The diplomatic history of the Southern Confederacy

The

Diplomatic History

of the

Southern Confederacy

THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES
ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D., of New
York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been
enabled to provide for three years a series of lectures
on Diplomatic History. These courses are given in
the Department of History, Politics and Economics
and are published under the direction of Professor
Herbert B. Adams.

THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY,

The Diplomatic History of the
Southern Confederacy

Q

By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. D.

BALTIMORE

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
1901

Copyright, 1901
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

$t JSorb (gafttmore

THE FRIEDENWALD COMPANY

BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. The Confederate Diplomatic Archives n

II. Confederate Government, Politics and Finances . 25

III. The Confederate Foreign Policy 66

IV. Mission of Yancey, Rost and Mann 108

V. Mission of Mason and Slidell 130

VI. Expectations of European Intervention .... 145,

VII. Controversies 169

\VIII. The Crisis in England 182

IX. Napoleon and the Projected Confederate Navy . 202

X. ' Confederate Operations from Canada 220

XI. The Last Effort — Kenner's Secret Mission . . . 239

Appendix 277

9 1.3.1

PREFACE

This volume is a study of the efforts of the Confed
erate authorities, in the face of waning hope and
diminishing resources, to secure foreign recognition
and support. It considers also the forces which con
trolled the European powers and defeated the attempt
to divide the American Union, which, if successful,
would have changed the current of political and eco
nomic evolution.

It attempts to give a careful and purely historical
presentation of the theories, purposes, policies, diplo
matic efforts, and difficulties of the Secessionists, as
reflected from their official archives and other original
records. It traces the inner working of the diplo
matic machine during the many variations of the mili
tary and political situation, closely observes the atti
tude, motives, and policy of the great nations with
whom the Confederate agents sought to negotiate,
and throws light upon international questions arising
between the United States and foreign powers.

Though other materials have not been neglected,
the work is, in a large measure, based upon the Con
federate diplomatic correspondence, which is now in
manuscript in the United States Treasury Depart
ment. For permission to read this correspondence

8 PREFACE

and to make extracts, I desire to acknowledge the
courtesies of Judge Lewis Jordan, Chief of the Mis
cellaneous Division of the Treasury Department.
For permission to examine several of the duplicates
of Mr. Mason's despatches and originals of his in
structions, I am grateful to his daughter, Miss Vir
ginia Mason. For the narrative of Mr. Kenner,
which has been utilized in the preparation of part of
Chapter XII, I am under obligations to Brigadier-
General J. L. Brent, of Baltimore, and the late Hon.
William Wirt Henry, of Richmond. For sugges
tions of value in obtaining material, or for informa
tion upon particular points, my thanks are due to
Mrs. Jefferson Davis and Burton N. Harrison, Esq.,
of New York; Comtesse Roman, of Paris; Brigadier-
General Marcus J. Wright, Brigadier-General F. C.
Ainsworth, Dr. J. L. M. Curry, Hon. John Goode,
and Theodore J. Pickett, Esq., of Washington, D. C.;
Colonel William Preston Johnston, Ernest B. Krutt-
schnitt, and Miss Grace King, of New Orleans; Rev.
J. William Jones, of Richmond, and others. For
careful and valuable service in the correction of the
typewritten manuscript and proof-sheets, acknowl
edgment is due to Miss Elizabeth R. Daran, Librarian
of the Historical Department of the Johns Hopkins
University.

I am especially under deep obligations to Professor
Herbert B. Adams, who has directed and encouraged
me in this and other fields of research. .

PREFACE 9

The materials upon which this volume is based
were used in the preparation of a paper on Anglo-
Confederate Relations, presented before the Ameri
can Historical Association, at the New Haven meet
ing, December, 1898. My investigations resulted
later in a course of lectures which were given upon
the Albert Shaw foundation in the Johns Hopkins
University.

JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C, April, 1901.

CHAPTER I

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

In a small room on the third floor of the Treasury
Department, overlooking the Executive Mansion, are
the manuscript archives, sometimes designated as the
" Pickett Papers," which relate the story of the un
successful diplomatic efforts of the Southern Con
federacy to secure admission as an independent mem
ber in the family of nations, to obtain the means
necessary to the establishment of a navy and the
maintenance of an army, and to bring about foreign
mediation or intervention.

During the war many valuable despatches were
captured while being carried through the blockade,
and were afterwards published by United States
papers, but the greater part of the Confederate cor
respondence, copies of which were in the offices at
Richmond, were safely kept until the close of the war,
and the Confederate Government exercised vigilance
to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Fed
eral authorities. For a time in the spring of 1862,
locomotives were kept in readiness to remove the
treasure and some of the archives. There were prep
arations for flight from Richmond for several weeks
before the evacuation in the spring of 1865. Papers of
the Government were revised and marked for destruc
tion, abandonment or preservation.1 A month before

Bollard: Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History
of the Confederacy, Chapter XXX. J. B. Jones: Diary.

12 iftk CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

of the archives were sent to
Lynchburg and others were packed in boxes to send
away later. Mr. Benjamin destroyed the secret ser
vice papers on April 2, the day the Confederates set fire
to Richmond. In the evening of that day trains
steamed from the city with the Confederate treasure
and archives, including those of the " State Depart
ment." The load dwindled until, in Georgia, it was
carried in the saddle-bags of individuals. Some of
Mr. Davis's papers accidentally fell into the hands of
a young man at Richmond, who distributed them as
autographs to his friends.2 Part of his correspond
ence, including letters from disloyal persons in the
North, was carried away and was said to be pre
served under seal of personal confidence with Mr.
Davis.8 Many other valuable papers were hidden in
the vicinity of Richmond.4

The United States captured only the refuse of the
archives at the Confederate capital,5 but soon estab
lished a bureau of " Rebel Archives," and added other
manuscripts from time to time. On the fall of
Charleston the Federal army had found a mass of
papers relating to many subjects; some treated of
the causes and plans of secession, others related to
Southern life before and during the war, while still
others were merely the letters and diary of a lady
belonging to one of the historic families of South
Carolina, whose trembling hand notified an ardent
and pleading lover that " men and matters change."

2 Letter of Mrs. Davis to the author, Jan. 13, 1899.
8 The volumes of " office copies " of letters written by Mr.
Davis, are preserved, and are now in the control of Mrs.
Varina J. Davis.
4 Pollard: Life of Jefferson Davis, etc., p. 368. 'Ibid.

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 13

Correspondence and records bearing upon the war
were obtained in many other places. When General
Joseph Johnston surrendered in 1865, he notified
General Schofield at Raleigh that he had in his pos
session at Charlotte, North Carolina, certain records
and archives of the Confederacy which he was ready
to deliver. A United States officer received them
and they were sent to Washington. The United
States afterwards claimed all the effects of the Con
federacy abroad, including money in the hands of
agents and vessels-of-war in foreign ports. Some of
the Confederate agents at the close of the war de
stroyed their papers for fear they might fall into the
hands of the Federal Government.8 Mr. Mason, how
ever, carefully preserved his voluminous correspond
ence, and while living in Canada guarded against any
possibility of its seizure.

While the important Confederate archives were
being removed from Richmond, the diplomatic cor
respondence, consisting of the " State Department "
archives, except the secret service vouchers, was taken
by a Southern man and hidden in a barn in Virginia.
After the excitement had somewhat subsided, the
papers were removed to Washington in 'five separate
trunks and, in order to guard against seizure by the
Government, were deposited in several places for
safe keeping. It appears that the custodian of the
papers was in reduced circumstances and that sums
of money for his current expenses were advanced by
Colonel John T. Pickett, who was employed by him
as an agent to dispose of the papers/

8 Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1872.

7 Interview with Theodore J. Pickett. It should be stated,
however, although Col. Pickett always claimed to be the

14 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

Picket! was a well-known Southern man, having
been United States Consul at Turk's Island and also
at Vera Cruz, Mexico, for a number of years. He
had also been commissioned by Louis Kossuth as a
general in the Hungarian service. Later he had joined
the Lopez expedition to Cuba and was in command
against the Spanish regulars at the battle of Cardenas.8
He was secretary of the Confederate Peace Commis
sion to Washington in 1861, after which he was sent
as a commissioner to Mexico, and later served in the
Confederate army as chief-of-staff to Gen. John C.
Breckinridge.

Pickett, stating that he had found the archives
stored away in Canada and had bought a certain con
trol of them, wrote, January 20, 1868, from Toronto,
offering them to Seward, who replied that they would
have to be brought to Washington and examined be
fore purchase. The proposition was declined. When
Grant became President the papers were offered to
him in person, and he favored their acquisition, but
the consideration of the subject was delayed. Pickett
also offered them to Southern men of wealth, to pub
lishers, and to historical associations, but was unable
to dispose of them. Knowing that the archives ex-
hibited the fact that Thompson was in Canada with
considerable money when the Confederacy fell, Pickett
made a long journey to Thompson's home in the sum
mer of 1871, but the latter, feeling that his correspond
ence had been destroyed by Mr. Benjamin, showed

agent of a custodian whom he never named, some of his
acquaintances suggested that he, himself, was the custodian.
8 Many interesting facts relating to Pickett may be found
among his private papers now in possession of his son.

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 15

no disposition to buy the documents.9 During the
same summer various persons went to Pickett to in
vestigate the papers, and he, acting as attorney for the
custodian, offered to sell them to the United States
officials, at the same time representing that they were
in Canada. He finally exhibited a copy of the in
ventory, found with the property, giving indices of
the contents of the trunks. The President, in the
meantime having issued his amnesty proclamation,
and the unknown, needy custodian urging a conclu
sion, Pickett entered into negotiations with Cabinet
officers and the " Southern Claims " Commissioners.
In April, 1872, the United States agents appointed
to make the purchase went with Pickett to Canada
to examine the contents of the trunks. Pickett, with
out the knowledge of the agents, carried the trunks
to Canada on the same train, and after crossing the
border they were submitted to a two weeks' examina
tion.10 He had hoped to obtain $150,000, but accepted
half the sum rather than wait longer. The officers
reported in favor of the purchase, and the custodian
of the papers agreed to deliver them to the Govern
ment.

An appropriation to enable the Secretary of War
to examine the Confederate archives was approved
May 8, 1872, but it seems that the diplomatic papers
were purchased by special act of Congress which was
passed a month later.11 Pickett, having first made
copies of the papers for his own use, transferred them
to the Government. On July 3, 1872, four yellow
trunks were delivered at the White House, where he

9 The Daily Patriot (Washington), July 19, 1872.

10 Interview with T. J. Pickett.

"See Cong. Globe, Part VI, Appendix, 42-2, p. 711.

l6 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

was handed $75,000, from which he received stipu
lated fees and reimbursement for his expenses.
Through Mr. Riggs, a Washington banker, a great
part of these fees was distributed to needy widows
and orphans of Confederate officers, without inform
ing them as to the source of the charity.

The news that the " Pickett Papers " had been pur
chased soon became public. Among them the report
of Jacob Thompson concerning plans to burn North
ern cities and commit other depredations was found
and soon afterwards published in the newspapers. A
great many articles appeared regarding the delivery
of the papers to the United States Government, very
exaggerated accounts of the character of the papers
and the price received were published, and great in
justice was done to Colonel Pickett, whose connec
tion with the transaction was that of an agent or attor
ney of the custodian. Some said that no good could
result from the exhibit of long-buried documents,
unless they should be in defense of persons maligned;
others, including Sanford Conover, said that the
papers would prove to be forgeries, and that Secretary
Boutwell had wasted $75,000 on four trunks of ^worth
less archives. Some, speaking of them as campaign
documents, said that the impending presidential elec
tion seemed -to have whetted the appetite of the ad
ministration to purchase records which, when sifted,
might be found to reflect on Judge Davis, who had
just been nominated for the presidency. Several
prominent Southern men blamed Pickett for deliver
ing the correspondence. Some suggested that it was
forged and some that it was stolen.12

12 N. Y. Herald, July 24 and 28, 1872. Daily Patriot, July
22 and 27, 1872.

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 17

Colonel Pickett, in a published statement of his
agency in the sale of the archives, vindicated his ac
tion. To those who feared that prominent men might
be injured, he stated that Mr. Benjamin had burned
the secret service vouchers, and that under any cir
cumstances he would not have delivered such papers
to the Government. Of those delivered he said that
the Thompson report was the only one that gave him
any pain, and without the consideration of incapacity
and blunders, that it was the only one " discreditable
to the three or four men who ran the Confederate
machine." He admitted that Thompson, Davis and
Benjamin might feel uncomfortable for awhile, but
stated that Thompson, to whom he had given an op
portunity to buy the papers, could not now complain.
As to the Thompson report, Pickett declared that he
did not know of its presence among the papers until
his attention was drawn to it while making the exam
ination in Canada, and that it was then too late to with
draw it. He repudiated the policy of attempting to
burn the Northern cities.

Pickett said that the Confederacy yet owed him
$50,000, but that, in preserving the documents, he
acted only in the interest of his client and of his
tory. " What right had I," inquired he, " to destroy
the material by which history is written? The per
son who spirited the papers away and held them in
his possession was getting impatient and swore that
he would dispose of them himself. When the papers
were sold he received the greater part of the money
and took the first train." As to the charge that the
documents were stolen, Pickett said that they were
rather restored to their rightful owner — the heir-at-
2

l8 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

law and residuary legatee of the defunct Confederacy.
The Baltimore Sun asked why Pickett had not deliv
ered them sooner, if they were the rightful property
of the United States!

Pickett declared that the archives had no present
political significance, and insisted that they should be
respected as part of American history. He did not
see any wrong in placing them in the hands of the
Government so that generations to come might know
the truth. He did not think that the Confederate
Government should be ashamed of its records, and
if by chance their publications should injure some
individuals it was simply the fate of war.

Aside from the letters from Confederate agents in
Canada, the archives did not contain the material
which was expected to make Thompson, Davis, Ben
jamin and others uncomfortable, and as a campaign
weapon the collection was not such a boomerang as
had been expected.18 After the publication of Thomp
son's report, parties in the South and elsewhere offered
to sell other Confederate manuscripts.14 iTckett ^riad a
list of books used by the Confederacy and held by
parties in Texas which he proposed to furnish for a
remuneration.18 They contained correspondence or
lists relating to subscriptions to the cotton loan,
transfers of steamers from English firms to the Confed
eracy, confiscation of property by the Confederate
Government and the exchange of cotton to English

13 Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1872. Also, the Memphis Appeal.

14 Baltimore Sun, July 15, 1873.

15 Pickett also had in his possession the official seal of the
Confederacy, but he did not sell it. Electrotype " medals "
of it were for awhile on sale by a Washington jeweler. Very
few persons know who now has the original seal.

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 19

subjects for rifles. Still other papers were offered by
other persons, but the Government had decided to
make no further purchases. Later, however, some of
those who had first been disposed to censure Pickett's
conduct sold important military papers to the Govern
ment, thus practically sanctioning his action.

In June, 1874, Congress passed an act to enable
the Secretary of War to begin the publication of
Union and Confederate official records. On July I,
General Marcus J. Wright was appointed agent of the
War Department for collecting Confederate military
records. He has obtained the originals or copies of
many valuable military and executive papers. Per
sons having correspondence have generally shown
a disposition to have it published, though the Gov
ernment no longer makes purchases.15 The Naval
War Records Office has also gathered much material
for publication.

Time has proven that Boutwell did not pay for waste
paper. The names in the indexes of the Pickett
papers, together with the indexes of the correspond
ence of the Confederate Treasury and other depart
ments, have proven of great convenience and value to
the Government in defeating the payment of fraudu-
lent claims to the amount of many millions of dollars.
Hence the transaction has proven a most profitable
one from a financial point of view. The indexes are
not made according to subjects, but are arranged ac
cording to the names of persons, giving their post-
office addresses and the subjects of their correspond
ence opposite. Thus the records of persons making

18 Marcus J. Wright in Phila. Weekly Times, April 10, 1880.

2O THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

claims on the Government can be ascertained in i.
short time by referring to the correspondence itself. Ii
the index the subjects of letters are given by such
short titles as are indicated in the following taker
from the index of the " Miscellaneous " papers
" Suggestions/' " salt-petre," " loud complaints," " ab
straction of State-papers," " vents his spleen on hie
captors," " bustling with joy for the Confederacy."

Outside of the great value which the Pickett ar
chives have had in facilitating the investigation o!
claims, they have still greater importance as historical

& material. Embracing the larger part of the diplomatic
correspondence of the Confederate Government, the}'
have a far greater value than any of the collections
of military papers or records. Pickett said that the;
archives consisted of all the " State Department " cor
respondence without the abstraction of a single paper ;
but it must be remembered that Mr. Benjamin de--

ostroyed papers relating to secret missions17 and that a
few despatches from abroad failed to reach Richmond,
although second and third duplicates were started
across the Atlantic. Of Slidell's despatches, numbered
from i to 76 inclusive (January, 1862, to December
13, 1864), only " No. 21 " is missing, but several of
Mason's failed to reach Richmond. No letters written
by Mason and Slidell to Mr. Benjamin, or by Mr.

17 Mr. Benjamin seems always to have had a desire not to
leave behind him any historical material. He also seemed to
have an abhorrence of any ransacking of his private papers
and correspondence, and a very short time before his death
he destroyed all such manuscripts. Some of his correspond
ence of the period before 1861 may be found passim in the
archives of the State Department at Washington, but no
collection of his private letters is to be found anywhere.

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 21

Benjamin to them, after December, 1864, are to be
found in the papers purchased from Pickett. It is
quite probable that the strict blockade after January,
1865, prevented Benjamin from receiving European
correspondence; and his own letters after December
30, 1864, were probably laid aside to be copied in the
record books later, and were not packed with the other
archives at the time when preparations were made to
evacuate Richmond.

The scope of the material included in the Pickett
collection may be indicated by the following list:

1. Instructions and despatches of the commission to
Washington, 1861.

2. Papers relating to the ratification of the ordi
nances of secession.

3. Correspondence relating to Fort Sumter.

4. Diplomatic despatches of Yancey, Rost, Mann,
Mason, Slidell, Lamar, Lynch, Pickett, Preston,
Cripps and Ricken, the Confederate representatives
in England, Spain, Belgium, France, Russia, Rome
and Mexico."

5. Record books containing the letters of Secre
taries Toombs, Hunter and Benjamin to diplomatic,
consular and special or confidential agents abroad.

6. Consular correspondence, including that of
Hotze, De Leon, McRae, Quintero, Fitzpatrick,
La Sere, Avegeno, Bannon, Capston, Dowling, Labor,
Walker, Lee, Helm, Heyleger, Thompson, Clay and
Holcombe, representing the Confederacy in London,
Paris, Mexico, Ireland, the West Indies and Canada.

18 The larger part of the diplomatic and consular corre
spondence is in " Trunk B."

22 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

7. Record copies and originals of domestic letters
from the State Department, and the originals of mis
cellaneous letters to the department.

8. Applications for appointments to positions, for
letters of marque and for passports, and subscription
lists for persons to whom passports were issued.

9. Index to testimony concerning property taken or
destroyed, etc.

10. Newspapers and clippings.

11. Proclamations, messages, pardons, commis
sions, appropriations, constitutions, and acts of Con
gress.

12. Indexes, " Cash Book," ledgers, etc.

Some of the Confederate agents abroad kept copies
of their private correspondence. In some cases this
is valuable in supplementing the Richmond archives
which have been preserved to us through the thought-
fulness of Colonel Pickett. J. M. Mason's complete
public and private correspondence, including that
with Messrs. Benjamin, Slidell, Mann, and other
Confederate officials, is in possession of his daughter,
Miss Virginia Mason of Charlottesville, who, after pub
lishing a portion of it, contemplates leaving it with
the Virginia Historical Society. Among these papers
are several official letters not found in the Richmond
archives. John Slidell unfortunately destroyed the
bulk of his private correspondence during his resi
dence in Paris."

Colonel Ambrose Dudley Mann wrote from mem
ory an account of his diplomatic career, leaving the
task of editing it to Miss Winnie Davis, but owing to

" Letter of Comtesse Roman to the author.

THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES 23

his death the manuscript was never placed in the
hands of Miss Davis and has never been published.20

The prominent men, who could have spoken from
personal experience and intimate acquaintance re
garding the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Con
federacy, have passed from the stage of action, and
have left no record of personal narratives which
might have been drawn from their mines of remin
iscences. John H. Reagan, of Austin, Texas, the
only surviving member of the Confederate Cabinet,
has been so busily engaged with public and private
cares since the war that he has had " substantially no
opportunity to review and perpetuate the memory of
past events." He is now over eighty years of age
and can no longer trust his memory on important
points unless fortified by the records. He probably
had no occasion to know much regarding the depart
ment of Mr. Benjamin, who knew how to keep his
own secrets.

Mr. L. Q. C. Washington, who was assistant sec
retary under Benjamin, and now resides in Wash
ington, D. C., is probably the only living man who
had opportunity to know the inside motives and plans
of Confederate diplomacy. In some cases, he finds
himself unable to recall details unless he can refresh
his memory by reference to documents. Although
he always knew more than anyone else, except Ben
jamin, regarding the routine work of the office, on
some points he has only a vague recollection. Perhaps
there were some diplomatic missions, the details of
which were not confided to him.

20 Letter of Mrs. Davis to the author.

24 THE CONFEDERATE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES

Walker Fearn, who was connected with the mis
sions of Lamar and of Preston as secretary, and was
for some time in close relation with Mason and Slidell
in Europe, lived until 1899, but was not inclined to
write.

In a letter of Colonel Pickett, under date of July
26, 1872, he alludes to a " forthcoming work " on the
" diplomacy of the rebellion," but does not name the
person who contemplated the preparation of such a
work. J. D. Bullock, an agent of the Confederate
navy, in his " Secret Service of the Confederate States
in Europe," has given a graphic account of the plans
of the Confederacy to secure a navy and of the diffi
culties which had to be met. John Bigelow, the
United States Consul at Paris and also United States
minister at the same place during the Civil War, has
treated the same subject in his volume on " France
and the Confederate Navy," a work based upon his
own observation and upon Mr. Slidell's correspond
ence.

CHAPTER II

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND FINANCE

The Confederacy had a de facto Government,
though it was not formally recognized by any power.
For over three years it made its home in Richmond,
and the vast armies of the United States unsuccess
fully beat against its strongholds. It adopted a flag
and a seal of its own.1 More important than flag or
seal, (t had an army whose achievements won the ad- '
miration of the world; )jut it had no navy with whichV
to open the blockade and give the Government that
probability of permanence which was necessary to k**
secure European recognition.2

1 Davis loved the old flag, and many favored keeping it;
but the Confederate Congress, in February, 1865, in the face
of Federal triumph, decided upon a temporary design, and
was debating the adoption of a flag for future generations.
The seal was not received at Richmond until near the close
of the war. In April, 1863, Congress passed a resolution for
the seal and the next month Benjamin authorized Mason to
have it executed in England. In July, 1864, after many de
lays, Mason sent it by Lieutenant Chapman and shipped two
boxes containing the iron press necessary for making the
impression. [Despatches of Mason, No. 10, July 6, 1864.]
The seal reached Richmond in September, but the boxes
were lost. [An article on the seal, by J. T. Pickett, appears
in the Am. Hist. Record, Vol. Ill, p. 360.] *'

* In some respects the South had the advantage at the
beginning of the war. The United States executive had
been left unprepared for war, two-thirds of the serviceable
steam vessels were in foreign ports, and many high officials
were Southern sympathizers. The Secessionists, from their
oosition, required a less number of troops than the Union-

26 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

The organization of a central authority for the
seceding states began at Montgomery, Alabama, on
February 4, 1861. The conservative leaders, like
Stephens, were opposed to secession as " a remedy
against anticipated aggressions," and many still hoped
for something to occur to prevent permanent dissolu
tion of the Union and at the same time secure terms
favorable to the institution of slavery. Stephens had
urged that Democratic failure at the polls furnished
the South no reason for breaking the Constitution, but
he had not been heeded by those of a more impulsive
temperament. Cobb, of Georgia, had advised the
state legislature to declare for secession without wait
ing " to hear from the cross-roads and the groceries."
Toombs, of Georgia, had demanded that he be given
the sword. In December a South Carolina conven
tion had declared for secession, and asked the other
slaveholding states to cooperate and to send dele
gates to form a provisional congress. Other state
conventions had soon responded to the invitation.

The Montgomery council of delegates, who had
been hastily selected at a time when it was expected
that a war resulting from secession could only last a
few months, became a provisional congress for one
year. Cobb, as the temporary president of the
council until the organization of the provisional gov
ernment, appointed the committees by which the

preservation party. The North, however, had the advantage
of resources and factories and more business men. These
count in war, and made the North firmer than the South had
expected. A navy large enough to blockade the Southern
ports was soon created. The North had a population of
23,000,000, while the South only had 9,000,000, of which
3,500,000 were slaves.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 2J

organization was effected. The constitution for the
provisional government was reported by a commit
tee including two members from each state, and on
February 8 it was accepted by the assembled dele
gates. It was practically the same as the Constitu
tion of the United States. Two new features were
introduced, however, by Mr. Stephens.8 Congress v
was to have no power to appropriate money unless ?
requested by the executive or the heads of the depart
ments. The clause excluding Cabinet members from
Congress was omitted. (Stephens thought it would
even be well to choose the Cabinet members from '.
Congress.) The provisional government was to last
one year. Davis and Stephens were elected President
and Vice-President respectively, the vote being taken
by states. Stephens concurred in Toombs's superior,
qualification for the presidency, but political ma
neuvering placed it on Davis, who, it seems, did not
want it. On February 16, Davis arrived, and at once
appointed a Confederate commission to Washington
in accordance with a resolution of Congress. He se
lected Forsyth of Alabama, Crawford of Georgia, and
Roman of Louisiana. He desired peace with the
United States. Slavery demanded it, and the South
was not ready for war. Stephens was greatly bored
by the debates of the new Congress; but it was from
the people that he expected trouble, for he saw that
it would be necessary for them to exercise great pa
tience with the inconveniences of derangements of
mails and commerce and the increase of taxes.
The permanent constitution was completed March 9.

Johnston and Browne: Life of Stephens.

28 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

Rhett was chairman of the committee that framed
it. He, Toombs and Stephens, proposed most
of the variations from the Federal Constitution,
which was followed as interpreted by Southerners.
The central Government was limited and its hands
tied. The constitution began: "We, the People of
the Confederate States, each State acting in its sov
ereign and independent character, in order to form a
Permanent Federal Government," etc. The " general
welfare " clause was omitted. Several new provisions
and restrictions were added. Congress was author
ized to allow heads of departments to appear in the
legislative chambers to explain their recommenda
tions.4 Appropriations were proposed by the heads
of the departments, except in case of a two-thirds
vote of both Houses to the contrary. The President,
who was given power to convene and adjourn either
House at his will, could approve or disapprove an
appropriation bill by sections. Bills appropriating
money were to relate to but one subject, and that was
to be expressed in the title (against the "rider"). The
post-office was to be self-sustaining after 1863. Rev
enue was to be obtained by import duties to pay the
debts, to provide for the common defense, and for the
expenses of the Government, but no bounties nor pro-

4 The committee favored the clause in the Federal constitu
tion which prevented the Cabinet from being chosen from
Congress, but this view did not carry. The permission to in
troduce heads of executive departments into Congress was
practiced under the provisional government, but after Feb
ruary, 1862, no steps were taken towards putting it into
practice, and Congress uttered stinging criticisms against
Davis and his cabinet officers, though it yielded to executive
need, and its members thereby became men of little influence
and initiative.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 29

tective duties were to be placed on imports. The Sec
retary of the Treasury was required to publish an
itemized statement of the receipts and the disburse
ments of his office. There were to be no general in
ternal improvements to facilitate commerce. Each
state was allowed to tax marine commerce in its har
bors. In case a harbor was improved by Congress
it was necessary to reimburse the Confederate treas
ury by taxes on the commerce of that harbor. States
could unite to improve a river dividing or flowing
through them. States were to be admitted by a two-
thirds vote of each House, the vote of the Senate
being by states. (Stephens had desired the new con
stitution to be framed so as to admit non-slave-
holding states in case they should apply.) Congress
could pass no bankruptcy act to discharge debts con
tracted before such act. Congress could not inter
fere with the place or the time of electing senators.
The African slave trade was forever prohibited,^
although the Confederate Government had no au-""^
thority to make treaties upon the subject. Congress
could prohibit the introduction of slaves from states
not members of the Confederacy. It could take no
part in amending the constitution.

The President and Vice-President were to serve for
six years and the President was not re-eligible. Pro
vision was made against the dogma " to the victors
belong the spoils." If the President removed officials
of a lower grade than the Cabinet it was necessary
for him to report the cause to Congress, and he could
make no appointment if rejected by the Senate.5

8 In the early part of 1865 a conference of the Virginia mem
bers of the Confederate Congress advised Davis to reorganize

30 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

No supreme court was provided, though it was
expected to establish one later. Citizens of one state
could not bring suit against citizens of another state
in trie Federal courts. For constitutional offenses
the legislature of a state could not impeach a Federal
judge whose duties were confined to that state. The
Department of Justice was to be administered under
the attorney-general. The states were denied their
former privilege of granting franchises to persons not
citizens under the general law of naturalization. Pro
vision was made to change the constitution. Three
states could demand a convention of states to alter
or amend it, but Congress could not suggest altera
tions. The constitution was ratified by state con
ventions.8

Davis promptly selected a Cabinet Toombs of
Georgia, was appointed Secretary of State; Mem-
minger of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury;
Mallory of Florida, Secretary of the Navy; Reagan

the cabinet by relieving all the existing members. Davis re
fused, but on January 18, Mr. Seddon of Virginia, the Secre
tary of War, handed in his letter of resignation. On February
I, the President finally acquiesced in Seddon's resignation,
but he did not admit the power of Congress to control such
a matter (as in England). He stated that the Confederate
Cabinet members were not members of Congress, did not
originate legislation, and were not admitted to the right of
debate. Two weeks later the Virginia delegates stated that
their advice to Davis had been confidential and had only been
given to prevent a collision; that there were many others in
Congress who favored a change in the Cabinet, but that they
did not assume the power of Congress to compel a resigna
tion of the Cabinet, and had spoken only for public sentiment
and safety. [Richmond Dispatch, Feb. 15, 1865.!

9 On the Confederate Constitution, see articles in the Galaxy
for March, 1874, and Frazer's Mag. for Oct., 1862.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 3!

of Texas, Postmaster-General, while J. P. Benjamin T
of Louisiana " full of accomplishments and sophistry,
placid and smiling, his brow ever unclouded " was,
strangely, not dispatched to European Courts, but
made Attorney-General of a government " never des
tined to have a judiciary." Toombs was chosen Sec
retary of State only after Barnwell of South Carolina,
had refused to accept the place. Chafing under red
tape and complaining that too many were seeking
bomb-proof positions under a timid administration,
he soon resigned and was succeeded by R. M. T.
Hunter of Virginia.8 William Lowndes Yancey was
offered the chief place in the European Commission,

7 Judah P. Benjamin was born in 1811 on the British island
of St. Croix in the West Indies. His parents had recently
sailed from England with the purpose of settling at New
Orleans, but at the close of the war of 1812 they located at
Wilmington, N. C. Benjamin located at New Orleans in
1832 to practice law, and in 1852 and again in 1857 he was
chosen to represent Louisiana in the United States Senate,
where his resolute face, piercing eyes and clear voice helped
him in gaining a reputation as an eloquent speaker. He
had great influence with the Buchanan administration — much
to the discomfort of John Forsyth who was minister to
Mexico in 1856-58. During the civil war some spoke of him
as " the brains of the Confederacy."

An English journalist said he was the most cordial Con
federate he ever met, though " too fond of the card table
where cooler heads squeezed his sponge dry."

He was at his office early and late and first suggested many
of the measures of the Davis administration, some of which
evoked severe criticism from the people and Congress. He
had for years been on intimate terms with Slidell, who took
steps to secure a Confederate navy in France.
. On the fall of Richmond, in 1865, he escaped to England
after several romantic adventures, and soon began practice
at the English bar, where he won distinction. In 1883 he
retired from practice, and died in 1884.

'Stovall: Robert Toombs, Chap. XXI.

32 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

and although he did not receive the instructions which
he considered necessary to his success, he decided to
accept.8

--The provisional congress soon passed laws relat
ing to the tariff, navigation, the slave trade, the estab
lishment of ports, and the issue of money. An act
for raising money authorized Mr. Davis to borrow
$15,000,000, payable in ten years at 8 per cent, and to
S :; impose an export duty on cotton as a means of creat
ing a fund for paying the principal and interest of the
loan. At a session held by the call of Mr. Davis at
Montgomery on April 29, 1861, Congress recognized
the existence of war, authorized letters of marque, and
passed a bill for the issue of $50,000,000 in bonds, or,
in lieu of these bonds, $20,000,000 of treasury notes
of small denomination, without interest.

In June the Government was removed to Richmond
for political and military reasons. Davis, expecting
to direct the armies, desired to be in Virginia near
the seat of war, and Congress decided to follow the
executive departing - '•• 10 The battle of Bull Run in
July gave the Conft .acy bright views of the future,
and Stephens expected a " reign of terror to develop
in the North." But there soon arose a strong oppo
sition party in the South. Many opposed Davis's
-v policy of endeavoring to produce a cotton famine in
order to force Europe to recognize his Government."
Congress gradually became alienated. As the time
approached for the inauguration of the " permanent

* Du Bose: Life and Times of Yancey.

10 Confed. " Dip. Cor.". Vol. I. Instr. to Yancey, Rost
and Mann, No. 6, May 24, 1861.

11 Mrs. Davis: Jefferson Davis.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 33

government," Hunter and Beauregard were men
tioned for the presidency, but Davis continued to hold
the reins.

In November, 1861, the people at the polls chose
presidential electors, and elected members to serve
in the new Congress. In the case of states overrun
by the enemy, as Missouri and Arkansas, congress
men were elected by a handful of votes in the camps
of the army of Virginia. The electors confirmed the
provisional choice of Davis and Stephens; and with
little ceremony Davis passed from a provisional chief
to a president chosen for six years. The permanent
government had its birth in a storm on February
22. The skies poured incessantly and Capitol Square
was black with umbrellas, but there was an im
pression that the Confederacy would yet thrive in
sunshine. Davis retained his former Cabinet, with
the exception of Hunter, who was succeeded by Ben
jamin as Secretary of State. He admitted that errors
had been made in the war policy, but he had abundant
faith in the administration for the,.J[uture.

After February, 1862, Coir;. ..,„..., was composed of
two Houses, the representatives being now chosen
by the people instead of by conventions, as in 1861."

12 The last session of the provisional Confederate Congress
began in Richmond on Nov. 18, 1861, and ended Feb. 17, 1862.
The first session of the first regular Confederate Congress
met on Feb. 18. Hunter, of Virginia, was chosen president
of the Senate, and Bocock, of Virginia, speaker of the House.
The more prominent members were Wm. L. Yancey of Ala.,
B. H. Hill of Ga., R. M. T. Hunter and Wm. B. Preston of
Va., A. H. Garland of Ark., Julian Hartridge of Ga., H. C.
Chambers of Miss., W. H. Smith of N. C., Wm. Porcher
Miles of S. C, H. S. Foote of Tenn., and C. W. Russell,
J. P. Holcombe and John P. Baldwin of Va. Though Foote
3

34 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

The members were prevented, by law, from holding
military commissions in the army, as many had done
in the provisional Congress. Some, like Pollard, said
that this was unfortunate and that it resulted in mak
ing Congress an inane and incompetent assembly, the
best men having a passion for military service. Pol
lard declared that the Congress came at last to be a
reflection of Mr. Davis, and was composed of un
known men or broken-down politicians, " who aban
doned the whole government to Davis and a few weak
creatures around him," though a few distinguished
politicians returned from the battle-field before the
close of the war. Stephens, on February 26, 1862,

urged aggressive measures, a defensive policy of conducting
the war was sustained. The Senate recommended the de
struction of all cotton and tobacco that could not safely be
removed beyond the reach of Federal forces; and the House
advised the planters to devote their attention to the produc
tion of provisions instead of cotton and tobacco. Authority
was given to impress negroes to work on fortifications. At
the second session, which began Aug. 18, 1862, Congress
extended the conscript law to persons under 45 years of
age, and passed a bill to reduce the interest on the funded
debt and to authorize the issue of 6 per cent convertible
bonds. At the third session, which began Jan. 12, 1863, it
passed an act authorizing the impressment of produce neces
sary for the use of the army, and discussed a bill for the
organization of a Supreme Court, which passed the House
(March 18) but died in the judiciary committee of the House,
where there was much difference of opinion as to how much
power should be conferred upon the court. At the session
which began Dec. 7, 1863, a conscript act was passed making
persons between the age^ of 18 and '55 subject to military
duty. The gravity of the situation induced many to favor
resolutions for peace. At the last session, which met Nov.
7, 1864, Congress talked more than it worked, but finally
adopted the most important of Mr. Davis's recommendations
and adjourned sine die.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 35

wrote that Congress was not such as he could wish
it either in the Senate or in the House. In April, he
said: " This is a very poor Congress. There are
few men of ability in the House — only two or three
in the Senate." Again, in September, when fretting
over military orders and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, he said: " We have not the men in
Congress to act — they have not the knowledge of prin
ciples. They are children in politics and statesman
ship." ] There were, however, several remarkable
men in the Senate,/Yancey of Alabama, and Wigfall
of Texas, were the fiercely eloquent orators. Orr
of' South Carolina, and Hill of Georgia, were also
prominent. Barksdale, a friend of Davis, was the
leader in the House.14

The dispersion of the " fugacious Congress " in

Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens.
14 Hon. John Goode, in response to a query, has named
the following persons as the ablest and most active members
of the Confederate Congress from 1862 to 1865:

1. Supporters of the policy of the administration — In the
House: R. M. T. Hunter of Va., Clement C. Clay of Ala.,
Benj. H. Hill of Ga., Gustavus Henry of Tenn. In the
Senate: J. L. M. Curry of Ala., Garland of Ark., Hartridge
of Ga., Conrad of La., Barksdale of Miss., Miles of S. C.

2. Those holding views in opposition to the policy of the
administration — In the House: Baldwin of Va., Smith of
N. C., Foote of Tenn. In the Senate: Louis T. Wigfall of
Texas.

Hon. J. L. M. Curry names as the most prominent mem
bers of the second Congress: Jemison, Walker, Hill, John
son, Semmes, Graham, Orr, Barnwell, Wigfall and Hunter.

Probably not more than ten or twelve members of that
Congress lived to see the last year of the nineteenth century.
Goode, Curry, Pugh, Breckinridge, Barksdale, Miles, Atkins,
Wright, Pryor, Lester, Bell, Bruce and one or two others
have been mentioned to the author as late survivors.

36 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

April, 1862, when whispered alarms said that McClel-
lan would take Richmond, was a source of much
amusement. Members were represented as running
to their homes even amidst the contempt of women. °
Shop-windows were filled with amusing caricatures
representing congressmen, with carpetbags, pursued
by insects magnified to represent gunboats. News
papers stated that some of the stampeders left in canal-
boats drawn by three sweet-tempered mules (for fear
of accidents on railroads), and that a regiment of
women were detailed to march in front of the mules
" to clear the tow-path of piratical snakes and bull-
frogs." »

Congress had no commodious quarters in which to
hold its sessions. The Senate met in a plain, dingy,
third-floor chamber. There were no accommoda
tions for ladies. The House had better chambers,
but the chairs were uncushioned and the benches
slashed by knives. There was no legislative decorum.
Members were described as sitting with their heels
in the air. All important business was conducted in
secret session. A synopsis of the ordinary debates
appeared only in the newspapers and there was no
stenographic report.17 •/ In August, 1862, Yancey de
sired to check the undemocratic practice of secret ses
sions so that the people could see how senators voted
on the war plans of the Government. A short time

15 Richmond Examiner, April 21, 1862. Also, the Rich
mond Whig.

18 E. A. Pollard in the Galaxy, Dec., 1868. For the temper
of the women in the war see G. C. Eggleston's " Recollec
tions " (N. Y., 1875), Chap. III.

17 Du Bose: Yancey; The Weekly Register (Lynchburg),
Vol. I, Feb. 27, 1864.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 37

later a committee of the Senate decided that a re
porter of the Richmond Enquirer had violated the
privileges granted him by the Senate and advised that
he be excluded from the bar hereafter. Yancey op
posed such action as an infringement of the liberty
of the press. Several months before this a report of
the judiciary committee of the provisional Govern
ment had recommended a law to restrict or restrain
the press and speech under certain circumstances,
and Wigfall, solemnly rising, simply read the sedition
law. On April 13, 1863, Johnson of Arkansas, moved
in the Senate that a committee of three be appointed
by the chair with leave to sit during vacation, and to
investigate and report to the Senate at the next ses
sion upon the expediency of providing for regular
and perfect reports of the debates of the Senate, and
of embracing secret as well as open sessions, and to
report the terms for which reporters could be ob
tained, and other costs incident to publication. The
Senate agreed to the resolution, but the debates were
never reported, and were more and more concealed
from the public eye.18 Toward the end of the war,
when the people were growing more restless, nearly
everything was done in secret session.19

There were many animated debates and exciting
scenes at Richmond which did not find their way into
the newspapers, but which leaked out in whispered
conversations. In January, 1863, when the Senate
was considering the organization of the judiciary,
Yancey and others opposed the conferring of appel-

18 Richmond Whig, April 14, 1863.

19 N. Y. Times, March 12, 1865.

38 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

late jurisdiction on the Confederate supreme cour:
over the state supreme courts, as had been proposed
by the judicial committee of the provisional Congress
of which Mr. Hill had been chairman. On February
4, Hill, while speaking on the same bill, made SOUK;
bitter references concerning Yancey, who replied thar
the statements were false. Shortly afterwards, during
a lull in business, Senator Hill, after some remark
by Yancey, whizzed a tumbler past his head and
broke an inkstand over his cheek bone.20 Yancey, in
a long speech of March 14, was severe on Hill for
making violent " assaults from the rear." In a nigh:
secret session of the summer of 1863, a row occurred
in the House between Foote of Tennessee, and Judge
Dargan of Alabama, throwing the whole House into
a panic. Dargan drew a bowie-knife and advanced
toward Foote, to resent some language which Foote
had muttered while Dargan was speaking. Several
members pinned Dargan to the floor, and Foote
changed passion to laughter by striking a melodra
matic attitude and saying: " I defy the steel of the
assassin." The following December a lady entered
the House of Representatives and cowhided Mr. V. —
of Missouri.21 The Richmond correspondent of the
London Times, in a letter of March 4, 1865, when the
struggle seemed nearing the end, said that the con
duct and language of legislative assemblies during the
war had brought republican institutions into deri
sion and disrepute.22

Toward the end of the war, Congress became very

20DuBose: Yancey, p. 739.

21 E. A. Pollard in the Galaxy. Dec., 1868.

22 London Times, March 31, 1865.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 39

lively in its opposition to Davis, the disposition to
oppose him being spurred on by such papers as the
Richmond Examiner and the Charleston Mercury.
Wigfall returned from the army to speak against him
with vehement passion, and the Richmond editors
feared to report his bitter, vindictive speeches. There
was, in fact, during the last year of the war, serious
thought in the South of inaugurating a counter-revo
lution against Davis's administration.

The Confederacy had all the paraphernalia of a con
stitutional government, but in reality the executive
department wielded powers far beyond those given by
the constitution.23 Laws prepared in the executive
offices were sent to a small room where the provisional
Congress sat to register them. Later in the war,
even Senator Miles of South Carolina, when he pre
pared a bill, sent it to the executive department for
approval. In the stupendous struggle, inevitable
exigencies made the executive will the force of law,
and Congress bent to the necessity of subordinating
law to the emergencies of war.

An act of the Confederate Congress in secret ses
sion, March I, 1862, proclaimed martial law in Rich
mond and vicinity and declared the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. A passport system placed re
strictions upon the free movement of individuals.
" Notorious Unionists " and those suspected of Fed
eral sympathy were arbitrarily arrested. A military
police was established under General Winder of Bal
timore, and rowdyism, which had recently shown it-

23 Du Bose: Yancey; The Richmond Examiner Q. M.
Daniels), Feb. 24, 1862.

4O CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

self, disappeared, but the despotic espionage of the
Baltimore detective system became a source of much
complaint,24 though it kept watch on the people of
Richmond until May, 1864, issuing its " reign of ter
ror passports." In April and September, 1862, Con
gress passed conscription acts which gave much dis
satisfaction." Stephens declared that conscripts would
go into battle like a horse starting from home, while
volunteers would go like horses returning home. It
is said that Davis at first opposed the conscription
policy, preferring the voluntary system, but that he
yielded to the newspapers and necessity. The Sep
tember law caused a quarrel in Georgia between the
Secessionists and the Unionists. An exemption law
was passed about the same time for the benefit of the
overseers of slaves.20

Stephens feared that the Confederacy tended toward
errors which would lead to its overthrow. In 1862
he was disappointed at the President's message and
dissatisfied with his appointments. The policy of the
Government was against his judgment, and he stated
that there was " no energy except such as a turtle
with fire on its back." Military orders and the sus
pension of the writ of habeas corpus were to him the
source of the greatest concern. Though he succeeded
in inducing the President to request some of the gen
erals to revoke part of their orders, he failed to
arouse Congress to opposition. He still clung to the

24 J. B. Jones: Diary.

25 For the acts of the Confederate Provisional Government
and the first and second Congress, see " Statutes at Large,"
edited by J. M. Matthews [one volume, 1861-64].

28 Du Bose: Yancey.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

view that government by the people was not a failure;
but it seemed to him that the people, though living
under a constitution, were indifferent, and yielded to
usurpations.27

Mr. Davis and his administration have been vari
ously estimated. Pollard has written pages to give
his mistakes, and General Thomas Jordon says of
him: "The longer he held power the narrower grew
his conceptions, the more imperious his will, until to
differ from or cross the orbit of his fancies, or even to
run counter to the plans or wishes of his favorites,
became a personal affront. . . . He and his minis
terial clerks . . . were always anticipating success in
a preposterous manner, always displaying little prac
tical industry, and quite as little judgment in prepar
ing for contingencies." : Mr. Alfriend, on the other
hand, has written a volume to praise him.

Mr. Davis, like all who accept offices in exciting
times, probably had to suffer from much censure that
was unjust. He was as sensitive to disapprobation
as Thomas Jefferson, the man of peace. He grew
cold under the criticism of his qualities as a military
organizer, and his appointments to civil and military
positions, but he seldom changed his opinion or his
policy. The pressure of public opinion could not
induce him to change his Cabinet or to dismiss Dr.
Northrop from the Commissary Bureau. His dis-
.position to have his own way, and his attitude toward
those who sought to interfere with what seemed to
him was a part of his own prerogative, swelled the

"Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens.
28 Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XXXI, p. 610. Oct., 1865.

42 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

opposition and made him very unpopular. His im
prisonment at the close of the war drew to him the
sympathies of the South, but during the closing
months of the conflict, when the Confederacy was
gasping for breath, he was rapidly losing the influ
ence which his magnetic personality had been able
to command. Much of the dislike for Davis arose
from the fact that he did not meet the people oftener
in social intercourse. He was a sufferer from nervous
dyspepsia; and with the arduous labors of his office
— examining as he did into the minutest details — he
found it necessary to be careful of his diet and to
economize his time. Soon after going to Richmond,
he resolved to administer the Government instead of
giving entertainments, and the people soon said he
was hoarding his wealth.29 Tuesday evening recep
tions were begun later in the war, but were discon
tinued after a month. Davis received a salary of
$25,000 in Confederate money. Richmond had offered
to make him a present of his house, but he declined
it.30 Toward the close of the struggle his salary was
insufficient to meet the household expenses, though
there were very few receptions and levees. In April,
1864, it was reported that Davis intended to move
the Government to Montgomery, because of the
scarcity and high price of supplies. In June, 1864,
Congress doubled the salaries of its own members
so that they received $5500, and debated a measure
for the increase of the President's salary, but took
no action upon the latter.

29 Mrs. Davis: Jefferson Davis.

30 J. W. Daniel: Life and Reminiscences of Jefferson Davis
(by distinguished men of his time).

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 43

/~

The Confederate Government was much embar-
rassed by popular opinion, state opposition, and by
controversies between officials. At the beginning of
the war Union sentiment probably preponderated in
several states that seceded. After the Battle of Bull
Run the voice of the Unionists was silenced by the
shouts of victory, but it was heard again in the train
of disaffection and defeat. " Secession from
Secessia " was also threatened. In November and
December, 1862, when state authorities complained of
military usurpations, some of the clerks at Richmond
said that patriotism was mainly in the army and
among the women, and that the President should
change his Cabinet and policy, and cultivate the sup
port of the people, else the Confederacy might split
into states. It was feared that Lincoln's message
for gradual emancipation would find advocates in the
South. A letter to Davis said that Louisiana and a
large part of Mississippi, if overrun by Federal troops,
would submit to the United States. Davis went to
Mississippi a few days later to encourage fighting.
In June, 1863, while the Federals thundered at the
gates, jealousy was growing between the Confederacy
and the state authorities and Davis feared conspiracy.
In September, defection was spreading in North Caro
lina and the United States flag was raised. Davis
made a month's tour in the South and it was suspected
that he was preparing to take measures for fuller
control. In December, collision between the Con
federate and Georgia authorities was imminent on
the question of " just compensation " for sugar seized
by the agents of the commissary. Northrop said
that it was necessary to impress food for the soldiers.

44 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

Foote was denouncing both Davis and Northrop, and
Senator Orr and others asked for the removal of
Northrop, but Davis refused, stating that the Com
missary-General was one of the greatest geniuses of
the South.

In January, 1864, the breach was widening between
Congress and Davis, but for the sake of the country,
Congress, in February, obediently passed the new
conscript act and other laws, greatly increasing the
power of the executive.31 It also passed a bill sus
pending the writ of habeas corpus for six months,
though it refused to pass Judge Campbell's supreme
court bill. A revival of the murmurs against Davis
followed. Colonel Brown ordered an armed guard
to protect him, and it soon became a fixture in front
of Mr. Davis's residence.32 Judge Pearson of North
Carolina continued to grant the writ of habeas cor
pus. In March Stephens said the purpose of the bill
to suppress the writ was to muzzle the North Caro
lina press. In April, in a speech against the sus
pension of the writ, Stephens said that indepen
dence without liberty was of no value to him, and
that he would as soon have a Northern as a Southern
master. In June, while the Federal guns thundered
down the river, there were intermittent " rows " in
the Bureau of Conscription, and they continued in

31 An act approved Feb. 6, 1864, prohibited all exports of
cotton, tobacco, etc., except by specific regulations issued
by the President, who was thus practically given full power
as to the regulation of foreign commerce. In carrying this
act into effect, Mr. Davis required that one-half the tonnage
of all vessels should be reserved for the use of the Confed
erate authorities.

82 J. B. Jones: Diary.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 45

September, November and December. The Govern
ment was almost in a state of paralysis. In July the
murmurs against Davis grew louder.33

The feeling against speculators and class exemp
tions increased the disaffection against the Gov
ernment in the autumn of 1864, and there were
signs that the curtain would soon rise on the
last act of the drama, and that the disturbed
and divided nation would " cease to float upon a
sea of blood." Both Seward and McClellan, in the
North, were making promises, and in the hour of
dulness many reflected on the repose once enjoyed in
the Union. Many favored a revolution in the South.
Governor Vance of North Carolina showed his teeth,
and said that he would not allow the Confederate
Government to interfere with his furnishing clothes to
his troops. From the attitude of Governors Brown,
Toombs, Stephens and others it appeared that Georgia
was in danger of making peace with the United States.
Davis went South' to make speeches. Governor
Brown refused to respond to his call for the Georgia
militia. He held to states rights and said that Davis
must send reinforcements if he demanded the return
of the Georgia troops. Notwithstanding Davis's
speeches in Georgia and Alabama to reanimate the
people, the states seemed determined to control their
own men not in the regular army, and the Union party
was increasing. There was danger of losing North
Carolina. In November J. T. Leach of that state
offered submission resolutions in the Confederate Con
gress, and two of his colleagues voted for them. A

33 J. B. Jones: Diary, June I, Sept. 6, Nov. 9 and Dec. 4.

46 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

few days later peace resolutions were offered in tlit
North Carolina legislature. General Lee's corre
spondence indicated that the conscription officers were
not doing their duty — that the rich, the slaveholders
and the speculators, were buying their way out of ser
vice. He complained that rich young men were
elected magistrates in order to escape field service.
The law exempting large slaveholders was creating
an anti-slavery party. In September, a clerk in the
War Department said that over 100,000 landed pro
prietors, and the majority of the slave-owners, were
out of the ranks — and that some wanted to keep the
horses that had been lent them by the Government,
while the poor were thrust into the trenches. Mili
tary officers were impressing men into the army, while
state governors were granting exemptions. In Oc
tober many men with exemptions were being forced
into the army — some while getting medicine for their
sick wives, and many became indifferent as to which
side should prevail.34 New and strong farmer soldiers
murmured, and many hoped that the soldiers in both
armies would desert and go home, and that the guns
would " cease to shoot sine die." Some who once held
the idea that " beauty and booty " were the aim of
the Northern troops, said that " Beast " Butler was
proving himself very generous before Richmond, and
they declared that the press had " long misrepre
sented the conduct of the enemy and tried to keep
animosity alive." They complained that they were
put in the trenches as " volunteers " under threat of
dismission, while able-bodied men escaped the army

84 J. B. Jones: Diary.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 47

and rode through the streets on sleek horses. Clerks
supposed that they were exempted from military ser
vice by the constitution, but in November, Attorney-
General George Davis said that though the constitu
tion exempted certain civil officers, the recent im
pressment act of Congress must be executed. A few
weeks later the clerks favored revolution.

As the year 1864 drew to a close, Congress was sit
ting most of the time in secret session, and while Mr.
Davis was suffering from neuralgia or busy with ap
pointments, promotions or the details of the adminis
tration, a strong party was preparing to transfer
the military powers of the executive to General Lee,
in order to prevent Georgia from reentering the
Union, and to strengthen the confidence of the peo
ple. The Federal cannon kept up their monotonous
noise, Lee's army was being depleted by desertions,
incessant rains made gloom gloomier, and the hungry
people complained that they were at the mercy of the
quartermasters, commissaries, railroads and the
Southern Express Company. Foote, in the House of
Representatives on December 17, announced his in
tention to withdraw from the Confederate Congress
rather than to legislate under a despotism, and said
that there was a land of freedom yet left that would
receive to its bosom a poor refugee.35 At the begin
ning of the new year the Government, in a volumin
ous correspondence, was planning for the arrest of
men who should attempt to cross the Potomac. To
the south " mountains were looming up everywhere."
States were evading the Confederate law and ignoring

85 Richmond Examiner, Dec. 19, 1864.

48 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

Confederate authorities, while the Confederate Gov
ernment was preparing the way for negro enlistment
and emancipation. North Carolina was swarming
with deserters and Georgia was favorable to the
Union. The people desired peace. Mr. Collier, ir
the Virginia legislature, on February 25, said that the
chief characteristic of the Confederate administration
was that it had separated the Government from the
people.3" Future events were casting their shadows
before.

The breach between Davis and Congress grew
wider as the alarm tocsin sounded and the end drev\
nearer. While the Federal artillery thundered at the
gates, the politicians quarrelled. Congressional com
mittees of five or six would visit Davis in a private
way to remonstrate or to ask the removal of Commis
sary Northrop, " the pepper-corn doctor from North
Carolina," but it was breath wasted. Members of
Congress asked the dismissal of members of the Cabi
net. On some questions Vice-President Stephens
used all his influence against the administration.87 In
March, 1864, he had objected to the act of Congress
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus which he heard
had for one of its objects the control of the elections
and the assemblages in North Carolina and to muzzle
certain presses in that state. He declared that the act
was unconstitutional, and that the denial of constitu
tional liberty could only hasten the departure of states.
" I want to see no Maryland this side of the Potomac,"
said he.38 In January, 1865, there was a tie vote in

30 Richmond Sentinel.

87 Cleveland: A. H. Stephens, p. 761.

88 H. S. Foote made a speech in favor of repealing the act
for suspending the writ of habeas corpus. He was not afraid

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 49

the Senate on a bill to re-suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, and Stephens was on the point of giving his
deciding vote in opposition to the bill when he was
prevented by a senator who changed his vote to the
affirmative. Stephens declared that the senator had
no right to change his vote after the result had been
announced. But the Senate overruled him. Stephens,
considering this as an indignity, told Senator Hunter
that he would resign. Hunter urged him not to do
so. The next day the Senate succeeded in conciliat
ing him by unanimously passing a resolution request
ing him to address them in secret session upon the
situation of public affairs. The bill to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus ultimately failed to pass.

After long secret debates, in which policy oscillated
between " not yet " and " too late," Congress finally
passed the bill for negro enlistments and decided to
adjourn March 10, 1865. But Mr. Davis requested
its members to remain a short time, as further legis
lation would be required. There was much anxiety
as to the kind of communication that he was prepar
ing to lay before Congress. Some supposed that it
related to foreign complications. Rumor said that a
treaty with France for alliance was about to be con
summated. On Sunday, March 12, Davis was clos
eted with Benjamin and the Secretary of War nearly
all day.3" The next day he sent a message to Con
gress stating that he considered the measures already
passed to be insufficient, and that only by the prompt

of newspaper criticism of the Government. " Paper bullets
are harmless " said he. [The Weekly Register (Lynchburg),
May 28, 1864.]
39 J. B. Jones: Diary.
4

5° CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

devotion of the entire resources of men and money
in the Confederacy could independence be achieved.
He said that Congress had so long debated and de
layed his recommendation of the preceding Novem
ber as to the enlistment of negroes, etc., that much
of their value was now lost. He asked that restric
tions on the power to impress supplies be removed
on account of the condition of the Confederate
finances; he again recommended a diminution of ex
empts and the abolition of class exemptions; and he
said that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
was indispensable.40 Davis and Benjamin were said
to be already rejoicing over their triumph over Con
gress. But on March 16, the Senate committee 01
Congress presented their reply which stated that
if the President had urged the necessity of the negro
bill legislation might have been quickened — but that
he had seemed to dissent from the general policy of
arming them as soldiers and had not even responded
to calls for information by the Senate. The commit
tee defiantly declared that all measures recommended
by Mr. Davis to promote the efficiency of the army
had been adopted " except the entire repeal of class
exemptions." (Exemption of overseers between 18
and 45 had been repealed.) Mr. Davis was informed
that on account of executive abuse of the power of
detail Congress had revoked details and limited their
power. When the members of the committee waited
upon Mr. Davis he fired a parting broadside into
them. Congress adjourned sine die, March 18, with
out passing Davis's last recommendations, but also

40 Richmond Dispatch, March 15, 1865.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 51

without succeeding in ousting Mr. Benjamin from the
cabinet.41

The Confederacy while embarrassed by political
conditions was also handicapped by lack of resources
and of communication with the world. The want of
skilled labor was a source of weakness. In April,
1863, Mallory asked Captain Bullock to send out
English mechanics capable of manufacturing Besse
mer steel but he met with difficulties in obtaining and
sending them. In the South there were no great
iron manufacturing establishments for furnishing ma
terials for ships and railways. Mason, in 1863, sent
a model of a wooden railway which was supposed to
have some advantages over the iron roads but the
Government appears to have had less confidence in
it than did Mr. Mason.42 Frequently the Government
was unable to obtain even reference books in the
library at Richmond.43 Benjamin, anxious to keep
posted on the British debates on the blockade, etc.,
had to wait months for a copy of " Hansard."

There was no direct communication with Europe,
though several plans were proposed before the close
of 1862. There were Government vessels most of the
time from Nassau and Bermuda to Charleston and
Wilmington, but supplies and dispatches were often
sent by private blockade runners which charged enor
mous freight. Agents carrying despatches were in-

41 Richmond Dispatch, March 20, 1865. J. B. Jones: Diary.
C. A. Evans (Ed.): Confederate Military History (Atlanta,
1899), Vol. I, Chap. 24, p. 538, ct seq.

42 Despatches of Mason, No. 35, April 30, 1863. Ibid., No.
13, Paris, Sept. 29, 1864.

** Instr. to Mason, No. 27, June 22, 1863.

52 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

structed to destroy them in case they were in danger
of capture, but in several instances United States
cruisers apprehended correspondence containing im
portant plans or damaging statements.

On July 19, 1862, Mr. Benjamin had for weeks had
no opportunity to send Mason instructions with any
reasonable hope of his getting them. Mr. Ward, re
cently United States minister to China, had just
brought Mason's despatches of May 6 and 15, which
were the first received since his despatch of February
7. Wetler and Ficklin had been entrusted with
despatches of a later date than February 7, and
they had arrived safely, but found it necessary to
throw their despatches overboard." In November,
1862, Mason had heard nothing from Benjamin since
his letter of the preceding April. In January, 1863,
after the capture of Reid Sanders, the Northern
papers were full of " intercepted correspondence "
of Benjamin and others, berating Russell and charg
ing Napoleon's consuls with occult designs to seize
Mexico as a colony, detach Texas and recognize it
separately. The correspondence also revealed the
Confederate plans to obtain money and vessels in
Europe.

The Northern papers were often the only means
of obtaining news from Europe. They also seem to
have been correctly advised of what happened at

** Instr. to Mason No. 6, July 19, 1862. Also, see Instr. to
Mason No. 20, April 14, 1863.

45 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 24, 1863. J. B. Jones: Diary,
Jan. 23, 1863. Benjamin advised that no more despatches
should be entrusted to Mr. Sanders. Instr. to Mason, No.
15, Feb. 7, 1863.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 53

Richmond. Perhaps in some cases persons with
regular passports carried information, but there were
other means.*5 Dr. McClure, an embalmer, was de
tected taking live men through the lines in his cof
fins. In December, 1864, a " Yankee " mail line was
discovered between Federal gunboats and the city
with a lady at one end of the line.

The Confederate Government resorted to all pos
sible expedients in financial measures, and its hands
sometimes largely controlled Southern resources.
By an act of May 16, 1861, and by subsequent laws,
Confederate treasury notes, payable six months after
the war, were provided. In June, 1861, a bureau of
printing and engraving was established and soon be
gan " to make money." A loan was provided in
April, 1861, and was met by a double subscription.
Another of $100,000,000 was provided in August, and
still others followed. The Government received
loans of cotton from planters who promised to ac
cept 8 per cent bonds for a portion of it when sold.
This " produce loan " was conceived with the idea
that cotton could be made a basis for security.
Within a short time the whole amount of the loan
was taken. By an order of the Treasury Department
no vessel was granted a clearance unless one-half her
cargo was shipped on Government account from the
accumulated Government stores. The Confederacy
also paid for direct purchases from planters " in 8 per

46 Secret service agents often furnished the U. S. Govern
ment with valuable information as to the plans of the Con
federates. See an interesting article, by Allan Forman of
Baltimore, on " A Bit of Secret History," in the Magazine of
American History, Vol. XII, Oct., 1884.

47 H. D. Capers: Life and Times of C G. Memminger,
Richmond, 1893.

54 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

cent bonds. When it was seen that the blockade and
war would continue, arrangements were made to use
cotton as a basis of a foreign loan negotiated by Er-
langer, of Paris. The states in undertaking to sup
port their quotas issued paper money and, in some
cases, seized supplies for the army, paying for them
state certificates of indebtedness. The property oi
all alien enemies was sequestered.

Supplies were impressed by the Confederate Gov
ernment where the depreciated currency failed tc
command them. In order to secure cotton as a basis
on the foreign loan it was sometimes found necessary
to enforce a tax in kind. In the early part of 1863
there was a bill before the Confederate Senate to
regulate the impressment of private property. It
was strongly opposed, especially by Yancey who had
for several months been making long speeches in
Congress protesting against the usurpations of the
Government and insisting that the war power was not
superior to the civil power. The administrative offi
cials called Yancey a professional alarmist, but the
Richmond Whig declared that he was the guardian
of public liberty. Yancey favored the exercise of
stern war powers by Congress and claimed to oppose
only extra-constitutional measures. At the close of
1863, Commissary Northrop found it necessary to
impress food for the army. At the close of 1864 and
the beginning of 1865 Mr. Benjamin favored the seiz
ure of cotton for the purchase of ships in Europe,
and, in a speech of February 9, he said that all per
sons having tobacco, corn, meat, and other supplies
must give them to the Government. Mr. Collier of
the Virginia legislature a few days later protested

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 55

against Benjamin's declaration that everything the
people had belonged to the Government in the hour
of its adversity.

The treasury notes, simple in appearance, uncertain
in promise, resting only on the scriptural faith,
" the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of
things unseen," nevertheless fell but little below par
until after the summer of 1861. When the blockade
of the Southern ports shut off all communication
with Europe they depreciated more and more, and
prices in the Confederacy became higher and higher
after 1862. Many suffered for the want of food.
Davis, speaking from a dray, quelled the threatened
bread riot at Richmond, and later advised the
people to raise food instead of cotton. Farmers
losing confidence in the currency refused to sell grain,
stating they had all the currency that they desired.
Many suffered in the midst of plenty because they
had not the means to purchase. A Richmond lady
being told by a merchant the price of flour said: "I
have seven children, what shall I do?" "I don't
know, madam," replied he, " unless you eat your
children." From October, 1863, to March, 1865,
flour rose from $70 to $1500 per barrel. In Septem
ber, 1863, quinine was $100 per ounce, and calico $10
a yard. In July, 1864, a saucer of ice-cream cost $6,
a pound of sugar $10, and coffee $i per cup. In
August, $33 in Confederate money were worth only
$i in gold. In March, 1865, the Government was
paying $i in gold for $60 of its currency. In Octo
ber, 1864, the physicians charged $30 per visit. The
Richmond Dispdtch cost $.50 per copy or $100 per
year. Some believed that prices could be regulated

5 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

and that jugglery could save the Confederate cur
rency. It was as possible for one to lift himself by
his boot straps. The Government could not live al
ways on credit. Some believed that a new issue of
currency would defeat the schemes of the speculators,
but the prices of food would not diminish. The ma
jority of the people lived on limited rations. Rats
ceased to appear; cats staggered and died. It cost
$200 a year to keep a cat. Wives made their petti
coats into undershirts for their husbands. Legisla
tures threatened to suppress theatrical' amusements
during the war. In some cases the Government lent
horses to the plantation owners.

The scarcity of food and the depreciation of the
currency were not the only causes of the high prices.48
They were often due to the lack of transportation.
Crops were abundant but the means of transportation
were poor. Railroads were not kept in repair, and,
in some cases, there were complaints that the Gov
ernment monopolized the roads for military pur
poses. In January, 1863, the Governor transmitted
to the Virginia legislature a copy of a joint resolu
tion of the Alabama legislature protesting against
the continued exclusive military control of the rail
roads and favoring their being kept open for private
business and transportation. Later complaints in
Virginia stated that the speculators occupied too
much space in the cars. Sometimes there was not
sufficient transportation for food for the troops in the
field. In February, 1865, Lee's armies suffered for

48 An article on the " History of Prices in the Confederacy,"
by J. C. Schwab, appears in the Report of the Am. Hist.
Ass'n for 1898.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 57

want of soap, though there was plenty at Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Government regulation of prices and transporta
tion was several times the subject of consideration.
In 1863 Congress authorized the seizure of food sup
ply at rates of payment fixed by state commissioners
who were to assess prices every sixty days.49 In Oc
tober of the same year some favored the Government
control of prices and transportation in order to break
up the speculators and to get the food to places
where it was most needed. Some favored martial
law as a step toward the equal distribution of food.
In May, 1864, the Government was selling meal to
private individuals. The following July, it caused an
increase in the price of food by fixing a high price
upon the goods which it seized. In November follow
ing, Senator Sparrows, of Louisiana, offered a reso
lution providing that no prices should be higher than
those assessed by the army. In January, 1865, Mr.
Seddon, the Secretary of War, was requested to im
press and distribute the coffee and sugar which was
" cornered " when Wilmington was threatened. In
some cases there was a state distribution of cloth.

The depreciation of the currency and the lack of
transportation made it very difficult for the Confeder
ate armies to get living rations during the last few
months of the war. Trenholm, the Secretary of the €?
Treasury, tried to mend the currency by purchasing

49 In September, 1864, the commissioners of prices for
N. C., Ga., Ala., Fla., Miss., and Tenn., met at Montgomery,
Ala., with a view to securing uniformity of prices (under the
impressment law). [Weekly Register (Lynchburg), Oct. 22,
1864, pp. 248-50.]

5 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

all the cotton and tobacco, selling it to foreign mer
chants and buying treasury notes with the proceeds.
In February the preachers offered to take the stump
to raise subscriptions. President Davis, marking
their proposal "special," sent it to the War Depart
ment. " Humbugged to the end," said Jones, a
clerk in the department. In that hour the ministers
could not stem the ebbing tide of Confederate for
tune. On March 22, Congress deemed it hopeless
to adopt any plan to reduce the currency. Deprecia
tion continued, and the operations of the Federals
made it impossible to collect the taxes.

Until 1863, Fraser, Trenholm and Company were
the only European bankers or " depositories " of the
Confederate Treasury. They paid the drafts of the
Confederate purchasing agents in Europe and the
bills drawn by the heads of departments at Richmond.
Thus, when Congress made appropriations for build
ing naval vessels in Europe, the navy made a requisi
tion on the treasury for the amount and received
treasury notes which could be converted only by buy
ing cotton and shipping through the blockade to
Fraser, Trenholm and Company, who placed the
proceeds to the Confederate navy.50 In this way,
Mallory, in 1862, placed $1,000,000 to the credit of
Captain Bullock, the naval agent in Europe. Soon
after that date the Confederate finances were much
depressed. On July 4, Bullock stated that the credit
of the Navy Department was thus far sound, but he
hoped for more money to settle the outstanding con-

00 Bullock: Secret Service of the Confederate States in
Europe, Vol. II, p. 416.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 59

tracts which amounted to £390,000. Congress ap
propriated very much larger sums for the navy, but
Mallory wrote in September that the exchange of
the country was nearly exhausted and that cotton
went out in very small lots.51 It was found neces
sary to resort to other means of finance for it was
seen that the blockade and the war would continue.
Mallory stated that if the agent of the treasury could
dispose of the Confederate bonds even at fifty cents
he would do so in order to pay the requisitions
in Europe, and he suggested that Bullock himself
might possibly be able to get advances by an agree
ment to repay with 8 per cent interest in cotton, and
that he might agree to have the amount expended
at Richmond by the Treasury Department for cot
ton, which could be stored and transported to the
sea-ports by the treasury — regarding it as the prop
erty of British creditors.

In May, Mason had enclosed a letter of Mr. Spence,
a Liverpool banker, whom he considered sagacious
and friendly, suggesting the importance of a Confed
erate financial agency in Europe. Benjamin replied
that the subject was considered premature. " It is
by no means certain that we shall require a loan in
Europe/'" In September, Mason suggested that
money might be commanded in England by the use
of cotton bonds or obligations for the delivery of
cotton at any Confederate port upon the thirty days'
demand of the holder of the bond, or within three
months after peace.58 In November he wrote again

61 H. D. Capers: C. G. Memminger.

82 Instr. to Mason, No. 6, July 19, 1862.

K Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1862.

60 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

enclosing views upon a "cotton bond" mode of fi
nance.5* Bonds for the delivery to the amount of
£60,000 had been negotiated through the house of
Lindsay. Erlanger, whose son was engaged to Mr.
Slidell's daughter, made a proposal to float a Con
federate loan of £5,000,000. Mason said that the cot
ton bond plan seemed to offer the best scheme of
finance, but that political advantages might follow the
Paris (Erlanger) plan.

When Mason wrote, the subject of a loan based on
cotton certificates had already been considered.
Benjamin wrote Mason, October 28, that the Gov
ernment had confided the matter to Mr. Spence as
Mason had suggested. Memminger's cotton certifi
cates represented cotton stored on the plantation and
accepted by the Government. These certificates
gave the European purchaser an absolute right to
the particular lot of cotton with the privilege of ship
ping the same. Spence was also appointed as agent
for the sale of $5,000,000 of 8 per cent bonds if he
could realize 50 per cent on them and he was direct
ed to negotiate for the application of $2,500,000 of
coin in the Confederate treasury for supplies — by
transfer to British owners who could transport it
from a Confederate port as British property.

Mr. Spence received the cotton certificates but it
was thought best to withhold them from the market
until the result of Erlanger's proposals for a direct
loan were known. Later they were withheld for fear
they would prejudice the proposed loan which was
considered of great political importance. The cer-

64 Ibid., No. 19, Nov. 4-

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 6l

tificate money bonds were also received by Spence;
but they could not be used at better rates than 50 cents
on the dollar, and they too were withheld until after
the floating of the Erlanger loan.

In January, 1863, Benjamin, in informing Mason
that the cotton bonds had been forwarded to Spence,
said that there was no desire to effect a loan in
Europe during the war, and that the Confederacy only
wanted moderate sums for the purpose of supplies.55
The Confederate loan based on cotton and nego
tiated by Erlanger had, however, been decided on.
The cotton was to be delivered at certain ports with
in six months after the close of the war — or before
the end of the war if possible. The agents of Er
langer had recently gone to Richmond to offer to
float a loan of $25,000,000, but Memminger would
agree to make it only $15,000,000. Erlanger took
the 7 per cent bonds at 77 per cent, and said that
Davis privately favored increasing the loan. Mem
minger also seems to have contemplated an exten
sion of the amount in case Congress would amend
the loan act so as to relieve all doubt as to his au
thority to do so; and in January, 1863, he recom
mended to the Speaker of the House of Representa
tives that the act be so amended that the bonds pro
vided for might be used for largely increasing the
Confederate specie credit in Europe.56

The Confederate loan was placed upon the Euro
pean market March 18, 1863, and, Mason rejoicing
that it wras a brilliant success, wrote Benjamin the

55 Instr. to Mason, No. 12, Jan. 15. 1863.

56 Capers: Memminger.

62 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

next day that over £5,000,000 were subscribed at
once and that it reached a premium of 4^ per cent
before night. " Mr. Erlanger worked it with great
diligence," said he, " and has conferred with me freely
and frankly." In two days and a half the subscrip
tion to the loan reached £16,000,000. The premiun
fluctuated, being 1^4 to 2 per cent by March 30. Er
langer did not expect it to touch par. " I congratu
late you," wrote Mason " on the triumphant success
of our infant credit; it shows malgre all detraction
and calumny that cotton is king at last."51 On April
9, however, Mason wrote that the loan had shown a
tendency to fall below par more and more. Erlanger
told him that the agents of the United States were
trying to discredit the loan by large purchases at low
' rates and that they might cause the subscribers to

forfeit the instalment of 15 per cent already paid and
abandon future subscriptions. To prevent a panic
Erlanger desired the Confederacy to give authority
for the purchase of £1,000,000 to bring it back to
par.08 The bears were bringing down the stock and
it was necessary to bull the market to keep it up till
April 24, when the second intalment on subscriptions
was to be paid.

Mason, by the advice of Slidell and others took the
responsibility of authorizing Erlanger and Company
to sustain the loan by secret purchases on Confeder
ate account — and from April 9, to April 24, £1,388,500
worth were bought, carrying the price from 4^ per
cent discount gradually to about il/2 per cent pre-

67 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. 32.
58 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, Unofficial, April 9,
1863.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 63

mium. Mason acted under the advice and guidance
of Mr. Spence, who was attending to the operations
in London.5" A second effort was made to bull the
market till May i. After that, they hoped that with
the mass of stock " in certain hands," and with favor
able news from the South, the stock would keep at
par and enable the government to sell what it had
bought. " Our purchase of the stock may yet turn
out to be a money-making affair," wrote Mason.

The loan dropped somewhat when the news arrived
that United States ships had run the batteries at
Vicksburg. Mason found that the conditions were
far different from what he had expected, but he said
that the press was confident of news from Fredericks-
burg that would " make our loan buoyant." On
June 12, he wrote that the loan seemed solidly placed
at last. After the news from Gettysburg and Vicks
burg, however, it soon fell to 30 per cent discount
and Mason saw that the Confederacy could not ex
pect another loan, and that the Government should
arrange to ship cotton to Nassau and Bermuda by
fast steamers running the blockade and under Gov
ernment control.

In May all the Confederate disbursing officers in
Europe were in arrears and there was no authority
to make the proceeds of the loan available to them.
C. J. McRae, who was sent to Europe as special agent
of the Treasury Department to regulate the disburse
ment of the Erlanger loan and to negotiate the sale
of treasury bonds arrived about June i.°° At first

59 Ibid., Unofficial, and No. 34, of April 27, 1863.
80 Bullock: Vol. II.

64 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

he had no orders to supply Confederate agents in
Europe, but later the heads of departments sent
drafts on him to meet the wants of purchasing agents
and he was authorized to keep the bankers in funds.
At the beginning of August he found only £700,000
on hand while the Government engagements for the
army and navy required much more.

A short time later, the financial programme in
Europe was changed. Both the Navy and Treasury
Departments had sent out large amounts of Confed
erate bonds to different persons who practically be
came competitors of each other in negotiating for
their sale. This was unsatisfactory and in Septem
ber, 1863, Benjamin drew up a scheme which pro
vided for a special fiscal agent with power to deal
exclusively with all bonds. All who had been en
trusted with the sale of bonds were asked to sur
render them to McRae who was to negotiate them
and distribute the proceeds among the purchasing
agents.01 Mr. Spence was thus superseded. He had
been dissatisfied when Erlanger was selected to effect
the Confederate loan. His retention was strongly
opposed by the Richmond Examiner. He was well
paid for his services but while speaking and writing
in favor of the Confederacy he had also promised that
it would abolish slavery as soon as it became inde
pendent. For this reason Mr. Benjamin afterwards
wrote him that he could not officially recognize him
as an agent.

Before the end of 1864, the net proceeds of the
Erlanger loan were exhausted, and after the fall of

61 J. B. Jones: Diary, Sept. 16, 1863.

CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 65

Fort Fisher the small supply of funds from the sale
of bonds ceased, the intercourse with the Confeder
acy being cut off by one or two shoal bays on the
coast of Texas. The financial agents of the Con
federacy saw that transmission of supplies must cease
and stopped their purchases and shipment. To get
money for urgent wants, McRae sold several ships and
transferred the funds to the Treasury Department.
When the war closed, the Confederate agents abroad
had no large sums of money to turn over to the
United States.

CHAPTER III

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

James L. Orr, chairman of the Confederate House
Committee on Foreign Relations, once said that the
Confederacy never had a foreign policy, and never
attempted any high diplomacy. Whatever may be
thought of this statement, the failure of the Confed
eracy was certainly not due to any deficiency in the
number of its agents abroad. Jefferson Davis com
missioned many diplomatic consular and secret agents
to watch every opportunity to negotiate treaties or to
press Confederate interests.1

An attempt to open diplomatic negotiations with
the United States Government in February, i86i,'was
made with the hope of securing a peaceful disruption
of the Union. The leaders of secession were, no
doubt, influenced by the belief that there would be a
strong Northern sentiment opposed to coercive
measures and in favor of the early establishment of
trade and diplomatic relations with the South. They
favored peaceful secession, and some desired alliance.
They proposed to win the good-will of the West by
maintaining the free navigation of the Mississippi.2
In March, while some thought it impracticable to go
on without further accession of territory, many ex-

1 Confed. Dip. and Consular Commissions. Pickett Papers,
" Trunk C."

2 Proceedings of the Confederate Congress, Feb. 25, 1861.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 67

pected the size and strength of the Confederacy to
increase rapidly. Stephens hoped and expected that
the border states would join, though the South could
get along without them until they should decide lo
follow.3 Looking at the distant future, he said that
even the states of the Northwest might gravitate to
ward the Southern door, which he considered was
wide enough to receive them " if they assimilate with
us in principle."

It has been said that if Andrew Jackson had been
President during the term before Lincoln's inaugu
ration he would have discouraged secession in its in-
cipiency and thus prevented the civil war. Buchanan
sympathized with the South on the slavery question
and took no decided position to prevent preparations
for the dissolution of the Union. He did not believe
that the states had a constitutional right to secede,
but neither did he think the United States Govern
ment could constitutionally prevent them.

The seceding states made several unsuccessful at
tempts to obtain recognition at Washington, and to
arrange for a peaceful secession. South Carolina*
after its resolution to secede sent three commission
ers to state its reasons to Buchanan, and to arrange
terms of separation, but they were not received.
They then prepared a memorial to the Secretary of
State but no answer was received. In February,
1861, South Carolina sent its Attorney-General to
Washington, but he received no official recognition.
When the Confederate Provisional Government was
established it sent three commissioners 4 to Wash-

3 Cleveland: A. H. Stephens, p. 723.

4 Commission to Washington Record Book. (Pickett
Papers, " Trunk B," Ncs. 28 and 29.) The three commis-

68 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

ington to arrange a peaceable settlement. The lat
ter were instructed to consult upon " matters of in
terest to both nations," and were authorized to con
clude treaties. They arrived March 5, and one week
later, through Judge Campbell, they communicated
their mission to Seward, who, after delaying his
reply until April 8, refused to receive them. The
commissioners believed that the United States would
evacuate Fort Sumter. Seward and others in Lin
coln's Cabinet seem to have thought that Sumter
amounted to little as a strategetical point, and were
waiting for an expression of public opinion on the
subject.6 Davis believed that Seward's views would
prevail at Washington. But as the war party at the
North grew, public opinion opposed the evacuation
of Government property, and the hope of peaceable
secession was lost. Seward was hoping that by wait
ing and making no attempt to precipitate war, the
Union element at the South would assert itself.8 But
in this he was mistaken.

In the history of the mission, which Davis pub
lished on April 29, he stated that Seward had induced
the commissioners to forbear pressing for an answer
and had said that Fort Sumter would be evacuated/
but that in the meanwhile preparations were being
made for its defense. Lincoln, however, had ex-

sioners were M. G. Crawford, John Forsyth and A. B.
Roman. Their credentials were dated Feb. 27, 1861. J. T.
Pickett was secretary of the commission.

5 Stovall: Toombs, p. 222, et seq.

6 Some favored a foreign war as a means of " reunion,"
but this project was smothered by Lincoln and Sumner.

T Correspondence relating to Fort Sumter. Confederate
Archives (Pickett Papers), " Trunk A," Package No. 35.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 69

pressed his views in no uncertain tone. In a speech
to the Indiana legislature February 12, referring to
some of the " lovers of the Union " who resisted co
ercion and seemed to " think the Union no regular
marriage, but rather a free-love sort of arrangement
to be maintained only on passionate attraction," he
said it was no coercion or invasion to hold United
States forts and collect duties, or even to withhold
mails. Abraham of old said to Lot, " Is not the
whole land before thee. Separate thyself, I pray
thee from me; let there be no strife between me and
thee, for we are brethren." But Abraham Lincoln
said no such thing to Jefferson Davis. To, settle
questions by avoiding them was not so easy as in the
days of the patriarchs.

President Lincoln remained firm in his purpose to
defend Sumter, Davis (in opposition to Toombs in a
Cabinet meeting) resolved to attack it, and soon " the
hornet's nest " was opened by a bloodless conflict in
which no one was hurt. On April 12, the newsboys
ran through the streets of Richmond shouting " The
storming of Fort Sumter." 8 The coup d'etat, which
some said should have been struck before the inaug
uration of Lincoln, had started the dogs of war, and
it was too late to dream of peaceable separation. On
April 15, there was a strong secession demonstration
at Richmond. Fiery speeches were made by Tyler,
Wise and others. On April 23, Alexander H. Steph
ens met the state convention in a closed door session
to arrange a treaty of alliance with the Confederate
states." For two days he waited in suspense while

8J. B. Jones: Diary.

"Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens.

70 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

the Virginians debated, but on April 25, the treaty
was ratified. The Virginia convention which had
> strongly declared against secession at last resolved
to secede and join the Confederacy. North Carolina
and Tennessee followed, and, for the succeeding four
years, the Confederate de facto Government was in
dependent of Washington and a civil war disturbed
the repose of Europe, as well as of America, until the
instruments of battle proved, notwithstanding the
prophecies of great statesmen, that secession was in
admissible. The devotion and constancy of the
South for its principles of government and econom
ics in the face of a waning hope and diminishing re
sources have, perhaps, no parallel in history, but at
the end of the war it accepted the historical situation,
and the constitutional interpretation of the majority.

A commission appointed by Davis in January, 1865,
when many were anxious to take some step to end
the fraternal contest, was directed to proceed to
Washington for an informal conference as to the is
sues of the war and terms of peace. Its members 10
met Lincoln and Seward at Hampton Roads where a
friendly interview occurred, but they failed to agree
upon the subject of reunion. Compelled by force of
circumstances, however the Confederate authorities
finally ceased the contest.

No agents were sent to Canada until 1864, when
it appeared that the British Government, unless in
duced by new circumstances or complications, would
continue to refuse to favor either recognition, media
tion or intervention. Agents were then sent to that

10 J. A. Campbell, A. H. Stephens, and R. M. T. Hunter.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 7!

country to encourage the peace party in the North
and disaffection in the Northwest, and to make the
Canadian border a base for hostile expeditions into
United States territory."

Mexico was a near neighbor whose territory, ever
since the purchase of the Mesilla valley in 1853, had
been looked upon by many as a field for the future
extension of the institution of slavery and its accom
panying agricultural system, and very early in 1861
the Confederates desired to open friendly relations
with the people of that country and take steps to
prevent the United States from securing any treaty
advantages in that direction. On May 17, Toombs
instructed J. T. Pickett as a special agent to sound
the Mexican Government on the subject of alliance,
to feel the pulse of merchants and ship owners on the
subject of privateering, and authorized him to grant
commissions of marque and reprisal or to employ
agents in Mexico for the same purpose.12 Looking
for arguments which might induce Mexico to form an
alliance with the Confederacy, Toombs said: "The
institution of domestic slavery in one country, and
that of peonage in the other, establishes between
them such a similarity of labor as to prevent any ten
dency on either side to disregard feelings and inter
ests of the other." Mexico was to be informed that
in case the Confederate States were to guarantee her
against foreign invasion " they could do so more
promptly and effectually than any other nation." '

u Jacob Thompson and C. C. Clay were appointed Special
Agents to Canada, on April 27, 1864, to carry out instruc
tions received orally.

12 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I, Instr. i.

13 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I.

72 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

Picket! remained in Mexico until December, writing
many letters, most of which Toombs failed to receive.
On his arrival at Vera Cruz, which he called " the
SoutE Carolina of Mexico," he sent to Mata (who
had recently been Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs) an unofficial note, looking toward recognition.
He also took steps to open negotiations with the
Governor of the province, which he suggested might
again resolve to resume its sovereignty as it had done
in the past. While awaiting the arrival of a " friend,"
he wrote: " Let the United States Minister [Corwin]
fire at random and waste his ammunition, and then I
will go to Mexico City." Learning that the United
States had probably made overtures for the passage
of her troops through Mexico, in order to reach
Arizona, he caused the insinuation to be made (to
various persons connected with the Government) that
the granting of such a privilege would be " a breach
of neutrality, attaining the gravity of a casus belli —
that it would be a step not only hostile to the Confed
eracy, but also suicidal to Mexico." At the city of
Mexico, he found that the Government was not dis
posed to give attention to his communications. Ne
gotiations with the United States, however, were " dili
gently pressed." Corwin wrote Seward, on July 29,
that well-informed Mexicans seemed to be aware that
the independence of the Confederacy would be a signal
for a war of conquest to establish slavery in each of
the states of Mexico.

Pickett, on learning that the Mexican Congress had
acceded to the American request for the privilege to
pass troops through Mexican territory, said privately:
" If this decree is not annulled, Mexico will lose the

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 73

state of Tamaulipas in 60 days." He unofficially in
formed the Mexican Government that invasion of the
northern states of Mexico by Confederate forces would
probably result. In October, while threatening re
taliation, he proposed to re-cede California and New
Mexico in order to secure a treaty of free trade be
tween the Confederate States and Mexico. He also
gave notification that the Confederacy could not con
sent to the sale or hypothecation of the Mexican pub
lic lands to any government not in amity with the
Confederate Government. On October 29, in a de
spatch (No. 12) to Toombs, suggesting that the pro
posed treaty of the United States with Mexico prob
ably had for its basis the hypothecation of Mexican
lands and the establishment of a line of United States
military posts through Mexican territory, he said:
" Under these circumstances does it not become the
policy of the Confederate States to take military pos
session of Monterey and declare their purpose of hold
ing all of that region until all questions with the
United States be brought to an amicable adjustment?
Such an occupation, under the direction of wise mili
tary and civil chiefs would ensure to us the permanent
possession of that beautiful country." Mentioning
the information that the privilege granted by Mexico
as to the passage of troops would probably not be used
by the United States, he said: " I have entered no
formal protest against that extremely offensive per
mission; for it affords a golden opportunity to the
people of the Confederate States of fulfilling speedily
a portion of that inevitable destiny which impels them
southward."

On October 30, Pickett received a telegram an-

74 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

nouncing Confederate victories and the safe arrival
of Mason and Slidell at Havana, and proceeded to
celebrate the occasion by jollification with his friends.
Learning that an American " pill vendor," named
Bennett, had doubted the authenticity of the news,
and had intimated it to be an invention, he went to his
place of business, called him a " liar/' slapped him,
and inflicted " severe punishment." with his hands and
feet. On the following night he was arrested, but was
allowed to remain at his hotel. He pleaded his diplo
matic character, which the Government refused to
recognize. On November 14, he was " thrust into a
filthy guard room," to await trial or the payment of an
indemnity to Bennett. After his release he wrote:
" To preserve my liberty, and perhaps my life, I have
had no alternative but to resort to bribery." He was
convinced that the Confederacy had few friends in
Mexico — " at least among the Mexicans themselves
of the dominant party."

In a despatch [from "near Mexico"], on Novem
ber 29, Pickett informed Toombs that, having no reply
from Mexico, and no further instructions from the
Confederacy, he considered his mission virtually
ended. As early as the middle of October he had so
notified the Mexican Government, stating that the
chief reason was the persistent violation of neutrality
by Mexico. Commenting upon the internal condition
of Mexico, the desire of Conservatives for the restora
tion of Spanish rule, and the effects of his own mis
sion, he said: "My enterprise has afforded the Gov
ernment of the Confederate States an opportunity
which may never present itself again. . . . My ap
proaches to the Conservatives was with the double

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 75

hope of making them our friends, and of having my
self sent out of the country as a pernicious intriguer,
and when first arrested I really supposed that to have
been the cause. . . . Mexico has placed herself in the
wrong in the eyes of all civilized nations . . . and thus
have I cut the Gordian knot of our infant diplomacy
in this quarter. If the Confederate States improve the
golden opportunity, I will not have suffered in vain.
.... Our people must have an outlet on the Pa
cific. . . .

" The part for the Confederate States to play in this
crisis is clear to my mind. Our revolution has emas
culated the Monroe doctrine in so far as we are con
cerned. The Spaniards are now become our natural
allies, and jointly with them we may own the Gulf of
Mexico and effect a partition of this magnificent coun
try. I little thought a few years ago ever to counsel
a Spanish alliance, but revolutions bring us into
strange company, and I am now prepared to advocate
an alliance which may tend to check the expansion of
the North."

Pickett reached Vera Cruz in December, in time to
witness its occupation by Spanish forces. He soon
returned to the Confederacy by request from Rich
mond.14 After September, 1863, some hoped for rec
ognition by Mexico, and Preston/5 being appointed
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, on

14 Confed. Dip. Cor., Mexico. (Pickett Papers, " Trunk
B," Record 5; Pickett's Despatches, June 15 (No. i), June
17 (No. 2), Oct. 29 (No. 12), Nov. 29 (No. 13) and Dec. 24
(No. 14), 1861; also Corwin's Despatches to Seward, July
29 (No. 3), Aug. 28 (No. 4), Sept. 7 (No. 5) and Oct. 29 (No.
7), 1861.

15 Walker Fearn was also appointed as secretary.

76 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

January 7, 1864, soon left the Confederacy for Cuba
with " secret service " money, but receiving no intima
tion that he would be received by Maximilian he never
reached the Mexican capital.10

At the opening of the civil war the northern prov
inces of Mexico were in a state of revolution, and
on May 22, Toombs sent J. A. Quintero on a mission
to New Leon to inform Governor Vidaurri that the ^
Confederacy wished to maintain friendly relations
and to prevent border raids between Mexico ard
Texas, but that if the Governor failed to stop tr.e
raids the Confederacy would be compelled to punish
the invaders and to guard against the recurrence of
such disturbing inconveniences.17 Vidaurri impress
ed Quintero with his friendliness, and confidentially
proposed a political union of the northern provinces
of Mexico with the Confederacy. Quintero, after
returning to report the success of his mission was
again sent as confidential agent to northeast Mexico
(September 3, 1861) to reside at Monterey, with in
structions to declare his official character only to the
Governor and such others as he might deem prudent.
He was authorized to say that Mr. Davis reciprocated
Vidaurri's expressions of friendship and good-will
for himself and his people, and that he desired to
serve mutual interests by intimate social and com
mercial relations ; but, although the Confederates felt
sympathy for the revolutionists, he believed " it
would be imprudent and impolitic in the interests of
both parties to take any steps at present in regard
to the proposition made by Governor Vidaurri in his

10 Confed. Dip. Cor., Mexico. Ibid., Package 15.
17 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

confidential communication ... in reference to the
future political relations of the Confederate States
and the northern provinces of Mexico." Quintero
was instructed to send statistics concerning that
country, to report on the prospects of getting powder,
lead and other war supplies through Matamoras, and,
in case Mexico had given the United States permis
sion to transport troops across her territory for war
against the Confederacy, to induce Vidaurri to use
his influence to prevent it. On November 4, Quin
tero reported that Vidaurri would oppose the pas
sage of the United States troops through New
Leon."

Naturally the Confederacy early sent a special
agent to the West Indies, where it was desired to
obtain a point of vantage for communication with
Europe. On July 22, 1861, Toombs instructed C. J.
Helm to perform this office, giving him a letter of
introduction to the Captain-General of Cuba to whom
it was desired that he should present reasons for
friendly relations between Cuba and the Confederacy,
leaving no efforts untried to remove appfehensions
as to Confederate designs to acquire that island.19 The
Confederate authorities, by sparing no pains to in-

18 Consular Corres., New Leon and Coahuila — Quintero
(Pickett Papers, " Trunk B," Package 17). Also, Dip. Mex.
8 and g — J. L. Cripps and Charles Ricken; Misc. Cor. and
Records, Mexico; Consular, Matamoras — Fitzpatrick; Con
sular; Vera Cruz — Matamoras, La Sere and Avegno.

Richard Fitzpatrick was appointed commercial agent at
Matamoras on Nov. 15. 1862. Bernard Avegno was ap
pointed on Dec. 18, 1862, to act in the same capacity at
Vera Cruz. Emile La Sere received credentials on May 30,
1864. to perform the same functions at Vera Cruz.

19 Confed. Dip. Cor., Vol. I.

78 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

form Spain that the South no longer desired Cuba,
by urging mutual interests in the institution of slav
ery, by suggesting probable aggressive expansive de
signs of the United States, and by proposing a de
fensive alliance, made strong efforts to secure the
friendship of that once powerful people; but Spai:i
remained neutral. In Cuba there was considerable
local sympathy with the Confederates; and, during
the blockade, the Richmond authorities hoped to
make the island an entrepot from which to obtain
European supplies, and a base for forwarding des
patches between the Confederacy and Europe. Sew-
ard, while denying any desire for conquest, in
formed Spain that the United States could not look
with favor upon any policy that would make that
island the fulcrum of the lever for overthrowing the
Union/0 The Confederacy several times tried to se
cure recognition by Spain, but was always disap
pointed, though it took fresh hope from complica
tions. The Confederate steamer, General Rusk, had
been used to get Confederate supplies at Havana,
and while there, it was supplied with British papers
and had its name changed to Blanche. After one suc
cessful voyage the vessel sailed for Havana with a
cargo of cotton, in the latter part of 1862, but, while
off the coast of Cuba in the neutral jurisdiction of
Spain, was destroyed by a United States steamer.
For this act the United States paid Spain $200,000,

m James Morton Callahan: Cuba and International Rela
tions, Chap, n, passim; 15 Instr. Sp., p. 263, Sevvard to
Schurz, No. 2, April 27, 1862. [Also, October 28, 1861];
Confed. " Dip. Cor.", Hunter to Yancey, Rost and Mann,
Aug. 24, 1861, and Benjamin to Slidell (No. 16), May 9, 1863.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY /9

and Benjamin instructed Slidell (March 22, 1863) to
urge Spain to pay all of the amount over to the
Confederacy, instead of to the individuals who tem
porarily had the loan of the vessel, but the Confed
eracy did not press its claim.

Agents in Nassau and the Bermudas, in addition
to Helm in Cuba, performed valuable service for
the Confederacy during the whole period of the war.21

It was to Europe that the Confederate leaders
principally looked for sympathy and assistance.
Their policy of secession had been greatly influenced
by the expectation of foreign aid. Naturally, in pre
senting their case to Europe they urged the advan
tages of free trade and avoided a discussion of the
slavery question. They desired especially to enlist
English sympathy. Benjamin, in a letter to the Eng- I s
lish consul in New York said that conditions might
arise which would even induce Southern states to
resume their former allegiance to England.22 \There !
was a strong belief that in case of war England would
not permit the United States to interfere with Eng
lish trade through the Southern ports. On January
28, Mr. Iverson, of Georgia, in his farewell speech •
to the United States Senate, referring to the possi
bility of a blockade, said : " We can live, if need be,
without commerce. But when you shut out our cot-

21 The name of Heyleger, who acted as agent at Nassau,
and obtained concessions favorable to blockade running,
does not appear among those whose credentials (from Mr.
Davis) are recorded in the " Diplomatic and Consular Com
missions " book of the Confederate State Department. Nor
man S. Walker was appointed commercial agent at Bermuda
on July 7, 1864.

22 Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. II, pp. 313-14.

8O THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

ton from the looms of Europe we shall see whether
other nations will not have something to do on that
subject. Cotton is king and it will find means 1.0
raise your blockade and disperse your ships."

The new American tariff gave the Confederare
leaders further hope of English sympathy, and an
opportunity to urge their opposition to the tariff
with greater effect.23 Buchanan, in his message of
December, 1858, had recommended a revision of tl e
tariff in order to increase the revenue, but the admin
istration leader in the House could not get the neces
sary two-thirds vote for the proposition. In April,
1860, Morrill introduced his tariff bill in the House.
Its principal object was stated to be revenue. It
passed the House by 105 to 64, but its consideration
by the Senate was postponed. On February 20, i86c,
however, it passed the Senate with some amendments
by a vote of 25 to 14 — after the senators from seven
seceding states had withdrawn. Some felt that its
passage made England much more liable to recognize
the Confederacy, and Clingman said that it contributed
to the secession of Virginia, North Carolina and Ten
nessee.

On general principles the Democrats of both
North and South since 1825 had leaned towards a
tariff for revenue only, but since 1832 there had
been no signs that the integrity of the Union was
endangered by tariff legislation. In the farewell
speeches of Southern leaders in Congress there had
been scarcely an allusion to the tariff. The burden
of the grievances expressed were concerning South-

23 See Hunter's remarks in the Cong. Globe, Feb. 27, 1861.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 8l

ern rights as to slavery. Many in the Alabama se
cession convention desired to induce the United
States to treat with the South as an independent
power and as an ally, and they were willing to agree
to a tariff equal to that of the United States but al
lowing free trade with the United States in order to
dispense with frontier custom houses, border
troubles and war debts.**

The Confederate constitution declared in favor of
a tariff for revenue only, and the commissioners who
were sent to England with instructions (of March 16)
to make a treaty ° practically providing for free trade
were told to inform the English Government that
dissolution was the result of long and mature delib
eration to escape the persistent efforts to compel the
South to pay bounties to the North in the shape of
high protective tariffs. It was soon discovered that
Seward had taken prompt steps to meet their argu
ments abroad. The nature of Seward's arguments
may be seen in his instructions to Carl Schurz April
27, in which he said : " The interest which now
raises the flag of disunion has directed the Govern
ment since the first murmur of discontent was heard.
The United States . . . for forty years has especially
accommodated that interest (slavery) and construct
ed all defenses required for that section."

" Rost to Yancey, April 7, 1862.

* The Confederacy offered to continue all the United States
treaties except the clause providing for the maintenance of
a naval squadron on the coast of Africa. The Confederate
constitution had a clause against the slave trade, but if Eng
land had asked for a treaty clause against it. she would have
been informed that the constitution gave the Government no
power relating to that subject. " It is not wise to impose
restraints on the future " said Benjamin in January, 1863.
[Instr. to Mason, Nos. 13 and 14, Jan. 15, 1863.]
6

82 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

The instructions of the Confederate commission
ers did not mention any of the expressed grievances
relating to slavery. But later, the agents in Eng
land endeavored through the press and otherwise to
leave the impression that the North desired the con
tinuance of the institution of slavery. This policy
was based upon the fact that England and France
were opposed to slavery but desired commercial
intercourse with the South. Palmerston, in July,
1861, said to August Belmont of New York, " We do
not like slavery but we want cotton and we dislike
very much your Morrill tariff."

There was a strong party in England led by
Bright, Cobden and Forster, who had pronounced
sympathies with the United States and would have
been glad if they could have informed their constitu
encies that the Lincoln administration was fighting
for emancipation as well as for the integrity of the
Union. But, notwithstanding the fears which had
been expressed in the speeches of the Southern lead
ers, the Lincoln party proposed only to restrict slav
ery in the territories and had no emancipation policy
until it came as a military exigency during the war.
Lincoln in his inaugural address said: vJ have no
purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the states where it exists."
The Confederate agents in Europe quoted this as a:
means of decreasing sympathy with the North. The'
Confederate arguments were presented to the Brit
ish Parliament by Lindsay, Gregory, Roebuck and
other members who sympathized with the South.
Lindsay, in explaining these positions in July, 1862,
said that the cry against slavery in the North was

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

1

only a political cry — else England could sympathize
with the North. He declared that taxation without
representation was the real cause of the war, stating
that the North and West had increased their repre
sentation in Congress while the South had fallen be
hind and had to pay the protective tariffs.28 Forster,
in reply, stated that slavery was the real cause of
the war, and that the tariff had scarcely been men
tioned in the elections and during the period of se
cession."7

Mr. Davis and his followers at first expected to
produce a cotton famine which \vould induce Eng
land and France to break the blockade and recognize
the Confederacy. , Later, they were willing to offer
special commercial advantages to secure the same
end, and proposed to give Napoleon,a large amount
of cotton for the loan of a squadronA They also fav
ored French and Spanish designs in America and, in
order to obtain a treaty of alliance, intimated their
readiness to guarantee the possessions of those pow
ers. (They made England and France a base for secret
attempts to fit out vessels. They endeavored to dis
turb internal affairs and create complications which
Iwould serve the interests of the Confederacy. Finally,
jin a paroxysm of desperation, they proposed to secure

emancipation for recognition, and in negotiations with
>ndon syndicates agreed to guarantee cotton for

noney to secure ships to break the blockade. /

i6» rarnaTDebates, p 511 et seq. July 18, 1862.

See "Appendix." Also, see F. W. Sargent: England,
the United States, and the Confederate States, London, 1864.
Also, an article on the changes in tariff legislation since
1789, by W. G. Cutler, in Mag. Am. Hist., Vol. XII (1884),
P- 519.

84 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

| R. B. Rhett, who had made some study of com
merce and revenues, had discussed in the secession
convention of South Carolina a policy of commercia1
agreements with the important states of Europe
At Montgomery, he was chosen chairman of the
committee of foreign relations, and before the inaug
uration of Davis had brought in a report author
izing the latter to send a commission to Europe to
secure recognition and make treaties, offensive and
defensive. As a plan of diplomacy he proposed,

•(i) A treaty of commercial alliance involving recipro
cal obligations offensive and defensive for twenty
years or more, during which the Confederacy would
impose no import duty higher than 20 per cent ad
valorem, no tonnage except for maintaining harbors
and rivers, and would permit European parties to the
treaty to enjoy the privileges of the coasting trade
free, subject only to the police regulations of the
states. (2) A discriminating duty of 10 per cent on
all goods of all nations refusing to accept the treaty.
(3) The commissioners to have power (as Franklin
in 1778) to form alliances with European powers and
guarantee their North American possessions.28 This
policy was discussed in Congress in the presence of
Toombs, who, as Secretary of State, hoped to be al
lowed to give the commissioners instructions based
upon this policy of overcoming European feeling
against slavery by offering liberal commercial ad
vantages, but Davis did not embrace these points
in his later conversation with Toombs. The com
mission had already been appointed to go to Wash-

28 Du Bose: Life and Times of Yancey.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 85

ington; but Toombs, Rhett, and Yancey, expecting
nothing from that source to justify a delay in foreign
diplomacy, said that the friendship of Europe should;
first be secured, and that the policy toward the<l
United States should depend upon circumstances.
There was a strong feeling, however, in the Confed
erate Congress, and especially in Alabama, in favor
of giving the first advantages of diplomacy to the
United States. Some expected that the desire for
cotton would induce the Government at Washing
ton to favor a treaty of peace with the Confederacy.
Yancey, the champion leader in " firing the South
ern heart " at the beginning of the secession move
ment, who had been spoken of for the presidency,
was asked by Davis to head the commission to Eu
rope, and P. A. Rost and Dudley Mann were named
as his colleagues. Yancey was born in 1814 and
elected to Congress in 1844. He had opposed the
Clay compromise of 1850, anticipated the coming
conflict, and prepared schemes for secession as early
as 1858. In January, 1860, he advocated the seces
sion of the Southern members from the Charleston
convention, if their demands were denied, and he be
came the chief manager in that convention and in
laying the program for secession from the Union.
P. A. Rost, born in France, 1797, had gone to Louis
iana in 1816, served in the Mississippi legislature in
1826, and a few years later removed to Louisiana
where he became judge in the Supreme Court.
Mann, born in 1801, had been sent as United States
consul to Bremen in 1842, commissioner to Hun
gary in 1849, and minister to Switzerland in 1850,
after which he was appointed Assistant Secretary of
State (March 23, 1853).

86 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

Yancey found that Davis did not favor the policy
of negotiating commercial treaties, but expected to
base his diplomacy on the importance of the cotton
crop (much of the previous year's crop being still
on hand) and the legality of secession. When
Yancey informed Rhett of Davis's instructions,
Rhett, feeling that the United States had already
warned Europe, and that it would be necessary to
compensate the latter for the risk of recognition,
said: "You have no business in Europe, you carry
no argument that Europe cares to hear. My coun
sel is ... to stay at home, or to go prepared to
conciliate Europe by irresistible proffers of trade.'
B. C. Yancey, who had recently been in England, anc
had " studiously sought information touching the
feeling of the Government there toward a probable
Southern Confederacy, and, also had applied himself
to ascertain the feeling of the laboring classes and
their leaders, Cobden and Bright," whom he found
would oppose the recognition of a slaveholders'
Confederacy, advised his brother not to undertake the
mission, stating that the English Government, how
ever well disposed, could not run counter to the Ex
eter Hall anti-slavery influence.29

Before the commission sailed, Congress and the
executive were urged to adopt a foreign policy simi
lar to that by which Franklin, Deane and Lee se
cured money and supplies during the American Rev
olution, but the commissioners only received power
to encourage practical reciprocity to aid them over
a crisis. The opposition afterwards complained that

-u Du Bose: Life and Times of Yancey, pp. 588-89.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 87

though the ports ,w~ere open for a year, cotton was
left on the plantations " while waiting for the United
States to fall into bankruptcy."3

Yancey, though he failed to receive the instruc
tions which he considered necessary to success, ac
cepted the mission. The instructions to the commis
sion directed them to Inform Europe that secession
violated no allegiance, that opposition by the United
States was not expected, and that the South, with
abundant resources^was able to win, and was willing
to accept the treaties between the United States and
foreign powers and to make a treaty practically pro
viding for free .trade. The commissioners were later
authorized to issue commissions to privateers. They
sailed March 31, and were in mid-ocean when news
arrived from Washington that an armed fleet had
been sent to relieve Fort Sumter. A call for troops
by Lincoln followed, and Virginia seceded.

Rhett soon appealed to the Confederate Congress
to direct Mr. Davis to instruct the commissioners in
favor of a more liberal treaty, granting commercial
privileges for a period of twenty years. Perkins,
fearing that so long a period would extinguish the
infant manufactures of the South, proposed to make
it six years, stating that England was compelled to
have cotton anyhow. Rhett replied that Europe, for
a treaty securing vital relief for the Confederacy,
would require a twenty years' guarantee, and that

30 It is said that six iron ships built for the East India
trade were, early in the war, offered to the Confederacy by a
Liverpool firm for ten million dollars, but that Mallory,
knowing the inefficiency of Memminger's department, omitted
to communicate this offer to President Davis. [Du Bose:
Life and Times of Yancey.]

88 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

during this period the Confederacy would have time
to recuperate from the sacrifices of the war, which
might not end for six years. To those who sug
gested that goods could be smuggled into the
United States, he said that in case of such an event
the manufactures of the United States would be in
jured more than those of the Confederacy. He did
not think that a currency based on the cotton de
posited in the South as good as a treaty that would
make a cotton deposit in Europe the basis of a cur
rency; and he declared that if the cotton ports be
closed, England would engage in attempts to culti
vate cotton in India and her other possessions, and
would thus be led to discourage trade with the Con
federacy. The Perkins amendment carried, but on
the motion of Rhett the whole subject was laid on the
table.

Davis expected to get Europe to recognize his
Government and receive its ambassadors on grounds
of international duty. Memminger, also, feared to
sell the cotton on account of possible political ef
fects at home, stating that the United States would
make the blockade more effective if an attempt
should be made to take cotton out of Confederate
ports and that there was little probability that
Europe would send vessels to get the product even
if it should be stored in seaports. He said, that cot
ton stored by the Government on the plantations was
the best basis for currency and European diplomacy.
Soon after this many began to say that it should all
be destroyed by the Government,81 and that notice

81 J. M. Daniels: Writings in the Richmond Examiner
during the Civil War (N. Y., 1868), Feb. 26, 1862.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 89

should be given to England that no more would be
raised until that power was willing to grant recogni
tion. The Confederate Government soon placed a
tax on cotton production.

Stephens had been strongly in favor of shipping
the cotton to Europe to pay for vessels to injure the
United States commerce and to hold at least one
Confederate port open while other Confederate ves
sels convoyed cotton to Europe where it could be
stored more safely than in the United States. He
was strongly opposed to the policy of Mr. Davis.
Many others preferred the exportation policy, and
strongly tried to convince Davis that his " cotton
famine policy " was wrong.82 Some urged him to
sell to persons in the United States. Toombs, who
had desired the Confederate Government to take the
responsibility of rapidly exporting all the cotton to
Europe, chafed under red tape, and resigned because
he thought the administration was too timid. He
said that if he had been president he would have
mortgaged every pound of cotton to France and
England at a price sufficient to remunerate the plant
ers as well as to get the aid of the navies of England
and France.33 It is doubtless true that the shipment
of 200,000 bales of cotton to Liverpool during the
first year of the war would have strengthened the \
Confederate chances of securing a navy, but there1
were, probably, insurmountable obstacles to this
policy. The Government was new and untried, and
the sudden blockade of Southern ports had not been
expected. Many merchant vessels made haste to
load and get away in March, 1861, but Bullock says

82 Mrs. Davis: Jefferson Davis. "Bullock.

QO THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

there were not enough vessels to carry out the cot
ton even if it had been bought. General J. E. Johns
ton stating that the blockade was not effective unti
the end of the winter of 1862, declared that the Con
federate Government could easily have shipped
4,000,000 bales to England and received the mone>
for it. Memminger pronounced Johnston's views
impracticable and visionary, stating that the block
ade was instituted in May, 1861, and that it would
have required 4000 ships to get the cotton out be
fore that time. He said that private enterprise ship
ped as much as the Government could have shipped;
that the Government had no funds with which to
make purchases; that, even if there had been enough
treasury notes and bonds for that purpose, it would
have been a bad policy to use them to meet the ne
cessities of the planters; that the Government could
not have secured donations of cotton and did not de
sire to seize it; and, with the expectation that the
blockade would last for less than a year, the Govern
ment had no motive to store cotton as a basis of
credit.8*

Stephens, who was never very confident of recog
nition by European powers, always said that it was
a serious mistake at the beginning of the war to
consider cotton as a political instead of a commercial
power.35 He strongly opposed the recommendations
which some made to cease cotton culture so and de
stroy the stock on hand in order to compel England

84 H. D. Capers: Memminger.

85 Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens.

80 The Confederate House, on March 3, 1862, passed a
resolution advising all growers of cotton and tobacco to
stop the cultivation of those products. [C. E. Evans (Ed.):
Confederate Military History, Vol. I, p. 436.]

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

9!

to raise the blockade. He had been in favor of the
Government paying ten cents a pound for all the
cotton that persons were willing to subscribe for
eight per cent bonds, and after the harbor system of
the South had been closed, Memminger adopted his
views as to the constitutionality of the Government
purchasing cotton, but Stephens said it was then
too late.

Yancey, Rost and Mann, on reaching Europe,
soon saw that the action of France and other powers
depended upon the policy of England who, though
opposed to slavery, desired commercial intercourse
with the South. They were encouraged by the Brit
ish neutrality act, recognizing the Confederacy as a
neutral, and later by the victory of Bull Run, and
hoped that the British Government would take of
fense at the harsh protests of Seward (who at that
time would have been willing to unite the North
and South in a war against England), but independ
ence was different from belligerency, and Adams,
anxiously keeping his hand on the British pulse
and watching every indication of variation, presented
all of Seward's protests in courteous language and
thus avoided an Anglo-American rupture. By their
active operations, the Confederates gave rise to im
portant legal and diplomatic questions, and to acrimo
nious correspondence between England and the
United States, and, at the time of the Trent affair
they anticipated complications which would induce
the British Government to take a stand favorable to
the Confederacy, but their hopes were disappointed.87

37 On Aug. 24, 1861, Messrs. Yancey, Rost and Mann were
also appointed special commissioners to Spain with full
powers.

92 — $H£jCON|.EDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

Yancey's commission was embarrassed by lack
of funds 38 and secret agents, by Seward's vigorous
diplomacy, and by the fact that Europe read the news
from Northern papers, but soon after sending Mason
and Slidell to Europe the Confederacy decided to
spend more money abroad. Agents with secret ser
vice money were sent to influence public sympathy.
[The Index, a Confederate organ, was established at
London, editorials and other articles were prepared
for insertion in the prominent English and French
newspapers. About the latter part of 1862 Benja
min, in writing to De Leon, expressed a desire for
him to extend his operations to the press of Austria,
Prussia and other parts of central Europe. Henry
Hotze, the confidential agent at London,30 in addi
tion to his press duties, also kept Mr. Benjamin in
formed on European public opinion, forwarding him
the London papers and the principal quarterly re
views.40 Mason and Slidell each received a salary of
$12,000 with an allowance of $3000 for contingent
expenditures for limited objects. In January, 1864,
Mason wrote Benjamin that Slidell and himself both

88When Yancey left London on the arrival of Mason he
borrowed money for his expenses. His salary had not been
remitted. ^&t~Z.£,

w Hotze was born in Zurich, Switzerland in 1834. In 1858
he was provisionally appointed secretary of the U. S. Le
gation at Brussels. In 1859 he became associated with John
Forsyth in editing the Mobile Register. In April, 1861, he
enlisted in the Confederate army. On Aug. 31, he was ap
pointed, by the Confederate war department, to proceed to
Europe to purchase supplies of war. On Nov. 14, he was
appointed commercial agent at London, where he founded
the Index. [The Mobile Register, May u, 1887.]

40 Instr. to Mason, No. 35, April 18, 1864.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 93

agreed that there " are objects of expenditure for
political ends, occasionally presenting themselves,
when it would be well that the commissioners in
Europe could have larger discretion." ' " This char
acter o/ expenditure might not generally admit of a
regular voucher but must be submitted to the integ
rity of the commissioners." On April 18, Benjamin
sent him £500 as a secret service fund.

When Mason and Slidell reached Europe the first
of February, 1862, Davis and Hunter were contem
plating the possibility that France and England, act
ing both from commercial and political motives,
would end the blockade by intervention, and, on Feb
ruary 8, prepared instructions urging that to prevent
the danger of future war or reunion, the area of the
Confederacy should be enlarged so as to include the
Chesapeake bay, the border states, and New Mexico
and Arizona.*2 _Mason, while unsuccessfully urging
the British Government to adopt the policy of recog
nizing the Confederacy and breaking the blockade
to secure cotton, also directed his efforts to mould
public opinion through the press and social channels,
and took an active part in arranging for the con
struction of Confederate vessels in British ports.
Though he always exaggerated the chances of suc
cess, public opinion in favor of recognizing the Con
federacy was increasing in 1862. The battle of Fred-
ericksburg seemed to silence Southern opposition to
the Confederate Government, and Gladstone said

41 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. I, Paris, Jan. 25,
1864.

42 Confed. " Dip. Cor., Great Brit." Hunter to Mason,
No. 4, Feb. 8, 1862.

•

94 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

that Davis had " created a nation." When the Brit
ish Government awaited future developments and re
fused to join France in a policy of mediation, the
Confederate leaders were disappointed, and pro
nounced English neutrality a farce and an irony man
aged to the advantage of the United States.43 The
Richmond Enquirer said that the English policy was
to let the war continue long enough to destroy the
strength of both North and South.

In November, 1862, Mason having been able " to
see and hear nothing from the British Government
officially or unofficially," suggested that a termina
tion of his mission might preserve the dignity of the
Confederate Government; but, in the same letter he
stated that his presence in London was really import
ant." As early as July, seeing that Russell would
neither receive him nor recognize the Confederacy
he had given a similar intimation, and, on September
26, Benjamin wrote him that Mr. Davis, though de
siring him to avoid being placed in the attitude of a
\suppliant, thought that he should await contingen
cies. In the last week of October, expecting San-
jiers to secure the construction of vessels in England,

"Alfriend: Jefferson Davis, Chap. 14.

** Commander Sinclair arrived at London with an order of
the Confederate Navy for money to pay for building a ship;
but Bullock's funds were needed to meet contracts already
made, and, in order to avoid delay, Mason, as an agent of the
Confederacy, agreed to an arrangement with Lindsay arid Co.
[Despatches of Mason, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1862.] In October,
after a murder had occurred on the Swntcr at Gibraltar,
Mason authorized Bullock to sell the vessel and endeavored
to induce the English authorities to deliver the murderer at
some Confederate port. The government at Richmond after
wards approved his action in these matters.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 95

Davis, notwithstanding Russell's scant courtesy, " of
fensive arrogance and rude incivility," decided that
Mason had better remain waiting for public opinion
to force the British Government to change its policy.
But, in a speech to the Mississippi legislature in
December, after referring to former expectations ofj
recognition and intervention by foreign nations, he
said " put not your trust in princes . . . this war is
ours; we must fight it out ourselves."4 The proba
bility that Russia, like England and France, would
postpone the question of recognition until the ques
tion of might was made clear, caused Benjamin to
hesitate in approaching Alexander II., but on No
vember 19 he instructed L. Q. C. Lamar to go to
St. Petersburgh and assure the Czar of the Confed
erate desire for friendly and commercial intercourse.46
Russia was friendly toward the United States and re
fused to receive the Confederate commissioner.47

Stephens, considering that France and England
while jealous of the growth of the United States were
also opposed to slavery, had " never looked to forr
eign intervention or recognition," and on September
I, 1862, in a letter to R. M. Johnston he said that
Davis should recall all commissioners.48 Others held
the same views by the close of the year. In Jan
uary, 1863, Foote in the House urged this measure.
On January 15, the Richmond Examiner, commenting

I

"Alfriend: Jefferson Davis.

48 Walker Fearn was appointed as secretary.

47 Despatches from U. S. Legation, Russia: Bayard Taylor
to Seward, No. 30, March 3, 1863 (encloses intercepted com
munication of Benjamin to L. Q. C. Lamar). Also, 14 Instr.
Russia, Seward to C. M. Clay, No. 2, March 31, 1863.

** Cleveland: A. H. Stephens, p. 761.

96 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

upon Davis's policy to avoid a conclusion upon this
subject, also favored a withdrawal, and said that th<;
European powers as soon as they saw the end of
the struggle approaching would then have to send
ambassadors to Richmond instead of calling up
Southern commissioners " now waiting in servants'
halls and on the back stairs." New York papers ot
March 30 published the Mason-Russell correspond
ence which had been brought before the public by a
resolution of Parliament, and the Richmond Whig of
April 6, republishing part of it, berated Russell for
his terror of Seward and his " perversion " of the
provisions of 1856 to which the Confederacy had
been induced to agree. In the Confederate House-
on April 6, 1863, Mr. Swan of Tennessee, moved z.
suspension of the rules to enable him to introduce
a joint resolution suggesting that Congress would
approve the removal of Mason from London.48 The
vote stood 39 yeas to 39 nays, but as a two-thirds
vote was necessary Swan's motion failed. On April
13, the Sentinel abused Congress for differing with
the President as to the retention of the diplomatic
agents.80 De Leon wrote Benjamin from Paris on

48 Richmond Dispatch, April 7, 1863.

60 On March 16, Mr. Davis sent to the Senate the name of
L. Q. C. Lamar as commissioner to Russia. The Senate
referred the nomination to the committee of foreign affairs.
The committee and the Senate did not think it expedient to
send a commissioner to Russia, and on April 13, in secret
session, requested Mr. Davis to state his reasons for making
such an appointment. Davis replied on April 20, but the
Senate adjourned May I without confirming the nomination,
and Lamar's commission thereby expired. Davis, while re
gretting the action of the Senate, deemed it his duty to yield.
[Confed. " Dip. Cor., Russia," Instr. to Lamar, June u,
1863, with enclosure of Burton N. Harrison to Benjamin.]

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 97

June 19, that by reason of the prejudice against
slavery no further attempts to get recognition should
be made, and renewed suggestions which he had
previously made that the commissioners should be
recalled from Europe. Slidell, considering De Leon
as a spy on his actions and his despatches, soon com
plained to Benjamin,51 and, after some annoyance
caused by the interception and publication of objec
tionable correspondence, De Leon's agency was s
ended.

The Confederacy had felt inconvenienced and han
dicapped by the slowness of communication with
Europe, and was anxious to secure a sure and swift
transportation of despatches and news. George X.
Sanders had early tried to get the privilege to estab
lish a line of communication.52 Benjamin would not
engage him in that capacity, but agreed to give him
a certain sum for the delivery of despatches from
abroad.83 In October, 1862, Benjamin wrote Mason
that Mr. Fearn had arranged a plan for facilitating
intercourse, but Sanders continued to act as des
patch bearer until the beginning of 1863 when his
son Reid Sanders, while attempting to run the block
ade from Charleston, allowed important despatches
to be seized on his person, and caused Benjamin to
advise Mason to risk no more letters through that
agency. Despatches and supplies were afterwards
sent through L. Heyleger, at Nassau or via Bermuda.
In November, 1862, Mr. Lindsay proposed a plan for
establishing a direct line of French steamers, with a

51 Despatches of Slidell to Benjamin, No. 50.

52 Instr. to Mason, No. 8, Oct. 28, 1862.

53 Instr. to Mason, Feb. 7, 1863.

7

98 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

view of diverting the trade of the West, and as far
as possible that of the North, through Norfolk and
other Confederate ports, but this line was not ex
pected to operate before the close of the war.54 Dav s.
and Benjamin replied that the Confederate constitu
tion did not allow a grant of postal subsidies as pro
posed by Lindsay's plan, but suggested that Vi;*-
ginia as a state might grant such a subsidy.55 About
the same time George McHenry made a proposition
for the establishment of an Atlantic mail line by Con
federate aid, but Davis, on the grounds that the Post
Office Department must sustain itself, and that tie
terms of transportation might be cheaper later, re
fused to accept the proposition.58 Despatches con
tinued to be sent by British vessels via Halifax ard
through the Confederate agents at Bermuda ard
Nassau.

In the early part of 1863, Benjamin seeing little
hope of action by England and suspecting Napo
leon's designs in Texas, Louisiana and Florida, asked
Slidell to open communication with Spain by sug
gesting the advantage of alliance and offering to join
in a disclaimer as to designs on Cuba." President
Davis refused to recognize any longer the British *
consuls unless they obtained exequaturs from the
Confederate Government.
lln the middle of 1863 Napoleon with the United

M Despatches of Mason, Nov. 4, 1862, and March 19, 1863.

55 Instr. to Mason, No. 12, Jan. 15, 1863. Despatches of
Mason, Jan. 16, 1863.

M Instr. to Mason, No. 19, March 31, 1863.

87 An attempt was also made to influence public opinion in
Ireland. On March 7, 1863, Robert Dowling was appointed
as commercial agent at Cork.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 99

States map before him said he was only waiting for
England to act, and the Confederates believed they
had two advocates in the British cabinet and ex
pected to get others to support a resolution for rec
ognition, but it was in vain that they hoped to over
come the influence of the British Liberals and of
Seward, who with an eye to the future, wras watch
fully making record of every case where he thought
the British Government had favored the Confeder
ates. When they turned secretly to secure the con
struction of vessels in British ports they found Se-
ward's consular agents watching the dockyards, and
securing evidence by which to emphasize protests
to the British Government.58 In the autumn of 1863
Mason withdrew from London to Paris, and soon
received duplicate full powers addressed in blank so
he could fill them out himself and go to any English
capital,5" but contingencies not arising to call for his
services on the continent he alternated between Paris
and London until the close of the wrar, drawing his sal
ary as a commissioner but having no diplomatic du
ties to perform.80 At London, however, he aided
certain members of Parliament in attempts to em
barrass the Government and force it to recognize the
Confederacy.

58 Bullock, Vol. I.

69 Instr. to Mason, No. 34, Jan. 25, 1864.

60 On September 24, 1863, Mann was instructed, by Benja
min, to go to the Pope, who had expressed sorrow as to the
ruin and devastation of the war, and to assure him £hat the
Southern people were desirous that the war should cease.
[Record i, Instr., p. 21.] On April 4, 1864, Rt. Rev. P. A.
Lynch, Bishop of Charleston, was appointed Special Com
missioner to the States of the Church, with full powers.

IOO THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

On October 26, 1864, Benjamin published a copy
of a despatch,61 which he prepared for publication in
Europe, with the purpose of showing that if the
United States continued the war she would be unable
to pay her debts abroad, and that the foreigners, in
order to escape ruin, ought not to lend her 'more
money.6" He also tried to impress Spain, England
and France with the statement that their American

\ possessions would be in danger from the desire of
he United States for empire.

There was considerable English sympathy for the
I secession movement, but the condition of parties, the
f sentiment against slavery, the active efforts of Eng
lish friends of the Union, together with the diplo
macy of Seward and Adams, prevented the success
of Confederate efforts to secure recognition or inter
vention.

Earl Russell in his " Recollections and Sugges
tions " says that the only grave error of his official
acts toward America was his neglect to detain the
Alabama. The British cabinet, while Napoleon was
intriguing and Anglo-American relations were
strained, was, as a rule, discreet and fair in its policy
,of neutrality. Benjamin, Mason and Slidell all con-
jsidered that Earl Russell was cold, distant and un-
i friendly to their cause, and after 1862 their only hope
[was for a change of cabinet or complications, but
many members of the Lords and Commons were in
(frequent conference with Mason and openly express-
*ed the desire to embarrass the government and force

61 Instr. to Mann (circular), Oct. 10, 1864.
02 Weekly Register (Lynchburg), Dec. 24, 1864. J- B. Jones:
Diary, Oct. 26, 1864. The Index, Jan. 5, 1865.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY IOI

it to recognize the Confederacy. It has been said y
that the dress suit and digestive apparatus of Eng
land were hostile to the United States, but that the
cerebro-centres, heart and muscle were friendly.

Napoleon was held back by England and the
people. He held many conversations with Slidell and
was eagerly planning in the Tuileries to recognize
the South and break the blockade, but the capture
of New Orleans prevented any step he 'i^av;- have
contemplated without the cooperation of England.
He afterwards seemed to favor the constructicji ' x*f
Confederate vessels in French ports ancTit'wa's prin
cipally the vigilance of Mr. Dayton, the American
minister, which prevented these vessels from reaching
the sea, but the Confederate agents asserted that the
Emperor had wilfully tricked them.

The Confederacy was disappointed in the power of
cotton to secure foreign influence. A report to the
Richmond congress in December, i864,63 said tha
England, at the beginning of the war, possessed larg
stocks of cotton and cotton goods which the owner
sold for exorbitant prices, doing a smaller busines
in quantity but a larger one in value and leaving
their unemployed operators to be supported by oth
ers. Besides, from 1862 there was a steady flow of
cotton to both Europe and the Northern states. The
report to Congress stated that England had received
indirectly from the Confederacy since September,
1863, 4000 bales per week; that United States mer
chants also had the benefit of exports in Confederate
cotton through the trade with Mexico and the West

63Geo. McHenry: Cotton Crisis, Dec. 18, 1864.

IO2 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

Indies, and had not drawn from Europe; that King
Cotton had been captured by United States vessels
while running the blockade, and had thus assisted the
finances of the United States. In February, 1862,
the Richmond Examiner proposed that the Govern
ment should burn the cotton to prevent it falling into
the hands of citizens of the North.04 In October,
1862, Benjamin, desiring to secure army stores, gave
Mr. Dunnock permission to sell cotton on the coast.
Randolph,, the Secretary of War, urged the accept
ance -of offers by others to trade it for meat and
< a •>

bread imports held by the United States. Davis hesi
tated, but on November 8, he consented to allow Gov
ernor Pettus of Mississippi to trade it for salt at New
Orleans which was under the jurisdiction of Butler.
In 1863, there were complaints that while the Con
federates could not place enough money in Europe
to pay for needed supplies, the United States was re
ceiving both cotton and information through the
blockade runners and the Southern Express Com
pany was monopolizing the railroads to deliver cot
ton to speculators who sent it into the North. In
April, 1863, it was said that importation by British
adventurers was contrived by Northern merchants
with the sanction of the United States Government
and that war supplies were therefore usually cap
tured. In March, 1864, J. B. Lamar of Savannah,
who had command of five steamers, wrote that he
could easily arrange with the Federal commanders

M Bunch, the British consul at Charleston, wrote Lord
Russell on August 15, 1862, that 1,000,000 bales of cotton had
been destroyed by the South. By the end of the year very
little was taken to the coast.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY 103

to permit them to pass out with cotton by paying
one-half for freight.53 On April 2, General Lee made
regulations to prevent cotton from passing to the
North unless allowed by the Richmond Government.
A month later Memminger favored a proposition of
Mr. Bond for the Government to give him a bill of
sale of ten thousand bales of cotton in exposed places
in the West " to be shipped via New Orleans to
Antwerp." In June, one of the commissary officers
in the West proposed to the Government to sell cot
ton on the Mississippi river for London exchange and
indicated that he had large sums to his credit by such
•transactions.

George McHenry, in a pamphlet on the approach
ing " Cotton Crisis " published at Richmond, in De
cember, 1864, said that under the acts of the United
States Congress of July 2, by which the Secretary of
the Treasury was directed to authorize purchases of
products of the Confederate States, the North had
been getting cheap cotton, and the South receiving
dear bacon; that the trade had been winked at on the
part of some of the Confederate authorities; that
frauds had been practiced to a shameful degree; and
that there had been a constant drain of cotton from
Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. On September 27,
1864, the Confederate cotton agent in Mississippi was
authorized by the Government at Richmond to sell
cotton in exposed situations to United States agents
for specie. In October, Beverly Tucker who was in
Canada made a contract by authority of the Secretary
of War to exchange cotton for bacon pound for

65 J. B. Jones: Diary.

IO4 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

pound. The Secretary of the Treasury was not
pleased with the arrangement.

In January, 1865, Trenholm, Secretary of ihe
Treasury, authorized an agent to go to Augusta to
buy all the cotton for the Government, and then sell
it for the London exchange to parties who were to
be allowed to remove it within the Federal lines or
abroad. A month later speculators at Wilmington
seemed to want their cotton to fall into United States
hands.

There had been a considerable loss on the cotton
exchanged in Europe for supplies. The rate for
blockade running was extravagant and the cotton was
usually sold at less than the market price. Some
said it would have been far better to pay gold for
supplies and retain the cotton; others that the Gov
ernment should have assumed complete control of all
cotton and the regulation of the price. When the
Richmond Government saw that the war and the
blockade would continue, it arranged to use cotton as
the basis of a loan negotiated in Europe by Erlanger,"8
but its power to control the cotton was restricted by
a large amount in the hands of those who would not
sell, and it did not desire to seize the crops of those
who refused to receive a depreciated currency in pay
ment. The first efforts to ship cotton on Govern
ment account met with difficulty and delay. Ships
engaged in the blockade trade were owned by private
firms who wanted all their space and the ships owned
by the Government were wanted for other purposes.
On December 29, 1863, Mallory wrote Bullock that

98 Capers: Memminger.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY IO5

3100 bales had been shipped from Charleston and
Wilmington via Bermuda and Nassau to go to Fraser,
Trenholm & Co. Later he said that 1200 bales had
been purchased by the State Department and would
go forward as rapidly as possible.67 At the beginning
of 1863, Bullock had suggested that the Government
should own its packets in order to avoid heavy
freights. In September, when Mason saw no pros
pect of another European loan, he wrote Benjamin
that the Confederacy in order to cheapen goods,
strengthen the Confederate credit and prevent the
United States from sharing in the profits of running
the blockade should take entire control of exporta
tion of cotton and the importation of supplies.68 Bul
lock suggested the same to Mallory in October, stat
ing that the Confederacy should accumulate in Eu
rope a large supply of cotton by which to rule the
market and perhaps exert political influence. Again,
in November, he urged the building of special ves
sels for shipments by the Government. In December
Benjamin prepared a project for a " Bureau of Ex
port and Import," and early in 1864 he recommended
a Government monopoly in the export of cotton and
the import of necessary supplies. Congress adopted
the measure; and McRae, who had written from Paris
urging this plan, during the following summer con
tracted with Fraser, Trenholm & Co. for eight steel-
clad steamers, six of which reached the Confederate
coasts and made one or more trips before the close of
the war. Other vessels were begun but not com-

61 Bullock, Vol. II. '

88 Despatches of Mason to Benjamin, No. 45, Sept. 5, 1863.

IO6 THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY

jpleted. Notwithstanding the tone of unofficial
speeches in England, the British Government refused
to allow unarmed ships to escape when they were
clearly intended for use by the Confederates.

One of the principal factors in forcing the Confed
eracy to end the war was the lack of supplies which
cotton could have purchased if it could have been
shipped to Europe. The blockade by sea and by lane
was the principal cause of the Confederate failure
If the vessels at Liverpool and Bordeaux had beet
allowed to go to sea in 1864 the South might hav<
opened some of her ports./ George McHenry in hi
report on " the approaching1 cotton crisis " in Decem
ber, 1864, said that if the Confederates could hav<
withheld their cotton from the outer world the pow
ers by that time would have been forced into a polic)
of recognition, but that a large share of it had abso
lutely been dissipated away; that most of the Con
federate legislation had operated to favor a few spec
ulators who had neither social nor political influence
across the Atlantic, and who, so long as they had con
tracts giving them the monopoly of the trade at 700
per cent profit did not care to see peace brought
about,""/ Mr. McHenry said that the cotton operators
in England who were over employed before the war
had invested money in the savings banks and had
been using it during the period of tinder-employ
ment since the war began, but that they had now ex
pended all their former earnings, and sold their fur
niture, and must soon have work. He held that Eng
land was in error in expecting an increased supply

09 Geo. McHenry: Approaching Cotton Crisis, Dec. 31,
1864.

THE CONFEDERATE FOREIGN POLICY IO7

of cotton from countries which had hitherto produced;
little, and stated that the stoppage of the Confederate!
cotton leak would certainly produce a cotton crisis
in England some time during the year 1865 and cause
Manchester to force the ministry to recognize the
Confederacy.

frt the beginning of 1865* Mr. Davis and Mr. Ben
jamin had resolved not only to offer emancipation
f&r recognition or intervention by England and
Rrance, but to contract with syndicates at London and
Paris ^agreeing to seize cotton and furnish it to them
in payment for funds necessary to procure a navy. At
tliat time, however, no policy could have secured the
success of secession.

CHAPTER IV

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

In 1860 the Prince of Wales visited the northern
portion of the United States, going as far south as
Virginia. He slept at the White House, planted .1
tree at the tomb of Washington, and was given a re
ception indicating that Anglo-American relations
were more cordial than they had been for years.
When the storm of the "irrepressible conflict" burst
forth in torrents of fury the next year, the sympathy
of Queen Victoria, Prince Albert, the Prince of
Wales and the majority of the people of England was
with the Union cause. Slavery in the South , had
been a source of much annoyance to England, and the
Northern people hoped that the secession movement
would receive no support, but in this they were disap
pointed. Many of the aristocracy of England stood
for the South. London club life was Southern in its
sympathies and prominent English papers endeavored
to mould England in favor of the Southern Confed
eracy. Prominent statesmen considered that the
Union was " shooting the Niagara Falls." Lord
Russell spoke of the " late United States." The Earl
of Shrewsbury spoke of the trial and failure of democ
racy and prophesied the establishment of an aristo
cracy in America. In October, 1862, Gladstone said
that Jefferson Davis had made an army, a navy and
a nation.

MISSION OF YAXCEY, ROST AND MANN (IOC)

On the day of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration Mr.
Gregory, in the House of Commons, gave notice of
motion to recognize the independence of the Confed^
erate States; and, soon after, by a public letter, urged
this policy as a means of breaking up the slave trade,
and as a retaliation against the American tariff.
Many of the leaders of the Confederacy already had
strong expectations of securing early recognition by
both England and France, especially for commercial
reasons.JOn March 16, 1861, while Confederate com
mission eTs""were at Washington trying to open peace
negotiations with Secretary Seward, Mr. Toombs-
directed Yancey, Rost and Mann to go to London
" as soon as possible " (and then to other European
capitals) to press claims for recognition.1 /The in
structions recite that dissolution was tfie result of
long and mature deliberation to escape the persistent
efforts to compel the agricultural South to pay bourp*j
ties to the North in the shape of high protective tar-'
iff_S4_that secession violated no allegiance or rights;1
that the Washington Government was not in a condi
tion to offer opposition; that a large party of Northern
people would not favor resistance to secession; that
there was no unusual reason to fear war; and that
the South had abundant means and determination,
jvpuld be joined by the border states, and would winM
| Power was given the commissioners to make a treaty
^"practically providing for free trade. A willingness
was expressed to continue all the United States trea
ties except the clause providing for the maintenance
of a naval squadron on the coast of AfricaTi Though

1 Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I.

IIO/ MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN
/

the Confederacy had prohibited the slave trade, she
could not help the rest of the world to end it. With the
South controlling the Gulf coast, and one-half of the
Atlantic coast, and with her large exports of cotton
and her laisscz faire policy in commerce, it was ex
pected that England would be ready to oppose any
measure by the United States Government that would
interfere with trade.2 £After Sumter fell, Toombs
wrote (April 24) to the commissioners stating that
war was unavoidable but that unrestricted intercourse
with friendly nations was desired,3 and he soon au
thorized them (May 18) to issue commissions for
privateers!"! In 1856 the powers of Europe had en -
deavorecPto persuade all nations to abandon priva
teering, but the United States having no large navy
had refused to join such an arrangement. Toombs
now stated that the large navy of the United States
made it necessary for the Confederacy to adopt this

2 W. H. Russell, an English journalist, who spent May of
1861 in the South, and had a seat on the floor of the legisla
tive assembly at Montgomery when it was not in secret
session, says in his diary (May 6th) that the press was fan
ning the flames, and that Browne, Assistant Secretary of
State, had informed him that 400 letters applying for letters
of marque and reprisal had been received by the Confederate
government. Russell visited the plain office of Mr. Davis,
and also that of the cordial Mr. Benjamin, whom he said
was " not afraid of anything." Benjamin stated that if
England declared privateers to be pirates the Confederacy
would consider it as a declaration of war, and meet it. He
was certain that if the United States claimed the Confederate
ports as United States ports, that the British law officers
would advise the British government not to recognize the
blockades. W. H. Russell: Diary, North and South.

3 Confed. " Dip. Cor.", Vol. I, Instr. to Y., R. and M.,
No. 2. Ibid., No. 5.

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN III

method of warfare. He had made no allusion to
slavery in the first instructions, but he now stated that
it was evidently the intention of Lincoln to overthrow
domestic instituticns and to sweep away the rights
of the minority. The right of each state to judge what
are infractions of the constitution, and the remedy for
such infractions, was declared. Assurance of the en
thusiasm and unanimity of the South was given, and
the commissioners were instructed to present to
England the prejudicial results of the blockade. At
the same time Captain Bullock was sent to secure war
vessels in Europe.

Before the last instructions had been received the
three commissioners had reached London, and, on
May 3, through the-.good .offices of Mr. Gregory of / A/VV"~'
the House of Commons, had obtained J^ormal inter- u *JL**
view with Lord Russell. They stated that a new -
government in America had been formed without
shedding a drop of blood and was prepared to main
tain its independence — and they emphasized especially
the unrestricted commercial advantages which Eng
land would obtain by recognition.4 They said that
the tariff was the principal cause of secession, and
pointed to the new Morrill tariff as a means of nearly
excluding English manufactures from the North.
Earl Russell informed the commissioners that the
whole matter would be a subject of Cabinet consider
ation, but he expressed no opinion. Mr. Rost re
ceived more encouragement in Paris, where he had an
interview with Count De Morny, a confidential friend
of the Emperor Napoleon. The Count said that

4 Russell to Lord Lyons, May n, 1861.

112 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

France and England had agreed to pursue the same
course, and that recognition was a mere matter of
time, but that it would be a fatal mistake to urge im-
^mediate action. He stated- that France ; would be
ready to receive suggestions from the Confederates
unofficially and secretly, and that so long as cotton
was for sale both France and England would see that
their vessels reached the Confederate ports. In a
despatch to Secretary Toombs, the commissioners
expressed confidence that neither England nor
France were averse to the -disintegration of the
United States, but they feared that public opinion
against the Confederacy on the question of slavery
would embarrass the governments in dealing with the
question of recognition.5

In April the British Government had concluded not
to intrude its counsels unsolicited to avert war.6 ' On
May 2, Russell referred to the war as a bad one and
, said: "For God's sake, let us, if possible, keep out
of it." ' Though war had been declared by neither
party, Russell, in reply to Gregory, on May 6, an
nounced the decision of the law officers of the Crown
that the Southern Confederacy must be treated as a
belligerent as Greece had been in 1825, but he antici
pated no disagreement with the United States as to
the blockade. On the same day he wrote to the
British ambassador at Paris inviting the Emperor to
cooperate in a joint endeavor to obtain from each of
the belligerents certain concessions in favor of neu-

5Confed. "Dip. Cor.," Vol. I, p. 105. Despatches of
Yancey and Mann, No. I, London, May 21, 1861.
8 162 Parl. Debates, Lords, April 29, 1861.
7 Sen. Rp. 1160, 54-2.

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

trals. The French minister concurred.8 British
statesmen saw the necessity of warning British sea
men that privateering was against the foreign enlist
ment act, and on May 13 the government issued a
proclamation of neutrality between the United States
and " certain states styling themselves the Confeder
ate States of America." Earl Russell based his ac
tion on the " si?e and population of the seceding
states." He soon gave orders to interdict the en
trance of all ships of war or privateers with prizes,
into any of the British ports.9 Some believed that
Russell felt that recognition of the independence of
the Confederacy was only a question of time, and
thought that he hurried his proclamation in order
to avoid the remonstrance of C. F. Adams, the new
American minister who was on his way to London.
W. H. Russell, the English journalist who was trav
elling in the United States, found people in the North
very indignant against England on account of the
British policy.10 They pointed out that the United
States had taken no such unfriendly course during the
Canadian rebellion.

The British proclamation of neutrality, practically
recognizing the Confederacy as a belligerent, was
given at a time when the United States claimed that
no state of war existed, and that this action would

8 In March, 1861, Mercier at Washington seems to have
advised France to recognize the Confederacy. In May he
advised his government to intervene by raising the blockade.
About May 21 he was at Richmond and held prolonged in
terviews with Benjamin — probably for the purpose of rescuing
tobacco which had been purchased by French citizens.

9 163 Parl. Debates, June 7, 1861.

10 W. H. Russell: Diary, p. 133.

8

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

be a means of aiding the secessionists in the estab
lishment of their power. Complaints were made tha
the British Government had not given the nev\
American administration time to develop its policy o
ending the " demoralization " which had been grow
ing since the November election. The United State:
did not recognize the Confederacy as a belligeren
until President Lincoln under the act of Congress o
July 13, issued his proclamation of August 16, 1861. I
was stated that England knew the Confederacy ha<'
no navy, and was aware that the United States consid
ered secession unconstitutional. Secretary Fish in
1869, in referring to the matter, said " the assumed
belligerency of the insurgents was a fiction . . . tho
anticipation of supposed belligerency to come, but
which might never have come if not thus anticipated
and encouraged." English writers, on the other
hand, said that President Lincoln's proclamation of
a blockade to suppress local insurrection practically
recognized belligerency, and that it had become nec
essary for Great' Britain to protect the interests of
Her citizens which would be affected by the war.

A few hours after the British Government issued
its proclamation Charles Francis Adams arrived in
London to replace Dallas as United States minister,
and to oppose decidedly any wavering policy of the
British Government which might give the Confeder
ates hope of recognition. " You alone will represent
your country at London " said Seward in his instruc
tions to Adams, " and you will represent the whole of
it there. When you are asked to divide that duty
with others, diplomatic relations between the Gov
ernment of Great Britain and this Government will

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1 15

be suspended." Before Adams arrived, Dallas
informed Seward of Russell's unofficial interview witr
the Confederate agents on May 3. Seward had also
learned that England and France had decided to act
together. He had not expected such an alliance, and
resolved to take no notice of it, but he was determined!
to take a decided stand against European interference;
in the war. On May 21, in a letter bristling with ref
erences to the danger of a war with European na
tions, and stating that the United States was ready
to meet such a war with confidence and success, he
wrote Adams that the United States after long for
bearance had a right to adopt a blockade as a means
of suppressing insurrection, and that the treatment
to be administered to Confederate privateers was a
matter for the United States alone to decide.11 He
also stated that even unofficial intercourse with the
Confederates was hurtful to the United States and he

11 This letter had several of its teeth drawn by Lincoln
before it was sent. In the original draft Seward said, " We
intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever issue
may arise between us and Great Britain," but Lincoln struck
out this phrase, as well as others. W. H. Russell, in his
diary said that the relations of the United States with Eng
land probably were considerably affected by Seward's failure
in his prophecies as to the early suppression of secession.
He said that Seward, becoming more exacting and defiant,
and assuming higher ground as the Confederacy gained
'power, had been " fretful, irritable and acrimonious," but
that Sumner was useful in allaying irritation. On July 4,
Seward told Mr. Russell that if any European power pro
voked a war the United States would not shrink from it, and
had nothing to fear from a foreign war, though it should
wrap the world in fire. Russell could not but admire his
confidence and coolness. It appeared that he, like Benjamin,
was " not afraid of anything.''

Il6 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

added " You will .... desist from all intercourse
whatever, official or unofficial, with the British Gov
ernment so long as it shall continue intercourse of
either kind with the domestic enemies of this
country." On June 14, Adams replied that Russell
declared he had " no intention of seeing them again."
Seward, by his constant vigilance, embarrassed the
Confederate commissioners at every corner. After
the passage of the Morrill tariff he expected that the
Confederates would ask for recognition as a retalia
tion and gave Adams his instructions to thwart the
arguments of the Confederates. He said that to seek
to destroy the Union as a retaliatory measure would
be far more injurious to the United States than the
temporary disadvantage of a revenue law could be to
England; he intimated that England should not as
sume that the Confederacy would offer more liberal
terms of trade than the North could offer; he stated
that the Confederates might in case of war find them
selves tempted to levy import duties, or be forced to
discontinue their offer of practically free trade; he
urged that most of the imports from Europe to the
United States were consumed in the North, and that
the Morrill tariff probably would not decrease the
amount; he declared that recognition would mean in
tervention and war, and that permanent disunion
would mean perpetual civil war and Confederate ag
gression for expansion, which might be fraught with
grave consequences to other nations and to the peace
of the world; he reminded England that recognition
would be a dangerous precedent to be set by a nation
whose bonds to her colonies might be put to a se
vere test by future insurrections.

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1 1/

By June the Confederate commissioners found that
the general opinion at London was that the North U/f
was too strong for the South.12 Seeing no immediate
hope of recognition by England and France they sug
gested that communication should be opened with
Spain. Gregory had proposed to make a move in
the Commons on June 7, looking toward recognition,
but he postponed his motion at the request of Earl
Russell, who said it was opposed to public interests
to raise such a question. The commissioners were
hopeful, however, that the Confederacy would win
favor by the failure of Seward's pledges to restore
the Union in ninety days. In a recent interview with
the Confederate commissioners, Earl Russell had
seemed to be interested in their narrative of the con
duct of the United States toward the Confederate I
Peace Commissioners at Washington, but he only said \
that. Great Britain desired to communicate with both
the United States and the Confederate States as to 1
the Declaration of Paris and the rights of neutrals, \
and that the cabinet would consider all the questions
that arose — but he could give no promise in regard
to recognition.18

12 Despatches of Yancey, Rost and Mann, No. 2., June I,
1861.

13 On June 15 Lord Lyons and Mercier in an interview
with Seward proposed to read their instructions as to the
neutral attitude of their respective governments, and ascer
tain the position of the United States as to the Declaration
of Paris, but Seward already having been informed of the
substance of the instructions, and feeling that foreign powers
had no right (by assuming the attitude of a neutral) to decide
that the United States was divided into two belligerent par
ties, declined to hear them read, and a few days later in
structed Dayton at Paris and Adams at London, that the
insurrection in the South did not constitute a war.

Il8 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

In 1856 representatives from the different Euro
pean governments met at Paris and agreed upon the
following declarations:

"(i) Privateering is and remains abolished.

"(2) The neutral flag covers enemies' goods with
the exception of contraband of war.

"(3) Neutral goods, with the exception of contra
band of war are not liable to capture under the ene
mies' flag.

"(4) Blockades in order to be binding must be ef
fective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

At that time the United States, having a small
navy as compared to the nations of Europe with
whom there was a possibility of a contest in the fu
ture, felt that it was inexpedient to agree to a declara
tion against privateering unless private property
should be exempted from capture by sea.14

Having practically recognized the Confederacy as
a belligerent, Lord Russell, on May 18, instructed
Lord Lyons at Washington to take steps to secure
the assent of the officials of the Confederacy to the
rules of 1856 in regard to a neutral flag, neutral goods
and blockades, and authorized him to confide the ne
gotiation to Robert Bunch, the British Consul at
Charleston. On July 5, Lord Lyons directed Bunch
, ^ to proceed in the negotiations with the Richmond au

thorities, using caution so as to avoid raising the
question of recognition. Mr. Bunch secured Mr,J\V^
H. Trescot as an agent to lay the matter before Mr.
^\ Davls7"and the latter, after a cabinet meeting, obtained

14 Exec. Docs., 24-3, Vol. I, p. 33-

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1 19

the passage by the Confederate Congress of a resolu
tion maintaining the right of privateering, but ac
ceding to the Declaration of Paris on all other sub
jects. This resolution was approved August 13, and
England practically agreed not to interfere with pri
vateering by the Confederacy.

As soon as Seward heard of the negotiations with
the Confederacy he asked the removal of Bunch, but
Lord RusselJ accepted the responsibility of his acts
and refused to remove him, whereupon his exequatur
was revoked by President Lincoln on the ground that
his communication invited the insurgents' to exercise
power belonging to a sovereign state — to become a
party to an international agreement which was simi
lar to a treaty. The United States was willing to
accept the entire declaration of Paris, but England
did not desire her to accept the article against pri
vateering.15

The Confederate commissioners abroad were still
watching the popular pulse. By July 15, Rost had
held an informal interview with M. Thouvenel the
French minister of foreign affairs. He found that
while France was ready to join the other powers in
an effort for peace it was necessary for her to look
[first to her interests in Europe. Yancey had joined
Lost in Paris, and he reported that the Emperor had

10 feeling hostile to the Confederacy but only waited \
[or England. The commissioners were of the opinion
lat Spain, Belgium and Denmark were friendly and

feady to extend recognition as soon as England and
France should do so. In a letter complaining of the

13 J. B. Moore: International Arbitrations, Vol. I, pp.
V>4-65.

120 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

neglect of the Confederacy to keep the commissioners
well informed as to vessels entering and clearing Con
federate ports, and urging the establishment of a se
cret line of communication by way of Canada, he said
that opinion was becoming reconciled to secession as
a fact though it had been opposed to it as a theory.
In a letter to Toombs (July 15) the commissioners
stated that relations between Mr. Adams and the
British Cabinet were neither amicable nor satisfac
tory. It was seen that complications might arise to
the advantage of the Confederacy. But Adams was
successful in breaking off the personal interviews be
tween Russell and the commissioners, and this caused
a difference of opinion in the commission. Yancey
thought that Russell's concession to Adams's de
mand was a violation of British neutrality. He said
that the cause of the Confederacy could not be ade
quately explained in writing, nor the temper of the
British Government be discovered, and urged that a
firm but moderate protest should be made, but Rost
and Mann objected to the protest and the subject was
referred to Richmond.10

After the Confederate victory at Manassas (Bull
Run), in July, the commissioners were encouraged to
renew their efforts and to furnish Russell with a long
communication giving reasons for immediate recogni
tion. R. M. T. Hunter, who had replaced Toombs,
informed the commissioners that Union sentiment in
the South had been silenced, and that Maryland and
Missouri were kept in the Union only by Federal
troops.17 Even in the United States some said that

16 Du Bose: Yancey.

L! Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I. Instr. to Y., R. and M.,
No. 7, July 29, 1861.

}Y*-t^v

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 1^12*

the Union was as dead as the Achean League.18 Earl
Russell in a note of August 7 intimated a desire to -^
have a written explanation of the alleged right of the
Confederate States to recognition by England.
Yancey and Mann replied on August 8, promising to
prepare the document. Rost came from Paris, the
document was prepared the next week, and on August
14 it was presented, j It reviewed the two previous in
terviews, and the instructions of the Confederate
Government, and urged that the secession violated
no principles of allegiance, but was sustained by the
principles of the American Declaration of Independ
ence in favor of self-government.

The commissioners had already expatiated upon
the extent, products and population of the Confeder
acy, offering arguments to prove that they were not
rebels and pirates. They now explained why it was
necessary for the agricultural South to resort to pri
vateering in order to injure American commerce,
stating that the English law of neutrality as to ports
favored the United States. They announced that
the blockade was ineffective except on the Chesa
peake, that Confederate resources were abundant and
that reconstruction was impossible. They then pro
ceeded to show that anti-slavery sentiment could not
remain in sympathy with the North. They were
aware of the strength of this sentiment in Europe
and of its influence in preventing friendly relation
with the Confederacy. They did not undertake to
discuss the morality of the institution; but they stated
that the authors of the Declaration of Independence

18 W. H. Russell: Diary, July 23, 1861.

122 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

found the African race in the colonies, in slavery by
English law and by the laws of nations, that they left
that fact where they found it, and made the declara
tion of freedom for the white race only and perpetu
ated slavery in the fundamental theory of the gov
ernment. As to the wisdom of the fathers, they said
that it was not a matter for them to discuss. But
they informed Russell that the United States Con
gress had declared that the war was prosecuted only
to maintain the constitution and to preserve the
Union. "It was not from fear of liberation of the
slaves," they said, " that secession took place. The
new party in power has proposed to guarantee slav
ery forever, if the states of the South will but remain
in the Union." Some at this time surmised that the
United States might change its policy in regard to
slavery. The commissioners met this squarely by
stating that the abrupt destruction of a labor system
which had given bread to 10,000,000 people engaged
in manufacturing, and reared so vast a commerce be
tween America and Europe, " would be disastrous to
the world as well as to the master and the slave." In
urging the claims of the Confederacy to recognition
as a de facto Government, Texas and South America
were mentioned as precedents, and reference was
made to the necessity of British commercial rela
tions with the South in order to preserve great inter
ests in England. As an inducement to break the
blockade the commissioners stated that the cotton
crop would be delivered at the Southern wharves and
ports whenever there was a prospect of the blockade
being raised, and not before. An embargo had been
laid as an offensive measure against the passage of

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

cotton across the border into the United States, thus
making it necessary for Europe to seek it at the ports
of the South.19 The commissioners closed their com
munication by saying that they would be surprised if
England left the Confederacy to contend alone for
interests which \vere as important to the commercial
powers of Europe as to herself without giving even
friendly countenance, but they said that the citizens
of the South would continue their task with vigor
and that when peace should be won they would not
be responsible for all the bloodshed and for the suf
fering of millions in the eastern as well as the western
hemisphere.20

Going to Paris, the commissioners had an interview
with the minister of the marine and colonies, who
gave hopeful intimations. They also soon receivec
private information that the letter of/ August 14 hac
made a good impression on Russell; that there was
a strong feeling in the cabinet in favor of recognition
and that England had suggested to France to take the
nitiative in European recognition. They also learned
:hat Louis Napoleon had officially asked England to,
cooperate with him in recognizing the Confederacy
and breaking the blockade, but that England had re-;
used. Cotton had gone up 100 per cent; the facto-
ies were running on short time and there was a
:>read riot in Paris. But France could not lead in a
policy of intervention or interference.!

3 Raising the blockade by England of course meant war
with the United States. In order to open the blockade,
Yancey, Rhett and Toombs had desired that the Confederacy
should adopt a policy of offering England a practical monop
oly of commerce for twenty years, as well as other stipula
tions. *° See McPherson: Rebellion.

\

124 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

^4 Russell replied on August 24, stating that the Brit-
fish Government did not pretend to pronounce judg
ment on questions in debate between the United
States and her adversaries in North America; that it
desired to remain neutral and would perform all tl e
duties required of a neutral; that it could not ac
knowledge the independence of the Confederacy until
arms or some peaceful mode of negotiation should
better determine the respective positions of the two
belligerents.'1 Yancey soon sent Hunter a letter of
resignation.

On August 24, Hunter instructed the commission
ers to hurry to Madrid, to inform Spain that since
secession the South no longer desired Cuba; to reprc-
; sent that mutual interests seemed to invite a close and
mutual alliance; and to ask for recognition. It was

1 stated that both Spain and the Confederacy were
interested in the same social system, that the growth
of Spanish power and resources could never be a
cause for Confederate jealousy, but that in case of
reunion the non-slave-holding states would also desire
to annex the Spanish colonies. It was suggested that
Spain would be justified, even at some risk, in assist-

"' ing to build up a great friendly power that would
prove so advantageous to her.22

A short time after Hunter's instructions were writ-
vxten, an act of the Confederate Congress disunited
the European commission, and on September 23, Mr.
i Davis appointed Mason and Slidell 23 as commission
ers to England and France respectively with instruc-

21 51 Brit, and Foreign State Papers.

22 Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I, p. 120.
88Instr. to Mann, No. n, Sept. 23, 1861.

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

tions to urge that the new " homogeneous " Southern
union could serve as no precedent for revolutionary
violence, that its existence was of deep commercial
and political interest to other nations, and that they
should intervene against American intervention and
an ineffectual blockade. Of the former commission
Mann was sent to Belgium, Rost was expected to go
to Spain, and Yancey was asked to remain in Europe
until Mason should arrive. Though Mason received
his instructions September 23, he did not reach Eu
rope until January 29/1862.

In the meantime the attitude of the European pow-
rs toward the blockade was *a disappointment to the
Tonfederacy. Russell, having heard of Mercier's
.dvice to the French Government, to intervene and
orcibly raise the blockade, wrote to Palmerston, on
3ctober 17, that there was much good sense in Mer-
ier's observations, but that it was not advisable to
>reak a blockade merely for the sake of getting cot
ton. He intimated that good offices for pacification
should first be offered, and that in case they failed,
intervention on a large scale might be taken about the
end of the year in order to close the war. Palmers-
ton was not ready at that time, and such an aggres
sive action would have been less popular in England
after the American concession in the Trent affair.
The English Government knew that the recognition
f the tonfederacy would place England in the atti-
ude of an ally against the United States, and there
;as no desire to assume such a position.

Yancey, after a short stay in France, returned to
England intending to depart for the Confederate
States at an early date. He was still confident of the

126 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

ability of the South to resist the superior numbers and
resources of the North. In November, at a dinner of
the Fish-monger's Society, he stated that the Souta
could live under a blockade. Yancey's return to the
Confederacy was delayed by the capture of Maso-i
and Slidell on the British steamer Trent. Mr.
Hanckel of Charleston, on the arrival of the Trent i i
England, delivered to Mr. Yancey and his associates
the instructions which had been given Mason an i
Slidell.'"* Information of the Trent affair reached
London November 27, and the press was indignant.
Yancey, immediately, while war was menacing, ur
gently renewed the attempt to get recognition, anc",
in order to show the inefficiency of the blockade, pre
sented information (brought by Mr. Hanckel) of a list
of over forty vessels which had passed the blockade in
safety (up to August 7).

In the letter to Russell (November 30) the commis
sioners, stating that the United States and the Con
federacy had both agreed to the Declaration of Paris
on the subject of the blockade, urged that the Euro
pean powers should enforce it, not only because of the
principles of the Declaration, but also from the inter
ests affected. They declared that a war shutting up
cotton was directed against Europe as well as against
the Southland suggested that since transit routes had
been made neutral, cotton could be made so. They
informed Russell that no blockade would ever sub
due the South, but that it should be declared ineffec
tive for the interests of mankind as well as for those
of the Confederacy. They insisted that real neti-

™ U. S. and Confed. Naval Records, Series i, Vol. I, p. 155-

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 127

trality called for a rigid observance of international
law on the subject <^L blockades, and that Europe
should not give aid to the United States through
considerations of her embarrassed condition.25

Russell briefly replied December 7, as follows:
" Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr.
Yancey, Mr. Rost and Mr. Mann. He has had the
honor to receive their letters and enclosures of the
27th and 3Oth of November; but in the present state
of affairs he must decline to enter into any official
communication with them."

The Confederate expectations which arose after the
Trent affair were gradually dissipated when the
course of the United States Government became
known. When Slidell reached Paris in February,
1862, Rost handed him a " Confidential Memoran
dum " dated "London, 31 Jan., 1862," and indicating
a correspondence between the British-Cabinet and the
maritime powers of Europe concerning the Federal
" Stone Fleet," and the blockade, in which the powers
alluded to the blockade as ineffectual.28 But Slidell
said that the memorandum was either a hoax played
on Rost's credulity, or an invention of his own.
Yancey left London upon Mason's arrival, carrying
with him Mason's first despatch, which narrated the
incidents relating to his eventful journey, and reported
that the ministry seemed to " hang fire." Running the
blockade at Sabine Pass, Yancey reached New Or
leans, where he informed Soule and others that Prince
Albert and Queen Victoria were against the seces-

25 51 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, pp. 254-57.
28 Despatches from Mason to Benjamin, No. 25, January 14,
1863.

128 MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN

sionists, and that English feeling was so strong
against .slavery that the Government would hardly
dare to give any help that would tend to perpetuate
the institutiori.(Tpn March 29, Mr. Davis accepted
Yancey's resignation with regretT""]

Rost, after an interview with trie French minister in
Paris in the latter part of January,27 soon went to his
post at Madrid. In March he was informed by
Mr. Calderon Collantes that Spain was not ready to
take the initiative in Europe in a policy recognizing
the Confederacy.28 There was no encouragement in
this mission. While waiting for news Rost wrote to
Yancey, on April 7, that there was no hope from Eu
rope until the United States should be ready to treat
with the Confederacy as an independent power, and
he thought it was to the interest of the South to
make concessions to secure an alliance with the
North. Seeing "that the Confederacy would have a
big war debt to pay, he suggested that the South
should intimate to the North its willingness to agree
to make its tariff equal to that of the North for a lim
ited time, dispensing with frontier custom houses and
having practically free trade with the United States.
He was willing to give the North commercial advan
tages in order to avoid frontier troubles, and said that
if other nations complained they could be reminded
of their course in the Confederacy's hour of need."9
In bad health, and discouragedf~Rost resigned in

"Despatches of Slidell, No. i, Feb. n, 1862. Rost's inter
view of Jan. 31 was in regard to the blockade, and the
number of vessels leaving Cuba for Confederate ports.

28 Despatches of Rost, March 21, 1862.

29 Rost to Yancey, April 7, 1862.

MISSION OF YANCEY, ROST AND MANN 129

May and left Madrid with his familyV- jThe following
September his health was still wretCTred and he had
not changed his views.30 He said that France waited
for England, that England would do nothing so long
as she could keep peace a.t home, and that Spain would
be the last power to act.31

30 Despatches of Rost, Paris, Sept. 13, 1862.

31 Perry, who represented the United States at Madrid in
1861, before the arrival of Carl Schurz, stated that the sym
pathies of the Spanish government at the beginning of the
war were favorable to the " faction " which seemed to offer
some hope of dividing the United States and diminishing
her power in the western hemisphere. He said that Preston,
of Kentucky, during the latter part of his term as United
States minister at Madrid, had endeavored to impress the
governing classes with the belief that the aristocratic and
chivalrous society was in the South, and that the sans culottes
democracy was at the North. Perry stated that the conserva
tive classes were at the North, and the filibusters at the
South. From speeches of Southern leaders at the outbreak
of the Civil War he showed that they contemplated annexa
tion of Cuba, San Domingo and Mexico, and that the Union
of South and North was the best guarantee to Spain of her
own peace in North America.

CHAPTER V

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL

On October 12, 186$, Secretary Hunter received
from W. H. Trescot, of Charleston, a telegram of
which the following is the substance: " Our friends
left here last night at one o'clock. Their escape was
favored by having a fast steamer with good officers,
and by the darkness and rain. The boat will be back
in about a week and nothing should be said of it in
the meantime." :

" Our friends " were James Murray Mason and
John Slidell, who on September 23 had received their
instructions as commissioners to Engffhd and
France7, respectively.2 It was felt that the Confeder
ate claims for recognition had been recently strength
ened, and the commissioners were sent to obtain aid
in every way possible. Both had been prominent
men in national affairs.

James Mason was born in Fairfax county, Virginia,
in 1798. He was a grandson of George Mason who
had been prominent in the Revolution. He graduated
from the University of Pennsylvania in 1818, prac
ticed law in Virginia, served in the state legislature,
and was a member of the state constitutional conven
tion of 1829. In 1833 he was elected to the United
States House of Representatives. In 1847 he entered

1 With Despatches of Mason.

2 Confed. " Dip. Cor.," Vol. I.

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 13!

the United States Senate, of which body he remained
a member for fourteen years, and for ten years was
chairman of the committee on foreign affairs. He
was the author of the fugitive slave law of 1850, and
was always a strong opponent to anti-slavery agita
tion. He had urged secession in Virginia when a
majority favored the Union, and took a prominent
part in changing the decision of his state. He was
a member of the Confederate Congress when ap
pointed commissioner.

John Slidell was born in New York about 1793,
graduated at Columbia in 1810, moved to New Or
leans in 1819, and began the study of law. After 1828
he became prominent in Louisiana politics and in
1842 he was elected to Congress where he served one
term. In 1845 ne was sent as commissioner to
Mexico, but Mexico refused to receive him. In 1853
he entered the United States Senate and remained
until his state seceded in 1861. He represented the
extreme views of the South, and was active on com
mittees, though not prominent in debate. In send
ing these two commissioners to Europe the Confed
eracy hoped soon to receive such support as would
enable it to break the blockade.

The investment of the Southern ports was becoming
severe. At the beginning of the war the United States
navy undertook to blockade the coast of 1900 miles,
capture seaports, acquire control of bays and sounds,
assist in opening the Mississippi, destroy Confeder
ate cruisers, and protect United States commerce.
Most of the steam vessels were abroad when Sumter
fell and there was then no cable to call them home,
but the resources of the North soon created a large

/••^^ A A^*~~ * j

l^tJ**^*^* /Jf
N AND SLIDELL ~*~ £x>*~

132 MISSION OF MASO

navy. On April 27, 1861, Lincoln, in order to stop
the trade and supplies of the Confederacy, declared a
blockade of all the Southern ports, and slowly this
became more and more effective. The cotton exports
of $202,000,000 in 1860 fell to $42,000,000 in 1861, and
to $400,000 in 1862. This was a serious blow to the
South, which was dependent on England for supplies.
A social and industrial revolution had improved the
conditions in the free states, but during the century
there had been very little change in the slave states.
The flow of European immigrants passed by the South
to carry their skill, energy and free labor to the new
homes in the Northwest, so that the resources of the
slave states remained undeveloped, owing to their
peculiar industrial system. The South had no ships,
no gun factories and no machine shops. Even medi
cines had to be bought in a foreign country. But
the English manufacturers and merchants, and four
million laborers, depended upon American raw cotton,
of which the South in 1860 had raised 4,700,000 bales.
Smuggling naturally took place in spite of the block
ade, but by means of the increase of Federal vessels,
and by sinking the hulks of vessels in the channels
leading to Charleston, the investment became so
effective that cotton fell to eight cents in South Caro
lina and rose to fifty cents in England — notwithstand
ing the fact that Nassau had become a centre for
blockade-runners which carried it out on moonless
nights and during storms. The distress of the South
increased, for want of manufactured goods, and the
people could not thrive under isolation from Europe.'

3 T. E. Taylor: Running the Blockade, pp. 16-32, 44-54.

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 133

Would England and France recognize the Confed-
leracy and oppose the blockade?

Mason, with power to make peace, had been
directed to " proceed to London with as little delay as
possible," in order to state the Confederate position
md urge recognition and opposition to the blockade
as a means of shortening an unnecessary war and sub
serving the interests of England as well as of the
Confederacy. He was instructed to say that a dom-
nant majority in the United States had violated the
original compact which had been made between sec
tions with diverse social systems, and that the Gov
ernment no longer protected the Southern system;
that the South, seeking self-government, had decided
to form a new union of more homogeneous materials
and interests, but that the old institutions would be
retained, the form of government not being changed,
and that secession would furnish no precedent for the
overthrow of lawful authority by revolutionary vio
lence; that the United States had rejected the offers
of amicable adjustment by peaceful separation; that,
notwithstanding the advantage of organization which
the United States had at the beginning of the strug
gle, the Confederacy now had a responsible Govern
ment, a united people, 200,000 men in the field and
bright prospects, while the North was suffering from
failures; that the English people had a deep political
and commercial interest in the establishment of the
Confederacy because the latter would not be a rival,
but a customer, of the manufacturing and commercial
nations — that it would favor free trade, prevent the
United States from any longer controlling the cotton
supply, and end the former Southern desire to seek

134 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL

protection and balance of power by the annexation
of contiguous territory. The instructions stated that
the South had resolved to seek protection by separa
tion instead of by annexations, and would no longer
threaten to disturb the peace of the world, but would
be a bond of peace between the nations.

It was urged that the recognition of the Confederacy
would be in accord with the previous policy of Eng
land. Lord John Russell, in recent despatches to
Lord Cowley on the Italian question, referring to the
consistent principles upon which England had acted
since 1821 (at Troppau, Laybach, Verona, and in
the cases of South America, Greece and Belgium),
said: " She uniformly withheld her consent to acts
of intervention by force to alter the internal govern
ment of other nations; she uniformly gave her coun
tenance, and if necessary her aid, to consolidate the
de facto governments which arose in Europe or
America." The Confederate instructions stated that
to withhold recognition would encourage the inter
vention of the United States, and invited the applica
tion of English principles. Hunter desired England
to treat the case of the Confederacy as she had that of
Italy, concerning which Russell had recently said:
" We, at least, are convinced that an authority restored
by force of arms, maintained by force of arms, con
stantly opposed by the national wishes, would afford
no solid and durable basis for the pacification and wel
fare of Italy." Hunter's instructions also insisted that
England should enforce the Declaration of Paris upon
the question of blockade; that a war shutting up cot
ton was directed against manufacturing nations and
humanity as well as against the producing nations;

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 135

and that cotton should be made neutral, like transit
routes, and protected by most of the chances of war.4

The strict blockade made it difficult for Mason and
Slidell to leave the Confederacy. Going to Charles
ton, they awaited a favorable opportunity. They
found three United States steamers and a sloop-of-
war patrolling the harbor. On October 3 they con
templated taking the route through Texas and Mata-
moras unless they were otherwise directed.5 But the
next day, before receiving a reply from Hunter, they
decided that the route by Mexico would be imprac
ticable and unsafe. They found that the Gordon, a
good sea boat of 500 tons, could go at any time, and
by any route, to Nassau or Havana, and that it could
be bought for $62,000, or chartered to either port for
$10,000 for the trip, the Government to pay for its
value if captured. On October 9, the Gordon was
chartered and its name changed to Theodora, and on
the night of October 12, Mason, Slidell, with his wife
and four children, J. E. Macfarland, and George
Eustis 6 and wife, started on their journey to Europe.
As they left the harbor, a shower of rain increased the
darkness, and they passed within a mile and a half of
the nearest United States ship without being captured.
When near Nassau they learned that they could not
obtain a steamer from that point to St. Thomas, and
instead of landing they determined to go to Cuba.

The Theodora reached Havana October 17, but the

4 Confed. " Dip. Cor.", Vol. I, pp. 146-60, Hunter to Mason,
Sept. 23, 1861.

5 Despatches of Mason. Telegram, Oct. 3, 1861.

3 Macfarland and Eustis were the secretaries of Mason and
Slidell, respectively.

136 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL

Confederate party disembarked at Cardenas, where
they were hospitably treated by a planter until they
were ready to go to Havana. At the latter port, the
British consul, Mr. Crawford, introduced them to Gen
eral Serrano, who received them unofficially. Slidell
wrote that they found almost universal sympathy in
Cuba.7 After their departure from Charleston had
become known in the Confederacy, there had been an
expression of much delight. The Richmond Exam
iner of October 29, said that the bold, straightforward
manner of Mason at London would wield an influence
in England which would enable him to sign a treaty
of amity. But Wilkes, stopping at Havana, resolved
to prevent both Mason and Slidell from reaching
Europe.

On November 7, the steamer Trent, with the Con-
ederate party on board, left Havana for St. Thomas,
nd the next day in Bahama channel a second shot,
red across her bows from the San Jacinto, caused her
stop. Lieutenant Fairfax of the San Jacinto was
nt on board with instructions from Wilkes to capture
iason, Slidell, their secretaries, their baggage and
espatches. Captain Moir of the Trent was indig-
ant but courteous. The commissioners refused to
eave the vessel peaceably, but they arranged their
aggage and, under protest, yielded to arrest. The
rent, though its seizure had been contemplated, was
allowed to proceed with its excited passengers, some of
whom indulged in emphatic words of anger. The
San Jacinto reached Fortress Monroe November 15,
and sailed by way of New York to Boston, reaching

7 Despatches of Slidell, No. I, Paris, Feb., 1862.

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 137

the latter place on November 24. During the voyage
Mason and Slidell were kindly treated, being allowed
to occupy Captain Wilkes' cabin. They were taken to
Fort Warren and given comfortable quarters.8 In
their baggage were fine liquors and cigars, but their
despatches had been given to Mr. Hanckel of Charles
ton, who, on his arrival in England on the La Plata
from St. Thomas, delivered them to Yancey, Rost and
Mann.9

From Fortress Monroe on November 15, the tele
graph informed the American people of the Trent /
affair. The people in the North had known of the/
appointment of Mason and Slidell; many also had be
come anxious at the news of their departure, and
there was a storm of applause at the news of their
capture. -Even the Cabinet was elated and Congresfe
gave a vote of thanks to Wilkes. Lincoln recognized .
that, if England protested, the United States ought to
deliver the prisoners, on the ground that their seizure
was a violation of the American principles concern
ing the rights of neutrals. Jefferson Davis, in a mes
sage to the Confederate Congress, said that in the
seizure the United States had assumed a right to
general jurisdiction over the high seas, and that a
claim to seize Confederates in London would have
been as well founded. Many felt that the anxiety of
the Washington Government to prevent the Confed
erate diplomatists from reaching Europe showed a
weakness, and that the seizure would endanger rela
tions between England and the United States, and

8 Despatches of Mason (to Hunter), London, Feb. 2, 1862,
No. i.

9 U. S. and C. S. A. Naval Records, Series i, Vol. I, p. 155.

138 MISSION OP MASON AND SLIDELL

strengthen the hands of not uninfluential persons in
England who were urging a policy of interference ir
the American quarrel. Seward waited to see the
course of the English Government, but November 30,
he informed Adams that the seizure was not author
ized by the Washington Government.
.| The report of the seizure reached London Novem-j
per 27, and the British press indignantly demanded
immediate reparation. The British Government be
gan to arrange for the increase of the British nava
force in American waters, and in a few days the trans
portation of troops to Canada was begun. The Lonj
don press declared that Seward desired a pretex
for a quarrel with England, but Thurlow Weed, wlu
was in London on government business, denied the
report through the Times. Even the manufacturing
classes represented by Bright, Cobden and Forster,
who were friendly to the United States and hoped to
see the doom of slavery, were silenced for the moment,
but they counselled moderation and were confident
that the United States had not authorized the capture.
The law officers of the crown advised Lord Russell
that an American man-of-war would have a right to
board a British mail steamer, open her mail bags, ex
amine their contents, and, in case despatches from the
enemy were found, carry the vessel to a United States
port for adjudication, but that she had no right to
seize Mason and Slidell and leave the vessel to con
tinue its voyage.

On November 29, after a Cabinet meeting, Pal-
merston submitted to the Queen and Prince Albert
the draft of a proposed despatch to Lord Lyons urg
ing the duty of Seward to deliver the prisoners and

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 139

to offer a suitable apology for the aggression. After
its form had been rendered less offensive, Russell sent
a copy to Lord Lyons (by Conway Seymour, Novem
ber 30), together with a private letter, instructing him
to leave Washington if, after a delay of seven days,
there should be no compliance with the demand. This
ultimatum intimated that a crisis was impending.
A messenger delivered it to Lord Lyons on Decem
ber 1 8, and its substance was given to Seward in a
courteous manner the next day.

European opinion generally declared the seizure to
be a violation of neutral rights; on the other hand,
the American press as a rule opposed the surrender
of the prisoners and was ready to risk a war. The
leaders at Richmond saw the great disadvantage which
such a war would bring to the United States, and they
hoped that, while breaking the blockade in America
and the cotton famine in England, it would result in
permanent disunion by establishing Confederate in
dependence.

The newspapers announced friction between Lord
Lyons and Seward,10 and this was followed by the
information that Prince Albert, the friend of "he
United States, was dead, but the Lincoln Adminis
tration was determined to make a friendly adjustment
of the difficulty with England. At a Cabinet meeting
on Christmas Day, and the day following, it was
finally decided that, notwithstanding public opinion,
the most expedient course was to surrender the pris
oners for diplomatic reasons, skillfully stating this
policy to be in accord with the principles for which
America had long contended.11

1- W. H. Russell: Diary. u Nicolay and Hay.

I4O MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL

International law forbids a neutral to perform any
act which will aid the belligerent in conducting hos
tilities. Among such acts are the transportation of
officers, soldiers, despatches of a military character
arms or military stores, and vessels so engaged are
liable to be confiscated. Wilkes had a right to search
the Trent for such contraband of war. But Mason,
Slidell and their secretaries were not contraband
goods, and there seems to have been no right to seizj
them while they were on board the Trent on the high
seas. Diplomatic ministers of recognized states
are entitled to special immunities and the protection
of other governments, but the government repre
sented by Mason and Slidell had no recognition ex
cept as a belligerent. The United States, however,
could not justify the seizure of the Confederate com
missioners on the ground that they were political
offenders unless there had been some treaty providing
for the extradition of such offenders. If there had
been some valid reason for seizing the Trent and
taking her into an American port, the commissioners
might have been legally arrested while in American
waters, but the Trent in carrying Confederate pas
sengers had not violated her duty as a neutral ship.

Though Seward disavowed the act of Captain
Wilkes, he carefully added: "If the safety of thej
Union required the detention of the captured persons 1
it would be the right and duty of this Government to 1
detain them. But the effectual check and waning \
proportions of the existing insurrection, as well as \
the comparative unimportance of the captured per
sons, . . . happily, forbid me from resorting to this
defense." In the later discussions of the principles

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 14!

involved, Russell informed Seward that Great Britain
could not have submitted to Wilkes' act " however
flourishing might have been the insurrection in the
South, and however important the persons captured
might have been." Feeling in the United States was
strong against the English attitude at a moment of
national embarrassment, but under the lead of Sum-
ner, Congress and the people were influenced to sup
port the surrender.

On December 30, Lord Lyons directed Commander
Hewett, of the British war vessel Rinaldo, to receive
the released prisoners at Provincetown, Massachu
setts, and to treat them with the courtesy due to
unofficial persons. On January I, 1862, they were
received on board and expected to go to England by
way of Halifax, but on account of bad weather they
turned to the Bermudas from whence they sailed to
Southampton.

The concession of Seward was a sore disappoint
ment to the Southern hopes of European complica
tion, and, notwithstanding the hopes of Mason, the
prospects at London were by no means encouraging.
The London Times (January n), recommending that
the Commissioners be treated simply as inoffensive
visitors to Europe, said: "They are here for their
own interests, and . . . rather disappointed perhaps
that their detention has not provoked a new war. . . .
They must not suppose, because we have gone to the
very verge of a great war that they are precious in our
eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue
two of their own negroes. . . . Let the Commissioners
come up quietly to town and have their say with
anybody who may have time to listen to them. For

142 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL

our part, we cannot see how anything they may have
to tell can turn the scale of British duty and delibera
tion."

When Mason and Slidell landed at Southampton, a
series of disastrous reverses to the North, followed b
sluggish action, caused many abroad to consider the
the North and the South would never be united again.
England and France were suffering from lack of co
ton, and the South was suffering from a congestion A
it. Napoleon was planning to realize the dream >f
his predecessors by founding an American empire to
perpetuate his dynasty in Europe. The Civil War
was his opportunity, and he was anxious to win glo • v
by playing the role of a mediator in favor of the Sout
,He promptly granted an interview to Slidell, who " i
(sisted on the insufficiency of the blockade, and t
vandalism of the ' Stone Fleet.' " The current f
feeling in France ran strongly against the Nort
>lidell had interviews with Napoleon and the Fren
Cabinet, who appeared to rejoice at Confederate vie-
>ries and regret her defeat. He learned that Napo-
>on had asked England to join with him in recog-
tizing the South; but that England had leaned to the
jide of the United States, and had declined to act.
Lussell refused to respond to £e Confederate protest
igainst " the paper blockade." He afterwards (May
>) said that though thousands in England, on account
)f the closing of the Southern ports, were obliged to

Slidell's instructions of Sept. 23, 1861, directed him to
seek recognition and commercial intercourse, and -to suggest
the importance of opening water communication to the great
coal fields of western Virginia, which would be valuable and
convenient for the French steam marine.

MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL 143

resort to the poor rates, the British Government had
sought to take no advantage of the obvious imper
fection of the blockade, and had scrupulously ob
served the duties due to a friendly state.13 Still, there
were many in England who, fearing the tendency
tpwards democracy, and opposing the Liberals in their
desire to Americanize English institutions, did not
deplore the disruption of the American Union. One
of these, James Spence, had just published a book
entitled " The American Union," in which he strongly
sympathized with the secession movement, and said
that slavery was not its real cause. A writer in Black-
wood's Magazine for January, 1862, 'desired to claim -
no ties of relationship with the performers in the
" convulsive dance " which was being executed in
America, and urged recognition of the Confederacy.14
Mason reached London January 29, and on Feb
ruary 2, he wrote Hunter that the ministry seemed
" to hang fire," but that there was a prevalent opinion
in well-informed circles that a resolution for recogni
tion would soon be introduced in the Commons as
an amendment to- the Queen's speech. He did not ^
then anticipate that Earl Russell would refuse to re
ceive him. A . few days after his arrival. Parliament
met. Mr. Gregory, ttio had visited the Southern^,
mn

States, in 1860, found him a place in the Commons to
hear the Queen's speech, which disappointed him by
saying nothing about the blockade.15 He wrote that

"Jefferson 'Davis: Confederate Government, Vol. II, p.
343.

M Blackwood's Mag., Jan., 1862, p. 118; April, 1862, pp.
514-36.

15 Despatches of Mason, No. 2, Feb. 7, 1862. ,

144 MISSION OF MASON AND SLIDELL

" our friends in Parliament " thought best not to at
tempt the amendment for recognition, while the Queen
was in mourning, and that they proposed first to try
opposition to the blockade. On February 7, by ad
vice of Gregory, who was " steering " him, Mason ap
plied for an interview, and was received unofficiall}
at Russell's home. The despatch reporting that in
terview never succeeded in getting through the block
ade; but subsequent events show that Russell gave no
encouragement.115 Mason said afterward that the min
ister's personal sympathy had always been against
the Confederates. Mason, eagerly watching for mail
that never came, was disappointed because he re
ceived no words of encouragement from Richmond,
and on May 15 wrote Benjamin that the public mind
at London " should be kept assured." 3

18 On Feb. 17, 1862, Mason submitted to Russell a list of
vessels entering and clearing Cuban ports engaged in com
merce with Confederate ports. On April i, he supplemented
the list, showing there had been 28 vessels for January and
February. On Aug. 4, Russell asknowledged the receipt of
his information. [55 Brit, and For. State Papers, p. 723.]

17 Despatches of Mason, No. 10, May 15, 1862.

CHAPTER VI

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

Hunter, still hoping that England and France, act
ing from commercial and political motives, would en
deavor by force of arms to break the blockade and end
the war, on February 8, instructed Mason that Mr.
Davis would not deprecate intervention, but that he
desired that the treaty of peace should enlarge the
Southern agricultural area, give the Confederacy pos
session of Chesapeake bay by which to concentrate
and control the Western commerce, and make it inde
pendent of the North. He urged that the Confed
eracy should have Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri,
and all south of those states, together with New
Mexico and Arizona, through which the Southerners
could have railroad connection with the Pacific. He
stated that the South needed North Carolina, Vir
ginia, Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland to produce
food supplies so that the remaining states could de
vote their entire attention to supplying the demand
for cotton and sugar. Besides, it was held that if
Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri should go to the
TTorth, it would end the hope of a balance of power,
and lead to war or to a Southern reunion party to se
cure peace and trade. It was claimed that, aside from
political reasons, it was England's commercial inter
est " to enlarge the area from which she draws
tribute." *

1 Instr. to Mason, No. 4, Feb. 8, 1862. Congress also passed
a resolution declaring its opposition to any peace which
10

146 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

It was not until June 23, that Mason replied. In the
meantime the Confederate Government had been born
in a storm on February 22; on March 8, the Merri-
mac had made an unsuccessful effort to break th<;
blockade; defeat and reverses had only resulted in
sterner stubbornness, and Benjamin, still confident ot
success, declared the Confederacy only needed arm ;
and ammunition; on March 5, Congress had resolved
never to affiliate with the Northern invaders;2 Count
Mercier, the French minister at Washington, visited
1 Richmond on a mysterious errand;3 missionaries witli
jplenty of money were sent abroad to aid and direct
public opinion;4 Benjamin, claiming despatches wer3
not contraband of war, was contemplating the organi
zation of communication with Europe by French de
spatch vessels; Slidell was instructed to offer Napo
leon seven million dollars in cotton 5 to indemnify him
for the expense of a fleet to relieve the Confederacy
and establish communication with Europe;6 Mason

should exclude any of the soil of the Confederacy. C. E.
Evans (Ed.): Confederate Military History (Atlanta, 1899),
Vol. I, p. 436 et seq.

2 Instr. to Mason, No. i, April 5, 1862.

8 Despatches of Mason, No. 8, April 2, and No. 10, May
15, 1862. J. B. Jones: Diary, May 21, 1862.

4 Instr. to Mason, No. 3, April 12, 1862.

8 Ibid.

8 Benjamin, in a " confidential " letter, on April 12, wrote
Slidell that there were certain points on which the interests
of England and France were so distinct, if not conflicting,
that Napoleon might not be precluded from acting alone on
the basis of certain commercial advantages. He stated that,
as a rule, Confederate relations should be on the same footing
with all nations, leaving commercial relations as free as pos
sible, but that while struggling against vastly superior re
sources no means to open Southern ports and successfully

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION ( 147

was asked to say that England by a few words could
encourage the Northern peace party to stop the war;
/"but the occupation of the Confederate ports and the
vigorous blockade by Federal forces gave little hope
for any interference. On March 10, Earl Russell had
said that separation would probably be a result of the
war, but in May, when Lord Lyons embarked for
England, it was understood in Richmond that he
would " report the rebellion on its last legs."

Napoleon asserted that he was ready to cooperate1
in declaring the blockade ineffective; but said that
Russell had dealt unfairly in sending his previous pro
posals to Lord Lyons, who made them known to
Seward.7 Slidell reported that Napoleon, in an inter
view with Lindsay (on April n), agreed that the block
ade was inefficient, and said that he had__twice ad
dressed the British Government through the French
\ambassador at London in-regard to taking steps to end
it, but had received no definite response. The Em
end the war should be neglected. He said that Mr. Davis, as
a means of inducing France to abandon her acquiescence in
the United States interdict (blockade) on Confederate com
merce, would be willing to concede to the French Emperor
the right to introduce French products free of duty for a
certain period. It was seen that temporary embarrassment
of the French finances might deter Napoleon from initiating
a policy likely to necessitate naval expeditions. Slidell was
instructed that if, after cautious inquiry, it should appear
probable that this obstacle might be removed by the grant
of a cotton subsidy to defray the expenses of such expedi
tions, he might stipulate to deliver 100,000 (or more) five-
hundrtd-pound bales of cotton in the Confederacy. It was
estimated that France could sell the cotton for 20 cents per
pound and that the vessels which sailed to convey the cotton
could take cargoes of merchandise and sell them, in the Con
federacy, at four times their cost in Europe.
7 Despatches of Mason, April 21, 1862.

148 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

peror said that he was still ready to act promptly, i i
cooperation with England, by sending a fleet to the
mouth of the Mississippi to demand free ingress and
egress for merchant vessels, and he authorized Lind
say to so inform Lord Cowley and to ascertain whether
the latter would recommend such a course to Eng
land.8 Lindsay saw Cowley on Sunday, April 13, and
immediately reported to Napoleon that Cowley thought
that England was not prepared to act, and that the
proper moment for action had passed. Napoleon
then requested Lindsay to see Lord Palmerston and
Russell, to tell them all that had occurred; to manage
to communicate his views to Derby and Disraeli of
the opposition; to get the views of Russell; and to
return. Lindsay returned on the I7th and met tie
Emperor on the i8th. In reply to his note, Russell
had informed him that he could receive no communi
cation from Napoleon except through the regular
diplomatic channel. Disraeli had concurred in the Em
peror's views. He had no reason to suspect a secret
understanding between Russell and Seward as to
England respecting the blockade, but he said that any
initiative which France might take would probably
be supported by a majority in Parliament and that
Russell, in order to avoid a change of ministry, would
assent.9 Napoleon was interested in Disraeli's sug
gestion, and thought that the best course was to make!
a friendly appeal to the United States to open the ports,
at the same time accompanying it with a proper dem
onstration of force, ready to act in case the United
States should fail to take New Orleans, but he do

8 Despatches of Slidell, April 14, 1862.

9 Ibid., April 18, 1862.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 149

cided to wait for more news, and asked Lindsay in
the meantime to observe secrecy. Perhaps Napoleon
meant what he said, but while he was saying it, th<
Federal guns opened fire and soon New Orleans fell

harles Wood of England wrote Slidell denying tha
the British Government was unwilling to act ir
American affairs. M. Billault, the/ minister sans port
folio of the French Government, said that the whol<
Cabinet, except Thouvenel, had been in favor of the
South, and that if New Orleans had not fallen recog
nition could not have been delayed much longer.

In June, Mason wrote Benjamin that he saw little
prospect for " the suggested form of mediation unless
the cotton famine should urge the Government to
act." ] Seward justified his obstruction of Charleston
harbor by saying that the holes of the three thousand
miles of coast line could not all be blocked by ships :
alone. On May 6, Russell said that though the irreg
ularity of the blockade had injured thousands, yet the
British Government had never sought to take advan
tage of obvious imperfections in order to declare it
inoperative. Mason had heard nothing further as to
the purpose of Mercier's visit to Richmond and was
much disappointed as to the results achieved. Na
poleon was still waiting. Russell and Palmerston^
both denied that France had proposed joint mediation,?
and said that such a policy would be inopportune.
Mason complained that even the recent seizure of
British ships on the high seas, between England and
Nassau, had not caused the British Government to
intervene. Though he found much sympathy for the
Confederacy, and suggested that the cotton famine

10 Despatches of Mason, No.' 12, June 23, 1862.

A

C^

I5O EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

might urge the Government to act, he thought it in-
expedient even to renew the request for recognition,
unless it should be done as a demand of right, to be
followed by his retirement to the continent as evidence
of Confederate dignity. Caleb Hughes, the Confed
erate agent for buying foreign supplies, wrote from
London (July 3), that there was much Southern sym
pathy in England, but that no one could see how the
Government could interfere — though in case the
South should win against McClellan, and at Charles
ton, he did not see how recognition could be deferred.
The Richmond authorities had expected that Eng
land, in the interests of trade, would favor the Con
federacy on the question of blockade, and that British
vessels would seek Confederate ports for cotton. In
October, 1861, they had prohibited two British ves
sels, the Bruce and the Napier, from proceeding out to
sea from Wilmington with their cargoes of naval
stores, but they offered compensation for the cargoes,
and denied that it was their policy to prohibit the ex
portation of cotton except to prevent its use by the
United States. On July 7, Mason asked Russell for
an interview, and for a statement of his attitude upon
the rules of blockade, and whether it would be prac
ticable to require blockaded ports to be designated.
On July 10, Under-Secretary Layard simply acknowl
edged the receipt of his letter and made no allusion to
his request. Mason wrote home that it was difficult
to hold intercourse under such circumstances, and
that the British Government would probably use its
own pleasure as to abiding by the rules of 1856."

11 Despatches of Mason, No. 14, July 30, 1862. In 55 Brit,
and Foreign State Papers, p. 724 et seq.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION !$!

The news of the defeat of the United States army
under McClellan, before Richmond, reached London
and Paris by July 15, and for several days Confederate
efforts were vigorously pushed. Slidell, in an inter
view with the Emperor at Vichy, on July 16, ex
plained the conditions and resources of the South;
proposed to pay him in cotton for vessels to break
the blockade; informed him that the United States
had negotiated a treaty with Mexico, agreeing to give
$11,000,000 to aid Juarez against France; and sug
gested that the Emperor now had a chance to secure
the Confederacy as a faithful ally in return for recog
nition. The Emperor had no objection to Slidell's
presenting his demand to Thouvenel for recognition.
He said that he had seen the nature of the contest
and that separation was a mere matter of time, but
that " the difficulty was to find a way to give effect to
his sympathies; that he had always desired to pre
serve the most friendly relations with England, and
that in so grave a question he had not been willing to
act without her cooperation; that he had several times
intimated his wish to England, but that he had received
no favorable response; and, besides, that England had
a deeper interest in the question than France, and
was wishing for him ' to draw the chestnuts from the
fire for her benefit.' He regretted that France had
ever respected the blockade, and said that Europe
should have recognized the Confederacy in the sum
mer of 1 86 1, when Washington was menaced and the
Southern ports not yet all closed."

Lindsay's carefully studied motion for mediation
had been dangling before the House of Commons for
some time, and even Lord Brougham, who, since the

152 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

days of Jefferson, had been known as the friend of the
United States, said that America should listen to the
•voice of friends and stop the war. Russell and Pal-
•merston, however, feared that an attempt at mediation
would only irritate both of the contestants. On July
17, Mason informed Russell that there was no au
thority for saying that the Confederacy would be
offended by such an attempt.12 The next day Lindsay,
in a long speech in the Commons, reviewed the causes
of the war and the " compact " nature of the former
Government. He attributed the cause of the struggle
not to the opposition against slavery, but to taxation
without representation. He stated that emigration
had favored the North, decreasing the proportion of
Southern representation in Congress without decreas
ing the taxes of the property-holders in the South. He
said that reunion was hopeless; that many people even
in the United States were anxious for England to
mediate to relieve the American Government of an
embarrassing situation, and that France was ready to
join.13 Others declared that the establishment of the
Confederacy would lead to the manumission of the
slaves. Whiteside favored secession and the recog
nition of a de facto Government, as in the case of
Texas. Taylor and others took the opposite view.
Taylor said that the war had been postponed for many
years by concessions to slavery until that institution
now struck at the interests of freedom in the North.
He gave warning tliat intervention would lead to a ter
rible conflict with the United States. In reply to the
statement that the tariff was the cause of the. war,

12 55 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, p. 728.
13 168 Parl. Debates, July 18, 1862.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 153

Forster quoted from A. H. Stephens' speech that
"the South went to war to establish slavery as the
corner-stone of a new republic," and drew attention I
to the fact that the South Carolina Declaration of In
dependence did not mention the tariff.14 Palmerston
said the thirty-years war was a joke compared to the
Civil War; but he denied that England would be jus-j
tified in assuming the independence of the Confed-Jk^
crates, and said that recognition would lead to direct^
intervention. Lindsay's resolution, therefore, was not
pressed to a vote — because there was no reasonable
assurance of its success. Mason wrote that it was
vexatious that the British Government could not
be driven to a decided position " in harmony with the
public sentiment " of England, and began to hope for
a new ministry. He said that Derby could take the
helm at any time; but that there were political reasons
for not ousting Palmerston while the Queen was in
mourning, and while there were fears of her going
insane.

Slidell, after an interview with Napoleon, wroteA
Mason that both should ask recognition at the samel
time. Slidell presented his letter on July 23.
Thouvenel agreed with him that the application to
England and France should be simultaneous, though
he advised him to wait. On July 24, Mason, cooper
ating with Slidell, sent a letter to Russell in which he 1
said the Confederate States asked recognition as a I
European duty. At the same time, desiring to state 1
orally that a failure of England to grant recognition I
would operate as an incentive to the United States to '

14 1 68 Parl. Debates, pp. 527-78.

154 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

protract the struggle, he sent a private note asking for
an interview. Russell declined the interview because
he thought no good could come of it. Mason then
supplemented his previous letter by stating that a word
of recognition would encourage many in the North to
speak openly against the continuation of the war.
j On August 2, after a Cabinet meeting, Russell re-
(plied that the British Government had never presumed
to form a judgment on the question of the right of
withdrawal of " certain Confederates," nor upon the
previous conduct of the United States. He left such
cases to be judged by interpretations of the United
States, and not by England. He informed Mason that
Secretary Seward affirmed that a large portion of the
disaffected population was restored to union and loy
alty, and that the Confederacy owed its main strength
to the hope of assistance from Europe. He said that
in the face of fluctuating events and contradictory
allegations, and the uncertainty of Confederate sta
bility and permanence, the British Government was
" determined to wait," and could only hope for a
peaceful termination of a bloody and destructive con
test. On August 4, Mason wrote Benjamin " the
British Government shuts its eyes to accumulating
proof . . . and relies on the open mendacity of Sew
ard." He hoped that division in the Cabinet, together
with Napoleon's attitude, might drag the Cabinet into
a " disgraceful reversal of its decision."

Lord Campbell in the House of Lords called for
Mason's correspondence; but Russell did not think

18 In Mason's despatch, No. 14, begun July 30, 1862. In
55 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, p. 733-

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 155

it then expedient to submit it, stating that it was un
official. Russell also declared that he had no com
munication with any foreign power upon the
subject of recognition, but that he would favor com
munication with the maritime powers if the Govern
ment should adopt a new line of policy. Malmsbury
suggested that England should act with the other
powers, whenever the time should come, upon ques
tions of blockade, recognition or mediation, and that
Lord Lyons should not be long absent from Wash
ington. Russell stated that there had been intimate
and unreserved communication, and no difference of
opinion, between England and Napoleon, and that
in case it became the duty of England to make a com
munication upon American affairs it would be very
deliberately considered, on account of the feeling in
the United States as to the sympathies of Great
Britain.16

Davis said that Mason's whole correspondence
showed that the feeling of the British Government was
unfriendly to the Confederacy, and not in harmony
with public opinion, and that there might be a change
of policy later. Benjamin, on October 28, in a letter
which was captured arid published before it reached
Mason, contrasted the friendliness of French states
men with the " rude incivility of Russell." But not
withstanding Mason's difficulty in holding intercourse
with the Government, and his failure to obtain recog
nition, Benjamin, elated over McClellan's defeat and
he military situation, advised him to remain in Eng-

18 168 Parl. Debates, Lords, Aug. 4, 1862. Also, Despatches
of Mason, No. 15, Aug. 5, 1862. [Received by Benjamin on
Oct. 25.]

156 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

*

land, where he could disseminate favorable impres
sions and where contingencies might arise to make
his presence important.17 Davis, however, agreed
that the Confederacy should not be put in the attitude
of a supplicant. Mason's house continued to be a
resort for Confederate sympathizers. The Index and
other papers were used to deny that the United States
aimed at emancipation, and Confederate aid associa
tions were formed to encourage sympathy with the
South.

In the case of the cruiser Alabama the English Gov
ernment apparently had favored the Confederates. The
departure of the Florida had caused the United States
consul at Liverpool, with a wakeful and agitated mind,
to watch for new vessels. In May, 1862, " No. 290,"
which was building in Laird's dock-yard, was under
suspicion. The building went on, however, and the
vessel was completed. A young lady christened it
Enrica, and its testing trip was satisfactory.18 As
early as July 4, the British Government had promised
Adams that the customs officials should keep a strict
watch on the vessel. On July 26, Bullock received
information from a private but reliable source that it
would not be safe to leave the vessel in Liverpool
another forty-eight hours, and, as previously agreed
with Laird, he arranged for another trial trip out of
the harbor, at the same time informing Captain
Butcher that the ship would not return. Though the
report of the British law officers was not given until
July 29, the signs indicated that it was time to get out;

1T Instr. to Mason, No. 7, Sept. 26, 1862.
"Bullock: Vol. I, Chap. 5.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 157

for inquiries were becoming very frequent and un
comfortable. Bullock claimed that no officer of the
British Government ever gave him a hint that would
lead him to anticipate the future action of the Gov
ernment, but Mason kept him informed of all he heard
as to naval affairs, and, though gathered merely from
the conversations of those who were accustomed to
observe the conduct of the ministers and draw their
own conclusions, the information often proved cor
rect. Bullock says " it is probable that through pri
vate friends Mr. Mason could and did have very fav
orable opportunities of learning the general, and in
some cases, the specific purposes of the Government."

On July 29, " No. 290," which was soon to be
known as the Alabama, under pretence of taking out a
pleasure party, including ladies and gentlemen of the
family of John Laird, M. P., left Liverpool in spite of
Mr. Adams' warnings. After a sail of fourteen miles,
the excursionists were transferred to the Hercules for
return, and the Alabama sailed away to do service for
the Confederacy. In reply to Adams' request for ex
planation, Russell stated that the delay of England
was due to the sickness of the Queen's Advocate, Sir
John D. Harding, which " made it necessary to call
in other parties, whose opinion had been at last given
for the detention of the gunboat, but before the order
got down to Liverpool the vessel was gone." The
Alabama was commissioned on the high seas, and
Seward never ceased to call her a pirate, nor to press
England to seize her, though she was flying the Con
federate flag.

After the close of the second campaign in Virginia, |*
both Palmerston and Russell contemplated the right I

158 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

or expediency of mediation or intervention.19 On
September 14, Palmerston, in a note to Russell, sug
gested the offer of joint " good offices " by England
and France. Three days later Russell wrote: ''The
Federal army is driven back to Washington and . .
I agree with you that the time is come for offering
mediation to the United States with a view to the rec
ognition of the independence of the Confederates. . . .
In case of failure ... to recognize the Southern
States as an independent state." He proposed a meet
ing of the Cabinet, and said that if it should determine
upon mediation England should propose it first to
France, who should cooperate in proposing it to Rus
sia and other nations as a measure decided upon by
England, and he suggested that the latter should
make herself safe in Canada. On September 23, Pal
merston replied, pronouncing the plan excellent, and
said: " Of course the offer would be made to both
the contending parties." He suggested that in case
of a defeat of the Federals, which might make them
ready for mediation, that " The iron should be struck
while it was hot; " but that if the Federals should
come out best, England should wait and watch awhile.
In October there was an impression in the United
States that England would soon grant recognition and
follow by mediation or intervention. The English
Chancellor of the Exchequer said the South had an
army and would soon have a navy.20 Mallory, at that

19 Mason wrote: "I look with renewed confidence to the
effect on the Emperor." Slidell had not yet received a reply
to his note of July 23. [Despatches of Mason, No. 17, Sept.
18, 1862.]

20 Parl. Debates, March 27, 1863. Quoted by Forster.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 159

time, had sent Mr. G. N. Sanders to England under
contract to construct six iron-clad steamers, to be paid
for in cotton.21

On October 17, Adams wrote to Secretary Seward
that the United States should try to achieve decided
success by February to prevent the possibility of rec
ognition of the Confederacy by England. The Cab
inet meeting, called for October 23, was recalled as
unnecessary, but some English statesmen compli
mented Davis upon having " made a nation." ' Lord
Donnoughmore and Fitzgerald, both warm friends of j
the Confederacy, told Mason that Palmerston would
probably not enter into a treaty with the Confederacy21
unless it should agree not to permit the African slave
trade; but bankers were proposing schemes to raise
Confederate finances in Europe. Lindsay was plan
ning for direct intercourse between France and the
South at the close of the war, and Mason, watching
for the slow arrivals from the South of " calm and dig
nified revelations of truth," was gaining hope, though
he had received no epistle from Benjamin of a later
date than April 14."

Napoleon was at this time shaking hands with
Slidell and listening to proposals to build a Confeder
ate navy in French ports; and, a few days later, wher
the cotton famine " was looming up," and simultane
ous with his expedition of 35,000 reinforcements tc
" establish stable government in Mexico," he formally
invited England and Russia to intervene in the Amer-

21 Despatches of Mason, No. 16, Sept. 18, 1862.

22 Ibid., No. 20, Nov. 6, 1862.

23 Ibid., " Unofficial," Nov. 4, 1862.

24 Ibid., No. 20, Nov. 6, 1862.

l6o EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

ican war by offering a six months' armistice with the
blockade removed. Dayton had heard reports of Na
poleon's hostile designs, but he had doubted whether
Slidell ever exchanged a word with the Emperor.
Lord Cowley at Paris had recently denied that France
had made any proposals on the American question,
and said that no action was contemplated.23 Thouvenel
expressed surprise, and Mason suggested that the
English denial probably referred only to official com
munications. Slidell had entire confidence in Na
poleon, but stated that English statesmen were full of
duplicity and hypocrisy. He spoke to Napoleon
concerning the British denial, and the latter, smiling,
suggested that in diplomacy nothing existed unless it
was formally written. Thouvenel, before his resign
nation, told Slidell that the British denial of official
knowledge of Napoleon's views was a " mauvaise
plaisanterie," for there had been " des pourparlers
tres reels " on the subject. Slidell, entertaining little
hope from England, on October 27, had an interview
with Drouyn de L'Huys, to whom he recapitulate
the views which he had expressed to Thouvenel in
July. He referred to Russell's statement that the pur
pose and policy of France on American affairs were
the same. He mentioned the conflicting statements
as to whether France had communicated Napoleon's
views to England, and showed L'Huys a letter from
a leading member of the British Parliament, insinuat
ing that France was playing an unfair game. L'Huys
said that he had been too recently in office to know
what Thouvenel had said or done, and when Slidell

25 Despatches of Slidell, Oct. 20, 1862.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION l6l

tried to show him how divergent were the interests of-
France and England on the subject of American affairs
he said that there were grave objections to France
acting without England.28

It appears that the armistice plan originated withj^
Napoleon. On October 22, at St. Cloud, Slidell
shook hands writjrthe Emperor and asked him to break
the blockade, ? The Emperor averred that his sym
pathies were with the Confederacy, but that England
might embroil him with the United States if he acted
alone,,' and that he preferred to make a proposition
for an armistice of six months with the Southern
ports. He stated that the refusal of his plan by the
North would give such strong reason for recognition,
and perhaps for intervention, that England might be
induced to cooperate. Slidell was pleased with the
plan, and on November 8, Mason wrote that there was
no doubt, but that the proposal had been made
officially to Russia and England, and that it was " con
fidently asserted that Russia would assent to it." The
French note, dated October 10, was read to Russell
on November 10. No copy was left, but it was pub
lished in the Monitcur. Russell replied on the thir
teenth, declining immediate action.27 Russia kept the
promise made through Gortchakoff to Bayard Taylor
earlier in the war, and refused. Napoleon now con
templated mediation through the French minister at
Washington, but seeing that the United States would
reject such a suggestion, he proceeded with his plan
to attack the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico — a policy

26 Despatches of Slidell, Oct. 28, 1862.

27 172 Parlc Debates, July 2, 1863. Layard in the House
cf Commons.

II

l62 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

which could conciliate neither England nor Spair.
Some in the North would have favored the French
tender of mediation. Mr. Cox in the United States
House of Representatives, on December 15, said that
the recent elections indicated that " the eagle must use
the dove."

The report of the French proposals to England and
Russia reached New York on November 25. A few
days later, after the news reached Richmond, Benja
min decided that it was a favorable time to further
encourage England and France to come to the rescue,
by insisting on the restoration of pre-blockade condi
tions and by taking steps to obtain a monopoly of the
trade with the Confederacy. In a letter to Mason "9
on December n,29 he said that there were indications
that Europe would soon recognize the Confederacy
and that trade with the South would be brisk. To en
courage Europe to take measures to break the block
ade, he said that the Confederacy, in the interests of
permanent peace, would expect a treaty of free trade
with the United States at the end of the war, and that
the rush of the Southern people to get commodities
might enable the agents of Northern merchants by
their cupidity to monopolize Southern products and
become the intermediaries in Southern commerce. To
prevent this monopoly, he urged that the European

28 Instr. to Mason, No. n, Dec. u, 1862.

29 Mason, still looking forward to a cotton famine, on
Dec. ii (No. 23) wrote: "We hear little, but I think events
are maturing which must lead to some change in the attitude
of Europe." The Alabama, in a successful cruise, had taken
British property in some instances. When British merchants
complained, Russell intimated that they should apply to the
Confederate prize courts for redress.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 163

governments, looking toward an early renewal of
trade, should encourage their citizens to purchase
Southern products en depot before the close of the war;
to establish West Indian depots of supplies needed
by the Confederacy, ready for immediate introduction;
and to prepare merchant steamers for sale in Confed
erate ports, in order to provide communication with
Europe. He urged that the cessation of Southern
commerce was not due to the blockade, but to the
seizure along the coasts, or on the high seas, of neutral
vessels " bound to points where not a blockade vessel
was ever stationed," and that, by stopping such seiz
ures, rrany neutral vessels, which before had not dared
to sail for fear of capture, could transport a large
supply of Southern staples upon which the North
hoped to get the profits. He said that Europe, by
encouraging trade with the Confederacy as a bellig
erent, could prevent the seizure of neutral property
by the United States, and thereby make it unneces
sary to destroy resources at the approach of the Fed
eral army. On March 2, Mason sent a copy of these
instructions to Russell, and the latter merely thanked
him for the information.

On October 31, Mr. Davis had complained that
England, after asking the Confederacy to concur in
the adoption of principles of international law regard
ing neutrals, had shown herself unfriendly by deviat
ing from her own principles, that no blockade was
binding unless enforced, and by refusing to reply to
requests for explanation.30 Mason was instructed to
protest against the British modification of the Decla-

30 Confed. "Dip. Cor., Great Brit.", p. 38. Instr. to Mason,
No. 9, Oct. 31, 1862.

164

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

ration of Paris, and on January 3, 1863, he brought
the complaint to the attention of Lord Russell.31 On
February 10, in replying to his note,32 Russell stated
that England would practically adhere to the rule of
1856, which was aimed against paper blockades, but
added that the escape of vessels on dark nights or dur
ing adverse winds did not make a blockade ineffectual
and that the neutral powers had no excuse for assert
ing that the United States had not maintained an
effectual blockade. In was in vain 33 that Mason
urged (February 18) that the departure of vessels was
notorious; that Confederate vessels had raised the
blockade of Charleston and Galveston and that the
duties collected at Confederate ports on foreign goods
were twice as much as before the war.34 In January,
Stephens said that there had been a change of tone in
the British press since the preceding summer, when
Lord Lyons visited London, and that the latter having
never become acquainted with Southern men had
probably influenced the change.35

In December, many in the Confederacy had de
spaired of the intervention by European powers, and
only hoped that the Great Power above would inter
vene and create an armistice by freezing the Chesa
peake. In January the newspapers published the in
tercepted correspondence of Benjamin, in which Rus
sell was much berated and Napoleon was charged
with designs on Mexico and Texas.36 Lincoln's eman-

81 Despatches of Mason, No. 24, Jan, 14, 1863.

82 In 55 Brit, and Foreign State Papers, p. 734.

33 Despatches of Mason, March 19, 1863.

34 Ibid., No. 31, March 19, 1863.

35 Johnston and Browne: Life of A. H. Stephens.

36 J. B. Jones: Diary, Jan. 23, 1863. Instr. to Mason, No.
15, Feb. 7, 1863.

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 165

v &

cipation proclamation was received with favor in Eng-;i)
land. After two years of the irrepressible conflict
many in the North had changed their early feelings
against emancipation. On March 6, 1862, Lincoln
had proposed that Congress should provide for re
munerating persons in the loyal slave states who would
free their slaves. This was based on the idea that
there was a strong Union sentiment at the South, and
was proposed as a war measure. Slaves had been a
great aid to the South by supplying food while the
whites fought. After the defeat of Lee at Antietam,
Lincoln decided to declare the freedom of all slaves
belonging to persons at war with the United States,
and when his proclamation was issued it gave no
strength to the Confederate sympathizers in England.
The North now fought not only for the Union, but
also for emancipation; and the English workingmen, Uj
notwithstanding the prophecies of the South, and the II
dangers of a cotton famine, prayed for the North and
the emancipation of slaves.

On January 17, the French Minister of Marine, ad
vised the French admiral off Mexico to protect some
vessels belonging to M. Bellot which were returning
to Havre laden with cotton, and Bellot suggested to /
Mason that this seemed to suggest intervention for
getting cotton to Matamoras.37 Mason was elated
over the recent democratic victories in the North, and
said that the Commons would respond unanimously
if Palmerston would recommend recognition;88 but
he was not hopeful as to any favorable action by the
British Government. A few days later he wrote that

87 Despatches of Mason, No. 28, Jan. 31, 1863.

88 Ibid., No. 27, Jan. 15, 1863.

l56 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

both the ministry and the opposition agreed that it
: was not a favorable time for recognition. Derby
stated that recognition without intervention would
have no fruits. " With those willingly deaf/' said
Mason, " it was vain to argue." ! Mason suggested
that the United States might provoke a conflict with
England in order to avert an internecine war at home .
But, by March,40 he was provoked that the British
Government was determined to do nothing objection
able to the United States, and he feared that Na
poleon 41 could do nothing owing to his ill-timed
Mexican expedition and the complications which re
sulted from the outbreak of Poland. Benjamin, read
ing the British debates, also saw little hope from that
direction, but he " awaited the onset on the Atlantic
and the Mississippi with calm confidence." Layard
said that the British Government had given orders to
keep a strict watch on vessels suspected to be preparing
for the Confederacy in English ports.42

When Campbell urged that it was the duty of Eng
land to recognize the Confederacy and send an am
bassador to Richmond, Russell replied 43 that though
Napoleon had actually proposed to the United States
to negotiate with the Confederacy, no offer of good
offices could now end the contest. Though Russell
doubted the ultimate success of the United States,
he favored British neutrality, leaving the belligerents

39 Despatches of Mason, No. 30, Feb. 9, 1863.

40 Ibid., No. 31, March 19, 1863.

41 The British Government claimed to have no official
document from France as to mediation.

42 169 Parl. Debates, Commons, Feb. 24, 1863. Palmerston
in reply to Hopwood.

43 Parl. Debates, March 23, 1863, PP- 1714-34-

EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 167

to conclude their own quarrel. In his speech of
March 23, he said that England had nothing to be
ashamed of in her past intervention — that it had al
ways been in behalf of the independence, freedom and
welfare of a great portion of mankind, and that he
would be sorry if it should ever be for any other pur
pose, no matter how much English interests were
affected. He predicted that if interference should
ever be necessary again, it would again be " in the
cause of liberty and to promote the freedom of man
kind." In concluding his speech, he said: "Depend
upon it, my Lords, that if that war is to cease, it is
far better it should cease by a conviction on the parts
of the North and South that they can never live again
happily as one community and one republic, than that
the termination of hostilities should be brought about
by the advice, the mediation or the interference of
any other power." '

Mason saw a double meaning to part of Russell's
speech, and suggested that he was not disposed to
recognize a state with slavery. He was certain the
Confederacy could take no action with England be
yond the protest at that time.45 During the spring
and summer Russell remained firm, and said the
United States blockade of 2500 miles was as legitimate
as the English blockade of 2000 miles was in the war
against Napoleon. In June Mason wrote that Russell
repudiated the rules of 1856 and that the Confederacy

** On May 20, Benjamin wrote Mason that even if the
defeats of the United States forces had no effect on Europe,
and even in the face of the strong blockade, the Confederates
were still determined to secure separation from the United
States.

48 Despatches of Mason, No. 31, March 19, 1863.

l68 EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

would have to watch him when the time came to make
treaties.40 In September he wrote again that Russell,
with unchanged opinions, was resorting to evasions of
the convention of Paris.47

In the spring of 1863, Davis and Benjamin hoped
that by disclaiming all designs on Cuba, and by agree
ing to guarantee the island to Spain, the Government
at Madrid could be induced to take the initiative in
recognition. They appointed Slidell as special com
missioner to Spain,48 but the latter received no intima
tion from Madrid that his presence there would be
acceptable and did not go, though he held long con
versations with Isturitz, the Spanish ambassador at
Paris, who professed sympathy for the Confederates.49
In June Slidell contemplated plans by which Spain
could be induced to take the initiative in recognition,
and cooperate with France in breaking the blockade.50
Napoleon gave assurance that he concurred in the plan,
and it appears that the Spanish Government was
sounded upon the subject; but after the news of Gettys
burg and Vicksburg, Isturitz informed Slidell that
nothing could be effected at Madrid.

48 Despatches of Mason, No. 40, June 20, 1863.

47 Ibid., No. 44, Sept. 4, 1863.

48 Confed. " Dip. Cor., France." Instr. to Slidell, March
22 and May g (No. 16), 1863.

49 Despatches of Slidell, No. 36, May 28, 1863.
80 Ibid., No. 38, June 21, 1863.

CHAPTER VII

CONTROVERSIES

During the spring of 1863, the fate of the Confed
erate States hung in the balance. Doubt succeeded
expectancy. The Confederate bonds were floated in
Europe above par on March 28; but, in a few weeks,
Mason was unable to keep them propped up even by
" bulling " the market. After the publication of cap-")
tured Confederate correspondence relating to vessels
building in England, Palmerston became very alert in r
investigating cases brought to his attention. But
Confederate friends in Parliament kept up an agita
tion in American affairs. They protested against the
American seizure of British vessels near the Confed
erate coast; they complained of American prize court
proceedings, and brought accusations of American;
enlistments in Ireland.

In the last week of March, 1863, Forster and others
in Parliament, complaining that Confederate vessels
were building in Liverpool and referring to the neu
trality of the United States in the Crimean War, urged
the Government to prevent further departures of ves
sels like the Alabama. Bright gave warning that thA
United States, which had the sympathy of the English
workingmen, and was receiving large numbers of f
Irish immigrants, might be inclined to remember V .
England's unfriendliness. Baring desired Russell toy
allay irritation by expressions of anxiety to avoid a

170 CONTROVERSIES

recurrence of such incidents. Laird, who built the
Alabama, replied that the Northern armies were also
obtaining war supplies in England, and that he would
rather build one hundred Alabama* than laud the
institutions of the United States, whose " ubiquitous
spies made her boasted liberty an absurdity." The
Solicitor-General quoted American decisions and the
opinions of Hamilton, Webster and Pierce to show
that the United States did not forbid its citizens to
sell war supplies, and said that the Government had
acted promptly and in good faith to prevent the de
parture of the Alabama. As precedents of the Ameri
can policy, he alluded to the cases of the Caroline at
Niagara, and Walker in Honduras. Palmerston, in
closing the debate, said that neutrality was difficult to
execute, but that English neutrality, whether warm or
cold, was honest, and that the Government was ready
to act on evidence.1 Mason, a few days later, in writ
ing Benjamin of the success of the Confederate loan,
said that the debate \vas " damaging to Yankee pre
tensions as well as to their advocates."

The seizure of the Alexandra 2 on April 6, by order
of the British Government, caused several to make
protest in Parliament that the vessel was not building
for the Confederacy, and, at the same time, to offer
objections to the Federal stone fleet in Charleston
harbor, the large emigration of Irish 3 and shipment
of arms to the United States, and even to eulogize the

1 170 Parl. Debates, pp. 33-72 and 90-101.

2J. B. Moore: International Arbitrations, Vol. I, p. 586.

8 Benjamin instructed Mason to inform Earl Russell that
there were " extensive enlistments in Ireland of recruits for
the armies of the United States." Instr. to Mason, No. 21
April 29, 1863.

CONTROVERSIES I/I

growing success of the Confederacy. Cobden said
that the equipment of ships of war was a different
question from that of traffic in fire-arms, and that
they should be seized in English ports even after their
escape from the place of building. Collier thought
that armed vessels left United States ports in 1793,
and said .that the American Government could not
complain of the construction of law in the English
courts followed the example of the United States.4 But
he stated that England had no right to refuse to en
force the law against the Confederacy.

Many long, low, greenish-gray blockade-runners
were fitted out in the Clyde to engage in the trade
between Nassau of the Bahamas and Confederate
ports. The United States found it difficult to stop
this trade. Nassau merchants complained of the law
of the American Congress by which vessels bound
from New York to that port were refused a clearance,
but the British Government was unable to induce the
Federal Government to change its orders.

As the Federal navy increased along the Atlantic,
part of the trade retreated to the Rio Grande and es
pecially to Matamoras, \vhich, from 1862, had become
a seat of flourishing traffic with both Europe and New
York. The United States had captured several neu
tral vessels engaged in this commerce, but, later,
made the claim that these vessels were not really
destined to Matamoras, but that they intended to dis
charge their freights into lighters to be conveyed di
rectly to Confederate territory.

When the news arrived at London that Captain

* 70 Parl. Debates, Commons, April 24, 1863.

172 CONTROVERSIES

Wilkes of the United States Navy had captured the
Peterhoof while she was on her way from London to
'Matamoras, Mason and his friends cooperated to
induce the British Government to take some action.
A deputation headed by Mr. Crawford, a London
member of Parliament, waited upon Russell and asked
him to protest, and it was believed for a while that
he would demand her release without reference to a
prize court.5 The Peterhoof was one of the vessels
which had been recommended to the protection of the
French admiral off the coast of Mexico, and Mr.
Mason had sent by Mr. Mohl, who sailed on the ves
sel, triplicates of five despatches which Benjamin had
never yet received, and which Mohl subsequently
found necessary to destroy in order to prevent their
capture.8 The Peterhoof was taken to New York as
a prize. Archibald, the British consul, refused to
open the packages which had been taken from the
sealed mail-bag, and the latter was soon forwarded to
its destination, but the vessel was held for the decision
of the court. Mj\J$pence at once asked the British
Government to relieve his vessels from carrying mail.
Although Russell had desired to keep the subject
from being discussed in Parliament at that time, Mr.
Peacock, in the Commons, precipitated a debate on
April 23, by calling for the correspondence. He had
understood that Russell had refused to allow certain
vessels to carry the mail. He and Mason were both
encouraged by the recent publication of a letter of

B Despatches of Mason, No. 33, March 30, 1863. [This
despatch was carried by Hobson of Richmond, who found it
necessary to destroy it.]

0 Ibid., No. 39, June 12, 1863.

CONTROVERSIES 173

Adams, who, by the advice of W. H. Aspinwall of
New York, J. M. Forbes 7 of Boston and R. J. Walker,
had offered protection to a vessel sailing to Mata-
moras with ammunition for the Mexican Government
to use against France, and Mason now wrote that the
British Cabinet might grant recognition and adopt
a bolder front as a policy to prevent drifting into war
with the United States.8

Layard, in reply to Peacock, said that the Govern
ment could not furnish the correspondence; that it
had not refused to allow vessels to carry mail, but that
the owners of the vessels, fearing that Confederate
correspondence might be found by a visiting Federal
vessel, had asked to be relieved.9

Hugh Cairns was surprised that the Government
seemed to admit that the United States could take
correspondence from an English vessel and place its
fate before an American prize court. Malins hoped
that England would not allow American dictation to
make her so timid that she dare not enforce the obli
gation of vessels to carry mail-bags. The Solicitor-
General merely referred to Russell's letter of Xovem-

7 Forbes and Aspinwall had been sent to England by the
United States Government with instructions to negotiate pri
vately for blocking the progress or changing the destination
of the Confederate cruisers then building in English ship
yards. They failed to purchase the cruisers, but their repre
sentations to prominent Englishmen, who were fearful of
provoking a war, had some influence in inducing the British
Cabinet to stop the. sailing of the rams and to purchase them
for the Government. [Sarah F. Hughes: Letters and Recol
lections of John Murray Forbes, 2 Vols, Boston, 1899.]

8 Despatches of Mason, No. 34, April 27. 1863. " The
recent debates in Parliament," said Mason, " have this good
effect at least — they keep up agitation on American affairs."

9 170 Parl. Debates

174 CONTROVERSIES

her 28, 1862, to Lord Lyons, which stated that the
right of search must depend upon circumstances.
Lord Robert Cecil said that England waited for Pal-
merston's decision and expected it at once, but Os-
born proposed that it was wise to drop the discussion,
and Peacock consented to withdraw his motion.

Lord Russell wrote Lord Lyons on April 24 that
the Matamoras trade was perfectly legitimate, even if
part of the goods was afterwards carried to Texas.
On the same day, in the House of Lords, he seemed
to admit that the United States had a right to require
an examination of sealed packages taken from seized
ships. He decided that if the English Consul, on
opening a mail-bag, should find a letter to the Con
federate Secretary of State, he could send it to the
prize court unopened. The Earl of Hardwick was
pained by this decision, stating that it made the Brit
ish Consul a tool of the United States. He desired to
see an ." impression made upon the . . . dis-United
States " by a fearless stand which he claimed would be
the best method of preventing collision.10 On April
27, Russell stated that it was not then desirable to
state the opinion of the law officers of the Crown; but
he agreed with Seward that the mail-bags of a neutral,
if duly certified and authenticated, should not be
opened or detained in case of the seizure of a mer
chant vessel, but should be forwarded immediately
to their destination. At the same time he intimated
that the United States was the sole judge of whether
a vessel should be captured on suspicion.11 On April

10 170 Parl. Debates, Lords, April 24, 1863.

11 Ibid., April 27, 1863. For correspondence between Great
Brit, and the U. S., see Parlia. Papers, " North America,
No. 5."

CONTROVERSIES 175

30 he announced that the Peterhoof would not be re
leased, but that her mail-bags had been forwarded.
The United States Supreme Court, in the Peterhoof
case, decided that the blockade could not be extended
to the Mexican half of the Rio Grande; that the trade
from London to Matamoras, even with intent to sup
ply Texas, was not a violation of the blockade and
could not be called unlawful; but that contraband of
war on a voyage to a neutral port, with a probable
ulterior destination to the Confederacy, were liable
to condemnation.13

On May 2, Mason wrote Benjamin that the British
Government, in its anxiety to prevent collision, seemed
etermined to yield everything to the United States.13
le understood that Adams had clandestinely made
is peace with Russell, but he still predicted that the
ublic would not be satisfied with this settlement of
le question. Marquis Clanricarde recommended
tat a squadron be sent to the Gulf of Mexico, but he
was informed that such an act would mean war. On
May 18, in the Lords, while asking for copies of the
proceedings in the United States prize court, he in
timated that those courts " set aside the whole inter
national law of the world." Russell denied his
charges and said that the United States judges had
always been quoted with respect. In a calm speech,
he referred to Clanricarde's speech as a " desultory
lecture on international law," and proceeded to show
the error of his charges.14 He stated that it was nat-

13 A treatment of the Nassau and Matamoras trade, and the
Peterhoff case, may be found in Montague Bernard's " Brit
ish Neutrality," Chap. 12.

13 Despatches of Mason, No. 34, April 27 and May 2.

" 171 Parl. Debates, pp. 1818-32.

176 CONTROVERSIES

ural for the United States to suspect vessels bound
for Nassau; and that while successful English cap
tains exulted over running the blockade, those who
failed and lost their vessels came to the Foreign Of
fice with an air of injured innocence.

Many Irish were emigrating to the United States,
some to join the army. Peel said that the Govern
ment had knowledge that United States agents were
in Ireland, and Mason, stating that Adams had tor
mented the ministry as to Confederate agents until it
would be alert to establish counter-charges against
United States agents, employed detectives to obtain
evidence of enlistments in Ireland, but no clear dis
coveries were made.15

The Confederate authorities at Richmond, angered
by their failure to establish diplomatic relations with
England, and, by the evident care which the British
Government exercised to prevent giving offense to
Seward, refused to recognize the exequaturs of the
British consuls in the Southern states. On December
19, 1862, Mr. Bunch, the British Consul, complained
of the forcible detention of an unnaturalized Irish de
serter, and stated that his letters had not been an
swered. The Richmond authorities replied in scath
ing terms. In the early part of 1863, several members
of the Confederate Congress favored recalling the
diplomatic agents and notifying the foreign consuls
to leave the country. Mr. Davis held that the British
consuls, having been appointed under the original
compact, of which the Southern states had been mem
bers, should be allowed to stay so long as they sought

15 Despatches of Mason, No. 38, Paris, June 4, 1863.

CONTROVERSIES 177

not to evade nor deny Confederate authority. But
England, while refusing recognition, had authorized
Lord Lyons at Washington to exercise authority over
the British consuls in the Confederacy, thus ignoring
the existence of the Confederate Government, and, in
June, Davis ordered that no further communication
should be allowed " between consuls of neutral na
tions in the Confederate States and the functionaries
of those nations in the United States," 16 stating that
there was now ample opportunity for correspondence
by Confederate fleets and neutral steamers between
neutral ports and the South.

Since February 20, Davis had refused to recognize
Moore as consul at Richmond. But the latter con
tinued to perform his duties. Two Irishmen, Mo-
loney and Farrell, claimed exemption from enroll
ment as conscripts on the ground that they were
British subjects. Moore, who had been asked by Ben
jamin, to show his commission and had not done so,
in April presented the two cases of the Irishmen to
the Secretary of War who, after ordering an investi
gation, found that both men had exercised the right
of suffrage and were thus subject to military duty.
Moore, incensed by his treatment, on May 5 wrote to
• J. B. Caldwell of White Sulphur Springs of Virginia,
•that from 1826 to 1858, he had lived in despotic coun-
[ tries where he had met with more official courtesy on
• complaint of grievances than he had received at the
hands of his own blood and kin in the Confederacy.

In June, Davis also refused to recognize the con
sul at Mobile. In the preceding November the Bank
of Mobile, as agent for the state of Alabama, informed

18 Instr. to Mason, No. 24, June 6, 1863.

178 CONTROVERSIES

Magee, the British Consul, that the state, owing Eng
lish citizens interest-coupons for the sum of for:y
thousand pounds, payable in London, asked to place
coin in the consul's hands for safe transportation at
the expense of Alabama. On November 14, Magoe
replied that he had asked the British Consul at New
Orleans whether the British Rinaldo could be sent ;o
take the coin from Mobile to Havana, from whence
it could go to London. Later, the British Vesuvius
received thirty-one kegs of specie, amounting to $155,-
ooo. The American commander of the blockading
squadron offered no objection, saying " we cannot
examine an English man-of-war; we trust all you do
will be right and proper." The specie was received
in England and paid to the British subjects. Lord
Lyons, as soon as he heard of the intention to trans
mit the specie, sent despatches to Mobile forbidding
it, but the Vesuvius had already sailed when his de
spatches arrived. Magee, having been dismissed,
Warner, a member of the House of Commons, in the
following May, asked whether he had been incon
sistent with British neutrality and whether the United
States had suggested his removal. Under-Secretary
Layard replied that the permission for the Vesuvius
to do private business was in violation of the pledge
given to the United States, and that a dismissal was
made before receiving the complaint of the American
Government. Though he did not know whether the
specie was intended for the payment of interest on the
Alabama bonds, or for use for purchasing privateers
in Europe, he felt that the British Government had
taken the right course.17

17 170 Parl. Debates, p. 1952, May 19, 1863.

CONTROVERSIES 179

In May, the Richmond Whig contained an article
complaining that Mr. Cridland, who had sometimes
acted in place of Moore in Richmond, was accredited
as consul to Mobile under the United States Govern
ment. The article, suggesting that the appointment
might tend to excite the Southern people to "take
the liberty of making a remark " before the close of
the war, said: "We know that sundry private citi
zens of the South, nick-named ministers, are cooling
their heels to 'no earthly purpose in the ante-chambers
of St. James and the Tuileries; and this useless refriger
ation of the ossa calcis of Messrs. Mason and Slidell
has been going on for above a year. Intimations of
this have reached the ' so-called.' " On May 18, Mr.
Cridland sought an interview with Benjamin, called
his attention to the article in the Whig, and denied that
he was going to Mobile except as a private citizen to
look after certain interests of the British Government.
There was no objection to his going unofficially, but,
after his arrival, a telegram from Admiral Buchanan
stated that he had papers showing him to be acting
consul at Mobile by appointment of Lord Lyons.
Cridland was at once informed that he would not be
permitted to act as consul and a hint was given him
that it would be agreeable if he would leave Mobile.18
On June n, Benjamin wrote Mason that he hoped
the British Government might be induced to change
its whole policy and soon instructed him to bring
to its attention all matters relating to consuls. As to
the specie sent from Mobile, he said that " according
to the principles of the modern public code debts due

18 Instr. to Mason, No. 25, June n, 1863.

ISO CONTROVERSIES

by a state are not subject to the operations of the law
of war, and that, notwithstanding the recent United
States confiscation laws (of August 6, 1861), they were
beyond confiscation; that England had always ab
horred such breaches of faith, and during the Crimean
War had paid to the enemy money that she knew
would be used against her; that the recent confiscation
laws of the United States had caused the Confederacy
to pass (August 30, 1861) a law for the sequestration
of the enemy's property, but that it exempted public
debts; that the United States, in trying to prevent the
remittance of specie, either hoped that she herself
would be able to get it by the fortunes of war or de
sired to dishonor Alabama. Benjamin held that if
Alabama was still a part of the Union the United
States had no right to prevent the payment of her
debts; and that if she was a member of the Confed
eracy, Lord Lyons, by his cooperation with the United
States concerning the British consuls in the South,
had been unfriendly to the Confederacy.19

In July, Russell wrote Mason concerning the cases
of both Moore and Cridland, and intimated that the
consular agents should have been allowed to remain.
Mason informed him that the Confederacy would
doubtless be willing to receive agents properly ac
credited.20

The extradition of one Hester, who committed a
murder on board the Confederate privateer Sumter,
which had landed in a port under British jurisdiction,
became a subject of correspondence between Russell

19 Instr. to Mason, No. 25, June n, 1863.

20 Despatches of Mason, No. 44, Sept. 4, 1863.

CONTROVERSIES l8l

and Mason in June and July. Hester was impris
oned by the British authorities, and the London Gov
ernment offered to deliver him in the West Indies or
in a Confederate port, in case the United States would
allow a British vessel to pass the blockade. Seward,
or Adams, protested against the delivery of the pris
oner through the blockade, and on July 25, Russell
informed Mason that the British Government had de
cided that he could be detained in custody by the
British authorities no longer than might be necessary
to dispose of him on the shore at the Bermudas.
Mason expressed regret that Russell had not adhered
to the original purpose of delivering the prisoner.21

21 Despatches of Mason, No. 41, July 10, 1863; No. 42,
July 21, 1863; No. 43, Aug. 6, 1863.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

The crisis in England came in the middle of 186.5
when Lee was in the heart of the North. Napoleon,
shaking hands with Slidell in friendly conferences,
consenting to the building of Confederate vessels,
denying the English rumors that he was not ready
to act, and sitting with the map of the United States
unrolled before him, only waited for Lee to take
Washington in order that he might grant recogni
tion.1 Roebuck and Lindsay, by a stroke of ama
teur diplomacy, in which tliey said that Napoleon had
proposed joint mediation to England, made an at
tempt through parliament to force the British Gov
ernment into cooperation with France. But Palmers-
ton opposed double diplomacy, and the govern
ment refused " to pull Napoleon's chestnuts from a
fire that was too hot for imperial hands." Lindsay,
Roebuck, and other friends of the Confederacy, were
soon depressed by the news of Lee's retreat, and,
Mason received instructions to quit London.

Notwithstanding the recent publication of Benja
min's correspondence suspecting Napoleon of occult
designs in Texas, the Emperor in the spring and

1 Dayton wrote Seward (July 10) that news from the U. S.
gave him anxiety; that it was already hard enough to prevent
recognition, and if Lee should take Washington he could
foresee the probable results.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 183

summer of 1863 professed great friendship for the
Confederates and showed a disposition to favor them.
On April 14, Mocquard, Napoleon's private secre
tary and confidential friend, stating that he was di
rected by the Emperor, sent Slidell a copy of a des
patch from Adams to Dayton concerning a Confed
erate cruiser which was expected to enter a French
port.2 It appears that all despatches passed through
the French Minister of the Interior, and, if of politi
cal interest, were telegraphed to Napoleon — so that
Slidell did not doubt that the copy was handed to
him as early as the original reached Mr. Dayton at
the American legation.

A year before, Napoleon, in a conference with
Lindsay and Slidell, said he was ready to act with
England, but, as an objection to his initiating official
communications with London upon American affairs,
he stated that Earl Russell had dealt unfairly in
sending his previous proposals (as to the blockade)
to Lord Lyons, who made them known to Seward.8
Since that time England had rejected Napoleon's
proposal for mediation upon the basis of a six-
months' armistice, and he did not care to take the
initiative in any more proposals.

In June, 1863, news from the United States, an<
the condition of French affairs, again encouraged th<
Confederacy to ask for recognition. Roebuck am
Lindsay were preparing to insure the success of
motion which it was proposed to offer in Parliament
on June 30. There were rumors in England that

2 Despatches of Slidell, April 20, 1863.

8 Despatches of Mason, July 2, 1863, and No. 8, April 21,
1862.

1 84 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

the Emperor thought recognition would be unwise
at that time, and Lindsay was anxious to see him
before the motion should be offered, for he saw that
Palmerston would probably inform Parliament of the
rumors of the reports concerning Napoleon's adverse
views. On June 13, Lindsay enclosed to Slidell a let
ter from Roebuck which referred to Napoleon and
the proposed interview as follows: " You know that
I am not a great admirer of that great personage, but
still I am a politician — so is he, and politicians have
no personal likes or dislikes that stand in the way of
their political ends. I therefore would act as if I had
no feeling either friendly or hostile to him — he could i
do the same as to myself, and therefore I have no \
fear but that he would listen to all I have to offer
by way of suggestion and advice .... and good
might come of our interview."4

On June 18, Slidell obtained an interview with the
Emperor who said that without the cooperation of
England with her strong navy, recognition, by creat
ing a rupture with the United States would jeopard
ize French commerce and the success of the Mexi
can expedition. He stated that other powers of
Europe had no navies, but Slidell suggested that Spain
had a fleet, and that a Confederate guaranty of
Cuba, and an assurance of French concurrence,
might induce her to take the initiative in recognition.
Napoleon agreed that France in such a case would
act even without England. Speaking of the possi
bility of forcing the English cabinet to act or to give
\way to a new ministry, and asking an interview for

* Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 185

Lindsay and Roebuck, Slidell stated that Lord
Malmsbury, who was friendly toward the Emperor,
would probably be the new English Secretary of
Foreign Affairs in case of a change in the govern
ment.5 Napoleon replied that the Tories were very
good friends of his when in the minority, but that
their tone changed very much when they came into
power. He made an appointment, however, to re
ceive Roebuck and Lindsay, and gave his permission
for Slidell to give an authorized unqualified denial
of the correctness of the rumor in England that he
thought it unwise to recognize the Confederacy.
Slidell in his report to Benjamin stated that Napo
leon added : " I think that I can do something bet
ter: make a direct proposition to England for joint
recognition. This will effectually prevent Lord
Palmerston from misrepresenting my position and
wishes on the American question. I shall bring the
question before the cabinet meeting to-day, and if
it should be decided not to make the proposition
now, I will let you know in a day or two through
Mr. Mocquard, and what to say to Roebuck."

On June 19, Slidell's friend in the French Foreign
Office wrote him that the council had decided to con
tradict the reports that France was less favorable
to the Confederacy, and also to remind the English
Government of previous French propositions. On
June 22, Mocquard wrote Slidell that the Emperor
requested him to say that L'Huys, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, had written Baron Gros, the French
ambassador at London, to sound Russell on the sub-

8 Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863.

1 86

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

ject of recognition, and to say that the French Cabi
net was ready to discuss the subject.6

On June 20, Mason having received an account oi
Slidell's interview with Napoleon sent a note to Lind
say and Roebuck, and they went to Paris that night
to urge the Emperor to invite England formally, b
fore June 30, to join France in recognition, ar
that, in case England should refuse to cooperate, 1
should act alone, with the assurance that Englai
would follow or have a change of ministry.7 C
June 25, Slidell wrote Benjamin that tlu
interview with the Emperor at Fontainebleau was
highly satisfactory, and that they " were authorized
to state in the House of Commons that the Em
peror was not only willing but anxious to recognize
the Confederate States with the cooperation of Eng
land. The Emperor, however, did not promise them
that he would make any formal proposition to the
British Government. But a few days later, the
Paris correspondent of the Times said that Russell
had received a communication from France, through
Baron Gros, looking toward the conclusion of the
war in America. On June 29, Roebuck asked Gros
the substance of his communication to Russell on
this subject, and Gros replied that he had made no
formal communication. The next day, Lord Camp
bell, in the House of Lords, asked Russell if he had
received such a document or verbal communication."
Russell replied that the French ambassador had told
him " an hour ago " that he had not even received an
order to deliver to him such a communication.

6 Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863.

7 Despatches of Mason, No. 40, June 20, 1863.
8 171 Parl. Debates, June 30, 1863.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

On June 30 Roebuck presented his petition in the
Commons, in favor of entering into negotiations
with the great powers of Europe with the object of
recognizing the Confederate Government. He re
viewed the establishment of the colonies in America;
the American Revolution, in which he said that
France in aiding the colonies had borne a similar
relation to them as that which England now bore to
the Confederate States; and the opposition of the
South to the tariff since 1827. Announcing that
secession was now successful, he stated that if the
United States had kept growing she would have
been the greatest bully in the world; and though he
did not favor slavery he was determined to try to
prevent the reconstruction of the Union. He said
that England by recognition could avoid the misery
of the cotton famine; and that, if recognition was de
layed, the people would look to the Government as
the cause of their misery and sweep the existing
Cabinet from its seat. Roebuck, in telling of his
interview with Napoleon, accused the Cabinet ,ofi
misrepresenting the Emperor's views, of concealing/
his offers, and of disclosing to Mr. Seward the na
ture of the Emperor's despatches. He said that Na
poleon was stronger than ever in favor of recogni
tion, notwithstanding reports to the contrary; that
on account of the leakage of previous overtures he
could not make a formal application to England;
but that he had authorized Lindsay and himself to
say to Parliament that he was ready to act writh
England.

Roebuck's motion evidently had little chance of suc
cess. Robert Montague in discussing the legal

l88 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

aspect of recognition, and historical precedents, fa
vored strict neutrality, feeling that England might
as well declare war against the United States at once
as to adopt the policy of recognition which would
certainly lead to war. He stated that the Confed
eracy should not be aided to fight its own battles,
and that Napoleon should be left to pull his own
chestnuts from the fire. Clifford denied that the
Confederate States were in rebellion, and prophesied
military despotism and failure in the United States,
but he also favored neutrality. The Chancellor of
the Exchequer9 did not believe that the restoration
of the United States, by force, was obtainable, how
ever much those who favored American institutions
might dislike to see great visions destroyed; but he
did not fear American expansion, nor think that the
United States should be divided in order to prevent
it from becoming a menace to England. He said
that England should suppress passion and treat the
matter as one of facts. Though he thought that
nineteen-twentieths of the House favored an end of
the war, he considered that Roebuck's motion was
untimely and inconvenient. Forster, whose father
had been killed in a slave state, favored neutrality
not only because it was a duty, but because a war
with the United States would endanger Canada and
commerce, and because he was opposed to any more
division and strife in the Anglo-Saxon race. Lord
Robert Cecil defended the course of Napoleon and
suggested that the fear for Canada would not in
fluence England. But Bright had no faith in the

8 171 Parl. Debates, p. 1807.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 189

scheming and land-hungry Emperor of France who,
he said, ran the chance of being " far too much rep
resented in this House." He considered that Lin
coln represented a moral and peaceful party, and
warned England not to lift her hand " to aid the
most stupendous act of guilt in history." " The
more I study this war," said he, " the more I con
clude that it is improbable that in the future the
United States will be broken into separate republics.
Even if separation occur, sympathies will later bring
the whole continent under one central government."
George Grey could not understand the extraordinary
statement of Roebuck as to what Napoleon said
about the danger of making proposals >to the Eng
lish Government, and he referred to the apparent
contradiction between the statements of Roebuck and
Baron Gros.

On July 2, Layard, the Under Secretary of State,
answered Roebuck's accusation against the British
Foreign Office.10 He stated that the Emperor's des
patch of November 10, 1862, which was the only one
to which Napoleon could have made reference, had
been published at once in France, and then in other
newspapers; and that it had been communicated to
Seward by Mercier, the French minister, and not by
Lord Lyons. He further said that, since the French
communication of the previous November, France,
notwithstanding the statements of Roebuck, had not
made any overtures to the British Government upon
the subject of proposed intervention, mediation or
recognition; that Gros of his own accord had stated

10 172 Parl. Debates, July 2, 1863.

19° THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

that he had received no such communication from
Paris; and that Earl Cowley at Paris knew of no
such communication. Roebuck asked if France had
not made a proposal in the spring of 1862. Lay-
ard had looked over every despatch and could find
none upon that subject.

Mason, July 2, said that the debates and the lan
guage of Gros reduced to a mere shadow the profes
sions of Napoleon to Slidell, Lindsay and Roebuck. :l
At the same time he saw an article in the Times,
from the Paris correspondent, stating that a private
letter from Madrid gave the information that the
Spanish Government had been sounded upon the
question of recognition, with an intimation that if
Spain were ready she would have the support of
France. He remarked that France seemed to be
playing a complicated diplomatic game. Slidell be
lieved that the Emperor had kept his promise, and
that the fault rested either with the French Foreign
Office, Palmerston, or with Russell and Layard.
Mason wrote that the Commons were agitated by the
entanglements, and that four-fifths of the members
were with the Confederacy, but that as parties stood
Roebuck's motion would probably be lost; and he
anxiously awaited news from General Lee.12

The debate on Roebuck's motion was resumed on
July 10, when the latest report from Lee's movement
in the North was favorable to the Confederacy, in
dicating to Mason that Washington and Baltimore
might fall, and make it impossible for the ministry
to hold out against recognition.13 Sir James Fergu-

11 Despatches of Mason, No. 41, July 2, 1863.

12 Ibid., No, 42, July 10, 1863. la Ibid.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 19!

son stated that the Confederacy seemed to be no
longer on the defensive, but that the debate should
be postponed until the result of the campaign was
learned. Though the debate was postponed until
July 13, there was a long discussion on July 10.
Palmerston said that all knew the wishes of Napo
leon now* and, while stating that England was ready
to interchange views with France on American
affairs, he suggested that Napoleon should know that
conversation between himself and two members of
Parliament was not a question for discussion in the
Commons. He hoped that Roebuck would let the
debate drop, claiming that it could not go on without
a revival of personal discussions as to what Napo
leon had said in private. Lindsay explained that in
the previous four years he had held several conver
sations with Napoleon upon the subject of naviga
tion — some of which had occurred since the Civil
War — and that he had told nothing except when Na
poleon gave him permission. He vouched for the
truth of what Robeuck had said, but he desired to
avoid such discussions in the House. He said that
he felt for the Southern people, but others replied
that the Confederacy need look for no sympathy
from the workingmen of England. O'Donoghue
declared that disunion would be one of the greatest
calamities to the world and protested against the
feeling of hostility to American prosperity in which
Roebuck's motion had been conceived.

After a long discussion, much of which related to
Napoleon's statements, Layard still declared that
he himself had gone through all the papers and that
no despatch sent by France to the British Govern-

192 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

ment had ever been sent to the American Govern
ment. He also mentioned a previous case where
Lindsay had come from Paris as an amateur diplo
matist to make communications which he had no au
thority to do. Lindsay in reply spoke of his con
versation with Napoleon on April n, 1862, stating
that Napoleon had asked him to report it to Russell.
As to the recent conference, he said that Napoleon
was anxious to recognize the Confederacy, had
wished to see him, and had authorized the use of any
means to notify the Commons of his readiness to acl.
He took no offense at what Lord Palmerston had
said, but he did not like to be called an " amateur
diplomatist " by the Under Secretary. He said that
if he was an amateur diplomatist the British Govern
ment had made him so by authorizing his talks with
Napoleon on the subject of navigation. Palmerston
made another speech on July 13, regretting the at
tack on the Under Secretary, and stating that it was
necessary to receive communications through re
sponsible ministers — even if the correspondence
should be between Napoleon and Victoria. He said
that it was not the habit of the British Government
to carry on double diplomacy or irregular negotia
tions by private individuals. He explained that
Lindsay had offered to talk with Napoleon on navi
gation; and that the Government, considering him
informed upon that subject, had accepted his offer
with the best intentions. At the request of Palmers-
ton, Roebuck moved to discharge the order for re
suming the debate. In doing so he said that there
Avere two great dangers to England which the Gov
ernment would have to meet: (i) The possibility of

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND IQ3

reconstructing the Union on a Confederate basis, or,
(2) recognition of the Confederacy by France alone.
The statement of Lindsay and Roebuck as to Na
poleon became a subject of conversation between
Dayton and L'Huys at Paris, and Dayton wrote
Seward : " Take it all in all, it was the most futile
and abortive attempt to help on the recognition of
the South that men in prominent positions ever
made." Both English and French officials declared
that there were no such official despatches as those
to which Napoleon had referred. L'Huys informed
Dayton that after the most diligent search he could
find no despatch to which Lindsay's statement could
possibly apply — except the November proposal for
an armistice.14 Perhaps, in his interview with Lind
say in 1862, Napoleon may have referred to unoffi
cial representations made through the French min
ister at London, but Secretary Seward positively
stated that Russell had never furnished him any com
munication of the Emperor. Seward distrusted Na
poleon, but his distrust probably arose from the
rumors and reports which found their way into the
newspapers. L'Huys stated to Dayton that the
Emperor had at no time made a proposal to Eng
land to acknowledge the South, though Roebuck
and Lindsay had pressed him hard to do so and had
told him that England was ready and would offer
recognition if it were not believed that France would
refuse to follow— ^that if he would but say the word
their proposals in the House of Commons would
pass at once; that Napoleon had replied that he had

14 Dayton to Seward, No. 333, Aug. 5, 1863.
13

194 TIIE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

given England no cause to believe that he would not
act with her, but that he would not initiate the move
ment; that when Roebuck and Lindsay asked him if
they might communicate his views, the Emperor had
replied that his views were no secret, little dreaming
that they would use his words in the Commons. An
article in the Monitcur admitted the readiness of the,
Emperor to follow England in case the latter be
lieved that acknowledgment of the Confederacy
would end the war.15

Notwithstanding the assurances of L'Huys, it
jseems that Napoleon may have sent some kind of a
despatch through L'Huys, asking Gros to sound
Palmerston and Russell and to notify them that he
was ready to join in recognition if England would
make the official proposal. Mocquard in explain
ing the subject to Slidell said: "On the next day
after the interview of Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay
with the Emperor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
telegraphed Baron Gros to inform Lord Palmerston
' officiously ' that, should Great Britain be willing to
\ecognize the South, the Emperor would be ready to
follow her in that way." Either Gros did not get the
telegram, or, seeing the feeble support which Roe
buck's motion met, he denied receiving any official
communication on the subject of recognition — as he
had a right to do if his despatch was purely confi
dential.

It is possible that if Lee had won, and the draft riots
had not failed in the North, and if Vicksburg had
not fallen, that England and France might have

15 Dayton to Seward, No. 329, July 30, 1863.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 195

intervened and sent iron-clads to America. Some
still hoped for foreign aid and complications, and
said that if France and England feared reconstruc
tion of the Union, they would manifest their purpose
when they heard of the recent Confederate calami
ties. Still others, seeing that the United States
would continue the war, would have been willing to
be included in the new Mexican empire, whose
notables were now asking France for an emperor.16
A few favored the abolition of slavery as a means of
obtaining recognition. By August, it became evi
dent that what nature and man's genius had bound
together could not be separated by the storms of a
single generation. Peoples might come and pass
away but the Mississippi would roll on through a
united country.

Parliament was prorogued July 28, and the expec
tations of the Confederate sympathizers were much
depressed by the news from America." The Con
federate engagements in Europe for an army and
navy required large sums, and Confederate affairs in
the stock market became more and more doubtful.
The loan fell to -70; and Mason, seeing that another
could not be expected, advised that the Confederate
authorities at Richmond should take control of the
shipment of cotton by fast steamers, and avoid the
exorbitant rates of the blockade runners. On Au
gust 10, in reply to Mason's note of July 16, Russell
stated that he saw no reason to change his opinion
on the subject of the blockade.18 Mason reported that

16 J. B. Jones: Diary. July 31, 1863.

17 Despatches of Mason, No. 43, Aug. 6, 1863.
13 Ibid., No. 44, Sept. 4, 1863.

196 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

England would still resort to evasions of the Decla
ration of Paris. Confederate agents had been sent
to Ireland to stop Irish emigration to the United
States, by assurances of Southern friendship, but
Mason doubted whether they could make much im
pression. Mason saw, in fact, very few crumbs of
comfort; but he wrote Benjamin that if Russia should
modify her policy toward Poland so as to remove ap
prehension of European war, France, compelled by
her interests in Mexico, might take a position of
value to the Confederacy. He suggested that the
authorities at Richmond should define their pol.cy
with the view of endeavoring to obtain France and
Mexico as allies against the supposed future designs
of the United States.

After the failure of Mason to obtain recognition,
in the summer of 1862, the Southerners had become
irritated, and many desired the recall of the diplo
matic agents.19 The withdrawal of Mason was con
templated by the Government, but it was decided that
his recall would interfere with Slidell's arrangements
for the purchase of war materials. The press com
plained that, while the Confederacy should have
agents abroad, the dignity of the country was com
promised by having them sit or kneel at the gate
of kings to petition for admission to the family of
nations. It was stated that, since European minis
ters had spoken so plainly, no one now believed in
the delusion of European recognition and that self-
respect demanded the withdrawal of the diplomatic
agents; that Europe wished to see the war pro-

18 Instr. to Slidell, Jan. 15, 1863.

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 197

tracted till both sides should become exhausted, and
would interfere only when it was clear that the South
could not succeed alone.20

In the spring of 1863 England published the cor
respondence between Mason and Russell on the le
gality of the blockade, and when it reached the Con
federacy the immediate withdrawal of Mason was
strongly urged. Editorials suggested that he had
no position from which to retire, save that of a waiter
on the pleasure of the English Government. Others,
adopting the policy of Davis, saw no humiliation in
allowing him to remain in London " to be ready for
any event which might turn up." They remembered
that they had received valuable assistance from some
of the English people who were " not so cold as
Russell." But a strong party in the Confederacy
continued to speak of Mason " cooling his heels in
the ante-chamber of St. James to no earthly advan-
tage.'"

On August 4, Benjamin, seeing by the parliamen
tary debates that England would decline overtures
for a treaty, wrote Mason that his residence in Lon
don was " no longer conducive to the interests nor
consistent with the dignity of the Confederacy," and
advised his withdrawal.22 In a private note, however,
he asked him to use his discretion if the British
Government showed any sign of a change of policy.
On September 21, Mason, after consulting Slidell,
notified Russell and the newspapers of his reasons
for withdrawal.

20 Richmond Dispatch, March 31, 1863.

21 Ibid., April 8, 1863.

" Instr. to Mason, No. 30, Aug. 4, 1863.

198 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

The London papers for which the Confederate
press agent (Hotze) wrote editorials to " affect the
public mind," commented upon Russell's very marr
ed and impolitic partisanship in favor of the United
States, stating that he licked the feet of Adams and
bit every one else who ventured within the length of
his chain — while rifles and Irishmen were sent to
New York in shiploads with impunity. The Morning
Herald (September 23) spoke of the inconvenience
which would result from England having no means
of communication with the South, and said that
Davis had reluctantly reached his determination after
enduring much provocation and lack of courtesy
from Russell, who, in order to please the indignant
American minister, had not even been disposed un
officially to converse with Mason as a private citizen,
concerning interests of British citizens in the vast
territories over which Davis affirmed himself the
ruling executive. Alluding to the continental idea
that Russell was " a very bear of diplomacy," the
Herald suggested that the bear had found his keeper,
and inquired: " How7 much dirt is this nation to eat
in order to escape the bugbear of an American war? "
It was urged that the Confederacy, with its seat at
Richmond unshaken by the hosts from the North,
had a right to expect more sympathy than it had re
ceived in Europe; and that it was unwise for Russell
to grow colder with the waning fortunes of the Con
federacy, while Napoleon was growing so friendly
that rumor spoke of a possible alliance of France,
Mexico and the Confederacy to cut the Gordian knot
of the American difficulty. But Russell, remaining
unmoved in his policy, replied (September 25) that

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 199

the reasons for declining Confederate overtures
were still in force, and that he regretted that circum
stances had prevented the cultivation of Mason's per
sonal acquaintance.

Mason still complaining of Russell's evasions in
favor of the North on the question of the blockade,
withdrew from London to Paris to await orders from
Richmond.23 He decided that it would be best for
him to remain in England — or at least in Europe.
Accustomed to dealing in futures, he was not yet
disheartened. Who could say when there might cease
to be a Palmerston and a Russell in the Cabi
net. To Jefferson Davis on October 2, he presented
his views in substance as follows : " I await orders.
We think best for me to stay in Europe. Notwith
standing the reluctance of those really our friends in
the Commons to vote for Roebuck's motion, ... it
resulted from no disaffection to our cause, but was
due to the peculiar structure of parties in England
just now. Palmerston's personal popularity is the
mainstay of his administration, and if his party \vere
overthrown it might be returned. The opposition
members think that if he were out of the way they
could come in with their strength greatly increased
— and he is now far advanced in years, and subject to
sharp attacks of the gout or its incidents. Were
there a new administration, or one reconstructed on
the loss of its chief, or any event which would dis
place Lord Russell, it is thought that the policy of

23 Despatches of Mason, No. 46, Sept. 25, 1863 (received
at Richmond on Oct. 23). On Sept. 25, Russell wrote Mason
that the reasons for declining Confederate overtures were
still in force. [Despatches of Mason, Oct. 19, 1863.]

200 THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

England in regard to our country would undergo
great modification."

Mr. Davis in his message to Congress strongly
criticised the Governments of Europe for refusing
to admit the Confederacy into the family of nations.'4
Nevertheless, in view of the very disturbed condition
of European affairs, the wars which might arise,
therefrom, the probable relations of France and
Austria in Mexico, and contingencies and unexpected
relations in which the Confederate interests could
not wait for the delays of uncertain communication,
Mason was appointed commissioner to the continent
with duplicate full power addressed in blank so they
could be used for any capital in Europe.25 He never
had any occasion to use them. Yet he continued to
draw his salary of $12,000 per year until the end of
the war, conferring alternately with Slidell at Paris,
and with Southern sympathizers in the British Parlia
ment who were seeking to embarrass the Palmerston
ministry. He watched the ebbing tide of the Con
federacy's fortunes and hoped against fate until the
last.26

"The Richmond Examiner (J. M. Daniels), Dec. 10, 1863.
Davis »was criticised at Richmond for " bad taste " in
complaining too much of the foreign powers. [J. B. Jones:
Diary, Dec. 9, 1863.]

24 Instr. to Mason, No. 34, Jan. 25, 1864. The Confederate
Senate, on Jan. 18, had confirmed the appointment of both
Mason and his secretary. Macfarland's salary was $3600.

26 The tenacity with which some clung to the hope of
foreign recognition and support is surprising. It appears
that their ideas as to English sympathy with the cause of
the secessionists were very much exaggerated. In April,
1864, L. Q. C. Lamar, who had recently returned from his
fruitless mission to Russia, in a speech at Macon, Georgia,

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND 2OI

said England was almost unanimously Southern in its sym
pathies, and that the majority in Parliament were sym
pathizers with the Confederacy, but that the Cobden-Bright
element held the balance of power. He declared that Napo
leon, the artful politician, was friendly, but was opposed by
his Chamber of Deputies and could do nothing. He con
sidered that the Confederacy was favored "by Austria and
Spain, and by Italy through the Pope, and might be able to
secure as an ally Mexico, under the rule of Maximilian.
[The Weekly Register (Lynchburg), April 23, 1864.]

CHAPTER IX

NAPOLEON, AND THE PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

While Napoleon was contemplating an American
empire around the Gulf, Slidell was planning in
France for a Confederate navy, and Mason was com
missioned to await contingencies.1 Some who favored
rushing headlong into political combinations for
" gigantic increase " urged entangling alliances with
France. Henry St. Paul, in a pamphlet published at
Mobile (November, 1863) on " Our Home and For
eign Policy," stating that France had contemplated
and panted for it, proposed making the gulf a Franco-
Confederate lake, of which Cuba and the French
islands would be the central key, by which the isth
mus could also be brought under control.

Louis Napoleon desired to perpetuate his dynasty
by a military revival and a strong foreign policy.
Even before the civil war he dreamed of restoring to
France her long-lost colonial empire. A professor in
the University of Virginia told Benjamin of an hour's
conversation which he had with the Emperor in 1859
or 1860. He said that the latter drained him by ques
tions, and was especially eager to talk of Mexican
affairs. The professor had just returned from Cuba,
but he found Napoleon apparently better informed
than himself concerning the condition of affairs in the
gulf. He knew the exact number of guns on Morro

1 Instr. to Mason, No. 32, Nov. 13, 1863.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 203

Castle and how much the United States spent on the
Florida fortifications. He seemed to seek in Mexico
a compensation for the lost colonies in the West
Indies, which he said could not be peaceably recov
ered. He stated that France must soon have a pied-a-
terre on the Florida coast to protect her gulf com
merce. " Nous ne voulons pas d'un autre Gibraltar
de ce cote-la." He seemed also to revolve in his
mind the possibility of getting a foothold in Louisiana.
In asking as to the disposition of the French in Texas,
the tendency of the German colonists, and the feeling
on the Mexican border, he twice said " La Louisiane
n'est ce pas qu'elle est Franchise au fond? . . . Eh
bien, il faut reconstruire Tempire la bas." ''

At the opening of the civil war Napoleon saw his
opportunity, and he was favored by the conditions
around the gulf. Spain was ready to introduce her
authority in San Domingo; and England and Spain
were cooperating with France in contemplated inter
vention in Mexico in order to collect claims resulting
from the revolutions there. The United States, how
ever, would not join the European powers, but soon
expressed a readiness to help Mexico in the settle
ment of her claims. In the early part of 1862 Eng
land, Spain, and France landed troops at Vera Cruz.
Mexico soon arranged with England and Spain by
negotiations, and they withdrew their forces. Napo
leon refused the terms offered, and by invitation of the
clerical party declared war against Juarez. He ex
pected the Confederacy to be successful, and hoped
that thereby the United States would be prevented

2 Confed " Dip. Cor.", France, Benjamin to Slidell, Feb. 7,
1863.

2O4 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

from interfering with his designs. French journalists
stated that intervention was rendered necessary by the
ambitious views of the United States as to expansion.
The American Government was apprehensive that
Spain might renew her cooperation with France.
Perry at Madrid suggested to the Spanish Govern
ment that it was time for her to end her participation
in the Mexican affair. Referring to the possible large
merchant navy which might traverse the waters be
tween Mexico and France, he suggested that the
strategical position of the Spanish colonies should
make Spain careful. For a while the influence of the
United States at Madrid was lessened by the report
that Mexico was to pledge territory for a loan from
the American Government, but Spain held aloof from
Mexican affairs.

The Confederate officials expressed no disapproval
of the policy of either France or Spain in Mexico and
San Domingo. They informed Spain that they de
sired to see her power grow. Slidell in 1862 told
Napoleon that the Confederacy would have no objec
tion to his taking the west end of San Domingo.

The Confederates were much encouraged by Napo
leon's attitude. In May, 1861, the Due de Morny, the
greatest person in France after the Emperor, informed
Rost that the recognition of the South was only a
matter of time. France only waited for England.
In April, 1862, Napoleon freely stated to Slidell that
he was ready to send an Anglo-French fleet to the
mouth of the Mississippi to break the blockade, but
New Orleans soon fell and postponed the chances of
Confederate recognition. In the fall of 1862 Napo
leon had been ready to mediate for a six months'

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 205

armistice but England and France had refused to join
him. Apparently his friendship grew in the spring
and summer of 1863, but Lee was driven from the
North and England firmly declared against coopera
tion in recognizing the South, and Napoleon soon
found it inconvenient to facilitate plans for building
a Confederate navy in his ports. Gradually the signs
of the times rudely destroyed his vision of a great
Latin empire beyond the seas.

While Napoleon, declaring the necessity of a stable
government in Mexico to prevent the United States
from controlling the entire gulf, was preparing, in
the summer of 1862, an expedition for Vera Cruz, his
consuls at Galveston and Richmond were acting in
such a manner as to make Benjamin suspicious that
the Emperor, in accordance with the traditions of the'
French policy, had secret and occult designs on some
of the Southern states, as well as on Mexico. Under
date of August 18, Theron, the French consul in
Texas, in a letter to Governor Lubbock, confidentially
asked his views as to whether the annexation of Texas
to the United States, and its subsequent secession and
incorporation with the Confederacy were good politi
cal movements, and whether the reestablishment of
the republic of Texas would be beneficial. He stated
that he was seeking information to guide him in his
political correspondence with his government. Lub
bock forwarded this letter to Davis ; and shortly after
wards Benjamin, in a communication which was cap- -
tured and published in the newspapers 3 of the follow
ing January, informed Slidell as to the discovery of

3 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 23, 1863.

206 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

a political intrigue believed to have been set on foot
by the French consul for the purpose of detaching
Texas from the Confederacy. Benjamin suggested
that it was the intention of Napoleon to hold Mexico
as a colony, and to establish Texas as a weaker power
between Mexico and the Confederacy so that he might
feel secure — or that it was his purpose to take Texas
under his protection as an independent republic, so
that he could get cotton to offset the India supply of
England, thus making Texas as subservient to French
interests as if it were a French colony. Benjamin
asked Slidell to investigate.

The Richmond Examiner, whose editor was not an
admirer of Benjamin, feeling that the publication of
this captured despatch would give the Yankees more
news than could possibly have been given by any
Confederate newspaper, and tend to disgust Napoleon
with the Confederate cabinet — and, at the same time,
ironically feigning to believe that the despatch was a
fabrication — said that two idle French consuls might
have conceived the " silly idea " of sandwiching
Texas between two strong governments, but that so
stupid a conception could not possibly have attracted
the serious attention of even the feeblest secretary of
state.* L'Huys voluntarily spoke to Dayton concern
ing the alleged intrigue, and said that he would
severely censure (" pound them "), the French con
suls, for assuming to interfere. Seward seems to
have attached no importance to Mr. Benjamin's fears,
nor to have apprehended any danger from the various
rumors as to French designs. He considered that

4 Richmond Examiner, Jan. 26, 1863.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 207

the French element around New Orleans had become
entirely Americanized. At the close of 1862, in writ
ing to Dayton that the relations between France and
Louisiana did not have any political significance in
the relations of the two countries, he said that there
was no hook in Louisiana upon which French inter
vention could grapple.5

Notwithstanding the suspicions of Benjamin, Napo- /
leon did not appear to take offense. He still professed /
to be ready to cooperate with England in any policy
affecting the Confederacy, and a few months later
he even appeared willing to act with Spain alone if
the latter would take the first step. In March, 1862,
Spain had not been ready to take the initiative in
recognizing the Confederacy. At the close of 1862,
when by the mutations of Spanish affairs General
Serrano was called to the portfolio of foreign affairs
in the O'Donnel cabinet, Slidell saw a possibility that
Spain might review her decision, and he recommended
that the Confederacy should be represented at Madrid.
On March 22, 1863, Benjamin appointed Slidell to
act as special commissioner to that court; and, on
May 9, sent him instructions to assure Spain that the
South, since secession, no longer desired Cuba, nor
sought to extend its boundaries, but that it foresaw
future aggression of the United States for acquisi
tions, and was willing to form an alliance with Spain,
and to guarantee her possession of Cuba. When
Slidell received his instructions Serrano had gone out
with the other members of the O'Donnel cabinet.

8 U. S. Dip. Cor., 1863, parts i and 2. pp. 640, 642, 646 and
702. Dayton to Seward, Feb. 13, 1863. Seward to Dayton,
Dec. 29, 1862, March 2, Sept. 26, 1863.

208 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

Slidell did not go to Madrid, but he held long con
versations with Isturitz, the Spanish ambassador at
Paris, who stated that the sympathy of himself and his
government was with the Confederacy, and that Spain
was prepared to act with France and England, but that
she could not take the initiative in recognition and
risk the results of a war with the United States.9
Slidell suggested that Spain and other powers might
unite with France without the cooperation of England,
and with apprehension of consequences no more ser
ious than " Seward's ebullitions." Isturitz seemed to
admit that Spain would be favorably disposed to his
suggestion, but he did not commit himself. He wrote
Miraflores, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs,
that Slidell would promptly go to Madrid in case he
should receive an intimation that his presence would
be acceptable.7 Napoleon, on June 18, was more fav
orably disposed than ever to a general European
recognition of the Confederacy; but he feared the
large navy of the United States, unless he could re
ceive English cooperation. Slidell suggested that
Spain had a navy, and that, by a guaranty of Cuba
and with assurance that France would concur, she
might be induced to act. Napoleon gave the assur
ance, Slidell informed Isturitz, the Paris correspond
ent informed the London Times, and Benjamin ex
pected a treaty; but after the defeat of the Confederacy
at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Isturitz stated that
nothing could be effected at Madrid.

The Confederates at this time were calculating upon
success in obtaining a navy in French ports. In an

8 Despatches of Slidell, May 28, 1863.
7 Ibid., June 21, 1863.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 209

interview of October, 1862, Napoleon had intimated
to Slidell that if the Confederacy would arrange to
build ships in France, the builders would not be inter
rupted, and that by making some plausible plea the
vessels would be allowed to leave. The two had just
been speaking of a plan of joint mediation for a six
months' armistice, when Napoleon changed the sub
ject by asking why the Confederacy had not created
a navy. Slidell said: "If the Emperor would give
only some kind of verbal assurance that the police
should not watch too closely when we put on the guns j
and men, we would gladly avail ourselves of it." The !
Emperor replied: "Why could you not have them:
built as if for the Italian Government? I do not think j
it would be difficult, but I will consult my ministers."
Slidell was further encouraged, in December, by an
interview with Mocquard, though in the early part of
January the latter said that Napoleon found greater
difficulties as to building the ships than he had an
ticipated.8

On January 7, M. Arman, a deputy of the French
legislative body, came to Slidell with a proposition to
build steamers, and the latter, feeling that he came at
the Emperor's instance, asked him to wait until he
learned the action of the Confederacy upon the propo
sition of European bankers to float a loan. L'Huys,
who was consulted as to building the vessels, said that
he preferred to close his eyes to the affair until some
direct appeal should be made to him, and that Slidell
had better communicate with him through his
" friend," except when there was something special.

8 Despatches of Slidell, Jan. II, 1863.
14

2io NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

The Minister of Marine officially assured Slidell and
Deputy Voruz that the builders of the corvettes " for
commercial purposes in the Indian ocean " would be
permitted to arm and equip them, and that the vessels
would be allowed to go to sea.9 The Emperor also
informed Arman that there would be no difficulty i i
arming the steamers.

By the last of March the success of the Confederate
loan seemed to be assured and Mason and Slidell ad
vised that the building of vessels should begin. On
April 15, Captain Bullock made a contract with J. L.
Arman for four clipper corvettes of the Alabama
type, to run between Shanghai, Yedo and San Frar-
cisco, and built with the contemplation of a sale to the
Emperor of China or of Japan. Arman arranged with
M. J. Voruz of Nantes for two of the vessels. Bul
lock, soon after, received Mallory's note, of May 16,
stating that the Confederate Congress by a secret act
had appropriated £2,000,000 for building iron-clad
ships of war abroad. Expectations at Richmond had
become much aroused by the hopes held out by
France. In an interview with Napoleon on June 18,
Slidell, in thanking him for his sanction of the con
tract for building the four corvettes, stated that the
Confederacy was also prepared to build several iron
clads if he would only give verbal assurance that they
would be allowed to proceed to sea. To this request
Napoleon replied that if the ships were built it would
be necessary to conceal their destination. Slidell
urged that it would be no violation of neutrality for
the Emperor to give his permission to the Confeder-

9 Despatches of Slidell, March 4, 1863; Feb. 16 and 18, 1864.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 211

acy, and mentioned the precedent of a ship built for
the Chilean Government, but the Emperor said there
was a distinction.10 On July 16, Bullock closed an
other contract with Arman for two iron-clad vessels.
There was no official assurance, as in the case of the
corvettes, that the vessels would be allowed to go to
sea; and afterwards, when Slidell found that they could
not leave except under the apparent ownership of
some recognized government, he stated that he did
not know of the contract until it was made.11

It will be seen from the foregoing statements, as
reported by Slidell, that Napoleon only promised that
the vessels should be built, and allowed to sail if their
real destination could be kept concealed. But the
secret of their destination becoming known through
no fault of his, in the face of American protest he
finally found it inexpedient to favor the Confederacy
in its plans to secure a navy.

On September 10, 1863, a mysterious stranger
walked into the office of John Bigelow, the United
States consul at Paris, and informed him of Bullock's
contract to secure Confederate vessels by having them
built for China. The stranger was Peterman, a clerk
of M. Voruz, who had abstracted his employer's cor
respondence. Bigelow at once informed Seward and
Dayton, who brought the matter to the attention of
the French Government.12 Arman claimed that he
was no longer dealing with the Confederacy; but, on
October 22, L'Huys informed Dayton that the Min-

10 Despatches of Slidell, No. 38, June 21, 1863 (in cipher).
Despatches of Mason, No. 40, June 20, 1863.

11 South. Hist. Ass'n Papers, Vol. XIV, p. 454.

12 Bigelow: France and the Confederate Navy.

212 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

ister of Marine had notified both Voruz and Arman
of the withdrawal of the authority which had been
obtained for the armament of the four vessels.13 Some
time later, when Dayton placed into the hands of the
French authorities full proofs as to the Confederate
vessels, L'Huys expressed amazement.

Slidell became uneasy, and on November 6, wrote to
Napoleon that the confident assertions of the agents
of the United States Government, and certain remarks
made at the office of foreign affairs, and of marine,
caused him to apprehend that orders might be given
to interfere with the completion of the vessels, and
he stated his confidence that Napoleon would take
necessary steps to prevent such interference. Three
days later L'Huys asked Slidell to call November 9.
He then told him that what passed with the Emperor
was confidential, and that France being bound by a
declaration of neutrality would not risk a war with
the United States. Slidell replied that the vessels
were building by an invitation of Napoleon, who had
originated the idea, and he invoked an adherence to
the promises confidentially given.

The Minister of Marine (November 19) drew a
broad line of distinction between corvettes and iron
clads, stating that if the latter be allowed to sail in
spite of the remonstrances from Washington and in
violation of the declaration of neutrality it would be
an overt, act of hostility. He informed Arman that
the iron-clads would not be allowed to go to sea ex
cept as the property of some non-belligerent govern
ment, and Bullock, after consulting Mason and Slidell,

13 U. S. Dip. Cor., 1863, Vol. II.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 213

determined to sell them. Bullock also desired to dis
pose of the corvettes, which he said were built only to
act in conjunction with the iron-clads in raising the
blockade. Slidell, however, suggesting that a few
months might change affairs, was in favor of using the
corvettes as cruisers like the Alabama. " I know the
Emperor's feelings are as friendly as ever," said he,
" and the new ministry in England may enable him
to indulge them. The chapter of accidents is always
in the long run fruitful of great and unexpected re
sults. Perhaps it may be better to go on and com
plete the ships." Davis and Mallory agreed that it
was best to complete the vessels and take chances.

A short time later, Slidell's hopes received a fresh
shock. The steam sloop Rappahannock, pierced for
four guns and purchased by Confederate agents in
Great Britain, left November 25, without armament
or war equipments, and by permission entered the
French port of Calais for repair, to adjust her engines,
and to complete preparations for her voyage to the
Confederacy. Napoleon wrote Persigny that he had
given orders that she might leave the French port,
but that the American minister must not know it. A
few days later, however, by an order which Benjamin
called unfriendly, the French Government prevented
the vessel from proceeding to sea with more than
thirty-five officers and men. This being insufficient
to manage the vessel she was detained at Calais.1*

Slidell soon had fresh evidence that the turn of
events in America and Europe, and the policy of Eng
land, were forcing Napoleon to endeavor to conciliate

14 Rp. of Mallory, Sec'y of the Confed. Navy, Richmond,
Nov. 5, 1864.

214 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

the United States. James Williams, a confidentia
agent, had spent two weeks at Miramar in frequent
communication with Maximilian, and wrote Davis tha*
the latter was disposed to enter into an alliance will
the Confederacy. Slidell was told by his friend in the
foreign office that Maximilian would recognize the
South, but when the latter, while at Paris, did noi.
receive him, he wrote that the whole policy of the
Emperor had changed. Mercier was on a visit to
Paris, and Mason suggested that perhaps Lincolr
had sent a message to the Emperor offering to recog
nize the Mexican Government if France would noi.
recognize the Confederacy.15

Arrangements for extricating vessels in Englanc
also met with serious interference. The British Gov
ernment had detained several steam rams upon com
plaints that they were building for the Confederacy,
and Earl Russell soon found occasion to warn Mr.
Davis that British neutrality must be respected. In
December, 1863, Seward sent Russell a copy of what
purported to be an annual report of Mallory of the
Confederate navy.19 It alluded to Confederate vessels
building in England, and to contemplated Confederate
operations in Canada. Seward stated that " The re
cognition of the insurgents without navy, ports,
courts, or coasts, as a belligerent, was deemed by

18 Despatches of Mason, March 16, 1864. Despatches of
Slidell, Dec. 3, 1863, Mar. 16, 1864, and May 2, 1864.

10 U. S. Dip. Cor. Instr. No. 789, Seward to Adams, Dec.
20, 1863. As to the spurious character of the Mallory report,
see Adams to Seward, Nos. 574 and 579; Seward to Adams,
Nos. 824 and 883; Adams to Seward, Nos. 596 and 640; and
Seward to Dayton, Feb. 25, 1864. Also, Despatches of
Mason.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 215

them ... as an invitation to use the British ports,"
and he urged that for the British Government to tol
erate the Confederate agents while they were carrying
on their avowedly hostile purposes against the United
States could not be called neutrality.

In March, 1864, Lord Russell asked Lord Lyons
to convey to Davis in a spirit of neutrality and impar
tiality a protest against the efforts of the agents of the
" so-called " Confederate States to build or purchase
war vessels in British dominions for use against the
United States — stating that they gave the United
States just cause for serious complaint, even if the
vessels were armed out of port.17 He further stated
that even if it should be difficult to prove in a court
of law that the parties procuring the building of these
vessels were Confederate agents, nevertheless it was
so undersood everywhere, and the British were satis
fied that Davis would not deny it.18 There were no
regular diplomatic or consular agents near Richmond,
and Lord Lyons (April i) by permission of the United
States Government sent Russell's protest to Rich
mond by special messenger. Davis replied (April 6)
through Burton N. Harrison, his private secretary,
protesting against the term " so-called," stating that
the British plea of neutrality was clearly contradicted
by British action in favor of the United States, and
refusing to notice Russell's argument upon a ques
tion which was still before the highest courts of Eng
land.19

17 Despatches of Mason, March 16, 1864.

18 Despatches of Adams to Seward, No. 596, Feb. 12, 1864.
Enclosure.

"Frank Moore: The Rebellion Record (N. Y., 1861-65,
8 Vols), Vol. VIII, p. 513, et seq. Mrs. Davis: Jefferson
Davis, Vol. II, Chap. 48-

216 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

A few days later Benjamin instructed Mason that
he could use his own discretion about going to Lon
don, in case he thought his presence would be useful
there.20 Mason had already been going to Londo i
to help " keep the public mind awake," to combat the
anti-slavery sentiments of his friends, to organize
Southern societies, and to communicate to Lori
Robert Cecil information which he might use in com
bating the Government.21 He was feeling the pulse of
the opposition and of public opinion, but he could
expect nothing from the British Government unless
Grant should be driven from before the gates of Rich
mond.22

At the beginning of 1864 the vigilance and pro
tests of the United States officials in France had
caused the French Government to notify the builders
that vessels for the Confederacy must not leave, and
Arman saw that his only opportunity was to make a
fictitious sale and have the vessels delivered to the
Confederacy on the ocean. Bullock, feeling that he
had been deceived, refused to agree to Arman's plan.
Maury returned to the Confederacy (February) to
report the failure to get out vessels from either France
or England. It was a painful disappointment."
Mason wrote that there was no excuse for the defeat
in France where the Confederate agents had a right

20 Instr. to Mason, April 18, 1864.

21 Despatches of Mason, No. i, Paris, Jan. 25; No. 2, Paris,
Feb. 8; No. 3, London, Feb. 18; No. 4, London, Feb. 18;
No. 5, March n, 1863.

22 On June 22, 1864 (Instr. to Mason, No. 36), Benjamin
wrote that the British action regarding the Tuscaloosa was
an " outrage."

23 Despatches of Mason, No. 3, London, Feb. 18, 1864.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 217

to expect better results.2* A month later he said that
there was no more hope from France than from
Austria, notwithstanding Napoleon's mysterious pol
icy and his " fairest professions sedulously made."
Again in July he wrote: " We have been duped by
that power and worse." Bullock stated that in future
it would be necessary to be very cautious in dealing
with France. Perhaps Napoleon had expected Con
federate victory, or contemplated an alliance which
would give him an opportunity to allow the vessels to
go, but he finally found it necessary to discountenance
any arrangement which would offend the United
States. Bullock had finally agreed to the fictitious
sale of the corvette tn a Denmark banker, to be deliv-
ered to the Confederacy on the sea, but Arman sold
Ifiem outright, claiming- that he did so by the order
of Napoleon. The two Bordeaux corvettes and the
ram were sold to Prussia! The builder at Nantes
declared that he would deliver the other two corvettes
at sea but Slidell was not confident. On June 2, in /
a letter stating that ex-Senator Gwin with a recom
mendation from Napoleon was on his way to colonize
Sonora with persons of Southern birth and proclivi
ties, Slidell advised that no further attempt be made
at that time to fit out a navy in Europe — but he said
that the Confederacy ivould need a navy at the close of
the war.™ Napoleon still studied the United States
map, but he ceased to see Slidell, except occasionally
at the races.

Of the prospective navy only one vessel was ever I

u Despatches of Mason, No. 5, March 16, 1864. Ibid., No.
7, Paris, April 12, 1864. Ibid., No. 11 July 8, 1864.
25 Despatches of Slidell, June 2, 1864.

218 NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY

delivered to the Confederates. About the last of
January, 1865, the ram JStoerkodder, which Arrran
pretended to have sold to Denmark, sailed from Bor
deaux. She changed her name to Olindc on_Jhe
FrenetLcoast, discharged her Danish crew, and taking
on arms, sailed to Spain as the Stonezvall. France
declined to meddle with the vessel after it reached
Spain. Commodore Craven, of the United States
navy, arrived to prevent its escape but he mysteriously
failed. The Stonewall escaped to Nassau and fina'ly
reached Havana, where it was sold for $16,000, though
the captain-general was willing to make the contract
read $100,000. The war had then ended and it was
too late to attempt to break the blockade. Bigelow
afterwards instituted suit against Arman for money
received from Confederate agents, but the claim was
rejected.

The failure to get out vessels in France was a blow
from an unexpected quarter.20 It disappointed both
Davis and Benjamin who seem already to have ha«l
grave doubts of the good faith of Napoleon. Davis
while walking through the capitol square with some
Richmond ladies said: " We have no friends abroad."1
Benjamin ceasing to put his faith in foreign powers
and expressing expectation of an early victory without
them said (April 18): "It has been, perhaps, fortu
nate for us, notwithstanding the awful price paid in
blood . . . that European powers have remained so
inconceivably blind to their own interests in this
trouble. The end is seen to be approaching and we
. . . shall have no favor to reciprocate, but many

20 Instr. to Mason, April 16, 1864.

27 J. B. Jones: Diary, March 21, 1864.

NAPOLEON: PROJECTED CONFEDERATE NAVY 219

wrongs to forget — some, perhaps, for which to ask
for redress." In September, 1864, Benjamin fur
nished Slidell with a long catalogue of acts of the
French Government — in France, in the Confederacy
and on the Mexican border — which he said had been
injurious to the Confederate States.28 He stated that
England had scarcely disguised her hostility, but that
the Emperor had obscured his under profuse pro
fessions of friendship. He decided, however, to defer
complaints against the French Government until a
more favorable season. There w%ere rumors of pros
pective French aid until the visions of both the Con
federacy and Napoleon vanished in the fall of Rich
mond. But there was no longer a cordial feeling
toward the Emperor, and Davis, while travelling
through Europe after the war, refused to call upon
him.29

28 Instr. to Slidell, Sept. 20, 1864.

29 J. W. Daniel: Jefferson Davis, p. 45.

CHAPTER X

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

The plans in the British Parliament had failed; the
British war vessels kept a close watch at the mouth
of the Mersey to prevent the escape of Confederate
vessels; Spain would not act; and France, owing to
the vigilance of the United States officials, had he-
come more careful than had been anticipated, leaving
doubt as to whether a Confederate navy would be
allowed to sail even if it were secretly built in European
ports. The decrease of Confederate opportunities in
Europe, together with the desire to embarrass the
United States Government, and to create national
complications, caused the Confederates to turn to
Canada as a base of operations.

The Richmond authorities in making their plans
placed much reliance upon the disaffection (against
the Lincoln administration) which existed in portions
of the North, and which found expression in the or
ganization of the Knights of the Golden Circle and
the Sons of Liberty. Some even expected a counter
revolution. The West, at the beginning of the war,
had been much excited as to the Confederate policy
on the waters of the Mississippi. On February 25,
1861, the Confederate Congress had passed an act for
free navigation of that river. In January, 1863, Foote,
in the Confederate Congress, offered a resolution
tempting the Northwest to make peace. A few days

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 221

later he stated that if Indiana and Illinois should
recede from the war and aid the Confederacy he
would be willing to furnish them an army for protec
tion against Lincoln. A month later it was stated in
Richmond that a gentleman from the Northwest de
clared that Ohio, Kentucky and Illinois would secede
and form a new confederacy, or join the South.
Though this was not reliable, the people began to dis
cuss whether Virginia would be willing to take back
her " erring children of the Northwest/' and whether
the cotton states would oppose such an accession.1
In March, it was suggested that conscription in the
North might cause a new civil war that would result
in giving aid and comfort to the Confederacy. In
the following June, Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio,
whom Lincoln had banished to the Confederacy for
an intemperate speech in Mount Vernon, Ohio, was
in Richmond, and told Ould that, if the Confederacy
could only hold out for the year, the peace party of
the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of
existence. In September, J. C. Jones asked Davis
for permission to run the blockade to confer with
Secretary Bates of Lincoln's Cabinet on terms of peace
by assuring the United States that none of the North
western states would be admitted to the Southern
Confederacy.2 In February, 1864, one of Morgan's
secret agents, who had spent several months in the
North, doubted whether Lincoln would be able to re
cruit the army by a draft, and stated that there was
a perfect organization all over the North for a revolu-

*J. B. Jones: Diary, Jan. 24 and 27, Feb. 14, March 3,
June 22. 1863.
2 Ibid., Sept. 10, 1863.

222 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

tion, and for the expulsion or death of the aboli
tionists.8

As early as February, 1863, Mr. Mallory had favored
an expedition against Johnson's Island for the pur
pose of releasing Confederate prisoners. Davis and
other members of the Cabinet, fearing complications
with England, opposed the expedition, but it was
finally arranged. The plans, however, miscarried.
In November, 1863, Lord Monck, Governor-Genen.l
of Canada, telegraphed Lord Lyons at Washington
that there was a rumor of a Confederate plot to capture
steamers on Lake Erie, release Confederate prisoners,
and then to invade the United States by an attac c
upon Buffalo. On the night of November n, Lyons
notified Seward, and a close watch being kept along
the frontier by both Canada and the United States, the
Confederates made no attempt to execute the plot.
Lieutenant Minor soon returned from Canada and
stated that his contemplated expedition had failed on
account of the gratuitous action of Lord Lyons.*

Notwithstanding the close watch kept by Lord
Monck, the United States Government in 1864 ex
pressed much anxiety concerning the large number
of Confederates in Canada and the suspicious-looking
vessels in Canadian waters. Seward had been pro
testing vigorously against the British policy, and there
was a widespread belief in the United States that the
Confederates received assistance which the British

3J. B. Jones: Diary, Feb. 22, 1864.

4 Lieut. Minor's letter of Feb. 2, 1864. In Naval War
Records, Series i, Vol. II, No. 36, House Docs., Vol. XLI,
54-1, 1895-96.

J. M. Callahan: The Neutrality of the American Lakes
and Anglo-American Relations, pp. 145-46.

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 223

Government could have prevented. With the rise of
controversies, the Confederates contemplated the con
tingency of an Anglo-American war which would
embarrass the United States and aid the cause of
secession. In April, 1864, Seward said: "We must
finish the Civil War soon or we shall get into a war
with England." Two months later he declared that
British sympathy was clearly with the South.

In February, 1864, the Confederates expected to
gain some advantage from the Chesapeake affair. On
December 5, 1863, J. C. Braine and H. A. Parr, with
twelve equipped men, boarded the United States
steamer Chesapeake, leaving New York for Portland.
They pretended that they were passengers for Port
land. On December 8, while on the high seas, they
captured the vessel, after a brief struggle, made pris
oners of those on board, and sailed to the bay of
Fundy. Near St. Johns, New Brunswick, the pas
sengers, and most of the crew, were released, and
Captain Parker took command. While the Chesapeake
was receiving coal from a British vessel in Sambro
harbor, Nova Scotia, the United States gunboat, Ella
and Annie, entered the harbor and seized her; but,
after reaching the sea, orders were received from a
Federal officer to deliver her to the British authorities
at Halifax. The United States Government re
quested that the men engaged in capturing the Chesa
peake on the high seas should be delivered to the
United States. Davis and Benjamin decided to as
sume responsibility for the seizure of the Chesapeake,
stating that the original conception of the plan was
probably by Captain John Parker, alias Locke, a Brit
ish subject, who had enlisted as a Confederate priva-

224 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

teer, and whose vessel had become unseaworthy. They
stated that Braine and Parr were Confederate citizens
; and that they had intended to take the Chesapeake
through the blockade at Wilmington.5

On February 15, Benjamin instructed Hon. J. P.
Holcombe to go to Nova Scotia to defend the men
and to claim the vessel. In case the authorities re
fused to give him an official interview, he was to re
monstrate firmly and inform them that the Confed
eracy would hold England responsible. He received
$3000 salary, and $5000 for expenses in carrying out
his instructions. He was also given $25,000 to se
cure passage to Bermuda for Confederate prisoners
who had escaped to Canada.6 Holcombe's instruc
tions asked him to insist upon the following points:
(i) That citizens of the Confederacy had a right, dur
ing the war, to make captures even without a com
mission, and that while engaged in such enterprises
they were neither pirates nor murderers. (2) That
the Chesapeake, while in a neutral harbor, was beyond
the reach of legal recapture, and that voluntary rendi
tion of the vessel gave the United States no right to
retain it. (3) That the Richmond admiralty court,
and not those of a neutral power, had jurisdiction in
determining whether the Chesapeake was a good prize
of war. (4) That this particular case was not affected
by the English prohibition against privateers carrying
prizes to English ports, as the vessel went to the Eng
lish port only to get fuel. (5) That England had rec
ognized the Confederates as belligerents. (6) That if
the British authorities had delivered the vessel to the
North, they must reimburse the Confederates

6 Instr. of Benjamin to Holcombe, No. I, Feb. 15, 1864.
8 Instr. to Holcombe, No. 2, Feb. 24, 1864.

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 225

Holcombe found Confederate sympathizers in
Canada; but, in April, the Confederate Government,
acknowledging that it had been led into error, dis
claimed the seizure of the Chesapeake.'1

In April, 1864, just before Grant began his advance
to Richmond, the Confederacy had recognized its
perilous condition. Many, both North and South,
were weary of war. The Confederate Congress, be
lieving that an organization in the North and West
would aid the South, secretly appropriated a million
dollars to be used by Confederate agents.8 In March,

Mrs. , of Maryland, whose son was in a Federal

prison, had already received secret service money, and
had gone to Canada on some enterprise in which she
expected aid from Catholic priests and nuns.9 On
April 27, Jefferson Davis sent Jacob Thompson and
C. C. Clay as special agents to Canada to carry out
instructions 10 received orally, by which that country
was to be made the base for striking the United States
in the back.11 Thompson, on April 28, received bills
of exchange for $900,000.

A subsequent report of Thompson to Benjamin (from

7 Instr. to Holcombe, April 20, 1864.

8 See N. Y. Herald, July 28, 1872.

*J. B. Jones: Diary, March 22, 1864.

10 Their credentials are in Confed. " Diplomatic and Con
sular Commissions." On April 30, Benjamin wrote Slidell:
" We have sent Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, and Clement
C. Clay of Alabama, to Canada on secret service in the hope
of aiding the disruption between the Eastern and Western
States in the approaching election at the North. It is sup
posed that much good can be done by the purchase of some
of the principal presses, especially in the Northwest." [Con-
fed. " Dip. Cor., France."]

u Benjamin to Thompson, April 28, 1864.
t-5

226 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

Toronto, December 3, 1864) indicates the nature of his
mission. By conferences with disaffected men, some of
whom hoped that without war the South would soon
consent to reconstruction, Thompson encouraged tae
organization of an insurrection in the North; he ad
vised with Colonel Martin in regard to burning New
York City, and with Captain C. H. Cole, who made a
tour of the lakes, studying forts, channels and peo
ple preparatory to plans for the release of Confed
erate prisoners and the inauguration of operations in
which the prisoners were expected to assist; he aided
a plot undertaken by J. Y. Beall for the capture of lake
steamers. By Benjamin's instructions, he urged t;ie
people of the North to convert their paper into geld
and withdraw it from the market. John Porterfield of
Nashville was sent to New York with $100,000 to use
in purchasing and exporting gold.12

On July 9, Thompson wrote Benjamin from Wind
sor: " We have sixty escaped prisoners who are
ready for any enterprise." He said that nothing could
be done in the Eastern States, but suggested that the
Confederate movements to Kentucky and Missouri
would facilitate a movement in the West, where there
was much discontent against the Lincoln Govern
ment. In a letter sent by Captain Hines, he stated
that " the work " would probably not begin before the
middle of August and that much caution would be
necessary. About the same time there were rumors
from Canada that the Confederate agents had ma
chines in Canada which were to be mounted on lake
vessels and shipped to destroy Northern cities.

13 Report of Thompson to Benjamin, Toronto, Dec. 3, 1864.

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 227

The coming presidential election in the United
States was at this time an absorbing question and the
Confederates were reckoning upon some chapter of
possible accidents to defeat Lincoln. Some in the
North, like Wendell Phillips, the stormy petrel of
political troubles, thought Lincoln \vas going too
slowly in his policy. Others who opposed military
arrests and the suspension of the habeas corpus, said
that he was going too fast and that recent reverses
justified efforts to obtain peace. Some had opposed
the war policy from the beginning. But the nearly
universal desire of the Union party was to renominate
Lincoln and to support the campaigns of Grant be
fore Richmond and Sherman before Atlanta. The
Baltimore Convention which met June 7, declared in
favor of maintaining the integrity of the Union, of
ratifying an amendment for emancipation, of con
structing a railway to the Pacific, of paying the public
debt and of re-electing Lincoln. It opposed any com
promise with secession.

Many of the opposition had charged Lincoln with
refusing to negotiate for peace on reasonable terms.
A. H. Stephens, who desired peace, had been stopped
before he reached Fortress Monroe on his way to
Washington, and had not been permitted to come
within the Union lines because he had refused to state
the object of his visit.13 In July, 1863, Colonel
Jacques, a Methodist clergyman, serving in Rosen-
cranz's army, returned from an unofficial visit to Rich-

13 President Davis to Gov. Vance, Jan. 8, 1864. On Dec.
30, 1863, Vance had urged efforts to secure peace. [Weekly
Register (Lynchburg), June 4. 1864.] See also Stephens'
"War Between the States," Vol. IT, pp. 557-80; ^and Nicolay
and Hay's " Abraham Lincoln," Vol. VII, pp. 369-74.

228 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

mond and reported that he had proposals for peace.
He said that prominent men in the South were willing
to give up slavery, but that they would not take the
initiative in a movement for peace. On June 14, 1864,
Davis issued a manifesto stating that the Confederacy
was willing to negotiate on points which required c.d-
justment and that it desired the United States to cease
the war against secession. He stated that if the
United States would withdraw its armies, the war
would be at an end. On July 8, Col. J. T. Jacques, in
company with J. R. Gilmore, a novelist (Edmund
Kirke), made an " unofficial visit " to Richmond,
where Davis listened (July 17) to their plans of ad
justment — to decide, by majority vote, whether there
should be union without slavery or disunion with it.
Davis pronounced their plan impracticable, said that
the Confederate States seceded to get rid of the rule of
the majority, and would not consider proposals for
peace except on the basis of independence.14

About the same time another peace comedy 15 was
being enacted on the Canadian boundary. After a
recent conference at Niagara Falls between Thomp
son, Clay and several prominent citizens of the United
States, the Confederate agents decided to open a cor
respondence looking toward negotiations for peace.
Holcombe in the following November wrote Ben
jamin that it was intended that the correspondence
snould have effect in rendering probable the defeat of
Lincoln at the polls.10 Clay and Holcombe opened

14 Nicolay and Hay, Vol. IX, p. 212. Benjamin to Mason,
Aug. 25, 1864. Register (Lynchburg), Aug. 27, Sept. 24, 1864.
Gilmore, Recollections of Lincoln; Atlantic Mo., Vol. 59.

13 The Index (London), Aug. 4 and 6, 1864.

10 Despatches of Holcombe (Richmond), Nov. 16, 1864.
Also, N. Y. Herald, July 31, 1872.

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 22()

communication with Greeley, and G. N. Sanders ex
pressed his willingness to go to Washington on a
peace mission.17 In the early part of July, Greeley
wrote Lincoln that Colonel Jewett was at Niagara in
communication with Confederates who had power to
make negotiations for peace. Lincoln had no faith in
Jewett' s story, but replied July 9: "If you can find
any person, anywhere, professing to have any propo
sition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, em
bracing the restoration of the Union and the aban
donment of slavery . . . say to him he may come
to me with you." A few days later he again wrote:
" I am disappointed you have not reached here with
those commissioners ... I not only intend a sincere
effort for peace, but I intend you shall be a personal
witness that it is made." On July 20, Major John
Hay, Lincoln's private secretary, arrived at Niagara
with the following note:

" Executive Mansion, Washington, July 18, 1864.
To Whom it may concern:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of
peace, the integrity of the Union, and the abandon
ment of slavery, and which comes by and with an
authority that can control the armies now at war
against the United States will be received and be con
sidered by the Executive Government of the United
States, and will be met with liberal terms on other sub
stantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers
thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
"The Weekly Register (Lynchburg), Aug. 6, 1864, p. 214.

230 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

It was discovered that the Confederates at Niagara
with whom Greeley opened peace negotiations had no
authority from the Confederate Government.18 They
were endeavoring to have Lincoln take the initiative
in the peace negotiations and to recognize the official
status of the Confederate Government. Lincoln con
sidered that the Niagara Confederates were cooperat
ing to aid the anti-administration movement by cre
ating an impression that he was opposed to peace ex
cept on the basis of immediate emancipation. Cn
August 24, Lincoln wrote a letter with the intention
of sending Henry J. Raymond to propose peace with
out mention of slavery, but events soon occurred 10
weaken the extreme peace men and the letter was
never used.19

Thompson and Clay, by confidential conferences
with men from the Northwest, had declared the readi
ness of the Confederacy to seize Illinois, Indiana and
Ohio. Peace meetings were inaugurated at Peoria
and other places, but the fire soon diminished and the
nerves of the leaders began to relax.20 The return of
Vallandigham in June encouraged the opposition to
attempt to defeat Lincoln by the ballot-box. The
half-formed project of an insurrection was given up
with the hope of success at the polls. The leaders of
the anti-administration party had called a national
convention on July 4; but after the Baltimore Conven
tion, hoping to receive advantage from some new
chapter of accidents, they agreed to postpone the meet
ing to a more inconspicuous date. Thompson, in his

18 Instr. to Mason, Aug. 25, 1864.

19 Nicolay and Hay.

20 Thompson to Benjamin, Toronto, Dec. 3, 1864.

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 231

report to Benjamin, said this postponement inter
rupted the calculations for a general uprising in the
North. The Democratic convention finally met at
Chicago, August 29, the day which had been set for
a counter-revolution, and nominated McClellan for
president. It was a time of depression and gloom.
The terrible fighting in the Wilderness, the horrible
slaughter at Cold Harbor, the Confederate raid into
Maryland had shocked and depressed the country.
Early, defiant, stormed up the Shenandoah; Sherman
was delayed at Kenesaw; Chase, tired of providing the
funds while others controlled the expenditures, had
resigned from the Cabinet, and seemed to see the
mirage of the presidency; the Wade-Davis manifesto
had been issued in August and the Democrats, attack
ing the administration and hoping to change the Gov
ernment, pronounced the war a failure. Mason, also
from London, wrote: " I do not see how the war can
be carried on when . . . people have no stomachs for
the fight." a

The Confederates had recently received fresh proof
that Europe would not take any action, and Mason
saw nothing to do but await events, hoping that the
presidential election and the anti-war feeling in the
United States, together with the distress in England,
would favor the South. In the last week in May,
Lindsay had had a conversation with Palmerston to
endeavor to conciliate the British Government's sup
port on a resolution for joint mediation in the Amer
ican war. He wrote Mason that Palmerston favored
his resolution, but thought it best to wait. At the

21 Despatches of Mason, No. 13, Paris, Sept. 29, 1864.

232 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

suggestion of Lindsay, Palmerston said he would
be willing to see Mason and hear his views if he were
in London.22 Mason did not feel at liberty to ap
proach the British Government without some intima
tion of its disposition to enter into official relation;
but, urged by Lindsay, he went to London, expecting
to see Palmerston in case he should be invited. He
found that only the news of a great victory against
Grant before Richmond would give any hope that the
ministry would support Lindsay's resolution.23 Rus
sell remarked that Adams still spoke confidently. On
July 8, however, Mason, in a note to Benjamin, stal
ing that new Confederate successes might cause Eng
lish public opinion to compel the Government to ac :,
said: " Palmerston has sent me a note that he de
sires to see me." : Benjamin had already (July 12),
in a note advising occasional conferences with Lind
say, favored the proposed interview and instructed
Lindsay to meet Palmerston's advances with courte
ous but lofty bearing." 23

On July 14, Palmerston received Mason and Lind
say in a friendly manner at his home. He asked
Mason his opinion of the nature and probable length
of the war; the probable results of the presidential
election upon it; whether the United States would be
as much opposed to intervention as formerly, and
what prospects the South had. Mason, in his reply,
stated that the North was strongly against a continua
tion of the war and indicated that the United States

22 Despatches from Mason, No. 8, Paris, June i, 1864.

23 Ibid., No. 9, London, June 9, 1864.
"Ibid., No. n, July 8, 1864.

25 Instr. to Mason, No. 37, July 12, 1864.

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 233

would be forced to cease hostilities and make peace.
He did not doubt the final success of the Confederacy.
Though he did not urge recognition, he suggested that
recognition alone by any European power would stop
the war. Palmerston, though friendly, did not define
his policy for the future.26 Lindsay, unable to con
ciliate the ministry, abandoned his resolution.27 On
July 25, Palmerston, in reply to Lindsay in the House
of Commons, said that the Government lamented the
sacrifice of life and property in America and the dis
tress in England, but in the existing state of affairs
there would be no advantage in entering into concert
with European powers to propose mediation.18 Mason
soon returned to Paris, from whence he wrote," a few
weeks later, that he might .be able to do some good at
Frankfort by efforts to prevent emigration to the
United States and aid a catastrophe to United States
securities. Palmerston had stated that recognition
would be of no value unless England should intervene
by raising the blockade, but Benjamin said that rec
ognition from whatever quarter would end the war
and that nothing else would. He insisted the Confed
eracy did not seek intervention, but he expected noth
ing from England except a " policy dictated by the
United States." As Benjamin was writing, Davis
was on a tour through Mississippi, Alabama and
Georgia endeavoring to dispel increasing disaffection

28 Despatches of Mason. July. 1864. Duplicate copy in
Mason's MS. Record Book. Ibid., No. 14, Nov. 10.

27 Ibid., No. 12, Aug. 4, 1864.

M 176 Parl. Debates. Also, Despatches of Mason, No. 12,
London, Aug. 4, 1864.

*" Despatches of Mason, No. 14, Nov. 10, 1864,

234 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

for the Confederacy. But Benjamin wrote : " There
is no reason for despondency." :

From the moment of the Chicago convention, the
stars in their courses seemed to fight against both the
Confederacy and the Chicago platform. During a
flow of rhetoric and the march of torchlight proces
sions, following the nominations, Hood was preparing
to evacuate Atlanta. The Union success at Mobile
knocked the second plank out of the platform.
McClellan seemed to see the poison of death in the
platform and his letter of acceptance he practicallv
repudiated part of it and disappointed the Confed
erates in their expectation of an early end of the at
tempts to preserve the Union. In September, Na
poleon shook hands with .Slidell at the races, and
agreed with him that McClellan's letter was disap
pointing. Slidell said the war would probably con
tinue till a revolution broke out in the North. As
the campaign proceeded, the thunder of great guns
announced new Union victories. Peace did not ap
pear so far distant, but it was the peace of reunion.

The crisis on the lakes came September 19, 1864,
when the steamer Philo Parsons, running between De
troit and Sandusky, was captured by Confederates
who had boarded her as passengers. The Confederate
flag was unfurled and the vessel started on her way to
Sandusky to capture the armed steamer Michigan, but
the design failed and the Parsons was taken back to

30 Instr. to Mason, Sept. 2, 1864. The Confederate Con
gress prepared a manifesto (July) which Mason, Slidell and
Mann, in November, decided to engross and present to the
principal European powers. [Despatches of Mason, No. 14,
Nov. 10, 1864.]

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 235

the Detroit river and left at Sandwich in a sinking
condition.31 Air. Seward had just prepared a state
ment of the Parsons affair for the British Govern
ment when the news arrived at Washington that
twenty-five desperate men had plundered St. Albans,
Vermont, and escaped on stolen horses into Canada.82
Excitement in the United States followed. It was
felt that Canada was responsible for her Confederate
guests, and that their bad conduct might endanger
the peace with Canada. This feeling wras not mollified
by the declaration of Lieutenant Bennett H. Young,
commander of the St. Albans raiders, that he went to
Canada as a commissioned officer in the provisional
army of the Confederate States M and that he had vio
lated no law of Canada. False reports continued
to alarm the people and to add to the excitement
which naturally existed upon the eve of a great presi
dential election. On Sunday, October 30, church

81 Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864.

"Seward to Adams (19 Instr., Great Brit.), No. 1136, Oct.
24, 1864.

33 The St. Albans raiders were afterwards tried in the
Canadian courts. Mason, learning that Lieutenant Young
had acted under orders of war, took steps to appeal his case
to the courts of England in case it should be necessary.
[Despatches of Mason, No. 15, Dec. 16, 1864.] In Decem
ber Sanders wrote from Montreal to Richmond asking for
copies of orders showing that the Vermont raid was author
ized by the Confederate Secretary of War. [J. B. Jones:
Diary, Dec. 15, 1864,] It appears that Thompson had no
knowledge that the raid was contemplated, but Sanders in
his testimony before the court at Montreal stated that Young
acted under the instructions of Clay. Davis issued a procla
mation assuming Confederate responsibility for Young's raid
[N. Y. Times, Jan. i, 1865], and Seddon, the Confederate
Secretary of War, said that the raid was authorized by in
structions of June 16, 1864. [N. Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1865.]

236 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

services at Detroit were disturbed over the report
from Toronto that one hundred Confederates had
left that place for the purpose of raiding Detroit. The
State Department at Washington received information
that there was a conspiracy to fire all the principal
cities in the North on election day, and, on that day,
General Butler and General J. R. Hawley, as a pre
cautionary measure, were placed upon lake steamers
ready for service at any point in case Confederate
sympathizers should attempt to execute any of the
reported plots. But no Confederate attempts were
made.

After the people had so strongly supported Lin
coln at the polls, the Confederacy saw its approach
ing doom — unless the United States should become
involved in foreign difficulties. The Sons of Liberty
had been demoralized by the election. Thompson,
holding letters from prominent Northern men, and
with much money still unused, was not anxious to
continue his operations from Canada. " The bane
and curse of carrying out anything in this country,"
said he, " is the surveillance under which we act.
Detectives stand at every corner." 3 Holcombe, how
ever, advised further encouragement of disaffection
in the North. In a letter to Benjamin dated at Rich
mond, November 16, he said: "The Northwest is
not . . . ready for a revolution. But it is fermenting
with the passions out of which revolutions have been

84 Report of Thompson to Benjamin, Toronto, Dec. 3,
1864. [Received by Benjamin on Feb. 13, 1865.] Published
in the N. Y. Herald of July 25, 1872, and in Naval War
Records, i°, Vol. Ill, No. 379, p. 714. [House Doc., Vol.
LXXIII, 54-1.]

CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA 237

created. In Illinois, Indiana ... a majority are
hostile to the present administration ... it would be
a fatal mistake, in my opinion, to abandon all effort to
separate this section from the United States because
no results have as yet been achieved commensurate
with our expectations. . . . We should employ money
and talent without stint to give this brooding resent
ment the proportions of anarchy and civil strife. Let
us preserve our communication with our friends in
the North, . . . introduce arms . . . gradually and
cautiously . . . subsidize leading presses. . . . With
arms, leaders and an opportunity, we could strike a
deadly blow." ! Benjamin did not recall Thompson
until March 2, i865.36

Confederate operations from Canada caused excited
debates in the United States Congress in December,
and for a while affairs seemed to be drifting toward an
Anglo-American war. The English' Parliament be
came alarmed at the proceedings in the American Con
gress, but Palmerston, seeking to avoid angry debate
/(February n), said: "We cannot deny that things
did take place of which the United States were justly
entitled to complain." The London Times became
friendlier in its tone toward the United States, and
said that the Confederacy was seeking to involve Eng
land in the war. The Richmond Dispatch, in reply,
said that England, seeking her own prosperity, was
responsible for the anti-slavery feeling in the North,
for secession, and " for the present calamities of this
continent," but that her precarious hold on Canada
was indicative of the coming day of retribution when

35 Holcombe to Benjamin, Richmond, Nov. 16, 1864.

36 See N. Y. Herald, July 24, 1872.

238 CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS FROM CANADA

that province would be " tied like a tinpail to the tai
of New England." 87

On February 13, Russell informed Mason, Slidel:
and Mann by a note, that the Confederates, by not
respecting the British neutrality, were attempting to
involve England in a war in which she had declared
her intentions to take no part. Referring to the seiz
ure of the Philo Parsons, the plan to capture the Mich
igan, and the raid into Vermont, he stated that the
" so-called Confederate States," by assuming respon
sibility for such acts and claiming them to be bellig
erent operations, showed " a gross disregard of her
Majesty's character as a neutral power, and the de
sire to involve her Majesty in hostilities with a coter
minous power with which Great Britain is at peace."
In conclusion, he said: " I trust you will feel your
selves authorized to promise that such practice shall
cease, and shall be entirely abandoned for the
future." 8S

87 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 14 and 18, and Feb. 24, 1865.

88 MS. at U. S. Dept. of State: Vol. 88 Despatches, Great
Brit. Enclosure in Russell to Adams, Feb. 15, and in Adams
to Seward, Feb. 16, 1865.

CHAPTER XI

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S SECRET MISSION.

Near the close of 1864 two Confederate officials at
Richmond apprehensive of an approaching crisis
were closeted in deep deliberation. One of them
had been suffering for days with neuralgia, and once
there had been rumors over the city that he was
dead; but, still bearing evidences of recent illness,
he had returned to his laborious work of reading let
ters of complaint, examining monotonous detail, and
deciding on applications for positions. The other
was the picture of robust health — though in his face,
over which there usually played a pleasant smile,
could now be seen the worry of those troubled times.
Both had been hearing the old dull sullen sounds of
bombs down the river for weeks and months, and
now they were informed that Lee's army was be
coming depleted by desertions; that the nitre and
mining companies were ceasing operations; that
Hood was defeated; that Sherman had seized Savan
nah; and that persons in high places were aiding
Federals to obtain information. They saw the people
feeding upon poor supplies and condemning the
speculators. The croakers were made gloomier by
dismal rain and fogs. Some of the states refused to
obey the Richmond authorities and were threatening
to make peace with the United States, or to estab-

240 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER's MISSION

lish a counter revolution.1 The soldiers and clerks
were complaining that rich property holders were
exempt from military service. Military officers and
disaffected congressmen were quarrelling with the
administration. Lee's shelterless men were shive:;-
ing over feeble fires before Richmond, and pulling
the trigger with frozen fingers; and Lee himself was
despondent.

In all attempts to secure European recognition or
aid by offer of commercial advantages or alliance, or
by international complications, the Confederacy had
failed; and, in its plans to raise a navy in French
ports, it had been duped by Napoleon.2 Notwitl -

1 Governor Brown of Georgia refused to obey the Coi -
federate authorities. The conditions in North Carolina were
such that Governor Z. B. Vance urged Davis (Dec. 30, 1863)
to send envoys to Washington to endeavor to bring the war
to an end. Davis in his reply expressed the fear that some of
the people of North Carolina would inaugurate a movement
to give aid and comfort to the Union, and that there would
be a civil war in that State. He hoped that Vance, by not
too long delaying action for conciliating men suspected of
disloyalty to the Confederacy, would make it unnecessary to
use " physical force to suppress treason." [South. Hist.
Society Papers, Vol. XIV, p. 412. Jefferson Davis to Z. B.
Vance, Jan. 8, 1864.]

2 Davis in his message of November said that the policy
of European nations in refusing recognition discriminated
unfairly in favor of the United States, and that it was chari
table to say that they were indifferent. Referring to the
impossibility of peace without independence he said: "The
common judgment of history will be unable to absolve the
neutral nations of Europe from a share in the moral respon
sibility for the myriads of human lives unnecessarily sacri
ficed." On November 25, Earl Russell — in a communication
acknowledging a joint note of Slidell, Mason and Mann,
which had as an inclosure the manifesto of the Confederate
Congress — lamented the " protracted nature of the struggle

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 24!

standing the immense war debt which had been piling
up, the United States had the confidence of for
eign powers, and they feared to oppose her while the
Confederacy was being crushed, and while the
clauses of Lincoln's message contained the Monroe
doctrine coiled up for a spring. Very few now as
serted the political power of cotton stored in Con-
between the Northern and Southern States of the formerly
United States of North America," and said that Great
Britain since 1783 had remained connected by friendly rela
tions with both the Northern and Southern States, and that
her policy was strict neutrality. [Despatches of Mason, No.
15, Dec. 16, 1864.] Some thought that there was a relaxa
tion in Russell's tone, but Mason attached no importance
to the reply. In December some hoped that complications
might arise over the seizure of the Confederate cruiser
Florida in Brazilian waters [Mason to Benjamin, Nov. 10,
1864], and some still looked across the Atlantic to see aid
brought from the East in ships, but Europe spoke not.
The editor of the Richmond Examiner said that a Confed
erate commission to Brazil might do more service than the
Erlanger loan would ever be able to do. He stated that if
Brazil should demand redress and the United States should
laugh at her that nothing would be more natural than a
Confederate-Brazilian alliance which might also include Mex
ico and " erect a barrier against the encroachments of the
Hoosier." [Richmond Examiner, Dec. 8, 1864.] Some pro
posed to enter into colonial or other subordinate relations
with European nations. The Sentinel counselled the Con
federate States to resume their places as the colonies of
England, France and Spain — like prodigal sons, or like
young birds that had broken their shells too soon. This
would have been a recantation of the Declaration of Inde
pendence in order to escape defeat in a nearly lost cause.
[J. B. Jones: Diary, Dec. 15, 1864.] The same paper shortly
afterwards advised that in order to secure recognition or;
intervention — and the good opinion of mankind — that the
Confederacy should inform Europe of its readiness to abolish
slavery. The Examiner (Dec. 30, 1864) preferred to put
military affairs in a really responsible hand, give him carte
blanche and carte noire and let Europe alone.
16

242 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER's MISSION

federate warehouses, or doubted that the crisis in the
English " cotton famine " was over.8 It was the
darkest period in the Confederacy, and Presic ent
Davis and Secretary Benjamin, seeing a com
ing cataclysm in which the Confederacy m;ght
be swept to its doom, began to feel convinced lhat
intervention by European powers was the only hope
— and they resolved to play their last card by sacri
ficing slavery, as a war exigency, for success against
the United States.

It had often been suggested that Europe was prej
udiced against the Confederacy chiefly on account
of the question of slavery. Mason so interpreted
one of Earl Russell's speeches in the House of

8 George McHenry, in a paper on " The Approaching
Cotton Crisis " (Dec. 31) endeavored to prove that, act-
withstanding the general belief on both sides of the Atlantic,
the cotton famine was not over, and the calamity was still in
store. On January 5, 1865, the Committee of Ways and
Means (F. S. Lyon, Chairman) passed a resolution asking
McHenry to furnish such information as he had in his
possession relating to " cotton products, cotton trade, and
its importance to the commerce of the world." McHenry
replied January 8. His belief in 1861 had been that cotton
was not then king, and now, although he found himself
almost alone, he asserted its political power — if the Confed
erate authorities would take the proper steps. He stated
that a supply of good cotton would, after the lapse of a
few months, be of vital importance to England, and endeav
ored to show that 90 per cent of all the cotton yarns and
goods manufactured in England were from southern cotton,
the China and Indian cotton being of a damaged or inferior
quality. He said that the time was at hand when the British
cotton manufacturers would not remain quiet if they were
deprived of the raw material to make the fabrics for which
there was a demand— that unless the mills obtained a full
supply of American cotton there would be a revolution in
the British isles. He considered it a mistake to attribute

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 243

Lords (March 23, 1863), in which, while urging the
present duty of England to stand still, he had stated
that if interference should be necessary in the future
it would be " in the cause of liberty and to promote
the freedom of mankind." Mason saw a double
meaning in these words and intimated that Russell
was not disposed to recognize a state with slavery.
Even the most ardent friends of the Confederacy
were opposed to its system of labor. In November,
1862, while Mason was taking dinner with Lord
Donnoughmore, a warm Confederate sympathizer,
the latter informed him that Palmerston would
doubtless not enter into any treaty with the Con
federacy unless it should agree not to permit the
African slave trade. Mason was surprised, and still

the previous distress in the English manufacturing districts
to a cotton famine. He stated that there were large stocks
of cotton and cotton goods in England when the war began—
enough for three years — and that these goods had been sold
at from two to five times the regular prices, and that the
supply from the Confederacy had never been fully shut off.
He believed that the cotton crisis had been staved off only
by the steady arrivals of 4000 bales of American cotton per
week, together with that which had been received in the
United States. It was to this that he attributed the fact that
the neutral powers had been passive viewers of the American
conflict. He declared that the American slavery question
had not in any degree influenced the course of the rulers of
England — that they knew that cotton could not be cultivated
by free negro labor and that they would not oppose the
South in obtaining necessary help even from Africa. Ac
cording to his view, England would already have been pre
pared to offer recognition if the export of cotton from the
Confederacy had been prohibited a year before. He ex
pected the famine sometime during 1865, and said, " If recog
nition or mediation could only be brought about in time to
permit of a good cotton planting in 1865, the finances of the
South would soon be righted.

244 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION

more so when Fitzgerald, another member of Par
liament, coincided. The Confederate constitution
forbade the opening of the slave trade, but Benjamin
stated that the Confederacy could not make a treaty
on the subject.4 He informed Mason that after all
it was not wise to impose restraints on men for the
future, and requested him, in case England should in
sist on this subject, to refer the matter back to Rich
mond.5 In June, 1863, De Leon wrote Benjamin
that the prejudice against slavery was so great that
the Confederate reasons and arguments were power
less.6 M. de Lesseps said that France could not
acknowledge the Confederacy without some promise
of emancipation. De Leon recommended that the
Richmond Government should withdraw the commis
sioners from Europe, stand on its dignity and en
lighten public opinion. In January, 1864, Mann in
formed Benjamin that the Southern Independence
association was against " our cherished institution "
and had desired kindly to show him that recognition
must lead to the gradual abolition of slavery.7 Ma
son at the same time wrote that he found it " but
vain to combat their sentiment " — though, still ex
pecting to convert them, he told them that the film
would fall from their eyes in time.8 Mr. Spence, who
wrote a book and many articles in favor of the
South, lost a prominent position under the Confed
erate Government because his published opinions

4 Instr. to Mason, No. 14, Feb. 6, 1863.

6 Ibid., No. 13 (and circular), Jan. 15, 1863.

6 De Leon to Benjamin, June 19, 1863.

7 Mann to Benjamin, London, Jan. 24, 1864.

8 Despatches of Mason, No. I, Paris, Jan. 25, 1864. [Re
ceived at Richmond on April 19.]

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER*S MISSION 245

were unfavorable to the Confederate institution of
slavery.

Many prominent men in the Confederacy had
favored the abolition of slavery. Others had pro
posed drafting slaves into the army. In 1862 John
T. Pickett favored emancipation. After the defeat
at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in 1863, E. S. Dargon,
a member of Congress said that he would agree to
abolish slavery in order to obtain intervention.9 In
August of the same year B. H. Micon of Florida
proposed that' slaves be drafted into the army to fight
for their masters. Benjamin in his reply stated the
following difficulties: (i) Slaves as property would
cost the Confederacy $2000 each. (2) If the Govern
ment should hire them they would cost $30 per
month, and only $11 per month were paid for white
men. (3) The banding together of negro men might
be an unsafe experiment, giving facilities for deser
tion. (4) The males were needed in the mines, on
fortifications, and in other fields of labor.10 The sub
ject was frequently discussed at that time. Lee, in
the fall of 1864, recommended the employment of
negroes as soldiers, and a few months later he stated
to the Senate committee that slaves should have their
liberty if put in the field to fight.11 In the early part
of the war Davis refused to respond to the intima
tions that England or France might recognize the
Confederacy without slavery. The constitution gave
him no power to treat with foreign nations on the

* J. B. Jones: Diary, July 31, 1863.

10 Confed. " Domestic Letters/' Aug. 18, 1863.

11 H. A. White: R. E. Lee and the Southern Confederacy,
N. Y., 1897.

246 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER's MISSION

subject of slavery. At last, however, he was per
suaded to favor gradual emancipation, and reluc
tantly he recommended the arming of the slaves.12
In November, 1864, after Davis's recommendation,
the Confederate Congress began a several months'
debate upon the proposition for arming and emanci
pating a part of the slaves.13 Some declared it was
Benjamin's idea for foreign effect, and the press at
first strongly opposed it." Howell Cobb thought it
would be better to " concede the demands of England
and France for the emancipation of the slaves and to
enlist them afterwards." In December and January
some of the newspapers counselled the Government
to propose to Europe that the Confederacy should
abolish slavery in order to obtain recognition ani
ships to break the blockade, but the majority of the
leaders did not favor such a course.
) In the fall of 1864 Benjamin realized even more
fully than Davis that desperate measures and new
forces were necessary to secure Confederate success.
He informed Davis that future negotiations with
Europe must be on the basis of emancipation and the
Government seizure of cotton to purchase ships by
, which to break the blockade. Davis hesitated to act
I in a matter so clearly extra-constitutional, stating
that the Confederate constitution was his supreme
court of law. But Benjamin justified his proposi
tion as a war measure; he believed that by emancipa-

12 J. W. Daniels: Jefferson Davis, p. 59.

18 Seward's Diary, Nov. 21 and Dec. 17, 1864. Richmond
Observer, Dec., 1864. Seward to Adams, No. 1193, Dec. 17,
1864, and No. 1298, March 13, 1865. [Instr. Great Brit.,
Vols. XIX and XX.]

14 J. B. Jones: Diary, Nov. 8, 1864.

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 247

tion, and a promise to ship cotton, the recognition
of France and perhaps of England might be ob
tained; he urged that the only way to get ships and
money was by cotton, the only unexhausted resource
of the Confederate Government and the people.
Mr. Davis was influenced or controlled by few men,
but he had entire confidence in Mr. Benjamin. After
careful deliberation, without appealing to Congress,
and independent of that body, he finally agreed to
accept the last and only hope of an almost expiring
Confederacy, trusting that if successful the plan
would gradually receive the support of Congress and
the states.

In determining what agencies to use in order to
carry out this new policy, Benjamin proposed the
selection of some one man of sound judgment who
\vould be ready and able to meet contingencies as they
might arise. For several reasons it was not consid
ered expedient to work through Mason and Slidell
alone. It was seen that they might not be enthusiastic
with the new policy, and that it would be better to send
some one from Richmond pledged to the new
scheme, and with power to act independently of diplo
matic agents, or even to dismiss them if necessary.
The blockade was very stringent and communication
was very hazardous. Speedy action was necessary.
There was no time to refer questions back to Rich
mond. Benjamin opposed sending more than one
prominent man on account of the danger of pub
licity, and of jars and quarrels.

The new plans were domestic dynamite, and it was
considered necessary to guard against exposure until
after a diplomatic triumph had secured a navy. This

248 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER*S MISSION

was expected to reconcile the people to the means
used to achieve the end. At the same time it was
desired to send an agent who had a commanding in
fluence in Congress — one who would prove a link
between that body and the executive authorities.
Such a man was Duncan F. Kenner of Louisiana, the
intimate friend of Benjamin. He was an able man
of conservative views, a wealthy sugar planter, rep
resenting personally and by his family connections
one of the largest slaveholdings in the South, and he
was chairman of the committee of ways and means
in the House of Representatives. He had been edu
cated in Europe and spoke French. He was asked
by Mr. Benjamin to go to Europe with general in
structions giving him not only full powers as a com
missioner to make treaties and bind the Confederate
States to the emancipation of slaves, but also with
separate instructions to negotiate for the sale of cot
ton. These instructions were based upon the prin
ciple that the Confederacy was a de facto Govern
ment, and could take extra-constitutional power if
necessary to its preservation. Mr. Kenner had be
fore proposed to offer a motion in Congress author
izing a commission to be sent to Europe to promise
emancipation for recognition, but had surrendered his
determination at the advice of Davis, who did not yet
approve his proposal, and begged him not to make
the move at that juncture. He now hesitated to ac
cept powers given neither by Congress nor by the
constitution.

But Kenner finally yielded to Mr. Benjamin's rep
resentation that it was necessary to ignore the con
stitution in order to save the Confederacy. He still

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER*S MISSION

objected to the form of his credentials, stating that
his instructions should be more specific as to the
plans of emancipation, but Benjamin prevailed. The
power given to Mr. Kenner to sell cotton was not dip
lomatic, nor was it necessarily intended to be a mat
ter of discussion with the European Governments,
but only with capitalists. The instructions relating
to this power were entirely separate and distinct
from his credentials as a high commissioner, and
were much fuller. They gave him power to sell all
the cotton in the Confederacy if necessary, to receive
the price thereof, and to invest in vessels and war
material. It was not expected that any contract to
sell cotton to the capitalists would be completed until
after the success of diplomatic negotiations wTith
either England or France, when it was expected that
France at any rate would wink at the fitting out of
a navy in her ports.13

In a letter addressed to Slidell on December 29,
Benjamin stated that the Confederacy in a four
years' courageous struggle for self-government had
really been fighting the battles of England and
France; that if the war had been against the United
States alone it would have long since ceased, but
that in calculating the length of the war the Con
federacy had not expected Europe to aid the United
States by the abandonment of the rights of neutrals,
by closing ports to Confederate prizes, by the seiz-
. ure of vessels intended for the Confederacy, and by
indifference to an unequal fight; that, notwithstand
ing miscalculations and the afflictions caused by the

15 From notes of an interview with Gen. J. L. Brent in
1898, and from correspondence with him in 1899.

250 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S MISSION

blockade and devastation, the Confederates were de
termined never to reunite with the North. At the
same time Benjamin mentioned Seward's " One war
at a time " policy, and warned Europe against future
Northern aggression. Then he approached the mari
question — were there no terms upon which recogni
tion could be obtained? "Will Europe never recog
nize us till the United States consent?" If so, he
said that it might be necessary to deliberate upon
the terms that could be secured from the Federals.
But he urged if Europe had objections to recogni
tion not already made known that she should give
the Confederacy a chance to meet them — or if it were
her purpose to exact terms or conditions before rec
ognition, a frank exposition of that purpose was due
to humanity — " for," said Benjamin, " it may enable
us to save many lives by consenting to such terms in
advance of another year's campaign." On Decem
ber 30 a copy of this despatch was addressed to
Mason with a statement that it would be handed to
him by Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, whose verbal com
munication upon the subject embraced in the des
patch should be accepted as reliable, and " as ema
nating from the department under the instructions of
the President."

Kenner was delayed, probably by the increased
blockade at Wilmington, and Mason was told that he
need not wait his arrival before taking steps toward
sounding the European Governments. " Confer
with Slidell " continued the instructions, " as to
measures best adapted to elicit some decisive re
sponse from France and England as to their inten
tions concerning the war after having freely con-

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S MISSION 251

versed with Kenner and obtained the information he
will convey." 5

It was intended that Kenner's mission should for
the time be kept secret. In such a crisis it is not
likely that Benjamin gave out any information except
so far as it could not be avoided. On December 29,
the Senate, in secret session, among other things
asked the President for information as to the
finances, the condition of foreign relations and as to
whether any aid from abroad was expected or had
been sought or proposed. No reply was ever sent
to the Senate. The Richmond newspapers, at the
beginning of 1865 however, indicate that public opin
ion was being prepared for the new policy. The
Enquirer said that the absence of a Confederate decla
ration of the causes of secession, and of the war,
had enabled the United States to say that slavery
was the corner-stone; that the thirty years' violent
anti-slavery discussion in the United States had led
anti-slavery Europe " to think our war is to perpetu
ate slavery; and that an avowal that slavery would
not be permitted to prejudice the question of recog
nition might not be too late, and might induce recog
nition or intervention." The Enquirer followed the
Sentinel in agreeing to urge upon its readers a policy
of emancipation, if it should be necessary as a means
of securing recognition and a guarantee of inde
pendence by England and France." The Sentinel,

19 Instr. to Mason, No. 39, Dec. 30, 1864.

17 An editorial from the Richmond Sentinel concluded with
this paragraph: " If France and England will enter into a
treaty with these Confederate States, recognizing our nation
ality and guaranteeing our independence upon the abolition
of slavery in all these states, rather than continue the war

252 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER's MISSION

which was often quoted as an " official " organ,
stated that such a proposition ought to be made to
England and France. It despondently spoke of the
recent reverses " as having done much to prepare
the minds of the people for the most extreme sacri
fices. It said: "Any sacrifice of opinion and sacri
fice of property, any surrender of prejudice, if neces
sary to the defeat of our enemy, is now the watch
word." It favored exhausting every resource, and
throwing overboard all the cargo if necessary, to
keep afloat the storm-tossed ship of the Confederacy.
" Let the Government determine what it needs and
what it can use," said the editor, " and if it be our
land . . . our negroes ... it shall have them ....
Our constitution . . . may not provide for all the
exigencies of war; questions may arise .... when
our best welfare will require of our rulers the exer
cise of a bold responsibility (as in the purchase of
Louisiana) .... Statesmen have sometimes to
throw themselves upon the intelligence of their
countrymen and seek their advantage by irregular
means."1

On January 25, after having had General Lee at

his house for tea the day before, Mr. Lyons,

informed Mr. J. B. Jones that as a last resort he was in

we should be prepared to urge the measure upon our readers.
We believe such a proposition would be favorably received
and acted upon by those nations and it ought to be made to
them." Some in the North declared this to be from the
pen of Davis, and Seward ordered copies of it to be sent to
foreign leaders. [Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 7, 1865.]

18 This despondent tone is also seen in the Whig of Jan. 2,
1865.

19 Richmond Sentinel, Jan. 2, 1865.

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 253

favor of sending out a commission to Europe for aid,
on the basis of emancipation, etc. He stated that to
use negroes as soldiers in the war would mean eman
cipation, and he thought that Lee always had been an
emancipationist. George D. Prentiss, of the Louis
ville Journal, in the early part of January returned
from a month's visit to Richmond and informed the
Kentuckians in the United States Congress that the
Confederate Congress had conclusively resolved to
free and arm the slaves — that 200,000 of them would
soon be equipped to fight under promise of liberty
and a proprietary interest in the soil.20

In January before Kenner sailed for Europe there
was much discussion in favor of peace negotiations,
and several preliminary unofficial interviews finally
resulted in the Hampton Roads conference. Gov
ernor Vance of North Carolina, in December, 1863,
had urged Davis to communicate with Washington
with a view of ending the war. Davis replied that
he had already made three such attempts, and that
it was Lincoln's policy to grant pardons to the Con
federates only after they had emancipated their slaves
and sworn allegiance to the United States. Mr.
Blair, without any official authority, went from
Washington to Richmond, in January, 1865, and urged
Davis to take steps looking toward a cessation of
hostilities. He stated that Lincoln would receive
Confederate commissioners, and that he did not
sympathize with the radicals in Congress. He ex
pressed a hope that the pride of the South would

20 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 13, 1865. Quotes from North
ern papers of Jan. 10.

254 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S MISSION

suffer no shock and the Southern21 territory would
be extended even to the isthmus of Darien. He pro
posed: (i) The gradual abolition of slavery by the
State legislatures, (2) The Confederate States to re
turn to the Union with their old rights; (3) The ir-
corporation of the Confederate army with the United
States army in case of a foreign war; (4) The past to
be forgotten.22 He suggested to Davis that slavery
was doomed even if reunion should be prevented
by foreign intervention, and said that rather tha:i
continue the war to make themselves dependencies
of European potentates, after having abandoned

"Jefferson Davis: Confederate Government, Vol. II, pp.
612-15.

22 The Richmond Enquirer about this time stated that the
Confederacy if it yielded would join the North in applying
the Monroe doctrine from Behring's Straits to the Isthmus
of Darien. There was much talk of the Monroe doctrine in
both Confederate and United States papers. [The Index,
Feb. 9, 1865.] Later the Confederacy desired to remove the
impression that it was the first to propose a peace based
upon foreign aggression as a means of sustaining the Monroe
doctrine. The Index of March 16 quotes from the Owl a
paragraph which doubtless relates to Mr. Kenner's official
instructions on the subject of Blair's mission. The para
graph is as follows: "A gentleman of the highest position
and character, and a member of the Confederate Congress
has just arrived in England, having left the South as late
as the end of January. Enjoying as he does the entire con
fidence of President Davis, he received prior to his departure
the account of Mr. Blair's mission from Mr. Benjamin, the
Secretary of State at Richmond, who used these words:
' The object of the mission was to assure President Davis
that commissioners would be received at Washington to
open negotiations on the following basis: (i) All questions
in dispute to be left undecided, and considered as open
questions. (2) An armistice to be granted, and a league
offensive and defensive to be made to drive the French out
of Mexico.' "

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 25$

slavery to escape the embrace of the United States,
it would be better for the Confederates to send a
Southern army to restore the rights of Mexico. He
even suggested that Davis might realize previous
Southern dreams, and complete the work of Jeffer
son, by modelling the Mexican states so as to adapt
them to the Union, and by extending the United
States to the Isthmus.23 Blair left Richmond on
January- 16, on a flag-of-truce boat, and Singleton, a
peace democrat from Illinois returned to Richmond
on the same boat on some unauthorized mission.

Mr. McMullin in a recent resolution24 in the Con
federate Congress had proposed a selection of peace
commissioners, and about the time that Blair reached
Richmond there were rumors that the resolution had
been passed, and that Orr, Gilmore, Stephens, and
twelve others had been selected to meet at Grant's
headquarters.25 On January 14 the Sentinel, alluding
to a rumor that Mr. Atkins of Tennessee had intro
duced a resolution before Congress in secret session
to open irregular intercourse through commissioners
with Lincoln, pronounced it treachery and disloy
alty.2* The article was evidently intended as a criti
cism of the committee on foreign affairs. The edi
tor of the Sentinel was public and private printer of
the House, and many considered that his paper was
the organ of the administration. Several members
of Congress were offended by the evident intention

23 Rhodes, Vol. III.

24 On Dec. 16, 1864. Several other peace resolutions were
offered on the same day. Printed copies may be seen at the
Library of Congress at Washington.

25 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 16, 1865.
29 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1865.

256 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S MISSION

of the article in regard to appointing peace commis
sioners. On January 17, Lester of Georgia moved
to suspend the rules in order to allow him to intro
duce a resolution stating that the imputations of the
article were false. The vote stood 32 to 26, but a
two-thirds vote was required, and thus the motion
failed. Atkins was willing to have his resolution
considered in public, instead of in secret session, and
intimated that he was willing to assault the adminis
tration if necessary. He considered that the Sentinel
spoke for the administration. W. R. Smith of Ala
bama, a member of the committee of foreign affairs
was offended because the House refused to allow
Lester's resolution. He ceased to attend sessions
and prepared to return home, stating that he favored
honest efforts to end the carnival of blood; that he
believed that this policy was sustained by a volume
of Southern sentiment, and that it could not be in
timidated by the Sentinel nor " the power behind the
throne of the Sentinel." ''

Lincoln (January 18) informed Blair on the return
of the latter from Richmond, that he was ready to
receive any agent informally sent with a view of se
curing peace to " our one common country." But
he said nothing of a joint invasion of Mexico. Blair
returned to Richmond a second time (January 21)
to inform Davis of his interview with Lincoln. Many
in the South were urging peace negotiations, and a
few days later Davis decided to appoint Stephens,
Hunter and Campbell as peace commissioners. Ben
jamin, with Lincoln's note to Blair before him, in
his instructions to the commissioners proposed

" Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 21, 1865.

THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 257

to say simply that they were empowered to confer
" upon the subject to which it relates," but Davis
(January 28) changed the instructions so that they
authorized a conference " upon the issues of the war
and for the purpose of securing peace to the two
countries." The commissioners expected to go to
Washington, but Seward decided to meet them at
Fortress Monroe. Lincoln arrived later, and the
Hampton Roads informal conference was held on
the River Queen, on February 3, between Seward
and Lincoln and the Confederate Commissioners/*
Stephens thought that an arrangement for the in
vasion of Mexico would be a rational and proper
enterprise,29 but Lincoln informed him that what
ever Blair said as to occupying themselves with con
tinental questions until the anger of the contestants
should cool " was of his own accord and not by au
thority " from Lincoln; that the restoration of the
Union was a sine qua non, and that there could be no
armistice until this question was settled. The Con
federate commissioners could not agree to accept
the terms of peace, and after a long informal talk —
which ended by shaking hands — Stephens, Hunter
and Campbell returned to Richmond and reported
the failure of negotiations.30

~s South. Hist. Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 212-14. Benjamin to
Davis, May 17, 1877.

19 John A. Campbell: Reminiscences and documents re
lating to the Civil War during the year 1865. Baltimore,
1887. Stephens had no hope of European intervention.
While going down the river to Hampton Roads he told
Campbell that European intervention was only a dream of
Benjamin's.

30 Perhaps Mr. Davis expected different terms than those
offered at Hampton Roads. H. S. Foote, who had recently
17

258 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER's MISSION

It was an opportune time to hold an indignation
meeting to reanimate the people, and cautiously pre
pare them for the contemplated new policy. Such
a meeting was held on February 9, on Capitol Square
at Richmond. Hunter presided and made a speech
picturing the future expansion of the Confederacy

resigned his place in the Confederate Congress, said that
the mission of Stephens, Hunter and Campbell was only a
ruse of Davis and a forced concession to the peace men of
the South. [N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1865.] Seward, in a
very confidential note to Adams on March I, enclosed tl e
contents of a cipher of February 13, from a Confedera e
emissary in Canada to Jefferson Davis, concerning tie
attempt of Thompson and Clay to get terms of assistance
and recognition from England and France. Seward believed
that it would throw some light upon the " late rebel pro
posals to the United States for a conference." [20 Instr.,
Great Brit., p. 75.] The Richmond Dispatch of March 3r,
quoted a Washington letter of March 23d to the New York
Tribune, stating that Clay had recently returned from an
unsuccessful mission to England. The records do not appear
to indicate any such mission of Clay. A Confederate cor
respondent of the London limes, had written from New
York in January that there was an unexpected theatrical
change in favor of the South which would make it possible
for Davis to secure independence. The Times suggested
that the clue to this startling mystery was to be found in
the report that the Emperor of Mexico had conveyed in
trust to Napoleon the province of Sonora to be held and
administered by a French viceroy in liquidation of the claims
of France upon the Mexican government; that it was as
sumed in the North that this could not occur without the
recognition of the Confederacy by France, and that such
recognition would be followed by England and other powers.
The Times further stated that these presumptions were
strengthened by the anticipations entertained of a Confed
erate emancipation policy. [N. Y. Times, March i, 1865.]
By February 9, there was a report at London that ex-
Senator Gwin, of California, who was a good adventurous
leader of the Southern men in California, had been appointed

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 259

into the countries bordering on the South.31 But he
was evidently not in harmony with the recent aboli
tion movement, and probably knew nothing of Ken-
ner's mission to Europe. He said that it was no
comfort to contemplate the terms offered by the
United States Government — that 3,000,000 negroes
would be let loose to wander about as the lazzaroni
of the land, and that Congress would be constantly
interfering between the whites and the blacks. He
considered that under the existing system the slaves
were provided for and were happy, but that under a
system of emancipation they must perish. " In the
fierce competition for food between white and negro,"
said he, " the latter will be blasted like human life
before the burning Sirocco and vanish like mist be
fore the sun."

The other speeches were in harmony with Benja
min's recent instructions for negotiations in Europe.
Senator Henry of Tennessee said that he would not
hesitate to give the negro his freedom and to em
ploy him in the army, and he urged the people to
deposit with the Government their gold, cotton and
tobacco. Benjamin, after having " worked night
after night under infamous Richmond gas-light "
studying , data and problems, announced that it was

viceroy of Sonora. It appears that before Maximilian went
to Mexico, Gwin had laid before him plans for rendering
the mineral riches of Sonora available for the Mexican
Empire. [The Index, Feb. 9, 1865.] In France it was stated
that his views were ultra French and that he would carefully
look after French interests. Gwin returned to France on
March 2. Many Southerners like Foote had contemplated
emigration to Sonora.
31 Richmond Dispatch, Feb. 10, 1865.

26O THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S MISSION

necessary for all the means (cotton, tobacco, bacon,
etc.), and men to be given to the Government and
the army. He favored emancipating the negroes and
placing them in the army, though he admitted i;
could only be done by the states. He said: " We
want means. Are they in the country? If so, thcv
belong to the country and not to the man who
chances to hold them now. ... I would take even-
cotton bale in the land . . . and make it the basis of
means without which we cannot go on. ... I am
going to open my whole heart to you. . . . Let us
say to every negro who wishes to go into the ranks
on the condition of being made free: ' Go and fight,
you are free.' >: This speech from the Secretary o '
State of the Confederacy caused considerable ex
citement among slaveholders who had no desire to
lose their slaves.33 Oukl, in January, had stated that
rather than adopt the administration policy of free
ing and arming the slaves many in Virginia would
seek reconstruction. Wigfall of Texas, Graham of
North Carolina, Orr and Miles of South Carolina,
were among those who strongly opposed the policy
in Congress.

About January 12, Kenner with full powers and
letters of credit had gone to Wilmington which he
found strongly invested.33 After the fall of Fort
Fisher on January 17, General Bragg suggested that
he should sail from Charleston but he decided that
he could reach Europe at least a month earlier by
way of New York. Returning to Richmond he stated

32 J. B. Jones: Diary, Feb. 9, 1865.

B3War Records, Series i, Part 2, Vol. XLVI, p. 1089.

THE LAST EFFORT KENNER's MISSION 26l

his plan to Benjamin and Davis who at first opposed
it on the ground that it was excessively perilous to
a man whose prominence, and especially whose inter-
terests in horse-racing before the war had made him
well known in the North, and that his capture would
be almost certain. The Confederacy had secret ser
vice communication across the Potomac, and two of
its officers were detailed to assist Kenner, one to
carry his papers and deliver them to him in New
York, the other to accompany him as far as Baltimore.
The companion was not acquainted with Mr. Kenner,
and was only informed that he was a Confederate
agent who was trying to get to Canada in order to
assist the Confederates who had been arrested for
operations on the lakes. Reaching the Potomac they
found it full of ice and dangerous to cross. The
boatmen hesitated to try the river. They remained
a few days at the home of a woman to whom they
promised to bring some needles and cloth as they re
turned. They finally crossed in the night and pro
ceeded on horseback to a place where they could
safely take a train. They passed the house of Mrs.
Surratt who had recently moved to Washington;
they spent a night in the woods, and another at the
house of a Confederate sympathizer; and after hav
ing passed near Washington they boarded the Balti
more and Ohio train, occupying seats far apart, and
were soon in Baltimore. Mr. Kenner, after obtain
ing a suit of clothes which gave him the appearance
of a Pennsylvania farmer, took leave of his com
panion and boarded the train for New York. Ar
riving at his destination early the next morning, he
drove to a Ne\v York hotel \vhose proprietor he

262 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER*S MISSION

had frequently entertained at his Louisiana home.
Taking a room on the upper floor he sent for the
proprietor and informed him that he was going to
London with a commercial enterprise in view.
Through his friend he obtained a ticket to Europe,
and also a trunk that had just come off a European
voyage and was covered with foreign advertisements
of hotels. His presence in New York was kept quiet
until his departure.34 On the steamer he escaped
the attention of Government officials and was soon
en route for England.35

Coming events cast their shadows before. By the
time Kenner reached Europe the new policy of the
Confederacy was already anticipated at London and
Paris. Perhaps a copy of Benjamin's instructions of

34 Memoranda by the late Wm. Wirt Henry of Richmond,
March 24, 1899, regarding a narrative which he and the Hon.
J. L. M. Curry heard Mr. Kenner give at the White Sulphur
Springs, W. Va., several years alter the close of the Civil
War.

35 One finds in the Richmond papers no reference to
Kenner's departure, but J. B. Jones says in his diary, under
date of January 23d, that there were rumors that a commis
sioner (Louisianian) sailed that day to England to make
overtures to that government. In the Richmond Examiner,
February 3d, we find the following: " On the whole, we
believe the Confederacy has given up the idea of making
a present of itself to England, France and Spain, and that
however willing we might be to give up slavery as the price
of independence, there is no more talk of offering that as a
bribe to some foreign power in order to induce it to do for
us what we should confess we are unable to do for our
selves." [Also, in London Times of Feb. 20.] Another
Richmond paper of February 6th stated that neither the
United States nor Europe desired the abolition of slavery
and that no rational being in the Confederacy had seriously
entertained the suggestion of emancipation for recognition.
It seems evident that the editors of these papers knew noth
ing of the pending negotiations. Did they?

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER'S MISSION 263

December 29-30 to Slidell and Mason had preceded
Kenner. A letter from Paris, dated January 31,
stated that there was little doubt that a proposition
had been ccmmunicated to England and France with
in the preceding month (and in a manner to leave no
doubt of its official character), which suggested that
in return for recognition the Confederates were pre
pared to abolish slavery, or for practical assistance
they were ready to offer " physical concrete advan
tages." The letter suspected from appearances that
the proposition would not be accepted. In the Inde-
pcndance Bclgc, a few days before February i, a Paris
correspondent stated that he had seen a letter from
a member of the Confederate Congress, stating that
President Davis intended at an early day to invite
Congress to abolish slavery, and that Mason and
Slidell had since informed him that if England and
France had decided to acknowledge the Confederacy
it could only be after the abolition of slavery. He
also said that immediately on the adoption of the
emancipation measure instructions and probably dep
uties would be sent to Europe, in order to facilitate
the mission of Mason and Slidell. Another corre
spondent at Paris wrote to the Index in February,
stating that he knew " from a good source " that
neither Slidell nor Mason had communicated to Rich
mond any views as to slavery hindering the recogni
tion of the Confederacy; nevertheless, he was con
vinced that the abolition of slavery would gain the
favorable opinion of the liberal party, especially in
France, and that, as a result, Confederate " political
rights would be speedily acknowledged." !

88 The Index., Feb. 2, 1865. About the middle of January,
the London Times stated that a Confederate offer to abandon

264 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER's MISSION

The Index a,nd other periodicals published a state
ment that after March 4, Lincoln could only be recog
nized as the President of the states which took part in
the election of the preceding November.37 The Indcv
of February 16 said that England and France both
admitted that after March 4, the government of tl e
United States could not be regarded as the dc facto cr
de jure of the South. " We are not prepared to say,"
it continued, "whether England and France will there
fore recognize the South on that day. . . . There an1,
however, some indications that recognition is contem
plated, at least by one of these governments . . .
Whether or not recognition shall be postponed, under
all circumstances a re-union or conquest of the Sout'i
is to be prevented by recognition, and if necessary
by intervention." This proved to be only a contribu
tion to a volume of unfulfilled prophecies.

Kenner,38 arriving at London in the latter part of
February, found that Mason was in Paris. He there
upon hastened thither to present his instructions and
hold a conference with Mason and Slidell. When the}

slavery could not secure the recognition of Europe, because
recognition was withheld for many other reasons. It was
also seen that the abolition of slavery could not propitiate
Spain. [Richmond Sentinel, Feb. 3.] The Times of Feb
ruary 13 said: "The assumption that the failure of Eng
land to recognize the Confederacy is due to the abhorrence
of slavery is based on ignorance of the real opinions o)
Englishmen as to the abstract principles of public policy."
[The Richmond Dispatch, March 4.]

37 N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1865. London Times, Jan. 23.

88 Kenner may possibly have arrived by the middle of Feb
ruary, for the eccentric Owl, whose articles attracted atten
tion from its alleged special sources of information, had
resumed publication on February 15, and stated that it was
" enabled from special sources " to give the Blair proposals.

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNEKS MISSION 265

came together, Mr. Kenner, seeing that Mr. W. W.
Corcoran was in the room, said: " I was directed to
show my instructions to Mr. Mason and Air. Slidell
and to no one else." But the latter gentlemen in
formed him that he could safely proceed in the pres
ence of Corcoran as he was their confidential adviser.
The instructions, which were in cipher, were then
translated by a clerk of Slidell. Both Mason and
Slidell were greatly astonished. Mason at first was
disinclined to cooperate in obeying the instructions,
but he yielded upon finding that he must assist or
be suspended.89

Kenner afterwards said that through Slidell he ob
tained an interview with the French Minister of For
eign Affairs, who asked to defer his reply for two
weeks. Mr. Slidell learned, however, that the Em
peror was still ready to offer recognition if England
would do so. A Confederate " diplomatic council,"
which had been in session for several days at the
Grand Hotel at Paris, adjourned on March 2. Mann
and Buchanan had gone over from Brussels to join
Mason, Slidell and their secretaries. Members of the
council boasted that there would be a peace between
the United States and the Confederacy before May i.40
The Index stated that negotiations which were going
on between European governments would " give quite
a turn to affairs in America." A Paris letter of March
2, in the London Telegraph, said: "Mr. Kenner, a
distinguished Confederate, has just arrived and brings

sa From memoranda of Kenner's narrative, by Wm. Wirt
Henry.

40 N. Y. Times, March 20. Richmond Dispatch, March 25,
1865.

266 THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER*S MISSION

what the Southerners evidently consider good news." 4
Mr. Mason and Mr. Kenner returned to London on
March 3, to sound the Prime Minister. Mr. Kenner
obtained no interview with Palmerston, though he
afterwards stated that Mason asked for one. Whi^e
waiting two weeks for a definite answer from France,
he opened negotiations with the bankers for the sale
of cotton. A syndicate of capitalists offered to invest
$15,000,000, and Kenner was encouraged to expect
$30,000,000, but his plans in this direction depended
upon recognition.

On March 14, Mason had an interview with Pal
merston, in which he mentioned the substance of
Benjamin's instructions of December 30. He also
gave the substance of later instructions which Kenner
had received after leaving Richmond. He denied that
an aggressive alliance had been first proposed by the
Confederate commissioners at Hampton Roads. He
stated that Blair had proposed that an armistice be
granted, and that the Union and Confederate armies
be united to drive the French out of Mexico, leaving
internal questions in dispute to be decided later.
While endeavoring to leave the impression that the
United States was planning aggression against neigh
boring possessions, Mason informed Palmerston that
the Confederacy had made an offer to France to
guarantee the French West Indies in return for alli
ance. He frequently and studiously reverted to the
suggestion of emancipation in a way that Palmerston
could not have misunderstood, but he " made no dis
tinct proposal in terms of the private note borne by

41 Richmond Dispatch, March 24, 1865.

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER's MISSION 267

Mr. Kenner." He said that the Confederacy might
be induced to agree to terms which it would not have
accepted under more favorable circumstances. He
did not use the word " slavery," but Palmerston could
not have had any doubt as to his meaning upon the
subject of emancipation of the slaves. Desiring that
Palmerston should at the close of the interview have
an impression that the Confederate chances were not
as hopeless as they seemed, Mason informed him that
the change in the Confederate military policy, by
which the coast-line was abandoned, encouraged the
people by making it possible to concentrate forces in
the interior.

Palmerston in reply to Mason stated that England
had no reason back of those already given against
recognition, and that those reasons still held. He said
that while England might have taken exception to the
blockade during the first year of the war, it would not
have been a good policy — in view of possible wars
which England might have in the future in which she
might be placed in a position similar to the United
States upon the question of the blockade.42 On Sun
day, March 26, Mason had a conversation with Lord
Donnoughmore also, in which Mr. Kenner's mission,
so far as it related to emancipation, was plainly dis
cussed. Lord Donnoughmore said that it was too
late to secure recognition by the abolition of slavery.

Across the Atlantic, at Richmond, on Sunday, two
days before Mason's interview with Palmerston, the
two leaders of the Confederacy again sat closeted in
an all-day interview. The bill for arming and eman-

42 Despatches of Mason, March 14. 1865. [From a dupli
cate, in the possession of Miss Virginia Mason.]

26& THE LAST EFFORT KENNER's MISSION

cipating 200,000 negroes had at last, after months of
consideration, passed the Senate, Mr. Hunter havii g
finally decided to vote for it, and in order to be a law it
lacked only the President's signature. But both Davis
and Benjamin saw that more than the negro bill won id
be required to save the Confederacy. Congress had in
tended to adjourn on March 10, but Davis had askt d
it to remain a few days. Many supposed that a trea y
of alliance with France was expected. There were
rumors that France had offered to intervene if the
Confederacy would cede Louisiana and oppose the
Monroe doctrine." But Mr. Davis had evidently re
ceived no dispatches from France. On March 13,
the day following the Sunday interview, Mr. Davis
sent to Congress a secret message, making no refer
ence to foreign relations, but stating that Congress
had so long debated and delayed his November recom
mendation as to the negro bill, etc., that much of the
value was now lost.44 He asked for additional legis
lation increasing the power of the executive. It was
observed that day that Benjamin's old smile had re-
turned, and it was interpreted to mean a new triumph
over Congress, but it was only temporary. Congress
on March 16, in a dissentient and defensive reply, said
that the executive had not urged the immediate neces
sity of the negro bill, that he had even seemed to
dissent from the policy of arming the negroes, thrit

43 Richmond Dispatch, March 13, 1865.

44 Lee wrote to the War Department March 10, "The
situation is full of peril and difficulty and requires prompt
action. If my situation is not greatly improved I can neither
hold my lines before Richmond, neither can I remove with
my army from there." This was sent to Congress with
Davis' secret message. [Campbell's Reminiscences.]

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER?S MISSION 269

he had failed to reply to requests for information as
to the condition of affairs, and had left Congress to
determine its policy of necessity by consulting the
opinion of General Lee.45

When the committee waited upon Davis the latter
in a vigorous broadside declared that the causes of
defeat could not be laid at the door of the executive;
but Congress, still refusing to pass his recommenda
tion, adjourned on Match 18, sine die, after issuing a
five-column address advising the Confederacy not to
pause or commit suicide. " The shades of our de
parted heroes hover over us and beckon us on," it
said, "... The enemy is far spent. . . . Let us stand
firm." "

When Congress issued its advice, and dispersed,
there was little chance of holding out much longer
against Grant's campaign of shot and shell. For
nearly two weeks the packing and boxing of govern
ment archives had been going on quietly. Even far
ther South there was little chance to prolong the
struggle. When Columbia, South Carolina, fell, in
February, and the lady employees of the " paper
money bureau " returned to Richmond, many wept in
real despair. News was scarce, but it was almost
all news of defeat. The Richmond newspapers
thought that the Northern Menelaus was too persist
ent in running after the wayward Southern Helen to
induce her to return to political wedlock after she had
so long trifled with marital relations.47 But there were
now many who were not opposed to returning to the

45 Richmond Dispatch, March 20.

46 Ibid., March 31, 1865.

47 Ibid., March 10, 1865.

270 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER's MISSION

old " political wedlock." " Street-corner generals "
were merely dissatisfied with the plans of the West
Pointers in the field, but many others contemplated
reconstruction or a counter revolution.48 Hon. H. S.
Foote of Tennessee, who, from the banks of the
majestic Potomac, on December 24, had proposed :o
resign his place in the Richmond Congress,49 wrote ;o
Seward on January 30, concerning the " strong Union
feeling of the majority in the South/' 50 and on Feb
ruary 6, before sailing for Europe, he suggested as a
political measure that Lincoln should issue a proc
lamation of amnesty to the people of the South. Foote
said that he had never favored secession. In March, he
published a pamphlet in London advising his friends
to return to the Union, and he proceeded to do the
same himself.31 In estimating Foote's statements, it
is necessary to bear in mind that he was one of the
boldest members of the Confederate Congress in his
opposition to the Davis administration. But Mr.
Foote's declaration was based upon what he had seen
and heard, and the voice for peace and reunion as
serted itself more and more. In the Virginia House
of Delegates, on March 9, when it was proposed to
reconsider a bill to confer conventional powers on the
General Assembly, Speaker Sheffey made strong op-

48 On March 5, Campbell, in a note to Breckinridge, re
ferring to the large number of desertions and advising an
investigation of the Confederate resources, said: " Georgia
is in a state of what may be properly called insurrection
against the Confederate authorities."

49 N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1865.

50 N. Y. Tribune, March 17.

Bl Richmond Dispatch, March 24, 1865. N. Y. Tribune,
March 17, 1865. H. S. Foote: War of the Rebellion (N. Y.,
1866).

THE LAST EFFORT — KENNER S MISSION 2/1

position, saying that a convention contemplated sever
ance from the Confederacy and consideration of re
construction.32 He said: "If other states fly madly
from their sphere to blaze awhile, then die out in eter
nal night forever, let them fly; but let Virginia be
one of the calm fixed stars, veiled sometimes in cloud
and tempests, but indestructible as the firmament
from which it shines. . . . The ship of state is upon
the rapids, and ... if we are to sink, let us sink
where we stand." Of the members of the Confed
erate Congress who were reported to be Unionists,
there were nine from Virginia, ten from North Caro
lina, two from South Carolina, nine from Georgia, six
from Alabama, and four from Mississippi.

After the closing of navigation at Wilmington the
The London Times had altered its tone. Lord Rus
sell's conferences with Mr. Adams were friendlier.53
On February 13, Russell had notified Mason, Slidell
and Mann of complaints that Confederate agents did
not respect British neutrality — that they sought to in
volve Great Britain in foreign complications by at
tempting to procure war armaments in British waters.
He stated that to buy vessels in one place and prepare

52 Richmond Dispatch, March 10. 1865.

53 A London correspondent said that the Emperor of
France might urge the recognition of the Southern Confed
eracy, but that England would not be shaken by the daily
letters of the Paris correspondent to the London papers —
that England had turned Quaker, Palmerston was too gouty,
and Earl Russell and the Queen desired peace with the
United States. " You may cover the lakes with gun-boats,"
said he to the New York Times, " and England will give
the St. Lawrence for a summer outlet for the western pro
ducts. If you take Canada she will throw in New Bruns
wick/' [N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1865.]

272 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION

them for war in another was manifestly offensive to
the British Crown; and that the Confederate instruc
tions for cruisers set aside some of the most settkd
principles of international law, and broke the English
laws of neutrality.54 This communication, besides bo-
ing delivered to the three commissioners, was sent
through Seward by way of General Grant's lines; aid
General Lee, receiving it under a flag of truce, fcr-
warded it to Benjamin at Richmond.55

When Russell's note came to Benjamin (March i/.),
his career as a diplomatist had about run its course.
For several weeks he had seen very little diplomatic
correspondence except what he read in Northern

54 Inclosure in Russell to Adams, Feb. 15, 1865. The Ssa
King, built in the river Clyde, Scotland, left London October
7, 1864, ostensibly for Bombay, but she was quietly purchased
by Confederate agents and a few days later at Madeira was
transformed into the Shenandoah, the crew and armament
going from Liverpool on the Laurel which ostensibly sailed
for Nassau. During the next year the Shenandoah circum
navigated the globe, cruising much of the time until the
end of the war against the American whalers in the Arctic
and Okhotsk seas, and finally returned to the Mersey, where
on November 5, 1865, Commander Waddell asked Earl
Russell that his men be released and that his vessel revert
to the United States. [C. E. Hunt: Cruise of the Shenan
doah; J. T. Mason: The Last of the Confederate Cruisers
(Century, Aug., 1898).]

55 When the note was first issued in London the Index
bitterly referred to Seward's indecency and stated that
though he danced a " can-can, he would not allow England
to lift her petticoat one inch to escape the dust, and that
England, while hiding her own ankles, shut her eyes to the
scantiness of the Federal petticoat." The Richmond Dis
patch announced that England had been " brought to play
second fiddle in the concert of nations," and philosophically
stated that the " greatest bullies are always first to succumb
when real danger presents itself." [London Index, Feb. 16,
1865.]

THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 273

newspapers, and his principal work had been to grant
passports. He returned Russell's letter to General
Lee (March 21), diplomatically declining to receive
through the Federals a communication from a neutral,
and expressing doubt as to its authenticity. General
Lee suggested that the expression of doubt be
omitted.66 On March 25, Benjamin forwarded to
Mason the correspondence relating to the transmis
sion of Russell's note through Grant and Lee, and
stated that he only had time to say that it was returned
to Grant's lines.87

All hope of recognition by England was now gone,
but rumors of French alliance or assistance floated
in Richmond until the end. The officials took no
pains to put the press in possession of authentic infor
mation, or to correct false reports.58 On April i, the
people were " fooled " by a report that a treaty had
been signed with Maximilian. The next day the
Union army broke the lines, and eight trains started
south with the archives and executive baggage of a
now hopeless Confederacy,59 which had for four long
years stubbornly but unsuccessfully fought and, to the
last, struggled for recognition as a nation. A few still
expected to continue the war. On May I, Mason

06 J. B. Jones: Diary, March 14 and 21, 1865.

57 Instr. to Mason, No. 40. No copy appears on the
records kept at Richmond, but the original, written on very
thin paper, is among the papers left by Mr. Mason.

58 Richmond Dispatch, Jan. 30, 1865.

59 Stephen R. Mallory, of Mr. Davis' cabinet, wrote an
interesting account of the removal from Richmond which
has just been published by his daughter under the caption:
" The Last Days of the Confederacy." [McClure's Mag.,
Dec., 1900, and January, 1901.]

18

THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION

nrote Benjamin: " It is the almost universal opinion
in Europe that the war is at an end, but I apprehend
no such event." He expected the Confederacy to ta <e
a new stand farther South, and to prolong the fight
until the North should be forced to come to terms on
account of internal dissension.00 But, fortunately for
both North and South, the war had ended.

Notwithstanding the prediction of statesmen tl at
the Union was dead, the Mississippi still flowed un-
vexed to the sea, with its springs and its mouth be th
in the control of one people. Not one Confederate
was executed for participating in the long political
disturbance. Aside from Benjamin and a few otl er
leaders who preferred to live in foreign lands, the
brave sons of the South took the oath of allegiai ce
and faced the problems of reconstruction. Kennor,
going to the United States Legation at Paris, accepted
the provisions of the President's amnesty proclama
tion, and returned to his native state to recover pos
session of his estates.01 Soldiers returned to fields of
productive labor to build up what had been destroyed
by the cruel fate of war. Emancipation, though not
contemplated as a purpose at the beginning of the
war, came as a result of it. But the prophecies that
territorial aggrandizement would follow reunion re
mained unfulfilled. The lapse of years, and mutual in-
f . •

terests and sympathies, have tended to heal the wounds

of war and the irritations of reconstruction, and to-day
an undivided nation looks upon England not with the

jealousies and suspicions of former days, but as a
/

v '

00 Despatches of Mason, No. 21, May i, 1865.

61 Mr. Kenner died in July, 1887.

THE LAST EFFORT KENNER S MISSION 275

friendly power, and even as a possible ally in case of
national danger. Friendly association, the study of
industrial conditions, better railway connections,
stronger economic interests and higher education have
been clearing away misunderstandings. The Con-^
federate armies fought gallantly, but now the veterans
of the South are as much a part of the nation as are the^'
veterans of the North or of the West.

NOTE. — There may have been other official " mis
sions " of which there is no official record owing to
their secret nature. There were also " missions " of
self-appointed agents who had errands abroad, and
saw fit to surround themselves with mystery. In
some cases, persons who visited Europe to publish
books, or pamphlets, to influence public opinion, prob
ably went with the aid and encouragement of the Con
federate authorities at Richmond.

Near the close of the war there were rumors re
garding various "missions" and of possible or expected
alliances. There were ttiose who, in order to win
in the war of secession, would have made great sacri
fices which would not have been offered at the begin
ning of the struggle. Their policy was dictated by the
feeling that dreads the chagrin of defeat. Though
they probably could not have induced Mr. Davis to
accept their policy, some of them, in order to obtain
foreign aid, would have made promises which they
never expected to fulfill. They would have promised
France and England to set the negroes free; but at
the same time they hoped for international conditions
that would have enabled the Confederacy to ignore
its agreements without fear of being forced to keep

276 THE LAST EFFORT KENNER's MISSION

them. The policy of Mr. Davis was based on higher
grounds. A prominent Confederate has recently said:
" If he had been less honest, we might have succeeded
in our efforts."

An editorial in the Washington Post of March 14,
1901, states the belief that Prince Polignac, who cc-m-
.. manded a brigade under General Kirby E. Smith,
was sent to Europe [early in -1865] on a very delicate
mission, accompanied by Major John C. Moncure.
"Gossip had it [at Shreveport, La.] that Polig lac
went authorized from Richmond to offer Louis Na
poleon all that part of the original Louisiana Purchase
\ then included in or claimed by the Southern Confed-
\eracy, the consideration being that France would
send an army to aid Jefferson Davis and othenvise
cooperate in the establishment of his Government in
the rest of the Southern States." The editor says he
heard of the mission from Moncure himself, when the
latter returned from Europe.

That such a mission was authorized by Mr. Davis,
is emphatically denied by Burton N. Harrison, Esq.,
who was the private secretary of the Confederate
President; — and also by General John H. Reagan, the
only surviving member of the Confederate cabinet.02
Polignac himself has cabled a denial (on April 2, 1901).

62 See also letters from Col. James Morris Morgan and others
in the Washington Post of March 18 and 25, 1901. The dip
lomatic archives contain no record of this mission. The
records for the early part of 1865 were destroyed or lost.

APPENDIX

CAUSES OF SECESSION.

The statements of the real causes of secession, and of the
beginning of the Civil War, are to be found, not in the
archives of Confederate diplomacy, but by following the
course of events immediately preceding the war, and by
examining the contemporary speeches and writings of the
secession leaders.

The assertion that the tariff was a cause of the secession
movement was evidently a ruse diplomatique, intended for
effect upon foreign powers that favored free trade. The
subject of the tariff was scarcely mentioned in the discussions
of Southern statesmen. Toombs, it is true, on November 13,
1861, while excitedly demanding hasty action, without the
formality of State conventions to ascertain the will of the
people, characterized the Union as a curse which by tariffs,
navigation laws', and otherwise, had legislated against the
South. But Stephens, in a reply, on the following day,
opposing secession and advising calmness and deliberation
in meeting the crisis, said he could not agree with Toombs.
He declared that the South had prospered under the Ameri
can system of government and had been protected and aided
in many ways by its provisions. Among other things, he
said: the Southern presidents had not opposed the early
fishing bounties of New England; the tariff had ceased to
distract public councils; the navigation laws had been begun
under a Southern president, and no subsequent president
had ever recommended their repeal; South Carolina, and
also Toombs, had voted for the existing tariff, which was
just as low as the South had asked.

The declaration adopted by the South Carolina Conven
tion, in December, 1861, said nothing of the tariff as a cause

278 APPENDIX

of secession. Maxey Gregg suggested that it should be
mentioned; but Keitt replied that all of the South Carolinian
senators and congressmen had voted for the recent tariff, and
that no tariff since that, ot 1832 had caused any desire for
secession. The address of the convention to the slaveholding
states (prepared by R. B. Rhett), however, had mentioned
the tariff, and unequal distribution of appropriations, among
other causes of grievance, and had made vague charges about
the consolidation of the North and the reduction of tie
South. Stephens, who was not favorably impressed by tl e
address, said these charges were not well-founded and aro.-e
from peevishness rather than from reason. Concerning tl e
tariff, he suggested that " perhaps the less said about it tl e
better," stating that the South though in a minority ruid
controlled the administration for sixty out of seventy-t\\ o
years, and had made the tariff and the government what tluy
were.

The principal sources of contention were connected with
the institution of slavery, which was seeking extension into
new territory — even into territory which had not yet been
acquired.

Questions relating to slavery had been most prominent
after Folk's nomination to the presidency. Stephens, during
the M^qcan^war, fearing the rock which Jefferson had pre
dicted would endanger the Ship of State, favored a policy
which would tend to avoid slavery discussions. The natural
tendency of slavery interests to seek expansion led to at-
temjjts-to^annex Cuba, and ajl£sij^Lj£LJ3t)tain control pf_othcr
countries southward — Mexico and Central

^

chance to acquire new slave territory faded away after the
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill and the decision in the
Dred Scott case. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Buch
anan Administration, the Kansas struggle terminated in favor
of free soil,1 and plans to acquire Cuba and part of Mexico
failed.

1 Stephens did not attribute the result entirely to the eternal
vigilance of the Northern leaders and to the developing sentiment

APPENDIX 279

In April, 1860, the Democratic party split at the Charleston
convention. Both factions agreed that personal liberty laws
were unconstitutional, that Cuba should be acquired, and
that the Pacific railway should be built. The Southern
leaders, however, feeling the moral reproach under which
they were living, complained that the admission by men from
the North that slavery was a wrong, but a wrong for which
they were not to blame, had been the cause of the discord,
and intimated that the Northern Democrats must pronounce
the institution a necessary good.2 Senator Pugh of Ohio
replied: " Gentlemen of the South, we will not do it." Other
sources of disagreement arose. Gaulden of Georgia asked
that the ruthless restrictions which cut off the supply of
slaves from foreign lands should be taken off. Some said
that slavery by the intention of the constitution should be
encouraged and protected by the Federal government, thus
deserting the argument of non-intervention as held by pre
vious statesmen. The Dred Scott decision has been charac
terized as the rock upon which the party went to pieces.
The Southern minority desired the platform to declare in
favor of the doctrine of the Dred Scott decision permitting
the Supreme Court to settle the question of the rights of
property in states or territories. The Western and Northern
majority rejected this plan, though they were willing to deny

against slavery. On March 11, 1858, he wrote that the Lecompton
constitution would' be defeated on account of several Southern
members being too drunk to get to the House. " If we are to
separate," said he, sadly, " what is to become of us in the hands
of such representatives." In the early part of 1860 Stephens
expected to retire from politics, and to a friend who asked him
why, he said: " When I am on one of the two trains coming in
opposite directions on a single track, both engines at high speed,
and both engineers drunk, I get off at the first station."

2 George Fitzhugh, five or six years before, had written a book,
" Sociology for the South," which justified slavery not only from
expediency but from right— stating that it was the happiest form
of socialism, the true relief for pauperism, and better than the
latescz faire labor policy for the protection of the poor laborer in
his struggle for existence. [Also, see De Bow, July, 1855.]

280

APPENDIX

the power of Congress or the territorial legislatures to abol
ish slavery in the territories. Thereupon, the minority
seceded from the convention, leaving the majority to ad
journ. In June, the majority nominated Stephen A. Douglas
and Herschel V. Johnson. The minority named John C.
Breckenridge and Joseph Lane. On May Qth, the Consti
tutional Union party had nominated John Bell and Edward
Everett. On May 16, the Republicans had met at Chicago
and nominated Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin upon
the platform repudiating the Dred Scott decision, opposing
the extension of slavery into the territories, but denying any
sympathy with interference with slavery in the states, and
declaring in favor of the Pacific railway and the homestead
law.

The Democratic tangle at Charleston gave the rapidly
growing Republican party such an advantage that a majority
of the Lincoln electors were chosen on November 6. The
South Carolina legislature chose electors on that day and
remained in session to learn the result of the election, and
then, being encouraged by the governor to expect aid from
other states, provided for the purchase of arms and called a
state convention to determine upon secession. A shower of
expressions on the subject of secession followed.3

Some urged a declaration of dissolution by state legisla
tures instead of by conventions. Cobb of Georgia advised
the legislature of that state to declare for secession without
waiting " to hear from the crossroads and groceries."
Toombs, fearing that a convention, if called by the state
authorities, " would vote for abolition rule," said to the

3 Col. R. B. Ithett of Charleston received a letter from Thomas
J. Butler of Mobile, Alabama, dated November 14, saying: " I
break down every barrier in order to effect the great object I have
had for over thirty years — the fli^mimn — oik^he states and the
security of slavery. If 1 betray unusual feeling~Trffll~ "zeal you
must attribute it in a degree to a somewhat impulsive tempera
ment, but more to the severe schooling I have had in the lessons
of Mr. Calhoun and your illustrious father."

APPENDIX 28l

Georgia legislature: " Give me the sword, for, if you do
not give it to me, as God lives, I will take it myself." It was
in vain that Stephens urged the Southern leaders not to yield
to temptation as did their first parents who " reopened their
eyes only to discover their own nakedness." *

No advice from a conservative could stay the action of the
South Carolina convention. In December it seceded, issued
a declaration of independence, and adopted an address to
the people of the slaveholding states. The declaration, pre-

4 Stephens urged that the South should not break the constitu
tion because she failed iu the election, but that she should wait
until the North broke it. He called attention to the fact that the
House of Representatives and the Senate were largely Demo
cratic, thus tying Lincoln's hands and leaving him no opportunity
to do any thing unconstitutional. He saw no reason why the South
should take the last step, so long as there was a chance that the
Northern and Western legislatures would recede from their hostil
ity towards the fugitive slave laws.

On November 24, Stephens wrote his brother that he had no
doubt that redress might be obtained if it was sought in the
proper spirit and with an honest purpose, but he feared that such
was not the object of the agitators. " We are, I fear," said he,
" in the hands of those who are bent upon dissolution at all
hazards. Nothing will satisfy them but to get out of the Union.
. . . The evil genius of civil discord seems to be rampant."
Again, on November 30, while Insisting that the popular will should
be as fairly represented as possible, he said, " The truth is our
leaders do not wish any redress . . . are disunionists per se . .
and . . they will carry the state." [Johnston and Browne: Life
of A. H. Stephens.]

There were others who threw their weight on the brakes to stop
the accelerating movement of the car of secession. One of these
was J. A. Campbell, who, although he had emancipated his slaves
while a member of the United States Supreme Court, exerted great
influence in the government at Richmond during the entire period
of the war. On November 26, he protested against secession on
the ground that all classes tend towards the same standard of
intelligence and submit eventually to the same rule of opinion —
stating that the South could gain nothing and that the election
of Lincoln was not a sufficient cause for revolt. [Du Bose: Life
and Times of William Lowndes Yancey, p. 689.]

282 APPENDIX

pared by Memminger and adopted December 24, declared
the right of a state to govern itself or to abolish govern
ments, advocated the compact theory of government, said the
Northern states had disobeyed the compact, complained that
the ends of 1787 had been defeated and that a sectional party
was now in power, endangering the institution of slavery.
The address recited that, notwithstanding the prosperity of
the United States, discontent had been caused by taxation
without representation, by unequal distribution of appro
priations, by Northern evasion of the compromises, by abro
gation of the limitations of the constitution, and by the atti
tude of the majority toward the minority. It spoke of the
constitution as only an experiment begun when there was no
tariff and no negro fanaticism; it did not seek reform but
desired only to be let alone. It preferred a system of slavery
" where capital and labor are identified in interests " to a
system of industry where capital and labor are in conflict/'

Stephens was not favorably impressed by the address of
the convention. He said that it hardly deigned to specify
grievances and that it almost entirely ignored the slavery
question — barely glancing at the personal liberty acts which
were the real cause of complaint.0

Events were now hurrying rapidly to a catastrophe. " The
times are fearfully distempered," said Stephens, " We are
on the high road to ruin." But when his state seceded a
few days later, he resolved to " go down with a fragment of
the wreck."

American public opinion had not yet decided in favor of
coercion, but expected compromise. Horace Greeley, in the

5 McPherson: Political History of the Itebellion.

0 In a loiter to Lincoln, Stephens said that previous presidents,
Washington and Jefferson, had had antislavery opinions, and thai
in his judgment " the people of the South did not fear that the
Republican administration would attempt to interfere directly or
immediately with slavery in the states, but that their discontent
and apprehension was created by the fear of results of fanaticism
like that of John Brown."

APPENDIX 283

Tribune of November 9, favored letting the seceding states
go rather than holding them by bayonets. Many in the
North and in the border states desired compromise, and
various plans were proposed. Thurlow Weed, in his Albany
Evening Journal t proposed a law for the payment of rescued
slaves by counties and the extension of the Missouri com
promise to the Pacific. George P. Curtis believed that
Massachusetts would repeal her personal liberty law, and the
House of Representatives, on December 17, by a vote of 153
to 14 recommended a repeal of these laws as far as they
were in conflict with the constitution, but Senator Iverson
said that the immediate repeal of all these laws could not
stop the progress of the " revolution." Davis and Toombs
complained that the North refused to recognize slaves as
property in the territories. Southerners were sensitive to the
Northern sentiment that slavery was out of harmony with
the moral progress of the age. Crittenden of Kentucky,
December 18, introduced into the Senate a plan of com
promise favoring an amendment to the constitution, extend
ing the Missouri compromise line of division to all territory
of the United States so long as it should remain as territory,
and providing that when states should be organized in such
territory, either north or south of the line of 36° 30', they
should be admitted free or slave as their constitution might
provide. Congress was to have no power to shut slavery
from the territories; slaves were to be protected as property
by all the departments of the territorial government; Con
gress was never to have the power to interfere with slavery
in the states where the laws permitted that institution — not
even in places within those states where Congress had ex
clusive jurisdiction^ and' payment for rescued slaves was to
be made by the United States government. Such was the
Crittenden plan to which the Republicans could not agree,
and no agreement could be reached on other plans before the
issue came.

On December 18, 1860, Senator Powell of Kentucky offered

284 APPENDIX

a resolution for the selection of a committee of thirteen to
consider the grievances of the slaveholding states. The
Senate adopted it and the Vice-President appointed Powell,
Crittenden, Hunter, Toombs and Davis with the Northern
Democrats, Douglas, Bigelow and Rice, and the Republi
cans Seward, Collamer, Doolittle and Grimes. Before they
met, South Carolina had seceded. On December 22, Crit
tenden presented his plan to the committee. Article i relat
ing to territories was the most important. It was opposed
by all the Republicans and by Toombs and Davis. The
Republicans also opposed the other articles. They probably
feared Southern filibustering to get Mexico, Cuba and Cen
tral America. Nevertheless there was considerable opinion
in the North in favor of the Crittenden amendment. The
Northern Democrats and Hunter, Powell and Crittenden
would have accepted the compromise but Seward, on De
cember 26, wrote Lincoln that, even with the restoration of
the 36° 30' line, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana
would secede. As a congressional law, instead of a consti
tutional amendment, Lincoln would have accepted all the
compromise except article i. He believed that the agitation
could be stopped for a time by the provision to extend the
36° 30' line, but would probably be renewed by Southern
attempts to seize and annex Mexico. He believed that com
promise could only postpone, but thought that the fugitive
slave law ought not to be resisted in the North.

The Republicans offered a plan of compromise. On De
cember 24 Seward proposed to the committee of thirteen:
(i) That there should be a constitutional amendment that
the constitution should never be amended so as to authorize
Congress to interfere with slavery in the state. (2) That the
fugitive slave law should be amended so as to grant jury
trial to the fugitive. (3) That Congress should recommend
the repeal of the personal liberty acts that were unconstitu
tional. Two days later he also proposed that Congress
should pass no law for the punishment of persons engaged in

APPENDIX 285

the armed invasion of any state from another. Grimes of
Iowa was \villing to admit Kansas under the Wyandotte
constitution, and to admit the rest of the western terri
tories as two states divided by the line of 36° 30' with pro
visions for their future sub-division when the population
should be sufficient. This would have made New Mexico
a pro-slavery pocket borough — though physical laws, even in
the face of congressional laws to the contrary, would, per
haps, have prevented slavery from thriving there. Of the
above Republican proposals only the first one was carried.

After considering other propositions, the committee of
thirteen reported to Congress that they could not agree on
a plan of adjustment. Crittenden then proposed (January
3, 1861) in the Senate, that his compromise plan should be
submitted to the people. Douglas favored it, but the ques
tion never came to a vote in the Senate.

Clingman of North Carolina said that he was astonished
that the North hesitated to accept the Crittenden plan; that
it gave that section the larger amount of present territory
and left undisturbed the right to a vote as to the acquisition
of further territory toward the South. Lincoln, however,
was opposed to surrendering his principles in order to please
those beaten at the elections, whom he feared would next ask
for Cuba as a condition for remaining in the Union. He
stated that the constitution was the same as before the
election, and that there never was a more shallow pretext
for extorting a compromise. " There is in my judgment,"
said he, " but one compromise which would really settle the
slavery question, and that would be a prohibition against
acquiring any more territory." In a letter to Seward on
February i, 1861, he said, " I am for no compromise which
permits extension of slavery to soil now owned by the nation,
or allows any trick by which the nation is to acquire terri
tory and allow some local authority to spread slavery over
it." 7

7 Nicolay and Hay : Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, Vol. I.

286 APPENDIX

On February 4, while the Southern leaders were making
their farewell speeches in Congress, and while delegates from
six cotton states were convening at Montgomery, Alabama,
to form a Southern confederacy, a peace convention in which
21 states were represented, met at Washington in response
to a proposal (January 19) from Virginia, whose legislative
deprecated disunion. The seceding states were not repre
sented. Virginia desired to save the Union and was willing
to accept the Crittenden compromise as a constitution il
amendment. The subject of future expansion8 was a promi
nent feature of the debates and many of the speeches ga\e
the intimation that the South was contemplating national
suicide because there was no constitutional amendment re
garding future acquisitions of territory. Some Southern
delegates, like Reid of North Carolina, were looking foi-
ward to the glory of future expansion. Some of the Northern
delegates spoke of the evils of expansion, and desired re
strictions on future acquisitions. Loomis of Pennsylvania,
declaring that new acquisitions would only bring new
troubles, said: " We want no more territory north or south."
Others, however, were opposed to restrictions for the future
on the ground that they were unnecessary and might prove
troublesome. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, told the South
ern delegates that there was no reason for discussing con
tingencies which might never happen — that they had enough
territory for the next two hundred years, and that, before they
should need more land possibly even the North would want
Cuba and Mexico for trade advantages. In discussing a
resolution based on the Crittenden plan, Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland, who thought we had sufficient territory and hoped
that we would not separate on account of territory we did
not have and did not need, desired to insert the word

8 On the influence of the South on expansion, see C. E. Evans
(Ed.): Confederate Military History, Vol. I, pp. 59-2-16, [\V. R.
Garrett: The Si nth as a factor in the territorial expansion of the
United States.]

APPENDIX 287

" present " before " territory " in article I, stating that a
constitutional amendment should not go forth to the world
indicating that the United States proposed to acquire new
territory in any way. The word " present " was inserted.
Afterwards Summer offered an amendment that no territory
should be acquired except by discovery or for naval depots
and transit routes, without the concurrence of the majority
of the senators from each section. The motion was carried,
but the proposition failed in the final vote upon the report of
the convention.9 On February 27, the convention, voting by
states, recommended to Congress a constitutional amend
ment which was less favorable to the South than the Critten-
den plan but was not satisfactory to the radicals or the
Republicans. It advocated the extension of the Missouri
compromise line to the Pacific, the establishment, by Con
gress, of slavery south of that line, and compensation by the
United States for fugitive slaves rescued after arrest. A
committee of Congress joined in favoring the compromise,
but it was too late. On March 4, Crittenden offered the
report to the Senate and it received only seven ayes, among
whom were Crittenden, Douglas and two Republicans. The
radical republicans had been opposed to the peace conven
tion. The House by 113 to 80 and the Senate by 20 to 19
refused to submit the Crittenden compromise to the people,
but Congress by a two-thirds vote of each House recom
mended a constitutional amendment providing that no future
amendment should ever give Congress power to interfere
with the domestic institutions of the states. This satisfied
many in Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee. Nelson
of Tennessee said it would remove the only ground of appre
hension to the slave states. But it could not stop secession.
Public sentiment changed with the course of events. Virginia

9 L. E. Chittenden: Report of the Debates and Proceedings of
the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention for proposing
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Feb., 1861.
N. Y., 1864.

288 APPENDIX

was at first strongly opposed to disunion, but she was aho
opposed to coercion in case conciliation failed to bring back
seceded states.

A statement of the causes of secession may be found in
the farewell speeches of Southern congressmen delivered in
January and February and also in the proceedings of the
seceding conventions. The predominant tone was that the
states seceded because they believed the election of Linco n
meant a blow to the institution of slavery. Toombs, on
January 7, in the Senate, said that the South made fi-e
demands to cure grievances and prevent secession: (i) Equil
right to go to the territories. (2) The same protection for
slaves as for other property — leaving each state to prote :t
or prohibit slavery. (3) The delivery of persons committing
crimes against slave property and fleeing to other state?.
(4) The surrender of fugitive slaves. (5) The passage 1 y
Congress of laws for the punishment of those aiding or
abetting invasion or insurrection in any state.10 The Missis
sippi convention said: " Our position is thoroughly identified
with the institution of slavery . . . There was no choice
left us but submission to the mandates of abolition or a dis
solution of the Union." " Your votes," said Jefferson Davis,
" refuse to recognize our domestic institution which pre
existed the formation of the Union, our property which was
guaranteed by the constitution."1 In his farewell speech to
the Senate, January 21, Mr. .Davis said: " Mississippi
secedes because she hears the theory that all men are created
free and equal made the basis of an attack upon her social
institutions."

Mr. Slidell, February 4, in presenting to the Senate an
ordinance to dissolve the compact between Louisiana and
the United States, stated that the mere election of Lincoln
was not the cause of secession, but that it indicated that
outside of New Jersey there was a solid North against

lu P. A. Stovall. Life of Robt. Toombs.
"Alfriend: Jefferson Davis, pp. 225-30.

APPENDIX 289

Southern institutions, and he declared that the inauguration
of Lincoln with Southern assent would mean slave outbreaks.
He spoke of the advantages which the South would have in
forming a new nation, and said there was no reason to fear
coercion. He was willing to adhere to the old constitution
and treaties, pay a portion of the national debt, and leave
the navigation of the Mississippi free to the inhabitants of
its valley; and he expected foreign nations to acknowledge
the de facto Southern government and to insist upon com
munication with Southern ports.12

Mr. Benjamin, in his "farewell" of February 5, said:
" Of all the causes which justify the action of the Southern
states I know none of greater gravity and more alarming
magnitude than that now developed of the denial of the
right of secession." He declared that the purchase of Louis
iana by the United States did not bind the white men of
the state by ties that could not be severed. Clingman held
that after an honest effort to defeat Lincoln the South was
not responsible for his election and was justified in seceding.

The foregoing speeches indicate the presence of a general
belief among Southern leaders that the perpetuation of the
institution of slavery, or of Southern rigfits~crmnected with
slavery, were endangered by the election of Lincoln. It must
be remembered, however, that, until the Southerners with
drew, the Republicans were still the smaller party in both
Houses, and that the President had no power to abolish
slavery except as a war measure. But the secessionists were
correct in their conviction that the Northern moral sense
against slavery pointed toward the ultimate doom of the
institution, and they made the election of Lincoln a pretext
for secession. Did secession and the war then result from
the desire to perpettfaTe^slavery? TrThis speech~at Savannah
on March I, 1861, Stephens stated that race servitude was
the real cornerstone upon which the Confederacy was based.
But, years after the close of the war, when the people, drawn

18 Cong. Globe, Feb. 4. 1861.
19

290 APPENDIX

together by mutual interests, were again being fused into a
durable nationality, Jefferson Davis said: "To whatever
extent the question of slavery may have served as an occa
sion, it was far from being a cause of the war."

Davis held that slavery was only an incident in a group
of causes — than the South did not secede on account of tl e
Northern attitude toward slavery, but rather from the fear
of what a_sgctional party might do when 7mce"Tn power.13

In the farewell spisecFTes one sees no reference to niary
causes which had contributed to embitter feeling on tie
subject of slavery: the lack of communication, the economic,
educational, social and political differences which arose fro n
different systems of labor, and the influence of climate arc!
soil in producing them. The Southern states being agricul
tural communities, were led to the general introduction of
slavery, and this in turn kept them agricultural while tLe
North was developing into a country of diversified interes:s
and of denser population than the South. The North hr.d
outgrown the economic conditions of 1776, and material in
terests had been changed by the growth of manufacturing and
commercial towns in the North and West. Helper, in h s
pamphlet of 1859, on the Impending Crisis, said that if
slavery could be abolished manufacturing might become an
industry in the South; and that the social position of the
non-slaveholding whites, consisting of about two-thirds of
the voters, would soon compare with the mechanics and
farmers of the North.

With the conditions of soil and climate which made slavery
more profitable in the South and secured greater immigra
tion to the North; with the differences in institutions which
resulted from slavery; with railroads of different gauge and
inconvenient connections; sometimes in an atmosphere of
misunderstanding where neighbor was ignorant of neighbor,
and where some of the opposing politicians learned nothing'
and forgot nothing-v-compromise failed, passions controlled,

13 ,T. Davis: Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. 1SS1.

APPENDIX 291

the spirit of secession spread, and war was precipitated.
Southern leaders, feeling that the social and industrial system
of the South was insecure, preferred tcfappeal toTiTe pre-
natioirafr" pTJrrdpte^'ot~CoTrred€«itioH- - an d— tO~~fep u'diate the
idga~bt nationality?*"""

The secession- movement had continued under the man
agement of the political leaders aid on February 4, 1861,
delegates met at Montgomery to organize a government.
Conservatives like Stephens were still opposed to secession
as a "remedy against anticipated aggressions." Stephens
finally decided to accept a place in the provisional govern
ment, though he wrote that when he considered the " ambi
tious . . . men at the head of the movement, who neces
sarily control [led] at least for the present" he had appre
hension and mistrust for the future. Some who joined the
movement hoped for something to occur to prevent perma
nent dissolution, and expected to obtain better terms for
slavery by a temporary withdrawal from the Union; others
dreamed of a peaceful dissolution, for many in the North
were opposed to coercion. There was a strong Southern
opposition to secession, especially in Georgia, Virginia,
North Carolina and Louisiana. Yet the movement did not
lack the substantial support of the majority of the people
after it was once begun, though in Georgia especially there
was at first a majority of the white people who opposed it.
It was only by impassioned persuasion, or by argument of
temporary expediency, that the leaders in some parts ob
tained popular support for their project. Perhaps the United
States constitution could never have been carried in 1788
if its ratification had been voted upon by the whole people
at the polls, and it has been said that secession would have
failed if it had depended upon the popular vote.

14 Papers rel. to the ratification of the ordinances of secession.

INDEX

Acquisition, territorial; demanded by
slavery, 278, 285; and the Critten-
den compromise plan, 283, 284;
discussed in " peace conference "
of 1861, 286; attempt to limit, 287.

Adams, C. F. ; U. S. Minister to Lon
don, 114; possibility of recognition
seen by, 159.

Aggressions, anticipated. [See " Se
cession " and " United States."]

Alabama, The; built at Liverpool, 156;
escape and commission on high
seas, 157.

Alexandra, The ; seizure of, 170.

Alliance; proposed with Spain, 75, 78,
98, 207; proposed with Mexico, 71;
proposed with northern provinces
of Mexico, 76; proposed with
France, 83, 151, 202, 266; proposed
with European powers, 84; ex
pected between England and
France, 115; advocated with the
U. S., 128, 257; suggested with
France and Mexico, 196, 198; sug
gested with Maximilian, 201, 213;
suggested with Brazil and Mexico,
241; rumor of with Maximilian,
273.

Anglo-American relations, 108, 115,
120, 188, 222, 237, 271, 274.

Archives. [See " Correspondence "
and " Pickett Papers."]

Armistice, proposed plan of, 159.

Aspinwall, W. H., 173.

Barksdale, of Miss., 35.

Barnwell, of South Carolina, 31.

Beall, J. Y., 226.

Belgium, diplomatic mission to, 125.

Belligerency, recognition by England,
112; views of Fish on, 114; views
of Seward, 214.

Benjamin, Judah P. ; papers destroyed
by, 12, 20; secretiveness, 23;
sketch, 31; complains against the
British policy, 94, 95, 155, 233;
suspicions as to French designs,
98, 205, 206; arguments to Europe
[see "Europe"]; and bureau of
export and import, 105; contrasts
French friendliness with the " rude
incivility" of Earl Russell, 155;
urges that England and France
should break the blockade to se
cure monopoly of Southern trade,
162; on cooperation of Lord Lyons
with the U. S. as to consuls in
the South, 180; complains of Euro
pean powers, 218, 249; accuses
Napoleon of duplicity, 219; covert
threat of future war against
France, 219; hopes against fate,
234; instructions to Kenner, 248;
warns Europe against future ag
gression by the North, 250;
" dreams " of European interven
tion, 257; advocates emancipation,
and seizure of cotton, etc., 260;
Sunday talk with Davis, 267; dip
lomatically declines to receive
Russell's note, 273; on cause of
secession, 289.

Bigelow, John (U. S. Minister at
Paris); "France and the Confed
erate Navy," 24.

Blair, mission of, 253-254, 256, 266.

Blanche, The, 78.

Blockade, 106, 115, 121, 122, 126, 131,
144; attitude of England to, 125,
127, 267; attitude of France to,
125, 147; and the cotton policy,
122, 126, 132; Confederate repre
sentations as to, 126, 144, 163;

294

INDEX

severity of on South, 132, 147, 163,
247, 260; inefficiency of, urged by
Mason, 144, 164 (also admitted by
Napoleon, 147); irregularities, Rus
sell's fairness as to, 149, 167;
Confederate expectation for Eng
land to favor the South as to, 150.

Blockade running, 104, 132, 169, 171;
government control of recom
mended, 105, 195.

Border States; necessity of to the ex
istence of the Confederacy, 145.

Brazil, 241.

Bread riot, threatened, 55.

Brent, Gen. J. L., 249.

Bright, John; opposed to disunion in
the U. S., 189.

British consuls in the South; exe
quaturs finally revoked by Davis,
176; authority exercised over by
Lord Lyons, 177; complain of for
cible conscription of Irish, 17(5,
177; Magee of Mobile recalled, 178;
case of Cridland at Mobile, 179.

British Government, The; Benjamin
complains of policy of, 94, 95, 155,
233; attempts to embarrass, 100;
objections to recognition of the
Confederacy, 125; attitude toward
blockade, 125, 127, 267; and con
flicting views as to cooperation
with France, 160; orders of as to
Confederate operations, 166, 169,
170, 272; futile attempt to force
recognition by, 186 et seq. ; de
tention of Confederate vessels by,
214; and Napoleon's supposed pro
posals for joint recognition, 185;
Roebuck's, charges against (as to
Napoleon's offers), 187; suspected
secret understanding between Sew-
ard and, 147, 148, 187; fears that
recognition would lead to war
with U. S., 188; leaves Napoleon
to pull his own chestnuts, 188; de
nials as to Napoleon's overtures,
189, 191; protests of Seward against
policy of, 222; its policy dictated
by the U. S., 233; " Index " com
plains as to England playing
" second fiddle," 272. [See
" Lyons," " Russell," " Palmers-
ton " and " Great Britain."]

British vessels; captured by U. S.,
171.

Bullock, J. D. ; "Secret Service" of,
24, 58, 59; views of on Confedeiate
policy, 105; sent to Europe, 111;
and the Alabama, 156; contn cts
for vessels in French ports, MO,
211 ; complains of French dec ;it,
216.

Bunch (British consul) ; negotiati )ns
through, 118; Seward requests re
moval of, 119; exequatur of re
voked by Davis, 176.

Butler, Thos. J., 280.

Cabinet; and congress, 28, 30, 48;
first, 30; second, 33. [See " Con
federate Government" and." Da
vis."]

Campbell, Judge J. A., 44, 68, 156,
257, 281.

Canada; and Anglo-American rela
tions, 188, 237, 271; Confedeiate
operations from, 214, 220 et s<q.,
236; Confederate missions to, 224;
225.

Chapman, Lieut., 25.

Chesapeake, The affair of the, 223;
and Holcombe's mission to Canada,
224.

Clay, C. C. ; special mission to Can
ada, 241.

Cobb, of Georgia, 26, 280.

Collier, of Va., 48, 54.

Colonial subjection to Europe sug
gested, 241.

Colonies, of Europe in North America;
Confederate policy of guaranty of,
84, 168, 207, 266.

Commerce; proposed advantages to
Europe, 84, 86, 87; Confederate
policy (laiswz faire) as to, 110,
133, 146; advantages offered
France, 142, 147; monopoly of Con
federate trade, England encour
aged to prepare for, 162. [See
" Cotton."]

Communication with Europe, etc.;
difficulties of, 51, 52, 55, 97, 304,
135, 173, 178, 247, 260; plans for
facilitating, 97, 146, 159.

INDEX

295

Compromise; plans of (in 1860-61), 283
et seq. ; and territorial expansion,
285.

Confederacy, The; seal of, 18, 25;
diplomatic and consular agents of
(list), 21; government of, 25-65
(survivors, 23, 24), [see " Con
federate Government"]; flag of,
25; provisional government of, 26,
32; permanent government of [see
" Confederate Permanent Govern
ment"]; missions of [see "Dip
lomatic missions"]; provisional
congress of, 26 (laws, 32); finances
of, 32, 53 et seq. ; constitution of,
28 et seq. (ignored, 242, 252);
permanent congress of [see " Con
gress"]; proposed supreme court
of, 30, 34, 38; opposition party in,
32, 47 [see " Secession," and
" Embarrassments and Difficul-
culties " under " Confederate
Government"]; defensive policy
of, 34; prospects of a counter
revolution in, 39, 47 [see " Seces
sion from Secessia "]; loans of, 53,
60, 63, 104, 195, 209 (the bears
and the bulls, 62, 63); expansion
policy of [see " Expansion pol
icy"]; and the Pacific, 75, 145,
272; foreign operations of closely
watched, 99; diplomacy of (fac
tors causing failure), 99, 100, 240;
commercial policy of, 110, 133,
142, 146, 147, 162; cotton policy
and the blockade, 122, 126, 132,
134, 243, 246; representations as
to blockade, 126, 144, 163; sever
ity of the blockade on, 132, 147,
163, 247, 260; disadvantages of
132, 146; distress of, 132, 225, 239,
268, 269; importance of border
states to, 145; aid associations in
England, 156; friends in the Brit
ish parliament (agitation by), 169;
suggested union with the Mexican
empire, 195; approval of European
intervention in Mexico, 204; opera
tions of from Canada, 214, 220 et
seq.; hope of Lincoln's defeat at

the polls, 227, 228; projects for
insurrection in the North, 230;
effect of victories of, 231; defeats
of, 234, 239, 260; attempts to in
volve England in war with the
U. S., 237, 238, 271; last card of,
239 et seq.; colonial subjection to
Europe suggested, 241. [Also, see
"Foreign policjV "Recognition,"
" Confederate Government," " Eu
rope," " France," " Great Brit
ain," " Mexico."]
Confederate Government, 25-65.
Confederate Government, the provis
ional; organization of, 26, 291;
removal of to Richmond, 32; finan
cial measures of, 32.
Confederate Government, the perma
nent; a " machine of the few,"
17; survivors, 23, 34; birth, 33;
policy of to regulate production,
34, 89, 90; collision of with state
authorities, 43, 45, 47; impress
ment of food by, 43; prohibition
of exports, 44; disaffection against,
46, 47, 233, 239, 270; embarrass
ments and difficulties of, 42 et
seq., 48, 51, 56, 102, 106, 233
[also, see " Communication."];
financial measures of, 53; argu
ments to secure European recogni
tion, 87 [see " Europe," " Great
Britain," and "France"]; and
U. S. treaties with foreign pow
ers, 87, 109; encourages defection
in the U. S., 220 et seq.; expecta
tion of revolution in North, 221;
expectation of international com
plications, 223, 271; last effort of,
239 et seq. ; secrecy and rumors,
273. [See " Confederacy," and
" Congress."]

Congress, provisional, 26; laws of, 32.
Congress, permanent, 33; survivors, 34;
prominent members, 33, 35; acts
of, 34, 44; character of, 34, 35;
financial measures of, 34; and the
executive, 34, 35, 39, 44, 45, 48,
49, 50, 96, 256, 268; flight of, 36;
quarters of, 36; secret sessions of,

296

INDEX

36; proposed report of debates of,
37; stormy scenes in, 37-38; ap
propriation for more vessels, 210;
dissentient reply to Davis' last
message, 268; address to the peo
ple, 269; " Unionist " members of,
271.

Conscription; laws, 34, 40; opposed by
Stephens, 40; bureau of (" rows "
in), 44, 46.

Controversies, 169 et seq.
Corcoran, W. W., 265.

Correspondence; private, 22; preserva
tion of, 14; purchase of, 15, 19;
capture of, 52, 97, 164; publication
of, 96, 164; destroyed, 172. [See
" Diplomatic correspondence."]

Cotton; export of urged, 63, 89, 90;
" Cotton is King," 80; Europe
and, 80, 123, 132, 142, 243; destruc
tion of advocated, 88, 102; aban
donment of culture recommended,
89 (opposed by Stephens, 90);
policy as to, 89, 90, 122, 126, 132,
134, 243 (obstacles to export pol
icy, 89) ; commercial value urged,
89, 90, 105; political value urged,
101, 242 (disappointment as to,
101, 242) ; government seizure of
(policy of), 107, 246, 249; indirect
export of, 101, 107, 165; trade in
with Federals, 102, 103; govern
ment monopoly and shipment of,
104, 105 (urged by Mason, 195);
proposed neutrality of, 126, 135;
and. the blockade, 134, 142; policy
of prohibiting export of (urged),
150; expectation of a " cotton
famine," 159 (" cotton famine pol
icy," 243).

Cotton bonds, 53.

Cotton loans, 59, 61.

Crawford, M. G., of Georgia, 27, 67.

Crittenden plan of compromise, to
prevent secession, 283, 287.

Cuba; policy of the Confederacy to
wards, 77, 98, 124, 168, 184, 202,
207; Seward's warning as to, 78;
Mason and Slidell in, 136; policy
of the South towards before seces
sion, 278.

Currency; depreciation of, 57; cl)se

of paper money bureau, 269.
Curry, J. L. M., 35.
Dargan, of Ala., 38.
Davis, George (Attorney-General), 47.
Davis, Jefferson; election, 27; cotion
famine policy, 32, 88, 89; increas
ing powers of, 39, 44, 47, ,iOj
estimates of his character, 41-
sources of embarrassment and un
popularity, 42 et seq., 239; list
message of, 48, 50, 268; foreign
policy of, 86, 88; complains of ihe
British Government, 155, 163, 25;
revokes exequaturs of British con
suls, 176; criticises European Gov
ernments for refusing recognition,
200, 240; opinion as to major ty
rule, 228; laborious work of, 2;;9;
and the " last card," 246, 263; on
cause of secession, 288. [See
" Confederate Government " and
" Congress."]

Davis, Judge, 16.

Davis, Mrs. Varina J., 12.

Davis, Miss Winnie, 22.

Declaration of Paris (of 1856), 111,
118, 126, 134; U. S. willing to
accept, 119; Confederate protects
against British modification as to
blockade, 164, 196; Russell's inter
pretation of rule as to blockade,
164, 168.

De Leon, recommends recall of Con
federate commissioners from Eu
rope, 97.

Democratic convention at Charleston,
279.

Democratic convention at Chicago
(1864), 231, 234.

De Morny, Count; views of, 111-112.

Desertions, 48, 239.

Despatch agents, 97.

Dictator, military; favored, 241.

Diplomacy, Confederate; factors caus
ing failure of, 99, 100, 240.

Diplomatic agents; list of, 25; recall
of, favored, 95, 176, 196; Sewaid
warns Europe not to hold inter
course with, 115. [See " Diploma
tic missions."]

INDEX

297

Diplomatic correspondence ; preserva
tion by Pickett, 14; purchase of,
15, 19.

" Diplomatic council," a, 265.

Diplomatic missions; (embarrassments
and difficulties of, 92, 94, 120); to
Washington, 27, 67, 70, 117; to
Canada, 70, 224, 225; to Mexico,
71, 75 (New Leon), 76; to the
West Indies, 77; to Europe (Yan-
cey, Rost and Mann), 91, (Mason
and Slidell) 130, (Mason) 200; to
Russia, 95 (recalled, 96); to the
Pope, 99; to England, 109 et seq.,
239, 258; to France, 123; to Spain,
124, 125, 168; to Belgium, 125; to
Hampton Roads conference, 257.

Dowling, Robt., 98.

Dred Scott decision, 279.

Dunnock, Mr., 102.

Emancipation; offered for recognition,

83, 266; Lincoln's proclamation,
effect in England, 165; favored as
a means of securing recognition,
195, 241, 242, 251; the "last
card," 239 et seq., 242, 246; prepa
ration of Southern public opinion
for, 251, 258, 260; opposition to,
260; secrecy of negotiations as to,
262; anticipated in London, 262.

Emigration to U. S. ; from Ireland,
168; from Frankfort, 233.

England, crisis in, 182 et seq. [See
" Great Britain " and " British
Government."]

Enlistments in Ireland, 168.

Erlanger loan, 54, 60, 61, 62. 241.

Europe; Confederate financial agents
in, 59, 63; change of financial
program in, 64; Confederate ex
pectations as to, 79, 91, 109, 117,
204, 249; and tariff policy, 79, 80,

81, 82; opposition to slavery, 79,

82, 84, 86, 97, 121, 242, 244, 263;
and Confederate cotton, 80, 123,
132, 142, 243; Confederate argu
ments to, 81, 93, 100, 109, 111,
121, 125, 126, 133, 162, 267; pro
posed commercial advantages to,

84, 86, 87 [see "Commerce"];
Confederate operations in, 93

(closely watched, 99); no hope
from, 128, 218, 231, 257, 264;
urged to break the blockade to
get cotton, 134 (and to establish
West India depots of supply, 163);
accused of desiring the ruin of
both North and South, 197; de
crease of Confederate opportuni
ties in, 220; Davis complains
against the indifference of, 240;
suggestion of colonial subjection
to, 241; warned against future
Northern aggression, 250. [See
" Recognition."]

Executive, absorption of power by, 17,
247 et seq., 268. [See " Davis,"
" Confederate Government " and
" Congress."]

Exemption laws, 40, 46, 50.

Exemptions, complaints against, 240.

Expansion policy; Confederate, 66, 71,
73, 75, 78, 93, 124, 129, 134, 145,
207, 221, 257, 258; discussions in
the peace convention of 1861, 286;
influence of the South on, 286.

Export and import, bureau of, 105.

Extradition, 180-181.

Fearn, Walker, 24, 76, 97.

Ficklin, 52.

Financial agents in Europe, 59, 63.

Financial measures, 32, 53 et seq., 58,
59.

Financial program in Europe, change
in, 64.

Florida, The, 156, 241.

Foote, H. S., 47, 95; urges recall of
commissioners, 95; on motion of
Hampton Roads conference, 258;
on strong Union feeling in the
South, 270.

Forbes, J. M., 173.

Foreign policy, 66-107; of Yancey,
Rhett and Toombs, 84, 87, 89, 123;
of Davis, 86, 88; of Stephens, 89
(cotton exportation), 90, 91; of
Johnston, 90; Henry St. Paul's
pamphlet on, 202. [See " Confed
erate Government," " Davis,"
" Benjamin," " Mason," " Sli
dell," " Recognition," etc.]

2<>8

INDEX

Forsyth, John, 27, 31, 67.

France; rumors of alliance with, 49,
273; attitude toward blockade, 125,
147; attitude toward secession, 142,
149; policy dependent upon that
of Great Britain, 148, 161,' 204;
proposes joint mediation, 159.;
playing a complicated diplomatic
game, 190, 212 Rumors of prospec^
tive aid by, 219, 268, 273; sug
gested alliance with, 196; Benja
min suspicious as to the designs
of, 98, 205, 206; Bullock complains
of deceit of, 216; covert threats of
future war against, 219. [See
" Alliance," " Napoleon," " L'-
Huys," " Europe " and " Great
Britain."]

Goode, John, 35.

Government. [See " Confederate Gov
ernment."]

Great Britain; Confederate sympathiz
ers in, 82, 100, 108, 150, 198, 201;
neutrality of, 94, 113, 170, 188,
205, 215; policy of Government of,
94, 106 [see " British Govern
ment"]; Confederate complaints
against, 96 [see " Davis," " Ben
jamin," "Mason"]; opposition to
slavery, 97, 128, 167, 187; consuls
of in Confederate States, 98; influ
ence of Liberals in, 99, 169, 201;
effect of Seward's watch on, 99;
effect of war on cotton operators
in, 106, 143, 159; sympathy for
Union cause, 108; Mason's instruc
tions as minister to, 133. [See
" British Government."]

Gregg, Maxey, 278.

Guaranty of N. Am. colonies of Euro
pean powers, 84, 168, 207, 266.

Gwin, ex-Senator, and Napoleon's
scheme for colonizing Sonora, 217,
258.

Hanckle, Mr., of Charleston, 126.

Hampton Roads conference, 253, 257.

Harrison, Burton N., 97, 215, 275.

Helm, C. J., 77.

Henry, Senator, speech on emancipa
tion policy, 259.

Henry, Wm. Wirt, memoranda of, 262.

Hester, extradition of; correspondence
between Russell and Mason as to,
180-181.

Heyleger, L., 79, 97.

Holcombe, J. P.; mission to Can; da,
224; and Niagara Falls pt ace
comedy, 228; advises further en
couragement of disruption and
anarchy in the North, 236.

" Hoosier," encroachments of .he,
241.

Hotze, Henry, 92, 198.

Hughes, Caleb, 150.

Hunter, R. M. T. ; in cabinet, 31, 120;
attitude toward Cuba and Sp lin,
124; instructions to Mason and
Slidell, 133-134; policy as to Eu
ropean intervention, 145; sp< ech
favoring expansion and oppo >ing
emancipation, 258-259.
" Impressment of supplies, 43, 54.

Index, The, 92, 156, 272.

Indexes to diplomatic corresponde ice,
19.

Internal complications, Confederate
hope for, 241.

Intervention; sought of Europe, 125;
British policy as to, 134, 167; ex
pectation of, 145 et seq., 195;
expediency of, contemplated by
Palmerston and Russell, 158; de
pendent on military situation, 158,
194-195; plan of joint European
action, proposed by Napoleon, 159,
161 (Russell's reply, 161); of Eu
rope in Mexico, 203; opposition
of U. S. to, 232; the only hope,
242; " dream of," 257; rumors of
by France, 268, 273. [See " Rec
ognition."]

Ireland; emigration to U. S. from,
176; Confederate agents sent to,
196.

Irish, complaints of in South, 176,
177.

Isturitz, 208.

Jacques, Col., peace mission of, '227-
228.

Johnson, of Ark., 37.

INDEX

299

Johnson's Island, plans for an expedi
tion against, 222, 226.

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., 13; views
of on foreign policy, 90.

Kenner, Duncan F., secret mission of,
239 et seq., 248, 251; goes to Eu
rope via New York, 260-261; ar
rival in Europe, 264, 265; confer
ence with Mason, etc., 265; in
terview with L'Huys, 265; Mason's
interview with Palmerston regard
ing, 266; negotiations with bank
ers for the sale of cotton, 266;
return to U. S., 274.

Lake Erie, Confederate plans for opera
tions on, 222, 226, 234.

Lamar; J. B., 102; L. Q. C., 95, 200.

Leach, J. T., 45.

Lee, General Robert E., 46, 103.

L'Huys, 160, 193; denies that Napoleon
proposed recognition, 193; as to
French designs in Texas, 206; and
the Confederate navy, 209, 211,
212. [See " France."]

Lincoln and slavery, 43, 82, 111, 285;
election to presidency, 280.

Lindsay, Mr., M. P.; plan to control
Confederate and Western com
merce, 98; " amateur diplomacy "
of, with Napoleon, 147, 148, 182,
186, 192; motion in Parliament for
mediation,- 152; statement of
causes of secession, 152; and Roe
buck — interview with Napoleon,
186; attempt to conciliate Pal
merston to favor joint mediation,
231; abandons resolution for medi
ation, 233.

Louisiana, rumors of French designs
to obtain, 268, 275.

Lubbock, Gov., 205.

Lyons, James, 252.

Lyons, Lord, 117, 118, 147, 164; co
operation with U. S. as to consuls
in the South, 177, 179, 180; coop
eration with the U. S. to frustrate
Confederate plans in Canada, 222.

Lynch, P. A., mission to States of
the Church, 99.

Mallory, Confederate Secretary of
Navy, 30, 58, 59, 104, 273.

Mann, A. Dudley; manuscript memoirs
of, 22; sent to Europe, 85; sent to
the Pope, 99; mission to Belgium,

. 125.

Mason, J. M. ; papers of, 22 ; and the
Confederate loan in Europe, 62-
63; salary as commissioner to Eu
rope, 92; operations and argu
ments in England, 93, 94, 99, 216;
failure to obtain official recogni
tion by Russell, 94, 144; recall
from England urged, 96; with
drawal to continent, 99; recom
mends government control of
blockade-running, 105, 195; sketch
of, 130; sent to England, 125; in
structions as minister to England,
133; unofficial reception, 144, 232;
suggests that a " cotton famine "
may force the British Government
to grant recognition, etc., 149;
complains of the British Govern
ment, 149, 150, 153, 154, 166, 167,
169; call for correspondence of (in
the Commons), 154; dissemination
of " impressions " by, 156, 267;
awaiting contingencies, 156; hopes
against fate, 159, 196, 199, 200,
267, 274; elated over Democratic
victories in the North, 165; in
structed to quit London, 189, 197;
remains in Europe awaiting con
tingencies, 196, 197; withdrawal
from Europe is strongly urged,
197; sees possible hope, if Pal
merston should die, 199; commis
sioner to the continent with full
power, 200; difficulties in combat
ing anti-slavery sentiment in Eng
land, 216; hopes for success of the
anti-Lincoln party at the North,
231, 232; plans to embarrass the
U. S., 233; hopes to convert Eng
land to slavery views, 244; and the
mission of Kenner, 265; gives im
pressions that U. S. has aggres
sive designs, 266.

300

INDEX

Mason and Slidell; mission of, 130-144;
departure from Charleston, 135; at
Havana, 136; capture of, by Wilkes,
136; reception by Europe, 141.

Mason, Miss Virginia, 22.

McHenry, George; views on the cotton
question, 103, 106, 242.

McRae, C. J., 63, 64, 105.

Martial law, 39.

Matamoras trade, 165, 171, 174; not a
violation of the blockade, 175.

Maximilian, 201, 213, 273.

McClure, Dr., 53.

Mediation; proposed by Lindsay, 152,
231. [See " Intervention."]

Memminger; Secretary of Treasury, 30,
61, 103; views of on foreign pol
icy, 88, 90, 103.

Mercier; views, 113, 117; mysterious
errand to Richmond, 146, 149; and
Napoleon's proposition, 189; visit
to Paris, 214.

Mexico; proposed alliance with, 71;
friendliness toward U. S., 72; sus
picious of Confederate policy, 72;
Pickett's policy towards, 73, 74;
Spanish invasion of, 75; northern
provinces of, 76; and Texas (bor
der raids), 76; suggested union
with, 76; European intervention
in, 203; and the U. S., 204; Na
poleon's expedition to, 205; and
Blair's proposal, 253, 256, 266; in
vasion of favored by Stephens, 257
[see " Alliance "]; policy of South
towards before secession, 278.

Michigan, The; plan to capture, 234.

Miles, of S. C., 39.

Military defeats and reverses of tire
Confederacy, 146, 149, 168, 182,
194, 195, 208, 252.

Mississippi, navigation of the, 66, 220,
289.

Mocquard, M., 185, 194.

Monroe doctrine; Confederate attitude
toward, 75, 79, 83, 98, 84, 196, 204,
217, 254, 257, 266; Napoleon's plan
to attack the, 161, 268, 275;
" coiled up " in Lincoln's mes
sage, 241.

Morgan, Col. James Morris, 275.

Morny, Due de, 204.

Napoleon, Louis; attitude of, 99, 101,
123, 142, 151, 161, 213; dreams of
empire, 142,_202, ,205; rcceptioi to
Slidell, 142"; ready" to act v ith
England to break the block; de,
147, 151; suggests plan of inter
vention, 148; and proposals to
build a Confederate navy in
French ports, 159, 209; " in di )lo-
macy nothing exists unless it is
written," 160; avers sympathy
with Confederacy, 161, 183; con
templated mediation through Mer
cier, 161; plan to attack the i on-
roe doctrine in Mexico, 161, :!03;
charged with designs on Mexico,
Texas, etc., 164, 203, 205-206; em
barrassed by Mexican expedition
and outbreak in Poland, 66;
complains of unfair treatment by
Russell, 183 (leakage of overtures) ,
187; unwilling to take initiative in
further proposals, 183, 194, ::08;
action of dependent on Bri ish
policy, 184; supposed proposal.- of
(for recognition), 185; denials as
to overtures of, 189; proposes joint
recognition, 185, 194; willing to
grant recognition, in cooperation
with Great Britain, 186, 207, "265;
distrusted by Seward, 193; Confed
eracy encouraged by, 204, 210; de
signs in Louisiana, 268 (Seward's
views of, 206); willing to cooper
ate with Spain in granting recog
nition, 208; promise of as to Con
federate navy, 211, 212; and the
Bappahannock, 213; policy of,
changed by international and po
litical events, 213, 214, 217; the
Confederacy " duped " by, '217,
240; " duplicity " of, 219; and
Sonora (and the Confederate
emancipation policy), 258. [See
" France."]

Nassau trade, 171.

Navy, Confederate attempts to obtain;
and the cotton policy, 89, 90; in
England, 105, 214, 215; from
France in exchange for cotton, 146

INDEX

301

(subsidy), 147; the Alabama, 156;
the Florida 156; G. N. Sanders
sent to England, 159; plans to
build in French ports (101), 159,
202 et seq., 209; the Alexandra
170; plans interrupted by Forbes
and Aspinwall, 173; plans frus
trated by U. S., 211, 216; the
Bappahannock, 213 ; disappoint
ment in, 216; the Stonewall, 218;
bold seizure of the Chesapeake, 223:
capture of the Philo Parsons, 234 ;
proposed seizure of cotton to pur
chase a navy, 246; the Shenandoah,
272.

Neutrality; of Mexico, 72; of Great
Britain, 94, 100, 112, 113, 117, 124,
125, 170, 188, 205, 215 [see " Brit
ish Government" and "Russell"];
of France, 100. [See " France "
and " Napoleon."]

New Leon (and the northern provinces
of Mexico) ; relations with the Con
federacy, 76.

Niagara Falls, peace comedy at, 228.

Northrop, Dr., 41, 43, 48, 54.

Northwest, the; Confederate expecta
tions as to, 67, 221; Confederate
plans for encouraging insurrection
and defection in, 225, 230, 237.

Opposition party in the South, 32, 47.
[See " Secession from Secessia."]

Orr, Senator, 44, 66.

Owl, The, 264.

Pacific, the; and Confederate policy,
75, 145, 272.

Palmerston, Lord, 125, 153, 169, 170;
opposed to double diplomacy, 182,
191, 192; popularity of, 199;
sounded by Lindsay, 231-232; in
formal interview with Mason, 232,
2C6; refusal to favor joint media
tion, 233; seeks to avoid angry
debate against the U. S., 237.

Parliament, the British; Confederate
friends in, 144, 152, 169, 174, 182,
190; policy of intervention dis
cussed in, 152; American seizure
of the Peterhoof discussed in, 173;
policy cf recognition discussed in,

187-188; U. S. friends in, 189, 191;
alarmed at proceedings in the
American Congress, 237. [See
" Great Britain."]

Peace; Confederate expectation of, 66,
265; favored by a party at North,
71, 227, 230; proposals as to, 221,
228, 229; missions, 227, 228, 253,
255, 257; resolutions, 255, 256; and
reunion sentiment in the South,
270.

Peace conference at Washington (1861),
286.

Pearson, Judge, of N. C., 44.

Personal liberty laws, 279, 283, 284
(the real cause of Southern com
plaint, 282).

Peterhoof. The; capture of, 171; case
before prize court, 171; case dis
cussed in Parliament, 173.

Peterman; Confederate-French secrets
divulged by, 211.

Pettus, Gov., 102.

Philo Parsons, The; capture of, 234.

Pickett, J. T.; preserver of Confed
erate papers, 14; blamed for sell
ing diplomatic correspondence, 16;
secretary of a commission to Wash
ington, 68; mission to Mexico, 71-
76; policy toward Mexico, 73, 74.

"Pickett Papers"; character of, 16,
19; historical value of, 17, 18, 20;
indexes to, 19; scope of, 21.

Policy, defensive, 34. [Also, see
" Foreign policy."]

Polignac, Prince, 275.

Politicians, Roebuck on, 184.

Pope, missions to the, 99.

Press agents, 92.

Prices, 55.

Privateering, 110, 118, 119, 121.

Prophecies, unfulfilled, 264.

Quintero, J. A., 76.

Rappahannock, The, 213.

Reagan, J. H., 23, 30, 275.

Recognition; sought in Mexico, 72;
sought in England, 111, 121, 153;
various plans to secure, 83; offer
of emancipation for, 107; proposed
in the British Parliament, 109,

302

INDEX

187; contemplated by Napoleon,
etc., 112; British objections to,
125, 264, 267; urged by Yancey
(after Trent affair), 126; urged as
in accord with previous British
policy, 134; possibility of, seen by
Adams, 159; dependent on Con
federate victories, 182, 190, 194,
204, 208, 213, 216, 232; conflicting
reports as to Napoleon's proposi
tion regarding, 186, 193, 194; a
delusion, 196, 264; mentioned as
the only means of ending the war,
233; rumors of (and emancipation),
263, 264; refusal by Great Britain
on grounds of general policy, 264,
267; emancipation offered for (too
late), 267.

Revolution, threatened within the
Confederacy, 39, 47.

Rhett, R. B., 28, 280; foreign policy
of, 84, 87; on causes of secession,
278.

Richmond; removal of the Confederate
Government to, 32; Mercier's mys
terious errand to, 146; indignation
meeting at, 258; removal of ar
chives from, 273. [See " Confed
erate Government " and " Con
gress."]

Roebuck; on politicians, 184; opposes
reconstruction of U. S., 187.

Roman, A. B., of Louisiana, 27, 67.

Rost, P. A.; sent to Europe, 85; at
Paris, 111, 112, 127; sent to Spain,
128; advocates alliance with the
North, 128

Russell, Lord John; Confederate com
plaints against, 96, 100; error in
the case of the Alabama, 100;.
fairness of, 100, 149, 154, 155, 156,
166, 174, 175; attempts to embar
rass, 100; neutral policy of, 112,
117, 124, 125; refuses to hold offi
cial communication with Confed
erate commissioners, 127; refuses
to respond to Confederate protests
against the "paper blockade," 142,
149, 195; receives Mason unoffici
ally, 144; personal sympathies

of against the Confederacy, 114;
and Napoleon's proposals, 147; re
fuses to resort to " double diplo
macy " of Lindsay, 148; a secret
understanding suspected between
Seward and, 147, 148; reply of to
Mason's request for recognition of
the Confederacy, 154; berated by
Benjamin, 155, 164; favored n m-
trality, 166; diplomacy of, ridi
culed by a London paper, 1 )8;
firmly declines to recognize he
Confederacy, 198; warns Davis fiat
Confederate neutrality must be re
spected, 215, 271; Benjamin dii lo-
matically refuses to receive n >te
of (warning), 273. [See " British
Government."]

Russell, W. H., 110, 113, 115.

Russia, friendship of for U. S., 95, 161.

Salaries, 42.

Sanders, Geo. N., 97; proposal to go to
Washington on a peace mission, 22 ).

Search, right of, 174.

Secession, 26, 280, 282; opposition to in
South, 26, 40, 43, 45, 68, 120, 1-35,
270, 281, 291; haste in, opposed
by Stephens, 26, 281; from " Se-
cessia," contemplated, 39, 43, 45,
239, 270; of Virginia, 70; influ
enced by expectation of foreign
aid, 79, 289; cause of, 82, S3, 333
(as stated to Europe), 143, l.">2,
277-91, (as given in " farewell "
speeches in U. S. congress, 288);
attitude of England and France to,
112, 143 [see " France " and
"Great Britain"]; pronounced
successful by Roebuck, 187; natu
ral obstacles to the success > f,
195, 274; declared to be a result of
British policy, 237; resulted in
emancipation, 274; compromise
plans proposed (in 1860-61) to pre
vent, 283-284; and coercion, 2^7,
289, 291; due to " anticipated ag
gression " of North, 289, 290, 2<>l;
election of Lincoln a pretext for,
289; from desire to perpetuate
slavery, 289; economic causes "f,
290.

INDEX

303

Secret service, 92, 93.

Seddon, Secretary, 57.

Seward, W. H. ; and Fort Sumter, 68;
firmness and vigilance of, 99, 114,
115, 116, 117, 272; arguments of
against secessionists, 116; -warning
of, against recognition of the
South, 116; asks removal of Con
sul Bunch, 119; views on the Trent
affair, 140; and Russell, 147-148;
views on belligerency, 214; control
of the British Government by,
272; protest of against British pol
icy, 222; England playing " second
fiddle " to, 272; compromise plan
of to prevent secession, 284. [See
" United States."]

Shenandoah, The, 272.

Sinclair, Commander, 94.

Slavery; and Mexico, 71; and Europe,
79; and Lincoln's policy, 82, 111;
the real cause of the war, 83, 278;
European opposition to, 84, 86,
122, 128 [see "Great Britain"];
Yancey, Rost and Mann, on, 122;
" necessary evil " or " necessary
good," 279; justification of, 279,
282; an anachronism, 283; Lin
coln's opposition to extension of,
285.

Slaves; impressment of, 34 (advocated),
245; enlistment of, recommended,
49, 245, 253, 259; bill for emanci
pation and arming, 268; com
plaint that Northern States refused
to recognize slaves as property in
the territories, 283, 288; fugitive
(laws as to), 284, 288.

Slave trade, 29, 32, 81, 109, 110, 224;
and treaties, 87, 109; British oppo
sition to, 159; opposition to re
strictions on, 279.

Slidell, John; private correspondence
of, destroyed, 22; salary as com
missioner to Europe, 92; complaint
against De Leon, 97; sent to
Europe, 125, 130; sketch, 131; in
sists on insufficiency of the " Stone
Fleet," 142; offers Napoleon a
cotton subsidy to break blockade,

151; views on duplicity of Eng
lish statesmen, 160; appointed
special commissioner to Spain, 168,
207; confidence of in Napoleon,
190, 212, 213; encouraged by Na
poleon to build a navy in French
ports, 209; views as to corvettes
building in France, 213; disap
pointment of, 216-217; on causes
of secession, 288. [See " France "
and " Napoleon."]

Sonora; French plans to colonize, 217,
259; contemplated Confederate
emigration to, 259.

South, cause of secession of, 277-291.

Spain; and Mexico, 75, 204; suggested
alliance with, 75, 78, 98, 124, 207;
missions to, 124, 125, 168; attitude
toward the Confederacy, 129, 168,
208; proposed guaranty of Cuba
for recognition by, 184, 207;
sounded on recognition, 190.

Sparrows, Senator, of La., 57.

Speculators, 45, 56, 57, 102, 106, 239.

Spence, of Liverpool, 51, 60, 61, 63,
143, S44.

States, collision of with the Confed
erate Government, 43, 45, 47. [See
" embarrassments and difficulties "
under "Confederate Government."]

Stephens, Alexander H. ; opposed to
hasty secession, 26, 277, 281; his
opinion of the congress, 35; dis
satisfied with administration pol
icy, 40, 44, 48; favors recall of all
European commissioners, 95; desire
of for peace, 227; favors invasion
of Mexico, 257; on cause of South
ern discontent, 277, 278.

Stonewall, The, 218.

St. Paul, Henry, pamphlet of on " Our
Home and Foreign Policy," 202.

Subsidies, requested for steamer lines,
98.

Sumptuary laws, 34, 44, 56, 89, 90.

Sumter, Fort, 69.

Swan, of Tenn., 96.

Supreme court, proposed, 30, 34. 38.

Tariff, 32, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 109, 111.
116, 128, 164 (at Confederat-

3°4

INDEX

ports), 277 et seq. ; not a cause of
secession, 277, 278.

Taxes, 29, 54; on cotton production,
89; difficulty of collecting, 58.

Texas; and Mexico, 76; French designs
as to, 98, 164, 203, 205-206.

Thompson, Jacob; agent to Canada,
14, 17, 18, 225; and proposition to
burn Northern cities, 226; confer
ences with the peace Democrats
of the North, 230.

Thouvenei, 149, 151, 160.

Toombs, Robert, 26, 31, 71, 77, 84, 89,
109, 277, 280, 288.

Transportation, insufficient 56, 57, 102.
[Also, see " Communication."]

Treasury notes, 55.

Trenholm, Secretary, 57, 58, 104.

Trent affair, 126r 136; rise of Confed
erate expectations after, 127, 137,
138; effect of news of in England,
138; friendly adjustment of, 139;
and international law, 140.

Trescot, W. H., 118, 130.

Tucker, Beverly, 103.

United States, The; " anticipated ag
gressions " of, 26, 282, 287, 288,
289, 290, 291; and Mexico, 71, 204,
256; Confederacy willing to ac
cept most existing treaties be
tween foreign powers and, 87,
109, 289; friendship of Russia for,
95,161; British sympathy for, 108;
and the Declaration of Paris, 119;
alliance with advocated, 128, 257;
and the Trent affair, 139; emigra
tion to, from Ireland, 169, 176;
capture of British vessels by, 171;
British fear of war with, 188;
Bright' s opposition to disunion in,
189; friends of in British parlia
ment, 189, 191; Confederate en

couragement of defection End
anarchy in, 220 et seq., 225, 256;
Confederate expectation of re so
lution in, 221; plans to burn
cities in, 226; Confederacy j nd
peace Democrats of, 230; opposi
tion of to intervention, 232; men
tioned as dictating British policy,
233; Palmerston and, 237; accused
of having aggressive designs, 241,
250, 266. [See " Seward."]

Vallandigham, C. L., 221, 230.

Vance, Gov., 45, 227; urges peace,
240, 253.

Vessels, Confederate; the Blanche, 78;
the Alabama, 156; the Alexandra,
170; the JRappahannock, 213; he
Stonewall, 218; the Shenandoift,
272. [See " Navy ".]

Victoria, Queen, 1C8, 127, 138.

Vidaurri, Gen., 77.

Walker, N. S., 79.

Walker, R. J., 173.

Washington, L. Q. C., 23.

West Indies, Confederate agents in,
77, 79.

Wetler, Mr., 52.

Wigfall, of Texas, 35, 39.

Wilkes, Captain, 136, 137, 140.

Williams, John, 214.

Winder, Gen., of Baltimore, 39.

Wright, Gen. Marcus J., 19.

Writ of habeas corpus; suspended, 39
(opposition of Stephens to suspen
sion, 44, 48).

Yancey, B. C., 86.

Yancey, W. L., 31, 36, 54, 85; mission
of to Europe, 87, 108 (arguments,
111), complaints, 120; resignation,
124; views on the blockade, 126;
return of to the South, 127.

Young, Lieut. Bennett H., 235.

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