(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Children's Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "A digest of deductive logic for the use of students"

J ! 



Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive 

in 2007 witii funding from 

IVIicrosoft Corporation 



littp://www.arcliive.org/details/digestofdeductivOObarkricli 



A DIGEST OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 



A DIGEST 



OF 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 



FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS 



JOHNSON BARKER, B.A. 



METHUEN & CO. 

36, ESSEX STREET, W.C. 

LONDON 

1897 



^3 



PREFACE 

This book does not pretend to be a treatise. It 
is a note book, intended to be used side by side 
with the ordinary Manual. My indebtedness to 
the ordinary Manual, as may be supposed, is con- 
siderable, for in large part these notes are little 
more than a summary of what any ordinary 
manual will contain : to summarise, however, was 
my main purpose. 

The book is designed, as stated in the title, for 
students preparing for examination. It offers 
them, firstly, an outline of that portion of the 
subject which the text book treats in full ; and, 
secondly, it provides a somewhat fuller discussion 
of points that are apt to be overlooked or omitted. 
It has been my aim throughout to bring into the 
relief of bare outline the essentials of deduction, 
and to elucidate obscurities. 

This book, then, differs from other works in 
being condensed where they are full, and in being 
supplementary where they are condensed, and thus 
it may claim a certain sort of freshness of treatment. 

220697 



vi PREFACE 

These notes have already been found useful in 
teaching. It is hoped that their usefulness may 
be extended by publication. 

The questions in Appendix I. are selected 
mainly from the B.A. examination papers set at 
the Universities of London and Durham. They 
are arranged, as far as possible, in sets correspond- 
ing to the subject matter of the chapters to which 
the Roman numerals refer. The number of ques- 
tions might easily have been multiplied : their 
purpose here, however, is not so much to supply 
an exhaustive praxis, but to indicate, all along the 
line of the study, the general standard required of 
those who take up Logic for examination. 

The Bibliography in Appendix II. is not in any 
sense complete. It is a list compiled in the course 
of my own reading, which for purposes of reference 
from time to time I have found useful. It is more 
complete than any similar list with which I am 
acquainted. 

Johnson Barker. 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. 

I. LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 

IL DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 

III. THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 

IV. TERMS 

V. CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION 

VI. PROPOSITIONS 

VII. PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 

VIII. DEFINITION AND DIVISION 

IX. IMPORT OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 
QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE 

X. DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION 

XI. IM.MEDIATE INFERENCES 

XII. THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 

XIII. THE SYLLOGISM 

XIV. FIGURE AND MOOD : REDUCTION 



PAGE 
I 

7 
17 
25 
32 

37 
48 

55 

59 
65 
71 
85 
89 
100 



Vlll 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. I'AGE 

XV. IRREGULAR AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS 112 



XVI. FALLACIES ... 

XVII. THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 
XVIII. SUMMARIES AND TABULAR STATEMENTS 

APPENDIX I EXAMINATION PAPERS 

APPENDIX II BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 



123 
129 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

CHAPTER I 

LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, ch. iv. and vi. 
Keynes, Introduction. 
Welton, Vol, i., Introd., ch. i. 
Mill, Bk. i., ch. i. 



Logic is the science of the laws of valid thought. 

No such science is possible without a commonly 
received and understood means of expressing 
thought. The accepted means of expression is 
language. At the outset therefore we must take 
into account the nature and purpose of language 
in its connexion with thought. 

Matter of thought is suppHed b}^ sensory impres- 
sions, which act as stimuli to the mind and 
excite ideas. This raw material becomes know- 
ledge only through the activity of the mind itself. 
Mind has a power of synthesis which collects into 



2 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

one complex whole the various impressions received 
through the senses, and allocates them in one 
external object, of which we thus form a mental 
image or idea. This result of mental activity is 
perception. Perception, then, may be defined as 
that state of mind in which it becomes conscious 
of an individual sensible object. But we are capable 
of more than such simple acts of consciousness, 
and so much more that this is not commonly 
regarded as being thought at all. 

The first stage of thought is conception. Con- 
ception is the name for knowing generally, as 
opposed to perception in which we apprehend only 
the attributes of the individual thing perceived. 
The concept is to be regarded as an extract or 
deposit — either word is better than "abstract" — 
from a number of resembling percepts or images. 
It is a general notion formed by a comparison of 
individuals and the selection of attributes common 
to them all : in other words it is the discovery of 
likeness. 

Perception is apprehension of a thing : concep- 
tion is apprehension of a kind of thing. Percept 
is knowledge of a particular : concept is knowledge 
of a general. For perception naming is advan- 
tageous, but not essential. For conception language 
is indispensable. The name combines and registers 
in a fixed form a group of certain attributes, which 
otherwise would become disunited in thought when 
not attended to. It helps to recall that group and 
to keep it distinct from other groups. 



LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 3 

The psychological concept is equivalent to the 
logical connotation or significance of a class name 
or general term. The general term thus formed 
need not refer to any actually existing class. It 
is enough that such a class can be conceived in 
thought, even though it have only one actual 
representative, or exist only in imagination. 

Naming, therefore, or some similar system of 
signs, is an essential factor in the progress and 
process of thought. The concept is the unit of 
thought, and without a name, would rapidly tend 
to disintegrate. 

Language may be defined as a system of signs 
for the purpose of facilitating or economising the 
process of thought and of recording and expressing its 
product. This definition includes gesture or imitative 
language, and conventional or verbal language. 
In conventional language the connexion between 
symbols and ideas is arbitrary and artificial. 

Speech is the universal medium of communica- 
tion because it is a natural method of expression. 
Men speak, not because they mean to speak, but 
because they are constituted as they are. It is 
also the most easily employed, as well as the most 
effective system of intercommunication. 

The chief functions of language may . thus be 
summarised — 

I. It is a means of intercommunication. 

II. It is a mechanical aid to thought, enabling 
us to form concepts and facilitating the process of 
thinking. 



4 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

III. It is an instrument of record and reference, 

demanding two main requirements, viz. — 

(i) Precision or definiteness of meaning, and 
(2) Completeness. 
Language is modified by two great and contrary 
processes, viz. — 

I. Generalisation, and 
II. Specialisation. 

I. Generalisation arises from detection of like- 
ness between a new object without a name, and 
some other object well known ; the old name is 
applied to the new object. This change is usually 
effected by a sort of unconscious instinct in a 
number of persons using the name. In the 
language of science such changes are often pur- 
posely made. Proper, or singular names, are 
constantly generalised both in popular and in 
scientific language. 

II. Specialisation is a change exactly the oppo- 
site, and equally important. A name originally 
applicable to a multiplicity of objects by usage 
comes to be applied only to a few ; or to put 
the same fact in another way, applied originally 
in a general sense it comes to have a special 
significance and application. One effect of special- 
isation is what is known as dcsyiionyiiiisatioii^ or 
the differentiation of synonyms. 

In addition to the changes effected b}^ generalis- 
ation and specialisation, vast enlargement and 
changes have also been made in language b}- the 
process of analogous or metaphorical extension of 



LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 5 

the meaning of words. Practically this consists 
in generalisation, and differs only in proceeding 
by analogy rather than identity, that is, the ex- 
tension of meaning is based on imagined re- 
semblance rather than any actual likeness between 
the new object and the old after which it is called. 

Ambiguities of language are of frequent occur- 
rence. Very few words indeed have one and only^ 
one definite meaning. The exact meaning of a 
word depends for the most part upon the context 
in which it is used. This indeterminateness of 
meaning gives rise to confusion of thought and 
misunderstanding — technically called fallacy. Bear- 
ing this in mind, words have been classified as — 

L Univocal when they suggest no more than 
one definite meaning, 

IL Equivocal^ ambiguous, or Jiouionyiiioits when 
suggestive of two or more meanings, and 

II L Analogous when with the same meaning 
they have a different application. E.g. foot — of a 
mountain : of an animal : of a page : a measure of 
length. 

Equivocal words are further classified according 
as equivocation arises from their (i) Sound, (2) 
Spelling, or (3) both Sound and Spelling. These 
latter are grouped according as equivocation arises 
from {a) accidental confusion of different words, 
(^) transfer of meaning by association of ideas, or 
{c) logical transfer of meaning to analogous objects. 

An ambiguous word is in reality not one, but 
two or more words confused together. Language 



6 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

is full of ambiguities, and we cannot proceed far 
in logic until we have placed a precise interpret- 
ation upon certain forms of words as representing 
thought. If thought, and thought alone, were the 
subject matter of logic, there would be no such 
necessity. The fact that such necessity exists shows 
that to eliminate all considerations of language 
from logic is an impossibility. In dealing with 
such ambiguous words logically, we must first of all 
determine from the context one clear and definite 
meaning. Then, and not till then, can we proceed. 



CHAPTER II 

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 



REFERENXES 

Jevons, Lessons, ch. i. 

Keynes, Introd., §§ i and 2. 

Welton, Vol. i., Introd., ch. ii., pp. 16 — 19. 

Mill, Logic, Introd. 

Mill, Exam, of Sir IVni. Hamilton, ch. xx., p. 373. 

Ray, Introd. and Appendix E, p. 302. 

Bain, Ded. Log., pp. 30— 37- 

Read, Carveth, Theojy of Logic, Introd. 



Logic is the science of the principles which regulate 
valid thought and its expression in language. 

Many other definitions of logic have been given 
which have varied greatly according to the view 
taken of the scope of the science. Of these Bain in 
his Deduction quotes and discusses the following — 

[rt:] The Art of Reasoning. 

\b'\ The Science and Art of Reasoning. 

[^] The Science of the Laws of Thought. 

\d\ The Science of the Operations of the Under- 
standing in the Pursuit of Truth. 



8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

[c] The Science of the Operations of the Under- 
standing which are concerned in, or are subservient 
to, the Estimation of Evidence. 

Mill quotes and criticises the definitions [a], [d], 
and [d], giving [e] as his own. 

Reverting to the definition given at the head of 
this chapter, and accepting it as tolerably compre- 
hensive, the meaning of the words employed must 
be clearly- understood. 

Science is coherent or systematised knowledge. 
Its office is to detect and describe the natural laws 
inflexibly observed by the objects treated in the 
science. There is a science of.human reason or 
thought because there are uniform modes in which 
every one thinks and reasons, and must think and 
reason. 

A law or principle is uniformity of mode : also 
the statement of this uniformity. In other words 
it is the statement of a general truth. By laws of 
thought we mean "a certain uniformity or agree- 
ment which exists and must exist in the modes 
in which all persons think and reason, so long as 
they do not make what w^e call mistakes, or fall 
into self-contradiction and fallacy " (/evo/is). 

Psychology deals with these laws in the sense of 
uniformities, that is, laws in accordance with which 
men are found by experience normally to think 
and reason. It also investigates their genesis and 
development. Logic deals with them purely as 
statements which are regulative and authoritative, 
that is, as affording criteria by the aid of which 



DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 9 

valid and invalid reasonings may be discrimin- 
ated. 

The word thought is used at least in three 
senses, viz. — 

{a) Any mental state : conceiving, judging, in- 
ferring. 

{b) Thought-process: conception, judgment, in- 
ference. 

(c) Thought-product : concepts, judgments, in- 
ferences. 

With regard to validity or truth, the most 
effective statement is that valid, true, or correct 
thought or thinking is that which is so recog- 
nised by all minds, that is, a thought is valid 
when it holds not only for the thinker, but for all 
others to whom he may communicate it. True 
thought has a general application : it is knowledge 
of a general kind for all alike. Logic investigates 
and determines the conditions under which the 
thought of one mind can stand for the thought of 
all minds ; it is concerned with the conditions 
under which a thinker can claim from all minds 
assent to his own thought. 

Validity is of two kinds : {a) formal, (J?) real. 

{ii) Formal validity is self-consistency, z. e. not 
self-contradiction. 

{U) Real validity is consistency with objective 
reality, i. e. with fact. 

Take, e.g. two propositions — 
(i) All men are mortal. 
(2) No man is immortal. 



lo A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

You cannot but think (i) when the thought ex- 
pressed is referred to the real and actual experi- 
ence of life, and it assures the validity of (2), that 
is, (2) is true in consistency with and because of 
(i). Some affirm that there is no other logic than 
that which has to do with making thought self- 
consistent. The Laws of Thought {q. v.), Identity, 
Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, are laws of 
consistency. 

The wider view of consistency requires the 
agreement of thought with fact. In the example 
above, (2) is consistent with (i), and is therefore 
logically valid. But does it also agree with fact ? 
If not, it must be rejected as invalid. It is to be 
noted that the conditions for determining the 
truth of self-consistency are different from those 
which determine the consistency of thought with 
fact. 

Since the time of Kant, it has been usual to call 
that treatment of logic which deals with the 
internal, intrinsic or self-consistency of thought by 
the name of pure or formal logic as opposed to 
applied or material logic which deals with the ex- 
ternal, extrinsic consistency of thought, /. f. of the 
agreement of thought with its object as actually 
existing either as something material or mental, 
real or imaginary. 

Formal logic takes no account whatever of the 
subject matter of thought. It deals with thought 
without any extrinsic reference, /. e. without refer- 
ence to fact or reality of any kind. Hence we may 



DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC ii 

represent thoughts by bare and empty symbols. 
Thus in the empty schema — 

All M is P 
All 5 is M 



All 6" is P 



S, M, and P may stand for anything. The 
reasoning proceeds and the conclusion follows 
irrespective of the matter denoted by the terms 
involved or our knowledge of their meaning ; the 
intrinsic consistency of the thought remains un- 
altered however we interpret the terms. 

The distinction between formal and material logic 
does not correspond with the distinction between 
Deduction and Induction. Some writers wrongly 
make this distinction, e.g. Bain and Fowler. There 
is a Logic of Formal Induction as much as a Logic 
of Formal Deduction, just as there is also a Logic 
of Material Deduction. 

The laws of thought have been called necessary. 
Their " necessity " consists in the impossibility of 
ev^ading them without inconsistency. In the defin- 
ition of logic therefore as "the science of the 
necessary laws of thought," necessary means valid 
in the sense of being self- consistent. 

As with the definition of logic the scope and 
purpose of the science is variously stated accord- 
ing to the aspect in which it is regarded. If a 
man holds that general knowledge or thought pro- 
ceeds only by way of language, he may treat of 



12 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

it by its expression and he is called a nominalist. 
If he holds that you may think without language, 
he may treat of it by concepts, judgments, infer- 
ences, and he is called a conceptualist But by 
talking of names and concepts indifferently no 
inconsistency is involved, for nominalism need not 
be accepted so as to deny conceptualism, nor need 
conceptualism be accepted so as to affirm the 
possibility of thought without language. 

Again, thought is always of something, i. e. has 
an objective reference, though not necessarily of 
anything which actually exists. But even when 
thinking of something which ' has no objective 
existence it is thought of as an object, i.e. the 
thought is objectified. Thus we may proceed 
further and say that logic is concerned with things 
in so far as they are the objects of thought, and 
with language in so far as it is the embodiment of 
thought. This is the view of the Realist. 

Though as pure logicians we deal with the form 
or manner of thought as opposed to its matter, 
yet in a sense log^ic is an objective science : in the 
sense, that is, of dealing with a certain aspect of 
things, viz. their thinkableness. 

There are then three aspects in which logic may 
be viewed, viz. — 

I. Subjectively, 
II. Objectively, 

III. Verbally. 

As previously stated the definition of logic 
adopted by any one logician will be modified 



DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 



according to the point of view taken. The defini- 
tions following are framed in accordance with one 
or other of these aspects, and exhibit the difference 
which the point of view adopted necessitates. 

I. Subjective aspect. Logic is the science of 
the regulative principles of thought ; or the science 
of the axioms and laws to which thought must 
conform in order to be valid. 

This definition may be read as either that of 
formal or material logic according to the meaning 
of the word valid. If valid be read as self-consistent 
the definition is of formal logic. But if as con- 
sistent with reality it is the definition of material 
logic. 

II. Objective aspect. Logic is the science of 
the most universal relations and correlations of 
things and attributes, i. e. the science of the prin- 
ciples and laws to which we must conform in order 
that a relation established by comparison of things 
and attributes, or inferred from one or more given 
relations between them, may be true. This is a 
definition of material logic. 

III. Verbal aspect. Logic is conversant about 
language, and is the science of the use of names, 
propositions and arguments ; or, logic is the science 
of the import and relations of propositions. As 
already noted, this treatment of logic is some- 
times called Nominalism, as opposed to Concep- 
tualism. These names are ambiguous, for they 
usually apply to certain doctrines concerning the 
true nature of concepts, or general names. Nom- 



14 A DIGEST OF LOCUC 

inalism however, involves no more than a clear 
recognition that, as a matter of fact, all thought- 
processes of any complexity are carried on by the 
aid of language. It is here used to denote that 
view of logic which seeks to remove from it the 
matter of thought, and also the mode of thought, 
and limits the science to a consideration only of 
the expression of thought. In this sense logic 
is also sometimes spoken of as symbolic. 

Ill its relation to other sciences logic has been 
called ^^ scientia scientiannn'' because in their 
method the sciences are based upon logical prin- 
ciples. This is its general r&lation. There are 
other special relations of logic to 

(i) Metaphysics. 

(2) Psychology. 

(3) Rhetoric, and 

(4) Grammar. 

In general the difference between logic and the 
other sciences may be stated as follows : the laws 
of thought arc laws of things as thinkable and are 
subjective in so far as they relate to thinking : but 
objective in so far as they relate to the objects 
thought about. In the other sciences we never 
get so far away from the objective basis. In logic 
the subjective aspect is always prominent and 
immediate. 

More particularly the relation of logic to these 
four sciences may be briefly stated as follows : 

(i) Metaphysics is the most general and specu- 
lative of the mental sciences, and its office is to 



CHAPTER III 

THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. ii. 

Welton, Vol. i., Introd., ch. ii., pp. 19 seq. 



Logic is usually regarded as consisting of three 
parts, which according to the point of view are : — 

I. ia) Concepts, {b) Terms, or {c) Things or 
attributes. Y 

II. {a) Judgments, (b) Propositions, or {c) Rela- 
tion between , things and attributes, things and 
things, or attributes and attributes. 

III. {a) Inference, {b) Syllogism, or {c) Inference 
of relation between things and attributes, things 
and things, or attributes and attributes from one 
or more given relations. 

In this partition {a) will be the phraseology of 
formal logic, {b) that of symbolic logic, and [c] that 
of material logic. 

Method is sometimes added as a fourth part of 
logical doctrine. It refers to the disposition or 



1 8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

arranorement of a series of reasonincf in discourse, 
and is therefore a part of rhetoric rather than of 
logic. 

These three parts of logical doctrine call for 
further discussion, and though the following analysis 
of conception is strictly speaking psychological, 
it finds a place here in deference to tradition which 
includes in the treatment of logic notice of the 
dispute anent the nature of the concept. The 
practical purpose served by introducing a notice 
of this dispute is that it enables us to understand 
more clearly than we could do otherwise what is 
the subject matter about which logic is con- 
versant. 

I. Three views as to the nature of the concept 
have been formulated. They are known as 

(i) Realism, 

(2) Conceptualism, and 

(3) Nominalism. 

( 1 ) The Realists hold that for every concept or 
general name there is somewhere in existence an 
objective, real something to correspond with it. 
They deny that the concept is a psychical pro- 
duct which grows out of a perception of singular 
or particular objects. This view is obsolete and 
has now only a historic interest. 

(2) The Conceptualist asserts that the concept 
is an intelligible synthesis of attributes, without 
any existing objective entity, and that thought 
proceeds without the accompaniment of definite 
images by means of the concept alone. 



THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 19 

(3) According to the Nominalist view a class 
is constituted only by its name : and the general 
name has nothing to correspond with it either 
objectively or subjectively. It is held that every 
time a general name is used, an image, or a rapid 
succession of images of various members of the 
class, is present to the mind, and as these images 
are individual they cannot be concepts, for as we 
have already seen the concept is knowledge of a 
general. 

The Conceptualists and Nominalists (both are 
sometimes called Nominalists) agree in declaring 
that the development of the concept is by elabora- 
tion from perceptions. The Conceptualist declares 
that in the concept there is something more or less 
definitely represented by the mind, that the concept 
is not an image of a thing, but is some kind of 
image. The Nominalist holds that the concept 
is nothing before the mind at all, but is a symbol, 
generally vocal, as a word or name : and that any 
image you can have is the image always of one 
thing, and as that is not a concept the name of 
the thing must be. Bain as a Nominalist says 
that the true psychological aspect of the concept 
is the representation of a number of individuals 
in rapid succession. If so the concept would be 
a mere collection. In conception we have, as a 
matter of fact, no definite or distinct image before 
the mind at all. 

These two positions are both true in part. The 
truth appears to lie in a combination of the two 



20 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

views. No general statement about the concept 
which shall be fully applicable to all cases can be 
made, for it includes a great variety of different 
kinds of intellectual product. This variety is 
shown by such a list of words as follows : — tiger, 
iron, man, fatJier, symbol, murder, nationality, 
substance. 

What the concept is as before the mind depends 
greatly on the number and kind of experiences 
brought together under it. If these experiences 
have been limited in number, or have been ex- 
tremely uniform, departing little from a certain 
sort of medium character, then some kind of repre- 
sentation is possible : yet not the representation 
of any one object, since then it would not be a 
concept, but a representation having something 
only of the definiteness of an image. 

If a variety of perceptions with few resemblances 
and predominant differences are brought together, 
it is impossible to have any sort of representative 
image, nevertheless there is the concept, for we 
can still conceive. E.g. Of the concept tiger a 
certain image comes before me representative of 
each tiger of the class of animals so named : it has 
a certain colour, size, stripes, yet none of these 
definitely represented — at any rate there is more 
than the mere name. No one tiger in particular 
is represented, nevertheless there is an image, not 
altogether indefinite and yet not definite. The 
Conceptualist rightly holds in opposition to the 
Nominalist that although vague there is represent- 



THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 21 

ation, in other words that to some extent we do 
visualise. 

Of concepts such as nvn the case is different. 
There is no image as with f/^-er, man, etc. It is 
easy for the ConceptuaHst to instance such examples 
as tiger, etc., and apply them universally : it is 
also easy for the Nominalist to instance others such 
as iron and apply them in like manner. 

As a matter of psychical fact, the human mind, 
impressed by a variety of experiences, simultaneous 
or successive, and trying to reduce them to unity, 
almost inevitably resorts to muscular expression 
and notably to a movement of the larynx, which 
results in sound. Words are sounds available for 
language, and they start forth naturally from 
human beings merely on occasion of the reception 
of a multitude of similar impressions, and so use- 
ful are words found to be that even percepts come 
to possess names, and in the end we don't properly 
perceive unless the percept is named. As previously 
stated, for general knowledge naming is indis- 
pensable, and it is to naming as a means of know- 
ing generally that the mind naturally resorts. 

Now concepts or general notions are of such 
variety that a statement equally applicable to all 
is impossible. The statement of the Nominalist 
is that all conceiving consists in naming. To 
imagine or to perceive there is no necessity for 
speech, but in order to conceive there is such 
necessity, and it is with a view to conceiving that 
language arose. But it must be also admitted 



22 A DIGEST OF LOCilC 

that the concept is a something subjective apart 
from something objective, and apart also from its 
symbol as expressed in speech. 

II. A judgment is the apprehension of relation 
between two concepts. In judging or forming a 
judgment two concepts are brought together for 
the purpose of comparison. It is thus the psychical 
correlative of the logical proposition. In other 
words a judgment is a mental act, its expression 
in language is a proposition. 

As to the nature of a judgment widely divergent 
views are held. Our estimate of the scope of logic 
will determine the view we adopt. There are two 
main points of dispute, viz. — 

{a) Concerning the matter of the judgment the 
question arises ; between what is it that a relation 
is apprehended ? 

{b) Concerning the form of the judgment the 
question arises; what is the nature of the relation 
between the two terms } 

The second point is discussed under the head of 
the Import of Propositions {q, v.). 

With regard to the matter of the judgment there 
are again the three conflicting theories, (i) Nomin- 
alism, (2) Conceptualism, and (3) Realism or Ma- 
terialism. It must be remembered, however, that 
these names most commonly refer to the doctrine 
of the concept just discussed. 

(i) Nominalism identifies the judgment with the 
proposition, and holds that we deal with names and 
names alone. The judgment is only a statement 



THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 2 



about names affirming or denying one or the other. 
According to this view the whole scope of logic is 
bounded by names and their relations. 

(2) Conceptualism, as the name implies, regards 
the judgment as the comparison of concepts purely 
as concepts. From this standpoint logic has been 
defined as the science of the pure (or formal) laws 
of thought, or as the science of thought as thought. 
It is the logic of consistency which takes no account 
of language as the expression of thought and no 
account of matter as that about which the thought 
is conversant. 

The extremists of this school, as Mansel, hold 
that all a judgment can express is that one concept 
is contained in, or forms part of another concept, 
and that the judgment cannot do more than unfold 
and make explicit the content of a concept. 

(3) Materialism explains judgment as a relation 
between two concrete objects having nothing to 
do with the mental abstraction of their attributes. 
Propositions do not express relation between con- 
cepts, but between the things these concepts repre- 
sent. When we say, e.g. grass is green : this does 
not mean that our concept grass contains or agrees 
with our concept green, but that the thing grass 
possesses the attribute greenness. The scope of 
logic thus becomes the investigation of the condi- 
tions of real validity. Th^'s is Mill's standpoint. 

The extremists of this school are known as 
Transcendental Logicians. 

III. Inference or Reasoning is a comparison of 



24 A DTGESI' DI' \f)(]](' 

judgments resulting in another judgment differing 
from the first. 

According to the point of view it has been 
variously defined, and as before there are the three 
doctrines. 

(i) NominaHsm regards inference as the act of 
thought by which we proceed from one or more 
propositions to a third proposition, the truth of 
which necessarily follows from those previously 
given. 

(2) Concept-ualism regaids inference as the pro- 
duct of comparing two of more judgments with a 
view to arriving at another which is contained in, 
or warranted by, the judgments already in the 
mind. 

(3) Materialism regards inference as the estab- 
lishment of a relation between two things or two 
attributes or between things and attributes by 
means of a third thing or attribute, or the infer- 
ence of a relation between things and attributes or 
things and things or attributes and attributes from 
one or more such relations given. 



ciiai^ti^:r IV 

tp:rms 



RKI'KRKNCKS 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. iii. and v. 

Keynes, Part i., pp. 7—51. Most useful. 

Mill less useful here than in the later part of his bk. 

Welton, Vol. i., 15k. i., ch. i and 2. 



A Term is one or more words forming the subject 
or predicate of a proposition: derived from the 
Latin tenniiins meaning a boundary. It is the 
verbal equivalent, in a proposition, of an object or 
f^roup of objects : or of a concept. 

In a wider sense it is synonymous with name. 
It is well to avoid thinking of names as terms, a 
name is only a term when it forms one element of 
a proposition. There are two terms in a proposition 
between which the proposition asserts a relation to 
exist. 

Hobbes' definition of a name is usually quoted 
in this connexion and runs as follows : " A name 
is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark 



26 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

which may raise in our minds a thought Hke to 
some thought we had before, and which, being dis- 
posed in speech and pronounced to others, may be 
to them a sign of what thought the speaker had or 
had not before in his mind." 

It is not accurate to describe a term or name as 
a concept expressed in language, for names are 
primarily names of things, by which is meant 
objects of thought, and only secondarily names of 
ideas. 

Words are of two kinds : — 

I. A categorematic word is a word capable of 
being used by itself as a term : tantamount to 
" term." 

II. A syncategorematic word is not capable of 
being used by itself as a term : tantamount to 
" not-term." Jevons speaks loosely of syncategore- 
matic terms. 

Categorematic words are nouns or their equiva- 
lents. By a suppositio materialis any word may 
be used categorematically, ^.^. This "that" is a 
demonstrative pronoun. 

Names are common, applicable to more objects 
than one, or Individual, applicable to one object 
only. 

Common navies are General or Col- 
lective. 

Individual names are Singular or Proper. 

A general name is the name of a group of things 
or attributes, whether real or imaginary, and 
applies both severally and collectively; /.r. to all 



TERMS 27 

and each. It is distributive : oriines as opposed to 
cuncti. A general name is applicable to a number 
of things in virtue of their being similar, or having 
something in common. This means in effect that 
it is the name of a concept as well as of individual 
things. 

A collective name is the name of a group taken 
together, i. e. collectively only. It refers to all 
{cuncti) not each. A collective name may be 
singular or general. There is no antithesis between 
general and collective as is sometimes implied. The 
classes overlap. The important logical antithesis 
is between the collective and distributive use of 
names. E.g. — 

Collective: All the angles of a triangle are eqjial 
to tivo rig] it angles. 

Distributive: All the angles of a triangle are less 
than tivo right angles. 

A singular name is capable of being applied only 
to one individual object. In dealing with singular 
names we are dealing with objects in the sense of 
percepts. 

A proper name is a singular name given to an indi- 
vidual merely as a mark to distinguish it from 
others. It is an arbitrary and unmeaning verbal 
sign, fohn is a proper name which can be correctly 
affirmed of more than one individual, but this does 
not make it general. The test of a proper name is 
insignificance, lack of meaning. 

Are substantial names singular or general ? 
Substantial is a \\-ord suggested by Jevons to 



28 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

describe the names of materials, as eartJi, oii, ivater^ 
flame. They are a pecuHar kind of collective name 
with the special characteristic of theoretically in- 
finite divisibility, and at the same time they possess 
perfect homogeneity or uniformity of structure. 
The test of generality is the mark of quantity, some, 
which can be prefixed in a meaning sense to all 
names that are general. Some cannot be attached 
to a really singular name. We can say, e.g. " some 
water is not good to drink : " the substantial name 
water therefore is general, not singular. 

Names are Concrete or Abstract. 

A concrete name denotes ^n object in virtue 
of special qualities which it possesses ; or a class of 
things in virtue of some quality, or set of qualities, 
which they have in common. Adjectives are 
therefore concrete, being epithets, descriptive of 
things. 

An abstract name " is the name of a quality, 
attribute, or circumstance of a thing." It only 
permits of one judgment, viz. that it is the pro- 
perty of its corresponding concrete. 

In the case of every concrete there is, or may be 
constructed, a corresponding abstract ; and also of 
the abstract there is, or may be constructed, a cor- 
responding concrete. Many names are abstract 
or concrete according to the precise signification 
attached to them. 

A general name, as such, is concrete : the 
name of the attribute connoted by the general 
name is abstract. The general name denotes 



TERMS 29 

concrete things and connotes certain common 
attributes. 

The names concrete and abstract correspond in 
a certain way to the distinction between denotation 
and connotation {see next chapter). 

The question has been asked whether the dis- 
tinction between general and singular names can 
be applied to abstracts. In reply it must be re- 
membered that an abstract name is not merely the 
name of a quality, but of a quality considered 
entirely apart from the thing possessing it. When 
we begin to distinguish kinds and differences, and 
hence to use abstract names in the plural number, 
we render them practically concrete, and therefore 
so far general. Every abstract name that is the 
name of a single quality (e. g. squareness, different 
species oi squareness being unimaginable) is singular. 

Names are Positive, Negative, or Priva- 
tive. 

A positive name implies the existence or posses- 
sion of certain definite attributes. 

A negative name implies the absence of one 
or other of certain definite attributes. Theo- 
retically every positive name has a corresponding 
negative, and between them they exhaust the 
whole universe of thought. The true logical op- 
position is between affirmative (not positive) and 
negative. Terms having a thorough-going negative 
character are called Infinite, Indefinite, or Indeter- 
minate : e.g. such terms as not-white, understood as 
covering with zvhite the whole universe of discourse. 



30 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

A privative name implies the absence of qualities 
usually possessed. This distinction is logically 
of no importance. 

Names are contradictory or contrary. 

An affirmative and its corresponding negative 
are called contradictories. Terms thus related 
exhaust between them the entire area of thoug^ht : 
there is nothing that can be thought of to which 
one or other of them will not apply. Aristotle 
first thought clearly in this matter, and since his 
time dates this distinction of opposite notions and 
names. In propositions this opposition is still 
more clearly marked. 

Contraries are terms the farthest apart in the 
same area of thought : e. g. zvJiite, black. They 
admit of a positive expression. They are terms 
most opposed in the same class. 

With the contradictory you deny : with the 
contrary you not only deny, but posit something 
else. The contrary opposite is more than a bare 
negative. The contrary of any assertion is counter- 
assertion : the contradictory of an assertion is its 
negation. 

Names are Relative, Correlative, oy 
Absolute. 

Relative names are those which imply in their 
signification some object over and above the one 
named : this other object is called its Correlative. 

Absolute names arc names not-rclativc. 

Relative and Absolute in the Manuals are merely 
defined. Their opposition is not clearly brought 



TERMS 



31 



out. Relatives are only a class of oppositcs, and 
may be identified as contrary opposites : e. g. child 
is the contrary oi parent. 

Logically no name is so absolute as not to have 
a correlative, which, wanting any other, is its 
negative. Any name is relative in relation to its 
contradictory, and the relation of contradiction is 
the only one we can be sure about in the form 
of thought. The opposition of positive and negative 
lies at the very foundation of thought, and in talk- 
ing of relatives we go beyond the sphere of pure 
logic as such. 

So-called absolutes are names whose opposites 
are indeterminate : e. g. inan^ the indeterminate 
term is not-inan. 



32 



CHAPTER V 

CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons, ch. v, 

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. i., t;h. ii., pp. 62 scq. 

Mill, Bk. i., ch. ii. 

Keynes, Part i., ch. ii. 

Ray, Part i., ch. ii. 



The meaning of a name in reference to the 
concrete is called its denotation or application. 

The meaning of a name in reference to the 
abstract is called its connotation or implication. 

If concepts rather than names be regarded as 
the logical unit instead of denotation, the word 
extension or extent is used : and instead of con- 
notation, the word intension, intent, content, or 
comprehension is used. The mnemonic Ex. AND 
De., In. and Con. will help to fix this in the 
mind. 

The connotation of a name comprises the attributes 
on account of which any individual is placed in the 
class called by the name ; that is, those attributes 



CONNOTATION AND DENOFATION S3 

which are regarded as essential to the class, in 
the absence of any one of which we should refuse 
the name to any individual : or, in short, the 
qualities which give meaning to a name. It may 
be called the characteristic of a name. 

The denotation of a name is made up of all the 
individuals which the name connotes : that is, those 
objects, real or imaginary, to which the name is 
given. 

The denotation and connotation of a name are 
mutually related, and the general law of their 
relation is thus stated — C'^ ^-^ 

If connotation increases denotation decreases : if 
denotation increases connotation decreases. 

This variation is not in mathematical ratio, and 
the law therefore is not accurately stated when 
denotation and connotation are said to " vary in- 
versely," for there is no definite measure of increase 
or decrease in the variation. If a short statement 
be needed, the connexion may be described as one 
of opposite mutation. 

We must be careful to notice how connotation 
is assigned ' and determined. All the attributes 
implied by the name form its connotation. Con- 
notation consists in the implication : in other 
words, the connotation of a name embraces THOSE 
ATTRIBUTES, and those only, ON ACCOUNT OF 
WHICH THE NAME IS GIVEN, and wanting any 
of which the name would be denied. 

Other views have been held. It has been 
maintained that connotation embraces — 



34 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

(i) TJic viaxinimn of attributes common to 
members of a class ; if so, no one would know the 
meaning of a term, for no one can know every 
quality. 

(2) TJie ascertained attributes which members of 
a class possess in common ; if so, connotation 
would depend upon each thinker's personal know- 
ledge, and vary moreover as knowledge increased. 

(3) The miniimnn of common attributes sufficient 
to distinguish the class from other classes ; this is 
too narrow, and fails to give the import of a term. 

(4) The fundamental attributes common to a 
class ; in this case only a speciarlist could know the 
connotation of a term. 

Denotation, which is the meaning of a term in 
reference to the concrete, since it includes all the 
individuals to which the name is applicable in the 
same sense, is possessed by all names, whether 
they have connotation or not, though in the case 
of proper names, and of some abstract names, the 
denotation is reduced to the least possible limit, 
viz. unity. 

This twofold meaning of names is sometimes 
expressed somewhat differently. Names are classed 
as connotative and non-connotative. 

A connotative name is one which denotes a subject 
and implies an attribute or attributes. 

A non-connotative name is one which merel}^ 
denotes a subject or an attribute. It is also called 
absolute. 

This is the classification adopted b}- Mill, whose 



CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION 



03 



definitions have been given : it will be seen that a 
connotative name, thus defined, must possess both 
denotation and connotation. By the word subject 
he means anything that can possess an attribute. 
By attribute he means not only the outward marks 
by which it is known, but all its properties and 
relations whatsoever. 

These definitions are noteworthy on account of 
the discussion to which they have given rise, and 
which is briefly indicated as follows. General 
names are connotative, i. e, have meaning ; and 
they must have meaning, for the name is given 
to each of a multitude of particulars upon some 
general ground of likeness. It is the likeness that 
makes the name expressive. 

The general name, according to Mill, denotes a 
number of particulars, and connotes the resembling 
attributes in each of them. Whately in different 
language brings out the same point. He says, 
'' p-eneral names have an attributive character." 

Proper names, as such, are meaningless, and 
therefore non-connotative, not that they are given 
for nothing, every name is given for discrimination, 
but this is the only purpose of a proper name, and 
this purpose does not constitute meaning. The 
proper name is a sign arbitrarily put upon an 
object to mark it out from others. A connotative 
name is given for a definite reason that can be 
assigned, because of certain attributes possessed. 
Proper names may suggest certain qualities [e.g. 
Gladstone), but the name itself was not given 



36 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

because of those qualities, and suggestion is not 
significance. Proper names are not given because 
attributes are possessed ; if that were so, they would 
become general. 

A connotative name, by Mill's definition, is one 
that denotes a subject and connotes an attribute. 
Every name given to a class of things in virtue of 
some quality or qualities possessed by them in 
common is concrete, and the name of the quality 
abstract. Therefore all connotative names are con- 
crete. Abstracts and concretes go in pairs. What 
is connoted by the concrete is denoted by its cor- 
responding abstract, i.e. there is nothing left for the 
abstract to connote. Abstracts are therefore in 
Mill's phraseology non-connotative. 



37 



CHAPTER VI 
PROPOSITIONS 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons, ch. viii. 
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. ii., ch. i. 
Keynes, Part i., ch. i. 
Mill, Bk. i., ch. iv. 



A proposition is a combination of names. It cor- 
responds with the judgment in the conceptualist 
view of logic, which is a combination of concepts. 
The proposition may be defined as — 

A statement of relation between objective facts, 
which are apprehended in thought and expressed 
in language ; or the expression of an act of judg- 
ment ; or the assertion or denial of agreement 
between two terms. 

It consists of two terms connected by the present 
tense of the verb " to be " ; and takes the form of 
Subject + Copula -}- Predicate. 

Grammatically the proposition answers to a sen- 
tence indicative. All propositions are sentences, 
but not all sentences are propositions. 



38 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

The copula — is, is not — is simply a lingual con- 
trivance for linking the terms of a proposition 
together for the purpose of comparison, and does 
not necessarily imply existence. 

Hamilton and Fowler insist upon a imiform 
copula, is or is not, according as we affirm or 
deny. In the working of problems which involve 
propositions it is a great and important safeguard 
against error to re-express, if necessary, the propo- 
sition so that this uniform copula shall appear, for 
it helps to ensure the correct interpretation of the 
proposition in question. 

The traditional view of the proposition has four 
aspects known as Relation, Quality, Quantity 
and Modality. The current classification takes 
no account of Modality, which is therefore lacking 
in the scheme subjoined. 

I. Relation. 

Categorical. 
Contingent: — 

Conditional. If S is J/, t/ie?i S is P. 

Hypothetical, //"A is true, then B is true. 
Disjunctive. vS' is either III or P. 

II. Quality. 

Affirmative. 
Negative. 

HI. Quantity. 

Universal. 

Particular. 
In this scheme, and wherever else they may 



PROPOSITIONS 



39 



occur, the letters ^\ M, P^ etc., stand for terms, either 
subject or object as the case may be: the letters in 
faced type, A, B, etc., stand for statements, which 
are given either true or not true. 

The names conditional and hypothetical are used 
by the majority of writers on logic indifferently for 
the class which is above called contingent. Con- 
fusion has naturally resulted. To avert confusion 
the name contingent is suggested to include the two 
classes of conditional proposition, and as co-ordi- 
nate with the class disjunctive. Welton has sug- 
gested the name inferential^ but on etymological 
grounds the name contingent seems preferable. 

Categorical propositions are those which are not 
conditional. Their empty form is exhibited as 
under. The vowels A and I in the word affinno 
are used to denote affirmative propositions, and 
the vowels E and O in the word nego to denote 
the negatives ; A and E are used for the universals, 
and I and O for the particulars. 





AFFIRMATIVE 


NEGATIVE 


Universal 

Particular 

1 


A. all S is P. 
I. some S is P. 


E. no 5 is P. 

O, some S is not P. 



Categorical propositions are either analytic or 
synthetic. 

I. Analytic or verbal propositions express only 
the connotation, or part of the connotation of a term. 



40 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Definitions are the best examples that can be given 
of analytic propositions. 

II. Synthetic or real propositions are those 
which express only, or in addition to part of the 
connotation, the properties or accidents of a term. 
E.g. tJie power to laugh is no part of the definition 
of man ; it is a property. The proposition man is 
a rational animal is analytic : man is an animal 
with the pozver to langh is synthetic. 

Analytic or verbal propositions have also been 
called explicative, identical or essential ; synthetic 
or real propositions have also been called ampliative, 
accidental or non-essential. 

There are otherclasses of propositions as follows — 

EXPONIBLE, those that are resolvable into more 
propositions than one : and these arc Copulativ^e, 
Remotive, or Exceptive, viz, — 

Copulative when two affirmative propositions 
are directly combined : the form is. All S is both 
M and P, i. e. All S is M and all S is P. 

Remotive when two negative propositions are 
directly combined : the form is, 5 is neither AT nor 
P, i. e. vS is not M and S is not P. 

Exceptive when the subject is limited by some 
qualifying word, e. g. exeept : the form is, vS' is M 
tinless it is P. 

Exclusive propositions limit the predicate 
to the subject by some qualif}'ing word such as 
only or alone : the form is, Only S is P. 

Indefinite or Indeterminate Propositions 
contain no explicit mark of quantity ; the only 



PROPOSITIONS 41 

safe interpretation of them is to treat them as 
particulars. 

Infinite or Limitative propositions have a 
predicate of a thorough-going negative character : 
i. e. are of the form, .S" is not P. 

Tautologous propositions affirm the subject 
of itself. vS is S. 

Modal propositions are assertions cuiii inodo : 
adverbs confer modality. 

This classification of the various kinds of propo- 
sition is not very important, except perhaps as a 
guide to interpretation in cases of doubt. Doubt 
as a rule arises respecting quantity, and in this 
connexion it is well to notice certain quantitative 
words in current speech which lack definiteness of 
meaning. Before the propositions containing them 
can be accurately interpreted, the meaning of these 
words must be clearly defined. Such are the words 
following — 

Some means logically, some at least : not none : 
one at any rate, it may be more than one, or it 
may be all. In popular usage some means some 
at most : not all : more than one but less than all. 

Most means in popular usage, at least one more 
than half In logic it must be regarded as the 
equivalent of sonic, for formal logic pays no heed 
to degree in quantity. 

Few means popularly, most are not, or at any 
rate less than half are. In logic its equivalent is, 
some are not. 

All is used in two senses — (i) all and each : 



42 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

every: onuies : distributlvely : and (2) all together, 
not each : cuncti: collectively. 

Any is equivalent to all used in the distributive 
sense when it quantifies the subject of a categorical 
proposition. When the proposition is not categori- 
cal it is to be read as some : e. g. if any S is M, then 
S is P ; means, if some S is My etc. 

Contingent Propositions are statements with quali- 
fication. The contingent proposition therefore con- 
sists of two parts which are called respectively 
antecedent ox protasis ^ which is the statement of the 
condition or hypothesis, corresponding to the subject 
of the categorical : and consequent or apodosis, which 
is the statement of the result, corresponding to the 
predicate of the categorical. 

The names conditional diwd hypothetical of the two 
classes of contingents are used by various writers 
indiscriminately for the whole class. Care must be 
taken to keep the two forms distinct : the differ- 
ence between them is well marked though not 
always recognised. 

The general symbolic form for the contingent is, 

// ^" is X, P is V. 

This form is better reserved for conditionals alone. 
In this case the formula for expressing hypotheticals 
will be, 

If A is true, B is true. 

Here, as previously pointed out, A and B stand for 
statements, not terms. 



PROPOSITIONS 43 

Conditional Propositions assert that if an object be 
found to have certain attributes it will also have, or 
not have, certain other attributes. The relation is 
between two combhiations of properties. Condition- 
als have both quality and quantity, and the four 
forms may be symbolically expressed thus — 

If S is M^ then S is P. A. 

Sometimes if S is J/, then S is P. I. 

If S is M, then S is not P. E. 

Sometimes if S is M, then S is not P. O. 

It will be seen that the quality is determined by 
the consequent. In a conditional proposition there 
often seem to be four terms : they can however 
always be reduced, with more or less ease, to three, 
so as to fit the general symbolic form, if S is AI, 
then S is P. Thus — 

If the standard of an examination \ is \ loiu, the 
percentage of passes \ is \ high. There are seem- 
ingly four terms. Instead of the word passes read 
failures^ and lozv instead of Jiigh. We thereby 
reduce the terms to three. Or we may read not 
low instead of the word high^ and, by a single 
alteration of phrasing, obtain the same result. 
The statement will thus run — If the standard of 
an examination \ is \ loiu, the percentage of passes \ 
is not I low. Another example — If the barometer 
falls, we shall have rain, may be re-expressed 
thus — If any atmospheric state causes a barometric 
fall, that state will bring rain. 

Conditionals may be reduced to categoric form. 



44 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Some logicians assert that both classes of con- 
tingents are in reality identical with categoricals. 
With certain limitations this assertion is accurate : 
the limitations, as will be seen, apply to hypo- 
theticals. Taking the illustrations above, their 
categorical expression will be — Examinations in 
wJiich the standard is loiv \ are \ those in ivJiich the 
percentage of passes is high: Ail atmospheric states 
causing barometric fall \ are \ those ivhich bring 
rain. 

Hypothetical propositions assert relationship be- 
tween two statements, so that if one is true the 
truth of the other is determined. Thus, though 
the symbolic form may be the same as for con- 
ditionals, the distinction can be better marked by 
using letters for the statements in the antecedent 
and consequent respectively : hence the preferable 
form is — 

If A is true, then B is true. 

Hypotheticals have quality, but not quantity. 
The antecedent is not an event which may occur 
always or sometimes, but a proposition which is 
simply true or false. In the hypothetical there is 
a relation of two absolute and self-contained 
assertions, each of which can be used alone without 
change of meaning. It is this self-sufficiency of 
both antecedent and consequent that differentiates 
the hypothetical from the conditional. Thus in 
the proposition — If all candidates for examination 
luere luell prepared sojne zcould certainly be success- 



PROPOSITIONS 45 

fiil^ the assertion is not about all and some 
candidates, but about their adequate preparation 
and their success. 

Hypotheticals can be reduced only to A and E 
categorical forms, for the reason that they consist 
only of singular terms and do not therefore admit 
of distinction in quantity. Some logicians would 
dispute the possibility of reducing the hypothetical 
to the categorical form on the ground that the 
dependence of one proposition upon another is not 
analogous to that existing between 5 and P of the 
categorical, and also on the ground that all hypo- 
theticals involve an element of doubt. This view 
however seems to be erroneous. Taking the 
illustration given above in reduced form it will 
stand — all cases of candidates being well prepared \ 
are \ cases in ivJiich some would certainly be snc- 
cessfid. 

Disjunctive propositions give the subject no 
definite predicate, but prescribe for it an alter- 
native between two different predicates, or it may 
be more than two. 

The general symbolic form is — 

6^ is either M or P. 

These predicates may always be brought under 
a wider predicate, which shall include all the 
others ; this however is seldom done in practice. 
Thus — He is either a doctor^ a lawyer^ a clergyman^ 
or a teacher^ may be expressed — He is a member of 
a learned profession. 



46 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Disjunctives have quantity but not quality, the 
quahty is ahvays affirmative. 

Universal — /;/ all cases S is P, or X is Y. 

Particular — In some cases S is P, or X is V. 

There is difference of opinion as to whether the 
disjunctive form necessitates the mutual exclusion 
of the alternative predicates. In many cases the 
alternatives are as a matter of fact exclusive ; 
exclusion however is not due to the disjunctive 
form, and in the logical treatment of these pro- 
positions it must not be assumed. 

The disjunctive is in fact a complex conditional, 
and the logical rule for its treatment is — Given a 
disjunctive with two alternatives, by taking away 
either of the alternatives you posit the other, but it 
cannot be said that by positing one you sublate 
the other. 

Disjunctives are reducible to conditionals of the 
form, if S is not M, it is P. They can therefore 
be reduced also to categoricals. E. g. All artificial 
tront flies are either zvinged or hackled. This yields 
in reduction the two conditionals as follows — (i) 
If any artiflcial tront fly is not zvinged it is hackled ; 
and (2) If any artiflcial tront fly is not hackled it is 
winged. These reduced to categorical form become, 
(i) All artiflcial tront flies not winged \ are \ 
hackled ; and (2) All artiflcial tront flies not Jiackled 
I are \ winged. According to a previous definition 
it is thus seen that disjunctives arc exponibles. 

One of the most important points in dealing 



PROPOSITIONS 47 

with propositions is to grasp clearly what is meant 
by the distribution of terms. A term is said to be 
distributed when reference is made to each and every 
individual denoted by that term. Thus in the A 
proposition, all men \ are \ mortal^ the subject all 
men means each and every individual denoted by 
the term men, and according to the definition given 
it is distributed. The predicate mortal does not 
mean each and every being of which mortality can 
be asserted. There may be mortal beings that are 
not men, as indeed from material considerations we 
know there are. The predicate therefore is not 
distributed, reference not being made to every part 
of it. Similarly the distribution of the terms in 
each of the other categorical forms may be worked 
out. The distribution of the terms will be found 
to be as follows — 

A distributes subject not predicate ; 

E distributes both subject and predicate ; 

I distributes neither subject nor predicate ; 

O distributes predicate not subject. 

This distribution of terms may be fixed in the 
mind by remembering the mnemonic word 
AsEbInOp, which must be read v4, j-ubject; E, 
<5oth ; /, /neither ; 6^, /redicate. It will be noticed 
that universals distribute their subject, and nega- 
tives their predicate. The importance of thoroughly 
understanding the point rests on the fact that the 
validity of every argument depends upon the 
proper distribution of the terms occurring in it. 



48 



CHAPTER VII 

PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xii. 

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. i., ch. iii. and iv. 

Mill, Bk. i., ch. iii. and vii. 

Bain, Dcductio?i, pp. 73—77 ; 263 — 266. 



A predicate is something which is affirmed or 
denied of a subject ; A predicable is something 
which CAN BE so affirmed or denied. That is, 
predicables are possible predicates. 

The doctrine of the predicables is a consideration 
of the number of different kinds of statement which 
can be made about a subject. 

The heads of predicables are a classification of the 
various relations the subject and predicate of a 
proposition may sustain one to the other. 

At root the doctrine of the predicables is not 
logical, but metaphysical. The scheme is as 
follows ; — 



Heads of 
Predicables 



PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 49 

Genus 

Species 

Differentia 

-n • fsjeneric 
Proprium< ^ 

i specific 

. ., (separable 
Accidens-{ ^ 

(niseparable 

Genus is a class made up of smaller classes. 

Species, with reference to genus, is the smaller 
class included ; with reference to an individual, it 
is the class including it. 

Differentia are the attributes, or attribute, by 
which one species is distinguished from all others 
contained in the same genus. 

Proprium is any quality common to the whole 
of the class, but not sufficient to distinguish that 
class from others. It is called generic when it 
belongs to the whole of the genus, and specific 
when belonging to the whole of the species. 
Jevons' nomenclature differs : property belonging 
to the whole species he zd^s peculiar, and he limits 
specific property to the infima (or lowest) species. 

Accidens is a quality which may or may not 
belong to an individual in relation to a species : or 
to a species in relation to a genus. It is called 
separable when it can be changed ; inseparable 
when, belonging to all the members of a class, it 
cannot be changed. 

Thus, e.g. taking triangle as species: genus, 
differentia, property, and accident will be respect- 
ively as follows : — Plane figiwe ; having three sides ; 

E 



50 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

having three internal angles equal to tzvo right angles ; 
having sides tJiree inches long. 

Genus and species are correlative terms ; the 
same term may be both a genus and a species, 
genus with regard to lower classes under it ; species 
with regard to a higher class above it. 

Sunimum genus is a term so general that it 
cannot be a species. The summum genus gives 
connotation at its lowest, denotation at its highest 
point. 

Infima species is a term so narrow that it cannot 
be a genus, and can only be divided into indi- 
viduals. It gives connotation. at its highest point, 
denotation at its lowest. 

The Aristotelian logicians held that there were 
ten summa genera which they called predicaments or 
categories. 

The connotation of a species is greater than that 
of the genus under which it is included. This 
excess of connotation is the difference of that 
species. Thus in connotation species = genus + 
difference. 

A proprium is an attribute which does not form 
part of the connotation of a term, but which does 
of necessity follow from it. Thus, whether an 
attribute is a difference or a proprium, depends 
upon the definition of the term. 

Accidens can only be determined by what it is 
not. It is a quality that does not of necessity 
belong to any class ; if however it docs, and if it 
belongs to every member of the class, it is called 



PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 51 

inseparable ; if not common to every member it is 
known as separable. 

In this scheme of predicables no provision is 
made for singular terms, which by the older logicians 
were looked upon as outside the sphere of the 
science. 

When genus or difference is predicated, the pro- 
position is called analytic ; when proprium or 
accidens is predicated, the proposition is called 
synthetic. Equivalent names for analytic and 
synthetic propositions have been given on p. 40. 
Species is strictly speaking only predicable of an 
individual. 

It is thus seen that embedded in the doctrine of 
the predicables, we have the difference between 
formal and material logic. In the categorical 
proposition, where 5 and P are subject and pre- 
dicate respectively, S and P may be taken to 
represent distinguishable terms which are not how- 
ever necessarily distinct. But when we have terms 
which are distinct as well as distinguishable, we 
have to deal with material considerations, and 
though the proposition may still be written in the 
form S is P, we are no longer working with 
symbols but with the actual notions themselves. 

In the proposition man is a rational animal, the 
terms are distinguishable but not distinct. The 
same notion is marked by each of the terms. 
Rational animal is a synonym for man. Under 
the concept man you think rational and vice versa. 
In other words, we have nothing more than a concept 



52 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

under the guise of a judgment. But in the pro- 
position man is moi'tal^ the terms are distinct as well 
as distinguishable. Mortal \^ no part of the meaning 
of man. It is a material consideration, neverthe- 
less the conjunction of such terms may still be 
formulated as vS is P. This distinction is marked 
in the predicables as above ; it is essential or 
analytic as opposed to non-essential or synthetic 
predication. Formal doctrine takes no notice of 
this difference, but in material logic it is taken into 
account. We have to consider our predicate as 
sometimes obtained by analysis of the subject, and 
sometimes by synthesis. 

The analytic has a predicate obtained from the 
subject merely under the laws of thought ; in the 
proposition given dhowQ, rational ajiimalis logically 
implicated in maji. Hence these propositions are 
also called explicativ^e, the explication taking place 
under the laws of thought {q. v.). The predicate 
of a synthetic proposition can never be obtained 
merely from the laws of thought. Such pro- 
positions are therefore called ampliative, the am- 
plification taking place by reference to the matter 
concerning which the statement is made. 

Analytic propositions are also sometimes called 
identical, that is, there is an identity between 
subject and predicate. Identical propositions 
therefore may be defined as those in which the 
predicate gives the subject over again, but not as 
a distinct and separate thought. Definitions are 
instances in point. As a test we may substitutt.' 



PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 53 

means for the formal copula is whenever we have 
an analytic proposition. In a synthetic proposition 
this substitution of means for is cannot be made, 
for is in this case has a totally different force. 

Classification depends entirely upon this scheme 
of predicables, consisting as it does of the formation 
of genera and species. 

The predicaments or categories of which mention 
has already been made, were intended by Aristotle 
as a classification of all possible predicates accord- 
ing to their own meaning and not in relation 
to the subject. These Aristotelian predicaments 
are now universally discredited, being usually 
regarded as a classification of all possible things 
with no reference to their use as predicates of a 
proposition. They are therefore of metaphysical 
rather than logical import. It is to be noted that 
no satisfactory scheme exists. 

Aristotle's scheme is as follows — 



ouaia 


substantia 


substance 


TTOcrhv 

TTOIOP 

Trpos Tl 


quantitas 

qualitas 

relatio 


quantity 

quality 

relation 


Ttoitiv 


actio 


action 


Trdaxitv 

TTOV 


passio 
ubi 


passivity 
where 


TTOTi 


quando 


Avhen 


KtiaOai 
t\nv 


situs 
habitus 


position 
condition 



Sir Wm. Hamilton has thus classified the above 
scheme — 



54 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

I. Substance 



(Quantity f Situs 



Actio 
I Passio 



Mill states and criticises this Aristotelian scheme, 
and gives the following classification of all nameable 
things as his own : — 

1. Feelings or states of consciousness : 

2. The minds which experience those feelings : 

3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of 
these feelings together with the po\v«r or property whereby 
they excite them : 

4. The successions and co-existencies, the likenesses and 
unlikenesses, between feehngs or states of consciousness. 

There have been other schemes suggested by 
others, but the matter is not one of great logical 
importance, if indeed it has any claim to a place of 
treatment in logic at all. 



55 



CHAPTER VIII 

DEFINITION AND DIVISION 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xii. 

Welton, Vol. i. Bk. i., ch. v and vi. 

Mill, Bk. i., ch. viii. 

Bain, Inductioi-i^ pp. 153 — 170 and 195 — 198. 



Definition and division have to do with names, 

and though expressed in proposltional form they 
are not concerned with the proposition as such. 
Hence their proper place of treatment is under the 
heading of terms. 

Definition is the exposition of the connotation of a 
term expressed in the form of a proposition. 

Distinguish definition, dcsa^iption, and explanation, 

A name is defined : 
a tiling is described : 
?i process is explained. 

The strictly logical form of definition is per g'enua 
et differentiam. 

To define a name does not involve statincr all 



56 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

that is known about the thing of which it is the 
name, for that would in most cases include attri- 
butes which are purely accidents. 

A definition is an analytic or verbal proposition. 

Rules of definition are not directions for defining, 
but criteria for testing definitions when made. 
Formal logic tests or proves, it does not discover 
or bestow knowledge. When a man has know- 
ledge and sets it out, logic tells him whether he 
has done so correctly. 

Formal definition is not always applicable, e.g. 
simple sensations cannot be defined. When we 
cannot define we can re-expres-s and give examples 
or fall back on description, or give an enumeration 
of constituent properties. E. g. miiid is that which 
feels, thinks, wills, and desires. This is definition 
by complete enumeration : it sets out the various 
functions of mind and is the only means of defini- 
tion in this particular case that we have. Definition 
is impossible when nothing else of the same class 
can be found : where the thing whose name is to be 
defined cannot be discovered as an object amongst 
similar objects or as an attribute amongst attributes. 
This is the case with the example mind. 

The rules of definition are usually thus stated : — 

I. A definition should not be redundant, i.e. 
contain either more or less than the connotation of 
the term defined. 

II. A definition should not be expressed in ob- 
scure, figurative, or ambiguous language. 

III. A definition should not be tautologous, i.e. 



DEFINITION AND DIVISION 57 

should not contain the term defined, nor a synonym, 
nor its opposite. Violation of this rule is called 
circiilus in dejiniendo. 

IV. A definition should not be negative when it 
can be affirmative. 

Division is the exposition of the denotation of a 
term expressed in the form of a proposition. 

Logical division must be distinguished from 
physical partitioft, and metaphysical analysis. 

The test of a logical division is that the term 
divided and the definition of the term divided can be 
predicated of each dividing member. This is its 
distinction from hoih. paj^iition and analysis. 

Every division must be progressive. The old 
rule is Divisio non facial saltuni. This precaution 
is against proceeding from high generalisation to 
narrow particulars at a bound, or in logical 
terminology emuneration of species mnst be from 
proximate genera. The constituent species must 
together make up the genus divided : if any of 
them can be brought under a genus itself subal- 
tern to that which had to be divided, we know 
that a saltiis has been made and our division is 
at fault. 

The rules for division may be stated thus : — 

I. Division must be distinct, the constituents 
must exclude one another, otherwise the species 
overlap and produce confusion called cross-division. 

II. Division must be adequate, the constituent 
species must exhaust the genus, i. e. when added 
together they must make up the genus. 



58 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

III. Division must be founded upon one principle 
or basis, called \h(^ fundainentiiin divisionis. 

These rules may be summarised in the single 
statement that division must be exclusive and 
exhaustive. 

Cross division may be avoided by adopting 
the method known as dichotomy or exhaustive 
division. This is the only process strictly to be 
called logical division. Dichotomic division is 
division by affirmative and negative names under 
the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. 
E.g. Take any notion A. Divide by decrease of 
denotation and addition to connotation. \i B, C, 
etc. be the added connotation and b, c, etc. their 
contradictories, the scheme stands thus : — 



AB Ab 



ABC ABc AbC Abe 



AbCD AbCd 

This process may be carried out to any number 
of terms, but has the demerit of being cumbrous, 
and in many cases there is no need to resort to 
it. In branches of knowledge where our informa- 
tion is uncertain, then it becomes useful as a safe- 
guard against possible oversight in making our 
divisions. 



59 



CHAPTER IX 

IMPORT OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS 
QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessofzs, ch. xxii. 

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. ii., ch. ii. 

Mill, Bk. i., ch. v., and Exam, of Sh' Wm. Hainilfo?!^ 

ch. xviii. and xxii. 
Keynes, Part ii., ch. viii. 



In the discussion of the meaning involved in 
predication answers to the following questions are 
considered :— 

(i) What is related? or what is the meaning of 
5 and P ? 

(2) What is the nature of the relation ? 

(3) Is existence implied? 

Here again in the question of import we are 
on extra-logical ground : as this subject has strictly 
speaking no place in formal logic. According to 
the traditional treatment of logic it is here in- 
cluded, but though full of interest it may be left 
for second reading. 



6o A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

1 . What is related ? Words, things, or ideas ? 
The proposition is a statement and therefore 

so far verbal : the statement is of a relation existing 
between objective facts, and therefore so far real : 
the relation is apprehended in thought and is 
therefore so far conceived. The point has already 
been discussed in determining the definition and 
scope of logic as a science. 

Two questions therefore only remain : — 

2. What is the nature of the relation expressed in 
predication? In what aspect are the terms to be 
regarded ? Various answers have been given. 

ia) The Predicative Theory. S — P (which is 
the empty form for a categorical proposition), 
read predicatively, means that the attributes pos- 
sessed by P also belong or do not belong to the 
object or to the group of objects denoted by .S. 
That is, it reads 6" in denotation, and P in conno- 
tation. It is a relation equivalent to that which 
exists between subject and attribute. This is the 
common and natural reading : it is psychologically 
correct. 

{b) The Extensive Theory reads both terms in 
denotation, viz. that objects denoted by 6" are 
or are not among the objects denoted by P. It 
regards 5 as included in the class P. As a theory 
of predication this is psychologically' false. More- 
over on this view it is not P that is predicated, 
but inclusion in P. 

(c) The Attributive Theory reads both terms in 
connotation. This is Mill's position. (Bk. I. ch. v. 



CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS 6i 

§ 4.) E. g. 7/iau IS mortal means whatever has the 
attributes of man has the attribute of mortality. 
This theory is psychologically false, and moreover 
on this view particular jDropositions are wanting 
in interpretation. 

{d) The Equational Theory regards 5 and P in 
a proposition as corresponding to the two sides 
of an equation, the copula being nothing more 
than the sign of equality between them. The 
act of judgment expressed in the proposition 
is thus held to be a mere assertion of identity. 
This view is developed by Jevons in his Prin- 
ciples of Science (p. 41). It was also in his later 
work adopted by Sir W. Hamilton as an outcome 
of the doctrine of the Quantification of the Predicate. 

3. Does the categorical proposition imply the 
existence of the objects denoted by the terms? 
Logical existence may be in any sphere, fiction, 
mythology, imagination, fact. Logical terms re- 
present something thought of, that is, they imply 
the existence in thought of that of which they 
are the name. More than this cannot be asserted. 
The implication of existence to this extent also 
follows from the nature of the proposition, which 
is a statement of relation between concepts that 
exist at any rate in the mind. It is usually and 
properly considered however that if existence in re 
is intended it must be specially predicated. The 
real existence of the subject can never be implied 
in the mere form of the proposition. 

Quantification of the Predicate. To quantify the 



62 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

predicate is to place a sign of quantity before it 
as well as before the subject. This doctrine was 
in this century stated by Hamilton and George 
Bentham. There are earlier cases of its notice 
both by English and continental writers. They 
urge that — 

(i) There is no thinking in the definite form which 
is necessary without having a definite notion as 
to the quantity of the predicate, i. e. they assert 
that what is implicit in thought must be made 
explicit in language ; and further that 

(2) In the process of conversion this explication 
is practically assumed. With the quantified pre- 
dicate therefore conversion as a doctrine falls away. 
The proposition in effect becomes an equation. 

Hamilton proposed four new categorical forms 
in addition to those in common use. The symbols 
to mark them usually given are those suggested 
by Abp. Thomson and are shown on the left hand 
margin. Hamilton's notation is that on the right. 

U AH .S is all P afa 

A All 5 is some P afi 

E No 5 is any P ana 

1] No 5 is some P ani 

T Some 5 is all P ifa 

1 Some S is some /' ifi 

O Some 5 is not any P ina 

o) Some vS is not some P ini 

The letters /and n in Hamilton's notation indicate 
affirmation and denial respectively. 



QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE 62, 

The objections to the doctrine may be summarised 
as follows : — 

(i) Getting rid of conversion really means that 
we have done so by getting rid of the proposition. 
The old A, E, I, O no longer remain. The 
quantified forms can each be shown to be complex 
not simple statements. All S is all Pis exponible 
and is equivalent to All S is P -\- All P is S. It 
is a compendious statement of two propositions. 
It is clear that All S is all P is not so simple a 
thought as All S is P. We think All S is P with- 
out reference to some or all P, and so we see that 
All S is all P ceases to be the expression of a 
simple thought. To aver that All S is all P is a 
simple thought is to deny that All S is /* is a 
thought at all. Hamilton declares (as he must do 
to maintain his position) that implicitly we do 
think all or some P. He calls U a toto-total pro- 
position, and A a toto-partial proposition. 

(2) Another objection, advanced by De Morgan, 
is that the doctrine alters the logical sense of sojne, 
or uses it ambiguously. Some becomes some but 
not ally or sojne at most : at least it becomes so in 
the predicate. If the meaning be thus changed 
we may get rid of the " disgusting rules of con- 
version," but we also get rid of the square of op- 
position, for if some mean sojne at most^ contrariety 
and contradiction are swept away. 

(3) Further in All S is all P we get a use of 
all which is not intelligible unless we take it 
collectively. The doctrine has grown out of a 



64 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

misconception as to the quantity of propositions, 
which has been taken to be the quantity of the 
subject, but it is only a matter of convenience 
that the mark of quantity is attached to the 
subject. The predicate is that which is univers- 
ally or particularly affirmed or denied of the 
subject. 



65 



CHAPTER X 

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. ix and xxii. 
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. ii., ch. iii. 
Keynes, Part ii., ch. vi. 



The value of any scheme for the diagrammatic 
representation of propositions depends upon the 
following requirements : — 

(i) The diagrams must be self-explanatory so 
soon as the principle on which they are constructed 
is understood. 

(2) Each diagram must be capable of one and 
only one interpretation. 

(3) Each proposition should be represented by 
one and only one diagram. 

Various methods have been suggested by differ- 
ent writers. Such methods are Euler's Circles, 
Lambert's Lines, Hamilton's Wedges, Venn's 
Diagrams, and, the most recent, Welton's Scheme. 

Euler's Circles. This is the method most com- 
monly given in the Manuals. Representing the 

F 



66 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



Individuals included in any class by a circle, there 
are between two classes five diagrams to indicate 
all the possible relations. These relations may be 
described as 

I. Coincidence : 
11. Inclusion of wS by P: 

III. Intersection : 

IV. Inclusion of /^ by S: 
V. Exclusion. 

The circles then are combined thus : — 







IV. 



II. 




III. 

(3B 



V. 





The method adopted in most text-books (c.^-, 
Jevons' Lessons), of using only a single diagram for 
each propositional form, is misleading. The E pro- 
position, being the figure of exclusion, is the only 
form for which one and only one diagram will suf- 
fice. Although we have not a single diagram for 
each fundamental form of proposition, the circles 



DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION 67 

are useful as indicating the real knowledge given 
by the propositions themselves. The circles treated 
as below, by shading, show in each of the forms that 
part of the predicate concerning which knowledge 
is given us. 








Venn's Diagrams. In this scheme the figure 
given does not represent a proposition. It is the 
framework into which the pro- 
positions are fitted. We are deal- 
ing with two terms, each of which 
has a contradictory. By combin- 
ing these terms and their contra- 
dictories we obtain four separate classes: viz. 




68 A DIGEST OF LOCUC 

S that is P : 

5 that is not-P: 

not-S that is P : 

and not-S that is not-P. 

Shortly they may be written S P, S P, S Py S P. 
The Hne over a letter is a common and convenient 
way of marking its contradictory. These four 
compartments are shown in the skeleton diagram. 
Every universal proposition denies the existence 
of one or more of these classes, and is indicated 
by a shading out of the compartment denied. 
Thus A and E are thus figured : — 





The weakness of this scheme is that it is not 
adapted to particular propositions. Dr. Venn 
proposes that a bar should be drawn across the 
compartment which the particular declares to be 
saved. The scheme has the advantage, however, 
of being good for propositions involving more 
terms than two, and it can also be used to repre- 
sent the categorical syllogism. 

Sir W. Hamilton uses heavy wedge-shaped lines 
which at best arc cumbrous and arc also somewhat 
confusing. 

Welton suggests a method which is a combin- 



DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION 69 

ation of Lambert's lines and Venn's four com- 
partments. It has an advantage over Venn's 
circles in being applicable to particulars. 

Lambert's Scheme is with lines to jnark the ex- 
tent of the terms, and it represents the inclusion 
of one term in another by drawing the lines parallel 
to one another. With modification it can be made 
useful and graphic. Thus draw three columns, 
the first to contain S P, the second for 5 P, and 
the third for 6' P. Use lines to indicate the extent 
of 5 and P : make them unbroken for the amount 
definitely referred to, dotted for what is left un- 
certain in the statement. Let 5 be the upper 
line, and P the lower. Then we shall get the 
subjoined diagram : — 



s 


SP 


p 





























It will be noted that lines wholly unbroken mark 
terms which are distributed. 

Yet another method may be employed, a com- 
bination of circles and lines, the lines unbroken 
and dotted to be interpreted as in the previous 
diagram. Here the predicate is figured by the 



70 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



circle, and the subject by the line, thus indicating 
the reading of them respectively in intension and 
extension. 




Distribution of P is marked by circles which do 
not contain an unbroken line : of .S by lines wholly 
unbroken. This scheme pictures one view of the 
import of the proposition. 



71 



CHAPTER XI 

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. ix. and x. 
Keynes, Part ii., ch. ii., iii., iv., v., and vii 
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iii. 
Mill, Bk. ii., ch. i. 



Inference is the derivation of one truth from 
another, and involves a mental process. Inference 
in short is passage from thought to thought. 

Inference is immediate when the conclusion is 
derived from one premiss only : immediate infer- 
ences may be regarded as the application of the 
laws of thought to two given terms. There are 
two main classes of such inferences, viz. — 
I. The opposition of propositions, and 

II. Eductions. 
The reduction of contingents and disjunctives to 
categorical form might be added as a third class, for 
this reduction is really a form of immediate Inference. 

I. Opposition. Two propositions are said to be 
in opposition, or to be opposed, when they have 
the same subject and predicate but differ in quantity 



72 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



or quality or both. They are usually arranged in 
what is called the Square of Opposition as below : — 



Contraries. 



Co. 






sP" 



in 
c 
cr 

ft- 



I Subcontraries. 



<L> 

-4-J 

CO 



o 



The inferences based on the square of opposition 
may be considered to depend exclusively on the 
three fundamental laws of thought {(/.v.). These 
inferences are summed up as follows : — 

Of Contradictories one must be true, one must 
be false. 

Of Contraries both cannot be true, both may be 
false. 

Of Subcontraries one may be false, both may be 
true. 

Of Subalterns the particular is true if the universal 
is true : the universal is doubtful when the particular 
is true. 

Aristotle arranged the square thus — 




IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 73 

Seeing that A and E were more opposed than A 
and O, he put them further apart in the figure. 
This square, however, broke down with I and O. 

Diametric opposition is another name for con- 
tradiction ; it means assertion and its negation, 
counter-assertion, no medium admitted. It has 
the same meaning as when apphed to terms. 

If we cannot go beyond the simple denial of a 
proposition, then it has no contrary distinct from 
its contradictory. 

The opposition of singular propositions is called 
by Mansel Secondary contradiction (Mansel's 
Aldrich, p. 56). Singulars have no contraries 
distinct from their contradictories. E.g. Socrates 
is zuise, has the contradictory Socrates is not wise. 
There is no distinct contrary. By another method 
of treatment, however, the proposition may be read 
as a general proposition in the guise of a singular. 
In this case Socrates will stand for the acts or 
judgnients of Socrates, and this gives us the contra- 
dictory Some of the acts of Socrates are not zvise, 
and the contrary None of the acts of Socrates are 
tvise. 

Conditionals admit of distinction both in quantity 
and quality, and therefore the doctrine of opposi- 
tion is entirely applicable. 

Hypotheticals admit only distinction of quality, 
and therefore the only opposition is that of con- 
tradiction. 

Disjunctives do not admit difference of quality 
but only quantity, and moreover all disjunctives 



74 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

are affirmative. Contradiction, however, is possible 
as well as contrariety, but both contradictory and 
contrary are categorical. E. g. Every S is M or P 
gives the contradictory Some S is jieitJier M nor P, 
and the contrary No S is either M or P. 

II. Eductions. Immediate inferences by which 
from a given proposition (posited true) we deduce 
others that differ from it in 5 or P or both, and 
whose truth is assured by the truth of the original, 
are called eductions. They are classified as 
follows : — 

1. Conversion.- 

2. Obversion. 

3. Contraposition. 

4. Inversion. 

5. Added Determinants. 

6. Complex Conception. 

7. Converse Relation. 

8. Reversion. 

It is well to note here that m working out 
exercises involving the statement of propositions 
they should always be brought first into the strict 
logical form with the uniform copula is or is not. 
It is most convenient to symbolise the terms by 
letters S, J\ etc., the contradictories of which may 
be marked by a line over them. Thus S, P will 
stand for not-S, not-P respectively. The symbols 
can be re-translated into the original terms, if 
desirable, in setting down the results. To remember 
this not only shortens the labour of working, but 



IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 75 

it is also a distinct aid to accuracy. It is astonishing 
what difficulty students often find in converting a 
simple proposition like the following P struck Q. 
If the rule be remembered, the difficulty disappears. 
In strict logical form it may be written P \ is \ a 
person ivJio struck Q. The converse will therefore 
be Some person zvho struck Q \ is \ P. 

Conversion in a broad sense means change in 
the position of the terms of a proposition. Logic 
is concerned with conversion only as a process of 
inference: "no conversion is employed for any 
logical purpose unless it be illative" (Whately, 
Log. p. 74). The distinct mental act in conver- 
sion and other immediate inferences lies in the 
different readings given to 6^ and P. In any 
judgment the natural reading of the subject is 
extensive and of the predicate intensive. In con- 
verting a proposition the attributive force of the 
predicate is dropped, the proposition is taken in 
extension. The difficulty sometimes found in con- 
version lies probably in this passage from the 
predicative to the " class " reading. 

I. Ordinary Conversion is transposition of 5 
and P. 

Conversion is simple when converse and con- 
vertend have the same form as in the case of E 
and I. 

Conversion is per accidens or by limitation when 
part of the information given in the convertend 
is lost, as in the case of A. O propositions do net 
admit of ordinary conversion. 



76 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Simple conversion and conversion per accidens 
have also been called conversio pura and conversio 
iinpura (cf. Lotze, Log.^ § 79). 

That particular negatives do not admit of 
ordinary conversion follows from the rule that no 
term must be distributed in the converse which 
was not distributed in the convertend. 

No difficulty can be found in converting or per- 
forming other immediate inferences upon any 
given proposition when once brought into strict 
logical form, and its predicate as well as its subject 
read in extension. 

2. Obversion is change of quality. It is a process 
of immediate inference, in which from one pro- 
position we infer another, having for its predicate 
the contradictory of the predicate of the original 
proposition. The name obversion was introduced 
by Bain. Other names for this process are — 

(i) Permutation, Foivler. 

(2) ^quipollence, Ueberiveg. 

(3) Infinitation, Boiuen. 

(4) Immediate Inference by Private Conception, 

Jevons. 

(5) Contra version, De Morgan. 

(6) Contraposition, Spalding. 

Bain, after dealing with formal obversion, follows 
with a statement of material ob\'crsion. This is 
extra-logical. From 5 a P, I may by formal ob- 
version infer vS" e P, but the material obverse, .S" is 
P, docs not follow, except as the result of actual 



IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 77 

observation and independent investigation. The 
only information I can infer about 5 from 5 a P 
is, S i P or S P. 

The meaning of obversion is explained by Bain 
in his Deductio7tJ ^^. 109, no ). " In affirming one 
thing we must be prepared to deny the opposite." 
Thus, the road is level, it is not inclined, are not two 
facts, but the same fact viewed from opposite sides ; 
this process is called obversion. All four pro- 
positional forms admit of an obverse. 

3. Contraposition is obversion followed by con- 
version. It is a process of immediate inference, in 
which from a given proposition we infer another 
proposition, having the contradictory of the original 
predicate for its subject, and the original subject 
for its predicate. Another name for this process 
is conversion by negation. 

Logicians differ as to whether the contrapositive 
of All S is P is No not-P is S, or All not-P is 
not-S, i. e. as to whether the quality should be 
preserved. The solution of the dispute is in the 
definition above, which rules that the original 
subject is to stand as the new predicate. Hence 
the contrapositive is No P is S. 

4. Inversion yields the original subject nega- 
tived. It is inference of a proposition having the 
contradictory of the original subject for its subject, 
and the original predicate for its predicate. This 
is the meaning given by Keynes, and it fits in best 
with the general scheme of eductions. Jevons uses 
the word in a different sense. 



78 A DIGEST OF LOCxIC 

Taking as the original proposition All S is P, 
Jevons classifies the related propositions thus — 

INFERABLE 

Converse Some 5 is P. 

Obverse No 5 is P. - 



Contrapositive 



No P_ is S, or 
All P is 5^. 



NON-INFERABLE 

Inverse All P is 5. 

Reciprocal All 5 is P. 

In this scheme the inverse as defined above finds 
no place, and indeed it is not recognised by Jevons 
at all. 

The inverse may be obtained from the original 
by converting and obverting, or by obverting and 
converting alternately. 

Each of the inferences above named takes two 
forms, one with a positive predicate, and the other 
with a negative predicate. The simplest forms are 
those with the positive predicate, and to these 
have been given the simple names converse, contra- 
positive, and inverse. The corresponding negative 
forms are called the obvcrted converse, obvcrted con- 
trapositive, and obvcrted inverse of the original 
proposition. 

The rule in all conversion is that no term shall 
be distributed in the converse that was not distributed 
in the convertend. 



IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 



79 



Given two terms and admitting their contra- 
dictories, the possible combinations are as follows — 



SP 



SP 
S P 



PS 
PS 



PS 
PS 



In the universals all these forms are obtainable. 
The table below shows the immediate inferences 
from each of the propositions A, E, I, O. 





A 


E 


I 


o 


' Original Proposition 


SaP 


SeP 


SiP 


SoP 


% Obverse 


Sep 


SaP 


SoP 


SiP 


^ Converse ... 

^ Obverted Converge' 


Pis 
PoS 


Pes 
PaS 


PiS 
PoS 


— 


J^' Contrapositive 


Pes 


PiS 


— 


Pi s. 


^7 Obverted Contrapositive 


PaS 


PoS 


— 


PoS 


^ Inverse 


SoP 


SiP 




— 


Obverted Inverse 


SiP 


SoP 




— 



The treatment of contingents and disjunctives 
remains to be noticed. In a conditional pro- 
position the antecedent and consequent correspond 
respectively to the subject and predicate of the 
categorical. They may be written — 

A. If any 5 is Af then always that 5 is P. 

E. If any S is M then never that 5 is F. 

I. If any 5 is M then sometimes that 5 is P. 

O. If any 5 is Jll then sometimes not that .S is P. 

Or more briefly — 



8o A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

A. All 5 M is 5 P, 

E. No i)^ M is 5 P. 

I. Some 5 M is 5 P. 

O. Some 5 M is not 5 P, 

Hypotheticals are to be treated similarly, except 
that here we have no distinction of quantity. The 
propositions are either A or E, viz. All cases A 
are^ or are not^ cases B. 

Disjunctives admit quantity and bar quality : 
they are always affirmative. Obversion and con- 
traposition are possible, but the disjunctive form 
disappears and becomes contingent. E. g. 5 is 
either M or P, this is equivalent 'lo If S is not M 
it is P. We have then as — 

Contrapositive If vS is not P it is not J/. 

Obverted contrapositive If 5 is not P it is M. 
Obverse If 5 is J/ it is not P. 

5. By added determinants is meant addition of 
qualification to both 5 and P, in order that the 
meaning of the term may be more exactly de- 
termined. In making this inference both 5 and P 
must be limited in the same way. The limitation 
is called determination, and the limiting word the 
deternii)iant. 

Inference by added determinants is not a typical 
case of immediate inference. The process is valid 
enough if both 5 and P are determined alike ; thus 
although from A cottage is a building we cannot 
infer that A huge cottage is a huge building, yoX it 



IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 8i 

is true that A cottage, Jmge as it is as a cottage is a 
building huge as it is as a cottage. A similar re- 
mark applies to complex conception, the process 
is valid if 5 and P are alike implicated. The 
reason for care in adding determinants is that 
meaning is apt to vary with context, and therefore 
render this sort of inference liable to fallacy. E. g. 
All negroes are ineriy therefore An honest negro is 
an honest man. This is true, for in each case the 
determinant agrees. It is, however, not true that 
because A bass singer is a man, that therefore A 
bad bass singer is a bad tnan. 

6. Complex Conception consists in the addition 
of a name to both 5 and P. The difference 
in this eduction and added determinants is that in 
this case 6^ and P become the determinants of a 
new name added. 6* and P qualify instead of 
being qualified. E. g. Honesty is the best policy, 
therefore Acts of honesty are acts of the best policy. 
There is the same liability to fallacy as before. It 
does not follow, e.g., that because All horses are 
animals, therefore A majority of horses is a majority 
of animals. 

y. Converse Relation is an inference made when 
in a proposition stating a relation of two things, 
the relation being expressed by a relative word, 
the same relation is expressed by transferring 
the names of the related objects and replacing the 
relative word by its correlative. Using symbols 
this eduction may be written (Q and Q}- being a pair 
of correlatives) 5 is Q of P, therefore P is 0} of S. 



82 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

E.g. The Prince of Wales is tJie son of Queen 
Victoria, therefore Queen Victoria is the mother of the 
Prince of Wales. Or DnrJiani is north of London, 
therefore London is sotttJi of DurJiani. This educ- 
tion is based on purely material considerations. 

8. Reversion consists in passage from the ex- 
tensive to the intensive reading of a proposition, in 
other words both the terms being read in denotation 
the inference lies in changing the proposition so as 
to exhibit the mutual relation of the terms in con- 
notation. Reversion is most readily performed 
upon the universal affirmative, for in this form of 
proposition subject and predicate most clearly stand 
to one another in the relation of species and genus. 
For this reason the other three forms have scarcely 
received due consideration. The inference can best 
be illustrated and explained by examples. 

Thus All metals \ ai^e \ elements when read in ex- 
tension means TJie species metal is included in the 
genus element. The problem is to frame a proposi- 
tion which shall express the relation of the terms 
in respect of their connotation. 

Now the law of connexion between denotation 
and connotation is one of opposite mutation, hence 
it follows that the species having the smaller deno- 
tation possesses the larger connotation, or in other 
words the connotation of the species includes that 
of the genus. The required proposition therefore is, 
All tJie attributes wJiicJi are characteristic of elevient 
I are \ attributes which give meaning to the name 
metal: or all qualities of genus clement \ are \ quali- 



IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 83 

ties of species metal. To express this eduction 
symbolically it will be convenient to use a new 
sign. The mathematical sign for the root of a 
quantity seems to be suitable : it denotes that the 
term to which it is attached is to be read inten- 
sively. Thus if the term A mean objects, real or 
imaginary, called A, J A will mean attributes 
giving meaning to the name A, and the reverse of 
S a P will appear as sj P ct sjS. 

The universal negative and the particular pro- 
positions are less readily dealt with. It must be 
remembered that in naming a class, whilst it is 
possible to refer to all or only some of the things 
included, the connotation of the class name is a 
fixed quantity, and the whole of it is always in- 
volved, that is, the connotation of a name is the 
same whether all of the objects denoted by it are 
referred to or only some of them. Put shortly we 
may say that reference in denotation may be either 
entire or partial, in connotation it is always entire. 
Hence it seems that there can be no particular 
reversions. 

This is not the view taken by Jevons (^Studies, p. 
128), who regards the connotation as including all 
the qualities belonging to the individuals of a class, 
and seeing that all the qualities are not always 
involved in predication a particular of the regular 
form may be obtained. Setting aside this view and 
reading connotation in the way previously defined 
(p. 32) the reversions for E, I, and O will be as 
follows : — 



84 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

E. No metals are compounds^ therefore The char- 
acteristic of compomids is not a quality of metals. 
Symbolically sjPe JS. 

I. Some elements are metals, therefore Sometimes 
the characteristic of metals is a quality of elements. 
Symbolically sjP i \fS. 

O. Some elements are not metals, therefore Some- 
times the characteristic of metals is not a quality of 
elements. Symbolically JP o JS. 

The matter of predication being concomitance of 
quality with quality the sign of quantity in the 
particulars will be sometimes. It may be urged that 
in reversion we drift away from the sphere of formal 
logic, nevertheless it is in ordinary speech a very 
common form of inference and deserves fuller 
attention than it has yet received in the Manuals, 
where usually it escapes attention altogether. 



B5 



CHAPTER XII 

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 



REFERENCES 

Jevons, Lesso7is^ ch. xii. 
Welton, Vol. i., Introd., ch. iv. 
Bain, Deduction^ pp. 14 — 21. 
Ray, Introd., ch. ii. 



About these laws there has been endless discus- 
sion and the various points that have been raised 
are difficult to summarise. Full treatment is outside 
the plan of these notes, reference therefore must be 
made to the Manuals in which they are adequately- 
stated and expounded. 

The laws of thought are usually given as three, 
viz. The law of 

I. Identity all A is A : 

II. Contradiction no A is not-^ : 

III. Excluded middle all A is either A or not-^. 

Leibnitz supplemented these three with a fourth 
which he called the Law of Sufficient Reason. 

The laws of thought have also been called Regu- 



86 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

lative Principles of Thought : Axioms of Consist- 
ency : and Criteria of Truth or Validity. 

They are a priori mental laws in agreement with 
which all valid thought must be conducted, hence 
they are laws in the scientific sense of being uni- 
formities ; they are also laws in the secondary sense 
of being regulative when applied to govern and 
test arguments. 

I. The principle of identity is most simply stated 
as A is A. Other statements are, Whatever is, is : 
or Everything is what it is. It demands during 
any argument that each term shall be used in 
one unvarying sense, that what is posited true in 
one context shall be held true in another. Such 
propositions as A is A command instant assent, but 
convey no information : the law must therefore be 
interpreted to cover such propositions as A is B. 
Such forms are statements, not of the same fact in 
the same language as A is A is, but of the same fact 
in different language, and it is in this that the iden- 
tity consists. The two names, though both appli- 
cable to the same thing or fact, differ in signification, 
and we have therefore an identity amid diversity of 
meaning, and the proposition in which they are 
conjoined is capable of giving information. 

II. The principle of contradiction states that 
tJie same thing cannot be both A and not- A : other- 
wise expressed, A is fiot not- A : or Nothing can 
both be and not be. By this law it is laid down that 
the same attribute cannot be affirmed and denied 
of the same subject at the same time. This, and the 



THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 87 

preceding principle, are the basis of all immediate 
inference: e.g. in opposition, for judgments to be 
contradictory they must refer to the same subject 
at the same time, and, if they do, they cannot by 
this law both be true. 

Thought in the last resort must agree with reality, 
and put to the test of material consideration we 
cannot conceive a thing as at once possessing an 
attribute and not possessing it. In argument this 
principle demands that having made a statement 
we must abide by it, for our consistency will be at 
fault unless we are prepared to deny the contra- 
dictory of the statement originally made. 

III. The principle of excluded middle is enunci- 
ated A is either B or not-B. Otherwise stated, Either 
a given judgment must be true or its co7itradictory ^ 
there is no middle course. Bain calls this law " an 
incident of partial or incomplete contrariety . . . 
too much honoured by the dignity of a primary law 
of thought." The principle has been questioned 
by other writers who have confused contradiction 
and contrariety. Contraries mark the utmost 
possible divergence. Contradictories are simple 
negations, they admit no intermediate course, they 
exclude all questions of degree. Care is necessary 
to avoid this confusion. Lotze objects to the for- 
mula A is either B or not-B on the ground that not- 
B embraces everything in the universe except B and 
is therefore meaningless : he would say Every A 
either is or is not B. Practically however negative 
terms are usually limited in application, 



SS A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

The axiom of excluded middle does not decide 
which of the two contradictory terms is true, but 
declares only the necessity of affirming one or other 
of them. By the principle of contradiction we are 
prohibited from thinking that two contradictory 
attributes can both be simultaneously present : by 
the principle of excluded middle we are prohibited 
from thinking that they can both be simultaneously 
absent. 

IV. The principle of sufficient reason, first distinctly 
formulated by Leibnitz, means that no fact is real, 
no proposition true, without a sufficient reason why 
it is so and not otherwise. The principle is not a 
fundamental law of thought. 

Valid arguments need not be based on the prin- 
ciples of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle 
entirely although they must be in conformity with 
them. Those that are founded on mathematical 
axioms are equally cogent, such as the argument 
a fortiori, If A is greater than B, and ^ is greater 
than 6", therefore A is greater than C: or If A is 
equal to B, and B is equal to C, therefore A is equal 
to C. Arguments however of this character are 
not in the form of reasoning recognised in formal 
logic. 



89 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE SYLLOGISM 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xv. 

Keynes, Part iii., ch. i. and ii. Most useful. 

Mill, Bk. ii., ch. iv. 

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iv., ch. i. and ii. 

Bain, Dediictioji^ pp. 133, seq. 



Mediate inference is of two kinds, viz. — 

I. Deduction, or method of argument from general 
to particular, and 

II. Induction, or method of argument from 
particular to general. 

Syllogism is a common name for mediate infer- 
ence, in Latin called coinpiitatio, which means a 
reckoning or summing up. It is the summing up 
of two terms in a conclusion through the medium of 
a third term. It is an act of thought by which we 
proceed from two judgments to a third, the truth 
of which follows from those already given. It is an 
inference in which one proposition is derived from 
two others conjointly. These various definitions 
fairly describe the nature of the syllogism. 



90 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

In form the syllogism consists of three pro- 
positions, of which the first two are called pre- 
misses, and the last the conclusion. 

Syllogism is of two kinds — 

(i) Deductive and 

(2) Inductive. 

The deductive s3^11ogism has received the fuller 
treatment. Aristotle spent most of his labour upon 
it. The genus syllogism has indeed been taken for 
the species deductive syllogism. 

Dealing now with the deductive syllogism, S, M, 
P are the usual symbols for minor, middle, and 
major terms respectively. 

The Major Term is the predicate of the con- 
clusion : 

The Minor Term is the subject of the con- 
clusion : and 

The Middle Term is the medium of comparison 
of two propositions. 

The Major Premiss is the proposition containing 
the major term : 

The Minor Premiss is the proposition containing 
the minor term. 

We are concerned in syllogism not with the truth 
or falsity of any one of the individual propositions 
which compose it, but simply with the dependence 
of one of them upon the other two, so that if we 
grant the latter we necessarily accept the former. 
The derived proposition called the conclusion, there- 
fore propounds no truth which was not contained 
in the data, and the propositions must contain a 



THE SYLLOGISM 91 

common element as the ground of comparison 
from which the conclusion is derived. 

The three propositions which compose a syllogism 
are called its proximate matter, and the terms united 
its remote matter. The conclusion put first as a 
thesis was called by the old logicians the question^ 
and the propositions establishing it, the reason. The 
common element is the middle term, the other two 
terms are called the extremes. 

We have already seen that the terms of a pro- 
position may be viewed in respect of quality, 
quantity, relation, and modality, giving rise to the 
classification set out on p. 38. The two premisses 
of a syllogism may be viewed In a similar way, 
giving rise to a corresponding classification of the 
syllogism. The moods of a syllogism spring from 
difference in the quantity and quality of the two 
premisses. In view of relation when the premisses 
are both of the same kind, both categoricals or both 
contingent, syllogism is said to be pure. If the 
premisses are of different relations the syllogism is 
said to be mixed. The following Is a tabular view — 

{a) Categorical. 



Syllogism 



(i) Pure - iU) Conditional. 
I {c) Hypothetical. 



(2) Mixed 



( {a) Hypothetico - catc- 
} gorlcal. 

1 {]?) Disjunctive. 

\ {c) Dilemma. 

Syllogistic reasoning rests upon the laws of 



92 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

thought : identity is at the root of every affirm- 
ative, contradiction is at the root of every negative 
categorical. Pure contingent syllogisms rest on these 
principles together with that of sufficient reason. 

Logicians have usually developed the laws of 
thought into Axioms of Syllogism. These axioms 
are therefore not ultimate, but secondary or 
derived: and so called axiomata media or middle 
axioms. 

Aristotelian logicians regarded the first figure as 
the type of categorical syllogism. The empty ^r/?^;//^? 
of this is — 

M P 

S M 



therefore 5 



Other forms of syllogism were tested by reduction 
to this form. These logicians therefore gave one 
axiom, viz. the Dictum de omni et nidlo, as they 
called it, which applied to this one form, and was 
stated as their fundamental principle of syllogistic 
reasoning. 

The Dictum may be thus stated — " Whatever 
may be said affirmatively or negatively of a class 
may also be said affirmatively or negatively of any- 
thing within that class." Or more shortly the state- 
ment may stand, " Whatever may be distributively 
predicated of a whole may in like manner be pre- 
dicated of each of a whole." The Latin form 
usually given by the older logicians is — " Quicquid 



THE SYLLOGISM 93 

de omni valet, valet enhn de quibiisdam et de singulis. 
Qiiicquid de nulla valet, nee de quibusdani valet, nee 
de singulis'' It is to be noted that the word class 
in the statement first given means the class name 
read distributively, the dictum is de omni, not DE 
CUNCTO. 

The dictum presupposes the class or extensive 
theory of judgments or propositions which is ap- 
plicable to all propositions having general terms, 
but those who regard the connotation of each term 
as being the important element formed an axiom 
corresponding to the dictum to express this conno- 
tative view, viz. ^^ Nota notae est not a rei ipsius. Re- 
pugnans notae, rep2ignat rei ipsi!' Mill adopts this 
statement in his Logic. It means wS Jias the mark 
M which is tJie mark of P, therefore 5 Jias P : ox S 
is ^a mark of M zvhich is a mark of P, therefore 6^ 
is a mark of P. Mill renders, " Whatever Jias any 
mark, has that zvhich it is the mark of. Or when 
the minor premiss as well as the major is universal 
we may state it thus : Whatever is a mark of 
any mark, is a mark of that which this last is a 
mark of." 

There are certain rules of mediate inference known 
as Canons of Syllogism, and according to tradition 
they are Six in number, as follows : — 

Relating to the nature of the syllogism. 

I. There must be three and only three terms. 

II. There must be three and only three pro- 
positions. 

Relating to quantity. 



94 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

III.vThe middle term must be distributed once 
at least. 

IV. No term not distributed in a premiss must 
be distributed in the conclusion. 

Relating to quality. 

V. One premiss must be affirmative, for from 
two negatives nothing can be inferred. 

VI. If one premiss be negative the conclusion 
must be negative, and vice versa, to prove a negative 
conclusion one premiss must be negative. 

It is usual to give in addition to the canons the 
fpllowing corollaries derived from them. 
/ I. From two particulars nothing can be inferred. 
./ 2, If one premiss be particular the conclusion 
must be particular. 

3. From a particular major and a negative minor 
nothing can be inferred. 

It is to be noted that Canons I. and II. are not 
rules of inference but rules for deciding whether or 
not we have a syllogism. I. forbids ambiguity, for 
if any term is used ambiguously it becomes in effect 
two terms, and so there are four terms instead of 
three present. Hence there is no need to add, as 
is sometimes done in Rule III., " the middle term 
must not be used ambiguously." 

The fallacy arising from ambiguity of one of the 
terms is called quateniio tcniiinoniin or fallacy of 
four terms. There must be a common element as 
a connecting link between major and minor terms, 
and this must be identical in the two premisses. 

Breach of Rule III. is called fallacy of the un- 



THE SYLLOGISM 95 

distributed middle. It is absolutely necessary for 
the middle term to be once distributed, for other- 
wise there is no bond of connexion between major 
and minor terms. The real mediation lies in that 
part of M which is common, and there can be no 
assurance that any part of M is common unless 
once at least the whole of J/ is referred to, and this 
is what distribution means. 

Breach of Rule IV. is called fallacy of illicit 
process, of the major or minor as the case may be : 
more shortly it is called illicit major or illicit 
minor according to the case in question. 

The Rule V. that two negatives yield no conclu- 
sion follows from the fact that in neither premiss 
is M in connexion with 5 and P. The accuracy 
of the rule has been questioned by Jevons {Princi- 
ples of Science, ch. iv., § lo), and on the same grounds 
by Bradley {Principles of Logic, p. 254). It is 
also noticed in the Port Royal Logic (p. 211). 
Jevons answers his own objection in his Lessons 

(P- 134). 

As a matter of fact the rule only applies so long 
as we keep strictly to syllogistic reasoning. Using 
the methods of immediate inference two negatives 
may yield a valid conclusion. By means of obver- 
sion and conversion the conclusion may be drawn. 
Keynes instances a syllogism in Barbara which may 
be written in the negative form. The following case 
seems more convincing. Given the premisses Mo P, 
SeM ; a conclusion is possible, viz. Si P. It is 
obtained thus — 



96 A DIGEST OF LOCxIC 

Some M is not P yields obverse Some ]\I is not-/*. 

No 5 is J/ yields the ob-) . ., __. ^ „ 
^ , ^All M IS not-5. 

verted conversej 

therefore Some not-5 is not-/*. 

As a concrete example take the following — 
(i) Some insects \ are not \ ivinged. 
(2) No vertebrates \ are \ insects. 

These premisses (i) obverted and (2) converted 
and then obverted, become 

(i) Some insects \ are \ wingless, 
(2) All insects \ are \ invertebrate. 

Some invei'teb rates \ are \ wingless. 

By a process similar to the above E E as well as 
O E can be shown to yield a valid syllogism : E O 
is intractable. 

E E is worked thus — 

Given two premisses, (i) M e P and (2) 5 e M. 
Take (2) and by inversion it becomes 5 i M. With 
this new minor construct the syllogism, and we have 

M_ e P 
S i M 



S P 



As a concrete example take the premisses, (i) 
No criminals are deserving of pity, and (2) No 
innoccjit persons are criminals. When wc have 
inverted the premiss (2) our syllogism will stand 
thus — 



THE SYLLOGISM 97 

(i) No criminals are deserving of pity. 
(2) Some guilty persons are criminals. 

. ' . Some guilty persons are not deserving of pity. 

Using the methods of immediate inference upon 
the premisses of the invalid syllogistic moods there is 
no reason why the majority of them cannot be made 
to conform with moods that are valid. This, as 
shown above, can certainly be done with E E and OE. 
The rule that two negatives yield no conclusion holds 
good only so long as we deal with the premisses as 
negative in the syllogism, i. e. do not go outside the 
syllogism to alter the form of the premisses. The 
premisses treated as here suggested cease to be 
negative, but if indirect reduction is allowable in 
any case, as it is, it is certainly allowable here also. 

The canons of the syllogism may be compressed 
' — "simplified" according to the Manuals — but it 
can hardly be called simplification, since they cease 
to be simple in the sense of being easily understood. 
The simplification is as follows — Canons L and IL 
are omitted as being not rules but description of 
syllogism, and thus we are left with four. These 
four are not independent, for breach of IV., V., or 
the first part of VI. involves indirectly a breach of 
III. The independent rules of the syllogism are 
thus reduced to two — 

1. The middle term must be distributed once at 
least in the premisses. 

2. To prove a negative conclusion one of the 
premisses must be negative. 



98 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

It may be noted that the only syllogism rejected 
by (2) and not also rejected directly or indirectly 
by (i) is A A O in Figure IV. So far as the first 
three figures are concerned, therefore, we are left 
with the single rule of the undistributed middle. 
This compression is not of any practical im- 
portance. 

The Connexion between the Dictum and the Syllo- 
gistic Canons is to be carefully noticed. The dictum 
applies to syllogisms in the first figure and was 
not intended to apply beyond that figure, but as 
all syllogisms may be reduced to the first figure 
the dictum applies indirectly to those also in 
Figures II., III., and IV. 

(i) The dictum provides for three and only three 
terms — 

I. Whatever is predicated = major term, 
II. of a whole = middle term, 

III. of each of a whole = minor term. 

(2) The dictum provides for only three pro- 
positions — 

I. Predication of something of a whole, 
II. statement that each is contained in the 

whole, 
III. making the original statement of the con- 
tained each. 

(3) The dictum provides not only that the middle 
term shall be distributed, but more definitely that 
it shall be distributed in the major premiss. 
Whatever is predicated of a whole means a distri- 



THE SYLLOGISM 99 

buted whole. The middle term in Figure L is the 
subject of the major premiss, and as this is A or E 
it is as a matter of fact always distributed. 

(4) The dictum provides for one affirmative pre- 
miss, since the declaration that the each is contained 
in the whole can only be affirmation, not denial, 
i. e. the minor premiss must be affirmative. 

(5) The dictum provides for a negative conclusion 
from a negative premiss, and vice versa by the words 
" in like manner." 

(6) Illicit process is provided against indirectly. 
We are limited by what has preceded to the follow- 
ing cases, A A, A I, E A, E I, and these separately 
examined are seen to fall under the rule. 



[OO 



CHAPTER XIV 

FIGURE AND MOOD. REDUCTION ' 



REFERENCES 

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xvi., xvii. 
Keynes, Part, iii., ch. iii., iv. 
Mill, Bk. ii., ch. ii. 
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iv., ch. iii., iv. 



Figure of syllogism is syllogism with a definite 
position of M. Moods of figure of syllogism are 
the possible combinations of the premisses in that 
position oi M. 

There are four figures corresponding to the 
different ways in which S, M, and P may be 
arranged. These letters as before are used to 
denote the minor, middle, and major terms respect- 
ively. The point of note in the subjoined table is 
the position of M. 



FI GU R E. 


r. 


II 


ni 


rv. 


MAJOR PREM155. 
jniNOR PREM15S. 


^ 


p 

5 








P 

s 


^ 


C ONCLUSION. 


S P 


S P 


S P 


S P 



FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION loi 

Account may be taken of the premisses without 
regard to the position of M, and this is called 
unfigured syllogism. 

Aristotle took account only of Figures I., II., and 
III. He regarded the first figure as the normal form 
and called it in consequence the perfect figure. The 
fourth figure was first explicitly recognised by Galen, 
and hence it has been called the Galenian figure. 
By some logicians the fourth figure is rejected. 

The first figure gives conclusions in all four pro- 
positional forms A, E, I, and 0. The second figure 
only proves negatives : the third only particulars. 
Hence the first figure is fairly called perfect. It 
proves moreover in the most clear and transparent 
manner. 

Special rules have been formulated for the figures 
as follows — 

I. (i) The minor premiss must be affirmative. 
(2) The major premiss must be universal. 
II. (i) One premiss must be negative. 

(2) The major premiss must be universal. 

III. (i) The minor premiss must be affirmative. 
(2) The conclusion must be particular. 

IV. (i) If the major is affirmative the minor is 

universal. 

(2) If either premiss is negative the major is 

universal. 

(3) If the minor is affirmative the conclusion 

is particular. 
There are certain characteristics peculiar to each 
figure that may be noted, viz. — 



1 



I02 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Fig. I. proves A, E, I, and O : it is the perfect 
figure. It is the only figure proving A. This alone 
makes it the most useful and important of all the 
syllogistic figures. All deductive science tends to 
work in A A A of this figure. 

Only in this figure have we the subject and pre- 
dicate of the conclusion occupying the same position 
as ^ and P in the premisses. This accounts in part 
for argument in Figure I. seeming more natural 
than in other figures. 

The dictum de oinni et iudlo as already pointed 
out applies directly to this figure only. 

Fig. II. proves E, O, — negatives only. 

As the middle term is predicate in both the pre- 
misses, unless one premiss were negative the middle 
term would be undistributed. 

This figure is chiefly used for purposes of dis- 
proof. It has also been called the exclusive figure 
because by means of it we may go on excluding 
various suppositions as to the nature of something 
under investigation whose real character we wish 
to ascertain. This process is called absciss io infiniti. 
(See Whately, Log., p. 60.) 

Fig. III. proves I, O — particulars only. If the con- 
clusion were universal it would involve illicit minor. 

This is the most natural figure when the pre- 
misses are singular propositions. It is also useful 
in taking exception to a universal proposition laid 
down by an opponent as establishing an instance 
in which such universal does not hold good. 

Fig. IV. proves only E, I, 0. It is seldom used 



FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION 103 

and by some rejected. It is not recognised by 
Aristotle. De Morgan calls it nothing but " the 
first with a converted conclusion." The natural 
order of thought in it is completely reversed. 

When a conclusion is weaker than the premisses 
warrant, i. e. when I or O is inferred where A or E 
are possible, the syllogism is said to be weakened 
and the mood is called subaltern. 

If a conclusion remains unaltered although we 
substitute for one of the premisses the subaltern 
of that premiss, the syllogism is said to be 
strengthened. 

Mood is the form of a syllogism as determined 
by the quantity and quality of the premisses, i. e. 
the arrangements of A, E, I, in sets of three, 
each triplet of propositions is called a mood, or 
form of the syllogism. The combinations of 3 out 
of 4 things are as follows : — 

(i) All three alike = 4 

(2) Two alike, one different = 4x3x3 =36 

(3) All three different = 4x3x2x1 =24 

Total 64 

Of these sixty-four possible arrangements only 
nineteen are valid. 

In Figure I. there are 4 



II. 


>; 


4 


[II. 


» 


6 


IV. 


,, 


5 



Total 19 



104 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



TABLE OF FIGURES AND VALID MOODS. 





B 


D 


c 


F 


L 


AAA V 


All 


EA£ 


EIO 


II. 


AOO 




EAE AEE 


EIO 


III. 


OAO 


All AAI lAI 




EIO EAO 


IV. 


AAI 


lAI 


AEE 


EIO EAO 



The valid syllogistic forms may be determined either 
directly or indirectly; directly by appeal to the 
fundamental laws of thought, indirectly by examina- 
tion of all possible combinations and the exclusion 
of those which break any of the canons of syllogism. 
The indirect method is the one usually resorted to. 

Reduction is the name given to the process of 
expressing in Fig. I. the syllogisms which appear 
in other figures, or, more generally stated, it is 
change of mood or figure. 

Unless specified, reduction is always taken to mean 
change of imperfect figure to the perfect. Questions 
on reduction depend upon immediate inference and 
the transposition or metathesis of the premisses. 

Reduction is of two kinds. 

I. Direct or Ostensive, which means proof of the 
same conclusion by an argument in Fig. I. 

II. Indirect or Reductio ad absurdum (also called 
Reductio ad or per vnpossibile, or Deductio ad iin- 
possibile or ad absurduni) consists in proof of the 
contradictory of the original conclusion to be false 
by syllogism in Fig. I. Unless specially asked for, 



FIGURE AND JSIOOD: REDUCTION 105 

it is always understood that reduction is to be 
made ostensively. 

Note, eduction applies to propositions ; reduction 
to syllogism. 

The doctrine of reduction is only intelligible on 
the ground that figures differ in cogency and 
efficiency in a marked way. It is conceivable that 
a man may grant a conclusion in the first figure 
and not in the second or third. Reduction is 
proving in the first figure, which is unexceptionable, 
that which may be excepted against in the other 
figures. Both kinds of reduction apply equally to 
every mood, but it was formerly usual to limit 
reductio per impossibile to the cases of Baroco and 
Bocardo. These moods the older logicians failed 
to reduce ostensively because O is not amenable to 
conversion. We now treat O by obversion, and by 
this means both these moods can be ostensively dealt 
with. The value of reduction has been disputed. 

The moods are usually designated by the names 
which occur in the following hexameters. It is 
most important to know these mnemonic lines 
thoroughly for the accurate working of problems in 
reduction. Note that the names Baroco and 
Bocardo are sometimes spelt with a " k." This is 
a mistake : " c " is the original form. 

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris : 
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundae : 
tertia, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, 
Bocardo, Ferison, habet : quarta insuper addit 
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison. 



io6 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Each valid mood in every figure — except sub- 
altern moods — is here represented by a separate 
word, which in the imperfect moods contains 
directions for reduction. 

Vowels give the quantity and quality of the 
propositions : 

Initials connect the moods of each figure. 

The consonants are thus to be interpreted — 
V s, the proposition denoted by the preceding vowel 
is to be converted simply : 

. /, the proposition denoted by the preceding vowel 
is to be converted per accidens : 

7;/, muta, i.e. metathesis or tTansposition of the 
premisses : 

c, indirect reduction, /. e. substitute for the pro- 
position whose vowel precedes its contradictory. 

The meaningless letters are /; (not initial), d (not 
initial), /, 71, r, and t. Note that s and / at the 
end of a word show that the conclusion of the new 
syllogism must be treated as the letters indicate. 

The syllogistic mnemonic appears in various 
forms. The lines given are from Aldrich and are 
those in general use. 

Modifications have been suggested in order to 
make all the letters significant. C. Read in Mind, 
No. xxvii., p. 440, seeks to obviate the disadvan- 
tages of — 

(i) The mood not being indicated by a letter : 

(2) meaningless letters : and 

(3) no indication of ostensive reduction of Baroco 
and Bocardo by obversion and contraposition. 



FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION 107 

He takes /, n, r, and t as signs of I., II., Ill , and 
IV. figures respectively, and makes the lines run 
thus : — 

Ballala, Cellalel, Dalii, Felioque prioris : 
Cesane, Camesnes, Fesinon, Banoco secundae : 

Tertia Darapri, Drisamis, Darisi, Ferapro 
Bocaro, Ferisor habet : quarta insuper addit 

Bamatip, Gametes, Dimatis, Fesapto, Fesistot. 

On the same principle Miss Christine Ladd in 
her Studies in Log., p. 40, suggests that difference 
of figure might be marked by r, /, /, and ;/ re- 
spectively. 

Dealing now with Baroco and Bocardo we note 
that— 

c indicates reductio per inipossibile. The position 
of the letter shows that the first step is the 
omission of the premiss preceding it, i. e. the other 
premiss and the contradictory of the conclusion are 
to be combined in a new syllogism, which gives a 
false conclusion and therefore indirectly establishes 
the truth of the original. 

The indirect reduction of Baroco is effected 
thus — 

Baroco 



P a M 


= 


All P 1 


is 


\M 


S ni 


= 


Some 5 1 


is not 


\M 



.' . S P = Some 5 | is not | P 

If S P \s false, its contradictory S a P is true. 
Substitute S a P for the minor premiss and we 
have the syllogism in Barbara thus — ■ 



io8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



p 


a 


M 


s 


a 


P 


. 5 


a 


M 



but in the minor of the original syllogism 5 o M 
is posited as true, therefore our new conclusion 
S a M \?> false ; but being the conclusion from two 
premisses, one of which, viz. P a M, is posited true, 
the other premiss, viz. S a P, must be false, that is, 
its contradictory, viz. S o P/\s true, and this is the 
conclusion of the original syllogism which was to 
be proven. 

The indirect reduction of Bocardo is effected 
similarly — 

Bocardo M o P 

M a S 



S P 



If this conclusion be false, then its contradictory, 
viz. S a P, must be true. Substitute S a P for 
the major premiss M o P and we have a syllogism 
in Barbara thus — 



5 a 
Ma 


P 
S 


M a 


P 



But this conclusion must be false since it con- 
tradicts the original major, M o P, which is 
admittedly true. But in the second syllogism, 
M a P \<, a conclusion drawn from two premisses, 



FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION 109 

of which the minor is posited true, therefore if our 
new conclusion, viz. M a P, is false, the major pre- 
miss of the second syllogism must also be false, that 
is, its contradictory, viz. S P, must be true, and this 
is the original conclusion which was to be proven. 

Both Baroco and Bocardo may be reduced osten- 
sively, and the following names have been suggested 
as substitutes to indicate the method — 

Baroco Facovo, Faksoko, Faksnoko, Facoco^ or 

Fakoro. 
Bocardo Docamovs, Doksamosk, Doksauirosk, 

Docajiioc, or Doksamo. 

Of these Faksoko and Doksamosk are the best. 
In the other substitutes the letters are open to 
misconstruction. 

k indicates obversion ; 

ks indicates obversion and then conversion, i. e. 
contraposition. 

In Facovoand Docamovs, <: means contraposition 
and V obversion. 

Baroco or Faksoko P a M 
S M 



.', S P 



Contraposition of the major and obversion of the 
minor premiss yield the syllogism — 

Ferio M e P 

S i M 

.'. S P 



no A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Bocardo or Doksamosk M o P 

J/ a S 



.'. S P 



Contraposition of the major and metathesis of 
the premisses yield — 

Darii M a S 

P i M 



.- , P i S 

This conchision by conversion and obversion 
becomes J^^ o P or the conclusion of the original 
syllogism, which was to be proven. 

Indirect reduction is applied usually only to 
Baroco and Bocardo, but it is equally applicable to 
the moods which are dealt with as a rule ostensively. 

Indirect reduction is a way of proving in the first 
figure that a conclusion is true because its contra- 
dictory is false. The assumption upon which the 
process is based, is that if a premiss leads to a false 
conclusion it must itself be false. There is nothing 
special to Baroco and Bocardo in this, for the 
process will apply to all the moods. 

Euclid uses reductio ad absurduni on the same 
fundamental principle that aiiytJiing, being used cor- 
rectly, which leads to fallacy must itself be fallacious. 

Aristotle was the first to see that a false con- 
clusion could never be got correctly from true 
premisses, and also that a materially true conclu- 
sion can be obtained from premisses one or both of 



FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION iii 

which may be false, i. e. from true we can only get 
true, but from false we may get true. E.g. — 

All stones are animals 
All cozvs are stones 



All cows are animals. 



A conclusion never proves its premisses, but the 
falsity of a conclusion overturns the premisses. 

There is an aspect of material investigation called 
plurality of causes ; this and the validity of scientific 
hypothesis repose on the principle that a materially 
true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses. 



112 



CHAPTER XV 

IRREGULAR AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xviii., xix. 
Keynes, Part iii., ch. vi. 
Welton, Vol. I., Bk. iv., ch. v.^ 



The table subjoined gives at a glance the 
irregular syllogisms. 

i First Order — omission of major premiss. 
ENTHYMEME x Second Order — omission of minorpremiss. 
( Third Order — omission of conclusion. 



T- 11 i. i. J ( Prosyllogism 
Fully stated | Episyllo|ism 

( Curtailed \ f£f '"^^''^ S Aristoteli 
\ Sorites I Goclenia, 



The word enthymeme is derived from the Greek 
ivOviJLijiJLa, which means a suggestion or argument. 
It is defined by Aristotle as {n;A.A.oyto-juos e^ dKorcov 
?y (njixeicov. The €Ik6s and o-T^/xeior themselves are 
propositions : qlkos states a general probability, and 
(Tiiixdov a fact which is known to be an indication 
more or less certain of some further statement, 



SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 113 

whether of a single fact or a general belief In 
short, an enthymeme meant originally a syllogism 
with probable premisses. Aristotle's use of the 
word is entirely different to present usage, and has 
now only historical interest. 

The enthymeme is now usually defined as an 
abridged syllogism. The syllogism instead of being 
stated in full is truncated by the omission of one 
or other of the constituent propositions. Ac- 
cording to the proposition omitted, enthymemes 
are ranked in three orders, viz. — 

first order, major premiss omitted : 
second order, minor premiss omitted : 
third order, conclusion omitted. 

The following are examples — 

1st. We are mortals^ and tJierefore liable to ei'ror. 

2nd. Mortals are liable to error, and therefore zve 
are liable to error. 

3rd. Mortals are liable to error, and we are 
mortals. 

In dealing with an enthymeme, care should be 
taken to express the omitted proposition. It is to 
be noted that according to the definition now 
current, the enthymeme differs in no way at all 
from the ordinary syllogism except in its expression. 

By a polysyllogism is meant a conjunction of 
syllogisms so stated that the conclusion of one 
becomes a premiss of another. The syllogism 
whose conclusion becomes the premiss of the 
syllogism that follows it is cdXXoidi^A prosyllogisni. 



114 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

The syllogism whose premiss is the conclusion of 
the syllogism preceding is called an episyllogism . 

When in these conjoined syllogisms the full 
statement is abridged by omission of any of the 
constituent propositions, it is called^an epicheirenia. 
In other words, the epicheirema is a polysyllogism 
in which the prosyllogisms are enthymemes. 

The following are examples. 

Polysyllogism fully stated. 

(i) All voyages of discovery have a scientific value. 

(2) All arctic expeditions are voyages of discovery. 

(3) .'. All arctic expeditions have a scientific value. 

(4) But Nansen's search for the North Pole zuas 
an arctic expedition. 

(5) .*. Nans ens search for the North Pole has a 
scientific value. 

In symbol the above argument may be written — 





Q 


a 


P 




R 


a 


Q 




R 


a 


P 


but 


S 


a 


R 



.' . S a P 

Note propositions (i), (2), and (3J form the 
prosyllogism : propositions (3), (4), and (5) form 
the episyllogism. 

Epicheirema or Polysyllogism curtailed. 

All arctic expeditions have a scientific value because 
they are voyages of discovery. Nansen's search for 
the North Pole therefore has a scientific value. 



SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 115 

Sorites (from o-Mpos a heap) is a chain of 
syllogisms curtailed in statement and differing from 
the epicheirema in being curtailed in a definite and 
uniform manner. Or more shortly put, the defini- 
tion may be given as follows — A sorites is a chain 
of enthymemes all of the third order terminating 
in a fully expressed syllogism. 

There are tzvo kinds of Sorites — 

(i) In the ordinary or so-called Aristotelian 
Sorites the suppressed conclusion of each syllogism 
becomes the minor premiss of the next. It is more 
easily remembered by noting that the subject of 
the conclusion is the subject of the first proposition. 

Thus — 

6" is R 
R \s Q 
Q is P 



.-. S \s P 



(2) In the Goclenian Sorites the suppressed con- 
clusion of each syllogism becomes the major 
premiss of the next. It may be remembered by 
noting that the predicate of the conclusion is the 
predicate of the first proposition. 
Thus — 

g is P 
R IS Q 
S is R 



. S Is P 



In the ordinary sorites there are two special 
rules, viz. — 



ii6 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

(i) The last and only the last premiss can be 
negative. 

(2) The first and only the first premiss can be 
particular. 

In the Goclcnian sorites these rules must be 
reserved in statement. 

(i) The first and only the first premiss can be 
negative. 

(2) The last and only the last premiss can be 
particular. 

An O proposition is therefore by these rules ex- 
cluded as a premiss, although an O conclusion can 
be drawn if the final syllogism is in Ferio. 

There is no difficulty in deducing these special 
rules from the general canons of syllogism : (i) one 
negative premiss only, or else with a second we 
shall have a syllogism wdth two, and so the chain 
will be broken : (2) one particular premiss only, or 
else with a second w^e shall have a syllogism with 
two, w^iich will break the chain. The position of 
these premisses is determined by the rule relating 
to distribution. 

Pure contmgent syllogisms do not call for special 
treatment, for in every case the premisses can 
be expressed in categorical form and dealt with 
as regards mood, figure, and reduction in the 
usual way. They are syllogisms in which both the 
premisses are conditional or both hypothetical, 
giving respectively a conditional or hypothetical 
conclusion, and called respectively conditional or 
hypothetical syllogisms. 



SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 117 

Thus the following argument is a hypothetical 
syllogism in Barbara — 

If M is P is 
If S is M is 



. • . If S is P is. 

No difficulty is experienced in transforming the 
premisses into categoricals and obtaining a cate- 
gorical conclusion. Treated thus it becomes — 

Every coincidence of M is a coincidence of P 
Every coincidence of S is a coincidence of M 

. • . Every coincidence of S is a coincidence of P. 

The name hypothetical syllogism, however, is 
commonly restricted, as by Jevons, to a mixed 
syllogism in which one of the premisses only is 
hypothetical, the other being categorical. A more 
accurate nomenclature would be to call these 
syllogisms Jiypothetico-categoricaL- 

In these syllogisms — 

the major premiss is hypothetical : 
the minor premiss is categorical : and 
the conclusion is categorical. 

The hypothetico- categorical syllogism has two 
moods — 
(I.) Modus ponens, and (II.) Modus tollens. 

I. The modus ponens or Constructive hypothetical 
syllogism is the mood of affirmation. If S is P 
is, but vS is, . • . P is. 

The antecedent of the hypothetical is affirmed, 
and thereby the consequent is established. 



ii8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

II. The modus tollens, or Destructive hypo- 
thetical syllogism is the mood of negation. If S 
is P 7Sy but P is not, .' . S is not. 

The consequent of the hypothetical is denied, 
and thereby the antecedent is found wanting. 

The rule for deahng with these syllogisms is 
commonly stated thus : " The antecedent must be 
affirmed, or the consequent denied." More shortly 
it may be put, posit antecedent, or snblate 
consequent. 

It has been urged by Bain, Mansel, and others 
that this form of syllogism is not mediate, but 
immediate reasoning, i. e. it is not syllogism at all. 
Immediate reasoning, however, always leaves off 
with a conclusion resembling in form the original 
proposition. Thus starting with the hypothetical, 
if the reasoning were immediate, the conclusion 
would be hypothetical : it is on the contrary, how- 
ever, categorical. We cannot from our hypothetical 
get any conclusion without either positing the ante- 
cedent or sublating the consequent, that is, given 
one proposition (viz. the hypothetical major), we 
pass from it throuc^h another (viz. the categorical 
minor) to a third (viz. the categorical conclusion), 
and this is as clearly mediate reasoning as in 
categorical syllogism. 

It is urged by Mansel that there is no middle 
term. In answer it may be said that the categori- 
cal minor is a proposition such as includes a middle 
term. Thus transform the categorical to the h)'po- 
thetic form as follows — 



SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 119 

M is P 
S is M 



. • . ^ is /^ 
If M is P is 
but M is (in the form of S) 

.-. P is. 

It appears then that it is not the middle term that 
is wanting, but the minor term in not being 
separately expressed. 

Bain's objection is different and is based on the 
ambiguity of the word if (see Mind, Logic of If 
1877, p. 264, and Bain, Ded., p. 116). He argues 
that the hypothetical, e. g. " If it is fine ivc ivi/l 
go azuay to-vwrrowl' is nothing more than a con- 
junction of two statements into one, viz., that zve 
will go away to-morrow and it is fine. He is read- 
ing into the word if the meaning since or because^ 
whereas it properly denotes bare hypothesis with 
the meaning suppose or granted that. In symbol 
Bain's hypothetical must be written. If S is {and 
it is) P is. In this case the conclusion is certainly 
deduced immediately. In answer it may be said 
that the same is true in the case of the categorical 
syllogism. If both the premisses are conjoined 
and read together the conclusion follows immedi- 
ately. They are however read separately and so 
from either of the premisses taken separately the 
conclusion is mediately drawn. In short whatever 
argument can be brought against the mediacy of 



I20 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

the hypothetical syllogism can also be brought 
against the mediacy of the categorical. 

A disjunctive syllogism is one in which the major 
premiss is a disjunctive proposition. The minor 
premiss and the conclusion are categorical. Many 
logicians recognise two moods : I. Modus tollendo 
ponens^ II. Modus ponendo tollens. 

I. The Modus Tollendo Ponens is equivalent to 
the constructive JiypotJietical into which it may be 
resolved. One of the alternatives is denied and 
thereby the other is established as — 

5 is either Q or P 
but S is not Q 
. • . 5 is P. 

Stated in hypothetical form the syllogism stands — 

If 5 is not 0, 5 is P 
but 5 is not Q 
.'. S is P. 

II. The Modus Ponendo Tollens is regarded by 
many logicians as a valid mood and equivalent 
to the destructive JLypotJietical. It consists in 
affirmation of one of the alternatives whereby the 
other is negatived and forms the conclusion. Thus 

^' is cither Q or P 
but 5 is Q 
.-. S is not /'. 

The validity of this mood depends entirely upon 
the interpretation of the disjunctive that in it the 
alternatives are mutuall)' exclusive. If however 



SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 121 

we take the opposite view, held by many, that the 
alternatives are not of necessity mutually exclusive, 
then the validity of this mood is vitiated. As will 
be seen it depends in any case upon how the dis- 
junctive premiss is read. The only case therefore 
in which we can be sure of the validity of this mood 
is that in which the terms of the alternatives are 
contradictories : 6" is either P or P. 

With regard to the dilemma logicians are not 
agreed either as to its form or nature : hence defi- 
nitions have varied considerably. It may perhaps 
be fairly called a contingent- disjunctive syllogism 
in which the major premiss is a contingent contain- 
ing a plurality, either of antecedents or con- 
sequents, and the minor premiss is a disjunctive. 
These premisses will yield either a categorical or 
disjunctive conclusion. 

As in the previous classes of mixed syllogism 
there are two moods, (I.) Modus Ponens, or Con- 
structive in which the conclusion is affirmative : 
called simple when categorical : complex when 
disjunctive. And (TI.) Modus tollens^ or Destructive 
in which the conclusion is negative, and (according 
to the view of the majority) always disjunctive : 
called therefore complex. 

The schema for the three forms may be written 
as follows : — 

I. Modus ponens. 

(i) Simple Constructive. 

If A then X, and if B then X: 
But either A or B : . • . X 



122 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

(2) Complex Constructive. 
If A then X, and if B then Y : 

But either A or B : .' . X or Y. 
II. Modus toUens. 

Complex Destructive. 

If A then X, and if B then Y: 

But neither X nor Y : .' . Neither A nor B. 

The dilemma is rather a device of rhetoric than a 
sound logical method. Its purpose is to force an 
opponent to a choice of alternatives both of which 
are damaging to his argument, hence the proverb, 
" to be on the horns of a dilemma." 

The rule for rebutting a dilemma is to change the 
position of the consequents and make them nega- 
tive. Thus e.g. against the complex constructive 
it may be retorted — 

If A tJien 710 t-Y, and if B then not-X : 

But either A or B : . ' . not- Y or not-X. 

The weakness of dilemmatic argument lies in 
the fact already noticed, that in a disjunctive pro- 
position the alternatives are not of necessity 
mutually exclusive. 



123 



CHAPTER XVI 

FALLACIES 



REFERENCES 



Jevons, Lesso7ts^ ch. xx., xxi. 

Mill, Bk. V. (all). 

Whately, Elejiients of Logic, 9th ed., Bk. iii., pp. loi seq. 

Welton, Vol. ii., Bk. viii. (all). 

De Morgan, Fo?inal Logic, ch. xiii. 



The word fallacy is used in three distinct senses, 
meaning — 

(i) error in an argument, 

(2) violation of any logical principle, and 

(3) any kind of mental confusion whatever. 
The meaning should be restricted to violation 

of any logical principle, and this will include the 
breach of the rules of inference. 

By Aristotle fallacies were classed according 
as the error lay — 

I. in the form — in dictione — or 
IL in the matter — extra dictione. 



124 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Subsequent logicians have rejected or modified 
this classification. 

Whately divides fallacies into — 

I. Logical which are (a) purely logical and {d) 
semi-logical. 

II. Non-logical or material — corresponding with 
Aristotle's exlra dictione. 

I. {a) The purely logical fallacies relate to the 
syllogism and are the fallacies of undistributed 
middle and illicit process whether of major or 
minor. 

ih) The semi-logical correspond with Aristotle's 
in dictione. 

Mill greatly enlarged and modified the scheme 
to include all possible errors liable to invalidate 
inference. The whole question is discussed at 
great length in Book V. of his Logic, and to this 
reference must be made for full treatment of the 
subject. 

No thoroughly satisfactory classification of fallacies 
has yet been made, although frequently attempted, 
and De Morgan doubts whether such a classification 
is possible. 

The fallacies of deduction have already been 
noticed and described. Those of induction are 
beyond our present scope. Material fallacies are 
strictly speaking outside the sphere of logic alto- 
gether. The following summary of the more im- 
portant fallacies is given in accordance with the 
traditional treatment of the subject. 



FALLACIES 125 

Semi-Log^ical Fallacies. 

I. Equivocation or Ambiguous Middle is use of 
the same word in a varying sense. 

E. g. The dog is an animal. Sir ins is the dog.. 
. ' . Sirius is an animal. 

A man zvho is deaf in one ear zvas rejected from 
a jury the other day because it was argned he 
couldn't Jiear both sides. 

2. Amphibology is doubtful grammatical structure 
of a sentence. 

E. g. / Jiave come from a country where mosquitoes 
abound. Majiy of them lueigh a pound, and they 
settle on the trees and bark. 

The stock illustration is: Aio te, Aeacida, 
Romanos vincere posse. 

3. Composition is the fallacy of using a middle 
term distributively in a major premiss and collec- 
tively in the minor. 

E. g. 3 and 2 are odd and even, 5 is 3 and 2, 
. • . 5 is odd and .even. 

4. Division is the fallacy of using a middle term 
collectively in the major and distributively in the 
minor. 

E. g. The planets are seven, Venus and Mars arc 
planets^ . ' . Venus and Mars are seven. 

5. Accent is a fallacy arising from false emphasis 
in speaking. 

E. g. {She.) " Do you think that I could get a 
donkey to take me up the mountain ? " (He^ *' Lean 
on ME." 

6. Figure of speech is the assumption that words 



126 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

similar in form are similar in meaning. Essentially 
this fallacy is one of equivocation. 

The traditional example is : IV/iat a man walks 
on he tramples on. He zvalks on the zvhole day, 
.', He tramples on the zvhole day. 

The material fallacies. 

These, also called non-logical, arise from the 
subject matter not the form of the argument, and 
of these the following are usually enumerated. 

1. A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, or 
Fallacy of Accident. It is a false argument from 
general to particular. 

E. g. To inflict pain purposely is the mark of a 
brutal nature. The surgeon inflicts pain purposely. 
. ' . The surgeon is a man of brutal nature. 

2. A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter or 
Converse Fallacy of Accident is a false argument 
from particular to general. 

E. g. Miracles ivere not stibjected to a thorougJi 
scientific examination at the time they ivere wrought, 
and. miracles have never been known to occur 
within modern times. . * . Miracles are altogetJier 
impossible. 

. 3. Ignoratio Elenchi or Fallacy of Irrelevant Con- 
clusion, literally ignorance of the refutation, the 
elencJius being the contradictory of the assertion 
of a supposed opponent. It is refutation of the 
wrong point. It includes all kinds of irrelevancy 
and assumes three main forms, viz. — 

{a) Mistake in the point at issue. E.g. ''Here, 
zuaitery take away these oysters. They arc badT 



FALLACIES i^l 

" Vesszr, but we've given you tzvo more than you 
asked for to make upT 

(b) The imputation of consequence or motive. 
E. g. The doctrine of the High Church party in the 
Church of England leads to Romanism .' . it must 
be false. 

{c) Introduction of rhetorical expedients such 
as the argumenta ad hominem, ad populum, etc. 

E, g. TJiis proposal is tJiorougJdy bad, as may 
readily be supposed from the cJiai'acter of the man 
zvho makes it. 

4. Petitio Principii or Begging the Question or 
Circulus in Probando. A form of fallacy in which 
the conclusion is either itself one of the premisses 
or is required to establish one of the premisses. 
The fallacy occurs generally in protracted argu- 
ments. It is analogous to t\\Q circulus in definiendoy 
viz. that fault in definition which seeks to define 
a word by itself or its synonym. 

E. g. Consumption is tuberculosis : we are able to 
diagnose consumption in a patient luhenever lue 
observe the symptoms of tubercular disease. 

5. Non sequitur or a conclusion not adequately 
supported by the premisses and which therefore 
" does not follow." This fallacy can always be 
reduced to some other form. 

E. g. {Professor of Chemistry.) " The substance 
you see in this vial is the most deadly of all poisons. 
A single drop placed on the tongue of a cat is enough 
to kill tJie strongest man!' This for instance might 
be classed as Ignoratio Elenchi. 



128 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

6. Noil causa pro causa or Post hoc ergo propter 
hoc or False Cause. The attribution of any event 
to some antecedent with which it has no sort of 
connexion. 

E. g. The Norivegians once at tr United a disap- 
pearance of fish from their shores to the introduction 
into Norzvaj/ of vaccination. 

7. Fallacia plurium interrogationum or Fallacy 
of Many Questions, i.e. a combination of two or 
more questions, each requiring a separate answer, 
into one, the single question asked not admitting 
of only one answer. The fallacy is refuted by 
answering separately each particular. 

P>. g. {Editor, to aspiring writer) " You shoidd 
write so that the most ignorant can understand 
zuhat you mean!' (^Aspirant.) " Well, wJiat part of 
my paragraph don't you understand ? " 



129 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 



REFERENCES 



Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iv., cli. iii., p. 37: 

Ray, p. 250. 

Mill, Bk. ii., ch. iii. 

Bain, Deduction^ Bk. ii., ch. iii. 



The value of the syllogism as a method of infer- 
ence has been disputed, in the seventeenth century 
by Locke, Descartes and others, in more recent 
times notably by Mill followed by Bain and others. 

Mill's objection is twofold. He urges that (i) syl- 
logistic reasoning is not a process of inference, and 
(2) it involves the fallacy oi petitio principii. 

The objection may be met if we are careful to 
bear in mind that syllogistic reasoning does not 
pretend to be more than a process of formal logic. 
Now formal logic does not provide us with the mat- 
ter of argument ; this is otherwise gained, but being 
gained the office of formal logic is to ensure its 
being used with self-consistency. Propositions are 
dealt with simply as relations between terms. The 



I30 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

question of their material truth lies outside the limit 
of formality. 

Syllogism deals with the application of two pro- 
positions that have a common or middle term, com- 
bining them under the laws of thought in a third 
proposition called the conclusion ; and once more, 
it is not the province of the syllogism to test this 
conclusion by reference to the matter about which 
it is concerned so long as the self-consistency of the 
syllogism itself is assured. 

If it is useful and important to combine our 
judgments so as to avoid fallacy, then in so doing 
syllogism has a very distinct value. Most of what 
we call knowledge is communicated by general 
statements. It is by the process of deduction that 
the general statement is applied to particular cases, 
or in other w^ords that inference is made from 
the more to the less general : and syllogism is the 
form of deduction. 

Mill's argument proceeds on the assumption that 
we argue from particulars to particulars and do not 
as a rule pass through a general proposition to 
reach the conclusion. He regards syllogism there- 
fore not as a necessary mode of reasoning but only 
as a permissible form into which an argument may 
be thrown. It serves as a test of validity in an 
argument, and so far it is a safe-guard against 
fallacy. But even if it be no more than this syllo.- 
gism is obviously valuable. 

The true ground that Locke, Descartes, and others 
had for their attack, was that for ages it had come 



THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 131 

to be thought that by mere combinations of state- 
ments it was possible to determine matters of fact. 
It was in this way that the schoohnen dogmatised 
about facts from statements borrowed from others 
or hastily assumed. Consequently syllogism fell 
into disrepute because it had come to be falsely re- 
garded as determining truth in relation to fact. In 
discussing therefore the question of the value of 
syllogism the key to its defence lies in remembering 
its proper function. It does not pretend to be 
anything more than a mere process of formally 
explicating what is already implicitly granted. It 
is concerned only with self-consistency. The con- 
sistency of thought with fact is a consideration 
entirely different and lies outside its sphere. 

Granting then that syllogism is a mere process of 
formal reasoning, it remains to be seen whether it 
is of any account for purposes of real inference. 
This is the question proposed by Mill, who deals 
with it in Book II. of his Logic. 

Mill's position is that all inference is ultimately 
deductive. Hence syllogism is not a process of 
inference at all. It is rather a process of interpret- 
ation. He writes — " All inference is from particu- 
lars to particulars : general propositions are merely 
registers of such inferences already made, and short 
formulae for making more. The major premiss of 
a syllogism consequently is a formula of this de- 
scription, and the conclusion is not an inference 
drawn from the formula but an inference drawn 
according to the formula, the real, logical antecedent 



132 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

or premiss being the particular facts from which 
the proposition was collected by induction." 

Mill in his analysis of the syllogism takes the 
moods Barbara and Celarent as the universal types 
for affirmative and negative conclusions respectively. 
Thus in the syllogism e. g. All mammals have 
hmgs, WJiales are mammals ,' . Whales have lungs, 
he argues that between the premisses and the con- 
clusion there is nothing that can be called real 
inference. By mere consistency the conclusion 
cannot be avoided. Unless it be known that whales 
have limgs we have no business to start with All 
mammals have lungs ; there is no passage here from 
known to unknown, and in any case if the conclusion 
of a syllogism is regarded as a new truth derived 
by a process of inference, that inference does not lie 
between the conclusion and the premisses, but 
between the conclusion and certain other data at 
the back of the syllogism, which other data are the 
actual foundation of the argument. The conclusion 
may involve a process of real inference but not 
from the premisses, and if from other data through 
the premisses it is because in getting to the major 
premiss a material inference was performed of such 
scope as to include the conclusion. The syllogistic 
process therefore is never more than explication 
or interpretation. 

Taking this view it follows further that the fallacy 
o{ petztio priiicipii {^.'wwfoXvcd. Syllogism is the form 
of deduction: deduction consists in deriving a parti- 
cular from a general : but since we cannot infer from 



THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 133 

a general any particular not included, therefore the 
conclusion of a syllogism simply re-asserts what 
was included in the major premiss. This re-asser- 
tion is according to Mill \h^ petitio principii. 

Mill's standpoint is open to criticism. Amongst 
other points these may be noted : — 

1. The discussion has been complicated by a 
confusion in the use of the words reasoning and 
inference. Reasoning or inference in the widest 
sense may be defined as progression in thought. 
But a distinction lies between formal and real 
reasoning or inference. In formal reasoning the 
thought to which we pass is implicated in what 
we start with. In real inference what we arrive at, 
however it may be connected with the starting- 
point, is not impHcated therein. Real inference, 
says Mill, "is passage from the known to the 
unknown." In formal reasoning the passage is 
from the implicit to the explicit, from what is 
implied in the premiss to what is explicitly stated 
in the conclusion. But this passage of thought is 
just as much inference as passage from known to 
unknown. 

To describe syllogism therefore as a mere process 
of interpretation does not by any means remove it 
from the sphere of reasoning, for interpretation 
after all is a short expression for the process of 
explicating what has already been implicitly given, 
and as we have already seen, this is all that syl- 
logism pretends to do. 

2. Mill, in his attack on the syllogism, leaves out 



134 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



of account the part played by the minor premiss. 
If the major premiss contained the conclusion in 
the sense that he assumes, then the conclusion 
could at once be gained per saltum, without a 
minor premiss intervening. The minor premiss, 
however, has a distinct and important part in the 
argument. It ensures the correct application of 
the major to the case under consideration, and, 
unless the minor affirms it to be included in the 
general statement of the major, there can be no 
passage of thought leading to the conclusion. In 
effect the minor is the essential factor in the process 
of interpretation. The conclusion is not, and cannot 
be, reached except through the two premisses taken 
jointly, and it is this that constitutes the reasoning. 
3. If Mill's view be accepted, it must be on the 
assumption that the mind cannot accept the 
premisses, and not at once deduce the conclusion. 
With omniscience and a perfect intellect the as- 
sumption would doubtless hold good, but with 
limited powers of attention, and imperfection of 
knowledge, and in the face of the complexity of 
nature, it is quite possible that while admitting M 
to be under P, and wS to be under AT it is not 
instantly seen that .9 is consequently under P. 
As a matter of fact it constantly happens that 
starting from a given proposition, and using only 
the syllogistic method we reach a conclusion which 
to lis is an entirely new judgment, and therefore 
the argument is not at any rate to us a petitio 
principii. The truth is that the petitio principii (as 



THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 



o; 



seen and argued by Martlneau) is entirely relative, 
depending upon whether the data forming the 
major premiss are near or too remote to be readily 
recognised, or in other words depending upon the 
range of knowledge and observation of the reasoner. 
This point is obscured by the simplicity of the 
examples commonly given in the Manuals to illus- 
trate the syllogism. Compare Mill's own favourite 
example — All men are mortal, Socrates is a man 
. * . Socrates is mortal^ with a deductive argument 
expressed in the current language of literature, for 
instance, the following passage from Drummond's 
Natural Law in the Spiritual World (Ed. 1888, p. 
249). " The part of the oj'ganism zvhich begins to 
get out of correspondence with the Organic Environ- 
ment is the only part which is in vital coj^respond- 
ence luith it. Though a fatal disadvantage to the 
natural man to be thrown out of correspondence 
with this Environment, it is of inestimable import- 
ance to the spiritual man. For so long as it is 
mai7itained the ivay is barred for a further 
Evohttion. And hence tJie co7tdition necessary for 
the further Evolution is that the spiritual be released 
from the natural!' The syllogistic forms in this 
argument are concealed by inversion, qualification, 
enlargement, and suppression of terms, so that the 
conclusion by no means appears merely on inspec- 
tion as it does in the unencumbered text-book ex- 
amples. It is, indeed, very rarely that we find in 
ordinary intercourse or composition that simplicity 
of form which the Manuals might lead us to expect, 



136 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

yet practically it is with these forms of everyday life 
that we must be practically prepared to deal, and 
it is in these forms that we best realise the actual 
passage from thought to thought involved in de- 
duction equally as in induction. 

4. Yet another answer has been given to Mill's 
objection. It was formulated by Whately, who 
saw that an inductive argument itself involves 
syllogism, and therefore syllogism cannot be 
described as only a special mode of treating an 
induction. In other words deduction is a necessary 
factor in induction. The reply is a just one, for it 
is impossible to formulate general truths until we 
have deduced from instances already observed those 
qualities or attributes which warrant inclusion under 
the general notion in its course of development. 

5. The truth is that in all reasoning neither the 
one process nor the other stands alone. Modern 
thought assigns greater prominence to the methods 
of induction since its results have reference to new 
matter, whilst deduction plays the humbler part 
of combining notions previously formed. In 
ordinary argument, however, even in a single proof, 
we pass continually from one process to the other. 
Both have their proper place, and the utmost that 
can be said is that they are interdependent. In- 
duction is a factor in all deduction, for our 
premisses are inductively derived. Deduction is 
a factor in all induction, for the principles induc- 
tively obtained can only deductively be applied to 
particular cases. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

SUMMARIES AND TABULAR STATEMENTS 

Logic is the science of the valid laws of thought. 



Science is systematised knowledge : coherent 
system depends upon logical method. Logic is 
therefore connected with all the sciences, but 
notably with — 

1. Metaphysics, 

2. Psychology, 

3. Rhetoric, 

4. Grammar. 



Logic deals with language as the instrument of 
thought. 

Language — 

1. assists the process of thought, 

2. records the products of thought, 

3. is the natural vehicle for expressing thought. 



138 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Language is modified by — 

1. Generalisation, 

2. Specialisation. 

Language is sometimes ambiguous, and according 
to the meaning suggested words are classified — 



Words - 



fUnivocal 
Equivocal or 

Ambiguous 
Analogous 



in sound only, 
in spelling only, 
both in sound and 
spelling. 



Thought is the subject-matter of Logic in rela- 
tion to — 

1. thought, 

2. things, or 

3. language. 



Validity is — 

1. Self-consistency, or 

2. Consistency with objective reality ; 

and according to the validity dealt with, logic is — 

1. Pure or Formal, or 

2. Applied or Material. 



SUMMARIES, TABULAR STATEMENTS 139 

There are three points of view relating to the 
nature of the concept, known as — 

1. Conceptualism, 

2. Materialism, 

3. Nominalism. 

These points of view, though primarily relating 
to the nature of the concept, affect the entire view 
taken of the nature and scope of logic. 

A concept is the product of comparing two per- 
cepts in order to discover their points of agreement. 

Objectively it is an attribute, or a group of 
attributes, possessed in common by a number of 
individual objects. 

Subjectively it is an idea which corresponds with 
the attribute or group of attributes. 

In language it is a name, i. e. a word or combina- 
tion of words, by which it is denoted and expressed. 
Any sign whatever may, as a matter of fact, stand 
as its symbol: its most natural expression, however, 
is articulate speech. 



Three parts of Logic 



'Names or Words as 
"counters of thought." 

Propositions or Names as 
terms in comparison. 

Inferences or Propositions 
as ground for argument. 



I40 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



NAMF^ JCategorematic = terms. 

\Syncategorematic = not-tcrms. 

Terms or categorematic words are — 

Univocal one meaning : 

Equivocal double meaning : 

same meaning differently applied : 
class name ; all and each ; distribu- 



Analogous 
General or^ 
Common/ 
Collective 

Singular or ^ 
Individual.) 
Proper 
Concrete 
Abstract 
Positive 
Negative 
Privative 

Contradictory 

Contrary 

Relative 

Correlative 

Absolute 



all, not each ; cuncti as opposed to 
oinnes: 

a single object ; significant : 

a verbal mark'; insignificant : 
thing ; adjectives are concrete : 
attributive : 

existence or possession of a quality : 
denial of a quality : 
absence of a quality usually pos- 
sessed : 
area of thought divided : 
most opposed in the same class : 
suggestive of some other object : 
the other object suggested : 
non-relative. 



Heads of 
predicables 



Genus 

Species 

Differentia 

,. . fq-eneric. 

rroi)rium -\^ .r 
^ (specific. 

A . , fseparable. 

Accidens -[ . '■ , , 

[m separable. 



SUMMARIES, TABULAR STATEMENTS 141 

Connotation comprises the qualities that give 
meaning to a name : 

Denotation, all the individuals possessing these 
qualities. 

Connotation and Denotation vary in 

OPPOSITE mutation. 



PROPOSITIO] 


^S 


or Names as Terms in 


Comparison — 


f Analytic 




Synthetic 




rCopulative 


fA| 


Exponible] Remotive 


]7 

I. Categorical^ j > - 


[Exceptive 
Exclusive 


oj 


Indefinite 




Infinite 




Tautologous 




Modal 


^ 


^A 




'Conditional - 


E 
I 


IT. Contingent - 




.0 




Hyp 


othetical - 


IE 



fA 
III. Disjunctive-^ y 



Immediate Inferences- 



I. Opposition. 
II. Eduction. 



142 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

EDUCTIONS 

T r- • ftransposition fsimple. 

I. Conversion ^ ^ {^^^ ^ {per accidens. 

II. Obversion — change of quality. 

III. Contraposition — obversion + conversion. 

IV. Inversion — subject negatived. 

The rule — No term must be distributed in the con- 
verse which was not distributed in the convertend. 
The less important eductions are — 

1. Added Determinants. 

2. Complex Conception. 

3. Converse Relation. 

4. Reversion. 

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT arc— 

I. Identity— all A is A. 
II. Contradiction — no A is not-A. 
III. Excluded Middle—all ^ is y^ or not-A. 



INFERENCES or Propositions as Ground for 
Argument. 

I. lMMEDIATEJOPl^°f.'"°" 
Eduction 



TDeduction o\'(Pitrc 

1 1. Mediate ^ Syllogism fnrgul.rr 
\ Traduction yMixed 
Induction 



SUMMARIES, TABULAR STATEMENTS 143 

SYLLOGISM 

^Categorical 
I. PURE^ Conditional 
[Hypothetical 



II. Irregu- 
lar 



'Enthymeme 



^Polysyllogism 



f Fully { P rosy llogis 111 
I sidiiQdyEpisyllogisvi 

I Cur- (Epickeirenia 
Ki^iltdySo rites 



/"Contingent-categorical 



III. MlXED^' Disjunctive 
[Dilemma 



FALLACIES 



I. Logical 



(illicit major *^ 
l*^ Purely logical- illicit minor ^ 

\undistitrbed middle 



.Semi-logical 



II. Non-Logical or 
Material 



(equivocation 
I amphibology 
\ composition 
j division 

accent 
Kfigitre of speech 
^Accident 
Converse accident 
Ignoratio Elenchi 
Petitio principii 
Non sequitur 
False cause 
^ Many questions. 



APPENDIX I 

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 
I. Logic, Thought, and Language 

1. Distinguish between the psychological and the 
logical treatment of thought, with special reference to the 
question whether all our thinking is carried out by con- 
cepts as the logician understands them. 

2. What is the central function of thought, and how 
are its activities regulated and classified ? 

3. Why and in what manner is logic concerned with 
the use of language? Distinguish accurately between 
the logical proposition and the grammatical sentence, 
giving examples. 

4. Define language ; and point out the main functions 
which it performs. How is it that spoken language has 
become the only universal one amongst mankind ? 

5. '■^ No reason without language'' 
^'' No language ivithoiit reason ^ 

Comment critically on these aphorisms. 

6. Discuss the ways in which the process of thought 
may be affected by language, and bring out in your 
answer the requisites of a philosophical language. 

IL Definition and Scope of Logic 

7. Compare any definitions of logic tliat may be known 
to you, and estimate their merits. 

8. ^^ Logic is entirely conversant about language.''' 



EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 145 

(Whately.) Is this a satisfactory account of the subject 
matter of logic ? 

9. What is meant by saying that logic deals only with 
the form of thought ? Show how the use of symbols 
enables us to examine the form of our thought. 

10. Bring out the exact scope of logic, defining its 
relation to {a) the special sciences ; {b) psychology ; {c) 
philosophy, or theory of knowledge. 

11. How is logic related to grammar, psychology, and 
metaphysics ? 

12. In what different ways has the relation of logic to 
psychology been conceived? Give your own view of 
the distinction and of the connexion between them. 

III. The Three Parts of Logical Doctrine 

13. '' The doctrine of terj?is is really a composite and 
for the most part extra-logical body of doctrine T Ex- 
amine this statement, and consider the differences that 
ensue according as this body of doctrine is regarded as 
treating of (i) concepts, (2) terms, or (3) classes. 

14. The origin of concepts. Give a brief account of 
the chief theories of modern philosophers on this 
question. 

15. Explain the point at issue between Realists, 
Nominalists, and Conceptualists. 

IV. Terms 

16. State the different ways in which terms may be 
classified, giving an illustration of each. Have all the 
distinctions equal logical importance ? 

17. Give the principal division of names needed for 
logical purposes. Why does not logic recognise the 
distinction between substantives, adjectives, and verbs ? 

L 



146 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

1 8. Discuss the meaning and the logical importance 
of the distinction between concrete and abstract terms. 
Explain fully how it happens that it is sometimes difficult 
to say to which of these classes a particular term should 
be referred. 

19. Explain the distinctions that have been drawn by 
logicians between (a) general and collective names, (l?) 
abstract and concrete terms. How far do you think them 
correct and important? Do the distinctions appear in 
any form in the treatment of judgments? 

20. Define and illustrate the distinctions {a) of con- 
tradictory, contrary, and indefinite terms ; (Z*) of contra- 
dictory, contrary, and indefinite propositions. 

Has some a contradictory? If so, what is the joint 
extent of some and not-some ? 

21. Is there any distinction to be drawn between 
singular and proper names ? What views are or may be 
held as to their being mere unmeaning marks in logic ? 

22. Describe the logical characters of the following 
terms — Equal, Equation, Equality, Equalness, Inequality, 
and Equalisation. 

V. Connotation and Denotation 

23. State the various ways in which terms may be 
divided, dwelling more in detail on the distinction 
between denotation and connotation. Which of these 
divisions of terms do you regard as of fundamental sig- 
nificance in logical theory ? Give your reasons. 

24. What are connotative names ? What are the 
principal difficulties by which we are beset in determining 
the connotation of any given name ? 

25. Analyse the following terms in the counter quantities 
or wholes of extension and intension — Ala/i, govenimejit^ 
law, triangle, vegetable. 



EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 147 

26. Argue at length the question whether {a) Proper 
names, {b) Abstract names have a connotation. 

27. State, in carefully chosen language, the logical law 
of the relation between extension and intension of con- 
cepts, giving illustrative examples. How do you reconcile 
with it the fact {a) that there are as many mortal men 
as there are men, {b) that the notion trilateral triangle 
imports nothing more than triangle? 

28. Define a term; and explain what is meant by the 
denotation and connotation of terms. 

Discuss the following — " T/iei'e is 7iothi?ig ifi the import 
of a proposition of which the terms a7'e abstract, but what 
there is in some proposition which can be framed of 
concrete terms. 

VI. Propositions 

29. Exemplify conditional propositions. How are such 
propositions reduced and converted ? 

30. Discuss the relation of the disjunctive proposition 
to {a) the hypothetical, {b) the categorical. 

31. Distinguish between ampliative and explicative 
propositions and give several examples of each kind. 

32. What is an essential proposition? and in what 
cases is it difficult to draw the line between essential and 
real propositions ? 

ZZ' (^) Unfold as completely as possible the implica- 
tions of the proposition, " None can be happy without 
virtue,^' naming in each case the process used. 

{b) Given the proposition, " Whatever is either B or C 
and at the same time either D or E, is A'' What can 
be asserted respecting not-A ? 

VII. Predicables and Predicaments 

34. Give an account of the predicables. In what part 
of logic are they properly placed ? 



148 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

35. Distinguish a genus and a type. 

36. Give some account of the predicables. How may 
they be adjusted to modern thought ? 

37. Mention the various heads of predicables, and 
explain their connexion with definition. Give in- 
stances of definitions, pointing out what are the genus 
and differentia in each case. In what cases may it be 
impossible to define a term ? 

38. Distinguish between verbal and real predication, 
and show how the five predicables bring out the distinc- 
tion. 

39. Explain what you understand by a category, and 
discuss some scheme of categories known to you. 

VIII. Definition and Division 

40. What is definition and of how many kinds does it 
consist? How would you proceed in order to define 
such a term as virtue ? How far does definition in 
all cases imply a reference to the things denoted by the 
terms ? 

41. State the currently accepted rules of logical defini- 
tion. Examine their worth and discuss the view that all 
definitions are of names only. 

42. Compare the following notions with respect to their 
definability — Iro7i, Steel, Murder-, Red, Grey. How would 
you proceed to give a definition of {a) Iron, (/>) Alurder? 

43. Discuss the requirements of definition as applied 
to scientific terms. How far do the rules of formal 
definition carry us in this case ? 

44. Explain clearly with examples how definition and 
division are related to each other. 

45. What is meant by saying — Divisio ?wn faciat 
saltuml How are you to know that a saltus has not 
been made? 



EXAMINx\TION QUESTIONS 149 

Draw up a logical scheme of divisions so as to indicate 
the places of the following — AB, Abe, ahcD, aBC^ 
abCD ; a, b, r, d, representing privative terms. 

IX. Import of Categoricals — Quantification of 
THE Predicate 

46. What is predication ? Does it ever involve exist- 
ence, or must existence be always specially predicated ? 

47. Assign precisely the meaning of the assertion that 
it is false to say that sotfie English soldiers did fiof behave 
discreditably in South Africa. 

48. How does the quality of a proposition affect its 
quantity ? Is the relation a necessary one ? 

49. Explain and discuss the following : — 

{a) In a judgment the subject is naturally interpreted 
in denotation and the predicate in connotation. 

{b) Every proposition is an assertion that two names 
are or are not applicable to one and the same object. 

50. On what grounds has the quantification of the pre- 
dicate been maintained? Estimate these grounds critically. 

51. Set forth the doctrine of the quantified predicate, 
and estimate the claims made for it. How far do you 
find that it maintains or departs from the traditional 
meaning of some in logic ? 

52. Is logic bound by the ordinary usages of language? 
Discuss the question in connexion with the following 
topics — {a) The quantification of the predicate, {b) the 
proper logical interpretation of the form Some S is P. 

53. Bring out clearly the grounds of difference of view 
between Hamilton and Mill in regard to quantification 
of the predicate. 

X. Diagrammatic Representation 

54. Give a concise account of any schemes of dia- 



ISO A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

grammatic representation of propositions and discuss 
their value. 

55. What are the possible distinct forms of syllogism 
that can be illustrated by Eulerian diagrams ? Discuss 
the propriety of this mode of representing propositions 
and syllogisms. 

XL Immediate Inferences 

56. Give the contradictory, the obverse, the converse, 
and the contrapositive of the following : — 

(n) Private vices are public benefits. 

(b) Not to kiioiu me argues thyself unknoicm. 

(c) Beauty aiid use are identical, 
{d) No mail is always cojisistent. 

57. ^'' Previsio7i is a test of true theory .^'' 
'•''Prevision is the test of t^'ue tJieory.^' 

Describe the forms of proposition to which the above 
belong and give their converses, contradictories, and 
obverses. 

58. Assuming that no organic beings are devoid of 
carbon, what can we thence infer respectively about 
beings which are not organic and things which are not 
devoid of carbon ? 

59. Prove the rules of obversion, conversion, and con- 
traposition by reference to the laws of tliought ; or show 
what other proof you would give of them. 

Convert and contraposit the proposition — For evefj 
wrong there is a legal remedy. 

60. State and illustrate what you understand by 
obversion. On what laws or axioms docs the validity of 
this process depend ? 

61. What is meant by obversion, formal and material ? 
How is obversion related to conversion by negation or 
contraposition ? 



EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 151 

Give the obverse and contrapositive of the following 
propositions : — 

{a) All animals feed, 
ip) No pla7tts feed, 
(c) Only a^iimals feed. 

62. What do you consider to be the real distinction 
between a categorical and a hypothetical proposition ? 
Are the processes of immediate inference applicable to 
hypothetical propositions ? 

63. From all Sis P\y['^dX can you infer concerning not-S 
and 7iot-P ? Show how you justify any inference you make. 

Illustrate by concrete examples what is called im- 
mediate inference by added determinants. If A = B 
and Z = M, A + Z = B + M. Is such a theorem 
logically valid either extensively or intensively ? 

64. Can all kinds of propositions be exhibited in the 
intensive as well as the extensive form ? Give reasons in 
support of your answer. In the event of its being in the 
negative, draw up a Hst distinguishing between those 
kinds of propositions which can and those which cannot 
be so exhibited. 

XII. The Laws of Thought 

65. Bring out the meaning and estimate the logical 
value of the three laws of thought. 

66. Enunciate, in the form that seems to you most 
suitable from the point of view of logical theory, the 
primary laws or axioms of thought, and discuss their 
relation to the processes of reasoning. 

67. State and explain the three formal laws of thought 
and discuss their connexion (a) with immediate and -{d) 
with mediate inference. 

In what sense are these laws called necessary ? How 
do you reconcile their necessity with the existence of 
fallacies ? 



152 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

68. What is a law of thought ? State the three primary 
laws of thought. Have they a real importance in logic ? 
or are they " absurdly obvious " ? 

69. Explain how the universal laws of thought give 
rise to dichotomous or bifid classification. 

70. Explain the relation between the universal laws of 
thought, the canons of syllogism, the dictum de omni et 
nullo, and any other forms of the fundamental axioms of 
inference that occur to you. 

XIII. The Syllogism 

71. Explain the syllogistic rule respecting two negative 
and two particular premisses, pointing out the grounds 
on which they rest. Do the following break either of 
these rules ? 

{a) This person is very learned and also very sociable^ 
consequently some very sociable persons are very learned. 

(b) No man is a proper object of contempt, at the same 
time no mail is perfectly admirable, cofisequently some 
bei?igs who are 7iot perfectly admirable are not proper 
objects of co7itempt. 

if) The majority of English people have but little 
literary taste, and the majority of English people read, 
fro?n which it follows that some who read have but little 
literary taste. 

72. Give a clear and precise explanation of the rule 
concerning the middle term of a syllogism. 

73. If the major term of a syllogism be the predicate 
of the major premiss, what do we know about the minor 
premiss ? 

74. ((?) Deduce from the general principles of tlie 
categorical syllogism tJie special rules of the second 
figure. 

{I)) What can be determined respecting a syllogism 



EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 153 

under each of the following conditions? — (i) that only 
one term is distributed, and that only once, (2) that only 
one term is distributed, and that twice, (3) that two terms 
only are distributed, each only once, (4) that two terms 
only are distributed, each twice. 

75. Invent a syllogism in Barbara, and state it both in 
the extensive and intensive form. 



XIV. Figure and Mood of the Syllogism. 
Reduction 

76. Ascertain how many universal terms there may be 
in the premisses of a syllogism more than in the con- 
clusion. 

77. How much can you tell about a syllogism when 
you know, (i) that only the middle term is distributed, 
(2) that all the terms are distributed ? 

Show directly^ i. e. using only the general rules of 
syllogism and the forms of immediate inference, in how 
many ways an E conclusion may be drawn. 

78. Show by deduction from the rules of the syllogism 
that there are five and only five ways of proving a 
universal conclusion. 

79. Write down the dictum de omni et nuUo. What 
is the connexion of this dictum with the process of re- 
duction ? Is reduction of any practical use ? 

80. Taking a syllogism of the third figure, and assum- 
ing one of the premisses to be false, show whether or 
not, with the knowledge of its falsehood thus supposed 
to be in our possession, we can frame a new syllogism ; 
if so point out the figure and mood to which it will belong. 

81. Explain fully the limitations of the conclusions 
obtainable in the third figure of the syllogism. Are 
these limitations got rid of by ob version (permutation) of 
the premisses ? 



154 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

82. State briefly the various opinions that have been 
held by logicians regarding figure, and in particular 
discuss the reasons for and against the admission of the 
fourth figure. 

83. What is a subaltern mood, and why is it so called ? 
In what figures do AA and AE yield subaltern moods at 
all ? Show why. In what cases, if any, is it impossible 
to weaken one of the premisses in a subaltern mood with- 
out affecting the conclusion ? 

84. Using any of the forms of immediate inference 
(including obversion), show in how many moods the 
following argument can be expressed — Every law is not 
bindings for some laws are morally bad, and nolJiing which 
is so is bindifig. 

XV. Irregular and Compound Syllogism 

85. Give instances of the various forms of conditional 
arguments. 

86. Does the mode of reasoning in a hypothetical 
syllogism differ from ordinary deduction ? 

87. Show that the reasoning in a sorites is strictly 
syllogistic. 

88. What is a dilemma ? Can it take more than one 
form? 

89. Define the dilemma. What are its various forms ? 
On what does its validity depend ? 

90. What is dilemma and why is it a treacherous form 
of argument ? 

XVI. Fallacies 

91. State and compare the most important methods of 
classifying the fallacies known to you. 

92. Explain the following fallacies, giving an example 



EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 155 

of each — ignoratio elenchi^ non causa pro causa, a dicta 
secundum quid, amphibology , false a?ialogy, malobserv- 
ation. 

93. On what ground would you base a classification of 
fallacies ? Compare critically various classifications that 
have been proposed. Explain exactly the nature of the 
fallacies called — Accident, Non causa pro causa, Argu- 
mentum ad hoi7iine7n. How far do the rules of formal 
logic suffice for their detection ? 

94. Mention any arrangements or classifications of 
fallacies commenting on the principle of classification 
involved. Explain and exemplify the following : — 

A dicto sif?tpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, ig?wratio 
elenchi, non causa pro causa, and petitio principii. 

95. Point out the exact nature of the fallacies called 
severally — Composition and division, A dicto secundujn 
quid ad dictum sinpiiciter, Post hoc trgo propter hoc. 
False analogy. 

XVII. The Value of the Syllogism 

96. Define induction, and state with reasons your view 
of its relation to syllogism. 

97. What is Mill's view of the function and value of 
the syllogism ? How has it been criticised ? 

98. Discuss tlie value and function of the syllogism. 

99. How does it come to pass that there can be any 
dispute as to whether the syllogism is a petitio principii ? 

100. It is maintained, on the one hand, that no in- 
ference is valid in which the conclusion is not contained 
in the premisses, and, on the other hand, that no move- 
ment of thought deserves to be entitled inference in 
which there is not progress from the known to the 
unknown. Examine the grounds for these two state- 
ments, and discuss the possibility of holding them jointly. 



156 



APPENDIX II 



Abbott, T. K. ... 
Adamson, R. ... 

Aldrich 

Aristotle 



Arnaud and Nicole ... 

Bacon, Sir Francis ... 

Bagot, Daniel, Dean 

Bain, Alex 

Baker, A 

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

,.. Elements of Logic. Dublin, 1885. 

... Art. " Logic" in Ejicyclo. Brit.^ ed. 

ix. Published separately. 

... See Mansel. 

... Logical woi'ks comprised under the 

title Organon. They are as 

follows : — 

Kategoriai (Predicamenta). 

Peri Hermeneias (De Interpre- 

tatione). 

Analytica Priora -^ , , ,. 

/ . ^ . -Analytics. 

Analytica PosterioraJ 

Topika (Dialectics). 

Peri Sophisticon Elenchthon. 
... La Logique, ou Fart de Penser. 
Paris, 1662. See Baynes, Port 
Royal Logic. 

... De Argumentis Scientiarum, libri 

ix. 1623. 
Novum Organon. October 1620. 
Explanatory Notes on the Principal 

Chapters of Murray's Logic. 

Dublin, 1826. 
Deductive Logic. Longmans, 1879. 
Inductive Logic. Longmans, 1879. 
Outlines of Logic, Psychology, and 

Ethics. Lond., 1891. 
Philosophic Doubt. Lond., 1879. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



157 



Banett, T. S 

Baynes, Thos, Spencer 

)? 55 ?? 

Bentham, Geo. 
Boole, Geo 

J) 55 

Bosanquet, B 



Bowen, Francis 

Bradley, F. H. 
Calderwood, Hy. 

Chase, D. P. ... 
Clarke, R. F. .. 

Coleman 
Davis, N. K. ... 



Devey, Joseph 

Drummond, P. C. ... 

Examination Ques- 
tions and Papers ... 



Logic and Metaphysics. Lond., 1875. 
Port Royal Logic. Lond., 1872. 
New Analytic of Logical Form. 

Edin., 1850. 
Outline of a new system of Logic. 

Lond., 1827. 
Pure Logic. Lond., 1864. 
Mathematical Analysis of Logic. 

Lond., 1847. 
Investigation of the Laws of 

Thought. Lond., 1854. 
Logic, or the Morphology of Know- 
ledge, 2 vols. Oxf, 1888. 
Lotze's Logic, Translation. Clar. 

Press, Oxf, 1889. 
Essentials of Logic. Lond., 1895. 
Treatise on Logic, or the Laws of 

Pure Thought. Camb. U.S.A. and 

Triibner, 1866. 
Principles of Logic. Lond., 1883. 

Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy. 
Griffen, Lond., 1887. 

A First Book of Logic. Oxf, 1879. 

Logic. Manuals of Catholic Philo- 
sophy. Lond., 1889. 

Notes on Logic. Oxf, 1880. 

Theory of Thought, Deduction. 

New York, 1880. 
Syllabus of a proposed System of 

Logic. Lond., i860. 
Art. " Logic,'' Engl. Cyclo. 
Formal Logic. Lond., 1847. 
A Bundle of Paradoxes. 
Logic, or the Science of Inference. 

Bohn's Library, Bell, 1852. 
A First Logic Book. Oxf, 1875. 

Sec Questions. 



158 A DIGEST OF LOGIC 

Fitzgerald, P. F. 
Fowler, Thos, ... 



Gilbert, J. W 

Gilmore, J. H. 

Hamilton, Sir W. 

55 55 

Harris, W. T 

Hegel 

Hill, D.J 

Hughlings, J. P. 

Jevons, Wm. Stanley 



Jones, Miss E. E. C. 
Kant, 1 



Treatise on the Principle of Suffi- 
cient Reason. Lond., 1887. 

Deductive Logic. Clar. Press, Oxf., 
1870. Last ed., 1895. 

Inductive Logic. Clar. Press, Oxf., 
1870. Last ed., 1895. 

Logic for the Million. Lond., 1851. 
Outlines of Logic. New York, 1879. 

Lectures on Logic, 2 vols. Lond. 

Exam, of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos. 
See Mill. 

Hegel's Logic. A critical exposi- 
tion. Chicago, 1890. 

Logic translated by Wallace, 2 \'ols. 
Oxf., 1892-94. 

Jevons' Logic recast. New York, 
1883. _ 

The Logic of Names : an Introd. to 
Boole. Lond., 1869. 



Elementary Lessons in Logic. Mac- 

millan, 1886. 
Studies in Deductive Logic. Mac- 

millan, 1880. 
Principles of Science. Macmillan, 

1877. 
Substitution of Similars. I\Lacmillan, 

1869. 
Pure Logic, z. e. The Logic of 

Quality. 1864. 
The Philos. of Induction. Contemp. 

Rev., vol. xiv., p. 457. 
The use of Hypothesis. //vV/., p. 

778. 
Elements of Logic. Edin., 1890. 

Introd. to Logic. Translated. Lond., 
1885. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



159 



Keynes, J. N Studies and Exercises in Formal 

Logic. Macmillan, 1894. 



Ladd, Miss Christine 
Lambert, Joliann H. 
Latham, R. G. 

Liard, L. 

Lotze , 



Studies in Logic. Lond,, 1883. 
Neues Organon. Leipzig, 1764. 
Logic in its application to Language. 

Lond., 1856. 
Les logiciens anglais contemporains. 

Paris, 1878. 
Logic translated by Bosanquet, 

2 vols. Clar. Press, Oxf., 1888. 



Mansel, H. L. 



Aldrich's Artis Logicae Rudimenta. 



Martineau, Jas. 
M'Cosh, Jas. ... 
Mill, John Stuart 



Prolegomena Logicae. Oxf., i860. 

Theory of Reasoning, Essays Philos., 
etc., vol. ii., 1869. 

Laws of Discursive Thought. Lond., 
1870. 

System of Logic, i vol. ed. Long- 
mans, Lond., 1884. 

Analysis of the above by Killick, q.v. 
„ „ „ Stebbing, ^.-6/. 

Exam, of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos. 
Longmans, 1865. 

Elementary Notions of Logic. Lond., 
1884. 
Miiid^ A Quarterly Magazine, Arts, by various authors. 



Minto, Wm. 



Murray, Richard 



Mussehenbroek, P. 



Logic, Inductive and Deductive. 

Murray, 1893. 
Introd. to Logic. Dublin Univ. 

Press Series. Dub., 1890, 
Compendium of Logic. Lond. and 

Dub., 1847. 
Explanatory Notes on, by Dean 

Bagot, q.v. 
Commentary on by J. Walker, q.v. 

Institutiones Logicae. 1748. 



;6o 



A DIGEST OF LOGIC 



Newman, F. W. ... Lectures on Logic. Lond., 1838. 
Nicole et Arnaud ... See Baynes, Port Royal Logic. 

Oxford Handbook of Logic. Oxf., 1880. 

Pcirce, C. S Proceedings of the American 

Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
on Intension and Intensive reading 
of Propositions, vol. iii., pp. 4i5— 
432, 1867. 
„ „ Studies in Logic. Boston, 1883. 

Questions, Examination Papers, etc. — 

Palaestra Oxoniensis: Questions and 
Exercises. Oxf., 1875. 

Jevons, W. S., Studies in Deductive 
Logic. Macmillan, 1880. 

Advanced Logical Questions. Simp- 
kin, Lond., 1 88 1. 

Holman, Questions on Welton's 
Logic. Clive, Lond., 1893. 

B.A. Mental and Moral Science 
Papers. Clive, Lond., 1889. 

Weatherly, F. E., Questions in 
Logic. Oxf, 18S3. 



Ray, P. K 

Read, Carvcth 
Robertson, Croom ... 
Royce, J. 

Ryland, F 

Sheldon 

Siduwick, A 



Si^jwart, C. 



Text Book of Deductive Logic. 

Macmillan, 1886. 
Theory of Logic. Lond., 1878. 
Articles in Mi?id, various dates. 
Primer of Logical Analysis. San 

Francisco, 1881. 
Logic. An introductory manual. 

Bell, Lond., 1896. 

Elements of Logic. Lond., 1864. 
The Process of Argument. Lond., 

1893- 
Fallacies. International scientific 

series, vol. xlviii. Lond., 1883. 
Logic, 2 vols., translated by H. 

Dendy. Lond., 1895. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



i6i 



Solly 

Spalding 

Stebbing, W 

Stewart, D 

Stock, St. G 

Thomson W ., Archbp . 
Trendelenburg, F. A. 



Ueberweg 

Veitch, J. 

Venn, John 

Walker, J 

Wallace 

W^allis 

W^atts, Isaac 

Weatherly, F. E . ... 

53 51 

Welton, J 

Whately, Richd., Abp. 

55 55 55 

Whewell 



Syllabus of Logic. 

Art. " Logic" in the Encyclo. Brit. 

ed. viii. 
Analysis of J. S. Mill's System of 

Logic. Lond., 1864. 
Handbk. of Ded. Logic. Edin., 1885. 
Deductive Logic. Lond., 1888. 

Outline of the Laws of Thought. 

Lond., 1882. 
Elementa Logices Aristotele^. 1852. 
Outlines of Logic. The above 

translated. Lond., 1881. 

System of Logic translated by Lind- 
say. 

Institutes of Logic. Edin., 1885. 
Symbolic Logic. Lond., 1881. 
The Logic of Chance. Lond., 1881. 

Commentary on Murray's Com- 
pendium. Lond. and Dub., 1852. 
Hegel's Logic translated. Lond., 

1874. 
Institutio Logicae. 1684. 
Logic, or the right use of reason. 

Lond., 1811. 
Rudiments of Logic. Oxf., 1879. 
Logic Tables. Oxf., 1879. 
Questions in Logic. Oxf., 1883. 
A Manual of Logic, 2 vols. Clive, 

Lond., 1 89 1. 
Lessons in Reasoning. 
Elements of Logic. Longmans, ed. 

ix., 1865. 
On the Philosophy of Discovery. 

1841. 
History of the Inductive Sciences. 

1840. 

M 



Richard Clay & Sons, Limited, 
London & Bungay. 



A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS 

AND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF 

METHUEN AND COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS : LONDON 

36 ESSEX STREET 

W.C. 



CONTENTS 




FORTHCOMING BOOKS, 


PAGI 

2 


POETRY, ..... 


lO 


BELLES LETTRES, .... 


II 


ILLUSTRATED BOOKS, .... 


13 


HISTORY, ...... 


14 


BIOGRAPHY, ...... 


16 


TRAVEL, ADVENTURE AND TOPOGRAPHVj 


x8 


GEJ^ERAL LITERATURE, 


19 


SCIENCE, ..... 


21 


PHILOSOPHY, ..... 


22 


THEOLOGY, ...... 


22 


LEADERS OF RELIGION, 


24 


FICTION, . . • . 


25 


BOOKS FOR EOYS AND GIRLS, . 


34 


THE PEACOCK LIBRARY, 


35 


UNIVERSITY EXTENSION SERIES, 


35 


SOCIAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY, 


36 


CLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS, 


37 


EDUCATIONAL BOOKS, . .^ 


38 



SEPTEMBER 1897 



September 1S97. 

Messrs. M et h u e n ' s 

ANNOUNCEMENTS 



Poetry 

SHAKESPEARE'S POEMS. Edited, with an Introduction and 

Notes, by George Wyndham, M. P. Crown Zvo. Buckram. 65-. 
This is a volume of the sonnets and lesser poems of Shakespeare, and is prefaced 
with an elaborate Introduction by Mr. Wyndham 

ENGLISH LYRICS. Selected and Edited by W. E. Henley. 
Crown 2>vo. Bnckraui. ()s. 

Also 15 copies on Japanese paper. Demy ^vo. £2, 2s. net. 
Few announcements will be more welcome to lovers of Ens;lish verse than the one 
that Mr. Henley is bringing together into' one book the finest lyrics in our 
language. 

NURSERY RHYMES. With many Coloured Pictures. By 
F. D. Bedford. Small ^to. 6s. 

This book has many beautiful designs in colour to illustrate the old rhj'mes. 

THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER. A Translation by J. G. 
Cordery. Crown %vo. \os. 6d. 

Travel and Adventure 

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA. By Sir II. H. Johnston, 
K.C.B. "With nearly Two Hundred Illustrations, and Six Maps. 
Croivn ^io. 30 j. net. 

Contents.— (i) The History of Nyasaland and British Central Africa generally. 
(■2) A detailed description of the races and Kingu.iges of British Central Africa. 
(3) Chapters on the European settlers and missionaries ; the Fauna, the Flora, 
minerals, and scenery. (4) A chapter on the prospects of the country. 

WITH THE GREEKS IN THESSALY. By W. Kinnaird 

Rose, Reuter's Correspondent. \Vilh Plans and 23 Illustrations. 
Crown 8vo. 6s. 
A history of the operations in Thessaly by one whose brilliant despatches from the 
seat of war attracted universal attention. 

THE MASSACRE IN BENIN. By Captain Boisragon. 
With Maps, etc. Crown Zt'o. y. 6.1. 
This volume is written by one of the two survivors who escaped the terrible 
massacre in Benin at the beginning of tin's year. The author relates in detail his 
adventures and his extraorclinary escape, and adds a description of the country 
;uid of the events which led up to the outt>rcak. 



Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 3 

FROM TONKIN TO INDIA. By Prince Henri of 
Orleans. Translated by Hamley Bent, ]\I.A. With 80 Illus- 
trations and 6 Maps. Crown d^to. 2^s. 

The travels of Prince Henri in 1895 from China to the valley of the Bramaputra 
covered a distance of 2100 miles, of whith 1600 was through absolutely unexplored 
country. No fewer than seventeen ranges of mountains were crossed at altitudes 
of from 11,000 to 13,000 feet. The journey was made memorable by the discovery 
of the sources of the Irrawaddy. To the physical difficulties of the journey were 
added dangers from the attacks of savage tribes. The book deals with many of 
the burning political problems of the East, and it will be found a most important 
contribution to the literature of adventure and discovery. 



THREE YEARS IN SAVAGE AFRICA. By Lionel Decle, 
\Yith an Introduction by H. M. Stanley, M.P. With 100 Illus- 
trations and 5 Maps. Demy^vo. 2\s. 

Few Europeans have had the same opportunity of studying the barbarous parts of 
Africa as Mr. Decle. Starting from the Cape, he visited in succession Bechuana- 
land, the Zambesi, jMatabeleland and Rlashonaland, the Portuguese settlement on 
the Zambesi, Nyasaland, Ujiji, the headquarters of the Arabs, German East 
Africa, Uganda (where he saw fighting in company with the late Major ' Roddy' 
Owen), and British East Africa. In his book he relates his experiences, his 
minute observations of native habits and customs, and his views as to the work 
done in Africa by the various European Governments, whose operations he was 
able to study. The whole journey extended over 7000 miles, and occupied 
exactly three years. 



WITH THE MOUNTED INFANTRY IN MASHONA- 
LAND. By Lieut. -Colonel Alderson. With numerous Illustra- 
tions and Plans. Demy 8?v. 12s. 6d. 

This is an account of the militarj?' operations in Rlashonaland by the officer who 
commanded the troops in that district during the late rebellion. Besides its 
Interest as a story of vv-arfare. It will have a peculiar value as an account of the 
services of mounted infantry by one of the chief authorities on the subject. 



THE HILL OF THE GRACES : OR, THE GREAT Stone 
Temples of Tripoli. By H. S. Cowper, F.S.A. With Maps, 
Plans, and 75 Illustrations. Demy Zvo. 10s. 6d, 

A record of two journeys through Tripoli in 1895 and 1896. The book treats of a 
remarkable series of megalithic temples which have hitherto been uninvestigated, 
and contains a large amount of new geographical and archaeological matter. 



ADVENTURE AND EXPLORATION IN AFRICA. By 
Captain A. St. H. Gibbons, F.R.G.S. With Illustrations by 
C. Whymper, and Maps. Demy 8z>o. 21s. 

This is an account of travel and adventure among the ]\Iarotse and contiguous tribes, 
with a description of their customs, characteristics, and history, together with the 
author's experiences in hunting big game. The Illustrations are by Mr. Charles 
Whymper, and from photographs. There is a map by the author of the hitherto 
unexplored regions lying between the Zambezi and Kafukwi rivers and from 18" 
to 15° S. lat. 



4 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 
History and Biography 

A HISTORY OF EGYPT, from the Earliest Times to 
THE Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L., 
LL.D,, Professor of Egyptology at University College. Fu/Zy IlluS' 
trated. In Six Vohtnies. Crotvn Svo. 6s. each. 
Vol. V. ROMAN EGYPT. ByJ. G.Milne. 

the decline and fall of the ROMAN E?^PIRE. 
By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, edited with Notes, 
Appendices, and Maps by J. B. Bury, ALA., Fellow of Trinity 
College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy Zvo, gilt fop. 8.f. 6d. 
each. Croro)i Zvo. 6s. each. Jo/. IV. 

THE LETTERS OF VICTOR HUGO. Translated from the 
French by F. Clarke, M.A. In Tzvo Volumes. Demy %vo. 
los. 6d. each. Vol. II. 1835-72. 
This is the second volume of one of the most interesting and important collection of 
letters ever published in France. The correspondence dates from Victor Hugo's 
boyhood to his death, aixl none of the letters have been published before. 

A HISTORY OF THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY, 

1845-95. By C. H. Grinling. With ^Nlaps and Illustrations. 
Demy ^vo. \os. 6d. 
A record of Railway enterprise and development in Northern England, containing 
much matter hitherto unpublished. It appeals both to the general reader and to 
those specially interested in railway construction and management. 

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COLONIAL POLICY. By 

II. E. Egerton, M.A. Demy 2>vo. 12s. 6d. 
This book deals with British Colonial policy historically from the beginnings of 
English colonisation down to the present day. The subject has been treated by 
itself, and it has thus been possible within a reasonable compass to deal with a 
mass of authority which must otherwise be sought in the State papers. The 
volume is divided into five parts : — (i) The Period of Beginnings, 1497-1650 ; 
(2) Trade Ascendancy, 1651-1830 ; (3) The Granting of Responsible Government, 
1831-1860; (4) Laisscz Alicr, 1861-1CS5 ; (5) Greater Britain. 

A HISTORY OF ANARCHISM. By E. V. Zenker. 

Translated by H. de B. Gibbins, M. A., Litt.D. Demy Svo. \os. 6d. 

A critical study and historj', as well as a powerful and trenchant criticism, of the 

Anarchist movement in Europe. The book has aroused considerable attention 

on the Continent. 

THE LIFE OF ERNEST RENAN By Madame Darmes- 
i ETER. With Portrait. Crown 2>vo. Gs. 
A biography of Renan by one of his most intimate friends. 

A LIFE OF DONNE. By AUGUSTUS JESSOPP, D.D. With 

Portrait. Croivn 8vo. 3-<-. 6d. 
This is a new volume of the ' Leaders of Religion' series, from the learned and witty 
pen of the Rector of Scarning, who has been able to enilx^dy the results of much 
research. 



Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 5 

OLD HARROW DAYS. By C H. Minchin. Cr.Zvo. 3^. 6^^. 

A volume of reminiscences which will be interesting to old Harrovians and to many 
of the general public. 



Theology 



A PRIMER OF THE BIBLE. By Prof. VV. H. Bennett. 
Crown %vo. 2s. 6d. 

This Primer sketches the historj- of the books which make up the Bible, in the light 
of recent criticism. It gives an account of their character, origin, and composi- 
tion, as far as possible in chronological order, with special reference to their 
relations to one another, and to the history of Israel and the Church. The 
formation of the Canon is illustrated by chapters on the Apocrypha (Old and 
New Testament); and there is a brief notice of the history of the Bible since the 
close of the Canon. 

LIGHT AND LEAVEN : Historical and Social Sermons. 
By the Rev. II. Hensley Henson, M.A., Fellow of All Souls', 
Incumbent of St. Mary's Hospital, Ilford. Crown Svo. 6s. 

g^botional genes 

THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Newly Trans- 
lated, with an Introduction, by C. Bigg, D.D., late Student of 
Christ Church. With a Frontispiece. iS;no. is. 6d. 

This little book is the first volume of a new Devotional Series, printed in clear type, 

and published at a very low price. 
This volume contains the nine books of the ' Confessions ' which 'are suitable for 

devotional purposes. _ The name of the Editor is a sufficient guarantee of the 

excellence of the edition. 

THE HOLY SACRIFICE. By F. Weston, M.A., Curate of 
St. IMatthew's, Westminster. iS;no. is. 
A small volume of devotions at the Holy Communion. 



Naval and Military 



A tllSTORY OF TFIE ART OF WAR. By C. Vv. Oman, 
]M.A., Fellow of All Souls', Oxford. Demj' 8z'<p. Ilhistratcd. 2\s. 

Vol. II. Medl^val Warfare. 

Ivlr. Oman is engaged on a History of the Art of War, of which the above, though 
covering the middle period from the fall of the Roman Empire to the general use 
of gunpowder in Western Europe, is the first instalment. The first battle dealt 
with will be Adrianople (378) and the last Navarette (1367). There will appear 
later a volume dealing with the Art of War among the Ancients, and another 
covering the 15th, i6th, and 17th centuries. 

The book will deal mainly with tactics and strategy, fortifications and siegecraft, but 
subsidiary chapters will give some account of the development of arms and armour, 
and of the various forms of military organization known to the Middle Ages. 



6 Messrs. Metiiuen's Announcements 

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, FROM 
Early Times to the Present Day. By David Hannay. 
Illustrated. 2 Vols. DcDiy '^vo. *]s. 6J. each. Vol. I. 
This book aims at giving an account not only of the fighting we have done at sea, 
but of the growth of the service; of the part the Navy has played in the develop- 
ment of the Empire, and of its inner life. 

THE STORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY. By Lieut.-Colonel 
Cooper King, of the Staff College, Camberley. Illustrated. Demy 
2>vo. ys. 6d. 

This volume aims at describing the nature of the different armies that have been 
formed in Great Britain, and how from the earl}^ and feudal levies the present 
standing armj' came to be. The changes in tactics, uniform, and armament are 
briefly touched upon, and the campaigns in which the army has shared have 
been so far followed as to explain the part played by British regiments in them. 



General Literature 



THE OLD ENGLISH HOME. By S. Baring-Gould. 
With numerous Plans and Illustration's. Crown %vo. Js. 6d, 
This book, like Mr. Baring-Gould's well-known ' Old Country Life,' describes the 
life and environment of an old English family. 

OXFORD AND ITS COLLEGES. By J. Wells, M.A., 
Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College. Illustrated by E. H. New. 
Fcap. 2>vo. 2)^. Leather, /^s. 
This is a guide — chiefly historical — to the Colleges of Oxford. It contains numerous 

illustrations. 

VOCES ACADEMIC/E. By C. Grant Robertson, M.A., 
Fellow of All Souls', Oxford. With a Frontispiece, Fcap. Svo. 
3s. 6d. 
This is a volume of light satirical dialogues and should be read by all who are inter- 
ested in the life of Oxford. 

A PRIMER OF WORDSWORTH. By Laurie Magnus. 
Crown 2>vo. 2s. Gd. 
This volume is uniform with the Primers of Tennj-son and Burns, and contains a 
concise biography of the poet, a critical appreciation of his work in detail, and a 
bibliography. 

NEO-MALTHUSIANISM. By R. Ussher, M.A. Cr.2>vo. 6s. 

This book deals with a very delicate but most important matter, namely, the volun- 
tary limitation of the family, and how such action affecis morality, the individual, 
and the nation. 

PRIMEVAL SCENES. By H. N. Hutchinson, B.A., F.G.S., 
Author of 'Extinct Monsters,' 'Creatures of Other Days,' ' Prc- 
liistoric Man and Beast,' etc. With numerous Illustrations drawn 
by John IIassall and Fred. V. Burridge. /[to. 6s. 

A set of twenty drawings, with short text to each, to illustrate the humorous aspects 
of pre-historic times. They are carefully planned by the author so as to be 
scientifically and archaeologicaliy correct and at the same time amusing. 



Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 7 

THE WALLYPUG IN LONDON. By G. E. Farrow, 
Author of *The Wallypug of Why.' With numerous Illustrations. 
Crown 8vo. 35'. 6d. 
An extravaganza for children, written with great charm and vivacity, 

RAILWAY NATIONALIZATION. By Clement Edwards. 
Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. {Social Questions Series. 



Sport 



SPORTING AND ATHLETIC RECORDS. By H. Morgan 

Browne. CrowjiZvo. is. pap^r ; is. 6d. cloth. 

This book gives, in a clear and complete form, accurate records of the best perform- 
ances in all important branches of Sport. It is an attempt, never yet made, to 
present all-important sporting records in a systematic way. 

THE GOLFING PILGRIM. By Horace G Hutchinson. 
Croivn Svo. 6s. 
This book, by a famous golfer, contains the following sketches lightly and humorously 
written : — The Prologue — The Pilgrim at the Shrine — Mecca out of Season — The 
Pilgrim at Home — The Pilgrim Abroad — The Life of the Links — A Tragedy by 
the Way— Scraps from the Scrip— The Golfer in Art— Early Pilgrims in the West 
— An Interesting Relic. 



Educational 



EVAGRIUS. Edited by Professor Leon Parmentier of 
Liege and INI. BiDEZ of Gand. De/iij/ Svo. ys. 6(1. 

[Byzaitiine Texts. 

THE ODES AND EPODES OF HORACE. Translated by 

A. D. GODLEY, ALA., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. 
Crown Svo. biukrain. 2s. 

ORNAMENTAL DESIGN FOR WOVEN FABRICS. By 

C. Stephenson, of The Technical College, Bradford, and 
F. SUDDARDS, of The Yorkshire College, Leeds. With 65 full-page 
plates, and numerous designs and diagrams in the text. Demy Svo. 
75. 6d. 
The aim of this book is to supply, in a systematic and practical form, information on 
the subject of Decorative Design as applied to Woven Fabrics, and is primarily 
intended to meet the requirements of students in Textile and Art Schools, or of 
designers actively engaged in the weaving industry. Its wealth of illustration is 
a marked feature of the book. 

ESSENTIALS OF COMMERCIAL EDUCATION. By 
E. E. Whitfield, M.A. Croivn Svo. is. 6d. 
A guide to Commercial Education and Examinations. 



8 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 
passages for unseen translation. by e. c. 

Marchant, M.A., Fellow of Pelerhouse, Cambridge; and A. M. 
Cook, INI. A., late Scholar of Wadham College. Oxford: Assistant 
Masters at St. Paul's School. Crown 2>vo. 3.f. bd. 

This book contains Two Hundred Latin and Two Hundred Greek Passages, and 
has been very carefully compiled to meet the wants of V. and VI. Form Boys at 
Public Schools. It is also well adapted for the use of Honour men at the 
Universities. 

EXERCISES ON LATIN ACCIDENCE. By S. E. Win- 
bolt, Assistant Master at Christ's Hospital. Croivn Zvo. \s. 6d. 
An elementary book adapted for Lower Forms to accompany the shorter Latin primer. 

NOTES ON GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX. By G. 

BucKLAND Green, M.A., Assistant Master at the Edinburgh 
Academy, late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxon. Cr. Svo. 2s. 6c/. 

Notes and explanations on the chief difficulties of Greek and Latin Syntax, with 
numerous passages for exercise. 

A DIGEST OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. By Johnson 
Barker, B.A. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. 
A short introduction to logic for students preparing for examinations. 

TEST CARDS IN EUCLID AND ALGEBRA. By D. S. 

Calderwood, Headmaster of the Normal School, Edinburgh. In 
a Packet of 40, with Answers, is. 
A set of cards for advanced pupils in elementary schools. 

HOW TO MAKE A DRESS. By J. A. E. Wood. Illustrated. 
Cro7vn Svo. is. 6d. 

A text-book for students preparing for the City and Guilds examination, based on 
the syllabus. The diagrams are numerous. 



Fiction 

LOCHINVAR. By S. R. Crockett, Author of 'The Raiders,' 
etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo. 6s. 

A romance of love and war, the plot of which is laid partly in Holland .ind partly in 
Scotland. The hero, a young cavalier, after serving with the regiment of the 
Prince of Orange, takes service under Dundee and fights at Killiecrankie. 

THE MUTABLE MANY. By Ror.ERT Barr, Author of ' In 
the Midst of Alarms,' ' A Woman Inlervcncs,' etc. CrownSvo. 6s. 

THE LADY'S WALK. By Mrs. Olh^hant. Cro7vn Svo. 6s. 

A new book by this lamented author, somewhat in the stylo of her ' Bclcagured City.' 



Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 9 

TRAITS AND CONFIDENCES. By The Hon. Emily Law- 
less, Author of ' Huirish,' ' Maelcho,' etc. Crown ^vo. 6j. 

BLADYS. By S. Baring Gould, Author of 'The Broom 
Squiie,' etc. Illustrated by F. H. TowNSEND. Crown %vo. 6s. 
A Romance of the last century. 

THE POMP OF THE LAVILLETTES. By Gilbert Parker, 
Author of ' The Seats of the Mighty,' etc. Crown Zvo. 31. dd. 

A DAUGHTER OF STRIFE. By Jane Helen Findlater, 
Author of ' The Green Graves of Balgowrie. ' Crown Zvo. 6s. 
A story of 17 10. 

OVER THE HILLS. By Mary Findlater. CrowitZvo. 6s. 

A novel by a sister of J. H. Findlater, the author of ' The Green Graves of Balgowrie.' 

A CREEL OF IRISH TALES. By Jane Barlow, Author 

of ' Irish Idylls. ' Crown Bvo. 6s. 

THE CLASH OF ARMS. By J. Bloundelle Burton, 

Author of ' In the Day of Adversity. ' Crown Svo. 6s. 

A PASSIONATE PILGRIM. By Percy White, Author of 
•Mr. Bailey-Martin.' Crown Svo. 6s. 

SECRETARY TO BAYNE, M.P. By W. Pett Ridge. 

Crown Svo. 6s. 

TPIE BUILDERS. By J. S. FLETCHER, Author of 'When 
Charles i. was King.' Crown Svo. 6s. 

JOSIAH'S WIFE. By NORMA LORIMER. Crozan Svo. 6s. 

BY STROKE OF SWORD. By Andrew Balfour. Illus- 
trated by W. CuBiTT Cooke. Crown Svo. 6s. 

A romance of the time of Elizabeth 

THE SINGER OF MARLY. By Ida Hooper. Illustrated 
by W. CuBiTT Cooke. Crown Svo. 6s. 
A romance of adventure. 

KIRKHAM'S FIND. By Mary Gaunt, Author of 'The 
Moving Finger. ' Crown Svo. 6s. 

THE FALL OF THE SPARROW. By M. C. BALFOUR. 
Crown Svo. 6s. 

SCOTTISH BORDER LIFE. By James C. DiBDiN. Crown 

Svo. ^s. GJ. 

A 2 



A LIST OF 

Messrs. Methuen's 

PUBLICATIONS 



roetry 

RUDYARD KIPLING'S NEW POEMS 

Rudyard Kipling. THE SEVEN SEAS. By Rudyard 
Kipling. Third Edition, Crown %vo. Buckram, f^ilt top. 6j. 

'The new poems of Mr. Rudj-ard Kipling lip.ve nil the spirit and swing of their pre- 
decessors. Patriotism is the solid concrete foundation on which Mr. Kipling has 
built the whole of his work.' — Times. 

' Full of passionate patriotism and the Imperial spirit.' — Yorkshire Post. 

'The Empire has found a singer ; it is no depreciation of the songs to say that states- 
men may have, one way or other, to take account of them.' — Manchester 
Guardian. 

' Animated through and through with Indubitable genius.' — Daily Telegraph. 

'Packed with inspiration, with humour, with pathos.' — Daily Chronicle. 

' All the pride of empire, all the intoxication of pov.-er, all the ardour, the energy, 
the masterful strength and the wonderful endurance and death-scorning pluck 
which arc the very bone and fibre and marrow of the British character are here." 
—Daily Mail. 

Rudyard Kipling. BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS; And 

Other Verses. By Rudyard Kipling. Elevenlh Edition. Crown 
Svo. 6s. 

' Mr. Kipling's verse is strong, vivid, full of character. • . . Unmistakable genius 
rings in every line.' — Times. 

The ballads teem with imagination, they palpitate witli emotion. We read them 
with laughter and tears ; the metres throb in our pulses, the cunningly ordered 
words tingle with life ; and if this be not poetry, what is?' — Pall Mall Gazette. 

*Q." POEMS AND BALLADS. By '^Q.," Author of ' Green 
Bays,' elc. Crown Svo. Bnckram. "^s. 6d. 
* This work has just the faint, ineffable touch and glow that make poetry ' Q." has 
the true romantic spirit.' — Speaker. 

"Q." GREEN BAYS : Verses and Parodies. By " Q.," Author 
of 'Dead Man's Rock,' etc. Second Edition. Crown Svo. -^s.Sd. 
'The verses display a rare and versatile gift of parody, great command of metre, and 
a very pretty turn of humour.' — Times. 

E. Mackay. A SONG OF THE SEA. By Eric ]\L\ckay, 
Author of 'The Love Letters of a Viohnist.' Second Edition. 
Fcap. "^vo. <jS. 
' Everywhere Mr. Mackay displays himself the master of a .«itylc marked by all the 
characteristics of the best rhetoric. lie has a keen sense of rhythm and of general 
balance ; his vc:sc i^ excellently sonoruus." — Globe. 



Messrs Methuen's List ii 

Ibsen. BRAND. A Drama by Henrik Ibsen. Translated by 
William Wilson. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. is. 6d. 

'The greatest world-poem of the nineteenth century next to "Faust." It is ia 
the same set with "Agamemnon," with "Lear," with the literature that we now 
instinctively regard as high and holy.' — Daily CJironkle, 

"A.G." VERSES TO ORDER. By "A. G." Cr,%vo. 2s.6d. 
net. 

A small volume of verse by a writer whose initials are well known to OxTord men. 
' A capital specimen of light academic poetry. These verses are very bright and 
engaging, easy and sufficiently -witty.'— St. James's Gazette. 

Belles Lettres, AnthologieSj etc. 

E. L. Stevenson. VAILIMA LETTERS. By Robert Louis 

Stevenson. With an Etched Portrait by William Strang, and 

other Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Buckram. *]s. 6d. 

* Few publications have in our time been more eagerly awaited than these " Vailima 
Letters," giving the first fruits of the correspondence of Robert Louis Stevenson. 
But, high as the tide of expectation has run, no reader can possibly be disappointed 
in the result.' — St. James's Gazette. 

Henley and Whibley. A BOOK OF ENGLISH PROSE. 
Collected by W. E. Henley and Charles Whibley. CrownZvo. 6s. 

'A unique volume of extracts— an art gallery of early pro?,Q.'— Birmingham Post. 
'An admirable companion to I\Ir. Henley's " Lyra Heroica.'" — Saturday Reviezv. 
' Quite delightful. A greater treat for those not well acquainted with pre-Restoration 
prose could not be imagined. ' — A thencezim. 

H. C. Beeclling. LYRA SACRA : An Anthology of Sacred Verse. 
Edited by H. C. Beeching, M.A. Crown %vo. Buckram. 6s. 
' A charming selection, which maintains a lofty standard of excellence.' — Tijues. 

"Q." THE GOLDEN POMP : A Procession of English Lyrics 
from Surrey to Shirley, arranged by A. T. QuiLLER CoucH. Crown 
?)V0. Buckram. 6s, 
' A delightful volume : a really golden "Pomp." ' — Spectator. 

W. B. Yeats. AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH VERSE. 
Edited by W. B. Yeats. Crown ^-oo. ^s. 6d. 
' An attractive and catholic selection.'— r?>«^j. 

G. W. Steevens. MONOLOGUES OF THE DEAD. By 

G. W. Steevens. Foolscap Zvo. ^s. 6d. 

A series of Soliloquies in which famous men of antiquity — Julius Csesar, Nero, 
Alcibiades, etc., attempt to express themselves in the modes of thought and 
language of to-day. 
The edcct is sometimes splendid, sometimes bizarre, but always aaia^In^ly clever. 
— rull Mall Cu^c i^c. 



12 Messrs. Methuen's List 

Victor Hugo. THE LETTERS OF VICTOR HUGO. 
Translated from the French by F. Clarke, M.A. In Two Volumes. 
Demy 2>vo. IQS. 6d. each. Vol.1. 1815-35. 
This is the first volume of one of the most interesting and important collection of 
letters ever published in France. The correspondence dates from Victor Hugo's 
boyhood to his death, and none of the letters have been published before. The 
arrangement is chiefly chronological, but where there is an interesting set of 
letters to one person these are arranged together. The first volume contains, 
among others, (i) Letters to his father ; (2) to his young wife ; (2)^ to his confessor, 
Lamennais ; a very important set of about fifty letters to Sainte-Beauve ; (5) 
letters about his early books and plays. 
'A charming and vivid picture of a man whose egotism never marred his natural 
kindness, and whose vanity did not impair his greatness.' — Standard. 

C. H. Pearson. ESSAYS AND CRITICAL REVIEWS. By 

C. H, Pearson, M.A., Author of 'National Life and Character.' 
Edited, with a Biographical Sketch, by H. A. Strong, M.A., 
LL.D. With a Portrait. Demy Svo. 10s. 6d. 

' Remarkable for careful handling, breadth of view, and knowledge." — Scotsman. 

* Charming essays. ' — Spectator, 

W. M. Dixon. A PRIMER OF TENNYSON. By W. M. 

Dixon, M.A., Professor of EngHsh Literature at Mason College. 
Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. 
' Much sound and well-expressed criticism and acute literary judgments. The biblio- 
graphy is a boon.' — Speaker. 

W. A. Craigie. A PRIMER OF BURNS. By W. A. Craigie. 

Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. 
This book is planned on a method similar to the ' Primer of Tennyson.' It has also 

a glossary. 
'A valuable addition to the literature of the poet.' — Times. 
' An excellent short account.' — Pall Mall Gazette. 
'An admirable introduction.'— G/tf3^. 

Sterne. THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM 

SHANDY. By Lawrence Sterne. With an Introduction by 
Charles Whibley, and a Portrait. 2 vols. ^s. 

'Very dainty volumes are these; the paper, type, and light-green binding are all 
very agreeable to the eye. Simplex munditiis is the phrase that might be applied 
to them.' — Globe. 

Congreve. THE COMEDIES OF WILLIAM CONGREVE. 

With an Introduction by G. S. Street, and a Portrait. 2 vols. ^s. 
' The volumes are strongly bound in green buckram, are of a convenient size, and 
pleasant to look upon, so that whether on the shelf, or on the table, or in the hand 
the possessor is thoroughly content with ih^m.' —Guardian. 

Morier. THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA OF 
ISPAHAN. By James Morier. With an Introduction by E. G. 
Browne, M.A., and a Portrait. 2 vols. ys. 

Walton. THE LIVES OF DONNE, WOTTON, HOOKER, 
HERBERT, AND SANDERSON. By Izaak Walton. With 
an Inlroduclion by \'lrnon Blacklurn, and a Portrait. 31. 6d. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 13 

Johnson. THE LIVES OF THE ENGLISH POETS. By 
Samuel Johnson, LL.D. With an Introduction by J. H. Millar, 
and a Portrait. 3 vols. \os. 6d. 

Bums. THE POEMS OF ROBERT BURNS. Edited by 
Andrew Lang and W. A. Craigie. With Portrait. Demy Svo, 
gilt top. 6j-. 

This edition contains a carefully collated Text, numerous Notes, critical and textual, 

a critical and biographical Introduction, and a Glossary. 
' Among the editions in one volume, Mr. Andrew Lang's will take the place of 

authority. ' — Times. 

F. Langbridge. BALLADS OF THE BRAVE: Poems of 

Chivalry, Enterprise, Courage, and Constancy. Edited, with Notes, 
by Rev. F. Langbridge. Croivn Zvo. Bttckram. 35. 6d. School 
Edition, is. 6d. 
'A very happy conception happily carried out. These "Ballads of the Brave" are 
intended to suit the real tastes of boys, and will suit the taste of the great majority.' 
— Spectator. ' The book is full of splendid things.' — World, 



Illustrated Books 



Jane Barlow. THE BATTLE OF THE FROGS AND MICE, 
translated by Jane Barlow, Author of ' Irish Idylls,' and pictured 
by F. D. Bedford. S7nall \to. ds. vet. 

S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF FAIRY TALES retold by S. 
Baring Gould. With numerous illustrations and initial letters by 
Arthur J. Gaskin. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Buch-avi. 6s. 
'Mr. Baring Gould is deserving of gratitude, in re-writing in honest, simple style the 
old stories that delighted the childhood of " our fathers and grandfathers." As to 
the form of the book, and the printing, which is by Messrs. Constable, it were 
difficult to commend overmuch. — Saturday Revie^v, 

S. Baring Gould. OLD ENGLISH FAIRY TALES. Col- 
lected and edited by S. Baring Gould. With Numerous Illustra- 
tions by F. D, Bedford. Second Edition. CrozvjtSvo. Buch'am. 6s. 
'A charming volume, which children will be sure to appreciate. The stories have 
been selected with great ingenuity from various old ballads and folk-tales, and, 
having been somewhat altered and readjusted, now stand forth, clothed in Mr. 
Baring Gould's delightful English, to enchant youthful readers.' — Guardian. 

S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF NURSERY SONGS AND 
RHYMES. Edited by S. Baring Gould, and Illustrated by the 
Birmingham Art School. Buckram^ gilt top. Croivn Svo. 6s. 
' The volume is verj' complete in its way, as it contains nursery songs to the number 
of 77, game-rhymes, and jingles. To the student we commend the sensible intro- 
duction, and the explanatory notes. The volume is superbly printed on soft, 
thick paper, which it is a pleasure to touch ; and the borders and pictures are 
among the very best specimens we have seen of the Gaskin school.' — Bir7ninz- 
ham Gazette. 



14 Messrs. Methuen's List 

H. C. Beeching. A BOOK OF CHRISTMAS VERSE. Edited 
by H. C. Beeciiixg, INI.A., and Illustrated by Walter Crane. 
Crown 8vo, gilt top. ^s. 

A collection of the best ver<;e inspired by the birth of Christ from the Middle Ages 
to the present day, A distinction of the book is the large number of poems it 
contains by modern authors, a few of which are here printed for the first time. 

'An anthology which, from its unity of aim and liigh poetic excellence, has a better 
right to exist than most of its fellows.' — Guardiatt. 



History 



Gibbon. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE. By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, Edited with 
Notes, Appendices, and Maps, by J. E. Bury, M.A., Fellow of 
Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy %vo. Gilt top. 
%s. 6d. each. Also crown 2>vo. 6s. each. Vols. /., //., and III. 

' The time has certainly arrived for a new edition of Gibbon's great work. . . . Pro- 
fessor Bury is the right man to undertake this task. His learning is amazing, 
both in extent and accuracy. The book is issued in a handy form, and at a 
moderate price, and it is admirably printed.' — Thiics. 

' The edition is edited as a classic should be edited, removing nothing, j'et indicating 
the value of the text, and bringing it up to date. It promises to be of the utmost 
value, and will be a welcome addition to many libraries.' — Scots»ian. 

'This edition, so far as one may judge from the first instalment, is a marvel of 
erudition and critical skill, and it is the very minimum of praise to predict that the 
seven volumes of it will supersede Dean Milman's as the standard edition of our 
great historical classic' — Glasgow Herald. 

* The beau-ideal Gibbon has arrived at last.* — Skeich, 

'At last there is an adequate modern edition of Gibbon. . . . The best edition the 
nineteenth century could produce." — Manchester Guardian. 

Flinders Petrie. A HISTORY OF EGYPT,fromthe Earliest 
Times to the Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders 
Petrie, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University 
College. Fnlly Illustrated. In Six Volumes. Crown 8vo. 6s. each. 

Vol. I. Prehistoric Times to XVI. Dynasty. W. M. F. 
Petrie. Third Editioji. 

Vol. IT. The XVIIth and XVIIIth Dynasties. W. ^\. F. 
Petrie. Second Edition. 

' A history written in the spirit of scientific precision so worthily represented by Dr. 
Petrie and his school cannot liut promote sound and accurate study, and 
supply a v.acant place in the English literature of Egyptology.' — Times. 

Flinders Petrie. EGYPTIAN TALES. Edited by W. M. 
I'^linders Petrie. Illustrated by Tristram Ellis. In Two 
Volumes. Cj-owii Zvo. ^s. 6d. each. 

'A valuable addition to the literature of comparative folk-lore. The drawings arc 

really illustrations in the literal sense of the \\ox<\.'— Globe. 
' It has a scientific value to the student of history and ?i.\c\\2^cAo%y .' —Scotsman. 
'Invaluable as a picture of life in Palestine and Egypt." — Daily Neivs. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 15 

Flinders Petrie. EGYPTIAN DECORATIVE ART. By 
W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L. With 120 Illustrations. Crown 

'- Professor Flinders Petrie is not only a profound Egyptologist, but an accomplished 
student of comparative archseology. In these lectures, delivered at the Royal 
Institution, he displays both qualifications Vflth. rare skill in elucidating the 
development of decorative art in Egypt, and in tracing its influence on the 
art of other countries.' — Titnes. 

S. Baring Gould. THE TRAGEDY OF THE C^SARS. 
The Emperors of the Julian and Claudian Lines. With numerous 
Illustrations from Busts, Gems, Cameos, etc. By S. Baring Gould, 
Author of 'Mehalah,' etc. Fourth Edition. Royal %vo. i^s. 

' A most splendid and fascinating book on a subject of undying interest. The great 
feature of the book is the use the author has made of the existing portraits of the 
Caesars, and the admirable critical subtlety he has exhibited in dealing with this 
line of research. It is brilliantly written, and the illustrations are supplied on a 
scale of profuse magnificence.' — Daily Chronicle. 

' The volumes will in no sense disappoint the general reader. Indeed,_ in their way, 
there is nothing in any sense so good in English. . . . Mr. Earing Gould has 
presented his narrative in such a way as not to make one dull page.' — Athenceunt. 

H. de B. GibMns. INDUSTRY IN ENGLAND : HISTORI- 
CAL OUTLINES. By H. de B. Gibbins, INI.A., D.Litt. With 
5 Maps. Second Edition. Demy Svo. los. 6d. 

This book is written with the view of affording a clear view of the main facts of 
English Social and Industrial History placed in due perspective. Beginning 
with prehistoric times, it passes in re\aew the growth and advance of industry 
up to the nineteenth century, showing its gradual development and progress. 
The book is illustrated by Maps, Diagrams, and Tables. 

A. Clark. THE COLLEGES OF OXFORD : Their History 

and their Traditions. By Members of the University. Edited by A. 

Clark, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Lincoln College. Svo. I2s. 6d. 

' A work which will certainly be appealed to for many years as the standard book on 

the Colleges of Oxford.' — Atlienceum. 

Perrens. THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE FROM 1434 
TO 1492. By F. T. Perrens. Translated by Hannah Lynch. 
Zvo. \2s. 6d. 

A history of Florence under the domination of Cosimo, Piero, and Lorenzo de 

Medicis. 
' This is a standard book by an honest and intelligent historian, who has deserved 

well of all who are interested in Italian history.' — Manchester Guardian. 

J.Weils. A SHORT HISTORY OF ROME. By J. Wells, 
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Wadham Coll., Oxford. With 4 Maps. 
Crown 2>vo. y. 6d. 
This book is intended for the INIiddle and Upper Forms of Public Schools and for 

Pass Students at the Universities. It contains copious Tables, etc. 
'An original work written on an original plan, and with uncommon freshness and 
vigour. ' — Speaker, 



i6 Messrs. Methuen's List 

E. L. S. Horsburgh. THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 
By E. L. S. Horsburgh, B.A. JVi'fh Plans. Crown 8vo. ^s. 

* A brilliant essay — simple, sound, and thorough.' — Dally Chronicle. 

' A study, the most concise, the most lucid, the most critical that has been produced. 
— Birmingham Mercury, 

H.B. George. BATTLES OF ENGLISH HISTORY. ByH.B. 

George, M.A., Fellow of New College, Oxford. With numerous 
Plans. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 

* Mr. George has undertaken a very useful task — that of making military' affairs in- 

telligible and instructive to non-military readers — and has executed it with laud- 
able intelligence and industry, and with a large measure of success.' — Times. 

0. Browning. A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ITALY, 
A.D. 1 250- 1 530. By Oscar Browning, Fellow and Tutor of King's 
College, Cambridge. Second Edition. In Two Volumes. Crown 
Svo. 5^. each. 

Vol. I. 1250-1409. — Guelphs and Ghibellines. 

Vol. n. 1409- 1530. — The Age of the Condottieri. 

'A vivid picture of mediaeval Italy.' — Standard. 

' Mr. Browning is to be congratulated on the production of a work of immense 
labour and \&z.xv\x\g.''— Westminster Gazette. 

O'Grady. THE STORY OF IRELAND. By Standish 

O'Grady, Author of ' Finn and his Companions.' Cr. %vo. 2s. 6d. 

'Most delightful, most stimulating. Its racy humour, its original imaginings, 
make it one of the freshest, breeziest volumes.' — Methodist Times. 



Biography 



Baring Gould. THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONA- 
PARTE. By S. Baring Gould. With over 450 Illustrations in 
the Text and 12 Photogravure Plates. Large quarto. Gilt top. 36J. 

■ The best biography of Napoleon in our tongue, nor have the French as good a 
biographer of their hero. A book very nearly as good as Southey's " hife of 
Nelson." '—Manchester Guardian. 

'The main feature of this gorgeous volume is its great wealth of beautiful photo- 
gravures and finely-executed wood engravings, constituting a complete pictorial 
chronicle of Napoleon I.'s personal history from the days of his early childhood 
at Ajaccio to the date of his second interment under the dome of the Invalides in 
Vaxis.'— Daily Telegraph. 

' The most elalwrate account of Napoleon ever produced l)y an English writer.'— 
Daily Chronicle. 

' A brilliant and attractive volume. Never before have so many pictures relating 
to Napoleon been brought within the limits of an English book.' — Globe. 

' Particular notice is due to the vast collection of contemporary illustrations.' — 
Guardian. 

'Nearly all the illustrations are real contributions to historj'.' — IJ'esf minster Gazette. 

'The illustrations arc of supreme inteTv<.t.' Standard. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 17 

Morris Fuller. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JOHN 
DAVENANT, D.D. (1571-1641), President of Queen's College, 
Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Bishop of Salisbury. By 
Morris Fuller, B.D. Crown %vo. 'js. 6d. 

' A valuable contribution to ecclesiastical history.' — Birniinghain Gazette. 

J. M. Rigg. ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY: A Chapter 
IN THE History of Religion. By J. M. Rigg. DeviyZvo. ^s. 6d. 

' Mr. Rigg has told the story of the great Primate's life with scholarly ability, and 
has thereby contributed an interestingchapter to the history of the Norman period.' 
— Daily Chronicle. 

F. W. Joyce. THE LIFE OF SIR FREDERICK GORE 
OUSELEY. By F. W. Joyce, M.A. With Portraits and Illustra- 
tions. Crown Zvo. *]s. 6d. 

' This book has been undertaken in quite the right spirit, and written with sympathy 
insight, and considerable literary skill.' — Times. 

W. G. Collingwood. THE LIFE OF JOHN RUSKIN. By 
W. G. Collingwood, M.A., Editor of Mr. Ruskin's Poems. With 
numerous Portraits, and 13 Drawings by Mr. Rusk in. Second 
Edition. 2 vols. S-vo. 32^. 

' No more magnificent volumes have been published for a long time,'— Tidies. 
* It is long since we had a biography with such delights of substance and of form. 
Such a book is a pleasure for the day, and a joy for ever.' — Daily Chronicle. 

0. Waldstein. JOHN RUSKIN : a Study. By Charles 
Waldstein, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. With a 
Photogravur Portrait after Professor Herkomer. Post Svo. ^s. 

'A thoughtful, impartial, well-written criticism of Ruskin's teaching, intended to 
separate what the author regards as valuable and permanent from what is transient 
and erroneous in the great master's writing.' — Daily Chronicle. 

W. H. Hutton. THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE. By 
W. H. Hutton, M.A., Author of ' William Laud.' With Portraits, 
Crown Svo. ^s. 

' The book lays good claim to high rank among our biographies. It is excellently, 
even lovingly, written." — Scotsman. ' An excellent monograph.' — Times. 

Clark RusselL THE LIFE OF AD]\IIRAL LORD COL- 
LINGWOOD. By W. Clark Russell, Author of ' The Wreck 
of the Grosvenor.' With Illustrations by F. Brangwyn. Third 
Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 

•A book which we should like to see in the hands of every boy in the country.' — 
.S"^. James's Gazette. ' A really good book.' — .Saturday Review. 

A3 



1 8 Messrs. Methuen's List 

Southey. ENGLISH SEAMEN (Howard, Clifford, Hawkins, 
Drake, Cavendish). By Robert Southey. Edited, with an 
Introduction, by David Hannay. Second Edition. CrownSvo. 6s. 

'Admirable and well-told stories of our naval history.' — Artny and Navy Gazette. 

'A brave, inspiriting book.' — Black and White. 



Travel5 Adventure and Topography 

R. S. S. Baden-Powell. THE DOWNFALL OF PREMPEH. 

A Diary of Life with the Native Levy in Ashanti, 1895. By Colonel 
Baden-Powell. With 21 Ilkistrations and a Map. Demy Zvo. 
\os. 6d. 

'• A compact, faithful, most readable record of the campaign.' — Daily News. 
' A bluff and vigorous narrative.' — Glasgoxv Herald. 

R. S. S. Baden-Powell TPIE MATKBELE CAMPAIGN 1896. 

By Colonel R. S. S. Baden- Powell. With nearly 100 Illustrations. 

Second Edition. Deniy^vo. 155. 

'Written in an unaffectedly light and humorous style.' — The World. 
'A very racy and eminently readable book.' — St. James's Gazette. 

* As a straightforward account of a great deal of plucky work unpretentiously done, 

this book is well worth reading. The simplicity of the narrative is all in its 
favour, and accords in a peculiarly English fashion with the nature of the subject.' 
Times. 

Captain Hinde. THE FALL OF THE CONGO ARABS. 

By Sidney L. Hinde. With Portraits and Plcns. Defuy Svo. 
i2s. 6d. 

* The book is full of good things, and of sustained interest.' — St. James's Gazette. 

A graphic sketch of one of the most exciting and important episodes in the struggle 
for supremacy in Central Africa between the Arabs and their_ Europeon rivals. 
Apart from the story of the campaign. Captain Hinde's book is mainly remark- 
able for the fulness with which he discusses the question of cannibalism. It is, 
indeed, the only connected narrative— in English, at any rate — which has been 
published of this particular episode in African history.' — Tima. 

* Captain Hinde's book is one of the most interesting and valuable contributions yet 

made to the literature of modern Africa.' — Daily Nczvs. 

W. Crooke. THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES OF INDIA : 

TiiEiR Ethnology and Administration. By W. Crooke. 

With Maps and Illustrations. Demy Svo. 10s. 6d. 

' A carefully and well-written account of one of the most important provinces of the 
Empire. In seven chapters Mr. Croote deals successively with the land in its 
physical aspect, the province under Hindoo and Mussulman rule, the province 
under British rule, the ethnology and sociology of the province, the religious and 
social life of the people, the land and its settlement, and the native peasant in his 
relation to the land. The illustrations are good and well selected, and the map is 
excellent. ' — Manchester Guardian. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 19 

W. B. Worsfold. SOUTH AFRICA : Its History and its Future. 

By W. Basil Worsfold, INI. A. IVich a Map. Second Edition. 
Crown Svo. 6s. 

'An intensely interesting book.' — Daily Chronicle. 

' A monumental work compressed into a very moderate compass.' — World. 



General Literature 

S. Baring Gould. OLD COUNTRY LIFE. By S. Baring 
Gould, Author of ' Mehalah,' etc. With Sixty- seven Illustrations 
by W. Parkinson, F. D. Bedford, and F. Masey. Large 
Crown Svo. los. 6d. Fifth and Cheaper Edition. (>s. 

'"Old Countrj' Life," as healthy wholesome reading, full of breezy life and move- 
ment, full of quaint stories vigorously told, will not be excelled by any book to be 
published throughout the year. Sound, hearty, and English to the core.' — World. 

S. Baring Gould. HISTORIC ODDITIES AND STRANGE 
EVENTS. By S. Baring Gould. Third Edition. Crown ^vo. 6s. 

' A collection of exciting and entertaining chapters. The whole volume is delightful 
leading.'— Times. 

S. Baring Gould. FREAKS OF FANATICISM. By S. Baring 
Gould. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 

'Mr. Baring Gould has a keen eye for colour and effect, and the subjects he has 
chosen give ample scope to his descriptive and analytic faculties. A perfectly 
fascinating book. ' — Scottish Leader. 

S. Baring Gould. A GARLAND OF COUNTRY SONG : 

English Folk Songs with their Traditional Melodies. Collected and 
arranged by S. Baring Gould and H. Fleetwood Sheppard. 
Demy ^to, 6s. 

S. Baring Gould. SONGS OF THE WEST: Traditional 
Ballads and Songs of the West of England, with their Traditional 
Melodies. Collected by S. Baring Gould, M.A., and H. Fleet- 
wood Sheppard, M. A. Arranged for Voice and Piano. In 4 Parts 
(containing 25 Songs each), Parts I., //., ///., 3j\ each. Part 
IV., ^s. In one Vol., French morocco, \^s. 
' A rich collection of humour, pathos, grace, and poetic fancy.' — Saturday Review, 



20 Messrs. Methuen's List 

S. Baring Gould. YORKSHIRE ODDITIES AND STRANGE 

EVENTS. Fourth Edition. Crown %vo. 6s. 

S. Baring Gould. STRANGE SURVIVALS AND SUPER- 
STITIONS. With Illustrations. By S. Baring Gould. Crown 
^vo. Second Edition. 6s. 

' We have read Mr. Baring Gould's book from beginning to end. It is full of quaint 
and various information, and there is not a dull page in it. ' — Notes and Queries. 

S. Baring Gould. THE DESERTS OF SOUTHERN 
FRANCE. By S. Baring. Gould. With numerous Illustrations 
by F. D. Bedford, S. Hutton, etc. 2 vols. Demy Zvo. 325. 

' His two richly-illustrated volumes are full of matter of interest to the geologist, 
the archaeologist, and the student of history and manners.' — Scotsvian. 

G. W. Steevens. NAVAL POLICY: With a Descrip- 
tion OF English and Foreign Navvies. By G. W. Steevens. 
Demy 8vo. 6s. 

This book is a description of the British and other more important navies of the world, 
with a sketch of the lines on which our naval policy might possibly be developed. 
It describes our recent naval policj', and shows what our naval force really is. A 
detailed but non-technical account is given of the instruments of modern warfare — 
guns, armour, engines, and the like — with a view to determine how far we are 
abreast of modern invention and modern requirements. An ideal policy is then 
sketched for the building and manning of oUr fleet ; and the last chapter is 
devoted to docks, coaling-stations, and especially colonial defence. 

' An extremely able and interesting work.' — Daily Chronicle. 

W. E. Gladstone. THE SPEECHES AND PUBLIC AD- 
DRESSES OF THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. 
Edited by A. W. Hutton, M.A., and H. J. Cohen, M.A. With 
Portraits, '^vo. Vols. IX. and X. \2s, 6d. each. 

J. Wells. OXFORD AND OXFORD LIFE. By Members of 

the University. Edited by J. Wells, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of 
Wadham College. Croivn 8vo. 3^. 6d. 

' We congratulate Mr. Wells on the production of a readable and intelligent account 
of Oxford as it is at the present time, written by persons who are possessed of a 
close acquaintance with the system and life of the JJniytrsity.'—Ai/iencrum. 

L. Whibley. GREEK OLIGARCHIES : THEIR ORGANISA- 
TION AND CHARACTER. By L. Wiiiblev, M.A., Fellow 
of Pembroke College, Cambridge. Crown Zvo. 6s. 

' An exceedingly useful handbook : a careful and well-arranged study of aii obscure 

subject.' — Tiiucs. 
' Mr. Whibley is never tedious ur pedantic' — Fall Mall Gazette. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 21 

L. L. Price. ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND PRACTICE, 
By L. L. Price, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Crown 
Svo. 6s. 

' The book is well written, giving evidence of considerable literary ability, and clear 
mental grasp of the subject under consideration. ' — ^Fi^j-^'grw Morning News. 

C. F. Andrews. CHRISTIANITY AND THE LABOUR 
QUESTION. By C. F. Andrews, B.A. Crown ^vo. 2s. 6J. 
' A bold and scholarly survey.' — Speaker. 

J. S. Shedlock. THE PIANOFORTE SONATA: Its Origin 
and Development. By J. S. Shedlock. Crown Svo. 5^. 

'This work should be in the possession of every musician and amateur, for it not 
only embodies a concise and lucid history ot the origin ofoneof the most im- 
portant forms of musical composition, but, by reason of the painstaking research 
and accuracy of the author's statements, it is a very valuable work for reference.' 
— A theHCB7i}n. 

E.M. Bowden. THE EXAMPLE OF BUDDHA: Being Quota- 
tions from Buddhist Literature for each Day in the Year. Compiled 
by E. M. Bowden. With Preface by Sir Edwin Arnold. Third 

Editiofi. iGf/io. 2s. 6d. 



Science 

Freudenreich. DAIRY BACTERIOLOGY. A Short Manual 
for the Use of Students. By Dr. Ed. von Freudenreich. 
Translated from the German by J. R. Ainsworth Davis, B.A., 
F.C.P. Crown Svo. 2s.6d. 

Chalmers Mitchell. OUTLINES OF BIOLOGY. By P. 

Chalmers I\Iitchell, M.A., F.Z.S. Fully Illustrated. Crown 
%vo. 6s. 

A text-book designed to cover the new Schedule issued by the Roj-al College of 
Physicians and Surgeons. 

G.Massee. A MONOGRAPH OF THE MYXOGASTRES. By 
George Massee. With 12 Coloured Plates. Royal Svo. iSs.net. 

'A work much in advance of any book in the language treating of this group of 
organisms. It is indispensable to every student of the Myxogastres. The 
coloured plates deserve high praise for their accuracy and execution.'— iV«^Kr<r. 



22 Messrs. Methuen's List 



Philosophy 



L. T. Hobhouse. THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. By 

L. T. Hobhouse, Fellow and Tutor of Corpus College, Oxford. 
Demy Svo. 21 s. 

' The most Important contribution to English philosophy since the publication of Mr. 
Bradley's " Appearance and Reality." Full of brilliant criticism and of positive 
theories which are models of lucid statement.' — Glasgow Herald. 

' An elaborate and often brilliantly written volume. The treatment is one of great 
freshness, and the illustrations are particularly numerous and apt.' — Times. 

\V. H. Fairbrotlier. THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. H. GREEN. 
By W. H. Fairbrother, ]\I.A., Lecturer at Lincoln College, 
Oxford. Crown Svo. ^s. 6d. 

This volume is expository, not critical, and Is Intended for senior students at the 

Universities and others, as a statement of Green's teaching, and an introduction to 

the study of Idealist Philosophy. 
' In every way an admirable book. As an introduction to the writings of perhaps the 

most remarkable speculative thinker whom England has produced in the present 

century, nothing could be better.' — Glasgozu lUfald. 

F. W. BusselL THE SCHOOL OF PLATO : its Origin and 
its Revival under the Roman Empire. By F. W. Bussell, M.A., 
Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. De?ny Svo. los. 6d. 

' A highly valuable contribution to the history of ancient thought.' — Glasgmu Herald. 
' A clever and stimulating book, provocative of thought and deserving careful reading." 
— Alancliester Guardian, 

F. S. Granger. THE WORSHIP OF THE ROMANS. By 

F. S. Granger, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Philosophy at Univer- 
sity College, Nottingham. Crown Svo. 6s. 

' A scholarly analysis of the religious ceremonies, beliefs, and superstitions of ancient 
Rome, conducted in the new instructive light of comparative anthropology.' — 
Times. 



Theology 



E. C. S. Gibson. THE XXXIX. ARTICLES OF THE 
CHURCH OF ENGLAND. Edited with an Introduction by E. 
C. S. Gibson, D.D. , Vicar of Leeds, late Principal of Wells 
Theological College. In Two Volumes. Demy Svo. \^s, 

'The tone maintained throughout is not that of the partial advocate, but the faithful 

exponent. ' — Scotsman. 
'There are .ample proofs of clearness of expression, sobriety of judgment, and breadth 

of view. . . . The book will be welcome to all students of the subject, and its sound, 

definite, and loyal theology ought to be of great service.' — Nationa.1 Observer. 
'So far from repelling the general reader, its orderly arrangement, lucid treatment, 

and felicltj' of diction Invite and encourage his attention.' — Yorkshire Post. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 23 

R. L. Ottley. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION. 

By R. L. Ottley, M.A., late fellow of Magdalen College, Oxon., 
Principal of Pusey House. In Two Volumes. Demy 2>vo. I'^s. 

* Learned and reverent : lucid and well arranged.' — Record. 
'Accurate, well ordered, and judicious.' — National Observer. 

' A clear and remarkably full account of the main currents of speculation. Scholarly 
precision . • . genuine tolerance . . , intense interest in his subject — are Mr. 
Ottley's merits, ' — Guardiati. 

F. B. Jevons. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY 
OF RELIGION. By F. B. Jevons, M.A., Litt.D., Principal of 
Bishop Flatfield's Hall. Demy Svo. los. 6d. 

Mr. F. B. Jevons' 'Introduction to the History of Religion' treats of early religion, 
from the point of vaew of Anthropology and Folk-lore ; and is the first attempt 
that has been made in any language to weave together the results of recent 
investigations into such topics as S^'mpathetic Magic, Taboo, Totemism, 
Fetishism, etc., so as to present a systematic account of the growth of primitive 
religion and the development of early religious institutions, 
' Dr. Jevons has written a notable work, and we can strongly recommend it to the 
serious attention of theologians, anthropologists, and classical scholars.' — 3fan- 
Chester Gtiardian. 
' The merit of this book lies in the penetration, the singular acuteness and force of the 
author's judgment. He isat once critical and luminous, at once just and suggestive. 
It is but rarely that one meets with a book so comprehensive and so thorough as 
this, and it is more than an ordinary pleasure for the reviewer to welcome and 
recommend it. Dr. Jevons is something more than an historian of primitive 
belief— he is a philosophic thinker, who sees his subject clearly and sees it whole, 
whose mastery of detail is no less complete than his view of the broader aspects 
and issues of his subject is convincing.' — BirmingJiam Post. 

S. R. Driver. SERMONS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED 
WITH THE OLD TESTAMENT. By S. R. Driver, D.D., 
Canon of Christ Church, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the Uni- 
versity of Oxford. Crown Svo. 6s. 

* A welcome companion to the author's famous ' Introduction.' No man can read these 

discourses without feeling that Dr. Driver is fully alive to the deeper teaching of 
the Old Testament.' — Guardian. 

T. K. Cheyne. FOUNDERS OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITI- 
CISM : Biographical, Descriptive, and Critical Studies. By T. K. 
Cheyne, D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scrip- 
ture at Oxford. Large crown Svo. 'js. 6d. 
This book is a historical sketch of O. T. Criticism in the form of biographical studies 

from the days of Eichhorn to those of Driver and Robertson Smith. 
' A very learned and instructive work.' — Times. 

C.H.Prior. CAMBRIDGE SERMONS. Edited by C.H. Prior, 
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Pembroke College. Crown Svo. ds. 
A volume of sermons preached before the University of Cambridge by various 
preachers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Westcott. 
A representative collection. Bishop Westcott's is a noble sermon.' — Guardian. 

E. B. Layard. RELIGION IN BOYHOOD. Notes on the 
Religious Training of Boys. With a Preface by J. R. Illing- 
WORTH. By E. B. Layard, M.A. \Smo. \s. 



24 Messrs. Metiiuen's List 

W. Yorke Faussett. THE DE CATECHIZANDIS 

RUDIBUS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Edited, with Introduction, 

Notes, etc., by W. Yorke Faussett, M.A., late Scholar of Balliol 

Coll. Crown 8vo. ^s. 6d. 

An edition of a Treatise on the Essentials of Christian Doctrine, and the best 

methods of impressing them on candidates for baptism. 
'Ablj' and judiciously edited on the same principle as the ordinary Greek and 
Latin texts.' — Glasgow Herald. 

2Det3Dtional ©oofe^. 

With Full-page Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo. Buckra?n. 3^. 6d. 
Padded morocco^ 55. 
THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. By Thomas A Kempis. 
With an Introduction by Dean Farrar. Illustrated by C. M. 
Gere, and printed in black and red. Second Edition. 
'Amongst all the innumerable English editions of the "Imitation," there can have 
been few which were prettier than this one, printed n strong and handsome type, 
with all the glory of red initials.' — Glasgow Herald, 

THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By John Keble. With an Intro- 
duction and Notes by W. Lock, D.D., Warden of Keble College, 
Ireland, Professor at Oxford. Illustrated by R. Anning Bell. 

' The present edition is annotated with all the care and insight to be expected from 
Mr. Lock. The progress and circumstances of its composition are detailed in the 
Introduction. There is an interesting Appendix on the MSS. of the "Christian 
Year," and another giving the order in which the poems were written. A "Short 
Analysis of the Thought" is prefixed to each, and any difficulty in the text is ex- 
plained in a note.' — Guardian. 

' The most acceptable edition of this ever-popular work.' — Globe. 



3/6 



Leaders of Religion 

Edited by H. C. BEECHING, M. A. With Portraits, crown 8zv. 

A series of short biographies of the most prominent leaders 
of religious life and thought of all ages and countries. 

The following are ready — 
CARDINAL NEWMAN. By R. H. HUTTON. 
JOHN WESLEY. By J. H. Overton, M.A. 
BISHOP WILBERFORCE. By G. W. Daniel, M.A. 
CARDINAL MANNING. By A. W. HuTTON, M.A. 
CHARLES SIMEON. By H. C. G. MOULE, M.A. 
JOHN KEBLE. By Walter Lock, D.D. 
THOMAS CHALMERS. By Mrs. Oliphant. 
LANCELOT ANDREWES. By R. L. Ottley, M.A. 
AUGUSTINE OF CANTERBURY. By E. L. CUTTS, D.D. 
WILLIAM LAUD. By W. H. HuTTON, B.D. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 25 

JOHN KNOX. By F. M'CUNN. 
JOHN HOWE. By R. F. HORTON, D.D. 
BISHOP KEN. By F. A. Clarke, M.A. 
GEORGE FOX, THE QUAKER. By T. Hodgkin, D.C.L. 
Other volumes will be announced in due course. 

Fiction 

SIX SHILLING NOVELS 

Marie Corelli's Novels 

Crown Svo. 6s. each. 
A ROMANCE OF TWO W^ORLDS. Sixteenth Ediiio?i. 
VENDETTA. Thirteenth Edition. 
T H E L M A. Seventeenth Edition. 
ARDATH. Tenth Editimi. 
THE SOUL OF LILITH Nijith Edition. 
WORMWOOD. Eighth Edition. 
BARABBAS : A DREAM OF THE WORLD'S TRAGEDY. 

Thi)-ty-first Edition. 
' The tender reverence of the treatment and the imaginative beauty of the writing 
have reconciled us to the daring of the conception, and the conviction is forced on 
us that even so exalted a subject cannot be made too familiar to us, provided it be 
presented in the true spirit of Christian faith. The amplifications of the Scripture 
narrative are often conceived with high poetic insight, and this "Dream of the 
World's Tragedy " is, despite some trifling incongruities, a lofty and not inade- 
quate paraphrase of the supreme climax of the inspired narrative.' — Dublin 
Review. 

THE SORROW^S OF SATAN. Thirty-sixth Edition. 

' A very powerful piece of work. . . . The conception is magnificent, and is likely 
to win an abiding place within the memory' of man. . . . The author has immense 
command of language, and a limitless audacity. . . . This interesting and re- 
markable romance will live long after much of the ephemeral literature of the day 
is forgotten. ... A literary phenomenon . . . novel, and even sublime.' — W. T. 
Stead in the Review of Reviews. 

Anthony Hope's Novels 

Crown ?)Vo. 6s. each. 
THE GOD IN THE CAR. Sevmih Edition. . _ 

' A very remarkable book, deserving of critical analysis impossible within our limit ; 
brilliant, but not superficial ; well considered, but not elaborated ; constructed 
with the proverbial art that conceals, but yet allows itself to be enjoyed by readers 
to whom fine literarj' method is a keen pleasure.'— The World. 

A CHANGE OF AIR. Fourth Edition. 

'A graceful, vivacious comedy, true to human nature. The characters are traced 
with a masterly hand.' — Times. 

A MAN OF MARK. Fourth Edition. 

' Of all Mr. Hope's books, "A Man of Mark " is the one which best compares with 
' ' The Prisoner of Zenda." ' — National Observer. 



26 Messrs. Methuen's List 

THE CHRONICLES OF COUNT ANTONIO. Third Editum. 

'It is a perfectly enchanting story of love and chivalry, and pure romance. The 
outlawed Count is the most constant, desperate, and withal modest and tender of 
lovers, a peerless gentleman, an intrepid fighter, a very faithful friend, and a most 
magnanimous foe. ' — Guardian. 

PHROSO. Illustrated by H. R. MiLLAR._ Third Edition. 

' The tale is thoroughly fresh, quick with vitality, stirring the blood, and humorously, 

(l2ish.\x\g\yto\A.'— St. James s Gazette. 
' A story of adventure, every page of which is palpitating with action and excitement.' 

—Speaker. 
' From cover to cover " Phroso " not only engages the attention, but carries the reader 

in little whirls of delight from adventure to adventure." — Academy. 

S. Baring Gould's Novels 

Crozvn 2>vo. 6s. each. 
'To say that a book is by the author of " ISIehalah" is to imx)ly that it contains a 
story cast on strong lines, containing dramatic possibilities, vivid and sympathetic 
descriptions of Nature, and a wealth of ingenious imagery.' — Speaker. 
' That whatever Mr. Baring Gould writes is well worth reading, is a conclusion that 
may be very generally accepted. His views of life are fresh and vigorous, his 
language pointed and characteristic, the incidents of which he makes use are 
striking and original, his characters are life-like, and though somewhat excep- 
tional people, are drawn and coloured with artistic force. Add to this that his 
descriptions of scenes and scenery are painted with the loving eyes and skilled 
hands of a master of his art, that he is alwaj'S fresh and never dull, and under 
such conditions it is no wonder that readers have gained confidence both in his 
power of amusing nnd satisfying them, and that year by j'ear his popularity 
widens. ' — Court Circular. 

ARM I NELL : A Social Romance. Fourth Edii:o7i. 
URITH : A Story of Dartmoor. Fifth Edition, 

' The author is at his best.'— T/w^j. 

IN THE ROAR OF THE SEA, Sixth Edition. 

'One of the best imagined and most enthralling stories the author has produced. 
— Saturday Review. 

MRS. CURGENVEN OF CURGENVEN. Fourth Editio7i. 

' The swing of the narrative is splendid.' — Sussex Daily Neivs. 

CHEAP JACK ZITA. Fourth Edition. 

' A powerful drama of human passion.' — IVesttninster Gazette. 
'A story worthy the author.' — National Observer. 

THE QUEEN OF LOVE. Fourth Edition. 

' You cannot put it down until you have finished it.' — Punch. 

' Can be heartily recommended to all who care for cleanly, energetic, and interesting 
fiction.' — Sussex Daily News. 

KITTY ALONE. Fourth Edition. 

' A strong and original story, teeming with graphic description, stirring incident, 
and, above all, with vivid and enthralling human interest.'— Daily Telegraph. 

NOEMI : A Romance of the Cave-Dvvellers. Illustrated by 

R. CaTON WOODVILLE. Third Edi(io7l. 
' " Nocmi " is as excellent a tale of fighting and adventure as one may wish to meet. 

The narrative also runs clear and sharp as the Loire itself.' — Fail Mall Gazette. 
'Mr. Baring Gould's powerful story is full of the strong lights and shadows and 

vivid colouring to which he has accustomed us.' — Standard. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 27 

THE BROOM- SQUIRE. Illustrated by Frank Dadd. 

Fourth Edition. 
' A strain of tenderness is woven through the web of his tragic tale, and its atmosphere 

is sweetened by the nobility and sweetness of the heroine's character.' — Daily Neivs. 
* A story of exceptional interest that seems to us to be better than anything he has 

written of late.' — Speaker. 

THE PENNYCOMEQUICKS. Third Edition, 
DARTMOOR IDYLLS. 

'A book to read, and keep and read again ; for the genuine fun and pathos of it will 
not early lose their effect. ' — Vanity Fair. 

GUAVAS THE TINNER. Illustrated by Frank Dadd. Scco?id 

Edition. 
' Mr. Baring Gould Is a wizard who transports us into a region of visions, often lurid 

and disquieting, but always full of interest and enchantment.' — Spectator, 
' In the v/eirdness of the story, in the faithfulness with which the characters are 

depicted, and in force of style, it closely resembles " Alehalah. '" — Daily TelegrapJi. 
' There is a kind of flavour about this book which alone elevates it above the ordinary 

novel. The story itself has a grandeur in harmony with the wild and rugged 

scenery which is its setting/ — A thenceiini. 

Gilbert Parker's Novels 

Crown %vo. 6s. each. 
PIERRE AND HIS PEOPLE. Fourth Edition. 

' Stories happily conceived and finely executed. There is strength and genius in Mr. 
Parker's style.' — Daily Telegraph. 

MRS. FALCHION. Fourth Edition. 

' A splendid studj' of character.' — Athencsutn. 

' But little behind anything that has been done by any writer of our time. ' — Pall 
Mall Gazette. 'A verj' striking and admirable novel.' — St. James's Gazette. 

THE TRANSLATION OF A SAVAGE. 

' The plot is original and one difficult to work out ; but Mr. Parker has done it with 
great skill and delicacy. The reader who is not interested in this original, fresh, 
and well-told tale must be a dull person indeed.' — Daily Chronicle. 

THE TRAIL OF THE SWORD. Fifth Edition. 

'Everybody with a soul for romance will thoroughly enjoy "The Trail of the 
Sword." ' — St. Ja7itess Gazette. 

' A rousing and dramatic tale. A book like this, In which swords flash, great sur- 
prises are undertaken, and daring deeds done, in which men and women live and 
love in the old straightforward passionate way, is a joy inexpressible to the re- 
viewer.' — Daily Chronicle. 

WHEN VALMOND CAME TO PONTIAC : The Story of 
a Lost Napoleon. Fourth Edition. 
' Here we find romance — real, breathing, living romance, but it runs flush with our 
own times, level with our own feelings. The character of Valmond is drawn un- 
erringly ; his career, brief as it is, is placed before us as convincingly as history 
itself. "The book must be read, we may say re-read, for any one thoroughly to 
appreciate Mr. Parker's delicate touch and innate sympathy with humanity.' — 
Pall Mall Gazette. 
'The one work of genius which 1895 has as yet produced.' — A^eiv Age. 

AN ADVENTURER OF THE NORTH: The Last Adven- 
tures of ' Pretty Pierre.' Second Edition. 
'The present book is full of fine and moving stories of the great North, and it will 
add to Mr. Parker's already high reputation.'— G/rti-^^w Herald. 



28 Messrs. Methuen's List 

THE SEATS OF THE MIGHTY. Illustrated. Eighth Edition. 

' The best thing he has done ; one of the best things that any one has done lately.' — 

St. Javiea's Gazette. 
' Mr. Parker seems to become stronger and easier with every serious novel that he 

attempts. . . , In " The Seats of the Mighty " he shows the matured power which 

his former novels have led us to expect, and has produced a really fine historical 

novel. . . . Most sincerely is Mr. Parker to be congratulated on the finest 

novel he has yet written.' — Athentpum. 
'Mr. Parker's latest book places him in the front rank of living novelists. "The 

Seats of the Mighty" is a great book.' — Black and White. 
'One of the strongest stories of historical interest and adventure that we have read 

for many a daj'. . . . A notable and successful book.' — Speaker. 



Conan Doyle. ROUND THE RED LAMP, By A. Conan 
Doyle, Author of ' The White Company,' ' The Adventures of 
Sherlock Hohnes,' etc. Fifth Edition. Crotvn 2>vo. 6s. 
' The book is, indeed, composed of leaves from life, and is far and away the best view 
that has been vouchsafed us behind the scenes of the consulting-room. It is very 
superior to " The Diary of a late Physician." ' — Illustrated London JVews. 

Stanley Weyman. UNDER THE RED ROBE. By Stanley 

Weym AN, Author of ' A Gentleman of France. ' With Twelve Illus- 
trations by R. Caton Woodville. TiveJfth Edition. Crown %vo. 6s. 

'A book of which we have read every word for the sheer pleasure of reading, and 
which we put down with a pang that we cannot forget it all and start again.' — 
Westtninstcr Gazette. 

' Every one who reads books nt all must read this thrilling romance, from the first 
page of which to the last the breathless reader is haled along. An inspiration of 
" manliness and courage." ' — Daily Chronicle. 

Lucas Malet. THE WAGES OF SIN. By Lucas 

Malet. Thirteejith Edition. Crown '^vo. 6$. 

Lucas Malet. THE CARISSIMA. By Lucas Malet, 

Author of 'The Wages of Sin,' etc. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 

Arthur Morrison. TALES OF MEAN STREETS. By Arthur 

Morrison. Eojtrth Edition. Croiim 8vo. 6s. 
' Told with consummate art and extraordinary detail. He tells a plain, unvarnished 

tale, and the very truth of it makes for l)eauty. In tlie true humanity of the book 

lies its justification, the permanence of its interest, and its indubitable triumph.' — 

A thentpunt. 
' A great book. The author's method is amazingly effective, and produces a thrilling 

sense of reality. I'he writer lays upon us a master hand. The book is simply 

appalling and irresistil)le in its interest. It is humorous also ; without humour 

it would not make the mark it is certain to make.' — World. 

Arthur Morrison. A CHILD OF THE JAGO. By Arthur 

]MoRRiSON. Third Edition. Croivn %vo. 6s. 
This, the first long story which Mr. ^Morrison has written, is like his remarkable 

' Tales of Mean Streets,' a realistic study of East End life. 
' The book is a masterpiece.' — Pall I\fall Gazette. 
'Told with great vigour and powerful simplicity.' — AtJtettaum. 

Mrs. Clifford. A FLASH OF SUMMER. By Mrs. W. K. Cr.ir- 
FORD, Author of ' Aunt Anne,' etc. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s. 

' The story is a very sad and a very lif autiful one, exquisitely told, and enriched with 
many subtle touches of wise and tender insight. It will, undoubtedly, add to its 
author's reputation— already high — in the ranks of novelists.' — Speaker, 



Messrs. Methuen's List 29 

Emily Lawless. HURRISH. By the Honble. Emily Law- 
less, Author of ' Maelcho,' etc. Fifth Edition. Crown ^vo. ds. 
A reissue of Miss Lawless' most popular novel, uniform with ' Maelcho.' 

Emily Lawless. MAELCHO : a Sixteenth Century Romance. 

By the Honble. Emily Lawless. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. (iS. 

' A really great book.' — Spectator. 

'There is no keener pleasure in life than the recognition of genius. Good work is 
commoner than it used to be, but the best is as rare as ever. All the more 
gladly, therefore, do we v.-elcome in " Maelcho " a piece of work of the first order, 
which we do not hesitate to describe as one of the most remarkable literary 
achievements of this generation. Miss Lawless is possessed of the very essence 
of historical genius.' — I\Ianchcsicr Guardian. 

J. H. Findlater. THE GREEN GRAVES OF BALGOWRIE. 
By Jane H. FiNDLATER. Third Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s. 

'A powerful and vivid s\.oxy.' —Standard. 

' A beautiful story, sad and strange as truth itself.' — Vanity Fair. 

' A work of remarkable interest and originality.' — National Observer. 

' A very charming and pathetic tale.' — Pall Mall Gazette. 

' A singularly original, clever, and beautiful story.' — Guardian. 

' " The Green Graves of Balgowrie" reveals to us a new Scotch writer of undoubted 

faculty and reserve force.' — Spectator. 
'An exquisite idyll, delicate, affecting, and beautiful.' — Black and White. 

H. G. Wells. THE STOLEN BACILLUS, and other Stories. 
By H. G. Wells, Author of 'The Time Machine.' Crown Svo. 6s. 

' The ordinary reader of fiction may be glad to know that these stories are eminently 
readable from one coverto the other, but they are more than that ; they are the 
impressions of a very striking imagination, which, it would seem, has a great deal 
within its reach.' — Saturday Review. 

H. G.Wells. THE PLATTNER STORY AND Others. By H. 

G. Wells. Second Edition. Croivn Svo. 6s. 
'Weird and mysterious, they seem to hold the reader as by a magic spell.' — Scotstnan. 
'Such is the fascination of this writer's skill that you unhesitatingly prophesy that 

none of the many readers, however his flesh do creep, will relinquish the volume 

ere he has read from first word to last.' — Black and iPhite. 
' No volume has appeared for a long time so likely to give equal pleasure to the 

simplest reader and to the most fastidious critic' — Academy. 
' Mr. Wells is a magician skilled in wielding that most potent of all spells — the fear 

of the unknown.' — Daily Telegraph. 

E. F. Benson. DODO : A DETAIL OF THE DAY. By E. F. 

Benson. Sixteenth Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s. 
' A delightfully witty sketch of society.' — Spectator. 
' A perpetual feast of epigram and paradox.' — Speaker. 

E. F. Benson. THE RUBICON. By E. F. Benson, Author of 
'Dodo.' Fifth Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 
' An exceptional achievement ; a notable advance on his previous v/orV.'— National 
Observer. 

Mrs. Oliphant. SIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE. By Mrs. 

Oliphant. Crown Svo. 6s. 
' Full of her own peculiar charm of style and simple, subtle chaxacter-painting comes 
her new gift, the delightful story before us. The scene mostly lies in the moors, 
and at the touch of the authoress a Scotch moor becomes a living thing, strong, 
tender, beaulii'ui, and changeful.' — Pall Mall Gazette. 



30 Messrs. Methuen's List 

Mrs. Olipliant. THE TWO MARYS. 13y Mrs. Oliphant. 
Second Ediiio7i. Croivn Zvo. 6j-. 

V/.E.Norris. MATTHEW AUSTIN. By W. E. Norris, Author 

of ' iMademoiselle de Mcrsac,' etc. FoiD'th Edition. CrownZvo. 6s. 

"Matthew Austin" may safely be pronounced one of the most intellectually satis- 
factory and morally bracing novels of the current year.' — Daily Tclerraf'h. 

W. E. Norris. HIS GRACE. By W. E. Norris. Third 

Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s. 

' Mr. Norris has drawn a really fine character in the Duke of Hurstbourne, at once 
unconventional and very true to the conventionalities of life.' — Atheticeum. 

W. E. Norris. THE DESPOTIC LADY AND OTHERS. 
By W. E. Norris. Crown Svo. 6s. 

' A budget of good fiction of which no one will tire.' — Scotsman. 

W. E. Norris. CLARISSA FURIOSA. By W. E. Norris, 

Author of 'The Rogue,' etc. Crown Svo. 6s. 

' One of Mr. Norris's very best novels. As a story it is admirable, as a. jt'u cE esprit 
it is capital, as a lay sermon studded with gems of wit and wisdom it is a model 
which will not, we imagine, find an efficient imitator.' — The World. 

'The best novel he has written for some time: a story which is full of admirable 
character-drawing. ' — Tlie Standard. 

Robert Barr. IN THE MIDST OF ALARMS. By Robert 

Barr. Third Edition. Crozun ^vo. 6s. 

' A book which has abundantly satisfied us by its capital humour,' — Daily Chronicle. 
'ISIr. Barr has achieved a triumph whereof he has every reason to be proud.'— /"a// 

Mall Gazette. 

J. Maclaren Cobban. THE KING OF ANDAMAN : A 
Saviour of Society. By J. Maclaren Cobban. Crozvn Svo. 6s. 

' An unquestionably interesting book. It would not surprise us if it turns out to be 
the most interesting novel of the season, for it contains one character, at least, 
who has in him the root of immortality, and the book itself is ever exhaling the 
sweet savour of the unexpected. . . . Plot is forgotten and incident fades, and 
only the really human endures, and throughout this book there stands out in bold 
and beautiful relief its high-souled and chivalric protagonist, James the Master 
of Hutcheon, the King of Andaman himself.' — Pall Mall Gazette. 

J. Maclaren Cobban. WILT THOU HAVE THIS WOMAN ? 

By J. M. Cobban, Author of ' The King of Andaman.' Crown Svo. 6s. 

' Mr. Cobban has the true story-teller's art. He arrests attention at the outset, and 
he retains it to the and.'— Birmingham Post. 

H. Morrah. A SERIOUS COMEDY. By Herbert Morrah. 

Crown Svo. 6s. 

'This volume is well worthy of its title. The theme has seldom beeu picocatcd with 
m'..re freshncas or more foico.' — .Scol^f/iuu. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 31 

K. Morrali. THE FAITHFUL CITY. By Herbert Morrah, 
Author of 'A Serious Comedy.' Crown 8vo. 6s. 
' Conveys a suggestion of welrdncss and horror, until finally he convinces and 
enthrals the reader with his mysterious savages, his gigantic tower, and his 
uncompromising men and v>-omen. This is a haunting, mysterious book, not 
without an element of stupendous grandeur.' — Athcnccnin, 

L. B. Walford. SUCCESSORS TO THE TITLE. By Mrs. 

Walford, Author of ' Mr. Smith,' etc. Second Edition. CrownSvo. 6s. 

' The story is fresh and healthy from beginning to finish ; and our liking for the two 

simple people who are the successors to the title mounts steadily, and ends almost 

in respect.' — Scoisfuan. 

T. L. Paton. A HOME IN INVERESK. By T. L. Paton. 

Crown 8z^<?. 6s. 
'A pleasant and well-written story.' — Daily Ch?-onicle. 

Jolin Davidson. MISS ARMSTRONG'S AND OTHER CIR- 
CUMSTANCES. By John Davidson. Crown 8vo. 6s. 

' Throughout the volume there is a strong vein of originality, and a knowledge of 
human nature that are worthy of the highest praise.' — Scotsman. 

M. M. Dowie. GALLIA. By Menie Muriel Dowie, Author 
of 'A Girl in the Carpathians.' Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 
'The style is generally admirable, the dialogue not seldom brilliant, the situations 
surprising in their freshness and originality, while the subsidiary as well as the 
principal characters live and move, and the story itself is readable from title-page 
to colophon.' — Saturday Review. 

J. A. Barry. IN THE GREAT DEEP : Tales of the Sea. 
By J. A. Barry. Author of ' Steve Brown's Bunyip.' Crown 8vo. 6s. 
'A collection of really admirable short stories of the sea, very simply told, and placed 
before the reader in pithy and telling English.' — IVestftiinster Gazette. 

J. B. Burton. IN THE DAY OF ADVERSITY. By J. Bloun- 

DELLE Burton.' Second Edition. CfvwnSvo. 6s. 

' Unusually interesting and full of highly dramatic situations.' — Cuardiar.. 

J. B. Burton. DENOUNCED. By J. Bloundelle Burton. 
Second Edition, Crown 8vo. 6s. 
The plot is an original one, and the local colouring is laid on with a delicacy 
and an accuracy of detail which denote the true artist.' — Broad Armv. 

W. C. Scully. THE WHITE HECATOMB. By W. C. 

Scully, Author of ' Kafir Stories.' Crown Zvo. 6s. 

' The author is so steeped in Kaffir lore and legend, and so thoroughly well acquainted 
with native sagas and traditional ceremonial that he is able to attract the reader 
by the easy familiarity with which he handles his characters.' — South Africa. 

' It reveals a marvellously intimate understanding of the Kaf&r mind, allied with 
literary gifts of no mean order.' — African Critic. 

H. Jolmston. DR. CONGALTON'S LEGACY. By Henry 
ToHNSTON. Croivn 8vo. 6s. 
' A worthy and permanent contribution to Scoltl^h liler^tuie.' — Ciuijow tierald. 



32 Messrs. Methuen's List 

J. F. Brewer. THE SPECULATORS. By J. F. Brewer. 

Crown Sz'o. 6s, 
' A pretty bit of comedy. ... It is undeniably a clever hooK.'— Academy. 
' A clever and amusing story. It makes capital out of the comic aspects of culture, 

and will be read wuh amusement by every intellectual xczidQi.'— Scotsman. 
'A remarkably clever study.' — Vanity Feiir. 

Julian Corbett. A BUSINESS IN GREAT WATERS. By 

Julian Corbett. Crozun ?>io. 6s. 

' Mr. Corbett writes with immense spirit, and the book is a thoroughly enjoyable 
one in all respects. The salt of the ocean is in it, and the right heroic ring re- 
sounds through its gallant adventures.' — Speaker. 

L. Cope Cornford. CAPTAIN JACOBUS : A ROMANCE OF 
THE ROAD. By L. Cope Cornford. Illustrated. Crown^vo. 6s. 
' An exceptionally good story of adventure and character.' — World. 

C. p. WoUey. THE OUEENSBERRY CUP. A Tale of 

Adventure. By Clive^'Phillips Wolley. Illustrated. Crown 
^vo. 6s. 
' A book which will delight boys : a book which upholds the healthy schoolboy code 
of morality.' — Scots niaji. 

L. Daintrey. THE KING OF ALBERIA. A Romance of 
the Balkans. By Laura Daintrey. Crown ^vo. 6s. 

' Miss Daintrey seems to have an intimate acquaintance with the people and politics 
of the Balkan countries in which the scene of her lively and picturesque romance 
is laid.' — Glasgow He-raid. 

M. A. Owen. THE DAUGHTER OF ALOUETTE. By 
Mary A. Owen. Croivn %vo. 6s. 

A story of life among the American Indians. 
'A fascinating story.' — Litcraty Jl'orld. 

Mrs. Pinsent. CHILDREN OF THIS WORLD. By Ellen 
F. Pinsent, Author of 'Jenny's Case.' Crozvn 8fi?. 6s. ^ 
' INIrs. Pinsent's new novel has plenty of vigour, variety, and good writing. There 
are certainty of purpose, strength of touch, and clearness of vision.' — Aihcnteum. 

Clark Russell. MY DANISH SWEETHEART. By W. 
Clark Russell, Author of 'The Wreck of the Grosvenor,' etc. 
Illustrated. Fourth Edition. Crozvn Svo. 6s. 

G. Manville Fenn. AN ELECTRIC SPARK. By G. Manville 
Fenn, Author of ' The Vicar's Wife,' 'A Double Knot,' etc. Second 
Edition. Crown Svo. 6s, 

L. S. McChesney. UNDER SHADOW OF TPIE MISSION. 
By L. S. McChesney. Crown Svo. 6s. 
' Those whose minds are open to the liner issues of life, who can appreciate graceful 
thought and refined expression of it, from them this volume will receive a welcome 
as enthusiastic as it will be based on critical knowledge.' — Church Times. 

Konald Ross. THE SPIRIT OF STORM. By Ronald 

Ross, Author of 'The Child of Ocean.' Crown %vo. 6s. 

A romaucc of the Sea. ' Weird, powerful, and impressive.'— i'/ac/t and White. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 33 

R. Pryce. TIME AND THE WOMAN. By Richard Pryce. 

Second Edition. Crown Svo. 6s. 

Mrs. Watson. THIS MAN^S DOMINION. By the Author 
of ' A High Little World. ' Second Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s. 

Marriott Watson. DIOGENES OF LONDON. By 

H. B. Marriott Watson. Crown 8w. Btickram. 6s. 

M. Gilchrist. THE STONE DRAGON. By Murray Gil- 
christ. Crown Zvo. Buckram. 6s. 

' The author's faults are atoned for by certain positive and admirable merits. The 
romances have not their counterpart in modern literature, and to read them is a 
unique experience.' — National Obscft'er. 

E. Dickinson. A VICAR'S WIFE. By Evelyn Dickinson. 

Crown Svo. 6s. 
E. M. Gray. ELS A. By E. M 'Queen Gray. Crozau Svo. 6s. 



3/6 



THREE-AND-SIXPENNY NOVELS 

Crown Svo. 
DERRICK VAUGHAN, NOVELIST. By Edna Lyall. 
MARGERY OF QUETHER. By S. Baring Gould. 
JACQUETTA. By S. Baring Gould. 
SUBJECT TO VANITY. By Margaret Benson. 
THE SIGN OF THE SPIDER. By Bertram Mitford. 
THE MOVING FINGER. By Mary Gaunt. 
JACO TRELOAR. By J. H. Pearce. 
THE DANCE OF THE HOURS. By 'Vera.' 
A WOMAN OF FORTY. By Esme Stuart. 
A CUMBERER OF THE GROUND. By Constance 

Smith. 
THE SIN OF ANGELS. By Evelyn Dickinson. 
AUT DIABOLUS AUT NIHIL. By X. L. 
THE COMING OF CUCULAIN. By Standish O'Grady. 
THE GODS GIVE MY DONKEY WINGS. By Angus 

Evan Abbott. 
THE STAR GAZERS. By G. Manville Fenn. 
THE POISON OF ASPS. By R. Orton Prowse. 
THE QUIET MRS. FLEMING. By R. Pryce. 
DISENCHANTMENT. By F. Mabel Robinson. 
THE SQUIRE OF W'ANDALES. By A. Shield. 
A REVEREND GENTLEMAN. By J. M. Cobban. 



34 Messrs. Methuen's List 

A DEPLORABLE AFFAIR. By W. E. Norris. : 

A CAVALIER'S LADYE. By Mrs. Dicker. 

THE PRODIGALS. By Mrs. Oliphant. 

THE SUPPLANTER. By P. Neumann. 

A MAN WITH BLACK EYELASHES. By H. A. KENNEDY. 

A HANDFUL OF EXOTICS. By S. Gordon. 

AN ODD EXPERIMENT. By Hannah Lynch. 



2/6 



HALF-CROWN NOVELS 

A Series of Novels by popular AtUhors. 

1. HOVENDEN, V.C. By F. Mabel Robinson. 

2. ELI'S CHILDREN. By G. Manville Fenn. 

3. A DOUBLE KNOT. By G. Manville Fenn. 

4. DISARMED. By M. Betham Edwards. 

5. A MARRIAGE AT SEA. By W. Clark Russell. 

6. IN TENT AND BUNGALOW. By the Author of ' Indian 

Idylls.' 

7. MY STEWARDSHIP. By E. M'Queen Gray. 

8. JACK'S FATHER. By W. E. NoRRis. 

9. JIM B. 

lo. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. By F. Mabel Robinson. 
ir. MR. BUTLER'S WARD. By F. Mabel Robinson. 
12. A LOST ILLUSION. By Leslie Keith. 



Lynn Linton. THE TRUE HISTORY OF JOSHUA DAVID- 
SON, Christian and Communist. By E, Lynn Linton. Eleventh 
Edition. Post Svo. is. 



Books for Boys and Girls olA 

A Series of Books by well-kno'iun Authors^ well illustrated. ^\ 

1. THE ICELANDER'S SWORD. By S. Baring Gould. 

2. TWO LITTLE CHILDREN AND CHING. By Edith 

E. CUTIIELL. 

3. TODDLEBEN'S HERO. By M. M. Blake. 

4. ONLY A GUARD-ROOM DOG. By Edith E. Cuthell. 

5. THE DOCTOR OF THE JULIET. By Harry Colling- 

WOOD. 

6. MASTER ROCKAFELLAR'S VOYAGE. By W. Clark 

RUSSKLL. 

7. SYD BELTON : Or, The Boy who would not go to Sea. 

Cy G. Manville Fenn. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 35 



3/6 



The Peacock Library 

A Series of Books for Girls by well-known Authors, 
handsomely bound in bine and silver, and zvell illustrated. 

1. A PINCH OF EXPERIENCE. By L. B. Walford. 

2. THE RED GRANGE. By Mrs. Molesworth. 

3. THE SECRET OF MADAME DE MONLUC. By the 

Author of ' Mdle Mori.' 

4. DUMPS. By Mrs. Parr, Author of 'Adam and Eve.' 

5. OUT OF THE FASHION. By L. T. Meade. 

6. A GIRL OF THE PEOPLE. By L. T. Meade. 

7. HEPSY GIPSY. By L. T. Meade, is. 6d. 

8. THE HONOURABLE MISS. By L. T. Meade. 

9. MY LAND OF BEULAH. By Mrs. Leitii Adams. 



University Extension Series 

A series of books on historical, Hterary, and scienlific subjects, suitable 
for extension students and home-reading circles. Each volume is com- 
plete in itself, and the subjects are treated by competent writers in a 
broad and philosophic spirit. 

Edited by J. E. SYMES, M.A., 

Principal of University College, Nottingham. 

Crown Svo. Price {with some exceptions) 2s. 6d. 

The following volumes are ready : — 

THE INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By H. de B. Gibbins, 
D.Litt., M.A,, late Scholar of Wadham College, Oxen., Cobden Prizeman. 
Fifth Editio7i, Revised. With Maps and Plans, y. 
'A compact and clear story of our industrial development. A study of this concise 
but luminous book cannot fail to give the reader a clear insight into the principal 
phenomena of our industrial history. The editor and publishers are to be congrat- 
ulated on this first volume of their venture, and we shall look with expectant 
interest for the succeeding volumes of the series.' — University Extension Journal, 

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY. By L. L. PmCE, 
M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxon. Second Edition. 

PROBLEMS OF POVERTY : An Inquiry into the Industrial Conditions of 
the Poor. By J. A. HOBSON, M.A. Third Edition. 

VICTORIAN POETS. By A. Sharp. 

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By J. E. Sy^IES. M.A. 

PSYCHOLOGY, By F. S. Granger, M.A. 



36 Messrs. Methuen's List 

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANT LIFE : Lower Forms. By G. TvLvssee. 

IVi^/i Illustratiotis. 
AIR AND WATER. Professor V. B. Lewes, M.A. Ilhistrated. 
THE CHEMISTRY OF LIFE AND HEALTH. By C. W. KiMMixs, 

M.A. Illustrated, 

THE MECHANICS OF DAILY LIFE. By V. P. Sells, M.A. Illustraied. 

ENGLISH SOCIAL REFORMERS. H. DE B. Gibbins, D.Litt.. M.A. 

ENGLISH TRADE AND FINANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY. By W. A. S. Hewins, B.A. 

THE CHEMISTRY OF FIRE. The Elementary Principles of Chemistry. 
By M. M. Pattison Muir, M.A. Ilhistrated. 

A TEXT-BOOK OF AGRICULTURAL BOTANY. By M. C. Potter, 
M.A.. F.L.S. Illustrated, y. 6d. 

THE VAULT OF HEAVEN. A Popular Introduction to Astronomy. 
By R. A. Gregory. With numerous Illustratlotis. 

METEOROLOGY. The Elements of Weather and Climate. By H. N. 
Dickson, F.R.S.E., F.R. Met. Soc. Illustrated. 

A MANUAL OF ELECTRICAL SCIENCE. By George J. Burch, 
M.A. With numerous I llustratio?is. 3?. 

THE EARTH. An Introduction to Physiography. By Evan Small, IvI A. 
Illustrated. 

INSECT LIFE. By F. W. Theobald, M.A. Illustrated. 

ENGLISH POETRY FROM BLAKE TO BROWNING. By W. M. 

Dixon, M.A. 
ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By E. Jenks, M.A., Professor of 

Law at University College, Liverpool. 
THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE. By G. L. Dickinson, Fellow of King's 

College, Cambridge. 

Social Questions of To-day 

Edited by H. de B. GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A. 

Crozvn 2>vo. 2s. 6d. \ /" 

A series of volumes upon those topics of social, economic, ^ j yj 

and industrial interest that are at the present moment fore- 1 

most in the public mind. Each volume of the series is written by an 
author who is an acknowledged authority upon the subject with which 
he deals. 

The following Volumes of the Series are ready : — 
TRADE UNIONISM -NEW AND OLD. By G. Howell, Author of 
' The Conflicts of Capital and Labour.' Second Edition. 

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT TO-DAY. By G. J. Holyoake, 
Author of ' The History of Co-Operation.' Second Edition. 

MUTUAL THRIFT. By Rev. J. Frome Wilkinson, M.A.. Author of 
' The Friendly Society Movement.' 



Messrs. Methuen's List 37 

PROBLEMS OF POVERTY : An Inquiry into the Industrial Conditions of 
the Poor. By J. A. Hobson, M.A. Third Edition. 

THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS. By C. F. Bastaple, M.A., Professor 
of Economics at Trinity College, Dublin. 

THE ALIEN INVASION. By W. H. Wilkins, B.A., Secretary to the 
Society for Preventing the Immigration of Destitute Aliens. 

THE RURAL EXODUS. By P. Anderson Graham. 

LAND NATIONALIZATION. By Harold Cox, B.A. 

A SHORTER WORKING DAY. By H. de B. Gibbins, D.Litt., M.A., 
and R. A. Hadfield, of the Hecla Works, Sheffield. 

BACK TO THE LAND : An Inquiry into the Cure for Rural Depopulation. 
By H. E. Moore. 

TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORNERS: As affecting Commerce and Industry. 
By J. Stephen Jeans, M.R.I. , F.S.S. 

THE FACTORY SYSTEM. By R. Cooke Taylor. 

THE STATE AND ITS CHILDREN. By Gertrude Tuckwell. 

WOMEN'S WORK. By Lady Dilke, Miss Bulley, and Miss Whitley. 

MUNICIPALITIES AT WORK. The Municipal Policy of Six Great 
Towns, and its Influence on their Social Welfare. By Frederick Dolman. 

SOCIALISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By M. Kaufmann. 

THE HOUSING OF THE W^ORKING CLASSES. By R. F. Bowmaker. 

MODERN CIVILIZATION IN SOME OF ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS. 
By W, Cunningham, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNEMPLOYED. By J. A. Hobson, B.A., 
Author of ' The Problems of Poverty. ' 

LIFE IN WEST LONDON. By Arthur Sherwell, M.A. Secoiid Edition, 



Classical Translations 

Editedby H. F. FOX, M. A. , Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. 

Messrs. Methuen are issuing a New Series of Translations from the 
Greek and Latin Classics. They have enlisted the services of some 
of the best Oxford and Cambridge Scholars, and it is their intention that 
the Series shall be distinguished by literary excellence as well as by 
scholarly accuracy. 

/FSCHYLUS— Agamemnon, Choephoroe, Eumenides. Translated by Lewis 
Campbell, LL.D. , late Professor of Greek at St. Andrews, 5^-. 

CICERO— De Oratore I. Translated by E. N. P. Moor, M.A. 3^. dd. 

CICERO — Select Orations (Pro Milone, Pro Murena, Philippic 11., In 
Catilinam). Translated by H. E. D. Blakiston, M.A., Fellow and 
Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. 5^. 



38 Messrs. Methuen's List 

CICERO— De Natura Deorum. Translated by F. Brooks, M.A., late 
Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford, ^s. 6d. 

LUCIAN — Six Dialogues (Nigrinus, Icaro-Menippus, The Cock, The Ship, The 
Parasite, The Lover of Falsehood). Translated by S. T. Ir win, M. A. , Assis- 
tant Master at Clifton ; late Scholar of Exeter College, Oxford, y. 6d. 

SOPHOCLES— Electra and Ajax. Translated by E. D. A. Morshead, 

M.A., Assistant Master at Winchester. 2s. 6d. 

TACITUS— Agricola and Germania. Translated by R. B. Townshexd, 
late Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge. 2s. 6d. 



Educational Books 



CLASSICAL 

PLAUTI BACCHIDES. Edited with Introduction, Commentary, and 
Critical Notes by J. M'COSH, M.A. Fca/>. a^to. \q.s. 6d. 
'The notes are copious, and contain a great deal of information that is good and 
useful.' — Ciassical Review. 

TACITI AGRICOLL With Introductionr Notes, Map, etc. By R. F. 
Davis, M.A., Assistant Master at Weymouth College. Ci-owji ^vo. 2s. 

TACITI GERMANIA, By the same Editor. C7-07vn 8vo. 2s, 

HERODOTUS : EASY SELECTIONS. With Vocabulary. By A. C. 
LiDDELi., M. A., Assistant Master at Nottingham High School. Fc(7./>. 
Svo. IS. 6d. 

SELECTIONS FROM THE ODYSSEY. By E. D. Stone, M. A., late 
Assistant Master at Eton. FcaJ>. Svo. is. 6d. 

PLAUTUS : THE CAPTIVI. Adapted for Lower Forms by J. H. Fresse, 
M.A. , late Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge, is. 6d. 

DEMOSTHENES AGAINST CONON AND CALLICLES. Edited with 
Notes and Vocabulary, by F. Darwin Swift, M.A., formerly Scholar 
of Queen's College, Oxford ; Assistant Master at Dcnstone College. 
Fcap. Svo. 2s. 

GERMAN 

A COMPANION GERMAN GRAMMAR. By H. de B. Ginr.ixs, D.Litt.. 
M.A., Assistant Master at Nottingham High School. Cro'w/i 8:v. is. 6d. 

GERMAN PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. By E. 
M 'Queen Gray. C?v7c>fi Svo. 2s. 6d. 

SCIENCE 

THE WORLD OF SCIENCE. Including Clicmistry, Heat, Light, Sotmd. 
Alagnctism, Electricity, Botany, Zoology, Physiology, Astronomy, and 
Geology, By R. Elliott Steel, M.A., F.C.S. 147 Illustrations. 
Seco7?d Edition. Croivn Svo. 2s. 6d. 
' If ]\Ir. Steel is to be placed second to any for this quality of lucidity, it is only to 
Huxley hlinscir; and to be named in the same breath with this master of the 
craft of teacliing is to be accredited with the clearness of style antl simplicity of 
arrangement that belong to thorough mastery of a subject.' — Parents' Kevieiv. 

ELEMENTARY LIGHT. By R. E. Steel. With numerous Illustrations. 

Croicji Zvo. .\s. 6d. 



Messrs. Methuen's List 39 

ENGLISH 

ENGLISH RECORDS. A Companion to the History of England. By 
H. E. Malden, M.A. Crowji Svo. y. 6d. 
A book which aims at concentrating information upon dates, genealogy, officials, con- 
stitutional documents, etc., which is usually found scattered in different volumes. 

THE ENGLISH CITIZEN : HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES. By H. E. 
Malden, M.A. is. 6d. 
' The book goes over the same ground as is traversed in the school books on this 
subject written to satisfy the requirements of the_ Education Code_. It would 
serve admirably the purposes of a text-book, as it is well based in historical 
facts, and keeps quite clear of party m^.tt&rs.'—Scots7!Ta7t. 

METHUEN'S COMMERCIAL SERIES 

Edited Ly II. de B. GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A. 
BRITISH COAIMERCE AND COLONIES FROM ELIZABETH TO 

VICTORIA. By li. de B. Gibbixs, D.Litt., M.A., Author of 'The 

Industrial History of England,' etc., etc., 2S. 
COMMERCIAL EXAMINATION PAPERS. By H. DE B. Gibbins, 

D.Litt., M.A. , IS. 6d. 
THE ECONOMICS OF COM?\IERCE. By H. DE B. Gibbins, D.Litt., 

M.A. i^. 6d. 
A MANUAL OF FRENCH COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE. 

By S. E. Bally, Modern Language Master at the Manchester Grammar 

School. 2s. 
GERMAN COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE. By S. E. Bally, 

Assistant Master at the Manchester Grammar School. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
A FRENCH COMMERCIAL READER. By S. E. Bally. 2s. 
COMMERCIAL GEOGRAPHY, with special reference to Trade Routes, 

New Markets, and Manufacturing Districts. By L. W. Lyde, M.A., of 

the Academy, Glasgow. 2s. 
A PRIMER OF BUSINESS. By S. Jackson, M.A. xs. 6d. 
COMMERCIAL ARITHMETIC. By F. G. Taylor, M.A. is. 6d. 
PRECIS WRITING AND OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE. By E. E. 

Whitfield, M.A. 

WORKS BY A. M. M. STEDMAN, M.A. 

INITIA LATINA: Easy Lessons on Elementary Accidence. Secorid Edition, 

Fcap. 8zv. Ts, 
FIRST LATIN LESSONS. Fourth Edition. Croum %vo. 2S. 
FIRST LATIN READER. With Notes adapted to the Shorter Latin 

Primer and Vocabulary. T/iird Edition. i8fno. is. 6d. 
EASY SELECTIONS FROM CAESAR. Part i. The Helvetian War. 

i8mo. IS. 
EASY SELECTIONS FROM LIVY. Part i. The Kings of Rome. i8?no. 

IS. 6d. 
EASY LATIN PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. Fi/t/i 

Edition. Fcap. 8vo. \s. 6d. 
EXEMPLA LATINA. Firit Lessons in Latin Accidence. With Vocabulary. 

Croion 8vo. \s. 
EASY LATIN EXERCISES ON THE SYNTAX OF THE SHORTER 

AND REVISED LATIN PRIMER. With Vocabulary. Sixth 

Edition. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. Issued with the consent of Dr. Kennedy. 



40 Messrs. Methuen's List 

THE LATIN COMPOUND SENTENCE : Rules and Exercises. Crown 

8vo. IS. 6d. With Vocabulary. 2s. 
NOTANDA QUAEDAM : Miscellaneous Latin Exercises on Common Rules 

and Idioms. Third Edition. Fcap. ?>vo. \s. 6d. With Vocabulary. 2j. 
LATIN VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION: Arranged according to 

Subjects. Sixth Edition. Fcap. Zvo. \s. 6d. 
A VOCABULARY OF LATIN IDIOMS AND PHRASES. iBmo. is. 
STEPS TO GREEK. i8mo. is. 
EASY GREEK PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. Second 

Edition. Fcap. 8vo. is. 6d. 
GREEK VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION. Arranged according to 

Subjects, Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. \s. 6d. 
GREEK TESTAMENT SELECTIONS. For the use of Schools. Third 

Edition. With Introduction, Notes, and Vocabulary. Fcap. 8vo. is. td, 
STEPS TO FRENCH. Second Edition. i8mo. M. 
FIRST FRENCH LESSONS. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. is. 
EASY FRENCH PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. Second 

Edition. Fcap. 2>vo. is. 6d. 
EASY FRENCH EXERCISES ON ELEMENTARY SYNTAX. With. 

Vocabulary. Crown 2>vo. 2S. 6d. 
FRENCH VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION: Arranged according to 

Subjects. Fifth Edition. Fcap, 8vo. is. 

SCHOOL EXAMINATION SERIES 

Edited by A. M. M. STEDMAN, M.A. Crown Svo. 2s. 6J. 

FRENCH EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS GRAM-^ 
MAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A. Eighth Edition. 
A Key, issued to Tutors and Private Students only, to be had on 
application to tl.e Publishers. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s.net. 

LATIN EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS GRAM- 
MAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. ^\. Stedman, M.A. Seventh Edition. 
Key issued as above. 6s. net. 

GREEK EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS GRAM- 
MAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A. Fifth Edition. 
Key issued as above. 6s. net. 

GERMAN EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS GRAM- 
MAR AND IDIOMS. By R. J. MORicii, Manchester. Fourth Edition. 
Key issued as above. 6s. vet. 

HISTORY AND Gl'lOGRAPHY EXAMINATION PAPERS. By C. H. 
Spence, M.A., Clifton College. 

SCIENCE EXAMINATION PAPERS. By R. E. Steel, M.A. , F.C.S., 
Chief Natural Science Master, Br^ulford Grammar School. In tzvo vols. 
Part I. Chemistry ; Part ii. Physics. 

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE EXAMINATION PAPERS. By A. M. M. 
Stedman, M.A. Third Edition. Key issr.cd as above, js. net. 



Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to Her Majesty 
at the Edinburgh University Press 



UNTVr STTY OF CALIFORNIA LIBR 



•T t:\7 



mmm_ 






RETURN TO nis?*^'*^ "SE 
^ TURN TO DBSK FROM WHICH BORROWED 

iOAN DEPT. 




LD 62A-50W-2 '64 
(E3494sl0)94i2A 




. GeneraJ Library