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DILEMMA IN JAPAN BT ANDREW ROTH Japan Strikes South French Interests and Policies in the Far East - Part II: French Indo-China in Transition Dilemma in Japan DILEMMA IN JAPAN BY ANDREW ROTH LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY BOSTON 1945 -'__ -V"Cp"p,Yk;GKT 1945, BY ANDREW ROTH ALL MGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THE RIGHT* - ; *7Q- REPRODUCE THIS BOOK OR PORTIONS ""-** THEREOF IN ANY FORM FIRST EDITION Published Septenj/jxsr 1945 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Dedicated To Those Who Have Died To Restore the Pacific To Its Name In the Hope That the Peace Will Be Worthy of Their 'Sacrifice SI? g7 The author wishes to thank Simon and Schuster, Inc., for permission to use excerpts from Ten Years in Japan by Joseph C. Grew, and Henry Holt and Company for permission to use excerpts from Re- port from Red China by Harrison Forman. CONTENTS I Japan at the Crossroads 3 II Through Unconditional Surrender to a Negotiated Peace 14 III The State Department and Japan's "Old Gang" 34 IV The Zaibatsu Threat to Peace 71 V Can We Do Business with Hirohito? 99 VI The Promise of a Minority 123 VII Japan's Hardy Democrats 140 VIII At the Grass Roots 1 6 1 IX Labor against Militarism 193 X Schools for Antifascists 234 XI Paving the Way 273 Bibliography 293 Index 295 DILEMMA IN JAPAN CHAPTER 1 JAPAN AT THE CROSSROADS The defeat of Japan precipitates perhaps the most important Far Eastern political crisis of this cen- tury the decision as to what road Japan should travel in the postwar period. The future security and pros- perity of the entire Pacific depend to a considerable ex- tent on the road which is taken. We are virtually as unprepared mentally to cope with the problem of Japan's postwar political future as we were to cope with the problems of war on Sunday, December 7, 1941. In the war years following that day, our energies have mainly been concentrated on the ne- cessity for the utter destruction of Japan's militarist system and the punishment of those guilty of war crimes. We have come to recognize the need for bring- ing home to the Japanese people the fact of their defeat. These sentiments have been expressed in widespread popular support for the war aim of unconditional sur- render. We have also determined to strip Japan of all territories it has gained by conquest. And we realize that we should and must maintain powerful military and naval forces in the postwar Pacific. But we must also be prepared to go further. A sound and permanent peace cannot be based on military re- straints alone. It can only be based on the uprooting of the basic political and economic forces which have propelled Japan along the disastrous road it has fol- lowed. We cannot afford to stand aloof, even in our armed might, and hope that somehow a peaceful Jap- anese political, economic and social structure will emerge 3 from the wreckage of this war. If it is to our interest to see a new Japan emerge, we should be willing to fa- cilitate its birth. And the first step In that direction is to take note of the alternate roads which Japan can follow. The pressures produced by defeat are many and con- fusing, perhaps nowhere more confusing than in Japan. Nevertheless the political and economic forces at play In a defeated Japan tend to point the way to either of two divergent roads. One of these roads has many well-known glides and familiar signposts for it is the road which is at bed- rock a slightly altered version of the one which led to Pearl Harbor and disaster. The other is a new, largely uncharted road with few signposts, and guides who are little known. It is one which various groups in Japan have sporadically at- tempted to pioneer during the last seventy-five years without success, but which will be thrown open once again by the blast of defeat. This is the broad highway to self-purification, democratization and social and eco- nomic reform in short, a road away from aggressive, repressive militarism and toward a peaceful and demo- cratic solution of Japan's problems. The cataclysmic shock of an unprecedented defeat Is capable of jarring loose the psychological blinders and strait jackets which have been imposed on the Jap- anese by three quarters of a century of authoritarian rule. With the blinders dislodged, and a measure of firm but sympathetic guidance, it is but a short step to a revulsion against the disproven and hackneyed slogans of the militarists, and thence to a searching criticism of the forces which led Japan to the abyss of defeat. One of the groups strongly subject to disillusionment 4 with the old Japan is that of soldiers returned from half-starved, isolated garrisons which have lived for endless months on the empty boasts of the Tokyo radio and on false promises of relief. In addition, there are countless numbers of small shopkeepers and peasants who have been squeezed dry for a victory which never came. If a breakdown of police repression follows in the wake of defeat, those democrats, liberals and radicals who have chosen silence in preference to jail or worse, will again become vocal These will be found particularly among intellectuals, students, small business men, indus- trial workers and even among some younger Western- educated aristocrats. Two of the groups which the "dan- gerous thoughts" police have watched most closely in the past have been the students and industrial workers. During the course of the war, largely as a result of the wholesale transf erral of students into Japan's manpower- hungry factories under atrocious conditions, a strong bond has grown up between these students and the in- dustrial workers. A reservoir of determined antimilitarist and pro- democratic leadership will be found in those among the many thousands of "dangerous thoughts" inmates of Japanese political prisons who may not have been slaughtered by their jailers. The term "dangerous thoughts" has been used to cover a wide range of de- termined opponents of the aggressive and repressive measures of the imperialist Japanese government, from Christian pacifists and militant democrats to doctrinaire Communists. Yenan will be able to supply hundreds of Japanese antifascist organizers: former prisoners of war cap- tured in China by the Communist-led Eighth Route 5 Army, and converted by Susumu Okano, leader of the Japanese People's Emancipation League. Tliese hope to return to Japan to attempt to carry out the antlmilitanst p/ogram of the League, Other antimllitarlst prisoners of war will come from Watara Kaji's Anti-War League, In Chungking. Although the advocates of a new Japan are for the most part little-tried and little-known, even in Japan, they reflect the frustrated desires of the common man and thus may come to the fore in the event of a popular movement of protest and resentment against things as they have been. The foreign observer of Japan has been inclined to ex- aggerate the loyalty and submission which have been such obvious characteristics of the Japanese. He has gen- erally overlooked the deep resentment against poverty and lack of opportunity which, while submerged, is an equally important part of their make-up. It is the Jap- anese peasant's sullen resentment against his oppressed status within Japanese society which frequently pro- pels him into becoming brutal and wanton when he becomes the topdog as a soldier in a conquered coun- try such as China. The main problem for those striving for a new Japan is to break the restraining dam of submission and loyalty, in order to release the common man's vast desire for improvement In position. In the past, the militarists have tapped this source, particularly by appealing to the peasants. They told them that the only way they could improve their abysmal land-hungry con- dition was to support the conquest of new lands. The approach of the advocates of an Improved Japan, oil the other hand, must be to harness the pressure of 6 peasant discontent to a program of agrarian reform within Japan. It is this reservoir, the discontent of peasants, industrial workers, intellectuals, men and women in small and medium business, that must power the movement to reform Japan. The crucial question is whether the handful of pioneers who have not been crushed in the past years will be able to harness this great potential power. The efforts of such democrats and antimilitarists, of varying political color, must cen- ter on bringing home to the Japanese people the lesson of Japan's defeat and on carrying out a drastic over- hauling of the political and economic structure which has led to aggression and disaster. Against this democratic potential is arrayed a strong and well-entrenched opposition an opposition which will attempt to keep Japan on the old course, and which will block any drastic alteration of the fundamental forces which have driven her from one aggressive act to another. The supporters of the status quo will range from unreconstructed militarists to so-called "moderate" businessmen. The most fanatical resistance to a program of reform will come from the residue of fascist-minded young officers and the cadres of the secret political societies; for any program of reform in Japan would have to start with a political delousing aimed at the elimination of these military fascist elements. These fanatical militarists will attempt to divert the shock of defeat into a con- suming hatred for the victors. Their tradition of political terrorism and their experience in secret organization make them a serious problem, not only by themselves but as a potential weapon in the hands of less fanatical groups such as the leaders of some of 7 Japan's giant financial combines, sections of the en- trenched, authoritarian bureaucracy and many large landlords. If this bloc of conservatives, nationalists and under- cover militarists have their way, they will limit the difference between prewar and postwar Japan at most to the degree of difference between Imperial Germany and post- Versailles Germany. The conservative ele- ments, interested primarily in retaining control of Ja- pan's economy and political structure, will utilize every stratagem and instrument toward that end. In order to secure Anglo-American support, and to provide a safety-valve for internal unrest, they will support the es- tablishment of a pseudo-parliamentary government where the needs of wide sections of the Japanese popu- lation can find impotent expression through political parties owned and controlled by the great financial in- terests. They will make every effort to retain the Em- peror institution as the most effective instrument for their hidden rule. At the same time, these interests are likely to continue to subsidize the patriotic and jingoistic societies which terrorize those seeking to broaden Japan's parliamentary facade into a real de- mocracy or to improve the living conditions of the people through such "antinationaP organizations as trade unions and peasant leagues. The success of these contending blocs in propelling Japan upon one road or the other depends primarily on their ability to organize and lead the stunned major- ity. The democratic and left groups have to build vir- tually from the bottom up, developing leaders, winning followers and building their organizations. Only the Communists have been able to retain a rudimentary sort 8 of decentralized organization during the past fifteen years of militarist aggression and suppression. The conservative, rightist and pro-militarist groups will have a comparatively easier task. The giant financial concerns have the power, the funds, and the trained personnel to re-establish the old-line political parties in order to divert popular discontent and unrest into safe channels. The authoritarian, Prussian-style bureaucrats and the semifeudal court-circle aristocrats will have the biggest advantage in already having control of the state apparatus and exerting strong influence upon the Em- peror. The military fascists should have little difficulty in go* ing underground, because most of the vast network of jingoistic and terroristic organizations have always been secret and conspiratorial. Furthermore, they should have an extensive residue of fanatic young partisans to draw upon. Although the question of which road Japan will follow will thus depend, in large part, upon the com- parative leadership, appeal and organizational ability of the competing Japanese blocs, the Allies will undoubt- edly have it in their power to determine which forces in Japan emerge triumphant, It has been said that while bayonets cannot make a people free, they can kill their jailers. There is prob- ably no place in the world where this idea is more im- portant than in Japan. During the initial period of peace the Allies, willy-nilly, will wield a tremendous power, a power capable of shaping the future of Japan. The victors can define the war criminals, and thus determine what military fascist elements remain free to pollute the political atmosphere. The victors also have the power of 9 deciding what is to be the character of the native offi- cials they choose to leave in office. Occupation carries with it the power to control the press, radio and public assembly, and thus to decide what groups will have ac- cess to these media. The terms of armistice and repara- tions will delineate to a considerable extent the character and direction of the postwar economy. It is within our power to pave the way in one direction, and to erect roadblocks in the other. If the course of least resistance and least effort is followed by the Anglo-American Allies, Japan will be smaller and weaker, but nevertheless only a slightly modified version of prewar Japan, In the past our closest diplomatic and economic ties have been with the civilian members of Japan's ruling oligarchy or with the "Old Gang," as it is frequently called. There are literally hundreds of business and gov- ernment officials who are Western-educated and have excellent contacts in the Anglo-American world. Vir- tually all of these supported Japanese aggression, while it was successful, but many of them have not been di- rectly or publicly associated with the extreme militarist point of view and thus feel that they can claim that they really have been angels of peace. And their case is helped considerably by congenital Anglo-American re- luctance to believe anything wrong of Japanese who speak English, drink Scotch-and-sodas and don't wear army uniforms. These defenders of the old order in Japan are not only experienced in business and well known but also attractive in other ways to Allied conservatives. They can pose as bulwarks of "order" and "stability," against "chaos" and "anarchy," in Japan and the Far East in general. Moreover, they can offer commercial induce- 10 ments to trade-hungry Anglo-American exporters and importers. The Allied governments, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, have .considerably less in common with the advocates of a new Japan. Their names and faces are largely unknown to the outside world. Some of them, particularly the handful of liberal and radical aristocrats, have studied in Western universities; but there are more graduates of political prisons than of Princeton or Harvard among them. Comparatively few speak English, and fewer still have experienced the gay social whirl of the diplomatic set in Tokyo. Some are avowed Communists, and more have ideas regarded as too liberal by conservatives the world over. Furthermore, those desirous of reforming Japan must necessarily support policies which the United States and Britain at best have accepted with great reluctance wherever they have been proposed. The elimination of the aggressive elements of the old order in Japan re- quires the liquidation of thousands of jingoists and mili- tary fascists, and a purge of the Prussian-style bureauc- racy. The reorientation of the Japanese economy toward internal improvement rather than external ag- gression may require exteasive social reforms, perhaps the nationalization of the banks and heavy industries. These are all words and processes which are looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion in the Anglo-Ameri- can world. No matter how desperately we try to avoid it, the Allies are compelled to decide which road they want Japan to follow. We do not even have the luxury of avoiding decision or delaying action. Refusal or delay of action against elements of the older order can only 11 be considered as negative support for that order. If we restrict the definition of war criminals to a handful of generals, admirals and colonels, we implicitly endorse the action of the other Japanese leaders by giving them immunity. Lack of Interest or effort to rescue the po- litical prisoners before they are slaughtered by their military fascist jailers can readily be interpreted as ^a lack of interest in the development of a new, democratic and antirnilitarist leadership. Therefore, a decision on Japan's future is not only important but also unavoidable. It is not a problem which can be solved adequately by reliance on magic words like "moderate" and "extremist," "hard peace" and "soft peace," Nor can a correct decision be reached on the basis of prejudice be It racial, conservative, anti- Russian, pro-Chinese or any other. We must analyze and understand the reasons for the backwardness and barbarism of Japan. We must see in these facts, not the eternal characteristics of a people, but the result of specific historic situations, which have transformed the Japanese into blind and frequently brutal tools of military fascism. It is only by understand- ing the reasons for the degradation of the Japanese that we can arrive at the means for leading them out of the confines of their crimes- The Allies have spent millions of lives and billions In treasure to repulse the aggression of Japan. We have had to learn the Japanese language, to study the effec- tiveness of their military and naval arms and to pin- point the location of their factories. An infinitely smaller effort has been made to under- stand the basic political and economic forces which un- leashed this aggression. Thousands of American service- men know the classes of Japanese naval vessels and their 12 offensive potential; but few Americans have any real knowledge of the classes in Japanese society, and their roles in the war. Thousands know the names of every Japanese plane type in action; but only a handful know more than a half-dozen names of important Japanese leaders. And who will say that the knowledge required to keep the peace is less important than the knowledge required to achieve the peace? The securing of this peace is a people's responsibility which cannot be safely relegated in entirety to the "skilled hands" of the experts. In the past, while many of our officials dealing with the Far East have per- formed most commendably, others have been charac- terized by what some in the services aptly describe as "unusual density above and beyond the call of duty/' When Colonel Evans F. Carlson, leader of "Carlson's Raiders," returned to Pearl Harbor in the fall of 1943 after the seventy-six-hour conquest of Tarawa by the United States Marines, he was asked for an explanation of the success of that exploit. He credited it to "the unflinching determination of our men to do the job after they had been given understanding of its necessity." The people of the United States and the United Na- tions have most assuredly been given adequate evidence of the necessity of understanding Japan. They have paid most grievously in blood for previous lack of un- derstanding. Having acquired the lesson so painfully, it is to be hoped that they will attack the problem of Japan's future with a determination akin to that with which their armed forces took Tarawa and the ob- jectives beyond on the road to Tokyo. Otherwise we must be considered as poorly prepared to secure the peace in the Pacific as we were at the outset to wage the war. 13 CHAPTER II THROUGH UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER TO A NEGOTIATED PEACE During the first half of 1945 there* was considerable concern about the possibility that Japan, stunned by military setbacks, would tempt us with an enticing offer for a negotiated peace. In February Ad- miral William F. Halsey, Jr., thought the situation im- portant enough to warn that America would be "com- mitting the greatest crime in the history of our coun- try" if it failed to exact "absolute and unconditional surrender." The fear that the wily and ruthless leaders of Japan would attempt some stratagem to avoid the consequences of their deeds and set the stage for a future comeback was more than justified. But those who warned only against a comeback by means of a negotiated peace grossly underestimated the skill and cunning of what they considered the moderate members of Japan's rul- ing clique* Strange and contradictory as the idea may seem, it is entirely possible -for the civilian members of Japan's ruling oligarchy to win the equivalent of a negotiated peace that is } the chance to make a comeback despite acceptance of unconditional surrender! COMEBACK LEADERSHIP The ruling oligarchy of Japan and particularly its more traditional or "moderate" wing is admirably 14 equipped In both experience and organization to rescue that nation from its present predicament. It must be remembered that whatever shortcomings Japan has had in material resources, it has not lacked in the resources of leadership highly capable of exploiting Japan's opportunities and wriggling out of Japan's dif- ficulties. It is only necessary to recall that less than eighty years ago Japan was a weak, strife-torn country, lacking important resources and possessing a backward agriculture and almost no modern industry, yet by 1942 it had been able to usurp the fabulous Pacific pos- sessions of the Dutch, French and British Empires and deal a punishing blow to the United States at Pearl Harbor, Guam, Wake and in the Philippines. The survival of the ruling class which has made these successes possible is made more likely by the peculiar structure of the Japanese organs of power. Although an absolute and divine monarchy in name, Japan's gov- ernment in the modern period has been an oligarchy, composed of four main groups, or batsu: the militarists or Gumbatsu; the landed court aristocracy or Mombatsu; the giant financial trusts or Zaibatsu; and the Prussian- style bureaucrats or Kambatm. This type of organization is extremely flexible and capable of maintaining continuity despite considerable shifts in the political, economic, military and inter- national fields. After World War I, the Zaibatsu (finan- cial trusts) became the most influential of the factions in the ruling oligarchy. In the 'thirties, the militarists (Gumbatsu), spearheaded by the Kwantung Army ex- tremists, elbowed their way into an increasingly large share of the ruling power. The assassination of the more cautious financiers and aristocrats eliminated some op- ponents within the oligarchy, and frightened others into 15 submission. At the same time the militarists nurtured dissidents within the ranks of opposing batsu. A group of "New Bureaucrats" with a militarist orientation was used to replace the less adventurist "Old Bureaucrats/' The militarists also sponsored a group of New Capital- ists (Shin Zaibatsu} who were completely dependent on war for their profits. The first War Cabinet of General To jo was the high- est point of militarist ascendancy, because it was almost entirely restricted to Kwantung Army militarists and New Bureaucrats. Contrary to the situation in Germany, the ascendancy of the Japanese militarists did not mean the purging of all the other elements in the oligarchy. The other batsu were pushed into the background, but as military reverses weakened the Tojo government, they once again became active. The Cabinet of General Koiso, who replaced Tojo, consisted primarily of a combination of the militarists and the Zaibatsu. The Cabinet of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki, established in April 1945, shunted the more reckless elements into the background and placed the direction of state affairs in the hands of a relatively small group of trusted, elderly advisers of the Emperor. All four traditional groups were represented: Zaibatsu, Mombafsu^ Kam~ batsu and Gumbatsu. All that was required to make it a "transition to peace" Cabinet was the dumping of the militarists or Gumbatsu. Naturally, a ruling group as flexible as Japan's has a greater chance of survival than that of Germany in which Doenkz was the only alter- native to Hitler. COMEBACK STRATEGY It is possible to predict that the surviving members of Japan's flexible oligarchy will have two outstanding ob- jectives for their post-defeat strategy. The first is the retention of control of Japan's economy and govern- ment in their own hands. The second is to help create and to exploit disunity among the victor powers in the hope of persuading one power or set of powers to rebuild Japan as a bulwark or counter to the others. The struggle on the part of members of the present oligarchy to hold on to state power is certain to be one of the central conflicts of the early postwar years. They realize the necessity of sharing this power with the Allied military administration or Allied control com- mission. But they are adamant against sharing it with Japanese outside the oligarchy. They confidently ex- pect that the Allies will allow the authority wielded by the control commission during the occupation to revert at its close to the oligarchy, but native Japanese might not be so generous. The retention of control of the state apparatus by the members of the present ruling group would be essential to a future aggressive comeback. The conduct of an aggressive foreign policy by a state with as limited re- sources as Japan requires the welding of the populace into an obedient, highly effective weapon of war. This can be done only by a tightly knit, farsighted ruling group with considerable power and the ability to use it effectively over a long period of time. The much-commented-on suicidal fanaticism with which the Japanese have fought is testimony to the effective use to which the present ruling group has put its control of the Japanese state over the last three 17 quarters of a century. A specially created system of Emperor-worship, supported by an educational program and controlled propaganda, has convinced the average Japanese of his country's right to dominate the Orient and his individual obligation to die, if necessary, to achieve this goal. An equally elaborate system of "dan- gerous thoughts" legislation, police spying, censorship, jailing and torture has succeeded in keeping the Japa- nese opponents of aggression ineffectual. Therefore, re- tention of the system of Emperor-worship and control of education, police, communications, propaganda, cen- sorship and the like are essential if the Japanese are to be regimented to the same purpose as before. The most critical period for the group seeking a comeback will be the first one or two years after de- feat. The psychological impact of defeat will neces- sarily be tremendous. Japan has never in its history suf- fered invasion, and its aggressive career of the past half-century has been virtually without setback, much less defeat. Adding to their difficulty will be those thousands of disillusioned soldiers from the garrisons which lived only on the unfulfilled promises of the Japanese high command, and the arrival of political agitators trained in Yenan by the Japanese People's Emancipation League. On the economic side bombing has produced whole- sale devastation accompanied by disruption of communi- cations, utilities and production. Domestic crop short- ages and disorganization of distribution and depletion of the fishing industry may produce famine conditions in the cities. Food shortages and the shutdown of war industries will throw millions back on the minute farms. Years of malnutrition, destruction of houses and break- downs in sanitation and public health services will prob- 18 ably breed epidemics and swell the already fantastic total of tuberculosis cases. Under such conditions, it is clear that Japanese gov- ernmental authority will rest on weak foundations and will probably seek support from the occupying powers. "STABILITY" AS A LEVER One might expect that one of the most difficult prob- lems facing those in Japan attempting to retain power would be that of convincing the United Nations' gov- ernments to allow those tainted with aggression to re- main in authority. This task was made immeasurably easier in the fall of 1944 by the emergence of a new theory in important circles in the foreign offices of Great Britain and the United States. The magic word in this theory is stability. On the American side this theory received its first major official emphasis in December 1944 during the hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee on the appointment of Mr. Grew as Under- secretary of State. In response to a question by Senator Guffey of Pennsylvania on his attitude toward keeping Hirohito in power, Mr. Grew declared that he wanted to keep the way open to support the Emperor because he might turn out to be "the sole stabilizing force" and if we did not support him we might have "the burden of maintaining and controlling for an indefinite period a disintegrating community of over 70,000,000 people." This emphasis on the necessity of maintaining stabil- ity and preventing chaos by retaining elements of the previous aggressive structure was developed to a much more impressive and explicit extent in an amazing docu- ment entitled Japan in Defeat, a report submitted by the 19 Royal Institute of International Affairs > to the Ninth International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Re- lations, held in Hot Springs in January 1945. The Royal Institute, or "Chatham House" as it is sometimes called, is best described as an authoritative but unofficial auxiliary of the British Foreign Office. The study group which prepared the document was headed by Sir Paul Butler, K.C.M.G., Adviser to the Foreign Office in 1944, and for two years previous to that Director-General of the Far Eastern Bureau of the British Ministry of Information at New Delhi. The re- mainder of the group included some nine other ex- residents in the Japanese Empire with official, educa- tional, religious, journalistic or military experience in Japanese affairs. Consequently it is safe to assume that this study represents a significant and authoritative stratum of expert opinion in Great Britain, including important foreign service officials. This study systematically discredits every alternative for Japan except a return to "the institutions and forces which have preserved her equilibrium in the past . * * y * It refers slightingly to the Japanese as an "obedient herd" in which "the political energy which breeds suc- cessful revolutionaries has hitherto been lacking." It goes on to express "misgivings regarding Japanese ability to operate democratic institutions" and conies to the conclusion that "liberalism cannot be numbered among those elements of stability upon which Japan must rely in the impending disaster," Apparently forgetting its charge that the Japanese have lacked "the political energy which breeds success- ful revolutionaries," the Royal Institute report warns that the "political confusion"' which it associates with a non-authoritarian regime in Japan may result in an 20 "agrarian-communist revolution" or "theocratic com- munism." "Theocratic communism" is the phrase the report uses to describe rule by the fascist-minded young officers. Apparently no distinction is made between the theories of the Communists who have rotted in jails during the last two decades and those of the military fascists who have been ruling the roost. Having discarded the possibility of constitutional democratic advance and raised the specter of a com- munist or fascist revolution, the Royal Institute docu- ment comes to the conclusion that in the interest of "stability" and "equilibrium" it will be necessary for Japan to revert to the prewar ruling groups minus the most obnoxious militarists, but most definitely including the aristocrats. The tenderness with which the Japanese monarchy is discussed is worthy of note: The present generation of peasants cannot be expected to support with conviction any other than a monarchial regime. . . . Bewildered by defeat and encircled by a hostile world, they are likely to coalesce round the refuge of the Throne. No alternative to a monarchial system, under the present Emperor or some other member of his family, is likely to provide that focus of stability which will be essen- tial if the State is not to dissolve into chaos in the impend- ing crisis, The report makes it clear that it expects that, in this monarchial regime which will prevent Japan from dis- solving into "chaos," the leadership will be in the hands of the upper middle class: the large trusts, the bureauc- racy, advanced politicians, supposedly moderate gen- erals and admirals, and a sprinkling of liberals. Then, somewhat apologetically: 21 If this looks suspiciously like a resuscitation of the "old gang," the answer is that a more advanced democratic administration could, for the present at least, scarcely main- tain itself without foreign support. Perhaps the climax of this astounding document Is the fact that the authors are apparently not only willing to leave the Old Gang in power, but also to permit them an army. The reasons given are eminently worth quot- ing: - ... It is very doubtful if the militarist obsession of the Japanese imagination can be removed by external pressure, since this is a symptom of a national disease which demands pathological, rather than surgical treatment. . . . Notwith- standing the insubordination and terrorism for which mili- tary and naval officers were responsible between 1932 and 1936, it remains true that, in internal emergencies, the armed forces have shown themselves to be a stable element in the State. . . . [They] embody a spirit of discipline without which the Japanese might [have to] find new re- sources of character with which to check the disruption of society in the postwar confusion. Whatever difficulties and disadvantages may be entailed, events may compel the allied Governments to set up a foreign administration in Japan. But, if the Japanese are to remain responsible for their own destinies, in a situation demanding, above all, maintenance of authority and discipline, the co-operation of some strong, organized military force will be indispensable. If the army refuses its support to whatever regime is established, mili- tary factions may join forces with extremist groups with serious results which might by no means be confined to Japan. Sir Paul Butler has summarized the group's position admirably, in declaring: 22 ... It has been impossible to avoid the conclusion that there are certain stabilizing institutions in Japan for which, although in their present form they have contributed directly to the aggressive past, adequate substitutes are un- likely to be forthcoming in the present immature stage of Japanese development. Instances of such institutions are the Throne, the army, the great business families and the educa- tional system. CONDITIONAL UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER In the early summer of 1945 there arose a crescendo of American voices calling for a peace with Japan which might be "unconditional surrender" in name but would be conditional surrender in fact. The advocates of this conditional surrender included responsible officials, members of Congress and conserva- tive columnists known to be close to high-ranking mili- tary and government officers. In general they advocated permitting Japan unlike Nazi Germany to retain in- tact its rilling oligarchy, including the Emperor institu- tion, if it would yield its territorial conquests and give up its army, navy and munitions plants. In May 1945 Captain E. M. Zacharias, U.S.N., former American Naval Attache in Tokyo and an expert lin- guist in the Japanese language, made a curious broadcast to Japan. He appealed personally in the most cordial language to leading military and diplomatic figures in the Japanese oligarchy whom he had known including ex-Premier Yonai, Admiral Nomura, Mr. Kurusu and Premier Suzuki. He transmitted the May 8 statement of President Truman that "unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or the enslavement of the 23 Japanese people." He then added that the Japanese "could choose a peace with honor." Senator Homer Capehart, Indiana Republican, was one of the most vocal advocates of a quick peace which would leave the Japanese oligarchy in undisturbed con- trol of that country's state apparatus. In a press con- ference on July 2 he declared that the Japanese had offered to give up all their conquered territory, their army and navy and war-making facilities and the only reservation they insisted on was that Emperor Hirohito be allowed to remain on the Japanese throne. He strongly advocated acceptance of these terms in order to avoid the sacrifice of "8000 casualties a week and a billion dollars every four days." On the very next day Representative Clare Hoffman, a Republican from Michigan, showed a touching con- cern for the Japanese oligarchy. In a speech in the I louse of Representatives which echoed Senator Capehart's po- sition he declared: "If we believe as we have so often professed that every people should have the right to their own form of government, their own religion, certainly we do not intend, when a complete victory has been won, to attempt to compel the Japanese to accept a form of government or of religion which is abhorrent to them." Representative Hoff man neglected to state that we had never professed that the people of aggressor states should have the right to retain an aggressive, fascist type of government. At first comparatively little attention was paid to these suggestions since they were considered to be the narrow views of the ultraconservative wing of the Re- publican Party. However, in the middle of July at the beginning of the Potsdam conference of the Big Three a series of reports by reliable reporters In 24 trustworthy newspapers such as the New York Herald Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor indicated that such views were held in more authoritative quarters. It was reported that President Truman carried with him to Potsdam surrender terms which called for Japan's yielding of all conquered territories, the destruction of the fleet, army and air force, and the elimination of shipbuilding, aircraft and armament facilities. These were described as the terms of "unconditional sur- render," but it was noted that unlike the terms for Nazi Germany they contained no provision for full-scale occupation of the Japanese homeland or for the elimina- tion of the Old Gang of aggressive autocrats! COMEBACK THROUGH DISUNITY If this Old Gang is permitted to retain power, their main opportunity to re-establish Japan as an aggressive power depends on the extent to which unbridled eco- nomic competition and balance-of-power politics rather than international economic co-operation and collec- tive security dominate international relations in the postwar Pacific arena. If the United Nations learn the lessons of the war and remain united on the basis of enlightened self-interest, most international political problems can be solved through consultation and com- promise. This may be prevented, however, by the emergence of unrestrained nationalism in the United States or elsewhere. If this is the case, and disunity and competition be- tween the Big Four prevail, it is entirely possible that certain groups in the Allied countries will seek to re- build a conservative Japan as a bulwark of their po- sition in the Orient. 25 There are still some conservative British businessmen and officials whose memories skip lightly over the face- dapping at Tientsin, the rape of Hong Kong and the brutal treatment meted out by the Japanese to the British prisoners of war in the steaming jungles of South- east Asia. They remember? instead, the substantial ad- vantages which accrued under the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance which lasted from 1902 to 192 L By means of this alliance Britain was able to utilixe its junior partner In further opening China to British commerce and investment and in all but eliminating Czarist Russia as a competitor, Japan's successful war on China In 1894-1895, spear- headed by a predominantly British-built navy, compelled China to permit foreigners to establish factories in China. Japan was not acting for itself, but primarily as an agent for Britain, because its own industry was In Its infancy. Britain was again a major beneficiary of the Russo- Japanese War, which came just two years after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. British and Russian Imperialism had been in conflict in several areas and the British authorities not only wel- comed the alliance but enabled Japan to wage successful war by strengthening the Japanese economy and fleet by loans and naval construction. In terms of Immediate results this policy was eminently successful, for the Rus- sian defeat at the hands of Japan, plus the Revolution of 1905 which was its product, considerably weakened Russian power and importance as a world competitor. This support of Japan as a bulwark of the status quo In the Far East did not end with the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921. It was strong enough to prevent effective Anglo- American action in 1931 26 when Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson attempted to organize opposition to the Japanese seizure of Man- churia. The degree of sympathy for Japan's role in some British circles is indicated by a statement made in 1931 by Colonel Aniery, ^ ater ^^^^ me Secretary of State for India: "I confess why, whether In act, or in word, should go in- dividually or in this mat- ter. . . . Who is there among us to cast the first stone and to say that Japan ought not to have acted with the object of creating peace and order in Manchuria and defending herself against the continuous aggression of a vigorous Chinese nationalism? Our whole policy in India, our whole policy in Egypt, stands condemned if we condemn Japan." THE FUNCTION OF A CONSERVATIVE JAPAN The willingness of certain conservative, Empire- minded British circles to consider using Japan again as a pawn in power politics is certainly not a product of any peculiarly British shortsightedness but rather the response of a small segment of British thought to per- vasive concern over Britain's precarious position in the postwar world. The war has cost the British dearly and at the war's end Britain must reckon with the industrialization of former British markets like Australia, the existence of a large war debt in the form of sterling balance held by India and other big customers, the loss of a large part of its overseas investments to pay for war purchases, and the prospect of increased trade competition from some of its own Dominions particularly Canada. The British 27 are also keenly aware that America will emerge from the war with an enormously increased industrial capacity and vast capital reserves, and they are fearful that the United States will try to obtain new outlets for this en- larged industrial pJ an ^^^ nc ^ in ^ a P owcr ^ c ^ vc for new export footholds already gained by Americ^^d production methods in all parts of a result of the Icnd-Icase program. In addition to the huge American economic potential, Britain is also concerned with maintaining its position on the continent in the face of the tremendous growth of Soviet power, prestige and influence. Marshal Smuts, leading defender and theoretician of the British Em- pire, has indicated British concern by referring to Rus- sia as "the new colossus that bestrides the Continent," Added to this is the possible emergence of a strong, nationalistic China on the borders of India and Burma. This growth of nationalism in China is considered by many Empire-minded Britishers to be a threat not merely to British interests in Hong Kong and the re- mainder of China but a danger as well to the British position in India, kingpin of the Empire. There already exists a considerable bond of sympathy between Gen- eralissimo Chiang Kai-shek and some of the Indian Na- tional Congress leaders, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru, Some Britons fear that a free and strong China may serve not only as an inspiring example to Indian na- tionalists, but perhaps as an ally as welL With these developments to cope with in the post- war period, it is not completely surprising that some conservatives, schooled in the traditional balancc-of- power techniques, and lacking confidence in the emerg- ing international organization, should again seize upon 28 Japan as an instrument for Improving Britain's adverse balance in the Orient. A "reliable" Japan might serve to check the progress of Chinese nationalism. It is noteworthy that even con- servative Chinese reco g n i^^^ possibility that a con- servative, moderately will be used to coun- ter China's growth. conference of the Institute of Pacific 1945 the Chinese delegates, several of wnSmhad conferred with the Generalissimo before flying to the conference, took a determined stand in favor of a liberal democratic Japan against the position of most of the British dele- gates, who preferred a conservative Japan. Some of the Chinese delegates supported democratic reforms in Japan, such as reforms of the agrarian system, which they would not dare advocate for China! Some British and American conservatives consider the resurgence of Japan as a means of curbing the great growth in the power and prestige of the Soviet Union. This growth is of greater concern to British conserva- tives because It has affected areas in Europe which they have traditionally considered a British preserve. Some quarters in London speculate as to whether the presence of a moderately strong and conservative Japan on the Soviet Union's Eastern flank might curb its influence in the West, by making it necessary for the Soviets to divert attention to the East. Others feel that a conservative Japan will prove a bulwark against communism in the East. In the London Daily Mail of March 6, 1944, Simon Harcourt-Smith, the eminent British Far Eastern expert, declared that a group of tories financiers, businessmen and members of Parliament has begun working for a compromise peace with Japan, playing upon the old bogey of com- 29 munism and insisting that Japan could be a bulwark against it in Asia. WHICH THE TOOL? Those who are of using Japan again as an policy would nat- urally emphasize to keep Japan under control as an instrument and not let it get out of hand. They point out that Japan will be thoroughly "man- ageable" in defeat, since the application of the peace terms strips it of its colonies, war industries, army and navy. But there is an essential contradiction in such think- ing. A country is only valuable as a "counter" or a "bul- wark" insofar as it is strong. And the moment it becomes valuable as a counter or bulwark it becomes dangerous as well The case of Germany after the last war is the best case in point. Britain strengthened Germany after Versailles as a means of countering the domination of the continent by France. In the 'thirties British and French conservatives applauded the rearmament of Germany because the Nazis promised them they would serve as a bulwark against communism. Thus a prostrate foe was helped to become a counter, permitted to become a bulwark, and wound up as an almost successful aspirant to world domination. And there can be little doubt that the Japanese are every whit as skillful as the Germans at this game. The provocation and exploitation of international disunity is a game at which they are past masters. The extent to which the utilization of international differences is in- grained in ,rnodern Japanese practice is indicated by the 30 famous forecast of Viscount Tani, who In 1887 advised his government to "wait for the time of the confusion of Europe which must come eventually" and predicted that by taking advantage of it Japan could "become the chief of the Orient." yThe Japanese this strikingly shrewd advice to the years its diplomacy resembled a swivel-hipped football player engaged elaborate sort of broken field running. During its period of greatest weak- ness, in the early years after the Restoration of 1868, Japan managed to keep its independence largely by playing off Czarist Russia against Great Britain. Not only did it use British support for its wars against China and Russia, but when the burden of the war against the sprawling giant Russia became too heavy for the rickety Japanese economy to bear much longer, the Japanese took advantage of Russo-American friction and got Teddy Roosevelt to intervene in the nick of time to secure a Japanese victory. The first World War provided Japan with its most lush opportunities. Although their ideological sympa- thies lay with Junker Germany, the Japanese rulers joined the Allies and limited their participation to the seizure of German colonies and war profiteering, thus tremendously strengthening Japan's economy and stra- tegic situation. It was only when the Bolshevik Revo- lution produced a rift among the Allies which culminated in Allied intervention in Russia that Japan found she could spare the troops she had been unable to provide for the European war and she attempted to seize large sections of Siberia as booty. The emergence of Nazi Germany once more pro- vided the element of serious "confusion" among the non- 31 Asiatic powers alluded to in Viscount Tani's prescrip- tion for conquest. Virtually every Nazi threat and attack was utilized as an opportunity for Japan to push Its ambition to emerge as "the chief of the Orient/' The very attack which was launched on December 7, 1941 was timed to climax of the heavy German attacks the Anglo-American In short, Japan's aggressive successes in the past have been due in no small measure to the ability of its un- scrupulous and cunning leaders to stimulate and exploit the conflicts and divisions among other powers. There is every reason to anticipate that future Japanese leaders with aggressive ambitions will also attempt to take ad- vantage of stresses and strains in the international arena. THE LESSON Despite devastation and defeat Japan can make a comeback. Whether she does or not depends on whether the United Nations recognize and block the strategy, We should recognize that just as war is a continuation of politics by other means, peace can be a continuation of war by political means. The first objective for a comeback is to retain power in the hands of a section of the Old Gang. During our military occupation we will have a considerable amount of influence to exert in terms of the individuals and groups with whom we decide to work or decline to work. It will be necessary, within the limits of effective administration, to take advantage of every opportunity to remove from influence as many members * of , the Old Gang as is possible, replacing them by people of all shades of opinion who are interested not in a re- 32 surgent Japan but In a reborn Japan purged of its ag- gressive oligarchy and its feudal fascist ideology, econ- omy and foreign policy. Another requirement for a Japanese comeback is the development of international disunity severe enough to persuade one or nations to per- mit or encourage the of a "reliable" Japan as a counter or another power or powers. The best precaution against this is to center every effort on overcoming differences among the major victors and to build a system of collective security and in- ternational collaboration which will preclude or sharply limit the international rivalries which might result in a resurgent Japan. 33 CHAPTER 111 THE STATE DEPARTMENT' AND JAPAN'S "OLD GANG" An of more than five hundred jammed th^MBRshioned Caucus Room of the Senate Office Building on December 12, 1944. The object of their attention was the handsome gray-haired witness, Joseph Clark Grew. The drama of the occasion lay in the fact that these hearings were being held as a direct result of a revolt on the part of a group of President Roosevelt's staunchest New Deal supporters in the Senate, against the nomina- tion of a conservative slate of State Department execu- tives. The fundamental significance of this brief revolt was the deep uneasiness it revealed concerning the direc- tion of American foreign policy. The tumult over the nominations in general and that of Mr. Grew in particular had many of the characteris- tics of a natural storm. Like a thunderstorm it helped clear the atmosphere, by bringing to the fore popular fears concerning the effectiveness of American policy in the Far East and elsewhere. There was much thun- der which was little more than noise. On the other hand, there were some extremely effective flashes of lightning which illuminated the main problems momen- tarily. GREW, THE SYMBOL The concern over Mr. Grew's nomination really rep- resented a growing recognition and fear of a future State Department policy toward postwar Japan which 34 would be merely a projection of the same theories which the State Department had attempted to apply in the prewar decade in an unsuccessful attempt to stave off the oncoming tide of aggression. The general pattern of the attack was that Mr. Grew was a gullible aristocrat and the chief conservative "Japan crowd" in the State would be likely to favor undemocratic Japan, thus laying the basis for Japan's comeback as an aggressive power. The Philadelphia Record, in an article on December 6 which was later Inserted In the Congressional Record, declared that Mr. Grew "has frequently advocated a policy of doing business with Hirohito after the war. He says that we must preserve the Mikado as a Japanese symbol around which a stable, peaceful government can be built." PM called in, as a special writer on the Grew nomina- tion, Ramon Lavalle, who had served as a newspaperman and Argentine Consul in Japan until he quit in January 1943 in protest against his country's refusal to co- operate with the United Nations. On the day of Mr. Grew's nomination, PM featured an article by Mr. Lavalle In which he associated the former Ambassador with "British and American tories who declare that the Emperor must be kept in a beaten Japan as a safeguard against Communism." Mr. Lavalle followed this up on the next day with an article in which he declared that, despite his "per- sonal integrity," Mr. Crew's appointment could only be accepted "with distress" because during his period as Ambassador he had followed a policy of "appeasement" and had "underestimated the [Japanese] aristocrats as our enemies, as much as he today overestimates them as our friends. . . ." 35 Probably the most effective of the liberal critics of the Grew appointment was indefatigable, encyclopedic I. F. Stone, Washington Editor of the Nation and correspond- ent of PM. Mr. Stone summed up the liberal opposition to the Grew school of thought in a pungent editorial In PM on December 15. was a reply to Mr. Grew's statement Senate Foreign Relations Committee in defended his record as Am- bassador to Japan. Mr* Grew had declared that he had opposed an embargo on scrap iron and oil because that would have been an important step toward a war for which the American people were unprepared. lie had also pointed out that after defeat "the Emperor in- stitution might ... be the only political clement capa- ble of exercising a stabilizing influence." Mr. Stone hit back energetically against Mr* Crew's theories; The misgivings aroused by Grew's appointment do not rest merely upon a record of past errors. His appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee shows that he still defends them. Like Chamberlain in the West, Grew in the Far East warned against energetic measures to halt Japanese aggression when it might still have been halted. Grew's contacts were with the upper classes in Japan as those of his British counterpart, Sir Nevile Henderson, were with the upper classes in Germany. Grew helped keep alive the myth that we must take no energetic steps in the Sino-Japanese war, lest we "strengthen" the military, lest we undermine the position of the Japanese businessmen and the Japanese Emperor who were supposed to be trying to "hold back" the military. This was wishful thinking. It seems to us that Grew, in his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicated that he had not yet shaken off the spell of that kind of thinking. He still thinks the Emperor, the heart and symbol of the Japanese 36 official religion, the focus of its grandiose schemes of world conquest, might yet be used by us to bring into being a "peaceful" Japan. We ask the Senate to consider whether there is not great danger that this point of view may be utilized by the Japanese upper classes to keep themselves In power with our help after thewar* on the promise that they would be "peaceful" they may be, until they feel strong enough to Mr. Grew had thus become more than the distin- guished elderly gentleman who could be seen almost any noon walking along Seventeenth Street from the State Department to the ornate Metropolitan Club. He had become the personification of the predominant school of American policy toward Japan. Not only had he been the American Ambassador to Tokyo in the critical dec- ade preceding the outbreak of war, but in the two books and 250 speeches which followed upon his return to the United States he had emerged as the chief and only vocal protagonist of the approach to Japanese problems fol- lowed by the State Department in the days before Pearl Harbor- In this discussion of the nomination of Mr. Grew it soon became clear that this was not a personal attack upon one of undoubted personal integrity who had spent forty years in the service of his country. Rather it was an attack upon an outstanding representative of the wealthy Groton-Harvard aristocracy in American diplo- macy who had become the symbol and foremost expo- nent of a Japan policy of dubious effectiveness. GREW, THE MAN When Mr. Grew was appointed to Tokyo in 1932 he had already served twenty-eight years in the foreign 37 service. He was first appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt to the position of clerk in the Consul General's office at Cairo, at the munificent salary of 600 dollars a year. Thereafter he held progressively im- portant positions in Mexico City, St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna. . .*$ As a result of his experience at these posts he was appointed of the Division of West- ern European Affairs at the Department of State, in March 1918; he accompanied Colonel House to the pre- Armistice negotiations at Versailles, as Secretary to the American delegation, in October-November 1918, He served as Secretary General of the American Commis- sion to Negotiate Peace, with the rank of Minister. This rather important position enabled him to sit in on many of the private discussions of the Big Four; Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando. In January 1919 he was designated American Secretary on the International Secretariat of the Peace Conference, Mr. Grew's first appointment as chief of a diplomatic mission came with his appointment as Minister to Den- mark in April 1920. He was transferred to the more im- portant post of Minister to Switzerland in 1921, where one of his additional duties was to keep an eye on the early efforts of the League of Nations. In 1922-1923 he was the American representative at the Conference on Near Eastern Affairs held at Lausanne and negotiated the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey, which he and Ismet Pasha signed in August 1923. This recognized Turkey if or the first time as a modern nation, free of extraterri- toriality. From 1924 to 1927 Mr. Grew served as Undersecre- tary of State in the Coolidge administration, the highest post to which a professional diplomat had risca* While 38 Undersecretary", he served as Chairman of the Foreign Service Personnel Board, and the Board was under con- tinual fire for its favoritism. Until 1924, when the pay scales were revised, salaries were so meager that only those with independent means had been attracted, and th$ .foreign service had become the province of young me ^ j ^^2" ea ^h an( l social back- ground. In 1926 and 1927 several very able and experienced men resigned because of the character of the assignments and promotions. Under severe pressure from Congress, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg admitted that there had been rank favoritism for a few of the blue blood insiders and promised an improvement. It was under these conditions that Mr. Grew resigned as Undersecretary and "wrote his own ticket" as Ambassador to Turkey in May 1927. This position was both a prelude and a prep- aration for Mr. Grew's subsequent position as Ambassa- dor to Tokyo. When Mr. Grew became Ambassador to Japan in the spring of 1932, the State Department was headed by Henry L. Stimson, who had spent the previous nine months in a vigorous and unstinting effort to reverse the train of events begun by Japan's attack on Manchuria. He had attempted to needle the League of Nations into adopting collective economic sanctions against Japan. Disappointed at the failure of the League to take more f orceful action, Stimson had proclaimed that the United States would not recognize the legality of Japan's con- quest, and invited Britain and France to take similar steps. The British Foreign Office refused to associate it- self with Stimson's action. In the middle of January, 1932, fighting broke out in Shanghai and the war spilled over from Manchuria i 3,9 China proper. In March Stimson was able to secure inter- national support for his doctrine of nonrecognition. By May 5, just before Mr. Grew left this country, Japan had agreed to peace terms under the pressure of foreign powers and the effective military resistance offered by the heroic Chinese Nineteenth Route Army at Shanghai. One of the ways in the American government showed its concern Japanese situation was by the appointment of a widely experienced and extremely conscientious professional foreign-service man to the post of Ambassador to Tokyo. THE MISSION Mr. Grew was going to require all his ability in his new post While he was crossing the United States to embark at San Francisco, a reporter met him at the train in Chicago on May 15 and informed him that the Japa- nese Premier, Inukai, had been murdered by the military fascists as a part of their campaign against those who were considered to be impeding the extremists 1 desire to rush into further military adventures. To meet this march of aggression Mr. Grew was armed with the State Department's simple formula for Japan: Uphold American rights and work for a victory of the Japanese "moderate" over the military extremists. The term "moderate" has been used by a generation of British and American diplomats and journalists to de- scribe the businessmen and other members of the Japa- nese oligarchy who have not been outspokenly and obviously anxious to precipitate war with the United States and Britain. It has been usual, however, to ex- aggerate the differences between these more cautious 40 economic imperialists and the brash and adventurist mili- tary extremists. This concept of the Japanese so-called liberals or "moderates" as virtual angels of peace battling valiantly against the militarist devils will probably go down In the history of American Far Eastern relations, along with the quaint notion of Japan'c^|taoderate" navy, as one of the most important, and dangerous bits of folklore in American thinking about Japan. Like many other inaccurate theories, the concept of the uncompromising straggle of the "moderates" against the militarist extremists had its basis In an inaccurate evaluation of actual facts* The 'twenties had seen a strug- gle between the "positive" school of General Baron Tanaka and the "conciliatory" school of Baron Shide- hara, over the question of Japanese policy on the con- tinent. General Tanaka, author of the notorious "Tan- aka Memorial," was the leading advocate of an aggres- sive policy of conquest on the continent. The idea of "safe and sane" Japanese businessmen restraining Gen- eral Tanaka's army extremists was one which had ap- pealed to the succession of American diplomatic repre- sentatives of Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover who had preceded Ambassador Grew. It was also one which appealed to the Japan specialists in the State De- partment, many of whom were graduates of the consular service and had extensive social contacts with Japanese business people. This theory had three fatal defects. First, it magnified a difference in tactics Into a difference in objective. The "moderates" were not believers In "peace at any price." They agreed wholeheartedly with the extremists on the necessity for Japanese domination of East Asia. They 41 disagreed on the need for using military force until all other means had failed. They were confident that they could get control of China by economic penetration, political intrigue and bribery, without incurring the ex- pense of a Japanese military campaign and an interrup- tion of the lucrative trade with China. This policy of peaceful penetration additional advantage of not openly provoking the inMvention of the major Western powers, with the consequent risk of a war which Japan's economy could not sustain. Second, the proponents of the theory of peaceful Japanese businessmen battling the extremist militarists closed their eyes to the fact that even during the 'twen- ties a very important wing of Japanese Big Business, the House of Mitsui, had supported the army extremists. Third, the theory was defective in that It was static. It did not take into consideration the pressures of eco- nomic changes. As a result of the world-wide depression of 1929, Japan's foreign trade was almost cut in half. Consequently, by the time Mr. Grew reached Japan in 1932 the most cautious elements in the business com- munity were beginning to think longingly of the com* petition-free, protected markets which would be avail- able in areas conquered and sealed off by the military. The Japan to which Mr. Grew's ship carried him in the late spring of 1932 was already on the toboggan slide toward war. The militarists, who were at the controls with increasing frequency, wished to go forward with the maximum speed possible under the circumstances. The "moderates," on the other hand, while they wanted to go in the same direction, attempted to retain control so that they could put on the brakes and make detours on occasion in order to reach the objective without un- necessarily risking a crack-up. 42 EMPEROR HIROH1TO AND THE "MODERATES" Even before Mr. Grew presented his credentials to Emperor HIrohito, In an audience granted shortly after his arrival, the American Ambassador was prepared to be very friendly. Mr. Grew was not a modeil' 1 counterpart of George Taylor, the American Minister to Berlin in the 1840's, who, when asked why American diplomats were in- variably dressed in simple black while the emissaries of most other countries were resplendent In gilt and bro- cade, made the classic reply: "We are dressed in black because what we represent in European courts is the burial of monarchy*" One of the most attractive features of the "moderate" theory for Mr. Grew must have been the fact that none other than the "Son of Heaven" himself, Emperor Hiro- hlto, was listed as the "dean of the moderates." This com- forting aspect of the prevalent State Department theory kept alive the hope that someday, somehow, "Charlie" (as the Emperor was called by irreverent Americans) would step In and set things right. This Idea, too, was supported by a certain amount of circumstantial evidence. The reasoning which pictured the Japanese businessman as a "moderate" was equally applicable to the Emperor. The Emperor was a "busi- nessman" in the sense that the Imperial Household was one of the largest holders of bank and industrial stocks in Japan. Furthermore, during the 'twenties the Emperor had selected as his close advisers aristocratic representa- tives of the Japanese business world: Count Makino, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Baron Ikki, Minister of the Imperial Household, and Prince Salon) i, the last of 43 the Elder Statesmen. The first two were closely allied with the Mitsubishi interests, while Prince Saionji was related to the Sumitomo family. Count Makino was apparently Ambassador Crew's favorite Japanese. He describes the Count as follows in a diary entry of July 13, 1932, a month after he had arrived In Japan and after a "long and intimate" talk with him: In every nation great gentlemen stand out, and during our entire conversation, which was by all odds the plcasant- est I've had here, Count Makino impressed me as a really great gentleman. He is close to the Emperor but he doesn't, alas, carry much weight in these days of military domi- nation. The talk was pleasant partly because Count Makino reassured the Ambassador, telling him that the extremism of the Japanese militarists was a thing of the moment, The strongest endorsement of the Emperor's ability to curb Japan's drift to fascist militarism was given by Count Makino three years later at a "brilliant' 1 dinner staged by Viscount Matsudaira for the Japanese aristoc- racy and leading diplomats. In a diary entry on May 22, 1935, Mr. Grew relates: After dinner I sat with Count Makino and had an inter- esting talk, in the course of which he told me of a conver- sation he had just had with Dubosc, editor of the Paris Temps, who has been traveling in Japan. Dubosc apparently told Count Makino that he considered the political situation in Japan as "dangerous" owing to the strife and corruption among the political parries and the risk of Military Fascism on the one hand and of Communism on the other, Makino said to Dubosc (as the former repeated the con- versation to me): "When you return to Paris and make your report or write your editorials on the domestic sir 44 tion In Japan, cut out the word 'danger' from your vocab- ulary. We have a safeguard in Japan which other countries do not possess in the same degree, namely the Imperial Household. There will never be 'danger' from military Fascism or Communism or from any other land of 'ism' simply because the Emperor is supreme and will always have the last word." I have never heard the old man speak so emphatically or exhibit so much patriotic emotion; his eyes filled with tears and he had to wipe his glasses. The manner in which he talked tonight his emphasis and emotion gave a momen- tary revelation of the intensity of their devotion to the Throne, and I think that the force of that devotion through- out the nation in spite of all the bickerings and political agitations and even assassinations or perhaps because of them is stronger, much stronger, than foreigners gener- ally appreciate. At any rate, I was greatly impressed tonight by this momentary glimpse into the mind of the usually suave, courteous and eminently gentle Count Makino, whom I shall always regard as one of the world's greatest gen- tlemen. The Ambassador's anticipation that the Emperor would prove an effective bulwark against militarist domi- nation was influenced also by his friendly regard for other members of the court circle. This is indicated by the oft-quoted entry of June 11, 1940, in which Mr. Grew tells of the gathering at the funeral rites for Prince Tokugawa: After eight years in Japan I had the feeling today of not being outsiders but an intimate part of that group, almost as if the gathering were of old family friends in Boston and not in Tokyo. We knew well a great many of the Japanese and their wives who were sitting around us, mem- bers of outstanding families and clans. The Tokugawas, Konoyes, Matsudakas, Matsukatas might have been Salton- 45 stalls and Sedgwicks and Peabodys. We knew their positions, their Influence and reputations, their personalities, and their inter-relationships as well as those of a similar group in Boston. And we felt too that they regarded us as a sort of part of them. In virtually every decadent or retrograde society in modern history there has been a handful of aristocrats who have been able to rise above their group or class loyalties and point the way to a new and better world. Apparently the American Embassy in Tokyo mistook the Makinos, Matsudairas and similar aristocrats for people of this caliber. This Impression was probably heightened in some measure by the vehemence with which the fanatic young militarists attacked them. Count Makino, Viscount Saito and other court-circle "moderates" were always high on the black lists of young assassins who hoped to clear the way for unrestrained military adventurism by elimi- nating all those who would Impose restraints even If out of caution. Both in the May fifteenth Incident of 1932, when Premier Inukai was killed, and in the February twenty-sixth uprising of 1936, when Viscount Saito was killed, Count Makino was also a target but escaped unharmed. But Count Makino and the others were as opposed to democracy as they were to military dictatorship. And despite the extreme form which their disagreements finally took, their differences with the militarists were still on strategy and timing rather than on objective. There can be no better proof of this essential unity of objective than that afforded by Mr* Grew's book, Ten Years in Japan, whose diary entries have already been quoted. In an entry dated September 18, 1933, just two years after the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, Mr- 46 Grew quotes a story written for him "in confidence" by an American newspaperman. It tells of two interviews, with two leading "moderates." One was with Viscount Salto, who was Premier of Japan at that time. The news- paperman reported that the Viscount had Informed him that "the Manchurian Incident should never have hap- pened," because "the same result could have been achieved without offending the world" This same American reporter also told of an interview with another Japanese whom he describes as "one of the Intellectual leaders of Japan," a person who appar- ently "narrowly escaped assassination at the time of the Manchurian Incident, having rashly raised his voice against the military party." This antimilitarist intellectual leader also had strong views on Manchuria: He said that the policy toward which his party is work- ing is to recognize the Chinese ownership of Manchuria; but to extend the Liaotung lease over the whole of Man- churia for ninety -nine years. Thus, both leading "moderates" approved of the fact of the seizure of Manchuria, but objected to the method. The "intellectual leader" felt that Japan could have got- ten all of Manchuria on a ninety-nine-year lease, while Premier Saito also wanted to secure Manchuria "without offending the world." This is perhaps the best proof that the distinction between the "moderates" and the ex- tremists was a question of method and not objective. APPEASEMENT BY INVITATION There can be little doubt that non-extremists had effective techniques of persuasion. They developed one technique which could be called "appeasement by in- 47 it vitation." This is the way It worked: a highly-placed spokesman would come to see Mr. Grew and inform him that the "moderates," with the aid of the Emperor, had things pretty well under control All that they needed to strengthen their control and keep the militarists from assuming power, he would urge, would be some con- cessions from the United States. One of the best examples of this sleight of hand was attempted on October 7, 1932, and is recounted in Mr. Grew's diary of that date, Mr. Crew's visitor goes un- named in the published diary (his name being replaced by dashes) presumably because Mr. Grew still thought him worthy of protection in 1944, at the time Ten Years in Japan was published. Mr. Grew wrote of this unnamed visitor: He has had two hours and ten minutes with the Emperor in the presence of Count Makino and others. . . . He says that the Emperor understands our position perfectly and is anxious to stop the anti-American press campaign and the chauvinistic war talk. then said that he wished to impress on me two points, first that if the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, will only keep quiet, there will be no question of Japanese troops going to Peiping and this all depends on Chang's movements; and, second, he expressed the hope that after the maneuvers of our Atlantic Fleet in the Pacific it will return to the Atlantic next winter, because irs pres- ence on the west coast furnished an excuse for much of the chauvinistic war talk and military and naval preparations here. continually repeated that the domestic political situation is now well in hand and that the more chauvinistic military people are being compelled to moderate their views. . . . In other words, all that was necessary to keep Japan peaceful was to make it easier for the Japanese militarists 48 to make further grabs, when the time was ripe, by with- drawing our fleet from the Pacific and suppressing the anti-Japanese Young Marshal who had been driven out of Manchuria by Japanese troops! Ambassador Grew certainly gave a considerable amount of credence to the above-quoted informant. This is demonstrated by a communication to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson which is quoted in Ten Years in Japan, marked "Strictly Confidential" and dated De- cember 2, 1932, a little more than two months after the above interview. Conditions had changed somewhat, as the American election had just taken place and President Roosevelt had been elected. This election was greeted favorably by the Japanese, because they applauded the anticipated retirement of Secretary of State Stimson who had made such strenuous efforts to weld world opinion against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In his communication to Secretary Stimson, Ambas- sador Grew declared: The anti-American press campaign has, for the present, practically ceased. I am inclined to think that had some- thing to do with this and I dare say that some order to that effect may have come from the Emperor himself. . . Later in the same message he continues: In my cablegram of November 28, I suggested that re- straint be exercised in handling the Sino-Japanese dispute, because coercive measures would undoubtedly result in more firmly welding the Japanese nation together in oppo- sition to the League and the United States. Any hint of force, either military or economic, I believe, would result in the uniting of the nation behind the military and would completely overwhelm the more moderate influences which are working beneath the surface to restore Japan to its former high place in the councils of nations. Moral pres- sure, however, I think, can be exerted without this danger and might tend to widen the rift now beginning to be noticed between the military and moderate elements. Event- ually the force of public opinion throughout the world, coupled with the difficulty and overburdening expense of pacifying Manchuria, might cause Japan to change its at- titude toward the problem. . . . This "appeasement by invitation," by which the United States was induced to refrain from "antagoniz- ing" Japan in order to give the "moderates" an oppor- tunity to get the militarists under control, was largely responsible for the continued shipment of scrap and oil to Japan. Mr. Grew has stated that we continued the shipments because nonshipment would have been a major step toward a war for which the American people were ill-prepared. Bur that is only part of the story. We were in part accepting the argument of the "moderates" that an embargo on such shipments would only strengthen the militarists, and thus lead to war. Actually the reasoning that an embargo on oil and scrap would have been sufficient cause for war was faulty. It is highly dubious that such an embargo, with the diplomatic ex- planation that the materials were needed in the United States, as they subsequently were, could have been a suffi- cient excuse for attack. Furthermore, it Is clear that the Japanese attack, when it did come, was not due to an embargo or any other diplomatic reason, but because the development of the war in Europe made it appear feasible for the Japanese to attack with a fair chance of success! THE CRUCIAL TEST The striking German military successes of 1941, which by October brought Nazi armies to the gates of Moscow 50 and Stalingrad, created great opportunities for the Japa- nese. England, still fearful of a German invasion, could spare little strength for the Pacific. France and Holland, both of which had rich possessions there, had already been overrun by the Nazis. American fleet strength, the chief military obstacle to the Japanese march of conquest, was divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Faced with these rich possibilities, the "moderate" and extremist wings of the Japanese ruling group continued to battle over the best manner of exploiting them. This conflict is very well described in a memorandum pre- pared by the State Department in May 1942, entitled: "Account of Informal Conversations between the Gov- ernment of the United States and the Government of Japan, 194L" In describing the struggle between what were called moderates and extremists in 1941, the memo- randum states that "Japan was . . , faced with a great internal struggle in regard to methods for taking advan- tage of the opportunities presented some groups were Insisting that Japan keep out of the war in Europe and gather all possible benefits obtainable by trade and by negotiations and threats short of participation in that war; other groups were determined to strike with force if necessary even at the risk of throwing together the war in China and the war in Europe." x In other words, the non-extremists were willing to use any and all methods short of war with the United States and Britain. And their opposition to such a war was simply because they were not confident that Japan could win. The resistance of such "moderates" to the pressure of 1 Foreign Relation? of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, p. 326. 51 the military adventurists was weakened rapidly by the desertion of a substantial number who became convinced by German victories that the blitzkrieg was, after all, a much more effective means of achieving imperialist dom- ination than the military and economic infiltration tech- nique which Japan was then using. The last great effort of the "moderates" to prove that they could exploit the opportunities of the moment with- out risking war with the United States was Prince Konoye's attempt to meet President Roosevelt "some- where in the Pacific" to negotiate a solution to Japanese- American "differences." President Roosevelt, recognizing that the only basis for compromise which could sat- isfy Prince Konoye's requirements would be American abandonment of the Chungking government and recog- nition of Japanese conquests in China, refused to meet the Prince. Unable to deliver American acceptance of Japanese conquests through negotiation, Konoye was compelled to resign, on October 16, 1941, to make way for those who were willing to risk Japan's greatest military gamble. In the previous January, Mr. Grew had informed the State Department that there were rumors that a "surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japa- nese military forces, in case of 'trouble* between Japan and the United States." The decisive test -for the Embassy *wa$ whether it would recognize the type of Japanese government likely to launch such an attack. The appointment of General Hideki To Jo as Premier, on October 18, 1941, certainly should have been taken as substantial evidence that aggression was in the air and was so interpreted by a great number of correspond- ents and analysts. To jo was an important member of the 52 Kwantung Army clique, the powerhouse of aggression in Japanese army politics, having served as the head of the dreaded military police of the Kwantung Army and later as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. Later, as commander of Japan's mechanized forces in China, he was very successful in blitzkrieg methods. To jo had entered the first Konoye Cabinet as Vice Minister of War and was chief of Japan's air force after that. He then served as War Minister in Konoye's sec- ond and third Cabinets. He had contributed considerably to reorganizing the army, strengthening its air force and generally streamlining it for offensive war. Clearly To jo combined the driving militarism, the military and admin- istrative leadership and the political experience required of a Premier who was destined to launch the greatest military effort in Japanese history. When Prince Konoye resigned on October 16 to make way for General To jo, he sent Ambassador Grew a per- sonal and extremely important letter, which Mr. Grew records in Ten Years in Japan. 16th October 1941 My Dear Ambassador, It is with great regret and disappointment that my col- leagues and I have had to resign owing to the internal political situation, which I may be able to explain to you sometime in the future. I feel certain, however, that the cabinet which is to suc- ceed mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have been carrying an up till today. It is my earnest hope, therefore, that you md your Government will not be too disappointed or discouraged either by the change of cabinet or by the mere ippearance or impression of the new cabinet. I assure you :hat I will do all in my power in assisting the new cabinet 53 to attain the high purpose which mine has endeavored to accomplish so hard without success. May I take this opportunity to express my heartfelt grati- tude for your most friendly co-operation which I have been fortunate to enjoy and also to convey to you my sincere wish that you will give the same privilege to whoever succeeds me, With kindest personal regards, I am Sincerely yours, F. KONOYE This letter may go down as one of the most effective smoke screens in diplomatic history, Mr. Grew was un- doubtedly influenced by the suave Prince Konoyc's re- quest for him not to be "too disappointed or discour- aged" by the "mere appearance or impression" of the To jo Cabinet. The degree to which the Ambassador was misled is revealed by the very significant diary entry of October 20, 1941, three days after the Ambassador re- ceived the Prince's letter and less than seven weeks be- fore Pearl Harbor: October 20, 1941 Since the American press and radio are almost universally interpreting the present government as a preliminary move leading to an attack on Russia or some other positive action which will inevitably bring about hostilities between Japan and the United States, I am setting forth certain factors, some based on fact and others on valid assumption, which indicate that the opinion which appears to have been ac- cepted by the American public in regard to the meaning of the change of government in Japan may not be an accu- rate appraisal of the situation viewed in perspective. We are informed by a confidant of Prince Konoye that the latter decided to resign and in so doing to ensure that the Prime Minister who succeeded him would be an official 54 who would attempt to pursue the policy Inaugurated by the previous government of reconstructing relations with the United States and bringing about a settlement of the China affair. . . . We think that a reasonable motive for the resignation of the previous government was Prince Konoye's belief that the conversations with the United States would make more rapid progress if our Government were dealing with a Prime Minister whose power was based on a commanding position in and on support of the Army, which is the con- trolling force in matters affecting policy, rather than with a go-betw T een. Despite the fact that, as anticipated, the Konoye Government was succeeded not by a civilian but by a military man, indications of a willingness on the part of the Tojo Government to proceed with the conversations in the light of the circumstances outlined in the preceding paragraph would imply that it is premature to stigmatize the Tojo Government as a military dictatorship committed to the furtherance of policies which might be expected to bring about armed conflict with the United States. The remarkable ability of the Japanese to utilize the American Embassy's vulnerability concerning the role of the Emperor and other "moderates" was demonstrated by a visit of still another informant. This visit was the perfect companion piece for Prince Konoye's smooth letter. The following is Ambassador Grew's diary entry for October 25, 1941, almost verbatim the text of a memorandum sent to the State Department on the same day. October 25, 1941 A reliable Japanese informant tells me that just prior to the fall of the Konoye cabinet a conference of the leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired 55 if they were prepared to pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the latter, with reference to the pro- gressive policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grand- father, in an unprecedented action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand necessi- tated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a position effectively to control the Army, hence the appoint- ment of General To jo, who, while remaining in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to con- clude successfully the current Japanese-American conver- sations. The informant emphasized to me that the recent anti- American tone of the Japanese press and the extreme views expressed by pro-Axis and certain other elements gave no real indication of the desire of Japanese of all classes and In particular of the present political leaders that in some way or other an adjustment of relations with the United States must be brought about. He added in this connection that Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, had accepted his appointment with the specific aim of endeavoring to pursue the current conversations to a successful end and it had been understood that should he fail in this he would resign his post. The belief is current among Japanese leaders that the principal difficulty in the way of an understanding with the United States is the question of the, removal of Japa- nese armed forces from China and Indo-China, but these same leaders are confident that, provided Japan is not placed in an impossible position by the insistence on the part of the United States that all Japanese troops in these areas be withdrawn at once, such a removal can and will be success- fully effected. The informant, who is in contact with the highest circles, 56 went on to say that for the first time in ten years the situa- tion at present and the existing political setup in Japan offer a possibility of a reorientation of Japanese policy and action. There are a number of extremely curious aspects to this memorandum four, to be precise. ' The first is the striking parallel between this diary entry in October 1941 and the previously quoted entry of October 1932. In both cases the Ambassador is in- formed that the "moderates" and the Emperor have the situation well in hand. All that the United States has to do is to accept the conquests of the militarists. The second is the "reliability" of the informant. It seems difficult to believe that anyone who was sufficiently antimilitarist to be reliable to us as an informant could risk going to the carefully watched American Embassy in October 1941 or even being seen with one of the closely followed Embassy secretaries without taking extremely great risks. The alternative interpretation is that this in- formant (who was still described as "reliable" in a foot- note in the State Department volumes published in the fall of 1943) was sent with the permission of the military and was as much a part of the smoke screen hiding the preparations for Pearl Harbor as the trip of Mr. Kurusu. The third curious aspect is the statement that the Em- peror, "with reference to the progressive policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprece- dented action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes." Just what "progressive policy" was pursued by the Emperor Meiji which has any relevance to the main- tenance of peace it is difficult to find. Emperor Meiji's reign is a long series of wars, climaxed with those against China and Russia, with the interim between wars spent in preparing for the next one. Why Emperor Hirohito 57 should use the war-ridden reign of his grandfather as a reason for banning a war is difficult to understand. It is still more difficult to understand why the Embassy ac- cepted this logic uncritically. The fourth curious aspect of this entry (and others on the Emperor) is that Mr. Grew apparently never thought of asking why the Emperor, if he really was such a devotee of peace and did not want to go to war against the United States, did not make some attempt, by re- script or radio address, to tell the Japanese people that he did not want war against the United States. Such a state- ment or rescript would have been a considerable stum- bling block for the militarists. The fact that the Emperor did not make such an attempt would seem to lend weight to the theory that the Emperor, like the rest of the "moderates," was willing to use the threat of action by the military as a weapon to exact concessions from the United States. Less than seven weeks after Mr. Grew wrote so trust- ingly of the Emperor's intentions, not only did the "mod- erate" navy launch a crushing blow against Pearl Har- bor, but the "moderate" Emperor issued an cxhortivc im- perial rescript declaring a holy war against the Allies. This rescript was so powerful that the militarist govern- ment established a monthly commemoration day on which it was reread to the Japanese people and fighting forces in all the long and bloody months that followed. MR. GREW RETURNS When Mr. Grew returned from internment on the first exchange trip of the Swedish liner Gripsholw in August 1942 there were many who were anxious to hear his views. The great mass of the American people had 58 been shocked and puzzled not only by the perfidy of the attack on Pearl Harbor but by the ability of a nation so much weaker in economic resources than its opponents to strike a stunning series of blows in all corners of the Pacific. Other Americans, with a more specialized interest in the Far East, were anxious to know to what extent the attack on the United States had altered the State Depart- ment views about Japan. In the year and a half after his return the ex-Ambas- sador's deep, confident voice was heard often over the radio, recounting his experiences and warning that the Japanese would fight fanatically to the "last cartridge and the last soldier." One might wonder that with such a firm belief in the fanaticism with which the Japanese would pursue a war against the United States, Mr. Grew had been so complacent about the possibility of such a conflict in October 1941! His stated purpose in these talks was to correct "preconceived but unfounded as- sumptions as to Japan's comparative weakness and vul- nerability in war." The depiction of Japanese strength, ability and fanati- cism in his first book of speeches, Report from Tokyo, was so vivid that, when it was relayed back to Tokyo, presumably by way of Lisbon, the Japanese propa- gandists quoted excerpts from his speeches with approval, in order to impress the Japanese people with their own strength. The only part of Mr. Grew's description they publicly took exception to was reference to their "fa- naticism." They preferred to substitute "patriotism." During this period after his return Mr. Grew held the title of "Assistant to the Secretary of State." This was largely an ornamental title without a responsible position attached to it. At last Mr. Grew became restive in Ms 59 role of rnorale-toughener and war bond salesman and made a slight foray into the field of postwar policy toward Japan. In a radio broadcast on August 28, 1943, under the auspices of the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, he called for the disarmament of Japan, the punishment of its military leaders responsible for aggres- sion as well as of those guilty of atrocities, the permanent elimination of the cult of militarism and the re-education of the Japanese. But perhaps the most significant section of the speech was the guarded warning: "If an ancient tree is torn up by the roots and remodeled, it will not live, but if the healthy trunk and roots remain, the branches and foliage can, with care, achieve regeneration. Whatever is found to be healthy in the Japanese body politic should be pre- served; the rotten branches must be ruthlessly cut away." This was coupled with another warning: "Only skilled hands should be permitted to deal with that eventual problem upon the happy solution of which so very much in the shaping of our postwar world will depend." Mr. Grew and the Japan experts in the State Depart- ment were probably emboldened by the fact that this speech was calmly received, although the lack of criti- cism was probably due in large part to the use of a non- committal figure of speech. It was difficult to object to "skilled hands" preserving "healthy" portions of the Japanese body politic and "ruthlessly" cutting away that which was "rotten." The crucial question was just what portions of the Japanese body politic were to be con- sidered healthy and which rotten. Part of the State Department answer was given in December 1943 when it issued the two-volume work, Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931- 60 1941. Of all the hundreds of documents which were in- cluded in their 1700-odd pages the only one which the State Department publicized was the above-quoted memorandum to the effect that in October 1941 the Emperor had forbidden the army and navy to attack the United States and Britain! The headlines the next day read: "U. S. Discloses that Hirohito Wanted Peace," "Hirohito War Ban Revealed by Hull" The implica- tions were further developed in a special article in the Herald Tribune by Wilfred Fleisher, entitled: "Hirohito Plea for '41 Peace May Save Him" and subtitled: "Allies May Let Him Remain on Throne." A considerable amount of attention was paid to Mr. Fleisher's interpre- tation, not only because the State Department itself had called attention to this document in releasing the two thick volumes, but because Fleisher himself was known to be close to a number of the Japan experts in the State Department whom he had known in Tokyo, and had on previous occasions reflected their views. An indication of the concern which this interpretation aroused in some circles is the title of a column written for PM by L F. Stone: "Is Our State Dept. Building Up Hirohito to Use as a Jap Petain?" THE CRITICAL RESPONSE The concern occasioned by this indirect indication that the State Department still did not consider Emperor Hirohito as having any responsibility for the war was dwarfed by the storm of comment over Mr. Grew's speech in Chicago on December 29, 1943, at the banquet of the Illinois Education Association. In the speech he declared: "I am speaking solely for myself and . . . although an officer of the government I 61 am presuming In no respect to reflect the official views of the government." Nevertheless, Mr. Grew had fol- lowed the usual practice of circulating the text of his speech in the Department, where certain passages prais- ing the Emperor were considered damaging enough to make it advisable at the last minute to recall the mimeo- graphed texts of his speech prepared as press releases. These were reissued after some 150 words dealing with the Emperor were deleted from page 1 1 of the mimeo- graphed text. Apparently" this last minute scissor-wielding was not vigorous enough, for it left intact two sections which, put together, made Mr. Grew a defender of the Japa- nese monarchy. At one point he declared: "I knew that many of the highest statesmen of Japan, including the Emperor himself, were laboring earnestly but futilely to control the military in order to avoid war with the United States and Britain. . . ." Elsewhere he said: "Shintoism involves Emperor-worship * . . and when once Japan is under the aegis of a peace-seeking ruler not controlled by the military, that phase of Shintoism can be an asset, not a liability, in a reconstructed nation." Newspapermen, looking for a simple and sensational story, put these two ideas together and came to the con- clusion that Mr. Grew wanted to use Hirohito after the war, and that was the story they sent over the wires* That wasn't a complete summary of the entire speech, which ran to sixteen pages, single-spaced; but it was the most newsworthy conclusion which could be made with- out violating the general tenor of the speech. The critical response to Mr. Grew's speech was imme- diate and widespread. It was remarkable not only for its volume but also for the quarters from which it emanated. The Chinese government made a pointed but indirect 62 criticism of Mr. Grew's approach by giving wide circu- lation to an article by Dr. Sun Fo, president of the Legis- lative Yuan of the Chinese government, and son of the founder of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Sun Fo pointed out that the present-day "divine" position of the Japanese Emperor is merely the creation of the mili- tary caste to command absolute submission from the people. Dr* Sun therefore concluded: To fight this war to a decision means that the common victory must be decisive in such a way as to preclude any resurrection of a militarist and aggressive Japan. . . . This can be done only if a fundamental revolution in the consti- tutional make-up of present-day Japan sweeps away the military caste and sweeps away also the Emperor and the cult of Emperor-worship. ... It is only by this means that real democracy can be introduced in Japan and the peace of the world safeguarded, . . . The Japanese people, once they are rid of their present rulers, will never want to undertake another war if they can exercise their will freely. But they will not be able to go their way so long as the Emperor remains a divine institution and the cult of Emperor-worship a state religion. ... Of a democratic- republican Japan we need have no fear. On the contrary, we shall be ready and willing to re-establish normal rela- tions with a new Japan, revolutionized after her defeat, whose Government will be democratically constituted and responsible to the Japanese people as a whole. Of the domestic criticism of Mr. Grew's remarks, the most significant was probably that of the New York Times, customarily a staunch supporter of the State De- partment. In an editorial, the Times took Mr. Grew se- verely to task for his suggestion that we "sponsor an autocratic theocracy incapable of developing a real de- 63 mocracy based on self-government by the people and therefore always subject to domination by cliques which can dominate the Emperor-" The editorial went on to point out that the idea of Japanese racial supremacy, which is based on the Emperor-worship cult, "confronts us with even more difficult but not less dangerous prob- lems than nazism and fascism, which we are pledged to eradicate." As a result of the deluge of criticism evoked by Mr. Grew's speech, early in January Secretary of State Cordell Hull instructed him not to make any more speeches on American postwar policy toward Japan be- cause he was associating the Department with the very unpopular policy of supporting the Emperor* Mr. Hull's reproval had a strange aftermath. In an in- terview in the New York Times of February 2, 1944, Mr. Grew responded to a question on the Emperor by the interviewer, Bertram D. Hulen, by declaring: "I wish to state categorically that never, either publicly or privately, have I expressed an opinion that Emperor Hirohito should be or should not be retained on the throne of Japan after the war. Frankly, I do not think that any of us are yet in a position to determine what shall be or may be the precise political structure in Japan after our certain, ultimate victory in the war." This statement demonstrated how far Mr. Grew, the most vocal of the State Department Japan experts, found it necessary to back water in the face of public opinion, The wide criticism of his Chicago speech, culminating in his being gagged by Secretary Hull, made Mr. Grew's future look very bleak in the winter of 1944* On January 15, 1944, the State Department announced a reorganization, in the course of which an Office of Far Eastern Affairs was set up. The position of Director of 64 this office was given to Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, for sixteen years "Political Adviser to the Secretary of State" on Far Eastern aff airs. When Dr. Hornbeck was given this important ap- pointment, although Mr. Grew was his senior in the De- partment, it was widely interpreted as being preliminary to the shelving of Mr. Grew and a victory for the "China crowd" in the State Department. For many years the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department had been divided by competition between the "China crowd," composed of those officials whose Far Eastern diplomatic experience had mainly been in China, and the "Japan crowd," comprising those whose specialty was Japan. This rivalry extended to fields of policy. The China hands were more likely to consider China the center of the Far Eastern problem and emphasize the necessity for developing China and the China trade. The Japan hands, on the other side, would point to the substantial volume of Japanese- American trade, which they had helped to develop, and were apt to sneer at the possibility of China's usurping the important place occupied by Japan. The victory of Dr. Hornbeck and the "China crowd" was to be shortlived, however, because Hornbeck was eased out of his job by a fortuitous development: a vir- tual revolt of his subordinates. This revolt was a product not of Dr. Hornbeck's Far Eastern policies, but of certain alleged personal shortcomings. His subordinates wrote a strong and detailed memorandum accusing Dr. Horn- beck, among other things, of poor judgment, withhold- ing from them information necessary to their work, and violating the instructions of his superiors. They actually declined to accept positions under him. The revolt suc- ceeded in displacing him, . 65 On May 1, 1944, ex- Ambassador Grew moved Into the spacious office of the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on the third floor of the State Depart- ment* THE "JAPAN CROWD" TAKES OVER When Mr. Grew was appointed Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Wilfred Fleishcr, in a confidential memo to Time, wrote that "the American Embassy in Japan has moved in to take possession of the Far Eastern division of the State Department." Indeed, the so-called "Japan crowd" had taken over. In addition to Mr. Grew, Joseph W. Ballantine, a former Secretary of the American Embassy in Tokyo, was made Deputy Director; Erie R. Dickover, a former First Sec- retary in Tokyo, was made chief of the Japan section. A little later Eugene H. Dooman, who was Counselor of the Tokyo Embassy at the outbreak of war, turned up as Special Assistant to Mr, Grew and a leading figure on the intra-departmental committee on postwar Far East- ern policy. These appointments were widely interpreted as mean- ing a shift in Far Eastern policy. Time considered the new leadership of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs as "a significant clue to the way the Administration is beginning to think about the problem of postwar Japan." Amerasw, a fortnightly on the Far East with a small circulation but wide influence among Far Eastern spe- cialists, devoted a whole issue entitled "A New Far Eastern Policy ?" to the implications of the new appoint- ments. It pointed out that it had been generally assumed that China would "automatically emerge as the leading 66 power in Eastern Asia" at the end of the war. However, the new appointments, according to Amerasia, greatly strengthened the position of those in favor of a "politi- cally 'reliable' Japan, purged of her militarists, but with sufficient economic strength to remain the dominant na- tion in the Far East and serve as a 'stabilizing factor' to offset any too rapid transformation of the political and economic status" of China and the colonial areas of the Far East. There can be little doubt that the State Department's "Japan crowd" tends to emphasize the importance of Japan rather than China, and harkens back to a conserva- tive Japan rather than a new, democratic Japan purged of its militarism, feudalism and the crushing control of its economy by the giant financial combines. One of the most interesting and important of the Japan hands in this regard is Eugene H. Dooman, prob- ably the most energetic and best-informed of the "Japan crowd." There seem to be two widely divergent schools of thought on Mr. Dooman. Mr. Grew on the one hand has told a number of people that " 'Gene Dooman knows more about Japan than any other man in America." When Mr. Grew returned to this country on leave in May 1939, he left the Tokyo Embassy in the hands of Mr. Dooman, declaring that the latter was a man "in whose judgment and analytical ability I have full con- fidence and whose views on policy and procedure coin- cide very closely with mine. . . ." In the foreword to his Ten Years in Japan Mr. Grew thanks Mr. Dooman, "on whose long experience in Japan, mature advice and incisive diagnosis of political developments I counted greatly in the formulation through those years of the views herein, set forth. . . ." 67 On the other hand, Pacificw, an anonymous Far East- ern expert of the Nation, showed no confidence In Mr. Dooman's ability. He labeled Mr. Dooman a u dan~ gerous expert" who "was primarily responsible for the execrable mistake in judgment which minimized the threat to the United States represented by To jo's ap- pointment in October, 1941." Both views are probably somewhat prejudiced, There can be no doubt that Mr. Dooman has extensive knowledge of Japan, the Japanese language and Japa- nese ruling groups. He was born in Japan, and in addi- tion to spending part of his youth there, sixteen of the thirty-three years he has served in the State Department were spent in Japan. During this period he worked his way up from student interpreter to the rank of Counselor of the Embassy, where he served as Mr. Grew's right- hand man. But there Is also little doubt that the American foreign- service official in Japan, even more so than the rest of the somewhat isolated foreign community there, tends to associate with a very restricted segment of the Japanese population: the Foreign Office representatives, members of large business concerns with extensive American trade, the "pro-American" wing of the court circle and other American- and British-educated members of the upper middle class. Therefore it is rather natural that a person like Mr. Dooman who has lived almost half of his life in these circles should share many of the reactions of his former associates in Japan.. Unfortunately, however, precisely because they have been conditioned by these contacts, the Japan hands In the State Department tend to favor the retention of Japan's Old Gang after defeat. Thus, various members of the "Japan crowd" have been known to discredit the 68 possibility that any groups other than the Old Gang have any capacity for leadership. Mr. Dooman himself, ac- cording to Amerasia, believes Prince Konoye a good candidate for postwar Premier of Japan! "STABILITY" AND THE OLD GANG Against this background, Mr. Grew's policy state- ment at the Senate hearings in December 1944 on his nomination as Undersecretary take on a fuller meaning. At first glance, Mr. Grew's statement seems a very diplomatic and noncommittal one. Further study, how- ever, reveals that Mr. Grew took a negative but none- theless definite stand which favors the retention of Japan's Old Gang. Two themes predominate in this statement. The first is that we should suspend judgment on Japan's future. We must "wait and see" because there are too many "im- ponderable factors" and therefore the "problem should be left fluid." Mr. Grew declared that he did "not be- lieve that the solution of this problem can be intelli- gently . . . handled . . . until we get to Tokyo." But while Mr. Grew was asking others to suspend judgment, his own Office of Far Eastern Affairs was going ahead full speed with plans for Japan's future on the assumption that they could predict what would happen! It is difficult to consider this anything but an uncandid attempt to restrict planning of Japan's fu- ture to the "skilled hands" of the "Japan crowd." The second theme of Mr. Grew's statement was his strong emphasis on "order" and "stability." During the early period of occupation, he pointed out, we would require order to facilitate the tasks of our occupation forces and at the end of our occupation we would need 69 "stability," even if it meant supporting the Emperor, in order to avoid the "burden of maintaining and control- ling for an indefinite period a disintegrating community of over 70,000,000 people." To achieve this perfect "order" and "stability" which Mr. Grew so longingly describes, it will be necessary to retain almost the entire authoritarian bureaucracy and the anti-democratic police as well as the Emperor. Once stability and order become our watchwords we almost necessarily become the watchdogs of the Old Order and the Old Gang. No society can purify itself as Japan must with- out a certain amount of disorder and instability. Cer- tainly the American Revolution was accompanied by considerable "disorder" and "anarchy." But is there a patriotic American who would suggest that we should have traded our democratic liberties for the "stability" of colonial servitude? 70 CHAPTER IV THE ZAIBATSU THREAT TO PEACE Our greatest danger In Japan comes from the group which will try most eagerly to please us. This group will proclaim themselves authentic mod- erates and liberals. They will swear they have never liked the militarists and only profited from their war with a bleeding heart. They will offer to put their ad- ministrative and organizing experience at the disposal of the victorious Allies, and thus maintain "order" and "stability." They will tell the Allies almost every mili- tary, industrial and diplomatic secret they know. They will protest their admiration for parliamentary govern- ment, and at a nod from the occupying authorities will bring back to life the now defunct Japanese political parties. These self -proclaimed angels of peace will be the front men for the Zaibatsu, which is Japanese for "plu- tocracy" or "moneyed group"; it generally refers to the Big Four financial combines, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumi- tomo and Yasuda, but is also used as it is here- to refer to the other large trusts as well. These Japanese combines represent a concentration of financial and economic power which is unparalleled anywhere else in the world. The relative position of the Mitsui or Mitsubishi concerns in the life of Japan is so important that beside them the role played by or- ganizations like du Pont and Standard Oil seems small. Even before the war these vast, monopolistic enter- prises dominated the financial, industrial and commercial 71 life of Japan, The five largest trusts controlled an esti- mated 62 per cent of the financial, industrial and com- mercial wealth of Japan. In 1937 the Big Four con- trolled more than one third of the total deposits in private banks, 70 per cent of the deposits in all trust companies and one third of total foreign trade. These mammoth combines also dominated the strategic sections of in- dustry, with controlling amounts of capital invested in shipping, shipbuilding, aviation, engineering, mining, metal manufacture and others. Because of their inter- locking control over banking, industry and commerce, the Zaibatsu were able to exercise indirect control over many smaller banks, industries and trading enterprises in addition to those which they operated directly. And because of the financial pressure they were able to exert on the government, they were in a position not only to Influence the government's industrial policies, but also to secure substantial subsidies, fiscal protection and profitable war contracts. The prewar domination exercised by the Zaibatsu over Japan's economy has been greatly extended as a result of the war. They received the lion's share of in- dustrial and raw material loot from conquered coun- tries. They also consolidated their hold within Japan because they controlled the Control Associations or semiofficial cartels, and while they profited from a bonanza of war contracts many small concerns were driven out of business in the interest of wartime effi- ciency. The evidence is almost overwhelming that unless something is consciously done to prevent it, postwar Japan will be dominated by the interests of these giant combines. During the last quarter of a century the militarists and the Zaibatsu have been the most dynamic 72 and powerful elements in the oligarchy ruling Japan. The very elimination or crushing of the militarists by defeat and disarmament will leave the Zaibatsu with almost a monopoly of power in the ruling class. Zaibatsu domination is also made more likely by the prevalent assumption that there is a "moderate" anti- militarist group in Japanese business and financial circles upon which we can depend, and that by offering eco- nomic inducements to this group we can persuade them to adopt a peaceful and co-operative policy. This argu- ment finds a ready audience among prospective Anglo- American occupation officials who feel that a postwar regime will have to rely on Zaibatsu technical per- sonnel to keep Japan from disintegrating into "chaos" and "anarchy." The Zaibatsu "moderates" are also eagerly defended in certain Anglo-American financial and commercial circles that enjoyed profitable prewar relations with the Japanese trusts, and are easily per- suaded that it would be difficult and unnecessary to alter the basic structure of the Japanese economy. Another fact aiding the Zaibatsu is the fact that plans for the future of Japan which have emanated from official and semiofficial sources appear to be almost exclusively concerned with how to render Japan in- capable of aggression by stripping her of her colonies and armed forces, supervising her industries and the like. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the even more important problem of the reorientation of the Japanese economy with a view toward encouraging the development of an economically trustworthy Japan that will not wish to solve its problems by military aggres- sion. There has been very little recognition of the fact that Japanese militarism, like German Nazism, is an organic disease with roots in Japan's past inability to 73 find a peaceful solution to Its economic problems. Since it seems likely that we shall have a Zaibatsu- dominated Japan unless something is consciously done to prevent it, it is important to see what this would mean in terms of the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Will a Zaibatsu Japan be a trustworthy Japan? Would it be consistent with the United Nations' abiding de- sire for an enduring peace? This problem must be examined in terms of the aims and interests of the Zaibatsu as a group. For though there are unquestionably individual representatives of these giant combines who are sincerely peaceful and liberal in their outlook, a policy cannot be based on the views of individuals, particularly in a country like Japan, where family and group loyalties are very strong. It must take Into consideration the fundamental factors that have determined the development of the Zaibatsu In modern Japan, and that have a bearing on the prob- able aims of a Zaibatsu-coMrolled Japan in the post- war world. THE "ZAIBATSU" DRIVE TOWARD WAR Many Americans, anxious to find some group on whom we can lean for support while building a better Japan, are not inclined to be too critical of the Zai- batsu. Their outlook has doubtless been conditioned by the knowledge that the United States has developed a great democracy and the highest living standards in the world In an era In which American trusts and Industrial combines have played a very important role in the political and economic life of the country. It is dan- gerous, however, to generalize from the experience of the United States; because Japan and the United States 74 represent the opposite extremes of modern economic de- velopment. Japanese industry has developed on the basis of an extremely limited internal market, while American capitalism has been conditioned by the ex- istence of a very great domestic market for consumer goods as well as for industrial and farm machinery. The limitations of Japan's internal market are due largely to the peculiarities of the modernization of Japan during the Meiji era (1868-1912). The Meiji Restora- tion of 1868 was led by an aspiring wing of the feudal militarist aristocracy with the backing of the budding business and financial interests of Kyoto and Osaka. The leading role was necessarily played by the feudal lords, because of the comparative weakness of the merchants and bankers, who had been shut off from foreign trade by the isolationist policies of the regime which preceded the Meiji Restoration. As a result of this weakness, Japan's transition to a modern capitalist economy did not involve an uprooting of Japan's feudal agricultural system comparable to that which ensued in England and France during the growth of capitalism in those countries. Under the terms of the Meiji land settlement, the serfs of feudal Japan were converted into independent farmers. But the continuation of feudal levels of rent involving 50-60 per cent of the crop usurious interest rates, and a land tax in money whose whole weight fell on the peasantry, caused many to lose their land and sharply limited the peasants' power to purchase consumer goods, farm machinery, and other products of Japan's new in- dustries. Since they were unable to develop a profitable market among the peasants, Japan's industrialists were almost immediately compelled to seek markets abroad. The low level of agricultural income and the existence of a large agricultural population that could not find 75 employment on the land provided a source of cheap Industrial labor that was of great advantage in many cases where Japanese industry was not as highly mechan- ized as its major competitors in world markets. Thus, the inadequacy of the Internal market provided the shotgun which wedded the Zaibatsu to militarism. The inability of Japan's low-paid peasants and industrial workers to provide a stable and expanding internal market compelled Japan's industrialists and bankers to Indulge In aggressive trade expansion that came to be linked inevitably with the militarists' drive for territorial conquest by force of arms. In addition to the profits reaped from the acquisition of colonies, there has been another reason for a com- munity of interest between the Zaibatsu and militarism. Industry has developed on a basis of intensive exploita- tion of labor, which has resulted in widespread discon- tent and movements of protest on the part of the Japa- nese people. Thus the Zaibatsu has needed the military to maintain "order" at home, as well as to open up new opportunities for Japanese business abroad. AGGRESSION PAYS OFF For three quarters of a century the Zaibatsu has been an indispensable partner of militarism In Japan's unend- ing series of aggressions. As a consequence, war and preparation for war have exercised an unprecedented influence on Japan's Industrial development. Modern industry in Japan received Its first great impetus from the determined efforts of the Melji gov- ernment to develop strategic industries as a base for a modern army and navy. Because of the comparative weakness of Japanese capitalism and Its reluctance to 76 invest in new and uncertain enterprises, the Meiji policy was to establish strategic industries under government control, develop them to a high level of technical effi- ciency and then sell a large proportion of them at very low prices to a handful of trusted financial oligarchs. This was the origin of the modern Zaibatsu. And even after the sale of these enterprises, the State continued to encourage the Zaibatsu-owntd strategic industries with generous subsidies. The next impetus to Japanese heavy industry was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The manufacture of war materials, the Chinese indemnity of 350,000,000 yen which was invested in war industries, and the opening of new Chinese markets all served to stimulate the accumulation of capital and the industrial development of Japan. The Russo-Japanese War provided a third impetus, and the Russian war indemnity of 200,000,000 yen also went into industry in the form of government subsidies. The Zaibatsu grew tremendously strong as a result of the first World War. Japan was second only to the United States as a supplier of the Allies and enjoyed an even greater proportionate increase in foreign trade. Much of this capital was accumulated as a result of shameless war profiteering at the expense of Japan's Allies. One of the most amazing stories about the ill-gotten gains of this period concerns Mr. Fusanosuke Kuhara, a most enterprising businessman. As owner of a ship- yard, the Nippon Steamship Company, he took an order in 1917 for four ships from the British government, for which he received nearly 2,000,000 yen in advance and facilities for importing steel, which was then almost un- available, from the United States. The ships were to be 77 delivered late in 1917, but were not ready, and there- fore the time was extended. On November 11, 1918, they were still undelivered, so the agents for the British government canceled the contract and demanded the 2,000,000 yen back. Kuhara refused on the ground that as no limit had been placed on the extension of time the contract was interminable. Actually the keels had never been laid. Having lost his case in every court to which he could appeal, Kuhara promised to pay by installments on condition that no bankruptcy proceedings should be taken. (In 1927 General Baron Tanaka, the Premier, with whom he was on very friendly terms, wanted to make Kuhara Foreign Minister, when a newspaper disclosed the fact that none of the installments had been paid and the British Ambassador informed Baron Tanaka that it would be embarrassing to deal with a Foreign Minister who owed his government money. So Kuhara had to be content with the Ministry of Communications, for which the little affair was not considered a disqualification.) Thanks to Japan's vast war profits and small war expenditures, the Zathatm were able to expand their operations in every field of industry, finance and trade, export large sums of capital and accumulate a consider- able amount of foreign currency. The capital invested in the Japanese national economy increased sevenfold during the war period. During the war years and the postwar crisis the Zaibatsu financial and industrial inter- ests were able to gobble up many smaller concerns, thus strengthening their monopolistic hold on the economy. Between 1913 and 1919, the number of banks decreased from 1614 to 1344, while their paid-up capital increased from 390,000,000 yen to 707,000,000 yen. By 1923, 37.8 per cent of the total resources of Japanese banks 78 consisted of stocks and shares, demonstrating their deep penetration Into the sphere of production. THE "ZAIBATSU" AND THE "LIBERAL DECADE" As a result of the tremendous accretion of economic power which came with the last war, the political posi- tion of the Zaibatsu within the Japanese oligarchy was greatly strengthened In the 1920's. At the same time Japan had its brief flowering of parliamentary govern- ment, and there was a conflict between the advocates of a "positive" policy of aggression on the Asiatic con- tinent and those favoring a more "conciliatory" policy of economic penetration, preferably without the use of armed force. On the basis of a misinterpretation of these facts, some American and British commentators have put together an oversimplified picture of the Zaibatsu as the defenders of democracy and the proponents of peace. It Is important to analyze this still-prevalent fic- tion, because many of those planning Japan's future in Washington and London look back to the 'twenties in Japan as the "Liberal Decade" which we must seek to recapture, The postwar increase in Zaibatsu political influence is best indicated by the Kato government of 1924-1925, known in Japan as the "Mitsubishi Gang." Both Premier Kato and Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, were related by marriage to the Iwasaki family which con- trolled the Mitsubishi interests. Two other members of the Kato government were directly associated with Mitsubishi, while the remainder of the Cabinet was indirectly linked with financial and industrial circles related to that firm. The growing influence of industrial 79 and financial interests also penetrated the higher ranks of the bureaucracy". Previously such institutions as the Imperial Household Ministry, the Elder Statesmen, and the House of Peers had been the exclusive preserve of the military nobility. Now, however, the influence of Big Business was felt in all these spheres. It made possible the formation of a pro-Mitsubishi clique in the imperial palace, including Count Makino, Lord Privy Seal, and Baron Ikki, Minister of the Imperial Household. Prince Saionji, last of the Elder Statesmen, was also sympathetic to the business interests because he was related to the founder of the Sumitomo concern and the uncle of its then owner. Actually the Emperor himself could be designated as a member of the Zaibatsu, since he had come into pos- session of about a half-billion yen in stocks and bonds or almost as much as the fabulous Zaibatsu families, He controlled 140,000 of 300,000 shares of the Bank of Japan, with the next largest block being 6000 shares, He also had effective control through 22 per cent of the stock of the Yokohama Specie Bank, the bank control- ling foreign financing. And he shared control of the N. Y. K. shipping lines with the Mitsubishi interests. The Zaibatsu had not only the power but also the opportunity for its maintenance and improvement. The whole structure of the Japanese autocracy had been shaken by the Rice Riots of 1918, which aroused millions and forced the resignation of the military aristocratic government of Premier Marshal TerauchL This power- ful ferment could have been harnessed to a reform movement to clear out the feudal, militarist elements of the Japanese social and political structure and institute a modern democracy, for such were the popular demands of the postwar period. 80 Instead, the Zaibatsu dissipated this democratic up- surge and perverted it to its own ends by siphoning off the discontent into a carefully controlled parliamentary system. Parliamentary government was considered "safe" by the Zaibatsu, not only because the imperial constitu- tion guarded against real popular control of the govern- ment but also because the Zaibatsu literally owned the two major political parties: the Seiyukai was the property of the Mitsui, and the Mitsubishi controlled the Minseito. This control was maintained by vast slush funds. The members of the Diet received tremendous campaign funds from the Zaibatsu for bribing the voters and thus securing their seats. And bribery was used within the Diet to gain additional votes on specific issues, as well as to bring about party switches. In June 1927, the Seiyukai obtained the adherence of twenty-two Diet members at the cost of 5000 yen per head. This money was paid by the Mitsui trust to keep control of the Diet. Those who were not satisfied with the Zaibatsu- controlled political parties were severely "discouraged" from seeking to carry out democratic or social reforms. Those who wanted only moderate social and economic reforms were harassed by police surveillance, censorship and the like. Those groups who advocated basic changes in the Japanese structure were ruthlessly suppressed. During 1923 and 1924, a group of industrialists led by Marquis Ito, the electric power tycoon, and Sanji Muto, the textile king, offered the police a reward of 250,000 yen to stamp out the proletarian movement. When uni- versal male suffrage was finally granted in 1925, the Peace Preservation Act, sometimes referred to as the "Law Against Dangerous Thoughts," was passed almost simultaneously. This law granted the police complete freedom of action to arrest those who discussed or 81 desired changes in the "national structure" and was designed to halt the activities of all radical organizations and to neutralize any influence they might exert on the elections, which were now open to 13,000,000 instead of 2,800,000 voters. And in 1928, by an imperial ordinance signed by Emperor Hirohito, "dangerous thoughts" be- came punishable by death. Under this law more than 10,000 people were arrested in the period from 1928 to 1931. THE "CONCILIATORY" POLICY OF EXPANSION The Zaibatsu was just about as "peaceful" in its for- eign policy as it was "democratic" in its internal policy in the 'twenties. It is true that the Zaibatsu firms were deeply involved in the division over foreign policy. But tbcy <wcre involved on both sides. The organizing centers of the two differing trends in foreign policy were the twin giants of the Japanese economy, the Mitsui and Mitsu- bishi trusts. The House of Mitsui not only controlled the Seiytikai Party but also had close connections with the Choshu clan which dominated the army until fairly recently. This Mitsui-SefywA^f-army alignment favored an aggressive foreign policy and one directed particu- larly against China and Russia. Its chief protagonist was General Baron Tanaka, Premier from 1927 to 1929, author of the notorious Tanaka Memorial. The Mitsubishi combine, which controlled the Min~ seito Party, was closely connected with the Satsuma clan and with the navy, in which the Satsumas had long been influential* The Mitsubi$hi~Min$cito~n%vy align- 82 ment was further strengthened by the fact that Mitsu- bishi owned the N. Y. K. lines and various shipyards that built not only merchant but naval vessels. During the 'twenties, Mitsubishi was deeply interested in foreign trade and considered the Tanaka policy of armed ag- gression toward China as unnecessary for the achieve- ment of Japanese economic domination over East Asia. Previous acts of aggression had cost them dearly in Chinese boycotts of their goods. The chief protagonist of the Mitsubishi-Minseito pol- icy of economic penetration by all means short of war if possible, was Baron Kijuro Shidehara Japan's Min- ister of Foreign Affairs in six of the seven governments that held office between June 1924 and December 193 L He became so closely associated with the more mod- erate policy of penetration that it is frequently called the "Shidehara policy," and he is often held up as evi- dence that a genuinely liberal section in Japan's civilian ruling class exists. However, it soon became clear that Shidehara was only a useful tool for a powerful section of the Zaibatsu that for the moment favored a policy of "peaceful" eco- nomic penetration. During the 'thirties, support for this policy diminished rapidly and Shidehara ceased to be a political influence. This was partly the result of pres- sure from the militarists. But militarism was not the only influence on the predominantly civilian governments that led Japan into an ever-expanding program of ag- gression against China and Indo-China and the foreign interests in those areas. Economic factors also played an important part in altering the attitude of former advo- cates of a "moderate" policy. Between 1929 and 1931, Japan's foreign trade was reduced by nearly half, and 83 the economic crisis that gripped Japan in 1931 was ac- centuated by the conservative deflationary policy of the Minseito government. As a result, protected colonial markets conquered and sealed off by the military "extremists" appeared increas- ingly desirable, even to the "moderate" Japanese busi- ness and financial interests. Mr. Ginjiro Fujiwara, then head of the Mitsui paper monopoly, the Oji Paper Company, spoke for ever wider sections of the Zaibatsu when he declared in his Spirit of Japanese Industry (p. 1 34) : Diplomacy without force is of no value. No matter how diligent the Japanese may be, no matter how superior their technical development or industrial administration may be, there will be no hope for Japan's trade expansion if there is no adequate force to back it. Now the greatest of forces is military preparedness founded on the Army and Navy. We can safely expand abroad and engage In various enter- prises, if we are confident of protection. In this sense, any outlay for armament is a form of investment. An important, though indirect, influence was also ex- erted on the "moderate" sections of the Zaibatsu by the larger and larger war budgets sponsored by the army and navy authorities. Mounting military and naval expendi- tures were primarily responsible for the shift from light to heavy industry that occurred throughout the 'thirties and resulted in a substantial increase in the production of munitions and the accelerated growth of the aircraft and automotive (tank) industries which had been the most backward feature of the Japanese war economy. This influence has been particularly important in con- verting Mitsubishi to wholehearted support of military aggression, The two industries receiving the greatest 84 impetus from war and preparation for war are aviation and shipbuilding, both naval and merchant. Mitsubishi is the largest firm in the shipbuilding industry and (with Nakajima) one of the two largest in aviation. The shipbuilding Industry was particularly badly hit by the depression of 1930-1933, and the preparations for armed aggression came to its rescue. Almost 3,000,- 000,000 yen were allotted in four naval programs begin- ning in 1931, and three quarters of that went to private companies. Large subsidies were granted to insure the development of a large, speedy merchant marine. The declared capital of the seven largest shipbuilding com- panies more than doubled between the outbreak of the China War in 1937 and the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. Mitsubishi shipbuilding itself had a declared capital of 120,000,000 yen in 1937; by 1941 it had 240,000,000 yen. By 1945 it reached 1,000,000,000 yen. Mitsubishi profited to an even greater degree from the expansion of the aviation industry due to the war in China and preparations for the Pacific war. The paid-up capital of Mitsubishi's aircraft subsidiary increased from 10,000,000 yen in 1937 to about 60,000,000 yen in 1943. At the same time that large war contracts gave the older members of the Zaibatsu an important stake in the "positive" policy of continental expansion, there emerged a new group of entrepreneurs closely asso- ciated with the army. These were the Shin Zaibatsu or "New Zaibatsu" and the most prominent member of this group is the Nissan firm controlled until recently by Mr. Gisuke Aikawa, brother-in-law of Kuhara. The emergence of these army-allied concerns was a potent reminder to the older members of the Zaibatsu that if they did not want to play ball in this very profit- able game there were others who would, 85 The warning seemed hardly necessary, for the Zai- batsu not only collaborated in the productive field but worked closely with the Japanese army and navy in espionage throughout the world. The foreign offices of Mitsubishi and Mitsui were an important part of the network of Japanese espionage organizations abroad, harboring undercover agents and serving as a postal sys- tem for relaying information back to Japan. Through their commercial and cartel relations with American firms, they were able to secure valuable information. Just six months prior to their attack, the Japanese mili- tary forces were able to learn through Mitsubishi how much oil and gasoline were being shipped to Pearl Harbor. These developments in the 'thirties, and particularly after the outbreak of the war in China, helped to weld the Zaibatsu and the militarists into an indissoluble bloc committed to Japan's war of aggression. This did not completely eliminate differences either within the Zai~ batsu or between the Zaibatsu and the army. But these differences became increasingly minor: tactical dif- ferences with regard to timing, direction and division of spoils, with general agreement on the main objective Japanese military domination of East Asia, It should be remembered that it was a civilian Cabinet, under Prince Konoyc, that embarked on the decisive China- Incident in July 1937, and that no significant section of the Zaibatsu opposed it. WALLOWING IN WAR The most extravagant hopes of the Zaibatm were 'fulfilled in the early stages of the Pacific war. Not only were they able to wallow in the bonanza of war con- 86 tracts and consolidate their hold on the prewar sectors of the Japanese economy, but they also gained tremen- dous additional strength by reaping the bulk of the profits from the rich territories conquered. The whole system of administration and economic ex- ploitation in the conquered areas was built up on the basis of concessions parceled out to various Japanese con- cerns. Mitsubishi was given jurisdiction over the Laokay phosphate deposits in Indo-China; in Singapore, trans- shipping is controlled, under general army supervision, by the Mitsubishi Warehouse Company, while the ship- building facilities are under the control of another branch of the Mitsubishi industrial octopus. Mitsui Mining re- ceived the Lepanto copper mines and other mineral re- sources in the Philippines; the shipbuilding branch of the House of Mitsui took over the facilities at Hong Kong. And in addition to giving the Zaibatsu the lion's share of the great resources captured in 1941-1942, Tojo also allowed Sumitomo, Mitsui and Mitsubishi to participate in the exploitation of Manchuria, from which the army had previously banned them. At the same time the Zaibatsu won greatly increased power over the economy of Japan. The Tojo govern- ment gave a tremendous impetus to the growth of mo- nopolies, both by restrictive measures against small busi- ness and by inducements to mergers. Small concerns were driven out of business by their inability to secure raw materials, credits and manpower in competition with the giant trusts. The Zaibatsu bought up these bankrupt firms at rock-bottom prices. At the beginning of the war, the trusts paid for their purchases in cash, but the huge amounts changing hands soon began to threaten the country with inflation. It was then that the militarist- dominated government made its greatest gift to the 87 Zaibatsu. Under the "Law Regulating the Application of Capital," passed by the Eighty-third Diet (October 1943), sellers of factories were compelled to accept pay- ment not in money but in shares of the buyer concern. Furthermore, owners of inactive factories were com- pelled to sell whether they wished to or not. A second measure, "The Adjustment of Enterprises Law," gave the government the right to take over all such factories and distribute their plants to war industries* One of the obvious results of such actions was a tre- mendous increase in the number of mergers. In 1940, 216 companies valued at 3,650,000,000 yen merged or were reorganized. By 1943 the figure had doubled, with 570 companies, totaling 7,500,000,000 yen, affected. Mitsubishi and other aviation companies engulfed dozens of textile companies which were converted to the pro- duction of airplane parts. One of the most significant developments in the direc- tion of monopoly control of the economy was an ex- tensive series of mergers involving the great banks. On April 1, 1944, the Teikolcu Bank was established as a result of the merger of the Mitsui Bank Ltd. and the Dai Ichi Bank. On April 13, 1944, the Finance Ministry approved the Teikolcu Banks' absorption of the Jugo Bank (popularly known as the Peer's Bank because of its aristocratic clientele). The total deposits of this new bank amounted to 6,400,000,000 yen, making it the larg- est in the Empire. A similar series of mergers was ar- ranged for the Yasuda Bank, enabling it to absorb the Nippon Chuya Bank, the Showa and the Dai San Banks. After the completion of all arrangements for these com- mercial banks in August 1944, there remained only a few banks in the Commercial Banks Control Association: the Mitsui-controlled Teikoku; Mitsubishi; Sumitomo; Yasuda; Sanwa; Nomura and TokaL And in March 1945 nine of the largest savings banks in Japan five in Tokyo, three in Osaka and one in Nagoya were merged into one central bank with total deposits of 8,500,000,000 yen. The swallowing up of small industries by the Zaibatsu reached such a pass that on September 7, 1944, Viscount Masatoshi Okawachi, speaking in the extremely con- servative House of Peers, pleaded with Premier Koiso to "maintain medium and small industries." Koiso re- plied that he would give this question "due considera- tion." THE "ZAIBATSU" MEETS A CHALLENGE As a result of its potent prewar power and wartime expansion the Zaibatsu was able not only to preserve but actually to strengthen its important place in the oligarchy ruling Japan. Contrary to the views of most Western commentators, Japan went to war under conditions highly favorable to Big Business. When To jo assumed office on October 18, 1941, preparatory to the attack on Pearl Harbor, he inherited, without protest, the much-propagandized "New Economic Structure" which had just been put into operation. This program was devised primarily by Japan's dominant economic interests. It combined the main points of two alternative schemes submitted by the Japanese Economic Federation and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, both Zaibatsu organizations. It provided for the mobilization and con- trol of war industries through a series of super-trusts or Control Associations. Theoretically, a Control Asso- ciation was a public organ embracing an entire indus- 89 try and responsible to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Actually It was made up of the leading firms in its particular field and given tremendous power over the industry concerned. This power was vested in the president of each association, and in practice the presi- dent of the leading trust in each industry became the president of the corresponding Control Association. Thus the Iron and Steel Control Association was only a slightly altered version of the Iron and Steel Manu- facturers' Federation, with the same President, Ilachisa- buro Hirao, who was a Mitsubishi official. The Federa- tion of Coal A4ine Owners was transformed into the Coal Control Association under President Kenjiro Mat- surnoto, a Mitsui Trust Company director. The great majority of these Control Associations were established during the early months of the Tojo Cabinet. The Zaibatsu was able to preserve this privileged position virtually unimpaired despite the deterioration of the Japanese military situation and the consequent in- crease in the demands of military production. While the Zaibatsu enthusiastically supported the war and all the rich conquests it involved, it was thoroughly unwilling to permit military "interference" with the way it ran industry and made profits. By the fall of 1942, however, the Zaibatsu's "profits as usual" policy came into conflict with the effective administration of a wartime economy. The Control As- sociations were still private organizations, over which the Cabinet could exert little direct control, and the large degree of autonomy which they retained, includ- ing power over the procurement of materials, funds and labor, prevented the enforcement of any general sys- tem of priorities. The inefficiency of this set-up did not become apparent during the first months of the 90 because Japan's military and naval forces were operat- ing largely on stocks of munitions and surplus shipping tonnage accumulated before the war and were adding to their resources by their early victories. But these first bright prospects were somewhat dimmed by the autumn of 1942 as a consequence of Allied operations in the Solomons, the toll of merchant shipping taken by Allied submarines and the smashing defeat suffered by the Japanese at Midway. Clearly more ships, planes and mu- nitions were needed, and during 1943 three different sessions of the Diet sought to deal with the problem of stimulating war production and bringing it under more effective government control. The regular Diet session which convened late in Jan- uary, 1943, set apart five industries (iron and steel, coal, light metals, shipping and aircraft) as essential to the prosecution of the war, and vested supreme powers for their administration in Premier To jo. But though To jo had evidently won his main point, he was forced to accept an extraordinary compromise with the Zaibatsu by which seven leading industrial and finan- cial magnates were attached to the Cabinet as an Ad- visers' Council. According to official regulations these men were to hold a rank equivalent to Ministers of State and were empowered to "participate in the Premier's conduct of administrative affairs with regard to expan- sion of wartime production and execution of the war- time economy of the nation." Another, more drastic attack on the disunity that still characterized Japan's system of wartime economic ad- ministration was made in the Special Diet Session at the end of October, 1943. The main feature of the new ad- ministrative system this Diet set up was the centraliza- tion of industrial production in a Ministry of Munitions. 91 Headed by Tojo himself, this Ministry became the chief organ of administration for the production of essential war materials. This appeared to be a victory of the mili- tary over the "profits as usual" Zaibatsu. A closer ex- amination reveals that this was far from the truth.^ Although Tojo was made Minister of Munitions, Shinsuke Kishi, who was made Vice-Minister of Muni- tions and actually handled the executive affairs of the Munitions Ministry, had consistently defended the Zai- to,ra-dominated Control Associations at the Diet Ses- sion in October 1943. The Zaibatsu won another victory in November 1943, when a number of representatives of Big Business were brought into the Cabinet. The most important of these was Ginjiro Fujiwara, veteran industrialist closely asso- ciated with Mitsui, who was made Minister without Port- folio. A blast of press and radio publicity on this appoint- ment stressed the fact that Fujiwara's appointment meant a closer welding of militarist and financial circles. A Yomiuri editorial declared that while at the start the Tojo government had been a "militarily bureaucratic Cabinet" it had gradually changed its character, but that until the appointment of Fujiwara "there was no one in the Cabinet representing civilian industrial circles, and contact with financial circles was only through advisers/' One of the most dramatic by-products of this Zaibatsu encroachment was a miniature revolt on the part of some of To jo's "radical fascist" supporters and the sui- cide of the fanatical Seigo Nakano. Nakano was a fire- brand ultranationalist of the most extreme type. Fie had been the head of the extremist organization Tohokai, a center of political terrorism. He combined this ultra- nationalism with opposition to the Zaibatsu and urged the nationalization of all industry, much like the "left 92 Nazis" of the Roehm type purged by Hitler In 1934. The radical fascism of Nakano and his associates had been very alarming to the Zaibatsu and they had made every attempt to keep him out of any place of authority. In the Diet elections of April 1942 they were able to prevent him from receiving the support of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society when he ran for the Diet. Nevertheless Nakano was elected by a large ma- jority, He apparently continued to fight inside the Diet, be- cause, on June 21, 1943, a Domei dispatch to Asia re- ported that many members of the I.R.A.P.S. had de- manded his expulsion as a result of a speech in the Diet during the emergency session of June 1943. When Nakano committed suicide on October 26, 1943, it was generally interpreted as a protest against the Zaibatsu's increasing strength in the To jo government. THE "ZAIBATSU" ENTRENCHED In the light of the increasing success of the Zaibatsds bid for supreme power, the replacement of General Tojo by Premier Koiso in July 1944 assumes a greater sig- nificance than Is usually attributed to it. There can be little doubt that the fall of Saipan and the first signif- icant B-29 blows on the home soil were the immediate causes of Tojo's fall, but he probably could have sur- vived had his political foundation been broader. The Cabinet headed by General Kuniaki Koiso crys- tallized the political shift of power that had been going on during the previous year. The new Premier was an early army "radical" who had made his peace with the business Interests. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy Minister, who was ranked as Deputy Prime Minister, 93 had never been an enemy of the Zaibatsu. Perhaps the most important appointment in the Cabinet was that of the Mitsui industrialist Ginjiro Fujiwara to the portfolio of Munitions Minister - a position that had been created by Tojo for himself, as a means of obtaining supreme control over the Japanese economy. Fujiwara gave evidence of the increased confidence of the Zaibatsu by immediately moving to take production control out of the hands of the army and navy and to unify it completely in his own hands. In his first press conference, held on July 29, 1944, he pointed out that he could not unify the war economy because the Army Ordnance Headquarters controlled the production of land weapons and the production of ships was under the jurisdiction of the Naval Construction Headquarters. He advocated the combining of these two bodies under the Munitions Ministry. Fujiwara's determined attempts to secure full control of the Japanese economy aroused violent opposition in the army and navy. He had ap- parently overplayed his hand; on December 16, 1944, Premier Koiso accepted his resignation because of "ill health." But this tactical retreat did not keep him down long. On February 15, 1945, he was appointed a Cabinet Adviser and assigned the important job of breaking the bottlenecks in the production of iron and steel. Fujiwara's temporary setback did not in any sense indicate a weakening of Zaibatsu influence in the reeling Koiso government. On the contrary, subsequent poli- cies and appointments attested to their entrenched po- sition. One of the important Koiso appointments in Feb- ruary was that of Juichi Tsushima to the post of Finance Minister. Mr. Tsushima had close connections with Seihin Ikeda, former head of Mitsui, and extensive con- nections in financial circles abroad; one of the main 94 points he stressed in his maiden speech on February 21 was the necessity for the firm maintenance of economic "order and stability." In March 1945, the Zaibatsu per- suaded the Cabinet to "nationalize" important industries in order to have the nation bear the cost of repairs to bomb-shattered plants and lay the basis for a claim against the government in the event that the plants were completely destroyed. By this point the Zaibatsu could see the handwriting on the wall and was seeking a method of getting out from under. A FURTHER STEP When the American invasion of Okinawa precipitated the resignation of Premier Koiso in April 1945, his suc- cessor, Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki, organized a Cab- inet which represented a further and greater step toward the solid, "respectable" and "moderate" circles of Japan's ruling group. The appointments to the Suzuki Cabinet represented a skillful interweaving of the political forces in the rul- ing oligarchy, but its main strain was that of the Zaibatsu and the throne. It is noteworthy that Admiral Suzuki himself had been so closely aligned with "moderate" inner court circles that during the military uprising of February 1936 he was attacked and wounded by the extremist assassins. Other appointments among high- ranking military and naval officers indicated the same traditionalist, conservative bent. The Minister of War, General Anami, had held the trusted post of Military Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. The Minister of State, Lieutenant General Toji Yasui, was Chief of Staff dur- ing the military revolt of February 1936. The Munitions 95 Minister, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, had married into the Mitsui family and became president of the Nippon Seitetsu, Japan's mammoth semiofficial iron and steel trust, and also of the Iron and Steel Control Association. Civilian appointments to the Cabinet also indicated the growing influence of the conservatives. The Min- ister of Finance, Toyosaku Hirose, had been chairman of the Central Association of Life Insurance Companies and of the Life Insurance Control Association. The Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Tadaatsu Ishi- guro, had been associated with the Central Bank of the Co-operative Societies. The further shift toward the less adventurist section of Japan's ruling oligarchy made possible a dual strategy. It became possible to make effective and extensive efforts to rally Japan for an all-out defense of the homeland, but at the same time the door was left open for surrender when Japan's conservatives decided that the time was ripe. In short, the Zaibatsu had carried through a further step toward protecting its position during the last stages of defeat and toward maintaining its important position in postwar Japan. CAN WE TRUST A "ZAIBATSU" JAPAN? Thus, in view of the history, motivations and structure of the Zaibatsu in Japan, the answer to the question "Can We Trust a Big Business Japan?" must be an emphatic no. Even at best, the more liberal section of the Zaibatsu did not disagree with the ultimate aims of the most aggressive elements in Japanese life. During most of the modern period, Japan's giant trusts have been im- portant and willing partners of the militarists In the ac- quisition of new territories for exploitation, with quar- 96 rels restricted to the question of methods, division of spoils, and supreme power over the domestic economy. The men who control Japan's great financial and in- dustrial monopolies cannot lead Japan along the road to democracy and peace for two reasons. They have shown clearly that they are opposed to democratic processes of government and have exerted every effort to suppress popular discontent. Consequently, continuation of their influence upon the postwar Japanese government will inhibit the growth and Influence of democratic elements in Japan. Even more important, these men would unquestion- ably be determined and powerful opponents of the measures of social and economic reform required to give Japan a stable and expanding internal market and to absorb venture capital in peaceful pursuits. Their power derives from an economic system that keeps the great majority of the Japanese people impoverished and there- fore unable to provide an adequate market for the prod- ucts of modern, large-scale industries. Zaibatsu domina- tion makes the emergence of an independent class of small capitalists virtually impossible. It is inconceivable that the Zaibatsu would voluntarily destroy the condi- tions that make possible this monopoly of power. Thus, a Zaibatsu-controlltd Japan would maintain, unchanged, the internal conditions that were basically responsible for launching Japan on her campaign of conquest. If Japan remains an autocratic state, ruled by the Zaibatsu and retaining an economic structure based on cheap peasant and factory labor, we may expect from her the same type of trade competition as before the war. The continued existence of such a Japan would make it extremely difficult if not impossible for the other coun- tries of Eastern Asia to establish prosperous expanding 97 economies. If, for example, Japan continues to utilize excessively cheap labor to manufacture cotton textiles, China would be able to develop her own textile industry only by competing in the matter of low living standards for her people. The same holds true for the industrial development of India, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and other Asiatic countries. They could protect themselves from the Japanese challenge only by creating high tariff walls and imposing other forms of trade re- strictions for the protection of their domestic industries. In this way the old cycle of commercial rivalry in a restricted market would begin once more, dooming to disappointment the hope for an expanding market in Eastern Asia and rising living standards for the Asiatic peoples. 98 CHAPTER V CAN WE DO BUSINESS WITH HIROHITO? Is the Emperor of Japan an oriental Charlie McCarthy, a past puppet of the militarists, who can be safely transferred to the knees of the United Nations? Or is the throne an integral part of the scourge of Japanese aggression? If so, should the Emperor be treated as a war criminal, to be tried and liquidated with Tojo and his ilk? Would it be better to put the throne "on ice" for a while until Japanese ardor for it has died down? The problem of the future of the Japanese Emperor and the throne, as an institution, has certainly generated more heat than any other subject relating to Japan. In the United States, we have seen how widespread criticism of Joseph Clark Grew's Chicago speech, which was widely interpreted as supporting the retention of the Emperor system, compelled him to back water and to insist that he had never declared in favor of or against the retention of the throne. In England, H. Vere Redman, chief of the Far Eastern Division of the British Ministry of Information, has frankly declared: ". . . wild horses will not drag from me whether I personally am an Emperor-debunker or not." THE CHARLIE McCARTHY SCHOOL Most of those who support the retention and utiliza- tion of the Emperor system in postwar Japan do so for one or more of the following three reasons: One: The Japanese believe in him in a deeply religio- 99 nationalistic way, and therefore any attempt on our part to depose or weaken him would make us hated and give the defeated militarists the best rallying cry they could desire for a comeback: "Restore the Emperor!" Two: The Emperor set-up will prove an extremely useful device for governing during the period of military occupation of Japan. Since the Emperor has generally been an instrument for other groups to manipulate, it is proposed that we use him for our own ends by having him issue our regulations as imperial edicts, in order to make the period of occupation easier. The people will accept anything their Emperor says; and the militarists will be unable to resist any document issued by His Imperial Majesty. Three: It may be possible to make a safe, easy transi- tion to parliamentary government by installing liberals in the court circles and changing the role of the Emperor to that of a constitutional monarch thereby liberaliz- ing Japan while preventing an extreme revolutionary re- action on the part of the masses. Such pro-Emperor reasoning is widely held in the American State Department and in the British Foreign Office. Many officials are fearful of the problem of oc- cupation if the occupying authorities do not have the endorsement of the Emperor. There is talk among many of ordering bullet-proof vests because they fear for their lives in a hostile Japan with a heritage of assassination. Others are afraid that, without the co-operation of the Emperor, the bureaucracy might refuse to work for the occupation authorities and that the latter then would be faced with the responsibility of governing 70,000,000 persons through only a handful of officials with a knowl- edge of Japan and the Japanese language. This idea of "government through Emperor manipula- 100 tion" is particularly favored by- British "Japan experts." As late as the beginning of 1945 there was still no British training program for "Civil Affairs" officers, and im- portant British officials were suggesting that the dis- advantages of occupation might exceed the advantages. They felt that a small Allied Control Commission, work- ing through the Emperor, could achieve Allied objectives in Japan without an elaborate military government ap- paratus. While the American government has indicated that it plans to land, occupy and if necessary administer Japan, there has been a strong sympathy for the "manipulate the Emperor" school in high places. In his testimony be- fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in De- cember 1944, Mr. Joseph Clark Grew suggested that if the Emperor should prove to be the only element of stability in postwar Japan we might be required to utilize him to prevent anarchy and chaos. The appeal of this pro-Emperor attitude for highly placed officials faced with the difficult problem of oc- cupation is obvious. This viewpoint errs, however, in one very important regard. It concentrates on only one portion of the Emperor question and consequently is a serious distortion of the problem as a whole. The problem of the continuation of the Japanese in- stitution of Emperor-worship cannot be judged narrowly in terms of the present transitory state of Japanese opinion on the subject, desire for a brief occupation, or prejudice against social changes in Japan on the part of the Allies. It must be judged in consonance with the main objective: the maintenance of Pacific security. Without this perspective we may achieve a short and peaceful military occupation but end up twenty years hence with another long and bloody conflict. 101 THE EMPEROR EMERGES The Japanese Emperor institution Is the most power- ful political Instrument of internal repression ^and external a gg ress ion developed in modern times. It is an instru- ment developed consciously and deliberately by Japan's ruling oligarchy during the last century, as a means of suppressing the movement for democracy and social re- form at home and channeling all of Japan's energies into the support of aggression abroad. When Commodore Perry reached Japan in 1853, the Emperor was in almost complete obscurity; his people gave him little or no thought. He was a virtual prisoner in the imperial palace at Kyoto, with his activities and ceremonies rigorously circumscribed by the shogun, or feudal military dictator. The imperial throne had suf- fered an almost unbroken record of misfortune for more than 650 years. Without any military resources of its own in a feudal society based on military power, it had been at the mercy of the ruling military dictator. In- dividual Emperors had been assassinated, deposed or re- tired at the whim of the ruling shoguns. Emperors had been exiled; some had been murdered in exile. From the remote island to which he had been relegated, one managed to escape hidden under a load of fish. Others had to sell autographs for a livelihood. The Emperor Tsuchi II lay unburied for six weeks until his son bor- rowed money from Buddhist priests to pay the funeral expenses. In the fourteenth century, things came to such a pass that two rival imperial lines defied each other for a space of fifty-seven years. These were the so-called Northern and Southern Courts, and it was the Northern Court branded by later historians as usurping and illegitimate that ultimately won the day. 102 During all this time, actual ruling power was in the hands of the shoguns. There were two reasons why the shoguns did not take the seemingly simple step of usurp- ing the royal title as well as the royal power. Theoreti- cally the shogun's power had been delegated to him by the Emperor. Therefore, the shogun held onto the Emperor as the symbol of his authority. In addition, there was the sentimental tradition perpetuated by a handful of historians and priests that Japan's reigning house dated back to the "Era of the (Sods" in "a line unbroken for ages eternal." Despite shogun opposition, these people had kept this tradition alive by secretly circulating mytho-histories like the Dai Nihon Shi (His- tory of Greater Japan) which exalted the throne by tracing it back to the Emperor Jimmu, mythical founder of Japan and alleged descendant of the Sun Goddess. The throne was ultimately rescued from its obscurity by a deep crisis which was already brewing when Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay, a crisis which Perry and the other Westerners who followed him helped to deepen. During the previous two decades, Japan had been shaken by peasant revolts and rice riots, bred of acute agrarian distress. The great merchant princes of Osaka and Kyoto, hampered by feudal restrictions on foreign trade and bedeviled by the bankrupt shogun's resort to forced loans, were growing increasingly restive. Simul- taneously, the only partially subdued great Western clans of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen were cautiously drawing together for a concerted attack on the sho- gun. The pressure of the foreign powers, which attempted to force the shogun to open Japan to trade, provided these anti-shogun forces with their opportunity. They raised the slogan of "Revere the Emperor; expel the 103 barbarians!" and told the people that unless the Shogun- ate were overthrown and the Emperor restored as ruler of Japan the country would be overrun by foreign bar- barians. The slogan of "Revere the Emperor" was both legitimate and effective as an anti-shogun device, because the shoguns had originally usurped power from the Emperor. Moreover, the diverse anti-shogun forces felt safe in supporting the throne, because they knew it was a symbol with only the power of a sentimental tradition and therefore felt that they could keep it under control Eventually a shogun was unable to cope with the in- ternal crisis and foreign pressure, and in 1868 he resigned and "restored" ruling power to the young Emperor, Meiji. It is typical of the Emperor's greatly exalted place in modern Japan'ese history that the name attached to this "Revolution of 1868" is the "Meiji Restoration" after the then seventeen-year-old Emperor and not after the real artisans of the transition, the oligarchy of West- ern clan leaders and merchant princes. THE THRONE AGAINST DEMOCRACY The Emperor institution acquired a new function in the 'eighties, when it became the main weapon against democracy in the arsenal of the Japanese autocrats. After 1875 a movement developed known as the "People's Rights Movement." (Mink en Undo.) Broadly speaking this represented an attempt to win for Japan not only a centralized state and modern industry but also the benefits of political and economic democracy. In 1881 the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) was established as a national organization. Despite the vagueness of its program and the opportunism of its leadership, it re- ceived enthusiastic backing from city artisans and the 104 land-hungry and debt-burdened peasants, and the move- ment developed a militancy which threatened to force democracy upon the Meiji government. But the oligarchy 'was able to use the throne as an in- strument to beat back this democratic movement of the 'eighties. One of the centers of the movement was Tokyo, where democratic aspirations found voice in liberal newspapers. In December 1887 a "Peace Preservation Law" was passed, one section of which was designed to rid Tokyo of liberal leaders. Note how this was ac- complished through the utilization of the throne, and also how "dangerous thoughts" were made criminal: Any person residing or sojourning within a distance of three ri (7 l / 2 miles) radius around the imperial palace, or around the imperial place of resort, who plots or incites disturbances or who is judged to be scheming something detrimental to public tranquility, may be ordered by the police or local authorities, with the sanction of the Minister of State for Home Affairs, to leave said district within a fixed number of days or hours. [Italics mine.] As a result of the application of this section, some 300 liberals, including the editors of the pro-democratic papers Choya Shimbun and Koron ShimpOj were driven out of Tokyo. This policy of shrouding the ugly form of the ruling autocracy under the ermine robes of a "heaven-sent" monarchy was crystallized in the constitution of 1889. The pressure of the Liberal Party and other opponents of the ruling oligarchy became so powerful that, in 1881, the Meiji government was forced to issue an imperial rescript promising a constitution and a Diet, but the rescript set the time for 1889 thus giving the oligarchy 105 eight years to devise a political instrument which would nominally include the national assembly demanded by the democrats, while leaving the powers of the ruling clique unimpaired. This carefully devised document was primarily the work of Prince Ito, who selected the Prussian constitu- tion to emulate after he had been sent to Europe as the head of a Japanese mission to study foreign constitutions. He met Bismarck, and decided that the constitution of Prussia - the most autocratic of the twenty-six federal states of Germany was the most suitable for adapta- tion to Japan's absolutist needs. Prince Ito worked for years in the sacrosanct environs of the Imperial Household. The locale of his labors was very carefully selected. The democrats of Japan main- tained that sovereignty lay with the people, and that consequently the constitution should be drawn up by an elected people's assembly. On the other hand, Prince Ito and other defenders of the autocracy insisted that sovereignty was inalienably attached to the Emperor's person and that accordingly he alone could grant a con- stitution to the people, as a gift. The Japanese constitution was finally promulgated on February 11, 1889. All opposition newspapers by now had been suppressed, and others were forbidden to com- ment on the document. Not only had the constitution been drawn up in secret, but it was read to an audience of select officials from which the general public was excluded. The product of Ito's labors was a political strait jacket which throttled the democratic movement of that period and has bound Japan to this day. The constitution en- shrined the theory that all the sovereign powers of the state are united in the Emperor, Under the supreme 106 direction of the Emperor, the administration of the gov- ernment is carried out by the Cabinet, in collaboration with the Privy Council and with the consent of the Diet. The Cabinet is responsible primarily to the Emperor. The army and navy, as in the Prussian constitution, are not controlled by the Diet, but are subject directly to the Emperor. The Diet is given no independent power of legislation or amendment, and is deprived of the power to use the withholding of money as a political weapon by the provision that in the event a proposed budget is not passed, the budget of the previous year goes into effect. Even the Diet's consent is not required for all measures, because in time of "emergency" when the Diet is not in session, imperial ordinances have the force of law. Thus it was that the throne was developed still further as a means of blocking the development of democratic forces and institutions in Japan. THE THRONE AGAINST PEACE The Meiji oligarchy developed still another use for the throne in the 1890's, when Japan made its debut as an imperialist power by joining in the mad scramble for loot in China. Until the 1890's, the throne had not developed a strong hold upon the people. It was still simply the center of a sentimental tradition and though it had been used as a political device by the oligarchy it did not as yet touch the lives of the people. This is clearly demonstrated by the diary of Dr. Erwin Baelz, a German doctor who was personal physician to Emperor Meiji and the imperial family for many years. In Dr. Baelz's diary, which was recently published under the title of Awakening Japan, 107 he has the following Illuminating entry, which shows what shallow roots the Emperor cult has in Japanese history: Tokyo. November 3, 1880. The Emperor's birthday. It distresses me to see how little Interest the populace takes in their rulers. Only when the police insist on it are the houses decorated with flags. The canny and ruthless leaders of Meiji Japan soon realized that modern weapons were not enough to create an effective aggressive army. Simple patriotism would be sufficient for the morale of an army designed for defense. But for an army capable of subjugating other peoples, patriotism alone did not suffice. A form of jingoism, a belief that Japan was superior to other nations and consequently was called upon by divine right to rule them, was required. Therefore they developed the cult of Emperor-worship as an instrument for channel- ing religious impulse Into the service of an aggressive state. Shinto provided the ideal raw material for the es- tablishment of this cult. The word Shinto means "The Way of the Gods." In its original form this religion was a primitive form of nature worship, paying homage to the sun, rain, moon and other natural phenomena. When Buddhism was introduced from China in the sixth century A.D., carrying with it the superior culture, the more pro- found philosophy and the higher ethical code of China, it drove Shinto into obscurity for thirteen centuries. In the nineteenth century a modified Shinto was re- vived by nationalist scholars. They helped develop a spirit of devotion to the imperial family by publicizing the legend that the throne dated back to Emperor Jimmu f mythical founder of the Japanese Empire, and descendant 108 of the Sun Goddess. This theory provided ammuni- tion for the forces which succeeded in overthrowing the shogun and establishing the Meiji Restoration. Having had so much success in utilizing Shinto as a political device, the Meiji leaders next desired to develop it still further as a means of establishing a na- tional morale capable of waging aggressive wars. They would have liked to accomplish this simply by converting Shinto into the state religion, and abolishing all other religions, but were unable to do so because this would have brought them into a head-on collision with all the missionary-exporting Western Powers. Japan could not yet afford to offend those powers, particularly simul- taneously. The Meiji leaders solved their problem in a character- istically shrewd and opportunistic manner. Out of the heterogeneous background of legend and nature-worship, they developed two separate strains of Shinto which are legally and theoretically entirely distinct. One was "Sect Shinto," which is considered a religion of personal choice, equal before the law with Buddhism and Chris- tianity. The other was "State Shinto," comprising the special beliefs and practices associated with nationalism, the Emperor and his "divine ancestors." All Japanese are compulsorily devotees of State Shinto, regardless of whether their personal religion is Christianity, Buddhism or Sect Shinto. Thus, all Christians in Japan must worship also at State Shinto shrines. The next stage was to build up a popular reverence for the Emperor. One means was to Insist on that special type of "honorific" language which translates so peculi- arly into English, being replete with words like "august," "divine," "trepidation" and the like. The term "Son of Heaven" was apparently first used 109 in 1889. Bowing toward the Emperor's portrait was be- gun in the eighteen-nineties. Simultaneously there began a "Shintofication" of Japanese history, designed to "prove" that since 660 B.C. Japan had been "reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." Unfortunately, the authentic history of Japan proved no such thing. Most Japanese scholars in the 'twenties placed the founding of Japan at 40 B.C. Actually there was no authentic Japanese history before about the fifth century A.O., and most of the history after this time showed that the imperial line had been anything but unbroken. These "antinational" facts were corrected, however, by recalling any history textbooks which treated the throne with such irreverent candor, and replacing them by "purified" mytho-histories. Some of these are really impressive examples of "creative" history writing. In order to stretch the imperial line back to 660 B.C., it was necessary to give certain Emperors reigns of over a hundred years! Every effort was made to relate Japan's successes in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo- Japanese War a decade later to the newly-exalted Em- peror. The somewhat unexpected victories of aggres- sive, highly organized Japan over the lumbering colossi of China and Russia were ascribed to the miraculous influence of the Emperor's virtue and to the virtues of his imperial and divine ancestors. After each great victory, imperial envoys were sent to carry the good tidings to the Sun Goddess at her great shrine at Ise, Cannon captured from the Chinese, and later from the Russians, were officially installed at Ise, at Yasukuni and at the other principal Shinto shrines throughout the land thus identifying aggression, State Shinto and 110 national glory as a single concept in the popular mind. The shrines played an increasingly important role in developing the cult of Emperor-worship. State Shinto is sometimes called "Shrine Shinto" because it is based upon a nationwide network of state shrines. Above the simple village shrine level there are some 5000 State Shinto shrines all with standard ceremonies to be used during national festivals and other state occasions. This hierarchy of shrines culminates in the two most important ones in Japan: Yasukuni and Ise. The shrine at Ise honors the Sun Goddess, who is officially defined as the ancestress of the royal line. It is largely by means of the governmentally supervised worship of the Sun Goddess that the virtue of devotion to the state is infused with the sentiment of religious faith. The Yasukuni shrine, second in importance, is the most direct link between State Shinto and military ag- gression. The word Yasukuni means "Nation-Protect- ing," and the shrine is dedicated to the spirits of those who have died in the defense of the Empire. Those who have died in battle "for the Emperor" are deified there, amid impressive ceremonies. These shrines are perfect complements to each other. The Ise shrine establishes the divinity of the imperial family through its ancestress the Sun Goddess. All the wars of Japan therefore are holy wars, since they are under the supreme command of a divine Emperor who can do no wrong. Thus those who die fighting such a war have died for a holy cause and the ceremony at Yasukuni raises them to the rank of demigods, and makes them living denizens of the spirit world. Ill THE THRONE AND THE PACIFIC WAR The experience of this latest war has demonstrated without peradventure of doubt the effectiveness of Emperor-worship as the politico-religious backbone of Japanese aggression. As an inspiration to battle it has far surpassed the Nazi dogma of Aryan supremacy^ more nearly approaching the religious fervor of militant Mohammedanism, the fervor which in the seventh and eighth centuries made the Moors rulers of a realm more extensive than that of Rome at its height. The fanaticism of a heavily indoctrinated Japanese, believing himself a descendant -of the Sun Goddess, is directly comparable to the fiery enthusiasm of the "true believers" of Islam. The war aims of the Japanese, who seek only to spread the "august virtues" of the Emperor to the "eight corners" of the world, are as crusadingly religious as was the Mohammedan attempt to force the world into the Islamic fold. Like the Mohammedan warrior, for whom death in battle was the surest admission to Paradise, the Japanese soldier feels assured of deification at the shrine of Yasukuni. In short, the Japanese cult of Emperor-worship is the ideal auxiliary to aggression, because it combines an evangelical belief in the cause for which the soldier is fighting plus a special inducement for death in battle. The Emperor cult is the religion of a ruthless militarism. Japan's wartime government officials have demon- strated the importance of this institution by the extent to which they have utilized it during this war. In the past, it always has been the rule to use the name of the Emperor sparingly and with great restraint. This custom has been based on the unstated but practical theory that too much use of the revered symbol would 112 cheapen it. But as the war has developed from Japanese victories to Japanese reverses, and then to crushing de- feats, the Emperor has lost more and more of his imperial privacy. On increasingly frequent occasions, harsh acts of the government and blunders of the military in the fields have been smoothed over by artful identification of these otherwise depressing events with the person and desires of the Emperor. When reinforcements and supplies could not be sent to an isolated garrison, the military would send a proclamation signed by the Em- peror telling them to die to the last man in order to put his mind at ease. With increasing frequency, Tokyo propagandists used a congratulatory message from the Emperor to bolster fantastic claims of Japanese successes against the United States Pacific Fleet. On the eighth of every month, all newspapers had to publish the declara- tion of war against the United States and Britain, promul- gated over the Emperor's signature. There can be no doubt that the potency of the Emperor cult has had the result of prolonging the war by putting the stamp of divinity upon the suicidal, last- ditch fight of many Japanese garrisons. "Even though the war situation develops unfavorably," declared an article in the magazine Fuji in June 1943, "we must con- tinue to fight without food and ammunition. If there are no bullets, offer our bodies. If our bodies are broken, our spirits will fight on until the Emperor commands 'cease.' It is Japan's purpose to offer everything to shield the Emperor." The Emperor cult has been one of the main causes for the bestial atrocities of the Pacific war. To the in- doctrinated Japanese soldier all 1 military duties are per- formed on behalf of the Emperor. Consequently the atrocity-committing soldier feels he has no personal re- 113 sponsibility and the most despicable act Is ennobled be- cause it is performed on behalf of the god-Emperor. THE CHARLIE McCARTHY SCHOOL DISPROVED In view of these facts it must be stated flatly that we cannot do business with Emperor Hirohito or his suc- cessor for any purpose except to have him accept un- conditional surrender and order his forces to surrender, Any further utilization on our part will only be con- sidered by the Japanese as our recognition of the su- premacy of the Emperor, thus strengthening the in- stitution. We need have little fear that it will be impossibly difficult to administer Japan without manipulating the Emperor. Most groups in Japan will be anxious to please. The upper classes will probably be overanxious, hoping to maintain their relative position in society by ingratiat- ing themselves with the victors. Other classes will realize that we have in our hands the food and raw material imports and that life is likely to go on pretty much auto- matically if they co-operate. Those who have dealt with Japanese prisoners of war generally agree that, with the exception of a minority of incorrigible military fas- cists, most of the prisoners have been submissive and co-operative. There is little reason for the fear which seems to haunt the State Department and the Foreign Office that the Japanese bureaucracy will not work for us unless the Emperor orders them to. Bureaucracies the world over will work for whosoever pays their salaries; and Japanese civil servants, if anything, are more dependent upon their salaries than most. Any sabotage of military gov- 114 ernment will not come from our not having the imperial rubber stamp but from the presence in the bureaucracy of military fascists who must therefore be rooted out and destroyed. If such a clean-out is made in the top policy-making strata of the bureaucracy, there should be little difficulty in getting the lower ranks of the Japanese civil service to fall into line. The exponents of the Charlie McCarthy school also suggest that it is possible to make a "painless" transition to parliamentary government in Japan, by installing "liberal" or "moderate" advisers behind the throne. This is both dangerous and impractical. Such a government might have a parliamentary f agade, but It would remain an oligarchy even though the dominant members of the oligarchy were industrialists and polished aristocrats rather than arrogant militarists. In such a case, all that the military fascists would have to do would be to re- place these "liberals" as the powers behind the throne and they would once more be in command of the world's most perfect instrument for Internal repression and external aggression. No, there is no shortcut to reforming Japan. The history of the modern world has demonstrated that those people who have had a voice in their own affairs have been the most reluctant to go to war. Consequently, it Is in the interest of the United Nations to encourage the emergence of a Japan controlled by its people, rather than by an oligarchy operating under the protection of imperial sovereignty. A DANGEROUS ALTERNATIVE All the dangers in Allied policy toward the Emperor are not restricted to the possibility that we will be too 115 soft, or attempt to convert him Into an Allied tool Dangers also lurk in the policy of a premature, frontal attack on the throne. The danger arises not from the ob- jective but pom the incorrect strategy for achieving the correct objective. Many liberals in this country believe that the immediate elimination of the Emperor cult is essential This argument is based on the undeniable fact that Emperor-worship constitutes the most important weapon in the arsenal of Japan's autocrats and military fascists. Despite this, it is equally true that those who demand an immediate, direct and leveling attack on the Emperor, the imperial house and the whole religio-political system are indulging in a dangerous form of political irresponsi- bility. The demand is understandable and undoubtedly soul-satisfying to those who make it, but it may play into the hands of the militarists. The mistake is based on an underestimation of the powerful hold which the Emperor cult now has upon the Japanese people, a hold which although of com- paratively recent vintage is so strong that not one Jap- anese in fifty has even a critical attitude toward the throne. There is little evidence that even a disastrous defeat will seriously undermine the belief of the ma- jority of the Japanese in their Emperor, at least at first. The evidence available, however, indicates that there will be widespread resentment against the militarists, who, in Japanese political theory, are responsible for ad- vising the Emperor incorrectly. While the hold of the Emperor cult is likely to be shaken somewhat in certain narrow sections of the population, others are likely to cling ever more tightly to their faith in the throne dur- ing the confusion of the initial stages of political re- adjustment. 116 If the victorious Allies make the mistake of openly and prematurely throwing their Influence against the throne and the imperial house, they will present the Japanese militarists and chauvinists with the best po- litical opportunity they could desire the opportunity of deflecting popular sentiment against them into a holy crusade in defense of the Emperor. It is important to note that all those antifascists who have actually worked at converting Japanese prisoners of war from their military fascist ideology agree that it is impossible to solve the problem of the Emperor with a frontal attack. Mr. Wataru Kaji, the well-known Japanese revolutionary writer who has been working with the Chungking government since 1938 as a "psycho- logical adviser" directing propaganda among Japanese soldiers and civilians, has repeatedly warned against the danger of starting a "holy crusade" in Japan by a direct attack on the Emperor. Susumu Okano, experienced leader of the Japanese People's Emancipation League founded in Yenan, has also warned against a direct or premature attack on the throne. This is particularly significant because this organi- zation has done the most extensive work among Japanese prisoners, having converted some 500 of them by the end of 1944. Furthermore, Okano is the leading Japanese Communist and came to this conclusion after years of advocating the Emperor's overthrow and then only after consultation with a delegate of the Communists working underground within Japan. THE FLANK ATTACK The reluctance of these antifascists to raise the cry of "Down with the Emperor" as an immediate political 117 slogan, despite the fact that they are personally and doctrinally very strongly opposed to the retention of the Emperor cult, is purely a question of political strategy. In politics, as In war, when a frontal attack Is too costly, it is frequently advisable and no less effective to utilize a flank attack. This is undoubtedly the strategy which should be followed in this case, for It is possible to cut the institution off from its base, Isolate it and finally destroy it by attrition without ever incurring the risk of strengthening the militarists by a premature direct assault. Our attack should consist of three complementary thrusts. One should have the objective of weakening the sources of the throne's strength. The second should at- tempt to discredit the institution itself. And the third should support the democratic forces In Japan which will of themselves work to counter the influences of the throne. The throne has derived Its greatest strength from those forces which have used it to shield their nefarious ac- tivities. This includes first and foremost the military fascists, the jingoists, the extreme nationalists. Without exception the most arrant militarists, like Generals Araki and Tojo, have always been the most ardent exponents of the Emperor cult. Many of these can be "liquidated" as war criminals; others imprisoned as a threat to the security of our occupation forces; others sent to hard labor on vigilance bases in the Pacific and the remainder denied access to the press and radio. The great financial interests have also been strong supporters of the Emperor institution. Several of the Emperor's closest advisers have been related to the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo families. A weakening of the stranglehold of these great financial combines on the 118 Japanese economy will simultaneously weaken one of the main pillars of the throne. Other elements of the old ruling class, such as the landlords, aristocrats and Prus- sian-style bureaucrats, have also supported the throne. The fewer of these elements allowed to pollute the political atmosphere, the greater the opportunity for the development among the Japanese people of a more critical and rational attitude on this subject. At the same time, every attempt should be made to chip away at the institution itself. The rate of chipping and the weight of the blows should be keyed to the rate at which the Japanese people develop a critical attitude. It is both possible and advisable to secure the abdica- tion of the present Emperor after he has accepted our surrender demands and ordered his forces to give up. Under Japanese law only the Emperor can declare and end wars, and he is the commander in chief of the armed forces. Hirohito cannot escape some personal responsi- bility for the war because, first of all, he made no overt move to prevent it. Such action could have been decisive at various times when the ruling group was fairly evenly divided, such as when the militarists invaded Manchuria and the financial interests were wary. Furthermore, dur- ing the course of the war he has gone far beyond any historical precedents in supporting the military effort. Therefore, every effort should be made to secure his abdication, his acceptance of the onus for the declaration of war, for the war's unsuccessful prosecution and for the final defeat. We should encourage the propaganda of the democratic Japanese in driving this point home to their people. If and when it will contribute to the disillusionment of the Japanese people with the throne, we should try him as a war criminal, 119 Since it is impossible to abolish the Emperor cult from the outside with any finality, it would be advisable to try to encourage the cooling-off of Japanese ardor by put- ting the throne "on ice" as much as possible. One such step might be to allow the naming of one of Hirohito's children as his successor rather than his brother Prince Chichibu who has strong connections with the Mitsui or his other brothers. There is plenty of precedent for a child sovereign. For centuries, when the imperial in- stitution was in eclipse, there was a succession of infant and child sovereigns, each one generally being forced to abdicate as soon as he approached maturity. The new Emperor should be installed in one of the more inaccessible, easily guarded palaces like Hayama, and treated with courtesy. The only persons with access to him should be regents selected from the few members of the aristocracy with a record of opposition to mili- tarism and leanings toward democracy. These regents would not have much power in view of the transference of policy and lawmaking powers to the occupation au- thorities during the period of military government. It is possible to do a number of other things to dimmish the aura of sacredness surrounding the institution. One is to publicize the tremendous holdings of the Im- perial Household in banking and industrial stocks, bonds and land. It is not known in Japan that the Emperor's economic holdings make him almost as wealthy as the Mitsuis. Big Business is thoroughly and widely disliked in Japan and if it were widely disseminated that the Imperial Household ranks with the largest combines, and has made war profits out of the "holy war," there would be a considerable amount of disillusionment. This education should be accompanied by actions which would deprive the Imperial Household of its bil- 120 lion-yen wealth while benefiting those whom the insti- tution has helped to oppress and damage. The farmland should be turned over to the tenants tilling it. The wealth represented by the vast holdings of bonds and stocks should be turned over to the Japanese treasury to help finance reparations to the countries which Japan has ravaged. The State Shinto shrines, and particularly Yasukuni, should be stripped of their militarist aspects. It must be emphasized that this renovation can be carried out only by the Japanese people themselves, but this does not pre- clude considerable encouragement from occupation au- thorities. These authorities themselves should be very careful not to encourage the retention of the cult by the use of any of the prestige words customarily used to describe the Emperor, such as Tenno Heika, meaning "Heavenly Ruler." All superpatriotic films, which generally exalt the Emperor, should be banned and the widespread showing of Western films encouraged. The textbooks of Dr. Minobe and other jurists and historians who have taken a rational or critical attitude toward the throne should be reprinted and free discussion and criticism of the throne encouraged. The positive, and thus the most vital, step in weaken- ing the cult's hold is the strengthening of its natural op- ponents those who favor popular sovereignty against imperial sovereignty. During the period of military oc- cupation it should be possible to encourage the potential democratic forces in Japan in many ways. The occupy- ing authorities will have control over the radio, press and public gatherings. Allowing the antimilitarists and oppo- nents of the Emperor cult to have access to the radio and press, and permitting them to hold public meetings, while 121 discouraging the antidemocratic and pro-Emperor ele- ments, will be of great importance. Similarly, the occupy- ing authorities will have the opportunity of assisting and encouraging the work of co-operatives, peasant leagues, trade unions and other popular organizations which are certain to emerge in the postwar period. In other words, our support must be given to those forces that desire to carry through a far-reaching pro- gram of internal and political reform, rather than to those who seek to retain the old order shrouded in the blood-spotted vestments of the monarchy. 122 CHAPTER VI THE PROMISE OF A MINORITY Out of the war has come a series of sto- ries, jokes and humorous and semihumorous conjec- tures which reflect a feeling which is widely held in the United States: the only good Jap is a dead Jap. One of the best illustrations of this attitude is con- tained in the instructions to advancing Marines on Bou- gainville: "Every Jap has been told that it is his duty to die for the Emperor. It is your duty to* see that he does." On the battlefield this method has Its merits. How- ever, the same attitude is carried over into many of the plans offered for the postwar solution of the Japanese problem. One high-ranking naval officer has suggested that our postwar plans for Japan should be restricted to offering cut-rate, one-way tickets to a live volcano famous In Japan as a suicide spot. Washington has re- ceived a steady flow of suggestions and plans as to how to bring the war to a quick end, and solve the problems of the peace such as causing an artificial earthquake which will cause all of Japan to slide down into the Pacific deeps. The prevalence of the feeling that the Japanese are an incurably warlike nation of 70,000,000 fanatics is also indicated by public opinion polls. In a poll taken by the Denver National Opinion Center in June 1943, of those having opinions six out of ten persons felt that the Jap- anese will always want to go to war; three out of ten felt that while the Japanese may not like war they are too easily led into war by powerful leaders; only one 123 out of ten felt that the Japanese people do not like war and if they could have the same chance as people In other countries they would become good citizens of the world. THE FANATIC JAPANESE The last-ditch struggle of Japanese troops on Attu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and other places, reports of suicidal banzai charges and mass civilian suicides have convinced many that all Japanese are incomprehensible, incurable fanatics. When American troops landed on the Island of Toka- shiki in the Kurama Group of islands in March 1945, preparatory to the landing on Okinawa, they came upon a mass civilian suicide which was certainly incompre- hensible at first. Advancing patrols of the 77th Division heard inhuman screaming and wailing and bursts of hand grenades. Finally they came upon a gully littered with nearly 200 dead and dying civilians who had committed suicide using all sorts of methods from self-strangulation to holding hand grenades against their chests. One group apparently included an entire family, consisting of a father, two small children and a grandfather and grand- mother. When the survivors were questioned it turned out that the civilians were victims of Japanese propaganda sto- ries that death was better than the fate which would await them at the hands of the Western barbarians. Jap- anese soldiers had told them that the Americans would violate and torture the women and kill the men. At the urging of the soldiers and in order to save themselves from what they thought would be a more horrible fate, the civilians had attempted suicide en masse. 124 The civilians who did not attempt to kill themselves, or else did not succeed, expressed amazement and grati- tude for the food and medical treatment given them. In no case was there any attempt at suicide after capture and treatment by the American forces. There was, of course, tremendous remorse on the part of heads of families who had killed their children but did not succeed in doing away with themselves. One old man who had strangled his daughter was overcome with grief when he saw other women unharmed and well-treated. Along with the feeling of gratitude for good treat- ment and grief for those who had died needlessly was a deep resentment against soldier and civilian ringleaders of the suicide movement, A group of seventy civilian refugees, munching food, stopped when a Japanese sol- dier was put in the circle with them. They turned on him and denounced him with such vehemence that the American soldiers were forced to move him elsewhere for his own safety. This incident would seem to indicate that the civilian suicides, rather than being the acts of incomprehensible fanatics, were those of peoples so thoroughly isolated from any outside truth and so saturated with lying propa- ganda about the sadistic brutality of Americans that they preferred suicide to a fate which they believed would be worse. The suicidal banzai charge of a hopelessly outnum- bered Japanese military force is similarly comprehen- sible. The soldier and the potential soldier has been the particular object of propaganda virtually from the day of birth. In the schools, shrines, youth associations, mili- tary camps, and through the newspapers, radio and movies he has been indoctrinated with one idea above all that there is no higher attainment than dying in 125 battle for the Emperor. But -and here Is the crucial point -the authorities have not even trusted this sat- urating propaganda. They have reinforced it by a num- ber of devices calculated to prevent soldiers from sur- rendering. The soldier knows that if he surrenders his family will be disgraced and he has been convinced that he himself will never be allowed to return to ^ Japan. The authorities have convinced the troops that if they are captured by American forces they will be tortured and lolled, probably by being run over by a tank or bulldozer. In addition, virtually every unit has had a core of fanatic military fascists ready to shoot in the back any man attempting to surrender. Consequently the motivation of some of those participating in a suicidal banzai charge is not necessarily fanaticism but the feeling that since their position is hopeless and they cannot sur- render either honorably or safely they may as well die in a final burst of glory. JAPAN FEARS HER PEOPLE The Japanese leaders have betrayed their knowledge that their people are not incurably warlike by the ex- treme attempts they have made to prevent Allied propa- ganda from reaching them. After the overthrow of Mus- solini, Japanese newspapers and magazines discussed in great detail the Allied methods of psychological warfare used in turning the Italian people against Fascism, and expressed concern that similar tactics would be tried against Japan. Tokyo revealed even greater uneasiness when American forces captured Saipan in July 1944. On July 16 the Asahi published an article entitled "Next Will Come Paper Bombs." This showed deep concern over the effect of leaflets which might be dropped in 126 Japan by planes operating from bases In China and Saipan. It warned that "the United States and England are clever old hands at" psychological warfare. "They were successful In Italy and other places." Official circles predicted that intensified American broadcasts would emanate from Saipan and the people were furnished with a list of official Japanese announcers and commentators. They were told to familiarize them- selves with the sound of the official announcers' voices and to shut off their radios If any unidentified announcers or strange voices came on the air with news. On July 17 the Asahi betrayed the same fear: "Japan has forbidden its citizens to receive short-wave broad- casts and thought herself perfectly safe, but from today onwards she cannot set her mind at rest." On August 15 the same paper warned that it was not entirely nonsense to say that the Japanese people were like hothouse flow- ers since "it really can be said that as regards enemy propaganda, our ears have received very little training." As predicted by the Japanese, psychological warfare reached a new high in December 1944 when the United States Office of War Information began beaming broad- casts to Japan from the new and powerful medium-wave transmitter on Saipan. This new transmitter opened a vast new avenue for reaching the Japanese people by radio. Until then Allied radio propaganda had been short-waved, and such broadcasts could only be re- ceived on a relatively few sets concentrated in the hands of government officials, industrialists and militarist lead- ers. It was a tremendous advance when the Saipan sta- tion was able to transmit to an estimated 5,000,000 medium-wave receiving sets in Japan. The Tokyo radio attempted to answer this threat by calling on all its domestic listeners to turn off their re- 127 ceiving sets and go to bed at the end of the regular broadcasting schedule. The reason for this was that the OWI transmitter went on the air as soon as the regular Japanese broadcasting schedule was over. These frantic attempts to maintain the Isolation of the Japanese people from the world of peaceful^ and democratic ideas have demonstrated official recognition of the fact that despite years of extremely intensive militarist indoctrination the Japanese are still susceptible to peaceful and democratic propaganda. RESISTANCE AND SUPPRESSION The Japanese government has not only been con- cerned with passive susceptibility to these ideas, but has had to take extensive and brutal repressive measures against those who have militantly supported them, even at the risk of their lives. Japan is as close to a police- state as any country can come. For half a century the authorities have mobilized every weapon at their dis- posal to uproot and destroy all vestiges of democratic and peaceful thought in Japan. The Japanese ruling oligarchy, both civilian and military, has always main- tained itself in large part through police terror. Even during the 1920's, when the somewhat increased role of the political parties led many to believe that Japan was on the way to a constitutional democracy, the par- liamentary fagade hid the sordid reality of a police despotism which denied the people the most elemen- tary human rights. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent of the powers of the police in Japan. They have always been at lib- erty to brush aside the existing laws under the pretext that their actions are required to "maintain the peace." 128 Although incarceration without trial is illegal, even in the 'twenties the police were arresting people and hold- ing them for as long as two years while "examining" them. Many of those being held for questioning are later reported to have died of "heart failure." The same excesses of torture and brutality which the Japanese military have demonstrated against Allied pris- oners and the people of the occupied areas were first unleashed by the Japanese police against those of their own people who resisted the drive toward aggression and repression. In the autumn of 1935 there was a pub- licly announced meeting of penitentiary wardens in Tokyo to discuss what torture instruments were best for Japanese prisoners. "A new instrument, undescribed, is said to be under contemplation for use on women prisoners," declared the Japan Advertiser of October 12, 1935. One of the outstanding examples of police brutality was the murder of Takiji Kobayashi, Japan's foremost proletarian writer. He was only thirty when he was killed in 1933, but he had already achieved a wide repu- tation with such powerful stories of popular discontent as The Cannery Boat. He had already served several prison terms for leftist agitation, and was again engaged in that type of illegal activity when he was caught by the police on February 21, 1933. On the street he strug- gled with the police for half an hour and almost suc- ceeded in escaping. He was finally overcome and dragged to the police station where third-degree methods were applied to him. Within five hours he was tortured to death, apparently without revealing the names of his associates. The police secured a death certificate which stated that he had died of "heart trouble," and the body was handed over to his mother, who, when she saw it, 129 refused to believe the police story. Friends contacted all the big hospitals requesting a post-mortem examination, but were refused everywhere. One hospital finally did consent, only to refuse when the body was brought and they realized its identity. Photographs of the body were taken, however, and these clearly revealed evi- dence of torture. On the forehead was the brand of a red-hot poker. On the neck were the cuts of a thin, tight rope. The wrists showed handcuff bruises, while one wrist was twisted completely around. The entire back was rubbed raw and from the knees up the legs were swollen and purple with internal bleeding. Arrest and brutal torture were experienced not alone by the Communists, although those arrested were gen- erally described as "Communists" or possessors of "dan- gerous thoughts." Between 1931 and 1934 more than 24,000 alleged Communists were seized and imprisoned. The Japan Times reported in 1936 that more than 59,000 persons had been arrested for various "dangerous thoughts" offenses during the preceding three years. These offenses extended to any intellectual, political or economic deviation from that prescribed by the increas- ingly repressive and aggressive government. In addition to actual Communists and leaders of labor and peasant unions who sought more rice for their followers, teachers in primary schools were arrested for seeking to give a modern interpretation to the Emperor myths that pass for history in Japan. Nurses were arrested for asking for more than forty cents in payment for twelve hours of work; so were university professors who contributed funds to help liberal candidates seek election to the Diet. Not only left-wing workers, but lawyers, college pro- fessors and the sons and daughters of millionaires, of 130 members of the House of Peers and of judges were among those caught In the police dragnet. Japan, like Germany, made every effort to crush in- ternal opposition before embarking upon its major ag- gression; and by the time of Pearl Harbor, Japan's po- litical organizations and trade unions had been fairly thoroughly crushed. But perhaps the most important political victory which the Japanese oligarchy won in the course of its suppressive efforts was won in the United States. The military fascists benefited greatly from the failure of Americans to realize that the internal suppres- sion of democrats and even radicals in Japan was a vital step in the direction of external aggression against the United States and other peaceful powers. We did not realize that the torture and death of a Japanese leftist for opposing war was preliminary to a war in which American, British and Chinese prisoners of war were to be tortured and killed. Even after Pearl Harbor there have been a fairly con- siderable number of indications of a persistence of anti- militarism, particularly among intellectuals and indus- trial laborers. There have been authentic reports of ar- rests, strikes, absenteeism, the banning of leading maga- zines. Had such events occurred in Germany, they would have merited newspaper headlines. Because they hap- pened in Japan they were almost entirely ignored. THE DEMOCRATIC MINORITY The capture of Saipan in July 1944 and with it the capture of thousands of Japanese civilians gave Ameri- can psychological warfare officials their first opportu- nity to determine Japanese reactions without having to 131 guess at the inner significance of information gleaned from Japanese broadcasts or captured periodicals. In order to get answers to questions in which they were interested, a poll was conducted on Saipan in Camp Suspe, where 13,243 Japanese were housed. This poll was conducted by American officers trained in the Japanese language and was limited to 500 Japanese civilians selected according to education, station in life and sex, so as to give the nearest possible cross-section of civilian Japanese opinion as it might exist in the home- land. One of the questions asked was: "Do you want a government in which the people rule? 7 ' Of those an- swering fifty-one said "yes," 290 said "no" and 151 de- clared that they did not know. Thus one out of ten interrogated and one out of seven with opinions ex- pressed a desire for democracy. At first sight this percentage may seem very small and therefore discouraging to hopes for a democratization of Japan. But a closer study of these results shows such pes- simism not only unwarranted but dangerous. It is not at all surprising that only a small minority answered in the affirmative to the question: "Do you want a government in which the people rule?" It would be more indicative of the real democratic potential of Japan if the farmer being polled were asked whether he wanted a democracy which could bring him lower rents and taxes and the ability to buy his own land on easy terms. The industrial worker should be asked whether he is interested in supporting a democracy in which he could obtain an eight-hour day, the right to organize free trade unions of his own choice and to bargain collec- tively. The small business man and merchant should be asked whether they would work for a democracy in which the tremendous power of Mitsui and Mitsubishi 132 could be curbed and the little fellow given an opportu- nity. And the intellectual should be queried as to his reaction to a democracy which would permit freedom of expression and give him the opportunity to use his talents for the general welfare. For every Japanese who consciously desires a demo- cratic government there are probably a half-dozen peas- ants, workers, and small business men with a purely nega- tive resentment of their present condition. This majority does not as yet connect its deep hunger for an improve- ment of their abysmally depressed condition with the political system of democracy. They think of democracy in terms of corrupt political parties owned by the great trusts and big landlords. They have as yet no concept of the possibilities of democracy in its full Lincolnian sense: government of, by and for the people. If these implications and possibilities of popular rule had been developed in the poll of the Saipan civilians, it almost certainly would have produced a larger pro- portion in favor of democracy for Japan. Even a small minority favoring democracy is a tribute to popular resistance to the pressures of military fascism. For upwards of half a century the Japanese have been subjected to an unending stream of all-pervading propa- ganda extolling imperial sovereignty against sovereignty of the people. They have been inculcated with the idea that their "spiritual superiority" was due to their pos- session of a "heaven-descended" monarchy. On the other hand, Japanese governmental and semiofficial propa- ganda has ridiculed the democracies as soft, effete, selfish and "spiritually weak." Furthermore, during the 'twen- ties, the major political parties which pretended to favor democracy had turned out to be corrupt tools of the giant trusts, and police terror made it extremely difficult 133 to support any political party closer to the needs of the people. For even a minority to retain a belief in democ- racy under these circumstances is a tribute to the strength of the belief. THE USE OF A MINORITY The existence of this minority of conscious opponents of the old regime can be of inestimable value to the oc- cupying authorities. Although these authorities have su- preme power during the period of occupation, the actual execution of our policies must necessarily be carried out by Japanese. If this democratic minority did not exist we would be forced to choose the least objectionable of the old regime's officials to work with those who would be least likely to sabotage Allied occupation policies. The existence of a democratic minority enables us to select administrators from among those in sympathy with the Allies and desirous not of retaining the old regime but of diverting Japan into peaceful and democratic paths. In addition to the professionally trained democrats who will be needed for positions requiring their skills, other friendly antimilitarists can be of great service as a bridge between our forces and the Japanese population. We have already had indications of how helpful this can be, one of the most interesting examples occurring during the period of the final pacification of Guam. The American marines assigned to completing the pacification of the island used two techniques. One was the usual one of wiping out the holed-up survivors with rifles, machine guns and flame throwers. The other was completely different it was psychological warfare aimed at inducing the Japanese to surrender. The psychological warfare outfit was headed by two 134 navy lieutenants, Lieutenant William Jones and Lieu- tenant John Oliver. On Guam they were the originators, producers and directors of a sound-truck show with which they toured the jungle country where the Japa- nese were hiding out. It wasn't a riskless job. They had an eight-man marine guard on the alert for ambushes; more than once they were fired upon by Japanese die- hards. The star of this show was a Japanese captive nick- named "Taki." He didn't exactly belong to the aristoc- racy. He had been a civilian attached to the Japanese army, with the job of supervising the feminine inmates of the "consolation-houses" whom that army had re- cruited in Japan and Korea. Taki had previously been a small business man driven out of his business by the government-sponsored activities of a "Laibatsu concern. After capture he volunteered for the risky job of going out as an announcer with the sound truck to induce the remaining Japanese to surrender. His collaboration with our forces was a means of getting back at a society which deprived him of what he considered to be his just rights. With Taki went another volunteer who had been a sergeant major in the Japanese army before his own surrender. Once the sound truck, with its prisoner volunteers, marine guard and navy language-officers reached its daily destination, the marine guards would deploy to prevent ambush and Taki would go into his act. For hours, spelled only briefly by the sergeant major, Taki called upon the Japanese in the jungle to surrender. He told them that it was not a disgrace to surrender and that further resistance was useless. He gave them the latest news of American landings and victories. He took verbal swipes at bushido and stressed the futility of fighting f OJF 135 the Emperor in a war which was already practically lost. The glory of dying in battle was nonsense, he shouted. "Bushido is dead," he declared, "there will be no bushido in the next generation." Because he was Japanese himself he could more easily persuade them that they would get humane treatment from the Americans, instead of the torture and death which propaganda had led them to expect. He told them that they would get good food and medical treatment. "It must be nice to be hungry and get shot and live like animals," he would say sarcastically. "Maybe you would not like to be given food and American cigarettes, and American doctors if you are sick. Maybe you would like to stay in the jungle and be wounded and killed." Many prisoners were captured through ^the use of these two antirnilitarists. A minority? Definitely. But a minority of great value. MINORITY INTO MAJORITY Time and again in Europe we have been surprised at the great rapidity with which democratic and antifascist groups have developed once the tight band of repression is broken. With regard to Italy, hardly any of the Anglo- American experts would admit to the existence of any substantial number of antifascists up to the very fall of Mussolini. And then, when the opportunity presented itself, the antifascists not only appeared, but grew with what some considered embarrassing rapidity. Those Japanese advocating a program of democracy and social reform have one great advantage over their German counterparts. The mass of the Japanese people have not at any time benefited economically from the war, When Nazi conquests were at their height, many a 136 German family received a pound of butter a week from its soldier son in Denmark or Norway. Or perhaps it was bacon from Holland, silk stockings from France, sweat- ers from Belgium or shoes from Czechoslovakia. The poorest German peasant could get an Eastern slave to do the dirty work on the farm for ten marks. In short, Ger- mans lived on the loot of all Europe. But for the common man in Japan there have been no material advantages from the war. The army has lived off the countryside in China and the southern regions but there has been hardly any loot in luxury or consumer goods to ship back, or the shipping in which to transport it. And the small amount which did come went into the hands of ranking militarists and Zaibatsu families and did not filter down to the middle or lower classes. The giant Japanese trusts have gained through the exploitation of the southern region's raw materials, but the products have generally been war goods and the great mass of the people remained on a bare subsistence level. Ealrly in the war Japan's critical shipping shortage made it impossible to import any large quantities of rice. Similarly, the short- age of fuel, small ships and manpower ate into the Japa- nese fishing fleet and reduced the fishing catch. By the autumn of 1944 large numbers in Japan made the transi- tion from bare subsistence to slow starvation. The fact that the vast majority of Japanese profited not at all from aggression is of great importance for the future. They will have no "good old days" of material prosperity from conquests to look back to and even a slight improvement over their subsistence living as a result of the reforms of a democratic government is likely to win their ap- preciation. Further evidence of the democratic potential can be gleaned from a study of the Japanese prisoners. German 137 prisoners generally surrender much more easily, but for the most part they remain arrogant and insolent, contemptuous of the considerate treatment they are ac- corded. Among the Japanese captives, most are fright- ened at the outset, having been convinced by the Japa- nese authorities that we would torture and loll them. After the initial period of decent treatment, a minority of incorrigible military fascists remains sullen and unco- operative. The majority are co-operative and grateful for decent treatment, although they are reluctant to express it if the fanatic militarists are around. Many express amazement and appreciation over the fact that they re- ceive as good rations as our own troops in forward areas. One of the most marked reactions of the Japanese captive has been toward the easy relation between offi- cers and men in the American army. The Japanese army is thoroughly imbued with the oppressive feudal class system. Not only are officers free to strike enlisted men, but sergeants customarily cuff corporals, and corporals slap privates. One captive Japanese non-com was over- come with admiration for the democracy in American military ranks when an American officer lit his cigarette for him; for a Japanese officer would never "degrade" himself by lighting the cigarette of a subordinate, much less that of a prisoner of war. It would seem, therefore, that the forces for democ- racy in Japan consist of two groups at different stages of advancement. The vanguard is a fairly small minority of those who are consciously and courageously antimilita- rist and strive for a new Japan in which democracy will be the keynote of its political, economic and social struc- ture. The great reservoir of democratic potential, how- ever, consists of that group which, as a result of long years of indoctrination, does not as yet favor political 138 democracy but desires the better living standards, free- dom of expression and reduction in social distinctions which come with popular rule. In view of this situation, the enlightened self -Interest of the United Nations would seem to dictate twin ac- tions: The first is to rely for our Japanese administrators on those with a consistent record of opposition to militarism. We shall be building upon sand if we depend on turncoat opportunists who collaborated unhesitatingly with the militarists and fascists so long as the going was good and then sought to get out from under by repudiating their leaders in defeat. In other words, we should look more to the political prisons than to the countinghouses for the future leaders of Japan. The second course of action should be to facilitate the efforts being made by Japan's conscious democrats to harness the power of discontent to a broad movement ca- pable of carrying through the required purification and the construction of a new Japan upon new foundations. 139 CHAPTER VII JAPAN'S HARDY DEMOCRATS One of the most intriguing bits of political intelligence to come out of Japan during the course of the war was the revelation on June 27, 1944 that Yukio Ozaki, Japan's greatest democratic spokesman, had been acquitted by the Supreme Court of charges of Use- majeste. According to Domei, this decision reversed a previous ruling rendered by a lower court under which the eighty-five-year-old Ozaki was convicted and sen- tenced to eight months' imprisonment, the sentence to take effect after two years. Ozaki had been "accused for a statement made during the course of a political cam- paign speech in April, 1942." The authorities apparently felt that if Ozaki were to die in prison he would become a martyr for the few but persistent Liberal opponents of the regime. This action was more than a tribute to the courage and popularity of a veteran democrat. For Ozaki is more than an individual Rather, he is the symbol of a whole stream of Japanese political life. THE FIRST UPSURGE During the 'eighties Ozaki was one of a group of young men leading a movement whose, profound impor- tance is little known either in Japan or in jthe outside world. This was the "Freedom and People's Rights Movement" (Jiyu minken undo) and its purpose was to broaden the limited technical, governmental and eco- nomic reforms of the Meiji period into a thoroughgoing 140 democratic and antif eudal reformation like the American and French Revolutions. It is not at all surprising that in the Western world little is known of this dramatic movement. Actually the names of important liberal leaders and theoreticians are scarcely known even in Japan, except for a limited circle of political and constitutional historians. The reason for this is that official circles in Japan have made a deliberate effort to obscure and distort Japan's early struggle for democracy. The democratic agitation, which reached its high- water mark in the years 1880 to 1885, was a broad move- ment embracing wide and varied classes and for a brief period constituted a serious challenge to the autocracy. Its criticism of Japanese society and government policy was incisive and it appealed to the most enlightened mem- bers of the former samurai class, the small merchants who complained of "taxation without representation" and the small farmers who were overburdened by taxation, rent and interest charges. By 1881 this democratic agitation had swept through the large centers of the country and was causing the government grave concern. There were two parties spearheading this democratic movement: the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) and the Progres- sive Party (Kaishinto). The Liberal Party was the more dynamic, with a program more closely keyed to the needs of the populace, and therefore it had a wider fol- lowing. Its leader was Taisuke Itagaki, but its theoretician and tactician was Emori Ueki, who might be called the Torn Paine of the Japanese democratic movement. Ueki, like Paine, defended the principles of the French Revolution, though he was careful not to claim baldly that republicanism was necessarily suitable to Japan. He favored a thorough democratic renovation, including 141 the introduction of representative institutions based on universal suffrage and a bill of civil rights. He advocated parliamentary control of finance, the full control of the army by the civil government and the right of an elective assembly to impeach any minister of state. Ueki wrote: "The Japanese State must not pass any law which de- creases in any way the free rights of an individual Jap- anese." The intoxicating ideas of a liberal democracy propa- gated by the followers of Ueki created a ferment among the poorer classes, particularly in Kochi Prefecture in Shikoku, where the Liberal Party was most active. One of the most interesting glimpses of this ferment is pro- vided in a contemporary newspaper account, translated by the brilliant young Canadian scholar E. Herbert Nor- man in his recent study Feudal Background of Japanese Politics. It is a report of a meeting held on June 10, 1881 with Taisuke Itagaki, the leader of the Liberal Party, as the main speaker: . . . Itagaki spoke and as usual there was great applause and cries of approval through the building, but when this had died down, two sturdy workmen wearing blue denim (their names were Umaji and Ushitaro) jumped up on the platform and commenced to speak in favor of social equality and their words were spoken with such vehemence and passion that they put to shame the Russian nihilists. The audience looked at them with amazement because it ap- peared that they were not members of the audience but two of the cooks who worked in the kitchen of the hall in which the meeting was being held. Itagaki was moved so much by the strong feeling of the plebeian class revealed here in which they understood the changed situation in which Japan found itself that he again got up to speak and greatly stirred the emotions of the audi- 142 ence. The people of Kochi prefecture are most earnest In disseminating the principles of democracy and if even those who perform the task of preparing food can speak with such eloquence on the rights of social equality and display such feelings and passion it goes without saying what strength the principles of our party [the Liberal Party] have in this prefecture. . . , That the Meiji oligarchy felt apprehension over such developments was indicated by an attack on the demo- crats made by Marquis Sasaki a few years later, when he was Vice-President of the Japanese Senate: "In the pres- ent day such extreme people as those who shout and cry out to the populace about people's rights are disturbing the Empire by their pens and tongues. ... [If] these violent extremists, this whole group of perfidious rascals, had attained their purpose then unavoidably it would have meant introducing the French Revolution into the country; a constitution of which we would bitterly re- pent would have been established." The Progressive Party provided another sharp thorn in the side of the Tokyo autocrats. This did not appeal as strongly to the populace as the Liberal Party but ad- vocated moderate reforms on behalf of out-of-office bureaucrats, the city intelligentsia and some of the promi- nent merchants and industrialists, notably the Mitsu- bishi firm. During the 'eighties perhaps the most conten- tious subject was the problem of sovereignty. The Lib- eral Party declared that sovereignty lay with the people, while the Progressive Party declared that sovereignty lay jointly in the throne and the people's representatives. The oligarchy, of course, held that it was inalienably attached to the Emperor's person. It was in the Progressive Party that Yukio Ozaki got his first experience in politics, as a protege of Count 143 Shigenobu Okuma, founder of the party. Count Okuma was fundamentally an opportunist who, when out of office, became a liberal as a means of attracting popular support. Despite Okuma' s personal opportunism, many of his followers in the Progressive Party were sincerely and courageously liberal The form which the opposi- tion of both the Progressive and Liberal parties to the ruling autocracy took was primarily propagandist. They eschewed terrorism and violent Putsch tactics and uti- lized political meetings, pamphlets and newspapers in- stead as their most important means of reaching the people. During the early period of his political activity, Ozaki was primarily a newspaperman and he became successively the editor of the Niigata Shimbun, the Hochi and later the Choya Shimbun, which under his editorship became the most important Japanese journal champion- ing the liberal viewpoint. In 1875 the government struck hard at these first beginnings of democratic agitation by passing a new press law and a new libel law. A reign of terror was inaugurated against journalists and other ad- vocates of liberalism. During July 1875 every editor in Tokyo was arrested at least once and either imprisoned or heavily fined. But this did not stop the flow of newspapers and pamphlets opposing the oligarchy. In 1882 the already stringent press laws were further tightened. In 1883 forty-nine newspapers were suspended altogether. In the next few years restrictions were made still harsher, cul- minating in the notorious Peace Preservation Law of 1887, an act specifically designed to rid Tokyo of liberal leaders. As a result, 570 liberals, including Ozaki, were driven out of Tokyo. 144 TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE After a tour of Europe and America, Ozaki returned to Japan to begin one of the most remarkable legislative careers in any country. He was elected to the Diet from Miye Prefecture in 1890, and has been elected to every successive Diet since that time from the same prefecture. Under the Japanese constitution, the Diet's powers were severely restricted, and parliamentary leaders could at best be little more than spokesmen of public opinion. Ozaki was precisely this, utilizing his seat to play the role of "tribune of the people." He also capitalized on his close connections with Count Okuma to improve his position in the government. When the latter became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1897, Ozaki became Coun- cilor of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and subsequently served as Minister of Education in the Okuma govern- ment of 1898. He did not, however, allow this position to interfere with his championing of popular rights, and actually caused the downfall of the Okuma government in that year by an attack on the power of the great trusts in the Japanese government, an act which took consider- able political courage because Count Okuma, his politi- cal sponsor, was a spokesman for Mitsubishi. Ozaki was severely criticized for his action, and the Okuma Cabinet was compelled to resign. In 1913 Ozaki launched the "Movement for the De- fense of Constitutional Politics" in collaboration with Tsuyoshi Inukai, who later became Prime Minister and was assassinated by military extremists in the May Fif- teenth Incident in 1932. It was in connection with this movement to convert Japan into a parliamentary democ- racy that Ozaki won the title "God of Constitutional Politics." 145 THE LIBERAL RESURGENCE The impact of the World War and the Russian Revo- lution created a considerable political ferment m Japan. Socialist thought made heavy inroads among the intel- lectuals and particularly among the industrial laborers At the same time there was a considerable upsurge of democratic ideology in middle-class intellectual circles, partly as a result of the wide influence of Wilsoman ideal- ism. Wilson's attacks on Prussian autocracy and Prus- sian militarism were considered by many to be equally applicable to Japan's autocrats and militarists. Liberalism was widespread among Japanese journalists and in some cases was reflected in the attitudes of impor- tant newspapers. For many years the Osaka Asalil and its sister journal, the Tokyo Asahi, were fairly consistent upholders of democratic ideas. They criticized the gov- erning oligarchy and its aggressive militarism and, in 1918, resolutely opposed Japan's intervention in Siberia. These attitudes were most objectionable to the militarist autocrats ruling Japan, and when the Osaka Asahi pro- tested against the suppression of the news of the momen- tous rice riots in 1918, the paper was indicted for dis- turbing the public peace. The trial was held in secret ses- sion and the court ordered the Asahi to disclaim its lib- eral views, to print a public apology for its opposition to the government and to dismiss nine members of its staff who were suspected of favoring the establishment of a republican government for Japan. The president of the company publishing the paper was forced to retire tem- porarily as a means of demonstrating his contriteness for the liberalism of his paper. The staff of the Tokyo Asahi thereupon showed its 146 distaste for the retreat of the Osaka paper. They pub- lished a manifesto of protest against the "craven attitude" of the Osaka journal. They warned that there was an at- tempt to foist the same "belated ideas of militarists and bureaucrats" upon the Tokyo paper as well and attacked the "despicable actions of the Tokyo colleagues who seek to curry favor by truckling to the wishes of the bureau- crats." The men responsible for this manifesto, the entire political and economic staff of the Tokyo paper, there- upon resigned en masse. Political ferment and democratic ideas were even more widespread in academic circles. It required considerable courage for Japanese college and university students to be interested in nontraditional ideas. Entrance to col- leges and universities in Japan is extremely difficult and comes only after severe competitive examinations. At the same time, success in Japanese communities depends to an unparalleled degree upon the possession of a college diploma. Therefore there was considerable pressure upon the students to "stay out of trouble" by staying away from all nontraditional ideas. Despite this pressure and despite close government supervision the schools became centers of democratic thought. The bulletin boards of all the universities were filled with notices of new societies to study "soci- ology." All were viewed with grave suspicion by the authorities. An official order from the Minister of Edu- cation in April 1926 prohibited the formation or the meeting of any such societies, forbade even the private reading or discussion of "studies concerning dangerous thoughts," and refused permission for the holding of any inter-university conferences on social studies. The oldest and one of the most influential universities did not per- 147 mit its students to draw books from its well-stocked li- braries until their senior year, and then only in connec- tion with the subjects of their graduation theses. Some of the attempts to control student opinion were somewhat ludicrous. In February 1926 for example the Tokyo police grilled officials of Phi Beta Kappa on the suspicion that the society was radical. The police sus- picions were apparently aroused by the fact that the group had a Greek name, but no Greeks were mem- bers! Despite close police supervision some of the coura- geous democratic intellectuals managed to level some ef- fective blows against the traditional ideas propagated by the governing oligarchy. One of the most telling attacks of this sort was an article under the innocuous title "The Ethical Significance of Worship at the Shrines," which appeared in the December 1920 issue of Chtio Koran* The author was the liberal Dr. Sakuzo Yoshino, a profes- sor at Tokyo Imperial University and a leader of the New Man Society (Shinjinkai) . In the article Dr. Yoshino struck an indirect but telling blow at the institution of deifying dead warriors by telling of a case which had occurred in the family of a friend. The father had been asked by one of his children why the souls of dead sol- diers were enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. He answered that it was because they had given their lives for their Emperor. The child then asked if a servant who had been employed in their home and who had lost his life in the war was enshrined there. The father replied that he was; that this former servant had died in battle and accord- ingly his spirit was enshrined at Yasukuni. The child knew that this person was a particularly bad character. He had lied, dissipated and had been an outright thief. The father finally convinced the child that no matter 148 how bad a person he had been, if he died in battle, his former sins were blotted out and he became a god worthy of the worship of the best living Japanese. But after he had convinced the child, the father himself was troubled by the influence of this incident on his child. He felt that the example of a bad person who had been elevated to the ranks of a deity was a poor influence for the moral education of the young. So lasting an impression was made by this somewhat indirect attack that even eighteen years later it was the target of violent criticism. In its issue of September 18, 1938, the Teikoku Shimpo, an influential Tokyo news- paper, resurrected this article and made a vigorous at- tack upon it. The author of this article, Dr. Yoshino, was not the only liberal on the staff of the Tokyo Imperial Univer- sity. The social science faculty had a number of profes- sors with a democratic outlook and some who were fairly radical. Professor Morito, of the Department of Eco- nomics, was dismissed from his position and sentenced to a brief term in jail in 1920. His crime was an article entitled "A Study of the Social Thought of Kropotkin" which he wrote for the journal Economic Research (Keizaigaku Kenkyu) published by the University. The police declared that the article tended to propagate the anarchistic views of Kropotkin. Mass meetings were held protesting the attack on Professor Morito as a threat to freedom of thought. Within a short time the leading bookstore in Tokyo was entirely cleared of Kropotkin's writings by students eager to read what the police had forbidden. In the months that followed, various mag- azines published articles on Kropotkin and the suppres- sion of issues of four magazines resulted. Other more cautious professors in the Tokyo Imperial 149 University, Kelo University and elsewhere managed to evoke democratic thoughts and critical and rational atti- tudes in their students without provoking suspension or police action. As a result of the activities of these liberal and leftist teachers, the most liberal strain in the edu- cated middle classes is to be found today among those who received their university training in the 'twenties, particularly at the Tokyo Imperial University. During the liberal resurgence of the 'twenties, Yukio Ozald remained the outstanding political spokesman of antimilitarist, democratic thought. In February 1921 he introduced a resolution in the lower house of the Diet demanding a reduction of naval armaments in concert with Great Britain and the United States, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. He publicly opposed the Peace Preservation Laws of 1925 and 1928, which imposed even more drastic restrictions upon "dangerous thoughts." What is more important, however, is the fact that he continued to work and speak openly for peace in the 1930's when it had become physically dangerous to do so. In 1932, while traveling abroad, Ozald declared that it was a "high act of nonsense to suggest that Manchu- kuo had been formed by the free will of the people.'' He repeated this point of view in 1935 in an article in the magazine Kaizo, entitled "Reflections on Contemporary Politics." In this article he also supported disarmament, and, apropos of Manchuria, declared that small countries might legitimately ask international intervention for their protection. For this and other fearless statements, one of Japan's numerous terrorist organizations warned him that his life was in danger. Ozaki commented on this threat in a letter to his son: "Assassination is now much in vogue in 150 Japan and any patriotic expression of opinion may ex- pose me to danger. . . . For a public man the best form of death is to fall victim to the cold hand of an assassin. Mr. Inukai, my old friend, was killed in his official resi- dence. I could not help envying him; it was a death befit- ting a statesman." Ozaki was not alone in his continued resistance to military fascism. In 1933 for example, Yokitatsu Taki- kawa was dismissed from his post as professor of politics at Kyoto Imperial University Law School for declaring that the laws In any country were conditioned by its economic structure. Every other professor in the Law School resigned In protest. The Kyoto University stu- dents remained away from classes; and when 6000 stu- dents of Tokyo Imperial University also walked out, the Japanese higher educational system experienced its first sympathetic strike. Many student leaders were ar- rested, but in that same year 800 Tokyo University stu- dents demonstrated in protest against the "imperialist war" In China. In view of the unparalleled extent to which a univer- sity degree is essential for future success in Japan, this continued opposition on the part of university students to the government's repressive measures takes on added significance. That so many students, many of them from prominent families, were willing to sacrifice their hopes for a career in politics or business by engaging in "radi- cal activities" was strong indication that the reactionary rulers of Japan had not succeeded in crushing all poten- tial democratic leadership. The election of February 1936 gave a renewed indi- cation of popular resistance to the steady drift toward military fascism. Fascism was the central issue in this campaign. The Minseito, the more moderate of the two 151 major parties, had as its election slogan: "Which shall it be parliamentary government or fascism?" The Social Mass Party, a moderate labor party headed by professors, lawyers and publicists, and supported by the bulk of the trade unions, took an even stronger stand against the drift toward fascism and war. The public showed an extremely active interest in the election: 1 1,100,000 votes were cast, representing some 80 per cent of the electo- rate. Virtually every feature of the election "returns demon- strated the strength of the antifascist tide in the electo- rate. The Minseito replaced the warlike Seiyukai as the largest party by a considerable margin. The Social Mass Party picked up fifteen seats, rising from three to eight- een. Most of the successful independents were liberals, including the veteran Yukio Ozaki. An unusually large number of military fascist candidates stood for election; most of them suffered disastrous defeats. It was this demonstration of widespread opposition to war and fascism which precipitated, just six days after the election, the military fascist uprising of February 26, 1936, the largest and bloodiest coup d'etat which Japan had yet witnessed. Ozaki was one of those listed for as- sassination but managed to survive. Although this revolt did not succeed it was a warning of the lengths to which the military extremists were willing to go. In the general elections of April 30, 1937, a bare ten weeks before Japan again invaded China, the drift to- ward military fascism was again an issue. The conditions under which the elections were held are indicated by the government's orders to prefectural chiefs of police to prohibit "utterances liable to alienate the people from the army" during the campaign. These were defined as statements "charging the military with trying to provoke 152 a war, alleging that the fighting services mean to reject the parliamentary system, arousing suspicion about obedience to orders in the services, or affecting the atti- tude of the people toward the conscription system." The outstanding result of these elections was the great in- crease In the vote of the Social Mass Party. It became the third largest party, polling nearly a million votes as a consequence of Its vigorous antifascist election cam- paign. This development caused considerable concern in ruling circles, and the decision to attack China was made partly with a view to using a war "emergency" as an excuse to liquidate opposition at home. After the Invasion of China In July 1937, Japan's ruling oligarchy moved with ruthless thoroughness to suppress all domestic opposition. Under Admiral Nobumasa Suet- sugu, fire-eating Home Minister in Prince Konoye's first Cabinet, wholesale arrests of liberals, pacifists and radi- cals were conducted. In December 1937, almost 400 men and women In the collegiate world were arrested and ac- cused of being members of a "popular front" movement. All mention of these arrests by the press was stringently prohibited for a month. This was followed In January 1938 by a hundred more arrests for no crime except that of holding liberal opinions. Baroness Ishimoto, prominent feminist known for her liberal-minded autobiography, Facing Two Ways, was also arrested. A number of the academic people arrested were charged with the heinous offense of "humanitarianism"! "Liberalism must go!" the Home Minister proclaimed in the Diet. The Dean of the Economics Department of Tokyo Imperial University, angered because his col- leagues would not vote to discharge, without honor, one of the professors implicated in the liberal purge, resigned. In mid-February, 5000 students in Tokyo alone were 153 arrested for "not taking the [Chinese war] Emergency seriously.'* The severity of police repression after the beginning of the war in China increasingly placed liberals in five general categories. Some were in prison; others worked underground; the largest group was silent; some recanted their liberal views; only a, rare few individuals continued to oppose openly the drive toward militarist dictatorship and war. Perhaps the most dramatic of the rear-guard actions conducted by Japanese democrats in the period between the outbreak of the China Incident and the attack on Pearl Harbor was that of a veteran Diet member, Takao Saito. He had shown his courage once before in the spring of 1936, soon after the military fascist Putsch of February 26, when he made a fiery attack on army activities and defended pailiamentarianism, On February 2, 1940, he again mounted the rostrum in the House of Representatives and this time leveled a violent attack at the whole Japanese war effort in China. He demanded to know what the Japanese people had received for their great sacrifices in China. Under the "cloak" of a holy war, Saito accused, the army had drawn the nation into a conflict which it could not conclude. He demanded that negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek be opened to terminate a futile and costly undertaking. This was the first vigorous parliamentary outburst against militarism since the invasion of China, and the army's political henchmen made every effort to see that it was not re- peated. Three fourths of the bold speech were ex- punged from the official record. The Minseito, of which Saito had been an outstanding member for many years, disowned him and compelled him to resign from the party. A servile Diet voted his expulsion from the cham- 154 her. Ozald was left as one of the few who continued to criticize the policies of the autocracy, and he was one of the few political leaders with the courage to maintain this attitude even after December 7, 1941. WARTIME RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION On the day that Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Japa- nese police arrested an estimated 3000 suspected oppo- nents of the war, apparently hoping with one blow to wipe out the last remnants of resistance. But despite these arrests, and the additional restrictions that came with all-out war, the forces of liberal resistance again made themselves felt. There is no evidence of any such activity, however, between December 1941 and March 1942, when the un- expected strength of the Japanese armed forces probably discouraged the resistance forces considerably. The first Important indication of the survival of antimilitarist feeling among moderate democrats came with the re- election of Yukio Ozaki in the elections of April 1942. Ozald's previous success at every election since 1890 was a record unparalleled in Japan, and perhaps in the world. But the crowning glory of his political life, and a striking evidence of the hardihood of Japanese liberal- Ism, was his victory In 1942. In order to appreciate the character of this victory, it Is necessary to recall the circumstances under which Ozaki was re-elected. The 1942 election was held on April 30, after the fall of Singa- pore and at the height of Japan's military victories. Al- most all of the few "moderates" who had still remained hesitant about the tactics of the militarists up to the out- break of the war were deeply impressed by the amazing successes of the military forces, and were hastily climb- ing on the Tojo bandwagon. 155 This was the first election Japan had had since 1937, and was rigorously regulated by the Imperial Rule As- sistance Political Society, one of whose chief functions is to ensure the defeat of candidates such as Ozaki. It issues a list of "approved" candidates; naturally Ozaki was excluded. Many broadcasts were made to the Japa- nese people warning them to be careful of their conduct during the campaign. A Japanese domestic broadcast on April 6, 1942 stated that "careful watch must be kept on speeches which might encourage dissatisfaction toward the policy of Japan, unnecessary criticisms of wartime policy, difficulties during wartime, or criticisms directed to the social problems in relation to the economic hard- ships due to the shortage of material/' Not only did the aged Ozaki seek re-election for him- self in the teeth of this bitter opposition, but he cam- paigned for Daikichiro Tagawa as well. Tagawa is of Ozaki's generation, being seventy-five years old, and has also had a distinguished record as a democratic leader. He has been an editor, Deputy Mayor of Tokyo, and Secretary of the Department of Justice, and had been elected to the Diet eight times previous to his candidacy in 1942. Like Ozaki he was anathema to the militarists. He had been imprisoned for five months during the last war for lese-majeste for having stated that the choice of Count Terauchi as Premier in 1916 had been made by the Elder Statesmen and not by the untrammeled de- cision of the Emperor. In 1940 Tagawa was "disciplined" for disobeying military regulations, but on this occasion his sentence was suspended. In the middle of his campaign for re-election, Ozaki was charged with le$e-maje$te for a statement he al- legedly made in support of the candidacy of Tagawa. Despite this charge and other attempts to intimidate the 156 voters, he was re-elected from Miye Prefecture with a total of 14,525 votes. Tagawa polled 9274 votes in the third Tokyo district, but this was not sufficient to elect him. These were the officially announced figures and it is possible that the actual votes were higher, because there was extensive ballot-box stuffing during the election. This was so flagrant in the Second District of Kagoshima, for example, that the election of four members to the lower house of the Diet was later declared null and void. In April 1943 Major General Nasu, Chief of the Mili- tary Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, told a con- ference of prefectural governors, in a speech reported in the Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun, that individualistic and liberalistic words and actions still remaining in some sec- tions of society gave rise to anti-army ideas. He de- clared that resolute action would be taken against any plots aimed at disseminating ideas estranging the army and the people and plotting to bring about the internal disintegration of the army. In the summer of 1943 General To jo gave further evidence of the existence of organized discontent when he instructed prefectural governors that "People should not express anxiety and dissatisfaction" and banned all political meetings save those sponsored by the govern- ment itself. In October 1943 the official Dai Nippon Press Association warned that "all antinational movements will be crushed." One of the most surprising revelations of the develop- ment of dissatisfaction among Japanese intellectuals was disclosed with the news that the leading intellectual magazines Kaizo (Reconstruction) and Chuo Koron (Central Review), publications analogous to Harper's and the Atlantic Monthly in this country, had been banned in the spring of 1944. Domei reported on June 157 27, 1944, that Kaizo had discontinued publication after twenty-six years, but gave no explanation for the move at the time. Two weeks later Radio Tokyo revealed that the Japanese Board of Information had suspended all pub- lications of two of Japan's leading publishing houses, the Chuo Koron Publishing Company and the Kaizo Pub- lishing Company, because "their policies were incompat- ible with the proper guidance of public thought." The dispatch admitted that the two magazines, which were the most important publications of the two firms, had a long played an important role in guiding the intellectual world" of Japan, but declared that the decision to sus- pend them followed an "investigation" by the Board of Information which disclosed that they "had followed editorial policies, which, from the standpoint of leading public thinking in wartime, were difficult to tolerate." It was not until several months later that it was re- vealed by the Japanese People's Emancipation League that the specific article which provoked the suspension of Kaizo was a criticism by the nutrition expert, Zawa Sakara, of the rice, grain and vegetable porridge sold at the semiofficial restaurants. Sakara declared that this kind of diet is "not nutrition but fat." Criticism of this sort by an expert was extremely dangerous, because it con- firmed the suspicions of many that the government- sponsored diet was one of slow starvation. It is clear, however, that the Japanese authorities were not likely to ban an outstanding magazine because of a single article. There must have been a fairly deep-rooted resistance to militarism in these editorial circles if the government could not clear up the situation by jailing a few men but had to make public admission that the staffs of two lead- ing periodicals were at best lukewarm in their support of the war. The uneasiness of ruling groups about discontent in intellectual circles was further evidenced in the Diet sessions of early autumn, 1944. A Japanese-language dis- patch by Domel reported: "The House of Peers, taking a serious view of the trend of the people's thought in wartime, established a thought investigation committee within the House on August 26." On September 9, Yoshimi Fund, Director of the Police Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, told the House of Repre- sentatives that "the government is prepared to place strict control over speech which is harmful to unity within the country. . . ." After the years of strenuous efforts by the Japanese police to wipe out any dissent, this statement must be considered an admission that these previous measures had not sufficed to suppress the rising tide of opposition. Further evidence in this direction was contributed by the Koiso government in March 1945 when it introduced legislation to suspend special elections. Special elections had been held since the general election of April 1942 in order to fill the seats vacated by death and other causes. The government's desire to call a halt to this customary procedure apparently was dictated by the fear that mounting unrest might be reflected in the elec- tion campaigns. These direct and indirect indications of the per- sistence of a liberal opposition in Japan do not, of course, demonstrate the existence of a well-organized and effective democratic resistance. There is little doubt, however, that there are thousands of middle-class demo- crats to be found among the professional men, the edu- cated technicians, and the owners of small or medium businesses in Tokyo, Kobe, Osaka and other metro- 159 politan centers. Probably the largest proportion of them is to be found among those who received their higher education in the 'twenties, when nontraditional thought was most widespread in the universities. It is probably- true that they have been unorganized and that most of them have preferred silence to imprisonment or some more severe penalty. But their very existence is of tre- mendous import to postwar Japan. Ozaki, Tagawa and Saito, as well as the lesser-known democrats, constitute a potential alternative for the leadership of postwar Japan to the so-called "moderates" in Japan's present ruling oligarchy. If Ozaki, Saito and Tagawa themselves are alive at the time of occupation, they will be eminently suitable to serve as Elder States- men. This would be a fitting final tribute to their op- position to militarism and fascist dictatorship and their advocacy of friendly relations with the United States and other nations. Their popularity among the people, already substantial, will undoubtedly be enhanced by the discrediting of the militarists they have so steadfastly opposed. And finally, their long records of devoted public service would render ineffectual any charge of "quisling" by their enemies. But it is to the younger democrats that we must look for the leadership of a new Japan and for the pro- fessional skills that Allied administrators will require during the period of military occupation. In this way we can help produce a genuinely antimilitarist leader- ship, capable of enlisting strong popular support in the postwar period. With our help, the democratic move- ment which was suppressed by the autocrats of another day can win out over the autocrats of today. 160 CHAPTER VIII AT THE GRASS ROOTS In the summer of 1943 the Japanese Min- ister of Agriculture decreed: "Dissatisfaction in the villages must be wiped out . . ." Some time later it was suggested to one of the fore- most State Department pundits on Japanese affairs that agrarian discontent might be harnessed to a democratic movement in postwar Japan. He dismissed the idea rather contemptuously, declaring that the peasant is the most reactionary element in the population and virtually beyond redemption. There is, in actual fact, a considerable amount of evi- dence to support the picture of the Japanese peasant as a conservative. It is in the villages that there is the most respect for the shrines and gods and the greatest de- votion to the dynasty. Modern and foreign ideas have made considerably less progress among the peasantry than among urban dwellers. And the militarists have looked to the peasantry for their hardiest and most fanatic soldiers. But to dismiss the peasantry as beyond redemption is both pessimistic and dangerously incorrect. It is as superficial as the observations of another day which held that the Soviets couldn't possibly develop a mechanized agriculture or a mechanized army because the Russian muzhik was too tradition-bound ever to be able to use machinery. And if we persist in^the attitude that the Japanese peasant is hopelessly conservative we will probably miss our greatest opportunity of striking a devastating blow at three quarters of a century of 161 promilitarist, antiforeign agitation and securing a major change in the attitude of the largest segment of the Japanese population. While it is true that he is a conservative in some re- spects, it is equally true that the Japanese peasant is an economic radical, for he strongly desires a fundamental change in his economic condition. Few countries have such a strong tradition of agrarian revolts, of pitched battles with the police. The peasant's mercurial char- acterpart radical, part conservative is a result of the terrific pressures built up by the agrarian crisis, a continuing crisis which is the most important factor in Japan's economic and political life. In the past, Japan's militarists have paid careful heed to this crisis. They have diverted the mounting pressure of peasant discontent and land hunger into zealous sup- port of foreign aggression. The results have been dis- astrous for the rest of the world. Agrarian pressures will mount even higher In the postwar period. The destruction of industry and trans- port in the final phases of the war, the scarcity of raw materials, the elimination of certain war industries and the temporary shutdown of others while being con- verted to peacetime production will all combine to throw many hundreds of thousands out of work. As in previous periods of mass unemployment, a large por- tion of these will go back to the villages of their origin, thereby adding to the burden on Japan's antiquated agrarian system. Therefore, it seems likely that unless it is understood and mastered, the dynamite-laden agrar- ian crisis may well explode in the faces of the occupation authorities. The agrarian crisis means more to us than the posing of an immediate problem in the early period of occu- 162 patlon. A solution of the agrarian crisis is an essential prerequisite for a sound political and economic future for Japan. Agrarian reform must serve as the cornerstone for the reform of the entire political and economic life of the country on democratic lines. If political democ- racy is to have a real meaning it must have grass roots; it must be based on the peasant proprietor and tenant farmer. Furthermore, a sound economy In postwar Japan must have the foundation of an expanding in- ternal market, which again means the development of the peasant as a consumer. In short, the peasant is the key to Japan's future. POVERTY OUT OF FEUDALISM The pervasive characteristic of the Japanese peasant is his extreme poverty and the tremendous effort re- quired to maintain himself and his family above the starvation level. Although Japan has been able to raise a first-rate military force, its living standards have never been better than fourth-rate. The lot of its peasant ma- jority is scarcely better than that of the colonial and nonindustrial areas of Asia. Most of the Japanese peas- antry have to render half or more of the harvest from their tiny farms as rent in kind to a landowner or as interest on a debt owed a usurer. They still cannot, for the most part, eat the rice they wrest from the soil by the difficult, unpleasant and unending hand labor of the entire family. Even at the best of times many have to live on millet, sweet potatoes and some imported rice of inferior quality. And during recurrent crises they are forced to sell their daughters to the brothels of the towns or send them as indentured laborers to the fac- tories. 163 Agrarian poverty Is due In some part to the limitations of natural resources. As a result of the mountainous char- acter of the country only 19 per cent of the land of Japan is arable, and only 15.5 per cent is actually culti- vated. Yet before the war almost half of the population was dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood. But although Japan's prospects for great agrarian prosper- ity are made dim by natural limitations of agricultural resources, its dire agrarian poverty is a product of a man-made system of semifeudal agriculture, a system of sharecropping and hand labor on small farms averaging two-and-a-half acres in size. Like many of Japan's eco- nomic, political or social problems, the problem of agriculture dates back to the Meiji government and its failure to eliminate feudalism on the land. Under the Shogunate, which preceded the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the peasantry lived in wretched poverty. One of the best descriptions of their lot is one by Kyugu Tanaka, who wrote in the nineteenth cen- tury: These people whom we call peasants are no better than cattle or horses. The authorities pitilessly compel them to pay heavy taxes; they are the objects of a most onerous corvee, but they have nothing to say about it. We hear of many cases where they lose all their fortune, sell their wives and children and suffer all sorts of violence or are even put to death. They pass their whole life enduring blows and insults. . . . Petty officials lord it over them so that the peasant cringes before their threatening stare. . . . The arrogant behavior of these officials is like that of a heartless driver of some horse or ox; after loading it down with a great weight he proceeds to rain blows upon it; then when it stumbles he becomes more and more angry, cursing it loudly and striking it even with greater force such is the fate of the peasant. 164 The peasantry did not remain inert. Some 1100 peasant revolts are recorded in the last two and a half centuries of the Shogunate. It was the mounting cres- cendo of peasant revolts which shook the country from within, coupled with the foreign guns which threatened it from without, that enabled the Meiji forces to over- throw the Shogunate in 1868. With the Restoration hopes arose among the peasants that now their burden of tribute and debt would be lightened. Furthermore, promises were held out by the new government that all state lands except temple lands would be divided up among the peasants. But the feudal aristocrats who dominated the Meiji oligarchy were not interested in improving the con- dition of the peasants. Their primary interest was in the rapid development of the strategic industries required to make Japan strong enough as a military power first to prevent foreign penetration and then to join in the scramble for loot then under way in the Western Pa- cific. The wealthy merchants of Japan, who were also part of the oligarchy, could not "raise the capital required for these industries because during the pre-Meiji period they had been cut off from foreign trade for two and a half centuries and hindered by other feudal restrictions and thus their opportunities to accumulate capital had been limited. Consequently a large part of the burden of industrialization and military preparation fell upon agri- culture, largely in the form of a land tax. The Meiji government converted the peasants from feudal serfs into independent cultivators, owning their own lands, but replaced the exactions of the feudal lord by a land tax which was at least as difficult to bear. Under feudalism the portion of the crop due to the land- lord was subject to some flexibility. In bad years a lord 165 might not collect his full quota of tribute, for his maxim with regard to the peasants was to see that they "neither died nor lived." In the early years of the Meiji govern- ment, however, the extraordinarily high rate of agrarian exploitation which had prevailed under late feudalism about 60 to 70 per cent of the crop was legalized and strictly enforced regardless of circumstances. Fur- thermore this land tax had to be paid in cash, in rural regions where cash was scarce. When the tax payment fell due, the peasant had to barter a disproportionate amount of his crop in order to acquire cash. In many cases this did not leave him with enough food to feed his family for the remainder of the year and frequently he had to borrow at usurious rates of 30-40 per cent. As a result of the high land tax, currency fluctuations and usurious rates of interest, spectacular shifts of land ownership took place. Tens of thousands of peasants were dispossessed. In a score of years almost a third of the peasantry had suffered expropriation. PARASITIC LANDLORDISM A similar process of peasant expropriation had ac- companied the rise of capitalism in England in the eight- eenth century. Small owners who lacked the land or capital to keep pace with improved agricultural pro- duction for the market had been forced to sell out and move to the cities to man the growing new industries. As a result of the expropriation in England, however, the land was cultivated in larger plots with improved techniques, modern fertilizers, and finally agricultural machinery. In short, agriculture also became a capitalist enterprise. The owner invested his capital aad exploited 166 the land for profit, employing agricultural laborers who worked for their wages. In Japan, agriculture never made the full transition from feudalism to capitalism, largely because of the high rent characteristic of Japanese landlordism. It was computed that in the mid 'thirties, for example, rents in Japan were seven times those of England, about three times those of Germany, about four times those of Italy and three times those of Denmark and Holland. As a result of this high rent absentee landlordism in Japan is a purely parasitic institution, since the land- lord contributes nothing to agricultural production, being interested exclusively in collecting rent. He has not been interested in driving off the old tenants or peasant proprietors for the sake of taking over the en- terprises himself and investing his capital. He has pre- ferred instead to leave the peasant household working its tiny farm with primitive but intensive methods for an exorbitant rent. He can let out land and receive in re- turn more than half the produce without investing any liquid capital or running any risk. Despite Japan's limited arable area, there is an amaz- ing concentration of ownership. It is estimated that while half the farm families own less than one-tenth the land, 7.5 per cent of the families own more than a half of the land. Perhaps the largest single holding out- side of the Imperial Household is one of 4000 acres on the Echigo Plain, a tract which is tenanted by 2500 families, or 14,000 persons. In all there are over 3500 landlords in Japan who hold more than 125 acres each. These large landlords have an average of just under 200 tenants apiece and between them account for one of ajl she tenant households in Japai*. Th^re .ar 167 about 50,000 moderately large landowners with hold- ings of between twenty-five and 124 acres each. In addition there are another million absentee landlords holding up to twenty-five acres. The smaller absentee landlords are drawn from the rentier class which in the advanced industrial countries of the West is inclined to invest in bonds or gilt-edged securities. Until very recently there has been little op- portunity for the Japanese urban middle-class investor to invest in the giant monopoly enterprises of the Zai- batsu, the shares of which were held largely in the fabulously wealthy families controlling those enter- prises. Investment in land has brought about 5 per cent return against the 10-15 per cent return from the in- accessible industrial and financial shares, but it has had certain compensations. Ownership of land brings with it social prestige and political power in the area in which it is owned. In addition, the small man who invests in land does not need any further capital. The tenant is usually required to furnish all the capital, including seed and fertilizer. Also, ownership carries with it the pos- sibility of lending money to the tenants at usurious in- terest rates sometimes running as high as 40 per cent. Frequently the noncultivating landowner also runs a sake brewing factory or is the part owner of a silk- reeling establishment. Silk reeling and a number of other small-scale industries are run for the most part on the labor of peasant girls. These peasant girls go to work most frequently to pay off their fathers' debts and naturally the landowner to whom the peasants are in- debted is in a good position to force them to work in his shop on pretty much his own terms. Furthermore, when the big textile mills want cheap labor they go to the landowner-moneylender who acts as a procurer by 168 forcing the peasants to send their daughters off into in- dentured servitude in the mills to work off their debt to him. In this and other ways the big millowners and the landowners have a community of interests. The mem- bers of the peasant household who go to the city, whether daughters or young sons, generally stay for fairly short periods, returning to the village because of unemployment, or for marriage, or to help out during harvest time. This type of worker does not consider factory work a permanent occupation, does not de- velop the class-consciousness of a regular industrial laborer and is not likely to respond readily to the per- suasion of a union organizer. Furthermore they return to their ancestral village when unemployed. In this way the burden of the upkeep of the unemployed is largely removed from the state and the factory owners; while at the same time the resultant overcrowding of the vil- lage tends to bid up the rent for the landlord. PEASANT PROPRIETOR AND TENANT These burdens of parasitic landlordism, high rents, high interest rates and indentured servitude in textile mills rest on the stooped shoulders of Japan's harried peasant proprietors and tenants who actually work the land. Of the 5,500,000 farm families tilling the soil, some 30 per cent own the soil they work, slightly less than 30 per cent are tenants only, while the remainder, over 40 per cent, are part owners, part tenants. This division has existed, with only slight changes, since the beginning of this century. At first sight one might assume that the peasant pro- prietor owning his own land would be comparatively 169 well-off. Actually he Is barely able to keep his head above water and wages a constant fight to hold on to his land. He is generally so deeply in debt and his farm so heavily mortgaged that he frequently remains an owner in name only. Heavy taxation, monopoly prices for fertilizer and the necessity of borrowing at exorbi- tant interest rates when harvests are poor, have long ago reduced him to almost as pitiful a state as the tenant. Many a peasant owner pays nearly as much in interest to usurers as the tenant pays in rent, and in addition is bur- dened by heavy taxes. Despite his bitter lot, the peasant proprietor clings with passionate attachment to land which has been con- secrated for him by the toil of countless ancestors. In his struggle to remain on the land, as proprietor or part proprietor, he sells a daughter or a few square yards of land to cover his tax arrears, to meet his debt to the village usurer or to tide himself over a lean year caused by poor crops. He surrenders each square yard of land with the greatest reluctance, As the peasant owner loses out he is compelled to rent small bits of land because the small section he retains is not enough to support his family. These part owners, part tenants, comprise some 42 per cent of the agricul- turists. But the lot of the full tenant is the worst of all He is not a tenant in the Western sense, an entrepreneur, who pays a cash rent generally amounting to 10-15 per cent of the value of the crop, hires labor to work the land, and then takes both the risks and the profits of the en- terprise. Rather he is a semifeudal sharecropper. He pays a rent in kind for the use of rice land which amounts to a fixed number of bushels per acre irrespective of yield, but generally amounts to 50-60 per cent of the 170 crop in rice lands. Out of the remainder of the crop the tenant has to buy high-priced artificial fertilizer, imple- ments and seed, in addition to feeding and clothing his family. Naturally, the income of the tenant depends in large part upon the crop. In a good year the tenant's share increases somewhat, but since the demand for agricultural products is relatively inelastic, its price is likely to fall drastically, especially at harvest time. Thus it is possible for the tenant's money income to decrease despite a good crop. In addition to the fluctuations of the market, the tenant is also afflicted with insecurity of tenure, a con- dition which has given- rise to many agrarian conflicts in the last two decades. Under the custom prevalent in Japan, the landlord has the right to order a tenant off his land virtually at will. Under ordinary circumstances he will do so if he feels that he can get a higher rent for it. Therefore if a tenant works hard, improves the land by putting in a good deal of expensive fertilizer, or im- proves the irrigation, he is apt to be evicted to make way for another tenant who is willing to pay a higher rent to the landlord for the improvements put in by the previous tenant. AGRARIAN UNREST One of the products of these oppressive conditions of rural exploitation has been a recurrently explosive situa- tion in the supposedly "conservative" rural areas. The Meiji government itself was ushered in during the 'sixties by a crescendo of peasant revolts. The peasants had hoped that with the advent of the Meiji government their overwhelming burden of rent and debt would be lightened. When they discovered that, on the con- 171 trary, it was to be Increased, they showed their dis- satisfaction partly by a renewed series of peasant revolts and partly by participating in new and significant agrar- ian political organizations. The number of peasant revolts for the first decade of the Meiji era was well over 190. At first sight, many of these revolts seem to be directed primarily against the innovations of the new regime. Peasants became riot- ously excited by wild rumors that the numbering of houses was preparatory to the abduction of their wives and daughters. They were easily persuaded that the phrase "blood-taxes" in the conscription decree of 1873 meant just what it said literally and that in joining the army they would have their blood drawn and shipped abroad to make dye for scarlet blankets. They believed that the new schools were places where their children would have their blood extracted and that the new tele- phone and telegraph lines would be used to transmit the blood. It cannot be doubted that many of the uprisings which characterized the early Meiji period arose from the in- stinctive opposition of a backward peasantry toward the innovations of the new government. But, as E. Herbert Norman has pointed out in his important study The Emergence of Japan as a Modern State, "While these old wives' tales and naive misunderstandings of the healthy attempt of the government to modernize the nation acted as the spark which ignited the uprisings, somehow the flames always spread to the quarter of the richest usurer, the land-grabbing village headman, the tyrannous official of the former feudal lord." (Italics Mr. Norman's.) In many cases, too, the resentment against innovations was based on justifiable fears. Peasant resistatnw to the 172 Introduction of a new calendar arose from the fear that the usurers would take advantage of this reform to juggle their accounts to their own advantage. They objected to a land survey imposed by the new government be- cause, of its total expense of 40,000,000 yen, the peasant proprietors were forced to pay 35,000,000. Thus, al- though the great wave of peasant revolts in the first decade of the Meiji government had an overtone of superstition and resistance to innovation, its main weight was thrown against the usurer, the rice broker, the village headman, in short against all the personifications of feudal oppression. DEBTORS' PARTIES In the second decade of the Meiji era, that is, after 1877, the deep resentment of the peasantry found an outlet in political action. The political movement among the peasantry had small beginnings. In some areas of the country, notably around Tokyo in Shizuoka, Ibaraki, Gumma and Sai- tama, the pervasive peasant resentment against high taxes and evictions found expression in local organizations with revealing names like Debtors' Party (Shakkmto), Poor People's Party (Kyuminto) and Social Party (Sha- kaito). They originated in the attempts of impoverished peasants to oppose wholesale evictions. Gradually they gave voice to wider demands and in handbills and mani- festoes which they circulated they campaigned for rent decreases, a moratorium on debts and popular elec- tions to a democratic assembly through which the needs of the peasantry could find expression. At the same time that the peasants' pressing material demands were broadening out into the political field, 173 the movement for political democracy found it in- creasingly necessary to sink its roots among the masses. At the inception of the movement for political democ- racy the opponents of the Meiji oligarchy ignored the great majority of the population. They addressed pe- titions to the government and the Emperor signed by a handful 1 of intellectuals and out-of -office bureaucrats. The petitions requested the election of a popular as- sembly and other democratic reforms, but the Meiji aris- tocrats were not to be persuaded by the reasoning of a handful of powerless opponents. The liberals finally recognized the weakness of their position and set about remedying it. In March 1879 the Society of Patriots (Aikokusha), a predecessor of the Liberal Party, decided to present a mass petition for the establishment of a national assembly. It divided the whole country into ten sections and dispatched propa- gandists to each of them. As a result of this activity the society sank its roots all over the country. When it met in convention in March 1880 there were several thou- sand delegates on hand, representing ninety-six societies with a total membership of some 100,000. The govern- ment demonstrated its fear of the deep roots the move- ment was developing by suddenly enacting a law re- stricting public meetings. Furthermore the new law was enforced on the same day by a telegram ordering the dissolution of the convention. The leaders of the society- had been warned of the government's intention, and in- stantly passed a resolution to continue the organization until the establishment of a national assembly, simul- taneously renaming the society the "League for the Es- tablishment of a National Assembly." (Kokkai Kisei Domei Kal) Since the League was ignored or rebuffed by the 174 Tokyo officials, It decided to demonstrate Its popular support by securing the signatures of a majority of the entire population to a petition demanding the establish- ment of popular government. The response it met was strong enough to make It possible to keep a stream of delegations from various parts of the country pouring into Tokyo. Their constant visits to government offices and to ministers of state proved to be so vexatious that the government issued an order directing all petitions and memorials to be forwarded through the local au- thorities. This caused the roots of the liberal move- ment to grow still deeper among the people, for now the whole movement had to be decentralized, and adapted to local conditions. For the first time in Japanese his- tory, meetings of a political character were held in every province. The liberal leader Itagaki made a speaking tour of the country and was welcomed everywhere, not only in the cities, but in the rural districts as well. In this way, under pressure of the government's op- pressive economic and political policies, the peasants became interested in politics and the liberal politicians became interested in the peasant. This linking of the agrarian movement with the liberal movement was of the greatest significance. It had been the acquisition of just such mass support among the French peasants which had given the French Revolution the strength required to overthrow the Bourbons. The authorities were particularly concerned when this broad coalition found national expression in the Liberal Party (Jiyuto} founded in 1881 under the lead- ership of Itagaki. Although the national leadership's lib- eralism was primarily political, the local branches of the Liberal Party quite often had fairly radical leaders who .stirred up popular sentiment not only in favor of repre- 175 sentative political institutions but also for rent reduc- tions and the other demands of the peasantry. The Governor of Fukushima Prefecture voiced the bitter opposition of government circles to such developments when he declared: "As long as I am in office I will not allow the Liberal Party and other assassins and bandits to raise their heads." The resourceful Meiji oligarchs met the threat of the Liberal Party by splitting and suppressing it. By in- ducing Itagaki and another leader, Shojiro Goto, to visit Europe, ostensibly to study political questions, they left the democratic movement leaderless at the most critical moment in its struggles. This discredited the leaders of the party in the eyes of the rank and file. Angered and bewildered by what seemed to them the defection of their chiefs, the local leaders of the Liberal Party and the Debtors' Party in many cases took to insurrection as a means of achieving the economic and political ends of the peasant-linked liberal movement. One of the outstanding revolts of this kind took place in Chichibu in Saitama Prefecture in 1884. In this area the Debtors 7 Party, in collaboration with a radical group from the local Liberal Party, aroused the peasantry and the village poor against the landlords. When the police ar- rived on the scene the peasants resisted them forcibly until they finally were quelled. There were similar re- volts in Aichi and Ibaraki during the next two years. While the government was suppressing these agrarian- democratic revolts, the more cautious and conservative leaders of the Liberal Party dissolved the organization to clear It of the stigma of inciting to revolt. Some of these leaders, while believers in political democracy, were also landlords who feared an aroused peasantry. The government was able to use the newly organized 176 conscript army to suppress the revolts. Conscription had been instituted not only for purposes of foreign combat. The government, recognizing the bitter poverty of the peasantry and having determined not to do anything to alleviate that poverty, made provision to keep agrarian unrest within bounds with the Conscription Act of 1873. The very existence of a sizable national army, with garrisons in strategic locations, made peasant up- risings less likely. At the same time conscription gave the authorities an opportunity to indoctrinate the peas- ant youth and to divert it from the pressing problems of rents, interest and taxes to the glories of war and con- quest. Instruction in the barracks emphasized loyalty, and stressed the dangers of seditious concepts such as democracy, universal suffrage and the like. Field Marshal Yamagata, the evil genius behind much of Japan's mili- tarism and reaction in that period, forbade soldiers to join political associations with democratic or liberal tendencies and warned against "giving free rein to idle chatter about the people's rights under the guise of discussing current affairs." But not all of the military leaders supported the use of the army against the people. One of those in dis- agreement, Takeki Tani, observed: "[To] our shame there is something which cannot be hidden even if we forcibly tried to gag the mouths of others; and that, as everyone knows, is that the army, created for the pur- pose of guarding the country against a foreign foe, slaughters the discontented populace of our country; this is truly a disgrace that can hardly be borne." The split between the conservative parliamentary democrats and the agrarian radical leaders, and the sup- pression of the premature and uncorrelated revolts, set back both the peasant and the parliamentary movements 177 tremendously. The peasant movement, already pros- trate, was given a further blow in 1900 when the Diet passed the Public Peace Police Law which practically prohibited tenant farmers from agitating in their own interests. FERMENT IN THE 'TWENTIES The mass of peasants and tenants were roused again from their resigned poverty by the impact of World War I and the economic distress and political agitation which followed in its wake. The great rise in the price of manufactured goods, particularly artificial fertilizers, more than doubled the burden of debt of the peasantry between 1918 and 1922. The price of rice and other agricultural products rose at a somewhat slower rate. Tenants, part owners and many peasant cultivators had to sell their crops when prices were low and could not afford to buy back enough to live on later when the prices soared. Famine stalked the countryside. The peasantry showed their great need and deep re- sentment in a great upsurge of rural discontent. The Rice Riots of 1918, which swept Japan like a prairie fire, took hold not only in the towns and cities but in the villages as well. The number of officially recorded tenant-landlord conflicts rose from eighty-five in 1917 to 408 in 1920. During the same period local tenant unions increased from 130 to 382 in number. The chief demand of these young, struggling organizations was a reduction in the oppressive land rents, but at this early stage of their development they were not strong enough to force any concessions. The peasant movement entered on a new phase in 1922 with the formation of the Japanese Peasants' Union 178 "XI. (Nippon Nomin Kwniai) , the first association of tenants and peasant cultivators on a national scale. Despite gov- ernment attacks and interference, the organization in- creased in strength and militancy. By 1926 government statistics admitted there were over four thousand local peasant unions with a total membership of 368,000. In that same year over 2000 agrarian disputes, involving 117,000 peasants, took place. The Peasants' Union did not restrict itself to purely economic struggles. It was primarily responsible for the formation of the Farmer- Labor Party (Nomin Rodoto) in 1925. Perhaps the best indication of this party's potentialities was the fact that it was suppressed on the day it was formed. In 1928 the government of the notorious General Tanaka attempted to suppress all popular and left-wing movements, partly because they were opposing his policy of sending troops to intervene in China. Stern repressive treatment was meted out to the agrarian move- ment. The Peasants' Union was suppressed and only permitted to function again after it had purged itself of suspected Communists. In Kagawa Prefecture, a center of agrarian activity, the authorities stamped out the unions almost completely and forced the resignation of four agrarian members of the prefectural assembly. This suppression was inspired in large part by the landlords who, during this time, not only were under the pressure of an organized and militant tenantry but were also hit by the importation of cheaper rice from Korea and Formosa. The consequent fall in the price of rice meant a reduction in the money value of the rents the landlords received in kind. They attempted to transfer the burden of their losses to the shoulders of the ten- antry by exacting more rent. They used their legal right to evict tenants who would not agree to pay an even 179 more oppressive rent. But the tenants defended their rights with increasing vigor. While in 1924 less than 2 per cent of the total number of tenant-landlord con- flicts resulted from tenants' attempts to resist eviction, by 1930 it had risen to 40 per cent. The landlords met this increasing resistance with in- creased organization on their own part. In 1921 there were 163 landlord leagues, but by the end of 1928 the number had risen to 734. In 1925 the Greater Japan Landlords' Association (Dai Nippon Jinushi Kyokai) was formed "to impart the landlord movement political strength on a national scale," and by 1930 the associa- tion had 30,000 landlord members. It announced Its aims in the following terms: "We cannot permit the present situation in the countryside to be ignored in silence. . . . Lease conflicts are becoming more acute every year. Danger faces us. ... This association is fighting to protect the countryside from left radicalism it endeavors to improve the position of the coun- tryside by moderate measures of justice and seeks to prevent the tenant farmers from resorting to ill-con- sidered actions. . . . The Association recognizes the human dignity of the tenant farmer and will endeavor by every possible social measure to improve his con- ditions and to put an end to the tenant-landlord con- flicts." The landlords' methods of recognizing the tenants' "human dignity" were truly unique. Landlord leagues appeared before the courts and demanded that recal- citrant peasants be deprived of the right to cultivate land. Where the courts were not adequately co-opera- tive, the organized landlords evicted the tenants forcibly, frequently calling upon the thugs of the "patriotic" societies for help. 180 THE DEPRESSION HITS THE LAND The crisis of 1929 tremendously accelerated the ruin of the peasantry. There was a sharp drop in agricultural prices: between 1929 and 1933 Japan's income from rice and silk cocoons was cut almost exactly in half. At the same time the giant trusts were able to maintain their prices on manufactured goods and fertilizers. As a result of the fall in agricultural prices, the small landlords attempted to secure additional rents in kind to pay interest on their debts to the banks. They mer- cilessly shifted the weight of their depression losses to the backs of their tenants. They refused to allow rent reductions and frequently evicted old tenants to secure new tenants at a higher rental. And added to this was a poor harvest in 193L Actual famine swept many districts in 1932. Local banks shut. Towns and villages were unable to pay their teachers. In many villages the peasants were forced to eat bracken, roots, rice husks. In the schools children fainted daily from lack of food. In the Tohoku district alone the number of persons requiring immediate as- sistance was officially estimated at 2,000,000. In some villages virtually all the unmarried girls were sold to the town brothels. According to the journal Chuo Koron 614 girls left a single village in Nagano Prefecture, 279 going to work as servants and 335 as prostitutes. In one village of 350 households in Akita Prefecture 50 girls became prostitutes in 1934 alone. In Iwate girls were sold for as little as 50 yen each. The tenants and peasant owners attempted to defend themselves against this increased burden of misery. The number of disputes rose. The three pre-crisis years (1926-1928) brought forth some 5600 tenant-landlord 181 conflicts. In the three crisis years (1929-1931) 7600 conflicts took place. In the next three years (1932-1934) the conflicts totaled 12,000. The greatest number of dis- putes were concerned with evictions. In many cases the rising peasant struggle expressed itself in extreme forms. Riots were frequent and at times the rice storehouses were broken open. At other times thousands of men and women with starving babies in their arms broke into the town halls and refused to leave until some rice had been distributed. Landowners' residences were sacked and burned; police and court officers sent to execute judgments were resisted in armed conflict. The violence exhibited in agrarian disputes exceeded anything seen in urban labor disputes. One of these incidents is described in the Japanese periodical Ne<w$ of the Social Movement (Shakai Undo Tsushiri) in November 1935: The tenants of a big- landlord, the millionaire Terao of Osaka, demonstrated in order to get their rents reduced 31.5 per cent. The landlord answered by getting" the court to prohibit entry into the fields. This judgment had to be put into effect by the court officers, who came and hung up a notice forbidding entry. A crowd of more than 70 tenants armed with field implements surrounded the court officers, wrested the notice from them and beat them, Police arrived immediately. Four persons were badly wounded, 72 persons were arrested. The peasants* unions, particularly the left-wing ones, played an important part in this rising conflict. The Japanese Peasants* Union which had been founded in 1922 existed until 1926 as an integral organization, when it split into three independent streams, right, left and centrist. After the invasion of Manchuria the right- wing Japanese Peasants' Society (Nippon Nomin 182 miai) 9 with a membership of about 38,000, strongly sup- ported aggression on the continent as the way out for the Japanese peasant, but retained the demand for state ownership of the land. The centrist Japanese Peasants 5 Federation (Nippon Nomin Sodomei) was headed by Bunji Suzuki, an op- portunist and conservative labor leader who was suffi- ciently well regarded by the Japanese government to be sent abroad repeatedly as a delegate to the International Labor Office. Suzuki payed lip-service to peasant re- form but was fearful of militant peasant action. The centrist group excused the invasion of Manchuria as a necessary move for the alleviation of the peasants' problems. The left-wing All- Japan Peasants' Union Conference (Zenkoku Nomin Kaigi) claimed a membership of 60,000 in the mid-'thirties but admitted to limited in- fluence, largely because of the close police surveillance under which it operated. Its ultimate program called for state ownership of the land with cultivation under the direction of committees elected by the peasants. Its immediate program called for reductions in rents, taxes and costs of farmers' necessities, cancellation of a sub- stantial part of the rural debt, security of tenure for tenants, distribution of government rice stocks to the starving and construction of improved irrigation works at government expense. Water to irrigate the rice fields in the hot summer months was so scarce that peasants armed with stones, bamboo pikes and implements frequently fought over the division of the water. In Saitama Prefecture some 3000 peasants fought each other until some 200 police stopped the battle. The left-wing tenant unions attempted to divert this 183 Internecine struggle Into more effective channels. An appeal to the peasants in Scarlet Banner (Akahata) in- dicates the approach they used: There is no sense, brothers, in fighting each other about water. We must make it clear who is the real enemy. . . . We have always suffered from a water shortage. The water problem would be quite easy to solve if we had the money to build a dam, to drain the underground waters, and to build large basins and reservoirs. We know exactly what needs to be done but we have no money to do it, because we are exploited by the Emperor, the landlords and the capitalists. Let all these people hand over the money which provides them with sweet food and rich clothing and let it be used to build darns and canals! Brothers! Cease foolish fratricidal strife over a drop of water; turn your blows against landlords, officials and capitalists (the local electric companies for example) and demand that they all bear their share of the expenses for the improvement of the irrigation system. This type of propaganda had a certain amount of in- fluence. In a village in Chiba Prefecture in 1934 about 400 peasants armed with shovels and hoes clashed with the police while demonstrating against the failure of the authorities to construct adequate irrigation works. In the city of Kumamotp 600 peasants forced their way into the governor's office early in August of the same year and were dispersed by the police only after blood had been shed. In addition to jailing the instigators and organizers of many of these protests some slight attempts were made to prevent such developments by ameliorating condi- tions. The landowners, working through organizations like the Imperial Agricultural Society, brought pressure on the government to make heavier purchases of rice 184 and to control the import of cheaper Korean and For- mosan rice, so as to boost the price of Japanese rice. They were also able to have the land tax reduced and loans made somewhat more available through extending the activities of the rural co-operative. But none of these measures touched the basic problems or affected a marked improvement in the living con- ditions of the millions that tilled the soil. MILITARIST DIVERSION The militarists could not and did not ignore the mounting agrarian crisis. A large number of the young officers came from the ranks of the middle and petty landlords whose profits were drastically cut by the fall in agricultural prices and the refusal of the organized tenants to pay increased rents in kind. Furthermore, the majority of the Japanese soldiers were from tenant or peasant proprietor families and the increasing ruin of the peasantry and the consequent growth of agrarian discontent threatened to create difficulties in the army and its reservist organizations. The problem was posed most sharply in the summer of 1932, when a fall in the price of silk coincided with a crop failure, famine in the northern prefectures and the return to the villages of additional unemployed workers forced out of the cities by the industrial crisis. The countryside became a caul- dron of simmering discontent threatening to explode in agrarian revolts on an unprecedented scale. Faced with this problem, the militarist leaders adopted an amazingly successful strategy of social demagogy. They deflected the tremendous pressure of social dis- content from a movement of internal revolt to mass support of the militarists' plans for external aggression. 185 Their strategy had two aspects, one negative, the other positive. First they attempted to make sure that the social unrest would not find any radical outlet by aug- menting the terror against the organizers of the tenants' movement. At the same time they harnessed the power of the reservoir of discontent for their own ends of military aggression. They posed as the only friends of the agrarian sufferers and in order to demonstrate their in- terest even launched genuine-sounding nation-wide pe- tition campaigns to alleviate rural misery. And then they inaugurated a campaign of tremendous proportions to lead agrarian unrest into aggressive channels. They preached that the problem of the peasant could only be solved through external expansion. They declared that their invasion of Manchuria was only a means of getting land for the poor crowded Japanese peasant. They de- clared that they had been forced into this attack because of the "oppression of European imperialism" which would not permit Japanese farmers to emigrate. For example they told the peasants that the Japanese gov- ernment had tried to lease large tracts of unoccupied lands in Australia but had been refused and that the at- tack on Manchuria was the only alternative. This ma- terial motive, combined with the idealistic motive of "spreading the Emperor's August Domain," swayed a large portion of the unsophisticated peasants. One of the reasons the militarists were so successful in winning over the peasantry was their control over so many of the influences reaching the rural village. They reached the rural children through the school- teachers, who had been heavily and specially indoc- trinated with the militarist viewpoint during their period of military service. The young peasant was subjected 186 to an even heavier barrage during his period of military training, in an attempt to convince him that his prob- lems could only be solved through the conquest and exploitation of other lands. And when he had completed his service, the Society of Reservists and the other army- dominated jingoist and chauvinist organizations con- tinued to develop the same themes. It is little wonder that some of the most rabid young officers have come from this class and that peasant soldiers have showed a brutal impatience with the conquered people of the "Co-Prosperity Sphere." The military fascist Putsch of May 15, 1932, the purpose of which was to accelerate the drive to complete fascism and all-out war, provided one of the best ex- amples of agrarian demagogy. The civilian participants in this Putsch were recruited in large part from gradu- ates of the Native-Land-Loving School of Kosaburo Tachibana, an agrarian fanatic closely connected with the young officers' movement. One of the leaflets dis- tributed in Tokyo clamored: "Kill the capitalists, pun- ish the arbitrary authorities, kill the sly landowners and the special privileged class. Peasants, workers and the whole nation, defend yourselves and guard your father- land." During their subsequent trial, in which the as- sassins were handled very gently by the authorities, one of the participants cried out: "The future in store for the children of rural families is nothing but slavish ap- prenticeship for the boys, and for the girls lives as fac- tory workers, maidservants, or abandoned waitresses." Tachibana explained his reason for becoming a leader in the movement in the following way: "Producing rice for the nation, the farmers were unable to obtain food for themselves. . . . The politicians and financiers have strayed from the spirit of patriotic brotherhood 187 which is the fundamental characteristic of our nation. I felt the need of awakening them and we acted with that motive. . . . The farmers were in a state of slavery and neither of the political parties helped them. At this moment the young officers stretched out a hand to us to stand up for better conditions." After the February 26 mutiny of 1936 apologists in- sisted that the young officers involved were of poor agrarian families, striking back against the oppressors of their class. Investigation revealed that among fourteen of the leaders, four were the sons of generals, one the son of a rear admiral, one the son of a colonel, two others the sons of a lieutenant and a sergeant major. Of the remainder, only one was the son of a farmer. One other was the son of a town mayor and therefore probably from a relatively well-to-do agrarian family, IMPACT OF THE WAR Although foreign conquest was held out as a panacea for the agrarian crisis, the peasantry was destined to be severely disappointed by the results of war. There were some slight and fleeting advantages at various stages. In the mid-'thirties the renewed demand for male labor in the growing munitions industries and for female workers in the textile plants removed some of the pres- sure of population in the rural areas. As rationing grew tighter after 1937 some of the peasants in the areas around the large cities were able to make illicit profits selling products on the black market. But the general impact of war produced a steady de- terioration in the position of the peasantry. The ever- increasing manpower demands of the military were a particularly heavy burden because Japanese agriculture 188 is almost entirely dependent on hand labor. Production was made still more difficult with the partial conversion of the ammonium sulphate industry into munitions pro- duction with the subsequent cut in the supply of arti- ficial fertilizer. The conditions of the tenants and part- owners were already deteriorating on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor because rents in kind were rising while productivity fell. In order to allay agrarian dis- content and thus maintain the morale of an army com- posed so largely of peasants the government instituted a number of measures. Preference was given the families of soldiers in purchasing government-owned rice. Slight financial assistance was given to help settle debts or keep the soldiers' families in their agrarian status. When the shipping shortage made the food situation par- ticularly precarious the authorities made strenuous ef- forts to supplement the inadequate manpower available on the farms with the labor of school children. In the early part of 1945 it was decided to discontinue almost all education as a means of supplying the required labor power. Despite these evidences of concern about agricultural production, the authorities showed a cold hostility to any suggestion of really aiding the working farmer. This was demonstrated most conclusively in the Diet discussions of January 1944. On January 26, 27 and 31 several Diet members suggested drastic reforms to im- prove the position of the tenant and thus increase pro- duction. Representative Ichio Sassai declared that farms owned and operated by the tenants themselves would produce more of the desperately needed foodstuffs. Representative Rikizo Hirano asked whether the gov- ernment wouldn't liberalize its loan regulations to en- able tenants to become peasant proprietors. The answers 189 of Minister of Agriculture Yamazaki were categorical He declared that the increase of individual farm owner- ship at that time would upset the "interdependent char- acter of the existing system" and that there was abso- lutely no chance of the government aiding such a de- velopment. POSTWAR PROSPECTS The agrarian crisis has not only found no alleviation through war but is intensified tremendously by the im- pact of defeat. The basic problems remain the same: parasitic landlords exacting semifeudal rents and usurious interest from a discontented but inarticulate peasantry. As before, this semifeudal system serves as an obstacle to the development of an internal market and a peace- ful economy and instead acts as a source for chauvinism and aggressive trends in foreign policy. Try as we might, the agrarian crisis cannot be ig- nored by the victors. There can be little doubt that the remaining cadres of military fascism will attempt to dig themselves underground in the rural areas and utilize peasant discontent as the mass basis for their resurgence. There can be no hope for a stable democracy or a peace- ful economy if the peasantry remain in their impover- ished and discontented plight. It would be the height of foolishness to suggest that the occupation authorities can by themselves perma- nently democratize or modernize Japanese agriculture. The main burden of the final solution of their funda- mental agricultural problems must rest upon the Japa- nese themselves. It is possible, however, for the occupy- ing authorities to expedite these developments by encouraging and facilitating such measures and all other 190 actions undertaken by the Japanese to assure the culti- vator an adequate return for his produce. Furthermore, during the period of military govern- ment the occupation authorities can themselves institute certain direct measures which will facilitate the solution of the agrarian crisis. We can encourage bona-fide or- ganizations representing the peasant owners and tenants. In the interest of peace in the countryside and as a means of depriving the military fascist demagogues of a breeding ground the seizure of agricultural land for the nonpayment of taxes or rent should be suspended for the period of military occupation. In the interest of increased production and self-sufficiency we can and should lower the land tax on owner-cultivated land and proclaim a corresponding reduction in farm rentals. All of these actions are possible under the broad powers of the occupying authorities. The extent to which these initial reforms are carried forward and made permanent will depend to a considerable degree on how far we go to encourage and facilitate the emergence of a demo- cratic government and peasant unions representative of the basic needs of those who till the soil. Such actions are not a matter of humanitarianism but simply constitute enlightened selfishness on our part, an effort to eliminate one of the basic causes of aggression in the past. The sponsorship of such measures would be a devastating blow to three quarters of a century of pro- militarist antif oreign agitation among the peasantry. The world over tenants and impoverished peasant proprietors turn toward those who help alleviate their condition. The militarists have recognized this and pretended to be the only allies of the peasants. But they have not delivered on their promises. If the United Nations prove them- selves to be better friends of the peasant than the mili- 191 tarists we may anticipate with confidence a gigantic re- versal in the attitude of the peasantry. The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the effectiveness of such measures In the countries on Its Western borders. It is particularly interesting to note results In Poland, Ru- mania and Hungary, where the peasants are Roman Catholics and until recently were anti-Russian. As in Japan the key economic problem of these East European countries was a semifeudal agriculture with masses of tenants and poor peasants living on the edge of starvation. The Russians recognized this and encouraged the estab- lishment of regimes which advocated peasant reforms. These reforms did not entail collectivization or anything approximating socialism, but rather the destruction of the survivals of feudalism. The large estates were divided among the landless tenants and small peasants. The land was acquired as private property, with payment spread over a number of years. Almost overnight the Balkan peasants, who had been converted into rural capitalists, became friendly to the socialist U.S.S.R., because it had helped them secure land. At the same time they became increasingly suspicious of the Western Powers who were friendly to the old regimes of large, semifeudal land- owners. It is clear therefore that the agrarian situation in Japan is a problem and a challenge. If the problem is not solved the remnants of militarism will benefit. If a democratic regime is able to carry through agrarian reforms it will win for itself millions of rural supporters. If the victori- ous powers assist in these reforms, they will not only vastly increase the chance for democracy and peace, but will earn for themselves a wealth of friendly feeling on the part of the rural half of Japan. 192 CHAPTER IX LABOR AGAINST MILITARISM In the winter of 1943-1944 General Juzo Nishio, military governor of the Tokyo area, declared: "We know there are workers in our country who think only of their own interests and seek a return to condi- tions of free labor. Such people deserve death." The verdict of death which General Nishio sought to Impose on laborers striving for freedom is not new. For the past half -century the militarists have regarded the labor movement as a mortal enemy to be harassed with relentless police terror and government suppression. Ever since the 1890's the trade unionists have con- sistently found their attempts to secure an improved livelihood blocked not only by greedy industrialists but also by army leaders. The latter have been Interested in keeping the workers' share of national production to a minimum, in order to devote the largest possible share of national production to war goods or to exports which would make it possible to acquire war goods abroad. Furthermore, the army leaders have seen, in the attempts of the trade unionists to extend democratic liberties, and to achieve an essential human dignity, a threat to the militarist regimentation of the nation behind aggressive adventures. It is no wonder that labor and militarism have been locked in a death struggle. And it is no wonder that the trade unions have been among the most consistent and best organized of the Japanese antimilltarists. In this unequal struggle, the militarists and their Zai- batsu allies have, of course, had all the tactical advan- tages. As their control of Japan has grown tighter, the 193 relentless onslaught of police terror against the unions has been intensified. Despite this, the underground labor movement has persisted in its antimilitarist activities right through the Pacific war; and through the media of strikes, sabotage and slowdowns it has made a small but direct contribution to Japan's defeat. The complete story is yet to be told, but what has already leaked out gives rise to hope that among Japanese workers excellent human ma- terial for a new and democratic Japan may be found. FIRST STIRRINGS The labor movement emerged in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, which greatly stimu- lated the country's industrial growth. Japan's trade union movement, like its industrialization, was late in starting and had to learn from foreign experience. The first major step in modern labor organization was the formation of the Society for the Promotion of Trade Unions in the summer of 1897 by a number of workers who had studied the organization of labor in the United States at first hand. The first trade union, the Iron Workers' Union, which was organized in December 1897 with over a thousand members, had a constitution and bylaws copied from those of American trade unions. This was due largely to the influence of its secretary, Sen Kata- yama, who had just returned from a twelve-year stay in the United States, where he had worked his way through courses at Grinnell College, Andover and Yale. At about the same time, the first issue of the Labor World, a monthly labor magazine edited by Katayama, was published. The following quotation from the maga- zine indicates its mission: The people are silent. I will be the advocate of this silence. I will speak for the dumb; I will speak for the 194 despairing silent ones; I will interpret their stammerings; I will interpret the grumblings, murmurings, the tumults of the crowds, the complaints, the cries of men who have been so degraded by suffering and ignorance that they have no strength to voice their wrongs. I will be the word of the people. I will be the bleeding mouth from which the gag has been snatched. I will say everything. In the next two years additional unions were organ- ized, spurred by a successful strike in the Nippon Rail- way Company, the largest railroad in Japan, and by examples of extreme cruelty and neglect on the part of employers. At a colliery in Kyushu over 200 miners were buried alive and permitted to burn to death in order to save the mining properties. Shortly thereafter thirty-one young girls burned to death in the dormitory of a spin- ning company. They were young peasant girls serving their periods of indentured servitude and were locked in at night with the doors and windows fastened on the outside to prevent them from escaping. When the fire broke out in the middle of the night they were unable to escape and all were maimed or killed. Alarmed by the flurry of labor activity, the Diet sounded the deathknell for the young struggling unions by passing the "Public Peace Police Law'^in 1900. It was declared a crime, punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, to enlist others in a movement to raise wages, shorten hours of labor or lower land rents. LABOR TURNS TO POLITICS This blow forced the dissolution of the infant unions and had the effect of turning the labor movement's efforts into the political field. While the police clamped down on discussion of strikes, boycotts or trade unions, 195 they were more lenient at first in permitting expression on labor politics, socialism and the like, apparently on the assumption that theories of a better future world were less dangerous than organizing to improve the exist- ing one. Labor leaders took full advantage of this oppor- tunity for political activity because they recognized that labor could make no permanent headway in Japan until the autocratic government was liberalized and labor per- mitted to express itself through the ballot and legal trade union organizations. They helped form a Universal Suf- frage Association which tried unsuccessfully to extend the franchise. In its early stages labor politics in Japan represented the confluence of two streams: Japanese liberalism and international socialism. From its origin the labor movement regarded itself as the heir of the liberal movement of the 1880's in the struggle for wider liberties, universal suffrage and women's rights. A labor newspaper declared in 1908: "The Meiji liberals have bequeathed to us as unfinished business the championing of these rights. Accordingly, the winning of these liberties is the responsibility which has fallen upon our shoulders." The labor movement also inherited some of the leading personalities of the left wing of the Liberal Party, for example Kantaro Oi, who after the demise of the Liberal Party established several periodicals favoring labor's cause. Shosui Kotoku, a former active liberal who turned socialist and who was later to pay with his life for his beliefs, expressed his feelings as follows: "Now that liberalism has been dead and buried, the Liberal Party of the past, which strug- gled on behalf of liberty and equality, which fought for culture and progress with such gallantry and high spirit, can only maintain its old traditions through socialists. 196 We alone can continue to put up a fight for freedom, equality and culture.' 7 The younger generation of labor progressives who returned after gaining experience in the American labor movement brought back with them to Japan the socialist ideas of Eugene V. Debs and the English translations of Ferdinand Lasalle, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. When the police prevented them from organizing labor unions they turned to writing and lecturing on socialism. The labor and socialist movements took organized form in 1901 in the Social Democratic Party. Sen Kata- yama, Shosui Kotoku and Dr. Iso Abe, who introduced baseball into Japan and was later to become the leader of the Social Mass Party, were among the founders. Like the German Social Democrats, whose lead they followed, they adopted both an ultimate and an immediate pro- gram. The ultimate program called for international disarmament, abolition of class distinctions, public owner- ship of the means of production, equalization of the distribution of wealth and universal education at the ex- pense of the state. Their immediate demands were for an eight-hour day and a six-day week, universal suffrage, freedom of speech and press, abolition of night work by adolescents and protection for the peasants. On the very day the Declaration of the Social Democratic Party was published, the Minister of Home Affairs summoned Katayama and another leader to his office and com- manded them to dissolve the party. In addition the authorities confiscated the printed copies of the declara- tion and prohibited the circulation of the Yorozu, the Mainichi and two other daily papers which had pub- lished it. The founders of the short-lived Social Democratic Party then founded an educational, nonpolitical organ- 197 ization: the Socialist Association (ShakaiShu&Kyokai). Later, when the Katsura Cabinet succeeded the one which had banned their party, the Socialists applied to the authorities for permission to revive the party under the title of the Japanese Commoners' Party, but they were bluntly rejected. The bulk of their educational work was carried on by means of lectures to working-class audiences. The largest and most momentous meeting was one held in April 1901 in Tokyo's Mukoshima Park. It was under the spon- sorship of the Niroku Shimpo, a daily newspaper whose owner was a personal friend of Sen Katayama. Some 50,000 workers bought tickets of admission in advance. The police, alarmed at the dimensions of the gathering, first ordered the newspaper to give up the meeting and then declared they would permit a crowd of not more than 5000. They set this limit because they could muster that many policemen and did not want to have the crowd more numerous than the police. The sponsors foiled this limitation by announcing that the 5000 would be ad- mitted on the basis of first come, first served. When the morning of the day arrived, more than the allotted num- ber were already there, having remained in the park all night. When the meeting opened there were over 30,000 present. The police were powerless. The assembly voted a resolution demanding improved factory conditions and universal suffrage. The government thereupon decided that it never again would permit a mass assembly of workers. The years 1902 and 1903 were the most fertile period for the labor and socialist movements. For a brief period Labor World was able to appear as a daily newspaper. There was a great increase in labor literature. A life of the German Socialist Ferdinand Lasalle was published, as 198 well as a translation of Labor by Emile Zola. An indige- nous literature also made its appearance. Fumio Yano, a widely known liberal political figure and writer, became a convert to socialism and wrote Neiv Society (Shin Shakai), showing how Japan could make the transition to socialism. Several thousand copies were sold in a few months. This was followed by the socialist novel Fire Pillar, by Naoe Kinoshita, which sold out ten editions in a few months and was frequently compared to Jack London's Iron Heel. LABOR'S FIRST TEST The small but growing labor and socialist movements met their first great test on the subject of internationalism and peace with the approach of the Russo-Japanese War. A decade later, the powerful German Social-Democratic Party, which in theory was just as antiwar and inter- national-minded as its struggling Japanese counterpart, was to support the Kaiser and Prussian militarism in World War I. But the Japanese laborites stood by their principles and incurred the undying enmity of the militarists and jingoists in their country. As early as October 1903, when the strain in Russo- Japanese relations became evident, a well-attended anti- war meeting was held by the Socialists at the YMCA Hall in Tokyo. Two Socialists, Shosui Kotoku and Toshihiko Sakai, gave up their editorial positions on the popular daily Yorozu because it became ultra-jingoistic. They founded a weekly of their own, Heimin SJnmbun (the Common People's Paper), which from its inception fought Japan's drift to war. When the war finally broke out in 1904, the Japanese Socialists gathered in Tokyo and sent a manifesto to the 199 Russian Social Democrats declaring that their two na- tions had been plunged into war by the "militarists" and "imperialistic desires" of both governments, but that the Socialists of both countries were bound together by common aims which recognized "no barrier of race, territory or nationality." Iskra, then edited by Lenin, commented: This manifesto is a document of historic significance. If we Russian Social Democrats know only too well with what difficulties we are confronted in time of war, ... we must bear in mind that far more difficult and embarrassing is the position of our Japanese comrades, who, at the moment when national feeling was at its highest pitch, extended their hands to us. The International Congress of Socialists was held at Amsterdam in August of 1904 and Sen Katayaina, who was then on a tour of the United States and Europe, was appointed as the representative of the Japanese So- cialists. At Amsterdam he and George Plekhanov, the Russian Social Democrat, were appointed Vice-Presidents of the Congress, and after the opening address they both appeared on the rostrum, shook hands warmly, and addressed the audience to give voice to their joint oppo- sition to the militarism of the Russian and Japanese autocracies. Within Japan the Socialists continued their opposition to the war despite continuous harassing by the police. The Heimin continued to criticize the war and all its hardships. For this and other acts "opposing the imperial constitution" the editors were brought to trial and im- prisoned, the weekly suppressed and the printing presses confiscated. An attempt was made to replace it with another weekly, Chokugen (Plain Speaking), but confis- 200 cation of issues, frequent trials and imprisonment of editors made work extremely difficult. Finally it was suspended altogether by the government in September 1905. Two months later the educational Socialist Asso- ciation was forcibly dissolved, FACTIONALISM TRIUMPHS The political atmosphere was somewhat less oppres- sive under the Saionji ministry, and it became possible to establish the Socialist Party in February 1906, with Sen Katayama and Toshihiko Sakai as two of its leaders. At the suggestion of Katayama, and as a means of pro- tecting its legality, the first clause in its constitution read: "We advocate socialism within the law." The party got off to a rather successful start by organizing demonstra- tions in Tokyo against a projected increase in the trolley fares. A meeting of 10,000 was held in Hibiya Park in Tokyo and afterwards the excited crowds attacked the cars and the offices of the company. As a result of this agitation the proposed fare increase was withdrawn. The police estimated the number of "Socialists" in Japan as about 25,000, but this probably was an attempt on their part to get added appropriations for the police forces, and at any rate represented the great majority of inactive socialist sympathizers rather than active and organized party members. But whatever potential the Socialist Party might have had at this time was almost entirely dissipated in a bitter factional fight between the followers of Katayama and Kotoku. Katayama, although a Marxian Socialist, felt that the labor movement was weak in numbers and organization and therefore it was necessary to utilize all the legal opportunities available to strengthen the organization and deepen the understanding of the industrial workers. He 201 thought it important to avoid giving the government un- necessary reason for suppressing the labor and socialist movements. He continued to travel around the country lecturing to laboring audiences. Although the police didn't permit him to mention words like "strike," "labor union," "boycott," "socialism," he did manage to express his ideas in a roundabout way and to include considerable propaganda in favor of universal suffrage and to retain his contacts with the workers. Kotoku, on the other hand, was a syndicalist, or be- liever in "direct action," partly as a result of having been influenced by the I.W.W. when he was in the United States. He minimized the agitation for universal suffrage and dependence on political action in general The few reforms passed by parliaments in the interest of labor were nullified in effect by hostile or corrupt judges. Real reform, Kotoku claimed, could be obtained only in one way, directly by the workingmen from the capi- talists, not indirectly through acts of parliament. "Direct action" was, therefore, the only logical policy for labor and it should give its whole time to preparation for general strikes and other revolutionary weapons. The policy of moderation advocated by Katayama and the syndicalist policy of Kotoku came into conflict in the first anniversary meeting of the Socialist Party held in February 1907. Although universal suffrage was supported, Kotoku's policies predominated and the clause "socialism within the law" was stricken from the constitution. A resolution openly advocated a funda- mental change of the existing society, and opposition to religion. The government thereupon suppressed the Socialist Party. Kotoku's influence was paramount in the Heimin, which was being published daily at that time. It was 202 very forceful and very radical One article, for exam- ple, was entitled "Kick Your Mother and Father." The Heimin was crippled with repeated censorship, fines and imprisonment of staff members, and was finally sup- pressed in March 1907. With the party dissolved and their common journal suppressed the two groups drifted apart. Katayama edited the Socialist News (Shakai Shimbun) while Kotoku contributed to the Osaka Heimin. Factionalism degenerated into bitter animosity between the two groups and they spent their time arguing doctrine rather than organizing. Of the two socialist groups the police were naturally most afraid of Kotoku's direct actionists, because under the conditions of extreme exploitation prevalent in Japan's factories and mines there was constant danger of violent explosion, and the syndicalists might strike the spark to cause a conflagration. During this period two such explosive incidents took place in the copper mines, where exploitation was par- ticularly brutal. The first came in the Ashio mines. Or- ganization had been started there by one Nagaoka, a veteran labor leader. He went to work as a common miner but achieved a leading position among the miners and quit to publish a little paper called "Friend of the Miners" and organize a secret labor organization under the fake title "Society of Sincere Persons." In February 1906 a group of miners came into conflict with the man- agement over wages and a riot broke out. Nagaoka tried to pacify the miners but was arrested by the police at the instigation of the mine owners. This infuriated the miners and they started a three-day riot of destruction which took a toll of 2,000,000 dollars' worth of com- pany property* As a result the labor organization was 203 thoroughly destroyed, and the leaders and members of the Society of Sincere Persons dismissed. A little over a year later, in the Besshi copper mines on the island of Shikoku, leaders of the miners who asked for 30 per cent wage increases and other demands were dismissed and roughly handled by the company's offi- cers. Conditions at these mines were particularly bad. Wages had been reduced the previous year and miners had often been forced to work at pistol point. Enraged by this final provocation about two hundred miners got very indignant, seized explosives and started to destroy every building except the school, hospital and the miners' dwellings. The rioters increased in numbers and during the six-day riot 15,000 miners participated. The local police force proved inadequate and national troops were called in. Many of the rioters were jailed but many of their demands were met. With such explosive potentialities in the labor situa- tion, the police were very anxious to use every oppor- tunity to keep the syndicalists out of the picture. One such opportunity presented itself in the "Red Flag Riot." In June 1908 the Katayama Socialists and the Kotoku syndicalists held a joint meeting to honor a co-worker who had just been released from prison. At the con- clusion of the meeting the syndicalists hoisted red flags in the street and sang a revolutionary song, "The Chain of Wealth," Suddenly the police appeared on the scene and arrested fourteen of the participants, imprisoning ten of them for from one to two-and-a-half years. SYNDICALIST SUPPRESSION The final crushing blow to the syndicalists and the socialist movement as a whole came two years later in 1910, when the government, using the name of the Em- 204 peror, performed an act of rank injustice. Without pre- senting a shred of evidence to the public, they arrested and tried in camera Kotoku and twenty-three others on a charge of conspiring against the Emperor's life. Kotoku and eleven others were condemned to death and strangled three days later, although a murderer was cus- tomarily given sixty days in prison before execution. Criticism of the trial was made le$e-maje$te. By painting the syndicalists as terrorists and would-be assassins of the Emperor, the government succeeded in turning the country against all Socialists. (It is said that a robber at Yamanashi prison committed suicide because his cellmate insulted him by calling him a Socialist.) The government then proceeded to act against the moderate Socialists. A few months after the trial Kata- yama's Socialist News was harassed into extinction by the authorities. All books on socialism were confiscated. Katayama himself was imprisoned for nine months for his association with a streetcar strike in Tokyo in 1912. After his release detectives dogged his every step; he was forced to leave Japan and come to the United States, where he resumed publication of the Heimin in New York. Even in the United States Japanese consuls and detectives hired by them made every effort to hamper his activities. His friends in this country were intimidated. One was actually kidnaped, sent to Japan and impris- oned for eighteen months. BLEAK REACTION The period that ensued was one of bleak reaction. The young labor movement was decapitated and disorganized and its fighting spirit seemed to have disappeared forever. Against this background Bunji Suzuki, who had spent some time in the United States and was a friend of 205 Samuel Gompers, organized in 1912 the innocuous Fraternal Society (Ywikai). It was supported by Baron Shibusawa, an important financier, and was in some ways a Christian reform movement, having begun with fourteen members of the congregation of Suzuki's Uni- tarian Church. Because its form of organization was that of a fraternal society seeking labor-management har- mony, it escaped the rigid suppression of the law. It was the only legal organization and it sheltered some de- voted labor fighters in its ranks. The Fraternal Society was not able to agitate for any reforms. However, protected by its legality, it became the only possible means through which labor leaders and the active rank and file were able to retain any con- tact with the defunct movement. As early as 1913, a young man named Tetsuo Nosaka was an active col- laborator of Bunji Suzuki. Later he became the well- known Communist leader Susumu Okano. Aided by funds contributed by philanthropists and the active work of young enthusiasts of all political shades, the Fraternal Society grew to 27,000 members in six years, with locals in Manchuria and Hokkaido. UPSURGE AND RECESSION World War I gave the labor movement its great im- petus. Industries grew rich and powerful and hungry for labor. Between 1914 and 1919 the number of workers in factories and mines doubled from 1,125,000 to 2,242,000. Prices doubled between 1914 and 1918 but wages rose only half as fast. The luxuries of the newly rich, the nankin, contrasted bitterly with the hard times of the workers. Strikes mounted rapidly from fifty in 1914 with 8000 participants to 497 with 66,000 par- 206 ticlpants in 1918, Japanese workers learned of the Rus- sian Revolution and became more confident of their own powers. Labor emerged as a serious factor with the Rice Riots of 1918, the greatest revolt of the Japanese people in this century. To the widespread popular protest against the exorbitant price of rice a member of the Terauchi min- istry replied: "It is high time the people limited the con- sumption of rice through self -control." In August 1918 a raid by fishwives on a rice-dealer's store in a village on the Japan Sea provided the spark. In Kobe rioters attacked rice stores, set fire to newspaper establishments, wrecked the homes of wealthy officials and finally ad- vanced on the police stations. In other cities and towns mobs of starving men, women and children broke into the town halls demanding the distribution of hoarded rice. Troops were called in to quell the disturbances. More than ninety civilians were killed, over 7000 ar- rested and a number incarcerated for life. While the Rice Riots were a mass national uprising, participated in by peasants, merchants and students, the city workers provided the core. Feeling was so high that the government felt it necessary to make concessions. The Police Law of 1900 was "reinterpreted" and dis- covered to mean that there would be no interference with "a wholesome development of labor unions," nor with strikes. A rash of strikes ensued. Most disturbing to the au- thorities were strikes in three military arsenals, another among government employees and a soldiers' mutiny. Strikes took new forms because the new unions had no money for strike benefit payments and the ill-paid work- men could not aif ord to lay off, unpaid, for long periods of time. Dockworkers whose demands for an eight-hour 207 day and higher wages were refused reported to work as usual, went through all the customary motions but ac- complished no work of importance. After a week they won their demands. Some months later the Tokyo trolley-men managed to win their demands by repeatedly tying up traffic, leaving would-be passengers futilely waiting at trolley stops and damaging an extraordinary number of cars. The Communists and Anarchists leapt to the helm of the mushrooming trade unions and until 1923 almost completely dominated them. The Communists empha- sized political action to achieve socialist reconstruction and for a period advocated universal suffrage. The most important union in the Communist camp was the Fra- ternal Society, which had turned left after 1917. The name was changed to "the Japanese Federation of La- bor," and Bunji Suzuki was relegated to an honorary post. Its program called for freedom of trade-union ac- tivity, a minimum-wage law, an eight-hour day, social insurance, an end to compulsory night shifts, universal suffrage, equal pay for women, and equal pay for Koreans and Chinese. The Anarchists, on the other hand, believed that all that was necessary to achieve their aims was the overthrow of the economic system through strikes and that political action was unnecessary. The labor movement failed to make the startling ad- vances anticipated; rather it suffered a recession. Total membership decreased from over 250,000 in the autumn of 1919 to 100,000 in March 1920. While in 1918 most of the strikes were successful, by 1921 most of them ended in complete failures. The reason was simple. After 1919 business dropped off and when men were dismissed, in almost every case, of course, the more active unionists were the first to go. The unions were weakened by loss 208 of dues-paying members, while the employers had a tremendous pool of unemployed workers from which to select the most tractable. As unemployment under- mined the people's new-found confidence and strength the police felt less compelled to make any concessions, and resumed their uninhibited methods. In 1923 the left wing of the labor movement was greatly weakened by the elimination of a number of its leaders. The Communists, who had never been permit- ted to organize a legal party, had organized secretly in 1922 and met in March 1923 to draw up a platform. The police discovered the names of the thirty delegates who attended the latter meeting and arrested them in June. Included among those arrested were Susumu Okano, Toshihiko Sakai and other leaders of the Com- munist wing of the labor movement. Under cover of the great earthquake of September 1923 there was a general police round-up. At that time 700 men, of whom about 120 were radicals, were jammed into prison, six to a cell, on charges of "improper speech and behavior, singing revolutionary songs and setting afloat wild rumors." Nine of the Communist labor lead- ers arrested were stabbed to death in jail and their corpses secretly burned. News of the murder was suppressed for thirty-seven days after the event and no punishment of any sort ever seems to have been inflicted on the guilty parties. Two weeks after the earthquake, moreover, Sakae Osugi, the intellectual leader of the Anarchists, his mistress and nephew were strangled in a Tokyo jail cell by a gendarmerie captain. The decimation of leaders and the wave of unemploy- ment in the wake of the earthquake enabled the rightists, with government help, to regain control of the Japanese Federation of Labor. Bunji Suzuki, "the Gompers of 209 Japan," again emerged as its leader. The Federation ex- pelled the left-wing unions, which comprised a third of its membership. The latter then established an organiza- tion of their own, the Japanese Trade Union Council (Nippon Rodo Kumiai Hyogikai). SUFFRAGE AS A SOP In 1925 universal manhood suffrage was granted in Japan in an attempt to siphon off labor and peasant dis- content into the carefully controlled parliamentary sys- tem, The Diet had no real power and the major parties were Zaibatsu-controlled. Despite these limitations, the reform made voting possible for 13,000,000 persons in- stead of only 2,800,000, and many in the labor move- ment felt that it offered the possibility of working to- ward a solution to some of the problems which the weak and ineffective unions had been unable to solve. But here again police repression beat back the attempts of labor to express its needs. New and more severe "dan- gerous thoughts" legislation was passed at the same time, granting the police wide freedom of action to render the leftist organizations impotent and neutralize any in- fluence they might exert on the elections. In the autumn of 1925 the Peasants' Union, the con- servative Federation of Labor and ten independent unions drew up a platform for a Farmer-Labor Party which was announced on December 1, 1925 but only lasted three hours because the police felt its platform was too red in hue. Desperately its founders strove to purge it of every suggestion of radicalism, only to have it dissolved by the police because "it lacked sincerity." In 1926 another and wider attempt was made to unite farmers and laborers into one political party, but it re- 210 suited in a three-way split, leftist, conservative and cen- trist. Each group set up its own party. SUCCESS AND ITS PRICE The labor parties experienced their first tests in the prefectural elections of 1927 and the national elections of 1928, both during the incumbency of the notorious General Tanaka as Premier. The laborites were badly handicapped by factional conflicts among themselves, lack of funds, and particularly by the harassing of the police, employers and the thugs of the jingoist societies. Every labor politician who campaigned was almost cer- tain to be beaten up by the thugs or silenced, detained or imprisoned by the police. In the Ashio copper mining district, scene of the famous 1906 strike, the local min- ing company hired all the halls in order to prevent a laborite from speaking. Despite these impediments the labor parties managed to win a fair scattering of seats. In the prefectural elec- tions of 1927 they elected 28 candidates of 1500 to be elected, and registered a total vote of 273,000. In the Diet elections of 1928 the laborites won eight out of the 466 seats and their total vote was increased to 438,000 4.4 per cent of the total votes cast. The Communist- influenced Workers and Peasants Party won two seats, polling 188,000 votes, or 2 per cent of the votes cast. The Communists considered this their first real victory in Japan. Even these slight advances were of considerable con- cern to the government. General Tanaka was particu- larly irked because he was planning to intervene in China against the Nationalist forces which were march- ing northward. One of the principal points which left- 211 wing propaganda emphasized was opposition to Japanese intervention in the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. Leaf- lets and placards denouncing Japanese imperialism in China were distributed by the left-wing laborites, and they even conducted agitation among the troops. In March and April 1928 the Tanaka government in- augurated the series of "Communist Raids," by arresting almost a thousand left-wing leaders, suppressed both the Workers and Peasants Party and the leftist Trade Union Council and terrorized Japanese workers for the next decade. In May 1928 Japanese troops landed in Shan- tung, China. LABOR SPLITS ON WAR The world now recognizes that September 18, 1931, the day when the Manchurian Incident broke out, marked the beginning of World War II. It also had an immediate and revealing effect upon the Japanese labor movement, dividing the unions and their affiliated parties into three streams: active supporters of aggression, timid apologists for it and militant opponents. Active support for the invasion of Manchuria was led by Katsumaro Akamatsu. Akamatsu had been a Social Democrat, but when the party refused to endorse his fascist position he and his followers split off in April 1932 and founded the Japanese State Socialist Party and a new trade union center. Akamatsu trumpeted to the almost three million unemployed that every jobless Jap- anese, every landless peasant, every employee or trades- man trying to make an honest living would find "heaven on earth" in Manchuria. He also proclaimed that Japan was "liberating" Asia from the race discrimination and exploitation of Western imperialism. Although the work- 212 ers were influenced by the prevalent nationalist sen- timent and the hope that conquest of foreign lands would improve their miserable lives somehow, Akamatsu suc- ceeded in massing only some 17,000 followers in his fascist labor unions in 1932, one fifth of total union mem- bership and 10,000 less than the harassed and per- secuted leftists. But by 1936, with the collaboration of the militarists, employers and the government and with the adherence of a large number of company unions, Akamatsu could claim a membership of 80,000, The conservative labor leaders, such as Professor Iso Abe and Bunji Suzuki, now emerged as apologists for aggression. Their political party was the Social Mass Party which succeeded to the Social Democratic Party in August 1932 as a result of the departure of the Aka- matsu "State Socialists" and the addition of centrist groups. There was also a parallel reorganization in the Federation of Labor, which was thereupon called the Japanese Trade Union Congress (Nippon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi). Its total membership was 275,000, or about three fourths of total union membership. The conservative labor leaders interspersed apologies for Japanese aggression with timid criticisms about the manner in which it was being carried out. Bunji Suzuki, who was "honored" by inclusion in the Matsuoka dele- gation to the League of Nations, attempted to "explain" Japan's Manchurian policy while touring Europe and the United States. When Japan withdrew from the League of Nations the Social Mass Party warned that Japan was "being isolated from the rest of the world," but instead of blaming militarism for this attacked the government's "aimless bureaucratic diplomacy." The Chief Secretary of the Social Mass Party criticized the government because it had taken "only Korea, Formosa 213 and Manchuria, which so far have only been an expense to the treasury and have brought in small profit." In many cases, however, even the more conservative rank-and-file laborites did not agree with their leaders. Hamada, leader of the Seamen's Union, openly sup- ported militarist intervention in Manchuria and was ex- pelled from the union as a consequence. When Bunji Suzuki returned from his international tour of "ex- planation," he was greeted by a storm of criticism from Social Mass Party members. The apologetic approach of the conservative laborites to the questions of war was also carried over into their attitude on economic problems. A conservative leader, Suehiro Nishio, in April 1934 told the Japanese Trade Union Congress that " ... we must endure wage cuts with tears in our eyes. . . ." Organized opposition to continental expansion was centered in the left wing of the labor movement. As a result of the unwillingness of the leftists to work under the severe restrictions imposed by the police on legal unions, during the period from 1928 to 1934 there were no legal left-wing trade unions and activities were car- ried on through underground organizations. In Septem- ber 1932 a group of Tokyo metalworkers and a group of workers in a munitions plant were arrested for carry- ing on antiwar propaganda. In the Kanazawa area bor- dering the Japan Sea the wives of workers who had been mobilized brought their children to the barracks and demanded that the government feed them, since it was depriving them of their fathers. In the Himeji-Okayama district several wives and mothers lay down on the rails in front of a troop train and shouted: "We shall not let our husbands and sons go to their deaths!" On July 26, 1932, the last day of a major trial of leftists, more 214 than 1500 laborers staged demonstrations in Tokyo, waving red flags and shouting: "Down with the War of Aggression!" * Withdraw from Manchuria!" The leftist workers managed to continue their activity even in the army. On September 20, 1932, teachers and students of the Takarajima and Yokohama aviation schools were arrested for distributing leftist literature. The periodical Nippon, for January 19, 1933, stated: " . . . the Communists carried on propaganda in the First Aviation School, Tokyo, issued a publication the Soldiers' Friend, organized a special brigade which car- ried on its work during last year's maneuvers in Kansai, organized nuclei in certain units of the army, while the n*vy section almost succeeded in setting up a unit in Naval Headquarters itself." Nichi Nichi reported on March 9, 1933: "Several days ago in Shibuya [in Tokyo], the gendarmes arrested some soldiers suspected of par- ticipating in the activities of the Anti-Imperialist League, distribution of Red literature and propaganda among the troops." Little wonder that the military conscription au- thorities were particularly severe with industrial work- ers, in their attempts to screen out "unreliable" elements! These antiwar activities brought down a fresh series of arrests on the heads of the left laborites and other antiwar elements. In October 1932 an extraordinary roundup of leftists netted some 2200 prisoners. The police alleged that those arrested were the financial agents of the Communist Party and had been confer- ring on ways and means of financing the revolution. They had agreed, the police asserted, to secure money by entering the white slave trade, by blackmailing, kid- naping, inducing rich girls to run away from home with their parents' funds, forgery, counterfeiting, and bank robberies! 215 The public was amazed by the presence of many- scions of wealthy families among the leftists arrested by the police. To minimize the impact of this fact, the Tokyo police chief solemnly informed the press that those aristocrats who turned "Communist" were suffer- ing from too active minds placed in too weak bodies! In 1934 the leftists apparently decided that there were important advantages to legality, despite the severe police restrictions, and in November of that year organized a National Council of Trade Unions (Zenkoku Rodo Kumai Hyogikai) and the Proletarian Party (Musanto*). The labor council began with only 14,000 members and an apparent determination to be as radical as possible while retaining the advantages of legality. By 1936 it had some 40,000 members. Both the National Council and the Proletarian Party were led by Kanju Kato, who, while not a Communist himself, was a militant leftist and was trusted and sup- ported by the Communists. Formerly a newspaperman, he became a strike leader of the Yawata Iron Foundry strike in 1920 and later a leader of the centrist Miners Federation. In 1935 he visited the United States at the invitation of the C.LO. AGGRESSION FAILS TO PAY OFF During the years following the Manchurian Incident there was a growing disillusion with the supposed benefits of aggression. This was true of the middle classes and particularly true of the industrial laborers. Instead of creating a "heaven on earth" the cost of aggression was footed by the mass of the people. Real wages dropped 23 per cent between 1931 and 1936; "take home pay" did not decline as much because of lengthened hours of 216 labor. The number of labor disputes rose from 1600 In 1935 to over 1900 in 1936, with a proportionate increase in participants. Public disappointment with the outcome of the Man- churian adventure and the general leftward movement of public opinion caused the opportunist leaders of the Social Mass Party to take a fairly vigorous antifascist and antimilitarist position during the very important Diet elections of 1936 and 1937. In the 1936 Diet campaign, the Social Mass Party called for a reduction of war expenditures and a new, more moderate foreign policy towards China. The Proletarian Party, under Kanju Kato's leadership, ad- vocated a "popular front" of all democratic, antimili- tarist elements. The police replied by pronouncing a ban on the use of the words "popular front." Significantly, both the Social Mass and the Proletarian parties increased their popular support on the basis of their antiwar pro- grams! The Social Mass Party received over 500,000 votes and picked up fifteen seats, rising from three to eighteen. The Proletarians achieved their first representa- tion nationally when they succeeded in electing three members to the Diet, including Kato himself. The MinseitOj which was still the less warlike of the two major parties, gained seventy-eight seats, while the ag- gressive Seiyukai lost sixty-eight. This demonstration of widespread support for a peace program precipitated, just six days later, the military- fascist revolt of February 26, 1936, the largest and bloodiest coup d'etat which Japan had yet witnessed. Although this revolt did not succeed, it was a warning of the lengths to which the military extremists were willing to go. The opponents of militarism attempted, within the 217 limitations imposed by Japanese police terror, to indicate their continued opposition. In 1936, for the first time in seventeen years, the May Day celebration was forbidden, but nevertheless the leftists held scattered, illegal demon- strations with workers demanding political freedom, the nationalization of monopolies and the ending of aggres- sion in China. Antiwar leaflets were distributed in the army. In the Diet, some members of the Social Mass Party, swept along on the wave of peace sentiment, de- nounced the government policy in China, sharply criti- cized the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Anti-Comintern Pact, and advocated a nonaggression pact with the U.S.S.R. In the general elections of April 30, 1937, a bare ten weeks before Japan renewed its invasion of China, the drift toward military fascism was a clear-cut issue. The outstanding result of the election was the great increase in the Social Mass Party which, as a result of its anti- militarist election campaign, became the third largest party in the Diet, polling nearly a million votes and doubling its representation from eighteen to thirty-seven seats. Kanju Kato, of the Proletarian Party, was again elected from a working-class constituency in Tokyo, with the largest majority polled by any candidate; five other proletarians were successful There can be little doubt that these indications of increasing antimilitarism in Japan, together with the increasing co-operation of the Nationalist and Communist forces in China, were the two most important catalytic agents precipitating the China Incident in July 1937. INTIMIDATION Japan's ruling oligarchy utilized the new "war emer- gency" to suppress all opposition with ruthless thorough-* 218 ness. Under fire-eating Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, Home Minister In Prince Konoye's first Cabinet, whole- sale arrests of opponents of militarism were made In December 1937. Kanju Kato and 400 other leaders of the National Council of Trade Unions and the Proletarian Party were arrested and both organizations were sum- marily dissolved. Also arrested were thirty prefectural and municipal representatives, four former university professors and Baroness Ishimoto. The outbreak of the China war enabled the more nationalistic leaders of the Social Mass Party to reverse the trend toward antimilitarism which had dominated party policies in the previous three years. Under cover of the "national emergency," pro-militarist elements were able to come to the fore in the leadership and swing the organization behind the China Invasion. In the Diet the party supported the war, criticized the government for its failure to insure the livelihood of the families of the soldiers at the front and called for good treatment of the North China peasants by the army so as to win them to the Japanese cause. Bunji Suzuki visited the United States in an effort to influence the American labor move- ment against taking hostile action toward Japan. In moving into this pro-war position the leaders of the Social Mass Party were not responding to any demand on the part of its followers. This was demonstrated in the Tokyo municipal elections held at the end of No- vember, 1937. The party elected only ten of its forty-two candidates whereas In 1936 it had elected two thirds of its candidates. The left laborites and Communists continued to op- pose militarism. On July 8, 1937, the day after the be- ginning of the China Incident, the Communists issued a statement denouncing Japan's attack as an "unjust 219 robbers' war" which every Japanese should oppose. Leaflets containing this statement were scattered in Tokyo, Kobe, Osaka and other Industrial centers. It is estimated that an average of one arrest per day for ac- tivity against the war occurred in the two years follow- ing the outbreak of the China Incident. In addition to this illegal form of antiwar activity, the leftists also carried out a legal form of antiwar struggle, the de- mand for subsidies for soldiers' families, payment of soldiers' wages during their military service and similar activities. They were so successful In agitating among the members of some of the conservative unions that the pro-war leaders of some of these unions were forced to give voice to these demands in order to retain their positions. The conditions for antiwar activity on the part of labor rapidly became more and more difficult. March 1938 saw the passage of the National Mobilization Law, which authorized the government to impose compul- sory labor service, regulate wages and prohibit strikes and trade unions. In July 1938 the government-supported "labor front" got under way. It was called the National Industrial Service Association (Sangyo Hokoku Kai, abbreviated as Sampo). In 1940 all the labor unions were abolished, their treasuries confiscated and their members ordered to join the Sampo, which was controlled directly by the Minister of Welfare. The workers in each plant were ordered to form a "co-operative body," with "the manager of the enterprise as the leader." One of the Sampo's first acts was to send delegations to visit Ger- many and Italy. In the same year the Social Mass Party and the re- maining political parties, the only other legal organiza- tions capable of being political vehicles of popular dis- 220 content, were abolished and replaced by the totalitarian Imperial Rule Assistance Association. RESISTANCE ON THE EVE OF WAR Despite ruthless repression, despite the fact that all their organizations were crushed, the workers neverthe- less carried on a series of bitter struggles in 1941, on the eve of war. Although there were Westerners in many of the areas involved, reports of these strikes did not reach this country until 1943 when the Allied Labor News correspondent in Chungking obtained them from Jap- anese prisoners of war in Chungking. These prisoners were members of the Japanese And- War League in Chungking and claimed to have been participants in the strikes. The fact that these strikes ^ere not noted by Westerners in Japan at that time is explainable by the strict police surveillance both of foreigners and of war Industries, and also by the likelihood that the strikes were of the type used by the Japanese workers at the end of the last Avar. In this type of strike the workers stay on the job and go through all the motions of work- ing but do not actually accomplish anything. Labor unrest in 1941 was the cumulative product of the steady decline in living standards. In 1939 a ceiling on wages was instituted, to be followed by a law pre- venting labor mobility and finally, in 1942, by labor conscription. At first these measures were merely pro- claimed and their enforcement was perfunctory, but gradually the screws were tightened. The first great strike apparently broke out in Kobe in April 1941. According to the story compiled by Jap- anese war prisoners in China the direct cause of the Kobe strike was dissatisfaction with the workers' food rations. Under the new system instituted that year each 221 worker was entitled to 2.7 go (one go equals three tenths of a pint) of rice daily, against a normal peacetime con- sumption of four go for men and three for women. Furthermore, because of shortages the amount actually- given the workers was about 15 per cent less. At the same time the working day had been increased from between ten and twelve to sixteen hours with com- pulsory night shifts twice every week. Workers' representatives from various plants met secretly to consider the situation and decided to launch a movement with three slogans: "Shorten working hours and 'increase wages/' "Give us 2,7 go of rice as you promised" and "A voluntary night shift." These de- mands were presented to the management and when they were refused a form of sit-down strike was started. The workers came to work but they stopped the ma- chines and did nothing. Despite police pressure the deadlock continued for five days and the owners showed no signs of weaken- ing. Another slogan then appeared: "The plant ad- ministrations have no sincerity break the machinery." Systematic sabotage began and more than one hundred lathes are reported to have been smashed in the Kawa- saki Shipbuilding Company dockyards alone. Every effort was made to suppress news of these developments. The papers were not allowed to publish a word and the police made arrests of people who were even heard talking about it. In the week following the strike the police questioned 20,000 workers in order to identify the ringleaders. After a thorough comb-out, four men were accused of fomenting the strike and shot. Twenty-four of the more active workers were sentenced to transportation from the country and not heard of again. 222 Japanese war prisoners declared that another large- scale strike broke out at Nagoya in August 1941, involv- ing the Mitsubishi aircraft plant and other factories in that city. As at Kobe, sabotage played a prominent part in the strike. It is reported that striking workers took airplane parts out of the plants, broke them and threw them into ditches. The strike was settled by partial con- cessions to the workers, but after work was resumed, numerous arrests were made. In September 1941 3000 of the 60,000 workers at the great Kokura arsenal in North Kyushu are reported to have struck, demanding shorter hours and improved working conditions. It is reported that there were no arrests and no reprisals after this strike because the War Ministry itself recognized that the degree of overwork was so high at the arsenal that production was impeded instead of speeded up. There may also have been a desire on the part of the militarists to show that they, unlike the private capitalists, were willing to listen to legitimate complaints. There is also a report of a large-scale strike in October in Tsurumi, the heavy industry section of Yokohama. A special characteristic of this strike was joint action be- tween the industrial workers and salaried employees. Not much is known about this incident except that repression was severe and many participants were trans- ported overseas for work on fortifications. Wataru Kaji, leader of the Japanese Anti-War League at Chungking, has stated that these 1941 strikes had an international significance, because they came at a time when the militarists were presumably deciding whether to strike north against the Soviet Union or south and east against Britain and the United States. Kaji declared that these strikes led many of Japan's leaders to believe that 223 an attack on the U.S.S.R. Involving an all-out con- tinental war close to home, with large-scale bombing of Japan and Soviet political warfare amid unsettled internal conditions was not wise until order within the country- was secured. On the other hand, a war against Britain and the United States, fought on distant battlefronts s would give the militarists advantages on the home front because they could claim that Japan was fighting for her life against economic strangulation and for the "liberation" of the subject peoples of Asia. Such slogans undoubtedly have influence among ordinary Japanese with no access to unbiased sources of news. THE ONSLAUGHT OF WAR Even before December 7, 1941, Japanese industrial workers labored under conditions difficult for the Westerner to conceive. But after that infamous date the workers of Japan were reduced to slavery, slow starvation and inhuman toil. Labor conscription was put into effect after March 1942, and steadily increased in scope until the govern- ment was able to assign men and women over twelve years of age and up to seventy to any industry in any part of the Japanese Empire. The method of conscrip- tion is the same as that used by the army, except that draft notices are printed on red cards for soldiers and white for workers. "White card service'* became a word of horror to Japanese workers. It meant their removal from place to place without regard for their family situation and pay fixed at a daily maximum of 1.60 yen (forty cents, United States currency) for men and one yen (twenty- five cents) for women. In normal times, before inflation 224 set in, this was approximately the minimum wage. Skilled workers often earned five yen ($1.25) a day, but with the advent of conscription they could be arbitrarily shifted from their old jobs into conscript categories where no amount of experience could get them even one third of this sum. Of all conscript labor, the lot of the workers in the scrapped and sold factories was the worst. Where their skills were directly useful these workers were literally sold with their plants. They were placed unconditionally at the disposal of the purchasing trusts who paid them the conscript wage regardless of their previous status. Those without important usable skills were sent on the same day to training camps where they underwent a forced course in vocational training under military dis- ciplineagain without a single day to arrange their own affairs. One result of the "white card service" was a wave of suicides. One suicide in Kobe attracted wide attention. A young man who was supporting his grandmother and two younger sisters received his white card ordering him to depart the next day. The same evening he wrote a letter to the governor of the prefecture, after which the entire family lay down on the railway track and was killed. Thousands of Kobe workers turned out for the funeral; and despite police surveillance, speakers at the ceremony poured out their indignation and told of similar episodes. The pitifully small sums earned by the conscripted workers bought them less and less in the way of goods. Taxes and prices of daily necessities rose sharply and many goods were only obtainable on the black market at several times the official prices. In the black market a pair of shoes had risen to the equivalent of 135 American 225 dollars by February 1945, or more than eleven months* salary for the average conscripted worker! There was a continual deterioration In the amount and quality of food so that by the autumn of 1944 Premier Koiso virtually admitted that Japan had made the transition from bare subsistence to slow starvation. The government had requisitioned all foodstuffs and the police rationed them out to the people, half of the ration being rice and the rest beans and other staples. But a day's ration was only enough for one meal and those who could afford it had to buy wheat flour and other food from the black market at many times the normal price. In the autumn of 1944 Dome* admitted in a broadcast that the rising infant mortality rate was due to the acute food shortage. The mothers lacked nutri- tion and consequently had no milk. In an attempt to allay mass unrest the Metropolitan police established soup kitchens, but even the Tokyo radio admitted that there was "not much nourishment in a hodgepodge con- sisting mostly of water and a few stringy shavings of eggplant"! In 1945, under the impact of increased bomb- ings and decreased shipping, mass starvation deepened. These inadequately fed workers were compelled to work a minimum of twelve hours and frequently as much as sixteen. Many industries worked three sixteen-hour shifts in forty-eight hours. The average worker was allowed only two days of rest each month. Industrial exhaustion developed to new and fantastic degrees. Workers began to show symptoms of various forms of insanity on a mass scale. Japanese scientists considered this phenomenon learnedly for a time, then came to a discovery that most of the cases recovered if given a sedative and left alone to sleep which some did for three or four days without waking. Despite the risks in- 226 volved, the doctors turned In a report stating flatly that the only thing wrong with the men was that they worked too hard and slept too little. Exhaustion and the assignment of Inexperienced work- ers to complicated jobs produced a terribly high rate of accidents and sickness throughout Japan. A prisoner of war captured in China who worked in one of the Mitsu- bishi electrical factories told how he himself had seen fifty accidents happen in one day, including seven deaths and thirteen serious injuries. Tuberculosis, always the great scourge of Japanese industrial laborers, mowed down hundreds of thousands. THE FIGHT CONTINUES Confronted with such conditions, Japanese labor found the energy to fight back. The full story, of course, can only be told after the war. Much of the information on this subject made available during the course of the war came from the Japanese People's Emancipation League and therefore might be discounted in some measure. However, the American and British observers who visited Yenan in the summer and fall of 1944 found that the League headquarters there had complete files of smuggled Japanese magazines and newspapers to which the visitors were given free access. These newspapers and periodicals had been culled by the League for items in- dicating popular resistance to Japanese militarism, and a similar effort had been made to obtain this type of in- formation from Japanese prisoners captured by the Eighth Route Army. The following evidences of unrest include only those which are substantiated in the Japanese press or else- where. 227 The first evidence of labor resistance after the attack on Pearl Harbor was a strike for shorter hours at the Kawasaki dockyard in Kobe in the spring of 1942, under Communist leadership. That this strike was not an iso- lated instance is evidenced by official Japanese govern- ment figures which admit to over 250 disputes during 1942. In the Diet session of February 1943 the Home Minister stated: "It is regrettable that although the Com- munist movement has gradually diminished since the China Incident, it has still not been completely obliter- ated." Labor discontent was apparently of great concern to those of the government's supporters who were in close contact with industrial workers. In the spring of 1943, at a conference of the Imperial Rule Assistance Associa- tion, a delegate from an industrial district made the fol- lowing statement: "The feeling of the Japanese people toward co-operation in winning the war is weakening. Is not the working class the only group that makes sacrifices, while the people on top do nothing and make money?" Labor resistance also took forms other than strikes, because strikes almost inevitably exposed the strike leaders to police retribution. Perhaps the next most important weapon was absenteeism. Absenteeism is just as effective in preventing production, and just as much of an economic sacrifice for poorly paid workers. Quot- ing the Japanese industrial magazine Diamond, XCNR, the Yenan Communists' transmitter, reported that in 1943 10 per cent of the workers in Japan stayed away from the factory for no apparent reason. In 1944 it was claimed that 15 per cent of the workers in 761 factories did not go to work regularly. These figures were more 228 than supported in a surprising talk to Japanese Home and Empire radio audiences on October 26, 1944, by Dr. Isaku Tsukada. Dr. Tsukada, according to the monitored broadcast, made the startling disclosure that in some factories absenteeism ran as high as 40 per cent! He attributed this poor showing largely to malingering on the part of the workers. During his investigation of workers absent from factories for periods of two weeks or more, the doctor asserted that "one third of those who were absent saying that they were suffering from beriberi or pneumonia had no physical breakdown and were per- sons who could work very well." The term "absenteeism" as used by Dr. Tsukada was not quite accurate, because he apparently included not only time lost by staying away from the plant, but also the total man hours lost due to absence from the worker's post in the factory. Such malingering would certainly seem to indicate a lack of enthusiasm for the war among a considerable number of industrial laborers and perhaps a conscious slowdown. Station XCNR contributed more material in this direc- tion with quotations from the well-known Japanese magazine Oriental Economist which reported that work- ers in the Kawasaki Shipbuilding yard in Kobe frequently asked for leave and even when they went to work purposely slowed down the pace or even damaged the machines by "pretending to be careless." Some workers were reported to have wasted and stolen raw materials. On this point the magazine Diamond was quoted as having said in its March 1944 issue that "in several cases as much as 40 per cent of (the) raw material was wasted or stolen." The outstanding suggestion of industrial sabotage by Japanese workers was contained in an article which 229 appeared in the Asahi Shimbun of July 29, 1944. This article warned that the "spirit of personnel producing planes must be recreated" and quoted a statement by Major General Masamitsu Mori of the army air force in which he attacked the shoddy quality of Japanese air- craft. The statement of General Mori suggests sabotage rather than carelessness. He declared that although a "factory that could manufacture two hundred planes last year can now increase output to five hundred planes, I want to inform you that this increase is only to be found in the factory's books. . . . Many facts which I have seen or heard cannot but make me warn producers in the rear . . . To speak of it is heartbreaking the in- creased number of planes are not of any use at the front, but instead only increase casualties of our flying officers, thus wasting [the] money and resources of the country. When five hundred planes are transported to the front, it is discovered that 10 per cent of them are not up to the mark, and this is only the number discovered by test flights. During fighting, the number not up to the mark is more. I can tell you that our planes, after flying a few hours, usually leak oil or have engine trouble, so that very often, when setting out to bomb or to attack enemy planes, they have to fly back when halfway or are even lost and damaged on the way. So this cannot but affect our plan of fighting. . . ." It is perhaps significant that Kanju Kato, antifascist labor leader, was imprisoned once again shortly after this. He had been arrested at the end of 1937 but was released later after promising to give up political ac- tivities. In November 1944 he was again arrested and sentenced to prison for three years. It seems reasonable to assume that the rising tide of political unrest had made it impossible for him to keep his promise. 230 In order to counter Increasing unrest and absenteeism among the industrial workers, the Labor Division of the Japanese police was greatly strengthened. This division was particularly important after the start of the great fire-bomb attacks on Japanese industrial centers early in 1945, because the destruction and temporary break- down of authority gave additional opportunities for absenteeism, sabotage, and the circulation of illicit propa- ganda. The importance attributed by Japanese ruling circles to police control of such labor activities is in- dicated by the fact that when the Emperor made a tour of the damaged areas in Tokyo on March 18, 1945, he paid a special and unprecedented visit to the Labor Division of the Metropolitan Police Board. LABOR AND THE FUTURE There can be little doubt that the Japanese labor move- ment will play an important role in the postwar world. Trade unions have never attained great numerical strength in the past because of severe repression and the availability of unlimited supplies of cheap labor from the impoverished rural areas, plus the additional under- mining effect of constant factional conflicts. For these reasons, labor unions have never organized more than 8 per cent of all the industrial laborers. But a rudimentary underground labor movement has apparently persisted and is certain to grow as the forces of repression weaken. Therefore we are faced with the immediate and long-run question of what the United Nations' attitude should be toward the Japanese in- dustrial laborer and his organizations. During the past half-century the labor movement in Japan has provided the most militant and consistent anti- 231 war elements. While we cannot expect military govern- ment to be popular among Japanese workers, there is every indication that these elements will co-operate with occupation authorities in rooting out their common enemies the military fascists and their collaborators. It is only just and wise that we co-operate with those who have demonstrated their opposition to militarism by their past actions. We should view with suspicion turn- coat opportunists like Bunji Suzuki should they offer their assistance. We can co-operate, however, with moderate labor leaders who have indicated their opposi- tion to war by retiring and refusing to aid the govern- ment. We should also enlist the aid of those left laborites like Kanju Kato who have braved jail, torture and death to oppose Japanese aggression. A large portion of the labor leaders who have resisted the militarists are leftists. It would be not only unjust but inexpedient to reject their aid on that score, because they command a considerable following, and a co-opera- tive attitude on the part of the Japanese working people will simplify many of the tasks of the occupation au- thorities. Furthermore, although the political affiliations of the labor leaders are leftist, the demands which they express are almost ridiculously moderate by Western standards: an eight-hour day, a six-day week, improved working conditions and pay, freedom of speech, press and organization, and freedom to picket and strike. We must not overlook the fact that the fulfillment of these demands not only favors the industrial laborers of Japan, but will also be in the interest of the prosperity and peace of the entire Pacific. An increase in the income of the Japanese worker will narrow the difference in labor costs between Japan and the other industrial powers, help diminish cutthroat competition, and make 232 possible the exchange of goods on a more equitable basis. The elimination of cheap labor in Japan will also re- duce the incentives for war. We have noted that one of the most important elements propelling Japan to war has been the low income of the great majority of the population, which has made it impossible for them to purchase any substantial proportion of Japanese produc- tion. This lack of an internal market has made necessary aggressive trade competition and war. The remedy, there- fore, lies in large part in enabling the industrial popula- tion, as well as other depressed groups, to constitute a stable internal market by increasing their proportion of Japanese national income. Since working with the labor movement is likely to provide us with expert assistance in eliminating mili- tarism and establishing peace and prosperity in Japan, it would seem merely enlightened self-interest on our part to do so. 233 CHAPTER X SCHOOLS FOR ANTIFASCISTS A postwar antimllitarlst government, under- taking the herculean task of re-educating Japan, will have to consider the work of both Wataru Kaji and Susumu Okano, the Japanese antifascists who have achieved such striking results in converting Japanese prisoners of war in Chungking and Yenan. There are few Japanese who can speak with more authority on the possibility of re- claiming the Japanese mind from the corruption of military fascism. L WATAHU KAJI The Chinese Government has lauded his work, but the Imperial Japanese Government itself has given the best tributes to the effectiveness of Wataru Kaji. The Japanese military police offered generous rewards for his head. The Japanese air force twice attempted to pin- point his residence in China. And Japanese newspapers in Shanghai and Japan devoted columns to reports of the activities of Kaji and his converts. Kaji was born in 1903 in Kyushu; his parents were prosperous landlords with twelve tenants and his grand- father had been a samurai of the Satsuma clan. In his early youth Kaji wanted to be a naval officer, but when he reached Tokyo Imperial University in 1923 he de- voted himself to literature exclusively. The University was a liberal institution in those days with intense dis- cussions raging on all sorts of political and economic questions. Through liberal friends he gradually became aware of the social implications of literature and got 234 caught up in the swirl of political argument. His first organizing activity was caused by his classmate Prince YamanashI All the students were obliged to bow to the floor, button their collars and do reverence before this member of the Imperial Household, who was ensconced at an elaborate desk set high above the others. It got under Kaji's skin and he organized a boycott of any class attended by the Prince. This boycott was actually en- forced for three years. At the university, Kaji joined Pro- fessor Yoshino's New Man Society and in 1926 organ- ized a Society for the Investigation of New Literature. After graduation in 1927, Kaji joined the Workers and Peasants Party and did organizational work in Niigata, a hotbed of peasant discontent. Kaji helped form a com- munal school and helped in the organization of peasant unions which during this period attained considerable strength. He was also very active as a leader of leftist writers. In 1928 a monthly magazine, Fighting Flag, was started and Kaji was one of its editors. By 1930 it attained a circulation of 30,000, mainly among intellectuals and trade union leaders. Nominally the magazine was legal but the police sought in every way to suppress it. Copies were often confiscated in bookstores and in many places the magazine had to be distributed in secret. As a result of the confiscation of its issues and the arrest of its editors, the magazine was forced to close in 1931. Kaji was one of the most active members of the Fed- eration of Revolutionary Artists and Writers. From 1927 to 1932 he was a member of its central executive com- mittee and from 1932 to 1934 he was general secretary. After 1930, however, the federation, like other leftist groups, was hampered and weakened by systematic repression. 235 Kaji paid for his activities with repeated jailings. He was arrested for the first time in 1930, charged with being a member of the Anti-Imperialist League. To make him confess the police beat him across the legs for two hours every day for a month. He was finally released, but thereafter was periodically rearrested and given short sojourns in prison. When free he carried on his work as best he could. Dozens of his friends were tortured to death in various prisons in 1932 and 1933 but apparently this fact did not undermine his courage. In 1933 Kaji was arrested for the third time, because his card was found among the effects of his best friend, Takiji Kobayashi, the celebrated short story writer, who was tortured to death by the Tokyo police. "In Tokyo," Kaji told Edgar Snow, "there are over eighty police jails, and each one can keep a prisoner without any trial for two months. The police did not charge me with any crime, I was just shifted from one jail to another. The filthy little cells *held an average of twenty people. Most of them were sick. I was beaten in every jail. The police would bind me up and lift me from the floor, beat me to unconsciousness, then revive me and beat me again." In February 1934 he was imprisoned once more and not released until November 1935. When he emerged from prison unexpectedly he realized that he had been released only because the police hoped he would lead them to his comrades. He lived for months in isola- tion and terror of re-arrest and realized that he could no longer work successfully in Japan. Lie most antimilitarists, Kaji understood that the power of the Japanese autocracy would only be broken if it met with severe military defeat. It became obvious that Japan's next military advance would come in China, 236 so he determined to go there. The authorities would not grant him a passport. An opportunity for escape came at last in January 1936 when he disguised himself as a samurai actor in a traveling drama company and was able to reach Shanghai. The Japanese authorities finally discovered him in Shanghai, but by that time Kaji had found a powerful protector, the famous Chinese short story writer Lu Hsun, who informed the Japanese that Kaji had come to China solely to study Chinese literature with him and must not be disturbed. Kaji stayed in Shanghai for a year and a half, during which period he married Yuki Ikeda, a beautiful young antifascist who had led an equally harrowing life. While still in college she had become active in the Christian re- form movement of Toyohiko Kagawa, and later worked with the liberal Baroness Ishimoto. Miss Ikeda had been imprisoned more times than Kaji for her antimilitarist activities and had undergone severe torture. Once her inquisitors broke all the fingers of both her hands. She was a woman of frail health and was an invalid for weeks after each imprisonment, but all the punishment failed to "reform" her. She continued her underground organi- zation of Japanese women laborers until pressure on active antimilitarists became so great that she transferred her activities to China. When the China war broke out in July 1937 the Jap- anese authorities almost nabbed both of them. Kaji and his wife fled at once to the French Concession, where Japanese secret service police soon found them and watched their activities. Kaji wanted to work with the Chinese but the Chinese mistrusted him, fearing a subtle Japanese ruse. The Japanese demanded that the au- thorities of the French Concession hand him over, and the situation looked desperate because the Japanese mili- 237 tary forces in Shanghai had In the meantime blocked the last land escape. Kaji and his wife were planning to kill themselves when at the last minute Rewi Alley, who was later to become foreign adviser to the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, secured passage for them to Hong Kong. They spent four months in Hong Kong with Japanese secret service men watching and threatening them. Kaji wrote many articles for Chinese newspapers and maga- zines and at last the Chinese allowed him to come into the interior. After a hair-raising last-minute escape from Japanese agents, who tried to kidnap him in Hong Kong, they reached Hankow, then the capital, in March 1938. Kaji was attached to the propaganda section of the Chinese Army Political Department and worked under Kuo Mo-jo, the Chinese left-wing writer and archxolo- gist who had returned from exile in Japan about the time war broke out. Kaji was "psychological adviser'* to the section, which was staffed with scores of Japanese- educated Chinese who wrote propaganda for distribu- tion among Japanese soldiers and civilians in China, Manchuria and even Japan. Kaji had his hand in every- thing, including a leaflet which Chinese airplanes dropped on Tokyo in that period before their airfields near the coast were captured. The Japanese army answered this political warfare by heavily bombing the building which housed the Political Department. Scores were killed and Kaji and his wife were almost completely buried. When they were dug out it was discovered that a missile had missed penetrating the roof directly above their heads by only a few inches. Shortly thereafter Japanese bombers aimed for the house in which the Kajis were living. Flying low, Japanese bombers circled their house and then dropped their bombs, hitting the house without injuring the Kajis. An 238 investigation revealed that a Chinese traitor had signaled the location to the enemy planes with a large mirror. After this disconcerting experience they kept their ad- dress a secret. In Hankow the Kajis ran head on into the problem of breaking through the heavy indoctrination of Japanese prisoners. As the American forces discovered later, Jap- anese captives were thoroughly convinced that capture was a disgrace and that the Chinese would cut their hearts out or roast them alive. Even when captured badly wounded they would attempt suicide by stabbing themselves with surgical instruments or jumping from moving trains or down the sides of cliffs. If they didn't succeed they became desperately homesick and lonely or fearful that if they fell into Japanese hands again they would be executed. In Hankow and later in Chungking Kaji and his wife worked tirelessly on this problem. With infinite patience they attempted to alter the captives' ideas concerning the character of the Chinese and the justness of Japan's war aims. They were gratified if they succeeded only in taking the prisoners* minds off suicide. In one case Kaji had to cure the suicide obsession twice. After curing a spirited captive of his initial desire to commit suicide, Kaji began the process of changing his ideas about the cause of the war, Japan's "divine mission" and the re- mainder of the military fascist dogma with which he had been instilled. The captive clung to his old ideas but apparently had enough innate honesty to begin to see the truth of Kaji's arguments. After about a year he came to a point where the next logical step was the rejection of his old ideas. He could not bring himself to do this and, terribly upset by this conflict between his old and new ideas, attempted suicide again. The attempt was 239 unsuccessful and Kaji helped nurse him back to health and again took up the thread of persuasion. In a number of cases Kaji's persistence was more fruit- fully rewarded. One of the outstanding examples was Seisaku Shiomi, who, up to December 1938, was secre- tary to the Japanese consulate in Hanoi, Indo-China, and at the same time a member of the Japanese secret service. He was captured by Chinese troops while on a spying tour of the frontier between China and Indo-China. Kaji worked on him, talking to him and giving him books to read, and after a year he decided to participate in the antifascist movement and became a very effective radio propagandist. "I used to believe that I was blessed to have been born Japanese," Shiomi told Agnes Smedley, "and I thought my government was doing the right thing in invading China. I could not help seeing that we Japanese were the only men of color who had not been conquered by the white race. The militarists of my country were able to use this fact to inspire us with the belief that we were fighting for the liberation of all colored people. But since I have studied and thought, it has become clear to me that our militarists merely wish to take the place of the white imperialists. It took a long time for me to change my whole life's training and take a step which the Japanese brand as treason. However, I see that the rulers of Japan, like those of most other countries, merely use the common people as sources of wealth in time of peace and as cannon fodder in time of war. Now I broadcast in Japanese to the Japanese troops and people, trying to explain what I believe. I work for real peace and justice and my mind is at rest." In addition to persuading those already captured, Kaji was active in front-line propaganda. He and a group of his converts began doing front-line loudspeaker propa- . 240 ganda at the end of 1939 on the Kwangsi front. The moment was dramatic. The first sound from the loud- speaker silenced the rifle and machine-gun fire and thereafter he was able to broadcast his denunciations of militarism without interruption. For six successive nights Kaji and his associates urged their compatriots to lay down their arms. None of the Japanese units surrendered, but the next day the Chinese drove the enemy back with little difficulty. A subsequent verbal bombardment on the Ichang front was so effective that Lieutenant General Sonobe, then commander of the Japanese troops in that area, made a personal visit to hear it. The Sixth Company of the 104-th Regiment was placed under arrest, and the company commander court-martialed when the General found the men weakening under the impact of the anti- militarist propaganda. This psychological warfare was not always waged without cost to the Japanese antifascists. One of those who was lost was Katsuo Aoyama, who, prior to com- ing to China, had been a labor leader in Japan. In China he first worked in Nanking with the Chinese army prop- aganda section and then in Hankow he helped organize a group of Korean volunteers. Later he went up to the front near Nanning and broadcast to a Japanese attack- ing force over a loudspeaker. His voice carried above the sound of battle and gradually the firing stopped on both sides, with the Japanese listening in amazement to a fellow countryman appealing to them to stop killing the Chinese and to turn their guns against their real enemies, the Mitsuis and other Japanese profiteers, who had made 10,000,000 yen out of the war. Suddenly fresh Japanese troops were rushed up to relieve those who had lost interest in fighting. They made an unexpected sally 241 against the loudspeaker and Aoyania was captured. The Mitsuis were mercilessly avenged. THE ANTI-WAR LEAGUE By December 1939 the number of Japanese prisoners who had been reclaimed from militarism and-had become antifascists numbered about fifty, and they banded to- gether in the Japanese Anti-War League with Kaji as their leader. These captives were trusted by the Chinese and were not compelled to remain in prisoner camps. They published their own magazine, and numbers of them traveled from one prisoner-of-war camp to an- other, lecturing to the unconverted. About twenty of them formed a dramatic group, wrote their own propa- ganda plays and put them on for the Chinese population and for the Japanese war prisoners. The Anti-War League had just about gotten started when it got entangled in the conflict between the Chi- nese Communists and the Kuomintang. From the begin- ning of the war until the fall of Hankow in 1938 rela- tions between the two major Chinese parties had been rather friendly, but after that had begun to cool By 1940 the conservatives in the Kuomintang had deter- mined upon an anti-Communist program and anything smacking of leftism was frowned upon. In June 1940 Chen Li-fu, the Chinese Minister of Education, sup- pressed the Anti-War League's dramatic troupe. The plays they presented were considered revolutionary be- cause they showed the eff ects of the war upon the poor people of Japan! As the conservative swing in Chungking continued, the work of Kaji and his associates in the Anti-War League was further circumscribed. Despite the fact that 242 the Chinese military forces continued to suffer reverses, the Japanese antifascists were no longer permitted to go to the front lines to broadcast to the Japanese troops. Kaji was replaced as "psychological adviser" by one Kazuo Aoyama (not to be confused with the afore- mentioned Katsuo Aoyama who was captured and killed by the Japanese forces while doing front-line propaganda) . Kaji continued, however, to write propa- ganda for the Chinese army, and in November 1944 the Chungking radio announced that Kaji was leading a series of weekly Friday evening discussions at the Sino- American Institute of Cultural Relations. Kaji was precluded from reaching his full effective- ness because of the limitations imposed by the Chinese political situation, but during the period in which he had free access to the Japanese prisoners he was able to estab- lish the fact that even during a period when Japanese forces were winning, patient re-education of Japanese prisoners with a heavy militarist indoctrination could win them over to the cause of antifascism. II. SUSTJMXJ OKANO When the handful of American and British cor- respondents and government observers made their long- coveted trip to the Chinese Communist capital of Yenan in the summer of 1944, one of the persons they were most interested in interviewing was not a Chinese, but a Japanese Susumu Okano. Okano's importance de- rived from two facts. He was .one of the founders and perhaps the most outstanding leader of the Japanese Communist Party, virtually the only group which had been able to maintain underground resistance within Japan. Furthermore he was the leading figure in the Japanese People's Emancipation League, the most po- 243 tent organization of antimilitarist Japanese outside of Japan. Before the arrival of the party of correspondents and observers, the Japanese army had indicated its estimate of Okano's activities by sending half a dozen specially trained assassins into the Yenan area to poison Okano and disrupt the activities of the Emancipation League. Through their interviews and observations both in Yenan and in the field the correspondents learned that through the collaboration of the Eighth Route Axmy and the Japanese antifascists, a remarkable political belt line had been developed capable of taking on Ignorant, heavily-Indoctrinated Japanese captives and even spies, and within a year and a half converting them into effec- tive and self-reliant antimilitarist organizers. This belt line took them through three stages: reception, school- ing and front-line experience. RECEPTION" From the outset of the war the Japanese captives who fell into the hands of the Eighth Route Army were be- wildered by the strangely kind treatment they received. They were handled in line with the policy of "Kill no captives, give them preferential treatment and release those who desire to return." This policy had two important objectives. The first was to weaken the Japanese soldier's last-ditch resistance by undermining the Japanese army indoctrination that the Eighth Route Army killed all its prisoners. The second was to recruit and train a group of Japanese to be used in the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army. To achieve these objectives the captives were virtually 244 overwhelmed with generosity. Early In the war strict orders were issued forbidding injury or insult to the captives or confiscation of their belongings. Captives were given substantially better food and more cigarettes than the Chinese soldiers themselves received. And spe- cial treatment was accorded to the sick or wounded. As soon as possible the captives were turned over to members of the Japanese People's Emancipation League, who operated in most of the front-line areas. The pres- ence of Japanese on the Chinese side puzzled most cap- tives even more than their good treatment. From the lips of these Japanese antifascists, who were formerly captives themselves, the captives learned that there were several hundred Japanese working with the Eighth Route Army to overthrow Japanese militarism and re- store peace and democracy in Japan. They themselves were given the choice of returning to the Japanese lines or going to the Japanese antifascist school in Yenan to learn how they had been tricked and betrayed by the militarists. Although the captives were generally deeply im- pressed by the generous treatment received, most of them preferred to return to their own lines. Of the 3000- odd deserters or prisoners taken by the Chinese Com- munists from the outset of the war until the middle of 1944, only about 325 had decided to remain with the Eighth Route Army. Those who chose to return to their own lines were given farewell parties and were pro- vided with traveling expenses and guides. The wounded were sent back after being cured. Toward the end of 1944 the front-line propaganda workers made a determined attempt to increase the number of those who would stay with the Eighth Route Army and go to school in Yenan. One reason was the 245 fact that the Japanese army, fearful of the effect of a steady stream of returning captives who told their fel- low soldiers of the generous treatment accorded them, had taken to segregating and killing those that returned. Furthermore, experience at the school at Yenan had demonstrated that the tough-minded captives who were at first least desirous of staying with Chinese forces fre- quently made the most aggressive and effective anti- fascist propagandists when converted. Finally, Susumn Okano had decided that Japan's defeat was approaching and that it was wise to train several hundred additional organizers to return to Japan and influence its postwar development. Before starting those who voluntarily chose to remain on the long trek from the front lines back to Yenan, every effort was made to determine whether or not the captive was a legitimate captive or a spy who had de- liberately "deserted" in order to worm his way into the Japanese People's Emancipation League. In areas where the Japanese propaganda workers had good con- tacts with Japanese soldiers in the blockhouses they in- vestigated suspicious deserters through telephone calls over tapped wires. The prisoners were interrogated time and again and asked to write their personal histories on several different occasions in order to detect incon- sistencies. Those who were considered suspicious were kept under surveillance but sent to Yenan nevertheless because the school there had demonstrated its ability to convert even spies, SCHOOL FOR CAPTIVES The Japanese Peasants' and Workers' School, one of the most remarkable educational institutions in the world, has been housed in a cluster of caves cut into the face of 246 yellow cliffs above Yenan, capital of Communist China. The education of Japanese captives by the Eighth Route Army began as early as 1938, but at that time it was carried on near the front, with the captives moving around with guerilla units and stopping temporarily at farmhouses and cave dwellings. Systematic study was difficult but the captives, or students, as they are called by the Eighth Routers, were given pamphlets and books to read and these were supplemented by informal conver- sations with Japanese-speaking political workers. Con- verted Japanese were encouraged to do propaganda work. At first they assisted the Chinese propaganda workers. Later they were given additional responsibili- ties but, because of their lack of political background, they required constant assistance by the Chinese po- litical workers. In November 1940 the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army established the Peasants' and Work- ers' School to answer its acute need for effective and self- reliant Japanese front-line propagandists. The school got off to a poor start. The first class comprised eleven students, only two of whom had any antifascist feelings. One of these was Susumu Takayama, who was later to become Superintendent of Education at the school. He was a former factory worker and stevedore who had been captured while on a looting expedition in North China. He had received several months of indoctrina- tion before the school had opened. The other antifascist student was Ken Mori, who was later to be elected to the People's Assembly in the Border Region. He had been teaching Japanese to the Chinese political workers in Yenan for some time prior to entering the school. The remaining students were new captives and were recalcitrant, frustrated and uninterested in their work. 247 They gambled and sold the allowances given them by the Eighth Route Army. The two advanced students together with the principal and teachers, who were all Chinese who had studied in Japan, attempted to win over the new captives but were making slow progress. In December 1940 their efforts were strengthened by the arrival of a new group of students who had received initial indoctrination at the front. On May 15, 1941, the school had its formal inaugura- tion in the Eighth Route Army Auditorium. Thousands of Eighth Route Army soldiers attended and General Chu Teh, their commander in chief, addressed the au- dience. He assured them that Japanese militarism would be defeated, that they could play an important role in building a new Japan, and that the Eighth Route Army would support them while they were studying to fit themselves for that role. Many of the wavering students were impressed by General Chu's address, the enormous size of the meeting and the enthusiastic applause and wel- come given them by the Chinese audience. As a result a better atmosphere was created at the school. The school reached a new level of effectiveness in the first half of 1943. By that time the Japanese students had made enough progress to take over virtually all the posts in the school, including teaching. This process of turning over the school to the Japanese was capped by the arrival of Susumu Okano in the spring of 1943 and his assumption of the post of principal In contrast to the recently trained students, Okano was an experienced political leader. During World War I he had been ac- tive in Bunji Suzuki's Fraternal Society after graduating from Keio University and in 1918 had gone to the London School of Economics. He returned to Japan in time to take part in the formation of the Japanese 248 Communist Party In 1922, for which he was jailed. He spent most of the 'twenties in jail, but in 1931 he escaped from Japan to attend a Communist International Con- ference as a Japanese delegate. In 1935 he was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Russia, succeeding Sen Katayama, who had died of tuberculosis there in 1931. He arrived in Yenan in the spring of 1943, apparently by way of North China and perhaps Japan. With Okano's arrival the school went into high gear, with a systematic and effective cur- riculum- New students were warmly welcomed at the school by the older students. As soon as possible they were entertained at an informal get together with mass sing- ing, Japanese dances, plays and recitations, with the new arrivals encouraged to take part. The new students had the rules of the school explained but they were not strictly enforced at first. The new arrivals were dis- tributed to the various sections, which were housed in individual caves, so that they could be absorbed into the life of the school by the older students. Shortly after their arrival the students were addressed by Director Okano. The new captives were generally confused, bewildered and frustrated. The Japanese army has not recognized prisoners of war and consequently they felt themselves men without a country, or as they put it, "men who have died." In his lecture, Okano at- tempted to take advantage of this feeling that they had been cut off from their old life. He started out by tell- ing them that he realized that they had never dreamt of coming to Yenan. They had come to North China with the belief that the Japanese army was fighting a just and holy war to liberate the Chinese people, but had found out differently through bitter experience. All their suf- 249 ferings and their families' sufferings had been caused by the militarists, who must be eliminated. Since a peo- ple's government could not retain the militarists' idea that a soldier must die rather than surrender, they would be able to return with honor to such a new Japan and thus they could and must play an active role in over- throwing militarism and in the establishment of a new, people's government in Japan. He pointed out that they could only do this by study- ing to prepare themselves for this role. "All of you have died once," he stated. "If you accept this, as most of you undoubtedly do, and plan to live anew, you will be able to do anything. It will be in your power to realize the impossible. Cast away your prejudices and make new men of yourselves. Turn over a new leaf in life, and this time work for the people." THE STAGES OF RE-EDUCATION The school was divided into beginning, intermediate and advanced classes, and all of the students started in the beginners' class, regardless of previous schooling. The school had three objectives: first, the destruction of the militarist ideology; second, the imparting of a new structure of ideas; third, to combine this new struc- ture of ideas with practical work. The beginners' class, which lasted about a month, was an attempt to ease the students into the routine of dis- ciplined education as well as to ease them out of the false ideas derived from militarist indoctrination. The main text was An Appeal to the Japanese People, a pamphlet by Okano published on July 7, 1943, the sixth anniversary of the China War. This pamphlet declares that all the Japanese people have gained from the war 250 has been "a sea of blood and tears, a mountain of mili- tary expenditures, bonds and taxes, physical collapse from overwork, restrictions, prisons and the slogans, lashes and swords of the militarists . . ." It calls Japan's war a "robber war" for the benefit of "the warlords and the big capitalists at the expense of the Japanese peo- ple." In order to bring the war to an end, the pamphlet continues, "First of all, the warlords must be over- thrown. It is only after this is done, that a genuine popu- lar government of Japan, representing the people and supported by the people, can be established . ." The warlords can be overthrown, the pamphlet continues, by a "popular front" of the working people and the vic- tims of the war. The pamphlet points out that Japan could not pos- sibly win the war, and that after the defeat of Hitler the Allies would overwhelm Japan. "What do the militarists say to the people?" Okano asks. "They say: c We must win the war, or our country shall become a British and American colony.' This is untrue. Everybody knows that the war was started not because Britain or America wants to change Japan into their colony, but because the Japanese warlords and their associates want to seize the South Seas territories as their colonies. . . . "What we want now is not a military victory of the government, but a defeat of it, the reason being that the so-called 'Greater East Asia War' is a war of the mili- tarists and their associates, therefore the failure of such a war is their failure. Their collapse furnishes a good opportunity for us to establish our people's government, to construct a New Japan. It is a short cut to our victory. "Fellow countrymen! Work hard in the factories, rail- ways, ships, offices, villages, schools, barracks and war- ships, not for the increase of production, but for its de- 251 cline, not for the victory of the militarists, but for their downfall. This is your road of emancipation." The study of this appeal took about a month, with students attending class twice a week for two-and-a- half-hour periods. In class the instructor read the text out loud in class and explained the contents. Frequently the pronunciation of the Japanese characters or ideo- graphs had to be explained, since the average student had only a grade-school education. The pupils were encour- aged to ask questions and the instructor endeavored to arouse interest by citing concrete examples. After class the students reviewed their lessons with the help of more advanced students. The intermediate class was titled "Political Common Sense" and lasted about four months. It represented an attempt to substitute a factual materialist analysis of Japan's history and role in the war for the fantastic myths of "Japan's divine mission" which have been the stand-by of Japanese education both in and out of the army. The students were introduced to the concept of a "just war" and an "unjust war." The conflict between Japan and the United Nations was described as a "just war of lib- eration" for the United Nations and an "unjustifiable war of aggression" for Japan and the Axis. It was in this class that the Emperor was first discussed and it was as a result of the general student reaction to attacks on the Emperor that Okano moderated his pro- gram in this regard. The students were willing and even anxious to discuss the severe exploitation in Japanese fac- tories, the poverty of the tenants, the oppressive con- ditions in the Japanese army and the baleful influence of the Zaibatsu, but when the instructors discussed the necessity for eliminating the Emperor system, the stu- dents generally froze up and refused to comment. Rev- 252 erence for the Emperor is the last portion of the mili- tarist ideology to give way; and then, in most cases, only after many months of indoctrination. THEORY INTO PRACTICE The objective of the advanced class was to train organizers and propagandists who were capable of work- ing independently. Considerable emphasis was placed on the encouragement of self-reliance and initiative as prep- aration for antimilitarist activity at the front and for political work in Japan after the war. Theoretical and practical work were combined. One of the subjects dis- cussed in the advanced class was what a people's news- paper should be like in Japan. They prepared themselves by writing articles and editorials for the Battle, a wall newspaper posted at the school. They got experience at research in the complete files of Japanese newspapers and magazines which they managed to have smuggled through from Japanese-occupied territory. They also studied and wrote articles for the Yenan newspaper, Liberation Daily. From the character of the articles con- tributed to the latter newspaper, it would appear that the graduates of the Yenan school do not intend to go in for "Nice Nelly" journalism when they return to Japan but intend to bring home to the Japanese people the atrocities committed by their army in China. In June 1939 [one account ran] I was with the Ohara Battalion of the Wataru Regiment, Homma Division, in a campaign on the Suiyuan-Ninghsia border. On one occasion I saw Sergeant Sakuma and Corporal Shimazu drag an old man, a young girl and a baby from a tiny shack. After a few moments' whispered conversation, the officers pointed a pistol at the old man and said: "You and your daughter 253 - saku, saku!!" Then they stripped the man and the girl and tried to make the old man have sexual intercourse with his daughter. The man cursed and fought them, so they shot him. The girl screamed as they tore the baby from her and then forced her to the ground and stuffed pepper into her sexual organ. Another report in Liberation Daily was written by a captive named Tajirna, In May 1940 the Third Company of the 39th Battalion, Ninth Independent Mixed Brigade, was garrisoned at San- chiu in Chihsien, Shansi Province. One day Second Lieu- tenant Ono said to us: "You have never killed anyone yet, so today we shall have some killing practice. You must not consider the Chinese as a human being, but only as some- thing of rather less value than a dog or cat. Be brave! Now, those who wish to volunteer for killing practice, step forward!" No one moved. The lieutenant lost his temper. "You cowards!!" he shouted. "Not one of you is fit to call himself a Japanese soldier. So no one will volunteer? Well then, I'll order you." And he began to call out names: "Otani Furukawa Ueno Tajirna! " ( My God me too!) I raised my bayoneted gun with trembling hands, and directed by the lieutenant's almost hysterical cursing I walked slowly toward the terror-stricken Chinese stand- ing beside the pit the grave he had helped to dig. In my heart I begged his pardon, and with my eyes shut and the lieutenant's curses in my ears I plunged the bayonet into the petrified Chinese. When I opened my eyes again, he had slumped down into the pit* "Murderer! Criminal!" I called myself. The advanced students, in addition to writing up Jap- anese atrocities, interpreted and commented OB news developments. They also drafted, edited and published leaflets, propaganda pamphlets and textbook. In 1943 254 thirty-two kinds of leaflets, fourteen kinds of pam- phlets and textbooks, 520,000 words in all, were circu- lated. The texts of the leaflets were radioed to forward bases where they were printed and surreptitiously dis- tributed among the Japanese troops. Up to the spring of 1943, when technical reasons made them impossible, broadcasts were made twice a week in Japanese from the Yenan radio station in an effort to reach both Japanese soldiers and civilians in North China. Both the script- writing and the announcing were done by the students. SELF-CRITICISM The constant drive at the school was to accelerate the process by which the student sloughed off the cus- tomary feudal habits of blind submission and unques- tioning acceptance and achieved the ability to think for, and act by, himself, albeit against a background of Marxist theory. One of the most effective techniques used to hasten this process of transformation was that of group and self-criticism. Each student periodically reviewed and criticized his own work in the presence of his fellows, who bestowed praise and blame where due. Criticism of the new students was mild, but as they advanced in their education the self-examinations and group criticisms became more vitriolic and excoriating. Sometimes the sessions became so merciless that sensitive ones shed tears. Superintendent Takayama expressed the purpose of these sessions as follows: "All of us have died once, and we're now building the foundations of our new lives. We have made many mistakes before which we cannot afford to repeat. Furthermore, another system requires considerable change; and normally, bad points would 255 crop up. These should be erased through group criti- cism. Those who are criticized must improve themselves from that minute." These criticism sessions generally took place with a group of students crowded around a charcoal brazier in one of the smoke-filled caves. One student criticized himself for being too conceited and not mixing well enough with the other students. Another was told that he was hypersensitive, still another that he had not for- gotten his past and liked too much to recall drinking bouts and adventures in the red-light district of Tokyo. These sessions were carried on with rigor and candor, and would be an emotionally wearing experience for any group of students. It is all the more wearing on the Japanese, who are accustomed to telling one another what they think the other person would like to hear. THE STORY OF A SPY The most convincing evidence of the effectiveness of the school was its ability to take specially trained spies, sent to Yenan with the purpose of killing Okano and conducting espionage, and convert them. The best pic- ture of the impact of this education on the mind of a spy Is provided by the story of Naoyulu Tanikawa, who, after his confession became treasurer of the Yenan branch of the Japanese People's Emancipation League. Tanikawa was born into a poor peasant family; after graduation from primary school he became a messenger at a business firm but developed into a juvenile delin- quent and was disowned by his parents. For about a year prior to his induction he lived as a hobo. Immediately after conscription in 1940 he was shipped to North China where he trained with the Suzuki Fourth In- 256 dependent Brigade. One day his regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kitagawa, called him to his quar- ters and offered him a proposition: he was to be trained as a spy and permit himself to be captured by the Eighth Route Army. "Your work will be as important as a whole division," Tanikawa was told. He was told that if he came back he would get 500 yen, a decora- tion and a long furlough back home. If he failed his family would be well cared for and honored In their community. Tanikawa liked the Idea for he craved ex- citement. By his own admission he had been fascinated by American gangster movies. In April 1941 he was sent to a school for spies at Yen-Ch'eng, Shansi, with twelve other soldiers from various units. They learned that their primary job was to counter the activities of the Japanese working with the Eighth Route Army. The latter had captured a great many Japanese during their Hundred-Regiment Of- fensive in 1940, and these captives were engaged in in- tensive propaganda work. During the three-month course the candidates were not given passes, were kept from mixing with other soldiers and from writing let- ters. They were better treated than the ordinary soldiers, were not slapped and had better food. During the course they were given a heavy dose of political indoctrination, with heavy emphasis on Japan's superiority to other countries, the justness of Japan's war aims and the like. They were told that the Chinese Communists took orders directly from Stalin, who was using them to conquer Japan and the whole Far East. They also received a technical training. They were trained to disguise themselves, to encipher messages, how to answer interrogations, how to poison the enemy with drugs and how to use knives and bayonets. They were 257 told that they would make contact through Chinese liaison men, and were instructed in how to exchange in- formation by such simple signs as removing one's cap, mopping one's brow, or picking one's nose. They were impressed with the importance of their work, being told repeatedly that one spy was equal to thousands of troops. When Tanikawa received his orders to infiltrate Into the Eighth Route Army area he traveled as the guard of a supply train and dropped out on the way. On the third day he saw some Eighth Route Army soldiers on a hill and deliberately went out into the open to pick a water- melon. They shot at him. He feigned running away, tripped himself and was captured. One week after his capture he was turned over to Japanese propaganda workers. They treated him well and endeavored to re- educate him through conversation and pamphlet study. He made only one contact with his Chinese liaison man. One evening Tanikawa was walking with a Chinese interpreter who had learned Japanese as a student in Japan, when he came upon his contact man disguised as a peddler. Tanikawa bought something and passed a marked piece of currency and received as change currency with the countersign marked on it. On the next evening he slipped the peddler a message that he had arrived safely. During his first months with the Eighth Route Army he had a number of experiences which caused him to weaken. One Japanese confessed to being a spy. Tani- kawa was asked by the other Japanese to treat the confessed spy as a friend but to keep an eye on him. Tanikawa feared that they suspected him and that he was being watched. In the spring of 1942, Tanikawa was sent to Yenan as a delegate to the Japanese Soldiers' Delegates Con- 258 ference. At the Conference, the ex-soldiers expressed the grievances they had against the Japanese army and its leaders: the slappings and abuse they had suffered, the corruption of their officers, the poor, insufficient food and the like. These were collected in a pamphlet, The Demands of the Soldiers, designed for propaganda work in the Japanese army. Tanikawa got interested in the work and after the conference remained in Yenan and enrolled in the Peasants' and Workers' School At first the school was rather difficult for him be- cause he had not had any interest in politics and eco- nomics before. It absorbed his interest, however, because it was down to earth and explained why the down- trodden Japanese people suffered so. It had a personal meaning for him because he had felt dissatisfied with his lot and had become a bum and juvenile delinquent in revolt against it. His awakening, however, was mad- dening, for if he were completely won over by the in- doctrination he would become a traitor to the Japanese army and be exposed as a spy. He could not stay away from class regularly, and if he attended the lectures, his old world came tumbling down upon him. Then one day a conference was held on "The Prob- lem of Spies." The advanced students declared that spies were soldiers who had been deceived by the mili- tarists just as other soldiers were deceived. They told the newer students that they should expect more and more spies to attempt to infiltrate as the work of the Japanese antifascists became more effective. Therefore, all the students should keep on the alert for spies, but when they were discovered should not persecute them, but treat them kindly and attempt to re-educate them. Tanikawa felt that every remark was directed against him. 259 Some time after this, some spies who escaped from the school were caught by Chinese peasants and were brought before the student body for questioning. The students reasoned with them, told them that they were being used by the militarists, and asked that they reveal what the Japanese army had ordered them to do. When they did they were taken back into the school and treated as friends. Time and again Tanikawa was moved to confess. He felt that even parents would not go to this extent to save their sons. But he feared that if he confessed, word might leak back to the Japanese army and his family might suffer the consequences. Finally, in May 1943, a year and ten months after he "deserted" to the Eighth Route Army, Tanikawa was called in by Kazuo Sugimoto, Political Affairs Di- rector of the school, who had known him for over a year and told him that there were inconsistencies in his personal records. He was asked a few questions and he asked for time to consider before answering them. He was not pressed and one day he confessed completely. No issue was made of the matter and subsequently Tani- kawa became an active and influential leader of the Emancipation League. INTO THE FIELD The final training ground for those attending the school was in the front lines where, working alongside the Eighth Route Army, they were able to develop their skills against the Japanese troops stationed in block- houses and important towns in North China. By the end of 1944 about forty graduates of the school had gone into the field, taking as much as six months to travel by 260 foot to advanced bases in Shantung peninsula and al- most a year to the New Fourth Army bases in the vicinity of Shanghai. At the front the propaganda work fell into three main categories: written propaganda, such as leaflets and pamphlets, "propaganda shouting," or the use of mega- phones or loudspeakers against a stationary foe, and telephone conversations with Japanese army personnel over lines which the propagandists cut into. In all of the propaganda work carried out, the basic principle was to emphasize the urgent needs of the Japanese soldiers and to prove that Japan was doomed to defeat, as a means of fanning their discontent and dis- satisfaction so as to cause internal strife in the Japanese army. The stand-by in pamphlet distribution was The Demands of the Soldiers, which is a compilation of all the gripes of the Japanese enlisted man. It was so effective that the Japanese army authorities issued orders strictly forbidding the soldiers to read it. In addition to this general pamphlet the propaganda workers issued leaflets adapted to the specific gripes in the units they were trying to demoralize and win over. In central Hopei a company commander was notorious for face- slapping. The propaganda workers learned of this and addressed a warning to him through handbills surrepti- tiously distributed around his post. Thereupon he stopped face-slapping. Even more effective than printed materials was the work of "shouting corps" which moved up within mega- phone range of a Japanese blockhouse and harangued the inhabitants. This was dangerous work requiring strong protection, because they were generally in rifle- range and on occasion an officer in charge of a block- house would order a sally. The method was particularly 261 successful when one of the Japanese antifascists located a friend in the blockhouse. In the Taiheng area, a propaganda worker named Kamada located his old out- fit, including the sergeant commanding the blockhouse who was an old friend from the same village. Once this sergeant was convinced that he was talking to the friend he had long believed dead, he leaned over the block- house ramparts to talk with Kamada, creating a sensa- tion among the troops under his command. Telephone-tapping had the same advantage of per- mitting direct conversation, in the course of which questions could be asked and answered. At the same time the danger was lessened and contact could be es- tablished with a number of blockhouses linked by the same telephone system. The best story of this telephone- tapping system of propaganda is that recounted by Harrison Forman and included by him in his Report from Red China. The story was told by Kobayashi, a propaganda worker and member of the Japanese Peo- ple's Emancipation League: "It was a bitter, blustery New Year's Eve. In pitch dark- ness we" slithered along an icy mountain trail, each fearful lest an unwary step send him hurtling over an unseen cliff. I was considerably worried about the precious telephone equipment that my Chinese guards carried on their backs in addition to their rifles and light machine-guns captured from the Japanese Army. The telephone set and the tools for tapping the strong points' telephone system were also booty. At last we reached our destination a roofless, burnt- out farmhouse barely two hundred yards from a Japanese strong point. We dared not light a fire for warmth, or even a candle for light. "On a propped~up three-legged table I set up my tele- phone set and leaned on my earphones waiting for the signal that would tell me that the Chinese trooper shinnying up 262 a telephone pole out there in the dark had succeeded in his task which was to cut my line into the system connect- ing a web of strong points in that area. Our guard was deployed in the snow-covered vicinity, the sergeant moving from post to post to keep his men on the alert. "At last the signal came. I looked at the luminous dial on my watch it was well on toward midnight. Just in time! I cranked my set four times. After a while a sleepy voice answered: 'Moshi! Moshif (Hello! Hello!) " 'Moshi! Moshir I replied. 'Is that Number Four Strong Point?' "'It is. Who is this?' " 'May I speak with Corporal Katayama?' I asked. I had been told that Katayama was a good man; only a few days before, he had reprimanded a man in his squad for need- lessly abusing a peasant. Presently Katayama came to the 'phone. " 'Is this Katayama-san?' " l Hai this is Katayama. Who is this?' " C I just called to wish you a Happy New Year,' I said. 'It's nearly midnight, you know.' " 'Why, of course so it is. I had intended to stay up for it, but I guess I must have dozed off. Thank you arid a Happy New Year to you, too; though I guess it isn't such a happy one, at that, is it? Brr-r-r-r! These North China winters are cold, aren't they? Say by the way, who is this? Headquarters?' " 'No. This is Kobayashi, a member of the Japanese People's Emancipation League.' "There was a long silence. Then I spoke again. 'Hello - hello! Are you there?' " 'JFM,' came the answer. But Katayama sounded a bit worried. I didn't want to frighten him oif the line, so I spoke hurriedly: 'How did you like the comfort bags we sent you yesterday?' " 'The comfort bags? Oh, yes I know what you mean. Did you send them?' 263 " 'Yes. Were there enough for all of you?' " 'Yes, there were, thank you. 7 Then I heard him chuckle. What is it?' I asked. " 'Oh, nothing just that our lieutenant was wild when he heard about them. He told us they would poison us!' He chuckled again. "We made the puppets taste them first, you know.' I laughed with him. Then he sobered. 'You know,' he went on, Tm not supposed to talk with you.' "I said that I knew that, but that this was New Year's Eve, and we were both Japanese, and homesick for our loved ones at home. I heard him sigh heavily. 'And when shall we ever see them again?' he asked, as if to himself. "This gave me the opening I was waiting for. I told him about myself how I had been wounded so badly that I was unable to commit suicide, which I thought was the honorable thing for a disabled Japanese to do. The Eighth Routers had picked me up on the battlefield, nursed me back to health, and even offered me my freedom. But by this time I had come to understand something of what they were fighting for. Other Japanese of the Japanese People's Emancipation League talked to me, and I decided to join them. Then I said: 'We, the Japanese People's Emancipa- tion League, are as concerned about our families as you are. We want to stop this war that nobody wants and from which nobody will gain anything.' "At that, he was silent. Then he asked me to tell him about the J.P.EJL, and we went on talking for the better part of half an hour, until he said that someone was coming and he would have to ring off. "I then rang up Number Six and Number Nine and Number Seven Strong Points and talked with several more fellows. At Number Two an officer carne into the room while I was talking to some of the men. He grabbed the telephone and started cursing me, ordering me to shut up and threatening to send out a party to hunt me down. I said quietly that I would take no orders from him and that it was such as he that I and my J.P.E.L. companions were 264 fighting, and that if he led a party out we would not only tear up the telephone wires but also capture him alive. That made him so mad that he nearly exploded! He hung up and I went on with my telephoning." THE IMPACT This continued and effective psychological warfare, waged by men with an intimate knowledge of the men- tality they have been trying to undermine, produced results. One of these was to start a trickle of deserters. In addition, intelligence reports reaching the Eighth Route Army indicated that several dozen deserters had been ar- rested by the Japanese army before they managed to sur- render. Seven soldiers in the 212th Regiment of the Thirty-second Mixed Brigade attempted to go over to the Eighth Route Army in a unit but were captured by puppet troops and were sent back to their unit. Subse- quently three of them were shot and four were handed over to the military police. In the Sixty-ninth Division a soldier named Takahashi stole his platoon commander's pistol and attempted to desert. He too was arrested on the way and was handed over to the military police. There have been a number of cases where Japanese soldiers, apparently under the influence of the propa- ganda of the antifascists, have resisted the authority of their officers. In January 1942 six soldiers in the Tenth Mixed Brigade requested their company commander not to launch a punitive drive. When their request was not granted and, on the contrary, they were slapped by the officer, they fired on him with a light machine gun. The company commander escaped to the outskirts of the city and refused to return to camp. Subsequently he was reprimanded by the regimental commander and 265 committed suicide, while, of the six soldiers who made the request, three were shot and three were sentenced to life imprisonment,, A platoon commander and a lance-corporal in the Second Mixed Brigade were very fond of slapping soldiers. One day the soldiers became fed up and twenty of them gave the two noncoms a thorough thrashing. In the Thirty-sixth Regiment of the Third Mixed Brigade food was bad and served in insufficient quantity. Dis- satisfaction resulted and the soldiers staged a hunger strike, as a result of which the company commander was questioned by his superiors. The food was improved. The Japanese army authorities, concerned with these developments, attempted to remedy them in a number of ways. They took to shifting men in and out of places in which they were protractedly exposed to propaganda, but this was of dubious effectiveness, because it gave the antifascist propagandists new personnel to propagandize. The army authorities also countered the antifascist prop- aganda by stepping up the military fascist indoctrina- tion. This indoctrination was filled with the following slogans: "We must fight to the end or we shall be op- pressed and exploited by Great Britain and America, and suffer the same harsh fate as China." "Japan was never defeated and we shall also win this war." "We die in order to live, and life should be found in death." "Once captured by the enemy you must commit sui- cide." "It is a disgrace for a military man to eat at the enemy table." "Japanese in the Eighth Route Army are traitors to their fatherland." In addition to this, Special Service operatives were scattered throughout all the companies in North China to determine what effect antimilitarist propaganda was having on the troops. Wounded soldiers who could not walk and thus might 266 fall Into the hands of the Eighth Route Army were shot. The fury which the propaganda workers aroused in the Japanese militarists sometimes produced amusing incidents. Harrison Forman tells of a Major Matsumoto, commanding the Seventy-fifth Battalion of an Inde- pendent Mixed Brigade who wrote to the Japanese propaganda workers promising them that if they were to return to the Japanese army he would guarantee that no harm would come to them. They replied that they were well treated by the Eighth Route Army and were fighting for something worth while. They countered by inviting the major to join them. He lost his temper and wrote once more, calling them traitors and threat- ening to shoot them on sight. He also wrote to the Eighth Route Army commander in that district, saying: "As one soldier to another, I demand that you send those men to me." The Chinese commander countered by ordering a surprise attack on the major's headquarters. The major's staff was captured but he himself just man- aged to escape. The Japanese antifascists chalked on the wall of the headquarters: "Major Matsumoto we have returned; why have you run away?" In September 1944 a Japanese magazine published in North China declared that the work of the antifascists was "shaking the faith of the Japanese in sure victory and breeding disharmony and strife between the Japa- nese government and the people." III. THE JAPANESE PEOPLE'S EMANCIPATION LEAGUE From the cauldron of the war in China there have emerged a group of Japanese antifascists who are al- most certain to loom as an important factor in the future of Japan. 267 They are not many in number. The group accepting the antimilitarist program of the Emancipation League in the early part of 1945 totaled some five hundred. A little more than fifty were in Chungking China, mostly under the leadership of Wataru Kaji, with the remainder in North China under Susumu Okano. Of these five hundred perhaps two hundred have the determination, experience and ability to become effective organizers and publicists, while a handful have emerged as poten- tial leaders. Two hundred, or even five hundred, antifascists seem very slight in number when compared with the over 70,000,000 Japanese they hope to influence. But this small band has had extensive opportunity to study and discuss Japan's problems and to work out a program as well as propaganda techniques to sell that program. Even before Japan's military might had suffered its most crushing setbacks, both the program and the techniques had proved to be very successful in North China, where about 80 per cent of the prisoners in- doctrinated came to at least a passive acceptance of antifascism. Most of the active and effective antifascists have expressed themselves as anxious to play their part in changing Japan and as ready to return there on their own initiative, without awaiting the invitation of the occupation authorities. What, then, are the character and program of the Japanese People's Emancipation League to which these antifascists belong? The Emancipation League was established in Jan- uary 1944 in Yenan at the suggestion of Susumu Okano. Prior to that there had been a North China branch of the Japanese Anti-War League, which had been founded in Chungking. Both the And- War League and the Eman- cipation League had the same three-point program: op- 268 position to the war, the overthrow of the militarists, and the establishment of a democratic, people's government in postwar Japan. The prime difference was in the emphasis. By January 1944 the defeat of Japan was evident and the Emancipation League was designed primarily to influence the character of Japan's postwar development. During the early part of 1945 the structure and ap- proach of the Emancipation League resembled most closely some of the Communist-influenced resistance movements of Europe. It had a core of Communists, but these were a minority of about 25 per cent. There were only two full-fledged Japanese Communist Party mem- bers, because the Japanese Communist Party did not permit recruiting outside of Japan proper, and only Okano himself and Jun Sawada, who escaped to North China from Japan in 1943, had belonged to the Com- munist Party in Japan. Not being able to join the Party itself, some of the students at Yenan organized a Commu- nist League in June 1942. In the early part of 1945 it had slightly more than 100 members, including the majority of the most experienced propaganda workers. The Emancipation League itself was open to Com- munists, non-Communists and anti-Communists. What was required for membership Was agreement with the basic program advocating the end of the war, the over- throw of the militarists and the establishment of a demo- cratic Japan with improved conditions for peasants, in- dustrial laborers and small business men. In short, this was a "people's front" organization, with a minimum program designed to attract the widest pos- sible acceptance. Although the League advocated the extension of democracy in Japan, and in the Workers' and Peasants* School in Yenan the instructors attacked 269 the role of the Emperor, opposition to the Emperor was not made a condition for admission to the Emancipation League. LEAGUE PROGRAM As explained by Susumu Okano to American and Brit- ish reporters in the summer of 1944, the League program for Japan envisaged a prolonged period of democratic capitalism. He indicated how remote he thought the possibility of socialism was for Japan by telling one re- porter, "I only hope to see a democratic Japan during my lifetime," Okano advocated the establishment of democracy in Japan by overthrowing the militarists and purging both them and the politicians responsible for the war. There- upon the government was to be liberalized by instituting universal suffrage, giving the people full democratic rights and limiting the power of the monarchy. "We don't want an Emperor," Okano told Guenthfer Stein, "but rather a President elected by the people." But he was opposed to any drastic move on that front at once. "The Emperor is still too much of a godlike figure to a good many Japanese for us to shout 'Down with the Emperor!' at this moment," he told Harrison Forman. He made it clear that he felt that Hirohito himself had a considerable personal responsibility for the war and that the League would not oppose any Allied attempt to try him as a war criminal. On the economic side, Okano favored placing "large- scale monopoly capital" under government control, and a shift to diversified, peacetime industries. As a first step toward the solution of the land problem he advocated the purchase of the land of the absentee landlords, the 270 land to be made available on easy terms to land-hungry peasants, with the title retained by the government. He also advocated a sharp improvement in the conditions of industrial laborers by the institution of an eight-hour day, collective bargaining, recognition of the right to organize unions and to strike. THE CHALLENGE This moderate program, together with the other ac- tivities of Kaji, Okano and their followers, constitutes a direct challenge to Allied political intelligence. The greatest asset the League possesses is its con- fidence that the common people of Japan can be won away from militarism provided that there is a complete debunking of the entire militarist ideology and its re- placement by a program with personal meaning for the great majority of the Japanese. This ability to reach the common people need not be a monopoly of the League. Those who fear that the Emancipation League or any outgrowth of it may grow overstrong can take comfort in the realization that the League will succeed only in so far as other Japanese groups abdicate in the field of social welfare. Thus, by encouraging other, more moderate, groups to come for- ward with a program answering the people's needs, it is possible to develop a popular leadership with a wider orientation. Similarly, the great majority of the popula- tion is likely to lean toward the Soviet Union only if the United States and Britain ignore the problems of the peasant, laborer and small business man and show an interest only in the remnants of the old ruling group. It would seem wise, therefore, to facilitate the broad- ening out of the antimilitarist forces by encouraging the 271 emergence of democratic and humanitarian groups and individuals desirous of reforming Japan. In order to encourage their emergence it will probably be necessary to make it perfectly clear that the occupying authorities look with favor upon those groups who want to help both Japan and the rest of the world by seeking to eradicate the basic causes of war. It will probably also be necessary to see to it that they are protected against the vengeance of the military fascists. As in Italy and other European countries reclaimed from fascism, it will probably be possible to form a broad coalition of political groups agreeing on a min- imum program of purging the forces of militarism and aggression, breaking the monopolistic stranglehold of the giant trusts and expediting the emergence of political and economic democracy. Internally this would have the signal advantage of mobilizing the greatest number of those desirous of reforming Japan. Internationally it would minimize friction among the major allies by harnessing those sympathetic to Western democratic and Soviet ideals to the same task. Nothing can be more desirable than effective internal reform, carried out with the agreement of the major powers. 272 CHAPTER XI PAVING THE WAY The sacrifices of those whose blood has red- dened the Pacific demand not only that Japan's sur- render be unconditional but that the peace be lasting. The entire parade of shameful episodes in Japan's modern history points to the inescapable conclusion that the only safe course of action for the United Nations is the encouragement of a thoroughgoing purge of all the forces which have made its name synonymous with treachery, brutality and rapaciousness. A fundamental and lasting change in Japanese policy cannot be expected until Japan has undergone a sweeping democratic trans- formation and a complete recasting of its political and economic leadership. The most immediate steps In the direction of securing a peaceful Japan consist of: stripping Japan of its mili- tary and naval forces; restricting and supervising its industries; punishing its war criminals; and its military occupation and subsequent supervision. But any system of international punishment which is purely penal and not corrective can be neither effective nor lasting. The terms applied to Germany in the Versailles Treaty were not wanting so much in severity as they were in their failure to correct Germany's basic drive to war. The real key to lasting peace lies in the reorientation of Japan's entire political and economic system. There can be no dispute with the necessity for the strengthening of the international security organization. But the development of a trustworthy Japan, which is not continually motivated toward war, is a vital corollary 273 to the establishment of a collective security system in the Pacific. Attempts to eliminate the internal causes of war In chronic aggressor nations should play as important a part In International peace efforts as preventive medicine does in a comprehensive scheme of public health. If this Is not done, If we leave Japan with an economy and a leadership which are basically incapable of solving Its problems peacefully, this leadership will seek out any and every loophole In the still emerging system of world security, to re-establish Japan as a divisive force and a threat to world peace. Therefore, in order that they may be effective and lasting, the measures applied must have as their objective the development of a trustworthy Japan. And It is not enough to mouth phrases about wanting a Japan which can "live in peace with its neighbors" or enter into "the fellowship of International society." What is required instead is a comprehensive idea of the changes In Japan's political and economic structure which will eliminate the source of aggression instead of merely forcing it under- ground for a few years. Many people have described Japanese militarism as a cancer. Too few have empha- sized the danger of removing it without destroying its roots. THE DANGER OF SUPERFICIALITY One of the greatest dangers in our program for Japan lies in the avid search for superficial solutions. Deliber- ately or not, the bulk of the Japan specialists in London and Washington seem intent on ignoring the direct re- lationship between the basic faults in the Japanese struc- ture and the long series of wars which have resulted from them. Their plans are permeated with expressed desires to encourage the emergence of a peaceful Japan but are 274 lacking in any manifest willingness to alter the economy and political structure which have given rise to war. The specific features which are listed for elimination are al- most always the symptoms rather than the disease itself. Militarism and the jingoist organizations which spear- headed it are listed for liquidation, but the oppressive conditions in agriculture which have produced the most rabid young military fascists apparently are to go un- touched. War industries are to be dismantled or trans- ferred, but the domination and exploitation of the econ- omy by the aggressive economic imperialists, the Z#z~ batsu, may be allowed to remain. One of the outstanding examples of this desire to "re- form" Japan painlessly is the attitude taken toward the educational system by some conservative Japan special- ists. Mr. Wilfred Fleisher, who frequently mirrors the views of State Department conservatives, gave his views on Japanese education on a broadcast of the "Town Meeting of the Air" in March 1945. "Education in Japan has been a matter of high policy," Mr. Fleisher declared. "The government provides an official negative from which millions of prints are made. Our main task will be to see to it that a new negative is provided one that will teach the Japanese that Japan's mission is not a divine one of conquest, but to take a law-abiding place in the society of nations." Mr. Fleisher's intentions are fine and his figure of speech very effective, but unfortunately it implies a sub- stantial retention of the present education organization, It is hard to conceive of a more dangerous illusion than to think that "our main task" will have been accom- plished once a "new negative" (presumably meaning new textbooks) is provided. In any educational system organized to inculcate a particular set of ideas not only is 275 it necessary to have textbooks and syllabi emphasizing the doctrine desired but also It is vital to have teachers and administrators who are advocates of the Ideology to be propagated. The oligarchy In Japan has made every effort to achieve both objectives, and during the last twenty years there have been repeated purges of the school system specifically designed to eliminate antimili- tarists. It should be obvious that such an educational system so carefully geared to militarist needs cannot be thrown into reverse by a flip of the wrist, the appointment of a few foreign advisers or the banning of a few particu- larly obnoxious books. We cannot effect a fundamental change in policy without a drastic reorientation of the entire educational system, accompanied by a counter- purge of those who have been most active in militarist and jingoist indoctrination. It is true that this is a diffi- cult task, but it Is not impossible because there were hundreds of American and British teachers scattered through Japan and they are sufficiently familiar with educational personnel in the areas in which they taught to point out the ringleaders In militarist education as well as the antimilitarists who were expelled from their positions or terrorized into silence. In the long run, the occupation of Japan will be briefer and more effective if we recognize at the outset that we cannot accomplish major changes in policy without major changes in structure and personnel. This is true of the entire structure of the Japanese government. It is true, of course, that occupation authorities frequently prefer to take over a "going concern," in order to keep essential services going and make It possible to have things run smoothly. This is not only expedient, but particularly wise when for military or other reasons it is 276 Imperative to avoid interruption. It is perfectly unob- jectionable when necessity dictates provided that we do not delude ourselves into believing that the "going concern" is going in our direction! THE ILLUSION OF STABILITY Many specialists in the field explain their reluctance to change the status quo in Japan in terms of maintaining "order" and "stability." This, too, is a dangerous illu- sion, for the old order is basically unstable; and a policy of support for its leaders, far from being conducive to civil peace and moderation, is likely to encourage extrem- ism and civil war. Even before the war, the inability of the leaders of the old regime to find a peaceful solution for the economic problems of the great majority of Japanese resulted in deep unrest among professionals, small business men, the peasantry and the industrial workers. Faced with this, the oligarchy of giant trusts, parasitic landlords, mili- tarists, antidemocratic bureaucrats and feudal aristocrats have maintained their position by the combined repres- sive power of the police, army, and the hoodlums of the jingoist societies, and by periodic recourse to war. The denouement of Japan's defeat has been accom- panied by a substantial weakening of the hold of the ruling oligarchy over the population. The glowing prom- ises of prestige, power and prosperity have been replaced with the bitter reality of starvation, searing death and ignominious defeats. Together with growing disillusion- ment has come a weakening of the ability of the govern- ment to stifle criticism. Wartime defeats and post-sur- render dissolution of the army will remove the most powerful weapon of the Old Gang. The nationalistic 277 propaganda of the jingoist societies will be discredited by defeat, and they will be driven deep underground. Con- sequently the autocratic old order will be left with only the police to hold back the rising tide of discontent. This tide is bound to rise, if defeat is not accompanied by extensive reforms. The peasantry will remain saddled with the burdens of high interest, semifeudal rents and monopoly-priced fertilizers. Industrial workers will still receive microscopic wages for work under inhuman con- ditions without the protection of adequate social legisla- tion or unions of their own choosing. Small business men will remain virtually impotent against the tremendous power of the Zaibatsu, and professionals will go hungry or sell their consciences for their daily rice and little else. And none of these will be able to make their voices ef- fectively heard in the political scene because of the ob- stacles inherent in the antidemocratic constitutional structure, with the Emperor at its apex. It would seem reasonable to assume that the Old Gang can retain power only if it combines the co-operation of the Allied occupation authorities with thorough exploita- tion of the Emperor's prestige and maximum use of police repression. But this procedure would have the effect of repressing and terrorizing only many of the more mod- erate critics of the regime. It is not likely to eliminate the radical organizations which have persisted despite long years of continuous persecution. The upshot of the con- tinuation of an old order incapable of solving any of the population's problems but willing to use repression against a rising tide of discontent is likely to be a bloody civil war. This is hardly a result to be anticipated from a policy advocated as a means of preserving "stability" and "order"! 278 PEACE THROUGH CHANGE The United Nations have an alternative to supporting those who would tread a slightly refurbished version of Japan's old road. It is within their power to facilitate the construction of that broad new road to self-purification, political democracy, economic reform and international peace. During the past three quarters of a century a wide range of groups have sporadically attempted to pioneer this new road. Virtually every sally has been beaten back, and those who have dared to pioneer have paid with their jobs and their health, and even with their lives, for their daring. Long years of repression have decimated the ranks of these pioneers, but new recruits have come forward to take the places of those who have fallen or have been terrorized into silence. The total number of those who consciously seek to have Japan move ahead along this new road is certainly a minority at present. But, for that matter, so is Japan's ruling oligarchy. The important fact about the anti- militarist minority is that they are capable of forming the nucleus of a broad democratic movement representing the majority of the people, and capable of carrying through reforms which are in the interest not only of the people of Japan, but also of the United Nations as a whole. While it would be the depth of political ineptitude to overlook these elements of opposition to the old regime, it would be the height of overoptimism to suggest that these advocates of a new Japan can carry through a renovation by themselves. There can be little doubt that the weakening of the old regime through defeat will 279 provide additional opportunities for the opposition. But the old order has the weight of wealth, social position, experience, international connections and inertia to sup- port it. The supporters of the old order control the police and other portions of the state apparatus, and can hide behind the "august virtue" of the throne. The opponents of the regime, on the other hand, are little known. Some have been dismissed from their positions, others have kept a careful anonymity, others have spent years in prison. Police espionage and repression have made it impossible to maintain effective organization. The lesson is clear. There is a minority capable of carrying through a democratic transformation, but only 'with our sympathetic assistance. Therefore the decision rests with us. We cannot impose a democratic system on Japan, but we can, by facilitating the activities of those who wish to carry through democratic reforms, accom- plish the same end, The support and encouragement of antimilitarist ele- ments has been attacked by some as "meddling" or "un- due interference." We apparently can intervene in the affairs of fascist nations to the extent of invading their lands at the expense of hundreds of thousands of lives, but not to the extent of enabling them to achieve the kind of governments which will make it unnecessary to repeat the sacrifice twenty years hence! In order to create conditions which will facilitate the emergence of a democratic government, it is necessary to be very severe and very sympathetic at the same time. The best way to divert Japan's efforts into constructive channels is to erect roadblocks against efforts to lead Japan along its old road, and to pave the way for those who want to push forward to a new and democratic Japan, or, to paraphrase a popular song of the recent 280 past, we must eliminate the negative and accentuate the positive elements in Japan. ELIMINATE THE NEGATIVE A task which is decisive for the emergence of demo- cratic forces and which at the same time should cause us special satisfaction is the purging of those elements which have been responsible for the war and its bar- barous crimes. The elements in Japanese life most active in bringing on the war and most responsible for hideous war crimes against Allied military men and civilians have also been the most active and ruthless opponents of those Japanese who preferred political and economic reform to external aggression. Consequently, a thoroughgoing pun- ishment of the militarists and their civilian collaborators will not only teach the Japanese a lesson in international morality, but also remove dangerous elements from the political life of Japan at a time when they can* do the utmost damage. The trial of military fascists and other war criminals is one of the most important means of revealing to the Japanese people how they were led into the war, by whom and for whose benefit. Some observers apparently believe that revulsion against militarism and contrition on the part of the Japanese is to be expected as an automatic accompaniment to defeat. This viewpoint overlooks the fact that for some years the Japanese have been subjected to an unending barrage of official propaganda which, in the absence of any contrary information, has convinc- ingly pictured Japan as defending hapless East Asia against the imperialist designs of the Allies. Correctly utilized, these trials of war criminals can serve to illu- minate the real causes of the war and the barbaric cruelty inflicted by the militarists. 281 Many Japanese will probably offer the excuse repeated so frequently by the Germans that the crimes were committed under orders. Many of the Individual war crimes, of course, have not been committed under orders, but have merely been officially tolerated. But even those crimes which were ordered cannot be condoned. This is Important, not only on moral grounds, but because unless the Japanese learn Individual responsibility for their ac tions, there is little hope for a firm democratic structur in which the people will not be led, robot-like, to slaughter. The trials can also serve to counteract the notion, widely disseminated by the Japanese propagandists, that the war is racial in character. We should make It clear to the Japanese that, if we single out certain Japanese leaders as war criminals and punish them severely for their atrocities, we are not punishing them because they are Japanese but because of their crimes, and that we have applied exactly the same standards in punishing German war criminals. It also would be wise to point out the fact that Japanese war criminals who tortured and killed Allied fliers also tortured and killed those of their own countrymen who opposed them. There are fundamentally two types of war criminals. The first includes individuals who order or participate in atrocities. The second comprises political and eco- nomic leaders who are responsible for the whole act of aggression, of which the atrocities are but one aspect. The simpler and more obvious category of war criminals comprises those who have committed crimes against the rules of war such as the maltreatment of war prisoners and wounded, or offenses against the lives, health, honor and property of enemy civilians. A great number of the military fascists fall into this category, and their liquida- 282 tion will constitute a major contribution to a peaceful Pacific and a new Japan. Since September 18, 1931, the Japanese military fascists and their accomplices have been responsible for a wide range of crimes, including the rape of Nanking, the ravaging of Hong Kong, the "Death March" of Bataan, the beheading of captured aviators, cannibalism directed against Australian prisoners in New Guinea and literally thousands of other crimes no less horrible. By combining the information available to the American, Chinese, British, Australian, Philippine and Dutch authorities, it should be possible to bring to swift justice a considerable number of the militarists who do not deprive us of that pleasure by eliminating themselves. We must be careful not to limit our search for those guilty of crimes against the rules of war to the armed forces of Japan. The role of the secret political police (known as the Tokkoka) is every whit as sinister as the Nazi Gestapo, and there is nothing that Himmler's or- ganization could have taught it in ruthlessness of meth- ods or its use of every conceivable torture. Many of the key members of the jingoist societies can also be caught up in the war-atrocities dragnet. In the course of their lurid histories of espionage, terrorism and propaganda they have organized gangs of terrorists in China and Manchuria who have tortured, despoiled and murdered Chinese who resisted Japanese aggression. A more difficult and important category of undesir- ables comprises those who were not personally respon- sible for specific atrocities, but who killed millions of people just as surely by actively planning, supporting and expediting Japanese aggression. This would take in virtually every policy-making official in the Japanese government in the last ten years including Prince Konoye, who led Japan into the China War, as well as 283 almost all the leaders of the giant trusts. Those which do not merit a death sentence should at least be stripped of their ill-gotten wealth and kept from polluting the po- litical atmosphere by imprisonment or exile to some bleak but well-guarded island. Undoubtedly the most dangerous of the elements of the old order will be the leaders of the Zaibatsu. They will seek to survive by abandoning the militarists, in order to win another chance to reconstitute the aggres- sive power of Japan. It is infinitely more difficult to pin guilt on a business leader than on an army commander. Furthermore, they will overwhelm us with their friend- liness, claiming they never wanted war and only profited from it with bleeding hearts. They will come in droves, carrying their diplomas from American and British uni- versities, to offer their services to the Allied occupation authorities. But a surrender which would leave this group of economic imperialists in power would fall far short of victory. The industrial monopolists have worked long and ardently for Japanese domination of East Asia. They have both supported and profited from aggression. Con- sequently punishment must not stop at removal of Japa- nese political and military leaders, but must include Japan's aggressive economic leadership as well. Furthermore, the Zaibatsu will attempt to maintain unchanged the internal conditions which were the eco- nomic mainspring for Japan's campaigns of conquest. To eliminate the risk of another war, the structure and control of the Japanese economy must be so altered that it cannot serve the purposes of war. This is as funda- mental as military occupation and political change. In the field of politics, the greatest single political ob- stacle to democracy, and the greatest headache for both 284 progressive Japanese and the United Nations as a whole, is the future role of the Emperor institution. It is an ob- stacle to democracy, an incentive to war and an excuse for atrocities. Democracy is possible only where the people are sovereign. For the past three quarters of a century virtually every attempt to achieve democratic advances has run head-on Into the thick wall of imperial sovereignty. Permanent peace is only possible when the concept of a "master race" has been erased. The Em- peror cult, or State Shinto, has persuaded the Japanese, as Nazism persuaded the Germans, that they are a nation with a "divine mission" to rule the world. Death on the battlefield is acclaimed as the highest attainment, and the most bestial tortures are condoned, because both are done in the name of the Emperor. We can begin to undermine this dangerous institution during the period of military occupation. The occupation, authorities have full justification for banning any text- book or publication that maintains that Japan has a "di- vine mission" to rule the world. Since it has already been made clear that any dissemination of the parallel Nazi dogma of "Aryan supremacy" is intolerable, there seems to be little reason to accord any special privileges to the Japanese. Because of the firmly entrenched character of the in- stitution, it is not enough merely to remove its most ag- gressive superstructure. We must demolish it completely, foundations and all. The main foundation of the institu- tion is the hold that it has developed upon the Japanese people, as a result of more than a half -century of inten- sive indoctrination. All the evidence available at present indicates that not one Japanese in fifty has a skeptical attitude toward the throne. Primary attention, therefore, must be concentrated on 285 the task of discrediting the throne and dispelling the aura of sacredness with which the oligarchy has surrounded it. One way to accomplish this is for the occupation authorities to encourage the publication of literature critical of the Emperor institution. Another method is to name Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal Emperor Hirohito can and should be tried as a war criminal. As chief of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he has been legally responsible for unprovoked aggression and unspeakable atrocities. An Allied bill of particulars, charging the Emperor with criminal complicity in die war, will come as a needed psychological shock to the Japanese. It will serve a useful purpose even if it only provokes prolonged dis- cussion in Japan on the merits of the institution and its occupant during the past two decades. Out of such dis- cussions can develop rational and critical attitudes ca- pable of dispelling the aura of sacredness. A further step in this direction is to reveal to the Jap- anese people that the Imperial Household, as a great landowner and substantial member of the Zaibatsu, is an integral part of the economic oligarchy which has de- nied them adequate living conditions. A permanent abolition of the throne one which will last beyond the withdrawal of occupation forces can only come as a result of action by the Japanese people themselves. Therefore the most vital and positive step in this direction is the strengthening of the natural op- ponents of the throne those who favor popular sov- ereignty against imperial sovereignty. When a substan- tial portion of the population recognizes that the institu- tion is an obstacle to progress and plenty, the Japanese themselves will raze it to the ground. 286 ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE A program adequate to the task of reorientating a na- tion cannot be purely negative in character. It is essen- tial to discredit, isolate and extirpate the aggressive ele- ments of the old regime, but that alone is not sufficient. It is not enough to eliminate the militarists and their civilian collaborators and to convince the Japanese peo- ple that their bitter fate is a direct result of the evils of the old order. A purely negative program leads to sullen- ness, despair and apathy. The Japanese not only must be won away from the old. They must be turned toward the new. They must realize that there is a real alternative, that something new and better can be built on the ashes of the old. A major part of this task will have to be done by forward-looking Japanese, but we can immeasurably facilitate their work in a number of ways. We have already made it clear that we do not intend to destroy or enslave the Japanese people. We should also make it clear that we do not intend to keep Japan in a state of lasting political or economic subjection, and that when the Japanese have proved themselves to be trust- worthy they will be given an opportunity to re-enter the community of nations. The most important contribution the United Nations can make to the achievement of a democratic Japan is through encouraging the development of those groups and individuals most intent on introducing the political, economic and social reforms requisite to democratiza- tion. One of the main problems of the United Nations forces occupying Japan, as in Germany, revolves around selecting suitable personnel for various positions of trust. By selecting persons with a consistent record of opposi- 287 tion to militarism and dedicated to measures that will uproot the old regime we simultaneously provide our- selves with trustworthy associates and give potential democratic leaders the experience and prestige which they require. There are a number of other ways in which we can facilitate the efforts of genuine antimilitarists to enlist popular support for a program of purification and re- form. We can and should abolish all repressive and anti- democratic legislation. Furthermore, during the period of military occupation the occupying authorities have control over the radio, press and public gatherings. Al- lowing the antimilitarists to have access to the radio and press, and permitting them to hold public meetings, while discouraging the antidemocratic and pro-mili- tarist elements, would be of signal importance. Simi- larly, the occupying authorities will have the opportu- nity to assist and encourage the work of trade unions, peasant leagues, professional associations, small business men's groups and other popular organizations which are certain to emerge. A close study of Japan's recent history demonstrates that a core of conscious democrats and genuine anti- militarists is to be found in four groups: among small business men who seek to break the crushing hold of the Zaibatsu and the burden of wartime taxation, among pro- fessionals opposed to militarism and favoring democracy and the opportunities it provides for full use of their skills, among industrial laborers seeking democracy and the opportunities for improving their living standards and among peasants interested in throwing off the yoke of a semifeudal and parastic landlordism. This core of forward-looking individuals do not all agree on ultimate objectives or on tactics. Their political 288 orientation divides them into parliamentary democrats, social democrats, agrarian reformers, socialists and com- munists. Despite these differences, there is a wide area of political and economic agreement, an area more than ample for the formation of an effective and fairly stable coalition. It is of the greatest moment for us that the fundamental points of agreement within this potential coalition represent not only the interests of the majority of the Japanese people but also those of the United States and the other United Nations. In sum they call for po- litical democracy, the creation of a welfare economy and the maintenance of peace. We are sure to be tempted with the hope that we can build a new Japan on a narrower basis ignoring the peasant and labor leaders. This would be both dangerous and self-defeating. The task of reforming Japan is suffi- cient in scope to command the assiduous and co-operative efforts of all democrats and antifascists. We cannot af- ford to ignore popular leaders with a following among the common people, for it is the latter who must be the foundation of a new, democratic Japan. Should we en- courage division among the forward-looking elements, we incur the risk not only of dissipating their efforts, but also of establishing a new area of conflict among the United Nations. We are also sure to be tempted with the hope that a new Japan can emerge purely on the basis of political reforms and without the "turmoil" and "chaos" of agrar- ian reforms and the like. This is the most dangerous illusion. Man does not live by bread (or rice) alone, but neither can he stay alive on a strict diet of ideas. Democ- racy and peace can only be sold in Japan if they are linked with enough rice. Agrarian reforms are an absolute prerequisite for a 289 democratic and peaceful Japan. If he does not receive land and a fair return therefrom, the peasant will re- main a potential recruit for the forces of fascism and war. If he receives land from a democratic Japanese gov- ernment, with the support and encouragement of all the United Nations, he will become a defender of the gov- ernment which gave him land and a friend of those countries which encouraged it. A narrow and negative policy on our part, therefore, will not only undermine the political support for a democratic government and leave untouched one of Japan's most serious founts of aggression, but it will also leave the field open for other governments to gain the friendship of the Japanese by sponsoring such reforms. Many have described Japan after defeat as a "political vacuum." It should be remembered that a positive and dynamic force flows more rapidly into a vacuum than a negative force or no force at all. THE BURDEN OF DECISION The burden of decision falls upon us. Ours is the heavy responsibility and the glowing opportunity to decide whether we shall leave Japan little better than it was before Pearl Harbor or help launch it upon a new road. The task of paving the way for the emergence of a Japan with a peaceful and democratic orientation will be a major test of our maturity and enlightenment in the sphere of international affairs. Its successful accom- plishment will require courage, vision and a type of social engineering on an international scale which is unprece- dented for the United States. Should we attempt it and succeed in any measure, it will establish the United States as the political and moral leader of the Pacific. 290 Almost unconscious of their magnitude, we have con- quered the tremendous problems of the war. In a half- dozen years, starting virtually from scratch, we have become the greatest military power of the world. We have overcome almost insuperable problems of produc- tion and logistics. We have landed on enemy shores in the teeth of the most tenacious and murderous resistance. Our wartime achievements beggar our postwar prob- lems. Yet, without an adequate solution of these prob- lems, our military victories become incomplete and fleeting. In Japan our military victories can only be translated into permanent peace by uprooting aggression and point- ing the way to democracy and peace. In the memory of those who died to restore the Pacific to its name, we can do no less. 291 JAPAN: A Short Bibliography for the General Reader ALLEN, G. C: Japan: The Hungry Guest. Dutton, 1938. BISSON, T. A.: Japan in China. Macmillan, 1938. America's Far Eastern Policy. Macmillan, 1945. BORTON, H.: Peasant Uprisings in Japan. Asiatic Society, 1938. CHAMBERLIN, W. H.: Japan over Asia. Little, Brown, 1938. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941. Vols. I & II. Government Print- ing Office, 1943. GREW, J. C.: Ten Years in Japan. Simon & Schuster, 1944. HARING, D. G.: Blood on the Rising Sun. Macrae Smith, 1943. HOLTOM, D. C.: The National Faith of Japan. Dutton, 1938. ISHIMOTO, BARONESS SHIDZUE: Facing Two Ways. Farrar & Rinehart, 1935. JOHNS-TONE, W. C.: The Future of Japan. Oxford, 1945. LAMOTT, W. C.: Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan. John Day, 1944. LATTIMORE, OWEN: Solution in Asia. Little, Brown, 1945. MAKI, J. M.: Japanese Militarism; Its Cause and Cure. Knopf, 1945. NEWMAN, J.: Goodbye Japan. Fischer, 1942. NORMAN, E. H.: Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. In- stitute of Pacific Relations, 1940. REISCHAUER, R. K.: Japan, Government Politics. Ronald, 1939. SANSOM, G. B.: Japan: A Short Cultural History. Century, 1932. TANIN, O., and IOGAN, E.: Militarism and Fascism in Japan. International Publishers, 1934. TOLISCHUS, O. D.: Tokyo Record. Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943. UTLEY, F.: Japan's Feet of Clay. Norton, 1937. WILDES, H. E.: Social Currents in Japan. Chicago, 1927. YOUNG, A. M.: Japan in Recent Times. Morrow, 1929. 293 INDEX ABE, DR. Iso, 197, 213 "Account of Informal Conversa- tions, etc.," 51 Adjustment of Enterprises Law, 88 Agriculture, 161-171, 181-185, 275 Aikawa, Gisuke, 85 Aikokusha, 174 Aircraft industry, 84, 85 Akahata, 184 Akamatsu, Katsumaro, 212-213 All-Japan Peasants Union Con- ference, 183 Alley, Rewi, 238 Allied Control Commission, 101 Allies, and postwar Japan, 9-13, 272-291 Amerasia, 66-67, 69 Amery, Colonel, 27 Anami, General, 95 Anarchists, 208, 209 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 26-27 Anti-Imperialist League, 215 Anti-War League, 6 Aoyama, Katsuo, 241-242 Aoyama, Kazuo, 243 Appeal to the Japanese People, An, 250 Appeasement by invitation, 47-50 Application of Capital Law, 88 Araki, General, 118 Aristocrats, 5, 9, 11, 15, 46 Afahi> 126, 127, 230 Ashio mines, 203, 211 Ami, 124 Automotive industry, 84 Awakening Japan, 107 BAELZ, DR. ERWIN, 107 Balance of power, in postwar Orient, 28-29 Ballantine, Joseph W., 66 Bank of Japan, 80 Banking, 78-79, 88-89 Batsu^ 15-16 Besshi mines, 204 Bougainville, 123 Buddhism, 108 Bureaucrats, 9, 15, 16 Bushido, 135-136 Butler, Sk Paul, 20, 22 Cannery Boat, The, 129 Capehart, Homer, 24 Capitalism, 16, 75, 76-77 Carlson, Colonel Evans F., 13 Carlson's Raiders, 13 Censorship, 18 Central Association of Life In- surance Companies, 96 Central Bank of the Co-operative Societies, 96 Central Review, intellectual mag- azine, 157-158 "Chain of Wealth, The," 204 Chamberlain, Neville, 36 Chang, Hsueh-liang, 48 Charlie McCarthy school, 99, 114 Chatham House, see Royal Insti- tute of International Affairs, 20 Chen, Li-fu, 242 Chiang Kai-shek, 28, 154 Chichibu, Prince, 120 China, 28, 29, 42, 83, 107, 153- 154, 217, 218, 219-220 "China crowd," 65 Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 212 Chokugen, 200 Choshu clan, 82, 103 Choya Shimbun, 105, 144 Christian Science Monitor, 25 Chu, Teh, 248 Chuo Koron, 148, 157-158, 181 295 Cod Control Association, 90 Colleges, democratic thought in, 147-150, 151 Combines, see Trusts Commercial Banks Control As- sociation, 88 Commission to Study the Organ- ization of Peace, 60 Common People's Paper, 199 Communism, 5, 8, 11, 21, 29, 44- 45, 130, 208, 209, 211, 215-216, 219, 242 Communist League, 269 Communist Raids, 212 Congressional Record, 35 Conscription, 177; labor, 224-227 Conservatives, 8, 9, 29-30 Constitution promulgated, 105- 107 Control Associations, 72, 89-90, 92 DAI ICHI BANK, 88 Dai Nihon Shi, 103 Dai Nippon Jinushi Kyokai, 180 Dai Nippon Press Association, 157 Dai San Bank, 88 Daily Mail, London, 29 "Dangerous thoughts," 5, 18, 81- 82, 130, 150, 210 Debs, Eugene V,, 197 Debtors' Party, 173, 176 Declaration of the Social Demo- cratic Party, 197 Demands of the Soldiers, The, 259, 261 Democracy, ignorance of, 132- 134; and Allied occupation, 134; potential, 136-139; agita- tion for, 140-160; in postwar Japan, 279-281, 285 Denver National Opinion Cen- ter, 123 Depression of 1929, 181-185 Diamond, 228, 229 Dickovcr, Erie R,, 66 Diet, 81, 91, 105, 107, 145 Disunity, danger from, among United Nations, 25, 30-33 Domei, 93, 140, 157, 159, 226 Dooman, Eugene H., 66, 67-69 Dubosc, M., 44 ECHIGO PLAIN, 167 Economic Research, 149 Education, control of, 18; of Jap- anese captives, 244256, 260- 267; postwar, 275-277 Eighth Route Army, 5, 244, 245, 247, 248, 257, 260 Elder Statesmen, 80 Emergence of Japan as a Modern State, The, III Emperor-worship, 8, 18, 62, 63, 64, 133, 270; Allied views of, 99-101; growth of, 102-111; po- tency of, 112-114; in postwar Japan, 114-122, 285-286 Engels, Friedrich, 197 Espionage, 86 "Ethical Significance of Worship at the Shrines," 148 Expansion, conciliatory policy of, 41, 79, 82-86; foreign, 76, 186-188, 212-216 Extremists, struggle with mod- erates, 41, 47, 51-52 Facing Two Ways, 153 Fanaticism, 17, 59, 112, 123, 124- 126, 239-240 Far East, American policy in, 34 Far Eastern Affairs, Office of, 64- 70 Farmer-Labor Party, 179, 210 Fascism, military, 9, 11, 44-45, 133, 151-152, 187, 218, 281-282 Federation of Coal Mine Owners, 90 Federation of Revolutionary Artists and Writers, 235 Feudal Background of Japanese Politics, 142 Fighting Flag, 235 Fire Pillar, 199 Fleisher, Wilfred, 61, 66, 275 296 Foreign Relatiom of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, 60-61 Foreign trade, 76, 83-84 Forman, Harrison, 262, 267 Fraternal Society, 206, 208 Freedom and People's Rights Movement, 140-141 "Friend of the Miners " 203 Fuji, 113 Fujiwara, Ginjiro, 84, 92, 93 Fund, Yoshimi, 159 GOMPERS, SAMUEL, 206 Goto, Shojiro, 176 Great Britain in postwar world, 27-29 Greater Japan Landlords' Asso- ciation, 180 Grew, Joseph Clark, 19, 99, 101; policy toward Japan, 34-37; career, 37-40; Ambassador to Japan, 42-50, 52, 53-58; As- sistant to the Secretary of State, 59-60, 61-64; Director of the Office of Far Eastern Af- fairs, 66-70 Gripsholm, S.S., 58 Guam, 15, 134-135 Gujffey, Joseph F., 19 Uy 15-16 HALSEY, ADMIRAL WILLIAM F., JR., 14 Hamada, labor leader, 214 Harcourt-Smith, Simon, 29 Heimm Shimbun, 199, 200, 202- 203, 205 Henderson, Sir Nevile, 36 Hkano, Rikizo, 189 Hirao, Hachisaburo, 90 Hirohito, Emperor, 19, 24, 55- 56, 80, 82, 114, 119, 270, 286; dean of moderates, 43, 48, 57- 58, 61, 62 Hirose, Toyosaku, 96 Hizen clan, 103 Hochi, 144 Hoffman, Clare, 24 Hong Kong, 87 Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley K., 65 House, Colonel E. Al, 38 House of Peers, 80 Hulen, Bertram D., 64 Hull, Cordell, 64 Hundred-Regiment Offensive, 257 I.W.W., 202 Ikeda, Seihin, 94 Ikeda, Yuki, 237-239 Ikki, Baron, 43-44, 80 Illinois Education Society, 61 Imperial Agricultural Society, 184 Imperial Household Ministry, 80 Imperial Rule Assistance Asso- ciation, 93, 156, 221, 228 India, 27, 28 Indo-China, 83, 87 Industry, 275; growth of Jap- anese, 75-78, 84-85 Institute of Pacific Relations, 20, 29 International Congress of Social- ists, 200 Inukai, Tsuyoshi, 40, 46, 145, 151 Iron Heel, 199 Iron and Steel Control Associa- tion, 90, 96 Iron and Steel Manufacturers' Federation, 90 Iron Workers' Union, 194 Ise, 110, 111 Ishiguro, Tadaatsu, 96 Ishimoto, Baroness, 153, 219, 237 hkra, 200 Itagaki, Taisuke, 141, 142, 175, 176 Ito, Prince, 81, 106 Iwasaki family, 79 Iwo Jima, 124 Japan Advertiser, 129 Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 89 Japan crowd, 65, 66, 67, 69 Japan in Defeat, 19-23 297 Japan Times, 130 Japanese And- War League, 221, 223, 242-243, 246, 268 Japanese Board of Information, 158 Japanese Commoners' Party, 198 Japanese Communist Party, 269 Japanese Economic Federation, 89 Japanese Federation of Labor, 208, 20^-210, 213 Japanese Peasants* Federation, 183 Japanese Peasants' Society, 182 Japanese Peasants' Union, 178- 179, 182 Japanese Peasants* and Workers' School, 246-256, 260-262 Japanese People's Emancipation League, 6, 18, 117, 158, 227, 243, 245, 267-272 Japanese Soldiers' Delegates Con- ference, 258-259 Japanese State Socialist Party, 212 Japanese Trade Union Congress, 213 Japanese Trade Union Council, 210 Jimmu, Emperor, 103, 108 Jingoism, 11, 108, 275, 278 Jiyu minken undo, 140-141 Jiyuto, 104-105, 141-144, 175-176 Jones, Lieutenant William, 135 Jugo Bank, 88 KAGAWA, TOYOHIKO, 237 Kaishinto, 141, 143-144 Ka&o, 150, 157-158 Kaji, Wataru, 6, 117, 223, 234-243, 268 Kambatsu, 15-16 Katayama, Sen, 194, 197, 200, 201- 203, 205, 249 Kato, Kanju, 216, 217, 218, 219, 230, 232 Kato, Premier, 79 Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co., 222 Kcio University, 150 Kcizaigaku Kenkyu, 149 Kellogg, Frank B., 39 "Kick Your Mother and Father," 203 Kinoshita, Naoe, 199 Kishi, Shinsuke, 92 Kobayashi, Takiji, 129-130, 236 Koiso, General Kuniaki, 16, 93, 94, 95, 226 Kokkai Kisei Domel Kai, 174-175 Konoyc, Prince, 52, 53-55, 69, 86, 153, 283 Koran Shmipo, 105 Kotoku, Shosui, 196, 197, 199, 201-203, 205 Kuhara, Fusanosuke, 77-78, 85 Kuo, Mo-jo, 238 Kuomintang, 242 Kxtrusu, Mr,, 23, 57 Kwantung Army, 15, 16, 53 Kyoto Imperial University, 151 Oy 173 Labor, 199 Labor movement, militarists op- pose, 193-194; growth of, 194- 198, 201-204, 211-212; and for- cig* 1 aggression, 212-221; and World War 1, 206-210; in World War IT, 221-231; in postwar Japan, 231-233 Labor World, 194, 198 Landlordism, 166-169 Laokay phosphate deposits, 87 Lasalle, Ferdinand, 197, 198 Lavalle, Ramon, 35 League for the Establishment of a National Assembly, 174-175 League of Nations, 39, 213 Lenin, Nikolai, 200 Lepanto copper mines, 87 Liberal Decade, 79 Liberal Party, 104, 105, 141-144, 174, 175-176, 196 Liberalism, 5, 11, 195; growth of, 146-160, 173-180 Liberation Daily, 253, 254 298 Life Insurance Control Associa- tion, 96 London, Jack, 199 Lu, Hsun, 237 Mainichi y 197 Makino, Count, 43-45, 46, 48, 80 Manchukuo, 150 Manchuria, 27, 39, 47, 87, 150, 182, 183, 186, 212 Marx, Karl, 197 Matsudaira, Viscount, 44 Matsumoto, Kenjiro, 90 Meiji, Emperor, 56, 57, 104, 107 Meiji Restoration, 31, 75, 76-77, 104, 109, 164, 165, 171, 172, 173 Mergers, 87, 88-89 Midway Island, 91 Militarism, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15-16, 42, 57, 73, 76, 96, 185-190, 275, 281- 284 Miners Federation, 216 Minken Undo, 104 Minobe, Dr., 121 Minseito Party, 81, 82-83, 151- 152, 154, 217 Mitsubishi Bank, 88 Mitsubishi, House of, 44, 71, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 118, 143 Mitsubishi Warehouse Company, 87 Mitsui Bank Ltd., 88 Mitsui, House of, 42, 71, 81, 82, 86, 87 Mitsui Mining Company, 87 Moderates, 57, 155; described, 40- 42, 47-48; struggle against ex- tremists, 41, 47, 51-52; appease- ment by invitation, 47-50 Mohammedanism, 112 Mombatsu, 15-16 Monopolies, 87-89, 97 Mori, Ken, 247 Mori, Major General Masamitsu, 230 Morito, Professor, 149 Moscow, 50 Movement for the Defense of Constitutional Politics, 145 Munitions, 84; Ministry of, 91- 92,94 Musanto, 216 Muto, Sanji, 81 N. Y. K., 80, 83 Nagaoka, labor leader, 203 Nakajima, 85 Nakano, Seigo, 92-93 Nasu, Major General, 157 Nation, the, 36, 68 National Council of Trade Un- ions, 216, 219 National Industrial Service Asso- ciation, 220 National Mobilization Law, 220 Native-Land-Loving School, 187 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 28 New Economic Structure, 89 "New Far Eastern Policy, A," 66 New Man Society, 148, 235 New Society, 199 New York Herald Tribune, 25, 61 New York Times, 63-^54 New Zaibatsu, 85 News of the Social Movement, 182 "Next Will Come Paper Bombs," 126 Nichi Nichi, 215 Niigata Shimbun, 144 Nippon, 215 Nippon Chuya Bank, 88 Nippon Nomin Kumiai, 179, 182 Nippon Nomin Sodomei, 183 Nippon Rodo Kumiai Hyogikai, 210 Nippon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi, 213 Nippon Railway Company, 195 Nippon Seitetsu, 96 Nippon Steamship Company, 77 Niroku Shimpo, 198 Nishio, General Juzo, 193 Nishio, Suehiro, 214 Nissan firm, 85 299 Nomln Rodoto, 179 Nomura, Admiral, 23 Nomura Bank, 89 Norman, E. Herbert, 142, 172 Northern Court, 102 Nosaka, Tetsuo, 206 OCCUPATION, Allied, of postwar Japan, 10-13 Oi, Kantaro, 196 Oji Paper Company, 84 Okano, Susumu, 6, 117, 206, 209, 234, 243-244, 246, 248-252, 256, 268, 269, 270 Okinawa, 95, 124 Okuma, Count Shigenobu, 144, 145 Old Gang, 10, 22, 25, 32, 68-70, 277, 278 Oligarchy, 10, 14-15, 16-18, 79, 107, 279 Oliver, Lieutenant John, 135 Oriental Economist, 229 Osaka Asahiy 146 Osaka Heimin, 203 Osugi, Sakae, 209 Ozaki, Yukio, 140-141, 143-145, 150-151, 152, 155-156, 160 PM, 35, 36, 61 Pacificus, 68 Paine, Tom, 141 Peace, negotiated, 14 Peace Preservation Laws, 81, 105, 144, 150 Pearl Harbor, 4, 15, 52, 58, 59, 89 Peasantry, 5, 6, 7, 161-171; re- volts, 171-173, 176-178, 179; or- ganizes, 173-176, 178-180; and crisis of 1929, 181-185; in World War II, 185-192 Peasants Union, 210 Peers' Bank, 88 People's Rights Movement, 104 Perry, Commodore, 102, 103 Phi Beta Kappa, 148 Philippine Islands, 15, 87 Plain Speaking, weekly, 200 Plekhanov, George, 200 Police, 18, 128-131 Police Law of 1900, 207 Poor People's Party, 173 Popular front, 217 Positive school, 41, 79 Progressive Party, 141, 143-144 Proletarian Party, 216, 217, 218, 219 Propaganda, 18, 126-128, 131-133, 135-136, 240-242, 261-267 Public Peace Police Law, 178, 195 RADIO, in psychological warfare, 127-128 Reconstruction, intellectual mag- azine, 157-158 Record, Philadelphia, 35 Red Flag Riot, 204 Redman, H. Vere, 99 "Reflections on Contemporary Politics," 150 Reform, basis of postwar, 3-13; agrarian, 7, 29, 161-162, 289- 290 Report from Red China, 262 Report from Tokyo, 59 Rice Riots, 80, 178, 207 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 49, 52 Roosevelt, Theodore, 31, 38 Royal Institute of International Affairs, 20 Russia, see Soviet Union Russian Revolution, Japan and, 146 Russo-Japanese War, 26, 31, 77, 110, 199-200 SABOTAGE, 229-230 Saionji, Prince, 43-44, 80 Saipan, 93, 126, 127, 131 Saito, Takao, 154-155, 160 Saito, Viscount, 46, 47 Sakai, Toshihiko, 199, 201, 209 Sakara, Zawa, 158 Sampo, 220 Sangyo Hokoku Kaf, 220 Sanwa Bank, 89 Sasaki, Marquis, 143 Sassai, Ichio, 189 300 Satsuma clan, 82, 103 Sawada, Jun, 269 Scarlet Banner, 184 Seamen's Union, 214 Seiyukai Party, 81, 82, 152, 217 Shakai Shimbun, 203 Shakai Shugi Kyokai, 198 Shakai Undo Tsushin, 182 Shakaito, 173 Shakkinto, 173, 176 Shibusawa, Baron, 206 Shidehara, Baron Eajuro, 41, 79, 83 Shikoku, 142 Shin Shakai, 199 ' Shin Zaibatsu, 16, 85 Shinjinkai, 148 Shintoism, 62, 108-111, 121, 285 Shiomi, Seisaku, 240 Shipbuilding, 85 Shogunate, 102, 103-104, 164, 165 Showa Bank, 88 Shrines, 110-111, 121 Sino-American Institute of Cul- tural Relations, 243 Sino-Japanese War, 36, 49; of 1894-1895, 77, 110, 194 Smedley, Agnes, 240 Smuts, Marshal, 28 Snow, Edgar, 236 Social Democratic Party, 197, 199, 213 Social Mass Party, 152, 153, 197, 213, 217, 218, 219, 220 Social Party, 173 Socialism, 196-204 Socialist Association, 198, 201 Socialist News, 203, 205 Socialist Party, 201-203 Society for the Investigation of New Literature, 235 Society of Patriots, 174 Society for the Promotion of Trade Unions, 194 Society of Reservists, 187 Society of Sincere Persons, 203- 204 Soldiers' Friend, 215 Solomon Islands, 91 Son of Heaven, 109 Sonobe, Lieutenant General, 241 Southern Court, 102 Sovereignty, problem of, 143 Soviet Union, 11, 28, 29, 192, 218, 223-224 Spirit of Japanese Industry, 84 Stability, theory of, 19-23, 69- 70, 71, 277-278 Stalingrad, 51 Stein, Guenther, 270 Stimson, Henry L., 27, 39-40, 49 Stone, I. F., 36, 61 "Study of the Social Thought of Kropotkin, A," 149 Suetsugu, Admiral Nobumasa, 153, 219 ' Suffrage, universal male, 81, 210 Sugimoto, Kazuo, 260 Suicide, 124-126 Sumitomo Bank, 88 Sumitomo, House of, 44, 71, 80, 87, 118 Sun Goddess, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112 Sun, Fo, 63 Sun, Yat-sen, 63 Surrender, unconditional, 14, 272- 291; conditional, 23-25 Suzuki, Admiral Baron Kantaro, 16, 23, 95 Suzuki, Bunji, 183, 205-206, 208, 213, 214, 219, 232 TACHTOANA, KOSABURO, 187-188 Tagawa, Daikichiro, 156-157, 160 Takayama, Susumu, 247, 255 Taki, 135 Takikawa, Yokitatsu, 151 Tanaka, General Baron, 41, 78, 82, 179, 211 Tanaka, Kyuga, 164 Tanaka Memorial, 41, 82 Tani, Viscount, 31, 32, 177 Tanikawa, Naoyuki, 256-260 Tarawa, 13 Taylor, George, 43 Teikoku Bank, 88 Teikoku Shimpo, 149 301 Temps, Paris, 44 Ten Years m Japan, 46, 48, 49, 67 Terauchi, Premier Marshal, 80, 156 Time, 66 Togo, Mr., 56 Tohokai, 92 Tojo, General Hideki, 16, 52- 55, 56, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 118, 157 Tokai Bank, 89 Tokashiki, 124 Tokkoka, 283 Tokugawa, Prince, 45 Tokyo Asahi, 146 Tokyo Imperial University, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153 Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun, 157 Torture, 129-130, 131 Tosa clan, 103 Toyoda, Admiral Teijiro, 96 Trade Union Council, 212 Truman, Harry S., 23, 25 Trusts, financial, 15, 71-72, 96 Tsuchi II, Emperor, 102 Tsukada, Dr. Isaku, 229 Tsushima, Juichi, 94-95 Tuberculosis, 19, 227 U.S.S.R., see Soviet Union Ueki, Emori, 141-142 United States, in postwar world, 28; Far Eastern policy, 34, 41 Universal Suffrage Association, 196 Universities, democratic thought in, 147-150, 151 VERSAILLES TREATY, 273 WAKE, 15 Wilson, Woodrow, 146 Workers and Peasants Party, 211, 212, 235 World War I, Japan in, 31, 77, 146, 178 World War II, 86-87, 90-91; Japan enters, 51-58, 60 YAMAGATA, FIELD MARSHAL, 177 Yamakazi, Minister of Agricul- ture, 190 Yamanashi, Prince, 235 Yano, Fumio, 199 Yaskuni, 110, 111, 112, 121, 148 Yasuda Bank, 88, 89 Yasuda combine, 71 Yasui, Lieutenant General Toji, 95 Yawata Iron Foundry, 216 Yokohama Specie Bank, 80 Yomhtrij 92 Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa, 23, 93 Yorozu, 197, 199 Yoshino, Dr. Sakuzo, 148-149, 235 YuaiM, 206 ZACHARTAS, CAPTAIN E. M., 23 Zaibatsu, 15-16, 275, 278, 284, 288; growth and influence of, 71- 72, 76-78, 79-81; dangers of, 72-75, 96-98; foreign policy, 82-86; in Pacific war, 86-87, 91-96; and Control Associa- tions, 89-91 Zenkoku Nomm Kaigi, 183 Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai 216 Zola, Eraile, 199 302 me autnor ol tins book believes that cer- tain Americans and Englishmen favor a peace formula for Japan which will provide only for a temporary truce. Just as German mili- tarists and their industrial supporters were left in power after the First World War, in the same manner these men would leave the Jap- anese Emperor and his imperialist partners in*' control of Japan after this war. Believing that most Americans want permanent peace m spite of the cost, Mr. Roth provides a force- ful analysis of the alternatives which face us and the Japanese people. He shows first what we can expect from a defeated Japan if we follow this expedient but shortsighted policy of leaving the gov- ernment in the hands of the so-called ' 'mod- erates." He points out that such a procedure would rule out the reconstruction of Japan on a democratic basis, for it would maintain in power the leading industrial giants, the Zaib#tsu> of whom the greatest is the Em- peror. These, combined with the semifeudal landlords, of whom Hirohito is also the lead- er, have always followed a policy of economic imperialism, whether by means of military conquest or by the subtler methods of the "moderates." This book is an honest warning by a keen analyst of Far Eastern affairs. We must realize before it is too late that we are headed toward disaster if we court the status quo in Japan, Here it is clearly demonstrated that a policy of appeasing the "moderates" can only end at another Pearl Harbor.