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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO

THE OUTBREAK OF THE
EUROPEAN WAR

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

DIRECTOR

PART I

•<»

V NEW YORK

' ^ OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

AMBBICAN BRANCH : 85 Wbst 88in> Stbkbt

LONDOr^r, TORONTO. MELBOURNE. AND BOMBAY

HUMPHREY MILFORD

1916

SiiT

BT THB

GABNBQIB ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PBACB
WAeHINOTOM, D. C.

QUINN « aOMN 00. PRtM
NAHWAY, N, i.

INTRODUCTION

The Bible tells us that "of making many books there is no
end," and it would seem that the writers on the great war of 1914
are intent upon establishing beyond peradventure the truth of this
pronouncement, if anyone should be bold enough to question it. In-
deed, we are in danger of being engulfed by the multitude of books
concerning its causes with which the world is flooded, many of
which, it is believed, unlike the ark, will not survive the deluge ; but
notwithstanding the many, there is one book of an authoritative na-
ture whose chapters are the official statements laid before the world
by each of the belligerent governments, and the present volume justi-
fies its appearance and its claim to usefulness because it is composed
exclusively of the appeals which each of the nations at war has made
to public opinion.

It is true that these many-colored books and papers have been
more than once brought together and published, but there appears to
have been in each case a special reason or an interested motive for so
doing. The present publication has no purpose other than to lay be-
fore the reader the statements which the nations have been pleased to
make as to the reasons which drove them to war (because apparently
none of them wanted the war and yet each of them was forced into
it) , without an attempt to analyze the reasons given by the govern-
ments of the warring countries; to separate them into pretext or
cause; to question their sincerity or to apportion praise or blame.
The documents speak for themselves and the reader is left to judge.
Now, the value of these documents is greater than the truth which
they may contain, for they are the reasons which each nation would
have us regard as the justification of its action, and from this stand-
point they are a contribution to the psychology of nations. Responsi-
ble statesmen thought that the publication of the documents would
vindicate the propriety of their actions; otherwise the ministers of
foreign affairs of the countries at war would not have issued them, and
they thus furnish unimpeachable evidence of the processes of thought
obtaining in the chancellories of Europe. The documents are further
valuable as evidences of the fact that the actions of the nations at
war required justification, and for the additional and even more im-
portant fact that they are addressed not merely to their citizens or
subjects at home, but primarily to the opinion of neutral countries,

iv INTRODUCTION

which the nations seek to influence as an advocate the judge, thus
recognizing public opinion and striving to win it to their side.

To an American observer the issue of these documents by the dif-
ferent belligerent countries seems to be a confession that a decent re-
spect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare
the causes which impel them to — war. Admitting that each nation
honestly believed that it was forced into the war against its will, and
that it would, if it could, gladly have maintained the peace unbroken,
these documents appear to show, as Hamlet would say to-day, that
something is rotten in the state of ... , and that the great need
of the future is some kind of international organization which will
enable nations, sincerely desirous of averting war, to settle their dis-
putes peaceably without resorting to the sword, which they would
prefer to have rust in the scabbard. What should be the nature, the
visible form and shape of this international organization, requires
the world's best thought, and it is only mentioned in passing that the
reader may ponder these things after he has laid the volume aside.

In view of the size of a one-volume book which would be needed to
include all these documents, this publication is arranged in two parts,
of which Part I contains the Introduction, a table showing the Official
Positions of the Principal Persons mentioned in the Correspondence,
a separate table of contents for the Austro-Hungarian, Belgian and
French Books, but which are printed consecutively and followed by
the documents of these three countries ; and of Part II, which contains
a separate table of contents for the German, British, Italian, Russian
and Serbian books, likewise printed consecutively and likewise fol-
lowed by the documents issued by these countries. The editor is
responsible for the table of contents to the Austro-Hungarian Red
Book (No. 2), German White Book, Russian Orange Book (No. 1),
Russian Orange Book (No. 2), Serbian Blue Book, and to the appen-
dices to the British Blue Book (No. 1). He is also responsible for the
translation of the table of contents to the Belgian Grey Book (No. 2).
In order to give no just ground for criticism of expressions
used in the summaries of the different documents in the tables of
contents, these summaries are much briefer than they would be made
under other circumstances. The tables of contents to the other books
reproduced in this publication were taken from the original sources,
with only such slight variations as were necessary for the sake of uni-
formity. The table of Official Positions of the Principal Persons

INTRODUCTION v

mentioned in the Correspondence is repeated for convenience in Part
II. The Analytical Index for the entire work is to be found at the
close of Part II. The English system of spelling is used throughout all
the documents, as well as in the tables of contents appertaining to them,
inasmuch as the greater number of governments, in issuing English
translations of their publications, used that system of spelling.

The popular titles of the different publications of the belligerents
have been used, as for example, the British Blue Book, the Belgian
Grey Book, etc. Where more than one publication has been issued by
a government, as in the case of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, etc., the
books are arranged chronologically in the order as issued by the par-
ticular government and are arbitrarily designated as (No. 1) and (No.
2). It is thought that this arrangement makes for ease of reference.

The documents in the present publication are printed from the
originals, when they are in English, and when in foreign languages,
from the official English translations supplied by the ambassadors and
ministers of the several countries accredited to the United States, in
all cases where such official English translations have been made and
issued by the respective governments. In the case of Belgium, France,
and Serbia, the official English translations issued by tne British
Government have been used, as acceptable to those countries.

In the present publication, the Division of International Law has
endeavored to reproduce textually the different documents and it
should be said, therefore, that practically the only changes made from
the originals furnished, were in cases of clear typographical errors.
In view of this textual reproduction, it will also be found that there is
a variation in spelling of proper names when the same names occur in
the documents issued by different governments, and it should be noted
also that the same letters or documents, when printed in more than
one book, may vary in phraseology because of different translators.

The undersigned is deeply grateful to the foreign representatives
of the belligerent countries for their kindness and courtesy in this
matter and regards it as a duty, for this reason as well as for others,
that the introduction prefixed to this volume should be free from any
expression which may, even to the most sensitive mind, imply or seem
to imply a criticism of one or the other of the warring nations.

James Brown Scott,
Director of the Division of International Law.
Washington, D. C, February 28, 1916.

OFFICIAL POSITIONS

OF THE

PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE
CORRESPONDENCE

Aehbenthal, Count Former Austro-Hungarian Minister for For-
eign Aflairs.

Akidzuki, S Japanese Ambassador at Vienna.

Albert King of Belgium.

Alexandeb Crown Prince of Serbia,

Allize, M French Minister at Munich.

Ambrozy, Count Austro-Hungarian Minister at Rome.

Annoville, M. d' French Charge d'Aif aires at Luxemburg.

Apohieb, M. d' French Consul-General at Budapest.

AVABNA, Duke d' Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

Bapst, M French Minister at Copenhagen.

Babrere, M French Ambassador at Rome.

Baudin, M French Minister of Marine.

Beaumont, Mb British Charg6 d'Affaires at Constantinople.

Below Saleske, Herb von German Minister at Brussels.

Benckendorff, Count Russian Ambassador at London.

Bebchtold, Count Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs.

Berthelot, M French Political Director.

Bertie, Sib Francis British Ambassador at Paris.

Bethmann-Hollweg, Db. von German Imperial Chancellor.

Beyens, Baron Belgian Minister at Berlin.

Bienvenu-Mabtin, M French Minister of Justice and Acting Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.

BoLLATi, M Italian Ambassador at Berlin.

Bompard, M French Ambassador at Constantinople.

BOPPE, M. French Minister at Belgrade.

BoscHKOViTCH, M Serbian Minister at London.

Bbonewsky, M Russian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin.

Bryan, William J Secretary of State of the United States.

BucH, Hebr von German Minister at Luxemburg.

Buchanan, Sir George British Ambassador at Petrograd.

BiJLOw, Prince von Special German Ambassador at Rome.

Bunsen, Sib Maubice de British Ambassador at Vienna.

BuRiAN, Baron Austro-Hungarian Privy Councilor and Cham-
berlain.

BuissERET, Count de Belgian Minister at St. Petersburgh.

Cambon, M. Jules M French Ambassador at Berlin.

Cambon, M. Paul French Ambassador at London.

Carlotti di Riparbella, Marquis . Italian Ambassador at Petrograd.

Che:valley, M French Minister at Christiania.

Clary, Count Austro-Hungarian Minister at Brussels.

Cbackanthorpe, Mb British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade.

vii

viii PKINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

CuccHi BoASSO, M Italian Minister at Sofia.

CzEBNiN, Count Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires at Petro-

grad.

Davignon, M Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Delcasse, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Demidoff, M Russian Minister at Athens.

DouMEBGUE, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

DtJDZEELE, Count db Belgian Minister at Vienna.

DuMAiNE, M French Ambassador at Vienna.

Elst, Babon van deb Belgian Secretary-General to the Ministry for

Foreign Affairs.
EscAiLLE, Babon de l' Counsellor of Belgian Legation at Petrogard

and Charge d'Affaires.

i^TiENNE, M French Minister of War.

Etteb, M. de Counsellor of Russian Embassy at London.

Eybchen, M. Paul President of the Government, Minister of State,

Liixemburg.

Faixon, Babon Belgian Minister at The Hague.

Fabamond, M. de Naval Attache to French Embassy at Berlin.

Fabqes, M French Consul-General at Basle.

Fleubiau, M. de French Charge d'Affaires at London.

Flotow, Hebb von German Ambassador at Rome.

FoBGASH, Count Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs.

Fbancis Joseph Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary.

FuNAKOSHi, Babon Japanese Charge d'Affaires at Berlin.

Geobge V King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Ireland, etc., and Emperor of India.

Geobgevitch, M Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople.

Gebbabd, Me. James W American Ambassador at Berlin.

GiEBS, M. de Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

GiESL, Babon von Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

Goschen, Sib Edwabd British Ambassador at Berlin.

Geaz, Mb. des British Ambassador at Belgrade.

Gbenieb, Babon Belgian Minister at Madrid.

Gbey, Sib Edwabd British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

GunLAUME, Babon Belgian Minister at Paris.

Haldane, Viscount Lord High Chancellor of England.

Henbt Prince of Prussia.

Hoflehneb, Hebb Acting Consul for Austria-Hungary at Nish.

HoHENiiOHE, Pbincb Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, suc-
cessor to Szogyeny.

IsvoLSKT, M Russian Ambassador at Paris.

Jagow, Hebb von German Secretary of State.

Jehlitschka, Hebb Austro-Hungarian Consul-General at UskOb.

JoNNABT, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Kazanskt, M Acting Russian Consul at Prague.

Klobukowski, M French Minister at Brussels.

KouDACHEFF, Pbince Russian Minister at Antwerp. Formerly Rus-
sian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna.
M. Kboupenski Russian Ambassador to Rome.

Lahube, Babon French Consul at Brussels.

Laiaino, Count db Belgian Minister at London.

PRINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE ix

LiCHOWSKY, Pbince German Ambassador at London.

Loudon, Db. Jkhb. J Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Macchio, Babon von Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs.

Malij;t, Sib L British Ambassador at Constantinople.

Mannevilub, Count de French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin.

Mensdobff, Count Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.

Mebey, Hebb von Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome.

MiCHAiLOviTCH, M Serbian Minister at Rome.

Mohammed V Sultan of Turkey.

Maybhauseb, Hebb von Austro-Hungarian Consul at Valona.

MoNCHEUB, Babon Belgian Minister at Constantinople.

MoLLABD, M. . ._ French Minister at Luxemburg.

MoBIcz DE Tecso, P Austro-Hungarian Consul at Ancona.

MiJLLEB, Babon von Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Tokio.

Nicholas II Emperor of Russia.

Nicholson, Sib Abthub British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs.
NiQBA, Count Former Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

Paleologue, M French Ambassador at Petrograd.

Pashitch, M Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for For-
eign Affairs.

Patchou, Db. Laza Serbian Acting Prime Minister and Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Pellet, M French Minister at The Hague.

Penfield, Mb. Fbedebick C American Ambassador at Vienna.

Pichon, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PoiNCABE, M President of the Republic of France.

PouBTAiJis, Count de German Ambassador at Petrograd.

Renb^n, M Colonial Minister of Belgium.

Rodd, Sib Rennell British Ambassador at Rome.

RoNSSiN, M French Consul-General at Frankfort.

RuMBOLD, Sib Hobace British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin.

Salviati, M Russian Consul-General at Fiume.

San Giuliano, Mabquis di Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sazonoff, M Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Schebeko, M Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

SCHOEN, Babon von German Ambassador at Paris.

Sebbet, Lieutenant-Colonel Military Attache to French Embassy at Berlin.

Sevastopoulo, M Russian Charg6 d' Affaires at Paris,

SoNNiNo, Babon Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Spalaikovitch, Db. M Serbian Minister at Petrograd.

Squitti, Babon Italian Minister at Nish.

Steen de Jehay, Count Van Den. Belgian Minister at Luxemburg.

Stobck, Rittee von Counsellor of Austro-Hungarian Legation at

Belgrade.

Stbandtman, M. de Russian Charg6 d' Affaires at Belgrade.

Stuebgck, Count President of Austrian Council of State.

SucHOMLiNOFF, M Russian Minister of War.

Swebbeew, M. de Russian Ambassador at Berlin.

SzAPABY, Count Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd.

SzECSEN, Count Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris.

SzoGYENY, Count de Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin.

Thiebaut, M French Minister at Stockholm.

TiszA, Count Hungarian Premier, Austro-Hungarian Min«

ister for Foreign Affairs.

X PRINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

ToMBETB, M Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga.

TscHiBSCHKY, Hebb VOW German Ambassador at Vienna.

Vksnitch, De. MitENKO. R. Serbian Minister at Paris.

Victor Emmanuex III King of Italy.

ViLLiEBS, Sib Fbancis British Minister at Brussels,

ViviAia, M. Rene French Minister for Foreign Affairs, President

of the Coimcil.

Watson, Mb. Gbaitt Secretary of British Legation at Brussels.

Weede, Jonkheeb de Netherland Minister at Brussels.

Welle, M. de Belgian Minister at Belgrade.

Whitlock, Mb. Bband American Minister at Brussels.

William II The German Emperor.

YoVANOVrrcH, Db. M Serbian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin.

YovANOVlTCH, M. Yov. M Serbian Minister at Vienna.

Ypebsele, M. van de Belgian Minister at Bucharest.

ZiHHEBMANN, Hebb VON German Under-Secretary of State.

CONTENTS OF PART I

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. l)

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Von Storck to
Count Berchtold

Consul- General
Jehlitschka to
Count Berchtold

Count Sz^csen to
Count Berchtold

Acting Consul
Hoflehner to

Count Berchtold

Baron von Giesl to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron von Giesl

1914
Belgrade
June 29

Belgrade
June 30

UskUb
July 1

Paris
July 4

Nish
July 6

Belgrade
July 21

Vienna
July 22

Manifestations of joy in Belgrade at
the news of the assassination of the
heir apparent to the throne, Arch-
duke Francis Ferdinand

Servian police have taken no steps to
trace the threads of the crime in
Servia

Joyous demonstrations at Uskllb and
Pristina, when crime of Serajevo be-
came known

President of French Republic ex-
presses conviction that Servian Gov-
ernment would lend its assistance to
Austria-Hungary in criminal inves
tigation and prosecution of possible
accomplices in Serajevo crime. . . .

Joyous satisfaction at Nish at crime
of Serajevo

Servian policy has but one aim: de-
tachment of the Austro-Hungarian
territories inhabited by South Slavs,
and ultimate destruction of Austria-
Hungary as a Great Power. Servian
Press Campaign indulges in lies,
hatred and contempt. A further
derogation of Austria-Hungary's
position cannot be permitted ....

The Imperial and Royal Government's
note to Servia

10
11

12
14

Xll

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Ambassa-
dors at Berlin,
Rome, Paris, Lon-
don, St. Peters-
burgh, and Con
stantinople

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff

Count Mensdorff to
Count Berchtold

Count Sz^csen to
Count Berchtold

Count Sz^sen to
Count Berchtold

1914.
Vienna
July 22

Vienna
July 23

London
July 24

Paris
July 24

Communication of the note to Servian
Government, Comments upon this
note disclosing the Servian agita-
tions and machinations against the
Monarchy and explaining why the
Austro-Hungarian Government had
displayed so much forbearance in
the face of provocative attitude ....

Servian Government has taken no
steps to follow up the traces of the
Serajevo crime, which point to Bel-
grade; but, on the contrary, has en-
deavoured to efface them. The short
time-limit was essential in order to
leave no loophole for Servian sub-
terfuges, so well known to the Im-
perial and Royal Government for
many years

Communication to Sir Edward Grey
concerning the Servian note. The
latter's apprehension at the short
time-limit, and fears of reaction
upon the peace of Europe. Ex-
planation of the standpoint of the
Vienna Cabinet. Defence of our
most vital interests; complete fail-
ure of our conciliatory attitude to-
ward Servia

Communication to French Govern-
ment of note to Servia and explana-
tion of the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment's standpoint: The question
must be settled between Austria-
Hungary and Servia alone. A check
to the unrest caused by Servia's
machinations for many years past
would be to the interests of Europe
in general. The Acting French Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs has refrained
from palliating and defending Ser-
via's attitude in any way

German Ambassador is instructed to
inform French Cabinet of his Gov-
ernment's view that the matter of
the Servian differences concerns only
Austria-Hungary and Servia

CONTENTS

xiu

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Sz6csen to
Count Berchtold

Count SzftpSry to
Count Berchtold

1914.

Paris

July 24

St. Peters-
burgh
July 24

Communique in the
Russian Official
Gazette

Count Szfipfiry to
Count Berchtold

St. Peters

burgh

July 24

St. Peters-
burgh
July 24

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff

Count Berchtold to
Count Szftpfiry

Vienna
July 24

German Ambassador has carried out
his instructions. French Govern-
ment shares German view and hopes
differences will be settled directly
and amicably

Communication of note to Servia and
comments on Austro-Hungarians
standpoint. M. Sazonow's objections
In reply to his version that Austria-
Hungary wants war, it is stated that
Austria-Hungary is the most peace
loving Power in the world, but is
compelled to put an end to the men
ace to our Dynasty by Servian
bombs and to our territory by Ser
via's revolutionary machinations . . .

Russia could not remain indifferent
to a conflict between Austria-Hun-
gary and Servia

In reply to observation made by Rus-
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs that
the controversy between Austria
Hungary and Servia is not a matter
to be restricted to those countries,
and that Russia cannot remain in-
different if Austria-Hungary should
intend to " swallow " Servia, Ger-
man Ambassador says that Austria
Hungary has no such intention, but
that she could not admit interven-
tion in her differences with Servia . .

Action taken in Belgrade has not the
character of formal ultimatum, but
of a representation with time-limit

Russian Chargg d'Affaires has been
informed that Austria-Hungary does
not seek to humiliate Servia or to
acquire territory: all she wants is
preservation of status quo, as well
as condemnation and suppression of
Great-Servian agitation directed
against the integrity of the Dual
Monarchy

XIV

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Ambassa
dors in Berlin,
Rome, Paris, Lon
don, St. Peters
burgh and Con-
stantinople

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio,
Councilor Austro-
Hungarian Min-
istry of Foreign
Affairs

Count Berchtold to
Co\int Sz&pfiry

Baron von Giesl to
Count Berchtold

1914.
Vienna
July 25

Lambach
July 25

Bad Ischl
July 25

Belgrade
July 25

Semlin
July 25

Count Berchtold to
Count Szfipfiry

July 12/25

Vienna
July 25

Dossier relative to Great-Servian
propaganda and its connexion with
the Serajevo outrage

Request presented by Russian Charge
d' Affaires, that time-limit for de-
mands upon Servia be extended, can
not be acceded to

Communication and explanation of
above refusal

Administrative and military prepara
tion in Servia

General mobilisation ordered in
Servia

Rupture of diplomatic relations with
Servia in consequence of Belgrade
Government's unsatisfactory reply
to Austro-Hungarian demands . . .

Note of the Royal Servian Govern-
ment

The Imperial and Royal Government's
attitude toward Servia could not be
influenced by the possibility of a con-
flict with Russia; fundamental con
siderations of Austro-Hungarian do-
mestic policy compelled Austria
Hungary to put an end to a situa-
tion which amounted to a Russian
safe conduct enabling Servia to con
tinuously threaten the Dual IMon
archy with impunity. The Vienna
Cabinet hopes that Russia will not
interfere with the Austro-Hungarian
action in Servia, in view of the good-
will shown heretofore by Austria-
Hungary toward the Balkan States,
and in consideration of the Austro-
Hungarian Government having dis-
claimed any intention of conquest
or of infringement upon the sov-
eignty of Servia

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page,

Count Berchtold to
Count Szfipfiry

Count SzfipSry to
Count Berchtold

1914.
Vienna
July 26

St. Peters-
burgh
July 26

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff

Vienna
July 26

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Ambassa-
dors in Berlin,
Rome, London,
Paris and St.
Petersburgh

Count SzSpSry to
Count Berchtold

Vienna
July 26

St. Peters-
burgh
July 27

The demand concerning the coopera-
tion of Austro-Hungarian officials in
suppressing the subversive agitation
in Servia was due solely to practical
considerations and was not aimed at
an infringement upon Servia's sov
ereignty

German Ambassador in St. Peters-
burgh warns Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs that Russian mobil-
isation measures against Germany
would inevitably lead to war. Ger-
man Military Attache informs Rus
sian Minister of War that mobilisa-
tion against Austria-Hungary would
create a very threatening situation
Minister of War gives his word of
honour that no order whatever has
been issued for mobilisation

Instructions to call Sir Edward
Grey's attention to the fact that the
general mobilisation of Servian army
ordered three hours before Servian
note in reply was presented, proves
how little disposition there was in
Belgrade for a peaceful settlement,
and indicates the insincerity of the
Servian declaration which purports
to be conciliatory

In view of the Servian Government's
refusal to accept the Austro-Hun-
garian demands, the Vienna Cabinet
is compelled to force Servia to t
radical change in her hitherto hos
tile attitude

The Imperial and Royal Ambassador
explains to Russian Minister of For-
eign Affairs that Austria-Hungary
was far from intending an on-
slaught on the Balkan Peninsula, or
even a preventive war against Rus-
sia. The aim of our action was self-
preservation and self-defence. Aus-
tria-Hungary had no intention to
menace Russian interests or to seek
trouble with Russia. Analysis of the
Austro-Hungarian demands upon
Servia

XVI

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Count Berchtold to
Count SzApftry

Count SzSgyfiny to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Ambassa
dors in Berlin,
Rome, London,
Paris and St.
Petersburgh

Count Szogy^ny to
Count Berchtold

Baron Mttller to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
the Royal Servian
Foreign Office at
Belgrade

Count Berchtold to
Count Sz6gy6ny

1914.
Vienna
July 27

Berlin
July 27

Vienna
July 27

Berlin
July 28

Tokio
July 28

Vienna
July 28

The Imperial and Royal Government
declares that the Dual Monarchy did
not intend any territorial conquest,
provided that the war remained lo
calised between Austria-Hungary
and Servia

■Military precautions" in Russia.

Communication of the note of the
Royal Servian Government, dated
12th/25th July, 1914, and of the
Austro-Hungarian Government's
comment thereon

The British proposal to leave the set-
tlement of the Austro-Hungarian
Servian differences in the hands of
a conference to be held in London
has been refused by Germany on the
ground that the latter could not
allow her ally to be hailed before a
European Court in its controversy
with Servia

Declaration of the semi-official Japan
Times that the Japanese Govern-
ment would remain strictly neutral
in the event of a war

Declaration of War on Servia.

It has been explained to Sir Edward
Grey that Austria-Hungary does not
intend territorial conquest or the
destruction of Servian independence
but solely demands satisfaction for
the past and guarantees for the fu-
ture. The British suggestion of a
conference on our controversy with
Servia is superseded by the existing
state of war. Concentration of
British fleet

CONTENTS

xvii

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff

1914.
Vienna
July 28

Count Berchtold to
Count Szfipfiry

Vienna
July 28

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorff

Vienna
July 28

Count Berchtold to
Count Sz6gy6ny

Vienna
July 28

Instructions to explain to Sir Edward
Grey the " Greater Servian " propa-
ganda and its relation to the crime
of Serajevo; also to make it clear
that Servia's reply only apparently
meets our demands but is intended to
deceive Europe while evading any
guarantee for the future

Russian Government's desire to nego
tiate with Vienna Cabinet with a
view of modifying several of our
demands on Servia. This request
had to be denied, because these de-
mands are essential for the termina
tion of the Servian machinations
against Austria-Hungary's existence
Servia, by issuing order for general
mobilisation, has committed hostile
action. Nevertheless, the Vienna
Cabinet waited another three days
Servia has now begun hostilities on
the Hungarian border. A peaceful
adjustment of our relations with
Servia has thus been rendered im
possible

The British Ambassador has explained
to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign
Minister Sir Edward Grey's proposal
for a conference. Great Britein's
offer to mediate in conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Servia. Reply
to the Ambassador that hostilities
could no longer be prevented, since
war has broken out. A compromise
based on the Servian reply is not
feasible, in view of the traditional
Servian quibbles. Peace could not be
maintained if Great Powers placed
themselves behind Servia and guar-
anteed the latter's impunity. Servia
would thus be encouraged and peace
would soon again be endangered ....

Request to German Government to
call Russian Cabinet's attention to
the fact that the mobilisation of the
military districts of Kieff, Odessa,
Moscow and Kazan was equivalent
to a threat to Austria-Hungary, and
would therefore be met by the Dual
Monarchy and Germany with the
most extensive military counter
measures

101

103

104

XVlll

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
Count SzOgyfiny

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Ambassa
dors in St. Peters-
burgh, London,
Paris and Rome

1914.
Vienna
July 28

Vienna
July 29

Count Sz€csen to
Count Berchtold

Paris
July 29

Count Sz8gy6ny to
Count Berchtold

Berlin
July 29

Germany has submitted for the con
sideration of the Vienna Cabinet
Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that
Austria-Hungary either accept the
Servian reply as satisfactory or con
sider it a basis for negotiations
among the Cabinets

With reference to Sir Edward Grey's
suggestions, the reasons are once
more pointed out why the Servian
reply is considered unsatisfactory
and insidious. The contention that
Austria-Hungary's action against
Servia is directed against Russia
and Russian interests in the Bal-
kans, must lead to the presumption
that the anti-Austro-Hungarian
propaganda is not only Servian but
of Russian origin. At the time of
the German representations at Vi-
enna, the whole question of the
Servian reply had already been su-
perseded by the opening of hostili-
ties. The good oflBees of the British
Government with Russia in the di-
rection of the preservation of peace
among the Great Powers would be
gratefully acknowledged

German Ambassador in Paris has
been instructed to impress upon
French Government that French
military preparations would force
Germany to similar action, which
may eventually plimge both peace
loving nations into a dangerous mo
bilisation. Germany counts on
France's support for the localisation
of the conflict between Austria-Hun
gary and Servia

Germany has informed St. Peters-
burgh on July 26th, that she may
be compelled to mobilise if Russia
proceeds with her preparations. . .

CONTENTS

XIX

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Szfipfiry to
Count Berchtold

1914.
St, Peters-
burgh
July 29

Count Berchtold to
Count Szogy^ny

Vienna
July 29

Count Berchtold to
Count Szfipfiry

Vienna
July 30

The Imperial and Royal Ambassador
impressed upon M. Sazonow the fact
that the Vienna Cabinet did not in-
tend to violate any Russian inter
ests or to acquire Servian territory
or to interfere with Servia's sov-
ereignty; and was always willing to
get into touch with St. Petersburgh
with regard to Austro-Hungarian
and Russian interests. The objec-
tion that the Southern Army Corps,
now mobilised against Servia, con
stituted a threat to Russia, could
not be taken seriously. It was im
perative that the dangerous race in
warlike preparations should be
quickly stopped. The Austro-Hun
garian Ambassador gives grave
warning of the impression which
the pending extensive mobilisation
in Russia would create in Austria-
Hungary

Suggestion to German Government
that the Austro-Hungarian and Ger-
man Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh
and Paris be instructed to declare
that the continuation of Russian
mobilisation would provoke counter
measures in Germany and Austria-
Hungary, which would inevitably
lead to serious consequences. Aus
tria-Hungary would, of course, not
allow herself to be influenced in her
armed action against Servia

The Government of the Dual Mon
archy is always ready for a friendly
discussion with the St. Petersburgh
Cabinet of questions bearing directly
on Austria-Hungary's relations with
Russia

108

110

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
Count Szfipfiry

1914.
Vienna
July 30

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Ambassa
dors in London
and St. Peters-
burgh

Vienna
July 31

Count SzftpSry to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
the Imperial and
Royal Embassies,
Legations and
Consulates

Count Sz^csen to
Count Berchtold

St. Peters-
burgh
July 31

Vienna
July 31

Paris
July 31

In reply to M. Sazonow's complaint
that no exchange of views had
taken place between Count Berch
told and the Russian Ambassador,
reference has been made to the re
cent discussions in which extensive
assurances were made with regard
to the observance of Servia's terri-
torial and sovereign rights. It has
been pointed out to what extent Rus-
sian diplomacy was to blame for
Austria-Hungary's intolerable rela-
tions with Servia. Russia's mo
bilisation against Austria-Hungary
compels the Dual Monarchy to ex-
tend her own mobilisation

Russian Cabinet has requested Brit
ish Grovernment to resume its medi-
ation between Austria-Hungary and
Servia on condition that hostilities
be temporarily suspended. Sir Ed-
ward Grey has suggested the media-
tion of France, Great Britain,
Italy and Germany. The Vienna
Cabinet would be glad to consider
Sir Edward Grey's proposal, pro-
vided that military action against
Servia be meanwhile continued and
that Russia shall stop her mobilisa
tion directed against Austria-Hun-
gary

General mobilisation of Russian army
and navy

Necessity of military action in Ga^
licia, in view of Russian mobilisa
tion; the former are of a merely
defensive character

Declaration in Paris by German
Government, that Germany would
likewise mobilise, if Russian mo
bilisation should not be stopped
within twelve hours. Enquiry as to
whether France would remain neu
tral in event of Russo-German war.

CONTENTS

XXI

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count SzfipSry to
Count Berchtold

Count SzSpSry to
Count Berchtold

Count Sz6gy6ny to
Count Berchtold

Count Mensdorff to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Count Szfip^ry

Count Berchtold to
Count Mensdorflf

Count Sz^csen to
Count Berchtold

1914.
St. Peters-
burgh
July 31

St. Peters-
burgh
Aug. 1

Berlin
Aug. 2

London
Aug. 4

Vienna
Aug. 5

Vienna
Aug. 6

Paris
Aug. 8

Russia is not satisfied even with
formal declaration that Austria
Hungary would not reduce Servian
territory nor infringe upon Servian
sovereignty, and that she would not
violate Russian interests in the
Balkans or elsewhere. Russia has
ordered general mobilisation

Imperial and Royal Ambassador once
more expresses Vienna Cabinet's
willingness to negotiate with Russia
upon the broadest basis. M. Sa-
zonow expresses conviction that such
negotiations would be less promising
if conducted in St. Petersburgh than
on neutral ground in London ....

Russia has not stopped war measures
against Austria-Hungary and Ger
many; Russian troops have crossed
German border. Germany, being at
tacked, therefore considers herself
in state of war with Russia

Great Britain's ultimatum to Ger-
many. Sir Edward Grey declares
that no cause for conflict exists be-
tween Great Britain and Austria
Hungary, as long as the Dual Mon
archy is not at war with France . . .

State of war between Austria-Hun-
gary and Russia in consequence of
Russia's threatening attitude in
Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict,
and of beginning of hostilities
against Germany

Austria-Hungary will on no account
begin hostilities against Great Brit-
ain without previous formal declara
tion of war. Expects similar atti
tude from Great Britain

French Government enquires whether
information be true, that the Army
Corps of Innsbruck had been sent to
French border

114

115

116

117

118

XXll

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Count Berchtold to
Count Szficsen

Count Szficsen to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Count MensdorflF

Count Mensdorff to
Count Berchtold

The Japanese Am
bassador to Count
Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Count Clary

Prince Hohenlohe
to Count Berch-
told

Count Berchtold to
Baron MttUer

1914.
Vienna
Aug. 9

Paris
Aug. 10

Vienna
Aug. 11

London
Aug. 12

Vienna
Aug. 20

Vienna
Aug. 22

Berlin
Aug. 23

Vienna
Aug. 24

Information that an Austro-Hun-
garian Army Corps is participating
in Franco-German war pronounced
a pure invention

French Government, having received
information that an Austro-Hun-
garian Army Corps had been
brought to Germany, considers this
to be military support lent to Ger
many and therefore has instructed
the French Ambassador in Vienna
to demand his passports

Instructions to inform British Gov
ernment that reports to the effect
that an Austro-Hungarian Army
Corps had been sent to Germany,
are utterly imf ounded

France and Great Britain declare
war upon Austria-Hungary

Communication of Japan's ultimatum
to Germany on August 15, 1914. .

Instructions to inform Belgian Gov
ernment that Austria-Hungary is
forced to break off diplomatic rela
tions with the Kingdom in view of
the latter's military cooperations
with France and Great Britain
against Germany, and also in view
of the inhumane treatment of Aus-
trian and Hungarian citizens in
Belgium ; Austria-Hungary hence-
forth considers herself in state of
war with Belgium

German Government gives no answer
to Japanese ultimatum and hands
passports to Japanese Charge d'Af
faires in Berlin

In view of Japan's proceding against
German Empire, the Commander of
H.M.S. " Elisabeth " receives orders;
to take part in action at Tsingtau;
Imperial and Royal Ambassador in
Tokio recalled

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. s)

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Von M6rey to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Von M^rey to
Count Berchtold

Von M6rey to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Count Berchtold to
von M^rey

1914.
Vienna
July 20

Vienna
July 20

Rome
July 21

Vienna
July 22

Rome
July 23

Rome
July 24

Vienna
July 25

Vienna
July 26

Instructions respecting the difficulty
with Servia

Additional instructions accompanied
by a note in support of the Austro-
Hungarian interpretation of the
Triple Alliance Treaty

Reply to the foregoing instructions
giving statement of the interview
with the Italian Minister for For-
eign Affairs

Instructions stating the terms of the
Austro-Hungarian demands on Ser-
via as to time-limit for compliance.

Transmits copy of the Austro-Hun-
garian note to the Government of
Servia for communication to the
Italian Government

Further instructions respecting the
break with Servia

Report as to his interview with the
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs
concerning Servia

Same subject

Despatch concerning the interview
with the Italian Ambassador at Vi-
enna respecting the reservation of
right to claim compensation under
Article 7 of the Treaty of the Triple
Alliance under certain conditions . . .

Advises of the breaking off of diplo-
matic relations with Servia

Instructions as to interview with Ital-
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs as
to the purpose of the pressure on
Servia

127

128

131

133

140

140
141

142

143

Note. — The editor Is responsible for the table of contents to the Austro-Hungarian
Red Book (No. 2), as a table of contents was omitted from the ofiQclal English transla-
tion issued by the Austro-Hungarlan Government.

xxiii

XXIV

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Von M6rey to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Von M^rey to
Count Berchtold

Von M6rey to
Count Berchtold

Coimt Berchtold to
von M6rey

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

His Imperial and
Royal Apostolic
Majesty to His
Majesty the King
of Italy

Von M6rey to
Count Berchtold

His Majesty the
King of Italy to
His Imperial and
Royal Apostolic
Majesty

1914.
Vienna
July 26

Vienna
July 26

Rome
July 28

Vienna
July 28

Rome
July 29

Rome
July 30

Rome
July 31

Vienna
July 31

Vienna
Aug. 1

Rome
Aug. 1

Rome
Aug. 2

Transmits telegram from Count
Sz6gy6ny

Gives information with respect to the
Lybian war and its possible use as
a precedent by the Italian Govern-
ment

Advises that he has carried out in
structions

Informs of request of German Am-
bassador at Vienna that the Austro
Hungarian and Italian Governments
reach an agreement concerning Arti-
cle 7 of the Treaty of the Triple Al
liance. Advises of the submission of
the Italian Ambassador at Vienna in
the views of his Government. . . .

Transmits the views of the Italian
Government on the question of
Austro-Hungarian relations with
Servia and the attitude of Italy as
a member of the Triple Alliance . .

Same subject

Interview with the Italian Minister
at Vienna concerning the interpreta
tion of Article 7 of the Treaty of
the Triple Alliance

Same subject

Telegram from the Emperor of Aus
tria to the King of Italy concerning
the war

Advises of desire of Italian Govern
ment to remain neutral in case of
European conflict

Telegram of the King of Italy to the
Emperor of Austria concerning
Italy's attitude

CONTENTS

XXV

No.

Name.

Count Berchtold to
von Mfirey

Von M&Tey to
Count Berchtold

Von M^rey to
Count Berchtold

Von Mfirey to
Count Berchtold

Von M6rey to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Count Berchtold to
von Mfirey

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Von M^rey to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Count Ambrfizy to
Count Berchtold

Place and
Date.

1914.
Vienna
Aug. 2

Rome
Aug. 2

Rome
Aug. 3

Vienna
Aug. 4

Rome
Aug. 5

Vienna
Aug. 9

Rome
Aug. 11

Summary.

Informs of interview with Italian
Ambassador at Vienna respecting
the attitude of Italy

States that he has carried out in-
structions to inform the Italian
Government of expectation that Italy
will fulfil her obligation of the
Triple Alliance

Transmits draft of proposed reply
of Italian Government concerning
Article 7 of the Treaty of the
Triple Alliance

Encloses text of Italian declaration
of neutrality

Reports interview with Italian Min
ister for Foreign Affairs concerning
attitude of Italian Government ....

Instructs as to information con-
veyed by Italian Ambassador to
Vienna respecting adherence of Italy
to agreement concerning Albania . . .

Informs of interview with the Italian
Ambassador concerning the neutral-
ity of Italy

Advises of telegraphic communica-
tion from the Italian Chief of the
General Staff

Instructs that Austro-Hungarian
Government does not contemplate a
war against Montenegro

Informs of attitude of Italian Gov-
ernment and possibility of our en
tering war

Question of Montenegro remaining
neutral

Instructs in detail of views of his
Government respecting the interpre
tation of Article 7 of the Triple Al
liance Treaty

Report of interview with Italian For-
eign Office concerning Triple Alli-
ance

Page.

155

156

157

159

160

162

163

165

XXVI

CONTENTS

38
39

Count Berchtold to
Count Ambr6zy

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe

44 Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Place and
Date.

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

1914.
Vienna
Aug. 12

Vienna
Aug. 16

Vienna
Aug. 20

Rome
Aug. 21

Vienna
Aug. 21

Berlin
Aug. 22

Vienna
Aug. 23

Rome
Aug. 25

Vienna
Aug. 25

Rome
Aug. 27

Summary.

Advises of interview with the Italian
Ambassador concerning Italian neu
trality and its inevitable eflFect on
the Austro-Hungarian Republic. .

Refers to the concentration of Italian
troops in the Province of Udine ....

Gives views of the Italian Govern-
ment as contained in a despatch to
the Italian Ambassador at Vienna
Refers to Italian military prepara-
tions on her frontier and the reasons
therefor; to the attitude of the Ital
ian press; expresses the belief of the
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs
that mutual distrust cannot be dis-
pelled without a positive agreement
by both parties

Discusses the question of Italy re
maining neutral and explains cer
tain military preparations

Instructs that he is to endeavour to
reach an understanding with the
Italian Government and to consoli-
date the mutual relations of the two
allies. Refers to the question of the
cession of the Austro-Hungarian ter
ritory to Italy

Refers to the neutral attitude of Italy
and the question of the acquisition
of territory in the Balkans by
Austria-Hungary

Concerns the interpretation of Arti
cle 7 of the Treaty of the Triple
Alliance

Same subject

Page.

Advises of interview of the German
Ambassador of Rome with the Ital-
ian Prime Minister respecting the
neutrality of Italy

Same subject

CONTENTS

xxvu

No.

48
49
50

66
57
68

69
60
61
62
63

Name.

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe

Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe to
Count Berchtold

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Von M<5ricz to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Place and
Date.

1914.
Vienna

Aug. 28

Vienna
Aug. 28

Berlin
Sept. 5

Vienna
Sept. 6

Berlin
Sept. 8

Vienna
Sept. 9

Rome
Sept. 11

Berlin
Sept. 12

Rome
Sept, 29

Ancona
Oct. 3

Vienna
Oct. 5

Rome
Oct. 6

Vienna
Oct. 7

Rome
Oct. 8

Vienna
Oct. 9

Rome
Oct. 10

Summary.

Interpretation of Article 7 of the
Treaty of the Triple Alliance

Question of the occupation by British
and French troops of Valona

Question of the occupation of the
Island of Saseno by Italy and the
reason therefor

Same subject

Page.

Refers to telegram of King of Italy
to the Prince of Albania as to the
welfare of that country

Question of occupation of Saseno.

Refers to the question of the occupa
tion of Valona

Same subject

Alleged promise of France that Tu-
nisia should go to the Italians if
Italy joined the allies

Question of occupation of Valona by
Italy

Effect of the placing of mines in the
Adriatic by Italian interests

Occupation of Valona.

Same subject

Purposes of the Entente Powers in
respect to the Austro-Hungarian
and Italian fleets

174
175

175
176

177

178
178

179
179

180

181
181

182

XXVIU

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

64
65
66
67

68
69
70
71

76
76
77
78

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Von Mayrhauser to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Von Mayrhauser to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

1914.
Vienna
Oct. 12

Rome
Oct. 18

Rome
Oct. 19

Vienna
Oct. 22

Rome
Oct. 22

Vienna
Oct. 24

Valona
Oct. 26

Valona
Oct. 30

Vienna
Oct. 31

Valona
Nov. 1

Vienna
Dec. 12

Vienna
Dec. 13

Vienna
Dec. 21

The occupation of Albania.

Condolences on the death of the Ital
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs ....

Violation of Albania's neutrality by
Greek troops

Italian war-ships to guard neutrality
of Albania, as other powers who
have guaranteed such neutrality are
at war

Same subject

Arrival of Italian battleships at
Valona

Landing of Italian detachment of
marines on Saseno

Occupation of Saseno by Italian
troops for preservation of Albania's
neutrality

Same subject

Informs of visit of Italian Ambas-
sador in respect to military inva-
sion of Servia by Austria-Hungary
He claims breach of Article 7 of the
Triple Alliance in crossing Servian
frontier without notification to
Italian Cabinet

Same subject. Discussion continued.

Same subject

CONTENTS

XXIX

No.

79
80
81
82

83
84

87
88

91
92
93

Name.

Place and
Date.

Baron Maechio to
Count Berchtold

Von Mayrhauaer to
Count Berchtold

Von Mayrhauser to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Count Ambr6zy

Von Mayrhauser to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Maechio

Von Mayrhauser to
Count Berchtold

Baron Maechio to
Count Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Maechio

Von Mayrhauser to
I Count Berchtold

1914.

Rome

Dec. 21

Valona
Dec. 25

Vienna
Dec. 26

Valona
Dec. 26

Valona
Dec. 28

Valona
Dec. 29

1915.
Valona
Jan. 1

Vienna
Jan. 4

Valona
Jan. 5

Rome
Jan. 6

Vienna
Jan. 7

Vienna
Jan. 8

Valona
Jan. 11

Summary.

Same subject

Firing of shots by individuals at
Valona

Informs of military occupation of
Valona for protection of colonies . . .

Advises of anarchy in Albania. Also
of the landing of marines at Valona
to quiet the Italians

Report of firing of shots by five in
dividuals in streets of Valona

Telegraphic communication of the
sending of Italian squads to Kanina,
Djuverina and Arta

Informs of expected Italian interfer-
ence with civil administration at
Valona

Landing of the 10th Bersaglieri Regi
ment at Valona

Same subject

Page,

Report of German Ambassador at
Rome in regard to Italy's attitude
toward the Dual Monarchy

Advises that Albanian officials are
still at their posts in Valona, but
that Italian control of civil admin-
istration has been allotted in some
cases

Report of discussion with Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs in re
gard to question of compensation . . .

Same subject

Refers to early arrival of Italian
customs officers for organisation of
customs service

197

197
198

198
199

200

200
200
201

201

202

203
204

205
206

TTV

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

95
96

99
100

101
102

103
104

105

Baron Macchio to
Ck)unt Berchtold

Count Berchtold to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifln to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Buridn to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Von Mayrhauser to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Burifln to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

1915.

Rome

Jan. 12

Vienna
Jan. 12

Vienna
Jan. 14

Vienna
Jan. 19

Vienna
Jan. 20

Vienna
Jan. 29

Valona
Jan. 29

Valona
Feb. 1

Rome
Feb. 2

Rome
Feb. 4

Vienna
Feb. 11

Rome
Feb. 15

Informs of visit to Italian Minister
for Foreign Affairs during which he
expressed his astonishment at the
small concern of the Minister about
Albania

Transmits notes on an interview with
the Italian Ambassador respecting
question of compensation

Requests that Baron Macchio be
merely receptive during conversation
with Italian statesmen

Instructions to conduct discussions
with Austria-Hungary for clearing
relations with Germany

Transmits notes on an interview with
the Royal Italian Ambassador on
the question of compensation

Further instructions to Italian Am-
bassador regarding compensation . . .

Report that Captain of the Italian
commissariat assumed control of
the financial administration of Va-
lona

Same subject

Conversation with Italian Prime
Minister regarding relations be
tween Italy and Austria-Hungary . .

Same subject

Advises of interview with the Italian
Ambassador with respect to the set-
tlement of questions between the
two governments, especially the
Italian demand for compensation
under Article 7 of the Triple Alli-
ance. Transmits copy of personal
memorandum handed by him to Ital-
ian Ambassador covering the sub-
ject

Present session of Italian Parlia-
ment will avoid discussion of foreign
policies

206
208
210
210

211

214

215
216

216
216

217

224

CONTENTS

XXXI

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Maechio

Baron Maechio to
Baron BuriSn

Baron Maechio to
Baron Buridn

Baron BuriSn to
Baron Maechio

Baron Maechio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Burifin to
Baron Maechio

Baron BuriSn to
Baron Maechio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Maechio

Baron Maechio to
Baron BuriSn

Baron BuriSn to
Baron Maechio

Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe to
Baron BuriSn

1915.
Vienna
Feb. 15

Rome
Feb. 17

Rome
Feb. 19

Vienna
Feb. 23

Rome
Feb. 27

Vienna
Mar. 1

Vienna
Mar. 2

Vienna
Mar. 4

Rome
Mar. 6

Vienna
Mar. 9

Berlin
Mar. 10

Advises of the visit of the Italian
Ambassador with instructions from
his government to discuss mutual
claims for compensation imder Arti
cle 7

Effect in Rome of declarations of
prominent journals in Vienna in op-
position to territorial concession to
Italy

Discusses meeting of Italian Parlia-
ment and speech of Premier Sa
landra

Encloses notes of conversation with
Italian Ambassador respecting inter-
pretation of Article 7

Refers to incorrect belief in Rome
that no direct discussions have taken
place with Vienna and reasons for
this belief

Encloses notes of discussion on ques
tion of compensation with Italian
Ambassador

Instructions with respect to public
statement of nature of negotiations
between Austria-Hungary and Italy

Encloses notes on discussion of the
question of compensation with the
Italian Ambassador

States that Italian situation involves
( 1 ) termination of political diflBcul-
ties, (2) increased anxiety about
Turkish situation

Advises of statement to Italian Am-
bassador of decision of Austria-
Hungary to accept principle of ces-
sion of territory as a basis for dis-
cussions in compliance with the Ital-
ian demand respecting compensation
question

Advises of satisfaction of Baron
Sonnino with the declaration of Aus-
tria-Hungary

224

227

228

231

232

234

236

237

XXXll

CONTENTS

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron BuriSn

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Von Mayrhauser to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

1915.
Vienna
Mar. 13

Vienna
Mar. 15

Vienna
Mar. 17

Vienna
Mar. 19

Rome
Mar. 19

Vienna
Mar. 19

Rome
Mar. 20

Vienna
Mar. 21

Valona
Mar. 22

Vienna
Mar. 23

Rome
Mar. 23

Rome
Mar. 24

Summary.

Encloses notes of conversation with
the Italian Ambassador on the sub-
ject of compensation

Same subject

Refers to compensation question and
states that Italy's demand for a ter-
ritorial cession has not yet been sat-
isfied. Discusses the situation . . .

Instructs him as to closer intercourse
with Baron Sonnino on the subject
of relations with Italy

Refers to interview with Baron Son-
nino on the compensation question
and statement that Italian conten-
tions prompts demands

Refers to conversation with Italian
Ambassador in which Italian de
mand for immediate transfer of ter-
ritory to be ceded was rejected, ap-
parent misinterpretation by Baron
Sonnino

Same subject

Same subject. Guarantees that Aus
tria-Hungary will adhere to promise
of cession of territory

Italian supervision at Valona.

Advises of further discussion with
the Italian Ambassador concerning
cession of territory

Same subject

Gives statement of views of public
at Rome <x)ncerning status of nego-
tiations between Austria-Hungary
and Italy. Speaks especially of
views for intervention in the war
by Italy and what concessions
would be acceptable

Page.

237
240

242

243

244
246

245

247
247

248
249

250

CONTENTS

XXXlll

No.

130

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

131
132
133
134

135
136

137
138
139
140
141

142
143

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron BuriSn to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buridn

Baron BuriSn to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burian

Baron Buridn to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burian

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifln to
Baron Macchio

Prince Gottfried
zu Hohenlohe to
Baron Burian

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burian

1915.
Vienna
Mar. 25

Vienna
Mar. 28

Rome
Mar. 31

Rome
Apr. 1

Vienna
Apr. 2

Rome
Apr. 2

Vienna
Apr. 2

Rome
Apr. 3

Vienna
Apr. 6

Rome
Apr. 7

Vienna
Apr. 11

Berlin
Apr. 12

Rome
Apr. 14

Advises of his declaration to the
Italian Ambassador of willingness
to accept Baron Sonnino's sugges-
tion and states that he will make
him a specific proposal for purposes
of initiating further negotiations.

Same subject. States concessions
which will be made Austria-Hungary

Discussion with Baron Sonnino as to
Austria-Hungary's proposals ....

Report on Italian mobilisation and
gives summary of situation

Encloses notes on conversation with
Italian Ambassador respecting Baron
Sonnino's reply to Austria-Hungary's
proposals as to basis of agreement . .

Gives statement of state of negotia
tions with Italy as exposed by of
ficial of the Consulta

States in view of unsatisfactory atti-
tude of Baron Sonnino as to pro-
posals, desires to obtain information
concerning real aims of Italian Grov
ernment

Same subject.
Italian views

Gives statement of

Subject of eoimter-proposals of Ital-
ian Government

Same subject

Discusses attitude of Italian Govern-
ment

Advises of submission by Italian Am-
bassador of his Government's condi-
tions and stipulations in form of
eleven articles

Italy's demands unacceptable.

Gives substance of conversation of
German Ambassador at Rome with
Baron Sonnino

251
252
253
254

255
257

258

260
261

261

263
266

267

XXXIV

CONTENTS

No.

144
145
146
147
148
149

150

151
152
153

154
155
156
157

158
159

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Baron Burifln to
Baron Macchio

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buridn

Baron BuriSn to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifln to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

1915.
Vienna
Apr. 16

Vienna
Apr. 16

Vienna
Apr. 17

Home
Apr. 18

Vienna
Apr. 18

Vienna
Apr. 19

Rome
Apr. 20

Vienna
Apr. 21

Rome
Apr. 22

Vienna
Apr. 22

Rome
Apr. 26

Vienna
Apr. 27

Vienna
Apr. 28

Rome
Apr. 28

Advises of proposed reply to Italian
proposals

Alleged separate peace between Aus-
tria-Hungary and Russia

Reply handed to Italian Ambassador.

Report of discussion with Baron Son-
nino of Austro-Hungarian reply. . . .

Further instrutions as to discussion
of Austria-Hungary's reply

Advises of interview with Italian Am-
bassador concerning Austria-Hun-
gary's intentions

Reports interview with Premier Sa-
landra, discussing questions of
Trieste, Tyrol and Albania

Instructs as to question of Trieste. .

Interview with Baron Sonnino as to
receipt of Austria-Hungary's reply . .

Advises of observations of Italian
Government handed to him by Ital
ian Ambassador

Same subject

Territory reported to be desired by
Italy in Albania

Advises of Garibaldi's clandestinely
meeting the King

Instructs to find out whether Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs would
favour a conference with Count Go
luchowski

Encloses text of Austria-Hungary's
reply to Baron Sonnino's observa-
tions

Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome .

268

272
272

273
275

275

276
278

279

279
280

281
281

282

282
286

CONTENTS

XXXV

No.

160

161
162
163
164

165
166

167

168

169
170

171
172

Baron Macchio
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Buriiin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burian

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Place and
Date.

1915.

Rome

Apr. 28

Vienna
Apr. 29

Rome
Apr. 30

Rome
May 1

Vienna
May 2

Rome
May 2

Rome
May 3

Vienna
May 4

Rome
May 4

Vienna
May 5

Summary.

Interview of Sgr. Tittoni with Baron
Sonnino and audience with the King,
representing France

Visit of Count Goluchowski \o Rome.

Reports on negotiations of Entente
Powers at Rome

Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome .

Interview with Baron Sonnino con
cerning Austria-Hungary's reply to
Italian proposals

Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome

Instructs him to vigorously maintain
negotiations with Italian Govern-
ment and to go into details of each
demand. Mentions particularly the
Albanian question

Advises of meeting of Chamber of
Deputies on May 12 for the purpose
of obtaining a vote of confidence.
Suggests authentic publication of
what it is proposed to cede to Italy
might create an impression sufficient
to frustrate designs of Italian Gov
ernment

States gravity of situation and that
negotiations with Entente appear to
be ready to be closed. Advises fur-
ther attempts

Replies to preceding and states con
cessions which might be made

Encloses note of Italian Ambassador
in which Italian Government de-
clares that Treaty of Alliance is void
and without eflFect

Reports further discussion with
Baron Sonnino on different demands
of Italian Government

Reply to foregoing with statement of
furthest limits of Austro-Hun-
garian concessions

Page.

287
287

288
289

289
290

291

292

294

297

300

XXXVl

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

173 Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

Place and
Date.

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Buri&n to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Summary.

1915.
Rome
May 5

Rome
May 6

Vienna
May 9

Vienna
May 10

Rome
May 10

Vienna
May 10

Rome
May 12

Vienna
May 13

Rome
May 13

Vienna
May 14

Rome
May 14

Reports on gravity of situation at
Rome

Page.

Reports interview with Baron Son-
nino on latest concessions offered by
Austria-Hungary

Advises of the probability that CouU'
cil of Ministers will reject Austria
Hungary's report. Suggests that as
senting principle with Baron Son
nino's original demands appears to
be jnly method of averting war ....

Asserts good faith of Austria-Hun
gary in its offers and that both the
Austro-Hungarian Government and
the German Government desire to
inaugurate newer and closer rela-
tions with her

Instructs that he must prevent sua
pension of negotiations. States ex
treme limits of concessions

Encloses statement si^ed jointly
with Prince Btilow stating Austria
Hungary's concessions and Ger
many's guarantee of agreement. . . .

Replies to foregoing and instructs
him further concerning concessions.

Reviews situation at Rome.

Reply to foregoing. Agrees with de-
cision not to call on Italian Min-
ister at present

Reports meeting of Council of Min-
isters and probability of difference
of opinion having developed

Further advices as to views of Aus-
tro-Hungarian Government in reply
to assertion of procrastination on
the part of Austria-Hungary

Reports Cabinet situation at Rome in
view of resignations. Rome actu-
ally in a state of siege and one-half
of garrison on duty

302

304

306

307
308

309

310

311

CONTENTS

XXXVll

No.

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

Name.

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buri&n

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Baron Burifin to
Baron Macchio

Baron Macchio to
Baron Buriftn

Baron Macchio to
Baron Burifin

Place and
Date.

1915.

Rome

May 15

Rome
May 15

Vienna
May 16

Rome
May 16

Vienna
May 17

Rome
May 17

Vienna
May 18

Rome
May 18

Summary.

Encloses draft of proposals which
have been approved by Prince Btilow
for submission to new Italian Cab-
inet

Advises that negotiations between
Italy and the Entente Powers are
becoming known. Among them are
suggestion for incursion into Aus
tria-Hungary of Garibaldian irregu
lars or with regular troops. Plan
blocked on account of dissension in
Cabinet

Resignation of Cabinet may not be
accepted. King misled as to true
feelings of the country

Concurrence as to prompt drafting of
eventual agreement with Italy. Ap-
prove text proposed and transmit
comments and modifications

Resignation of Cabinet not to be ac-
cepted. Present foreign policy will
be continued. Attitude of the King
one of uncertainty

Instructs him to cooperate with
Prince Biilow and submit to Baron
Sonnino draft of agreement con-
tained in instructions of yesterday . .

Procrastination of Baron Sonnino in
postponing interview. Will hand
him draft of new agreement. En-
deavour to ascertain from his atti-
tude if war is imminent

Page.

Refers to Italian view to the transfer
of proposed territories to be ceded
and sets forth concession to be in-
corporated in agreement after Arti-
cle 13

The Senate and Chamber of Deputies
have been convened

Reports interview with Baron Son
nino in which he explained new draft
agreement. Sonnino expressed no
opinion

311

316
317

318

321

322

323
324

324

XXXVlll

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

195
196

197
198
199

200

201
202
203

204
205

1915.

Baron Macchio to Rome

Baron Buridn May 19

Baron Macchio to Rome

Baron Buri&n May 19

Baron Macchio to Rome

Baron BuriSn May 20

Baron Macchio to Rome

Baron Burifln May 20

Baron Burifin to Vienna

Baron Macchio May 21

Baron Burifin to Vienna
Baron Macchio May 21

Baron Macchio to Rome
Baron Burifin May 21

Baron Burifin to Vienna
Baron Macchio May 22

Baron Macchio to Rome
Baron Burifin May 23

Baron Burifin to Vienna
Baron Macchio May 23

Baron Macchio to Rome
Baron Burifin May 23

Text of concessions to be inserted as
new article communicated in writing
to Baron Sonnino and Sgr, Salandra

Situation at Rome. Review of garri-
son by King and audience with
d'Annunzio

No reply received concerning new
article

Report of the day's session in the
Chamber of Deputies

Instructs him to call to attention of
Baron Sonnino, the fact that the
Italian Government owes a reply to
last proposal

Encloses copy of reply of Austria-
Hungary to Italian Ambassador's
communication concerning cancella
tion of Treaty of the Triple Alii
ance

Attitude of public at Rome and pro-
ceedings of Chamber of Deputies
Great war manifestation

In order to avoid war, instructs him
to make final effort with Baron
Sonnino

Reports that he reminded Baron Son-
nino of absence of any reply to
later proposal. Endeavours unavail-
ing

Transmits copy of Italian declara-
tion of war handed him by Italian
Ambassador

Advises that passports have been re-
ceived. Both Embassies depart to-
morrow

325

325
326
326

329

329
332
333

333
334
335

CONTENTS

XXXIX

Appendix

No.

Name.

Count Guiccardini
to Duke of Avarna

Count Aehrenthal
to Baron Ambrozy

Von M6rey to
Count Aehrenthal

Count Aehrenthal
to von M6rey

Count Aehrenthal
to Count Szogy^ny

Count Berchtold to
von M^rey

9 Count Berchtold to
Imperial and Roy-
al Ambassadors
in Berlin, Con-
stantinople, Lon-
don, Paris, Rome
and St. Peters-
burgh

Place and
Date.

10
II
12

Count Berchtold to
von M^rey

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

Count Szogygny to
Count Berchtold

1909.

Rome

Dec. 15

1911.
Vienna
Sept. 26

Rome
Oct. 21

Vienna
Nov. 6

Vienna
Nov. 15

Vienna
Nov. 29

1912.
Vienna
Mar. 1

Vienna
Mar. 3

Summary.

Text of Article 7 of the Treaty of
the Triple Alliance

Instructions as to completing and
perfecting Article 7 of the Treaty
of the Triple Alliance. Specifies
particularly settlement of any Bal-
kan question arising

Discussion of effect of Italian action
in Tripoli on Balkans

Freedom of military operations ob-
served by Italy outside of Turkish
coasts in the Adriatic and Ionian
Seas

Annexation of Tripoli and Cyrena-
lea and its effect in the Balkans . . .

Same subject

Same subject. Question of assur-
ances from Italy that no military
operations will be undertaken in the
Dardanelles or in the adjacent
waters

Same subject

Vienna
Apr. 6

Vienna
Apr. 15

Berlin
May 21

Same subject
Same subject

Page.

335

336

337

339

339
340

341

341
342

342

344

Same subject 344

CONTENTS

No.

, Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Berchtold to
von M6rey

1912.
Vienna
May 23

14
15
16

Reports discussions with Italian Am-
bassador of the proposed Italian
operations in the Mediterranean.
States Austria-Hungary's opinion
that occupation of islands in the
^gean Sea is contrary to Article 7
of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance .

Text of Article 3 of the Treaty of
Triple Alliance

Text of Article 1 of the Treaty of
Triple Alliance

Text of Article 4 of the Treaty of
Triple Alliance

345
346
346
346

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. l)

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count E. de Dud-
zeele to M. Da-
vignon

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris, Berlin,
London, Vienna,
and St. Peters-
burgh

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at The Hague,
Rome, and Lux
emburg

M. M. de Welle to
M. Davignon

Count Clary to M,
Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count E. de Dud-
zeele to M. Da-
vignon

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Berlin, Paris,
London, Vienna,
St. Petersburgh,
Rome, The Hague,
and Luxemburg

1914.
Vienna
July 24

Brussels
July 24

Brussels
July 25

Belgrade
July 25

Brussels
July 26

Berlin
July 27

Vienna
July 28

Brussels
July 29

Forwards text of Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum to Servia

Instructions for eventual presenta
tion of a note to the respective
Governments informing them of
Belgian determination to remain
neutral in the event of a European
war

Instructions eventually to present a
note to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs in same terms as that to be
addressed to the five Powers guar-
anteeing Belgian neutrality

Forwards text of reply of Servian
Government to the Austro-Hun-
garian note

Austro-Hungarian Government con
sider the Servian reply unsatisfac-
tory and have broken oflf diplomatic
relations with Servia

British Government suggest inter
vention at Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh by Great Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy to find a basis
of compromise. Germany alone has
not yet replied

Declaration of war by Austria-Him-
gary against Servia

Belgian Government have placed
army on strengthened peace footing.
This step should not be mistaken
for mobilisation

349

356

357

358

362

363

364

xll

xlii

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Berlin, Paris,
and London

M. Davignon to
all Belgian Heads
of Missions

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Berlin, Paris,
and London

M. Davignon to
Belgian Lega-

tions at Berlin,
Paris, and Lon
don

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Berlin, Paris,
and London

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
accredited to

Guarantor Pow-

M. Davignon to
Belgian Legations
at Rome, The
Hague, and Lux
emburg

M. Eyschen to M.
Davignon

1914.
Brussels
July 31

Brussels
July 31

London
Aug. 1

Berlin
Aug. 1

Brussels
Aug. 1

Luxemburg
Aug. 2

French assurance to Belgium that no
French troops \?ill invade Belgium
even if considerable forces are
massed upon the Belgian frontiers

Belgian mobilisation ordered
from Saturday, 1st August

British Government have asked
French and German Governments
separately if each of them is pre
pared to respect Belgian neutrality,
provided it is not violated by any
other Power

Baron van der Elst has reminded
German Minister of the assurances
given by Germany to Belgium re-
garding respect of her neutrality. . .

France accepts British suggestion
that she should not violate Belgian
neutrality, provided it is respected
by Germany (see No. 11)

Germany refuses to answer British
proposal to respect Belgian neu
trality

France explains the conditions on
which she will respect Belgian neu-
trality

To carry out the instructions con-
tained in the despatch of 24th July
(see No. 2)

To carry out the instructions con-
tained in the despatch of 24th July
(see No. 3)

The President of the Luxemburg
Government protests against the
violation of the neutrality of the
Grand Duchy guaranteed by the
Treaty of London of 1867

CONTENTS

xliii

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

M. Davignon to
the Belgian Min-
isters accredited
to Guarantor

Powers

Herr von Below to
M. Davignon

Interview between
Herr von Below
and Baron van
der Elst

M. Davignon to
Herr von Below

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris, Lon
don, Vienna, Ber
lin, St. Peters
burgh, and The
Hague

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Berlin, Paris,
London, Vienna,
and St. Peters-
burgli

The King of Bel
gium to the King
of England

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

Herr von Below to
M. Davignon

Sir F. Villiers to
M. Davignon

1914.
Brussels
Aug. 2

Brussels
Aug. 2

Brussels
Aug. 3

London
Aug. 3

Brussels
Aug. 4

French Minister has published his
declaration of 1st August. Belgium
would greatly value a similar assur
ance from Germany

Presentation of German ultimatum
Germany calls upon Belgium to al
low the passage of German troops . .

Germany complains to Belgium of
the violation of her frontiers by
dirigibles, and a French patrol . .

Belgian reply to German ultimatum
Belgium cannot fail in the duties im-
posed upon her by the treaties of
1839

Informs of German action and of Bel
gian attitude

Belgium has informed France that for
the moment she does not appeal to
the guarantee of the Powers. She
will eventually decide what must be
done

Belgium makes a supreme appeal to
the British Government to safe-
guard her neutrality

Great Britain declares she will go to
war if the neutrality of Belgium is
violated ( see No. 23 )

Germany will take, if necessary by
force of arras, such steps as she
may consider necessary for her
safety in face of French menaces . . .

Great Britain expects Belgium to re-
sist to her utmost the pressure ex-
erted by Germany to make her
abandon her neutrality and that she
will appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers

371

371
373

373
375

375

376

377

xliv

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

34
35

Baron Fallon to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at London and
Paris

31 M. Davignon to
Herr von Below

Herr von Below to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Grenier

M. Davignon to
Baron Beyens

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

Coimt de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris, London,
and St. Peters
burgh

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

1914.

The Hague

Aug. 4

Brussels
Aug. 4

Berlin
Aug. 4

London
Aug. 4

Brussels
Aug. 4

London
Aug. 4

Holland informs Belgian Government
that she may perhaps be forced to
establish war buoying of the Scheldt

Violation of Belgian territory at
Gemmenich

Forwards passports to German Min-
ister

Germany leaves German interests in
Belgium in hands of the United
States of America

Belgian Government request Spanish
Government to take charge of Bel
gian interests in Germany ,

Instructions to ask for his passports

Speech of Herr von Bethmann-Holl-
weg in the Reichstag, in which the
Chancellor admitted that Germany
committed an injustice in disregard
ing the protests of the Luxemburg
and Belgian Governments

British attitude in the European dis
pute

Great Britain expects that Norway,
Holland, and Belgium will resist
German pressure and will preserve
their neutrality. In that event they
will be supported by her

Summary of the diplomatic situation.
ITo act of war having been com-
mitted before the expiration of the
ultimatum, the Cabinet decided on
3rd August, at 10 o'clock, not yet
to appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers

Great Britain has called upon Ger-
many to respect Belgian neutrality,
The ultimatum expires at midnight.

CONTENTS

xlv

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page..

41
42

45
46

47
48

60
51

M. Davignon to
British, French
and Russian Min-
isters at Brussels

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris, London,
and St. Peters-
burgh

M. Davignon to
all Heads of Bel-
gian Missions

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Baron Grenier to
M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Sir F, Villiers to
M. Davignon

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

Baron Fallon to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Grenier

1914.
Brussels
Aug. 4

London
Aug. 5

Brussels
Aug. 5

Berlin
Aug. 5

St. Sebas-
tian
Aug. 5

Paris
Aug. 5

Brussels
Aug. 5

London
Aug. 5

The Hague
Aug. 5

Brussels
Aug. 5

German troops having entered Bel-
gium, the Belgian Government ap-
peal to Great Britain, France, and
Russia to cooperate, as guarantee-
ing Powers, in the defence of Bel-
gian territory

Great Britain has declared war
against Germany

Belgium appeals to the Powers guar-
anteeing her neutrality

Summary of the diplomatic situation

In virtue of Article 10 of the Fifth
Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium,
in forcibly repelling the infringe
ment of her neutrality, commits no
hostile act

Staff of Belgian Legation in Ger-
many will leave Berlin on 6th Au
gust

Spanish Government undertake the
protection of Belgian interests in
Germany

Germany declared war on France on
3rd August at 6 p.m

Great Britain agrees to cooperate, as
a guaranteeing Power, in the de
fence of Belgian territory

British fleet will ensure free passage
of the Scheldt for the provisioning
of Antwerp

War buoying is about to be estab
lished (see No. 29 )

Belgian Government thank Spanish
Government for taking charge of
Belgian interests in Germany ....

386
387
387

388

389

390

390
390

392

392
392

393

xlvi

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M, Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris, London,
and St. PeterS'
burgh

M. de Weede to M
Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Fallon

Baron Fallon to
M. Davignon

1914.
Brussels
Aug. 5

Brussels
Aug. 6

The Hague
Aug. 6

France and Russia agree to coop-
erate with Great Britain in the de-
fence of Belgian territory

M. Davignon to Brussels
Baron Fallon Aug. 7

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris and Lou-
don

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at Paris and Lon
don

59 Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Baron Fallon
M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Baron Fallon
M. Davignon

M. Davignon
Baron Fallon

Brussels
Aug. 7

Paris
Aug. 8

The Hague
Aug. 9

Paris
Aug. 9

The Hague
Aug. 10

Brussels
Aug. 10

Communicates declaration of Nether-
lands neutrality in war between
Belgium and Germany

Regulation of commercial navigation
of the Scheldt (see No. 50)

Same subject as above

Belgian Grovernment anxious that
war should not extend to Central
Africa. Do French and British
Governments agree to Belgian pro
posal to neutralise the Congo con
ventional basin ?

Despatch explaining preceding tele-
gram

France reserves her reply respecting
Belgian proposal to neutralise
Congo conventional basin

Communication of a fresh German
proposal repeating the ultimatum
of 2nd August

French Government are inclined to
proclaim the neutrality of the
Congo conventional basin (see No.
59)

Communicates German text (contain
ing an error) of the second German
proposal and a translation of that
document (containing another er
ror )

Belgian Government have received
the fresh German proposals and will
reply shortly

CONTENTS

xlvii

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Davignon to
Baron Fallon

M. Davignon to
British, Russian,
and French Min-
isters

M. Davignon to
Belgian Ministers
at London, Paris,
and St. Peters
burgh

Mr. Whitlock to
M, Davignon

Sir F. Villiers to
M. Davignon

M. Klobukowski to
M. Davignon

Baron Fallon to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Fallon

M. Sazonof to M^
Davignon

Baron Fallon to
M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

1914.
Brussels
Aug. 10

Brussels
Aug. 10

Brussels
Aug. 11

The Hague
Aug. 12

Brussels
Aug. 12

St. Peters-
burgh
Aug. 13

The Hague
Aug. 13

Paris
Aug. 16

London
Aug. 17

To ask German Government the
meaning they attach to the word
" Auseinandersetzung "

Belgian Government communicate to
Representatives of the guaranteeing
Powers the text of the second Ger-
man note and of the reply which
they propose to return

Luxemburg authorities have asked
Belgian Minister to leave Luxem
burg. In the circumstances, Bel
gian Government have not taken a
similar step with regard to Luxem
burg Representative at Brussels ....

United States of America agree to
take charge of German interests in
Belgium

Great Britain concurs in proposed
Belgian reply to second German
ultimatum ( see JNo. 65 )

French Government likewise entirely
agree in proposed reply (see No. 65)

The German text contained an error,
The meaning is " her conflict with
France "

The new German proposal repeats the
proposal contained in the ultima
tum of 2nd August. Belgium can
only repeat the reply she gave to
that ultimatum

Russian Government congratulate
Belgian Government on their firm
and dignified attitude (see No. 65) .

Belgian reply to second German pro
posal presented on 13th August. . . .

France no longer wishes to neutralise
the Congo conventional basin (see
Nos. 57 and 58)

British Government cannot agree to
Belgian proposal to neutralise the
Congo conventional basin

404

405

407

407
408

408

409
409

410

xlviii

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Tombeur to M.
Renkin

Count Clary to M.
Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Fallon

M. Davignon to
all Heads of Bel-
gian Missions

1914.
Elizabeth-

ville
Aug. 26

The Hague
Aug. 28

Antwerp
Aug. 29

Germans attacked Belgian Congo on
22nd August

Austria-Hungary declares war against
Belgium

Belgian reply to Austro-Hungarian
declaration of war

Information respecting German al-
legations against Belgium contained
in British Parliamentary White
Paper

411

412

413

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2)
PART I

No.

Name.

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Baron Beyena to
M. Davignon

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

M. de rEscaille to
M. Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

Place and
Date.

1913.

Paris

Feb. 22

1914.
Berlin
Apr. 2

Vienna
July 22

Berlin
July 24

Vienna
July 25

Berlin
July 25

St. Peters-
burgh
July 26

Berlin
July 26

Vienna
July 26

Summary.

M. de Margerie asks if the new mill
tary law is not caused by fear of
violation of Belgian neutrality by
France

M. de Jagow wishes to conclude with
France and England an agreement
relative to the expenses of Belgian
Congo

Vienna seems more belligerent than
Budapest

The violence of the Austro-Hun
garian ultimatum passes all con-
jecture; it will revive the sympa
thies of Europe for Serbia

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum is
calculated in the end to render war
with Serbia inevitable

Germany approves the dimarche of
the Austro-Hungarian Government
at Belgrade

Russia will not permit Austria-Hun-
gary to crush Serbia, to whom
counsel of moderation has been sent.

Germany and Austria-Hungary wish,
besides annihilating Serbia, to de
liver a mortal blow to Russia and
France

War between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia is imminent. If all the
Powers wish peace sincerely, they
should be able to arrive at a com-
promise. The attitude of Austria-
Hungary, upheld by Germany, per-
mits of but faint hope

Page.

419

420

422

424
425
426
428

428

431

Note. — The editor Is responsible for the translation of the table of contents to
the Belgian Orey Book {No. 2), as a table of contents was omitted from the official
English publication.

xlix

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Count Errembault
de Dudzeele

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon
Baron Beyens

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

Count de Buisseret
to M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

1914.
Berlin
July 27

Brussels
July 27

Berlin
July 28

Brussels
July 28

Berlin
July 28

Vienna
July 30

St. Peters-
burgh
July 31

Paris
July 31

Vienna
July 31

Berlin
Aug. 1

Paris
Aug. 2

Opinion of M. Zimmermann upon the
situation

Please telegraph where mobilisation
has taken place

According to the Ambassador of
Italy, the German and Austro-
Hungarian Governments are per
suaded that Russia is unable to pre
vent the execution of Serbia

Please telegraph if any measures
have been taken in view of mobilisa-
tion

The warning given by Sir E. Grey to
Prince Lichnowsky should, by dis
sipating an illusion, have weight
with the German Government ....

Rupture seems imminent, but after
a friendly interview between M
Sch4b6ko and Count Berchtold
there is a basis for the renewal of
parleys

Same subject

Germany refuses to exert any influ-
ence over Austria-Hungary and the
latter refuses discussion with Rus-
sia. The attitude of Germany makes
unavailing the efforts of M. Sazonow

At Paris the situation is very un-
settled

The situation is very hopeless by
reason of the mobilisation of Aus-
tria-Hungary and the ultimatum ad-
dressed by Germany to Russia

The order for mobilisation has been
given. Germany seeks to burden
Russia with the responsibility for
the war

France is alarmed at the military
measures which Germany has taken
against her

432
434

434

436

438
439

440
441

442

443
444

CONTENTS

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

22
23

29
30
31
32
33

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Count Errembault
de Dudzeele

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to
M. Davignon

M, Davignon to
the Legations at
London, Paris
and St. Peters-
burgh

1914.
Berlin
Aug, 2

Vienna
Aug. 2

Berlin
Aug. 4

London
Aug. 5

Paris
Aug. 6

London

Aug. 7

Paris
Aug. 8

Paris
Aug. 10

Brussels
Aug. 12

Vienna
Aug. 18

Antwerp
Aug. 21

There Is talk in Berlin of the inva-
sion of Luxemburg

Count Berchtold is astonished at
Dutch mobilisation

General war seems inevitable. The
attitude of England is anxiously
watched

Belgium can make no response to
Germany's ultimatum except such
as she has unhesitatingly made ....

The support of the English expedi-
tionary corps is not yet certain. . . .

The splendid resistance of the Bel-
gians will facilitate the task of the
English Cabinet with regard to
public opinion

The Belgian Grovemment asks the
French Government to hasten the
sending of military forces to Bel
gium

The heroic example of Belgium has
decided the English people to make
war against Germany

M. Poincar6 has conferred upon the
town of Li6ge the Cross of the
Legion of Honour

Rupture in the diplomatic rela-
tions between Austria-Hungary and
France

The military governor of Antwerp
has the right to expel the subjects
of Austria-Hungary

The Austro-Hungarian consul at Ant-
werp complains of having been dis-
missed under disagreeable circum-
stances

England will give its diplomatic sup
port to Belgium after the war and
will endeavour to assure to her
compensation for the suffering en
dured

445
446

446

448
449

450

451
451
453
454
454

455
455

CONTENTS

M. Davignon to
Count Errembault
de Dudzeele

Prince Koudacheff
to M. Davignon

Count de Lalaing
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Prince Koudacheff

M. Davignon to
the Legations at
London, Paris
and St. Peters-
burgh

M. Davignon to
Baron Grenier

Co\mt F. van den
Steen de Jehay to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
all the Heads of
Belgian Missions
abroad

Baron Moncheur
to M. Davignon

His Majesty the
King to the Presi-
dent of the French
Republic

His Majesty the
King to His Maj
esty the King of
England

His Majesty the
King to His Maj-
esty the Emperor
of Russia

Place and
Date.

1914.
Antwerp
Aug. 22

Antwerp
Aug. 27

London
Aug. 28

Antwerp
Aug. 29

Antwerp
Aug. 30

Antwerp
Sept. 4

Constanti-
nople
Sept. 7

Antwerp
Sept 13

Summary.

All measures have been taken to pre-
vent any Austro-Hungarian subject
from being molested

Belgium may count upon the diplo
matic support of Russia at the end
of the war

English homage to the heroic resist-
ance of the Belgian army and people

Acknowledges receipt of communica-
tion of August 27 ( see No. 36 )

Instructions given to the Belgian
troops of the Congo

The Belgian Government protests
against the accusations of the Vi-
ennese press relative to the cruelty
to which German and Austrian sub
jects have been victims

Supplementary report upon the de-
parture from Luxemburg of the
Minister of the King to the Grand
Ducal Court

Note of the Antwerp court on the
subject of anti-German manifesta-
tions which occurred on August 4
and 5

The Germans are doing all in their
power to excite the Turks to war
against the Triple Entente

Congratulations upon the great vic-
tory achieved by the French army. .

Congratulations upon the superb con-
duct of the English troops in the
battle of the Marne

Congratulations upon the victory
achieved by the Russian army

Page.

CONTENTS

liii

The President of
the French Re
public to His
Majesty the King

His Majesty the
King of England
to His Majesty
the King

His Majesty the
Emperor of Rus
sia to His Maj
esty the King

Count Errembault
de Dudzeele to M.
Davignon

Baron Beyens to
M. Davignon

Baron Moncheur
to M. Davignon

Telegram of Mr.
Bryan to Mr.
Brand Whitlock
communicated by
the American Con
sulate at Ant-
werp

Baron Grenier to
M. Davignon

Baron Guillaume
to M. Davignon

Place and
Date.

1914.
Bordeaux
Sept. 14

London
Sept. 14

Tsarskoy-

Selo
Sept. 14

Berne
Sept. 16

Hove

( Sussex )
Sept. 21

Hove

(Sussex)
Sept. 22

Constanti-
nople
Sept. 22

Brussels
Sept. 25

Madrid
Sept. 30

Bordeaux
Oct. 11

Summary.

Appreciation of congratulations.

The same

Report upon the departure from
Vienna of the Minister of the King
at the Imperial and Royal Court. . .

August 4th M. de Jagow acknowl-
edged that Germany had nothing
with which to reproach Belgium and
that he understands the reply of the
Belgium Government

M. Zimmermann says that the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs was
powerless to prevent the invasion of
Belgium, all power belonging to the
military authority after mobilisa-
tion. Return to Belgium of the
Legation at Germany

Turkey is an instrument of war at
the disposal of Germany

The German Government, on August
22, addressed to the Ambassador of
the United States a note relative to
the neutralisation of the conven
tional free-trade zone of the Congo,
a neutralisation which Germany is
disposed to accept

Protest of the Belgian Government
against the accusation relative to
the ill-treatment of Austro-Hun-
garian subjects has been delivered
to the Government of His Catholic
Majesty (see No. 40)

Transfer of the Belgian Government
to Havre

Page.

469

470

472

475
479

480

481
481

liv

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

His Majesty the
King to the Presi-
dent of the French
Republic

M. Davignon to
Baron Grenier

Baron Moncheur
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Moncheur

M. Davignon to
M. van Ypersele
de Strihou

Jonkheer de Weede
to M. Davignon

M. Davignon to all
Heads of Belgian
Missions abroad

Baron Moncheur
to M. Davignon

Mr. Brand
lock to M.
gnon

Whit-
Davi-

M. Davignon to
Mr. Brand Whit-
lock

1914.
Ostend
Oct. 12

Havre
Oct. 21

Constanti-
nople
Oct. 23

Constanti-
nople
Oct. 31

Havre
Nov. 1

Havre
Nov. 6

Havre
Nov. 7

Havre
Nov. 9

Melin
Nov. 16

Brussels
Nov. 16

Havre
Dec. 5

Appreciation for the hospitaliiy of-
fered by France

By attacking the Belgian port of Lu-
kuga the German Government has
taken against Belgium the initiative
with regard to hostilities in Africa
(see No. 54)

Turkey pushes forward its prepara-
tions for war

The Representatives of the Powers
of the Triple Entente leave Con
stantinople

Is it not well to advise Belgians to
go to the coast towns of Turkey?. . .

Transmit to your colleague at Con
stantinople the order to demand his
passports

The Minister of the Netherlands has
taken charge of Ottoman interests in
Belgium

Reasons for the rupture in the diplo-
matic relations between Belgium and
Turkey

Report upon the departure from
Constantinople of the Legation of
the King

Transmits the German note of Au
gust 22 relative to the neutralisation
of the conventional free-trade zone
of the Congo (see No. 54)

The Belgian Government has already
responded to the German note (see
No. 58)

483

484

484
487

487

488

489

490
491

CONTENTS

PART II
X.

GEBMANY accuses BELOroM OP HAVING CONCLUDED A MiLITAEY UNDERSTANDING

WITH England.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Davignon to
the Foreign Lega-
tions of the King

1914.
Havre
Oct. 19

Havre
Dec. 4

Havre
Dec. 15

1915.
Havre
Jan. 13

Havre
Feb. 13

Havre
Mar. 4

Reply to the note of the Hiord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Oc-
tober 13

492

Reply to the note of the Nord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of No-
vember 25

495

100

Despatch of Sir E. Grey to Count de
Lalaing of April 7, 1913, on the
subject of the apprehension caused
in Belgium by the rumours relative
to a future violation of Belgian
neutrality by England

498

101
102

103

The Gazette de VAllemagne du Nord
has falsified the Ducarne document.

Sir E. Grey replies to the explana-
tions given by M. von Bethmann-
Hollweg on the subject of the pre-
tended Anglo-Belgian conventions . .

New protest of the Belgian Govern-
ment against the affirmation that
Belgium had, in 1906, abandoned its
neutrality by the conclusion of a
treaty with England

500
503
507

XI.

austbia-hungabt sent batteries of cannon into belgium before the
Declaration of Wab.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

104

M. Davignon to
Baron Fallon

1914.
Havre
Oct. 20

When replying to the declaration of
war of August 28, the Government
of the King was ignorant of the
sending of Austrian heavy artillery
against the forts of Namur

511

Ivi

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

105

Baron Grenier to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
Baron Grenier

1915.
Madrid
Apr. 5

Havre
Apr. 20

In addressing the declaration of war
to Belgium, the Imperial and Royal
Government was ignorant, likewise,
that the Belgian Government had
had pourparlers with the object of
Belgian military coSperation with
Great Britain and France

512

106

Reply to the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment

614

XVI.

No Fbench oe English Troops entered Belgium before August 5.

No.

116

117

118

119

M. Davignon to
the Foreign Lega
tions of the King

M. Davignon to
M. Klobukowski

M. Klobukowski to
M. Davignon

M. Davignon to
the Foreign Lega
tions of the King

Place and
Date.

Havre
Jan. 28

Havre
Feb. 6

Havre
Mar. 13

Havre
Apr. 10

Summary.

Denial of the affirmation of the Nord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung

The French Government will doubt-
less be able to truthfully deny the
disembarkation of French troops at
Erquelinnes, July 24

Denial of the French Government.

The plan of concentration of France
shows that the latter had no inten-
tion of violating Belgian neutrality.

Page.

517

519
520

527

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK
WARNINGS

No.

Name.

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Jonnart

M. ^tienne to M.
Jonnart

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Stephen
Pichon

Place and
Date.

1913.

Berlin

Mar. 17

Paris
Apr. 2

Berlin
May 6

Summary.

Transmission of reports of the mili-
tary attache and of the naval at-
tache at Berlin on the new military
law. EfTorts of the German Gov-
ernment to represent this law as a
reply to the French project of a
three years' law and to foster a
warlike spirit in the people

Enclosure I. — Report of Lieut
Col. Serret. German armaments are
intended to place France in a defi
nitely inferior position. Anger
aroused in ofBcial circles by French
precautionary measures

Enclosure II. — Report of M. de
Faramond. The proposed military
law is intended to make easy a
crushing offensive against France
Confidence of Germans in the su-
periority of their army. Financial
measures intended to cover military
expenditure

Despatch of a German oflBcial secret
report on the strengthening of the

army

Enclosure. — Text of the report.
Retrospective survey of the succes
sive armaments caused by the Al
geciras Conference, the Agadir in
cident, and the Balkan war. Neces
sity of making a new effort, of ac-
customing public opinion to the idea
of war, of stirring up trouble in
French or English colonies, and of
considering the invasion of Belgium
and Holland

End of Balkan crisis. It nearly
brought Germany to a war of ag-
gression against France and caused
preparations for mobilisation

Ivii

Page.

531

540

544

Iviii

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

M. Alliz6 to M.
Stephen Pichon

Memorandum to M,
Stephen Pichon

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Stephen
Pichon

M. Dumaine to M,
Ren6 Viviani

M. Dumaine to M.
Ren6 Viviani

M. de Manneville
to M. Ren6 Vi

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. d'Apchier to M,
Ren6 Vivian!

M. Dumaine to M.
Ren6 Viviani

M. Dumaine to M,
Ren6 Viviani

Consular Report
from Vienna

1913.
Munich
July 10

Paris
July 30

Summary.

Berlin
Nov. 22

1914.
Vienna
June 28

Vienna
July 2

Berlin
July 4

St. Peters-
burgh
July 6

Budapest
July 11

Vienna
July 15

Vienna
July 19

Vienna
July 20

Page.

Bavarian opinion considers the new
armaments as intended to provoke a
war in which it sees the only possi-
ble solution for internal difficulties.

Prevailing ideas in German opinion;
desire for revenge for Agadir, fear of
revival of a strong France. Power-
lessness of peace party. Formation,
composition, and growing develop-
ment of a war party, encouraged in
its ambitions by the presumed weak-
ness of the Triple Entente

Conversation of King of the Belgians
with the Emperor, who has ceased
to be pacific, gives in to the bellicose
circle of which his son is the centre,
and accustoms himself to the pros-
pect of a near conflict with France . .

News of assassination of Archduke
Francis-Ferdinand at Serajevo

Exploitation of that event by the
Austrian military party

Pretended confidence of German Gov-
ernment in a friendly arrangement
of Austro-Servian diflFerences

M. Sazonof warned Austrian Ambas
sador that Russian Government
could not accept assassination of
Archduke as pretext for action on
Servian territory

Forced official optimism, contrasted
with serious military preparations
in Hungary

Official Austrian newspapers advocate
a war to the finish against Pan-
Servism, Russia and France appear
ing to them incapable of intervening

Forwards a Consular report.

Austrian political circles appear de
termined on a war of aggression
against Servia, and military circles
consider possibility of a European
conflict

547

647

554
556
567

557

658
658

659
660

661

CONTENTS

lix

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
London, St. Pe-
tersburgh, Vi-
enna, Rome

M. Dumaine to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
London, Berlin,
St. Petersburgh,
Rome

M. Alliz6 to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin

1914.

Berlin

July 21

Paris
July 21

Paris
July 22

Vienna
July 22

London
July 22

Paris
July 23

Munich
July 23

Reval
July 24

German Government, who have al-
ready issued " preliminary mobilisa-
tion notices," state categorically
that they have no knowledge of
tenour of note which Austria intends
sending to Servia

Germany will strongly support Aus-
trian action, without attempting to
act as mediator

French Government orders French,
Ambassador to give friendly counsel
for moderation to Vienna

Conciliatory attitude of Russia and
Servia. Reassuring indications fur
nished to foreign diplomatists. Vio-
lent language of German Ambas-
sador

Grave anxiety of Sir Edward Grey
after a conversation with German
Ambassador. Counsels of prudence
and moderation given to Austro
Hungarian Ambassador

Forthcoming presentation of Austrian
note to Servia. Contradictory im
pressions of diplomatists as to its
contents and scope. Calming assur
ances given by Vienna

Pessimism of Bavarian official circles,
particularly of President of the
Council, who had knowledge of Aus
trian note to Servia

In agreement with M. Sazonof, M.
Viviani requests M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin. Acting Minister for Foreign Af
fairs, to give instructions that from
Paris and London counsels of mod
eration shall be addressed to Count
Berchtold, the delivery of the Aus-
trian note the evening before being
still unknown

562

663

664

665

666

667

668

CONTENTS

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. Ren6
Viviani

Austrian Note

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. Rend
Viviani

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. Thie-
baut

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
Stockholm ( for
the President of
the Council), Bel-
grade, London, St.
Petersburgh, Ber-
lin, Rome

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
Stockholm ( for
the President of
the Council), Bel-
grade, London, St.
Petersburgh, Ber-
lin, Vienna, Rome

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

Place and
Date.

1914.

Paris

July 24

Vienna
July 24

Paris
July 24

Berlin
July 24

Summary.

Instructions sent in this sense to
Vienna, where they did not arrive
till after delivery of note to Bel-
grade

Text of Austrian note to Servia, com-
municated on the morning of 24
July by Count Sc^zsen to M. Bien-
venu-Martin

Analysis of note. Count Sc^zsen was
warned, when he brought it, of the
painful impression which must be
produced, particularly under present
conditions, by the extension of Aus
trian demands, as also by the short
ness of the time-limit for Servia's
reply

Advice given by French Government
to Servian Government to accept
Austria's demands so far as may be
possible, and to propose to submit
the question to the arbitration of
Europe

Information given to our Ambassa-
dors as to bellicose inclinations of
the Austrian military party, as to
difficulty for Servia to accept whole
of Austrian demands, and as to
threatening tone of German press. .

D-marche taken by Herr von Schoen
at the Quai d'Orsay to support, in
the name of his Government, the
d-marche of Austria-Hungary, ap-
proving its note, and making appar-
ent the " incalculable consequences "
which, by reason of the natural play
of the alliances, would result from
any attempt at interference by a
third Power in the Austro-Servian
conflict

Austrophil and chauvinist manifesta-
tions at Berlin; pessimism of diplo-
matic circles

CONTENTS

Ixi

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Bienvenu
Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
Stockholm ( for
the President of
the Council), Bel
grade, St. Peters
burgh, Berlin, Vi-
enna, Home

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu
Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
Stockholm ( for
the President of
the Council), and
to London, Ber-
lin, St. Peters-
burgh, Vienna

1914.

Berlin

July 24

St. Peters-
burgh
July 24

London
July 24

Paris
July 24

Berlin
July 25

Paris
July 25

Herr von Jagow states approval of
Austrian note, but denies absolutely
previous knowledge of contents. He
hopes Servia will be advised by her
friends to give in. The official press
is equally in agreement with Austria

Peaceable tendency of Russian Gov-
ernment, in spite of deep impression
made on public by presentation of
Austrian note

Sir E. Grey explains to M. Paul
Cambon his plan of mediation by
four Powers. Pessimism of Count
Benckendorff on subject of Ger
many's intentions

Semi-official intervention by Germany
at Vienna appears to M. Paul Cam
bon the best means of arresting the
conflict

Sir E. Grey wishes to propose to Ger
many that they should act together
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, in
order that Austro-Servian conflict
should be submitted to mediation by
four Powers not interested in ques
tion. Counsel of prudence given to
Servian Minister at Paris

Belgian Minister at Berlin sees in
the course crisis is taking the execu-
tion of warlike intention premedi-
tated by Germany

Summary of situation. At Paris,
Herr von Schoen comes to the Quai
d'Orsay to deny menacing character
of his action of previous evening.
At London the Austrian Ambassador
states that Austrian note is not in
the nature of an ultimatum. Sir
E. Grey advises prudence at Bel
grade and explains to German Am
bassador his plan of mediation by
four Powers

582

584

585

586

587

588

Ixii

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Palfiologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. Du-
maine

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Barr6re to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Dumaine to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

1914.
London
July 25

St. Peters-
burgh
July 25

Paris
July 25

London
July 25

Berlin
July 25

Rome
July 25

Vienna
July 25

German Government refusing to in-
tervene between Vienna and Bel-
grade, Sir E. Grey draws Prince
Lichnowsky's attention to fact that
this attitude will help to bring on
a general conflict in which England
could not remain inactive

Conciliatory eiTorts of M. Sazonof ; he
requests Vienna to extend the time-
limit allowed Servia for her reply. .

French Government support this re-
quest for delay

English Government also associate
themselves with this request

Herr von Jagow again states cate
gorically that he had no knowledge
of Austrian note before its presenta-
tion. He gives evasive answer to re-
quest of English Charg6 d'Affaires
that he would intervene at Vienna
in order to prevent a conflict and to
prolong period of ultimatum

Russian Charg6 d'Aflfaires also pre-
sents this last request to Berlin. He
insists on the urgency of a reply,
which Herr von Jagow tries to post-
pone

On further pressing action by Rus-
sian Charg6 d'Affaires, Herr von
Jagow states that he considers
Austro-Servian differences as a
purely local affair, which should be
confined to Austria and Servia, and
which does not appear to him likely
to lead to International difficulties . .

Russian Ambassador at Rome re-
quests Italian Government to inter-
vene on behalf of extension of time-
limit of ultimatum

Austrian Government evade request
for extension of time-limit presented
at Vienna by Russian Charge d'Af-
faires

CONTENTS

Ixiii

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Boppe to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Dumaine to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

Servian Note

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the Presi
dent of the Coun
cil {on board the
"La France")
and to the French
Ambassadors at
London, St. Pe
tersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome

M. Barrfire to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Barrfere to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. de Fleu
riau

M. Palgologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Dumaine to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

1914.
Belgrade
July 25

Berlin
July 25

Vienna
July 25

Belgrade
July 25

Paris
July 26

Rome
July 26

Paris
July 26

St. Peters-
burgh
July 26

Vienna
July 26

Summary of Servian reply to Aus-
trian note

News of departure of Austrian Min-
ister from Belgrade evokes demon-
strations of chauvinism at Berlin
Financiers believe there will be war

French Ambassador at Vienna, on ac
count of delay of telegram sent him
from Paris, does not receive his in-
structions in time to associate him
self with action of his Russian col
league

Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hun-
garian note

Summary of situation on evening of
25th, as resulting from Austria-Hun
gary's uncompromising attitude.
Impressions made in the different
capitals, and attempts to prevent
aggravation of conflict which would
result from military measures taken
by Austro-Hungarian Government
against Servia. Sir E. Grey still
hopes to prevent a conflict by the
intervention of four disinterested
Powers

Italy will participate in eff'orts to
maintain peace, but wishes to remain
outside conflict if it comes

Russia still hopes for peaceful solu
tion; Italian opinion hostile to
Austria

French Government support Servia's
request for mediation, addressed to
English Government by Russia's
advice

M. Sazonof, still imbued with the
same spirit of conciliation, proposes
a direct conversation between Vienna
and St. Petersburgh on modifications
to be introduced in ultimatum to
make it acceptable

Russian Ambassador, on return to
Vienna, proposes to present there
fresh proposals for a settlement ....

595

596

697
597

602

604

605

606

Ixiv

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

56
67

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the Presi-
dent of the Coun-
cil (on board the
"La France")
and to the French
Ambassadors at
London, St. Pe-
tersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome

Note for the Min-
ister

M. Chevalley to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. d'Annoville to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Farges to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. Jules
Cambon and to
the French Am-
bassadors at Lon-
don, St. Peters-
burgh, Vienna,
Rome

1914.

Paris

July 26

Paris
July 26

Christiania
July 26

Luxemburg
July 26

Basle
July 27

Paris
July 27

D-marche by Herr von Schoen at the
Quai d'Orsay that France should in-
tervene with Germany at St. Peters-
burgh only, in order to give counsels
of peace. His refusal to reply, in
default of instructions, to the re-
quest for mediation by four Powers
at St. Petersburgh and Vienna

Further visit of German Ambassador
to confirm and strengthen the pacific
intentions of his previous d-marche.
He refuses to give an opinion as to
the advisability of Germany recom-
mending moderation at Vienna, and
persists in trying to bind the French
Government in a common action of
"pacific solidarity" at St. Peters-
burgh only, on whom, according to
him, peace depends

607
609

Order to German fleet to return to
Germany from Norway

611

First preparations for mobilisation
at Thionville

611

First preparations for mobilisation in
Grand Duchy of Baden

612

Summary of three successive d4-
marches made by Herr von Schoen.
The situation becomes more serious,
Austria refusing both to content her-
self with Servian concessions and to
enter into conversation on the sub-
ject with the Powers. New English
proposal to endeavour to find, at
Berlin, Paris, Rome, and London,
means of avoiding a crisis, Russia
and Austria, the Powers directly in-
terested, remaining apart

612

CONTENTS

Ixv

No.

M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin to the Presi
dent of the Coun
cil (on board the
"La France")
and to the French
Ambassadors at
London, St. Pe
tersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Bompard to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. de Fleu
riau

Place and
Date.

1914.

Paris

July 27

London
July 27

St. Peters-
burgh
July 27

Constanti-
nople
July 27

London
July 27

Berlin
July 27

London
July 27

Paris
July 27

Summary.

Further d-marche of Herr von Schoen
at the Quai d'Orsay, with the object
of compromising France in regard to
Russia, while gaining time to facili-
tate military action by Austria in
Servia, which Germany does nothiiig
to delay ,

The German and Austrian Ambas
sadors make it known that they are
sure of England's neutrality, in spite
of language used by Sir A. Nicol
son to Prince Lichnowsky

Conciliatory attitude of M. Sazonof .

It is considered at Constantinople
that Austro-Servian dispute will re-
main localised, and that Russia will
not intervene on behalf of Servia.

Great Britain stops demobilisation of
her fleet, and warns Germany that
an Austrian invasion of Servia may
cause European war

Herr von Jagow gives vague pacific
assurances, and states, in reply to
a question, that Germany would not
mobilise if Russia mobilised only on
the Austrian frontier. The Secre
tary of State shows lively anxiety.

Sir E. Grey suggests that the French,
German, and Italian Ambassadors at
London should examine, in concert
with him, the means of solving the
present difficulties

Servia has not asked for English
mediation; the plan of mediation by
four Powers advocated by England
must therefore be adhered to

French Grovernment accepts English
position, that a sincerely moderat-
ing action by Germany at Vienna
could aloie bring matters to a close

Page.

614

616
616

617

618

619

Ixvi

CONTENTS

No.

75
(2)

M. de Fleuriau to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Barrfere to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bieiivenu-
Martin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
London, St. Pe
tersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome

Communique of
the Press Bureau

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to M. Ren6
Viviani

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to French Am-
bassadors at Lon-
don, Berlin, St.
Petersburgh, Vi-
enna, Rome

Place and
Date.

1914.
London
July 27

Rome
July 27

Berlin
July 27

Berlin
Ju> 27

Paris
July 27

Vienna
July 28

On board
the "La
France "
July 28

Paris
July 28

Paris
July 28 I

Summary.

Italian Government also accepts medi
ation by four Powers

The Marquis di San Giuliano states
that he had no previous knowledge
of Austrian note, and adheres, with
out hesitation, to Sir E. Grey's pro-
posal

Herr von Jagow dismisses the plan
of a conference of the Powers, while
proclaiming his desire for a peace
ful settlement

He evades fresh pressure from M.
Jules Cambon. Opportunity of re-
newing the English suggestion in a
different form in order to drive Ger-
many into a corner

CQunt Sc^zsen hands to the Quai
(iK)r8ay a memorandum from his
Government justifying the coercive
measures against Servia which he
states are imminent. Text of this
memorandum

Semi-official communique of the Vi-
enna Press Bureau on the subject of
the Servian reply, which is repre-
sented as insufficient

Ackn«>wledgment of receipt of com-
munications received from M. Bien-
venu-Martin and approval of replies
he made both to Herr von Schoen
an<l to Sir E. Grey's proposal

Summary of the situation: Germany's
refusal to intervene at Vienna, ob-
iection raised by her to English pro-
posal, postponement of Austrian
memorandum. Dangers of the sit-
uation

Visit of Herr von Schoen to the Quai
d'Orsay. He protests again his
pacific sentiments, but always evades
investigation as to practical means
of preventing a conflict

Page.

CONTENTS

Ixvii

No.

Place and
Date.

M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin to M. Du-
maine

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Dumaine to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Barrfere to M
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
St. Petersburgh,
London, Berlin,
Rome, Vienna,
Const antinople,
Belgrade

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

1914.

Paris

July 28

London
July 28

Berlin
July 28

St. Peters-
burgh
July 28

Vienna
July 28

Rome
July 29

Paris
July 29

Summary.

Recommendation to M. Dumaine to
keep in touch with his English col
league for the purpose of presenting
the English proposal for mediation
to Vienna

German Ambassador at London in
sists, as does Herr von Schoen at
Paris, on the expediency of moderat-
ing action by England at St. Peters-
burgh alone. On the other hand, M.
Sazonof has accepted the English
proposal of mediation, but he would
like it to be preceded by direct con-
versation with Vienna, from which
he expects good results

Herr von Jagow continues to show
hostility to the conference proposed
by Sir E. Grey, and rests his dilatory
attitude on the news of Russian ef-
forts for a direct understanding be-
tween Vienna and St. Petersburgh . .

M. Sazonof is obliged to state that
Austria evades his proposal for a
direct understanding

Austrian declaration of war on Servia
renders useless all attempts at con-
ciliation, according to Count Berch-
told, who thus breaks off all discus-
sion with St. Petersburgh

The Consulta considers that Austria's
declaration of war should not pre-
vent the continuance of diplomatic
efforts for the meeting of a confer-
ence at London

St. Peters-
burgh
July 29

Germany appears to renounce hope of
Franco-English pressure on Russia
alone, but continues to refuse to act
at Vienna. It therefore appears in-
dispensable that Russia should join
definitely and at once in the English
proposal for mediation by four
Powers, in order that it should be
accepted by Berlin before Austria's
military measures should have defi-
nitely compromised peace

Russian Government gives complete
adherence to this proposal

Page,

641

643

644

645

646

647

Ixviii

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Klobukowski to
M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin

M. Ronssin to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Alliz6 to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Dumaine to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Bienvenu
Martin

M. Dumaine to M,
Bienvenu-Martin

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
London, Berlin,
St. Petersburgh,
Rome, Vienna,
Con s tantinople,
Belgrade

M. Bienvenu-Mar-
tin to the French
Ambassadors at
London, Berlin,
St. Petersburgh,
Rome, Vienna,
Const antinople,
Belgrade

M. Barrftre to M.
Bienvenu-Martin

1914.
Brussels
July 29

Frankfort
July 29

Munich
July 29

Vienna
July 29

St. Peters-
burgh
July 29

Berlin
July 29

Vienna
July 29

Paris
July 29

Rome
July 29

Anxiety caused at Brussels by the
enigmatical and threatening attitude
of Germany

Important movements of troops noted
round Frankfort

Military preparations in South Ger
many

Military preparations in Bohemia.

Austria evades the direct conversation
to which she was invited, and
hastens to arm

Herr von Jagow maintains his dila
tory attitude, vaguely pacific, throw
ing all final responsibility for the
conflict on Russia, stating at the
same time his hope of a direct un-
derstanding between Vienna and St.
Petersburgh, for the success of
which he claims to be trying to
work

Austria appears to have decided for
war; she is strongly urged thereto
by Herr von Tschirschky, German
Ambassador. The situation grows
worse

Herr von Schoen called to say that
Germany was going to consult Vi-
enna as to its intentions, that that
would furnish a basis for discussion,
and that military operations would
not be actively advanced

Russia, confronted with the disquiet-
ing attitude of Germany and with
the refusal of Count Berchtold to
continue the discussions, and with
Austria's military preparations, is
obliged to proceed to partial mo-
bilisation

Marquis di San Giuliano explains the
attitude of Germany and Austria as
due to their erroneous conviction
that Russia would abandon Servia. .

CONTENTS

Ixix

No.

100

101

102

103

Name,

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Paul Cambon

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Bienvenu-
Martin

M. Boppe to M,
B ienvenu-Martin

M. Pal6ologue to
M. Bienvenu-Mar
tin

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the French Am
bassadora at St.
Petersburgh and
London

M. Pal^ologue to St. Peters

Place and
Date.

1914.

Paris

July 29

London
July 29

Belgrade
July 29

St. Peters-
burgh
July 29

Paris
July 30

M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Pal6oIogue to
M. Ren6 Viviani

burgh
July 30

St. Peters-
burgh
July 30

Summary.

Direct Austro-Russian conversations
having been interrupted by Aus-
tria's declaration of war on Servia,
the French and Russian Govern-
ments beg Sir E. Grey to renew at
Berlin his proposal of intervention
by four Powers, and to work upon
Italy to obtain her complete coop-
eration

Germany having been willing to ac-
cept only the principle of mediation
by four Powers, Sir E. Grey, to
avoid any further dilatory reply, will
leave the German Government to
choose whatever form of intervention
may appear practicable to it. He
considers the situation very grave.

Servian Government has obtained
from Russia the assurance that that
Power will not abandon its interest
in the fate of Servia

German Ambassador at St. Peters
burgh called to state that his coun-
try would mobilise if Russia did not
discontinue her military prepara-
tions

Informed of this menacing step, the
French Government declare their
resolution to fulfil all the obliga-
tions of the Russian alliance, while
continuing to work for a peaceful
solution, and requesting the Russian
Government to act in the same way
on their side

Page,

Russian Government state their readi-
ness to continue negotiations to the
end, while remaining convinced that
Germany will not work at Vienna in
favour of peace

Upon a further and less threatening
move by the German Ambassador,
M. Sazonof hastened to make a fresh
proposal, intimating that Russia
would break oflF her military prepa-
rations if Austria declared herself
ready to eliminate from her ulti-
matum the clauses which impugned
the sovereignty of Servia

656

657

658

659

660

Ixx

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

104

M. Dumaine to M
Ren€ Viviani

105

106

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Paul Cambon

1914.
Vienna
July 30

Berlin
July 30

Paris
July 30

107

108

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

M, Paul Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

Berlin
July 30

London
July 30

109

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

Berlin
July 30

Following a very friendly interview
between Russian Ambassador and
Count Berchtold, a fresh attempt
will be made at St. Petersburgh to
hold direct communication between
Austria and Russia for friendly set
tlement of Servian affair

German Government deny the report
of mobilisation, but take all neces
sary measures to hasten it

M. Paul Cambon is requested to
bring to knowledge of English Gov-
ernment all corroborative informa
tion proving the active and threaten
ing military measures taken by Ger
many since July 25, while France
is keeping her covering troops at
about ten kilometres from the fron-
tier

Herr von Jagow states that M. Sa
zonof's proposal is unacceptable for
Austria

German Ambassador has brought no
answer to Sir Edward Grey's request
that the German Government should
themselves put forward a proposal
for mediation by four Powers
Prince Lichnowsky has questioned
English Government as to their
military preparations. The informa-
tion given to Sir E. Grey as to Ger-
many's military operations has led
him to believe, like M. Paul Cam-
bon, that the time has come for them
to consider together all the possi-
bilities

Herr von Jagow states that in order
to gain time he will take direct ac-
tion at Vienna by asking to know
the Austrian conditions, thus again
evading Sir Edward Grey's request.
He makes recriminations against
Russia

CONTENTS

Ixxi

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Rene Vi
viani

M. Mollard to M
Ren6 Viviani

M. Reni5 Viviani to
the French Am
bassadors at St.
Petersburgh, Lon-
don, Berlin, Vi
enna, and Rome

M. Pal^ologue to
M. Rene Viviani

M. Rene Viviani to
the French Am
bassadors at Lon
don, St. Peters-
burgh, Berlin, Vi-
enna, Rome, and
Constantinople

M. Dumaine to M.
Ren6 Viviani

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Rene Vi-
viani

1914.
London
July 31

Luxemburg
July 31

Paris
July 31

St. Peters-
burgh
July 31

Paris
July 31

Sir E. Grey warns German Ambas
sador at London that England could
not remain neutral in a general con-
flict in which France was implicated
On the other hand, he had said to M
Paul Cambon that the English Gov-
ernment could not promise France
that they would intervene.

The autograph letter from the
French President to the King of
England had been handed to the
King

The Luxemburg Minister of State
notifies military preparations on
German frontier, and requests
France to engage to respect the neu-
trality of the Grand Duchy, a prom-
ise it cannot obtain from Germany

French Government, in compliance
with England's wish, request St
Petersburgh to modify the sugges-
tion M. Sazonof has made to Aus
tria, in order to make it acceptable
to that Power and to permit of a
peaceful settlement of the dispute . .

Russian Government have agreed to
modify their formula, in spite of
the feeling aroused by the bombard
ment of Belgrade and the con-
stantly provocative action of Aus-
tria-Hungary

Vienna
July 31

Berlin
July 31

The concurrent efforts made by Eng
land and Russia for the mainte
nance of peace have been united,
and give hope of an understanding
with Austria-Hungary, who appears
more inclined thereto. Germany's
attitude, however, gives the impres-
sion that that Power has worked
from the beginning for the humilia-
tion of Russia, the breaking up of
the Triple Entente, and, if this re-
sult could not be obtained, for war.

General Austrian mobilisation is de-
creed

Germany, in her turn, decrees
" Kriegsgefahrzustand," and re-
quests Russia to demobilise

667

668

669

670

671

672

Ixxii

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Pal6ologue

M. Pal6ologue to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Klobukowski to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the French Am-
bassadors at Lon-
don, St. Peters-
burgh, Berlin, Vi-
enna, Rome

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the French Am-
bassadors at Lon-
don, Berlin, and
to French Min-
ister at Brussels

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

M. Barrfere to M.
Ren6 Viviani

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the French Am-
bassadors at Lon-
don, St. Peters-
burgh, Berlin, Vi-
enna, Rome, Ma-
drid, Constantino-
ple

1914.

Paris

July 31

St. Peters-
burgh
July 31

Brussels
July 31

Paris
Aug. 1

Berlin
Aug. 1

Paris
Aug. 1

Berlin

Aug. 1

Rome
Aug. 1

Paris
Aug. 1

In annoimcing to Paris the ultimatum
addressed to Russia, Herr von
Schoen asks the French Government
to inform him, before 1 o'clock on
the following afternoon, what atti
tude France would assume in the
event of a Russo-German conflict . . .

General mobilisation of Austro-Hun-
garian army entails general Russian
mobilisation

Belgian Government receive official
assurance that France will respect
Belgian neutrality

Austrian Ambassadors at Paris and
St. Petersburgh make two concilia-
tory moves. Unfortunately Ger
many's attitude leaves hardly any
hope of a peaceful settlement . . .

Austria-Hungary announces at St.
Petersburgh that she is willing to
discuss the ground of her diflFerences
with Servia; but Germany's sum
mons to Russia to demobilise within
twelve hours seems to destroy the
last hope of peace

French Government inform English
Government that they will respect
Belgian neutrality

German Government refuse a similar
engagement

Marquis di San Giuliano informs Ger-
man Ambassador that Italy will pre-
serve neutrality

Herr von Schoen, informed of Aus-
tria's conciliatory attitude and of
Russia's acceptance of the English
formula, makes no further mention
of his departure and proclaims his
peaceful intentions, at the same time
stating that he has received no fur-
ther information from his Govern-
ment

CONTENTS

Ixxiii

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Rene Vi-
vian!

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Paul Cambon

M. Mollard to M,
Ren6 Viviani

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Mollard

M. Jules Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-

M. Eyschen to M.
Ren6 Viviani

M. Mollard to M.
Ren6 Viviani

Note of Herr von
Schoen

M. Palgologue to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the Representa-
tives of France
abroad

M. Ren6 Viviani
to the French
Ambassadors at
London, St. Pe-
tersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome,
Madrid, Constan-
tinople

1914.

Paris

Aug. 1

Paris
Aug. 1

Luxemburg
Aug. 1

Paris
Aug. 1

Berlin
Aug. 1

Luxemburg
Aug. 2

Paris
Aug. 2

St. Peters-
burgh
Aug. 2

Paris
Aug. 2

Sir E. Grey states that England has
refused the promise of neutrality for
which Germany asked. The ob
servance of Belgian neutrality is of
great importance to England, and
Germany has not answered the ques-
tion put to her

French mobilisation has been ordered
during the day, as a reply to German
preparations

Luxemburg Minister of State asks
French Government for an assurance
of neutrality similar to that re-
ceived by Belgium

This assurance is given by French
Government

General mobilisation is ordered at
Berlin

Violation of Luxemburg neutrality by
German troops. Protest by Minister
of State

Explanations furnished by German
Government who state that measures
taken in Luxemburg are solely pre-
ventive and are in no sense hostile to
the Grand Duchy

The same explanation regarding the
entry of German troops into the
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg

Germany has just declared war on
Russia

Communication of this news to
French diplomatic representatives
abroad

French diplomatic representatives
abroad are requested to make known
the situation to the Governments to
which they are accredited

681
681

683
684
684

684

685

686
686

687

Ixxiv

CONTENTS

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

237

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M, Paul Cambon

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Jules Cambon

M. Pellet to M.
Ren6 Viviani

M. Klobukowski to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi
viani

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Paul Cambon

Herr von Schoen to
M. Ren6 Viviani

1914.
London
Aug. 2

Paris
Aug. 2

The Hague
Aug. 3

Brussels
Aug. 3

London
Aug. 3

Paris
Aug. 3

Sir E. Grey has given assurance that
British fleet will defend French
coasts against any German attack
by sea. The violation of the neu-
trality of Belgium would be con-
sidered a casus belli

The President of the Council com-
municates to French Chamber Sir
E. Grey's statements as to coopera-
tion of British fleet

Protest to Berlin against the viola-
tions of French frontier

German Minister at The Hague in-
forms Netherlands Government of
the entry of Imperial troops into
Luxemburg and Belgium, under the
pretext of preventive measures

Belgian Government refuse the sum-
mons sent to them to allow German
troops a free passage through their
territory

Belgium does not think the moment
has come to appeal to the guarantee
of the Powers to defend her inde-
pendence

The statement regarding intervention
of English fleet is binding on British
Government

Fruitless attempt by German Ambas-
sador to obtain from Sir E. Grey as-
surance that England's neutrality
would not depend on the observance
of Belgian neutrality

Sir E. Grey makes statement in the
Commons regarding intervention of
English fleet, and reads a letter
from King Albert asking for Eng-
land's support

French Government deny in London
statement that German frontier had
been violated by French officers

Declaration of war handed by Ger-
man Ambassador at Paris to Presi-
dent of the Coimcil

CONTENTS

Ixxv

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the French Repre-
sentatives abroad

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Jules Cambon

M. Ren6 Viviani to
M. Alliz6

M. Ren6 Viviani to
the French Rep
resentatives at
London, St. Pe-
ter sburgh, Vi-
enna, Rome, Mad-
rid, Berne, Con-
stantinople, The
Hague, Copenha-
gen, Christiania,
Stockholm, Bu-
charest, Athens,
Belgrade

M. Klobukowski to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Paul Cambon
to M. Ren6 Vi-
viani

M. Klobukowski to
M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Bapst to M.
Doumergue

M. MoUard to M.
Doumergue

M. Ren6 Viviani
(Circular to the
Powers)

M. Raymond Poin-
car6. President of
the Republic
(Message to Par-
liament)

1914.

Paris

Aug. 3

Paris
Aug. 3

Brussels
Aug. 4

London
AuCT. 4

Brussels
Aug. 4

Copen-
hagen
Aug. 6

Paris
Aug. 5

Paris
Aug. 4

Communication of this news to
French diplomatic representatives
abroad

Instructions sent to M. Jules Cam
bon, at Berlin, to ask for his pass
ports

French Minister at Munich instructed
to ask for his passports

Violation of Belgian territory by Ger-
man troops

Belgium's appeal to England, France,
and Russia

German Government will be requested
by English Government to withdraw
before midnight their ultimatum to
Belgium

German Government state at Brus-
sels that they find themselves
obliged to invade Belgian territory . .

Enclosing a report in which M. Jules
Cambon informs the Government of
the circumstances of his return
journey and of the annoyances to
which he was subjected

Report of M. Mollard to the Govern
ment on the subject of his departure
from Luxemburg, which was insisted
on by German military authorities . .

Text of notification to the Powers of
the state of war existing between
France and Germany

Message of President of the Republic,
read at the sitting of Parliament on
August 4, 1914

694

695
695
696

696

697

703

707

709

Ixxvi

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

159

160

M. Ren6 Viviani,
President of the
Council. (Speech
in the Chamber)

M. DelcassS to the
French Ambassa-
dors and Minis-
ters abroad

1914.
Paris

Aug. 4

Paris
Sept. 4

Text of speech delivered by President
of the Council to the Chamber of
Deputies, August 4, 1914

711

Declaration of England, Russia, and
France regarding their reciprocal un-
dertaking not to conclude a separate
peace, and not to put forward con-
ditions of peace without previous
agreement with each of the other
Allies

721

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

extbacts fbom blue book [british] conceening the attitude taken by
England during the Pourparlers which preceded the Wab.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Sir G. Buchanan to
Sir E. Grey

Sir E. Grey to Sir
F. Bertie

1914.
St. Peters-
burgh
July 24

London
July 29

Conversation between M. Sazonof, M,

Palgologue, and Sir G. Buchanan

concerning an eventual declaration

of solidarity of England with Russia

and France in a European crisis. .

Information given to M. Paul Cambon
of the view taken by English Govern
ment on the subject of their atti
tude: not to give Germany a false
impression of possible abstention on
the part of England, not to make
any definite engagement from now
on in regard to France

722

724

Sir E. Grey to Sir
E. Goschen

Sir F. Bertie to
Sir E. Grey

London
July 29

Paris
July 30

Accoimt of an interview with German
Ambassador to warn him that Eng
land would in no case undertake not
to intervene if the crisis developed
and if Germany and France were
implicated in it

725

Conversation with the President of
the Republic, who considers that a
declaration by England affirming her
intention of supporting France,
whose wish for peace is known,
would arrest Germany's desire for
war

726

CONTENTS

Ixxvii

No.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

119

148

Sir E. Grey to Sir
F. Bertie

1914.
London
July 31

London
Aug. 2

Statement made to French Ambas-
sador that, in the present position
of the crisis, the English Government
cannot give any definite under-
taking

Assurance given regarding the pro-
tection of the French coasts and fleet
by the English fleet against any at-
tack by German fleet by the Pas-de-
Calais or the North Sea

727

729

APPENDIX II.

Extracts fbom Blue Book [Beitish] belatino to the Pboposals made by
THE German Government to the English Govebnment in obdeb to

OBTAIN THE NeUTBALITT OF ENGLAND.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Sir E. Goschen to
Sir E. Grey

1914.
Berlin
July 29

101

Sir E. Grey to Sir
E. Goschen

London
July 30

Offers made by German Chancellor to
English Ambassador in endeavour to
obtain English neutrality; promise
to respect integrity of French terri-
tory, but not of her colonies; inten
tions with regard to Holland and
Belgium. Proposal of a general un-
derstanding of neutrality betvreen
Germany and England

Refusal of German proposals, not only
unacceptable in fact, but their ac-
ceptance would be a stain on Eng
land's reputation. Uselessness of
considering the proposal for a gen-
eral agreement of neutrality between
England and Germany for the future.
England will keep her entire free-
dom of action and continue to coop-
erate for the maintenance of peace
in Europe: that is the only way by
which good relations can be main-
tained between Germany and Eng-
land

730

731

Ixxviii

CONTENTS

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

123

Sir E. Grey to Sir
E. GoBchen

1914.
London
Aug. 1

Account of a conversation with (Jer-
man Ambassador regarding Belgian
neutrality. Prince Lichnowsky
presses for a statement by the Eng-
lish Government of the conditions
on which England would remain
neutral; the reply is given that the
English Government definitely re-
fuse any promise to remain neutral
and will keep their hands free

732

APPENDIX II (6).

GEBMAN attempts to OBTAIW, tTNDEB PBETENCE OF A " MiSUNDEBSTANDINQ," A

Guarantee by England of the Neutbauty of Fbance in a Gebman-
RussiAN Wab, {Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, August 20, 1914.)

No.

Name.

Place and
Date,

Summary.

Page.

Prince Lichnowsky
to Herr von Beth-
mann-HoUweg

His Majesty Em-
peror William II.
to King George V.

Herr von Beth-
mann-Hollweg to
Prince Lichnow-
sky

His Majesty King
George V. to Em-
peror William II.

1914.
London
July 31

Berlin
Aug. 1

London
Aug. 1

Account of a soi-disant request by
telephone concerning an eventual un-
dertaking by Germany not to attack
France if the latter would remain
neutral in a war between Germany
and Russia

Telegram from the Emperor William
to King George V. stating that he
cannot stop his mobilisation against
Russia and France, but will not at-
tack France in the hypothesis of
that Power offering its neutrality
guaranteed by the English army and
fleet

Telegram to Prince Lichnowsky re-
peating Germany's undertaking. .

Telegram from the King of England
to the Emperor William, stating
that German Ambassador is mis-
taken and that Sir Edward Grey
spoke to Prince Lichnowsky only of
the means of delaying an armed con-
flict between France and Germany
until some definite ground of under-
standing should have been reached
by Austria-Hungary and Russia

733

734

735

CONTENTS

Ixxix

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Prince Lichnowsky
to Herr von Beth-
mann-HoIlweg

1914.
London
Aug. 2

Notice given to Herr von Bethmann-
Hollweg that the conversations of
which he had given an account had
been abandoned as " useless "

735

APPENDIX III.

extbacts fbom blue book concebninq england's refusal to admit the
Gebman Point of View on the Question of the Violation of Belgian
Neutbality.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

1914.

153

Sir E. Grey to Sir

London

Request for immediate undertaking

E. Goschen

Aug. 4

by Germany that she will respect
Belgian neutrality

735

155

Sir E. Grey to Sir

London

Statement to Belgium that England

F. Villiers

Aug. 4

is ready to unite with France and
Russia to resist a German attack on
Belgium and to guarantee the in-
tegrity and independence of that
country

736

157

Herr von Jagow to

Berlin

Declaration communicated through

Prince Lichnow-

Aug. 4

German Ambassador at London that

sky

in spite of the violation of Belgium,
which is judged necessary, no terri-
tory will be annexed. Proof of the
sincerity of this declaration is given
by the affirmation that the neutral-
ity of Holland will be respected, an
annexation of Belgian territory Juw-
ing no value without a simultaneous
annexation of Dutch territory

737

159

Sir E. Grey to Sir
E. Goschen

London
Aug. 4

England's ultimatum to Germany

737

Ixxx

CONTENTS

160

Sir E. Goschen to
Sir E. Grey

Place and
Date.

1914.
London
Aug. 8

Summary.

Report of English Ambassador at
Berlin of his last conversations with
Herr von Jagow, Herr von Beth-
mann-Hollweg, and Herr von Zim-
mermann. The German Chancellor
cannot understand how, " for a word,
neutrality," how, " for a scrap of pa-
per," England could go to war with
a nation to which she is related and
which desired nothing so much as to
be her friend. The English Ambas-
sador tries to make his interlocutor
understand that it is a question of
life or death for the honour of Great
Britain to keep a solemn engage-
ment which she has signed in de-
fence of the neutrality of Belgium. .

Page.

738

APPENDIX IV.

EXTBACTS FROM THE GBEY BOOK SHOWING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GEBMANT

VIOLATED Belgian Neutbality.

Place and
Date.

1914.

Summary.

Despatches Nos. 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 39,
40, 41, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71

Page.

741
to

758

APPENDIX V.

EXTBACTS FBOM WHITE BOOK.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Telegrams exchanged between the Em-
peror of Germany, William II., and
the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II.,
from July 28 to August 1, 1914

758

763

CONTENTS

lyYTI

APPENDIX VI.

EXTBACTS FROM OBANQE BOOK RELATING TO GeBMANY'S DeCLABATION OF WAB ON

Russia.

No.

Name.

Place and
Date.

Summary.

Page.

Count Pourtalfis

M. Sazonof

M. Sazonof to Rus-
sian Representa-
tives abroad

1914.

St. Peters-
burgh
Aug. 1

St. Peters-
burgh
Aug. 2

Note transmitted through the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to
the Russian Minister for Foreign
Aflfairs

763

77
78

Communication from the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs sum-
ming up the events which took place
between July 23 and August 1, 1914.

Circular letter from the Russian Min-
ister for Foreign AflFairs to the Rep-
resentatives of the Empire abroad. .

764
767

THE
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK

(NO. 1)

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1)^

NOTE OF INTRODUCTION.

Ever since the Karageorgevitch Dynasty ascended Servia's blood-
stained throne, surrounded by the conspirators against King Alex-
ander, the policy of the kingdom has been directed by various means
and with varying intensity toward a hostile propaganda and a revo-
lutionary agitation in those territories of Austria-Hungary which are
inhabited by Southern Slavs. This underground policy has been aimed
at the forcible separation of these territories from the Dual Monarchy,
when the general political situation should favour the attainment of
the aspirations for the establishment of a Greater Servia.

The bitter disappointment caused in Servia by the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which drove the Servian nation to the
brink of war, shows plainly what ambitious hopes were entertained
by Servia and how near she thought herself to be to the goal.

In the spring of 1909, Russia, though assuming the part of the
protecting power, considered her armaments not sufficiently advanced
to support Servia. Under the circumstances the Servian government
decided to declare solemnly before Europe that it recognised the
international situation created by the annexation as an act which
had not affected Servia 's rights. The Servian Government further-
more undertook to dissolve the irregular bands which had armed
against the Dual Monarchy and to maintain good neighbourly rela-
tions with the latter for the future.

The Austro-Hungarian Government looked forward to the restora-
tion of the peace and good understanding with Servia which had
prevailed under the Obrenovitch Dynasty. It hoped to be enabled
to promote Servians interests in the friendly spirit which had been

^ Aiistro-Hungarian Red Book. Official English Edition, with an Introduc-
tion. Published by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Title of publication in
the original text: Osterreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke
zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914. Volkaausgabe. Abdruck der offiziellen
Ausgabe mit einer Einleitung. Wien 1915. Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und
Univeraitats-Buchhandlung, I., Kohlmarkt Nr. 20.

4 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

evidenced by Austria-Hungary at the Berlin Congress, when she
successfully advocated the recognition of the independence of the
kingdom. These Austro-Hungarian hopes were not to be fulfilled,
however. Far from respecting the pledge of good neighbourly rela-
tions, the Servian Government permitted the Servian press to rouse
unrestrained hatred against the Monarchy; it tolerated societies in
Servia which, under the leadership of high officers, functionaries,
teachers and judges, publicly carried on an agitation aiming to
precipitate a revolutionary outbreak in Austro-Hungarian territories ;
it permitted prominent officers of the Servian military and civil
services to demoralise the public conscience to the point where
assassination was regarded as a legitimate weapon against the ad-
joining monarchy. This subversive agitation led to a series of
outrages against prominent Austrian and Hungarian officials and
culminated in the dastardly assassination of the heir apparent, the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Instead of precipitating the disin-
tegration of Austria-Hungary which our enemies had foolishly an-
ticipated, however, the Prince's martyrdom rallied all the peoples
of Austria-Hungary in fervent loyalty to the defence of the Habs-
burg Dynasty. The whole world now sees that the Monarchy rests
upon solid foundations, and that her sons are firmly united in the
conviction that their dignity, self-respect and vital interests made
it imperative to check Servia 's criminal agitation.

Convinced by experience of the duplicity of the Servian Govern-
ment, Austria-Hungary found only one method which promised a
satisfactory settlement. That method was to demand from Servia
absolute guarantees that those implicated in the infamous murder
would be punished and that the subversive agitation for a Greater
Servia would be suppressed.

Austria-Hungary's forbearance having been construed as an evi-
dence of weakness, the Belgrade Government had to be made to
realise that the Dual Monarchy was prepared to go to any lengths
to uphold her prestige and integrity; Servia had to be taught that
Austria-Hungary could not tolerate her policy of prevarication and
ostensible compliance with the Austro-Hungarian demands, meant
only to deceive the Great Powers while the Servians carried on their
incendiary agitation. The necessity for decisive action was em-
phasised by the recollection of a similar act of duplicity and evasion
successfully accomplished by Servia after the solemn declaration of
1909. Every time that the monarchy called Servia to account for
her reprehensible campaign of disruption, the Belgrade Government

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 5

turned to the Powers for protection and impunity. Under the cir-
cumstances there was but one way of safeguarding the territorial
integrity of Austria-Hungary and putting an end to the ever-
recurring economic disturbance of the Dual Monarchy, without en-
dangering the peace of Europe. From the very beginning the
Imperial and Royal Government, wishing to reassure the Powers,
declared that it did not intend to go beyond the protection of its
legitimate interests, and that no territorial aggrandisement was
contemplated. It was compelled, however, to insist upon a direct
settlement between Austria-Hungary and Servia within the desig-
nated restrictions. Russia's proposal to extend the time-limit for
the Servian answer would have furnished the Belgrade Government
with the opportunity for underhanded procrastination, and would
have opened the door to the intervention of other Powers on Servians
behalf. An extension of the time-limit had, therefore, to be declined.
Though Servia 's hostility was plainly proved by the fact, that before
giving her ambiguous reply, she had ordered a general mobilisation,
still the Dual Monarchy did not declare war until another three
days had elapsed.

The British Government's suggestion that the Servian contro-
versy be submitted to a conference of the Powers reached Vienna
too late, as hostilities had already begun. This proposal, however,
could by no means have safeguarded the Dual Monarchy's interests.
Nothing less than the unconditional acceptance of Austria-Hungary's
demands by the Belgrade Government could have guaranteed even
tolerable neighbourly relations with Servia. On the other hand, the
Entente Powers were guided by the wish to put aside Austria-
Hungary's demands by means of a compromise. This method would
have nullified the assurances required for the future correct be-
haviour of Servia, which would thus have been encouraged to
persist in her activities for the detachment of the southern terri-
tories from Austria-Hungary.

The demand that Servia punish the accomplices in the Serajevo
murder who were on Servian soil, and live up to the obligations of a
peaceful neighbour, was aimed solely at the protection of our djmasty
and of the integrity of the Dual Monarchy from subversive agita-
tions. The Austro-Hungarian Government acted as the spokesman
of the civilised world when it asserted that it could not permit
murder to be employed with impunity in political strife, and that
the peace of Europe ought not to be continually menaced by Servia 's
ambitious projects.

6 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Entente Powers, dominated by selfish motives, ignored the
laws of public morality and sided with the guilty party ; in so doing,
they assumed a heavy responsibility. The Dual Monarchy had given
ample proofs of its conservative policy and thoroughly peaceful dis-
position during the crisis of the Balkan wars, when the balance of
power in the Peninsula underwent far-reaching changes; she, there-
fore, deserved unrestricted confidence in the new situation. Had
the Entente Powers accepted Austria-Hungary's assurances and
adopted a policy of waiting, the general conflagration would have
been averted. When the history of this war shall be written, it will
place upon their shoulders the blame for the frightful disaster which
their policy has brought upon the world.

The small Servian state would never have dared to carry on its
disruptive agitation in the territories of a great Power, had it not
been assured of Russia's secret protection. Servia had tangible
pledges that in the event of a clash with Austria-Hungary, the
powerful Pan-Sla^dc party in Russia would bring the Czar's Gov-
ernment to the active support of the movement for the establishment
of a Greater Servia at the expense of the Dual Monarchy. Such a
support was only a minor phase of the expansive policy of the Rus-
sian Empire which, like an ever-extending glacier, had ground down
tremendous territories and many peoples, whose religious freedom
and languages it has suppressed. The essential and traditional
feature of the ambitious scheme of world-domination, of which the
Servian agitation is only an incident, is the possession of the Darda-
nelles. Such an acquisition would make Russia predominant in the
Near East, with exclusive political and commercial privileges.

Since the attainment of this purpose constituted a menace to
the vital interests of both Austria-Hungary and Germany, it was
bound to rouse their opposition; Russia's efforts were consequently
directed toward weakening their capacity for resistance. This was
to be attained by disrupting the powerful combination of the two
countries which stood in Russia's way, and by isolating Germany.
The first move was the creation of the Balkan League, designed to
weaken Austria-Hungary, whose foundations as a great Power were
to be undermined by the Pan-Slav and Servian agitation in her
border districts. As a preliminary step Turkey had to be crushed
and driven out of Europe. By this act the power of the augmented
Christian Balkan States was to be made available for Russia's
struggle against the two central European Powers.

When the Balkan League was rent asunder by the dispute over

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 7

the distribution of the territories wrested from Turkey, the "pro-
tecting power" of the Slavs assented to the defeat and humiliation
of Bulgaria, who was deprived of the greater part of her recent
conquests. New inducements were now offered for the reconstitu-
tion of the Balkan League by the promise of territorial expansion
at the expense of Austria-Hungary. After the defeat of Turkey,
the Balkan Federation could be directed solely against Austria-
Hungary and Germany. Russia and France conceived this plan,
which was to shift Europe's balance of power. In this criminal
game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the peace of Europe
and the existence of the Dual Monarchy, Servia was a trump card
in Russia's hand, and Russia was determined not to lose this trump,
even at the cost of a universal conflagration.

The following series of documents show that, up to the very last,
the Imperial and Royal Government repeatedly assured the St.
Petersburgh Cabinet that it did not intend to violate any Russian
interest, or to seize Servian territory, or to infringe upon Servia 's
sovereign rights, and that it was willing to enter into negotiations
with the Russian Government for the adjustment of Austro-Hun-
garian and Russian interests. These solemn assurances, however,
did not satisfy the Russian Government, which, as early as the 24th
of July, adopted a threatening tone in a public statement on the
issues involved.

Though Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single soldier
against Russia, the latter ordered on July 29th a mobilisation of the
military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan, which implied
a threat against the Dual Monarchy. In spite of the repeated warn-
ings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in St. Petersburgh and
the intimation by the German Government on the 26th of July that
preparatory military measures in Russia would compel Germany to
take corresponding steps, and that mobilisation would mean war,
the Russian general mobilisation order was issued on the 31st of July.

On the 24th of July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador met the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and emphatically pointed out
the thoroughly peaceful disposition of the Dual Monarchy. He
explained that Austria-Hungary only wished to put an end to the
dangerous Servian policy of murderous outrages and of revolutionary
agitation.

The vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, and she
had to protect herself; she could not abandon her defensive policy
even if Russia should choose to provoke a collision by taking Servia

8 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

under her protection. The Imperial and Royal Government had no
choice but to endeavour to put an end to an intolerable situation
wherein Servia, in effect, would have continued its provocations
under a Russian pledge of immunity.

On the 30th of July the British Foreign Secretary once more
suggested that Austria-Hungary accept the good offices of mediating
Powers in her controversy with Servia. The Imperial and Royal
Government, animated by a sincere desire to do its utmost to pre-
serve the world's peace, agreed to accept this mediation. Austria-
Hungary's honour and interests, however, demanded that this should
not be done under the pressure of Russia's threatening measures.
She, therefore, had to insist that Russia's order of mobilisation
should be revoked prior to Austria-Hungary's acceptance of media-
tion. The St. Petersburgh Cabinet responded by issuing the general
call to the colours.

In cooperation with Great Britain's selfish policy and France's
craving for revanche, the Russian Government had left nothing un-
done to place Europe under the domination of the Entente Powers
and thus to open the way for her own bold schemes.

Russia has resorted to most unscrupulous methods in her efforts
to twist a rope around the Monarchy's neck. When Austria-Hungary,
acting in self-defence, set about to sever this rope, Russia tried to
tie her hands and to humiliate her.

Threatened in their most vital interests, Austria-Hungary and
Germany had to choose between protecting their security and sur-
rendering to the Russian menace. They chose the way which honour
and duty prescribed.

No. 1.

Von Storck to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, June 29, 1914.

Still under the profound impression of the ghastly outrage of
yesterday, I find it difficult to comment upon the bloody deed of
Serajevo in the calm, self-possessed manner befitting the seriousness
of the occasion. I therefore beg to be allowed to confine myself to-
day to a mere record of some facts.

Yesterday, the 15th/28th, the anniversary of the battle of Kos-
sovopolje was celebrated with more than usual pomp, and the memory
of the Servian patriot, Milosh Obilitch, who in 1389 treacherously

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 9

assassinated the victorious Murad, was solemnised. Wherever Ser-
vians live, Obilitch is counted a national hero. Yet, as a result of
the propaganda fostered under the auspices of the Servian Govern-
ment and of a press campaign carried on for many years past, we
have been substituted for the Turks as Servia's hereditary foes.

In the minds of the three juvenile assassins of Serajevo (Princip,
Gabrinovitch and the third unknown bomb-thrower) must have
loomed up the glamour of a re-enactment of the tragedy of Kos-
sovopolje. They have even shot and killed an innocent woman, and
therefore may have considered that they have surpassed their model.

For years hatred against the Dual Monarchy has been sown in
Servia. The seed has taken and the harvest is murder.

The news became known at about 5 p.m., and at 10 o'clock that
night the Servian Government officially ordered the celebration of
the Obilitch anniversary to be stopped. Unofficially, however, and
under the cover of darkness, the festivities were kept up for some
time.

According to eye-witnesses people embraced each other in delight
and jubilant remarks were heard, such as: " Serves them right! "
"We expected it for a long time!" "That's the revenge for the
annexation!"

No. 2.
Von Storck to Count BercJitold.

(Telegram.) Belgrade, June 30, 1914.

I presented to-day to M. Gruitch, the Secretary General of the
Foreign Office, the pertinent enquiry as to what steps the royal
police had taken, or intended to take, in an effort to trace the threads
of the outrage, which notoriously led into Servia.

His reply was that, so far, the Servian police had not even taken
the matter up.

No. 3.

Consul General JeJilitschka to Count Berchtold.

VsUuh, July 1, 1914.
On June the 15th/28th, the Vidov Dan (Corpus Christi Day),
which this year coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle

10 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of Kossovopolje fought in 1389, was for the first time officially
celebrated at Pristina as the feast of the "Liberation of the Servian
nation."

For four months a special committee had been working to make
that festival as solemn as possible and to turn it into a great national
Serb demonstration.

In preparation for the forthcoming festivities a propaganda had
been extended into Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and especially into
Hungary. Those desirous of taking part in the festivities were
granted free passage on the Servian state railways, and the authori-
ties promised them cheap lodging, food and other assistance. The
agitation had been energetic and well planned. The guests were
taken to Pristina on special trains.

The various speeches reveled in historical reminiscences connected
with the scene of the celebration, and invariably led up to and dwelt
upon the customary topic of the unification of all Serbs and the
"liberation of the oppressed brethren" across the Danube and the
Save, including those who live in Bosnia and Dalmatia.

During the evening hours, news of the terrible deed of Serajevo
began to spread and the fanatic populace gave itself up to a spon-
taneous outburst of passion, which, to judge by the numerous utter-
ances of approval reported to me from absolutely reliable sources,
must be described as positively inhuman.

In view of this attitude, which was also taken up by the popula-
tion of Uskiib, and in consideration of the fact that the news of the
crime has been received with unconcealed satisfaction by a repre-
sentative gathering, all attempts of the Servian press to shift from
Servia the moral responsibility for the deed crumbled to pitiable
nothing.

No. 4.
Count Szecsen to Count BercJitold.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 4, 1914.

I conveyed to-day to M. Poincare, the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment's thanks for his sympathy.

Referring to the anti-Servian demonstrations in our country, he
remarked that after the assassination of President Carnot all Italians

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 11

were exposed to the most violent attacks at the hands of the popu-
lation throughout France.

I drew his attention to the fact that the assassination to which
he referred had no connection whatever with any anti-French agi-
tation in Italy, whereas it can no longer be denied that for many
years past a campaign has been waged in Servia against the Dual
Monarchy, availing itself of all means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In concluding the interview M. Poincare expressed his firm con-
viction that the Servian Government would lend us every assistance
in the judicial investigation and prosecution of persons suspected as
accomplices. He added: "No State could evade such a duty."

No. 5.
4-cUng Consul Hoflehner to Count Berchtold.

Nish, July 6, 1914.

At Nish the news of the terrible outrage of Serajevo has caused
a sensation in the full sense of the word. No signs of consternation
or indignation could be seen, however. A feeling of satisfaction and
even of joy was predominant, and was often manifested in an un-
concealed manner. So little restraint was put on the public feeling,
that many instances of coarse expression could be recorded. This
chiefly applies to the so-called leading circles and educated classes,
such as politicians, teachers, government officials, officers and stu-
dents. The business community remained more reserved.

All declarations made from Servian official quarters and by promi-
nent individuals expressing indignation at the outrage and condemn-
ing the deed, appear merely as irony to those who have had the
opportunity to observe at close quarters the sentiments of the edu-
cated classes during the past few days.

Toward nine o'clock on the day of the outrage I proceeded to a
local cafe, still ignorant of what had happened. A gentleman of
my acquaintance informed me of the persistent rumours of the crime.
It was revolting to witness the elation displayed by the numerous
guests, who discussed the event with evident satisfaction. Exclama-
tions of joy and mockery were heard, which could not have failed
to painfully affect even those who had been hardened by the cus-
tomary political fanaticism of the Servians.

12 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 6.
Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

Some time has passed since my return to my post after the
unfortunate crime of June 28th, and I may now venture to give my
estimate of the prevailing public feeling in Servia.

Since the annexation crisis, the relations between the Dual Mon-
archy and Servia have been strained by the jingoism and animosity
of the latter and by an effective propaganda for the "Great Servian"
cause, carried on in those parts of our country which are inhabited
by Serbs. Servia 's successes in the Balkan wars have intensified that
jingoism, until it now manifests itself at times in outbreaks of frantic
passion bordering upon madness.

I consider it superfluous to adduce proofs or instances. They
may be obtained at any time and everywhere, in political circles as
well as among the populace, without distinction of party. I affirm
it as an established axiom that Servia 's policy has but one aim,
namely, the detachment from the Dual Monarchy of all territories
inhabited by Southern Slavs and the eventual destruction of that mon-
archy as a great Power. Nobody who has spent a week in the dis-
charge of his duties in this political atmosphere can question the
truth of my assertion.

The latest political events have vastly increased the existing
hatred against the Dual Monarchy. I here refer to the crime of
Serajevo, Hartwig's death and the electoral campaign.

The outrage of Serajevo has evoked before the Servian people
visions of the impending disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.
They have been led to believe that the dismemberment of the Austro-
Hungarian territories in question was to be expected shortly, that a
revolution had broken out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the
loyalty of the Slav regiments could not be relied upon. Thus the
event introduced a certain system into the scheme of mad nationalism,
and invested it with a semblance of justification.

In the eyes of the Servians the hated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
has become powerless, and is henceforth hardly worth a military
effort. Hatred is now accompanied by contempt. Without any
further trouble exhausted Austria-Hungary would fall helplessly
into the lap of the Greater Servian Empire which before long would
come into being.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 13

Papers, which certainly may not be classed among the most
radical publications, emphasise in daily articles the impotence and
disintegration of the neighbouring monarchy, and without fear of
punishment insult our authorities, including the august person of
our sovereign. The press organ of the government points to the
internal conditions in Austria-Hungary as the sole cause of the
damnable crime. The dread of a future settling of accounts has
vanished. For decades the Servian people have been entirely under
the influence of the press, and the press of the ruling party deter-
mines the national policy. The outrage of Serajevo is the horribly
abortive product of this influence of the press.

I shall pass over the absurd accusations raised on the occasion of
Hartwig's death, utterances verging on madness, which the London
Times qualified as "raging mad." Nor shall I dwell upon the men-
dacious press campaign which endeavours to confirm the Servian
people in their conviction that the government of Austria-Hungary
as well as its representatives are outlawed. Terms like "murderers,"
"rascals" or "infamous Austrians" were some of the ornamental
by-words applied to us.

Hartwig's death, which meant a profound bereavement to the
Servian political world, has been followed by a fanatic cult of the
departed. This sentiment, however, was due not only to gratitude
for his assistance in the past, but to a sense of apprehension as to
the future. Every effort was made to please Russia by a display
of slave-like servility, in order to secure that country's good- will for
the future.

The third important factor is the electoral campaign. A common
platform of hostility to the Dual Monarchy has united all parties.
No party aspiring to the powers of government, therefore, would
risk exposing itself to the suspicion of weakly yielding to Austria-
Hungary. Thus the electoral campaign is waged under the watch-
word of battle against Austria-Hungary.

It is generally believed that, for reasons internal as well as ex-
ternal, the Dual Monarchy is utterly powerless and incapable of any
energetic action. Solemn warnings emanating from our competent
sources are regarded as mere bluff.

The leave of absence granted to the Austro-Hungarian War Min-
ister and to the Chief of the General Staff have confirmed the
conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now evident.

In imposing upon your patience with this lengthy report, I am
fully aware that I am presenting nothing new; but I consider this

14 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

exposition essential to the inevitable conclusion that a settlement
with Servia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-
Hungary 's position as a great power, but even for her very existence,
cannot be permanently avoided.

If we neglect to clear up our relations with Servia, we shall lay
ourselves open to blame for increased difficulties and disadvantages
in a future conflict which, sooner or later, is bound to come.

In the view of an official representative of the Austro-Hungarian
government, who is observing events on the spot, the realisation is
inevitable that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of
our prestige.

Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective
control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the
Augean Stable of Greater Servian intrigues), we would have to con-
sider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be
firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.

Half measures, demands, endless debating and finally a foul com-
promise, would be the hardest blow to Austria-Hungary's authority in
Servia and her standing as a Great Power.

No. 7.
Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl, Belgrade.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

You are directed to hand the following note to the Royal Govern-
ment, in the course of the afternoon of Thursday, July 23rd:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on
instructions from the Servian Government, made the following declara-
tion to the Imperial and Royal Government :

''Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such
decisions as the Powers may take with regard to article XXV. of the
treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers,
Servia undertakes to renounce henceforth the attitude of protest and
opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since
last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of
her present policy toward Austria-Hungary and to live in future
on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 15

of the 28th of June last, have disclosed the existence of a subversive
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its
birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as
to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape of
acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the
declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government
has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated the
criminal activity of various societies and associations directed against
the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the glorification of
the authors of outrages, and the participation of officers and func-
tionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome
propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all
manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred
of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had
not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last
demonstrated its ominous consequences to the world.

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo
assassination has been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and ex-
plosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to
them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna
Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals
and their arms was organised and carried out by the Chiefs of the
Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do
not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer
the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for
years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence
propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the
contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues
which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end, the Imperial and Royal Government finds
itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a
formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against
the Monarchy — in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the
ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories be-
longing to it — and that it undertakes to suppress by every means at
its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

16 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking the Royal
Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "journal
official," of the 13th (26th) July the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach
from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and
it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal pro-
ceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and func-
tionaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and
thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal
Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of
March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all
idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers
it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole
population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with
the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machina-
tions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress. ' *

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the
royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and
published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and con-
tempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency
of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana,
to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same
manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which
engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The
Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the
societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name
and form ;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia,
both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction,
everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda
against Austria-Hungary ;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the adminis-
tration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 17

Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating
to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the cooperation in Servia of representatives of the
Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive
movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot
of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation re-
lating thereto ;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja Tanko-
sitch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State
employee, who have been compromised by the results of the prelimi-
nary investigation at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the Ser-
vian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the
frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier
service at Schabatz and Loznica who have been guilty of having
assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their
passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explana-
tions regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials,
both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official posi-
tions, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give
utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the
Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without de-
lay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding
heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal
Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th
of July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary in-
vestigation at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under
heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note.

(Enclosure.)

The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip
and accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28 of this
year has up to now established the following facts :

18 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his
stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrino-
vitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Trifko Grabez, with the as-
sistance of Major Voja Tankositch.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammuni-
tion, which were used by the criminals were obtained for them and
handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a certain
Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch.

3. The bombs are hand grenades which come from the arsenal
of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to make sure of the success of the attempt, Milan
Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez in the art
of hurling bombs and taught Princip and Grabez how to shoot with
Browning pistols in a forest adjoining the shooting range of Top-
schider, in Belgrade.

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herze-
govina frontier by the conspirators and the smuggling in of their
weapons, a secret transportation system was organised by Cigano-
vitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons into Bosnia
and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of the frontier
Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica and the co-
operation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Grbitch of Loznica, and
several other persons.

In presenting the above note you will add verbally that you are
instructed to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation at the ex-
piration of the time-limit mentioned in the note (forty-eight hours
after the hour and day of its presentation) in the event that within
that period you have not received an unconditional and favourable
response from the Royal Servian Government.

No. 8.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin,
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petershurgh, and Constantinople.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.
The Imperial and Royal Government has found itself obliged to
address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Imperial and

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 19

Royal Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Govern-
ment of Servia. ( See instructions to the Imperial and Royal Ministry
at Belgrade of July 22, 1914.)

I have the honour to request you to bring the contents of this
note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited,
accompanying this communication with the following comment :

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government ad-
dressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is
reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a
policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb sub-
jects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities
for detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the Ser-
vian frontier.

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count
among their membership generals and diplomats, government officials
and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society
in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propa-
ganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day
passes without the organs of the Servian press inciting their readers
to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to out-
rages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the
youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left
such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals
belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to
place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against
Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has been
exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it in-
cumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government
has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration
of the 31st March, 1909, and has acted in opposition to the will of
Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

20 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face
of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial
disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope
that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by
appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By
observing an attitude of good-will toward the political interests of
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the Kingdom
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its
own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of
this kind in the political ideas of Servia when, after the events of
1912, the Imperial and Royal Government by its disinterested and
ungrudging attitude, made so considerable an aggrandisement of Ser-
via possible.

The good-will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neigh-
bouring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the King-
dom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of
which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to the world
on the 28th of June last, when the heir apparent to the Monarchy and
his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched in Belgrade.

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade
with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary
movement which is menacing the security and integrity of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that, in tak-
ing this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of
all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon
to be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of
Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from
Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government
holds at the disposal of the Government to which you are accredited
a dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the con-
nection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of
June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Im-
perial and Royal Representatives accredited to the other signatory
Powers.

You are authorised to place a copy of this despatch in the hands
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 21

No. 9.
Count Berchtold to Count Men^dorff, London,

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 23, 1914.

As England is the most likely of the Entente Powers to be brought
to an unprejudiced judgment of our present move in Belgrade, I
request your Excellency to point out among other things in the con-
versation which you will have at the Foreign Office on the 24th
instant, following the presentation of the circular note, that it was
within the power of Servia to avert the serious steps she had reason
to expect from our side, if she had spontaneously begun within her
own territory proceedings against the Servian accomplices in the
murderous attack of the 28th of June, and to disclose the threads of
the plot, leading, as it has been proved, from Belgrade to Serajevo.

Until to-day the Servian Government, in spite of much notorious
circumstantial evidence pointing to Belgrade, not only has failed to
do anything of that sort, but even has endeavoured to efface the ex-
isting traces.

According to a telegraphic report from our Legation in Belgrade,
the Servian State employee Ciganovitch, who is compromised by the
corroborating depositions of the assassins, was still in Belgrade on
the day of the murder; but when his name appeared in the news-
papers three days later, he had left the town. At the same time the
head of the Servian Press Bureau declared Ciganovitch to be abso-
lutely unknown in Belgrade.

As to the short time-limit of our demands, it is based upon our
long-standing experience with Servian proficiency in procrastination.

We cannot allow our demands, which, as a matter of fact, do not
contain anything unusual in the intercourse between states which
ought to be living in peace and friendship, to become the object of
negotiations and compromises ; and, with due regard to our economic
interests, we cannot accept a political method which would enable
Servia to prolong the crisis at her pleasure.

22 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 10.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) London, July 24, 1914.

Circular note just presented to Sir Edward Grey, who perused
it attentively. With regard to No. 5 he asked for explanations, as
the installation of Austrian officials in Servia impressed him as
equivalent to the termination of Servia 's independent sovereignty. I
replied that cooperation of police officials, as in this instance, would
not infringe upon the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the brevity of the time-limit, which made it im-
possible to calm the first irritation and to induce Belgrade to give
us a satisfactory reply. There would be time enough for an ultimatum
should the answer prove unacceptable, he thought.

I explicitly pointed out our position. (Necessity to proceed
against subversive agitation which threatened parts of the Monarchy ;
defence of our most vital interests, most complete failure of the
conciliatory attitude we have shown up to now in our dealings with
Servia, which has had more than three weeks' time to institute a
spontaneous enquiry concerning complicity in the murder, and so on.)

The Secretary of State repeated his apprehension with regard to
the short time-limit, but he admitted that what has been said about
the complicity in the murder of Serajevo was justified, as are some
of our demands.

He would be quite willing to regard the whole affair as concerning
solely Austria-Hungary and Servia. Yet he is very "apprehensive"
of the possibility that several Great Powers might be involved in
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he remarked that
the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance are probably somewhat
similar to those of the Triplice. I explained at length our point
of view, and I repeated with emphasis that in this case we would
have to remain firm in order to get some guarantees, as Servian prom-
ises hitherto never have been redeemed. I could appreciate his con-
sidering primarily the effect of our act upon the peace of Europe, but
indicating that, in order to understand our point of view, he ought to
put himself in our place.

He did not wish to enter into a further discussion of this subject,
and said it would be necessary for him to study the note more care-
fully. As a preliminary step he will confer with the German and

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 23

the French Ambassadors, as he feels obliged to obtain an exchange
of views first of all with the allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia,
who, however, have no direct interests in Servia.

No. 11.

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 24, 1914.

Have just read your instructions of the 22nd instant to the
Minister of Justice, who is in charge of the affairs of the absent
Foreign Secretary, and left a copy with him. M. Bienvenu-Martin,
who was vaguely acquainted with our step in Belgrade through the
reports in this morning 's papers, seemed considerably impressed with
my information. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the
text, he readily admitted that recent events, and the attitude of the
Servian Government, have made our energetic intervention appear
intelligible.

Demand No. 5 of our note presented in Belgrade seemed especially
to strike the Minister, as he asked me to read it again. The Minister
thanked me for the communication, which, he said, would be studied
closely. I took the occasion to emphasise the point that the issue
was one to be dealt with exclusively by Servia and ourselves, but
that it would be to the general advantage of Europe if the unrest per-
petuated for years by the Servian agitation against us were, at last,
to be replaced by a clearly defined political situation. I pointed out
that all friends of peace and order, among whom I am counting
France in the foremost place, should earnestly advise Servia to
change her attitude fundamentally and to meet our legitimate de-
mands.

The Minister conceded that it is the duty of Servia to proceed
energetically against any accomplices of the assassins of Serajevo,
which duty she would not be likely to evade. Emphasising the sym-
pathy of France with Austria-Hungary, and the good relations be-
tween the two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy
would be settled peacefully and in accordance with our desires.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or defend the
attitude of Servia.

24 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 12.
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 24, 1914.

Baron Schoen, following out his instructions, will declare to-day
that our dispute with Servia is regarded by the Berlin Cabinet as
an affair concerning solely Austria-Hungary and Servia.

In connexion with this information, he will make it understood
that, should a third Power try to intervene, Germany, true to the
obligations of her Alliance, would be found on our side.

No. 13.
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 24, 1914.

Baron Schoen has just taken the step enjoined upon him. M.
Bienvenu-Martin told him that he could not yet give a definite reply,
although he was prepared to say at the outset that the French
Government shared our opinion that our controversy with Servia
concerned only Vienna and Belgrade, and that hopes were enter-
tained that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Servian Minister here has been advised that his Government
should yield on all points as much as possible, yet with the restriction :
"As long as her rights of sovereignty were not touched."

Baron Schoen emphasised the necessity, from the European point
of view, of eliminating, at last, the center of unceasing disturbance
in Belgrade.

No. 14.

Count Szdpdry to Count BercJitold.

(Telegram.) 8t Petershurgh, July 24, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs received me with the remark
that he knew the object of my visit, and declared that he would not

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 25

define his position at once. I began to read my instructions to him.
He first interrupted me when the series of murderous attempts was
mentioned. My explanation was met with the question whether it
had been proved that all those attempts originated in Belgrade. I
emphasised the fact that they were the outcome of Servian instiga-
tion. In the further course of the reading he remarked that he knew
what it all was about; that we intended to make war on Servia and
this was to be the pretext. I replied that our attitude during the
last few years was sufficient evidence that we neither sought nor
needed such pretexts. The solemn declarations demanded from Servia
did not evoke any objection from the Minister; he only repeated
again and again that Pasitch already had expressed himself in the
sense demanded by us, and interjected: "He will say that twenty-
five times if you wish. ' ' I told him that no one in Austria was trying
to infringe upon the integrity of Servia or her dynasty. M. Sazonow
most vigorously declared himself against the dissolution of the
"Narodna Odbrana," which he assured me Servia would never under-
take. The Minister also objected to the proposed cooperation of
Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the subversive
propaganda. Servia, then, he pointed out, would no longer be mistress
in her own house ! * ' After that you will want to interfere again and
again, and what will the life of Europe be like V he asked. I replied :
* ' It will be quieter than hitherto, if Servia shows some good- will. ' *

The observations with which I accompanied the reading of the
note were listened to by the Minister rather calmly. Our belief that
our feelings in the matter were shared by all civilised nations, he
declared to be erroneous. With all the emphasis of which I was
capable, I pointed out how deplorable it would be if we were to fail
to meet with a sympathetic response in Russia in a situation imperil-
ling all that was most sacred to us as well as to Russia, whatever the
Minister might choose to say. He endeavoured to belittle the
monarchical aspect of the question.

With regard to the dossier held at the disposal of the govern-
ments, M. Sazonow wondered why we had taken the trouble, since
we already had issued an ultimatum. This proved conclusively, to
his mind, that we did not desire an impartial investigation of the
case. I replied that the results of our own enquiry were sufficient to
justify our proceedings in an affair solely concerning Austria-Hun-
gary and Servia, but that, having nothing to conceal, we were quite
willing to furnish the Powers with all the information they might
desire.

26 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

M. Sazonow observed that, the ultimatum having been issued, he
had no further interest in the proffered information. He presented
the case in such a way as to make it appear that we were seeking a
war with Servia under any circumstances. I replied that we are the
most peace-loving Power in the world, and that all we want is to safe-
guard our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues and to pro-
tect our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of further discussion, M. Sazonow once more ihade
the remark that we had certainly created a serious situation. In
spite of the comparative calmness of the Minister's manner, his atti-
tude was throughout one of negation and antagonism.

No. 15.

Communique in the Russian Official Gazette.

St. PetersburgJi, July 24, 1914.
The St. Petersburgh Telegraphic Agency reports:
The Official Gazette publishes the following communication :
The Imperial Government, gravely alarmed by the surprising
events in Belgrade and by the ultimatum addressed to Servia by
Austria-Hungary, is following attentively the development of the
Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain
indifferent.

No. 16.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. PetersburgJi, July 24, 1914.

After the Ministers had been in session for five hours, M. Sazonow
received the German Ambassador in the course of the evening and
had a long conference with him.

The Minister, probably as a result of the meeting of the Cabinet,
advanced the opinion that the controversy between Austria-Hungary
and Servia was by no means a matter that could be confined to these
two States, but that it involved all Europe, inasmuch as the com-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 27

promise arrived at in consequence of the Servian declaration in 1909
had been brought about under the auspices of the whole of Europe.

The Minister stated emphatically that he was affected in a par-
ticularly unpleasant way by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary
had offered to submit a dossier for examination at a time when an
ultimatum already had been sent to Servia. Russia would demand
an international examination of the dossier which we had placed at
the Minister's disposal. My German colleague at once drew M.
Sazonow's attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary would not ac-
cept an intervention in her differences with Servia, nor would Ger-
many consent to a suggestion incompatible with the dignity of her
ally as a Great Power.

In course of the conversation the Minister stated that Russia
could not remain indifferent to Austria-Hungary's possible intention
to "devorer le Serbie" (absorb Servia). Count Pourtales retorted
that he did not assume such an intention on the part of Austria-
Hungary, and that any such purpose would be contrary to the
Monarchy's own interests. Austria-Hungary only considered it
necessary to inflict a fully deserved chastisement upon Servia. M.
Sazonow expressed his doubts as to whether Austria-Hungary would
abide by such a declaration.

The conversation ended with an appeal by M. Sazonow that
Germany cooperate with Russia for the maintenance of the peace.
The German Ambassador assured the Minister that Germany had no
desire to precipitate a war, but that she naturally would defend her
ally's interests without reservation.

No. 17.
Count BercTitold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Re: Your yesterday's telegram.

I request you to explain to Sir Edward Grey without delay that
our representations of yesterday at Belgrade should not be regarded
as a formal ultimatum, but merely as a note with a fixed time-limit.
You will give Sir Edward Grey the strictly confidential information,
that, for the time being, the interruption of diplomatic relations with
Servia and the beginning of the necessary military preparations would

28 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

be the only consequences if the time-limit should expire without
result. We are absolutely determined to exact satisfaction of our
legitimate demands.

You are authorised to declare that we shall, however, be compelled
to demand indemnification from Servia for all expenses incurred in
such military preparations, should Servia, after the expiration of
the stipulated time, yield only under the pressure of the aforesaid
preparations. It must be remembered that we already have had to
mobilise twice on account of Servia, namely, in 1908 and 1912.

No. 18.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburgh.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I received the Russian Charge d 'Affaires this forenoon, and ex-
plained to him that I made a special point of informing him as early
as possible of our step in Belgrade, and of acquainting him with our
point of view in this matter. Prince Kudascheff thanked me for this
mark of consideration, but did not conceal his uneasiness at our
summary proceeding toward Servia. He pointed out that it was
feared at St. Petersburgh that our action would involve the humilia-
tion of Servia, an event to which Russia could not remain indifferent.

I endeavoured to reassure the Russian Charge d 'Affaires on that
score. I explained that our object was to obtain a readjustment of
the intolerable attitude of Servia toward the Monarchy. For this
purpose we endeavoured to induce the Servian Government to make
public disavowal of the existing hostile agitation against the integrity
of Austria-Hungary, and to suppress it by administrative measures.
We also desired an opportunity to satisfy ourselves that the measures
adopted would be conscientiously carried out.

I emphasised the dangers which the continuation of the Great-
Servian propaganda involved, not only to Austria-Hungary's integ-
rity, but also to the equilibrium and the peace of Europe. I, more-
over, pointed out that the safety of all dynasties, and not least of
all, the Russian, would be threatened if the conviction were to spread
broadcast, that murder could be employed with impunity as a weapon
in a chauvinistic agitation.

Finally, I pointed out that we did not aspire to territorial ag-
grandisement, but merely desired the maintenance of the status quo;

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 29

a point of view that should be understood by the Russian Government.

Prince Kudascheff then observed that he was unfamiliar with
the views of his Government and he did not know what attitude
Servia would take with regard to several of the demands.

In concluding our interview the Charge d 'Affaires undertook to
bring to his Government's knowledge the explanations I had given
him concerning our action, and especially promised to mention our
assurance that we did not intend to humiliate Servia.

No. 19.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin,
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petershurgh and Constantinople.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

I have the honour to enclose herewith for you the dossier an-
nounced in the circular note to the Powers concerning the Pan-Servian
propaganda and its connexions with the Serajevo plot.

You will please communicate this dossier to the Government to
which you are accredited:

Memoir.

The movement emanating from Servia which aims at the detach-
ment of the Southern Slav parts of Austria-Hungary from the
Monarchy to unite them with Servia, extends far back into the past.

The propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in purpose,
varying merely as to means and intensity, reached its climax during
the crisis of the annexation. Divesting itself of the protecting cloak
of secrecy, this propaganda at that juncture emerged with an open
confession of its tendencies. Under the patronage of the Servian
Government, it strove to attain its object by every means at its dis-
posal. While on the one hand the entire Servian press clamoured
for war against the Monarchy in a series of broadsides wherein the
facts were maliciously distorted, on the other hand associations were
formed in preparation for a struggle. There were also other means
of propaganda.

The Narodna Odbrana was the most important among these.
Ostensibly organised as a private society, it was entirely dominated

30 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

by the Belgrade Foreign Office through the officers and State func-
tionaries on its roll of membership. Among its founders were the
following : General Bozo Jankovitch, former State Secretaries Ljuba
Jovanovitch, Ljuba Davidovitch and Velislav Vulovitch; Professor
Zivojin Dacitch (Barcitch), director of the State Printing Office, and
the then Captains, now Majors, Voja Tankositch and Milan Pribice-
vitch. This society devoted itself to the recruiting and equipment
of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy. (See Enclosure 2.)

As an illustration of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, the
deposition of Trifko Krstanovitch, a subject of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and a witness in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo, will
be of interest. This man was then in Belgrade and had been hired
by the Narodna Odbrana as a "Komitadji," together with other sub-
jects of the Monarchy. "With some hundred and forty other members
of this band, Krstanovitch at the beginning of 1909 had been enrolled
in a school established and managed by the Majors Voja Tankositch
and Dusan Putnik in Cuprija (County of Jagodina) for the instruc-
tion and equipment of armed bands of men. In it all the instructors
were Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovitch and Captain Milan
Pribicevitch made regular inspections of this three-months' course of
education in irregular warfare.

The future "Komitadjis" were there instructed in shooting,
bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railways, tunnels and
bridges, and the destruction of telegraph lines. It was their task to
apply their newly acquired knowledge in Bosnia and Herzegovina
under the orders of their commanders.

Through these activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which were
carried on openly and were supported by the Servian Government,
the guerrilla warfare against Austria-Hungary was organised. Sub-
jects of the Monarchy were induced to commit acts of treason against
their own country and were systematically trained to make treacher-
ous attacks upon the defences of their country as Servian emissaries.

This period of aggressions was terminated by the declaration of
the Servian Government on the 31st of March, 1909, wherein the
latter declared its willingness to abide by the new political order
created by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly
pledged itself to maintain friendly relations with the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy in the future.

This declaration seemed to mark the end of the movement against
Austria-Hungary, the source of so much unrest, and to point a path

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 31

to a really friendly approach between Servia and the Dual Monarchy.
Deprived of the assistance of the Servian Government, and checked
by the latter as in duty bound, the hostile propaganda would have
been reduced to a mere shadowy existence, sure to vanish.

In such an event the kinship of Servia with the Southern Slavs
in the Dual Monarchy by race, language and traditions, would have
stimulated a joint work of culture which would have been of common
value to both countries. But expectations in this direction were not
fulfilled.

The aspirations hostile to the Dual Monarchy remained in opera-
tion, and, under the very eyes of the Servian Government, which has
done nothing to suppress this movement, the propaganda against
Austria- Hungary was intensified. Rancor against the Dual Monarchy
was kept at a high pitch, and by new instigations was made im-
placable.

In the same old way, adapted to the changed conditions and
supplemented by new methods, the people of Servia were roused to a
struggle of extermination against Austria-Hungary. In a systematic
manner secret meshes were woven to and fro in the Southern Slav
districts of the Dual Monarchy, and the citizens of the latter were
corrupted to betray their country.

Above all other agencies, the Servian press has not ceased to
work in this direction. No less than 81 Servian publications had to
be excluded from Austria-Hungary because their contents were in
flagrant violation of the provisions of the domestic criminal code.

There was hardly a provision enacted for the protection of the
august person of the Sovereign, members of the dynasty and the
integrity of the State, which was not violated by Servian newspapers.
A few specimens of these too frequent press utterances, selected from
an abundant crop of such matter and referring to various periods,
are tabulated in Enclosure 1.

Without entering into a more minute discussion of these indi-
cations of public opinion in Servia, it must be stated that they habit-
ually referred to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act
of robbery committed against Servia and requiring remedy. This
view is not only repeated over and over in the ultra-radical papers
in all the degrees of filthy expression of which the Servian language
is capable, but it finds practically open utterance in the "Samou-
prava," a publication closely connected with the Belgrade Foreign
Office. (See lit. C of Enclosure 1.)

Attention must be directed likewise to the manner in which the

32 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Servian press treated the murderous plot of Bogdan Zerajitch on
June 15, 1910, in Serajevo against the Governor of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, General von Varesanin.

Zerajitch, as is known, committed suicide immediately after his
deed, having previously reduced all his papers to ashes. Under these
circumstances the motive of his plot could not be completely estab-
lished. However, from a badge found on him, one might infer that
he was a believer in Kropotkine's tenets. Investigation led to the
conclusion that the crime rested on Anarchist foundations.

The press of Servia, nevertheless, extolled the assassin as a Servian
national hero and glorified his deed. And the * * Politika ' ' even voiced
a solemn protest against the assumption that Zerajitch was an anar-
chist, claiming him as an * * heroic Serb whose name every Servian will
cherish with sorrow."

The day of the 18th of August of the same year (the birthday
of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty), was chosen as the
appropriate occasion by the "Politika" for a resumption of its dis-
cussion of the plot of Zerajitch, whose name is uttered by the people
as something sacred, and to publish a poem extolling this murderous
attempt (lit. A of Enclosure 1).

Thus this crime, which had nothing to do with Servian aspira-
tions to territories belonging to the Dual Monarchy, was utilised for
the propagation of subversive ideas. Through the glorification of
Zerajitch, murder was expressly commended as a model weapon in
the struggle to realise Servian ideas, and as a deed worthy of emula-
tion. This sanction of murder as a legitimate method in the fight
against the Dual Monarchy recurs later in the press comments on the
murderous attempt of Jukitch against the Royal Commissioner, M.
von Cuvay. (See lit. C of Enclosure 1.)

These sheets were not only circulated in Servia, but, as will be
shown hereafter, were also smuggled into the Monarchy through well
organised secret channels. It is these sheets that roused the masses
and made them fertile soil for the activities of the associations
antagonistic to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the focus of the agitation carried
on by various organisations. The persons who had been at the head
of this society at the time of the annexation were still its leaders.
Now, as then, the most untiring and active organisers were the most
violent enemies of the Dual Monarchy, to wit : General Bozo Janko-
vitch, Zivojin Dacitch, Director of the State Printing Office, and
the Majors Milan Pribicevitch and Voja Tankositch. In its broader

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 33

organisation, which was under a strict hierarchical rule (see Enclosure
2 under "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana soon included about
400 committees, all of which displayed a lively activity.

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna
Odbrana became the centre of an agitation to which the Sharp-
shooters' Association, including 762 societies; the Sokolbund, with
2,500 members; the Olympian Club, the Equestrian Society, "Knez
Mihajlo, ' ' the Jagerbund, the Kulturliga and numerous other societies
belonged. Owing to a constant mutual interchange, these organisa-
tions were practically amalgamated and to-day their membership
constitutes one body, the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana extended its close-meshed net of agita-
tion over the whole of Servia, drawing to itself everybody who proved
susceptible to the seduction of its ideas.

The spirit of the Narodna Odbrana is clearly disclosed by its
official publications.

Disguised by its articles of association as a cultural organisation,
concerned solely with the intellectual and physical development of the
population of Servia, as well as with its material betterment, the
Narodna Odbrana betrays the true and only reason for its existence,
by the publication in its organ of the following programme of re-
organisation : Under the pretext that the Dual Monarchy is seeking
to despoil Servia of "her freedom and language and crush her ut-
terly," the Odbrana pledges its members to preach to the people of
Servia, "fanatically and untiringly," the "holy truth" that the
waging of a war of extermination against Austria-Hungary, Servia 's
first and greatest enemy, is an imperative necessity ; that this war must
be carried on "with rifles and cannon," and that the people must be
put in readiness "in every way" for "the struggle to liberate the
oppressed territories where 7,000,000 of our enslaved brothers are
suffering." (See Enclosure 2.)

The "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana are completely
dominated by this idea. They are means to the end of organising
and educating the people for the longed-for struggle of extermination
against the Dual Monarchy.

The same spirit animates all the societies affiliated with the
Narodna Odbrana. The Sokol Societies in Kragujevac (see Enclo-
sure 3) are a case in point.

Like the Narodna Odbrana itself, these affiliated organisations
are under the direction of army officers, professors and state officials.
The opening address which the president of the society, Major

34 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Kovacevitch, delivered in 1914, at the annual meeting, omits all men-
tion of athletics, the main object of a Sokol Society, and deals ex-
clusively with the "preparations for the struggle" against the
"dangerous, heartless, lustful, hateful and greedy enemy in the
north, ' * who is ' ' depriving millions of Servian brothers of their free-
dom and rights and keeping them in slavery and chains."

In the report of the management of this society all references to
the nominal objects of its activities are relegated to the background.
The report only indicates the real aims of the executive committee,
to wit : the promotion of the national evolution and the strengthening
of the "suppressed people," to the end that they may carry out their
programme and accomplish that "great deed" which will be achieved
in the near future — "the liberation of the brothers across the Drina,
who are suffering the torments of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial report to sound a
warning that it is necessary to "train falcons" which would be able
"to bring freedom to the brothers not yet liberated."

Like the "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana, the "athletic
sports" of the Sokols are not an end in themselves but a
mere means to advance the same propaganda, which is carried
on with the same idea, and even with the use of almost identical
words.

The Narodna Odbrana, in inciting the "people" to the struggle
of extermination against the Dual Monarchy, appeals not only to the
masses in both Servia, but to all Southern Slavs. To the Narodna
Odbrana the Southern Slav territories of the Monarchy represent
"our conquered Servian dominions." (Also see Enclosure 4.) Thus,
the Southern Slav subjects of the Dual Monarchy are asked to par-
ticipate in this "national work," this "sound, vital work" beyond
the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana appeals for * ' heroes for
this holy struggle" on the soil of the Dual Monarchy, where Oblitch,
Sultan Murad's murderer, is pointed to as an example of national
devotion, worthy of imitation.

To spur on the "brothers outside of Servia" to participate in the
"work of private initiative," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close
touch with the ' ' brothers across the frontier. ' ' Nothing is said in the
official organs of the society about the nature of this connexion,
presumably because it belongs to that part of the "general work"
which, for manifold reasons, is not to be disclosed.

How extensive this branch of their activity is, however, can be
gathered from the fact that both the Central Committee of the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 35

Narodna Odbrana and some of its regional committees maintain their
departments "for Foreign Affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and of its
afl&liations is many-sided.

Relatively the least dangerous means of this agitation, because
amenable to the control of the authorities, are the lecture tours which
prominent members of the Narodna Odbrana undertake to south-
eastern parts of the Dual Monarchy, where they address various
societies on national and cultural subjects. On such occasions the
opportunity is offered to the lecturer to recruit more or less openly for
the above-mentioned societies, using words and expressions which
carry a hidden meaning to the initiated.

In the ranks of these emissaries the above-mentioned director of
the Servian State Printing Office, Zivojin Dacitch, plays a prominent
part. Zivojin Dacitch had issued a proclamation to the Servian peo-
ple on August 9, 1909, in which he designated Austria-Hungary as
Servia's enemy and exhorted the country to prepare for the war
against the Monarchy, He undertook many trips for purposes of
agitation to the southeastern parts of the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy. In one of these lectures, delivered in Karloci (1912), he
abandoned his usual caution and advocated the "union of all Serbs
against the common enemy." His references to Austria-Hungary in
this instance lacked nothing in clearness.

More menacing were the relations which the Servian societies,
imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana, entertained with
organisations in the Monarchy under cover of a unity of interests
and culture. The mutual visits of these societies, made either in a
body or by delegates, could not be controlled by the police and
authorities, and were utilised by Servia for the prosecution of many
plans hostile to the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, a delegate of the Narodna Odbrana at the
notorious celebration of the Prosvjeta Society in Serajevo (September,
1912), did not hesitate to secretly enlist Bosnian members for his
society. (See Enclosure 6.) The delegating of a representative of
the Sokol Society at Kragujevac to this celebration was meant to
convey this message to the "Brethren in Bosnia": "We have not
forgotten you; the wings of the falcons of the Sumadija are still
powerful." As to the proceedings at such meetings in Servia, it is
more difficult to report in detail. They are not under the control of
the Imperial and Royal authorities, which have to collect their infor-
mation at second-hand. (See Enclosure 3.) In this connexion the

36 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

visit of the students of Agram to Servia in April, 1912, may be re-
called. This event took on the aspect of a strongly suggestive demon-
stration, by reason of an official military reception and a review of
Servian troops in honour of the students. Not without justification
in fact did the report of the business manager of the Sokol Society at
Kragujevac refer to this event "as the beginning and germ of a great
deed which shall be performed in the nearest future," as "a seed
which will put forth shoots when the soul of the people shall have
been warmed to the task until there shall be no barriers which cannot
be torn down."

Only a short while ago the authorities of the Dual Monarchy
were apprised of the fact that the Servian Sokol Societies effected a
secret union with corresponding organisations in the Monarchy, of
which the exact character, pending investigation, is not yet clearly
established. Tentative results of this investigation indicate, however,
that herein has been traced one of the channels through which the
Servian Sokols and their friends are instilling their subversive aims
into the minds of beguiled and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This preliminary propaganda, affecting masses as a whole, is,
however, entirely overshadowed by the "foreign service work" per-
formed by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in their man-to-man
canvass. This is the ground where the most deplorable results of
the movement are evidenced. Through its secret emissaries and
trusted agents, the agitation has stirred up unthinking youths as well
as adults. Thus, Milan Pribicevitch induced the former Honved
officers, V.B., D.K., V.N. and V.K., the last named a lieutenant in
the Croatian-Slavonian gendarmerie, to desert the army of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy under serious circumstances, and to flee to
Servia. True it is that they have been disappointed in their hopes
and some of them would gladly return to the country which they
betrayed.

The agitation developed by Servia in the middle schools in Croatia
and Bosnia is unfortunately too well known to require exemplifica-
tion. It is probably not so well known, however, that those expelled
from Croatian and Bosnian schools for gross breaches of discipline
are welcomed with open arms in Servia, often subsidised by the State
and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. Servian schools with their
anti-Austro-Hungarian text-books and maps, and the large number
of professors and teachers belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, lend
themselves admirably to the training of these adepts. The following
is a notable instance of this sort : In March, 1914, several pupils of

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 37

the training college for elementary teachers in Pakrac (Croatia) had
to be expelled on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where
some of them immediately obtained appointments as teachers, while
others were admitted to a training college for teachers. Affiliating
with people hostile to the Monarchy, one of these expelled school
strikers publicly declared that he and his friends, on the occasion
of the visit to Bosnia of the heir apparent, would produce convincing
proofs that Bosnia was a Servian land. It must seem at least strange
that the Royal Servian District Prefect and Krajna issued Servian
passports to three of these compromised students at the time of the
visit of Archduke Francis Ferdinand to Bosnia, in which they were
falsely designated as Servian subjects, although he could not have
helped being aware of their Croatian citizenship. Provided with these
passports, the three undergraduate teachers were able to enter, un-
recognised, the territory of the Monarchy, where eventually they were
identified and arrested.

These activities, however, do not exhaust the full scope of the
"foreign" work of the Narodna Odbrana. For some time past the
Imperial and Royal Government has had confidential information
that military preparations were being made for the longed-for-war
against Austria-Hungary and that Servian emissaries in the Dual
Monarchy were under orders to destroy means of transportation and
communication, after the manner of guerrilla fighters, and to kindle
revolts and cause panics in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.
(See Enclosure 7.)

The criminal prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his confederates
in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo in 1913 for the crime of
espionage (see Enclosure 6) has produced evidence confirming this
confidential information.

As at the time of its establishment, the Narodna Odbrana still
has on its programme the preparation of a warfare of bands, supple-
mented by the development of a system of espionage. To-day the
so-called "reorganised programme" of the Narodna Odbrana is in
truth of broader scope, including the organisation of the so-called
"war of extermination" against the Monarchy and the unfurling of
the * * old red flag of the Narodna Odbrana. ' *

Here, it will be seen, an atmosphere of hatred, promoted openly
and secretly against the Dual Monarchy, prevailed. Coupled with it
was an irresponsible agitation, availing itself of any means in the
struggle against Austria-Hungary and remorselessly advocating com-
mon murder as the most efficient weapon. It is evident that out of

38 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

such conditions acts of terrorism would be born, even without
the active cooperation of anti-Austro-Hungarian individuals from
Servia.

On June 8th, 1912, Luka Jukitch fired a shot at M. von Cuvaj,
the Royal Commissioner, which fatally injured Councillor von
Hervoitch, who was seated next to him in the carriage. In his flight
Jukitch shot down a police officer who was pursuing him, and wounded
two others.

The views expressed by Jukitch at the public hearing of his case,
were in full accord with the basic ideas and plans circulated by the
Narodna Odbrana. Although Jukitch had been brooding over his
murderous schemes for some time, these projects really matured when
he joined the pilgrimage of students from Agram to Belgrade on
April 18th, 1912. During the celebrations given in honour of the visi-
tors, Jukitch came in close touch with various persons within the
sphere of the Narodna Odbrana and he had political discussions with
them. A few days later Jukitch was again in Belgrade, where a
Servian Major handed him a bomb and another sympathiser a
Browning pistol, with which he carried out his attempt at murder.

The bomb which was found in Agram had been, in the opinion of
experts, manufactured for military purposes in an arsenal.

Jukitch 's attempt was a matter of recent memory when Stefan
Dojcitch, who came from the United States to Agram, made a
murderous attack in Agram on August 18th, 1913, upon the Royal
Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz — an act born of the "foreign" agita-
tion carried on by the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates among
the Southern Slavs in America.

The pamphlet, "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," published in Chi-
cago by the Serb, T. Dimitrijevitch, contains unbridled invectives
against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and an appeal to
the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy to leave America and return to Servia
for the impending "liberation." This publication shows a remarkable
parallelism between the unrestrained propaganda carried on by Servia
in America and the agitation carried on by Servia in the territories
of the Dual Monarchy.

Hardly a year later Agram was again the scene of a murderous
attempt of this kind, which happily failed. On May 20th, 1914, Jacob
Schafer attempted to kill the Banus, Baron Skerlecz, in the Agram
theatre, which attempt was frustrated at the last moment by a police
officer. The ensuing investigation uncovered a plot, of which the soul
was Rudolf Hereigonja. The depositions of Hereigonja and his five

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 39

co-defendants made it plain that this plot also had originated in
Servia.

Having participated in an unsuccessful attempt to free the above-
mentioned Jukitch, Hercigonja had fled to Servia (October, 1912)
where he and his accomplice, Marojan Jaksitch, associated constantly
with ''Komitadjis" and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As in so
many other instances where premature dabbling in politics had driven
youthful minds to frenzy, the result of this corrupting intercourse
proved disastrous. Hercigonja brought home the dogma preached
in Belgrade, that the Southern Slav districts of Austria-Hungary
must be detached from the Monarchy and united with the Kingdom
of Servia. In this connexion he had acquired the notion from his
associations in Servia that this end could be attained solely by the
perpetration of murderous plots against persons of high rank and
leading statesmen of the Dual Monarchy.

Hercigonja sought to instil these ideas into the minds of his
friends in Agram, some of whom he won over to his cause. In the
foreground of his programme was an attempt upon the life of Arch-
duke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne.

A few months previously, proceedings in connexion with a
propaganda of high treason had been instituted against Luka Al-
jinovitch. In the course of the investigation three witnesses had
deposed that Aljinovitch had declared in their presence that in 1913
he had received 100 dinars from the Narodna Odbrana and a like sum
from a secret association of students for purposes of agitation and
especially for an attack upon Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

These incidents indicate how the criminal activities of the Narodna
Odbrana and its sympathisers had lately converged upon the person
of the Archduke and heir apparent to the throne.

All these disclosures point to the conclusion that the Narodna
Odbrana and the anti-Austrian circles affiliated with it in Servia,
deemed that the time had come to translate their teachings into
deeds.

It is noteworthy, however, that in these activities the Narodna
Odbrana confined itself to furnishing the impulses for deeds of vio-
lence, and, when its seeds had sunk into fertile ground, to supplying
the material means for their commission; but that it left the dan-
gerous role of the "propaganda of deeds" solely to the misled youth
of the Dual Monarchy, who had to bear the full burden of their
sorry "heroism."

All the features of this method we find in the history of the

40 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

origin of the deplorable murder plot of June 28, 1914 (see Enclosure
8). Princip and Grabez are types of the youth whose minds had
been poisoned in school by the teaching of the Narodna Odbrana.

In Belgrade, associating with a circle of students nourished upon
these ideas, Princip conceived schemes to assassinate Archduke Francis
Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of all Servian elements antago-
nistic to the Dual Monarchy had turned under the impetus of his
visit to the annexed provinces.

Princip was joined by Gabrinovitch, a member of the same circles,
whose erratic radical-revolutionary views had developed, according
to his own admissions, under the influence of his surroundings in
Belgrade and through perusal of Servian papers. Thus Gabrinovitch
also drifted into ways hostile to the Monarchy and adopted the
theories of "the propaganda of deeds." Thanks to his antecedent
dispositions, Grabez also quickly succumbed to the influence of these
surroundings, which he had entered later.

But, howsoever far the matter may have developed and howsoever
flrm the determination of the conspirators may have been to carry
out the plot, it would never have materialised, had not other persons
supplied the means for its accomplishment, as in the case of Jukitch.
Princip and Gabrinovitch at their trial admitted that they had neither
weapons nor money of their own.

It is interesting to note the quarters where the confederates tried
to get their weapons. Milan Pribicevitch and Zivojin Dacitch, these
two notorious leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, were the first whom
they thought of as helpers in their hour of need, apparently because
in the circle of would-be-murderers and plotters it had become a
tradition to procure murderous weapons from those representatives
of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these
two men were not in Belgrade at the critical time frustrated this
plan ; Princip and Gabrinovitch had no difficulty, however, in finding
other helpers in the person of Milan Ciganovitch, a former "Komi-
tadji" and now an official of the Central Servian State Railway in
Belgrade, another active member of the Narodna Odbrana who had
made his first appearance in its history as the graduate of a school
for the training of bands in Cuprija in 1909. (See Enclosure 5.)
Nor were they disappointed in Ciganovitch, who immediately gave
them the required supplies.

Ciganovitch with his friend, the Servian Major Voja Tankositch,
likewise a leader of the Narodna Odbrana and a former director of
the school of bands in Cuprija (see Enclosure 5), became now the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 41

intellectual leaders and promoters of the plot which they seemed
to approve with an indifference characteristic of the moral qualities
of the whole movement aimed at the Dual Monarchy. They had only
one doubt in the beginning, and that was whether the three conspira-
tors had firmly made up their minds to risk the deed. This hesita-
tion, however, was soon overcome by the suggestive cooperation of
the two Servian officials. Tankositch secured four Brownings with
ammunition, and money for travelling expenses; six hand grenades
from the Servian army stores supplemented this equipment, which
in kind and origin invites comparison with the conditions in the
Jukitch case. To make certain the success of the plot, Tankositch
ordered that the conspirators be instructed in marksmanship, which
task Ciganovitch assumed with a success now realised but too well.
Special anxiety was evinced by both Tankositch and Ciganovitch in
insuring secrecy about the plot. They supplied cyanide of potassium,
with instructions that the perpetrators commit suicide with it after
they should have performed their task. This precaution was to the
sole advantage of the instigators of the deed, as the preservation of
the secret would eliminate even the small risks which they had to
assume in the undertaking. Certain death to the victims of its wiles,
and complete security for themselves — such is the usual usage of the
Narodna Odbrana.

To render possible the carrying out of the murder scheme, bombs
and weapons had to be smuggled into Bosnia. Ciganovitch again
acted as the helper, minutely designating to the conspirators the
roads which they should follow and enlisting the cooperation of the
Servian frontier authorities to pass them into Bosnia. The manner
of the organisation of this passage, which even Princip found
"mysterious," leaves no doubt of the fact that this was a well pre-
pared and often utilised road for the secret purposes of the Narodna
Odbrana.

In a matter-of-fact way which indicates long-established habit,
the frontier captains at Schabatz and Loznica placed their entire
staffs and administration at the disposal of the authors of the scheme.
This mysterious means of travel, with its elaborate system of constantly
changing guides, always ready on the spot, as if by magic, when
they were needed, worked without a hitch. Without even inquiring
into the object of this unusual trip of a few immature students, the
Servian authorities, at the behest of the former "Komitadji" and
subordinate railway employee, Ciganovitch, set the machinery of
their offices running smoothly for the accomplishment of the task.

42 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

There was, of course, no need of questions, as the instructions which
they had received made it quite clear to them that another "mission"
of the Narodna Odbrana was to be carried out. The sight of the
arsenal of bombs and revolvers elicited merely a benevolently approv-
ing smile from Grbitch, the customs officer on duty, which goes to
show that on this "road" the sight of such contraband was quite
customary.

The Royal Servian Government has assumed a heavy load in
allowing all this to happen. Pledged to neighbourly and friendly re-
lations with Austria-Hungary, it has permitted its press to dis-
seminate hatred against the Dual Monarchy. It has permitted the
establishment, upon its soil, of organisations designed to conduct a
revolutionary campaign against a neighbouring State, under the lead-
ership of high military and civil officials, teachers and judges. It
has not suppressed the activities of men holding high posts in the
State administration, who poisoned the national conscience to an
extent that has made common assassination appear to be a com-
mendable weapon.

(ENCIiOSURE 1.)

Servian Press Comments.

(a) On the occasion of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Maj-
esty's 80th birthday, on August 18, 1910, the "Politika" published
a large picture of Bogdan Zerajitch, who two months before this had
attempted to murder Baron Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia. The
accompanying article ran as follows : ' ' Two months ago, on June 2nd,
on the very day of the opening of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diet, a
Servian youth, the student Bogdan Zerajitch, attempted to murder
the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serajevo, General Marian
Varesanin, Zerajitch fired five shots at this renegade, who had as-
sured his career in the famous uprising in Rakovica by shedding the
blood of his own brethren. Owing to a peculiar accident, the at-
tempt to kill him was unsuccessful. Thereupon brave Zerajitch, with
the sixth and last bullet, blew his brains out and instantly fell dead.

"In Vienna they knew full well that Zerajitch had not been
prompted to attempt this murder by reading Russian and revolu-
tionary writings. He had done this as a noble scion of a people,

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 43

which in this bloody manner desired to protest against foreign
rule. For this reason they tried to hush up the whole matter as
quickly as possible and — also against their habit — tried to avert a
trial, which would have compromised the Austrian Government in
Bosnia and Herzegovina even more. In Vienna, the desire was ex-
pressed that the memory of Zerajitch be blotted out and that sig-
nificance be denied to his murderous attempt. It is this fear of Zera-
jitch dead and the ban placed on his name throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which has exalted his memory among the people as that
of a saint — ^to-day, on August 18th, perhaps more than ever. On this
day we also light a candle on his grave and cry: 'Honour to Zera-
jitch!'"

Here are appended some verses which in rough translation run
as follows:

** Bosnia lives, death not yet has come unto her;
In vain her body have you entombed;
A fettered victim, she still flashes her fire.
Time is not yet to intone her dirge.
"With devilish hands you scratched upon the grave,
Yet will the living dead not go down to rest.
Emperor, harkst Thou? In the flash of the gun
Those bullets of lead how they whiz by Thy Throne ;
Not slaves they; no, 'tis freedom divine
Shining forth from the brave hand of the conquered.
Why quaketh thus that terrible Golgotha?
In defence of Christ, Peter drew his sword.
His hand fell, but from his blood
A thousand more brave hands will rise;
Yon shot was but the first messenger
Of the Servian Easter that shall follow Golgotha's pain."

(b) On October 8, 1910, on the anniversary of the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "Politika" and "Mali Journal," the
latter with black borders, published violent attacks upon Austria-
Hungary.

"Europe must take note that the Servian people still thirst for
revenge." "The day of revenge must arrive; the feverish efforts of
Servia to organise her army are a token of this accounting to come,
as is the hatred of the Servian people for the neighbouring Mon-
archy."

44 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Such were some of the expressions used by these journals.

On the same occasion the "Samouprava" on October 9, 1910,
said: "Invective and excesses are not the effective expression of
genuine patriotism. It is solely through calm and dignified work that
the goal can be reached."

(c) On April 18, 1911, the "Politika" wrote: "With the ex-
ception of a few cynics nobody in Servia would look with favour upon
a visit of King Peter to Vienna or Budapest. The annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina has once for all shattered even the semblance
of friendship between Servia and Austria-Hungary. This every Ser-
vian feels."

(d) The "Belgradske Novine" on April 18, 1911, wrote as fol-
lows: "Most of the men close to the Government disapprove King
Peter's projected visit to Emperor Francis Joseph. The storm of
indignation which stirred all Servians because of this proposed trip
of the King, is quite natural."

(e) The "Mali Journal" of April 19, 1911, has this to say:
* ' King Peter 's visit to the Sovereign of Austria-Hungary would mean
an insult to all Servia. Through this visit Servia would lose her
claim to Piemont's part. Servia 's interests can never be identified
with Austria's interests."

(f) On April 23, 1911, the "Politika," "Mali Journal," "Tri-
buna," "Belgradske Novine" and "Veeernje Novosti" thus comment
on the proposed visit of King Peter to the court of Vienna: "Be-
tween Servia and Austria-Hungary there never can be friendship.
King Peter's proposed visit means, therefore, 'an infamous capitula-
tion,' *a humiliation to Servia,' *a solemn sanction of all the crimes
and misdeeds committed by Austria-Hungary against Servia and the
Servian people.' "

(g) On April 18, 1912, the "Trgovinski Glasnik" publishes an
editorial entitled "Austria's Collapse," which reads in part: "In
Austria-Hungary there is ruin in every direction. What is happen-
ing beyond the Danube and Save is no longer a German, Magyar,
Bohemian or Croatian crisis, but a general Austrian crisis, a crisis
of the dynasty itself. We Servians view with satisfaction such a
course of affairs in Austria."

(h) In an article entitled "The Frontiers of Albania" the "Bal-
kan" attacks Austria-Hungary as follows: "If Europe is too weak
to call a halt on Austria, Montenegro and Servia will do so by shout-
ing to Austria : * Stop ; you shall go no further. ' War between Aus-
tria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dismembered the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 45

Turkish Empire; we shall likewise rend Austria asunder. We have
ended one war ; now we are facing another. ' '

(i) The **Vecernje Novosti," April 22, 1913, publishes a plea
to the travelling Servian public and Servian business men to boycott
the Danube steamship company. It says: "Nobody should travel
on the ships of this Austrian company, nor should anybody transport
cargo on them. Whoever does this, should be fined by a committee.
The fines would go into the fund of the Komitadjis, which is to be
utilised in the coming war with Austria."

(k) The "Tribuna," May 26, 1914, on the occasion of Austria-
Hungary's occupation of Ada Kaleh, publishes the following: "Crim-
inal black-and-yellow Austria has again played a burglar's trick.
She is a thief, who, if she cannot steal a whole bag of money, contents
herself with one dinar."

(1) On June 10, 1913, on the anniversary of the attempted
murder of the Royal Commissioner in Agram by the student Luka
Jukitch, Servian papers published commemorative articles. Says the
"Pravda" in one article: "It must hurt the soul to its depths that
not everybody has acted as our Jukitch did. We have Jukitch no
more, but we have hatred and anger ; we have to-day ten millions of
Jukitch. We are firmly convinced that Jukitch, through the window
of his prison, will soon hear freedom's last gunshot."

(m) "Mali Journal," October 7, 1913, published an editorial,
wherein the right of existence is denied to Austria-Hungary and all
Slavic nationalities are called upon to second the offensive war, which
Servia planned to start soon.

(n) The "Piemont," October 8, 1913, has this to say on the
anniversary of the annexation: "To-day five years have elapsed
since an Imperial decree extended the sceptre of the Habsburgs
over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people of Servia will feel the
pain inflicted upon them on this date for many another decade. Hu-
miliated and bereft, the Servian people moaned in despair. The na-
tion made vows to wreak vengeance and to win freedom by heroic
measures. This day has come again to rouse the slackened energies
of the race. To-day, Servian graves dot the ancient Servian coun-
tries; Servian cavalry is treading on the battlefields of Macedonia
and Old-Servia. The people of Servia, having finished their task in
the South, now turn in the opposite direction, whence the moans
and anguish of the Servian brother come to them, and where the
gibbet is set up. Servian soldiers, to-day, fighting these Albanians,
stirred up in Dusan's Empire by the State which took Bosnia and

46 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Herzegovina from us, have vowed that they will proceed in a similar
way against the 'Second Turkey,' as they have dealt by God's help
with the Turkey of the Balkans. They take this pledge, confident
that the day of vengeance is approaching. One Turkey has disap-
peared. The good God of Servia will grant that the 'Second Turkey'
shall also disappear."

(o) The "Mali Journal" of November 4, 1913, publishes this:
"Any thought of a reconciliation with Austria-Hungary is equivalent
to treason against the people of Servia. Servia must reckon with the
facts and forever bear in mind that Austria-Hungary is her dan-
gerous enemy and that to fight that monarchy must be the most
sacred duty of every Servian Government."

(p) Thus the "Pravda" of January 14, 1914: "Our new year's
wishes go first to our not yet liberated brothers, groaning under an
alien yoke. Servians may well persevere ; after Kossovo came Kuma-
novo, and our victorious march is not yet ended."

(q) The "Novosti" of January 18, 1914, published a picture of
the religious ceremony of the blessing of the waters in Bosnia, in
connexion with the following text: "Servians maintain their cus-
toms without modification even in lands which groan under foreign
rule, until the day of freedom shall find them united in enthusiasm. ' '

(r) The "Zastava" in the issue of January, 1914, admits that
"Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Serbs to revolution."

(s) The "Mali Journal" of March 9, 1914, has this to say:
"Servia can never forget the rattling of Francis Ferdinand's sabre
on the occasion of the Scutari affair."

(t) The "Zastava," April 4, 1914, publishes this: "The
Austrian statesmen who promote a policy of hatred, a policy of
bureaucrats, not a far-reaching policy, are themselves bringing about
the ruin of their state."

(u) The "Pravda" of April 8, 1914, makes the following com-
ment: "Austria has lost all rights to existence."

(v) In the Easter issues (April, 1914), all Servian papers express
hope that their ' ' unliberated, conquered and oppressed brethren may
soon celebrate a glad resurrection."

(w) The "Tribuna" of April 23, 1914, says: "The Pacifists
have discovered a new slogan: that of 'Europe's patriotism.' This
programme can be carried out only if Austria is divided."

(x) The "Mali Journal" of May 12, 1914, says: "What is a
crime in private life Austria calls politics. History knows only one
monster, and that monster is Austria."

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 47

(Enclosure 2.)

Extract from tJie "Narodna Odbrana," tJie Official Organ of the
Society of tJie Same Name, Published by the Central Committee of
That Society. (Narodna Odbrana, izdanje stredisnog odbora Nar-
odna Odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija ^'Davidovic,"
Decanska ulica br. 14. Ljub. Davidovica.)

In a brief preface to this pamphlet it is pointed out that the
publication "does not represent a complete, exhaustive analysis of
the total general work of the Narodna Odbrana, as for many reasons
it neither should nor could do that."

This publication is divided into three parts, the first of which
consists of fourteen Chapters setting forth a sort of programme,
while the second contains a report on the activity of the society and
the third consists of sample rules for the organisation of similar
societies beyond the frontiers of Servia.

In Chapter I., entitled * ' Genesis and Activity of the first Narodna
Odbrana," it is pointed out that this society was the outcome of
the popular movement which swept over Servia after the annexa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had the following object:

(1.) To arouse, encourage and strengthen national sentiment.

(2.) To enroll and recruit volunteers.

(3.) To form volunteer-units and prepare them for armed action.

(4.) To collect voluntary contributions in money and supplies
for the realisation of the task.

(5.) To organise, equip and drill special irregular troops ("com-
mittees") for special, independent warfare.

(6.) To institute movements in all other ways for the defence
of the Servian people.

In connexion with the above, it is pointed out that on account
of the recognition by the Great Powers of the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, a stop was put to the work of the society, whereupon
under the by-laws the programme of the Odbrana was reorganised
and a new work was started in order that the "old, red war-flag of
the Narodna Odbrana might again be unfurled" if a similar situation
should arise.

In Chapter II., entitled "The New Narodna Odbrana of To-day,"
is the following passage :

"Experience taught us in the days of the annexation that Servia
was not prepared for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon

48 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

her. The struggle which Servia has to assume is more serious and
difficult than was thought. The annexation was merely one of the
blows dealt to this country by the enemies of Servia. It was a blow
preceded by many other blows, which will be followed by still others.
In order that a new surprise attack may not find Servia in an equally
unprepared state, it is necessary to prepare ourselves for work."

The preparation of the people for a forward movement in all
directions of national work in conformity with the requirements of
modern times, is set down as the object of this "work" in which the
mass of the people must take part. As a means to attain this end,
a strengthening of national consciousness, athletic sport, economic
and hygienic welfare, the raising of the level of culture, etc., are
conspicuously enjoined upon the individual and upon the society,
next to the state itself.

, In Chapter III., "The Three Chief Problems," it is declared that
the annexation taught that the national consciousness in Servia was
not so strong as it should be in a country which, with a population
of less than three millions, constituted the hope and mainstay of
seven millions of the subjugated Serb people. The first problem of
the society was, therefore, to strengthen the national consciousness.
The second problem was the promotion of physical training; the
third was to accomplish the goal of proper valuation of these sporting
activities.

In the fourth chapter, "About Shooting," the value of a good
training in marksmanship, especially for the Servian contingents, is
emphasised, inasmuch as there the military training lasts only six
months. These remarks conclude with the sentence:

"A new blow like the annexation must be met by a new Servian
people, in which every Serb, from childhood to old age, must be a
sharpshooter. ' '

Chapter V., which treats of "The Relation of the Narodna Od-
brana to the Sokol Societies, ' ' begins with a general discussion of the
conditions for the strength of States in culture and political life.
In this connexion the decline of Turkey is pointed out, and it is
added :

"The old Turks of the South are disappearing little by little, and
only a part of our people still suffer under their rule. But new Turks
come from the North, more terrible and more dangerous than the
old. Stronger in culture and economically, the northern enemies at-
tack us. They wish to deprive us of our freedom, to suppress our
language, to crush us. The preliminary symptoms of the approach-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 49

ing struggle are perceptible. The Servian people face the question,
'To be or not to be.' "

' ' What Do We Desire in the Lectures ? " is the heading of chapter
VII., the gist of which is summed up in the sentences :

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were more or
less lectures of agitation. The programme of our new work was de-
veloped. At every lecture the annexation was spoken about, the old
Narodna Odbrana and the tasks of the new. The lectures will never
cease to be lectures of agitation, but they will always develop more
and more into individual channels and concern themselves with every
question of our social and national life."

Chapter VIII., "Woman's activity in the Narodna Odbrana," IX.,
"Work with reference to details and secondary matters," and X.,
"Renaissance of the Association," while referring to the task of the
Narodna Odbrana, deal with the preparation and intensification of
the association's activity, and with the necessity of regenerating in-
dividuals, the nation and the state.

Chapter XI., "New Obiliteh* and Singjelitch," says by way of
introduction :

"It is a mistake to assert that Kossovo is a thing of the past. We
are in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo to-day is the darkness and
ignorance in which our people live. The other reasons for the new
Kossovo exist on our borders at the north and west: The Germans,
Austrians, and Swabians (Schwabas), with their encroachment upon
our Slav and Serb South."

The heroic deeds of Obiliteh and Singjelitch are pointed out, and
the necessity of self-sacrifice in the service of the nation, and it is
added: "The national cause involves sacrifices, namely, in Turkey
and Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities,
thrown into prison, and brought to the gallows. For this battle
against darkness and ignorance, too, such heroes are needed. The
Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the battle with rifles and
cannon against the Schwabas and our other enemies our people will
furnish a host of heroes. But the Narodna Odbrana is not satisfied

* Milos Obiliteh (also Kobiliteh), Servian tradition tells, crept into the
Turkish camp after the battle of Kossovopolie, or Kossovo, and murdered Sultan
Murad, {cf. von Kallay, "History of the Serbs," Vol. I.).

Stephan Singjelitch, Knez of Resara, played a part in the Servian revolt of
1807-1810, In 1809 Singjelitch defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the
Turks, and it is said that when he realised he was no match for the superior
forces opposed to him numerically, he blew up his position and part of his men,
together with many Turks, (von Kallay, "The History of the Servian Revolt").

50 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

with that, for it regards the present so-called peaceful relations as
a state of war, and calls for heroes likewise for this struggle which
we are waging in Servia and beyond the border. ' *

Chapter XII. is headed "The Union with the Brothers and
Friends," and its significance is suggested by the following sen-
tences :

"Among the main problems of the Narodna Odbrana is that of
maintaining the union with our near and distant brothers beyond the
border and the rest of our friends in the world. By the word 'people'
the Narodna Odbrana is meant our entire race, not only those in
Servia. It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the
brothers outside of Servia to more active participation in the work
of private initiative in order that the new upward movement to-day
for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana shall proceed
in common in all Serb territories."

In Chapter XIII., which is headed "Two Important Problems,"
occurs the following:

"Inasmuch as we take the ground that through the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the encroachment upon our territories
from the north has been fully revealed, the Narodna Odbrana regards
Austria-Hungary as our greatest enemy." This work (namely, to
designate Austria to the Servian people as its greatest enemy) is
regarded by the society as a vitally necessary task, as its funda-
mental duty. Then the book continues :

"As once upon a time the Turks poured in upon us from the
south, so Austria-Hungary to-day is attacking us from the north. If
the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of a war against Austria-
Hungary, it is preaching a holy truth of our national situation."

The hatred arising as a result of this propaganda, it is pointed
out, is not to be regarded as the goal, but as a natural phase of the
work whose purpose is independence and freedom. If hereby hatred
against Austria is engendered, it is Austria who sowed it through its
course, a course which "makes necessary the war against Austria
until that Monarchy is exterminated. ' '

The modern conception of the national idea is extolled, and it is
remarked that in talking about "deliverance and union" too much
work is done with phrases. The people must be told :

"The liberation of our alienated Serb territories and their union
with Servia is necessary for our gentlemen, our merchants, our farm-
ers, for the most fundamental requirements of culture and trade,
for space and for bread. Recognising this, the people wiU lay a hand

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 51

to the national work with a will and great self-sacrifice. Our people
must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for the latter,
not only out of pity for the brothers there suffering, but also for
the sake of trade and for an outlet to the sea."

The **two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then summed up
in the following closing sentences: "Besides the task of explaining
to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna
Odbrana has the more important task of carrying home to the people,
with complete preservation of the holy national memories, this new
healthy conception, so mighty in its results, of nationalism and of
work for freedom and union."

Chapter XIV., the concluding division, opens with an appeal to
the Government and the people of Servia to prepare with all means
for the conflict "which the annexation foreshadowed."

In these passages the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are once
more recapitulated:

' ' Since the Narodna Odbrana works in accordance with the spirit
of the time and in conformity with the altered circumstances, main-
taining at the same time all connexions that were formed at the time
of the annexation, it is the same to-day as it was then. It is to-day
Odbrana (defence) ; it is also to-day Narodna (of the people). To-
day, too, it rallies to its banners the citizens of Servia as it did at
the time of the annexation. At that time the cry was for war; to-
day the cry is for work; at that time meetings, demonstrations,
volunteer committees, rifles, and bombs were called for ; to-day silent,
fanatical, indefatigable work is required, and more work in the di-
rection of the tasks and duties which we have indicated, as temporary
preparation for the battle with rifle and cannon that will come. * '

On the subject of the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana, this
annual report of the society contains the following:

A central Committee with its seat at Belgrade conducts all the
minutes of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Na-
rodna Odbrana are subordinate to this. The Central Committee is
divided into four sections: for educational work, for physical train-
ing, for financial collection, and for foreign affairs.

District committees, whose headquarters are at places where there
are political authorities, direct the affairs of the respective districts.

Town societies are the directing organisations in the individual
towns.

Trusted men are to be found in those places within the country
where there is no need of forming a committee.

52 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Societies which "stand in closest relations with the work of the
organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the lat-
ter are: the Sharpshooters' Union, with 762 societies; the Sokol Union,
''Dusan Silni," with 2,500 members; the Olympic Club, the Riding
Society, "Knez Mihaljo"; the Hunters' Union and the Culture
League.

All these societies are similarly organised as the Narodna Od-
brana, utilise the quarters of the latter, namely, society houses,
libraries, etc. ; prominent members of these societies are chairmen of
committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

(Enclosure 3.)

Extract from the "Report of the Activities of the Sokol Society Dusan
Silni in Kragujevac in the Years 1912 and 1913." {Kragujevac,
*'Buducnost" Press, Tih. Lekitch, 1914.)

At the head of this report appears the address with which the
President of the society, the Royal Servian Major Kovacevitch,
greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914:

"It is known to you that the Sokol institution, born in the battle
against Germanism, is a purely Slavic institution, which pursues the
aim of uniting all Slav brothers, to inspire them with enthusiasm and
through education and force to prepare for the battle against the
foe of Slavdom.

"We Serbs, as a part of the great Slav community, have adopted
the Sokol idea and joined hands in the common work for our own
welfare and that of our brothers.

"We Serbs, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokol,
for we wish to revive the weary and exhausted, to strengthen the
weak and anxious, to free the captives and the enchained. We have
done this both at present and in former wars. We have delivered a
part of our brothers from the arrogance of the enemy in the south.
We have torn away their chains, have freed them from pain, and
have given them freedom so that in it they may enjoy happiness,
equality, and fraternity."

After some words of praise of this "noble work" which realised
a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevitch continued:

"But, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the north is more

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 53

dangerous and heartless because economically and culturally he is
stronger.

"This enemy is insatiable in his lust; he holds millions of our
brothers in chains and slavery. He deprived them of freedom and
law, and subjugated them to his service. The brothers cry and beg
for speedy help.

"We may not abandon them to the mercy of this terrible and
devouring foe. Rather must we hasten to their assistance, because to
do that is our duty. Could we, in the last analysis, be happy if so
many of our brothers live, suffer, and complain in slavery?

"Brothers and sisters!

"The foe is dangerous, lustful, and vicious. Let us always be
on our guard,

"Let us work with greater eagerness and self-sacrifice. Let us be
faithful in our holy Sokol duty, true and persevering.

"Let us prepare for the struggle and for the support of the just
Sokol idea.

"Let us unite with the numberless swarms of Sokols and let us
always think of that truth which the Servian Sokolists have in-
scribed on their banner: That only a healthy, strong, nationally
conscious, and well- organised people is fit to defend itself, to give
battle, to conquer."

To this address of the President is appended the report of the
Executive Committee. After summarising the results achieved in the
last wars, which hampered the society in its activities for two years,
it points out : ' ' The day has come on which we return to our work
because our programme is not yet fulfilled and our task not yet
completed. A large part of our people still endure the suffering of
the Crucified Christ; we must still visit our brothers beyond the
Drina; we must still seek the City of Serajevo and the heritage of
the holy Sava; we must see to the homeland of Marina Novak, of
Deli Radivoj, and the old Vujadin; we must cross the hills of Ro-
manija and see why Travnik has wrapped himself in mist ; some day
that song must cease. Woe, Bosnia, thou orphan before God, hast thou
nowhere people of thy tribe?"

After a discussion of the various undertakings of the society, em-
phasis is laid on the fact that the society maintains relations with
"the brother societies beyond the Save and Drina," and special em-
phasis is laid on the sending of delegates to the celebration of the
Prosvjeta at Serajevo. In this connexion the report says: "By
sending these delegates to the brothers in Bosnia the committee in-

54 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

tended to say to them : ' We have not forgotten you. The wings of
the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty.' "

After a detailed account of a visit of Agram students to Servia
and the consecration of the flag of the "Society of the Sober Youth"
the report of the Executive Committee ends with these sentences :

"The administration knows how properly to value these phe-
nomena— the arrival of the brother Croatians in the Sumadija and
the convening of the 'Sober Youth' from all districts in Serbdom, and
it will be no exaggeration to say that these events signify the be-
ginning and germ of a great deed that will be enacted in the very
near future.

"They are the expression of a great, and until now silent,
awakening of the national consciousness and strength of a down-
trodden race, which is not permitted to arise and unite. Only a
while longer and this germ will ripen, and when the popular soul
expands still more there will be no restrictions that it cannot tear
to pieces, no obstacles in its path which it will not be able to over-
come. The work of strengthening this power, the cooperation in and
hastening of the course of this national development, the develop-
ment and support of this idea, was always the goal of the adminis-
tration's actions."

The report of the Treasurer in the first place names all those who
liberally supported the society: the District Committee of the Na-
rodna Odbrana in Kragujevac, especially its cavalry section, which
frequently has come to the assistance of the Sokol Society with
precious help; the Director of the gymnasium at Kragujevac, who
always "showed his active paternal interest" in the Sokols; the
Divisional Commandant of the Sumadija, who liberally supported the
society; the President of the District Court in Kragujevac, the district
chief, and the community leader in Kragujevac.

After the Treasurer has memorialised the members of the society
who had been killed in the war he concludes his report with the
following words:

"After such a brilliant victory over a part of our enemy the
society's leaders hope that all of you from now on will devote your-
selves even more fully and joyfully to the activities of the Sokol
institution, so that in our falcon aerie you may train falcons which
at a given time will be able to soar aloft and on their mighty
pinions bring to all our unliberated brothers fraternity, love, and
freedom, ' '

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevitch as

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 55

President, by the Court Secretary, D. V. Brzakovitch, as Secretary,
and by ten members of the board, among whom are two Professors
(Emil Lukitch and Milan Jankovitch), as well as one other officer
(Infantry Major Michael Vasitch).

From this annual report and from a table sent out by the Kragu-
jevac Sokol Society to the "Srpski Sokol" in Tuzla for filling out,
and likewise signed by Major Kovacevitch and Court Secretary
Brzakovitch, it appears that the Sokol societies in Servia were linked
with organisations of the same kind in the Monarchy in closer rela-
tions than had heretofore been the case.

(Enclosure 4.)
The Servian Official Gazette in the Service of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian official gazette, "Srpski Novine," of June 28, 1914,
contained as a supplement an appeal to the Narodna Odbrana which
was furnished to all subscribers to the gazette. This appeal contained
the following passages:

' ' Brothers and Sisters : Only a part of Kossovo has been avenged,
only a part of St. Vitus Day atoned for. Throughout the lands in
which our popular tongue is heard — the Servian, Croatian, and Sla-
vonic— from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Selo, ex-
tends the significance of St. Vitus Day and of Kossovo. As many
national souls still weep upon this territory, as many chains still
press our brothers, as much work is still to be accomplished, as
much must we still sacrifice. St. Vitus Day might formerly have de-
noted a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have gone far
into our new history, when back of us stand great and glorious
national events, and still greater and more glorious ones still await us,
to-day when we are in the midst of the creation of the great national
State, St. Vitus Day must be for us a day of great rejoicing and
pride for what has taken place, since it sprung from that day, and
still more because of what is to come. Servian men and Servian
women! Millions of our brothers, Slavonians, Croatians, and Serbs,
outside of our borders look upon us to-day, the children of the
kingdom, and their breasts swell with hope and joy as they look
upon our majestic manifestations of to-day for the national cause.

"God helps the brave! Forward all! That part of our holy

56 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

task that has not yet been accomplished summons ns, that part
which is still to be accomplished. St. Vitus Day, 1914, in Belgrade."

(Enclosure 5.)
Testimony of Trifko Krstanovitch about the Narodna Odhrana.

Trifko Krstanovitch, a journeyman baker of Zavidovitchi, was
arrested on the night of July 6-7, 1914, because by a remark made by
him shortly after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand
to the effect that this assassination was to have been expected, he
had rendered himself suspicious of having had advance knowledge
of the conspiracy.

He was, therefore, brought before the district court at Serajevo.
In the examination of the prisoner it developed that the suspicion
against him was not justified by the remark he had made, inasmuch
Jas the remark was based solely on his former knowledge of the activi-
ties of the Narodna Odbrana and had merely been an expression
of his opinion that in the agitation in Servia against the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against Archduke Francis
Ferdinand, such an act was to have been expected. The prosecution
of Krstanovitch was, therefore, dropped for lack of evidence, and
the prisoner was examined as a witness with a view to his knowledge
of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which was considered im-
portant for the purposes of the investigation.

The following extract from his sworn testimony on July 19, 1914,
is of pertinent interest:

''In the Autumn of the year 1908 I crossed the border to Servia
on the Mokra Gora at Visegrad, in search of employment. I went to
Bajina Basta in the Uzice district, and as I found no employment
there I went to Belgrade, where I arrived at the time of the announce-
ment of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inasmuch as I
saw that on account of the annexation great excitement and commo-
tion had been aroused among the populace and that I would be
unable to find any sort of employment, I entered the Imperial and
Royal Consulate in order to be helped home. But as I left the Con-
sulate a gendarme grabbed me on the street and asked me where I
came from. Thinking me to be a spy, he took me to a police station.
Here I was questioned, and when I told them that I would like to go

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 57

home a subaltern officer began to abuse me, asking why I wanted to
leave Servia at this time, when they needed men more than ever
because there might be a war with Austria. When I told him that
I had nothing to live on, he replied that I would get all I needed if
I would enroll with the committee. In my distress I agreed, and a
gendarme led me into the Hotel Zelenou Vijencu (The Green Gar-
land) and there introduced me to Voja Tankositch, the leader of the
committee and a Captain in the regular army. Here I received
board and lodging, and, as I saw, others of the committee lived
here.

"Voja Tankositch told me it was the purpose of the committee to
give training in bomb throwing, in the destruction of bridges, tunnels,
telegraph and railway lines, because things might easily lead up to a
war between Austria and Servia. Thereupon a man led me into a
house of smaller area adjoining the Ministry of Finance, where the
offices of the committee were, and here in the office I met Milan
Pribicevitch, who registered me in the committee. At this registra-
tion Milan Pribicevitch asked me if Voja Tankositch had told me
what my duties as a committeeman would be, and I answered 'Yes.'
He told me that the men who had been registered must be efficient,
strong, and ready to make sacrifices. At that time we had been regis-
tered to the number of about seventy. We did nothing in Belgrade.

"After about a month and a half our leader, Tankositch, in-
formed us that the Great Powers had ordered the dissolution of our
committee and that we must leave Belgrade and hide in some out-of-
the-way place. They sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here we were
trained by the officers Voja Tankositch, Dusan Putnik, Zivko
Gvozditch, and Mitar Djinovitch, who was involved in the Montene-
grin bomb affair and who was shot in Montenegro. We were forbidden
to associate with the people of the place, so that nothing might be
disclosed about our objects and our numbers. We practiced throwing
bombs, laying mines, and destroying telephone and railroad lines,
tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan
Pribicevitch, Gen. Bozo Jankovitch, and the apothecary Skaritch, the
delegate Zivko Rafajlovitch, a certain Glisitch Milutin, an official in
the Ministry of Finance, and these watched as we practiced and each
time paid the expenses of our keep. Our teachers told us that as
soon as war should be declared we committees would go forward in
advance, behind us the volunteers, and then the regular army.

"In Cuprija we were about 140 men. In addition to board, lodg-
ing, and clothes, each of us received 25 para a day for tobacco. The

58 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

course lasted about three months — that is, until March, 1909. Then
the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed and
that we must disperse, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
had been recognised by the Great Powers, and our committee, there-
fore, had no further purpose. Upon the dissolution of the committee
Gen. Bozo Jankovitch told me that I would enter into the service of
Bozo Milanovitch in Sabac and get 50 dinar a month. He did not tell
me what sort of service that would be. I accepted, because I felt
myself as a committeeman to be in duty bound to obey Gen. Janko-
vitch, and also because I had nothing to live on. Thus in March,
1909, I arrived at Sabac and announced myself to Bozo Milanovitch,
a merchant in Sabac.

"Gen. Jankovitch had told me that Bozo Milanovitch was the
leader of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac and that I would serve under
him in this Narodna Odbrana. When I gave Bozo Milanovitch the
General's letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve
him faithfully and carry out instructions. My chief duty would be
to carry his letters wherever they were addressed. In case I should
not carry a letter to the place to which it was addressed, and in case
any one else got in possession of this letter, my life would be in-
volved. The very next day Bozo Milanovitch gave me a sealed letter
which I was to carry to Cedo LuMtch, Guardian of the Treasury in
Servian Raca. On the way toward Raca in the village of Bojatitch
I was halted by the District Captain, who took my letter, opened it,
and read it. In the letter Lukitch was instructed to buy three boats
immediately, so that they might be ready in case they were needed.
Enclosed in the letter were 100 dinar. On this occasion the Captain
told me that strict orders had been given by the Ministry that the
komitadjis should do nothing on their own initiative, so that no in-
ternational diplomatic intervention might be provoked. I returned to
Sabac and reported to Bozo Milanovitch what had happened. Bozo
Milanovitch turned to the District Prefect, and the latter gave orders
that the revolver which the Captain in Bojatitch had taken from me
should be returned to me. He also ordered the Captain to expedite
the letter to the Cedo Lukitch to whom it was addressed. From March,
1909, to October, 1910, I carried forty-three such letters to Servian
Raca, fifty-five to Loznica, five to Zvornik, two to Ljubivija, and I
know not how many to Koviljaca. I noted how many times I was in
each place because these places were very far from Sabac.

' ' I carried the letters to the Directors of the customs offices in the
respective places, and from these I received other letters in reply,

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 59

which I carried to Bozo Milanovitch. I remember that I also carried
letters several times to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in carrying letters
was a certain Vaso Eritch, a native of Srebrenica. I carried letters
every week to Belgrade from Bozo Milanovitch and delivered them
to Milan Pribicevitch and Bozo Jankoviteh. I knew nothing of the
contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about these.
So far as I could see the letters which Bozo Milanovitch sent were
not in cipher, while the letters which the Directors of the customs
offices sent were written with peculiar signs, which I noticed when
Bozo Milanovitch opened them. Once I brought to Bozo Milanovitch
such a letter in cipher, I think from Zvornik, and he sent me with
the note to Mika Atanasijevitch, Professor in Sabac, so that the latter
might decipher it. The latter did so, as he usually did. But he forgot
to seal the translation, so I read it. In this letter was written that
it was reported from reliable sources that money was to be coined
with the portrait of the Heir Apparent, and that this was an indica-
tion that the Emperor Francis Joseph would abdicate. After about
eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovitch, Bozo gave me a
visiting card on which a skull had been drawn and on which was
written that I had been appointed a trusted man (Povjerenik) of
the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me that it was a
matter of espionage.

"Once I learned from the officer Dusan Opterkitch, a member
of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana in Bosnia and
Herzegovina had twenty-three members. Otherwise, however, I do
not know whether the Narodna Odbrana has any organisation in
Bosnia, or what kind of organisation it is. From time to time Milan
Pribicevitch gave me a revolver, or sometimes money to buy a re-
volver, so that I might give it to the revenue men on the border who
served as komitadjis, since they had no revolvers and no money to
buy them. As it seemed to me, Milan Pribicevitch gave them these
as a token of honour for being komitadjis. I had no other business
with weapons.

"Once I was assigned by Bozo Milanovitch to accompany a man
to a farm in Lijesnica, on the Drina, and was told that the farmer
would give us information and show us everything necessary so that
we two might kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, a Servian reserve officer who
had fled to Bijeljina. The committee of the Narodna Odbrana had, it
seems, discovered that Ljubo Stanaricitch was dangerous for the
Servian State and had condemned him to death.

"From Bozo Milanovitch I and that other man received instruc-

60 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

tions to cross the Drina at a certain place and kill Ljubo Stanarieitch,
who lives in the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side, in the
Bijeljiner District. I and the other man started to ford the Drina,
but because the water was deep, and also because we saw that Ljubo
was walking around his house with his gun on his shoulder, we
returned to the farmer. Because I saw that we could not kill him
with a knife, I sent my companion to Sabac to inform Bozo Milanovitch
that it was impossible to kill Stanarieitch in the manner in which he
desired, namely, with the knife. Thereupon I received instructions
from Bozo Milanovitch to kill him any way. Then we decided to
shoot him with the rifle. The man who was with me was instructed
by Bozo to shoot at Stanarieitch and kill him, and I was to make sure
that this was carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted
gendarme came, bringing instructions from the District Prefect in
Sabac that we were to return and give up our original task. And so
we returned to Sabac.

*'In October, 1910, I asked Bozo Milanovitch to increase my pay,
and when he was unwilling to do that I told him that I would no
longer remain in his service. From Sabac I went to Belgrade, where
I met Gen. Jankovitch, who had me arrested because I had refused
obedience. They dragged me through various prisons for about two
months, and all because I had given notice that I would quit obeying
commands and they were afraid I would betray their secrets. Finally
the authorities decided to send me back to Bosnia. In Sabac a
prisoner told me that my life was in danger. The gendarmes ac-
companied me to Zvornik, where they turned me over to the Bosnian
gendarmes. Thus I arrived in December, 1910, in Bosnia.

"I know nothing definite about any Black Hand except what I
read about that Hand in Servian newspapers. I do not remember to-
day what was written about that Black Hand in the newspapers.
Likewise, I know nothing about the Black List. In Servia after the
annexation there was a general resentment and hatred against the
person of the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent, for he was generally
looked upon as a blood foe of the Serbs. ' '

Krstanovitch also called attention to previous statements by him,
of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the above
declaration :

The committee in which Krstanovitch was enrolled through Milan
Pribicevitch was created by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school in
Cuprija there were twenty-two members from the Monarchy. Among
the pupils was also Milan Ciganoviteh.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 61

In the school at Cuprija it was taught that the committee must
be ready to go to Bosnia at the order of the Narodna Odbrana and
there to act under instructions to be received from their superiors.

(Enclosure 6.)

Extract from the Documents of the District Court in Serajevo in the
Prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his Accomplices for the Crime
of Espionage.

In the year 1913 a system of espionage carried on by Jovo
Jaglicitch and several accomplices in Bosnia in favour of Servia was
discovered. The criminal prosecution, which was begun in Serajevo,
brought out, among other things, the following facts, affording a
glimpse into the methods of the Greater Servian propaganda and
especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

Jovo Jaglicitch stated that in the month of August or September,
1912, he met for the first time the former Cattle Inspector in Foca,
Petar Klaritch, called Pesut, who in the Autumn of 1912 fled to
Montenegro and then became a ''komitadji."

At their first meeting Klaritch asked Jaglicitch whether he knew
Rade Milosevitch of Kalinovik, and upon his answer that Milosevitch
was dangerously ill in the hospital, said: "It's a pity if he dies.
We have been talking of wonderful things. Has he not told you
anything about it?" Upon his replying in the negative, Klaritch
said : "I would like to tell you something important. We are Serbs
and must do something important for Servia; come to my office."
There then took place between them the following conversation :

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I do not yet know you or
whether you will betray me. I tell it to you, neverthless, and if
you have the heart to do so betray me ! "

Upon enquiry by Jaglicitch as to what it was all about, Klaritch
answered: "Brother, in Servia there is a society, the Narodna
Odbrana. Many persons should join this society. There are already
many enlisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the entire
Monarchy; there are persons among them of intelligence and means,
great heads ; and if those can do it why should not we also, that we
may contribute something to the work?"

Asked as to the aims the society pursued, Klaritch replied : * * The

62 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

society has as its object — for example, you are in Kalinovik, you tell
me what the news is there, how many soldiers, cannon, how much
ammunition, different kinds of rifles, who comes and who goes, etc.
We have a secret cipher, and correspond in it. If you are faithful
you will receive it, too."

Jaglicitch was afraid that Klaritch was only trying to pump him
in order thereafter to betray him, and therefore he begged him to
name some of the members, whereupon IQaritch deliberated for a
while, and then mentioned to Jaglicitch a name which he whispered
to him in strictest confidence.

Thereupon Klaritch said to him, "Shall I give you the cipher?"
Jaglicitch agreed. Klaritch, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it
out on a scrap of paper and handed it to Jaglicitch.

Another time Klaritch told about his sojourn in Banja-Koviljaca
(near Loznica,) where he had been trained in bomb-throwing by a
Servian Captain, Todorovitch,^ and said in reply to an enquiry by the
accused as to why he had learned this : " If it comes to anything, as
I have already told you, it is necessary that I should understand how
to handle bombs, that I should train you, and you train others, so
that powder magazines and other important structures may be blown
up. For that purpose we shall receive bombs from Servia."

Klaritch described the appearance of the bombs and said he
already had enlisted people who would cut telegraph and telephone
wires in the event of a war.

At these meetings Jaglicitch also learned from Klaritch that it
is one of the aims of the members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce
Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert their colours, to recruit volunteers
(komitadjis,) and to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots,
&c. Klaritch also informed him that even the cipher correspondence
between the Servian and Bosnian members is not intrusted to the
postal service, but is carried across the border by messengers.

Klaritch further told Jaglicitch that on the occasion of the
Prosvjeta celebration, (in September, 1912) a Servian Major together
with the deputation sent to this celebration from Servia lived in the
Hotel Europef to which Klaritch led members of the Narodna Od-
brana whom he swore in.

From a spy Jaglicitch learned that bombs would reach Serajevo

• Capt. Kosta Todorovitch was then actually Frontier Commissioner and
Director of the Servian Customs Service for the border territory from Raca to
Lj uboi ja.

t The Servian Major Mika Jankovitch appeared aa a Servian delegate at
the Prosvjeta celebration.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 63

or had already reached it, that these had the appearance of pieces of
soap * and that two or three pieces would be sent to this spy also or
that he would fetch them himself.

(Enclosure 7.)
From Confidential Reports About tlie Narodna Odbrana.

At the head of the Narodna Odbrana are representatives of all
political parties, so that the Progressives and the opponents of the
conspirators might cooperate. Its real moving spirit is the present
Major Pribicevitch. The office of Secretary is always occupied by
an officer on furlough.

The Narodna Odbrana seeks to develop in the Southern Slav por-
tions of Austria-Hungary an effective propaganda in military and
civil circles in order thus to prepare a revolution, disturb eventual
mobilisations, precipitate panics and revolts, &c.

The organisation has several confidential men and emissaries in
the Monarchy who carry on a silent man-to-man propaganda. Indi-
viduals have special missions, such as, for instance, to enlist persons
— ^wherever possible railroad officials — at important bridge and junc-
tion points for the task of carrying out instructions received at the
proper moment, or getting them carried out.

Communication between the members of the Narodna Odbrana
is carried out wherever possible through personal contact.

Chiefly young people, workingmen and railroad men are enrolled
as members.

*The bombs used against Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the assassination
at Serajevo and those which were found in the year 1913 in the Save near Broko,
originating from the Royal Servian Arsenal at Kragujevac, bear a resemblance to
pieces of soap.

64 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

(Enclosure 8.)

Some Extracts from the Documents of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian
District Court in Serajevo on the Prosecution of Gavrilo Princip
and His Accomplices for the Crime of Assassination Committed
on June 28, 1914, Against His Imperial and Royal Highness, the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Este, and Her Highness,
the Duchess Sophie of Hohenherg.

I. — The Act and Its Authors.

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, Trifko Grabez, Vaso
Cubrilovitch, and Cetro Popovitch confessed that in common with
the fugitive Mehemed Mehemedbasitch they formed a conspiracy for
the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and equipped with
bombs and Browning pistols, lay in wait for his Highness on June
28, 1914, on his trip through Serajevo, with a view to carrying out
the attack they had planned.

Nedeljko Gabrinovitch confesses to have been the first among
the conspirators to throw a bomb against the carriage of the Arch-
duke, but says that the bomb missed its aim and injured only those
seated at the time of the explosion in the carriage following the auto-
mobile of the Archduke.

Gavrilo Princip confesses to having fired two shots from a Brown-
ing revolver upon the Archduke 's automobile, by which the Archduke
and the Duchess of Hohenberg were mortally wounded.

Both perpetrators admit murderous intent in the execution of
their act.

Full corroboration of these confessions has been furnished by
the investigations, and it is established that the late Archduke
Francis Ferdinand and the late Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died
of the consequences of the revolver shots fired upon them by Gavrilo
Princip.

II. — Genesis op the Conspiracy.

The accused, agreeing in essentials, have given the following testi-
mony before the examining Judge:

In April, 1914, Princip during his stay in Belgrade, where he
associated in the local coffee houses with many Servian students,
formed the plan for an attack upon the late Archduke Francis Ferdi-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 65

nand. This intention he discussed with Gabrinovitch, then also in
Belgrade, who already was busying himself with the same thought,
and who expressed immediate readiness to participate in the attack.
The plans for the murderous attempt were frequently discussed
among the persons with whom Princip and Gabrinovitch associated,
since the Archduke was regarded as the most dangerous enemy of
the Servian people.

Princip and Gabrinovitch at the outset proposed that the bombs
and weapons necessary for the carrying out of the deed be obtained
from the Servian Major, Milan Pribicevitch, or from the Narodna
Odbrana because they themselves did not have the means to buy
them. But inasmuch as Major Pribicevitch and the influential mem-
ber of the society named Zivogin Dacitch were at that time away on
travels, they decided to try to get the weapons from the former
"komitadji," then an official of the State Railway, Milan Ciganovitch,
whom they knew.

Princip got in touch with Ciganovitch through an intimate ac-
quaintance of the latter. Ciganovitch thereupon sought out Princip,
spoke with him about the plan of attack, which he fully approved,
and declared that he would think over the request for weapons.
Gabrinovitch also spoke with Ciganovitch about the weapons.

At Easter Princip took into his confidence Trifko Grabez, who
was also present in Belgrade at the time, and who, according to his
own confession, likewise declared himself ready to cooperate in the
attack.

In the following period Princip repeatedly had conversations with
Ciganovitch about the carrying out of the attack.

In the meantime Ciganovitch had placed himself in communica-
tion with the Servian Major, Voja Tankositch, an intimate friend
of his, about the proposed attack, and Tankositch thereupon placed
at his disposal the Browning pistols for this service.

Grabez confesses, in corroboration of the evidence of Princip and
of Gabrinovitch, that on May 24, in company with Ciganovitch, he
visited Major Tankositch in the latter 's home and at his request.
After the introduction Tankositch said to Grabez: "Are you this
man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabez replied: "I am
he." When Tankositch asked, "Do you know how to shoot with a
revolver?" Grabez answered in the negative. Tankositch said to
Ciganovitch: "I will give you a revolver. Go and teach them how
to shoot."

Thereupon Ciganovitch led Princip and Grabez to the army shoot-

66 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ing range at Topcider and gave them instructions in shooting with
Browning revolvers at targets in a wood near the range. Princip
showed himself to be the better marksman. Ciganoviteh also famil-
iarised Princip, Grabez, and Gabrinovitch with the use of bombs,
which were later turned over to them.

On May 27, 1914, Ciganoviteh gave to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and
Grabez, according to their joint confession, six bombs, four Brown-
ing revolvers, and enough ammunition, as well as a glass tube con-
taining cyanide of potassium, so that they might, after carrying out
their act, poison themselves with the view of keeping the secret. In
addition Ciganoviteh gave them money.

As early as Easter, Princip had instructed Danilo lUitch about
his plan for the attack. Upon returning to Serajevo he now begged
lUitch to enlist several more persons to insure the success of the at-
tack. Thereupon Illiteh, according to his confession, enlisted for this
Jaso Cubrilovitch, Cetro Popovitch, and Mehemed Mehemedbasitch.

III. — Origin op the Bombs.

Only one of the bombs was at their disposal at the time of the
carrying out of the attack. The remaining five were later found by
the police in Serajevo.

These bombs, according to the opinion of experts in court, are
Servian hand grenades, manufactured in a factory and destined for
military use. They are identical with the twenty-one bombs which in
the year 1913 were found in the Save at Brcko and some of which
were still in the original package. By this it was shown with cer-
tainty that they had come from the Servian arms depot in Kragu-
jevac.

It is established also that the bombs used in the assassination
of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand originated from the arms depot
at Kragujevac.

Grabez of his own accord called the bombs which were handed
over to him and his accomplices "Kragujevac bombs."

IV. — Transport op the Three Assassins and the Weapons prom

Servia to Bosnia.

The following testimony was given by Princip:
Ciganoviteh told Gabrinovitch, Grabez and Princip to take their
journey over Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla, and there turn to Misko

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 67

Jovanovitch, who would take charge of the weapons. They should
next go to Sabac, and there report to the border Captain, Major Rade
Popovitch, for whom he gave them a note, which Princip carried.
The three left Belgrade with their weapons on May 28. In Sabac,
Princip delivered the note which he had received from Ciganovitch to
Major Popovitch, who thereupon led all three to the commander's
station (Kommando) and filled out a permit, in which it was certified
that one of them was a revenue guard and the two others were
his comrades. The permit also contained the name of this alleged
revenue guard; but he had forgotten the name. At the same time
Major Popovitch handed them a sealed letter for a border Captain
in Loznica, whose name was Pravanovitch, Prdanovitch, or Predoje-
vitch.

The next night Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez spent in Sabac
and went on the next day by train to Loznica, at half fare, on the
strength of the permit that had been filled out for them by Major
Popovitch. At noon they arrived in Loznica and handed to the local
border Captain Major Popovitch 's letter, in which was written:
* ' See that you receive these people and conduct them through to you
know where." The Captain said that he would call his revenue
guards from the border and intrust the three to the most reliable man.
Thereupon he telephoned, and ordered the three accomplices to report
at his office at 7 o'clock the next morning.

On the next morning the three conspirators agreed that Gabrino-
vitch, with the pass of Grabez, should openly take the road to Zvornik,
but that Princip and Grabez should cross the border secretly. This
plan was discussed with the border Captain and it was hereby agreed
that a revenue guard from Ljesnica, named Grbitch, should take
Princip and Grabez in his karaula and conduct them across the line.
Gabrinovitch went on foot to Banja Koviljaca, in the direction of
Zvornik. Princip and Grabez rode with the revenue guard, Grbitch,
to Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolvers in a
hotel room. Here the revenue guard Grbitch saw these objects.
Princip himself characterised the journey as ''mysterious."

The testimony of Grabez agreed with that of Princip on the
essential points and he added by way of supplement that Grbitch
laughed when he saw the bombs and revolvers and only asked whither
in Bosnia they were going with these bombs. The revenue guard
certainly thought Grabez and Princip had a mission.

Grbitch and a second revenue guard brought Princip and Grabez
in a rowboat to an island in the Drina. There Grbitch instructed

68 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

them to wait for a peasant who would fetch them. They spent the
night on the island in a peasant's cottage to which Grbitch had directed
them. On the next day a peasant took them during the night, first
through a swamp and then across the hills to the neighbourhood of
Priboj, where he turned them over to the local teacher Cubrilovitch,
who seemed to have been waiting for them. The latter then took
them to Tuzla, to Misko Jovanovitch.

Gabrinovitch testified concerning the happenings on the trip up
to the moment in which he separated from Princip and Grabez in a
manner that corroborated the essentials of what they had said, and
added that Major Popovitch had told them he had come from Bel-
grade only on the day before their arrival in Sabac.

In Loznica, Gabrinovitch, Princip, and Grabez decided to separate,
since it would be dangerous for them to go together. The border
Captain in Loznica, whom they informed of this, expressed his ap-
proval of their plan and gave Gabrinovitch a letter for the teacher,
M. Jaklojevitch, in Mali-Zvornik. Gabrinovitch thereupon turned
over the bombs which he had carried, the Brownings and ammunition,
to Princip and Grabez, and in company with a revenue guard, who
had been given to him as escort, went to Mali-Zvornik.

There he found the teacher, Jaklojevitch, to whom he handed
the letter of the border Captain of Loznica. The latter advised the
Servian guard. When Gabrinovitch later reached this frontier guard
with the teacher there was waiting there for them a man who
brought them in a rowboat across the Drina to Greater Dvornik in
Bosnia.

From there Gabrinovitch went to Tuzla to Misko Jovanovitch.

Cubrilovitch, the teacher, who undertook to guide Princip and
Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the
following important points are summarised :

In 1911 Cubrilovitch, as a result of a Sokol excursion to Sabac,
was made a member of the Narodna Odbrana through Bozo Fovitch,
a member of the Board of Directors, and then made Commissioner
of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). On his invitation
Misko Johanovitch was later made Commissioner of the Narodna
Odbrana for Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the dealings with Narodna
Odbrana, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabez to Cu-
brilovitch with the news that he was bringing two armed Servian
students with him. When he learned this he said that he knew this
was a "message" of the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabez told

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 69

him that they had bombs and revolvers for an attempt on the life of
Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

Supplement.

Just before the close of this memoir, a sworn statement is pro-
duced by the District Court in Serajevo, from which it appears that
a subject of the monarchy some days before the 28th of June of this
year wished to notify the Imperial and Royal Consulate in Belgrade
that a murderous attack had been planned against Archduke Francis
Ferdinand during his stay in Bosnia, This witness, it is said, was
prevented from giving this information by the Belgrade police, who,
on a trivial pretext, arrested him before he could enter the Imperial
and Royal Consulate. The sworn testimony and the cross-examina-
tion indicate that the Servian police officials had knowledge of the
attack that was planned and only arrested this man to prevent him
from furnishing the information.

Inasmuch as these statements have not yet been investigated,
no judgment can yet be given as to their ability to stand the test.
In consideration of the importance attaching to this, the further de-
tails of this testimony can at the present time not be divulged.

(Enclosure 9.)
The Servian Press on the Assassination.

(a) The Belgrade newspaper "Balkan" on June 29 wrote con-
cerning the two assassinations:

"Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a typesetter, was imbued with anar-
chistic ideas and known as a restless spirit. Up to twenty days ago
he lived in Belgrade, where he had gone after the war and found em-
ployment in the State printing plant. Before he left he said he was
going to Trieste, where he expected to obtain work in a new printing
plant. Gavrilo Princip also sojourned until recently in Belgrade.
In the course of the war he volunteered for army service, but was
not accepted; so he left Belgrade. But he returned to Belgrade on
Christmas of the preceding year, attended the gymnasium for a while,
and departed from Belgrade at about the same time as Gabrinovitch,
but by a different route. Princip was silent, nervous, a good scholar,

70 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

and associated with several fellow-students who likewise came from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in later times with Gabrinovitch. He
inclined toward socialist ideas, although he originally belonged to the
Progressive youth. Princip as well as Gabrinovitch had grown up in
Serajevo ; both had been united in inseparable friendship since their
childhood."

(b) It is pointed out in the "Piemont " of July 1 that the loud
protest of the assailant Zerajitch was followed by the protest of
Princip. The work of the latter could likewise be explained by reason
of the Bosnian Government system. The fact that Princip carried out
his act of vengeance on the sacred national holiday of Vidovdan (St.
Vitus Day), the day fixed for the carrying on of manoeuvres, makes
the desperate deed of the young martyr appear more intelligible and
natural.

(The paper was confiscated by the police because of this article,
but the confiscation was annulled on the following day by the Belgrade
court of first resort.)

(c) The Young Radical paper, "Odjek," of July 3 says: "Arch-
duke Francis Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of national
enthusiasm to celebrate a brutal manifestation of power and subjec-
tion. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance,
of hatred, and of revenge."

(d) The National Party organ, "Srpska Zastava," says in an
article of July 3, headed * * Suspicions and Threats " : " The assassina-
tion appears even more and more the result of unhealthy conditions
in the Monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the
Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina excites the horror of the
whole civilised world."

(e) The Progressive paper, "Pravda," of July 3 writes: "The
Vienna policy is cynical. It is exploiting the death of the unfortunate
couple for its repulsive purposes against the Servian people."

(f) The "Agence des Balkans" of July 3 reports: "The crimes
practised in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbs have been
carried out under the auspices and direct ineitation of the Austro-
Hungarian civil and military authorities."

(g) The "Pravda" of July 4 says: "All murders and attacks
heretofore committed in Austria have had one and the same origin.
The oppressed peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to resort to this
kind of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos
of a reign of terror it is natural and understandable that the era of
murderous attacks should become popular."

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 71

( h) The ' ' Balkan ' ' of July 5 remarks that Austria-Hungary, * ' be-
cause of its persecution of the innocent, must be put under interna-
tional control," since Austria-Hungary was less consolidated than
Turkey.

(i) The ''Mali Journal" of July 7 says : " A scion of the Middle
Ages was murdered in Serajevo a few days ago. He was murdered
by a boy who felt the suffering of his enslaved fatherland to the point
of paroxysms of emotion — the suffering which the despoilers of the
lands of his fathers had inflicted upon it. What has official Austria-
Hungary done thereafter? It has replied with general massacres,
plunderings, and destruction of Serb life and property. By such
exploits only those who are worthless distinguish themselves. The
cowards are always great heroes when they are certain that nothing
will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Gabrinovitch with
these heroes, and the great difference will be noted at once. Civili-
sation and justice in Austria-Hungary are a great, gross falsehood."

( j ) The ' ' Tribuna ' ' of July 7 says : ' ' We are of the opinion that
the murderous deed of Serajevo was ordered to the end that the
extermination of the Serbs might be accomplished with one blow."

(k) The "Piemont" of July 8 reports from Bajina Baschka that
the Austrian authorities in Bosnia were preparing a massacre of the
Christians.

(1) The "Balkan" of the 8th publishes a report from Bosnia,
under the heading "St. Bartholomew's Night in Serajevo," and ad-
vocates a general boycott of all Austrians resident in Servia.

(m) The "Mali Journal" of the 8th demands a boycott against
the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the caption, "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the
"Tribuna" of the 8th writes that it is best to buy no goods originating
in Austria-Hungary, not to visit the Austrian and Hungarian baths,
and not to call any physicians from Austria-Hungary. Private initia-
tive, it says, could accomplish much in the direction indicated. The
State and the authorities would not have to take action. It would
be enough to appeal to the citizens.

(o) It is stated in the "Stampa" of the 8th that the police at
Serajevo were subjecting the arrested assailants to the most shame-
less and inhuman torture in order to force confessions from them,
to be used as the basis for an indictment of the Servian people.

(q) Commenting upon the statement by Premier Asquith, upon
being informed of the death of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, that
he despaired for humanity, the "Balkan" on July 9 published a his-

72 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

torical survey of the events of the last forty years, from which it
concludes that the Servian people in that period were subjected to
the terrible tortures of the Jesuit policy of Austria-Hungary. Finally
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, like all sons of Loyola who only work
in the blood of human beings and believe in the principle that "the
end justifies the means," was inexorably overtaken by fate and fell
a victim to Jesuitism, even as entire Austria-Hungary will. But by
the fall of Austria-Hungary humanity shall obtain peace and free-
dom. When one recapitulates all these truths, one must reach the
conclusion that Asquith could with calm spirit have met the an-
nouncement of the death with the words, "I no longer despair for
humanity. ' '

(r) In a leading article the "Politika" of July 9 says, under the
caption "Shameless Lie": "The manner and fashion in which the
investigation of the Serajevo attack is being conducted point openly
to the ends which Austria is pursuing. Since the assailants, despite
all the torments inflicted upon them, refuse to state what is demanded
of them, other individuals have been discovered, with difficulty, who
declared themselves ready, under certain conditions, to confess to a
certain complicity in the attack, but at the same time to accuse all
those who are inconvenient for Austria. This method for the time
being has succeeded, for the hired individuals show a willingness to
say anything that one wants of them, and the Austrian police take
care that these lies are at once circulated broadcast. Austria has
no shame, and it believes that some one will be found who will
believe such lies."

(s) The "Stampa" of the 9th says that not everything that has
occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been uncovered and
brought out to publicity. Much, it says, is being concealed. But
truth will sooner or later come to the surface for all that. Blood-
thirsty Austria simply wants to sate herself now with Servian blood
and is doing it. It is reported that there are to-day about 10,000
dead and wounded in Bosnia.

(t) The "Politika" of July 10 hurls unmeasured insults at mem-
bers of the Imperial House.

(u) The "Trgovinski Glasnik" of July 10 speaks of the corrupt-
ness and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it
calls "Jesuitical, ruthless, and dishonourable." It ought to convince
the Serb people in Austria-Hungary that they do not dwell in a civi-
lised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must ever
be armed and ready to defend themselves against robbery by the au-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 73

thorities and the Government. After the latest events, the Servian
people must no longer wait like a lamb that might be slaughtered any-
day, but like a lion ready for bloody defence.

(v) The "Stampa" of July 10 says: "Nothing is eternal, and
Austria-Hungary will not remain forever in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The time is not distant when the Serbs, who broke the power of the
Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will range over the Ivan Planina
on the Trebevitch."

(w) Under the title "Boycott Against the Worthless," the
"Pravda" of July 10 demands a boycott of Austro-Hungarian firms in
Belgrade as well as of Austro-Hungarian wares, and says that it is the
duty of the Narodna Odbrana to promote the strictest execution of
the boycott.

(x) The "Zvono" of July 16 declares Princip a son of Countess
Lonyay, to whom the task was allotted to avenge the death of the
Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, the Archduke Francis
Ferdinand.

(y) In the "Mali Journal" of July 19 occurs the following:
* ' Princip was instigated to the attack by an Austro-Hungarian agent.
In Vienna it is said that the really guilty person could be found only
in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Belgrade."

(z) The leading Young Radical paper, "Odjek," of July 20
writes : ' ' Austria-Hungary indicates by a hundred signs that it wishes
to inherit the title of the Sick Man of Europe. While in Servia not a
single Austro-Hungarian citizen was molested, villages and cities were
plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact shows afresh how
much higher Servia stands, morally and culturally, than Austria-
Hungary."

(Enclosure 10.)

The Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at NisTi on tJie Crime Against
Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

To the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has come
from a trustworthy informant, whose name can be given if necessary,
reliable information that the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana re-
cently held a session at Nish, in which its Chairman, the Director of
the Nish House of Correction, Jasa Nenadovitch, spoke of the assassi-
nation of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and told the following:

74 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Servia was compelled absolutely to avail herself of some means
like the attack on Archduke Francis Ferdinand, since the latter, on
account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a formidable
danger to Servia and, possibly, to other Slavic groups. Had he re-
mained alive, he would soon have challenged Servia to war or attacked
that country, in which case Servia, which is now so materially weak-
ened and which has not finished organising its army, would unques-
tionably have been hopelessly beaten. But as matters stand, Servia
has been saved by the Serajevo murder and, moreover, one of the
men dangerous to Servia has been removed. Servia will now have
quiet for some years, since the new Heir Apparent will certainly
think twice before he follows in the footsteps of his predecessor.

The speaker was aware, he continued, that the murder of the
Archduke would be a severe blow and a bitter sorrow to Austria-
Hungary, and that it would cause the Serbs living there to be perse-
cuted, but he did not think his suppositions would be so completely
justified by events as they had been, and that the Croatians would
rise to the requirements of the moment as they had risen. He said
that his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the
Austro-Hungarian officials were timid and would not go too far,
but that these friends had been deceived and that we had been
deceived through them; that if things continued thus, revolvers and
bombs had yet to play their real parts, and whatever the Servian God
might ordain, things could not continue in this way.

The statements of the speaker found complete support from those
who heard him.

(Enclosure 11.)
Anti-AtLstro-Hungarian Paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade.

Before the Reception Hall of the Servian Ministry of War there
are on the wall four allegorical paintings, of which three are repre-
sentations of Servian victories, while the fourth pictures the realisa-
tion of Servia 's anti- Austrian aspirations.

Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia), and part plain (South-
em Hungary), there is shown the "zora," or dawning of Servian
hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 75

the names of all the provinces **yet to be freed" — Bosnia, Herze-
govina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

No. 20.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio, Councilor, Austro-Hungarian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Lamhach, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires has informed me by telegraph
that his Government has urgently instructed him to demand an ex-
tension of the time-limit in the ultimatum to Servia. I request you
to reply to him in my behalf, that we cannot consent to an extension
of the time-limit. You will please add that, even after the breaking
off of diplomatic relations, Servia will be in a position to bring about
an amicable settlement by an unconditional acceptance of our de-
mands. In such case, however, we would be compelled to demand
from Servia an indemnification for all costs and damages caused to
us by our military measures.

No. 21.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. PetershurgTi.

(Telegram.) Bad IscU, July 25, 1914.

For your personal information and guidance:

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires called on Baron Macchio this fore-
noon and requested in his Government's behalf that the time-limit
stipulated in our note to Servia be extended.

This request he based upon the ground that our move had taken
the Powers by surprise and that the Russian Government would con-
sider it a matter of due consideration on the part of the Vienna
Cabinet toward the other Cabinets, if the latter should be given an
opportunity to examine the merits of our communication to the
Powers and to study the promised dossier. Baron Macchio replied
to the Charge d 'Affaires that he would advise me at once of his re-
quest, but he could already venture to say that there is no proba-

76 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

bility of a prolongation of the stipulated time-limit being conceded
by us.

As to the explanations given by the Russian Government in sub-
stantiation of its request, they appear to be based upon an erroneous
conception of the premises. Our note to the Powers was by no means
meant as an invitation to them to inform us of their views on this
matter, but simply to convey information as a matter of international
courtesy. Besides, we hold that our action concerns solely ourselves
and Servia, and that this action, despite the patience and leniency
which we have displayed for many years, had been forced upon us by
the developments of a situation which compelled us to defend our most
vital interests.

No. 22.
Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Cabinet met in council last night and this morning. Accord-
ing to various reports the reply to our note will be handed to me
before the expiration of the stipulated time. I hear that the court
train is being made ready for use; that the money of the National
Bank and of the Railroad as well as the archives of the Foreign Office
are being removed to the interior of the country. Several of my
colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government,
especially so the Russian legation, where packing is proceeding.

The garrison has left town in field equipment. The ammunition
has been removed from the fortress. There is a considerable move-
ment of troops at the railway station. Sanitary convoys have left
Belgrade in a southerly direction. According to the instructions
which I have meanwhile received, we shall leave Belgrade by train
at 6.30 o'clock if diplomatic relations are broken off.

No. 23.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Semlin, July 25, 1914.

General mobilisation has been ordered in Servia at 3 p.m.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 77

No. 24.
Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Semlin, July 25, 1914.

The reply of the Royal Servian Government to our demands of
the 23rd instant being inadequate, I have broken off diplomatic rela-
tions with Servia and have left Belgrade with the staff of the lega-
tion.

The reply was handed to me at 5.58 p.m.

No. 25.

Note of the Royal Servian Government, Dated July 12/25, 1914.

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and is
convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may
threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

78 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take
place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and
which as a general rule are beyond official control. The Royal Gov-
ernment is all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time
of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia
and Austria-Hungary it showed much consideration and thus suc-
ceeded in settling most of these questions to the mutual advantage
of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government has been painfully sur-
prised at the allegations that citizens of the Kingdom of Servia
have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at
Serajevo ; the Royal Government had expected to be invited to collabo-
rate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and it stood
ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take
measures against any persons concerning whom representations might
be made to it.

Complying with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, it is prepared to commit for trial any Servian subject, regard-
less of his station or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of
Serajevo proofs shall be produced, and more especially it undertakes
to publish on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of
the 13th/26th July, the following declaration :

''The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, and in general all the tendencies
which aim at the ultimate detachment from the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy of territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the
fatal consequences of these criminal activities.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and func-
tionaries have participated, according to the communication of the
Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda
and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the
Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the
31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all
idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austro-Hungary, considers
it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole
population of the Kingdom, that henceforth it will proceed with the
utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machina-
tions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 79

Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King,
by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be
published in the next official army bulletin.
The Royal Government further undertakes :

1. To insert, at the first ordinary convocation of the Skuptchina,
a provision into the press law for the most severe punishment of
incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy, and for taking action against any publication the general
tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of
Austria-Hungary. The Government engages, at the impending re-
vision of the Constitution, to add to Article 22 of the Constitution an
amendment permitting that such publications be confiscated, a pro-
ceeding at present impossible according to the clear provisions of
Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the Na-
rodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to
the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings
of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will
accept the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government and will
dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other association
which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes to remove without
delay from the system of public instruction in Servia all that serves
or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, when-
ever the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with facts
and proofs of such a propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the mili-
tary and the civil service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may
have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integ-
rity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial
and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later date the names
and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the pro-
ceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly
understand the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the
Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept
the collaboration of officials of the Imperial and Royal Government
upon Servian territory, but it declares that it will admit such col-
laboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with
criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

80 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers
it a duty to begin an enquiry against all such persons as are, or
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who
may happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards
the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or
authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal
Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrange-
ment, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of
the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases com-
munications as to the results of the investigation in question might be
given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankositch. As
regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation)
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest
him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good
as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the pre-
sumptive evidence of guilt as well as the possible proofs of guilt which
have been collected up to the present time, at the enquiry at Serajevo,
for the purposes of the Servian enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the meas-
ures which have been taken for suppressing the illicit traffic in arms
and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that the
Servian Government will immediately order an enquiry and will
severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line
who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime
of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly furnish explanations of
the remarks made by its officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in
interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of
the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy,
as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communi-
cated to it the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as
it shall have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said
officials, in connexion with which the Royal Government itself will
take steps to collect evidence.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 81

present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and
carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this
reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the com-
mon interest to take precipitate action in the solution of this ques-
tion, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by
referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal
at The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing
up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31
March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

No. 26.
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petershurgh.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

In resolving to proceed firmly against Servia, we are fully aware
that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian
differences. Yet, in determining our attitude toward Servia, we could
not allow ourselves to be influenced by this possibility, because funda-
mental considerations of our home policy have forced us to put an
end to a situation which enables Servia, under Russia's promise of
immunity, to threaten this empire constantly and to do so unpunished
and unpunishable.

In case Russia should consider that the moment for an accounting
with the Central European Powers has come, and therefore a priori
be resolved to make war, the following instructions would appear to
be useless.

Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that Russia might reconsider
her attitude and not permit herself to be carried away by the warlike
element, in case Servia should refuse to comply with our demands
and we should be compelled, in consequence, to resort to force.

The following is designed for the latter emergency and it is left
to your discretion to make proper use of it at the right time and in
a suitable manner in your conference with M. Sazonow and the Prime
Minister.

I presume that under the present circumstances you are in close
touch with your German colleague, who has surely been instructed

82 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

by his Government not to allow the Russian Government any room
for doubt that Austria-Hungary would not stand alone in the event
of a conflict with Russia.

I have no doubt that it will not be an easy task to bring Sazonow
to a true appreciation of our action at Belgrade, which has been
forced upon us.

But there is one point which cannot fail to impress the Russian
Foreign Minister, namely, an emphatic statement by you to the effect
that Austria-Hungary, in conformity with her established principle
of disinterestedness, is guided by no selfish motive in the present
crisis, although the situation has culminated in warlike action.

The Monarchy is sated with territory and has no desire for
Servian lands. If war with Servia be forced upon us, it will be for
us not a war of conquest, but of self-defence and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently
comprehensive, may be placed in a still more convincing light by a
study of the dossier referring to the Servian propaganda against the
Dual Monarchy and the relation between this propaganda and the
crime of June the 28th.

You will therefore call the Russian Foreign Minister's special
attention to this dossier and point out to him that there is no precedent
of a Great Power tolerating so long and with such unexampled for-
bearance the seditious agitations of a small neighbour.

We had no wish to adopt a policy adverse to the free development
of the Christian Balkan States, and therefore we have permitted
Servia to almost double her territory since the annexation crisis of
1908, although we knew how little Servian promises are worth.

Since then the subversive movement fostered against the Monarchy
in Servia has become so excessive that Austria-Hungary's vital inter-
ests and even her dynasty are seriously menaced by Servia 's under-
ground activities.

We must presume that conservative and dynastic Russia will not
only understand our energetic action against such a menace to public
order, but will even regard it as imperative.

On reaching this point in your conversation with M. Sazonow it
will be necessary to state, in addition to your explanation of our
motives and intentions, that, although we have no ambitions for
territorial expansion and do not intend to infringe upon the integrity
of Servia, as you already have pointed out, still we are determined to
go to any length to ensure the acceptance of our demands.

The course of the last 40 years, as well as the historical fact

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 83

that our gracious Sovereign has acquired the glorious name of
"Guardian of the Peace," attest that we have always held peace to
be the most sacred blessing of the people, and that, in so far as it
depended on us, we have endeavoured to maintain it.

We would all the more regret a disturbance of the peace of
Europe, because of our conviction that the evolution of the Balkan
States toward national and political independence could only improve
our relations with Russia, eliminating all possibilities of a clash of
interests with that empire, and because in framing our own policy
we always have been disposed to respect the important political in-
terests of Russia.

To tolerate the Servian machinations any longer, however, would
undermine our national existence and our standing as a Great Power,
and would, therefore, imperil the European balance of power — an
equilibrium the maintenance of which, we are convinced, the peace-
loving statesmen of Russia regard as essential to their own interests.
Our action against Servia, whatever form it may take, is altogether
conservative and has no object except the necessary maintenance of
our position in Europe.

No. 27.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Yiennu, July 25, 1914.

As clause 5 of our demands, which concerns the cooperation of
Austro-Hungarian officials in the suppression of the subversive agita-
tion in Servia, has called forth M. Sazonow's particular objection, you
are instructed to give him the strictly confidential information that
the insertion of this clause is due to merely practical considerations
and is not intended as an infringement on Servia 's sovereignty. The
"collaboration" mentioned in clause 5 refers to the creation in Bel-
grade of a secret bureau de surete which would work like the similar
Russian institution in Paris and would cooperate with the Servian
police and administration.

84 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 28.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. PetershurgJi, July 26, 1914.

Reports concerning Russian mobilisation have caused Count Pour-
tales to call the Russian Minister's earnest attention to the fact
that an attempt to exert diplomatic pressure by means of mobilisa-
tion is extremely dangerous at this juncture. In such an event the
military considerations of the General Staff will be supreme and the
situation will become irrevocable once **the button has been pressed"
by the Chief of Staff in Germany. M. Sazonow gave the German Am-
bassador his word of honour that the reports of a mobilisation were
unfounded, that for the present not one horse had been levied, not one
reservist called, and that merely preparatory measures were being
taken in the military districts of Kieff and Odessa, and possibly of
Kazan and Moscow.

Immediately afterwards a courier delivered to the German Mili-
tary Attache a request to call on the Minister of War. Suchomli-
now, referring to Count Pourtales's conversation with the Minister
of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Russian military preparations,
stated that, as the Ambassador might possibly have misunderstood
some details pertaining to military questions, he would be prepared
to give the Military Attache fuller information. Major von Eggeling's
report was summarised in the following telegram which Count Pour-
tales sent to Berlin and placed at my disposal :

Military Attache reports on conversation with Russian Minister
of War:

M. Sazonow has requested him to enlighten me concerning mili-
tary situation. Minister of War gave me his word of honour that
no order whatever had as yet been issued for mobilisation. For the
present merely preparatory measures were being taken, no horse
levied, no reservist called. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross
Servian boundary, the military districts adjoining Austria (Kieff,
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan) would be mobilised. Under no circumstances
would mobilisation extend to districts of Warsaw, Vilna and St.
Petersburgh, bordering on Germany. Peace with Germany is ear-
nestly desired. In answer to my question as to object of mobilisation
against Austria-Hungary, War Minister shrugged his shoulders and
hinted at diplomatic influences. I pointed out to War Minister that

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 85

we should appreciate friendly disposition but consider mobilisation
against Austria-Hungary alone as decidedly threatening. War Min-
ister repeatedly and insistently laid stress on absolute necessity and
desire for peace.

No. 29.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

M. von Tschirschky informed me to-day under instructions that,
according to a telegram sent from London on the 25th instant, at
3 p.m., by Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey had forwarded the
latter a draft of Servia's reply together with a personal letter ex-
pressing the hope that, in view of the conciliatory tenor of the reply,
the Berlin Cabinet would recommend its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it advisable that you should revert to this matter and
call the Foreign Secretary's attention to the fact that, almost at
the time when he sent his note to Prince Lichnowsky, i.e., yesterday
at 3 p.m., Servia had already ordered a general mobilisation; this
goes to prove that there was no inclination in Belgrade for a peaceful
settlement. The unsatisfactory reply, which, it appears, had pre-
viously been wired to London, was not handed to the Imperial and
Royal Minister in Belgrade until 6 p.m., after the mobilisation order
had been issued.

No. 30.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Arribassadors in Berlin,
Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Servia having rejected our demands, we have broken off diplo-
matic relation with that country.

You are instructed to call immediately on the Foreign Secretary
or his representative and frame your statement as follows :

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the

86 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

demands which we had been compelled to make upon it in order to
permanently safeguard our most vital interests, which Servia is
menacing. In so doing Servia has manifested her unwillingness to
abandon her subversive tactics, which are directed at fomenting dis-
turbances in some of our border territories with a view to their even-
tual separation from the Dual Monarchy. To our regret, and much
against our wish, we have been placed under the necessity of employ-
ing the severest measures to compel Servia to modify radically her
hitherto hostile attitude toward us.

No. 31.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. Peter sburgh, July 27, 1914.

I have just had a long conversation with M. Sazonow. I told the
Minister I was under the impression that the nature of our action
had been misunderstood in Russia. We were suspected of contem-
plating an attack upon the Balkans, and of intending to march upon
Saloniki or possibly even upon Constantinople. Others go so far as
to describe our action as the beginning of a preventive war against
Russia. I declared all this to be erroneous and in a sense absurd.
The purpose of our action is merely self-preservation and self-defence
against a hostile propaganda threatening the integrity of the Mon-
archy, carried on by word, writing and deed. No one in Austria-
Hungary would think of threatening Russian interests or picking a
quarrel with Russia.

We were, however, resolved to reach the goal which we had in
view, and the road which we had chosen seemed to us the most
effective. As we had embarked upon an action of self-defence, I
emphasised the fact that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted
by any consequences whatsoever.

M. Sazonow agreed with me in principle. He recognised our aim
as a perfectly legitimate one, but expressed the opinion that the
method we had selected for its attainment was not happy in its form.
He had studied the note since its presentation, he observed, and would
like to peruse it once more with me, if I had time to do so.

I responded that I was at his disposal, but was neither authorised
to discuss the wording of the note nor to give an interpretation of it.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 87

His remarks, however, would be of greatest interest. The Minister
then analysed all the points of our note and this time found that
seven of the ten clauses were, on the whole, acceptable. He took ex-
ception only to the two clauses dealing with the cooperation of
Austro-Hungarian officials in Servia and to the clause concerning
the dismissal of officers and officials to be designated by us. Those
clauses he qualified as unacceptable in their present form. With
reference to the two first clauses, I found myself in a position to give
an authentic interpretation in the sense of your telegram of the
25th instant. The third clause I qualified as a necessary demand.
In any case events had been set in motion. The Servians had mobil-
ised as early as yesterday, and I was ignorant of what had happened
since.

No. 32.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. PetersburgJi.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I authorise you to tell M. Sazonow that Austria-Hungary has no
intention whatever to make any territorial conquests, as long as the
war remains localised between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

No. 33.
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 27, 1914.

M. Sazonow declared to the Gterman Ambassador that he could
* ' guarantee that no mobilisation had been effected by Russia. Certain
essential military precautions had been taken, however."

German Military Attache in St. Petersburgh reports that "the
Russian Minister of War had given him his word of honour that not
one man or horse had been mobilised; yet certain military precau-
tions had, of course, been taken"; precautions which, however, are
"fairly extensive," in the personal opinion of the Military Attach^,
expressed in his report.

88 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 34.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin,
Borne, London, Paris and St. PetersburgJi.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.
You will receive herewith the text of the note which was handed
to the Imperial and Royal Minister in Servia on July the 25th by the
Royal Servian Government, and our comments thereon.

(Enclosure.)

Note of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal
Austro-Hungarian Government, Dated 12/25th July, 1914, and
Comments Thereon.

Servian Reply to Austrian
Government.

The Royal Servian Government
has received the communication
of the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment of the 10th instant, and
is convinced that its reply will
remove any misunderstanding
which may threaten to impair the
good neighbourly relations be-
tween the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and the Kingdom of
Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the
protests which were made both
from the tribune of the national
Skuptchina and in the declara-
tions and actions of the responsi-
ble representatives of the State —
protests which were discontinued
as a result of the declarations
made by the Servian Government

Comments of the Austro-Hun-
garian Government.

The Royal Servian Government
confines itself to the statement
that no endeavour has been made
by either the Servian Government
or its officers to modify the status
of Bosnia and Herzegovina since
the declaration of the 18th of
March, 1909.

Thereby it deliberately evades

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1)

on the 18th March, 1909— have
not been renewed on any occasion
as regards the great neighbouring
Monarchy, and that no attempt
has been made since that time,
either by the successive Royal
Governments or by their organs,
to change the political and legal
status created in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Royal Govern-
ment calls attention to the fact
that in this connexion the Im-
perial and Royal Government has
made no representation, except
one concerning a school book,
when the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment received an entirely sat-
isfactory explanation. Servia in
numerous instances has given
proofs of her pacific and moderate
policy during the Balkan crisis,
and it is due to Servia and to the
sacrifice that she has made in the
exclusive interest of European
peace that the same has been
preserved.

The Royal Government cannot
be held responsible for manifes-
tations of a private character,
such as articles in the press and
the peaceable work of societies —
manifestations which take place
in nearly all countries in the ordi-
nary course of events, and which
as a general rule are beyond
official control. The Royal Gov-
ernment is all the less responsible,
in view of the fact that at the
time of the solution of a series
of questions which arose between
Servia and Austria-Hungary it

the basic point in our representa-
tions, as we have not asserted
that the Servian Government or
its officers have officially under-
taken anything to that end.

Our grievance, however, is that
the Servian Government has
omitted to suppress the agitation
directed against the territorial
integrity of the Dual Monarchy,
notwithstanding the obligations it
entered into under the terms of
the above-mentioned note.

The Servian Government, there-
fore, was in duty bound to a
radical change in the trend of its
policy and to establish good
neighbourly relations with Aus-
tria-Hungary; and not merely to
refrain from official attempts to
dispute the status of Bosnia as
an integral part of the Dual
Monarchy.

The contention of the Royal
Servian Government that utter-
ances of the press and the activi-
ties of associations have a private
character and are beyond the
control of the State, is plainly
at variance with the institutions
of modern States, even of those
which have the most liberal regu-
lations in this respect; these
regulations, designed to safe-
guard public polity and right,
impose State supervision upon
both press and associations.
Moreover, the Servian institu-

90 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

showed much consideration and
thus succeeded in settling most of
these questions to the mutual ad-
vantage of the two neighbouring
countries.

For these reasons the Royal
Government has been painfully
surprised at the allegations that
citizens of the Kingdom of Servia
have participated in the prepara-
tions for the crime committed at
Serajevo; the Royal Government
had expected to be invited to col-
laborate in an investigation of all
that concerns this crime, and it
stood ready, in order to prove the
entire correctness of its attitude,
to take measures against any
persons concerning whom repre-
sentations might be made to
it.

Complying with the desire of
the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, it is prepared to commit for
trial any Servian subject, regard-
less of his station or rank, of
whose complicity in the crime of
Serajevo proofs shall be pro-
duced, and more especially it
undertakes to publish on the first
page of the "Journal Officiel,"
on the date of the 13th/26th July,
the following declaration:

' ' The Royal Government of Ser-
via condemns every propaganda
directed against Austria-Hun-
gary, and in general all the
tendencies which aim at the ulti-

tions themselves provide for such
supervision. The charge against
the Servian Government is that
it completely failed to supervise
the Servian press and associa-
tions, although it well knew that
both were engaged in a campaign
against the Monarchy.

This assertion is incorrect. The
Servian Government had been
fully informed of the suspicion
raised against certain designated
persons, and therefore was not
only in a position spontaneously
to institute an investigation, but
was even bound to do so by its
own laws. It has done nothing
at all in this respect.

Our demand read as follows :
"The Royal Government of
Servia condemns the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 91

mate detachment from the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Monarchy of ter-
ritories belonging to it, and it
sincerely deplores the fatal con-
sequences of these criminal ac-
tivities.

"The Royal Government re-
grets that Servian officers and
functionaries have participated,
according to the communication
of the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment, in the above-mentioned
propaganda and thus compro-
mised the good neighbourly rela-
tions to which the Royal Govern-
ment was solemnly pledged by its
declaration of the 31st of March,
1909.

' ' The Royal Government, which
disapproves and repudiates all
idea of interfering or attempting
to interfere with the destinies of
the inhabitants of any part what-
soever of Austria-Hungary, con-
siders it its duty formally to warn
officers and functionaries, and
the whole population of the King-
dom, that henceforth it will pro-
ceed with the utmost vigour
against persons who may be
guilty of such machinations,
which it will use all its efforts to
prevent and suppress. ' '

This declaration will be brought
to the knowledge of the Royal
Army in an order of the day, in
the name of his Majesty the King,
by his Royal Highness the Crown
Prince Alexander, and will be
published in the next official army
bulletin.

The alteration made by the
Royal Servian Government in the
declaration demanded by us im-
plies either that such a propa-
ganda against Austria-Hungary
does not exist, or that its exist-
ence is not within the knowledge
of the Royal Government. This
formula is insincere and equivo-
cal; it is intended to furnish the
Servian Government with a loop-
hole for future emergencies. The
Servian Government might, in
future, interpret this declaration
as neither a disavowal of the ex-
isting propaganda, nor an admis-
sion of its hostility to the Mon-
archy; it might, furthermore,
base thereon the claim that it is
not bound to suppress any future
propaganda similar to the pres-
ent one.

The wording of our demand
was: "The Royal Government re-
grets that Servian officers and
functionaries have participated
in . . . " By the additional
phrase, "according to the com-
munication from the Imperial
and Royal Government," the
Royal Servian Government seeks,
as indicated above, to keep a
free hand for the future.

92 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Royal Government further
undertakes :

1. To insert, at the first ordi-
nary convocation of the Skupt-
china, a provision into the press
law for the most severe punish-
ment of incitement to hatred and
contempt of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy, and for taking
action against any publication the
general tendency of which is di-
rected against the territorial in-
tegrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engages, at
the impending revision of the
Constitution, to add to Article 22
of the Constitution an amendment
permitting that such publications
be confiscated, a proceeding at
present impossible according to
the clear provisions of Article 22
of the Constitution.

We had demanded:

1. The suppression of "any
publication which incites to hat-
red and contempt of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and the
general tendency of which is di-
rected against its territorial in-
tegrity."

We thus wished to establish
Servians obligation to provide for
the prevention of such press at-
tacks in the future; we wished,
therefore, to secure definite re-
sults in the present instance.

Servia, instead, offers to decree
certain laws intended to serve as
means to that purpose, to wit:

(a) A law providing individual
punishment of above-mentioned
press utterances hostile to the
Dual Monarchy. This is all the
more immaterial to us, as it is a
notorious fact that individual
prosecution of press offences is
very rarely possible, and as, fur-
thermore, the lax application of
such a law would leave unpun-
ished even the few cases that
might be prosecuted. This pro-
posal, therefore, in no way meets
our demand, as it gives no guar-
antee whatever for the results de-
sired by us.

(b) An addition to Article 22
of the constitution, permitting
confiscation, as referred to in the
Servian note. This proposal like-
wise must fail to satisfy us. The
existence of such a law in Servia
is of no avail to us, whereas only
a pledge by the Government to

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1)

2. The Government possesses
no proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government
furnish it with any, that the Na-
rodna Odbrana and other simi-
lar societies have committed np to
the present any criminal act of
this nature through the proceed-
ings of any of their members.
Nevertheless, the Royal Govern-
ment will accept the demands of
the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment and will dissolve the Na-
rodna Odbrana Society and every
other association which may be
directing its efforts against Aus-
tria-Hungary.

apply it would be useful. This,
however, has not been promised
to us.

These proposals are, therefore,
quite unsatisfactory, all the more
80 because they are also evasive,
as they do not state the time
within which these laws shall be
decreed. Besides, no provision is
made for the event of a rejection
of the bills by the Skuptchina —
not to mention a possible resig-
nation of the Cabinet — in which
case matters would remain un-
changed.

The propaganda against the
Monarchy conducted by the Na-
rodna Odbrana and its affiliated
associations permeates the entire
public life of Servia ; the Servian
Government's declaration that it
knows nothing about this propa-
ganda, is, therefore, an absolutely
inadmissible act of evasion. Set-
ting this contention aside, our de-
mand is not wholly met, as we
have also demanded:

The confiscation of the means
of propaganda of these societies.

The prevention of the reorgani-
sation of the dissolved societies
under other names and in other
guise.

These two points the Belgrade
Government ignores, thus elimi-
nating even the guarantee which
the preceding half -promise would
imply that the proposed dissolu-
tion would put an end, once for
all, to the activities of the socie-
ties hostile to the Dual Monarchy,

94 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

3. The Royal Servian Govern-
ment undertakes to remove with-
out delay from the system of
public instruction in Servia all
that serves or could serve to
foment propaganda against Aus-
tria-Hungary, whenever the Im-
perial and Royal Government
shall furnish it with facts and
proofs of such a propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also
agrees to remove from the mili-
tary and the civil service all such
persons as the judicial enquiry
may have proved to be guilty of
acts directed against the terri-
torial integrity of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and it ex-
pects the Imperial and Royal
Government to communicate to it
at a later day the names and the
acts of these officers and officials

and especially of the Narodna
Odbrana.

In this case, be it noted, more-
over, the Servian Government
first demands proof that a propa-
ganda against the Monarchy is
being carried on in Servia 's pub-
lic instruction ; this, too, when the
Servian Government must know
that the books in use in Servian
schools contain much objection-
able matter, and that a large
number of the Servian teachers
are connected with the Narodna
Odbrana and its affiliated asso-
ciations.

The Servian Government has
again in this instance failed to
comply with our demand in the
way indicated by us, inasmuch
as the phrase, "with regard to
both the teaching-staff and the
means of instruction," has been
omitted in the Servian note. In
this eliminated phrase are clearly
pointed out the mediums where-
by the propaganda against the
Dual Monarchy is being con-
ducted in the Servian schools.

If the dismissal of the military
officers and civil officials referred
to from the Government service
should be conditional upon their
guilt being first confirmed by
means of a trial, the Servian Gov-
ernment restricts its acceptance
of our demand to cases where
persons are charged with having
committed a crime punishable
under the provision of the penal
code. Since we, however, de-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 95

for the purposes of the proceed-
ings which are to be taken against
them.

5. The Royal Government must
confess that it does not clearly
understand the meaning or the
scope of the demand made by the
Imperial and Royal Government
that Servia shall undertake to ac-
cept the collaboration of officials
of the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment upon Servian territory,
but it declares that it will admit
such collaboration as agrees with
the principle of international law,
with criminal procedure, and with
good neighbourly relations.

6, It goes without saying that
the Royal Government considers
it a duty to begin an enquiry
against all such persons as are,
or possibly may be, implicated
in the plot of the 15/28 June, and
who may happen to be within the
territory of the kingdom. As re-
gards the participation in this en-
quiry of Austro-Hungarian agents
or authorities appointed for this
purpose by the Imperial and
Royal Government, the Royal
Government cannot accept such
an arrangement, as it would con-
stitute a violation of the Consti-
tution and of the law of criminal
procedure; nevertheless, in con-

manded the removal of officers
and officials who carry on a propa-
ganda hostile to the Monarchy,
our demand is palpably not com-
plied with in this respect, for the
reason that in Servia the propa-
ganda of which we complain does
not constitute an offence punish-
able by law.

International law and the penal
code governing criminal proceed-
ings have nothing whatever to do
with this question; this is purely
a problem of national polity to be
settled by a special mutual ar-
rangement. Servians reservation
is, therefore, unintelligible and,
on account of its vague and unde-
fined form, is likely to give rise
to insurmountable difficulties in
the attainment of a final settle-
ment.

Our demand was perfectly clear
and could not be misunderstood.
We demanded:

1. The institution of a legal in-
vestigation against those who par-
ticipated in the plot.

2. The cooperation of Austro-
Hungarian officials in the enquiry
(recherches, in contradistinction
to enquete judiciaire).

We did not contemplate the
participation of Austro-Hunga-
rian officials in the Servian legal
proceedings; these officials were
only to cooperate in the prelimi-
nary police investigation, which
was to seek out and collect the
data for the judicial enquiry.

96 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Crete cases communications as to
the results of the investigation in
question might be given to the
Austro-Hungarian agents.

7, The Royal Government pro-
ceeded on the very evening of the
delivery of the note, to arrest
Commandant Voja Tankositch.

As regards Milan Ciganovitch,
who is a subject of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and who
up to the 15th June was employed
(on probation) by the directorate
of railways, it has not yet been
possible to find out his where-
abouts. Notices for his appre-
hension have been published in
the press.

The Austro-Hungarian Govero.-

If the Servian Government has
misunderstood us, it has done so
intentionally, since it must be
familiar with the difference be-
tween an enquete judiciaire (a
judicial enquiry) and simple re-
cherches (a preliminary police in-
vestigation).

Since the Servian Government
wishes to evade every form of
control in connexion with the
proposed investigation which, if
correctly conducted, would ad-
duce results highly undesirable
for that Government; and since
it is unable to decline on plausi-
ble grounds the cooperation of
our officials in the police prelimi-
naries,— a police intervention for
which there are a great number
of precedents — it has adopted a
contention designed to furnish an
apparent justification of its re-
fusal to comply with our demand
and to make our demand appear
impossible of acceptance.

This reply is equivocal.

Our investigations have shown
that Ciganovitch took a leave of
absence three days after the
assassination, when it became
known that he had partici-
pated in the plot ; and that under
orders from the Belgrade Police
Department he proceeded to Ri-
bari. It is, therefore, untrue that
Ciganovitch had retired from the
Government's service as early as
the 15/28th of June. In addition,
it should be stated that the Chief
of the Belgrade Police, who him-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1)

ment is requested to be so good as
to supply as soon as possible, in
the customary form, the presump-
tive evidence of guilt as well as
the possible proofs of guilt which
have been collected up to the pres-
ent time, at the enquiry at Sera-
jevo, for the purposes of the Ser-
vian enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will
reinforce and extend the meas-
ures which have been taken for
suppressing the illicit traffic in
arms and explosives across the
frontier.

It goes without saying that
the Servian Government will im-
mediately order an enquiry and
will severely punish the frontier
officials on the Schabatz-Loznica
line who have failed in their duty
and allowed the authors of the
crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will
gladly furnish explanations of
the remarks made by its officials,
whether in Servia or abroad, in
interviews after the crime, and
which, according to the statement
of the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment, were hostile to the Mon-
archy, as soon as the Imperial and
Royal Government shall have
communicated to it the passages in
question in these remarks, and as
soon as it shall have shown that
the remarks were actually made
by the said officials, in connexion
with which the Royal Government
itself will take steps to collect
evidence.

self had caused Ciganovitch's de-
parture and knew his where-
abouts, stated in an interview
that no person of the name of
Milan Ciganovitch existed in
Belgrade.

The interviews here referred to
must be well known to the Ser-
vian Government. The request
that the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment furnish details concern-
ing these interviews, and the fact
that the Servian Government re-
serves the exclusive right to con-
duct the formal investigation in
this matter, prove that on this
point, as on others, Servia has no
serious intention to accede to our
demands.

98 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

10. The Royal Government will
inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of
the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has
not already been done by the pres-
ent note, as soon as each measure
shall have been ordered and car-
ried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment is not satisfied with this
reply the Servian Government,
considering that it is not to the
common interest to take precipi-
tate action in the solution of this
question, is ready, as always, to
accept a pacific understanding,
either by referring this question
to the decision of the Interna-
tional Tribunal at The Hague, or
to the Great Powers which took
part in the drawing up of the
declaration made by the Servian
Government on the 18/31 March,
1909.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

No. 35.

Count Szogyeny to Count Bercktold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Great Britain's proposal for a conference in London, in which
Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should take part, has been
rejected by Germany on the ground that Germany could not bring
her ally before a European tribunal for adjudication of Austria-
Hungary's differences with Servia.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 99

No. 36.
Baron Muller to Count Bercktold.

(Telegram.) Tokio, July 28, 1914.

To-day's semi-official "Japan Times" concludes an editorial by
saying that Japan is on the best of terms with the three Great Powers
concerned, namely, Austria-Hungary, (Germany and Russia, and had
no interest whatever in Servia.

In the event of war the Imperial Government would naturally
remain strictly neutral.

No. 37.
Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office, Belgrade.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Royal Servian Government having failed to give a satis-
factory reply to the note which was handed to it by the Austro-
Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and
Royal Government is compelled to protect its own rights and in-
terests, by a recourse to armed force.

Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers herself from now on to
be in state of war with Servia.

No. 38.
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

For your information and for transmission to the Secretary of
State.

I have received from Count Mensdorff the following telegram,
dated the 27th inst.:

**I had occasion to-day to explain fully to Sir Edward Grey, that
our action does not mean aggression but self-defence and self-preser-

100 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

vation, and that we do not contemplate conquest of Servian territory
or destruction of Servian independence. We desire to obtain satisfac-
tion for the past and guarantees for the future.

"In so doing I made use of certain points in your instructions to
Count Szapary. Sir Edward Grey said he felt very much disap-
pointed at the fact that we dealt with the Servian reply as if it were
a downright refusal.

"He had expected that this reply would furnish a basis upon
which the four other Governments would be able to elaborate a
satisfactory arrangement.

"This had been his idea when he suggested a conference. The
conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as
well as Russia would refrain from all military operations while the
other Powers endeavoured to find a satisfactory solution. (To-day's
declaration by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons enlarges
upon the project of the conference.)

"When he made the suggestion that we should refrain from
military operations against Servia, I expressed the fear that it might
possibly be too late.

"The Secretary of State was of the opinion that we were taking
a great risk if we were bound, under all circumstances, to make war
on Servia, on the assumption that Russia would remain inactive.
Should we be able to persuade Russia to refrain from action, he
would have no more to say ; if not, the possibilities and dangers were
incalculable.

"As a symptom of the feeling of uneasiness prevalent in England,
he pointed out that the Great British fleet which had been concen-
trated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres and was to have been
dispersed to-day, would remain there for the time being. 'We would
not have called out any reserves,' he observed, 'but since they are
gathered, we cannot send them home at this moment. '

"The object of his suggestion of a conference is to avert a collision
among the Great Powers, if possible, and presumably to isolate the
conflict. Should Russia mobilise and Germany take action, the proj-
ect of a conference would automatically faU through.

"It seems to me superfluous to point out to you that Grey's
project of a conference has been superseded by the course of events
inasmuch as it concerns our conflict with Servia, in view of the
existing state of war."

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 101

No. 39.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

We attach great importance to Sir Edward Grey's impartial
appreciation of our action in Servia in general, and of our rejection
of the Servian note in particular. I therefore request you to explain
in detail to the Secretary of State the dossier which has been des-
patched to you by post, and to emphasise the salient points in it.
In the same sense you will discuss with Sir Edward Grey the critical
comments on the Servian note (copy of the note together with our
comments was despatched to you by yesterday's past) and make
clear to him that Servia has only apparently met our demands with
the object of deceiving Europe, without giving any guarantee as to
the future.

In view of the fact that the Servian Government was fully aware
that the unconditional acceptance of our demands alone could satisfy
us, the Servian tactics are easily fathomed. Servia has accepted,
with various reservations, several of our demands in order to deceive
public opinion in Europe, confident that she never would be called
upon to carry out her promises. In your conversation with Sir
Edward Grey, you will lay particular stress upon the circumstance
that the general mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered for
July the 25th, 3 o'clock p.m., while the reply to our note was handed
in shortly before the expiration of the stipulated time, a few minutes
before 6 o'clock.

We had previously made no military preparations, but were forced
to make them by the Servian mobilisation.

No. 40.
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

For your information and guidance:

The Imperial Russian Ambassador called on me to-day to inform
me of his return from Russia after a short leave of absence, and at

102 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the same time to comply with telegraphic instructions received from
M. Sazonow. The latter had informed him of having had a long
and friendly conversation with you (re your telegram of the 27th
inst.) in the course of which you had, with great readiness, analysed
the different points of Servia's response. M. Sazonow held the opinion
that Servia had met our demands to a great extent, but that he con-
sidered several of these demands to be unacceptable, a view which he
already had communicated to you. Under the circumstances the
Servian response appeared to him to furnish the basis for an
understanding, to which the Russian Government would willingly
lend a hand. M. Sazonow therefore wished to propose that the ex-
change of views be continued with you and that I should instruct you
to that effect.

I replied that I could not agree to such a proposal. Nobody in
Austria-Hungary would understand or approve such a discussion of
a note which we already had found unsatisfactory. Such a discus-
sion appears all the more impossible since public opinion is already
deeply and generally excited, as the Ambassador must be well aware.
Moreover, we have declared war on Servia to-day.

The Ambassador's arguments were chiefly to the effect that we
would not stamp out the admitted ill-feeling in Servia by force of
arms, but that on the contrary we would inflame it still further. In
reply I shed some light upon our actual relation with Servia, which
made it inevitable that we should, however reluctantly and without
any underhand design, exert the necessary pressure to make it clear
to our restless neighbour that we are irrevocably resolved no longer
to permit a movement tolerated by the Servian Government and
directed against the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover,
Servia's attitude after the receipt of our note was not such as would
make possible a peaceful settlement, because Servia, before presenting
her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and by
so doing had committed a hostile act against us. Nevertheless, we
had waited three more days.

Yesterday Servia inaugurated hostilities against us on the Hun-
garian border. Thus we are compelled to abandon our forbearing
attitude toward Servia. It has now been made impossible for us to
bring about a complete and peaceful adjustment of relations with
Servia, and we are forced to meet the Servian provocations in the
only manner compatible with the dignity of the Dual Monarchy under
the circumstances.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 103

No. 41.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The British Ambassador called on me this morning and, accord-
ing to instructions, explained Sir Edward Grey's attitude on our
controversy with Servia, as follows :

The British Government has followed with great interest the
course of the crisis up to date, and wishes to assure us of its sympathy
with the stand we have taken and of its thorough understanding of
our grievances against Servia.

Although Great Britain has no special concern about our difficulty
with Servia as such, the London Cabinet could not ignore the con-
flict, inasmuch as it involves the possibility of extending into widening
eddies and thereby endangering the peace of Europe.

Only on this ground was Sir Edward Grey prompted to invite the
Governments of the countries not directly interested in this conflict
(Germany, Italy and France) to examine all the possibilities by a
continuous exchange of views and to consider methods of as speedy
a settlement as possible. The Secretary of State considers it expe-
dient that, following the precedent of the London Conference during
the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the aforesaid States in
London should keep in continuous touch with him.

Sir Edward Grey already has received responses in which the
above-mentioned Governments expressed their cordial assent to his
suggestion. For the present the Secretary of State would desire, if
possible, to prevent at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities
between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Should this, however, not be
possible, he was anxious to avoid a bloody collision, possibly by induc-
ing Servia to ^vithdraw her troops without giving battle. Servia 's
reply to us seems to offer the basis for an understanding, in the
opinion of Sir Edward Grey. England, he intimated, was willing to
use her influence in this direction, subject to our desire.

I thanked the Ambassador for Sir Edward Grey's communication,
and replied that I fully appreciated the views of the Secretary of
State. His point of view, however, necessarily differs from mine,
since Great Britain has no direct interest in our dispute with Servia,
and because the Secretary of State could hardly be thoroughly c(^ni-
sant of the seriousness and importance of the pending questions for

104 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the Dual Monarchy. Sir Edward Grey's suggestions concerning the
possibility of preventing an outbreak of hostilities are somewhat
belated, since, as early as yesterday, the Servians had opened fire on
our frontier-guards, and also because we declared war upon Servia
to-day. Referring to the idea of an exchange of views on the basis
of the Servian response, I have to decline the suggestion. We had
demanded an unqualified acceptance. Servia had endeavoured to
extricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles.
With such tactics we were only too familiar.

I added that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's personal experience surely
placed him in a position to appreciate fully our standpoint and to
explain it accurately to Sir Edward Grey.

Inasmuch as Sir Edward Grey is desirous to serve the cause of
European peace, he certainly will meet with no opposition from us.
But he should realise that the peace of Europe would not be preserved
if Great Powers stood behind Servia and assured her of impunity.
Suppose, even, that we agreed to attempt such a compromise, Servia
as a result would only be encouraged to persevere in her old tactics —
a situation which would once more endanger peace in a very short
time.

The British Ambassador assured me that he perfectly understood
our standpoint; but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under the
circumstances, there was no chance of attaining the British Govern-
ment's desire to bring about a peaceful compromise. He hoped to be
allowed to remain in touch with me, particularly on account of the
grave danger of a European conflagration.

I replied that I was always at the Ambassador's disposal, and
with this the interview terminated.

No. 42.
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I request you to call at once on the Imperial Chancellor or on
the Secretary of State and to convey to him the following in my
behalf :

According to corroborative news from St. Petersburgh, Kieff,
Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 105

preparations. M. Sazonow, however, as well as the Russian Minister
of War, have given their word of honour that a mobilisation had not
yet been ordered. The latter Minister, however, has advised the Ger-
man Military Attache that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa,
Moscow and Kazan, which adjoin Austria-Hungary, would be mo-
bilised if our troops crossed the Servian border.

Under these circumstances I would urgently request the Berlin
Cabinet to consider whether Russia's attention should not be called,
in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above-
mentioned districts would be equivalent to a threat to Austro-Hun-
gary, and that should it actually occur it would have to be met by
Austria-Hungary and her ally, the German Empire, with the most
comprehensive military counter-measures.

In order to facilitate the possible adoption of a more conciliatory
attitude by Russia, we think it advisable that such a move should
be initiated by Germany, alone, although we would, of course, be pre-
pared to join in the action.

Plain language would seem to me to be the most effective meas-
ure at this moment, in order to bring home to Russia the lengths to
which her menacing attitude may lead.

No. 43.
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin,

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador has advised me that Sir Ed-
ward Grey has approached the German Government with a request
that it use its influence with the Imperial and Royal Government to
the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satis-
factory or else accept it as a basis for discussions between the Cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was instructed to submit the British pro-
posal to the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration.

106 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 44.

Count Berchtold to tJie Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Peters-
burgh, London, Paris and Rome.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

For your information :

I have conveyed to the Imperial German Ambassador to-day, the
following memorandum in reply to a communication by him:

(Memoir.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government has noted with profound
thanks the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador
transmitted to it on the 28th instant, by request of the British Cabi-
net, to the effect that the Imperial German Government use its in-
fluence with the Vienna Cabinet in an effort to induce the latter, either
to approve the response from Belgrade or else to accept it as a basis
for discussions.

Referring to the communication made by the British Secretary
of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government
wishes to point out, in the first place, that Servia's reply by no means
conveys an assent to all our demands with one sole exception, as Sir
Edward Grey seems to assume, but on the contrary, contains reserva-
tions in almost every clause, so that the value of the concessions is
essentially reduced. The clause which has been entirely rejected
covers the very points which would have afforded us some guarantee
for the realisation of our object.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal its surprise
at the assumption that its action against Servia was aimed at Russia
and Russian influence in the Balkans, a supposition which would imply
that the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is not only Servian
but also of Russian origin.

Hitherto we have presumed that official Russian circles had no
connexion with the agitation against the Dual Monarchy, and our
present action is directed solely against Servia, while our sentiments
toward Russia are perfectly friendly, as we can assure Sir Edward
Grey.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government must point
out that, to its sincere regret, it no longer is in a position to meet the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 107

Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time
when the German request was presented here, a state of war already-
existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, and thus the Servian
reply had been superseded by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government wishes to call attention to
the fact that the Royal Servian Government has proceeded to the
mobilisation of the Servian forces before it replied to our note, and
subsequently has allowed three days to elapse without showing any
disposition to modify its point of view, whereupon we have declared
war.

Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its influence
upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of peace among
the Great Powers, and for a localisation of the war which has been
forced upon us by the Servian agitation of many years' standing,
such efforts would meet with the Imperial and Royal Government's
appreciation.

No. 45.
Count Szbcsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 29, 1914.

France undoubtedly is making military preparations as announced
by the newspapers, though the latter may possibly be exaggerating.
According to strictly confidential information, Baron Schoen has been
instructed to touch upon the topic of these military preparations with
M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that, under the circumstances,
Germany might be compelled to adopt similar measures, which, of
course, could not be concealed and which would cause great excite-
ment when they should become known to the public.

Thus both countries, though only desirous of peace, might be
driven to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous.

Moreover Baron Schoen, acting on instructions, will also declare
that Germany anxiously desires that the conflict between us and
Servia shall remain localised, and that Germany counts on the sup-
port of France on this point.

108 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 46.
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

As early as Sunday the Gterman Government declared at St.
Petersburgli that a mobilisation by Russia would be followed by a
mobilisation by Germany.

Thereupon the Russian Government replied in the sense of my
telegram of the 27th instant. Another telegram was sent to St.
Petersburgh to-day, to the effect that Germany may be compelled to
mobilise if Russia carries on her mobilisation any further.

No. 47.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.

On information received from the German Ambassador that M.
Sazonow appeared greatly disturbed by your apparent unwillingness
to continue discussions with Russia and by the Austro-Hungarian
order of mobilisation, which appears to him to exceed the necessary
scope and therefore is believed to be directed against Russia, I called
upon the Minister in an attempt to clear up misconceptions which
seemed to exist.

The Minister asserted that Austria-Hungary had refused point-
blank to discuss matters any further. In accordance with your tele-
gram of the 28th instant, I explained that, in view of recent events,
you certainly had refused to discuss any further the wording of the
notes and our conflict with Servia in general; that, on the other
hand, I have to state that I was in a position to open a much wider
field for discussion by declaring that we do not wish to interfere with
any Russian interests and that we do not intend to take any Servian
territory; provided, always, that the conflict be localised between
Austria-Hungary and Servia; that, moreover, we did not intend to
violate Servia 's sovereignty. I expressed my firm conviction that
you would always be willing to keep in touch with St. Petersburgh
with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 109

M. Sazonow replied that he felt reassured on the territorial ques-
tion, but that he must adhere to his former view that the enforcement
of our demand would place Servia in a condition of vassalage; that
such an event would affect the equilibrium of the Balkans and thereby
would infringe upon Russian interests. He then reverted to the dis-
cussion of the note, to Sir Edward Grey's action, etc., and again
suggested that he recognised our legitimate interests and wished to
satisfy them fully, but that this should be done in a manner acceptable
to Servia. I rejoined that these were not Russian but Servian inter-
ests, whereupon Sazonow retorted that in this case Russian interests
were identical with Servian interests. In order to find an issue from
this vicious circle, I passed to another topic.

I observed that it had been brought to my notice that some ap-
prehension was felt in Russia, because we had mobilised eight army
corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonow stated that not he but
the Chief of the General Staff had expressed uneasiness, and that he
himself knew nothing about it. I endeavoured to convince M. Sazonow
that any unbiased person could be easily convinced that our southern
army corps could not be a menace to Russia.

I pointed out to the Minister that it might be well to inform his
Imperial Majesty, the Czar, of the true situation, the more so, because
it is urgently necessary for the preservation of the peace that an
immediate stop be put to this race in military preparations, which
appeared imminent as the result of this information. M. Sazonow
said in a significant manner — and his observation shed an illuminat-
ing light upon the situation — that lie would inform the Chief of the
General Staff, as that officer conferred with His Majesty every day.

The Minister also said that an Ukase was being signed to-day,
ordering a somewhat extensive mobilisation. He could, however,
declare in an absolutely official way that these forces were not in-
tended for a sudden attack upon us, but would be kept under arms
in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be menaced. An
explanatory note, he said, would confirm this assurance that it was
only a question of a precautionary measure, which Czar Nicholas had
deemed justifiable on the ground that we not only have the advantage
of a quicker mobilisation, but also have the benefit of so long a start.
I emphatically drew Sazonow 's attention to the impression which
such measures are bound to create in Austria-Hungary. I expressed
my doubts as to whether the explanatory note would be able to soften
that impression, whereupon Sazonow reiterated his assurance that
this measure is absolutely inoffensive ( !).

110 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 48.
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Herr von Tschirsehky has just told me that the Russian Ambas-
sador has informed him that his Government had communicated to
him the fact that the Military Districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and
Kazan would be mobilised. Russia considers her honour as a Great
Power to have been offended, and therefore she has been obliged to
take adequate measures. The Russian mobilisation is being confirmed
by our generals commanding the Army Corps in Galicia, and, ac-
cording to our Military Attache, was not denied by M. Sazonow in
his conference with the German Ambassador.

You are instructed to convey the above information to the Ger-
man Government without delay and to point out emphatically that
for military reasons our general mobilisation will have to be ordered
at once, unless the Russian mobilisation is stopped immediately.

As a last attempt to avert a European war, I consider it desirable
that our Envoy and the German Representative in St. Petersburgh,
and if necessary also in Paris, be instructed at once to explain in an
amicable way to the respective Governments that the continuation
of the Russian mobilisation would provoke counter-measures in Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary, which necessarily would lead to the most
serious consequences. You will add, that it is self-evident that we
cannot allow any interference with our armed action in Servia.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh and Paris
are being simultaneously instructed to make the above declaration as
soon as their German colleagues receive the same instructions.

No. 49.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

In reply to your telegram of July 29th, I am still ready, as
before, to allow you to explain to M. Sazonow the individual points
in our note to Servia, which has since been superseded by events. In

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 111

this connexion I would also make a point of discussing in a frank
and friendly manner the questions which directly concern our rela-
tions with Russia, in accordance with the suggestion transmitted to
me by M. Schebeko, From such a discussion, it is to be hoped, may
result the elimination of the unfortunate misconception in this par-
ticular matter, as well as the peaceful development of our good
relations with Russia.

No. 50.
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. PetershurgJi.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

For your information and guidance :

I have explained to M. Schebeko to-day, that it had been reported
to me that M, Sazonow was painfully impressed by my flat rejection
of his suggestion of a conference between you and himself, and also
because no exchange of views had taken place between myself and
M. Schebeko.

With regard to the first proposal, I had already instructed you
by telegraph to give M. Sazonow any explanation he might require
concerning our note, although recent events have superseded that
note. Such an explanation, however, could be confined to only be-
lated elucidation, as we had intended never to abate any point in the
note. I also stated that I had authorised you to make our relations
with Russia the subject of an amicable exchange of views with M.
Sazonow. The complaint that there had been no conference between
myself and Schebeko must be based on a misunderstanding, as we —
Schebeko and I — had discussed the pending questions only two days
ago. The Ambassador confirmed this and said that he had sent a full
report of our interview to M. Sazonow.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia had
caused such anxiety in St. Petersburgh. He asserted that we, as a
Great Power, were taking action against the small Servian State,
without conveying any knowledge of our intention at St. Petersburgh,
as to whether we would infringe upon its sovereignty, overthrow it,
or even crush it out of existence. Being connected with Servia by
historic and other ties, Russia could not remain indifferent to Servia 's
fate. Every attempt has been made in St. Petersburgh to impress

112 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

upon Belgrade the necessity of complying with our demands. This,
however, at a time when it could not have been known what demands
we would formulate.

But even now, after the demands have been made, every influence
would be exerted, I was assured, to obtain all possible concessions to
our wishes. I begged the Ambassador to remember that we had re-
peatedly stated that we were not following a policy of conquest in
Servia, that we did not intend to infringe upon her sovereignty, but
that we merely desired to attain a solution which would afford us a
guarantee against further agitations on the part of Servia. In en-
larging upon the subject of our intolerable relations with Servia, I
plainly gave Schebeko to understand to what extent Russian diplo-
macy was responsible for this state of things, though surely against
the inclination of the leading men in Russia.

In the course of our conversation I referred to the Russian mobili-
sation, which had meanwhile been brought to my knowledge. Since
the mobilisation is restricted to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff,
Moscow and Kazan, it bears the character of a hostile demonstration
against the Dual Monarchy. The cause of this measure is unknown
to me, since there is no matter in dispute between us and Russia.
Austria-Hungary has mobilised her troops solely against Servia, and
not one man against Russia. The very fact that the 1st, Xth, and
Xlth army corps have not been mobilised, bears out my statement.
Since Russia is obviously mobilising against us, we are compelled to
extend our own mobilisation ; I, however, wish to point out expressly,
that this measure should not be considered as a hostile act against
Russia, but simply as a response to the Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schebeko to report the above to his Government, which
he undertook to do.

No. 51.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in London
and St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am telegraphing to Berlin as follows:

Herr von Tschirschky, acting on instructions, informed me yes-
terday of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lich-

THE AUSTEO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 113

nowsky, in the course of which the Secretary of State made the
following declaration to the German Ambassador:

Sazonow has made known to the British Government that, since
Austria-Hungary has declared war on Servia, he was no longer in a
position to treat directly with Austria-Hungary, and therefore re-
quested Great Britain to resume her mediation. As a condition of
this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the sus-
pension of hostilities in the meanwhile.

Commenting upon this Russian suggestion. Sir Edward Grey told
Prince Liehnowsky that Great Britain was considering a plan of
mediation a quatre, and held such mediation to be urgent and essen-
tial for the avoidance of a general war.

You are instructed to thank the Secretary of State warmly for
the communication made by Herr von Tschirschky and to express
our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposition to mediate
between us and Servia despite the changes brought about in the
situation by Russia's mobilisation.

Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condition that our
military action against Servia shall nevertheless proceed and that
the British Cabinet shall induce the Russian Government to stop the
mobilisation directed against us. It is understood that in this case
we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in
Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's mobilisation.

No. 52.

Count Szapdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. Petershurgh, July 31, 1914.

Early this morning an order was issued for the general mobilisa-
tion of the entire army and navy.

114 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 53.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Embassies, Legations

and Consulates.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.

For your information and for use at the respective Governments:

In response to Russian Government's order for mobilisation at
our frontier we are forced to take similar measures in Galieia.

These measures are of a purely defensive character and are solely
due to the pressure of the Russian preparations, which we greatly
regret, as we have no aggressive intentions whatever against Russia,
and desire the continuation of the same friendly relations as here-
tofore.

Negotiations dealing with the situation are proceeding between
the Cabinets at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh, and we still hope that
they may lead to a general understanding.

No. 54.
Count Szicsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

The German Ambassador, on instructions from his Government,
has made a declaration here to the effect that, if the Russian general
mobilisation shall not be stopped within twelve hours, Germany also
will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen enquired whether
France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war.
He requested an answer to this question within eighteen hours. The
time-limit expires to-morrow, Saturday, at 1 o'clock p.m.

No. 55.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914.

Received your telegram of the 30th inst. My telegram of the
29th inst. will have acquainted you with the fact that I had resumed

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 115

the exchange of views with M. Sazonow without waiting for instruc-
tions and practically on the basis now suggested by you, without
succeeding, however, in bringing the conflicting viewpoints nearer to
an agreement.

Meanwhile the conversations between the German Ambassador
and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs have made it clear that
Russia would not be content even with a formal declaration by
Austria-Hungary that she would not reduce Servian territory, nor
infringe upon her sovereignty, nor violate any Russian interest in the
Balkans, or elsewhere. Moreover, Russia has, since then, ordered a
general mobilisation.

No. 56.
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) St. PetershurgJi, August 1, 1914.

On my visit to M. Sazonow to-day, I declared that I had received
certain instructions, but that I was not aware of the situation created
in Vienna by the Russian general mobilisation.

Therefore, in carrying out the instructions which had been des-
patched to me before that event, I could not take into account the
newly created situation. I said that the two points of your instruc-
tions dealt with the misunderstanding arising out of our refusal to
discuss matters any further with Russia. As I had said even before I
was authorised to do so, this conception is erroneous. I pointed out
that you were not only willing to enter into negotiations with Russia
on a most comprehensive basis, but even to discuss the wording of
our note, inasmuch as it was only a question of interpretation.

I emphasised the point that your instructions once more bear out
your good intentions ; that I was still ignorant of the effect produced
in Vienna by the Russian general mobilisation and that I could but
hope that events might not yet have carried us too far. In any case
I considered it my duty at the present momentous juncture to fur-
nish another proof of the good-will of the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment.

M. Sazonow, in reply, expressed his satisfaction at this evidence
of our good intentions, but observed that for obvious reasons the
neutral ground of London would promise better success for the pro-

116 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

posed negotiations than St. Petersburgh. I replied that you desired
to be in direct touch with St. Petersburgh, and that I was conse-
quently unable to give an opinion on the suggestion, but would not
fail to convey it to you.

No. 57.
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 2, 1914.

The Secretary of State has just advised me that no reply to the
German enquiry has arrived from Russia.

Russian troops have crossed the GJerman border near Schwiddin
(southeast of Bialla). Russia has, therefore, attacked Germany.
Germany consequently considers herself to be in state of war with
Russia.

The Russian Ambassador was handed his passports this forenoon ;
he probably will leave to-day.

No. 58.
Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

I have just seen Sir Edward Grey. The British Government has
addressed an ultimatum to Germany on the subject of Belgium. He
expects reply at midnight.

Sir Edward Grey holds that, meanwhile, there was no reason for
a similar communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and
no cause for a conflict with us, as long as we are not at war with
France. He hoped we would not open hostilities without a previous
formal declaration of war. He will not recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we enter into a state of war with France, Great Britain,
as an ally of France, would find it difficult to cooperate with the
latter in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 117

No. 59.

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. PetershurgJi.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 5, 1914.

You are instructed to hand the following note to the Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"By order of his Government, the undersigned Ambassador of
Austria-Hungary has the honour to notify His Excellency, the Rus-
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows:

"In view of the threatening attitude assumed by Russia in the
conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia, and in
view of the fact that, in consequence of this conflict, and according
to a communication of the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has considered it
necessary to open hostilities against Germany; furthermore, in view
of the fact that the latter consequently has entered into a state of war
with the former Power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally
in a state of war with Russia."

After having presented this note, you will ask for the return of
your passports and take your departure without delay accompanied
by the entire staff of the Embassy, with the sole exception of those
officials who may have to remain.

Simultaneously passports are being handed to M. Schebeko.

No. 60.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.) Yienna, August 6, 1914.

Received your telegram of the 6th inst.

You are instructed to assure Sir Edward Grey, that we shall
under no circumstances begin hostilities against Great Britain with-
out previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect Great
Britain to act on the same principle.

118 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 61.

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, August 8, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent for me and has informed
me that the Innsbruck army corps has been despatched to the French
frontier, according to positive information received by him. M. Dou-
mergue urgently desires to know whether this information is correct,
and in the event of the affirmative to know the Imperial and Royal
Government's intentions. France being at war with Germany, such
a movement of troops to the French border is, in his opinion, incom-
patible with the state of peace existing between Austria-Hungary and
France. M. Dumaine is instructed to make a similar representation
to you.

No. 62.
Count Berchtold to Count Szecsen, Paris.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 9, 1914.

Re your telegram of the 8th inst.

On information received from General Staff I authorise you to
declare to the French Government that news of participation of our
troops in the Franco-German war is a pure invention. I have made
an identical declaration to M. Dumaine.

No. 63.
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Paris, August 10, 1914.

Received telegram of 9th August.

Immediately communicated contents to M. Doumergue. The
Minister, having received a similar telegraphic report from M. Du-
maine concerning his conversation with you, is satisfied that our

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 119

troops are not on the French frontier, but says that he has positive
information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been trans-
ported to Germany, thus enabling the latter to withdraw her own
troops from the German territories now occupied by our forces. In
the Minister's view this facilitates the military operations of the
Germans.

I have repeatedly called the Minister's attention to the wording
of your reply; he recognises that there could be no question of an
active participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but in-
sists that the presence of our troops on German territory is undeni-
able and represents military support to Germany. Under these cir-
cumstances he has instructed the French Ambassador in Vienna to
ask immediately for his passports and to leave Vienna with the entire
staff of the Embassy, to-day.

The Minister told me that, under the circumstances, my presence
here could be of no avail, but owing to public excitement, might even
give rise to unpleasant incidents which he would like to avoid. He
offered to have a special train ready to-night for my conveyance out
of France. I replied that it would be impossible for me to obtain
instructions from you by to-night, but in view of the recall of M.
Dumaine, I begged him to have my passports handed to me.

No. 64.
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

Vienna, August 11, 1914.

The French Government has instructed its Ambassador here to
ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army
corps has been sent to Germany, thereby enabling the German mili-
tary authorities to withdraw their troops from the German territories
now occupied by our forces.

This move by our General Staff is considered to constitute mili-
tary support to Germany.

You are instructed to assure the British Government that this
French assertion, according to authentic information, is unfounded.

120 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 65.
Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) London, August 12, 1914.

I have just received from Sir Edward Grey the following com-
munication :

"By request of the French Government, which no longer is able
to communicate directly with your Government, I wish to inform you
of the following:

"After having declared war on Servia and having thus initiated
hostilities in Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Government has, with-
out any provocation on the part of the Government of the French
Republic, entered into a state of war with France.

Ist : " After Germany had declared war successively upon Russia
and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government has intervened in
this conflict by declaring war on Russia, which was already in alliance
with France.

2nd: "According to manifold and reliable information Austria
has sent troops to the German border under circumstances which
constitute a direct menace to France.

"In view of these facts the French Government considers itself
compelled to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that it
will take all measures necessary to meet the actions and menaces of
the latter."

Sir Edward Grey added: "A rupture with France having thus
been brought about, the Government of His Britannic Majesty is
obliged to proclaim a state of war between Great Britain and Austria-
Hungary, to begin at midnight."

No. 66.

TJie Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.

Monsieur le Comte : Vienna, August 20, 1914.

No doubt you already have been informed by Baron Miiller of
the nature of the communication made to the German Government
by my Government on the 15th inst. ; but, for your personal infor-
mation, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram received from
Tokio on the subject, although I have no instruction to do so.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 121

(Enclosxjre.)

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the
present situation, and as the result of full communication with the
British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining
the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which forms one of
the objects of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, have come to the decision
of taking the necessary measures therefor in common with Great
Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government
thought it proper to once approach the German Government with
a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following
effect on the 15th of August, 1914:

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from
the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels
which cannot be so withdrawn, to be disarmed.

2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and with-
out compensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased terri-
tory of Kiau-Chau before the 16th of September, 1914, for the purpose
of returning it to China.

The Japanese Government has declared to the German Govern-
ment that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above
advice should be received before noon of Sunday, the 23rd instant,
the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem neces-
sary.

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allow-
ance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government ;
but should, unfortunately, the German Government not accept the
advice of the Japanese Government, the latter will be obliged to take
the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object.

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the
present attitude is, already mentioned, none other than to safeguard
the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the
Anglo-Japanese alliance by consolidating the foundation of perma-
nent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Gov-
ernment have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of
territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Conse-
quently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect,
with the utmost care, the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia
and not in the least to injure them.

122 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 67.

Count Berchtold to Count Clary, Brussels.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 22, 1914.

I request you to inform the Royal Belgian Minister of Foreign
Affairs without delay, as follows:

By order of my Government I have the honour to notify you, as
follows :

In view of the fact that Belgium, having refused to accept the
propositions addressed to her on several occasions by Germany, is
now in military cooperation with France and Great Britain, both of
which have declared war on Austria-Hungary; and in view of the
recently established fact that Austrian and Hungarian subjects resi-
dent in Belgium have, under the eyes of the Royal authorities, been
treated in a manner contrary to the most primitive laws of humanity,
and inadmissible even toward subjects of a hostile State, Austria-
Hungary is necessarily compelled to break off diplomatic relations
and considers herself from now on in a state of war with Belgium.

I leave the country with the staff of the Legation and place the
subjects of my country under the protection of the Minister of the
United States of America in Belgium.

The Imperial and Royal Government has handed his passports to
Count Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 68.
Prince HoJierdolie to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 23, 1914.

The Japanese Minister here has been informed by the Foreign
Office that the German Imperial Government had no intention to reply
to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government has instructed
its Ambassador in Tokio to leave Japan upon the expiration of the
time-limit fixed by Japan for noon to-day. Simultaneously the
Japanese Charg6 d 'Affaires is to be handed his passports.

At noon the Charge d 'Affaires received his passports; he will
leave Berlin to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 123

No. 69.

Count Berchtold to Baron Miiller, Tokio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 24, 1914.

The Commander of H. M. S. ** Elisabeth" has been instructed to
participate in the action at Tsingtau.

In view of Japan's action against our ally, the German Empire,
I request you to ask for your passports, notify Consulates and leave
Japan for America together with our colony and the staffs of Em-
bassy and Consulates. You will place our subjects and interests under
the protection of the American Ambassador. Passports will be handed
to Japanese Ambassador here.

THE
AUSTRO-HMGARIAN RED BOOK

(NO. 2)

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2)^

No. 1.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 20, 1914.

On the occasion of your meeting with the Marchese di San Giu-
liano, which presumably will take place to-morrow, you will express
yourself in this sense :

So far you had not received any precise information as to the
results of the trial of Serajevo, nor with regard to the steps we
propose to take in this matter at Belgrade. Nevertheless, I had
acquainted you with the fact that the evidence established up to
date, as well as the constant subversive Servian agitations carried
on for many years past, are likely to compel us to assume a serious
attitude in Belgrade. You are authorised to bring this to the
knowledge of the Marchese di San Giuliano, and to add that we
consider it decidedly within the range of possibilities that a peace-
able issue may be reached in our undertakings in Belgrade. We
are convinced that in clearing up our relations with Servia, we
can rely on Italy's loyalty in fulfilment of the terms of our alliance.

Summing up correctly the international situation, the Marchese
di San Giuliano has frequently remarked to you, and had also ex-
pressed to me at Abbazia, the view that Italy needs a strong Austria-
Hungary. The clearing up of our delicate relations with Servia
seems an absolute necessity for the preservation of the present position
of the Monarchy and of the power of resistance of the Triple Alliance,
which is the foundation of the peace and the equilibrium of Europe.
At the present moment it is also to Italy's interest to side with us

* Imperial and Royal Austro-Eungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplo-
matic Documents Concerning the Relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy
from July 20, 1914, to May 23, 1915. Published by the Austro-Hungarian
Grovernment. Title of publication in the original text: K.U.K. Ministerium des
Aussern. Diplomatische Aktenstucl-e betreffend die Beziehungen Osterreich-
ungarns zu Italien in der zeit vom 20. Juli 1914 his 23. Mai 1915. Wien:
Druck der K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1915.

127

128 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

openly. It would therefore be of great importance, that the Minister
should make timely efforts to inspire Italian public opinion in a sense
favourable to our alliance in order that it may manifest itself accord-
ingly, as soon as our demands on Servia shall be made.

In the course of a possible discussion of the subject you may,
meanwhile without authorisation, express your own firm conviction,
that, should all peaceful means fail, the Vienna Cabinet would not
think of inaugurating a war of conquest or of acquiring any Servian
territory. At the same time you may also deny the malicious in-
vention of the Temps, that we intend an attack on the Lovcen. We
would be greatly obliged to the Italian Government if it were to use
its influence at Cetinje in an effort to persuade Montenegro to remain
quiescent during our conversations with Belgrade. Montenegro cer-
tainly is at variance with the attitude of the Belgrade Government
and, moreover, has had its own painful experiences with bombs im-
ported from Servia.

I have expressed myself in the above sense in my conversation
with the Italian Ambassador.

No. 2.

Count Berchtold to von Mirey.

(Instructions.) Vienna, July 20, 1914.

We must consider the possibility that the Royal Italian Govern-
ment, in case of warlike complications between us and Servia, will
endeavour to interpret Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty *
in a way which would conform neither with the sense nor with the
wording of it, and that it will claim compensation. The enclosed
note will serve for your guidance in opposing such a possible Italian
interpretation of the above mentioned article which the Marchese di
San Giuliano may bring forward.

* See Enclosure I.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 129

(Enclosure 1.)
(Note.)

In possibly resorting to the necessity of declaring war against
Servia, Austria-Hungary by no means intends any territorial con-
quest. The Monarchy aims solely at the attainment of the object as
set forth in her note to the Belgrade Government, namely, freedom
from a disturbance of her normal and peaceful development by a
subversive agitation fostered by the neighbouring kingdom.

Even though the Dual Monarchy does not aim at territorial ex-
pansion by a war with Servia, the nature of the war would necessarily
transfer the basis of operations to Servian soil. It must also be
understood that a provisional occupation of Servian territory would
be maintained until the required guarantees are given and until
the payment of the expenses which Austria-Hungary will have in-
curred for the mobilisation and for conducting the war in consequence
of Servia 's original refusal. This applies also in the event of Servia
deciding to yield, whether during the mobilisation or after the be-
ginning of hostilities.

It would mean a complete misunderstanding of the spirit of the
Triple Alliance agreement, if Article VII were to be interpreted in
such a way as to make a temporary occupation of territory belong-
ing to a neighbouring Balkan State at war with Austria-Hungary
conditional upon a previous agreement with Italy based on com-
pensations.

As far as the wording of the treaty is concerned, Article VII
may give rise to misinterpretation : in dealing with a possible neces-
sity for a modification of the status quo by Austria-Hungary or Italy,
occurs the phrase ''dans les regions des Balcans," which may suggest
an interpretation in the sense that the provisions of the above-men-
tioned article should apply as much to the Balkan possessions of
Turkey as to the territories of other Balkan States, no special dis-
tinction being made between the two.

The wording of our agreements shows how unjustified such an
interpretation of Article VII would be.

Following the words "dans les regions des Balcans/' the same
Article VII says: "des cotes et iles ottomanes dans la mer Egee"
(the Ottoman coast and islands in the Adriatic and -/Egean Seas).
This specific mention of Turkish territory implicitly excludes the

130 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

coasts and islands of other States from the provisions of that article,
and must be accepted as proof that the words **dans les regions des
Balcans" also refer solely to Turkish possessions. Otherwise, a surely-
unintended differentiation would arise, according to which, for in-
stance, the provisions of Article VII would have no bearing on
Montenegrin or Greek coastal territories or islands, but would apply
to parts of the interior.

The particular clause of the same article which deals with a
possible compensation, also shows the correctness of the view that
Article VII refers solely to territories of the Turkish dominion.
There can be no doubt that in the event of either of the contracting
powers occupying any Turkish territory, the other would be at liberty
to participate in the war, and thus have the opportunity to occupy
temporarily or permanently a previously defined territory by way of
compensation. It seems out of the question to apply this maxim in
connexion with a war between the Dual Monarchy and a Balkan
state which has no coastal territory as long as no other Balkan
state, which possesses its own coast, joins Austria-Hungary's ad-
versary and thus places Italy in a position to occupy a compensatory
territory by way of the sea.

The wording of the *' Arrangement special concernant le Sandjak
de Novibazar" of 1909, also clearly points to the meaning of the
words ''les regions des Balcans*' in Article VII of the Triple Alliance
agreement. This "arrangement/' which was made expressly for
the purpose of defining and completing the much discussed Article
VII, says that the provisions of the said article shall have equal
bearing on the Sandjak of Novibazar as on the other parts of Turkey.
If, therefore, the next sentence in the ''arrangement/' which begins
with "Si done," once more speaks of the "maintien du statu quo dams
les Balcans" (maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans) it can
be understood only in one way, namely, that in this instance, as
throughout the entire agreement, the words "les Balcans" refer only
to the Turkish possessions in the Balkans.

As to the spirit of the treaty, it should suffice to consider the
words of the introduction to the agreement on the "hienfaits que leur
garantit, au point de vue politique, aussi bien qu'au point de vue
monarchique et social, le maintien de la Triple Alliance" (the bene-
fits which the maintenance of the Triple Alliance guarantees from
political as well as from a monarchical and social point of view)
to make it clear that the Dual Monarchy cannot anticipate an inter-
pretation of the agreement on the part of Italy which would hamper

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 131

our action against Servia; especially so, as the object of that action
is to obtain guarantees against the continuation of a propaganda
which endangers the very existence of the Monarchy.

Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that in the spirit of Article
VII the maintenance of the status quo existing at that time, was said
to be desirable, in order to prevent any territorial changes which
miglit be of disadvantage to either Austria-Hungary or Italy. Since
that time such changes have taken place in a manner decidedly un-
favourable to the interests of the Dual Monarchy. Servia 's aggran-
disement at the expense of Turkey has accentuated the Great-Servian
Utopia to such an extent that the peaceful development of our terri-
tories is seriously menaced and Austria-Hungary may be compelled
even to resort to force of arms to defend her possessions. An inter-
vention on the part of the Dual Monarchy for the purpose of chang-
ing the status quo of the present Turkish possessions or of the terri-
tories which at the time of the treaty had been part of the Turkish
dominion, undoubtedly would necessitate a previous understanding
with Italy; on the other hand, it is evident that Austria-Hungary
must have a free hand to protect her interests in connexion with
changes of the status quo which have been affected without her in-
tervention.

No. 3.

Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 21, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of the 20th instant.

Interview with the Marchese di San Giuliano took place this
afternoon.

The Minister seemed very apprehensive of our proposed step
at Belgrade. I dwelt upon the first part of the above-mentioned
telegram in the sense indicated. In the course of the ensuing thor-
ough discussion, I also found occasion to use the last paragraph.

In regard to the clearing up of our relations with Servia, the
Minister, as on many previous occasions, explained in detailed argu-
ments that we could remedy them only by adopting a conciliatory
attitude but not by means of force and the humiliation of a neigh-
bouring State. For a State of mixed nationalities like Austria-

132 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Hungary he considers such a policy to be the only practicable one,
and pointed out that it had proved successful in dealing with the
Germans and the Poles. I declared that this argument, so often
discussed between us, was merely hypothetical and that it was, more-
over, erroneous. In reality things are different. I drew his attention
to all that we have done for Servia since the Treaty of Berlin, to our
conciliatory attitude during the Balkan war and to the Pan-Servian
offensive, which was becoming more and more violent.

The Minister then continued by saying that Italy desired a strong
Austria-Hungary, hut such as it is, without territorial expansion.
My declaration that we do not aspire to any territorial aggrandise-
ment met with the Minister's approval, and the one concerning the
Lovcen was received with evident satisfaction.

The Marchese di San Giuliano then expressed his decided inten-
tion to assist us as long as our demands were justifiable. Should
this not be the case, he would be opposed by the sentiment of the
entire country, which, undoubtedly liberal, remembers its own revolu-
tionary origin and sympathises with nationalistic movements, no
matter in what part of the world. He pointed out that his position
would be materially stronger if our measures at Belgrade were prin-
cipally, if not entirely, based upon the outrage at Serajevo, and to
a lesser degree on other agitations. I argued against all these limita-
tions, which I described as wrong in theory and in practice an indica-
tion of insufficient friendship and assistance.

In respect of the press, the Minister promised to use his influence
under the aforesaid reservations, but he thought he would be
unable to act until the contents of our note became known in Bel-
grade.

As to Montenegro, he promised to send instructions in the sense
described by us this very day. He has already advised Belgrade to
be conciliatory.

Finally, the Minister remarked that his confidence in our modera-
tion toward Servia was chiefly based on the wisdom of our Sovereign.
While agreeing with him on this point, I replied that for this very
reason he could rest assured that our steps in Belgrade will be care-
fully thought out and that whatever form they might take, they
would be limited to absolutely necessary action.

On the whole, the conversation gave me the impression of many
friendly phrases with as many mental reservations; furthermore,
that the Minister evidently does not yet believe that events will lead
to war, but rather expects Servia to yield. He probably bases his

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 133

calculations on an intensive diplomatic intervention in Vienna and
Belgrade on the part of the Powers.

No. 4.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

^Telegram.) ' Vienna, July 22, 1914.

I request you to inform the Marchese di San Giuliano in strict
confidence and in pursuance of the information you have given him
previously, that our decisive step in Belgrade has now been fixed for
Thursday noon, 28rd inst. As to the contents of the note which
Baron von Giesl will hand to the Servian Government, you will
say that it contains demands dealing with the suppression of the
agitation which endangers our territories. We are compelled to make
these demands as a result of the facts so far disclosed by the Serajevo
investigation, and because we realise that we must put an end to
the subversive agitation which has been carried on for many years
in our southern provinces and which emanates from Belgrade.

We have given the Servian Government a time-limit of forty-
eight hours for the acceptance of our demands, as we cannot expose
ourselves to the usual Servian delays. The signatory Powers will
be notified on Friday, 24th inst., and on that day you will also be
placed in a position to acquaint the Italian Government officially of
our steps in Belgrade.

Your proceeding of to-day is limited to Berlin and Rome, in
special consideration of our alliance.

I request you, if possible, to acquaint the Marchese di San
Giuliano personally — and only if this be impossible, his representa-
tive— ^with the contents of this telegram.

No. 5.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 22, 1914.

(Translation from the French.)
The Austro-Hungarian Government has found itself obliged to
address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Austro-Hun-

134 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

garian Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Govern-
ment of Servia. (See Enclosure.)

I have the honour to request you to bring the contents of this
note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited,
accompanying this communication with the following comment:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government
addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text
is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a
policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb sub-
jects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities
for the detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the
Servian frontier.

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among
their membership generals and diplomats, government officials and
judges — in short, men at the top of the official and unofficial society
in the kingdom.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the
youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence
of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which
has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom.
Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia
have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propa-
ganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has
been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it
incumbent upon it to take the slightest step. The Servian Govern-
ment has thus failed in the duty imposed upon it by the solemn
declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, and has acted in opposition
to the will of Europe and the pledges given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in the face

THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 135

of the provocative attitude of Servia, was inspired by the territorial
disinterestedness of the Dual Monarchy and by the hope that the
Servian Government, in spite of everything, would come to an appre-
ciation of Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observ-
ing an attitude of good-will toward the political interests of Servia,
the Austro-Hungarian Government hoped that the Kingdom would
finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side.
In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind
in the political ideas of Servia when, after the events of 1912, the
Austro-Hungarian Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging
attitude, made so considerable an aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The good-will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neigh-
bouring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the King-
dom, which continued to tolerate upon its territory a propaganda
of which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to tho
world on the 28th of June last, when the Heir Apparent to the
Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched
in Belgrade.

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade
with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the in-
cendiary movement which is menacing the security and integrity of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is convinced that, in taking
this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of all
civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon to
be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of
Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from
Belgrade.

In support of the above the Austro-Hungarian Government holds
at the disposal of the Government to which you are accredited a
dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the con-
nection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of
June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Austro-
Hungarian Representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to place a copy of this despatch in the hands
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

136 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

(Enclosure.)

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on
instructions from the Servian Government, made the following
declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such
decisions as the Powers may take with regard to the annexation
since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direc-
tion of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live in
future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events
of the 28th of June, have disclosed the existence of a subversive
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement which had
its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far
as to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape
of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in
the declarations of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Gov-
ernment has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated
the criminal activity of various societies and associations directed
against the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the
glorification of the authors of outrages, and the participation of
officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted
an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has
permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian popu-
lation to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not
ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last demon-
strated its ominous consequences to the world.

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo
assassination had been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and ex-
plosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to
them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna
Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals
and their arms was organised and carried out by the Chiefs of the
Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 137

not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer
the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for
years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence
propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the
contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues
which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end, the Austro-Hungarian Government finds
itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a
formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against
the Monarchy — in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the
ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories
belonging to it — and that it undertakes to suppress by every means
at its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking, the
Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its
"Official Journal " of the 26th of June (13th of July) the following
declaration :

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach
from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it,
and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal
proceedings.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all
idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it
its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole
population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with
the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machi-
nations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress. ' '

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the
royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and
published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and con-
tempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency
of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

138 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana,
to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same
manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which
engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent
the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under any other
name or form ;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia,
both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction
everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda
against Austria-Hungary ;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administra-
tion in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the
Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating
to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the cooperation in Servia of representatives of
the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the sub-
versive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
Monarchy ;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja
Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian
State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the
preliminary investigation at Serajevo ;

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the
Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives
across the frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of
the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica who have been guilty
of having assisted the perpetrators of the crime of Serajevo by
facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Austro-Hungarian Government with explana-
tions regarding the unjustifiable utterance of high Servian officials,
both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official posi-
tions, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give
utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the
Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally,

10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 139

of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding
heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal
Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the
25th of July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary in-
vestigation at Serajevo with regard to the oflBcials mentioned under
heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note.

(Memorandum.)

The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip
and his accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28th of
this year has up to now established the following facts :

1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his
stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrino-
vitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch and Trifko Grabez, with the
assistance of Major Voja Tankositch.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammuni-
tion, which were used by the criminals, were obtained for them and
handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a cer-
tain Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch.

3. The bombs are hand grenades which came from the arsenal
of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herzego-
vina frontier by Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez, and the smug-
gling in of their weapons, a secret transportation system was organised
by Ciganovitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons
into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of
the frontier Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica,
and the cooperation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Groitch or Loznica,
and several other persons.

140 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 6.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Instructions.) Vienna, July 22, 1914.

When carrying out the instructions despatched herewith, further
verbal comments will hardly be necessary, as you have advised the
Marchese di San Giuliano in your previous interview of what he had
to expect. However, it may seem opportune to you to draw his
special attention to the fact that the Narodna Odbrana, which counts
among its members all the Servians committed in connexion with the
plot of June 28, 1914, constitutes a fighting organisation, which is
scattered all over Servia. Its activities, according to the programme
which we hold in its authentic form, are now solely and purely
directed against the Dual Monarchy, since Turkey has vanished from
the sphere of its aggressions.

No. 7.

Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 23, 1914.

To-day, at 4.45 p.m., I carried out your telegraphic instructions
of yesterday in an interview -with the Marchese di San Giuliano at
Fiuggi. The latter expressed his inability to give an opinion with-
out being acquainted with the demands made at Belgrade by the
Austro-Hungarian Government, and without having discussed the
matter with the Prime Minister. The latter will proceed to-morrow
to Fiuggi, where events will be discussed between him, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador, who is there at
present.

In terms which he distinctly qualified as both official and private,
the Marchese di San Giuliano expressed his misgiving concerning
Italian public opinion. Nevertheless, he at once wrote a letter to
Secretary General de Martino, with the professed instruction to in-
spire the press with moderation when the news of the delivery of our
ultimatum shall reach Rome.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 141

No. 8.
Yon Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 24, 1914.

Owing to absence of Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Under-
Secretary of State, our note to the Servian Government was de-
livered to the Secretary General this forenoon.

In commencing the reading, the latter remarked that it was very
clever to begin the note by citing the Servian note of 1909. In
further perusal of the note he said, while laying stress on the personal
character of his utterance, that it appeared to him that, in consider-
ing ourselves endangered by the agitation carried on in Servian terri-
tory we were treating Servia almost as a Great Power. This gave
me the occasion to utilise the information received from you concern-
ing the aims of the Narodna Odbrana and the wide scope of its
activities.

As to the publication which we demand from Servia, he remarked
that the Servian Government could and should accept this unim-
portant item.

Clause 4 he thought the Servian Government would find it diffi-
cult to accept.

The reading of the note concerning the result of the Serajevo in-
vestigation seemed to surprise him considerably.

In concluding the reading he remarked that we apparently had
reached a turning point in history. De Martino agreed with my con-
tention that he could not fail to admit the purely defensive char-
acter of our action and said: ** Certainement je n'aurais jamais cru
que Von puisse constater et prouver la culpabilite d'officiers et de fonc-
tionnaires serhes dans le drame de Seraievo" ("I certainly never
would have believed that the culpability of Servian army-officers and
functionaries in the drama of Serajevo could be ascertained and
proved").

Finally he promised to send a copy of the note to the Marchese di
San Giuliano without delay.

142 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 9.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador came here to-day and announced with
regard to the conflict between the Monarchy and Servia, that the
Royal Italian Government, in case this conflict should reach the stage
of war and lead to the occupation of Servian soil, even provisionally,
would reserve the right to claim compensation under Article VII of
the treaty of the Triple Alliance. He also stated that the Royal
Italian Government was, moreover, of the opinion that, according
to the above-mentioned article of the alliance, we should come to an
understanding with Italy regarding the possible occupation of Servian
territory.

Beyond this, he continued, the Royal Italian Government in the
event of war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, intended to main-
tain a friendly attitude in accordance with its obligations under the
terms of its alliance.

No. 10.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Since Servia has refused to comply with our demands, we have
broken off diplomatic relations with that country.

You will at once call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs or on
his representative and make, in effect, the following declaration :

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the
demands which we have been compelled to make for the permanent
safety of our most vital interests. In so doing it has manifested its
unwillingness to abandon its subversive aspirations, which aim at
the constant disturbance of some of our territories upon the border
and at their ultimate separation from the Dual Monarchy.

To our regret, and much against our will, we are therefore placed
under the necessity of forcing Servia by the most drastic means to
alter radically her hitherto hostile attitude.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. ?,) 143

No. 11.
Count Berchtold to von MSrey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

In carrying out the instructions contained in to-day's telegram
you will also point out to the Marchese di San Giuliano or to his
representative, that the Royal Italian Government is well aware
that we are far from entertaining any aggressive purpose and that
it is an act of self-defence if, after many years of tolerance, we at
last decide to put a stop to the Great-Servian machinations by force
of arms, if need be. I must assume that no attempt will be made in
Rome to deny that we have shown the utmost patience with Servia
during many years, in the face of the most serious provocations, al-
though the Great-Servian propaganda was conducted with increas-
ing boldness and inevitably aroused our grave apprehension. The
results of the investigation prove plainly that Belgrade has not
refrained even from the most violent means for the attainment of its
goal, and therefore we have come to the conclusion that it is high
time to use every available pressure to exact guarantees for the dis-
continuance of the present intolerable conditions on our southeastern
border. All peaceful means to induce Servia to alter her attitude
having been exhausted, a resort to arms may be expected.

A short time ago Italy deemed it necessary to make war for
the preservation of her economic interests and for her position in
the Mediterranean. In the friendly spirit of our alliance we wel-
comed the successes of her arms and readily recognised the subse-
quent extension of the Italian sphere of power.

Finally, you will point out that the Duke of Avarna has officially
declared that Italy, in the event of war between us and Servia,
would remember her obligations toward the alliance and that we
greatly appreciate this friendly act as being in accord with the terms
of our alliance.

144 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 12.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Yesterday's telegram from Count Szogeny:

"Secretary of State told me to-day that my Italian colleague
seemed surprised you had not earlier informed his government, as an
allied power, of our steps in Belgrade.

"Von Jagow replied that Germany had not been informed by
us any earlier, which he (von Jagow) considered a perfectly correct
procedure because present conflict must be regarded as a matter
between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

"He would also telegraph this to the Imperial German Am-
bassador in Rome for his guidance and instruct him to point out to
Marchese di San Giuliano, if occasion should arise, that Italy had not
previously informed her allies of her 48-hour ultimatum to Turkey."

No. 13.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Instructions.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

By instructions dated the 20th inst. yoU have been informed
of the arguments to use if Italy should attempt to interpose obstacles
to our action against Servia on the ground of an arbitrary interpreta-
tion of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty.

You are also aware that it does not seem to me desirable to
create ill-feeling between Rome and Vienna by discussions which offer
little hope of a satisfactory result.

On the other hand, we must be prepared for an insistent attitude
on the part of the Italian Government, and, in view of the tone
adopted by some Italian papers, it seems not impossible that the
Marchese di San Giuliano will endeavour to present our attitude dur-
ing the Lybian war as obstructive to Italian activities. He might also
misuse for his purposes our reference to Article VII on that occasion.

The question whether the territories of the Balkan States come
under the provisions of Article VII or not has no bearing upon the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 145

question whether the application of Article VII would have been
justified in respect of the islands under Italian occupation in the
^gean Sea.

My chief object, however, at the present moment is to refute
emphatically a possible reproach by Italy that we have acted in a
manner contrary to the friendly spirit of our alliance.

For this purpose it seems advisable to recall briefly to your
memory our attitude during the Lybian war.

On September 26, 1911,* the Duke of Avarna, on instructions
from his government, declared that Italy would confine her activities
to the Mediterranean and that she would do nothing adverse to the
policy which she had hitherto followed, namely, the maintenance of
the status quo in the Balkans. Nevertheless, a month later, the
Marchese di San Giuliano took up a position which he expressed as
follows: '^ Nous nous sommes toujour s reserves la liberte des opera-
tions militaires en deJiors des cotes ottomanes de VAdriatique et la
mer Jonienne." "We have always reserved to ourselves a free hand
to conduct military operations beyond the Turkish coasts on the
Adriatic and on the Ionian Sea.")t

Thereupon Count Aehrenthal confined himself to pointing out
the dangers of reaction on the Balkans in the event of Italy carrying
her military activities upon the coasts of the ^gean Sea and re-
marked that even a temporary occupation of the islands in the
./Egean Sea would be contrary to the provisions of Article VII.|

At the same time Count Aehrenthal emphasised Austria-Hun-
gary's long-standing friendship.

Our further reserve in the matter of the extension of Italy's
activities was subsequently § explained by the consideration that
Austria-Hungary, by giving her consent, would have shared the re-
sponsibility which Italy would have to assume if she wished to act
contrary to her declarations at the beginning of the war or dis-
regarded her obligations to the alliance.

Count Aehrenthal 's utterance || to the German Ambassador (at
the end of November, 1911) plainly shows our friendly attitude and
our endeavours to avoid any discussions which might disturb the
relations among the Allies at a time when Italy was at war. On
that occasion it was pointed out to von Tschirschky that we would
endeavour to avoid dealing with the question concerning the exten-

* See Appendix No. 3. § See Appendix No. 6.

t See Appendix No. 4. || See Appendix No. 7.

X See Appendix No. 5.

146 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

sion of Italian activities upon the Asiatic coast without, however, hav-
ing any intention of causing thereby any difficulties to the Italian
Government ; we did not wish even to arouse her apprehension of such
a possibility.

Further proof of our friendship was given when at the end of
February, 1912, Great Britain advanced the proposal * that a promise
be obtained from Italy that she would refrain from any action against
the Dardanelles. In compliance with Marchese di San Giuliano's
wish, we rejected this proposal, and it was because of our opposition
that the British project was dropped. The Dual Monarchy did
more; she published denials in London and Constantinople of the
circulated rumours that Italy had made promises to her concerning
the Dardanelles.!

On April 6, 1912, von Tschirschky reverted once more to Italy's
intention to extend her sphere of activity. It was then pointed out
to him that we could not alter our attitude of unwillingness to
assume a part of Italy's responsibility. At the same time he was
given to understand that Italy could rest assured of our tacit passivity
in the event of a proposed temporary action in territories which
would not be likely to affect the Balkans. It would, however, be
better to avoid | going into the details of specific operations.

In order to assure the allied governments of our good-will, we
declared in our conversations § with the Duke of Avarna on April
the 13th and 15th, 1912, our willingness to make an exception of
the islands of Rhodos and Karpathos, on the southern outlet of the
-<Egean Sea and geographically pertaining to the Mediterranean, as
well as of the ledge of rocks, called Stampalia (Astropalia), off the
Cyclades; that we would not object to their occupation. We only
demanded that guarantees be given us by Italy that the proposed
occupation of these islands would be temporary.

Count Szogyeny reported, |1 under date of May 21, 1912, that
von Kiderlen-Waechter had gratefully acknowledged our conciliatory
attitude in the matter of the Italian action in the Archipelago.

In the course of a conversation ^ which took place on the follow-
ing day in connexion with the occupation of Kos, which had been
accomplished meanwhile, and of several other neighbouring islands
by Italy, the Duke of Avarna reproached us for our "protest"
against further occupations of islands. This reproach was naturally

•See Appendix No. 8. § See Appendix No. 11.

t See Appendix No. 9. || See Appendix No. 12.

f See Appendix No. 10. ^See Appendix No. 13.

THE AUSTRO-HUNaARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 147

refuted and it was stated that there was no question of a "protest";
we had simply specified our legitimate claims based upon the wording
of Article VII. Meanwhile, in order not to make Italy's problem
more difficult, we had no intention of availing ourselves of our rights.
It is clearly shown that we have specified in express terms our rights
in accordance with the agreement, but have done nothing to impede
Italy's activities. In order not to involve ourselves in the responsi-
bility, we have refused our positive consent to measures which might
be expected to create a reaction in the Balkans. Otherwise, we were
content with having warned Italy against threatening reactions. Sub-
sequent events have shown that those warnings were justified. All
this will prove that we always have been mindful of our obligations
to our allies and have shown our good-will as far as possible; we
evaded useless discussions which might have disturbed the friendly
relations between Vienna and Rome.

The above is exclusively for your personal information and you
will avail yourself of the most suitable arguments therein contained,
only in the event that the Marchese di San Giuliano should charge
the Monarchy with having acted in an unfriendly manner during
the Lybian war.

No. 14.
Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 28, 1914.

Have carried out your telegraphic instructions of the 26th inst,,
Minister of Foreign Affairs having meanwhile returned to Rome.
Have added that you reserve the right to discuss the question of
compensation at the opportune moment.

The Marchese di San Giuliano promised his reply for to-morrow.

No. 15.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

On instruction from his government, the Imperial German Am-
bassador has requested me, if possible, to come to an agreement with

148 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Italy concerning the interpretation of Article VII of the Triple
Alliance treaty. Italy considers our procedure against Servia as an
aggression against Russia, and therefore holds that she is not com-
pelled to join us in the struggle which may result therefrom, in view
of the defensive character of the Triple Alliance.

Furthermore, BoUari, in Berlin, as well as the Marchese di San
Giuliano and Salandra in Rome, have declared that Italy could as-
sume a friendly attitude only if we accepted the Italian interpreta-
tion of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement.

Von Tschirschky was at the same time instructed to inform me
that the German Government construed Article VII in the same
sense as the Italian Government.

The Duke of Avarna called on me to-day and in behalf of his
government made a statement analogous to that of my telegram of
the 26th instant, to wit: Should the threatening conflict lead to war
and concurrently to an even temporary occupation of Servian terri-
tory, the Italian Government, in accordance with Article VII of the
treaty of the Triple Alliance, would reserve its right to claim com-
pensation, with regard to which an agreement should be reached in
advance. Furthermore, he declared that in case of war between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, the Italian Government would main-
tain a friendly attitude, such as might be expected from a faithful
and dutiful ally.

I replied to the Italian Ambassador that the disagreement with
Servia concerns only ourselves and Servia; that, besides, we contem-
plated no territorial conquests, and that an occupation of Servian ter-
ritory was therefore not intended.

The Duke of Avarna having suggested that it would impress the
Powers very favourably if we were to make a formal statement to
this effect, I replied that we could not do so, as it was impossible to
assume that, in the course of the war, a situation would not arise
which would compel us to occupy Servian territory, even against our
will. Such a contingency, however, was not to be expected in the
normal course of events.

I request you to communicate to the Marchese di San Giuliano
the statement made by the Duke of Avarna and my reply thereto.
Furthermore, with reference to the claims of compensation based
upon Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, you will make
the following declaration :

As already stated to the Italian Ambassador, territorial acquisi-
tions are in no way contemplated by us. Should we, nevertheless, be

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 149

compelled to decide upon an occupation which could not be con-
sidered as merely provisional, we should be prepared to enter upon
an exchange of views with Italy concerning an eventual compensation.
On the other hand, we fully expect Italy not only not to impede her
ally 's action in the pursuance of her aims, but to maintain steadfastly
the friendly attitude of an ally, in accordance with her promise.

No. 16.
Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 29, 1914.

The reply of the Italian Government which, as mentioned at the
end of my telegram of the 28th instant, had been promised to me, has
been handed to me by the chief of the Foreign Minister's cabinet;
though it is in writing, I was requested to consider it as a verbal
note.

The text of the reply reads:

(Translation from the French.)

" Animated by the most friendly feelings for Austria-Hungary,
the Italian Government has exerted itself and will continue to do so
in an effort to induce Servia to accede to the demands made by the
Austro-Hungarian Government in its note of July 23, 1914. The
Italian Government has repeatedly counselled Servia to pursue a
policy of correct and good neighbourly relations with Austria-
Hungary.

"The Italian Government recalls with satisfaction Austria-Hun-
gary's friendly attitude toward Italy during the last phase of the
Italo-Turkish war.

"The object of that war was a far-distant province, which could
not affect the interests of Austria-Hungary. The scene of the present
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia is in territories close
to Italy ; our vital interests might, therefore, become involved in the
outcome of events.

"The provisions of Article VII present, in our mind, one of the
main points upon which the Triple Alliance rests, and which have
even been conducive to the strength of the Alliance. They apply to
the whole of the Balkan peninsula; they were supplemented by the

150 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

agreement of 1909 concerning the Sandjak of Novibazar, which in its
turn was confirmed when the Triple Alliance was renewed.

' ' The cordial cooperation of Italian and Austro-Hungarian diplo-
macy should be based upon Article VII and the agreements covering
the Sandjak of Novibazar and Albania. Should this not be the
case, said cooperation would, it is feared, not be possible. It is
upon these premises that the mutual friendship and confidence be-
tween the two allied powers should rest.

"Germany concurs in our interpretation of Article VII.

"With reference to Count Berchtold's intention to take up the
question of compensation when occasion arises, it is clear that an
agreement on this point is urgent. As long as an understanding has
not been reached, and as long as Austria-Hungary's interpretation of
Article VII leaves room for doubt, Italy cannot pursue a policy which
would, either now or at a later time, facilitate a temporary or per-
manent occupation by Austria-Hungary ; on the contrary, Italy would
have to support every measure calculated to prevent such a possible
occupation, while at the same time endeavouring to harmonise as
much as possible such a policy, dictated by her vital interests, with
her keen desire to strengthen more and more the intimate relations
existing between the two allied powers. During the last few years
these relations have improved considerably and should still further
develop for the strengthening of the existing amity and the adjust-
ment of the mutual interests of the two countries.

"We therefore hope that the frank and loyal exchange of views
pending among the three allied powers in Vienna and Berlin may as
soon as possible be concluded in a way which will enable them to
cooperate in a common policy."

This reply fully confirms my impression that this Government
is chiefly concerned in the question of compensation; that it is de-
termined to force a solution at this time and to this end invokes
Germany's interpretation of Article VII and does not even shrink
from attempts at blackmail (see penultimate paragraph). It is also
worthy of note that the Italian Government desires the exchange of
views to take place in Vienna and in Berlin.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 151

No. 17.
Yon Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 30, 1914.

Minister of Foreign Affairs spontaneously brought up to-day
the question of Italy's attitude in the event of an European war.

As the character of the Triple Alliance is purely defensive; as
our measures against Servia may precipitate a European conflagra-
tion, and finally as we had not previously consulted this govern-
ment, Italy would not be bound to join us in the war. This, how-
ever, does not preclude the alternative that Italy might, in such an
event, have to decide for herself whether her interests would best be
served by taking sides with us in military operations or by remain-
ing neutral. Personally he feels more inclined to favour the first
solution, which appears to him as the more likely one, provided
that Italy's interests in the Balkan Peninsula are safeguarded and
that we do not seek changes likely to give us a predominance detri-
mental to Italy's interests in the Balkans.

No. 18.
Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, July 31, 1914.

The statement contained in your telegram of July 28, already
more than half concedes Italy's right to compensation as claimed
by the Rome Cabinet. After this partial success, the blackmailing
policy to extort the remaining claims is naturally further encouraged.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs actually told me to-day that, in reply
to your statement, he had informed Vienna that your communication
is vague and unsatisfactory.

I firmly believe that, whether Italy joins in the war or remains
neutral depends, not really upon the question of compensation, but
chiefly upon the Italian Government's view of the international sit-
uation in Europe and upon military considerations. We are, there-
fore, running the risk of assuming far-reaching obligations concern-

152 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ing compensation, without, however, being certain of attaining our
object, which is to assure Italy's military cooperation.

Furthermore, the exact nature of the compensation is obviously
vague, and we cannot anticipate and determine a compensation when
we do not ourselves know what we might receive in return therefor.
In my opinion it would be unwise for us to go any further than to
declare our readiness to grant to Italy, in the spirit of Article VII
of the Triple Alliance Treaty, an adequate compensation after the
conclusion of the war — whether localised or extending to Europe —
provided Italy faithfully fulfils her duties as an ally, and also pro-
vided we occupy territories in the Balkans, either permanently, or
for a period exceeding in length that of the occupation of the Dode-
canesos (the Turkish islands) by Italy.

No. 19.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.

In a long interview with Duke of Avarna to-day, we reached
a complete understanding concerning compensation. The German
and Italian Ambassadors thereupon drafted a note based upon this
interview and fully acceptable to the Duke of Avarna. The text of
this note will be wired to Rome to-morrow.

I hope that this question may now be considered as settled in
agreement among the parties to the Triple Alliance.

Please inform the Marchese di San Giuliano immediately of the
foregoing and point out to him that we now confidently expect Italy
to carry out her obligations as an ally, a matter about which I never
have been in doubt.

For your own information I wish to state that the natural fears
of Italy's possible future attempts to misuse the right to compensa-
tion for purposes of extortion have had to be relegated to the back-
ground on account of the heavy responsibility which would have at-
tached to an uncompromising interpretation by us of Article VII of
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 153

No. 20.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 1, 1914.

Please inform immediately the Marchese di San Giuliano that I
have made the following statement to the Duke of Avarna :

(Translation from the French.)

"I consider that a difference of opinion as to the interpretation
of Article VII constitutes, with regard to our relation in the present
and the future, an element of uncertainty likely to harm the close
relations between the two Powers. I accept Italy's and Germany's
interpretation of Article VII provided that Italy shall observe a
friendly attitude toward the pending operations of war between
Austria-Hungary and Servia and that she shall carry out her duties
as an ally in case the present conflict should lead to a general con-
flagration. ' '

No. 21.
His I. and B. Apostolic Majesty to His Majesty the King of Italy.
(Telegram.) Vienna, August 1, 1914.

(Translation from the French.)

"Russia, who assumed the right to intervene in our conflict with
Servia, has mobilised her army and her fleet and threatens the peace
of Europe.

"In agreement with Germany, I am resolved to defend the rights
of the Triple Alliance and I have ordered the mobilisation of all
my military and naval forces. We owe thirty years of peace and
of prosperity to the treaty which unites us, and I am gratified that
our Governments fully agree on its interpretation.

"At this solemn hour I am happy to be able to count upon the
support of my Allies and their gallant armies, and I cherish the

154 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

heartiest wishes for the success of our arms and for a glorious future
of our countries. ' '

No. 22.
Vori Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 1, 1914.

According to statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a
meeting of the Cabinet to-day there developed a desire that in case of
an European war Italy should remain neutral. The prevailing senti-
ment was that neither her obligations nor her interests would justify
Italy's participation in the conflict. The consensus of opinion was
that the Triple Alliance is purely defensive; that the war has been
precipitated by us without previously notifying the Italian Govern-
ment of our action ; and that Italy could not be expected to sacrifice
the lives of her people and their welfare and to expose her extensive
coasts to the greatest danger, when the object of the war would at
the very best be directly contrary to the interests of Italy, inasmuch
as it would disturb the status quo in the Balkans in favour of Austria-
Hungary, either materially or morally.

During the discussion which followed, the Marchese di San
Giuliano remarked incidentally that — as no formal decision had been
reached — his statement did not definitely mean that Italy would not,
possibly at a later date, participate in the war. The word * * compen-
sation" was again uttered on this occasion.

My impression persists that this is a case of blackmail which
already has been partly successful. It is Italy's desire, whether the
war be localised or extended to the other Powers, that her attitude
shall be purchased on the principle of cash payment before delivery.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 155

No. 23.

His Majesty the King of Italy to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic

Majesty.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 2, 1914.

(Translation from the French.)

"I have received Your Majesty's telegram. I need not assure
Your Majesty that Italy, who has done all she could for the main-
tenance of the peace and who will do all she can to contribute to
its restoration as soon as possible, will preserve an attitude of cordial
friendliness toward her allies, in conformity with the Treaty of
the Triple Alliance, in accordance with her sincere sentiments and
with due regard to the great interests she has to safeguard. ' '

No. 24.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 2, 1914.

I understand from your telegram of yesterday that the Italian
Government is considering the eventuality of an active participa-
tion at a later time in the European war.

In consideration of this circumstance I made to-day the follow-
ing statement to the Duke of Avarna:

'*Afin d'eviter tout malentendu je tiens a constat er que les
ouvertures faites le I. ct. au Due d' Avarna au sujet de I'interpre-
tation de V article VII de notre Trait e d' alliance ont ete faites sur
la base de notre ferme conviction que V Italic remplisse des le debut
ses devoirs d'alliee conformement a V article III.''* (**With a view
to avoid any misunderstanding I wish to point out that our declara-
tions of the 1st instant to the Duke of Avarna concerning the in-
terpretation of Article VII of our Treaty of Alliance were based
upon our firm conviction that Italy from the very outset would
fulfil her duties as an ally in accordance with Article III * of the
Treaty of Alliance.")

* See Appendix No. 14.

156 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I added that the unjustified Russian mobilisation against us
and Germany, and in particular the meantime reported incursion
of Russian patrols across several points on the Russo-German border
line, constituted an ample justification for applying the terms of the
Alliance.

Please express identical views to the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

I add for your personal information that the Duke of Avarna
gave warm expression to his conviction that, even if an intervention
by Italy in our favour were not to be deducible from the letter of
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Italy would be morally bound to
side with her allies. He had strongly advocated this course in his
reports to his government, but he did not know if his opinion would
carry decisive weight.

No. 25.
Yon Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 2, 1914.

I have carried out the instructions contained in your telegram of
yesterday.

Up to 5 P.M. the Minister of Foreign Affairs had received from
the Duke of Avarna no telegram with the concerted text; on the
contrary, a report dated from yesterday evening had reached him,
according to which you rejected the Italian interpretation.

The Marchese di San Giuliano, therefore, declined to discuss,
before knowing the text, the possibility of Italy reconsidering, on
the ground of our concessions, her intention to remain neutral. I
naturally insisted that our concessions were wholly dependent upon
the strict carrying out on Italy's part of her duties as an ally, such
as we understand them.

In the course of the evening I had another conversation with
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who alleged he had just received
from Vienna the text of the declaration.

Though I endeavoured to obtain a declaration from the Marchese
di San Giuliano, he could not be induced to make one. He said
that he would have to consider this serious matter carefully before

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 157

discussing it with the Prime Minister to-morrow ; he hoped to be able
to reply to-morrow afternoon.

As I further pressed for a statement, he remarked that his first
impression was not favourable because we had laid down conditions.
Our declaration, in any event, would be nothing more than one
link in the chain, and the question of Italy's participation in the
war or of her neutrality would not be decided solely by a satis-
factory settlement of this matter.

No. 26.

Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 2, 1914.

The Marchese di San Giuliano has just sent me in the form of
a letter his reply concerning Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple
Alliance.

Its contents are as follows:

(Translation from the French.)

"Salandra and I examined yesterday evening the reply of Count
Berchtold with regard to Article VII, and I hasten to inform you
of the result of our conversation.

** Count Berchtold subordinates the acceptance of our interpre-
tation of Article VII to Italy's attitude in the present crisis. Al-
though any modification of a treaty can be subordinated to this or
some other condition, its interpretation cannot be subordinated to
any condition. It is not a question of expressing the present will
of the contracting parties, but of determining their intentions at
the time when the pact was concluded. For instance, Germany sub-
ordinates to no condition her interpretation, which is similar to ours,
and this is logical.

"In the second place it must be borne in mind that the present
crisis is temporary, whereas the Triple Alliance is to last twelve
years and can be renewed; it is desirable, I might almost say neces-
sary, that during this long period the policy of Austria-Hungary
and Italy regarding Balkan questions should be identical. It is
desirable and even necessary that their diplomatic action should

158 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

develop in thorough agreement, trust and mutual friendliness. In
order to attain this end it is indispensable that we should be thor-
oughly agreed as to the interpretation of Article VII. This necessity
is clearer than ever in the present crisis, even if we do not participate
in the war; we would not be able to lend an unswerving and strong
diplomatic support to the military activity of our allies if we were
not fully reassured as to the interpretation of Article VII by Austria-
Hungary, particularly in anticipation of more complicated situations,
when occasions might arise to apply Article VII.

"Furthermore, the acceptance of our interpretation of Article
VII, important as it is for determining our diplomatic attitude, will
in itself not suffice to eliminate all the very weighty reasons which
prevent us, at least for the time being, from joining in the war.

"As a matter of fact, this general statement does not clearly and
definitely settle the nature and value of compensation in all cases,
nor their relation to the perils and immeasurable sacrifices to which
this war might expose us; perils and immense sacrifices which are
greater than those to which our allies are exposing themselves. This
enormous difference between the perils and sacrifices on the one
hand and the advantages on the other is, in fact, the very reason
why Austria-Hungary desired a war which she could easily have
avoided, whereas we did all in our power to save Europe from this
fearful misfortune. Nevertheless, we hope that there will be an
opportunity, without our participating in the war, of giving our
allies proof of our sincere, friendly sentiments, and we count, there-
fore, on a settlement which will reconcile our respective interests.

"All these considerations, serious as they might be, would not
prevent us from doing our duty, were such a duty incumbent upon
us ; but inasmuch as the * casus foederis ' cannot apply to this war, the
Cabinet yesterday evening decided upon neutrality, with the proviso
that it might later on come to a decision more in accordance with
the wishes of our allies, should this become our duty or should our
interests make such a course advisable.

"The balance of power in Europe, in the Balkans and on the
sea which surrounds Italy represents a vital interest to our country,
and it is not afraid to face any sacrifice or any decision which the
protection of its interests, and of its existence, should impose upon it.

"Since the day I took over the conduct of the foreign affairs
of my country, one of the principal goals of my activities has been
to bind ever more closely the ties of mutual friendship between
Italy and Austria-Hungary. I shall continue to bend all my energies

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 159

in this direction, for I consider it essential in the interests of our
two nations. In order to attain this goal, their interests must be
reconciled and those of each be satisfied without harming those
of the other.

"I rely upon Count Berchtold and upon you, my dear Am-
bassador, to assist me in carrying out this task. ' '

No. 27.
Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Borne, August 3, 1914.

The text of the Italian declaration of neutrality published to-day
follows :

"Several European Powers are in a state of war, and as Italy
is on terms of peace with all belligerent parties, the Royal Govern-
ment and the nationals of the kingdom are bound to observe the
precepts of neutrality according to the principles of international
law. Whosoever violates these precepts shall bear the consequences
of his action and eventually be subjected to legal punishment."

No. 28.
Von Mirey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Borne, August 3, 1914.

In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of yesterday,
I had an explanation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Marchese di San Giuliano denied that an occasion for apply-
ing the terms of the Alliance had risen for Italy and submitted argu-
ments which my report will have meanwhile conveyed to you.

160 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 29.
Count Berchtold to von MSrey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914.

In conformity with the statements of the Marehese di San Giuliano
to you, the Italian Ambassador to-day informed me, in accordance
with his instructions, that in the matter of Albania Italy would
adhere to the agreements made with Austria-Hungary as well as the
decisions of the London Conference. He stated furthermore that
Italy in no way wished to derive advantage from the fact that
Austria-Hungary is at present preoccupied elsewhere, and that she
wished to maintain a similar attitude regarding every situation that
might arise later.

The Italian envoy at Durazzo, he stated, had been instructed to
issue very stringent orders in like spirit to the consulates subordinated
to him.

I request you to say to the Marehese di San Giuliano that I take
note of this declaration with gratification; moreover, that I am con-
vinced in advance that Italy will respect our agreement now, just as
we respected it during her campaign in Lybia.

No. 30.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914.

Acting under instructions, the Italian Ambassador notified me
yesterday that, according to a circular telegram, the Italian Govern-
ment had decided to remain neutral in the present conflict.

I replied to the Duke of Avarna that I considered this decision
as hardly friendly on the part of Italy, that it is an attitude not in
accord with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and that as Germany
had been assailed by Russia, and France was siding with Russia, the
occasion for applying the terms of the treaty was plain.

Aside from these circumstances I should define it as an ex-
tremely unwise policy on the part of Italy to separate herself from
her allies at such a momentous time in the history of the world.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 161

This is the first time since the conclusion of the Triple Alliance
that a general alignment of nations was in progress. Were Italy
to remain on the side of her allies, an opportunity would offer for
the realisation of her far-reaching aspirations, such as the acquire-
ment of Tunisia, Savoy and so on ; should she detach herself, then she
would receive nothing. Italy was on the wrong path in allow-
ing herself to be dominated by the fear that Austria-Hungary might
extend her power in the Balkans. The Italian Government was well
aware that we did not at all aspire to such an expansion but aimed
solely at the maintenance of the existing situation. The outlook for
Italy was, however, favourable for expansion and an increase of
power. Nothing was further from our mind than to shift the balance
of power. If such were really the view taken in Italy, he, as Am-
bassador, should dissipate such suspicions and adduce the argu-
ments furnished by our attitude during the thirty years that our
alliance had lasted. I could not believe that the Marchese di San
Giuliano intended to deceive us when he repeatedly emphasised at
Abbazia that Italy wanted, nay needed, a strong Austria-Hungary.
How could he reconcile such statements with his present departure
aiming at a policy finally directed against the maintenance of the
Monarchy in its present shape? This is all the more inexplicable
at a time when feeling with us is turning in favour of Italy, when
a wave of warm sympathy for the allied kingdom is noticeable. He
could not have failed to observe the very friendly demonstrations
which had occurred here lately. The Government intended to take
advantage of this improvement in public feeling to exert itself in
favour of the Italian element.

When I pointed out the loyal attitude which His Majesty, my
gracious Sovereign, had maintained toward Italy throughout all
crises since the existence of the alliance, the Ambassador was obliged
to confirm the truth of my observation.

The Duke of Avarna finally told me that he had requested the
Marchese di San Giuliano to grant him a short personal interview;
if the Minister agrees, he will spend a few days in Rome.

162 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 31.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914.

The enquiry directed by the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff to Cadorna, Chief of the Italian General Staff, regarding
the execution of the measures agreed upon between the allies in
case of war, has elicited the following reply :

"Meeting without object, as Cabinet has declared Italy's neu-
trality.

" 'Moderate' mobilisation has been ordered. If Austria-Hungary
refrains from occupying Lovcen and from disturbing balance of
power in Adriatic, Italy will 'never take up arms against Austria-
Hungary.' "

From the foregoing statement you will gather how the policy of
blackmail is still being pursued.

The Duke of Avarna leaves to-day; I have requested him to tell
the Marchese di San Giuliano that his letter of the 2nd inst., addressed
to you, indicates that stand taken by us had been somewhat mis-
understood.

No. 32.
Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914.

Austro-Hungarian Military Attache in Rome reports that from
a conversation with Italian Chief of General Staff he understands
that fears entertained by Italy concerning disturbance of balance
of power in Balkans and Adriatic are ascribable to possible occupa-
tion of the Lovcen.

Please inform the Marchese di San Giuliano that we have abso-
lutely no intention to wage war against Montenegro. We shall not
invade Montenegrin territory so long as the small border kingdom
shall refrain from hostile acts against the Monarchy.

You will renew suggestions to the Marchese di San Giuliano to
consider advisability of repeating in Cetinje his counsel favouring
neutrality.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 163

No. 33.
Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 5, 1914.

I fear that Italy will attempt to force us to continue discussions
regarding compensation with the intention of demanding cession of
Trentino, to the exclusion of compensation elsewhere.

Italy is likely to depart from neutrality sooner or later. If
our group achieves swift and decisive success, Italy will probably
join us and possibly become more moderate in her claims to com-
pensation ; in contrary eventuality she might be tempted to reinforce
her moral extortion by means of military measures.

I have as yet no tangible indications to support my apprehension.
But rumours of such intentions on the part of Italy reach me from
different sources.

Such an interpretation of events is in complete accord with the
overt references in the official press to the Trentino as compensa-
tion, the reported withdrawal of troops from Genoa and Naples, the
prohibition of the export of grain and flour purchased by us, as well
as the reports published in Milan newspapers regarding events in
Trent.

No. 34.

Von Merey to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Borne, August 5, 1914.

Minister of Foreign Affairs appeared pleased at statement I made
in accordance with your telegram of yesterday and said he was quite
willing once more to warn Montenegro to remain neutral.

No. 35.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 9, 1914.

Your telegram of 2nd instant conveyed the text of a letter from
the Marchese di San Giuliano. As his letter contains many incorrect

164 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

statements, I consider it advisable to revert to them. Please bring
the following to the attention of the Marchese di San Giuliano in
any way you may deem suitable. I leave it to your judgment either
to add complementary arguments, or to modify any passage so as to
make it fit in with the situation which may prevail on your side.

The Italian contention that we wish to construe Article VII of
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance according to our present conveni-
ence— "volonte actuelle" — is contrary to facts. We have always held
that, in accordance with the original intent of the treaty. Article VII
could not apply to a conflict such as our present one with Servia.
We have nevertheless expressed our willingness to extend the appli-
cation of Article VII to the present case, but we considered ourselves
entitled to expect Italy to fall in with the views of her two allies
regarding the interpretation of Article II of the same treaty in the
case of an European conflagration.

We fully agree with the Rome Cabinet that it is highly desirable
that the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy concerning Balkan
questions shall be tuned to the same key, and that the diplomacy of
both countries shall be guided by principles of perfect agreement
and mutual confidence, not only for the long period of twelve years
during which the present treaty is to remain in force, but even with
a view to its possible renewal after the expiration of that period. For
this very reason, in accepting the Italian interpretation of Article
VII, we did not limit our concession to the present conflict with
Servia and Montenegro, but did it in a way — ''pour nos relations du
present et de Vavenir" — which could leave no room for doubt that
we intended that our agreement with Italy's interpretation should
remain in force for the whole duration of the treaty.

We must strongly emphasise that the present great war has been
forced upon us and Germany by Russia, who sought to prevent us
from punishing a state, independent from Russia, for acts which
roused the indignation of the civilised world and threatened our
existence.

The undeniable fact that for years we have, under most difficult
circumstances, sacrificed important interests solely for the sake of
avoiding a conflict, is the surest proof that we did not desire war.
When a settlement of our difference with Servia became unavoid-
able, we hoped that the conflict might remain localised. Germany
supported us to the same end.

We will not question the self-evident fact that a participation
in the war would involve Italy in sacrifices and expose her to dangers,

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 165

but we cannot agree with the opinion expressed that these sacrifices
and dangers would be greater than those we have to face. Though
Italy may be exposed to very dangerous attacks by the British and
French navies, even the most fatal issue of such an engagement would
not endanger her territorial integrity and her existence. On the
other hand, most important advantages would accrue to Italy in the
event of victory: predominance in the Western Mediterranean and
the first place among Latin nations.

We note with satisfaction the suggestion expressed by the Italian
Government of an eventual decision at a later date upon a course
complying with the wishes of her allies, and we are willing to coop-
erate as far as possible in effecting such a change in the situation.

With reference to the contention that the general wording of
Article VII is not sufficient and does not express clearly the nature
and extent of eventual compensation, it should be recalled that we
already have declared that we do not seek territorial acquisition in
the Balkans, Under the circumstances we had no cause to suggest
an exchange of views with Italy concerning specific compensation.

The closing words of the Marchese di San Giuliano's letter meet
with our appreciative sympathy. He must be perfectly aware that
the aim which he set for himself when he assumed office and toward
which he has been steering his policy, are fully in accord with those
which I, too, considered consistent with our policy when I succeeded
Count Aehrenthal. I, too, hope that the mutual good-will and
friendly spirit which inspire our recently inaugurated exchange of
views will easily dissipate the difference of opinion which followed the
outbreak of the present crisis. I further hope that it will prove pos-
sible to effect the desired agreement, not only as applying to the
present crisis but also for the duration of the Treaty.

No. 36.
Count Amhrozy to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 11, 1914.

By order of Ambassador von Merey, I handed to-day to the
Secretary General a written memorandum drafted in the sense of
your telegram of the 9th instant.

After having carefully read the document he remarked that

166 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

opinions were certainly divided as to whether in our conflict with
Servia we had adhered to Article I * of the Treaty of the Triple
Alliance; that the second paragraph of this Article provides that
the contracting parties are bound to mutual consultation and support
in defence of their interests.

Sgr. de Martino further argued that, even conceding that we did
not seek any permanent territorial acquisition in Servia, we might
nevertheless wish to seize the Oriental Railway. If such an in-
tention existed on our side — and he would not deny that it would be
legitimate — it would have been of great value to Italy to have had
first an exchange of views with us, in order that we might be enabled
to protect her interests in connexion with the construction of a
railway from Servia to the Adriatic. He finally requested me to
consider his remarks as merely his private views, as it is incumbent
solely upon the Marchese di San Giuliano to define Italy's stand-
point.

No. 37.
Count Berchtold to Count AmhrSzy.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 12, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day after his return from
Rome.

The Duke of Avarna said that he had submitted a detailed re-
port on the situation created by Italy's declaration of neutrality to
His Majesty King Vittorio Emanuele, to the Marchese di San Giuliano
and to the Prime Minister, Sgr. Salandra. He had emphasised the
point that the position taken by the allied kingdom had impressed
us very unfavourably and even had the effect of shaking our faith
in Italy's loyalty and the value of her word. The explanations given
to the Ambassador — Italy 's political and military unpreparedness, her
consideration for England, etc. — concur with the reports on the sub-
ject which already have reached us from Rome. The publication of
the White Book concerning the exchange of views between us and
Berlin with regard to Russia's possible intervention had caused
particular dissatisfaction in Rome, as we had failed to discuss the
subject with the Italian Government.

• See Appendix No. 15.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 167

In reply, I insisted that Italy's declaration of her neutrality had
undoubtedly created ill-feeling here when it became known. Mean-
while we had learned the reasons which had impelled Italy to choose
a neutral attitude, and we were inclined to view her course in an-
other light. Considering the situation, we accepted Italy's neutrality
and were convinced that she would loyally maintain it.

With regard to the publication of the White Book it should be
stated that, as the Ambassador was well aware, I never had concealed
from him that the investigation instituted at Serajevo might possibly
lead to explanations with Servia and to our demand for guarantees;
an eventuality which the Duke of Avarna fully admitted. It had
always been our intention to settle the difference with Servia by
ourselves and to localise the possible conflict that might ensue. All
other powers, with the exception of Russia, had supported us in our
endeavour. We had, it is true, received the assurance from Germany
that she would stand by our side if Russia should intervene. Our
action against Servia was, however, not aimed at provoking Russia.

The Duke of Avarna was gratified to find that Italy's attitude
is viewed now in a more friendly way than was the case at the time
of his departure for Rome.

I confirmed this in reasserting my conviction that if Italy had
not wholly fulfilled her duties as an ally, this was due only to the
pressure of particularly dijQficult circumstances. I then brought to
the Ambassador's knowledge the contents of our reply to the Marchese
di San Giuliano's letter of August 2nd received by von Merey. I
pointed out in particular that we had no intention whatever of
disturbing the existing balance of power in the Balkans or in the
Adriatic, and that we should certainly consult with our Italian ally if
any modification of our position in this respect were contemplated.

No. 38.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 16, 1914.

Acting on instructions, the Italian Ambassador informed me
yesterday that Italian War Office is concentrating troops in the Valley
of Lagna and of Cornazzo, in the vicinity of Tarcento, Province of
Udine, for manoeuvres which had been decided upon long ago.

168 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 39.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 20, 1914.

The Duke of Avarna to-day read to me a long despatch from
his Government.

The Marehese di San Giuliano first of all states that the German
Military Attache had greatly exaggerated the military preparations
made by Italy on all her frontiers. Three reasons had compelled
the Government to resort to these measures: the wish to appease
public opinion, the necessity of preserving order at home, and finally
the impossibility of otherwise keeping in check the thousands of
Italian labourers who are flocking back from abroad as a consequence
of the state of war.

With regard to the attitude of the Italian press, the Marehese di
San Giuliano refers to his endeavour to induce it to remain im-
partial. His influence, however, is small as the greater part of the
press is not subsidised.

While insisting upon the desirability of dispelling the existing
mutual distrust, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses
the belief ''que tant qu'on ne s'entend pas sur des moyens con-
crets a concilier les interets des deux Parties la mefiance reciproque
persistera, hien qu'elle ne soit pas justifiee ni par les intentions du
Gouvernement italien ni par celles — hien connues — de Sa Majeste
VEmpereur et Roi Frangois Joseph et du Comte Berchtold"; ("that
the mutual distrust will continue as long as no agreement is reached
concerning positive measures toward conciliating the interests of
both parties; this, notwithstanding the fact that such distrust is
warranted neither by the intentions of the Italian Government nor
by those — so well known — of His Majesty the Emperor-King Francis
Joseph and of Count Berchtold").

At this juncture the Ambassador asked me to express my opinion ;
I assured him that this view would meet with understanding on our
side. Thereupon he asked if Baron Macchio might not receive in-
struction in this direction.

The Duke of Avarna added that his Minister's despatch drew
attention to the news again circulating in Italy about "the con-
centration of large Austro-Hungarian forces on the Italian frontier ' '
and also concerning the alleged preparations for the departure from

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 169

Riva of officers of the military and civil service and of their
families.

I authorised the Ambassador to deny these rumours as wholly
unfounded.

The despatch of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs closes
with the assurance that he will steadfastly "persevere" in his en-
deavours, the object of which is that the relations between Austria-
Hungary and Italy, if possible, shall be improved at the conclu-
sion of the present crisis, and that under all circumstances they
shall be safeguarded from further derangement. In this connex-
ion the Marchese di San Giuliano points out that should stringent
measures be adopted for the repression of "Austrian or Hungarian
nationals of Italian extraction, the result might be very dangerous."
As to the Italian Government, it had recently issued orders to the
prefects to prevent carefully, within the limits of the law, any anti-
Austrian demonstrations; and to suppress such demonstrations if
they should break out nevertheless.

No. 40.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) ' Rome, August 21, 1914.

Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that it was a
necessity for Italy to remain neutral. While frankly admitting the
enticements and inducements of the Entente Powers, he assured me
that they would be unavailing.

Certain military preparations, it is true, were being made —
in such time of uncertainty some precautions are necessary — but a
further call to arms on a large scale was not contemplated. He
had besides applied to General Cadorna to furnish him with a sum-
mary of the measures already taken which would be placed at my
disposal; I approved this course with satisfaction, especially on
account of the news disseminated from various quarters for the
obvious purpose of promoting mutual distrust; I mentioned the
ridiculous rumours concerning our alleged aggressive preparations
in the Trentino and elsewhere, and suggested an occasional frank
explanation of such delicate matters as the safest means of counter-
acting a campaign aimed at creating ill-feeling.

170 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Minister then also referred to the serious perplexity which
hundreds of thousands of unemployed workmen were causing to
Italy. The emigration to Argentine, which usually sets in in Sep-
tember, would be impossible this year; uncounted labourers are
streaming back from other countries, and many factories in Italy
had been obliged to shut down or at least to reduce their output.
It is a serious matter to keep in check these people, among whom
many turbulent elements are to be found- as far as I could under-
stand him, the military measures up-to-date were to a great extent
connected with that problem, though there was no question of calling
all these people to arms.

No. 41.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 21, 1914.

When a suitable occasion offers you will show the Marchese di
San Giuliano that you are conversant with the contents of the Duke
of Avarna's statement which was telegraphed to him yesterday.

Should the Minister ask if you have received specific instructions,
you will reply that your mission and the general instructions which
it carried with it naturally predisposes you to join gladly in every
conversation tending to dissipate possible misunderstandings and to
consolidate the mutual relations of the two allies. Under those cir-
cumstances and in accord with instructions I sent you after my last
conversation with the Italian Ambassador, you are prepared to seek,
together with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, though non-
committally for the time being, such concrete means as could lead to
the goal which Italy, in common with ourselves, is trying to reach.

For your personal information I add that on the one hand I lay
stress on not breaking off our negotiations with Italy, while on the
other hand I do not wish to see Italy advance such demands as the
cession of a part of the Monarchy's territory. If the Marchese di
San Giuliano opens the conversation with positive proposals you will
show a willingness to listen ; however, if the Minister should refer to
the cession of the Trentino or some other part of the Monarchy, you
will point out that such a proposal could not possibly lead to the
desired understanding.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 171

As against this you might refer to a previous conversation that
took place between Count Ambrozy and the Secretary General and
bring up the subject of Italy's interest in the construction of a rail-
way to connect Servia with the Adriatic, as well as of the Kingdom's
important interests in the Mediterranean.

No. 42.
Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 22, 1914.

The Under-Secretary of State to-day advised me to suggest that
we issue statements to the effect that we willingly recognise the
Italian Kingdom's neutral attitude; this with a view to soothing
Italy's guilty conscience and thus confirming her in her present
attitude.

An unreserved acceptance by you of the Italian interpretation
of Article VII would be welcomed here with gratification.

In the view of the German Government, Austria-Hungary and
Germany should at the earliest possible date make the analogous
declaration that they acknowledge the Italian interpretation of said
Article, i.e., that an acquisition of territory in the Balkans by Austria-
Hungary would, even if Italy remained neutral, be subject to a prior
understanding with and an adequate compensation for the Kingdom.

No. 43.

Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 23, 1914.

You will have gathered from my statement to the Duke of Avarna
(last conversation of 20th instant) that I am constantly endeavour-
ing to soothe Italy's guilty conscience, and I request you to remind
the Under-Secretary of State of this fact ; you will recall that I told
the Duke of Avarna on the 12th instant that, "considering the situa-
tion, we accepted Italy's neutrality and were convinced that she
would loyally maintain it."

172 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

With regard to Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Al-
liance, I have explained that my first statement, which was to a
certain degree conditional, meant that I had thought myself entitled
to expect in exchange that Italy would fall in with the opinion of
her allies concerning the occurrence of the "casus foederis." Wish-
ing to avoid any misunderstanding, I expressly stated in a subsequent
conversation with the Duke of Avarna that I had not made the
acceptance of the Italian interpretation subject to any condition but
had simply expressed the hope that Italy would consider the "casus
foederis" as actually existing.

You will inform Herr Zimmermann that he may consider him-
self authorised by us to expressly aflSrm to the Rome Cabinet that
the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin unreservedly accept the Italian
interpretation of the words ''dans les regions des Balcans" of Article
VII, not only with regard to the present crisis, but as applying to the
whole duration of the Treaty. I am sending identical instructions to
Baron Macchio, should he and Baron Flotow * have to make a similar
joint declaration in Rome.

This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotiations
with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or
permanent occupation of territory in the Balkans by us.

You will further inform the Under-Secretary of State that I should
have no objection to conceding to Italy specific rights, in the form
of territorial acquisitions at the expense of others, should she remain
neutral or join in the war on the side of her allies at a later date.

No. 44.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 23, 1914.

I authorise you to declare to the Rome Cabinet, in conjunction
with your German colleague, that we accept unreservedly the Italian
interpretation of the term "dans les regions des Balcans" in Article
VII, not only for the present crisis, but also for the whole duration
of the Treaty.

This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotia-
* German Ambassador to Italy.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 173

tions with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary
or permanent occupation of a territory in the Balkans by us.

No. 45.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 25, 1914.

My German colleague having received instructions to-day which
authorise him to declare the acceptance of the Italian interpretation
of Article VII, we to-day individually made to Marchese di San
Giuliano an analogous verbal statement.

He appeared to be favourably impressed but stated that at the
present stage of the war there was as yet no basis for entering into
a conversation,

I declared that I was always ready for such a conversation, but
that I understood perfectly well his wish to postpone it.

No. 46.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador to-day read to me the contents of a
telegram from Baron Flotow reporting on a conversation with the
Prime Minister, Salandra.

The Italian Prime Minister informed him that the majority in
Parliament and almost the entire country are for the maintenance of
neutrality ; that the Government is determined to hold steadfastly to
this attitude.

The military measures taken by Italy did not go beyond those of
other neutral states, such as Switzerland, for instance.

He had formally declared to the socialists that Italy would re-
main neutral. He had made a similar statement to the republicans,
represented in the Chamber by eight Deputies, who are said to favour
war.

Salandra finally stated with emphasis that neutrality would be

174 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

maintained as long as nothing happened in those parts of Austria-
Hungary inhabited by a population speaking the Italian tongue.

Sgr. Bollati is said to have expressed similar views in Berlin.

No. 47.
Baron Macchio to Count Bercktold.

(Telegram.) Rome, August 27, 1914.

In complete agreement with the declarations of the Marchese di
San Giuliano, Sgr. Salandra to-day laid stress upon the Italian Gov-
ernment's firm determination not to allow itself to be forced out of
its neutrality.

The Prime Minister recounted Italy's domestic dilBBculties and
the measures taken by him for influencing the press and the political
world. He expressed a strong hope that our relations would not only
not suffer from the present international crisis, but that they would
grow even more intimate after the crisis.

No. 48.

Cou/nt Bercktold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 28, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador, in accordance with instructions, informed
me to-day of the declarations made by you and Baron Flotow to
Marchese di San Giuliano concerning the interpretation of Article
VII. Although gratified by the declaration that we agreed to the
German and Italian interpretation and extended it to the full dura-
tion of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, the Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs agreed with you and Baron Flotow that a concrete
conversation on the application of said article could not well be
entered into while the war situation continued uncertain.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 175

No. 49.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 28, 1914.

The Duke of Avarna told me to-day that he had received tele-
graphic information from his Government, with liberty to communi-
cate it to me, that the British and French Governments had declared,
in Rome, their intention not to occupy Valona. These two govern-
ments at the same time, by means of more or less veiled references,
tried hard to find out if Italy would eventually depart from her
neutrality. The Marchese di San Giuliano had declared categorically
that Italy would maintain her policy of strict neutrality.

I thanked the Ambassador for the information and requested
him to tell his Minister that I considered this a confirmation of that
loyal adherence to neutrality which I had expected from Italy.

No. 50.
Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, September 5, 1914.

The Under-Secretary of State informs me that Sgr. Bollati made
a long call upon him to-day and, after remarks on the general situa-
tion, finally brought to light Italy's great desire to occupy the island
of Saseno, of course only in perfect harmony with Austria-Hungary
and Germany and only for the purpose of upholding the agreements
concerning Albania.

Bollati said he was very much in favour of this plan, which would
enable Italy to display some activity and thus divert public opinion
from its attitude of hostility to the Triple Alliance. Besides, it would
serve a useful purpose to state publicly that the occupation had been
decided upon by the Triple Alliance; the Entente Powers would
understand — probably to their discomfiture — that the Triple Alliance
is still working together.

Finally, the Ambassador requested Herr Zimmermanu to use
his influence in Vienna in that direction.

176 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

A few hours later the Under-Secretary of State received from
BoUati the following letter:

''Au sujet de Inoccupation de Vile de Saseno, il est hien entendu
que cette mesure conservatoire, a effectuer par un petit detachement
italien et qui devait etre faite en plein accord avec I'Autriche-
Hongrie, n'aurait qu'un caractere purement temporaire pendant la
duree de la guerre et sans aucun hut territorial. Plus j'y pense plus
je crois que cette idee presente de serieux avantages. Vous feriez,
j'en suis convaincu, ceuvre tres utile en y ohtenant aussitot que pos-
sible V adhesion du Cabinet de Vienne, adhesion qui serait naturelle-
ment rendue publique, et qui produirait les meilleurs resultats en
Italic et ailleurs." ("With regard to the occupation of the island
of Saseno, it is well understood that this conservative measure, to be
carried out by a small Italian detachment and to be undertaken in
full agreement with Austria-Hungary, would be a purely temporary
undertaking for the duration of the war, without any territorial aim.
The more I consider this plan, the more it seems advantageous to
my mind. I am convinced that it would prove very useful if you
would obtain as soon as possible the consent of the Vienna Cabinet;
this consent, of course, would be made publicly known, and its publi-
cation would produce excellent results in Italy and elsewhere.")

Herr Zimmermann has instructed von Tschirschky to discuss the
matter with you.

No. 51.
Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe.

(Telegram.) Vienna, September 6, 1914.

Herr von Tschirschky called on me yesterday; he brought up
the question of the island of Saseno and asked me if the Duke of
Avarna would possibly lay himself open to a refusal if he were to
sound me in connexion with Italy's desire.

I replied to the German Ambassador that the Duke of Avarna
had no reason to fear a refusal on my part.

I am contemplating a reply to the Duke of Avarna to the follow-
ing effect:

In response to Sgr. BoUati 's statement to Herr Zimmermann, and
considering the assurances repeatedly exchanged between Vienna and

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 177

Rome, that our agreement with Italy and the decisions of the Lon-
don Conference concerning Albania remain in force, I agree to the
temporary occupation of the island of Saseno by Italian troops during
this war.

We naturally must lay stress upon the occupation of Saseno by
Italy as having been decided upon by the Triple Alliance and as
being announced by simultaneous official publication in Vienna,
Berlin and Rome. I shall also give expression to my hope that the
Italian Government will appreciate our consent all the more, as
public opinion in the Monarchy is particularly sensitive with regard
to all questions concerning Albania.

No. 52.

Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, September 8, 1914.

The Under-Secretary of State told me that Sgr. Bollati informed
him to-day that the negotiations concerning Saseno should be con-
ducted in Berlin, and that the Duke of Avarna would not approach
you on the subject. Herr Zimmermann replied to Bollati that he
failed to understand this. At Bollati 's request he consented to find
out how the proposal would be viewed in Vienna, but ventured the
opinion that, after the conciliatory reply he had received from you,
he considered that the Duke of Avarna should negotiate directly
with you on the matter.

No. 53.

Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe.

(Telegram.) Vienna, September 9, 1914.

I am unable to discern the reasons for transferring from Vienna
to Berlin the negotiations concerning Saseno. Since we have given
our consent to the temporary occupation of Saseno we shall main-
tain it ; we are even prepared to conduct negotiations on the matter
by way of Berlin. We hold, however, that since the proposed occupa-

178 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

tion is to satisfy an Italian desire, excessive complaisance on our
part might lead the Italian Government to undervalue the tokens we
have so far given of our willingness to meet its wishes.

No. 54.

Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, September 11, 1914.

In reply to a despatch from the Prince of "Wied appealing for
his sympathy, King Vittorio Emanuele has sent him the following
telegram :

*Ve remercie Voire Altesse des sentiments qu'Elle veut hien
m'exprimer aussi au nom de la Princesse, et je tiens a L' assurer que
je forme les vceux les plus sinceres pour le succes de Sa Jiaute
mission et que mon Oouvernement continuera de faire tout ce qui
sera possible pour la prosperity de I'Albanie." ("I thank Your
Highness for the feelings kindly expressed also on behalf of the
Princess. I wish to assure Your Highness of my most sincere wishes
for the success of your high mission. My government will continue
to do all in its power for the welfare of Albania.")

Through the medium of the press, Italy semi-officially denies
any intention to occupy Valona, although the local newspapers for
the past few days have been discussing such an eventuality, and
although, according to reports from Naples, troops are in readiness
there for an expedition to Valona.

No. 55.

Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold,

(Telegram.) Berlin, September 12, 1914.

The Under-Secretary of State told me to-day that, according to
reports from Rome, the Marchese di San Giuliano is said to state
that the question of an occupation of Saseno broached here by-Sgr.
BoUati is to be ascribed to a misunderstanding and was in no way
meant seriously. Sgr. BoUati, on the contrary, told Herr Zimmer-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 179

mann yesterday that it has been decided in Rome not to occupy
Saseno because it had become apparent that Greece would respect
Albania's neutrality, and also because the intended diversion of public
opinion from the relations with Austria-Hungary had become super-
fluous since these relations had become quite satisfactory.

No. 56.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Borne, September 29, 1914.

I had a conversation yesterday with the Secretary General on
the subject of fresh rumours about an impending Italian expedition
to Valona ; he renewed the statement made to me by the Marchese di
San Giuliano weeks ago, that such an undertaking was quite out of
the question, unless Epirote forces occupied Valona. In such a case
the Italian Government would find it impossible to disregard public
opinion, which is extremely sensitive on that point.

When I pointed out that this decision is likely to be known in
Athens, Sgr. de Martino said that Venizelos, in spite of all his denials,
had been prone to favour the activities of the Epirotes. The very
reservations made formerly by Zografos that they would advance
only if they were provoked by Mohammedan raids, proved, in his
opinion, that such an eventuality was not excluded, since such raids
can be brought about at any time.

I took occasion to emphasise our common interest in the con-
tinued existence of Albania in conformity with our agreement; I
also pointed out how far we were from an expansion policy in the
Adriatic, a fact demonstrated by our decision to conduct a purely
defensive war against Montenegro.

No. 57.

Von Mdricz to Count Berchtold.

(Report.) Ancona, October 3, 1914.

The editorial in to-day's issue of I'Ordine, the local organ of
the governmental party, urges the immediate occupation of Valona
by Italy.

180 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

This occupation, to be carried out by a detachment of marines,
should be confined to Valona and the island of Saseno.

The necessity of such an occupation is explained by the argu-
ment that Italy should forestall Greece and Servia, who will advance
claims upon Albania and have already begun underhanded military
and diplomatic activities.

It is pointed out to Austria-Hungary, who may object to Italy's
proposed action, that she must recognise Italy's right to proceed
alone, in view of the Dual Monarchy's inability to join in an action
in Albania at the present time.

No. 58.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 5, 1914.

According to confidential information, France has now also
promised Tunisia to the Italians, if Italy places herself on the side
of the Triple Entente, The aim of the Entente is evidently to check-
mate the Austro-Hungarian fleet with the Italian fleet and thus re-
lease the Anglo-French naval units in the Mediterranean for use in
the North Sea.

You might, in the course of conversation, pass a remark at com-
petent quarters to the effect that the Entente is anxious to engage
the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets in a fight for their mutual
destruction in order, first to destroy the German fleet by all available
means, and then to obtain unlimited power in the Mediterranean.

No. 59.

Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, October 6, 1914.

Information received from Salandra quarters indicates that an
occupation of Valona, limited to a detachment of marines, may take
place soon. The endeavour to convince the Prime Minister that this
would be a good means to divert the mind of the nationalists and
their followers from the northern neighbour, has been successful. At
the same time it would give an opportunity to obtain a foothold in

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 181

the Balkans with the avowed object of safeguarding the interests
of the Balkan States under Italy's lead at the time of the great
settlement of affairs.

On various occasions my opinion on the subject has been directly
sought, and I have expressed my personal view that Italy, in con-
sequence of her repeated declarations, stood on the same ground as
to our agreement and the London decisions as we do. Even a tem-
porary separate action, therefore, could not alter the situation but
would only accentuate the necessity for the existence of an inde-
pendent Albania in the interests of Europe.

No. 60.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 7, 1914.

Should your conversation with the Marchese di San Giuliano about
the dangers of mines in the Adriatic offer an opening, I leave it to
your discretion to point out that this situation constitutes a proof
of the detrimental effects of the Anglo-French action in the Adriatic
upon Italian interests.

This complication would surely have been avoided had the two
above-mentioned powers had any reason to fear that Italy would in
this case abandon her neutrality.

No. 61.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, October 8, 1914.

In various conversations of a general nature concerning Albania,
and lastly with Sgr. Salandra, I have been unable to discover any
inclination to discuss with me the possible occupation of Valona.

Should it actually be planned to carry it out in a small way,
namely, without any other preparations than those which have been
mentioned of late, it is possible that a fait accompli might be created
in the belief that the Central Powers could not interfere at present;

182 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the old song of woe would be struck up that Italy had no* been
notified in good time of our intentions against Servia.

No. 62.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 9, 1914.

Referring to your telegram of yesterday :

Separate action on the part of Italy in Albania would constitute
an open breach of our Albanian agreement and would oblige us to
formulate certain reservations. In any case, the contemplated step
on the part of Italy would furnish us with the occasion, in the
event of a successful war, either to demand at a later date the resti-
tution of equality in Albania or else to consider the occupation of
Valona as Italy 's chosen measure of compensation for a possible terri-
torial expansion on our part in the Balkans.

At the commencement of our enquiry at Serajevo, I informed
the Duke of Avarna of the possibility that complications might
arise with Servia. Therefore no comparison can be made between
the Italian procedure in Albania and ours in Servia.

No. 63.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, October 10, 1914.

In a conversation dealing with the contents of your telegrams of
the 5th and 7th inst., I was interested to learn from the Marchese
di San Giuliano that he fully shares your views concerning the in-
tentions of the Entente in regard to the fleets, as set forth in your
first-mentioned telegram.

Only in this way, he said, could the hitherto passive and watch-
ful tactics of the Anglo-French fleet in the Adriatic be explained.

To his mind, the Entente would not attain this object, and he
would do all in his power to prevent it. This is the chief reason
why he remained at his post, despite his serious illness.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 183

I told him that you, who are well acquainted with his intentions,
would receive his decision with great satisfaction. I also ventured
to say that in so doing he was carrying out logically and consistently
his own policy, which he had introduced on the day of his entry
into the Consulta. The Minister replied that this would remain his
policy forever, and that it was the only one which Italy could reason-
ably pursue.

The Marchese di San Giuliano then said that his opponents are be-
ginning to realise that they cannot win the day. Their anger over this
discovery, however, will impel them to redoubled eiTorts, and they
will make the best possible use of every trifling incident in their at-
tacks. The agitation should not be taken too seriously, he advised me ;
it would recur time after time, and the Italian Government is doing
its best to counteract it as far as the liberal institutions of the country
permit. In so doing, the Government must be careful not to put new
weapons into the hands of the opposition. The recent arrest in Rome
of propagators of irredentistic pamphlets should prove that the
Italian Government is in earnest, and that it is paying due atten-
tion to the matter.

No. 64.

Count BercJitold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 12, 1914.

I hear from Berlin that the Marchese di San Giuliano has told
the German Ambassador in Rome that should an expedition to Albania
be effected, detachments would be landed from time to time, to be
used according to the development of affairs. The occupation of
Saseno, as originally contemplated, would be of no avail.

No. 65.

Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Borne, October 18, 1914.

According to instructions I conveyed to-day to the Italian Prime
Minister the condolences of the Austro-Hungarian Government and

184 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the expression of your personal sympathy on the occasion of the
Marchese di San Giuliano's death.

Sgr. Salandra asked me to express the sincere thanks of the
Italian Cabinet to the Austro-Hungarian Government and especially
to your Excellency for the kind expressions.

Subsequently the Prime Minister informed me that he had taken
over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ad interim in order to cut short
all discussions among the public and to avoid giving rise to specula-
tions as to the possibility of a change in Italy's foreign policy as a
result of the change in the person of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
As long as he remained at the head of the Cabinet, the Marchese di
San Giuliano's course would be adhered to, the Minister assured
me.

No. 66.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, October 19, 1914.

Secretary General informs me Italian Government has received
news from French sources that Greek troops are advancing on
Argyrokastro.

Simultaneous information is available, that thousand armed men
with machine guns are planning to land in Albania by means of
sailing vessels. Also that Essad's intentions are doubtful, and that
he endeavoured to draw troops from Valona. Albania's neutrality
appears, therefore, in danger. In view of these discoveries the Con-
sulta intends to address a circular note to the Italian Ambassadors
to the signatories of the London protocol. In that note Italy, as the
only neutral power among them, will emphasise her strict adherence
to the protocol and express her intention to prevent any attempts
to land expeditions. For that purpose Italy would increase the num-
ber of ships in those waters.

I confined myself to the assurance that we also adhered to the
terms of the London protocol and that therefore our cooperation
with Italy in those regions holds good even though it may confine
itself to moral action for the time being.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 185

No. 67.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 22, 1914.

Report from Berlin says that Italian Ambassador there has in-
formed Under-Secretary of State of Italy's decision to have war-ships
cruise off Albanian coast to prevent importation of foreign arms and
ammunition.

As the other Powers who have guaranteed Albania 's independence
are at war, Italy considers it her duty to assume this part.

Bollati added he could confidentially inform Zimmermann that this
measure involved no other purpose, but that Rome looked upon it as
a welcome opportunity to divert public opinion from demonstrations
hostile to the Triple Alliance.

No. 68.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, October 22, 1914.

De Martino tells me Sir Edward Grey has called attention of the
Italian Government to the great misery and famine among the
Mohammedans in Epirus, and has given the Italian Government to
understand that it should consider the idea of a helpful interven-
tion. Sir Edward Grey emphasised the danger that these adverse
conditions may result in a massacre of the Christian population.

The ConsuUa, therefore, is considering the idea of some minor
action "avec des gardes'' (with guards) to remedy the prevailing
conditions. A military expedition, as discussed in the local press,
is out of the question.

Italy would in any case adhere to the two principal points of
the London decisions, namely, the neutrality and the integrity of
Albania.

186 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 69.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, October 24, 1914.

I beg to hand you herewith copy of notes from an interview
which I had yesterday with the Duke of Avarna concerning an
Italian action in Albania.

(Enclosueb.)
(Translation from the French.)

The Italian Ambassador read to me on October the 23rd, a tele-
gram from his Government, the gist of which is :

The British Ambassador, Sir J. Rennell Rodd, has called the
attention of the Italian Government to the miserable conditions pre-
vailing in Epirus and to the danger of massacres. The autonomous
government would not be in a position to cope with the situation.

Venizelos could not do less than send one regiment to Argyro-
kastro to avert massacres, under a promise to withdraw his troops
at a later date should the Powers so desire. The Greek Government
would not object to an Italian occupation of Valona.

Sir J. Rennell Rodd hopes that the Italian and Greek Govern-
ments will find a way to a mutual understanding.

In consideration of this request by the British Ambassador, the
Italian Prime Minister is said to have expressed the following views:

Sgr. Salandra could not accept the suggestion of a direct under-
standing with Greece in the matter of an even temporary occupation
of Epirus by Greek troops.

He, however, appreciated the humanitarian motives invoked by
the Greek Government and would not oppose the sending to Argyro-
kastro of one Greek regiment for police purposes, while noting Veni-
zelos's promise to withdraw the Greek troops at a later date. Finally
he reserved to himself the right to carry out at Valona such police
operations and humanitarian measures as might be needed for the
welfare of the refugees. The London decisions with regard to Al-
bania would remain in force.

The Duke of Avarna, instructed to communicate to me the above

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 187

in strict confidence, added that in view of the abnormal conditions
at Valona, and in order to protect for humanitarian reasons the
Moslem refugees, the Italian Government proposed to undertake
strictly necessary operations without giving them the character of
a military expedition with the purpose of an actual occupation of
the city. The London decisions concerning Albania would remain
intact.

In acknowledging the Duke of Avarna's communication I laid
stress upon the reservations made by the Italian Government in con-
nexion with the character of the police and humanitarian operations
as proposed by the Italian Cabinet, and especially upon the main-
tenance of the London decisions as the basis of the expedition referred
to. I made the point that I also considered the Italian action from
the point of view of our Albanian agreement with Italy, and that it
must be understood that that agreement should be maintained in full
vigour.

The Duke of Avama promised me to telegraph to his govern-
ment in that sense.

No. 70.
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, October 26, 1914.

Italian battleship "Dandolo" made port this afternoon; is said to
have sanitary expedition on board.

Special correspondents of leading Italian papers have arrived in
Valona.

No. 71.

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, October 30, 1914.

Italian flotilla has landed small detachment of marines on Saseno.
My Italian colleague informed me of this fact without touching

188 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

upon the question of the purpose of this measure (observation or
military occupation).

On highest point of island the Italian flag has been hoisted.

No. 72.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 31, 1914.

In pursuance of my communication about the installation of an
Italian sanitary station at Valona (which is already known) the
Italian Embassy, acting on instructions, announced to-day that the
Italian Government has proceeded to the provisional occupation of
the island of Saseno for the effective preservation of Albania's neu-
trality.

No. 73.

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, November 1, 1914.

Local Italian representative has verbally informed the local
authorities of the occupation of Saseno and described it as a measure
for the protection of Albania's neutrality and for the maintenance
of the London agreement. He added that no similar measures were
contemplated in respect of Valona.

I note that the provisional character of the measure has not been
specifically stated.

No. 74.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 12, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador called on me yesterday and gave me the
following verbal information under instructions:

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 189

The military invasion of Servia by Austria-Hungary has created
a new situation which demands a conversation between us and Italy
in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement. Under
the terms of that article we were obliged to come to an understanding
with Italy before our occupation of Servian territory, were it only
temporary, "We, therefore, should have notified the Italian Cabinet
and effected an understanding before we crossed the Servian frontier.

Baron Sonnino did not wish to dwell upon this delay or to ham-
per our military measures ; this fact, he pointed out, should be appre-
ciated as a proof of Italy's conciliatory disposition. The Ambassador
then hinted at objections on our part to various operations which
Italy proposed to undertake during the Italo-Turkish war, and espe-
cially to our reservations against any action in the Dardanelles. He
further declared that Italy had a vital interest in the preservation
of Servians full integrity and in her political and economic inde-
pendence. Our repeated declarations to the effect that we did not
aspire to any territorial acquisitions at Servia 's expense, did not
constitute a formal and permanent obligation. Moreover, an inva-
sion of Servian territory — even a temporary one — is sufficient in
itself to disturb the equilibrium in the Balkans and to give Italy a
right to compensation. Even in the event of Austria-Hungary gain-
ing any advantages of non-territorial nature, Italy would have that
right under the terms of Article VII. In the opinion of the Italian
Government it is necessary to proceed without delay to concrete
negotiations, because of the new situation which closely affects most
vital political and economic interests. The Duke of Avarna then re-
ferred to the uneasiness which prevailed in the Italian Parliament
and to Italian public opinion, which clearly indicated the direction
of Italian national aspirations and which the Italian Government
would have to take into serious account. An understanding between
the two governments on the basis which Baron Sonnino has in mind,
would eliminate the old causes of friction and put an end to the
frequent and deplorable incidents; a condition of cordial and per-
manent friendship would thus be established without which all ofl&cial
agreements are void and barren.

In conclusion the Ambassador emphasised the friendly feeling
which inspired his representations.

190 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 75.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 12, 1914.

In reply to the Duke of Avama's communication which I trans-
mitted to you to-day, I have expressed my surprise at his declara-
tions; the starting point, namely, the assumption that we should
have sought an understanding with Italy before we crossed the
Servian border, seems unfounded in view of the actual situation. I
recalled to his mind that I informed him then of our intention to
face all the consequences that might result from Servia's attitude
and that the Marchese di San Giuliano, at that time, gave us his
formal assurances that Italy would not impede our military opera-
tions; all she desired was that we should recognise the applicability
of Article VII to the present situation. We then noted the first-
mentioned promise; as to the latter demand, the Italian point of
view was accepted after some arguing on our part. In a letter to von
Merey at the beginning of August, the Marchese di San Giuliano re-
ferred to the circumstances which required clarification in order to
put the relations of the allies upon a sound basis. Although we re-
plied thereto in a friendly manner, the Italian Government failed to
revert to the subject.

As to our reservations during the Lybian war, I must point out
that Count Aehrenthal's objections to the operations on the Albanian
coast were primarily based upon our Albanian agreement; that the
seizure of the islands in the .^gean Sea practically constituted an
occupation, as this was not a military operation in the theatre of
war and was done solely because Italy wished to hold a pledge;
finally, that the action in the Dardanelles endangered the status quo
of the Turkish Empire and was therefore in conflict with the terms
of the Triple Alliance agreement, which had been effected for the
preservation of the Turkish possessions in the Balkans. Besides, in
the matter of the last-mentioned action, we had confined ourselves to
calling Italy's attention to the danger involved in it and to a re-
fusal to share the responsibility for its possible consequences. The
Ambassador also recalled our previous objection to the extension of
the Lybian war to the mainland of Asia Minor ; I pointed out to him
the fundamental differences between the situation in those days, when
Italy contemplated the creation of a new theatre of war, and the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 191

present instance, when we are fighting on the only available battle-
ground.

I further explained to the Duke of Avarna that there could be
no question of a temporary occupation in the present case. The
expression ** temporary occupation" had been used in the Triple
Alliance agreement in reference to the occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It can hardly be asserted that our present military
operations could be construed as an occupation of a certain terri-
tory. Moreover, I could not possibly be in a position to state with
certainty at this moment that one or the other particular locality
was at present in our possession, as continued changes are taking
place in this respect.

As to Servians integrity, the Ambassador should be well aware
that we never intended to interfere with it ; but on the contrary that
it was Servia's lust for our territory that brought on the war. At
the present time we still hold the same standpoint and desire no
more than the maintenance and protection of our possessions. Should
we seriously consider the occupation of some defined territory, we
would acquaint the Italian Government in a loyal manner of our in-
tention to do so, and would then broach the subject of compensation.

It is impossible to-day to foresee what turn events may take, and
therefore I could not accept the view that the mere fact of our ad-
vance into Servia has already disturbed the equilibrium in the Bal-
kans. Any agreement presupposes a well-defined basis ; but an agree-
ment reached at this time could not provide for every eventuality,
and it would be subject to daily modifications.

However much I would like to assist in the clarification of the
matter, I could really find no basis for specific negotiations to-day;
all the less so as our agreement clearly stipulates that the com-
pensation should be in proportion to the advantages gained by the
other party.

In concluding the conversation, I requested the Ambassador to
point out to his Government the inconsistency of adopting Servia's
standpoint — as it appears to do — namely, the standpoint of a State
whose foreign policy is aimed mainly at the acquisition of our posses-
sions in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. Any unbiased judge of
the present situation must realise the grave dangers which Italy
would incur by adopting such a policy.

192 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 76.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 13, 1914.

In pursuance of my telegrams of yesterday, I send you the fol-
lowing for your guidance :

The Triple Alliance agreement provides for the events of tem-
porary and permanent occupations. Our advance into Servia does
not even partake of the character of a temporary one. In the course
of the last few months the theatre of war has been frequently on
Servian soil but at times also in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Hungary.
In the nature of things it is necessary that we should endeavour to
carry the war as much as possible beyond our border. But even when
that has been accomplished there can be no question of an occupation.
A temporary occupation would exist only if, after the termination
of the war, some of the enemy's territory were held as a pledge or
if for some reason beyond the purposes of the war such territory were
to be kept under military occupation.

Should the Italian Government refer to a disturbance of the
equilibrium in the Balkans in connexion with the provisions of the
Triple Alliance treaty, you will point out that Count Aehrenthal had
drawn Italy's attention at the beginning of the Lybian war to the
dangers of a reaction on the Balkan peninsula, for the possible con-
sequences of which Italy would have to bear the responsibility. In
the same way I warned Italy of the dangers which an extension of
the sphere of that war would involve. Events which have since
then followed in quick succession have ultimately brought about
a disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, and especially a strengthen-
ing of Servia, which considers that the time has now arrived when
she may extend her aspirations to the territories of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy.

If the Italian Government desires at this early stage of events
to open negotiations with us concerning a possible compensation, I
have no material objection to such a course, but am confronted with
the practical difficulty of finding a concrete starting point for such
negotiations at the present time. It is naturally out of the question
to involve in such a discussion any territory belonging to the Dual
Monarchy if such territory be the object of the Duke of, Avarna's
insinuations about national aspirations. It would rather have to

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 193

deal with the question of the islands in the ^gean Sea, still occupied
by Italy, and the evacuation of which had been expressly promised;
also with the taking possession of the island of Saseno.

No. 77.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 13, 1914.

Under instructions from his government, von Tschirschky to-day
communicated the following:

The German Foreign Office has been informed that the Duke
of Avarna has been instructed to open negotiations on the question
of compensation in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance
agreement. The Rome Cabinet has added to this information the
request that the German Government support its proceedings at
Vienna.

Von Jagow replied that the time had not yet come for a division
of the spoils, whereupon Bollati explained that it was only a ques-
tion of an exchange of views. The fact that his Government desired
to communicate its wishes to Vienna at this time proved its intention
to adhere to its agreement and to maintain its neutrality.

The Italian Ambassador decidedly rejected the objection of the
Secretary of State that such a representation on the part of Italy
could easily be taken as a threat.

In the further course of the conversation between von Jagow and
Sgr. Bollati reference was made to the uncertainty of Italy's real
desires; the Secretary of State gave the Italian Ambassador con-
fidentially his private opinion that the word "Trentino" should not
be mentioned.

The instructions to von Tschirschky express the views of the Ger-
man Government in concise form that, however unpleasant the ques-
tion of compensation, it appeared most advisable under the circum-
stances to accede to the exchange of views desired by the Italian
Government.

The Secretary of State assumes that Italy has in mind the Tren-
tino, but can hardly believe that the Rome Cabinet would dare pro-
nounce the word. Should this, however, happen against his expec-
tation, he would consider it advisable to avoid a harsh refusal but to

194 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

explain the reasons which make that cession by Austria-Hungary im-
possible.

No. 78.
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, December 21, 1914.

The Duke of Avarna has been supplied by his government with
arguments with which to reply to those that I have recently brought
up in the question of compensation.

The Ambassador has consequently expressed himself on the 19th
inst. in the following sense :

Baron Sonnino does not agree with the differentiation between
a temporary occupation and an "occupation momentanee derivant
d' operations de guerre" (momentary occupation resulting from war-
like operations.) Such a differentiation would be against the spirit
and wording of Article VII.

We should have sought an understanding with Italy before we
crossed the border. On this point Italy had made no difficulties and
thereby had given ample proof of her friendly intention to take into
account Austria-Hungary's military urgencies. Nevertheless, it was
Austria-Hungary's duty to come to an agreement with Italy on the
matter of compensation.

Our arguments based upon Austria-Hungary 's attitude during the
Lybian war are being opposed by the contention that we not only
impeded temporary or momentary occupations, but even the mere
bombardment of coasts and so forth. The apprehension that the
status quo may be disturbed, could not be cited by us, as at the
present time, by her measures against Servia, Austria-Hungary, her-
self had disturbed the equilibrium stipulated in Article VII.

Italy could not be satisfied with our promise to refrain from the
annihilation of Servia, as she herself had declared that she would
not permit any encroachment upon Servia 's integrity and independ-
ence, which would be contrary alike to Italian interests and to the
provisions of the agreement. There was a wide margin between the
preservation of the political and economic integrity and independence
of a country on the one hand and its annihilation on the other; this
margin should be the object and the basis of negotiations and an
agreement.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 195

The occupation of territory, whether partial, permanent, or tem-
porary, as well as advantages of a non-territorial nature and even
the acquisition of a merely political influence or of economic privi-
leges, should be made the object of a previous agreement on the basis
of a compensation.

Our declaration that we would seek an understanding whenever
we should be about to proceed to an actual occupation was not suffi-
cient, and the Italian Government would regret it if we held to the
view that we are not yet called upon to enter into negotiations on
the subject.

Finally, it was pointed out that prolonged discussions about the
principles of the interpretation of Article VII, while events are tak-
ing their course and may confront Italy with accomplished facts,
must be considered as decidedly prejudicial to Italian interests; and
that it would be of the greatest importance to place our mutual rela-
tions upon a sound basis of permanent mutual confidence.

I gave the Ambassador the opportunity to speak without inter-
ruption and then expressed myself virtually in the following sense:

To begin with, I considered it both regrettable and unjustified
that the Italian Government should qualify our attitude during the
Lybian war and at the commencement of our war with Servia as un-
friendly to Italy. Nothing could be more incorrect than this state-
ment. It evidently had been forgotten in Rome that we made no
difficulties about her fighting in Africa, when Italy began the mili-
tary operations in 1911 without informing us ; that we have repeatedly
exerted our influence during the peace negotiations to induce the
Porte to accede to the Italian demands, and that we had been the
first to recognise Italy's new possessions. Both Count Aehrenthal
and I had pointed out the dangers which the transfer of the theatre
of war to European Turkey would bring about, as the status quo of
that country would be endangered by such an action, and the main-
tenance of that status quo was the main object of the Triple Alliance.
We have met Italy as far as possible in the matter of the islands of
the Dodecanesos, the continued occupation of which surely repre-
sented more than a mere incident of war.

The Ambassador should not forget the many official and semi-
official demonstrations which took place in Italy after the conclusion
of the war — demonstrations which gave full recognition to and appre-
ciation of our friendly attitude.

I then reminded the Duke of Avarna that not long ago it was
stated on both sides, here and in Rome, that our alliance after thirty

196 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

years of existence had never been stronger than after the Lybian war ;
that the two governments had been in perfect harmony as to the
fundamental principles of the Albanian question which had come to
the fore during the Balkan war, and were brought into closer touch
with each other by the daily labours in connexion with minor affairs
of common interest. We should not forget the great aims for the
future. Italy, as much as Austria-Hungary, has vast cultural in-
terests to protect from common dangers which we can overcome in
the long run only by our united efforts. This thought was the guid-
ing principle of my Italian policy, and I would sincerely regret it if
this were not understood in Italy.

As to the contention that we should have reached an under-
standing with Italy before we crossed the Servian border, I would
say that this view was unfounded, because we opened war upon
Servia solely to defend ourselves against Servian aggression. We
at that juncture accepted Italy's interpretation of Article VII and
certainly would not have refused to enter into negotiations on the
basis of that article, had the Italian Government desired it.

We now still adhere to the same views, namely:

1. We do not question the claims which Italy may advance on
the ground of Article VII, if the proper occasion should arise.

2. We are prepared to enter into negotiations with Italy on the
question of compensation, although we realise fully that it will be no
easy matter to find a stable basis for such negotiations in view of the
shifting war situation, especially in the Balkans.

With regard to the distinction between temporary occupation and
war operations, I called the attention of the Italian Government to
the fact that this differentiation was to be traced back to the occupa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had not the character of a
permanency and was taken as a precedent when the Triple Alliance
agreement was drawn up. The temporary occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina could not under any interpretation be construed as a war
operation, pure and simple. But even should the present war opera-
tions justify the claims for compensation, both governments would
still find it impossible to come to an agreement even by means of an
analogous interpretation of the facts, as it is impossible to foresee
all eventualities connected with the military activities.

In comparing our objections to the imperilment of the status quo
in European Turkey during the Lybian war with the dangers arising
for the status quo in the Balkan peninsula by reason of our armed
action in Servia, Italy seems to overlook the fact that in those days

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 197

the question concerned the status quo as defined in the Triple Alliance
agreement, and which since then has been upset in favour of Servia by
the treaty of Bucharest.

With reference to the Italian contention that it would not suffice
if we merely gave assurances that we did not intend to annihilate
Servia, I must fully admit that Italy's claim for compensation is not
confined to this sole event; but no assertion to the contrary has ever
been made by us.

No. 79.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, December 21, 1914.

As early as two days ago, Baron Sonnino directed a conversation
with me to the subject of the discussion which the Duke of Avarna
has entered into with you on his instructions. He observed that its
starting point, namely, the occupation of certain parts of Servia by
Austro-Hungarian troops, must now of course be eliminated.

I was in a position to state that he already had received your
reply, and had given counter-arguments thereon to the Italian Am-
bassador in Vienna. As neither he nor I had as yet been acquainted
in what way these had been received, and as I did not wish to fore-
stall your instructions, I confined myself to the assertion, in reply
to Sonnino 's statement that he was anxious to discuss that question
without delay and in a friendly manner with the Austro-Hungarian
Government, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to my knowl-
edge, was willing to pursue that discussion on principle. I do not
think the impression prevails here that we declined further dis-
cussion.

No. 80.

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, December 25, 1914.

Single shots were fired this morning in various parts of the city.
Italian colony took refuge at the Consulate.

198 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Subsequently Italian ships at anchor landed 300 men with land-
ing guns, which occupied public buildings.

No. 81.
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, December 25, 1914.

After the occupation of city, Italian Consul called on me and made
the following explanation:

In consequence of revolutionary feeling in neighbourhood of
Valona and of to-day's incident (rifle shots) he had requested Ad-
miral Patris for military occupation of city for efficient protection
of Italian and foreign colonies. Fulfilment of this measure also in-
volves occupation of Kanina and Svernez.

Admiral Patris moved from anchored ship to Italian Consulate.

City is quiet.

No. 82.
Count Berchtold to Count Ambrdzy.

(Telegram.) Yienna, December 26, 1914.

The Duke of Avarna called on me to-day and spoke in the follow-
ing sense, according to instructions:

Anarchy prevails in Albania. Under the stress of existing con-
ditions, the Government in Durazzo unanimously decided on the
20th inst. to appeal to Italy for protection, requesting earliest possible
intervention and maintenance of public order.

The Italian Government has furthermore received news from
Valona in the last few days, that dangerous events with unknown
aims were under way. Public feeling in Valona is intense ; rifle shots
have been fired; the population is restless, and the Italians who had
taken refuge at the Consulate requested Admiral Patris to land
marines. This request was granted.

The Italian Government informs the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment that it will take the requisite measures to reestablish normal
conditions in the city.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 199

Italy has no intention to proceed to further occupations beyond
Valona. Even in the case of that city, the measures are provisional.
The provisional character of the proceedings is evidenced by the
circumstance that the measures have been taken by a signatory to the
London Conference, and because Italy has great interest in the main-
tenance of its agreement concerning Albania.

I confined myself to the response that I noted the Ambassador's
declaration and especially his assurance that Italy was acting in the
interest of the decisions of the London Conference and would en-
deavour to enforce them.

No. 83.
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Report.) Valona, December 26, 1914.

Five individuals of no particular account fired several shots in
various streets of Valona at 7 a.m., December 25, without hitting
anybody.

The population remained quiet; the police started in pursuit of
the disturbers of the peace, several of whom fled to the Italian ( !)
Consulate.

The Albanian notable, Tschako, appeared at the window of his
residence and declared that he had been shot at ; one of his servants
ran into the street and shouted the Greeks were coming.

Several Italians carrying their packed portmanteaux repaired
to their Consulate, where, according to his neighbours, the Consul had
been awaiting events for some time despite the early hour.

At 8 A.M. a detachment of marines was landed and occupied
the cross-roads, the Albanian Government buildings and the branch
office of the Banking Syndicate. Several members of the local ad-
ministration (the head of which, Osuman Nuri, had been in Durazzo
for several days) proceeded to the Italian Consulate, where Admiral
Patris had meanwhile arrived. After apologising for their early
call, they declared that the public safety was not endangered, and
that they considered all extraordinary measures unnecessary.

They were informed, in reply, that the prevailing anarchy was
menacing to foreign interests and that it had been found necessary
to end it.

200 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Subsequently I received a visit from my Italian colleague, who
offered to me the explanation which I have reported by telegram.

No. 84.

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, December 28, 1914.

Italian landing detachment has sent squads of fifteen or twenty
men to Kanina, Djuverina and the height east of Arta. Svemez
is not occupied.

No. 85.

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, December 28, 1914.

General Italian interference with civil administration is expected.
Special symptoms consist in scrutiny of financial administration of
district, and an order against the delivering of moneys to Central
Government in Durazzo.

No. 86.
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, December 29, 1914.

About six hundred men of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment landed
this afternoon and entered the town. Landing not yet completed;
engineers and artillery are expected.

Local authorities and population (the latter in compliance with
public proclamation) and students of Italian schools, with Albanian
and Italian flags, went to meet Italian troops, who were objects of
ovations.

The Italian and Albanian flags were hoisted over the prefecture
this morning without special ceremonies, replacing the Turkish flag
which was flying until yesterday.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 201

No. 87.
Yon Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Report.) Valona, January 1, 1915.

The Italian troops landed in Valona consist of three battalions
of the 10th Regiment of Bersaglieri, four mountain batteries and
about fifty engineers.

The detachment, which has an approximate total strength of 2,000
men, is under command of Colonel Mosca.

The three commanders of battalions are at Valona, Kanina, and
on height of Asna (No. 241 north of Valona).

Companies of the two detached battalions are at Djuverina, Kish-
bardha and in the vicinity of Risili.

Moreover, Krionero is held by sixty marines, the harbour by
twenty, and Porto Nuovo by one company of landing troops.

The presence of two officers of Carabinieri and of a police official,
the latter already cooperating with the local police, points to a
project for the reorganisation of the native gendarmerie and police.

No. 88.

Count Berchold to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 4, 1915.

The German Ambassador, in conformity with his instructions,
to-day read to me two long reports by Prince Biilow from Rome.
They referred to his conversations with Baron Sonnino and Giolitti
on Italy's attitude toward the Dual Monarchy.

The contents of these reports may be condensed as follows:
Both the Italian statesmen reaffirm their friendly attitude toward
the Triple Alliance and regret that Italy was not in a position to
enter the war on the side of her allies. It should not be forgotten
that the war had taken Italy by surprise; that Austria-Hungary
failed to communicate with the Italian Government before she ad-
dressed her note to Servia; that the note was couched in aggressive
terms which produced a bad impression in Italy; and finally that
the view generally prevailed in Italy that Austria-Hungary, in view

202 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of her present internal situation, could not conduct a war and that
the Dual Monarchy was doomed to destruction. Moreover, the gen-
eral situation in Italy should be remembered; the profound public
irritation, the inability of the Dynasty to maintain its throne if Italy
should fail to obtain territorial advantages from the general con-
flagration, and the consequent necessity of making preparations for
war.

The Trentino was named as the territorial compensation, with a
hint that many considered this as insufficient, as their aspirations
extended even to Trieste.

Many Italian circles certainly desired the preservation of the
peace and deprecated the idea of any departure from neutrality. On
the other hand a minority of war agitators clamoured all the more.
Notoriously it is the spouters who for the most part come to the sur-
face in Italy.

In connexion with the communication, the Ambassador was in-
structed to emphasise the importance of not dropping the thread of
the negotiations on the question of compensation and of reaching a
timely and friendly understanding.

I remarked to von Tschirschky that negotiations on the question
of compensation had been initiated, as he was aware; it now rested
with Italy to express her views.

With particular reference to the cession of the Trentino, I deemed
it necessary to draw von Tschirschky 's attention to the fact that it
appeared very doubtful whether even in this manner a guarantee
could be obtained that Italy would remain inactive to the end. I
asked whether Prince Billow's conversation contained any reference
to Italy's action in Albania. The Ambassador replied that the reports
before him included nothing of that kind, but suggested that this
might be a subject for interchanges between Vienna and Rome.

No. 89.
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, Janitary 5, 1915.

The Albanian officials are still at their posts, but Italian control
of the civil administration has been allotted as follows:

The superintendency of the prefecture and the supreme com-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGABIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 203

mand of the police and gendarmerie, in charge of Carabinieri officers,
to Captain Castoldi ; the post of adviser to the municipality, to Naval
Lieutenant Pericone.

No. 90.
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, January 6, 1915.

During my visit to-day. Baron Sonnino discussed the general
situation and led the conversation to the question of compensation.
He expected that we would soon resume our advance into Servia,
and that thereby the formal basis for entering into negotiations would
be restored. Therefore he thought it expedient to take advantage of
the present lull until the next meeting of the Italian Parliament, to
discuss the matter frankly and without reserve, and to analyse the
viewpoints of both sides; possibly even to determine the main points
for an agreement, as far as it may be possible to do so in a general
way before the outcome of the world-war is known.

He then outlined the obvious difficulties of Italy's internal situa-
tion ; the necessity, which was equally ours, of supporting the existing
order in Italy and not exposing ourselves to the adversities that the
existence of a Republican country on our border would imply;
vigorous efforts which the Entente was making to bring Italy over to
her side by all sorts of promises; finally, the dangers which any
Italian Government would have to face should it fail to produce
tangible results at the conclusion of the great crisis. Not only would
the Anglo-French efforts collapse completely, but the maintenance
of the Triple Alliance on principles adapted to the modified situation
would appeal strongly to the country, if the Government were in a
position to point to an existing and acceptable basis for the con-
clusion of an agreement, instead of talking of an empty willingness
to discuss the principle of compensation.

Only in the interest of safeguarding the old alliance, which he
thought the only suitable arrangement for Italy's interests, had he
decided to enter these delicate negotiations; he had accepted his
portfolio with the understanding that he would attempt such an
agreement in order to remove the old causes of friction and to bring

204 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

about a sounder basis for our relations. If he were to fail in this, he
would resign.

We then broached the subject of the various modes of compensa-
tion and of the difficulty of anticipating a solution to the numerous
alternatives, which would meet all the possibilities that later develop-
ments might bring about. When I expressed the wish that the Italian
aspirations for territorial compensations be specified, and referred
to Albania, I found Baron Sonnino adverse to that question, as he
does not at all approve the Albanian adventure. He held that Italy's
interests in Albania consisted solely in preventing others from gain-
ing a foothold there, but not in establishing herself on Albanian soil.

Without pronouncing the word * ' Trentino, ' ' he hinted that Italy 's
territorial aspirations could be satisfied in one direction only.

After this I turned the conversation to more hypothetical discus-
sions of the give-and-take principle and the like; I encouraged the
Minister in his views upon the expediency of these negotiations.
Thereupon he expressed his intention to instruct the Duke of Arvana
to continue the discussions with you, as negotiations could be carried
on simultaneously in Vienna and here. Particularly should the
mediation of a third party be avoided, he thought; the conversations
should be conducted directly, so as to prevent misunderstandings and
misinterpretations.

Moreover, I gathered from Baron Sonnino 's utterances, that, judg-
ing from the tone of the press and from all indications in political
circles, he did not consider the situation in Italy any worse than it
was two months ago.

No. 91.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 7, 1915.

Baron Sonnino 's deprecatory utterance with respect to Albania
may be explained, to my mind, by the fact that Italy since her
occupation of Valona is in possession of the locality most valuable
to her and on the other hand because it is obviously in the interest
of the Italian Government to assume now toward us the appearance
of attaching but little value to Albania in general.

For that reason I think it desirable that you should not permit

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 205

yourself to be diverted by that assumption of indifference from per-
sistently reverting to the Albanian matter in your conversation on
the compensation question. You might base an argument as to Al-
bania's value to Italy not only upon Italy's own attitude on the
Albanian problem but also upon the disturbing effect which the
despatch of a Greek man-of-war to Albanian waters has notoriously
produced in Italy.

No. 92.
Count Berchtold to Baron MaccTiio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 8, 1915.

I note with satisfaction that you have succeeded in having an
extended amicable conversation with Baron Sonnino on the ques-
tion of compensation, despite the delicate nature of the subject. I can
but agree with the Minister, that misunderstandings and miscon-
structions may best be avoided by a direct explanation.

To my mind mediation by a third party should be invoked only
if a deadlock should be threatened.

In pursuing the negotiations, it would appear desirable to treat
the Italian claims for compensation not as the main theme but rather
as a secondary item in the aggregate of all the questions referring to
the alliance.

I consider it most important that it be made clear to the Italian
statesmen that their claims are derived from the provisions of an
article of the treaty of alliance, to the maintenance of which — I am
glad to say — they adhere; and that the spirit and wording of that
article require at this time a continuous keeping in touch and the
pursuance of negotiations on the give-and-take principle.

Inasmuch as we recognise in principle Italy's right to eventual
compensation and are willing to conduct friendly negotiations on that
subject, Italy on her part must also remember her obligations to the
alliance. Having admitted the merits of the Italian interpretation
of the casus foederis, we are entitled to demand Italy's benevolent
neutrality on the ground of the agreement. Although this has not
always been the case (as for instance in economic questions) we have
made no complaints, giving due consideration to the difficulties that
confront Italy. On the other hand we cannot fail to note that the

206 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR

Italian statesmen in their utterances in Parliament have maintained
a silence on the existing alliance and that they have made little use
of their possibilities to create a friendly feeling in the country by
means of the press.

In this connexion attention should be drawn to the mobilisation
and to the at least striking coincidence of the concentration of troops
exactly on our border, which we have been observing without excite-
ment or recrimination, in view of the existing alliance. These meas-
ures, however, have not failed to produce an effect upon public feel-
ing in Italy itself, and have been regarded by foreign countries as
directed against us. Our attitude in the matter of the Italian land-
ing at Valona has been in full accord with our alliance; we have
viewed Italy's military preparations in precisely the same spirit.

It appears to me desirable to lay stress upon these matters in dis-
cussing the question of compensation, without, however, making any
recrimination in the sense above indicated; also to suggest to the
Italian statesmen that, in negotiations purporting to be based upon
the agreement, we expect an endeavour on Italy's part to give us
tangible proof of her professed desire to maintain and intensify the
friendly spirit of our alliance.

The attainment of Italy's territorial aspirations is a matter of
Italian interest, and it should therefore be left to the Rome Cabinet
to take the initiative in this respect.

No. 93.

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Valona, January 11, 1915.

Italian Consul informed me in course of conversation, that Italian
customs officers would arrive soon for organisation of customs service.

No. 94.

Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Rome, January 12, 1915.

In connexion with the despatch of a Greek war-ship to Durazzo,
I took occasion on my visit to Baron Sonnino to-day to express my

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 207

astonishment at the fact that the Minister now seemed so little con-
cerned about Albania, an attitude which is contrary to all previous
impressions and to the former moulding of public opinion in Italy.
Seeing that the value which Valona represents to Italy has been
appreciated by us for a long time, and in view of the fact that we
also held to the axiom that no other Great Power should be allowed
to obtain a foothold there, our readiness now to consider such a
possibility must be regarded as a great concession.

The Italian uneasiness about the Greek ship also is in contradic-
tion with the disinterestedness which Italy now professes.

Baron Sonnino retorted that we had both overestimated the value
of Albania. He realised that an intervention in Albania involves the
intervening power in the danger of being drawn into all Balkan
affairs. He still adhered to the London agreement and therefore
looked upon the present occupation as provisional; especially since
the public at present was not interested in Albania and — so to speak —
prevented the Government from going too far.

It was, therefore, not possible to make any successes in Albania
palatable to the public.

My remark, that public opinion should be directed by the Govern-
ment and that I had seen to my regret that for many months it
had been left entirely to itself, was answered by the frank admission
of my statement. The Minister described this situation as being a
deplorable consequence of local conditions and of the lack of in-
formation since the outbreak of the war.

I emphasised the point that we had met the wishes of the Italian
Government also on these questions by having consented in the mean-
while to the occupation of the Dodecanesos ; by so doing we had made
an advance compensation to Italy. I also resorted to the arguments
you suggested in the telegram of the 8th instant and impressed upon
the Minister our expectation that Italy should prove by actions what
she always expresses in words, namely, her desire to consolidate our
alliance, as a response to our generous interpretation of the terms of
the alliance on all the issues involved.

Baron Sonnino had little to reply to this. As to the concentration
of troops upon our border, he endeavoured to justify it in the usual
way by referring to our own measures. I had no difficulty in point-
ing out the inconsistency of this argument, by saying that our terri-
tories bordering upon Italy could not be exempted from the general
mobilisation, and that our troops in those localities had subsequently
been removed to the theatre of war.

208 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 95.

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 12, 1915.

I beg to transmit to you the enclosed notes on an interview which
I had yesterday with the Italian Ambassador on the question of
compensation.

(Enclosure.)
(Translation from the French.)

The Italian Ambassador read to me on January 11th a telegram
from his Government with the following contents:

In the course of a conversation which took place on December
the 19th last, between Baron Sonnino and Baron Macchio, the former
remarked: "Although the situation in the Balkans, where Austria-
Hungary has embarked on a war likely to modify the equilibrium,"
justified a discussion about the applicability of Article VII, the with-
drawal of the Austro-Hungarian troops from Servia divested such a
conversation of its actuality and urgency.

Nevertheless, Baron Sonnino holds that the logical and political
reasons remained unchanged and retained their original importance.

The logical reasons which required discussion, consisted in the
fact that the war had been started from the very first with an object
entirely at variance with the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans.

The political reasons which favoured a similar discussion were
to create a basis of thorough good faith between the two Powers, to
eliminate the continuous friction between them and to render possible
their cooperation toward the common aims in matters of general
policy. Any alliance which is not based upon friendship and does not
tend to enhance that friendship, cannot be successful and is doomed
to remain barren and useless.

In order to reach a relation of that kind it is necessary to possess
the courage and the calm judgment to broach at the proper time the
subject of compensation provided for in Article VII — a delicate
question dealing with the possible cession of territory at present per-
taining to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 209

Baron Sonnino put the question whether the Austro-Hungarian
Government felt inclined to enter upon negotiations on that basis
and pointed out that Italy as a neutral power could not at present
consider a discussion which may involve territories belonging to other
belligerents, as this would mean a participation in the conflict from
now on.

When the Ambassador had finished reading, I reaffirmed our
desire to consolidate and develop the friendly relations between
Austria-Hungary and Italy and to take Article VII as a starting
point for the conversations on the subject of the compensation ques-
tion referred to in that article. While reserving the right to give
a definite answer later on, I expressed to the Ambassador my astonish-
ment and my regret that the Italian Government should have placed
itself upon a ground which will hardly make it possible for us to
enter upon negotiations. Moreover, the Italian viewpoint was at
variance with the fundamental stipulations of the Triple Alliance
agreement, which distinctly states that the alliance is designed to
safeguard the absolute maintenance of the political status of the
contracting parties and to protect them from any dangers that might
threaten their safety.

* * It is clear, ' ' I added, * * that the proposition made by the Italian
Government would involve an encroachment upon the fundamental
idea of our alliance." Neither was that proposition in conformity
with the spirit of Article VII, as the compensation provided for in
that article could refer solely to territories on the Balkan peninsula.
In fact, the equilibrium in the Balkans and the maintenance of the
status quo in the Near East having been the point of departure of
Article VII, the occupation of a territory on the peninsula by one
of the contracting parties would necessarily give the other party the
right to a compensation in the same region. Compensation beyond
these limits could never have been contemplated at the time when
the alliance was perfected.

I protested emphatically against the assertion by the Italian Gov-
ernment that the war against Servia had, from the very first, been
started for a purpose adverse to the interests of Italian policy in
the Balkans, and pointed out again that the war had been resorted
to for the sole purpose of maintaining our status quo. This purpose
not only did not militate against Italian policy in the Balkans but
was essentially in accord with the spirit of that policy as sanctioned
by the Triple Alliance Treaty.

Before closing our conversation, I drew the Ambassador's atten-

210 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

tion to the fact that the occupation of Valona by the Italians gave
us the right to compensation from Italy on the ground of Article VII.
The Duke of Avarna did not attempt to deny this.

Finally, I expressed the opinion that it seemed desirable to proceed
to a general clearing of the ground for our future relations. In this
connexion it appeared to me necessary to call the attention of the
Italian Government to the almost daily advices of difficulties which
Italy was putting in the way of the transit and the importation into
Austria-Hungary of merchandise consigned to us, although she was
bound by the terms of Article VII to observe a benevolent neutrality
toward us. Aside from the above-mentioned circumstances, it must
be noted that the fact of Italian troops having been massed quite
close to our border for many months past, is incompatible with a
benevolent neutrality.

The Duke of Avarna admitted the last contention but observed
that the principle of give-and-take should apply to the exchange of
merchandise, but that it would appear to him opportune if we were
to lodge a complaint in Rome concerning the concentration of troops
on our border.

No. 96.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Yienna, January 14, 1915.

In anticipation of later instructions I request you to remain
merely receptive during the conversation you may have with Italian
statesmen on the question of compensation.

No. 97.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 19, 1915.

Von Tschirschky read a telegram to me from Prince Bulow to
Foreign Office, dated 18th inst. Prince Biilow urged Italian Foreign
Minister to conduct discussions with us for clearing of our relations

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 211

and solution of pending questions with full consideration of our posi-
tion and of our integrity as a Great Power. On that occasion he
left no doubt in Baron Sonnino's mind that should he not succeed
in keeping the peace with Austria-Hungary, Italy would find Ger-
many with all her might at our side.

No. 98.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 20, 1915.

I beg to transmit to you for your information the enclosed notes
on my interview with the Royal Italian Ambassador which took place
on the 7th inst., on the question of compensation.

(Enclosure.)

Vienna, January 17, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day to resume the con-
versation on the topic of compensation, which had been interrupted
after his discussion with Count Berchtold on January the 11th.

After having agreed to conduct an entirely friendly and there-
fore more frank exchange of views, the Duke of Avarna proceeded
to reiterate Baron Sonnino's instructions, which were known to me
from Count Berchtold 's notes. These instructions show with com-
plete clearness that the aim of Italian policy is the acquisition of
Austro-Hungarian territory.

The Ambassador having carried out his mission, a conversation
ensued in the course of which we considered each individual point.

The Duke of Avarna, first of all, explained that the Italian Gov-
ernment, as well as the great majority of the Italian people, were
inclined to a conservative policy, including the preservation of our
alliance, *'mais avec la superposition de quelque satisfaction des
aspirations nationales" ("but with the presupposition of some satis-
faction of the national aspirations"). Without such a success their
efforts would be unavailing, and moreover, the dynasty and the exist-
ing order would be endangered.

212 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I replied with hearty assurances of our sincere desire to meet
all acceptable conditions for the preservation and consolidation of
our close relations with Italy; at the same time I was in doubt as
to whether Italy was at present on the right path to the goal at
which we both aimed. I noted with great regret that strong popular
tendencies were at work in Italy toward contestable aspirations and
that still more extremist political factions threaten a general dis-
ruption in the event of a disappointment in their now awakened
purposes of greed. Nevertheless, I was considerably surprised that
Italy should expect us, her ally, to sacrifice our territory in order to
assist Italy in the suppression of a dangerous internal turbulence.

The Duke of Avarna replied that he recognised the great diffi-
culties which would present themselves to the solution of the problem
of Italian desires, and he would not conceal this fact from his gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, he thought himself justified in assuming that
the Italians of the Dual Monarchy could not be regarded in the same
light as the other nationalities, as they were not as numerous and
therefore were of no great importance to the Monarchy; moreover,
they were unable to resist attacks on their nationality and had no
support. I took a stand against this differentiation with the obvious
arguments, whereupon we dealt with the individual point of his
instructions.

First of all I objected to the assumption that "Austria-Hungary
had engaged in a war likely to modify the equilibrium in the Bal-
kans," upon which Baron Sonnino based his justification of a dis-
cussion of compensation even at the moment when our retreat from
Servia is divesting it of its actuality.

I reiterated our readiness to discuss at any time with Italy the
question of compensation on the basis of Article VII, even in an
academic way. Yet, we could no more accept the above-mentioned
motive than the subsequent assertion in the instructions: "que le
guerre avait ete initiee des le premier jour avec un hut tout contraire
aux inter ets de la politique italienne dans les Balcans" ("that the
war had been started from the very first with a purpose totally ad-
verse to the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans"). Italy must
be aware that the war was undertaken solely for defence against the
Servian machinations which threatened our integrity.

The two above-quoted contentions were explained by the
Ambassador to mean only that the natural consequences of the war
were bound to encroach upon the Italian sphere of interests, and that
claims for compensation would arise from this fact.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 213

It stands to reason that the part of the instructions which deal
with the Italian desire to strengthen and consolidate our alliance by
the elimination of all causes of friction developed no difference of
opinion between us. We then took up the delicate point wherein
Italy's desire for a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory based
upon the claims derived by Italy from Article VII, was enunciated
in the following words: ^'qu'il faut avoir le courage et le calme
d'ahorder a V occasion la discussion au sujet de cette question deli-
cate" ("it is necessary to possess the courage and the calm judgment
to broach at the proper time that delicate question").

I did not conceal from the Ambassador the fact that I was dumb-
founded at so bold an inference from the premises of the situation.

We had already conceded the reasons which prompted Italy to
declare her neutrality, to the amazement of our public opinion. We
had also accepted the interpretation of Article VII as Italy has chosen
to construe it.

We were then confronted with the fact that Italy was determined
to regard the invasion of Servian territory in the course of the
military operations as a "provisional occupation" within the mean-
ing of Article VII. These preposterous assumptions had given us
ample occasion to give proofs to Italy of our conciliatory spirit and
of our friendship in accordance with the alliance. Nevertheless, the
first concrete formulation of Italy's desires in the way of compensa-
tion has exceeded all expectations. I now found myself under the
necessity of reserving the right to examine whether Article VII re-
ferred in any way to compensation elsewhere than on the Balkan
peninsula. I took positive exception to the reason given in the in-
structions as to why no claims for compensation could be based
upon territories belonging to other belligerents; namely: "Comme
Puissance neutre, Vltalie ne pourrait pas accepter aujourd'hui une
discussion sur la base eventuelle concernant des territoires possedes
par d'autres helligerants, attendu que cela correspondait d participer
des a present au conflit" ("Italy as a neutral power could not at
present consider a discussion which might involve territories belong-
ing to other belligerents, as this would mean a participation in the
conflict from now on"). To put it in another way, this would mean
that Austria-Hungary, though also a belligerent power, was entitled
to worse treatment at the hands of Italy, although and because she was
her ally! The scruples of neutrality in this instance were taking a
queer turn, which suggests the following reflection: how can the
remedy which Italy had devised for her protection at our expense

214 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

against internal crises, possibly be brought into harmony with Italy's
own conception of her alliance with us, for which new guarantees are
to be created for the future ? I repeated to the Duke of Avarna the
contention which Count Berchtold had put to him once before, that
the Italian demand was in contradiction with the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Triple Alliance, which primarily purported to safeguard
in every respect the integrity of the allies.

The Ambassador was visibly impressed by my explanation. As
we both were guided by the desire not to drop the thread of our
conversation, we refrained at this time from a further polemic. I
therefore made a resume of our conversation in the sense that our
Governments were as one in their desire to place their alliance upon
a new and solid foundation; that we considered the friendly con-
tinuance of our conversation as useful and necessary, and that we
were both willing to pursue it. The differences between us consisted
at present in Italy 's preference for the acquisition of territory belong-
ing to Austria-Hungary, while we proposed to choose the object of
compensation in other countries.

No. 99.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 29, 1915.

On receipt of new instructions, the Italian Ambassador yesterday
reverted to the question of compensation :

Considering that it was, even in our opinion, Italy's business to
define the compensation she aspired to on the ground of Article VII,
in order to counterbalance the advantages which we may gain by
our renewed invasion of Servia, the Ambassador has been instructed
to explain to me that no compensation could be considered at present
by the Kingdom save the cession of a part of the Austro-Hungarian
possessions, which was the sole proposal of his government. Baron
Sonnino had instructed him to urge me "d'accepter la discussion sur
la hase d'une cession de territoire" ("to accept discussion based on
a territorial cession"). No reference could be made to territories of
other belligerents, as this would constitute a breach of neutrality.
We were at liberty to cede voluntarily some of our own territory. By
this odd declaration Baron Sonnino evidently wishes to get around the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 215

contention I raised the other day to the effect that we were also
belligerents and that this would be no reason why we should be
treated worse than others by an ally.

Baron Sonnino in his instructions to the Duke of Avarna, which
was read to me, stated that time was pressing and that he was very
anxious to be in possession of our virtual acceptance by the time of
the opening of Parliament. Against this preposterous presump-
tion, I pointed out to the Ambassador that I could hardly accept
Italy's contention that she is entitled to obtain a definite advance
compensation for the mere possibility of a future acquisition on our
part, especially if such compensation was to consist in a slice of our
own flesh — an idea which Italy deduces from the right provided in the
agreement, to obtain adequate advantages in the Balkans or elsewhere
in the event of Austro-Hungarian acquisitions in the Balkans. Never-
theless, I was willing to enter into a discussion of that subject in order
to give proof of our serious intention to come to a satisfactory under-
standing with Italy.

For the present I requested Baron Sonnino to be content with
a declaration to the effect that we consent to discuss the question on
the basis of a territorial cession ; this would be equivalent to a virtual
acceptance and to a concession of the main point. There would re-
main only a discussion as to the mode and time. The Italian Govern-
ment was at liberty to advance any proposal regarding compensation,
however extensive it might be; but, on the other hand, we should
have an opportunity to examine and consider it carefully. The Am-
bassador should appreciate that the task was an exceedingly difficult
one under the existing conditions, and that it was in the interest of
the continuance of our negotiations that Italy should not press for
a quick reply.

No. 100.

Von Mayrhauser to Baron Buridn.

(Report.) Valona, January 29, 1915.

Sgr. Devoto, Commissario del esercito (Captain of the Italian
commissariat), who had been connected with the financial administra-
tion of Skutari, assumed control of the financial administration of
the Kaza of Valona to-day.

216 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

In compliance with a decree issued to-day and signed by Colonel
Mosca, the commander of the Italian forces of occupation, criminal
jurisdiction will be exercised henceforth by a military Court of
Justice (with its seat at the prefecture) according to the provisions
of the Italian military penal code.

No. 101.

Von Mayrhauser to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Valona, February 1, 1915.

Italian customs officials (two officers and eight men) have ar-
rived.

No. 102.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, February 2, 1915.

The Prime Minister in conversation to-day expressed the conviction
that the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary would not be
injured by the present crisis. He had noted with interest the com-
mencement of the negotiations and hoped that means would be found
to meet the national aspirations of Italy. I replied by calling atten-
tion to the discussions which were progressing between you and the
Duke of Avarna, and expressed the hope that, in the course of time,
means would be found to attain results satisfactory to both parties.

No. 103.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, February 4, 1915.

Baron Sonnino spontaneously told me to-day that Prince Biilow,
obviously for the purpose of maintaining the conversations between

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 217

Vienna and Rome, had advised him to specify more closely his desires.
To this suggestion he had replied that it was impossible for him to
do so as long as he did not know whether you considered his initial
suggestion about the cession of Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis
for further negotiations, as at all acceptable.

The Minister then said that he had hoped to be in a position, when
Parliament meets, to submit a basis for an accord. I responded that
the fact that the friendly conversations were in progress bore evi-
dence of the good intention on both sides to come to an understanding,
and that this may possibly be of use to him.

Finally Baron Sonnino told me that Parliament would have its
hands full, as sufficient matter for debates was furnished by the bills
introduced in connexion with the earthquakes, with the provisions
for the regulation of grain supply, and lastly by the budget.

No. 104.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, February 11, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador called on me the day before yesterday
and brought up the question of compensation, in behalf of his Gov-
ernment.

He read to me his instructions from the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs. They contained no fundamentally new items, but betrayed
a slightly increased impatience and laid stress upon the necessity of
reaching a palpable progress in our conversations before the meeting
of Parliament.

I replied that the Italian Government, if pressed, should simply
declare that it is in friendly negotiation with us on all pending ques-
tions ; more than that we were unable to say at present.

"With reference to the matter itself I recalled to the Duke of
Avarna my previous statement that I was so deeply concerned about
reaching an understanding satisfactory to both sides, that I would
bring the suggestion of a territorial cession to the attention of the
other competent authorities of the Dual Monarchy, however great
the difficulties ; but I had no power to accept or reject it on my own
initiative.

218 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

This exchange of views was still in progress, but we did not wish
to lose time in the meanwhile. The starting point of the Italian
demands for compensation was the express desire that the alliance
between us and Italy should be consolidated, that all causes of fric-
tions should be eliminated and that real friendship should develop
from it. This again demanded a settlement of all existing questions
and difficulties. As we were guided by the same sincere feelings, I
considered it most expedient to discuss simultaneously with the Italian
claims for compensation our own claims, to which we are undoubtedly
entitled by the clear wording of Article VII. In this way we would
avoid the necessity of raising another question after having cleared
the one which is now the subject of our discussions.

The temporary occupation of Valona, as well as of the Dode-
canesos, gives us the full right to compensation under the provisions
of Article VII, a right in any case more tangible than the one claimed
by Italy, in view of the fact that the latter has effectively taken
possession of those localities, whereas our position in Servia, which
according to Italy calls for compensation, constitutes no more than a
future possibility.

I therefore begged to announce our claim to compensation for
the temporary Italian occupation of the eight islands of the Dode-
canesos, which are in the ^gean Sea, as well as for Valona, in the
same cordial and friendly spirit which Italy professed in her case.

The Duke of Avarna was somewhat perplexed by this newly
raised question. He also failed to find a reply about the Dodecanesos,
concerning which I recalled to him that we had already stated our
claim under Article VII and had added that we would enforce it
"a un moment donne" ("when occasion should arise")*

As to Valona he attempted to prove that this was no occupation
in the real sense of the word. Order had to be restored there and
Albania's integrity had to be protected. Italy, in view of her neu-
trality, had been the only Power who could accomplish that task in
behalf of Europe. Italy had done nothing there for her own benefit.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that Article VII did not deal
with the cause, object, extent or duration of the occupation and that
the Italian action in Valona, to which we had raised no objection,
was subject without doubt to the definition of an '* occupation tem-
poraire" as given in that article. When Italy filed her claims for
compensation on account of our invasion of Servia, and did so even
at a time when we had again evacuated that country, she admitted

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 219

neither the latter reason nor the fact that we had invaded Servian
territory solely in the course of pending military operations and
therefore by force of circumstances. Italy had taken the ground that
Article VII allowed no exception. We now apply the same inter-
pretation.

When I stated that Italy's measures in Valona had already con-
siderably overstepped what she had then declared to us to be her
purpose, the Duke of Avarna refrained from further polemic and
only expressed his fears that this announcement would be construed
in Italy as an indication of ill-will on our part.

I assured him that this was, of course, not the case. The two
discussions could be conducted in equally friendly terms and inde-
pendently of each other. If I have chosen this moment to advance our
justified claims, I have done so with the sincere desire to do all in
my power in order that our mutual relations might be cleared all the
earlier of all causes of friction and of unsolved questions, in exactly
the same spirit which had guided the Italian Government when it
started these negotiations.

The Ambassador promised to bring my declaration to the knowl-
edge of his Government and asked me to give it to him in writing.
I sent him to-day a personal memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

(Enclosure.)

(Translation from the French.)

(Memorandum.)

Vienna, February 11, 1915.
At the beginning of the negotiations which for some time past
have been in progress between Austria-Hungary and Italy on the
subject of compensation which Italy may claim on the ground of
Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement in the event that Austria-
Hungary derives any territorial or other advantages from her action
against Servia and Montenegro, the Royal Italian Government has
advanced the opinion that the political reasons in favour of such a
discussion were : to create complete confidence between the two Powers,
to eliminate the constant friction between them and to render possible

220 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

a mutual cooperation toward the common aims of our general
policy.

Guided by the same sincere feelings, the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment also realises the advantages of clearing the ground at once
of all matters which might impede the future development of the
thoroughly cordial relations between the two Powers. In this sense
it considers it necessary, first of all, to bring about an understanding
on all questions concerning our mutual rights deriving from Article
VII of our treaty of alliance. This applies especially to two ques-
tions, one of which dates back several years, while the other has
arisen more recently, and both of which concern our most vital and
fundamental interests. Reference is made here to the question of
the islands in the Mge&n Sea, occupied by Italy, and to Italy's action
in Albania.

As to the first of these questions, it seems needless to recapitulate
at this time the different phases of the pourparlers on that subject;
they were conducted in 1911 and 1912 between Vienna and Rome
and are still fresh in our minds. Besides, they are filed, in all proba-
bility, in the archives of the Consulta. It will suffice to state the fol-
lowing points :

1. Regardless of the obvious danger that the modification of
the status quo as a result of Italy's occupation of the islands of the
Dodecanesos would sooner or later exert a disturbing effect upon the
Balkans, Austria-Hungary, guided by her desire not to hamper in
any way the military operations of her ally, has not formally op-
posed it.

2. Nevertheless, the Government of the Dual Monarchy, on the
occasion of the occupation, referred to Article VII of the Triple
Alliance agreement and in several instances (on November 6, 7,
and 14, 1911; on April 13, 15, and 20, 1912; on May 20, 21, and 31,
1912, and on June 5, 1912) declared to the Italian Government that
Austria-Hungary's right to a previous accord based on the principle
of compensation as stipulated by said article, had been put into effect
by Italy's occupations which have been declared to be temporary;
furthermore, we reserved the right to apply those provisions at a
proper time.

3. Concerning the duration of this occupation — a question in
fact immaterial to the validity of the right to compensation — Italy
has repeatedly and most categorically assured the Austro-Hungarian
Government that this occupation was only temporary and would be
terminated after the cessation of hostilities between Italy and Turkey.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 221

Discussions were even conducted concerning a written declaration
which the Royal Italian Government would hand to the Austro-
Hungarian Government in this matter, although no agreement was
reached as to the wording of such a note. Nevertheless, the Austro-
Hungarian Government wishes to reproduce herewith the following
text of that declaration, such as it was proposed by the Royal Italian
Government :

"II est entendu que dans la pensee du Gouvernement Royal italien
V occupation effectuee jusqu'd ce jour ou qui pourrait s'effectuer dans
la suite des ties de la mer Egee (Archipel) a un caractere provisoire
et que lesdites ties seront restitutees a la Turquie apres la cessation
des hostilites entre Vltalie et la Turquie et, par consequent, apres
V evaluation de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrenaique de la part des
troupes et des officiers ottomans et aussitot que la realisation des con-
ditions indiquees dans le note italienne du 15 mars 1912, aux Grandes
Puissances aura ete ohtenue. II est egalement entendu que la presents
declaration qui decoule des dispositions de V article VII du Traite
de la Triple Alliance sera consideree par le Gouvernement austro-
hongrois ainsi que par le Gouvernement italien comme strictement
secrete et confidentielle, car si elle etait connue par la Turquie elle
n'atteindrait pas le hut commun aux deux Puissances que est de hater
et de faciliter la paix." ("It is understood that the Royal Italian
Government considers the occupation of the islands in the uEgean
Sea (Archipelago) as effected up to this day or which may be
effected later to be of a provisional character and that the said
islands will therefore be restored to Turkey after the evacuation of
Tripoli and of the Cyrenaica by the Turkish troops and officers, and
as soon as the conditions indicated in the Italian note to the Great
Powers dated March 15, 1912, shall be carried out. It is also under-
stood that this declaration, which derives from the provisions of
Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement, will be considered by
the Austro-Hungarian Government, as well as by the Royal Italian
Government, as strictly secret and confidential. For, should this
become known to Turkey, it would no longer serve the common
purpose of the two Powers, namely, to accelerate and facilitate
peace.")

It appears clear from the above text that the conditions to which
the Royal Government had subjected the evacuation of the Dode-
canesos no longer exist and that Italy, nevertheless, has not restored
those islands to Turkey, although almost three years have elapsed
since then. On the other hand the above-mentioned text proves that

222 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Italy has recognised the bearing of Article VII of the Triple Alliance
agreement upon those occupations.

It seemed, therefore, obvious that if the Royal Government wishes
to discuss at this time the compensation to which Italy would be
entitled by virtue of Article VII in the event of a future and at
least uncertain Austro-Hungarian occupation, Austria-Hungary can
demand, with all the more reason, the discussion of compensation
which is already due to her by the fact of the prolonged occupation
of the Dodecanesos by Italy.

Proceeding to the question of Italy's recent action in Albania,
the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes to state that it has received
but two communications on that subject from the Italian Government.
On October 23rd last, the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold
that Italy had found herself obliged, in view of the penury among
the refugees at Valona and of the anarchy which prevailed there, to
provide by means of a small sanitary expedition for *'des operations
de police et mesures humanitaires necessaires, en faveur des refugies,
san^ donner a ces operations un caractere d' expedition militaire con-
stituant une occupation, dans le sens propre du mot, de la ville de
Valona" — ("police operations and humanitarian measures in behalf
of the refugees without, however, giving those operations the char-
acter of a military expedition representing an occupation of the city
of Valona in the proper sense of the word")- The Duke of Avarna
was instructed to add that Italy, in conformity with her declarations
made at the beginning of the present war, would adhere to the Italo-
Austro-Hungarian agreement now in force with regard to Albania;
she would also respect and maintain the decisions of the London Con-
ference, and especially those of them which provided for the neutrality
and the territorial integrity of Albania. The Austro-Hungarian
Government took note of that communication. On December 26th
last, the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that the Royal
Italian Government had found it necessary to land a detachment of
marines at Valona in order to put an end to the anarchy which
existed there. This would constitute a purely provisional measure,
which would not be extended beyond the city of Valona.

The declarations referred to above were renewed on that occa-
sion. Count Berchtold confined himself to the acknowledgment of the
communication.

Since then, Italy's activities in Albania have been gradually ex-
tended and intensified. The landing of a detachment of Italian
marines at Valona was followed by the arrival of a transport of

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 223

Italian troops (infantry and artillery) and of a considerable quantity
of war material. The city of Valona, as well as Kanina and Svemez,
were occupied by military. The number of Italian war-ships in Al-
banian waters has been constantly increased. At the time when an
invasion by Essad Pasha's enemies was feared at Durazzo, one of
those war-ships fired upon the besiegers — the very thing which the
Royal Italian Government last year considered itself bound to refuse
to do jointly with the Austro-Hungarian Government on a far more
serious occasion. In addition to these military activities Italy has
also — to a certain degree — taken over the civil administration of
Valona, where the prefecture, the financial administration, the police,
the gendarmerie and the municipality are actually under the control
of Italian Government officers, some of whom have been designated
"Royal Commissioners." A similar measure has recently been ap-
plied to the Customs office at Valona. Another regulation of the
Italian Government demands that all persons entering Valona must
be provided with passports bearing the Italian vise.

Notwithstanding the fact that these measures, from our point of
view, are not in harmony with either the words or the sense of the
repeated declarations of the Royal Italian Government, the Austro-
Hungarian Government refrains from any complaint for the time
being. However, it finds itself compelled to state that the Italian
action undoubtedly comes under the definition of a " temporary occu-
pation" according to our joint interpretation of Article VII and, as
in the case of the occupation of the Dodecanesos, gives us the imme-
diate right to a compensation. The fact that the Italian occupation
of Valona ceased to be absolutely temporary, is immaterial to the
issue. It is self-evident, however, that even this latter alternative,
being incompatible with the Italo- Austro-Hungarian accord about
Albania and constituting a disturbance of the equilibrium in the
Adriatic, which Italy has so often invoked, confers upon Austria-
Hungary an additional right to adequate compensation.

As a resume of the aforegoing, the Austro-Hungarian Government
holds that the amicable negotiations now in progress would be still
more useful if they included the question of the compensation which
Austria-Hungary is to receive for the Italian occupation of the Dode-
canesos and for the Italian occupation of Valona-— even should the
latter be only temporary.

224 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 105.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buri&n.

(Telegram.) Rome, February 15, 1915.

On the occasion of to-day's diplomatic reception, Baron Sonnino
made no mention whatever of your last conversation with the Duke
of Avarna.

On the other hand he made the spontaneous observation that to
his mind the present session of Parliament would deal but little with
foreign politics. After conferences with the leaders of various fac-
tions he was under the impression that the latter had realised that
it was premature to go into such matters in view of the present war
situation.

No. 106.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, February 15, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He had received
detailed instructions from his Government, in which Baron Sonnino
first of all endeavoured to invalidate my counter-claim to compensa-
tion for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and of Valona.

His argument in regard to the Dodecanesos consisted in a recapitu-
lation of the entire diplomatic procedure since 1912, and culminated
in the assertion that we had then actually referred to our claim for
compensation according to Article VII, but had subsequently dropped
it with a protest against any further extension of the occupations.
Italy, in consequence of this objection, refrained from occupying
Chios and Mytilene.

I replied that there was no record of the sort among our docu-
ments, but that only the assertion of our claims to compensation was
discoverable — claims which would be advanced '^diin moment donne"
(at a suitable occasion).

As to Valona, Baron Sonnino stated again what the Duke of
Avarna had already said, namely, that Italy had not sent forces there

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 225

for her own benefit, but in order to uphold European interests and to
protect the status quo — but not to modify it.

I repeated the explanation I gave the Ambassador the other day,
that Article VII dealt solely with the fact of the occupation, without
any reference to its purpose, extent or duration. Italy herself en-
forced this interpretation toward us. Article VII by no means pre-
vented the two Powers from taking whatever steps either might
consider necessary. It acknowledged their right to act, in the event
that they saw themselves compelled to alter the status quo, but
stipulated the right to compensation for the preservation of the mu-
tual equilibrium.

I could, therefore, not agree with Baron Sonnino's conclusion and
insisted upon the validity of our full title to compensation.

The Italian Ambassador then broached the second and most as-
tonishing part of his instruction, and said:

Two months have elapsed since the Italian Government had first
introduced the question of Article VII and had asked us for a friendly
discussion about the compensation to be given Italy in consideration
of the disturbance of the equilibrium in the Balkans.

Although we had never declined to enter into such a discussion,
weeks and months had elapsed and Italy had not yet succeeded in
obtaining even as much as our reply to the fundamental question,
whether or not we were willing to discuss the matter on the basis of
a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory. We had brought up new
questions and arguments with the sole intent of evading the issue
and of prolonging the negotiations. In the meanwhile, preparations
were being made by us for a renewed expedition in the Balkans.
In view of this attitude toward Italy, the Italian Government could
no longer entertain any illusions as to the practical result of these
negotiations.

The Italian Government, therefore, is compelled, for the protec-
tion of its dignity, to withdraw all its proposals and suggestions and
to abide by the clear provisions of Article VII. The Italian Govern-
ment declares that it would consider any Austro-Hungarian step,
whether against Servia or Montenegro or any other Balkan State, as
being in plain violation of the said article, provided no previous
arrangement to that effect has been made in accordance with Ar-
ticle VII.

Should Austria-Hungary evade this obligation, serious conse-
quences may result, for which the Royal Government in advance an-
nounces its refusal to bear the responsibility.

226 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I expressed my regret to the Ambassador that Baron Sonnino
seemed to have become impatient, although our negotiations could
not possibly have been accelerated. The Minister might have real-
ised how very difficult the ground is on which he had based the
compensation question. We might surely have reached a speedier
solution had Baron Sonnino accepted my suggestion and sought the
object of compensation in other regions. Even so, I have taken great
pains to deal thoroughly with the matter and to examine it jointly
with the other competent authorities of the Government, with the
firm intention of arriving at a friendly agreement with Italy. Baron
Sonnino knew that I was engaged in assiduous negotiations between
the two Governments. On his own initiative he has declined to await
a reply and now has put an end to our conversations.

All I could do now was to take cognisance of this fact and to
consider more closely the standpoint which the Italian Government
is taking.

This being based upon Article VII, I should have no diffi-
culty in following the Italian Government on that ground, as we
also adhere to the interpretation of that article as accepted by both
Powers.

The "previous understanding" requisite for every occupation,
could, within the meaning of the article, only apply to the initial
stages of a military action, the results of which cannot be gauged
beforehand, and for which therefore no "adequate" compensation
can be determined according to the agreement.

The Duke of Avarna agreed with me on this point without
hesitation.

I further explained that it was an absolute impossibility, in the
case of our war with Servia, to await the conclusion of negotiations
with Italy before invading Servia, as these negotiations might be
prolonged indefinitely and to no purpose, to the detriment of our
military operations. The Duke of Avarna admitted that such a pro-
ceeding would have been out of the question, and held the opinion
that our obligation was limited to giving previous notice to Italy of
a prospective resumption of our activities against Servia, and in
opening without delay negotiations concerning compensation.

Thereupon I gave him the following assurance, which seemed to
satisfy him: '^qu'd la veille de I'eventuelle reprise de notre action
militaire contre la Serbie nous tiendrons presente la situation de droits
et d* obligations que nous cree V article VII de notre Traite d'alliance"
("that on the eve of a possible resumption of our military operations

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 227

against Servia we shall keep in mind the rights and obligations cre-
ated by Article VII of our treaty of alliance").

No. 107.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, February 17, 1915.

The recent emphatic declarations by prominent journals of Vienna,
in opposition to every territorial concession, are said to have created
a profound impression in journalistic circles in Rome, especially
because of the fact that they have been passed by the censor.

No. 108.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, February 19, 1915.

Yesterday's first meeting of parliament was calm. Commemora-
tion of earthquake disaster, formal questions, reading of bills, and
interpellations.

Salandra's speech contained references to foreign situation framed
in the vague phrase, that the fatherland expected from its sons a
confidence that its destiny will not be confined to its present interests,
but also involves the glory of the past and the hopes and ideals of
the future.

I am informed that the feeling in parliamentary circles is calm
and collected, indicating a growing sense of responsibility ; an attempt
to provoke sentimental manifestations in parliament failed.

In the same way little notice was taken of the street demonstra-
tions which some hired youths had started in favour of intervention
before the opening of the session, and against which large contingents
of troops had been kept in readiness.

The information I received that the Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet
had decided five days ago to venture war if it should be unable to
secure territorial concessions, though supposed to be authentic, is
in striking contrast with the above-mentioned observations.

228 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 109.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, February 23, 1915.

I beg to send you the enclosed notes on my conversation yesterday
with the Duke of Avama on the question of compensation.

(Enclosure.)
(Translation from the French.)

Vienn^i, February 22, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador to-day acquitted himself of his mission
from Baron Sonnino to me. The method now adopted by the Italian
Government to induce us to cede Austro-Hungarian territory is marked
by a notable advance upon any preceding action.

The Duke of Avarna was instructed to declare to me, in contra-
diction to his personal opinion as expressed at our last interview, and
which coincided with mine, that Baron Sonnino has placed the
following interpretation upon the ' ' previous understanding ' ' provided
by Article VII of the treaty :

The understanding must not only be initialed, but must also be per-
fected before the commencement of the military action which it must
precede — and not accompany or follow it — and which it is destined
to sanction under the obvious meaning of Article VII, unless the
other party has consented to another mode of procedure.

This consent being out of the question under the existing cir-
cumstances, the communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government
is equivalent to a veto by the Italian Government upon all military
measures by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans until the understand-
ing provided for by the agreement has been perfected.

Any mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government
other than the above-mentioned, would be regarded as a flagrant
violation of our treaty of alliance and as an open manifestation of
its intention to resume its freedom of action. In such an event the
Italian Government would consider itself likewise at liberty to resume
its entire freedom of action for the conservation of its interests.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 229

To this enunciation of his own views the Italian Minister adds
that the Italian Government intended to follow the precedent set by
us at the time of the Lybian war in 1912 with regard to the islands
already occupied provisionally ; in the same way as we, at that time,
renounced our rights to compensation for the occupation of the
Dodecanesos, the Italian Government now renounces all discussions
concerning our operations in Servia prior to this date. But from
now on an absolute veto would be imposed upon any similar move,
unless a previous understanding has been signed and initialed.

At this juncture I interrupted the Ambassador by declaring cate-
gorically that his Minister was grossly mistaken if he believed that
we have renounced our rights to compensation for the occupation of
the Dodecanesos. The circumstance mentioned by Baron Sonnino
could only refer to our friendly attitude at the time of the occupation
of the Dodecanesos, when we renounced the immediate enforcement of
our right to compensation, in order not to hinder Italy's military
operations. We have always expressly asserted that right, while
reserving its application for a later date. Only in the event that
Italy had extended her occupations beyond the Dodecanesos, as she
had shown an inclination to do, especially with regard to Chios and
Mitylene, did we intend to demand immediate compensation, which
in any case was due to us. We have never signed a document, nor
have we ever made a declaration equivalent to a renunciation of that
kind — a renunciation which would have been in no way justified.

Quite on the contrary, I formally announced to the Duke of
Avarna, on February 9th last, our demand for the compensation which
was undoubtedly due to us by virtue of Article VII, both for the
occupation of the Dodecanesos and for Valona. Moreover, I declared
to the Ambassador to-day, that I persisted in that demand in its full
force and to its entire extent.

As to Baron Sonnino 's interpretation of the "previous under-
standing" stipulated in Article VII, I first pointed out to the Duke
of Avarna that the Italian Minister's interpretation constituted no
law to us and that mine was equally authoritative; furthermore, it
appeared to me inadmissible, because of the existence of a difference
of opinion, to resort at once to the extreme measure of a violation of
the Treaty which we have always taken the utmost care to respect
scrupulously.

To my mind it is evident that Baron Sonnino 's interpretation
oversteps the mark, and if put in effect would place us in an im-
possible position. Discussions for the purpose of an understanding

230 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

with Italy, conducted on the eve of our resumption of hostilities with
Servia, would deprive us of our freedom of action and thus place us
hopelessly at the mercy of our enemy, if, against our will, the nego-
tiations should be protracted, in the event, for instance, of Italy
choosing a ground where it would be difficult for us to follow. In
these negotiations we would be subjected to intolerable pressure from
two directions.

Besides, there is another matter to be considered. The com-
pensation, as provided for by Article VII, must be proportionate
and equivalent in the plain sense of the words. Hence it will be
impossible to perfect an arrangement for compensation at a time when
the advantage subject to compensation is non-existent and depends
entirely upon the future. It would be unthinkable to specify and
define a compensation so long as the point of comparison is still com-
pletely lacking.

We fully and loyally acknowledge the obligation which Article
VII imposes upon us and we do not mean to evade it. Yet, if we
do not wish to reach an absurd situation, the references to com-
pensation in Article VII can be interpreted only in the following
sense : Each of the contracting parties is obliged to give timely notice
to the other party and to open negotiations without delay on the
subject of compensation. It will always be possible to fix the general
basis of the accord in a short time ; the details and concrete stipula-
tions on the appraising of values, however, are inevitably subordi-
nated to the possibility of comparing the advantages to be compensated
for. This implies that the activities referred to must take their
course without awaiting an adjustment of counter-proposals — a delay
which at the present juncture could be nothing less than fantastic.

We applied the logic of such a situation when, in order not to
hamper Italy's military activities in the uEgean Sea, we confined
ourselves to an assertion of our rights to compensation, while renounc-
ing their enforcement for the time being.

The Duke of Avarna took note of my statement and then com-
municated to me a hint, which he had also been instructed by his
Minister to give me.

Baron Sonnino does not conceal his conviction that it would be
useless to open negotiations on the subject of eventual compensation
on the grounds which have been discussed in the course of the nego-
tiations interrupted by him on February 14th, unless such negotia-
tions are based on the cession of territories at present belonging to
Austria-Hungary. As for the chances of reaching an understanding,

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 231

any negotiation conducted on any other basis than the aforesaid
would necessarily be futile.

In reply to this plain talk I told the Duke of Avarna that I was
justifiably surprised at the renewed introduction of this topic after
the formal withdrawal of Baron Sonnino's previous proposals.

I would confine myself to-day to the assurance that, if occasion
should arise, we would inform the Italian Government at an oppor-
tune time of our intention to enter into negotiations with Italy on the
subject of a previous understanding, in compliance with Article VII ;
this, however, without binding ourselves as to the basis of compen-
sation which Baron Sonnino had asserted, because I do not admit the
tenability of his assertion.

No. 110.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, February 27, 1915.

I observed that even in parliamentary circles here the incorrect
assumption still prevails that no direct discussions have yet taken
place between Vienna and Rome. For my guidance and for the
reason that all referential information hitherto received from you
was only destined for my personal cognisance, I request you for
telegraphic instructions whether I shall continue the silence I have
accordingly maintained or whether I may divulge the facts that
negotiations have been in progress and that they have been brought
to a stop through no fault of ours.

For months past I have not regarded myself as authorised, in
my talks with Italians outside of Government circles, to go beyond
the statement that we always have shown our readiness for nego-
tiations, provided these were not based upon unacceptable premises.

As affairs are at present, I fear that before long the entire blame
will be put on us, as the Government here evidently persists in its
assiduous silence. This may result in an adverse change of sentiment
on the part of the political factions which favour a compromise with
the Government.

232 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 111.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 1, 1915.

I beg to transmit to you the enclosed notes on a discussion on the
compensation question which took place between me and the Royal
Italian Ambassador on February 26th last.

(Enclosure.)

Vienna, February 26, 1915.

Baron Sonnino endeavoured to invalidate my objections to his
interpretation of Article VII and to the considerations he had prof-
fered in rather spirited terms. He sent me a short reply thereto
which the Ambassador conveyed to me to-day.

The Minister reiterates his assertion that the "previous under-
standing" concerning compensation must not only be initiated but
also terminated before the commencement of any military action on
our part. He persists in his two standpoints : that there must exist
a complete previous understanding before we begin our action and
that no discussion could promise practical results unless it were
based on the principle of a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory.

Baron Sonnino attempts once more to justify his view-point on
the first question by the contention that Italy would incur the danger
of delays in our negotiations until we had secured all the desired
advantages in Servia ; she might find herself thwarted of all compen-
sation if she consented to our resumption of hostilities against Servia
prior to the completion of an agreement between us.

I observed to the Duke of Avarna that a danger of that nature,
if it existed at all, would be far greater in our case, as the Italian
interpretation of Article VII would expose us to the possibility
of being prevented indefinitely from resuming military activities by
a protraction of the negotiations; thus we would be deprived of any
possibility of defending ourselves against the attacks and operations
of our southern enemy — a situation unacceptable for a belligerent
Power.

The Ambassador replied that his latest instructions contained

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 233

a clause concerning a possible modification of the method of procedure
fti our future discussions, and which, he thought, met my contentions
to a certain extent. Baron Sonnino had suggested to him that the
two parties might come to an understanding outside of the strict sense
of Article VII, special circumstances made it advisable that the
"accord prealahle" concerning compensation be framed on an ad-
justable scale, which would allow such compensation to be fixed in
proportion to the possible and future results of the military activities
upon which it is based.

I received the Italian Minister's suggestion favourably and ac-
knowledged that in my opinion it indeed tended to facilitate our
future exchange of views in an advantageous and expedient manner.

To my mind a special effort should be made to determine as
quickly as possible the principles of the understanding and to direct
the negotiations into the proper channel, without, however, making
it necessary to postpone our military action until the details of the
agreement have been definitely settled. The completion of the
understanding in detail would in any case be impossible as long as
no basis was available for the valuation of the advantages to be
compensated for.

On the other hand nothing would prevent us from dealing con-
ditionally with the specific details of the agreement if it were under-
stood that certain concessions would become valid only if we actually
acquired or definitely secured a certain advantage in the course of
events.

Baron Sonnino 's presumption, "si des circonstances speciales le
conseUlent" ("if special circumstances made it advisable")* seems
to be an existing situation in the full meaning of the term, in view
of the fact that we are actually at war with Servia and that con-
sequently every military measure which we might find it necessary
to take against her will always bear the character of urgency. There-
fore, I do not hesitate to accept sympathetically Baron Sonnino 's idea
regarding conditional arrangements.

The Ambassador again reverted to his intimation of the 22nd
inst. that future discussions could be conducted profitably only if
based upon a cession of our territory. I replied that I could not
abandon my former standpoint, namely, that, as the negotiations
were interrupted by the Minister's own desire, I could not at
present bind myself as to the basis of our future conversations, and
that this question had consequently no actuality.

The Duke of Avarna endeavoured to convince me of the existence

234 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUKOPEAN WAR

of a prospective actuality, which surely justified our discussing the
subject. I recalled to him that I had adapted myself and adhered
to the programme as set up by Baron Sonnino, who had stipulated
for the opening of our negotiations at the time when we should resume
our campaign against Servia.

No. 112.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 2, 1915.

Please do not generally abandon your adopted reserve on your
own initiative. Only in the case of direct enquiries, or if in the
course of conversation you have occasion to do so, you may say that
the two Governments are now, as before, in direct negotiations of a
frank and friendly nature, concerning questions of mutual relations
and interests.

No. 113.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 4, 1915.

I beg to hand you the enclosed notes on a discussion concerning
the compensation question, which took place between me and the
Italian Ambassador on the 2nd instant.

(Enclosure.)

Vienna, March 2, 1915.
The Italian Ambassador's visit to-day served no other purpose
than the enquiry in behalf of his Government, as to whether I had
not yet reached a decision concerning the basis of negotiations
which had been designated by the Italian Government as the only
profitable one.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 235

I pointed out the present stage of the negotiations, which had
been brought about by Baron Sonnino himself, in suspending the
conversation for the time being, to be resumed only when, because
of a prospective resumption of military activities in Servia, we shall
have to seek an understanding with Italy on the ''previous under-
standing," in conformity with Article VII. Hence, the issue lacked
actuality; nevertheless, we would avoid delaying our decision un-
necessarily.

The Duke of Avarna still holds that the question is an actuality
because it could not be withdrawn from the programme owing to
the sentiment prevailing in Italy and also because a settlement may
become more and more difficult.

He then repeated Baron Sonnino 's stale and familiar statements,
adding to them a new item in the shape of a denial of my assumption
of the other day. The "special circumstances" which may occasion
a conditional discussion of the compensation question were not ap-
plicable in this case on the grounds which I had proffered, because
the war against Servia had been started without Italy's knowledge
and against her advice and her interests. Besides, the main point
was the determination of the basis of the negotiations, and a certain
minimum of compensation was due to Italy for the very fact of our
military action. This in any case should be fixed immediately, even
if further arrangements may possibly be governed by the actual
results of the campaign at a later date.

I maintained my standpoint, that naturally the basis of the nego-
tiations had to be settled first, but that it always would be impossible
to decide upon the extent of the compensation so long as our acquisi-
tions or advantages could not be ascertained.

Baron Sonnino was insistent for action on account of the diffi-
culties arising from Italy's political situation; but I pointed out that
he should also consider somewhat the difficulties he was causing us.

Finally I reminded the Ambassador that we maintained in their
entirety our claims to compensation for the seizure of the Dodecanesos
and of Valona.

236 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 114.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, March 6, 1915.

Resume of my last week's reports, to my mind, involves two
important phases in the progress of Italian situation :

(1) Elimination of internal political difficulties. Action of Cabinet
Sonnino-Salandra will henceforth alone direct further development,
all the more so as Parliament realises heavy responsibility and on
every occasion and with utmost unanimity emphasises its confidence
in Government. Thereby it shows disposition to leave it in Govern-
ment's hands to find issue compatible with Italy's interests.

(2) Increasing anxiety about possibility that Turkish problem be
brought to an issue by attack on Dardanelles, which may be expected
to kindle general Balkan conflagration.

Considering general aversion to a great war, country's majority
may still prefer victory of Central Powers for Italy's future, pro-
vided an understanding with us may be reached which would consist
of minimum that Government could declare in parliament as ad-
vantageous.

In this respect I expect further attempts, which in view of general
situation will probably be the last.

Above resume of present situation appears to me more serioiis
than ever.

No. 115.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 9, 1915.

I declared to-day to the Italian Ambassador, who had come to
see me, that we had decided to accept the principle of a cession of
Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis for discussions in compliance
with his Government's demands in the negotiations on the compen-
sation question. This decision, however, did not involve any specific
obligation on our part and we reserved to ourselves the definition

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 237

of the conditions under which a territorial cession may be effected.
This concession makes possible the resumption of negotiations.

I told the Duke of Avama that I had already informed the Ger-
man Government of our attitude, and through it also the Consulta.
My action was based, I explained, upon the desire that in future
negotiations I should be guided by the wishes which the Italian Gov-
ernment has previously expressed and which I fully share, that the
sacrifice we are about to make shall serve to enhance the interests of
our future relations with Italy and of the continuance of the policy
of the Triple Alliance.

In the course of the conversation the Italian Ambassador ex-
pressed the wish that the negotiations on the compensation should be
conducted separately between us and Italy, to which I assented.

Finally I mentioned to the Duke of Avarna that I would esteem
it a favour if the Italian Government should come to a previous agree-
ment with us on the wording of any declaration which it might feel
desirable or necessary to make at this time in parliament on the
prospective negotiations with us.

No. 116.

Prince Gottfried zu Hoherilohe to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Berlin, March 10, 1915.

Prince Biilow informs me that Baron Sonnino has received our
declaration with thanks and said he would make an announcement in
parliament only after the conclusion of the preliminary negotiations.
He thought it better to come forward with an accomplished fact, in
order to avoid all interference from Italian politicians.

No. 117.

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccJiio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 13, 1915.

I beg to send you the enclosed copy of notes on a conversation
I had yesterday with the Duke of Avarna on the subject of com-
pensation.

238 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

(Enclosure.)
(Translation from the French.)

Vienna, March 12, 1915.

In reply to my declaration of the 9th instant, the Italian Am-
bassador to-day communicated to me the following instructions from
his Government:

The Austro-Hungarian Government having assented to the ques-
tion of compensation as proposed by the Italian Government, the
latter agrees to open the discussions on that subject. For the time
being, it has no intention to make any declarations in parliament or
to publish anything concerning the impending negotiations. The ac-
cord being once concluded, the two Governments would easily agree
on the form of its publication.

Baron Sonnino hopes that the task will be begun without delay
and that the conversations will be conducted speedily in order to
arrive as soon as possible at the agreement which must be concluded
before any Austro-Hungarian military action is undertaken in the
Balkans.

These conversations should be conducted directly between us,
without the intervention of a third party.

Baron Sonnino desired to make clear the following starting
points :

(1) Absolute secrecy of the fact and of the progress of the
negotiations. Any indiscretion would compel the Italian Gov-
ernment to break off the negotiations at once.

(2) The agreement once concluded, must be perfected imme-
diately. Otherwise, the Italian Government would not have
sufficient political power to obtain the ratification indispensable
for the enforcement of the agreement.

(3) In order to prevent the raising of any new question or
contention, as well as any recurrence of adverse incidents between
the two parties ; and also in order to assure to the Imperial and
Royal Government the freedom necessary for the continuance
of the war, the agreement should extend over the entire period
of the war and cover all possible references to Article VII.

When AustriarHungary shall have accepted these formal points,
Baron Sonnino will be ready to specify his demands. He will confine
them to what he considers to be the minimum necessary to reach the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 239

aim of the accord, which consists in the elimination of all causes of
friction between the two Powers and the creation between them of an
atmosphere of confidence which will allow of their cooperation toward
their common aims in international politics.

The two parties are equally interested in a speedy conclusion of
an understanding which will eliminate all suspicions of procrastina-
tion. For that reason Baron Sonnino proposes to limit the time for
the negotiations to a fortnight. Should no agreement have been
reached at the end of that period, both parties would withdraw their
proposals as null and void and would resume their freedom as before
the commencement of the conversations.

I told the Duke of Avarna that I noted all he had said at the end
of his communication but at the same time maintained my interpre-
tation of the expression, "previous agreement," as against the one
Baron Sonnino reiterated in his message. As I have amply explained
before, the latter would make it impossible for us even to defend our-
selves against attack.

I added that I raised no objection to the Italian Minister's pro-
posal that the negotiations should be carried on directly between our
two Governments and without the intervention of a third party.
Yet, it was understood that we mutually agree to keep Germany in-
formed of all the phases in our negotiations, as befits the spirit of our
relations as allies.

Commenting on the three points proffered by Baron Sonnino, I
remarked to the Ambassador in respect of No. 1 that I recognised
the justification of his contentions and coincided in the Minister's
desire for the strictest secrecy in the conduct of our negotiations,
with the sole exception of Germany. For the reasons given above,
it is indispensable that the latter should be taken into our confidence.
Point 2 is absolutely unacceptable for us. If Baron Sonnino, accord-
ing to the Ambassador, reasons that the agreement which must pre-
cede the realisation of the advantage to be compensated for, in
virtue of Article VII, must consequently be put into effect at once,
I must state in return that this would involve too great a violation
of the text. It is the agreement that must be ' ' previous, ' ' but not its
fulfilment. It would be positively impossible for us to transfer any
territory before the conclusion of the peace, for various reasons
which in themselves are imperative and which we could not possibly
disregard.

I hoped the Italian Government would not decline to reconsider
this demand.

240 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I unreservedly subscribed to the considerations contained in
Point 3.

I finished by saying that I was guided by the same desire as Baron
Sonnino, to arrive as quickly as possible at a happy conclusion of our
prospective negotiations; if the period of a fortnight stipulated by
him was the expression of his unalterable desire, then I would gladly
accept his opinion ; yet it seemed to me difficult to fix a definite num-
ber of days for negotiations of such importance.

No. 118.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 15, 1915.

I beg to send you the enclosed notes of my conversation to-day
with the Duke of Avarna on the question of compensation.

(Enclosure.)
(Translation from the French.)

Vienna, March 15, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that he had received
Baron Sonnino 's reply to his report on our last conversation, however,
without instructions to convey it to me. Nevertheless, he did not wish
to conceal from me that the Minister was not satisfied with the way
in which I had received his latest propositions.

Baron Sonnino did not wish to attach too much importance to
my aversion to his interpretation of the term "previous agreement."
If we agreed upon the principles, this question would become a mere
matter of form.

Our opposition to the principle of immediate transfer would, on
the other hand, represent an insurmountable obstacle to any under-
standing. The execution of the agreement immediately after its con-
clusion would be the conditio sine qua non, without which it would
be of no avail to enter into any discussions. Without that condition

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 241

the Italian Government could give no guarantee for the acceptance
of the prospective agreement by public opinion.

Furthermore, my persistence in maintaining our claims to com-
pensation for the Dodecanesos and for Valona indicates strong desire
on my part to carry on our negotiations to a happy conclusion.

I asked the Duke of Avarna first of all to reassure the Minister on
the score of the apprehensions which he seems to entertain in regard
to our military operations in the course of our prospective conversa-
tions. Once the discussions are well under way we certainly shall
refrain from any action which might retard their progress or endanger
their happy conclusion.

It is rather Baron Sonnino's persistence in his demand for imme-
diate execution that I consider at this moment the only, and I hope
ephemeral, impediment to a happy issue of our problem.

I refrained from repeating what I had said before : if the reaching
of an agreement had to be "previous," it was impossible to derive
from the text of Article VII that its execution had to be equally
' ' previous. ' ' At the very least the advantage to be compensated for
should be simultaneous with the transfer of the compensation.

Leaving aside the formal part of the question, the Italian Govern-
ment should realise the difficulties which the Dual Monarchy would
have to face in order to comply with that demand.

Public sentiment should also be considered, and the transfer could
be perfected only when the aggregate results, probably more satis-
factory in other directions, should be determined at the end of the
great present crisis. Last, but not least, it would be impossible to
change the fate of a province while its sons are bravely fighting with
all the other soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for the in-
tegrity of their country. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, though it has assumed the responsibility of an eventual terri-
torial sacrifice, remains firm in the conviction that it is its duty to
postpone its execution until the end of the war.

We have accepted in principle the basis proposed by Baron Son-
nino, and have done so with the best intention to resume the con-
versations immediately and to reach an amicable and complete under-
standing with Italy. Yet the great sacrifice we are ready to make
should not be rendered more difficult by the introduction of new
demands.

Baron Sonnino has construed my repeated assertion of our right
to compensation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and
of Valona as an indication of insufficient enthusiasm on my part to

242 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

come to an understanding. He was wrong. In the face of the Italian
Minister's constant denial of our right, I am obliged to persist in its
incontestability. Our right is as clear as the one which Italy derives
from Article VII for her own benefit; as I have not specified our
demands, I can not admit the imputation that I intend to impede the
negotiations. On the contrary, I have only one desire, namely, to
see them continued and carried to a conclusion.

No. 119.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 17, 1915.

You will have noted from the conversations I have had with the
Italian Ambassador, the gist of which I have given you, that Italy's
demand for a territorial cession has not yet been specified. On the
other hand the fundamental demand has been laid down that the
territory eventually to be ceded should be actually transferred to
Italy immediately after the conclusion of the prospective agreement.

Should you, in the course of your conversation, get the impression
that this contestable Italian demand was prompted by the apprehen-
sion that we might change our minds in the event of a successful
issue of the war and refuse to transfer the territory ceded to Italy,
you will combat such an assumption, not only on the ground that the
very fact of our eventual cession being binding would make such a
fear baseless, but also by suggesting that definite guarantees for our
adherence to our obligations may be discussed.

As the Entente Powers now appear to be making steadily aug-
mented offers to Italy, I request you also to explain to the Italian
Government — without, however, mentioning this circumstance — that
we would include in our calculations a far-reaching participation
of Italy in the advantages that would result from the conclusion of
peace, in the event of Austria-Hungary and Germany being vic-
torious.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 243

No. 120.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 19, 1915.

I gather from your reports that Baron Sonnino desires a closer
intercourse with you on the subject of our relations with Italy.

I entirely share this wish. Although it appears necessary that the
principal negotiations, which have been initiated in Vienna, be con-
centrated here, it will be desirable to give you a possibility to maintain
our closely defined position while affording Baron Sonnino an oppor-
tunity to convey his ideas to me chiefly by consecutive and direct
discussions between you.

I therefore request you to place yourself, when the next occasion
arises, at the disposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and possibly
of the Prime Minister.

No. 121.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, March 19, 1915.

I had occasion to-day to discuss the compensation question with
Baron Sonnino.

The Minister reiterated his demands exactly as set forth in your
notes. He referred without any curtness to the difference of opinion
on the question of the immediate transfer of the territory to be ceded.
He said Prince Biilow had suggested leaving this phase of the question
open and proceeding meanwhile to negotiations on the concrete points.
Baron Sonnino expected little from such a procedure, which would
increase the difficulties and, in a way, make the prospective discussions
problematic. Nevertheless, he was prepared to accept this modus
procedendi if you approved it, so as to avoid giving me the impression
that he was creating difficulties.

In the course of the conversation it became clear that two conten-
tions had particularly prompted Baron Sonnino 's demand:

(1) Public feeling, which, as on various previous occasions dur-
ing this war, might take a dangerous turn if those who by virtue of

244 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the accord have become Italian subjects, were to shed their blood for
a foreign cause. Notwithstanding this contention, he did not seem
unresponsive to our reasoning from the military standpoint and was
rather inclined to put this matter in a secondary place.

(2) The ratification of the territorial cession by parliament. He
calculated upon the necessity of submitting the eventual accord for
acceptance immediately after its conclusion. In that event Italy
would be bound definitely, while we would still have a loophole in the
possibility that the Houses of Representatives might withhold their
consent if the accord is not submitted to them until after the con-
clusion of peace. The consent of a Government could be binding
only upon itself; in the event of a parliamentary refusal, it would
have to resign. In this case Italy would have fulfilled her engage-
ments resulting from the agreement, and yet the cession would be
void. He failed to see what guarantees could be given. I told him
that you surely would be prepared to discuss this matter of guar-
antees.

Otherwise, the conversation was conducted on friendly terms. The
Minister also reiterated his desire that the matter be brought to a
speedy conclusion and suggested *'un polo di settimane" ("a couple of
weeks"). This, however, he did not regard as a fixed period, but his
only desire in specifying a time-limit was to remove any suspicion
of an intention to procrastinate on either side.

No. 122.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 19, 1915.

I observe that a misunderstanding has arisen which has made
an unfavourable impression upon the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

In my last conversation with the Italian Ambassador, in rejecting
the demand for an immediate transfer of the territory to be ceded,
I said, among other things, that as our possible future acquisitions in
the Balkans will definitely materialise only after the conclusion of
peace, the taking possession by Italy of the territory to be ceded
could also be effectuated only at that time. It now appears that
Baron Sonnino interprets this utterance as a design to connect the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 245

transfer to Italy of the territory to be ceded with the question as to
whether, and what kind of, acquisitions in the Balkans would fall
to us at the end of the war. This is by no means my intention. Quite
on the contrary, my standpoint is that our territorial cession to Italy
should in no way depend upon the circumstance whether, and what
kind of, territorial or other advantages we would gain by avail-
ing ourselves of the freedom of action in the Balkans which Italy
would concede to us for the entire duration of the war. My utter-
ance to the Duke of Avarna was misconstrued by error. I only
meant to say that the territorial cession to Italy could be definitely
effected only at the conclusion of peace, in the same manner as would
our eventual acquisitions in the Balkans.

With the above explanation I request you to clear up, without
delay, the misunderstanding referred to, and to convey simultane-
ously to Baron Sonnino my willingness to enter forthwith into
negotiations.

No. 123.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, March 20, 1915.

On receipt of your telegram of yesterday, I called on Foreign
Minister and elucidated the misunderstanding. Baron Sonnino
listened to explanation with visible satisfaction. To make case more
clear, I summed matter up by saying you regarded eventual terri-
torial cession to Italy and the advantages which accrue to us from
eventual freedom of action in Balkans, as two independent issues,
both of which, however, would only become effective after the con-
clusion of peace.

No. 124.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 21, 1915.

I also explained the misunderstanding to the Duke of Avarna
yesterday, and said we did not subject the later fulfilment of the

246 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

"previous agreement" to the circumstance, whether, and what kind
of, advantages we would acquire in Servia. As a starting point for
our negotiations Baron Sonnino has offered us unlimited freedom of
action against Servia and Montenegro for the entire duration of the
war, in return for a territorial cession. On our part I took this under
consideration, without, however, binding myself in any direction, as
neither have the Italian desires been specified as yet nor have we had
an opportunity to define our conditions.

In any case, it would then be our business to see what advantages
we might derive from our freedom of action, and that the fulfilment
of our agreement shall not be governed by the extent of our acquisi-
tions.

According to his instructions, the Duke of Avama further en-
deavoured to advance more arguments in an endeavour to show that
it could make no material difference to us whether we effected the
cession at once or after the conclusion of the peace. After an agree-
ment has been perfected it would be necessary to make some state-
ment to the public. From such a disclosure all concerned would learn
of the change in their destinies; moreover, the political and moral
effect which the event might produce in the Dual Monarchy would
likewise be immediate and could not be postponed till the time of the
actual cession.

I explained in detail to the Ambassador that his remarks in no
way invalidated any of the arguments which render it impossible for
us to carry out the eventual cession before the end of the war.

The Ambassador then informed me that Baron Sonnino did not
wish to assume the initiative any longer and that he left it to us to
make acceptable proposals. I replied that the Minister had reached
that decision under the impression of a misunderstanding which has
since been cleared up, and that he would, therefore, most likely
abandon this view. On my part, I now propose to commence nego-
tiations without delay and shall expect definite proposals from Baron
Sonnino, to which we will at once give our reply and state our
conditions.

The Duke of Avama also mentioned Baron Sonnino 's concern
about the possibility that we might contest an agreement which was
not immediately carried out, and about the risk which Italy might
run thereby. I reassured him on that score by referring to Austria-
Hungary's word and seal, which never yet have been broken.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 247

No. 125.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macckio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 21, 1915.

I share Baron Sonnino's doubts as to the advisability of your
proposal contained in your telegram of the 19th inst., namely, to
defer a decision on the Italian demand for immediate transfer to
Italy of the territory to be ceded, until the conclusion of the negotia-
tions with the Italian Government. Such a procedure would subject
our understanding on all material points in the transaction to the
final outcome of the negotiations on an important, fundamental, pri-
mary question.

I request you to discuss the matter in this sense with the Italian
Minister.

In reply to Baron Sonnino's query about guarantees which may
possibly be given for the adherence to our promise, you will tell the
Minister of Foreign Affairs that this matter might be discussed in the
course of the negotiations ; I had primarily in mind Germany 's guar-
antee for the fulfilment of our obligations, a guarantee which Ger-
many is willing to give.

No. 126.
Von MayrJiauser to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Valona, March 22, 1915.

The office of harbour captaincy under Italian supervision was
established at the port of Valona on the 19th inst.

Lieutenant- Commander A. Puliti acts as chief of that authority,
a lieutenant being his assistant ; both are officers of the Italian Navy.

248 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 127.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 23, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador told me to-day that Baron Sonnino has
expressed to him his satisfaction with the explanation by which I
have dissipated the misunderstanding concerning the question whether
or not the obligations to be entered into by the future agreement
between us would be independent of the eventual results of our activi-
ties in the Balkans.

The Italian Minister also has been pleased to note my good dispo-
sition to open negotiations without delay and has authorised the
Duke of Avarna to lend his assistance to that end. Baron Sonnino
now awaits my specific and exact proposals toward the understanding
we both desire to reach.

He still maintains the view that the execution of the agreement
should follow immediately upon its conclusion, as it would be impos-
sible for any Italian Government to take upon itself serious engage-
ments before the country and parliament — engagements which would
bind Italy's freedom of action for an unlimited period — on a mere
promise on the part of Austria-Hungary.

I replied to the Duke of Avarna that I would not decline to
consider Baron Sonnino 's new proposition to take the initiative in
specifying the subject of our negotiations; I would inform him of
my decision as soon as I have had an opportunity to reach it.

As to the question whether the execution of the agreement should
be immediate or deferred, I regretted my inability to share Baron
Sonnino 's view, as, to my mind, an agreement duly concluded and
signed by two Governments with all the formalities required to give
that act the character of an international convention, could not be
qualified as a "simple promise." No more could I agree with the
idea that it was only the Italian Government that would take a serious
engagement binding its freedom of action. Austria-Hungary, by
signing the agreement, would undertake engagements at least equally
serious which, by the very fact of their being generally known, would
be equally binding upon her, regardless of all measures which might
be considered suitable and practicable in the course of the nego-
tiations.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 249

No. 128.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, March 23, 1915.

In to-day's conversation with Baron Sonnino, he still adhered to
his established standpoint concerning the immediate, actual transfer
of the territory to be ceded. I gave him a detailed explanation of
the practical impossibility of his proposal.

Baron Sonnino admitted my contentions to be very justifiable,
but argued that this question was no mere matter of form for him ;
he was guided by the apprehension that the Government would not
be strong enough to convince parliament of the absolute certainty of
the deferred cession.

I referred to your willingness to discuss the question of guarantees
and emphasised Germany's promise of her guarantee.

In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of the 21st inst.,
I informed Baron Sonnino of your doubts about the advisability of
my suggestion to defer decision on time of cession.

Baron Sonnino reiterated his doubts, but declared his readiness
to discuss concrete questions in order to show his good intentions and
to avoid loss of time. Yet, he was unable to define his claims so long
as this preliminary question was not settled; he could only receive
your proposals with the chief object of keeping up the negotiations.

He regarded this course as positively non-committal and without
prejudice, so that neither party can, at a later date, inject suggestions
which the other party had not agreed to.

I do not doubt Italian Government will in both cases endeavour to
put on us the blame of a possible failure, whether you or Baron Son-
nino comes forward with specific proposals.

However urgent the talk here about accelerating matters, I cannot
help suspecting that the inclination prevails to gain time before en-
gaging anywhere in any way.

250 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 129.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Report.) Rome, March 24, 1915.

Summing up the impressions I have gathered in all circles from
the time when the public here began to glean some information about
the change of attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, I have come to the conclusion that this news has been received
here with a sigh of relief. I mean to say that the great majority of
so-called serious political and intellectual circles — with the exception,
of course, of professional agitators — consider an understanding with
the Dual Monarchy as most desirable for Italy's interests. Yet, in-
timidated and confused as they have been by an intense internal and
external pressure, they no longer entertained any hopes of success
unless advances emanated from Vienna which would afford them a
moral support against adverse currents and furnish them with suffi-
cient excuse to stand by the Central Powers.

Despite the continuance of military preparations, the anxiety of
the past weeks has subsided.

They seem to realise that intervention would be unreasonable
under existing conditions, and a general feeling of relief on that
score may be perceived. All this, without any knowledge as to what
Austria-Hungary's advances really were, and how far they would
go! The country's enthusiasm for war may be gauged by this cir-
cumstance. It is evident that the public, including the politicians,
would be content even with comparatively unimportant gains, if
they could only escape the present intolerable uncertainty. It is
obvious that the other side has realised this situation promptly.
Consequently the press of the Entente has lost no time in inaugu-
rating a new campaign to eliminate the possibility of an understand-
ing by any available means. In this campaign, of course, the best
is made of everything. More than ever does it enlarge on our un-
favourable situation, hoping thus to prompt the Italians to increase
their demands, in order to prevent a conclusion of our n^otiations.
New reports are being launched that Roumania had been induced to
align herself against us, and rumours are being circulated of a change
of regime in Sofia, and of Bulgarian aspirations to Constantinople —
rumours which have been contradicted since — and all this in an
attempt to make Italy believe her interests in the East could be

THE AtJSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 251

conserved solely by her entering the war on the side of the Entente.
Finally, efforts are made to organise an imposing demonstration in the
shape of a great meeting of the Associazione Trento-Trieste which
would culminate in the usual rhetorical feats of Bissolati, Barzilai,
Federzoni, Chiesa and others.

In this way all the old and tried devices are availed of in the
attempt to nip in the bud any amelioration which may take place in
public opinion and to confuse the always wavering and aimless
Government by the spectre of non-existent dangers. This design is
made all the more feasible by the undoubted fact that there are
persons in the highest Government posts who lend their aid to these
activities.

Basing a conclusion upon the above-mentioned observations, the
whole weight of the situation rests now, since the adjournment of
parliament, solely upon the Government, and therein lies the danger
of future unfavourable developments.

The attitude of these gentlemen strongly indicates that they do
not seriously mean to come to an understanding. In contrast to
this indication, due weight must be given to the feeling of relief which
the hope for an amicable settlement has produced among the general
public.

It is likely that Salandra and Sonnino are coquetting with the
influences emanating from the various camps; in this manner they
can follow the war situation for some time yet, taking advantage of
opportunities, and eventually secure for themselves the best possible
results.

I do not think it impossible that this policy may lead even to a
mobilisation if a fairly plausible excuse can be found.

No. 130.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 25, 1915.

Yesterday I declared to the Italian Ambassador my willingness
to accept Baron Sonnino 's latest suggestion. I shall consequently
make him a specific proposal, to serve as the starting point for nego-
tiations toward a "previous agreement" on the basis we have already
assented to in principle.

252 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 131.

Ba/ron Buridn to Baron Macchio.
(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 28, 1915.

Yesterday I made a proposal to the Italian Ambassador in the
matter of an agreement to be concluded between our two Govern-
ments on the following terms :

Italy shall bind herself to observe toward Austria-Hungary and
her allies throughout the duration of the present war a benevolent
neutrality in matters political, military and economic.

Within the meaning of this pledge, Italy shall undertake to leave
to Austria-Hungary full and unrestrained freedom of action in the
Balkans for the entire duration of the present war, and shall renounce
beforehand all further claims to compensation for territorial or other
advantages which Austria-Hungary may eventually derive from that
freedom of action.

This stipulation, however, shall not extend to Albania, in respect
of which the existing agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy,
as well as the decisions of the London conference of Ambassaors, shall
hold good.

Austria-Hungary on her part will assent to a cession of territories
situated in southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent. The details of
delimitation shall be defined in such a manner as to comply with the
strategic exigencies created for us by a new frontier, and with the
wishes of the population.

This territorial cession on the part of Austria-Hungary shall imply
an obligation on Italy's part to take over the proportionate share of
the Austrian public debt incumbent on these territories, as well as
their provincial, municipal and other liabilities, inasmuch as the latter
are guaranteed by the State. Italy shall also pay to Austria-Hungary
a lump sum as an indemnity for all investments made by the State
within the territories to be ceded, independently of the purchase of
the railroads pertaining to that territory and of collective and indi-
vidual indemnification for Church properties, entails, pensions of
former public officials, etc.

As soon as the fundamental points of the agreement shall have
been determined on the above-mentioned basis, Austria-Hungary and
Italy will proceed to the discussion of details.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 253

The final agreement resulting from this discussion shall be em-
bodied in a secret convention between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The transaction referred to will also necessitate the revision of
certain treaties which exist between the two Powers, such as those
concerning the new junction of railroads, the arrangements relating
to border transit trade, navigation on Lake Garda, etc., etc.

The Duke of Avarna observed that Baron Sonnino might find the
designation of the object of cession a little vague. I replied that the
indication of southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent, showed
clearly the extent of the sacrifice we were prepared to make.

The border-line could not be defined in this initial verbal com-
munication as made to-day, but I was prepared to do so at our next
meeting.

The Ambassador further observed that Baron Sonnino would not
assent to the condition of secrecy on the agreement to be concluded;
he had expressed the desire for secrecy pending the negotiations,
but he intended to make the agreement public as soon as it was
perfected.

I asked the Duke of Avarna, nevertheless, to communicate my
proposal to the Minister, who had promised to confer with me about
the declaration he would make in parliament concerning our pro-
spective arrangements. Besides, we could take up this phase of the
question in the course of the negotiations.

No. 132.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, March 31, 1915.

Not until to-day have I had an opportunity to discuss your pro-
posals with Baron Sonnino.

He declared them to be very insufficient and insisted especially
that they were vague. Thereupon I explained, according to my in-
structions, that you had only meant to sketch the outlines of an agree-
ment and that you intended to offer more detailed proposals before
long.

Baron Sonnino told me that he had conferred on the matter with
Salandra yesterday, but not yet with the King; he hoped to be able
to despatch his reply to-night or to-morrow.

254 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

He refrained from discussing the individual points of the pro-
posal with the exception of the one relating to the obligation into
which Italy would enter, to maintain a benevolent neutrality on
economic matters among others.

His desire to avoid misunderstandings compelled him to state
in advance that in this respect Italy could not engage herself any
further than to a strict and impartial neutrality. England's pres-
sure was so heavy that any suspicion of a preferential treatment
of the Central Powers would lead to immediate reprisals, which
may even include the closing of the Straits of Gibraltar to Italian
supplies. Many Italian industries depended entirely upon Great
Britain for their supply of raw material, and therefore would ran
the risk of being compelled to- close. This would mean the dismissal
of thousands of workmen, which in its turn would create most serious
problems.

While admitting Italy's peculiar geographical position, I took
occasion to describe her attitude up to this time as one of benevolent
neutrality toward the Entente Powers.

I also cited instances where export matters were strangely held
up after they had already been decided upon in our favour on prin-
ciple.

Baron Sonnino refused to admit any bad intent in that respect
and ascribed it all to the terrible pressure from England.

No. 133.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 1, 1915.

Latest news bears out reports that large transports laden with
troops have been converging during the past few days from various
directions to Udine and right up to our border. This operation is
equivalent to a secret deployment, whereby eventual mobilisation is
considerably facilitated.

To-day's situation may be summarised as follows:

Alleged offer by Great Britain to provide for war expenses;

territorial inducements, which cannot exactly be defined; constant

fear of missing opportunity in the East; underhand pressure, as

exerted by Free Masons and Republicans, simultaneously with similar

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 255

work of Entente, in which Cabinet Minister Martini is taking the
leading part; and above all, the daily tightening fist of England,
against which Italy is developing no energy of opposition. All this
would explain possible failure of weak Italian Government to resist
any longer.

Baron Sonnino's further attitude in the present negotiations will
best show whether the Italian Government wishes to procrastinate or
to overstep the mark by exorbitant counter-proposals and thereby to
shift the blame of an eventual breach upon the Austro-Hungarian
Government, which is bound by its pledge of secrecy; or whether the
Italian Government intends to use the pressure of military prepara-
tions in conducting the negotiations.

No. 134.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) Vienna, April 2, 1915.

I beg to send you the enclosed notes on my conversation with the
Italian Ambassador yesterday.

(Enclosure.)
(Translation from the French.)

Vienna, April 1, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador to-day brought me Baron Sonnino's reply
to my proposals of March 22nd, concerning the basis of the agreement
to be negotiated.

Referring to the benevolent neutrality which we demand from
Italy, the Minister had given instructions that I be informed that
Italy would have no objection to assuming that obligation for the
entire duration of the war, provided Austria-Hungary understood
the term neutrality to mean a complete and sincere neutrality, such
as Italy has observed up to this time toward both belligerent parties ;
but Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean prevented her

256 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

from adopting a neutrality inclined to favour us, as such a step might
provoke reprisals from the other side.

I replied that we demanded a benevolent neutrality in the sense
of Article IV of our Treaty of Alliance. It is obvious that we would
not think of demanding anything that might expose Italy to justi-
fiable reprisals from any party. Yet, a neutral country has at its
disposal numerous legitimate means to be of assistance to a belligerent
neighbour and ally.

As to the freedom of action we were compelled to demand for
our activities in Servia — a freedom which was understood not to apply
to Albania, in the face of the further validity of our special agree-
ment— Baron Sonnino's attitude has taken an astounding turn: he
informed me that Italy could not possibly consent to Austria-Hun-
gary's unlimited freedom of action in the Balkans without obtaining
Austria-Hungary's renunciation of her interest in Albania.

I pointed out to the Duke of Avarna that this was an entirely
new pretension, which I must decidedly oppose as being adverse to
our unchangeable interests in Albania, which Italy has always recog-
nised. We have entered into mutual engagements with Italy, and
mean to maintain them. Our demand for compensation for the occu-
pation of Valona is a consequence of that occupation.

I found no difficulty in accepting Baron Sonnino's view that the
questions concerning the carrying out of a territorial cession are
subordinated to the solution of the fundamental issue. This phase
would be discussed in detail in due time, and the Italians would
certainly present no obstacle to an understanding.

As to that fundamental issue, the Minister characterises my pro-
posals as insufficient and vague. He holds, "that in order to create
a cordial relation between the two Powers, which will eliminate all
causes of friction in future, and to make possible a collaboration
toward common political aims, it is necessary to establish conditions
of greater equality and security on the frontiers and in the Adriatic —
conditions which would prevent new and frequent irredentistic move-
ments. For the accomplishment of such an end the cession of a
strip of land in Tyrol would certainly not be sufficient. ' *

To this enigmatic, yet very clear statement, I replied that the
aims to which Baron Sonnino referred now, as he had done previ-
ously, were in entire accord with my frequently expressed views. On
the other hand I found it hard to understand just what was meant
by the reference to irredentistic movements and to conditions of
equality and security between the two Powers. Whatever the phrases

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 257

may mean, our offer of all the districts which constitute what is
commonly called the "Trentino" could certainly not be spoken of
as the "cession of a strip of land in Tyrol."

The Italian Minister had qualified my first proposal as vague.
To-day, having examined the situation, I am in a position to specify
it. The territoriesi which Austria-Hungary would be prepared to
cede to Italy under the conditions indicated would comprise the dis-
tricts {politische Bezirke) of Trent, Rovereto, Riva, Tione (with the
exclusion of Madonna di Campiglio and its surroundings), and the
district of Borgo. In the valley of the Adige, the frontier line would
run to Lavis, which place would fall to the Italian side.

I expressed my hopes to the Duke of Avama, that Baron Sonnino,
after having familiarised himself with the extent of the proposed
cession, will change his mind as to its importance.

The Minister did not fail to remind the Ambassador, at the
beginning of his instructions, that serious differences still existed as
to the time when the agreement should be put into effect; but he
advised him not to insist at this time, so as not to complicate the
negotiations.

No. 135.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 2, 1915.

I have received from a reliable source an exposition of the present
state of our negotiations with Italy. It emanates from an official of
the Consulta and corresponds exactly with the facts, though it does
not include the merits of your proposals. This shows what secrecy
here means.

Official referred to adds that there will be no hurry in replying
as it is necessary to see first when and whether the Russians will
invade Hungary and the allies will take the Dardanelles.

There is no doubt that systematic endeavours are being made to
learn the truth about Austria-Hungary's power of resistance and
about her general situation. This is borne out by the fact that the
Italian Consul General in Budapest has been sent for. It is signifi-
cant in this connection that the newspapers, ever-ready to follow
the Government's hints in their leading editorials, have published

258 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

during the past few days a particularly large number of articles
on the economic misery, the discouragement, dissatisfaction, and the
craving for peace in various parts of the Dual Monarchy. These
articles, together with contemptuous remarks, chiefly emanating
from military circles, on the chances of an attack upon us, evidently
serve the purpose of stimulating their own courage and of justifying
an opportune attempt to secure a share in the booty as a legitimate
undertaking.

No. 136.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Yienna, April 2, 1915.

From the notes which were attached to my communication of
yesterday you will have gathered that Baron Sonnino's reception of
my proposals is unsatisfactory.

In view of this attitude of the Italian Government, as well as
of various still more unfavourable news received lately, it would be
of great value for my future action to obtain the best possible infor-
mation concerning the real aims of the Italian Government in this
entire question, and to discover whether it is in earnest about its
professed endeavour to reach an understanding with us.

No. 137.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 3, 1915.

For many months past the conviction has been taking root in
Italy that the Kingdom could not emerge from the general crisis
without acquiring a territorial expansion, as otherwise the main-
tenance of her position as a Great Power — an idea cherished with
increasing jealousy — would be menaced. By repeated utterances in
parliament the Government has anticipated tliis aspiration and has
reserved to itself the right to decide how, when and to what extent
it may be realised.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 259

England's entrance into the war brought Italian sympathies
from the very start to the side of the Entente, whose power was ex-
pected to be overwhelming.

For many years past a cleverly conducted press campaign, coupled
with the intense activities of the Free Masons, has directed the eyes
of the nation to the northeast and has thus kindled the glowing
irredentism.

Out of weakness at first, and later as a matter of internal party
politics, the Government may have looked upon these activities as
a means to divert the population from the unpleasant questions at
home.

Then, humiliated by her complete military impotence at the be-
ginning of the war, Italy endeavoured to relieve this situation by
extensive armaments.

Incidentally, Salandra is entertaining the idea of acquiring the
laurels of a great statesman by making best use of this opportunity,
which never will recur, when all her great neighbours are engaged in
other directions.

The slow progress of the war, the increasing exhaustion on both
sides, the economic situation, and lastly her gradually enhanced
military preparedness, accentuated more and more Italy's importance
as the only undamaged Great Power. These considerations have
aroused in Italy the highest imaginable ambitions to be satisfied
with as little sacrifice as possible.

For Italy the aim is, first of all, territorial conquest at Austria-
Hungary's expense; a fact which has been expressed in all circles
openly or under cover.

For the Entente, however, the aim is war itself — to increase the
numbers of enemies ranged against the Central Powers. It is said
that at the beginning of March the Entente had reckoned with cer-
tainty on Italy's entrance into the war, basing its confidence upon
the presumption that the Austro-Hungarian Government would prove
stubborn. Our acceptance of the Italian basis of negotiations was a
heavy blow to the Entente. The Entente is now endeavouring to
represent the situation in the Dual Monarchy as becoming daily more
desperate. Sgr. Martini is said to have succeeded lately in obtaining
an audience with Baron Sonnino for Barzilai.

On that occasion Barzilai is said to have explained to the Minister
that his followers would not accept an arrangement with us without
provoking disturbances, unless such arrangement included a satis-
factory settlement of the Adriatic aspirations. Under the pressure

260 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of all these influences the Italian Government is augmenting its pre-
tensions; all the more so as the daily Russian reports of victories
lead it to the belief that Austria-Hungary's power is broken.

Just now the papers announce quite seriously that the Russians
have invaded the Hungarian plains and give the most incredible
details about the invasion.

On the other hand, the Government is anxious to avoid making
permanent enemies of the Central Powers, and especially of Germany,
in the event that their collapse should not materialise as it has been
imagined here. At the same time the Government also fears to be
left to the mercy of the Entente, as it realises that the greater part
of the country is opposed to war, and would only accept it if the
goal of its aspirations could not be reached otherwise. Furthermore,
the Government hesitates at the dubious chances for success and at
the material sacrifices. For the above-mentioned reasons the Italian
Government probably will attempt to postpone the weighty decision
which would bind her definitely to either side.

In the aforesaid I have purposely ignored the ethical points like
loyalty, faithfulness to the alliance, etc., as they do not apply in this
case; the whole matter may be viewed only according to Italian
mentality, intensified by the general conflagration. It stands to
reason that under such conditions there can be no question of argu-
ing, but simply of discussing adverse contentions.

Nevertheless, I fear that an eventual declination to pursue the
negotiations may lead to dangerous consequences.

No. 138.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 6, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day and I asked him
whether he had yet received his Government's reply to my last
proposal.

On his negative reply I asked the Duke of Avama to telegraph
to Rome asking Baron Sonnino to be so kind as to let me know in
his turn the proposition he had to make, since he considered my

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 261

first proposal as insufficient and vague and had given no reply to my
subsequent specific proposal; then each of us could try and find
an acceptable agreement on the matter of territorial cession. I added
that my request was inspired by the desire to see our negotiations
speedily nearing a happy conclusion to the mutual and urgent interest
of our respective countries to establish our future relations on a more
definite and cordial footing.

No. 139.
Ba/ron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 7, 1915.

Baron Sonnino told me to-day he had been informed by the
Duke of Avarna of your request as contained in yesterday's tele-
gram.

Without discussing your latest proposals, the Minister told me that
he would confer again to-night with Sgr. Salandra about it, and he
hoped to be able to formulate his specific counter-proposals either
to-morrow or the day after.

I emphasised the point that he could once more see from your
expressed desire that the good intention still prevails in Vienna
to come as soon as possible to an understanding which would secure
the good relationship between the two neighbouring Powers for the
future.

I made a special effort to emphasise your friendly attitude in
order to counteract the Minister's boundless innate distrust, which is
stimulated daily by the Entente.

No. 140.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Report.) Rome, April 7, 1915.

Aside from the powers and factors which are well known to you
and which work on parallel lines toward the incitement to action in
this country, the psychological moment also deserves consideration.

262 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Personal and national vanity is deeply affected by Italy's enforced
idleness in the gigantic struggle between the Great Powers, regardless
of the fact that the main reason for this inaction is to be found in
local conditions.

The Italians consider it unendurable that they should have no hand
in the game which might set them up as a Great Power and give
them the satisfaction of being appreciated at their full value. This
feeling is so intense that I do not doubt many still wish that some
action be taken, no matter for or against whom. Such feelings may
lie dormant in the ordinary man, but combined with other motives,
are active forces in the minds of those who think.

It is easy to build on a foundation of that sort, and the Entente
has been enabled, through England's agency, to keep Italian sjrm-
pathies on its side by exploiting in the most contemptible way the
alleged violation of little Belgium and of her neutrality; also by
exerting England's economic pressure daily and most inconsiderately
upon Italy, who has little disposition to heroism.

In this way it was easy for our enemies to enmesh the Kingdom
more and more in their artful network of lies, and even to disseminate
doubts as to the invincibility of Germany, which has always been so
much admired in this country.

A few years ago it would have been considered an act of madness
to incur the wrath of Germany ; now, this danger seems to fade away
in the presence of the false reports on the real situation. In their
blind hatred against Austria-Hungary the Italians willingly believe
what they wish to believe.

It would seem that a serious Government would in the first place
listen to its own most competent sources of information: to its own
representatives. It is significant that most Italian Ambassadors advise
the maintenance of neutrality ; I believe I may say this with certainty
of the Ambassadors in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburgh and Con-
stantinople. Yet, all this good advice is cast to the winds.

On a contrary assumption, it would be impossible to explain the
Government's calm toleration of the utterances of all the newspapers
which are within the scope of its influence; and, despite all assur-
ances to the contrary, there are a good many of them. To my mind
this represents an ominous symptom, or at least a dangerous playing
with fire.

As long as the Government had to reckon with the attitude of
political parties in domestic affairs, greater reserve toward the press
might have been explicable. But now, since the majority in parlia-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 263

ment, with the exception of the interventionists, has adopted a pro-
gramme of cautious reserve and is unmistakably in favour of the
maintenance of neutrality, it is the Government itself that keeps up
the agitation alive in the press, and thereby betrays the duplicity
of its policy. This is all the more obvious, in view of the fact that
just at present the existing severe restrictions would make it par-
ticularly easy to give a desired direction to political discussions.

I have gained the impression that the Government's policy in
press matters is aimed at arousing public feeling against the Dual
Monarchy as a factor in its dealings with us, and at the same time
at discrediting our internal situation in order to encourage the agi-
tators in Italy and to create sentiment for an attack upon us if such
a step should appear desirable.

The Government's game with the press seems to me doubly
dangerous as the war preparations are now nearing completion. This
latter development represents the great difference between the present
situation and that of last autumn.

In any case the Government is assuming incalculable risks.
Whether these activities must be ascribed to Sgr. Salandra or to
Baron Sonnino remains to be seen.

The late Macchiavelli may be proud of his disciples. Yet, neither
of these gentlemen seems to have considered the question as to whether
any one will consider Italy's friendship worth seeking after this
episode.

No. 141.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 11, 1915.

The Duke of Avama called on me yesterday. After having en-
larged on many points of historical, ethnographical and military na-
ture, as well as on Italy's alleged secondary position in the Adriatic,
the Ambassador proceeded to read a memorandum to me. That docu-
ment, written in answer to my request, comprises eleven articles
enumerating the conditions and stipulations which the Italian Gov-
ernment considers indispensable to the establishment of an agreement
and a permanent understanding between the two Powers.

264 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The memorandum, which the Ambassador subsequently handed to
me, is framed in the following terms :

Article 1.

Austria-Hungary shall cede to Italy the Trentino with the boun-
daries defined for the Regno Italic© in 1811, or, in other words,
according to the Treaty of Paris, February 28, 1810.

The new boundary line shall diverge from the present frontier
at Monte Cevedale and shall follow for a certain distance the mountain
range between Valle Venosta and Valle del Noce; it shall then come
down to the Adige at Gargazone, situated between Meran and
Bolzano ; from there it shall run to the top of the plateau on the left
bank of the river, divide the Valle Sorentina in two halves and cross
the Eisack Valley at Klausen; then it shall lead across the Dolomites
on the right of the river Avisio, exclusive of the valleys of Garden and
Badia and inclusive of the region of Ampezzo (Ampezzano) until it
rejoins the present boundary line.

Article 2.

The eastern boundary shall be rectified by Austria-Hungary in
Italy's favour, to include the cities of Gradisca and Goricia.

Starting from Tragkofel, the new boundary line shall diverge
from the present frontier by running westward to Osternig, whence
it shall follow the slope of the Carnie Alps to Saifniz. It shall then
run to the Wiseberg by the mountain range between Seisera and
Schliza; subsequently it shall merge into the old boundary until it
reaches Sella di Nevea. Therefrom it shall follow the banks of the
Rombone to the Isonzo, leaving Plezzo to the west. The boundary
shall then follow the course of the Isonzo as far as Tolmino. Leav-
ing the Isonzo, it shall assume a more easterly direction, passing the
eastern side of the plateau of Pregona-Planina and following the track
(solco) of the Chiappovano. It shall then run east of Goricia and
across the Carso di Comen and reach the sea between Monf alcone and
Trieste in the neighbourhood of Nebresina.

Article 3.

The city of Trieste, with its territory extended northward to
Nabresina inclusive (thus making it adjoin the new Italian border —
Art. 2) and southward, comprising the present administrative dis-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 265

tricts of Capodistria and Pirano, shall be constituted into an autono-
mous and independent state in matters political, international, mili-
tary, legislative, financial and administrative. Austria-Hungary shall
renounce all rights of sovereignty over that state, which shall remain
a free port. Austro-Hungarian and Italian troops shall not enter
that territory.

The new state shall assume a proportional share of the Austrian
public debt.

Article 4.

The groups of islands called Curzolari, including Lissa (with the
adjoining isles of Sant' Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with the isles of
Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the adjoining isles
and ledges) , Cazza and Meleda, as well as Pelagosa, shall be ceded to
Italy by Austria-Hungary.

Article 5.

The territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shaU be occupied im-
mediately by Italy (Art. 1, 2 and 4). On the other hand, the Austro-
Hungarian authorities and troops shall evacuate Trieste and its terri-
tory (Art. 3) and all natives of those territories in military service,
whether in the land or sea forces, of Austria-Hungary shall be dis-
charged at once.

Article 6.

Austria-Hungary shall recognise Italy's unrestricted sovereignty
over Valona and its bays, including Saseno and as much territory in
the hinterland as may be required for the defence thereof.

Article 7.

Austria-Hungary shall unreservedly renounce all her interests in
Albania, as defined by the London Conference.

Article 8.

Complete amnesty and immediate release shall be granted by
Austria-Hungary to all persons belonging to the ceded (Art. 1, 2, 4)
and evacuated (Art. 3) territories, who have been condemned or are
committed to trial for reasons either political or military.

266 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Article 9.

In order to relieve the ceded territories (Art. 1, 2, 4) of their
proportional share in the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian public
debts, as well as of the liabilities in connexion with the pensions of
former Austro-Hungarian officials; furthermore, in exchange for the
immediate and integral transfer to the Kingdom of Italy of all
state property, movable and immovable, with the exception of arms,
which may be within those territories; also in lieu of compensation
for the necessary rights connected with the territories in question as
they apply to the present and the future — without any exception —
Italy shall pay to Austria-Hungary the sum of Two Hundred Million
Italian lire in gold.

Article 10.

Italy shall pledge herself to maintain absolute neutrality toward
Austro-Hungary and Germany throughout the duration of the present
war.

Article 11.

Italy shall renounce for the entire duration of the present war
her right to invoke afterwards for her benefit the dispositions of
Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, and Austria-Hungary shall
make a similar renunciation in respect of the effected Italian occupa-
tion of the islands of the Dodecauesos.

I did not conceal from the Duke of Avama the painful impres-
sion which Baron Sonnino's excessive pretensions had made upon me
while I listened to the reading of his proposals. I informed him
that I would examine each point in his communication with all due
care and that I would convey to him my reply with as little delay
as possible.

No. 142.

Prince Gottfried zu HoJienloJie to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Berlin, April 12, 1915.

The Secretary of State agrees with you that Italy's demands are
unacceptable, but he presumes that they have been made merely for

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 267

the purpose of negotiations and in order thus to make sure of obtain-
ing a part of them.

General Pau is said to have greatly influenced the Italian demands
during his stay in Rome, by declaring that our military power of re-
sistance has been broken and by telling wonders about the Russian
reserves still to be expected.

No. 143.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 14, 1915.

Prince Biilow has given me the following information on a con-
versation he had yesterday with Baron Sonnino :

The two gentlemen went over each individual article of the latest
Italian demands together. In the matter of the Trentino, Baron
Sonnino admitted that he had included purely German districts but
endeavoured to excuse this by saying that you in your proposal had
retained purely Italian districts for the Dual Monarchy.

Prince Biilow gained the impression that the Italians would be
open to negotiations as to the extent of territory to be ceded as well
as on the question of the Isonzo border.

Prince Biilow considered the stipulations about Trieste to be
entirely obscure in their disclosures of Baron Sonnino 's real aspira-
tions. When Baron Sonnino explained that he had in mind a status
similar to that of Hamburg, Prince Biilow retorted that Germany
was a confederation of states and that therefore an analogy between
the two situations could hardly be established. Moreover, he re-
capitulated with all his available energy all the reasons why Austria-
Hungary could not renounce Trieste.

The most heated conversation ensued on the subject of the Dal-
matian group of islands. Baron Sonnino admitted that this phase of
the proposed cessions involved the entire so-called Adriatic question.
The Italian coast in the Adriatic, from Venice to Tarent, did not
afford a single suitable port (read: Naval port!). On this account
the Italian Navy is in a position of inferiority in the Adriatic Sea.
The Minister of Marine and his entire department had exerted pres-
sure upon him on that score and the whole country expected him to
bring about an improvement of the situation. The Minister added

268 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

in a most cynical manner that the present opportunity must be
availed of to the best advantage as it would never occur again.

Prince Billow asked how these exorbitant demands could possibly
be brought into harmony with Sonnino's repeatedly asserted desire to
create a better basis for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. To this
question the Minister replied that it was precisely by the most radical
extermination of irredentism that he meant to serve that end!

Referring to Albania, the German Ambassador pointed to the
repeated Italian declarations concerning the maintenance of the Lon-
don decisions and the provisional character of the occupation of
Valona. Baron Sonnino became visibly embarrassed as he replied
that that matter was only a proposal, open to discussion.

Toward the end of the conversation Baron Sonnino had become
more tractable, and in parting said: **Je vous promets, je vais dis-
cuter et je serai tres raisonnable.'* ("I promise you I shall discuss it
and shall be very reasonable,")

The chief elements which dominate the Italian Government still
remain the same : Fear of England, fear of revolution — and at Court
revolution seems to be feared even more than war — and on the other
hand the uncertainty as to the relative power of the two camps.

No. 144.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 16, 1915.

I intend to hand this day to the Italian Ambassador the following
reply to Baron Sonnino's latest proposal:

The Austro-Hungarian Government has carefully examined the
proposals which the Duke of Avama has made in the name of the
Italian Government in connexion with the agreement to be concluded
between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

To its sincere regret the Austro-Hungarian Government has found
a great part of those proposals, and especially those embodied in
Articles 2, 3 and 4, unacceptable for political, ethnographical, strategic

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 269

and economic reasons, which it would be of no avail to enlarge upon.
These proposals in their entirety would place the Austro-Hungarian
Government in a position incompatible with its vital interests, and
are not calculated to answer the purpose which the Italian Govern-
ment has always proffered, namely, the consolidation of the mutual
relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, their establishment on
a basis of perfect good faith, and the elimination of all causes of fric-
tion between them to the end that their collaboration on questions of
general policy might be made possible. Sincerely concerned about
these considerations, and desiring to prove to Italy its wish to arrive
at a definite and permanent understanding up to the highest admis-
sible limit, the Austro-Hungarian Government is prepared to augment
the territorial cession in southern Tyrol which it had consented to in
its communication to the Duke of Avarna, dated April 1st. Under
our new proposal the future boundary-line would diverge from the
present frontier in the vicinity of the Zufallspitze and would follow
for a certain distance the boundary between the district of Cless on
the one side and the districts of Schlanders and Meran on the other,
coinciding with the watershed between the Noce and Adige rivers as
far as the lUmenspitze. The boundary-line would then run west of
Proveis in such a manner that this district would remain a part of
Tyrol; then join the Torrente Pescara and follow its course up to
its confluence with the Noce. Thence it would run along the course
of the Noce as far as a point south of Tajo ; whence it would lead up
the Como di Tres; the new boundary-line would subsequently be
identical with the northern boundary of the district of Mezzolombardo
and cross the Adige south of Salurn. Thence it would lead up the
Geiersberg, would follow the watershed between the valleys of the
Avisio and the Adige, passing by the Castion and taking a direction
toward the Homspitze and the Monte Comp. There it would turn
southward, describe a semicircle, leaving the district of Altrei to
Tyrol, and would then run upward to the Pass of San Lugano. Sub-
sequently the new boundary-line would be formed by the boundary
between the districts of Bozen and Cavalese, marked by the watershed
between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige ; it would pass by the
Cima di Rocca and the Grimm-Joch as far as Latemar. From Pass
Camon it would follow the slopes down to the Avisio, would cross that
river between the districts of Moena and Farno and would then rise
to the watershed between the valleys of San Pellegrino to the north
and the valley of Travignolo to the south. It would rejoin the
present boundary-line east of the Cima di Bocche.

270 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Austro-Hungarian Government consequently could not accept
the boundary-line as described in Article 1 of the Italian proposals
and which would include the cession to Italy of districts with a Ger-
man population.

As to the proposal contained in Article 5, which provides that the
territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shall be transferred to Italy
immediately, the precipitate measures which such a proceeding would
involve, technically impracticable for many reasons of general admin-
istration and on other considerations, even in time of peace, would
be all the more so in time of war.

Without wishing to cite any more instances in history, it will
suffice to recall the mode of procedure applied at the time of the
cession of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, when even after the
conclusion of peace a certain number of months elapsed between the
conclusion of the convention and the actual transfer of the ceded
territories.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has no objection to the pro-
posal contained in Article 8, referring to an amnesty to be granted
to all persons belonging to the territories ceded to Italy who are
either condemned or committed for trial for military or political
offences.

With regard to the question of Albania in general, and of Valona
in particular, the Austro-Hungarian Government is compelled to
state that it seems difficult to bring into harmony the proposals made
by the Italian Government in Articles 6 and 7 with the engagements
into which Italy has entered on four occasions — ^namely : by the Italo-
Austro-Hungarian accord of 1900-1, by the decision of the London
Conference, by its declaration of August 4th of last year, to remain
true to its engagements toward Austria-Hungary as well as to the
decisions of the London Conference, and not to take advantage in
Albania of the fact that Austria-Hungary is at war; finally, by its
formal and clear declarations on the occasion of the Italian occupation
of Valona. On the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government,
in full consciousness of the necessity to uphold the mutual rights
and obligations resulting from the arrangements now in force, and
to maintain the attitude it always has held on the Albanian question,
could not renounce its interests in Albania — a country so very close
to the sphere of Austria-Hungary's most vital concerns. Moreover,
the Dual Monarchy has, in conjunction with Italy, contributed to
the creation of Albania, not only politically, but also by considerable
sacrifices of a military nature (partial mobilisation of 1913), as well

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 271

as economically and financially. Besides, in consequence of the de-
cisions of the London Conference, the Albanian question has become
a European question and neither one individual Power nor several
Great Powers may, single-handed or by virtue of an agreement, inter-
fere with Albania, whose existence and neutrality have been guar-
ranteed by Europe. Only by the concordant will of the Great Powers
could the political situation of Albania be modified — an eventuality
impossible during the present war.

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government adheres to the
spirit of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord about Albania and
recognises that this very Albanian question constitutes a problem
of general policy, in the solution of which Austria-Hungary and Italy
may profitably cooperate in the future. The Austro-Hungarian
Government, therefore, declares itself ever ready to discuss with the
Italian Government our respective interests in Albania, either on the
basis of the present situation or in whatever way political changes
in the future may make it incumbent for either party to subject our
arrangements to a revision.

Proceeding to the examination of the engagements which Italy
would have to take, the Austro-Hungarian Government would point
out that Turkey, by her entrance into the war, has joined Austria-
Hungary and Germany; consequently, the neutrality which Italy
would be bound to observe until the end of the war toward Austria-
Hungary and Germany should also include the Ottoman Empire.

As to Article XI of the proposal we would be prepared to accept
it, provided that the phrase: "ef relativement aussi aux avantages
territoriaux ou autres qui resulteraient pour VAutriche-Hongrie du
traits de paix termiimnt cette guerre" ("and also in respect of the
territorial and other advantages, which may accrue to Austria-Hun-
gary by virtue of the peace treaty terminating this war") be inserted
after the words "guerre actuelle" ("present war").

Our renunciation of a compensation for the occupation of the
islands of the Dodecanesos would also be subject to this condition.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is not yet prepared to state
the precise figure which would correspond to the proportional share
of the territories to be ceded to Italy in the public debts nor of the
lump sum to be demanded from Italy as an indemnity for all invest-
ments made by the State in the territories referred to; but it can
state at the outset that the figure proposed by the Italian Government
would be absolutely inadequate and would not by a considerable
margin constitute an equitable indemnification. To cite only one

272 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

item here, the value of military structures alone within the terri-
tories to be ceded to Italy would considerably exceed the sum total
proposed by the Italian Government.

Yet, the Austro-Hungarian Government does not wish to pre-
vent the conclusion of the agreement by differences of a purely
financial nature and declares itself willing, in the event of a dis-
agreement with the Italian Government, to submit the question of
monetary indemnification to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

No. 145.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 16, 1915.

The Entente Powers, and especially France, have disseminated
the news of an alleged possibility that the conclusion of a separate
peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia may be imminent.

We are informed that this news has caused an unfavourable
impression in Italy as in other countries. I therefore have ordered
a denial to be published in to-morrow's issue of the Fremdenblatt.

No. 146.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 17, 1915.

I gave my reply to the Italian Ambassador yesterday; its text
has been communicated to you.

I told the Duke of Avama that although I was unable, for im-
perative reasons, to consider demands which would involve the renun-
ciation to [of] some of our most important interests, our offer, on the
other hand, was of so great a value and was so much in excess of all
that Italy used to describe as the most important of her national
aspirations, that the Italian Government could not fail to recognise

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 273

in it a conspicuous proof of our active desire to create a relation of
cordial friendship with Italy, free from all causes of friction and
such as Baron Sonnino, agreeing with us, had professed to be his
desire from, the beginning of the negotiations.

The Ambassador refrained from comment and confined himself
to an expression of his apprehension that my reply may be un-
favourably received, as it would probably be considered in Rome as
too far short of what the public is clamouring for.

No. 147.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 18, 1915.

On the occasion of my call at the Consulta to-day, I first of all
urged Baron Sonnino to construe your reply and the important
concession the Austro-Hungarian Government had decided to make
in southern Tyrol, as proof that we have done all in our power to
show our serious desire to arrive at an understanding calculated to
place the relations between the two Powers on a sound footing also
for the future — a wish which must coincide with the intentions of
the Italian Government as indicated by its repeated assurances.

The Minister agreed with me; so I continued by saying that to
that end all obstacles must be removed which might eventually bar
the way; therefore it did not seem consistent with this intention to
place before us demands which are unacceptable because they are
incompatible with our most vital interests, as, for instance, the recti-
fication of the frontier on the Isonzo, the creation of the free state of
Trieste and the cession of the Dalmatian islands.

I then enlarged upon the political and economic necessity for
an inland country to have a free outlet to the sea and pointed out
that Austria-Hungary, even under existing conditions, was confined
in this respect to a small part of the Adriatic. To Austria-Hungary
it would be like depriving a human being of air if the Italian border
were to be pushed to the very gates of Trieste, if a free state were
to arise which would cut off our access to the sea, and would in time
become an even worse focus of irredentism than any now existing,
and shortly would succumb to the national agitation and join the
Kingdom of Italy. Dalmatia would be in a similar position if its

274 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

most important group of islands were to become the possession of a
foreign country; the defence of the country against any enemy
whatsoever would thus be rendered impossible and the valuable port
of Spalato would be barred from traffic on the seas,

I j&nally called the Minister's attention to the fact that Italy was
thus attempting to strangle Austria-Hungary, with her population
of fifty millions, by shutting her off from the Adriatic, which would
become an Italian sea; and pointed out that Italy was trying to do
this while she herself was complaining of the closing of the Mediter-
ranean by Great Britain.

Baron Sonnino retorted that the present Isonzo border was for
strategical reasons absolutely unsatisfactory for Italy, and that its
rectification was imperatively necessary. Speaking of Trieste, he
said he only contemplated making it a free port; about Dalmatia
he referred to the open Italian coast on the Adriatic which afforded
no naval base whatever. When I mentioned Ancona and Brindisi,
he insisted that Ancona had now been declared an open seaport
because its harbour was absolutely useless, but he found himself
obliged to admit that the construction of Brindisi might be com-
pleted so as to make it serve the purpose of a base. The very poor
way in which he defended his demands gave ground for the suspicion
that he had never studied the matter seriously, and I am more than
ever convinced of the truth of the assertion that he has been egged
on by the General Staff in the matter of the Isonzo border, by the
Minister of Marine in the matter of the islands, and by Barzilai in
the matter of Trieste.

Concerning Albania, the Minister presumed that he had been
misunderstood, as it had never entered his head to ignore our
existing agreement; he had only meant to replace it by another;
this, he thought, could be done without prejudice to an eventual
decision by the Great Powers on the final destiny of Albania.

He regarded our acceptance of the article on the amnesty as a
natural consequence of the cession. The same applies to the mutual
renunciation of a further invocation of Article 7, inclusive of the
phrase you desired in regard to eventual advantages at the conclusion
of peace. Although the Minister at first had observed that the reply
did not appear satisfactory to him, and that, besides, he had not
yet read it carefully, he was not at all disturbed; his replies to
my arguments betrayed little enthusiasm or conviction. On his own
accord he said it would be necessary to confer with Sgr. Salandra
and with His Majesty before he could give a reply. Nothing what-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 275

ever in his words or bearing suggested that he had no intention to
continue the negotiations.

No. 148.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 18, 1915.

Should Baron Sonnino still insist upon immediate occupation
of territories ceded to Italy, you may state that we would be willing
to adopt certain measures, such as the convening of mixed com-
missions for the settlement of questions arising from the cession. By
this means every doubt would be removed as to the earnestness of
our intention to carry out our obligation. Besides, our sincerity
is made evident by the very fact that we propose an eventual de-
cision by an international court — namely, The Hague Court of
arbitration — in the matter of the extent of [pecuniary] indemnifica-
tion.

No. 149.

Ba/ron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.) Yienna, April 19, 1915.

The Italian Ambassador told me very confidentially to-day that
he had heard from a reliable source that I manifested an intention
to take up, in subsequent discussions, a standpoint completely at
variance with the one indicated in the memorandum of April 16th,
and that I would make concessions exceeding all those demands
which we have qualified as unacceptable. I am represented as
having suggested that I was unapproachable in the matter of the
Isonzo, that I would permit an extension of the autonomy and of
the Italian institutions of Trieste, cede to Italy some port or island
in Dalmatia to accept the proposals concerning Albania.

The Duke of Avama added that he could not disclose the origin

276 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of that information, but that it had reached even his government.
He had come to tell me that, in order to forestall erroneous impres-
sions in Rome — impressions likely to influence the reply we expect
from Baron Sonnino — he would be obliged if I stated to him myself
whether this information is correct or wrong.

I deemed it unnecessary to enter into details with the Duke of
Avama on the meaning of this strange move. However, I grasped
this opportunity to explain to the Ambassador the serious considera-
tions which prevented Austria-Hungary from discussing demands
which so closely touch the problems of our very existence. I once
more assured him that Italy would find us ever ready to examine
carefully any proposal she may put before us; to further to the
utmost her interests in the questions which particularly concern
her, and to come to an amicable understanding with her on any point
where our interests run on parallel and conciliable lines. Accord-
ingly, we would be willing to accept the change of conditions in
Albania ; and although it would be impossible for us to renounce our
interests there for reasons which the Italian Government would not
fail to find justifiable, Italy on the other hand would find us inclined
to enter into the merits of her actual position in Albania and to har-
monise it with our own interests in that country by means of a
revision of the existing agreement.

The Duke of Avama was pleased with my explanation, which
confirmed the anticipations so clearly referred to in the memoran-
dum concerning the possession of Valona. He was surprised to
learn from my demonstrations on a map what an infinitesimal part
the watchword "national aspirations" really played in the proposed
rectification of the Isonzo border and how very far purely German
and Slav territories would be penetrated by a boundary line which
would be strategically advantageous to Italy, yet impossible for
Austria-Hungary.

No. 150.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 20, 1915.

Had extensive conversation with Sgr. Salandra to-day.

The Prime Minister particularly dwelt on the question concern-
ing Trieste. He explained that Italy meant to meet Austria-Hun-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 277

gary half-way by proposing to make that city a free port, as Italy
realised that the Dual Monarchy could not aiford to cede it. Italy's
chief object was to secure the national existence of the Italian
majority in Trieste, which, in the view of the wildly aroused national
sentiment here, appears impossible under Austro-Hungarian rule.
In opposition to this I endeavoured to prove that the forcible creation
of a free port at Trieste would necessarily lead to its ultimate
junction with Italy, an eventuality which he himself had just admit-
ted as impossible as far as Austria-Hungary is concerned; and
that any new arrangement of that description would also constitute
an unbearable hindrance to our outlet to the sea.

I then enlarged upon the historical, material, technical and com-
mercial importance which Trieste represented to us. I endeavoured
to disprove his contentions that the Italian aspirations were
prompted by the requirements of the economic welfare of the greater
part of the population, and not by selfish ambitions of individuals;
such aspirations, I pointed out, develop even more relentlessly in
a free state and would eventually lead to the annexation and material
ruin of the city.

Sgr. Salandra, though appreciating our far-reaching concession
in Tyrol, asserted that this particular question was so thoroughly
inherent in the national sentiment that he would not dare to submit
to parliament an arrangement which in no way responded to that
feeling. He thought that in such an event he would then have to
resign. This, however, would be the lesser evil; the real danger
consisted in the imminence of general disturbances, and he could
therefore not recommend such an arrangement to the King. The
dynasty is not on a firm foundation and His Majesty would run the
risk of unpopularity, if not worse. When I expressed my doubts
as to the validity of all this buncombe he admitted his belief that
the majority of Italians desired an amicable settlement. This led
back to the old and worn subject of the inspiration of public opinion
by the government.

With regard to the islands Sgr. Salandra expressed the same
view as Baron Sonnino did yesterday. I laid particular stress on
the circumstance that in maritime matters in the Adriatic, Italy
would be better off if the agreement desired by both parties were to
be concluded on a sound basis, enabling Austria-Hungary and Italy
to establish joint mastery of the Adriatic and cooperation in its
defence.

The Minister's remark concerning Albania is fidgnificant. He

278 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

said that this question was only of secondary importance to him,;
Albania could not become the cause of a conflict between us. He
admitted that the other Powers had also a word to say in that
matter. He would have preferred to keep Valona, but felt confi-
dent that some understanding about Albania's future may be found,
possibly upon the basis of spheres of interests; but he emphasised
his viewpoint that this was a matter of secondary importance.

It also was interesting to hear him say, in the matter of Tyrol,
that Italy did not wish to acquire any German subjects, but that the
ethnographical limits should be adhered to as closely as possible.

I finally pointed out that you felt sure the Italian reply would
be drawn up with due consideration of all the reasons which arise
from the necessary protection of our vital interests; I also sug-
gested that a certainty always appeared to me preferable to a doubt-
ful chance. Sgr. Salandra quite followed my argument and answered
that this too would certainly have to be considered.

In conclusion he said that the entire subject had to be examined
carefully and he would have to confer with the Chief of the General
Staff" and with the other ministers.

The conversation was carried on in the most friendly termfl.

No. 151.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 21, 1915.

I share your opinion that continuance of negotiations by Italy
is by no means out of question.

Referring to Trieste, you will maintain refusal of territorial
or constitutional concessions, but you will point out specifically in
reply to Sgr. Salandra 's references to the national sentiment, that
that independent city in any case enjoys a broad autonomy; that
her municipality enjoys the functions of "Landtag" (provincial
diet), and that the national existence, as well as the cultural and
economic life, of the Italian element there is safeguarded by the
very fact of its numbers and its economic importance.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 279

No. 152.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 22, 1915.

I called on Baron Sonnino to-day, and enquired whether he
had received your reply. He stated that he had studied the entire
subject, but refrained from entering into the merits of it. He told
me that you had sent him a message through the Duke of Avama,
and that he would reply before long.

I asked for an explanation of this utterance, which I found
hard to follow. To my surprise I learned that the Italian Ambassa-
dor had been instructed to hand you yesterday what Baron Sonnino
called his "observations" to your reply of the 16th, and that you
had promised your speedy reply, according to a telegram which
arrived here to-day.

He also mentioned that those "observations" had been couched
in the spirit of our previous conversation. I could obtain from
him no further information on the subject ; he ostentatiously refused
a further discussion.

No. 153.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 22, 1915.

Baron Sonnino has brought to the knowledge of the Duke of
Avama his observations on my reply of the 16th inst. Without
being specifically instructed to do so, he has communicated them
to me.

According to the Italian Minister my reply does not afford a
proper basis for the good understanding and the permanent harmony
we strove for.

He admits that we have made some new concessions in Tyrol,
but to his mind they were not sufficient for a satisfactory settlement
of the military and ethnographical questions in those parts, as they
do not include certain territories of Italian speech, such as a part
of the val di Noce, the val di Fassa and di Ampezzo.

280 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Against his demands in respect of Albania I had referred to
our previous arrangements. The precise meaning of his proposi-
tion was a modification of those arrangements by a mutual agree-
ment wherein we would avow our complete disinterestedness in all
new arrangements which the Royal Government might enter into
with the other Powers concerning Albania, in the same way as Italy
would have no further interest in whatever arrangements Austria-
Hungary might be able to make on her part with regard to the
Balkans.

As to Article IX, Baron Sonnino admits that the amount of the
proportional share in the public debts of the State devolving upon
the ceded territories and to be paid by Italy may be made a subject
for negotiation.

In regard to the valuation of the investments made by the
State, the Minister refers to his observation in reply to our first
proposal on that point.

He is willing to accept the amendment to Article XI as proposed
by me, relating to our freedom of action in the Balkans. This, he
said, would entirely correspond with his ideas.

Baron Sonnini again insists upon the necessity of the imme-
diate execution of the cession and in this connexion refers to his
previous explanations and especially to the impossibility of any
Italian Government submitting an accord without that particular
clause.

The Minister concluded his observation by saying that I had
replied to all his other demands by a plain refusal, paying no atten-
tion to the motives he had proffered in support of his contentions.

I took cognisance of the Ambassador's communication, and told
him of my intention to give him my answer with as little delay as
possible.

No. 154

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 22, 1915.

The stubborn persistence of the Italian Government in all its
demands, as well as the deficient and stale arguments it invariably
advances in their support in almost the identical phrases, brings to

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 281

the fore the question whether Italy is really aiming at an under-
standing with us, possibly at the price of more extensive sacrifices
on the part of Austria-Hungary, or whether she is continuing the
conversations only for the sake of appearances and with the con-
cealed motive either to gain time for a later definite decision, or
else to join soon the camp of the Entente after having ascertained
what our highest offer would be.

In any case you will keep up your conversations with Baron
Sonnino by reverting in the most friendly manner to the arguments
against the various Italian demands and by endeavouring to explain
and rectify any erroneous views entertained by the Italian Govern-
ment.

No. 155.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buri&n.

(Telegram.) 'Rome, April 26, 1915.

I learn from reliable source that some time ago a scheme was
worked out in the Consulta, which contemplates the acquisition of
the territory between the rivers Skumbi in the north and Vojussa in
the south — the latter is said to be considered as future boundary
of Greek Epirus — as the hinterland of Valona.

That strip of territory, which comprises roughly the part of
Albania inhabited by the Toscs, is supposed to extend as far as
Lake Ochrida. According to that project the northern part, which
is occupied by the Ghegs, is expected to constitute independent
Albania, i^ith the exception of the outlet on the Adriatic which is to
be given to Servia in that region.

No. 156.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buri&n.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 26, 1915.

Pepino Garibaldi, the leader of the lately dissolved Garibaldi
Legion in France, was recently clandestinely received by the King.

282 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The fact, however, was so sensational that naturally it could
not be kept concealed in this country.

There is no doubt that this audience was not granted without
the advice of the Government

No. 157.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 27, 1915.

It may further the conclusion of our accord with Italy and —
as I understand — ^it would also please Baron Sonnino, if a prominent
political personage of Austria-Hungary were given an opportunity
to enter into extensive discussion of our mutual interests as a whole
with the Italian Ministers in Rome. In such an event an explicit
explanation should be made of our views and of the reasons why
we cannot accept certain points of the Italian pretensions.

Count Goluchowski, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and now a member of the Upper House, is intimately conversant
with my views and would be willing to pay a short visit to Rome.
He could undertake the task of such an explanation with Baron
Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra on political matters and more especially
on the future development of our relations with Italy.

I ask you to bring this confidentially to the knowledge of the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to find out whether he
would be favourably inclined to a similar conference. Should the
answer be in the affirmative, I would acquaint Count Goluchowski
with the details of the present status of our negotiations with the
Italian Government.

No. 158.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Instructions.) YienvAi, April 28, 1915.

I intend to give to the Italian Ambassador to-morrow my reply
to Baron Sonnino 's observations, which the Duke of Avarna con-
veyed to me on the 2lBt instant. The text of the reply is contained
in the enclosure.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 283

(Enclosure.)
(Translation from the French.)

To judge from the Duke of Avarna's last communications, Baron
Sonnino's observations on Baron Burian's reply of the 16th instant
refer primarily to the general trend of that reply, which the Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs considers not ''comme une base propre
d assurer la honne entente et I'Jiarmonie durable que nous avions
en vue" (*'a proper basis to assure the good understanding and the
permanent harmony we aimed at").

Baron Burian, on his part, wishes to observe that his sincere
desire, so often manifested by him, to reach a definite understanding
with Italy has met with serious obstacles, inasmuch as several of
the Italian propositions touched to the quick the most vital inter-
ests of Austria-Hungary. The renunciation of these interests would
create for Austria-Hungary a position which would impair con-
siderably her participation in the political collaboration which Baron
Sonnino contemplates for the future, not only so far as Italy is
concerned, but also in respect of the other Powers.

Baron Sonnino also asserts that Baron Burian had not taken
into account the motives he had proffered in support of several
of his proposals. Although the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in
Rome already has had occasion to explain our viewpoint to Baron
Sonnino, as well as to Sgr. Salandra, Baron Burian is quite ready
to enlighten them further on these questions.

As to Trieste, it must be stated first of all that that city enjoys
an extensive autonomy under the Austrian constitution. Trieste
represents an individual territory and her municipality is simul-
taneously vested with the prerogatives of a provincial diet. The
Italian element is extensively represented in the autonomous admin-
istration of the city. In addition to the constitutional guarantees,
the numbers, as well as the cultural level and economic position, of
this element safeguard its satisfactory existence in every respect.
By separating Trieste and her environments from the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy and by making her an independent state, a death-
blow would be struck at the economic prosperity of that city. Once
deprived of her hinterland, she would lose all importance, and not
even an eventual annexation by Italy, of which she would be no
more than a superfluous port on her outskirt, could alter that fact.

284 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Trieste has always been the object of particular care on the
part of the Austrian Government, which will continue in the future,
for the sake of the state itself, to favour the material and moral
progress of the municipality in conformity with the desires of the
population whose prosperity depends entirely upon the ties which
bind it to the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary on her part, while
demanding the allegiance of her citizens, has never done anything
that might encroach on their national character. Baron Burian
will readily discuss with Baron Sonnino all questions on which he
may seek enlightenment in regard to the real interests of Trieste.

The proposition to cede the Curzolari Islands to Italy equally
meets with insurmountable difficulties. Aside from the fact that
these islands have a purely Slav population, they would in the
hands of Italy constitute a strategic position which would command
the upper part of the Adriatic, thus putting an end for Austria-
Hungary to the balance of power in that sea, and would be a menace
to our possession of the adjacent coast.

The proposed territorial cession in Austrian Friuli would deprive
Austria-Hungary of a boundary line indispensable for the defence
of the coast, as well as of several central provinces, while it would
push the Italian frontier still nearer to her principal port. Be-
sides, the Italian element is little represented in the greater part of
that region, which is inhabited by Slavs.

If the last Austro-Hungarian proposal has delimited the Tyrol
in such a way as to exclude from the proposed territorial cession
the val di Noce and the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, this was
certainly not done with the intention on our part of retaining some
territories of Italian tongue. Such a charge in any case would not
apply to the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, where the population is
"Ladinian" (Grison) and desires intensely to remain united with
Austria-Hungary; all its interests also gravitate exclusively toward
the north. Nobody in Italy has ever considered the Grisons in
Switzerland to be Italians, and Italy has likewise no reason to reclaim
the Grison population of the two valleys in question, whose existence
is completely identical with that of the inhabitants of the adjoining
Pustertal.

Imperative strategical reasons compel Austria-Hungary to retain
the eastern part of Val di Noce, as otherwise the heights protecting
the environments of Bozen would be poorly defensible.

Presuming that Italy will, in the case of the one or the other
of the above-mentioned localities, advance more or less analogous

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 285

arguments against our reasons of defence, it should not be forgotten
that Austria-Hungary is offering an amicable cession of a part of
her territorial possessions; it stands to reason that the arguments
of the giver, who in this instance relinquishes a safe frontier, must
have precedence over those of the acquirer.

As to the persistence in the demand for immediate execution
of the territorial cession, Baron Burian does not abandon hope that
Baron Sonnino will himself, on renewed and close investigation,
realise the material impossibility of such a measure. The strict
secrecy which both parties are observing, at Baron Sonnino 's own
suggestion, both on the fact and on the different phases of the nego-
tiations, would prohibit, until after the conclusion of the accord,
all preparations, military, administrative and otherwise, that should
precede the transfer of the ceded territories. All these preliminary
measures require time and can hardly be improved at the last min-
ute. Besides, Austria-Hungary would be placed in a more than
abnormal position if Italy were to take possession of the territories
referred to at a time when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is en-
gaged in a gigantic war and when consequently the greater part of
her territory is deprived of all means of defence, as her armies are
concentrated in the various theatres of war.

Notwithstanding the above, and in order to ameliorate as much
as possible the Italian Government's position toward Parliament
and public opinion, measures may be considered which would, at
the proper time, demonstrate before the whole world our loyal and
serious purpose to faithfully carry out the engagements entered
into. To that end mixed commissions may be detailed immediately
after the conclusion of the agreement, for the purpose of settling
the numerous minor questions involved in the territorial cession.
The establishment and the deliberations of these commissions would
remove every doubt as to the complete and definite execution of
the cession. Should Baron Sonnino on his part wish to propose
other measures for the same purpose. Baron Burian would not fail
to examine them with the best intention of adopting them as far
as possible.

Although it can be proved easily and conclusively that the sum
offered by the Italian Government for the proportional share in the
public debts and for indemnification is considerably below the value
of public property ceded to Italy, Baron Buridn's view coincides
with Baron Sonnino *s, that this question should not prevent the
conclusion of the accord, once an understanding has been reached

286 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

on all other matters. It is exactly in this spirit, and as another
proof of his desire to assure the territorial cession by outward and
definite guarantees, that Baron Burian suggests the submission of
the financial controversy to an international tribunal, namely. The
Hague Court of Arbitration, if occasion should arise.

Baron Burian reiterates the expression of his friendly desire
to discuss with Baron Sonnino the respective interests of the two
Powers in Albania with due consideration of the changed conditions
since the present war began, and to arrive at a new understanding
with Italy in this respect. The Albanian question would thus be
placed once more in the hands of Europe, while Austria-Hungary
might even renounce her interests there provided that Italy would
likewise renounce her interests in Albania with the exception of
Valona and the sphere of influence of which Valona is the centre;
provided, also, that adequate guarantees be furnished against any
operations and the establishment of other Powers in Albania — an
eventuality equally menacing for the political and maritime interests
of Austria-Hungary and Italy.

This represents the outlines of a basis for negotiations and
could be worked out in the course of the discussions with such
modifications as might be proposed, and which might be made
acceptable to both sides.

No. 159.
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian.

(Telegram.) ' Rome, April 28, 1915.

I informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs confidentially and
without delay of Count Goluchowski's possible visit to Rome, accord-
ing to my instructions.

Baron Sonnino will, of course, gladly receive him; yet, I easily
discerned some suspicion on the part of the Minister, that this
proposal may mean another delay.

He expressed the view that special missions, as a rule, have
little value. Thereupon I endeavoured to explain that Count Golu-
chowski would arrive here without delay. I emphasised the great
advantage that might accrue from a conversation with a personage
who is not dependent upon written instructions, as I am, but who

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 287

has conducted our foreign policy for so many years, and who is
more fully acquainted with your intentions and ideas by means of
recent and detailed discussions with you.

Baron Sonnino seemed gradually to realise the force of my rep-
resentations.

No. 160.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 28, 1915.

Sgr. Tittoni arrived here yesterday and had long interview with
Baron Sonnino and was received by the King.

I understand that Tittoni in behalf of France made many prom-
ises of no specific nature. In return for these he demanded an
Italian army for assistance in France. It is said that France has
offered Djibuti, a part of Tunisia and a rectification of the border
in the Departement des Alpes Maritimes — all within her own terri-
tories— besides several offers at the expense of others. Only the
latter constitute new offers, as the cessions in Africa are said to have
been offered some time ago.

No. 161.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 29, 1915.

You reported by telegram of the 28th that Baron Sonnino would,
of course, gladly receive Count Goluchowski and that the Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed himself on that occasion as
being sceptical as to the value of special missions.

To-day the Duke of Avama informed me in conformity with
a telegram from Baron Sonnino, that the latter had no particular
reason against receiving Count Goluchowski, but that he failed to
see what good it would do to use a third mediator, in view of the
good relations existing between me and the Italian Ambassador here,
as well as between himself and you.

288 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

In view of this information from the Duke of Avama, the tone
of which somehow differs from your report, I request you to ask
Baron Sonnino confidentially to tell you quite frankly whether
Count Goluchowski 's visit to Rome would appear to him agreeable
or undesirable.

At the same time you will once more explain that in sending
Count Goluchowski I would be chiefly guided by the desire to offer
to the Italian Government a new proof of my friendly intentions
and of my earnest wish to reach an understanding with Italy.

No. 162.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, April 30, 1915.

All my information and observation lead to the conclusion that
the negotiations with the Entente Powers are conducted now at a
feverish pace. The initiative is not, in all probability, emanating
from the ever undecided Baron Sonnino. M. Barrere visits him
daily. Constantly the same offers are mentioned to me, including
a more important cession in Tunisia, if Alsace-Lorraine should become
French. The French offer concerning the rectification of the border
near Ventimiglia is said to comprise only a few square kilometers
of territory.

British Ambassador is said to offer loan of two billions, at low
rate, also realisation of Italian aspirations in Asia Minor and the
Dodecanesos, and the discontinuance of Senussi movement.

I believe the Italian Government is availing itself of the double
negotiations primarily to exert pressure on either side in order to
increase bids as much as possible while reserving its own decision.

It is not likely that 'the tension which the Government has cre-
ated upon the public mind by the secret mobilisation, may be kept
up much longer without leading to an explosion in one way or the
other.

Cadorna's entourage is exploiting the view that war against
Austria-Hungary must be waged now, as it is unavoidable in any
event.

A voluntary cession, it is pointed out, would soon bring in its
wake a war of "revanche"; Italy would then stand alone, while she

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 289

can now rely on the assistance of the Entente. I also hear from
well-informed quarters that the present military Attache in Vienna
represents the situation in Austria-Hungary to be such that the war
would merely be a military excursion; this, of course, is like pour-
ing oil on the fire and consequently favours Cadorna 's policy.

Considering that Italy's ambitious monomania has swelled to ex-
treme proportions in consequence of the courting she receives from
all sides, such military self-deception finds most fertile soil and the
influence of the General Staff is ominous.

No. 163.
Baron MaccMo to Baron Burian.

(Telegram.) Borne, May 1, 1915.

I addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the alternative
question concerning Count Goluchowski 's visit according to your
telegram of the 29th instant. He replied that Count Goluchowski 's
mission seemed to him inopportune at this moment and therefore
could hardly be of any use.

In addition to the reasons given by the Duke of Avama, Baron
Sonnino also expressed his apprehension that Count Goluchowski 's
presence here, which could not be concealed, might create an unde-
sirable sensation and give rise to all kinds of comments.

The Minister was pleased with the message contained in the
last paragraph of your telegram. Lastly, he requested that you
inform him of your decision in this matter.

No. 164.
Baron MaccMo to Baron Burian.

(Telegram.) Borne, May 1, 1915.

In my conference with Baron Sonnino to-day the conversation
led up to the reply he had received from you last night.

In reply to the Minister's remark that the answer was certainly
more detailed but scarcely contained anything new, I pointed to

290 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the last sentences in lines 2 and 5, as well as to the decided approach
toward the Italian point of view contained in the clause which refers
to Albania. I pointed out that every sentence breathed our sincere
effort to come to a lasting and complete understanding. At the
same time, I suggested, he would surely admit the validity of the
Austro-Hungarian standpoint as to the vital questions involved,
after the conclusive proof we had proffered.

I presumed that he would find in it sufficient ground for further
discussions. Baron Sonnino replied that he would have to examine
the question in detail with Sgr. Salandra and the ministry (should
probably read: General Staff).

Then he complained of the restricted position into which the
Government here had been placed by the general crisis and by
internal difficulties and tendencies, and observed that our opinions
were still far asunder.

I observed that negotiations as a rule make good progress only
when both parties make concessions, and I had not noticed any step
in that direction on the part of Italy up to this time. Baron Sonnino
replied that the Italian demands in any case were very small, and
that it would be difficult to curtail them.

I indicated my surprise at this view and retorted that in this
case there could hardly be a question of negotiations but rather of
dictation on Italy's part, which was not apt to advance matters.

The Minister declared this to be incorrect, without, however,
losing his temper, and subsequently resumed his habitual taciturnity.

No. 165.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Yienna, May 2, 1915.

Please inform Baron Sonnino that, in consideration of his
views, I shall refrain, for the time being, from sending Count
Goluchowski to Rome. Yet, I reserve the privilege of reverting
to the matter at an opportune moment. You may also suggest that
I had all the more reason to expect that Baron Sonnino would
accept my proposal, as he had recently come into touch with the
former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Hanotaux, during
that gentleman's visit to Rome.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 291

No. 166.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 2, 1915.

I consider it highly important that you should maintain the nego-
tiations with the Italian Government in their full vigour and to that
end you will not only enter into the minute details of each Italian
demand but will also discuss the political situation that may result
therefrom. Should Baron Sonnino show a disposition to confine
himself once more to short utterances, you might stimulate the
conversation by pointing out our repeated and detailed explana-
tions and arguments, and in return urge that, in the name of fair-
ness, an effort be made on the part of Italy to explain and justify
her standpoint and her demands.

Among the subjects which would especially lend themselves to
thorough discussion, the Albanian question certainly stands to the
fore. In connexion with this matter, you could point to the fact
that not only do we not protest against the Italian occupation of
Valona, but would even be prepared to cede to Italy an additional
sphere of interest, with Valona as its centre. This alone constitutes
a far-reaching concession. As to our objection to declaring a com-
plete disinterestedness in Albania on the part of Austria-Hungary,
we are impelled by the consideration that we could not be indif-
ferent to the fate of a territory so close to our Adriatic dominion.

This question, and possibly the creation of spheres of influence
in Albania, may be the subject of a discussion with the Italian
Government in which I am always ready to participate and which
could prove advantageous to both parties.

In your conversations with the Italian statesmen you should
make a particular effort to find out what degree of importance is
attached to the cession of territory on the Isonzo among the various
Italian demands.

It would be of importance to me to know whether special im-
portance is attached in Rome to that demand, inasmuch as con-
cessions on that point may help to eliminate the other difficulties and
thereby facilitate the agreement with Italy.

Should you reach the conclusion that such is the case, you. will
tell the Italian Minister, on your own responsibility, that you will
enquire in Vienna and ascertain whether we would feel inclined to

292 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

bring about an understanding with Italy by a concession on this
point.

No. 167.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 2, 1915.

The Chamber of Deputies is to meet on May 12, but only for
the purpose of a vote of confidence in the Government. It is
believed that Sgr. Giolitti has no intention to take advantage of this
occasion to cause any difficulties to the Government in the Chamber
of Deputies.

In order to win public opinion, which is three-quarters opposed
to war, it is necessary for the Government to foster the belief, under
cover of the promise to keep the negotiations secret, that we are
offering nothing or so little that war is imposed upon the Govern-
ment as the only means of attaining the justified aspirations.

The negotiations, therefore, are serving no other purpose than
to put things off until the most suitable moment shall come for Italy
to show her cards.

In political circles the opinion prevails that only an authentic
publication of what we are prepared to cede to Italy, could create
such an impression as would be likely to frustrate the designs of the
Government. It certainly would be difficult to determine when
we might consider ourselves absolved from the promise of secrecy;
we must, also, consider the fact that the time may come when such
publication may be made in Vienna, but would no longer find its
way into the Italian press.

No. 168.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 3, 1915.

From my telegram of yesterday, you will have concluded that
I consider the situation very grave and that the beginning of the
crisis is imminent.

Since then, I have learned from reliable source that the nego-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 293

tiations with the Entente have practically reached maturity and are
ready to be closed.

If it be a fact that all competent quarters have already accepted
Cadorna's conception — a preventive war — the conclusion of an
agreement can no longer be thought of.

Yet, it is possible that the Government has not yet come to a
definite decision, and we should leave nothing undone in an attempt
to reach an understanding at the last moment. In this connexion,
Baron Sonnino's character, which I have so often analysed, deserves
particular consideration. On account of his very suspicious nature
his first thought is always a presumption that we wish to dupe him
and Italy, as I often have had occasion to state. Therefore the
idea of "revanche" has easy access to his mind. His mental state
is aggravated by the great advances made to him by the Entente.
As soon as he definitely loses his last grain of faith in our earnest
intentions, he will sign the agreement with the other side. To my
mind there is no hope of success in promising small concessions step
by step. We should try to attain as quickly as possible at least
the basis for an accomplished fact.

To this end it will be necessary for us to offer something in
the region of the so-called vital interests; I here refer to the Isonzo,
in regard to which I deduce from your telegram of yesterday a
certain receptiveness on your part; then to Trieste, where some
assurances might perhaps be given with regard to the extension of
the municipal autonomy, after the style of the self-government of
Hamburg, and possibly including the establishment of a Faculty of
Laws.

With reference to Albania, an agreement will hardly be difficult;
the Dalmatian Islands being in my opinion the most difficult point.

With respect to carrying out of our pledges, some effective
guarantee in addition to the guarantees of the two governments and
of the mixed commission should be offered.

My appointment with Baron Sonnino to-day was deferred by
his unexpected summons to the King; I shall see him to-morrow
morning and will make every effort to induce him to state definitely,
clause by clause, what settlement really would be accepted here as
satisfactory ; in other words, in what way the Italian demands might
be drawn closer to the Vienna offer.

My suggestions mean another attempt; but, as I said before,
in my judgment of the situation and of the personalities involved,
it is the only one that might still lead to the goal.

294 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 169.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 4, 1915.

Referring to your yesterday's telegram.

With reference to the cession on the Isonzo you may concede
a boundary beginning at the coast near the mouth of the Isonzo
(Sdobba), following the course of the river upward to a point
north of Gradisca (leaving this city to Italy), and running thence in
a northwesterly direction to Medea on the Judrio, which would rep-
resent the border line from this point.

In respect to Trieste, you may express our willingness to con-
cede in principle the establishment of a university, inasmuch as
this would correspond with the wishes of the population; also to
submit the municipal statute to a revision by which the national and
cultural existence of the Italian-speaking population would be safe-
guarded.

As to Albania, our disinterestedness may be declared in the case
of extreme necessity, with the reservation that guarantees must be
provided against the establishment there of a third power.

With reference to the Italian demand for immediate occupa-
tion of the ceded territories, you may, in addition to the guarantee
of Germany and the mixed commissions, mention the possibility of
a manifesto which would remove every doubt as to the execution of
the territorial cession.

I request you to make use of this maximum of concessions as
soon as possible.

No. 170.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 4, 1915.

Under instructions from his Government, the Italian Ambas-
sador has communicated to me the following note, and has handed
me a copy of it.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 295

(Translation from the French.)

The Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy has been
instructed by his Government to make the following communication
to his Excellency, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and to hand him a copy of it.

The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proved itself,
from the beginning, an element and a guarantee of peace and was
directed primarily to the principal end of mutual defence. In view
of later events, and of the new situations which resulted therefrom,
the Governments of the two countries were obliged to seek another
aim no less essential, and in the course of successive renewals of
the treaty they addressed themselves to safeguarding the continuity
of their alliance by stipulating the principle of previous agreements
regarding the Balkans, to the end of conciliating the divergent inter-
ests and tendencies of the two Powers.

It is absolutely clear that the loyal observance of these stipula-
tions would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis for common and
effective action.

On the contrary, Austria-Hungary, during the Summer of 1914,
without any agreement with Italy, without even letting her have
the slightest notification of her intentions, and without taking into
account the counsels of moderation which were addressed to her
by the Italian Government, addressed to Servia on the 23rd of July
the ultimatum which was the cause and the starting point of the
present European conflagration.

Austria-Hungary, in ignoring the obligations existing under the
treaty, profoundly disturbed the status quo in the Balkans, and
created a situation from which she alone was destined to profit,
to the disadvantage of interests of the greatest importance, which
her ally had many times affirmed and proclaimed. So flagrant a
violation of the letter and the spirit of the treaty, not only justified
the refusal of Italy to place herself on the side of her allies in a
war provoked without her knowledge, but at the same time deprived
the alliance of its essential meaning and of its reason for existing.

Even the pact of benevolent neutrality provided for by the
treaty was affected by this violation. Reason and sentiment alike
are repugnant to the view that benevolent neutrality can be main-
tained when one of the allies takes up arms for the realisation
of a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the

296 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constituted the prin-
cipal reason of the alliance itself.

Notwithstanding this, Italy has endeavoured for several months
to create a situation favourable to the reestablishment between
the two states of those friendly relations which constitute the
essential foundation of all cooperation in the domain of general
politics.

To this end, and with this hope, the Italian Government was
disposed to enter upon an understanding having as its basis the
satisfaction in an equitable manner of the legitimate national aspira-
tions of Italy, and which would have served at the same time to
reduce the existing inequality in the reciprocal situation of the two
states in the Adriatic.

Nevertheless, these negotiations did not lead to any appreciable
result.

All the efforts of the Italian Government encountered the resist-
ance of the Austro-Hungarian Government, which, after several
months, decided only to acknowledge the special interests of Italy
in Valona and to promise an insufficient concession of territories in
the Trentino — a concession which cannot be considered a normal
settlement of the situation, either from the ethnical, political, or
military point of view.

Furthermore, this concession was to be put into effect only at
the end of an indeterminate period, that is, only at the end of the
war.

In this state of affairs, the Italian Government must renounce
the hope of reaching an agreement, and sees itself constrained to
withdraw all its propositions for an accord.

It is equally useless to keep up an appearance of formal alliance,
which would only help to disguise the existence of a continuous
distrust and of daily disagreements.

Accordingly Italy, confident in her good right, affirms and pro-
claims that from this moment she resumes her entire freedom of
action, and declares her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary
to be void and henceforth of no effect.

I expressed to the Ambassador my perplexity at this manifesta-
tion, which does not seem to me justified, especially at a moment
when we are in the midst of negotiations which we on our part
have conducted in the most friendly and conciliatory spirit. I
declared to the Duke of Avama that I henceforth declined all

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 297

responsibility for the consequences which might result from the
situation created by Baron Sonnino's step.

No. 171.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 4, 1915.

I had a conversation with Baron Sonnino to-day lasting one
hour and a half. By way of an introductory remark, I said I felt
convinced of the possibility of reaching an understanding between
the two countries which are so dependent upon each other ; especially
so, as the Italian Government itself had so often, and only recently,
expressed the desire to attain that end. I added that I not only
presumed, but knew for certain, that my Government too is guided
by this sincere desire. The Minister then surprised me with the
remark that he had entertained the same wish, but had scarcely any
hope left on account of the dilatory policy of the Austro-Hungarian
Government and that he had therefore telegraphed yesterday to the
Duke of Avama in this sense, with the addition that in view of
the vague replies from Vienna he could offer no more proposals
and withdrew those he had hitherto advanced.

I then tried to impress upon Baron Sonnino the enormous respon-
sibility which a breach would involve and denounced, as a chimera,
the idea of an Austro-Hungarian revanche, as propagated here;
war was more likely to breed such a tendency, which would logi-
cally be out of the question in the event of an agreement. The
Austro-Hungarian Government had accepted the Italian basis for
negotiations for the very purpose of creating a sound relation of
friendship for the future.

The Minister was disposed to admit that your propositions were
showing some improvement, but these also were couched in general
phrases, which invariably gave them the appearance of precarious
prospects for the future instead of affording a practical basis for
an agreement. After five months of discussion hardly any progress
had been achieved, and he could not escape the impression that the
matter would once more be involved in delays. I specified the
reasons on both sides which had hampered the negotiations. I gave
him to understand that it was time to be more precise, and asked

298 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

him to convince himself that a greater approachment has taken
place than he wished to admit, by recapitulating all the points in
question.

First of all I explained the Trentino boundary, which you had
suggested, and I used maps and arguments to carry my point. The
Minister observed that an agreement may be reached on this point.
"With respect to the Isonzo, I declared that I could take it upon
myself to induce my Government to grant some further concession
despite the serious objections which had hitherto existed. A more
detailed discussion ensued on the subject of Trieste. He holds that
his aim of suppressing irredentism could solely be attained by his
scheme of a free state which should cooperate commercially with
the Austrian hinterland, as it would otherwise be unable to exist.
Trieste would then have no reason for drawing further toward
Italy. I made use of all conceivable arguments to demonstrate the
indispensability of Trieste for the Monarchy and the inability of
a state thus created to exist. He admitted that the main object was
to secure incontestably the national independence of the people of
Trieste, and that this was considered here as indispensable. I
pointed to the phrase in your last reply which expresses your readi-
ness for further discussion. Baron Sonnino remarked that he could
not conceive what arrangement might be devised which would pre-
vent subsequent encroachments upon the administration of Trieste,
upon its educational and other matters. He failed to see what pro-
posal he could proffer, but would be glad to consider any suggestion
Vienna could make, provided that it deserved consideration.

Nevertheless, I obtained the impression in this matter that a
course similar to the one suggested by us would be feasible and
that the creation of a free state would not be insisted upon here.

We then talked of Albania. The Minister admitted that we
had made advances, but said that he looked upon the disinterested-
ness of the Dual Monarchy in Albania as a counterbalance to the
free hand which Italy was to grant us in the other parts of the
Balkans.

Even so, it appeared to him necessary to define more precisely
the advances you had suggested, in order to formulate the integral
parts of Italy's desires, many of the details of which may be reserved
for a separate agreement.

The question of islands, now as before, proved to be only strateg-
ical. After having enlarged on the well-defined respective stand-
points, I asked the Minister whether he thought it justifiable to

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 299

jeopardise the conclusion of the agreement on account of a single
question, although an understanding could be reached on all other
points. With greater emphasis than ever he then defended his pet
idea, namely, the time of putting our cessions into execution.

He declines to see in the mixed commissions anything more
than merely advisory bodies, which could decide nothing and there-
fore could have no value whatever. He particularly enlarged vsdth
much verbiage on his topic that all the gilt may be taken from the
accord by the continuous stirring up of animosity by the anti-Austro-
Hungarian agitators — an agitation which would last to the very
end of the war, possibly for many months after its conclusion.

The retention at the front of soldiers who in virtue of the
agreement would have become Italian subjects, every punishment
of such soldiers, every case of desertion and numerous other imagi-
nable incidents, would operate to prevent the subsidence of the
existing hatred. Thus the purpose of the new agreement would be
jeopardised in advance. He readily admitted the difficulties of
the question; but here too, he thought, means should be found to
carry out the cession in the same way as means exist for the
cession of territories which have been occupied by an enemy during
a war, and have not subsequently been evacuated. I need not
mention that on this point also I employed all available arguments
for the defence of our position.

Nevertheless, Baron Sonnino announced his willingness to con-
sider any new proposals you may proffer, if they are specific, and
to submit them to the Cabinet, provided that they would not be
such as to give rise to protracted interpretation; he, on his part,
had no further proposals to make.

The situation, he added, is such that it is necessary to acquaint
the Cabinet with the progress of these negotiations, which can no
longer be delayed in view of the public being in so high a state of
tension.

I do not entertain any illusions; the situation has become still
more unfavourable by the withdrawal of the Italian propositions, as
it leaves the Italian Government a perfectly free hand in dealing
with our new proposals. On the other hand I have gained the
impression that the agreement with the Entente, though not yet
perfected, may be signed by the Italian Government at any time.

If we are anxious to make another and final attempt to come
to an understanding, only quick action in drafting new and suffi-
ciently extensive proposals can serve the purpose. Considering

300 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Baron Sonnino's character and temperament, any new suspicion in
his mind would inevitably put an immediate stop to the negotiations.

No. 172.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 5, 1915.

I approve the position you have taken in your conference with
Baron Sonnino as reported in your telegram of yesterday. Accord-
ingly I inform you of the furthest limits of our concessions:

1) Trentino:

Baron Sonnino's statement that an understanding on this point
might well be possible, indicates that Italy does not consider an
extension of our concessions as hitherto proposed as a condition
sine qua non for the conclusion of the agreement.

2) Isonzo district:

Concerning this point you already have been authorised by my
telegram of yesterday to make a concession which represents to us
a considerable sacrifice.

3) Trieste:

"While emphasising once more, that Trieste is a sovereign city
and enjoys a far-reaching municipal and provincial autonomy —
the municipal council being vested with the functions of a provincial
diet — the establishment of a university and the revision of the
municipal regulations for the purpose of safeguarding the Italian
character of the city may be promised.

4) Albania :

Renouncing all reservations and restrictions, we are ready to
declare our complete disinterestedness in Albania.

5) Immediate occupation of the ceded territories.

The physical impossibility of this demand should be demon-
strated once more by the basic arguments which we have hitherto
employed. Baron Sonnino's contention that territories occupied by

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 301

the enemy in war and subsequently not being evacuated may yet
eventually be receded, may be met with the statement that this
method of solving the problem would be one-sided, compulsory and
catastrophic, but certainly not peaceful and friendly, such as he
and I had intended it to be in the course of our negotiations.

The Italian Minister's tendency to minimise the importance of
the mixed commissions, should be opposed with the arguments that
the activities of these commissions would not be of a merely advisory
scope but that their work would mean the beginning of the execu-
tion of the cession; that these comimissions would have authority to
reach decisions, subject only to sanction by the Government, a
sanction which can hardly be questioned. In addition to the solemn
declaration of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to the guar-
antee by the German Government, as well as to the operations of
those commissions, another proof may be given of our honest and
earnest intention to fulfil our obligations after the conclusion of
peace, by our promise not to engage at the front any persons belong-
ing to the ceded territories, once the agreement with Italy has been
perfected.

I request you to communicate the above concessions to Baron
Sonnino as soon as possible. They are, of course, conditional upon
the fulfilment of the Italian obligation (neutrality until the end of
the war, consent to our freedom of action in the Balkans, with the
exception of Albania, in conformity with the project previously
agreed upon, discharge of financial liabilities and indemnification).
You will endeavour to convey to the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs the impression, amply borne out by the actual facts, that
our concessions come very close to the realisation of his demands
in their entirety, both as to individual points and collectively.
Should Baron Sonnino appear inclined to conclude an agreement
based on the above-mentioned points, you are authorised to pro-
ceed with the Italian Foreign Minister to the drafting of the text
of the agreement — possibly in conjunction with Prince Biilow.

If Baron Sonnino should lay particular stress upon some spe-
cific demand, while otherwise indicative of a perceptible inclination
to reach an understanding, or else should introduce new or some-
what modified demands, you will note them ad referendum and
report them to me by telegram.

302 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 173.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 5, 1915.

As a result of the tearing up of the treaty of Triple Alliance,
which Baron Sonnino had not mentioned to me, a critical moment
seems to have arisen. After the Ministry had induced the King
to promise to attend the Quarto festival, the whole country has
been plunged into feverish excitement by the sudden withdrawal
of his acceptance, which was accompanied by the announcement
that neither King nor Government could leave Rome even for two
days, in view of the gravity of the moment.

The Ministry realises that this awkward proceeding has weak-
ened its position and is now apparently trying to precipitate a
decision and possibly to confront the coming man (Giolitti) with
an accomplished fact. Salandra and Baron Sonnino are striving
to achieve a great success or else make their fall brilliant.

In the very next days, therefore, the decision must come; it
is possible that the situation can still be saved by making immediate
and most extensive concessions, and especially by submitting our
offers in definite form, adapted to the prompt conclusion of an
agreement.

No. 174.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 6, 1915.

I employed the contents of your telegram of yesterday in my
conversation with Baron Sonnino to-day.

I conveyed to the Minister our .concessions in detail, and en-
deavoured particularly to emphasise the newly added points, in
conformity with your wishes. I recapitulated also the counter-
obligations expected from Italy and reiterated the belief of the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Government that its present propositions satisfy many
of Italy's former contentions and that they come as close as pos-
sible to meeting her demands in their entirety.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 303

Baron Sonnino noted minutely all my propositions and obser-
vations and made the following remarks:

The last phase of the negotiations is terminated by the with-
drawal of the former Italian demands and by the cancellation by
Italy of the treaty of Triple Alliance in Vienna. Italy has resumed
complete freedom of action. He particularly mentioned that the
linguistic boundary in Trentino still excludes the three aforemen-
tioned valleys, that the proposed change of frontier along the
Isonzo is insufficient and that the revision of the municipal statute
of Trieste was likely to be rendered ineffective at any moment by
the dissolution of the municipal council and by the appointing of
a Governmental Commissioner, a proceeding which is not unusual in
political life. With respect to the time of putting the cessions in
effect, the Minister still retains his former scruples. He did not
refer to the question of the islands; neither, of course, did I.

Baron Sonnino promised to submit the propositions I had prof-
fered to the council of ministers for their approval, and to obtain
its opinion thereon. Asked if he had any special and modified
wishes, he answered in the negative. I can explain this non-com-
mittal attitude by the assumption that he is now entrenching himself
entirely behind the decisions of the Cabinet. With the object of
attempting once more to disarm his notorious distrust, I again pointed
out that you had authorised me to proceed immediately to the draft-
ing of the text of the agreement, if the present concessions should
be accepted as a basis thereto, and laid stress upon the fact that
this represented a new proof of the Austro-Hungarian Government's
firm desire for a speedy understanding. Baron Sonnino noted this
remark as well, for reference at the council of ministers.

I immediately communicated the gist of the above-mentioned
conversation to Prince Biilow. The main point gained is that the
negotiations are not suspended and that time is gained by the refer-
ence of the matter to the council of ministers. On the other hand,
the rejection of our terms by the latter body would create a dead-
lock. My German colleague, who has been authorised to offer Ger-
many's mediation in the event that direct negotiations can not be
continued, will announce this to Baron Sonnino this afternoon and
hopes by that means to tide over these critical days.

304 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 175.
Baron MaccMo to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Borne, May 6, 1915.

It may be expected almost with certainty that the council of
ministers will reject the propositions I communicated to Baron
Sonnino to-day as insufficient to justify new negotiations with Aus-
tria-Hungary.

If, therefore, the imminent conclusion of the agreement with
the Triple Entente — which means war — is to be averted at this
last moment, the assent in principle to Baron Sonnino 's original
demands as a basis of negotiations would appear to me the only
means of accomplishing that end. By that means we would gain
more time.

If you desire that this experiment be made, I ask for authority
to communicate this to Baron Sonnino in case of extreme necessity.

No. 176.

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 9, 1915.

In our negotiations with Italy there has been a dominant sus-
picion at Rome that we would offer far-reaching concessions solely
under the present pressure of events, but with the mental reserva-
tion to ignore them as soon as the occasion should present itself.
A means which may possibly serve to dispel this distrust, may be
found in the declaration to Italy of our own and Germany's will-
ingness to inaugurate a new and closer political relation with her,
at any time and independently of the object of the present negotia-
tions. The German Government has offered to approach the Italian
Government in this direction.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 305

No. 177.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 10, 1915.

In your next conversation with Baron Sonnino you must keep
in mind, and be guided by the necessity of making the most strenu-
ous effort to prevent a suspension of the negotiations with Italy.

If Baron Sonnino in no way agrees with our last offer, and,
of his own accord neither reverts to former demands nor brings
forth any new ones, but confines himself to the rejection of our
proposals, you may advance the proposal suggested in your tele-
gram of May 6th, namely, the acceptance in principle of Italy's
former propositions as a basis for negotiations with the suggestion
that still further concessions might be made on one point or another.

In the following I give you the extreme limit of concessions
which we might still consider. You are authorised even to draft
the text of a preliminary agreement on this basis:

1) Southern Tyrol:

On this point the Italian Government seems to be more or less
satisfied with our offer.

2) Isonzo:

An extension of the concessions, as hitherto made, to wit : Along
the western bank of the Isonzo to a point on the boundary between
the German and Italian speaking population; consequently, includ-
ing the cession of Carmons.

3) Trieste:

The granting of a title, such as "Free City," may be considered.

4) Islands:

Pelagosa may be ceded in consideration of its proximity to the
Italian coast.

5) The putting into execution:

The suggested division of points may be effected on any rea-
sonable basis and the execution of the proposals affecting Albania,
Trieste and Pelagosa may be made immediate.

306 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 178:
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 10, 1915.

It appears that the King as well as most of the members of
the Cabinet have been systematically misinformed by Baron Sonnino,
both as to our concessions and as to the state of feeling in the
country. I have heard in particular that the Minister of Foreign
Affairs made a very incomplete report to the council of ministers
concerning my explicit communication (see my telegram dated May
6), although he had written them down, had read them to me and
then had promised expressly to submit them to the council of min-
isters. For instance, he omitted mention of the concession in regard
to the time of putting the cessions into effect.

For the purpose of enlightening the influential personages, of
whom some at least are friendly disposed to the Triple Alliance,
although they may be influenced by the general distrust, it now
seemed necessary to furnish them immediately with a list of the
Austro-Hungarian concessions, authenticated by Prince Biilow and
myself. In this manner it might be possible to block the political
intrigues of Salandra, Sonnino and Martini. This list had to be
supplemented so as to leave a margin for further concessions in
the spirit of the original Italian demands.

After having drafted the following document with the German
Ambassador's assistance, I assumed, in view of the urgency of the
situation, the responsibility of signing it jointly with Prince Biilow
and to submit it to Sgr. Salandra, Baron Sonnino and other political
personages.

(Translation from the French.)

Austria-Hungary is willing to make the following concessions
to Italy:

1) The entire Tyrol of Italian nationality.

2) The entire western bank of the Isonzo of Italian nation-
ality, including Gradisca.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 307

3) Complete municipal autonomy, Italian university, a free port
in Trieste, which will be a free city.

4) Valona.

5) Complete disinterestedness of Austria-Hungary in Albania.

6) Guarantee for the national interests of Italian inhabitants
of Austria-Hungary.

7) Amicable examination of demands which Italy may yet pro-
pose in connexion with the entirety of the questions which form the
object of the negotiations (especially Goricia and the Islands).

8) Germany assumes full responsibility for the correct and
faithful execution of the agreement to be concluded between Austria-
Hungary and Italy.

The Ambassador of Austria-Hungary and the Ambassador of
Germany guarantee the authenticity of the above-mentioned propo-
sitions.

From the drafting of Article III you will see that the idea of
granting a suitable title to the city of Trieste has been taken under
consideration. Moreover, Articles VI and VII are drafted in a man-
ner suggesting our willingness to give further consideration to Italy's
wishes.

No. 179.
Baron Buridn to Baron MaccJiio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 10, 1915.

Have just received your telegram of to-day.

Under the present conditions you will adhere to the following
points whenever you discuss this list of concessions:

1) Southern Tyrol. Apart from the fact that the Italian Gov-
ernment does not seem to insist absolutely upon an extension of
our concession concerning the Trentino, the proposition referred
to could not include the valleys of Ampezzo and Fassa, both of

308 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

which are Ladinian, nor that part of the Val di Noce, the possession
of which we could not relinquish for vital strategical reasons.

2) Isonzo. Concession may be made in conformity with my
previous telegram of to-day.

3) Trieste. It must be noted that we have by no means con-
sidered making Trieste a free port, and that there has been only
a question of conferring upon it the title of a "Free City," but
not the functions of such a municipality.

6) Position of citizens of Italian nationality. This concession,
under which the wording of a definite agreement might prove ex-
tremely precarious, should at all events be considerably modified.

No. 180.
Baron MaccJiio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 12, 1915.

Meanwhile I do not propose calling on Baron Sonnino. Dis-
sensions among the Ministers and a gradually dwindling confidence
in his foreign policy in certain parliamentary circles, can no longer
be concealed from him and he feels the ground tottering under him.
He is accordingly in a precarious frame of mind and may in his
stubbornness contemplate some desperate move which might be pre-
cipitated by my calling. Besides, he, as well as Sgr. Salandra, is in
possession of the propositions signed by Prince Billow and myself;
and it is therefore left to his discretion to reply or not.

Should he reject them, either here or in Vienna, there would
still be left a resort to your telegram of the 10th instant, and the
proposal of the original Italian demands as a basis for negotiations,
as mentioned therein.

I may reiterate once more my last report by saying that there
is no further doubt as to Baron Sonnino 's disloyal intention to make
war in any event.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 309

No. 181.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 13, 1915.

I agree with your decision not to call on the Italian Minister for
the time being.

Should he in the further course of events reject the list of
concessions referred to as inadequate, you will merely take note
of his action and proffer no further proposal until you receive new
instructions.

I also must draw your attention to the fact that naturally all
our concessions are conditional upon the full observance of the
counter-obligations assumed by Italy.

No. 182.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 13, 1915.

Council of Ministers was in session all day yesterday, and con-
siderable differences of opinion seem to have developed. I shall
report on the subject as soon as I receive reliable information.

Baron Sonnino positively urges war, but can not at present
count upon the unanimous support of his colleagues; therefore the
possibility of various eventualities must be considered.

The fact that Baron Sonnino will still have the opportunity
to bring his views before the public by means of the press or in
parliament, must also be reckoned with.

My attention has been called from various quarters to the pos-
sibility that Baron Sonnino may, for instance, in some way or another,
endeavour to describe the Austro-Hungarian Government's policy
of deliberation as incompatible with Italy's dignity or else he may
take the ground that Italy had entered into negotiations solely for
the sake of complying with our desire, but had repeatedly dropped
them because the offers of the Austro-Hungarian Government had
been inadequate.

310 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 183.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 14, 1915.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.

In reply to the assertion that Italy had entered into negotia-
tions solely in compliance with our desire, you will point out that,
on the contrary, it was the Italian Government that had already
initiated the discussions with my predecessor and subsequently with
me, basing its claims for compensation on Article VII of the treaty
of Triple Alliance. Should Baron Sonnino also endeavour to prove
a policy of procrastination on the part of the Austro-Hungarian
Government, incompatible with Italy's dignity, you will meet this
charge by saying that the Italian Government on its part had
declined for a long time to specify its demands. It demanded from
us the acceptance of the vague, and therefore, doubly precarious,
basis of negotiations involving the cession of some of our own ter-
ritories; it had subsequently rejected our successive offers as inade-
quate and had only at a very much later stage of the negotiations,
and only at our specific request, advanced her own very far-reach-
ing demands. Baron Sonnino has consequently no cause to reproach
us with a certain hesitation; his part as demander was infinitely
easier than ours, considering that we were expected to make sacri-
fices which were hard to submit to. Besides, Baron Sonnino con-
tradicts himself if, while qualifying our tactics as procrastinating,
he states in the same breath that he has himself repeatedly dropped
the negotiations — a proceeding which could surely not facilitate their
smooth and speedy progress.

On the whole you will hardly find it difficult to combat effectively
any possible animadversions by Baron Sonnino, in an adequate man-
ner, as you are thoroughly in touch with all the stages and details
of our negotiations.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 311

No. 184.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 14, 1915.

The Agenzia Stefani announces:

"The constitutional parties having been unable to give their
undivided support to the trend of the Government's foreign policy
at a time when the seriousness of the situation makes such support
imperative, the council of ministers has decided to hand its resig-
nation to His Majesty."

Seven ministers are said to have taken sides with opposition
at Cabinet meeting two days ago, and I have been told action is
imminent and is not likely to be confined to the Chamber of Depu-
ties; decision is considered all the more desirable as disturbances
are steadily increasing since the arrival of d'Annunzio.

Reports are already coming in from all larger cities about dem-
onstrations by the hired mob, and for two days past Rome has been
actually as in a state of siege. One-half of the garrison is on duty;
traffic and freedom of movement are likewise suspended or ham-
pered by the closing of streets on an extensive scale. The insulting
of politicians who adhere to the Triple Alliance and similar inci-
dents are the order of the day.

The King has not reached a decision yet on the resignations.
All indications point to a reconstruction of the Cabinet under the
presidency of Salandra as the most likely solution.

No. 185.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 15, 1915.

In my opinion it would be advisable to decide as quickly as
possible upon the text of an eventual agreement with Italy, so that
we could, if circumstances permit, approach a new Ministry with
a ready proposal. Protracted negotiations, or to wait for Italian
proposals, would mean a change that the distrust, which it has

312 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

been so difficult to dispel, would break forth again with elementary
violence and upset everything at the last moment.

I have therefore drafted the following proposal; which I have
discussed with Prince Biilow, who has signified his approval:

(Translation from the French.)

Inspired by a sincere desire to consolidate the mutual relation
between Austria-Hungary and Italy, to place them upon a founda-
tion of absolute good faith, to eliminate every cause of friction
between them, and to reach a final and lasting understanding, the
Austro-Hungarian and the Italian Governments have agreed as fol-
lows:

Article I.

In compliance with the wish expressed by Italy to take possession
of those parts of Tyrol, the inhabitants of which are of Italian
nationality, Austria-Hungary accepts a new boundary line which
shall diverge from the present frontier near the Zufallspitze and
shall follow for a distance the frontier between the districts of
Cles on the one side and those of Schlanders and Meran on the other,
i.e., the watershed between the Noce and the Adige as far as the
lUmen-Spitze. It shall lead to the west of Proveis, so that this
district shall remain a part of the Austrian Tyrol, and then join
the Torrente Pescara and follow the latter 's course up to its mouth
in the Noce. It shall follow the course of the Noce as far as south
of Tajo, then ascend the Corno di Tres, follow the northern boundary
of the district of Mezzolombardo and join the Adige to the south
of Salurn. It shall ascend the Geiersberg, follow the watershed
between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige, crossing the Cap-
tion toward the Nornspitze and Mount Comp. It shall then turn
southward, describe a semicircle, leaving the district of Altrei in
the Austrian Tyrol and ascend up to the pass of San Lugano. It
shall follow the boundary between the districts of Bozen and Cavalese,
i.e., the watershed between the valley of the Avisio and that of the
Adige, and extend to Latemar across the Cima di Rocca and the
Grimm-Joch. From the Camon pass it shall descend to the Avisio,
cut across that river between the districts of Moena and Fomo and
ascend again toward the watershed between the valley of San Pelle-
grino to the north and that of Travignolo to the south. It shall
rejoin the present boundary to the east of the Cima di Bocche.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 313

Article II.

Austria-Hungary further agrees to cede to Italy the territories
on the west bank of the Isonzo, inasmuch as their inhabitants are
of Italian nationality.

Starting at the mouth of the Isonzo (Sdobba) the boundary
shall follow the course of that river upstream beyond the town
of Gradisca, which will be included in the territory ceded to Italy.
Above Gradisca it shall depart from the Isonzo and running in a
northwesterly direction toward Medea follow up to the Judrio a line
to be drawn in accordance with the nationality of the inhabitants.
The new boundary shall then follow the course of the Judrio.

Article III.

The title "Kaiserliche Freistadt" shall be conferred on the city
of Trieste. It will have a university and receive a new municipal
regulation which, while maintaining its present full autonomy, will
furnish absolute guarantees that the predominance of the Italian
element shall not be modified.

The present zone of the free city will be maintained and, if need
be, extended.

Article IV.

Austria-Hungary recognises Italy's unrestricted sovereignty over
Valona and its bay, as well as over the sphere of interest surround-
ing it.

Article V.

Austria-Hungary renounces all her interests in the future fate
of Albania within the boundaries of that country drawn by the
London Conference.

Article VI.

Although after this agreement the subjects of Italian nationality
in Austria will be considerably diminished, the Austro-Hungarian
Government will conserve their national interests with special care.

Article VII.

All natives of the territories thus ceded to Italy who, for political
or military reasons, have been condemned or are being prosecuted
will be set free immediately and a general amnesty will be granted.

314 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Article VIII.

Italy undertakes to maintain absolute neutrality toward Austria-
Hungary and Germany and Turkey as long as this war lasts.

Article IX.

For the whole duration of the present war, and also with regard
to territorial and other advantages which Austria-Hungary might
derive from the treaty of peace at the conclusion of the war, Italy
renounces any and every claim to invoke subsequently in her favour
former stipulations applying to this matter with regard to the
Balkans, with the exception of Albania.

Article X.

Concerning the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos Islands,
Austria-Hungary renounces on her side the claim to invoke in her
favour former stipulations applying to this matter with regard to
the Balkans.

Article XI.

Italy agrees to indemnify all possible claims arising from the
cession to herself of the above-mentioned territories by the payment
of one lump sum. A mixed commission shall be appointed to define
the mode of payment and the amount to be paid; in case of dis-
agreement the commission will submit the matter to the decision
of the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

Article XII,

Mixed commissions shall be appointed in the districts affected
by this agreement with powers to effect decisions which will be put
into effect as the work proceeds. The detailed powers of these com-
missions will be defined in a supplementary protocol.

Article XIII.

Military persons born in the territories ceded to Italy shall cease
serving at the front in the Austro-Hungarian army as soon as the
agreement shall have been concluded.

Article XIV.

The German Empire undertakes to guarantee the faithful and
loyal execution of this agreement.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 315

Article XV.

A solemn declaration shall be issued to the above effect by the
Austro-Hungarian Government immediately after the agreement will
have been signed.

This draft deals only with the questions concerning us and Italy,
as I do not know if tripartite agreement would be preferred in
Vienna and Berlin.

In the latter case the concessions to be granted by Germany
would have to be added.

Considering the great importance which is attached here to the
time and method of putting our cessions into execution, I think
it indispensable that you should include the respective proposals in
the agreement, all the more so as Germany's guarantee is already
provided for in the document signed here previously.

I considered it important to omit none of the questions which
appear in that document; though drafted only in general outline,
it constitutes the basis of our proposals. Article VII of that docu-
ment has, of course, been omitted; it stipulates only a willingness
to examine and its text therefore can not be drafted before a dis-
cussion of the subject. Regarding this discussion, I intend to try
and offer Carmons instead of Goricia and — if the Italian demand
concerning the islands is not withdrawn — to remove the difficulties
by offering Pelagosa; I have so far mentioned neither Carmons nor
Pelagosa.

Remarks concerning the draft:

Article I.

The new boundary corresponds exactly with your former pro-
posal; if the Italian Government should revert to the central Noce
valley, and to the Fassa and Ampezzo valleys, I would object to
this on the grounds already indicated, and report on the subject.

Article II.
This article mentions neither Carmons nor Goricia.

Article III.

The title "Kaiserliche Freistadt" implies the same basis of free-
dom as that of Fiume. The wording of the last paragraph repre-

316 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

sents an attempt to place the question of the free port within rea-
sonable limits.

Article V.

The expression ''future fate" is used to emphasise the purely
political character of our renunciation.

Article VI.

As some kind of statement in this direction will be insisted upon,
the proposed wording is the least dangerous of those among which
we would have to choose.

Article IX.

Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance has intentionally not
been referred to, as it is uncertain whether the new Cabinet will con-
sider the situation from the point of view of the Triple Alliance,
or from that of a settlement on another basis. The same consider-
ations apply to Article X.

Article XII.

With regard to the execution of the agreement, I think that the
greatest importance should be attached to giving the mixed com-
missions as extensive powers as possible, as this would, in my opin-
ion, best demonstrate our intention to carry out the cession at the
earliest possible date. The agreement should provide for the imme-
diate convention of that commission, which would define and lay
down in writing its programme and its powers.

The commission's programme ought, I believe, to provide for the
demarcation of a neutral zone as an initial measure to avert possible
conflicts.

No. 186.
Baron MaccJiio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 15, 1915.

More particulars of the game prearranged between the Govern-
ment and the representatives of the Entente Powers are gradually

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 317

becoming known. I have previously reported that one is here ap-
parently at a loss how to construe the casus belli. According to
information from reliable sources, the moving spirit, the Colonial
Secretary Martini, who calls every morning on the British Ambas-
sador for orders, at first proposed to organise an incursion with
Garibaldian irregulars or with regular troops; Baron Sonnino had
under consideration a plan to stun Vienna by the issuance of some
new document as astounding as the recent abrogation of the Alliance,
or to combine this action with the step proposed by Martini.

The General Staff having recommended a postponement of the
decision for a few days, Sgr. Martini suggested, as a first step, the
cancellation of the treaty of Lausanne on the ground of the alleged
presence of Turkish officers among the Lybian rebels; he hoped by
this method to involve the Central Powers in the controversy and
thus to gain the days required by the General Staff.

In agreement with the Entente Powers, this day. May 15th, had
been selected for the decisive step. When these proposals were made,
the unanimity of the Cabinet had already vanished and the final
acceptance of the plan was still blocked.

Though the final break may be inevitable, it has at least been
postponed.

Meanwhile the formation of the new Cabinet seems to meet with
difiSculties.

No. 187.

Baron MaccTiio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 15, 1915.

Information reaches me to-night from several sources that the
resignation of the Cabinet may not be accepted. The main object
of the street demonstrations, partly organised, partly favoured by
the Government in cooperation with the Entente Powers,, is to
influence and to mislead the King as to the true feelings of the
country, which are essentially in favour of neutrality. This appar-
ently has been successfully accomplished, and the King seems to
accept the explanation that the street demonstrations must be re-
garded as the preliminaries to a revolution and that the throne can
only be saved by adhering to the present policy.

318 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Should this information prove accurate the decision against us
might be taken as early as to-morrow or on one of the succeeding
days ; it is true that the Cabinet crisis possibly might be taken advan-
tage of to reenforce the blackmailing of the Entente Powers with
a view to extorting the maximum of concessions obtainable from
that side before a final understanding is reached.

No. 188.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 16, 1915.

I concur in the view that the prompt drafting of an eventual
agreement with Italy is desirable ; an agreement only between us and
Italy should be sought, and not a tripartite one.

I approve on the whole the text proposed by you, and I also
assent to the endeavour to substitute Carmons for Goricia and to
offer Pelagosa if the question of the islands is raised, in case Italy
should insist upon the exemplifications added in parenthesis to para-
graph 7 in the document drafted on the 10th instant by you and
your German colleague.

I communicate to you herewith my comments on the separate
items of the drafted agreement and the modifications which must
be made.

There is no objection to the introduction and to Article I.

Article II.

In the first sentence, the following should be added after the
word "Isonzo": "en tant que la population est purement de nation-
alite italienne." ("As far as their population is of purely Italian
nationality,")

The sketch of the boundary-line in the second paragraph should
read after the word "Isonzo" : "Ensuite elle se tournera au nordouest
vers Medea et rejoindra le Judrio dont le talweg continuera a former
la frontiere." ("It will then turn to the northwest toward Medea
and meet the Judrio, the course of which will continue to be the
boundary-line.")

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 319
Article III.

In the first sentence "Le titre de vUle libre Imperiale' " ("Im-
perial free city") should take the place of ''Le Hire 'Kaiserliche
Freistadt.' " After the word " actuellement" the second sentence
should read "assurer a en plus le caractere italien de cette ville."
("Will besides insure the Italian character of that city.")

The paragraph concerning the free port zone is approved.

Article IV.

Inasmuch as Italy has so far not proclaimed her sovereignty
over Valona, it should read: " L'Autriche-Hongrie est prete, en ce
qui la concerne, a reconnaitre, etc/' ("As far as she is concerned,
Austria-Hungary is prepared to recognise, etc.")

Article V.

Should read: " L'Autriche-Hongrie declare son desinteressement
politique concernant I'Albanie comprise entre les frontieres traces
par la Reunion de Londres/' ("Austria-Hungary proclaims her
political disinterestedness with regard to Albania as comprised within
the borders drawn by the London Convention.")

Article VI.

This article should read: "Un certain nomhre de sujets de no-
tionalite italienne se trouvant encore en Autriche-Hongrie apres la
conclusion de cet accord, les Gouvernements autrichien et Jiongrois
veUleront tout particulierement a la sauvegarde de leurs interets
nationaux.** ("As a certain number of subjects of Italian nation-
ality will still remain in Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of
this agreement, the Austrian and Hungarian Governments will
devote special attention to safeguard their national interests.")

Articles VII and VIII.
Meet with no objection.

Article IX.

Since Italy has abrogated the treaty of Triple Alliance in our
relations with her, not only a specific but even a hypothetical refer-
ence to any of its provisions must be avoided; as we have further-

320 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

more to forestall possible future chicaneries on the part of Italy
in the event of territorial acquisitions by us in another direction,
for instance, in Russian Poland, this article should read: '*L'Italie
declare son desinteressement au sujet de tout avantage territorial
ou autre resultant pour I'Autriche-Hongrie, soit du cours de la guerre
actuelle, soit des traites de paix qui la terminer ont.** (''Italy de-
clares her disinterestedness in any territorial or other advantage that
might accrue to Austria-Hungary as a result either of the present
military operations or of the treaties of peace that shall mark their
end.")

Article X.

The proposed wording of this article should be replaced by the
following: '' L'AutricJie-Hongrie renonce pour sa part a toute pre-
tention se basant sur le fait de V occupation italienne des ties du
Dodecanese." ("On her part, Austria-Hungary waives any claim
to be based on the fact of the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos.")

Article XI.
Remains unchanged.

Since the solemn proclamation of the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment would apply only to the carrying out of the territorial ces-
sions, whereas Article XV in its proposed wording and by its place
at the end of the agreement would apply to all the clauses, this
provision should be inserted as Article XII and should read: *'Le
Gouvernement I. et R. procedera aussitot apres la conclusion de cet
accord a une manifestation solennelle relative aux cessions terri-
toriales." ("The Austro-Hungarian Government will issue a solemn
proclamation concerning the territorial cessions immediately after
the conclusion of this agreement.")

Article XII of the Draft Becomes Article XIII.

Instead of the first paragraph read: "Des commissions mixtes
seront instituees sur les lieux pour regler les details relatifs a la
cession des territoires en question. Ces commissions seront auto-
risees a prendre des decisions qui seront soumises d la ratification
des Gouvernements." ("Mixed commissions will be appointed on the
spot to settle details in connexion with the cession of the territories
in question. These commissions will be authorised to reach deci-
sions that will be submitted to the ratification of the Governments.")

The second paragraph to remain unchanged.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 321
Article XIII of the Draft, Now Article XIV.

In order to avoid misunderstandings this Article should read:
*'Des que cet accord aura ete conclu, les militaires originaires des
territoires cedes a I'ltalie seront retires des lignes de comhat de
Varmee Austro-Hongroise." (''As soon as this agreement will have
been concluded, military persons born in the territories ceded to
Italy will be withdrawn from the fighting lines of the Austro-Hun-
garian army.")

Article XIV of the Draft, Now Article XV.

The following wording should be used in this article:
" L'Autriche-Hongrie et I'ltalie accept ent la garantie assumee par
I'Allemagne pour I' execution fidele et loyale de cet accord.'* ("Aus-
tria-Hungary and Italy accept the guarantee assumed by Germany
for the faithful and loyal execution of this agreement.")

No. 189.
Baron MaccJiio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 16, 1915.

Royal decree issued to-day states that His Majesty has not
accepted the resignation of the Cabinet.

It must be taken for granted that Baron Sonnino's and Sgr.
Martini's foreign policy will be continued.

The street demonstrations here and in the provinces against
Sgr. GKolitti and in favour of war have assumed more serious pro-
portions in the last few days. There are indications that this was
part of the political activity of the resigned Cabinet with a view to
influencing and intimidating the King on the one hand and the
members of Parliament supporting Sgr. Giolitti on the other. Both
ends have been attained and Sgr. Salandra has become popular over
night.

I am informed that the King continues to waver and cannot
take it upon himself to decide the issue of war or peace. He is
said, in particular, still to entertain misgivings as to the chances
of success in a war, misgivings which have been strengthened since
General Cadoma, who resents the assistance demanded from the

322 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

allies, has offered to resign. This would confirm the widely accepted
belief that the King wishes to leave the decision to the Parliament
and has verbally prevailed on Sgr. Salandra not to create a fait
accompli before Parliament so decides.

If these reports are correct, it would mean a brief postponement
of the decision. I must say, however, that the majority, which so
far has stood for neutrality, is undergoing a change ascribable to
Salandra 's machinations. A renewed vote of confidence would thus
be secured for Sgr. Salandra in the Chamber of Deputies.

I intend to-morrow, when the Cabinet will have been re-organ-
ised, to ask Baron Sonnino to appoint a meeting, for I wish to
avoid everything that might enable him to assert that I have avoided
meeting him.

No. 190.
Baron Buridn to Baron MaccJiio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 17, 1915.

The resignation of the Salandra Cabinet having been rejected,
I instruct you to act in cooperation with Prince Biilow and com-
municate immediately to Baron Sonnino the draft of the agreement
with Italy as drawn up in my telegram of yesterday.

Should Baron Sonnino describe as inadequate, or reject the
concessions contained in the draft, then the instructions sent you in
my telegram of the 10th instant will again apply.

In such an eventuality you will receive in a friendly way and,
without committing yourself, immediately submit to me such modi-
fied or new wishes as the Italian Government may propose either
spontaneously or at your suggestion.

No. 191.

Baron MaccJiio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 17, 1915.

In reply to my request for an interview the Minister of Foreign
Affairs has asked me not to call until to-morrow morning. It

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 323

thus becomes clear that the same Baron Sonnino who charged us
with procrastination is constantly postponing meetings. I shall hand
him the draft of the agreement in the wording prescribed by you,
and shall endeavour to find out from his attitude if an outbreak of
war is imminent.

The meeting of the Cabinet this morning may already have come
to some decision in this matter.

The public manifestations continue here and throughout Italy
under various aspects; they assume more and more the character
of national and patriotic demonstrations, though they are palpably
artificial.

No. 192.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 18, 1915.

Since the Italian Government has persistently remonstrated
against the remoteness of the actual transfer of the ceded territories
— any form of military occupation being, however, absolutely ex-
cluded— you will, if this can influence the situation favourably, be
prepared to make the concession set forth below and which could
be incorporated in the draft of the agreement after Article XIII,
which deals with the commissions.

(Translation from the French.)

The mixed commission mentioned in the preceding Article shall
begin work immediately after the conclusion of this agreement.

The transfer of the ceded territories will take place as soon
as the decisions taken by aforesaid commissions shall have been
satisfied; it will be completed within one month.

You are empowered, in cooperation with Prince Biilow, to com-
municate immediately to Baron Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra the draft
agreement thus extended.

324 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 193.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 18, 1915.

The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies here have been con-
vened for the 20th instant. Order of the day is hearing of declara-
tions by the Government.

No. 194.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 18, 1915.

I have just seen Baron Sonnino. I opened the conversation
by telling him that you had instructed me to hand him a draft
agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government based on our
last proposals. This should convince him that you are ever willing
to come to terms with Italy, and the fact that the various clauses
for the proposed agreement are already worked out is a new proof
of our sincere desire to avoid all that could cause unnecessary delay.
Baron Sonnino asked if he could keep the document, and I ac-
quiesced. He accepted my offer to read the contents to him. I
wished to induce him to talk and to remind him of our former con-
versations in the course of the reading.

The conversation, however, remained a monologue.

When I was through, he only enquired whether the boundary-
line in the Trentino was the same as that designated in the former
proposals from Vienna.

I replied in the affirmative and added that my Government was
still prepared to consider in a most conciliatory way any new Italian
proposals, remarks, wishes or amendments of whatever kind.

I could see that Baron Sonnino also took serious note of this
statement. To my question whether I could report to Vienna that
he had received the draft and would submit it to the Cabinet, he
replied affirmatively and observed this might be done to-night; that
the Chamber would certainly meet on the 20th instant, and that it
had been agreed to let the Chamber decide the whole question.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 325

Baron Sonnino could not be induced to express any opinion
on the draft agreement. Former experience suggests that we must
view the future discussion with the utmost scepticism. He has for
the time being avoided everything that might resemble a break.
It is most likely, however, that on the 20th instant the decision of
the Chamber will be against us and then matters will progress
rapidly. The fact that the Senate is to meet two hours after the
opening of the Chamber indicates that there is no expectation of
any further action than a mere vote on a prepared declaration by
the Government ; if, as everything points, this be a vote of confidence,
adjournment and the break with us are likely to follow simultan-
eously.

No. 195.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 19, 1915.

I immediately communicated in writing to Baron Sonnino and
Sgr. Salandra the text of the concessions to be inserted as a new
article in the draft agreement in accordance with your telegram of
yesterday.

Reports in the newspapers state that at to-morrow's meeting
the Chamber will take cognisance of and approve the declaration of
the Government without further debate.

I take a sceptical view of the demonstrations planned for to-day
by the socialists in favour of neutrality; experience shows that the
Government has always suppressed such demonstrations far more
effectively than the riotous scenes staged by its proteges, the so-
called interventionists.

The report of Giolitti's departure is confirmed.

No. 196.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Borne, May 19, 1915.

The King reviewed the garrison to-day and then received d'An-
nunzio in private audience. The press does everything to arouse

326 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

enthusiasm and reports patriotic demonstrations and alleged whole-
sale applications from volunteers who want to join the colours.

The Agenzia Stefani published our concession concerning the
putting of the cessions into effect and most of the newspapers have
reproduced it with invidious comments. The conviction prevails here
generally that Italy's entanglement with the Entente is already ad-
vanced to such a point that nothing can be done to prevent it.

The first intoxication that had seized everybody on the occasion
of the street demonstrations of the 14th, 15th and 16th, is neverthe-
less beginning to evaporate; a more earnest and calm state of mind
prevails now that more than one man views the outlook with doubt
and that the horrors of war are almost beginning to be felt. Some
people express regret at Sgr. Giolitti's departure, but they hardly
raise their voices to an audible pitch.

No. 197.
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 20, 1915.

Up to this hour I have not received a reply from either of the
two Ministers to my written communication concerning our con-
cession as to the putting of the cessions into effect.

I am therefore reduced to draw conclusions from indirect indi-
cations as to the way in which the Italian Government has received
the concession. For instance, the absence so far of a reply to my
letters is such an indirect indication, as is generally the passive atti-
tude of the Government, which contrasts with the unfavourable press
comments already reported.

This morning's "Popolo Romano" is the only newspaper which
still has a friendly word for the Triple Alliance, but its utterances
are resigned.

No. 198.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 20, 1915.

An eye-witness gives me the following report on to-day's ses-
sion of the Chamber.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 327

Sgr. Salandra read a Government bill demanding extraordinary
powers in the event of war. After the speaker had said a few
words, the urgency measure was put to vote. It was passed without
debate by 377 against 54 votes. Forty-eight socialists and six depu-
ties from Southern Italy voted against the bill. A number of depu-
ties were unable, it is stated, to obtain access to the Chamber. My
informant also professes to have heard several deputies asking to
be heard; their voices were, however, silenced by the shouts of the
majority. Before the opening of the session, when the poet d'An-
nunzio appeared on the scene, a demonstration against him was
tentatively undertaken, but it was overwhelmed by the applause of
the majority and the cheers of the spectators.

The introductory sentence of the bill refers to the Triple Alliance
which had stood for the European balance of power and the mainte-
nance of peace. To that end Italy is represented as having set aside
the insecurity of her frontier districts and her national aspirations;
she has even had to witness with concealed distress the systematic
attempts to suppress the Italian character of certain districts.

The bill then proceeds to state that the Triple Alliance was
disrupted through the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia — out-
wardly in that Austria-Hungary omitted to inform Italy beforehand,
and inwardly in that she intended to disturb the status quo and
the spheres of influence in the Balkans. In any event, however,
the spirit of the treaty has been violated, for the precipitation of the
European war is contrary to the sentiments and interests of Italy
and constitutes a disturbance of the European balance of power
which the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was designed to preserve.
The Italian Government had, nevertheless, pursued for months a
policy of patience and tried to come to an agreement. These nego-
tiations were subject, however, to a limit with regard both to time
and to Italy's dignity. For that reason the notification was issued
in Vienna on May 4th withdrawing all previous proposals, cancel-
ling the treaty and asserting Italy's freedom of action. On the
other hand it was no longer possible to leave Italy isolated, without
security and without prestige at a decisive moment in history.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the seriousness of
the international situation, the Government was obliged to formulate
a policy which might lead to the ultimate test of force.

The Government, it was declared, is conscious of having taken
the measures imposed by the noblest aspirations and the most vital
interests of the country. Then follows a warm appeal for the union

328 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of all classes and parties for the attainment of the ideal goal: La
fortuna e la grandezza d' Italia.

The final sentence refers to the army and the navy, as well as
to the King, who will lead them in the achievement of the destinies
of the new history.

The foregoing indicates that the King was not placed to the
fore, that a war against the Dual Monarchy was only alluded to,
in the same way as an agreement with the Entente Powers was
only hinted at.

After the Cabinet had introduced the bill in the Senate, the
Ministers appeared once more in the Chamber of Deputies. The
speaker, Roselli, in a passionate speech urged the passing of the bill ;
while he talked the enthusiasm rose and belligerent cries, such as:
"Long live Italian Trieste!", "Long live the avengers of Lissa!",
etc., were applauded, even from the Government benches. After him
Barzilai addressed the House and then the socialist Turati, whose
speech against war visibly caused some impatience. After Colojanni,
the reform socialist Ciscoti spoke and in spite of his socialistic theories
declared himself in favour of the war because "it is a war for the
protection of civilisation against barbarisuL"

After almost all the deputies had obtained access the vote stood
407 for and 74 against the Government.

The Chamber adjourned sine die; the Senate will meet again
to-morrow.

The socialist bodies, which are said to have prepared various
plans for making themselves conspicuous, were prevented from carry-
ing out any demonstration by the stringent measures of the Gov-
ernment and by numerous arrests.

Feeling in the street was to-day more calm; the demonstration
in the Chamber by the scum of the populace, obviously hired for the
purpose, was directed solely against Sgr. Giolitti.

It may be that the Government will make use of its powers
to-morrow, without delay, to complete the military measures by
further calls to the colours. We must be prepared for a rupture of
relations at any moment.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 329

No. 199.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 21, 1915.

I deem it desirable that you call on Baron Sonnino and rep-
resent to him in a friendly way that, though you are cognisant of
yesterday's tumultuous session of Parliament, you must call his
attention to the fact that the Italian Government still owes you a
reply to your last communications.

No. 200.
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 21, 1915.

I gave, this afternoon, to the Italian Ambassador my reply to
his communication of the 4th instant concerning the cancellation of
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and I handed him a written copy
of it.

The reply reads as follows:

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister has had the honour to
receive the communication concerning the cancellation of the Treaty
of the Triple Alliance, which the Italian Ambassador made on the
4th of May by order of his Government.

With painful surprise, the Austro-Hungarian Government takes
cognisance of the decision of the Italian Government to put an end
in such a summary manner to a treaty which was based on a com-
munity of our most important political interests, which has guar-
anteed security and peace to our respective States for so many
years, and which has been of obvious benefit to Italy.

This surprise is all the more justified since the facts invoked
in the first instance by the Italian Government in justification of
its decision date back more than nine months and since the Royal
Government in the meantime has repeatedly asserted its desire to
maintain and even to strengthen the bonds of the alliance between
our two countries, a desire which has always found a favourable
reception and a cordial echo in Austria-Hungary.

330 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The reasons which compelled the Austro-Hungarian Government
in July of last year to send an ultimatum to Servia, are too well
known to require repetition here. The aim of Austria-Hungary
was purely and simply to safeguard the Monarchy against the sub-
versive machinations of Servia and to prevent the continuance of an
agitation which aimed at the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary,
and which had led to numerous outrages, culminating in the tragedy
of Serajevo. This aim could in no way affect the interests of Italy,
for the Austro-Hungarian Government never has supposed and con-
siders it out of the question, that Italy's interests could in any way
be identified with criminal intrigues against the security and ter-
ritorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, unfortunately tolerated and
encouraged by the Belgrade Government.

The Italian Government, moreover, was informed and knew that
Austria-Hungary had no purposes of conquest in Servia. It was
expressly declared in Rome that if the war remained localised, Aus-
tria-Hungary had no intention to encroach upon the territorial in-
tegrity of Servia.

When, in consequence of Russia's intervention, the purely local
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia, contrary to our desires,
assumed a European character, and Austria-Hungary and Germany
found themselves attacked by several Great Powers, the Italian Gov-
ernment proclaimed Italy's neutrality, without, however, making
the slightest suggestion that this war, which had been provoked
and planned far in advance by Russia, could deprive the treaty of
the Triple Alliance of its raison d'etre.

It suffices to recall the declarations made at that time by the
late Marchese di San Giuliano and the telegram which His Majesty,
the King of Italy, on August 2, 1914, addressed to His Majesty,
the Emperor-King, to establish the fact that the Italian Govern-
ment saw nothing at that time in Austria-Hungary's proceeding
which was in conflict with the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance.

Attacked by the Powers of the Triple Entente, Austria-Hungary
and Germany were obliged to defend their territories; but this
defensive war was in no wise directed toward ''the realisation of a
programme opposed to Italy's vital interests." These vital inter-
ests, or what we could know of them, were in no way menaced. If,
moreover, the Italian Government entertained apprehensions in this
direction it could have given expression to them and would cer-
tainly have found both in Vienna and Berlin the best will to protect
these interests.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 331

The Royal Government at that time held the view that neither
of its allies, considering the situation, could invoke the casus foederis
as affecting Italy, but it made no communication which could justify
the belief that it regarded the proceeding of Austria-Hungary as
a "flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty
of Alliance."

The Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, even though deploring Italy's
resolution to remain neutral, — a resolution which in our view was
hardly compatible with the spirit of the treaty, — nevertheless loyally
accepted the view of the Italian Government, and the exchange
of views which then took place established the maintenance of the
Triple Alliance.

Precisely with reference to this treaty, and especially to Article
VII, the Royal Government presented its claims, which aimed at
securing certain compensation in the event of Austria-Hungary
obtaining territorial or other advantages in the Balkan Peninsula
from the war.

The Austro-Hungarian Government accepted this standpoint, and
declared itself ready to consider the question, at the same time
pointing out that, as long as the eventual advantages accruing to
Austria-Hungary remained unknown, it was difficult to specify such
compensation.

The Italian Government acceded to this view, as is shown by
the declaration of August 25, 1914, by the late Marchese di San
Giuliano, who said: "It would be premature now to talk of com-
pensation," and by the remarks of the Duke of Avarna after our
withdrawal from Servia: "At present there is no object of com-
pensation. ' *

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government has always been
ready to enter into negotiations on this subject.

When the Italian Government, while still repeating its wish to
maintain and strengthen the alliance, presented certain demands
which, on the plea of compensation, referred to the cession of terri-
tories constituting integral parts of the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-
Hungarian Government always showed that it was guided by a
sincere desire to reach an understanding with Italy, and although
for ethnical, political, and military reasons, which have been amply
explained in Rome, it was impossible to accede to all the demands of
the Italian Government, the sacrifices which the Austro-Hungarian
Government was prepared to make were so important that they
were only justified by its desire to continue an alliance which had

332 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

existed for so many years to the mutual advantage of both coun-
tries.

The Italian Government contends that the concessions offered
by Austria-Hungary were to be realised only at an indefinite time,
namely, at the end of the war, and seems to conclude that these
concessions would therefore lose their entire value.

The Austro-Hungarian Government, while emphasising the ma-
terial impossibility of an immediate surrender of the ceded territory,
showed itself none the less ready to offer all necessary guarantees
for the purpose of preparing for and insuring this transfer at no
distant date.

The obvious good-will and conciliatory spirit of which the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Government has given proof in the course of the
negotiations seem in no way to justify the opinion of the Italian
Government that every hope must be abandoned of reaching an
agreement.

Such an agreement, however, can be reached only when both
sides are animated by the same sincere desire to reach an under-
standing.

The Austro-Hungarian Government cannot take cognisance of
the declaration of the Italian Government that it desires to recover
complete freedom of action, and to consider the Treaty of Alliance
with Austria-Hungary henceforth null and void, as such a declara-
tion by the Italian Government is in absolute contradiction with the
solemnly undertaken obligations which Italy assumed in the treaty
of December 5, 1912, and which fixed the duration of our alliance
to July 8, 1920, with a right to cancel it only on one year's notice,
and with no provision for cancellation or abrogation of the treaty
before that time.

The Royal Italian Government having in an arbitrary manner
freed itself from all its obligations, the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment declines the responsibility for all consequences that may arise
from this procedure.

No. 201.

Ba/ron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 21, 1915.

To judge from newspaper reports, to-day's debate in the Senate
exceeded in patriotic superlatives yesterday's proceedings in the

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 333

Chamber of Deputies. The speaker, Don Prospero Colonna, Sin-
daco of Rome, gave the impetus to the enthusiasm and earned a
storm of applause. The order of the day as proposed by Canevaro
and seconded by Vice-President Torrigiani, was unanimously ac-
cepted by the 281 Senators present.
It read as follows :

"After the hearing of the Governmental declarations which
emphasised Italy's good right and the will of the nation with so
much firmness, the Senate shall proceed to take a vote."

To-night a great war manifestation is to take place on the Capi-
tol. For that reason the massing of large bodies of troops and
the closing of streets which have extremely impeded traffic and
communication during last week, are still in progress.

It is said that 240 socialists were arrested yesterday, with the
result that to-day a meeting of socialist deputies has already advo-
cated a change of front by their party in favour of war.

No. 202.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 22, 1915.

In order to save our respective countries from a senseless war,
I authorise you to make a final effort with Baron Sonnino and to
ask whether he would be prepared to sign the agreement in con-
formity with the entirety of our last proposal if we met Italy still
further on the question of the putting of the cessions into effect,
without, however, conceding immediate military occupation.

No. 203.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 23, 1915.

In compliance with your telegram of yesterday I reminded Baron
Sonnino in a friendly manner that he had not yet sent me his reply

334 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

to your latest proposals, which he had promised to submit to the
Cabinet. Sonnino referred to the demonstrations of the past few
days and to the decisive vote in Parliament, which in accord with
previous meetings of the Cabinet had pronounced those latest pro-
posals too tardy.

In the spirit of your telegram to-day, I responded that I had
always been anxious to further the understanding up to the very
last, and that I was still prepared to make another proposal to that
end. I would undertake to induce my Government to take another
step forward in the matter of putting the cessions into effect, not-
withstanding the latest and very precise definition of time, provided
he would agree to accept the last draft of the accord as a whole.

The Minister replied that it was too late; he had from the very
first looked upon the time of putting the cessions into effect as the
pivot of the entire agreement; yet even the latest proposal, where
the time was to begin with the ratification of the agreement, was
calculated to postpone everything indefinitely.

All my endeavours to continue the discussion were met with the
ever-recurring phrase : " It is too late. ' '

No. 204.

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 23, 1915.

The Duke of Avarna this afternoon handed to me the follow-
ing declaration of war :

(Translation from the French.)

In compliance with the orders of his noble Sovereign the King,
the undersigned, Royal Italian Ambassador, has the honour to com-
municate the following to his Excellency, the Austro-Hungarian
Minister of Foreign Affairs:

On the 4th of this month the Austro-Hungarian Government
was informed of the grave reasons for which Italy, confident of
being in the right, declared that her alliance with Austria-Hungary
was null and void, and without effect in future, since this alliance
had been violated by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 335

Italy resumed her full freedom of action. Fully determined to pro-
tect Italian rights and interests with all the means at its disposal,
the Italian Government cannot evade its duty to take such measures
as events may impose upon it against all present and future menaces
to the fulfilment of Italy's national aspirations. His Majesty the
King declares that from to-morrow he will consider himself in a
state of war with Austria-Hungary.

The undersigned has the honour at the same time to inform his
Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that to-day the Austro-
Hungarian Ambassador in Rome will receive his passports, and he
would be grateful if his Excellency would hand him likewise his
own passports.

No. 205.

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn.

(Telegram.) Rome, May 23, 1915.

Passports received; departure of both Embassies to-morrow
(Monday) night.

APPENDIX

No. 1.

Article VII of the Treaty op Triple Alliance.

(Translation from the French.)

Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the terri-
torial status quo in the near East be maintained as much as pos-
sible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all ter-
ritorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the
other of the Powers signatory to this Treaty. To that end they
shall communicate to one another all such information as may be
suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dis-
positions as well as those of other Powers. Should, however, the

336 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts
and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas in the course of events
become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed
under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or other-
wise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or permanent occu-
pation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a
previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based
on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, ter-
ritorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the
present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate
interests and aspirations of both parties.

No. 2.

Instructions of Count Guiccardini to tJie Duke of Avarna, Dated
Rome, December 15, 1909, Handed by the Latter to Count
AeJirentJial on December 19, 1909.

In the conversations which have lately taken place between Count
Aehrenthal and yourself with a view to specifying and perfecting
Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, you have firstly agreed
that, Austria-Hungary having renounced the rights which the Treaty
of Berlin had conferred upon her in respect of the Sandjak of Novi-
bazar, the provisions of the aforesaid article of the treaty of Triple
Alliance apply equally to the Sandjak as to other parts of the Otto-
man Empire. If, therefore, Austria-Hungary, in consequence of the
impossibility of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, shall
be compelled by force of circumstances to proceed to a temporary
or permanent occupation of the Sandjak of Novibazar, that occu-
pation shall only be effected after a previous agreement has been
reached with Italy, based on the principle of compensation.

Faithful to the spirit which has inspired the Treaty of Triple
Alliance, and with a view to defining exactly and by mutual consent
the mode of procedure which the two allied cabinets intend to adopt
in certain eventualities, you have also arranged with Count Aehren-
thal as follows:

Each of the two cabinets binds itself not to effect with a third
Power any agreement whatsoever concerning the Balkan question
without the participation of the other cabinet on a footing of abso-
lute equality. The two cabinets also bind themselves to communi-

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 337

cate to one another all propositions which may be made to the one
or to the other by a third Power, contrary to the principle of non-
intervention and referring to a modification of the status quo in
the regions of the Balkans or of the Turkish coasts and islands in
the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

It is understood that Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance,
which is defined and completed only by the aforesaid provisions,
shall remain in force in its entirety.

As to the duration of the obligations which the two cabinets
assume by virtue of the aforesaid, it is understood that it shall
coincide with that of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in such a manner
that these obligations will be implicitly renewed with the renewal
of the Triple Alliance.

Conforming with the analogous provisions of this Treaty, the
two cabinets mutually promise secrecy on the obligations thus entered
into. Only the Berlin Cabinet, in its capacity as an ally, shall
be informed by the two governments without delay.

In order to define exactly all that has been agreed upon in the
conversations I have conducted through your mediation with the
Austro-Hungarian Government, I request you to communicate this
telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to leave with him
a copy thereof.

No. 3.

Count AeJirentJial to Baron Amhrozy.

(Instructions.) Vienna, September 26, 1911.

The Duke of Avarna told me to-day, in accordance with instruc-
tions, that the Italian Government had resolved to bring the question
of Tripoli to an issue. As motives to such action the Ambassador
cited the circumstance that the situation had been constantly grow-
ing worse, despite Italy's endeavours for many months past to estab-
lish better relations with Turkey, and that affairs in Tripoli had now
become absolutely intolerable. On the other hand the Duke of
Avarna pointed to the international situation and more especially to
the relations between Italy and France. The latter Power was on
the eve of a very considerable territorial aggrandisement and was
at present bound by an agreement not to put any obstacles in the

338 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

way of Italy's action in Tripoli. It could not be foreseen whether
a modification in the European situation would not, at a later date,
render the consent of France less certain. Once the problem of
Tripoli is solved in accordance with the Italian aspirations, the
Ambassador continued, Italy will represent a perfectly contented and
therefore all the more reliable member of the Triple Alliance.

The Marchese di San Giuliano had considered in detail the con-
tentions which I had proffered as early as June against an Italian
action in Tripoli on account of a possible reaction in the Balkans.
Yet, the Minister thought that there was no such danger, especially
as Italy would make it lier duty to confine Tier action to tJie Medi-
terranean. The present moment was very favourable even from that
point of view, because an extension of the conflict to the Balkans
was least likely to occur during autumn and winter. Moreover^
Italy's policy Jiad always aimed at tJie maintenance of tJie "status
quo" in tJie Balkans, and Italy would certainly do nothing tJiat could
interfere with this policy, n>ow any more than ever before. The
Duke of Avarna then added that Italy will be in a better position
to cooperate in the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans,
after the question of Tripoli has been solved.

In conclusion, the Italian Ambassador explained that his Gov-
ernment, in advising the Austro-Hungarian Government at so late
a date of its decision, had been guided solely by its desire to spare
it the certainly inconvenient duty of taking a stand in the matter.

I thanked the Duke of Avarna for this very important com-
munication, which called for very minute consideration on my part.
I informed him that I would report thereon to His Imperial and
Royal Apostolic Majesty, and that I would let the Ambassador know
the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government in a few days.
For the time being I expressed to him, in accordance with our
well-known friendly feelings toward Italy, my first impression that
it should be left to her own discretion to decide how to protect her
own interests, and that in such action she could rely upon our
friendly benevolence; yet, I inclined to my former contention on
account of the possibility of the extension of the conflict to the
Balkans.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 339

No. 4.

Von Merey to Count Aehrenthal.

(Telegram.) Rome, October 21, 1911.

Have just received the following reply from Foreign Minister
to my latest representations.

(Translation from the French.)

We have always reserved our freedom of military operations
outside of the Turkish coasts in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. We
would be delighted if we should not be compelled to take advantage
of that freedom, but nevertheless we reserve it in its entirety.

No. 5.
Count Aehrenthal to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, November 6, 1911.

In handing to me the circular telegram concerning the annexa-
tion of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the Duke of Avarna denied the
news that Italian men-of-war were cruising off Salonica.

I replied that I took cognisance of his communication with all
the more satisfaction as I had actually received various reports from
the Austro-Hungarian Consulates during the past few days which
pointed to warlike operations in that vicinity on the part of Italy.

I drew the Duke of Avarna 's attention to the fact that Italy
was bound by the Treaty of Triple Alliance to avoid all that may
menace the status quo in the Balkans. That an Italian attack upon
Salonica may involve a considerable menace to the peace of the
Balkan Peninsula, was apparent, among other reasons, from the fact
that the Bulgarian revolutionary organisation has declared in a
recently published circular that it would carry on the fight for
obtaining the autonomy of Macedonia with all available means.

Austria-Hungary, as well as Germany, had adopted a most
friendly attitude in the matter of the Italian action in Tripoli, which
in any case constituted an encroachment upon the principle of the

340 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But Austria-Hungary in par-
ticular is not in a position to accept calmly an eventual military
action of Italy upon the coast of the Aegean Sea, in view of the
above-mentioned apprehensions.

The Duke of Avama took my contentions as perfectly natural
and added, in an enquiring manner, that a temporary occupation of
the islands in the Aegean Sea would also be in contradiction to
Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance! In answering this
hint I left no doubt in his mind that my previous declaration applied
likewise to this eventuality.

No. 6.
Count Aehrenthal to von Merey.

(Instructions.) Vienna, November 15, 1911.

The Duke of Avama yesterday conveyed to me a series of com-
munications from the Marchese di San Giuliano, among which were
his thanks for our having refused to answer the two notes of pro-
test from the Ottoman Government.

The Ambassador then read to me a telegram from the Minister
of Foreign Affairs on the possible extension of hostilities to the
Aegean Sea.

In reply, I requested him to report again to his Government
that, for reasons well known to him, I must dissent from such an
undertaking. I once more emphasised the friendship and benevo-
lence which we surely have abundantly manifested toward Italy,
and declared that — setting aside the duties of neutrality — I would
overstep the mark which I had been obliged to define for myself,
if I embarked upon renewed discussions of that topic; if I were
to do so, I would assume a share in the responsibility which Italy
would have to assume if she were to depart from the declarations
made by her at the beginning of the war, or from her treaty obli-
gations.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 341

No. 7.
Count Aehrenthal to Count Szogyeny.

(Instructions.) Vienna, November 29, 1911.

Von Tschirschky informs me that Italy has expressed a desire
in Berlin to ascertain what warlike operations on her part would
be admissible upon the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea, in the view
of the Berlin Cabinet.

Without basing his step upon any intimation from the Rome
Cabinet, the German Ambassador asked for my opinion in the mat-
ter, under instructions. I replied to von Tschirschky that I made
it a point not to discuss the extension of Italian operations to the
Asiatic coast of Turkey, without, however, intending to make any
difficulties for the Italian Government, or even to incur the appear-
ance of such a possibility. In closing my explanations, I said that
I was guided by the consideration that it would be unwise for us as
well as for Germany to embark upon a similar negotiation, as a
subsequent military operation of that sort would then necessarily
be considered as being performed with our consent.

No. 8.

Count Berchtold to von Mirey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 1, 1912.

Expected British representations were made yesterday in the
form of the following memorandum:

(Translation from the French.)

It is certain that international commerce would suffer consid-
erable losses if the Ottoman Government decided for reasons of
self-defence to close the Dardanelles by means of mines. Conse-
quently, Sir Edward Grey desires to know whether or not the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Government would deem it expedient that the Powers
approach the Italian Government with the query whether it would
be willing to give assurances that no military operations of any

342 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

description will be undertaken in the Dardanelles or in the adjacent
waters.

No. 9.

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin,
Constantinople, London, Paris, Rome and St. PetershurgJi.

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 3, 1912.

Sir F. Cartwright called on me yesterday and reiterated verbally
the proposal made by the delivery of the Aide-Memoire.

I told the Ambassador that, in my opinion, the Italian Govern-
ment would not entertain the demand for a declaration that she will
not undertake any warlike operations in the Dardanelles and the
adjacent waters; it was our duty as neutrals to avoid all that might
give the appearance that we wish to impede the freedom of action
of either of the belligerent parties.

In support of his representations Sir F. Cartwright asked whether
the Italian Government had not previously made to the Vienna
Cabinet a declaration coinciding in principle with the one which
the five Powers were to demand now from Italy on Sir Edward
Grey's initiative. I replied to the Ambassador that I had never
heard of such a declaration by Italy.

No. 10.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 6, 1912.

Acting on instructions, von Tschirschky made to me the follow-
ing declaration:

In consequence of the long duration of the Italo-Turkish con-
flict, the situation is beginning to become serious for Italy, and both
military circles and public opinion urge that a decisive blow be
delivered. It is not a question of action in the Aegean Sea, but in
the Dardanelles.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 343

The Ambassador added in strict confidence that the King of
Italy had approached Emperor William on the subject at Venice.

The question now arising for Germany is, what attitude the
Allies will take up toward these intentions of Italy.

You will please seek an occasion to converse with the Marchese
di San Giuliano and tell him that you have perceived, from informa-
tion received from Vienna, that it was a matter of great surprise to
me to learn that von Tschirschky had been instructed by his Gov-
ernment to make the aforesaid intimation. In consideration of
our alliance, as well as of the friendly manner in which I have
met Italy heretofore, I would have thought a direct discussion more
natural and more expedient. At the same time you will hint that
for conspicuous reasons I was obliged to adhere in principle to the
standpoint which my predecessor had taken up in respect of an
eventual extension of the hostilities. Von Tschirschky explicitly
designated an Italian action in the Dardanelles; the apprehension is
easy to understand, that such action might find its echo in Con-
stantinople and in the Balkans, the consequence of which may not
be gauged to-day, but which would be diametrically opposed to the
maintenance of the status quo — the policy pursued by both Italy
and Austria-Hungary. Should, nevertheless, the Italian Govern-
ment find an extension of the region of her warlike operations indis-
pensable, then I would certainly consider a direct discussion of the
matter the most natural course to take. Without obtaining a de-
cided consent from me, which would to a certain extent imply our
participation in the responsibilities for the consequences, Italy may
secure our tacit passivity in the event of an intended temporary
warlike action, confined to such territories as would not involve the
danger of a reaction in the Balkans.

If the Marchese di San Giuliano enters upon a discussion of
any specific Italian operation, you will lead the conversation into
other channels with the intimation that you consider such discussion
inopportune. In fact, we must positively avoid every appearance
that any specific warlike action had received our previous consent.

344 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 11.
Count Berchtold to von MSrey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 15, 1912.

The Duke of Avama again broached the subject of a possible
extension of the Italian naval operation, though pointing out with
emphasis that he spoke without instructions.

I pointed out in the first place that, to my mind, an action by
the Italian Navy outside of the north-African war theatre could
accomplish its purpose only if it caused a strong enough impression
in Constantinople to be felt in the Balkans. Such reaction, how-
ever, could not leave us, Italy's allies, indifferent. A minor operation
and a less extensive reaction would bring Italy no nearer to her
aim, while it would still create a feeling of uneasiness with us if
the scene of action comprised the territories referred to in Article
VII of the Alliance Treaty.

Under these circumstances I could not give my express consent
to any similar action whatsoever. The Duke of Avarna had not asked
me to give such consent; but I, on my part, was determined to
leave the responsibility for the consequences upon Italy's shoulders.

Concerning the islands of Rhodos, Karpathos and Stampalia, I
expressed my willingness to consider it disputable whether or not
they pertain to the islands of the Aegean Sea. The Duke of Avarna
replied that he felt convinced that his Government would give us its
express assurances, in the event of their occupation, that such occu-
pation would be only temporary.

No. 12.

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.) Berlin, May 21, 1912.

Von Kiderlen-Waechter assured me that he gratefully acknowl-
edged our conciliatory attitude in the matter of Italian action in
the Archipelago. He still entertained hopes that the occupation
of several islands in the Aegean Sea by Italy would not provoke
a dangerous reaction in the Balkans.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 345

No. 13.

Count Berchtold to von Merey.

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 23, 1912.

The question of occupation of islands in Aegean Sea has repeat-
edly been the subject of conversations between me and the Italian
Ambassador in the last few days.

The Duke of Avarna resumed the discussion yesterday. He
especially expressed the apprehension that the decision we had prom-
ised in respect of the occupation of several unimportant islands
(he referred to Chios and the isles whence the Turkish officials had
first been removed) might be such as to arouse profound ill-feeling
in Italy.

He further observed that it impressed him strangely to see that
of all Europe, including Germany, it was Austria-Hungary, Italy's
ally, who caused her the greatest difficulties in the attainment of
her aim, which consisted in a speedy conclusion of the war.

I pointed out, that in this case we were in a peculiar situation
in two respects : Firstly, because we had entered into bilateral agree-
ments with Italy concerning the matter in question; secondly, be-
cause we were directly adjacent neighbours of Turkey, and conse-
quently were the most closely concerned of all. Besides, I failed
to understand his apprehension, inasmuch as there never had been
a question of a "protest" against the occupation of the islands re-
ferred to. Yet, we were compelled to specify our legitimate claim
at this time in order to avoid possible future misunderstandings.

I finally specified our standpoint on this question as follows:

We have been painfully impressed by the news of the occupa-
tion of additional islands by Italian troops. Because of the con-
sequences to be feared from such operations, we are compelled to
express our most serious misgivings. At the same time it is our
duty to point out that in our opinion the occupations in question
are contrary to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty of Triple
Alliance, and give us the right to demand compensation on our part.
True, for the time being we do not wish to make use of this right,
out of a desire to avoid complicating Italy's position. However, we
must declare emphatically that if Italy perseveres in this policy the
responsibility for it will rest with her, while we would be con-
strained to reserve the right to compensation which we are at liberty
to use according to our own judgment.

346 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 14.

Article III of the Treaty of Triple Alliance.

(Translation from the French.)

If one or two of the high contracting parties should be attacked
without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war
with two or several Great Powers not signatory to this Treaty,
the casus foederis shall apply simultaneously to all the high con-
tracting parties.

No. 15.
Article I op the Treaty of Triple Alliance.

The high contracting parties mutually promise peace and friend-
ship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed
against any one of their respective States.

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political
and economic questions of a general nature as may arise ; and, more-
over, promise their mutual support within the scope of their own
interests.

No. 16.

Article IV of the Treaty of Triple Alliance.

In the event that a Great Power not signatory to this Treaty
should menace the safety of the States of one of the high con-
tracting parties, and that the menaced party should be forced to
make war on that Power, the two others bind themselves to observe
toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in
that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if
she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her
ally.

THE
BELGIAN GREY BOOK

(NO. 1)

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1)^

No. 1.

Count Erremhault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum to Servia.

COMTE ErREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

Enclosure in No. 1."

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the
following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through
the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade : —

"On the Slst March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on
the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following
declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government : —

^Miscellaneous. No. 12 (1914). Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the
War, published by the Belgian Oovernment. Presented to both Houses of Par-
liament by command of His Majesty, October 1914. London: Printed under the
authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914. [Cd. 7627.] Translated and
published by the British Government. No English translation was published by
the Belgian Government. Title of publication in the original text: Royaume de
Belgique. Correspondance Diplomatique Relative d la Guerre de 1914 (24
Ju4,llet-2Q AoUt). Septidme Edition. Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79,
Boulevard Saint-Oermadn ; Londres, 18, King William Street, Strand, 1915.

2 This note is not printed in Miscellaneous, No. 12 (1914), which merely
refers to No. 4 of Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914). The translation as here repro-
duced is taken from the latter source.

849

350 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

" 'Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the
decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25
of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great
Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude
of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the
annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify
the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to
live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter. '

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events
of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its
birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as
to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the
shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

**Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in
the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Govern-
ment has done nothing to repress these movements. It has per-
mitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations
directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained lan-
guage on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators
of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in
subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda
in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of
a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy
and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had
not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last
proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assas-
sinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives
with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by
Servian ofiicers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Od-
brana ; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and
their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian
frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do
not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 351

the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained
for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and
thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results,
on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the
intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the
Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see
themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government
a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda
against the Monarchy ; in other words, the whole series of tendencies,
the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories
belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means
this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the
Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their
'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration: —

** 'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of
which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" 'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and func-
tionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus
compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Gov-
ernment were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st
March, 1909.

" 'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea
of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it
their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole
population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed
with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such
machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and
suppress. *

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the
Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and
shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

" 'The Royal Servian Government further undertake: —

352 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

** *1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and
contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tend-
ency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

*' *2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ''Narodna Od-
brana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in
the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia
which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to
prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under
another name and form ;

" * 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia,
both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

" *4. To remove from the military service, and from the adminis-
tration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the
Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
communicating to the Royal Government ;

** *5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of
the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the sub-
versive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
Monarchy ;

** *6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot
of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
relating thereto;

*' *7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tanko-
sitch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian
State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the
magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

" *8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the
Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across
the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the
frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted
the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage
across the frontier ;

** *9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with
explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian
officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their
official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 353

to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-
Hungarian Government; and, finally,

" '10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without
delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding
heads. '

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the
Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening,
the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial
enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under
heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the con-
tents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you
are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following
observations : —

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed
to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced
above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a
policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of
the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among
their members generals and diplomatists. Government officials and
judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in
the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propa-
ganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day
passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their
readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to
outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the
youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has

354 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; indi-
viduals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have
come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda
against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has
been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it
incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Govern-
ment have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn
declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the
will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face
of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial
disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope
that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by
appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By
observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development
of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested
and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement
of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the
neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of
the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propa-
ganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the
whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to
the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched
at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at
Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking
this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the senti-
ments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become
a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife,
and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements
emanating from Belgrade.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 355

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold
at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the
Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the
murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial
and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Annex.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against
Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassina-
tion committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present
led to the following conclusions :^-

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke
Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed
at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan
Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez with the assistance of Commander
Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition
with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to
Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and
Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of
the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught
Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave
lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest
near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms
secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina
of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling
the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by
the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of
various individuals.

356 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 2.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Peters-
iurgh.

Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914.

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration
whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to ad-
dress to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neu-
trality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to
fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the
event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a com-
munication would be premature at present, but that events might
move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable in-
structions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives
abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my
colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now
exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect
of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should
read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should
give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication
necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these
instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the
mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope
and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our informa-
tion leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

Davignon.

Enclosure in No. 2.
Sir,

The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a
war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Gov-
ernment:

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 357

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral
State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839 ; and those
duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circum-
stances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so
often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory
will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon
her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has
been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have
been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect
of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been
put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these meas-
ures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her inter-
national obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been
nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in
an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust
of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to com-
municate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian
Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take
note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

No. 3.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tJie Belgian
Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Sir, Brussels, July 25, 1914.

I have addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is
enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers
guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become
imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments

358 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed
determination to fulfil those international obligations that are im-
posed upon us by the treaties of 1839.

The communications in question would only be made upon tele-
graphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request
you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are
accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a
copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without
any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to the
circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy
which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure
should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh
instructions from me. Davignon.

Enclosure in No. 3.
(See Enclosure in No. 2.)

No. 4.

M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the
reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian
note of the 10 (23) July.

Michotte de Welle.

Enclosure in No. 4.

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are

* This note is not printed in Miscellaneous, No. 12 (1914), which merely
refers to No. 39 of Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), where it is printed. The transla-
tion as here reproduced is taken from the latter source.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 359

convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which
may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both
from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations
and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests
which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Gov-
ernment on the 18th March, 1909 — ^have not been renewed on any
occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no
attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal
Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal
state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Gov-
ernment draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Im-
perial and Royal Government have made no representation except
one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial
and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation.
Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to
the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European
peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government
cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character,
such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies —
manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary
course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control.
The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the
fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which
arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a
great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority
of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and
surprised at the statements according to which members of the King-
dom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations
for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected
to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this
crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness
of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning
whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with
the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared
to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his
situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs
are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be

360 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

published on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the date of
the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: —

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda
which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all
such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they
sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal move-
ments. The Royal Government regret that, according to the com-
munication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain
Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-
mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly
relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly en-
gaged by the declaration of the 3l8t March, 1909, which declaration
disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with
the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-
Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the
officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that hence-
forth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons
as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will
use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal
Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King,
by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be
published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake: —

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the SkuptchSna
a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punish-
ment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general
tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of
Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching
revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced
into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such pub-
lication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under
the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the
"Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up
to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceed-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 361

ings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government
will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and
will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other
society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without
delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that
serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary,
whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with
facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military
service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to
be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and
Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names
and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the
proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial
and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the col-
laboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon
their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration
as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal pro-
cedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it
their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who
happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the
participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori-
ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as
it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal
procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the
results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-
Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As
regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation)
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest
him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good

362 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump-
tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which
have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for
the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the meas-
ures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms
and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they
will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the fron-
tier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their
duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the
remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in
interviews after the crime and which according to the statement of
the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Mon-
archy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have com-
municated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and
as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by
the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take
steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present
note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this
reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the
common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are
ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring
this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The
Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up
of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th
(31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

No. 5.

Communication made on July 26, 1914, hy fhe Austro-Hungarian
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. Pashitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the
Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 363

having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been
broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have
left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before
3 o'clock.

No. 6.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M, Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 27, 1914.

According to a telegram from the British Charge d 'Affaires at
Belgrade, the Servian Government have given way on all the points
on the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian
officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of
international law. The British Charge d 'Affaires considers that this
reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Neverthe-
less, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particu-
larly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British
Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France,
and Italy at St. Petersburgh and Vienna in order to find some basis
for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision
rests with the Emperor.

No. 7.

Count Erremhault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declara-
tion of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.

364 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 8.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburgh,
Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Sir, Brussels, July 29, 1914.

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a
strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in
some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace
footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened
peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions
and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength
as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones
of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which
may be addressed to you.

Davignon.

No. 9.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence
Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said : —

**I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French
troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are
massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish
to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking
the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the
French authorities."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt
bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 365

the loyal obsei-vance by both our neighbouring States of their engage-
ments towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the
attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the
Government of the French Republic.

Davignon.

No. 10.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of
Belgian Missions abroad.

(Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The Minister of "War informs me that mobilisation has been
ordered, and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

Davignon.

No. 11.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and
made the following communication, which he had hoped for some
days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a
European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German
Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect
Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : —

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir
Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain
her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers
will respect and maintain it."

366 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers,
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which
had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that
neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been
considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation,
were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the
event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to
me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to
mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had
come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover,
the recent date of our new military system and the temporary nature
of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary
for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours
and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold
our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that
his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing nego-
tiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be
communicated to me.

Davignon.

No. 12.

M, Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of
my department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained
to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we
had undertaken, and said to him that they were a consequence of
our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no
wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he
knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor,
Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor
had instructed the latter to give.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 367

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a con-
sequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain
newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war
Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declara-
tion in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs
would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which
was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between
the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg replied that he had fully appreciated
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but
he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would
weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on
the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood
the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg to the proposed
public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913,
Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget
Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian
neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with
Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments ex-
pressed at that time had not changed.

Davignon.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, May 2, 1913.

I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respect-
ing Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister
of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on
April 29th :—

"A member of the Social Democrat Party said: 'The approach
of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension

368 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neu-
trality of Belgium.'

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neutrality
is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is deter-
mined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social
Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add
to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between
Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat
Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: 'Belgium
plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation
of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situa-
tion in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the
neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty. '

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken
of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard
to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

Baron Beyens.

No. 13.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914.

Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately if they
intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being
violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France
has replied in the affirmative.

No. 14.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to enquire of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 369

would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister
replied that he was unable to answer the question.

No. 15.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tJie Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Sir, Brttssels, August 1, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has
made the following verbal communication to me: —

"I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international
war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations
they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In
the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power,
the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it
necessary to modify their attitude."

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken
without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our inde-
pendence and our frontiers should be respected.

Davignon.

No. 16.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis-
ters at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. PetershurgJi.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 24th
July.

Davignon.
(See No. 2.)

370 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 17.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis-
ters at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch, of the 25th
July.

Davignon.
(See No. 3.)

No. 18.

M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davi-
gnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following
facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops,
according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand
Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the
bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly
towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital
of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with
troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from
"Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These
occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the
neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of
London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to
address an energetic protest against this aggression to the repre-
sentatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An
identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

Eyschen.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 371

No. 19.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis-
ters at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petershurgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 2, 1914.

I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bas-
sompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobu-
kowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration
which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next
met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added
that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an
official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to
the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards
our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of
their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did
not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I
added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to
the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would
hear of with joy and gratitude.

Davignon.

No. 20.

Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — ^Brussels, August 2, 1914.

(Very Confidential.)

Eeliable information has been received by the German Govern-
ment to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line
of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt
as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory
against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite
of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel
80 considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success

372 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is
essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate
any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however,
feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility
against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents
force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the
German Government make the following declaration: —

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In
the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain
an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German
Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee
the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to
evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in
cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries
for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity
for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular
should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance
of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads,
tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be
compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards
Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two
States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope
that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Govern-
ment will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the
occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the
friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow
stronger and more enduring.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 373

No. 21.

Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 a.m., on August 3, by
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der
Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der
Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government
to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown
bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in
violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these inci-
dents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron
van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand
the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these
acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to
lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law,
would be committed by France.

No. 22.

Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August,
1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended
to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in
spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse,
without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves com-
pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In
these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government
to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the
conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and
its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium
put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany
would 1^ compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the

374 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the
decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the
Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradic-
tion to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name
of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her interna-
tional obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous
resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for
the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee
of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the
King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obliga-
tions, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality,
and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for
her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Gov-
ernment threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international
law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and be-
tray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than
eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe
that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price
of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon
their rights.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 375

No. 23.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at St. Petershurgh, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The
Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914.

At 7 p.m. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly
neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory,
while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium
and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in
the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time-limit
of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply.

Our answer has been that this infringement of our neutrality
would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the
German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation.
Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack
by all the means in her power.

Davignon.

No. 24.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Peters-
hurgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ulti-
matum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no
act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided
that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers.

The French Minister has made the following statement to me
upon the subject : —

"Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration
from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known
intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal

376 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their
neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Bel-
gium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that, —
unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in
self-defence — the French Government would not intervene until Bel-
gium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I
informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal
at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide
later what ought to be done.

Davignon.

No. 25.
His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George.

(Telegram.) Brussels, Augiist 3, 1914.

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England
in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Maj-
esty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

Albert.

No. 26.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 3, 1914.

I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with
Germany.

CoMTE DE Lalaing.
(See No. 23.)

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 377

No. 27.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(The original is in French.)

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform
your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian
Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them
by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find
themselves compelled to take — if necessary by force of arms — those
measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable in view
of the menace of France.

VON Below.

No. 28.

Note communicated by Sir Francis H. VUliers, BritisJi Minister at
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Ger-
many brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of
forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic
Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means
at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared
to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at
once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to
resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium,
and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future inde-
pendence and integrity of Belgium.

378 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 29.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at TJie Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, The Hague, August 4, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening
that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing
to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on
the Scheldt.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce
this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note
in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By
day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who
have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In
this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and
Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that
in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause
the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" to be withdrawn in
order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch ter-
ritory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up
the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be
permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however,
given me this assurance.

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this
exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.

I will at once telegraph to you.

Baron Fallon.

Note enclosed in No. 29.

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to
maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 379

upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of
the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so
drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible
to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch
pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instruc-
tions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced
that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in
the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the
navigation of Antwerp,

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there
would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing
at night, and as the presence of the lightships "Wielingen" and
"Wandelaar" is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Nether-
lands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government
would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoy-
ing, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance
of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

No. 30.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis-
ters at London and Paris.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been
violated at Gemmenich.

Davignon.

No. 31.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day
the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic

380 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency
will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with
the staff of the legation.

Davignon.

No. 32.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davi-
gnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's
note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have entrusted the
custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United
States colleague.

VON Below.

No. 33.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,
Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough
to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that
event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador
at Berlin.

Davignon.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 381

No. 34.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Beyens,
Belgian Minister at Berlin.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The German Minister is leaving to-night; you should ask for
your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to
authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge
of Belgian interests in Germany.

Davignon.

No. 35.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of
part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chan-
cellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality : —

'*We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no
law.

* * Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already
entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international
law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was pre-
pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected
by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade
Belgium. France could wait ; we could not. A French attack upon
our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal.
We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate
protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the
wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as
our military object is attained.

"Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling
for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of
extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria."

382 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises,
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international
law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing
a wrong against us.

Baron Beyens.

No. 36.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, London, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons
this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard
to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir
E. Grey, the Prime Minister read: —

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which
gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented to the Belgian
Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you
this morning (see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at
Gemmenich, a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its
Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of
misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation
as published in one of this evening's newspapers: —

"Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of
the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating
most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever,
annex Belgian territory.

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neu-
trality.

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian terri-
tory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense
of Holland.

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 383

be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned
according to absolutely unimpeachable information.

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it
being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. ' '

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note
of the German Government the British Government had repeated
their proposal of last week, namely, that the German Government
should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France
had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British
Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.

COMTE DE LaLAING.

No. 37.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Min-
isters in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects
that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe
neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great
Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned
Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alli-
ance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of
force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the
future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed
to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs answered : This is in case her neutrality is violated.

CoMTE DE Lalaing.

384 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 38.

If. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis-
ters at Paris, London, and St. Petershurgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you of the course of recent events
as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which
guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal com-
munication according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a
European war, had asked the German and French Governments
separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality
of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other
Power.

In view of existing treaties. Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring
this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that
Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her
neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this com-
munication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I
added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaran-
teed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm deter-
mination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem possible that
our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom
we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Gov-
ernment, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from
now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated
by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication
on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the
Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French
Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would
respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to
modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian
neutrality by another Power.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken
all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence
and our frontiers.

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 385

with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had
lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his
Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the
solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to
defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded.
He added: "We know that Prance has given you formal assurances,
but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this sub-
ject."

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration
from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of
existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed,
at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th,
1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which
Germany intends to respect."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called
at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me
the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the
Belgian Government a time-limit of twelve hours within which to
communicate their decision.

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing
proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed.
(See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock
no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that
there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers.

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this
point, and said: —

"Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet
received no instructions to make a declaration from my Govern-
ment, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in say-
ing that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French
Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the
French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if
such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of course,
exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence — the
French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken
some effective measure of resistance. ' '

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal

386 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide
later what ought to be done.

Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the
following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the ques-
tion of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

Davignon.

No. 39.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Bel-
gian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed
by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the
force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops ; and whereas
Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich ; and whereas Ger-
many has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that
given last week by France ; therefore Great Britain must once again
demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian
neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great
Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British
proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

CoMTE DE Lalaing.
(See No. 37.)

No. 40.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French,
and Russian Ministers at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your
Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered
Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 387

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all
the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-
operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible
measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time,
to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and in-
tegrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake
the defence of her fortified places.

Daviqnon.

No. 41.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914.

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain
has informed her that a state of war existed between the two coun-
tries as from 11 o'clock.

CoMTE DE Lalaing.

No. 42.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. PetershurgJi.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914.

After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, Belgium
appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their repre-
sentatives at Brussels, to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the
defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

Davignon.

388 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 43.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petershurgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914.

In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to
inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the inter-
national relations of Belgium from July 3l8t to August 4th. I added
that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium,
whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal
to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British
Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated
to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed
to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power,
was cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of atti-
tude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Germany
a time-limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory
and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the even-
ing, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain,
and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a
note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France,
and Russia to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of
her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independ-
ence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the
defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

Davignon.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 389

No. 44.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations
with Belgium.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914.

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, Prance, Great Britain,
Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty
concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the
Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty
runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually
neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations,
she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she
has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that
neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with
deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing
Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the
obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage
against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all
the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality,
and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague
Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral
Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power
repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be
considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his
Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted
at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

Davignon.

390 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 45.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 1914.

I have received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow
morning for Holland with the staff of the legation.

Baron Beyens.

No. 46.

Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.

The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian inter-
ests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to
their Ambassador at Berlin.

Baron Grenier.
(See No. 33.)

No. 47.

Baron GuUlaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 5, 1914.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification
of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been
communicated to me to-day.

Baron Guillaume.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 391

Enclosure in No. 47.

Notification hy the French Government to the Representatives of the

Powers at Paris.

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its
armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of
murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the
neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the
stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May 1867, and of
Convention V. of The Hague, 18th October 1907, on the rights and
duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1
and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Govern-
ment; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Govern-
ment of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German
troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the
19th April 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of
the above Convention of The Hague

Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August
1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find them-
selves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these
presents the Government of Belgium that a state of war exists
between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August
1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised
nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the
Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by
the German Empire of their international engagements, and they
reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves
brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted
word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the
principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and
assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with
the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law
of war on land and sea.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of

392 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the Third Convention of The Hague of the 18th October 1907, relating J
to the opening of hostilities and handed to. . . . ^

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m.

No. 48.

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis VUliers, British
Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for For-
eign Affairs.

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His
Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view
to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty
of 1839.

No. 49.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914.

Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of
guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The
British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the
provisioning of Antwerp.

CoMTE DE Lalaing.

No. 50.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 1914.

The war buoying is about to be established.

Baron Fallon.
(See No. 29.)

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 393

No. 51.

Jf. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,
Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914.

Please express to the Spanish Govemment the sincere thanks of
the Belgian Government.

Davignon.
(See No. 46.)

No. 52.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tJie Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. PetershurgJi.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian
Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me
of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal,
and to cooperate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian
territory.

Davignon.

No. 53.

Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davi-
gnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 6, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy
of the special edition of the " Staatscourant, " containing the declara-
tion of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium
and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

Jonkheer de Weede.

394 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Enclosure to No. 53.
Laws, Decrees, Nominations, &c.

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the
Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty the Queen, make
known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government
will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between
Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers
friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance
of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken: —

Article 1.

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the
territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions
in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted,
neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations.

Article 2.

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State
by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is
permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging to the
belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within
the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships
assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted.

Article 3.

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for
them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately
disarmed and interned until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent,
who contravenes the provisions of Articles 2, 4, or 7, will not be per-
mitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 395

Article 4.

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the
belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

Article 5.

The provisions of Article 4 do not apply to : —

1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter
the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the
state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads
as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter
there shall have ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent
which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or over-sea pos-
sessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of
foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circum-
stances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist,
subject to the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall
not exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent
employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian
mission.

Article 6.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent
may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the
State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no
way increase their fighting capacities.

Article 7.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent
who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the
State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the
publication of this declaration.

Article 8.

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different
belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set
forth in Article 5, in the same part of the world and within the
territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must
elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship.

396 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be
determined by the order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated
thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the
State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which
flies the flag of another belligerent.

Article 9.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent
to which Articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned
with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the
extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in
time of peace. '

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent
necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board,
to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period
of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned
in the territory of the State.

Article 10.

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is
unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to
enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given
her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible means shall be
employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to
intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it
as prize.

Article 11.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of combatants
or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents.

Article 12.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships
or ships assimilated thereto.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 397

Article 13.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels
intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish
or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

Article 14.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to supply arms or ammunition
to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or
to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to
augment their crew or their equipment.

Article 15.

It is forbidden, in State territory, failing previous authorisation by
the competent local authorities, to repair warships or ships assimi-
lated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with
victuals or fuel.

Article 16.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take part in the dismantling
or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary to make them
seaworthy ; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive
them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

Article 17.

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of
3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-
water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured
from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the
entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical
miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude.

Article 18.

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of
the Penal Code; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Sec-
tion 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality,
and respecting domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268;
1910, No. 216) ; Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of
Netherlands nationality (**Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55;

398 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

"Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal
Code of Surinam ; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curagoa) .

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and
charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to
which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective
blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military
despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal
service), or by rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to
all the consequences of those acts, and would not be able, as regards
them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the
Netherlands Government.

No. 54.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at TJie Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 6, 1914.

Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands Gov-
ernment : —

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of
war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands
Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from
30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the
exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands
Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in
the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen
and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel.

Davignon.
(See No. 50.)

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 399

No. 55.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, io M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914.

Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long
as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange
of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you
particularly anxious to have Bath?

Baron Fallon.

No. 56.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks
of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure naviga-
tion on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agreement with
the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of naviga-
tion. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this
port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.

Davignon.

No. 57.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris and London.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central
Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instruc-
tions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French
Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim

400 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conven-
tional basin of the Congo], in accordance with Article 11 of the
General Act of Berlin. A telegram from. Boma reports that hostili-
ties are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

Davignon.

No. 58.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris and London.

Sir, Brussels, August 7, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour
to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Govern-
ment the following information: —

While instructions have been sent to the Governor- General of the
Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the
Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the
Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer
that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations,
the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons,
not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will,
therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisa-
tion in that region, and the military forces which they possess there
will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct
attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Govern-
ment share this view and in that case whether it is their intention,
during the present conflict, to avail themselves of Article 11 of the
General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are
contained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at
London [Paris].

Davignon.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1)

401

No. 59.

Baron GuUlaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914.

I have had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic
with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during
the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before
answering.

M. Poincare has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to
the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little diffi-
culty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he
nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have
already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity
to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also
to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

Baron Guillaume.

No. 60.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) TJie Hague, August 9, 1914.

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to
convey to you the following information, the United States Minister
at Brussels having declined to do so: —

402 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very
superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians
and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors
of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with
Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with
France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assur-
ance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to
herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Ger-
many is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war
will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under-
take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it
to oblige him.

Babon Fallon.

No. 61.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, August 9, 1914.

The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the
neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo
and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin.

Baron Guillaume.
(See No. 59.)

No. 62.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, The Hague, August 10, 1914.

In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9
o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 403

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just
left his room, and had handed him a document which the United
States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at
Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from
Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in
the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his col-
league at The Hague, who informed the German representative of
Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by ap-
proaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these
matters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the
intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with
you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I
did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its
poor chance of success in this form ; but, solely in order to oblige the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph
to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.

You will find the German document enclosed in original and
translation.

Baron Fallon.

Enclosure in No. 62.

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave
defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody
encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Government's atti-
tude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into
Belgium. It is only through the force of circumstances that she has
had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave
decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld
the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic
resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the
King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium
the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any

404 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their
arrangements with France. Germany gives once more her solemn
assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appro-
priating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is
far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium
as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at
mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

No. 63.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914.

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to
them by the German Government through the intermediary of the
Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly.

Davignon.
(See No. 62 and Enclosure.)

No. 64.

M, Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914.

Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word " Auseinanderset-
zung," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain
whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements
which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dis-
pute between France and Germany.

Davignon.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 405

No. 65.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the BritisJi,
Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian
Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister
for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from
the German Government. (See Enclosure in No. 62.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply
to this communication: —

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats
the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of August 2. Faith-
ful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate
her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her
neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on
her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded
loyally and without delay to her appeal."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing
the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents.

Davignon.

No. 66.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914,

I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led
to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg.
The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand
Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town,
on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the depar-
ture of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the
Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : —

406 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

"Your Excellency, ** Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

"In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by
Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves
obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from
Luxemburg.

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count
van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way
that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von
Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settling the details of the further
stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via
Treves- Coblentz.

(Signed) von Buch."

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count
van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following
terms : —

"Sir, "Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.

"I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed
copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the
German military authorities demand your departure.

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you
to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by
motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for rea-
sons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left
to you.

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present
task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed
between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under
the best possible conditions.

(Signed) Eyschen."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal
Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they
had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous inten-
tion towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided
that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the
Luxemburg Charge d 'Affaires to leave Belgium.

Daviqnon.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 407

No. 67.

Mr. WMtlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914.

The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Wash-
ington, conveying the information that the United States Government
had, at the request of the German Government, consented, as a matter
of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German
subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram,
we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good
and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection
of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with
you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may con-
tinue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

Brand Whitlock.

No. 68.

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914.

I have telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German communication
and the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the en-
tire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter
can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the
Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord
between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties
violated by Germany.

F. H. Villiers.
(See No. 65.)

408 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 69.

M. Kldhukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French
Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the
Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government
and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation
of their territory.

Prance will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power
of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium,

Klobukowski.
(See No. 65.)

No. 70.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Hie Hague, August 12, 1914.

The German text contained a mistake: instead of *' seine
AiLseinandersetzung," it should read *'ihre," and thus be translated
"their conflict with France." Baron Fallon.

(See No. 64.)

No. 71.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914.

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands
Minister for Foreign Affairs: —

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 409

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats
the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd.
Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate
her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her
neutrality has been yiolated, a distressing war has been waged on
her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded
loyally and without delay to her appeal. ' '

Daviqnon.

No. 72.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) St. PetershurgJi, August 13, 1914.

Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication,
and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel
at the firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to
be congratulated.

Sazonof.
(See No. 65.)

No. 73.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, The Hague, August 13, 1914.

I had the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at
once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs
the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

410 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication
to the German Minister forthwith.

Baron Fallon.

(See No. 71.)

No. 74.

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 16, 1914.

In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with
M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to
the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram
and your despatch of the 7th instant.

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had
approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing
the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given
no answer.

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation
Germany should be attacked wherever possible ; he believes that such
is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to
satisfy ; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she
had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident.

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to
obtain.

Baron Guillaume.
(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 75.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, London, August 17, 1914.

In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to
inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Belgian

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 411

proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the
conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the
offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Further-
more, British troops have already attacked the German port of
Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy
station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they
were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of
the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending
to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will
take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native
population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of
German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

COMTE DE LaLAINQ.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 76.

M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin,
Belgian Minister for the Colonies.

(Telegram.) ElizabethvUle, August 26, 1914.

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika
and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their
natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

Tombeur.

No. 77.

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The
Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 28, 1914.

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to
inform your Excellency as follows: —

412 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

"Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made
to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military
assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have
declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been
proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to
submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment
contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible
even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds
herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself
from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the
country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the pro-
tection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium.
The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to
Count Errembault de Dudzeele."

Clary.

No. 78.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for
Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration
of war against Belgium, and add the following: —

"Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her
neighbours without distinction. She has scrupulously fulfilled the
duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able
to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contem-
plated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements
which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom.
She had been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may
be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to
force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum
had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by
German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guar-
antors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and
Austria-Hungary, to cooperate in the name and in virtue of the

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 413

treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by
force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down
by the provisions of Article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting
the rights and duties of neutral Powers.

"Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a
violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has
pleaded her strategical interests.

''Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hun-
garian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the
most primitive demands of humanity.

"The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hos-
tilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-
Hungarian persons and property."

Davignon.

No. 79.

If. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian

Ministers abroad.

Sir, Antwerp^ August 29, 1914.

Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the
Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention
to certain allegations made by the German Government which are
mentioned in the Blue Book recently published by the British Gov-
ernment.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the
despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the
Government to which you are accredited.

Davignon.

414 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count d»
Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London.

Sir, Brussels, August 17, 1914.

The Blue Book [No. 1] recently published by the British Govern-
ment contains (see No. 122) the text of a telegram despatched from
Berlin on the Slst July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which
the following passage occurs : —

"It appears from what he [His Excellency the Secretary of State]
said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts
have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this,
he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed
under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in
his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an
hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application
of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited
the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from
the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which
we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has
wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the
Moniteur beige the following day forbade, provisionally, the export,
both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of
cereals. On the 3l8t July the German Minister at Brussels called
my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining
cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely
transshipped in our port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von
Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should
be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Min-
ister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to
the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd
August, that Department informed us that instructions had been for-
warded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction
to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the
correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske.
You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 415

any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the
Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple
precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in
such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the
British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

Davignon.

Enclosure 2 m No. 79.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden
the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the
export of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in question having
been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your
good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to
leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port
of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the
Moniteur of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible con-
venience, I have, &c. von Below Saleske.

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914.

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the
honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July con-
cerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

416 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance
and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials
in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned
decree might be avoided.

Daviqnon.

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914.

With reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough
to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you
that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the
prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last,
only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods
regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when
duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although
they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of
special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit
documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been
declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were
to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave
the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch re-
ceipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported forthwith
in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals
was authorised on the 1st August.

Daviqnon.

THE
BELGIAN GREY BOOK

(NO. 2)

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2)^

PART I.

No. 1.

The Belgicm Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, February 22, 1913.

In the course of the interview which I had this morning with M.
de Margerie, formerly French Minister in China and Assistant to the
Director-General of Political Affairs, he questioned me on the passing
of our military law, its importance, its significance, its object, and its
chances of success in Parliament.

I gave a suitable reply, remarking, with all necessary reservations,
that the close relations into which Great Britain had recently entered
with certain Great Powers did not leave her in the same position to-
wards us which she had formerly occupied, although the existence of
a free and independent Belgium continues to be a vital necessity for
her policy. Our wish is, if possible, to prevent Belgium from again
becoming the battlefield of Europe, as she has been too often in the
past.

I added that it was the intention of Belgium to possess an army
which should be strong enough to be taken seriously and which would
allow her to fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her inde-
pendence and neutrality.

"That is excellent," M. de Margerie replied, "but are not your
new armaments actuated by the fear that your neutrality might be
violated by France?" "No," I replied, "they are no more directed
against France than against Germany; they are intended to prevent
anyone, whoever he may be, from entering the country. M. Poincare
has assured me that France would never take the initiative in violat-

* The Second Belgian Qrey Book. London: Printed under the authority
of His Majesty's Stationery OflSce, 1915. No English translation was published
by the Belgian Government. Title of publication in the original text: Royaume
de Belgique. Correapondance Diplomatique Relative d la Ouerre de 1914-1915,
II, Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79, Boulevard Saint-Oermain; Londres,
18, King William Street, Strand, 1915.

419

420 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ing our neutrality, but that if the German armies should enter
Belgium and we should not be strong enough to drive them back,
the Government of the Republic would consider themselves justified
in taking whatever steps they thought expedient to defend French
territory, either upon their own frontier or, if the General Staff
thought it more expedient, to advance to meet the Imperial armies.

"I cannot," I added, "doubt M. Poincare's word. I place every
trust in his statements, and I am even bound to say that in my hum-
ble opinion, and I only speak now as a private individual, it seems
to me that strategically it would be more advantageous to Germany
to make use of Belgium as a road whereby a blow could be struck at
the heart of France not far from the capital, than it would be for
the armies of the Republic to go and attack the German frontier in
the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. But, as I have already said,
we are not relying on any balancing of probabilities; besides what
may be true to-day may not be so to-morrow, since new circumstances
may arise, and our sole object is to prevent, so far as our strength
allows, any violation of our neutrality."

M. de Margerie showed sustained interest in our conversation as
to the defence of Belgium. I have no doubt that he will repeat what
I said to those whom it concerns.

Babon Guillaume.

No. 2.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, April 2, 1914.

The French Ambassador this morning communicated to me in con-
fidence a conversation which he had had quite recently with Herr von
Jagow after a private dinner at which he was the guest of the latter.

During a recent absence of M. Cambon, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies met the French Charge d 'Affaires at an evening party
and, a few days afterwards, the Naval Attache, and said to them that
Germany and France ought to come to an understanding as to the
construction and linking-up of the railway lines which those coun-
tries proposed to build in Africa in order that these lines should not
compete with one another.

M. Cambon asked the meaning of these overtures. Herr von

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 421

Jagow replied that the question was still under consideration, but
that he, as well as Herr Solf , thought that an understanding between
the two countries and also with England would be very useful. ' * In
that case," replied the Ambassador, "it would be necessary to invite
Belgium to confer with us, for that country is building new railway
lines in the Congo, and in my view it would be preferable that the
conference should take place at Brussels."

" Oh no ! " replied the Secretary of State, * * for it is at the expense
of Belgium that our agreement would have to be reached." — "How
would that be?" — "Do you not think that King Leopold has placed
too heavy a burden on the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not
rich enough to develop this vast domain. It is an enterprise which
is beyond her financial means and her power of expansion. She will
be obliged to give it up. ' '

M. Cambon thought this view altogether exaggerated.

Herr von Jagow did not consider himself beaten. He developed
the view that only the Great Powers are in a condition to colonise.
He disclosed even what was at the bottom of his mind, arguing that
in the transformation which was going on in Europe to the advantage
of the strongest nationalities, as a result of the development of eco-
nomic forces and means of communication, small States could no
longer lead the independent existence which they had enjoyed up to
the present. They were destined to disappear or to gravitate into
the orbit of the Great Powers.

M. Cambon replied that these views were by no means those of
France nor, so far as he knew, those of Great Britain; that he still
thought that certain agreements were necessary for the proper devel-
opment of Africa, but that on the conditions set out by Herr von
Jagow no understanding was possible.

On receiving this reply Herr von Jagow hastened to say that he
had only expressed his personal views and that he had only spoken
in his private capacity and not as Secretary of State addressing the
French Ambassador.

M. Cambon, none the less, takes a very serious view of the opin-
ions which Herr von Jagow did not hesitate to disclose in this con-
versation. He thought that it was in our interest to know the views
with which the official who directs the German policy is animated in
respect to small States and their colonies.

I thanked the Ambassador for his confidential communication.
You will certainly appreciate its full gravity.

Baron Beyens.

422 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 3.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 22, 1914.

I have the honour to lay before you the information which I have
been able to collect on the question of the relations between the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Ten days ago the attitude at the Ballplatz was very warlike. The
Minister for Foreign Affairs and his principal advisers used very
aggressive language. They appeared determined to give to the
demarche about to be made at Belgrade a very energetic character
and, foreseeing a refusal on the part of the Serbian Government to
submit to all the conditions which were to be imposed, they showed
no hesitation in admitting the necessity for armed intervention. Al-
ready the numbers of the eight army corps to be used for the inva-
sion of Serbia were mentioned, and people talked of nothing less than
applying to this kingdom the treatment formerly inflicted upon
Poland by dividing her territory between the neighbouring states.
It seemed that Count Berchtold intended at one blow to take his re-
venge for the successive checks which his policy has suffered during
recent years. It was the practical application of the theory dear
to those who have been preaching for long "that the Serbian ques-
tion must be dealt with once and for all. ' '

In the inner circles of the Austrian Government there does not
appear to have been any protest against such designs, and if the same
view had been taken at Budapest it would not have been impossible
that the Emperor, in spite of his leanings to peace, should have
ranged himself with the unanimous opinion of his advisers.

It is the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has twice visited
Vienna, who tried to rein in these warlike ardours. As a prudent
and far-sighted statesman. Count Tisza pointed out the great danger
which lay in the Austro-Hungarian Government committing itself
lightly to such an adventure, and insisted vigorously on the adop-
tion of a more moderate attitude.

Indeed, it seems very difficult not to come to the conclusion that
an armed conflict between the Monarchy and her neighbour would
contain at least the germ of a European conflagration. It is true that
the Austro-Hungarian press, which talks every day of war with Ser-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 423

bia as not only possible but probable, affects to prophesy that the
war would remain localised between these two Powers. "We should
have the moral support of Germany," they say. "England and
France will not be interested in the question, and Russia far from
intervening will on the contrary advise Serbia to give us full satisfac-
tion." This reasoning is evidently the fruit of a very exaggerated
optimism.

I cannot admit for a moment that the Serbian Government and
the enlightened party in that country have any reason to reproach
themselves for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his
wife, as many people here allege. On the contrary I am convinced
that this unhappy event must have produced a painful impression in
Serbia, since people there were in truth very anxious to maintain
good relations with Austria-Hungary.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, who goes away to-day on
leave but declares himself ready to return to his post at the least
alarm, declares that the Czar's Government will invite King Peter's
counsellors to accept every demand addressed to them in courteous
terms, and having a direct bearing on the murder. The same course
would be taken with respect to the dissolution of certain societies
whose irredentist tendencies are too much accentuated. "But," says
M. Schebeko, "we should not allow Serbia to be made the subject of
a general attack intended to discredit her."

I have every reason to believe that M. Pashitch will follow the
first part of this advice, but that he will show himself very determined
if there should be any question of conditions which he could not fulfil
legally or which would inflict a direct blow upon the national pride.
In particular, so far as the dissolution of societies is concerned, it is
worthy of remark that the Serbian constitution, which is very liberal,
guarantees the right of association and in addition it is not a few so-
cieties only which take the reconstitutiwi of "Greater Serbia" for
their political programme, but the whole population of the country
cherishes this dream.

What is more, the Prime Minister at Belgrade certainly takes into
consideration that the whole of the mixture of jougo-Slavs who in-
habit the south of the Monarchy is composed of Serbians, Bosnians,
Slovenes, and Croates who are favourable to his cause. The latter,
in spite of their difference of religion, are greatly dissatisfied with
the regime to which Hungary subjects them, and the great majority
of them, in spite of what is alleged here on the subject, extend their
full sympathies to Serbia.

424 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Apart from the possible intervention of Russia and the uncertain
part which might be played by Roumania, there is in this state of
things a very real danger for Austria-Hungary, and Count Tisza's
moderating words show it sufficiently. Will his influence prevail to
the last? Count Berchtold has just gone to Ischl to report to the
Emperor; it seems that the present uncertain situation cannot con-
tinue for long, and that an early decision must be taken.

CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 4.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, July 24, 1914.

The publication of the ultimatum addressed yesterday by the
Cabinet of Vienna to that of Belgrade goes far beyond anything that
the most pessimistic anticipations of which I informed you in my
report of the 16th of this month had anticipated. Evidently Count
Berchtold and Count Tisza, the responsible authors of this sudden
blow, have come under the influence of the military party and the
Austro-Hungarian General Staff. The result of such a lack of mod-
eration and discretion will inevitably be to attract the sympathies of
the great mass of European public opinion to Serbia, in spite of the
horror caused by the murders of Serajevo. Even at Berlin, to judge
by the Liberal papers, one has the impression that the Austro-Hun-
garian demands are considered excessive. "Austria-Hungary," says
the Vossische Zeitung this morning, "will have to prove the grave
accusations which she brings against Serbia and her Government by
publishing the results of the judicial enquiry held at Serajevo."

Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann had assured us last week
that they did not know the decisions taken by the Vienna Cabinet,
nor the extent of the Austro-Hungarian demands. How can we be-
lieve in this ignorance to-day? It is improbable that the Austro-
Hungarian statesmen should have made up their minds to such a step,
the most dangerous stroke which their diplomacy has ever ventured
against a Balkan State, without having consulted their colleagues at
Berlin, and without having obtained the assent of the Emperor
William. The fact that the Emperor has given a free hand to his

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 425

allies in spite of the risk of bringing on a European conflict, is ex-
plained by the fear and horror which he has of regicides.

' * What is Serbia going to do ? " was the question which the majority
of my colleagues were asking this morning; "Will she turn to Rus-
sia and beg for her support by telegram?" If she does so, she can-
not receive any reply before the expiration of the time-limit in the
Austrian ultimatum. Russia will be obliged as a preliminary to con-
cert measures with France and, very astutely, the Cabinet of Vienna
has postponed the outbreak of the storm until the moment when M.
Poincare and M. Viviani are on their voyage between St. Petersburgh
and Stockholm. The threatening tone in which the Austro-Hun-
garian note is couched is all the more unfortunate because the Rus-
sian Ambassador at Vienna, I learn, had recently informed Count
Berchtold that his Government would support the Austro-Hungarian
demands with the Pashitch Cabinet if those demands were moderate.

To-day a new crisis has begun, recalling the crisis of 1909 after
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The best we can hope is
that it will not develop in a more tragic manner, in spite of the belli-
cose wishes of the Austrian General Staff, which are perhaps shared
by that at Berlin. The best advice to give to Serbia would be to in-
vite the mediation and intervention of the Great Powers.

Baron Beyens.

No. 5.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The situation has suddenly become very serious. It was obvious
that an early demarche by Austria-Hungary to Serbia was to be ex-
pected. But the note delivered on the 23rd of this month by a rep-
resentative of the Monarchy at Belgrade to Dr. Paccu, Acting Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, puts forward demands which are more ex-
cessive and imposes conditions which are harder than I had foreseen.

The press here is unanimous in stating that the conditions im-
posed on Serbia are not of such a nature as to wound her national
pride and dignity and that, therefore, Serbia can and ought to ac-
cept them. But at the same time the press implicitly admits the

426 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

rigorous nature of these conditions, since it expresses only a very
faint hope th«t King Peter's Government will submit to them. Not
to mention the humiliating declaration to be inserted in the Official
Journal and the Order of the Day to the Army, paragraph 5 would
evidently constitute an excessive interference with the internal affairs
of the country. It would amount to a complete delivery of Serbia
to the suzerainty of the Monarchy.

Certainly, a refusal might have the gravest consequences from the
international point of view. It may provoke a European conflict and
cause enormous economic losses. In a few hours the purport of the
Serbian reply will be known, but it is extremely improbable that it
will be of such a nature as to give satisfaction. Besides, King Peter
and his Government would provoke a revolution in the country if
they showed any tendency to make such concessions. This fact must
clearly have been taken into consideration at the Ballplatz, and it
also appears as if such hard conditions had only been imposed because
it was hoped that they would be refused, because it was wished "to
have done with Serbia once and for all."

CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 6.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The situation has grown no worse since yesterday, but this does
not mean that it has grown any better.

As unfavourable symptoms, mention must first be made of the lan-
guage used at the Wilhelmstrasse to the members of the diplomatic
body : The Imperial Government approves the demarche made by the
Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade, and does not consider it
excessive in form. An end must be made of the murder plots and
revolutionary intrigues which are hatched in Serbia. Herr von
Jagow and Herr Zimmermann would not talk in this way if they had
not received orders to this effect from the Emperor, who has de-
termined in the interests of dynastic friendship to support Austria-
Hungary to the last, and who is susceptible to the very legitimate
fears inspired by outrages against Royal personages.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 427

It should, further, be remarked that the German press, with the
exception of course of the Socialist papers, appears to have recovered
from first astonishment caused by the Austro-Hungarian note. It
plays the part of chorus to the press of Vienna and Budapest, and
contemplates coolly the contingency of war while expressing the hope
that it will remain localised.

Finally, the view gains ground more and more among my col-
leagues— and I believe it to be well founded — that it is not so much
a desire to avenge the death of the Hereditary Archduke and to put
an end to the pan-Serbian propaganda, as an anxiety for a personal
rehabilitation as a statesman which has induced Count Berchtold to
send to Belgrade this incredible and unprecedented note. From the
moment when his personal feelings and reputation are at stake it will
be very difficult for him to draw back, to temporise and not to put
his threats into execution.

The favourable signs are less evident. However, they deserve to
be pointed out. Not to mention European public opinion, which
would not understand the necessity for taking up arms to determine
a dispute whose settlement is undoubtedly within the sphere of dip-
lomacy, it appears impossible not to notice the general movement of
reaction and disapproval which manifests itself outside Germany and
Austria-Hungary against the terms of Count Berchtold 's ultimatum.
The Vienna Cabinet, which was right in substance, is wrong in form.
The demand for satisfaction is just; the procedure employed to ob-
tain it is indefensible.

Although Count Berchtold has skilfully chosen his moment to act
— the British Cabinet being absorbed in the question of Home Rule
and Ulster, the head of the French State and his Prime Minister be-
ing on a journey, and the Russian Government being obliged to put
down important strikes — ^the fact that the Austrian Minister has
thought himself bound to send to the Great Powers an explanatory
memorandum, gives to those Powers, and particularly those of the
Triple Entente, the right to reply, that is to say, to open a discussion
and intervene in favour of Serbia, and enter into negotiation with the
Cabinet of Vienna. If it is done at the earliest moment possible, a
great gain in favour of the maintenance of European peace will result.
Even a hasty military demonstration by the Austro-Hungarian army
against Belgrade, after the refusal of the Serbian Government to ac-
cept the ultimatum, might, perhaps, not produce irremediable con-
sequences.

Lastly, the three members of the Triplice are not in perfect agree-

428 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ment in the present dispute. It would not be surprising if the Italian
Government should determine to play a separate part and seek to in-
tervene in the interests of peace.

Baron Betens.

No. 7.

The Belgian Charge d' Affaires at St. Peter shurgh to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petershurgh, July 26, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that Russia will
not permit Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia, to whom, however, mod-
erating advice has been given, counselling her to give way on the
points of the ultimatum which have a judicial and not a political char-
acter. The Russian Government thinks that the situation is very

serious.

Baron de L'escaille.

No. 8.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, July 26, 1914.

What I have to tell you on the subject of the crisis is so serious
that I have decided to send you this report by special messenger.
The reports which I have committed to the post, with a fear lest they
should be read by the German cabinet noir, necessarily contained
opinions of a much more optimistic nature.

Repeated conversations, which I had yesterday with the French
Ambassador, the Dutch and Greek Ministers, and the British Charge
d 'Affaires, raise in my mind the presumption that the ultimatum to
Serbia is a blow prepared by Vienna and Berlin, or rather designed
here and executed at Vienna. It is this fact which creates the great
danger. The vengeance to be taken for the murder of the hereditary
Archduke and the pan-Serbian propaganda would only serve as a

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 429

pretext. The object sought, in addition to the annihilation of Serbia
and of the aspirations of the jougo-Slavs, would be to strike a mortal
blow at Russia and France, in the hope that England would remain
aloof from the struggle.

To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion
which prevails in the German General Staff that war with France
and Russia is unavoidable and near — an opinion which the Emperor
has been induced to share. Such a war, warmly desired by the mil-
itary and pan-German party, might be undertaken to-day, as this
party think, in circumstances which are extremely favourable to Ger-
many, and which probably will not again present themselves for some
time: "Germany has finished the strengthening of her army which
was decreed by the law of 1912, and on the other hand she feels that
she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with Russia and
France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrheitrag has been a
disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has demon-
strated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the mis-
take of making a display of her strength before having finished her
military reorganisation. That strength will not be formidable for sev-
eral years ; at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary
for its deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed
her deficiency in guns of large calibre ; but apparently it is this arm
that will decide the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which
during the last two years Germany has been trying, not without some
success, to detach from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal
dissensions and her Irish quarrels."

In the eyes of my colleagues as well as in my own, the existence
of a plan concerted between Berlin and Vienna is proved by the ob-
stinacy with which the Wilhelmstrasse denies having had knowledge
of the tenor of the Austrian note prior to Thursday last. It was
also only on Thursday last that it was known at Rome, from which
circumstances arise the vexation and dissatisfaction displayed here
by the Italian Ambassador. How can it be admitted that this note,
which, owing to the excessive severity of its terms and the shortness
of the period allowed to the Cabinet of Belgrade for their execution,
is destined to render war immediate and unavoidable, was drafted
without consultation with and without the active collaboration of the
German Government, seeing that it will involve the most serious con-
sequences for that Government? An additional fact, which proves
the intimate cooperation of the two Governments, is their simultane-

430 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ous refusal to prolong the period allowed to Serbia. After the re-
quest for an extension formulated by the Russian Charge d 'Affaires
at Vienna had been refused yesterday at the Ballplatz, here, at the
Wilhelmstrasse, Herr von Jagow evaded similar requests presented
by the Russian and English Charges d 'Affaires, who, in the name of
their respective Governments, claimed the support of the Berlin Cab-
inet for the purpose of inducing Austria to grant Serbia a longer in-
terval in which to reply. Berlin and Vienna were at one in their de-
sire for immediate and inevitable hostilities. The paternity of the
scheme, as well as of the procedure employed, which are, on account
of their very cleverness, worthy of a Bismarck, is attributed here, in
the diplomatic world, to a German rather than to an Austrian brain.
The secret had been well guarded, and the execution of the scheme
followed with marvellous rapidity.

It should be observed that, even if the secret aim of the states-
men of the two empires is not to make the war general and force
Russia and France to take part, but merely to destroy the power of
Serbia and prevent her from carrying on her clandestine propaganda,
the result is the same. It is impossible that that result has not been
perceived by the far-seeing rulers of the German Empire. On either
of these assumptions, the intervention of Russia would appear inevita-
ble ; they must have deliberately faced this complication, and prepared
themselves to support their allies with vigour. The prospect of a
European war has not caused them an instant 's hesitation, if, indeed,
the desire to evoke it has not been the motive of their actions.

Diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia have been broken
off since yesterday evening. Events are developing rapidly. It is
expected here that the Serbian King, together with his Government
and the Army, will withdraw to the newly-annexed territories, and
allow the Austrian troops to occupy Belgrade and the country abut-
ting on the Danube, without offering any resistance. Then, however,
arises the painfully acute question : what will Russia do ?

We too must put this disquieting question to ourselves, and hold
ourselves in readiness for the worst eventualities, for the European
war, of which people were always talking on the agreeable assumption
that it would never break out, has now become a threatening reality.

The tone of the semi-official German press is more moderate this
morning and suggests the possibility of a localisation of the war, only
however at the cost of the desinteressement of Russia, who is to con-
tent herself with the assurance that the territorial integrity of Serbia
will be respected. Is not the aim of this language to give some satis-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 431

faction to England and also to German public opinion, which, in spite
of yesterday 's Austrophile demonstrations in the streets of Berlin, is
still pacific and alarmed ? In any event the denouement of the crisis,
whatever it may be, is apparently to be expected soon.

I am, &c.,

Baron Beyens.

No. 9.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 26, 1914.

As I foresaw, the Serbian Government 's reply to the Austro-Hun-
garian note has been found insufficient by the representative of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy at Belgrade. General Baron von Giesl
left immediately with all his staff: mobilisation has been ordered on
both sides, and war appears imminent.

The very severe terms of the above-mentioned note, the refusal to
enter into any discussion upon them, and the brevity of the period
given, seem to show clearly that the position arrived at is precisely
that which was desired here. It is evident that the action undertaken
by the Austro-Hungarian Government had been fully approved in
Berlin. Some persons go so far as to maintain that Count Berchtold
adopted this course under both the encouragement and the pressure
of the German Government, who would not shrink from the danger
of a general conflagration, and would prefer now to come into conflict
with Prance and Russia, where preparations are insufficient, whilst in
three years these two powers would have completed their military re-
organisation.

Yesterday the Austrian papers reproduced a communique pub-
lished by the telegraphic agency of St. Petersburgh to the effect that
Russia could not be indifferent towards the events which had super-
vened between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Yesterday, on the other hand, the Russian Charge d 'Affaires made
an official demarche at the Ballplatz with the object of gaining an
extension of the time-limit for Serbia, and received a polite refusal.

These facts in themselves do not enable us to predict with abso-
lute assurance that the Czar will take up arms on Serbia's behalf. On

432 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the other hand, however, it seems very difficult to assume that Russia
will remain as a passive spectator of the crushing of this Slavonic
state.

At Belgrade, where an unqualified submission would very prob-
ably have provoked a revolution and endangered the lives of the
Sovereign and his ministers, the object will have been to gain time.
It is to be supposed that the reply handed by Mr. Pashitch to Gen-
eral von Giesl made important concessions as regards a large number
of the conditions demanded, especially in relation to those referring
to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and the pos-
sibility of arriving at a compromise need not be despaired of if the
Powers, animated by a sincere desire for the maintenance of peace,
made all possible efforts to attain that result. It is highly desirable
that this solution should be found. Unfortunately, however, the very
resolute attitude of Austria-Hungary, and the support accorded to
her by (Germany, permit of but faint hopes on this head.

I am, &c.,
CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 10.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, July 27, 1914.

The contradictory opinions which I have gathered to-day in the
course of my conversations with my colleagues, render it difficult for
me to form a precise opinion on the situation as it presents itself at
the end of the third day of the crisis. I thought that it would be
safest to speak to the Under-Secretary of State himself, but I did not
succeed in seeing Herr Zimmermann until 8 o'clock in the evening, and
immediately on my return to the Legation (without even leaving time
to take a copy of it, for I wish that this letter may go by the last
train this evening) I am sending you a memorandum of our conver-
sation.

The Under-Secretary of State spoke to me as follows : —

**It is neither at our instigation nor by our advice that
Austria has made the demarche which you know of to the
Cabinet of Belgrade. The reply has not been satisfactory and

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 433

to-day Austria is mobilising. She will carry the matter
through. She cannot draw back without losing all her prestige
both within and without the Monarchy. It is now a question
of existence for her, to be or not to be. She must cut short
the audacious propaganda which aims at her internal disin-
tegration, and at the rebellion of all her Slavonic provinces in
the Danube Valley. She must also avenge, in a striking man-
ner, the assassination of the Archduke. For that a severe and
salutary lesson must be administered to Serbia by means of a
military expedition. A war between Austria and Serbia can-
not then be avoided.

"England has asked us to combine with her, and with
France and Italy, with a view to preventing the extension of
the conflict and the breaking out of hostilities between Austria
and Russia, or rather the British proposal contemplates a peace-
ful settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute so that it may not
spread to other nations. We have replied that we desired noth-
ing better than to aid in circumscribing the conflict by making
representations in that sense to St. Petersburgh and Vienna, but
that we would not press Austria not to inflict an exemplary
punishment on Serbia. We have promised our support and as-
sistance to our allies, if any other nation puts obstacles in the
way of this. We shall keep our promise. If Russia mobilises
her army, we shall immediately mobilise our own, and war will
then become general; it will be a war involving the whole of
central Europe and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Rou-
manians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Turks will be un-
able to resist the temptation to take part in it, one against
another.

''Yesterday I said to M. Boghitschewitsh (the former Ser-
bian Charge d 'Affaires, who was highly esteemed at Berlin but
who was unfortunately transferred to Cairo; he is on a short
visit here) that the best advice that I could give to his coun-
try, would be not to oppose Austria otherwise than by a pre-
tence of military resistance, and to conclude peace at the earli-
est possible moment by accepting all the conditions demanded
by the Cabinet of Vienna. I added that if a general war breaks
out and results in a victory for the armies of the Triple Al-
liance, Serbia will practically cease to exist as a nation, she will
be erased from the map of Europe. She had better not expose
herself to such a risk.

' * In the meantime I do not wish to conclude this conversation
on too pessimistic a note. I have some hope that a general
conflagration can be avoided. We are informed by telegraph
from St. Petersburgh that M. Sazonow is more disposed to con-
sider the situation calmly. I hope that we shall be able to
dissuade him from intervening in favour of Serbia, whose ter-
ritorial integrity and future independence Austria is deter-
mined to respect, once she has obtained satisfaction."

434 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I represented to Herr Zimmermann that, according to certain of
my colleagues who had read the Belgrade Cabinet's reply, this was a
complete capitulation to the Austrian demands, to which satisfaction
had been given subject to merely formal limitations. The Under-
Secretary of State replied that he had no knowledge of the reply and,
moreover, that nothing could prevent a military demonstration by
Austria-Hungary. Such is the situation.

I am, &c.,

Baron Betens.

No. 11.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian

Minister at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, July 27, 1914.

I have received your report of the 25th inst. Please telegraph what
stage the mobilisation has reached and when hostilities may be ex-
pected to begin. Your colleague in Berlin writes on the 26th that in
his opinion Germany and Austria-Hungary have taken stock together
of all the consequences which might follow from the ultimatum ad-
dressed to Serbia and have decided to go to any lengths. We ought
to be properly informed with a view to our own course of action.

Davignon.

No. 12.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Events are moving so rapidly that one must be on one's guard
against making predictions, especially too favourable ones, in case
they are falsified by facts. It is more profitable to seek to unravel
the causes of the present crisis in order to understand its develop-
ment, as far as possible, and forecast its conclusion.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 435

This is what I tried to do in my report of the 26th July. The
opinion which I expressed in the first part of it still seems to me the
soundest. I am bound, however, to submit to you to-day a divergent
opinion because it comes from a man who is in a position to form a
good judgment on the situation, the Italian Ambassador, with whom
I had a conversation yesterday.

According to M. BoUati the German Government, whilst agreeing
in principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity of striking
a blow at Serbia, was ignorant of the purport of the Austrian Note,
or, in any case, did not know that it was couched in terms so violent
and so unusual in the language of diplomacy. At Vienna, as at Ber-
lin, they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of the official assurances
recently exchanged between the Tsar and M. Poincare on the subject
of the full preparedness of the two armies of the Dual Alliance, was
incapable of engaging in a European "War and would not dare to
launch herself upon so formidable an adventure — disquieting internal
situation; revolutionary intrigues afoot; military equipment incom-
plete; means of communication inadequate; all these reasons must
force the Russian Government to be an impotent spectator of the ex-
ecution of Serbia. The same low estimate is taken, not indeed of the
French army, but of the spirit which prevails in Governmental circles
in France.

The Italian Ambassador believes that a great mistake is being
made here as to the steps which the Government of the Czar will de-
cide to take. According to him, the Russian Government will find
itself forced to the necessity of making war, in order not to lose all
authority and all prestige in the eyes of the Slavs. Inaction, in the
presence of Austria's entry into the field, would be equivalent to sui-
cide. M. Bollati has given me to understand that a European war
would not be popular in Italy. The Italian people has no interest in
the destruction of the power of Russia, who is Austria's enemy. They
need at the present moment to remain quiet and aloof (se-recueillir)
in order to solve at their leisure other problems which are of more
urgent concern to them.

The impression that Russia is incapable of meeting the strain of
a European war prevails not only within the circle of the Imperial
Government but amongst the German industrials who specialise in the
production of material of war. One of these, whose opinion carries
the greatest authority, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, has assured one of
my colleagues that the Russian artillery is far from being good or
complete, whilst that of the German army has never been of a finer

436 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

quality. It would be madness, he added, for Russia to declare war on
Germany under these conditions.

The Serbian Government, taken by surprise at the suddenness of
the Austrian ultimatum, has nevertheless replied, before the expiry
of the time-limit, to the demands of the Vienna Cabinet, and has
agreed to give all the satisfactions asked for. Its answer has been
badly presented, in too voluminous a text, accompanied by too many
corroborative documents ; it constitutes a bulky document, instead of
being in short, precise form. It would appear, nevertheless, to be
very conclusive. It has been communicated to all the Cabinets inter-
ested— ^yesterday morning to that of Berlin. How comes it that no
German newspaper has published it, whilst they almost all reproduced
an Austrian telegram declaring that the Serbian answer is quite in-
adequate ? Is not that a new proof of the inflexible resolution, formed
both here and at Vienna, to go ahead, at whatever cost ?

Baron Beyens.

No. 13.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. le Baron
Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, July 28, 1914.

Be so good as to telegraph if measures have already been taken
with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Keep me in-
formed by telegraph of all that you may learn on this subject.

Davignon.

No. 14.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.
I take the opportunity offered me of a safe channel to transmit
to you impressions which I would not trust to the post.

The declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia has been

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 437

judged by public opinion to be an event tending dangerously to com-
promise the peace of Europe. This is the way in which the Cabinet
at Vienna responds to the attempts at conciliation made in London
and Petersburgh ; it breaks down the bridges behind it, so as to pre-
vent all possibility of retreat. There is a fear that this declaration of
war may be considered by the Czar as a challenge.

Hostilities are bound then to commence, but they might be of short
duration, if Germany would consent to use her influence upon her
ally, or if, on their side, the Serbs would yield to the advice given
them, and would retire before the invader, without giving him the
opportunity to perpetrate any useless bloodshed. By occupying Bel-
grade, without striking a blow, Austria would have at the same time
a moral and material satisfaction and a pledge — both which things
would permit of her not Showing herself too obdurate. An interven-
tion might then perhaps take place with some chance of success.

Unhappily these are only suppositions inspired by the desire to
prevent a European catastrophe. But here is a fact, which might
possibly influence the measures taken by the Cabinet of Berlin. Sir
Edward Grey declared yesterday to Prince Lichnowsky that if a
European war broke out, none of the six Great Powers would be able
to keep out of it. At the same time the German papers announced
that the British Fleet had been put onto a war footing.

It is certain that these warnings will dissipate an illusion which
everyone at Berlin, both in official circles and in the press, found
a pleasure in creating for themselves. Articles in papers, published
during these last few days, even after the opening of the conflict,
breathed the greatest confidence in the neutrality of England. There
can be no doubt that the Imperial Government had reckoned upon it,
and that it will have to modify all its calculations. As in 1911, the
Berlin Cabinet has been deceived by badly informed agents; to-day,
as then, it sees England, in spite of all the advances, in spite of all the
diplomatic caresses with which Germany has been lavish these two
years past, ready to go over to the camp of its enemies. The reason
is that the British statesmen are well aware of the dangers which the
absolute hegemony of Germany on the European Continent would
entail for their country, and they attach a vital interest, not from
sentimental motives, but from considerations of the Balance of Power,
to the existence of France as a Great Power.

The German papers to-day at last publish the answer of Serbia
to the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government, with the Austrian
commentary. Its late appearance is to a large extent the fault of the

438 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Serbian Charge d 'Affaires ; he had omitted to have the document type-
written in order to send copies to the press. The impression which it
will make in Berlin, where people persist in looking only with the
eyes of Austria and where, up till now, with a quite inexplicable com-
pliance, they approve everything which Austria has done, will be
practically nil.

In your telegram of the 28th inst. you ask me to keep you in-
formed of the measures taken with a view to the mobilisation of the
German army. Happily, up till now, we have not to do with mobili-
sation, in the strict sense. But, as a military attache said to me yes-
terday evening, every State before mobilising takes within its ter-
ritory certain preparatory measures, without exciting attention — re-
call of officers and men from furlough, purchase of horses for the
artillery and ammunition wagons, which are not completed unless war
breaks out, preparation of shells, ammunition, &c. There can be no
question that these measures of precaution have been taken in Ger-
many. It is no less necessary to keep a cool head than it is to be on
the alert. We ought to do nothing rash; to recall, at the moment
when desperate efforts are being made to preserve peace, three classes
of our army would seem here to be premature, and there is a risk
of its producing an unfortunate impression.

Baron Beyens.

No. 15.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

I have to advise you that the negotiations which had taken place
at St. Petersburgh between the Austrian Ambassador and the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs have been broken off for two days.
Mobilisation is proceeding on both sides. The rupture appeared im-
minent, but after a long and friendly conversation, which took place
yesterday between the Russian Ambassador and the Austro-Hunga-
rian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a basis has been found for the re-
sumption of negotiations.

CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 439

No. 16.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 30, 1914.

My reports of the last few days have sufficiently shown that I
was not successful in getting precise information as to the intentions
of Russia, with regard to which country the Austro-Hungarian press
moreover observes, by order, a complete silence. I was wondering
whether the Government of the Czar would not maintain an expectant
attitude and would ultimately intervene only if Austria-Hungary
made what was in their eyes an extravagant use of the victories she
was about to gain.

At last, yesterday evening, I succeeded in gathering from a sure
source some authentic data.

The situation is almost hopeless, and the Russian Ambassador was
expecting at every moment to be recalled. He has made one last ef-
fort which has succeeded in warding off the immediate danger. The
conversation of His Excellency with Count Berchtold has been long
and absolutely friendly. The Ambassador and the Minister have both
recognised that their Governments had given orders for mobilisation,
but they parted on good terms.

On leaving the Ballplatz, M. Schebeko repaired to M. Dumaine's,
where Sir Maurice de Bunsen was also present. This interview was
profoundly moving, and the Russian Ambassador was congratulated
warmly by his colleagues on the success which he had gained so
cleverly.

The situation continues to be grave, but at any rate the possibility
of resuming negotiations has been given, and there is still some hope
that all the horrors and all the ruin which a European war would
necessarily cause may be avoided.

I am astounded to see with what recklessness and at the same time
with what egoism people here have rushed upon an adventure
which might have the most terrible consequences for the whole of
Europe.

I commit this report to a compatriot recalled to military service,
and I take the opportunity. Monsieur le Ministre, of telling you that,
whether rightly or wrongly, the Austrian post has the reputation of
being indiscreet. Under these conditions, and in view of present cir-

440 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

cumstances, you will be good enough to excuse me if I sometimes find
myself obliged to write less openly than I should like to do.

CoMTE Ebrembault de Dudzeele.

No. 17.

The Belgian Minister at St. PetersburgJi to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, iSf*. Petershurgli, July 31, 1914.

On arising this morning at St. Petersburgh I went to see the
French Ambassador; M. Paleologue spoke to me to the following
effect : —

"The mobilisation is general. So far as France goes it has
not yet been notified, but there can be no doubt as to the fact.
M. Sazonof is still negotiating. He is making the utmost ef-
forts to obviate a war and has shown himself ready for all con-
cessions. The German Ambassador has also, personally,
worked his hardest in the direction of peace. Count de Pour-
tales called on M. Sazonof and entreated him to use his influence
with Austria. The Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs re-
plied to him more than once: 'Give me some means of doing
so: cause some word of conciliation to be addressed to me,
which makes it possible for me to open conversation with
Vienna. Tell your ally to make some concession, however small,
to withdraw those points only in the ultimatum which no coun-
try could possibly accept.' The German Ambassador has al-
ways replied that his country was no longer able to give any
counsels of moderation to Austria. It is probable that at
Vienna it is not admitted that the German Empire is lending
to its ally anything but an unconditional support.

"More than once," continued M. Paleologue, "the Imperial
Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Count de Portales 'Have
you any communication to give me from your Government?'
The German Ambassador was obliged to answer on each occa-
sion in the negative, insisting over again that the initiative
must come from St. Petersburgh. At last M. Sazonof asked for
an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, and told him that
he accepted everything, either a conference of Ambassadors at
London or the conversation ' of Four, ' undertaking not to inter-
fere in it, and promising to adopt the opinion of the other Pow-
ers. Nothing had any effect; Vienna has consistently refused
to discuss: Austria has mobilised eight army corps; she has

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 441

bombarded Belgrade. Italy, it appears, is to be expected to
maintain an attitude of reserve.

"The Russian patriotic press and the military element are
both maintaining a notable calm. It would not appear to be
the ease that any pressure exerted upon the Emperor by his
military entourage has determined the attitude of the Russian
Government. Confidence is felt in M. Sazonof. It is the ex-
traordinary attitude of Germany which is preventing the efforts
of M. Sazonof from having any result."

I have also just had a talk with the British Ambassador. He tells
me that M. Sazonof had tried from the outset to ascertain the inten-
tions of the London Government, but, up till now, in spite of the
mobilisation of the British Fleet, Sir George Buchanan has not yet
been instructed to make any communication of this kind to the Pont
des Chantres. The instructions of the Ambassador are to explain to
St. Petersburgh that if Russia desires the support of Great Britain, it
must carefully avoid even the appearance of any aggressive step in
the present crisis.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian means of mobilisation
are much slower than those of Austria. Bukovina is named as the
point at which the Russian Army might attempt to enter upon Aus-
trian territory.

COMTE C. DE BUISSERETT StEENBECQUE DE BlARENGHIEN.

No. 18.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, July 31, 1914.

I have just had a long conversation with M. de Margerie. He is
very much disturbed by the situation. Baron von Sehon had promised
to communicate the reply given to the overture made in Vienna. He
has heard nothing. Nevertheless touch is being maintained every-
where between the chancelleries; conversations are going on every-
where, but without result.

M. de Margerie gave me the following military information, which
I telegraphed to you immediately : Germany is putting her army upon
the footing of Kriegsgefahr; that implies a notable aggravation of
the measures already taken. Russia has taken important decisions, in

442 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the matter of its railways. All this does not amount to mdhilisation
in the strict sense, but it comes near to it.

I asked M. de Margerie what the French Government were going
to do; he would answer nothing further than that they would not
mobilise before Germany, but certain measures might be deemed im-
perative.

Time does not allow of my writing more. We are being besieged
by Belgians recalled to Belgium, by those who seek various kinds of
information, &c.

Baron Guillaumb.

No. 19.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 31, 1914.

The Neue Freie Presse of this evening publishes a telegram from
Berlin which, coming immediately after the announcement of general
mobilisation, has produced a great sensation. It says that Germany
has asked Russia for explanations as to the motives of her mobilisation
and that she demands an answer within twenty-four hours.

I went to the British Ambassador's, whom I found very much
astonished at the double news. He had no information tending to
confirm the latter statement. His Excellency had had this morning
a conversation with the second Departmental Chief in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which the latter had given him
the same comparatively reassuring explanations which Count Berch-
told had given the evening before to M. Schebeko, declaring especially
that the general mobilisation decreed in Austria-Hungary had no ag-
gressive character against Russia.

The question now is, is Germany in her turn going to mobilise?
If that were so, the situation would take a turn of extreme gravity,
since this measure would, I am assured, be immediately imitated in
France.

At the Embassy of the French Republic the prevailing impression
this evening is pessimistic, and the staff are making arrangements with
a view to a speedy departure, which appears to these gentlemen more
and more probable.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 443

I write you these lines in great ha^te, in order to be able to entrust
them to a compatriot who is leaving for Belgium to-night.

CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 20.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I take the opportunity of a safe channel in order to write to you
and give you certain confidential information as to the latest develop-
ments.

At 6 P.M. no answer had yet come from St. Petersburgh to the ulti-
matum from the Imperial Government. Herr von Jagow and Herr
Zimmermann went to the Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to
secure that the order for general mobilisation should not be issued
to-day, but they were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister
for War and the Chiefs of the Army, who must have represented to the
Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty-four hours' delay. The
order was immediately issued and brought to the knowledge of the
general public by a special edition of the Lokal-Anzeiger. I tele-
graphed it to you immediately.

The official and semi-official papers, the brief pronouncements of
the Emperor and of the Chancellor, and all the official Proclamations
which are to appear, will seek to throw the responsibility of the war
upon Eussia. In governing circles there is still an unwillingness to
doubt the good faith of the Emperor; but it is said that he has been
got round and skilfully led to believe that he had done all that was
necessary for the maintenance of peace, whilst Russia was resolved
absolutely on war.

I wrote to you that the Ambassador of the Czar had not received
any official confirmation of the general mobilisation in Russia. He
was informed of it at 1 o'clock yesterday by Herr von Jagow; but
having received no telegram communicating the news to him, he
formally threw doubt upon it. Is it possible that Count Pourtal^s
took for a complete mobilisation what were only preparatory meas-
ures of war ? Or can it even be that this mistake has been voluntarily
made in Berlin ? One loses oneself in suppositions.

444 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

It was impossible for Russia to accept the German ultimatum, pre-
senting as it did so short a time-limit, one almost insulting, and the
obligation to demobilise, that is to say, to cease all measures pre-
paratory to war, both on the Austrian and on the German frontiers,
at the very time when Austria had mobilised half her forces. As for
the Government of the French Republic, they had no intention of re-
turning any answer to Germany, not being bound to give account of
their conduct to any save their allies — so the French Ambassador ex-
pressed it to me.

With a little good-will on the side of Berlin, peace might have been
preserved and the irreparable catastrophe prevented. The day before
yesterday the Austrian Ambassador declared to M. Sazonof that his
Government were willing to discuss with him the basis of their note to
Serbia ; that they undertook to respect the territorial integrity of their
adversary, that they did not even cherish any ambition to regain the
Sandjak, only they would not allow any other Power to take its place
in dealing with Serbia. M. Sazonof replied that on this basis it was
possible to come to an understanding, but that he preferred that the
negotiations should be conducted in London under the impartial di-
rection of the British Government rather than at St. Petersburgh or at
Vienna. At the same time, the Czar and the German Emperor were
exchanging friendly telegrams. The German Government seem to
have arranged this scenario in order to lead up to the war, which they
seek to render inevitable, but the responsibility for which they desire
to throw upon Russia.

Babon Beyens.

No. 21.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 2, 1914.

In the course of a conversation which I had yesterday evening with
M. de Margerie, he said to me : * * The situation is certainly very grave,
but it would not be considered hopeless if we could have more con-
fidence in the attitude of Germany. The British proposal, by virtue
of which the Great Powers would engage to demobilise under certain
conditions, has been warmly accepted by France, Russia, and Italy;

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 445

Austria would come into line, but the Berlin Cabinet gives no
answer. ' '

The military measures which Germany has taken against Russia
are much less severe and less complete than those taken against
France. One asks why. I said again to-day to Baron von Schon:
"Are you trying to fasten a German quarrel upon us? Relations be-
tween the two countries have been good for a fairly long time and
there is no incident between us. That being so, why does your Gov-
ernment act in this fashion, if it has no arriere-pensee? Why have
you yourself been ostentatiously packing up for several days?"

M. de Margerie, to whom I had made the communication prescribed
in your telegram of the 1st August (see First Grey Book, No. 16), has
repeated to me what the French Minister told you as to the intentions
of the Government of the French Republic with regard to us.

M. de Margerie said to me yesterday evening that it was part of
the programme of the French Government not to decree mobilisation
before Germany had done so, but that the neighbour on the East was
taking measures which were equivalent to a state of mobilisation with-
out pronouncing the word, and that under these conditions the dan-
gers were becoming too great for them to refrain from acting without
delay. "All Europe would laugh at our nmvete," said he in conclu-
sion of this friendly conversation.

Baron Guillaume.

No. 22.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, August 2, 1914.

I have the honour to confirm my telegram of to-day : —
"I have executed the instructions contained in your telegram of
yesterday. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me for this com-
munication, of which he has kept a copy and taken note (see First
Grey Book, -No. IQ)."

I learnt to-day, by the indiscretion of a General Officer, belonging
to the Emperor's Household, that Luxemburg would be occupied to-
night. Whether it was a question of the Grand Duchy or of our
Province, I was not able to elicit clearly. The Grand Duchy was oc-

446 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

cupied to-day. "Will our Province be occupied to-night ? If the news
is official to-morrow morning, I shall immediately protest to Herr von
Jagow and Herr Zimmermann. I shall call their attention to the
disastrous consequences of such an action, but I shall wait for your
instructions before asking for my passports. I telegraphed to you in
my state of uncertainty :

"Rumours portending danger to us. I consider that the Belgian
Army ought to be ready immediately for all eventualities."

Babon Betens.

No. 23.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, August 2, 1914.

I had the honour to receive this morning your telegram of August
Ist. (See First Grey Book, No. 16.) I immediately communicated
with the Imperial and Royal Department for Foreign Affairs, and at
1 o'clock, after having read to the Minister the note with regard to
our neutrality which you have addressed to me, I handed a copy of
it to His Excellency, which he was good enough to acknowledge.

Count Berchtold expressed his astonishment at Holland having also
mobilised. He seemed unable to understand what reasons could have
induced the Government of Queen Wilhelmina to take this precau-
tionary measure at the present stage.

CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 24.

The Belgia/n Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, August 2, 1915.

The die appears to have been cast and the universal war seems to
have become inevitably, Germany has ordered mobilisation, and the

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 447

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me an hour ago that Russian patrols
had crossed the frontier of the German Empire.

The news, which came yesterday afternoon from Berlin, and the
article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung have produced a
great sensation. The Czar is reproached in lively terms in that he
asked the intervention of the German Emperor in favour of the
maintenance of peace, giving his word that the mobilisation would not
take place, and then proceeded all the same with this operation, whilst
attempting to keep it secret. Viennese papers declare that such a way
of acting is unworthy, that it is playing the part of a traitor, and it
is now proclaimed more loudly than ever that if the war becomes
general Russia alone will be to blame.

Following upon the assassination of M. Jaures, a rumour was
spread here yesterday evening that a revolution had broken out in
Paris and that the President of the Republic had been killed. The
French Ambassador, whom I saw at 11 o'clock, and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who had received me at 1 o'clock, had had no con-
firmation of this news, no doubt circulated by those who hoped that the
French Socialists would oppose the war. On the contrary, the news
has come that France in its turn has mobilised.

Vienna is very much preoccupied about the decision which Eng-
land will take. From the conversations which I have had during these
last few days with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, I imagine that, after hav-
ing kept up their efforts for conciliation till the last minute, the Eng-
lish Government will maintain at the outset a waiting attitude. This
is what Count Berchtold also told me to-day.

Public opinion here counts much upon England standing com-
pletely out, and the newspapers are continually publishing articles
calculated to corroborate this view. I am afraid that on this matter
they labour under too many illusions. The Ambassador said to me
the day before yesterday: "No one in England can yet say at this
moment what we are going to do. We shall be guided by events, but
we should not allow France to be crushed without intervening."

COMTE EeBEMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

448 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 25.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, Augtist 4, 1914.

I was received this morning at 9 o'clock by the Minister for For-
eign Affairs. He said to me : " "We have been obliged by absolute ne-
cessity to address to your Government the request of which you are
aware. For Germany it is a matter of life and death. In order not
to be crushed, she has first to crush France and then turn against
Russia. We have learnt that the French Army was preparing to pass
through Belgium, in order to attack our flank. We are bound to
forestall it. If the Belgian army abstains from blowing up the
bridges, allows us to occupy Liege and retires upon Antwerp, we
promise, not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the life and
property of its inhabitants, but also to pay you an indemnity. It is
only with the utmost anguish {la mart dans Vame) that the Emperor
and the Government have seen themselves obliged to come to this de-
cision. For me it is the most painful one that I have ever had to
make in the course of my career. ' '

I answered that the Belgian Government could only return to this
proposition the reply which they had made without hesitation. What
would you say of us, if we yielded to a similar threat on the part of
France ? That we were cowards, unable to defend our neutrality and
to live in independence. All Belgium will approve the action of its
Government. France, in spite of what you say, has promised to re-
spect our neutrality, if you respect it.

In return for our loyalty, you make Belgium the field of battle
between France and yourselves. Europe will judge you, and you will
have against you England, the guarantor of our neutrality. Liege
is not quite so easy to take as you imagine.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when pressed by me, acknowl-
edged that we could not have replied to the German demand otherwise
than we had done, and that he understood our answer. He repeated
more than once the expression of his grief that it had come
to this. "It is," he said, "a question of life-and-death for Ger-
many. ' '

I answered that a people, like an individual, cannot live without
honour. I then declared myself ready to leave Berlin with my staff.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 449

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not wish to break off dip-
lomatic relations with us.

I said: "It rests with my Government to make a decision, and I
await their orders before asking you for my passports."

Baron Beyens.

No. 26.

The Belgian Minister in London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, London, August 5, 1914.

You will perhaps be interested to know the views of the French
Embassy on the situation, and I think it is worth while for me to give
you a summary of the conversations which I have had during these
last few days with Monsieur de Fleuriau, Councillor of the Em-
bassy : —

The French concentration begins to-day, and has been arranged to
take place behind the covering troops which are massed upon the
frontier. The Generalissimo is absolutely decided, if necessary, to al-
low the troops of the first line to be crushed, in order to leave time
for the army to take up the positions which have been assigned to it
in the strategic plan, in which the Generalissimo does not intend to
make any modification. Only the event of the British army not co-
operating would oblige him to extend the French left. That is why
M. Cambon is exerting himself at the present moment to obtain from
the British Government a speedy decision as to the despatch of a Brit-
ish expeditionary force to the Continent. This would require from
twelve to fifteen days to be in a position to take part in the military
operations. Everything is ready, the Councilor of Embassy repeated
to me, for the transport of British troops to the French ports, and
thence to the Belgian frontier. "But we must act quickly, because
it would never do for the British to arrive after it is too late."

M. Cambon, in an interview which he had yesterday with Sir Ed-
ward Grey, begged him to note that England had decided to go to
war because Belgian neutrality had been violated. * 'But how will you
carry on war," he said, "if the German fleet, as appears very likely,
refuses battle and remains in the Baltic ? You ought then to send the
expeditionary corps to the Continent immediately."

450 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Sir Edward Grey did not answer, but perhaps the decisive refusal
of Germany to respect Belgian neutrality will give the Cabinet in
London food for thought, and will enlighten it as to German tactics,
which consist in acting with an overwhelming rapidity and in adopt-
ing the most daring plans.

I learn that Sweden and Norway have promised Russia, France
and England to remain neutral.

My telegram of to-night asserted that it was Germany which had
declared war on England. This information was first telephoned to
me from the Foreign Office and then confirmed by a circular letter.
But shortly afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs took pains
to rectify this version, which represented the matter somewhat incor-
rectly, and he supplied me with the following communication : —

"A summary refusal having been given by the German
Government to the British demand for an assurance concerning
the respect of Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Ambassador
at Berlin has received his passports, and the British Govern-
ment has announced to the Imperial Government that a state
of war existed between the two countries as from 11 p. m. on
August 4th."

I have summed up this second version in my telegram of to-day.

I remain,

COMTE DE LaLAING.

No. 27.

The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, London, August 5, 1914.

I have handed in to Sir Edward Grey Belgium's appeal to the
three Guaranteeing Powers. Great Britain will naturally answer it
warmly. Sir Edward will read to-day in the House of Commons a
despatch of this morning from Sir F. Villiers containing the text of
that appeal. The fine resistance of Belgium, said the Minister to me,
will render easier the task of the British Cabinet with regard to
public opinion. Great Britain will help you with all her might. Sir
Edward Grey told me that you had asked him to assure the provision-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 451

ing of Antwerp by way of the Scheldt, and that he had for that reason
asked the Dutch Minister to come to see him soon, to whom he will ex-
plain that for Belgium this is necessary under the circumstances, and
that he did not expect any difficulties concerning the free passage of
mercantile vessels. In any case the British First Lord of the Ad-
miralty has told Sir Edward Grey that Belgium could rely on it that
the British fleet will keep good guard at the mouth of the Scheldt.

I remain,

COMTE DE LaLAINQ.

No. 28.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 6, 1914.

I have urged at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that French
military action should be accelerated. I was answered that considera-
ble forces have already gone; several detachments are already in
Belgium.

Baron Guillaume.

No. 29.

The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

London, August 7, 1914.

I have the honour to confirm the fact that Parliament has voted
£100,000,000 war credits and a levy of 500,000 men.

The French and Russian Ambassadors have come to congratulate
the King's Minister on the heroic conduct of the Belgian Army, which,
by delaying the advance of the Germans, compelled them to modify
their original plans, and allowed the enemies of Germany time to
concentrate their forces for the general defence.

The despatch of the Expeditionary Force is being actively pre-
pared. The first transports with provisions and ammunition will
leave for France on Sunday, August 9th, The troops will then be

452 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

embarked, and it is expected that by the end of next week, that is,
about August 15th, the 100,000 men of the Expeditionary Force will
assemble on French soil; according to what I have been told by the
French Ambassador the landing is to be effected at four different
points, after which the troops are to be assembled.

The Prime Minister analysed yesterday in the House of Commons
the Blue Book which I had the honour to send you on August 6th.
He has branded the insidious proposals made to Great Britain by Ger-
many with a view to obtaining her neutrality.

"Besides matters concerning France and Holland," said Mr.
Asquith, "they wanted us to barter away to the Imperial Govern-
ment our obligations towards Belgium, and that without her knowl-
edge. Had we accepted those infamous proposals, what reply could
we have given to-day to the moving appeal which that country has
addressed to us, when she asked us in these last few days to guarantee
her neutrality? I do not envy the man who can read with an un-
moved heart the appeal of the King of the Belgians to his people. Sir,
Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. Had we listened to Ger-
many and betrayed our friends and our duty, what would now be our
position ? In return for our dishonour we would have received prom-
ises from a Power which not only has violated its own promises but
asks you to do the same. We are going to fight, first of all in order
to fulfil our international obligations, secondly in defence of the small
nations. The country will understand that our cause is Just, and I
ask the House to vote a credit of £100,000,000 and to increase the
army to 500,000 men."

The House voted the war credits and the men in the same sitting.
Public opinion has moved at last and the change has come in a most
startling way. Europe had realised that a small nation has given
an example of honour and honesty without considering the conse-
quences. The adherents of peace at any price were beaten. Then, peo-
ple learned that the enemy had crossed the frontier, that fighting had
begun, and that the Belgians had resisted the German colossus. The
speech of our King was read, everyone at last realised the seriousness
of the situation, and even the most pacific Englishman has scrutinised
his conscience. He said to himself, * * Can we abandon a nation which
gives us such an example of loyalty?" Then came the news of the
German atrocities and of the heroic defence of Liege. That was de-
cisive. The whole of England asked for war, and was no longer satis-
fied with the naval support which the Cabinet favoured at first. The
sending of the Expeditionary Force was demanded. The Government

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 453

waited to be given that order by the people. It obeyed. Two Min-
isters who differed resigned office, and their resignations were im-
mediately accepted. Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State
for War, and mobilisation was ordered.

To-day the admiration of this country for Belgium has no limit.
In the military clubs the health of the brave Belgians is drunk, news-
papers of all shades praise our nation. We are receiving numbers of
congratulatory letters and telegrams. If the King came over here, he
would be carried in triumph through the streets of London.

I have opened a subscription for the families of the Belgian
soldiers, and for the sick and wounded of our army; Her Grace the
Duchess of Vendome is its Honourary President, and I shall hold the
funds at your disposal. I am, &c.,

COMTE DE LaLAINQ.

No. 30.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914,

The President of the Republic has done me the honour to announce
that he conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liege. I
thought this a good opportunity for seeing him, and have asked for
an interview in order to thank him. He received me and the inter-
view lasted three-quarters of an hour, and only ended when the Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs asked to speak to him.

He did not want to accept my thanks, declaring that it was he who
had to thank me and to congratulate me. I did not hide from him
my view that France owed to us the value of four days' delay in the
German mobilisation. He is convinced of that. I pass over all the
flattering things which he said to me about our country and our
valiant army.

The French army is in Belgium ; but those are only the vanguard ;
before four days are passed the bulk of the French army will be at
our side. He expects that the French army has already joined battle
with the Germans on our territory. The English will also be soon at
the front ; they need about four more days. A hundred thousand men
will land and wiU be joined by another fifty thousand.

Babon Guillaume.

454 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 31.

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 19, 1914.

The day before yesterday I asked for and obtained an interview
with the President of the Republic to thank him for having conferred
the Legion of Honour on the town of Liege. I have sent you account
of that interview. I could not take a similar step to-day on the oc-
casion of the Military Cross being conferred on the King. I, there-
fore, abstained.

M. de Margerie has just told me that the Austrian Ambassador
will leave Paris to-night. It is not yet announced, in order to avoid
demonstrations. M. Doumergue told him during the day that as the
explanations given by his Government concerning the movements of
troops towards the French frontier were not considered satisfactory,
M. Dumaine had received orders to return to Paris. Count Szecsen
answered that, in these circumstances, he masked for his passports.

Baron Guillaume.

No. 32.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Errem-
bault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 12, 1914.

Please communicate the following note to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs : —

"The necessities of the defence of Antwerp give the military
authorities an incontestable right to remove strangers from the
fortified district. A great number of foreigners and even of
nationals have consequently been asked to leave the place where
Austrian and Hungarian subjects have been able to remain.
Nevertheless, the Consul-General did not telegraph on the sub-
ject either to the Austro-Hungarian Minister or to me, I am
told by the Military Governor of Antwerp that the Consul-Gen-
eral was warned to be prepared to leave the fortified district
(but not Belgium), just as were his compatriots in his district.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 455

At his own request he was conducted to the Dutch frontier, and
he was accompanied by an officer whom he thanked."

Davignon.

No. 33.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, August 18, 1914.

I had the honour to speak to Count Forgach about the alleged
hardship inflicted on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium. Our
conversation was conducted in a friendly manner, and the words of
His Excellency can be summed up as follows : —

''Our Consul-General at Antwerp arrived here a few days
ago. He says that he has been sent in a discourteous manner,
and under disagreeable circumstances, to the Dutch frontier,
with many Germans and Austrians resident at Antwerp. The
military Commander of the fortress seems rather to have lost
his head. We have received from our Minister at Brussels a re-
port concerning those events which seems to confirm the state-
ments of Herr von Sponer."

I think that the regrettable incident can, fortunately, be consid-
ered as closed.

CoMTE Errembault de Dudzeele.

No. 34.

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) August 21, 1914.

The British Minister has been authorised to make the following
declaration to the King : —

"His Majesty's Government will give during the war all
possible military support to Belgium and, after the war, its dip-
lomatic support. The example of patriotism given by the Bel-
gians has impressed us all and will never be forgotten. At the

456 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

conclusion of peace, the Government will do its best to get for
Belgium compensation for the sufferings through which she had
passed."

Daviqnon.

No. 35.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian

Minister at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Antwerp, August 22, 1914.

All measures have been taken to secure that no Austrian subject
should be molested. The President of the Council has himself asked
the Austrian Minister to let him know of any regrettable incident so
that the guilty might be punished.

Davignon.

No. 36.

The Russian Minister in Belgium to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Antwerp, August 27, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you of the following: —

"His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to order me
to declare to His Majesty the King that at the end of the war,
Belgium may count on the fullest diplomatic support of Rus-
sia."

Prince Koudachefp.

No. 37.

The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, London, August 28, 1914.

The day before yesterday, Mr. Asquith announced to the House
of Commons that at the next sitting an address to His Majesty the

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 457

King will be moved, asking him to transmit to the King of the
Belgians the sentiments of sympathy and admiration with which the
House has been inspired by the heroic resistance offered by the Bel-
gian army and nation to the brutal invasion of its territory, and the
assurance that Great Britain was determined to support by every
means the efforts of Belgium to defend her independence and the
public law of Europe.

Yesterday, in fact, Mr. Asquith delivered a speech in the House
in which he rendered signal homage to the Belgian King and Nation.
Never has similar praise of a foreign State been heard in the English
Parliament. The Prime Minister added that Belgium can count on
Great Britain to the very end.

Mr. Bonar Law, in the name of the Opposition, and Mr. Redmond,
in the name of the Irish Nationalists, spoke in the same sense.

In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Crewe, in the name of the
Government, and Lord Lansdowne, as spokesman of the Unionists,
warmly praised Belgium and her King.

Time does not allow me to sum up these speeches, the tribute of
England's gratitude to a country which has rendered an inestimable
service to Great Britain and to the whole of Europe.

Count de Lalaing.

No. 38.

M. Davigtion, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince Koudacheff,
Russian Minister in Belgium.

Sir, Antwerp, August 29, 1914.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August
27th, in which Your Excellency kindly informed me that His Majesty,
the Emperor of Russia, had asked Your Excellency to assure my
august Sovereign that, after the war, Belgium will be able to count
on the diplomatic support of His Government.

I thank Your Excellency for that gracious communication.

Davignon.

458 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 39.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers
at London, Paris, and St. PetershiirgJi.

Sir, Antwerp, August 29, 1915.

Under date of August 26th, the Vice-Governor of Katanga tele-
graphed to the Minister for the Colonies that on August 22nd the
Germans attacked the harbour of Lukuga (Albertville) on Lake
Tanganika.

My colleague, M. Renkin, addressed, on August 28th, the follow-
ing instructions to M. Tonbeur :

"In view of the direct attacks by the Germans against the colony
of the Belgian Congo, and specially against the harbour of Lukuga,
the Government instructs you to take all necessary military measures
for the defence of Belgian territory.

"You may therefore authorise the entry of British troops into
Belgian territory, accept the offer of a free passage for Belgian
troops into Rhodesia, and undertake in cooperation with British
troops, or by means of Belgian troops alone, any offensive action re-
quired for the defence of the integrity of our colonial territory.

"Identical instructions have been addressed to the Governor-
General of the Congo, at Boma, regarding a possible cooperation
with the French troops on our frontier in the Basin of the Ubanghi
for similar defensive measures. ' '

I have communicated to the ministers of France, Great Britain,
and Russia the telegram of the Vice-Governor of Katanga and the
answer sent to him.

Davignon.
(Cf. First Grey Book, No. 57.)

No. 40.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,
Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegraphic.) Antwerp, August 30, 1914.

The Viennese newspapers, especially the Neue Freie Presse, pub-
lish alleged accounts by German and Austrian subjects expelled from

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 459

Belgium, stating that our population committed the greatest atroci-
ties against them under the eyes of the Belgian authorities. A man
called Weber is alleged to have been massacred by the mob at Ant-
werp, whilst at Ostend the baker Bichof is alleged to have been
beaten to death, and his hands and feet cut off.

The Government protest indignantly against these accusations,
and formally deny that outrages were committed on the persons of
German or Austro-Hungarian subjects. With the exception of the
breaking of the furniture of some coffee-houses, the perpetrators of
which have been severely punished, no German or Austrian property
has been damaged.

Please ask the Spanish Government to transmit our protest to the
Austro-Hungarian Government.

Davignon.

No. 41.

The Belgian Minister at Luxembourg to M. Davignon, Belgian Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Antwerp, August 30, 1914.

You asked me for an account of the conditions under which I
was obliged to leave my post at Luxemburg, although the most
friendly relations still existed between the Grand Duchy and Bel-
gium.

On Saturday, August 8th, at 3 p. m., M. Eyschen came himself to
hand to me the letter of which I enclose a copy, together with a copy
of a letter which he had received from Herr von Buch, the German
Minister (see First Grey Book, No. 66).

Saying how much he regretted to have to perform such a mission,
the Minister of State asked me to let him know my intentions as
soon as possible.

I immediately addressed to His Excellency the answer given be-
low:

Sir, Luxernburg, August 8, 1914.

"Your Excellency has just given me notice that the German mili-
tary authorities demand my departure.

"Whatever the courtesy with which the communication was de-

460 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

livered, I must bow before a wish which is nothing but the expres-
sion of force.

"Your Excellency's letter says that the military authorities ad-
vise me to travel by railway rather than by motor-car. I conform
to that suggestion, and I am prepared to leave Luxemburg to-mor-
row, at the hour which will be indicated to me, and to go by train
to Coblentz, provided, however, that from there I may be authorised
to return immediately to Belgium by whatever route may seem pos-
sible, and that diplomatic immunities be guaranteed to me whilst on
the territory of the Empire.

"I cannot cease to take an interest in the fate and security of the
numerous Belgians who inhabit the Grand Duchy, and I ask Your
Excellency kindly to take measures for their protection, as well as for
care of the building of the Legation.

**It is especially painful for me to have to leave the territory of
Luxembourg without having offered my most respectful homage to
Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess in acknowledgment of the
kind reception which the Sovereign to whom I had the honour of be-
ing accredited has always been pleased to give to me. I hope that
Your Excellency will kindly express my regrets.

"Taking the opportunity of repeating to you, Sir, my most sin-
cere thanks for the very friendly way in which you have, in all cir-
cumstances, been at pains to facilitate my mission,

"I remain, &c.,
"CoMTE F. Van Den Steen de Jehat."

Having again seen Herr von Buch, M. Eyschen came back to tell
me that the Officer then Commanding Luxembourg could not give
any undertaking except for the journey from Luxemburg to Cob-
lentz, and that in that town it would fall to General von Ploetz to
instruct me as to what I shall have to do. Such an answer did not
seem satisfactory to me, and I declared that under these circum-
stances I would remain at my post whatever should happen.

Thereupon it was decided to ask at Berlin for instructions.

On Sunday, August 9th, at 9.30 a. m., M. Eyschen came person-
ally and brought me a passport conforming entirely to the wishes
which I had expressed. It was signed by the German Minister, and
by the General Commanding the 8th Army Corps. A saloon carriage
was put at my disposal, and the train which I was asked to take
was to leave at 12.18 p. m.

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess kindly sent to the sta-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 461

tion her Chamberlain and Secretary, M. de Colnet d'Huart, to bid
me farewell; he told me that he was sent to transmit to me as well
as to my wife the farewell of the Grand Duchess, and to assure me
of the very sincere way in which Her Royal Highness sympathised
with our feelings. There were also at the station M. Eyschen and
Major van Dyck, A.D.C. of the Grand Duchess and commander of
the armed forces.

The line being blocked by military trains, the journey proceeded
slowly, but without any incident. At Treves, an A.D.C. of the Gen-
eral commanding the town came to ask me very politely whether I
had any wish to express. The same happened at Coblentz. I was
brought by a special train to Granemburg, the last station of the
German railway system on the line Cleve-Nimegue.

I remain, &c.,
CoMTE F. Van Den Steen de Jehay.

No. 42.

M. Davignon, Belgian Mvnister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Heads
of Belgian Missions abroad.

Sir, Antwerp, September 4, 1914.

The German and Austrian press is spreading through the whole
world the most misleading rumours concerning the attitude of the
population of our large towns towards the German and Austrian sub-
jects resident in Belgium at the beginning of the present war. A
considerable number of them are said to have been molested, women
and children to have suffered the worst outrages ; at the cemetery of
Antwerp the German graves are said to have been plundered.

The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, after having published these
alleged acts of hostility on the part of our population in the oflScial
and semi-official press, have invoked them as a justification, the one
for the atrocities committed by the German troops in our country,
the other for its declaration of war against Belgium.

In order to throw full light on those allegations the Royal Gov-
ernment has ordered the most minute enquiry into the subject and
this has been carried out with the greatest impartiality by the Court
of First Instance at Antwerp.

You will find enclosed the report addressed by the Procureur du

462 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Roi on this subject to the Procureur-General of the Court of Ap-
peal.

As you will see, the population of Antwerp has pillaged certain
coffee-houses and shops belonging to Germans and Austrians, but it
has not committed any act of aggression against their persons and
no damage has been committed on German graves, which remain at
present as well looked after as before the war.

Please bring this report to the knowledge of the Government to
which you are accredited and communicate it to the press.

I remain, &c.,

Davignon.

Appendix to No. 42.

Court of First Instance at Antwerp. No. 81,909.

Antwerp, August 25, 1914.
To the Procureur-General.
Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you this report on the events
which occurred on August 4th and 5th last, after the population had
learned of the determination of Germany to invade our territory, con-
cerning which there recently appeared in the Kolnische Zeitung an
account wholly at variance with the facts.

At the news of the imminent invasion, the population became very
much excited, and its irritation was increased by the fact that German
and Austrian subjects had always been treated in our town with the
greatest regard and the greatest friendship. The anger of the peo-
ple was such that in the afternoon of August 4th huge bands
of demonstrators began to move through the different parts of the
town, singing the BrabanQonne, and hooting in front of the shops and
houses occupied by German subjects.

The demonstrators, among whom were many young people, began
by pulling down German flags in various places, including the Ger-
man school in the Rue Quellin.

Towards night the bands constantly increased in numbers, and
soon a considerable number of small retail shops and public-houses
owned by Germans were pillaged, the windows smashed, and the
furniture thrown into the street and trampled upon.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 463

Certain evil-doers did not miss the opportunity of appropriating
the belongings of other people.

The police and the civic guard intervened as promptly as possible
and order was soon reestablished ; but the demonstrations had broken
out so suddenly, and simultaneously at so many different points, that
it was physically impossible to prevent a certain amount of destruc-
tion and even some thefts.

Numerous arrests were, however, made, and I felt it my duty to
ask for warrants of arrest in all cases which seemed in the least seri-
ous. The breaches of the law were made at once the object of a
thorough investigation and the guilty persons brought before the com-
petent courts with as much despatch as possible.

I got in touch with the President of the Court of my department
in order urgently to arrange for extraordinary hearings, so as to be
able to secure prompt suppression.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a complete list of cases sent
for trial, both those which have been tried and those in which the
investigation has not yet been completed.

In certain serious cases, the Court has rightly considered it its
duty to show severity against certain hooligans who were fishing in
troubled waters.

For the reason given above it was impossible for the representa-
tives of public force to determine the identity of the pillagers, as on
arrival of the police or civic guard, they at once plunged into the
crowd.

With the exception which I shall specify below, no one has been
beaten or wounded, and all foreigners have remained absolutely un-
harmed as far as their persons are concerned.

The only wounded are two Belgian subjects who were spectators
of one of the demonstrations of August 5th.

At the corner of the Rue Artevelde, a coffee-house leased to a
German was attacked by a band of rioters when suddenly five or six
revolver shots were fired from the interior of the establishment. A
certain Isenbaert and a certain Simons, Belgian subjects, the two
spectators mentioned above, were struck by the revolver bullets, one
in the right arm, the other in the head ; the latter was not a serious
wound, the bullet having passed between the skull and the scalp. The
perpetrator of that crime was himself also a Belgian subject, a cer-
tain Meeus, brother-in-law of the German lessee.

Mr. Justice Denis is charged with the investigation of the case of
Meeus.

464 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

As to the violation of the cemetery, there is only one cemetery at
Antwerp, namely the great necropolis of Kiel, which lies about five
kilometres away from the place where the riots occurred.

As appears from the Report No. 900 of the Ninth Section, en-
closed herewith, no damage was done to the graves of the Germans
or to those of any others who were there buried. The graves of the
German subjects have remained completely intact and are still at
the present moment kept in repair and decorated with flowers
as they have always been.

It ought to be noted that the damage done in the public houses
has been, as a rule, only partly to the prejudice of the German ten-
ants. As a matter of fact, almost all these premises belong to brewers,
as in most cases does also the furniture of the business part of the
public houses. So true is this that several civil actions for damages
and indemnities have already been brought by the brewers before
the jurisdiction of the Court of my Department.

Attorney-General,

Jacobs.

No. 43.

The Belgian Minister at Constantinople to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Constantinople, September 7, 1914.

Since I had the honour of announcing to you my return to Con-
stantinople on 16th August, I have addressed to you no political des-
patch, finding myself without any means of transmitting one to you.

I entrust the present letter to a special messenger of the French
Embassy, in the hope that it will reach you.

On my return here, I found the situation very strained. The
incident of the ' * Goeben ' ' had just taken place.

The German Ambassador, all-powerful here, to the extent that
the Ottoman ministers fairly frequently hold their Council meet-
ings at his house, used all his efforts to push the Turks into an im-
prudent step, which might provoke war with the powers of the Triple
Entente.

At this moment, Talaat Bey and Halil Bey, President of the
Chamber, had just left for Sofia and Bucharest with the object, they

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 465

said, of settling the question of the islands with Greece. But the
real aim of their journey was to feel the ground with a view to con-
stituting a compact group (un hloc), which might engage in war
against Bussia.

They were soon able to assure themselves that this attempt had
no chance of success, and it was at that moment that I had the
honour of telegraphing to you that the Ambassadors of the Triple
Entente were beginning to hope that the complication of a war with
Turkey would not supervene.

Since then the situation has gone through different phases and
more than once has looked dangerous.

Baron de Wangenheim, and especially General Liman von San-
ders, are doing all they can to incite the Turks to war, and they have
succeeded in creating here an absolutely German atmosphere in Ot-
toman circles.

A week ago a rupture appeared probable. The Government not
only did not send back the German crews of the "Goeben" and the
"Breslau," but hundreds of sailors and artillerymen were seen ar-
riving from Germany, to serve both in the naval forces and in the
batteries guarding the Straits.

The moment therefore appeared near, when the sense of national
dignity would oblige the three Allied Powers to put a limit to the
provocations of Turkey. Their Ambassadors then began to prepare
for departure, and I had the honour of informing you of this by tele-
graph, adding that in the event of my receiving my passports myself,
I proposed to entrust the protection of the Belgians residing in Tur-
key to the Ambassador of the United States.

But in consequence of energetic representations made on August
30th to the Grand Vizier, the situation has seemed to clear up some-
what. His Highness is personally in favour of peace. The same may
be said of several members of the Cabinet, amongst others Djavid
Bey, who sees the abyss into which the finances of the State will be
hurled.

Unhappily the power of Enver Pasha is still very great, and he
would like to launch the country into the maddest adventures at any
cost.

The mobilisation which has taken place under his orders far sur-
passed in rigour that which took place during the Balkan War. This
time, nobody is excepted between the ages of 20 and 45. Requisitions
have assumed a character of a veritable spoliation. The military
authorities not only require the provisions to be delivered to them

466 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

which are found in the shops of private owners or at the Customs
House, but also goods of every kind, from motor-cars to ladies' toilet
articles.

Numerous boats coming from the Black Sea and going past on
their way to the Mediterranean, have been stopped at the passage and
unloaded by force.

These proceedings, which the Minister of a foreign Power has not
hesitated to term piracy, in a note which he addressed to the Porte,
have, as their result, made trading ships desert the Bosphorus.

I learn that the receipts of the customs at Constantinople have
diminished by more than 75 per cent. As to tithes, they will amount
to practically nothing, according to what I was told by a member of
the Council of the Debt. On the one hand, the harvest has been gath-
ered in under adverse conditions, in consequence of lack of labour;
on the other hand, the military authorities have seized a mass of agri-
cultural produce, before there was opportunity for the tithe to be
levied.

It will be possible for the September coupons of the Public Uni-
fied Debt to be paid, but that will probably not be the case with the
following coupon, and, for the first time since the Decree of Muhar-
ram, a suspension of the service of the Public Debt will be seen,
whilst the deficit, according to the British Delegate on the Council of
the Debt, will reach the figure of £T16,500,000.

It is not Surprising that under these conditions Djavid Bey, as
Minister of Finance, is exerting himself to stop the Government on
the fatal incline, down which German influence and the chauvinism
of Enver Pasha wish to drag them.

For the moment, it is especially war against Greece which is con-
templated. As I was told yesterday by an Ambassador, the Hellenic
Government are well aware that they can no longer hold without ques-
tion all that was assigned to them by the Treaty of London. The
European situation has changed and they will have to make some con-
cessions. Athens would be willing to make concessions with regard
to the government in Chios and Mitylene; for instance, it would be
prepared to recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan over these islands.
But the Turks, in accordance with their system of bargaining, are now
formulating on this head such demands that it seems difficult for an
understanding to be reached.

There are, nevertheless, various reasons which lead one to believe
at present that Turkey will not decide to open hostilities against
Greece.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 467

Turkey could not attack Greece by sea, since England has given
it to be understood that if the *'Goeben" or the "Breslau" comes
out of the Dardanelles, the British squadron has orders to sink
them.

As to a campaign on land, that would need the consent of Bul-
garia, and certain signs seem to indicate that there is little disposi-
tion at Sofia to yield an assistance which might involve the country
in grave complications.

All the Ambassadors at Constantinople are, in fact, convinced
that a rupture between Turkey and Greece will inevitably lead to
a war with the three great allied Powers.

To sum up, the danger has diminished, but it is far from having
disappeared. The Powers of the Triple Entente are doing their best
to remove it, but German influence may bring things to such a pass
that the dignity of the three allied countries will be compromised.

Finally, if war breaks out, this will mean political, as well as eco-
nomic, ruin for Turkey, since the persons most competent to speak
are of the opinion that the Turkish army is incapable of taking the
field.

Baron Moncheur.

No. 44.

His Majesty the Kmg of the Belgians to the President of the French

Republic.

(Telegraphic.) Antwerp, September 13, 1914.

The great victory which the allied army has just gained, thanks
to its bravery and to the military genius of its leaders, has given us
profound joy.

In addressing to you my warmest congratulations I speak for the
whole Belgian people.

We keep an unshakable confidence in the final success of the
struggle, and the abominable cruelties which our people has suffered,
far from intimidating us, as was hoped, serve only to increase the
energy and ardour of our troops.

Albert.

468 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 45.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the King of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

(Telegraphic.) Antwerp, September 13, 1914.

I wish to congratulate you very cordially on the superb conduct
of the English troops in the Battle of the Marne. In the name of
the Belgian nation I express to you our profoundest admiration for
the dauntless courage of the officers and soldiers of your army.

God will certainly help our armies to avenge the atrocities com-
mitted upon peaceable citizens and against a country whose only
crime has been that it refused to be false to its engagements.

Albert.

No. 46.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the Emperor

of Russia.

(Telegraphic.) Antwerp, September 13, 1914.

The magnificent victory which the troops of your Majesty have
just gained fills us, both the Belgian people and myself, with sincere
admiration for the courage of the Russian soldiers and the talent of
their leaders. It is with all my heart that I address to Your Majesty
my warmest congratulations.

The cruelties which the country is suffering so unjustly do not at
all deject it, and its ardour grows at the thought of the innumerable
armies of Your Imperial Majesty advancing triumphantly, uniting
their efforts to those of the victorious troops of the friendly Powers
who are fighting valiantly in France.

Albert.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 469

No. 47.

The President of the French RepuhUc to His Majesty the King of

the Belgians.

(Telegraphic.) Bordeaux, September 14, 1914.

I return Your Majesty lively thanks for the congratulations which
you have been good enough to address to the leaders and soldiers
of the French army. Our troops are proud of fighting side by side
with the valiant armies of Belgium and England for civilisation and
for liberty. When the hour of remedial justice strikes no one will be
able to forget what Your Majesty and the admirable Belgian people
have done for the triumph of the common cause.

Raymond Poincabe.

No. 48.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.

(Telegraphic.) London, September 14, 1914.

I thank you most sincerely for your kind telegram and for your
appreciation of the services of my troops. I earnestly trust that the
combined operations of the allied forces in cooperation with your
brave army, whose heroic efforts are beyond all praise, will meet with
continued success and will free your much-tried country from the
invader.

George V.

No. 49.
His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty the King of the

Belgians.

(Telegraphic.) Tsarskoy-Selo, September 14, 1914.

Touched by the congratulations of Your Majesty, I thank you
very cordially and take pleasure in calling to mind on this occasion

470 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

that in the present contest it was Belgium who first opposed a heroic
resistance to the invaders. The noble attitude of the Belgian people
and of its valiant army, led to glory by its King, has evoked the ad-
miration of the whole world. As a testimony of this admiration,
which I share with all Russia, I beg Your Majesty to accept the Cross
of Chevalier of my Military Order of St. George, which is not given
to any but the brave.

Nicolas.

No. 50.

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berne, September 16, 1914.

It was on the evening of August 27th that the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, after making use of certain not very lucid phrases as to acts
of barbarity alleged to have been committed upon Austro-Hungarian
subjects in Belgium, announced to me the rupture of our relations.

What was the determining motive which led to this change of at-
titude in regard to us ?

Was it the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Minister of War has
placed at the disposal of the German military authorities a certain
number of siege guns of 30.5 calibre, mounted on motors, constructed
in the works of the "Skoda" Society at Pilsen (Bohemia) and served
by Austro-Hungarian gunners?

Was it the desire to have ground for an eventual demand, to be
put forward at the conclusion of peace, for a war indemnity?

Was it the feeling that they must satisfy public opinion, which had
been strongly excited against us by the extremely violent language
of the press?

Was it finally a yielding to pressure exercised by the German Em-
bassy ?

I imagine that it was a combination of all these motives which
provoked this decision.

I have been assured from a good source that a certain number
of the guns, whose manufacture I mentioned in one of my reports
last winter, without being then able to give the precise figure of their
calibre, have been sent to France and Belgium.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 471

In one of the conversations which I had had with Count Forgach,
the latter had spoken to me of numerous Jewish trades-men and dia-
mond-cutters from Galicia having been completely ruined in conse-
quence of their summary expulsion from the Place of Antwerp. His
Excellency had not concealed from me that certain demands for com-
pensation would be advanced on this head.

The Austrian journals have not only published numerous letters,
duly signed, coming from travellers who complain of having under-
gone bad treatment in Belgium, but they have reproduced all the
German accusations with regard to cruelties and atrocities alleged to
have been perpetrated by our people during the course of the con-
flict. It is evidently the disagreeable realisation of the wrong they
have committed in violating our neutrality, and the lively desire, if
not to efface, at any rate to weaken, the bad impression produced by
those proceedings against the rights of peoples, which have prompted
this particularly bitter campaign against us.

"We thought the Belgians possessed of a high civilisation and cul-
ture, and now we see they are worse than Serbians, worse than the
negroes of the Congo." This is the dominant note. Further, with
reference to the violation of our neutrality and on the subject of the
political side of the question, the most serious papers, such as the
Neue Freie Presse and the Fremdenhlatt itself, have published
articles containing arguments which are absurd and childish. They
could do this all the more easily, because no one was in a position to
reply to them, or, at least, foreign papers which would have refuted
their arguments could not cross the frontiers of the Monarchy.

Naturally the public confidently accepted all they read in regard
to us, and the result was a malevolent and hostile disposition towards
the Belgians, which has been shown also in the circle of the Police
Prefecture of Vienna. Certain high functionaries of this administra-
tion distinguished themselves in this respect. Before the declaration
of war had been presented to us, countrymen of ours who had just ar-
rived in Vienna, or those whose immediate circumstances obliged
them to pass through the capital, were summoned to the police, were
questioned, were watched or interned, either under the suspicion that
they were spies, or because they were considered as being of age
sufficient for military service in their country. Nevertheless, so far
as I know, no grave abuse has been committed and none of our com-
patriots has been really ill-treated. Thanks to the efforts of our Con-
sul-General with the Police Authorities, and thanks to my representa-
tions at the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, three

472 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

men who had been interned were released, but kept under supervi-
sion.

After having announced to me that relations were broken off,
Count Berchtold expressed to me in a very kind way his personal
regrets, adding that after the end of the war he would be pleased to
see me once more occupy the same post, if the Royal Government
wished to appoint me to it.

In conformity with your telegraphic instructions I put myself into
communication with the Spanish Ambassador, who had already un-
dertaken the protection of Russian and Serbian subjects, and who
hastened to undertake the defence of our interests as well.

I also addressed to our Consuls-General and Consuls a circular in
which I thanked them in the name of the Royal Government for their
whole-hearted cooperation. I told them that they could keep their
archives for the time being, while at the same time they were to
put themselves into communication with their Spanish colleagues, and
I expressed the hope that they would continue, even in their private
capacity, to take an interest in the lot of our countrymen who re-
sided in their districts.

Since a faster train service had been organised to the Swiss
frontier from the 1st of this month, a saloon was put at my disposal
and attached to the train which left Vienna on the 3rd at 10.30 p. m.
I left with my daughter and with M. and Mme. de Raymond, ac-
companied by their three children and a governess. We reached the
Swiss frontier at Buchs on the 5th at 7.30 a. m. Free tickets had
been handed to us and the transport of our luggage took place under
the same conditions.

I am, &c.,

COMTE ErREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 51.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

Hove (Sussex),
Sir, September 21, 1914.

I had the honour to address to you on the 4th August {see No.
25) a telegraphic summary of the conversation I had had the same

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 473

day with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after having re-
ceived the telegram by which you informed me of the ultimatum of
the German Government and the reply which the Government had
made to it.

The mission which you entrusted to me immediately after my re-
turn to Belgium prevented me, as you know, from sending you a de-
tailed account of this conversation, and now that it is ended I am
anxious to carry out this duty.

Your telegram was brought to me on the 3rd towards 8 p. m. By
the time I had deciphered it, it was too late for me to go to Wilhelm-
strasse. I resolved to postpone until the following morning the verbal
explanations which it was my duty to demand from Herr von Jagow
on the subject of the German Government's unjustifiable action.
Early the next day I telephoned to him asking him to receive me as
soon as possible. He replied, asking me to go immediately. At 9
o'clock I was shown into his room. The Ministry was still empty.

"Well, what have you to say to me?" These were his first words
as he hurried to meet me.

"I have to ask you for explanations in regard to the ultimatum
which the German Minister handed on Sunday evening to my Gov-
ernment. I suppose you have some reason to give in explanation of
such action."

"An absolute necessity forced us to present that demand to you.
It is with mortal grief that the Emperor and his Government have
had to resign themselves to doing so. To myself it is the most pain-
ful resolution, and the most cruel thing I have had to do throughout
my career. But the passage through Belgium is for Germany a ques-
tion of life and death. She must be finished with France as quickly
as possible, crush her completely, so as then to be able to turn
against Russia, otherwise she herself will be caught between the ham-
mer and the anvil. We have learnt that the French army was pre-
paring to pass through Belgium and to attack us on our flank. We
must forestall her."

"But," I answered, "you are in direct contact with France on a
frontier of 200 kilometres; why in order to settle your quarrel did
you need to turn aside and pass through our country ? ' '

"The French frontier is too strongly fortified, and we are
obliged," he repeated, "to act very quickly before Russia has had
time to mobilise her army."

* * Contrary to what you think, France has given us a formal prom-
ise to respect our neutrality, provided that you respect it too. What

474 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

would you have said if, instead of making us this promise of her
own accord, she had presented to us the same summons before you,
if she had demanded a passage through our country, and if we had
yielded to her threats ? That we were cowards, incapable of defend-
ing our neutrality and unworthy of an independent existence?"

Herr von Jagow did not reply to this question.

"Have you," I continued, "anything with which to reproach ust
Have we not always correctly and scrupulously fulfilled the duties
which the neutrality of Belgium imposed upon us with regard to
Germany as well as the other guarantee Powers? Since the founda-
tion of our kingdom have we not been loyal and trustworthy neigh-
bours to you ? ' '

"Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, whose
attitude has always been correct."

"And so, in recognition of our loyalty, you wish to make of our
country the battlefield for your struggle with France, the battlefield
of Europe; and we know what devastation modern warfare brings
with it! Have you thought of that?"

"If the Belgian army," the Secretary of State replied, "allows
us to pass freely, without destroying the railways, without blowing
up the bridges and tunnels, and if it retires on Antwerp without at-
tempting to defend Liege, we promise not only to respect the inde-
pendence of Belgium, the lives and property of the inhabitants, but
also to indemnify you for the loss incurred."

"Sir," I replied, "the Belgian Government, conscious of its
duties towards all the guarantors of its neutrality, can make no reply
to such a proposal other than the reply which it has made without
hesitation. The whole nation will support its King and its Govern-
ment. You must recognise yourself that no other reply was possi-
ble."

As I urged him to speak, Herr von Jagow, in the face of my per-
sistence, ended by saying: "I recognise it. I understand your reply.
I understand it as private individual, but as Secretary of State I have
no opinion to express." And then he repeated the expression of his
grief at having come to such a point after so many years of friendly
relationship. But a rapid march through Belgium was for Germany
a question of life or death. We in our turn should understand that.

I answered immediately: "Belgium would have lost her honour
if she had listened to you, and no nation, any more than an indi-
vidual, can live without honour. Europe will be our judge. And
besides," I added, "you will not take Liege as easily as you think,

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 475

and you will have to meet England, the faithful guarantor of our
neutrality."

At these words Herr Jagow shrugged his shoulders, an action
which could be interpreted in two ways. It signified: "What an
idea! It is impossible!" Or, perhaps: "The lot is cast, we cannot
go back."

I added, before retiring, that I was ready to leave Berlin with my
staff and to ask for my passports. "But I cannot break my rela-
tions with you in this way, * ' cried the Secretary of State ; * ' perhaps
there will still be something for us to talk over." "It is for my
Government to take a decision about that," I replied; "it does not
depend upon you or me. I will wait for their orders to ask for my
passports. ' '

As I left Herr von Jagow after this painful interview, which was
to be our last, I carried away the impression that he had expected
something else when I had asked to see him, some unforeseen pro-
posal, perhaps the request to allow the Belgian army to retire in se-
curity to Antwerp after having made a show of resistance on the
Meuse and having, on the invasion of the country, formally defended
the principle of her neutrality. After my first words, the face of the
speaker seemed to me to betray a feeling of disappointment, and his
persistence in telling me not to break our relations yet strengthened
this idea which I had had from the start of our conversation.

I am, &c.,

Baron Beyens.

No. 52.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Hove (Sussex), September 22, 1914.

In continuation of my report of yesterday, I have the honour
to present to you the account of the conversation I had on the 5th
August with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I add
to it an account of the return journey to Brussels of the Belgian
Embassy at Berlin.

On 5th August, in the morning, I received the telegram, in which
you directed me to ask for my passports and informed me of the de-

476 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

parture of the German Minister from Brussels. I went immediately
to the Wilhelmstrasse, where I was received by the Under-Secretary
of State, to whom I made known your instructions.

Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his pro-
found regrets for the cause of my departure. But, he added, the
passage through Belgium is an absolute necessity for us — a question
of life or death {Sein oder nicht sein). Germany must crush France
as quickly as possible in order to be able then to turn against
Russia.

Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the violation of
our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan, al-
leged against France by the Chancellor in the speech which he had
delivered the evening before in the Reichstag, of passing through Bel-
gium in order to attack Germany on the Lower Rhine, a plan to
which Herr von Jagow had alluded in his conversation with
me.

I replied nearly in the same terms that I had used the evening
before in my discussion with Herr Jagow; if France had been ready
first and had demanded a passage of us on the same conditions as
Germany, we should have made the same reply to her. If, in a cow-
ardly way, we had yielded to her threats, you would not have had
enough words of contempt and anger to throw in our faces and we
should have deserved them, since we should have failed to keep our
word and have violated our engagement to remain neutral, which had
been received by the founders of our independence. "You must rec-
ognise that we could not have acted in any other way without for-
feiting our honour, and you could not imagine for one moment that
the Belgian Government would throw itself to the ground before the
feet of the German Government and would give up to it the keys
of our cities and our fortresses. Have you anything with which to
reproach us? Have we not been good and loyal neighbours, desir-
ous of maintaining with you, as with the other nations bordering on
Belgium, the most cordial relations ? For 80 years no cloud has arisen
to darken our relations. And to-day how do you recognise the friend-
ship and the confidence of the Belgian people which is now nearly a
century old? By the intention of making its territory the field of
European battle and devastation."

Herr Zimmermann simply replied that the department for Foreign
Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilisation had been
issued by the Emperor, all power now belonged to the military
authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 477

to be an indispensable operation of war. "I hope," he added with
emphasis, "that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end
of the policy of alliances which has led to this result."

From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr
Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity and that the
Department for Foreign Affairs, since the opening of the Austro-
Serbian conflict, had been on the side of a peaceful solution and that
it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed.
To-day, even, it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first,
that Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth when
they assured my colleagues and myself that they did not know be-
forehand the text itself of the ultimatum addressed by Austria-Hun-
gary to Serbia. A superior power intervened to precipitate the
march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to Russia,
sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet
was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the
war. As to the hope expressed by Herr Zimmermann that this war
would be the last, it is necessary to understand him as speaking on
the assumption of a victorious campaign by Germany. The Under-
Secretary of State, in spite of the visible fear which the coalition of
his country's enemies caused him, is too good a Prussian to have had
at that moment any doubt of final victory.

He was not able to promise me that I should be sent by way of Hol-
land ; he feared that the military authorities would have me taken to
Denmark. Before leaving the Department I urged upon Dr. Zahn,
Director of the Protocol, with whom I had always maintained the best
relations, that I should not be obliged to take a route so out of the
way as that of Denmark. Herr Zahn assured me that he would do his
best and he kept his promise. In fact when Count von Mirbach,
Councillor at Law, brought me my passport at 3 p. m., after having
expressed to me his regret at having to undertake such a mission, he
told me that a special train would be ready to take me the following
morning with the English Ambassador to the Dutch frontier.

I had only a few hours left to finish my preparations, to dismiss
my servants, and to entrust the archives of the Legation to the care
of the Spanish Ambassador, who had been authorised by his Govern-
ment to undertake the protection of Belgian interests during the war.
I recommended the Councillor and the Secretaries to hold themselves
in readiness to depart the following morning at 7 a. m., and I ap-
pointed the Legation as our meeting place.

On the 6th August at the hour named, M. Peltzer, Major and

478 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Madame de Melotte, M. Adrien Nieuwenhuys, M. Jacques Davignon,
M. and Madame Rothe and myself, accompanied by two Belgian
servants, left the Hotel of the Jagerstrasse in motor-cars sent in part
by the Department for Foreign Affairs. The roads which led to the
Lehrter Bahnhof, where we were to join the train, were guarded by
mounted police. There were few people about in the streets at that
hour of the morning and our journey did not give rise to any demon-
strations.

The special train which was placed under the orders of a Colonel
of the Reserve, whose attitude towards us was very courteous, was
provided with a dining car. Before our departure Count Botha von
Wedel, Minister Plenipotentiary, came and greeted the British Am-
bassador and myself in the name of the Under-Secretary of State,
and enquired if we needed anything. The journey took place slowly
on the line Stendhal-Hanover-Minden, with long stops in order to
allow the passage of trains full of reservists. At the first stations the
population watched our journey without animosity, perhaps because
they were unaware of our identity. At Minden on the Weser our
identity had obviously been divulged, for an assembly of curious
people, mostly women, approached the dining car in which I was
chatting with Sir Edward Goschen. They shouted patriotic songs
for our benefit, put out their tongues and shook their fists with ac-
companying words to which we paid no attention.

The German train took the Ambassador to the Hook of Holland,
where he embarked for England. The staff of the Belgian Legation
and myself got out at The Hague. At the Dutch frontier, which we
crossed on the 7th at 8 a.m., we were able to obtain papers ; they in-
formed us of the events at Liege. After passing twenty -four hours
without any news, in an anguish of patriotism which you will easily
understand, the telegrams giving an account of the heroic resistance
of General Leman and of our soldiers made our hearts beat with joy
and pride. Our travelling companions belonging to the British Em-
bassy warmly expressed their admiration for the conduct of the Bel-
gian Army.

At The Hague we found my colleague. Baron Fallon, at the sta-
tion, to whom I had been able to telegraph in the course of the
journey. He gave us a most cordial reception, as likewise did Prince
Albert de Ligne, and brought us the latest editions of Dutch papers
filled with news concerning the defence of Liege. Thanks to his ex-
treme obligingness, the two railway companies which own the line
as far as the Belgian frontier, without any charge, put at our dis-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 479

posal special trains which took us, one to Rotterdam and the other to
Antwerp, We arrived at Brussels at 6 p. m.

In conclusion I am glad to bring to your notice the intelligence
and devotion with which I was assisted by the members of the Lega-
tion in the course of these difficult days. You know already of the
indefatigable zeal shown on all occasions by M. Peltzer. The two sec-
retaries, the Military Attache and the Chancellor, have rivalled him
in calmness and sangfroid. I must give special praise to the courage
shown by the ladies of the Legation. It was an encouragement and
a consolation to us.

The few hours which were left me before my departure did not
allow of my taking with me our Consul-General at Hamburg. He
would not have been able to reach Berlin in time, as the line was
crowded by military trains. I should have been glad to spare him
the fatigue and weariness of returning by way of Denmark.

I am, &c.,

Baron Beyens.

No. 53.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Constantinople, September 22, 1914.

In diplomatic circles for the last three days, a more decided
uneasiness has prevailed with regard to the possibility of a declara-
tion of war by Turkey.

The Grand Vizier continues to affirm in the most persistent fashion
Turkey's intention of remaining neutral. The Sultan expressed him-
self in the same way in the course of the audience which he granted
yesterday to Sir Louis Mallet.

But, as I was told yesterday by an Ambassador whose judgment
in the matter is the less suspect since he does not belong to the Triple
Entente, it is no longer the Sultan or the Grand Vizier who governs ;
it is not even Enver Pasha; it is Germany. She rules with a high
hand not only the Porte, but the Army and the Navy, into which she
has sent hundreds of officers.

The "Goeben" and the ''Breslau" fly the Turkish flag, but the
crews have not even discarded their German uniforms. On the Dar-

480 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

danelles and on the Bosphorus the cannon of the forts are manned
by German artillerymen.

Turkey is no longer anything but an instrument of war at the dis-
posal of Germany, and she will make use of it on the day she finds
it to her advantage to do so.

It is true that the Turkish army is much too weak to make any
effective diversion against Russia. But Roumania seems on the point
of taking up an attitude hostile to Austria; this she could only do
after assuring herself of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria. Per-
haps in Berlin there is a desire to influence the decisions of Roumania
and Bulgaria by causing them to fear an attack on their weak side,
that is to say, their coasts, which they could not defend against a
bombardment by the Turkish fleet.

On Sunday and yesterday the "Breslau" and "Goeben" in suc-
cession had gunnery drill in the Black Sea. These goings and com-
ings have helped to raise apprehensions here.

On Sunday morning Sir L. Mallet once more declared quite
frankly to the Grand Vizier that if these two units went out into the
Aegean Sea the English fleet which is at the entrance to the Dar-
danelles would sink them immediately.

Baron Moncheur.

No. 54.

Telegram communicated on 25th September hy the American Consul
at Antwerp to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

For Legation, Brussels, Circular 23,

September 24.
At the request of the German Government and on the understand-
ing that the department is merely acting as a medium of communi-
cation and has no comments whatever to make, you may bring to
the attention of the Foreign Office the fact that on August 22nd the
German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador
at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Congo act of February 26th,
1885, relating to the neutralisation of the Colonies lying within the
conventional free trade zone. The note points out that chapter three
of this act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree
to such neutralisation. Bryan,

Secretary of State, Washington.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 481

No. 55.

Baron A. Orenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Madrid, September 30, 1914.

I have not neglected to carry out the instructions contained in
your telegram of August 30th last {see No. 40) relating to the al-
leged bad treatment of which, according to the Neue Freie Press,
Austrian subjects had been victims at Antwerp and at Ostend.

The Minister of State has just informed me that the Embassy of
his Catholic Majesty at Vienna has on the 11th of this month handed
to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs the protest of
the Belgian Government.

I am, &c..

Baron A. Grenieb.

No. 56.

Baron Cfuillaume, the Belgian Minister in Prance, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Bordeaux, October 11, 1914.

The President of the Republic summoned me this morning and
received me in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He
said to me in effect : —

"I have during the night and this morning received many tele-
grams from M. Klobukowski informing ihe of the grave situation in
which Belgium is placed. It has caused me great emotion and sin-
cere regrets. I have also learned that a Cabinet Council, at which
General Pau and the English general were present, has declared that
in view of probable attacks by the German forces the Belgian Gov-
ernment and its army must leave the national territory. King Al-
bert has expressed a desire to receive for himself, his Government
and his Army the hospitality of France. He has named the port of
Havre, adding that the Army will continue to cooperate in the joint
action of the Allies.

"The Government of the Republic required no deliberation on

482 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

this matter, since at the first word we were unanimous in affirming
our sentiments of affection and admiration for the noble Belgian
people and in declaring that the widest hospitality would be offered
to them in France, leaving them their full independence and sov-
ereignty.

"I wish to assure King Albert without delay and I beg you to
lend me your assistance in conveying the following cypher telegram
to His Majesty: —

" 'His Majesty, King Albert, Ostend.

" *I am informed of the decision made by the Belgian Gov-
ernment. The Government of the Republic is profoundly
moved by it and will immediately take the necessary steps to
assure the sojourn in France of Your Majesty and his Min-
isters in full independence and sovereignty. I am anxious to
say personally to Your Majesty how proud France is of offer-
ing you, until the hour of our joint victory, hospitality in the
town which you have chosen, and I beg you to accept the as-
surance of my unalterable friendship.

Raymond Poincare.* "

The President of the Republic and M. Delcasse have omitted noth-
ing to assure me of their sympathy in the misfortunes which are
falling so unjustly upon Belgium. M. Poincare laid much emphasis
on the measures which will be taken in order to safeguard the sov-
ereignty and independence of the country.

During the day I had an opportunity of being received a second
time by the President of the Republic, who had charged M. William
Martin, the Chief of the Protocol, with the duty of going at once
to Havre in order to look into the question of making provision for
Their Majesties, the Ministers, and the high functionaries of the Bel-
gian State. I had an opportunity of conferring several times with
the Chief of the Political Direction. Everyivhere I found a welcome
full of sincere grief, completely sympathetic and absolutely devoted.

I am, &c.,

Babon Guillaume.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 483

No. 57.
His Majesty King Albert to the President of the French Republic.

M. le President, Ostend, October 12, 1914.

I am profoundly touched by the hospitality which France is
ready to offer so cordially to the Belgian Government and by the
measures which the Republic is taking in order to secure our full in-
dependence and sovereignty. We await with unshakable confidence
the hour of joint victory. Fighting side by side for a just cause our
courage will know no yielding.

I beg you, M. le President, to accept the assurance of my un-
alterable affection.

Albert.

No. 58.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Bel-
gian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegraphic.) Le Havre, October 21, 1914.

Please have recourse to the good offices of the Spanish Ambas-
sador in order to forward to the German Government the following
telegram : —

Under date September 25th, the United States Consul at Antwerp
sent a telegram (see No. 54) according to which he was authorised to
draw the attention of the Belgian Govemmjent to the fact that on
August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the Ameri-
can Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Act of Ber-
lin of February 26th, 1885, with regard to the neutralisation of the
Colonies within the conventional free-trade zone. The note drew at-
tention to the fact that this Act deals with neutrality and that Ger-
many is disposed to accept such a neutralisation.

The Belgian Government cannot explain how this note, which was
sent on August 22nd to the Ambassador of the United States at Ber-
lin, did not reach him until September 25th.

Under date August 7th the Belgian Government put itself into

4iB4 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

communication with the French and British Governments to pro-
pose to them the neutralisation of the conventional basin of the
Congo, and, in the meanwhile, gave to its agents the order to ob-
serve a strictly defensive attitude. It desired, in fact, that the war
should not be extended to Central Africa.

The British and French Governments could not be parties to this
proposal by reason of the acts of hostility which had already at this
time been committed in Africa. In particular German forces had at-
tacked British Central Africa and British East Africa.

At the same time the Belgian Government was advised that the
German Colonial forces had from August 22nd been attacking the
port of Lukuga, on Lake Tanganyika.

The Belgian Government in consequence draws the attention of
the Imperial Government to the fact that it was they who had taken
the initiative in hostilities in Africa, and had thus opposed the reali-
sation of the desire of the Belgian Government concerning the appli-
cation of the above-mentioned Article 11.

Davignon.

No. 59.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, October 23, 1914.

In consequence of the Russian successes the Germans are increas-
ing their pressure on the Porte with the object of bringing about
war. The Porte still gives the Ambassadors assurances of peaceful
intentions, but pushes forward its preparations for war.

No. 60.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople, October 31, 1914.
I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 23rd of this month
that Germany was increasing her pressure on Turkey to go to war,

THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 2) 485

as her armies are experiencing reverses in Poland as well as in
France.

Since then events have been very much hastened.

The day before yesterday, October 29th, the English Ambassador
came to see me and warned me that according to reliable information
troops of Bedouins, led by German officers, had crossed the Egyptian
frontier, and that if the news were confirmed a casus belli with Tur-
key would be the result.

But on the same evening we learnt the still more serious fact of
the attack on Russian troops and ports by a part of the Turkish
fleet, commanded of course by German officers.

According to the unanimous opinion of diplomatic circles the coup
was prepared and executed by the Germans without the knowledge
of the Grand Vizier and perhaps even of the Turkish Naval Minister,
Djemal Pacha, with the object of forcing the Government, several
members of which had a well-marked repugnance to war, to decide
on it.

From that moment there was no longer any hope of maintaining
peace here, and I telegraphed to you on the night of the 29th-30th
that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were preparing for de-
parture.

Yesterday, October 30th, they went separately to the Grand Vizier
to demand their passports. Prince Said Halim was in a state of
extreme agitation and seemed to be in despair at the turn that events
were taking. He repeated with emphasis to the Ambassadors that he
did not desire war and there is reason for believing that he spoke
in good faith.

To-day at 2 o'clock the Ambassadors had not yet received their
passports and a persistent rumour was even going about this morn-
ing that all hope of some arrangement was not lost.

But this was not possible. To make good the outrage committed
on Russia by ships flying the Turkish flag, it was not sufficient for
the Porte to make excuses and to disavow the action of the German
admiral who was in command. The Powers of the Triple Entente
would further require that the German crews and, in general, all
officers of this nationality belonging to the German mission to Turkey
should be sent back. Now the Young Turk Government, even if it
desired to have recourse to this measure of safety, would lack the
courage and energy necessary to execute it. It is caught in the Ger-
man wheel and will remain there.

I have just telegraphed to you that the Ambassadors are leaving

486 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

this evening whether they have received their passports or not. The
French Ambassador has postponed his departure till to-morrow
evening for reasons of personal convenience.

The press has received an order to publish a communique de-
signed to mislead the public and to make it believe that Russia com-
menced hostilities. This manoeuvre will have been dictated by Ger-
many, and it recalls that which was employed to make France ap-
pear responsible for the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Here the city is very quiet. There has been no demonstration
against foreigners. There is rather a feeling of consternation which
prevails among many Turks who do not share the ideas of Enver
Pasha and his chauvinistic followers.

It is probable enough that this fresh war will have no considera-
ble development, at least for a long time. The Powers of the Triple
Entente are very much occupied elsewhere and will not make any
very great efforts here.

As I have often written, England and Russia, who did not desire
any new complications from the East, have here shown extreme
patience for three months. But if they could have known that peace
could not be maintained it would have been preferable to send an
ultimatum to Turkey on the arrival of the "Goeben" in the Dar-
danelles last August. Since that time, in fact, the entry to the
Straits, on the side of the Black Sea as well as the Aegean Sea, has
been very much strengthened by new batteries manned by Germans,
and by a whole system of mines. And in other respects we must
recognise that, thanks to the sacrifices which are ruining the coun-
try and thanks to the millions which have come from Germany, the
army is much more strongly organised than at the outbreak of the
European war.

It is therefore probable that the European fleets will not at-
tempt at present to force the Straits. From this point of view it is
very regrettable that in the Russian Black Sea Fleet there is no unit
equal in strength to the "Goeben."

I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 30th of this month
that in accordance with the instructions you transmitted by tele-
gram on the 9th August to M. Leclercq, I would remain at my post
unless the Porte handed me my passports.

In view of the irregularity of telegraphic communications, I
thought it advisable to return to this question in my telegram of
to-day, and I asked you to let me know by courier if you adhere to
your instructions of the 9th August.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 487

I do not think that the Porte will hand me my passports unless
the Germans, who, I repeat, rule everything with a high hand, con-
sider that my presence here offers danger from the point of view of
information that I might supply to the Allies.

But in reference to this question, I think I ought to let you know
that a German who is connected with the Embassy of his country at
Constantinople has here evolved the opinion that, the Belgian Gov-
ernment, having left Belgian soil, is no longer considered existent by
Germany, and that in consequence, the Embassy, in order to remain
faithful to its theory, must prevent the Porte from sending his pass-
ports to the representative of a Government which no longer exists.

I should not be able to stay here with dignity if my maintenance
were based on such a theory.

I must, nevertheless, add that up to the present nothing in the be-
haviour of the Sublime Porte towards me indicates that it has adopted
the point of view attributed to the German Embassy.

I am, &c.,

Baron Moncheur.

No. 61.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Moncheur, Bel-
gian Minister at Constantinople.

(Telegraphic.) Le Havre, November 1, 1914.

In view of the existing tension you will judge whether it is not
desirable, through our Consuls, to advise our countrymen residing
in Turkey to go to the coast towns where they will have an oppor-
tunity of embarking.

Davignon.

No. 62.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. van Ypersele de
Strihou, Belgian Minister at Bukarest.

(Telegraphic.) Le Havre, November 6, 1914.

The Turkish Minister has asked for his passports. Notify the Bel-
gian Minister at Constantinople either directly or through the Rou-

488 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

manian Government to do the same and to leave Turkey with his
staff and the consular officials.

Davignon.

No. 63.

Jonkheer de Weede, Minister of the Netherlands, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs. ,

Sir, Le Havre, November 7, 1914.

I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency
that the Government of the Queen has authorised me, in accordance
with the request of the Turkish Minister, to look after Turkish in-
terests in Belgium during the rupture of diplomatic relations between
Belgium and Turkey.

I am, &c.,

Jonkheer de Weede.

No. 64.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Belgian Min-
isters in Foreign Countries.

Sir, Le Havre, November 9, 1914.

The French Government has informed the Belgian Government
of the state of war existing between France and Turkey, and in these
circumstances the presence at Havre of the Turkish Minister with
the Belgian Government became delicate. Understanding the situa-
tion in which he was placed by the course of events His Excellency
Nousret Sadoullah Bey took the initiative by asking for his passports
and by putting Turkish interests in Belgium under the protection
of the Minister of the Netherlands.

Under date November 6th I sent to His Excellency the passports
which he had asked for, and remarked that, according to the inter-
pretation of the Belgian Government, the rupture of diplomatic re-
lations in no way implied a state of war between the two countries.

The Belgian Minister at Constantinople has received instructions

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 489

to ask for his passports and to leave Turkey. The care of Belgian
interests in Turkey has been entrusted to the Ambassador of the
United States of America.

Davignon.

No. 65.

Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Melin, November 16, 1914.

On Saturday, the 7th of this month, at 4 p. m., I received a tele-
gram from my colleague at Bukarest informing me that the Turkish
Minister in Belgium having asked for his passports, you ordered me
to do the same and to leave Turkey with my staff and the officials
of the Belgian Consular Service.

Since receiving your communication, made through M. van
Ypersele de Strihou, I went to the Ambassador of the United States
in order to make all arrangements for the protection of Belgians re-
maining in Turkey.

On his advice I telephoned to the Porte to ask if the Grand Vizier
could receive me. On receiving the reply that His Highness was at
a meeting of the council, I sent the same evening to his residence on
the Bosphorus a letter setting out the reasons why I was asking for
my passports and informing the Porte that in leaving Constantinople
with my staff I left Baron de Hulsch and Baron Marghetich, attached
provisionally to the American Embassy, to help M. Morgenthau in
protecting my countrymen and their interests.

Passports were sent to me 24 hours later in an envelope of the
Sublime Porte, but without any accompanying letter.

I left Constantinople on Tuesday, November 10th, at 7 a. m. The
American Ambassador sent me his motor-car, and in spite of the
early hour, he came to say good-bye at the station. The Grand Vizier
had sent his Chief Secretary to salute me on the departure of the
train.

My colleague of the Bulgarian Legation having previously warned
his Government of my passage through Bulgarian territory, the Sub-
Prefect came to salute me at the frontier station in the name of M.
Radoslavof. At Dedeagatch the authorities also waited upon me, act-

490 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ing under superior orders, and facilitated my departure in the most
obliging manner. From Dedeagatch I telegraphed my thanks to M.
Radoslavof.

The French and English subjects at Constantinople, whose pro-
tection is also entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States,
highly praised the efficient way in which he has taken their interests
in hand. He has already shown much energy and decision in this
respect.

It is entirely due to him that several English subjects whom Enver
Pasha wished to hold back as hostages were able to leave the country.
Consequently, I am certain that our colony will be well protected.

The Legation is closed, but I have left the staff of Khavas's, just
as has been done in the other Embassies and Legations. This is es-
sential for the protection of the house and its contents. The Ameri-
can flag has been hoisted.

I am, &c..

Baron Moncheur.

No. 66.

The Minister of the United States of America to M. Davignon, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Minister, Brussels, November 16, 1914.

I am in receipt of the following telegram from my Government,
which I am directed to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge:

"At request of German Government, and on understanding that
the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and
has no comments whatsoever to make, you may bring to attention of
Foreign Office the fact that on August 22nd German Government
addressed a Note to American Ambassador referring to Article 11 of
the Congo Act, February 26th, 1885, relating to neutralisation of
colonies lying within the conventional free trade zone. The note
points out that Chapter 3 of this Act deals with neutrality and that
Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation."

I avail myself, &c..

Brand Whitlock.
{See No. 54.)

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 491

No. 67.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Brand Whitlock,
Minister of United States of America.

Sir, Le Havre, December 5, 1914.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt from Your Excel-
lency of the letter of November 16th, referring to the neutralisation
of the Conventional Basin of the Congo suggested by Germany.

The proposal of the German Government, which was dated
August 22nd, was notified to us by the Consul-General of the United
States at Antwerp on September 25th.

Your Excellency has learned by reading the Grey Book the steps
which the Belgian Government has taken with a view to maintain-
ing the neutrality of the Congo. (See First Grey Book, No. 57.)
You will find herewith a copy of the telegram regarding this mat-
ter which I addressed on October 21st to the Imperial Government
through the Spanish Government. (See No. 58.)

I am, &c.,

Davignon.

PART II

German Accusations as to the Attitude of the Belgian Civil

Population.

II.

Illegal Seizure op the Funds op the Hasselt Agency op the
National Bank of Belgium.

1 Sections X, XI, and XVI are the only sections of Part II which relate to
the outbreak of the war. The other sections have therefore not been Included
in this publication except by title.

The translation of Section X is taken from " The Second Belgian Grey
Book," which did not contain translations of Sections XI and XVI. These
sections were translated in the Division of International Law of the Endowment
from the official French publication issued by Belgium.

492 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

III.
Protection op German Buildings in Belgium.

IV.

Bombardments by Zeppelins.

Sending op an Oppicial Mission to the United States op America.

VI.

Civil Prisoners in Germany.

VII.

Use op Dum-dum Bullets by the German Armies.

VIII.

Employment op Undisciplined and Unenrolled Natives.

IX.

Violations op the Geneva Convention.

Germany accuses Belgium op having concluded a Military Under-
standing WITH England.

No. 98.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Rep-
resentatives abroad.

Sir, Havre, October 19, 1914.

The Norddeutsche Allgemeime Zeitung has recently published an
article with the object of gaining credence for the view that in 1906
England had, in view of a Franco-German war, endeavoured to in-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 493

volve Belgium in the Triple Entente. This article has been com-
mented upon in the Times of the 14th October.

You will find enclosed a note refuting the allegations of the
Norddeutsche Allgememe Zeitung.

I have the honour to request you to be so good as to cause it to
be inserted in one of the principal newspapers in the country to
which you are accredited.

I am, &c.,

Davignon.

Enclosure to No. 98.
Note.

The Times of the 14th October reproduces a long article from the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung commenting on the discovery
made in the archives of the War Office at Brussels of a document en-
titled ''Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," and of a memoire ad-
dressed to the Belgian Minister of War, purporting to prove that in
April, 1906, the Chief of the Staff, on the initiative of the English
Military Attache, and with the approval of General Grierson, had
elaborated a plan of cooperation between the British Expeditionary
Forces and the Belgian Army in the event of a Franco-German war.
This agreement would probably have been preceded by a similar ar-
rangement concluded with the French General Staff.

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung also reproduces certain
passages from a report of the Minister at Berlin written in De-
cember, 1911, with regard to another plan of the Belgian Staff, in
which the measures to be taken in the event of a violation of Bel-
gian neutrality by Germany are examined. Baron Greindl pointed
out that this plan only took stock of the precautions to be taken in
the single case of an aggression by Germany, whereas in view of its
geographical situation, Belgium might equally well be exposed to an
attack from France or from England.

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung draws from this discovery
the strange conclusion that England intended to draw Belgium into
the war, and at a certain moment contemplated the violation of Dutch
neutrality.

We have only one regret to express with regard to the discovery

494 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of these documents, viz., that the publication of our military works
is maimed and arranged in such a manner as to give to the reader
the impression of the duplicity of England and of an adhesion on the
part of Belgium to the policy of the Triple Entente in violation of
its duties of neutrality. We ask the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung to publish in extenso the result of their ferretings in our
secret papers. This would furnish a new and striking proof of the
loyalty, the correctness, and the impartiality which for 84 years Bel-
gium has brought to the discharge of her international duties.

It was quite natural that Colonel Barnardiston, the military agent
at Brussels of one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality,
should on the occasion of the Algeciras crisis make enquiries of the
Chief of the Belgian Staff as to the measures which it had taken to
prevent every violation of this neutrality.

The Chief of the Staff — then Lieutenant-General Ducame — re-
plied that Belgium was in a position to repel an invasion from what-
ever quarter it might come.

Did the discussion pass these limits, and did Colonel Barnard-
iston, in a conversation of a private and confidential character, re-
veal to General Ducame the plan of campaign which the British
General Staff would have desired to follow in the event of this neu-
trality being violated? We doubt it, but what can be solemnly af-
firmed, and the contrary cannot be proved, is that neither the King
nor his Government have ever been invited, either directly or indi-
rectly, to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German
war.

Further, by their words and their actions, they have always shown
so categorical an attitude that every supposition that they would
depart from the most strict neutrality has been removed a priori.

So far as concerns the despatch of Baron Greindl, of the 23rd
December, 1911, it has reference to a proposal for the defence of
Luxembourg, due to the personal initiative of the Head of the First
Division of the War Office. This proposal was entirely private in
its character, and had not been approved by the War Office.

There is no ground for astonishment if this proposal had in view,
above all, an attack from the side of Germany, since the great Ger-
man military writers, and especially von Bemhardi, von Schliefen-
bach and von der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the Next
War of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the beginning of hostilities the Imperial Government, by the
mouth of the Chancellor and of the Foreign Secretary, did not seek

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 495

empty pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the
victim. It justified it on the ground of military interests.

Since then, faced with the universal reprobation which this act
has aroused, it seeks to mislead opinion by representing Belgium as
having been subject to the Triple Entente from a time preceding
the war.

These intrigues will deceive no one. They will turn to the shame of
Germany. History will testify that that Power, after having bound
herself by treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, took the initi-
ative in violating it without even being able to find a pretext to
justify herself.

No. 99.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Rep-
resentatives abroad.

Sir, Havre, 4 December, 1914.

Germany having discovered a note on the interview which took
place in 1912 between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, re-
turns to the alleged Bamardiston secret, and endeavours to show
that the aggression of Germany against Belgium was justified be-
cause the latter had herself failed in her duties of neutrality by ne-
gotiating a military agreement with England.

I have thought it my duty to oppose a new dementi to this as-
sertion. You will find enclosed a communication on this subject.

I am, &c.,

Davignon.

Enclosure to No. 99.
Note.

In its number of the 26th November, the Kolnische Zeitung
writes: —

**We were compelled to violate Belgian neutrality because
Belgium had not observed her duties of neutrality. The truth

496 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of this forcibly appears from two incontestable documents.
There is the one published by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung, proving that there existed between Belgium and Eng-
land a secret agreement for the cooperation of the military
forces of these two countries in the struggle against Germany.
"On the other hand," adds the Kolnische Zeitung, "it fol-
lows, from the report of the confidential conversation between
Messrs. Jungbluth and Bridges, that the English intended to
disembark in Belgium, in any case, even if their aid was not
solicited by Belgium."

The thesis advanced by the German press thus consists in justi-
fying the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium, on the
ground that Belgium herself, by negotiating with England a mili-
tary agreement against Germany, had failed in her duties of neu-
trality.

This is a false thesis, contradicted by the facts and by the very
documents which the German press cites.

When on the 13th October the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
published for the first time the secret Barnardiston document, we
challenged it to prove the existence of a military agreement between
Belgium and England. This challenge has not been taken up, and
the photographic documents which it publishes have no value as to
this point. One would seek in vain to infer from them that Belgium
had not observed the obligation of the strictest neutrality.

What, in fact, happened in 1906? Colonel Barnardiston, mili-
tary attache to the British Legation, went at the end of January to
the head of the first department at the War Office, and had an inter-
view with him.

Colonel Barnardiston asked General Ducarne if Belgium was
ready to defend her neutrality. The reply was in the affirmative.

He then enquired as to the number of days necessary for the
mobilisation of our army.

"It takes place in four days," said the General.

* ' How many men can you raise ? ' ' continued the military attache.

The General confirmed that we would mobilise 100,000 men.

After having received this information, Colonel Barnardiston de-
clared that in the event of the violation of our neutrality by Ger-
many, England would send to Belgium 100,000 men to defend us.
He further pressed the question that he should know whether we
were ready to resist a German invasion.

The General replied that we were ready to defend ourselves at
Li^ge against Germany, at Namur against France, and at Antwerp

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 497

against England. There then followed several conversations between
the Chief of the Staff and the military attache on the measures which
England would take with a view to giving effect to her guarantee.

In devoting himself to this study, the Chief of the Staff only
performed his most elementary duty, which was precisely to study
the dispositions calculated to enable Belgium to repel, either alone
or with the aid of her guarantors, a violation of her neutrality.

On the 10th May, 1906, Greneral Ducarne addressed to the Min-
ister of War a report on his interviews with the British military
attache. In this report it is observed on two occasions that the
despatch of English help to Belgium would be conditional on the
violation of its territory. Further, a marginal note of the Minister,*
which by an excess of perfidy the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
does not translate, in order that it may escape the majority of Ger-
man readers, establishes incontestably that the entry of the English
into Belgium would not take place till after the violation of our
neutrality by Germany.

The course of events has sufficiently proved that these precau-
tions were justified. These very natural conversations between the
Chief of the Staff and the British military attache merely demon-
strate the serious apprehensions entertained by England on the sub-
ject of the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium.

Were these apprehensions legitimate? To be convinced on this
point, it is sufficient to read the works of the great German mili-
tary writers of the period — von Bernhardi, von Schliefenbach, von
der Goltz.

Were the conversations of General Ducarne and Colonel Bar-
nardiston followed by a convention or an entente?

Germany will herself furnish us with an answer by a document
which she has caused to be published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung of the 25th November. This document, which refers to an
interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, furnishes
a striking testimony that the conversation on the fulfilment of the
guarantee by England had had no results in 1912 and was at the
same point at which it had been left six years before, in 1906.

No document could justify in a clearer manner the loyalty with
which the Government of the King fulfilled their international ob-
ligations.

Colonel Bridges is reported to have said that, on the occasion of

the last occurrences, as we were not in a position to defend our

* The note is in the handwriting of the General and not of the Minister («m No. 101).

498 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

neutrality ourselves, the British Government would have disem-
barked immediately, even if we had not asked for assistance.

To which General Jungbluth is said to have replied immediately:
"But you could not disembark in our country without our consent."

Is there any reason for attaching so much importance to the views
of a military attache which, as we could prove, have never been
shared by the Foreign Office? Did he admit the thesis, false in our
view although supported by some authors, that, in the event of a
violation of neutrality, the intervention of a guarantor is justifiable,
even in the absence of any appeal from the guaranteed? We do not
know. One thing is certain that the military attache, when faced
with the objection of the General, did not insist.

Was Belgium bound to communicate these conversations to her
guarantors? As to the first, Colonel Barnardiston was not author-
ised to contract an engagement any more than General Ducarne
was authorised to take note of a promise of assistance. The incrim-
inated conversations had, moreover, a purely military character,
they could have no political bearing, they never formed the subject
of deliberation by the Government, and they were not known to the
Department of Foreign Affairs till a much later date.

So far as concerns the interview between General Jungbluth and
Colonel Bridges, was it necessary to inform the Powers that the lat-
ter had given expression to an opinion which the Belgian Govern-
ment would not admit any more than the British Government would,
and against which General Jungbluth had immediately protested,
without his interviewer thinking it necessary to insist on it?

The alleged justification of Germany turns against her. In his
speech of the 4th of August, in his interview in the morning with the
English Ambassador, the Imperial Chancellor declared that the ag-
gression against Belgium was to be attributed only to strategic ne-
cessity. The cause is understood.

No. 100.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Rep-
resentatives abroad. '

Sir, Havre, 15 December, 1914.

In continuation of my letter of the 4th December last with ref-
erence to the allegations of the German Government regarding an

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 499

alleged Anglo-Belgian military agreement, I have the honour to di-
rect your attention to the publication in the Times of the 7th of this
month of the account of the conversation which took place between
Sir B. Grey and Count de Lalaing on the 7th April, 1913.

I enclose, for your information and use, a translation of the
English communique.

I am, &c.,

Daviqnon.

Enclosure to No. 100.
Belgian Neutrality.

Proof of British Sincerity.

With reference to statements implying that Great Britain ever
contemplated a violation of Belgian neutrality, the Foreign Office
issues for publication the following record of a conversation with
the Belgian Minister on April 7th, 1913. It was sent to the British
Minister in Brussels and a record was communicated by him to the
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time: —

"Sir,

"In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speak-
ing unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that
there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first
to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this ap-
prehension could have come from a British source.

"The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been
talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the land-
ing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to antici-
pate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium
to France.

"I said that I was sure that this Government would not be
the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not
believe that any British Government would be the first to do
so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What
we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing ques-
tion, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as
one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian
neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first
to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give
Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into
Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in
that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should

500 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other
Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
territory. "lam, &c.,

"E. Grey."

No. 101.

M, Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Rep-
resentatives abroad.

Sir, Havre, IStJi January, 1915.

In my despatch of the 4th December I had the honour of send-
ing you a denial of the accusation made by the Norddeutsche All-
gemeine Zeitung against Belgium, to the effect that the latter coun-
try had deviated from her duty of neutrality by negotiating with
Great Britain a military agreement directed against Germany.

In this communique I said that a marginal note made by the
Minister of War established the fact that the entry of British troops
into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neu-
trality by Germany.

At the time when I prepared the communique I had been una-
ble to obtain a copy of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung con-
taining a photograph of this document. I only had before me the
German translation of the Ducarne Report made by the NorddeutscJie
Allgemeine Zeitung and reproduced by the German papers. This
translation omits the most important phrase in the document, which
says "that the entry of the British into Belgium would only take
place after our neutrality had been violated by Germany." It is
true that the NorddeutscJie Allgemeine Zeitung in a later portion
of its article prints this phrase in French, letting it be understood
that it is merely a marginal note. But now it appears, as is shown
by the photograph, that the phrase forms part of the Report of Gen-
eral Ducarne, that it was written by his hand, and that its proper
place is marked by a reference mark.

In these circumstances it appears to me necessary to call the at-
tention of the various Governments and of readers to the falsifica-
tion of the Ducarne document by the NorddeutscJie Allgemeine
Zeitung. I should be obliged if you would be kind enough to ob-
tain the publication of this communique, which is in the form of a
newspaper article, in one of the newspapers of your capital. It is

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 501

unnecessary for you to make it the subject of a communication to
the Government. I am, &c.,

Davignon.

Enclosure to No. 101.

The Barnardiston Affair and Historical Criticism.

The NorddeutscJie Allgemeine Zeitung has a singular way of
perusing, reading, and translating documents. German learned criti-
cism when carried away by the heat of argument loses all sense of
cold objectivity. Guided by its desires, it sees, or fails to see; it
inserts phrases in the text or excludes them ; it transposes or invents.

The Barnardiston affair is a remarkable example of this.

On the 13th October the Zeitung mentioned the discovery which
German searchers made in the offices of the Belgian General Staff,
and the Ducarne Report, which sets out the interviews of Barnardis-
ton with certain Belgian officers.

It then stated that this report was part of a dossier {Mappe)
bearing the title "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," and it en-
deavoured to show that from the details of this report it followed
that a "convention" had been concluded between Belgium and Great
Britain.

An answer was immediately made that the report and its details
did not allow of this incorrect conclusion, that there were interviews
but that there was never an agreement.

On the 25th of November the Zeitung again took the matter up
and published facsimiles of the documents. We no longer hear of
the title "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique": a new title appeared.
According to the Zeitung, which had suddenly become clairvoyante,
the famous report had been enclosed in a wrapper (Umschlag) with
the inscription "Conventions Anglo-Beiges."

This second discovery, made just at the right time, and at a mo-
ment when the Zeitung found itself in a position to make no reply,
appeared sufficiently strange. How was it that this inscription
which, being placed at the top, ought to have attracted attention at
the very first moment, was not seen on the 13th October, and could
only be seen on the 25th November?

502 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Suspicious people then examined the documents more closely.
They compared the photographs and the translations, and it was seen
that some of the versions were akin to forgeries.

We understand that the Zeitung maintains that the Barnard-
iston affair was not limited to pourparlers. It makes out that there
was an agreement, and this is how it goes about to show to its kind
readers that it is right.

The photograph of the Ducarne Report contains the following
phrase : —

"My visitor (Barnardiston) emphasised the following
points: (1) Our CONVERSATION WAS absolutely confi-
dential."

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung has wonderful eyesight.
It stated: —

"Herr Barnardiston betonte: 1° dass unser ABKOMMEN
absolut vertraulich sein sollte."

It turned the word "conversation" into "convention." It made
Barnardiston say that our CONVENTION would he absolutely con-
fidential.

How can it then help succeeding in its claims ? Voltaire required
two lines to hang a man. But Germany has made progress since
then. To curse a people three letters in a word are sufficient. A
"conversation" became "convention."

But that is not all. In the photograph of the official record of
the report erasures and additions are visible. When General Du-
carne was reporting the suggestions or the first demarche of Bar-
nardiston he perceived that he had omitted to mention at the very
beginning the hypothesis on which the interview was based. He
wrote five lines in the margin, and by two signs he marked the place
where the addition ought to figure in his letter.

Alas, this addition troubled the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung! The actual words were "the entry of the British into Bel-
gium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by
Germany." What could it do to diminish or remove the effect of
this? It was quite simple. In its translation the Zeitung does not
mention the addition. But to give an appearance of perfect loyalty
it quotes it in its comments. This is the art of detaching words from
their context.

Subordinates go on to complete and perfect the mancBUvre. They

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 503

proceed to publish a mutilated text, and so make people think that
the addition was perhaps a subsequent note made possibly by some-
body other than the author of the report.

And that is how history is written in Germany !

No. 102.

M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Rep-
resentatives of Belgium.

Sir, Havre, 13th February, 1915.

I have the honour of sending to you herewith the completed
translation of a note published by the Times on the 27th January
last, in which Sir E. Grey replies to the explanations given by M.
von Bethmann-HoUweg to the American press on the question of the
British attitude in the present war and the violation of Belgian
neutrality by Germany.

I am, &c.,

Davignon.

Enclosure to No. 102.
Sir E. Grey's reply to the Chancellor.

January 26, 1915.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorises the publi-
cation of the following observations upon the report of an interview
recently granted by the German Chancellor to an American corre-
spondent : —

It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should show
anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty be-
ing a mere "scrap of paper." The phrase has made a deep impres-
sion because the progress of the world largely depends upon the
sanctity of agreements between individuals and between nations, and
the policy disclosed in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's phrase tends
to debase the legal and moral currency of civilisation.

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain, in re-
quiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium, "was going
to make war just for a word, just for a scrap of paper"; that is,
that Great Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He

504 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

now asks the American public to believe that he meant the exact op-
posite of what he said ; that it was Great Britain who really regarded
the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and Germany who "took
her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously." The argu-
ments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish the
two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of plain facts.

First, the German Chancellor alleges that "England in 1911 was
determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the
Belgian Government." This allegation is absolutely false. It is
based upon certain documents found in Brussels which record con-
versations between British and Belgian officers in 1906 and again in
1911. The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the
British War Office or Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely
informal character, and no military agreement of any sort was at
either time made between the two Governments. Before any con-
versations took place between British and Belgian officers, it was ex-
pressly laid down on the British side that the discussion of military
possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in case of
need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Bel-
gium for the defence of Tier neutrality, and on the Belgian side a
marginal note upon the record explains that "the entry of the Eng-
lish into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neu-
trality hy Germany.'* As regards the conversation of 1911, the Bel-
gian officer said to the British, "You could only land in our country
with our consent," and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian
Government a categorical assurance that no British Government
would violate the neutrality of Belgium, and that "so long as it was
not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops
ourselves into their territory."

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illus-
trated in this connexion. He represents Sir Edward Grey as say-
ing, "He did not believe England would take such a step, because
he did not think English public opinion would justify such action."
What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: "I said that I was sure
that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality
of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government
would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever ap-
prove of it."

If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were con-
versations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers,
he may find one reason in a fact well known to him, namely, that

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 505

Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical rail-
ways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier, through a bar-
ren, thinly-populated tract; railways deliberately constructed to
permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in
August last. This fact alone was enough to justify any communica-
tions between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that there
would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it were previously
violated by another Power. On no other footing did Belgium ever
have any such communications. In spite of these facts the German
Chancellor speaks of Belgium having thereby "abandoned" and
"forfeited" her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have
spoken of the German invasion as a "wrong" had he then known
of the conversations of 1906 and 1911. It would seem to follow, that
according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's code, a wrong becomes
a right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees
the possibility and makes preparations to resist it. Those who are
content with older and more generally accepted standards are likely
to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said in his Pastoral let-
ter: "Belgium was bound in honour to defend her own independence.
She kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and
protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath; England kept
hers. These are the facts."

In support of the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis,
namely, that Germany "took her responsibilities towards neutral
States seriously," he alleges nothing except that "he spoke frankly
of the wrong committed by Germany" in invading Belgium. That
a man knows the right, while doing the wrong, is not usually accepted
as proof of his serious conscientiousness.

The real nature of Germany's view of her "responsibilities to-
wards neutral States" may, however, be learnt, on authority which
cannot be disputed, by reference to the English White Paper. If
those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously, why, when Ger-
many was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were
respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the
corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have
guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium.
The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von Bethmann-
Hollweg's colleague. It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss
upon Shakespeare:

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just;
But four times he that gets his blow in fust. ' '

506 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

''They had to advance into France," said Herr von Jagow, "by
the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with
their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early
as possible."

Germany's real attitude towards Bel^um was thus frankly given
by the German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and
the German Chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag, claimed the
right to commit a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of ' ' hack-
ing a way through." The treaty which forbade the wrong was by
comparison a mere scrap of paper. The truth was spoken in the first
statements by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and argu-
ments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts to ex-
cuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover, all attacks upon
Great Britain in regard to this matter, and all talk about "responsi-
bilities towards neutral States, ' ' come badly from the man who on the
29th July asked Great Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of
his ' ' efforts for years to bring about an understanding between Eng-
land and Germany," an understanding, he added, which would have
"absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe." He omitted to men-
tion what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, that
Germany required, as the price of an understanding, an uncondi-
tional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government
were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression
against Germany ; they were not prepared to pledge their neutrality
in case of aggression by Germany. An Anglo-German understand-
ing on the latter terms would not have meant an absolute guarantee
for the peace of Europe ; but it would have meant an absolutely free
hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for Germany
to break the peace of Europe.

The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the British Am-
bassador in August last he "may have been a bit excited at seeing
the hopes and work of the whole period of his Chancellorship
going for nought." Considering that at the date of the conversation
(4th August) Germany had already made war on France the nat-
ural conclusion is that the shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes con-
sisted, not in the fact of a European war, but in the fact that Eng-
land had not agreed to stand out of it.

The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the
American correspondent may be brought to a very simple test, the

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 507

application of which is the more apposite because it serves to recall
one of the leading facts which produced the present war. Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg refused the proposal, which England put forward
and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a Conference
at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and honourable
terms without war. If he really wished to work with England for
peace, why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known,
after the Balkan Conference in London, that England could be
trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the
Reichstag to England's good faith in those negotiations. The pro-
posal for a second Conference between the Powers was made by Sir
Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in
1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of avert-
ing war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the
conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.

No. 103.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Rep-
resentatives abroad.

Sir, Havre, March 4, 1915.

I have the honour of sending you herewith the protest of the
Government of the King against the declaration of the German Chan-
cellor that Belgium had abandoned her neutrality since 1906 by con-
cluding an agreement with Great Britain. I would ask you to com-
municate this protest to the Government to which you are accredited
and to give it as much publicity as possible.

I am, &c.,

Davignon.

Enclosure to No. 103.
Communique.

**0n December 2nd, 1914, the Chancellor of the German Empire
declared before the Reichstag that *on August 4th we had already
certain indications of the fault committed by the Belgian Govern-
ment, but I had not yet at my disposition any formal proofs in writ-

508 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ing, though the British Government was aware that such proofs
existed. Now, by means of certain documents discovered at Brus-
sels, which I have caused to be published, it has become clear how,
and in what measure, Belgium had abandoned her neutrality in
favour of England. The whole world now realises that when our
troops on the night of August 3rd-4th moved into Belgian territory,
they were setting foot on the soil of a State which had long ago
abandoned its neutrality. '

"Belgium is justly proud of her traditions of honour and correct
action, and can not pass over this campaign directed against her
honour by a Chancery which has made untruthfulness its regular
method, without branding the attempt with a well-merited stigma.
Hard though the sufferings of the present hour may be, the Belgian
people regards honour as a thing precious and immutable.

"Belgium never allowed her patrimony of national uprightness
to be lessened. It was the resolve to keep that patrimony intact
which dictated her decision on the night of August 2nd, and the im-
partial historian will repeat the fact to future generations still proud
of their moral integrity.

' ' There is a campaign on foot to distort historical truth before the
eyes of the nations, and no means are too base for employment in
it. Once more the Belgian Government must speak out, and so
speaking must address its declaration to every land where Right and
Honour are still worshipped.

"At the outbreak of the War, the crime perpetrated against Bel-
gium was obvious, and the interest of Germany in avowing it seemed
evident — she was trying to exercise a sort of moral pressure on her
victim. The violation of international law was avowed by the Im-
perial Chancellor from the very tribune of the Reichstag. At that
moment things went so far that money was offered in compensation
for lost honour to the nation that Germany was trying to fascinate !
As if honour could be bought back by gold! But 'necessity knows
no law' — not kennt kein gebot. It was said that every act was per-
missible— even the act of beating down by a lightning-stroke a na-
tion that it was necessary to crush. Once more the course of war
has demonstrated that one initial crime infallibly brings about a
series of subsequent crimes.

"No sooner had our soil — that soil whose inviolability had been
guaranteed by Germany — suffered invasion, than part of the invad-
ing army began to disgrace itself by the systematic perpetration of
arson, rape and murder on a harmless people, with incredible details

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 509

of cruelties, theft and pillage. And while this flood of unparalleled
barbarism was being let loose on Belgium, no act of Belgium could
be found to justify the invasion : the spoiler himself confessed it.

' ' This situation of affairs showed up in a most unfavourable light
the Empire which, in order to conquer France, had set itself to
torture unoffending Belgium. The moral position was odious, and
Germany had to get out of it at all costs. On the one hand the
martyrdom of innocent Belgium was disturbing the conscience of the
whole world. On the other hand, there were nations which this
menacing triumph of brute force exposed to a similar fate, though
they had no concern with the War. They were asking themselves,
and with good reason, the most agonising questions as to their own
future security.

"A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery
discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which had
taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military At-
taches and two Chiefs-of-Staff of the Belgian Army. In order
to transform these reports into documents which would justify Ger-
many's conduct, it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such
was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could
be made to appear decent. And thus Germany, when she had
crushed a people that had remained scrupulously neutral, could pre-
tend that she was enacting (though she might not have known it at
the moment) the role of the minister of avenging justice.

"Undoubtedly this idea had its advantageous points — if it could
be successfully carried out. Moral guilt could be heaped upon the
Belgian people — a people whose loyal and vigorous resistance had
caused the failure of the first plans of the German General Staff.
They were in arms for honour alone, and they were to suffer their
final outrage : it was not enough that they were sacrificed — they were
to be dishonoured also. Thus it came to pass that, with a shameless-
ness for which history shows few parallels, the German Chancery
gave out that a convention had existed, by which Belgium had be-
trayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own neutrality for
the benefit of England. To produce an impression on those ignorant
of the facts, German honesty suppressed, when the precis of the
above-named conversations was published, the clause in which it was
set forth that the exchange of opinion therein recorded had reference
only to the situation that would be created if Belgian neutrality had
already been violated.

*'The Belgian Government gives to the allegations of the German

510 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Chancery the only answer that they deserve — they are a tissue of lies,
all the more shameless because they are set forth by persons who
claim to have studied the original documents.

"But what are the documents which Germany produces in order
to prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number: —

"(1) The report of certain interviews which took place between
Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In
the course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views as
to the way in which England could help Belgium in case the latter
were attacked by Germany. One phrase in the document clearly
proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a hypothetical case,
viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium would only take place
after a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.' The transla-
tion in the Norddeutsche Zeitung of November 25th omits this clause^
the phrase which gives its exact scope and significance to the docu-
ment. Moreover, the photograph of General Ducarne 's report con-
tains the words 'the officer with whom I spoke insists that our con-
versation has been absolutely confidential.' For the word conversa-
tion the Norddeutsche Zeitung substitutes the word 'convention.*
Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that our 'convention' would be
absolutely confidential !

"Such proceedings need no comment.

" (2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the
same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation
the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in
favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression, could
only take place with our consent.' The British Military Attache
raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her rights and
duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium, without waiting
for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel Bridges' per-
sonal opinion only. The British Government has always held, as did
the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter was a neces-
sary preliminary.

"The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only
was no 'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two
Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the
conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great
Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her
behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole Bel-
gian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no con-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2)

511

elusion arising from these conversations was ever brought before the
Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.

"The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of
all this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of
them is either garbled or suppressed.

"In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Govern-
ment, faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is
its duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of
infamy — which so far is his only legitimate conquest. It also takes
the opportunity of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevo-
lence is obvious, that : —

" (1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the
smallest size, had entered Belgium. No trustworthy evidence can be
produced to contradict this affirmation.

" (2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help
made by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the declaration
of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her guarantors.

"(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence
of her fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude,
such help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for
that defence.

"Belgium, the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head
before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehoods.
She has faith in the justice of the World. On the day of judgment
the triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to
serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right and Honour."

XI.

Austria-Hungary Sent Batteries of Cannon into Belgium
Before the Declaration of War.

No. 104.

M. le Baron, Havre, October 20, 1914.

I would ask you kindly to request the Spanish Legation to

transmit the following declaration to the Government of His
Apostolic Majesty:

"When the Government of the King replied to the declara-
tion of war by Austria-Hungary, it was ignorant of certain

512 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

facts which would have modified its reply, or rather which
would have caused it to take the initiative in breaking off diplo-
matic relations. It appears, in effect, from a proclamation of
the German Lieutenant-General, who calls himself Governor of
the fortified city of Liege, that 'the heavy motor batteries sent
by Austria have proved their efficiency in the fighting around
Namur.' This fighting took place before Austria-Hungary's
declaration of war on Belgium, which was based principally on
the military cooperation of Belgium with France and Great
Britain. If the Belgian Government had been aware at that
time of the participation of Austria-Hungary in the attack on
Belgium, it would immediately have recalled the King's Min-
ister accredited to Vienna. The Austrian declaration of Au-
gust 28 stated that Austria-Hungary found itself constrained
to break off diplomatic relations and considered itself from that
date at war with Belgium.

"It was therefore during a period of absolute peace, at a
time when the two countries had diplomatic relations with each
other, that the Austrian artillery attacked and destroyed the
Namur forts."

Kindly accept, etc.

Davignon.

(See the First Grey Book, Nos. 77 and 78.)

No. 105.

The King's Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Minister, Madrid, April 5, 1915.

The Minister of State has just handed me and I have the honour
to transmit herewith to you a note, dated February 6 last, from the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary to the Spanish Am-
bassador at Vienna, in reply to a communication from M. Polo de
Bernabe concerning the Austro-Hungarian batteries placed at the
disposal of the German army at the siege of Namur.

The Marquis de Lema adds that this document, which accom-
panies a letter from the Ambassador dated February 11, reached
him after an unaccountable delay.

Kindly accept, etc. Baron Grenier.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 513

Annex to No. 105.
Note.

If the Royal Government of Belgium states that at the time of
its reply to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary certain facts
were unknown to it and that it was unaware especially that previous
to the Monarchy's declaration of war on Belgium Austro-Hungarian
batteries had entered into action in the fighting around Namur, the
Imperial and Royal Government begs to state that when it made its
declaration of war on the said Kingdom, it likewise was in a similar
situation. At that time, the Imperial and Royal Government had
not been authentically informed of the fact that, long before the
commencement of the present war and without the knowledge of
Austria-Hungary, which was one of the States guaranteeing Belgian
neutrality, Belgium had opened negotiations with other guaranteeing
Powers looking to the military cooperation of Belgium with Great
Britain and France, negotiations which, as appears from documents
recently discovered by the German authorities in the Belgian
archives, finally resulted in the conclusion of military arrangements
directed against Germany. It was undoubtedly these tendencies,
absolutely contrary to the spirit and the tenour of the Treaties of
April 19, 1839, which induced the Belgian Government to decline the
proposals that Germany had made for the purpose of obtaining free
passage for German troops through Belgian territory, — proposals
called forth by the hostile attitude of Belgium and dictated by the
imperative necessity for the German Empire to preserve itself —
and thus to force Germany to make war on Belgium. It was precisely
by such proceedings that the Belgian Government gave grounds for
the employment, in the operations against Belgian fortresses, of the
Austro-Hungarian batteries, which, at the beginning of warlike com-
plications, had been placed by the Monarchy at the disposal of Ger-
many. As appears from the foregoing remarks, the Royal Govern-
ment of Belgium itself provoked the state of affairs which it is now
endeavouring to lay at the door of the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment. This Government is therefore entirely in the right in repudiat-
ing this charge, which is without foundation, and in stating, on
its side, that Belgium's conduct has been in contradiction with the
duties devolving upon it as a perpetually neutral State.

514 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 106.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, tJie
King's Minister at Madrid.

M. le Baron, Havre, April 20, 1915.

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith, the reply of
the King's Government to the note of the Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment which you transmitted to me with your report of April 5.

I should be obliged to you if you would have it transmitted to its
destination through the good offices of the Spanish Government.

Kindly accept, etc. Davignon.

Annex to No. 106.

In a note, dated February 11, the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, in order to justify the participation of Austro-Hungarian artil-
lery in the destruction of the forts at Namur at a time when Belgium
and Austria-Hungary were still at peace, points to the discovery in
the Belgian archives of documents revealing an alleged Anglo-Belgian
military understanding directed against Germany. It declares that
it was these tendencies, contrary to the spirit of the Treaties of
1839, that instigated Belgium to reject the German proposals, which
were called forth by the hostile attitude of Belgium and were dic-
tated to Germany in the interest of its self-preservation. Finally,
it adds that the employment of Austrian cannon, which at the begin-
ning of hostilities were placed at the disposal of Germany, against
the forts at Namur, was due to this hostile attitude on the part of
the King's Government and that the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment has the right to state that the conduct of Belgium has been
in contradiction with the duties devolving upon it as a perpetually
neutral State.

The Imperial and Royal Government pretends therefore to justify
hostilities directed against us in a time of peace by alleging that we
have failed to fulfil our duties in the matter of neutrality by nego-
tiating with England a military agreement against Germany. This
calumnious accusation, which is keenly resented by the King's Gov-
ernment, in no way influenced the declaration of war which Austria-
Hungary addressed to Belgium on August 28, 1914. As a matter of
fact, even though the guilt of the Belgian Government were proved,

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 515

the question would still present itself how it could justify an act of
aggression which took place two months before the discovery of the
incriminating documents.

But the King's Government, which for more than eighty-four
years has fulfilled its international obligations with scrupulous ex-
actness, energetically repudiates the charge of the German chancel-
lery accusing it of playing false.

If the Imperial and Royal Government had read the documents
found in the archives of Brussels, it would have convinced itself that
they did not prove any guilt on the part of the King's Government.

These documents are two in number.

The first is a report from General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian
general staff, to the Minister of War on the interviews which he had
had with Colonel Barnardiston, British military attache at the begin-
ning of 1906. These interviews concerned the carrying out of the
guarantee by England. In his opening sentences General Ducarne
mentions the hypothesis assumed by his interlocutor: "English
troops would not enter Belgium until after the violation of Belgian
neutrality by Germany."

The hypothesis assumed — namely, previous violation of Belgian
neutrality — is enough in itself to free the King's Government of the
charge made against it by Germany, provided, of course, that the
documents be not quoted in part, that they be not made to say what
is not contained in them, as was done by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung in translating them.

The violation of Belgian neutrality on the eastern frontier being
an eventuality, of which there appeared many threatening indica-
tions as early as 1906, the first duty of the Belgian general staff
was to study a plan for the assistance, which England, as a guar-
anteeing power, would send into Belgium, under this hypothesis, to
repel a German attack. The fact that this eventuality took place
with a brutality that no one would have imagined as possible shows
that this solicitude was justified. Moreover, Colonel Barnardiston, a
mere military attache, had not the power necessary to conclude an
agreement, nor was General Ducarne, an official of the War Depart-
ment, empowered to take note of a promise of assistance. Not only
such a convention was never concluded, but the impugned conver-
sations were never the subject of deliberation on the part of the
Government.

The second document relates to a conversation on the same sub-
ject, which took place in the month of April 1912 between military

516 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

attache Bridges and Lieutenant-General Jungbluth. In the course
of this conversation General Jungbluth remarked to his interlocutor
that English intervention in favour of Belgium could take place
only with the consent of the latter. The British military attache
objected that England would perhaps be led to exercise its rights
and fulfil its duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgium without
waiting for the latter to call for aid. That was Colonel Bridges*
personal opinion; it was never shared by his Government and it
clearly follows from this conversation that intervention by England
could not have taken place before the violation of Belgian neutrality
by Germany. This second document would of itself remove the sus-
picion that a convention, as a result of the Ducarne-Barnardiston
interviews, had been concluded in 1906. As a matter of fact, Colonel
Bridges did not in 1912 allude to the interview of Colonel Bar-
nardiston in 1906, and it is evident that if a convention had been
concluded six years before, the interlocutors, in taking up the sub-
ject, would have had only to refer to it.

The Imperial and Royal Government is manifestly in error in
attributing the German attack to the hostile attitude of Belgium.
Up to August 2, 1914, the date of the ultimatum, no difference had
arisen between the two countries, their relations had not ceased to
remain cordial, and Germany had given voice to no complaint
against us.

It is clear from the evidence of the official documents published
up to the present time and of the speech of the Imperial Chancellor
delivered on August 4 that Germany had nothing with which to
reproach Belgium, and that, if its troops attacked Belgium, it was
for the purpose of pushing into France by the quickest and easiest
way, in order to strike a decisive blow as soon as possible. "We
were compelled," said the Chancellor in his speech of August 4, "to
override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Govern-
ments. The wrong — I speak frankly — ^that we are committing we
will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been
reached."

In order to declare war on Belgium, the Imperial and Royal
Government invoked all manner of pretexts except the non-
fulfilment of neutral duties, and it cannot deny that while we were
on friendly terms with it and while we were endeavouring to com-
ply with the requests of its representative at Brussels, it was order-
ing its troops to destroy our forts at Namur.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 517

XII.

Legend Concerning the Putting out op Eyes.

XIII.

Annulment op the Exequator op Consuls in Belgium.

XIV.
Arbitrary Arrest op M. Max, Burgomaster of Brussels.

XV.

Fine Imposed on the City op Courtrai por Having Obeyed Two
German Commanders.

XVI.

No French or English Troops Entered Belgium Before

August 5.

No. 116.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Missions
in Foreign Countries.

Mr. Minister, Havre, January 28, 1915.

As you are aware, Germany is endeavouring to justify its attack
on Belgium by alleging facts which, if true, would prove deference
to the wishes of France and England on the part of our country,
and consequently a disregard of our obligations as neutrals.

Thus the Wolff Agency telegraphed to the newspapers, according
to an article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, that as early
as July 24 French troops under arms had entered Belgian territory.

I deem it my duty to issue a denial of this audacious statement.

I should be obliged to you if you would kindly have this denial
published in the country of your residence.

Accept, etc. . Davignon.

Annex to No. 116.

Note.

A German manufacturer saw at Erquelinnes on July 24 two
companies of French troops under arms. He so states to the General
Government of Belgium, and the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung

518 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

considers it as an established fact. We regret that the memory of
the anonymous witness, who has vouched for this story under oath,
has served him so poorly. It is quite possible, however, that after
the lapse of six months his memory has confused the names of places.

We have already said, but we are compelled to repeat, that no
French or English armed troops entered Belgium before August 5.
The Government did not appeal to the guarantee of its guarantors,
nor did it remove in favour of French troops the prohibition to enter
the territory of the Kingdom until Germany had violated the neu-
trality of Belgium. This violation took place on August 4th, at
eight o'clock in the morning, and it was on the same day, at six
o'clock in the evening, that the Government decided to call France
and England to its aid. Before that date no French soldier had
entered Belgium.

As against the German manufacturer, we call to witness the
officials of the Empire, the German Minister at Brussels, the Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Chancellor himself. Dur-
ing the night of August 2-3 Herr von Below endeavoured to find some
grievance against us to support his ultimatum. At two o'clock in
the morning he called on the Secretary-General at the Department
and told him that a patrol of French cavalry had crossed the fron-
tier. Baron van der Elst asked him where this took place. In Ger-
many, was the reply. If a single French soldier under arms had
crossed our frontier, it is evident that he would not have escaped the
vigilance of Herr von Below 's numerous spies.

On the 3rd of August the Belgian Minister was received by the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. "Have you any complaints
against us?" enquired Baron Beyens. "Have we not for three-
quarters of a century always lived up to all the duties of our neu-
trality with respect to Germany as well as with respect to all the
great guaranteeing powers ? " " Germany, ' ' replied Herr von Jagow,
"has no complaint to make against Belgium, whose attitude has al-
ways been one of perfect correctness. ' '

Finally, the Chancellor, at the session of the Reichstag on Au-
gust 4, expressed himself no less frankly : ' ' Our troops, ' ' he declared,
"have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian
soil. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. The wrong —
I speak frankly — that we are committing we will endeavour to make
good." But inasmuch as the frank admission of the Chancellor has
been disavowed by the German press, because the cynical disregard
of the treaties created in all neutral countries the same unpleasant

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 519

impression, Germany has endeavoured to impugn the loyalty of
Belgium.

Thus Germany, after having unjustly attacked, ruined, and mur-
dered us, would rob us of the only thing we have left, our honour.
But these imputations of witnesses, whose very names are withheld,
imputations which are advanced six months after the events, will not
mislead public opinion. From the outset public opinion has con-
demned the premeditated attack on Belgium and has passed judg-
ment on the abominable calumnies invented to justify that attack.

No. 117.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Klohukowski,
French Minister.

Mr. Minister, Havre, February 6, 1915.

Your Excellency has been so good as to call my attention to the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which published testimony to the
effect that French soldiers under arms had entered Belgium before
the outbreak of hostilities. This trick is part of the campaign at-
tempting to prove that Belgium, in complicity with France and Eng-
land, had failed to live up to its international obligations, and that
the first hostile acts were committed, not by Germany, but by
Belgium.

As early as the month of November the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung published seven depositions of witnesses, which were repro-
duced in the November number of the War Journal. These seven
depositions agreed in the statement that French soldiers and officers
were present in Belgium before the war. But the place where they
had been seen varied: now it was Charleroi, now Namur, Ougree,
or Liege. We did not protest against these allegations. As your
Excellency knows, French soldiers on leave, in uniform but unarmed,
were often seen in Belgium, especially at Dinant, Namur, and Liege.
Foreigners also mistake for French soldiers the Belgian guides, who
wear red trousers. But a witness having asserted that two French
regiments were at the Gare du Midi on August 2, we published a
denial, which appeared in the Petit Havre.

In its issue of January 9, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,
again on testimony given under oath, stated that armed French
troops from Paris had landed at Erquelinnes on July 24. In an

520 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

official communication, a summary of which appeared in Le Mating
I showed that this accusation was unfounded. Your Excellency will
find this communication herewith enclosed (see Annex No. 116). It
is evident that the entry of French troops into Belgium, before the
latter had appealed to its guarantors, would have been reported to
the Government by the customs and police agents, as well as to the
German Minister by his spies. No complaint was addressed to us
in this respect before the German attack. Dispossessed of our terri-
tory, it is not possible for us to make investigations with regard to
the depositions of German witnesses. But it will be possible for the
French Government to deny the aforesaid accusation, in so far as
the landing of troops at Erquelinnes on the evening of July 24 is
concerned.

Such a denial would be gratefully appreciated by us.

I take, etc. Davignon.

No. 118.

M. Klohukowski, French Minister, to M. Davignon, Minister
for Foreign Affairs. .

Mr. Minister, Havre, March 13, 1915.

Referring to your Excellency's letter of February 6 last, con-
cerning alleged violations by France of Belgian neutrality, sworn
to under oath before German courts, I have the honour to hand you
herewith a letter from M. Millerand and categorical declarations by
our Consuls at Liege and at Brussels, in which I entirely concur.

These documents, together with the energetic denials of the Royal
Government, proving how absolutely unfounded are the charges in
the testimony invoked, which teems with gross errors and more or
less intentional inaccuracies, will be communicated to the neutral
Powers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic proposes,
moreover, to have them summarised in the form of a brochure, so
as to reach the public opinion of the various countries.

The object of the German publications is evidently to justify in
the eyes of neutrals the attack on Belgium.

Although the cause has been heard, through the diplomatic pub-
lications, notably the Belgian Grey Book and the declarations of
the German Chancellor to the Reichstag, it is none the less interest-
ing and instructive to catch the Germans again red-handed in acts of
deceit and of bad faith.

I take, etc. Klobukowski.

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 521

Annex I to No. 118.
The Minister of War to M. Delcasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Paris, February 16, 1915.

Under date of February 13 you kindly brought to my attention
the fact that M. Davignon had expressed a desire to have the French
Government deny the accusation concerning the landing of French
troops at Erquelinnes on the evening of July 24, and asked how I
felt on this subject.

I have the honour to inform you that it seems to me that nothing
but advantage could accrue from the publication of the most formal
denial of the allegations of the German press on this point, as well
as on the points mentioned in the letters of your representatives in
Belgium, copies of which you sent me.

In order to facilitate the measures that you believe you should
take to refute these mendacious allegations, I deem it my duty to
give you the following details:

(a) No landing of French troops at Erquelinnes could have been
witnessed on July 24, 1914, for on that date not only no measure
of preparedness, but not even of precaution, had been taken, either
to watch the frontier or to guard the railroads.

The first precautionary measure, the cancelling of leaves of ab-
sence, was taken on July 26.

(&) Even at a later date, at the time when measures were taken
to cover mobilisation, no covering measures were taken on the Bel-
gian frontier, because of the respect due to the neutrality of that
country.

(c) Furthermore, on August 2, the first day of mobilisation, in
order to prevent any untoward incident, my predecessor issued the
following telegraphic order to the General commanding the first
region :

August 2, 214 3/11 to the First Region, Lille.

"It is absolutely necessary in the present diplomatic situa-
tion that there be no untoward incident on the Franco-Belgian
frontier, and therefore that the troops keep at a distance of not
less than 2 kilometres approximately from that frontier.

"Customs officers and forest rangers will be instructed to
avoid all untoward incidents."

This order merely extended to the first region, when it became
affected by the mobilisation telegram, the orders given to the regions
along the Franco-German frontier, which prescribed that the troops

522 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

should not cross a line which, by reason of the chances of conflict,
my predecessor deemed it advisable to fix at a distance of about 10
kilometres from the German frontier.

The German allegations are therefore mendacious in all respects;
they have not even the excuse of likelihood.

Annex II to No. 118.

M. Pallu de la Barriere, French Consul at Liege, now at Havre, to
U. Klohukowski, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Re-
public to the Belgian Government, now at Havre.

Havre, February 2, 1915.

I have the honour to communicate to you, in so far as the con-
sular district of Liege is concerned, the following remarks called
forth by the item in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung concern-
ing the alleged violation of Belgian neutrality by France:

To the three charges made under oath before the courts of Essen,
Eschweiler, and Bonn, I am in a position to reply with a formal
denied.

I declare that the facts set forth in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung are false.

That paper says: "In the latter part of July I frequently saw
French soldiers in the neighbourhood of Liege. Together with the
Belgians they were digging trenches around Liege."

No French soldiers could have been seen either at Liege or in
its vicinity at that time (or even later), for the good reason that
there was not a single soldier there. This being so, it was no less
impossible to see our soldiers helping Belgian soldiers to dig trenches.
I can even assure you that at that date the Belgians themselves
were not digging trenches, as I was able to observe in passing by
and between several of the forts. On the contrary, I saw Belgian
soldiers cutting down trees in the vicinity of these forts at the very
beginning of mobilisation (August 2, 1914).

Second Charge. — Court of Eschweiler, October 20, 1914.

"In the latter part of July I saw French officers and soldiers
in the streets of Liege, and in large numbers, contrary to cus-
tom. They were French line soldiers (red kepis) who were
passing through the streets of the city."

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 523

Neither on that date nor up to August 6, the date of my de-
parture from Liege, did I see in the streets of that city or in its
environs, or even at my consulate, a single French officer or soldier
in uniform.

In this connexion, I might add that as soon as French mobilisa-
tion began, I gave strict instructions to Frenchmen called to the
colours, forbidding them to leave Belgium in uniform, in case some
of the reservists might have uniforms. I did this in order to prevent
any demonstration whatever on the part of the populace and any
act contrary to the observance of Belgian neutrality.

Third Charge. — Court of Bonn, December 9, 1914.
"At Namur, on August 2, everyone was saying: We have
help; the French have arrived; whole trainloads have reached
Liege ; on the road between Namur and Luxemburg only French
soldiers (cavalry and infantry) were to be seen; all the stations
were under the military occupation of the French. From
Namur to the frontier we were conducted under a French escort. ' '
I protest vigorously against this new charge, which is as false
as the preceding ones. Up to August 6, as can be proved by the
record of my telephonic communications at the Post Office Depart-
ment at Liege, I communicated several times a day with my con-
sular agent at Namur, to keep myself informed of even the slightest
incidents. I affirm that on August 2 no train had brought French-
men to Namur. Whether misinformed persons stated "that the
French had arrived" I do not know. What is certain is that such
a statement was erroneous as regards Namur as well as Liege.

Besides, if there had been French soldiers on the road between
Namur and Luxemburg, I would have been informed of that fact at
once, as well as of the military occupation of the railroad stations
on that line by our troops. These assertions are mendacious.

The same is true as to Germans being conducted to the frontier
under a French escort.

Annex III to No. 118.

Baron Lahure, French Consul at Brussels, now at Havre, to M»
Klohukowski, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic
to the Belgian Government, now at Havre.

Havre, February 2, 1915.
You have been so kind as to send me a translation of the stories
circulated in Germany, particularly in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine

524 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Zeitung for January 9, concerning alleged violations of Belgian neu-
trality by France.

I hasten to give below, in so far as Brussels is concerned, and
following the order of the quotations, the observations that the
reading of this testimony has suggested to me.

1. Court of Rastatt. — "A regiment in grey campaign uniform
took part in the review at Brussels on July 26, on the occasion of
the Lord Mayor's visit."

The Belgian General Staff, considering a change in its uniforms,
had a company of infantry march in the various reviews at Brussels
before the war, dressed in the proposed new bluish grey uniform
and wearing a helmet of the same colour. The object of this was
in all likelihood to learn the opinion of the public on the uniform
that was being tried.

I have never heard any one mention an incident that is alleged
to have taken place in the neighbourhood of the Bourse on July 29,
when an officer is said to have harangued the crowd. The witness
alleges that he had four stars on his collar and that he was a cavalry
officer.

This is manifestly inaccurate, as no French officer has stars on
his collar. Only Belgian officers have stars on their collars, and
never more than three.

3. Court of Tittlungen. — French soldiers in uniform were seen
in the streets of Brussels, as early as the morning of August 3, after
the sending of the ultimatum, but before the declaration of war.
The crowd cheered a French hussar.

That is quite possible and an absolutely normal state of affairs.
French soldiers, who are on leave and whose families reside in Bel-
gium, were, as a matter of fact, authorised to visit their relations in
uniform, but unarmed. The national holidays of Belgium taking
place at the end of July and coinciding with the Brussels fair, this
was a time when soldiers were accustomed to ask for leave of from
eight to fifteen days to visit their families before the manoeuvres.
Perhaps the soldier in question was on sick leave with his family
and was preparing to rejoin his corps before the expiration of his
leave.

Since our French colony at Brussels numbers 25,000 persons and
is located in the centre of the city, it is quite natural that a group
of Frenchmen may have cheered the uniform of our army when war
had just been declared on our country; and there would be no
occasion for astonishment if Belgians had joined in acclaiming a

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2)

525

soldier of one of the powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality at a
time when it had just been violated by the delivery of the ultimatum
announced by the press.

5. Court of Diisseldorf. — Ovations on the boulevards of Brussels
to French soldiers on August 2.

As I have just pointed out, this is an entirely normal state of
affairs, resulting from the number of French soldiers on leave who
happen to be in Brussels at this time. The 2nd of August being the
first day of our mobilisation, the Legation, which had been advised
of it during the night, had immediately communicated its mobilisa-
tion call to the Havas Agency. It had appeared in the Belgian
newspapers on Sunday morning, August 2. In the course of the day
soldiers in uniform undoubtedly passed through the city on their
way to the station.

6. Court of the Reserve Battalion of the 119th Infantry Regi-
ment of the Landwehr at Stuttgart. — Several French artillery
oflScers, whom the crowd cheered enthusiastically, were seen on
July 16.

The place where this demonstration took place is not specified.
July 16 was a Thursday. During the holidays there is always a large
crowd in the centre of the city, even on week-days. I have never
heard any one speak of an ovation to a group of officers of our
artillery, and I ask myself how they could have been walking in
uniform without the Legation's being advised of that fact. Our
officers are, as a matter of fact, required to ask the Legation for per-
mission to wear their uniforms, and the permission is granted only
in exceptional cases.

Might these not have been a group of Belgian musicians, members
of a band having a uniform somewhat like that of our artil-
lery adjutants: black with a red band, kepi with a feather and
lace?

8. Court of Hamburg. — The crowd sang the Marseillaise in front
of the Bourse on August 2 and cheered a group of French soldiers.

Groups of our fellow-countrymen, who are so numerous in
Brussels, did, as a matter of fact, sing the Marseillaise and cheered
our soldiers on leave who were returning to France, when they met
them. The Bourse being situated on the main thoroughfare leading
to the Gare du Midi and war being declared on France, this patriotic
demonstration was quite natural.

That the crowd cheered English officers on the arrival of the
train at the Gare du Nord in Brussels on August 5th is not in the

526 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

least surprising, inasmuch as German troops had two days before
violated the territory of Belgium and as the Government had on
August 4 appealed to England.

9. Court of Anrath. — On Sunday, August 2, a soldier in full
equipment, with his bayonet on his gun, was seen on the Bouelvard
Botanique at Brussels, apparently engaged in gathering together
young Frenchmen who were subject to military service. The witness
recognised the soldier as French by his red trousers. Here there is
evident confusion, as no soldier on leave had a gun. Furthermore,
it is difficult to see of what use a soldier would be on the boulevard
of the Botanical Garden, where there is no gathering point of the
French colony, where he might have collected reservists.

It must have been a Belgian soldier of one of the guide regiments,
which also wear red trousers. The Belgian army having been mo-
bilised on August 2, fully equipped soldiers, even single soldiers,
were frequently seen on their way to the station, bound for the con-
centration point of their corps.

None of these facts can therefore be seriously considered as indi-
cations of the violation of Belgian neutrality by France ; but, on the
other hand, there are proofs of German premeditation, easy to verify
if the testimony of householders, with whom German reserve officers
had lodgings, and of furniture moving companies were taken. It
could be proved that in the month of July Germany had begun the
mobilisation of its army by individual call and under conditions that
had never been put into effect up to that time, not even at the time
of the greatest tension following the Agadir demonstration.

I was informed of this shortly after July 14 by one of our fellow-
countrymen, a business man, with whom I lunched at the manu-
facturers' club on the Boulevard Anspach. He considered as a sure
premonitory sign that war would soon break out the fact, which had
come to his knowledge, that a large number of Germans, particularly
reserve officers, had, as if in obedience to the same order, settled up
their business in Belgium, sending their furniture to Germany and
placing their apartments or houses on the market for rent. Such a
thing had never before been done, and it might be presumed there-
from that they felt sure their country would violate Belgian neu-
trality. Otherwise how account for their solicitude to protect their
furniture by sending it to Germany?

I was much impressed by this sign and you will surely remember,
Mr. Minister, that I made the fact known to you. I mentioned it
likewise to Lieutenant-Colonel Genie, a certain number of reserve

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 527

officers of our army having come to tell me how surprised they were
at not having yet received individual orders calling them back to
France.

No. 119.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Diplomatic
Representatives abroad.

Mr. Minister, Havre, April 10, 1915.

In its ultimatum of August 2, the German Government has
endeavoured to justify its invasion of Belgium by alleging that the
German right wing was threatened by an attack on the part of the
French through Belgian territory.

"The German Government," said this ultimatum, "has received
trustworthy information to the effect that the French forces intend
to march upon the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur. This informa-
tion leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march against
Germany through Belgian territory."

These allegations were, from the very first, in evident contradic-
tion with the formal declarations of the French Government and with
the facts. Nevertheless, in certain neutral countries the question was
raised whether there might not be some foundation for them.

The events that followed removed all doubt on this score, and no
thoughtful person could give them the slightest credence.

The fact that the Belgian army found itself alone in facing the
German armies during the first period of the campaign demonstrated
the falsity of the statements of the German General Staff.

The German writer on military matters. General von Bernhardi,
attempted, however, in an article published in the New York Sun a
few months ago, to make the Americans believe that in the month of
July France and England were preparing to violate the neutrality
of Belgium.

Desiring to make an unanswerable reply to these accusations,
the French Government published a note, in which it gave exact
information as to the disposition of French troops at the beginning
of the war. You will find a copy thereof under this cover.

This publication clearly proves, in the first place, the sincerity
of the declarations which the French Government made to us on the
outbreak of hostilities ; it further proves that the German allegations

528 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

were only an idle pretext with a view to masking the real purpose
of the Imperial General Staff, which was, by means of an over-
whelming march, to take France by surprise in the midst of
mobilisation.

An error has slipped into the communique. The violation of
Belgium territory took place on the 4th, not the 3rd, of August.
{First Grey Book, No. 30, page 12).

Accept, etc.

Annex to No. 119.

PRANCE AND THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

The Reply of France to German Lies.

In an article published in an American newspaper, the German
General von Bernhardi, in discussing the origin of the war, pretends
to prove that French concentration and the presence of our principal
forces on our left wing demonstrate the fact that the French Gov-
ernment had resolved, together with Great Britain, to violate the
neutrality of Belgium.

To this allegation of General von Bernhardi, the French concen-
tration plan is an unanswerable reply.

I. OuB Concentration Plan.

On the outbreak of the war, all the French forces were, by virtue
of the concentration plan, stationed, facing the northwest, between
Belfort and the Belgian frontier, as follows:

1st Army: between Belfort and the general line Mirecourt-
Luneville ;

2nd Army: between that line and the Moselle;

3rd Army: between the Moselle and the line Verdun- Audun-le-
Romain ;

5th Army : between that line and the Belgian frontier.

The 4th Army was held in reserve west of Commercy.

Consequently, all the French forces were stationed facing Ger-
many, and Germany alone.

II. Variations in Our Concentration.

So true was it that such was the disposition of the forces that
when the violation of Belgian neutrality by the German troops be-

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 529

came known, the Prencli General Staff was obliged to order variations
in the concentration plan.

The eventuality of these variations had naturally been studied,
for there had been numerous indications that a violation of Belgian
neutrality by Germany was to be feared.

When this violation took place and when the Belgian Government
(August 4, Yellow Book, page 161) had asked for our support, the
lines of our 2nd Army were extended to the region of Verdun; the
4th Army was placed between the 3rd and the 5th, on the Meuse;
the 5th slipped towards the northwest along the Belgian frontier, as
far as the heights of Fourmies.

In addition, two corps of the 2nd Army, the 18th and the 9th,
were shifted from the region of Nancy towards Mezieres and Hirson.

Two divisions from Algeria and the division from Morocco were
likewise sent in this direction.

Finally, a corps of cavalry was ordered to enter Belgium, to
reconnoiter the German columns and impede their movements (Au-
gust 6), three days after the latter had violated the Belgian frontier.

Thanks to this variation, the French General Staff was able to
meet the shock of the German attack west of the Meuse by bringing
our principal forces to that point.

If there had been premeditation on its part, this sudden change
in the disposition of our troops would not have been necessary and
we would have been able to arrive in time to prevent the enemy from
crossing the Meuse into Belgium.

A single detail is sufficient to illustrate this unanswerable argu-
ment: our left covering corps, the second, that is to say that of
Amiens, was, by virtue of the concentration plan, not facing the
Belgian frontier, but in the region of Montmedy-Longuyon.

III. The Concentration op the English Army.

As for the English Army, its support was not assured us until
August 5, that is to say, after the violation of the Belgian frontier
by the Germans, which took place on August 3 {Yellow Book, page
151).

The concentration of the British Army was effected back of
Maubeuge, from August 14 to 21.

530 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

IV. Various Orders Concerning the Intentions op the French

Government.

On July 30 the French Government, in spite of the military
measures taken by Germany, orders our covering troops to remain
at 10 kilometres from the frontier.

On August 2 a second order directs our troops to leave to the
Germans the entire responsibility for hostilities and to confine them-
selves to driving back any attacking troops that enter upon French
territory.

On August 3 a further telegram orders our troops absolutely to
avoid any untoward incident on the Franco-Belgian frontier. The
French troops must keep two to three kilometres from the frontier.

On the same day, August 3, a new order is issued, confirming the
instructions of August 2 and giving them precision.

An order of the Minister of War, issued on August 4, states:

"By spreading false reports, Germany will endeavour to induce
us to violate Belgian neutrality. Until orders are issued to the con-
trary, it is strictly and formally forbidden, even to patrols and
troopers, to enter Belgian territory, and aviators are forbidden to fly
over that territory."

On August 5, at the request of the Belgian Government (made on
the 4th), French airships and dirigibles are authorised to fly over
Belgian territory, and our reconnoitering parties are authorised to
enter that territory.

XVII.
Tax on Absentees.

XVIII.

Carrying off of Machinery.

XIX.

German Accusations Concerning the Treatment of German
Officers and Soldiers Made Prisoners of War by the Belgian
Army.

XX.

Creation of Exceptional Tribunals.

THE
FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK^

CHAPTER I.

Warnings.
(1913.)

No. 1.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 17, 1913.

Our naval and military attaches are sending to their respective
Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this oppor-
tunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important
documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany
intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of
the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Govern-
ment. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to
accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particu-
larly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures
which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy
imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the

^Miscellaneous. No. 15 (1914). Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the
War, published "by the French Oovernment. Presented to both Houses of Par-
liament by command of His Majesty, December, 1914. London: Printed under
the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914. [Cd. 7717.] Translated
and printed by the British Government. No English translation was published by
the French Government. Title of publication in the original text: Ministdre des
Affaires Etrangdres Documents Diplomatiques, 1914. La Guerre EuropSenne, I,
Pieces Relatives aux NSgociationa qui ont PrScSdS les Declarations de Guerre de
I'Allemagne d la Russie (ler Aont 1914) et 4 la France (3 AoUt 1914) Declara-
tion du 4 Septembre 1914. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, MDCCCCXIV.

631

532 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly
opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived
from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved
to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this
principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (personaliU) of
the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign
power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German
army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of
a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that
country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-
establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with
which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise
occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Gov-
ernment for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an
increase of German military strength; the German proposals are
represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the
immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse-
quence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment.
Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yester-
day evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and
speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared
to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find
an echo in the speeches which wiU be delivered next month in the
Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will
be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and
Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism
would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but
to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy.
If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which
a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who
aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart
would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect
itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both
countries makes the situation grave.

Jules Cambon.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 583

Enclosure I.

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the French
Embassy at Berlin, to M. ^tienne, Minister of War.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in Prance has
caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the
Kolnische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather
the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been imme-
diately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the
Kolnische Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important news-
papers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it
appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light
on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet
people who declare that the military plans of France are extraor-
dinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag
who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France,
went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it."
More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion
that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to com-
pete in this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the
shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay
little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising
that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and
even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time
to outrun Prance completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with
her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact
that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too
apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and
expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately,
according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units
incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in

534 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

filling in the gaps.* The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right mo-
ment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary
of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices
through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at
a time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I
beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pelle a
year ago, when the law of 1912 was published :

"We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feel-
ings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events
of last year.

"The Treaty of the 4th November, 1911, has proved a complete
disillusion.

"The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the
Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in
Morocco.

"It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to
conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no
one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening
out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

"Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared
to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial
expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because
their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs
to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a
second-rate power.

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second-rate power successfully
withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way.
Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are deter-
mined that such a thing shall never happen again."

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the
programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is
on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the
occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction,
France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "her
eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of
Germany can well be understood.

* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again
a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our
contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace
footing.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 535

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe
and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public
opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has
accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens
of these two successive laws.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the levee en masse
of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge
crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the
middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and
Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France,
will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a
centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the
Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France,
as does the Kolnische Zeitung, we are in fact, and shall long remain,
the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of
inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace — so they keep on proclaiming, and the
Emperor more than any one — ^but they do not understand peace as
involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They
want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the
necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is
wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous
superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national
anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Govern-
ment will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing every-
thing to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the
various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more
or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should
justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first
decisive blows being struck at France.

536 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Enclosure II.

M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to
M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the
Finance Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would
be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet,
and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the
German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we
know that it deals with * ' an increase of military strength of immense
scope ' ' to use the expression of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal
in terms which enable us to consider the communique of the Lokal
Anzeiger as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men.
We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914,
the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed
from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the pro-
visions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the
official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912
tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which
most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the
very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with
forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative
for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of
the operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays
commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years
ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General
Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive,
and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence,
remarked to his sovereign, * * There they will come to a stop. ' ' William
II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the
German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a
plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it
is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 537

the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany
at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed
of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable
proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will
throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come
to blows ; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government
should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors,
and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction
of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the
oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme
for his address to the young soldiers * ' the duty of being braver and
more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such
an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans
worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive
movement against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to
meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France
that the danger seems to them greatest. The Kolnische Zeitung has
said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather
than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelm-
strasse.

But we must be willing to realize that the opinion expressed by
the Kolnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the immense
majority of the German people.

In this connexion I think it is interesting to quote a conversation
which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old
Prince Henckel von Donnersmarek, as it may serve to reflect the
opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donners-
marek spoke as follows : —

* ' French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil
designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular
opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on
us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion,
which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Govern-
ment to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to pro-
tect ourselves."

And the Prince added: "I have even been considered in France

538 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false.
Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost
to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to
be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages
of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile
sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France
and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was
because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly
be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am
afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia,
but rather because I think that it is in the interests of both countries
to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of
such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you
will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities
which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire,
you are not sufficiently accurate ; by accuracy I do not mean arriving
in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of
the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not
as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the
coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the
top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute ex-
actitude, however important or small it may be.' " And Prince
Donnersmarck added: "An exactitude which played so great a role
forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far
greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of
moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared
by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded
to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an
increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not
known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated
to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did
not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered
by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of
the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the
tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the
sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 539

raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th
January, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite
an important part of these loans must have been applied to military
expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial
measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the
"non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while
the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of
effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be
covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would
be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a
progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be
objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their
usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the
same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois
classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on ac-
quired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are
doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy
an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threat-
ened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike
times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independ-
ence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and
to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their heredi-
tary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their
utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be
made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the
newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July,
1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing
can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain
war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure
resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be
met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be
necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forth-
coming.

To sum up : In G^ermany the execution of military reforms always

540 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions
made by the law of the quinquennnium of 1911 and by the law of
1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that
part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by
the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets
are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes
in personnel and materiel.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large
number of reservists who are at the present time in training) , a per-
fect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed
by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the Ger-
man people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in
France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German
effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the
call to the colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any
selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements
of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The
morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps
which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do
little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice.
Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

Faramond.

No. 2.

M. ^tienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonn^rt, Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

Paris, April 2, 1913.
I have just received from a reliable source an official secret report
concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is
divided into two parts ; the first consisting of general statements, the
second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest de-
tail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted.
Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employ-
ment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 541

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this docu-
ment, which seems to merit your attention.

fiTIENNE.

Enclosure.
Memorandum on the Strengthening of the German Army.

Berlin, March 19, 1913.
I. — General Memorandum on the New Military Laws.

The increase has taken place in three stages : —

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with
regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain,
and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was
obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy ;
finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end
of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening
of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To
meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000
men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better forma-
tion of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protec-
tion of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already
clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a
great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought
on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the
French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance
in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on
France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by
the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened
our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase
was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in
support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-
Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us.
On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new loi des cadres;
it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution con-
templated by the new military law.

542 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active
army, which would insure Germany an honourable peace and the
possibility of properly insuring her influence in the affairs of the
world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should
follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists,
nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the
Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutsch-
tum (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one
day increase their population. The employment of an army of black
men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long
time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

II. — Aim and Obligations op Our National Policy, of Our

Army, and of the Special Organisations for

Army Purposes.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education
of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices.
It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into
our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence.
We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our
armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.
We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part
is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries.
We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid
the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so
manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments,
considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak
(Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would
come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must
prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to
be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our
financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final
result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we
must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a
means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore,
absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of
well-chosen agents, witti influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria,

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 543

and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be
necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war
we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion
of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had
gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt
which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired rela-
tions. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated.
Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations
of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be
carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out
simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication ;
they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential
leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly
suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between
the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at
one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the
next European war it will also be necessary that the small states
should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions
their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or
neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Hol-
land, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory
which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In
the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, espe-
cially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a
strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this
direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced
by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the
decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea.
Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased
by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any
offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and
we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against
France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states
on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light.
This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the
offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this pur-
pose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by

544 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to
follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations,
and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we
could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in
such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank
we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reor-
ganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that
it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary,
their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving
definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no
circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neu-
trality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work
in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the
complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ulti-
matum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by
invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in inter-
national law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which de-
mand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks
us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a
hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight,
will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We
will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire,
the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the
hands of the French ; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic
provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question
that Germany 's former possessions should be restored to her.

No. 3.

M. Jules Canibon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen
Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, May 6, 1913.
I was talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the
conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in
London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 545

in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said
Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district.
"We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in
front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I re-
plied, ' ' was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross. ' '

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious.
Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof
of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts
which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom
I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the
visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague con-
fidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East,
and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear
which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter.
The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely
nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian
Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Eu-
rope.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as
extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with inves-
tigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been
made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the
recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a pre-
liminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in
warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for
the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements.
It is a general call to ' ' attention, ' ' and it requires an incredible spirit
of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country,
to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given
in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would
be in the papers the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I
was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say, at
the moment of the Austro- Albanian tension. I know that this is so,
and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of
the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence.
These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in
a safe the means of existence, for their families for a year. It has even

546 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was
to make the trial trip on the ' * Imperator, ' ' did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order
is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point
I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by
General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished
officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "We must
put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces as to
the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary
it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances
in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot
and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then
be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that
she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority,
to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must
anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances
to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly
to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it
corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not
consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight
ago.

Prom these events the following conclusions may be drawn which
comprise the facts stated above; these people are not afraid of war,
they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken
the necessary steps. They wish to he always ready.

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of
persistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form
a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic
ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the
country.

Jules Cambon.

THE FBENCH YELLOW BOOK 547

No. 4.

M. Allize, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister

for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 10, 1913.

From a political point of view people are asking what is the object
of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany,
they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal
forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect
German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the
Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery
will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active
foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which
would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the
Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public
opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark,
even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the
events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two
years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solu-
tion of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to
increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on
Grermany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune
of war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man
is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory. ' *

Allize.

No. 5.

Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on

Public Opinion in Germany According to the Reports

of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents) .

Paris, July 30, 1913.
From observations which our agents in (Germany have been able
to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it

548 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate
men's minds: —

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a dis-

appointment for Germany;

(2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer

of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want
war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives
to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany,
university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students,
elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers,
artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Demo-
cratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade
unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg,
country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin cele-
brating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen,
officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous
on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their
position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of
all these opinions :

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof
of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the
Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the
Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humilia-
tion, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige,
all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of
Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerless-
ness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question
for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion
of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which fol-
lowed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised,
what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had
left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular,
Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter.
However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to
be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became
restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco.
And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity,
her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 549

that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are
the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper
on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911,
since public opinion, although not so unanimous and determined as
French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the
pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and
financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment
in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be
intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she
had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion
in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press
of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their
incapacity and cowardice, has discovered with surprise mingled with
irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since
then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her
arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories ; that Ger-
many, on the other hand, had lived on her reputation, that Turkey
is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had
made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the dis-
grace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial
conquest this consolation was offered: — "Yes, but that does not pre-t
vent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home. ' '

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing
for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility
and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the ques-
tion of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are
unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war
would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prus-
sian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate
would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit
Great Britain.

The forces consist of the following elements: —

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-
loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests
and engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and

550 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently
enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences
of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants, and financiers, in a mod-
erate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean
bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly
supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein —
conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy.
There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large
southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand Duchy
of Baden — are divided by these two opinions : — an unsuccessful war
would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great
economic advantages ; a successful war would only profit Prussia and
Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their
political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer
peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political mat-
ters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social
forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of war-
like feeling.

An example will make this idea clear : — The 110 Socialist members
of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to
prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag,
and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their
number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry ex-
citement and enthusiasm.

Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe
in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for
the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers'
contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the
case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the
one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for
some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism
gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The
expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that
Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is
said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme.
There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 551

this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and
more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a
press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public
opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation
of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas,
burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and
fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each
of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and
moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create
a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of
the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think
it is inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the
better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on
over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets ;
or for social reasons, i.e., to provide the outside interests that alone
can prevent or retard the rise to power of the Democratic and So-
cialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that
time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to
an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of con-
versation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply
rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are
two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from " Bismarckism " as it may be termed.
They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions
with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in
negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it
easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating
force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever
fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and
by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disap-
pointment is the unifying force of the WeTirvereine and other asso-
ciations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary
France ; other finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the
people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as fol-
lows:— The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the

552 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which
are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session
which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle.
It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed
gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character,
and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of
the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its
family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Con-
servative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers
as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms
a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises
with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power
of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not
only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection
threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its
political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In
the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aris-
tocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong
to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the
Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party,
the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the
squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are
bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy
at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members
in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do
not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the
leading role in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against
the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative
instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which
their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solv-
ing. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the diffi-
culties between themselves and their workmen originate in France,
the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France indus-
trial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big
merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating
on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all
these regard war as good business.

Amongst the "Bismarekians" must be reckoned officials of all

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 553

kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Con-
servatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the "pensioned,"
whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the Post. They find
disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young
men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools
and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop
a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Ger-
many's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate
with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological
fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a
crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of
the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging
obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for
all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence ; that
is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apolo-
gists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of
thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from
France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest
thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the
phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the
Kriegsvereine, Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well
known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the
dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably
swelled the membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is
inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous.
They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists
are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are
those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between
France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up
their grievances against us, and one day they will present their ac-
counts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for griev-
ances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in
any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have
been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these
warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have
any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man
under arms."

554 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion
is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany
will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and
the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she
will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her.
Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France
can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the
Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which
exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a
wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea
will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue
be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political
and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is
not believed that her cooperation will be sufficiently rapid and
energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war
as a duel between France and Germany.

No. 6.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin to M. Stephen Pichon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, November 22, 1913.

I have received from an absolutely reliable source an account of
a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Em-
peror and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of
the General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears,
has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way
surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what
I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing,
and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then,
as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had
been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was
still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 555

changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion
of peace against the war-like tendencies of certain parties in Germany.
William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and
that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crush-
ing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his
sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but
he showed himself still more assured of success, ' * for, ' ' he said, to the
King, "this time the matter must be settled, and Your Majesty can
have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole
German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the
intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense ;
and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation
by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of
unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless
persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover
seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years,
family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the Court, and espe-
cially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his
mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity ac-
quired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and
who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the
world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France
to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to
establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain
extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is
realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation.
The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished
to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any
opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany
would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately
manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last
hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of
(General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his im-
patience than is usually supposed, I have known him more than once
to allow his real thoughts to escape him. Whatever may have been

556 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none
the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the
general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public
opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that
it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the
Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly
repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he
likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry."

Jules Cambon.

CHAPTER II.

Preliminaries.

From the Death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the
Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia (July 23, 1914).

No. 7.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 28, 1914.
News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke
of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by
a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack
to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb
which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed
by telegraph.

Dumaine.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 557

No. 8.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bene Vivia/ni,
President of the CouncU, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2, 1914.

The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in
Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to
allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has
acquired.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired
to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable
to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of com-
plaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

Dumaine.

No. 9.

M. de Manneville, French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 4, 1914.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yester-
day, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped
Servia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make
to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the
accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was con-
fident that this would be the case because Servia, if she acted in any
other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against
her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety
which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in
the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or
at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

De Manneville.

558 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 10.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. PetershurgTi, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 6, 1914.

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the
Austro-Hungarian Charge d 'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a
friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the
Austrian press against Servia are in danger of producing in his
country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-
Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for
the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M.
Sazonof interrupted him: "No country," he said, "has had to suffer
more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have
we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure
with which your papers threaten Servia? Do not embark on such a
course."

May this warning not be in vain.

Paleologue.

No. 11.

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M.
Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

Budapest, July 11, 1914.
Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian
question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was neces-
sary to wait for the result of the judicial enquiry, as to which he
refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the
Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself
equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers
at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a
demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres
are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without
hesitation.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 559

With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been
given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has,
as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press,
which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might
be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for
the word '^demarche," with its appearance of a threat, there should
be substituted the expression ''pourparlers/' which appears to them
more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment
all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes
in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason
to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day
cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards
the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me
from various quarters with details which agree with one another; at
least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are gen-
erally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous
of peace, or whether it is preparing a coup, is now doing all
that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the
Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by
two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they
had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (d plaisir). Their
optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; the nervousness of the
Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this ;
without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level;
the Hungarian 4 per cents, were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate
which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'Apchier le Maugin.

No. 12.

M. Dumadne, French Amhassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.
Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organi-
sation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as in-
capable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure
to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities

560 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to
impose. The Militdrische Rundschau frankly admits it. "The mo-
ment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in
which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years
will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment
the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and
right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept
the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our
position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ; and yet more,
for it would seem that our very existence is concerned — to be or not
to be — ^which is in truth the great matter to-day."

Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day reproaches
Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he
said, ' ' Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear. ' '
These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security
can result only from a war to the knife against Pan-Servism, and it is
in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the
cursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

No. 13.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, ie M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 19, 1914.

The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly
report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have
been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has
added a section containing political information emanating from a
trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has
obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note
to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently
announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account
of the accurate information which it contains.

DUMAINS.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 561

No. 14.

Memorandum.

(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic <md Political Situa-
tion in Austria.)

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

From information furnished by a person specially well informed
as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be
wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will
be demanded of Servia ; she will be required to dissolve several propa-
gandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to
guard the frontier in cooperation with Austrian officials, to keep
strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools ; and it is a
very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this
way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subter-
fuges by which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and
direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for
her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and
its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse.
Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the
idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a con-
flagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary
to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her
army and railways, and before France has brought her military organi-
sation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high
circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most
localised operations against Servia. But everything must be regarded
as possible. A singular fact is pointed out : generally the official tele-
graph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays
attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important
organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others.
This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official
agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete
review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the
least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just
on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more
aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has

562 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation
of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

No. 15.

M. Jules Camion, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at
Berlin declared, at the "Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government
was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the out-
rage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial cooperation
in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was
charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous
to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Servia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian
Charge d 'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this
subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German
Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria,
and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-
Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State pro-
tested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note,
and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help show-
ing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what
circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices
for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind
of * ' attention ' ' attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to
those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That
is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have
recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is
not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full
mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

Jules Cambon.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 563

No. 16.

if. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London^
St. Petershurgh, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 21, 1914.

I specially draw your attention to information of which I am in
receipt from Berlin; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme
weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the
anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when
Austria makes the demarche at Belgrade which she judges necessary in
consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with
her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

Bdenvenu-Maetin.

No. 17.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenor
of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew
nothing of the text ; our Ambassador expressed his great astonishment
at this. He emphasises that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse con-
tinues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrere also discussed the same question with the Marquis di
San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance
that he is working at Vienna in order that Servia may not be asked
for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution
of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial enquiry into the causes of
the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can
make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the
press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from
Servia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks
to Germany for support in this.

564 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his
influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly
conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the
part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be
likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 18.

M. Dumaine, French Anibdssador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who
is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor.
The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest severity,
of having done with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is
attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be
ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed
about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively
in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the demarche will be made at Bel-
grade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees
of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity
of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be accepted. M.
Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready
for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian
army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Mon-
archy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here
that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-
Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed
by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself
a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing
to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in
entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador,
who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring ex-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 565

planations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has con-
fided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps
directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of
the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept
requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

No. 19.

M. Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, io M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 22, 1914.

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the
impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin
with regard to the demarche which the Austro-Hungarian Minister
is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I
had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir
Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who
stated to him that at Berlin a demarche of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince
Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavour-
ing to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to
the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was
not without anxiety as to the results of a demarche of this kind. Sir
Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to
believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian
Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of
the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of
Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the
Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that
lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be
proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated
to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be
justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward
Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me.
The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who

566 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian rela-
tions.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares
the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may
make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and
above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to
accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which
appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors ac-
credited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official
quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most funda-
mentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a
public form {demarche) which lacks the moderation that is desirable,
it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which
has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which the Austrian
Government have constantly subjected that country, and which has
been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is
still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has
made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field,
and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with
any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart
from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new compli-
cations, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could
not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away
too far.

Paul Cambon.

No. 20.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. Petershurgh and Rome.

Paris, July 23, 1914.

According to information collected by the French Ambassador at
Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had
been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keep-
ing eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer
to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 567

the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety
aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the
tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated
in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary
procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence
ought to be placed in these assurances.

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short
space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes
to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate
to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and
police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might
affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in
favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that
the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him
on this point ; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which
have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure con-
fided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection
to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary
associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were
humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 21.

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Munich, July 23, 1914.

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the
Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable; on
the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with
more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that

the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him (dent il

avait connaissance) , was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could

be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation

appeared to him to be very serious.

Allizb.

568 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

CHAPTER III.

The Austrun Note and the Servian Reply.
(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

No. 22.

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine
the following information and instructions.

Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 a.m.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which
might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to
Servia in connexion with the crime of which the Hereditary Arch-
duke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in think-
ing that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request
for an explanation or some mise en demeure which would be equivalent
to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that
Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and in-
dependence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by
means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him
counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how
undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear
to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof,
expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself
with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten gen-
eral peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko.
While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 569

Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I
ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Am-
bassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best
means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand
without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to
us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring
the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey,
and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia
will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Bencken-
dorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

Rene Vivian i.

No. 23.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Bene
Viviani, President of the Council, on hoard the '^France.''

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I have sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but from
information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the
Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday
evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to
us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp ;
it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs
who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to re-
quire the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian
propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia
till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

In sending your instructions to M. Duraaine I requested him to
come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues as to
his action.

Bienvenu-Mabtin.

570 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 24.

(Note communicated by Count Scezsen, Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassador, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs, on Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 a.m.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.
The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the
following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through
the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade: —

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on
the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following
declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government : —

' ' The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events
of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its
birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far
as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian fron-
tier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and
murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in
the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Govern-
ment has done nothing to repress these movements. It has per-
mitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations
directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained lan-
guage on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators
of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 571

subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda
in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of
a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy
and contempt of its institutions.

''This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had
not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last
proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assas-
sinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives
with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by
Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Od-
brana ; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and
their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian
frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do
not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer
the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained
for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and
thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results,
on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the
intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the
Monarchy.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the
Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their
'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration: —

" 'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of
which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" 'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and func-
tionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus

572 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Gov-
ernment were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st
March, 1909.

" 'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea
of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it
their duty formally to warn oflfieers and functionaries, and the whole
population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed
with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such
machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and
suppress. '

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the
Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and
shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army.

" 'The Royal Servian Government further undertake: —

" *1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and
contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tend-
ency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

" '2. To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Od-
brana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in
the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia
which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to
prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under
another name and form ;

" ' 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia,
both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

" '4. To remove from the military service, and from the adminis-
tration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
communicating to the Royal Government ;

** '5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of
the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the sub-
versive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
Monarchy ;

" '6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot
of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 573

Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
relating thereto;

** '7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tanko-
sitch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian
State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the
magisterial enquiry at Serajevo ;

" '8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the
Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across
the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the
frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted
the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage
across the frontier;

'' '9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with
explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian
officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their
official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June
to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-
Hungarian Government; and, finally,

*' *10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without
delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preced-
ing heads.'

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the
Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening,
the 25th July.*

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial
enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under
heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the con-
tents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you

*The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July
sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction: —

"In the copy of the despatch which I had the honour to send to
your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Grovernment ex-
pected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock
on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister
at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the
evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been pro-
longed to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening,

"I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight
alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the
Servian Government."

574 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following
observations : —

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed
to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced
above.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among
their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and
judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in
the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propa-
ganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day
passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their
readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or
to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and
integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the
youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has
left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; indi-
viduals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have
come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda
against Austria-Hungary.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 575

appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By
observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development
of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested
and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement
of Servia possible.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold
at the disposal of the French Government a dossier elucidating the
Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the
murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial
and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Annex.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against
Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassina-

576 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

tion committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present
led to the following conclusions : —

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke
Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed
at Belgrade by Gavrilo Prineip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan
Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander
Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition
with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to
Prineip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and
Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of
the Servian army at Kragujevae.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught
Prineip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave
lessons in firing Browning pistols to Prineip and Grabez in a forest
near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Prineip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms
secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina
of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling
the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovie) and Loznica, as well as by
the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of
various individuals.

No. 25.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene

Viviani, President of the Council, on board the ** France,"

amd to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petershurgh,

Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, July 24, 1914.
I have the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was
handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Scezsen informs
me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Govern'
ment up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their
answer.^

*See note on page 573. ^

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 577

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st
March, 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an
anti- Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press
have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and
integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the
crime of the 28th June, which, according to the facts established dur-
ing the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put
an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their
tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official
pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it,
by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the
terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and
threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian
army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the
army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake
to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those
officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to
them by the Austrian Government, to accept the cooperation of
Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their
attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the
crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a
Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums
up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo,
and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were
provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian
army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian
officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after mak-
ing this communication. Count Scezsen without any observations
informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on
my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-
Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been
aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents
of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to
be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so cate-
gorical a demarche with so short a time-limit ; that is to say, a time
when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Peters-

578 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

burgh and were at sea, and consequently were not able to exert, in
agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that
soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in
the interest of general peace.

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to
the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock
this afternoon. Bienvenu-Maetin.

No. 26.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.

Thiehaut, French Minister at Stockholm {for the President

of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London,

Berlin, Rome, St. Petershurgh.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from
his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not
know the contents of the Austrian note.

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director,
M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone,
that Servia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty-eight hours
perhaps formed rather a "mise en demeure" than an ultimatum in
the proper sense of the term; that there might, for instance, be an
opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not
inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; he was ad-
vised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Aus-
trian investigations at Serajevo were one-sided, and that Servia, while
she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices
of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full in-
formation as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all
speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria
by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburgh for the views and
intentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on
the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not
communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been
consulted nor even informed of it.

Bienvenu-Martin.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 579

No. 27.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade,
London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has
been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian
demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be
that Servia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will
show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment
of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to
the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they
could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor
the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the
interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Yovanovitch considers
that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dis-
pute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement
aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the
Russian Charge d 'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion
in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening
and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our
Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrere informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influ-
ence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 28.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade,
London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.
Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Govern-
ment, of which he would not leave me a copy, but at my request he
read it twice over to me.

580 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR
The note was almost word for word as follows: —

"The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers con-
cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the
Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place dis-
close unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda
has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts
made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre
of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards
the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian
Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work
th£re, with the connivance of members of the Government and
the army,

* ' The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years.
In an especially marked form the Pan- Servian chauvinism mani-
fested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to
the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-
Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the
Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-
Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The as-
surance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian
Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes,
at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-
Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased
in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the
recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has
become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either
with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this
movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security
and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced.
Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as
justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as
well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not
exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might
refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow
themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they
do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great
Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment
of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pres-
sure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of
the means having to be left to them. ' '

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the
last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 581

that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ;
it is as follows: — "The German Government consider that in the
present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively
between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers
ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
concerned.

' ' The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable con-
sequences. ' '

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while
it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those
who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it
seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted,
having regard to the dignity tfnd sovereignty of Servia ; the Servian
Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk
being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into
account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of
a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis
(which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also
be taken into consideration; that of Servia 's acceptance and of her
agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the
accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-
Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sov-
ereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by
Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be ex-
amined; if Servia gave obvious proof of good-will it could not be
thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers,
who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest
in Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of
Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations
and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked
him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple
mise en demeure, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he
answered that personally he had no views.

Bienvenu-Martin.

582 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 29.

M, Jules Canibon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep
impression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could
not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as
in the press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the Charges d 'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me
this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Rus-
sian Charge d 'Affaires bitterly remaidied that Austria has presented
her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and
the President of the Council had left St. Petersburgh. He is inclined
to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires
war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will
no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the
German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the
monarchic principle {par un sentiment de solidarite monarchique)
and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory
attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

Jules Cambon.

No. 30.

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

I asked the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I
had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers,
that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with
Servia ; if he had received it ; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 583

having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. More-
over, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and
he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions,
the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly per-
sonal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been
entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were com-
municated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed
him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims,
of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, "It is only because we
are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to
me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, do-
mestic trouble will probably break out in Servia; that will open the
door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led
by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers
was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and un-
acquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support.
Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time-limit given to
Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in
Europe.

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excite-
ment {un pen d' emotion) on the part of Servians friends, but that
he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would
endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable
concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from
the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at
Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at
Vienna from another quarter ? ' '

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended
on circumstances ; but immediately checked himself ; he repeated that
the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the
situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is
happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why
all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Aus-
tria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-
Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the
confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag

584 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the
Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with
ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be
strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this evening
shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind
to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient atten-
tion, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (senti-
ment de la solidarite monarchique) . I am convinced that great weight
must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the
attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must
have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he
had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von
Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every
one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria
to Servia.

Jules Cambon.

No. 31.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M.
Sazonof a threatening note to Servia.

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could
not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the Republic
and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy them-
selves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian
Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces
a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence
to Servia. The shortness of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum
renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers
of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire
to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 585

Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can
prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative
attitude.

Paleologue.

No. 32.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave
no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the
British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initia-
tive in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation,
between Austria and Servia, of the four Powers which are not directly
interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the
essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince
Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the
matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from
Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have dispatched
her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburgh
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great
Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this
that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have
been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return
from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so
she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no
way of arresting the course of events.

586 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the
demarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

Paul Cambon.

No. 33.

M. Paul Canibon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914.

The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a tele-
gram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him
their ultimatum, the time-limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow,
Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian
communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's Times,
it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely
difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been ask-
ing ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I pro-
pose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of
the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

Paul Cambon.

No. 34.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm {for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St.
Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's
note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such formidable
declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another;
he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed
by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia be-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 587

fore him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the cooperation of
the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four
Powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question,
namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be
exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh,

I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing
to cooperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that
Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against
a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfac-
tion which is considered compatible with her independence and her
sovereignty.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 35.

M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take
advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances
at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be
threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the
army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pre-
tended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of
Austria's demarche.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen
in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple
Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted
his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be sur-
prised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole
affair by her two allies.

Jules Cambon.

588 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 36.

M. Bienvenu-Martm, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm {for the President of the Council), and to London,
Berlin, 8t. Petersburgh, Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against
an article in the Echo de Paris which applied the term "German
threat" {menace allemande) to his demarche of yesterday. Herr von
Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the
Direction Politique, that there has been no "concert" between Aus-
tria and Germany in connexion with the Austrian note, and that
the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was
communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though
they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat";
the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it
desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other
Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen 's
demarche. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last
two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed
the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers
and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information
had been given to any journalist, the information in the Echo de
Paris involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the
German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the
Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German
Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came
to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note
did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with
a time-limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not
accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave
Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military
"preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburgh,
has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which
might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 589

most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that
in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the
interests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at
Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these
have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise the Servian
Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall
decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present,
has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen
at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between
Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to con-
cern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiff-
ness of the note and the shortness of the time-limit would bring about
a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could
be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France,
Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence
the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this
suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a
relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to
any demarche at Vienna.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 37.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d* Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that
his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between
Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the cooperation of Ger-
many at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St.
Petersburgh. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that
would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to inter-
vene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive
attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and
Italy?

590 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would
no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of
a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually
broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached
attitude {pourrait s'en desinteresser.)

De Fletjriau.

No. 38.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the
Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time-limit fixed
by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an
opinion on the judicial dossier, the communication of which is offered
to them.

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his
Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from mak-
ing any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be
led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial in-
tegrity of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the re-
criminations of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on
M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor
presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. "We must
avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the
crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotia-
tions."

Paleologue.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 591

No. 39.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government has instructed its representative at
Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time-
limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion
on the dossier which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and
with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for every one.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive
of all meaning the demarche which she made to the Powers by com-
municating her note to them, and would place her in a position of
conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a cor-
responding and urgent demarche to Count Berchtold. I beg you to
support the request of your colleague. The Russian Government have
sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

Bienvenu-Mabtin.

No. 40.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the
instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask
for an extension of the time-limit given to Servia by Austria's note of
the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian
demarche should be supported by the British Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the
same action as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's com-
munication which was made to him late last night by Count Mens-
dorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply
with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from

592 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military
operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left
for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

De Fleuriau.

No. 41.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

This morning the British Charge d 'Affaires, acting under in-
structions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany
were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the
object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a con-
flict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of
the time-limit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly
after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of
the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this
very morning to the German * Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that
he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately
Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In any case Herr von Jagow does not
think that this request would be granted.

The British Charge d 'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow,
as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further ;
but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank
cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a do-
mestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially
an international one.

Jules Cambon.

• In French text by an obvious error " de la Grande-Bretagne " is printed.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 593

No. 42.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires has been instructed to ask the
German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet
at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time-limit of
the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until
late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the
ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed
to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of
Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this com-
munication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time
to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration
of the time-limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for ex-
tending the time-limit, unless the intention be to create a serious
crisis.

Jules Cambon.

No. 43.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires has, in accordance with his in-
structions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to secur-
ing an extension of the time-limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow
replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of
this nature, but that in his opinion all these demarches were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time-limit could not be ex-
tended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers
to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian
note was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force
her into war.

594 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but
of an '* execution 'Mn a local matter.

The Charge d 'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German
Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of
hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe;
to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such
consequences.

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour
that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation
of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received
complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word
'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's
ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

Jules Cambon.

No. 44.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the
demarche which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia
at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to undertake, the object of
which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to
that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of
the time-limit imposed on Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and
M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communi-
cation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply
could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late
to take any step at Vienna.

BaBIOiBE.

THE FEENCH YELLOW BOOK 595

No. 45.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martm,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires received instructions from his
Government to ask for an extended time-limit for the ultimatum to
Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl,
with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there
near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the demarche
which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en clair, one
addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination.
He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, to whom the Prince communicated the tenor of his instruc-
tions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was
represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with
documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied,
was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio re-
plied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being
courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on
Servia: it will accept no intervention from any Power until the
blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

Dumaine.

No. 46.

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be
sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agree to publish to-morrow in the
Journal Officiel the declaration which has been required of them;

596 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order
of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and
all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary;
they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in
the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other
Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken
part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these
officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the
Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will
be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participa-
tion which conflicted with international law or with good and neigh-
bourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare
that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this,
they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal or to the
decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of
the declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

No. 47.

M. Jules Canibon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that
Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the
newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at
Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the Agence Havas at the Wilhelmstrasse
has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds con-
sisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the
newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people
has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of * ' Hurrah ' '
for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are
visiting the Siegessaul, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy.
It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 597

been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note,
reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect
should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts
of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet
every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view
of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might
be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburgh and London will not
succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm
and absolutely united front.

Jules Cambon.

No. 48.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram reaches me exactly at the moment when the time-
limit given to Servia expires. On the other hand I have just informed
you under what conditions the Russian Charge d 'Affaires has had
to carry out his demarche. It seems useless to support him when
there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Servia had yielded
to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers
against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are
assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly ;
he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the
conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

Dumaine.

No. 49.

Beply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — {Com-
municated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are

598 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which
may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both
from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations
and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests
which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Gov-
ernment on the 18/31 March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any
occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no
attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive
Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and
legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal
Government draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the
Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except
one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial
and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation.
Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the
sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European
peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government
cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character,
such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies —
manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary
course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control.
The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the
fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which
arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a
great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority
of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring coun-
tries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and
surprised at the statements, according to which members of the King-
dom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations
for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected
to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns
this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correct-
ness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concern-
ing whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore,
with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are
prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard
to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 599

proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause
to be published on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the
date of the 13/26 July, the following declaration : —

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda
which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all
such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they
sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal move-
ments. The Royal Government regret that, according to the com-
munication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian
officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned
propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to
which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the
declaration of the 18/31 March, 1909, which declaration disapproves
and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny
of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and
they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and
entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the
most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such
acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost
endeavour. ' '

The Royal Government further undertake : —

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupt-
china a provision into the press law providing for the most severe
punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication
the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial
integrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Con-
stitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of
the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be con-
fiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical
terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

600 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the
"Noradna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up
to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceed-
ings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government
will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and
will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other
society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-ilungary.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military
service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved
to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial
and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the
names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of
the proceedings which are to be taken against them,

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial
and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the
collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government
upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such
collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with
criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider
it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and
who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards
the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or
authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal
Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrange-
ment, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law
of criminal procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications
as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to
the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of
the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch.
As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 601

Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15/28 June was employed
(on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been
possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good
as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump-
tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which
have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo
for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the
measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of
arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that
they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the
frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loziiica line who have failed in their
duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the
remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in inter-
views after the crime which according to the statement of the Im-
perial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy,
as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated
to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as
they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said
officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to
collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the
present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried
out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with
this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the
common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are
ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring
this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The
Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up
of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31
March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

602 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

CHAPTER IV.

From the Rupture op Diplomatic Relations, (July 25, 1914), to

THE Declaration op War by Austria on Servia

(July 28, 1914).

No. 50.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
President of the Council {on hoard the "La France/') and to
the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows: — refusal
of Austria to grant the extension of the time-limit asked for by
Russia, — departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after
receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient al-
though it reached the limit of any possible concession — order for
mobilisation given in Servia, whose Government retired to Kragou-
jewatz, where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been
communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even
advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who
does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the
Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension
of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the
Italian Ambassador to M, Paleologue that at Vienna people still
soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm."
It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements
of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburgh we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia
to ask for British mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the
25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of
thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria
was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 603

effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Servia,
and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being
left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be
occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and
morally impossible for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed.

In London the German demarche was made on the 25th in the
same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward
Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break
out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did
not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language
to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening
of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey
more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily
involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still
willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the
Russian Charge d 'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the
latter asked him to associate himself with a demarche at Vienna for
an extension of the time-limit, he replied that he had already taken
action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an
extension of the time-limit before active measures were taken, he
replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a
war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to
believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The
German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks
that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would im-
mediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before
attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in
the demarche of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension
of the time-limit fixed for Servia ; he does not regret it, this demarche
having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time
to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it
gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador
at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue. Sir Edward
Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested
ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should
not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England,

604 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If
Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that
Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of Eng-
land and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither
Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of
impartial friends or allies.

Bienvenu-Mabtin.

No. 51.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

Telegram from Vienna which has just been received at the Con-
sulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and
Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military
measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return
to Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of
the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises.
From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the im-
pression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war,
to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the
greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; our situation is some-
what analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something
in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra stated
definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to
Rome at the last moment.

Barrere.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 605

No. 52.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.
M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a
conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead
Austria to a less uncompromising attitude ; but that Russia could not
be asked to allow Servia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile
to Austria in this serious business.

Barrere.

No. 53.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de
Fleuriau, Charge d' Affaires at London.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

M. Paleologue sends me the following telegram : —

"M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the
mediation of the British Government."

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French
Government can only say that they hope to see the British Govern-
ment accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign
Office.

Bienvenu-Martin.

606 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 54.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 26, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy
perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up
to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready
to negotiate."

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary to come
to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his
presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article,
making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. "The
intention which inspired this document," he said, " is legitimate if
you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against
the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you
have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back
your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the
result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by
this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the
opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof
has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening
of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petershurgh on the
changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between
Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I there-
fore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to
succeed. Paleologue.

No. 55.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.
M. Schebeko has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he
had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 607

Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly
acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh spoke in
the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the
note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the
Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me,
seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian
Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay
which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal
for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allow-
ing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in com-
pany with Sir M, de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from
the Foreign Office with reference to the demarche to be attempted
by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I
am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with
the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirscky, who, in order to refuse
his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the
principle of localising the conflict.

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, al-
though surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they
have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence
military action.

DUMAINE.

No. 56.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
President of the Council {on hoard the "La France/') and to
the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.
The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only
reached us after twenty hours delay. Although the Servian Govern-
ment had given way on all points, with the exception of two small
reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations,
thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to
execution on Servia.

608 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Am-
bassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to
Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene
between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be
localised, to intervene with England, Prance and Italy at Vienna and
St. Petersburgh, the Secretary of State declared that he would do
his best to maintain peace.

In the course of an interview between M. Barr^re and the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter
indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have ap-
proved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to
them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this
fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by
Austria.

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a com-
munication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia
in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to
Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement, nor
any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia; her only in-
tention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures.
The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany
feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace
may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her
influence in this sense at St. Petersburgh."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she
had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her
moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a
peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that
Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would
certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations
leading to the occupation of Servia.

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be
reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question
concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the mediation
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be the act of the four other
Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of in-
structions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I
did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburgh
alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Am-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 609

bassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to
be on this point identified with France.

Bienvenu-Mabtin.

No. 57.
Note for the Minister.

Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.

After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the
Direction Politique, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in
the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion,
such as that in the Echo de Paris of the evening before, and in order
to define exactly the sense of the demarches of the German Govern-
ment, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the
interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind,
suggested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director
took down at his dictation : * ' During the afternoon the German Am-
bassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview,
in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an
identical spirit of peaceful cooperation (sentiment de solidarite
pacifique), they examined the means which might be employed to
maintain general peace."

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your
opinion, everything is settled, and you bring us the assurance that
Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with
the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared
surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was ex-
plained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's nega-
tive attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were
exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French
opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of
which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the
optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political
Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite

610 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard
to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's atti-
tude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective
analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German rela-
tions led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated
statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian
note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point;
but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the
side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the
psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one
to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any
possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the conse-
quences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared
the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna
now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! What
responsibility was the German Government assuming and what sus-
picions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between
Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute
submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to
Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe !

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats
of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking make pecu-
liarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day
when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be
faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Peters-
burgh Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war
which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,* and had
only approved it after its delivery ; she thought, however, that Servia
had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it,
and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation

• Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the
Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian
note to Servia.

Cf. also the English Blue Book, No. 95, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, British
Ambassador at Vienna, states: —

" Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the
German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before
it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the
German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

THE FEENCH YELLOW BOOK 611

which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He de-
clared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply,
and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if
indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill-informed, rep-
resented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his
impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given,
for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According
to him Austria was not uncompro^iising ; what she rejects is the idea
of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference : a peaceful word
coming from St. Petersburgh, good words said in a conciliatory tone
by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being
well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany
on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would
ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to
the press a short note in a moderate tone.

No. 58.

M. Chevalley, French Minister at Ghristiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Ghristiania, July 26, 1914.
The whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to put to
sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make
straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were
to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

Chevalley.

No. 59.

M. d'Annoville, French Charge d' Affaires at Luxemburg, to M. Bien-
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.
According to information which I have just received from Thion-
ville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold

612 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

themselves at the disposition of the Kommandatur at any moment.
Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden
to go away from their place of residence.

d'Annoville.

No. 60.

M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Basle, July 27, 1914.

Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district received
orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has
been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of
Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military
authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject
of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities
are restricted.

Fabges.

No. 61.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.
Jules Carnbon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on hoard the "La
France" {for the President of the Council), and to the French
Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.
The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem
characteristic: — On Friday he reads a note in which the German
Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the
Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding
that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain
localised, since any intervention of another party must through
the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences"; — the
second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 613

Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-
limit, and the risks of general war, advised Servia to yield, Herr von
Schoen returns to minimise this step, pretending to be astonished at
the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed
to Germany which she does not harbour, ** since," he says, "there was
neither concert before nor threat afterwards ; ' ' — the third day, Sun-
day, the result having been obtained, since Servia has yielded, as
one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German
Ambassador appears on two occasions to insist on Germany's peaceful
intentions, and on her warm desire to cooperate in the maintenance
of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes
the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on
account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Servia 's
submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to
invade Servia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the
Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept
any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter
to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Ger-
many. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the
frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia
not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Servia after
the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving
every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of
the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively
and be listened to at Vienna ; if she does not do this she justifies all
suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by
their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield ; they have thus fulfilled
their part ; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid
hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satis-
faction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general
war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet
of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British
Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the
Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has
formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin
and Rome : the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London
would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of
resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during

614 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all
active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this sugges-
tion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to
it ; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, accord-
ing to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak,
and she has an opportunity to show her good-will by other means
than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British
colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government
in whatever form appears to you opportune.

Bienvenu-Maetin.

No. 62.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
President of the Council {on hoard the "La France") and to
the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin,
Yienna.

Paris, Juhj 27, 1914.

After his demarche of yesterday tending to an intervention by
Prance at St. Petersburgh in favour of peace, the German Ambassador
returned, as I have informed you, to the Direction Politique on the
pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short
note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation;
he even suggested the following terms: — "During the afternoon the
German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a
fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit
and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful cooperation, they
examined the means which might be employed to maintain gen-
eral peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared ex-
aggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the
real situation; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated,
that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means
employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might be issued if
I approved it.

The note communicated was as follows: — "The German Ambas-
sador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh inter-
view, in the course of which they sought means of action by the

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 615

Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately
colourless, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which
might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the
Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the
Minister, and has added : ' ' Note well the phrase * in an identical spirit
of peaceful cooperation.' This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere
expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was
drawn up as follows: — "The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and
officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburgh, that
it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it
has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the
kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity.
At this moment the decision whether a European war must break
out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm
confidence that the French Government, with which they know that
they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be
able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet
of St. Petersburgh in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply which has been given (a French
demarche at St. Petersburgh would be misunderstood, and must have
as corollary a German demarche at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation
by the four less interested Powers in both capitals) .

Herr von Schoen 's letter is capable of different interpretations;
the most probable is that it has for its object, like his demarche itself,
an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure,
to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on
France ; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to,
to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to complete
the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for
any useful purpose you can put it to,

Bjenvenu-Martin.

616 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 63.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would
preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur
Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after
the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any
doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to
preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with
this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid
a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought
to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the
side of France.

De Fleubiau.

No. 64.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bien-
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 27, 1914.
M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.
In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is
applying itself successfully to restrain the press ; in particular great
moderation towards Germany has been recommended.

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or
from Berlin since yesterday.

Paleologue.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 617

No. 65.

M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Therapia, July 27, 1914.

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman
Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of
Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict
will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia
will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would
extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria,
with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she
will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the
Triple Alliance.

Bompard.

No. 66.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador this morning that
if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would
make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of
the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished
to crush a small state. *' Then," he added, " a European question
would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would
be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement
of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty
took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night,
Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This
result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia.

De Fleuriau.

618 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 67.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

To-day I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on
the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of
London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Peters-
burgh and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the
way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed
to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany
would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the
same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable.
I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise
in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he
told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this
limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an
intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with
and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany
would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention
proposed by England at St. Petersburgh and Vienna could, in his
opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated.
In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed
my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude, had led
Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I
expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

Jules Cambon.

No. 68.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.
Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof,
M. Paleologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 619

Servia was disposed to appeal to the Powers, and that in that case
his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate
to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome a proposal with which
Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers
would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German and Italian
Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E.
Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little
conference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active
military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion
to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

De Fleuriau.

No. 69.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.
The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Gov-
ernment to ask for the mediation of England ; it is, however, possible
that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the
way.

However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers
intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought
I think to be supported in the first place.

De Fleuriau.

No. 70.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.
de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London.

Paris, July 27, 1914.
The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's
proposal for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy

620 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburgh, to stop active military
operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at
London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a
solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over
with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his demarche
in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E.
Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St.
Petersburgh and Belgrade instructions in the sense asked for by
the British Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E.
Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would
be disposed to take at Vienna; a demarche from this side, promoted
with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would
appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not
first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron von Schoen's observations, that
the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible
when the words "mediation," ** intervention, " "conference" were
used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "con-
versations."

BrENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 71.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

I have communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to
his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference
at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the
necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government
as soon as his French, German and Italian colleagues are authorised
to make the same demarche.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four
Powers with a view to prevent military operations ; they are consult-
ing the German Government on the proposal for a conference and

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 621

the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian
Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

De Fleuriau.

No. 72.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 27, 1914.

The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening,
and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of
the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he
had not had any previous knowledge of it.

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and
forcible character ; but he had not suspected that it could take such
a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as
certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an
assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Aus-
tria. *'In no way," the Minister replied: ''we were not consulted;
we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such
communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted
more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he
still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced
that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain
them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he
doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure
on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment
attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he
believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful
action, it is England.

As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of
peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without
hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London
of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested
in the Austro-Servian dispute.

Barrere.

622 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 73.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary
of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In
his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace,
but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble
a conference of the Powers ; that would be to set up a kind of court
of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were
asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Herr von Jagow 's lan-
guage confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a demarcJie by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming
the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications ;
the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh
the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be
avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be
found by gaining time.

Jules Cambon.

No. 74.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

I had a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave
support to the demarche which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Am-
bassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian,
French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour
to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present
difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal
with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 623

that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went
beyond any question of form; that what was important was the
cooperation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy
in a work of peace; that this cooperation could take effect through
common demarches at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna; that he had
often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups
always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an
opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing
four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agree-
ment to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had
engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of
Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with
Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two
groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing
to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could
not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the con-
sequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing
the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to
intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged
to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was
bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if
he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the
Servian Charg6 d 'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I
have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that
except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It ap-
pears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which
your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to
be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether
Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that
he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect.
"You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the
Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the
terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of
the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be
prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was
ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it
was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could

624 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on
this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna
and St. Petersburgh have been entered upon and are in progress. I
expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the
impression that the hour of detente had struck, but I now saw clearly
that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that
he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps
rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such
action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it
was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development
in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before
them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who
must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his
proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under
another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing
to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsi-
bilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

Jules Cambon.

No. 75.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tTie
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna,
Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me
a memorandum which amounted to an indictment of Servia; he was
instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not
given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Govern-
ment, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to
induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are required
of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that
effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures con-
templated by Austria, and Count Scezsen replied that they might

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 625

be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of
the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia
had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and
that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish
with a little mutual good-will, and with the help of the Powers who
wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her
resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their
cooperation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave re-
sponsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of
which it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count
Scezsen handed to me.

Bienvenu-Martin.

Enclosure.

Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed hy Count
Scezsen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.

The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from
the Austrian Monarchy of the South Slav districts, in order to attach
them to a Great-Servian state, dates from far back. This propaganda
on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although
varying in its means and intensity, reached its culminating point at
the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak
of secrecy, it then revealed its purposes openly and undisguisedly,
and showed, under the patronage of the Servian Government, its
intention of achieving its aims by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against
the Monarchy with shouts of rancour and by the perversion of facts,
associations were being formed to foment this strife — irrespective of
other means of propaganda.

The association which had become the most important was the
Narodna Odbrana. Having its origin in a revolutionary committee
which already existed, it was constituted as a private society, although
in fact it took the form of an organisation dependent upon the For-
eign Office at Belgrade through military and civil officials. Amongst
its founders should be specially mentioned General Buzo Jankvic,

626 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

ex-Ministers Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic and Valislav Valovic,
Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government Printing Establishment),
and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tanovic and Milan Pribieevic.
This association adopted as its aim the creation and organisation of
armed bands, with a view to the war that they hoped for against
the Monarchy. A convincing description of the activity of the
Narodna Odbrana at this time will be found, in particular, in the
statements of Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in
the course of his evidence before the Council of War at Serajevo;
he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna
Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy, as comitadji. Krsta-
novic had been brought, with about one hundred and forty others, to
a school established for the formation of new bands at Cuprija, in
the district of Jagodina, managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and
Dusan Putnick. The only masters in this school were Servian officers ;
General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribieevic introduced great
regularity into the courses of organisation of these bands, which lasted
three months.

The comitadji received there complete instruction in musketry,
bomb throwing, mines and the destruction of railways, tunnels,
bridges and telegraphs; their duty was, according to their leaders,
to put into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina the knowledge they had
recently acquired.

By this action on the part of the Narodna Odbrana, carried on
in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government,
guerrilla warfare was carried on against the Monarchy. In this way
the subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their
country, and induced as Servian emissaries systematically to practise
secret attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the announce-
ment of the Servian Government on the 31st March 1909, in which
that Government announced that they were prepared to accept the
new situation created in public law by the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and solemnly promised that they would do their best to
maintain in future friendly and neighbourly relations with the
Monarchy.

With this declaration it might have been expected that the agita-
tion, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-
Hungary, would be brought to an end, and that means might have
been found for an amicable rapprochement between Servia and the
Monarchy. Deprived of the support of the Servian Government, and

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 627

combated by that Government in accordance with its engagements,
the hostile propaganda could only have continued secretly, and would
have been condemned to prompt destruction. On the other hand, the
ties of language, race and culture existing between the Servian dis-
tricts in the south of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted
in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by
mutual friendship and parallel interest.

However, these hopes have not been realised. Aspirations hostile
to the Monarchy have continued : and, under the eyes of the Servian
Government, who have done nothing to suppress this agitation, the
propaganda instituted against Austria has only increased in extent
and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and has
developed into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike
by the old methods, which have been adapted to the situation, and
by more thorough methods, have been called "to an inevitable
struggle of annihilation " against Austria. Their secret ramifica-
tions have been systematically spread towards the Slav domains in the
south of the Monarchy, whose subjects have been incited to treason.

Above all, this spirit has found constant expression in the Servian
press.

Up to the present time, no fewer than 81 newspapers appearing
in Servia have had to be withdrawn from postal circulation on
account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law.
There is hardly a clause protecting the sacred person of the Monarch
and of the members of the Imperial Family or the integrity of the
State that has not been violated by Servian papers. In Appendix I.
will be found a few of the numerous instances occurring in the
press, of ideas of the nature indicated above.

"Without entering into a detailed examination of the points of
view of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that the press
has, in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, never
ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both before
and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which
reparation is due. This idea recurs not only in the papers of advanced
views, but also in the Samuprava, which is in such close touch with
the Foreign Office at Belgrade, where this idea finds expression in
hardly veiled terms. (See Appendix II. (6).)

Nor can one omit to consider how the attempt made on 15th June
1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic against Commandant von Vare-
sanin, Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was applauded by the press.

It will be remembered that Zerajic killed himself immediately

628 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

after his deed, and before committing it had burned all his papers.
For these reasons it is impossible to throw full light upon the motive
of this outrage ; it has, however, been possible from a document found
on his person to form the conclusion that he was a follower of the
views of Kropotkin. Circumstantial evidence likewise leads to the
conclusion that the attempt was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from proclaiming
the criminal as a national Servian hero, or from praising his deed.
The Politika even combated the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist,
and declared him to be a "Servian hero whose name all Servians
will repeat with respect and grief."

The Politika considers the 18th August of the same year, "the
birthday of His Imperial and Royal Majesty," as a favourable oppor-
tunity on which to return to the subject of Zerajic, "whose name
will be to the people something like that of a saint, ' ' and solemnly to
praise the outrage in a poem. (Appendix No. 1.)

This is the way in which this crime, which was quite foreign
to territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, has been exploited
for the furtherance of this idea, and in which the murder was hailed
in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation
of this aim, and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This
sanctification of murder, as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle
against the Monarchy, reappears later in papers speaking of the
attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner of Cujav.
(Appendix L(e).)

These newspapers, which are circulated not only in Servia, but
also, as was ascertained later, illicitly in the Monarchy, by well-
organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood
in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the mis-
deeds of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana has become the centre of the agitation
carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its
head at the time of the annexation still control it. They still include
the very violent opponents of the Monarchy mentioned above in the
capacity of active and energetic organisers. Organised on a broad
and far-reaching scale and governed by a hierarchy of officials {see
Appendix II., "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana had soon
acquired about 400 members who carried on a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna became closely allied with the "Shooting
Federation" (762 societies), the Association of the Sokol, Dusan
Silni (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the Association of Horse-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 629

men, Knez Mihajlo, the Society of Sportsmen and the League of De-
velopment, as well as numerous other associations, all of which, under
the guidance and protection of the Narodna, work on the same lines.
Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations
arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they
are only members of the single body of the Narodna. Thus the latter
has set up all over Servia a very close network of agitation and has
attracted to its principles all those who are receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of this Society demonstrate sufficiently
clearly the policy of the Narodna.

In its statutes, ostensibly those of a "Development Society,"
concerning itself only with the spiritual and corporal improvement
of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna
discloses in its deed of amalgamation (see Appendix II.) the true
and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "reorgan-
ised programme. ' *

To preach to the Servian people especially "the sacred truth by
fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pretence that the Mon-
archy wishes "to take away Servia 's liberty, her language, and even
to destroy her ' ' ; that it is an unavoidable necessity to wage against
Austria-Hungary, her first and greatest enemy, "a war of destruc-
tion with rifle and cannon" and "by every means" to prepare the
people for this war for the liberation of the conquered territories
in which seven millions of their brothers are subject to contumely
and oppression. All the efforts for progress of the Narodna are
exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organ-
isation and education of the people, with a view to the struggle of
annihilation that they foresee.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna work in the same
spirit. The association of the Sokol of Kragujevac will serve as an
example. {See Appendix III.)

As in the case of the Narodna, officers, professors and civil
servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the
annual meeting of 1914 made absolutely no mention of physical
training, which is the real object of the Sokol, and only spoke of
"preparation for War" against a "dangerous, heartless, and odious
enemy invading us from the North," who robs millions of Servian
brothers of their liberties and rights, and keeps them in bondage and
irons.

In the administrative reports of the association the technical

630 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as head-
lines for the records of the real "objects of the activities of the
Administration," especially 'HJie preparation of national develop-
ment and the necessity of strengthening the oppressed nation," with
the object of enabling it to carry out its ''incomplete programme,
its unfinished task," and accomplishing "that great action which is
to be carried out in the near future: the liberation of brothers who
are living beyond the Drina and who are suffering the martyrdom of
the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send
forth the appeal that "hawks must be reared" capable "of bringing
freedom to the brothers not yet freed. ' '

As in the case of the aspirations of progress in the Narodna, the
gymnastic activity of the Sokol is not the real object, but simply a
means at the service of the same propaganda carried on with the
same intentions, not to say with the very same words.

When the Narodna makes its appeal for the struggle of annihila-
tion against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the
people of the Monarchy but to all the Southern Slavs, In the eyes
of the Narodna the Slav regions in the south of the Monarchy belong
to "our subjected Servian territories." (See also Appendix IV.)
So also the Slav subjects of the south of the Monarchy must take
part in this "national work," so also this "healthy and necessary"
activity must make itself felt on the other side of the southern
frontier, and even on the soil of the Monarchy the Narodna seeks its
"heroes for the holy war," among whom Obilic, the murderer of
Mourad, is cited as an example worthy of imitation, of sacrifice for
one's country.

But in order to induce the brothers "outside Servia" to share
in ' ' the work of private effort, ' ' the Narodna is intimately associated
with the "brothers on this side of the frontier." It is not said in
what way this intimate association is effected, no doubt because it
appertains to that part of the ''common work" which "for many
reasons cannot and ought not to be explained. ' '

How far this branch of its activity extends is shown by the fact
that not only the central committee of the Narodna but also certain
of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

The foreign activity of the Narodna and its affiliated branches is
particularly varied.

What is relatively the less dangerous, because it can be officially
controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by the influential

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 631

members of the Narodna in the southwestern parts of the Mon-
archy, where they speak before various societies on national or edu-
cational subjects. These occasions give the speakers the opportunity
of explaining the true aims of the association in the most receptive
circles of their adherents, in language more or less veiled, which is
intelligible to those who are already au courant.

Amongst these emissaries one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic,
Director of the Government Printing Establishment, already alluded
to ; it was he who on the 8th of August, 1909, issued an appeal to the
Servian people in which he called Austria "the enemy of Servia"
and invited Servia to prepare herself for a war against the Monarchy.
On numerous occasions he has undertaken tours of this nature. At
Karlova, in 1912, he flung prudence to the winds and spoke of "the
union of aU the Serbs against the common enemy. ' '

More dangerous are the relations formed by associations imbued
with the spirit of the Narodna, under the cloak of common interests
and of culture, with associations in the Monarchy ; for the respective
envoys and corporate visits of these associations, which escape all
control, are utilised by the Servians for all sorts of plots against the
Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, an envoy of the Narodna at the fete of Sera-
jevo in September 1912 (see Appendix VI.) had the effrontery
secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. The sending of
a representative of the Sokol of Kragujevac to this fete must have
meant for the brothers of Bosnia: "We have not forgotten you, the
wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still strong" — a thought which,
to the initiated, will no doubt have found a quite different expression
consonant with the aims of the Narodna explained above (Ap-
pendix III.). As to the events that take place at the meetings of
the same kind in Servia, it is clear that they escape all control of the
Royal and Imperial authorities, who only possess on this matter
confidential information which is difficult to check. In this connex-
ion doubts must be raised regarding the visit of Agram students to
Servia (April 1912) who received from the Servians an official
reception of an almost military character, accompanied even by a
parade and by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a
manner so suggestive that the association of the Sokol of Kragujevac
could say, "This event marks the beginning and the key of a great
deed which must find its accomplishiiient in the near future ; it is a
germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bounds
until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

632 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the
Austro-Hungarian authorities that the associations of the Servian
Sokols have succeeded in making arrangements with some similar
societies of the Monarchy to establish a connexion with them which
is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet
quite clear ; for the information on this point is still being collected.
Up to the present, however, the information obtained admits of the
conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by
which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols have seduced and led
astray certain groups of persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda among circles so very different assumes minor
importance if it is compared with that of the "foreign work" which
is conducted by the Narodna and its friends in the form of a personal
agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melan-
choly results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the
poison of mutiny to the circles of men of mature age as well as those
of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late Officers of Honved
V.B.D. K.V.N, and the Lieutenant of Gendarmerie of Slav Croatia
V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevitch, left the service of the army
of the Monarchy in the most suspicious circumstances and turned
towards Servia ; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their hopes
falsified, or at any rate in part, and are thinking of returning to the
country that they have betrayed. The agitation introduced from
Servia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily so
well known that it hardly needs illustration. What is less known is
that people who have been expelled from the Croatian and Bosnian
schools, owing to grave acts against discipline, are received in Servia
with open arms and often even protected by the State and supported
as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their masters,
who, inspired by hostility towards Austria, are to a great extent
members of the Narodna, are clearly establishments thoroughly
adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case may
be quoted here. Last March several pupils of the normal training
college of Pakrac (Croatia) were expelled on account of a strike.
They returned to Servia, where they immediately obtained places as
schoolmasters or were admitted to training colleges. One of those
who had been so expelled, and who had relations with circles un-
friendly to the Monarchy, declared publicly that he and his people
would express the opinion and disseminate the view during the stay

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 633

of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province is Servian
territory. It should be particularly noted that during the stay of
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia the prefect of the Servian
district of Krajna gave to three scholars, who were thus involved,
Servian passports, in which he falsely described them as Servian
Subjects, although he must have known that they were Croats. With
these passports the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy
without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recog-
nised and arrested.

But all this is not enough to give a complete representation of
the "foreign" activity of the Narodna.

The Imperial and Royal Government has been informed for a long
time past confidentially that the Narodna has made military prepara-
tions for the war which it desires to make against the Monarchy in
the following way: it has been sending emissaries in order, as soon
as hostilities broke out, to attempt in bands the destruction of the
transport and to stir up revolt or panic {see Appendix VII.).

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the Council of War at
Serajevo against Jovo Jajlicic and his associates for espionage, confirm
this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the
preparation for war by armed bands still figures in the programme
of the Narodna, to which must now further be added a complete
service of espionage. It is for this reason that the programme of
the Narodna, described as "reorganised," is, in reality, an extended
programme. Acts of terrorism must finally result from an atmos-
phere of hatred which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from
an agitation which evades all responsibility; and in order to bring
them about, all means are to be regarded as good in the struggle
against Austria, including even, without any sense of shame, common
acts of murder.

On the 8th of June 1912, a man named Jukic shot at von Cuvaj,
the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that Councillor
von Herwic, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally
wounded; in his flight he killed a policeman who followed him and
he wounded two others.

From the subsequent investigation it appeared that JuMc was
saturated with the ideas and plans of the Narodna, and that, although
Jukic had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal
schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an
excursion to Belgrade, together with the Agram students, for the
celebrations prepared in honour of these visitors on the 18th April

634 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

1912 ; that Jukic entered into relations with several people belonging
to the Narodna with whom he had had political discussions. A few
days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there he received from
a Servian Major a bomb and from a friend a Bnowning pistol, with
which he carried out his crime. The bomb found at Agram came,
according to experts, from a military arsenal.

Jukic 's attempt had not yet been forgotten, when on the 18th
August 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America to
Agram, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner,
Baron Skerlecz, an attempt which was the outcome of action organ-
ised by the (Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America,
and which was the work of the foreign propaganda of the Narodna.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevitch, printed in Chicago,
with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Majesty,
and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their
impending "deliverance," and urging them to enter Servia, demon-
strates the correspondence between the propaganda carried out un-
checked by the Servians in America and that carried on from
Servia in the territory of the Monarchy.

And again, scarcely a year afterwards, Agram was the scene of
a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th May 1913, Jacob Schaffer made an attempt at the
Agram theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an
attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a policeman.
The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired
by Rudolph Hercigonja. From the depositions of the latter and
his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in
Servia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic,
Hercigonja fled to Servia (October 1912), where together with his
accomplice Marojan Jakcic he was seen in company with comitadjis
and members of the Narodna. As frequently happens when imma-
ture minds concern themselves too early with political questions,
these meetings had the worst possible result. Hercigonja returned
home impressed by the dogma of Belgrade, that the Slav areas in
the south of the Monarchy should be separated from it and re-united
to the Servian kingdom. He had further been persuaded by the
teachings of his friends that this object should be pursued by means
of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office in the
Monarchy.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 635

Agram and converted them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans
was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the
throne.

A few months before Suka Alginovic had been tried for high
treason. In the course of his trial three witnesses declared that
Alginovic had told them that he had received one hundred dina
from the Narodna and a similar sum from a secret association of
students to start propaganda, but especially to carry out an attempt
on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear Jiow far the criminal agitation of the Narodna and of
those who share in its views has of late heen primarily directed
against the person of the hereditary Archduke.

From these facts the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna,
as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy which were
grouped around it, recently decided that the hour had struck to
translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy that the Narodna limits itself in this way to
inciting, and where the incitement had fallen on fertile soil, to
providing means of material assistance, but that it has confided all
the dangerous part in this active propaganda exclusively to the youth
of the Monarchy, which has been excited and corrupted by this organ-
isation, which alone ought to bear the burden of this pitiful
"heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history
and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th June.

Princip and Grabez are examples of these young men who have
been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna.
At Belgrade, where he consorted with students imbued with these
ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the heredi-
tary Archduke (against whom was directed the particularly ran-
corous hatred of the elements hostile to the Monarchy), when he
made his tour in the annexed territories.

He became friendly with Kabrinovitch, who mingled with the
same associates, and whose radically revolutionary opinions, as he
himself admits, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the
Monarchy, and brought him into the active propaganda. But how-
ever carefully this plot might have been prepared, and however de-
termined the conspirators may have been, the attempt would never-
theless not have been carried out if people had not been found, as
in the case of Jukic, to provide for the conspirators means of com-
mitting their crime; for as Princip and Kabrinovitch have expressly

636 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

admitted, they lack the necessary arms as well as money to purchase
them. It is interesting to see where the conspirators procured their
arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivogin Dacic, the two principal men
in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators turned as to
a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already
become a tradition among those ready to commit crimes that they
could obtain from the members of the Narodna instruments for
murder. The fortuitous circumstance that these two men were not
at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless frustrated this plan;
however, Princip and Kabrinovitch had no difficulty in finding other
help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-comitadji, and now a railway
official at Belgrade and member of the Narodna. The latter and his
friend Major Voja Tankosic, who has already been mentioned, and
was also one of the heads of the Narodna, and who in 1908 was the
head of the school of armed bands of Kuprija (Appendix V.), now
appear as the moving spirits in the plot. They had only one doubt,
and that but a fleeting one, namely, whether the three conspirators
were really resolved to commit this act, but this doubt soon disap-
peared, thanks to their own suggestions. Thenceforward they were
ready to give every assistance. Tankosic procured four Browning
pistols, and ammunition, and money for the journey. Six hand
grenades from the Servian army completed the armament, a fact which
recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious to be successful, Tankosic obtained
shooting lessons for them, but Tankosic and Ciganovic were further
anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means scarcely de-
sired by the assassins. They therefore suborned Zian Kali, pointing out
that the two culprits must commit suicide after the crime, a precau-
tion which was to be specially advantageous to them because secrecy
would relieve them of the slight danger which they themselves were
incurring in this enterprise. Sure death for victims of their cor-
ruption, perfect security for themselves, such is the motto, as is now
known, of the Narodna.

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was
necessary that the arms and the bombs should arrive in Bosnia by
underhand methods and without being perceived. There again
Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power; he explained to the
conspirators the route which had been agreed upon, and assured
them that the Servian customs authorities would help them. The
way in which this journey, described by Princip as ** mysterious,"
was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route
was a secret route prepared in advance and already often used for

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 637

the secret designs of the Narodna. With a simplicity and assurance
which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabak
and Loznica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose;
the secret transport with its complicated system of constantly chang-
ing guides, who could be summoned as if by magic, and were always
to be found on the spot when there was need, was effected without
any difficulty. Without investigating the object of this strange
journey of a few very young students, the Servian authorities set this
smooth machinery in motion at a word from the ex-comitadji and
minor railway official Ciganovic. However, they had no need to
make any enquiry, for, from the information before them, it was
clear that a new mission of the Narodna was being carried out.
When he saw the arsenal of bombs and revolvers, the guard, Crbic,
smiled a benevolent smile of approval, showing conclusively how
accustomed they were on this route to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Servian Government have committed a serious default
in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-
Hungary, they have allowed the press to excite hatred against the
Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own
territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of
masters and of judges, to busy themselves with a public campaign
against the Monarchy, instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds
of its citizens; they have not prevented men with a share in the
direction of the military and civil administration from poisoning the
public conscience contrary to all moral sentiment, to such an extent
that in this conflict vulgar and treacherous assassination appears the
most praiseworthy weapon.

No. 75 (2).
Official Communique of the Press Bureau.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and
presented the text of the Servian reply.

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply ; it makes
it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of
putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the

638 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restric-
tions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the
Austro-Hungarian demarclie, but also with regard to the claims
advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are with-
out importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept
the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution
of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that
the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to
a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent
associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity
under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even
been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as
necessary for the reestablishment of a permanent peace in the
south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be
insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the
fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitra-
tion, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply
was due, and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for
mobilisation.

No. 76.

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On hoard the "La France," July 28, 1914.

I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the
events of Saturday; the telegram describing the last visit of the
German Ambassador; that relating to the mediation which Russia
advises Servia to ask for and to the British demarches at Berlin, as
well as your telegram received this morning directly through the
Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen;
the proposition which you maintained is self-evident; in the search
for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 639

with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and
has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least
suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it
difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government,
whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German
Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two British
proposals mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the com-
bination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M.
Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should
be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given
to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view
to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of
the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above,
be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. In proposing to
exert it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and
Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not
excluding St. Petersburgh, he offers on the other hand to Germany
a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the demarche
by which the German Government have caused it to be known at
Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as
purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives
with the Great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

Rene Viviani.

No. 77.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.

Rene Viviani, President of the Council, on hoard the '*La

France.'*

Paris, July 28, 1914.

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the
German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist
in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been
taken by them to hold back Austria; the British proposal, which
consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a
cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Peters-
burgh, and in a meeting at London of the German, French and

640 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a
view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets
with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure.
The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his
Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia
to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand
from that Power; Count Scezsen has given no explanation as to
those measures; according to our Military Attache at Vienna, mobi-
lisation dating from July 28 appears to be certain.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 78.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. PetersburgJi, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this
morning; he told me that he had no communication or official pro-
posal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before,
to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid
action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Aus-
tria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was
ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may
act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing
to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers, to which
we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from
Italy and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the
Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to
associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that
that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference,
which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle
to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other
means ; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria
to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instruc-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 641

tions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure
on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the
French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has
not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she
approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Aus-
trian note; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for
Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 79.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have for-
warded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation
by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our
adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by
Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British
colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to acquaint
the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as
soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same
demarcJie; you will adapt your attitude to his.

No. 80.

M. Paul Cambon, FrencJi Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 28, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and
German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian
reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that
of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderat-
ing action by Great Britain at St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey

642 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the begin-
ning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Servian Government,
and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific advice.
He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that
Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has
telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian
Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This infor-
mation has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna,
who has sent the information that the first interview between the
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szapary had pro-
duced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an
agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St.
Petersburgh and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation,
but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof 's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual
meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain,
France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situa-
tion, the latter replied "that he had begun pourparlers with the
Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favour-
able ; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal
for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct
explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M.
Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the British proposals or
any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of
the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious
consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotia-
tions should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E.
Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping
out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined
effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's sug-
gestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it
was best to await the result of the conversation which had been
begun between St, Petersburgh and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in
consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his demarche for
the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially
declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

Paul Cambon.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 643

No. 81.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szapary was brought to
the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Charge d 'Affaires.
The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks
of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Govern-
ment did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian
Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground
for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse
with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from
the present difficulties. The Russian Charge d 'Affaires takes a
favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr
von Jagow 's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburgh enter into
direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however,
for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her
preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the demarcJie made by my British
colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as
he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to
accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Am-
bassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to
give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisa-
tion. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on
war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added
that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were
in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morn-
ing together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had
had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward
Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same
language to them as to me ; accepting in principle the idea of joining
in a demarche with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any
idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of
form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Govern-
ment that they should change the wording of their proposal, which

644 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

might take the character of a diplomatic demarche at Vienna and
St. Petersburgh.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to
any demarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a
dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic
action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of
peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but to
place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to
ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

Jules Cambon.

No. 82.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bietir
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the
proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of
direct conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this
double interview is a bad one ; * ' Certainly, ' ' he said to me, * * Austria
is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my
two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

Paleologue.

No. 83.

M. Bumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.
Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any
intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between
Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 645

useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially
declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the
present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict,
but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very
difficult the initiation of pourparlers by the four Powers, as well as
the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and
Count Szapary.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might
obtain the adherence of Germany — "Mediation between Austria and
Russia," — is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between
those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolu-
tion of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have
pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be
able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circum-
stances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself
and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

CHAPTER V.

From the Declaration op War by Austria on Servia (July 28,
1914) TO THE German Ultimatum to Russia (July 31, 1914).

No. 84.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Borne, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.
The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war
by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts
for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation
should be interrupted. Barrere.

646 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 85.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St.
Petershurgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Bel-
grade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy-
concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the
crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to
obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are
allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Govern-
ment and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes
between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the ques-
tion is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime com-
mitted in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-
Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government
thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal
assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek terri-
torial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of
Servia; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come
from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well
defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of
peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburgh alone.

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at
Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von
Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-
German action at St. Petersburgh; it has been also expounded in
London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was
given that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet have, from the beginning,
given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by asso-
ciating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to
the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore
in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be
taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment
that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of
Servia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the coop-
eration of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain
to be arranged between Austria and Servia; and, finally, that they
do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the
original Austro-Hungarian note.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 647

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the
former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safe-
guard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the
idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being
suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna.
In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburgh in
play with the illusion of an entente which might result from direct
conversations, while they are taking action against Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburgh
Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest,
should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal.
This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to
decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of
stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplo-
matic advantages by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian
Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in
order to impose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guaran-
tees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial
aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status
of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising
the general peace either at once or in the near future.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 86.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienr
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.
I am now in a position to assure your Excellency that the Rus-
sian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and
Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British
colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

Paleologue.

648 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 87.

M. Klohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.

I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact in-
formation. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, ac-
cording to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready
to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require,
but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention
against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and
British colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with
the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything
will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the
country.

Klobukowski.

No. 88.

M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Frankfort, July 29, 1914.
I notify you of important movements of troops yesterday and
to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived
here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence,
which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded
under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manoeuvres.

Ronssin.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 649

No. 89.

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 29, 1914.

I am informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have
been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep
all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport
of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the
non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regi-
ments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received
orders yesterday to return immediately.

Allize.

No. 90.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th
army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Land-
wehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are
also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and
Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier.
Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in
order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order
to impress St. Petersburgh, intend to decide on a general mobilisa-
tion of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude,
it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

Dumaine.

650 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 91.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador ai St. Petershurgh, to M. Bien-
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 29, 1914.

The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had
invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has
been refused by the latter.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied them-
selves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against
Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on
the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be
despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to
operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the
idea of a conference of the four Powers in London ; further, he does
not attach any importance to the title officially given to the dis-
cussions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace.

Paleologue.

No. 92.

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I asked the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, which seemed to
him yesterday the best means of arriving at a detente, stood. He
answered that at St. Petersburgh they seemed well disposed towards
them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was
awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the sug-
gestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would
view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria
and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the
Imperial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 651

reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw
in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it was just on that
account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had
received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations
one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished
to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a
supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary
of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that
Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject
the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission
would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more
than one, for instance, the Financial Commission at Athens. One
could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a
Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of
controlling the police enquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear,
by this instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conver-
sations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct con-
versations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, to which Sir E.
Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action
could be exercised by the four PoAvers by means of their Ambassadors.
He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the Lon-
don Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence
in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the
British Ambassador to come and see him. He spoke to him of the
proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him
that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose
the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague
of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was making to
that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to
maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war
broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible
for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was
trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and
Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a
favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered
very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised

652 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague
to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the
last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky, Up to quite
the last days they flattered themselves here that England would
remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the
German Government and on the financiers and business men by her
attitude is profound.

Jules Cambon.

No. 93.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees
with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak
of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid
the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Peters-
burgh by M. Sazonof and Szapary should be continued and made
more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but
Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that
Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would
prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the
imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav in-
habitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still
clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian
arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the
conflict.

Dumaine.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 653

No. 94.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. Petershurgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Bel-
grade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

The following communication was semi-oiBicially made to me this
morning by the German Ambassador: —

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to
obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conver-
sation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly
the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet
hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia.
The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war
which has occurred." A similar communication will be made at
St. Petersburgh.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning
with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German
Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When
Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis
of discussion which will make conversations with a view to interven-
tion easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been
begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that
the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to
delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise
any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be
pushed forward very actively.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 95.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Lon-
don, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome,
Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.
M. Isvolsky came to me by order of his Government to com-
municate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears

654 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war
by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already
taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army,
and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations
between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Russia had decided to mobilise
in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While inform-
ing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador
at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were
not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply
aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Rus-
sian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two
telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof : the first, after pointing
out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the conver-
sations of the Russian Ministry with the Austrian Ambassador, asked
England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view
to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military
operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush
Servia while mediation was dragging on) ; the second communicated
the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with
the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncom-
promising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The
Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very dis-
quieting, and considers that England is in a better position than the
other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pres-
sure on Vienna.

Bienvenu-Martin.

No. 96.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by
the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of
the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of
mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria,
had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa,

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 655

Moscow and Kazan. He added that this step had no aggressive char-
acter against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna
had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano
told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Ger-
many had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not
move. In this connexion he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati
reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von
Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did
not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact
that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to
treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at
Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a
general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to
make war.

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He
thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Servia and
with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material
advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find
some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria
wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an inde-
pendent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not
to intervene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an
agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal
of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday,
he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir
R. Rodd, in order to show him to what extent British intervention
might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, **If your Govern-
ment are of the same opinion, they could on their side make repre-
sentations to this effect in London."

Barrere.

656 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 97.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

I should be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good
enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which
he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of
mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle obtained the
adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the
same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of
war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-
Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician
frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian con-
versations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to
ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von
Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention
of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise
effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburgh for the main-
tenance of peace.

I would ask j'^ou also to point out to the British Secretary of
State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian
Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in
cooperating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

Rene Viviani.

No. 98.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 29, 1914.
In his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey
observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations
between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna,

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 657

it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention
by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This sugges-
tion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but
they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky
to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new
formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of
peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's
request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this
conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that
Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia con-
cerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier
would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government.
My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions
of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation
very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

Paul Cambon.

No. 99.

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 29, 1914.

The Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum
was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian
colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch
His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so
critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to
arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures
the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never
cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPFE.

658 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 100.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. PetershurgJi, to M. Bien-
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Peterslurgh, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia
does not stop her military preparations the German army will
receive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been
caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising atti-
tude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-
Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tone in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication
has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the
mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against
Austria.

Paleologue.

No. 101.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and
London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

M. Isvolsky came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador
has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilise
the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these
preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight
army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences
with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia
can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that
she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers
it desirable that England should join Russia and France without
loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 659

the conflict in tlie interests of universal peace. The conversation
entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested
still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore
think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures
of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not imme-
diately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a
total or partial mobilisation of her forces.

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came
and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of
the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this
way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and
that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on
them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step
which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and
that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose
of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

Rene Viviani.

No. 102.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. PetershurgJi, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 30, 1914.

M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated your desire that every
military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general
mobilisation should be avoided, answered that in the course of last
night the General Staff had suspended all measures of military pre-
caution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the
Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attache of
the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the
mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against
Austria.

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with
Count Pourtales, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Ger-
many does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which
would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same
impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had
personally with the Emperor William.

660 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received
disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German
army and navy.

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian
Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards con-
ciliation. He repeated to me: '*I shall continue to negotiate until
the last moment."

Paleoloque.

No. 103.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M.
Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her
military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe
the territorial integrity of Servia: —

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must
safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and
her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of
Austria. ' '

M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to
tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburgh
while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking
to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom
before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas is so
anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to
you in his name:

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has as-
sumed the character of a question of European interest, declares
herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which
are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to
stop all military preparations."

Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with his
Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 661

Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion
by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they
are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

Paleoloque.

No. 104.

M. Dumadne, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bene Viviani,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, Julxj 30, 1914.

In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian
Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German
Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his coun-
try, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This
enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great
importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who ex-
amined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal
readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.

M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military prepa-
rations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria,
and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate
his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps
towards mobilisation taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold,
have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards main-
taining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will
be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs
of hostility.

With a view to settling the Austro-Servian dispute it was agreed
that pourparlers should be resumed at St. Petersburgh between M.
Sazonof and Count Szapary; they had only been interrupted owing
to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representa-
tive should be given powers which would allow him to modify the
terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szap&ry will only be
authorised to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the
dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and

662 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion
which Sir Edward Grey proposed to entrust to the four Powers not
directly interested would take place.

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared to M.
Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new
procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the
Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much
broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the
Monarchy; M. Schebeko did everything to convince Count Berchtold
of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement which
would be acceptable to the two Empires.

The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason
for thinking that all chances of localising the dispute were not lost,
when the news of the German mobilisation arrived at Vienna.

DUMAINE.

No. 105.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news
of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was
false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial
Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which
announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps
diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday
evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presi-
dency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the
preparation of the special edition of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that
from various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she re-
served her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between
the Tsar and William II.) the serious measures which had been
decided upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations
saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-
Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 663

mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany
lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the
haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been
successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided
upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the Lokal
Anzeiger, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news
calculated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the
measures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication
of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here,
and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation
first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

Jules Cambon.

No. 106.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

Please inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts concerning
French and German military preparations. England will see from
this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive
steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken
by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has
made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the
frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and
has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have
kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them
to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided,
however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should
be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory
undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government
of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more
than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the
steps taken on the two sides of our frontier ; in France, soldiers who

664 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany
had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been
pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units
transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves
or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing
of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire
entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with
us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from
taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany
on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have
been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes
of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been
summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only
circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None
of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occa-
sions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole
16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves
and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the
15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts
of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

Rene Viviani.

No. 107.

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's
reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted
Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr van Jagow (to
whom Count Pourtales had communicated the conciliatory formula

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 665

suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had
just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria,
thus showing the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

Jules Cambon.

No. 108.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 30, 1914.

Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request
addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the Ger-
man Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers
in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military prepara-
tions of England.

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character,
but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural
to take some precautions ; that in England, as in France, there was a
desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France,
defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the
object of making any aggression.

The information which your Excellency has addressed to me on
the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the
French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E.
Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between
Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of
aggression which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as
I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together
every hypothesis.

Paul Cambon.

666 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 109.

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State,
I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey,
who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the inter-
vention of the disinterested Powers.

He answered that "to gain time" he had decided to act directly,
and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which
conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect,
under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great
Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky,
whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the
duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation
on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compro-
mised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything
depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise
completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this
might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and
consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told
me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise
if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not
being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the
army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for
the German army, and ' * that the words of which I reminded him did
not constitute a firm engagement on his part."

The impression which I received from this conversation is that
the chances of peace have again decreased.

Jules Cambon.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 667

No. 110.

M. Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 31, 1914.

At the beginning of our conversation to-day Sir E. Grey told
me that Prince Liehnowsky had asked him this morning if Great
Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the con-
flict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neu-
tral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would
be drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which
took place this morning. He replied that after having examined
the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for the moment the British
Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that
they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an
understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before con-
sidering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to
develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Govern-
ment would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on
the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany
showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a
renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great
Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would
give France the help on which she relied.

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been
formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be
modified, and that in that ease a meeting of the Cabinet would be
called together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary
of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow,
and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps
to secure that the autograph letter which the President of the Re-
public has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should
be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly

668 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will,
I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

Paul Cambon.

No. 111.

M. Molla/rd, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of tJie Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 31, 1914.

The Minister of State has just left the Legation, he has just told
me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at
Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormeldange
with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over
the Sure have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the
export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.

M. Eyschen requested me — and this was the real object of his
visit — to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France
will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I
asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German
Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister
to get the same declaration.

Postscript. — ^Up to the present no special measure has been taken
by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the
German Legation. He complained of the measures showing sus-
picion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister
of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration
from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr
von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course,
but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the
same undertaking."

MOLLARD.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 669

No. 112.

M. Rene Viviani, President of tJie Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh,
Berlin, Vienna and Rome.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

The British Ambassador has handed me a note from his Govern-
ment asking the French Government to support a proposal at St.
Petersburgh for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir
B. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influ-
ence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of
Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the fron-
tier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the
Powers endeavoured to secure that Servia should give sufficient
satisfaction to Austria; the occupied territory would be evacuated
as soon as she had received satisfaction.

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July, and expressed
the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides.
Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the
Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition (if Aus-
tria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed the char-
acter of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to
eliminate from her ultimatum the points which endanger the principle
of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military prepa-
rations) cannot be modified. Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria
stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian
Government could agree to change their formula in the following
way :—

That the Powers would examine how Servia should give complete
satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or in-
dependence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occup3dng Bel-
grade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare herself
ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss
how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent
to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided
that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French
Government joined in the British suggestion, and in the following

670 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

terms asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to try to obtain,
without delay, the assent of the Russian Government: —

"Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir
E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation
between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an
honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of avert-
ing in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

"The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to
the Powers the duty of examining how Servia could give full satis-
faction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the
independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of
suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to
act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to
Russia and to Austria and to provide for Servia an acceptable
means of issue from the present difficulty.

"I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing con-
siderations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence
without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have
been himself informed."

Rene Viviani.

No. 113.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. PetershurgJi, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914.

The news of the bombardment of Belgrade during the night and
morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia.
One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations
since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's
attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged
between St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to
prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me
that he has modified his formula, as requested by the British Am-
bassador, in the following way: —

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 671

territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has
assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits
that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can
accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to her
sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia under-
takes to preserve her waiting attitude."

Paleologue.

No. 114.

M. Rene Yiviani, President of tlie Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, 8t, Petershurgh,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome and Constantinople.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

The efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and
Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for
every peaceful effort), with the object of a direct understanding
between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, or of the mediation of the
four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day;
Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has
hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture made by
Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on
which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating
a formula, and then modifying it in accordance with the request of
Great Britain ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having
also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassa-
dors, that British mediation will complete at London that which is
being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany, who, since the
beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power
her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative
attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has
not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising
attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since
the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation ; the im-
mediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, declared at
Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been

672 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin
bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to
disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be
obtained, to make war.

Rene Viviani.

No. 115.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.
General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age
was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning
at 1 o'clock.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely
in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berch-
told.

Dumaine.

No. 116.

M. Jules Canibon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the CouncU, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Herr von Jagow sent for me and has just told me that he was
very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of
the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the
Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary meas-
ures. What is called " Kriegsgef ahrzustand " (the state of danger
of war) has been declared, and this allows the authorities to pro-
claim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some
of the public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand is being made at St. Petersburgh
that th^ should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the Ger-
man side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 673

side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been in-
structed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the
Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

Jules Cambon.

No. 117.

M. Rene Yiviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Peters-
hurgh.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military
measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening,
Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same
time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government
has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will
mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at
all about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy
which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new
military measures which they are taking to-day.

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Govern-
ment, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between
Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply
to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject,
and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard
to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed
give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

I ask you to inform M, Sazonof of this immediately. As I have
already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in
the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to
avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.

Rene Viviani.

674 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 118.

M. PaUologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 31, 1914.

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the
measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Ger-
many for the last six days, the order for the general mobilisation of
the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without
most serious danger, to aUow herself to be further outdistanced;
really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those
taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, know-
ing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion
of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation.

Paleoloque.

No. 119.

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

L'Agence Havas having announced that the state "of danger
of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I
could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect
the neutrality of Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government
of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked
me. The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw
subsequently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I
gave this assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me,
was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

Klobukowski.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 675

CHAPTER VI.

Declaration op War by Germany on Russia (Saturday, August
1, at 7.10 P.M.) ; AND on France (Monday, August
3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

No. 120.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

Two demarches were made yesterday evening by the Austrian
Ambassadors — the one at Paris, which was rather vague, the other
at St. Petersburgh, precise and conciliatory.

Count Scezsen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian
Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial
ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia; that it
also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that
these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the
war remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war
would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee.
The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations,
gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the
questions of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would
certainly answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these condi-
tions in the name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction
was perhaps still possible.

At St. Petersburgh the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof
and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a
discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia.
The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration,
and proposed that the pourparlers should take place in London
with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested
the British Government to take the lead in the discussion ; he pointed

676 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her
operations in Servia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last
show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian
Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the
British proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope
for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless
by the attitude of Germany. This Power has in fact presented an
ultimatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which
to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against
Germany, but also as against Austria ; this time-limit expires at noon.
The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British
proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all
the Powers.

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she
wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen
came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to
take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador,
although there has been no direct dispute between France and Ger-
many, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used
all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to
do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to
the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good
enough to make arrangements as to him personally (des dispositions
pour sa propre personne) ; we know also that he has already put
the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off
diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he
has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of
the determination of Germany to make war against France. The
want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the
rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria
had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations.

Rene Viviani.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 677

No. 121.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams
from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at
St. Petersburgh had explained that his Government was ready to
discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to
its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversa-
tions should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances
of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The ques-
tion may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by
Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the re-
sponsibility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal
to Herr von Jagow 's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that
the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian
answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen
that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand
their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against
Austria ; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said
that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agree-
ment seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and
Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria ; in these circum-
stances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals were
prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand why
Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing
like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she
desired war on her own account.

J. Cambon.

678 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 122.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to
the French Minister at Brussels.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Govern-
ment, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French
Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had
repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect
their neutrality.

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that
neutrality that Prance might find herself brought to enter Belgian
territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaran-
teeing Power.

Rene Viviani.

No. 123.

M. Jules Canibon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government
to make to the German Government a communication identical with
that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of
Belgium.

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions
of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an
answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military
plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow
to-morrow afternoon.

J. Cambon.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 679

No. 124.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

I went to the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-
past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the
attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the
results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the
German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said
to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to sus-
pend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as
to their intentions ; Germany had given France a time-limit of eighteen
hours and Russia a time-limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what
were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war under-
taken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of
the consequences which might result from it according to the declara-
tion of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war.

Barrere.

No. 125.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, August 1, 1914.
The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock
this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts
made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-
Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which
has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the
pourparlers which have been carried on since yesterday : —

680 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

(1) A British compromise, proposing, besides other sugges-
tions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia,
on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way ;
adherence of Russia to this proposal.

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government declar-
ing that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor
even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were
ready to discuss even the basis of the Austro-Servian question at
London with the other Powers.

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany, who, abandoning all
pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment
when this Power had just accepted the British formula (which im-
plies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which
have mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with
France.

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the develop-
ments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four
hours, that there was perhaps in them a ** glimmer of hope" for some
arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from
his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave
renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to
those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid
stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government
would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initia-
tive which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably
compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and
did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question con-
cerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict.
He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of
France was not doubtful.

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result
from my conversation with the German Ambassador, for, on their
side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous prepara-
tions on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities,
and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side
France is taking all military measures required for protection against
too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers
that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so
far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is
forced on her. Rene Viviani.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 681

No. 126.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the
Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked
Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrality and had not ob-
tained it, the British Government remained masters of their action;
this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to
Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement to
respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a position
to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of
this answer and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the
House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a
violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place, the British fleet is mobilised, and Sir Edward
Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state that it will
oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or,
if the German fleet should pass through (venaient d le passer), will
oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions
will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention
of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening
period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a sur-
prise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time.

Paul Cambon.

No. 127.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 1, 1914.
We are warned through several channels that the German and
the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence
England by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if

682 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

it breaks out, will fall on Russia. Efforts are being made to obtain
the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.

France has not ceased in cooperation with England to advise
moderation at St. Petersburgh ; this advice has been listened to.

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Servia
to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not
incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria; this was
fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to
allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of
composing the dispute.

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George
Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first formula which
he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown
not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Scezsen
made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Scezsen affirms that Aus-
tria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does
not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. He expressly adds that
Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's
suggestion, M. Sazonof 's formula and the Austrian declarations could
easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in cooperation with England, to work to
the very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia
in the negotiations showed a good-will which cannot be disputed,
Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilisation.

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not
to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has con-
tinued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are con-
cerned, we will, in cooperation with England, continue to work for
the success of these pourparlers.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory
for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day.

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I have
already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the
impending publication of Kriegsgefdhrzustand. This measure has
been taken by Germany, and under the protection of this screen,
she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the
word.

THE FEENCH YELLOW BOOK 683

To-day M. Paleologue telegraphed that Count Pourtales had noti-
fied the Kussian Government of German mobilisation.

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War
confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.

Our decree of mobilisation is then an essential measure of pro-
tection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation
signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in
which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the
present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding
peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their
efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the
notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have
throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any
act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion
would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would
realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey
for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the
interest of the future of the European balance of power.

Bene Viviani.

No. 128.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of fhe Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.

The Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Gov-
ernment an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been
given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the
declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of
the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he
thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard
to the Grand Duchy.

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request
direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of
Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by
that date; a similar demarcJie is being made at the same time with
the German Minister at Luxemburg. Mollard.

684 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 129.

M. Rene Viviani, President of fhe Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.

Paris, August 1, 1914.
Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in
conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, the Government of the
Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of
Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be
an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be
guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

Rene Viviani.

No. 130.

M. Jules Camhon, FrencJi Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
K President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.
Special editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets
of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and
the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is
Sunday, 2nd August.

Jules Cambon.

No. 131.

M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. Rene Yiviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.
I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the fol-
lowing facts: —

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, accord-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 685

ing to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal
Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of
Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the
south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand
Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and am-
munition have been sent along the railway line from "Wasserbillig
to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences
constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of
the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867.
The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic
protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty
the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be
sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at
Berlin.

The Minister of State,

President of tJie Government.
Eyschen.

No. 132.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.
The Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just re-
ceived, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a
telegram from Bethmann-HoUweg, Chancellor of the German Empire,
saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg
do not constitute a hostile act against this country; but are solely
measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been
leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army.
Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

MOLLABD.

686 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 133.

Note "handed in hy the German Ambassador.

Paris, August 2, 1914.
The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens
to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures
taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not con-
stitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely pre-
ventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which,
under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg, are under German administration.

VON SCHOEN.

No. 134.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. RenS
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, August 2, 1914.
Yesterday at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German
Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Gov-
ernment; he will leave St. Petersburgh to-day.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instruc-
tions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

Paleologue.

No. 135.

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad.

Paris, August 2, 1914.
The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just de-
clared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are
proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to
discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia.

Rene Viviani.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 687

No. 136.

M. Rene Yiviani, President of tJie Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to tJie French Ambassadors at London, St. PetersburgJi,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Coimsiantinople.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at
Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears
the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice
been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this
morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact
that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war
against France without provocation on our part, or any previous
declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone
of ten kilometres which we have maintained, even since the mobili-
sation, between our troops and the frontier.

Bene Viviani.

No. 137.

M. Paul Camhon, FrencJi Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 2, 1914.
After the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward
Grey made the following declaration to me: —

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German
fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to under-
take hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the
British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His
Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and
must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take
any action until the above contingency of action by the German
fleet takes place."

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and
that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the

688 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the
Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to
require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance
of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg
all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so im-
portant that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a
casus belli. It is a specially British interest and there is no doubt
that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy,
will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German
influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent
the Government committing itself against Germany.

Paul Cambon.

No. 138.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

I note the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 30th,
31st July and the Ist August, and in that which you have sent to
me to-day.

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir
Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in
your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great
Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great
Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French
coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way
that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be
supported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North
Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could
not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

Rene Viviani.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 689

No. 139.

M. Rene Viviani, President of tJie Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin.

Paris, August 2, 1914.
German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at
several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the
German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text
the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications be-
tween Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German
Ambassador : —

"The French administrative and military authorities in the
eastern district have just reported several acts which I have
instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to
the knowledge of the Imperial Government.

* * The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belf ort ;
on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality
has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North
of Delle two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed
the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Jon-
cherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier.
The officer who commanded the first has blown out the brains of
a French soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses
which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the
inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses,

"The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been in-
structed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government
against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by
German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything
in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can
only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility
for these acts."

Rene Viviani.

No. 140.

M. Marcelin Pellet, FrencJi Minister at The Hague, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 3, 1914.
The German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Germany

690 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding
that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day.
He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into
Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of
that country by France.

Pellet.

No. 141.

M, Klohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Avoirs.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

Yesterday evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian
Government an ultimatum stating that his Government, having learnt
that the French were preparing for operations in the districts of
Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which
was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven
hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Bel-
gium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would
decide.

The Government of the King answered that the information as to
the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view
of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were
still quite recent, that Belgium, which, since the establishment of
her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her
dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peace-
ful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation
of her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, sup-
posing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with
energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers,
and notably by the King of Prussia.

Klobukowsei.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 691

No. 142.

M. Elohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to
the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality
by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs answered:

"It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the
Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer
us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee
of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will
weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."

No. 143.

M. Paul Canibon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to inform you that you could
state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the Commons
as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the
chief of these declarations would be as follows: —

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered
the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the
object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy
and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet
would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete
protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain
and Germany would be in a state of war."

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an opera-
tion by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demon-
stration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet
must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward

692 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Govern-
ment were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic com-
munication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium.
I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

Paul Cambon.

No. 144.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.

Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meet-
ing of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him
yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great
Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir
Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

The German Ambassador has sent to the press a communique
saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give
up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast
as a point d'appui. My answer is that respecting the coast is not
respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ulti-
matum is already a violation of this neutrality.

Paul Cambon.

No. 145.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the interven-
tion of the British fleet. He has explained, in considering the situa-
tion, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and
the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of
Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 698

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for;
from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Govern-
ment, and it follows public opinion, which is declaring itself more
and more in our favour.

Paul Cambon. .

No. 146.

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I am told that the German Ambassador is said to have stated to
the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in
Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in
twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this
formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure
invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the
German campaign of false news which is beginning.

Rene Viviani.

No. 147.

Letter handed hy the German Ambassador to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during
his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 p.m.

M. le President,

The German administrative and military authorities have estab-
lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on Ger-
man territory by French military aviators. Several of these have
openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory
of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ;
others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown
bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg,

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency,

694 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire
considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the
acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge
of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French
mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if,
within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains
for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me
with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to
assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well
as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Con-
sulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of
my deepest respect.

SCHOEN.

No. 148.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is
leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German
Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen
has given as his reason the establishment by the German administra-
tive and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to
have been committed by French military aviators accused of having
flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Am-
bassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the
neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. **In the
presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von
Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with
France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power."

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassa-
dor, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed
to him a note protesting against the flagrant violations of the French
frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

Rene Viviani.

THE FEENCH YELLOW BOOK 695

No. 149.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Jules Canibon, French Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)

Paris, August 3, 1914.
I request you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at
once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French
interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I
request you at the same time to protest in writing against the viola-
tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which
notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against
the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German
Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian
neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate
military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally
against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these
two countries by French armies, by which he has attempted to justify
the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany
and France.

Bene Viviani.

No. 150.

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Allize, French Minister at Munich.

Paris, August 3, 1914.
Be good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that
you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our
Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

Bene Viviani.

696 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 151.

Jf. Rene Viviani, President of tlie Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Peters-
hurgh, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague,
Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Bel-
grade.

Paris', August 3, 1914.
I learn from an official Belgian source that German troops have
violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers.

Rene Viviani.

No. 152.

M. KlohukowsJci, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends
me a letter by which **the Government of the King declare that they
are firmly decided to resist the aggression of Germany by all means
in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Rus-
sia to cooperate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its
object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany
against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance
of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future. ' '

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the
defence of her fortified places."

Klobukowski.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 697

No. 153.

M. Paul Canibon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 4, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him immediately
in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a
statement in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited
to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to
Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night.

Paul Cambon.

No. 154.

M. Klohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.
This morning the German Minister informs the Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian
Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to
carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are
rendered indispensable by the French threats.

Klobukowski.

No. 155.

M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.

Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.

The French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to
your Excellency the following telegram: —

I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I
have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all the stafP
of the Embassy and the Russian Charg6 d 'Affaires at Darmstadt
with his family. The treatment which we have received is of such

698 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report
on it to your Excellency by telegram.

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in
accordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a
protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory
by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr
von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged
had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and
Coblenz, by French aviators, who according to his statement "had
come from Belgium." I answered that I had not the slightest in-
formation as to the facts to which he attached so much importance
and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part
I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him
with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the
German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet
read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention
to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detach-
ments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten
kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a
French soldier, whom he had met there. After having given my
opinion of this act I added: "You will admit that under no circum-
stances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of
an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons
animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are
distinguished.

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour
by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an
importance of quite a different nature."

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of
the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was
difficult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies
filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves
face to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in
front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window
of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France.
I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

"The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von
Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen wiU receive
orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive
yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 699

any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the pro-
prieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff.
We were not to see one another any more and we took leave of one
another after an interview which had been courteous and could not
make me anticipate what was in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to
make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last
opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out
this intention, as this interview would serve no purpose and could not
fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my
passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to
the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to
travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should
go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a
free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance.

I accepted this last route ; Herr von Langwerth having asked me
to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration
of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the
Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our inter-
ests, that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10
o'clock at night.

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr
von Laneken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff
of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order
was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to
the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send
our meals to the Embassy.

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth
came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return
by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three
days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that
I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration
under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to
Herr von Langwerth : —

*'M. le Baron, Berlin, August 3, 1914.

* * I have been thinking over the route for my return to my country
about which you came to speak to me this evening. You propose

700 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself
detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Govern-
ment, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great diffi-
culties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movement of
trains.

"Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government
for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will
send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close
its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am accompanied,
as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners.

"I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me
unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured
that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

Jules Cambon."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th
August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that
the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to
this effect.

At the same time M. MiladowsM, attached to the Consulate at
Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house
while in bed. M, Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had
been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr
von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave
with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the evening, but
that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new requirement I asked
if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply.
Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would return to receive
my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German
Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from
Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back
that I would submit to the order which had been given to me, but
"that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following
is a copy: —

"Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914.

"More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial
Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy,

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 701

would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me
every, means of getting back to it quickly.

''Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me
access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to
Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that
I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the
present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the
intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing
but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth
that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that
the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all pos-
sible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would
not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good enough
to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey
and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just
announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the
present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to
take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject
this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

**In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a
prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining
that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards
me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner
in which I am being treated.

Jules Cambon."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey
would not be made direct, but by way of Schleswig, At 10 o'clock
in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of
a great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only repre-
sented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more
than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at
every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accom-
panied by Major von Rlieinbaben of the Alexandra Regiment of the
Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel
Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut
and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to
remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or

702 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage
before the door of each of our compartments, which were kept open,
revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Charge
d 'Affaires, the women and children and every one were subjected to
the same treatment.

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night. Major von
Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the follow-
ing letter to Herr von Jagow:

"Sir, Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914.

"Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your
Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed
upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

"To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal
an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have
hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference
of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they
went further,

"They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the
windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the
corridors of the carriages at the door of each compartment and
facing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the
trigger, for nearly half an hour.

"I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence
to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy,
violence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yes-
terday I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was
being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as
a dangerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey
which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food
has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were
travelling with me to the frontier.

Jules Cambon."

I thought that our troubles had fmished, when shortly afterwards
Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that
the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay
the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not
been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been
forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest
Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 703

companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was required
from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig.
This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of
exchange.*

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von
Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman
that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me,
and I required that the policeman who was with us should accom-
pany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the
Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to
Copenhagen.

I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister,
although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route
to Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as
Denmark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I
succeed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be
arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me.

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your
Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the
Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this crisis.
I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which
on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic,
in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military
and Naval Attaches.

Jules Cambon.

No. 156.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 5, 1914.
The Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morning,
Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half -past eight o'clock, in order
to notify me that the German military authorities required my de-
parture. On my answering that I would only give way to force M.

* Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to
the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.

704 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it
was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this
communication which cost him so much, for it was just because
force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was
going to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which
I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked
him to be good enough to undertake their protection; this he prom-
ised to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (Enclosure
I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declara-
tion which I had made the evening before, according to telegraphic
instructions of M. Viviani.

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Legation
and left me, with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the
letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject
of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch
that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the pro-
tection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and
the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my German
colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this re-
sponsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister
of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her
Royal Highness the Grand Duchess, and as my country was not in
a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly
indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should
look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not
insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave
quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would
not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military
authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much
value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he
had nothing to fear.

My departure, which was required to take place as soon as possible,
was fixed for two o'clock; it was at the same time understood that
I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen
told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the
German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care
that I received it in good time.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 705

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M.
Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me
and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and
that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon
roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the
Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road
which had been determined on, but I did not meet any one.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text
of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my
post (Enclosure IV.).

MOLLARD.

Enclosure I.

M. Eyscken, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M.
Mallard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo-
tentiary at Luxemburg.

Sir, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

In an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excel-
lency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accord-
ance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the
Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of
Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the violation
of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to
compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the
care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the
Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third
Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary
occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will
have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times
and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally

706 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

fulfilled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue
of the Treaty of 1867.

I remain, etc.,

Eyschen,
Minister of State, President of the
Government.

Enclosuke n.

Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the
Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.

Sir,

A short time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of
the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in
Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in
writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this
matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment received
from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be
no want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret
and my deep regard.

Eyschen.

Enclosure III.

To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen.

Your Excellency,

In accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General
Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request
the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as
possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military
authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 707

placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in
the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to
receive the assurance of my deepest regard.

VON BUCH.

Enclosure IV.

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency, M.
EyscJien, Minister of State, President of the Government of
Luxemburg.

Sir, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

I have just received your communication and I submit to force.

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the
fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit
of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the
honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection,
and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of
the Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be
good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess
the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having
been able myself to express them to her.

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have
given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

Armand Mollard.

No. 157.

Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of th6

Powers at Paris.

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its
armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of
murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the

708 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the
stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and of
Convention V. of The Hague, 18th October, 1907, on the rights and
duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1 and
2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Government;
after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of
Belgium vsrith the object of requiring passage for German troops
through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th
April, 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of the
above Convention of The Hague

Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August, 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find them-
selves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these pres-
ents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between
France and Germany dating from 6,45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised na-
tions, and especially those Governments which have signed the Con-
ventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the
German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve
full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought
to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of
the Third Convention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relat-
ing to the opening of hostilities and handed to . , .

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 709

No. 158.

Message from M. Poincare, President of the Repuhlic, read at the
Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.

{Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914.)

{The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the

Message.)

"Gentlemen,

"France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated
attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before
any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German
Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been
violated. The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to
give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it
had already created.

"For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace,
have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate
reparation.

"They have given to the world the example of a great nation
which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience
and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in
the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

* ' Since the ultimatum of Austria opened a crisis which threatened
the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in
recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and mod-
eration.

"To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word,
which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

"At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right,
in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to
the last moment, supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break
out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will
have to bear before history. {Unanimous and repeated applause.)

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were
publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been
begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peace-
ful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has
invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted

710 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the noble Belgian nation (loud and unanimous applause), our neigh-
bour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us
while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (Fresh and
repeated unanimous applause.)

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she
was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant
covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen
behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be method-
ically completed.

"Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accom-
panies with her maternal thought (loud applause), has risen eager
to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (Unani-
mous and repeated applause.)

"The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feel-
ing of the country, expresses to our troops, by land and sea, the
admiration and confidence of every Frenchman (loud and prolonged
applause).

"Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere
with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis,
she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to
harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with
that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the
best guarantee of victory (applause).

"In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her
side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded
by nations any more than by individuals (loud and unanimous ap-
plause).

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will
break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined
together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor,
and in a common patriotic faith (loud and prolonged applause and
cries of 'Vive la France').

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (loud and unani-
mous applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great
Britain (loud and unanimous applause).

"And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy
and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she
stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (loud and
repeated applause) 'Haut les cceurs et vive la France!' (unanimous
and prolonged applause).

Raymond Poincare.'*

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 711

No. 159.

Speech delivered by M. Rene Viviani, President of tJie Council, in
the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.

{Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.)

M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council.

Gentlemen,

The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us
of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events
which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and com-
pelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against
an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calcu-
lated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we
were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose
origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy
and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-
Hungarian Heir Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives,
difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of
these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular
which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum
delivered the evening before to Servia oy the Austro-Hungarian
Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum, in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian
subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the
official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It
demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Satur-
day, July 25th,

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, without
doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwith-
standing their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared
that she submitted to them almost without reserve.

712 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary,
a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with
the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France,
Russia and Great Britain.

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-
Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Chanceries of
the Triple Entente, to whom hi the three preceding weeks the Austro-
Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance
that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of
Paris, St. Petersburgh and London learned on 26th July that the
Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination,
declared that the Servian reply was unacceptable, and broke off
diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the
24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs a note verhale asserting that the Austro-Servian
dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the Great
Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared.
A similar demarclie was made on Saturday, the 25th, at London
and at St. Petersburgh.

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the
threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris
and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple
Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to
Servia to submit?

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the Ger-
man demarche, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies and
our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join
in it.

"We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that
our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-
Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right
to offer, but from this moment, and still more in the following days,
she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the
compromises suggested by the other Powers.

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.
This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs
brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days
before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 713

for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement of
Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the inde-
pendence of a brave people, but the balance of power in the Balkans,
embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, and consecrated by the
moral support of all the Great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government, with its
constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of
Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately,
the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action by the
four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was in-
tended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring
about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the
persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian mobili-
sation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of
Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops
of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned
along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to in-
form the German Government that their measures, restricted as they
were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not
in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the
German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this
without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the
adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria
and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were
encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the
diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that
there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed.
Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to
become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours
later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July
Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," cut the com-
munications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained
for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute

714 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could
justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain,
Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace
footing to a war footing.

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the
expiration of the time-limit given to Servia by Austria, she had
confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same
day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence.
On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures prepara-
tory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions
and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the sum-
mons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant
from the frontier had been brought up to it.

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave
us in doubt of Germany's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the Slst July,
the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated
by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente,
addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pre-
text that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and
demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve
hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because
a few hours earlier the ]5mperor Nicholas II., with a movement at
once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor
for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request
of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Gov-
ernment was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foun-
dation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and
of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of mili-
tary operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly demarche towards Russia was sup-
plemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the
rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone,
the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier,
the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way
which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the
sincerity of the pacific declaration which the German representative
continued to shower upon us ('^Hear! hear!").

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 715

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of
the "state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and
that transport was being collected even for those army corps which
were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful
and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour,
the measures of precaution which the situation required ; the general
mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for the
acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the English pro-
posal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Eussia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the
extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful
declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of
the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier
at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guar-
anteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg,
they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause
for protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The
German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to
the Belgian Government an ultimatum requesting facilities in Bel-
gium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext
that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Govern-
ment refused, and declared that they were resolved to defend with
vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaran-
teed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. {Unani-
mous and prolonged applause.)

Since then. Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed,
multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier
has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Cus-
toms officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a
German military aviator dropped three bombs on Luneville.

The German Ambassador, to whom, as well as to all the Great
Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express
his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening
to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a
state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts,
hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in

716 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near
Nuremberg. This is the letter which he handed to me on the
subject : —

"M. le President,

"The German administrative and military authorities have estab-
lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on Ger-
man territory by French military aviators. Several of these have
openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory
of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ;
others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown
bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

"I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Ex-
cellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German
Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence
of the acts of this latter Power.

*'At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge
of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French
mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if,
within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

"My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only
remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to
furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suit-
able to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as
well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German
Consulate General in Paris.

"Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of
my deepest respect.

(Signed) Schoen.'*

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts
which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any
French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator
committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any
hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to
these wretched inventions. (Loud and unanimous applause.)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and
all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary
steps ; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calm-
ness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with re-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 717

markable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. {Vnanimous and
prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The
Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid
passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and inde-
pendence of their country. (Renewed loud and unanimous applause.)

The entire British fleet is mobilised and orders have been given
to mobilise the land forces. (Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to
their feet.)

Since 1912 pourparlers had taken place between English and
French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters
between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these let-
ters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the
consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents
of these two documents.

"Foreign Office,
"My dear Ambassador, November 22, 1912.

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage-
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency
that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in-
stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present
moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it
might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend
upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect
an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre-
pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans
of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and
the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to
them. Yours, &c.,

E. Grey."

718 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the
23rd November, 1912 :—

"Dear Sir Edward, London, November 23, 1912.

"You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November,
that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of
France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time
to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations
should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in
the future whether they should lend each other the support of their
armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between ex-
perts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding
our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, how-
ever, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Govern-
ments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part
of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could
count on the armed support of the other.

"Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state
that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons
to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event
threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately
examine with the other the question whether both Governments
should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or pre-
serve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the
measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those
measures involved action, the two Governments would take into
immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would
then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.
Paul Cambon."

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the members in a
noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already found
an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen {loud and unanimous
applause). I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic
to thank the British Government from this tribune for their cordial
words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this
sentiment {renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the
following declaration : —

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 719

"In ease the German fleet came into the Channel or entered
the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the
object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and
of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would
intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete pro-
tection in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and
Germany would be in a state of war."

From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and
western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the
facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify
the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, however, to
make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give
its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the
victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired
to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war
which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France
was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom
we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of
friendship (unanimous applause), by the intervention of Russia and
of Great Britain {prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their
feet).

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national
forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly
adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which
even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon
Europe.

She has reestablished the balance of power in Europe, a guar-
antee of the liberty and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me
that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally
ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial cooperation of King Ed-
ward VII. of England and the Government of the Crown {applause),
this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one
daring stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound
which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented
sacrifice {loud and unanimous applause).

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since

720 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in
Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of
the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with
her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formu-
lated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still
were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day
in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are at-
tacked by surprise {prolonged applause).

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is
the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty
to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject; Italy, with that
clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that
she proposes to preserve neutrality {prolonged applause, all iJie
deputies rising to their feet).

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy.
I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Charge
d 'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the
two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a
common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another {re-
newed applause).

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack — it is
the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente
has regained in the balance of power for the service of peace. The
object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies,
and her friends, are proud to defend {loud applause).

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in
dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done
everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend
herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet
declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between
the two countries. {Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is
wholly united to defend its existence ; a democracy which knows how
to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to
increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour;
a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence
of Europe — here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 721

lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been pre-
paring with the greatest calmness and method. We are without
reproach. We shall be without fear. {Loud applause, all the deputies
rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less favourable
circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights,
as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (applause).

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges,
we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility,
the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done
our duty (prolonged applause, all fhe deputies rising to fheir feet).

CHAPTER VII.

No. 160.

Declaration op the Triple Entente.

(September 4, 1914.)

Declaration.

M. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tJie FrencJi Ambassadors
and Ministers abroad.

Paris, September 4, 1914.
The following declaration has this morning been signed at the
Foreign Office at London: —

**The undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective
Governments, hereby declare as follows: —

"The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage
not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three
Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed,

722 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous
agreement of each of the other Allies.

(Signed) Paul Cambon.

Count Benckendorpp.
Edward Grey.
''This declaration will be published to-day.

Delcasse."

APPENDICES.

EXTRACTS.

From the **Blue Book" (English), from the **Grey Book*'
(Belgian), from the "White Book" (German), from
THE ''Orange Book" (Russian).

APPENDIX I.

Extracts from the "Blue Book" Relating to the Attitude
Taken by the English Government in Regard to Russia,
Germany, and France, During the Pourparlers which Pre-
ceded the War.

No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan, BritisJi Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir
Edward Grey. — {Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the
effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was
demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy
to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was
imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria 's conduct was both
provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 723

quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Gov-
ernment would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and
France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would
fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic
negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their
Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in
the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no
reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's
Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their
part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British
interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M.
Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European
question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the
former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from
the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what
he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should
join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active
intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be
tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark
on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations,
was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare
war on Austria ?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation
would at any rate have to be carried out ; but a council of Ministers
was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A
further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the
Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce
Austria to extend the time-limit, and that the first thing to do was
to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view;
French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made
up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it
might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm
and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out
my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that
we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the

724 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied
that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubt-
less some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me
for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government
with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it
seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make
strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments,
urging upon them that an attack upon Austria by Servia would
endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your
way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would
probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France
and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep
out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that
we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we
should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset
make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate,
he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation
of action taken by Austria.

G. Buchanan.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed
to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day
that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations
into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the
efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common
with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I
thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here ap-
proached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view
from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago.
In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was
primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an
attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a
question that was the subject of a special agi'eement between France
and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 725

was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the
question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel
called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the
supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the
Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into
a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and
France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we
should do; it was a ease that we should have to consider. France
would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but
in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her
to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to
decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary
to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with
regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not
to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should
let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had
decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for
supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to inter-
vene ; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become
involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe,
we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed
quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated
a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany
attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give;
she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

E. Grey.

No. 88.»

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Amhassador at Berlin.

Sir, Foreign Ofice, July 29, 1914.

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The
• Sic in the French text this should be 89.

726 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at
present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it.
But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue
might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and
I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversa-
tion— which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should
stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I
meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that
was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if
things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no ques^
tion of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if
France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue
did become such that we thought British interests required us to
intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to
be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I
hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as
at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch
with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed
in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it
involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be
open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our
conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that
we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not
been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said;
indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given
in Berlin as his view of the situation.

E. Grey.

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Chrey.

Paris, July 30, 1914.
President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government
have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia
stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report,

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 727

since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the German com-
munication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed
on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The
answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-
Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of
Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which
Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by
Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the
hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced
that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a
conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differ-
ences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Ger-
many would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's
Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must
maintain that it would be in tl>e interests of peace. France, he said,
is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at
present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken
unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Govern-
ment informed of everything that may be done in that way. They
have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated
round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general
war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for
the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her inten-
tion to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be
maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going
to war.

F. Bertie.

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to
Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in
Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we
would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and

728 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and
France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany
under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused
overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only
definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even
gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that,
if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn
into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engage-
ment to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had
not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said
yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day,
that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we
should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge
Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel,
and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of
this country were involved. Further developments might alter this
situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view
that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of
Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important
factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Par-
liament to intervene or not to intervene in a war. Parliament would
wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium,
and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether
each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not
be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France
if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as
things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected
proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to
England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We
should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Ger-
many. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous
increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the
mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to
the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 729

there was some new development, but at the present moment the
only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite
engagement.

E. Grey.

►

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.
After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following
memorandum : —

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult
issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind
themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out
between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the
French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the
Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their
north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary
to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with
Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did
give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposi-
tion of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told
him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord
Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more
important matter; we were considering what statement we should
make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare

730 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what
had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

E. Grey.

APPENDIX II.

Extracts from the "Blue Book" Relating to the Proposals Made
BY the German Government to the English Government in
Order to Obtain England's Neutrality.

No. 85.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency
had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's
obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to
maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid
for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was
able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that
Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object
at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain
were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Govern-
ment that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisi-
tions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any
war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect.
As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as
Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government
an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action
of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon
in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be
respected if she had not sided against Germany.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 731

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to
bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these
assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so
much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement
between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present
moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British
neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce,
would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at
this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of
action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full
liberty.

E. GOSCHEN.

No. 101,
Sir Edward Orey to Sir E. Ooschen, British Anibassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from
her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and
become subordinate to German policy.

Although apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.
We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England

732 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us
for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to
act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavour-
able and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chan-
cellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add
most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations
between England and Germany is that they should continue to work
together to preserve the peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object,
the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso
facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's
Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved,
and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to
promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would
be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and our-
selves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it,
so far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany
having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The
idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite
proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any
that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am
hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make
possible some more definite rapproachement between the Powers than
has been possible hitherto.

E. Grey.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir, Foreign Ofjice, August 1, 1914.

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the
German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was
a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium
affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to
give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it
would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On
the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 733

by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had
been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was
authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate
Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and
we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say
was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion
here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly
to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise
of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate
conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested
that the integrity of Prance and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain
neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our
hands free.

E. Grey.

APPENDIX IL (6).

German Attempts to Obtain, on the Plea op a *' Misunder-
standing," A Guarantee by England of the Neutrality op
^ France in a German-Russian War.

{Semi-official publication in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,*'

August 20, 1914.

No. 1.

Prince LicJinowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of tJie German Empire.

London, July 31, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and asked
me if I thought I could say that we would not attack France if she
remained neutral in a German-Russian war. I said I thought I could
assume responsibility for this.

LiCHNOWSKY.

734 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 2.
Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

I have just received the communication from your Government
offering me the neutrality of France under the guarantee of Great
Britain. This offer was accompanied by the question whether, in
these circumstances, Germany would not attack France. For tech-
nical reasons my mobilisation, which has been ordered for both fronts,
East and West, this afternoon, must be carried out in accordance
with preparations already begun.

Orders countermanding this cannot be given and unfortunately
your telegram came too late. But if France offers her neutrality,
which must be guaranteed by the English navy and army, I will
refrain from attacking her and will use my troops elsewhere. I hope
that France will not be nervous. At this moment the troops on my
frontier are stopped by telegraphic and telephonic orders from con-
tinuing their advance over the French frontier.

William.

No. 3.

Herr von BetJimann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Empire, to Prince
Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.
Germany is ready to agree to the English proposals if England
will guarantee, with her military and naval forces, the neutrality of
France in the Russo-German conflict. German mobilisation took
place to-day, in reply to Russian provocation, and before the receipt
of the English proposals. Consequently our concentration on the
French frontier cannot be modified. We guarantee, however, that
between now and Monday, August 3, at 7 p.m., the French frontier
shall not be crossed if England's acceptance has reached us by that
time.

Bethmann-Hollweg.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 735

No. 4.

Telegram from King Oeorge V. to the Emperor William.

London, August 1, 1914.
In reply to your telegram which has just reached me, I think
there has been a misunderstanding with regard to the suggestion
made during the course of a friendly conversation between Prince
Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, when they were discussing how
an armed conflict between Germany and France might be delayed
until a means of agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia
has been found. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky
to-morrow morning to make it clear that there has certainly been
misunderstanding on the part of the latter.

Georoe.

No. 5.

Prinze Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.

London, August 2, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey's suggestions, founded on England's wish to
remain neutral, were made without previous agreement with France,
and have since been abandoned as useless.

Lichnowsky,

APPENDIX III.

Extracts from the "Blue Book" Relating to England's Refusal
TO Admit the German Point of View on the Question of the
Violation op Belgian Neutrality.

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.
The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the
King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the fol-
lowing terms : —

736 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

"Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's
friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly atti-
tude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have
just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic
intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the
integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German
Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note pro-
posing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian
territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity
of the Kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threat-
ening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was
requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this
as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty 's Government are bound to protest against this viola-
tion of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with them-
selves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon
Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be
respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

E. Grey.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, BritisJi Minister at Brussels.

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.
You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied
to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His
Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in
their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them
in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in
this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in
offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the
purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a
guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future
years.

E. Grey.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 737

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Am-
bassador at London. — {Communicated by German Embassy,
August 4.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.
Please dispel any mistnist that may subsist on the part of the
British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most
positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict
with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex
Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact
that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect
her neutrality. It is obvious tJiat we could not profitably annez
Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisi-
tions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that
German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium,
which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa-
tion. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it
being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

Jagow.

No. 159.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. GoscJien, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be com-
pelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures
considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at
Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France
gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory
reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received by 12

738 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports,
and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all
steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as
ourselves.

E. Grey.

No. 160.
Sir E. GoscJien to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir, London, August 8, 1914.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of
the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon
and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether
the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neu-
trality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say
that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German
troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality
had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the
reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this
step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest
and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their opera-
tions and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.
It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time.
This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians
for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of
action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow
that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier ren-
dered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave,
and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and
avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He
replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible
for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 739

same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained,
I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the
Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give
the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no
further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their
advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform
the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a
party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no
other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day,
namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely neces-
sary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I
gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and,
pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His
Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether,
in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue,
it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should
be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-,
four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in
that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview
took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued
Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of
his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make
friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get
closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin
was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that
he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of
our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have
acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very
agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for
about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's
Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — ^"neutrality,"
a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for
a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred
nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All
his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last

740 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted
himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house
of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking
a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two
assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible
events that might happen. I protested strongly against that state-
ment, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow
wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter
of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and
violate the latter 's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand
that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour
of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn
compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have
in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chan-
cellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept?
Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his
Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could
hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements,
but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news
of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained
from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving
he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies
was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his
Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts
to maintain peace between Austria and Russia, I said that this was
part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at
the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly
and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwith-
standing our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria,
the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation
which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid,
and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-
workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this
more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy
and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram
was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m.
It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.

At about 9:30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary
of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 74X

very friendly official and personal relations between us were about
to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was
equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on
international law as he Avas known to be must know as well or better
than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many
cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, never-
theless, war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen
from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written
summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to
a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a
satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their
engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact,
a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly
give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

E. GOSCHEN.

APPENDIX IV.

Extracts prom the "Grey Book" Pointing out the Conditions
under which germany violated belgian neutrality.

No. 2.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. PetersburgJi.

Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914.

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration
whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address
to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a
communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil
the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event
of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a com-
munication would be premature at present, but that events might
move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instruc-
tions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my
colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact

742 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a
Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should
read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give
him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these
instructions.

Davignon.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Sir,

The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war
between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Gov-
ernment.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has
been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been
chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its
neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put
in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these meas-
ures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her
international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have
been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part
in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of
distrust of any of those Powers.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 743

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

No. 8.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburgh,
Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Sir, Brussels, July 29, 1914.

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon
a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists,
in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace
footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strength-
ened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army
divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the
same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the
frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which
may be addressed to you.

Davignon.

No. 9.

M. Davign/)n, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence
Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said : —

744 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

"I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of
French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable
forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France
does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is
concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this
sense will be given to the French authorities. ' '

I thanked M. Klobulcowski for his communication, and I felt
bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in
the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engage-
ments towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the
attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the
Government of the French Republic.

Davignon.

No. 11.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tJie Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and
made the following communication, which he had hoped for some
days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a
European war. Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German
Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect
Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : —

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say
that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost
to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that
the other Powers will respect and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication,
which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added
that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our inde-
pendence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to main-
tain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other
Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 745

which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain
that neutrality.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to
me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to
mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had
come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover,
the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature
of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary
for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours
and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold
our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that
his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotia-
tions with France and Germany, the result of which would be com-
municated to me.

Davignon.

No. 12.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tJie Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of
my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained
to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which
we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our
desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise
implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew
of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von
Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had in-
structed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a conse-
quence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain

746 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war
Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreci-
ated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He de-
clared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality,
but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany
would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured
on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood
the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed
public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913,
Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget
Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian
neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with
Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments ex-
pressed at that time had not changed.

Davignon.

Enclosure in No. 12.

TJie Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for

Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, May 2, 1913.

I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations re-
specting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-oflficial Nord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and
the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the
Reichstag on April 29th: —

"A member of the Social Democrat Party said: 'The ap-
proach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with
apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not
respect the neutrality of Belgium.'

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 747

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neu-
trality is provided for by International Conventions and Ger-
many is determined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the
Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing
to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the rela-
tions between Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social
Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War,
replied: 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the
proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That
proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will
not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guar-
anteed by international treaty. '

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again
spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declarar
tion in regard to Belgium was sufiSciently clear. ' '

Baron Beyens.

No. 13.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914.

No. 14.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to enquire of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany
would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Min-
ister replied that he was unable to answer the question.

748 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 15.

M. Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has
made the following verbal communication to me: —

"I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an interna-
tional war, the French Government, in accordance with the
declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality
of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected
by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own
defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude."

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had
taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our
independence and our frontiers should be respected.

Davignon.

No. 19.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. PetershurgJi.

Sir, Brussels, August 2, 1914.

I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de
Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M.
Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declara-
tion which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I
next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and
added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us
an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as
to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain
towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we
knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversa-
tions, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards
Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 749

importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Bel-
gian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

Davignon.

No. 20.

Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

Reliable information has been received by the German Govern-
ment to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of
the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt
as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory
against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite
of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel
so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success
to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is
essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate
any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however,
feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility
against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents
force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the
German Government make the following declaration: —

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned conditions, to
evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared,
in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries
for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for
any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular
should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance

750 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads,
tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be com-
pelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards
Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the
two States must be left to the decision of arms. The German Gov-
ernment, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality
will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to
take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents
such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind
the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

No. 22.

Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).

The German Government, therefore, consider themselves com-
pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In
these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government
to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the con-
clusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its
possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium
put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany
would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the
ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the
decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the
Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contra-
diction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the
name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 751

should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her interna-
tional obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous
resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for
the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of
the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King
of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations,
she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and
she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her
neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Gov-
ernment threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international
law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and
betray their duty towards Europe.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon
their rights.

Daviqnon.

No. 27.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).

752 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 28.

Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

Francis H. Villiers.

No. 30.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian
Ministers at London and Paris.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The General Staff announced that Belgian territory has been
violated at Gemmenich. Davignon.

No. 31.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von
Below Saleske, German Minister.

Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day
the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 753

status and cease to have ofScial relations with you. Your Excellency
will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with
the staff of the legation.

Davionon.

No. 35.

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of
part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial
Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian
neutrality : —

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows
no law.

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps
already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of
international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels
that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so
long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that
France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we
could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the
Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, com-
pelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the
Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which
we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our
military object is attained.

"Any one in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is
struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with
the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with
Austria. ' '

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg recognises,
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international
law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing
a wrong against us.

Beyens.

754 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

No. 39.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Bel-
gian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed
by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the
force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and
whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and
whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assur-
ance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain
must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the
respect of Belgian neutrality and of the Treaty to which Germany,
no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires
at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British
proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

Count de Lalaing.

No. 40.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British,
French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your
Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered
Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all
the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to coop-
erate as guaranteeing powers in the defence of her territory.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 755

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the
defence of her fortified places.

Daviqnon.

No. 41.

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914.

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has
informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries
as from 11 o'clock.

Count de Lalaing.

No. 44.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations
with Belgium.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914.

By the Treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain,
Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty
concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the
Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty
runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually
neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she
has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has
neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that
neutrality to be respected.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage
against international law provoked by no act of ours.

756 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all
the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality,
and they recall the fact that, in virtue of Article 10 of The Hague
Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers
and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels,
even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be con-
sidered as a hostile act.

Davignon.

No. 48.

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British
Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for For-
eign Affairs.

No. 52.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petershurgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian
Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me
of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and
to cooperate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

Davignon.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 757

No. 60.

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914.

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to
convey to you the following information, the United States Minister
at Brussels having declined to do so : —

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave
defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody
encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian
Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy
into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she
had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave
decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld
the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior
force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and
the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of
war. The German Government are ready for any compact with
.Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with
KPrance. Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is
not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and
that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still
ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war wiU allow her
to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under-
take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken

it to oblige him.

Baron Fallon.

No. 71.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914.

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands
Minister for Foreign Affairs : —

758 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

* ' The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats
the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August
2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only
reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since Au-
gust 3rd her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has
been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neu-
trality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal."

Daviqnon.

APPENDIX V.

Telegrams Exchanged Between the Emperor William II. and
THE Emperor Nicholas II.

(Extracts from the German "White Book.")

The Emperor William to fhe Emperor Nicholas.

July 28, 1914, 10.45 p.m.

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is
caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The
unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia,
has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand
has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder
their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubt-
less You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all
other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who
are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved
punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encoun-
tered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public
opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both
for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce
Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 759

with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my
efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

William.

II.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1914, 1 p.m.
I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment
I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been
declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation
which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be
unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be
forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity
as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old
friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going
too far.

Nicholas.

III.

The Emperor WUliam to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 29, 1914, 6.30 p.m.

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the
conservation of peace. However: I cannot — as I told You in my
first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ig-
nominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises
of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am
strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that
Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of

760 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for
Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without
drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your
Government and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already
telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all possible
effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be con-
strued as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity
which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position
as mediator which — ^upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I
willingly accepted.

William.

IV.

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 30, 1914, 1 A.M.
My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your
Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisa-
tion. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-
Hungary has mobilised only against Servia, and only a part of her
army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice
and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary,
the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such
friendly manner, and which I have accepted upon Your express desire,
is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision
now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility
for war or peace.

William.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1.20 p.m.
I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending
to-night Tatisheff (Russian honourary aide to the Kaiser) with in-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 761

structions. The military measures now taking form were decided
upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the prepara-
tions of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will
not influence in any manner Your position as mediator, which I
appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria
so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

Nicholas.

VI.

TJie Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

July 31, 1914.
I thank You cordially for Your mediation, which permits the hope
that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible
to discontinue our military preparations which have been made
necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want
war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia con-
tinue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You
my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace
of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for
the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

Your cordially devoted
Nicholas.

VII.

The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 31, 1914, 2 p.m.
Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid
I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the
Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place,
Your troops were being mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary,
whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has
become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and
now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are

762 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security
of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the
extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of
the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for
the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It
rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and
peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of my
mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed
to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to
me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious
affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can
still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those mili-
tary preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.

William.

VIII.

The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.

August 1, 1914, 2 p.m.
I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are
forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same
guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not
mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of
our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our
hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-tried
friendship to prevent the shedding of blood, I expect with full con-
fidence Your urgent reply.

Nicholas.

IX.

Hie Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.
I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your
Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 763

Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my
Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I
therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate,
clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to
avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my
great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask
most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit,
under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.

William.

APPENDIX VI.

Extracts from the "Orange Book" Relating to Germany's
Declaration op War on Russia.

No. 76.

Note presented hy the German Ambassador at St. PetershurgTi.

July 19 (August 1), 7.10 p.m.
The Imperial German Government have used every effort since
the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In
compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor
of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with
Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna
and St. Petersburgh ; but Russia, without waiting for any result, pro-
ceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea.
In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by
any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German
Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German
Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have
compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The
German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations
to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias
and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia
having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary

764 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

to answer *) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this
attitude *) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the
honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Ex-
cellency as follows : —

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of
the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at
war with Russia.

P. PouRTAiis.

No. 77.

Announcement hy the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Respecting Recent Events.

July 20 {August 2), 1914.

A garbled version of the events of the last few days having
appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account
of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review: —

On the 10th (23rd) July 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at
Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which
the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-
Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to
the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, de-
manded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in
the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but
also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures
for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian
subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any
future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time-limit
of forty-eight hours was given to the Servian Government within
which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassador at St. Petersburgh had communicated the text of the note
seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note
of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some

* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two
variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both
inserted in the note.

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 755

of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their sub-
stance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible
with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that
the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and equally
the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony
in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible.
The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary
in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to reexamine
the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-
Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion
of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna
was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime, and had
shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond
the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers —
despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade con-
sidered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Aus-
tria, Russia had previously declared that she could not remain indif-
ferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful
issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter 's
self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be
clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the
question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as an
independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Govern-
ment to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government,
which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the
Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded to mobilise
and declared war officially against Servia, and the following day
Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the
declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having prepared and
carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at
common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State,
aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Servia
throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain
indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered
it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff,
Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary
by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was

766 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps
taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet
had not taken one step to meet Russia half-way in her efforts towards
peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of
the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken
by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these
steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they
were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Rus-
sian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue dis-
cussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in
the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great
Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not
directly interested, that is to say. Great Britain, France, Germany,
and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuc-
cessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with
Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed
conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When
questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which
we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recog-
nition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European
character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon
such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights
of Servia.

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to
Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation
of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached St. Peters-
burgh.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and
Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the
scope of our precautionary military measures.

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that
Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for
every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that
account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the
situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any pro-

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 767

posed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided
it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Govern-
ment on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government
that they should suspend their military measures by mid-day on the
19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply,
to proceed to general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German
Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration
of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sazonop.

No. 78.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives

Abroad.

(Telegram.) St. PetershurgJi, July 20 (August 2), 1914.

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist
upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to
mobilise by the immense responsibility which would. have fallen upon
our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures
at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a
dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking
general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that
he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with
Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs
of Russia 's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right
to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful
settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia.
Any other solution, besides being incompatible with our own dignity,
would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by
securing the hegemony of Germany. The European — nay, the world-
wide— character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the
pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon
us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the
Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

Sazonof.

283 4

MAY - 3 1W

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