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FIRST SERIES, NO. 41 JANUARY 15, 1921
UNIVERSITY OF/ IOWA STUDIES
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME VII NUMBER 4
Diplomatic Relations of the United
States with Sweden and Norway
BY
BRYNJOLF J. HOVDE
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY, IOWA CITY
Issued semi-monthly throughout the year. Entered at the post office at Iowa City, Iowa, as second clas
matter. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1 103,
Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on July 3, 1918
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA STUDIES
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
A. M. SCHLESINGEB, Editor
C. M. CASE, Advisory Editor J. VAN DER ZEE, Advisory Editor
VOLUME VII NUMBER 4
Diplomatic Relations of the United
States with Sweden and Norway
1814-1905
BY
BRYNJOLF J. HOVDE, M.A.
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVEBSITY, IOWA CITY
CONTENTS
EDITOR 's INTRODUCTION 5
I. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1814 7
II. TREATIES AND TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 1814 AND 1827.... 18
III. SOME CLAIMS AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 34
IV. RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND AFTER 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY .. .. 69
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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
American diplomatic history has been written very largely
from the standpoint of the relations of the United States with
the great powers of the world. While this emphasis has been a
natural one, it is nevertheless true that, after many years of in
vestigation and writing by historians of our foreign affairs, we
know little or nothing about our relations with the lesser coun
tries of Europe and Asia.
With the hope of breaking a path into this ' ' Dark Continent ' '
of American diplomatic history, Mr. Brynjolf J. Hovde has
undertaken the task of tracing the diplomatic intercourse between
the United States and the kingdoms of Sweden and Norway
during the period of their union from 1814 to 1905 ; and he has
prefaced his study with a brief discussion of these relations prior
to 1814. The presence of great numbers of Scandinavians in the
United States as naturalized citizens renders this monograph of
particular interest, as does also the fact that Sweden was the
first country to offer its friendship to the United States after the
Declaration of Independence without first being solicited.
Although Mr. Hovde 's monograph is based almost entirely
upon American materials, there is no reason to believe that any
essential facts have been overlooked or that any evidence remains
undiscovered that would change materially any of his conclusions.
The manuscript was originally prepared under the direction of
Professor Gilbert Giddings Benjamin, of the Department of
History.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER
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CHAPTER I
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1814
At the time of the American Declaration of Independence
Norway was governed as a province of Denmark, and remained
under Danish domination until May 17, 1814, when she declared
herself an independent kingdom to be governed by a constitu
tional monarchy.1 By the treaty of Kiel, January 14, 1814, the
allied powers had virtually granted Norway to Sweden in return
for assistance against Napoleon,2 and as time wore on, it became
increasingly evident that they would not recognize the complete
independence of Norway. The Norwegian patriots were there
fore glad to accept the offer of Charles John Bernadotte, Crown
Prince of Sweden, to recognize the constitution of Norway on the
condition that that kingdom should submit to a loose union with
Sweden. By the act of November 4, 1814, the union was acknowl
edged by the Norwegian Storthing.3 According to a speech of
the King to the Swedish Rigsdag, perfect equality was to obtain
between the two kingdoms, but this "perfect equality", was,
"nevertheless, not established in practice, as diplomacy and for
eign affairs, as well as the representation of both kingdoms at for
eign courts, remained in the hands of the Swedish Government.
But this was a practice based on no express right, as no such
privilege was granted Sweden by the Act of Union. ' ' 4 Our
relations with Norway were, therefore, prior to 1814 bound up
with our relations with Denmark, and between 1814 and 1905
they were conducted with Sweden and Norway as a unit.
During the American struggle for independence, circum
stances, or to be more specific, the aggressiveness of the English
navy toward neutral commerce, forced the Scandinavian king
doms into an attitude not entirely compatible with the then pre
vailing theory of the divine rights of kings. John Adams in
1 Gjerset, A History of tfie Norwegian People, Vol. II, p. 432.
2 Ibid., p. 415.
3 Ibid., p. 444.
4 Ibid., p. 445.
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8 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
1779 wrote to the President of the American Congress, that the
Powers of the North were not indifferent to or unapprehensive of
the American Revolution, "yet the motive of humbling the pride
of the English, who have endeavored to exercise their domination
even over the northern seas and to render the Danish and Swedish
flag dependent upon theirs, has prevailed over all others, and
they are considered in Europe as having given their testimony
against the English in this war. ' ' 5 The Revolution precipitated
a great naval war, and England immediately sent out privateers,
who captured and brought into English ports neutral merchant
vessels, on the charge that they were contraband of war. Inas
much as there were no rules as to what should be considered con
traband, the depredations of the English navy threatened to
sweep neutral commerce off the seas,6 and created a condition,
which made imperative the banding together of the northern
powers, Russia, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden into an Armed
Neutrality League,7 for the purpose of resisting forcibly any
attempt to prey upon neutral commerce. This coalition was too
powerful to resist, and England wisely refrained from attempting
it. The safety upon the seas thus established had the effect of
ingston, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the United States.
and the Powers of the League. ' t The Norwegian merchant marine
nearly doubled its tonnage during the war, and while the total
export in 1773 was estimated at 1,370,492 riksdaler, it amounted
in 1782 to 2,084,913 riksdaler."8 To quote from John Adams,
"All the Powers of Europe who are called neutral, have felt a
sudden increase of their navigation in the course of the late war,
and the profits they have made have excited a desire to augment
it still further."9
It was probably this desire to establish durable commercial re
lations, more than any spontaneous sentiment of friendship,
although a friendly spirit undoubtedly existed, which prompted
the advances of Gustavus II, King of Sweden, for a treaty of
commerce with the United States in 1782. The only account we
5 Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Vol. Ill,
p. 285.
6 Gjerset, A History of the Norwegian People, Vol. II, p. 361.
7 Copies of the documents creating this league are to be found in , Scott, The Armed
Neutralities of 1780 and 1800, pp. 644 and 652.
8 Gjerset, A History of the Norwegian People, Vol. II, p. 362. The face value of
one riksdaler is one specie daler, or about $1.08.
9 Adams, The Life and Works of John Adams, Vol. VIII, p. 131.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 9
have of the negotiation of this treaty is given very briefly in a
series of four letters from Benjamin Franklin to Robert R. Liv
ingston, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the United States.
As early as June, 1782, five months before the preliminary
articles of the peace treaty with Great Britain were signed, the
Swedish ambassador to France called on Dr. Franklin, and de
sired to know if he was empowered to negotiate a treaty of com
merce with Sweden. Franklin, remembering certain general in
structions, which had been given him, replied in the affirmative.
Upon receiving this information the ambassador seemed very
much pleased, and added "that is was a pleasure to him to think,
and he hoped it would be remembered, that Sweden was the first
Power in Europe, which had voluntarily offered its friendship to
the United States without being solicited. ' ' 10 Before proceeding
with the negotiations of the treaty, however, Franklin applied
to Congress for more specific powers. These were in due time
received, and on the 24th of December, 1782, the full powers of
the framers of the treaty had been exchanged and some confer
ences held.11 The negotiations continued to be conducted in the
same amicable and cordial spirit, in which they had been begun,
and on the 7th of March Franklin was able to inform Livingston
that the treaty had been signed on ' ' Wednesday last. ' ' 12 The
signatories of the treaty were, on the behalf of the United States,
Benjamin Franklin, and, on the behalf of Sweden, Count Gus-
tavus Philip de Creutz. It was not, however, definitely con
cluded until April, 1783. On the 29th of July it was ratified by
Congress, and proclaimed by that body September 25, 1783. 13
The treaty thus entered into consists of a preamble, twenty-
seven articles, and six additional articles. The first article
pledged the high contracting parties to "a firm, inviolable, and
universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship. ' ' Provisions
were inserted guaranteeing to each party the same privileges at
the hands of the other, as were granted to the most favored na
tions. Religious freedom was made the subject of Article V.
Article VI established that the effects of deceased persons might
be inherited by the next of kin, even though he were not a subject
10 Sparks, Franklin's Works, Vol. IX, p. 342.
11 Ibid., p. 460.
12 Ibid., p. 495.
13 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions of the 77. AS', with Foreign Powers, Vol. II, p.
1725.
10 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
of the same country as the deceased.14 The subsequent thirteen
articles determined the course to be pursued in various difficul
ties, which might arise out of a state of war, in which one of the
parties might be involved. Most important of the principles,
which should govern the navigation of the seas in time of war,
was the thesis that "free ships make free goods." To this rule
there was, of course, the exception of contraband, and to obviate
the possibility of conflicting interpretations contraband was de
fined to consist of certain specified articles, such as arms, ammu
nition, matches, saltpetre, sulphur, and "instruments of war for
the use of troops. ' ' The right of search was affirmed, but restric
tions on goods were limited to contraband only, and restrictions
on destination only to ports which were effectively blockaded.
Further articles provided for the protection of vessels belonging
to either party, when driven into the ports of the other by storms ;
for the safeguarding of the interests of either party in the ports
of the other ; and for the liberty of having consuls and agents in
those ports. By a separate article the life of the treaty was
limited to a period of fifteen years from the date of ratification,
and was made renewable at the option of the contracting parties.15
The significance of the treaty is to be found in the two great
principles which it embodied, namely, that "free ships make free
goods", and that there should be a perfect reciprocity in com
merce. The first of these principles, though acceded to by almost
all foreign powers, met opposition in England. ' * Free ships, free
goods" had been the slogan of the Armed Neutrality League,
and though England did not venture to oppose that coalition, she
had never conceded the point, and it had never become a part of
recognized international law.16 The second great principle,
namely, reciprocity, or "balance in trading", was first enunci
ated as the commercial policy of the United States by Mr. Frank
lin, when he was negotiating a commercial treaty with France in
1778. Mr. Franklin wrote, "The great principle ... is a
perfect equality and reciprocity",17 and strove with success to
14 "It was held by the Attorney General in 1819 that Article VI of the treaty be
tween the United States and Sweden of April 3, 1783, in relation to rights of in
heritance, applied to personal property only and not to real estate. His opinion was
formally transmitted to the Swedish government, and is not known ever to have been
questioned." Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, p. 865.
15 The above paragraph is based on the text of the treaty as found in United States
Statutes at Large, Vol. VIII, p. 60.
16 Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. VII, pp. 558-564.
17 Sparks, Franklin's Works, Vol. VIII, p. 239.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 11
have it in corporated in the treaty with Sweden. The treaty
thus "not only contained the most favored nations clause, but
secured to each party the right to import and export all kinds
of merchandise whatsoever. The more important commercial
nations, however, were not yet prepared for such radical
changes. ' ' 18
As has been pointed out, the treaty was to expire in 1798,
fifteen years after the ratification, unless the parties thereto
should be agreed to its renewal. In the United States there was
some sentiment against renewing any of our treaties with Eu
ropean powers. The first president, George Washington, had
but very recently delivered his memorable Farewell Address, con
taining an admonition against "entangling alliances"; and, in
deed, the situation in Europe was not of a nature to encourage
alliances of any sort. John Adams, however, distinguishing be
tween commercial treaties and ' ' entangling alliances ' ', appointed
his son, John Quincy Adams, who had been recently commissioned
minister plenipotentiary at Berlin, to negotiate for the renewal
of the treaty with Sweden.19
Acting under instructions, therefore, Adams approached the
Swedish ambassador to Prussia with regard to the renewal. A
considerable period of time elapsed, and Sweden had not yet
answered the overtures of the United States. This silence Mr.
Adams attributed to the belief entertained in official quarters in
Sweden and Prussia, that the United States had, in the Jay treaty
of 1794, surrendered to the views of Great Britain on the question
of neutral rights.20 Some years before an incident had occurred,
which, without a doubt, influenced to some extent the government
of Sweden in this suspicion. John Quincy Adams relates the in
cident in a letter to the Secretary of State. Count d 'Engestrom,
Swedish ambassador to the court of St. James, had in 1793 deliv
ered to Mr. Pinckney on behalf of Sweden ' ' certain propositions
which he then forwarded to our own Government, the object of
which was a concert for the support of neutral rights. He has
mentioned this fact to me, and added that no answer has ever
been received to those proposals. . . The omission of an
answer, I am confident, was felt, and I fear is still felt by the
18 Thomas Walker Page, "The Early Commercial Policy of the United States,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. X, p. 170.
19 Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. II, pp. 174-5.
20 Ibid., p. 304.
12 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Swedish Government. ' ' 21 The coolness of Sweden toward the
project of renewal became increasingly apparent, and in view of
that fact the treaty was permitted to expire.22
Between 1809 and 1811 American commerce suffered extensive
depredations at the hands of Danish and Norwegian privateers.
This was the period when Napoleon by his continental system
was exerting himself to destroy the trade of his most dangerous
opponent, England, and the autocratic King of Denmark-Norway
was heartily in sympathy with his plans. The loss of the fleet in
the harbor of Copenhagen in 1801 rendered that power impotent
as far as regular naval warfare was concerned, but by fitting out
privateers and small gun-boats it was still capable of making the
surrounding seas uncomfortable for British commerce.23 Priv
ateering became a lucrative business, and when the Berlin and
Milan decrees rendered all commerce with England, whether
neutral or not, subject to seizure by the members of Napoleon's
continental coalition, American vessels immediately began to
experience trouble. One after another they were stopped, and,
after a cursory examination of their papers, haled into a Nor
wegian port, usually Christiansand, there to be tried by a local
court.
In July, 1809, there were twenty-six American merchant ves
sels in Christiansand, and exasperated finally by the delay in the
settlement of their cases, the masters framed a memorial to the
President of the United States, setting forth their grievances.24
The document is characterized by the tone, which might be ex
pected from disappointed and impatient men, and decries in
strong language the "incivilities", which they had experienced
at the hands of civilians and officials. They complain that in
those cases, which had been adjudged, the proceedings were all in
the Danish language, and that no opportunity was given them to
21 Ibid., p. 304.
22 The disinclination of Sweden to renew the treaty was probably, in view of later
events, a source of satisfaction to many American statesmen of the period. In 1801
John Quincy Adams wrote to William Vans Murray, "I am altogether of your opinion
that this northern coalition [the Armed Neutrality League of 1800] contains the seeds
of very baneful weeds, which there may be an attempt to try upon our soil. But in
the north I do not think there is any design to compel our accession to it. The north
of Europe (excepting Denmark) think very little about us, and in my opinion the
longer this inattention continues the better it will be for us. I would rather con
tribute to increase than remove it." Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol.
II, p. 506.
23 Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People, Vol. II, p. 388 ff.
24 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, pp. 329-330.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 13
obtain a translated copy thereof until the case was settled. In all
cases where the lower courts had acquitted a vessel of breach of
the laws of navigation, the privateer had appealed to the High
Court of Admiralty at Christiania ; and where the vessel was pro
nounced guilty, the captain had appealed, thus involving that
every case be carried to the High Court of Admiralty. "The
memorialists beg leave to lament, that in the kingdom of Norway,
the United States have not either a consul or a commercial agent
to whom, in circumstances so novel, unprecedented, and distress
ing, we could apply, either for pecuniary aid, advice or protec
tion." They had therefore appointed Mr. Isaacsen, a Danish
citizen, who had kindly interested himself in their situation, to
act as their representative, and highly recommend him for United
States consul in Norway.
Mr. Isaacsen also directed a letter to the President, in which he
corroborated the grievances, of which the Americans had com
plained in their memorial, and added that he had proposed to the
Danish government that the privateers who had appealed be
ordered to give security for the unnecessary delay, loss and dam
ages derived from it, and that if security were not given, the
vessels be permitted to proceed on their voyages. To this proposal
he had not yet received any reply.25 On the 1st of August, 1809,
the privateers were recalled,26 due, no doubt, to the representa
tions of Mr. Isaacsen and Mr. Saabye, our consul at Copenhagen,
and thereafter the only anticipated difficulty was the settlement
of the cases pending. As it happened, however, the depredations
were renewed in 1810.
On the 19th of September of this same year, 1809, John Quincy
Adams landed at Fleckeroe, Norway, near Christiansand. Mr.
Adams was on his way to Russia, having been commissioned by
President Madison as our ambassador at that court. He was
immediately informed of the plight of the American vessels, and
was implored by their captains to interfere in their behalf. Dur
ing his brief stay in Norway, he busied himself principally with
the case of his countrymen, and had numerous conferences with
Mr. Isaacsen, by whom he was liberally entertained. His official
position as ambassador to Russia, however, prevented tarrying in
Norway, and he was obliged to leave them without having ac-
25 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, p. 331.
26 Ibid., p. 332.
14 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
complished much. While lying at Elsinore with a contrary wind,
he availed himself of the opportunity to visit Copenhagen, hoping
that he might be able to lay the cause of the Americans before
Count Bernstorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But neither
he, nor Mr. Saabye, our consul at that port, were in the city ; the
most he could do, therefore, was to leave certain instructions for
the latter gentleman.27
The United States government was finally aroused to the neces
sity of action, and Mr. George W. Erving was dispatched on a
special mission to Denmark. He arrived at Copenhagen about
June 1, 1811, and was able on the twenty-third to write to the
Secretary of State that, though considerable, the losses suffered
by the American commerce were not so great as had been sup
posed; and that since his arrival privateering had been discon
tinued.28 A subsequent report transmitted statistics on the capt
ure and disposal of American vessels, as compiled by Mr. Isaac-
sen. The following tables have been condensed from the orig
inals.29
CAPTURES IN 1809
Total number captured 36
Released by inferior courts, and not appealed 17
Released by High Court of Admiralty against appeal of
captors 3
Condemned in inferior courts, masters appealed 16
Released by High Court of Admiralty at appeal of masters 8
Condemned by High Court of Admiralty against appeal of
masters 8
CAPTURES IN 1810
Total number captured 36
Cleared in inferior courts, captors appealed 17
Condemned in inferior courts, masters appealed 4
Cleared in inferior courts, no appeal 13
Cleared in High Court of Admiralty 13
Still pending in High Court of Admiralty at time of report.... 8
Captured by the French (Papers in Paris) 2
That the number of actual condemnations was so small, was
due almost entirely to the exertions of Mr. Peter Isaacsen, who in
the course of the events had been appointed United States consul
at Christiansand, thus becoming the first representative of Amer-
27 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. II, pp. 21-25, 34-36.
28 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, p. 521.
29 IMd., pp. 529-530.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 15
lean interests in Norway. Mr. Erving realized what his services
had meant, and praised him generously in a report to the Secre
tary of State, in which he alluded to Mr. Isaacsen 's ' * intrepidity
and independence, and disinterestedness of character, his constant
zeal and industry."30 The special mission of Mr. Erving was
attended by very gratifying results, and effectively stopped all
encroachments by Denmark-Norway upon American commerce.
Between 1783 and 1814 the United States had no official repre
sentative at the court of Sweden, nor did that country have one at
Washington. The project of an exchange of ministers had been
discussed as early as 1783, when Baron de Stael, the Swedish am
bassador to France, expressed to Mr. Franklin the hope that
young Mr. Franklin, grandson of the latter gentleman, might be
appointed to that office, and brought positive assurance from the
King that he would be welcomed.31 In the same month and year,
June 10, 1783, James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson from
Philadelphia, that, "A Swedish gentleman recommended by Dr.
Franklin as a philosopher, and by the Count De Vergennes as an
intended Minister, has been here for some time. ' ' 32 However, it
was not at that time considered wise, or necessary, to accredit a
minister to Sweden, and, as the trade between the two countries
was not of proportions which were liable to involve them in diffi
culties on that score, the matter did not again come up for con
sideration until 1813.
Our relations with Sweden had always been cordial, but the
War of 1812 made the diplomatic situation generally precarious
as regarded those powers which had aligned themselves in hostil
ity to Napoleon. Sweden, however, manifested a desire to remain
on friendly terms with the United States. President Madison, in
his message to Congress, November 4, 1812, announced that
11 Sweden professes sentiments favorable to the existing har
mony. ' ' 33 Mr. R. G. Beasley, commissary of prisoners at Lon
don, wrote to Secretary of State Monroe on December 12, 1812 :
tion. British cruisers are not allowed, within its territories, to
" Those American vessels which have sought shelter in its [the
Swedish government's] ports have experienced perfect protec-
dispose of prizes they make from the United States ; and, in some
30 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, p. 522.
31 Sparks, Franklin's Works, Vol. IX, p. 526.
82 Gilpin, Madison Papers, Vol. I, p. 547.
33 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. I, p. 81.
16 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
instances, the protection of Swedish convoy has been afforded to
American vessels passing through the Sound. Indeed, this cir
cumstance . . . has been mentioned ... by Lord Cas-
tlereagh with no satisfaction. " 34 At the same time, however, as
this amicable disposition was manifesting itself, there was always
present at the court of Sweden an influence of an opposite tend
ency, and no representative of the United States was on the
ground to counteract that influence. The opinion was expressed
by Mr. Beasely that there was considerable dissatisfaction at the
failure of the United States to appoint a minister to Sweden,
and that the fuel of jealousy had been added to the flame of this
dissatisfaction when the United States, in 1811, appointed a
special mission to her rival, Denmark. "The Crown Prince
[Bernadotte] is fond of court splendor, the government is poor,
and, to say nothing of the two great spoliators [France and Eng
land] , the example of Denmark is immediately before it. ' ' 35
In January, 1812, Mr. John Speyer, United States consul at
Stockholm, wrote to Secretary of State Monroe, that the Swedish
government had expressed to him its intention of sending a min
ister to the United States ; and in September, though no intima
tion had been received that the courtesy would be reciprocated,
the appointee, Mr. de Kantzow, left Sweden for America via
England. However, upon hearing nothing further concerning a
minister to Sweden, he spent the winter in London.36 But per
haps the reason, which, more than any other, prompted President
Madison to nominate a minister to Sweden in 1813 was the pos
sibility of obtaining better peace terms from England. England
had but lately rejected the Russian offer of mediation because she
feared a concert between the United States and the northern
powers. The more likely such a concert was, therefore, the better
terms she would be willing to grant her enemy. Among certain
notes of James Monroe on "Views Respecting the Rejection of
the Mediation of Russia" this statement occurs, "The appoint
ment to Sweden intended to conciliate, and bring his [the Swed
ish Crown Prince's] aid in favor of our rights." 37
In view of the above considerations President Madison on May
29, 1813, nominated Jonathan Russell of Rhode Island to be
34 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, p. 619.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, Vol. V, p. 280.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 17
minister plenipotentiary of the United States to Sweden. M The
Senate elected a committee to confer with the President on the
subject of the nomination, but Madison declined the conference
on the ground that it was beneath the dignity of the executive
office to meet with a committee of the Senate.39 That body re
torted by refusing to confirm the nomination, advancing no other
justification for its action than that it was deemed ' ' inexpedient ' '
at that juncture to send a minister to Sweden.40 The Senate was
severely criticized for this obstructionist policy, especially by the
National Intelligencer, and was defended by Rufus King, a mem
ber of the committee, which the President had refused to receive.41
The next year, however, the Senate changed its policy ; and when,
on the same day that he and the other commissioners were nomi
nated by the President to conclude a treaty of peace with Great
Britain, Mr. Russell was for the second time nominated to be
minister to Sweden, his nomination was confirmed by a vote of
sixteen to fourteen.42
38 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, p. 618.
39 Ibid., pp. 619-620.
40 Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 1st sess. (1813-1814), Vol. I, p. 98.
41 King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, Vol. V, pp. 323-337.
42 Updyke, The Diplomacy of the War of 1812, p. 173.
CHAPTER II
TREATIES AND TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN
1814 AND 1827
The basis for an intelligent discussion of our relations with
Sweden and Norway between 1814 and 1827 is an understanding
of the aims and fluctuations of our commercial policy between
those years. The principle of complete reciprocity was, as we
have seen,1 expressed by Benjamin Franklin as early as 1778.
The same principle was incorporated in our treaty with Sweden
of 1783, which restricted the limitations on goods to contraband
only, and made an effective blockade the sole determinant of
destination.2 The fact, however, that England, especially, was
not prepared to advance her policy to this length, together with
the disturbing influence of Napoleon, prevented the normal devel
opment of the principle of reciprocity. In 1815, therefore, even
the United States had abandoned its earlier policy, and, though
still in advance of most nations, had retreated to the proposition
that the trade between two countries should be confined to the
vessels owned in them, and to their produce or manufacture. It
did, however, insist upon the abolition of colonial monopoly, and
here again England was the most obdurate opponent.
Legislation enacted by Congress in 1815 and 1817 had as its
object the ultimate compulsion of other nations to accede to our
policy.3 The outcome, though not due entirely to our measures,
was that Norway and England "went us one better", and de
manded absolute reciprocity. At first the United States were
unwilling to take this further step, but in 1828 a law was passed
which committed them definitely to that principle.4
The commercial treaty of 1816 5 was the first diplomatic trans
action between the United States and Sweden and Norway in the
development of this commercial policy. The two governments
1 Chapter I, p. 10.
2 Chapter I, p. 10, 11.
3 Keiler, American Shipping, Its History and Economic Conditions, p. 49.
4 Bates, American Navigation, p. 432.
5 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. VIII, p. 232.
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DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 19
were mutually anxious to conclude a treaty, though perhaps from
somewhat different motives. The wars immediately preceding
had left the economic resources of both the Scandinavian king
doms in a state of exhaustion, and especially was this true of
Norway. The punitive measures of England against the Danish
fleet had fallen with equal rigor upon the Norwegian shipping ;
crop failures from 1815 to 1818 reduced the people to the point of
starvation ; the fisheries failed ; the lumber trade with England
was falling off ; Denmark was reluctant to sell her grain to Nor
way ; and, to cap the climax of misery, the finances of the country
were in such a condition, that in 1815 bills passed the Storthing,
which in all but phraseology were declarations of bankruptcy.6
The two questions of paramount importance under such circum
stances were the reestablishment of credit and the promotion of
commerce. To a lesser degree the same conditions obtained in
Sweden. When, therefore, the Congress of the United States
adopted the so-called Reciprocity Act of 1815, which by its pro
visions was practically an invitation to foreign countries to enter
into treaty relations with the United States on the principle of
reciprocal liberty of commerce,7 the government of Sweden and
Norway was willing, and even glad, to support their policy.
There is no published account of the negotiation of the treaty
of 1816. It was drawn up at Stockholm by Mr. Jonathan Russell,
our minister plenipotentiary to Sweden and Norway, and the
Count Laurent d'Engestrom, Minister of State and Foreign Af
fairs. The treaty was signed on September 4, 1816, but was not
ratified by the President until May 27, 1818. The ratified treaty
was dispatched to Sweden in the care of Mr. George Washington
Campbell, with instructions that it be delivered into the hands of
Mr. Russell,8 and the ratifications exchanged at Stockholm Sep
tember 25, 1818, on which date, also, the treaty became effective.
In the United States it was proclaimed by the President on De
cember 31, 1818.9
The treaty aimed to establish ' ' reciprocally, commerce between
the two States upon the firm basis of liberal and equitable prin
ciples, equally advantageous to both countries. ' ' With this object
6 Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People, Vol. II, pp. 446-447.
7 Keiler, American Shipping, Its History and Economic Conditions, p. 49.
8 Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. VI, pp. 359-360.
9 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions of the United States with Foreign Powers, Vol.
II, p. 1742.
20 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
in view it stipulated that * ' there shall be between all the territo
ries under the dominion of the United States of America and of
His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway a reciprocal liberty
of commerce, ' ' and continued in force the most favored nations '
clause. It was agreed that no other or higher duties, imposts or
charges whatsoever should be imposed on the importation or
exportation of the produce or manufacture of one country into
the other, than those to which the same articles would be
subjected in each of the two countries, respectively, if these
articles were the growth, produce or manufacture of any other
country. Swedish and Norwegian vessels arriving in ballast,
or importing into the United States the produce or manu
facture of their country, or exporting from the United States
the produce or manufactures of said States, should not be
obliged to pay, either for vessels or cargoes, any other or
higher duties, imposts, or charges whatsoever, than those which
the vessels of the United States would pay in the same circum
stances; and vice versa. The above stipulations were also to
apply to the Swedish colony of St. Bartholomew. By the third
article it was agreed by the King of Sweden and Norway that all
articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the West Indies,
which were permitted to be imported by vessels of Sweden and
Norway, should also be permitted to be imported in vessels of the
United States ; on such imports an increase in duties of ten per
cent should be allowed. To compensate for this privilege the
United States, on their part, in Article IV, made the same agree
ment as regarded the growth, produce, or manufacture of the
countries of the Baltic. These two articles were, however, mani
festly in disagreement with the commercial policy of the admin
istration, which was to reserve the trade of two parties to their
shipping, and to abolish discriminating duties. Nor were they in
harmony with the other plan, namely, complete reciprocity.
"They belong properly to neither system, but form a half-way
term between the two. ' ' 10 And, indeed, when the treaty was
submitted to the Senate for its advice, that body disapproved of
the ratification of those articles.11 The liberty of having consuls
and agents in the ports of the other party was mutually granted,
and their duties and rights defined. Article VI attempted to ob-
10 Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. VI, p. 352.
11 Ibid., p. 359.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 21
viate the possibility of a difference in the interpretation of the
words "growth, produce, or manufacture" by determining that
whatever should be designated as such at the port of clearance,
should be so considered at the port of entry. Herein, however,
the Senate again refused its acquiescence, and the article was
expunged.12 Articles seven, eight, nine, and ten established regu
lations of courtesy and aid to supplement the major principles
which were expounded in the preceding articles. The treaty of
amity and commerce of 1783 was renewed, and the life of the
present treaty limited to a period of eight years from the date of
the exchange of ratifications.
To summarize the significant stipulations of the treaty, Sweden
and Norway agreed to the principles of reciprocity in commerce
as far as concerned the growth, produce, or manufactures of the
two contracting parties. Trade between Sweden and her colony
of St. Bartholomew still remained a monopoly of the mother
country, but American vessels were permitted to trade between,
the United States and that island.
Even before the ratifications were exchanged it seemed to have
become apparent from Mr. Russell's letters to the Department
of State that the government of the United Kingdoms was dis
posed to proceed further than stipulated by the treaty in placing
the commercial intercourse between those countries and the
United States upon a liberal footing.13 Two acts passed by Con
gress in the year 1817 may, to some degree, have influenced that
government in its leaning toward this policy. The motives behind
the passage of the acts were to force other countries into making
treaties similar to the one with Sweden and Norway, and "to
extend the principle of reciprocity. ' ' 14 The Act of January 14,
1817, was .designed to force the opening of colonial and other
ports to American vessels by imposing the prohibitive tax of
$2.00 per ton on vessels coming from those ports.15 The Act of
March 1 of the same year was aimed against countries which
discriminated by refusing to admit goods except when brought
by vessels which were owned in the same country as that in
which the goods originated.16 That the United States were pre-
12 Ibid,
is Ibid., pp. 351-352.
14 Keiler, American Shipping, Its History and Economic Conditions, p. 49.
15 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. Ill, p. 44.
16 Ibid., p. 351; Keiler, American Shipping, Its History and Economic Conditions,
p. 50.
22 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
pared to reciprocate any such liberal action on the part of
Sweden and Norway, is plain from the following extract of a
letter from John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, to Mr.
Eussell, June 22, 1818: "You are authorized to assure the
Swedish government that there is no doubt the same principles
will be adopted with Sweden (as recently adopted with the
Netherlands) upon the same conditions of reciprocity, and that
we are willing to admit Swedish vessels and the merchandise
imported in them into our ports upon an equal footing with our
own, if we can obtain admission upon the same terms for our
vessels and their cargoes in Sweden. ' ' 17 That country, however,
does not seem to have carried its enthusiasm for liberal com
mercial relations beyond the point of theory, for there are no
records of measures intended to bring this theory into practical
operation.
On the contrary, Sweden clung with tenacity to the principle
of maintaining a monopoly in the trade with her colony. It ap
pears that the United States had, about the year 1821, applied
to Sweden for permission to appoint a consul in the island. On
June 26, 1822, Baron De Stackelberg, the minister plenipoten
tiary of Sweden and Norway to the United States, informed Mr.
Adams, that he had received a note from the Count d'Engestrom,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, declaring the determination of the
Swedish government not to admit an American consul to the
island of St. Bartholomew, because it was a colony and because
during the French Revolution a French Consul had proved
troublesome. Adams replied that European governments ex
cluded consuls from their colonies because commerce with them
was interdicted ; that so far from being excluded from St. Bar
tholomew, we actually had treaty rights there; and that con
sults exist to secure those rights. "If", he added, "American
citizens were denied the benefit of an official protection in the
island, why should the people of the island, have the right to the
support of a Swedish consul in the United States?" To this,
Mr. Adams continues, the Baron had little to say.18
As stated above,19 one of the two great problems of Norway
during the first years of the union with Sweden was the rehabil-
17 Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. VI, pp. 351-352.
18 Adams, The Memoirs of John Quvncy Adams, Vol. VI, pp. 32-33.
19 Above, p. 19.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 23
itation of her commerce. Norway, however, was then, as she has
been in more recent years, engaged principally in the carrying
trade of the world. Her merchant marine was ordinarily larger
than necessary for the importation of needed articles and for the
exportation of her own produce. Obviously, then, the logical
commercial policy of Norway would be the opening of the mark
ets of the world to the freest possible competition. Only under
such a system would she be able to increase and find employment
for her shipping; for under the monopolistic plan of England
many wares and many ports would be prohibited to her vessels,
and under the American policy they would be compelled to trade
directly between Norway and the United States.
Only in view of these considerations can we explain the action
of Norway in offering to the United States in 1821 complete
commercial reciprocity. On January 25th of that year the fol
lowing note was delivered to our minister at Stockholm: "By
express order of the King, the undersigned, Minister of State and
Foreign Affairs, has the honor to inform Mr. Hughes, charge
d 'affaires of the United States of North America, that, hereafter,
vessels belonging to the citizens of the United States, as well as
their cargoes, will be subject, in the ports of the Kingdom of
Norway, to no other or higher duties of entry or clearance than
those payable by the national vessels and their cargoes; so that
every sort of distinction between Norwegian and American ves
sels may cease, and that neither the place from which a vessel
arrives, nor the place of her destination, may be any cause of
exception from the general rule. The cargoes may consist of the
production of the soil, or of the industry of such country, what
ever it may be. ' ' 20 The meaning of this document is apparent.
It was a proposition for the abolition of all discriminating
duties, regardless of the nationality of either vessel or cargo, and
for the lifting of all restrictions respecting ports of entry or des
tination. In other words, it was proposed to legalize the prin
ciple, "Let him take who can."
In July of 1821 Baron De Stackelberg inquired of Secretary
of State Adams "if, in view of the commercial regulations now
existing in the United States, the Norwegian commerce will enjoy
in the ports of the said States the same advantages and immuni
ties which have been lately granted in the ports of Norway to
20 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 868.
24 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
the American commerce. ' ' 21 Mr. Adams replied by pointing out
the differences between the ordinance of the Kingdom of Norway
and the Act of Congress of March 3, 1815, those differences being
that by the former the cargoes might consist of the productions
of the soil, or of the industry of any and all countries, without
exception, and without any limitation of time, whereas the latter
proceeded only to the length of repealing discriminating duties
"so far as the same respects the produce or manufacture of the
nation," to which the foreign ships importing them belonged,
and was limited by law to expire January 1, 1824.22 The baron
answered this not very encouraging note on August 16, 1821. He
felt that he should demand a perfect reciprocity on the part of
the United States toward Norwegian commerce, but that, since
the laws of the country did not seem to have given an equivalent
to that which had been granted to American commerce by Nor
way, he would, until a more satisfactory arrangement could be
reached, content himself with officially requiring that the inter
ests which he represented be granted the benefits of the Act of
March 1, 1817, as well as of the Act of March 3, 1815.23 The
Act of March 1, 1817, was more liberal in its provisions than
that of 1815, but Mr. Adams, possibly less from design than
defect of memory, had neglected to mention it in his note to the
Baron. The benefits conceded by the Act of 1815 were the repeal
of discriminating duties ' ' so far as the same respects the produce
or manufacture of the nation to which such foreign ships or
vessels (as import the goods) may belong; such repeal to take
effect in favor of any foreign nation, whenever the President of
the United States shall be satisfied that the discriminating or
countervailing duties of such foreign nation, so far as they oper
ate to the disadvantage of the United States, have been abol
ished."24 The Act of March 1, 1817, stipulated that nothing
whatsoever should be imported into the United States, except in
American vessels, or in vessels which were "truly and wholly"
owned in the country of which their cargoes were the growth,
produce, or manufacture ; ' ' Provided, nevertheless, that this regu
lation shall not extend to the vessels of any foreign nation, which
has not adopted, and which shall not adopt a similar regula-
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 869.
24 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. Ill, p. 224.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 25
tion. ' ' 25 Baron De Stackelberg argued, and obviously not in
correctly, that since American commerce could enter into the
ports of Norway with cargoes of the production of the soil or of
the manufactures of their country, the act of navigation in
question (that of 1815) was reciprocally applicable to the Nor
wegian commerce in the ports of the United States. He also
ventured to propose, officially, that Congress pass a law, whereby
perfect reciprocity, on the principles laid down in the Count
d'Engestrom's note, be established between the two countries." 26
The result was a proclamation by President Monroe, declaring
that Norway had fulfilled the requirements which would entitle
her to the enjoyment of the benefits of the Act of March 3,
1815,27 and a note from the Secretary of State to the Baron,
declaring that without further proceeding she would also be en
titled to the privileges of the Act of March 1, 1817.28
In his annual message, December 3, 1821, President Monroe
called the attention of the legislative body to the policy of Nor
way and the request of that nation for reciprocity. "As this
privilege ' ', he added, * * is not within the scope of the Act of the
3rd of March, 1815, and can only be granted by Congress, and as
it may involve the commercial relations of the United States
with other nations, the subject is submitted to the wisdom of
Congress. " 29 No action was immediately taken on the matter,
and on April 12, 1822, Baron De Stackelberg renewed to the
Secretary of State his application that the President recom
mend the passage of a law of reciprocity. Adams promised to
propose it to the President, but said that "it was not probable
Congress would agree to it, because it would affect unfavorably
our trade with other countries," and suggested that Norway
might revoke the regulation.30 The Baron insisted, however, and
in response to his urgent request the matter was, on May 1, 1822,
made the subject of a special message.31 It was referred to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and there caused no
little concern, until it was learned that the administration was
not particularly interested that Congress should comply with
25 Ibid., p. 344.
26 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 869.
27 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, pp. 96-97.
28 State Papers^ Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 869.
29 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, pp. 102-103.
30 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. V, p. 489.
31 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 868.
26 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
the wishes of Norway. Mr. King, who was a member of the com
mittee, asked Mr. Adams to meet with them, that they might
converse with him upon the subject of the message, but upon
being informed that it had been communicated merely as a
courtesy to the country in question, and not with the hope that
the measure would pass, Mr. King withdrew his request.32 Mr.
Adams's assurance seems to have put the matter definitely at
rest, as there are no records of its ever having been reported by
the committee.
On January 7, 1824, an act was approved by the President
which abolished discriminating duties on tonnage and imports
jfi foreign ships, in so far as they affected vessals belonging
" truly and wholly" to the citizens of certain enumerated coun
tries and North German cities among them Norway.33
Although the effort of Norway to open all trade to free com
petition was doomed to failure, she had to wait only a few years
until her policy gained the support of no less a commercial power
than England. In 1825 Huskisson, the liberal President of the
Board of Trade under Canning, expounded the identical prin
ciples which Norway had championed in 1821, and made prac
tically the same proposal to the United States.34 It was not until
May, 1828, that our government finally committed itself to that
policy,35 but even before the enactment of that law, a new treaty
had been concluded with Sweden and Norway, which embodied
the same principle, namely, the treaty of July 4, 1827. 36
The treaty of 1816 expired by its own limitation on September
25, 1826. The government of Sweden and Norway, as well as that
of the United States, expressed regret that it had not been re
newed, and were anxious to enter into negotiations for another
treaty. Circumstances, however, necessitated a delay of a few
months. The sickness and subsequent death of Mr. Somerville
(our minister to Sweden and Norway), the unavoidable delay in
the arrival of his successor at Stockholm, and "the expectations
that Baron De Stackelberg would have been charged, on the part
of the government of Sweden, with the conduct at Washington of
those negotiations," were contributing factors in the delay.37
32 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. V, pp. 513-514.
33 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. IV, p. 2.
34 Bates, American Navigation, p. 257.
35 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. IV, p. 308.
36 /bid., Vol. VIII, p. 346.
37 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, p. 367.
DIPLOMATIC KELATIONS 27
The King of Sweden and Norway wished the negotiations to
take place at Stockholm, but indicated his earnest desire to have
a new treaty by arbitrarily continuing in force, in the ports of
Sweden and Norway, the provisions of the one recently expired.
Information to that effect was communicated to the Secretary of
State on the 26th of September, the day following the expiration
of the treaty, and simultaneously it was proposed that the Amer
ican government give similar orders in the ports of the United
States in regard to Swedish and Norwegian commerce.38 Ac
cording to the Constitution, however, the President was not
authorized to accord this act of courtesy without the consent of
Congress ; the matter was, therefore, referred to the Committee
on Commerce. Mr. Tomlinson, on behalf of that committee, re
ported to the House of Representatives that in their opinion * ' the
frank and friendly conduct of the King of Sweden and Norway
in this emergency ought to be reciprocated on the part of the
United States, ' ' 39 and presented a bill, whereby Swedish and
Norwegian vessels, and the merchandise imported in them, if the
same were the produce and manufacture of those countries, were
to be exempt from the payment of alien or discriminating duties
of tonnage and impost while negotiations for a new treaty were
pending, and whereby such discriminating duties, as had already
been collected, should be refunded. This bill was acted upon
February 13, 1827,40 and became a law on February 22.41 The
operation of the law was limited in time to the end of the ensuing
session of Congress, as it was thought the treaty would be effec
tive before that time.
Mr. J. J. Appleton was appointed minister of the United
States to Sweden and Norway to succeed Mr. Somerville, and as
soon as Henry Clay, Secretary of State under President Adams,
was informed of his arrival at Stockholm, he forwarded instruc
tions concerning the new treaty.42 Appleton was authorized to
propose the renewal of all the articles of the treaty of 1816, ex
cept numbers three, four, and six, to which the Senate refused
its consent. In lieu, and as entirely superseding the necessity of
them, he was instructed to propose "a stipulation of a more lib-
38 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, pp. 367-368.
39 Ibid., p. 367. Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, Vol. IX (1826-1828),
p. 369.
40 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, Vol. IX (1826-1828), pp. 428-429.
41 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. IV, p. 206.
42 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, pp. 717-718.
28 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
eral and comprehensive character — that is, that whatever can
by law be imported from or exported to any foreign country,
place or possession, including the colonies of either party, in the
vessels of one party, may be in those of the other, the foreign
vessel and her cargo paying no higher or other duties or charges
of any kind than the national vessel." This article would open
the trade, as well between the island of St. Bartholomew and the
ports of the United Kingdoms, as between any other country and
those ports, to the vessels of the United States. This principle
was identical with the proposal of Norway to the United States
in 1821, and was thus made the policy of the administration over
a year before the passage of the Act of 1828.43
The earnestness with which the administration desired this
extension of the principles of unrestricted commerce is evidenced
by the following quotation from Henry Clay's instructions to
Appleton : < ' The President being very anxious to secure the
adoption of the general principle without qualification, and that
it should ultimately be extended to all colonial Powers, you will
oppose the reservation [of the trade with St. Bartholomew] as
long as there is any prospect of your prevailing on the Swedish
government to yield the point. ' ' 44 Even the arguments to be
urged in support of the proposition were enumerated: (1) that
the inconsiderable trade of the colony could render this monopoly
of no importance to Sweden; (2) that Sweden was equally with
the United States interested in the universal adoption of the
general principle; (3) that the uncertainty of continuing to hold
the island, in events of such frequent occurrence in Europe,
should induce her to concur in the introduction of a liberal rule
of permanent duration, not likely to be affected by those events ;
(4) that she would gain more by her example, in her intercourse
with other colonial powers, as well as with those which are with
out colonies, than by contending for the retention of a worthless
monopoly; and (5) that considering the relative amount of com
merce and navigation of the two countries, the United States
manifested a liberality, in the offer of this proposal, which ought
to be reciprocated.45
43 The instructions were dated January 12, 1827.
44 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, p. 718.
45 The Swedish government made two distinct efforts to sell the island of St. Bar
tholomew to the United States. The first approach was made in 1798, when John
Quincy Adams was seeking a renewal at Berlin of the treaty of 1783. Sweden at that
time declared herself willing to part with the island for what it had cost her to main-
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 29
In the event of failure to persuade accession to this broad
principle, Appleton was instructed to direct his efforts toward
the insertion of an article, whereby Sweden should still retain a
monopoly on the trade between the mother country and the col
ony, but which would open the trade of that island with other
parts of the world to American vessels. Even thus restricted the
article would be an advance upon the old treaty, in that our com
merce would not be limited to the direct trade between St. Bar
tholomew and the United States, but could engage in all the
trade of the colony, that between it and the mother country only
excepted. If Sweden should not agree to this extension of the
principles of free trade, a simple renewal of the old treaty was
authorized.
On one other point Clay's instructions were very explicit. It
had come to the notice of the State Department that Swedish,
Norwegian and, recently also, British vessels arriving in distress
on the coasts of Norway and Sweden, were accorded assistance
on more liberal terms than were American vessels. This prac
tice was, of course, in contravention of the principle of equality,
which was the spirit, as well of the old as of the new treaty.
Appleton was directed to investigate the matter, and to guard
definitely in the new instrument against any possible repetition
of this discrimination. He therefore, immediately upon the re
ceipt of this letter, instituted inquiries which resulted in the
revelation that certain inequalities did exist, especially as con
cerned the treatment of American and Swedish ships. The ad
vantage enjoyed by British and Swedish vessels arriving in
distress consisted in the fact that they might avail themselves of
the assistance of smaller and cheaper companies, whereas those
of the United States had to patronize the so-called " Diving and
Saving Company. ' ' In reply to Mr. Appleton 's inquiries it was
argued in Sweden that the large company could better serve the
interests of ships in distress. In the port of Gothenburg there
tain it since it had been ceded to her by France. Adams discouraged the offer, but
the Count d'Engstrom persisted until it was evident that the United States government
did not desire the purchase. (Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. II, pp. 381-
382.) The second attempt occurred in 1845, when the Swedish king was empowered
by the Rigsdag to make the sale. An offer was submitted to Mr. Lay, charge d'affaires
at Stockholm, and by him communicated to the State Department. Secretary of State
Buchanan, however, politely but firmly rejected the offer on the ground "that the
acquisition of distant insular possessions for colonial dependencies, has never been
deemed desirable or expedient by the United States." (Moore, The Works of James
Buchanan, Vol. VI, p. 212.)
30 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
was no evidence that American vessels had been paying higher
duties and charges than the national vessels, but in Stockholm
there existed a considerable discrimination. American vessels, it
was found, were paying higher rates than those of Sweden, and
even more than those of Great Britain, although the difference in
the treatment accorded British and American vessels resulted,
not so much from favoritism, as from the difference in the cost of
freight between England and America. Thus port charges for a
vessel of a hundred Swedish lasts were for a national vessel
$101.07, for a British vessel $110.57, and for an American vessel
$112.34. These discriminations Appleton promised to guard
against.46
The Count of Wetterstedt, Minister of State and Foreign Af
fairs, was empowered to conduct the negotiations on behalf of
Sweden and Norway, and on May 16, 1827, the first conference
was held. Both negotiatiators declared that their governments
wished to place their commerce upon the most liberal footing.
The Count proposed that they start upon the principle that what
ever could be imported into or exported from a foreign country
in the vessels of one party might also be in the vessels of the
other. This proposition was agreeable to Appleton, provided that
the principle applied to St. Bartholomew.47 Wetterstedt inter
posed that the trade with that colony was in reality of a coast
wise nature, which by mutual agreement was reserved to the
ships of each nationality. When Appleton insisted that it could
not be so considered, the Count replied that his authority did not
extend to the point of acceding to that demand, and that he must
lay the matter before the King. It was agreed that they should
each prepare a project embodying the principles which each
party wished to see incorporated into the treaty, and out from
those projects seek to arrive at an agreement.
On only one point in Appleton 's project was there any serious
difference of opinion between the negotiators, namely the aboli
tion of colonial monopoly. True to his instructions, our repre
sentative urged the relinquishment of that monopoly with great
persistence. The treaty, in the form which Appleton proposed,
made separate mention of the island of St. Bartholomew, wher
ever there might be an opportunity of interpreting the stipula-
46 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, pp. 719-721.
47/&id., p. 727.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 31
tions as not extending to it. He also made the trade with the
colony the subject of a special memorandum to the Minister of
State and of Foreign Affairs.48 His efforts were rewarded with
success, and the Swedish Chamber of Commerce, with some re
luctance it is true, agreed to surrender the exclusive monopoly
of the St. Bartholomew trade.
Count Wetterstedt 's project proposed several new articles,
almost all of which were finally admitted into the treaty. He
was very anxious to include an article for the mutual delivery
of deserters from the navy and merchant service of the two coun
tries, and, while Appleton had no instructions on that matter, he
found justification for approving of the provision in one of a
similar nature in a treaty recently concluded by the United
States with Central America. In its original form, however, the
article would have accrued almost solely to the benefit of Sweden
and Norway, and was therefore changed to conform to the prin
ciple of reciprocal advantage.49 Contrary to the broad prin
ciple of unrestricted commerce, which had already been recog
nized in previous articles, Wetterstedt proposed that the importa
tion of salt into Sweden and Norway be confined to national ves
sels. This reservation Appleton strenuously opposed, even to the
extent of making it, too, the subject of a special note. Wetter
stedt thought that, in view of the concessions already granted to
American commerce, it was unreasonable to demand that Swedish
and Norwegian vessels relinquish their monopoly on the article,
which had always guaranteed them a homeward freight. How
ever, when the matter was brought to the attention of the King
and the Chamber of Commerce, they held that the reservation of
salt was not worth the risk of losing the treaty, and the monopoly
was relinquished.50 Wetterstedt 's project contained a clause in
the article governing quarantine regulations, which would have
rendered the whole article a mere useless appendage to the treaty.
The quarantine laws of Norway were more exacting in their re
quirements than the stipulations of the treaty, and, in order that
the force of those laws should not be impaired, the proviso was
48 Ibid., p. 728.
49 Ibid., p. 729. At a subsequent date Denmark claimed the benefits of this article
under the most favored nations clause of her treaty with the United States of 1826.
Attorney General Caleb Cushing, however, held that the privilege contained in the
article had. been bargained and paid for, and consequently could not be claimed on
that ground. Opinions of the Attorneys General, Vol. VI, p. 148.
50 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, p. 729.
32 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
inserted, "That the provisions of this article were not to be
understood as to exempt vessels from the effect of other health
regulations in force in the countries where they arrive." To
obviate the necessity of this proviso, Appleton proposed, and
easily prevailed upon Wetterstedt to agree, that the essential
regulations of the Norwegian laws be adopted in toto by the
article in question.51 By reason of her former possession of
Finland and her peculiarly intimate relations with that part
of the Russian Empire, Sweden had always been especially
favored in the Finnish trade. A separate article was, therefore,
drawn up, by which it was except ed from the general principle
embodied in the treaty proper.52
It will be clear from the above that the treaty secured all the
interests for which Appleton had been instructed to provide.
The principle of reciprocity was recognized by both parties, with
only three exceptions : "1) As regards vessels, the reserve made
by each State of its own coasting trade. 2) As regards vessels
and produce, the reserve made by Sweden and Norway of their
trade with Finland. 3) As regards produce alone, the reserve
made by Sweden and Norway of particular advantage to the
tallow and tallow candles of Russia. ' ' 53 The monopoly on the
trade of St. Bartholomew was relinquished. The inequality of
treatment accorded to Swedish and Norwegian and American
vessels was removed. A great portion of the treaty of 1783 was
reenacted by article seventeen,54 and changed so as to be applic
able to Norway and so as to avoid ambiguity in its interpreta
tion. An article was admitted providing for the mutual delivery
of deserters. The remaining articles differed in nothing material
from those of the recently expired treaty. The new instru
ment was to become effective on the date of the exchange of
ratifications, and was to remain in force for a period of ten
years; but "if before the expiration of the first nine years
neither of the high contracting parties shall have announced,
by an official notification to the other, its intention to arrest
the operation of said treaty, it shall remain binding for one year
51 Ibid., p. 730.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 726.
54 Articles 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, and
25. Separate Articles 1, 2, 4, and 5.
DIPLOMATIC EELATIONS 33
"beyond that time, and so on until the expiration of the twelve
months which will follow a similar notification. ' ' 55
Upon the suggestion of Appleton that it would be an appropri
ate commemoration of the independence of the United States and
the birth of the Prince Royal, the treaty was completed and
signed on July 4, 1827.56 It was ratified by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on January 18,
1828, and proclaimed the following day. Neither of the con
tracting parties have ever intimated a desire to abrogate the
treaty, and its provisions have continued to regulate our com
mercial relations from the date of the exchange of ratifications
to the present time. The dissolution of the union of Sweden
and Norway in 1905 did not affect the life of the treaty, for both
kingdoms pledged themselves to abide by the document.57
55 Article XIX.
56 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. VI, p. 730.
57 Foreign Affairs, 1905, pp. 872-874.
CHAPTER III
SOME CLAIMS AND THEIR SETTLEMENT
Between the years 1816 and 1825 the relations of Sweden
and the United States were disturbed by a claim of indemnity,
which the latter was pressing for spoliations upon American
commerce, claimed to have been committed under Napoleon's
continental policy. The evasion by Sweden of the points at
issue and her manifest reluctance to make reparation for dam
ages, to which she had herself at an earlier date virtually con
fessed, created a condition of irritability, which for some years
affected the intercourse of the two countries. The difference
was ultimately settled to the satisfaction of the injured parties,
but not through diplomatic channels.
Sweden was never wholly in sympathy with the continental
scheme of Napoleon, and during the short period when she could
be classed among the allies of the Emperor of France, she was
at best but a half-hearted ally. The ambitions of the Swedish
king in Pomerania, however, proved a means whereby accession
to that policy could be secured, and by the treaty of Paris,
January 6, 1810, Sweden recognized the continental system
in return for Pomerania and the island of Rugen.1 In his own
home ports the King of Sweden could afford to overlook, and
even to encourage, the breach of Napoleon's regulations, for the
English navy was an effective guarantee against punishment;
but in his Pomeranian possessions the situation was quite dif
ferent, and although the tendency toward a lax enforcement
existed also there, the exposed position of that province to a
land attack rendered obedience a matter of necessity. There
is no indication that American vessels were ever detained, or
their cargoes confiscated, in the ports of Stockholm or Gothen
burg, but in the Pomeranian port of Stralsund important losses
were incurred.
In June, 1810, the Swedish government was directed to
i Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, p. 323.
(34)
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 35
sequestrate certain American vessels at Stralsund in accordance
with the continental system. Obviously there was no choice but
to obey, or lose the newly acquired territory. At the time
when the sequestration occurred, the United States had no
official representative at the court of Sweden, but that govern
ment instructed the American consul at Stockholm, Speyer, to
say that the mandate of the Emperor was highly regretted, and
to ask Sweden to use her good offices to have the order counter
manded and the property of the United States restored. About
the first of August, 1811, the order for sequestration was actually
raised with the consent of France, and the property then passed
into the hands of Sweden. Instead of returning it to its rightful
owners, however, the Swedish officials in Pomerania, at the head
of whom was Baron De Wetterstedt, confiscated and sold it. At
the time when it passed into Swedish hands the property was
evaluated at 192,000 Pomeranian rix-dollars, but its actual value
was considerably in excess of that at which it had been estimated
and sold. The money accruing from the sale was undoubtedly
appropriated by the Swedish government to its own ends. Such,
in short, were the circumstances leading to the claim of the
American citizens for indemnity.2
The owners of the confiscated property immediately took steps
to obtain restitution, as well by private representations, as
through diplomatic channels. They appointed one Ecky to act
as their agent, and while it appears that Baron De Wetterstedt,
the Chancellor of Pomerania, ''invariably admitted with Mr.
Ecky the justice of the claims, and the obligation of the Swedish
government to discharge them." 3 his efforts were for a long time
unsuccessful. The Swedish government would make reparation
for the damage only in certain articles, for which the claimants
could have no use, and for which they could find no sale, such as
iron cannon, cannon balls and saltpeter. These articles the
claimants refused to accept. Simultaneously with their private
negotiations, their cause was being urged by representatives of
the United States government. Before the arrival of our first
minister at Stockholm, however, Consul Speyer accomplished
little beyond collecting valuable data.
On September 3, 1816, Mr. Jonathan Russell, our first minister
2 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, pp. 636-637.
3 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV, p. 424.
36 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
to Sweden and Norway, addressed a note to Count d'Engestrom,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he formally advanced the
claim of the United States for indemnity.4 Basing his account
upon the information of the American legation, he related the
circumstances under which the debt had been incurred, and
contended that these alone should insure the success of the claim.
To remove all doubt of their validity, however, instances were
cited where Swedish authorities had acknowledged that Sweden
was wholly responsible for the confiscation and sale of the
American property at Stralsund. Thus Baron de Wetterstedt
at the time of the confiscation had assured Speyer that Sweden 's
participation in the sequestration was merely to protect the
owners, and that if France would give its consent to the sale of
the property, a just proportion of the proceeds should be re
turned to them. Indeed, the Count d'Engestrom had himself on
August 12, 1811, informed Speyer that "the sequestered property
at Stralsund was then at the sole disposal of his Swedish Ma
jesty. ' ' 5 Nor had the government of Sweden ever attempted
to excuse or defend its action in confiscating the merchandise
by urging that it had been forced into that course by circum
stances other than its own free will. A note from the Count
d'Engestrom to Speyer of May 22, 1813, had, it was true, cast
the blame for the original sequestration upon Napoleon, but it
had not denied the responsibility of Sweden for the ultimate
confiscation and sale, which, in the last analysis, was the funda
mental injustice of which the United States complained. In
deed, so far from defending the action of his country, d'Enge
strom had implied an admission of the claim in the statement
that the King had hoped to be able to indemnify the Americans
from the revenues of Pomerania. The dispute had not, there
fore, been over the question of justice, but over that of practic
ability. Russell further urged, that, while the merchandise
represented a sum, the loss of which was well-night sufficient to
ruin the owners, its value could not for a moment cause embar
rassment to the Swedish treasury. He hoped, therefore, that a
speedy settlement would be made.
The receipt of the note was acknowledged by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs in a brief communication on September the
4 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, pp. 636-637.
5 Quoted by Mr. Russell in his note. Ibid.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 37
sixth, in which he promised to give the subject of the claims his
immediate attention, and to lay the matter before the King.
Other than this formal acknowledgment there was not the slight
est indication of any earnest attempt on the part of the Swedish
government to arrive at any solution of the problem ; in fact, no
further attention was deigned the matter, not even to the extent
of a reply, until the patience of Russell, after a lapse of two
years, became exhausted, and a very vigorous note brought a
realization to the foreign office, that it was necessary, at least,
to abandon a policy of inactivity.
Before submitting this note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Russell wished to prepare him for its arrival. He therefore
availed himself of an audience to broach again the subject of the
claims. The Count d'Engestrom was reluctant to converse on
the matter, but finally admitted himself at fault in delaying a
reply, adding that there had been "a sort of promise to accord
..... an indemnity. " 6 It was clear, however, that it was
the definite policy of the Swedish government to evade as long as
possible the payment of this obligation. Russell, therefore,
hastened to take advantage of the Count's admission that there
had been "a sort of promise," and to interpret it as favorably
as possible to the claims of the United States. Wishing also to
thoroughly arouse the foreign office, he determined to make his
note "strong and rather spirited".
On October 5, 1818, the note was presented. It complained
"that all the representations which have hitherto been made to
the government of Sweden concerning its voluntary seizure and
sale of the ~bona fide property of citizens of the United States, at
Stralsund, in 1811, have not only remained without effect in
obtaining a just indemnity but have not been noticed with the
common courtesy of an answer." Russell interpreted the long
and strange silence of Sweden as merely another, though tacit,
admission of the claim, and pronounced himself authorized, now
that the first and most important question had been settled, to
proceed immediately to the negotiations concerning the amount
of indemnity that Sweden was prepared to pay.7
The note had the desired effect of arousing the government of
that nation to activity, and Russell was directly invited to a
p. 637.
7 Ibid., p. 639.
38 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
conference with the Count. That gentleman had been com
manded to request the minister to dine with the King on the
following day, so that His Majesty might converse with him upon
the matter of the claim. D'Engestrom also begged Russell to
take back with him the note of October 5th, and put it in terms
less harsh. "I dare not present your note to His Majesty", he
said, ' ' and I hope you do not wish to quarrel with us. " 8 Russell,
however, refused to take it back, saying that he considered it
perfectly appropriate to the occasion, and that it might serve
to remind the Swedish government in the future of the lengths
to which it had driven a friendly nation. Instead, he consented
to write an additional note, couched in more moderate terms, as
* * a palliative, in order to prevent consequences more violent than
had originally been contemplated. ' ' 9
On the following day he dined with the king in the company
of the Count d'Engestrom, and immediately after dinner His
Majesty opened the question of the claim. He intimated that
the Swedish government was in possession of information, which
would "palliate, if not justify, the conduct of Sweden in that
transaction. ' ' He also affirmed a sincere desire to indemnify the
American owners of the property at Stralsund, but declared that
he would be able to do so only in military stores. Russell ex
pressed surprise that there could be information, of which he
was not in possession, but was willing candidly to consider any
facts that might be submitted. The Count d'Engestrom was in
structed to acquaint the American government with the full
circumstances of the case, and the interview thus terminated.
On October 27 the "unknown" circumstances connected with
the sale of the property were divulged to Russell ; but, as a matter
of fact, the note was only an attempt to shift the responsibility
onto France. It affirmed that Napoleon had not only ordered
the original sequestration of the merchandise, but had also given
directions how the funds resulting from the sale should be ap
plied, namely toward placing Pomerania in a state of defense
against the English navy.10
Russell replied on December 12 that he had confidently ex
pected "from the conversations with which he had so recently
8 Ibid., p. 638.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 640.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 39
been honored by His Majesty the King, and by his excellency the
Count d'Engestrom, that, whatever objections might have been
entertained to the justice of the American claims, they would, in
this tardy communication, have been distinctly and definitely
stated, and supported by documents of an authoritative and un
impeachable character." In rebuttal of the Count's statement
that the sale of the property was fundamentally a French meas
ure, he cited the note of the French minister to Sweden, which
announced the consent of Napoleon to the termination of the
sequestration on the sole condition that the colonial wares thus
released "should not be introduced into France or into the
States of the Confederation of the Rhine ' '. The confiscation and
final disposal of the property was, therefore, wholly and entirely
an action for which the Swedish government was responsible.
That the proceeds of the sale were not applied, as the Count
d'Engestrom 's note had suggested, on the fortification of Pom-
erania but were paid into the Swedish royal treasury in that
province, was proved, Russell contended, by a communication
from the government of Pomerania to certain merchants of
Stralsund in reply to petition concerning the property, which
they had presented on behalf of themselves and of the American
owners. In closing, he called the attention of the foreign
office to his first note, that of September 3, 1816, and the demands
made therein, "which has hitherto remained without an answer,
and of which his excellency, in his communication just men
tioned, has not taken the slightest notice. ' ' xl
The minister, whose unpleasant task it was to reiterate these
claims, was not the only person to whom the evasions and delays
of Sweden caused annoyance; the American Department of
State also found its patience taxed. John Quincy Adams, Secre
tary of State, expressed himself as follows : ' ' Of all the robberies
which were committed upon the property of the citizens of the
United States by the various governments under the control of
Napoleon at the time of his power, those of the Swedish authori
ties in Pomerania are the most shameless and inexcuseable. For
although the seizures there, as elsewhere, were made at his requi
sition, they were actually released and discharged by his order,
but were still detained and appropriated by the Swedish officers
11 Ibid., pp. 640-644.
40 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
themselves. Mr. Hughes (charge d'affaires during an absence of
Mr. Kussell) has written that he was informed from very re
spectable authority (Baron Rehausen) that, according to the
universal impression, the whole money, proceeding from this
pillage of Americans, went into the private pockets or purses
of Count Engestrb'm, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and of
Baron Wetterstedt, the Chancellor. There has been more shuff
ling and equivocation, too, by the Swedish government in the
discussions upon these claims than by any of the other Govern
ments upon claims of a similar character. ' ' 12 The very grave
accusation here made against the two prominent Swedes is at best
but loosely founded, and would in all probability be very difficult
to substantiate in fact. Certain it is, however, that the inexplic
able reluctance of the Swedish statesmen even to discuss the
claims has in it something not quite candid.
While these communications were being exchanged by the two
governments, the owners of the seized property continued their
efforts to obtain privately the indemnification which they sought.
In this undertaking they received aid and information from the
American government, but the first attempt terminated unsuc
cessfully in the fall of 1817.13 Ultimately, however, the Swedish
government realized that evasion was useless, and made an offer
of indemnification which satisfied the claimants, and thus closed
an unpleasant episode in the relations of the two countries.14
In 1828 the Kingdom of Norway enforced a differential scale
of tonnage dues, against which the United States, by the treaty
of 1827, claimed the benefits of the lowest schedule. By the
Norwegian law the navigation of the world was divided into three
groups, the classification of any vessel entering a Norwegian
port being based entirely upon its clearance papers. The three
groups were : 1) vessels arriving from all European ports, except
those of the Mediterranian ; 2) vessels arriving from Mediter-
ranian ports; 3) vessels not from European ports. Tonnage
dues were collected on the basis of this classification ; vessels from
distant ports were charged the highest rate, while those from
European ports, not on the Mediterranian, enjoyed the advant-
12 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV, p. 424.
13 State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 639.
14 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 301, Annual
Message of President John Quincy Adams, December 6, 1825.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 41
ages of the lowest rate. According to the law, American shipping
was subject to the highest rate. The difference in money value
between the highest and the lowest rates was for vessels laden
78 skillings, and for vessels in ballast 40 skillings per ton.15
Henry Clay, Secretary of State under John Quincy Adams,
claimed for American vessels the benefits of the lowest rate, and
also a refund of duties collected in excess of that rate. He based
the demands of the United States upon Article VIII of the treaty
of 1827, which read as follows: "The two high contracting
parties engage not to impose upon the navigation between their
respective territories, in the vessels of either, any tonnage or
other duties, of any kind or denomination, which shall be higher
or other than those which shall be imposed on every other navi
gation except that which they have reserved to themselves, re
spectively, by the sixth article of the present treaty." The
reservation referred to its coastwise trade.16
To this claim Baron De Stackelberg, the charge d'affaires of
Sweden and Norway at Washington, objected on the ground that
it would secure to American commerce in the ports of Norway
a privilege which was not extended to national vessels. American
vessels arriving from New York were subject to no other or
higher duties of tonnage than were national vessels arriving from
the same port. This just and undiscriminating treatment, as it
was called, would be changed, to the advantage of American and
the disadvantage of Norwegian shipping, by admitting the claims
of the United States government, a condition which would con
flict with the spirit of equality upon which the treaty was based.
Also, it was contended that the words in Article VIII, "every
other navigation", referred solely to another foreign navigation,
so that the vessels of no other nation should be accorded more
advantageous treatment in the ports of either of the parties than
the vessels of the other, and that those words were not applicable
to a purely geographical limitation, with which not only foreign,
but also national vessels were forced to comply.17
Clay replied that it seemed unjust to force a navigation, which
was already contending with the adverse circumstances of a long
voyage, to the additional hardship of an increased tonnage duty.
is One skilling was equal to nine-tenths of a cent, American money.
16 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. VIII, p. 350.
17 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1887, pp. 1050-1051.
42 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The wisdom of such laws was, however, he continued, not a mat
ter of international dispute, but of Norwegian policy. In sup
port of his contention that American vessels were entitled to the
lowest rate of tonnage duties in the ports of Norway, he could
merely repeat the words, "every other navigation", than which
a clearer statement was impossible. No exception was made
other than that of coast-wise navigation. Obviously, then, the
only task remaining was for each government to investigate into
the condition of its laws, with the view to make them conform
to the stipulations of the treaty. In the United States perfect
equality was observed in the treatment of every vessel, regardless
of whence it cleared; in Norway the laws established discrimin
ating duties. Clay met the argument of Baron De Stackelberg,
that the concession of the claim would establish a discrimination
in favor of American at the expense of Norwegian commerce,
with the statement that a very similar condition would have ob
tained in American ports, if the United States had not changed
its laws to conform with the treaty. "The laws of the United
States, if they were to remain unaltered, would also create a
different rule for vessels of Norway from that which is applic
able to the vessels of the United States. But the United States,
always faithful to their national engagements, never fail to ac
commodate their legislation to the obligations which those en
gagements import. ' ' ll8
Clay's argument convinced the Swedish and Norwegian gov
ernment of the correctness of his interpretation of Article VIII,
and of the justice of the American claims. On August 9, 1828,
the Norwegian customs officers were instructed to refund to
American vessels arriving at, or sailing from, their ports the ton
nage dues, which had been collected in excess of the lowest rate.19
On January 1, 1829, Baron De Stackelberg mentioned to the
Secretary of State that Sweden would claim indemnity for an
act committed by an American ship in the harbor of St. Bartholo
mew in 1828. A vessel carrying the flag of Buenos Ayres had
stopped an American vessel on the high seas, and taken property
out of her as. belonging to Spain, with which nation Buenos
Ayres was at war. The privateer had then repaired to the
is Ibid., pp. 1051-1052.
19 Ibid., p. 1053.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 43
harbor of St. Bartholomew, pursued by the American sloop-of-
war Erie, Captain Turner commanding. Captain Turner de
manded of the authorities of the island that the commander and
crew of the privateer be surrendered up to him as piratical ag
gressors on the property of the United States. When this de
mand was refused, the officer summarily cut the vessel out.20
President Adams and Mr. Clay were both agreed that the act
of Captain Turner should be disavowed, but the former was of
the opinion that the disavowal should be accompanied by an
earnest protest against the authorities of the island for harboring
the privateer. Nothing, however, was done during the two re
maining months of President Adams's second term, and the
problem was inherited by Andrew Jackson.21 On January 3,
1833 the President recommended to Congress that the losses in
curred by the Swedish citizens of St. Bartholomew be repaid by
the United States.22
By a treaty concluded with the United States on July 17,
1858, 23 Belgium procured for her line of steamers, in American
ports, exemption from certain dues of tonnage, anchorage,
beaconage and lighthouse, which were regularly charged of all
vessels. On October 2, 1872, 0. Stenersen, Minister of Sweden
and Norway to the United States, presented, on behalf of his
government, a demand that the steamers plying between Norway
and the United States be similarly exempted from the payment
of those dues. The claim was based on the treaty of 1827. The
Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, referred the matter to the
Secretary of the Treasury, who returned the opinion that the
treaty contained ' ' no stipulations authorizing the steamers of the
line aforesaid to claim the privileges which had been granted to
the Belgian line. ' ' Fish, in communicating this decision of the
Secretary of the Treasury, said that if it was considered unjust,
the parties interested might appeal to the courts.24
Sternersen, having transmitted this information to his gov
ernment, received instructions to try once more through diplo-
20 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. VIII, p. 90.
21 Ibid.
"22 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 609.
23 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions of the 77. S. with Foreign Powers, Vol. I,
pp. 69-73.
24 Foreign Relations, 1874, p. 1118.
44 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
matic channels to obtain the acquiescence of the United States.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1874, he directed another note to the
Secretary of State, in which he quoted from Article VIII of the
treaty of 1827,25 and from Article II of the treaty of 1783, which
had been revived by the subsequent instrument, and in which
"The King and United States engage, mutually, not to grant
hereafter any particular favor to other nations in respect to
commerce and navigation, which shall not immediately become
common to the other party. " 26 A clearer implication would,
indeed, be difficult to imagine, and the claim could not with
reason be further disputed.
The subject was again referred to the Secretary of the
Treasury, and on October 13 Stenersen received information from
John L. Cadwalader, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, that his
department was prepared to admit the fairness and reasonable
ness of the claim made by Sweden and Norway, and that the
proper instructions would be issued to the customs officers.27
Before a repayment of the duties already collected in contraven
tion of the treaty agreements could be made, however, the
authorization of Congress was necessary. It developed in the
Senate that between July, 1871, and May, 1873, $6,447.60 had
been collected illegally,28 and on June 19, 1878, an act was ap
proved by President Hayes enabling the Secretary of the Treas
ury to repay tonnage dues which had been collected in contra
vention of treaty provisions.29
On June 26, 1884, President Arthur affixed his signature to an
act, which was destined to form the basis of another claim by
Sweden and Norway for a reduced rate of tonnage dues. Section
XIV of this act30 provided that "in lieu of the tax on tonnage
of thirty cents per ton per annum heretofore imposed by law, a
duty of three cents per ton, not to exceed in the aggregate fifteen
cents per ton in any one year, is hereby imposed at each entry on
all vessels which shall be entered in any port in the United States
from any foreign port or place in North America, Central Amer-
25 Above, p. 41.
20 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. VIII, p. 60.
27 Foreign Relations, 1874, pp. 1120-1121.
28 Senate Reports, 44th Congress, 1st Session, No. 525.
29 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. XX, p. 171.
30 Ibid., Vol. XXIII, pp. 53-60.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 45
ica, the West India Islands, the Bahama Islands, the Bermuda
Islands, or the Sandwich Islands or Newfoundland; and a duty
of six cents per ton, not to exceed thirty cents per ton per annum,
is hereby imposed at each entry upon all vessels which shall be
entered in the United States from any other foreign ports. ' ' Ob
viously there was created here a differential scale of tonnage
duties, one for vessels arriving from a certain geographically
defined zone, and another, twice as great, for vessels arriving
from all other places, the very principle, which Mr. Clay in
1828 had declared to be unfair and discriminatory, when it was
being operated by Norway to the disadvantage of American com
merce.31 This inconsistency was not, however, realized by either
the government of Sweden and Norway or that of the United
States, until the latter had for some time opposed the claim for
the reduced rate.
L. Reuterskiold, Minister of the United Kingdoms at "Washing
ton, broached the claims in a semi-official memorandum dated
June 17, 1885, and followed it up with a formal note on October
4th. The demand was made that by the eighth article of the
treaty of 1827, in which both parties engaged to impose no other
or higher duties of tonnage on the vessels of each other than were
imposed upon "every other navigation", Swedish and Norwegian
ships were, in the ports of the United States, entitled to the three
to fifteen cent rate.32
Due to the importance of the issues raised by the claim, and to
the fact that accession to the demands of all nations, who had
similar treaties with the United States,33 would practically de
stroy the intention of the act ' ' to remove certain burdens on the
American merchant marine, and encourage the American foreign
carrying trade ", the entire subject was submitted
to the judgment of the Attorney General. Other nations had
based their claims to the reduced rate upon the most-favored-
nation clause, whereas Sweden and Norway claimed that rate by
Article VIII of the treaty of 1827, in which the most-favored-
nation clause did not appear. This fact, however, Bayard, then
Secretary of State, overlooked, and communicated to the United
Kingdoms the decision of the Attorney General that a purely
31 Above, pp. 41, 42.
32 Foreign Relations, 1885, pp. 789-790. Dipl. Cor.
33 Similar claims were made by Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Portugal.
46 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
geographical limitation was not a national discrimination, and
that, therefore, the most-favored-nation clause could not be urged
in support of the demand for the lower rate of duties,34 "as
fully covering the points presented in [the] note of the 17th of
June . . . ' ' 35 To this note Mr. Reuterskiold on November
11, 1885, replied that Sweden and Norway did not base their con
tention on the most favored nation clause, but on Article VIII of
the treaty of 1827, and that they could not, therefore, recognize
the decision of the Attorney General as being applicable to their
demands.36 Bayard, however, contended that the United States
States could not recognize the claim of those countries any more
under that article than under the most-favored nation clause.37
This refusal led to a protracted and somewhat heated debate over
the interpretation of Article VIII.
The Swedish and Norwegian government clung to its inter
pretation of the words, "every other navigation", as being abso
lutely incontrovertible. The language employed and the spirit
of the whole treaty forbade, it was urged, the imposition of
limitations. But, granting for the sake of argument, that am
biguity did exist, the claimants contended that the privileges of
the lower rate could still be claimed under the most-favored-
nation clause contained in the second article of the treaty of
1783, for, though the limitations imposed by the Act of 1884 were
geographical, nevertheless the favors inuring from them were
national. Swedish and Norwegian vessels, since they did not
engage extensively in the trade between the enumerated regions
and islands and the ports of the United States, would be largely
subject to the six to thirty cent rate, whereas vessels belonging to
the countries within the favored zone would reap the benefits of
the lower rate. The only inference that could be drawn from a
continued opposition on the part of the United States to the
reasonable demands of the United Kingdoms was, it was urged,
that the Act of 1884 had rendered the treaty ineffective.38
Secretary Bayard replied that if the law had been purposely
designed to evade the provisions of the treaty of 1827, it could
not have been more aptly worded. ' t It favors the flag of Sweden
34 Opinions of the Attorneys General, Vol. XVIII, p. 260.
35 Foreign Relations, 1885, p. 791. Dipl. Cor.
36 Ibid., pp. 791-792.
37 Foreign Relations, 1887, pp 1038-1039. Dipl. Cor.
38 Ibid., pp. 1040-1042.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 47
and Norway, within the defined geographical limits, equally
with that of the United States or of any nation. It creates an
absolute and universal status of navigation, without any national
discrimination whatever." Vessels of Sweden and Norway, ar
riving in American ports from within the established geograph
ical zone, would be equally with those of the United States en
titled to the three to fifteen cent rate, but, the Secretary con
tinued, it was unreasonable to expect that the navigation of the
United Kingdoms should enjoy the privileges of the law without
conforming to its conditions. Furthermore, concurrence in the
demand of Sweden and Norway would give their vessels in the
ports of the United States an advantage in the matter of tonnage
dues, which even American vessels did not enjoy, and "no con
struction that gives Swedish and Norwegian vessels a preference
over our own is rational or admissible, or deducible from the
terms of the treaties." In view of these considerations Bayard
felt himself bound "courteously but positively to reaffirm the
contention of the United States government, that the Act of
1884 was not in violation of treaty obligations.39
It is manifest from the above that the subject of the discussion
in 1886 was analogous to the issues involved in the debate of
1828. In the later instance, however, the defenders of the two
sides had reversed their positions, so that the government of the
United States was then opposing the very principle it had suc
cessfully championed in 1828. Neither of the contestants had
hitherto realized that Sweden and Norway possessed the strong
est possible argument in the form of a precedent ; but on March
9, 1887, a note from Reuterskiold to the Secretary of State en
closed copies of a part of the correspondence which, in 1828, had
been exchanged on the matter of the proper interpretation of
the eighth article of the treaty of 1827. 40 This note immediately
changed the aspect of the situation, and convinced the Secretary
of State that the claims were just.
Believing that the action of Sweden and Norway in 1828
"created an honorable obligation on our part similarly to con
cede to that government the benefit of the treaty which we had
claimed and enjoyed," Secretary Bayard "conferred with the
Secretary of the Treasury with a view to make that benefit im-
39/6t<Z., p. 1046.
40 Ibid., pp. 1049-1053.
48 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
mediately effective."41 C. B. Morton, Commissioner of Naviga
tion, to whom by the rules of the Treasury Department the de
cision in such cases belonged, returned the opinion, that "the
legislation fixing a higher rate of dues being absolute, later than
the treaty, and therefore paramount," there was "no legal au
thority to prescribe the collection of the 3-15 cent rate in the
case of vessels from those countries. ' ' 42 Under these circum
stances the only alternative was an appeal to Congress. The cor
respondence and the report of the Secretary of State were
accordingly submitted by President Cleveland to the House of
Representatives on January 14, 1889. 43 In 1890, and again in
his annual message of December 9, 1891, President Harrison
recommended "the immediate adoption by Congress of the neces
sary legislation to enable this government to apply in the case
of Sweden and Norway the same rule in respect to the levying
of tonnage dues under the treaty of 1827 as was claimed and
secured by this government under the same instrument in
1828. " 44 A bill containing those provisions was finally passed
by the senate on July 6, 1892,45 and referred to the House where
it was submitted to the Committee on Claims,46 and seems never
to have been reported back. In 1892 the matter was again re
ferred to the Commissioner of Navigation, Edward C. O'Brien,
who ruled that the claims of the United Kingdoms were just, and
that there was no authority for denying them the benefits which
our shipping had been granted in their ports, and who, there
fore, issued orders prescribing the three to fifteen cent rate for
all vessels entering American ports from Sweden and Norway.47
41 House Executive Documents, 50th Congress, 2d Session (1888-1889), No. 74,
p. 5. Also Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, pp. 293-294.
42 House Executive Documents, 50th Congress, 2d Session (1888-1889), No. 74,
pp. 50-51.
43 Ibid., pp. 1-93.
44 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IX, pp. 59-60; 186.
45 Congressional Record, Vol. XXIII, Part 6, p. 5796.
46 Ibid., p. 5848
47 Bates, American Navigation, p. 297.
CHAPTER IV
RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND
AFTER
The outbreak of the Civil War in the United States created a
tense atmosphere in our relations with foreign countries. The
blockade of the southern ports was likely to give rise to many
embarrassing and delicate situations unless very effectively estab
lished; the removal from the commercial field of such staple
articles as tobacco and cotton was not calculated to meet with the
pleasure and approval of European consumers ; and in addition,
there was known to exist among certain classes, especially in
England and France, a sympathy for the cause of the Confed
erates, which was better traceable to jealousy of a united Amer
ica than than to an approval of their political and social institu
tions. The efforts of Jefferson Davis to obtain recognition for
the government of the seceding states caused President Lincoln
and Secretary of State Seward no little concern, therefore, and
the activities of the Confederate commissioners, Mason and
Slidell, in England and France respectively were watched with
anxiety.
It was England, however, which was the key to the whole situa
tion, as her course would practically determine that of France.
"The field of contest for southern and northern diplomacy was
practically confined to Great Britain. Of the European Powers,
Russia, Germany, Italy, and Denmark were friendly to the
North, but the last two were not substantially important. ' ' x
The latter part of this statement holds good of Sweden and Nor
way also; they, too, were friendly, but not "substantially im
portant. ' '
From the very beginning of the war the United Kingdoms
maintained a definitely pro-northern attitude. Several forces
contributed toward this sentiment. In the first place the very
name of slavery was abhorrent to all Scandinavians. Bonded
labor had been unknown since the days of their Viking fore-
i Fish, American Diplomacy, p. 313.
(49)
50 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
fathers. In Norway the nobility had been abolished as being an
institution, not of national growth, but of foreign importation;
and, though Sweden had not proceded to this length her sturdy
and independent peasantry were proverbially susceptible to ap
peals in the name of freedom. Since 1848 the socialistic doc
trines of German and French reformers had been spreading in
Sweden and Norway despite the rigorous efforts of the govern
ment to suppress them. The laboring classes, therefore, saw in
the Civil "War a struggle to make free labor honorable, and
aligned themselves unreservedly on the side of the Union arms.
Then, too, the emigration from the United Kingdoms, which had
assumed proportions truly alarming to that government, was
almost entirely to the northern States. The "America-letters,"
which were constantly coming to the common people of Sweden
and Norway from their relatives in Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota and
Wisconsin, formed a link of sympathy with the cause of freedom
and union, which had in it an element of the personal.2
The dispatches of our ministers plenipotentiary to Sweden and
Norway are consistently optimistic in regard to the attitude of
the two Scandinavian peoples. Count Manderstrom, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, on June 14, 1861, upon welcoming Jacob S.
Haldeman as the representative of the United States, referred to
the condition of affairs in his country, "and expressed himself
strongly in favor of our government." 3 Again on July 4, 1861,
Haldeman wrote that : ' i The public voice of this nation, repre
sented by a free press, is clearly and emphatically in favor of my
government, and view secession as a causeless rebellion, which
ought to be suppressed by the strong arm of military law. ' ' 4
In the same year the Swedish and Norwegian government had
occasion to appoint a new minister to the United States. Out of
respect for the American government and as proof of the good
wishes of the two Scandinavian peoples, Count Edward Piper
was appointed to that position. This personage was "one of the
first noblemen in Sweden, with a thorough English education and
manners," and was therefore exceptionally well qualified.5 His
appointment was received in Washington with gratification, and
was considered as an earnest of the favorable disposition of the
2 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, Part I, p. 397.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 399.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 51
United Kingdoms toward the Union cause. The State Depart
ment was careful to accord the Count Piper a flattering welcome,
a fact which received very favorable mention in the Swedish
press.6
In Sweden, as in other European States, numbers of profes
sional military men sought permission to enlist in the armies of
the United States, among them two experienced military engi
neers. Haldeman, to whom these men applied for information,
replied that he had no instructions on the subject, and could,
therefore, make no promises or arrangements. He informed Sec
retary Seward of the petitions, and received the reply that, how
ever gratifying it was to observe the willingness of "military
gentlemen of talent and experience in Sweden, as in other neutral
nations, to enter the army of the United States," it would be
impossible to accept all who would come, for it was unknown
how many were coming, and at the same time the extraordinary
ardor of the northern youth furnished more candidates than they
had places for. However, Seward would be happy to recommend
any the government of Sweden might desire the United States
to accept.7 Eventually several Swedes obtained admission to
the army of the North, among them Baron Feysach and Lieu
tenant Anderson, who fought with gallantry wherever they were
engaged.8
On November 8, 1861, Captain Wilkes, commanding the Amer
ican man-of-war San Jacinto, intercepted the British vessel
Trent, and arrested the Confederate commissioners, Mason and
Sliddell. This action on the high seas evoked a storm of protest
from England, although equally as high-handed proceedings had
previously been engaged in by that power, and for a time our
relations with her were very precariously balanced. News of the
arrest caused the greatest excitement, not only in Washington
and London, but in all European courts. The usually quiet
city of Stockholm was stirred to expectancy, and American af
fairs were regarded with an all-absorbing interest. The Minister
of Foreign Affairs, upon receiving a telegram conveying the in
formation, sent it to Haldeman "with a note, expressing strong
doubts of its truth," as it had come through English channels.
When subsequent telegrams corroborated the first one and there
6 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, p. 781.
7 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, Part I, pp. 399-400.
& Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part III, p. 197.
52 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
could be no longer any room for doubt, the opinion was gen
erally expressed that the action of Captain Wilkes was in viola
tion of international law and a casus belli unless disavowed.
The violent temper of the French press was perhaps to some de
gree influential in determining the attitude of the Scandinavian
press. Nevertheless, "the American side of the question was
taken by one of the most influential papers, and discussed with
great vigor and ability. ' ' The peaceable settlement, and the can
did course pursued by our government in disavowing the seizure,
were regarded in Sweden and Norway with universal satisfac
tion.9
The battle between the Monitor and the Merrimac, March 9,
1862, the significance of which was recognized everywhere, cre
ated an uproar of excitement and exultation in Sweden. Indeed,
that nation felt that it had made a very personal contribution to
the supremacy of the northern navy, inasmuch as both the in
ventor of the Monitor and the inventor of her guns were of Swed
ish stock.10 Captain John Ericsson, who is credited with the
distinction of having perfected the type of vessels known as
monitors, was born and educated in Stockholm. Captain Dahl-
gren, a distinguished ordnance officer in the American navy, who
had invented the type of cannon with which the Monitor was
armed, was the son of a Swedish consul in Philadelphia.11 These
two circumstances contributed to make the Swedes regard the
defeat of the Merrimac as almost a victory for their own nation ;
and this feeling in turn strengthened the bond of sympathy for
the Union cause.
The danger of intervention by Great Britain and France in
favor of the Confederate arms was, during the first two years
of the war, the chief concern of the Department of State. From
the first, Napoleon III manifested his desire to intervene, a de
sire which could be held in check only by England. The position
of the Emperor of France was never doubtful, but Seward real
ized that England was the keystone of the neutral arch, and
directed his chief efforts toward retaining the good will of that
power. A crisis in the struggle against foreign intervention oc
curred in the summer of 1862 when Palmerston, Prime Minister
of England, declared himself in favor of intervention. The dan-
9 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, p. 781.
10 Ibid., p. 782.
11 Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. II, pp. 53-54.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 53
ger was, however, averted by the efforts of our ambassador,
Charles Francis Adams, and by members of the British cabinet.
In October of the same year Napoleon proposed to Russia and
England that the three Powers offer their mediation, but his pro
posal was promptly refused by both.12 While the danger was
imminent, Congress passed resolutions, declaring that the United
States would brook no interference by European powers in its
purely domestic affairs; and copies of these resolutions were
transmitted to all governments, that of Sweden and Norway in
cluded. There had never existed any doubt of the amicable in
tentions of these peoples, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs
embraced the opportunuity to assure the government of the
United States that Sweden and Norway had "no disposition, in
clination or intention to join France, or any other nation, in an
offer of mediation, unsolicited ; that [they] considered the advice
or proposal of the Emperor of France ill-timed and unneces
sary."13
As a testimonial of the friendly relations obtaining between
the two governments several small acts of courtesy were inter
changed. President Lincoln, in 1863, as an earnest of his appre
ciation of the friendship, presented the King of Sweden and
Norway with a case of pistols. They were of superior quality
and elaborately ornamented. Their mechanism was revolving
and of the Colt type. The gift was peculiarly appropriate be
cause the King, Charles XV, took great interest in military af
fairs and in weapons of warfare. The pistols were presented by
Haldeman, and the King, in expressing his pleasure over the gift
and the sentiments which prompted the giver, enunciated his
desire for ' ' a speedy and happy conclusion of our desolating civil
war. " 14 In 1864 the United States steamer Wachusett, with
varioloid, a disease resembling small-pox, "on board, was forced
to touch at the island of St. Bartholomew for supplies. In spite
of the dangers of contagion, every facility was afforded the vessel
by the officials of the island to procure the necessary supplies.
For this act of courtesy the United States minister at Stockholm
was instructed to convey the gratitude of his government.15 In
the same year a Swedish naval officer requested, and easily ob-
12 Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. IV, pp. 346-347.
13 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part II, pp. 1312-1313.
14 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part II, pp. 1312; 1315-1316.
15 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part III, pp. 188; 190-191.
54 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
tained permission to take passage in one of our monitors to New
Orleans, for the purpose of enabling him to make a report upon
its construction and qualities, as Sweden was at that time build
ing three monitors after the American model. This favor was
duly appreciated by the Swedish government, and its gratitude
conveyed to the United States through diplomatic agents.16
These acts of reciprocal friendship are not here mentioned as be
ing in themselves of monumental of epochal importance, but
because they are incidents in a series of such acts which have ren
dered the relations of the United States and Sweden and Norway
almost proverbially amicable.
Jefferson Davis not only sent out commissioners to persuade
European governments to recognize the Confederate States, but
dispatched agents to buy vessels and enter into contracts for the
construction of new ones. Such transactions were, of course, in
contravention of the law of nations, and could be engaged in
only under cover of secrecy. The fact, however, that some of the
powers of Europe were not disinclined to shelter the agents and
their operations, made it necessary for every representative of
the United States abroad to observe the utmost vigilance lest any
such illegal transaction escape their notice. It was reasonable to
suppose that maritime nations, such as Sweden and Norway,
would be especially favorable ground for the negotiations of
Confederate agents; therefore the correspondence between the
Secretary of State and the United States minister, covering the
period of the Civil War, deals largely with suspicions, admoni
tions and assurances on the subject of insurgent commissioners.
On May 22, 1861, Angel assured Secretary Seward that the neu
trality laws of Sweden were very strict, and that he was con
fident that none of the ports of that kingdom nor of Norway,
would ' * be prostituted to the wicked purpose of fitting out priva
teers."17 The same assurance was repeated by Haldeman on
July 4th,18 shortly after he had succeeded Angel. In November,
1862, Seward was warned by Leas, late consul of the United
States at Stockholm, that a number of Confederate agents had
passed through Hamburg on their way to Denmark and Sweden.
He surmised that their object in the latter country was the pur
chase of cannon, which were manufactured there in considerable
p. 187.
17 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, Part 1, p. 395.
p. 397.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 55
quantities. The Secretary of State immediately notified Halde-
man to be on his guard, and to use every lawful means to frus
trate their sinister efforts. That gentleman after having made a
thorough investigation assured the Secretary, that the agents,
which were known to be active in Hamburg, had not visited
Sweden, and that his " arrangements " were such that activities
in the United Kingdoms, of the nature described, could not fail
to attract his attention. He did not anticipate that the Swedes
would willingly sell cannon to the insurgents, for : ' ' The cannon
foundries of Sweden, while large and justly celebrated as the
best in Europe, are few in number and well known; they are
now, and have been for ten years past, engaged to their full
capacity (after this government has received her annual supply)
on contracts for the governments of France, Belgium, and Italy ;
besides, the Swedes do not expect large profits, neither will they
take large risks. ' ' 19
In 1863 a similar incident occurred. During the Polish revo
lution of that year, with which Sweden and Norway were very
much in sympathy, the British vessel Ward Jackson, with Polish
insurgents on board, was driven into Malmo, Sweden, by a Rus
sian cruiser. Upon the claim of one Mr. Joseph Spence and his
partners, owners of the vessel, it was delivered up to them.
Meanwhile the State Department had been apprised that Spence
had come to Sweden "with the surmised object of purchasing
armament . . . for vessels being built in England for Con
federate service." Haldeman, upon receiving instructions, con
ferred with Count Manderstrom on the matter. The latter
thought the suspicions of the State Department were unfounded
inasmuch as the gentleman in question was in Sweden on account
of the Ward Jackson ; but he promised to act upon information,
or sufficient suspicion. More substantial information, however,
was not forthcoming, and the subject was not again considered.20
The suspicions of the United States government were again
aroused in 1864. B. F. Tefft, ex-consul of the United States at
Stockholm, wrote to the Assistant Secretary of State that in all
probability the rebels would next "turn their attention to
Sweden for the purpose of supplying themselves with war ves
sels and other armaments," and suggested the employment in
19 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part II, pp. 1312-1313.
20 Ibid., pp. 1315-1317.
56 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
that country of a special detective agent to frustrate such at
tempts. Haldeman, upon receiving this information, replied
that, however well founded Mr. Tefft 's fears might be, he deemed
it unnecessary and unwise to employ a special detective. "The
Scandinavians," he wrote, "are warm friends of our govern
ment, our institutions, and the Union; we have had their sym
pathy from the first, and have it now. They are intensely hostile
to slavery in every form and name — under every disguise ; and
I wish to do no act expressive of unnecessary distrust, unless
absolutely required. ' ' 21 The absence of Confederate agents in
Sweden and Norway was corroborated by dispatches from James
H. Campbell, Haldeman 's successor.22 There appears to be no
record of a single transfer of vessel or armament to the Confed
erates by any citizen of the United Kingdoms.
As the war continued, and no decisive victory was won by the
North, a feeling of scepticism concerning the ability of the free
states to triumph in the struggle became evident in the Scandi
navian countries. On September 19, 1864, Campbell had an
interview with Count Manderstrom, in the course of which the
latter inquired what influence upon the Union cause the capture
of Atlanta would have. Upon being assured by Campbell that
it would have a "very material influence," Manderstrom ex
pressed some doubt, and remarked that both sides seemed equally
confident.23 The news of the reelection of Lincoln in 1864 was
received with a degree of surprise in certain quarters. Campbell
writes that : "It was not what the ' governing classes ' expected
or desired. They preserve * friendly relations, ' but would prefer
the dismemberment of a power jealously regarded as too great,
and the success of the aristocratic rebellion. ' ' 24 The ' ' governing
classes" were noblemen, aristocrats and landowners, and it is
not strange, therefore, that they felt their institutions to be chal
lenged by the bourgeois armies of the North. This was more
true of Sweden than of Norway. The mass of the people, how
ever, the artisans and laborers, were enthusiastic in their appro
bation of the principles of liberalism, for which those armies
fought.
The news of Lee's surrender was hailed with joyful acclama-
21 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, Part. IV, p. 359.
22 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part III, pp. 187; 193.
23 Ibid., p. 184.
24 Ibid., p. 188.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 57
tion by all factions in the Scandinavian countries. To the com
mon people it meant cheaper cotton and tobacco, as well as a vic
tory of right over wrong; to the merchants it meant profitable
trade ; and to the governing classes it meant restoration of order.
The reopening of the southern ports was announced to the gov
ernment of Sweden and Norway on September 25, 1865, at which
Count Manderstrom expressed His Majesty's pleasure, as "the
disturbances in the United States had been severely felt in
Sweden by diminishing the export of iron, and reducing the re
ceipt of cotton, as well as in the high price of tobacco. . ."
The Count ended by extending congratulations * ' upon the resto
ration of authority in and through the national domain. ' ' 25
The assassination of President Lincoln was contemplated in
Sweden and Norway with a shudder of horror. All classes,
nobles and peasants, financiers and laborers, felt that the murder
was not only the cowardly assault of a craven upon the life of a
good man, but a direct blow at law, order, and the institutions
of freedom. King Charles XV commissioned Count Axel Cron-
hielm, an officer of the royal staff, to present in person to the
American legation the condolences of His Majesty. In some
ports flags were lowered to half mast. The Court had worn
mourning for several members of European royal houses that
winter, "but in no instance," writes Mr. Campbell, "have I ob
served a popular tribute comparable with this. ' ' Several Swed
ish officers, who had fought in the Union armies, came in person
to the legation to express their sorrow at the death of their for
mer commander-in-chief.26 The press was full of praise for
President Lincoln and the principles for which he stood. A
prominent Stockholm paper under date of April 27, 1865, con
tained the following tribute: "Abraham Lincoln was struck by
the assassin's bullet — he who, during the war, the whole world
was looking up to as the true symbol of that great idea, the aboli
tion of slavery, the established fact of universal freedom, and
that free labor is honorable : he should be sacrificed when these
sublime thoughts were almost realized. It is a beautiful
death. . . " 27 In Norway Henrik Ibsen in his poem, ' ' The
Murder of Abraham Lincoln," paid tribute to the martyr, and
in the same breath inquired of Europe by what right she went
25 Ibid., pp. 204-205
26 Ibid., p. 197.
27 Ibid., Part IV, p. 549.
58 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
into mourning for a son of freedom, she who still had the red
blood of Poland and Denmark on her hands.28 The Swedish and
Norwegian government also expressed its sympathy with that of
the United States through its representative at Washington, the
Baron N. W. De Wetterstedt.29
While the United States were engaged in civil strife, Napoleon
III availed himself of the opportunity to inaugurate a French
colonial empire in Mexico. The Austrian Archduke Maximilian
was made Emperor of Mexico, and, with the aid of French
troops, defeated the republicans. These proceedings were in vio
lation of the Monroe Doctrine, but President Lincoln was not at
that moment in a position to threaten active interference, and
contented himself with maintaining a policy of neutrality in the
struggle between the republicans and Maximilian. The United
States, however, did not recognize an emperor in Mexico, and
protested to the Austrian and the French government against the
introduction into this hemisphere of institutions inimical to our
own. When Maximilian had established a throne for himself, he
sent representatives to the various governments of Europe to
petition for recognition.
Coincident with this petition the United Kingdoms found it
necessary to appoint a minister to the United States to succeed
Count Piper, and the choice fell upon the Baron Nils W. DeWet-
terstedt. This appointment was entirely acceptable to the Amer
ican government, and Mr. Campbell was instructed to express its
pleasure, and to extend its welcome. Shortly afterwards, how
ever, in November, 1864, and before DeWetterstedt had departed
from Sweden, the Department of State was apprised of the fact
that it was purposed to send the Baron to Mexico before he pre
sented his credentials at Washington. The object was to recog
nize the Emperor of Mexico.
Recognition had been foreshadowed in September, when Halde-
man was relieved by Campbell. At a dinner given by the Min
ister of Foreign Affairs in honor of the two American gentlemen,
Mora, the representative of the newly established Empire of
Mexico, was also present, and shared "the various honors which
Swedish etiquette permits upon such occasions. ' ' 30
Mr. Campbell was accordingly instructed to inform the Min-
28 Ibsen, Digte, pp. 134-137.
29 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part IV, pp. 546-547.
so Ibid., Part. Ill, p. 185.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 59
ister of Foreign Affairs that the proposed visit of De Wetterstedt
was "for obvious reasons, far from satisfactory to this govern
ment, and that if it should not prevent [his] official reception
here, it would certainly make him less welcome." 31 The "obvi
ous reasons" were, of course, that the United States did not
themselves recognize the imperial government of Mexico, and
could not, therefore, view with complacency its admission to
relations with other powers. It would be particularly aggravat
ing if such recognition were made through the agency of an offi
cial who was already delegated to be a minister to the United
States.
Count Manderstrom argued, that, as DeWetterstedt had not
yet been officially received in Washington, he could not properly
be termed the minister to the United States while on this errand.
Mr. Campbell, however, maintained "that the note of his ex
cellency, on file in the Department of State at Washington,
announcing the diplomatic trust confided to the Baron Wetter
stedt, and the reply of welcome on the part of the United States,
certainly established inchoate relations in the contemplation of
both governments. ' ' 32 Manderstrom assured Campbell that no
disrespect was meant to the United States; that it was simply a
matter of economy; and that, as he had been given to under
stand, Russia had directed her representative at Washington to
proceed to Mexico on a similar errand. This information, how
ever, proved to be unfounded.33 It was further argued that the
United States could hardly object with justice to the recognition
of Maximilian by Sweden and Norway, inasmuch as he had ap
plied for and received recognition from "most of the Powers of
Europe," and the United Kingdoms were therefore merely fol
lowing the example of their neighbors. Furthermore it had been
inexpedient "to maintain relations with Mexico in her former
condition," whereas "the empire was now the only government
in that country. ' ' 34
Campbell replied that his instructions limited him to object, at
that time, only to the recognition of the Emperor of Mexico
through the intended minister to the United States, and not to
recognition as such. He maintained, however, that since the
31 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, Part IV, p. 348
32 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, Part III, p. 189.
33 Ibid., p. 191.
34 Ibid., p. 189
60 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
American government continued its relations only with the Mex
ican republic, and since it had consistently been the policy of
that government to discourage the introduction of monarchical
and imperial institutions into the Americas, it could obviously
view only with disapprobation the admission of the Emperor to
official relations with other nations.35 In the face of such urgent
protest it was not held to be wise to insist on the original ar
rangement. The project of sending the Baron De Wetterstedt
to Mexico was, therefore, abandoned.
Kussia has long suffered the chronic dislike of Sweden and
Norway. The seizure of Finland in 1809 earned for the Czar
the lasting enmity of Sweden, and, because of the well-known
desire of Eussia for an ice-free port, the two Scandinavian coun
tries lived in constant fear of aggression by way of Norwegian
Finmarken to the northwest coast of Norway. This apprehen
sion of invasion was particularly acute during, and immediately
following, the years of our own Civil War.36 Czar Nicholas I
demanded that Russian Finns be permitted to fish on the coast of
Norway, and that a district along the Varangerf jord be ceded
to them in return for the right of Norwegian Fins to graze their
reindeer in Eussia. When this demand was refused, a policy of
exclusion was inaugurated by both governments, which created a
very tense situation.
The United States had always maintained very friendly rela
tions with Eussia, and at this time our intercourse with that
Power was more cordial than at any previous time. The sale of
Alaska to the United States and the warm welcome accorded to
the American squadron, which visited St. Petersburg in 1866,
were evidences of this friendship. It is not strange, therefore,
that the more excitable elements in Sweden and Norway, living
under the fear of impending disaster, should interpret these
proofs of amity as being dangerous to their safety. During a
meeting of the Swedish Eigsdag in 1867, Baron Eabb, a member
of the upper chamber, directed this inquiry to Count Mander-
strom : ' ' Has the sudden friendship between Eussia and Amer
ica anything menacing in it?" The minister replied that the
Foreign Office was not of the opinion that any alliance existed
between the United States and Eussia, especially since the Eus-
36 Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People, Vol. II, pp. 516-517.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 61
sian Foreign Minister had publicly denied rumors to that effect,
but admitted that if an offensive agreement should be formed
against the United Kingdoms, or the nations with which they
were allied, their "security would be diminished by it in rather
a considerable degree."37
In June, 1867, Joseph J. Bartlett relieved Campbell as min
ister to Sweden and Norway, and during a vacation in the sum
mer of 1868 he journeyed into the north of Sweden to see the
country, and especially the midnight sun. On his return he
traveled through the heart of the Scandinavian peninsula. The
public journals at first attributed his journey to a friendly in
terest in the country but a few weeks later a different motive was
thought to have been discovered. An inland newspaper pub
lished a full account of Mr. Bartlett 's travels, and added that he
had advised his government "that in order to make the alliance
between the United States and Russia more effective in case of
war, it was absolutely necessary that Russia should have the
ports on the northwest coast of Norway." Another journal
argued that "the Emperor of all the Russias did not cede the
open ports of Russian America to the United States without hav
ing in return a bond securing to him their assistance to get ice-
free ports on the Norwegian coasts. ' ' 38
Bartlett at first paid no attention to these attacks, but upon
viewing the avidity with which they were read and upon consid
ering heir baneful effects upon the relations of the two govern
ments, he brought the matter to the notice of the Foreign Office,
by which the rumors were on the following day officially denied.39
Between 1879 and 1890 a number of minor problems of immi
gration were settled by the two governments through their diplo
matic agents. The first of these was the question of restricting
the emigration from Sweden and Norway of Mormon proselytes.
The struggle against Mormonism and the institution of polygamy
was at its height in this country, and the Mormon church re
cruited its new members largely from Europe; therefore the
Secretary of State directed communications to the European
governments requesting their cooperation in preventing the emi
gration of Mormons to the United States. The Foreign Minister
37 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1867, Part I, p. 727.
38 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1868, Part II, pp. 101-102.
39 Ibid., p. 103.
62 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
of Sweden and Norway, General Bjornstjerna, was of the opinion
that it would be difficult to control the emigration of such persons
by a system of inspection and evidence, but gladly promised to
aid in making known to the people of the United Kingdoms the
purport of the American laws. The introduction of Mormonism
into Sweden and Norway was heartily opposed by their authori
ties, and the whole administrative machinery was put into opera
tion to frustrate the efforts of Mormon missionaries.40
In November, 1885, Sidney W. Cooper, United States consul
at Gothenburg, wrote to Secretary of State Bayard that it was
' ' a common practice ' ' throughout Sweden to give aid to the emi
gration of criminals and paupers. The attention of Rufus Ma-
gee, our minister at Stockholm, was immediately directed to this
matter and he was instructed to report thereon. Magee replied
that, after thorough investigation, he was satisfied that no such
practice prevailed, as the laws of Sweden demanded a certificate
from every emigrant, a regulation which was designed to protect
the United States against objectionable characters.41
To facilitate and regulate the extradition of criminals in the
territories of the two governments, a convention was drawn up,
and subscribed to by the United States and Sweden and Norway
in 1860. The negotiations were conducted at Washington, and
the convention signed on March 21st. By the provisions of this
agreement the high contracting parties bound themselves to sur
render any person, charged with one or more of certain enumer
ated crimes, upon proof of his guilt, or upon presentation of the
indictment.42 Under this treaty the United States in 1888
claimed the extradition of Albert Erbers, alias Eberson, a man
who was wanted by the authorities of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for
attempted murder and forgery. The government of Norway
secured the arrest of the criminal in Christiania, but refused to
deliver him up until the American authorities should prove his
identity as a United States citizen. Upon news of Erbers' arrest,
two deputy sheriffs were dispatched by the city of Milwaukee to
Christiania to take the prisoner into custody but without sub-
40 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1879, pp 964-965; 1880, pp. 933-934; 1881, pp.
1067-1068.
41 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1886, pp. 840-841.
42 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions of the 77. S. with Foreign Powers, Vol. II,
pp. 1756-1758: "this treaty was superseded as to Norway, December 8, 1893, by the
Treaty of June 7, 1893, and as to Sweden April 17, 1893, by the Treaty of January
14, 1893."
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 63
mitting the necessary naturalization certificates. The extradi
tion of the offender was, therefore, refused.43
To obviate any possible difficulty which might arise out of the
varying modes of acquiring citizenship in the United Kingdoms
and the United States, a naturalization treaty was signed at
Stockholm on May 26, 1869. The covenant stipulated that both
governments should require as qualifications for citizenship a
residence of five years. Further, a naturalized citizen, who re
turned to the country of his birth, should forfeit his naturalized
citizenship upon a residence there exceeding two years. Upon
such return military service might be exacted only if the person
had emigrated after he had attained the age, when such service
could be required.44
In 1882 John S. Stevens, United States minister to Sweden and
Norway, wrote to Frelinghuysen, then Secretary of State, that
the question of American naturalized citizenship was becoming
more important as emigration and European armaments in
creased. Whenever a naturalized American citizen returned to
the land of his birth, the authorities there immediately attempted
to exact military service, and it was then incumbent upon him to
prove his American ciizenship. In that year two such cases re
quired the interference of Stevens. C. M. Cedergren, a Swede,
had emigrated to the United States in June, 1864, at the age of
nineteen. He was naturalized February 28, 1880, in Washington
Territory, having taken out his preliminary papers in 1877.
Upon visiting Sweden in 1881, he was fined for non-performance
of military duty, and ordered to present himself at the training
station. Cedergen produced his naturalization certificate but the
authorities disregarded it. He then appealed to Stevens, and
certified that he had emigrated at an age when military service
could not be required. Stevens brought the case to the attention
of Baron Hochschild, the Foreign Minister, showing that the
treaty of 1869 rendered Cedergren free from liability as to
Swedish obligations. The Minister of Justice, to whom the
Baron had referred the matter, decided that, although Cedergren
was exempt from performing military service, the fine could still
be demanded. Stevens again called on Baron Hochschild, and
43 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1888, Part II, pp. 1483-1484; 1486-1487; 1489-
1490.
44 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions of the United States with Foreign Powers,
Vol. II, pp. 1758-1761.
64 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
showed how similar cases had been decided in Germany in ac
cordance with the American interpretation of the treaty. After
a careful reconsideration of the case, the Baron admitted the cor
rectness of Stevens 's construction and the immunity of Ceder-
gren from obligations to the Swedish government.45 A similar
instance occurred the same year in Norway, and another in 1901,
but no serious difficulty was experienced in their settlement.
Between nations, as between individuals, small acts of kindness
and courtesy assume significance when viewed in the light of long
friendship. In 1866 an American squadron, composed of the
double-turreted monitor Miantonomoh, and the steamship Au
gusta, commanded by Captain Alexander Murray and accom
panied by the Hon. Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy and intimate friend of John Ericsson, visited various
European ports, among them Stockholm. The cordial reception,
which the officers and men experienced in that city, was proof of
the friendly spirit, which directed the intercourse of the two
governments.46
The visit in 1875 of Admiral Worden, who had commanded the
Monitor in her battle with the Merrimac, was, if possible, even
more appreciated by the government and people of Sweden.
The admiral was to them associated with Captain John Ericsson,
a relationship, which in their opinion, added lustre to an already
heroic name.47
In the course of his tour around the world, General Grant in
July, 1878, visited Norway and Sweden. King Oscar II was at
that time in Christiania, and there the ex-President was pre
sented to His Majesty. "The King promptly returned the call,
and the following day gave a dinner party in his honor." In
Stockholm a large association of mechanics and laboring men
visited Grant to pay their respects. Other citizens joined the
delegation until their number was upward of five thousand per
sons. Their spokesman addressed the distinguished American in
terms of commendation, to which he replied with customary
brevity but undoubted sincerity.48
An invitation was in 1877 extended to the United States by the
45 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1882, Part I, pp. 487-491.
46 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1866, Part II, p. 179.
47 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1875, Part II, pp. 1261-1262.
48 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1878, pp. 823-824.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 65
Swedish government to participate in the International Prison
Congress at Stockholm in August of the following year. The in
vitation was accepted, and Dr. E. C. Wines was appointed to be
the official representative of the American government. Penn
sylvania, Ohio, Illinois and Connecticut sent representatives of
their own.49 In 1898 the United States Commission of Fish and
Fisheries took a prominent part in the international fisheries ex
hibition at Bergen, Norway. The sum of $20,000.00 had been ap
propriated by Congress to this end, and Joseph W. Collins was
appointed by the President to make appropriate arrangements.
1 1 The applications for publications of the United States Commis
sion of Fish and Fisheries were numerous and urgent. These came
not only from Norwegian museums, fishery schools, etc., but also
from gentlemen prominently identified with the fishery, fish cul
tural, and scientific interests of other countries. ' ' 50 When the
exhibition closed, some of the American exhibitors presented
their collections to schools and museums in Norway, thus winning
very favorable mention in Scandinavian papers. Collins, in
reporting their gifts to the United States government, added
that: "There is every reason to believe such intelligent and
generous action will have a most satisfactory result. " 51
If there is one incident, which, more than any other, stands
in the memory of Swedish people as typifying the friendship of
the United States, that incident is the honorable manner in which
Captain John Ericsson's remains were returned to the land of
his birth. The great inventor had expressed his desire to be
buried in Sweden, and, upon the suggestion of that country, the
Navy Department in 1890 assumed the duty of transferring his
remains in a manner "befitting his rank and distinguished
name." The United States man-of-war Baltimore was desig
nated to bring the corpse to Sweden, and the ceremonies of de
parture in New York harbor were very impressive. At two
o'clock on a Sunday afternoon, September 14, 1890, Captain
Schley of the Baltimore delivered the casket to our minister,
W. W. Thomas, who in turn delivered it to Rear Admiral Peyron
of the Swedish Navy. The body was escorted between decorated
streets and immense crowds to its final resting place. Thomas,
49 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1877, pp. 547-548; 1878, pp. 824-828.
50 Senate Documents, 56th Congress, 2d Session, 1900-1901, Vol. IV, No. 39,
p. 18.
51 Ibid., p. 20.
66 IOWA STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
in a communication to the Secretary of State, wrote that: "By
no other act, it seems to me, could the friendly feeling between
the two nations have been so invigorated and strengthened;"
and he added that the presence of the Baltimore, l ' towering like
a colossus above every other ship of war," had the effect of im
pressing the people of our power.52 Eleven years later a monu
ment was raised by voluntary subscription in Stockholm in mem
ory of Captain Ericsson, at the unveiling of which Thomas testi
fied to our indebtedness to Sweden through her great son.53
By a treaty between the United States, Germany, and Great
Britain it was stipulated, that in the event of the three Powers
failing to agree upon the appointment of a Chief Justice in the
Samoan Islands, that officer should be appointed by the King of
Sweden and Norway. As it happened it was impossible for the
parties to the treaty to make a selection, which was acceptable to
all, and they therefore instructed their representatives at Stock
holm to request the kind offices of the King. The United States
suggested privately that His Majesty appoint one of his own
subjects. The answer to this application in the interests of a
peaceful settlement was affirmative, and Judge Otto Conrad
Waldemar Cedercrantz, associate judge of the Swedish court of
appeals, was appointed Chief Justice of Samoa.54 Again in 1900
the arbitration of the King of Sweden and Norway was sought
by the three powers in the settlement of certain claims arising
out of disturbances in Samoa.55 Article I of the convention for
the arbitration of the Behring Sea seal fisheries dispute invited
the Scandinavian monarch to appoint one of the seven arbitra
tors. Gregers Gram, a Minister of State, received the appoint
ment, and thus materially aided in the peaceful settlement of
that aggravating question.56
The long-continued dispute between Sweden and Norway over
the question of foreign representation and consular service came
to a head in 1905. Norway demanded an equal share in the
management of the foreign affairs of the two kingdoms, and
52 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1890, pp 706-710; Church, The Life of John
Ericsson, Vol. II, pp. 325-332.
53 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1901, pp. 495-497.
54 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1890, pp. 703-705.
55 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1900, pp. 896-902.
56 Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations, Vol. I, p. 805 ; Vol. V,
p. 4759.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 67
when this demand was persistently refused, the Storthing on
June 7, 1905, declared the dissolution of the Union.57 To the
eternal credit of both kingdoms the separation was accomplished
without bloodshed, and the two nations continued to live in
friendship and good understanding. Upon receiving news that
the King of Sweden, on October 18, had recognized the right of
Norway to determine her own affairs, Elihu Hoot, Secretary of
State, on October 30, officially recognized Mr. Chr. Hauge as
Norway's charge d'affaires ad interim, and from that date on
ward our relations have been conducted with the two nations
independently. Both kingdoms signified their intention to abide
by their common agreements with the United States in so far as
those compacts were applicable to each one of them individ
ually.58
Our intercourse with the sister-kingdoms of the Scandinavian
peninsula has not in general been marked, or marred, by tense
diplomatic situations or dramatic military episodes; nor has
it at any time been directed by policies other than those of con
sistent friendship. Belonging, as they do, to the class of small
and distant nations, whose sole aim is to live and let live, they
have not played a decisive role in international affairs. Never
theless, no nation in the world, except Ireland, has given so gen
erously of its strong young blood as Norway to the upbuilding of
the United States. By the "America-letters" of their emigrated
loved ones, the common folk of Sweden and Norway have been
introduced to this great land of ours, and have learned in a
measure to love it. The names of George Washington, Abraham
Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and the ' ' free America ' ' are house
hold words, and there is probably not a family in either of the
two kingdoms, which does not feel itself bound by personal ties
to Wisconsin, Minnesota, or North Dakota. No stronger guar
antee is possible for future peace and good will between the
United States and the Scandinavian peninsula than this personal
relationship and the long tradition of sincere friendship.
57 Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People, Vol. II, p. 578.
58 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1905, pp. 853-874.
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