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A DIGEST OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC

A DIGEST

DEDUCTIVE LOGIC

FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS

JOHNSON BARKER, B.A.

METHUEN & CO.

36, ESSEX STREET, W.C.

LONDON

1897

PREFACE

This book does not pretend to be a treatise. It
is a note book, intended to be used side by side
with the ordinary Manual. My indebtedness to
the ordinary Manual, as may be supposed, is con-
siderable, for in large part these notes are little
more than a summary of what any ordinary
manual will contain : to summarise, however, was
my main purpose.

The book is designed, as stated in the title, for
students preparing for examination. It offers
them, firstly, an outline of that portion of the
subject which the text book treats in full ; and,
secondly, it provides a somewhat fuller discussion
of points that are apt to be overlooked or omitted.
It has been my aim throughout to bring into the
relief of bare outline the essentials of deduction,
and to elucidate obscurities.

This book, then, differs from other works in
being condensed where they are full, and in being
supplementary where they are condensed, and thus
it may claim a certain sort of freshness of treatment.

220697

vi PREFACE

These notes have already been found useful in
teaching. It is hoped that their usefulness may
be extended by publication.

The questions in Appendix I. are selected
mainly from the B.A. examination papers set at
the Universities of London and Durham. They
are arranged, as far as possible, in sets correspond-
ing to the subject matter of the chapters to which
the Roman numerals refer. The number of ques-
tions might easily have been multiplied : their
purpose here, however, is not so much to supply
an exhaustive praxis, but to indicate, all along the
line of the study, the general standard required of
those who take up Logic for examination.

The Bibliography in Appendix II. is not in any
sense complete. It is a list compiled in the course
of my own reading, which for purposes of reference
from time to time I have found useful. It is more
complete than any similar list with which I am
acquainted.

Johnson Barker.

CONTENTS

CHAP.

I. LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE

IL DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC

III. THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE

IV. TERMS

V. CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION

VI. PROPOSITIONS

VII. PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS

VIII. DEFINITION AND DIVISION

IX. IMPORT OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION
QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE

X. DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION

XI. IM.MEDIATE INFERENCES

XII. THE LAWS OF THOUGHT

XIII. THE SYLLOGISM

XIV. FIGURE AND MOOD : REDUCTION

PAGE
I

7
17
25
32

37
48

59
65
71
85
89
100

Vlll

CONTENTS

CHAP. I'AGE

XV. IRREGULAR AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS 112

XVI. FALLACIES ...

XVII. THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM
XVIII. SUMMARIES AND TABULAR STATEMENTS

APPENDIX I EXAMINATION PAPERS

APPENDIX II BIBLIOGRAPHY ...

123
129

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

CHAPTER I

LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE

REFERENCES

Jevons, ch. iv. and vi.
Keynes, Introduction.
Welton, Vol, i., Introd., ch. i.
Mill, Bk. i., ch. i.

Logic is the science of the laws of valid thought.

No such science is possible without a commonly
received and understood means of expressing
thought. The accepted means of expression is
language. At the outset therefore we must take
into account the nature and purpose of language
in its connexion with thought.

Matter of thought is suppHed b}^ sensory impres-
sions, which act as stimuli to the mind and
excite ideas. This raw material becomes know-
ledge only through the activity of the mind itself.
Mind has a power of synthesis which collects into

2 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

one complex whole the various impressions received
through the senses, and allocates them in one
external object, of which we thus form a mental
image or idea. This result of mental activity is
perception. Perception, then, may be defined as
that state of mind in which it becomes conscious
of an individual sensible object. But we are capable
of more than such simple acts of consciousness,
and so much more that this is not commonly
regarded as being thought at all.

The first stage of thought is conception. Con-
ception is the name for knowing generally, as
opposed to perception in which we apprehend only
the attributes of the individual thing perceived.
The concept is to be regarded as an extract or
deposit — either word is better than "abstract" —
from a number of resembling percepts or images.
It is a general notion formed by a comparison of
individuals and the selection of attributes common
to them all : in other words it is the discovery of
likeness.

Perception is apprehension of a thing : concep-
tion is apprehension of a kind of thing. Percept
is knowledge of a particular : concept is knowledge
of a general. For perception naming is advan-
tageous, but not essential. For conception language
is indispensable. The name combines and registers
in a fixed form a group of certain attributes, which
otherwise would become disunited in thought when
not attended to. It helps to recall that group and
to keep it distinct from other groups.

LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 3

The psychological concept is equivalent to the
logical connotation or significance of a class name
or general term. The general term thus formed
need not refer to any actually existing class. It
is enough that such a class can be conceived in
thought, even though it have only one actual
representative, or exist only in imagination.

Naming, therefore, or some similar system of
signs, is an essential factor in the progress and
process of thought. The concept is the unit of
thought, and without a name, would rapidly tend
to disintegrate.

Language may be defined as a system of signs
for the purpose of facilitating or economising the
process of thought and of recording and expressing its
product. This definition includes gesture or imitative
language, and conventional or verbal language.
In conventional language the connexion between
symbols and ideas is arbitrary and artificial.

Speech is the universal medium of communica-
tion because it is a natural method of expression.
Men speak, not because they mean to speak, but
because they are constituted as they are. It is
also the most easily employed, as well as the most
effective system of intercommunication.

The chief functions of language may . thus be
summarised —

I. It is a means of intercommunication.

II. It is a mechanical aid to thought, enabling
us to form concepts and facilitating the process of
thinking.

4 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

III. It is an instrument of record and reference,

demanding two main requirements, viz. —

(i) Precision or definiteness of meaning, and
(2) Completeness.
Language is modified by two great and contrary
processes, viz. —

I. Generalisation, and
II. Specialisation.

I. Generalisation arises from detection of like-
ness between a new object without a name, and
some other object well known ; the old name is
applied to the new object. This change is usually
effected by a sort of unconscious instinct in a
number of persons using the name. In the
language of science such changes are often pur-
posely made. Proper, or singular names, are
constantly generalised both in popular and in
scientific language.

II. Specialisation is a change exactly the oppo-
site, and equally important. A name originally
applicable to a multiplicity of objects by usage
comes to be applied only to a few ; or to put
the same fact in another way, applied originally
in a general sense it comes to have a special
significance and application. One effect of special-
isation is what is known as dcsyiionyiiiisatioii^ or
the differentiation of synonyms.

In addition to the changes effected b}^ generalis-
ation and specialisation, vast enlargement and
changes have also been made in language b}- the
process of analogous or metaphorical extension of

LOGIC, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE 5

the meaning of words. Practically this consists
in generalisation, and differs only in proceeding
by analogy rather than identity, that is, the ex-
tension of meaning is based on imagined re-
semblance rather than any actual likeness between
the new object and the old after which it is called.

Ambiguities of language are of frequent occur-
rence. Very few words indeed have one and only^
one definite meaning. The exact meaning of a
word depends for the most part upon the context
in which it is used. This indeterminateness of
meaning gives rise to confusion of thought and
misunderstanding — technically called fallacy. Bear-
ing this in mind, words have been classified as —

L Univocal when they suggest no more than
one definite meaning,

IL Equivocal^ ambiguous, or Jiouionyiiioits when
suggestive of two or more meanings, and

II L Analogous when with the same meaning
they have a different application. E.g. foot — of a
mountain : of an animal : of a page : a measure of
length.

Equivocal words are further classified according
as equivocation arises from their (i) Sound, (2)
Spelling, or (3) both Sound and Spelling. These
latter are grouped according as equivocation arises
from {a) accidental confusion of different words,
(^) transfer of meaning by association of ideas, or
{c) logical transfer of meaning to analogous objects.

An ambiguous word is in reality not one, but
two or more words confused together. Language

6 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

is full of ambiguities, and we cannot proceed far
in logic until we have placed a precise interpret-
ation upon certain forms of words as representing
thought. If thought, and thought alone, were the
subject matter of logic, there would be no such
necessity. The fact that such necessity exists shows
that to eliminate all considerations of language
from logic is an impossibility. In dealing with
such ambiguous words logically, we must first of all
determine from the context one clear and definite
meaning. Then, and not till then, can we proceed.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC

REFERENXES

Jevons, Lessons, ch. i.

Keynes, Introd., §§ i and 2.

Welton, Vol. i., Introd., ch. ii., pp. 16 — 19.

Mill, Logic, Introd.

Mill, Exam, of Sir IVni. Hamilton, ch. xx., p. 373.

Ray, Introd. and Appendix E, p. 302.

Bain, Ded. Log., pp. 30— 37-

Read, Carveth, Theojy of Logic, Introd.

Logic is the science of the principles which regulate
valid thought and its expression in language.

Many other definitions of logic have been given
which have varied greatly according to the view
taken of the scope of the science. Of these Bain in
his Deduction quotes and discusses the following —

[rt:] The Art of Reasoning.

\b'\ The Science and Art of Reasoning.

[^] The Science of the Laws of Thought.

\d\ The Science of the Operations of the Under-
standing in the Pursuit of Truth.

8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

[c] The Science of the Operations of the Under-
standing which are concerned in, or are subservient
to, the Estimation of Evidence.

Mill quotes and criticises the definitions [a], [d],
and [d], giving [e] as his own.

Reverting to the definition given at the head of
this chapter, and accepting it as tolerably compre-
hensive, the meaning of the words employed must
be clearly- understood.

Science is coherent or systematised knowledge.
Its office is to detect and describe the natural laws
inflexibly observed by the objects treated in the
science. There is a science of.human reason or
thought because there are uniform modes in which
every one thinks and reasons, and must think and
reason.

A law or principle is uniformity of mode : also
the statement of this uniformity. In other words
it is the statement of a general truth. By laws of
thought we mean "a certain uniformity or agree-
ment which exists and must exist in the modes
in which all persons think and reason, so long as
they do not make what w^e call mistakes, or fall
into self-contradiction and fallacy " (/evo/is).

Psychology deals with these laws in the sense of
uniformities, that is, laws in accordance with which
men are found by experience normally to think
and reason. It also investigates their genesis and
development. Logic deals with them purely as
statements which are regulative and authoritative,
that is, as affording criteria by the aid of which

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 9

valid and invalid reasonings may be discrimin-
ated.

The word thought is used at least in three
senses, viz. —

{a) Any mental state : conceiving, judging, in-
ferring.

{b) Thought-process: conception, judgment, in-
ference.

With regard to validity or truth, the most
effective statement is that valid, true, or correct
thought or thinking is that which is so recog-
nised by all minds, that is, a thought is valid
when it holds not only for the thinker, but for all
others to whom he may communicate it. True
thought has a general application : it is knowledge
of a general kind for all alike. Logic investigates
and determines the conditions under which the
thought of one mind can stand for the thought of
all minds ; it is concerned with the conditions
under which a thinker can claim from all minds
assent to his own thought.

Validity is of two kinds : {a) formal, (J?) real.

{ii) Formal validity is self-consistency, z. e. not
self-contradiction.

{U) Real validity is consistency with objective
reality, i. e. with fact.

Take, e.g. two propositions —
(i) All men are mortal.
(2) No man is immortal.

lo A DIGEST OF LOGIC

You cannot but think (i) when the thought ex-
pressed is referred to the real and actual experi-
ence of life, and it assures the validity of (2), that
is, (2) is true in consistency with and because of
(i). Some affirm that there is no other logic than
that which has to do with making thought self-
consistent. The Laws of Thought {q. v.), Identity,
Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, are laws of
consistency.

The wider view of consistency requires the
agreement of thought with fact. In the example
above, (2) is consistent with (i), and is therefore
logically valid. But does it also agree with fact ?
If not, it must be rejected as invalid. It is to be
noted that the conditions for determining the
truth of self-consistency are different from those
which determine the consistency of thought with
fact.

Since the time of Kant, it has been usual to call
that treatment of logic which deals with the
internal, intrinsic or self-consistency of thought by
the name of pure or formal logic as opposed to
applied or material logic which deals with the ex-
ternal, extrinsic consistency of thought, /. f. of the
agreement of thought with its object as actually
existing either as something material or mental,
real or imaginary.

Formal logic takes no account whatever of the
subject matter of thought. It deals with thought
without any extrinsic reference, /. e. without refer-
ence to fact or reality of any kind. Hence we may

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC ii

represent thoughts by bare and empty symbols.
Thus in the empty schema —

All M is P
All 5 is M

All 6" is P

S, M, and P may stand for anything. The
reasoning proceeds and the conclusion follows
irrespective of the matter denoted by the terms
involved or our knowledge of their meaning ; the
intrinsic consistency of the thought remains un-
altered however we interpret the terms.

The distinction between formal and material logic
does not correspond with the distinction between
Deduction and Induction. Some writers wrongly
make this distinction, e.g. Bain and Fowler. There
is a Logic of Formal Induction as much as a Logic
of Formal Deduction, just as there is also a Logic
of Material Deduction.

The laws of thought have been called necessary.
Their " necessity " consists in the impossibility of
ev^ading them without inconsistency. In the defin-
ition of logic therefore as "the science of the
necessary laws of thought," necessary means valid
in the sense of being self- consistent.

As with the definition of logic the scope and
purpose of the science is variously stated accord-
ing to the aspect in which it is regarded. If a
man holds that general knowledge or thought pro-
ceeds only by way of language, he may treat of

12 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

it by its expression and he is called a nominalist.
If he holds that you may think without language,
he may treat of it by concepts, judgments, infer-
ences, and he is called a conceptualist But by
talking of names and concepts indifferently no
inconsistency is involved, for nominalism need not
be accepted so as to deny conceptualism, nor need
conceptualism be accepted so as to affirm the
possibility of thought without language.

Again, thought is always of something, i. e. has
an objective reference, though not necessarily of
anything which actually exists. But even when
thinking of something which ' has no objective
existence it is thought of as an object, i.e. the
thought is objectified. Thus we may proceed
further and say that logic is concerned with things
in so far as they are the objects of thought, and
with language in so far as it is the embodiment of
thought. This is the view of the Realist.

Though as pure logicians we deal with the form
or manner of thought as opposed to its matter,
yet in a sense log^ic is an objective science : in the
sense, that is, of dealing with a certain aspect of
things, viz. their thinkableness.

There are then three aspects in which logic may
be viewed, viz. —

I. Subjectively,
II. Objectively,

III. Verbally.

As previously stated the definition of logic
adopted by any one logician will be modified

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF LOGIC

according to the point of view taken. The defini-
tions following are framed in accordance with one
or other of these aspects, and exhibit the difference
which the point of view adopted necessitates.

I. Subjective aspect. Logic is the science of
the regulative principles of thought ; or the science
of the axioms and laws to which thought must
conform in order to be valid.

This definition may be read as either that of
formal or material logic according to the meaning
of the word valid. If valid be read as self-consistent
the definition is of formal logic. But if as con-
sistent with reality it is the definition of material
logic.

II. Objective aspect. Logic is the science of
the most universal relations and correlations of
things and attributes, i. e. the science of the prin-
ciples and laws to which we must conform in order
that a relation established by comparison of things
and attributes, or inferred from one or more given
relations between them, may be true. This is a
definition of material logic.

III. Verbal aspect. Logic is conversant about
language, and is the science of the use of names,
propositions and arguments ; or, logic is the science
of the import and relations of propositions. As
already noted, this treatment of logic is some-
times called Nominalism, as opposed to Concep-
tualism. These names are ambiguous, for they
usually apply to certain doctrines concerning the
true nature of concepts, or general names. Nom-

14 A DIGEST OF LOCUC

inalism however, involves no more than a clear
recognition that, as a matter of fact, all thought-
processes of any complexity are carried on by the
aid of language. It is here used to denote that
view of logic which seeks to remove from it the
matter of thought, and also the mode of thought,
and limits the science to a consideration only of
the expression of thought. In this sense logic
is also sometimes spoken of as symbolic.

Ill its relation to other sciences logic has been
called ^^ scientia scientiannn'' because in their
method the sciences are based upon logical prin-
ciples. This is its general r&lation. There are
other special relations of logic to

(i) Metaphysics.

(2) Psychology.

(3) Rhetoric, and

(4) Grammar.

In general the difference between logic and the
other sciences may be stated as follows : the laws
of thought arc laws of things as thinkable and are
subjective in so far as they relate to thinking : but
objective in so far as they relate to the objects
thought about. In the other sciences we never
get so far away from the objective basis. In logic
the subjective aspect is always prominent and
immediate.

More particularly the relation of logic to these
four sciences may be briefly stated as follows :

(i) Metaphysics is the most general and specu-
lative of the mental sciences, and its office is to

CHAPTER III

THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. ii.

Welton, Vol. i., Introd., ch. ii., pp. 19 seq.

Logic is usually regarded as consisting of three
parts, which according to the point of view are : —

I. ia) Concepts, {b) Terms, or {c) Things or
attributes. Y

II. {a) Judgments, (b) Propositions, or {c) Rela-
tion between , things and attributes, things and
things, or attributes and attributes.

III. {a) Inference, {b) Syllogism, or {c) Inference
of relation between things and attributes, things
and things, or attributes and attributes from one
or more given relations.

In this partition {a) will be the phraseology of
formal logic, {b) that of symbolic logic, and [c] that
of material logic.

Method is sometimes added as a fourth part of
logical doctrine. It refers to the disposition or

1 8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

arranorement of a series of reasonincf in discourse,
and is therefore a part of rhetoric rather than of
logic.

These three parts of logical doctrine call for
further discussion, and though the following analysis
of conception is strictly speaking psychological,
it finds a place here in deference to tradition which
includes in the treatment of logic notice of the
dispute anent the nature of the concept. The
practical purpose served by introducing a notice
of this dispute is that it enables us to understand
more clearly than we could do otherwise what is
the subject matter about which logic is con-
versant.

I. Three views as to the nature of the concept
have been formulated. They are known as

(i) Realism,

(2) Conceptualism, and

(3) Nominalism.

( 1 ) The Realists hold that for every concept or
general name there is somewhere in existence an
objective, real something to correspond with it.
They deny that the concept is a psychical pro-
duct which grows out of a perception of singular
or particular objects. This view is obsolete and
has now only a historic interest.

(2) The Conceptualist asserts that the concept
is an intelligible synthesis of attributes, without
any existing objective entity, and that thought
proceeds without the accompaniment of definite
images by means of the concept alone.

THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 19

(3) According to the Nominalist view a class
is constituted only by its name : and the general
name has nothing to correspond with it either
objectively or subjectively. It is held that every
time a general name is used, an image, or a rapid
succession of images of various members of the
class, is present to the mind, and as these images
are individual they cannot be concepts, for as we
have already seen the concept is knowledge of a
general.

The Conceptualists and Nominalists (both are
sometimes called Nominalists) agree in declaring
that the development of the concept is by elabora-
tion from perceptions. The Conceptualist declares
that in the concept there is something more or less
definitely represented by the mind, that the concept
is not an image of a thing, but is some kind of
image. The Nominalist holds that the concept
is nothing before the mind at all, but is a symbol,
generally vocal, as a word or name : and that any
image you can have is the image always of one
thing, and as that is not a concept the name of
the thing must be. Bain as a Nominalist says
that the true psychological aspect of the concept
is the representation of a number of individuals
in rapid succession. If so the concept would be
a mere collection. In conception we have, as a
matter of fact, no definite or distinct image before
the mind at all.

These two positions are both true in part. The
truth appears to lie in a combination of the two

20 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

views. No general statement about the concept
which shall be fully applicable to all cases can be
made, for it includes a great variety of different
kinds of intellectual product. This variety is
shown by such a list of words as follows : — tiger,
iron, man, fatJier, symbol, murder, nationality,
substance.

What the concept is as before the mind depends
greatly on the number and kind of experiences
brought together under it. If these experiences
have been limited in number, or have been ex-
tremely uniform, departing little from a certain
sort of medium character, then some kind of repre-
sentation is possible : yet not the representation
of any one object, since then it would not be a
concept, but a representation having something
only of the definiteness of an image.

If a variety of perceptions with few resemblances
and predominant differences are brought together,
it is impossible to have any sort of representative
image, nevertheless there is the concept, for we
can still conceive. E.g. Of the concept tiger a
certain image comes before me representative of
each tiger of the class of animals so named : it has
a certain colour, size, stripes, yet none of these
definitely represented — at any rate there is more
than the mere name. No one tiger in particular
is represented, nevertheless there is an image, not
altogether indefinite and yet not definite. The
Conceptualist rightly holds in opposition to the
Nominalist that although vague there is represent-

THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 21

ation, in other words that to some extent we do
visualise.

Of concepts such as nvn the case is different.
There is no image as with f/^-er, man, etc. It is
easy for the ConceptuaHst to instance such examples
as tiger, etc., and apply them universally : it is
also easy for the Nominalist to instance others such
as iron and apply them in like manner.

As a matter of psychical fact, the human mind,
impressed by a variety of experiences, simultaneous
or successive, and trying to reduce them to unity,
almost inevitably resorts to muscular expression
and notably to a movement of the larynx, which
results in sound. Words are sounds available for
language, and they start forth naturally from
human beings merely on occasion of the reception
of a multitude of similar impressions, and so use-
ful are words found to be that even percepts come
to possess names, and in the end we don't properly
perceive unless the percept is named. As previously
stated, for general knowledge naming is indis-
pensable, and it is to naming as a means of know-
ing generally that the mind naturally resorts.

Now concepts or general notions are of such
variety that a statement equally applicable to all
is impossible. The statement of the Nominalist
is that all conceiving consists in naming. To
imagine or to perceive there is no necessity for
speech, but in order to conceive there is such
necessity, and it is with a view to conceiving that
language arose. But it must be also admitted

22 A DIGEST OF LOCilC

that the concept is a something subjective apart
from something objective, and apart also from its
symbol as expressed in speech.

II. A judgment is the apprehension of relation
between two concepts. In judging or forming a
judgment two concepts are brought together for
the purpose of comparison. It is thus the psychical
correlative of the logical proposition. In other
words a judgment is a mental act, its expression
in language is a proposition.

As to the nature of a judgment widely divergent
views are held. Our estimate of the scope of logic
will determine the view we adopt. There are two
main points of dispute, viz. —

{a) Concerning the matter of the judgment the
question arises ; between what is it that a relation
is apprehended ?

{b) Concerning the form of the judgment the
question arises; what is the nature of the relation
between the two terms }

The second point is discussed under the head of
the Import of Propositions {q, v.).

With regard to the matter of the judgment there
are again the three conflicting theories, (i) Nomin-
alism, (2) Conceptualism, and (3) Realism or Ma-
terialism. It must be remembered, however, that
these names most commonly refer to the doctrine
of the concept just discussed.

(i) Nominalism identifies the judgment with the
proposition, and holds that we deal with names and
names alone. The judgment is only a statement

THREE PARTS OF LOGICAL DOCTRINE 2

about names affirming or denying one or the other.
According to this view the whole scope of logic is
bounded by names and their relations.

(2) Conceptualism, as the name implies, regards
the judgment as the comparison of concepts purely
as concepts. From this standpoint logic has been
defined as the science of the pure (or formal) laws
of thought, or as the science of thought as thought.
It is the logic of consistency which takes no account
of language as the expression of thought and no
account of matter as that about which the thought
is conversant.

The extremists of this school, as Mansel, hold
that all a judgment can express is that one concept
is contained in, or forms part of another concept,
and that the judgment cannot do more than unfold
and make explicit the content of a concept.

(3) Materialism explains judgment as a relation
between two concrete objects having nothing to
do with the mental abstraction of their attributes.
Propositions do not express relation between con-
cepts, but between the things these concepts repre-
sent. When we say, e.g. grass is green : this does
not mean that our concept grass contains or agrees
with our concept green, but that the thing grass
possesses the attribute greenness. The scope of
logic thus becomes the investigation of the condi-
tions of real validity. Th^'s is Mill's standpoint.

The extremists of this school are known as
Transcendental Logicians.

III. Inference or Reasoning is a comparison of

24 A DTGESI' DI' \f)(]]('

judgments resulting in another judgment differing
from the first.

According to the point of view it has been
variously defined, and as before there are the three
doctrines.

(i) NominaHsm regards inference as the act of
thought by which we proceed from one or more
propositions to a third proposition, the truth of
which necessarily follows from those previously
given.

(2) Concept-ualism regaids inference as the pro-
duct of comparing two of more judgments with a
view to arriving at another which is contained in,
or warranted by, the judgments already in the
mind.

(3) Materialism regards inference as the estab-
lishment of a relation between two things or two
attributes or between things and attributes by
means of a third thing or attribute, or the infer-
ence of a relation between things and attributes or
things and things or attributes and attributes from
one or more such relations given.

ciiai^ti^:r IV

tp:rms

RKI'KRKNCKS

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. iii. and v.

Keynes, Part i., pp. 7—51. Most useful.

Mill less useful here than in the later part of his bk.

Welton, Vol. i., 15k. i., ch. i and 2.

A Term is one or more words forming the subject
or predicate of a proposition: derived from the
Latin tenniiins meaning a boundary. It is the
verbal equivalent, in a proposition, of an object or
f^roup of objects : or of a concept.

In a wider sense it is synonymous with name.
It is well to avoid thinking of names as terms, a
name is only a term when it forms one element of
a proposition. There are two terms in a proposition
between which the proposition asserts a relation to
exist.

Hobbes' definition of a name is usually quoted
in this connexion and runs as follows : " A name
is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark

26 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

which may raise in our minds a thought Hke to
some thought we had before, and which, being dis-
posed in speech and pronounced to others, may be
to them a sign of what thought the speaker had or
had not before in his mind."

It is not accurate to describe a term or name as
a concept expressed in language, for names are
primarily names of things, by which is meant
objects of thought, and only secondarily names of
ideas.

Words are of two kinds : —

I. A categorematic word is a word capable of
being used by itself as a term : tantamount to
" term."

II. A syncategorematic word is not capable of
being used by itself as a term : tantamount to
" not-term." Jevons speaks loosely of syncategore-
matic terms.

Categorematic words are nouns or their equiva-
lents. By a suppositio materialis any word may
be used categorematically, ^.^. This "that" is a
demonstrative pronoun.

Names are common, applicable to more objects
than one, or Individual, applicable to one object
only.

Common navies are General or Col-
lective.

Individual names are Singular or Proper.

A general name is the name of a group of things
or attributes, whether real or imaginary, and
applies both severally and collectively; /.r. to all

TERMS 27

and each. It is distributive : oriines as opposed to
cuncti. A general name is applicable to a number
of things in virtue of their being similar, or having
something in common. This means in effect that
it is the name of a concept as well as of individual
things.

A collective name is the name of a group taken
together, i. e. collectively only. It refers to all
{cuncti) not each. A collective name may be
singular or general. There is no antithesis between
general and collective as is sometimes implied. The
classes overlap. The important logical antithesis
is between the collective and distributive use of
names. E.g. —

Collective: All the angles of a triangle are eqjial
to tivo rig] it angles.

Distributive: All the angles of a triangle are less
than tivo right angles.

A singular name is capable of being applied only
to one individual object. In dealing with singular
names we are dealing with objects in the sense of
percepts.

A proper name is a singular name given to an indi-
vidual merely as a mark to distinguish it from
others. It is an arbitrary and unmeaning verbal
sign, fohn is a proper name which can be correctly
affirmed of more than one individual, but this does
not make it general. The test of a proper name is
insignificance, lack of meaning.

Are substantial names singular or general ?
Substantial is a \\-ord suggested by Jevons to

28 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

describe the names of materials, as eartJi, oii, ivater^
flame. They are a pecuHar kind of collective name
with the special characteristic of theoretically in-
finite divisibility, and at the same time they possess
perfect homogeneity or uniformity of structure.
The test of generality is the mark of quantity, some,
which can be prefixed in a meaning sense to all
names that are general. Some cannot be attached
to a really singular name. We can say, e.g. " some
water is not good to drink : " the substantial name
water therefore is general, not singular.

Names are Concrete or Abstract.

A concrete name denotes ^n object in virtue
of special qualities which it possesses ; or a class of
things in virtue of some quality, or set of qualities,
which they have in common. Adjectives are
therefore concrete, being epithets, descriptive of
things.

An abstract name " is the name of a quality,
attribute, or circumstance of a thing." It only
permits of one judgment, viz. that it is the pro-
perty of its corresponding concrete.

In the case of every concrete there is, or may be
constructed, a corresponding abstract ; and also of
the abstract there is, or may be constructed, a cor-
responding concrete. Many names are abstract
or concrete according to the precise signification
attached to them.

A general name, as such, is concrete : the
name of the attribute connoted by the general
name is abstract. The general name denotes

TERMS 29

concrete things and connotes certain common
attributes.

The names concrete and abstract correspond in
a certain way to the distinction between denotation
and connotation {see next chapter).

The question has been asked whether the dis-
tinction between general and singular names can
be applied to abstracts. In reply it must be re-
membered that an abstract name is not merely the
name of a quality, but of a quality considered
entirely apart from the thing possessing it. When
we begin to distinguish kinds and differences, and
hence to use abstract names in the plural number,
we render them practically concrete, and therefore
so far general. Every abstract name that is the
name of a single quality (e. g. squareness, different
species oi squareness being unimaginable) is singular.

Names are Positive, Negative, or Priva-
tive.

A positive name implies the existence or posses-
sion of certain definite attributes.

A negative name implies the absence of one
or other of certain definite attributes. Theo-
retically every positive name has a corresponding
negative, and between them they exhaust the
whole universe of thought. The true logical op-
position is between affirmative (not positive) and
negative. Terms having a thorough-going negative
character are called Infinite, Indefinite, or Indeter-
minate : e.g. such terms as not-white, understood as
covering with zvhite the whole universe of discourse.

30 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

A privative name implies the absence of qualities
usually possessed. This distinction is logically
of no importance.

Names are contradictory or contrary.

An affirmative and its corresponding negative
are called contradictories. Terms thus related
exhaust between them the entire area of thoug^ht :
there is nothing that can be thought of to which
one or other of them will not apply. Aristotle
first thought clearly in this matter, and since his
time dates this distinction of opposite notions and
names. In propositions this opposition is still
more clearly marked.

Contraries are terms the farthest apart in the
same area of thought : e. g. zvJiite, black. They
admit of a positive expression. They are terms
most opposed in the same class.

With the contradictory you deny : with the
contrary you not only deny, but posit something
else. The contrary opposite is more than a bare
negative. The contrary of any assertion is counter-
assertion : the contradictory of an assertion is its
negation.

Names are Relative, Correlative, oy
Absolute.

Relative names are those which imply in their
signification some object over and above the one
named : this other object is called its Correlative.

Absolute names arc names not-rclativc.

Relative and Absolute in the Manuals are merely
defined. Their opposition is not clearly brought

TERMS

out. Relatives are only a class of oppositcs, and
may be identified as contrary opposites : e. g. child
is the contrary oi parent.

Logically no name is so absolute as not to have
a correlative, which, wanting any other, is its
negative. Any name is relative in relation to its
contradictory, and the relation of contradiction is
the only one we can be sure about in the form
of thought. The opposition of positive and negative
lies at the very foundation of thought, and in talk-
ing of relatives we go beyond the sphere of pure
logic as such.

So-called absolutes are names whose opposites
are indeterminate : e. g. inan^ the indeterminate
term is not-inan.

CHAPTER V

CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons, ch. v,

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. i., t;h. ii., pp. 62 scq.

Mill, Bk. i., ch. ii.

Keynes, Part i., ch. ii.

Ray, Part i., ch. ii.

The meaning of a name in reference to the
concrete is called its denotation or application.

The meaning of a name in reference to the
abstract is called its connotation or implication.

If concepts rather than names be regarded as
the logical unit instead of denotation, the word
extension or extent is used : and instead of con-
notation, the word intension, intent, content, or
comprehension is used. The mnemonic Ex. AND
De., In. and Con. will help to fix this in the
mind.

The connotation of a name comprises the attributes
on account of which any individual is placed in the
class called by the name ; that is, those attributes

CONNOTATION AND DENOFATION S3

which are regarded as essential to the class, in
the absence of any one of which we should refuse
the name to any individual : or, in short, the
qualities which give meaning to a name. It may
be called the characteristic of a name.

The denotation of a name is made up of all the
individuals which the name connotes : that is, those
objects, real or imaginary, to which the name is
given.

The denotation and connotation of a name are
mutually related, and the general law of their
relation is thus stated — C'^ ^-^

If connotation increases denotation decreases : if
denotation increases connotation decreases.

This variation is not in mathematical ratio, and
the law therefore is not accurately stated when
denotation and connotation are said to " vary in-
versely," for there is no definite measure of increase
or decrease in the variation. If a short statement
be needed, the connexion may be described as one
of opposite mutation.

We must be careful to notice how connotation
is assigned ' and determined. All the attributes
implied by the name form its connotation. Con-
notation consists in the implication : in other
words, the connotation of a name embraces THOSE
ATTRIBUTES, and those only, ON ACCOUNT OF
WHICH THE NAME IS GIVEN, and wanting any
of which the name would be denied.

Other views have been held. It has been
maintained that connotation embraces —

34 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

(i) TJic viaxinimn of attributes common to
members of a class ; if so, no one would know the
meaning of a term, for no one can know every
quality.

(2) TJie ascertained attributes which members of
a class possess in common ; if so, connotation
would depend upon each thinker's personal know-
ledge, and vary moreover as knowledge increased.

(3) The miniimnn of common attributes sufficient
to distinguish the class from other classes ; this is
too narrow, and fails to give the import of a term.

(4) The fundamental attributes common to a
class ; in this case only a speciarlist could know the
connotation of a term.

Denotation, which is the meaning of a term in
reference to the concrete, since it includes all the
individuals to which the name is applicable in the
same sense, is possessed by all names, whether
they have connotation or not, though in the case
of proper names, and of some abstract names, the
denotation is reduced to the least possible limit,
viz. unity.

This twofold meaning of names is sometimes
expressed somewhat differently. Names are classed
as connotative and non-connotative.

A connotative name is one which denotes a subject
and implies an attribute or attributes.

A non-connotative name is one which merel}^
denotes a subject or an attribute. It is also called
absolute.

This is the classification adopted b}- Mill, whose

CONNOTATION AND DENOTATION

definitions have been given : it will be seen that a
connotative name, thus defined, must possess both
denotation and connotation. By the word subject
he means anything that can possess an attribute.
By attribute he means not only the outward marks
by which it is known, but all its properties and
relations whatsoever.

These definitions are noteworthy on account of
the discussion to which they have given rise, and
which is briefly indicated as follows. General
names are connotative, i. e, have meaning ; and
they must have meaning, for the name is given
to each of a multitude of particulars upon some
general ground of likeness. It is the likeness that
makes the name expressive.

The general name, according to Mill, denotes a
number of particulars, and connotes the resembling
attributes in each of them. Whately in different
language brings out the same point. He says,
'' p-eneral names have an attributive character."

Proper names, as such, are meaningless, and
therefore non-connotative, not that they are given
for nothing, every name is given for discrimination,
but this is the only purpose of a proper name, and
this purpose does not constitute meaning. The
proper name is a sign arbitrarily put upon an
object to mark it out from others. A connotative
name is given for a definite reason that can be
assigned, because of certain attributes possessed.
Proper names may suggest certain qualities [e.g.
Gladstone), but the name itself was not given

36 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

because of those qualities, and suggestion is not
significance. Proper names are not given because
attributes are possessed ; if that were so, they would
become general.

A connotative name, by Mill's definition, is one
that denotes a subject and connotes an attribute.
Every name given to a class of things in virtue of
some quality or qualities possessed by them in
common is concrete, and the name of the quality
abstract. Therefore all connotative names are con-
crete. Abstracts and concretes go in pairs. What
is connoted by the concrete is denoted by its cor-
responding abstract, i.e. there is nothing left for the
abstract to connote. Abstracts are therefore in
Mill's phraseology non-connotative.

CHAPTER VI
PROPOSITIONS

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons, ch. viii.
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. ii., ch. i.
Keynes, Part i., ch. i.
Mill, Bk. i., ch. iv.

A proposition is a combination of names. It cor-
responds with the judgment in the conceptualist
view of logic, which is a combination of concepts.
The proposition may be defined as —

A statement of relation between objective facts,
which are apprehended in thought and expressed
in language ; or the expression of an act of judg-
ment ; or the assertion or denial of agreement
between two terms.

It consists of two terms connected by the present
tense of the verb " to be " ; and takes the form of
Subject + Copula -}- Predicate.

Grammatically the proposition answers to a sen-
tence indicative. All propositions are sentences,
but not all sentences are propositions.

38 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

The copula — is, is not — is simply a lingual con-
trivance for linking the terms of a proposition
together for the purpose of comparison, and does
not necessarily imply existence.

Hamilton and Fowler insist upon a imiform
copula, is or is not, according as we affirm or
deny. In the working of problems which involve
propositions it is a great and important safeguard
against error to re-express, if necessary, the propo-
sition so that this uniform copula shall appear, for
it helps to ensure the correct interpretation of the
proposition in question.

The traditional view of the proposition has four
aspects known as Relation, Quality, Quantity
and Modality. The current classification takes
no account of Modality, which is therefore lacking
in the scheme subjoined.

I. Relation.

Categorical.
Contingent: —

Conditional. If S is J/, t/ie?i S is P.

Hypothetical, //"A is true, then B is true.
Disjunctive. vS' is either III or P.

II. Quality.

Affirmative.
Negative.

HI. Quantity.

Universal.

Particular.
In this scheme, and wherever else they may

PROPOSITIONS

occur, the letters ^\ M, P^ etc., stand for terms, either
subject or object as the case may be: the letters in
faced type, A, B, etc., stand for statements, which
are given either true or not true.

The names conditional and hypothetical are used
by the majority of writers on logic indifferently for
the class which is above called contingent. Con-
fusion has naturally resulted. To avert confusion
the name contingent is suggested to include the two
classes of conditional proposition, and as co-ordi-
nate with the class disjunctive. Welton has sug-
gested the name inferential^ but on etymological
grounds the name contingent seems preferable.

Categorical propositions are those which are not
conditional. Their empty form is exhibited as
under. The vowels A and I in the word affinno
are used to denote affirmative propositions, and
the vowels E and O in the word nego to denote
the negatives ; A and E are used for the universals,
and I and O for the particulars.

AFFIRMATIVE

NEGATIVE

Universal

Particular

A. all S is P.
I. some S is P.

E. no 5 is P.

O, some S is not P.

Categorical propositions are either analytic or
synthetic.

I. Analytic or verbal propositions express only
the connotation, or part of the connotation of a term.

40 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Definitions are the best examples that can be given
of analytic propositions.

II. Synthetic or real propositions are those
which express only, or in addition to part of the
connotation, the properties or accidents of a term.
E.g. tJie power to laugh is no part of the definition
of man ; it is a property. The proposition man is
a rational animal is analytic : man is an animal
with the pozver to langh is synthetic.

Analytic or verbal propositions have also been
called explicative, identical or essential ; synthetic
or real propositions have also been called ampliative,
accidental or non-essential.

There are otherclasses of propositions as follows —

EXPONIBLE, those that are resolvable into more
propositions than one : and these arc Copulativ^e,
Remotive, or Exceptive, viz, —

Copulative when two affirmative propositions
are directly combined : the form is. All S is both
M and P, i. e. All S is M and all S is P.

Remotive when two negative propositions are
directly combined : the form is, 5 is neither AT nor
P, i. e. vS is not M and S is not P.

Exceptive when the subject is limited by some
qualifying word, e. g. exeept : the form is, vS' is M
tinless it is P.

Exclusive propositions limit the predicate
to the subject by some qualif}'ing word such as
only or alone : the form is, Only S is P.

Indefinite or Indeterminate Propositions
contain no explicit mark of quantity ; the only

PROPOSITIONS 41

safe interpretation of them is to treat them as
particulars.

Infinite or Limitative propositions have a
predicate of a thorough-going negative character :
i. e. are of the form, .S" is not P.

Tautologous propositions affirm the subject
of itself. vS is S.

Modal propositions are assertions cuiii inodo :
adverbs confer modality.

This classification of the various kinds of propo-
sition is not very important, except perhaps as a
guide to interpretation in cases of doubt. Doubt
as a rule arises respecting quantity, and in this
connexion it is well to notice certain quantitative
words in current speech which lack definiteness of
meaning. Before the propositions containing them
can be accurately interpreted, the meaning of these
words must be clearly defined. Such are the words
following —

Some means logically, some at least : not none :
one at any rate, it may be more than one, or it
may be all. In popular usage some means some
at most : not all : more than one but less than all.

Most means in popular usage, at least one more
than half In logic it must be regarded as the
equivalent of sonic, for formal logic pays no heed
to degree in quantity.

Few means popularly, most are not, or at any
rate less than half are. In logic its equivalent is,
some are not.

All is used in two senses — (i) all and each :

42 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

every: onuies : distributlvely : and (2) all together,
not each : cuncti: collectively.

Any is equivalent to all used in the distributive
sense when it quantifies the subject of a categorical
proposition. When the proposition is not categori-
cal it is to be read as some : e. g. if any S is M, then
S is P ; means, if some S is My etc.

Contingent Propositions are statements with quali-
fication. The contingent proposition therefore con-
sists of two parts which are called respectively
antecedent ox protasis ^ which is the statement of the
condition or hypothesis, corresponding to the subject
of the categorical : and consequent or apodosis, which
is the statement of the result, corresponding to the
predicate of the categorical.

The names conditional diwd hypothetical of the two
classes of contingents are used by various writers
indiscriminately for the whole class. Care must be
taken to keep the two forms distinct : the differ-
ence between them is well marked though not
always recognised.

The general symbolic form for the contingent is,

// ^" is X, P is V.

This form is better reserved for conditionals alone.
In this case the formula for expressing hypotheticals
will be,

If A is true, B is true.

Here, as previously pointed out, A and B stand for
statements, not terms.

PROPOSITIONS 43

Conditional Propositions assert that if an object be
found to have certain attributes it will also have, or
not have, certain other attributes. The relation is
between two combhiations of properties. Condition-
als have both quality and quantity, and the four
forms may be symbolically expressed thus —

If S is M^ then S is P. A.

Sometimes if S is J/, then S is P. I.

If S is M, then S is not P. E.

Sometimes if S is M, then S is not P. O.

It will be seen that the quality is determined by
the consequent. In a conditional proposition there
often seem to be four terms : they can however
always be reduced, with more or less ease, to three,
so as to fit the general symbolic form, if S is AI,
then S is P. Thus —

If the standard of an examination \ is \ loiu, the
percentage of passes \ is \ high. There are seem-
ingly four terms. Instead of the word passes read
failures^ and lozv instead of Jiigh. We thereby
reduce the terms to three. Or we may read not
low instead of the word high^ and, by a single
alteration of phrasing, obtain the same result.
The statement will thus run — If the standard of
an examination \ is \ loiu, the percentage of passes \
is not I low. Another example — If the barometer
falls, we shall have rain, may be re-expressed
thus — If any atmospheric state causes a barometric
fall, that state will bring rain.

Conditionals may be reduced to categoric form.

44 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Some logicians assert that both classes of con-
tingents are in reality identical with categoricals.
With certain limitations this assertion is accurate :
the limitations, as will be seen, apply to hypo-
theticals. Taking the illustrations above, their
categorical expression will be — Examinations in
wJiich the standard is loiv \ are \ those in ivJiich the
percentage of passes is high: Ail atmospheric states
causing barometric fall \ are \ those ivhich bring
rain.

Hypothetical propositions assert relationship be-
tween two statements, so that if one is true the
truth of the other is determined. Thus, though
the symbolic form may be the same as for con-
ditionals, the distinction can be better marked by
using letters for the statements in the antecedent
and consequent respectively : hence the preferable
form is —

If A is true, then B is true.

Hypotheticals have quality, but not quantity.
The antecedent is not an event which may occur
always or sometimes, but a proposition which is
simply true or false. In the hypothetical there is
a relation of two absolute and self-contained
assertions, each of which can be used alone without
change of meaning. It is this self-sufficiency of
both antecedent and consequent that differentiates
the hypothetical from the conditional. Thus in
the proposition — If all candidates for examination
luere luell prepared sojne zcould certainly be success-

PROPOSITIONS 45

fiil^ the assertion is not about all and some
candidates, but about their adequate preparation
and their success.

Hypotheticals can be reduced only to A and E
categorical forms, for the reason that they consist
only of singular terms and do not therefore admit
of distinction in quantity. Some logicians would
dispute the possibility of reducing the hypothetical
to the categorical form on the ground that the
dependence of one proposition upon another is not
analogous to that existing between 5 and P of the
categorical, and also on the ground that all hypo-
theticals involve an element of doubt. This view
however seems to be erroneous. Taking the
illustration given above in reduced form it will
stand — all cases of candidates being well prepared \
are \ cases in ivJiich some would certainly be snc-
cessfid.

Disjunctive propositions give the subject no
definite predicate, but prescribe for it an alter-
native between two different predicates, or it may
be more than two.

The general symbolic form is —

6^ is either M or P.

These predicates may always be brought under
a wider predicate, which shall include all the
others ; this however is seldom done in practice.
Thus — He is either a doctor^ a lawyer^ a clergyman^
or a teacher^ may be expressed — He is a member of
a learned profession.

46 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Disjunctives have quantity but not quality, the
quahty is ahvays affirmative.

Universal — /;/ all cases S is P, or X is Y.

Particular — In some cases S is P, or X is V.

There is difference of opinion as to whether the
disjunctive form necessitates the mutual exclusion
of the alternative predicates. In many cases the
alternatives are as a matter of fact exclusive ;
exclusion however is not due to the disjunctive
form, and in the logical treatment of these pro-
positions it must not be assumed.

The disjunctive is in fact a complex conditional,
and the logical rule for its treatment is — Given a
disjunctive with two alternatives, by taking away
either of the alternatives you posit the other, but it
cannot be said that by positing one you sublate
the other.

Disjunctives are reducible to conditionals of the
form, if S is not M, it is P. They can therefore
be reduced also to categoricals. E. g. All artificial
tront flies are either zvinged or hackled. This yields
in reduction the two conditionals as follows — (i)
If any artiflcial tront fly is not zvinged it is hackled ;
and (2) If any artiflcial tront fly is not hackled it is
winged. These reduced to categorical form become,
(i) All artiflcial tront flies not winged \ are \
hackled ; and (2) All artiflcial tront flies not Jiackled
I are \ winged. According to a previous definition
it is thus seen that disjunctives arc exponibles.

One of the most important points in dealing

PROPOSITIONS 47

with propositions is to grasp clearly what is meant
by the distribution of terms. A term is said to be
distributed when reference is made to each and every
individual denoted by that term. Thus in the A
proposition, all men \ are \ mortal^ the subject all
men means each and every individual denoted by
the term men, and according to the definition given
it is distributed. The predicate mortal does not
mean each and every being of which mortality can
be asserted. There may be mortal beings that are
not men, as indeed from material considerations we
know there are. The predicate therefore is not
distributed, reference not being made to every part
of it. Similarly the distribution of the terms in
each of the other categorical forms may be worked
out. The distribution of the terms will be found
to be as follows —

A distributes subject not predicate ;

E distributes both subject and predicate ;

I distributes neither subject nor predicate ;

O distributes predicate not subject.

This distribution of terms may be fixed in the
mind by remembering the mnemonic word
AsEbInOp, which must be read v4, j-ubject; E,
<5oth ; /, /neither ; 6^, /redicate. It will be noticed
that universals distribute their subject, and nega-
tives their predicate. The importance of thoroughly
understanding the point rests on the fact that the
validity of every argument depends upon the
proper distribution of the terms occurring in it.

CHAPTER VII

PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xii.

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. i., ch. iii. and iv.

Mill, Bk. i., ch. iii. and vii.

Bain, Dcductio?i, pp. 73—77 ; 263 — 266.

A predicate is something which is affirmed or
denied of a subject ; A predicable is something
which CAN BE so affirmed or denied. That is,
predicables are possible predicates.

The doctrine of the predicables is a consideration
of the number of different kinds of statement which
can be made about a subject.

The heads of predicables are a classification of the
various relations the subject and predicate of a
proposition may sustain one to the other.

At root the doctrine of the predicables is not
logical, but metaphysical. The scheme is as
follows ; —

Heads of
Predicables

PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 49

Genus

Species

Differentia

-n • fsjeneric
Proprium< ^

i specific

. ., (separable
Accidens-{ ^

(niseparable

Genus is a class made up of smaller classes.

Species, with reference to genus, is the smaller
class included ; with reference to an individual, it
is the class including it.

Differentia are the attributes, or attribute, by
which one species is distinguished from all others
contained in the same genus.

Proprium is any quality common to the whole
of the class, but not sufficient to distinguish that
class from others. It is called generic when it
belongs to the whole of the genus, and specific
when belonging to the whole of the species.
Jevons' nomenclature differs : property belonging
to the whole species he zd^s peculiar, and he limits
specific property to the infima (or lowest) species.

Accidens is a quality which may or may not
belong to an individual in relation to a species : or
to a species in relation to a genus. It is called
separable when it can be changed ; inseparable
when, belonging to all the members of a class, it
cannot be changed.

Thus, e.g. taking triangle as species: genus,
differentia, property, and accident will be respect-
ively as follows : — Plane figiwe ; having three sides ;

50 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

having three internal angles equal to tzvo right angles ;
having sides tJiree inches long.

Genus and species are correlative terms ; the
same term may be both a genus and a species,
genus with regard to lower classes under it ; species
with regard to a higher class above it.

Sunimum genus is a term so general that it
cannot be a species. The summum genus gives
connotation at its lowest, denotation at its highest
point.

Infima species is a term so narrow that it cannot
be a genus, and can only be divided into indi-
viduals. It gives connotation. at its highest point,
denotation at its lowest.

The Aristotelian logicians held that there were
ten summa genera which they called predicaments or
categories.

The connotation of a species is greater than that
of the genus under which it is included. This
excess of connotation is the difference of that
species. Thus in connotation species = genus +
difference.

A proprium is an attribute which does not form
part of the connotation of a term, but which does
of necessity follow from it. Thus, whether an
attribute is a difference or a proprium, depends
upon the definition of the term.

Accidens can only be determined by what it is
not. It is a quality that does not of necessity
belong to any class ; if however it docs, and if it
belongs to every member of the class, it is called

PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 51

inseparable ; if not common to every member it is
known as separable.

In this scheme of predicables no provision is
made for singular terms, which by the older logicians
were looked upon as outside the sphere of the
science.

When genus or difference is predicated, the pro-
position is called analytic ; when proprium or
accidens is predicated, the proposition is called
synthetic. Equivalent names for analytic and
synthetic propositions have been given on p. 40.
Species is strictly speaking only predicable of an
individual.

It is thus seen that embedded in the doctrine of
the predicables, we have the difference between
formal and material logic. In the categorical
proposition, where 5 and P are subject and pre-
dicate respectively, S and P may be taken to
represent distinguishable terms which are not how-
ever necessarily distinct. But when we have terms
which are distinct as well as distinguishable, we
have to deal with material considerations, and
though the proposition may still be written in the
form S is P, we are no longer working with
symbols but with the actual notions themselves.

In the proposition man is a rational animal, the
terms are distinguishable but not distinct. The
same notion is marked by each of the terms.
Rational animal is a synonym for man. Under
the concept man you think rational and vice versa.
In other words, we have nothing more than a concept

52 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

under the guise of a judgment. But in the pro-
position man is moi'tal^ the terms are distinct as well
as distinguishable. Mortal \^ no part of the meaning
of man. It is a material consideration, neverthe-
less the conjunction of such terms may still be
formulated as vS is P. This distinction is marked
in the predicables as above ; it is essential or
analytic as opposed to non-essential or synthetic
predication. Formal doctrine takes no notice of
this difference, but in material logic it is taken into
account. We have to consider our predicate as
sometimes obtained by analysis of the subject, and
sometimes by synthesis.

The analytic has a predicate obtained from the
subject merely under the laws of thought ; in the
proposition given dhowQ, rational ajiimalis logically
implicated in maji. Hence these propositions are
also called explicativ^e, the explication taking place
under the laws of thought {q. v.). The predicate
of a synthetic proposition can never be obtained
merely from the laws of thought. Such pro-
positions are therefore called ampliative, the am-
plification taking place by reference to the matter
concerning which the statement is made.

Analytic propositions are also sometimes called
identical, that is, there is an identity between
subject and predicate. Identical propositions
therefore may be defined as those in which the
predicate gives the subject over again, but not as
a distinct and separate thought. Definitions are
instances in point. As a test we may substitutt.'

PREDICABLES AND PREDICAMENTS 53

means for the formal copula is whenever we have
an analytic proposition. In a synthetic proposition
this substitution of means for is cannot be made,
for is in this case has a totally different force.

Classification depends entirely upon this scheme
of predicables, consisting as it does of the formation
of genera and species.

The predicaments or categories of which mention
has already been made, were intended by Aristotle
as a classification of all possible predicates accord-
ing to their own meaning and not in relation
to the subject. These Aristotelian predicaments
are now universally discredited, being usually
regarded as a classification of all possible things
with no reference to their use as predicates of a
proposition. They are therefore of metaphysical
rather than logical import. It is to be noted that
no satisfactory scheme exists.

Aristotle's scheme is as follows —

ouaia

substantia

substance

TTOcrhv

TTOIOP

Trpos Tl

quantitas

qualitas

relatio

quantity

quality

relation

Ttoitiv

actio

action

Trdaxitv

TTOV

passio
ubi

passivity
where

TTOTi

quando

Avhen

KtiaOai
t\nv

situs
habitus

position
condition

Sir Wm. Hamilton has thus classified the above
scheme —

54 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

I. Substance

(Quantity f Situs

Actio
I Passio

Mill states and criticises this Aristotelian scheme,
and gives the following classification of all nameable
things as his own : —

1. Feelings or states of consciousness :

2. The minds which experience those feelings :

3. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of
these feelings together with the po\v«r or property whereby
they excite them :

4. The successions and co-existencies, the likenesses and
unlikenesses, between feehngs or states of consciousness.

There have been other schemes suggested by
others, but the matter is not one of great logical
importance, if indeed it has any claim to a place of
treatment in logic at all.

CHAPTER VIII

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xii.

Welton, Vol. i. Bk. i., ch. v and vi.

Mill, Bk. i., ch. viii.

Bain, Inductioi-i^ pp. 153 — 170 and 195 — 198.

Definition and division have to do with names,

and though expressed in proposltional form they
are not concerned with the proposition as such.
Hence their proper place of treatment is under the
heading of terms.

Definition is the exposition of the connotation of a
term expressed in the form of a proposition.

Distinguish definition, dcsa^iption, and explanation,

A name is defined :
a tiling is described :
?i process is explained.

The strictly logical form of definition is per g'enua
et differentiam.

To define a name does not involve statincr all

56 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

that is known about the thing of which it is the
name, for that would in most cases include attri-
butes which are purely accidents.

A definition is an analytic or verbal proposition.

Rules of definition are not directions for defining,
but criteria for testing definitions when made.
Formal logic tests or proves, it does not discover
or bestow knowledge. When a man has know-
ledge and sets it out, logic tells him whether he
has done so correctly.

Formal definition is not always applicable, e.g.
simple sensations cannot be defined. When we
cannot define we can re-expres-s and give examples
or fall back on description, or give an enumeration
of constituent properties. E. g. miiid is that which
feels, thinks, wills, and desires. This is definition
by complete enumeration : it sets out the various
functions of mind and is the only means of defini-
tion in this particular case that we have. Definition
is impossible when nothing else of the same class
can be found : where the thing whose name is to be
defined cannot be discovered as an object amongst
similar objects or as an attribute amongst attributes.
This is the case with the example mind.

The rules of definition are usually thus stated : —

I. A definition should not be redundant, i.e.
contain either more or less than the connotation of
the term defined.

II. A definition should not be expressed in ob-
scure, figurative, or ambiguous language.

III. A definition should not be tautologous, i.e.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION 57

should not contain the term defined, nor a synonym,
nor its opposite. Violation of this rule is called
circiilus in dejiniendo.

IV. A definition should not be negative when it
can be affirmative.

Division is the exposition of the denotation of a
term expressed in the form of a proposition.

Logical division must be distinguished from
physical partitioft, and metaphysical analysis.

The test of a logical division is that the term
divided and the definition of the term divided can be
predicated of each dividing member. This is its
distinction from hoih. paj^iition and analysis.

Every division must be progressive. The old
rule is Divisio non facial saltuni. This precaution
is against proceeding from high generalisation to
narrow particulars at a bound, or in logical
terminology emuneration of species mnst be from
proximate genera. The constituent species must
together make up the genus divided : if any of
them can be brought under a genus itself subal-
tern to that which had to be divided, we know
that a saltiis has been made and our division is
at fault.

The rules for division may be stated thus : —

I. Division must be distinct, the constituents
must exclude one another, otherwise the species
overlap and produce confusion called cross-division.

II. Division must be adequate, the constituent
species must exhaust the genus, i. e. when added
together they must make up the genus.

58 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

III. Division must be founded upon one principle
or basis, called \h(^ fundainentiiin divisionis.

These rules may be summarised in the single
statement that division must be exclusive and
exhaustive.

Cross division may be avoided by adopting
the method known as dichotomy or exhaustive
division. This is the only process strictly to be
called logical division. Dichotomic division is
division by affirmative and negative names under
the laws of contradiction and excluded middle.
E.g. Take any notion A. Divide by decrease of
denotation and addition to connotation. \i B, C,
etc. be the added connotation and b, c, etc. their
contradictories, the scheme stands thus : —

AB Ab

ABC ABc AbC Abe

AbCD AbCd

This process may be carried out to any number
of terms, but has the demerit of being cumbrous,
and in many cases there is no need to resort to
it. In branches of knowledge where our informa-
tion is uncertain, then it becomes useful as a safe-
guard against possible oversight in making our
divisions.

CHAPTER IX

IMPORT OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS
QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessofzs, ch. xxii.

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. ii., ch. ii.

Mill, Bk. i., ch. v., and Exam, of Sh' Wm. Hainilfo?!^

ch. xviii. and xxii.
Keynes, Part ii., ch. viii.

In the discussion of the meaning involved in
predication answers to the following questions are
considered :—

(i) What is related? or what is the meaning of
5 and P ?

(2) What is the nature of the relation ?

(3) Is existence implied?

Here again in the question of import we are
on extra-logical ground : as this subject has strictly
speaking no place in formal logic. According to
the traditional treatment of logic it is here in-
cluded, but though full of interest it may be left
for second reading.

6o A DIGEST OF LOGIC

1 . What is related ? Words, things, or ideas ?
The proposition is a statement and therefore

so far verbal : the statement is of a relation existing
between objective facts, and therefore so far real :
the relation is apprehended in thought and is
therefore so far conceived. The point has already
been discussed in determining the definition and
scope of logic as a science.

Two questions therefore only remain : —

2. What is the nature of the relation expressed in
predication? In what aspect are the terms to be
regarded ? Various answers have been given.

ia) The Predicative Theory. S — P (which is
the empty form for a categorical proposition),
read predicatively, means that the attributes pos-
sessed by P also belong or do not belong to the
object or to the group of objects denoted by .S.
That is, it reads 6" in denotation, and P in conno-
tation. It is a relation equivalent to that which
exists between subject and attribute. This is the
common and natural reading : it is psychologically
correct.

{b) The Extensive Theory reads both terms in
denotation, viz. that objects denoted by 6" are
or are not among the objects denoted by P. It
regards 5 as included in the class P. As a theory
of predication this is psychologically' false. More-
over on this view it is not P that is predicated,
but inclusion in P.

CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS 6i

§ 4.) E. g. 7/iau IS mortal means whatever has the
attributes of man has the attribute of mortality.
This theory is psychologically false, and moreover
on this view particular jDropositions are wanting
in interpretation.

{d) The Equational Theory regards 5 and P in
a proposition as corresponding to the two sides
of an equation, the copula being nothing more
than the sign of equality between them. The
act of judgment expressed in the proposition
is thus held to be a mere assertion of identity.
This view is developed by Jevons in his Prin-
ciples of Science (p. 41). It was also in his later
work adopted by Sir W. Hamilton as an outcome
of the doctrine of the Quantification of the Predicate.

3. Does the categorical proposition imply the
existence of the objects denoted by the terms?
Logical existence may be in any sphere, fiction,
mythology, imagination, fact. Logical terms re-
present something thought of, that is, they imply
the existence in thought of that of which they
are the name. More than this cannot be asserted.
The implication of existence to this extent also
follows from the nature of the proposition, which
is a statement of relation between concepts that
exist at any rate in the mind. It is usually and
properly considered however that if existence in re
is intended it must be specially predicated. The
real existence of the subject can never be implied
in the mere form of the proposition.

Quantification of the Predicate. To quantify the

62 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

predicate is to place a sign of quantity before it
as well as before the subject. This doctrine was
in this century stated by Hamilton and George
Bentham. There are earlier cases of its notice
both by English and continental writers. They
urge that —

(i) There is no thinking in the definite form which
is necessary without having a definite notion as
to the quantity of the predicate, i. e. they assert
that what is implicit in thought must be made
explicit in language ; and further that

(2) In the process of conversion this explication
is practically assumed. With the quantified pre-
dicate therefore conversion as a doctrine falls away.
The proposition in effect becomes an equation.

Hamilton proposed four new categorical forms
in addition to those in common use. The symbols
to mark them usually given are those suggested
by Abp. Thomson and are shown on the left hand
margin. Hamilton's notation is that on the right.

U AH .S is all P afa

A All 5 is some P afi

E No 5 is any P ana

1] No 5 is some P ani

T Some 5 is all P ifa

1 Some S is some /' ifi

O Some 5 is not any P ina

o) Some vS is not some P ini

The letters /and n in Hamilton's notation indicate
affirmation and denial respectively.

QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE 62,

The objections to the doctrine may be summarised
as follows : —

(i) Getting rid of conversion really means that
we have done so by getting rid of the proposition.
The old A, E, I, O no longer remain. The
quantified forms can each be shown to be complex
not simple statements. All S is all Pis exponible
and is equivalent to All S is P -\- All P is S. It
is a compendious statement of two propositions.
It is clear that All S is all P is not so simple a
thought as All S is P. We think All S is P with-
out reference to some or all P, and so we see that
All S is all P ceases to be the expression of a
simple thought. To aver that All S is all P is a
simple thought is to deny that All S is /* is a
thought at all. Hamilton declares (as he must do
to maintain his position) that implicitly we do
think all or some P. He calls U a toto-total pro-
position, and A a toto-partial proposition.

(2) Another objection, advanced by De Morgan,
is that the doctrine alters the logical sense of sojne,
or uses it ambiguously. Some becomes some but
not ally or sojne at most : at least it becomes so in
the predicate. If the meaning be thus changed
we may get rid of the " disgusting rules of con-
version," but we also get rid of the square of op-
position, for if some mean sojne at most^ contrariety
and contradiction are swept away.

(3) Further in All S is all P we get a use of
all which is not intelligible unless we take it
collectively. The doctrine has grown out of a

64 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

misconception as to the quantity of propositions,
which has been taken to be the quantity of the
subject, but it is only a matter of convenience
that the mark of quantity is attached to the
subject. The predicate is that which is univers-
ally or particularly affirmed or denied of the
subject.

CHAPTER X

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. ix and xxii.
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. ii., ch. iii.
Keynes, Part ii., ch. vi.

The value of any scheme for the diagrammatic
representation of propositions depends upon the
following requirements : —

(i) The diagrams must be self-explanatory so
soon as the principle on which they are constructed
is understood.

(2) Each diagram must be capable of one and
only one interpretation.

(3) Each proposition should be represented by
one and only one diagram.

Various methods have been suggested by differ-
ent writers. Such methods are Euler's Circles,
Lambert's Lines, Hamilton's Wedges, Venn's
Diagrams, and, the most recent, Welton's Scheme.

Euler's Circles. This is the method most com-
monly given in the Manuals. Representing the

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Individuals included in any class by a circle, there
are between two classes five diagrams to indicate
all the possible relations. These relations may be
described as

I. Coincidence :
11. Inclusion of wS by P:

III. Intersection :

IV. Inclusion of /^ by S:
V. Exclusion.

The circles then are combined thus : —

IV.

II.

III.

(3B

The method adopted in most text-books (c.^-,
Jevons' Lessons), of using only a single diagram for
each propositional form, is misleading. The E pro-
position, being the figure of exclusion, is the only
form for which one and only one diagram will suf-
fice. Although we have not a single diagram for
each fundamental form of proposition, the circles

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION 67

are useful as indicating the real knowledge given
by the propositions themselves. The circles treated
as below, by shading, show in each of the forms that
part of the predicate concerning which knowledge
is given us.

Venn's Diagrams. In this scheme the figure
given does not represent a proposition. It is the
framework into which the pro-
positions are fitted. We are deal-
ing with two terms, each of which
has a contradictory. By combin-
ing these terms and their contra-
dictories we obtain four separate classes: viz.

68 A DIGEST OF LOCUC

S that is P :

5 that is not-P:

not-S that is P :

and not-S that is not-P.

Shortly they may be written S P, S P, S Py S P.
The Hne over a letter is a common and convenient
way of marking its contradictory. These four
compartments are shown in the skeleton diagram.
Every universal proposition denies the existence
of one or more of these classes, and is indicated
by a shading out of the compartment denied.
Thus A and E are thus figured : —

The weakness of this scheme is that it is not
adapted to particular propositions. Dr. Venn
proposes that a bar should be drawn across the
compartment which the particular declares to be
saved. The scheme has the advantage, however,
of being good for propositions involving more
terms than two, and it can also be used to repre-
sent the categorical syllogism.

Sir W. Hamilton uses heavy wedge-shaped lines
which at best arc cumbrous and arc also somewhat
confusing.

Welton suggests a method which is a combin-

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION 69

ation of Lambert's lines and Venn's four com-
partments. It has an advantage over Venn's
circles in being applicable to particulars.

Lambert's Scheme is with lines to jnark the ex-
tent of the terms, and it represents the inclusion
of one term in another by drawing the lines parallel
to one another. With modification it can be made
useful and graphic. Thus draw three columns,
the first to contain S P, the second for 5 P, and
the third for 6' P. Use lines to indicate the extent
of 5 and P : make them unbroken for the amount
definitely referred to, dotted for what is left un-
certain in the statement. Let 5 be the upper
line, and P the lower. Then we shall get the
subjoined diagram : —

It will be noted that lines wholly unbroken mark
terms which are distributed.

Yet another method may be employed, a com-
bination of circles and lines, the lines unbroken
and dotted to be interpreted as in the previous
diagram. Here the predicate is figured by the

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

circle, and the subject by the line, thus indicating
the reading of them respectively in intension and
extension.

Distribution of P is marked by circles which do
not contain an unbroken line : of .S by lines wholly
unbroken. This scheme pictures one view of the
import of the proposition.

CHAPTER XI

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. ix. and x.
Keynes, Part ii., ch. ii., iii., iv., v., and vii
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iii.
Mill, Bk. ii., ch. i.

Inference is the derivation of one truth from
another, and involves a mental process. Inference
in short is passage from thought to thought.

Inference is immediate when the conclusion is
derived from one premiss only : immediate infer-
ences may be regarded as the application of the
laws of thought to two given terms. There are
two main classes of such inferences, viz. —
I. The opposition of propositions, and

II. Eductions.
The reduction of contingents and disjunctives to
categorical form might be added as a third class, for
this reduction is really a form of immediate Inference.

I. Opposition. Two propositions are said to be
in opposition, or to be opposed, when they have
the same subject and predicate but differ in quantity

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

or quality or both. They are usually arranged in
what is called the Square of Opposition as below : —

Contraries.

Co.

sP"

in
c
cr

ft-

I Subcontraries.

<L>

-4-J

The inferences based on the square of opposition
may be considered to depend exclusively on the
three fundamental laws of thought {(/.v.). These
inferences are summed up as follows : —

Of Contradictories one must be true, one must
be false.

Of Contraries both cannot be true, both may be
false.

Of Subcontraries one may be false, both may be
true.

Of Subalterns the particular is true if the universal
is true : the universal is doubtful when the particular
is true.

Aristotle arranged the square thus —

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 73

Seeing that A and E were more opposed than A
and O, he put them further apart in the figure.
This square, however, broke down with I and O.

Diametric opposition is another name for con-
tradiction ; it means assertion and its negation,
counter-assertion, no medium admitted. It has
the same meaning as when apphed to terms.

If we cannot go beyond the simple denial of a
proposition, then it has no contrary distinct from
its contradictory.

The opposition of singular propositions is called
by Mansel Secondary contradiction (Mansel's
Aldrich, p. 56). Singulars have no contraries
distinct from their contradictories. E.g. Socrates
is zuise, has the contradictory Socrates is not wise.
There is no distinct contrary. By another method
of treatment, however, the proposition may be read
as a general proposition in the guise of a singular.
In this case Socrates will stand for the acts or
judgnients of Socrates, and this gives us the contra-
dictory Some of the acts of Socrates are not zvise,
and the contrary None of the acts of Socrates are
tvise.

Conditionals admit of distinction both in quantity
and quality, and therefore the doctrine of opposi-
tion is entirely applicable.

Hypotheticals admit only distinction of quality,
and therefore the only opposition is that of con-
tradiction.

Disjunctives do not admit difference of quality
but only quantity, and moreover all disjunctives

74 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

are affirmative. Contradiction, however, is possible
as well as contrariety, but both contradictory and
contrary are categorical. E. g. Every S is M or P
gives the contradictory Some S is jieitJier M nor P,
and the contrary No S is either M or P.

II. Eductions. Immediate inferences by which
from a given proposition (posited true) we deduce
others that differ from it in 5 or P or both, and
whose truth is assured by the truth of the original,
are called eductions. They are classified as
follows : —

1. Conversion.-

2. Obversion.

3. Contraposition.

4. Inversion.

5. Added Determinants.

6. Complex Conception.

7. Converse Relation.

8. Reversion.

It is well to note here that m working out
exercises involving the statement of propositions
they should always be brought first into the strict
logical form with the uniform copula is or is not.
It is most convenient to symbolise the terms by
letters S, J\ etc., the contradictories of which may
be marked by a line over them. Thus S, P will
stand for not-S, not-P respectively. The symbols
can be re-translated into the original terms, if
desirable, in setting down the results. To remember
this not only shortens the labour of working, but

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 75

it is also a distinct aid to accuracy. It is astonishing
what difficulty students often find in converting a
simple proposition like the following P struck Q.
If the rule be remembered, the difficulty disappears.
In strict logical form it may be written P \ is \ a
person ivJio struck Q. The converse will therefore
be Some person zvho struck Q \ is \ P.

Conversion in a broad sense means change in
the position of the terms of a proposition. Logic
is concerned with conversion only as a process of
inference: "no conversion is employed for any
logical purpose unless it be illative" (Whately,
Log. p. 74). The distinct mental act in conver-
sion and other immediate inferences lies in the
different readings given to 6^ and P. In any
judgment the natural reading of the subject is
extensive and of the predicate intensive. In con-
verting a proposition the attributive force of the
predicate is dropped, the proposition is taken in
extension. The difficulty sometimes found in con-
version lies probably in this passage from the
predicative to the " class " reading.

I. Ordinary Conversion is transposition of 5
and P.

Conversion is simple when converse and con-
vertend have the same form as in the case of E
and I.

Conversion is per accidens or by limitation when
part of the information given in the convertend
is lost, as in the case of A. O propositions do net
admit of ordinary conversion.

76 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Simple conversion and conversion per accidens
have also been called conversio pura and conversio
iinpura (cf. Lotze, Log.^ § 79).

That particular negatives do not admit of
ordinary conversion follows from the rule that no
term must be distributed in the converse which
was not distributed in the convertend.

No difficulty can be found in converting or per-
forming other immediate inferences upon any
given proposition when once brought into strict
logical form, and its predicate as well as its subject
read in extension.

2. Obversion is change of quality. It is a process
of immediate inference, in which from one pro-
position we infer another, having for its predicate
the contradictory of the predicate of the original
proposition. The name obversion was introduced
by Bain. Other names for this process are —

(i) Permutation, Foivler.

(2) ^quipollence, Ueberiveg.

(3) Infinitation, Boiuen.

(4) Immediate Inference by Private Conception,

Jevons.

(5) Contra version, De Morgan.

(6) Contraposition, Spalding.

Bain, after dealing with formal obversion, follows
with a statement of material ob\'crsion. This is
extra-logical. From 5 a P, I may by formal ob-
version infer vS" e P, but the material obverse, .S" is
P, docs not follow, except as the result of actual

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 77

observation and independent investigation. The
only information I can infer about 5 from 5 a P
is, S i P or S 0 P.

The meaning of obversion is explained by Bain
in his Deductio7tJ^^. 109, no). " In affirming one
thing we must be prepared to deny the opposite."
Thus, the road is level, it is not inclined, are not two
facts, but the same fact viewed from opposite sides ;
this process is called obversion. All four pro-
positional forms admit of an obverse.

3. Contraposition is obversion followed by con-
version. It is a process of immediate inference, in
which from a given proposition we infer another
proposition, having the contradictory of the original
predicate for its subject, and the original subject
for its predicate. Another name for this process
is conversion by negation.

Logicians differ as to whether the contrapositive
of All S is P is No not-P is S, or All not-P is
not-S, i. e. as to whether the quality should be
preserved. The solution of the dispute is in the
definition above, which rules that the original
subject is to stand as the new predicate. Hence
the contrapositive is No P is S.

4. Inversion yields the original subject nega-
tived. It is inference of a proposition having the
contradictory of the original subject for its subject,
and the original predicate for its predicate. This
is the meaning given by Keynes, and it fits in best
with the general scheme of eductions. Jevons uses
the word in a different sense.

78 A DIGEST OF LOCxIC

Taking as the original proposition All S is P,
Jevons classifies the related propositions thus —

INFERABLE

Converse Some 5 is P.

Obverse No 5 is P. -

Contrapositive

No P_ is S, or
All P is 5^.

NON-INFERABLE

Inverse All P is 5.

Reciprocal All 5 is P.

In this scheme the inverse as defined above finds
no place, and indeed it is not recognised by Jevons
at all.

The inverse may be obtained from the original
by converting and obverting, or by obverting and
converting alternately.

Each of the inferences above named takes two
forms, one with a positive predicate, and the other
with a negative predicate. The simplest forms are
those with the positive predicate, and to these
have been given the simple names converse, contra-
positive, and inverse. The corresponding negative
forms are called the obvcrted converse, obvcrted con-
trapositive, and obvcrted inverse of the original
proposition.

The rule in all conversion is that no term shall
be distributed in the converse that was not distributed
in the convertend.

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES

Given two terms and admitting their contra-
dictories, the possible combinations are as follows —

SP
S P

PS
PS

In the universals all these forms are obtainable.
The table below shows the immediate inferences
from each of the propositions A, E, I, O.

' Original Proposition

SaP

SeP

SiP

SoP

% Obverse

Sep

SaP

SoP

SiP

^ Converse ...

^ Obverted Converge'

Pis
PoS

Pes
PaS

PiS
PoS

—

J^' Contrapositive

Pes

PiS

—

Pi s.

^7 Obverted Contrapositive

PaS

PoS

—

PoS

^ Inverse

SoP

SiP

—

Obverted Inverse

SiP

SoP

—

The treatment of contingents and disjunctives
remains to be noticed. In a conditional pro-
position the antecedent and consequent correspond
respectively to the subject and predicate of the
categorical. They may be written —

A. If any 5 is Af then always that 5 is P.

E. If any S is M then never that 5 is F.

I. If any 5 is M then sometimes that 5 is P.

O. If any 5 is Jll then sometimes not that .S is P.

Or more briefly —

8o A DIGEST OF LOGIC

A. All 5 M is 5 P,

E. No i)^ M is 5 P.

I. Some 5 M is 5 P.

O. Some 5 M is not 5 P,

Hypotheticals are to be treated similarly, except
that here we have no distinction of quantity. The
propositions are either A or E, viz. All cases A
are^ or are not^ cases B.

Disjunctives admit quantity and bar quality :
they are always affirmative. Obversion and con-
traposition are possible, but the disjunctive form
disappears and becomes contingent. E. g. 5 is
either M or P, this is equivalent 'lo If S is not M
it is P. We have then as —

Contrapositive If vS is not P it is not J/.

Obverted contrapositive If 5 is not P it is M.
Obverse If 5 is J/ it is not P.

5. By added determinants is meant addition of
qualification to both 5 and P, in order that the
meaning of the term may be more exactly de-
termined. In making this inference both 5 and P
must be limited in the same way. The limitation
is called determination, and the limiting word the
deternii)iant.

Inference by added determinants is not a typical
case of immediate inference. The process is valid
enough if both 5 and P are determined alike ; thus
although from A cottage is a building we cannot
infer that A huge cottage is a huge building, yoX it

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 8i

is true that A cottage, Jmge as it is as a cottage is a
building huge as it is as a cottage. A similar re-
mark applies to complex conception, the process
is valid if 5 and P are alike implicated. The
reason for care in adding determinants is that
meaning is apt to vary with context, and therefore
render this sort of inference liable to fallacy. E. g.
All negroes are ineriy therefore An honest negro is
an honest man. This is true, for in each case the
determinant agrees. It is, however, not true that
because A bass singer is a man, that therefore A
bad bass singer is a bad tnan.

6. Complex Conception consists in the addition
of a name to both 5 and P. The difference
in this eduction and added determinants is that in
this case 6^ and P become the determinants of a
new name added. 6* and P qualify instead of
being qualified. E. g. Honesty is the best policy,
therefore Acts of honesty are acts of the best policy.
There is the same liability to fallacy as before. It
does not follow, e.g., that because All horses are
animals, therefore A majority of horses is a majority
of animals.

y. Converse Relation is an inference made when
in a proposition stating a relation of two things,
the relation being expressed by a relative word,
the same relation is expressed by transferring
the names of the related objects and replacing the
relative word by its correlative. Using symbols
this eduction may be written (Q and Q}- being a pair
of correlatives) 5 is Q of P, therefore P is 0} of S.

82 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

E.g. The Prince of Wales is tJie son of Queen
Victoria, therefore Queen Victoria is the mother of the
Prince of Wales. Or DnrJiani is north of London,
therefore London is sotttJi of DurJiani. This educ-
tion is based on purely material considerations.

8. Reversion consists in passage from the ex-
tensive to the intensive reading of a proposition, in
other words both the terms being read in denotation
the inference lies in changing the proposition so as
to exhibit the mutual relation of the terms in con-
notation. Reversion is most readily performed
upon the universal affirmative, for in this form of
proposition subject and predicate most clearly stand
to one another in the relation of species and genus.
For this reason the other three forms have scarcely
received due consideration. The inference can best
be illustrated and explained by examples.

Thus All metals \ ai^e \ elements when read in ex-
tension means TJie species metal is included in the
genus element. The problem is to frame a proposi-
tion which shall express the relation of the terms
in respect of their connotation.

Now the law of connexion between denotation
and connotation is one of opposite mutation, hence
it follows that the species having the smaller deno-
tation possesses the larger connotation, or in other
words the connotation of the species includes that
of the genus. The required proposition therefore is,
All tJie attributes wJiicJi are characteristic of elevient
I are \ attributes which give meaning to the name
metal: or all qualities of genus clement \ are \ quali-

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 83

ties of species metal. To express this eduction
symbolically it will be convenient to use a new
sign. The mathematical sign for the root of a
quantity seems to be suitable : it denotes that the
term to which it is attached is to be read inten-
sively. Thus if the term A mean objects, real or
imaginary, called A, J A will mean attributes
giving meaning to the name A, and the reverse of
S a P will appear as sj P ct sjS.

The universal negative and the particular pro-
positions are less readily dealt with. It must be
remembered that in naming a class, whilst it is
possible to refer to all or only some of the things
included, the connotation of the class name is a
fixed quantity, and the whole of it is always in-
volved, that is, the connotation of a name is the
same whether all of the objects denoted by it are
referred to or only some of them. Put shortly we
may say that reference in denotation may be either
entire or partial, in connotation it is always entire.
Hence it seems that there can be no particular
reversions.

This is not the view taken by Jevons (^Studies, p.
128), who regards the connotation as including all
the qualities belonging to the individuals of a class,
and seeing that all the qualities are not always
involved in predication a particular of the regular
form may be obtained. Setting aside this view and
reading connotation in the way previously defined
(p. 32) the reversions for E, I, and O will be as
follows : —

84 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

E. No metals are compounds^ therefore The char-
acteristic of compomids is not a quality of metals.
Symbolically sjPe JS.

I. Some elements are metals, therefore Sometimes
the characteristic of metals is a quality of elements.
Symbolically sjP i \fS.

O. Some elements are not metals, therefore Some-
times the characteristic of metals is not a quality of
elements. Symbolically JP o JS.

The matter of predication being concomitance of
quality with quality the sign of quantity in the
particulars will be sometimes. It may be urged that
in reversion we drift away from the sphere of formal
logic, nevertheless it is in ordinary speech a very
common form of inference and deserves fuller
attention than it has yet received in the Manuals,
where usually it escapes attention altogether.

CHAPTER XII

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lesso7is^ ch. xii.
Welton, Vol. i., Introd., ch. iv.
Bain, Deduction^ pp. 14 — 21.
Ray, Introd., ch. ii.

About these laws there has been endless discus-
sion and the various points that have been raised
are difficult to summarise. Full treatment is outside
the plan of these notes, reference therefore must be
made to the Manuals in which they are adequately-
stated and expounded.

The laws of thought are usually given as three,
viz. The law of

I. Identity all A is A :

II. Contradiction no A is not-^ :

III. Excluded middle all A is either A or not-^.

Leibnitz supplemented these three with a fourth
which he called the Law of Sufficient Reason.

The laws of thought have also been called Regu-

86 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

lative Principles of Thought : Axioms of Consist-
ency : and Criteria of Truth or Validity.

They are a priori mental laws in agreement with
which all valid thought must be conducted, hence
they are laws in the scientific sense of being uni-
formities ; they are also laws in the secondary sense
of being regulative when applied to govern and
test arguments.

I. The principle of identity is most simply stated
as A is A. Other statements are, Whatever is, is :
or Everything is what it is. It demands during
any argument that each term shall be used in
one unvarying sense, that what is posited true in
one context shall be held true in another. Such
propositions as A is A command instant assent, but
convey no information : the law must therefore be
interpreted to cover such propositions as A is B.
Such forms are statements, not of the same fact in
the same language as A is A is, but of the same fact
in different language, and it is in this that the iden-
tity consists. The two names, though both appli-
cable to the same thing or fact, differ in signification,
and we have therefore an identity amid diversity of
meaning, and the proposition in which they are
conjoined is capable of giving information.

II. The principle of contradiction states that
tJie same thing cannot be both A and not- A : other-
wise expressed, A is fiot not- A : or Nothing can
both be and not be. By this law it is laid down that
the same attribute cannot be affirmed and denied
of the same subject at the same time. This, and the

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT 87

preceding principle, are the basis of all immediate
inference: e.g. in opposition, for judgments to be
contradictory they must refer to the same subject
at the same time, and, if they do, they cannot by
this law both be true.

Thought in the last resort must agree with reality,
and put to the test of material consideration we
cannot conceive a thing as at once possessing an
attribute and not possessing it. In argument this
principle demands that having made a statement
we must abide by it, for our consistency will be at
fault unless we are prepared to deny the contra-
dictory of the statement originally made.

III. The principle of excluded middle is enunci-
ated A is either B or not-B. Otherwise stated, Either
a given judgment must be true or its co7itradictory ^
there is no middle course. Bain calls this law " an
incident of partial or incomplete contrariety . . .
too much honoured by the dignity of a primary law
of thought." The principle has been questioned
by other writers who have confused contradiction
and contrariety. Contraries mark the utmost
possible divergence. Contradictories are simple
negations, they admit no intermediate course, they
exclude all questions of degree. Care is necessary
to avoid this confusion. Lotze objects to the for-
mula A is either B or not-B on the ground that not-
B embraces everything in the universe except B and
is therefore meaningless : he would say Every A
either is or is not B. Practically however negative
terms are usually limited in application,

SS A DIGEST OF LOGIC

The axiom of excluded middle does not decide
which of the two contradictory terms is true, but
declares only the necessity of affirming one or other
of them. By the principle of contradiction we are
prohibited from thinking that two contradictory
attributes can both be simultaneously present : by
the principle of excluded middle we are prohibited
from thinking that they can both be simultaneously
absent.

IV. The principle of sufficient reason, first distinctly
formulated by Leibnitz, means that no fact is real,
no proposition true, without a sufficient reason why
it is so and not otherwise. The principle is not a
fundamental law of thought.

Valid arguments need not be based on the prin-
ciples of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle
entirely although they must be in conformity with
them. Those that are founded on mathematical
axioms are equally cogent, such as the argument
a fortiori, If A is greater than B, and ^ is greater
than 6", therefore A is greater than C: or If A is
equal to B, and B is equal to C, therefore A is equal
to C. Arguments however of this character are
not in the form of reasoning recognised in formal
logic.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SYLLOGISM

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xv.

Keynes, Part iii., ch. i. and ii. Most useful.

Mill, Bk. ii., ch. iv.

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iv., ch. i. and ii.

Bain, Dediictioji^ pp. 133, seq.

Mediate inference is of two kinds, viz. —

I. Deduction, or method of argument from general
to particular, and

II. Induction, or method of argument from
particular to general.

Syllogism is a common name for mediate infer-
ence, in Latin called coinpiitatio, which means a
reckoning or summing up. It is the summing up
of two terms in a conclusion through the medium of
a third term. It is an act of thought by which we
proceed from two judgments to a third, the truth
of which follows from those already given. It is an
inference in which one proposition is derived from
two others conjointly. These various definitions
fairly describe the nature of the syllogism.

90 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

In form the syllogism consists of three pro-
positions, of which the first two are called pre-
misses, and the last the conclusion.

Syllogism is of two kinds —

(i) Deductive and

(2) Inductive.

The deductive s3^11ogism has received the fuller
treatment. Aristotle spent most of his labour upon
it. The genus syllogism has indeed been taken for
the species deductive syllogism.

Dealing now with the deductive syllogism, S, M,
P are the usual symbols for minor, middle, and
major terms respectively.

The Major Term is the predicate of the con-
clusion :

The Minor Term is the subject of the con-
clusion : and

The Middle Term is the medium of comparison
of two propositions.

The Major Premiss is the proposition containing
the major term :

The Minor Premiss is the proposition containing
the minor term.

We are concerned in syllogism not with the truth
or falsity of any one of the individual propositions
which compose it, but simply with the dependence
of one of them upon the other two, so that if we
grant the latter we necessarily accept the former.
The derived proposition called the conclusion, there-
fore propounds no truth which was not contained
in the data, and the propositions must contain a

THE SYLLOGISM 91

common element as the ground of comparison
from which the conclusion is derived.

The three propositions which compose a syllogism
are called its proximate matter, and the terms united
its remote matter. The conclusion put first as a
thesis was called by the old logicians the question^
and the propositions establishing it, the reason. The
common element is the middle term, the other two
terms are called the extremes.

We have already seen that the terms of a pro-
position may be viewed in respect of quality,
quantity, relation, and modality, giving rise to the
classification set out on p. 38. The two premisses
of a syllogism may be viewed In a similar way,
giving rise to a corresponding classification of the
syllogism. The moods of a syllogism spring from
difference in the quantity and quality of the two
premisses. In view of relation when the premisses
are both of the same kind, both categoricals or both
contingent, syllogism is said to be pure. If the
premisses are of different relations the syllogism is
said to be mixed. The following Is a tabular view —

{a) Categorical.

Syllogism

(i) Pure - iU) Conditional.
I {c) Hypothetical.

(2) Mixed

( {a) Hypothetico - catc-
} gorlcal.

1 {]?) Disjunctive.

\ {c) Dilemma.

Syllogistic reasoning rests upon the laws of

92 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

thought : identity is at the root of every affirm-
ative, contradiction is at the root of every negative
categorical. Pure contingent syllogisms rest on these
principles together with that of sufficient reason.

Logicians have usually developed the laws of
thought into Axioms of Syllogism. These axioms
are therefore not ultimate, but secondary or
derived: and so called axiomata media or middle
axioms.

Aristotelian logicians regarded the first figure as
the type of categorical syllogism. The empty ^r/?^;//^?
of this is —

M P

S M

therefore 5

Other forms of syllogism were tested by reduction
to this form. These logicians therefore gave one
axiom, viz. the Dictum de omni et nidlo, as they
called it, which applied to this one form, and was
stated as their fundamental principle of syllogistic
reasoning.

The Dictum may be thus stated — " Whatever
may be said affirmatively or negatively of a class
may also be said affirmatively or negatively of any-
thing within that class." Or more shortly the state-
ment may stand, " Whatever may be distributively
predicated of a whole may in like manner be pre-
dicated of each of a whole." The Latin form
usually given by the older logicians is — " Quicquid

THE SYLLOGISM 93

de omni valet, valet enhn de quibiisdam et de singulis.
Qiiicquid de nulla valet, nee de quibusdani valet, nee
de singulis'' It is to be noted that the word class
in the statement first given means the class name
read distributively, the dictum is de omni, not DE
CUNCTO.

The dictum presupposes the class or extensive
theory of judgments or propositions which is ap-
plicable to all propositions having general terms,
but those who regard the connotation of each term
as being the important element formed an axiom
corresponding to the dictum to express this conno-
tative view, viz. ^^ Nota notae est not a rei ipsius. Re-
pugnans notae, rep2ignat rei ipsi!' Mill adopts this
statement in his Logic. It means wS Jias the mark
M which is tJie mark of P, therefore 5 Jias P : ox S
is ^a mark of M zvhich is a mark of P, therefore 6^
is a mark of P. Mill renders, " Whatever Jias any
mark, has that zvhich it is the mark of. Or when
the minor premiss as well as the major is universal
we may state it thus : Whatever is a mark of
any mark, is a mark of that which this last is a
mark of."

There are certain rules of mediate inference known
as Canons of Syllogism, and according to tradition
they are Six in number, as follows : —

Relating to the nature of the syllogism.

I. There must be three and only three terms.

II. There must be three and only three pro-
positions.

Relating to quantity.

94 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

III.vThe middle term must be distributed once
at least.

IV. No term not distributed in a premiss must
be distributed in the conclusion.

Relating to quality.

V. One premiss must be affirmative, for from
two negatives nothing can be inferred.

VI. If one premiss be negative the conclusion
must be negative, and vice versa, to prove a negative
conclusion one premiss must be negative.

It is usual to give in addition to the canons the
fpllowing corollaries derived from them.
/ I. From two particulars nothing can be inferred.
./ 2, If one premiss be particular the conclusion
must be particular.

3. From a particular major and a negative minor
nothing can be inferred.

It is to be noted that Canons I. and II. are not
rules of inference but rules for deciding whether or
not we have a syllogism. I. forbids ambiguity, for
if any term is used ambiguously it becomes in effect
two terms, and so there are four terms instead of
three present. Hence there is no need to add, as
is sometimes done in Rule III., " the middle term
must not be used ambiguously."

The fallacy arising from ambiguity of one of the
terms is called quateniio tcniiinoniin or fallacy of
four terms. There must be a common element as
a connecting link between major and minor terms,
and this must be identical in the two premisses.

Breach of Rule III. is called fallacy of the un-

THE SYLLOGISM 95

distributed middle. It is absolutely necessary for
the middle term to be once distributed, for other-
wise there is no bond of connexion between major
and minor terms. The real mediation lies in that
part of M which is common, and there can be no
assurance that any part of M is common unless
once at least the whole of J/ is referred to, and this
is what distribution means.

Breach of Rule IV. is called fallacy of illicit
process, of the major or minor as the case may be :
more shortly it is called illicit major or illicit
minor according to the case in question.

The Rule V. that two negatives yield no conclu-
sion follows from the fact that in neither premiss
is M in connexion with 5 and P. The accuracy
of the rule has been questioned by Jevons {Princi-
ples of Science, ch. iv., § lo), and on the same grounds
by Bradley {Principles of Logic, p. 254). It is
also noticed in the Port Royal Logic (p. 211).
Jevons answers his own objection in his Lessons

(P- 134).

As a matter of fact the rule only applies so long
as we keep strictly to syllogistic reasoning. Using
the methods of immediate inference two negatives
may yield a valid conclusion. By means of obver-
sion and conversion the conclusion may be drawn.
Keynes instances a syllogism in Barbara which may
be written in the negative form. The following case
seems more convincing. Given the premisses Mo P,
SeM ; a conclusion is possible, viz. Si P. It is
obtained thus —

96 A DIGEST OF LOCxIC

Some M is not P yields obverse Some ]\I is not-/*.

No 5 is J/ yields the ob-) . ., __. ^ „
^ , ^All M IS not-5.

verted conversej

therefore Some not-5 is not-/*.

As a concrete example take the following —
(i) Some insects \ are not \ ivinged.
(2) No vertebrates \ are \ insects.

These premisses (i) obverted and (2) converted
and then obverted, become

(i) Some insects \ are \ wingless,
(2) All insects \ are \ invertebrate.

Some invei'teb rates \ are \ wingless.

By a process similar to the above E E as well as
O E can be shown to yield a valid syllogism : E O
is intractable.

E E is worked thus —

Given two premisses, (i) M e P and (2) 5 e M.
Take (2) and by inversion it becomes 5 i M. With
this new minor construct the syllogism, and we have

M_ e P
S i M

S 0 P

As a concrete example take the premisses, (i)
No criminals are deserving of pity, and (2) No
innoccjit persons are criminals. When wc have
inverted the premiss (2) our syllogism will stand
thus —

THE SYLLOGISM 97

(i) No criminals are deserving of pity.
(2) Some guilty persons are criminals.

. ' . Some guilty persons are not deserving of pity.

Using the methods of immediate inference upon
the premisses of the invalid syllogistic moods there is
no reason why the majority of them cannot be made
to conform with moods that are valid. This, as
shown above, can certainly be done with E E and OE.
The rule that two negatives yield no conclusion holds
good only so long as we deal with the premisses as
negative in the syllogism, i. e. do not go outside the
syllogism to alter the form of the premisses. The
premisses treated as here suggested cease to be
negative, but if indirect reduction is allowable in
any case, as it is, it is certainly allowable here also.

The canons of the syllogism may be compressed
' — "simplified" according to the Manuals — but it
can hardly be called simplification, since they cease
to be simple in the sense of being easily understood.
The simplification is as follows — Canons L and IL
are omitted as being not rules but description of
syllogism, and thus we are left with four. These
four are not independent, for breach of IV., V., or
the first part of VI. involves indirectly a breach of
III. The independent rules of the syllogism are
thus reduced to two —

1. The middle term must be distributed once at
least in the premisses.

2. To prove a negative conclusion one of the
premisses must be negative.

98 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

It may be noted that the only syllogism rejected
by (2) and not also rejected directly or indirectly
by (i) is A A O in Figure IV. So far as the first
three figures are concerned, therefore, we are left
with the single rule of the undistributed middle.
This compression is not of any practical im-
portance.

The Connexion between the Dictum and the Syllo-
gistic Canons is to be carefully noticed. The dictum
applies to syllogisms in the first figure and was
not intended to apply beyond that figure, but as
all syllogisms may be reduced to the first figure
the dictum applies indirectly to those also in
Figures II., III., and IV.

(i) The dictum provides for three and only three
terms —

I. Whatever is predicated = major term,
II. of a whole = middle term,

III. of each of a whole = minor term.

(2) The dictum provides for only three pro-
positions—

I. Predication of something of a whole,
II. statement that each is contained in the

whole,
III. making the original statement of the con-
tained each.

(3) The dictum provides not only that the middle
term shall be distributed, but more definitely that
it shall be distributed in the major premiss.
Whatever is predicated of a whole means a distri-

THE SYLLOGISM 99

buted whole. The middle term in Figure L is the
subject of the major premiss, and as this is A or E
it is as a matter of fact always distributed.

(4) The dictum provides for one affirmative pre-
miss, since the declaration that the each is contained
in the whole can only be affirmation, not denial,
i. e. the minor premiss must be affirmative.

(5) The dictum provides for a negative conclusion
from a negative premiss, and vice versa by the words
" in like manner."

(6) Illicit process is provided against indirectly.
We are limited by what has preceded to the follow-
ing cases, A A, A I, E A, E I, and these separately
examined are seen to fall under the rule.

[OO

CHAPTER XIV

FIGURE AND MOOD. REDUCTION '

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xvi., xvii.
Keynes, Part, iii., ch. iii., iv.
Mill, Bk. ii., ch. ii.
Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iv., ch. iii., iv.

Figure of syllogism is syllogism with a definite
position of M. Moods of figure of syllogism are
the possible combinations of the premisses in that
position oi M.

There are four figures corresponding to the
different ways in which S, M, and P may be
arranged. These letters as before are used to
denote the minor, middle, and major terms respect-
ively. The point of note in the subjoined table is
the position of M.

FI GU R E.

rv.

MAJOR PREM155.
jniNOR PREM15S.

C ONCLUSION.

S P

FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION loi

Account may be taken of the premisses without
regard to the position of M, and this is called
unfigured syllogism.

Aristotle took account only of Figures I., II., and
III. He regarded the first figure as the normal form
and called it in consequence the perfect figure. The
fourth figure was first explicitly recognised by Galen,
and hence it has been called the Galenian figure.
By some logicians the fourth figure is rejected.

The first figure gives conclusions in all four pro-
positional forms A, E, I, and 0. The second figure
only proves negatives : the third only particulars.
Hence the first figure is fairly called perfect. It
proves moreover in the most clear and transparent
manner.

Special rules have been formulated for the figures
as follows —

I. (i) The minor premiss must be affirmative.
(2) The major premiss must be universal.
II. (i) One premiss must be negative.

(2) The major premiss must be universal.

III. (i) The minor premiss must be affirmative.
(2) The conclusion must be particular.

IV. (i) If the major is affirmative the minor is

universal.

(2) If either premiss is negative the major is

universal.

(3) If the minor is affirmative the conclusion

is particular.
There are certain characteristics peculiar to each
figure that may be noted, viz. —

I02 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Fig. I. proves A, E, I, and O : it is the perfect
figure. It is the only figure proving A. This alone
makes it the most useful and important of all the
syllogistic figures. All deductive science tends to
work in A A A of this figure.

Only in this figure have we the subject and pre-
dicate of the conclusion occupying the same position
as ^ and P in the premisses. This accounts in part
for argument in Figure I. seeming more natural
than in other figures.

The dictum de oinni et iudlo as already pointed
out applies directly to this figure only.

Fig. II. proves E, O, — negatives only.

As the middle term is predicate in both the pre-
misses, unless one premiss were negative the middle
term would be undistributed.

This figure is chiefly used for purposes of dis-
proof. It has also been called the exclusive figure
because by means of it we may go on excluding
various suppositions as to the nature of something
under investigation whose real character we wish
to ascertain. This process is called absciss io infiniti.
(See Whately, Log., p. 60.)

Fig. III. proves I, O — particulars only. If the con-
clusion were universal it would involve illicit minor.

This is the most natural figure when the pre-
misses are singular propositions. It is also useful
in taking exception to a universal proposition laid
down by an opponent as establishing an instance
in which such universal does not hold good.

Fig. IV. proves only E, I, 0. It is seldom used

FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION 103

and by some rejected. It is not recognised by
Aristotle. De Morgan calls it nothing but " the
first with a converted conclusion." The natural
order of thought in it is completely reversed.

When a conclusion is weaker than the premisses
warrant, i. e. when I or O is inferred where A or E
are possible, the syllogism is said to be weakened
and the mood is called subaltern.

If a conclusion remains unaltered although we
substitute for one of the premisses the subaltern
of that premiss, the syllogism is said to be
strengthened.

Mood is the form of a syllogism as determined
by the quantity and quality of the premisses, i. e.
the arrangements of A, E, I, 0 in sets of three,
each triplet of propositions is called a mood, or
form of the syllogism. The combinations of 3 out
of 4 things are as follows : —

(i) All three alike = 4

(2) Two alike, one different = 4x3x3 =36

(3) All three different = 4x3x2x1 =24

Total 64

Of these sixty-four possible arrangements only
nineteen are valid.

In Figure I. there are 4

II.

[II.

IV.

Total 19

104

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

TABLE OF FIGURES AND VALID MOODS.

AAA V

All

EA£

EIO

II.

AOO

EAE AEE

EIO

III.

OAO

All AAI lAI

EIO EAO

IV.

AAI

lAI

AEE

EIO EAO

The valid syllogistic forms may be determined either
directly or indirectly; directly by appeal to the
fundamental laws of thought, indirectly by examina-
tion of all possible combinations and the exclusion
of those which break any of the canons of syllogism.
The indirect method is the one usually resorted to.

Reduction is the name given to the process of
expressing in Fig. I. the syllogisms which appear
in other figures, or, more generally stated, it is
change of mood or figure.

Unless specified, reduction is always taken to mean
change of imperfect figure to the perfect. Questions
on reduction depend upon immediate inference and
the transposition or metathesis of the premisses.

Reduction is of two kinds.

I. Direct or Ostensive, which means proof of the
same conclusion by an argument in Fig. I.

II. Indirect or Reductio ad absurdum (also called
Reductio ad or per vnpossibile, or Deductio ad iin-
possibile or ad absurduni) consists in proof of the
contradictory of the original conclusion to be false
by syllogism in Fig. I. Unless specially asked for,

FIGURE AND JSIOOD: REDUCTION 105

it is always understood that reduction is to be
made ostensively.

Note, eduction applies to propositions ; reduction
to syllogism.

The doctrine of reduction is only intelligible on
the ground that figures differ in cogency and
efficiency in a marked way. It is conceivable that
a man may grant a conclusion in the first figure
and not in the second or third. Reduction is
proving in the first figure, which is unexceptionable,
that which may be excepted against in the other
figures. Both kinds of reduction apply equally to
every mood, but it was formerly usual to limit
reductio per impossibile to the cases of Baroco and
Bocardo. These moods the older logicians failed
to reduce ostensively because O is not amenable to
conversion. We now treat O by obversion, and by
this means both these moods can be ostensively dealt
with. The value of reduction has been disputed.

The moods are usually designated by the names
which occur in the following hexameters. It is
most important to know these mnemonic lines
thoroughly for the accurate working of problems in
reduction. Note that the names Baroco and
Bocardo are sometimes spelt with a " k." This is
a mistake : " c " is the original form.

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris :
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundae :
tertia, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton,
Bocardo, Ferison, habet : quarta insuper addit
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison.

io6 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Each valid mood in every figure — except sub-
altern moods — is here represented by a separate
word, which in the imperfect moods contains
directions for reduction.

Vowels give the quantity and quality of the
propositions :

Initials connect the moods of each figure.

The consonants are thus to be interpreted —
V s, the proposition denoted by the preceding vowel
is to be converted simply :

. /, the proposition denoted by the preceding vowel
is to be converted per accidens :

7;/, muta, i.e. metathesis or tTansposition of the
premisses :

c, indirect reduction, /. e. substitute for the pro-
position whose vowel precedes its contradictory.

The meaningless letters are /; (not initial), d (not
initial), /, 71, r, and t. Note that s and / at the
end of a word show that the conclusion of the new
syllogism must be treated as the letters indicate.

The syllogistic mnemonic appears in various
forms. The lines given are from Aldrich and are
those in general use.

Modifications have been suggested in order to
make all the letters significant. C. Read in Mind,
No. xxvii., p. 440, seeks to obviate the disadvan-
tages of —

(i) The mood not being indicated by a letter :

(2) meaningless letters : and

(3) no indication of ostensive reduction of Baroco
and Bocardo by obversion and contraposition.

FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION 107

He takes /, n, r, and t as signs of I., II., Ill , and
IV. figures respectively, and makes the lines run
thus : —

Ballala, Cellalel, Dalii, Felioque prioris :
Cesane, Camesnes, Fesinon, Banoco secundae :

Tertia Darapri, Drisamis, Darisi, Ferapro
Bocaro, Ferisor habet : quarta insuper addit

Bamatip, Gametes, Dimatis, Fesapto, Fesistot.

On the same principle Miss Christine Ladd in
her Studies in Log., p. 40, suggests that difference
of figure might be marked by r, /, /, and ;/ re-
spectively.

Dealing now with Baroco and Bocardo we note
that—

c indicates reductio per inipossibile. The position
of the letter shows that the first step is the
omission of the premiss preceding it, i. e. the other
premiss and the contradictory of the conclusion are
to be combined in a new syllogism, which gives a
false conclusion and therefore indirectly establishes
the truth of the original.

The indirect reduction of Baroco is effected
thus —

Baroco

P a M

All P 1

S 0 ni

Some 5 1

is not

.' . S 0 P = Some 5 | is not | P

If S 0 P \s false, its contradictory S a P is true.
Substitute S a P for the minor premiss and we
have the syllogism in Barbara thus — ■

io8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

. 5

but in the minor of the original syllogism 5 o M
is posited as true, therefore our new conclusion
S a M \?> false ; but being the conclusion from two
premisses, one of which, viz. P a M, is posited true,
the other premiss, viz. S a P, must be false, that is,
its contradictory, viz. S o P/\s true, and this is the
conclusion of the original syllogism which was to
be proven.

The indirect reduction of Bocardo is effected
similarly —

Bocardo M o P

M a S

S 0 P

If this conclusion be false, then its contradictory,
viz. S a P, must be true. Substitute S a P for
the major premiss M o P and we have a syllogism
in Barbara thus —

5 a
Ma

P
S

M a

But this conclusion must be false since it con-
tradicts the original major, M o P, which is
admittedly true. But in the second syllogism,
M a P \<, a conclusion drawn from two premisses,

FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION 109

of which the minor is posited true, therefore if our
new conclusion, viz. M a P, is false, the major pre-
miss of the second syllogism must also be false, that
is, its contradictory, viz. S 0 P, must be true, and this
is the original conclusion which was to be proven.

Both Baroco and Bocardo may be reduced osten-
sively, and the following names have been suggested
as substitutes to indicate the method —

Baroco Facovo, Faksoko, Faksnoko, Facoco^ or

Fakoro.
Bocardo Docamovs, Doksamosk, Doksauirosk,

Docajiioc, or Doksamo.

Of these Faksoko and Doksamosk are the best.
In the other substitutes the letters are open to
misconstruction.

k indicates obversion ;

ks indicates obversion and then conversion, i. e.
contraposition.

In Facovoand Docamovs, <: means contraposition
and V obversion.

Baroco or Faksoko P a M
S 0 M

.', S 0 P

Contraposition of the major and obversion of the
minor premiss yield the syllogism —

Ferio M e P

S i M

.'. S 0 P

no A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Bocardo or Doksamosk M o P

J/ a S

.'. S 0 P

Contraposition of the major and metathesis of
the premisses yield —

Darii M a S

P i M

.- , P i S

This conchision by conversion and obversion
becomes J^^ o P or the conclusion of the original
syllogism, which was to be proven.

Indirect reduction is applied usually only to
Baroco and Bocardo, but it is equally applicable to
the moods which are dealt with as a rule ostensively.

Indirect reduction is a way of proving in the first
figure that a conclusion is true because its contra-
dictory is false. The assumption upon which the
process is based, is that if a premiss leads to a false
conclusion it must itself be false. There is nothing
special to Baroco and Bocardo in this, for the
process will apply to all the moods.

Euclid uses reductio ad absurduni on the same
fundamental principle that aiiytJiing, being used cor-
rectly, which leads to fallacy must itself be fallacious.

Aristotle was the first to see that a false con-
clusion could never be got correctly from true
premisses, and also that a materially true conclu-
sion can be obtained from premisses one or both of

FIGURE AND MOOD: REDUCTION iii

which may be false, i. e. from true we can only get
true, but from false we may get true. E.g. —

All stones are animals
All cozvs are stones

All cows are animals.

A conclusion never proves its premisses, but the
falsity of a conclusion overturns the premisses.

There is an aspect of material investigation called
plurality of causes ; this and the validity of scientific
hypothesis repose on the principle that a materially
true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses.

112

CHAPTER XV

IRREGULAR AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lessons^ ch. xviii., xix.
Keynes, Part iii., ch. vi.
Welton, Vol. I., Bk. iv., ch. v.^

The table subjoined gives at a glance the
irregular syllogisms.

i First Order — omission of major premiss.
ENTHYMEME x Second Order — omission of minorpremiss.
( Third Order — omission of conclusion.

T- 11 i. i. J ( Prosyllogism
Fully stated | Episyllo|ism

( Curtailed \ f£f '"^^''^ S Aristoteli
\ Sorites I Goclenia,

The word enthymeme is derived from the Greek
ivOviJLijiJLa, which means a suggestion or argument.
It is defined by Aristotle as {n;A.A.oyto-juos e^ dKorcov
?y (njixeicov. The €Ik6s and o-T^/xeior themselves are
propositions : qlkos states a general probability, and
(Tiiixdov a fact which is known to be an indication
more or less certain of some further statement,

SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 113

whether of a single fact or a general belief In
short, an enthymeme meant originally a syllogism
with probable premisses. Aristotle's use of the
word is entirely different to present usage, and has
now only historical interest.

The enthymeme is now usually defined as an
abridged syllogism. The syllogism instead of being
stated in full is truncated by the omission of one
or other of the constituent propositions. Ac-
cording to the proposition omitted, enthymemes
are ranked in three orders, viz. —

first order, major premiss omitted :
second order, minor premiss omitted :
third order, conclusion omitted.

The following are examples —

1st. We are mortals^ and tJierefore liable to ei'ror.

2nd. Mortals are liable to error, and therefore zve
are liable to error.

3rd. Mortals are liable to error, and we are
mortals.

In dealing with an enthymeme, care should be
taken to express the omitted proposition. It is to
be noted that according to the definition now
current, the enthymeme differs in no way at all
from the ordinary syllogism except in its expression.

By a polysyllogism is meant a conjunction of
syllogisms so stated that the conclusion of one
becomes a premiss of another. The syllogism
whose conclusion becomes the premiss of the
syllogism that follows it is cdXXoidi^A prosyllogisni.

114 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

The syllogism whose premiss is the conclusion of
the syllogism preceding is called an episyllogism .

When in these conjoined syllogisms the full
statement is abridged by omission of any of the
constituent propositions, it is called^an epicheirenia.
In other words, the epicheirema is a polysyllogism
in which the prosyllogisms are enthymemes.

The following are examples.

Polysyllogism fully stated.

(i) All voyages of discovery have a scientific value.

(2) All arctic expeditions are voyages of discovery.

(3) .'. All arctic expeditions have a scientific value.

(4) But Nansen's search for the North Pole zuas
an arctic expedition.

(5) .*. Nans ens search for the North Pole has a
scientific value.

In symbol the above argument may be written —

but

.' . S a P

Note propositions (i), (2), and (3J form the
prosyllogism : propositions (3), (4), and (5) form
the episyllogism.

Epicheirema or Polysyllogism curtailed.

All arctic expeditions have a scientific value because
they are voyages of discovery. Nansen's search for
the North Pole therefore has a scientific value.

SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 115

Sorites (from o-Mpos a heap) is a chain of
syllogisms curtailed in statement and differing from
the epicheirema in being curtailed in a definite and
uniform manner. Or more shortly put, the defini-
tion may be given as follows — A sorites is a chain
of enthymemes all of the third order terminating
in a fully expressed syllogism.

There are tzvo kinds of Sorites —

(i) In the ordinary or so-called Aristotelian
Sorites the suppressed conclusion of each syllogism
becomes the minor premiss of the next. It is more
easily remembered by noting that the subject of
the conclusion is the subject of the first proposition.

Thus —

6" is R
R \s Q
Q is P

.-. S \s P

(2) In the Goclenian Sorites the suppressed con-
clusion of each syllogism becomes the major
premiss of the next. It may be remembered by
noting that the predicate of the conclusion is the
predicate of the first proposition.
Thus —

g is P
R IS Q
S is R

. S Is P

In the ordinary sorites there are two special
rules, viz. —

ii6 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

(i) The last and only the last premiss can be
negative.

(2) The first and only the first premiss can be
particular.

In the Goclcnian sorites these rules must be
reserved in statement.

(i) The first and only the first premiss can be
negative.

(2) The last and only the last premiss can be
particular.

An O proposition is therefore by these rules ex-
cluded as a premiss, although an O conclusion can
be drawn if the final syllogism is in Ferio.

There is no difficulty in deducing these special
rules from the general canons of syllogism : (i) one
negative premiss only, or else with a second we
shall have a syllogism wdth two, and so the chain
will be broken : (2) one particular premiss only, or
else with a second w^e shall have a syllogism with
two, w^iich will break the chain. The position of
these premisses is determined by the rule relating
to distribution.

Pure contmgent syllogisms do not call for special
treatment, for in every case the premisses can
be expressed in categorical form and dealt with
as regards mood, figure, and reduction in the
usual way. They are syllogisms in which both the
premisses are conditional or both hypothetical,
giving respectively a conditional or hypothetical
conclusion, and called respectively conditional or
hypothetical syllogisms.

SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 117

Thus the following argument is a hypothetical
syllogism in Barbara —

If M is P is
If S is M is

. • . If S is P is.

No difficulty is experienced in transforming the
premisses into categoricals and obtaining a cate-
gorical conclusion. Treated thus it becomes —

Every coincidence of M is a coincidence of P
Every coincidence of S is a coincidence of M

. • . Every coincidence of S is a coincidence of P.

The name hypothetical syllogism, however, is
commonly restricted, as by Jevons, to a mixed
syllogism in which one of the premisses only is
hypothetical, the other being categorical. A more
accurate nomenclature would be to call these
syllogisms Jiypothetico-categoricaL-

In these syllogisms —

the major premiss is hypothetical :
the minor premiss is categorical : and
the conclusion is categorical.

The hypothetico- categorical syllogism has two
moods —
(I.) Modus ponens, and (II.) Modus tollens.

I. The modus ponens or Constructive hypothetical
syllogism is the mood of affirmation. If S is P
is, but vS is, . • . P is.

The antecedent of the hypothetical is affirmed,
and thereby the consequent is established.

ii8 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

II. The modus tollens, or Destructive hypo-
thetical syllogism is the mood of negation. If S
is P 7Sy but P is not, .' . S is not.

The consequent of the hypothetical is denied,
and thereby the antecedent is found wanting.

The rule for deahng with these syllogisms is
commonly stated thus : " The antecedent must be
affirmed, or the consequent denied." More shortly
it may be put, posit antecedent, or snblate
consequent.

It has been urged by Bain, Mansel, and others
that this form of syllogism is not mediate, but
immediate reasoning, i. e. it is not syllogism at all.
Immediate reasoning, however, always leaves off
with a conclusion resembling in form the original
proposition. Thus starting with the hypothetical,
if the reasoning were immediate, the conclusion
would be hypothetical : it is on the contrary, how-
ever, categorical. We cannot from our hypothetical
get any conclusion without either positing the ante-
cedent or sublating the consequent, that is, given
one proposition (viz. the hypothetical major), we
pass from it throuc^h another (viz. the categorical
minor) to a third (viz. the categorical conclusion),
and this is as clearly mediate reasoning as in
categorical syllogism.

It is urged by Mansel that there is no middle
term. In answer it may be said that the categori-
cal minor is a proposition such as includes a middle
term. Thus transform the categorical to the h)'po-
thetic form as follows —

SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 119

M is P
S is M

. • . ^ is /^
If M is P is
but M is (in the form of S)

.-. P is.

It appears then that it is not the middle term that
is wanting, but the minor term in not being
separately expressed.

Bain's objection is different and is based on the
ambiguity of the word if (see Mind, Logic of If
1877, p. 264, and Bain, Ded., p. 116). He argues
that the hypothetical, e. g. " If it is fine ivc ivi/l
go azuay to-vwrrowl' is nothing more than a con-
junction of two statements into one, viz., that zve
will go away to-morrow and it is fine. He is read-
ing into the word if the meaning since or because^
whereas it properly denotes bare hypothesis with
the meaning suppose or granted that. In symbol
Bain's hypothetical must be written. If S is {and
it is) P is. In this case the conclusion is certainly
deduced immediately. In answer it may be said
that the same is true in the case of the categorical
syllogism. If both the premisses are conjoined
and read together the conclusion follows immedi-
ately. They are however read separately and so
from either of the premisses taken separately the
conclusion is mediately drawn. In short whatever
argument can be brought against the mediacy of

I20 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

the hypothetical syllogism can also be brought
against the mediacy of the categorical.

A disjunctive syllogism is one in which the major
premiss is a disjunctive proposition. The minor
premiss and the conclusion are categorical. Many
logicians recognise two moods : I. Modus tollendo
ponens^ II. Modus ponendo tollens.

I. The Modus Tollendo Ponens is equivalent to
the constructive JiypotJietical into which it may be
resolved. One of the alternatives is denied and
thereby the other is established as —

5 is either Q or P
but S is not Q
. • . 5 is P.

Stated in hypothetical form the syllogism stands —

If 5 is not 0, 5 is P
but 5 is not Q
.'. S is P.

II. The Modus Ponendo Tollens is regarded by
many logicians as a valid mood and equivalent
to the destructive JLypotJietical. It consists in
affirmation of one of the alternatives whereby the
other is negatived and forms the conclusion. Thus

^' is cither Q or P
but 5 is Q
.-. S is not /'.

The validity of this mood depends entirely upon
the interpretation of the disjunctive that in it the
alternatives are mutuall)' exclusive. If however

SYLLOGISMS— IRREGULAR, COMPOUND 121

we take the opposite view, held by many, that the
alternatives are not of necessity mutually exclusive,
then the validity of this mood is vitiated. As will
be seen it depends in any case upon how the dis-
junctive premiss is read. The only case therefore
in which we can be sure of the validity of this mood
is that in which the terms of the alternatives are
contradictories : 6" is either P or P.

With regard to the dilemma logicians are not
agreed either as to its form or nature : hence defi-
nitions have varied considerably. It may perhaps
be fairly called a contingent- disjunctive syllogism
in which the major premiss is a contingent contain-
ing a plurality, either of antecedents or con-
sequents, and the minor premiss is a disjunctive.
These premisses will yield either a categorical or
disjunctive conclusion.

As in the previous classes of mixed syllogism
there are two moods, (I.) Modus Ponens, or Con-
structive in which the conclusion is affirmative :
called simple when categorical : complex when
disjunctive. And (TI.) Modus tollens^ or Destructive
in which the conclusion is negative, and (according
to the view of the majority) always disjunctive :
called therefore complex.

The schema for the three forms may be written
as follows : —

I. Modus ponens.

(i) Simple Constructive.

If A then X, and if B then X:
But either A or B : . • . X

122 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

(2) Complex Constructive.
If A then X, and if B then Y :

But either A or B : .' . X or Y.
II. Modus toUens.

Complex Destructive.

If A then X, and if B then Y:

But neither X nor Y : .' . Neither A nor B.

The dilemma is rather a device of rhetoric than a
sound logical method. Its purpose is to force an
opponent to a choice of alternatives both of which
are damaging to his argument, hence the proverb,
" to be on the horns of a dilemma."

The rule for rebutting a dilemma is to change the
position of the consequents and make them nega-
tive. Thus e.g. against the complex constructive
it may be retorted —

If A tJien 710 t-Y, and if B then not-X :

But either A or B : . ' . not- Y or not-X.

The weakness of dilemmatic argument lies in
the fact already noticed, that in a disjunctive pro-
position the alternatives are not of necessity
mutually exclusive.

123

CHAPTER XVI

FALLACIES

REFERENCES

Jevons, Lesso7ts^ ch. xx., xxi.

Mill, Bk. V. (all).

Whately, Elejiients of Logic, 9th ed., Bk. iii., pp. loi seq.

Welton, Vol. ii., Bk. viii. (all).

De Morgan, Fo?inal Logic, ch. xiii.

The word fallacy is used in three distinct senses,
meaning —

(i) error in an argument,

(2) violation of any logical principle, and

(3) any kind of mental confusion whatever.
The meaning should be restricted to violation

of any logical principle, and this will include the
breach of the rules of inference.

By Aristotle fallacies were classed according
as the error lay —

I. in the form — in dictione — or
IL in the matter — extra dictione.

124 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Subsequent logicians have rejected or modified
this classification.

Whately divides fallacies into —

I. Logical which are (a) purely logical and {d)
semi-logical.

II. Non-logical or material — corresponding with
Aristotle's exlra dictione.

I. {a) The purely logical fallacies relate to the
syllogism and are the fallacies of undistributed
middle and illicit process whether of major or
minor.

ih) The semi-logical correspond with Aristotle's
in dictione.

Mill greatly enlarged and modified the scheme
to include all possible errors liable to invalidate
inference. The whole question is discussed at
great length in Book V. of his Logic, and to this
reference must be made for full treatment of the
subject.

No thoroughly satisfactory classification of fallacies
has yet been made, although frequently attempted,
and De Morgan doubts whether such a classification
is possible.

The fallacies of deduction have already been
noticed and described. Those of induction are
beyond our present scope. Material fallacies are
strictly speaking outside the sphere of logic alto-
gether. The following summary of the more im-
portant fallacies is given in accordance with the
traditional treatment of the subject.

FALLACIES 125

Semi-Log^ical Fallacies.

I. Equivocation or Ambiguous Middle is use of
the same word in a varying sense.

E. g. The dog is an animal. Sir ins is the dog..
. ' . Sirius is an animal.

A man zvho is deaf in one ear zvas rejected from
a jury the other day because it was argned he
couldn't Jiear both sides.

2. Amphibology is doubtful grammatical structure
of a sentence.

E. g. / Jiave come from a country where mosquitoes
abound. Majiy of them lueigh a pound, and they
settle on the trees and bark.

The stock illustration is: Aio te, Aeacida,
Romanos vincere posse.

3. Composition is the fallacy of using a middle
term distributively in a major premiss and collec-
tively in the minor.

E. g. 3 and 2 are odd and even, 5 is 3 and 2,
. • . 5 is odd and .even.

4. Division is the fallacy of using a middle term
collectively in the major and distributively in the
minor.

E. g. The planets are seven, Venus and Mars arc
planets^ . ' . Venus and Mars are seven.

5. Accent is a fallacy arising from false emphasis
in speaking.

E. g. {She.) " Do you think that I could get a
donkey to take me up the mountain ? " (He^ *' Lean
on ME."

6. Figure of speech is the assumption that words

126 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

similar in form are similar in meaning. Essentially
this fallacy is one of equivocation.

The traditional example is : IV/iat a man walks
on he tramples on. He zvalks on the zvhole day,
.', He tramples on the zvhole day.

The material fallacies.

These, also called non-logical, arise from the
subject matter not the form of the argument, and
of these the following are usually enumerated.

1. A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, or
Fallacy of Accident. It is a false argument from
general to particular.

E. g. To inflict pain purposely is the mark of a
brutal nature. The surgeon inflicts pain purposely.
. ' . The surgeon is a man of brutal nature.

2. A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter or
Converse Fallacy of Accident is a false argument
from particular to general.

E. g. Miracles ivere not stibjected to a thorougJi
scientific examination at the time they ivere wrought,
and. miracles have never been known to occur
within modern times. . * . Miracles are altogetJier
impossible.

. 3. Ignoratio Elenchi or Fallacy of Irrelevant Con-
clusion, literally ignorance of the refutation, the
elencJius being the contradictory of the assertion
of a supposed opponent. It is refutation of the
wrong point. It includes all kinds of irrelevancy
and assumes three main forms, viz. —

{a) Mistake in the point at issue. E.g. ''Here,
zuaitery take away these oysters. They arc badT

FALLACIES i^l

" Vesszr, but we've given you tzvo more than you
asked for to make upT

(b) The imputation of consequence or motive.
E. g. The doctrine of the High Church party in the
Church of England leads to Romanism .' . it must
be false.

{c) Introduction of rhetorical expedients such
as the argumenta ad hominem, ad populum, etc.

E, g. TJiis proposal is tJiorougJdy bad, as may
readily be supposed from the cJiai'acter of the man
zvho makes it.

4. Petitio Principii or Begging the Question or
Circulus in Probando. A form of fallacy in which
the conclusion is either itself one of the premisses
or is required to establish one of the premisses.
The fallacy occurs generally in protracted argu-
ments. It is analogous to t\\Q circulus in definiendoy
viz. that fault in definition which seeks to define
a word by itself or its synonym.

E. g. Consumption is tuberculosis : we are able to
diagnose consumption in a patient luhenever lue
observe the symptoms of tubercular disease.

5. Non sequitur or a conclusion not adequately
supported by the premisses and which therefore
" does not follow." This fallacy can always be
reduced to some other form.

E. g. {Professor of Chemistry.) " The substance
you see in this vial is the most deadly of all poisons.
A single drop placed on the tongue of a cat is enough
to kill tJie strongest man!' This for instance might
be classed as Ignoratio Elenchi.

128 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

6. Noil causa pro causa or Post hoc ergo propter
hoc or False Cause. The attribution of any event
to some antecedent with which it has no sort of
connexion.

E. g. The Norivegians once at tr United a disap-
pearance of fish from their shores to the introduction
into Norzvaj/ of vaccination.

7. Fallacia plurium interrogationum or Fallacy
of Many Questions, i.e. a combination of two or
more questions, each requiring a separate answer,
into one, the single question asked not admitting
of only one answer. The fallacy is refuted by
answering separately each particular.

P>. g. {Editor, to aspiring writer) " You shoidd
write so that the most ignorant can understand
zuhat you mean!' (^Aspirant.) " Well, wJiat part of
my paragraph don't you understand ? "

129

CHAPTER XVII

THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM

REFERENCES

Welton, Vol. i., Bk. iv., cli. iii., p. 37:

Ray, p. 250.

Mill, Bk. ii., ch. iii.

Bain, Deduction^ Bk. ii., ch. iii.

The value of the syllogism as a method of infer-
ence has been disputed, in the seventeenth century
by Locke, Descartes and others, in more recent
times notably by Mill followed by Bain and others.

Mill's objection is twofold. He urges that (i) syl-
logistic reasoning is not a process of inference, and
(2) it involves the fallacy oi petitio principii.

The objection may be met if we are careful to
bear in mind that syllogistic reasoning does not
pretend to be more than a process of formal logic.
Now formal logic does not provide us with the mat-
ter of argument ; this is otherwise gained, but being
gained the office of formal logic is to ensure its
being used with self-consistency. Propositions are
dealt with simply as relations between terms. The

I30 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

question of their material truth lies outside the limit
of formality.

Syllogism deals with the application of two pro-
positions that have a common or middle term, com-
bining them under the laws of thought in a third
proposition called the conclusion ; and once more,
it is not the province of the syllogism to test this
conclusion by reference to the matter about which
it is concerned so long as the self-consistency of the
syllogism itself is assured.

If it is useful and important to combine our
judgments so as to avoid fallacy, then in so doing
syllogism has a very distinct value. Most of what
we call knowledge is communicated by general
statements. It is by the process of deduction that
the general statement is applied to particular cases,
or in other w^ords that inference is made from
the more to the less general : and syllogism is the
form of deduction.

Mill's argument proceeds on the assumption that
we argue from particulars to particulars and do not
as a rule pass through a general proposition to
reach the conclusion. He regards syllogism there-
fore not as a necessary mode of reasoning but only
as a permissible form into which an argument may
be thrown. It serves as a test of validity in an
argument, and so far it is a safe-guard against
fallacy. But even if it be no more than this syllo.-
gism is obviously valuable.

The true ground that Locke, Descartes, and others
had for their attack, was that for ages it had come

THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 131

to be thought that by mere combinations of state-
ments it was possible to determine matters of fact.
It was in this way that the schoohnen dogmatised
about facts from statements borrowed from others
or hastily assumed. Consequently syllogism fell
into disrepute because it had come to be falsely re-
garded as determining truth in relation to fact. In
discussing therefore the question of the value of
syllogism the key to its defence lies in remembering
its proper function. It does not pretend to be
anything more than a mere process of formally
explicating what is already implicitly granted. It
is concerned only with self-consistency. The con-
sistency of thought with fact is a consideration
entirely different and lies outside its sphere.

Granting then that syllogism is a mere process of
formal reasoning, it remains to be seen whether it
is of any account for purposes of real inference.
This is the question proposed by Mill, who deals
with it in Book II. of his Logic.

Mill's position is that all inference is ultimately
deductive. Hence syllogism is not a process of
inference at all. It is rather a process of interpret-
ation. He writes — " All inference is from particu-
lars to particulars : general propositions are merely
registers of such inferences already made, and short
formulae for making more. The major premiss of
a syllogism consequently is a formula of this de-
scription, and the conclusion is not an inference
drawn from the formula but an inference drawn
according to the formula, the real, logical antecedent

132 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

or premiss being the particular facts from which
the proposition was collected by induction."

Mill in his analysis of the syllogism takes the
moods Barbara and Celarent as the universal types
for affirmative and negative conclusions respectively.
Thus in the syllogism e. g. All mammals have
hmgs, WJiales are mammals ,' . Whales have lungs,
he argues that between the premisses and the con-
clusion there is nothing that can be called real
inference. By mere consistency the conclusion
cannot be avoided. Unless it be known that whales
have limgs we have no business to start with All
mammals have lungs ; there is no passage here from
known to unknown, and in any case if the conclusion
of a syllogism is regarded as a new truth derived
by a process of inference, that inference does not lie
between the conclusion and the premisses, but
between the conclusion and certain other data at
the back of the syllogism, which other data are the
actual foundation of the argument. The conclusion
may involve a process of real inference but not
from the premisses, and if from other data through
the premisses it is because in getting to the major
premiss a material inference was performed of such
scope as to include the conclusion. The syllogistic
process therefore is never more than explication
or interpretation.

Taking this view it follows further that the fallacy
o{ petztio priiicipii {^.'wwfoXvcd. Syllogism is the form
of deduction: deduction consists in deriving a parti-
cular from a general : but since we cannot infer from

THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 133

a general any particular not included, therefore the
conclusion of a syllogism simply re-asserts what
was included in the major premiss. This re-asser-
tion is according to Mill \h^ petitio principii.

Mill's standpoint is open to criticism. Amongst
other points these may be noted : —

1. The discussion has been complicated by a
confusion in the use of the words reasoning and
inference. Reasoning or inference in the widest
sense may be defined as progression in thought.
But a distinction lies between formal and real
reasoning or inference. In formal reasoning the
thought to which we pass is implicated in what
we start with. In real inference what we arrive at,
however it may be connected with the starting-
point, is not impHcated therein. Real inference,
says Mill, "is passage from the known to the
unknown." In formal reasoning the passage is
from the implicit to the explicit, from what is
implied in the premiss to what is explicitly stated
in the conclusion. But this passage of thought is
just as much inference as passage from known to
unknown.

To describe syllogism therefore as a mere process
of interpretation does not by any means remove it
from the sphere of reasoning, for interpretation
after all is a short expression for the process of
explicating what has already been implicitly given,
and as we have already seen, this is all that syl-
logism pretends to do.

2. Mill, in his attack on the syllogism, leaves out

134

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

of account the part played by the minor premiss.
If the major premiss contained the conclusion in
the sense that he assumes, then the conclusion
could at once be gained per saltum, without a
minor premiss intervening. The minor premiss,
however, has a distinct and important part in the
argument. It ensures the correct application of
the major to the case under consideration, and,
unless the minor affirms it to be included in the
general statement of the major, there can be no
passage of thought leading to the conclusion. In
effect the minor is the essential factor in the process
of interpretation. The conclusion is not, and cannot
be, reached except through the two premisses taken
jointly, and it is this that constitutes the reasoning.
3. If Mill's view be accepted, it must be on the
assumption that the mind cannot accept the
premisses, and not at once deduce the conclusion.
With omniscience and a perfect intellect the as-
sumption would doubtless hold good, but with
limited powers of attention, and imperfection of
knowledge, and in the face of the complexity of
nature, it is quite possible that while admitting M
to be under P, and wS to be under AT it is not
instantly seen that .9 is consequently under P.
As a matter of fact it constantly happens that
starting from a given proposition, and using only
the syllogistic method we reach a conclusion which
to lis is an entirely new judgment, and therefore
the argument is not at any rate to us a petitio
principii. The truth is that the petitio principii (as

THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM

seen and argued by Martlneau) is entirely relative,
depending upon whether the data forming the
major premiss are near or too remote to be readily
recognised, or in other words depending upon the
range of knowledge and observation of the reasoner.
This point is obscured by the simplicity of the
examples commonly given in the Manuals to illus-
trate the syllogism. Compare Mill's own favourite
example — All men are mortal, Socrates is a man
. * . Socrates is mortal^ with a deductive argument
expressed in the current language of literature, for
instance, the following passage from Drummond's
Natural Law in the Spiritual World (Ed. 1888, p.
249). " The part of the oj'ganism zvhich begins to
get out of correspondence with the Organic Environ-
ment is the only part which is in vital coj^respond-
ence luith it. Though a fatal disadvantage to the
natural man to be thrown out of correspondence
with this Environment, it is of inestimable import-
ance to the spiritual man. For so long as it is
mai7itained the ivay is barred for a further
Evohttion. And hence tJie co7tdition necessary for
the further Evolution is that the spiritual be released
from the natural!' The syllogistic forms in this
argument are concealed by inversion, qualification,
enlargement, and suppression of terms, so that the
conclusion by no means appears merely on inspec-
tion as it does in the unencumbered text-book ex-
amples. It is, indeed, very rarely that we find in
ordinary intercourse or composition that simplicity
of form which the Manuals might lead us to expect,

136 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

yet practically it is with these forms of everyday life
that we must be practically prepared to deal, and
it is in these forms that we best realise the actual
passage from thought to thought involved in de-
duction equally as in induction.

4. Yet another answer has been given to Mill's
objection. It was formulated by Whately, who
saw that an inductive argument itself involves
syllogism, and therefore syllogism cannot be
described as only a special mode of treating an
induction. In other words deduction is a necessary
factor in induction. The reply is a just one, for it
is impossible to formulate general truths until we
have deduced from instances already observed those
qualities or attributes which warrant inclusion under
the general notion in its course of development.

5. The truth is that in all reasoning neither the
one process nor the other stands alone. Modern
thought assigns greater prominence to the methods
of induction since its results have reference to new
matter, whilst deduction plays the humbler part
of combining notions previously formed. In
ordinary argument, however, even in a single proof,
we pass continually from one process to the other.
Both have their proper place, and the utmost that
can be said is that they are interdependent. In-
duction is a factor in all deduction, for our
premisses are inductively derived. Deduction is
a factor in all induction, for the principles induc-
tively obtained can only deductively be applied to
particular cases.

CHAPTER XVIII

SUMMARIES AND TABULAR STATEMENTS

Logic is the science of the valid laws of thought.

Science is systematised knowledge : coherent
system depends upon logical method. Logic is
therefore connected with all the sciences, but
notably with —

1. Metaphysics,

2. Psychology,

3. Rhetoric,

4. Grammar.

Logic deals with language as the instrument of
thought.

Language —

1. assists the process of thought,

2. records the products of thought,

3. is the natural vehicle for expressing thought.

138 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Language is modified by —

1. Generalisation,

2. Specialisation.

Language is sometimes ambiguous, and according
to the meaning suggested words are classified —

Words -

fUnivocal
Equivocal or

Ambiguous
Analogous

in sound only,
in spelling only,
both in sound and
spelling.

Thought is the subject-matter of Logic in rela-
tion to —

1. thought,

2. things, or

3. language.

Validity is —

1. Self-consistency, or

2. Consistency with objective reality ;

and according to the validity dealt with, logic is —

1. Pure or Formal, or

2. Applied or Material.

SUMMARIES, TABULAR STATEMENTS 139

There are three points of view relating to the
nature of the concept, known as —

1. Conceptualism,

2. Materialism,

3. Nominalism.

These points of view, though primarily relating
to the nature of the concept, affect the entire view
taken of the nature and scope of logic.

A concept is the product of comparing two per-
cepts in order to discover their points of agreement.

Objectively it is an attribute, or a group of
attributes, possessed in common by a number of
individual objects.

Subjectively it is an idea which corresponds with
the attribute or group of attributes.

In language it is a name, i. e. a word or combina-
tion of words, by which it is denoted and expressed.
Any sign whatever may, as a matter of fact, stand
as its symbol: its most natural expression, however,
is articulate speech.

Three parts of Logic

'Names or Words as
"counters of thought."

Propositions or Names as
terms in comparison.

Inferences or Propositions
as ground for argument.

I40

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

NAMF^ JCategorematic = terms.

\Syncategorematic = not-tcrms.

Terms or categorematic words are —

Univocal one meaning :

Equivocal double meaning :

same meaning differently applied :
class name ; all and each ; distribu-

Analogous
General or^
Common/
Collective

Singular or ^
Individual.)
Proper
Concrete
Abstract
Positive
Negative
Privative

Contradictory

Contrary

Relative

Correlative

Absolute

all, not each ; cuncti as opposed to
oinnes:

a single object ; significant :

a verbal mark'; insignificant :
thing ; adjectives are concrete :
attributive :

existence or possession of a quality :
denial of a quality :
absence of a quality usually pos-
sessed :
area of thought divided :
most opposed in the same class :
suggestive of some other object :
the other object suggested :
non-relative.

Heads of
predicables

Genus

Species

Differentia

,. . fq-eneric.

rroi)rium -\^ .r
^ (specific.

A . , fseparable.

Accidens -[ . '■ , ,

[m separable.

SUMMARIES, TABULAR STATEMENTS 141

Connotation comprises the qualities that give
meaning to a name :

Denotation, all the individuals possessing these
qualities.

Connotation and Denotation vary in

OPPOSITE mutation.

PROPOSITIO]

or Names as Terms in

Comparison —

f Analytic

Synthetic

rCopulative

fA|

Exponible] Remotive

I. Categorical^ j > -

[Exceptive
Exclusive

Indefinite

Infinite

Tautologous

Modal

'Conditional -

E
I

IT. Contingent -

Hyp

othetical -

fA
III. Disjunctive-^ y

Immediate Inferences-

I. Opposition.
II. Eduction.

142 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

EDUCTIONS

T r- • ftransposition fsimple.

I. Conversion ^ ^ {^^^ ^ {per accidens.

II. Obversion — change of quality.

III. Contraposition — obversion + conversion.

IV. Inversion — subject negatived.

The rule — No term must be distributed in the con-
verse which was not distributed in the convertend.
The less important eductions are —

1. Added Determinants.

2. Complex Conception.

3. Converse Relation.

4. Reversion.

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT arc—

I. Identity— all A is A.
II. Contradiction — no A is not-A.
III. Excluded Middle—all ^ is y^ or not-A.

INFERENCES or Propositions as Ground for
Argument.

I. lMMEDIATEJOPl^°f.'"°"
Eduction

TDeduction o\'(Pitrc

1 1. Mediate ^ Syllogism fnrgul.rr
\ Traduction yMixed
Induction

SUMMARIES, TABULAR STATEMENTS 143

SYLLOGISM

^Categorical
I. PURE^ Conditional
[Hypothetical

II. Irregu-
lar

'Enthymeme

^Polysyllogism

f Fully { P rosy llogis 111
I sidiiQdyEpisyllogisvi

I Cur- (Epickeirenia
Ki^iltdySo rites

/"Contingent-categorical

III. MlXED^' Disjunctive
[Dilemma

FALLACIES

I. Logical

(illicit major *^
l*^ Purely logical- illicit minor ^

\undistitrbed middle

.Semi-logical

II. Non-Logical or
Material

(equivocation
I amphibology
\ composition
j division

accent
Kfigitre of speech
^Accident
Converse accident
Ignoratio Elenchi
Petitio principii
Non sequitur
False cause
^ Many questions.

APPENDIX I

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
I. Logic, Thought, and Language

1. Distinguish between the psychological and the
logical treatment of thought, with special reference to the
question whether all our thinking is carried out by con-
cepts as the logician understands them.

2. What is the central function of thought, and how
are its activities regulated and classified ?

3. Why and in what manner is logic concerned with
the use of language? Distinguish accurately between
the logical proposition and the grammatical sentence,
giving examples.

4. Define language ; and point out the main functions
which it performs. How is it that spoken language has
become the only universal one amongst mankind ?

5. '■^ No reason without language''
^'' No language ivithoiit reason ^

Comment critically on these aphorisms.

6. Discuss the ways in which the process of thought
may be affected by language, and bring out in your
answer the requisites of a philosophical language.

IL Definition and Scope of Logic

7. Compare any definitions of logic tliat may be known
to you, and estimate their merits.

8. ^^ Logic is entirely conversant about language.'''

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 145

(Whately.) Is this a satisfactory account of the subject
matter of logic ?

9. What is meant by saying that logic deals only with
the form of thought ? Show how the use of symbols
enables us to examine the form of our thought.

10. Bring out the exact scope of logic, defining its
relation to {a) the special sciences ; {b) psychology ; {c)
philosophy, or theory of knowledge.

11. How is logic related to grammar, psychology, and
metaphysics ?

12. In what different ways has the relation of logic to
psychology been conceived? Give your own view of
the distinction and of the connexion between them.

III. The Three Parts of Logical Doctrine

13. '' The doctrine of terj?is is really a composite and
for the most part extra-logical body of doctrine T Ex-
amine this statement, and consider the differences that
ensue according as this body of doctrine is regarded as
treating of (i) concepts, (2) terms, or (3) classes.

14. The origin of concepts. Give a brief account of
the chief theories of modern philosophers on this
question.

15. Explain the point at issue between Realists,
Nominalists, and Conceptualists.

IV. Terms

16. State the different ways in which terms may be
classified, giving an illustration of each. Have all the
distinctions equal logical importance ?

17. Give the principal division of names needed for
logical purposes. Why does not logic recognise the
distinction between substantives, adjectives, and verbs ?

146 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

1 8. Discuss the meaning and the logical importance
of the distinction between concrete and abstract terms.
Explain fully how it happens that it is sometimes difficult
to say to which of these classes a particular term should
be referred.

19. Explain the distinctions that have been drawn by
logicians between (a) general and collective names, (l?)
abstract and concrete terms. How far do you think them
correct and important? Do the distinctions appear in
any form in the treatment of judgments?

20. Define and illustrate the distinctions {a) of con-
tradictory, contrary, and indefinite terms ; (Z*) of contra-
dictory, contrary, and indefinite propositions.

Has some a contradictory? If so, what is the joint
extent of some and not-some ?

21. Is there any distinction to be drawn between
singular and proper names ? What views are or may be
held as to their being mere unmeaning marks in logic ?

22. Describe the logical characters of the following
terms — Equal, Equation, Equality, Equalness, Inequality,
and Equalisation.

V. Connotation and Denotation

23. State the various ways in which terms may be
divided, dwelling more in detail on the distinction
between denotation and connotation. Which of these
divisions of terms do you regard as of fundamental sig-
nificance in logical theory ? Give your reasons.

24. What are connotative names ? What are the
principal difficulties by which we are beset in determining
the connotation of any given name ?

25. Analyse the following terms in the counter quantities
or wholes of extension and intension — Ala/i, govenimejit^
law, triangle, vegetable.

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 147

26. Argue at length the question whether {a) Proper
names, {b) Abstract names have a connotation.

27. State, in carefully chosen language, the logical law
of the relation between extension and intension of con-
cepts, giving illustrative examples. How do you reconcile
with it the fact {a) that there are as many mortal men
as there are men, {b) that the notion trilateral triangle
imports nothing more than triangle?

28. Define a term; and explain what is meant by the
denotation and connotation of terms.

Discuss the following — " T/iei'e is 7iothi?ig ifi the import
of a proposition of which the terms a7'e abstract, but what
there is in some proposition which can be framed of
concrete terms.

VI. Propositions

29. Exemplify conditional propositions. How are such
propositions reduced and converted ?

30. Discuss the relation of the disjunctive proposition
to {a) the hypothetical, {b) the categorical.

31. Distinguish between ampliative and explicative
propositions and give several examples of each kind.

32. What is an essential proposition? and in what
cases is it difficult to draw the line between essential and
real propositions ?

ZZ' (^) Unfold as completely as possible the implica-
tions of the proposition, " None can be happy without
virtue,^' naming in each case the process used.

{b) Given the proposition, " Whatever is either B or C
and at the same time either D or E, is A'' What can
be asserted respecting not-A ?

VII. Predicables and Predicaments

34. Give an account of the predicables. In what part
of logic are they properly placed ?

148 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

35. Distinguish a genus and a type.

36. Give some account of the predicables. How may
they be adjusted to modern thought ?

37. Mention the various heads of predicables, and
explain their connexion with definition. Give in-
stances of definitions, pointing out what are the genus
and differentia in each case. In what cases may it be
impossible to define a term ?

38. Distinguish between verbal and real predication,
and show how the five predicables bring out the distinc-
tion.

39. Explain what you understand by a category, and
discuss some scheme of categories known to you.

VIII. Definition and Division

40. What is definition and of how many kinds does it
consist? How would you proceed in order to define
such a term as virtue ? How far does definition in
all cases imply a reference to the things denoted by the
terms ?

41. State the currently accepted rules of logical defini-
tion. Examine their worth and discuss the view that all
definitions are of names only.

42. Compare the following notions with respect to their
definability — Iro7i, Steel, Murder-, Red, Grey. How would
you proceed to give a definition of {a) Iron, (/>) Alurder?

43. Discuss the requirements of definition as applied
to scientific terms. How far do the rules of formal
definition carry us in this case ?

44. Explain clearly with examples how definition and
division are related to each other.

45. What is meant by saying — Divisio ?wn faciat
saltuml How are you to know that a saltus has not
been made?

EXAMINx\TION QUESTIONS 149

Draw up a logical scheme of divisions so as to indicate
the places of the following — AB, Abe, ahcD, aBC^
abCD ; a, b, r, d, representing privative terms.

IX. Import of Categoricals — Quantification of
THE Predicate

46. What is predication ? Does it ever involve exist-
ence, or must existence be always specially predicated ?

47. Assign precisely the meaning of the assertion that
it is false to say that sotfie English soldiers did fiof behave
discreditably in South Africa.

48. How does the quality of a proposition affect its
quantity ? Is the relation a necessary one ?

49. Explain and discuss the following : —

{a) In a judgment the subject is naturally interpreted
in denotation and the predicate in connotation.

{b) Every proposition is an assertion that two names
are or are not applicable to one and the same object.

50. On what grounds has the quantification of the pre-
dicate been maintained? Estimate these grounds critically.

51. Set forth the doctrine of the quantified predicate,
and estimate the claims made for it. How far do you
find that it maintains or departs from the traditional
meaning of some in logic ?

52. Is logic bound by the ordinary usages of language?
Discuss the question in connexion with the following
topics — {a) The quantification of the predicate, {b) the
proper logical interpretation of the form Some S is P.

53. Bring out clearly the grounds of difference of view
between Hamilton and Mill in regard to quantification
of the predicate.

X. Diagrammatic Representation

54. Give a concise account of any schemes of dia-

ISO A DIGEST OF LOGIC

grammatic representation of propositions and discuss
their value.

55. What are the possible distinct forms of syllogism
that can be illustrated by Eulerian diagrams ? Discuss
the propriety of this mode of representing propositions
and syllogisms.

XL Immediate Inferences

56. Give the contradictory, the obverse, the converse,
and the contrapositive of the following : —

(n) Private vices are public benefits.

(b) Not to kiioiu me argues thyself unknoicm.

57. ^'' Previsio7i is a test of true theory .^''
'•''Prevision is the test of t^'ue tJieory.^'

Describe the forms of proposition to which the above
belong and give their converses, contradictories, and
obverses.

58. Assuming that no organic beings are devoid of
carbon, what can we thence infer respectively about
beings which are not organic and things which are not
devoid of carbon ?

59. Prove the rules of obversion, conversion, and con-
traposition by reference to the laws of tliought ; or show
what other proof you would give of them.

Convert and contraposit the proposition — For evefj
wrong there is a legal remedy.

60. State and illustrate what you understand by
obversion. On what laws or axioms docs the validity of
this process depend ?

61. What is meant by obversion, formal and material ?
How is obversion related to conversion by negation or
contraposition ?

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 151

Give the obverse and contrapositive of the following
propositions : —

{a) All animals feed,
ip) No pla7tts feed,
(c) Only a^iimals feed.

62. What do you consider to be the real distinction
between a categorical and a hypothetical proposition ?
Are the processes of immediate inference applicable to
hypothetical propositions ?

63. From all Sis P\y['^dX can you infer concerning not-S
and 7iot-P ? Show how you justify any inference you make.

Illustrate by concrete examples what is called im-
mediate inference by added determinants. If A = B
and Z = M, A + Z = B + M. Is such a theorem
logically valid either extensively or intensively ?

64. Can all kinds of propositions be exhibited in the
intensive as well as the extensive form ? Give reasons in
support of your answer. In the event of its being in the
negative, draw up a Hst distinguishing between those
kinds of propositions which can and those which cannot
be so exhibited.

XII. The Laws of Thought

65. Bring out the meaning and estimate the logical
value of the three laws of thought.

66. Enunciate, in the form that seems to you most
suitable from the point of view of logical theory, the
primary laws or axioms of thought, and discuss their
relation to the processes of reasoning.

67. State and explain the three formal laws of thought
and discuss their connexion (a) with immediate and -{d)
with mediate inference.

In what sense are these laws called necessary ? How
do you reconcile their necessity with the existence of
fallacies ?

152 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

68. What is a law of thought ? State the three primary
laws of thought. Have they a real importance in logic ?
or are they " absurdly obvious " ?

69. Explain how the universal laws of thought give
rise to dichotomous or bifid classification.

70. Explain the relation between the universal laws of
thought, the canons of syllogism, the dictum de omni et
nullo, and any other forms of the fundamental axioms of
inference that occur to you.

XIII. The Syllogism

71. Explain the syllogistic rule respecting two negative
and two particular premisses, pointing out the grounds
on which they rest. Do the following break either of
these rules ?

{a) This person is very learned and also very sociable^
consequently some very sociable persons are very learned.

(b) No man is a proper object of contempt, at the same
time no mail is perfectly admirable, cofisequently some
bei?igs who are 7iot perfectly admirable are not proper
objects of co7itempt.

if) The majority of English people have but little
literary taste, and the majority of English people read,
fro?n which it follows that some who read have but little
literary taste.

72. Give a clear and precise explanation of the rule
concerning the middle term of a syllogism.

73. If the major term of a syllogism be the predicate
of the major premiss, what do we know about the minor
premiss ?

74. ((?) Deduce from the general principles of tlie
categorical syllogism tJie special rules of the second
figure.

{I)) What can be determined respecting a syllogism

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 153

under each of the following conditions? — (i) that only
one term is distributed, and that only once, (2) that only
one term is distributed, and that twice, (3) that two terms
only are distributed, each only once, (4) that two terms
only are distributed, each twice.

75. Invent a syllogism in Barbara, and state it both in
the extensive and intensive form.

XIV. Figure and Mood of the Syllogism.
Reduction

76. Ascertain how many universal terms there may be
in the premisses of a syllogism more than in the con-
clusion.

77. How much can you tell about a syllogism when
you know, (i) that only the middle term is distributed,
(2) that all the terms are distributed ?

Show directly^ i. e. using only the general rules of
syllogism and the forms of immediate inference, in how
many ways an E conclusion may be drawn.

78. Show by deduction from the rules of the syllogism
that there are five and only five ways of proving a
universal conclusion.

79. Write down the dictum de omni et nuUo. What
is the connexion of this dictum with the process of re-
duction ? Is reduction of any practical use ?

80. Taking a syllogism of the third figure, and assum-
ing one of the premisses to be false, show whether or
not, with the knowledge of its falsehood thus supposed
to be in our possession, we can frame a new syllogism ;
if so point out the figure and mood to which it will belong.

81. Explain fully the limitations of the conclusions
obtainable in the third figure of the syllogism. Are
these limitations got rid of by ob version (permutation) of
the premisses ?

154 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

82. State briefly the various opinions that have been
held by logicians regarding figure, and in particular
discuss the reasons for and against the admission of the
fourth figure.

83. What is a subaltern mood, and why is it so called ?
In what figures do AA and AE yield subaltern moods at
all ? Show why. In what cases, if any, is it impossible
to weaken one of the premisses in a subaltern mood with-
out affecting the conclusion ?

84. Using any of the forms of immediate inference
(including obversion), show in how many moods the
following argument can be expressed — Every law is not
bindings for some laws are morally bad, and nolJiing which
is so is bindifig.

XV. Irregular and Compound Syllogism

85. Give instances of the various forms of conditional
arguments.

86. Does the mode of reasoning in a hypothetical
syllogism differ from ordinary deduction ?

87. Show that the reasoning in a sorites is strictly
syllogistic.

88. What is a dilemma ? Can it take more than one
form?

89. Define the dilemma. What are its various forms ?
On what does its validity depend ?

90. What is dilemma and why is it a treacherous form
of argument ?

XVI. Fallacies

91. State and compare the most important methods of
classifying the fallacies known to you.

92. Explain the following fallacies, giving an example

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 155

of each — ignoratio elenchi^ non causa pro causa, a dicta
secundum quid, amphibology , false a?ialogy, malobserv-
ation.

93. On what ground would you base a classification of
fallacies ? Compare critically various classifications that
have been proposed. Explain exactly the nature of the
fallacies called — Accident, Non causa pro causa, Argu-
mentum ad hoi7iine7n. How far do the rules of formal
logic suffice for their detection ?

94. Mention any arrangements or classifications of
fallacies commenting on the principle of classification
involved. Explain and exemplify the following : —

A dicto sif?tpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, ig?wratio
elenchi, non causa pro causa, and petitio principii.

95. Point out the exact nature of the fallacies called
severally — Composition and division, A dicto secundujn
quid ad dictum sinpiiciter, Post hoc trgo propter hoc.
False analogy.

XVII. The Value of the Syllogism

96. Define induction, and state with reasons your view
of its relation to syllogism.

97. What is Mill's view of the function and value of
the syllogism ? How has it been criticised ?

98. Discuss tlie value and function of the syllogism.

99. How does it come to pass that there can be any
dispute as to whether the syllogism is a petitio principii ?

100. It is maintained, on the one hand, that no in-
ference is valid in which the conclusion is not contained
in the premisses, and, on the other hand, that no move-
ment of thought deserves to be entitled inference in
which there is not progress from the known to the
unknown. Examine the grounds for these two state-
ments, and discuss the possibility of holding them jointly.

156

APPENDIX II

Abbott, T. K. ...
Adamson, R. ...

Aldrich

Aristotle

Arnaud and Nicole ...

Bacon, Sir Francis ...

Bagot, Daniel, Dean

Bain, Alex

Baker, A

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

,.. Elements of Logic. Dublin, 1885.

... Art. " Logic" in Ejicyclo. Brit.^ ed.

ix. Published separately.

... See Mansel.

... Logical woi'ks comprised under the

title Organon. They are as

follows : —

Kategoriai (Predicamenta).

Peri Hermeneias (De Interpre-

tatione).

Analytica Priora -^ , , ,.

/ . ^ . -Analytics.

Analytica PosterioraJ

Topika (Dialectics).

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Bentham, Geo.
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Bosanquet, B

Bowen, Francis

Bradley, F. H.
Calderwood, Hy.

Chase, D. P. ...
Clarke, R. F. ..

Coleman
Davis, N. K. ...

Devey, Joseph

Drummond, P. C. ...

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Edin., 1850.
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Logic. Manuals of Catholic Philo-
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Notes on Logic. Oxf, 1880.

Theory of Thought, Deduction.

New York, 1880.
Syllabus of a proposed System of

Logic. Lond., i860.
Art. " Logic,'' Engl. Cyclo.
Formal Logic. Lond., 1847.
A Bundle of Paradoxes.
Logic, or the Science of Inference.

Bohn's Library, Bell, 1852.
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Sec Questions.

158 A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Fitzgerald, P. F.
Fowler, Thos, ...

Gilbert, J. W

Gilmore, J. H.

Hamilton, Sir W.

55 55

Harris, W. T

Hegel

Hill, D.J

Hughlings, J. P.

Jevons, Wm. Stanley

Jones, Miss E. E. C.
Kant, 1

Treatise on the Principle of Suffi-
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Deductive Logic. Clar. Press, Oxf.,
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Inductive Logic. Clar. Press, Oxf.,
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Logic for the Million. Lond., 1851.
Outlines of Logic. New York, 1879.

Lectures on Logic, 2 vols. Lond.

Exam, of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos.
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Hegel's Logic. A critical exposi-
tion. Chicago, 1890.

Logic translated by Wallace, 2 \'ols.
Oxf., 1892-94.

Jevons' Logic recast. New York,
1883. _

The Logic of Names : an Introd. to
Boole. Lond., 1869.

Elementary Lessons in Logic. Mac-

millan, 1886.
Studies in Deductive Logic. Mac-

millan, 1880.
Principles of Science. Macmillan,

1877.
Substitution of Similars. I\Lacmillan,

1869.
Pure Logic, z. e. The Logic of

Quality. 1864.
The Philos. of Induction. Contemp.

Rev., vol. xiv., p. 457.
The use of Hypothesis. //vV/., p.

778.
Elements of Logic. Edin., 1890.

Introd. to Logic. Translated. Lond.,
1885.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

159

Keynes, J. N Studies and Exercises in Formal

Logic. Macmillan, 1894.

Ladd, Miss Christine
Lambert, Joliann H.
Latham, R. G.

Liard, L.

Lotze ,

Studies in Logic. Lond,, 1883.
Neues Organon. Leipzig, 1764.
Logic in its application to Language.

Lond., 1856.
Les logiciens anglais contemporains.

Paris, 1878.
Logic translated by Bosanquet,

2 vols. Clar. Press, Oxf., 1888.

Mansel, H. L.

Aldrich's Artis Logicae Rudimenta.

Martineau, Jas.
M'Cosh, Jas. ...
Mill, John Stuart

Prolegomena Logicae. Oxf., i860.

Theory of Reasoning, Essays Philos.,
etc., vol. ii., 1869.

Laws of Discursive Thought. Lond.,
1870.

System of Logic, i vol. ed. Long-
mans, Lond., 1884.

Analysis of the above by Killick, q.v.
„ „ „ Stebbing, ^.-6/.

Exam, of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos.
Longmans, 1865.

Elementary Notions of Logic. Lond.,
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Miiid^ A Quarterly Magazine, Arts, by various authors.

Minto, Wm.

Murray, Richard

Mussehenbroek, P.

Logic, Inductive and Deductive.

Murray, 1893.
Introd. to Logic. Dublin Univ.

Press Series. Dub., 1890,
Compendium of Logic. Lond. and

Dub., 1847.
Explanatory Notes on, by Dean

Bagot, q.v.
Commentary on by J. Walker, q.v.

Institutiones Logicae. 1748.

;6o

A DIGEST OF LOGIC

Newman, F. W. ... Lectures on Logic. Lond., 1838.
Nicole et Arnaud ... See Baynes, Port Royal Logic.

Oxford Handbook of Logic. Oxf., 1880.

Pcirce, C. S Proceedings of the American

Academy of Arts and Sciences,
on Intension and Intensive reading
of Propositions, vol. iii., pp. 4i5—
432, 1867.
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Palaestra Oxoniensis: Questions and
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Jevons, W. S., Studies in Deductive
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Advanced Logical Questions. Simp-
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Holman, Questions on Welton's
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Solly

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Stock, St. G

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Veitch, J.

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Richard Clay & Sons, Limited,
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LAND. By Lieut. -Colonel Alderson. With numerous Illustra-
tions and Plans. Demy 8?v. 12s. 6d.

This is an account of the militarj?' operations in Rlashonaland by the officer who
commanded the troops in that district during the late rebellion. Besides its
Interest as a story of vv-arfare. It will have a peculiar value as an account of the
services of mounted infantry by one of the chief authorities on the subject.

THE HILL OF THE GRACES : OR, THE GREAT Stone
Temples of Tripoli. By H. S. Cowper, F.S.A. With Maps,
Plans, and 75 Illustrations. Demy Zvo. 10s. 6d,

A record of two journeys through Tripoli in 1895 and 1896. The book treats of a
remarkable series of megalithic temples which have hitherto been uninvestigated,
and contains a large amount of new geographical and archaeological matter.

ADVENTURE AND EXPLORATION IN AFRICA. By
Captain A. St. H. Gibbons, F.R.G.S. With Illustrations by
C. Whymper, and Maps. Demy 8z>o. 21s.

This is an account of travel and adventure among the ]\Iarotse and contiguous tribes,
with a description of their customs, characteristics, and history, together with the
author's experiences in hunting big game. The Illustrations are by Mr. Charles
Whymper, and from photographs. There is a map by the author of the hitherto
unexplored regions lying between the Zambezi and Kafukwi rivers and from 18"
to 15° S. lat.

4 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements
History and Biography

A HISTORY OF EGYPT, from the Earliest Times to
THE Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L.,
LL.D,, Professor of Egyptology at University College. Fu/Zy IlluS'
trated. In Six Vohtnies. Crotvn Svo. 6s. each.
Vol. V. ROMAN EGYPT. ByJ. G.Milne.

the decline and fall of the ROMAN E?^PIRE.
By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, edited with Notes,
Appendices, and Maps by J. B. Bury, ALA., Fellow of Trinity
College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy Zvo, gilt fop. 8.f. 6d.
each. Croro)i Zvo. 6s. each. Jo/. IV.

THE LETTERS OF VICTOR HUGO. Translated from the
French by F. Clarke, M.A. In Tzvo Volumes. Demy %vo.
los. 6d. each. Vol. II. 1835-72.
This is the second volume of one of the most interesting and important collection of
letters ever published in France. The correspondence dates from Victor Hugo's
boyhood to his death, aixl none of the letters have been published before.

A HISTORY OF THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY,

1845-95. By C. H. Grinling. With ^Nlaps and Illustrations.
Demy ^vo. \os. 6d.
A record of Railway enterprise and development in Northern England, containing
much matter hitherto unpublished. It appeals both to the general reader and to
those specially interested in railway construction and management.

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COLONIAL POLICY. By

II. E. Egerton, M.A. Demy 2>vo. 12s. 6d.
This book deals with British Colonial policy historically from the beginnings of
English colonisation down to the present day. The subject has been treated by
itself, and it has thus been possible within a reasonable compass to deal with a
mass of authority which must otherwise be sought in the State papers. The
volume is divided into five parts : — (i) The Period of Beginnings, 1497-1650 ;
(2) Trade Ascendancy, 1651-1830 ; (3) The Granting of Responsible Government,
1831-1860; (4) Laisscz Alicr, 1861-1CS5 ; (5) Greater Britain.

A HISTORY OF ANARCHISM. By E. V. Zenker.

Translated by H. de B. Gibbins, M. A., Litt.D. Demy Svo. \os. 6d.

A critical study and historj', as well as a powerful and trenchant criticism, of the

Anarchist movement in Europe. The book has aroused considerable attention

on the Continent.

THE LIFE OF ERNEST RENAN By Madame Darmes-
i ETER. With Portrait. Crown 2>vo. Gs.
A biography of Renan by one of his most intimate friends.

A LIFE OF DONNE. By AUGUSTUS JESSOPP, D.D. With

Portrait. Croivn 8vo. 3-<-. 6d.
This is a new volume of the ' Leaders of Religion' series, from the learned and witty
pen of the Rector of Scarning, who has been able to enilx^dy the results of much
research.

Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 5

OLD HARROW DAYS. By C H. Minchin. Cr.Zvo. 3^. 6^^.

A volume of reminiscences which will be interesting to old Harrovians and to many
of the general public.

Theology

A PRIMER OF THE BIBLE. By Prof. VV. H. Bennett.
Crown %vo. 2s. 6d.

This Primer sketches the historj- of the books which make up the Bible, in the light
of recent criticism. It gives an account of their character, origin, and composi-
tion, as far as possible in chronological order, with special reference to their
relations to one another, and to the history of Israel and the Church. The
formation of the Canon is illustrated by chapters on the Apocrypha (Old and
New Testament); and there is a brief notice of the history of the Bible since the
close of the Canon.

LIGHT AND LEAVEN : Historical and Social Sermons.
By the Rev. II. Hensley Henson, M.A., Fellow of All Souls',
Incumbent of St. Mary's Hospital, Ilford. Crown Svo. 6s.

g^botional genes

THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Newly Trans-
lated, with an Introduction, by C. Bigg, D.D., late Student of
Christ Church. With a Frontispiece. iS;no. is. 6d.

This little book is the first volume of a new Devotional Series, printed in clear type,

and published at a very low price.
This volume contains the nine books of the ' Confessions ' which 'are suitable for

devotional purposes. _ The name of the Editor is a sufficient guarantee of the

excellence of the edition.

THE HOLY SACRIFICE. By F. Weston, M.A., Curate of
St. IMatthew's, Westminster. iS;no. is.
A small volume of devotions at the Holy Communion.

Naval and Military

A tllSTORY OF TFIE ART OF WAR. By C. Vv. Oman,
]M.A., Fellow of All Souls', Oxford. Demj' 8z'<p. Ilhistratcd. 2\s.

Vol. II. Medl^val Warfare.

Ivlr. Oman is engaged on a History of the Art of War, of which the above, though
covering the middle period from the fall of the Roman Empire to the general use
of gunpowder in Western Europe, is the first instalment. The first battle dealt
with will be Adrianople (378) and the last Navarette (1367). There will appear
later a volume dealing with the Art of War among the Ancients, and another
covering the 15th, i6th, and 17th centuries.

The book will deal mainly with tactics and strategy, fortifications and siegecraft, but
subsidiary chapters will give some account of the development of arms and armour,
and of the various forms of military organization known to the Middle Ages.

6 Messrs. Metiiuen's Announcements

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, FROM
Early Times to the Present Day. By David Hannay.
Illustrated. 2 Vols. DcDiy '^vo. *]s. 6J. each. Vol. I.
This book aims at giving an account not only of the fighting we have done at sea,
but of the growth of the service; of the part the Navy has played in the develop-
ment of the Empire, and of its inner life.

THE STORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY. By Lieut.-Colonel
Cooper King, of the Staff College, Camberley. Illustrated. Demy
2>vo. ys. 6d.

This volume aims at describing the nature of the different armies that have been
formed in Great Britain, and how from the earl}^ and feudal levies the present
standing armj' came to be. The changes in tactics, uniform, and armament are
briefly touched upon, and the campaigns in which the army has shared have
been so far followed as to explain the part played by British regiments in them.

General Literature

THE OLD ENGLISH HOME. By S. Baring-Gould.
With numerous Plans and Illustration's. Crown %vo. Js. 6d,
This book, like Mr. Baring-Gould's well-known ' Old Country Life,' describes the
life and environment of an old English family.

OXFORD AND ITS COLLEGES. By J. Wells, M.A.,
Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College. Illustrated by E. H. New.
Fcap. 2>vo. 2)^. Leather, /^s.
This is a guide — chiefly historical — to the Colleges of Oxford. It contains numerous

illustrations.

VOCES ACADEMIC/E. By C. Grant Robertson, M.A.,
Fellow of All Souls', Oxford. With a Frontispiece, Fcap. Svo.
3s. 6d.
This is a volume of light satirical dialogues and should be read by all who are inter-
ested in the life of Oxford.

A PRIMER OF WORDSWORTH. By Laurie Magnus.
Crown 2>vo. 2s. Gd.
This volume is uniform with the Primers of Tennj-son and Burns, and contains a
concise biography of the poet, a critical appreciation of his work in detail, and a
bibliography.

NEO-MALTHUSIANISM. By R. Ussher, M.A. Cr.2>vo. 6s.

This book deals with a very delicate but most important matter, namely, the volun-
tary limitation of the family, and how such action affecis morality, the individual,
and the nation.

PRIMEVAL SCENES. By H. N. Hutchinson, B.A., F.G.S.,
Author of 'Extinct Monsters,' 'Creatures of Other Days,' ' Prc-
liistoric Man and Beast,' etc. With numerous Illustrations drawn
by John IIassall and Fred. V. Burridge. /[to. 6s.

A set of twenty drawings, with short text to each, to illustrate the humorous aspects
of pre-historic times. They are carefully planned by the author so as to be
scientifically and archaeologicaliy correct and at the same time amusing.

Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 7

THE WALLYPUG IN LONDON. By G. E. Farrow,
Author of *The Wallypug of Why.' With numerous Illustrations.
Crown 8vo. 35'. 6d.
An extravaganza for children, written with great charm and vivacity,

RAILWAY NATIONALIZATION. By Clement Edwards.
Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. {Social Questions Series.

Sport

SPORTING AND ATHLETIC RECORDS. By H. Morgan

Browne. CrowjiZvo. is. pap^r ; is. 6d. cloth.

This book gives, in a clear and complete form, accurate records of the best perform-
ances in all important branches of Sport. It is an attempt, never yet made, to
present all-important sporting records in a systematic way.

THE GOLFING PILGRIM. By Horace G Hutchinson.
Croivn Svo. 6s.
This book, by a famous golfer, contains the following sketches lightly and humorously
written : — The Prologue — The Pilgrim at the Shrine — Mecca out of Season — The
Pilgrim at Home — The Pilgrim Abroad — The Life of the Links — A Tragedy by
the Way— Scraps from the Scrip— The Golfer in Art— Early Pilgrims in the West
— An Interesting Relic.

Educational

EVAGRIUS. Edited by Professor Leon Parmentier of
Liege and INI. BiDEZ of Gand. De/iij/ Svo. ys. 6(1.

[Byzaitiine Texts.

THE ODES AND EPODES OF HORACE. Translated by

A. D. GODLEY, ALA., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.
Crown Svo. biukrain. 2s.

ORNAMENTAL DESIGN FOR WOVEN FABRICS. By

C. Stephenson, of The Technical College, Bradford, and
F. SUDDARDS, of The Yorkshire College, Leeds. With 65 full-page
plates, and numerous designs and diagrams in the text. Demy Svo.
75. 6d.
The aim of this book is to supply, in a systematic and practical form, information on
the subject of Decorative Design as applied to Woven Fabrics, and is primarily
intended to meet the requirements of students in Textile and Art Schools, or of
designers actively engaged in the weaving industry. Its wealth of illustration is
a marked feature of the book.

ESSENTIALS OF COMMERCIAL EDUCATION. By
E. E. Whitfield, M.A. Croivn Svo. is. 6d.
A guide to Commercial Education and Examinations.

8 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements
passages for unseen translation. by e. c.

Marchant, M.A., Fellow of Pelerhouse, Cambridge; and A. M.
Cook, INI. A., late Scholar of Wadham College. Oxford: Assistant
Masters at St. Paul's School. Crown 2>vo. 3.f. bd.

This book contains Two Hundred Latin and Two Hundred Greek Passages, and
has been very carefully compiled to meet the wants of V. and VI. Form Boys at
Public Schools. It is also well adapted for the use of Honour men at the
Universities.

EXERCISES ON LATIN ACCIDENCE. By S. E. Win-
bolt, Assistant Master at Christ's Hospital. Croivn Zvo. \s. 6d.
An elementary book adapted for Lower Forms to accompany the shorter Latin primer.

NOTES ON GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX. By G.

BucKLAND Green, M.A., Assistant Master at the Edinburgh
Academy, late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxon. Cr. Svo. 2s. 6c/.

Notes and explanations on the chief difficulties of Greek and Latin Syntax, with
numerous passages for exercise.

A DIGEST OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. By Johnson
Barker, B.A. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.
A short introduction to logic for students preparing for examinations.

TEST CARDS IN EUCLID AND ALGEBRA. By D. S.

Calderwood, Headmaster of the Normal School, Edinburgh. In
a Packet of 40, with Answers, is.
A set of cards for advanced pupils in elementary schools.

HOW TO MAKE A DRESS. By J. A. E. Wood. Illustrated.
Cro7vn Svo. is. 6d.

A text-book for students preparing for the City and Guilds examination, based on
the syllabus. The diagrams are numerous.

Fiction

LOCHINVAR. By S. R. Crockett, Author of 'The Raiders,'
etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo. 6s.

A romance of love and war, the plot of which is laid partly in Holland .ind partly in
Scotland. The hero, a young cavalier, after serving with the regiment of the
Prince of Orange, takes service under Dundee and fights at Killiecrankie.

THE MUTABLE MANY. By Ror.ERT Barr, Author of ' In
the Midst of Alarms,' ' A Woman Inlervcncs,' etc. CrownSvo. 6s.

THE LADY'S WALK. By Mrs. Olh^hant. Cro7vn Svo. 6s.

A new book by this lamented author, somewhat in the stylo of her ' Bclcagured City.'

Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 9

TRAITS AND CONFIDENCES. By The Hon. Emily Law-
less, Author of ' Huirish,' ' Maelcho,' etc. Crown ^vo. 6j.

BLADYS. By S. Baring Gould, Author of 'The Broom
Squiie,' etc. Illustrated by F. H. TowNSEND. Crown %vo. 6s.
A Romance of the last century.

THE POMP OF THE LAVILLETTES. By Gilbert Parker,
Author of ' The Seats of the Mighty,' etc. Crown Zvo. 31. dd.

A DAUGHTER OF STRIFE. By Jane Helen Findlater,
Author of ' The Green Graves of Balgowrie. ' Crown Zvo. 6s.
A story of 17 10.

OVER THE HILLS. By Mary Findlater. CrowitZvo. 6s.

A novel by a sister of J. H. Findlater, the author of ' The Green Graves of Balgowrie.'

A CREEL OF IRISH TALES. By Jane Barlow, Author

of ' Irish Idylls. ' Crown Bvo. 6s.

THE CLASH OF ARMS. By J. Bloundelle Burton,

Author of ' In the Day of Adversity. ' Crown Svo. 6s.

A PASSIONATE PILGRIM. By Percy White, Author of
•Mr. Bailey-Martin.' Crown Svo. 6s.

SECRETARY TO BAYNE, M.P. By W. Pett Ridge.

Crown Svo. 6s.

TPIE BUILDERS. By J. S. FLETCHER, Author of 'When
Charles i. was King.' Crown Svo. 6s.

JOSIAH'S WIFE. By NORMA LORIMER. Crozan Svo. 6s.

BY STROKE OF SWORD. By Andrew Balfour. Illus-
trated by W. CuBiTT Cooke. Crown Svo. 6s.

A romance of the time of Elizabeth

THE SINGER OF MARLY. By Ida Hooper. Illustrated
by W. CuBiTT Cooke. Crown Svo. 6s.
A romance of adventure.

KIRKHAM'S FIND. By Mary Gaunt, Author of 'The
Moving Finger. ' Crown Svo. 6s.

THE FALL OF THE SPARROW. By M. C. BALFOUR.
Crown Svo. 6s.

SCOTTISH BORDER LIFE. By James C. DiBDiN. Crown

Svo. ^s. GJ.

A 2

A LIST OF

Messrs. Methuen's

PUBLICATIONS

roetry

RUDYARD KIPLING'S NEW POEMS

Rudyard Kipling. THE SEVEN SEAS. By Rudyard
Kipling. Third Edition, Crown %vo. Buckram, f^ilt top. 6j.

'The new poems of Mr. Rudj-ard Kipling lip.ve nil the spirit and swing of their pre-
decessors. Patriotism is the solid concrete foundation on which Mr. Kipling has
built the whole of his work.' — Times.

' Full of passionate patriotism and the Imperial spirit.' — Yorkshire Post.

'The Empire has found a singer ; it is no depreciation of the songs to say that states-
men may have, one way or other, to take account of them.' — Manchester
Guardian.

' Animated through and through with Indubitable genius.' — Daily Telegraph.

'Packed with inspiration, with humour, with pathos.' — Daily Chronicle.

' All the pride of empire, all the intoxication of pov.-er, all the ardour, the energy,
the masterful strength and the wonderful endurance and death-scorning pluck
which arc the very bone and fibre and marrow of the British character are here."
—Daily Mail.

Rudyard Kipling. BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS; And

Other Verses. By Rudyard Kipling. Elevenlh Edition. Crown
Svo. 6s.

' Mr. Kipling's verse is strong, vivid, full of character. • . . Unmistakable genius
rings in every line.' — Times.

The ballads teem with imagination, they palpitate witli emotion. We read them
with laughter and tears ; the metres throb in our pulses, the cunningly ordered
words tingle with life ; and if this be not poetry, what is?' — Pall Mall Gazette.

*Q." POEMS AND BALLADS. By '^Q.," Author of ' Green
Bays,' elc. Crown Svo. Bnckram. "^s. 6d.
* This work has just the faint, ineffable touch and glow that make poetry ' Q." has
the true romantic spirit.' — Speaker.

"Q." GREEN BAYS : Verses and Parodies. By " Q.," Author
of 'Dead Man's Rock,' etc. Second Edition. Crown Svo. -^s.Sd.
'The verses display a rare and versatile gift of parody, great command of metre, and
a very pretty turn of humour.' — Times.

E. Mackay. A SONG OF THE SEA. By Eric ]\L\ckay,
Author of 'The Love Letters of a Viohnist.' Second Edition.
Fcap. "^vo. <jS.
' Everywhere Mr. Mackay displays himself the master of a .«itylc marked by all the
characteristics of the best rhetoric. lie has a keen sense of rhythm and of general
balance ; his vc:sc i^ excellently sonoruus." — Globe.

Messrs Methuen's List ii

Ibsen. BRAND. A Drama by Henrik Ibsen. Translated by
William Wilson. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. is. 6d.

'The greatest world-poem of the nineteenth century next to "Faust." It is ia
the same set with "Agamemnon," with "Lear," with the literature that we now
instinctively regard as high and holy.' — Daily CJironkle,

"A.G." VERSES TO ORDER. By "A. G." Cr,%vo. 2s.6d.
net.

A small volume of verse by a writer whose initials are well known to OxTord men.
' A capital specimen of light academic poetry. These verses are very bright and
engaging, easy and sufficiently -witty.'— St. James's Gazette.

Belles Lettres, AnthologieSj etc.

E. L. Stevenson. VAILIMA LETTERS. By Robert Louis

Stevenson. With an Etched Portrait by William Strang, and

other Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Buckram. *]s. 6d.

* Few publications have in our time been more eagerly awaited than these " Vailima
Letters," giving the first fruits of the correspondence of Robert Louis Stevenson.
But, high as the tide of expectation has run, no reader can possibly be disappointed
in the result.' — St. James's Gazette.

Henley and Whibley. A BOOK OF ENGLISH PROSE.
Collected by W. E. Henley and Charles Whibley. CrownZvo. 6s.

'A unique volume of extracts— an art gallery of early pro?,Q.'— Birmingham Post.
'An admirable companion to I\Ir. Henley's " Lyra Heroica.'" — Saturday Reviezv.
' Quite delightful. A greater treat for those not well acquainted with pre-Restoration
prose could not be imagined. ' — A thencezim.

H. C. Beeclling. LYRA SACRA : An Anthology of Sacred Verse.
Edited by H. C. Beeching, M.A. Crown %vo. Buckram. 6s.
' A charming selection, which maintains a lofty standard of excellence.' — Tijues.

"Q." THE GOLDEN POMP : A Procession of English Lyrics
from Surrey to Shirley, arranged by A. T. QuiLLER CoucH. Crown
?)V0. Buckram. 6s,
' A delightful volume : a really golden "Pomp." ' — Spectator.

W. B. Yeats. AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH VERSE.
Edited by W. B. Yeats. Crown ^-oo. ^s. 6d.
' An attractive and catholic selection.'— r?>«^j.

G. W. Steevens. MONOLOGUES OF THE DEAD. By

G. W. Steevens. Foolscap Zvo. ^s. 6d.

A series of Soliloquies in which famous men of antiquity — Julius Csesar, Nero,
Alcibiades, etc., attempt to express themselves in the modes of thought and
language of to-day.
The edcct is sometimes splendid, sometimes bizarre, but always aaia^In^ly clever.
— rull Mall Cu^c i^c.

12 Messrs. Methuen's List

Victor Hugo. THE LETTERS OF VICTOR HUGO.
Translated from the French by F. Clarke, M.A. In Two Volumes.
Demy 2>vo. IQS. 6d. each. Vol.1. 1815-35.
This is the first volume of one of the most interesting and important collection of
letters ever published in France. The correspondence dates from Victor Hugo's
boyhood to his death, and none of the letters have been published before. The
arrangement is chiefly chronological, but where there is an interesting set of
letters to one person these are arranged together. The first volume contains,
among others, (i) Letters to his father ; (2) to his young wife ; (2)^ to his confessor,
Lamennais ; a very important set of about fifty letters to Sainte-Beauve ; (5)
letters about his early books and plays.
'A charming and vivid picture of a man whose egotism never marred his natural
kindness, and whose vanity did not impair his greatness.' — Standard.

C. H. Pearson. ESSAYS AND CRITICAL REVIEWS. By

C. H, Pearson, M.A., Author of 'National Life and Character.'
Edited, with a Biographical Sketch, by H. A. Strong, M.A.,
LL.D. With a Portrait. Demy Svo. 10s. 6d.

' Remarkable for careful handling, breadth of view, and knowledge." — Scotsman.

* Charming essays. ' — Spectator,

W. M. Dixon. A PRIMER OF TENNYSON. By W. M.

Dixon, M.A., Professor of EngHsh Literature at Mason College.
Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.
' Much sound and well-expressed criticism and acute literary judgments. The biblio-
graphy is a boon.' — Speaker.

W. A. Craigie. A PRIMER OF BURNS. By W. A. Craigie.

Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.
This book is planned on a method similar to the ' Primer of Tennyson.' It has also

a glossary.
'A valuable addition to the literature of the poet.' — Times.
' An excellent short account.' — Pall Mall Gazette.
'An admirable introduction.'— G/tf3^.

Sterne. THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM

SHANDY. By Lawrence Sterne. With an Introduction by
Charles Whibley, and a Portrait. 2 vols. ^s.

'Very dainty volumes are these; the paper, type, and light-green binding are all
very agreeable to the eye. Simplex munditiis is the phrase that might be applied
to them.' — Globe.

Congreve. THE COMEDIES OF WILLIAM CONGREVE.

With an Introduction by G. S. Street, and a Portrait. 2 vols. ^s.
' The volumes are strongly bound in green buckram, are of a convenient size, and
pleasant to look upon, so that whether on the shelf, or on the table, or in the hand
the possessor is thoroughly content with ih^m.' —Guardian.

Morier. THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA OF
ISPAHAN. By James Morier. With an Introduction by E. G.
Browne, M.A., and a Portrait. 2 vols. ys.

Walton. THE LIVES OF DONNE, WOTTON, HOOKER,
HERBERT, AND SANDERSON. By Izaak Walton. With
an Inlroduclion by \'lrnon Blacklurn, and a Portrait. 31. 6d.

Messrs. Methuen's List 13

Johnson. THE LIVES OF THE ENGLISH POETS. By
Samuel Johnson, LL.D. With an Introduction by J. H. Millar,
and a Portrait. 3 vols. \os. 6d.

Bums. THE POEMS OF ROBERT BURNS. Edited by
Andrew Lang and W. A. Craigie. With Portrait. Demy Svo,
gilt top. 6j-.

This edition contains a carefully collated Text, numerous Notes, critical and textual,

a critical and biographical Introduction, and a Glossary.
' Among the editions in one volume, Mr. Andrew Lang's will take the place of

authority. ' — Times.

F. Langbridge. BALLADS OF THE BRAVE: Poems of

Chivalry, Enterprise, Courage, and Constancy. Edited, with Notes,
by Rev. F. Langbridge. Croivn Zvo. Bttckram. 35. 6d. School
Edition, is. 6d.
'A very happy conception happily carried out. These "Ballads of the Brave" are
intended to suit the real tastes of boys, and will suit the taste of the great majority.'
— Spectator. ' The book is full of splendid things.' — World,

Illustrated Books

Jane Barlow. THE BATTLE OF THE FROGS AND MICE,
translated by Jane Barlow, Author of ' Irish Idylls,' and pictured
by F. D. Bedford. S7nall \to. ds. vet.

S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF FAIRY TALES retold by S.
Baring Gould. With numerous illustrations and initial letters by
Arthur J. Gaskin. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Buch-avi. 6s.
'Mr. Baring Gould is deserving of gratitude, in re-writing in honest, simple style the
old stories that delighted the childhood of " our fathers and grandfathers." As to
the form of the book, and the printing, which is by Messrs. Constable, it were
difficult to commend overmuch. — Saturday Revie^v,

S. Baring Gould. OLD ENGLISH FAIRY TALES. Col-
lected and edited by S. Baring Gould. With Numerous Illustra-
tions by F. D, Bedford. Second Edition. CrozvjtSvo. Buch'am. 6s.
'A charming volume, which children will be sure to appreciate. The stories have
been selected with great ingenuity from various old ballads and folk-tales, and,
having been somewhat altered and readjusted, now stand forth, clothed in Mr.
Baring Gould's delightful English, to enchant youthful readers.' — Guardian.

S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF NURSERY SONGS AND
RHYMES. Edited by S. Baring Gould, and Illustrated by the
Birmingham Art School. Buckram^ gilt top. Croivn Svo. 6s.
' The volume is verj' complete in its way, as it contains nursery songs to the number
of 77, game-rhymes, and jingles. To the student we commend the sensible intro-
duction, and the explanatory notes. The volume is superbly printed on soft,
thick paper, which it is a pleasure to touch ; and the borders and pictures are
among the very best specimens we have seen of the Gaskin school.' — Bir7ninz-
ham Gazette.

14 Messrs. Methuen's List

H. C. Beeching. A BOOK OF CHRISTMAS VERSE. Edited
by H. C. Beeciiixg, INI.A., and Illustrated by Walter Crane.
Crown 8vo, gilt top. ^s.

A collection of the best ver<;e inspired by the birth of Christ from the Middle Ages
to the present day, A distinction of the book is the large number of poems it
contains by modern authors, a few of which are here printed for the first time.

'An anthology which, from its unity of aim and liigh poetic excellence, has a better
right to exist than most of its fellows.' — Guardiatt.

History

Gibbon. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE. By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, Edited with
Notes, Appendices, and Maps, by J. E. Bury, M.A., Fellow of
Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy %vo. Gilt top.
%s. 6d. each. Also crown 2>vo. 6s. each. Vols. /., //., and III.

' The time has certainly arrived for a new edition of Gibbon's great work. . . . Pro-
fessor Bury is the right man to undertake this task. His learning is amazing,
both in extent and accuracy. The book is issued in a handy form, and at a
moderate price, and it is admirably printed.' — Thiics.

' The edition is edited as a classic should be edited, removing nothing, j'et indicating
the value of the text, and bringing it up to date. It promises to be of the utmost
value, and will be a welcome addition to many libraries.' — Scots»ian.

'This edition, so far as one may judge from the first instalment, is a marvel of
erudition and critical skill, and it is the very minimum of praise to predict that the
seven volumes of it will supersede Dean Milman's as the standard edition of our
great historical classic' — Glasgow Herald.

* The beau-ideal Gibbon has arrived at last.* — Skeich,

'At last there is an adequate modern edition of Gibbon. . . . The best edition the
nineteenth century could produce." — Manchester Guardian.

Flinders Petrie. A HISTORY OF EGYPT,fromthe Earliest
Times to the Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders
Petrie, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University
College. Fnlly Illustrated. In Six Volumes. Crown 8vo. 6s. each.

Vol. I. Prehistoric Times to XVI. Dynasty. W. M. F.
Petrie. Third Editioji.

Vol. IT. The XVIIth and XVIIIth Dynasties. W. ^\. F.
Petrie. Second Edition.

' A history written in the spirit of scientific precision so worthily represented by Dr.
Petrie and his school cannot liut promote sound and accurate study, and
supply a v.acant place in the English literature of Egyptology.' — Times.

Flinders Petrie. EGYPTIAN TALES. Edited by W. M.
I'^linders Petrie. Illustrated by Tristram Ellis. In Two
Volumes. Cj-owii Zvo. ^s. 6d. each.

'A valuable addition to the literature of comparative folk-lore. The drawings arc

really illustrations in the literal sense of the \\ox<\.'— Globe.
' It has a scientific value to the student of history and ?i.\c\\2^cAo%y .' —Scotsman.
'Invaluable as a picture of life in Palestine and Egypt." — Daily Neivs.

Messrs. Methuen's List 15

Flinders Petrie. EGYPTIAN DECORATIVE ART. By
W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L. With 120 Illustrations. Crown

'- Professor Flinders Petrie is not only a profound Egyptologist, but an accomplished
student of comparative archseology. In these lectures, delivered at the Royal
Institution, he displays both qualifications Vflth. rare skill in elucidating the
development of decorative art in Egypt, and in tracing its influence on the
art of other countries.' — Titnes.

S. Baring Gould. THE TRAGEDY OF THE C^SARS.
The Emperors of the Julian and Claudian Lines. With numerous
Illustrations from Busts, Gems, Cameos, etc. By S. Baring Gould,
Author of 'Mehalah,' etc. Fourth Edition. Royal %vo. i^s.

' A most splendid and fascinating book on a subject of undying interest. The great
feature of the book is the use the author has made of the existing portraits of the
Caesars, and the admirable critical subtlety he has exhibited in dealing with this
line of research. It is brilliantly written, and the illustrations are supplied on a
scale of profuse magnificence.' — Daily Chronicle.

' The volumes will in no sense disappoint the general reader. Indeed,_ in their way,
there is nothing in any sense so good in English. . . . Mr. Earing Gould has
presented his narrative in such a way as not to make one dull page.' — Athenceunt.

H. de B. GibMns. INDUSTRY IN ENGLAND : HISTORI-
CAL OUTLINES. By H. de B. Gibbins, INI.A., D.Litt. With
5 Maps. Second Edition. Demy Svo. los. 6d.

This book is written with the view of affording a clear view of the main facts of
English Social and Industrial History placed in due perspective. Beginning
with prehistoric times, it passes in re\aew the growth and advance of industry
up to the nineteenth century, showing its gradual development and progress.
The book is illustrated by Maps, Diagrams, and Tables.

A. Clark. THE COLLEGES OF OXFORD : Their History

and their Traditions. By Members of the University. Edited by A.

Clark, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Lincoln College. Svo. I2s. 6d.

' A work which will certainly be appealed to for many years as the standard book on

the Colleges of Oxford.' — Atlienceum.

Perrens. THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE FROM 1434
TO 1492. By F. T. Perrens. Translated by Hannah Lynch.
Zvo. \2s. 6d.

A history of Florence under the domination of Cosimo, Piero, and Lorenzo de

Medicis.
' This is a standard book by an honest and intelligent historian, who has deserved

well of all who are interested in Italian history.' — Manchester Guardian.

J.Weils. A SHORT HISTORY OF ROME. By J. Wells,
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Wadham Coll., Oxford. With 4 Maps.
Crown 2>vo. y. 6d.
This book is intended for the INIiddle and Upper Forms of Public Schools and for

Pass Students at the Universities. It contains copious Tables, etc.
'An original work written on an original plan, and with uncommon freshness and
vigour. ' — Speaker,

i6 Messrs. Methuen's List

E. L. S. Horsburgh. THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.
By E. L. S. Horsburgh, B.A. JVi'fh Plans. Crown 8vo. ^s.

* A brilliant essay — simple, sound, and thorough.' — Dally Chronicle.

' A study, the most concise, the most lucid, the most critical that has been produced.
— Birmingham Mercury,

H.B. George. BATTLES OF ENGLISH HISTORY. ByH.B.

George, M.A., Fellow of New College, Oxford. With numerous
Plans. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

* Mr. George has undertaken a very useful task — that of making military' affairs in-

telligible and instructive to non-military readers — and has executed it with laud-
able intelligence and industry, and with a large measure of success.' — Times.

0. Browning. A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ITALY,
A.D. 1 250- 1 530. By Oscar Browning, Fellow and Tutor of King's
College, Cambridge. Second Edition. In Two Volumes. Crown
Svo. 5^. each.

Vol. I. 1250-1409. — Guelphs and Ghibellines.

Vol. n. 1409- 1530. — The Age of the Condottieri.

'A vivid picture of mediaeval Italy.' — Standard.

' Mr. Browning is to be congratulated on the production of a work of immense
labour and \&z.xv\x\g.''— Westminster Gazette.

O'Grady. THE STORY OF IRELAND. By Standish

O'Grady, Author of ' Finn and his Companions.' Cr. %vo. 2s. 6d.

'Most delightful, most stimulating. Its racy humour, its original imaginings,
make it one of the freshest, breeziest volumes.' — Methodist Times.

Biography

Baring Gould. THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONA-
PARTE. By S. Baring Gould. With over 450 Illustrations in
the Text and 12 Photogravure Plates. Large quarto. Gilt top. 36J.

■ The best biography of Napoleon in our tongue, nor have the French as good a
biographer of their hero. A book very nearly as good as Southey's " hife of
Nelson." '—Manchester Guardian.

'The main feature of this gorgeous volume is its great wealth of beautiful photo-
gravures and finely-executed wood engravings, constituting a complete pictorial
chronicle of Napoleon I.'s personal history from the days of his early childhood
at Ajaccio to the date of his second interment under the dome of the Invalides in
Vaxis.'— Daily Telegraph.

' The most elalwrate account of Napoleon ever produced l)y an English writer.'—
Daily Chronicle.

' A brilliant and attractive volume. Never before have so many pictures relating
to Napoleon been brought within the limits of an English book.' — Globe.

' Particular notice is due to the vast collection of contemporary illustrations.' —
Guardian.

'Nearly all the illustrations are real contributions to historj'.' — IJ'esf minster Gazette.

'The illustrations arc of supreme inteTv<.t.' Standard.

Messrs. Methuen's List 17

Morris Fuller. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JOHN
DAVENANT, D.D. (1571-1641), President of Queen's College,
Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Bishop of Salisbury. By
Morris Fuller, B.D. Crown %vo. 'js. 6d.

' A valuable contribution to ecclesiastical history.' — Birniinghain Gazette.

J. M. Rigg. ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY: A Chapter
IN THE History of Religion. By J. M. Rigg. DeviyZvo. ^s. 6d.

' Mr. Rigg has told the story of the great Primate's life with scholarly ability, and
has thereby contributed an interestingchapter to the history of the Norman period.'
— Daily Chronicle.

F. W. Joyce. THE LIFE OF SIR FREDERICK GORE
OUSELEY. By F. W. Joyce, M.A. With Portraits and Illustra-
tions. Crown Zvo. *]s. 6d.

' This book has been undertaken in quite the right spirit, and written with sympathy
insight, and considerable literary skill.' — Times.

W. G. Collingwood. THE LIFE OF JOHN RUSKIN. By
W. G. Collingwood, M.A., Editor of Mr. Ruskin's Poems. With
numerous Portraits, and 13 Drawings by Mr. Rusk in. Second
Edition. 2 vols. S-vo. 32^.

' No more magnificent volumes have been published for a long time,'— Tidies.
* It is long since we had a biography with such delights of substance and of form.
Such a book is a pleasure for the day, and a joy for ever.' — Daily Chronicle.

0. Waldstein. JOHN RUSKIN : a Study. By Charles
Waldstein, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. With a
Photogravur Portrait after Professor Herkomer. Post Svo. ^s.

'A thoughtful, impartial, well-written criticism of Ruskin's teaching, intended to
separate what the author regards as valuable and permanent from what is transient
and erroneous in the great master's writing.' — Daily Chronicle.

W. H. Hutton. THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE. By
W. H. Hutton, M.A., Author of ' William Laud.' With Portraits,
Crown Svo. ^s.

' The book lays good claim to high rank among our biographies. It is excellently,
even lovingly, written." — Scotsman. ' An excellent monograph.' — Times.

Clark RusselL THE LIFE OF AD]\IIRAL LORD COL-
LINGWOOD. By W. Clark Russell, Author of ' The Wreck
of the Grosvenor.' With Illustrations by F. Brangwyn. Third
Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

•A book which we should like to see in the hands of every boy in the country.' —
.S"^. James's Gazette. ' A really good book.' — .Saturday Review.

1 8 Messrs. Methuen's List

Southey. ENGLISH SEAMEN (Howard, Clifford, Hawkins,
Drake, Cavendish). By Robert Southey. Edited, with an
Introduction, by David Hannay. Second Edition. CrownSvo. 6s.

'Admirable and well-told stories of our naval history.' — Artny and Navy Gazette.

'A brave, inspiriting book.' — Black and White.

Travel5 Adventure and Topography

R. S. S. Baden-Powell. THE DOWNFALL OF PREMPEH.

A Diary of Life with the Native Levy in Ashanti, 1895. By Colonel
Baden-Powell. With 21 Ilkistrations and a Map. Demy Zvo.
\os. 6d.

'• A compact, faithful, most readable record of the campaign.' — Daily News.
' A bluff and vigorous narrative.' — Glasgoxv Herald.

R. S. S. Baden-Powell TPIE MATKBELE CAMPAIGN 1896.

By Colonel R. S. S. Baden- Powell. With nearly 100 Illustrations.

Second Edition. Deniy^vo. 155.

'Written in an unaffectedly light and humorous style.' — The World.
'A very racy and eminently readable book.' — St. James's Gazette.

* As a straightforward account of a great deal of plucky work unpretentiously done,

this book is well worth reading. The simplicity of the narrative is all in its
favour, and accords in a peculiarly English fashion with the nature of the subject.'
Times.

Captain Hinde. THE FALL OF THE CONGO ARABS.

By Sidney L. Hinde. With Portraits and Plcns. Defuy Svo.
i2s. 6d.

* The book is full of good things, and of sustained interest.' — St. James's Gazette.

A graphic sketch of one of the most exciting and important episodes in the struggle
for supremacy in Central Africa between the Arabs and their_ Europeon rivals.
Apart from the story of the campaign. Captain Hinde's book is mainly remark-
able for the fulness with which he discusses the question of cannibalism. It is,
indeed, the only connected narrative— in English, at any rate — which has been
published of this particular episode in African history.' — Tima.

* Captain Hinde's book is one of the most interesting and valuable contributions yet

made to the literature of modern Africa.' — Daily Nczvs.

W. Crooke. THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES OF INDIA :

TiiEiR Ethnology and Administration. By W. Crooke.

With Maps and Illustrations. Demy Svo. 10s. 6d.

' A carefully and well-written account of one of the most important provinces of the
Empire. In seven chapters Mr. Croote deals successively with the land in its
physical aspect, the province under Hindoo and Mussulman rule, the province
under British rule, the ethnology and sociology of the province, the religious and
social life of the people, the land and its settlement, and the native peasant in his
relation to the land. The illustrations are good and well selected, and the map is
excellent. ' — Manchester Guardian.

Messrs. Methuen's List 19

W. B. Worsfold. SOUTH AFRICA : Its History and its Future.

By W. Basil Worsfold, INI. A. IVich a Map. Second Edition.
Crown Svo. 6s.

'An intensely interesting book.' — Daily Chronicle.

' A monumental work compressed into a very moderate compass.' — World.

General Literature

S. Baring Gould. OLD COUNTRY LIFE. By S. Baring
Gould, Author of ' Mehalah,' etc. With Sixty- seven Illustrations
by W. Parkinson, F. D. Bedford, and F. Masey. Large
Crown Svo. los. 6d. Fifth and Cheaper Edition. (>s.

'"Old Countrj' Life," as healthy wholesome reading, full of breezy life and move-
ment, full of quaint stories vigorously told, will not be excelled by any book to be
published throughout the year. Sound, hearty, and English to the core.' — World.

S. Baring Gould. HISTORIC ODDITIES AND STRANGE
EVENTS. By S. Baring Gould. Third Edition. Crown ^vo. 6s.

' A collection of exciting and entertaining chapters. The whole volume is delightful
leading.'— Times.

S. Baring Gould. FREAKS OF FANATICISM. By S. Baring
Gould. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

'Mr. Baring Gould has a keen eye for colour and effect, and the subjects he has
chosen give ample scope to his descriptive and analytic faculties. A perfectly
fascinating book. ' — Scottish Leader.

S. Baring Gould. A GARLAND OF COUNTRY SONG :

English Folk Songs with their Traditional Melodies. Collected and
arranged by S. Baring Gould and H. Fleetwood Sheppard.
Demy ^to, 6s.

S. Baring Gould. SONGS OF THE WEST: Traditional
Ballads and Songs of the West of England, with their Traditional
Melodies. Collected by S. Baring Gould, M.A., and H. Fleet-
wood Sheppard, M. A. Arranged for Voice and Piano. In 4 Parts
(containing 25 Songs each), Parts I., //., ///., 3j\ each. Part
IV., ^s. In one Vol., French morocco, \^s.
' A rich collection of humour, pathos, grace, and poetic fancy.' — Saturday Review,

20 Messrs. Methuen's List

S. Baring Gould. YORKSHIRE ODDITIES AND STRANGE

EVENTS. Fourth Edition. Crown %vo. 6s.

S. Baring Gould. STRANGE SURVIVALS AND SUPER-
STITIONS. With Illustrations. By S. Baring Gould. Crown
^vo. Second Edition. 6s.

' We have read Mr. Baring Gould's book from beginning to end. It is full of quaint
and various information, and there is not a dull page in it. ' — Notes and Queries.

S. Baring Gould. THE DESERTS OF SOUTHERN
FRANCE. By S. Baring. Gould. With numerous Illustrations
by F. D. Bedford, S. Hutton, etc. 2 vols. Demy Zvo. 325.

' His two richly-illustrated volumes are full of matter of interest to the geologist,
the archaeologist, and the student of history and manners.' — Scotsvian.

G. W. Steevens. NAVAL POLICY: With a Descrip-
tion OF English and Foreign Navvies. By G. W. Steevens.
Demy 8vo. 6s.

This book is a description of the British and other more important navies of the world,
with a sketch of the lines on which our naval policy might possibly be developed.
It describes our recent naval policj', and shows what our naval force really is. A
detailed but non-technical account is given of the instruments of modern warfare —
guns, armour, engines, and the like — with a view to determine how far we are
abreast of modern invention and modern requirements. An ideal policy is then
sketched for the building and manning of oUr fleet ; and the last chapter is
devoted to docks, coaling-stations, and especially colonial defence.

' An extremely able and interesting work.' — Daily Chronicle.

W. E. Gladstone. THE SPEECHES AND PUBLIC AD-
DRESSES OF THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
Edited by A. W. Hutton, M.A., and H. J. Cohen, M.A. With
Portraits, '^vo. Vols. IX. and X. \2s, 6d. each.

J. Wells. OXFORD AND OXFORD LIFE. By Members of

the University. Edited by J. Wells, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of
Wadham College. Croivn 8vo. 3^. 6d.

' We congratulate Mr. Wells on the production of a readable and intelligent account
of Oxford as it is at the present time, written by persons who are possessed of a
close acquaintance with the system and life of the JJniytrsity.'—Ai/iencrum.

L. Whibley. GREEK OLIGARCHIES : THEIR ORGANISA-
TION AND CHARACTER. By L. Wiiiblev, M.A., Fellow
of Pembroke College, Cambridge. Crown Zvo. 6s.

' An exceedingly useful handbook : a careful and well-arranged study of aii obscure

subject.' — Tiiucs.
' Mr. Whibley is never tedious ur pedantic' — Fall Mall Gazette.

Messrs. Methuen's List 21

L. L. Price. ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND PRACTICE,
By L. L. Price, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Crown
Svo. 6s.

' The book is well written, giving evidence of considerable literary ability, and clear
mental grasp of the subject under consideration. ' — ^Fi^j-^'grw Morning News.

C. F. Andrews. CHRISTIANITY AND THE LABOUR
QUESTION. By C. F. Andrews, B.A. Crown ^vo. 2s. 6J.
' A bold and scholarly survey.' — Speaker.

J. S. Shedlock. THE PIANOFORTE SONATA: Its Origin
and Development. By J. S. Shedlock. Crown Svo. 5^.

'This work should be in the possession of every musician and amateur, for it not
only embodies a concise and lucid history ot the origin ofoneof the most im-
portant forms of musical composition, but, by reason of the painstaking research
and accuracy of the author's statements, it is a very valuable work for reference.'
— A theHCB7i}n.

E.M. Bowden. THE EXAMPLE OF BUDDHA: Being Quota-
tions from Buddhist Literature for each Day in the Year. Compiled
by E. M. Bowden. With Preface by Sir Edwin Arnold. Third

Editiofi. iGf/io. 2s. 6d.

Science

Freudenreich. DAIRY BACTERIOLOGY. A Short Manual
for the Use of Students. By Dr. Ed. von Freudenreich.
Translated from the German by J. R. Ainsworth Davis, B.A.,
F.C.P. Crown Svo. 2s.6d.

Chalmers Mitchell. OUTLINES OF BIOLOGY. By P.

Chalmers I\Iitchell, M.A., F.Z.S. Fully Illustrated. Crown
%vo. 6s.

A text-book designed to cover the new Schedule issued by the Roj-al College of
Physicians and Surgeons.

G.Massee. A MONOGRAPH OF THE MYXOGASTRES. By
George Massee. With 12 Coloured Plates. Royal Svo. iSs.net.

'A work much in advance of any book in the language treating of this group of
organisms. It is indispensable to every student of the Myxogastres. The
coloured plates deserve high praise for their accuracy and execution.'— iV«^Kr<r.

22 Messrs. Methuen's List

Philosophy

L. T. Hobhouse. THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. By

L. T. Hobhouse, Fellow and Tutor of Corpus College, Oxford.
Demy Svo. 21 s.

' The most Important contribution to English philosophy since the publication of Mr.
Bradley's " Appearance and Reality." Full of brilliant criticism and of positive
theories which are models of lucid statement.' — Glasgow Herald.

' An elaborate and often brilliantly written volume. The treatment is one of great
freshness, and the illustrations are particularly numerous and apt.' — Times.

\V. H. Fairbrotlier. THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. H. GREEN.
By W. H. Fairbrother, ]\I.A., Lecturer at Lincoln College,
Oxford. Crown Svo. ^s. 6d.

This volume is expository, not critical, and Is Intended for senior students at the

Universities and others, as a statement of Green's teaching, and an introduction to

the study of Idealist Philosophy.
' In every way an admirable book. As an introduction to the writings of perhaps the

most remarkable speculative thinker whom England has produced in the present

century, nothing could be better.' — Glasgozu lUfald.

F. W. BusselL THE SCHOOL OF PLATO : its Origin and
its Revival under the Roman Empire. By F. W. Bussell, M.A.,
Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. De?ny Svo. los. 6d.

' A highly valuable contribution to the history of ancient thought.' — Glasgmu Herald.
' A clever and stimulating book, provocative of thought and deserving careful reading."
— Alancliester Guardian,

F. S. Granger. THE WORSHIP OF THE ROMANS. By

F. S. Granger, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Philosophy at Univer-
sity College, Nottingham. Crown Svo. 6s.

' A scholarly analysis of the religious ceremonies, beliefs, and superstitions of ancient
Rome, conducted in the new instructive light of comparative anthropology.' —
Times.

Theology

E. C. S. Gibson. THE XXXIX. ARTICLES OF THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND. Edited with an Introduction by E.
C. S. Gibson, D.D. , Vicar of Leeds, late Principal of Wells
Theological College. In Two Volumes. Demy Svo. \^s,

'The tone maintained throughout is not that of the partial advocate, but the faithful

exponent. ' — Scotsman.
'There are .ample proofs of clearness of expression, sobriety of judgment, and breadth

of view. . . . The book will be welcome to all students of the subject, and its sound,

definite, and loyal theology ought to be of great service.' — Nationa.1 Observer.
'So far from repelling the general reader, its orderly arrangement, lucid treatment,

and felicltj' of diction Invite and encourage his attention.' — Yorkshire Post.

Messrs. Methuen's List 23

R. L. Ottley. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION.

By R. L. Ottley, M.A., late fellow of Magdalen College, Oxon.,
Principal of Pusey House. In Two Volumes. Demy 2>vo. I'^s.

* Learned and reverent : lucid and well arranged.' — Record.
'Accurate, well ordered, and judicious.' — National Observer.

' A clear and remarkably full account of the main currents of speculation. Scholarly
precision . • . genuine tolerance . . , intense interest in his subject — are Mr.
Ottley's merits, ' — Guardiati.

F. B. Jevons. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY
OF RELIGION. By F. B. Jevons, M.A., Litt.D., Principal of
Bishop Flatfield's Hall. Demy Svo. los. 6d.

Mr. F. B. Jevons' 'Introduction to the History of Religion' treats of early religion,
from the point of vaew of Anthropology and Folk-lore ; and is the first attempt
that has been made in any language to weave together the results of recent
investigations into such topics as S^'mpathetic Magic, Taboo, Totemism,
Fetishism, etc., so as to present a systematic account of the growth of primitive
religion and the development of early religious institutions,
' Dr. Jevons has written a notable work, and we can strongly recommend it to the
serious attention of theologians, anthropologists, and classical scholars.' — 3fan-
Chester Gtiardian.
' The merit of this book lies in the penetration, the singular acuteness and force of the
author's judgment. He isat once critical and luminous, at once just and suggestive.
It is but rarely that one meets with a book so comprehensive and so thorough as
this, and it is more than an ordinary pleasure for the reviewer to welcome and
recommend it. Dr. Jevons is something more than an historian of primitive
belief— he is a philosophic thinker, who sees his subject clearly and sees it whole,
whose mastery of detail is no less complete than his view of the broader aspects
and issues of his subject is convincing.' — BirmingJiam Post.

S. R. Driver. SERMONS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED
WITH THE OLD TESTAMENT. By S. R. Driver, D.D.,
Canon of Christ Church, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the Uni-
versity of Oxford. Crown Svo. 6s.

* A welcome companion to the author's famous ' Introduction.' No man can read these

discourses without feeling that Dr. Driver is fully alive to the deeper teaching of
the Old Testament.' — Guardian.

T. K. Cheyne. FOUNDERS OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITI-
CISM : Biographical, Descriptive, and Critical Studies. By T. K.
Cheyne, D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scrip-
ture at Oxford. Large crown Svo. 'js. 6d.
This book is a historical sketch of O. T. Criticism in the form of biographical studies

from the days of Eichhorn to those of Driver and Robertson Smith.
' A very learned and instructive work.' — Times.

C.H.Prior. CAMBRIDGE SERMONS. Edited by C.H. Prior,
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Pembroke College. Crown Svo. ds.
A volume of sermons preached before the University of Cambridge by various
preachers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Westcott.
A representative collection. Bishop Westcott's is a noble sermon.' — Guardian.

E. B. Layard. RELIGION IN BOYHOOD. Notes on the
Religious Training of Boys. With a Preface by J. R. Illing-
WORTH. By E. B. Layard, M.A. \Smo. \s.

24 Messrs. Metiiuen's List

W. Yorke Faussett. THE DE CATECHIZANDIS

RUDIBUS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Edited, with Introduction,

Notes, etc., by W. Yorke Faussett, M.A., late Scholar of Balliol

Coll. Crown 8vo. ^s. 6d.

An edition of a Treatise on the Essentials of Christian Doctrine, and the best

methods of impressing them on candidates for baptism.
'Ablj' and judiciously edited on the same principle as the ordinary Greek and
Latin texts.' — Glasgow Herald.

With Full-page Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo. Buckra?n. 3^. 6d.
Padded morocco^ 55.
THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. By Thomas A Kempis.
With an Introduction by Dean Farrar. Illustrated by C. M.
Gere, and printed in black and red. Second Edition.
'Amongst all the innumerable English editions of the "Imitation," there can have
been few which were prettier than this one, printed n strong and handsome type,
with all the glory of red initials.' — Glasgow Herald,

THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By John Keble. With an Intro-
duction and Notes by W. Lock, D.D., Warden of Keble College,
Ireland, Professor at Oxford. Illustrated by R. Anning Bell.

' The present edition is annotated with all the care and insight to be expected from
Mr. Lock. The progress and circumstances of its composition are detailed in the
Introduction. There is an interesting Appendix on the MSS. of the "Christian
Year," and another giving the order in which the poems were written. A "Short
Analysis of the Thought" is prefixed to each, and any difficulty in the text is ex-
plained in a note.' — Guardian.

' The most acceptable edition of this ever-popular work.' — Globe.

3/6

Leaders of Religion

Edited by H. C. BEECHING, M. A. With Portraits, crown 8zv.

A series of short biographies of the most prominent leaders
of religious life and thought of all ages and countries.

The following are ready —
CARDINAL NEWMAN. By R. H. HUTTON.
JOHN WESLEY. By J. H. Overton, M.A.
BISHOP WILBERFORCE. By G. W. Daniel, M.A.
CARDINAL MANNING. By A. W. HuTTON, M.A.
CHARLES SIMEON. By H. C. G. MOULE, M.A.
JOHN KEBLE. By Walter Lock, D.D.
THOMAS CHALMERS. By Mrs. Oliphant.
LANCELOT ANDREWES. By R. L. Ottley, M.A.
AUGUSTINE OF CANTERBURY. By E. L. CUTTS, D.D.
WILLIAM LAUD. By W. H. HuTTON, B.D.

Messrs. Methuen's List 25

JOHN KNOX. By F. M'CUNN.
JOHN HOWE. By R. F. HORTON, D.D.
BISHOP KEN. By F. A. Clarke, M.A.
GEORGE FOX, THE QUAKER. By T. Hodgkin, D.C.L.
Other volumes will be announced in due course.

Fiction

SIX SHILLING NOVELS

Marie Corelli's Novels

Crown Svo. 6s. each.
A ROMANCE OF TWO W^ORLDS. Sixteenth Ediiio?i.
VENDETTA. Thirteenth Edition.
T H E L M A. Seventeenth Edition.
ARDATH. Tenth Editimi.
THE SOUL OF LILITH Nijith Edition.
WORMWOOD. Eighth Edition.
BARABBAS : A DREAM OF THE WORLD'S TRAGEDY.

Thi)-ty-first Edition.
' The tender reverence of the treatment and the imaginative beauty of the writing
have reconciled us to the daring of the conception, and the conviction is forced on
us that even so exalted a subject cannot be made too familiar to us, provided it be
presented in the true spirit of Christian faith. The amplifications of the Scripture
narrative are often conceived with high poetic insight, and this "Dream of the
World's Tragedy " is, despite some trifling incongruities, a lofty and not inade-
quate paraphrase of the supreme climax of the inspired narrative.' — Dublin
Review.

THE SORROW^S OF SATAN. Thirty-sixth Edition.

' A very powerful piece of work. . . . The conception is magnificent, and is likely
to win an abiding place within the memory' of man. . . . The author has immense
command of language, and a limitless audacity. . . . This interesting and re-
markable romance will live long after much of the ephemeral literature of the day
is forgotten. ... A literary phenomenon . . . novel, and even sublime.' — W. T.
Stead in the Review of Reviews.

Anthony Hope's Novels

Crown ?)Vo. 6s. each.
THE GOD IN THE CAR. Sevmih Edition. . _

' A very remarkable book, deserving of critical analysis impossible within our limit ;
brilliant, but not superficial ; well considered, but not elaborated ; constructed
with the proverbial art that conceals, but yet allows itself to be enjoyed by readers
to whom fine literarj' method is a keen pleasure.'— The World.

A CHANGE OF AIR. Fourth Edition.

'A graceful, vivacious comedy, true to human nature. The characters are traced
with a masterly hand.' — Times.

A MAN OF MARK. Fourth Edition.

' Of all Mr. Hope's books, "A Man of Mark " is the one which best compares with
' ' The Prisoner of Zenda." ' — National Observer.

26 Messrs. Methuen's List

THE CHRONICLES OF COUNT ANTONIO. Third Editum.

'It is a perfectly enchanting story of love and chivalry, and pure romance. The
outlawed Count is the most constant, desperate, and withal modest and tender of
lovers, a peerless gentleman, an intrepid fighter, a very faithful friend, and a most
magnanimous foe. ' — Guardian.

PHROSO. Illustrated by H. R. MiLLAR._ Third Edition.

' The tale is thoroughly fresh, quick with vitality, stirring the blood, and humorously,

(l2ish.\x\g\yto\A.'— St. James s Gazette.
' A story of adventure, every page of which is palpitating with action and excitement.'

—Speaker.
' From cover to cover " Phroso " not only engages the attention, but carries the reader

in little whirls of delight from adventure to adventure." — Academy.

S. Baring Gould's Novels

Crozvn 2>vo. 6s. each.
'To say that a book is by the author of " ISIehalah" is to imx)ly that it contains a
story cast on strong lines, containing dramatic possibilities, vivid and sympathetic
descriptions of Nature, and a wealth of ingenious imagery.' — Speaker.
' That whatever Mr. Baring Gould writes is well worth reading, is a conclusion that
may be very generally accepted. His views of life are fresh and vigorous, his
language pointed and characteristic, the incidents of which he makes use are
striking and original, his characters are life-like, and though somewhat excep-
tional people, are drawn and coloured with artistic force. Add to this that his
descriptions of scenes and scenery are painted with the loving eyes and skilled
hands of a master of his art, that he is alwaj'S fresh and never dull, and under
such conditions it is no wonder that readers have gained confidence both in his
power of amusing nnd satisfying them, and that year by j'ear his popularity
widens. ' — Court Circular.

ARM I NELL : A Social Romance. Fourth Edii:o7i.
URITH : A Story of Dartmoor. Fifth Edition,

' The author is at his best.'— T/w^j.

IN THE ROAR OF THE SEA, Sixth Edition.

'One of the best imagined and most enthralling stories the author has produced.
— Saturday Review.

MRS. CURGENVEN OF CURGENVEN. Fourth Editio7i.

' The swing of the narrative is splendid.' — Sussex Daily Neivs.

CHEAP JACK ZITA. Fourth Edition.

' A powerful drama of human passion.' — IVesttninster Gazette.
'A story worthy the author.' — National Observer.

THE QUEEN OF LOVE. Fourth Edition.

' You cannot put it down until you have finished it.' — Punch.

' Can be heartily recommended to all who care for cleanly, energetic, and interesting
fiction.' — Sussex Daily News.

KITTY ALONE. Fourth Edition.

' A strong and original story, teeming with graphic description, stirring incident,
and, above all, with vivid and enthralling human interest.'— Daily Telegraph.

NOEMI : A Romance of the Cave-Dvvellers. Illustrated by

R. CaTON WOODVILLE. Third Edi(io7l.
' " Nocmi " is as excellent a tale of fighting and adventure as one may wish to meet.

The narrative also runs clear and sharp as the Loire itself.' — Fail Mall Gazette.
'Mr. Baring Gould's powerful story is full of the strong lights and shadows and

vivid colouring to which he has accustomed us.' — Standard.

Messrs. Methuen's List 27

THE BROOM- SQUIRE. Illustrated by Frank Dadd.

Fourth Edition.
' A strain of tenderness is woven through the web of his tragic tale, and its atmosphere

is sweetened by the nobility and sweetness of the heroine's character.' — Daily Neivs.
* A story of exceptional interest that seems to us to be better than anything he has

written of late.' — Speaker.

THE PENNYCOMEQUICKS. Third Edition,
DARTMOOR IDYLLS.

'A book to read, and keep and read again ; for the genuine fun and pathos of it will
not early lose their effect. ' — Vanity Fair.

GUAVAS THE TINNER. Illustrated by Frank Dadd. Scco?id

Edition.
' Mr. Baring Gould Is a wizard who transports us into a region of visions, often lurid

and disquieting, but always full of interest and enchantment.' — Spectator,
' In the v/eirdness of the story, in the faithfulness with which the characters are

depicted, and in force of style, it closely resembles " Alehalah. '" — Daily TelegrapJi.
' There is a kind of flavour about this book which alone elevates it above the ordinary

novel. The story itself has a grandeur in harmony with the wild and rugged

scenery which is its setting/ — A thenceiini.

Gilbert Parker's Novels

Crown %vo. 6s. each.
PIERRE AND HIS PEOPLE. Fourth Edition.

' Stories happily conceived and finely executed. There is strength and genius in Mr.
Parker's style.' — Daily Telegraph.

MRS. FALCHION. Fourth Edition.

' A splendid studj' of character.' — Athencsutn.

' But little behind anything that has been done by any writer of our time. ' — Pall
Mall Gazette. 'A verj' striking and admirable novel.' — St. James's Gazette.

THE TRANSLATION OF A SAVAGE.

' The plot is original and one difficult to work out ; but Mr. Parker has done it with
great skill and delicacy. The reader who is not interested in this original, fresh,
and well-told tale must be a dull person indeed.' — Daily Chronicle.

THE TRAIL OF THE SWORD. Fifth Edition.

'Everybody with a soul for romance will thoroughly enjoy "The Trail of the
Sword." ' — St. Ja7itess Gazette.

' A rousing and dramatic tale. A book like this, In which swords flash, great sur-
prises are undertaken, and daring deeds done, in which men and women live and
love in the old straightforward passionate way, is a joy inexpressible to the re-
viewer.'— Daily Chronicle.

WHEN VALMOND CAME TO PONTIAC : The Story of
a Lost Napoleon. Fourth Edition.
' Here we find romance — real, breathing, living romance, but it runs flush with our
own times, level with our own feelings. The character of Valmond is drawn un-
erringly ; his career, brief as it is, is placed before us as convincingly as history
itself. "The book must be read, we may say re-read, for any one thoroughly to
appreciate Mr. Parker's delicate touch and innate sympathy with humanity.' —
Pall Mall Gazette.
'The one work of genius which 1895 has as yet produced.' — A^eiv Age.

AN ADVENTURER OF THE NORTH: The Last Adven-
tures of ' Pretty Pierre.' Second Edition.
'The present book is full of fine and moving stories of the great North, and it will
add to Mr. Parker's already high reputation.'— G/rti-^^w Herald.

28 Messrs. Methuen's List

THE SEATS OF THE MIGHTY. Illustrated. Eighth Edition.

' The best thing he has done ; one of the best things that any one has done lately.' —

St. Javiea's Gazette.
' Mr. Parker seems to become stronger and easier with every serious novel that he

attempts. . . , In " The Seats of the Mighty " he shows the matured power which

his former novels have led us to expect, and has produced a really fine historical

novel. . . . Most sincerely is Mr. Parker to be congratulated on the finest

novel he has yet written.' — Athentpum.
'Mr. Parker's latest book places him in the front rank of living novelists. "The

Seats of the Mighty" is a great book.' — Black and White.
'One of the strongest stories of historical interest and adventure that we have read

for many a daj'. . . . A notable and successful book.' — Speaker.

Conan Doyle. ROUND THE RED LAMP, By A. Conan
Doyle, Author of ' The White Company,' ' The Adventures of
Sherlock Hohnes,' etc. Fifth Edition. Crotvn 2>vo. 6s.
' The book is, indeed, composed of leaves from life, and is far and away the best view
that has been vouchsafed us behind the scenes of the consulting-room. It is very
superior to " The Diary of a late Physician." ' — Illustrated London JVews.

Stanley Weyman. UNDER THE RED ROBE. By Stanley

Weym AN, Author of ' A Gentleman of France. ' With Twelve Illus-
trations by R. Caton Woodville. TiveJfth Edition. Crown %vo. 6s.

'A book of which we have read every word for the sheer pleasure of reading, and
which we put down with a pang that we cannot forget it all and start again.' —
Westtninstcr Gazette.

' Every one who reads books nt all must read this thrilling romance, from the first
page of which to the last the breathless reader is haled along. An inspiration of
" manliness and courage." ' — Daily Chronicle.

Lucas Malet. THE WAGES OF SIN. By Lucas

Malet. Thirteejith Edition. Crown '^vo. 6$.

Lucas Malet. THE CARISSIMA. By Lucas Malet,

Author of 'The Wages of Sin,' etc. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

Arthur Morrison. TALES OF MEAN STREETS. By Arthur

Morrison. Eojtrth Edition. Croiim 8vo. 6s.
' Told with consummate art and extraordinary detail. He tells a plain, unvarnished

tale, and the very truth of it makes for l)eauty. In tlie true humanity of the book

lies its justification, the permanence of its interest, and its indubitable triumph.' —

A thentpunt.
' A great book. The author's method is amazingly effective, and produces a thrilling

sense of reality. I'he writer lays upon us a master hand. The book is simply

appalling and irresistil)le in its interest. It is humorous also ; without humour

it would not make the mark it is certain to make.' — World.

Arthur Morrison. A CHILD OF THE JAGO. By Arthur

]MoRRiSON. Third Edition. Croivn %vo. 6s.
This, the first long story which Mr. ^Morrison has written, is like his remarkable

' Tales of Mean Streets,' a realistic study of East End life.
' The book is a masterpiece.' — Pall I\fall Gazette.
'Told with great vigour and powerful simplicity.' — AtJtettaum.

Mrs. Clifford. A FLASH OF SUMMER. By Mrs. W. K. Cr.ir-
FORD, Author of ' Aunt Anne,' etc. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s.

' The story is a very sad and a very lif autiful one, exquisitely told, and enriched with
many subtle touches of wise and tender insight. It will, undoubtedly, add to its
author's reputation— already high — in the ranks of novelists.' — Speaker,

Messrs. Methuen's List 29

Emily Lawless. HURRISH. By the Honble. Emily Law-
less, Author of ' Maelcho,' etc. Fifth Edition. Crown ^vo. ds.
A reissue of Miss Lawless' most popular novel, uniform with ' Maelcho.'

Emily Lawless. MAELCHO : a Sixteenth Century Romance.

By the Honble. Emily Lawless. Second Edition. Crown Zvo. (iS.

' A really great book.' — Spectator.

'There is no keener pleasure in life than the recognition of genius. Good work is
commoner than it used to be, but the best is as rare as ever. All the more
gladly, therefore, do we v.-elcome in " Maelcho " a piece of work of the first order,
which we do not hesitate to describe as one of the most remarkable literary
achievements of this generation. Miss Lawless is possessed of the very essence
of historical genius.' — I\Ianchcsicr Guardian.

J. H. Findlater. THE GREEN GRAVES OF BALGOWRIE.
By Jane H. FiNDLATER. Third Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s.

'A powerful and vivid s\.oxy.' —Standard.

' A beautiful story, sad and strange as truth itself.' — Vanity Fair.

' A work of remarkable interest and originality.' — National Observer.

' A very charming and pathetic tale.' — Pall Mall Gazette.

' A singularly original, clever, and beautiful story.' — Guardian.

' " The Green Graves of Balgowrie" reveals to us a new Scotch writer of undoubted

faculty and reserve force.' — Spectator.
'An exquisite idyll, delicate, affecting, and beautiful.' — Black and White.

H. G. Wells. THE STOLEN BACILLUS, and other Stories.
By H. G. Wells, Author of 'The Time Machine.' Crown Svo. 6s.

' The ordinary reader of fiction may be glad to know that these stories are eminently
readable from one coverto the other, but they are more than that ; they are the
impressions of a very striking imagination, which, it would seem, has a great deal
within its reach.' — Saturday Review.

H. G.Wells. THE PLATTNER STORY AND Others. By H.

G. Wells. Second Edition. Croivn Svo. 6s.
'Weird and mysterious, they seem to hold the reader as by a magic spell.' — Scotstnan.
'Such is the fascination of this writer's skill that you unhesitatingly prophesy that

none of the many readers, however his flesh do creep, will relinquish the volume

ere he has read from first word to last.' — Black and iPhite.
' No volume has appeared for a long time so likely to give equal pleasure to the

simplest reader and to the most fastidious critic' — Academy.
' Mr. Wells is a magician skilled in wielding that most potent of all spells — the fear

of the unknown.' — Daily Telegraph.

E. F. Benson. DODO : A DETAIL OF THE DAY. By E. F.

Benson. Sixteenth Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s.
' A delightfully witty sketch of society.' — Spectator.
' A perpetual feast of epigram and paradox.' — Speaker.

E. F. Benson. THE RUBICON. By E. F. Benson, Author of
'Dodo.' Fifth Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.
' An exceptional achievement ; a notable advance on his previous v/orV.'— National
Observer.

Mrs. Oliphant. SIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE. By Mrs.

Oliphant. Crown Svo. 6s.
' Full of her own peculiar charm of style and simple, subtle chaxacter-painting comes
her new gift, the delightful story before us. The scene mostly lies in the moors,
and at the touch of the authoress a Scotch moor becomes a living thing, strong,
tender, beaulii'ui, and changeful.' — Pall Mall Gazette.

30 Messrs. Methuen's List

Mrs. Olipliant. THE TWO MARYS. 13y Mrs. Oliphant.
Second Ediiio7i. Croivn Zvo. 6j-.

V/.E.Norris. MATTHEW AUSTIN. By W. E. Norris, Author

of ' iMademoiselle de Mcrsac,' etc. FoiD'th Edition. CrownZvo. 6s.

"Matthew Austin" may safely be pronounced one of the most intellectually satis-
factory and morally bracing novels of the current year.' — Daily Tclerraf'h.

W. E. Norris. HIS GRACE. By W. E. Norris. Third

Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s.

' Mr. Norris has drawn a really fine character in the Duke of Hurstbourne, at once
unconventional and very true to the conventionalities of life.' — Atheticeum.

W. E. Norris. THE DESPOTIC LADY AND OTHERS.
By W. E. Norris. Crown Svo. 6s.

' A budget of good fiction of which no one will tire.' — Scotsman.

W. E. Norris. CLARISSA FURIOSA. By W. E. Norris,

Author of 'The Rogue,' etc. Crown Svo. 6s.

' One of Mr. Norris's very best novels. As a story it is admirable, as a. jt'u cE esprit
it is capital, as a lay sermon studded with gems of wit and wisdom it is a model
which will not, we imagine, find an efficient imitator.' — The World.

'The best novel he has written for some time: a story which is full of admirable
character-drawing. ' — Tlie Standard.

Robert Barr. IN THE MIDST OF ALARMS. By Robert

Barr. Third Edition. Crozun ^vo. 6s.

' A book which has abundantly satisfied us by its capital humour,' — Daily Chronicle.
'ISIr. Barr has achieved a triumph whereof he has every reason to be proud.'— /"a//

Mall Gazette.

J. Maclaren Cobban. THE KING OF ANDAMAN : A
Saviour of Society. By J. Maclaren Cobban. Crozvn Svo. 6s.

' An unquestionably interesting book. It would not surprise us if it turns out to be
the most interesting novel of the season, for it contains one character, at least,
who has in him the root of immortality, and the book itself is ever exhaling the
sweet savour of the unexpected. . . . Plot is forgotten and incident fades, and
only the really human endures, and throughout this book there stands out in bold
and beautiful relief its high-souled and chivalric protagonist, James the Master
of Hutcheon, the King of Andaman himself.' — Pall Mall Gazette.

J. Maclaren Cobban. WILT THOU HAVE THIS WOMAN ?

By J. M. Cobban, Author of ' The King of Andaman.' Crown Svo. 6s.

' Mr. Cobban has the true story-teller's art. He arrests attention at the outset, and
he retains it to the and.'— Birmingham Post.

H. Morrah. A SERIOUS COMEDY. By Herbert Morrah.

Crown Svo. 6s.

'This volume is well worthy of its title. The theme has seldom beeu picocatcd with
m'..re freshncas or more foico.' — .Scol^f/iuu.

Messrs. Methuen's List 31

K. Morrali. THE FAITHFUL CITY. By Herbert Morrah,
Author of 'A Serious Comedy.' Crown 8vo. 6s.
' Conveys a suggestion of welrdncss and horror, until finally he convinces and
enthrals the reader with his mysterious savages, his gigantic tower, and his
uncompromising men and v>-omen. This is a haunting, mysterious book, not
without an element of stupendous grandeur.' — Athcnccnin,

L. B. Walford. SUCCESSORS TO THE TITLE. By Mrs.

Walford, Author of ' Mr. Smith,' etc. Second Edition. CrownSvo. 6s.

' The story is fresh and healthy from beginning to finish ; and our liking for the two

simple people who are the successors to the title mounts steadily, and ends almost

in respect.' — Scoisfuan.

T. L. Paton. A HOME IN INVERESK. By T. L. Paton.

Crown 8z^<?. 6s.
'A pleasant and well-written story.' — Daily Ch?-onicle.

Jolin Davidson. MISS ARMSTRONG'S AND OTHER CIR-
CUMSTANCES. By John Davidson. Crown 8vo. 6s.

' Throughout the volume there is a strong vein of originality, and a knowledge of
human nature that are worthy of the highest praise.' — Scotsman.

M. M. Dowie. GALLIA. By Menie Muriel Dowie, Author
of 'A Girl in the Carpathians.' Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.
'The style is generally admirable, the dialogue not seldom brilliant, the situations
surprising in their freshness and originality, while the subsidiary as well as the
principal characters live and move, and the story itself is readable from title-page
to colophon.' — Saturday Review.

J. A. Barry. IN THE GREAT DEEP : Tales of the Sea.
By J. A. Barry. Author of ' Steve Brown's Bunyip.' Crown 8vo. 6s.
'A collection of really admirable short stories of the sea, very simply told, and placed
before the reader in pithy and telling English.' — IVestftiinster Gazette.

J. B. Burton. IN THE DAY OF ADVERSITY. By J. Bloun-

DELLE Burton.' Second Edition. CfvwnSvo. 6s.

' Unusually interesting and full of highly dramatic situations.' — Cuardiar..

J. B. Burton. DENOUNCED. By J. Bloundelle Burton.
Second Edition, Crown 8vo. 6s.
The plot is an original one, and the local colouring is laid on with a delicacy
and an accuracy of detail which denote the true artist.' — Broad Armv.

W. C. Scully. THE WHITE HECATOMB. By W. C.

Scully, Author of ' Kafir Stories.' Crown Zvo. 6s.

' The author is so steeped in Kaffir lore and legend, and so thoroughly well acquainted
with native sagas and traditional ceremonial that he is able to attract the reader
by the easy familiarity with which he handles his characters.' — South Africa.

' It reveals a marvellously intimate understanding of the Kaf&r mind, allied with
literary gifts of no mean order.' — African Critic.

H. Jolmston. DR. CONGALTON'S LEGACY. By Henry
ToHNSTON. Croivn 8vo. 6s.
' A worthy and permanent contribution to Scoltl^h liler^tuie.' — Ciuijow tierald.

32 Messrs. Methuen's List

J. F. Brewer. THE SPECULATORS. By J. F. Brewer.

Crown Sz'o. 6s,
' A pretty bit of comedy. ... It is undeniably a clever hooK.'— Academy.
' A clever and amusing story. It makes capital out of the comic aspects of culture,

and will be read wuh amusement by every intellectual xczidQi.'— Scotsman.
'A remarkably clever study.' — Vanity Feiir.

Julian Corbett. A BUSINESS IN GREAT WATERS. By

Julian Corbett. Crozun ?>io. 6s.

' Mr. Corbett writes with immense spirit, and the book is a thoroughly enjoyable
one in all respects. The salt of the ocean is in it, and the right heroic ring re-
sounds through its gallant adventures.' — Speaker.

L. Cope Cornford. CAPTAIN JACOBUS : A ROMANCE OF
THE ROAD. By L. Cope Cornford. Illustrated. Crown^vo. 6s.
' An exceptionally good story of adventure and character.' — World.

C. p. WoUey. THE OUEENSBERRY CUP. A Tale of

Adventure. By Clive^'Phillips Wolley. Illustrated. Crown
^vo. 6s.
' A book which will delight boys : a book which upholds the healthy schoolboy code
of morality.' — Scots niaji.

L. Daintrey. THE KING OF ALBERIA. A Romance of
the Balkans. By Laura Daintrey. Crown ^vo. 6s.

' Miss Daintrey seems to have an intimate acquaintance with the people and politics
of the Balkan countries in which the scene of her lively and picturesque romance
is laid.' — Glasgow He-raid.

M. A. Owen. THE DAUGHTER OF ALOUETTE. By
Mary A. Owen. Croivn %vo. 6s.

A story of life among the American Indians.
'A fascinating story.' — Litcraty Jl'orld.

Mrs. Pinsent. CHILDREN OF THIS WORLD. By Ellen
F. Pinsent, Author of 'Jenny's Case.' Crozvn 8fi?. 6s. ^
' INIrs. Pinsent's new novel has plenty of vigour, variety, and good writing. There
are certainty of purpose, strength of touch, and clearness of vision.' — Aihcnteum.

Clark Russell. MY DANISH SWEETHEART. By W.
Clark Russell, Author of 'The Wreck of the Grosvenor,' etc.
Illustrated. Fourth Edition. Crozvn Svo. 6s.

G. Manville Fenn. AN ELECTRIC SPARK. By G. Manville
Fenn, Author of ' The Vicar's Wife,' 'A Double Knot,' etc. Second
Edition. Crown Svo. 6s,

L. S. McChesney. UNDER SHADOW OF TPIE MISSION.
By L. S. McChesney. Crown Svo. 6s.
' Those whose minds are open to the liner issues of life, who can appreciate graceful
thought and refined expression of it, from them this volume will receive a welcome
as enthusiastic as it will be based on critical knowledge.' — Church Times.

Konald Ross. THE SPIRIT OF STORM. By Ronald

Ross, Author of 'The Child of Ocean.' Crown %vo. 6s.

A romaucc of the Sea. ' Weird, powerful, and impressive.'— i'/ac/t and White.

Messrs. Methuen's List 33

R. Pryce. TIME AND THE WOMAN. By Richard Pryce.

Second Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

Mrs. Watson. THIS MAN^S DOMINION. By the Author
of ' A High Little World. ' Second Edition. Crown Zvo. 6s.

Marriott Watson. DIOGENES OF LONDON. By

H. B. Marriott Watson. Crown 8w. Btickram. 6s.

M. Gilchrist. THE STONE DRAGON. By Murray Gil-
christ. Crown Zvo. Buckram. 6s.

' The author's faults are atoned for by certain positive and admirable merits. The
romances have not their counterpart in modern literature, and to read them is a
unique experience.' — National Obscft'er.

E. Dickinson. A VICAR'S WIFE. By Evelyn Dickinson.

Crown Svo. 6s.
E. M. Gray. ELS A. By E. M 'Queen Gray. Crozau Svo. 6s.

3/6

THREE-AND-SIXPENNY NOVELS

Crown Svo.
DERRICK VAUGHAN, NOVELIST. By Edna Lyall.
MARGERY OF QUETHER. By S. Baring Gould.
JACQUETTA. By S. Baring Gould.
SUBJECT TO VANITY. By Margaret Benson.
THE SIGN OF THE SPIDER. By Bertram Mitford.
THE MOVING FINGER. By Mary Gaunt.
JACO TRELOAR. By J. H. Pearce.
THE DANCE OF THE HOURS. By 'Vera.'
A WOMAN OF FORTY. By Esme Stuart.
A CUMBERER OF THE GROUND. By Constance

Smith.
THE SIN OF ANGELS. By Evelyn Dickinson.
AUT DIABOLUS AUT NIHIL. By X. L.
THE COMING OF CUCULAIN. By Standish O'Grady.
THE GODS GIVE MY DONKEY WINGS. By Angus

Evan Abbott.
THE STAR GAZERS. By G. Manville Fenn.
THE POISON OF ASPS. By R. Orton Prowse.
THE QUIET MRS. FLEMING. By R. Pryce.
DISENCHANTMENT. By F. Mabel Robinson.
THE SQUIRE OF W'ANDALES. By A. Shield.
A REVEREND GENTLEMAN. By J. M. Cobban.

34 Messrs. Methuen's List

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