others equally substantial : what is
to be done, he asks, if the original sureties decline to act again ?
However, I should say, if they decline, others must be found who
are equally smtable ;

26 Paulus {on the Edict 13) so that it shall not be in the
power of sureties who decline to renew their engagement to cause
the penalty to be incurred. A similar rule must be applied if the
sureties die.

27 Ulpianub (on the Edict 13) The arbitrator can enkuige the
time either in his own person, or through a messenger, or by letter.
1. If the agreement to refer made no mention of the heir or other
successor, it drops on the death of either party. The present
practice is not in accordance with Labeo's opinion, who held that
if the arbitrator orders a man to pay a sum of money and the latter
dies without paying it, the penalty may be demanded, even though
his heir is ready to tender the money. 2. The parties are bound
to abide by the award which the arbitrator pronounces on the
question referred to him, whether it is just or unjust ; a person
who agreed to refer the matter has only himself to blame [if he
is not satisfied] ; a rescript of the Divine Pius ends thus : — " the
party must make up his mind to content himself with the award,
even if it is not quite reasonable.'* 3. If there are several arbi-
trators, and they pronounce different awards, the parties are free
to decline to abide by their awards ; but if a mtyority agree, their
decision must be followed, or else the penalty can be demanded

TTT. vm] On arbitrattans 286

Hereupon we find this question raised in Julianns : — suppose there
are three arbitrators and one orders 15 to be paid, the second 10^
and the third 5 ; which award is to be followed ? to which JuUanus
says 5 must be given, as all the arbitrators agreed to the extent
of that sum. 4. If any one of the parties fails to attend, then,
seeing that what he does prevents the arbitration being held, the
penalty can be demanded. On the same principle an award pro-
nounced when the parties are not all present will have no foroe^
unless it was specially provided in the submission that an award
should be given even if one or both parties should be absent ;
and.it is the party who felled to attend who incurs the penalty,
because it is owing to him that no arbitration is held [as intended].
5. An arbitrator is held to pronounce his award in the presence of
persons when those before whom he pronounces it are persons
possessed of intelligence ; but it cannot be said to be pronounced
*^ in the presence of" a lunatic or one who is deranged ; indeed, an
award is not held to be pronounced ** in the presence of" a boy
under age, unless it is done before his guardian ; this is what
Julianus says on the above points (Dig. b. 4). 6. If either party
being present obstructs the arbitrator in pronouncing his award,
the penalty can be sued for. 7. If no penalty was included in the
terms of the submission, but the party simply promised that the
award should be complied with, there will be an action against
him for unliquidated damages.

28 Paulus (on the Edict 13) It is of no consequence whether
the sum agreed on by way of penalty is specific or unliquidated,
for instance, the agreement may be in the terms '' whatever the
matter may be worth."

29 UiiPiAKUS (on the Edict 13) If an action for money is
brought against a person who the arbitrator ordered should not
be sued for it> this is a transgression of tiie arbitrator's award.
How then, if the action is brought against a surety of the same
person, will the penalty be incurred ? I should say that it will,
and so Sabinus says, since the action is virtually against the
principal If on the other hand I agree with the surety to refer
the matter as far as he is concerned, but I sue the principal, the
penalty is not incurred, unless the surety had an interest in my
not suing.

30 Paulus {on the Edict 13) Where, after an agreement to
refer some matter to arbitration, one of the parties sues in the
ordinary court, some authorities hold that the Prsetor will not

286 On arbUrations [book iy

interfere to compel the arbitrator to pronounce an award, because
now there can be no penalty payable in the matter, any more^ than
if the agreement to refer were annulled. Howeyery if this view
should prevail, the result will be that a man who r^^rets that he
made an agreement to submit a matter to arbitration will hare it
in his power to eyade the submission. Accordingly it must be
held that the party in question has incurred the penalty, and an
action to enforce it can be carried through before the judge in the
regular way.

31 Ulpianus (an the Edict 13) When anything is done contrary
to a promise made on stipulation, the promise can only be sued
upon where the breach was conmiitted without there being any
doliL8 mcUvs (malicious contriyance) on the part of the promisee ;
a promise can only be sued upon at all subject to this proviso, that
a man is not to derive a benefit from his own doltis. But if an
agreement to refer contains a special clause providing for the case
of something in the matter being done with dolus^ then the party
who acts with dohis can be sued upon the promise ; accordingly,
where a man uses bribes or solicitation, so as to corrupt the arbi-
trator or the pleader on the other side, or some one of those to
whom he has committed his own case, he can be sued on the clause
which refers to dolus ; also where he circumvents his opponent by
craft ; in short, if he behaves with any dolus in the course of the
proceedings, the action ex stipulatu will be available; conse-
quently, if such opponent desires to proceed by an action de dolOy
it will not be allowed, as be has the action ex stipuUxtu. If however
such a clause as above mentioned is not inserted in the agreement,
there is room for an action or an exceptio founded on dohia. Such
an agreement for reference, that is, one which includes a clause
mentioning dokLS^ is a complete submission.

32 Paulus {on the Edict 13) In the case of a submission to
arbitration no attention iis paid to the question whether the penalty
is greater or less than the amount which the matter at issue is
worth. 1. When the penalty is once incurred the arbitrator will
not be compelled to pronounce an award. 2. If a woman is a party
to a submission on behalf of a third person, this is novalid submis-
sion of a money claim, because it is a case of intervention on behalf
of some one else. 3. On the whole, it comes to this : the Prrotor
is not to interfere where either, to begin with, there was no sub-
mission, or there was one, but it is uncertain as yet whether it is

^ Read ettei for ett

TET. Tm] On arbitrations 287

one in pursuance of which a penalty can be sued for, or the penalty
has ceased to be recoverable, because the contract is avoided by
lapse of time, or by death, or by a formal release, or by a judicial
decree, or by simple agreement 4. As to the question whether,
where some priestly office devolves on an arbitrator, he will be
compelled to pronounce an award, this is a point to consider about
[but probably he will not] ; an excuse on that ground would be
allowed not merely out of regard to the office of the person himself,
but to give glory to God, to whose worship a priest ought to give
himself up. However if he assumed such an office after he was
chosen arbitrator, then even a priest is bound absolutely to give an
award. 5. Again, the arbitrator is not to be compelled to act if
the matter has been compromised, or a slave, who was to be the
subject of the arbitration, is dead ; unless indeed, in this last case,
the parties have some interest in the matter being proceeded with.
6. Julianus lays down the following without further discrimi-
nation ; — ^if, owing to a mistake, parties go to an arbitrator on a
question about some delict which entails infamiay or about some-
thing which the law makes a subject for a criminal trial, as for
instance a question of adultery or murder or the like, the Prsetor
ought to forbid the arbitrator to give a decision, and if he gives
any, the Prsetor ought not to allow it to be put in force. 7. If a
reference is agreed upon in respect of a question at issue at law aB
to a man's freedom, the arbitrator, as is very reasonable, will not
be compelled to give an award ; because the law fistvours liberty,
so that the matter ought to go to a higher tribunal. The rule is
the same where the question is as to whether a person is freebom
or a freedman, also where it is alleged that fi-eedom has to be given
in pursuance of a fidei-<iomwi,9»wni. The same rule applies to an
adUo popularis. 8. If one of the parties to a submission is a slave,
in the opinion of Octavenus, the arbitrator cannot be compelled to
pronounce an award, and, if he does pronounce one, no proceedings
can be allowed for the penalty in the nature of an action de pecuKo.
If the other party to the submission is a free man, it is a question
worth considering whether proceedings for a penalty can be allowed
against him ; but, on the whole, I shoidd say not 9. Again, if a
man is party to a submission in Rome, [then goes away,] and after-
wards comes to Rome as a legate, in this case the arbitrator is not
compellable to give an award, any more than the party himself, if he
had before joined issue in an action, would be compelled in the same
case to prosecute it ; and it makes no difference whether the party
was a legate on the first occasion too or not But if he makes the

288 On arbitrations [book it

sabmiaBion now, being a legate at the time, then I should say that
the arUtrator can be compelled to give an award ; becaose, if the
party had under the same circumstances joined issue in an action
at law, he would be bound to proceed with it Some persons how-
ever are in doubt on this point, though without sufficient reason ;
but at any rate they would be in no doubt at all, if the question
which the party agreed to refer while he was a legate were one
arising upon a contract which he made while a legate ; because on
such a question he would be equally compellable to sustain a trial
at law. With regard to the point first mentioned, one question
worth considering is whether, supposing the legate made the
submission bef<Nre [leaving Rome], the arbitrator can be compelled
to pronounce an award on the legate's own application, as, on tibe
principle first relied on, it might be held unjust to leave it in the
legate's own power [to determine whether the arbitrator shall give
an award or not]. However, this case will be treated in the same
way as would be that of his desiring to proceed by an action at
law, which he is quite free to do. f But tuck cm arhUratian is to be
treated like an action brought m ths regtdar wajfy so that, if he
wishes the arbitrator to pronounce an awards he will only get a
hearing where he is ready to defend his own case-f} 10. If a man
who had agreed with some one now deceased to refer a matter to
arUtration should raise a claim to the inheritance judicially, then,
if the arbitrator gives his award, it wiU prejudge the question of
inheritance, consequently the arbitrator must be prevented firom
proceeding for the present 11. The time agreed on for the arbi-
tration may be enlarged, I do not mean, that is, when this has to
be in pursuance of an agreement, but when it is necessary to get
the arbitrator's order for the purpose, to prevent the penalty being
incurred. 12. If an arbitrator attempts to conceal himself, the
Praetor ought to have a search made for him, and if he keeps away
for a long time, he should be ordered to pay a fine. 13. Where an
agreement is made to refer a question to several arbitrators, on the
understanding that if ^ any one should pronounce an award, even
standing by himself, the parties should abide by it, then, if all
but one should be absent, still that one will be bound to give a
decision ; but if the submission was on the understanding that all
were to pronounce, or fthat the view of the minority was to prevail,!*
tibe PrsBtor ought not to put compulsion on the individual arbi-

^ Apparently some confasion.

< After ut ills. si. Cf. M.

' Text hopeless; the sense must be as aboye.

TIT. vin] On arbUrcUions 289

trators separately, as no individual arbitrator's view will determine
the penalty. 14. In a case where an arbitrator seemed clearly
to be an enemy of one of the parties on independent grounds,
where moi*eover he was called upon, on special evidence produced,
not to pronounce an award, but^ he nevertheless proceeded to
pronounce one, though no one pressed him to do so, whereupon a
complaint was made to the Emperor Antoninus, the note which
the Emperor made on the party's libel was that he could have an
exeeptio of dolus malvs. The same Emperor being consulted by
the judge before whom an action was brought for the penalty, his
answer was that although no appeal could be brought, nevertheless
the action for the penalty could be barred by an exeeptio of dolus
mains. Accordingly that plea gives a remedy which amounts to a
kind of appeal, as a legal means is furnished of having a rehearing
after an arbitrator's award. 15. In discussing the duty of an
arbitrator we must understand that the whole discussion must be
founded on the particular terms of the submission, as the arbitrator
cannot legally do anything but what it was provided by the agree-
ment that he should be able to do ; accordingly he cannot decide
just as he pleases, nor on whatever question he pleases, but only
on the question which it was agreed to refer and in conformity with
the agreement. 16. Questions have been raised as to pronouncing
the award, and it has been held that it is not simply any award
which the arbitrator chooses to pronounce that will be valid, though
on some points there has been a difference of opinion. I should
say that the award is in fact not binding, if the arbitrator should
declare that on such a point the parties must go to the court, or
make a fresh submission, either to him or to some other arbitrator.
In fact Julianus himself declares that he may be disobeyed with
impunity, if he orders the parties to go before another arbitrator,
as otherwise the matter will never end, — ^though if he gives some
such award as follows, that land must be delivered or security must
be given, subject to the approval of Publius Msevius, the award must
be obeyed. The above view is supported by Pedius: [he says
tliat] in order to prevent arbitrations being prolonged or transferred
to other arbitrators, who perhaps are hostile to [one of] the parties,
the arbitrator ought to frame his award so as to put an end to the
dispute ; whereas the dispute is not put an end to where the
question is either postponed or transferred to some other arbitrator.
The award, he adds, is partly on the question in what form security
shall be given and who shall be sureties, and the decision on these

^ After dieeret read et, M.

M. J. 19

200 On arhUrationa [book iy

points cannot be delegated, unless the agreement was to refer to
the arbitrator the very question on whose arbitration security should
be given. 17. Again, if the arbitrator should require that someone
else should be joined with him, where there is no such provision
in the submission, this is no award ; an award can only be on the
question referred, but the above was not referred. 18. If two
principals make mutual i^pulations, and then desire the case to be
carried on before the arbitrators through their procwratoraj the
arbitrator may require the parties themselves to be present as well ;
19. indeed, if the submission expressly names the heir, he can call
upon their heirs to be present too. 20. It is a regular part of the
duty of the arbitrator to say how clear possession is to be given.
Does it comprise the ordering^ an undertaking to be given that the
principal will ratify what is done by his procurator ? Sextus Pedius
holds that it does ; however there is no sense in this view, because,
if the principal should not ratify, he will become liable on the
stipulation. 21. An arbitrator can do nothing outside the terms
of the submission, consequently it is necessary to add expressly
any provision as to enlarging the time ; otherwise his order may
be disobeyed with impunity.

3S Papinianus {Questions 1) An arbitrator who is chosen in
pursuance of a submission on the understanding that he may
enlarge the time is at liberty to do so ; but he may not advance
the hearing if the parties object

34 Paulus (on the Edict 13) If there are two correal creditors
or debtors, and one of them refers a question to arbitration, and
thereupon an award is made ordering that he shall not sue or shall
not be sued, as the case may be, let us consider whether, if the
other sues — or is sued — the penalty is incurred ; the same question
arises in the case of two bankers who are co-creditors {quortmi
namina simtd eunt). The truth is we might perhaps put them on
the footing of sureties, if they are partners ; but, if they are not,
then there is no action against you [by your co-debtor] though I
sue* [him], and, though you should be sued [by my co-creditor],
the action is not on my behalf. 1. If the penalty is once incurred,
then I should say that the true rule is that there is an end of the
submission, and the penalty cannot be incurred any more, unless
the intention was that it should be incurred from time to time on
each separate occasion.

^ After satia read ut detur. Of. M.

* Read licet ego petam for nee ego peto. HaL ct M.

TFT. vm] On arbitrtUions 291

36 Gaius (on the pravmcial Edict 5) If a boy under age agrees
to refer a matter without his guardian's concurrence, the arbitrator
cannot be compelled to pronounce an award, (because, if the award
should be against the boy, he will not be liable to pay the penalty,)
unless the boy gave a surety who can be sued for the penalty.
This is Julianus's opinion too.

36 Ulpianus {on the Edict 77). If an arbitrator should, under
compulsion firom the prsetor, give an award on a holiday {fericUis
didms\ and the penalty should be sued for in pursuance of the
submission, it is clear that no exceptio is admissible, unless, by
some^ statute, the very holiday on which the award was given was
barred.

37 Celsus {Digest 2) Where an arbitrator has ordered that
neither party shall sue the other, then, if the heir of either sues
in spite of the prohibition, he will incur the penalty; the object
of going before an arbitrator is not to postpone a dispute but to
put an end to it altogether.

38 MoDESTiNUS {Rules 6) When a penalty is sued for in
pursuance of a submission, the man who incurs the penalty will
have an order made upon him to pay it, and it is of no consequence
whether the other party had an interest in the award being com-
plied with or not

39 Javolenus {extracts from Casmis 11) It is not every case
of disobedience to the award of an arbitrator which causes the
penalty to become recoverable in pursuance of the agreement
between the parties, but only those cases in which the question
at issue turned on the payment of money or the performance of
some service. The same : — An arbitrator can punish contumacy in
a party to the arbitration by ordering him to pay a sum of money
to his opponent ; but a man is not to be reckoned contumacious
because he did not set out the names of his witnesses to the
satisfaction of the arbitrator. 1. Where an arbitrator orders
the time agreed upon to be enlarged, in a case in which he was
authorized to do so, the default of either party will afford ground
for the penalty being demandable by the other.

40 PoMPOKius {extracts from various passages 11) An arbitrator
ordered the parties to attend on the first day of January, and died
before that day ; when the day came one of the parties failed
to attend. In this case, beyond all doubt, the penalty was not

^ Read altqua for alia, Pothier, c£ M.

19—3

292 On arbitrcUions [bookiv

incurred ; indeed Aristo tells ua he once heard Casdas say that no
penalty was incurred in the case of an arbitrator himself fietiling to
come to hold the arbitration. The above is in keeping with what
is said by Servius, vis. that if it is the &idt of the promisee that he
fails to receive the money promised, the penalty is not incurred.

41 Callistratus {vnonitory Edict 1) As it is provided by the
leoc Julia that no one under twenty is to be compelled to be a
judge, it is held that no one can be allowed to choose one under
that age as judge in an arbitration ; consequently no penalty can
be incurred through an award given by such a person. At the
same time it has often been said that if a man who is over twenty
but under twenty-five should without due reflection undeiiake to
hear an arbitration case, under the circumstances relief would be
given.

42 Papinianxxs (Be^Hmsa 2) An arbitrator ordered that certain
slaves should be handed over by a given day, and, as they were not
so handed over, adjudged the party to pay so much to the Jiscm by
way of penalty, in accordance with the terms of the submission.
By this award no rights are acquired by the /isous, but nevertheless
the penalty promised can be demanded, because the party failed to
do what was ordered by the arbitrator.

43 ScJEVOLA {Responsa 1) A reference to arbitration was agreed
upon of '* all matters and disputes," by Lucius Titius and Msevius
Sempronius. Thereupon, by mistake, Lucius Titius omitted in his
application some particular matters, and nothing was said about
them in the arbitrator's award. The question arose whether a
fresh application could be made as to the matters so omitted. The
answer was that it could, and that no penalty was incurred in
pursuance of the submission ; but that if the party made the
omission with malicious intent, then, though he could no doubt
still apply, he would have to submit to the penalty.

44 The same {Digest 2) A dispute arose on a question of
boundaries between Castellianus and Seius, and an arbitrator was
chosen in order that the question might be set at rest by his
decision ; who accordingly gave his award in the presence of the
parties and laid down the boundaries. The question was asked
whether, on failure to observe the award on the side of Castellianus,
the penalty was incurred in pursuance of the submission. I
answered that if the arbitrator was not obeyed in respect of an
award which he made in the presence of both parties, the penalty
was incurred.

TIT. vm] On arbUratians 298

45 UiiPlANUS (an Sabimu 28) In arbitration cases, where part
of the agreement is that the decision shall be made by a particular
person, the right of decision is confined to that person.

46 Paulus (on Sabirms 12) An arbitrator can decide as to
matters, accounts, and disputes which were pending between the
parties to the arbitration at the time, not such as occurred after
the reference.

47 JULIANUS {Digest 4) If an agreement to refer is made in
such terms that the arbitrator is to pronounce his award in the
presence of both parties or of their respective heirs, and one of the
litigating parties dies leaving for heir a boy under age, no award
given is held to be valid, unless the guardian has given his con-
currence. 1. Similarly, if one of the parties to the agreement
becomes insane,

48 MoDESTlNUS (Rules 4) the arbitrator will not be compelled
to give an award :

49 JuiiiANUS (Digest 4) indeed, he may be ordered not to give
one, as it is held that there is no such thing as an act done in the
'^ presence " of a lunatic. If however the lunatic has a curator or
comes to have one while the case is still pending, the award can be
pronounced in the presence of the cwrcUor. 1. An arbitrator can
summon the parties to attend either by a messenger or by letter.
2. If mention is made of the heir in connexion with one of the
parties only, the arbitration will be annulled by the death of either
of the parties, just as it would be if there had been no reference
to the heir of either.

60 Alfenus (Digest 7) An arbitrator who was had in pursuance
of a submission, not being able to give his award by the day which
was laid down in the reference, ordered the time to be enlarged ;
but one of the contending parties refused to observe the order;
whereupon an opinion was sought on the question whether he
could be sued for the penal sum in pursuance of the submission.
I answered that he could not, because the arbitrator had not been
authorized to make such an order.

61 Marianus (Rules 2) If a man is appointed arbitrator in his
own affair, he cannot pronounce an award, as he would be ordering
himself to do something or forbidding himself to bring some action,
and nobody can issue a command or a prohibition to himself.

62 Thb same (Rules 4) If a man who is ordered by an arbi-
trator in pursuance of asabmission to pay a sum of money should

294 On arbitrations [book it

make default in doing so, he is boand to pay the penalty in
aocordance with the agreement, but, if he afterwards pays the
money, he is discharged from the penalty.

IX.
Seamek, ikkkeepebs, stablekeepebs, to restobe what thet

BEOEIYE.

Ulpianus (on the Edict 14) The prjetor says:— "Where
seamen, innkeepers, or stablekeepers have received the property
of anyone on the terms of safe custody, then, unless they restore
it, I will allow an action against them." 1. This Edict is highly
beneficial, as it is very often necessary to rely on the engagements
of the persons mentioned and to commit things to their custody.
And no one need think that the above Edict bears hardly on
them, as it is open to them, if they like, to refuse to receive
anyone, and, unless this rule were laid down, they would have
it in their power to conspire with thieves against the persons
they took in ; in fact, even as it is, they are not always innocent of
dishonest machinations of this kind. 2. Let us consider then,
first of all, who the persons are that are held liable. The praetor
uses the word " seamen '* (nautce). By seaman we must understand
a person who has the management of the ship, though, as a matter
of &ct, anybody is called a seaman who is on board the ship to
aid in the navigation ; however, the praetor is only thinking of the
exercitor (owner or charterer). It is clear, Pomponius says, that
the exercitor ought not to be bound by the act of some oarsman
or man before the mast, but only by his own act or that of the
master ; though, no doubt, if he himself told anyone to commit
something to the care of one of the sailors, he must himself be
liable. 3. There are particular officers on board vessels who
exercise authority in the ship mth. a view to the proper custody
of goods, such as the nauphylax (ship's guard) and the dicetarius
(steward) ; so if one of these receives anything, I should say there
ought to be an action allowed against the exercitor ^ because a man
who gives the above officers the conduct of any such department
as described authorizes things being committed to their charge,
though it is the owner {naviculariuB) or the master who does what
is called the cheirembolon (taking charge). Even if he does not do

TFT. ix] SeameUy innkeepers etc. 295

this, gtill the owner will be liable for what is received. 4. As for
those who ply rafts, or wherrymen, there is no provision in the
Edict about them, but, according to Labeo, there ought to be
the same rule, and such is the present practice. 5. Under the
description of innkeepers and stablekeepers are to be understood
not only those who carry on those respective businesses, but their
agents as well But those who discharge the duties of a common
drudge are not included ; for instance, doorkeepers, kitchenboys
and the like. 6. The prsetor says, " where they have received any
one's property on the terms of safe custody"; this means where
they receive any object or ware. Hence it is stated in Vivianus
that the Edict deals equally with things which are over and above
the actual cai^go, such as clothes which passengers wear on board
ship, and such things in general as people require for everyday use.
7. Pomponius says (b. 34) that it is a matter of small account
whether the goods which people bring in are their own or those
of other persons, so long as those who bring them have an interest
in their being preserved, as the articles in question will have to be
given up to such people rather than to their owners. Accordingly
if goods were held by me as security for money lent on a sea-risk
{pecu/nia navUca\ the '^ seaman " will be responsible to me and
not to the debtor, if he received the goods from me'. 8. Does the
party receive goods on terms of safe custody only where, besides
being put on board, they are expressly entrusted to him ; or, if
they are not so entrusted, is he still held to receive on the above
terms by the bare fact that they are put on board ? I hold that he
undertakes the custody in all cases where anything is put on board,
and that he is bound to answer for the acts not only of seamen but
even of passengers ;

2 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 5) just as an innkeeper is
bound to answer for the acts of travellers ;

8 Ulpianus ipn the Edict 14) and with regard to the acts of
passengers, the same thing is set down by Pomponius too (b. 34).
According to this writer, even if the goods have not yet been taken
on board, but have been lost on land, still, if they are goods which
the exerdtor has once engs^ed to carry, the loss falls on him.
1. The pr»tor says, " Unless they restore it, I will allow an action
against them.'' The action founded on this Edict is in factum.
However we may fairly ask whether this action is necessary, as the
case is one which would a£ford ground for a civil action ; namely,

^ For ante read a me. HaL d M.

296 Seamen^ innkeepers etc. [book ty

if there was a pecuniary oonBideration giTen^ the action ex loecUo
or ex coTidacU} ; that is to say, if the whole ship was hired out, the
party who chartered her can bring an action ex conducto even for
the goods that are missing, but, if the '* seaman " engaged to carry
the goods, he can be sued ex loeato ; lastly, if the goods were taken
on board for nothing, then, says Pomponius, there is a good action
on depositwni. This writer, therefore, is surprised at there being
an honorary action introduced, as there are civil actions available ;
unless indeed, be says, the object was to let it become known that
the praetor took express care to check the dishonesty of persons
such as those mentioned ; and also because in cases of heatio and
conductio a man answers for negligence, in dqposUum for dohu
only, but under this Edict the party who took in the goods is
bound absolutely, even where the goods are lost or mischief happens
through no fault of his, unless what ensues is a case of unavoidable
mischief. Accordingly Labeo says that if anything is lost through
shipwreck or through an attack by pirates, the exercitar may
reasonably be allowed an exceptio. The same must be said where
a case of vis nuyor happens in a stable or an inn. 2. Innkeepers
and stablekeepers are liable, so fieur as it is in the exercise of their
calling that they take the goods in ; but if they do so in some way
which is not connected with their business they are not liable.
3. If 9i JUiusfamUiohs or a slave takes in the goods, and the consent
of the father or^ owner is given, the latter may be sued on the
whole liability. Again, if a slave of the exereitor stole the property
or did damage, there will be no noxal action, because, the goods
having been taken in, the owner [of the slave] can thereupon be
sued in a direct action. If however the above-mentioned persons
act without the consent [of the father or owner], there will be an
action de peeulio. 4. This action, Pomponius says, is to indemnify
the plaintiff (rei perseciUiohem contin>et), and consequently it will
be allowed against the heir and without limitation of time. 5. We
may lastly ask whether proceedings by way of an honorary action
for goods received and by way of action for theft can be taken in
respect of the same thing. As to this, Pomponius is in doubt ; but
I should say on the whole that the party ought to be confined to
one or other of the two, either on motion or by an exceptio doH

4 Paulus (on the Edict 13) On the other hand the seaman
himself at whose risk the goods are has a good action for theft,
unless either he stole them himself, and after that they were stolen

> After patrti ios. auL M.

TFT. ix] Seamen, innkeq^ers etc. 207

from him, or someone else stole them, but the seaman is not in a
solvent condition. 1. If a seaman receives [the goods] of a seaman,
a stablekeeper those of a stablekeeper, or an innkeeper those of an
innkeeper, he will still be liable. 2. Vivianus declared that the Edict
applies as much to such things as are brought in after the cargo is
placed on board and the contract to carry it is made, though no
freight should be payable for them, such as articles of clothing, or
food to be consumed on board, as these things are comprised as
accessories in the general contract

S Gaius {on the provincial Edict 5) Seamen, innkeepers, and
stablekeepers receive pay not for taking care of the goods, but, in
the case of the seaman, for conveying passengers to their destination,
in that of the innkeeper, for letting travellers stay in the inn, and
in that of the stablekeeper, for allowing horses to be put in his
stables ; still they are respousible for custody. Fullers and cobblers
do not receive pay for custody, but for their handiwork, nevertheless
they are liable to an action ex locato for the custody. 1. What
has been said about theft must be understood to apply equally
to damage ; as there can be no doubt that a man who receives
property on terms of safe custody must be held to engage to protect
it not only from theft but from damage.

6 Paulus {(m the Edict 32) Though you should be

in a ship or make use of an inn without charge, still an action
in factum on your part will not be disallowed if your property is
unlawfully damaged. 1. If you make use of my slave in your ship
or inn, and he damages my property or commits a theft thereof,
then, although it is true that [generally] actions for theft and
damnum injuria [on my slave's part] would have to be brought
against me, still, in this case, the action, being in factum, is avail*
able against you, even in respect of my own slave's behaviour.
The rule is the same if he belongs to both of us in common ; but
whatever you pay me on account of the slave's act^ whether your
liability was established in an action eommuni dimdundo, or pro
socio, or in an action founded on the fact that you hired a share in
the slave, or hired the whole man, you will have a good demand on
me on the contract of hiring too. 2. But if I am damnified by
some iiyury done to the slave himself by a third person who is on
board the same vessel or in the same inn, and whose acts the
prsetor is in the practice of taking into account, Pomponius is of
opinion that this action will not be arailable on die slave's
account 3. An innkeeper is liable to the action in factum

208 Seamen^ innkeepers etc. [book iv

on the ground of the behaviour of persons who are in the inn
as lodgers, but this does not apply to one who is admitted by
way of casual entertainment, such as a traveller. 4. A man may
very well have recourse to an action for theft or unlawful mischief
against seamen themselves, if, that is, he can prove the ill-behaviour
of any particular person ; but he is bound to confine himself to
one action ; and if he proceeds a^inst the exerdtor, he ought to
assign to him his right of action [against the actual delinquent],
though indeed the exercitar would have a right to sue such
delinquent in an action ex canducto. If however the exercUor is
dismissed from the action, and then the party proceeds against the
seaman, the latter will be allowed an exceptio, so as to avoid
repeated trials being had on the ground of the behaviour of the
same man: and, conversely, if proceedings are taken and carried
through founded on the behaviour of one particular man, and then
the action in factum is brought [against the exercitar], an exceptio
is allowed.

UiiPiAKUS (on the Edict 18) The exercUor is bound to
answer for the behaviour of all his seamen, whether they are slaves
or free ; and it is quite reasonable that he should be answerable
for their behaviour, as he himself employed them at his own risk.
But he is only answerable where the damage is committed on
board the ship ; if it happens off the ship, even by the act of the
seamen, he is not responsible. Moreover if he gives notice before-
hand that all the passengers are to look after their own goods,
and that he will not be answerable for damage or loss, and the
passengers agree to the terms of this notice, then he cannot be
sued. 1. The action in ftuctnm referred to is for double damages.
2. If the seamen should do any damage to one another^s property,
this does not concern the exercitor. But where a man is both
seaman and merchant he will have a good claim ; and where the
loss falls on one of those called ncmtepibatce (persons who work out
their passage), the exercitor is liable to him too ; but he is also
bound to answer for the acts of such persons, since they are seamen
as well [as passengers]. 3. If the mischief is done by the slave of
a seaman, though such slave is not a seaman himself, it will be
perfectly just to allow an utilis cbctio against the exercitor, 4. In
this action the exercitor is liable directly, that is, in respect of his
own fault for employing such men ; consequently even if the men
themselves should die, this will not release him. Where however
the action is founded on acts of the exercitor*8 own slaves, it can

TIT. ix] Seamen, innkeepers etc. 299

only be a noxai action, to bind the exerdJtor ; no doubt, where he
employs slaves belonging to someone else, he is bound to make full
inquiry as to how fiur they can be trusted, and are men of good
character ; but in respect of his own slaves he may ftirly be
excused, whatever kind of slaves it is that he got to equip his
vessel. 5. If there are several exereitors to the same ship, each
may be sued in respect of his own share in the business of exercUor.
6. The actions under discussion are pnetorian, nevertheless the
right to sue is subject to no limitation in respect of time ; on the
other hand they are not allowed against the heir. We may add
that if a slave was exemtor, and he is dead, no action de pectdio
will be allowed against his owner, even within the year ; but where
a slave or a son has the control of a ship or an inn or a stable,
with the consent of the owner or father, there, I should say, the
latter himself will have to defend the action for the whole damage,
on the implied assumption that he undertook the full responsibility
for all contingencies.

FIFTH BOOK.

I.

On TBIAL8 AT LAW : AS TO WHBBE A MAN OUGHT TO TAKE

PBOGBEDINGS OB BE SUED.

1 Ulpianus {an the Edict 2) If persons submit their case to
some particular tribunal, upon agreement so to do, thereupon, as
between the parties so agreeing, jurisdiction belongs to any judge
who presides in the court, or has other authority therein.

2 The same {on the Edict 3) Parties are held to agree who
know that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the judge in
question, but do in &ct agree to resort to his court ; but if they
merely suppose that the jurisdiction belongs to that judge, it will
not on that account belong to him ; where the litigating parties
make a mistake, as Julianus himself says {Dig. 1), there is no
agreement Or, if they took for praetor one who was not prsetor,
then again the agreement so made in error confers no jurisdiction.
Again, if one of the parties refuses to concur, but is compelled
thereto by the praetor by the force at his command, no jurisdiction is
conferred. 1. In respect of agreements, is an arrangement between
priyate persons enough, or is the consent of the praetor himself
required as well ? The words of the lex Jvlia on trials-at-law are
^' so as to prevent private persons agreeing " ; so that an agreement
between private persons is enough. If then the private persons
agree, but the praetor is not aware of their agreement, and thinks
the jurifldictioii is hiB own, we may fiurly consider whether the
conditions required by the statute are not fulfilled ; and I should
say that it may be very well maintained that the jurisdiction
belongs to the person agreed upon. 2. If a man is nominated as
judge, and is to hold the office for a given time, and all the litigating
parties agree to an enlargement of the time within which he is to

TFT. i] On trials at law 801

be bound to decide the case, the enlargement may take eflfect,
unless this is expressly barred by Imperial order. 3. Legates are
allowed the right of having the case transferred to the court of
their domicile, where the question turns upon any contract which
they made before they became legates, and a similar right is given
to persons who have been required to attend to give evidence or
have been sent for or ordered to go to a province to act as judges.
The &ct^ that a man has appealed against a judgment does not
put him under the necessity of defending proceedings taken by
other persons during the time occupied by the prosecution of his
appeal at Rome or in any other place at which it is being carried
on ; Celsus says that under these circumstances a man may in fiust
ask to have the case transferred to his own domicile^ because
he only came to Rome on other business. This opinion is held by
Celsus and it is perfectly sound ; the Divine Hus himself laid down,
in a rescript addressed to Plotius Celsianus, that a man whom he
had dted to appear at Rome to give an account of a guardianship
ought not to be compelled to appear in respect of a different
guardianship in connexion with which he had not been dted. The
same Emperor, in a rescript to Claudius Flavianus, laid down that
a youth under twenty-five who had asked for a restitution in
integrum against one Asinianus, who had come to Rome on some
other business, had no right to have his application heard at Rome.
4. All the above-mentioned persons have the cause transferred to
their own home on the supposition that they did not enter into the
contract in the place where they are sued ; but if they did enter
into the contract there, they have no right to have the cause
transferred ; except legates, who are not compelled to defend their
case in Rome as long as they i-emain there in the character of
legates, even if it was there that they made the contract, provided
they made it before the time of their discharging the office of
legate. This we are told by Julianus, and a rescript of the Divine
Pius lays down the same rule. No doubt if they continue to reside
at Rome after the duties attached to the character of legate are
discharged, then, according to a rescript of the Divine Pius, they
can be sued there. 5. If they made the contract outside their
own province, but not in Italy, it is a matter of question whether
they can be sued in Rome. Marcellus says they can only use the
privilege of having a matter transferred to their domicile when it
depends on a contract made by them in their own city, or at any

^ For quoqiAe qui read quod quiB, 0£ M.
' For domui perhaps read domum.

302 On trials at law [book y

rate within their own province, and this is true. However^ on the
other hand, if they bring an action themselves, they must defend
any action brought against them ; but I do not mean to say that
this is so where they simply sue on some irytMria or theft or damage
which they suffered where they are ; or else, as Julianus nicely
observes, either they will have to bear insults and loss without
getting redress, or else it will be in anybody's power, by attacking
them, to make them subject to [Roman] jurisdiction tiie moment
they seek redress. 6. If there is any doubt whether a man is
or is not in such a position that he can have a matter transferred
to his home tribunal, it is for the praetor to determine the
question, on inquiry into the case ; and if it should be clear that
he can under the circumstances have it so transferred, the party
will be bound to undertake to appear at the trial, the prsator
laying down to what day his engagement shall refer. As to
whether he is simply to enter into an undertaking or find security,
Marcellus is in doubt ; my own opinion is that he need only give a
formal promise, and Mela says the same thing ; and, were it other-
wise, the case would be not so much that he had to find persons to
be security for him as that he was compelled to meet the action
where he was. 7* But in all cases in which the time for appearance
is extended, it ought to be done so as not to allow lapse of time
to occasion loss to creditors. 8. The right of inflicting a fine is
allowed to such as exercise judicial functions by governmental
appointment, and to no others ; save in pursuance of express
authorization.

The same {an the Edict 4) A man cannot be held to be
keeping out of the way to avoid an action, if, even when present, he
is not compellable to meet the action.

Oaius (on the promncial Edict 1) A man cannot have any
action-at-law against a person whom he has in his own potestas^
save in respect of castrense pecvlvwm.

Ulpiakits (on the Edict 5) Where a man is cited out of the
jurisdiction of some other magistrate to appear in the prffitor's
court, he is bound to attend, so both Pomponius and Vindius
inform us ; because it is for the praator to form a judgment as
to whether he has jurisdiction in the case, and not for the party
cited to treat the authority of the praetor with contempt: as
even legates and all those generally who have a right to have
a case removed to their domicile are in this position that, if

^ Dele et. M.

TIT. i] On trials at law 808

they are cited, they must appear, and then they can assert their
privilega

6 The same (on the Edict 6) A blind man is competent to
discharge the office of judge.

7 The same {on the Edict 7) If a man, after he has once been
cited, becomes a soldier, or comes to have a different forum, he will
not have a right to have the case removed to his forum, as the
plaintiff, you may say, is beforehand with him.

8 Oaius {on the provincial Edict 2) If a man in the course of
a legation makes a constitutum of money which he owed before he
was legate, he cannot be compelled to meet an action in the place
where he made the constitutfwnu

9 Ulpianus {on the Edict 9) The Italian islands are a part of
Italy, and [the islands in the vicinity] of any province [are a part
of that province].

10 The same {on the Edict 10) A man is held to ''desist" not
where he postpones a trial at law, but where he abandons it
altogether ; to desist is to give up with a vexatious object pro-
ceedings which a man had set on foot There is no doubt that if a
man, on ascertaining the real facts of the case, relinquishes some
proceeding because he is unwilling to persevere in an ui\just
contest, not having begun it originally with a vexatious object^
he is not held to desist .

11 The same {on the Edict 12) If I arrogate a man after he
has joined issue with me in an action which he brought against me
or I brought against him, then, according to what Marcellus tells
us {Dig. 3), the action is at an end, because there could have been
no action between us at the outset [if we had been in our present
position].

12 Paulus {on the Edict 17) Where the prsetor forbids one out
of a number to act as judge, he may be held to authorize the
others. 1. Those officers can appoint a judge to whom the power
of doing so is given by a statute or an Imperial enactment or a
decree of the senate. By a statute, for instance, this power may
be given to a proconsul. Moreover one to whom jurisdiction is
delegated can appoint a judge ; in this position are proconsular
legates. We may add those to whom the right has been allowed
by custom, because of their general power of command {imperivmjy
for instance the prcpjectus wbi and the other magistrates at Rome.

804 On trials at law [book v

2. Officers who have the power of appointing a judge are not at
liberty to give any judge they please ; some kinds of persons are
incapacitated from being judges by statute, some by nature, some
by custom. By nature deaf and dumb persons are incapable, also
incurable lunatics and boys under age, as they are devoid of
judgment By statute a man is incapacitated who has been re-
moved from the senate. By custom, women and slaves, not because
they are wanting in judgment, but because it is an established rule
that they are not to discharge civil offices. 3. As to those who are
legally capable of holding the office of judge, it is immaterial
whether they are under po^e^teu or sui juris.

13 Qaius {on the provincial Edict 7) In the three actions called
famUice erciacundce, commwni dividundo, and finium regundorum
it is a question who is to be regarded as plaintiff, seeing tliat [in
each of these cases] all parties appear to be in the like position.
However it is held on the whole that the party to be regarded
as plaintiff is the one who brought the matter before the court ;

14 Ulpiakus {Disputations 2) but where both parties bring
the matter before the court, the practice is to determine the
question by lot.

16 The same {on the Edict 21) If a JUiurfarmliaSy being a
judge, should ''make the case his own," he is liable to pay an
amount equal to the value of what there was in his peculium at
the time of his pronouncing judgment 1. A judge is said to
'' make the case his own " when he maliciously pronounces judg-
ment in fraud of a statute ; and he is held to pronounce maliciously
when plain proof is given of &vour or spite or, it may be, some
corrupt motive on his i>art. The result is that he is compelled
to hand over the true vsJue of the matter at stake.

16 The same {on the Edict 5) Julianus holds that where a
judge has made the case his own, there will be a good right of
action against his heir ; but this opinion is not correct, and many
have criticised it

17 The same {on the Edict 22) Julianus says that if one of the
parties makes the judge heir either to the whole or a part of his
estate, some other judge must needs be had, because it is unjust
that a man should be made the judge of his own case.

18 The same {on the Edict 23) If a considerable interval of
time will have to pass before the judge appointed can attend to the

TTT. i] On trials at law 805

matter, the Pnetor orders another appointment; this occufb, for
instance, where he is engrossed by something or other which does
not allow him to bestow his attention on the trial, — ^he may have
an attack of illness or be obliged to go on a journey, or his private
property may be exposed to dangers. 1. If Sk^iusfamiUae wishes
to take proceedings on the ground of some injuiy as to which his
&ther has a good right of action, he is only aUowed to bring an
action where there is no one to bring it on behalf of the &ther.
Julianus himself holds that if a JiUtM/amUias is away from home
on a legation or with a view to study, and some act of theft or
wrongful damage to property is committed against him, he can
proceed by way of ttHU$ aetioy as, if he waited for his father to
sue, the wrongs done might go unpunished, because either the
&ther never meant to come to the place at all, or els^ before he
arrived, the party who committed the offence took himself off
Accordingly, the rule which I have always approved of is that
where the matter does not depend on delict but on contract, then,
if the father happens to be somewhere in the provinces and the
son himself is staying at Rome, either for the sake of study or for
some other good reason, the son ought to proceed by way of utUie
actio ; let us suppose that he seeks to recover a deposit or sues on
manddtum or for money which he lent ; — and the reason for this
is that, if he is not allowed the action, the result may be that he
will be victimized with impunity and be living at Rome in a state
of destitution because he does not get the allowance which his
fitther intended him to have for his expenses. Suppose the ^ius-
familiaa is a senator and his fother is in the provinces ; would not
the &ct of his rank enhance the equity of the case ?

19 The same {on the Edict 60) An action against an heir who
is away from home ought to be defended at the place at which the
deceased was liable, and the heir can be sued there if he can be
found on the spot, and is not protected by any special ground of
exemption personal to himself. 1. If a man has been carrying on
a guardianship or a curatorship or has been engaged in business,
or banking, or anything which has made him incur some
obligation, in any particular place, he must be ready to defend
actions in the same place, though he had no home there, and if he
will not defend actions, and has no home there, he must submit to
possession being taken of his property. 2. Similarly, if he sold
goods in any particular place, or dealt with them in any way, or
bought goods, it is held that he must^ sustain actions at the same

^ After d^endere ina. debere. Ot M.
M. J. 20

806 On trials at law [book ▼

place^ unless it was agreed that he should do so somewhere else.
Is the rule^ then this, that a man who has bought from a merchant
who IS a stranger, or sold to some one whom he knew to be on the
point of leaving the place, has no right to an order for possession^
of the other party's goods on the spot [if the occasion arises], but
must go to the party's place of abode, while if a man [buys] from
one who has a shop or a place of business which he hired in some
particular locality, then the [latter's] position is such that he ought
to be sued there^? This is on the whole the most reasonable rule;
in &ct, where a dealer comes to a place with the intention of
speedily leaving it, you can only buy^ from such a person as if he
were a mere traveller, some one, that is, who is on his way by land
or sea to some other destination, and^ it would be a very oppressive
rule that whatever place a man came to in the course of a voyage
or a land-journey he should [be compellable to] defend an action
at every spot. But if he stops anywhere, — I do not say as though
the place were his legal home, but because he has hired some
small shop or stall or warehouse or box or office at the place, and
sells goods there or carries on business, — then he will be bound to
defend actions at the respective places. 3. Labeo mentions the
following point : — ^Where a provincial trader has a slave stationed
at Rome as a fector to sell goods^ any contract made with the slave
is to be treated as if it were made with his owner ; accordingly
the trader must defend actions at Rome. 4. One point which we
must bear in mind is this : where a man's obligation is such that
he is bound to pay in Italy, then, if he has his domicile in a pro-
vince, he can be sued both here and there alike ; this is held by
Julianus and by many others.

20 Paitlus {on the Edict 68) The correct view is that every
kind of obligation is to be treated like [one founded on] contract,
so that, wherever a man incurs an obligation, it is to be held that
a contract was made there, though it should not be a case of a
debt founded on a loan.

21 UiiPiANTJS {on the Edict 70) If I desire to exhibit my
demand to my debtor \edere actionem] a good rule is that if he
admits that he owes the money and declares that he is prepared to

^ Feriiape read igitur for dicimtu. Gf. M.
' Read poaidere for posiiderL Of. M.

* Sense clear, exact words lost I hare put the mark of interrogation after
conveniatur instead of after iequi ^u$,
^ For empHs read emu. Of. M.
A For 0mit read ei. Ot M.

I

TTT, i] On trials at law 807

pay it, the statement must be accepted, and he must be ordered to
pay the money by a given day, giving the proper undertaking in
the meantime : there is no great mischief in delay being made for
a short while. The expression ''a short while" must be understood
to apply to so much time as has been allowed defendants for pay-
ment after an order is made upon them.

22 Paulus {on Plavtius 3) Where a man is not compellable
to sustain an action at some particular place, then, if he brings an
action there himself, he can be compelled to defend actions too,
and to appear before the same judge.

23 Thb same {on PUmtius 7) A matter which arises after
joinder of issue cannot be held to be before the Court ; so that a
fresh application will have to be made.

24 The same {on PlavZivs 17) No right of action exists at
Rome against persons who are summoned to the city by the
Emperor, except where they enter into a contract during their
stay. 1. Legates are compellable to submit to actions in Rome in
respect of delicts committed during the time of their legation,
whether such delicts are committed by themselves or by their
slaves. 2. But if an action in rem is applied for against a legate,
ought it to be allowed, this action being founded on the fact of
present possession ? Cassius laid down that the proper rule is that
if the action might result in the legate being deprived of his whole
suite of attendant slaves, it ought not to be allowed, but if it
relates to one slave out of a large number, it is not to be refused.
Julianus says, without distinction, that no action can be allowed ;
which is quite right, as the object of disallowing the action is to
prevent the legate from being called away from the duties of the
post which he has undertaken.

25 Julianus {Digest 1) If a man while serving on a legation
should purchase — or in any way whatever come to possess — a
slave or any other piece of property, he is compellable, and that
very justly, to submit to an action in respect of such property [on
the spot] ; otherwise it will be put in the power of a legate, in
virtue of his office, to carry off other people's goods to his own
place of abode.

26 Paulus {on Plautms 17) In the case of a legate entering
on an inheritance, we are told by Cassius that even where he enters
on it at Rome, there is no right of action against him ; because it
might embarrass him in the discharge of the duties of his legation ;

20—2

808 On trials at law [book t

and this is quite sound He cannot even be sued by a legatee ; at
the same time, a legatee can get an order for possession of the
property, unless the legate gives security; and the same rule
applies to creditors on the estate.

27 JuLiANUS (Digest 1) What indeed is there to prevent the
legate continuing to discharge his official duties and there being
some agent in the meantime in possession of the estate in order to
take care of it ?

28 Paulus (on PlatUius 17) Again, if an inheritance is handed
over to him under the Trebellian statute, no action against him
will be allowed, whether the heir entered on the inheritance of his
own free will or under compulsion ; the most convenient course
will be, no doubt, that the inheritance should be handed over to
the legate ; still matters ought to be put on the same footing as if
he had entered on the inheritance himself. 1. Where, to take the
converse case, the legate himself, during his legation, enters on an
inheritance and hands it over, an action will be allowed against the
fideicommissary ; and no exceptio under the Trebellian statute is
admissible founded on the position of the legate, as what has just
been mentioned is a direct relief to the legate himself. 2. But in
those cases in which a legate is not compellable to sustain an
action, he is equally little compellable to swear that he is not
liable to pay, as the oath takes the place of joinder of issue.
3. A legate is bound to give the regular engagement as to damnum
infectum in respect of a house, or else submit to the neighbour
taking possession. 4 If the time for bringing an action against
the legate is on the point of expiring, the Prsetor is bound, on due
cause shown, to allow the action to be brought^ so that issue may
be joined, and the case may be removed into the provincial Court
5. If a paterfa/imlias dies leaving one son, and his widow is preg-
nant, the son cannot legaUy demand from the debtors half the
money lent [by the deceased, nor will such a demand be legalized]
though eventually one son should be bom, because where in the
nature of things we might count upon one child being bom, the
number might be greater \ However, Sabinus and Cassius hold
that what he ought to have asked for is a quarter, because it was
not certain that there would not be three bom, and we need not
consider the nature of things, according to which nothing is unde-
terminedy seeing that whatever is going to take place does come to
pass in any case ; what has to be considered is our own ignorance.

^ Wording apparently hopeless : c£ M.

TIT. i] On triah at law 809

29 The sams (on Pla/iUius 8) The party who first applies is
Plaintifi:

80 Maboellus (Digest 1) Wherever the trial is once accepted,
there too it ought to be carried through to its termination.

81 Celsus (Digest 27) If a plaintiff dies leaving several heirs,
and one of them carries on the proceedings, it will not be true to
say that the whole matter involved in the trial up to that point is
before the Court ; as no one can bring before the Court a suit
instituted by another, unless he has the consent of his coheirs.

82 Ulpianus (an the office of Consul 1) Where a judge has a
certain period of time laid down^ within which he is to give judg-
ment, but he dies, and another judge is appointed in his place, we
must understand that the same period is laid down afresh with
reference to the new judge ; although the magistrate in appointing
him should not state this expressly ; provided always that this
does not go beyond the statutable period.

38 MoDESTiNUS (Rides 3) A man is not held to have agreed to
a particular judge because he calls upon the plaintiff to state the
nature of his action in that judge's court

84 Jayolenus (extracts from Cassivs 15) If a man dies after

joining issue as defendant at Rome, his heir, even though his
domicile should be beyond the sea, must still defend the case at
Rome, because he steps into the place of the person by whom he
was appointed heir.

36 The same (Epistles 10) It is not the case that whereas the
obligation of a surety can be left contingent or even expressly con-
tracted in such terms as to refer to a future day, so too an action
can be left contingent, or relate to something as to which an
obligation may arise subsequently. I suppose nobody will deny
that a surety can be given before the principal debt is contracted,
but that there can be no issue joined before there is a debt in
existence.

36 Callistratus (Inquiries 1) In some cases, where there is
sufficient cause, and particular kinds of parties are concerned, the
hearing may be ordered to be postponed; for example, where
documents bearing on a case are alleged to be in the hands of
persons who will have to be absent in the service of the State.
This was laid down by the Divine brothers in the following terms :
^'Humanity requires that a postponement should be allowed on

^ For prasiHta read prwitituUL QL M.

810 On trials at law [book y

the ground of accidental misfortunes, for example, where a father
who is party to- an action has lost his son or daughter, or a wife
her husband, or a son his parent, and that in other cases of the
same kind the inquiry should be postponed, within certain limits V
1. Where a senator volunteers to manage some other person's
afiairs in a province, he has no right to decline to sustain an action
on negotia gesta ; Julianus expressed the opinion that he is obliged
to defend the action, because he contracted the obligation of his
own accord.

37 The same {Inquiries 6) If an inquiry is made as to alleged
violence and as to the fact of possession ; the question of violence
should be taken before the question of ownership, according to a
rescript of the Divine Hadrian addressed to the Thessalian com-
munity in the Greek language.

38 LiciNNius RuFiNUS {Rules 4) A thing given by way of
legacy, if it is sued for by an action in personam, ought to be
handed over where it is, unless it was removed with malice on the
part of the heir ; and in that case it ought to be handed over where
it is sued for. It must be added that a legacy defined by weight
tale or measure ought to be handed over where it is sued for,
unless the bequest contained some such additional words as ^'a
hundred bushels out of such a warehouse " or ^^ so many amphorcB
of wine out of such a vat." But if the legacy is sued for by an
action in rem, the action, we may add, must be brought where the
thing is ; and if the thing is moveable, an action ad exhibendum
may be brought against the heir to make him produce it ; because
then the legatee can bring a vindicatio to recover it

39 Papinianus {Questions 3) If the man appointed judge is a
lunatic, there is nothing that need prevent there being a valid trial
in the fact that he is unable to act as judge at the time ; so that
whatever he lays down in a judgment given after he recovers the
use of his wits may be upheld : for a judge to be appointed, his
own presence or knowledge is not required. 1. When a man
comes to Rome on a legation, he can always be surety in any
matter, since he cannot make use of his privilege, where his con-
tract was entered into in Italy.

40 The same {Questions 4) It is not everything which a judge
is empowered to do that is made a matter of l^gal compulsion.
1. If a judge in giving judgment should maliciously omit some
part of his duty, contrary to a statutable rule, he ofiends against
the statute.

^ M. thinks the text of the reecript is omitted.

TFT. i] On trials at law 311

41 The same {Questwns 11) In aU bona fide actions^ so long^
as the day for paying over money has not arrived, if anyone applies
to have an undertaking given for payment, the order will be made
on sufficient cause shown.

42 The same {Qiiestions 24) If the wife of a legate is divorced
from her husband at Rome, the opinion has been given that [if she
sues for dos\ the husband must be ready to defend the action in
Rome.

43 The same {Questiana 27) Where a man stipulates that a
block of chambers shall be built for him at Capua within a specified
time, it is recognised law that, when the time expires, he can bring
an action for damages to the extent of his interest wherever he
likes.

44 The same (Responsa 2) The discharge of the duty of judge
is not obstructed by the fact that, after an action has been com-
menced against all the guardians, some of the number have become
absent in the service of the State, since the management carried on
by those who are present can be distinguished from that of those
who are not defending the case, and a separate estimate can be
made. 1. If a person on whose account an action has been
brought through a procurator afterwards turns out to be a slave,
the defendant ought to be dismissed from the action, but this will
be no bar to the principal, if on some future day he should choose
to bring the action in his own name.

46 The same (Responsa 3) A banker ought to be sued where

the contract with him was made, and no adjournment of the case
should be allowed save on sufficient grounds, [for example,] to
allow of his books being brought from a province. A similar rule
holds with reference to an action on guardianship. 1. Where the
guardians of a girl have judgment given against them in the
province in an action which they defended on behalf of their ward,
the curators of the girl are compellable to obey the decree in
Rome, the fitct being that the girl's mother borrowed the money
in Rome, and the girl was her mother's heir.

46 Paulus {QuestwnB 2) A man who is appointed judge con-
tinues to hold the office though he should come to be insane,
because he was properly appointed judge at the outset ; but in
case of a serious illness he is excused the necessity of sitting ;
accordingly someone else must be put in his place.

47 Calustbatus {.Qu/etAwm 1) Care must be taken not to

312 On trials at law [book y

appoint as judge anyone whom one side asks for expressly by
name ; (such an appointment, according to a rescript of Hadrian,
would be a thing of bad example ;) unless special permission for
this being done should be given by the Emperor out of respect for
the person asked for as judga

48 Paulus {Re9p(m9a 2) The following is an extract from a
letter of the Diyine Hadrian : Magistrates are not in the year of
their office to commence any proceedings on their own behalf
either as plaintiffs or defendants, nor are they to be judges in a
matter which they are concerned in as guardians or curators. But
as soon as the term of their office expires, then actions may be
brought both by them^ and against them.

49 The same {Responsa 3) A vendor, being called upon by
the purchaaer to defend him in an action brought by a person who
claimed to recover the property as owner, declares that he has a
special right to have his own judge ; the question is whether he
has a right to remove the case from the court of the judge before
whom the matter has been begun between the plaintiff and the
purchaser to that of his own judge. Paulus answered that the
practice is for the vendor to take the purchaser's judge. 1. Judges
appointed by the Prsases commonly continue to hold their office
even in the time of his successors, when they are still bound to
deliver judgment^ and their judgments are upheld. ScsBvola too
gave his opinion to the same effect.

60 Ulpiamus {FideicommisM 6) If an action is brought for a
fdeicoimmssvmy and the defendant [the heir,] declares that the
main part of the estate is somewhere else, he cannot be compelled
to execute the trust [in pursuance of the action] ; it is in fact
provided by a great number of imperial enactments that a Jideir
eomndsswm, must be sued for in the place where the bulk of the
estate is ; unless it be shown that the testator desired the trust to
be executed in the place where the action to enforce it is brought.
1. The following point has been considered in connexion with a
question of debt : Suppose in the province in which the action on
a fideicommissmn is brought, there were an excess of debt;
would a prce8criptio be admissible on the ground that the bulk
of the estate was somewhere else? However, the rule is that
even in such a case the plea of debt makes no difference, debt
not being a thing which depends on locality, but one affecting

^ deL frp^ff ravr ^cvyoirraf and row ^tvyovo'i. 0£ M.

Trr« i] On trials at law 313

the whole of the estate.; a debt^ it is well known, is a deduction
from the whole of the property, not from the resources existing at
a particular place. Suppose, however, this particular portion of
the property were specially charged with some burden, such as,
for example, that of an alimentary provision which the testator
directed to be paid in Rome, or with taxes, or any other burdens
the payment of which it was impossible to get remitted, would the
plea be admissible ? In such a case the better opinion, I should
say, is that it would. 2. However, there is in fact a rescript to the
effect that o, Jideicommisaitm should be sued for at the place where
the heir has his home. But whenever an heir once begins to
pay in discharge of a Jideicommissuniy he cannot afterwards have
recourse to the above plea,

61 Mabcixsvb {Institutes 8) even though the inheritance
should have come to a man whose home is in a province. We may
add that the Emperors Severus and Antoninus laid down by rescript
that ^if the party ^ agrees to pay in discharge of the trust in some
other place, he is bound to pay accordingly in the place so agreed
upon.

52 XTLPiAKtJS {Fideicommissa 6) Moreover if the heir appears to
the action on the Jideuxmimissmn and has recourse to other grounds
of defence, but avoids this one, he cannot afterwards fall back upon
this ground, even before judgment is given. 1. If a testator orders
that com tickets (tesserce frumentarice) should be bought for his
freedmen, then, although the bulk of the estate should be in a
province, nevertheless the correct view is that the Jideieommissum
must be dischai^ed in Rome, as it is clear that that was the
testator's intention, considering the nature of the purchase directed.
2. Again, if the case should be that there are left so many pounds
of silver or gold to such and such honourable persons, and there
are Sufficient assets in Rome to discharge this Jideieommissum ;
then, although the main bulk of the whole assets should be in a
province, we shall have to say that the trust must be executed in
Rome ; as it is very unlikely that a testator who desired honour
to be done to persons to whom he left such small Jideicommissa
should have wished them to be discharged in the province. 3. If
the thing left by way of Jideieommissum is on the spot, the correct
view is that the action cannot be met by a prcescriptio founded
on the fiu^t that the bulk of the estate is elsewhere. 4. But if
the object of the action is to have given on the spot not the actual

^ Bead Jldei eommUium for Jidei commiaaritu, Qt M.

814 On trials oJt law [book t

thing left hy Jideicommissfumy but security for the discharge of the
trusty it is a fair question whether this plea is not available ; but I
should say it is not ; nay more, eyen if there is nothing at all on
the spot, still the defendant should be ordered to give the security.
What is there for him to be afraid of? if he does not give the
security, the plaintiff will be put in possession in order to secure
the fdeicommisdv/ifn,

63 HermogenijlNTJS {epitomes of law 1) There are just a few
special cases in which slaves are allowed to appear against their
owners ; one case is where a slave alleges that a testament is kept
back in which, as he declares, he was given his liberty. Slaves are
also allowed to inform against owners accused of short deliveries
of the annxma of the Roman people, also of insufficient returns of
property, also of coining. Besides this they may proceed against
their owners to procure freedom left them hy Jideicommi88iim\ as
well as in cases in which they allege that they are bought by their
own money, and that, contrary to the faith of the agreement, they
have not been manumitted. Moreover, where it is provided [by
testament] that a slave shall be free on rendering his accounts, he
has a right to ask for an arbitrator between himself and his owner
to examine his accounts. Again, if a slave chooses to rely on the
good faith of a person who promised that he should be bought
with that person's money, and be manumitted on repayment of the
sum by himself, after which the person in question declines to take
the .money when tendered, the slave has a right given by law to
inform as to the terms of the credit on the strength of which the
contract was made.

54 Paulus {Sentences 1) An inquiry of greater importance
should not be prejudged by a case of less importance ; the more
important question attracts the less important case.

65 The same {on the office of assessor) A citation made by a
preceding judge ought to count as one of the three citations. It
is true that if the whole number of citations should have been
completed by the preceding judge, the practice still is for the
successor to issue one more.

66 Ulpianus {on Sabintis 30) Although it is perfectly true
that [only] a real procurator can bring a matter before the Court,
still, where a man, without being a procurator, proceeds to joinder
of issue, and, after. that> the principal ratifies his act, it is held, by
relation back, that the matter has been properly brought before
the Court.

TTT. i] On truds at law 816

67 The same {on Sabirms 41) There is a good right of action
against a JUitis/amiliaB, both on contracts and delicts ; but if the
defendant dies after joinder of issue, the action is transferred to
his &ther ; only however as an action de pecfulio and de in rem
verso. It is clear that if a JUit^familias undertakes to defend an
action as procurator for some one, th.en, on his death, the action is
transferred to the person whose case he defended, or [if judgment
has ab*eady been pronounced,] an action^ on the judgment may be
given to the same person.

68 Paulus (on Sabintis 13) An action is put an end to if the
person who ordered the judge to hear it forbids him to proceed, or
indeed any magistrate does so who possesses superior authority to
the first in the same kind of jurisdiction, or even the judge himself
comes to be vested with authority equal to that of the magistrate
who appointed him judge.

69 Ulpianxjs (on Sabinus 61) If, in. the order given to a man
to act as judge, no place is mentioned, the magistrate is regarded
as ordering him to act in the place where the Court is usually held^
provided the litigating parties are not put to inconvenience.

eO Paulus (on Sabimts 14) When a judge dies, whatever it
was that he had to adjudicate upon, the person who is put in his
place is bound to address himself to the same point

61 Ulpianus (on the Edict 26) ' It is commonly said that the
point which is the subject of the trial is whatever it was that the
litigating parties both intended ; Celsus however declares that there
is some risk in ascertaining this by reference to the defendant
personally, because he will always try to avoid an adverse judgment
by saying that that was not the point agreed upon. On the whole
then, it comes to this : the best rule to give is not that the subject
of the trial is whatever the parties intended that it should be, but
that nothing is the subject of the trial which it was expressly
intended that it should not be. 1. A judge for cases of robbery is
not qualified to hear pecuniary cases.

62 The same (on the Edict 39) It is impossible for a contest to
proceed between two parties, unless one of them is demandant and
the other is in possession ; there must be someone who bears the
burden of being plaintiff and another who has the advantage of
being in possession.

^ For tramaetio vel read tramit aetiove.

816 On trials at law [book y

03 The same {on the Edict 49) A proper defence impliea this :
the party accepts a trial, either in his own person or by an agent,
always giving security ; and a man is not held to make a proper
defence who does not pay what the judge orders.

64 The same {Diiputations 1) Damages for dolus are not
assessed by the judge by reference to the actual interest of the
plaintiff, but by reference to the value asserted on oath : indeed, it
is admitted that even a thief has for this reason a good right of
action on a deposit or on a loan for use. 1. If a man who is
prepared to bring one kind of action first accepts security that the
judge's order will be obeyed, and then proceeds upon another kind
of action, he will not be able to sue on the stipulation, because the
undertaking appears to be given in reference to a different matter.

66 The same (on the Edict 34) A woman ought to sue for
her doB where her husband's home was, not where the written
assurance of doa was made ; the contract of doa is not of such a
kind that regard should be had^ to the place where the assurance
was executed so much as to the place which the woman herself
would have naturally made her home in consequence of the
marriage.

66 The same {Di^pvitaJtiona 2) Where a man raises an issue in
ambiguous terms or uses obscure language, his expressions must
be construed in the way that makes most for his own advantage.

67 The same (DispiUationa 6) When a slave avers that he
has been bought with his own money, if he establishes the fact,
he will be deemed free by relation back to the time when he waa
bought, since the Imperial enactment does not order that he shall
be pronounced free, but that liberty shall be made good to him.
Accordingly the owner will be compellable to manumit a slave who
buys himself with his own money ; moreover if the owner should
keep out of the way, the proper course is' to go by the analogy of
those senatorial decrees which deal with the question of gifts of
liberty made by way o{ Jldeicommissum.

68 The same {Disputatioris 8) A peremptory summons {edi^^-
Umi) is arrived at in the following course : the defendant failing to
appear, the plaintiff asks for one summons, next for a second,

69 The same {on ail the Courts 4) after an interval of not less
than ten days ;

^ Dele et M.

' D^e debwe^ or, with M., read d4 ea rs.

TFT. i] On triais ai law 817

70 The same {IHsputaiians 8) then for the third ; and all these
haying issued he may sue out the peremptory summons. It was
called peremptory, because it put an end to (perimU) the con-
tention, that is to say, it did not allow the other party to shirk the
trial any longer.

71 The same {on aXL the Courts 4) In the peremptory summons
the judge who issues it gives warning that he will hear the case
and give judgment even if the other party fails to attend.

72 The same (DiymtcUions 8) This summons is sometimes
allowed when the full number of summonses above mentioned has
been issued already, sometimes after one only or two, sometimes in
the first instance, — in which case it is said to be given once for alL
Which course shall be taken is a question for the consideration of
the magistrate exercising jurisdiction, whose duty it will be to
arrange the series of summonses or to abridge the same according
to the nature of the case or the person or the time.

73 Th^ same {on all the Couais 4) Even after the peremptory
summons is sued out, as soon as the day mentioned arrives, the
defendant who was absent is still called upon, and, whether he
answers or does not answer, the case will be taken and judgment
will be pronounced ; though not necessarily in favour of the party
who is present ; even the one who is absent may sometimes get the
better if he has a good case. 1. But should the party who sued
out the peremptory summons be himself absent on the day when
the cause was to be heard, whereas the party against whom he
sued it out is present, then the peremptory summons must be
cancelled, and the cause will not be heard, nor will judgment be
pronounced in favour of the party who is present 2. If the
summons is cancelled, we may consider the question whether the
rule is that the defendant cannot be sued any further, or whether
the contention is still open, but simply the particular proceeding
in which the summons occurred goes for nothing ; and the better
view is that the particular proceeding alone goes for nothing, but
the parties can proceed to litigate afresh, a It must be under-
stood that if judgment is given against an absent person on the
strength of a peremptory summons and he appeals, he will not be
allowed a hearing, supposing, that is, his absence was contumacious ;
if it was not, he may be heard.

74 JuLiANUS (Digest 5) Whatever matter the judge hears he
is compellable to pronounce judgment upon it too. 1. Where a
judge has been appointed to decide a matter, provided the amount

818 On trials at law [book y

involyed doeo not exceed a certain sam, he may still abjudicate
in respect of a higher amount, if the parties agree. 2. On one
occasion, I had undertaken to defend an action brought against an
absent person, and I joined issue with the plaintiff at a time when
the person in question was dead, after which I lost the case and
paid the damages assessed. The question arose whether my pay-
ment was a discharge to the heir of the deceased, also what sort
of action I could bring against the heir. The answer was that
issue joined through a person who defended the case on the debtor's
behalf is no joinder at all where the debtor is already dead, and
consequently the heir is not discharged, on the other hand that the
person in question, if he paid in pursuance of a judgment, cannot
sue to recover the money ; however, he has a good right of action
against the heir on negoUa gegta, and of course the latter can
protect himself by the exeeptio of dolw nudus, if he should be
sued by the original plaintiff

76 The same (Digest 36) If the Prsetor orders a man who is sued
for a debt to appear in Court, and, after the series of summonses is
gone through, pronounces that the absent defendant must pay the
money, then, if an action is brought on the judgment, the judge
who hears the case cannot as a matter of course inquire into the
grounds of the Prsetor's decision ; otherwise such summonses and
decrees made by the Prsetors will be a mockery. Note by MarceUvs :
if the plaintiff craftily and with knowledge of the facts made some
false allegation, and it is clearly proved that it was by that means
that he got a fetvourable decision Irom the Praetor, then my opinion
is that thejttdex ought to listen to the defendant's complaint;
Note by Patdns : but if the reason why the defendant was not able
to appear was that he was hindered by illness, or was detained by
business of the State, I should say that, in such a case, either action
against him on the judgment ought not to be allowed, or else the
Praetor ought not to allow execution on the judgment itself so given.

76 Alfenus {Digest 6) A case was stated to the effect that a
number of judges having been appointed for the same matter, some
of them, afl^r listening to the case, were allowed to retire, and
others were put in their places; whereupon the question arose
whether a change in respect of some particular judges left the
matter the same or made it a different case. My answer was that
not only one or two judges might be changed, but even the whole
bench, and still it would be the same matter, and the csuse would
remain the same that it was before ; indeed this> I said, was not

TFT. i] On trials (xt law 319

the only instance in which it happened that^ though the parts were
changed, nevertheless the thing itself was held to be the same ; as
it occurred in a great many other cases. A regiment was held to
be the same, though numbers of the men were killed and others
had been put in their places, and the people at large were looked
upon as being the same people at this time as they had been a
hundred years ago, though not one of the old number was now
living : in the same way, where a ship had been so often repaired
that there was not a single plank still in her that was not new,
nevertheless she was regarded as the same vessel. If, I said, any-
body held that where the parts are changed the thing itself becomes
a different individual thing, it would come to this, on his principle,
that we ourselves are not the same persons that we were a year
ago ; the &ct being, so philosophers tell us, that the very smallest
particles of which our bodies are composed^ are every day being
detached and others from without are coming into their place.
Accordingly, where the outward form of a thing remained un-
changed, the thing itself, I said, was held to be the same.

77 Aebioanus {Questiana 3) In private matters the son may
be judge in the father's case, or the father in the son's :

78 Paultts {on Plautivs 16) as the business of judging is a
public office.

79 Ulpianus {on the office of proconsul 6) When a man is
proved to have cited his opponent on insufficient grounds, he is
bound to make good his travelling expenses and the cost of the
trial. 1. Where judges are in doubt about the law, the practice is
for the Prseses to lay it down ; if they consult the Prseses on a
question of fact, he is not bound to furnish them with an opinion,
he must tell them to pronounce judgment in accordance with their
own conscientious conviction ; to proceed otherwise sometimes
gives rise to scandal, and furnishes occasion for partiality and
canvassing.

80 PoMPONius {on Sabinns 2) Where a mistake is made about
the name or forename of a judge, then, according to the opinion
given by Servius, if he was appointed judge in pursuance of an
agreement between the paiiies, the person to act will be the one
whom both parties had in their minds.

81 Ulpianus {Opinions 5) A man who does not preside at any
fvrisdictio, and is not clothed with any authority by the Emperor,

^ For (xnuHtsremui read consistsrmntu. Of. M.

820 On inofficious testaments [book y

nor appointed by a magistrate who has the right to appoint jodges,
nor chosen as arbitrator by mutnal agreement, nor confirmed in
his position nnder some statute, cannot be judge.

82 The same {on the office of Consul 1) Sometimes the magis-
trates of the Roman people are in the habit of expressly appointing
the oflScer of the Court by way of arbitrator ; this should be very
seldom done and only in a case of pressing need.

11.
On Ikofficious Testamebtts.

1 Ulpianus {on the Edict 14) It must be understood that
plaints of an inofficious testament are frequently made ; all kinds
of persons alike being allowed to raise the question of inoffidous-
ness, whether parents or children ; it is true that those particular
kinsfolk who are more remote than lHK)thers would do well not to
incur the burden of useless expense, as they would have no chance
of succeeding.

2 Mabcianus {InstittUes 4) Proceedings are taken on
^ inofficious testaments on the assumption that the testators were
not in their right minds when they made their testaments. By
this it is not meant that the person who made the testament was
actually a lunatic or deranged, rather the testament was duly
made, but it was not in accordance with what &mily afiection
prescribes ; if the testator were really a lunatic or out of his
mind, the testament would be void.

3 Marcellus {Digest 3) The allegation that a testament is
inofficious is made by adducing reasons to show that the applicant
ought not to have been disinherited or passed over, such a case
often occurs where parents are instigated to disinherit or pass over
their children by fitlse statements about them.

4 Gaius {on the lex Glitia) A parent ought not to be humoured
who commits a wrong against his children in his testament; the
reason why he does so often being that he has allowed the csgolery
and incitements of the stepmother of his children to pervert his
mind to that extent that he conceives a prejudice against those of
his own blood.

1 After eohre read cKsl CC M.

TIT. n] Qn inqffhiaua testaments 821.

6 Maroktj.us {Digest 3) Eren those who do not desoend
from the testator in the male line have a right to take proceed-
ings, as they can be taken on the testament of a mother, and
the application is very often successful. The point of the term
inofficioQS, as already sdd, is this, — the parties applying show that
they were passed over, or, it may be, even got rid of by disinherison,
without deserving it, and consequently, unduly ; and the colour
put on the matter, when it is argued in Oourt, is that the testator
appears not to have been in his right mind when he frttmed such
an unjust testament

6 tJLPiANUS (on the Edict 14) A posthumous son can allege
that a testament is inofficious where the testator was a person to
whom he might have become suus heres or statutable heir, if he
were himself already conceived before the testator's death ; and
he can equally do so where the testator was his cognate, because
in that case too he could get bonortmi possessio on intestacy. Does
it come to this then, that it is made matter of reproach to the
testator that he did not die intestate? This, we may be sure,
no one could induce the judge to agree to ; the testator is not
treated as if he had been deprived of te^amenti /actio. What
the applicant can charge the testator with is this, that he did not
make him heir ; as, had he been named heir, he might have had
the benefit of an order for possession in pursuance of the clause
as to giving the order to the mother of an unborn child ; and being
once bom he would have a right to ask for possession secwndum
tabulcu. On the same principle I should say that the plaint may
be brought by a person who, after the testament^ is made, is
extracted from his mother's womb by excision. 1. If some person
who is not legally capable of succeeding to the deceased on in-
testacy takes proceedings for inofficiou8nes9,^-a thing which nobody
prevents him from doing, — and his application happens to be
successful, his success will be of no use to himself, but only to those
persons who have a right to inherit on intestacy ; what he does
is to make the deceased intestate. 2. When a man dies after
bringing forward a charge of inofficiousness, does he transmit the
right of plaint to his heir ? Papinianus answered, — and the same
thing is pointed out in more than one rescript, — that if the man
dies after he has already accepted bonorum posseseio, the right of
proceeding with the plaint is transmitted. Even if the bonortim
possessio has not been asked for, but the contention has been begun

^ For matri$ factum read factum mairU, Of. M.
M. J. 21

822 On inofficious testaments [book ▼

or pat in tram, or the party dies after taking steps to bring the
plaint, I should say tiiat the right is transmitted to the heir.

7 Paultjb (an Sepiemviral easeg) Let us <xHisider how a
man can be hdd to have put a case in trains so as to be able to
transmit the right of action. Let us suppose that he was under
the potestaa [of the deceased], so that he does not require banarvm
poBseasiOj and entry on the inheritance would be an act without an
object ; if such a person simply gives warning that he means to
make the charge or goes so far as to make a notification (dentm-
ticUia), or to serve the libel, he will transmit to his heir the right
to proceed with the charge ; this is laid down in a rescript of the
Divine Pius on serving libels and making notification. How then
if he was not under the potestds of the deceased? does he still
transmit the right of action to his heir ? I should say [again] that^
if he does as much as is above mentioned, he puts the case in train
sufficiently.

8 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 14) Papinianus says (QueMona 5)
very correctly that a father cannot institute the plaint for in-
offidousness in the name of his son against the wish of the latter,
as the wrong is done to the son. Immediately after he says that, if
a son dies after he has accepted banorum paasessio with a view to
presenting the question in due form, there is an end of the plaint
for inofficiousness, as it was not allowed to the father [in his own
person], but on behalf of his s<mi. 1. If a man abandons the case
after taking the preliminary steps required in the matter of a
plaint for inofficiousness, he will not get a hearing afterwards.
2. It has very often been laid down by rescript that where the
Emperor is appointed heir, the testament can still be pronounced
inofficious. 3. Papinianus says (Reepansa 2) that there can be a
good plaint for inofficiousness against the testament of a pojter-
famUias who is an old soldier, although the only property he had
should be what he acquired on active service. 4 Where a soldier
makes his testament while in military service, and dies within a
year's time after his dischai^ge, I doubt whether the plaint for
inofficiousness is admissible, because his testament is in force all
the while by military law; there is indeed good ground for
saying that it is not admissible. 6. Again, where the testament
is that of a boy under age, his mother cannot allege that it is
inofficious, because it was his fiither who made it for him, — ^this
opinion was given by Papinianus, — ^nor can his fitther's brother,
because it is the son's testament ; consequently the boy's brother

TFT. n] Oh inc^g^auM testaments 828

cannot do it either, if he let the &ther'8 own testament pass. If
however the appUoation waa granted as to the fistther's testament^
then the son's is upset too ; unless the rescission was expressly
confined to what concerns the &ther, in which case the pupillary
poHion remains good. 6. If a man niuJies his son a dcmation fnortis
causa of a fourth part of what would have ccoie to him if he—
the testator— had died intestate, then I should say his testament is
safe. 7- If a man makes secondary provisions in his testament
(secundas tabulas)^ and thereby appoints a substitute to his son
who is under age, this is not a sufllcient ground for allowing the
boy himself to have the plaint for inoffidousness. 8. Seeing that
one quarter of tiie portion due [on intestai^] is enough to bar the
plaint, a point to consider is whether a disinherited child who
does not raise the complaint nevertheless counts {partem faeia() ;
take for instance a case where there are two dirinherited sons ;
but no doubt he does county so Papinianus lays down, and, if
the other alleges inoffidousness, he cannot ask for the whole estate
of the deceased, but only half. Similarly where there are grand-
children throagh two deceased sons respectively, eig. through the
one several, say three, and through the other one, the grandson
who stands by himself will be debarred the plaint by getting
tht<ee twenty-fourths of the inheritance and any one of the
others by getting one twenty-fourth* 9. The quarter will of course
he calculated after debts and funeral expenses are deducted ;
whether testamentary manumissions count, so as to reduce it
further still, is a point to consider. Then how does the matter
stand ? If, where a man is appointed sole heir, he cannot allege
that the testament is inoffidous, because he has got the Falcidian
quarter, but the lex Faicidia does not interfere with testamentary
manumissions, it may be reasonably assumed that the quarter in
our case is to be taken after deducting the amount lost by manu-
missions. It being accordingly the law that the quarter is reduced
by testamentary manumissions, it will follow that^ where a man's
whole estate consists of slaves, if he gives them all their liberty,
he bars any plaint for inoffidousness ; unless, perhaps, in such a
case, the son, if he was not under potestaSf has a good right, when
appointed heir by his ftither, to dedine the inheritance, and,
having by that means transmitted it to the substitute, thereupon
to bring the plaint for inoffidousness, so ^ as to aoquire the
inheritance [as] on intestacy without incurring the penalty men-
tioned in the Edict 10. YHiere a testator bade his heir perform

^ Read u^ for a^L Cf. M.

21—2

824 On ifu^fieiouB testaments [book y

fiome conditioti in respect of a son or of some other rdation who is
qualified to bring this plaint, and the latter accepted the benefit
with knowledge of his position, we may well consider whether he
is not debarred from making the plaint for inoffidousnesSy since
he acquiesced in the will ; and a similar question arises when the
person from whom the gift came was a legatee or a statniiber.
It may faiily be said that the son is in fact debarred, especially
where the party whom the testator ordered to make the. gift was
the heir ; however, if it was a legatee, may not the rule be that,
where the right to bring the plaint for inofficiousness has once
arisen, an ofier by the legatee will not take it away? Then why
did we lay down the rule for the case of the heir in absolute terms?
The reason was that before entry on the inheritance no right to
bring the plaint can arise at all. My own opinion is that in this
matter we must go by the eyent, so that if what was left the son
was offered him before proceedings were taken by him, then the
son has all he can ask for, as the gift is offered in pursuance of
the testator's intention. 11. It follows' that where a man is
appointed heir, say for one half, whereas he would have a claim
to one-sixth of the testator^s assets in case of intestacy, and he is
requested to hand over his inheritance after a specified interval of
time, it may reasonably be said that he cannot institute proceedings,
because he has the means of taking the portion due to him and the
produce thereof; it is well known that [where legacies are deferred]
the heir must debit himself with the proceeds of the property
bequeathed towards the discharge of bis claim to the Falddian
quarter. Hence if a man is appointed heir at the outset to the
extent of a half and is requested to hand over the inheritance at
the end of ten years, he has no occasion to bring the plaint,
because he can easily receive during that time the amount he had
a right to and the proceeds thereof. 12. Where a man alleges
that a testament is void or nullified as well as inofficious, he should
be called upon to choose which contention he would prefer to
begin with. 13. If a disinherited son is in possession of the
estate of the deceased, the person named heir can sue to recover
the inheritance, but the son can bring the plaint in the form
of a cross action, just as he would proceed if he were not in
possession but were suing to recover. 14. It must be remem-
bered that a person who alleges that a testament is inofficious
without grounds, and thereupon loses, will forfeit what the testa-

^ Reference is to 8 and 9.

TFF. n] On inofficious tertaments^ 826.

rnent gave hiniy and the fiscus can recover it by action as a thing
which is taken away from the party for unworthiness. However
be is only deprived of what was given him by the testament where
he persisted in maintaining a groundless contest till the actual
decision of the Court was given ; if, before judgment, he gave the
case up or died, what was given him is not taken away; on the
same principle, if he is absent and, that being the case, a decision
is pronounced in favour of the other party, who is present, we may
again say that he can keep what was given him. But a man can
only lose in pursuance of this rule a thing which he would have
had the right to enjoy ; if he was requested to hand anything over
to another, no wrong ought to be done [to the intended bene-
ficiary]. Hence it is not a bad remark that is made by Papinianus
{Responsa 2), that if a man is appointed heir and requested to
hand over the inheritance, and after that he brings the plaint for
inofficiousness and fails, all he loses is whatever he would have
got under the lex Falcidicu 15. Where a boy under age has been
arrogated [by the testator], being one of those relations who,
irrespective of any adoption and emancipation, have a right to the
plaint for inofficiousness, I should say that he is debarred the plaint,
because he has a quarter in pursuance of the enactment of the
Divine Pius. If however be brings the plaint but does not succeed,
will he lose this quarter? To this I should say that either he ought
not to be permitted to move the plaint at all, or, if he is permitted,
then, even if he does not succeed, he must be allowed to have the
quarter as a debt which is owed him. 16. If the judge goes into
the case of inofficiousness and decides against the testament, and
there is no appeal made, the testament is rescinded in law, the
person in whose favour judgment is given will be suns heres or
bonarum possesaor^ according to the nature of his claim, testa-
mentary manumissions are absolutely void, legacies are not payable,
and, if they should have been paid already, they can be recovered,
either by the person who paid them or by the successful applicant,
the recovery being by utUi8 oustAo. As a rule, if they were paid
before the proceedings commenced, the person to recover them is
the successful applicant, so the Divine Hadrian and the Divine
Pius laid down by rescript. 17. No doubt, if the allegation of
inofficiousness is made on some very plain grounds allowed in law,
as much as five years after the testator^s death, then manumis-
sions already made or which there was a good right to demand are
not to be revoked, but the successful party will have a right to
have twenty CBwrd given him by each freeman. .

826 On inoffieious te^ameml$ [book t

9 MoDEBrnruB {on inofficUms testaments) But if a man
proceeds withm five years' time^ manumissioDS are rescinded
However Paulus says tike judge will allow cases of freedotn givea
by way of Jideicanimissum, each person, that is^ having to pay
twenty aturei as before.

10 Marcellus {Digest 3) If some of the judges in the case of
an inofficious testament decide against the testament and others in
favour of it, as is occasionally the case, it is more humane to go by
the opinion of those judges whose view was in favour of the
testament, save in case of clear proof that their pronouncement in
favour of the person named heir was unjust 1. One thing is per-
fectly well known : a man who accepts a legacy cannot with
propriety maintain that the testament was inofficious, unless he
duly disposed of the whole legacy to some one else.

11 MoDESTiNUS {Responsa 3) I gave it as my opinion that
even where a man is successful on the plaint for inofficiousness,
still it does not follow that donations which the testator appears to
have carried out in his lifetime in fistvour of him [the defendant] are
upset, or that an action can be had to recover part of what he
[the testator] may have given him by way of dos.

12 The same {an prescriptions) It makes no diflTerence whether
a son who is disinherited accepts a legacy left to himself or gets it
through his own son or slave to whom it was left ; either way be
will be barred by the prcescriptio. Moreover if a slave of such
a son is appointed heir, and the son manumits him without first
ordering him to enter on the inheritance, in order that the party
manumitted may enter of his own free will, the son doing
this with a fraudulent intention, his action will be barred. I. If
a son who is disinherited proceeds to ask a statuliber for the
money which the latter has to pay, he is held to accept his
father's will 2. If a son institutes proceedings for a legacy
which his fitther revoked, and, being unsuccessfrd, falls back on
the plaint for inofficiousness, he will not be barred by the pfw--
scriptio ; as, granting that by the original action he affirmed the
testament, still there is something on the other hand which has to
be set down to the testator's own &ult, so that the son cannot
with propriety be refused a hearing. 3. Where a son of the
testator owed [his father] a sum of money as co-debtor with TiCiiis,
and the father ordered in his testament that Titius should be
released, the son will not, if fi*eed firom the debt by a/fbrmal

TiT« n] On imyffieious testaments 827

release given to Titius, be deprived of his right of action for
inofficiousness.

13 SoJEVOLA {Besponsa 3) Titia appointed her daughter heir,
leaving her son a legacy, and in the same testament made the
following provision : '^ everything that I have hereinbefore ordered
to be given or done I desire to be given and done by whatsoever
person shall be my heir or banorum possessor, even by intestate
succession, and whatever I hereinafter order to be given [or done],
I leave it in trust to such person to see that it is given or done."
This question was asked, — ^supposing a sister [that is, another
daughter^] succeeds in a plaint brought in the Centumviral Court,
will the Jideicomfnissa have to be executed in pursuance of the
above clause? Answer : if the question is whether a man can legally
impose a jMeicommissum on those persons whom he expects to
succeed him on intestacy, as heirs or bonorum possessores, the
answer is :— he can. Note by Pavlus : he approves however of
the view that Jideicommissa made by a man who dies intestate
need not be discharged, the party being deemed to be out of
his mind.

14 Papikianus (Questions 5) A father emancipated his son,
and kept under his potestas a grandson through that son ; the son
so emancipated afterwards had another son, and died, having in
his testament disinherited both sons and passed over his father.
During the inquiry whether the testament is inofficious as far as
the sons are concerned, which takes the first place, the question as
to any issue to be raised on the part of the lather of the deceased
is in suspense ; but if the case is decided against the sons, then
the father's turn for the plaint comes, and be can proceed with
his own case.

16 The same (Questions 14) Though succession to the inherit-
ance of their children is no right of the parents, considering what
they hope on their children's behalf and their natural affection for
them, still, when the regular order of mortality is inverted, the
property ought, as a matter of natural feeling, to be left by
children to their parents as much as by parents to their children.
1. Where a man, after instituting proceedings for inofficiousness,
changes his mind, and then dies, the plaint is not allowed to his
heir ; it is not enough to commence proceedings, if the party does
not choose to follow them up. 3. Where a son brings an action for

Unless above we read Jilia tor JUio, fanother daughter' for 'her bod.' Ct M.

828 On inoffici4yM teriammts [book t

inofficiousness against two heirs, and gets different decisions from
the judges as to the respective heirs, that is, he is successful against
one, but is beaten by the other,— it is open to him to sue debtors
and he is liable to be sued by creditors to the extent of a share in
the inheritance, and he can, to the like extent^ recover specific
property and divide the inheritance ; in fact it is quite correct to
say that an action famUioe erciscundoe is open to him, as it is
held that he becomes statutable heir for a share ; accordingly
part of the inheritance remains sul^ect to the testament, and there
does not seem to be any objection to saying that the testator is to
be held to die intestate in respect of a portion of his property.

16 The same {Responm 2) Where a son has already taken
proceedings in the matter of an alleged inofficious testament of his
mother against his brother who was appointed heir for a part\
and he was successful, a daughter [sister of applicant] who takes
no proceedings, or, at any rate, is not successful in any, cannot
take a share as statutable heir along with her brother. 1. A
fitther, in pursuance of the right founded on emancipation, got
an order for possession contra tabulas of his son's property, and
actually took possession; after this, a daughter of the deceased
son, who had been disinherited by her &ther, carried through on
good grounds an action for inofficiousness : in this case the ord^
for possession which the father got falls to the ground ; because in
the former proceedings the subject of the inquiry was the legal
position of the father, not the legal character of the testament ;
consequently the whole inheritance must be made good to the
daughter with mesne profits.

17 Paulxts {Questions 2) Where a man abstains from impeach-
ing an inoj£cious testament^ by way of tacitly renouncing Ids
claim to the succession, his share does not count to the prejudice
of any that desire to i*aise the plaint Accordingly, where one of
two children who are disinherited brings the plaint on the ground
of an inofficious testament of their father, and thereupon ^ — ^looking
at the fact that, if the testament is upset, the other son too has a
claim to succeed ab intestatOy — ^the first son would have no right
to bring a vindicatio to recover the whole estate, [it will follow
that,] if such first son is successful with the plaint^ he will take his
stand on the authority of a res judicata, his assumption being that

^ For de parts ante it is proposed by M. to read de triente : which would
make the above '^ Where a son has taken proceedings etc.... heir for one-third."
' Insert the next et before quia. Cf. M.

TTF. n] On inqffieious testamenU 829

the Centmnviral Court, at the moment when it made the testator
intestate, must have believed him to be the only son in existence.
1. When a decree is made against the testament as being in-
offidouB, the deceased is regarded as having had no testamentary
capacity. This construction is not to be maintained where the
applicant is present and recovers judgment because the heir makes
no defence, as in this case it is not held that the judgment of the
Court makes law, consequently manumissions are upheld and
legacies are payable.

18 The same (on inofficiovs testaments) There is in fact an
enactment of the Divine Brothers which recognises the above
distinction.

19 The saikie {Questions 2) A mother at her death appointed
a stranger heir for three-quarters, and one daughter for a quarter,
passing over a second daughter : thereupon the latter brought the
plaint for inoffidousness and was successful. I wish to ask what
relief can be had by the daughter who was named heir. My
answer was this: — The daughter who was passed over ought to
sue to recover whatever she would have had if her mother had
died intestate. Hereupon it may be said that the daughter so
omitted, if she sues for the whole inheritance ab intestato and gets
judgment in her favour, will in fact have the entire and exclusive suc-
cession, just as if the other had declined the statutable inheritance.
However it is not admissible that the daughter who was passed
over should, if she brings the plaint for inofficiousness, be given a
hearing in opposition to her sister ; and another thing to be said
is that the sister who has made entry in pursuance of a testament
is not on the same footing as one who declines to take up the
succession : accordingly the sister [who was passed over] must sue
to recover half from the stranger, and it may be safely maintained
that by such suit she will recover the full half, on the ground that
half the whole estate is her proper share. It would follow from
this that the testament is not upset altogether, but the testatrix is
made intestate to a certain extent, even though the Court set aside
her last will on the assumed ground of insanity. The fitct is that
if any one holds that where the daughter succeeds on the plaint
the whole testament is upset, it must be maintained that her sister,
who was appointed heir, has as good a right as she to enter on the
inheritance, considering that one who entered in pursuance of
a testament which she thought was valid cannot be regarded as
declining the succession ab intestato, which she did not know to be

880 On inqfieiaw testaments [book y

open to her ; we know that even where persons are aware of their
legal rights, still they do not lose them because they choose to go
upon some other claim which they believe to be good. This is
exemplified in the case of a patron who ad(q[>ts a deceased freed-
man's will in consequence of a mistaken opinion which he has
formed of it, as such a one is not regarded as having declined the
bonarum possessio contra tabulas. It is clear from this that the
daughter who was passed over cannot sue to recover the whole
estate, seeing that, even if the testament is upset, the right of the
sister who was appointed heir to enter on the inheritance herself is
unimpaired.

20 ScsvoLA (Qiiestions 2) Where a person wishes to make out
a case of ino£Bciousnes6, in spite of its being denied that he is son
to the deceased, he is not allowed to have the Carbonian bonortMn
possessio, as that is only granted in cases where, if the applicant
were really son, he would be heir or bonorum possessor, the object
being to enable him for the time being to be in possession and
have maintenance without being liable to have any action pre-
judged that he might be in a position to bring ; but where a person
raises a case of inofBciousness, he cannot bring any action nor
take any other proceeding except the hereditatis petitio, and he
has no right to maintenance. The reason for the above rule is
that otherwise the party might possibly be in a better position
than he would be if the other side had admitted [that he was a son
of the deceased].

21 Paulxjs {Responsa 3) Where a man commences the plaint for
inolBciousness and afterwards drops the action owing to fraudulent
representations of the person named heir, who pretends that he is
under a tacit trust to hand over to him a third part of the in-
heritance, he cannot be held to have abandoned the plaint, and
consequently he is not forbidden to recur to the proceedings which
he commenced. 1. Again, the question has been raised whether
the heir has a right to a hearing, if he asks to have made good the
payments which he made before the plaint for inofficiousness was
brought The answer given was that a man, who with his eyes
c^n discharges a Jidekommissmn by which he was not bound, has
no right thereupon to an action to recover what he paid. a. The
same authority laid down that where a pers(»i who is appointed
heir is deprived of the inheritance by means of the plaint for
inofficiousness, everything ought to proceed as if no entry had
been made on the inheritance ; accordingly the person who was

TIT. n] On iw^Seiau^ teBtamerUs 881

i^xpointed heir will retain his fall i%ht of action agunst the
meoeasfol applicant for any debt and he cao set off any

22 Tryphoninus {Disputations 17) A son is not debarred from
impeaching the testament of his mother for inofBciousness by the
fact that his father gets a legacy under the testament, or even has
entered on the inheritance, although he should be in the father's
potestas: indeed I have myself laid down that the father is at
liberty to impeach it on his son's behalf, ais the indignity affects the
8on. 1. It was asked further, supposing the son were unsuccessfW
in his impeachment, whether what was given to the fttther would
escheat to the State ; the fact being that ^ if he had succeeded, the
benefit won would go to some one else, and that nothing in the case
turns on the duty of the lather, but the whole question is as to the
merits or demerits of the son ? As to this, we must incline to the
opinion that the father does not lose what was given him, if the
decision is in favour of the testament 2. Much more is it the case
that where a testator leaves me a legacy, and then hia son takee
proceedings to set aside the testament for inofBciousness, and dies,
leaving me his heir, whereupon I continue the proceedings relating
to the inheritance, but fail of success, I do not lose the legacy left
me by the testament : — I am assuming that the deceased son had
already commenced proceedings. 3. Again, if I adopt some person
sui juris after he has already brought proceedings to try the
question of the inofficiousness of a testament under which testa-
ment a legacy was left me, and I continue the case as representing
my adopted son, and fail of success, I ought not to lose my legacy,
as there is no demerit on my part, such as to entitle the fiscus
to take away what was left me *, seeing that I did not bring the
action on my own personal behalf, but in virtue of a kind of right
of succession.

23 Paulus {an inofficious testaments) If your case is that an
emancipated son is passed over [in his Other's testament] and a
grandson through him who remained under the potestas of the
testator is appointed heir, [my answer is that] the son can sue for
bonorum possessio against his own son, the testator's grandson,
but he cannot bring the plaint for an inofficious testament But
if the emancipated son is disinherited, he can bring the plaint, and

^ Read the mark of interrogfttkm after JiHi agitmr ittfli0ad of after pulh
liearstur,

* For derdictum read rdictum, Cf. M.

832 On inoffieiaui tettamenig [book v

thereupon he can be joined with his own aon, and he will get the
inheritance together with him. 1. If disinherited ohildren have
purchased the inheritance or any specific things contained in it
from the persons appointed heira, knowing that the vendors are
heirs, or have hired land from them, or done anything of that
kind, or have paid the heir debts which they ow^ the testator,
they are held to acquiesce in the will of the deceased, and they are
excluded from the plaint. 2. If there are two sons disinherited,
and both take proceedings for an inofficious testament, after which
one of them resolves to discontinue the proceedings, his share goes
to the other by accretion. The same follows equally if he is barred
by lapse of tima

24 Ulpiakus {on Sabinua 48) It very often happens in con-
nexion with the plaint for inofficiousness that different decisions
are pronounced in one and the same case. Suppose for instance
the applicant is a brother to the persons appointed heirs and the
latter have different l^gal positions. Should this be the case, the
deceased must be held to have died partly testate and partly
intestate.

26 The same {DisptUationa 2) If some donation is made not
mortis causa but inter vivos, but in any case with the intention
that it shall count towards the quarter, it may fairly be said that
the plaint for inofficiousness does not lie, if either the party gets
the quarter by the donation, or else, if he does not get so much,
the amount by which the donation falls short is made up in
accordance with the arbitration of an impartial person ; or, at any
rate, [if he is to have the plaint,] the donation must be brought
into hotchpot 1. Where a man who has no ground on which to
present the plaint for inofficiousness, being nevertheless allowed to
do so, endeavours to upset the testament in part, and chooses one
particular heir against whom to bring the plaint, [and is successful
thereon \] the proper thing to say is that, inasmuch as the testa-
ment is valid as to the remainder, and the persons who had a
prior claim to the applicant are shut out, the applicant has insti^
tuted the proceedings to good purpose.

26 The same {Disputations 8) If a man is appointed heir on
condition, say, that he manumits Stichus, and he does manumit
him, but after the manumission the testament is pronounced in-
officious or uiyost ; it is still right that he should be relieved, that

^ Of. M.

TiT» n] On iwjsfficiam teUameiUi 888

ie^ that he should recover from the manttmitted man the vahie of
the shive^ so as to prevent his losing the slave for nothing.

27 The same (Opinions 6) Where, after the impeachment of a
testament for inofficiousness has been set on foot, the parties have
come to an agreement by which they compromise the case, but the
heir fells to abide by the terms of the compromise, it is held that
the case for the plaint remains as it was before. 1. Where a man
avers that he is the son of a testator who in his testament denied
that he was so, but nevertheless disinherited him, there is still a
good case for the plaint for inofficiousness. 2. The testament of
a soldier cannot be alleged to be inofficious even by an applicant
who is a soldier himself. 3. A plaint to set aside a testament for
inofficiousness in respect of a certain portion had been brought by
a grandson of the testator against his own father's brother, or some
other person named heir, and he was successfiil; but the heir
under the testament appealed : it was held that in the meantime,
considering the want of means of the applicant^ who was a boy
under age, he might have an order for maintenance on a scale
corresponding to the amount of the fortune a share in which was
being sued for in his name by the proceedings to impeach the
testament as inofficious; and that the other party was bound to
keep him supplied accordingly till the case was decided. 4. The
plaint for inofficiousness may be brought on the testament of a
mother who held the mistaken opinion that her son was dead, and
so appointed some one else heir.

28 Paulus (on 8eptemviral cases) In a case where a mother
was informed falsely that her son, who was a soldier, was dead, and
she thereupon appointed other persons heirs, the Divine Hadrian
decreed that the inheritance should belong to the son, on the
understanding that manumissions and legacies were to be main-
tained. Particular attention should be paid^ in this case to the
additional clause about manumissions and legacies ; as where a
testament is made out to be inofficious, none of its provisions
are valid.

29 Ulpianus (Opinions 5) Where the legatees suspect that
the persons nominated heirs and the party who is taking pro-
ceedings to set aside the testament as inofficious are in collusion,
it is a settled rule that the legatees have a right to appear and
argue in support of the will of the deceased ; and the same persons
have in fact a right to appeal, if judgment is given against the

^ Bead adnotandum for adnotatum, Ct M.

884 On im^Maus teOaments [book T

testament. 1. Even faafitard children are aUowed to aOege in*
officiousneas in respect of the teetament of their mother. 2. Where
the impeachment of a testament for inoffidoosness has been set on
foot| then, although the matter should be settled by a compromise^
nevertheless the testament remains in full force ; consequently the
testamentary manumissions and the legacies, to the extent sanctioned
IfLA to the latter] by the lex Faleidid, retain their validity. 3. As
a woman can never adopt a son without the leave of the Emperor,
it follows that a man cannot bring proceedings to set aside fcnr
inofficiousness the testament of a woman whom he felsdy supposed
to be his adoptive mother. 4. Proceedings for inofficiousness
ought to be brougl^t in the province in which the persons nominated
heirs have their home.

SO MabOiakcjs (Instfiutes 4) Where a son has been given in
adoption, the natural father has a good right to take proceedings
to set aside the son's testament for inofficiousness. 1. According
to a rescript of the Divine Severus and Antoninus, guardians^ can
take proceedings to set aside a testament as inofficious, or as forged
ifdUum), without risking the loss of anything left them by the
testament.

«

31 Paulus {on Septemviral cases) Where a person who is
qualified to impeach a testament is unwilling or unable to do so, it
is fair matter of inquiry whether it is not open to the person next
in order to take proceedings. In fact the law is that it is, so that
it is a case for succession. 1. On the question of the plaint for
inofficiousness on the part of children or parents, it makes no
difference who the person is that is nominated heir, whether he
is taken from among children or strangers, say fellow-townsmen.
2. If I become heir to the person who was appointed heir himself
under the testament which I wish to impeach as inofficious, this
circumstance will be no bar to me, especially if I do not possess
the portion which is in question, or only possess it in my own right
(Jure moY. 3. The rule is different if a man makes me a legacy
of what he received under the testament in question ; if I accept
that, I am debarred from impeaching the testament How then if
I confirm the testator's will in some other manner ? Suppose, for
instance, after the death of my father, I endorse on the testament
itself that I consent to it ; in this case I am debarred from im-
peaching it

^ For tiUortbus read tiUorei,
> Of. Dig. 41. 10. 1. pr.

T!T. n] On inqfftcioiM testaments 836

32 The same (on inafficums testaments) If a disinherited son
acts as adTocate or undertakes to be procurator for one who sues
for a legacy under the testament, he is not allowed to impeach the
same testament himself; a man who has in any way expressed
his approbation of any testamentary disposition whatever of the
deceased is regarded as accepting the testament 1. If a dis-
inherited son becomes heir to a legatee and sues for the legacy,
we may iWrly consider whether he is not debarred from bringing
the impeachment ; there is no doubt about the will of the deceased,
and on the other hand it is a fact that nothing has been left him
by the testament Howerer his safest course will be to abstain
from suing for the legacy.

III.
Ok the acxiok for becovert of an inheritance.

1 Gaius (on the provmciai Edict 6) A man may have a right
to. an inheritance either by the old law or the new. By the old, ta
virtue of the Twelve Tables or of a testament made in due form
of law,

2 Ulpianus (on the Edict 15) whether the party is made heir
directly or by his own act or through some one else,

3 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 6) for example, where a
man has some person under his potestas, and, that person being
appointed heir, he orders him to enter on the inheritance ; and we
may add that if a man is made heir to Titius where the latter has
himself become heir to Beius, then, just as he may lay claim in an
action at law to the inheritance of Titiils, so he may to that of Seius
too. A man may also be heir on intestacy, as where, let us say, he
is suns heres to the deceased, or he is an agnate, or he manumitted
the deceased, or his paterfamilias manumitted him. Persons be-
come heirs by the new law whenever they are entitled to the
inheritance in virtue of a decree of the senate or of an Imperial
constitution.

4 Paulus (on the Edict 1) If I bring the action for recovery
of an inheritance (hereditaMs petitio) against a man who is in
possession of a single piece of property which is the only subject
of the contention, he [the defendant] will have to hand over equally
anything which comes into his possession afterwards.

836 Action for recovery of inheritance [book y

6 Ulpianus (an the Edict 14) The Dime Hub laid down by
rescript that the possessor of an inheritance about which a con-
tention arises is not to be allowed to sell any part of it before the
proceedings are begun, unless he likes to give security for the
whole amount of the inheritance, or for the handing over of every-
thing contained therein* However^ the PrsBtor announced by Edict
that on special ground shown, he would allow some portion of the
property to be disposed of, though no such security were given, but
only the ordinary undertaking, and that, even though the trial
had begun ; becaxise, if diminution of the property were barred al-
together, this might stand in the way of some independent desirable
objects. Suppose, for instance, something is required for funeral
expenses ; this is an object for which the Praetor allows a portion
of the property to be spent Again, suppose there is ground to
believe that if a sum of money is not paid by a given day, some
article which is pledged for the debt will be sold. A diminution of
the property will also be necessary in order to provide food for the
household ; furthermore, the Prsetor allows the sale of things which
in a short while would perish. 1. The Divine Hadrian laid down
in a rescript to Trebius Sergianus that iElius Asiaticus should give
security for the inheritance which it was sought to recover from
him ; and then, the rescript continues, he can raise the question of
the testament being foi^ged ; the point is that proceedings on the
hereditcUis petitio will be stayed while the question of forgery is
being tried. 2. A trial which is had for the recovery of an in-
heritance is of that preeminence that no other proceeding is allowed
to prejudge the question which is at issue in it

6 The same {on the Edict 75) Where a testament is allied
to be forged (Jiilsum), but a legacy is sued for in pursuance of it,
either the legacy must be paid, on an undertaking being given, or
the question must be argued as to whether the legacy is due [on
the footing of the testament itself], although the testament is
alleged to be forged. But no legacy should be paid to the person
who raises the question of forgery, if the question is once set down
for trial.

7 The same (an the Edict 14) Where any one alleges that he
has a right to his liberty in pursuance of a testament^ the judge
ought not to deliver judgment on the question of liberty, lest he
should prejudge the question for whoever wiU have to pronounce
on the testament ; this was enacted by the senate ; but the Divine
Tngan himself laid down that the trial on the question of liberty

TIT. in] Action for recovery of inheritance 387

ought to be stayed until the action for inofficiouenees is either
struck out or carried through. 1. However, trials of liberty cases
are only put off where the question of inofficiousness has reached
the stage of joinder of issue ; if the matter does not come to that
point, the question of liberty is not deferred. This is laid down in
a rescript of the Divine Pius. The facts were these. Proceedings
had been taken against one licinnianus to determine his status,
who accordingly, in order to prevent a speedy decision as to what
his legal status was, avoided appearing at the trial on the question
of liberty, declaring that he would take issue on the question of
inoflSciousness of the testament, and would then bring a heredUatis
petitio^ as his contention was that the testament made him free and
heir. Hereupon the Divine Pius lays down that if LiciDnianus had
been in possession of the inheritance, he would be in a better
position for being allowed a hearing, because then he would have
defended the action claiming to be heir-at-law, and it was open to
the party who professed to be his owner to prosecute^ the inquiry
as to an inofficious testament ; but, as it was, his servitude ought
not to be suspended for five years on the pretence that there was a
trial for inofficiousness to come in which Licinnianus himself had
not joined issue. The Emperor did, however, allow the judge to
form an opinion in a general way whether the trial on the testament
was asked for in good &ith, and ordered, in case he found that it
was, that a short period should be fixed at the end of which, if
issue had not by that time been joined, the judge who had to try
the question of liberty should be called upon to do his office.
2. But the Divine Pius [also] laid down that whenever a man has
to defend a case in which the issue is as to his own liberty and
heirship, m which, however, he does not allege that he is free by
virtue of the testament^ but that he was manumitted in some other
way, say, for instance, by the testator himself in his lifetime, then
the trial of the question of liberty ought not to be postponed, even
though it were expected that judicial proceedings would be taken
as to the testament ; it is true, the Emperor added, this was always
subject to the proviso that the judge of the question of liberty must
be warned that he was not to listen to any argument in favour of
liberty that was founded on the testament itself.

8 Paulus (on the Edict 16) A man is not prevented from
jsuing to recover a statutable inheritance on the ground that he
acted in pursuance of the will of the deceased at a time when he
did not know whether the testament was valid or not

^ M. suggests adigere for agere,

M. J. 22

340 Action far recovery of inheritance [book v

petUio heredUatis for recovery of it ; Maroellus however adds that the
woman herself is liable to a direct action^ especially if a divorce
has already taken place. 11. It is further settled that the heir
of a deceased possessor is liable to a peiiHo hereditoHs in respect
even of such things as the deceased possessed as purchaser^ on the
ground that the heir possesses ''as heir/' although he is beyond
doubt equally liable to the suit in respect of things which the
deceased possessed ''as heir" or "as possessor." 12. Where a mxa
is in possession of an inheritance on behalf of some one who is
absent, it being uncertain whether that person will ratify his action
or not, I should say that he can be called upon to defend the petitio
hereditatis on behalf of such absent person, but that he is certainly
not so liable on his own account, because a man cannot be held to
possess as heir or as possessor, who possesses as representing
another; unless indeed it should be said that, inasmuch as the
principal does not ratify, therefore the procuraiar is, so to speak,
a plunderer ; on that view he can be held liable on his own account
13. The petitio hereditatis is not good simply against a man who
possesses something or other which formed part of the inheritance ;
even if he possesses nothing, it is a fair question whether, by
volunteering to defend the suit^ though he does not possess, he
does not make himself liable. Celsus tells us {Dig. 4) that he is
liable on the ground of fraud, as a man who volunteers to defend
the petition acts fraudulently ; and Marcellus expresses his approval
of this opinion in general terms, in commenting on Julianus ; every
one, he says, who volunteers to defend a suit for recovery of the
inheritance is liable just as if he were in possession. 14. Again,
where a man uses fraud so as to avoid being in possession, he will
be liable to a petitio hereditatis. But where I lose possession with
fiuudulent intent, and then another acquires it who is prepared to
stand a trial, Marcellus {Dig. 4) discusses the Iquestion whether
thereupon any assessment of damages does not become null and
void as against the party so ceasing to possess, and, on the whole,
he says that it does, unless the party who sues has an interest in
its being held otherwise ; but at any rate, he says, there is no
doubt that the assessment becomes void if the party acquiring
possession is prepared to hand over the property. But if the party
who went out of possession with dolus is sued first, this will not
discharge the one who possesses. 15. [The petitio hereditatis
may] also [be brought] against a debtor to the estate, on the ground
that he possesses (withholds) a right ; it is settled that the petitio
may be brought against 'possessors' of a right;

TPT. in] Action for recovery of inheritance 841

14 Paulus {an the Edict 20) and whether the defendant was
liable on a delict or on a contract is a matter of indifference. The
expression ''debtor to the estate" is held to include a person who
made a promise to a slave who was part of the estate, or one who
did some damage before the inheritance was entered upon,

16 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 6) or stole something which
was part of the estate.

16 Ulpianus {on the Edict 15) But when the debt owed by
the person against whom the petitio is brought is deferred or
on condition, no judgment can be given against the debtor ; it is true
that, [in the case of such debts,] according to the opinion of
Octavenus, as reported by Pomponius, it is the time when judgment
is given that the Court must look at [on the question] whether the
day for payment has come ; the same rule, applies to a stipulation
on condition : and, if the day has not come, the defendant may be
compelied, on motion to the judge, to give security for the discharge
of the debt when the day does come, or the condition happens.
1. The petitio hereditcUis may equally be brought against a man
who is in possession of the price got for things forming part of the
inheritance, or who has received payment from a debtor to the
estate. 2. Accordingly Julianus says {Dig. 6) that where a man
brings the petitio hereditcUia, and has received the damages assessed,
he is himself liable to be sued in like manner. 3. The petition can
be brought not only against a debtor of the deceased but against a
debtor to the estate ; indeed both Cclsus and Julianus declare that
it may be brought against a person who acted for the benefit of
the estate as a voluntary agent, but that where the party was
voluntary agent for the heir it certainly cannot ; there can be no
petitio hereditatis against a debtor of the heir's. 4. According to
Julianus, where a man who was in possession as heir is ejected by
force, the petition may be brought against him as being the
possessor of a right, because he has the interdict unde vi, which he
is bound to assign, if judgment is given against him ; but the party
who ejected him is liable to be sued in the same way too, because
he is in possession ''as possessor" of things forming part of the
inheritance. 5. Julianus says further that if a man sells a portion
of the inheritance, whether, when he does so, he is in possession of
it or not, he is liable to the petition, and this whether he has been
paid the purchase money or is in a position to sue for it, he too [in
the latter case] assigning his rights of action. 6. The same writer
says that a patron cannot bring a petitio hereditatis against a man

342 Action far recovery of inheritance [book v

to whom biB freedmaii trangferred property in fraud of him the
patron, because the transferee is liable to the Galvisian action on
the part of such patron ; the transferee is in foot debtor to the patrcm
and not to the [deceased freedman's] estate. On the same principle
there can be no peUtio hereditaiU against one to whom the deceased
[freedman] made a doncUio mortis causa. 7. Again, Julianus tells
us that where a man [who assumes to be heir] hands over an
inheritance or delivers specific objects in pursuance of a Jidet-
cammissumf the petition can be brought against him, because he
has a right to bring a condictio to recover the things transferred
in [the assumed] dischai^ge of the trusty so that he is, so to speak,
the 'possessor' of a right : S. and he adds tiiat if the party shoidd by
way of discharging the trust pay over the purchase mcmey of things
which he sold, the petitio heredUatis can be brought against him,
because he has a right to recover the money. In these cases
however, so Julianus says, the defendant will only have to make
over his rights of action ; as the things themselves are in existence,
and the plaintiff can, if he likes, claim them by an action m rem.

17 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 6) If the possessor of the
inheritance should, in the belief that he is heir under the testament,
pay money out of his own pocket by way of discharging legacies,
and some one who claims ab intestato should recover the inheritance
from him, then, although it may be held to be so much the worse
for the defendant if he did not look out for himself by taking a
formal promise by stipulation that the legacies should be returned,
in case the inheritance were recovered by some one else, — still,
inasmuch as it may chance that he paid the legacies at a time when
no question had been raised, and it was for that reason that he
omitted to have any undertaking given him such as above mentioned,
the rule is that in such a case, if the inheritance is recovered, he is
to be allowed to bring an action for repayment of the money. At
the same time, where the action for repayment is allowed in the
absence of an undertaking, there is some danger of its being
impossible to recover anything by the action, owing to want of
means in the person to whom the legacy was paid ; accordingly, it
is laid down by a senaius constdtum that the party who paid is to
be relieved as follows : he is to recoup himself by retaining things
which form part of the inheritance, but he must assign his rights
of action to the plaintiff in the petitio, for him to take proceedings
in pursuance thereof at his own risk.

18 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 15) The ibliowing is a question

TFT. m] Action for recovery qf inheritance 343

wwth ooBsictering. A person in poeseBfiaon of an inheritance effects
a sale by the agency of a banker, after which the purchase money
is lost in the banker's hands ; is he liable to a petitio hereditaUs,
having regard to the &ct that he has got nothing and he can get
nothing ? Labeo hohls that he is liable, as the ill-advised credit
which he gave to the banker must be at his own risk ; but,
according to Octavenus, he will only have to assign his rights of
action, and for such rights of action he is liable to a petitio her&-
diUitia. My own view is that> in the case of a person who was in
possession in bad faith, Labeo's opinion is the sound one ; but in the
other case, that of a banajide possessor, I should say that Octavenus's
opinion is the one to follow. 1. Where proceedings are being taken
by way of petitio hereditaOs against one who is not in possession
of a thing, nor, so to speak, of a rights at the time, but who after-
wards gets hold of one of the two, will he be held liable to the
petition ? Celsus lays down quite correctly (Dig. 4) that the order
may be very properly made upon him, though at first he did not
possess anything. 2. We may now consider what kind of subject-
matter is embraced by the petitio hereditaJtis. As to this, the rule
is that the a^ion comprises eveiy kind of thing that forms part
of an inheritance, whether it consists of a right or of a material
object

19 Paulus {on the Edict 20) In fieu^ it includes not only
objects forming part of the inheritance, but even those which do
not form part of it, but which nevertheless are at the risk of the
heir, such as things pledged with the deceased, or lent to him or
deposited in his custody. As to things given in pledge, there is a
right of action to recover them separately, though they are still
comprised in the petitio hereditatis too, like things in respect of
which the Publician action lies. It is true that there can hardly
be any [separate] action in respect of objects which have been
lent or deposited, still as people are subject to risk in regard of
them, it is fair that they should be given up. 1. But if the
period necessary for acquiring by um8 as purchaser should have
been completed by the heir himself, a thing so acquired will not be
comprised in the petitio heredttatiSy because the heir, that is, the
person who would be plaintiff in the petitio^ has a good vindicoMo^
and there is no ea)ceptio allowed to the defendant in possession.
2. The petitio hereditaiis further comprises things as to which the
[deceased being] possessor had a right of retention, though not a
right of action for their recovery ; for instance, where the deceased

844 Adion far recovery of inherUance [book v

swore that a thing was not the properly of some one who sued
him to recover it and, after that, died, this too mnst be handed over.
Indeed even where the possessor of the thing has lost it by his own
negligence, he will be liable acoordingly. A similar rule applies to
a plunderer, although he is not liable on the ground of negligence ;
simply he has no right to keep the property in his possession.
3. I have always maintained the opinion that where an inheritance
has to be given up, servitudes are not included, because there is
nothing which can be given up under that head, as there is in the
case of material things and the profits derived from them ; but if
the owner of the servient land refuses to allow free passage he
can be sued in the appropriate action.

20 Ulpianus {on the Edict 20) The inheritance [to be sued for]
further comprises whatever was procured in order to preserve the
estate, as, for example, slaves, cattle, and anything else which was pro-
curedas a matterof necessity for the benefitof the estate. Where such
things were bought with money which formed part of the inheritance,
they are beyond all doubt comprised ; if they were not so bought,
it is a question for us to consider whether they are comprised ; but
I should say they are even then, if some great advantage to the
inheritance is involved ; of course the heir must make good the
purchase-money. 1. At the same time it is not everything that is
bought with money forming part of the inheritance that is comprised
in the petith. Julianus, for instance, tells us {Dig. 6) that if the
possessor bought a slave with money which was part of the inherit-
ance, and then the petUio hereditoMs is brought against him, the
slave will only be comprised in a case where it was an advantage
to the inheritance that he should be purchased ; if the possessor
bought the slave for his own convenience, then what is comprised
is the price which he gave for him. 2. On the same principle,
suppose the possessor sold land belonging to the inheritance, — ^if
he had no good reason for doing so, then, according to Julianus,
the land itself with mesne profits is comprised in the suit ; but if
he did it for the purpose of paying a debt due from the estate, all
that is comprised is the price which he received. 3. The things
comprised in the petitio, he goes on to say, are not simply such as
existed at the moment of the death, but any increase that accrues
to the inheritance subsequently ; an inheritance does, as a matter
of fact, admit of increase and decrease. Anything which accrues
after the inheritance has been entered upon, if it is produced
out of the inheritance itself, will, I should say, accrue to the

TIT. m] AcHan for recovery of inheritance 346

inheritance, but if it comes from some other sonrce, it will not ; such
things go to the possessor personally. All produce is so much
addition to the inheritance, whether it accrued after or before
entry on the inheritance ; and the children bom of female slaves no
doubt accrue to the inheritance. 4. Whereas the statement was
made above that all actions the right to which is part of the estate
are comprised in the petUiOj the question arises whether they carry
with them their regular character or not For instance, suppose
an action in which the measure of damages is increased by the
defendant's denial : does the right to this action carry the right to
the increase with it^ or is it open only for the simple amount?
Take the action under the lex AquUia. Julianus tells us (Dig. 6)
that the defendant will have to pay the simple amount. 5. The same
writer says, and very justly, that if the possessor should have had
judgment given against him in a noxal action brought by the
deceased, he cannot now get off on motion by a surrender for nooMHy
because a man is only allowed to make such a surrender up to the
time of an action against him on the judgment, but after he has
become defendant in that action, he cannot free himself by a
surrender for noxa ; and in &ct he has been made such a defendant
by means of the petitio hereditatia. 6. Besides the above, we find a
great many questions discussed relative to the petitio hereditaiiBy to
the sale of the assets of deceased persons, to past fraud and to mesne
profits. But as an express rule was laid down on these subjects
by a decree of the senate, the best plan is to give the text of the
decree and a|^nd an explanation. '* On the fourteenth of March
Quintus Julius Balbus and Publius Juventius Celsus, Titus Aufidius,
(Enus Severianus, consuls, expressed themselves on the subject of
those matters which the Emperor Csesar, son of [the Divine]
Tn^anus the Parthian conqueror and grandson of the Divine Nerva,
Hadrianus Augustus, Emperor and mighty Prince on the third of
March last preceding propounded and set forth in a bill as to what
he desired should be done, whereon they resolved as follows : —
6 a. 'Whereas, before such portions of the goods of Rusticus as fell
to the State were sued for by the Treasury, those persons who
deemed themselves the heirs sold the inheritance, we hold that
interest ought not to be demanded on the purchase money received
as the price of the things sold, and the same rule must be observed
in similar cases. 6 b. We hold further that, if judgment were given
against those persons who were defendants to the petitio hereditcUiSf
they would be bound to pay over the purchase money which came
to their hands as the price of any ofcgects included in the inheritance

846 Action for recovery of inheritance [book ▼

which were sold, even though such objects were destroyed or
damaged before the peiitio was brought 6 c Furthermore, that
where any persons should have laid hands on the goods of the
deceased, knowing that they did not belong to th^u, even though
they contrived before joinder of issue to avoid being in possession
of them, judgment ought to be passed upon them just as much as
if they were in possession ; but^ wherever they should have had
reasonable ground to believe that the goods belonged to them, the
judgment should be only for the amount to which they were
enriched by what they had done. 6 d. The senate held that the
petitio herediiatis must be deemed to have been brought for the
Treasury so soon only as the party knows that it is being brought
against him, that is, so soon as it is notified to him or he is sum-
moned by a letter or citation V We have now therefore to apply
the proper interpretation to the separate terms of this enactment
7. The Senate says: '^ Whereas, before such portion of the goods
as fell to the State were sued for by the Treasury" etc. What took
place was that portions which escheated to the State were sued
for by the Treasury, but if the demand had been for the whole
inheritance, the decree of the senate would apply equally, and if it
were a case of unclaimed property being sued for by the Treasury,
or goods which came to it on any other title, 8. still the decree of
the senate would apply, and it would be the same thing if the claim
were made by a municipality. 9. Moreover no one doubts that
where the petitio is brought by a private person, the decree of the
senate will apply equally, although it was made with reference to a
demand of the State. 10. It may be added that the decree is not
put in force solely with reference to inheritances, it is applied
equally to H,peciUivm ocigtrefiae or any other collective unit of
property (universitas), 11. As for the words ''the petitio heredi-
iatis must be deemed to have been brought so soon" etc.: this
means so soon only as the party knows that the inheritance is being
demanded of him at law, because, the moment he knows this he
becomes at once a mcda fide possessor. ''That is, so soon as it is
notified to him'* etc: suppose however he knows that the suit is
being brought, but still nobody notified it to him, will he from that
time be chargeable with interest on money realized by sale of the
goods ? I should say that he will, because from that time he is a
mala fide possessor. Let us suppose on the other hand that the
notification was made, but the party does not know, because notice
was given not to himself but to his procurator. Then, as the
senate required that notification should be given to the party

TIT. mj Action far recovery of inheritance 347

himfiolf, it will not affect bim, unleBB indeed the person to whom it
was given informed him, but [it will] not [affect him] where, though
he was aUe to inform him, he omitted to do aa As to the question
who the person must be by whom the notification is given, the
s^iate lays down no rule on the subject ; accordingly the notice
will be effectual whoever it is that gives it. 12. The above relates
to tiie case of bauaftde possessors, as the words of the decree are
''those persons who deemed themselves the heirs" ; where however
a man sells an inheritance which he knows does not belong to him,
then, beyond all doubt^ what is demandable in the petitio
hereditatis is not the purchase money of the things sold, but the
things themselves and the mesne profits of the same. However
the Emperor Severus in a letter to Celer is clearly shown to have
applied the rule to mala fide possessors as well, though the decree
of the Senate only mentions those who deem themselves heirs ;
(unless indeed we assume the words [of Severus] to refer to such
things as it was desirable to sell because they were a burden rather
than a profit to the inheritance ;) the result being to leave it in
the power of the applicant to dioose what sort of charge he will
make on the mala fide possessor, iwe. whether he will charge him
with the thing itself and the profits or with the purchase money
and interest from the date of the action being brought 1.3. The
senate speaks of persons who deem themselves to be heirs; if
however they deem themselves to be bonorum possessares or lawful
successors of any other kind, or aver that the inheritance has been
hand€$d over to them [in pursuance of 9l fideicommi8W.m]f they
will be in the same position. 14. Papinianus says however
(Questiona b.3) that if the possessor of an inheritance leaves un^
touched money which was found among the heritable effects of the
deceased, he can by no means be sued for interest 15. The decree
says interest '' on the purchase money received as the price of the
things sold." We must understand by purchase money received
not merely money got in already, but money which might have
been got in though it never was. 16. How if the possessor sell
things after the petitio hereditatis has been brought ? In such a
cafie the things themselves and the mesne profits will be comprised
in the petitio. Should they however be things of such a kind that
they could yield no profits or were liable to perish by lapse of
time, but they were sold at their full value, perhaps the plaintiff in
the petitio may elect to have the purchase money handed over with
interest 17. The decree proceeds : — " We hold that if judgment
were given against those persons who were defendants to the

348 Action for recovery of inheritance [book v

petitio hereditoiiisy they would be bound to pay over the purchase
money which came to their hands as the price of any objects
included in the inheritance which were sold, even though such
objects were destroyed or damaged before the petitio hereditatis was
brought/' If it is a bonafde possesscM* who sells things belonging
to the inheritance, whether he received the purchase money or not,
as [at least] he has a right of action for it, he will be bound to
make good the amount to the applicant ; however, where he has a
right of action, it will be enough to assign such right 1& If the
possessor sold something, and the true owner afterwards got judg-
ment to recover it, whereupon the possessor restored the price he
received for it, the money cannot be said to have come to his hands ;
though indeed it might be said that at the outset the purchase
money is not comprised in the peHtio, because the thing sold was
not part of the inheritance ; however although what is mentioned
in the decree of the senate is not the sale of things which form
part of the inheritance but the sale of things out of the inherit-
ance, still he need not pay over this money, as nothing is left in
his hands. In fact Julkmus himself (Dig. h. 6) tells us that the
possessor will not have to make good to the applicant money
received by him which was not really due, nor on the other hand
can he credit himself with any money that he paid which was not
owing. 1 9. Again, if some article has been returned [by a purchaser
Arom the possessor] by way of redhibition, then, no doubt, it is
part of the inheritance, and the purchase money which was refunded
will not be comprised in the petitio hereditatis. 20. Add that
if the possessor of the inheritance is bound to the purchsuser in
pursuance of the contract of sale, his case must be held to be
sufficiently provided for by [the petitioner's] undertaking. 21. But
the possessor is bound to hand over the purchase money for things
sold, even where the things themselves are destroyed or lost. Here
this question arises: is he bound to hand over the money only
where he is possessor in good faith, or equally where he was such
in bad faith ? As to this, if the things are still in existence in the
hands of the purchaser, and are not destroyed or lost, then, no
doubt, a mala Jide possessor is bound to hand over the actual
things, or, if he cannot possibly recover them from the purchaser,
he must pay damages to the amount assessed by the plaintiff on
oath at the trial. But, where the things are destroyed or lost,
the actual value ought to be given, because if the plaintiff had got
the thing itself, he could have sold it, and then he would not have
failed to get the actual value.

TET. m] Action far recovery of inheritcmee 349

21 Gaius {on ihe provineial Edict 6) A thing is regarded as
destroyed (deperditum) when it has ceased to exist in this world ;
it is lost (demiimtum) if is it acquired by some one else by U99i8y
and has so been taken out of the inheritance.

22 Paulus (on the Edict 20) If the bona fide possessor has
[now] got both the thing and the purchase money, for instance,
because he bought the thing back, will he be allowed to say that
he would rather give up the thing, and not the purchase money ?
In the case of a depredator the rule laid down is that it is the
plaintiff who should be allowed to elect ; must we rather say here
that the possessor in question has a good right to be heard, if he
desires to hand over the thing itself, though deteriorated, but the
plaintiff in the petitio hereditcUiSf if he desires to have the purchase
money, will be refused a hearing, on the ground that this last is an
unconscionable demand, or must we say that, as the purchaser is
the richer by something contained in the inheritance, he ought to
hand over along with the thing so much of the purchase money as
is in excess of the present value ? This is a point to consider. In
an address of the Divine Hadrian we find this passage : — '* You
must consider, conscript fathers, whether it is not the fairest rule
that the possessor should not make a profit, but should give up
the price which he received for another man*s goods, as it may be
held that the purchase money received for the thing sold, where
such thing formed part of the estate of the deceased, takes the
place of the thing itself, and has in a certain sense become a portion
of such estate." Accordingly the possessor will be bound to give
up to the plaintiff both the thing itself and the profit he made by
the sale of it.

23 UlpUlNUS (on the Edict 15) It is a fair question whether
the bona fide possessor will be bound to give up the purchase
money in all cases, or only where he is the richer by it ; suppose,
for instance, after receiving the money, he lost it or spent it or
gave it away. As to the expression '^came to their hands,** it is
doubtful whether it only refers to what there was at the outset^
or the phrase applies equally to what remains; but I should
say [that it must refer to what remains, on account of ^] the next
clause in the decree (though that is ambiguous too), so that no
demand can be made except where the party is enriched. I. Ac-
cordingly, if what comes to the possessor's hands is not the
purchase money alone, but a penalty too, in consequence of the

» 01 M.

I

860 Action far recovery of mheritance [book y

money being in arrears when paid, it may be said that tiiia was
comprised as well, as the party is enriched to that full ext^it;
although the decree of the senate only mentioned the purchase
money.

24 Paulus (on the Edict 20) Where the possessor is turned
out by force, he is not bound to hand over a penalty which became
due to him thereon, that being a thing to whidi the plaintiff has
no right On the same principle he is not bound to hand over a
penal sum which some defendant to an action promised to pay him
in case he should fail to appear at the trial.

26 XTlpianus {on the Edict 15) Again if he sold part of the
inheritance with a hx commiasoria (an agreement avoiding the
sale on non-payment), it must be said, in accordance with the
above, that he will have to hand over any gain he made in con-
sequence of such agreement. 1. Moreover, if he sold anything
and bought something else with the purchase money, the petitio
hereditatis will comprise the purchase money, not the thing of
which he acquired the ownership. If the thing [which he bought]
is worth less than the sum for which it was boughti he will be
regarded as enriched to the extent only of the value of the thing ;
on the principle on which, if he had consumed the thing [to any
extent], he would not be regarded as enriched to the extent of its
full value. 2. Where the decree says " where any persons should
have laid hands on the goods of the deceased, knowing that they
did not belong to them, even though they contrived before joinder
of issue to avoid being in possession of them, judgment ought to
be passed upon them just as much as if they were in possession,''
these words must be taken to imply that past dolus as well as
present is to be brought into account in the petitio hereditcUis,
and, in fact^ ctdpa (negligence) too. Consequently the proceedings
can be brought against a person who failed to get in a debt to the
estate from a third person or even from himself, supposing the
debt is now extinguished by lapse of time ; that is, at any rate, if
it was in his power to do sa 3. As for the words '^ where any
persons should have laid hands on the goods," the decree here
refers to depredators, that is to say, persons who lay hands on the
goods knowing that the inheritance does not belong to them, in
short, having no good ground for taking possession. 4 With
regard to profits^, it is held that they will have to make good not
merely what they realized but what they ought to have realized.

^ del inquit M.

TTT. in] Actum far recovery of inheritance 861

5. The deeree is referring to the case of a person who lays hold of
goods belonging to the inheritance having at the outset predatory
intentions Where a man however at the outset had some lawfiil
ground for taking possession, but afterwards, having become aware
that the inheritance in no sort belonged to him, thereupon con-
ducted himself in predatory fashion, the decree says nothing
directly about him ; nevertheless I should say that the intention
of the decree includes this case too ; it makes very little difference
whether a man acted with malice in respect of the inheritance from
the very first or only began to do so later on. 6. With regard to
the party^s knowing that the inheritance does not belong to him,
is a man held to be in this position simply where he knows the
fitcts of the case, or do the words not exclude one who is mis-
taken about the law^? He may have thought that a testament
was made in due form when it was really void, or that the
succession db iniestato was open to him in preference to some
other agnate who really preceded him. I should say that a man
is not a depredator who has no wrong intention, though he should
be mistaken about the law. 7. The decree proceeds : " though
they^ contrive before joinder of issue" etc. The reason why these
words are added is that after joinder of issue, indeed after pro-
ceedings are begun, every possessor is at once mcUa fide. It is
true that in the decree of the senate jmnder of issue alone is
referred to, but, in spite of this, as soon as ever proceedings are
commenced, all possessors are on the same footing and are liable
as depredators ; and this is the present practice ; as soon as the
party is challenged he knows from that moment that he is in
possession of something which does not belong to him ; and
when a man is a depredator, he will be held liable on the ground
of dolus even before joinder of issue ; it would be a case of past
dohji;^. 8. ^^ Judgment" it proceeds '^ ought to be passed upon
them just as much as if they were in possession." This is quite
right; where a man contrives fraudulently to avoid being in
possession, he is liable to adverse judgment just as if he were
in possession. This rule holds equally, whether he contrives
ftt^udulently to cease to possess or to avoid taking possession.
The above clause will apply whether the thing is in the possession
of some one else or has ceased to exist at all ; hence if some one
else is possessor, the petUio hereditatis can be bi*ought against

^ Ad iemum : the text aBks whether the words indnde one who does not
know the law as well as one who knows the facts, which is absurd, \i factum
does not include Jm. ' B^&iAfeeerini for fecerit Cf. M.

862 Action for recovery of inheritance [book y

both persons alike, and if the possession passes from one to
another through a number of persons in succession, they will all
be held liable. 9. Is it however only the person in possession
who will have to pay over mesne profits, or is it equally one who
contrived to avoid being in possession ? As to this, after the decree
of the senate, we are bound to say that both are liable. 10. The
above words of the decree allow of an oath being employed in an
action even against a man who is not in possession, as a plaintiff
may swear to the amount just afi much where the defendant con-
trived to avoid being in possession as where he is in possession.
11. The senate consulted the interests of bonajide possessors so
&r as to secure that they should not have to bear the loss to the
full extent, but only be obliged to pay to the extent to which
they are enriched. Accordingly, any expenditure which they have
made out of the inheritance itself, as by squandering anything or
losing anything, thinking all the while that they were making away
with their own property, they will not have to make good. Again,
if they give anything away, they will not be held to be enriched
with reference to such property, though they put some one imder
a natural obligation to requite them. No doubt if they have
received some donation in return, then it must be said that they
are enriched to the extent of the gift so received ; the case would
be much the same thing as a kind of exchanga 12. Where a man
spends his own money more lavishly in consideration of his having
come in for an inheritance, Marcellus holds {Dig. 6) that he will
nevertheless have to hand over the estate without any deduction,
if he has left the inheritance untouched. 13. The same rule holds
if he borrowed money, as though he were well off, [but] deceived
himself in the matter. 14. If however he pledged for debt things
forming part of the inheritance, we may fairly ask whether the
inheritance is touched even then ; but it can hardly be said that it
is, as he is personally liable for the debt. 15. So true is it that
a man is not held liable who is not enriched, that in a case where
a man [is made heir to half an inheritance and^], thinking himself
to be sole heir, wastes with no dishonest intent half the estate^
Marcellus discusses the question {Dig. 4) whether he b not free
from any liability on the ground that what he spent came out of
what did not belong to him but to his coheirs ; his point being that
even where a man who is not heir at all wastes all he had in his
hands, whatever it was, there is no doubt that he is not liable, on
the ground that he is not the richer. As to the question itself,

1 C£ M.

TIT. m] Action far recovery of mherUanee 363

there being three views suggestedy one the view first
[viz. that the party in question is not liable at all], then a second,
Tiz. that it may be said that he ought to hand over all that
remains in his hands, on the ground that what he spent was his
own share, thirdly the view that the amount lost ought to be
charged equally on both shares, — ^Marcellus says that he certainly
ought to hand over s(Mnething or other, but he is in doubt whether
to say that he must hand over the whole or a part However
I should say that he is not bound to hand over the whole balance
remaining in his hands, but a moiety thereof. 16. When a man
has spent part of an inheritance [under the above dreumstauoes],
will the whole loss fall on the estate, or will a proportion come out
of his private proi>erty^? Suppose, for instance, the possessor
drinks up the whole stock of wine belonging to the estate of the
deceased : will the whole amount be charged cm the inheritance, or
wiU something be charged to the man's own property ? The latter
construction would of course imply that he was held to be the
richer by whatever amount it was he was in the habit of spending
[on wine] before the inheritance came to him ; so that if he b^gan
to spend on a more liberal scale in consideration of the inheritance,
he would not be regarded as the richer to the extent of such
excess, but he would be so regarded to the extent of his habitual
outlay ; since granting that [except for the inheritance] he would
not have spent in such a lavish style, still he would anyway have
spent something or other on daily meals. The Divine Marcus
himself, in the case of one Pythodorus, who had been requested
to hand over so much of the inheritance as might remain in his
hands, decided that as to things whidi had been disposed of with-
out any design of diminishing the fideicommissaiy gift and the
price of which had not gone to augment Pythodorus's private
estate, the loss must fall both on his private estate and on the
inheritance, not on the inheritance alone. Consequently in the
above case it will be a point to consider whether the possessor's
usual outlay is to come out of the inheritance in accordance with
the rescript of the Divine Marcus, or out of his own pocket alone,
and the better opinion is that those expenses must come out of his
own pocket which he would have incurred even if he had not been
heir. 17. Again, if the bona fide possessor has made a sale and
is not the richer by the purchase money, can the plaintiff in the
petitio hereditatis recover the separate articles from the purchaser,
assuming that they have not been acquired by tisus ? and, if he

^ Read patrimonio for patrimaniu Gf. M. et seq.
M. J. 23

364 Action for recovery of inheritance [book v

attemptB to do so, is he not liable to be barred by an excepUo
audi as this: — ''so fiur as the question of heirship would not be
prejudged as between the plaintiff and the [defendant's] Tender/'
on the ground that the petiUo kenditatis cannot be hdd to
comprise the purchase money of the tilings in question, although
the purchaser, if the case goes against him, has a claim to recoup
himself at the expense of the vendor. To this I should say that
the thing can be recoTored, vmles8 the purehaser can come down
upon the bona fide po$9e8gar\ How will it be however if the party
who sold is prepared to defend the case on the petitio so as to let
himself be sued as though he were in possession ? In this case
an exeeptio would at once be admissible on the part of the
purchaser. There is no doubt that if the things were sold for a
small price and the plaintiff in the petiUo recovers the money,
whatever the amount^ then much more may it be said that there
is a good exeeptio against him [on the part of the purchaser] ;
since the law is, so Julianus informs us {Dig. b. 4), that where
the possessor pays the plaintiff in the petitio the money which
he has himself got in from debtors to the estate, these latter are
discharged, whether the party who got the debts in was a bona
fide possessor or a depredator, and they are discharged directly
(ipso jure). 18. A peiUio hereditaUSy though it is an action in
rem, still is a means of enforcing some personal performances,
for instance, the payment of money received from debtors, also
the purchase money of things sold. 19. The above decree of the
senate, though it was made in aid of the peiitio hereditatis is
held to be applicable to the action famUim ereisewndae, else we
should have this absurdity that there might in respect of the same
thing be an action to recover it but not an action to divide it
20. The young of flocks and cattle go to increase the inherit-
ance;

26 Paulus {on the Edict 20) and if lambs are born, and after-
wards others bom of the firsts the latter also must be handed over
as an accretion to the estate.

27 ULPLAirtrs (on the Edict 15) The children of female slaves
and the children of their female children are not regarded as profits,
because it is not a usual thing for female slaves to be procured with
a view to the breeding of children, still such children go to increase
the inheritance ; and there is no doubt, seeing that they all fidl
into the estate, that the possessor is bound to hand them over,

^ Perhaps iQteipol&ted. Of. M.

TIT. m] Action for recovery of inheritance 866

rappoeing that he i» in possession of them, or that, after the
petitio was brought, he fbiudulently contrived to avoid being in
possession. 1. Again, rents which are collected from lessees of
buildings will be comprised in the petUio hereditatis, even where
the tenement leased is a brothel : there are brothels kept on the
estates of a great many respectable proprietors :

28 Paulus (on the Edict 20) and after the decree of the senate
we are bound to hold that every kind of gain can be taken over
both from honafde possessors and depredators.

29 ULPIAN0S (on the Edict 15) Any consideration paid by
agricultural tenants is treated as profits. Money received for the
services of slaves is in the same case as rents are, and so are
payments taken for the hire of ships or of horses.

SO Paulus {on the Edict 20) Julianus says that the plaintiff
ought to elect whether he will claim the principal sum simply or
the interest too, taking an assignment of the right of action at his
own risk. However according to that we shall be varying the
practice from what the senate intended ; which was that the bona
fide possessor should be liable to the extent to which he was
enriched ; and how if the plaintiff were to elect to have money
which the defendant had been unable to keep ? The proper rule
therefore is, in the case of a bona fide possessor, that all that he is
bound to hand over is either the principal and interest thereon if
he received any interest, or else, [if he prefers it,] his right of
action, making an assignment of the same for such amoimt as is
still owing him in virtue of such right ; all this at the risk of the
plaintiff

81 Ulpianus {on the Edict 16) If the possessor has paid any
debts, he can set them off, although he will not have directly
discharged the plaintiff to the petitio, as a i)ayment which a man
makes on his own account and not on account of the debtor does
not discharge the debtor. Accordingly Julianus says {Dig. b. 6)
that the possessor can only take credit for such payments where he
undertakes that he wfll defend^ actions brought against the plaintiff
to the petUio. Whether it goes as far as this, that even a bona
fide possessor is bound to undertake that the plaintiff shall be
defended, is a thing to consider, as he is not enriched in respect of
what he paid ; unless indeed it so happen that he has a condictio
to recover it, and so far is the richer, as he can sue to get the

1 Ins. a before #«. Gf. M.

28—2

856 Action for recovery of wheritcmce [book v

money back ; Buppoae, for inBtanoe, thinkiiig himself to be the
heir, he paid on his own account But JulianuB septus to me to
have been thinking only about a depredator when he spoke of his
giving the above undertaking, and not about a bona fide possessor.
However the latter will have to assign the [right of] eowUdio.
If the plaintiff in the petUio is himself sued by the creditors
[after the possessor has paid the debts], he will have to plead the
payment by way of exceptio. 1. If anything was owing [from the
inheritance] to the depredator himself, he will not be allowed to
deduct it ; especially if it was a debt only owing by way of natural
obligation. But how if the plaintiff would benefit by the debt
being discharged, because it was owing und^ a pensdty, or for
any other reason? [In that case] it may be held that he [the
depredator] has paid himself or ought to have done so. 2. But
a rightful possessor beyond all doubt ought to deduct what is owing
to him. 3. Just as a possessor may deduct expense which he
incurred, in the same way, if he ought to have incurred expense
and did not do so, he must answer for his negligence, unless he is
a bona fide possessor ; in that case, as he neglected the matter
because he regarded it as his own affair, there is nothing for which
he can be sued up to the time when the petitio heredUatis is
brought ; but from that time he is a depredator himself. 4. One
thing no doubt a depredator cannot be called to account for, vis.
allowing debtors to be discharged [by lapse of time], or waiting till
they were too poor to pay, instead of suing them at once, the &ct
being that he had no right of action. 5. It is worth considering
whether the possessor is bound to hand over what has been paid
him ; but whether he was a bona fide possessor or not, it is held
that he ought to hand it over, and that, if he does hand it over,
as Cassius tells us and Julianus too (b. 6), this is a direct discharge
to the debtors.

32 Paulus {on the Edict 20) Things acquired through a slave
must be handed over to the heir ; (the same principle is followed
both in the case of the inheritance of a freedman and in that of
proceedings on an inofficious testament ; where, for the time being,
the slave belongs to the heir,)

33 Ulpianus (on fhs Edict 16) unless the slave made [the
acquisition through] a stipulation founded on the property of {ex re)
such heir. 1. Julianus telh us that, if the possessor has sold a
slave, then, where the slave was not required for purposes con-
nected with the inheritance, he can be called upon in die petitio

i

TTT. m] Action for recovery of inheritance 867

hereditaUs to hand orer the purchase money ; as, in ^act, he would
hare been debited with it, if he had not sold him ; but, where
the slave was cm> required, the slave himself must be handed over,
if he is living, though, if he is dead, perhaps not even the purchase
money ; however Julianus tells us that the judge who hears the
case will not allow the possessor to put the purchase money in his
poi^et, and this is the better opinion.

34 Paulus {on the Edict 20) I should say that, where the
inheritance of a JUiusfamilicLS who is a soldier comes to any one
by testament, it may be sued for by ^petitio hereditcUis. h Where
a slave or a JUiasfa/mUiaa has got in his hands things which are
part of an inheritance, the petitio hereditaria can be brought against
the owner or the paterfamilias [as the case may be,] if it is in his
power to hand the things over. At any rate, if the owner has got
the purchase money of things forming part of the inheritance as
part of the slave's peculium, then, in Julianus's own opinion, the
petitio can be brought against the owner, this latter being regarded
as in possession of a right

86 Oaius {on the pramndai Edict 6) Julianus also says that
9^ petitio hereditatis can be brought against the owner, as being in
possession of a right, even where the slave has not yet received the
purchase money for things sold, on the ground that the owner has
a right of action by means of which he can get the money, which
right of action a person may very well acquire without knowing it

86 Patjlus {on the Edict 20) Where the petitio hereditatia
is brought against an owner or a father who is in possession of
purchase money, ought the proceedings to be taken within a year
after the death of the son or the slave, or the manumission of the
slave or the emancipation of the son ? again, can the owner or the
fother deduct what is owing to himself? Julianus says that the
better opinion is, — and Proculus lays down the same rule, — that
the action is subject to no limitation in point of timie, and that the
defendant's own debt cannot be deducted, as it is not a case of an
action depeculio, but of a petitio hereditatiB. This is perfectly sound
where the slave or the son has got the purchase money ; but if the
reason why the petitio hereditatia is brought against the owner is
that the debtor was a slave, the matter ought to be treated as
though it were a case of an action de peculio. According to
Mauridanus, the rule is the same, even where the slave or the son
wastes the money which he makes by the price, but it can be paid
some way or other out of the pecidium. 1. But there is no doubt

868 AcUan for recawry of inherUanee [book v

that the peiHio can equally well be brought directly agaiuftt a
/Uiutj/amiUas, fduce he has it in his power to hand the property
pver, just as he has to produce it if sued ad eaMbendunu Much
more is it held that the petUio can be brought against a fitiu^
founilias who, when he was a pateffamilias and in possession of
the inheritance, gave himsdf in arrogation. 2. If the possessor
kills a slave who is part of the inheritance, the petUio hereditaiis
will comprise a demand on that head : Pomponius however says
that the plaintiff is bound to choose whether he would like judg-
ment to be given in his favour against the possessor, he himself
giving an undertaking that he will not proceed on the lex AquUta,
or be would prefer to reserve full right of action on the lex Aquilia,
and forbear to have the damage in question ascertained by the
judge [on the hearing of the petitio]. This right of election exists
where the slave was killed before entry was made on the inherit-
ance ; if it was done afterwards, then the right of action becomes
the heir's personal right, and it is not comprised in the petitio
hereditatis. 3. If a depredator discontinues possession craftily, and
the thing is destroyed in some way in which it would have equally
been destroyed if he had continued in possession on the same
footing as before, then, looking at the actual words of the decree
of the senate, the depredator is in a better legal position than the
bonajide possessor, because where a depredator craftily discontinues
possession, the same order is made upon him as if he were still in
possession, and the decree does not go on to say [what is to
happen^] if the thing is destroyed. At the same time there is no
doubt that the depredator ought not to be in a better position than
a bona fide possessor. According to this it must be added that, if
the tiling is sold for more than.it is worth, the plaintiff ought to be
at liberty to elect to take the purchase money ; otherwise the
depredator will make a profit 4. There is some doubt on the
question to what moment the enrichment of the bona fide possessor
refers ; but, on the whole, the true view is that it is the time when
judgment is given. 5. In speaking of profits, the cost is supposed
to be deducted which is incurred for the purpose of producing,
collecting and preserving the profits themselves : this is absolutely
required on principles of natural justice not only in the case of
bona fide possessors, but even of depredators, as Sabinus himself
holds.

87 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 15) Where the party has made an

^ V. M.

TIT* m] Actu>n for reewery of inheHtaiwe 859

outlay, but realiied no peofitB» it is perfectly just that even then
the outlay should be allowed for in the case otbatuijide possesson.

88 Paulxts {on the Edict 20) It is held, no doubt, with reference
to necessary and useful expenditure in general that the two can be
estimated separately, so that bona fide possessors should be credited
with the latter as well, but a depredator has only himself to blame,
if he chose with his eyes open to lay out money on another man's
property. However it is more liberal, even in the case of this last,
that his outlay should be taken into account, (after all, the plaintiff
ought not to make a profit out of another man's loss,) and it will
be part of the judge's duty to make this allowance as a matter
of course ; in fitct, no exoeptio on the ground of dolus modus is
required There may, no doubt, be this difference between the
bona fide and the mcdafide possessor in the matter, that the former
can deduct his outlay at all events, though the subject matter on
which it was made has ceased to exist, just as a guardian or curator
has his expenses allowed, but a depredator can only make the
deduction where the subject matter is improved by the outlay.

89 Qaius (on the provincial Edict 6) Expenditure is held both
useful and necessaiy where it is incurred for the repair of buildingB,or
for plantations of young trees, or in cases in which damages asseeeed
in a [noxal] action are paid in respect of a slave, because it is more
worth while to make such payment than to surrender the dave
himself ; and it is manifest that there must be a great many other
occasions of outlay of the same kind. 1. It may however be
reasonably considered whether a man has not just as good an
exoeptio doli in respect of an outlay on pictures and sculptures and
other otgets de luxe ; that is, so long as he is a bona fide possessor;
of course, a depredator may very properly be told that he ought
not to have gone into unnecessary expense on anotUer man's
property ; provided it is always open to him to take away whatever
can be removed without ii\]ury to the property.

40 Paulus {on the Edict 20) It may be added that the provision
in the address of the Divine Hadrian to the effect that when the
parties are at issue there ought to be made good to the plaintiff
whatever he would have bad, if the inheritance had been handed
over to him at the time of the action being brought, sometimes acts
oppressively. Suppose, for instance, after joinder of issue, slaves
or horses or cattle die : in such a case, according to the words of
the enactment, the possessor will be ordered to make good the
deficiency, because, if tiie inheritance had be^i handed over, the

360 Action far recovery of inheritance [book t

plamtiff could have eold them, l^ie order woiild» acoording to
Proculufl, be perfectly right in a case where the peiitio is brought
to recover a specific thing ; but Cassius holds otherwise. Where
the possessor is a depredator, the opinion of Proculus is sound,
but Cassius is right where the possession is honafide ; as a possessor
is not bound to guarantee the plaintiff against the event of death,
or from fear of such a mishap to leave his own claim undefended
without more. 1. A depredator does not acquire a right to mesne
profits, they go with the estate ; consequently he must in fiict make
good the profits derived from such profits. But, in the case of a
l>ona fide possessor, those profits only will be comprised in the
order for handing over the inheritance, as an increment thereof,
by which the possessor has become the richer. 2. If the possessor
has acquired any rights of action, he must assign them, if the
inheritance is recovered from him ; for instance where he is entitled
to an interdictum unde vi, or has granted property in precariunu
Add, to take a converse case, that if the possessor has given an
undertaking against damnum ir^fectumy the plaintiff must undertake
to indemnify him. 3. Noxal actions too come within the scope
of the judge's duty, so that, if the possessor is prepared to surrender
for noxa a slave who has done any damage to something which is
part of the inheritance, or has committed a theft in respect of it^
he will be discharged, on the principle of the rule applied in the case
of the interdict quod vi ant clam.

41 Qaiub (on the provincial Edict 6) If, at the time when the
possessor of the inheritance was sued, the things which he had in
his possession were somewhat few in number, but he afterwards
took into possession some others besides, he will, if the application
is successful, have to hand over these as well, whether he acquired
the possession after or before the joinder of issue : and if the
sureties he found are not sufficient for the whole matter at stake,
the proconsul must call upon him to give suitable security. If, to
take the converse case, he comes afterwards to be in possession of
fewer things than he possessed originally, provided this happens
without any craft of his own, the case against him must fidl as feur
as those things are concerned which he ceases to possess.. 1. Ac-
cording to Julianus, the possessor must include in what he brings
into account the mesne profits derived from such things as the
deceased had in his hands as pledges for debt

42 .Ulpianus (on the Edict 67) If a debtor to the inheritance
declines to pay, not because he claims to be heir himself, but

TIT* m] Action far recovery of inheritance 861

because he denieSy or hentates to admits that the inheritance belonga
to the person who sues to recover it, he is not liable to the petUio
heredOoHs.

43 Paulus (on Plautivs 2) I first accepted a legacy from you,
and then sued to recover the inheritance. According to AtilicinuSi
some authorities have been of opinion that I cannot have a petUio
heredUatis against you without refunding the legacy. It is however
worth considering whether the rule is not that the party who sues
for the inheritance is only obliged to restore the legacy on the
terms of an undertaking being given him that if the suit for the
inheritance is decided against him, it shall be paid him again ; as
it is unjust that the possessor of the inheritance should in such
a case keep in his hands a legacy which he once paid, especially
where the other party did not sue for the inheritance vexatiously,
but owing to a misteke ; and this view is supported by Lselius.
However the Emperor Antoninus laid down in a rescript that where
a man has put in his pocket a legacy under the testament, the suit
for the inheritance ought, on cause shown, to be refused him, that
is, if it is a plain case of vexatious proceedings.

44 Jayolenus {Extracts from PlauUua 1) Where a man sues
for the inheritance after accepting a legacy under the testament,
then, if by any means whatever the legacy is not returned, it is
part of the duty of the judge as a matter of course to see that, if
the suit is successful, the inheritance shall be handed over to the
plaintiJBT, less the amount he received.

45 Celsus (Digest 4) Where a man volunteers to defend a case
without having the thing demanded in his possession, judgment
will be given against him, unless he can show by the clearest possible
proofs that the plaintiff knew from the very commencement of the
case that he had nothing in his possession ; because then the
plaintiff was not deceived, moreover the party who volunteered to
defend the suit is liable under the clause referring to doltis : of
course the measure of damages will be the interest the plaintiff had
in not being deceived.

46 MoDESTiKUS (Differences 6) Any man will he considered as
practically a depredator who gives a tacit assurance [to a testator]
that he will hand over the inheritance to some one who is not en-
titled to take it

47 The same (Besponsa 8) One Lucius Titius having been un-
successful in an application to have the testament of a kinsman set

862 Aistion far recovery qf mheritanee [bcx>k v

aside as foif^ed, I wish to know whether he can have a good right
to hnpeach the testament as not ralidly made and not sealed. The
answer given was that he was not debarred from raising the issoe
whether the testament was validly made merely because he was
unsuccessful in the application to have it set aside as not genuine.

48 Javolbkus {Extra4stsjram Camus 3) In estimating the value
of an inheritance, the purdbase money realized on a sale of it is
to be taken into account, with the addition of whatever further
sum the inheritance was worth, where it was sold with a view to
business ; but, if it was sold in pursuance of a fideic(mwnM&wmy
nothing more will be comprised than what the possessor received
in good faith.

49 Paphtianus {Questions 3) If a bona fide possessor chooses
to proceed against debtors to the inheritance or persons in occupa-
tion of property forming part of the estate, he has a right to be
heard, at any rate where there is a danger lest rights of action
should be lost by lapse of time. . But a man who is bringing the
petitio will have no reason to fear being barred by an exceptio if he
brings an action in rem; suppose, for instance, the possessor of
the inheritance should be remiss in the matter, or suppose he
should know that he has no legal claim.

60 The same (Questions 6) An inheritance may have an ex-
istence in the eye of the law, though it is not a corporeal thing.
1. If a boTia fide possessor erects a monument to the deceased in
order thereby to fulfil a condition, then, inasmuch as the will of
the deceased ought to be observed in this matter as well as in
others, it may be said, at any rate where the cost of making the
monument does not exceed reasonable limits, or does not go
beyond the amount directed by the testator, that the person from
whom the inheritance is recovered will either have a right exer-
dseable by means of an exceptio^ doli to retain the amount of his
outlay, or else an action of negotia gesta to recover it^ in short an
action for '' managing the affair " of the inheritance ; for, true as it
is that in strict law there is no right of action to compel heirs to
erect monuments, nevertheless they may be constrained by imperial
or pontifical authority to follow out the testator's last will.

51 The same (Responsa 2) The heir of a lunatic will have to
make good to the substitute or to a kinsman in the next degree the
profits for the time intervening by which the lunatic appears to

^ Read eaeepUanii for exceptions, Onj. (£ M.

TIT. m] Action for recovery of inheritance 868

have become the richer through his curator; except, of course,
such expenditure incurred about the substance of the estate as
was either necessary or useful. Moreover if any necessary expense
was incurred on the lunatic's own behalf, this will be likewise
excepted, unless the lunatic had other sufficient means by which he
could be maintained. 1. No interest is due on profits recdved after
the suit to recover the inheritance was brought ; a different principle
is applied in the case of those which were received before such pro-
ceedings were begun and so fell into the inheritance.

52 Hermogeniakus {Epitomes of law 2) If a possessor has
received immoral profits (itihaneatos questas) from an inheritance,
he will have to hand over these as well, otherwise a scrupulous
construction will give the possessor the benefit of unscrupulous
gain.

53 Paulus {on Sabinus 10) A possessor's disposition of property
is necessary not merely where it is to pay debts owed by the
inheritance, but also where it is to provide fbr the case of any
necessary outlay which he has made on something which is part of
the inheritance, or for the case of something being likely to be lost
or injured by lapse of time.

54 JuLlAKUS {Digest 6) Where a man purchases from the fiscus
either shares in an iaheritance or the whole estate, it is not ui\ju6t
that he should be allowed an action by which to sue for the whole
of the property, just as a petitio hereditoMs is allowed to one to
whom an inheritajioe is handed over under the Trebellian decree of
the senate. 1. There is no question that the heir of a debtor can by
means of a hereditatis petitio get into his hands objects pledged by
the deceased as security for debt 2. If buildings and lands have
been allowed to deteriorate by the negligence of the possessors, for
example, vineyards, orchards or gardens have been cultivated in
some way which is not in accordance with the habits of the de-
ceased proprietor, the possessors must submit to have damages
assessed in the trial corresponding to the deterioration which the
property has undergone thereby.

56 Thb same {Digest 60) When an inheritance is recovered by
action irom a bona fide possessor, he will have to hand over what
he may have received under the lex AquUia not merely to the
extent of the simple amount of the injury, but to that of double
damages ; as he has no right to make a gain out of what he receives
on account of the estate.

864 Action for recovery of inheritance [book t

66 Africakus {Questions 4) In a herediiatis petitio any profits
received by the poosessor will have to be handed over at all events,
even where the plaintiff himself would not have received them.

67 Neratius {Parchments 7) If the same person defends two
suits for the same inheritance against two plaintiffs [respectively],
and judgment is given in favour of one of tiie two, the question is
sometimes asked whether the inheritance ought to be given up to
the successful suitor, exactly as would have been required if the
defendant had not had to sustain a suit on the part of the other ;
so that, in short, supposing judgment should be subsequently given
for the other suitor as well, the defendant would be discharged, on
the ground that he neither was in possession nor had used any
fraudident contrivance to avoid being in possession of the property,
having given it up upon judgment being given against him ; or
the rule rather is that, since it was always possible that the
second suitor too would get judgment in his favour, the defendant
is not bound to hand over the estate unless an undertaking is given
him; seeing that he has to defend the action for the same in-
heritance against the other suitor? However the best plan is that
it should be the duty of the judge, on motion, to meet the case of
the unsuccessful defence by an undertaking or security [such as
mentioned] ; as by that means the property is still there for the
benefit of the party who is tardy about vindicating his rights
against the successfiil suitor who got before him.

68 SCuSVOLA {Digest 3) A son who was emancipated by his
&ther in accordance with a condition imposed by the testament of
his mother entered upon her inheritance, which the father had in
his possession before emancipating his son, and of which he had
received the profits', but out of which the father made a certain
outlay in honour of his son, the latter being a Senator. This ques*
tion was asked, — ^whereas the father was ready to hand over the
inheritance, crediting himself however with the amount which he
had laid out on his son's behalf, would the son, if he should still
persevere in his suit for the inheritance, be liable to be barred by
an exceptio of dolus maius ? My answer was that, even if the father
did not raise the point by way of exceptio^ the case was sufficientiy
met by the duty incumbent on the judge, on motion.

^ Bead percepU for ponedit.

TTT. iv] On suits far part of an inheritance 866

IV.

On suits for part of an inheritance.

1 Ulpianus (on the Edict 5) After the action which the
Pr»tor offers to a man who maintains that he has a right to the
whole inheritance, it naturaUy follows that he should proceed to
offer an action to one who claims a share in the inheritance.
L When a man sues for an inheritance or part of an inheritance,
he does not apportion his demand to the amount which the pos-
sessor occupies but to his own assumed right ; accordingly if he is
sole heir, he claims the whole inheritance, although you — [the de-
fendant] — may be in possession of one single thing only, and if he
is heir to a share, he claims a share, although you may be in pos-
session of the whole. 2. Not only so, but supposing two persons
are in possession of an inheritance and there are two who claim to
be respective owners of shares, the two claimants will not have to
content themselves with making their demands against the two
respective possessors, for example, the first claimant against the
first possessor and the second claimant against the second pos-
sessor, but both sue the first and both sue the second, as you can-
not say that one defendant has got the first claimant's share and
the other has got the second claimant's share, but each defendant
is in possession of both shares, and that as heir. Where the
possessor and the suitor in the action to recover are both in
possession of the inheritance, each of them laying claim to a moiety
thereof, they will have to sue reciprocally to get their respective
shares in the effects ; or, if they raise no contention as to who is
heir, their proper course will be to take proceedings to divide the
inheritance (familice ereiscundce). 3. If I claim to be heir to a
share, and my coheir is in possession of the inheritance jointly with
an outsider, such coheir being in possessionof no more than his proper
share, a question which is asked is whether I ought to bring my
petitio hereditaMs against the outsider alone, or against my coheir
too. As to this, P^asus is reported to have been of opinion that I
ought to sue the outsider alone, and that he will have to hand over
whatever he is in possession of, which perhaps the judge will have
to order on motion ; however, as a matter of strict principle, I ought
to bring the petitio against both, that is to say, against my coheir
as well as the other, and the coheir himself ought to bring his

866 On suits for part of an inheritance [book v

action against the outsider who is in possession. Still the view
held by Pegasus is the more practical. 4. Again, suppose I claim
to be heir to half the inheritance, but I am in possession of a third,
[and two others of a third each,] and I wish to get hold of the sixth
part which remains [to make up my half], let us consider what is my
proper course. Labeo says I must in any case sue each separate
possessor for half [his share], the consequence of which will be that
I shall get one-sixth [of the whole] from each, and I shall haye
altogether two-thirds. This, I should say, is true : but I shall my-
self be bound to give up a sixth out of the third which I originally
possessed; accordingly the judge must order on motion that I
should for my own part allow a set off of what I possess myself,
supposing the persons from whom I demand the inheritance are
my coheirs. 5. In some cases the Praetor goes so far as to grant
leave to bring the peHtio for an unascertained share, where
sufficient grounds occur. Take the following case. Of seyeral
brothers deceased one left a son and others left widows with child:
in this case it is uncertain what share in the inheritance can be
claimed by the son of the deceased brother [first mentioned],
because it is unknown how many children will be bom, issue of the
brothers of such deceased brother. It is accordingly perfectly just
that the son should be allowed to claim an unascertained share ; so
that it will not be going too far to say that wherever a man is in
reasonable doubt as to what share he should sue to recorer, he
ought to be allowed to claim an unascertained share.

2 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 6) Where the same in-
heritance comes to a number of persons, of whom some make entiy,
and some still hesitate, then, such as make entry cannot^ if they
bring the petitio hereditatis, sue for a larger share than they would
have had if the others had entered, and they will be in none the
better position for the others not entering. But if the others do
not enter [at all] they may then sue for the shares of such others,
provided they have a right to them.

3 Paulus (on Plautvus 17) The old lawyers had so much
consideration for an unborn child which would be free on ite birth
(J/Sbero ventri) that they kept for it all its possible rights unimpaired
against the day of its birth. We see an instance of this in the law
of succession, as those persons who are in a more remote degree of
relationship to the deceased than the unborn child are not entitled,
so long as it is uncertain whether there will be a child bom or not
Where, however, the others are related to the deceased in the same

TFT. lYj On mUs for part of cm inheritanoe 367

degree as the nnborn ohild, then the qneetion has been raised how
much of the inheritance onght to be kept in suspense, on the ground
that it was impossible for them to tell how many children might be
bom. There are^, in fact, so many various and incredible stories
told^ in connexion with this subject that they are generally set
down for fictions. It is related that a married woman had four
daughters at a birth, again some authors of repute have left it on
record that a Peloponnesian^ woman five times had four children
at a birtby and that many Egyptian women have borne seven children
at one time. We have all heard of the three twin-brothers Horatii,
all senators^ girt for battle ; and Lselius tells us that he saw on the
Palatine a free woman who was brought from Alexandria to be
shown to Hadrian, with five children, four of whom, so he says, she
was reported to have brought forth on the same occasion, and
the fifth forty days later. What is to be said then? The legal
authorities, very well deserving the name of '* prudentes/^ have
adopted a kind of middle course, viz. that of taking into con-
sideration what may happen with tolerable frequency ; in other
words, inasmuch as it was possible that three children should be
bom on one occasion, they gave a fourth part to the existing son ;
what comes once or twice, as Theophrastus says, lawyers do not
heed, consequently, even if, as a matter of fact, the mother is
destined to have only one child eventually, the existing son will be
heir in the meantime not to the extent of half but of a quarter ;

4 Ulpianus (on the Edict 15) and if less than three are bom,
a further share will accrue to the son in due proportion out of the
vacant part ; if more than three, there will be a similar decrease of
the share which he took as heir.

5 Paulus (on PltmHus 17) One thing more should be under-
stood, that if the woman is not really with child at all, but is thought
to be so, the son is already sole heir, although he does not
know that he is sole heir. 1. A similar rule applies in the
case of an outsider, where he is appointed heir for a definite
share, and all postumous children to the rest But if the appoint-
ment of heirs should be as follows, '^ all children bom to me and
[with them] Lucius Titius are to be heirs in equal shares," there is
ground for doubt whether Lucius Titius is not unable to enter, just
as a man would be who did not know what was his share under a

1 Del. idea, C£ M.

' Read traduntur for eredumHir, Of. M.

^ Read PehpoiMMem for Pdoponen$L

870 On (he possemyry petitio hereditatis [book v

Ok the possessort petitio hereditatis.

1 Ulpi ANUS (on the Edict 1 6) According to the regular sdieme,
after the civil actions open to the heirs the Praetor would proceed
to take into consideration those persons whom he makes virtual
heirs, that is to say, to whom there is given bonorum posaeg^io ;

2 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 6) and, by means of the
petitio hereditatis allowed thereupon, a bonom/m possessor gets
just as much as an heir can get by the civil actions above discussed.

VI.
On the fidei-commissary petitio hereditatis.

1 Ulpianus {on the Edict 16) The order of arrangement
brings us now to the action offered to persons to whom an inherit-
ance is handed over [in pursuance of ^ fideicomfnissvm\. Any one
in &ct to whom an inheritance is handed over in pursuance of the
decree of the senate in virtue of which rights of action pass can
employ the fide-commissarian petitio hereditatis^

2 Paulus {on the Edict 20) and this action is subject to the
same rules as the civil petitio hereditatis ;

3 Ulpianus {on the Edict 16) and it makes no difference
whether a man was requested to hand over to me or to the person
to whom I am heir ; moreover, if I am honorvm possessor or
successor of any kind to the person to whom the fide-commissarian
inheritance was left, I can still have recourse to this action* 1. It
must be understood that a man has no right to bring this action
against the party who hands the inheritance over. 2. The actions
allowed to the applicant are such as are available on behalf of an
heir and he is liable to such as are good against an heir.

SIXTH BOOK

I.

On specific vindications.

1 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) After the actions which are
offered relating to a collective entirety {tmiversitas) there is added
the kind of action which consists in a demand for a specific thing.
1. Such an action in rem to recover a specific object is in use in the
case of all moveable things, whether animals or things inanimate,
and also where the thing is so much land. 2. But by this action
no demand can be made for free persons over whom some one
claims a right, as for example for children who are in a man's
poiestcts; accordingly, such demands are made by ^'prejudicial "
actions or by interdicts or by pretorian suits, as is mentioned by
Pomponius (b. 37) ; " unless indeed," as this writer says, " the
plaintiff proceeds to give the nature of his title," so that\ if a man
inserts in his demand such words as '^my son" or '^ under my
potestas by the law of Rome," then Pomponius himself agrees that
the proceedings are in proper form ;. what he says is that a man
can, by the law of the Quirites, bring a vindicatio where he adds
the nature of his title. 3. By this action, as Pomponius tells us
{passages, b. 25), not only can recovery be prayed of separate objects,
but even a flock may be sued for ; and, similarly, a herd of oxen
or a stud of horses and in general animals which are kept herded
together. It should be observed that it is enough that the flock
itself should belong to the plaintiff, although particular animals
should not be his ; the subject of the vindicatio is the flock, not
individual animals.

2 Paulus {on the Edict 21) If the two parties to the suit own
equal numbers respectively, neither of them ca,n sue to recover the

^ Read et before si. Cf. M.

24—2

372 (hi specific vindicatians [book yi

entire flock, nor even a half of the whole. Where however one of
the two owns the greater number, so that, even if all that are not
his are taken away, he will still be in a position to describe the
subject-matter of his suit as the flock, then the animals which do
not belong to him will not be comprised in the number to be
handed over.

3 UiiPiANUS (on the Edict 16) Marcellus has the following
(Digest 4). A man who owned a flock of three hundred head lost
a hundred of them and purctmsed thereupon that number firom
some one who owned them or who was bona fide possessor of them,
though some one else owned them: these animals too, he says, will
certainly be comprised in an action brought for the flock. Indeed,
even if there are no others remaining except those purchased as
above mentioned, he can still include them in his mndicatio for
the flock. 1. The objects which go to make up the tackle of a
ship, must be sued for separately, the ship's boat too must be sued
for by itself. 2. Pomponius tells us that if thii^ of the same
kind are so fused and mixed up together that they cannot be
detached and separated, the viridicaHo must not be for the whole
mass, but for a portion of it Suppose, for instance, your silver and
my silver are reduced to a single mass; we shall own the mass in
common, and each of us can have a vindicatio for an amount
proportionate to the weight of so much of it as belongs to him,
though it should not be ascertained what are the weights of our
respective shares therein.

4 Paulus (on the Edict 21) In this case there may also be
an action communi dividundo ; moreover, any one who contrived
maliciously that the two masses of silver should be mixed would
be liable to an action for theft and to an action for production, the
rule being that in the action for production we must take into
account the question of value, and, in the case of a vindicatio or
an action commtmi dividtrndo, the party whose silver was the more
valuable will get the greater quantity.

6 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) Pomponius says further:— if
com belonging to two is mixed up without the owners' consent,
they have rights of action in rem for such quantities in the heap
as appear to belong to them respectively ; but, if the mixture was
made with their consent, the two quantities must be held to have
become common property, and there can be an action communi
dividundo. 1. Again, he says that if mulsum should be made
out of your honey and my wine, some hold that here again the

TFT. i] On specific vindiccUians 3*78

resulting object is owned in common, but I should be more inclined
to say, as indeed he himself suggests, that the mulsum belongs to
the person who made it^ as it is not a case of a thing retaining
its individual character. If lead should be mixed with silver, then,
inasmuch as it can be separated again, there will be no common
property created, and no action eammtmi dividtrndo can be brought ^
but there will be a good right of action in rem ; where, however,
our authority proceeds, the matmal cannot be separated, for
example, where bronze and silver are mixed, a vindiccttio must
be brought for such and such a portion of the mixture ; and it is
impossible to apply what is said in the case of the mulmimy because,
though the two materials are mixed up, still they are both there.
2. The same author lays down that, if your stellion covers my
mare, the foal will not be yours but mine. 3^ In the case of a
tree which was transplanted into another man's field and there
grew and drove its roots into the soil, Varus and Nerva used to
admit an tttilis actio in rem ; if it did not grow in the way
described, it would not cease to be mine [the original owner's].

4. In an action in rem, if the parties are agreed as to the thing
which is the subject of the action, but there is a mistake about the
name of it, the proceedings are held to be in sufficiently good form.

5. If there are more slaves than one of the same name, for instance
several named Eros, and it does not appear which of them is the
subject of the action, Pomponius lays down that no order will be
made.

6 Paulits (on the Edict 6) When a man brings an action
in rem, he is bound to specify the thing, and to say whether he
iB suing for the whole or a share, and, [if a share,] what share, the
very term ^' thing" (res) does not mean a thing described in kind
but individually. Octavenus lays down this rule, that a man is
bound to give, in the case of unwrought materials, the weighty
where the things are stamped or coined, the number, and of wrought
articles individual descriptions ; and the dimensions ought to be
given Bs well, where the dimensions are an essential part of the
description of the subject-matter. If the action is to have it
declared that the plaintiff owns particular articles of clothing, or
that they must be transferred to him, are we only bound to give the
number, or must we state the colour too? On the whole the proper
course is to do both things ; but it would be a cruel thing to oblige
a man to say whether his clothes are worn or new. There is stQl

^ Del. ^fuia ieparari poteiL 0£ M.

874 On Bpedfic mndicatioiis [book ti

sometimes a difficalty in tlie case of household yessek, vis. on ihe
qnestion whether we ought simply to say, for ezankploy ' a dish/ or
go on to specify in every case whether it is square or round, plain
or engraved, as it is not always easy in a statement of claim to
add these particulars and the practice need not be so strict:
though it is true that, in suing to recover a slave, the name ought
to be given, and it ought to be said whether he is a boy or a
fuU-grown man, especially if there are more than one ; stQl, if I do
not know what the slave's name is, I must have recourse to some
description that will identify him ; for instance, I can say that he
was part of the assets of such a one, or he was the child of such
and such a woman. Similarly, where a man is smng for land, he
ought to give the name it bears and say where it is situated.

7 The same (cm the Edict 11) If a man puts himself forward
to defend an action to recover land, and judgment is given against
him, still, BO Pedius says, there is a good right of action against
the actual possessor to recover the property.

8 The same {on the Edict 12) Pompouius (b. 36) approves
of the following opinion. If you and I own land in common in
equal shares, and you and Lucius Titius are in possession of it,
I must not sue you both for two quarters respectively, but I must
sue Titius, who owns nothing in the land at all, for the entire half.
It would be different if you and Titius were respectively in
possession of two portions in severalty which made up the whole ;
in that case, no doubt, I should have to sue you and Titius for
your respective shares in the whole; because, if any distinct
portion is possessed in severalty, some share in what is so possessed
must necessarily belong to me : consequently, indeed, you yourself
must sue Titius for a quarter. The above distinctions do not apply
to moveable property, nor to a suit to recover an inheritance ;
in fact in such cases there can never be any possession of the thing
for a divided portion {pro diviso).

9 Ulpianus {on the Edict 16) In this action the duty of
the judge will be this: the judge must ascertain whether the
defendant is in possession ; but it is immaterial on what assumed
title he is in possession ; as soon as I have proved that the property
is mine, the party in possession is bound to deliver it up to me,
unless he pleaded something by way of exceptio. Some writers
however, one of whom is Pegasus, have expressed the opinion that
the.only kind of possession dealt Mrith in this action is that which
is relevant in asking for the Interdict tUi possidetis or tUrubi. For

I

TIT. i] On specific vindications 376

instance, Pegasus says that where anything is deposited with a
man, or is lent him for use, or he hired it, or he is in possession to
secure the payment of legacies, or for the sake of dos, or in the
name of an unborn child, or beosbuse he fiailed to obtain security for
damnum infectmny then, because in none of these cases does he>
properly speaking, possess, a vindiccUio cannot be brought against
him. I hold however that where any person whatever has got a
thing in his hands and is able to deliver it over, an action to
recover it can be brought

10 Paulus {on the Edict 21) Where the action is for moveable
property, where is it to be handed over, I mean if it is not
on the spot? As to this, it is not a bad rule that where the
defendant is a bona Jide possessor, the delivery over should be
made either where the thing is, or else where the action is broij^ht^
but at the cost of the plaintiff, — ^the cost being that of the necessary
travdling expenses, whether by land or sea, exclusive of the price
of provisions,

11 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) unless the plaintiff prefers that
the property should be handed over at the place where judgment
is given, but at his own expense and risk ; as in that case an
undertaking will be given with security for delivery up accordingly.

12 Paulus {on the Edict 21) If the defendant is a mala fide
possessor, who got hold of the property somewhere else, the same
rule will apply ; but if he took it away ftoxxi the place where issue
was joined and carried it somewhere else, he must hand it over at
the place from which he took it, at his own expense.

13 Ulpiakus {on the Edict 16) The judge is bound not only to
order the thing to be handed over, but also to take into account
any deterioration it may have suffered ; suppose, for instance, a
slave is handed over who has been enfeebled or severely beaten or
wounded ; the judge will certainly take into account how far his
value is reduced. It is true the possessor might be sued by an action
under the lex Aquilia; accordingly, the question arises whether
it is not the duty of the judge to decline to put an estimate on the
damage done unless the right of action under the lex Aquilia is
released. As to this, Labeo holds that the plaintiff is bound to
undertake that he Mill not sue under the lex Aquiliay which is a
sound opinion.

14 Paulus {on the Edict 20) Should the plaintiff, however,
prefer to have recourse to an action under the lex Aquilia^ the

376 On epedfie vindications [book vi

oaoe ou the vindicaiio must be dismissecL Accordingly the plaintiff
will be allowed to elect, so as to get twofold damages^ but not
tiireefold

16 Ulpianus {on the Edict 16) Moreover, if the defendant
beats the slave severely and then hands him over^ according to
Labeo, the plaintiff has a good right of action for iryuria toa
1. Where the defendant has sold something out of necessity, then
perhaps it will be the duty of the judge to give him relief so &r
that he will only have to hand over the price. There is no doubt
that if he has gathered fruit and sold it to prevent its being spoilt,
this too is a case in which he will not have to account for more than
the price. 2. Again, suppose the subject of the suit is a field, and
this is assigned to soldiers, a small sum being given to the possessor
by way of compliment, will he have to give up this ? I should say
that he will. 3. If the slave, or any animal which is the subject of
the action, should have died without malice or n^ligence on tiie
part of the possessor, it is very commonly said that the value need
not be made good ; but the better opinion is that where it so
happens that the plaintiff would have sold the property if he had
received it, then the value ought to be made good where the
possessor was in default, because, if the other had handed it over,
the plaintiff would have sold and made a clear gain of the purchase
money.

16 Paulxjs {on the Edict 21) It is a matter of course that, even
where a slave dies, some judgment must be given in respect of
profits and any children of a female slave, and on the ground of the
stipulation against disturbance [by one claiming superior title ; it
does not go further], as the possessor is certainly not bound after
joinder of issue to make good what is unavoidable. 1. It is not
regarded as a case of negligence if the possessor, where a ship is
the subject of the action, sent her on a voyage at a proper season for
navigation, even though, as a matter of fact, she was lost ; unless
he entrusted her to incompetent persons.

17 XJlpianus {on the Edict 16) Juliauus (Digest b. 6) has the
following. If I buy from Titius a slave who is really owned by
Msevius, and afterwards, on Msevius suing me to recover him, I
sell him, and the purchaser kills him, justice requires that I should
hand over the purchase money to Msevius. 1. Julianus also says,
in the same book, that if the defendant makes default in giving up
a slave, and the slave dies, mesne profits must be included in the
account up to the time of judgment being given. The same writer

TFT. i] On speeific vindieations 377

says that not only profits must be made good, but every incidental
gain (amnem cau9am\ conBequendy children of a female .slave are
comprised in the order to deliver up, and the mesne profits accruing
irom such children. 80 thoroughly is it the case that incidental
gain is comprised that Julianus tells us (b. 7) that if the defendant
should have acquired through the slave a right of action under the
lex A quiliay he will be compelled to assign it Should the defendant
on the other hand have fraudulently gone out of possession, and
then some stranger have wrongfully killed the slave, the defendant
can be compelled either to give the slave's value or else to assign
his own right of action, whichever the plaintiff prefers. He is also
bound to hand over any profits [derived from the slave] which he
may have received from another possessor, as he is not to be allowed
to make any gain out of a slave who has become the subject of an
action. He is not bound to hand over profits referable to a time
at which the slave was in the possession of the party who recovers
him by action. What Julianus says with reference to an action
under the lex AquUia applies where the possessor has acquired the
ownership by u8m» after joinder of issue, because he then comes
to have full right over the slave.

18 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 7) If, after issue is joined,
the defendant becomes owner of the slave by u»uSf he is stiU bound
to deliver him over, and to give an undertaking against dolus in
connexion with him, as there is a danger of his having pledged him
for debt or manumitted him.

19 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) We are informed by Labeo
that the defendant himself has a right to an undertaking that
he shall be duly saved harmless in the matter (his rebus recte
prcestart)^ as, for instance, where he has himself given an under-
taking for damnvm ififectum.

20 Oaius {on the provincial Edict 7) Moreover, the possessor
must hand over as well anything which he got through the slave
after joinder of issue otherwise than out of his own property : this
will comprise inheritances and legacies which may have come to
him through the slave. It is in fact not enough that the man
himself should be handed over, it is required that the legal impli-
cations attached to the property {causa ret) should go too, that is
to say, that the plaintiff should have whatever he would have had
if the slave had been handed over at the time when issue was taken.

1 Cf. D. 60. 16. 71.

378 On specific mndicatians [book yi

Aooordingly, children of a female slave must be handed over, even
where the birth may have taken place after the defendant acquired
ownership of the mother by ums, I mean, if this happened aftor
issue was joined ; and, in such a case, the rule applies to the
children as well as to the mother that the defendant is bound to
deliver them up and also give an undertaking against doltis.

21 Paultjs (on the Edict 21) If the slave runs away from a
honafde possessor, a material question will be whether the slave's
character was such that he ought to have been kept in safe custody ;
as, if he appeared to be a slave of thoroughly good repute, so as
not to require to be confined, the case against the possessor must
be dismissed, subject however to this, that if he has become owner
by tLSUB pending the proceedings, he must assign his rights of action
to the plaintiff, and make good the mesne profits referable to the
time during which the slave was in his possession. If on the other
hand the defendant had not yet acquired ownership by tums^ the
case must be dismissed without any undertaking being required, so
that he need not undertake to the plaintiff that he will follow the
property up : what is there to prevent the plaintiff himself following
the property up at once, even though the defendant should still
become owner while the man is on the run? Pomponius is of
opinion that this is perfectly fair (on the Edict b. 39). If, however,
the slave ought to have been kept securely, the C!ourt will hold the
defendant liable in respect of the slave himself ; subject always to
this, that if the defendant has not become owner by usus^ the
plaintiff must assign to him his rights of action. Julianus, however,
holds in the above cases, where owing to the flight of the slave the
defendant is declared free from liability, that although he is not
compellable to undertake to follow the property up, still he must
undertake that in case it [i.e. the man] should come into his hands,
he will hand it over. This view is supported by Pomponius ( Various
passages, b. 34), and it is the better opinion.

22 Ulpiakus (on the Edict 16) If the slave runs off by the
fraudulent contrivance of the possessor, judgment must be given
against the latter as if he were in possession.

23 Paulus (on the Edict 21) A man has a good right of action
in rem when he has become owner either by the^'u^ gentium or the
civil law. 1. Consecrated places, also religious places, cannot be
sued for by an action in rem as though they were some one's
property. 2. If a man afiixes to that which is his own something
belonging to another, so that it becomes part of it, for instance.

TTT. i] On specijie vindications 379

affixes to a statue of his own an arm or a foot which belongs to
some one else, or a handle or a bottom to a bowl, or a figure to a
chandelier, or a foot to a table, most authorities hold very properly
that he becomes owner of the whole thing, and that he can say
with truth that the statue or the bowl is his. 3. Again, whatever
is written on my paper or painted on my board at once becomes
mine ; though it is true that some have held a different opinion
about a painting, on the ground of the value of the picture ; still,
where one thing cannot exist without some other, it must be allowed
to go with that other. 4. Accordingly in all these cases, in which
what belongs to me draws to it by preponderance what belongs to
some one else and makes it mine, [it follows that] if I sue to recover
the [whole] thing I can be compelled by means of an excqptio of
dohis nuUtis to offer the defendant the value of the accessory part
5. We may add that wherever anything at all, by being joined or
affixed to something else, goes with it by way of accession, its
previous owner cannot have a vindicatio for it so long as it coheres
to the principal thing, but he can bring an action for production so
that it may be detached and then sued for by a vindicatio : subject,
that is, to the exception mentioned by Cassius in connexion with
the welding {ferrwndnatio) of two things together ; what he says
is that where an arm has been joined by welding to the statue to
which it belongs, it is merged in the unity of the principal part,
and that which has once become the property of another cannot,
he says, even if it should be broken off, revert to its previous owner.
The same rule does not apply to what is soldered with lead ; as
welding, by bringing together two objects consisting of identical
material, efiaces the distinction between them, but soldering does
not produce the same effect Consequently in all the above cases,
I mean where there is no ground for an action to produce nor for
an action in rem^ there must needs be an action in fwctvm. But,
in the case of things which consist of a number of detached objects,
it is clear that the different members all retain their respective
individual characters, take the case of so many slaves or so many
sheep ; so that I may very well lay claim by action to a flock of
sheep by that name, though there should be amongst them a ram
belonging to you ; and you yourself can bring an action to recover
the ram. The case would be different where there are things
consisting of coherent parts : if you affix to my statue an arm taken
from some one else's statue, it cannot be said that after that the
arm belongs to you, as the whole statue corresponds to one idea
(«mo apiritu cantinetur). 6. Where one man's building materials

380 On specific vindications [book yi

have been built into another man's house, there cannot be a suit
to recover them by the former, because of the statute of the Twelve
Tables, nor can an action be brought for production in respect of
them, except against one who built them into his house, knowing
that they were not his ; there is, howev^, an old action called
de tignoJundOf which is for double damages and is founded on the
Twelve Tables. 7. Again, where a man builds on his own ground
with another man's stone, he will have a good action to recover the
house as owner, but the previous owner can recover the stone, if it
should be taken down, even though the building should only be
taken to pieces after the period for acquisition by ti8U8 has expired,
reckoning from the time when the house gets into the hands of a
bona fide possessor : as where the house itself passes into new
ownership by lapse of time, it does not follow that the separate
stones are acquired by tisus.

24 Gaius (on the provincial Edict 7) A man who intends to
bring an action for something ought to consider whether he can
obtain possession of it by some interdict, as it is &r more convenient
for him to be in possession himself and compel the other party to
undergo the burden of being plaintiff than to be plaintiff himself
while the other party is in possession.

26 Ulpianus (on the Edict 70) A man who volunteers to defend
a case without ground, the fact being that he is not in possession
and has not taken fraudulent means to avoid being in possession,
cannot get the action dismissed, so Marcellus tells us, if the plaintiff
is unaware of the facts ; and this opinion is true. This is always
supposing that issue is already joined, but if he has not taken
joinder of issue, a man who declares that he is not in possession,
when he really is not, does not deceive the plaintiff, and if [during
the same period] he takes himself ofl^ he cannot be said to have
volunteer^ to defend the case.

26 Paulus (on PlatUius 2) In fact, if the plaintiff knows the
truth, he is not deceived by any one, he deceives himself; conse-
quently the defendant will be dismissed from the action.

27 The same {on the Edict 21) But if I want to sue Titius,
and, that being the case, some one says that he is in possession,
and accordingly volunteers to take up the defence, and I establish
all this by testimony in the course of the proceedings, judgment
may be pronounced adversely to the party in question as a matt^
of course. 1. The defendant certainly ought to be in possession

TFT. i] On q^edfie vindications 881

both at the time of joinder of issue and when judgment is pro-
nounced. If he was in possession at the time of joinder of issue,
but had, without dolus malua, lost possession by the time when
judgment was given, he ought to be discharged. If on the other
hand at the time of joinder of issue he was out of possession, but
was in possession when judgment was given, then we must follow
the opinion of Proculus, to the effect that judgment must absolutely
be given against him ; consequently the order made will include
mesne profits, reckoned from the time when his possession began.
2. If the slave who is the subject of the suit is maliciously damaged
by the possessor, and after that dies, owing to some other cause,
and not through any negligence of the defendant's, there will be
no account taken of the previous damage, because that makes no
difference to the plaintiff. What I say refers to the action in rem;
the right of action on the lex Aquilia still remains. 3. Moreover,
a man who before joinder of issue has contrived fraudulently to
avoid being in possession of a thing is liable to an action in rem ;
this indeed may be inferred from the Senatusconsultnm, by which
it was provided, as already said, that past doltis should be comprised
in the suit to recover an inheritance ; for if past dolus [as just
said] is included in the suit for an inheritance, which in fact is itself
an action in rem, it is only to be expected that, in keeping there-
with, past dolus should be included in an action in rem for a
specific thing. 4. If a father or an owner is in possession by means
of a son or a slave, who should thereupon be absent at the time
when judgment is pronounced, without negligence on the part of
the father or owner ; then these latter either must have time allowed
them or else must give an undertaking to deliver up possession.
5. Where the possessor expends money on the thing which is the
subject-matter of the suit before joinder of issue, he can, by an
exceptio of doltus mcUus, procure that account shall be taken of the
expenditure, supposing the plaintiff perseveres with the suit for his
property without allowing for the outlay. A similar rule applies
where the possessor defends a noxal action brought in respect of a
slave, and, the case being decided against him, pays the damages,
or, by mistake, builds a block of houses on ground belonging to the
plaintiff ; unless, that is, in this last case, the plaintiff is willing to
allow him to take the building down. The same thing, as some
have said, ought to be effected through the judge in a case for the
recovery of das with reference to a vacant piece of ground given to
the wife. But where you educate a boy belonging to me whom
you have in your possession, then, so Proculus holds, the rule need

882 On specific vindications [book vi

not be followed, because I caunot be expected to do without my
slave, and it is impossible for the same remedy to be applied as
was mentioned in the case of the vacant ground.

28 Gaitjs (on the provincial Edict 7) Suppose for instance yon
have taught him to be a painter or a clerk. [Accordingly] the rule
is that no estimate of expenditure can be called for on motion to
that effect,

29 PoMPONius {Notes to Q. Mtidtis 21) unless you are^ offering
the slave for sale, and would get a better price for him in conse-
quence of his accomplishment,

30 Gaiits (on the provincial Edict 7) or the defendant has
already notified the plaintiff to pay the expense, whereupon he
said nothing, and the defendant has now raised an exceptio of
dolus malus.

31 Paulus (on the Edict 21) But if an inquiry is made as to
mesne profits on a slave who is the subject of a suit^ we must not
look merely at the period of the slave's puberty, as some services
can be done even by a child under that age. It would, however,
be an unconscionable thing for a plaintiff to ask for an estimate of
profits which might have been realised by means of the dave's
accomplishments, where the slave learnt those accomplishments at
the expense of the defendant

32 MoDESTiNtTS (Differences 8) However, if the defendant has
taught the slave some craft, then, when the slave who learnt the
craft in question has reached the age of twenty-five, the expense
[of his education] may be set off.

33 Paulus (on the Edict 21) The estimate of profits must
include not only those received, but also such as could without
impropriety have been received ; accordingly, if the thing sued for
is lost through the contrivance or the negligence of the possessor,
then, according to Pomponius, the better opinion is that of Trebatius,
who holds that the account of the profits is to be carried on to the
point to which it would have been carried if the thing had not
been lost^ that is to say, to the time when judgment is pronounced;
and this is held by Julianus too. On this principle, where the
action is brought by a bare proprietor and the usufruct comes to
an end after the defendant has begun to be in default, then profits

1 <'Tou" may have meant the plaintiff and the word have been inadvertently
left unaltered. Of. Pellat, de R. V, 241.

TFT. i] On specific vindications 388

will be accounted for from the time when the usufract gave place
to the bare proprietorship.

34 Jttlianus {Digest 7) (A similar rule holds where so much
land accrues to existing land by alluyion,)

36 Paulus {on the Edict 21) and conversely, where a plaintiff
after joinder of issue bequeaths the usufruct of the property [and
dies, and the suit is continued by his heir], some writers very justly
hold that the account of profits must not be carried on beyond the
time when the usufruct was separated in enjoyment from the bare
property. 1. Where I have sued for land which as a matter of fact
belongs to some one else, and the Court pronounces judgment
declaring it to belong to me, the order made on the possessor must
comprise the profits too ; having once for all made the mistake, the
judge will of course go on to make this order ; as the profits cannot
be allowed to go into the pocket of the possessor after the action
has gone against him : otherwise, as Mauricianus says, the judge
cannot decide that I am to have delivery made me of the thing
itself; and why, he asks, is the possessor to have what he would
not have had if he had delivered possession at once? 2. The
plaintiff who has accepted the value put upon some property in
dispute is not bound to guarantee the defendant against a better
title in respect of the property itself ; the defendant has himself to
blame that he did not give up the possession. 3. There is no doubt
that even where things cannot be divided without being destroyed^
a man can still sue for a share in them.

36 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 7) When a man proceeds by
way of petitorian action, he ought to inquire, if he wishes to sue to
any purpose, whether the person against whom he brings his action
is in possession or has fraudulently gone out of possession. 1. A
man who is sued in rem is liable to judgment on the head of
negligence as well, and the possessor of a slave is guilty of n^ligenoe
if he sends the slave into dangerous places, and thereupon he is
lost ; or he allows a slave for whom he is sued to be made to fight
in the amphitheatre, and he is killed ; equally so, if the slave sued
for was a runaway and he did not keep him fast, so that the man
made his escape ; or where, the subject of the action being a vessel,
he sent her to sea in bad weather and she was lost by shipwreck.

37 Ulpianus {on the Edict 17) Julianus has the following
{Dig. b. 8) : — ^if I build on another man's ground of which I am a
bona fide purchaser, but I do this at a time at which I already have

884 On ^eeifie vindications [book vi

notice that the ground is another's, let us consider whether it is not
the &ct that I have not got a good eoDoeptio ; — unless indeed you
choose to say that I have a good exceptio if I was apprehensiTo of
loss. Howeyer, I should say that a person in my case has no such
exceptio ; as soon as he once knew that the ground was not his, he
ought not to hare built At the same time the Court will go so fisur
as to allow him to take down the building which he put up, so long
as he causes no loss or damage to the owner of the ground.

38 Celsus {Digest 3) You bought without notice land which
did not belong to your vendor and then built or planted, afl^ which
the land is recovered by the true owner. In this case the order
made by a wise judge will vary according to the circumstances of
the parties and the facts. Take the case in which the owner him-
self would have made the same improvements ; then, before he can
get his land back, he must reimburse your expenses, but only to
the extent to which the property was made more valuable, and
where the additional value exceeds the cost, he need only pay what
was actually expended. Supposing, however, the owner is a poor
man; and, if he is to be compelled to pay the above amount, he will
have to relinquish his household gods^ and the graves of his fathers,
then it will be enough that you should be allowed to take away as
much as you can of what you erected, provided that the property
will not thereby be in a worse condition than it would be if no
building had ever been set up. However, we lay down that if the
owner is prepared to give you an amount equivalent to whatever
you, the possessor, would have in your hands if you took away the
things referred to, he shall be allowed to do so ; and you are not
to be at liberty to act spitefully ; you might, for instwce, be dis-
posed to scrape off plaster which you had put on, or effiu^ pictures,
though this should serve no object but that of giving annoyance.
Lastly, suppose a case where the person who is owner is one who
intends to sell the land almost at once after getting it back ; then,
unless he hands over the amount which it has been already said that
he ought to hand over in the first of the above cases, the damages
which you will be ordered to pay must be reduced by that amount

39 Ulpianus (on the Edict 17) Contractors who build with
their own materials at once pass the property in the materials to
the persons on whose ground they build. 1. Julianus says well
{Dig. 12) that a woman who pledges land by way of guaranteeing

^ After lartbta ins. patemU, M.

TIT. i] On specific vindications 385

another person's debt can recover it by an action in rem even after
the creditor should have sold it ;

40 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 7) because the creditor is
held to have sold what was not legally pledged.

41 Ulpianus {on the Edict 17) If a man purchases on these
terms, that, if any one should make a better offer, the purchase shall
be abandoned, then, as soon as such an offer is made, he is no longer
able to have an action in rem. Indeed if land is assigned to a man,
subject to a conditional avoidance {in diem), then, up to the time
of a better offer being made, he can have an action in rem to recover
it, but after such an offer he cannot. 1. If a slave or a JUvus-
fcMmliMy having free management of his pecuUtmij sells and delivers
land to me, I can have an action in rem to recover it Add that if
a slave delivers his owner's property with his owner's consent, the
same rule holds ; just as, where a procurator sells or delivers [to
me] with the consent of his principal, this will give me a right of
action in rem.

42 Paulus {on the Edict 26) If there is an action in rem
brought, then it is true that the case must fail as against the heir
of [a deceased] possessor, if he is not^ in possession himself ; at the
same time if any liability has been incurred which was personal to
the deceased, this may certainly be comprised in the order.

43 The same {on the Edict 27) Whatever is affixed to a religious
object is itself religious ; consequenHy stones built in [so as to form
part of a sepulchral monument], even if they should be once
removed, cannot be recovered by an action in rem ; however the
plaintiff will get extraordinary relief by an action in fadtum, the
party who removed the stones being compelled to restore them.
But if a man should build into a monument stones that were some
one else's property, without the consent of their owner, and, before
the monument has served as such [i.a before interment] they should
be taken out again in order to be set up somewhere else, they can
be recovered by the owner. In fact if they should be taken out in
order to be set up again in the same monument, there is no doubt
the owner can sue to recover them equally welL

44 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 29) Fruit on a tree is
regarded as part of the land.

^ After non read poBtideat absolvetur, tamen, si quid ex, some such words
being apparently omitted by a slip of the pen. Of. M.

M. J. 25

386 On ^edfio vindicatians [book yi

46 Ulpianus (on the Edict 68) Where the action is for a slave,
and, after action brought, he is restored to the plaintiff^ if the
restoration is made by a hona fide, possessor, I should say that he
ought to give security against malicious wrong only, but other
possessors must do so against negligence too; indeed so must a
hona fide possessor, if issue has already been joined.

46 Paultjs {on Sahinus 10) Where a thing which is sued for
by an action in rem is valued at the amount which the plaintiff
deposes to on oath, the property in it at once passes to the defendant
in possession ; as, if I am possessor, I am held to have compromised
and settled the matter on the footing of the amount which the
plaintiff himself fixed.

47 The same {on PlatUivs 17) This is on the assumption that
the thing is on the spot ; if it is somewhere else, then [the property
passes only] when the possessor gets into possession in pursuance
of the plaintiff's consent ; consequently it is in accordance with
principle that the judge's valuation should in such a case be made
only on the plaintiff giving an undertaking that nothing will be
done by him to prevent possession of the thing being delivered

48 Papinianus {Responsa 2) Where a bona fide possessor has
gone to expense on a piece of land which is shown to belong to
some one else, he cannot sue to recover his outlay from any person
who gave him the land for nothing, or from the true owner ; still,
by means of an exceptio dolt, he can have such expense made good,
on motion to the judge, on principles of justice, that is, where the
expenditure exceeds the profits which he received before joinder of
issue ; the fact being that there is a set-off allowed, and the owner
is compelled to hand over the amount expended in excess, if the
land has been improved.

49 Celsus {Digest 18) My opinion ia that the ground on which
a house is built is part of the house and is not simply subjacent to
it as the sea is to ships. 1. Whatever there is remaining of property
of mine which I have a right to recover by action is itself my
property.

60 Callistratus (Monitory Edict 2) Where a man has a right
to a field in virtue of a purchase, no action of this kind can be
brought until the field has been delivered and possession subse-
quently lost 1. But an heir may very well sue for what is coming
to the inheritance, even though he should not yet have had pos-
session of it (i.e. of what he sues for).

TIT. i] On specific vindications 387

51 PoHPONins (an Sabinus 16) If an action is brought in rerny
and judgment is given against the heir of the possessor, the judg-
ment takes into account negligence and iraudident contrivance on
the part of the heir himself.

52 JuLiAKUs {Dig. 55) If the possessor of a piece of land
fmudulently contrived to go out of possession of the land before
joinder of issue, his heirs certainly are not compellable to take up
the defence of the action in rem ; at the same time an action in
fachmi against them must be allowed, by which they can be com-
pelled to hand over the amount by which they have been enriched
out of the property.

63 POMPONius (on Sabinus 31) If the possessor of land should
have cultivated or planted it, and after that the land is recovered
by action, he is not at liberty to carry away what he planted.

54 Ulpianus {Opinions 6) There; is a great deal of difference
between discharging the office of an advocate and defending one's
own case ; and where a man finds out eventually that a piece of
property is his own, he will not have lost his ownership in it by the
fact that when some one else was suing to recover it he assisted
him, not knowing at the time that he was himself owner.

55 JuLiANTTS {Dig. 55) If the possessor of land dies before
taking joinder of issue, leaving two heirs, and an action is brought
to recover the whole estate against one of the two, who is in
possession thereof, there can be no doubt that an order must be
made against him for the undivided whole.

66 The same {Dig. 78) The law does not admit an action for
recovery of a peculiwn as it does of a flock ; the legatee of a peculkmi
will have to sue for the separate things of which it consists.

57 Alfenus (Dig. 6) A man against whom an action was
brought for recovery of land was sued by a second plaintiff for the
same land. This question was asked, — Supposing the defendant
should hand over the land to either of the two plainti£b in pur-
suance of the judge's order, and after that the other case should
be decided in favour of the plaintiff, how is the defendant to escape
suffering loss twice over ? My answer was that whichever of the
two judges in the respective cases gave judgment first ought to
order the land to be handed over to the plaintiff on condition that
he undertook or gave security to the defendant that if the other
plaintiff got a judgment for recovery too he would give it up.

25—2

888 On ipecijie vindieatious [book ti

68 Paulits {Epitomes of Al/enuSf Digest 3) A man who was
sued in an action to recover a slave and an action for theft com-
mitted by the same slave, asked the question what he ought to do
if judgment were given against him in both actions. The answer
was — ^if the judgment first given were in the action for recovery of
the slave, the judge ought not to compel him to deliver the slave
in pursuance thereoi^ unless security were first given him that in
case any damages should be paid by him in consequence of the
fact that he had taken joinder of issue [for furtum] in respect of
the same man, they should be duly made good to himu But if
judgment were first given on the theft, and he had accordingly
surrendered the man for noxay and thereupon another judgment
were given in feivour of the plaintiff in the action in rem for the
man himself, then the judge ought not to assess any damages for
non-delivery of the man, because the non-delivery was in no
respect attributable to malice or negligence of the defendant
himself.

69 JuiiiAKUS (Extracts from Minimis 6) A lodger placed
windows and doors in another man's buildings, and these the
owner of the buildings in a year's time removed : I wish to know
whether the person who placed them can have a vindicatio for
them. Answer — ^Tes : things affixed to another person's building,
as long as they remain attached, are part of the building, but as
soon as they are removed they at once revert to their original
legal condition.

60 PoMPONius (on Sahinus 29) Where a possessor who is a
child or a lunatic destroys or spoils anything, this is not punishable.

61 JtJLiANUS (Extro/cts from Minicius 6) Minicius was asked
whether, supposing a man used another man's timber to repair his
ship, the ship would nevertheless remain the property of the same
owner. His answer was that it would : but if he did the same
when originally building it the case must needs be different.
JulianuB makes this note : the property in the whole ship follows
the legal position of the keeL

62 Papikianus (Questions 6) If an action is brought for a ship
against a maia fide possessor, there must be an estimate made of
mesne profits too, just as in the case of shops or yards such as
are usually let This is not inconsistent with the rule that the
[pretended] heir is not compelled to pay interest on money set
aside which he does not himself touch ; as, however true it may

TFT. i] On specific vindications 389

be that freight, like interest, does not come by nature but is
receivable in virtue of law, still the reason why the freight can be
claimed in this case is that the possessor of the ship is not re-
sponsible to the plaintiff for risk, whereas the money is lent out at
interest at the risk of the lender [as between the lender and the
plaintiff]. 1. As a general rule, when a question arises as to bring-
ing profits into the account^ it is understood that what has to be
considered is not whether the mala fidt possessor eiyoyed the
profits himself, but whether the plaintiff would have been able to
ei\joy them if he had been allowed to be in possession of the
property. This opinion has the approval of Juhanus.

68 The same (Que^^tom 12) Where a man loses possession
through negligence, but without fraud, then, as he will have to
submit to have the value assessed, and to be charged widi it, his
application will be entertained if he asks that the other party
should assign his right of action ; and, as the pr»tor will give his
aid at any time, if any one should be in possession, he will be put
to no disadvantaga He has a right to relief even if the very
person who received the amount assessed should be in possession ;
and the latter will not easily get a hearing if he should afterwards
want to give back the money after once receiving it in pursuance of
the judge's decision at the risk of the defendant on whom the
order was mada

64 The same (QtMesiions 20) If an action in rem is brought^
there is no doubt that mesne profits must be handed over in
respect even of those things which are not held for profit but only
for use.

66 The same (Responsa 2) A man who purchased land from
one who was not the owner will not be compelled, if he raises an
exeeptio doli, to hand over the land to the true owner, save on the
terms of getting back any money which he may have paid to a
creditor of the owner who had ^ken the land in pledge for his
debt, as well as the balance of interest for the intermediate period,
where, that is, such interest exceeds the amount of the profits
which he received before the trial ; as these profits can in justice
only be set off against later interest, on the same principle as that
applying to money spent on improvements. 1. Where a man
allowed his daughter a female slave, not by way of do$, but as
part of her peculmmy then, if he does not bequeath pecuMtmi to
the daughter by way of l^acy, it follows that the woman is one of
the slaves comprised in the assets of the deceased. If however

890 On specific mndicalwiis [book vi

the father disinherited his daughter in consideration of her dos
and pecfdium, and gave that express reason for leaving her
nothing by testament, or for leaving her so much the less, the
daughter will have a sufficient defence [to an action by the heir] in
her father's intention.

66 Paulus (Questuma 2) A man has none the less right to
sue for recovery of something as his own because there exists a
probability of his losing the ownership in case some condition on
which a l^a^y or a gift of freedom was made to depend should be
fulfiUed.

• >

67 Scmvoul {Responsa 1) A man who had purchased a house
from the guardian of a boy under age having sent in a carpenter
to repair it, the carpenter found some money there ; the question
is asked to whom the money belongs. My answer was that if the
coins were not a hoard, but money which happened to be lost or
which the person to wh(mi it belonged had by mistake omitted to
take away, then there was no reason why they should not still
belong to the same person as before.

68 Ulpianus {an the Edict 51) When a man is ordered to
hand over property and refuses to obey the judge, allying that
he is unable to hand it over, then, if he has got it in his hands,
possession is, on motion, transferred from him to the other party
by armed force, and the only order made upon him refers to the
profits and legal accessions in general. But if it is out of his
I)ower to hand it over, then, if he fraudulently contrived to put it
out of his power, he must be ordered to pay whatever amount the
other party swears to as the value, subject to no limitation and
without taxation. But if he is unable to hand the thing over, and
it is the fiftct that he did not contrive fraudulently to be so unable,
he can be ordered to pay no more than the actual value, that is to
say, what the other party's interest amounts to. The above rules
are of general application, and are followed on all occasions where
something is to be handed over on the intimation of the judge,
whether it is a case of an interdict or an action in rem or in
perBonam.

69 Paulus {on Sabinns 13) Where a man has used fraudulent
contrivance to avoid being in possession, he is liable to this special
punishment that the plaintiff is not bound to give him an under-
taking that he will assign to him the rights of action which he has
in connexion with the matter ;

TIT. i] On speei/ic vindications 391

70 PoMPOVius (on Sabimts 29) and it is held that he must
not even be allowed an action in the nature of a Publician action,
because otherwise a man would have it in his power to acquire
property by violence against the will of the owner by paying its
real valua

71 Paulus (on Sabinus 13) If however the possessor used
fraudulent contrivance, but the plaintiff declines to swear, and
prefers that the other party should be ordered to pay the actual
value, his wish must be complied with.

72 Ulpiakus (on (he Edict 16) If you purchase from Titius
the land of Sempronius, and, on your paying the price, it is
delivered to you, after which Titius becomes heir to Sempronius,
and sells and delivers the same land to someone else, it is fair
that you should have the prior claim ; as, even if the vendor
himself (Titius) should sue you to recover the land, you might bar
his action by an exceptio. It may be added that, if Titius were in
possession, and you were to sue him, then, if he raised an eooceptio
of ownership, you would have a good repliccUio.

78 The Same (on the Edict 17) In an action brought in
respect of a particular thing the possessor is not compelled to say
what is the extent of his share in it; this is the duty of the
plaintiff, not of the possessor; the same practice holds in the
Publician action. A superficiary,

74 Paulus (on the Edict 21) that is to say a person who has a
mperficies in someone else's ground on the terms of paying a
fixed rent for it,

76 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) is promised by the praetor that
he will be allowed an action in rem on sufficient cause shown.

76 Gaiub (on the provincial Edict 7) The rules laid down as
to an action for recovery of an entire thing must be taken to
apply equally to the recovery of a share, and it is part of the
judge's duty to order that whatever kind of things ought to be
handed over along with the share itself shall be handed over to an
amount proportionate to the shara 1. An action is allowed for
recovery of an unascertained share, if there is sufficient ground.
Such sufficient ground may occur where some case on a testament
calls for the application of the lex FcUcidid, on account of the
uncertainty as to the amount to be deducted from legacies, this
question not having been carefully gone into before the judge ; as,
in such a case, a legatee to whom a slave is left by testament, may

392 On ipecific vindieations [book vi

well be in ignorance what share in the slave he ought to sue for ;
accordingly an action such as mentioned will be allowed. The
same rule must be applied to any other kind of subject-matter
as welL

77 Ulpianus (on the Edict 17) A woman made a present by
letter to a man who was not her husband of a piece of land, and
then hired the same land from him : [I opined] that it might
plausibly be held that the man had a right of action in rem for
the land, on the ground that he had acquired possession of it
through the woman herself as his tenant in occupation. Part of
the case was that he had in bet been on the land which was given
him at the very time when the letter was despatched ; and this
circumstance alone was enough to constitute trajisfer of possession,
even if there had been no hiring in the question.

78 Labeo (Probabilities epitomized by Pavlus 4) If you have
not collected the produce of the piece of land of which you
were in possession, though not owner, you are not bound to hand
over anything in respect of the produce of such land. Paulus : Or
rather the question to ask is this : Has the produce become the
defendant's by collection on his part on his own account? We
must understand that there is a gathering of produce not merely
where the whole produce is got together, but where the gathering
is begun and has gone so fi^r that the ground has ceased to support
the fruit ; for example where olives or grapes are plucked, though
no one has made any wine or oil ; in which case the party who has
thus gathered is deemed to have thereby received the produce.

79 The same (ProhcAUities epitomized by Pofuhis 6) If you
sue me to recover a slave, and the slave dies after joinder of
issue, profits must be brought into account for the time of his lifa
Paulus : I should say that this is only true where the slave had
not already fallen into such a state of health as to render his
services of no value ; as even if he had continued to live in such a
condition as that, it would not be right that profits should be
taken into account for that period

80 FuBius Anthiakus (on the Edict 1) Nobody is compelled
to stand an action in rem ; as any one is free to declare that he is
not in possession, with the result that if the other party can prove
that the property really is in the possession of his opponent^ he
can take over the possession with the aid of the Courts even though
he do not prove that he is himself owner.

TFT. n] On tii>e Pvhlieian cbction in rem 398

11.

Ok the Publician action in rem.

1 Ulpianus {on the Edict 16) The prrotor says "where a
man desires to sue for something which was delivered to him on
sufficient ground, the action not being against the owner, and the
thing not having become the plaintiff's property by usuSy I will
allow him an action." 1. The praetor says with good reason "not
having become the plaintiff's property by vsus,'^ because, if it has
once been acquired by usvs^ he has a good civil action, and has no
need for a prsetorian one. 2. Why however did he only mention
delivery and acquisition by usfus^ when there are plenty of heads
of law besides under which a man can acquire owner^p ? For
instance there is bequest,

2 Paulus {on the Edict 10) or donation made mortis cavsa^
in the case of which last^ if the donee loses possession, he has a
right to the Publician action, because acquisition by such a gift is
treated after the analogy of that by a legacy.

8 ULPiAiiaJS {on the Edict 16) There are a number of other
heads of law besides under which acquisition is made. 1. The
praetor says " sue [for something delivered] on sufficient ground " ;
accordingly it is a man who has sufficient ground for taking the
delivery who can bring the Publician action, and it is not only the
bona fide purchaser who has a right to the action, but others have
too, for example, one to whom property was delivered by way of
do9y such property not having yet become his by vjgm ; gift by
way of do% is in fact a very sufficient ground, whether the property
was given with a valuation or without Again, suppose a thing
was delivered in pursuance of a judgment,

4 Paulus {mi the Edict 19) or in discharge of an obligation,

6 Ulpianus {(m the Edict 16) or by way of surrender for
noxa, whether the ground of surrender was famished by a true
view of the facts or an untrue view.

6 Paulus {on the Edict 19) Again, if in a case founded on
noxa, no one having defended the slave, I have the prsBtor's leave
to take him away, and, after taking him, I lose possession of him,
I have a right to the Publician action.

7 Ulpianxjs {on the Edict 16) Add that if the property is
transferred to me by a vesting order (oc^tMf ieoto), I have a right

894 On the Pvblieian dction in rem [book vi

to the Publician action. 1. If a judicial valuation is put on the
property sued for, this is equiyalent to a sale ; and Julianus tells
us (Big. 22) that if the defendant tenders the amount of the
valuation so made, he has a right to the Publician action.
2. Marcellus says (Dig. 17) that a man who buys a thing from a
lunatic, not being aware of his lunacy, can acquire it by usus:
consequently he will have the Publician action too. 3. We may
add that where a man receives something as a volunteer, he has a
right to the action, as it is good even against a donor ; the plaintiff
is none the less a possessor on sufficient grounds where he accepted
a liberality. 4. Where a man purchases from a person under
twenty-five in ignorance of his age, he has a right to the action.
5. Again, he has the same right of action, if it is a case of an
exchange. 6. The Publician action is formed on the model of a
case of ownership, not on the model of a case of possession. 7. If
I sue you to recover property and you tender me an oath, where-
upon I swear that the thing is mine, I have a right to the action,
but only against you ; — ^the only person against whom the oath is
available is the man who tendered it : and if the oath is tendered
to the defendant in possession, and he swears that the thing
does not belong to the plaintiff, he will have an exceptio against
that plaintiff only ; it does not go so far as to give him a right
of action. 8. All the rules laid down with reference to a
mndicatio apply to the Publician action too. 9. The right to
the action goes to the heir and to prsetorian successors also.
10. If the act of purchasing is not mine but that of my slave,
I have the action. A similar rule holds where the purchase is
made by my procurator, or my guardian, or my curator, or any
one who volunteei's to act on my behalf. 11. The praetor speaks
of a honajide purchaser. Accordingly it is not every purchase
which will serve, but only one made hmia fide ; moreover, it is
enough that I should be a bona fide purchaser, though I do not
purchase from the owner ; and that even where the vendor sells
with a fraudulent intent: I am not prejudiced by the vendor's
fraud. 12. In connexion with this action, if I succeeded to the
original purchaser, and I myself acted with fraud, this wiU do me
no harm, where the purchaser himself bought in good faith ; and
if the purchaser to whom I succeeded acted with fraud, I shall
gain nothing by being clear of fraud myself. 13. However, if my
slave was the actual purchaser, it is fhiud on his part that has to
be considered and not on mine ; — and a similar remark applies to
good faith. 14. The action regards the time of purchase ; accord-

TIT. n] On the P^Mwicm^ actimi in rem 396

ingly, in the opinion of Pomponios, nothing that was frandolently
done either before or after the purchase can be brought in
question in the actioa 15. The good faith involved in the
matter is that of the purchaser only. 16. In order therefore
that a man should have a good right to the action, the following
things must be the case ; there must be a bona fide purchaser, and
the thing which is the subject of the purchase must have been
delivered to him in pursuance of the bargain ; it must be carefiilly
remembered that a man cannot proceed on the Publician action
before delivery, however much he may be a bona fide purchaser.
17. According to Julianus {Dig. 7) the delivery of the thing
purchased ought to be taken in good faith ; so that where a man
takes possession knowing that the thing belongs to another, he
cannot take proceedings by way of a Publician action, because he
can never acquire the property by wms. But no one must suppose
the legal view to be this, that if the purchaser should be ignorant
at the time when delivery begins that the thing belongs to some-
one else, this is enough to enable him to bring the Publician
action ; it is required that the purchaser should be bona fide at
the other moment too [viz. when the delivery is completed].

8 Gaius {on the provincml Edict 7) But nothing is expressed
as to the price having been paid ; on which we may found the
opinion that in fact it is not the view of the prsator that the
question need be asked whether the price is paid or not.

9 Ulpianus {an the Edict 16) Whether the thing is delivered
to the purchaser or to the heir of the purchaser, the Publician
right of action exists in both cases equally. 1. Where a man
purchases a thmg which was deposited with him or lent to him
or pledged with him, it must be taken as delivered, if after the
purchase it remains in his hands. 2. It may be added that a
similar rule holds where the delivery preceded the purchasa
3. Again, if I purchase an inheritance, and some article contained
in the inheritance has been delivered to me, for which I wish to
bring an action, — according to Neratius, I can have the Publician
action. 4. If a man makes separate sales to two persons respectively
who both purchase bona fide^ let us consider which haa the best
right to bring the Publician action ; is it the one to whom delivery
was made first, or the one who simply purchased [first] ? To this
Julianus says {Dig. 7) that if the two both purchase from the same
assumed owner, preference must be given to the one to whom de-
livery was made first, but if they purchase from different assumed

396 On the Ptiblieian cuAion in rem [book; yi

owners, the one in possession is in a better position than the one
who sues: — ^and this is a sound view. 5. This action is not in
place in the case of things which cannot be acquired by usub^ for
example in the case of things stolen or fugitive slaves. 6. If a
slave who forms part of an inheritance should before entry by the
heir purchase something, and then lose the possession which was
delivered to him, the heir can very weU bring the Publician action,
as though the possession had been his own. The members of a
munUsipmm will also be in the same position, supposing something
has been delivered to a slave whom they owned as such members,

10 Paulus {on the Edict 19) whether the slave purchased with
reference to his own pecuUum or not

11 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) If I have purchased something,
and the thing is delivered to another at my request, then, according
to a rescript of the present Emperor, Severus, the latter party will
have a right to ask for the Publician action. 1. I^an action is
brought for a usufruct duly delivered, the Publician action is
allowed ; also where servitudes of urban estates are created by
delivery or by sufferance (prescription), for example, suppose a
man has allowed a water-course to be made through his house ;
also where rustic servitudes are similarly created, as in their case
too there is no doubt that delivery and sufferance must be allowed
to produce their respective effects. 2. Where the child of a
stolen slave-woman was conceived at a time when the woman
was in the possession of a bona Jide purchaser, it can be recovered
by this action, even though such child itself has not been in the
possession of the purchaser ; but the heir of the party who stole
the woman cannot bring the action, because he succeeds to the
bad title of the deceased (Le. the thief). 3. Sometimes however,
even where the mother who was stolen was not sold, but was given
to me for nothing, without my knowing of the theft, and she
conceived and bore a child whUe in my possession, I have a
right to a Publician action to recover the child, so Julianus
says, provided that at the time at which I bring the action I
am unaware that the mother was stolen. 4. The same author,
Julianus, gives the general rule that under whatever circumstances
I could acquire the mother by usfus^ if she were not stolen property,
I can under the same circumstances acquire the child by i^mjis, if
I was unaware that the mother was stolen property ; so that in all
[such] cases I shall have the Publician action. 5. The same rule
holds in the case of the child of a female child of a slave-woman, and

TIT. n] On the Publidan action in rem 397

also in the case of a child which was not bom, but was brought into
the world by excision after the death of the mother, so Pomponius
says (b. 40). 6. The same writer says that^ where a house was
purchased, if the house is destroyed, any accessions to it can be
recovered by the action under discussion. 7. Any accession made
to land by alluvion takes the legal implications of the principal
thing to which it accedes ; consequently, where the land itself
cannot be recovered by a Publician action, neither can the ac-
cession in question, but where it can, then [the action embraces^]
the portion which accrued by alluvion, and this we read in
Pomponius. 8. The same writer adds that if it is desired to sue
for missing portions of a statue that was purchased, a similar
action will serva 9. He also proceeds to lay down that if I buy
a piece of vacant ground and build a block of houses on it> I can
very properly use the Publician action. 10. Again, so he says, if
I built such a block and the whole becomes a piece of vacant
ground, I can similarly use the Publician action.

12 Paxjlus {on the Edict 19) In a case where a man made a
present of a slave to a woman to whom he was betrothed, and,
before ownership in the slave was acquired by ttms, he received
him back again by way of do8, it was laid down in a rescript of the
Divine Pius that, should the parties be divorced, the slave ought
to be handed over to the woman; as the gift was between a
betrothed man and woman, and so was valid. Accordingly the
woman wiU be allowed an exeeptio if she is in possession and the
Publician action if she should have lost possession, whether [in the
latter case] the person in possession should be a stranger or the
donor. 1. When an inheritance is handed over to any one in
pursuance of the Trebellian Senatusconsultum, he can have the
Publician action, even though he should not yet have acquired
possession. 2. In lands held on perpetual lease (praedia vectu
galia)y and in other lands which are not subject to usucapio, the
Publician action is allows, if it should happen that such land^ is
delivered to one who takes it bona Jide. 3. The same rule holds
equally where I purchase bona fide from one who is not owner a
block of chambers which goes with the surfietce. 4. In the case of
a thing of such a kind that some statute or imperial enactment
prohibits a transfer of it, the Publician action is not available ; in
such cases the prsBtor gives no assistance to any one, lest he should

^ Some such words probably omitted. M.
' Ins. re9 after tradita, v. M.

308 On the Publidan dction in rem [book yi

be transgreflsing a statute. 5. A Publician action may be had even
to recover a slave-child under the age of a year. 6. A man can
employ the Publician action where the subjectrmatter of his suit is
a share in something. 7. Indeed even a man who has been in
possession for a single moment might perfectly well proceed by
means of this action.

13 Gaius {on the provincial Edict 7) Whenever people get
hold of anything under such circumstances, whatever they are, as
constitute a lawfiil method of acquisition, and then lose possession
of it, they will be allowed this action for the purpose of recovering
the thing in question. 1. But there are cases where particular
classes of persons have no right to the Publician action, even in
pursuance of lawful possession : possession in consequence of a
pledge or of a gift in precariiim is lawful, but in neither of these
cases is it in accordance with practice that a right of action of this
kind should exist ; the reason being simply this, that neither the
pledge nor the holder on precarium takes possession with that
intent that he believes himself to be owner. 2. Where a man
purchases from a boy under age, he is bound to show that he
bought with the concurrence of the boy's guardian, and not in
transgression of any statute. Still, if he is deceived into buying
with the concurrence of a simulated guardian, he may be held to
have purchased in good faith.

14 Ulpianus (on the Edict 16) Papinianus has the following
{Qiieations 6) : — ^where a man forbids delivery to be made in
pursuance of a sale or notifies to that effect, the thing having been
sold by his agent at his request, but the agent thereupon never-
theless delivers, the praetor will protect the purchaser, whether he
is in possession of the thing or is suing to recover it But if the
agent should have to pay anything to the purchaser in consequence
of an action brought by the latter on the contract, such agent will
recover [against the principal] by an actio contraria on the
numdatam ; [and this case might very well arise,] as it is possible
that the thing should be recovered from the purchaser by the
person who gave the mandate to sell, owing to the purchaser,
through ignorance, omitting to raise the eooceptio which he ought
to have raised, for example, the following: ^'unless the man that I
dealt with sold at your request."

15 PoMPOKius {on Sabinvs 3) If a slave of mine in the course
of his flight from my house should purchase something from a man
who is not the owner, I shall have a good Publician right of action,

TIT. ni] On cictions to recover vectigcUicm land 399

even though I should not have acquired through such slave the
possession of the thing delivered.

16 Papikiakus {Qiiestions 10) Paulus's note : The Publician
action may be barred by the eosceptio of legal ownership.

17 Nbratius {Parchments 3) The Publician action was not
devised with the object of taking property away from the actual
owner; this we may conclude in the first place on principles of
justice, and in the second place from the existence of the exceptio
"provided the thing in question is not the property of the de-
fendant *' ; the object of the action was to secure that where a man
has bought a thing in good faith and has acquired the possession
of it in pursuance of the purchase, he rather than the other party
should keep it

III.
On actions to recover vectigalian — ^that is

EBiPHYTBUTIC — LAND.

1 Paxjlus (on the Edict 21) Of town lands some are called
vectigalian and some are not so called The word vectigalian is
applied to land which is let by way of perpetual lease, that is to
say, on the terms that so long as '^vectigai is paid it shall not be
possible in law to take the land away from the original lessees or
from those who succeed to their position : land which is not
vectigalian is such as is let for cultivation in the way in which
lands commonly are let with that object by private contract
1. Where persons take a lease of land from municipal bodies to
be enjoyed in perpetuity, then, although such lessees do not
thereby become owners, nevertheless the law now is that they
have a good right of action in rem against any one who should
have taken possession, in fact even against the members of the
municipal body themselves,

2 Ulpianus {on Sabinus 17) provided always they pay the
vectigal.

3 Paxjlus {on the Edict 21) The case is the same where they
contracted a lease for a definite term, but the period for which it
was contracted has not yet expired.

^ Transpose tamdiu and quamdiu. Cf. M.

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