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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SAN  DIEGO 


3  1822  02584  1974 


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DIPLOMATIC    REMINISCENCES 


DIPLOMATIC 
REMINISCENCES 

BEFORE    AND    DURING   THE 
WORLD    WAR,     1.911  — 1917 


BY    A:    NEKLUDOFF 


-   ) 


FORMERLY  RUSSIAN  MINISTER  AT  SOFIA    AND   AT    STOCKHOLM 
AND    AMBASSADOR    AT    MADRID 


TRANSLATED   FROM   THE   FRENCH 

BY    ALEXANDRA    PAGET 


NEW    YORK 

E.   P.    BUTTON   AND   COMPANY 

1920 


PREFACE 

My  Diplomatic  Reminiscences  include  the  period 
between  February,  191 1,  when  I  was  appointed 
Russian  Minister  to  Sofia,  and  September,  1917,  when 
I  put  an  end  to  my  ephemeral  term  of  office  in  Madrid 
by  refusing  my  further  services  to  M.  Kerensky's 
Government. 

The  first  fourteen  chapters  deal  with  my  work  in 
Bulgaria  and  with  the  two  Balkan  Wars,  that  of 
1912  and  that  of  1913,  which  form  the  prelude  to  the 
catastrophe  of  1914.  The  succeeding  chapters  have 
to  do  with  Sweden,  with  the  World-War  and  with 
the  Russian  Revolution  as  I  saw  them  from  my  post 
in  Stockholm. 

In  my  Reminiscences  I  describe  what  came  under 
my  notice,  not  disdaining  small  touches ;  I  note  what 
I  was  able  to  gather ;  but  as  by  virtue  of  my  diplomatic 
position  my  range  of  vision  and  my  information  were 
limited,  1  in  no  way  aspire  to  explain  the  whole  of  the 
great  drama  which  has  just  been  performed.  Moreover, 
circumstances  have  obliged  me  to  compile  my  work  far 
awa}''  from  sources  at  which  I  might  have  refreshed  and 
verified  m}'  impressions,^  and  consequently  there  are 
a  few  inevitable  gaps  in  the  narrative,  probably  also  a 
few  inexactitudes  and  some  errors  in  dates.  I  tender 
my  apologies  beforehand  to  the  reader  for  these 
involuntary  errata,  and  I  leave  them  to  become  the 
prey  of  those  who  might  wish  to  profit  b}'-  them  to 
invalidate  my  testimony  when  this  testimony  does  not 
suit  them. 

^  My  Reminiscences  were  written  at  Nice  between  June,  1918,  and 
July,  1919. 


f> 


vi  PREFACE 

Nevertheless  I  venture  to  cherish  the  hope  that  the 
faithful  description  of  what  I  have  been  enabled  to  see, 
to  hear  and  to  know,  and  even  the  judgments  that  I 
pass — in  all  sincerity — on  men  and  matters,  will  form  a 
contribution  to  the  study  of  those  events  which  have 
destroyed  an  entire  world,  and  which  are  inaugurating 
a  new  and  unknown  order  of  things. 

This  order  of  things  is  greeted  by  some  with 
ecstasy ;  others  view  it  with  terror ;  others  again  hope 
to  exploit  it  to  their  own  advantage  or  to  that  of  their 
old  moral  and  political  conceptions  which  they  are 
striving  to  disguise  as  best  they  can. 

I  prefer  to  confess  at  once  that— although  sincerely 
deploring  the  disappearance  of  a  world  to  which  I  was 
bound  by  my  former  habits,  my  mentality  and  my 
work — I  do  not  suffer  from  any  illusion  as  to  the 
possible  return  of  this  old  world,  of  this  ancient  order 
of  things.  And  more  especially  must  I  realise  this 
where  it  is  a  question  of  Russia  and  of  her  future 
destinies. 

All  of  us  who  have  taken  an  active  part  in  the 
tremendous  events  which  have  just  occurred,  belong 
to  an  irrevocable  past,  and  history  is  already  preparing 
to  engrave  our  final  sentence  on  its  tables  of  bronze. 

That  is  why — contrary  to  established  custom — I 
have  allowed  myself,  in  the  course  of  these  Reminis- 
cences, to  judge  my  contemporaries  with  complete 
frankness,  and  to  say  all  I  think  about  them  and  the 
part  they  have  played,  when  I  have  observed  them, 
heard  them  or  seen  them  act.  And  the  dead — I 
bury  my  dead  as  my  conscience  dictates :  To  some — 
the  pomp  of  a  national  funeral,  the  mournful  chants  of 
Melpomene,  the  fumes  of  incense  and  of  smouldering 
torches  ;  to  others — the  modest  procession  of  relatives 
and  a  few  friends ;  to  others  again — the  felon's  end. 

A.  N. 

Feb.  1 6,   1920. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   I 

MY   APPOINTMENT   TO   SOFIA 


PAGES 


My  former  relations  with  M.  SazonolT — Scheme  for  a  Russo-Bulgarian 
military  convention — Question  of  relations  with  King  Ferdinand — 
Audience  of  the  Emperor  ;  H.I.M.  gives  me  his  instructions — Serious 
illness  of  M.  SazonolT — I  leave  for  Sofia    ......     i-6 

CHAPTER    n 

KING    FERDINAND    OF    BULGARIA 

His  youth  ;  his  sudden  rise  to  power — First  years  of  his  reign — His  recon- 
ciliation with  Russia — Relations  between  the  King  and  the  people  ; 
the  King's  janizaries — Moral  and  political  portrait  of  Ferdinand  ;  his 
distrust  ;  his  irresolution  .......  7~IS 

CHAPTER   in 

BULGARIA   IN    191I 

My  audience  of  the  King — Fall  of  the  Malinov  Cabinet ;  its  antecedents — 
The  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908 — The  crisis  of  the  annexation  of 
Bosnia  ;  complete  independence  of  Bulgaria  ;  we  favour  the  new  King- 
dom in  the  settlement  of  the  crisis — Ulterior  Bulgarian  ambitions 
dictate  the  formation  of  a  new  Nationalist  and  essentially  Russophile 
Cabinet  ..........  16-24 

CHAPTER   IV 

RUSSIAN    AND    BULGARIAN    RELATIONS 

M.  John  Gueshov — M.  Todorov — M.  Danev  ;  my  first  conversation  with 
him — My  relations  with  Gueshov — The  Great  Sobrattji  of  Tirnova  in 
June,  191 1 — Visit  to  Russia  of  the  Crown-Prince  Boris  ;  matrimonial 
schemes — Death  of  M.  Stolypin  ;  his  characteristics  ;  influence  of  his 
disappearance  on  the  foreign  policy  of  Russia — Visit  of  the  Russian 
Squadron  to  Varna — Outbreak  of  the  Italo-Turkish  war      .         .  25-37 

CHAPTER   V 

SERBO-BULGARIAN   RELATIONS 

Serbo-Bulgarian  relations  ;  the  Bulgarians  enter  on  fresh  parleyings  with 
the  Serbians — Historical  statement  of  Russian  action  with  regard  to 
the  Serbians  and  Bulgarians — My  journey  to  Davos — An  unexpected 
meeting — Conversation  with  M.  Sazonoff — Return  by  Belgrade  ;  con- 
versation with  M.  Hartwig;  characteristics  of  the  latter      .  .  S^^S^ 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE   SERBO-nULGARIAN    TREATY  pages 

Scrbo-Bulgarian  negotiations — Demarcation  of  the  "  spliercs  of  influence  " 
in  Macedonia — Fixing  boundaries — Conversations  with  the  King — I 
warn  St.  Petersburg  of  the  dangers  which  might  result  from  a  Scrbo- 
Bulgarian  alliance — The  alliance  is  concluded  with  our  approval — 
Festivities  for  the  coming-of-age  of  Prince  Boris — Personal  service 
rendered  to  King  Ferdinand  by  H.I.M.  the  Emperor — Audience  of  the 
King  before  my  departure  for  St.  Petersburg — Ferdinand's  perplexities 
and  suspicions        .........  52-66 

CHAPTER  VII 

RASPUTIN 

Arrival  in  St.  Petersburg  ;  violent  speech  by  M.  Gutchkoff  at  the  Duma — 
Rasputin  ;  his  peculiarities  become  a  subject  for  scandal ;  his  influence 
— Mile.  Tutcheff" — Audience  of  II.  I.  M.  the  Emperor — The  Empress 
Alexandra  spends  an  afternoon  in  St.  Petersburg — Conversation  with 
General  Jilinsky,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff — Conversations  with 
MM.  Kokovtzoff^  and  Gutchkoff;  drawing-room  gossip — Reception  at 
the  Sazonoffs'  ;  the  "  Rasputin  crisis  "  is  successfully  settled — I  return 
to  Sofia 67-81 

CHAPTER   VIII 

INTRIGUES    AT    SOFIA 

Bulgarian  "activist"  party;  M.  Danev's  journey  to  Russia — Colonel 
Merrone — Italian  military  circles  know  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agree- 
ment— Intrigues  directed  against  me  ;  I  fall  into  disfavour  with 
Ferdinand  ;  the  King's  candidates  for  my  post ;  M.  Rizov  enters  the 
arena — King  Ferdinard's  Policy — My  reconciliation  with  the  King — 
Rumours  of  my  recall — ^Journey  to  Constantinople  ;  conversations  with 
M.  de  Giers  and  with  General  Holmsen  ;  their  opinion  of  the  Turkish 
Army — Political  ferment  in  Sofia  and  Belgrade  ;  my  telegram  of  the 
4th  July  ;  my  warning  disregarded  ;  Kotchana  and  Ishtib  incidents — 
M.  Gutchkoff  in  Sofia  and  Belgrade — Prince  Alexander  goes  to  inspect 
the  army — The  Schipka  Veterans'  Fete;  "it  is  war!" — M.  de  Giers 
warns  Bulgaria — Europe  does  not  believe  it — Jubilee  for  the  twenty- 
five  years' reign  of  Ferdinand — M.  Sazonoffs  apathy  .  .         82-107 

CHAPTER   IX 

THE    BALKAN    WAR,    I912 

Mobilisation  of  the  Balkan  allies  ;  futile  protests  of  the  Cabinets ;  war 
breaks  out — First  decisive  successes  of  the  Allies — Lozengrad  taken 
— Greco-Bulgarian  incident  at  Salonika — Victory  of  Lule-Burgas  ; 
Bulgarians  and  Greeks  at  Salonika ;  torrential  rains  alone  stop  the 
Bulgarian  advance — King  Ferdinand's  elation  ;  his  inordinate  ambition  ; 
his  dreams — Reverse  of  Chataldja — In  St.  Petersburg  the  question  of 
the  "  prohibited  area  "  in  Thrace  is  raised  ;  I  succeed  in  causing  this 
prohibition  to  be  removed — Russian  concessions — Ferdinand  wishes  to 
have  Rodosto  at  any  cost — General  Radko-Dmitriev's  mission  to  St. 
Petersburg — The  Bulgarians  allow  the  propitious  moment  for  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  to  escape         .......        10S-113 


CONTENTS  ix 

CHAPTER   X 

THE    BALKAN    WAR,    1912    {continued)  pages 

The  Serbians,  having  to  renounce  an  outlet  to  the  Adriatic,  demand  com- 
pensations in  Macedonia — My  conversations  on  the  subject  with  my 
Serbian  colleague — Serbian  claims — Msit  of  M.  Venizelos  to  Sofia  ; 
our  conversation — My  advice  to  Gueshov  ;  his  powerlessness — Two 
meetings  with  Ferdinand  ;  the  French  Minister's  audience  of  the  King  ; 
The  German  Minister's  audience — Bulgaro-Rumanian  relations  ;  the 
Dobrudja — Russo-Rumanian  relations ;  M.  Rosetti-Solesco  ;  our 
representatives  at  Bukharest ;  succeeded  by  M.  Nicolas  Schebeko  ; 
jubilee  of  the  annexation  of  Bessarabia  ;  commencement  of  the  Russo- 
Rumanian  intimacy — Rectification  of  the  Dobrudja  frontier  in  favour 
of  Rumania   ..........       132-153 

CHAPTER  XI 

QUARRELS    BETWEEN    THE   ALLIES  ' 

Capture  of  Adrianople — Quarrels  with  the  Serbians — Bulgarian  cruelties ; 
the  character  of  the  Bulgarian  people  is  a  product  of  their  history — I 
advocate  the  creation  of  a  small  autonomous  State,  embracing  those 
parts  of  Macedonia  which  the  Balkan  Allies  are  contesting — Emperor 
Alexander  II. 's  letter  to  Prince  Alexander — My  suggestion  rejected — 
Idea  of  an  Anti-Bulgarian  league  ;  this  idea  is  carried  out  owing  to  the 
Bulgarian  faults  ;  the  Serbo-Greek  alliance  is  concluded — The  Press  in 
St.  Petersburg  is  against  the  Bulgarians — I  am  ordered  to  preach  con- 
ciliation to  them — Madame  Karavelov  ;  scene  in  the  military  hospital 
in  Sofia — Peace  signed  in  London — Interview  between  Gueshov  and 
Pachitch — My  Serbian  colleague  and  I  begin  to  hope — The  Emperor  of 
Russia  offers  himself  as  mediator  ;  telegrams  exchanged — Conflict  in 
Sofia  about  the  Russian  proposal — King  Ferdinand's  telegram  attri- 
buted falsely  to  me — Greece  and  Serbia  continue  to  arm — Bulgaria 
suggests  a  time  limit —Satisfactory  outlook        ....       IS4~^7S 

CHAPTER   XH 

BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES 

Danev's  return  spoils  everything — Warlike  preparations — An  earthquake — 
Gueshov  leaves  the  Cabinet ;  Danev  remains  alone  at  the 'head — The 
King  holds  a  Council  ;  our  mediation  is  accepted  ;  I  entreat  Danev  to 
start  at  once  for  St.  Petersburg — The  Bulgarians  treacherously  attack 
the  Serbians — The  shameful  underhand  play — War  begins — Soldiers 
refuse  obedience — The  Bulgarians  beaten  by  the  Greeks  and  by  the 
Serbians ;  my  advice  to  Danev  ;  Mission  of  General  Paprikov  and 
Colonel  Romanowski  ;  the  Rumanian  Aimy  enters  Bulgaria  and 
approaches  Sofia  ;  the  Turks  return  to  Adrianople — Fall  of  the  Danev 
Ministry — Collapse  of  Bulgarian  Army — The  King  summons  the 
foreign  representatives  ;  a  ridiculous  conference — Russian  influence — 
The  Bulgarians  forced  to  conclude  the  Peace  of  Bukharest  .       176-202 

CHAPTER   XHI 

THE   PEACE   OF    BUKHAREST 

Comparison  of  the  conditions  of  the  Peace  of  London  (May,  1913)  with 
those  of  the  Peace  of  Bukharest  (September,  1913) — The  question  of 
Mount  Athos;  the  "  Monte  Santo"  and  its  customs;  the  Russian 
cenobites — Nature  of  the  Treaty — Sacrifices  imposed  on  Bulgaria  at 


CONTENTS 

I'AGES 

Bukharesl — The  Turks  keep  Adrianople  and  Eastern  Thrace  ;  enor- 
mous signification  of  this  restitution — Diplomatic  influences — We  do 
not  insist  on  tlie  autonomy  of  Mount  Athos — Pan-Germans  at  work — 
Disquieting  situation  in  Sofia — Why  Ferdinand's  power  was  not 
wrecked — Solemn  reception  of  the  Bulgarian  troops  on  their  return  to 
Sofia — I  am  intended  for  the  post  of  Stockholm  .         .         .       203-219 


CHAPTER   XIV 

MY   TRANSFER   TO    STOCKHOLM 

Departure  from  Sofia  for  Paris — Bad  omen — Arrival  in  Paris  ;  conversation 
with  M.  Sazonoff — The  Grand-Duchess  Marie's  divorce — The  Russians 
enjoy  themselves  wildly — M,  Kokovtzoff  in  Paris — I  go  to  the  Crimea 
— General  Dedulin's  death — General  Dumbadze — Rasputin  again — 
Audience  and  luncheon  at  Livadia  ;  I  give  the  Emperor  a  detailed 
report — Journey  to  Sofia  and  farewell  audience  of  the  King  and  Queen 
— St.  Petersburg  in  February,  1914  ;  "  balls  and  festivities  "  ;  very 
serious  conversations  during  the  parties — Count  Witte — Prince 
Alexander  of  Serbia — M,  Kokovtzoff  out  of  office — M.  Goremykin — 
Conversation  with  M.  Zinovieff,  our  former  Ambassador  to  Constanti- 
nople— The  "young  people"  continue  to  be  optimistic — I  leave  for 
Stockholm     ..........       220-245 


CHAPTER   XV 

SWEDEN    IN    1 9 14 

Three  ;centuries  of  Swedish  history — Gustaf  III. — Struggles  with  Russia 
— Change  of  dynasty — New  aspect  of  Sweden — Union  with  Norway — 
The  people  and  their  qualities — Sweden's  prosperity — The  Spaniards 
of  the  North — French  influence  replaced  by  German  influence — Reasons 
for  this  change — The  Bernadottes — King  Oscar  II.  and  German 
influences — Prince  Max  of  Baden — German  intrigues — Russian  aspira- 
tions— The  Anti-Russian  current — Sven-Hedin — The  Bondestog — 
Change  of  Ministry — Political  situation  in  March,  1914      .         .       246-267 


CHAPTER   XVI 

ON    THE    EVE   OF   WAR 

Solemn  audience  of  King  Gustaf  V. — "Do  not  judge  Sovereigns  too 
harshly  !  " — Queen  Victoria — The  Royal  Family — Interesting  conver- 
sation with  M.  Wallenberg  ;  I  draw  erroneous  conclusions — My  foreign 
colleagues — Mr.  Howard — M.  Thiebaud — Baltic  exhibition  at  Malmo 
— The  Riksdag  "  of  national  defence  " — Alarming  symptoms  every- 
where— Our  incomprehensible  calmness — M.  Sverbeieff  in  Berlin — 
Our  Ambassadors  in  Berlin  and  Vienna — Count  Osten-Sacken's  warn- 
ings— M.  Schebeko  in  Vienna — Precarious  situation  in  Russia — 
The  assassination  at  Serajevo — Another  trip  to  Malmo  ;  Count  Brock- 
dorf-Rantzau — Delightful  expedition  ;  a  bad  fairy  overhears  me — The 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia 268-288 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  XVII 

THE   TRAGIC   WEEK  pages 

The  tragic  week — President  Poincare's  arrival — Banquet  at  the  Palace — 
M,  Poincare's  advice — "The  torch  of  Bellona" — Germans  determined 
on  war — Last  conversation  with  my  German  colleague,  Reichenau  ; 
"the  war  will  kill  the  monarchical  principle" — Duties  of  a  monarch 
— Colonel  Kandauroft's  tidings — The  Emperor  Nicolas  wishes  to 
avoid  war  at  all  costs — Deep  emotion  in  Sweden — I  suggest,  if  neces- 
sary, energetic  action  in  Bulgaria — War  is  declared — "  Let  us  drain  the 
cup  to  the  dregs  "  ......,,       289-305 

CHAPTER   XVIII 

SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY 

What  will  Sweden  do? — Audience  of  the  King  ;  reassuring  words  of  H,M. 
— France  and  England  offer  guarantees  to  Sweden — We  associate  our- 
selves with  this  declaration — Neutrality  of  Sweden  ;  pacificist  sentiments 
of  most  of  the  country — England's  decision — Russians  fleeing  from 
Germany  inundate  Stockholm  ;  tragico-comic  scenes — Refugees  of 
note — Our  Ambassador  arrives  from  Berlin — Generous  hospitality  of 
the  Swedes — Tales  of  German  brutality — First  events  of  the  war ; 
Russian  reverses  ;  the  luck  turns  ;  the  Marne  victory  ;  German  propa- 
ganda— Our  advance  in  Galicia — Grand-Duke  Nicolas'  Manifesto  on 
the  subject  of  Poland — Decisive  hour  for  the  Empire  of  the  Hapsburgs 
— Aims  of  Russian  diplomacy — Neither  Austria  nor  Russia  profit  by 
this  hour — Our  mistakes  in  Galicia — Turkey  enters  the  war — In  spite  of 
the  agitation  of  Germanophiles  and  Activists,  the  absolute-neutrality 
party  gains  ground  in  Sweden — Interview  of  the  three  Scandinavian 
Monarchs       ..........       306-331 

CHAPTER   XIX 

SWEDEN    IN    1 915 

Economic  situation  of  Sweden  during  the  war — Temporary  prosperity — 
The  hold  over  Sweden  possessed  by  the  Entente  Powers  on  one  side 
(the  grip  of  the  Entente)  and  by  Germany  on  the  other — Causes  of  the 
economic  influence  of  Germany — A  strange  tangle — Perfect  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Entente  representatives  in  Stockholm — Baron  von  Lucius  ; 
intrigues  of  the  German  Legation — My  official  attitude — Decrease  in 
Swedish  hostility  to  Russia ;  the  Murman  railway ;  the  Straits ;  the 
case  of  M.  Perrichon — I  wish  to  build  for  the  future — Finland  for 
Sweden — Russian  reverses  in  191 5  encourage  Sven-Hedin  afresh — 
German  peace  proposals — The  Yul-Klappor  and  Swedish  indignation — 
Prince  Gortchakoff  and  M.  de  Giers — The  understanding  between  the 
three  Scandinavian  countries  counter-balances  the  efforts  of  the  Activists 
— The  question  of  the  Aland  Islands         .....       332-357 

CHAPTER   XX 

WAR    SUFFERERS 

The  Russians  in  Sweden  during  the  war — The  Russian  committee  of  bene- 
volence— Prisoners'  correspondence — The  Duke  of  Amalfi  and  the 
splendid  work  of  the  Spanish  Legation — The  Y.M.C.A. — Treatment 
of  prisoners  of  war  in  Germany — Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  repre- 
sentatives in  Stockholm,  and  improvement  resulting  from  it — The 
ambulance   trains — Humanity  of   the   Swedes — Touching  scenes  ;    a 


xii  CONTENTS 

PACKS 

strange  people  ;  odi  et  amo  ;  an  epic  hero — An  old  acquaintance  re- 
appears— Ferreting  out  a  secret — Russian  official  personages  pass 
through  Sweden — M.  Peter  Struve — The  Poles — The  Lithuanians  and 
Lithuania— M.  Itchas — Other  typically  Russian  silhouettes  .       358-384 

CHAPTER   XXI 

A   VISIT   TO   PETKOGRAD 

I  go  to  Petrograd — Conversation  with  Sazonoff — General  Polivanoff's 
opinion  as  to  Rumanian  help — Rumania's  difficult  position — I  see  my 
successor  in  Sofia  again  ;  M.  Savinsky  on  Balkan  affairs  ;  what  he  tells 
me  and  what  he  does  not  tell  mc — RI.  Stiirnier  appointed  President  of 
the  Council — The  Emperor  present  at  the  Duma — Prince  N.  Galilzyn 
— Prince  Alexander  of  Oldenburg — M.  Alexis  Neidhart  and  the 
"  Moderates  " — Audience  of  the  Emperor — The  Grand-Duke  Paul  and 
his  family — Audiences  of  the  Empress  Alexandra  and  the  Dowager 
Empress — The  Grand-Duke  Nicolas  Mikhailovitch — Impressions  of  my 
visit — Misgivings  in  political  and  Government  circles — In  popular 
circles — Mutterings  of  revolution — German  machinations — The  Ger- 
mans increase  their  efforts  to  bring  about  a  revolution  in  Russia  ,       385-410 

CHAPTER   XXII 

EVIL   OMENS    IN    PETROGRAD 

Return  to  Stockholm — Audience  of  the  King — Russian  "  parliamentarians  " 
pass  through  Stockholm  ;  I  make  Protopopoff's  acquaintance — The 
Swedish  Activists  raise  the  Aland  question — Wallenberg's  wise  and 
clever  policy — M.  Branting — All  is  serene — Bad  news  from  Petrograd  ; 
Sturmer,  Rasputin,  the  Empress  Alexandra — The  Empress  at  General 
Headquarters;  idyll  and  tragedy;  JNL  Odier ;  prophetic  verses — 
Brussiloff's  offensive — M.  Protopopoff  and  the  Polaks — -Protopopoff's 
talks  with  M.  Warburg — M.  Pokrovsky — The  rest  of  the  parliamentary 
delegation  returns  by  Stockholm — M.  Schingareff — Russo-Swedish 
banquet — Baron  Rosen — Count  S.  Wielopolski — Operations  in  Galicia 
— Sturmer  replaces  Sazonoff — Sazonoff- — A  subaltern  of  the  Guards  has 
done  his  whole  duty ;  painful  journey  to  Petrograd — Conversations 
with  Sazonoff;  a  band  of  malefactors — Count  Wielopolski  with  Proto- 
popoff— I  call  on  Stiirmer — Sazonoft's  minute  on  the  Polish  question — • 
The  Rumanians  come  into  the  war — Odious  impressions  of  Petrograd 

411-443 
CHAPTER  XXIII 

RUSSIA    IN    DECLINE 

Return  to  Stockholm — Bad  turn  of  affairs  on  the  Rumanian  front — Ferment 
and  disorder  in  Russia — Protopopoff",  Home  Secretary  ;  his  vagaries ; 
his  madness — Prince  Nicolas  of  Greece  goes  to  Russia — I  expect  to 
leave  my  post — Fall  of  Stiirmer  ;  succeeded  by  M.  Trepoff — I  retain  my 
post — The  Protopopoff-Warburg  incident  begins  to  agitate  t'ne  Russian 
public — I  emphatically  contradict  the  Home  Secretary — The  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  has  again  a  perfectly  honest  man  in  view — Intense 
agitation  in  all  grades  of  Russian  society — Murder  of  Rasputin — 
ProtopopofPs  increasing  influence — The  Trepoff  Ministry  is  of  short 
duration — The  situation  becomes  worse— Protopopoff  and  an  American 
spiritist — Rizov  arrives  from  Berlin  to  talk  to  me  ;  his  curious  prophecy 
— "  The  Emperor  must  go  "  and  a  great  illusion — The  Revolution  breaks 
out  and  triumphs — Every  one  is  happy  and  content — I  adhere  to  the 
Provisional  Government  .......       444-468 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER   XXIV 

REVOLUTION  PAGES 

The  Hindu  fakir  ;  a  theory  of  suggestion — The  Revolution  relieves  the 
conscience  of  our  Allies  and  reassures  them — Illusions — First  alarming 
revelations — Report  of  a  Danish  eye-witness — The  Prikase  No.  I — 
The  real  origin  of  those  March  days  ;  the  real  situation  in  Russia — A 
tragic  dialogue — The  Soviets  supreme — Political  exiles  return  to  Russia 
— Prince  Kropotkin — "  Madam  demands  her  whole  paraphernalia" — 
A  revolutionist  of  the  old  stamp — Early  memories  of  Moscow — 
Bolsheviks — An  Armenian  throws  off  his  mask — Some  dancers — The 
army  of  treachery — Lenin  and  Trotsky  pass  into  Russia — M.  Keskula 
states  the  Esthonian  case — I  am  appointed  Ambassador  to  Madrid — 
Ead  news  from  Petrograd — M.  Kerensky,  Dictator — His  praiseworthy 
efforts — Increasing  dissolution — I  leave  Stockholm  with  a  heavy  heart 
and  scant  hopes  for  the  future  ......       469-498 

CHAPTER   XXV 

IN    SPAIN    AND    IN    EXILE 

Journey  from  Stockholm  to  Paris — Brief  revival  of  hopes  and  illusions — 
Solemn  reception  of  an  Ambassador  in  Madrid — Stately  ceremonies — 
Generous  step  of  King  Alfonso  XIII. — Two  Queens — Reception  by 
the  Marquis  de  Lema  and  M.  Dato — Sad  reflections — My  colleagues — 
Bird's-eye  view  of  Spain — Grievous  news  from  Russia — I  reconsider 
my  position — ^Journey  to  Paris  ;  I  am  disgusted  with  all  I  see  and  hear 
— I  return  to  San  Sebastian  and  send  in  my  resignation  to  Kerensky — 
Letter  to  M.  Terestchenko — A  well-advised  counsellor — I  go  into 
exile      ...........       499-521 

Index 523-541 


DIPLOMATIC    REMINISCENCES 

CHAPTER   I 

MY   APPOINTMENT    TO    SOFIA 

I  WAS  on  leave  in  St.  Petersburg  in  January,  1911,  when 
the  news  arrived  there,  first  of  the  serious  illness,  and 
then  of  the  death,  of  M.  Sementovsky,  Russian  Minister 
in  Sofia. 

Having  been  for  more  than  six  years  Counsellor  to 
the  Embassy  in  Paris,  I  had  an  indisputable  right  to  pro- 
motion, and  having  spent  seventeen  years  as  secretary 
in  Sofia,  Constantinople  and  Belgrade,  my  professional 
antecedents  seemed  to  entitle  me  to  one  of  the  Balkan 
posts.  My  appointment  was  talked  of  all  over  the  town 
and  at  the  Foreign  Office.  I  therefore  was  not  surprised 
when  a  few  days  after  M.  Sementovsky's  death,  M. 
Sazonoff,  who  had  only  been  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
for  three  months,  sent  for  me,  and  informed  me  that  my 
appointment  to  Sofia  had  just  received  the  Emperor's 
approval,  and  that  I  was  to  prepare  to  take  up  my  post 
almost  immediately. 

I  had  been  acquainted  with  M.  Sazonoff  for  some 
time,  but  it  was  only  in  Paris  that  I  enjoyed  the  privilege 
of  seeing  him  frequently  and  of  discussing  political 
affairs  with  him.  In  June,  1904,  we  had  both  been  raised 
on  the  same  day  to  the  dignity  of  Counsellors  :  he  to  the 
Embassy  in  London  and  I  to  the  Embassy  in  Paris.  M. 
Sazonoff  remained  in  London  three  years;  in  1907  he 
was  appointed  Minister  to  the  Holy  See,  and  in  1909 
assistant  to  the  Minister  in  St.  Petersburg.    During  his 


2  MY  APPOINTMENT  TO  SOFIA    [chap.  i. 

lime  in  London  he  often  came  to  Paris;  times  were 
strenuous  and  interesting :  first  the  Japanese  war  and 
the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  ;  followed  immediately  by  the 
first  Russian  Revolution,  with  Dumas  succeeding  one 
another  and  ending  in  the  Stolypin  regime,  which 
appeared  to  quell  the  great  tumult ;  finally,  the  Russo- 
British  Entente.  All  this  gave  rise  to  much  interchange 
of  opinions  and  ideas  between  two  close  colleagues. 
These  meetings  in  Paris  cemented  a  certain  intellectual 
intimacy  between  us,  and  later  on  when  M.  Sazonoff 
became  assistant  to  M.  Isvolsky,  I  often  had  the  satis- 
faction of  noticing  that  he  still  took  an  interest  in  my 
opinions. 

In  announcing  my  appointment  to  me,  M.  Sazonoff 
said,  amongst  other  things,  that  I  was  going  to  Sofia  at 
a  particularly  interesting  moment :  King  Ferdinand 
appeared  to  be  directing  his  policy  more  and  more 
towards  Russian  sympathies  and  designs,  and  his 
Government — composed  of  Radicals  with  Malinov  at 
their  head — proposed  to  us  to  conclude  a  military  con- 
vention. This  was  a  matter  for  mature  deliberation,  and 
the  Minister  was  confident  that  my  knowledge  of  Balkan 
affairs  would  enable  me  to  study  the  proposal  and  to 
give  my  advice  on  the  expediency  of  such  negotiations. 
He  advised  me  to  try  and  be  on  good  terms  with 
Ferdinand,  who  had  the  reputation  of  being  very  dis- 
trustful and  unreliable  in  his  dealings  with  foreign 
representatives,  especially  the  Russian  ones.  My  pre- 
decessor had  achieved  notable  success  in  this  respect. 
In  1909,  at  the  outset  of  M.  Sementovsky's  term  of 
office.  King  Ferdinand,  on  arriving  in  St.  Petersburg,  had 
tried  to  get  rid  of  the  new  Russian  Minister,  and  to 
secure  the  appointment  to  Sofia  of  some  person  belong- 
ing to  the  smartest  society  in  St.  Petersburg.  But  the 
Ministry,  in  the  offices  of  which  Sementovsky  had  spent 
all  his  career,  not  being  willing  to  part  with  him, 
Ferdinand  made  haste  to  be  reconciled  with  a  repre- 
sentative who  he  felt  was  well  supported,  and  then  tried 


i9ii]  KING   FERDINAND  3 

to  attract  him,  to  make  him,  if  possible,  the  instrument 
of  his  political  designs  concerning  Russia.  It  was  just 
in  the  midst  of  these  favours,  always  very  uncertain, 
that  the  Russian  Minister  fell  ill  and  died,  furnishing  the 
King  with  an  opportunity  of  displaying  his  grief  by 
spectacular  funeral  ceremonies,  which  were  to  serve  as 
a  proof  of  his  Russophile  sentiments. 

Although  I  had  no  intention  of  having  recourse  to 
such  extreme  measures  in  order  to  collect  proofs  of 
royal  good-will,  yet  I  entirely  shared  the  Minister's 
point  of  view  as  to  the  necessity  of  establishing — infer 
vivos — good  personal  relations  with  King  Ferdinand. 
One  may  have  had  a  lurking  feeling  of  distrust  for  him,  but 
it  was  all-important  that  this  should  not  be  perceived  by 
the  public  of  Sofia,  which  is  strongly  addicted  to  intrigue 
and  feverishly  busy  with  political  tittle-tattle.  I  had 
been  a  witness  at  the  outset  of  my  career  of  the  troubles 
and  disappointments  undergone  by  Russian  policy 
through  the  attitude  which  we  had  taken  up  with  regard 
to  the  first  Prince  of  Bulgaria,  Alexander  of  Battenberg. 
In  the  very  midst  of  the  reaction  prevailing  in  Russia 
in  the  eighties,  we  had  vehemently  supported  the 
grievances  of  the  Bulgarian  Radical  party  against  the 
absolutist  inclinations  of  the  young  Prince  of  Hesse ; 
we  ended  by  quarrelling  completely  with  him  and  with 
the  Bulgarian  Radicals  ;  we  succeeded  in  bringing  about 
the  downfall  of  the  Prince,  but  only  in  order  to  deliver 
the  country  over  to  the  Stamboulovists,  to  give  birth  in 
Bulgaria  to  an  entirely  Russophobe  party,  and  finally  to 
end  in  the  kingship  of  Ferdinand  of  Coburg!  He  was 
far  more  dangerous  and  a  thousand  times  more  crafty 
than  Battenberg,  and  yet  we  began  to  flatter  him,  after 
having  heaped  insults  and  contempt  upon  him  for  years  ! 
Certainly,  I  should  not  allow  myself  to  fall  into  the  same 
mistakes  again;  I  said  as  much  quite  frankly  to  M. 
Sazonoff,  who  agreed  entirely  with  my  point  of  view. 

A  few  days  later  I  received  an  audience  of  H.I.M. 
the  Emperor.     My  reception  was  a  particularly  gracious 

B 


4  MY  APPOINTMENT  TO  SOFIA     [ciiAr.  i. 

one,  and  the  Emperor  enumerated  with  me  the  principal 
points  of  my  programme  of  procedure  in  Bulgaria— a 
programme  which  had  been  previously  drawn  up  in 
my  conversations  with  M.  Sazonoff :  the  question  of 
relations  to  the  King,  the  Macedonian  question,  that  of 
the  relations  between  the  Bulgarians  and  the  Serbians, 
which  one  would  wish  to  improve  above  all  things, 
and  finally  the  question  of  the  military  convention  pro- 
posed by  the  Bulgarians.  I  noticed,  however,  that  the 
Emperor  appeared  to  slur  over  this  last  point  and  not 
to  attach  so  much  importance  to  it  as  Sazonoff  did. 

Since  my  appointment  to  Paris,  I  had  several  times 
had  business  interviews  with  His  Majesty,  of  course  only 
on  matters  coming  within  my  sphere.  Each  time  I  had 
carried  away  the  impression  of  great  kindness  and 
extreme  personal  politeness,  of  a  ready  and  subtle  wit 
slightly  tinged  with  sarcasm,  and  of  a  very  quick  though 
somewhat  superficial  mind.  When  I  wished  my  august 
questioner  to  give  an  opinion  on  such  and  such  a  subject, 
I  tried  to  bring  the  conversation  round  to  it.  In  this 
case  the  Emperor  would  seize  the  opportunity — if  he 
wished  to — and  pass  in  an  almost  imperceptible  manner 
and  as  if  on  his  own  initiative  to  the  subject  in  hand ;  if 
he  did  not  wish  to  give  an  opinion,  he  allowed  my 
allusion  to  pass  unnoticed,  showing  plainly,  however, 
that  he  had  understood  it,  but  that  he  did  not  intend  to 
commit  himself  On  this,  as  on  former  occasions,  the 
Emperor  displayed  the  same  qualities  in  our  interview. 
He  was  obviously  well  prepared  for  the  discussion,  and 
finally  gave  me  some  general  instructions  which  were 
fairly  definite.  He  spoke  in  his  usual  urbane  manner, 
and  whilst  giving  instructions  which  were  really  orders, 
only  appeared  to  be  airing  his  opinions. 

Once  only  in  the  course  of  the  interview  did  the 
Emperor  assume  a  solemn  and  dictatorial  manner; 
after  an  intentional  pause,  stepping  backwards  and 
fixing  me  with  a  penetrating  stare,  he  said:  "Listen  to 
me,  Nekludoff :  do  not  for  one  instant  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  go  to  war.     I  do  not  wish  for  war  as 


19"]  M.  SAZONOFFS   ILLNESS  5 

a  rule;  I  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  preserve  for  my 
people  the  benefits  of  peace.  But  at  this  moment,  of  all 
moments,  everything  which  might  lead  to  war  must  be 
avoided.  It  would  be  out  of  the  question  for  us  to  face 
a  war  for  five  or  six  years,  in  fact  till  1917.  .  .  .  Though 
if  the  most  vital  interests  and  the  honour  of  Russia 
were  at  stake,  we  might,  if  it  were  absolutely  necessary, 
accept  a  challenge  in  191 5,  but  not  a  moment  sooner — in 
any  circumstances  or  under  any  pretext  whatsoever! 
Do  you  quite  understand  me  ?  " 

I  replied  promptly  that  I  had  assimilated  the  royal 
instructions,  that  I  understood  the  situation  perfectly, 
and  that  during  my  time  as  Minister,  I  should  not 
ignore  for  one  instant  the  orders  I  had  just  received. 

On  this  His  Majesty  resumed  his  light,  good- 
natured  manner,  and  dismissed  me,  after  a  short  con- 
versation. 

A  few  days  after  my  interview  at  Tsarskoe-Selo, 
M.  Sazonoff  was  suddenly  taken  ill  with  septic  inflam- 
mation of  the  throat  which  afterwards  attacked  his  lungs. 
A  fortnight  later,  as  I  was  leaving  for  Sofia,  the  illness 
was  already  considered  to  be  serious.  During  the  month 
of  March  the  Minister's  condition  became  so  bad  that  the 
doctors  hastily  dispatched  him  to  Davos,  and  society  in 
St  Petersburg  was  already  taking  an  inordinate  interest 
in  the  question  of  a  successor.  However,  no  appoint- 
ment was  made.  Stolypin,  still  fairly  powerful,  did  not 
wish  to  abandon  the  hope  that  M.  Sazonoff,  his  brother- 
in-law  and  friend,  would  recover  and  return  to  his  post. 
This  hope  was  realised.  After  a  stay  of  a  few  months 
at  Davos  and  a  very  serious  operation,  the  invalid's  state 
of  health  improved  to  such  an  extent  that  in  December 
he  was  able  to  return  to  St.  Petersburg  to  resume  the 
direction  of  his  Ministry  which  during  his  absence  had 
been  in  the  hands  of  his  assistant,  M.  Neratoff,  who  had 
just  been  promoted  to  this  important  post.  Such  a  pro- 
longed absence  of  M,  Sazonoffs — coming,  too,  at  the 
time  when  he  was  assuming  the  direction  of  affairs — 


6  MY  APPOINTMENT  TO  SOFIA    [chap.  i. 

could  not  but  be   prejudicial  to  the   foreign   policy   of 
Russia. 

At  the  end  of  Februar}^  I  left  St.  Petersburg,  vid 
Vienna,  and  on  the  17th  of  March,  at  a  solemn  audience, 
I  presented  my  credentials  to  King  Ferdinand  of 
Bulgaria. 


% 


CHAPTER  II 

KING   FERDINAND   OF   BULGARIA 

Ferdinand  of  Coburg  was  then  in  the  twenty-fourth  year 
of  his  reign. 

This  scion  of  two  races,  the  Coburgs  and  the 
Orleans,  who  had  played  a  distinguished  part  in  the 
great  events  of  the  eighteenth  and  of  the  first  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  had  begun  life  under  circum- 
stances which  did  not  enable  one  to  form  an}^  idea  of  his 
ultimate  destiny.  Son  of  a  father  who  was  almost  a 
nonentity  and  of  a  mother  who  was  as  intelligent  as  she 
was  ambitious  (that  famous  ambition  of  the  Orleans  ! ), 
the  young  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Coburg,  youngest  son 
and  Benjamin  of  the  family,  very  much  spoilt  by  his 
mother  but  also  carefully  educated  under  her  super- 
vision, cut  rather  a  strange  figure  at  the  Austrian  Court 
and  in  high  Viennese  society.  Remarks  were  made 
about  his  Bourbon  nose,  and  every  one  laughed  at  his 
effeminate  manner,  his  exaggerated  elegance,  and  his 
love  for  jewels  and  knick-knacks  ;  he  was  supposed  to 
possess  inclinations  which  harmonised  with  his  appear- 
ance and  manner.  In  a  set  which  only  cared  for  hunting, 
riding,  the  society  of  light  and  frivolous  women,  and  was 
only  interested  in  the  life  in  cavalry  regiments, — the  re- 
finement and  intellectual  affectation  of  young  Ferdinand, 
his  pretty  speeches,  his  hatred  of  riding  and  all  sport, 
his  learning  even,  served  as  a  butt  for  the  laughter  and 
sarcasms  of  the  young  archdukes  and  grand-dukes. 
Moreover,  he  did  not  possess  the  gift  of  making  himself 
liked.  His  sly  and  suspicious  expression  prejudiced 
people  against  him.  The  more  he  became  aware  of  his 
unpopularity,  the  more  did  he  secretly  indulge  in  veno- 
mous  and   bitter  thoughts,  and  yet  nurse   in  his   heart 


8  KING   FERDINAND  [chap.  ii. 

ambitions  and  schemes  which  would  have  evoked  shrieks 
of  laughter  if  he  had  ever  dared  to  disclose  them.  It 
was  only  from  his  mother  that  he  got  encouragement 
and  sympathy.  And  she  was  the  only  being  that  he 
ever  really  loved,  and  who  had  any  influence  over  him. 
From  the  day  of  Princess  Clementine's  death,  a  void  was 
created  in  Ferdinand's  heart  which  nothing  could  ever  fill. 

On  the  abdication  of  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg, 
the  European  diplomatic  world  was  astonished  at  the 
proceedings  of  the  young  Prince  of  Saxe-Coburg,  who 
presented  himself  as  a  candidate.  The  Courts  laughed 
— ours  especially,  although  Prince  Lobanoff,  our  Am- 
bassador in  Vienna  and  an  intimate  friend  of  Princess 
Clementine's,  had  upheld  to  a  certain  extent  the  ambi- 
tions of  young  Ferdinand,  whom  he  represented  in  his 
dispatches  as  possessing  far  more  personality  than 
public  opinion  would  have  supposed.  In  Vienna  they 
were  certainly  glad  to  have  at  hand  some  one  of  no 
importance  who  would  be  willing  to  embark  on  the 
venture  ;  if  he  failed,  it  would  not  be  a  serious  rebuff  for 
Austrian  policy  ;  if  he  succeeded,— then  there  would  be 
at  the  head  of  Bulgaria  a  Catholic  prince,  related  to  the 
Austrian  Royal  Family,  and  naturally  prejudiced  against 
Russia,  who  at  this  very  moment  was  declaring  his 
election  and  installation  in  Bulgaria  to  be  illegal. 

We  are  all  acquainted  with  the  beginning  of  Prince 
Ferdinand's  reign  and  his  complete  effacement  before 
Stamboulov's  omnipotence.  We  know  of  his  marriage 
with  a  princess  of  Bourbon-Parma — a  young  lady  en- 
dowed with  neither  beauty  nor  health,  but  whose 
intelligence  and  high  moral  qualities  were  indisputable. 
She  had  a  true  affection  for  her  husband,  who  finally  re- 
ciprocated it  a  little  and  who  even  deigned  occasionally 
to  take  her  advice.  The  people  around  her  loved  her, 
and  even  in  her  new  country  she  succeeded  in  making 
herself  liked. 

But  Princess  Marie-Louise's  virtues  were  not  suffi- 
cient in  themselves  to  uphold  the  tottering  throne  of  the 


i9ii]       RECONCILIATION  WITH    RUSSIA  g 

Prince.  Ferdinand  felt  that  the  dictatorship  of  Stam- 
boulov  could  not  last  long,  that  the  country  was  tired  of 
it,  that  plots  would  multiply,  and  that  if  he  himself  did 
not  forsake  the  dictator  in  good  time,  the  downfall  of 
the  latter  would  inevitably  entail  his  own,  and  per- 
haps even  involve  him  and  his  family  in  a  sanguinary 
catastrophe. 

At  this  moment  the  change  of  regime  in  Russia, 
followed  by  the  appointment  of  Prince  Lobanoff  as 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  opened  up  to  Ferdinand 
vistas  of  salvation.  By  the  interposition  of  Serge 
Tatischeff,  a  publicist  of  great  talent  and  an  ex-diplomat, 
confidential  conferences  took  place  between  Lobanoff 
and  the  Prince  of  Bulgaria.  They  led  to  startling 
events  :  the  resignation  of  Stamboulov  ;  the  reception  of 
the  eldest  son  and  heir  of  the  Prince — who  had  been 
baptised  as  a  Catholic — into  the  pale  of  the  Orthodox 
Church ;  and  the  reconciliation  of  the  Prince  with 
Russia.  There  is  an  old  fairy-tale  in  which  an  un- 
natural lady  in  a  castle,  in  order  to  preserve  her  youth 
and  beauty  for  ever,  allows  a  horrible  witch  to  plunge 
her  child  at  midnight  into  water  which  has  been  cursed, 
and  to  turn  him  thereby  into  a  were-wolf  Those  who 
are  acquainted  with  the  feelings  of  the  old  Catholic 
families  of  Austria  and  Italy  can  readily  understand  that 
to  all  Ferdinand's  relations— and  especially  to  his  wife— 
the  deed  which  he  had  committed  with  regard  to  his 
child  was  almost  equivalent  to  the  infernal  baptism  in 
the  fairy-tale.  He  was  selling  the  soul  of  his  innocent 
child  in  order  to  keep  his  throne.  He  himself  was  for 
ever  after  haunted  by  feelings  of  shame  and  superstitious 
terror ;  and  he  never  forgave  Russia  for  this  sacrifice 
which  he  had  been  obliged  to  make  to  our  political  and 
religious  exigencies. 

Ferdinand  has  never  been  beloved  by  his  people, 
whom  he  hated  and  despised.  He  allowed  this  contempt 
to  be  apparent  to  foreigners,  especially  to  the  members 
of  the  diplomatic  corps  in  Sofia.     ("  Countess,  allow  me 


10  KING   FERDINAND  [chap.  ii. 

time  to  put  on  my  gloves  :  I  have  to  shake  hands  with 
my  charming  subjects,  and  I  never  risk  that  with  a  bare 
hand."  "Madame,  I  am  going  to  take  you  into  the 
great  hall,  where  the  ilite  of  Sofia  is  assembled ;  you 
will  see  dreadful  faces  !  Do  not  be  alarmed  ! "  These 
are  the  kind  of  things  that  I  myself  have  heard  him  say. 
And  he  did  so  repeatedly.) 

But  Prince  and  subjects  were  agreed  on  other  points 
than  those  of  personal  relations  and  sympathies.  In 
politics,  the  Bulgarians  considered  Ferdinand  an  admir- 
able tool  for  their  national  aspirations ;  his  personal 
ambition,  his  intelligence,  his  great  cunning,  his  parent- 
age and  connections,  were  all  great  natural  assets  to  the 
Bulgarian  cause.  On  his  side  the  Prince  knew  that  on 
questions  of  foreign  policy,  he  could  always  rely  on 
Bulgarian  patriotism,  stubbornness  and  artfulness,  and 
that  in  the  event  of  war,  officers  and  men  would  fight 
with  ferocious  and  even  brutal  courage,  and  would 
display  that  tenacity,  endurance  and  voluntary  sub- 
mission to  iron  discipline  which  would  make  the 
Bulgarian  army  one  of  the  finest  in  the  world. 

Since  the  downfall  and  assassination  of  Stamboulov, 
and  the  reconciliation  with  Russia,  the  Prince  had  been 
able  to  breathe  more  freely  and  to  feel  that  he  was  at 
last  master  of  the  country.  But  dangers  and  difficulties 
still  existed.  Party  quarrels,  and  passionate  national 
aspirations  exploited  first  by  one  side  and  then  by  the 
other ;  the  flagrant  incompatibility  between  a  decadent 
prince  of  Franco- Austrian  origin  and  a  people  composed 
of  "peasants  of  the  Danube";  Macedonia  in  a  perpetual 
state  of  ferment  and  hurling  at  Sofia  her  rifT-rafT  who 
were  past-masters  in  the  art  of  conspiracy — all  com- 
bined to  keep  alive  the  Prince's  fears  and  to  sharpen  his 
instinct  for  intrigue.  Ferdinand  by  his  very  nature 
belonged  to  those  men  who,  in  order  to  compass  their 
ends,  are  far  more  inclined  to  bring  into  play  the  vices 
than  the  virtues  of  those  around  them.  His  reign  served 
to  develop  this  tendency.  He  loved  to  stir  up  irreconcil- 
able rivalries,  he  excelled  in  the  art  of  keeping  the  fear  of 


t9Ti]  FERDINAND'S  JANIZARIES  n 

judgment  ever  before  political  men  who  had  compromised 
themselves  by  bribery  and  corruption,  and  in  holding 
them  by  the  dread  of  punishment  or  by  the  necessity  of 
relying  on  his  protection  or  forgiveness.  In  191 3  there 
was  at  one  time  in  Bulgaria  a  Cabinet  composed 
almost  entirely  of  men  who  had  either  been  sentenced 
and  forgiven,  or  who  were  on  trial  for  malpractices  and 
abuse  of  power. 

The  military  element,  always  dangerous  in  these 
countries  of  pronunciamoifos,  became  the  object  of 
the  Prince's  special  attention.  Ferdinand  took  great 
trouble  over,  and  spent  his  own  money  on  building,  an 
enormous  school  for  officers  in  Sofia,  and  supplied  all 
the  necessary  accessories.  The  young  men  are  com- 
pletely isolated  from  the  world,  and  are  under  the 
supervision  of  instructors  possessing  Ferdinand's  com- 
plete confidence ;  their  national  feeling  is  intensified, 
but  at  the  same  time  they  are  taught  to  look  on  the 
goodwill  of  the  sovereign  and  supreme  chief  of  the 
army  as  the  sole  source  of  all  welfare  and  promotion. 
When  the  young  men  leave  the  school  the  vigilant  eye 
of  the  master  is  still  on  them.  In  order  to  isolate  the 
soldiers  in  their  garrisons  in  civil  surroundings,  com- 
fortable officers'  messes  were  inaugurated  everywhere 
at  the  Prince's  own  expense.  Good  food  and  good  wines 
were  provided  at  extremely  low  prices ;  officers  passed 
all  their  spare  time  there,  and  they  learnt  above  all 
things  to  be  very  guarded  and  discreet.  They  realised 
that  there  were  eavesdroppers  about  who  repeated 
to  their  superior  officers  and  even  to  the  Sovereign 
things  they  had  discussed  amongst  themselves,  and  they 
discovered  that  capable  and  deserving  officers  had  often 
been  arrested  in  the  midst  of  a  brilliant  career,  whilst 
promotion  had  been  given  to  others  whose  only  claim 
to  it  had  been  their  talent  in  gaining  access  to  the 
master's  ear.  Ferdinand,  who  is  well  versed  in  history, 
knew  that  the  Sultans,  when  raising  janizaries,  used  to 
take  Bulgarian  boys,  convert  them  to  Islamism,  and 
have  them  educated  in  special  schools.     He  wished  to 


12  KING   FERDINAND  [chap.  ii. 

have   his  own  janizaries,   and  he   succeeded    up   to   a 
point. 

At  the  time  that  I  became  acquainted  with  Ferdinand 
and  his  Court,  Princess  Marie-Louise  had  been  dead 
some  years ;  her  death  had  caused  sincere  grief  to  all 
around  her,  and  had  put  an  end  to  all  family-life  in  the 
Palace  in  Sofia.  Princess  Clementine  had  followed  her 
daughter-in-law  to  the  grave,  leaving  a  terrible  void  in 
her  son's  life;  he  had  married  again,  but  his  second 
wife  played  no  part  whatever  in  his  life,  or  in  that  of 
his  subjects.  The  King  plunged  into  voluntary  solitude, 
absorbed  completely  in  his  plans,  his  dreams  of  grandeur, 
his  acute  anxieties,  his  masterly  political  combinations. 

If  Ferdinand  had  lived  in  the  very  middle  of  the 
"  Quattro  cento  "  as  podcsta  either  of  Ferrara  or  Mantua, 
he  would  have  vacillated  between  the  Pope,  the  King  of 
France,  the  Roman  Emperor  and  the  "  Serenissima " ; 
he  would  have  pillaged  orphanages  and  erected  beauti- 
ful buildings ;  he  would  have  caused  his  enemies  to  be 
stabbed  at  night  in  the  streets,  or  he  would  have 
poisoned  them  at  his  feasts  ;  he  would  have  surrounded 
himself  with  scholars  and  artists,  and  luxurious  palaces, 
with  brocades  and  halberdiers  covered  in  gold  lace. 
He  would  certainly  have  possessed  that  fine  and  true 
artistic  taste  which  now  he  only  pretends  to  have.  Born 
four  centuries  too  late,  the  King  of  the  Bulgarians  con- 
tents himself  with  indulging  in  dreams  of  greatness, 
with  dressing-up  as  a  Byzantine  "  Basileus,"  and  with 
being  portrayed  thus  by  third-rate  painters  ;  instead  of 
erecting  palaces,  he  is  content  to  lay-out  botanical 
gardens,  for,  far  from  having  become  rich  as  a  sovereign, 
he  has  on  the  contrary  ruined  himself  by  presents,  endow- 
ments and  pecuniary  assistance  destined  to  purchase 
partisans ;  being  unable  to  exterminate  his  enemies  by 
poison  or  steel,  Ferdinand  endeavours  to  pit  them  one 
against  the  other.  But,  exactly  like  his  mediaeval  proto- 
types, he  wields  the  weapon  of  political  intrigue  admir- 
ably, preferring  it  to  any  other  occupation  or  any  other 


i9ii]  PORTRAIT  OF  THE   KING  13 

concern,  displaying,  however,  more  elasticity  than  perse- 
verance, more  audacity  in  conceiving  his  plans  than 
determination  in  carrying  them  out. 

The  portrait  that  I  am  drawing  of  the  King  of  the 
Bulgarians  may  appear  to  be  very  black  and  much 
exaggerated.  And  yet,  in  passing  judgment  on  this 
complicated  character  and  on  this  person  so  universally 
disapproved  of,  I  am  ready  to  plead  extenuating  cir- 
cumstances. 

The  exercise  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty  in  a  Balkan 
country  does  not  come  within  the  category  of  callings 
which  ennoble  the  characters  of  those  who  pursue  them. 
More  especially  must  one  admit  this  when  it  is  a  question 
of  Bulgaria  and  the  Bulgarians,  a  people  already  cursed 
once  by  history — for  it  is  they  who  brought  the  Turks 
into  Europe — and  who  then,  during  five  centuries  of  a 
particularly  cruel  yoke,  being  deprived  of  the  slightest 
vestige  of  national  autonomy,  became  uncouth  and  less 
civilised  than  any  other  nation  of  the  Near  East. 

In  a  word,  for  thirty  years  Ferdinand  and  the 
Bulgarians  have  mutually  corrupted  each  other. 

But  we  ought  to  place  to  the  moral  credit  of  the  King 
of  the  Bulgarians  the  fact  that  in  the  whole  course  of 
his  existence  as  prince,  he  has  lived  exclusively  in  the 
political  life  of  his  people,  interesting  himself  deeply 
and  solely  in  the  problem  of  the  raising  of  Bulgaria,  and 
consecrating  himself  to  that  at  all  hours  and  on  all 
occasions.  This  undoubtedly  endued  him  with  strength 
in  comparison  with  other  sovereigns,  especially  with 
those  whose  private  life  meant  far  more  to  them  than 
their  public  life  and  that  of  their  subjects.  Some  were 
mainly  occupied  in  increasing  their  fortune ;  others  gave 
themselves  up  to  sensual  pleasures ;  others  again  sub- 
ordinated everything — even  their  most  sacred  duties — 
to  the  joys  and  cares  of  family  life ;  Ferdinand  had  two 
passions  only :  the  consolidation  of  his  throne  and  the 
career  of  his  people. 

In  Ferdinand's  defence  one  must  also  plead  the  fact 
that  he  was  born  neurasthenic,  and  that  the  circumstances 


14  KING  FERDINAND  [chap.  ii. 

of  his  life  and  calling  greatly  aggravated  this  tendency. 
To  this  is  due  his  indecision,  unsuspected  by  the  public 
at  large,  and  also  his  suspiciousness,  so  patent  to  every 
one.  Ferdinand  has  never  been  able  to  come  to  a 
decision  unaided.  He  could  evolve,  and  cleverly 
elaborate  the  details  of,  a  political  combination ;  when 
the  moment  came  to  carry  it  out  he  needed  another  will 
to  impose  itself  on  his  and  to  force  him  to  act.  For  a 
long  time  his  mother  had  furnished  the  necessary  will- 
power. With  Princess  Clementine's  death,  Ferdinand's 
indecision  assumed  formidable  proportions.  In  1908, 
when  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  nearly  set  all  Europe  by 
the  ears,  Ferdinand,  warned  in  time  by  M.  d'Aerenthal, 
prepared  to  follow  up  the  Austrian  step  by  the  pro- 
clamation of  Bulgarian  independence  and  sovereignty. 
Everything  was  carefully  arranged  and  prepared ;  but 
at  the  vital  moment  it  was  necessary  for  M.  Malinov 
and  his  colleagues  to  force  themselves  on  him  in  his 
saloon-carriage  and  to  drag  a  decision  from  him — they 
succeeded  far  more  by  threats  than  by  persuasion.  And 
this  is  no  solitary  example. 

Touching  his  deep  distrust  I  must  say  that  I  have 
seldom  seen  any  one  more  suspicious  than  King 
Ferdinand.  Nearly  every  conversation  that  I  had  with 
him  began  in  a  favourable  manner;  one  was  face  to  face 
with  an  intelligent,  cultivated  and  subtle  questioner 
willing  to  use  his  intellectual  charm  and  entering  to  a 
certain  extent  into  one's  point  of  view ;  then  all  of  a 
sudden,  without  any  apparent  reason,  a  shadow  would 
cross  his  face,  his  expression  became  crafty,  and  the 
King's  thoughts  were  abruptly  hidden  from  one,  and  one 
had  to  be  content  with  a  medley  of  evasions  and 
commonplaces.  This  was  because  at  a  given  moment 
the  usual  thought  had  crossed  the  King's  mind:  "Ah I 
but  who  knows  whether  he  is  not  laying  a  trap  for  me? 
Whether  he  is  not  seeking  an  answer  from  me  which 
may  compromise  or  bind  me?"  From  that  moment  all 
one's  arguments  were  futile. 


i9ii]  MY   NEW  COLLEAGUE  15 

This  was  the  Sovereign  to  whom  I  came  to  present 
my  credentials,  and  whom  I  was  to  have  as  colleague 
during  the  course  of  the  most  serious  events  that 
Bulgaria  has  ever  passed  through,  and  which  have  had 
a  fatal  effect  on  our  relations  to  the  Bulgarian  people. 


CHAPTER  III 

BULGARIA   IN    I9II 

The  presentation  of  his  credentials  by  a  foreign  Minister 
takes  place  in  Sofia  with  the  usual  ceremonial  but  with 
a  little  more  pomp  than  in  other  Balkan  capitals. 

On  the  appointed  day,  gala-coaches  and  an  escort  of 
Hussars  of  the  Royal  Guard  came  to  fetch  me  and  my 
suite,  and  thus  in  full  uniform  and  accompanied  by  the 
general  aide-de-camp  of  the  King,  I  crossed  the  short 
space  between  the  Russian  Legation  and  the  King's 
Palace,  an  unimposing  building  situated — ^justas  in  Abel 
Hermant's  play — between  the  public  gardens,  the  square 
and  the  four-storied  house. 

The  King  awaited  me  in  the  Throne  Room,  with 
M.  Malinov,  President  of  the  Council  and  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  at  his  side ;  I  read  my  speech  and 
handed  my  credentials  to  the  King,  I  listened  to  his 
reply,  after  which  he  stretched  out  his  hand  to  me  with 
a  few  words  of  welcome  and  invited  me  to  his  study, 
the  doors  of  which  closed  upon  us  without  M.  Malinov 
being  invited  to  accompany  us.  There  the  King  begged 
me  to  be  seated,  and  we  held  a  fairly  long  conversation 
touching  on  political  questions  of  the  moment  and  the 
news  from  the  Russian  Court, — a  conversation  of  no 
importance,  but  in  the  course  of  which  the  King  was 
pleased  to  show  me  a  great  deal  of  friendliness.  When 
we  had  exhausted  these  subjects,  we  returned  to  the 
Audience  Hall,  where  the  King's  Court  and  the  Prime 
Minister  were  still  waiting.  Having  been  dismissed 
with  great  ceremony  by  the  King,  I  was  taken  to  pay 
my  court  to  Queen  Eleanor  and  the  heir  to  the  throne, 
and  then  1  left,  surrounded  by  the  same  pomp. 

i6 


i9n]  FALL  OF   MALINOV  CABINET  17 

The  King's  treatment  of  his  Prime  Minister  did  not 
altogether  astonish  me ;  I  had  often  heard  of  the  off- 
hand manner  with  which  he  treated  his  Ministers ; 
moreover,  during  the  customary  interview  which  I  had 
had  the  day  before  with  M.  Malinov,  the  latter  did  not 
conceal  from  me  that  the  days  of  his  Cabinet  were 
numbered,  and  that  in  all  probability  he  would  shortly 
hand  in  his  resignation  and  that  of  his  colleagues  to 
the  King.  A  few  days  after  my  audience  I  left  for  Paris, 
in  order  to  collect  my  establishment  and  to  make  the 
necessary  purchases  for  my  new  installation.  I  stayed 
a  couple  of  days  in  Vienna,  and  there  I  read  in  the 
papers  of  the  resignation  of  the  Malinov  Cabinet,  and 
of  the  formation  of  the  Gueshov-Danev  Coalition 
Ministry,  with  the  leaders  of  which  I  had  had  long 
conversations  before  my  departure. 

The  fall  of  the  Malinov  Cabinet  was  not  due  to 
any  acute  political  crisis.  As  always  happens  in  parlia- 
mentary countries,  but  more  particularly  in  the  Balkan 
States,  the  Ministry  was  simply  worn  out  by  a  fairly 
long  period  of  power,  and  then  foreign  political  circum- 
stances were  assuming  another  direction  which  naturally 
demanded  other  actors. 

The  Malinov  Cabinet  had  witnessed  a  crisis  as 
strange  as  it  was  unforeseen  in  Macedonian  affairs.  As 
is  well  known,  during  the  first  years  of  the  century 
European  diplomacy  had  undergone  high  trials  in 
Macedonia.  I  mean  the  usual  sequence,  but  becoming 
year  by  year  more  complicated,  of  plots,  provocations, 
local  massacres ;  and  above  all  the  vehemence  of  the 
struggle  between  the  rival  Christian  nationalities : 
Serbian,  Bulgarian,  Greek ;  between  the  two  latter, 
particularly,  deeds  of  ferocious  cruelty  were  committed. 

The  situation  gradually  led  to  the  direct  interference 
of  Europe.  The  country  was  placed  under  the  authority 
of  an  Ottoman  High  Commissioner  chosen  by  the 
Powers ;  two  civil  commissioners — one  Russian  and  one 
Austrian — were  added ;  European  officers  were  placed 


i8  BULGARIA    IN    1911  [chap.  111. 

at  the  head  of  a  gendanncric  which  they  strove  to 
reform ;  finally,  an  international  financial  commission 
inaugurated  in  the  province  a  system  for  controlling 
and  preserving  the  resources  of  the  country  from  the 
demands  of  the  Ottoman  Treasury. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  relations  between  the 
Russian  and  Austrian  commissioners  were  not  at  all 
strained,  and  that  this  good  understanding  reacted  in  a 
favourable  manner  on  the  actions  of  the  Consuls  of  the 
two  Empires  in  Macedonia.  This  latter  state  of  things 
was  due  to  the  modus  vivendi  existing  between  the  two 
rival  diplomacies  since  1897,  which  threw  cold  water  on 
the  efforts  of  the  Balkan  States,  especially  those  of 
Bulgaria,  to  create  friction  between  Russia  and  Austria, 
and  under  cover  of  this  friction  to  foment  serious 
trouble  in  Macedonia.  With  the  year  1908  came  the 
overthrow  of  this  scheme,  which  was  partly  artificial, 
partly  necessary  and  beneficial  to  the  work  of  maintain- 
ing the  peace  of  the  world. 

In  July  of  that  year,  at  an  inopportune  moment  for 
every  one,  the  Turkish  Revolution  broke  out.  In  a  few 
short  weeks,  Abdul  Hamid's  regime  and — more  important 
still— all  the  former  autocratic  Turkish  regime  were 
destroyed,  and  at  the  same  time  the  enormous  influence 
which  Germany  'had  been  able  to  acquire  in  Constan- 
tinople seemed  to  be  lost  for  ever.  Under  the  influence 
of  spontaneous  enthusiasm,  the  Christian  nations  of 
Turkey  believed  ardently  in  the  inauguration  of  a  new 
era  of  fraternity  and  progress,  they  threw  themselves 
into  the  arms  of  the  sons  of  their  former  oppressors,  and 
wished  to  work  out  the  salvation  of  their  common 
country.  Armenians,  Roman  Catholic  Syrians,  Greeks 
of  the  Archipelago,  and  Bulgarians  of  Macedonia  forgot 
their  grievances  and  their  old  quarrels.  Heads  of 
Macedonian  bands  fraternised  with  the  members  of  the 
Committee  "  Union  and  Progress  " ;  Greeks  and  Bul- 
garians embraced  one  another ;  and  meanwhile  the  civil 
commissioners,  the  officers  of  the  gendarmerie^  the 
European  members   of  the  financial   commission  were 


19. i]  THE  TURKISH    REVOLUTION  19 

gradually  disappearing  like  a  useless  appendage,  in- 
compatible with  the  unlimited  moral  credit  which  the 
Powers  vied  with  one  another  in  assigning  to  Turkey  in 
her  radical  renovation. 

Moreover,  relations  between  the  European  Powers 
themselves  were  becoming  particularly  complicated 
during  the  same  year  1908. 

The  act  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  had 
been  prepared  before  the  Turkish  Revolution,  which  as  I 
said  before  had  been  a  surprise  to  every  one. 

As  the  year  1908  coincided  with  the  Jubilee  of  the 
sixty  years'  reign  of  Francis  Joseph  of  Austria,  a  newly- 
appointed  and  ambitious  Minister — M.  d'Aerenthal — 
wishing  to  make  his  name  from  the  outset,  desired  to 
present  the  annexation  as  a  Jubilee  present  to  the  aged 
Monarch.  In  M.  Isvolsky — also  newly  appointed,  and 
keen  to  make  his  country  forget  the  recent  disasters  on 
the  shores  of  the  Pacific  and  to  replace  Russian  policy 
in  the  historic  groove  of  the  Near  East — M.  d'Aerenthal 
found  a  suitable  partner,  willing  to  listen  to  proposals 
and  to  formulate  some  of  his  own.  A  friendly  exchange 
of  views  took  place  through  the  interposition  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg.  The 
Russian  Foreign  Office  received  the  wishes  of  Vienna 
fairly  favourably,  and  suggested  on  their  side  that  it  was 
necessary  for  Russia  that  the  government  of  the  Straits 
should  be  improved  in  her  favour.  In  the  very  midst 
of  these  discussions,  which  were  endorsed  by  a  very 
friendly  exchange  of  views  between  St.  Petersburg  and 
London  on  this  same  question  of  the  Straits,  the  Turkish 
Revolution  broke  out.  This  event,  however,  did  not 
check  the  plans  of  the  two  partners,  and  the  interview 
planned  between  M.  Isvolsky  and  M.  d'Aerenthal 
took  place  all  the  same  at  Buchlau.  But  there  all  the 
cards  were  shuffled.  The  ambitious  and  unscrupulous 
Austrian  Minister  persisted  with  his  schemes  and,  in 
order  to  take  Europe  by  surprise,  hastened  the  act 
of  annexation,  with  the  result  that  Russia— supported 
by  England  and  France,  who  thought  the  moment  had 

c 


20  BULGARIA   IN    1911  [chap.  iii. 

arrived  to  regain  tiieir  former  influence  in  Constantinople 
— refused  to  demand  the  compensation  of  which  she  had 
formerly  dreamt,  and  also  absolutely  refused  to  recognise 
the  annexation. 

The  diplomatic  negotiations  which  ensued  did  not 
turn  to  our  advantage,  as  is  well  known.  Thanks  to  the 
support  which  Germanyjhastened  to  lend  to  Austria,  the 
annexation  was  first  recognised  by  the  Sublime  Porte, 
then  by  Russia  and  by  the  other  Powers  on  Russia's 
representations.  M.  d'Aerenthal  received  the  much 
coveted  title  of  Count ;  and  Russian  public  opinion, 
violently  excited  by  the  ultra-patriotic  Press,  felt  and 
displayed  deep  displeasure. 

This  displeasure  was  much  exaggerated  :  the  countries 
annexed  had  been  for  a  long  time  under  the  real  power 
of  Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia  herself,  in  her  con- 
fidential negotiations  with  Austria,  had  contemplated  on 
four  separate  occasions  the  possibility  of  the  annexation 
pure  and  simple  of  these  provinces  (firstly  in  1875  at 
Reichstatt,  secondly  in  1879  at  a  select  and  secret  sitting 
of  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  thirdly  in  1897  on  the  occasion 
of  the  Emperor  Francis-Joseph's  visit  to  St.  Petersburg, 
and  fourthly  at  Murzsteg);  concerning  the  government 
of  the  Straits,  the  right  of  passage  through  these  for  our 
men-of-war  belonging  to  the  Black  Sea  Fleet — which 
was  all  that  we  asked — did  not  constitute  any  very  real 
advantage  for  Russia,  for  in  the  event  of  political  com- 
plications the  Porte  could  always  close  the  Straits  to  us 
de  facto,  finally,  the  crisis  due  to  the  annexation  had 
brought  us  far  nearer  to  England  and  had  consolidated 
the  entente  once  for  all. 

Further,  our  relations  with  Bulgaria  at  the  settle- 
ment of  the  crisis  of  1908-1909  assumed  a  particularly 
favourable  character.  Looking  on  himself,  especially  at 
the  outset  of  his  ministerial  career,  as  a  continuer  of 
Prince  LobanofTs  policy,  M.  Isvolsky  inherited  also  the 
Prince's  feelings  of  good-will  towards  the  Bulgarians 
and  towards  Ferdinand.  Thanks  to  the  efforts  of  our 
Foreign   Secretary — supported  by  the  Grand-Duchess 


i9ii]         INDEPENDENCE   OF   BULGARIA  21 

Vladimir,  the  sworn  patroness  of  King  Ferdinand  at  the 
Imperial  Court— the  title  of  "Tsar,"  which  the  latter  had 
assumed  under  cover  of  the  last  European  crisis,  was 
accorded  to  him  by  Russia  before  all  the  other  Powers. 
Ferdinand,  when  hastening  to  the  funeral  of  the  Grand- 
Duke  Vladimir,  who  had  just  died,  was  greeted  in 
St.  Petersburg  with  the  title  of  "  Tsarinian  Majesty  " 
and  royal  honours  were  given  to  him. 

The  independence  of  Bulgaria  was  also  recognised  by 
us  without  difficulty,  and  in  order  to  facilitate  a  definite 
arrangement  between  the  new  kingdom  and  its  former 
suzerain,  our  Foreign  Office  proposed  the  following 
combination  and  succeeded  in  getting  it  accepted. 
Turkey  consented  to  transfer  the  arrears  of  the  Bulgarian 
contribution  to  the  account  of  the  war-contribution 
which  she  had  owed  us  since  1878  ;  and  Bulgaria,  entirely 
free  of  all  liabilities  to  the  Ottoman  Empire,  pledged 
herself  to  indemnify  us  by  adequate  annuities.  M. 
Isvolsky  liked  to  say  in  those  days  that  Russia  by  her 
benevolent  actions  had,  as  it  were,  freed  Bulgaria  for 
the  second  time  ;  and  up  to  a  point  he  was  right,  for  our 
attitude  under  these  circumstances  had  effectually  laid 
the  foundation  of  an  extremely  close  Russo-Bulgarian 
understanding  which  lasted  till  the  end  of  1912. 

Such  were  the  advantages  accruing  to  Russian  politics 
from  the  crisis  of  1908-1909. 

It  is  true  that  some  of  our  statesmen  and  of  our 
diplomats,  such  as  Count  Witte,  M.  Kokovtzoff",  M. 
Zinovieff,  Count  Osten-Sacken,  Prince  Ouroussoff  1  and 
others,  sincerely  regretted  everything  that  had  happened 
since  the  interview  at  Buchlau,  and  saw  in  it  a  decided 
step  towards  the  universally  dreaded  European  con- 
flagration. But  the  opinions  of  these  men  had  their 
origin  in  a  point  of  view  directly  opposed  to  that 
prevailing  amongst  the  bulk  of  Russian  politicians  and 
intellectual  people,  and  in  consequence  their  critics  had 
nothing  in  common  with  the  ordinary  critics.  Alas!  The 
terrible   events   which   dismembered    before   our   very 

'  Our  Ambassadors  in  Constaiitinople,  Berlin,  and  Vienna. 


22  r^ULGARIA    IN    1911  [cii.  III. 

eyes  our  unhappy  country,  so  ill-prepared  to  face 
them,  justified  the  apprehensions  of  these  statesmen. 
Altogether,  the  crisis  of  August,  1908  to  March,  1909, 
marked  the  end  of  a  policy  of  compromise  between 
Russia  and  Austria,  and  accentuated  the  division  of 
Elurope  into  two  directly  opposed  camps,  whilst  compli- 
cations were  to  be  foreseen  in  the  near  future  on  the 
Balkan  question — henceforth  to  be  a  burning  one. 

The  Balkan  statesmen,  ever  practical  and  on  the 
alert,  immediately  took  advantage  of  the  new  state  of 
affairs.  They  realised  that  Russian  policy  would  most 
certainly  wish  to  avenge  the  Buchlau  trap,  and  the 
thinly  disguised  German  ultimatum  of  March,  1909;  and 
that  in  consequence  it  was  necessary  to  prepare  for 
events  which  might  occur — or  even  to  provoke  them  if 
they  did  not  occur  with  sufficient  rapidity. 

Moreover  the  evolution  of  the  new  Turkish  Govern- 
ment facilitated  these  schemes  of  the  Balkan  States  and 
gave  fresh  impetus  to  their  national  aspirations. 

Two  years  had  not  gone  by  since  the  second  taking-up 
of  arms  by  the  Young  Turks  (in  April,  1909,  followed  by 
the  final  deposing  of  Abdul-Hamid)  when  the  Ottoman 
revolutionaries  resumed  towards  their  Christian  fellow- 
citizens  the  same  policy  as  that  pursued  by  the  "  Red 
Sultan,"  First  came  the  horrible  massacre  of  Adana — 
said  to  have  been  fomented  by  the  partisans  of  the  Old 
Regime,  but  in  the  repression  and  punishment  of  which 
the  New  Regime  displayed  rather  too  obvious  a  mild- 
ness ;  then  by  degrees  the  Young  Turks  imagined  that 
the  Christians  were  becoming  too  grasping — which  was 
possibly  fairly  true — and  to  check  this  abuse  of  liberty 
they  sought  to  affirm  the  superiority,  indispensable  in 
their  eyes,  of  the  believing  Osmanlis.  They  did  this  so 
unconstrainedly  and  with  so  much  impatience  that  the 
Christians  were  forced  to  guard  their  new  rights  by  the 
old  means  of  plots  and  recourse  to  foreign  protection. 
Little  by  little  the  former  state  of  chaos  reappeared  in 
Macedonia  and  Thrace,  then  in  Armenia  and  Syria. 
And    simultaneously    with    this    metamorphoses    of 


i9ii]  A    NEW   CABINET  23 

Turkey,  the  Talaats,  the  Djavids  and  others  who  now 
ruled  the  Ottoman  Empire  uncontrolled,  were  allowing 
themselves  to  be  more  and  more  allured  by  the  advances 
made  to  them  by  German  policy  through  the  medium 
of  the  "great  and  glorious  Enver,"  the  promoter  of  the 
Revolution,  who  was  a  military  agent  in  Berlin,  and 
who  lived  there  surrounded  by  Imperial  care  and 
flattery. 

Towards  the  spring  of  191 1  the  cycle  of  Turkish 
evolution  was  complete,  and  a  practically  quo  ante 
political  situation  existed,  except  that  instead  of  a 
Europe  ostensibly  united,  the  East  had  to  deal  with  a 
Europe  frankly  divided  into  two  camps  and  arming 
herself  with  feverish  haste. 

Malinov's  Radical  Cabinet  had  had  its  day ;  it  had 
profited  by  the  crisis  of  1908  to  secure  the  complete 
independence  of  the  country,  and  to  take  over  the  section 
of  the  Ottoman  railways  which  still  existed  in  Rumelia; 
it  had  maintained  intimate  relations  with  the  Bulgarian 
revolutionaries  in  Macedonia  before  as  well  as  after  the 
short-lived  period  of  reconciliation  and  fraternisation 
with  the  Turks ;  it  had  succeeded  in  securing  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Russian  representatives  and  had  not 
made  unfair  use  of  it.  But  times  had  changed,  causing 
a  new  situation  to  arise.  For  Bulgaria  the  key  to  this 
situation  lay  in  Russian  protection  and  good-will.  The 
Bulgarian  Radicals  were  on  good  terms  with  our 
diplomacy  and  on  excellent  ones  with  our  Liberal  Party, 
but  Russian  diplomacy  was  suspected  of  "  Moderantism  " 
and  our  Liberal  Party  was  far  less  enthusiastic  about 
enterprises  in  the  Near  East  than  were  the  Nation- 
alists who  gathered  round  the  Novoye  Vremja,  the  Octo- 
brists  of  the  Duma,  etc.  ...  It  was  these  groups  who 
had  to  be  conciliated ;  moreover,  they  had  corre- 
spondents in  Bulgaria  and  special  proteges  amongst  the 
old  Bulgarian  Nationalists,  commencing  by  the  pure 
Russophiles  with  M.  Danev  at  their  head  as  the  recog- 
nised  successor  of  the  old  Dragan  Tzankov.     It  was 


24  BULGARIA   IN    191 1  [chap.  iii. 

therefore  necessary  to  comply  with  the  newstate  of  affairs 
and  to  present  to  Slavophile  Russia,  always  impatient 
of  action,  an  "orthodox"  Bulgarian  Ministry,/.^,  a  group 
of  people  of  ancient  traditions,  and  whose  very  names 
would  be  synonymous  with  devotion  to  Russia.  This 
was  done  by  fusing  the  Danev  party  with  jhat  of 
Gueshov;  and  King  Ferdinand,  who  personally  did  not 
like  the  one  and  detested  the  other,  gave  way  for  once 
to  the  combination,  and  accepted  the  formation  of  the 
"great  National  Ministry."  As  to  M.  Malinov'c  party, 
it  promised  not  to  oppose  his  successors  in  m^J^jers  of 
foreign  policy. 

This  was  the  meaning  of  the  change  of  Cabinet  which 
took  place  in  March,  191 1,  and  this  the  political  situation 
in  Bulgaria  when  I  took  up  my  post  there. 


CHAPTER  IV 

RUSSIAN   AND   BULGARIAN   RELATIONS 

I  HAD  been  acquainted  with  M.  Gueshov  for  a  long  time, 
and  I  had  a  liking  for  this  calm,  self-possessed  old  man, 
whom  I  held  to  be  perfectly  sincere  in  his  feelings 
towards  Russia.  Such  he  appeared  to  me  during  the 
whole  time  that  I  had  dealings  with  him.  In  the  spring 
of  19 1 2,  when  I  was  in  St.  Petersburg,  M.  Sazonoff,  to 
whom  I  imparted  my  sentiments  conceiving  Gueshov, 
simply  remarked  :  "  he  is  crafty "  ;  he  repeated  this 
in  1913  when  Gueshov  had  already  been  out  of  office 
for  some  months;  but  he  would  never  explain  his 
words.  I  conclude  that  this  opinion  of  Gueshov  came 
from  a  Bulgarian  source.  It  is  also  true  that  since 
1 9 14  M.  Gueshov's  newspaper.  The  Mir,  has  gone  over 
rather  openly  to  the  side  of  the  enemies  of  Russia 
and  the  Entente.  Nevertheless,  until  I  have  proof  to  the 
contrary  I  shall  persist  in  asserting  that  during  his 
whole  term  of  office  his  attitude  towards  us  was  perfectly 
correct,  and  that  he  sincerely  desired  to  act  in  accordance 
with  Russia's  views.  After  the  catastrophe  of  191 3 
Bulgarian  feelings  changed  and  became  so  hostile  that 
even  the  passing  over  of  old  Gueshov  to  the  enemy's 
camp  could  be  admitted  as  a  possibility;  but  one  ought 
to  know  if  this  really  ever  took  place,  and  whether 
Gueshov,  who  has  lived  abroad  a  great  deal  since  191 3; 
really  inspired  the  articles  in  The  Mir. 

At  one  time  also  I  had  been  acquainted  with  M. 
Todorov,^  who  in  the  Gueshov-Danev  Cabinet  held  the 
post  of  Minister  of  Finance  and  in  the  "  Narodniak  "  party 
the   second   place   after   M.  Gueshov.     He  was   a  very 

'  His  name  is  now  spelled  Theodorov,  and  he  is  Bulgarian  Plenipo- 
tentiary at  the  Conference  in  Paris. 

2; 


26   RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS  [chap.  iv. 

sincere  man  of  moderate  views,  though  a  little  too 
excitable  in  conversation.  No  one,  even  amongst  us, 
ever  doubted  the  sincerity  of  his  feelings  towards 
Russia. 

Among  the  Tzankovists,  I  knew  M.  Ludskonov  very 
well,  the  son-in-law  of  the  old  Tzankov  who  had  died 
in  March,  191 1.  He  was  a  perfectly  honest  and  sincere 
man  ;  his  feelings  towards  Russia — I  should  even  say 
his  devotion  to  the  Russian  cause — were  indisputable. 
But  a  little  weak  and  far  too  easy-going  by  nature,  he 
was  not  born  to  lead  a  party;  therefore  he  gave  up  his 
place  to  M.  Danev. 

I  had  never  met  the  latter  before  I  came  to  Sofia  as 
Minister.  As  soon  as  I  returned  from  Paris,  M.  Danev, 
who  in  the  meantime  had  been  made  Home  Secretary, 
called  on  me,  and  sketched  out  his  ministerial  pro- 
gramme. I  was  not  very  favourably  impressed  by  him. 
With  the  experience  I  had  acquired  of  Balkan  politicians, 
I  seemed  to  recognise  in  him  the  typical  characteristics 
of  the  sworn  Russophile — the  political  man  who,  whilst 
not  being  hostile  to  us,  considers  that  the  Russian 
representatives  are  forced  to  support  him  in  all  he  does, 
to  hate  all  his  enemies,  even  personal  ones,  and  to  see 
eye  to  eye  with  him  on  all  matters  affecting  his  country. 
Like  most  men  of  this  type,  Danev  appeared  to  me  to 
be  imbued  with  stubbornness  even  more  than  Bulgarian. 

During  his  visit  he  announced — as  if  he  was  saying 
something  that  would  cause  me  special  pleasure— that 
the  new  Government  was  going  to  carry  on  the  pro- 
secution, already  begun  by  the  Malinov  Cabinet,  of  M. 
Ghennadiev,  General  Savov  and  the  other  shufflers  who 
had  formerly  belonged  to  Stamboulov's  camp  and  who, 
as  was  universally  known,  had  been  guilty  of  financial 
dishonesty  when  last  in  office.  M.  Danev  apparently 
thought  that  the  Russian  Minister  ought  to  be  delighted 
at  the  imminent  conviction  of  the  "agents  of  Austria," 
which  would  render  them  harmless  for  ever.  He  was 
much  astonished  at  the  indifference  with  which  I  received 
the  news.      In  the  first  place  I  had  serious  doubts  as  to 


i9iil  M.   GUESHOV  27 

whether  Ferdinand  would  allow  men  to  be  completely 
crushed  who  might  be  of  use  to  him  in  the  event  of  any 
change  of  political  system,  and  then  I  considered  it  to  be 
beneath  the  dignity  of  a  representative  of  Russia  to  take 
an  interest  in  these  internal  quarrels  and  to  mix  up  our 
political  interests  with  a  case  which  only  concerned  the 
penal  laws  and  justice  of  the  country.  M.  Danev  then 
spoke  for  some  time  about  the  necessity  of  strengthening 
the  present  relations  between  Russia  and  Bulgaria  by 
the  conclusion  of  a  military  convention,  and  he  ended  by 
attacking  King  Ferdinand  very  violently.  What  he  said 
about  him  was  quite  true,  but  I  refused  to  follow  him  on 
to  this  dangerous  ground. 

I  was  far  more  satisfied  with  my  first  conversations 
with  M.  Gueshov,  who  I  often  saw  in  his  capacity  as 
Foreign  Secretary.  In  compliance  with  my  orders  from 
St.  Petersburg,  I  entered  into  practical  negotiations  with 
him  which  aimed  at  securing  definitely  the  use  of  the 
sum  lent  by  us  to  the  Bulgarians  in  1909,  and  at  obtain- 
ing at  last  the  payment — by  regular  annuities — of  the 
Bulgarian  debt  of  thirteen  million  francs,  unliquidated 
since  the  Russian  occupation  of  1877-79. 

I  succeeded  in  carrying  these  matters  through,  thanks 
to  the  good-will  of  M.  Gueshov  and  M.  Todorov,  who 
had  set  their  hearts  on  maintaining  the  commercial 
integrity  of  Bulgaria. 

King  Ferdinand  was  away  at  the  moment,  as  he 
generally  was,  either  when  there  were  no  dangers  or 
disturbances  ahead  in  the  country,  or  when  he  did  not 
wish  to  come  to  a  decision — but  to  await  developments — 
in  a  difficult  political  situation.  Hence,  he  was  away  a 
great  deal ;  moreover  he  was  bored  to  death  in  his 
Palace  in  Sofia. 

However,  the  King  returned  rather  early  in  the 
summer.  The  new  Cabinet,  in  agreement  with  the 
King  and  the  Radical  members  of  the  Opposition,  had 
just  put  a  constitutional  question  :  whether  the  Royal 


28   RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS  [chap.  iv. 

Government  should  be  granted  the  riglit  to  conclude 
secret  conventions  with  foreign  countries  before  sub- 
mitting them  to  the  Sobranje,  a  right  which  was  not 
mentioned  in  the  existing  constitution.  Hence  as  it  would 
be  necessary  to  add  an  additional  clause  to  the  organic 
law  of  the  country,  the  Great  Sobranje — i.e.  a  constituent 
assembly  alone  possessing  the  right  to  decide  the 
question— had  to  be  convened.  As  I  have  just  said,  the 
King,  his  Ministers  and  the  Radicals  who  were  not  in 
power  were  agreed  on  this  point.  The  Radicals  were 
desirous  of  following  up  the  conferences  they  had  held 
with  us  on  the  subject  of  a  Russo-Bulgarian  military 
convention  which  they  thought  was  on  the  eve  of  being 
concluded.  Moreover,  at  the  Russian  Legation  it  was 
thought  that  this  was  the  object  of  the  new  organic  law. 
In  the  country  at  large,  opposition  only  came  from 
the  Socialists  and  the  "  Agriculturists  " — a  new  party 
who  preached  the  strictest  economy  in  State  expendi- 
ture, and  who  were  irreconcilable  foes  to  war  and 
armaments.  Much  astonishment  was  created  in  Sofia 
when  the  Novoye  Vi^cmja  and  a  few  other  Russian 
Nationalist  newspapers  suddenly  began  to  support  the 
Bulgarian  Opposition,  represented  on  this  question  by 
elements  with  which  these  papers  had,  after  all,  nothing 
in  common.  The  Novoye  Vremja,  which  led  the  campaign, 
displayed  a  fear  that  if  the  Bulgarian  Government 
obtained  the  right  to  conclude  secret  treaties  without 
having  to  have  recourse  to  the  vote  of  the  Sobranje, 
Ferdinand  would  be  in  a  position  to  come  to  all  kinds  of 
agreements  with  Austria !  Our  Foreign  Secretar}'  had 
to  intervene  in  order  to  persuade  the  Novoye  Vremja  to 
relinquish  this  ill-timed  campaign. 

In  the  month  of  June  the  "  Great  Sobranje "  was 
convened  at  Tirnova,  and  the  Diplomatic  Corps  was 
invited  to  the  formal  opening.  We  had  a  special  train 
for  the  journey,  as  if  we  were  going  on  a  pleasure-trip. 
The  weather  was  beautiful,  the  political  sky  fairly  clear, 
and  most  of  the  Forrign  Ministers  were  on  pleasant 
terms.     The  followin;^"  summer  we  made  the  same  trip 


i9ii]  GENERAL   FICHEV   IN    RUSSIA  29 

for  ihe  festivities  marking  the  25th  anniversary  of 
Ferdinand's  reign.  But  how  changed  the  situation  had 
become  !  and  what  fears  haunted  us ! 

On  the  very  day  of  the  opening,  the  Assembly  passed 
the  proposed  law  by  a  large  majority,  in  spite  of  a  few 
violent  speeches  made  by  the  Socialist  leaders. 

Throughout  the  summer,  my  relations  with  Govern- 
ment and  Court  were  still  very  friendly.  On  mine  and 
our  Military  Attache's  initiative.  General  Fichev,  Chief  of 
the  Bulgarian  General  Staff,  was  invited  to  the  grand 
manoeuvres  at  Krasnoe-Selo,  where  he  was  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Emperor  and  to  meet  our  military  chiefs. 
Fichev,  who  had  finished  his  military  education  at  Turin, 
had  never  been  to  Russia,  and  was  looked  upon  as  a 
Stamboulovist  and  an  enemy  to  Russian  policy.  Yet  in 
his  relations  with  us  he  never  showed  any  hostile  feel- 
ings, but  appeared  to  be  sincere  and  moderate.  Acting 
on  the  principle  that  one  ought  to  attract  people 
possessing  genuine  qualities  and  not  repulse  them,  we 
took  the  necessary  steps  to  insure  a  hearty  welcome  to 
the  Bulgarian  General.  He  left  St.  Petersburg  flattered 
and  delighted.  Later  on,  in  momentous  circumstances, 
General  Fichev  displayed  a  sincerity  and  prudence  that 
many  Russophile  leaders  might  well  have  envied.  He 
vehemently  opposed  the  march  of  Bulgarian  troops  on 
Constantinople,  a  move  which  ended  in  the  bloody 
and  useless  sacrifices  of  Chataldja,  and  provoked  our 
suspicion  and  displeasure.  By  his  opposition  to  this, 
Fichev  fell  into  disgrace  with  his  master;  the  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  was  forced  to  apply  for  sick-leave  and 
to  return  to  Sofia,  leaving  the  direction  of  his  Staff  to 
his  adjutant  Nerezov.  The  latter  played  a  disastrous 
part  later  on  at  the  time  of  the  Bulgarian  attack  on 
the  Serbians  (June,  191 3). 

Fichev's  journey  to  Russia  was  followed  by  another 
of  far  greater  importance.  At  the  wish  expressed  by 
M.  Gueshov,  acting  as  the  King's  spokesman,  I  readily 
agreed  to  arrange   the  visit  of  the  Bulgarian  Crown- 


2,0    RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS  [ciiap.iv. 

Prince  to  his  godfather  the  Emperor.  My  suggestions 
were  favourable  received,  and  Prince  Boris  was  invited 
to  Kieff,  where  the  Imperial  Family  passed  the  month  of 
August,  and  from  there  he  was  to  accompany  them  to 
Tsarskoe-Selo.  The  young  Prince,  who  was  seventeen 
years  of  age,  had  never  been  to  Russia  and  did  not 
know  his  august  godfather. 

In  a  conversation  which  I  had  had  before  leaving 
St.  Petersburg  with  M.  Sazonoff,  he  had  confessed  to 
me  that  he  would  very  much  like  to  marry  one  of  the 
Grand-Duchesses,  daughters  of  the  Emperor,  to  the 
Crown-Prince  of  Rumania,  and  another  to  Prince  Boris. 
Only,  as  he  wisely  added,  it  would  be  necessary  to  be 
extremely  cautious,  as  he  had  not  mentioned  the  matter 
at  Tsarskoe-Selo,  and  he  knew  that  the  Emperor  and 
Empress  would  never  consent  to  arrange  marriages  for 
their  daughters  which  might  be  contrary  to  the  feelings 
and  inclinations  of  the  young  Grand-Duchesses  them- 
selves. 

Moreover,  from  a  political  point  of  view,  anything 
was  preferable  to  a  marriage  missed  by  a  refusal 
from  our  side :  these  humiliations  are  never  forgiven. 
I  agreed  entirely  with  M.  Sazonoff.  Therefore  one  can 
imagine  how  disagreeably  surprised  I  was  on  my  arrival 
in  Sofia  to  hear  my  assistants  talking  quite  openly  and 
unconstrainedly  about  the  future — and  apparently  settled 
— marriage  of  Prince  Boris  with  one  of  the  Emperor's 
daughters,  the  only  point  still  unsettled  being  whether 
he  was  to  marry  the  Grand-Duchess  Olga  or  the  Grand- 
Duchess  Tatiana!  The  First  Secretary  to  the  Legation, 
a  young  man  with  a  great  deal  of  assurance  and  a  very 
loud  voice,  even  went  so  far  as  to  mention  it  in  my 
presence,  at  the  salon  of  one  of  my  foreign  colleagues.  1 
immediately  silenced  my  young  and  impetuous  assistant 
by  asking  him  if  he  had  received  these  confidences  from 
the  Emperor  himself,  who  had  not  deigned  to  honour 
me  with  the  same  trust.  The  lesson  was  absolutely 
imperative,  but  it  drew  down  on  me  the  irreconcilable 
enmity  of  the  gentleman  in  question. 


i9ii]  MURDER  OF   M.  STOLYPIN  31 

As  I  had  expected,  Prince  Boris  was  received  with 
the  utmost  friendliness;  in  consequence  of  his  air  of 
extreme  youth — he  was  small  and  puny,  with  a  childish 
face — he  was  treated  as  a  boy  and  allowed  to  share 
without  any  formality  in  the  intimate  family  life  of  the 
Emperor.  The  greatest  care  was  taken  of  him,  and 
he  associated  quite  informally  with  the  two  youpgest 
daughters  of  the  Emperor,  the  Grand-Duchesses  Maria 
and  Anastasie;  the  former  was  then  only  about  fourteen 
years  of  age. 

The  Crown-Prince's  visit  to  Kieff  coincided  unfortu- 
nately with  the  assassination  of  the  Minister-President  of 
Russia,  Stolypin.  The  Prince  was  an  eye-witness  of 
the  foul  deed,  which  occurred  in  the  entr'acte  of  a  gala 
performance,  and  one  feels  sure  that  this  sad  and 
horrible  sight  must  have  thoroughly  spoilt  the  good 
impressions  which  he  would  otherwise  have  brought 
back  from  his  visit. 

I  was  deeply  depressed  by  Stolypin's  death.  It 
proved  that  the  Russian  Revolution  was  far  from  being 
over.  Under  cover  of  an  apparent  calm,  the  lava  of 
passion  and  violence  was  smouldering,  ready  to  upset  a 
state  of  order  which  was  really  only  due  to  the  power 
of  the  police  and  the  force  of  habit. 

I  had  known  Stolypin  as  a  youth  in  his  parents' 
house  in  Moscow.  At  that  time  I  was  very  intimate 
with  his  eldest  brother  Michael,  since  killed  in  a  duel. 
"Petia"  Stolypin,  as  he  was  then  called,  was  about 
fifteen  years  old,  and  was  noted  for  his  good  behaviour, 
love  of  study,  and  deep  feeling  of  honour,  which  more- 
over was  a  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  whole 
Stolypin  family.  Such  he  remained  through  all  the 
vicissitudes  of  life  and  up  to  his  death.  I  saw  him 
again,  after  the  lapse  of  long  years,  at  the  Winter 
Palace  in  St.  Petersburg  ;  he  was  living  there  with  his 
family  in  1908,  in  consequence  of  the  criminal  attempt 
made  on  his  life  in  the  summer  of  1906,  in  which  some 
of  his  children  were  injured.     The   President   of  the 


32    RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS   [chap.  iv. 

Council  gave  me   the  impression  then  of  being  very 
uncommunicative    and,     up    to    a    point,    very    much 
depressed  ;  I  doubt  very  much  whether,  in    his   heart 
of  hearts,  he  had  preserved  unbounded  confidence  in 
himself  and  his  system.     In  an  uncongenial  atmosphere, 
surrounded  by  the  high  dignitaries  of  St.  Petersburg, 
this  country  squire  displayed  an  openness  and  straight- 
forwardness which  won  universal  esteem,  but  his  task 
was   in   no  way   made   easier   thereby.     On  the  other 
hand,  his  long  rural  career,  more  particularly  his  term  as 
governor  of  a  province,  had  developed  in  him  leanings 
towards  patriarchal  despotism.     These  tendencies  alien- 
ated all  truly  liberal  minds.    The  flattery  heaped  on  him 
by   a  certain  portion   of  the  Press,  and  the  Octobrist 
section  of  the  Duma — which  only  existed  through  his 
protection — all    combined    to   dim   his   mental    vision; 
having  commenced  his  ministerial  career  as  a  champion 
of  the  "Zemstvo,"  i.e.  of  provincial  self-government,  he 
ended    it — sad    to    say — as   the    unlucky   head    of  the 
political   police  of  the   old   regime  !    All  the  same,  in 
spite  of  his  errors,  Stolypin  preserved  a  perfect  honesty 
of  purpose,  and  a  strong  and  upright  character.     His 
death  deprived  the  Conservative  party  of  a  man  who, 
on  going  out  of  office,  might  have  become  an  eminent 
political  leader.     But  even  if  he  had  remained  at  the 
head  of  the  Government,  Stolypin  would  never  have 
allowed  the  Government  machinery  to  get  so  completely 
out  of  order  and  to  reach  a  pitch  of  dilapidation  which 
made  possible  the  new  victorous  thrust  of  the  Revolu- 
tionists.    The  Revolution  was  ill-timed  and  disastrous, 
for  in  the  midst  of  a  world  war  it  aimed  at  establishing 
an  ultra-Socialist  Republic  in  Russia,  and  in  the  mad 
attempt  it  destroyed  all  patriotic  feeling  in  the  country. 
In  the  sphere  of  foreign  policy,  Stolypin  played  a 
more  important  part  than  was  generally  supposed.     He 
undoubtedly   possessed    certain    German     sympathies, 
while  remaining  intensely  Slavophile  and    Nationalist, 
and   consequently    firmly   attached    to   the    system    of 
the   French    alliance.      The  German    Empire  attracted 


igii]  STOLYPIN'S   INFLUENCE  33 

him  by  the  order  which  reigned  there,  by  the  national 
patriotism  which  seemed  to  animate  all  classes  of  the 
population,  all  political  parties.  Moreover,  possessing 
an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  actual  state  of  Russia,  and 
realising  the  internal  dangers  the  Empire  would  have 
to  face  if  war  broke  out,  Stolypin  frankly  dreaded  a 
war  and  consequently  anything  which  might  lead  to 
the  collision  so  often  predicted  with  Germany,  As 
long  as  he  lived  he  had  an  indisputable  influence  on 
M.  Sazonoffs  policy  and  on  that  of  his  locum-tenens,  M. 
Neratoff.  This  influence  showed  itself  in  very  early  days 
in  the  interviews  which  the  new  Russian  Foreign 
Secretary  held  with  the  Berlin  politicians  in  November, 
1910, 

On  his  return  to  St.  Petersburg  and  to  business  after 
the  death  of  his  brother-in-law,  Sazonoff  had  no  longer 
any  reason  or  desire  to  be  under  the  influence  of  that 
incongruous  group  of  men  officially  called  the  "  Council  of 
Ministers  "  or  "  Cabinet."  From  the  autumn  of  191 1  our 
foreign  policy  was  definitely  divorced  from  the  home 
policy  of  the  Empire,  and  remained  solely  within  the 
province  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Sazonoff,  who  was  above 
all  things  a  good  comrade  and  a  staunch  friend,  was  from 
henceforth  entirely  under  the  influence  of  his  own  en- 
vironment, and  all  his  decisions  were  arrived  at  in  select 
committees  of  a  few  collaborators,  men  who  were  mostly 
intelligent  and  mentally  distinguished,  but  who  often 
lacked  practical  experience. 

During  the  years  that  followed,  M.  Sazonoff"  and  the 
Foreign  Office  became  more  and  more  cut  off"  from  the 
rest  of  the  Government. 

We  ought  to  note  that  in  general  during  the  years 
immediately  preceding  the  World  War  and  the  Revolu- 
tion, there  was  a  pecular  change  in  the  kind  of  people 
who  were  called  upon  to  govern  Russia.  Men  of  no 
proved  political  reputation,  lacking  in  experience,  with 
no  marked  ability,  sprang  up  no  one  knew  whence,  and 
gradually  monopolised  the  power  and  influence  over  all 
state  affairs.     Thus   bank-notes    of   great    value   were 


34   RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS   [chap.  iv. 

exchanged  for  small  change,  which  rattled  about  in  the 
money-bags  but  only  possessed  one  merit :  that  it  was 
easy  to  circulate  and  exchange. 

The  summer  of  191 1  ended  for  me  by  the  visit  of  the 
Russian  Squadron  to  Varna.  The  principal  ships  of  our 
Black  Sea  Fleet,  under  the  new  Vice-Admiral  Bostroem, 
came  this  year  with  great  pomp  to  visit  the  harbours 
of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  and  the  Rumanian  harbour 
Constanza.  At  Varna,  whither  I  went  with  my  suite  to 
meet  our  Squadron,  the  reception  was  exceedingly  warm. 
King  Ferdinand  was  not  there,  of  course :  as  soon  as  he 
was  free  from  the  worries  of  the  Great  Sobranje,  he  had 
left  for  foreign  parts.  But  Queen  Eleanor,  who  was 
spending  the  summer  at  Euxinograd  near  Varna,  all  alone 
in  the  seclusion  of  a  small  ancient  convent,  hidden  away 
in  one  of  the  corners  of  the  park,  was  delighted  to  preside 
at  the  reception  and  to  receive  from  our  Navy  the  royal 
honours  which  were  so  grudgingly  bestowed  on  her  at 
the  Court  of  the  King  her  husband. 

As  is  customary  on  such  occasions,  I  received  the 
official  visit  of  the  Admirals,  and  then  went  the  same  day 
with  great  ceremony  on  board  the  flagship  and  others 
of  the  Squadron.  Each  time  it  was  the  usual  naval  recep- 
tion :  the  cutter  stopping  at  the  ship's  side  ;  the  thunder 
of  the  salute,  then  on  board,  the  reception  by  the 
Admiral  and  the  ship's  officers,  with  military  honours, 
and  the  introduction  of  the  other  officers  on  board ; 
finally  the  salute  of  the  crew  drawn  up  on  deck,  the 
presenting  arms,  answered  by  the  usual  cheers.  I  had 
witnessed  these  receptions  several  times  at  Constanti- 
nople when  I  was  in  attendance  on  my  eminent  and  never- 
forgotten  chief,  M.  de  Nelidoff,  and  they  had  always 
produced  in  me  a  pleasant  feeling  of  emotion :  they 
evoked  images  of  our  country,  represented  by  the 
splendid  ships,  by  the  glorious  flag  of  St.  Andrew,  by  the 
formidable  guns,  by  the  charming  hospitality  of  the 
officers,  and  last  but  not  least  by  those  tall,  fair  youths, 
with    open,   almost   child-like,   expressions,  who  were 


i9ii]     VISIT  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  SQUADRON      35 

drawn  up  before  us,  and  who  later  on,  in  the  evening, 
sang  patriotic  songs  reminding  us  of  loved  ones  far 
away. 

I  felt  the  same  emotion  at  first  when  I  visited  our 
Squadron  lying  off  Varna.  The  firing  of  the  salute,  the 
going  on  board,  the  cordial  shaking  hands  with  the 
officers  .  .  .  but  when  I  was  face  to  face  with  the  men 
drawn  up  in  battle  array,  when  I  had  said  "  good  luck, 
my  good  fellows,  "  and  had  received  the  usual  answer 
from  them,  I  felt  a  sudden  and  painful  shock.  It  was 
twenty  years  since  I  had  seen  our  sailors,  and  good 
gracious!  what  a  change!  Instead  of  a  row  of  open 
countenances,  young  and  happy,  looking  at  one  with 
ingenuous  and  gay  expressions,  I  only  saw  surly  faces, 
with  dark  and  suspicious  looks,  in  which  one  seemed  to 
catch  glimpses  of  ill-concealed  hatred.  It  even  appeared 
to  me  as  if  the  physical  aspect  of  the  crew  had  changed  ; 
I  seemed  to  remember  them  fair,  with  clear  grey  eyes, 
and  broad,  bright  faces ;  now  they  stood  looking  at  me 
with  dark  eyes  that  looked  old  and  bilious.  At  first  I 
thought  I  was  influenced  by  a  preconceived  idea;  the 
regrettable  incidents  of  1905  and  1906,  the  bloody  mutiny 
on  board  the  Potemkin,  the  terrible  insurrection  at 
Cronstadt  had  doubtless  biassed  my  mind,  and  led  me  to 
look  at  very  ordinary  faces  with  a  prejudiced  eye.  But 
no ;  the  more  I  observed  our  sailors  during  the  few  days 
I  was  at  Varna,  the  stronger  my  first  impression  became. 
As  to  the  officers,  they  had  changed  very  little  :  they 
seemed  to  have  the  same  good  qualities  and  the  same 
faults.  They  were  the  same  good  fellows  who  seemed  to 
answer  one's  silent  interrogation  by  :  "  We  realise  what 
threatens  us,  but  we  can  do  nothing.  When  the  time 
comes  we  shall  know  how  to  die,  as  our  friends  died  at 
Tsushima  ;  if  necessary  we  shall  bare  our  chests  to  the 
bayonets  of  our  own  men;  but  meanwhile  let  us  lead  our 
ordinary  daily  life,  come  what  may ! " 

The  visit  of  our  Squadron  to  Varna  was  marked  by 
official  festivities  which  were  very  friendly ;  there  was 
the   dinner   I   gave   to   the   officers    of   the   Squadron, 

D 


36    RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS  [chap.  iv. 

the  Bulgarian  authorities  and  the  principal  townspeople 
of  Varna;  a  reception  given  by  Queen  Eleanor  in  the 
beautiful  park  at  Euxinograd  ;  Her  Majesty's  visit  to 
the  Squadron,  when  all  the  ships  returned  the  royal 
salute;  finally  the  "curfew-bell,"  followed  by  a  dance 
on  board  the  flagship,  to  which  the  townspeople  of 
Varna  were  invited. 

Vice-Admiral  Bostroem,  who  commandedithe  Squad- 
ron and  the  whole  of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet,  was  an 
acquaintance  of  mine.  We  had  often  met  in  Paris 
during  the  winter  of  1904-5,  while  the  International 
Commission  of  Inquiry  on  the  Dogger-Bank  incident 
was  sitting.  Holding  at  that  time  the  post  of  Counsellor 
to  our  Embassy  in  Paris,  I  was  appointed  delegate  of 
the  Russian  Government  to  the  Commission ;  and 
Captain  Bostroem,  then  our  naval-attache  in  London, 
often  came  to  Paris  to  report  to  Admiral  Dubassoff, 
Baron  Taube,  our  legal  adviser,  and  to  me  the  result  of 
the  investigations  he  made  in  Hull  and  other  English 
seaports.  Captain  Bostroem  was  very  zealous  in  his 
investigations,  but  rather  too  credulous  concerning  the 
information  he  gathered ;  this  finally  placed  him  in  a 
very  false  position,  as  two  English  witnesses,  found 
and  presented  by  him,  were  convicted  of  perjury. 

Alas!  The  command  of  the  Black  Sea  Squadron 
ended  even  more  disastrously  for  poor  Bostroem  than 
his  zeal  in  the  Hull  incident.  A  few  days  after  our 
leave-taking  at  Varna,  when  the  Russian  Squadron, 
after  a  series  of  festivities,  was  leaving  the  harbour  at 
Constanza,  the  Admiral  had  the  bad  luck  to  run  his  ship 
aground  on  a  sandbank.  This  incident  put  an  end  to 
Bostroem's  brilliant  but  brief  career. 

Thus  I  spent  my  first  summer  in  Sofia.  The  summer 
of  191 1  will  remain  memorable  in  history  through  an 
event  which  caused  more  surprise  than  emotion  in 
Europe,  but  which  was  the  starting-point  of  fateful 
events.  1  allude  to  the  commencement  of  the  Italo- 
Turkish  War. 


^ 


I9I2]  ITALO-TURKISH   WAR  ly 

Of  course,  neither  of  the  two  interested  parties  had 
realised  the  importance  and  significance  of  their  conflict 
for  the  world  at  large.  Anxious  to  secure  to  the  re- 
stored Ottoman  Empire  its  complete  independence  of 
the  Powers  up  till  then  arbiters  of  its  fate,  the  Young- 
Turkish  Government  had  selected  Italy  as  being  the 
least  dangerous  of  the  Great  Powers  on  which  to  impose 
its  claims.  It  felt  certain,  moreover,  that  Germany 
would  intervene  at  the  crucial  moment  to  prevent  an 
armed  contest.  In  reasoning  thus  it  had  lost  sight  of 
Italy's  privileged  situation  among  the  rival  Powers,  and 
of  the  fact  that  Italian  action  in  the  East  would  not 
arouse  exaggerated  fears  or  inclinations  to  interfere  in 
either  of  the  two  camps.  As  to  Italy,  she  hoped  that 
her  energetic  attitude  would  ensure  the  immediate 
success  of  her  cause.  Rome  had  not  reckoned  with  the 
slowness  of  a  war  in  the  desert,  in  which,  as  far  as  Italy 
was  concerned,  everything  had  yet  to  be  organised, 
whereas  the  Turks  should  come  off  fairly  well  with  a 
small  array  of  forces,  and  a  ready-made  system  of 
guerilla  warfare. 

By  lasting  for  more  than  a  year,  the  Italo-Turkish 
War  doubtless  contributed  to  the  ripening  of  the  Balkan 
events  of  1912  and  1913.  And  these  most  certainly 
hastened,  and  up  to  a  point  prepared,  the  explosion  of 
the  terrible  World  War. 


CHAPTER  V 

SERBO-BULGARIAN   RELATIONS 

In  my  conversations  with  the  principal  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  I  repeatedly  had  opportunities  of  touching  on 
the  question  of  Serbo-Bulgarian  relations;  each  time  I 
noticed  the  desire  to  improve  these  relations,  but  1 
always  found  myself  up  against  a  feeling  of  distrust  of 
the  Serbians,  so  I  refrained  from  insisting  too  much. 
However,  towards  the  end  of  September,  191 1,  when 
paying  a  call  on  M,  Todorov,  who  was  taking  the 
place  of  M.  Gueshov  then  on  leave,  I  was  very  much 
surprised  to  hear  him  broach  the  whole  question. 

"  We  have  come  to  the  conclusion,"  said  M.  Todorov, 
"that  if  we  wish  to  guard  our  complete  political  and 
economic  independence  from  the  encroachments  of 
Central  Europe,  and  if  we  truly  desire  to  improve  the 
lot  of  our  kin  in  Turkey,  we  must  as  far  as  possible 
make  our  national  and  economic  polic}^  one  with  that  of 
Serbia.  We  represent  two  nationalities  very  closely 
related  by  blood,  language,  and  even  by  our  former 
historic  destinies.  What  prevents  us  from  living  in 
perfect  harmony  together?  Simply  and  solely,  at  this 
moment,  disagreement  on  the  subject  of  our  sphere  of 
action  in  Macedonia.  We  would  therefore  suggest  to 
the  Serbians  to  go  thoroughly  into  this  question  with 
us,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  good  and  solid  understanding. 
I  will  not  conceal  from  you  that  we  wish  to  draw  up  a 
settled  agreement  with  Serbia.  What  do  you  think  of 
the  idea.  Monsieur?" 

I  replied,  of  course,  that  speaking  generally  I  could 
not  but  approve  of  the  reasons  and  feelings  which 
appeared  to  sway  the  Bulgarian  Government.     But  that 

38 


I9I2]  JOURNEY  TO   DAVOS  39 

as  to  knowing  whether  we  should  consider  it  an 
opportune  moment  to  start  these  delicate  negotiations 
between  Sofia  and  Belgrade,  I  should  first  have  to  ask 
the  advice  of  our  Foreign  Secretary,  and  to  confer  also 
with  my  colleague  in  Belgrade,  M.  Hartwig.  I  con- 
tinued :  "  I  have  just  received  permission  to  go  to  Paris 
for  a  fortnight  on  urgent  private  business.  I  could  go 
by  Vienna  instead  of  straight  through  by  the  Orient- 
Express,  and  take  the  Zurich  train,  and  branch  off  at 
Landquart  to  Davos,  where  M.  Sazonoff  is  still  staying. 
His  health  has  improved  so  considerably  that  he  will 
shortly  be  able  to  return  to  St.  Petersburg  and  to 
business.  On  returning  from  Paris,  I  will  stop  for  a 
few  hours  in  Belgrade  so  as  to  confer  with  Hartwig. 
Then  in  three  weeks  from  now,  I  could  discuss  the 
question  far  more  profitably  with  you." 

"Splendid!"  said  M.  Todorov;  "the  King  will 
probably  have  returned  by  then,  and  so  will  M. 
Gueshov ;  and  if  you  bring  back  with  you  the  approba- 
tion of  your  Minister  and  the  valuable  co-operation  of 
M.  Hartwig,  I  trust  we  might  then  succeed  in  carrying 
through  the  negotiations  which  have  been  outlined 
several  times,  but  which  up  to  now  have  begun  and 
ended  there." 

Two  days  after  I  started,  and  during  my  journey  I 
had  enough  leisure  to  go  over  in  my  mind  the  vicissitudes 
of  Serbo-Bulgarian  relations.  I  will  limit  myself  here 
to  the  enumeration  of  the  principal  phases. 

I.  Up  to  about  1870  there  existed  an  almost  complete 
ignorance  on  the  part  of  Russian  policy  of  Bulgarian 
nationality  and  aspirations.  Serbia,  under  the  noble 
Prince  Michael  Obrenovitch,  represented,  as  far  as  we 
were  concerned  then,  the  whole  Slav  cause  in  the  Near 
East ;  the  enthusiasts  of  this  cause  looked  on  the  Serbian 
principality  as  a  "  Balkan  Piedmont." 

II.  Between  1870  and  1875  General  Ignatieff,  the 
omnipotent  Russian  Ambassador  to  the  Sultan  Abdul- 
Azis,   discovers   Bulgaria,   and   espouses   the    Bulgarian 


40        SKRBO-BULGARIAN  RKLATIONS    [chap.  v. 

cause  at  the  time  of  the  movement  which  founded  the 
Bulgarian  National  Church.  The  Bulgarian  nation — 
"  Bulgar-meleti " — makes  its  appearance,  as  it  were,  in 
the  political  world  of  the  Balkans,  with  the  representa- 
tive of  Russia  as  godfather.  In  the  meantime  Prince 
Michael  Obrenovitch  had  been  assassinated,  and  during 
the  minority  of  Prince  Milan,  Serbian  policy  was 
suffering  from  the  want  of  a  respectable  and  respected 
Government. 

III.  Balkan  troubles  begin  in  1875  with  the  Herze- 
govinian  insurrection,  secretly  supported,  if  not  actually 
fomented,  by  Austria.  The  Emperor  Alexander  II. 
and  Russian  public  opinion  wish  to  obliterate  com- 
pletely the  recollection  of  the  Crimean  campaign,  to 
cover  Russian  arms  with  new  glory,  and  especially  to 
resume  the  illustrious  part  of  Defenders  of  the  Christian 
Faith  in  the  East.  The  influence  of  the  aged  Prince 
Gortchakoff,  who  opposes  these  projects,  is  definitely  on 
the  wane,  and  the  Emperor  frames  his  own  policy — 
allowing  for  that  of  his  Chancellor — with  his  Am- 
bassadors :  Ignatieff  in  Constantinople ;  Count  Peter 
Schuvaloff  in  London ;  and  M.  Novikoff  in  Vienna. 
Disorders  break  out  in  Bulgaria  followed  by  massacres, 
horrible  as  ever,  but  this  time  exaggerated  rather  than 
suppressed  by  the  Press  and  European  diplomacy.  A 
palace  revolution  in  Constantinople,  and  a  heated 
struggle  for  influence  between  the  Embassies  of  Russia 
and  Great  Britain.  Serbo-Turkish  War,  and  enormous 
enthusiasm  in  Russia  for  the  Serbian  cause,  which  is 
completely  mistaken  for  the  whole  Slav  cause. 

IV.  Conference  at  Reichstadt,  at  which,  in  order  to 
guarantee  the  neutrality,  or  even  under  certain  con- 
ditions the  co-operation,  of  Austria  in  a  war  in  the  East 
which  we  feel  to  be  imminent,  we  consent  beforehand  to 
the  Austrian  occupation  of  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and 
even  of  the  sanjak  of  Novibazar;  in  other  words  we 
leave  Serbia  herself  within  the  sphere  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  influence.  Hence  the  absolute  necessity  for 
our  policy  to  found  a  new  autonomous  Slav  State  in  the 


I9I2]  RETROSPECT  41 

Balkans,  which  would  constitute  a  sphere  for  Russian 
influence. 

V.  War  in  the  East  and  the  creation  of  the  Bulgaria 
of  San  Stefano,  the  Bulgaria  of  General  Ignatieff,  in- 
cluding the  whole  of  Macedonia,  closing  Salonika,  as  an 
outlet,  to  the  Austrians,  and  the  Nish  Valley  to  the 
Serbians.  Revision  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  in 
Berlin,  and  considerable  restrictions  in  the  boundaries  of 
Bulgaria.  Count  Schuvaloff,  in  answer  to  the  lamenta- 
tions of  M.  Ristitch,  the  Serbian  Plenipotentiary,  advises 
him  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Austria,  and  he 
is  perfectly  right,  in  view  of  the  concessions  granted 
by  us  to  Austria-Hungary  at  Reichstadt.  Impressed 
by  these  warlike  events  and  by  these  clauses  in  the 
agreements,  Serbia  and  her  young  King  begin  practically 
to  submit  to  the  predominating  influence  of  Austria.  In 
the  meantime,  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Rumelia  appear  to  be 
genuinely  devoted  to  Russia  and  amenable  to  our  advice. 

VI.  (1880-1886).  An  era  of  internal  political  quarrels 
in  Bulgaria,  in  which  we  take  an  active  part,  begins  to 
disturb  Russo-Bulgarian  relations.  The  change  of  reign 
in  Russia,  and  the  faults  of  Prince  Alexander  cause  us 
to  dislike  the  latter.  Abandoned  by  Russia,  threatened 
in  Bulgaria,  the  Prince  abruptly  changes  his  policy, 
discards  his  absolutist  tendencies,  calls  a  Radical 
Government  into  power,  seeks  English  protection,  and 
to  satisfy  national  wishes,  invades  Eastern  Rumelia. 
King  Milan  of  Serbia,  under  pressure  from  Austria, 
turns  against  his  neighbour  and  declares  war  on  him. 
This  unfair  and  fratricidal  blow  does  not  succeed  ;  the 
Serbians  are  defeated  at  Slivnitza,  the  Bulgarians  occupy 
Pirot,  and  are  only  stopped  before  the  gates  of  Nish  by 
European  interposition.  These  events,  however,  con- 
stitute a  real  misfortune  for  the  Slav  cause  in  the 
Balkans,  as  they  inaugurate  a  long  era  of  distrust  and 
estrangement  between  the  two  adjacent  countries. 

VII.  During  the  next  few  years  and  up  till  1896  the 
Serbians  take  advantage  of  the  complete  breach  between 
Russia  and  the  Bulgaria  of  Stamboulov  to  enhance  in 


42        SERBO-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS    [chap.  v. 

our  eyes  their  national  aspirations  in  Macedonia,  where 
they  are  fighting  Bulgarian  propaganda.  Towards  1890, 
on  the  abdication  of  King  Milan  and  the  formation  of 
the  new  and  powerful  national  party  of  the  Radicals,  the 
Serbians  definitely  supplant  the  Bulgarians  in  the  good 
graces  of  official  and  Slavophile  Russia :  the  Treaty  of 
San  Stefano  is,  as  it  were,  tacitly  revised  by  Russia, 
and  the  Serbians  benefit  by  the  revision. 

VIII.  A  new  change  of  reign  and  the  appointment  of 
Prince  Lobanoff  to  the  post  of  Foreign  Secretary  mark, 
between  1895  and  1896,  a  new  trend  in  Russian  policy. 
The  Bulgarians  return  to  favour,  and  very  naturally 
profit  by  it  to  attempt  once  more  to  place  their 
Macedonian  aspirations  under  Russian  protection.  The 
muddled  state  of  Serbian  home  policy  between  1896  and 
1900  seems  to  facilitate  this  plan.  And  soon  Bulgarian 
activity  redoubles  in  Macedonia. 

IX.  But  Russian  policy,  taught  by  experience,  will 
not  undertake  to  protect  one  of  the  competitors  at  the 
expense  of  the  other,  nor  allow  itself  to  be  forced  into 
separate  action  in  favour  of  the  populations  of  Mace- 
donia. Meanwhile  a  modus  vivcndiis  inaugurated  with 
Austria,  and  Macedonia  gradually  becomes,  thanks  to 
our  initiative,  a  sphere  for  wise  intervention  by  the 
Powers,  with  the  exception  of  Germany.  The  Foreign 
Secretary  and  his  Russian  representatives  in  Con- 
stantinople, Vienna,  Belgrade  and  Sofia  use  their  efforts 
to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  and  more  especially  a 
unification  of  interests  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria. 
These  efforts  are  not  altogether  successful.  A  certain 
strain  of  mutual  distrust  and  jealousy  always  exists. 
However,  the  tension  is  slightly  relaxed,  even  on  the 
dangerous  ground  of  Macedonia,  where,  during  the 
particularly  troublous  times  of  1903-1908,  the  struggle 
between  Bulgarians  and  Serbians  becomes  less  bitter, 
and  in  any  case  never  attains  to  that  pitch  of  ferocity 
which  characterises  during  the  same  period  the  Bul- 
garian exploits  against  the  Greeks,  and  vice-versa.  The 
Turkish   Revolution   helps   to    check    momentarily   all 


I9I2]  MACHA   VASSILTCHIKOFF  43 

rivalries  in  Macedonia.  They  are  about  to  begin  again 
when  the  advent  of  the  new  Russophile  Grand  Ministry 
in  Sofia  appears  to  facilitate  our  efforts  to  bring  about 
an  understanding  between  Bulgarians  and  Serbians, 
which  would  prevent  a  renewal  of  former  hatred  and 
the  repetition  of  former  errors. 

I  only  spent  a  few  hours  in  Vienna ;  I  did  not 
succeed  in  reserving  a  sleeping-carriage  to  Zurich,  so 
had  to  take  a  seat  in  the  evening  in  a  small  first-class 
carriage,  where  a  lady  was  already  installed,  signifying  to 
me  by  her  presence  that  I  should  spend  the  night  sitting 
bolt  upright,  and  hence  without  sleep.  My  surprise  was 
great  when  I  recognised  this  lady  as  a  very  old  ac- 
quaintance of  mine.  Mademoiselle  Marie  Vassiltchikoff — 
Macha  Vassiltchikoff,  as  she  was  commonly  called — an 
intelligent  and  cheerful  old  maid,  of  enormous  size  and 
brilliant  colouring,  and  very  light  and  amusing  in  con- 
versation. At  one  time  she  had  been  maid-of-honour, 
with  active  duties,  to  the  reigning  Empress,  and  was  in 
high  favour  with  her  royal  mistress.  She  was  the 
daughter  of  Alexander  Vassiltchikoff,  keeper  and  head 
of  the  collections  of  the  Imperial  Hermitage,  and  laid 
claim  to  artistic  taste,  and  placed  this  taste  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Empress,  assisting  and  advising  her  in 
the  furnishing  of  the  sumptuous  apartments  of  the 
young  Imperial  couple  in  the  Winter  Palace  in  St. 
Petersburg.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  was  a  natural 
inclination,  or  a  desire  to  flatter  the  tastes  of  her  mistress 
that  made  the  plump  Macha  go  in  so  very  much  for  the 
"  secessionist  "  and  decadent  style  which  had  just  sprung 
into  being  in  Germany,  and  which  had  found  an  august 
patron  in  the  person  of  the  unbalanced  Grand  Duke  of 
Hesse-Darmstadt,  brother  of  the  Empress  of  Russia. 
This  style  was  utterly  discordant  with  the  old  walls  of 
the  Winter  Palace,  built  by  the  best  Italian  and  French 
architects  of  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  But 
naturally  every  one  admitted  to  visit  the  new  Imperial 
apartments  was  lost  in  admiration  and  praise.     Prince 


44       SERBO-BULGARIAN    RELATIONS    [chap  v. 

Lobanoff,  then  Foreign  Secretary,  who  in  art  ostensibly 
cultivated  the  principles  of  the  great  styles  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  alone  dared  to  be  outspoken,  and 
each  time  that  he  accompanied  the  Empress  into  a 
room  in  the  Palace  which  had  not  yet  been  touched, 
would  exclaim  :  "  Thank  goodness,  Macha  Vassiltchikoff 
has  not  been  in  here!" 

Man}^  years  had  elapsed  since  then,  and  Macha,  who 
had  left  the  Court,  was  now  living  near  Vienna,  attracted 
thither  by  some  close  friendships  she  had  made  in  an 
agreeable  and  sympathetic  little  set  of  the  best  Austrian 
society. 

My  travelling  companion  explained  that  she  was  on 
her  way,  accompanied  by  Prince  Francis  of  Lichtenstein 
(formerly  Ambassador  to  St.  Petersburg)  and  a  few  of 
his  guests,  to  the  re-opening  of  the  old  castle  of  Vaduz 
(capital  of  Lichtenstein),  which  had  recently  been  restored; 
she  said  that  she  like  me  had  not  been  able  to  get  a 
sleeping  berth.  Having  talked  for  a  long  time,  we 
settled  ourselves  as  best  we  could,  each  in  our  corner ; 
we  spent  a  most  unpleasant  night,  and  in  the  morning 
dashed  as  soon  as  we  could  into  the  restaurant-car,  to 
solace  ourselves  with  hot  coffee.  There  we  found 
Prince  Lichtenstein,  who  had  known  me  for  some  time, 
and  a  very  gay  party,  in  which  I  found  some  former  good 
colleagues.  When  they  saw  the  two  of  us  appear 
together,  after  a  night  spent  in  a  tete-d-tete  it  was 
naturally  the  signal  for  a  running  fire  of  witticisms  :  we 
were  treated  as  a  newly-married  couple,  questioned  as 
to  our  first  impressions,  etc.,  etc.  Breakfast  was  ending 
merrily  when  the  train  reached  Vaduz,  where  my 
travelling  companions  got  out,  and  a  few  minutes  later 
I  arrived  at  Landquart,  where  I  was  to  take  the  little 
mountain  railway  which  goes  to  Davos. 

I  should  have  been  greatly  surprised  if  any  one  at 
that  moment  had  predicted  that  in  a  few  years  I  should 
meet  the  plump  Macha  Vassiltchikoff  again,  in  Stockholm 
on  her  way  to  St.  Petersburg,  i//^  Lapland,  in  order  to 


I9I2]      CONVERSATION  WITH  SAZONOFF         45 

play  a  brief  politico-comic  part,  to  her  own  disadvantage 
and  to  her  shame. 

At  Davos  I  had  the  pleasure  of  finding  M.  Sazonoff 
really  on  the  road  to  recovery,  and  the  next  day  I  was 
able  to  relate  and  discuss  with  him  the  overtures  recently 
made  to  me  by  M.  Todorov.  M.  Sazonoff  listened  most 
attentively.  "Well,"  said  he,  when  I  had  finished,  "but 
this  is  perfect!  If  only  it  could  come  off!  Bulgaria 
closely  allied  to  Serbia  in  the  political  and  economic 
sphere  ;  five  hundred  thousand  bayonets  to  guard  the 
Balkans — but  this  would  bar  the  road  for  ever  to  German 
penetration,  Austrian  invasion  !  "  "  Quite  so,"  I  replied  ; 
"but  there  is  also  another  side  to  the  question  which  1  ven- 
ture to  raise.  In  the  first  place,  I  personally  do  not  greatly 
dread  an  Austrian  militaiy  invasion ;  I  firmly  believe 
that  Austria  does  not  nurse  such  dangerous  schemes. 
Penetration  by  intrigues,  economic  stratagems  and  other 
means — that  I  believe  in  ;  and  also  that  such  penetration 
would  be  effectually  checked  by  a  sincere  and  lasting 
Serbo-Bulgarian  reconciliation  ;  but  in  a  direct  attack 
with  armed  forces,  no  !  I  shall  never  believe  in  it,  except 
in  a  completely  new  situation  and  under  quite  exceptional 
circumstances!^  But  on  the  other  hand,  I  cannot  help 
wondering  whether  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  having  united 
their  forces  (representing  more  than  half  a  million 
soldiers — and  admirable  soldiers,  I  assure  you),  are  not 
thinking  much  less  of  guarding  against  Austrian  aggres- 
sion than  of  attacking  Turkey  and  of  settling  the 
Macedonian  question  by  the  sword?  The  Italo-Turkish 
war  may  well  encourage  them  in  this  idea.  That  is 
what  I  fear.  The  most  serious  events  might  well  occur 
at  a  time  when  Russia  is  not  ready  and  she  might  have 
to  submit  to  many  disagreeable  things  if  she  does  not 
wish  to  be  drawn  into  the  fray  .  .  ." 

1  I  was  wrong  as  it  turns  out.  But  one  must  allow  that  the  general 
political  situation  at  the  moment  when  I  talked  to  Sazonoff  at  Davos  was 
quite  different  from  what  it  was  after  the  two  Balkan  wars,  and  more 
especially  after  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest. 


46        SERBO-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS    [chap.  v. 

"  Oh !  but  Russian  diplomacy  is  there  to  prevent 
matters  taking  such  a  turn,"  replied  the  Minister  sharply. 
"  We  must  simply  check  all  dangerous  proclivities  at  once 
in  Sofia  and  in  Belgrade.  You  tell  me  that  the  present 
Bulgarian  Government  is  quite  sincere  in  regard  to 
Russia ;  you  also  tell  me  that  King  Ferdinand  seems  to 
you  to  be  very  cautious.  We  have  the  same  impressions 
about  Belgrade.  Under  the  circumstances,  I  repeat,  we 
shall  make  both  countries  listen  to  reason.  You  might 
write  to  M.  Neratoff  and  ask  him  for  instructions  ;  for  my 
part,  I  firmly  believe  that  a  loyal  agreement,  putting  an 
end  to  all  these  sad  misunderstandings  between  Serbians 
and  Bulgarians,  is  highly  desirable,  and  that  we  ought 
openly  to  encourage  them  to  enter  into  it." 

This  was  briefly  the  pith  of  my  conversation  with  the 
Minister. 

A  fortnight  later,  on  my  return  from  Paris,  I  stopped 
in  Belgrade  to  talk  with  M.  Hartwig. 

He  appeared  to  be  very  well  versed  in  the  overtures 
made  to  me  by  M.  Todorov,  although  he  did  not  openly 
admit  this. 

"  The  Bulgarians,"  said  my  colleague,  "  have  at  last 
understood  that  they  can  do  nothing  without  the 
co-operation  of  the  Serbians.  I  expected  this  and  I  am 
quite  satisfied:  if  only  the  Government  in  Sofia  will 
display  in  the  negotiations  about  to  commence  a  true 
conciliatory  spirit,  and  will  not  ask  the  Serbians  to  give 
up  things  which  they  cannot  give  up ;  for  at  the  last 
attempt  to  arrange  and  define  the  spheres  of  influence 
in  Macedonia,  the  Bulgarians  would  not  even  abandon 
their  claim  to  Uskub — the  former  Serbian  capital — which 
as  you  must  admit  was  really  insane  on  their  part !  But 
I  have  reason  to  believe  that  this  time  the  Bulgarians 
will  be  obliged  to  be  more  reasonable.  As  to  my 
Serbians,  I  am  quite  sure  of  them." 

"  But  are  you  not  afraid  that,  if  they  come  to  a 
complete  and  formal  agreement,  the  two  Slav  states  may 
be  tempted   to  throw  themselves  immediately  into  the 


I9I2]  M.  HARTWIG  47 

fray  and  to  attack  Turkey,  whose  dissolution  appears 
to   be   setting  in   again?  .  .  ." 

"  Oh !  I  feel  sure  that  the  Bulgarians  would  willingly 
interpret  the  matter  thus.  But  the  Serbians  would  not 
allow  themselves  to  be  drawn  into  such  a  venture,  with 
Austria  in  the  background !  Moreover,  they  will  always 
listen  to  our  good  advice.  King  Peter  is  very  prudent, 
and  you  yourself  know  the  wisdom  of  M.  Pachitch.  .  .  ." 

We  separated  with  great  cordiality,  exchanging  the 
promise  to  communicate  with  each  other  on  the  negotia- 
tions doubtless  about  to  commence  between  the  two 
countries. 

M.  Hartwig  played  such  an  important  part  in  the 
events  which  have  occurred  since,  that  I  must  here 
attempt  to  sketch  his  political  portrait. 

Born  and  educated  in  Russia  and  in  exclusively 
Russian  surroundings,  this  grandson  of  a  German 
doctor  who  had  emigrated  to  Russia,  had  absolutely 
nothing  German  about  him,  either  in  his  appearance  or 
his  way  of  thinking.  To  the  end  of  his  life  he  remained 
typically  Russian,  a  Russian  student,  an  enthusiast  for 
certain  ideas,  devoted  up  to  his  death  to  certain  political 
conceptions,  despising  formality,  and  conventionality  in 
appearance,  sometimes  even  in  his  intercourse  with 
others  ignoring  the  conventions  ;  vehement  and  despotic 
in  his  opinions,  but  a  good  fellow  all  the  same,  and 
willing  to  forgive  the  wrongs  he  had  done  to  others.  (A 
characteristic  far  more  rare  than  might  be  supposed.) 

Poor  and  lacking  patrons,  but  with  a  brilliant 
scholastic  career  behind  him,  and  possessing  the  true 
Russian  powers  of  application  and  thoroughness, 
Hartwig  soon  attracted  attention  in  the  Asiatic  Depart- 
ment of  the  Foreign  Office,  which  he  entered  on  leaving 
the  University  of  St.  Petersburg. 

At  that  time  the  offices  of  the  Ministry  were  still 
divided  into  two  definite  camps.  On  one  side  the 
"Chancellor's  office" — or  Minister's  Cabinet — full  of 
young  men-of-the-world,  well  connected,  well  educated, 


48        SERBO-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS    [chap.  v. 

and  destined  for  careers  in  tlie  Embassies  and  Legations 
of  the  West;  cleverness  at  once  attracted  attention,  if 
any  one  showed  any  true  ability  all  the  town  talked 
about  it.  Much  stress  was  laid  on  good  manners  and 
discreet  behaviour  generally,  and  scrupulous  good- 
fellowship  ;  personal  intrigue  was  rigidly  excluded,  and 
every  young  man  who  went  through  the  successive 
stages  could  be  sure  of  promotion  in  his  turn;  ex- 
ceptions were  only  made — and  approved  of  among  the 
men  themselves — in  those  cases  of  recognised  striking 
ability  alluded  to  above. 

On  the  other  side,  the  Asiatic  Department  were 
supplied  from  divers  grades  of  society,  to  which  the 
former  Directors  had  tried  to  attract  the  talent 
and  intelligence  of  the  day.  Those  who  were  admitted 
were  destined  to  diplomatic  and  consular  careers  in 
the  Near  East  and  in  Persia.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
talents  abounded  in  this  profession  between  the  forties 
and  eighties  of  last  century.  Later  on  the  composition 
of  this  Ministry,  which  had  been  so  brilliant  under 
Prince  Gortchakoff,  deteriorated  as  he  grew  older  and 
feebler,  and  men  of  talent  became  more  rare  in  the 
Asiatic  Department. 

But  all  the  same  Hartwig  had  to  push  himself  forward. 
The  ambitious  young  man  became  one  of  the  informants 
of  the  Novoye  Vreuija,  which  at  the  time  was  pursuing  the 
Ministry  with  criticism  and  accusing  it  of  lack  of  vigour 
and  patriotism,  more  especially  in  Eastern  affairs ;  he 
also  kept  in  touch  with  our  General  Staff,  which  indulged 
in  the  same  criticism  of  our  diplomacy.  But  one  must 
admit  that  it  was  not  personal  views  alone  which 
induced  Hartwig  to  become  the  echo  of  these  critics 
and  to  furnish  them  with  material ;  all  his  life  he  had 
been  a  staunch  adherent  of  a  policy  of  action  in  the 
Near  East  and  in  Central  Asia;  and  he  devoted  his  zeal 
and  his  talents  to  this  end.  It  was  during  the  ad- 
ministration of  Count  Lamsdorf  that  Hartwig's  career 
received  its  true  impetus.  He  promptly  became  the 
right  hand  of  the  amiable  and  retiring  Minister,  who,  an 


I9I2]  HARTWIG'S   EARLY  CAREER  49 

ardent  worker  himself,  appreciated  unceasing  work  and 
devotion  to  duty  in  others.  Moreover,  without  entirely 
shelving  his  "Activist"  convictions  in  the  sphere  of 
our  eastern  policy,  Hartwig  succeeded,  as  long  as  the 
Lamsdorf  Ministry  lasted,  in  restraining  his  ardour  and 
in  bowing  to  the  wisely  Opportunist  views  of  his  chief. 
Appointed  Director  of  the  Asiatic  Department,  he  soon 
became  known  and  recognised  in  High  Places,  and  when 
in  1904  Lamsdorfs  successor  appointed  him  Minister  to 
Teheran,  Hartwig  left  to  take  up  the  post  rather  as  if 
he  were  in  disgrace,  for  he  had  aspired  either  to  the 
Embassy  in  Constantinople  or  to  the  post  of  Foreign 
Secretary.  After  two  years  in  Teheran,  his  relations 
with  his  colleague  of  Great  Britain  became  impossible; 
they  no  longer  spoke  to  each  other,  they  hardly  even 
bowed  ;  as  at  the  moment  we  were  inaugurating  the 
entente  with  England,  the  two  Ministers  were  recalled 
by  common  consent,  and  Hartwig  was  appointed  to 
Belgrade. 

Having  spent  all  his  life  (with  the  exception  of  two 
short  visits  to  Montenegro  and  Burgas)  in  the  offices  of 
the  Asiatic  Department  specialising  in  the  Slav  question, 
Hartwig  had  gained  a  knowledge  not  only  of  Balkan 
questions  and  records,  but  up  to  a  point  of  the  people 
themselves.  To  him  were  sent  all  the  Slavs  who  came 
to  St.  Petersburg  :  political  exiles  and  refugees,  ministers 
on  missions,  young  princes  and  princesses  educated  at 
the  expense  of  the  Court  in  privileged  schools  and 
institutions,  etc.  Amongst  all  these  people,  whom  he 
received  with  good-nature  and  in  whose  favour  he 
interceded  with  his  chiefs,  "Nicolas  Henricovitch  "  was 
deservedly  popular.  He  found  himself  at  once  amongst 
old  acquaintances  when  he  took  up  his  post  in  Belgrade, 
where  he  had  access  to  everything,  and  where  he  might 
flatter  himself  that  his  advice  would  be  listened  to  and 
followed.  On  this  score  he  experienced  a  few  dis- 
appointments. But  with  the  innate  adaptability  of  his 
nature,  he  appropriated  those  very  ideas  which  it  was 
his   duty  to   fight,  and   made   himself  their  authorised 


50        SERBO-BULGARIAN  RELATIONS    [chap.  v. 

champion ;  so  that  they  often  were  approved  of  by  our 
Foreign  Office,  where  he  had  left  a  few  fervent  friends 
and  some  devoted  admirers.  But  one  must  allow  that, 
in  order  to  have  his  support,  every  cause  had  to  bear 
the  stamp  of  very  orthodox  Slavophilism,  i.e.  of  hostility 
to  Austria  and  devotion  to  Russia. 

Very  intelligent,  as  1  said  before,  gifted  with  a 
wonderful  memory,  and  having  read  and  studied  much, 
Hartwig  had  two  flaws  in  his  reasoning  powers  which 
sometimes  obscured  his  judgment  and  hampered  his 
actions.  In  the  first  place,  he  had  too  much  confidence 
in  the  might  of  his  own  pen,  when  writing  minutes, 
dispatches,  etc. ;  his  career  had  endued  him  with  the 
soul  of  the  publicist  and  brilliant  official  writer.  With 
him,  an  apt  syllogism  often  took  the  place  of  the 
inexorable  logic  of  facts.  Secondly,  this  man,  so  near 
the  zenith  of  his  career,  had  framed  for  himself  a 
political  system  which  was  absolutely  arbitrary,  in- 
genuous even  :  Hartwig  firmly  believed — and  said  so 
openly — that  it  was  quite  possible  for  Russia  to  remain 
on  the  best  terms  with  Germany,  whilst  striving  to  outdo 
Austria  in  every  possible  way.  In  St.  Petersburg  he 
had  always  endeavoured  to  be  friendly  towards  the 
German  Embassy ;  in  his  two  posts  as  Minister,  he 
maintained  the  best  possible  relations  with  his  German 
colleagues.  Officially  the  Germans  did  the  same,  but  in 
their  heart  of  hearts  they  did  not  like  him  ;  they  saw  in 
him  a  fanatic  and  a  muddler,  and  suspected  him  of 
duplicity.  I  have  always  wondered  how  a  man  of 
Hartwig's  intellectual  worth  could  fail  to  see  that  in 
Berlin  for  years  they  had  thoroughly  espoused  the 
Austrian  cause  in  the  East ;  that  they  had  made  it  their 
own;  that  they  were  driving  Austria  towards  Salonika 
whilst  they  were  taking  possession  more  and  more  of 
Constantinople.  To  come  to  a  friendly  agreement  with 
Austria  which  should  contain  nothing  disadvantageous, 
to  Germany — that  might  be  contemplated  as  a  merely'' 
opportunist  and  temporary  policy !  But  to  attempt  to 
cement  a  true  friendship  either  with  Germany  to  the 


I9I2]         HARTWIG'S   CHARACTERISTICS  5* 

exclusion  of  Austria,  or  with  the  latter  to  the  exclusion 
of  Germany — here  was  a  policy  doomed  to  failure  and, 
what  is  more,  which  might  become  extremely  dangerous 
at  any  moment ! 

I  knew  the  character  and  the  opinions  of  my  colleague 
of  Belgrade  long  before  I  was  appointed  to  Sofia,  I 
knew  he  was  as  popular  in  Bulgaria  as  he  was  in  Serbia, 
that  he  had  much  influence  and  commanded  authentic 
sources  for  private  information.  I  was  therefore  pre- 
pared beforehand  to  learn  that  when  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
negotiations  began,  Hartwig  would  wish  to  play  a 
prominent  part  in  them.  Personally  I  saw  no  objection 
to  this,  and  I  should  have  been  glad  if  my  colleague  had 
been  successful  in  certain  cases  in  obtaining  from  the 
Bulgarians  from  afar  what  I  should  not  have  been  able 
to  obtain  from  them  on  the  spot.  But  the  continuation 
of  the  negotiations  proved  that  whenever  it  was  a 
question  of  national  claims,  all  restraining  action  became 
difficult  in  Belgrade,  impossible  in  Sofia. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   SERBO-BULGARIAN   TREATY 

The  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations  lasted  from  October, 
191 1,  till  February,  1912.  The  place  chosen  was  Sofia, 
King  Ferdinand  being  very  persistent  on  this  point : 
he  pretended  that  Belgrade,  owing  to  its  geographical 
position,  was  infested  with  Austro-Hungarian  spies ; 
but  the  fact  of  the  matter  was  that  it  flattered  his  vanity 
to  see  the  Serbians  coming,  as  it  were,  to  him  !  The 
negotiations  were  to  be  conducted  with  the  utmost 
secrecy,  and  only  the  respective  Russian  Ministers  were 
allowed  to  know  what  was  going  on.  In  point  of  fact, 
Hartwig  and  I  were  the  constant  arbiters,  continually 
consulted,  and  referred  to  in  each  difficulty,  however 
small,  by  both  parties. 

The  negotiations  were  soon  concentrated  almost 
exclusively  on  the  defining  of  the  spheres  of  influence  in 
Macedonia,  and  finally  four  months  were  spent  in  fixing 
the  future  frontier  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria.  In 
discussing  the  line  of  this  frontier  in  spc,  the  two  parties 
showed  such  an  entire  lack  of  any  conciliatory  spirit 
that  I  am  still  wondering  how  they  ever  arrived  at  any 
agreement !  After  long  preliminary  debates  the}^  at  last 
agreed  on  the  two  extreme  points  of  this  famous  frontier. 
These  were  :  in  the  north-east  the  spot  where  at  that 
period  the  frontiers  of  Turkey,  Bulgaria  and  Serbia 
converged ;  in  the  south-west  the  northern  point  of 
Lake  Ochrida. 

But  then  the  line  between  these  two  points  had  to  be 
drawn.  As  it  was  manifestly  impossible  to  send  a  com- 
mission to  work  on  the  spot  (the  Turks  might  have  taken 
this  amiss ! ),  it  was  necessary  to  rely  on  the  most 
detailed  maps  of  the   Russian,  Serbian  and   Bulgarian 

52 


I9I2]  SPHERES  OF  INFLUENCE  53 

General  Staffs.  The  demarcation  of  the  boundary-line 
gave  rise  to  endless  discussions ;  each  elevation,  each 
village,  each  stream  was  bitterly  disputed,  and  to  solve 
the  question  they  sought  now  the  interposition  of  the 
Russian  Ministers,  now  the  topographical  authority  of 
our  military  agents.  Each  side  wished  to  mark  the 
frontier  by  a  curved  line,  curving  outwards  as  far  as 
possible  into  the  future  territory  of  the  competitor ; 
but  by  dint  of  arguing,  a  remarkably  straight  line  was 
arrived  at — and  this  in  spite  of  the  very  uneven  surface 
configuration  of  Macedonia — the  result — well-known  in 
physics — of  two  equal  efforts  working  in  an  inverse 
sense ! 

On  the  Bulgarian  side  it  was  M.  Gueshov  and  M. 
Todorov  who  were  the  most  amenable  and  the  most 
willing  to  arrive  at  a  sincere  agreement,  whereas  M. 
Danev  and  the  military,  as  was  moreover  to  be  expected, 
displayed  inflexible  obstinacy.  So  far  as  the  principal  re- 
presentative of  Serbian  interests — the  Serbian  Minister 
in  Sofia,  M.  Spalaikovitch  (later  on  Minister  in  St.  Peters- 
burg)— was  concerned,  his  vehement  nationalism  was 
tempered  by  the  sincere  desire  to  cause  Slav  solidarity 
to  triumph  on  this  question.  Very  hasty  and  very 
impressionable,  M.  Spalaikovitch  had  always  been  dis- 
tinguished by  his  straightforwardness  and  sincerity,  as 
well  as  by  his  keen  intelligence  :  on  the  whole  it  was 
the  quintessence  of  the  Serbian  nature  ;  the  bonds  of 
friendship  which  I  kept  up  with  him  often  enabled  me 
to  have  a  soothing  and  restraining  influence  on  him. 

Throughout  the  conferences — more  especially  during 
the  first  three  months — King  Ferdinand  aff'ected  to  hold 
himself  aloof  from  them  and  to  give  a  free  hand  to  his 
Ministers.  He  only  mentioned  the  subject  to  me  two  or 
three  times.  The  first  time  was  at  the  end  of  November, 
at  the  wedding  of  my  eldest  daughter,  to  which  the 
Court  and  the  Diplomatic  Corps  came.  That  day,  in  a 
brief  aside,  the  King  told  me  of  the  satisfaction  he  felt 
about  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations ;  but  he  sug- 
gested a  few  doubts  as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  Serbians.   I 


54  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY    [chap.  vi. 

hastened  to  assure  His  Majesty,  by  reason  of  information 
received  from  Belgrade,  that  the  Serbians  truly  desired 
to  arrive  at  the  most  complete  agreement  with  Bulgaria, 
The  second  time  I  went  into  the  subject  much  more 
thoroughly  with  the  King.  This  was  on  the  6th  (19th) 
December,  the  birthday  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor. 
It  was  customary  on  that  day  for  the  King  to  accept  an 
invitation  to  luncheon  at  the  Russian  Legation,  and  in 
the  evening  for  him  to  give  a  State  dinner  followed 
by  a  grand  reception  at  the  Royal  Castle.  After 
the  luncheon,  having  held  little  formal  conversations 
with  every  one  in  iturn,  the  King  came  into  my 
study  and  we  talked  together  for  some  time.  In  the 
course  of  conversation  the  King,  for  the  first  time, 
mentioned  certain  fears  he  entertained  concerning  the 
actual  fact  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations.  His 
Majesty  expressed  the  rather  justifiable  thought  that  if 
the  substance  of  these  conferences  came  to  be  known  by 
Vienna  and  Berlin,  the  Central  Powers  might  bring  for- 
ward the  whole  Balkan  question  and  raise  difficulties 
which  primarily  would  not  suit  St.  Petersburg.  "That 
is  why,"  said  the  King  in  conclusion,  "one  cannot 
possibly  be  too  prudent  either  in  the  negotiations  them- 
selves, or  as  to  the  ends  which  these  negotiations  are  to 
attain."  This  time  Ferdinand  seemed  to  me  to  be  sincere ; 
doubts  and  fears  were  always  much  more  frankly  ex- 
pressed by  him  than  any  other  sentiments  or  motives 
of  his  complex  mind.  Up  to  a  point  I  shared  the  opinion 
of  the  august  speaker.  The  Serbo-Bulgarian  con- 
ferences, in  this  respect,  did  most  certainly  present 
certain  dangers.  Of  course,  the  chief  reason  of  Fer- 
dinand's fears  lay  in  his  desire  not  to  break  definitely 
with  Vienna;  but  at  the  same  time,  he  sincerely  dreaded 
the  risk  of  war,  and  he  fully  realised  that  this  risk 
existed  as  the  result  of  a  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance,  based 
solely  on  the  partition  of  Macedonia.  Bearing  in  mind 
the  words  of  the  Emperor,  and  constantly  remembering 
my  last  conversation  with  Sazonoff"  in  which  he  had  ex- 
pressed his  conviction  that  the   chief  aim   of  Russian 


I9I2]  I  WARN  ST.  PETERSBURG  55 

diplomacy  should  consist  in  avoiding  all  conflict  in  the 
Near  East,  I,  as  representative  of  Russia,  was  com- 
pletely at  one  with  King  Ferdinand  the  moment  it  was 
a  question  of  avoiding  the  possibility  of  war.  Con- 
sequently, in  the  course  of  conversation  I  tried  to  induce 
him  to  express  more  definitely  his  dread  of  a  collision 
with  Turkey;  but  the  King  avoided  doing  this  :  he  truly 
dreaded  war,  but  he  was  not  going  to  have  it  said  that 
he  dreaded  it. 

In  the  dispatches  which  I  sent  off  every  fortnight 
to  St.  Petersburg,  to  M.  Neratoff  and  then  to  M. 
Sazonoff  on  his  return  from  Davos,  I  related  in  detail 
the  progress  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations ;  but 
each  of  my  dispatches  was  accompanied  by  a  private 
and  confidential  letter  in  which  I  did  not  omit  to  point 
out  the  danger  of  war  which  might  be  brought  about  by 
the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement,  so  much  extolled  and 
desired  by  us.  I  laid  great  stress  on  the  facts  that  the 
negotiations  were  now  exclusively  concerned  with 
territorial  demarcation  and  with  the  defining  of  a 
frontier  in  spe  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia ;  that 
throughout  the  conferences  1  could  not  observe  a  desire 
to  arrive  at  a  really  cordial  agreement  between  the  two 
countries ;  that  these  conferences  were  assuming  a 
character  of  mere  political  opportunism,  and  that  the 
Italo-Turkish  war  which  was  going  on  meanwhile 
certainly  incited  the  Balkan  States  to  action.  Each  time 
the  answer  from  St.  Petersburg  was  to  the  effect  that  we 
certainly  would  not  hear  of  an  armed  collision  in  the 
Balkans,  and  that  everything  must  be  done  to  prevent 
such  a  collision,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  a  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  agreement  would  be  particularly  welcome  and 
agreeable  to  us,  because  it  would  constitute  an  eftectual 
barrier  against  Austro-German  penetration  in  the 
Peninsula.  In  the  following  dispatch  I  expressed  my 
complete  adherence  to  this  point  of  view  of  the  Ministry, 
but  at  the  same  time  I  reiterated  my  apprehensions. 
To  which  the  answer  was  once  more  that  "  although  on 
the  one  hand  one  would  .  .  .  etc.  .  ,  .  notwithstanding, 


56  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY    [ciiap.vi. 

on  the  other  hand,  one  perhaps  etc.,  etc !  .  .  ."  This 
exchange  of  views  lasted  till  the  beginning  of  February, 
1912,  when  the  famous  frontier-line  was  at  last  settled 
and  marked  on  the  map  of  Macedonia,  and  nothing  re- 
mained to  be  done  but  to  sign  the  agreement.  At  this 
juncture  I  was  informed  from  St.  Petersburg  that  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor,  when  receiving  the  Bulgarian 
military  attache,  had  expressed  to  him  in  very  precise 
terms  his  desire  to  see  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement 
concluded  and  signed.  From  that  moment  I  no  longer 
felt  myself  justified  in  expressing  doubts  and  fears  as  to 
the  agreement.     Roma  locuta — causa finita. 

The  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement  was  signed  by  the 
Serbian  and  Bulgarian  Foreign  Secretaries  in  the  last 
days    of    February,    191 2,    and     ratified    by    the    two 
Sovereigns  under   date  of  March   13th,  which   in   this 
leap-3^ear  corresponded  to  February  29th,  O.S.      I  have 
often  remembered,  since,  the  superstitions  attached  in 
the  West  to  the  number  13,  and  in  Russia  to  the  date  of 
February  29th,  which  is  considered  singularly  unlucky. 
But   the   fact   that   it   had   been   possible   to    keep   the 
conclusion  of  the  agreement  a  complete  secret  may  have 
consoled  the  interested  parties  for  this.     No   one   had 
any  idea  of  it,  except  Russia,  and  those  to  whom  we 
judged  it  fit  and  proper  later  on  to  confide  the  secret. 
Turkey  and    the   Powers  of  the   Triple  Alliance  only 
knew  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  compact  when  the  Balkan 
War  broke  out.     It  is  true  that  our  Foreign  Secretary 
had  received  from  Belgrade  some  information  as  to  the 
secret   of   the    agreement    having    been    betrayed    by 
Ferdinand  to  the  Austrian  Court.     Later  on,  in   1913, 
this   retrospective   disclosure   appeared   in   the  Novoye 
V^rernja.      Nevertheless   it   was   quite   untrue,   and  our 
Foreign  Secretary  had  an   opportunity  of  proving  to 
hivcis^Mirrefittably  that  in  Vienna,  as  in  Berlin,  there  was 
no  idea  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement  till  shortly 
before  the  Balkan  War,  and  that  the  German  Minister 
in  Sofia  denied  up  to  the  end,  that  is  till  the  mobilisation, 
the   very    existence   of  the   agreement.      I   consider  it 


I0I2]     COMING  OF  AGE  OF  PRINCE  BORIS       57 

necessary,  however,  in  alluding  to  the  ignorance  of  the 
agreement  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  to  except  the  military  spheres  of  Italy.  But  I 
shall  deal  with  this  question  later  on. 

The  close  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations  almost 
coincided  with  the  festivities  held  for  the  coming  of  age 
of  the  heir  to  the  Bulgarian  throne,  Prince  Boris. 

King  Ferdinand  wished  to  invest  this  anniversary 
with  all  the  pomp  possible.  Invitations  had  been  issued 
to  related  and  neighbouring  Courts,  and  for  the  nth 
(24th)  of  February  members  of  the  Royal  Families  and 
ambassadors  extraordinary  arrived  in  Sofia,  entrusted 
with  the  congratulations  and  good  wishes  customary  on 
these  occasions. 

The  Emperor  of  Russia,  godfather  to  young  Prince 
Boris,  sent  as  his  representative  to  Sofia  the  Grand- 
Duke  Andrew  (son  of  the  Grand-Duchess  Vladimir). 
The  Crown-Princes  of  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Greece  and 
Rumania,  the  Archduke  Charles  Albert,  the  Prince  of 
Prussia,  Leopold,  completed  the  group  of  august  person- 
ages that  King  Ferdinand,  accompanied  by  his  two  sons, 
received  at  the  station  in  Sofia  with  military  honours 
and  all  customary  ceremonial.  The  Ambassadors  of  the 
other  European  Powers,  of  the  United  States,  and  of 
Turkey  all  enhanced  by  their  presence  the  brilliancy  of 
the  festivity,  which  was  favoured  with  exceptionally  fine 
weather.  For  three  days  the  streets  of  Sofia,  usually 
rather  deserted,  were  enlivened  by  automobiles  and 
royal  carriages  conveying  the  King's  guests  and  their 
suites  to  feasts  in  the  Palace,  to  receptions  and  to 
military  parades.  The  Castle  of  Sofia,  ordinarily  so 
dark  and  gloomy,  was  brilliantly  illuminated,  and  filled 
with  the  gay  life  of  festivity  and  by  a  crowd  of  courtiers 
in  full  dress.  The  Russian  Grand-Duke,  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  godfather  of  Prince  Boris,  took  the  first 
place  at  all  ceremonies. 

Among   the   princely   guests.    Prince   Alexander  of 
Serbia  was  the  one  who  made  the  best  impression  on 


?8  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY    [ciim'.  vi. 

me.  Serious  and  sincere  in  manner,  he  displayed  much 
tact  during  his  stay  in  Sofia  ;  he  talked  a  great  deal  and 
very  willingly  with  the  Bulgarian  politicians,  preserving 
an  attitude  of  official  respect  towards  King  Ferdinand  ; 
he  treated  Prince  Boris  with  sincere  good-fellowship  ; 
his  manner  was  unassuming,  yet  perfectly  dignified. 

The  Austrian  Archduke,  still  quite  young  and 
allowed  for  the  first  time  in  his  life  to  go  to  foreign 
parts — and  on  an  official  mission,  too! — behaved  with 
exemplary  modesty,  always  looking  to  his  governor — 
an  ultra-correct  Austrian  General. 

Finally  Prince  Leopold  of  Prussia  presented  the 
really  curious  type  of  a  Prussian  officer  half  automaton, 
half  decadent.  It  seemed  as  if  his  every  movement  was 
planned  in  order  not  to  make  creases  in  his  extremely 
well-cut  uniform ;  even  his  conversation — if  a  few  short 
sentences  uttered  in  a  perfectly  monotonous  voice  can 
be  called  "conversation" — seemed  to  belong  to  some 
ingenious  German  machine.  This  Prussian  Prince  had 
at  one  time  found  special  favour  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Emperor  William,  who  revived  for  him  the  grade  of 
Field-Marshal-Colonel,  in  disuse  since  1800.  But  on 
discovering  that  no  real  ability  was  concealed  behind 
the  military  rigidity  of  the  Prince,  William  was  dis- 
illusioned about  his  protege,  and  henceforth  only  em- 
ployed him  in  formalities.  The  sending  of  Prince 
Leopold  to  the  solemnities  in  Sofia  emphasised  the 
German  Emperor's  wish  to  show  perfect  coldness  to- 
wards Bulgaria  and  her  Sovereign,  though  at  the  same 
time  displaying  a  great  deal  of  correctness ;  William 
desired  nothing  from  the  Bulgarians  and  offered  them 
nothing.  In  Berlin  the  choice  of  persons  to  whom 
missions  of  etiquette  and  ceremonial  were  entrusted 
was  always  influenced  by  ulterior  motives  and  certain 
ideas,  and  in  no  way  by  the  desire  to  please  those  to 
whom  they  were  sent.  Amongst  us,  unfortunately,  this 
was  never  noticed  and  never  well  understood. 

The  festivities  for  the  coming  of  age  of  Prince  Boris 


,912]  FERDINAND'S   REQUEST  59 

and  the  ratification  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement 
ended  the  first  winter-season  of  my  stay  in  Sofia;  during 
this  winter  my  wife  and  I  had  given  a  series  of  dinners 
and  receptions  to  Bulgarian  society,  to  the  Court,  and  to 
the  Diplomatic  Corps.  Having  successfully  terminated 
an  important  negotiation  and  fulfilled  all  my  social 
duties,  I  could  think  of  undertaking  my  journey  ad 
limina,  i.e.  of  going  to  St.  Petersburg,  to  explain  the 
ulterior  aims  of  our  Balkan  policy,  and  to  discuss 
certain  questions  of  the  hour  with  M.  Sazonoff.  Among 
these  questions,  one  in  particular  would  have  to  be 
discussed  verbally  and  very  secretly. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  winter  which  was  just  over, 
the  Minister  of  Finance,  M.  Todorov,  with  whom  I  was 
on  excellent  personal  terms,  and  in  whom  I  had  much 
confidence,  had  come  to  see  me  one  day  to  tell  me  of  a 
very  confidential  and  quite  unexpected  request  made  to 
me  by  King  Ferdinand.  It  was  this  :  His  Majesty  was 
in  great  financial  difficulties,  he  was  especially  worried 
by  a  debt  of  a  million  and  a  half  francs  (or  Austrian 
crowns,  which  amounted  to  about  the  same)  which  he 
owed  to  the  Laender  Bank  (Banque  des  Pays  Autrichiens) 
of  Vienna,  and  the  Bank  for  some  time  had  been  making 
difficulties;  it  demanded  securities  or  mortgages  which 
the  Bulgarian  Court  would  not  or  could  not  give;  it 
refused  further  credit ;  and  meantime  money  was  scarce 
in  the  Palace,  and  Ferdinand  was  often  reduced  to 
selling,  not  without  difficulty,  short-dated  Court  bonds 
to  the  Sofia  banks  for  trifling  sums.  In  order  to  put  an 
end  to  this  humiliating  state  of  things,  the  King  begged 
me  to  arrange  with  one  of  our  large  financial  houses  in 
St.  Petersburg  for  a  loan  of  two  million  francs,  as  a 
mortgage  on  his  property  of  Vrana,  situated  a  few 
kilometres  from  Sofia,  a  property  small  in  area,  where 
the  King  was  laying  out  a  beautiful  garden  and  building 
a  villa.  His  Majesty,  according  to  M.  Todorov,  under- 
stood perfectly  well  that  no  Russian  bank  would  accept 
such  a  mortgage  without  receiving  supplementary 
security  on  the  part  of  the   Russian  Government ;  the 


6o  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY     [chap.  vi. 

difficulties  which  latterly  the  Laender  Bank  was  always 
raising  for  the  King  were  apparently  mainly  actuated 
by  the  displeasure  felt  by  the  Austrians  at  the  present 
Bulgarian  policy ;  ergo,  it  entered  into  our  calculations 
to  liberate  King  Ferdinand  from  all  pecuniary  obligation 
to  Vienna,  and  thus  to  acquire  fresh  claims  on  his  sincere 
gratitude. 

I  answered  Todorov  by  saying  that  while  refusing  to 
enter  into  these  latter  arguments,  I  would  at  once  fulfil 
the  King's  wish  and  would  forward  his  request  to  St. 
Petersburg  and  second  it.  I  did  this  in  a  special  and 
very  confidential  letter  to  M.  Neratoff,  who  was  still 
managing  the  Foreign  Office.  Amongst  other  things  I 
said  that  such  a  loan  must  most  certainly  not  be 
considered  a  means  of  buying  Ferdinand  ;  that  I  remem- 
bered perfectly,  during  my  stay  in  Belgrade,  how 
our  Government,  on  the  entreaties  of  my  chief, 
M.  Persiant,  had  paid  King  Milan,  who  had  just 
abdicated,  a  million  francs  on  condition  that  he  left 
the  country  for  ever  and  never  interfered  again  in 
the  home  or  foreign  policy  of  Serbia.  Milan  took  the 
money  and  left  for  Paris,  but  when  the  last  few 
thousand  francs  had  been  lost  in  gambling  or  spent 
on  women,  he  returned  quite  naturally  to  Belgrade,  as 
being  the  only  place  where  he  could  exist  decently,  but 
where  his  presence  soon  caused  fresh  trouble.  And  it 
was  we  who  were  blamed  by  public  opinion  for  having 
given  money  to  a  father  to  enable  him  to  desert  his  son 
— a  minor  !  So  I  wrote  to  Neratoff  that  I  wished  frankly 
to  warn  the  Ministry  against  the  erroneous  idea  that  one 
could  buy  Ferdinand  with  those  two  millions.  It  was  not 
money  that  would  secure  to  us  a  lasting  influence  in  Bul- 
garia, but  systematic  and  laborious  work.  Nevertheless, 
the  moment  the  King  was  obliged  to  beg  such  a  favour 
of  us,  I  considered  that  we  ought  to  grant  it  frankly, 
simply,  and  without  any  humiliating  conditions.  Such  a 
course  of  action  would  bind  Ferdinand  up  to  a  point, 
and  in  any  case  would  make  our  relations  with  him 
more  intimate.     M.  Neratoff  promptly  replied  that   he 


I9I2]  THE   LOAN   ARRANGED  6i 

shared  my  point  of  view ;  and  that  he  would  certainly 
forward  the  King's  request  to  the  right  quarter.  But 
from  that  moment  I  had  received  no  further  information 
on  the  subject,  and  decided  to  elucidate  the  question 
personally  in  St.  Petersburg. 

I  think  it  necessary  to  relate  here  the  end  of  this 
affair.  Ferdinand's  request  met  with  decided  opposition 
at  first  from  M.  Kokovtzoff,  who  as  Minister  of  Finance 
refused  to  give  any  security  whatsoever  to  the  society 
which  might  be  willing  to  advance  the  sum  in  question 
to  the  King  of  Bulgaria.  Speaking  politically  and  as 
President  of  the  Council,  M.  Kokovtzoff  had  no  objection 
to  granting  the  King  this  small  favour  and  was  willing 
to  recommend  the  affair  to  one  of  our  large  banks,  but  he 
would  not  hear  of  a  State  guarantee;  but  without  such 
guarantee  no  bank  would  do  business.  The  discussions 
dragged  on  for  a  few  months  longer,  and  after  renewed 
entreaties  on  my  part  and  fresh  favourable  intervention 
from  M.  Sazonoft,  the  affair  was  arranged  thus :  the 
two  million  francs  were  advanced  to  Ferdinand  by  the 
Banque  d'Escompte  of  St.  Petersburg;  but  in  reality 
the  money  was  supplied  from  the  personal  funds  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor,  at  five  per  cent,  interest,  with 
repayment  spread  over  a  certain  number  of  years. 
When  1  left  Bulgaria  towards  the  end  of  1913,  the  Court 
of  Sofia  had  already  paid  the  first  instalment  of  this 
debt.  I  do  not  know  if  it  was  as  punctual  in  1914 ;  but 
I  should,  above  all  things,  be  interested  to  know  whether 
King  Ferdinand  discharged  this  debt  of  honour  (he 
knew  whence  the  two  million  came)  before  he  definitely 
passed  over  to  the  camp  of  our  enemies,  and  before  he 
treacherously  stabbed  heroic  Serbia  in  the  back?  If 
Ferdinand  did  not  do  so,  it  is  an  additional  stain  on  his 
character. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  month  of  March,  1912.  Before 
leaving  Sofia  for  St.  Petersburg  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  me  to  see  the  King.  However,  Ferdinand 
had  had,  as  if  purposely,  an  attack  of  his  usual  ailment — 


62  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY     [chap.vi. 

the  gout— and  always  kept  on  putting  off  my  audience. 
I  learnt  at  last  from  a  fairly  authentic  source  that  the 
King's  illness  was  a  diplomatic  one,  and  that  for  special 
reasons  known  to  himself  alone,  he  did  not  wish  to  see 
me  at  the  moment  or  to  have  the  necessary  politcal 
interview  with  me.  Thus  forewarned  I  thought  it 
imperative  to  insist  on  my  audience,  by  declaring  that  I 
should  not  go  on  leave  till  I  had  seen  the  King.  Two 
days  after  1  was  invited  to  the  Palace. 

His  Majesty  received  me  in  his  study ;  he  was  half 
lying  on  a  wide  leather  sofa;  one  of  his  legs  was 
wrapped  in  a  plaid  rug,  testifying  to  the  attack  of  gout. 
On  a  table  next  the  sofa  a  few  art  treasures  were  littered 
about :  an  antique  Byzantine  crucifix  in  carved  wood 
set  in  silver — the  gift,  if  I  am  not  wrong,  of  the  Metro- 
politan of  Moscow;  an  old  snuff-box  in  gold — the  gift  of 
the  Empress  Alexandra ;  a  box  with  artistic  miniatures — 
a  souvenir  of  the  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  In  his  hand,  white, 
dimpled  and  well  cared-for,  the  King  held  a  crutch-stick 
with  a  gold  knob  in  the  old  Russian  style,  similar  to 
that  with  which  John  the  Terrible  was  always  armed ; 
only  the  steel  point  which  ended  the  stick  of  the  Tsar 
of  all  the  Russias  and  which  the  bloodthirsty  autocrat 
sometimes  dug  into  the  foot  of  an  undesirable  questioner 
by  leaning  his  whole  weight  on  the  knob,  was  replaced 
on  that  of  the  Tsar  of  the  Bulgarians — for  the  greater 
wellbeing  of  his  visitors — by  a  common  rubber  end ; 
the  crutch  had  been  given  to  the  King  by  his  cousin  the 
Grand-Duchess  Vladimir. 

"You  see  before  you,  Monsieur,"  began  the  King, 
"a  poor  invalid  surrounded  by  a  few  of  his  treasures, 
valuable  by  reason  of  their  associations.  Here  is  my 
sole  consolation  in  my  sufferings,"  he  continued,  point- 
ing to  the  old  crucifix,  "here,  .  . ."  and  the  King  began  to 
show  me  the  artistic  treasures  which  consoled  him  on 
his  bed  of  sickness,  and  to  tell  me  about  their  Russian 
origin.  This  preamble  over,  Ferdinand  came  down  to 
facts. 

He  began  by  expressing  his  very  vivid  fears  on  the 


I9I2]  FERDINAND'S   PERPLEXITIES  67, 

subject  of  a  possible  disclosure  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
treaty. 

"They  are  so  imprudent  in  the  Palace  of  Belgrade  ; 
every  one  has  access  to  it  and  they  talk  to  every  one. 
Moreover,  the  whole  of  Belgrade  is  full  of  Austrian,  and 
especially  Hungarian,  spies.  Hence  what  would  my 
position  be  if  the  old  Emperor  Francis-Joseph  got  to 
know  of  the  agreement  that  I  have  just  signed,  and  which 
has  all  the  appearance  of  being  chiefly  directed  against 
the  monarchy  of  the  Hapsburgs?  And  I  feel  sure  that 
the  Serbians  will  not  fail  to  boast  everywhere  of  their 
friendship  with  Bulgaria,  that  they  will  allow  it  to  be 
understood  in  Vienna  that  henceforth  they  can  depend 
on  us ;  and  the  Serbian  irredentists,  that  King  Peter's 
Government  cannot  keep  in  hand — as  /  can  keep  the 
Macedonians — will  not  miss  the  opportunity  to  annoy 
Austria  in  Bosnia  and  in  Herzegovina.  And  finally,  we 
two,  that  is  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  instead  of  profiting 
by  our  agreement  to  guard  the  rights  of  our  kin  in 
Macedonia,  shall  be  forced  to  arms  in  all  haste  to  uphold 
our  own  integrity  and  our  own  independence.  I  would 
entreat  you  most  earnestly,  Monsieur,  to  make  my 
apprehensions  known  in  St.  Petersburg  and  to  explain 
the  true  state  of  affairs.  I  shall  await  your  return  with 
impatience.  For  my  part,  I  have  already  given  the 
necessary  instructions  to  General  Papriskov"  (at  that 
time  Bulgarian  Minister  in  St.  Petersburg). 

I  listened  with  some  astonishment  to  the  long-winded 
explanations  of  the  King,  in  which  truth  was  mingled  with 
lies  and  clumsy  fictions  alternated  with  real  opinions 
and  fears.  King  Ferdinand  was  sincere  when  he 
acknowledged  himself  guilty  towards  the  Emperor 
Francis-Joseph.  Accustomed  from  his  early  youth  to 
respect  the  aged  monarch,  he  felt  truly  uneasy  at  the  idea 
that  in  the  Castle  of  Schoenbrunn  he  might  be  looked 
on  as  a  traitor  and  an  enemy.  The  fears  which  the 
King  expressed  on  the  subject  of  the  Serbian  irredentists 
were  also  well  founded.  But  what  he  said  about  the 
Palace  of  Belgrade  bore  the  stamp  of  wilful  exaggeration. 


64  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY     [chap.vi. 

Most  certainly  the  doors  of  this  palace  were  thrown  open 
to  all  Serbians;  King  Peter  did  not  shut  himself  up  as 
King  Ferdinand  did  in  his  study,  only  admitting  those 
whom  he  wished  to  instruct  on  some  point,  or  those  from 
whom  he  hoped  to  hear  some  interesting  gossip.  King 
Peter,  taking  his  j'olc  of  constitutional  monarch  very 
seriously,  talked  freely  with  all  the  representatives  of 
Serbian  democracy,  interchanging  ideas  and  information 
with  them ;  but  above  all  he  was  guided  by  the  opinions 
of  his  strictly  constitutional  Ministry.  Though  opening 
his  door  to  every  one,  he  did  not  really  open  it  wide,  just 
as  he  really  only  disclosed  his  thoughts  and  sentiments 
to  true  Serbian  patriots  who  were  incapable  of  having  any 
dealings  with  the  enemies  of  the  country.  King  Peter 
did  not  recruit  his  servants,  informants  and  secret 
counsellors  from  the  ranks  of  those  persons  who  were 
compromised  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation  and  the  law  ; 
among  Jiis  satellites  one  did  not  find  a  Ghennadiev,  a 
Radoslavov,  a  General  Savov  and  other  doubtful 
characters  of  this  type ! 

As  to  the  fact  that  the  newly-signed  agreement  would 
necessitate  a  fresh  political  situation  for  Bulgaria,  the 
King  could  not  be  unaware  of  it.  The  frequent  warnings 
that  I  had  issued  on  the  subject  to  M.  Gueshov  and  the 
other  members  of  his  Government  throughout  the  course 
of  the  negotiations  wd'e  perfectly  well  known  to  him. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  circumstances  and  of  the 
words  that  the  King  had  just  uttered,  I  considered  it  my 
duty  to  repeat  these  warnings  to  His  Majesty.  "  I  am 
afraid,"  I  said,  "  that  the  entirely  new  situation  arising 
from  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement  is  not  sufficiently 
clearly  understood  in  Bulgaria.  By  signing  this  agree- 
ment Bulgarian  policy  has  entered  on  a  new  course, 
accurately  outlined,  and  cannot  now  turn  back;  having 
formed  ties  that  cannot  be  broken  with  Serbia,  Bulgaria 
has  bound  herself,  by  that  very  fact,  to  us,  and  the  two 
Governments  will  have  henceforth  to  listen  very  atten- 
tively to  our  advice  if  they  really  wish  to  attain  their 
national  aims.    As  to  the  apprehensions  of  your  Majesty 


I9I2]  I   WARN    HIS   MAJESTY  65 

on  the  subject  of  Austria,  you  may  rely  entirely  on  us. 
My  august  Master  does  not  wish  for  war,  at  all  costs  he 
will  avoid  anything  that  might  bring  it  about ;  and  we 
will  warn  the  Serbians,  in  the  most  explicit  manner, 
against  all  dangerous  impulses,  against  anything  which 
might  justly  irritate  the  Central  Powers.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  two  Balkan  countries,  henceforth  united, 
were  to  be  attacked  without  cause  by  Austria  we  should 
doubtless  look  on  such  aggression  as  a  challenge  hurled 
directly  at  us.  Moreover,  Your  Majesty  knows  my 
opinion  and  probably  shares  it,  this  opinion  being  that 
Austria — under  present  conditions  anyhow — would  not 
dare  to  risk  an  aggression  without  due  cause.  Finally, 
touching  the  justifiable  claim  of  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  to 
protect  their  kin  in  Turkey — for  us  the  question  resolves 
itself  thus  :  on  the  one  hand,  as  Your  Majesty  knows  so 
well,  we  should  not  wish  to  do  anything  conducive 
to  an  armed  collision  in  the  Near  East,  and  I  have 
repeatedly  informed  the  Royal  Government  that  in 
St.  Petersburg  everything  will  be  done  to  prevent  such 
a  collision.  But  on  the  other  hand,  we  realise  perfectly 
well  that  the  best  way  to  prevent  any  untoward  events 
would  be  to  resume  and  successfully  to  terminate  the 
international  work  so  well  started  in  Macedonia  before 
the  Turkish  Revolution.  At  that  period  one  of  the 
stumbling  blocks  to  the  work  had  been  Serbo-Bulgarian 
rivalry.  This  rivalry  once  disposed  of,  our  work  will 
become  far  easier,  and  Your  Majesty  may  rest  assured 
that  we  shall  avail  ourselves  of  this  improved  situation." 

While  I  was  unfolding  these  ideas  of  mine,  Ferdinand's 
expression  became  more  and  more  gloomy.  He  refrained, 
however,  from  all  controversy  and,  passing  over  to 
personal  subjects,  soon  dismissed  me  with  the  same 
studied  politeness  and  amiable  words  as  heretofore. 

But  under  this  apparent  amiability  I  thought  I 
detected  signs  of  displeasure,  coldness,  even  hostility! 

1  have  since  been  told — and  had,  moreover,  found  it 
out  for  myself — that  the  beginning  of  my  personal 
rupture  with    Ferdinand    dated    from    this    significant 


66  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY    [charvi. 

conversation.  The  King  realised  that  I  had  no  intention 
of  becoming  the  blind  interpreter  of  his  opinions  to  the 
Imperial  Government ;  he  also  understood  that  the  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  treaty  gave  a  certain  hold  over  him  to  Russian 
policy  and  consequently  to  the  representatives  of  the 
Tsar.  Ferdinand  felt  that  certain  alleys  were  henceforth 
closed  to  him  :  the  feeling  was  unbearable  and  roused  his 
anger  against  the  Russian  Minister  who  contemplated 
hampering  the  freedom  of  his  political  enterprises. 

M.  Gueshov,  with  whom  I  had  a  long  interview  on 
the  eve  of  my  departure,  did  not  display  any  apprehension 
— in  contrast  to  his  master — on  the  score  of  the  newly- 
signed  agreement,  and  repeated  the  opinion,  already 
expressed  by  him  during  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
with  Spalaikovitch,  that  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty, 
concluded  under  the  aegis  of  Russia,  would  necessarily 
involve  the  conclusion  of  military  conventions  between 
the  two  contracting  parties  as  well  as  between  both  of 
them  and  Russia.  I  had  already  imparted  this  suggestion 
of  M.  Gueshov's  to  M.  Sazonoff,  and  added — as  my 
private  opinion— that  such  conventions,  drawn  up,  of 
course,  on  strictly  defensive  lines,  might  furnish  us  with 
further  means  of  preventing  ill-timed  action  on  the  part 
of  the  two  Balkan  kingdoms.  The  answer  was  delayed, 
and  on  taking  leave  of  M.  Gueshov,  I  promised  him 
that  I  would  go  into  the  question  in  St.  Petersburg, 
and  would  bring  him  back  a  definite  answer  from  M. 
Sazonoff. 


CHAPTER  VII 

RASPUTIN 

I  ARRIVED  in  St.  Petersburg  at  the  end  of  March,  after  an 
absence  of  a  year.  I  recollect  as  if  it  were  yesterday, 
the  first  impression  of  a  political  nature  that  I  received  : 
the  very  morning  of  my  arrival,  on  looking  over  the 
Novoye  Vreinja,  I  noticed  a  short  article  in  which  the 
speech  made  the  evening  before  by  M.  Goutchkoff  at 
the  Duma  was  quoted. 

This  speech  was  a  brief  but  vehement  diatribe  against 
certain  sinister  influences  which  were  dominating  the 
Court  and  beginning  to  interfere  in  Government  affairs. 
I  at  once  realised  that  this  was  aimed  at  the  famous 
Gregory  Rasputin.  But  as  up  till  then  I  had  only  heard 
the  strange  influence  of  this  individual  at  Tsarskoe-Selo 
spoken  of  as  a  mystico-hysterical  whim  of  the  Empress 
Alexandra's,  and  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Emperor 
was  not  in  any  case  very  devoted  to  Goutchkoff",  I  dis- 
approved of  this  new  philippic,  which  would  cause 
further  estrangement  between  His  Majesty  and  the 
former  President  of  the  Duma:  whereas  I  considered 
that  it  would  be  advantageous  to  the  aff'airs  of  the 
country  if  the  Emperor  were  occasionally  to  confer 
with  this  influential  and  very  well-informed  member  of 
our  Parliament,  who  with  ardent  patriotism  and  recog- 
nised authority  presided  over  the  Commission  of  National 
Defence.  In  short,  I  inwardly  accused  Goutchkoff"  of  a 
want  of  tact. 

I  was  thinking  all  this  over  when  I  went  to  luncheon 
with  a  near  relation  of  mine.  This  relation  was  also 
related  to  Goutchkoff"  and  did  not  like  him  much,  and  in 
our  intimate  conversations  often  alluded  to  him  as  an 
ambitious  man  who  had  become  embittered  and  restless. 

67  F 


n^  RASPUTIN  [chap.vii 

On  arriving  at  my  relation's  house,  1  found  him  talking 
at  the  telephone:  "  Is  that  you,  my  dear?  I  ventured 
to  ring  you  up  on  the  telephone  to  tell  you  how  very 
much  I  admired  your  excellent  speech  of  yesterday  at 
the  Duma.  .  .  .  No,  no !  do  not  excuse  yourself  for  a 
good  deed;  you  have  only  done  your  duty  as  a  citizen  : 
it  is  very  regrettable  that  every  one  else  does  not  do  the 
same,"  etc.  ...  I  could  not  believe  my  ears,  and  when 
my  relation  had  at  last  finished  his  conversation,  I 
exclaimed:  "  Is  it  really  you  talking  ?  How  many  times 
have  I  quarrelled  with  you  by  standing  up  for  Goutchkoff 
when  you  were  abusing  him  ;  and  now  you  overwhelm 
him  with  compliments,  whereas  I — I  frankly  admit — 
considered  his  speech  to  be  a  want  of  tact.  What  does 
this  change  mean?" 

"Listen,"  replied  my  host,  "do  not  let  us  lose  time 
in  idle  discussion :  you  see  a  great  many  more  people 
in  St.  Petersburg  than  I  do  ;  in  three  days  from  now 
you  will  have  seen  and  heard  so  much  that  there  will  be 
nothing  left  for  me  to  tell  you.  And  then  we  shall  see 
what  you  will  say  !  "  My  relation  was  only  wrong 
about  the  time-limit !  On  the  evening  of  the  very  next 
day,  I  had  only  one  remark  to  make  to  him  :  "  You  were 
perfectly  right ;  but,  good  God !  how  sad  it  all  is,  and 
what  is  more  hozv  dangerous  ! " 

I  had  heard  the  name  of  Rasputin  mentioned  in  St. 
Petersburg  for  the  first  time  in  1908.  An  intimate  friend 
of  mine  with  whom  I  was  discussing  Court  affairs — I 
forget  exactly  why — said  amongst  other  things  :  "  There 
are  strange  rumours  in  circulation  among  the  public,  or 
rather,  among  the  people !  Yesterday,  my  wife's  house- 
keeper— you  know  the  one  we  have  had  for  more  than 
ten  years — came  into  my  study  and  said  :  *  Pray  excuse 
me,  sir,  but  I  have  something  I  wish  to  say  to  you.  I 
have  often  heard  you  complain  that  your  son-in-law 
could  not  get  the  post  which  had  been  promised  to 
him  ages  ago.  .  .  .  Well  !  I  believe  I  can  help  you.' 
'You!  my  good  woman;  but  in  what  way?'  'In 
this  way.     My  sister,  who  is  also  in  domestic  service, 


I9I2]  HIS  ORIGIN  69 

told  me  the  other  day  that  her  master  and  mistress  often 
receive  a  certain  "old  man  " — a  man  of  the  people,  quite 
simple  :  but  he  is  received  with  a  great  deal  of  fuss  ;  and 
he  has  already  been  an  enormous  help  to  that  family; 
he  has  been  able  to  help  many  others,  as  he  is  quite 
intimate  with  the  Tsar  and  Tsarina,  who  do  everything 
that  he  tells  them.  Allow  me  to  beg  my  sister  to  speak 
to  the  "  old  man  "  in  your  son-in-law's  favour !  *  As  you 
may  imagine,"  continued  my  friend,  "I  did  not  consent  to 
this  curious  suggestion;  but  it  is  odd  what  rumours 
there  are  about  amongst  the  people  !  It  is  evidently  a 
question  of  a  new  Papus  or  of  another  M.  Philip,  only 
of  Russian  origin  and  in  the  popular  style  !" 

While  I  was  spending  the  winter  of  1910-11  in  St. 
Petersburg,  rumours  and  inquiries  on  the  subject  of 
Gregory  Rasputin  had  been  the  rage  in  society.  It  was 
relatively  known  that  this  "  old  man  "  or  "  poor  innocent " 
was  a  native  of  Siberia,  that  he  had  formerly  led  a 
particularly  dissolute  life  ("Rasputin"  is  derived  from 
"  rasputny  "  =  dissolute  person) ;  that  then  suddenly  he 
became  a"trezvennik,"  i.e.  a  preacher  of  temperance  and 
piety,  and  that,  henceforth  protected  by  a  few  great 
ecclesiastical  dignitaries,  he  was  summoned  by  them  to 
St.  Petersburg.  There,  through  the  "  Montenegrins  " — 
the  Grand-Duchesses  Militza  and  Stana — and  through 
the  salon — "  little  parish  " — of  Countess  Sophie  Ignatieff, 
he  finally  worked  his  way  up  to  the  Court,  where  he  finds 
a  patroness  and  so  to  speak  an  impresario  in  the  person 
of  the  divorced  lady  Vyrouboff,  nee  Taneieff.  However, 
as  during  this  winter  of  1910-11,  the  Empress  Alexandra 
did  not  shut  herself  up  so  completely  as  in  former  years, 
and  was  apparently  feeling  quite  well,  which  means  that 
she  was  behaving  more  or  less  normally,  there  was 
much  less  open  mention  of  Rasputin  and  the  Vyrouboff; 
moreover,  the  influence  of  these  persons  had  not  yet 
extended  to  Government  affairs. 

But  matters  had  assumed  a  very  different  aspect 
during  the  year  that  I  had  spent  out  of  Russia.  It  appears 
that  in  the  meantime  a  group  of  low  "  opportunists " 


70  RASPUTIN  [chap.  VII. 

had  sprung  up,  who,  aware  of  the  ever-increasing 
influence  of  the  Siberian  rogue  over  the  august  person- 
ages of  Tsarskoe-Selo,  set  themselves  out  to  guide 
Rasputin,  and  allied  themselves  to  the  Vyrouboff  and 
her  relations  in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  public  offices 
of  the  State  and  particularly  to  the  public  funds.  One 
began  to  hear  the  names  of  a  Prince  Andronnikoff,  of 
a  M.  Manus,  of  a  MiassoTedoff,  and  they  were  spoken 
of  as  people  who  were  plotting  great  things  and 
influencing  even  the  Government.  The  waiting-room  of 
the  uncouth  moujik  Rasputin  was  filled  every  morning 
by  persons  coming  to  ask  favours,  amongst  whom  one 
met  with  people  of  position  and  of  the  upper  classes  ; 
they  showed  each  other  notes  scrawled  by  this  same 
Rasputin  in  a  common  style  and  an  appalling  hand- 
writing, and  in  which  he  recommended  some  humble 
protege  or  some  one  in  need  of  assistance  to  the  good 
graces  of  such  and  such  a  Minister. 

One  heard  at  the  same  time  that  the  ecclesiastical 
dignitary  who  had  contributed  the  most  to  Rasputin's 
good  fortune  had  just  written  a  letter  to  the  Emperor 
in  which  he  revealed  the  depravity  of  his  ex-protege,  and 
repented  bitterly  of  having  introduced  him  at  the 
Palace  ;  the  honest  but  ingenuous  bishop  concluded  his 
epistle  by  entreating  the  Emperor  to  send  Rasputin 
away;  for  himself,  he  implored  permission  to  retire  as  a 
simple  monk  into  a  monastery,  in  order  to  do  penance 
there  to  the  end  of  his  da3^s.  The  story  went  that  the 
bishop  received  a  very  gracious  reply  from  the  Emperor, 
earnestly  begging  him  to  remain  at  the  head  of  his 
diocese  :  but  Rasputin  still  continued  in  high  favour. 

At  one  time,  influenced  by  a  few  letters  of  this  kind, 
the  statements  of  a  few  officials  and  some  serious 
warnings,  the  Emperor  did  make  up  his  mind  to  send 
Rasputin  back  to  his  Siberian  village,  where  the 
adventurer  arrived  loaded  with  magnificent  gifts  and 
provided  with  a  considerable  sum  of  money ;  but  by 
the  time  I  arrived  in  St.  Petersburg  all  the  town  was 
indignantly  talking  about  the  return  of  the  "old  man  " 


1912]  A  SUBJECT  FOR  SCANDAL  n 

to  the  capital,  and  they  quoted  the  names  of  such  and 
such  a  lady  and  of  such  and  such  an  official,  whose 
houses,  in  the  evening,  were  the  scene  of  strange 
religious  rites  conducted  by  Rasputin.^ 

Much  comment  was  also  caused  by  the  resignation 
of  two  maids-of-honour,  specially  attached  to  the  Palace  : 
Princess  Obolensky,  a  person  noted  for  her  wit,  tact, 
and  kindness  of  heart,  who  at  one  time  was  very 
intimate  with  the  Empress,  and  Mile.  Tutcheff,  much 
esteemed  for  her  character  and  her  intelligence,  to  which 
she  owed  her  position  as  governess  to  the  Imperial 
children.  The  latter  had  several  times  protested 
vehemently  against  the  repeated  visits  of  the  "  old 
man"  to  her  august  pupils,  visits  during  which  he 
allowed  himself  to  take  liberties  which  were  unnecessary 
to  say  the  least  of  it.  Mile.  Tutcheff  was  promised  that 
this  should  not  occur  again,  and  Rasputin's  departure 
brought  the  desired  solution  of  the  question.  But  now 
the  terrible  scoundrel  had  reappeared  at  Tsarskoe- 
Selo,  the  question  revived  with  added  acuteness  and 
Mile.  Tutcheff,  foreseeing  a  return  to  former  practices, 
definitely  left  her  charming  pupils  and  the  Court. 

My  first  official  visit  in  St.  Petersburg  was  naturally 
to  our  Foreign  Secretary.  Having  discussed  with  him 
all  that  had  happened  in  Bulgaria  since  our  last  con- 
versation at  Davos,  I  begged  M.  Sazonoff,  as  was 
customary,  to  procure  me  an  audience  of  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor. 

"  The  Emperor  will  probably  receive  you  during 
this  week.  To-morrow  is  the  day  for  my  report  to 
Tsarskoe-Selo  and  I  will  take  the  opportunity  to  inform 
His  Majesty  of  your  arrival." 

"And  does  the  Empress  Alexandra  not  receive?" 

"Oh  no!  She  has  been  ailing  for  a  long  time,  and 
in  general  things  are  not  going  well  in  that  quarter." 

"  But  what  is  wrong?" 

^  Rasputin  was  in  fact  a  Khlysf,  ?>.'half  "  Shaker,"  half  Flagellant— 
a  strange  sect  which  from  time  to  time  rises  in  Russia  from  the  common 
depths  to  the  upper  classes  of  society. 


^2  RASPUTIN  [chap.  VII. 

"Oh!  You  will  soon  hear  of  it;  no  one  talks  of 
anything  else  in  town." 

I  let  the  matter  drop,  as  in  honour  bound. 

Two  or  three  days  later,  I  got  out  of  the  train  at  the 
Tsarskoe-Selo  station  and  got  into  a  Royal  carriage  to 
go  to  the  Alexander  Palace,  the  usual  residence  of  the 
Imperial  family.  The  weather  was  beautiful,  dry  and 
sunny.  As  we  were  nearing  the  palace,  the  footman 
began  to  explain  to  me — with  the  usual  familiarity  of 
those  sort  of  people — why  I  was  being  taken  to  a 
different  entrance  than  usual. 

"See,  your  Excellency,  the  Empress's  carriage 
standing  at  the  other  door!  Her  Majesty  is  going  out 
for  the  first  time  for  a  long  while,"  continued  the  footman 
with  a  self-satisfied  smile. 

A  few  minutes  later,  preceded  by  another  Royal 
servant,  I  was  making  my  way  to  the  Emperor's  study 
through  the  charming  Louis  XVI.  rooms  of  the  Palace, 
and  across  the  spacious  library,  all  lit  up  by  the  sun- 
shine, and  I  was  admiring  the  fine  and  simple  architecture 
of  this  masterpiece  of  Guarenghi's.  And  beyond  the 
grand  colonade  of  the  Palace,  I  could  see  the  Empress's 
carriage  disappearing  on  its  way  to  the  station.  ,  .  . 
The  following  day  the  whole  of  St.  Petersburg  was 
saying  that  the  Empress,  having  gone  unexpectedly  into 
the  town  to  visit  an  institute  for  young  ladies,  then  went 
on  to  the  house  of  one  of  Rasputin's  faithful  followers, 
and  spent  two  hours  there  conversing  with  the  "holy 
man."  ,  .  . 

How  many  times  since  then  have  I  recalled  that 
morning,  and  that  Imperial  carriage  driving  away 
through  the  dazzling  snow  across  the  park  at  Tsarskoe. 
How  many  times  have  I  recalled  that  magnificent 
dwelling,  simple  and  grand  in  outline,  with  its  ex- 
quisitely-proportioned rooms,  its  beautiful  works  of  art, 
its  admirable  library,  its  beautiful  bay-windows  over- 
looking the  park,  which  is  delightful  even  in  winter;  all 
this  setting  which  seemed  to  call  for  a  royal  existence, 
not  so  much  sumptuous  as   refined  and  distinguished  ; 


I9I2]         THE   EMPRESS  AND   RASPUTIN  73 

conversations  with  cultivated  friends,  scholars,  poets, 
and  artists  ;  receptions,  rather  informal  than  otherwise, 
but  composed  of  the  real  elite  of  a  society  in  which  in- 
telligent elements  have  never  been  lacking ;  political 
discussions  with  the  menof  yesterday  and  of  to-morrow, 
who  would  be  flattered  at  being  admitted  into  this 
sanctuary  of  refinement  and  elegance.  This  dwelling,  I 
thought  to  myself,  shelters  a  sovereign,  powerful,  but 
prone  to  good-nature  and  simplicity,  gifted  with  a  quick 
and  inquiring  mind  made  for  the  interchange  of  impres- 
sions and  opinions  ;  four  young  girls,  whose  beauty  and 
charm  will  gradually  be  revealed  to  a  respectfully- 
admiring  world,  like  the  blooming  of  rare  and  lovely 
flowers  in  our  hot-houses  ;  an  adored  son,  just  weak  and 
sickly  enough  to  bring  a  shade  of  melancholy  into  the 
beautiful  eyes  of  his  mother.  .  .  .  And  this  mother,  this 
wife,  this  Empress,  moving  in  this  beautiful  setting,  with 
all  these  sources  of  joy  and  happiness,  leaves  the  beauti- 
ful white  palace,  with  its  pictures,  its  sculpture,  and  its 
beautiful  books,  the  flowers  which  perfume  it  and  the 
delightful  children  who  fill  it  with  life ;  she  leaves  all 
this  with  the  eager  joy  of  a  convalescent  going  out  for 
the  first  time  into  the  fresh  air,  and  she  goes  to  shut 
herself  up  for  hours  in  a  wretched  room  in  a  common- 
place apartment  with  a  dirty  and  knavish  moujik,  seek- 
ing from  this  creature — so  immeasurably  beneath  her — 
spiritual  consolation,  foretelling  of  the  future,  guidance 
for  a  timid  conscience  and  a  sick  mind.  .  .  .  And  then 
she  returns  to  this  Tsarskoe  palace,  in  which  she  has 
succeeded  in  "sequestering"  her  husband,  to  this  palace 
whence  nothing  radiates  to  the  adjacent  capital  and  to 
the  country:  neither  noble  refinement,  nor  mental 
shrewdness,  nor  even  political  guidance — nothing  save 
an  absurd  and  ridiculous  legend — grieved  over  by  the 
friend  and  retailed  triumphantly  by  the  foe,  and  which 
goes  on  growing  and  circulating  till  it  becomes  one  of 
the  chief  causes  of  a  downfall  and  a  catastrophe  almost 
unequalled  in  history  ! 


74  RASPUTIN  [chap.vii. 

This  time  my  audience  with  the  Emperor  was  some- 
what brief.  His  Majesty  first  expressed  his  sincere  satis- 
faction on  the  subject  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement. 
I  repeated  to  the  Emperor  my  last  conversation  with 
Ferdinand. 

"Yes,"  said  the  Emperor,  "Ferdinand  is  terribly 
suspicious  and  dreadfully  afraid  that  we  shall  take  him 
altogether  in  hand.  But  you  may  reassure  him  on  this 
subject.  I  have  no  wish  to  direct  Bulgarian  policy 
provided  that  Bulgaria  behaves  herself  and  does  not 
drag  us  whither  we  cannot  and  will  not  follow  her." 

The  Emperor  then  proceeded  to  speak  of  the  festivities 
held  for  the  coming  of  age  of  Prince  Boris,  and  charged 
me  to  thank  the  King  from  him  for  the  welcome  extended 
to  the  Grand-Duke  Andrew  Vladimirovitch.  I  gathered 
from  this  audience  the  impression  that  His  Majesty  was 
indeed  very  much  pleased  at  the  complete  reconciliation 
between  Serbians  and  Bulgarians.  When  he  spoke  of 
King  Ferdinand  one  perceived  in  his  words  a  sceptical 
and  even  slightly  scornful  touch,  but  that  in  spite 
of  that  he  looked  on  the  King  of  the  Bulgarians 
as  a  political  factor  who  would  have  to  be  reckoned 
with.  This  renewal  of  goodwill  towards  Ferdinand 
might  also  serve  as  a  sign  that  the  idea  of  a  matri- 
monial alliance  between  Prince  Boris  and  one  of 
the  Grand-Duchesses,  daughters  of  the  Emperor,  had 
grown  to  a  certain  extent.  And,  indeed,  in  intimate  Court 
circles,  I  heard  great  liking  expressed  for  the  young 
Bulgarian  heir— which  proved  relatively  that  Boris  had 
produced  a  good  impression  on  the  Imperial  couple. 

The  next  day  I  went  to  see  M.  Sazonoff  and  gave 
him— as  was  fit  and  proper — an  epitome  of  my  interview 
with  his  Majesty.  I  asked  the  Minister  on  this  occasion 
what  his  personal  impression  was  on  the  subject  of  the 
military  convention — a  question  on  which  we  had  only 
touched  lightly  at  our  first  interview. 

"  Well ! "  said  Sazonoff,  "  I  wish  you  would  be  so 
good  as  to  go  yourself  to  General  Jilinsky  (at  that  time 


I9I2]  GENERAL  JILINSKY  75 

head  of  the  General  Headquarters  Staff)  and  endeavour 
to  find  out  whether  he  is  really  in  favour  of  this 
convention  or  not.  I  am  under  the  impression  that  the 
matter  is  being  settled  at  General  Headquarters, 
although  the  preliminaries  are  the  work  of  our  former 
military  agent  in  Bulgaria — Colonel  Leontieff — and 
although,  as  you  say  yourself,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Romanowski  endorses  his  predecessor's  point  of  view." 

On  the  appointed  day,  I  went  to  see  General 
Jilinsky,  with  whom  I  had  never  discussed  important 
matters.  At  my  first  allusion  to  the  convention,  the 
General  became  irritable. 

"But  why  should  it  be  necessar}^  for  us  to  conclude 
a  military  convention  with  Bulgaria  when  one  already 
exists?  Have  you  been  told  nothing  of  tHe  convention 
concluded  by  me  pcrsonaily  in  1902?  It  is  here  in  this 
drawer,  but  of  course  I  cannot  read  it  to  you  as  it 
is  a  most  secret  convention  ;  but  you  had  better  make 
inquiries  about  it  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and  perhaps 
you  will  be  initiated  into  the  circumstances  relating  to 
the  conclusion  and  terms  of  this  arrangement." 

"  I  read  the  convention.  General,  when  I  was  appointed 
Russian  Minister  to  Bulgaria,  and  I  re-read  it  to-day  at 
the  Foreign  Office  before  coming  to  you.  I  know  it  by 
heart,  and  consequently  I  realise  that  it  has  a  fixed  object 
and  that  the  point  was  directed  almost  exclusively  at 
Turkey  and  Rumania.  When  Rumania  had  concluded 
a  special  convention  with  Austria-Hungary,  we  thought 
it  expedient  to  conclude  one  with  Bulgaria,  promising 
her  eff'ectual  help  in  the  event  of  her  being  attacked  by 
Turkey  aided  by  Rumania.  But  now  the  political 
situation  has  completely  changed ;  it  is  no  longer  a 
question  of  the  possibility  of  an  alliance — certainly  not 
an  offensive  one — between  Turkey  and  Rumania ;  on 
the  contrary,  we  have  to  deal  with  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
alliance,  which  brings  quite  different  elements  into  the 
question.  .  .  ." 

"  All  this  is  quite  likely,"  interrupted  the  General ; 
"but  so  long  as  the  convention  of  which   I  spoke,  and 


76  RASPUTIN  [chap.vi. 

which  I  m^'self  concluded,  exists,  it  is  waste  of  time  to 
speak  of  any  other." 

I  understood  that  I  had  to  deal  with  a  pre-conceived 
idea  firmly  fixed  in  an  obstinate  brain ;  so  I  abandoned 
the  principal  object  of  my  visit  and  passed  to  another 
subject :  the  journey  which  the  Chief  of  the  Bulgarian 
General  Staff,  General  Fichev,  had  made  to  Russia  a  few 
months  previously. 

"General  Fichev,"  I  said,  "  was  very  much  flattered 
by  the  welcome  which  he  received  here,  and  has  carried 
away  the  best  impressions  of  our  military  organisation. 
Up  till  then  he  had  never  been  to  Russia  and  did  not 
know  anything  about  the  Russian  Army.  Colonel 
Romanowski,  who  accompanied  the  General,  told  me 
that  at  every  moment  he  uttered  exclamations  of  genuine 
surprise  at  the  high  standard  of  instruction  of  our 
troops,  their  skill  in  manoeuvres,  etc.  .  .  .  His  foreign 
masters  (Fichev  had  been  a  pupil  of  the  Military  College 
in  Turin)  had  probably  described  the  Russian  Army  as 
a  semi-Asiatic  force." 

"So  that  is  what  M.  Fichev  told  Romanowski,  is 
it?"  interrupted  the  General,  "and  I  happen  to  know 
that  he  talked  of  our  Army  and  of  Russia  generally  in 
exceedingly  hostile  terms !" 

"  Really  ?"  I  exclaimed.  "  But  then  be  good  enough 
to  quote  your  sources  of  information.  General ;  the 
matter  ought  to  be  thoroughly  sifted,  and  we  ought  to 
warn  our  military  agent  who,  since  his  trip  with  Fichev, 
has  become  very  intimate  with  him  and  trusts  him." 

"  But  I  did  not  need  any  sources  of  information," 
replied  Jilinsky,  angrily.  "Being  a  rabid  Stambou- 
lovist,  he  could  not  speak  otherwise  about  Russia  and 
the  Russian  Army.     It  is  as  clear  as  daylight ! " 

After  this  there  was  nothing  left  for  me  to  do  but  to 
close  our  interview  and  to  make  my  bow  to  the  peppery 
General. 

Two  years  and  a  half  after  this  interview — in 
September,  1914 — General  Jilinsky,  who  in  1913  had 
been     made    Governor-General    of    Poland,   was    also 


igi2 


]  OTHER  OFFICIAL  VISITS  77 


commanding  an  army  corps.  He  was  responsible  for  the 
operations  of  General  SamsonofTs  army  in  the  region  of 
the  Mazovian  Lakes,  operations  which  ended  in  the  loss 
of  this  army.  The  future  historians  of  the  War  will  have 
to  decide  who  was  the  real  culprit  in  this  catastrophe  : 
was  it  General  Samsonoff  who  made  mistakes,  or  was  it 
General  Jilinsky  who  decided  on  the  operations  before 
he  had  estimated  the  fighting  strength  of  the  army  in 
question,  and  without  knowing  exactly  what  forces  the 
enemy  was  opposing  to  it  ? 

I  went  the  next  day  to  see  the  Foreign  Secretary,  to 
repeat  the  conversation  I  had  had  with  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Headquarters  Staff,  and  I  frankly  expressed  my 
conviction  that  under  the  circumstances  the  proposed 
military  convention  could  never  be  concluded. 

"But  what  is  your  exact  opinion  as  to  the  expedi- 
ency of  such  a  convention  ?  "  asked  Sazonoff. 

"To  be  quite  frank,"  I  replied,  "  I  am  still  in  doubt 
myself  On  the  one  hand,  you  know  my  opinion  about 
the  desire  for  conquest  of  the  Bulgarians  and  Serbians  : 
having  concluded  with  them  a  military  convention  of 
which  the  point  would  be  directed  against  Turkey,  we 
should  appear  to  be  encouraging  their  projects ;  by 
making,  per  contra,  this  convention  into  a  weapon  against 
Austria-Hungary,  we  should  still  further  strain  the  chain 
of  our  relations  with  the  Central  Empires  :  woe  to  us  if 
a  link  snaps!  But  on  the  other  hand  a  military  con- 
vention, drawn  up  with  skill  and  great  caution,  might 
ttnife  Serbians  and  Bulgarians  and  prevent  them  taking 
up  arms  against  our  wish,  or  at  a  moment  we  might 
consider  inopportune.  All  this  should  be  carefully 
weighed,  and  it  is  most  regrettable  that  the  chief  of  our 
General  Headquarters  Staff  will  not  even  allow  a  care- 
ful and  impartial  examination  of  such  an  important 
question." 

"  In  that  case,  let  us  wait,"  said  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
in  conclusion. 

Besides    my    audience    at    Tsarskoe-Selo    and    my 


78  RASPUTIN  [chap.  vii. 

interviews  with  M.  Sazonoff,  I  called  on  several  members 
of  the  Government,  and  amongst  others  on  M. 
Kokovtzoff— at  that  time  already  President  of  the 
Council — to  whom  I  was  bound  by  pleasant  recollections 
of  work  shared  in  Paris  at  the  time  of  our  great  loans 
of  1906.  I  also  did  not  omit  to  visit  General  Polivanoflf, 
then  assistant  to  the  Minister  for  War,  to  whom  I 
always  enjoyed  talking,  and  who  stood  high  in  my 
opinion,  for  the  thoroughness  and  impartiality  which  he 
displayed  in  the  examination  of  all  business  questions. 
Moreover,  I  was  bound  to  inform  both  these  gentlemen 
of  matters  relative  to  my  work  in  Bulgaria. 

I  also  visited  M.  Goutchkoff,  and  talked  at  great 
length  with  him.  Goutchkoff  complained,  amongst  other 
things,  of  our  want  of  all  military  preparation. 

"You  cannot  imagine,"  he  said,  speaking  of  the 
work  of  the  Commission  for  National  Defence  for  the 
Duma,  "  what  it  has  cost  us  to  make  the  War  Office  ask 
for  supplies  to  he  voted  for  the  making  of  big  guns  for  the 
artillery,  of  which  we  hardly  possess  any.  At  last  the 
first  orders  have  been  given,  but  they  are  quite  inade- 
quate." In  spite  of  its  being  against  his  principles  that 
grand-dukes  should  be  at  the  head  of  public  departments, 
Goutchkoff  appeared  tc  be  on  fairl}'  good  terms  with 
the  Grand-Duke  Serge  Mikhailovitch,  who  was  still  in 
command  of  the  artillery;  but  he  complained  bitterly  of 
the  Minister  for  War,  Soukhomlinoff.  I  do  not  exactly 
remember  whether  it  was  on  this  occasion  or  later  on 
that  Goutchkoff  gave  me  the  full  details  of  his  collision 
with  General  Soukhomlinoff  on  the  subject  of  the  retired 
colonel  of  the  gendarmerie,  Miassoi'edoff,  who  lived 
permanently  with  the  Soukhomlinoffs  at  the  War  Office, 
as  family  friend  and  general  factotum,  and  whom 
Goutchkoff  openly  accused  of  being  a  military  spy,  on 
behalf  of  Germany. 

"Your  principal  will  end  at  the  gallows,"  he  said  to 
MiassoTedoff's  seconds  when  they  presented  themselves 
at  his  house.  This  prophecy  was  fulfilled  in  191 5. 
Nevertheless   it   is   very   regrettable    that    Goutchkoff 


I9I2]  DRAWING-ROOM    GOSSIP  79 

should  have  consented  to  fight  a  duel  with  this  low 
scoundrel.  It  was  inconsistent  on  his  part.  But  then 
it  is  through  inconsistency  and  superfluous  generosity 
that  we  Russians  usually  err. 

It  was  not  only  Goutchkoff  who  spoke  to  me  with 
indignation  about  Soukhomlinoff.  The  President  of  the 
Council,  Kokovtzoff,  who  was  always  extremely  guarded 
in  his  conversation,  spoke  in  very  bitter  terms,  one  day, 
about  his  colleague  of  the  War  Office :  "What  can  one 
do,"  he  said,  "  when  the  Minister  for  War  is  a  gentle- 
man whose  sole  wish  is  to  report  to  the  Emperor,  in  his 
most  agreeable  baritone  voice,  the  things  which  please 
His  Majesty,  but  which  he,  Soukhomlinoff,  knows 
perfectly  well  to  be  untrue !  " 

On  the  other  hand,  Kokovtzoff  did  not  like  Goutchkoff 
either ;  he  accused  him  of  being  ambitious  and  conceited, 
and  of  causing  unscrupulous  political  disturbances. 

And  it  was  between  these  three  persons  :  Soukhom- 
linoff, Goutchkoff,  and  Kokovtzoff,  that  questions  re- 
lative to  our  armament  were  to  be  discussed  ! 

In  the  salons  of  St.  Petersburg,  which  I  frequented 
fairly  regularly,  Rasputin  was  the  sole  topic  of  con- 
versation. Some  persons,  who  were  in  a  position  to 
know,  and  A^ho  were  very  truthful,  told  me  amongst 
other  things  that  the  Dowager  Empress  Marie- 
Feodorovna  had  been  to  Tsarskoe-Selo  and  had  had  a 
heart-to-heart  talk  with  her  son  and  daughter-in-law. 
"  It  is  no  question  of  you,  of  your  affections,  your 
convictions  or  rather  your  religious  manias,"  she  said, 
addressing  the  Empress  Alexandra;  "it  is  a  question  of 
the  Emperor,  of  the  Dynasty,  of  Russia!  If  you  go  on 
in  this  way,  you  will  be  the  undoing  of  us  all ! " 

A  fortnight  after  my  arrival  in  St.  Petersburg,  I  was 
invited  to  an  evening  party  given  by  the  Foreign 
Secretary — the  first  big  reception  held  by  the  Sazonoffs 
since  their  return  from  Davos.  The  beautiful  "  Empire  " 
reception-rooms  were  brilliantly  lit  up,  and  gradually 
filled   with   guests :     members   of  the   Cabinet,   of  the 


So  RASPUTIN  fcnAP.vii. 

Council  of  the  Empire  and  of  the  Duma,  foreign 
diplomats,  journalists,  financiers,  and  society  people  of 
St.  Petersburg,  like  one  sees  at  all  receptions  of  this 
kind.  The  men  wore  their  orders  and  decorations,  the 
ladies  their  smartest  evening-dresses;  in  one  of  the 
rooms  an  excellent  orchestra  was  playing,  and  in  the 
first  drawing-room  the  host  and  hostess  smilingly 
received  their  guests,  shaking  them  by  the  hand,  and 
exchanging  friendly  small-talk  with  them.  In  short 
everything  was  done  as  it  should  be  at  such  receptions. 
Yet  nevertheless,  from  the  outset,  one  felt  there  was 
something  in  the  air,  something  which  was  depressing 
all  the  brilliant  assembly.  Smiling  faces  suddenly 
assumed  a  severe  and  anxious  expression  ;  some  of  the 
guests  with  worried  looks  were  whispering  together  in 
corners  ;  the  Ministers,  in  particular,  seemed  to  be  in  a 
very  nervous  state,  with  the  exception,  however,  of 
General  Soukhomlinoff,  who  walked  through  the  rooms 
like  a  conquering  hero,  with  his  over-dressed  wife  on 
his  arm.  I  went  up  to  M.  Kokovtzoff,  who  was  leaning 
against  a  doorpost  with  an  expression  on  his  face  like 
that  of  a  judge  about  to  pass  sentence  of  death.  I  begged 
him  to  grant  me  an  interview  so  that  I  could  discuss 
with  him  an  important  matter  entrusted  to  me  by  the 
King  of  Bulgaria  (that  of  the  loan  mentioned  above). 

"  Forgive  me,  my  dear  M.  Nekludoff,"  interrupted 
Kokovtzoff,  "but  at  this  moment  I  really  have  not  the 
heart  for  that.  We  have  such  a  situation  to  face.  .  .  . 
Besides,  how  can  I  make  an  appointment  with  you,  when 
1  do  not  even  know  if  by  to-morrow  I  shall  still  be  in 
office?  I  tell  you  this  quite  confidentially,  and  beg  that 
you  will  not  repeat  it." 

After  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  done,  but  to 
leave  the  speaker  to  his  gloomy  thoughts.  In  the  next 
room  I  met  Sazonoff  who  had  left  his  post  as  master  of 
the  house  for  a  few  minutes  and  was  talking  with 
Krivocheine  in  a  window ;  the  official  smile  on  my  chiefs 
face  had  given  way  to  a  sad  and  worried  expression. 
What  does  it  all  mean?  I  wondered. 


T9I2]    RASPUTIN'S  DISMISSAL  AND  RETURN   8i 

At  this  moment  I  came  across  General  Polivanoff. 
I  drew  him  aside. 

"  Look  here,  General,  what  is  going  on  amongst  you 
all?"  I  asked  him  straight  out. 

"You  do  not  know  yet?  but  it  is  this,"  .  .  .  and  the 
General  told  me  that  the  next  day  the  President  of  the 
Duma — it  was  already  Rodzianko — and  Makaroff,  at  that 
time  Minister  of  Justice,  were  to  go  to  Tsarskoe-Selo  in 
order  to  hand  to  the  Emperor  the  whole  revolting  record 
of  Rasputin,  and  to  endeavour  to  obtain  the  instant  dis- 
missal of  this  dangerous  and  infamous  person. 

"  If  the  Emperor  does  not  consent,  all  the  Ministers 
will  resign." 

"  All,  do  you  think  ?  "  I  asked  the  General,  glancing 
at  Soukhomlinoff,  who  was  passing  at  the  moment. 

"  Perhaps  all  is  saying  too  much,"  amended 
Polivanoff,  with  a  knowing  smile,  "  but  the  majority  will 
go  :  Kokovtzoff,  Krivocheine,  Sazonoff  and  others  .  .  ." 

The  next  day  towards  evening  the  rumour  spread  in 
town  that  the  Emperor  had  favourably  received  the 
reports  of  the  President  of  the  Duma  and  of  the  Minister 
of  Justice,  and  consented  to  the  instant  dismissal  of  the 
"  old  man  "  Gregory  to  his  native  village.  A  few  days 
later,  the  Court  left  for  the  Crimea.  Among  the  people 
who  came  to  see  the  Imperial  Family  off  at  the  station, 
one  noticed  Mile.  Tutcheffand  Princess  Obolensky,  to 
whom  the  Imperial  couple  were  particularly  friendly ; 
this  might  betoken  their  early  return  to  Court.  In  St. 
Petersburg  all  the  official  world  calmed  down  ;  all  the 
Ministers  remained  at  their  posts. 

Six  weeks  later,  Rasputin  returned  incognito  from 
Siberia,  and  took  up  his  abode  again  in  the  capital ! 

Detained  in  St.  Petersburg  a  little  longer  by  some 
business  matters,  I  did  not  return  to  my  post  till  the  end 
of  April  {N.S.). 


CHAPTER  VIII 

INTRIGUES   AT   SOFIA 

On  my  return  to   Sofia  I  perceived   at   once   that  the 
situation  there  was  much  changed.     I  noticed  that  the 
first  result  of  the  newly-signed  agreement  had  been  to 
strengthen  the  "activist"  party,    at  the  head  of  which 
M.  Danev  had  of  course  placed  himself;  in  my  absence 
he  had  become  infinitely  more  intimate  than  before  with 
the  King.     Ferdinand  had  left  for  foreign  parts   a  few 
days   before   my  arrival ;    but   before   leaving  he    had 
decided   to  send   M.  Danev  to  Livadia  and  St.  Peters- 
burg,  under    pretext    of   presenting   officially    to    His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  and   to  M.   Sazonoff  the  text   of 
the    Serbo-Bulgarian    agreement.     Danev   was    to    be 
accompanied  to  St.  Petersburg  by  our  military  agent  in 
Sofia,  Colonel  Romanovski.     All  this  was  related  to  me 
on  my  arrival  as  a  settled  thing,  and  I  learnt  at  the  same 
time  that  the  discussions  about  this  journey  had  been 
confided  to  General  Poprikov,  Bulgarian  Minister  in  St. 
Petersburg.     It  was  quite  clear  to  me  that  Danev  was 
being  dispatched  to  our  country  in  order  to  entreat  the 
Emperor  and  M.  Sazonoff  to  grant  active  and  willing 
support  to  Bulgaria  in  case  of  certain  events  and  com- 
plications in  Macedonia.      And  at  the  same  time  Danev 
was  to  use  his  best  efforts  to  convince   us   that   King 
Ferdinand  was  at  present  behaving  with  perfect  loyalty 
towards  Russia'  and  the  Tsar,  and  that  we  might  hence- 
forth abandon  all  suspicion  and  distrust  with  regard  to 
him. 

Danev  left  soon  after  my  return  to  Sofia.  He  was 
very  graciously  received  at  Livadia  by  H.I.M.  the 
Emperor,  and  perfectly  well  received  in  St.  Petersburg 

82 


I9I2]  COLONEL   MERRONE  83 

by  M.  Sazonoff.  On  his  return,  however,  he  seemed 
somewhat  disappointed.  I  soon  learnt  the  reason  when 
I  received  official  information  on  the  exchange  of  views 
which  had  taken  place  between  King  Ferdinand's  envoy 
on  one  side,  and  M.  Kokovtzoff  and  M.  Sazonoff  on  the 
other.  These  two  statesmen  had  given  Danev  to  under- 
stand in  a  very  amiable  but  very  firm  manner  that  we 
should  not,  under  any  circumstances,  allow  ourselves 
to  be  drawn  into  an  active  policy  in  the  Balkans.  The 
same  thing  was  repeated  to  Danev  at  Livadia. 

I  heard  later  that  Danev  had  been  entrusted  with 
another  mission  for  King  Ferdinand  ;  I  will  speak  of  this 
further  on. 

After  my  return  to  Sofia  and  during  the  succeeding 
summer  months,  I  noticed  the  increased  activity  of  the 
Italian  military  attache,  Colonel  Merrone.  During  my 
absence,  the  latter  had  formed  a  close  friendship  with 
our  military  agent.  In  the  summer  these  gentlemen 
were  already  on  thee-and-thou  terms  which  evoked  a 
certain  amount  of  astonishment  in  the  Diplomatic  Corps 
of  Sofia,  for  such  terms  are  not  customary  between 
two  foreign  colleagues.  Through  Romanowski  and  also 
through  General  Fichev — a  former  Italian  pupil — 
Merrone  managed  to  become  acquainted  and  to  be  on  a 
friendly  footing  with  several  Bulgarian  senior  officers, 
from  whom  there  was  much  to  be  learnt.  I  am  justified 
in  believing  that  Colonel  Merrone — a  tall,  fat  and  jovial 
Neapolitan,  with  a  very  friendly  manner,  but  at  the 
same  time  intelligent  and  rather  a  Paul  Pry— knew  how 
to  use  all  these  friendships,  and  that  he  ended  by  know- 
ing of  the  existence  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement 
and  its  contents.  He  hastened — as  in  honour  bound — 
to  communicate  this  information  to  the  Italian  General 
Staff.  The  Italian  Minister  in  Sofia,  Count  Bosdari— 
as  I  was  able  to  prove  conclusively  later — was  only 
initiated  into  the  secret  some  time  afterwards.  An 
intelligent  man,  highly  educated  and  of  very  moderate 
views,   he   did   not   share   the  enthusiasm  of  a  certain 

G 


84  INTRIGUES   AT   SOFIA        [chap.  viii. 

number  of  Italian  politicians  who  wished  that  a  con- 
flagration should  break  out  in  the  Balkans  in  order  to 
assure  to  Italy  a  prompt  and  brilliant  victory  over 
Turkey. 

When  Lieutenant-Colonel  Merrone's  statements  on 
the  subject  of  the  alliance  concluded  between  Bulgaria 
and  Serbia  were  received  in  Rome,  the  first  question 
asked  must  have  been  as  to  what  Italy  could  gain  from 
the  new  situation.  Should  she  approach  Serbia  and 
Bulgaria,  suggest  an  alliance  with  them,  and  with  their 
help  finish  the  war  in  a  brilliant  manner  by  conquering 
part  of  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor?  Yes,  but  would 
Germany  and  Austria  countenance  such  a  proceeding  by 
their  ally  ?  And  would  the  other  Powers  consent  to  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  Near  East  being  thus  upset  in 
Italy's  favour?  No,  this  plan,  however  alluring  it  might 
be  at  first  sight,  offered  too  many  pitfalls  and  dangers. 
Would  it  not  be  better,  on  the  contrary,  to  transmit  the 
valuable  information  just  received  to  Berlin  and  to 
Vienna  ;  and  by  warning  the  Allies  thus  of  the  danger 
which  threatened  them,  incite  them  thereby  to  energetic 
intervention  in  Constantinople,  an  intervention  which 
would  force  the  Porte  to  grant  important  concessions 
in  Italy's  favour,  and  would  put  an  immediate  end  to 
the  war  ?  But  in  the  first  place  such  a  course  of 
action  would  not  harmonise  with  the  principles  of 
loyalty  ;  and  then  who  could  guarantee  that  the  Central 
Powers  would  set  such  a  price  on  the  information 
furnished  by  Italy?  It  is  quite  possible  that,  having 
warmly  thanked  the  Ally  King  for  the  service  rendered, 
Berlin  and  Vienna  might  forge  any  kind  of  diplomatic 
weapon  with  the  information,  without  concerning  them- 
selves further  with  Italy's  interests,  and  would  continue 
to  concentrate  all  their  efforts  on  increasing  German 
influence  in  Turkey.  But  then  how  could  one  make  use 
of  the  information  received  and  of  the  new  political 
situation  ?  In  this  way :  by  allowing  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  complete  freedom  of  action,  but  by  taking  great 
care  at  the  same  time  not  to  lavish  diplomatic  favours  on 


I9I2]      IN  DISFAVOUR  WITH  FERDINAND         85 

them.  If  a  Balkan  war  ensued,  then  either  the  Porte 
would  immediately  accept  all  the  Italian  conditions  and 
the  Italo-Turkish  war,  which  was  beginning  to  drag  on 
too  long,  would  end  very  advantageously  for  Italy ;  or 
some  new  path  would  be  discovered,  some  new  com- 
binazione  arise  which  Italy  could  profit  by.  By  virtue 
of  these  considerations  of  an  essentially  practical  nature, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Merrone  was  allowed  to  watch  very 
closely  the  patriotic  inclinations  of  his  Bulgarian 
comrades-in-arms. 

One  must  be  fair  to  Merrone  :  he  fulfilled  this  mission 
with  great  cleverness  and  perfect  tact,  and  fully  deserved 
the  reward  bestowed  on  him  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  between  Italy  and  Turkey,  when  he  was 
made  aide-de-camp  to  the  King,  but  allowed  all  the  same 
to  keep  his  command  in  the  regiment — a  distinction  very 
rarely  conferred  in  the  Italian  army. 

I  have  already  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter 
that  King  Ferdinand  had  received  unfavourably  the 
explanations  which  I  gave  him  before  my  departure  for 
St.  Petersburg  in  regard  to  my  view  of  the  scope  of  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement.  A  fewof  my  dear  colleagues 
at  the  Russian  Legation  profited  by  my  absence  to 
endeavour  to  exasperate  Ferdinand  still  more  against 
me,  by  all  the  means  in  their  power — some  of  them  very 
unscrupulous  ones — and  to  show  him  that  it  was  possible 
to  get  rid  of  the  Russian  Minister  who  had  ceased  to 
please  him.  The  King  jumped  at  these  suggestions, 
and  shortly  after  my  departure  for  St.  Petersburg  he 
had  already  fixed  his  choice  on  two  candidates  for  my 
post.  One  was  the  former  Chief  of  the  Chancellery  in 
the  Foreign  Office,  M.  A.  Savinsky,  who  had  just  been 
appointed  Minister  to  Stockholm,  and  who  had  twice 
been  recommended  for  the  post  in  Sofia  by  M.  Sazonoff's 
predecessor,  as  well  as  by  the  Grand-Duchess  Vladimir 
— Ferdinand's  chief  patroness  at  the  Russian  Court. 
The  other  candidate  was  General  Mossoloff,  formerly 
an  officer  in  the  Horse  Guards,  who  in  his  youth  was 


S6  INTRIGUES   AT   SOFIA        [chap.  viii. 

aide-de-camp  to  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  and 
who  then  went  into  the  administration  of  the  Imperial 
Court,  where  he  was  finally  given  the  rank  of  Lieu- 
tenant-General,  although  he  had  never  returned  to  the 
Army.  Very  intimate  with  the  Emperor,  Mossoloff 
was  commissoned  to  accompany  the  Grand-Duke 
Andrew  Vladimirovitch  to  Bulgaria,  to  act  as  mentor  to 
His  Highness  in  this  country  where  he  had  so  many 
acquaintances.  This  flattering  mission  and  the  festivities 
of  Sofia  awoke  in  the  worthy  General  the  sudden  desire 
to  exchange  his  Court  functions  for  the  activity,  the 
honours,  and  the  high  salary  of  a  Minister  Plenipoten- 
tiary. He  seemed  to  have  been  predestined  by  fate 
itself  to  the  post  of  Sofia.  All  the  same  it  was  M. 
Savinsky  who  became  my  successor,  and  that  only  at  the 
end  of  191 3.  As  to  General  Mossoloff,  his  diplomatic 
career  only  began  much  later,  during  the  celebrated 
Sturmer's  short  term  at  the  Foreign  Office. 

The  spring  of  1912,  thus  served  as  a  starting  point 
for  intrigues  emanating  from  different  sides,  which  aimed 
at  terminating  my  term  of  office  in  Sofia.  The  historic 
events  which  occurred  soon  after  prevented  the  realisation 
of  these  intrigues,  up  till  the  moment  when  these  same 
events  in  their  final  development  caused  my  departure 
from  Bulgaria  to  be  almost  opportune.  I  was  trans- 
ferred from  Sofia  to  Stockholm,  after  the  Treaty  of 
Bukharest  in  1913,  and  as  I  did  not  approve  of  the  stipu- 
lations in  it,  it  would  have  been  very  painful  to  me  to 
remain  in  Sofia;  although  my  presence  in  Bulgaria 
during  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  might  have 
been  of  some  use  to  the  cause  of  Russia  and  the  Allies. 

I  received  the  first  information  on  the  subject  of  the 
intrigues  against  me  in  June,  1912.  I  heard  from  St. 
Petersburg  that  Danev  had  repeatedly  insinuated  there 
and  at  Livadia  that  I  had  not  succeeded  in  establishing 
good  relations  with  Ferdinand  and  that  I  had  not  even 
got  on  well  with  the  Bulgarians.  Besides  these  accusa- 
tions of  a  purely  academic  nature,  I  got  to  know — on 
good  authority — that  a  great  deal  of  gossip  about  me 


I9I2]         M.  RIZOV  ENTERS  THE  ARENA  87 

was  circulated  in  the  office,  and  lobbies  of  our  Foreign 
Office.  Some  of  this  gossip  was  merely  ridiculous,  but 
some  was  of  a  fairly  shameful  nature.  This  gossip  had 
its  origin  in  Sofia,  came  from  one  and  the  same  source, 
and  aimed  at  one  and  the  same  object — that  of  getting 
rid  of  a  Russian  representative  who  did  not  approve  of 
a  policy  of  chance  and  who  possessed  some  influence 
over  the  greater  part  of  the  Bulgarian  Government. 
One  of  the  vilest  calumnies  about  me  came  from  a  most 
unexpected  source  and  chiefly  through  the  medium  of 
the  Bulgarian  Minister  in  Rome,  M.  Rizov,  who  at  the 
moment  enjoyed  the  closest  friendship  with  our  Ambas- 
sador to  the  Quirinal,  M.  Kroupensky.  This  calumny 
for  one  instant  succeeded  in  upsetting  M.  Sazonoff.  A 
year  later  he  begged  me  "to  consign  the  incident  to  the 
place  for  all  noxious  things";  but  it  had  produced  a 
certain  impression  prejudicial  to  me  all  the  same. 

M.  Rizov  is  too  well  known  for  it  to  be  necessary 
to  say  much  about  him.  A  schoolmaster  in  Macedonia 
and  a  vehement  Bulgarian  agitator,  he  was  one  of  the 
first  Macedonian  Bulgarians  who  thought  it  useful  to 
the  national  cause  to  side  with  Stamboulov  and  to 
declare  himself  openly  an  enemy  of  Russia.  For  about 
ten  years,  between  1885  and  1895,  Rizov  was  the 
bugbear  of  our  consuls  in  Macedonia  and  of  our 
Embassy  in  Constantinople,  for  he  incited  his  fellow- 
countrymen  to  the  most  bitter  and  vehement  strife 
against  the  partisans  of  the  Universal  Patriarchate, 
and  not  only  against  the  Greeks  but  also  against  the 
Serbians  and  the  Kutzo-Wallachians  (Rumanians).  In 
1896,  when  a  complete  change  occurred  in  the  relations 
of  Bulgaria  with  Russia,  Rizov  gave  up  his  Catilinarian 
existence  in  Macedonia  and  entered  the  Bulgarian 
Diplomatic  Service.  After  long  years  spent  in  Cetigne 
as  Bulgarian  Diplomatic  Agent,  Rizov,  who  in  the  mean- 
time had  married  a  young  and  beautiful  Montenegrin, 
had  managed  to  insinuate  himself  into  the  good  graces 
of  Prince  Nicholas  and  his  set,  and  to  cause  his  former 
hostility  towards  Russia  to  be  forgotten  ;  he  endeavoured 


88  INTRIGUES   AT  SOFIA        [chap.viii. 

to  conciliate  Russians  in  general,  and  his  Russian 
colleague  in  particular.  From  Cetigne  he  was  appointed 
Minister  to  Rome.  At  the  beginning  of  the  winter  of 
1912  he  came  from  Rome  to  Sofia;  we  saw  each  other 
several  times  and  had  some  interesting  interviews, 
during  which,  as  was  only  natural,  Rizov  tried  very 
hard  to  captivate  me.  He  was  undoubtedly  an  intelligent 
and  shrewd  man,  who  had  acquired  a  certain  amount  of 
cultivation,  and  who  knew  how  to  adapt  himself  to  the 
diplomatic  environment  which  seemed  so  inappropriate 
to  the  poor  Macedonian  schoolmaster  of  former  days. 
But,  violent,  addicted  to  intrigue  and  devoid  of  all 
principles,  Rizov  remained  a  conspirator  all  his  life, 
and  at  the  crucial  moment  when  Serbo-Bulgarian 
relations  were  becoming  strained,  he  played  a  bold  but 
fatal  part.  Later  on  I  shall  have  occasion  to  mention 
this  remarkable  but  suspicious  personage  again. 

Of  course,  if  from  the  very  beginning  our  Foreign 
Office  had  met  the  step  taken  by  King  Ferdinand  with 
marked  coldness,  as  they  had  done  when  he  attacked  M. 
Sementovsky,^  the  intrigue  would  have  fallen  through 
this  time  also,  and  the  King  would  at  once  have  realised 
that  it  was  better  in  his  own  interest  to  remain  on  good 
terms  with  me.  But  as  it  was,  I  received  the  impression 
that  the  attacks  directed  against  me  from  Sofia  found  a 
very  ready  echo  amongst  a  certain  set  in  our  Foreign 
Office,  amongst  just  those  men  who  kept  up  close 
relations  with  my  colleague  of  Belgrade  and  who  had 
been  connected  in  some  way  or  other  with  my  lamented 
predecessor. 

I  have  already  given  an  account  of  the  conversation 
which  I  had  with  the  King  in  March,  just  before  I  left 
for  St.  Petersburg,  and  have  moreover  explained  that  it 
was  in  this  conversation  that  the  King's  resentment 
against  me  had  its  origin.  This  ill  feeling  was  carefully 
and  skilfully  fostered  during  my  absence. 

No  doubt  I  made  a  mistake,  in  the  course  of  that 
conversation,  in  speaking  to  the  King  too  frankly,  and 

^  See  Chapter  I. 


I9I2]  KING  FERDINAND'S    POLICY  89 

in  recommending  that  Bulgaria  should  henceforward 
pursue  a  straightforward  and  undeviating  line  of  policy, 
relying  confidently  on  co-operation  with  Serbia,  and  in 
concert  with  her,  on  the  benevolent  and  essentially 
prudent  advice  of  Russia. 

Now  this  was  exactly  what  Ferdinand  was  most 
afraid  of,  for  above  all  things  he  was  most  anxious  to 
keep  himself  independent  of  all  such  measures  and  to  be 
free  to  follow  the  tortuous  policy  of  which  he  was  so  fond. 

Ever  since  his  arrival  in  Bulgaria  his  policy  had  been 
that  of  balancing  St.  Petersburg  against  Vienna.  The 
irreconcileable  antagonism  between  the  policy  of  Russia 
and  that  of  Austria  was,  with  him,  not  only  a  dominant 
article  of  faith,  but  also  a  chosen  ground  of  action.  He 
did  not  believe  that  there  was  the  least  chance  of  an 
agreement,  or  even  of  a  durable  modus  vivendi  between 
the  two  powers  who  were  struggling  for  mastery  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula. 

Ferdinand  was  convinced  that  if  he  managed  affairs 
so  badly  as  to  become  irrevocably  associated  v^ith  the 
policy  either  of  Vienna  (which  meant  Berlin  also)  or  St. 
Petersburg,  Bulgaria  would  sooner  or  later  be  dis- 
astrously involved  in  the  struggle  which  was  sure  to 
come,  and,  if  that  struggle  resulted  in  the  decisive  defeat 
of  either  of  the  adversaries,  Bulgaria  and  her  king, 
even  if  they  were  on  the  victorious  side,  would  have 
perforce  to  submit  to  the  control  of  the  conqueror. 

Ferdinand's  ideal  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  consisted 
in  keeping  a  free  hand  for  himself  and  his  country,  and 
in  securing  and  consolidating  for  Bulgaria,  an  influence, 
even  if  it  were  only  a  subordinate  influence,  which  would 
enable  him  to  hold  the  balance  in  the  Near  East. 

He  had  much  greater  confidence  in  his  own  political 
skill  than  in  his  military  power  :  he  was  afraid  of  war, 
but  always  recognised  that  if  it  was  necessary  to  fight  in 
order  to  fulfil  the  national  aspirations  of  the  Bulgarians, 
it  would  be  much  better  to  ally  himself  with  partners 
who  were  weaker  than  himself  than  with  more  formid- 
able allies. 


90  INTRIGUES   AT  SOFIA  [chap.  viii. 

The  chief  desire  at  St.  Petersburg  was  to  see 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia  closely  united  in  order  to  bar  the 
approach  to  the  Peninsula  against  the  Teuton  and 
Swabian  aggressors.  But  to  the  Bulgarians  and  their 
King  this  was  not  the  chief  concern  ;  they  were,  above  all 
things,  men  of  action,  and  sought  for  immediate  and 
substantial  advantages,  while  Ferdinand,  a  political 
dreamer,  was  forming  plans  of  greater  magnitude  to 
which  I  will  refer  later  on. 

If  the  King  had  been  willing  to  place  more  confidence 
in  me,  and  in  his  conversations  with  me  to  enter  more 
frankly  and  less  enigmatically  into  those  political  designs 
which  dominated  him,  he  would  have  seen  that  I  was  in 
no  wise  disposed  to  add  to  his  anxieties  or  to  demand 
what  was  impossible. 

But  to  place  confidence  in  any  one  was  just  what 
Ferdinand  was  incapable  of  doing,  and  this  advantage 
was  withheld  from  all  the  Russian  ministers  accredited 
to  his  Government.  He  wanted  them  to  be  docile 
instruments,  and  to  act  as  the  advocates  of  his  cunning 
desires  and  ambitions  at  St.  Petersburg.  He  knew 
quite  well  that  I  would  never  lend  myself  to  this  sort  of 
thing;  to  a  certain  extent  I  vexed  him,  and  he  thought 
it  best  to  get  rid  of  me  with  all  civility. 

Warned  by  the  intrigue  which  had  been  formed 
against  me,  I  only  took  two  measures  to  fight  it.  During 
the  month  of  July,  I  informed  King  Ferdinand,  through 
his  private  secretary,  M.  Dobrovitch,  that  if  for  any 
reason  His  Majesty  wished  me  to  leave  Sofia,  he  had 
only  to  tell  me  so  quite  frankly,  and  then  I  would 
myself  beg  St.  Petersburg  to  give  me  another  post,  as 
I  considered  it  quite  inadmissible  that  between  the 
King  of  the  Bulgarians  and  the  Russian  Minister  such 
constant  misunderstandings  should  exist.  Some  time 
after  I  received,  through  the  same  M.  Dobrovitch, 
the  answer  that  the  King  still  appreciated,  esteemed  and 
liked  me  very  sincerely ;  that  if  some  friction  had 
existed  between  him  and  me,  it  was  due  solely  to  mis- 
understandings ;  that  the  King  considered  the  continua- 
tion of  my  work  in  Sofia  to  be  valuable  for  Bulgaria, 
etc.,  etc.     It  is  true  that   in  the  meantime  the  political 


I9I2]  RUMOURS   OF   MY    RECALL  91 

situation  had  changed  completely,  and  that  Ferdinand 
at  the  moment  was  inclined  to  view  things  in  the  same 
light  as  I  did.  Soon  after  these  mutual  explanations, 
the  King,  at  his  Jubilee  celebrations  at  Tirnova,  con- 
versed at  great  length  and  very  amiably  with  me  in  full 
view  of  all  present,  and  on  his  return  to  Sofia  sent  me 
a  signed  photograph  of  himself. 

Before  all  this  I  had  already  informed  M.  Gueshov 
and  M.  Todorov  of  the  intrigue  against  me,  and,  frankly 
disgusted  at  it,  they  both  entreated  me  earnestly  not  to 
try  to  leave  my  post. 

A  few  months  later,  when  the  intrigue  frustrated  in 
July  began  again,  one  read  one  day  in  the  Rousskoye 
Slovo  that  the  Russian  Ministers,  Nekludoff  in  Sofia,  and 
Savinsky  in  Stockholm,  were  soon  to  be  mutually  ex- 
changed. I  wrote  then  to  the  man  whom  1  esteemed 
the  most  in  M.  Sazonofi^s  set.  Baron  Schilling,  begging 
him  to  tell  me  quite  frankly  if  this  news  was  true.  1  added 
that  having  always  judged  people  severely  who  clung  to 
their  places,  I  had  not  the  slightest  intention  of  clinging  to 
the  post  in  Sofia,  important  and  interesting  though  it  was, 
because  the  person  holding  such  a  post  ought  above  all 
things  to  possess  the  complete  confidence  of  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs.  Schilling  replied  that  the  question 
of  my  being  transferred  to  an  equivalent  post  had  been 
raised  at  oiie  moment  at  the  Foreign  Office,  but  that  at 
the  present  moment  there  was  no  question  of  it.  All  the 
same,  the  news  published  in  the  Rousskoye  Slovo  was 
not  officially  denied,|as  it  ought  to  have  been.  I  came  to 
the  conclusion  from  all  this  that  at  the  present  moment 
(the  Balkan  War  had  just  broken  out)  the  Foreign 
Office  still  considered  my  presence  in  Bulgaria  to  be 
indispensable;  but  that  when  these  serious  events  were 
over,  they  would  not  scruple  in  St.  Petersburg  to  send 
me  to  another  post,  even  to  a  far  less  important  one. 

If  I  dwell  so  much  on  these  purely  personal  intrigues, 
it  is  because  they  did  have  an  indisputable  influence  over 
the  final  course  of  events  in  Bulgaria.  Towards  the  end 
of    1912    ever}'   one   in    Sofia    knew    that   the    Russian 


92  INTRIGUES  AT  SOFIA        [chap.  viii. 

Minister's  position  was  insecure  and  that  from  hence- 
forth one  need  not  reckon  much  with  his  opinions  or 
advice.  All  this  was  known  also  to  my  foreign  col- 
leagues, and  several  of  them  gave  me  friendly  warning 
of  what  was  being  plotted  and  hatched  against  me. 
But  I  am  anticipating  events.  Let  us  return  to  the 
spring  of  1912. 

During  the  month  of  May  I  succeeded  in  making 
a  trip  to  Constantinople  which  I  had  had  in  view  for  a 
long  time.  I  had  left  the  Bosphorus  twenty  years  ago 
and  I  was  delighted  at  the  prospect  of  renewing  my 
glorious  impressions  of  this  unique  spot.  Moreover,  I 
wished  to  have  a  heart  to  heart  talk  to  Michel  de  Giers, 
recently  appointed  Russian  Ambassador  to  Constan- 
tinople, to  Hartwig's  intense  disappointment.  I  had 
met  M.  de  Giers  in  St.  Petersburg  in  March,  but  we 
had  not  had  time  to  talk  at  great  length,  besides  de  Giers 
lacked  the  most  essential  element  of  a  political  inter- 
view— his  own  impressions  of  Constantinople,  where 
he  was  going  for  the  first  time. 

During  an  enchanting  week,  I  had  again  before  my 
eyes  the  marvellous  panorama  of  the  shores  of  the 
Bosphorus  and  of  the  Sea  of  Marmara  and  all  the  well- 
known  pictures  of  Constantinopolitan  life.  I  found  few 
changes.  Only  the  wretched  street  curs  no  longer 
existed  ;  the  picturesque  and  crazy  wooden  bridge  con- 
necting Galata  and  Stambul,  and  lined  with  fruit  stalls 
and  shops  where  Turkish  delicacies  were  sold,  had  been 
replaced  by  an  ordinary  iron  bridge  ;  and  in  the  environs 
of  Pera  Turkish  soldiers,  newly  dressed  in  khaki,  were 
drilling  without  ceasing  under  the  watchful  eye  of 
German  instructors,  which  in  my  day  was  a  somewhat 
rare  sight.  Everything  else  looked  very  much  as  usual. 
During  one  of  my  visits  to  the  Grand  Bazaar  of  Stambul 
a  fire  broke  out  in  the  adjacent  quarter  between  St. 
Sophia  and  the  sea,  and  immediately  assumed  the  pro- 
portions that  a  fire  assumes  in  Constantinople  alone, 
because  of  the  accumulation  of  old  wooden  buildings 


I9I2]  IN   CONSTANTINOPLE  93 

made  of  dry  old  planl^s.  A  very  familiar  sight  to  me  : 
a  motley  crowd  intent  on  rescuing  its  wretched  garments, 
the  sinister  double  illumination  of  the  fire  on  one  side 
and  of  the  sun  veiled  and  reddened  on  the  other ;  swarms 
of  pigeons  driven  out  of  their  nests  by  the  fire,  and 
flying  around  at  the  same  time  as  the  burning  brands  in 
clouds  of  white  smoke ;  the  tonloumbadjis  (voluntary 
firemen),  half-naked,  rushing  to  the  fire  and  giving  wild 
shrieks  from  time  to  time.  .  .  .  The  fire  lasted  two 
days,  and  delayed  for  a  few  hours  the  departure  of  the 
train  which  was  to  take  the  German  Ambassador,  Baron 
Marschall  von  Biberstein,  who  had  been  appointed  to 
London  in  the  same  capacity.  I  remember  meeting  the 
aged  diplomat  on  his  way  to  the  station.  The  carriage 
in  which  Baron  Marschall,  his  wife  and  his  daughter 
were  seated  was  preceded  by  an  open  carriage  entirely 
filled  with  bouquets  and  bunches  of  flowers,  gifts,  evi- 
dently, of  the  German  colony  and  the  "grateful  Turks." 

"Do  look,"  I  said  to  my  companion,  "it's  exactly  like 
a  funeral :  here  is  the  carriage  with  flowers  and  wreaths 
preceding  the  hearse,  and  behind,  the  long  file  of 
carriages  accompanying  the  deceased  to  his  last  resting- 
place  !  Truly  I  should  not  have  liked  to  leave  my  post 
surrounded  by  that  style  of  ceremonial !  " 

My  words  were  an  involuntary  prophecy.  Two 
months  later  Baron  Marschall  died  suddenly  in  London, 
carrying  with  him  into  the  grave  all  the  hopes  centred 
by  Germany  on  their  new  Ambassador.  Marschall  was 
replaced  in  London  by  Prince  Lichnowsky,  and  in 
Constantinople  by  the  fiery  Wangenheim. 

M.  de  Giers,  to  whom  I  confided  my  impressions  on 
Bulgaria  and  my  apprehensions  as  to  the  real  aim  of  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance,  expressed  his  own  fears  quite 
as  frankly.  I  even  received  the  impression  that  in  his 
heart  he  was  blaming  me  for  having  consented  to  serve 
as  intermediary  in  the  negotiations  between  Bulgaria 
and  Serbia  and  for  having  taken  such  an  active  part 
in  them.  I  feel  sure,  however,  that  if  he  had  been  in 
my  place   he   would   have  done  exactly  the   same,  for 


94  INTRIGUES   AT   SOFIA        [(hap.vhi. 

it  was  not  part  of  the  duty  of  a  Russian  representative 
in  a  Slav  country  to  offer  opposition  to  the  reconciliation 
or  even  the  alliance  of  this  country  with  another  Slav 
country.  Of  course  our  policy  was  bound  to  check 
beforehand  all  the  warlike  tendencies  of  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  and  was  capable  of  doing  so;  but  this  role 
belonged  to  the  central  organ  of  our  diplomacy,  which 
moreover  had  been  warned  in  good  time  and  repeatedly 
by  me. 

Our  new  Ambassador  to  Constantinople  in  our  inter- 
views also  emphasised — with  the  obvious  intent  that  I 
should  pass  the  information  on  to  Sofia— the  enormous 
danger  that  according  to  him  war  with  Turkey  would 
present  to  the  two  Slav  kingdoms  themselves.  Accord- 
ing to  M.  de  Giers  the  Ottoman  Army  was  quite 
different  from  what  it  had  been  in  Abdul  Hamid's  time. 
Admirably  equipped  and  perfectly  trained,  under  the 
command  of  German  generals  and  senior  officers  and 
of  young  Turkish  officers,  well  trained  and  drilled,  it 
constituted  a  real  power  which  might  cause  disagreeable 
surprises  to  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  optimists.  The 
Ambassador  maintained  this  opinion  till  the  actual  war 
of  191 2,  or  rather  till  the  first  decisive  defeat  of  the 
Turks.  Always  concientious  in  his  work  as  in  the 
expression  of  his  opinions,  M.  de  Giers  usually  placed 
entire  confidence  in  his  professional  collaborators  in 
any  branch.  His  opinion  of  the  Turkish  Army  was  based 
entirely  on  the  reports  and  information  of  our  military 
agent  in  Constantinople,  General  Holmsen,  an  honest 
Finno-Swede,  married  to  the  daughter  of  the  former 
Governor-General  of  Finland,  Bobrikoff.  Holmsen  was 
on  very  intimate  terms  with  the  military  attache  and 
the  German  senior  officers,  who  were  very  attentive 
to  him  and  who  furnished  him  with  all  sorts  of  informa- 
tion on  the  Ottoman  Arm}^  And  in  representing  to 
their  Russian  colleague  the  state  of  this  Army  as  a 
truly  brilliant  one,  the  German  officers  were  far  from 
displaying  premeditated  duplicity  :  they  were  simply 
guided    b^^  that  very  natural   feeling  which  consists  in 


I9I2]  GENERAL   HOLMSEN  95 

seeing   one's  own   work    through    rose-coloured    spec- 
tacles. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  Holmsen  himself  was  firmly 
convinced  that  the  Bulgarian  and  Serbian  Armies  were 
infinitely  inferior  to  the  Turkish  Army,  and  he  maintained 
this  opinion  with  the  straightforwardness  and  obstinacy 
inherent  in  his  Swedish  nature.  It  is  a  fact  that  the  brave 
general  did  not  know  the  condition  of  the  Serbian  and 
Bulgarian  Armies. 

I  met  General  Holmsen  four  years  later  in  Stock- 
holm, on  his  return  from  captivity  in  Germany — he 
was  a  physical  wreck!  From  the  beginning  of  the 
war  he  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  army  corps  of 
General  Buhakoff,  which,  at  the  time  of  our  second 
defeat  in  East  Prussia  in  February,  191 5,  displayed  heroic 
courage  in  cutting  through  the  hostile  army  which 
surrounded  it  on  all  sides.  General  Holmsen  told  me 
that  there  were  neither  guns  nor  shells  left  in  some  of 
the  battalions  of  the  division  of  which  he  had  become  the 
head  on  the  battlefield,  and  half  the  bayonets  were 
twisted  or  broken  by  the  continual  shock  of  hand-to- 
hand  fighting.  The  soldiers,  worn  out  by  four  days  and 
nights  of  continued  fighting  and  marching,  sometimes 
fell  down  in  the  snow  and  went  off  into  a  leaden  slumber 
without  paying  any  attention  to  death  which  was  raging 
round  them— so  terrible  was  their  fatigue.  At  last  the 
remnants  of  the  heroic  army  corps  reached  the  first  line 
of  defence  of  Grodno  :  alas !  it  was  already  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  so  they  had  to  surrender.  They  did  not 
know  that  Grodno  was  still  held  by  Russian  troops,  and 
that  if  they  had  advanced,  these  could  have  rescued 
them.  In  listening  to  this  heartrending  account,  I 
naturally  refrained  from  reminding  the  General  of 
our  conversations  in  Constantinople  and  from  pointing 
out  how  mistaken  he  had  been  in  his  prognosti- 
cations ! 

One  of  the  things  which  struck  me  most  in  Constanti- 
nople was  the  complete  serenity,  the  indiff'erence  even, 
with  which  every  one  seemed  to  look  on  the  Italo-Turkish 


96  INTRIGUES  AT  SOFIA        [chap.viii. 

war;  one  really  could  not  believe  in  the  Italian  Fleet 
blockading  the  Dardanelles,  and  that  quite  recently  the 
Italians  had  tried  to  break  through  the  Straits.  The  only 
complaint  heard — and  that  a  bitter  one — was  of  stagnation 
in  commercial  affairs. 

In  May  and  June  there  appeared  on  the  whole  to  be  a 
political  lull  in  Sofia.  The  King  was  still  abroad,  and 
M.  Gueshov  at  some  watering-place.  But  shortly  after 
my  return  from  Constantinople,  I  learnt  through  several 
sources  that  very  important  business  was  being  trans- 
acted at  the  Bulgarian  Foreign  Office,  and  more 
especially  at  the  War  Office.  My  Serbian  colleague  was 
also  holding  frequent  interviews  with  the  Bulgarian 
Ministers  and  politicians.  The  tone  of  the  Bulgarian 
Press  was  becoming  more  and  more  nervous  with  regard 
to  Macedonia  and  what  was  going  on  there.  In  the  streets 
of  Sofia  one  met  more  and  more  frequently  brown  and 
sunburnt  individuals  with  gloomy  expressions,  sometimes 
armed  to  the  teeth,  who  were  the  object  of  great  curiosity  ; 
these  were  the  heads  of  well-known  troops  arriving  from 
Macedonia.  Finally  I  was  informed  in  a  more  definite 
manner  that  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  were  on  the  point  of 
concluding  a  military  convention  aimed  exclusively  at 
Turkey.  Having  some  slight  knowledge  of  the  psycho- 
logy of  Balkan  nations,  I  soon  possessed  proof  that  my 
fears  of  a  conflagration  were  about  to  be  realised.  After 
a  little  hesitation,  on  the  4th  July,  1912,  I  dispatched  a 
fairly  long  code-telegram  to  M.  Sazonoff,  in  which  I 
mentioned  all  the  alarming  signs  I  had  noticed,  and  I 
concluded  the  telegram  by  expressing  my  deep-rooted 
conviction  that  both  on  the  Bulgarian  and  the  Serbian 
side,  they  were  actively  preparing  for  war,  and  that  they 
even  intended  to  hasten  events.  I  heard  later  that 
my  telegram  produced  an  impression  highly  unfavour- 
able to  me. 

"  Have  you  read  Nekludoff  s  hysterical  telegram  ?  "  the 
heads  of  departments  and  the  young  secretaries  of 
Sazonoffs    set    were    continually    asking    each    other. 


I9I2]  MY   WARNING   DISREGARDED  97 

Alas!      This    telegram    proved     to     be    historical,    not 
hysterical ! 

During  the  month  of  July  M.  Gueshov  and  the  other 
Ministers  who  had  been  on  leave  returned  to  Sofia.  At 
the  same  time  affairs  in  Macedonia  were  taking  a  more 
and  more  alarming  turn.  It  was  quite  clear  that,  setting 
aside  natural  and  logical  causes,  one  was  confronted  by 
the  work  of  Serbo-Bulgarian  agitators  and  abettors. 
Two  small  towns  in  Macedonia,  Ishtib  and  Katchaneh,  in 
particular  became  in  turn  the  scene  of  bloody  events  of 
the  kind  so  common  in  Hamid  times.  In  both  these 
places,  on  market  day,  bombs  exploded  close  to  the 
bazaar;  among  the  killed  and  wounded, naturally,  Turkish 
women  and  children  were  found  :  immediately,  as  at  a 
given  signal,  the  Mussulman  population  fell  on  the 
Bulgarian  peasants  who  had  come  to  market  and  began 
to  massacre  them ;  they  also  attacked  the  houses  of 
Bulgarian  patriots  and  leading  men,  and  the  usual 
"atrocities"  took  place.  In  both  cases  the  Turkish 
garrison  did  nothing  to  stop  the  massacre  ;  it  was  even 
suspected  of  having  aided  and  abetted.  Certainly  the 
people  who  threw  the  bombs — and  they  never  were 
Turks — knew  perfectly  well  what  the  result  of  their  deeds 
would  be. 

Such  sad  incidents  were  of  frequent  occurrence  in 
the  days  before  the  Turkish  Revolution  ;  but  then  no  one 
thought  of  making  them  a  casus  belli;  Bulgaria  became 
irritable,  the  Bulgarian  newspapers  published  warlike 
articles,  the  Great  Powers  cautioned  the  Porte,  and  then 
everything  resumed  its  normal  aspect.  That  was  why 
the  respective  Governments  of  Western  Europe  did  not 
attach  any  extraordinary  significance  to  the  Macedonian 
events  of  July,  1912.  But  our  Foreign  Secretary,  who 
was  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  true  meaning  of  these 
regrettable  incidents,  ought  to  have  perceived  a  serious 
warning  in  them.  That  is  how  I  understood  them,  and 
consequently  I  did  not  fail  to  emphasise  in  my  telegrams 
and  dispatches  that  the  Balkan  War  was  the  order  of 
the  day  and  was  a  perpetual  menace. 


98  INTRIGUES   AT  SOFIA        [ciiAr.viii. 

On  this  occasion  it  is  noteworthy  that  M.  Gueshov, 
as  soon  as  he  returned  from  his  holiday,  was  remarkably 
frank  and  correct  in  his  behaviour  to  me.  He  confirmed 
the  information  that  I  had  received  from  a  private  source 
on  the  conclusion  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Military  Con- 
vention, and  if  my  memory  does  not  deceive  me,  the 
actual  text  of  this  convention  was  communicated  by 
Colonel  Romanowski  to  our  General  Headquarters 
Staff. 

M.  Gueshov  even  went  further  in  his  confidences; 
he  confided  to  me  that  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  had  just 
made  an  arrangement  with  Greece;  this  arrangement, 
in  contrast  to  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement,  was  not 
concerned  with  the  demarcation  of  boundaries  in  Mace- 
donia, but  it  was  a  kind  of  military  convention  in  case  of 
"  Turkish  aggression." 

There  is  one  curious  detail ;  whereas  M.  Gueshov 
was  displaying  so  much  frankness  towards  me,  the 
Greek  Government  took  great  care  not  to  communicate 
this  arrangement  to  our  representative  in  Athens, 
although  he  was  much  esteemed  and  very  popular 
there.  At  the  end  of  July  I  went  to  Vienna  to 
meet  M.  Sverbeieff,  to  discuss  some  important  private 
matters  with  him.  Sverbeieff,  who  had  just  left  the 
post  of  Athens  and  was  on  his  way  to  Berlin,  where 
he  had  been  appointed  Ambassador,  heard  for  the  first 
time  from  me  that  the  Greeks  had  made  an  arrangement 
with  Bulgaria  and  Serbia. 

In  the  first  days  of  July  I  was  more  or  less  agreeably 
surprised  by  the  advent  of  my  friend  M.  A.  Goutchkoff 
in  Sofia.  As  managing  director  of  one  of  our  principal 
insurance  companies,  he  came  to  Bulgaria  and  Serbia 
to  assist  at  the  inauguration  of  branches  of  this  company. 
At  least  that  was  the  avowed  object  of  his  journey,  but 
in  reality  the  journey  was  a  kind  of  political  inquiry. 
In  Russian  activist  circles  in  which  Goutchkoff 
possessed  undoubted  authority,  they  had  got  wind  of 
the   events   which   were   shaping   in   the    Balkans,  and 


I9I2]  GOUTCHKOFF   IN    SOFIA  99 

Goutchkoff  was  commissioned — unless  he  was  acting  on 
his  own  initiative — to  verify  de  visa  the  rumours  which 
were  circulating.  Political  circles  in  Sofia  greeted  the 
eminent  Russian  guest  with  the  most  cordial  reception. 
The  principal  Ministers  conversed  at  great  length 
with  him ;  the  members  of  the  former  Malinov  Cabinet 
met  Goutchkoff  at  an  evening  party  given  by  their 
colleague,  M.  Liaptchev,  a  fiery  and  irreconcilable 
Macedonian. 

Under  the  influence  of  all  that  he  had  heard  there, 
Goutchkoff  talked  to  me  for  a  long  time  and  appeared 
desirous  of  convincing  me  that  the  events,  apparently 
imminent  in  Bulgaria  and  Sofia,  were  not  only  un- 
avoidable but  desirable. 

"But  look  here,"  I  replied,  "was  it  not  you  yourself 
who  told  me  four  months  ago  that  Russia's  equipment 
was  absolutely  inadequate,  and  that  a  war,  taking  us 
unawares,  might  be  fatal  to  us?  And  now  you  appear 
to  think  it  natural  and  almost  desirable  that  the  Balkan 
States  should  declare  war  on  Turkey  !  But  what  in 
this  case  would  Russia's  position  be,  forced  to  remain 
a  passive  witness  of  these  events,  whatever  their 
result?" 

"Yes,  that  is  true,"  said  Goutchkoff;  "but  then  have 
we  ever  been  prepared  for  events  during  the  whole 
course  of  our  modern  history?  and  nevertheless  we 
have  progressed  considerably  in  the  solution  of  our 
historic  problems  in  the  Near  East.  Moreover,  at  this 
moment,  as  I  have  satisfactorily  proved,  the  Slav  States 
will  not  wait  for  the  concentration  of  our  forces.  You 
yourself,  M.  Nekludoff,  who,  by  virtue  of  family 
traditions  and  the  whole  of  your  earlier  career,  have  had 
Constantinople  as  a  centre  of  attraction,  would  you  not 
be  happy  to  have  your  name  connected  with  the  definite 
solution  of  the  Straits  question  in  our  favour?" 

"Certainly,  I  should  have  felt  the  most  intense  and 
legitimate  pleasure.  But  on  the  other  hand,  what  heavy 
responsibility  I  should  have  taken  on  myself  if,  seduced 
by  this   mirage   of   personal   ambition,   I   had    allowed 

H 


loo  INTRIGUES  AT  SOFIA         [ciiap.viii. 

myself  to  be  drawn  into  a  game  which  might  have  ended 
in  cruel  disappointments  for  Russia!" 

Goutchkoffs  opinion  that  we  often  reaped  success 
in  spite  of  our  perpetual  unpreparedness  was  shared  by 
our  military  agent,  and  it  often  led  him,  in  his  interviews 
with  the  Bulgarian  military,  into  making  assertions 
which  I  should  have  wished  to  be  less  encouraging  and 
less  enthusiastic. 

P>om  Sofia  Goutchkoff  went  to  Belgrade,  where  he 
was  received  with  even  more  cordiality  than  in  Sofia, 
there  was  even  an  official  tinge  in  the  reception  given 
in  his  honour.     A  few  days  after  I  had  taken  leave  of 
him,  I   left  to  meet  Sverbeieff  in   Vienna,   and  at   the 
Belgrade   station    I   was   an    incognito   witness   of  the 
almost  triumphal  departure  of  Goutchkoff,  who  got  into 
my  train.      The  royal  waiting-rooms  were  brilliantly  lit 
up,  a  soft  red  carpet  was  laid   down  up  to    the  door 
of  the  wagon-lit;    and  after  a  somewhat    long  wait,    1 
perceived    the    excellent   M.    Goutchkoff,    dressed    for 
travelling,  accompanied   by  all  the   Serbian   Ministers 
headed  by    M.    Pachitch,    M.    Hartwig,    the   Mayor   of 
Belgrade,  and  other  political  personages ;  most  of  these 
gentlemen  were  in  evening  clothes,  for  they  had  just 
come  from  a  grand  banquet  given  to  the  eminent  Russian 
guest.     At  last  all  the  good-byes  were  said,  there  was 
much  shaking  of  hands,  some  friendly  tapping  on  the 
back,  cries  of  "jivio,"  and  the  train  slowly  steamed  out 
of  the  station,  while  Goutchkoff,  touched  by  so  much 
cordiality,  stood  at  the  open  window  of  his  coupe  waving 
to  his  Serbian  friends.     He  was  slightly  abashed  when 
I  suddenly  emerged  out  of  the  darkness  of  the  corridor 
and  asked  him  :  "  Well,  my  dear  Goutchkoff,  and  what 
have  you  been   doing   in  Belgrade?"      The   following 
morning,  before  we  reached  Vienna,  he  told  me  that  the 
public   mind   was   much   excited    in    Serbia,    and    that 
Macedonian  events  were  looked  on  as  most  serious  ;  he 
omitted  to  tell  me  what  he  himself  had  said  and  preached 
to  the  Serbians. 

Three  days  after,  on  my  return  from  Vienna,  I  was  a 


I9I2]        THE   SCHIPKA   VETERANS'   FETE         loi 

witness  at  the  same  Belgrade  station  of  another  de- 
parture :  that  of  the  heir  to  the  throne,  Prince  Alexander, 
who,  with  M.  Pachitch,  was  going  to  inspect  the  troops 
in  the  south-east  of  Serbia,  that  is  near  the  Turkish 
frontier,  I  could  not  help  thinking  that  this  journey 
was  rather  significant. 

Towards  the  beginning  of  August,  Bulgaria's  dis- 
quieting state  of  mind  was  already  the  constant  topic  at 
the  interviews  of  members  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  of 
Sofia.  I  noticed  that  the  representatives  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and  the  new  Turkish  Minister,  the  intelligent 
and  shrewd  Nabi-bey,  had  no  idea  of  the  complete 
understanding  between  the  Bulgarians  and  the  Serbians, 
and  did  not  perceive,  in  the  conduct  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments, a  direct  preparation  for  war;  but  all  the  same 
they  were  beginning  to  be  anxious,  and  watched  my 
words  and  deeds  with  suspicious  curiosity.  Moreover, 
Nabi-bey  soon  left  for  Switzerland,  ostensibly  to  take  a 
cure,  but  in  reality  to  begin  secret  negotiations,  by  order 
of  the  Porte,  with  some  Italian  financiers,  selected  ad  hoc. 
These  secret  conferences  were  transformed  into  official 
negotiations  of  peace  as  soon  as  the  Balkan  War  had 
broken  out.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  pre- 
liminaries of  these  negotiations  had  been  laid  down  in 
Sofia  before  Nabi-bey's  departure  to  Switzerland. 

On  the  nth  (24th)  August,  the  feast  of  the  veterans  of 
the  first  Bulgarian  militia  was  generally  celebrated  in 
Sofia,  and  always  with  great  pomp.  During  the  days — 
celebrated  for  ever  in  Bulgaria's  history — of  the  9th  to 
the  nth  August  (O.S.),  1877,  when  the  Turks,  pursuing 
from  Kazanlyk  the  weak  detachment  of  General  Gourko, 
ascended  the  southern  slope  of  the  Balkans  and  tried  to 
take  the  Schipka  Pass  by  assault — a  position  fiercely 
defended  by  us— the  Bulgarian  militia,  newly  formed 
into  picked  battalions,  displayed  heroic  courage  side  by 
side  with  regiments  of  Russian  Chasseurs,  and  helped  to 
save  Shipka  and  to  bar  the  road  to  northern  Bulgaria  to 
the  Turks.     Ever  since,  the  anniversary  of  the  i  ith  (24th) 


I02  INTRIGUKS   AT   SOFIA         [chap.viii. 

August  has  been  celebrated  every  year  by  the  illustrious 
survivors  of  these  battles.  On  the  eve  of  this  day,  the 
veterans  gave  a  banquet  to  the  representatives  of  the 
Government  and  to  the  Russian  Legation  ;  on  the  day 
itself  a  solemn  service  was  held  in  the  cathedral  of  Sofia, 
and  the  historical  colours  of  the  first  Bulgarian  militia, 
amongst  which  the  flag  called  "of  Samara"  was  par- 
ticularly noticeable,  were  brought  from  the  Palace  to  the 
church ;  this  was  the  flag  embroidered  and  presented 
to  the  Bulgarian  militia  by  the  Russian  ladies  of  the 
town  of  Samara ;  it  was  covered  with  Bulgarian  blood  in 
the  hand-to-hand  fighting  near  Stara-Zagora  {Eski- 
Zagra),  where  the  Bulgarian  militia  with  their  bayonets 
succeeded  in  cutting  through  the  Turkish  lines  and  in 
saving  the  precious  flag. 

The  Bulgarians  in  general  have  not  an  expansive 
nature.  This  people,  reserved  and  taciturn,  is  almost 
completely  incapable  of  boisterous  manifestations  of 
enthusiasm.  So  that  the  festival  of  the  veterans  usually 
went  off  very  calmly  according  to  the  programme 
once  drawn  up  ;  and  the  crowd  gathered  round  the 
cathedral  appeared  to  watch  with  indifference  the  pro- 
cession of  the  colours  and  the  review  of  the  veterans 
and  of  the  Sofia  garrison  which  took  place  in  the  big 
square. 

On  this  occasion,  that  is  in  1912,  we  received  as  usual 
an  invitation  to  the  veterans'  banquet  and  to  the  service 
in  the  cathedral.  But  on  the  eve  of  the  banquet  Gueshov 
said  to  me:  "Shall  you  go  to  the  banquet,  Monsieur?  "  "I 
was  just  going  to  ask  you  the  same  question,"  I  replied. 

"  I  think,"  said  Gueshov,  "  that  it  would  be  better 
for  you  and  me  not  to  go  ;  every  one  is  over-excited  ; 
at  the  banquet  speeches  may  be  made  which  would 
place  us  in  an  embarrassing  position.  But  I  shall,  of 
course,  go  to  the  cathedral,  and  we  earnestly  beg  of  you 
to  come  as  usual." 

On  arrival  at  the  cathedral  at  the  appointed  time,  we 
were  struck  by  the  emotional  atmosphere  which  per- 
vaded the  sacred  edifice.     One  saw  pale  faces,  shining 


I9I2I  "IT   IS   WAR"  103 

eyes,  tears  coursing  down  the  cheeks  of  aged  men  .  .  . 
and  all  of  a  sudden  from  the  precincts  of  the  cathedral, 
where  an  enormous  crowd  was  collected,  a  formidable 
"  hurrah  !  "  resounded,  but  a  "  hurrah  !  "  the  like  of  which 
I  have  not  heard  since  my  childhood,  when  in  the  large 
square  of  the  Kremlin  in  Moscow  the  crowd  cheered  the 
Tsar- Liberator  Alexander  II.  What  can  this  mean?  I 
inwardly  wondered.  Is  the  King  arriving  at  the 
cathedral,  and  would  they  give  hint  such  an  ovation  ? 
At  this  moment  the  doors  of  the  church  were  thrown 
open,  and  there  appeared  :  first  the  flag  of  Samara,  then 
theold  colours  of  the  militia,  and  then  Macedonian  colours 
entwined  in  crepe.  But  all  eyes  were  bent  on  the  flag 
of  Samara;  the  veterans  gathered  round  it ;  with  tears  in 
their  eyes  they  kissed  the  staff,  the  drapery,  the  St. 
George  streamers.  A  thought  flashed  like  lightning 
through  my  mind  :  it  is  war,  I  thought.  Certainly  and 
undoubtedly,  it  is  war  ! 

The  review  passed  off  with  every  one  still  in  the 
same  frame  of  mind,  and  when  I  drove  to  the  Legation 
I  was  cheered  with  cries  of  "hurrah!"  and  "Russia 
for  ever ! " 

Soon  after  Gueshov  informed  me  of  the  agreement 
concluded  with  Montenegro.  In  all  my  interviews  with 
Bulgarian  Ministers  I  always  tried  to  restrain  the  war- 
like tendencies  of  some  amongst  them,  by  proving  to 
them  the  undoubted  dangers  to  which  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia  would  expose  themselves  if  they  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  drawn  into  a  war  with  Turkey,  even  if  they 
were  supported  by  Greece  and  Montenegro.  I  quoted 
the  excellent  state  of  the  Turkish  Army  reformed  and 
commanded  by  German  generals,  the  possibility  of  an 
attack  on  the  Serbians  from  behind  by  Austria  and  the 
utter  impossibility  of  our  doing  anything  to  prevent 
this;  I  did  not  conceal  my  doubts  of  the  Balkan  allies 
maintaining  close  solidarity  up  to  the  end ;  but  my 
principal  argument  was  that  Russia  was  afraid  of  blood- 
shed which  might  finally  spread  all  over  Europe — which 


104  INTRIGUES  AT   SOFIA         [chap.viii. 

would  not  lielp  tlic  cause  of  our  Balkan  kinsmen  in  the 
least. 

My  arguments  on  the  subject  of  the  strength  and 
perfect  equipment  of  the  Turkisii  Army  were  received 
by  my  Bulgarian  listeners  with  a  sceptical  smile. 
Gueshov  assured  me  repeatedly  that  the  Bulgarian 
Headquarters  Staff  possessed  quite  different  information 
on  the  state  of  the  Ottoman  Army,  information  based 
on  systematic  observation  and  absolutely  reliable  secret 
intelligence.  And  that  concerning  our  wise  desire  to 
prevent  a  war  in  the  Near  East,  the  only  way  to  attain 
that  would  be  for  Russia  and  Europe  to  resume  their 
former  course  of  action  and  their  work  of  organisation 
and  autonomy  in  Macedonia  ;  in  short  that  Europe  must 
at  last  renounce  her  illusions  on  the  subject  of  a  new 
state  of  affairs  in  Turkey.  I  entirely  shared  this  last 
point  of  view,  and  I  remember  that  after  the  second 
massacre  which  took  place  in  Macedonia,  I  made  the 
suggestion,  in  a  dispatch  to  M.  Sazonoff,  that  the 
Powers  should  take  Macedonian  affairs  in  hand  and 
immediately  send  their  consuls  to  Katchaneh  and 
Ishtib,  to  hold  an  inquiry  on  the  massacres  which  had 
taken  place  there,  just  as  was  done  under  the  old 
Turkish  regime,  which  was  exactly  like  the  new  one. 
I  also  communicated  my  views  to  our  Ambassador  in 
Constantinople.  In  St.  Petersburg  it  was  not  thought 
possible  to  carry  out  my  idea.  It  is  true  that  it  would  be 
difficult  to  change  our  relations  with  Turkey  all  at  once, 
and  to  reconquer  a  position  voluntarily  abandoned  by 
European  diplomacy  nearly  four  years  ago — four  years 
during  which  the  Powers  had  vied  with  one  another  in 
good  behaviour  towards  the  Young  Turks  and  had 
almost  been  obsequious  to  them.  And  even  admitting 
that  we  had  decided  to  change  our  attitude  towards 
Turkey  abruptly,  should  we  have  been  followed  along 
this  path  by  the  other  Powers,  even  those  of  the 
Entente? 

M.  de  Giers  was  not  long  in  replying  to  me  from 
Constantinople ;     and    he   persuaded   me   to   warn   the 


I9I2]  FERDINAND'S  JUBILEE  105 

Bulgarians  in  the  most  emphatic  manner  that  they  were 
courting  certain  disasterif  they  declared  war  on  Turkey. 
M.  de  Giers — a  serious-minded  and  straightforward 
man — was  absolutely  sincere  in  his  warning.  He  felt 
much  sympathy  for  the  Slavs  of  the  Balkans  and  dreaded 
their  defeat,  which  would  have  had  as  a  consequence 
either  the  considerable  diminishing  of  the  prestige  of 
Russia,  or  our  being  dragged  into  a  collision  with  the 
Central  Empires. 

I  took  care  to  impart  to  Gueshovthe  opinion  of  our 
Ambassador  in  Constantinople,  but  I  could  only  realise 
afresh  and  more  fully  that  arguments  on  the  subject  of 
the  military  strength  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  would  not 
produce  any  effect  on  the  Bulgarians. 

I  heard  besides  that  King  Ferdinand,  who  in  April 
and  May  had  seemed  inclined  for  war,  was  much  per- 
plexed at  this  moment ;  he  dreaded  extreme  measures 
and  would  have  liked  things  to  drag  on  for  some  time. 

In  August,  191 2,  it  was  twenty-five  years  since 
Prince  Ferdinand  of  Coburg  had  been  elected  Prince  of 
Bulgaria  and  had  set  foot  on  Bulgarian  soil,  although  he 
was  not  recognised  by  Russia  and  a  few  other  powers. 
This  anniversary  was  to  be  solemnly  celebrated  at 
Tirnova  in  the  presence  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps. 
Given  the  circumstances  and  the  activist  fever  which 
had  seized  the  Bulgarians,  it  was  to  be  feared  that  the 
Jubilee  would  not  pass  off  without  incident;  I  foresaw 
at  the  same  time  that  at  Tirnova  all  eyes  would  be  fixed 
on  the  Russian  Minister  and  that  the  King  himself 
would  pay  me  marked  attention.  By  a  concurrence  of 
strange  and  significant  circumstances,  the  representative 
of  that  Power  which  a  quarter  of  a  century  earlier  had 
positively  refused  to  recognise  Ferdinand,  now  became 
the  most  prominent  acolyte — I  might  even  say  the 
principal  trophy — of  his  Jubilee! 

The  celebrations  passed  off  well.  There  were  no 
political  demonstrations;  only  in  all  the  speeches 
addressed  to  the  King,  beginning  with  the  sermon  of  the 


io6  INTRIGUES   AT   SOFIA       friiAP.vm. 

Metropolitan  of  Tirnova,  the  following  note  predomin- 
ated :  "  Vou,  sir,  have  enhanced  Your  own  prestige,  won 
the  attention  of  the  Powers,  raised  Bulgaria  to  the  rank 
of  a  sovereign  State,  and  assumed  for  Yourself  the  title 
of  King;  but  You  must  remember  that  during  these 
twenty-five  years  You  have  not  furthered  by  a  single 
degree  the  real  aims  of  Bulgaria,  those  which  had  been 
fixed  by  the  Tsar-Liberator  in  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  !  " 
Russia  and  the  Tsar-Liberator  were  repeatedly  men- 
tioned in  the  speeches. 

After  the  banquet  served  in  the  municipal  theatre, 
the  King  drew  me  aside  and  had  a  long  talk  with  me. 
He  complained  of  his  difficult  position,  assured  me  of 
his  sincere  desire  to  avoid  a  collision  with  Turkey,  but 
at  the  same  time  alluded  to  the  patriotic  agitation  which 
had  seized  on  the  whole  of  Bulgaria  and  which  would 
only  settle  down  in  a  peaceful  manner  if  the  rights 
and  the  autonomy  of  the  Bulgarians  of  Macedonia  and 
Thrace  were  truly  and  effectually  realised. 

"You  have  heard  the  speeches  which  have  just  been 
made,  and  you  have  probably  grasped  their  true  mean- 
ing. Hence  you  can  judge  the  difficulty  of  my  position. 
Nevertheless  I  mean  to  act  up  to  the  last  moment  with 
the  idea  of  preserving  peace.  I  beg  you  to  transmit  this 
to  St.  Petersburg,  and  at  the  same  time  to  entreat  them 
earnestly  to  come  to  my  assistance." 

This  was  my  last  interview  with  the  King  before 
the  Bulgarian  mobilisation.  Of  course,  I  informed  M. 
Sazonoff  of  the  purport  of  it,  and  added  that,  according 
to  my  own  opinion,  events  could  still  be  checked  by 
energetic  action  respecting  the  Porte,  but  that  in  a  few 
weeks  it  would  be  too  late. 

I  was  inordinately  astonished,  and  up  to  now  I  cannot 
understand  that,  in  spite  of  my  warnings,  our  Foreign 
Secretary  could  remain  so  calm  about  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia.  When  the  mobilisation  was  announced,  we  like 
all  the  other  European  Cabinets  were  aghast,  and  we  pro- 
ceeded to  heap  on  Sofia,  Belgrade,  Athens  and  Cetigne 


1912]  M.    SAZONOFFS  APATHY  107 

threatening  warnings  and  reproaches  which  were  almost 
ultimatums.     But  it  was  too  late  ! 

At  the  time  I  explained  this  impenitent  optimism  of 
St.  Petersburg  to  myself  in  the  following  way :  our 
Foreign  Office  was  certain  that  without  the  help  of 
Serbia,  the  Bulgarians  would  never  make  up  their  minds 
to  move ;  moreover,  no  one  in  our  country  doubted  the 
obedience  and  good  behaviour  of  the  Serbians  ;  and 
M.  Hartwig  took  great  care  not  to  report  to  the 
Foreign  Office  what  was  really  happening  in  Belgrade, 
as  it  might  shatter  our  illusions. 

But  later  on  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
behaviour  of  my  colleague  in  Belgrade  did  not  repre- 
sent so  much  a  cause  of  ulterior  events  as  one  of  the 
symptoms  of  our  way  of  tackling  political  questions. 
Our  diplomatic  chiefs  in  St.  Petersburg,  simply,  were 
filled  with  what  M.  Isvolsky,  in  a  speech  made  at  the 
Duma  some  time  before,  had  called  "  healthy  optimism," 
and  which  had  led  Russia  then  to  the  brink  of  war  ! 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE    BALKAN  WAR,    I9I2 


The  17th  (30th)  September,  1912,  the  Bulgarian  mobi- 
lisation was  ordered  simultaneously  with  the  Serbian, 
Greek,  and  Montenegrin  mobilisations,  and  from  the 
first  moment  all  the  members  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps 
in  Sofia  without  exception  understood  that  this  mobi- 
lisation meant  a  determined  war  with  no  turning  back. 
But  such  was  not  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Governments.  For  several  days  warnings,  prayers,  and 
threats  were  abundantly  poured  on  Sofia,  Belgrade, 
etc.,  but  they  produced  no  effect  whatever  on  those 
to  whom  they  were  addressed.  Finally,  on  the  fourth 
or  fifth  day,  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  in  Sofia, 
Belgrade,  etc.,  received  from  their  respective  Govern- 
ments instructions  to  declare  to  the  Government  to 
which  they  were  accredited  that  the  Powers  were  de- 
termined to  obtain  from  Turkey  a  regime  of  justice  and 
autonomy  for  all  the  people  of  a  common  origin  of  the 
four  Balkan  States  at  present  allied ;  but  that  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  these  States  would  not  listen  to  the  wise 
advice  offered  them,  and  insisted  on  making  war  on 
Turkey,  the  Powers,  even  in  the  event  of  victory  by 
the  allies,  would  not  permit  any  territorial  change  in 
the  Peninsula  prejudicial  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The 
first  part  of  this  declaration  was  eminently  sound,  and 
corresponded  on  all  points  with  what  1  had  suggested 
and  preached  in  June  and  July  ;  but  in  October,  and 
after  mobilisation  had  been  ordered,  the  promises  of 
the  Powers  were  arriving  decidedly  too  late ! 

Having  assembled  at  the  house  of  our  senior,  we 
decided  to  make   the   prescribed   declaration  the  very 

108 


I9I2]  FUTILE   PROTESTS  109 

next  day  to  M.  Gueshov,  one  after  the  other,  and  in  a 
verbal  form  but  strictly  identical.  To  effect  this  we 
drew  our  communication  up  together,  and  each  of  us 
was  to  read  the  text  to  M.  Gueshov.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  guess  that  not  one  of  us  expected  any  result  from 
this  proceeding.  The  evening  before,  my  French  col- 
league and  I  had  confessed  as  much  to  one  another. 
The  next  day,  when  I  was  on  my  way  to  the  Foreign 
Office  at  the  appoijited  hour,  I  met  Count  Tarnowski, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister,  coming  out  of  his 
Legation. 

"  Well,  so  we  are  going  to  take  our  famous  step,  are 
we  ?  "  he  asked  with  a  sarcastic  smile. 

"Certainly,"  I  replied. 

"And  you  think  that  something  will  come  of  it?" 

"  I  doubt  it." 

"And  I  am  quite  sure  that  nothing  will,"  replied  my 
colleague  sharply;  "Europe  is  simply  placing  herself 
in  a  ridiculous  position  !  " 

I  did  not  answer,  but  in  my  heart  of  hearts  I  could 
not  but  agree  that  Tarnowski  was  perfectly  right.  A 
few  weeks  later,  when  the  final  and  brilliant  success  of 
the  Balkan  States  was  clearly  evident,  the  Powers  com- 
pletely/or^o/ the  declaration  they  had  made  during  the 
mobilisation  ;  every  one  in  Europe  began  to  court  the 
victors,  more  especially  the  Bulgarians.  Such  always 
has  been  and  such  always  will  be  the  power  of  success. 
But  after  this  what  must  the  Bulgarians,  Serbians,  etc., 
have  thought  of  the  august  decisions  of  Europe,  of  her 
warnings,  her  threats? 

The  mobilisation  went  off  splendidly  in  Bulgaria 
and  in  Serbia.  I  should  never  have  thought  that  a 
people  so  reserved  as  the  Bulgarians  were  capable  of 
the  enthusiasm  they  displayed  during  those  memorable 
days.  There  were  no  drunkards  :  there  never  are  in 
Balkan  countries.  Everywhere  exemplary  order  reigned, 
except  in  a  few  railway  stations  where  the  reservists 
who  had  been  called  up  took  the  trains  by  assault,  and 
even  climbed  up  on  the  roofs  of  the  carriages  in  order 


no  THE   BALKAN   WAR,  1912         [chap.  ix. 

to  arrive  more  quickly  at  the  rallying-point.  My  wife 
and  my  youngest  daughter,  who  were  returning  from 
Russia  vid  Bukharest  and  passing  through  the  whole  of 
northern  Bulgaria  exactly  at  this  time,  told  me  that  at 
each  station  there  were  crowds  of  women,  old  men,  and 
children  escorting,  with  flowers,  songs,  and  jokes,  their 
sons,  husbands,  and  brothers  who  were  jo^^fully  going 
off  to  the  decisive  conflict  with  the  time-honoured  enemy. 
The  same  thing  was  told  me  by  travellers  who  had 
crossed  Serbia.  The  day  after  the  one  on  which  the 
mobilisation  was  ordered  war  became  inevitable.  If 
the  Bulgarian  or  Serbian  Government  had  wished  to 
obey  the  injunctions  of  the  Powers  and — not  to  demo- 
bilise— but  only  to  check  the  course  of  events,  it  would 
have  inevitably  provoked  a  revolution,  and  the  armed 
troops  would  have  crossed  the  frontier  on  their  own 
initiative. 

The  die  was  cast.  As  to  us,  representatives  of  the 
Great  Powers  in  Sofia,  we  could  only  be  spectators  of 
military  deeds  and  of  the  first  decisive  encounters. 

I  often  wondered  at  the  time  and  afterwards  how  the 
Central  Empires  could  have  allowed  the  Balkan  States 
to  go  to  war  without  at  least  trying  to  prevent  it  by 
more  prompt  and  effectual  means  than  the  representa- 
tions of  united  Europe  and  her  platonic  threats.  I 
explain  the  fact  by  the  complete  confidence  possessed 
by  Berlin  in  the  victory  of  the  Turks  over  the  Allies. 
Such  a  victory  would  necessarily  lead  to  diplomatic 
negotiations  between  the  Powers,  and  during  these 
negotiations  the  Central  Empires  would  have  the  enor- 
mous advantage  of  being  on  the  side  of  the  victor.  The 
unexpected,  and  what  is  more,  rapid  and  decisive, 
success  of  the  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  arms  flabber- 
gasted Berlin  and  Vienna  to  such  a  pitch  that  they  had 
not  even  time  to  agree  together  to  prevent  this  success. 
It  became  henceforth  necessary  to  change  the  sphere 
of  action  to  that  of  the  inevitable  competition  between 
the  victorious  countries,  and  to  postpone  the  decisive 
blow  to  another  day  and   a  more   propitious  moment. 


I9I2]  WAR   BREAKS  OUT  m 

Germany  waited  for  this  moment  for  exactly  twenty- 
two  months. 

I  must  confess  that  from  the  moment  war  broke 
out  I  was  entirely  and  whole-heartedly  on  the  side  of 
the  Serbians,  the  Bulgarians,  and  the  Greeks.  I  was 
witnessing  the  accomplishment  of  all  that  had  been 
prepared  by  the  efforts,  the  blood,  and  the  thought  of 
several  generations  of  Russian  statesmen,  soldiers,  and 
thinkers.  The  three  small  nations — of  a  common  origin 
and  Orthodox — had  become  strong  enough  to  risk  a 
contest  with  their  time-honoured  foe,  alone  and  without 
outside  help  ;  their  victory  would  serve  as  a  striking 
justification  of  all  our  previous  policy,  of  all  the  efforts, 
all  the  sacrifices  of  the  Russian  people ;  hence  any  one 
will  realise  the  intense  interest  with  which  I  followed 
the  military  operations  which  had  just  begun. 

I  knew  through  private  sources  that  the  Bulgarian 
Army  would  advance  boldly  in  Thrace,  and  that  the  key 
to  its  final  success  would  be  the  taking  of  Lozengrad 
(Kirk-kilisseh),  whilst  the  Serbian  Army  had  reserved 
Macedonia  as  its  scene  of  action  in  the  direction  of 
Skoplie  (Uskub)  and  beyond.  I  was  overjoyed  the 
morning  that  Gueshov  telephoned  to  tell  me  that  Lozen- 
grad had  been  taken  by  two  Bulgarian  divisions  which 
crushed  the  Turks  by  a  truly  overwhelming  advance. 
From  that  moment  the  Bulgarians  were  threatening  the 
rear  of  the  Turkish  Army,  which  had  to  retreat  hurriedly 
before  the  principal  forces  of  the  Bulgarians.  By  the 
afternoon  all  the  town  knew  of  the  happy  event,  and 
towards  evening  there  was  a  procession  of  townspeople, 
school  children,  Macedonians,  and  reservists  marching 
with  torches  through  the  principal  streets,  and  stopping 
to  cheer  lustily  in  front  of  the  Palace  and  the  houses  of 
Gueshov  and  Danev,  and  more  lustily  still  in  front  of 
the  Russian  Legation.  This  time  I  thought  it  my  duty 
to  go  out  on  to  the  corner  balcony  which  overlooked 
the  Square,  to  listen  to  the  excited  speeches  of  the 
leaders  of  the  procession  and  to  reply  by  a  short  but 


112  THE   BALKAN    WAR,  1912  [chap.  ix. 

stirring  address.  From  that  day  and  at  each  fresh 
success  of  the  Bulgarian  arms  up  to  the  taking  of 
Adrianople  inclusive,  the  like  manifestations  were  re- 
peated in  front  of  the  Russian  Legation,  but  none  of 
them  made  such  a  lasting  impression  on  me  as  the 
first  one,  in  honour  of  the  taking  of  Lozengrad, 

A  few  days  later  we  heard  that  the  Serbian  Army, 
after  the  sanguinary  assault  of  the  "Zrny-Vrch"  positions, 
during  which  the  Serbians  accomplished  astounding 
feats  of  valour,  had  completely  beaten  the  Turkish  Army 
and  was  pursuing  it  across  the  elevated  plain — so  sadly 
famed  in  the  history  of  the  Serbian  people — which  bears 
the  name  of  "  Kossovo  Pole."  I  was  told  later  that  when 
the  Serbians  reached  this  place,  hallowed  throughout 
centuries  by  immortal  memories  of  heroism  and  mourn- 
ing, and  extolled  in  the  three  epic  poems  called  the 
"  Kossovo  Pole  Songs,"  that  each  Serbian  soldier  bent 
down  to  kiss  the  sacred  soil  and  placed  a  handful  of  earth 
in  his  bosom  in  a  clean  cloth.  .  .  .  Such  moments  are 
indeed  rare  in  the  history  of  nations :  all  honour  to 
those  amongst  them  who  have  purchased  them  by  time- 
honoured  fidelity  to  the  historic  ideal,  and  with  their 
noble  blood  shed  on  the  very  spot  and  at  the  vital 
moment !  .  .  . 

Neither  the  Bulgarian  nor  the  Serbian  Army  gave 
the  enemy  time  to  recover.  While  the  Serbians  had 
occupied  their  former  capital  Skoplie  almost  without 
striking  a  blow,  had  advanced  on  Bitolia  and  there, 
after  four  days'  ferocious  and  difficult  fighting,  had 
utterly  and  completely  beaten  the  last  Turkish  troops, 
the  Bulgarians  were  overtaking  the  Ottoman  Army  at 
Lule-Burgas.  After  three  days'  sanguinary  fighting^ 
during  which  the  positions  were  perpetually  changing 
hands,  the  Turkish  resistance  was  finally  overcome 
and  their  Army  forced  to  the  most  hurried  retreat,  which 
at  times  degenerated  into  a  flight.  Such  is  the  glorious 
account  of  the  first  Balkan  War  (October,  1912). 

But  beside  these  glorious  annals,  an  incident  far  less 


I9I2]         GRECO-BULGARIAN    INCIDENT  113 

flattering  to  the  Bulgarians  occurred  at  the  very  outset 
of  the  War. 

As  I  have  already  said,  the  principal  operations  in 
Macedonia  fell  to  the  Serbian  Army ;  but  parallel  to 
the  Serbian  action  and  more  to  the  south-east  a  large 
Bulgarian  detachment  was  operating,  that  of  General 
Todorov,  who  was  sent  across  the  Rhodope  Mountains 
straight  in  the  direction  of  Salonika.  In  this  quarter 
there  were  but  few  Turkish  troops,  and  only  the  town 
and  port  of  Salonika,  constituting  the  base  of  opera- 
tions of  defence  in  Macedonia,  were  guarded  by  a  fairly 
large  garrison.  General  Todorov's  detachment,  having 
crossed  the  mountains  and  routed  the  irregular  detach- 
ments of  native  Mussulmans  who  courageously  defended 
the  passes  and  defiles,  at  length  emerged  on  the  road 
to  Salonika.  The  Bulgarians  advanced  so  quickly  that 
they  hardly  had  time  to  set  fire  to  the  rich  Turkish 
villages,  or  to  massacre  many  of  the  inhabitants.  This 
was  because  from  another  side  the  troops  of  the 
"  Diadoch  "  Constantine  were  advancing,  or  rather  rush- 
ing with  giddy  haste.  Never  before,  since  the  days 
when  Achilles  with  the  swiftness  of  a  stag  pursued 
Hector  round  the  walls  of  Troy,  have  the  Greeks 
marched  with  such  rapidity  as  on  this  occasion,  when 
they  had  at  all  costs  to  reach  Salonika  before  the  Bul- 
garians. And  the  Greeks  were  the  first  to  get  near 
the  town  of  St.  Cyril  and  Methodius.  When  General 
Todorov's  detachment  got  near  Salonika  the  Greeks 
had  already  been  there  two  days,  and  the  whole  Turkish 
garrison,  discouraged  by  a  series  of  defeats  in  Mace- 
donia, and  knowing  that  they  were  between  two  fires, 
had  already  surrendered  to  the  "Diadoch."  But  this 
did  not  suit  the  Bulgarians  at  all.  Having  arrived  in 
sight  of  the  Turkish  camp,  they  opened  fire,  and  then 
dispatched  envoys  to  the  Ottoman  heads  suggesting 
they  should  surrender.  The  'Turks,  who  had  just 
surrendered  to  the  Greeks,  hastened  to  surrender  again 
to  the  Bulgarians.  But  the  Greeks  would  have  none  of 
this.     And  when   General  Todorov's   troops  began  to 


114  THP:    BALKAN    WAR,  1912         [chap.  ix. 

surround  the  Turkish  camp,  the  commander  of  the 
Greek  troops  informed  the  Bulgarians  that  he  would 
resort  to  force  if  they  did  not  cease  immediately  to 
molest  their  Turkish  prisoners  and  if  the}^  did  not 
abandon  the  idea  of  entering  the  town.  A  little  more 
and  they  would  have  come  to  blows,  but  fortunately 
the  young  Crown  Prince  Boris  was  in  Todorov's  de- 
tachment, and  this  constrained  the  Bulgarian  general 
to  prudence,  and  the  "  Diadoch  "  Constantine,  who  had 
been  warned  in  time,  to  be  a  little  more  conciliatory. 
The  incident  was  at  last  settled.  A  Bulgarian  brigade 
was  allowed  to  enter  the  town,  and  to  garrison  the 
northern  suburb,  while  the  greater  part  of  Salonika 
remained  in  the  power  of  the  Greeks,  who  made  their 
headquarters  there.  The  Turkish  prisoners  also  were 
left  in  Greek  hands  and  sent  to  Greece.  This  beginning 
augured  no  good.  Throughout  the  duration  of  the  war, 
the  Greeks  and  Bulgarians  who  occupied  the  southern 
part  of  Macedonia  were  in  a  permanent  state  of  feud. 
Each  side  schemed  to  occupy  more  ground,  and 
shortly  before  the  conclusion  of  peace  a  real  collision 
took  place,  which  ended  in  bloodshed  ;  I  will  refer  to 
this  further  on. 

The  complete  defeat  of  the  Turkish  Army  at  Lule- 
Burgas  opened  to  the  Bulgarians  the  road  as  far  as 
Constantinople,  or  rather  up  to  the  strongly  fortified 
line  of  Chataldja,  which  encircles  the  town  north  of  the 
shores  of  the  Black  Sea  as  far  as  those  of  the  Sea  of 
Marmara.  The  demoralisation  of  the  Turkish  troops 
and  the  state  of  panic  in  Constantinople  were  such 
that  if  at  this  moment  the  army  of  Radko-Dmitriev 
had  risked  an  immediate  march  on  Chataldja  it  could 
have  taken  the  Turkish  fortifications  at  one  stroke. 
Unfortunately  for  the  Bulgarians  they  were  short  of 
munitions,  and  had  to  halt  for  three  or  four  days  await- 
ing them.  But  at  this  moment  a  circumstance  occurred 
which,  although  quite  natural,  had  not  entered  into  the 
Bulgarians'  calculations ;  and  Stambul  was  saved. 


I9I2]  RAINS   STOP  THE   ADVANCE  115 

Generally   speaking,    the   autumn,   or    at    least   the 
months  of  September  and  October,  O.S.,  constitute  the 
most  beautiful  season  of  the  year  in  the  entire  Balkan 
Peninsula.     During  the  seventeen   years   that   I   spent 
there  at  the  outset  of  my  career  I  only  once  saw  a  wet 
autumn;  in  the  other  years  this  season  was  fine,  mild, 
and  sunny,  except  for  a  few  stormy  days  now  and  then. 
Such  was   also  the  previous  autumn  of  191 1  which  I 
spent  in  Sofia.     But  in  1912,  shortly  before  the  battle 
of  Lule-Burgas,  rain  suddenly  began  to  fall,  and  there 
were  continual  downpours  lasting  for  at  least  a  month. 
From  the  first,  the  bad  Bulgarian  roads  and  the  execrable 
Turkish  ones  became  absolutely  impassable ;  the  heavy 
clay  soil  of  this  part  of  the  Peninsula  turned  into  deep 
and  holding  mud,  and  the  military  convoys  stuck  on  the 
road.    A  few  days  later  all  the  draught-horses  had  died  ; 
then   the  bullocks  succumbed,  and  only  the  bufi'aloes 
still  held  out  and  managed  to  draw  their  heavy  loads, 
but  at  a  snail's  pace.     The  doctors  and  sisters  of  one  of 
our  Red  Cross  detachments  who  at  this  moment  were 
travelling  between  the    Bulgarian  frontier  and    Lozen- 
grad  told  me  later  that  their  convoy  only  managed  to 
do  from  four  to  six  kilometres  a  day,  and  that  only  thanks 
to  the  efforts  of  the  robust  Russian  medical  attendants, 
and  of  the  no   less   robust   Bulgarians  of  the  convoy, 
who  perpetually   shovelled  away  the  clay  into  which 
the  wheels  of  the  waggons  were  sinking  up  to  the  axle. 

Under  these  conditions  the  march  of  the  Bulgarian 
Army  was  becoming  extremely  difficult :  the  guns  had 
to  be  drawn  by  buffaloes,  and  as  to  the  cavalry  it  simply 
had  to  halt,  as  the  horses,  up  to  the  hocks  in  mud,  were 
perpetually  breaking  their  legs.  Also  the  head  of  the 
Bulgarian  Headquarters  Staff,  General  Fichev,  and  most 
of  the  other  generals  protested  firmly  against  the  further 
advance  on  Constantinople.  But  at  this  moment  a  new 
factor  in  the  development  of  events  appeared  on  the 
scene  :  the  ambition,  suddenly  aroused  and  immeasur- 
ably increased,  of  the  King  of  the  Bulgarians  ! 

Knowing  Ferdinand  fairly  well,  I  could  easily  picture 

I 


ii6  THE   BALKAN   WAR,    1912        [chap.  ix. 

his  terrible  anguish  during  the  fateful  days  of  the  mobi- 
lisation and  the  first  days  of  military  operations. 

But  when  at  the  King's  headquarters  the  news  came 
through,  first  of  the  brilliant  victory  of  his  troops 
at  Lule-Burgas  and  of  the  decisive  successes  of  the 
Serbians  in  Macedonia,  when  in  a  few  short  weeks 
there  was  nothing  remaining  to  the  Turks  in  Europe 
but  Constantinople  and  its  outskirts,  Adrianople, 
Janinaand  Scutari  in  Albania  surrounded  and  besieged, 
and  the  peninsula  of  Gallipoli — then  Ferdinand's  anguish 
suddenly  gave  place  to  a  violent  outburst  of  pride  and 
ambitious  hopes. 

A  Bulgarian  lady,  Russian  by  birth,  who  met  the 
King  just  at  this  time,  told  me  some  amusing  details 
about  Ferdinand's  behaviour;  he  did  not  conceal  his 
almost  childish  joy  and  his  overweening  pride  in  the 
least.  The  King  walked  with  her  along  the  platform  of 
the  station  where  his  headquarters  were,  and  the  in- 
credible elasticity  of  his  movements  were  a  great  con- 
trast to  his  usual  heavy  walk  of  a  gouty  and  obese 
person :  His  Majesty  bounded  in  the  air  like  an  india- 
rubber  ball.  "Now  then!"  he  exclaimed  with  a  trium- 
phant smile,  "what  have  you  to  say  about  it,  madame? 
What  do  you  say  ?  Bulgav-Vilayct !  Eh  what?  Bulgar- 
Vilayet?  Who  would  have  thought  it?"  and  the  King 
went  on  repeating  his  Biilgar-Vilayet,  accompanying  the 
words  with  his  most  malicious  smile  aimed  at  the 
Padishah. 

At  this  moment  he  was  evidently  remembering  his 
first  journey  to  Constantinople,  when  the  Sultan  was 
holding  an  investiture ;  he  remembered  his  meeting  with 
the  sly,  obstinate,  old  Abdul-Hamid,  and  how  he  had  to 
bow  before  him  and  to  kiss  the  hand  of  the  Padishah, 
his  sovereign.  Yes,  he  had  gone  through  it  all ;  he  had 
done  it  in  an  insinuating  manner,  as  if  it  cost  him 
nothing ;  but  in  reality  he  had  felt  deeply  humiliated, 
and  the  memory  had  never  been  effaced  from  his  heart. 
It  was  at  this  period  that  at  the  Sultan's  Court  Bulgaria 
was  always  spoken  of  as  Bulgar-l/ilayet  (the  Bulgarian 


I9I2]  FERDINAND'S   ELATION  117 

province).  And  now  "what  a  change  of  destiny  by  the 
grace  of  God !  "  The  fate  of  Turkey  seemed  to  be  in 
Ferdinand's  hands  as  it  had  once  been  in  the  hands  of 
the  Bulgarian  Tsar  Simeon,  who  approached  the 
walls  of  Constantinople  with  his  army,  with  the 
object  of  cutting  a  way  through  and  being  proclaimed 
Emperor  of  the  East.  And  Ferdinand  with  his  vivid  and 
prompt  imagination  foresaw  himself  playing  the  part 
of  Simeon. 

The  objects  assigned  to  the  war  with  Turkey  seemed 
to  him  to  have  been  left  far  behind,  and  all  his  thoughts, 
all  his  projects  were  centred  now  on  the  town  so  near 
at  hand.  He  pictured  himself  making  his  entry  into  the 
Imperial  City,  having  obliterated  the  last  traces  of 
Ottoman  domination  in  Europe.  And  then  on  his  skill, 
his  subtle  diplomacy  an  unexpected  solution  of  the 
Straits  question  might  depend — a  solution  in  favour  of 
the  Bulgarians,  this  people  who  forty  short  years  ago 
had  been  ignored  by  the  whole  world. 

There  is   Russia,  it  is  true,  who  for  two  centuries 
has  been  aspiring  to  the  possession  of  the  Straits  and 
dreams  of  erecting  the  cross  on  the  dome  of  St.  Sophia. 
But  these  political  ambitions  of  the  Tsars,  these  tradi- 
tional aspirations  of  the   Russian  people  have  always 
met  with  and  will  continue  to  meet  with  irreconcilable 
opposition  from  the   rest   of  Europe.     Even   in   allied 
France  the  Russians  would  scarcely  find  a  handful  of 
politicians   willing    to   accept   the    installation    of  the 
Empire   of   the   Tsars   in    Constantinople   and   in   the 
Dardanelles.     The  possession  of  the  Straits  by  a  Power 
like  Russia  would  increase  her  might  to  such  an  extent 
that  she  would  become  a  real  danger  to  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe.     The  old  formula  of  Napoleon  I.  that 
the  Power  which  possessed  the  Straits  would  acquire 
world-wide  supremacy  has   not   yet   lost  its  meaning. 
For  Austria  it  would  be  the  signal  for  the  disintegration 
and  the  secession  of  her  Slav  dominions;  for  Germany, 
the   overthrow  of  all  her  projects  of  commercial  and 
"  Kultur"  supremacy  in  the  Near  East ;  for  England  the 


ii8  THE    BALKAN    WAR,    1912       [chap.  ix. 

sharing  of  her  supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  finally, 
for  Italy  the  sudden  approach  of  an  alarming  giant. 
Russia  in  Constantinople  would  be  the  reconstitution  of 
the  Rome  of  the  Orient,  but  how  far  more  powerful  than 
Byzantium  ever  was  !  And  where  in  this  case  would 
the  Rome  of  the  West  be,  where  the  second  half  of  the 
Roman  Empire  which  counterbalanced  the  Oriental  half? 
One  would  most  certainly  not  seek  this  Rome  at  Pots- 
dam, and  still  less  in  Vienna  or  at  the  Quirinal ! 

There  still  exists  one  power,  thought  Ferdinand, 
continuing  his  soliloquy,  which  has  neither  lost  its 
prestige  nor  abandoned  its  aspirations  to  universal 
supremacy,  and  to  which  the  extension  of  the  Empire 
of  the  Tsars  as  far  as  the  shores  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
would  be  intolerable  and  almost  fatal.  This  power  is 
Roman  Catholicism.  The  triumph  of  the  cause  of  Greek 
Orthodoxy  the  day  after  the  abrogation  of  the  temporal 
power  of  the  Popes — for  to  the  Church  fifty  years  are 
but  a  day — would  furnish  a  palpable  proof  that  the 
*  Ccesarian-papacy  of  the  Orient  is  at  least  equal  to  the 
power  of  the  Roman  Holy  See. 

Hence,  concluded  Ferdinand,  all  the  vital  forces  in 
Europe  are  hostile  to  the  installation  of  the  Russians  in 
Constantinople.  But  if  the  stupid  domination  of  the 
Turks  in  this  capital  of  world-wide  importance  were 
once  broken  and  were  to  disappear,  would  it  be  possible 
for  Europe  to  restore  it  ?  No,  that  is  out  of  the  question  1 
Who  then  would  replace  the  Turks  on  the  shores  of  the 
Bosphorus  ?  Would  Constantinople  become  an  inter- 
national free  town,  in  other  words  the  principal  market 
and  seat  of  power  of  European  bankers  and  Americans 
of  Jewish  origin  ?  Or  would  one  give  Turkey  over  to 
that  "  Constantine  XIV."  who  with  his  tiny  army  had 
just  "  prigged  "  Salonika  from  the  Bulgarians  ?  Would 
it  not  be  infinitely  more  natural  for  the  European  Powers 
to  favour  the  installation  on  the  Bosphorus  of  a  State 
powerful  enough  to  guard  the  Straits,  but  not  powerful 
enough  to  be  a  menace  to  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe, 
i.e.  Bulgaria? 


I9I2]  KING   P^ERDINAND'S    REASONS  119 

And  how  would  the  Holy  See  look  on  such  a  solution 
of  the  question?  But  to  this  Ferdinand  had  an  answer 
ready,  formulated  during  long  years  of  meditation. 

The  Bulgarians,  throughout  the  course  of  their  history, 
have  represented  one  of  the  feeblest  supports  of  Greek 
Orthodoxy ;  sometimes  they  fell  under  the  influence  of 
Rome;  sometimes  the  heresies  of  the  Paulicians  and 
Albigenses  triumphed  all  over  the  kingdom  ;  and  not 
so  very  long  ago,  at  the  very  first  awakening  of 
the  Bulgarian  national  conscience  in  the  forties,  this 
awakening  was  already  partly  exploited  by  Roman 
propaganda.  The  first  preachers  of  Bulgarian  liberty 
did  not  issue  only  from  the  universities  and  seminaries 
of  Moscow  and  Kieff.  Several  of  the  striking  personali- 
ties of  the  future  Bulgaria  had  received  their  education 
either  at  Montpellier  or  in  Constantinople  under  the 
vigilant  eye  of  the  Lazarists  and  of  the  brothers  of  the 
Christian  Faith,  until  the  English  Robert  College  and 
the  Protestant  work  of  American  missions  competed 
against  these.  Given  these  precedents  Ferdinand  did 
not  think  it  would  be  so  very  difficult  to  guide  his 
people  into  the  path  of  a  reconciliation  with  Rome,  a 
path  traced  nearly  four  centuries  ago  by  Ignatius  Pocej 
in  Western  Russia. 

In  imagination  Ferdinand  already  drew  the  picture 
of  this  reconciliation — under  his  aegis — of  the  Western 
Church  with  the  Church  of  the  East;  the  solemn  Mass 
in  St.  Sophia's,  celebrated  strictly  in  accordance  with 
the  Oriental  ritual  (Ferdinand  had  made  a  deep  study  of 
this  ritual),  but  during  the  course  of  which  the  name  of 
the  successor  to  St.  Peter  would  be  mentioned  before 
and  above  that  of  the  Patriarch  of  Constantinople.  Then 
only  would  they  understand  in  Rome  that  by  consenting 
to  his  son's  conversion  to  the  Greek  Church,  Ferdinand 
had  rendered  one  of  the  greatest  services  to  Roman 
Catholicism.  And  then  not  only  would  his  excom- 
munication be  rescinded,  but  also  his  name  would  be 
blessed  and  quoted  side  by  side  with  those  of  the  great 
isapostolic  monarchs. 


I20  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912       [chap.  ix. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  this  hope  of  a  reconciliation 
witli  the  Holy  See  (and  with  his  own  conscience  into  the 
bargain)  was  one  of  the  mainsprings  which  incited 
Ferdinand  to  the  taking  of  Constantinople.  And  there 
is  also  no  doubt  that— from  the  moment  that  such  in- 
credible prospects  unfolded  themselves  to  the  King  of 
the  Bulgarians— he  at  once  realised  that  he  had  but  one 
real  competitor  and  enemy,  and  that  this  enemy  was 
Russia. 

Onward  then !  onward !  whate'er  the  cost,  towards 
these  sacred  wails,  while  Europe  has  not  yet  realised  the 
whole  importance  of  the  success  of  the  Serbian  and 
Bulgarian  arms.  The  King's  headquarters  sent  off  an 
order  to  Sofia  to  dispatch  at  once  all  the  grand  uniforms 
of  the  Royal  Guard,  the  gala-coaches,  and  six  white 
horses :  perhaps  it  would  be  as  well  to  include  even  the 
costume  of  the  Byzantine  Basileus  in  which,  shortly, 
before,  the  King  had  posed  to  a  French  painter  and  a 
Viennese  medallist;  this  costume  would  surely  be  found 
in  the  Royal  wardrobe  !  The  ceremonial  of  the  entry 
into  Constantinople  of  the  new  Tsar  Simeon — for 
Ferdinand  intended  to  adopt  this  name  in  the  event  of 
eventual  success — was  thought  out  in  every  detail. 
" Biilgar-Vilayct !  Eh  what?  Who  would  have  thought 
it?     Bulgar-Vilayet  V' 

But  the  floodgates  of  heaven  which  were  opening 
over  the  Balkan  Peninsula  prevented,  this  time  at  least, 
the  realisation  of  all  this  phantasmagoria.  It  was  not 
till  a  week  after  the  victory  of  Lule-Burgas  that  the 
Bulgarian  troops,  by  the  King's  express  order,  resumed 
their  march  on  Constantinople,  and  a  week  went  by 
before  they  could  approach  the  lines  of  Chataldja.  In 
the  interval  Berlin  had  pulled  herself  together,  and  so 
had  the  German  military  instructors  of  the  Ottoman 
Army.  The  Baron  von  Wangenheim  and  the  German 
generals  in  Constantinople  united  their  efforts  to  infuse 
some  energy  into  the  broken  and  wavering  spirits  of 
the  Young  Turks.     The  fortifications  of  Chataldja  were 


I9I2]  REVERSE    AT  CHATALDJA  121 

hurriedly  armed,  guns  were  brought  in,  the  garrison 
made  up  to  strength,  and  on  both  sides  of  the  fortified 
line,  in  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Sea  of  Marmara,  the  battle- 
ships of  the  Ottoman  Fleet  with  their  guns  prevented 
the  Bulgarians  creeping  along  the  shores.  When  the 
Bulgarian  Army  began  nevertheless  to  attack  the  line 
of  Chataldja,  the  enterprise  was  found  to  be  too  much 
even  for  the  indomitable  courage  of  the  Bulgarians : 
one  after  the  other  the  hosts  of  brave  men  who  rushed 
to  the  attack  were  mown  down  and  littered  the  ground 
with  their  corpses  ;  and  after  two  days  of  deadly  effort, 
only  one  Turkish  redoubt  had  been  taken,  only  to  be 
lost  the  next  day,  for  the  Turks  concentrated  the  fire 
from  their  other  forts  on  to  it.  No,  the  line  of  Cha- 
taldja was  absolutely  impregnable  without  the  assist- 
ance of  big  guns  or  of  ships  of  the  line,  if  it  were  only 
from  the  Black  Sea  side;  and  the  Bulgarians  possessed 
neither. 

Checked  and  thrown  back  at  Chataldja,  the  Bulgarian 
Army  spread  over  the  whole  of  Thrace,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  narrow  peninsula  of  Gallipoli,  where  it  also 
was  stopped  by  the  formidable  positions  of  Bulair; 
moreover,  the  Bulgarians  had  no  interest  in  occupying 
the  European  shore  of  the  Dardanelles.  The  Bulgarian 
sphere  established  itself  on  the  whole  of  the  northern 
shore  of  the  Sea  of  Marmara,  and  Ferdinand  had  his 
headquarters  sometimes  at  Kavala  on  the  iEgean  Sea, 
sometimes  at  Rodosto  on  the  Sea  of  Marmara.  But  his 
dreams  about  Constantinople  were  decidedly  shattered. 
Ferdinand  realised  this  himself,  and  from  that  moment 
all  his  efforts  were  concentrated  on  securing  to  Bulgaria 
all  the  country  just  occupied  by  his  Army,  plus  that 
part  of  Macedonia  which  was  due  to  the  Bulgarians  by 
virtue  of  the  agreement  with  Serbia. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  say  to  what  extent  the  Bul- 
garian people  shared  or  did  not  share  the  dreams  of 
their  master  about  Constantinople.  On  the  one  hand, 
there  existed  in   Bulgaria — and  ever  since  the  eighties 


122  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912       [chap.  ix. 

— some  extreme  patriots  who  looked  on  Constantinople 
as  the  natural  portion  of  the  Bulgarian  people,  and  who, 
like  Ferdinand,  dreamt  of  the  times  of  the  Tsar  Simeon. 
In  the  celebrated  military  song  composed  during  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  for  the  use  of  the  Bulgarian  militia, 
and  which  has  since  become  the  national  anthem  of 
Bulgaria,  "  Schoumi  Maritza,"  one  already  read  the 
line,  "March,  march  —  Tzarignid  \i.c.  Constantinople] 
is  ours !  "  But  I  have  always  thought,  and  I  still  think, 
that  the  greater  part  of  the  Bulgarian  "  intelligence," 
and  more  especially  the  mass  of  the  people,  did  not 
dare,  and  did  not  even  wish,  to  aspire  to  the  possession 
of  the  town,  which  was  commonly  considered  the  goal 
and  lawful  portion  of  the  Great  Liberator — Russia. 

Bulgarian  public  opinion — I  would  rather  say  the 
opinion  of  the  Bulgarian  people — which  was  thoroughly 
intractable  on  the  subject  of  Macedonia  and  of  the 
famous  frontiers  of  San  Stefano,  did  not  aspire  to  the 
south-eastern  part  of  the  peninsula  beyond  Adrianople 
and  Lozengrad.  But  these  two  towns  were  considered 
by  the  Bulgarians  to  be  theirs  by  right,  although 
Adrianople  was  inhabited  principally  by  Turks,  and 
Kirk-Kilisseh  by  Turks  and  Greeks.  The  latter  had 
been  in  the  power  of  the  Bulgarians  from  the  first  days 
of  the  war,  and  Adrianople  surrounded  and  besieged, 
it  was  easy  to  see  that  the  Bulgarians  were  determined 
to  take  it  at  all  costs,  and  to  possess  definitely  this 
ancient  capital  of  the  Osmanlis  (before  the  conquest  of 
Constantinople  by  Mahomet  II.). 

I  knew,  on  the  other  hand,  that  amongst  us — or  at 
least  our  Headquarters  Staff— a  rule  existed  about  a 
prohibited  area  round  the  Straits,  within  the  limits  of 
which  the  aspirations  of  no  matter  which  other  country 
would  not  be  tolerated  by  us ;  and  the  Bulgarians  had 
been  warned  of  this  about  1909.  Towards  the  end  of 
October,  when  all  Russia — not  excepting  official  Russia 
— was  hailing  the  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  victories  with 
enthusiasm,  and  when  the  famous  threat  of  the  Powers 
not  to  recognise   any  of  the  conquests   of  the  Balkan 


I9I2]  THE   PROHIBITED   AREA  123 

States  had  been  completely  forgotten  by  every  one,  1 
received  from  St.  Petersburg  instructions  to  remind 
the  Bulgarian  Government  of  the  rule  about  the  pro- 
hibited area,  or  in  other  words  to  warn  it  that  Russia 
would  not  allow  the  Bulgarians  definitely  to  occupy 
Adrianople  and  its  environs. 

These  instructions  placed  the  Russian  representative 
in  Sofia  in  a  very  awkward  position.  Bulgarian  public 
opinion,  as  I  said  above,  demanded  the  taking  and  the 
annexation  of  Odrine.  Moreover,  the  military  opera- 
tions which  were  developing  in  Thrace  showed  clearly 
that  if  such  a  formidable  fortress,  situated  at  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Maritza  and  the  Arda,  were  left  in  the  hands 
of  the  Turks,  the  establishment  of  the  Bulgarians  on 
the  shores  of  the  ^^gean  Sea  would  become  very  pre- 
carious. Now,  not  only  were  we  not  opposed  to  this 
establishment,  but  we  even  supported  it  up  to  a  point. 
Southern  Bulgaria  is  separated  from  the  ./Egean  Sea 
by  ranges  of  very  high  and  impassable  mountains : 
the  only  practicable  road  from  Philippopolis  towards 
the  shores  of  the  i£gean  Sea  follows  the  valley  of  the 
Maritza  in  a  south-crt'5/  direction  as  far  as  Lule- Burgas, 
and  from  there  it  turns  abruptly  to  the  south-zc^s/  and 
reaches  the  sea  at  Dedeagatch.  One  could,  if  necessary, 
make  the  road  from  Dedeagatch  end  above  Lule-Burgas 
but  not  above  Adrianople.  During  the  war  and  so  long 
as  Adrianople  held  out,  the  Bulgarians  could  not  even 
make  a  way  round  which  would  connect  the  two  sections 
of  the  Sofia-Constantinople  line,  as  topographical  con- 
ditions were  too  difficult.  1  could  well  imagine  what 
an  unfavourable  impression  our  communication  on  the 
subject  of  the  prohibited  area  would  produce,  and  how 
all  our  enemies  in  Bulgaria  would  hasten  to  profit 
by  it. 

But  other  reflections  were  added  to  this  one.  It  was 
evident  to  every  one  that  the  Turkish  Revolution  of 
1908  had  not  caused  the  political  scales  in  Constanti- 
nople to  turn  in  favour  of  England,  of  France,  and  still 
less  of  Russia.    German  influence  had  issued  triumphant 


124  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912       [chap.  ix. 

from  this  momentary  trial,  and  had  continued  to  reign 
on  the  shores  of  the  Bosphorus  up  till  the  day  when 
the  Balkan  war  broke  out.  At  this  very  moment  the 
fate  of  this  influence,  or  rather  of  this  taking  possession, 
was  at  stake.  If  Turkey  ended  by  losing  all  her  Euro- 
pean possessions,  except  Constantinople  and  the  strip 
of  land  absolutely  indispensable  to  the  defence  of  the 
Straits,  the  Turks  would  be  led  by  direct  evidence  to- 
understand  how  little  they  had  reaped  from  German 
influence  and  protection.  The  prestige  of  Germany  in 
the  Near  East  would  be  for  ever  compromised.  But 
there  would  be  more  in  it :  seeing  a  Bulgaria,  doubly 
strong  with  her  obstinate  people  and  her  immoderately 
ambitious  King,  rising  up  so  near  her  own  capital, 
Turkey  would  be  inclined  to  seek  the  protection  of 
those  who,  in  case  of  danger,  could  come  to  her  assist- 
ance directly  and  with  no  delay.  Now,  such  help  could 
only  be  brought  to  the  Turkish  capital  by  the  Fleet 
that  Russia  kept  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  by  the  troops  of 
Russian  origin  which  could  be  brought  up  in  a  few 
days  ;  on  the  Dardanelles  side  a  like  service  could  be 
rendered  to  Turkey  by  the  English  and  French  Medi- 
terranean Squadrons.  Such  a  situation  of  the  Powers 
of  the  Entente  in  Constantinople  would  naturally  not 
constitute  the  definite  solution  of  the  Eastern  question, 
but  it  would  hold  enormous  guarantees  for  us  in  the 
event  of  Germany  planning  to  provoke  a  collision  with 
Russia,  In  short,  I  considered  that  the  real  diminution 
of  Turkish  power  on  the  European  shores  of  the  Straits 
and  of  the  Sea  of  Marmara  would  bring  about  the 
downfall  of  German  iufluence  and  the  increase  of  our 
own.  The  world-wide  events  of  the  last  years  have 
confirmed  the  opinion  I  formed  then.  I  am  convinced 
that  if  in  1913  the  Turks  had  not  been  enabled  almost 
entirely  to  recover  their  former  frontier  with  Bulgaria, 
the  Young-Turk  regime  would  have  promptly  come  to 
an  end,  and  Turkey,  humiliated,  disillusioned  about 
German  benefits  and  constantly  threatened  on  the  Bul- 
garian  side,  would   never  have  dreamt  of  challenging 


I9I2]  RUSSIAN   CONCESSIONS  125 

Russia,  but  on  the  contrary  would   have  sought   our 
protection. 

Inspired  by  these  considerations  I  answered  the 
telegram  of  M.  Sazonoff,  who  enjoined  me  to  remind  the 
Bulgarians  of  our  rule  about  the  "prohibited  area," 
by  saying  that  I  considered  such  a  proceeding  most 
dangerous  to  our  influence  in  Bulgaria  and  to  our  future 
relations  with  the  country.  My  arguments  prevailed. 
A  few  days  later  I  received  another  telegram  in  which 
I  was  told  that  Russia  was  rescinding  her  prohibition 
on  the  subject  of  Adrianople,  and  was  recognising 
beforehand  between  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  a  frontier 
going  from  Midia  on  the  Black  Sea  to  Enos  on  the 
iEgean  Sea ;  this  frontier  effectually  gave  full  satisfaction 
to  the  justifiable  aspirations  of  the  Bulgarians.  1  was 
authorised  to  inform  the  Bulgarian  Government  of  the 
matter,  and  the  good  news  was  hurriedly  made  public. 
"  From  this  day  forward  there  are  no  more  Russophobes 
in  Bulgaria,"  I  wired  to  Sazonoff.  And  in  fact  the 
Russian  name  has  never  enjoyed  so  much  prestige  in 
Bulgaria  as  it  did  from  this  moment  until  the  untoward 
events  of  the  summer  of  1913. 

But  the  line  of  the  future  Turko-Bulgarian  frontier 
still  had  to  be  drawn  more  accurately.  I  considered 
that  it  ought  to  ascend  slightly  from  Midia  to  the 
environs  of  Lule-Burgas,  and  curve  again  southwards 
as  far  as  Enos,  so  as  not  to  go  too  near  the  Sea  ot 
Marmara.  But  our  military  agent,  who,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Bulgarian  victories,  had  arrived  at  a  paroxysm  of 
Bulgarophile  sentiments,  thought  we  ought  to  consent  to 
the  line  which  would  follow  the  course  of  the  Erghen, 
and  which  the  Bulgarian  General  Staff  favoured.  His 
opinion  prevailed  in  St.  Petersburg,  and  our  Head- 
quarters Staff,  who  but  a  month  before  were  insisting  on 
the  "  prohibited  area,"  were  now  giving  their  consent 
to  a  line  which  only  left  a  strip  of  land  about  forty 
kilometers  in  depth  for  the  "  hinterland  "  of  the  Straits. 

But  Ferdinand's  ambition  was  not  satisfied  with  this 


126  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912       [chap.  ix. 

concession.  Having  had,  with  a  heavy  heart,  to  give 
up  the  conquest  of  Constantinople,  he  began  from 
December,  1912,  obstinately  to  demand  the  extension  of 
the  new  Bulgarian  territory  to  the  shores  of  the  Mar- 
mara, the  inclusion  of  the  town  of  Rodosto,  and  the 
annexation  by  Bulgaria  of  two  islands  in  the  itgean 
Sea:  Samothrace  and  Thasos.  The  island  of  Samo- 
thrace,  close  to  the  exit  from  the  Dardanelles,  evidently 
tempted  Ferdinand  by  the  divine  classic  lines  of  its 
pearl-grey  rocks  rising  out  of  the  blue  sea;  thus  it 
met  his  gaze  from  Dedeagatch,  but  at  the  same  time 
this  island  is  so  near  the  Straits  that  if  necessary  it 
could  command  the  entry.  The  large  island  of  Thasos, 
separated  from  Kavala  only  by  a  narrow  arm  of  the  sea, 
forms  a  natural  complement  of  the  Macedonian  coast 
where  Bulgaria  was  going  to  establish  herself;  as  it 
possesses  vast  forests  this  island  could  be  very  useful 
to  its  new  owners.  Unfortunately  nearly  the  whole  of 
it  is  the  private  property  of  the  family  of  the  Khedives 
of  Egypt,  direct  descendants  of  the  lucky  native,  the 
celebrated  Mehmed  Ali.  Hence  the  annexation  of 
Thasos  could  only  be  effected  by  virtue  of  a  special 
arrangementwith  the  reigning  Khedive  and  consequently 
with  England  ;  and  the  latter  appeared  in  no  way  dis- 
posed to  deliver  into  the  unscrupulous  hands  of  the 
Bulgarians  the  beautiful  forests  of  Thasos  and  the 
mineral  riches  with  which  the  island  was  credited. 

Ferdinand's  entreaties  on  the  subject  of  Rodosto 
assumed  an  acute  character  during  the  last  months  of 
the  war.  The  King  repeatedly  sent  his  confidants  to 
me,  to  persuade  me  to  lend  my  help  to  the  arranging  of 
the  affair;  but  each  time  I  absolutely  refused  to  touch 
it.  Then  Ferdinand  wished  to  profit  by  a  journey  which 
the  Minister  of  Finance,  Todorov,  was  going  to  take  to 
St.  Petersburg — on  business  connected  with  his  depart- 
ment— and  he  gave  him  a  statement,  which  he  hoped 
would  be  passed  on  to  M.  Sazonoff,  and  which  showed 
the  absolute  necessity  for  Bulgaria  to  possess  the  town 
of  Rodosto  as  an   outlet  on  the  Marmara.     The   King 


I9I2]        GENERAL    DMITRIEV'S   MISSION  127 

availed  himself  of  this  opportunity  also  to  send  letters 
on  the  same  subject  to  his  friends  and  exalted  patrons 
in  St.  Petersburg,  and  Todorov  himself  was  to  endorse 
the  aspirations  of  his  master  in  our  country.  As  may 
be  supposed,  all  this  was  done  behind  my  back  ;  but 
Todorov,  who  has  always  been  sincere  with  me,  confided 
the  secret  to  me,  and  in  exchange  I  gave  him  the  friendly 
advice  not  to  make  himself  the  advocate  of  the  King's 
claims  on  the  subject  of  Rodosto  in  St.  Petersburg,  as 
these  claims  could  not  fail  to  create  an  unfavourable 
impression  amongst  us.  As  was  to  be  expected,  the 
reply  to  the  King  from  St.  Petersburg  was  to  the  effect 
that  there  could  be  no  question  of  Bulgaria  annexing 
Rodosto  or  any  other  point  on  the  Marmara. 

The  King,  however,  would  not  acknowledge  himself 
beaten.  Some  time  after  he  dispatched  to  St.  Peters- 
burg the  victor  of  Lule-Burgas,  General  Radko-Dmitriev, 
who  was  considered  by  us — and  rightly  so — to  be  quite 
devoted  to  Russia.  The  General  was  ordered  to  be 
persistent  with  the  Russian  Government  and  even  with 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  on  the  subject  of  Rodosto. 
He  was  also  told  to  be  careful,  when  leaving  Sofia,  that 
his  journey  and  the  object  of  this  journey  should  not  be 
known  to  me.  To  this  end,  the  General  was  not  even  to 
have  his  passports  vised  at  the  Russian  Legation  in 
Sofia,  but  by  our  consul  in  Rustchuk,  and  from  there 
he  was  to  travel  by  the  Bukharest-Odessa  line.  Having 
carried  out  these  instructions  with  regard  to  "  Russian 
diplomacy,"  Radko-Dmitriev,  however,  did  not  think  it 
possible  to  conceal  his  journe}^  and  the  object  of  this 
journey  from  his  comrade-in-arms,  our  military  agent  in 
Sofia ;  and  the  latter  -naturally  informed  me  of  it. 
Moreover,  Radko-Dmitriev's  journey  was  no  more 
successful  than  the  other  steps  taken  by  the  King  :  in 
St.  Petersburg  every  one  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the 
subject  of  Rodosto. 

When  he  had  abandoned  all  hope,  Ferdinand  re- 
solved to  leave  the  town  which  had  become  so  dear  to 
him  and  where  he  had  stayed  several  times  during  the 


128  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912        [chap.  ix. 

winter  months  of  1912-13.  But  befere  his  departure  he 
visited  the  cemeteryNvhere  lie  the  bones  of  some  of  the 
unsuccessful  actors  in  the  Hungarian  insurrection  of 
1848,  who  after  the  failure  of  their  efforts  had  taken 
refuge  in  Turkey  and  were  interned  at  Rodosto. 
Ferdinand  prayed  fervently  on  the  graves  of  the 
Magyar  national  heroes.  Sulking  with  Russia  he 
thought  it  a  well-chosen  moment  to  remember  his 
Kohary  ancestors  and  his  Hungarian  possessions.  .  .  . 
For  want  of  something  better  Rodosto  at  least  gave 
him  an  opportunity  of  parading  his  Magyar  sympathies  : 
who  knows  but  that  he  might  derive  some  profit  from 
this  parade? 

It  is  easy  to  realise  that  Ferdinand's  behaviour  after 
the  battle  of  Lule-Burgas  and  his  obstinate  proceedings 
on  the  subject  of  Rodosto  should  have  aroused  the 
displeasure  and  distrust  of  the  Russian  Government : 
his  insatiable  ambition  and  his  secret  schemes,  incom- 
patible with  the  historic  problems  and  vital  interests  of 
Russia,  stood  revealed.  In  mentioning  all  this  political 
intrigue  here,  I  am  anticipating  events  a  little.  The 
journeys  of  M.  Todorov  and  General  Radko-Dmitriev 
only  took  place  in  191 3,  but  Ferdinand's  intrigues  and 
the  steps  he  took  in  St.  Petersburg  form  the  natural 
sequel  to  the  attitude  adopted  by  him  ever  since 
November,  1912. 

From  December,  191 2,  when  the  success  of  the  allied 
arms  was  clearly  proved,  the  Turks  entered  into  negotia- 
tions for  peace.  For  this  purpose,  by  common  consent 
of  the  belligerents  and  of  the  Great  Powers,  a  Conference 
was  convened  in  London,  at  which  Bulgaria  was 
represented  by  M.  Danev.  An  armistice  was  decided 
on,  and  concluded  on  most  advantageous  conditions 
for  the   allies   and    particularly   for    the    Bulgarians ;  ^ 

1  Thus  the  Bulgarians  were  authorised  to  send  trains  full  of  provisions 
by  the  railway  line  which  goes  through  the  fortified  place  Adrianople, 
whereas  the  Turks  could  not  obtain  the  right  to  provision  the  garrison, 
which  was  already  beginning  to  suffer  from  hunger  ! 


I9I2]        THE   CONFERENCE   OF   LONDON  129 

afterwards  the  clauses  of  the  Peace  were  discussed. 
The  Turks  consented  to  give  up  the  whole  of  Thrace  to 
the  Bulgarians,  as  far  as  the  line  of  Midia,  Adrianople, 
Dedeagatch.  The  forts  of  Adrianople  were  to  be  razed 
to  the  ground,  and  the  Turks  even  yielded  to  the  Bul- 
garians the  railway  line  and  station  situated  three  or 
four  kilometers  from  the  town.  In  this  way  Adrianople 
would  only  be  nominally  in  the  power  of  the  Turks. 
Nevertheless,  the  Ottoman  plenipotentiaries  clung 
tenaciously  to  this  nominal  possession,  being  well 
aware  of  the  bitter  humiliation  which  would  be  felt  in 
the  Mussulman  world  if  the  ancient  capital  of  the 
Osmalis  in  Europe  with  its  celebrated  mosque  and  the 
tombs  of  the  Sultans,  ancestors  of  Mahomet  II.,  were  to 
be  handed  over  to  the  giaotws. 

The  negotiations  in  London  coincided  with  the 
reawakening,  on  the  part  of  the  Central  Empires,  of  the 
desire  to  limit  as  much  as  possible  any  territorial 
acquisitions  of  the  Balkan  Allies.  The  idea  of  an 
autonomous  Albania  was  suggested  and,  in  support  of 
this  idea,  Austria  began  to  bar  the  outlet  to  the 
Adriatic  to  the  Serbians,  an  outlet  which  the}^  had  just 
conquered  at  the  cost  of  enormous  sacrifices.  She  also 
vetoed  beforehand  the  annexation  by  Montenegro  of 
the  town  of  Scutari,  still  being  besieged  and  around  the 
walls  of  which  streams  of  the  noblest  Montenegrin 
blood  had  been  shed.  In  Rumania  an  agitation  was 
setting  in  on  the  subject  of  the  "  rectification  of 
frontiers "  in  Dobrudja,  and  even  amongst  the  Allies 
dangerous  dissensions  had  begun  and  were  increas- 
ing day  by  day.  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  misunder- 
standings between  Bulgarians  and  Greeks  ;  these  had 
broken  out  almost  simultaneously  with  the  war;  the 
question  of  Salonika  was  not  yet  settled  and  the 
Bulgarian  chauvinists  upheld  claims  which  enraged 
the  hearts  of  the  Greek  chauvinists.  Even  in  Serbia 
every  one  was  agitating  and  laying  down  the  principle 
that  the  Serbians  had  a  right  to  supplementary  com- 
pensations in  Macedonia  in   exchange    for   what   they 


130  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912       [chap.  ix. 

were  threatened  with  losing  on  the  Adriatic;  that  Bul- 
garia by  laying  a  hand  on  the  whole  of  Thrace  had 
received  more  than  she  expected  to  receive,  and  that  in 
return  she  ought  to  give  up  to  Serbia  a  part  of  the 
territory  she  had  acquired  by  the  treaty  of  February 
29th,  1912.  In  short,  one  foresaw  clearly  and  in  the 
immediate  future  a  conflict  of  interests  between  the 
Bulgarians  on  one  side  and  the  Serbians  and  the  Greeks 
on  the  other. 

In  view  of  this  tangled  situation  I  strongly  advised 
the  Bulgarian  ruling  powers  to  moderate  their  demands 
regarding  the  Turks,  and  to  patch  up  a  general  peace 
as  quickly  as  possible.  The  Bulgarians  could  insist  on 
all  their  territorial  claims  in  Thrace,  but  by  allowing 
the  Turks  free  access  to  Adrianople,  which  would 
represent  an  Ottoman  enclave  within  the  actual  limits  of 
the  town.  At  the  moment  the  Turks  would  have  been 
glad  to  conclude  peace  on  this  condition.  Gueshov 
shared  my  opinion  and  acted  on  it,  but  without  success. 
He  was  confronted  by  the  opposition  of  Danev,  of  the 
military,  and  of  the  King  himself,  who  was  willing  to 
give  up  Salonika,  but  who  wished  for  the  whole  of 
Thrace  with  its  ancient  capital  and  ardently  coveted 
Rodosto  and  Samothrace.  At  last  the  Turkish  plenipo- 
tentiaries in  London  were  induced  to  resign  themselves 
and  to  yield.  The  Bulgarians  received  Adrianople  and 
the  whole  of  Thrace  up  to  the  line  Midia-Enos.  But 
alas !  this  diplomatic  success  was  essentially  ephemeral 
and  only  existed  on  paper. 

The  intense  humiliation  undergone  by  Turkey  at 
the  London  Conference  was  the  signal  for  a  new  pro- 
nunctamento  from  Enver-Bey,  for  the  assassination  of 
Nazim-Pasha,  for  the  downfall  of  the  Grand  Vizier 
Kiamil-Pasha,  and  for  the  annulment  of  the  peace  con- 
ditions which  the  latter  was  already  prepared  to  sign. 

On  the  2ist  January  (4th  February),  191 3,  the  London 
Conference  paused  in  its  labours  and  the  Balkan  War 
broke  out  afresh.  I  had  then  a  very  strong  feeling  that 
this  foreboded  no  good  either  to  Bulgaria  or  to  the  Slav 


igi 


3]  FRESH    OUTBREAK   OF   WAR  131 


cause  generally.  The  unbounded  ambition  of  King 
Ferdinand  and  the  exaggerated  claims  of  his  subjects 
were  at  this  moment  preparing  the  destruction  of  the 
brilliant  edifice  of  Bulgarian  power,  which  had  been 
erected  with  the  rapidity  of  a  fairy-tale,  and  which  was 
to  fall  down  just  as  rapidly. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE    BALKAN    WAR,    I912    {cOHtillUCd) 

At  the  beginning  of  February,  191 3,  the  situation  was 
as  follows  :  the  war  between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan 
Allies  had  begun  again,  and  the  peace  conference  had 
suspended  its  sittings ;  but  the  ambassadors  of  the 
Great  Powers  in  London  continued  to  confer  on  the 
questions  relative  to  the  future  peace  and  to  the  definite 
distribution  of  the  Balkan  territories. 

In  reality  at  that  period  only  Bulgaria  and  Monte- 
negro had  any  interest  in  the  prolongation  of  the  war. 
The  Bulgarians  wished  to  take  Adrianople,  the  Monte- 
negrins Scutari.  The  two  other  allies  had  already 
gained  the  objects  for  which  they  had  taken  up  arms. 
Greece,  with  Crete  restored  to  her,  had  laid  hands  on 
all  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago — except  those  taken 
by  the  Italians  in  191 1 — and  was  occupying  Salonika, 
Chalcidice,  part  of  Southern  Macedonia,  and  Epirus,  the 
capital  of  which,  Janina,  surrendered  to  the  Greek  Army 
shortly  after  the  resumption  of  hostilities.  The  Serbians 
held  all  the  rest  of  Macedonia  and  Northern  Albania  with 
the  ports  of  San  Giovanni,  Medua  and  Durazzo  ;  and 
they  knew  perfectly  well  that  the  result  of  their  efforts 
and  sacrifices  did  not  depend  on  the  prolongation  of 
the  war  and  on  Turkish  demoralisation,  but  on  Austrian 
claims  and  chicanery.  Already  in  December,  1912,  when 
the  irreconcilable  opposition  of  Austria,  backed  up  by 
Germany,  to  the  establishment  of  the  Serbians  on  the 
shores  of  the  Adriatic  became  apparent,  Serbia  began 
to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  an  outlet  on  the  J£gea.n 
Sea  ;  for  that,  it  would  be  necessary  to  occupy  the  whole 
of  Western  Macedonia,  with  Monastir,  and  to  come  to 

132 


I9I3]  SERBIAN    DEMANDS  133 

an  arrangement  with  the  Greeks  for  absolutely  free 
transit  to  Salonika.  Such  a  combination  would  naturally 
constitute  a  violation  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement ; 
but  Belgrade  justified  this  by  saying  to  herself  that  the 
Bulgarians  would  be  compensated  to  a  great  extent  by 
the  annexation  of  Adrianople  and  of  the  whole  of  Thrace, 
as  far  as  the  Erghen,  a  conquest  they  had  not  dared  to 
dream  of  when  they  signed  their  agreement  with  the 
Serbians. 

I  remember  perfectly  well  the  day  on  which,  for  the 
first  time,  I  heard  my  colleague  Spalaikovitch  state  these 
claims.  It  was  a  foggy  afternoon  in  December,  and  I 
was  taking  my  usual  walk  along  the  highroad  of  Tsari- 
grad,  and  near  the  "  fourth  kilometre  " — the  usual  goal 
of  my  walks — I  met  Spalaikovitch  and  we  walked  back 
together  towards  the  town.  It  was  then  that  Spalaiko- 
vitch, complaining  bitterly  of  the  behaviour  of  the 
Bulgarians  towards  the  Serbians,  described  the  above- 
mentioned  combination  to  me.  I  was  very  unfavourably 
impressed  by  it ;  I  realised  the  fanaticism  with  which 
the  Bulgarians  looked  on  and  maintained  their  right  to 
that  part  of  Macedonia  allotted  to  them  by  the  agree- 
ment of  1912,  and  I  could  picture  the  storm  of  indigna- 
tion which  the  new  Serbian  claims  would  raise  in 
Bulgaria,  and  how  the  relations  of  alliance  between  the 
two  countries  would  immediately  change  into  bitter 
hostility.  Moreover,  a  treaty  is  a  treaty,  and  to  the  one 
signed  by  the  Serbians  and  Bulgarians  in  February, 
1912,  Russia  had  morally  set  her  seal;  this  agreement 
had  been  made  under  our  aegis,  and  we  had  taken  part 
in  it,  if  not  formally,  at  least  by  lending  the  support  ot 
our  sympathies  and  consent.  I  mentioned  all  these 
considerations  to  my  Serbian  colleague  and  entreated 
him — and  his  Government — not  to  "start  that  hare." 
But  Spalaikovitch  did  not  appear  to  be  too  willing  to 
listen  to  reason. 

Some  time  after,  when  the  coup  d'etat  of  Con- 
stantinople had  occurred  and  hostilities  were  beginning 
again,   the  trend  of  opinion  mentioned  above  became 


134  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

more  pronounced  in  Serbia.  The  Serbians  had  to 
make  fresh  sacrifices  in  men  and  money  for  an  object 
to  which  they  were  supremely  indifferent — for  the  siege 
of  Adrianople.  The  Bulgarians  had  hardly  any  heavy 
artillery;  the  Serbians,  on  the  contrary,  owing  to  the 
wise  foresight  of  M.  Pachitch,  were  fairly  well  supplied. 
The  Bulgarians  could  not  even  think  of  taking 
Adrianople  without  the  help  of  Serbian  artillery,  and 
without  the  co-operation  of  their  troops,  because  the 
Bulgarian  Army  was  scattered  between  the  positions 
of  Chataldja,  Bulair,  and  the  numerous  garrisons  in 
Southern  Macedonia,  where  they  had  to  oppose  the 
Greek  allies.  Also,  before  the  armistice  the  Serbians 
had  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  Bulgarians  before 
Adrianople  about  100  of  their  big  Creusot  guns  and 
two  divisions  of  infantry,  which  held  the  trench  against 
the  bastions  north  of  the  town,  which  were  by  far  the 
strongest  of  the  whole  defences.  With  the  resumption 
of  hostilities,  the  question  naturally  arose  as  to  whether 
the  Serbians  would  leave  these  forces  before  Adrianople. 
At  this  moment  the  Serbians  could  realise  clearly 
that  the  outlet  to  the  Adriatic  would  be  barred  to  them 
by  the  irreconcilable  opposition  of  Austria-Hungary. 
Russian  diplomacy,  which  for  a  long  time  had  sup- 
ported the  legitimate  aspirations  of  the  Serbians,  and 
at  the  London  conferences  had  upheld  Serbia's  right 
to  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic,  was  forced  at  last  to  give 
in  to  the  hostile  mood  not  only  of  Austria-Hungary, 
but  also  of  Germany.  M.  Sazonoflf  evidently  did  not 
wish  for  a  repetition  of  1909,  when  a  thinly-veiled 
ultimatum  from  Berlin  forced  us  to  change  our  course 
abruptly,  and  to  recognise  Austrian  claims.  In  the 
person  of  our  Ambassador  in  London,  Count  Bencken- 
dorf,  Russia  possessed  a  plenipotentiary  who  was 
energetic  as  well  as  extremely  well-informed.  At  the 
conferences  of  the  Ambassadors,  for  a  long  time  the 
Count  stubbornly  upheld  the  vital  interests  of  Serbia; 
but  when  he  saw  that  affairs  were  taking  an  acute  turn, 
and  that  the  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Asquith  and  Sir  Edward 


I9I3]  SERBIAN   CLAIMS  i35 

Grey,  determined  above  all  to  maintain  peace,  was  not 
disposed  to  uphold  to  the  end  the  just  aspirations  of 
the  Serbians — then  he  did  not  conceal  from  St.  Peters- 
burg that  henceforth  all  his  efforts  in  Serbia's  favour 
would  be  futile.  On  which  there  was  nothing  left  to 
us  but  to  persuade  the  Serbians  themselves  that  it  was 
necessary  to  yield  in  the  cause  of  universal  peace. 

The  position  of  the  Russian  Minister  in  Belgrade 
became  almost  impossible.  Whatever  his  personal 
influence  over  the  Serbians,  and  his  intimacy  with  the 
Court  and  the  party  in  power  may  have  been,  it  was  a 
very  arduous  task  to  make  the  Serbians  give  up  the 
long-wished-for  outlet  to  the  sea — after  the  sacrifices 
they  had  made,  and  the  victories  they  had  gained ! 
In  such  an  undertaking  M.  Pachitch's  authority,  firmly 
established  though  it  was,  the  popularity  of  the  new 
dynasty,  and  Russian  influence  in  Belgrade  might  well 
be  shipwrecked.  Therefore  it  would  be  unfair  to 
blame  M.  Hartwig  too  much  if,  in  order  to  get  out  of 
such  a  terribly  difficult  situation,  he  promised  the 
Serbians  to  uphold,  by  all  the  means  in  his  power,  their 
schemes  for  obtaining  an  outlet  to  Salonika  and  the 
JEgean  Sea.  It  was  then  that  Serbia's  stern  resolve 
took  shape,  to  keep  for  herself  Southern  Macedonia, 
and  to  remain  on  that  side  in  close  proximity  to  Greece. 
One  must  also  admit  that  during  the  whole  period  of 
military  operations,  the  Bulgarian  authorities  by  their 
greed,  their  lack  of  any  conciliatory  spirit,  and  their 
domineering  attitude,  had  roused  the  indignation,  not 
only  of  the  Greeks,  but  also  of  the  Serbians.  The 
latter  had  every  reason  to  hope  that,  once  masters  of 
Monastir,  and  neighbours  of  Greece,  they  would  easily 
obtain  free  and  direct  transit  to  Salonika;  on  the  other 
hand,  if  it  was  a  question  of  establishing  this  same 
transit  through  Bulgarian  territory,  one  might  justly 
fear  perpetual  difficulties  and  quibbles.  Hence,  a  com- 
munity of  interests  and  a  natural  solidarity  bound  the 
Greeks  and  the  Serbians  with  regard  to  Bulgaria. 

Already,  in  the  middle  of  January,  that   is  to  say 


136  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

before  the  resumption  of  hostilities,  Spalaikovitch  had 
come  one  day  to  tell  me  that  he  had  made  the  following 
suggestion  to  Belgrade :  the  Serbian  Government 
should  warn  the  Bulgarian  Government  that,  having 
no  longer  any  interest  in  the  continuation  of  the  war, 
Serbia  would  only  consent  to  leave  her  troops  and  her 
guns  before  Adrianople  in  return  for  supplementary 
compensations  in  Macedonia.  I  must  confess  that  this 
suggestion  pleased  me  enormously :  such  a  warning 
from  the  Serbian  Government  might  force  the  Bul- 
garians to  make  the  necessary  concessions,  and  thus 
hasten  the  conclusion  of  peace.  I  foresaw  already  that 
the  prolongation  of  the  war  might  become  fatal  to 
Bulgaria  first,  and  then  to  the  Slav  cause  in  general. 

Such  a  prolongation  would  constitute  a  menace  to 
the  peace  of  Europe.  In  the  course  of  about  six  weeks, 
the  Balkan  Allies,  astounding  Europe  by  the  rapidity 
of  their  successes,  had  managed — incredibile  dicta — to 
drive  the  Turks  definitely  out  of  Europe,  with  the 
exception  of  Constantinople  and  a  restricted  hinterland 
of  the  Straits.  It  was  imperative  to  confirm  these 
results  without  delay :  more  especially  because,  during 
the  short  space  of  time  that  the  armistice  had  lasted, 
Germany  and  Austria  had  pulled  themselves  together 
and  had  presented,  almost  in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum, 
their  demands,  which  were  so  unfair  to  Serbia  and  to 
Montenegro.  How  would  it  be,  then,  if  war  broke  out 
afresh,  and  if  the  differences  already  existing  in  the 
heart  of  the  Balkan  Alliance  were  to  become  more  acute 
and  more  palpable?  No,  it  was  high  time  to  confirm 
the  results  obtained,  in  comparison  with  which  the 
differences  of  the  Allies  appeared  to  me  to  take  a 
secondary  place. 

It  was  by  virtue  of  these  considerations  that  I 
approved  so  thoroughly  of  Spalaikovitch's  idea,  and  1 
awaited  his  answer  from  Belgrade  with  great  im- 
patience. A  few  da3^s  later  my  worthy  Serbian 
colleague,  in  a  very  unhappy  frame  of  mind,  came  to 
call  on   me :  M.   Pachitch  did  not  approve  of  his  idea 


I9I3]  M.   SPALAiKOVITCH'S   VIEWS  137 

at  all,  and  told  him  very  emphatically  not  to  mention 
it  to  any  one.  Evidently  Pachitch  considered  the  taking 
of  Adrianople  to  be  indispensable.  This  town,  and 
Thrace  as  far  as  the  Ergene,  to  Serbian  eyes  apparently, 
represented  for  the  Bulgarians  the  equivalent  of  what 
they  would  have  to  give  up  in  Macedonia.  I  concluded 
from  this  that  in  Belgrade  they  had  irrevocably  decided 
to  obtain  a  modification  of  the  demarcation  agreement 
of  1912,  and  especially  to  insist  on  the  Serbian  and 
Greek  frontiers  joining. 

News  came  very  soon  that  M.  Venizelos,  then 
omnipotent  Prime  Minister  of  Greece,  was  going  to 
Belgrade  to  confer  with  M.  Pachitch.  This  news 
caused  great  alarm  in  the  political  circles  of  Sofia, 
because  the  relations  between  the  Bulgarians  and  their 
Greek  allies  were  already  very  bad,  and  those  between 
the  Bulgarians  and  Serbians  were  palpably  changing 
for  the  worse.  Before  Adrianople  the  Serbian  and 
Bulgarian  soldiers  still  fraternised  willingly  enough ; 
but  the  officers  already  looked  askance  at  one  another, 
and  ended  by  forbidding  their  men  to  associate 
mutually;  but  I  ought  to  mention  that  the  initial  step 
of  this  odious  measure  was  taken  by  the  Bulgarian 
Headquarters  Staff  At  the  same  time,  in  Sofia, 
Spalaikovitch  no  longer  refrained  from  expressing  his 
displeasure  and  his  suspicions  with  regard  to  the 
Bulgarians.  He  was  extremely  outspoken  on  the 
subject,  especially  when  he  was  talking  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Entente.  One  of  the  conversations 
I  had  with  him  at  this  period  engraved  itself  deeply 
on  my  memory.  I  was  trying  to  persuade  him  that 
it  was  not  to  the  interest  of  the  Serbians  and  that  it 
was  even  very  dangerous  for  them  to  be  at  daggers 
drawn  with  the  Bulgarians.  "  I  admit,"  I  said  to 
Spalaikovitch,  "that  Serbia  has  been  cruelly  wronged 
compared  to  Bulgaria.  They  have  taken  from  her  the 
outlet  to  the  sea,  to  which  she  had  every  right  to  aspire, 
and  which  she  purchased  with  her  blood.  1  admit  also 
that  the   Bulgarians  have  made  territorial  acquisitions 


138  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

in  Thrace,  which  the}'  did  not  even  dare  to  hope  for 
when  they  took  up  arms.  All  that  is  quite  true.  But 
one  must  also  look  to  tiie  future.  The  Bulgarians  will 
have  nothing  more  to  gain,  whereas  the  Serbians  will 
have  all  their  historic  goals  before  them.  These  goals 
are  situated  in  the  west.  Sooner  or  later,  the  Serbians 
will  aspire  to  unite  all  Serbian  lands,  and  then,  if 
successful,  they  will  possess  a  splendid  coast,  inhabited 
by  Serbians  of  the  purest  race,  and  who  have  been 
experienced  sailors,  from  father  to  son,  whereas,  in  this 
respect,  the  Bulgarians  have  to  depend  on  Greeks  and 
Turks.  If  at  the  present  moment  you  contrive  to 
keep  intact  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance — even  at  the 
cost  of  real  sacrifices — the  achievement  of  your  great 
national  aims  is  already  half  guaranteed." 

"All  that  would  be  quite  true,"  replied  Spalaikovitch 
sharply,  "  if  the  Bulgarians  were  not  Bulgarians  and  if 
their  Tsar  was  not  Ferdinand.  Do  you  seriously  think 
that,  if  we  yield  to  them  in  everything  to-day,  they  will 
come  to  our  assistance  when  the  moment  arrives  for  us 
of  a  decisive  national  contest?"  "  No,  that  I  could  not 
guarantee,"  I  agreed ;  "  and  it  would  be  particularly 
difficult  to  expect  such  noble  behaviour  on  Ferdinand's 
part.  It  is  as  you  say.  But  on  the  other  hand,  if  to-day 
you  violate  the  agreement  and  if  you  succeed  in  keeping 
Southern  Macedonia,  to  the  detriment  of  the  claims  so 
long  matured  by  the  Bulgarians,  you  may  be  quite 
certain  that  at  the  moment  of  the  supreme  and  decisive 
contest,  Bulgaria  will  attack  you  from  behind.  And  in 
doing  so  the  Bulgarian  people  will  be  one  with  Ferdi- 
nand, for  you  know  the  essentially  vindictive  character 
of  the  Bulgarians." 

I  had  no  idea  at  the  time  that  my  prediction  would 
come  true  so  quickly. 

I  took  care  to  inform  M.  Sazonoff  of  my  conversa- 
tions with  Spalaikovitch,  and  to  warn  him  of  the 
storm  which  was  brewing  and  of  the  frame  of  mind 
of  the  Bulgarians  with  regard  to  it. 

During  the  first  week  in  March  M.  Venizelos  really 


I9I3]       M.  VENIZELOS  COMES  TO   SOFIA        i39 

went  to  Belgrade  and  held  long  conferences  with 
M.  Pachitch,  with  Hartwig  and  with  the  members  of 
the  Royal  Famil3^  From  Belgrade  the  Greek  President 
of  the  Council,  with  the  tact  and  courtesy  for  which  he 
is  noted,  announced  his  visit  to  Sofia,  undertaken  in 
order  to  confer  with  Bulgarian  statesmen.  He  was 
only  to  stay  exactly  one  da}-,  from  the  morning  to  the 
evening.  I  greatly  wished  to  make  the  acquaintance  of 
M.  Venizelos  and  to  converse  with  him,  but  I  foresaw 
that  the  Bulgarians,  under  pretext  of  the  too  short 
duration  of  the  visit,  would  try  to  conjure  mvay  the 
Greek  President  of  the  Council  from  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives, more  especially  from  the  Russian  one. 
Consequently  I  wrote  a  note  beforehand  to  my  worthy 
Greek  colleague,  M.  Panas,  to  beg  him  to  arrange  an 
interview  for  me  with  Venizelos.  We  arranged  that 
after  the  luncheon  that  the  Bulgarian  Ministers  were 
going  to  give  in  honour  of  their  guest  at  the  club  in 
Sofia,  Panas  should  escort  Venizelos  to  the  reading- 
room  of  the  club,  where  he  would  find  me  installed. 
This  was  done.  At  the  hour  agreed  on,  the  Greek 
Minister  led  M.  Venizelos  up  to  me,  introduced  us  to 
each  other,  and  then  left  us  alone.  We  began  our  con- 
versation without  losing  any  time. 

I  have  rarely  seen  a  man  who,  at  the  first  meeting, 
has  produced  such  a  favourable  impression  on  me  as 
M.  Venizelos  did.  An  astonishing  simplicity,  an  abso- 
lutely frank  and  open  way  of  expressing  his  opinions 
and  convictions — which  one  feels  to  be  deep — consti- 
tuted and  still  constitute  the  strength  and  the  prestige 
of  this  true  statesman.  I  felt  at  once  that  I  was  in  the 
presence,  first,  of  a  perfect  gentleman  and  then  of  a 
scrupulously  honest  politician.  No  phraseology,  no 
desire  to  deceive  his  questioner  were  apparent  in  the 
clear,  precise  and  modest  expression  of  his  thoughts. 
The  very  fact  that  he,  promptly  and  without  any  pre- 
amble, broached  the  principal  question — that  of  Greco- 
Bulgarian  demarcation — predisposed  me  enormously  in 
his  favour. 


140  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

Venizelos  began  by  telling  me  quite  openly  that  he 
had  not  yet  concluded  any  separate  alliance,  nor  any 
convention  with  the  Serbians.  Such  a  convention 
would  only  be  necessary  in  the  event  of  the  Bulgarians 
becoming  unreasonable  in  their  demands.  Then  on  a 
large  map  hanging  on  the  wall  of  the  room  we  began  to 
examine  the  possible  line  of  the  future  frontier.  In 
discussing  this  frontier  M.  Venizelos  laid  stress  only  on 
the  absolute  necessity  for  Greece  to  possess,  north  of 
Salonika  and  of  Chalcidice,  a  large  enough  hinterland 
adapted  to  the  efficacious  defence  of  these  new  terri- 
torial acquisitions;  west  of  Salonika  he  thought  it 
would  be  fair  to  extend  the  Greek  frontiers  as  far  as 
Fiorina,  inclusive.  Such  a  frontier  was  strategically 
sufficient  and  had  the  advantage  of  forming  a  fairly 
straight  line.  It  is  true  that  it  left  to  Greece  part 
of  the  Slav  population  of  Macedonia,  south  of  Mona- 
stir;  but  in  return  the  Bulgarians,  at  Seres,  Drama, 
Kavala,  etc.,  were  taking  over  populations  which 
were  entirely  Greek,  and  their  celebrated  tobacco 
plantations,  which  represented  the  great  riches  of  those 
parts. 

I  promised  Venizelos  to  endorse  as  far  as  possible  his 
opinion  among  the  Bulgarians,  and  more  especially  his 
outline  of  the  frontier  ;  but  I  made  a  few  reservations  on 
the  subject  of  some  localities  which  it  would  be  difficult 
to  persuade  the  Bulgarians  to  give  up.  "  Oh !  but  that 
can  always  be  settled  during  negotiations,"  remarked 
Venizelos  judiciously.  "  What  is  bad,  and  what  makes 
me  anxious,  is  the  fact  that  nothing  on  earth  will  induce 
the  Bulgarians  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  us,  as 
we  have  repeatedly  suggested  they  should  do.  They 
always  elude  the  subject,  as  if  they  were  on  the 
watch  for  fresh  occurrences  or  some  new  situation  ; 
and  yet  amongst  us  public  opinion  is  very  much  excited 
over  the  tone  of  the  Bulgarian  Press,  which  even 
disputes  our  possession  of  Salonika!" 

All  this  was  absolutely  true.  But  on  this  we  had  to 
close  our  interview,   M.   Venizelos    being   expected    at 


I9I3]  MY  ADVICE  TO   M.  GUESHOV  141 

the  Palace.  The  meeting  and  conversation  with  this 
eminent  Greek  statesman  left  not  only  an  agreeable 
impression  on  me,  but  also  a  tranquillising  one. 

The  next  day  I  went  to  see  Gueshov,  and  had  a  long 
conversation  with  him  on  the  subject  of  what  Venizelos 
had  said  to  me  the  evening  before.  I  impressed  most 
emphatically  on  the  Bulgarian  President  of  the  Council 
the  necessity  of  starting  negotiations  in  due  order  as 
soon  as  possible  with  the  Greek  Government,  and  of 
responding  to  the  wise  moderation  of  Venizelos  by 
prudent  concessions. 

"  If  the  policy  pursued  by  you  here  at  the  moment  is 
continued  for  two  or  three  months  more,  you  will  be  sur- 
rounded by  irreconcilable  enemies,"  I  said  to  Gueshov. 
"You  complain  of  the  Serbian  claims  and  of  their  inten- 
tion to  violate  the  treaty  signed  hardly  a  year  ago.  But 
if  you  settle  the  demarcation  question  definitely  and  in  a 
friendly  way  with  the  Greeks,  the  Serbian  claims  will 
naturally  diminish  ;  in  the  opposite  case  you  are  actually 
threatened  with  the  danger  of  a  defensive  and  even 
offensive  alliance  between  the  Greeks  and  the  Serbians, 
an  alliance  not  yet  concluded,  for  I  have  complete  trust 
in  Venizelos'  word — but  which  might  be  concluded  in 
the  immediate  future.  Besides  this,  you  seem  to  have 
completely  forgotten  your  relations  with  Rumania,  who 
looks  on  the  increase  of  Bulgarian  power  as  a  real 
menace  to  her.  And  you  must  surely  realise  that  even 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  the  Turks  will  bear  malice 
for  ages,  not  against  all  their  conquerors  collectively, 
but  almost  entirely  against  the  Bulgarians,  as  being  the 
strongest  and  the  nearest — hence  the  most  dangerous  of 
their  neighbours.  Do  try  to  divide  the  difficult  political 
problem  with  which  you  are  faced  into  several  parts, 
and  to  solve  at  least  one  definitely.  It  is  lucky  for  you 
that  at  the  head  of  Greek  policy  at  the  moment  there 
should  be  a  man  so  essentially  moderate  and  wise  as 
Venizelos.  You  ought  promptly  to  take  advantage 
of  this  good  luck  before  Greece  gets  into  such  a  state 
of  ferment  that    neither   Venizelos    nor    King   George 


142  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912        [chap.  x. 

himself-also  an  essentially  moderate  man — will  be  able 
to  calm  her." 

M.  Gueshov,  who  was  listening  to  mo  with  bowed 
head,  was  silent  for  a  while,  and  tlien  replied : 
"M.  Nekludoff,  I  have  thought  over  all  this  myself 
for  a  long  time,  and  I  must  confess  that  I  entirely 
share  your  opinion.  .  .  ."  "Then  it  is  King  Ferdinand 
who  is  against  an  arrangement  with  Greece  ? "  I 
interrupted.  "  No,"  replied  M,  Gueshov  somewhat 
sharply;  "as  far  as  I  know,  His  Majesty  would  be  very 
willing  to  converse  and  to  come  to  terms  with  Athens. 
But  Danev,  whose  attitude  to  London  is  so  irrecon- 
cilable; and  some  of  his  partisans  here  .  .  .  and  the 
military.  Do  not  forget  that  the  present  Cabinet  is  a 
Coalition  Cabinet.  On  such  a  serious  question  I  cannot 
dissociate  myself  from  Danev." 

"But  surely,"  I  exclaimed,  "the  question  is  so 
serious  that  you  have  every  right  to  appeal  to  the  King, 
as  to  a  supreme  authority.  If  His  Majesty  the  King 
and  you,  as  President  of  the  Council  and  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  can  agree  on  this  question,  Danev  will 
be  obliged  to  give  in  !  As  you  know,  I  should  be  the 
last  person  to  encourage  the  perpetual  and  uncontrolled 
interference  of  King  Ferdinand  in  questions  of  the 
Home  and  Foreign  Policy  of  Bulgaria ;  but  given  the 
exceptional  circumstances  an  appeal  to  the  King's 
decision  would  be  quite  natural ;  it  is  done  in  most 
constitutional  countries." 

"  It  is  easy  to  talk,  M.  Nekludoff,"  replied  Gueshov 
with  a  deep  sigh,  "  but  do  you  know  that  it  is  more 
than  six  weeks  since  I  have  seen  my  constitutional 
sovereign  ?  Under  one  pretext  or  another  he  avoids 
interviews  and  conversations  with  me.  When  he  wants 
anything,  he  writes  me  a  little  note,  or  even  sends  me 
his  question  or  his  opinion  verbally  through  his  private 
secretary,  M.  Dobrovitch,  and  I  am  expected  to  answer 
in  the  same  way.  No  business  can  be  done  like  that, 
and  I  am  more  and  more  inclined  to  send  in  my 
resignation  !  " 


I9I3]  FERDINAND'S   EVASIVENESS  143 

I  tried  fervently  to  dissuade  Gueshov  from  taking 
such  a  step  ;  but  in  my  heart  of  hearts  I  could  not  help 
agreeing  that  indeed  things  could  not  go  on  like  that, 
and  that  such  an  abnormal  situation  would  finally  lead 
to  disastrous  consequences  for  the  country. 

King  Ferdinand  was  not  hiding  himself  only  from 
Gueshov  at  this  period.  I  have  already  mentioned  the 
curious  state  of  things  existing  at  his  headquarters, 
which  he  hardly  left  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
During  the  month  of  December  he  began  coming  more 
frequently  to  Sofia,  but  he  remained  invisible  and  in- 
accessible there.  More  especially  did  he  hide  himself 
carefully  from  the  diplomats  accredited  to  his  person, 
thinking— and  not  without  foundation — that  these  latter 
would  endeavour  to  give  him  the  advice  of  their  Govern- 
ments, which  he  was  not  at  all  inclined  to  listen  to. 

Since  the  King's  Jubilee  and  the  festivities  at  Tir- 
nova  (in  August,  1912)  and  up  to  April,  1913,  I  had  the 
honour  of  catching  sight  of  the  King  twice  only,  and 
both  times  in  the  cathedral;  the  French  Minister  saw 
him  once  at  the  Palace,  and  the  German  Minister  once 
also  at  the  Royal  villa  of  Vrana  (near  Sofia) ;  all  the 
other  Ministers  also  saw  him  once  in  the  cathedral,  and 
that  is  all.  My  two  meetings  with  Ferdinand  took  place 
as  follows:  on  the  ist  (14th)  January,  1913,  I  went  to 
the  Sofia  cathedral,  according  to  the  Orthodox  custom, 
to  attend  High  Mass  and  the  Tc  Dcmn  for  the  New 
Year.  In  previous  years  all  the  Diplomatic  Corps 
appeared  in  full  dress  at  the  Tc  Dcitm,  by  special  invi- 
tation from  the  Court ;  after  the  Te  Dcuui  the  King 
came  to  talk  to  the  foreign  Ministers  and  to  exchange 
with  them  good  wishes  for  the  New  Year ;  in  the 
evening  a  dinner  at  the  Palace  was  given  to  the  Diplo- 
matic Corps,  at  which  the  senior  member  made  a  con- 
gratulatory speech  to  the  King.  On  this  occasion  there 
was  no  invitation  from  the  Court,  and  we  were  not  even 
certain  if  His  Majesty  was  in  Sofia. 

Just  before  the  Tc  Dcmn  began  the  King  made  his 


144  THE   BALKAN   WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

entr^'^  into  the  cathedral  in  a  khaki  uniform,  which,  by 
the  way,  did  not  suit  him  at  all !  The  service  over,  he 
hurried  up  to  me,  shook  hands  with  me  and  said  that 
he  greatly  regretted  not  to  see  my  colleagues. 

"  We  have  received  no  official  invitation,  sir,"  I  said 
to  the  King. 

"Oh !  there  has  doubtless  been  some  mistake,"  replied 
P^erdinand  sharply.  "  Please  tell  all  your  colleagues 
this,  and  convey  to  them  my  best  wishes  for  the  year 
just  beginning." 

Having  exchanged  congratulations  and  good  wishes 
with  me,  the  King  left  the  cathedral. 

The  second  time  I  saw  Ferdinand  was  at  the  Requiem 
Mass  for  King  George  of  Greece,  who  had  been  assas- 
sinated at  Salonika  by  an  insane  Greek  anarchist  on  the 
6th  (19th)  March.  When  this  sad  news  was  known,  the 
Court  of  Sofia  ordered  a  Solemn  Mass  to  be  held  in 
the  Sofia  Cathedral,  to  which  all  the  Diplomatic  Corps, 
in  full  dress,  were  invited.  The  service  over,  the  King, 
who  appeared  to  be  genuinely  moved,  went  up  to  the 
Greek  Minister,  and  talked  for  some  time  with  him, 
expressing  his  condolences.  Then  passing  the  other 
Ministers  by,  Ferdinand  sprang  towards  me,  seized 
my  hand,  and  keeping  it  in  his,  repeated :  "  M.  Neklu- 
doff,  it's  horrible !  .  .  .  it's  horrible !  .  .  .  horrible !  .  .  . 
horrible ! " 

Now,  for  some  weeks  and  even  months,  I  had  tried 
in  vain  to  obtain  an  audience  of  the  King,  or  at  least 
to  seize  an  opportunity  to  present  to  his  Majesty  my 
newly-appointed  Counsellor  to  the  Legation,  M.  Sabler. 
Very  little  impressed  by  the  King's  manner,  I  was  not 
going  to  allow  the  opportunity  to  escape  of  at  last  in- 
troducing my  chief  collaborator  to  him  :  "  Sir,  allow  me 
to  present  to  Your  Majesty  the  new  Counsellor  to  the 
Russian  Legation,  M.  Sabler." 

The  King,  with  an  angry  frown,  drew  his  hand  away 
from  mine  and  held  it  out  to  M.  Sabler — who  bowed 
low — and  went  on  repeating :  "  It's  horrible  .  .  .  hor- 
rible !  .  .  .  horrible ! " 


I9I3]  FERDINAND'S   AUDIENCES  <45 

"  M.  Sabler  is  the  son  of  the  Procurator  of  our 
Holy  Synod";  I  went  on  with  my  introduction  without 
allowing  myself  to  be  the  least  perturbed. 

"Horrible!  .  .  .  horrible!  .  .  .  horrible!"  continued 
the  King,  casting  at  Sabler,  who  was  much  dis- 
concerted at  this  reception,  such  stern  glances  that 
one  would  have  thought  that  he  suspected  him — or 
even  his  pious  and  illustrious  father — of  having  parti- 
cipated in  the  abominable  assassination  at  Salonika. 
Then  calling  out  to  me  once  more  his  "horrible!  .  .  . 
horrible  !  .  .  .  horrible ! "  the  King  hurriedly  left  the 
cathedral. 

In  February,  191 3,  after  the  election  of  M.  Poincare, 
the  French  Minister  was  to  present  to  the  King — 
according  to  etiquette — an  autograph  letter  from  the 
new  President  of  the  Republic.  After  three  weeks  of 
negotiations  and  delays,  M.  de  Panafieu  was  at  last 
granted  an  audience.  I  naturally  was  interested  to 
know  what  the  King  would  tell  him  during  this  audience, 
and  my  French  colleague,  with  whom  I  was  very 
intimate,  promised  to  call  on  me  on  leaving  the  Palace. 

"  Well,  and  how  did  your  audience  go  off?  What 
did  the  King  say  to  you?"  I  asked  M.  de  Panafieu,  who 
came  to  me  at  the  hour  agreed  on. 

"  His  Majesty  was  excessively  kind  and  amiable," 
replied  my  colleague,  smiling.  "  He  kept  me  for  half 
an  hour,  and  this  half-hour  was  taken  up  by  a  mono- 
logue, bright  and  charming,  from  the  King  !  He  spoke 
of  his  recent  journey  to  Paris  (in  1910),  of  M.  Fallieres, 
of  the  way  in  which  he  had  made  the  acquaintance  of 
the  present  President,  even  of  the  scientific  studies  of 
the  President's  cousin,  Poincare  the  mathematician ;  in 
short,  he  tried  not  to  let  me  get  in  a  word,  afraid  evi- 
dently that  I  might  try  and  put  in  a  question  or  a  remark 
of  a  political  nature.  When  the  half-hour  was  over,  he 
dismissed  me  with  the  same  studied  friendliness;  and 
here  I  am  !  " 

The  German  Minister,  Herr  von  Below,  was  invited 
by  the  King  to  a  tcte-a-Ute  luncheon  with  him  at  Vrana, 


146  THK    BAIJ<AN    WAR,    1912        [chap.  x. 

his  new  country  house  near  Sofia  :  this  was  in  April,  1913. 
My  German  colleague,  who  was  on  the  best  of  terms 
with  me  throughout  our  time  in  Sofia,  told  me  about 
this  himself,  adding  that  the  object  of  his  interview  with 
the  King  and  of  their  conversation  had  been  the  affairs 
and  private  concerns  of  Queen  Eleanor,  Jiic  Princess  of 
Reuss. 

I  think,  however,  that  I  am  justified  in  asserting  that 
von  Below's  interview  with  the  King,  which  took  place 
at  Vrana,  on  purpose  so  that  the  Sofia  public  should 
not  know  about  it  or  comment  thereon — was  of  quite  a 
different  nature  from  the  forced  meetings  of  His  Majesty 
with  me  and  with  M.  de  Panafieu.  If  the  information  I 
received  on  the  subject  from  a  strictly  confidential 
source  is  true,  Herr  von  Below  received  from  Berlin 
the  order  to  communicate  to  the  King  that  Germany 
was  willing  to  uphold  the  Bulgarian  cause  against  the 
Serbians  and  the  Greeks,  if  only  the  Bulgarians  would 
consent  to  come  to  friendly  terms  with  the  Turks  on 
the  subject  of  Adrianople,  and  would  lessen,  generally 
and  in  a  tangible  way,  their  claims  in  Thrace.  This  is 
what  the  German  Minister  had  discussed  with  the  King 
after  luncheon  at  Vrana.  This  proposition,  coming 
after  the  capture  of  Adrianople  by  the  Bulgarians,  was 
declined  by  Ferdinand  as  well  as  by  his  Government, 
who  had  been  much  startled  at  it.  When  the  Bul- 
garians were  beaten  by  their  former  allies  Germany 
remembered  this  refusal  of  Ferdinand's,  and  not  only 
prevented  Austria  from  going  to  his  assistance  against 
the  Serbians,  but  further  lent  her  most  essential  political 
support  to  Turkey,  who  had  just  occupied  Adrianople 
and  Kirk-Kilisseh  without  striking  a  blow.  But  the 
information  on  the  subject  of  this  German  step  only 
reached  me  long  after  it  had  been  taken — that  is  to  say, 
during  the  winter  of  191 3-14. 

As  1  said  above,  Bulgaria  during  the  last  months  of 
the  year  was  the  object  of  the  suspicions  and  complaints 
not  only  of  her  allies  but  also  of  Rumania.  For  the 
Rumanians,  the  sudden  rise  and  increase  of  power  of 


I9I3]  RUMANIAN    FEARS  147 

Bulgaria  not  only  constituted  a  sharp  blow  to  their 
amour-propre  but  also  an  undoubted  menace.  During 
the  whole  Balkan  war  Rumania  had  unflinchingly  per- 
formed her  duties  as  a  neutral,  allowing  free  passage 
through  her  territory  for  all  munitions  which  the 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  works  sent  to  Turkey 
via  the  Black  Sea,  where  the  Bulgarians,  whose  naval 
forces  were  inadequate,  could  not  sink  or  seize  the 
Turkish  transports.  It  can  easily  be  imagined  that  such 
a  way  of  proceeding  would  not  exactly  predispose  the 
Bulgarians  in  Rumania's  favour,  even  if  between  the 
two  nations  there  had  not  been  another  cause  for 
rivalry  and  mutual  displeasure.  But  this  cause  existed. 
In  1878,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Turkish 
Peace,  the  Bulgarian  chauvinists  had  expressed  their 
displeasure  at  Russia  giving  part  of  the  Dobrudja  as 
far  as  the  forts  of  Silistria  to  the  Rumanian  Principality 
in  exchange  for  that  part  of  Bessarabia  close  to  the 
Danube  which  had  been  taken  from  Russia  by  the  treaty 
of  1856.  According  to  the  Bulgarians,  Russia,  although 
taking  back  all  the  southern  part  of  Bessarabia,  ought 
to  give  the  whole  of  the  Dobrudja  to  Bulgaria  and  thus 
become,  across  the  mouths  of  the  Danube,  the  imme- 
diate neighbour  of  the  Slav  Principality  which  she  had 
just  created.  The  Rumanians,  on  the  contrary,  were  of 
opinion  that  Russia  ought  to  leave  Southern  Bessarabia 
to  them,  adding  to  it,  as  a  reward  for  having  "  saved  the 
Russian  Army  at  Plevna,"  the  whole  of  the  Dobrudja  with 
Silistria  and  Tutrukan  and  nearly  as  far  as  Varna.  The 
two  sides  founded  their  exclusive  claims  to  the  Dobrudja 
on  ethnographical  principles.  According  to  the  Bulgarian 
version,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Dobrudja  is  peopled  with 
Bulgarians ;  according  to  the  Rumanians  it  is  inhabited 
solely  by  Rumanians.  In  reality,  this  province  repre- 
sents the  same  motley  mixture  of  population  as  Southern 
Bessarabia  :  Turks,  Gagailzi,  Tatar-Budjaks,  Tziganes, 
and — in  the  towns — Armenians,  Greeks  and  Jews,  make 
up  with  Rumanians,  Bulgarians  and  Russians  of  the 
Old  Faith,  the  population  of  the  Dobrudja,  which  in  its 

L 


148  THE    BALKAN    WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

northern  part  suffers  from  scarcity  of  water  and  is  very 
thinly  populated,  but  on  its  southern  side  possesses 
beautiful  fertile  slopes  and  many  forests.  In  1879  the 
Bulgarians  received  just  this  fertile  part  of  the  Dobrudja 
— the  forest  of  Deli-Orman — where  there  are  a  few 
rich  Turkish  villages.  Gradually,  in  consequence  of 
the  usual  migration  of  a  l\irkish  population  from 
places  where  it  has  ceased  to  be  the  predominant  caste 
and  in  consequence  of  all  kinds  of  administrative 
trickery  practised  by  the  Bulgarians,  the  larger  part  of 
Deli-Orman  passed  into  the  hands  of  Bulgarian  peasants, 
of  which  many  had  become  fairly  wealthy  proprietors. 
When  this  land  passed  into  these  grasping  but  hard- 
working hands  the  fertility  of  the  soil  increased  to  such 
an  extent  that  about  1910  the  department  of  Dohritch 
(Hadji-Oglu-Pazardjik)  produced  nearly  one-sixth  of 
the  Bulgarian  cereals.  One  can  understand  that,  as 
good  neighbours,  the  Rumanians  would  in  no  way 
have  been  against  appropriating  such  fertile  ground. 
At  the  same  time  they  considered  that  it  would  be  only 
fair  if  the  Bulgarians— having  in  191 2  acquired  such  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  coast  with  ports  situated 
not  only  on  the  Black  Sea  but  also  on  the  iEgean — were 
to  give  up  to  Rumania  a  small  part  of  their  former 
coast,  if  only  up  to  the  port  of  Kavarna  inclusive.  It 
could  not  indeed  be  denied  that  Rumania  did  effectually 
suffer  from  a  lack  of  maritime  outlets  and  had  con- 
sequently a  natural  desire  to  enlarge  her  coast  line. 
These  were  the  reasons  why  the  Rumanians  in  1913 
considered  themselves  morally  authorised  to  present 
claims  to  Bulgaria  on  the  subject  of  the  cession  of 
Silistria  and  of  a  strip  of  land  as  wide  as  possible  in 
the  Dobrudja. 

The  fulfilment  of  the  Rumanian  wishes  naturally 
mainly  depended  on  the  attitude  of  the  Great  Powers, 
for,  since  the  convocation  of  the  London  Conferences, 
the  definite  settlement  of  the  Balkan  imbroglio  had 
passed  into  the  hands  of  Europe,  and  the  further 
successes  of  the  Allies  could  only  effect  slight  modifi- 


I9I3]  M.   ROSETTI-SOLESCO  149 

cations  in  the  final  results  of  the  war.  It  was  to  the 
interest  of  those  amongst  the  Powers  who  displayed 
goodwill  to  the  Balkan  Allies  that  the  differences 
between  Bulgaria  and  Rumania  should  not  culminate 
in  a  collision  which  might  rekindle  the  fire  which 
fortunately  had  been  dying  down.  A  great  deal 
depended  on  the  position  taken  up  by  Russia  on  this 
question. 

During  the  last  ten  years  which  preceded  the  Balkan 
War,  our  relations  with  Rumania  had  begun  to  change — 
although  in  a  way  as  yet  imperceptible  to  the  public  at 
large  and  to  the  Press — and  to  show  steady  improve- 
ment. 

Since  the  year  1890,  the  post  of  Rumanian  Minister 
to  St.  Petersburg  had  been  held  by  M.  Rosetti-Solesco 
who,  while  still  Secretary  to  the  Legation,  had  married 
the  daughter  of  our  former  Foreign  Secretary,  M.  N. 
de  Giers.  Rosetti,  an  intelligent  and  energetic  man 
(although  sometimes  rather  restless  in  his  energy), 
enjoyed  the  confidence  and  the  protection  of  King 
Charles,  who  had  entrusted  him  with  the  task  of  im- 
proving Russo-Rumanian  relations  as  much  as  was 
possible. 

His  wife,  who  was  a  Russian,  did  all  in  her  power  to 
support  her  husband  in  this,  and  made  great  use  of  her 
large  circle  of  relations  and  friends.  But  this  was  not 
all :  in  1902  Madame  Rosetti's  brother,  M.  Michel  de 
Giers  (Ambassador  to  Constantinople  since  1912  and  at 
the  moment  in  Rome),  was  appointed  Russian  Minister 
to  Bukharest.  During  ten  consecutive  years  the  work 
of  M.  de  Giers — work  which  was  persevering,  silent  and 
earnest — was  directed  to  the  same  object :  that  of  the 
improvement  of  Russo-Rumanian  relations.  Michel  de 
Giers,  who  throughout  his  career  remained  imbued  with 
feelings  of  absolute  devotion  to  the  person  of  the 
Monarch  (he  had  inherited  these  feelings  from  his 
father),  in  return  justly  possessed  the  special  goodwill 
and  confidence  of  Nicolas  II.     Under  these  conditions 


150  THE    BALKAN    WAR,    1912         [chap.  x. 

it  is  not  surprising  that  tiie  opinions  ot  our  Minister  in 
Rumania  were  often  adopted  and  towards  the  end  of  his 
stay  in  Bukharest  he  could  prove  with  legitimate  satis- 
faction that  he  had  not  laboured  in  vain. 

At  the  beginning  of  1912  M.  Michel  de  Giers  was 
given  the  exalted  post  of  Russian  Ambassador  to  Con- 
stantinople, and  was  succeeded  in  Bukharest  by  a  young 
and  brilliant  diplomat,  M.  Nicolas  Schebeko.  Schebeko, 
who  belonged  to  the  most  influential  aristocratic  circles 
of  St.  Petersburg,  had  begun  life  in  a  regiment  of 
Guards,  and  then,  entering  the  diplomatic  service,  had 
been  appointed  Secretar}^  to  the  Embasy  in  Vienna, 
where  Prince  Lobanoff  was  then  Ambassador.  Un- 
doubtedly gifted  and  possessing  moreover  the  advantage 
of  very  firm  convictions,  Schebeko,  after  a  few  years  in 
the  diplomatic  service  spent  in  the  capitals  of  Western 
Europe,  was  appointed  Counsellor  to  the  Embasy  in 
Berlin,  where  our  venerable  and  respected  Ambassador, 
Count  Osten-Sacken,  was  nov/ ending  his  career  and  his 
days.  The  young  Counsellor  often  had  to  replace  his 
chief  for  months  at  a  time,  and  this  gave  him  an 
opportunity  of  proving  his  real  capabilities.  The 
appointment  of  M.  Schebeko  to  Bukharest,  and  more 
especially  the  fact  that  he  had  accepted  this  appointment, 
proved  that  St.  Petersburg  set  a  price  on  good  relations 
with  Rumania  and  the  Rumanian  Court.  The  matri- 
monial schemes  of  which  Sazonoff  had  spoken  to  me  had 
evidently  taken  root  in  Rumania  as  well  as  in  our  country 
and,  in  this  case,  no  one  could  be  of  more  use  than 
Schebeko  and  his  charming  wife  as  authorised  and 
discreet  intermediaries  between  the  two  Courts. 

The  appointment  of  the  new  Russian  Minister  to 
Rumania  coincided,  it  is  true,  with  a  somewhat  dis- 
agreeable incident  from  the  diplomatic  point  of  view — 
the  commemoration  of  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest  of  1812 
and  of  the  annexation  of  Bessarabia.  Amongst  us,  this 
jubilee  was  only  an  occasion  for  a  few  local  ceremonies 
of  an  administrative  character  and  for  a  few  articles 
in  the  newspapers.     But  in  Rumania  there  were  some 


I9I3]    ANNEXATION   OF   BESSARABIA,  1812     151 

fairly  important  patriotic  demonstrations  and  the 
Rumanian  Press  sounded  its  loudest  trumpets  to  pro- 
test against  Russian  spoliation  which  had  deprived 
Rumania  of  one  of  her  most  beautiful  integral  parts ! 
All  this,  to  be  sure,  was  rather  far-fetched;  in  18 12 
there  was  as  yet  no  "Rumania,"  but  only  "  Danubian 
Principalities,"  abominably  governed,  exploited  and 
often  invaded  by  the  Turks,  and  where  the  earlier 
mediaeval  patriotism  had  given  place  to  complete 
atrophy  and  demoralisation.  In  a  word,  the  inhabitants 
of  the  part  of  Moldavia  annexed  by  Russia  were  con- 
gratulating themselves  very  heartily  on  this  change  of 
thraldom :  the  Russia  of  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  seemed  to  these  poor  people  a  real 
paradise  of  political  liberty,  in  comparison  with  the 
yoke  and  despotism  they  had  borne  up  till  then.  More- 
over Alexander  I.,  with  his  usual  coquetry  towards 
every  new  arrival,  had  heaped  privileges  on  the  annexed 
Bessarabia:  exemption  from  several  taxes,  complete 
exemption  from  military  service,  nobility-rights,  titles 
in  profusion  and  high  official  posts  given  to  the  govern- 
ing classes  of  the  country,  etc.,  with  the  result  that  a 
few  short  years  had  sufficed  to  make  Bessarabia  into 
one  of  the  Russian  provinces  which  was  the  most 
faithful  and  the  most  devoted  to  the  Imperial  auto- 
cracy. The  Rumanian  chauvinist  Press,  of  course^ 
ignored  all  these  details.  For  their  ends  it  was  neces- 
sary to  describe  this  taking  possession — accomplished 
so  peacefully  and  almost  imperceptibly  on  the  spot,  as 
every  one  was  so  accustomed  to  seeing  the  Russians 
occupying  the  country — as  a  kind  of  Mongolian  in- 
vasion, or  as  the  conquest  of  Gaul  by  the  Franks  or 
(as  we  should  say  now)  the  Boche  occupation  of 
Belgium. 

Fortunately  these  demonstrations  in  no  way  affected 
our  relations  with  Rumania.  Our  Government  and 
particularly  our  Foreign  Office  pretended  not  to  notice 
all  this  fuss,  knowing  perfectly  well  that  it  was  not 
serious,  and  that  after  these  chauvinist   fireworks  we 


152  THE   BALKAN    WAR,    1912        [chap.  x. 

could  resume  the  cultivation  of  good  and  even  intimate 
relations  between  the  two  countries. 

The  new  Russian  Minister  wrote  and  acted  on  these 
lines,  and  was  successful.  During  this  same  yean 
H.I.M.  the  Emperor  sent  the  Grand  Duke  Nicolas 
Mikhailovitch  (brother  officer  and  intimate  friend  of 
M.  Schebeko's)  to  King  Charles  of  Rumania  to  present 
to  him  the  baton  of  Russian  Field-Marshal.  The  old 
King  was  much  flattered  by  this  high  distinction,  which 
carried  him  back  to  the  glorious  days  when  he  was  in 
command  at  the  siege  of  Plevna  and  made  the  celebrated 
Osman  Pasha  prisoner. 

This  whole  episode  proves  that  in  our  country  we 
were  quite  capable  of  smoothing  away  difficulties  and 
avoiding  causes  for  discord  based  on  exaggerated 
nationalism,  zvJien  ive  unshed  to.  When  we  did  not  do  so, 
it  was  because  we  did  not  care  to. 

At  the  beginning  of  1913,  when  the  Rumanian  claims 
with  regard  to  Bulgaria  were  taking  shape,  M.  Sazonoff 
thought  it  opportune  not  to  contest  fundamentally 
the  Rumanian  point  of  view,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to 
support  it  up  to  a  point,  and  then,  taking  the  question 
into  our  own  hands,  to  solve  it  in  a  way  which,  while  not 
wronging  Bulgaria  too  much,  would  procure  some 
compensations  for  Rumania.  Consequently,  I  received 
instructions  to  obtain  the  Bulgarians'  consent  to  the 
action  which  the  Rumanians  were  bringing  against 
them  being  examined  in  St.  Petersburg  by  the  Ambas- 
sadors of  the  Powers,  presided  over  by  M.  Sazonoff. 
This  was  no  easy  task  for  me ;  the  Bulgarians  not 
unreasonably  retorted  that  no  litigation  existed  between 
them  and  the  Rumanians;  that  Rumania,  merely  profit- 
ing by  the  fact  that  the  whole  Bulgarian  Army  was  in 
Thrace,  was  claiming  without  any  justification  the 
cession  of  a  portion  of  the  Bulgarian  territory.  Gueshov 
alleged  among  other  reasons  the  constitutional  impos- 
sibility for  the  Government — without  the  authorisation 
oi  the  Chamber,  which  was  not  sitting  at  the  time — to 


I9I3]    RUSSIAN   ARBITRATION   ACCEPTED     153 

enter  into  negotiations  which  might  end  in  the  meta- 
morphosis of  a  portion,  even  though  a  minute  one,  of 
the  Bulgarian  population  into  subjects  of  another  State, 
and  that,  moreover,  without  any  wish  on  their  part. 

"One  of  the  regiments  which  has  distinguished 
itself  most  in  the  present  campaign,"  said  Gueshov  to 
me,  "is  the  regiment  of  Silistria,  composed  of  citizens 
of  that  town  and  its  environs.  How  could  we  suddenly 
say  to  the  soldiers  of  this  regiment,  which  is  before 
Chataldja :  'You  are  no  longer  Bulgarians,  you  are 
Rumanians  ! '  "     Truly  an  unanswerable  argument. 

However,  I  employed  my  best  efforts  and  all  means 
of  persuasion  to  accomplish  the  object  proposed  by  our 
Foreign  Office,  and  at  the  crucial  moment  when  the 
question  was  to  be  settled  by  a  Council  of  Ministers 
presided  over  by  the  King,  I  wrote  Gueshov  a  letter 
which  he  could  and  should  show  to  His  Majesty,  and  to 
his  colleagues,  in  which — in  the  name  of  the  higher 
interests  of  Bulgaria — I  insisted  on  the  necessity  for 
her  to  accept  the  Russian  proposition  and  to  refer  the 
question  to  the  judgment  of  a  conference  of  Ambassadors 
in  St.  Petersburg.  My  arguments  finally  prevailed  ;  the 
Bulgarians  bowed  to  our  advice,  and  after  a  few  sittings, 
the  conference,  presided  over  by  M.  Sazonoff,  announced 
the  result  of  the  arbitration  :  Rumania  was  to  receive 
the  town  of  Silistria  and  some  territories  along  the 
frontier,  but  these  latter  were  so  insignificant  that  as  a 
matter  of  fact  they  were  not  worth  the  trouble  taken  by 
Rumania  in  raising  this  whole  question.  The  two  sides 
accepted  the  award,  but  Rumania  resolved  in  petto  to 
raise  her  claims  afresh  with  regard  to  Bulgaria  at  the  first 
favourable  opportunity.  From  this  moment  the  Ru- 
manian Government  sought  to  draw  closer  to  Belgrade 
and  Athens,  estimating  very  judiciously  that  the 
"allies"  would  end  in  coming  to  blows,  and  that  then 
Rumania  would  have  the  chance  of  obtaining  from 
Bulgaria  far  more  substantial  concessions  than  those 
which  had  just  been  awarded  to  her. 


CHAPTER  XI 

QUARRELS    BETWEEN   THE    ALLIES 

On  the  12th  (25th)  March,  M.  Gueshov  telephoned  to  me 
in  the  morning  to  say  that  the  attack  on  Adrianople 
had  begun,  and  that  the  Bulgarians  had  taken  all  the 
advanced  positions  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  place.  At 
noon  I  heard  that  the  operations  had  been  successful, 
and  that  the  Bulgarians  were  already  occupying  several 
of  the  principal  forts.  And  at  four  o'clock,  the  beautiful 
big  Russian  bells,  which  had  been  put  up  a  few  days 
before  in  the  belfry  of  the  cathedral  which  was  being 
built — the  cathedral  of  St.  Alexander  Nevsky — began 
their  deep  and  solemn  pealing  to  announce  the  great 
victory  to  the  inhabitants  of  Sofia.  The  last  rampart 
of  Ottoman  domination  in  Thrace  had  fallen :  the 
Bulgarian  and  Serbian  troops,  who  had  vied  with  one 
another  in  courage  and  self-sacrifice,  had  taken  this 
formidable  fortified  place  by  assault,  thereby  displaying 
to  the  whole  world  what  Slav  patriotism  was  capable 
of  From  that  moment  one  could  consider  the  war 
with  the  Turks  to  be  ended,  to  the  complete  advantage 
of  our  Slav  kinsman  and  our  Greek  co-religionists. 

Although  latterly  I  had  been  a  sorrowful  spectator 
of  the  rivalries  and  of  the  hostilit}^  which  divided  these 
same  kinsmen  and  co-religionists,  yet  I  could  not 
repress  a  deep  and  joyful  emotion  when  I  heard  the 
symbolic  pealing  of  the  Russian  bells  in  honour  of 
the  Slav  victory.  Likewise  in  Russia  the  taking  of 
Adrianople  produced  a  profound  impression.  The 
Duma  was  the  scene  of  a  great  ovation  in  honour  of 
the  Bulgarian  hero,  Radko-Dmitriev,  who  was  in  St. 
Petersburg  at  the  time. 

The     taking    of    Adrianople    virtually    concluded 

154 


I9I3]  CAPTURE  OF  ADRIANOPLE  155 

hostilities.  For  five  weeks  more  the  definite  winding- 
up  of  the  war  was  discussed  in  London— with  the  help 
once  more  of  delegates  of  the  belligerents — but  an 
armistice  was  soon  concluded,  and  one  foresaw  clearly 
that  military  operations  would  not  begin  again. 
Henceforth  the  relations  of  the  Allies  with  Turkey 
took  a  secondary  place,  while  the  interest  of  the 
moment  was  centred  on  the  relations  of  the  Allies 
amongst  themselves. 

The  capture  of  the  powerful  defences  of  Adrianople 
will  remain  for  ever  one  of  the  most  glorious  pages  in 
the  military  annals  of  Bulgaria.  Just  as  they  had  done 
throughout  the  war,  the  Bulgarians  distinguished  them- 
selves by  their  courage,  their  sang-froid,  and  their  will 
to  win  at  all  costs.  Unfortunately,  side  by  side  with 
these  admirable  traits  of  the  Bulgarian  character,  the 
taking  of  Adrianople  revealed  some  very  ugly  ones. 

The  Bulgarians  generally  appeared  to  deny  any 
Serbian  participation  in  the  taking  of  Adrianople, 
whereas  the  Serbians  had  not  only  helped  them  with 
their  big  guns,  but  had  also  finally  carried  the  place  by 
a  brilliant  sally.  If  Ferdinand  had  had  any  true  political 
perception,  he  would  have  used  all  his  efforts  to  clear 
up  these  mutual  misunderstandings.  He  should  have 
come  to  Adrianople,  reviewed  the  Serbian  and  Bul- 
garian troops  collectively,  have  made  a  cordial  speech 
to  the  Serbian  officers,  have  mentioned  in  dispatches 
to  both  armies  the  courage  of  the  Serbians,  and  the 
enormous  services  they  had  rendered  their  allies,  and 
a  great  many  things  would  thus  have  been  smoothed 
over  and  forgotten.  But  Ferdinand  was  not  con- 
templating anything  of  the  kind.  He  was  preparing  to 
come  from  Sofia  to  Adrianople  to  make  his  triumphal 
entry  into  the  conquered  town,  leaving  the  Serbians 
completely  out  of  this  exclusively  Bulgarian  festivity. 
The  festivity  never  took  place  :  cholera  having  broken 
out  at  Adrianople,  Ferdinand — who  is  afraid  of  many 
things,  but  particularly  of  all  epidemics  and  infection — 


156   QUARRELS  BETWP:EN  THE  ALLIES   [en.  xi. 

countermanded  the  triumphal  entry  into  Adrianople, 
and  postponed  it  sine  die.  It  was  the  Turks  who 
entered  it  four  months  later! 

Meanwhile,  the  Bulgarians  displayed  another  trait 
of  their  national  character  in  Adrianople — cold  and 
relentless  cruelty.  Forty  thousand  Turkish  prisoners 
had  been  put  in  a  camp  on  an  island,  which  is  formed 
by  the  two  arms  of  the  Maritza  below  the  town ;  they 
were  to  be  taken  from  there  into  the  interior  of  the 
countr}^  But  when  cholera  broke  out,  the  removal 
was  postponed.  Huddled  together  in  an  almost  in- 
credible way  on  the  island,  which  was  encircled  with 
a  network  of  barbed  wire,  and  within  range  of  the  guns 
on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  the  wretched  Turks  had 
soon  eaten  all  the  bread  they  had  with  them,  and  began 
to  suffer  from  hunger.  It  should  be  mentioned  that, 
prior  to  the  surrender  of  the  town,  the  Turks  had  had 
time  to  set  fire  to  fairly  large  quantities  of  flour  and 
grain,  which  were  still  in  the  town,  and  the  Bulgarian 
military  authorities,  who  bore  a  grudge  against  the 
Turks  for  this  destruction,  could  find  no  better  means 
of  revenge  than  that  of  refusing,  with  heartless  cruelty, 
to  supply  provisions  to  the  unhappy  prisoners  of  war. 
"But  what  can  we  do?"  replied  the  Bulgarians  to 
those  who  came  to  plead  the  cause  of  these  miserable 
wretches,  "  it  is  the  fault  of  the  Turks.  Why  did  they 
set  fire  to  their  grain  stores?  Now  we  have  nothing 
to  give  them  to  eat."  And  for  eight  or  ten  days  one 
heard  the  plaintive  cries  of  thousands  of  famished  men 
coming  from  the  prisoners'  camp  on  the  island.  To 
keep  body  and  soul  together  these  poor  wretches 
gnawed  the  bark  of  the  trees,  and  drank  the  water  from 
the  river.  As  was  to  be  expected,  in  a  few  days  cholera 
was  raging  among  the  prisoners,  and  the  dead  and  the 
dying  lay  next  to  those  who  were  still  immune.  Finally, 
rumours  about  this  abominable  behaviour  with  regard 
to  the  Turkish  prisoners  of  war  reached  Sofia,  and  from 
there  got  through  to  Europe,  and  the  Bulgarians  were 
forced  to  remove  the    poor  wretches;   but  during  the 


1913]  BULGARIAN  CRUELTY  157 

removal   they  were   so   inhumanly   treated   that   more 
than  half  of  them  died  of  cholera  and  of  other  diseases. 

Yes,  the  Bulgarian  is  coldly  cruel !  All  the  same, 
one  must  not  see  in  this  cruelty  an  inborn  trait  of  the 
Bulgarian  character.  It  is  the  product  of  the  whole 
history  of  this  unhappy  people.  One  must  not  forget 
that  throughout  the  five  centuries  of  Turkish  domination, 
the  Bulgarian  nation  formed  a  human  agglomeration 
deprived  of  all  representation  of  the  people,  and  of  all 
governing  classes. 

The  Serbians  subjected  to  Turkey  had  their  own 
national  clergy  and  their  convents.  On  the  other  side 
of  the  frontier  they  had  brothers  who  were  not  subject 
to  the  Turks,  and  centres  of  Serbian  culture,  such 
as  the  towns  on  the  coast  of  Dalmatia,  and  later 
on  Karlovtz}^  Novy-Sad,  and  the  monasteries  of 
the  "  Fruschka-Gora,"  in  the  land  of  the  Serbian 
"Granitchars"  of  Austria. 

The  Greeks  possessed  a  powerful  spiritual  hierarchy 
extending  over  the  whole  Ottoman  Empire,  with  the 
Universal  Patriarch  at  its  head,  who  continued  to  reside 
in  Constantinople.  The  numerous  and  cultivated  class 
of  the  families  of  the  archons  shared  with  the  clergy  the 
influence,  not  only  over  their  kinsmen,  but  also  over 
the  Turkish  authorities. 

In  the  provinces  in  normal  times,  Turks  and 
Albanians  of  distinction  were  often  on  a  friendly  footing 
with  Greek  notabilities.  The  knezes  (heads  of  villages) 
and  kmcts  (mayors  of  Serbian  small  towns)  kept  com- 
pany and  drank  their  "  tzrno  vino"  with  the  local 
Mussulmans,  Serbians  like  them  by  birth  and  language, 
but  converts  to  Islamism.  Up  to  to-day,  the  Serbian 
Mussulmans  remaining  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  are 
proud  of  their  extraction  and  still  speak  the  purest 
Serbian.  "So  you  also  are  a  leaf  out  of  our  forest,''  I 
heard  an  old  Bosnian  Mussulman  say  to  a  young 
Serbian  to  whom  I  was  introducing  him. 

The  Bulgarian  people  have  existed  for  five  centuries 


158   QUARRELS  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  [cn.  xi. 

without  any  moral  or  intellectual  support ;  their 
bojars  (the  nobility)  were  swept  away  or  converted  to 
Islamism,  or  reduced  to  fleeing  to  Rumania.  The 
national  hierarchy  was  abolished.  All  the  higher  clergy 
had  become  Greek,  and  the  Greeks,  who  from  time 
immemorial  had  had  an  organic  hereditary  hatred  for 
the  Bulgarians,  now  literally  trod  them  underfoot. 
For  centuries  the  Bulgarian  pope  was  a  being  deprived 
of  all  rights,  completely  unpolished,  often  illiterate, 
whose  business  it  was  to  extract  pence  from  the  peasant 
in  payment  for  certain  religious  rites,  and  then  to  pass 
almost  all  these  pence  on  to  his  inexorable  master — the 
Greek  bishop. 

However,  some  localities  existed  in  which  the  Bul- 
garian inhabitants,  by  virtue  of  certain  economic 
conditions  or  of  certain  traditions,  enjoyed  relative 
comfort  and  seemed  to  possess  some  rights.  For 
instance,  in  Southern  Bulgaria  there  was  a  whole 
district  of  which  the  male  population  from  father 
to  son  was  employed  in  Constantinople  and  at 
the  Padishah's  Court  as  syces  (grooms).  Naturally 
these  people  could  save  money,  and  having  powerful 
protectors  among  the  domestics  of  the  Palace,  could 
keep  this  money,  which  enabled  them  to  live  in  comfort 
at  home.  There  were  also  a  few  villages  and  small 
towns  in  the  mountain,  far  removed  from  the  Turks 
and  where  local  conditions  favoured  the  development 
of  some  small  lucrative  industry:  these  spots  formed 
oases  in  which  up  to  a  certain  date  the  ancient 
Christian  and  Slav  culture  was  preserved.  Such  were 
the  districts  of  Gabrova,  Elena,  Karlovo,  where  the 
native  type  is  even  now  finer  and  purer  than  in  the 
rest  of  the  country.  If  it  had  not  been  for  these  happy 
and  rare  exceptions,  the  name  even  of  the  Bulgarian 
people  would  have  been  lost  in  the  course  of  the 
centuries,  for  all  the  rest  of  the  country  showed  such 
an  utter  lack  of  culture,  such  degrading  slavery,  that  it 
is  wonderful  that  even  the  consciousness  of  nationality 
could  exist  there. 


I9I3]  STATE  OF  THE   BULGARIANS  159 

Thus  amongst  an  enormous  majority  of  the  nation 
there  was  no  conscious  religious  feeling,  no  civilisation, 
a  complete  absence  of  rights,  and  to  all  money  was  the 
sole  means  of  procuring  a  semblance  of  a  decent  exist- 
ence ;  add  to  this,  stubbornness  and  a  certain  strain 
of  materialism  which  had  filtered  into  the  blood  of 
the  Slav  population  of  the  country  with  the  blood  of 
the  former  Ugro-Finnish  conquerors — the  Bulgarians, 
properly  so-called — and  no  one  can  wonder  that  in  the 
modern  Bulgarian  soul  there  is  hardly  any  room  for 
finer  feelings  and  ideal  aspirations. 

During  my  first  stay  in  Bulgaria  at  the  outset  of 
my  diplomatic  career,  I  had  had  an  opportunity  of  see- 
ing a  very  interesting  document :  the  letter  which  the 
Emperor  Alexander  II.  had  written  to  his  nephew  by 
marriage.  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  when  the 
latter  was  elected  the  first  Prince  of  Bulgaria  at  the 
Tsar's  wish.  This  letter,  very  perfect  on  the  whole, 
concluded  with  touching  and  profoundly  true  words, 
which  ran  something  like  this  : — 

"  But  above  all  things,  my  dear  nephew,  never  forget 
in  your  relations  with  your  new  people  the  complete 
slavery  in  which  they  have  lived  for  centuries.  Be 
generous  and  indulgent  towards  the  failings  which  are 
the  natural  consequence  of  this  slavery.  Be  patient 
with  your  people  and  endeavour  by  kind  deeds  to  raise 
them  to  your  level  and  to  draw  them  nearer  to  you." 

Prince  Alexander  of  Battenburg  did  not  appear  to 
have  been  created  for  such  a  beautiful  mission — but 
still  less  was  Ferdinand  of  Coburg.  During  the  thirty- 
five  years  that  Bulgaria  had  existed  much  had  been 
done  to  give  her  a  surface  polish,  and  to  provide  her 
with  modern  State  machinery,  but  nothing  was  done 
for  the  souls  of  the  people,  to  soften  their  natural 
dispositions  and  their  manners.  On  the  contrary, 
national  fanaticism  was  encouraged  and  stimulated  as  a 
virtue.  And  as  no  people  can  exist  without  religion 
and  without  ideals,  the  Bulgarians  in  place  of  religion 
had  their  national  policy,  and  as  supreme  moral  ideal 


i6o  QUARRELS  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES   [ni.  xi. 

the  work  of  the  "Great    Bulgaria";  the  creed  of  this 
religion  was  "the  Bulgaria  of  San-Stefano." 

The  roughness  of  the  Bulgarian  manners  and  the 
absence  of  all  humanitarian  feeling  among  them  became 
strikingi}^  apparent  during  the  Balkan  War.  I  do  not 
mean  the  cruelties  inflicted  on  the  Mussulman  popula- 
tion wherever  the  Bulgarian  armies  penetrated.  These 
cruelties,  practised  in  cold  blood  and  as  "lawful  ven- 
geance," were  fortunately  tempered  by  a  certain  fear 
of  the  public  opinion  of  Europe.  But  even  for  their 
own  people  the  Bulgarians  demanded  no  mercy,  no 
pity.  In  no  other  army  in  the  world  is  the  work  of 
tending  the  wounded  so  neglected  as  it  is  in  the 
Bulgarian  Army.  Thousands  of  soldiers  fell  wounded 
on  the  battlefield  and  lay  there,  without  any  one  paying 
any  attention  to  them  ;  to  pick  them  up  during  the  fight 
was  considered  a  crime ;  but  even  when  the  battle  was 
over  there  was  not  much  time  to  devote  to  them.  The 
wounded  dragged  themselves  as  best  they  could  to  the 
ambulances  near  the  front,  where  the  Bulgarian  military 
surgeons  hacked  at  them  with  the  coolness  of  a  butcher 
or  hurriedly  bound  up  their  wounds  with  dirty  cloths, 
and  then  sent  them  in  buffalo  waggons  to  the  hospitals 
in  the  rear.  And  these  poor  wretches  never  thought  of 
complaining  of  such  treatment ;  according  to  their  own 
ideas  a  soldier,  wounded  and  unfit  to  fight,  is  only  a 
burden  to  the  Army  and  to  his  country;  so  that  nothing 
more  need  be  done  for  him  ;  much  has  already  been 
done  when  his  wound  has  been  bound  up,  and  he  has 
been  put  on  a  waggon  ! 

It  was  only  when  a  Bulgarian  wounded  soldier  had 
the  luck  to  get  to  a  foreign  hospital,  especially  a  Russian 
one,  where  he  became  the  object  of  the  refined  and 
tender  care  of  the  sisters  and  doctors,  that  the  poor 
wretch  began  to  discover  and  understand  a  new  world 
of  human  solidarity  and  of  Christian  love,  hitherto 
completely  sealed  to  him.  "Yes,  now  we  under- 
stand what  pity  is,  what  charity  is ! "  These  were 
the    touching    words    that    I    often    heard    from    the 


I9I3]  MY  SUGGESTED  COMPROMISE  i6i 

lips  of  the  wounded  who  were  being  nursed  in  our 
hospitals. 

Woe  to  the  sovereigns  !  woe  to  the  statesmen !  who 
have  not  understood  that  a  people  cannot  live  exclu- 
sively for  their  material  welfare  and  the  aims  of  their 
national  policy  unless  at  the  same  time  their  hearts  are 
opened  to  other  feelings,  more  especially  to  those  of 
justice  and  of  human  solidarity  ! 

I  address  these  words  to  the  Palace  of  Sofia,  but 
with  the  humble  prayer  to  pass  them  on  to  German 
Headquarters  !  ^ 

As  I  said  above,  with  the  taking  of  Adrianople  all 
interest  was  centred  on  the  relations  between  the 
Allies,  and  in  the  first  place  on  the  relations  between 
Bulgarians  and  Serbians.  When  in  November,  1912, 
the  result  of  the  war  become  fairly  apparent  and 
negotiations  between  the  Allies  and  Turkey  were 
already  in  sight,  I  twice  submitted  a  project  to  our 
Foreign  Secretary  which,  in  my  opinion,  might  facili- 
tate and  accelerate  the  conclusion  of  peace  and  prevent 
a  clash  of  interests  between  the  Allies,  a  clash  that  I 
dreaded  from  that  moment.  This  project  consisted  in 
the  creation  of  a  Macedonia  which  was  to  be  completely 
autonomous  but  of  restricted  dimensions,  for  it  was 
only  to  include  just  those  districts  which  might  be 
disputed  between  the  competitors.  The  remainder  of 
the  territories  conquered  from  the  Turks  would  be 
easily  divided  by  the  Allies.  I  foresaw  at  the  same 
time  the  creation  of  an  autonomous  Albania  of  which 
the  limits  would  be  fixed  by  an  agreement  between 
the  Great  Powers. 

I  realised  perfectly  that  such  a  compromise  would 
in  no  way  offer  the  definite  solution  of  the  Balkan  ques- 
tion ;  but  in  the  first  place  I  have  never  been  able  to 
understand  why  one  was  to  ask  of  the  present  genera- 
tion the  solution  o^  a/l  the  most  difficult  questions  ;  and 
then  I  feared  above  all  things  that  events  would  drag 
'  These  lines  were  written  in  June,  1918. 


i62   QUARRELS  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES   [cii.  xi. 

on  too  long  and  would  lead  to  acute  differences 
between  the  groups  of  European  Powers.  My  idea, 
however,  was  rejected  without  appeal :  for  our  Foreign 
Office,  the  temptation  to  have  done  once  for  all  with 
the  Macedonian  question,  which  had  bored  the  whole 
world  to  distraction,  was  far  too  great. 

When  military  operations  had  begun  again,  and 
especially  after  the  fall  of  Adrianople,  it  would  doubt- 
less have  been  still  more  difficult  to  bring  forward  the 
proposition  of  an  autonomous  Macedonia.  But  if  this 
combination  could  nevertheless  have  been  accepted 
and  realised,  we  should  have  avoided  the  sad  spectacle 
of  the  fratricidal  war  of  1913;  and  Bulgaria  certainly 
would  have  been  less  accessible  to  Austro-German 
intrigues.  Unfortunately  our  Foreign  Office  would  not 
even  go  into  these  considerations ;  there  optimism 
reigned  supreme  under  the  influence  of  the  victories  of 
the  Slavs  and  Greeks  ;  it  already  foresaw  the  failure  of 
German  policy  on  the  Bosphorus,  the  question  of  the 
East  reduced  to  that  of  the  Straits,  and  all  this  without 
any  sacrifice  on  our  part!  How  could  one  be  anything 
but  joyful  ? 

About  two  months  later  a  very  distinct  threat  of  a 
clash  between  the  Allies  was  apparent  in  the  Balkans. 
But  everyone  was  still  optimistic.  At  first  a  word  from 
Russia  appeared  to  St.  Petersburg  to  be  sufficient  to 
obtain  the  necessary  concessions  from  the  Bulgarians  ; 
if  they  refused  to  listen  to  our  kind  advice,  they  would 
have  all  the  other  Balkan  States  against  them  ;  and 
then  instead  of  a  very  precarious  alliance  between 
Serbia,  Bulgaria  and  Greece,  we  should  have  to  deal 
with  the  far  closer  league  between  Rumania,  Greece, 
Serbia  (with  Montenegro),  a  league  which  would  be 
obliged  to  seek  Russian  direction  and  to  listen  to  our 
advice. 

This  idea  of  a  Balkan  alliance  with  an  anti-Bulgarian 
foundation  certainly  did  not  emanate  from  M.  Sazonoff. 
who  was  unaware  of  it  at  the  beginning.  It  was 
M.  Hartwig  who,  in  his  sincere  indignation  against  the 


I9I3]         THE   SERBO-GREEK  ALLIANCE  163 

Bulgarian  proceedings,  made  himself  the  initiator  and 
the  champion  of  this  new  political  combination.  He 
quickly  found  a  sympathetic  echo  from  our  represen- 
tative to  Bukharest,  to  whose  interest  it  was  that  our 
good  relations  with  Rumania — which  he  made  his 
own — should  redouble  in  weight  in  the  scales  of  our 
policy.  The  Russian  Minister  to  Athens  naturally 
followed  his  two  colleagues;  and  as  to  the  Foreign 
Office — M.  Hartwigtook  charge  of  that :  his  ascendency 
over  the  friends  he  had  left  there — over  those  who 
formerly,  in  the  Asiatic  Department,  were  "  the  shadow 
of  his  shadow  " — sufficed  to  alter  completely  the  course 
that  M.  Sazonoff  had  adopted  at  the  outset  of  his  term 
of  office.  It  is  true  that  the  Bulgarians  and  their  august 
master,  on  their  side,  contributed  powerfully  to  this, 
the  former  by  their  proverbial  obstinacy,  the  latter  by 
his  breach  of  faith. 

Hartwig's  influence — exercised  through  the  channel 
of  his  friends  and  admirers  at  the  Foreign  Office — made 
itself  felt  in  Balkan  affairs  beyond  the  period  of  which 
I  speak.  It  only  ceased  at  his  sudden  death,  which 
occurred  only  three  weeks  before  the  general  conflagra- 
tion of  1914.  He  was  a  true  and  faithful  friend  of  the 
Serbians ;  he  was  just  as  sincere  and  ardent  a  Russian 
patriot ;  he  displayed  in  the  service  of  Russian  politics 
and  of  the  Slav  cause,  an  intelligence  above  the  average, 
much  learning  and  unremitting  work  ;  but  his  vehement 
and  domineering  character,  his  intolerance  of  any 
opinion  differing  even  slightly  from  his  own,  prevented 
him  from  forming  an  equitable  judgment  on  men  and 
matters,  and  from  seeing  the  terrible  dangers  accumu- 
lating on  the  horizon. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  spring  of  191 3.  Serbia  and 
Greece  ended  by  concluding  a  formal  alliance,  directed 
against  the  encroachments  of  Bulgaria ;  Montenegro 
also  acceded  to  this  alliance ;  and  Belgrade,  like  Athens, 
conferred  actively  on  the  subject  with  Bukharest. 

I  was  not  at  all  surprised  to  receive,  towards  the 
end  of  April,  a  voluminous  telegram  from  the  Foreign 

M 


i64  QUARRELS  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES   [ch.  xi. 

Office  ordering  me  to  urge  the  Bulgarian  Government  to 
make  some  concessions  to  the  Serbians  with  respect 
to  the  demarcation  of  Macedonia.  All  the  arguments 
used  by  the  Foreign  Office  were  cleverly  constructed 
and  admirably  expressed ;  but  alas !  I  had  good  reason 
to  foresee  that  they  would  not  produce  the  desired 
effect,  and  that  the  actual  fact  of  our  taking  this  step 
would  cause  a  formidable  outcry  from  Bulgarian  public 
opinion.  It  was  perfectly  well  known  to  the  public  in 
Sofia  that  our  representatives  in  Belgrade,  Athens  and 
Bukharest  shared  the  prejudices  of  the  countries  to 
which  they  were  accredited  against  Bulgaria,  and  in 
consequence  were  quite  ready  to  lend  their  support  to 
all  the  Serbian  and  Greek  claims  in  Macedonia  and  also 
to  those  put  forward  by  the  Rumanians  with  regard  to 
the  Dobrudja.  From  that  moment  the  partition  of  Mace- 
donia became  for  the  Bulgarians  not  only  a  cause  of 
dispute  with  the  Greeks  and  the  Serbians,  but  it  also 
involved  them  in  a  struggle  with  a  current  in  Russian 
diplomacy  at  the  head  of  which,  according  to  Sofia,  was 
M.  Hartwig,  our  Minister  in  Belgrade. 

The  Bulgarians  were  certainly  mistaken  in  attributing 
such  exaggerated  importance  to  the  opinions  and  the 
activities  of  my  colleague  of  Belgrade.  Hartwig's  in- 
fluence was  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  in  Serbia  at  the 
time  and  expressed  the  Serbian  point  of  view  in  his 
dispatches  to  St.  Petersburg.  Now,  throughout  the 
course  of  these  last  Balkan  events,  the  behaviour  of 
the  Serbians  with  regard  to  Russia  was  marked  by 
perfect  sincerity  and  deferential  confidence  in  our  advice. 
Unfortunately  one  could  not  say  the  same  of  the  Bul- 
garians. King  Ferdinand's  behaviour — as  I  said  above — 
was  such  as  to  inspire  us  with  well-founded  suspicions  ; 
and  even  the  actions  of  the  celebrated  "Russophile" 
Danev  aroused  justifiable  displeasure  amongst  us  and 
amongst  our  allies. 

When  the  situation  became  still  more  acute,  that  is 
towards  the  end  of  May,  1913,  the  whole  of  Russian 
public   opinion  had  veered  round  to  the  Serbian  side, 


I9I3]  MADAME   KARAVELOV  165 

with  the  sole  exception  of  M.  P.  N.  Miliukoff,  who  up- 
held my  point  of  view  that  a  treaty  is  a  treaty  and  that 
the  Serbians  would  be  better  advised  to  desist  from 
their  new  claims  in  Macedonia  than  to  provoke  senti- 
ments of  hatred  in  the  Bulgarians  by  which  all  the 
enemies  of  the  Slav  cause  would  immediately  profit. 

It  was  easy  to  write  from  St.  Petersburg:  "Try  to 
persuade  the  Bulgarians  of  the  necessity  to  yield  and  to 
make  concessions  to  the  Serbians,"  but  it  was  difficult 
to  do  it  on  the  spot! 

I  remember  a  scene  I  witnessed  in  the  large  Bul- 
garian military  hospital  which  had  been  set  up  during 
the  war  in  the  huge  building  of  the  Military  School 
of  Sofia.  From  the  beginning  the  head  of  this  hos- 
pital was  Madame  Karavelov,  widow  of  the  celebrated 
Petko  Karavelov ;  on  the  death  of  her  husband  she 
had  remained  the  recognised  leader  of  the  Radical 
party,  M.  Malinov  only  taking  a  second  place.  In  the 
early  eighties  I  had  been  well  acquainted  with  both 
M.  Karavelov  and  his  wife,  who  was  young,  beautiful, 
and  intelligent.  Both  of  them  Russian  students,  both 
fiery  enthusiasts  for  liberty,  they  gave  one  the  impression 
of  having  come  to  life  out  of  the  pages  of  Turgeneff  s 
celebrated  novel,  "  On  the  Eve."  ^  Years  had  gone  by 
since  then :  Petko  Karavelov  having  incurred  the  per- 
secution of  Stamboulov,  was  shut  up  in  the  "  Black 
Mosque"  of  Sofia,  underwent  real  tortures,  and,  his 
health  being  completely  ruined  in  this  hell,  died  soon 
after  his  release.  But  his  widow — guardian  of  the  creed 
of  her  martyred  husband — had  remained  the  same 
enthusiast,  the  same  political  woman  full  of  energy. 
From  our  arrival  in  Sofia  my  wife  and  I  had  kept  up 
relations  of  mutual  sympathy  with  Madame  Karavelov. 
But  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  we  only  saw  each 
other  at  rare   intervals ;    the   reason    being   that    this 

*  The  hero  of  this  novel,  the  imaginary  Bulgarian  Insarov,  has  done 
more  to  make  the  Bulgarian  name  and  cause  popular  in  Russia  than  all 
his  fellow-countrymen  who  really  existed  and  who  one  met  at  this  period 
i  n  our  country  ;  habent  sua  fata  libelli. 


i66   QUARRELS   BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  [cii.  xi. 

energetic  woman  was  entirely  absorbed  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  work  she  had  undertaken  and  into  which 
she  was  putting  her  whole  heart ;  she  never  left  the 
enormous  hospital,  and  we  often  wondered  whence  she 
drew  the  physical  strength  to  bear  all  this  unceasing 
work. 

Towards  the  middle  of  May  an  old  acquaintance  of 
mine,  Mademoiselle  Pauline  Milutin,^  arrived  in  Sofia. 
Always  interested  in  politics  and  in  good  works, 
Mademoiselle  Milutin  expressed  the  wish  to  make  the 
acquaintance  of  Madame  Karavelov,  and  in  order  to 
fulfil  this  wish  1  gladly  escorted  her  to  the  large  hospital 
in  the  Military  School. 

Madame  Karavelov  received  us  amongst  her  invalids, 
of  which  at  this  time  the  number  had  considerably 
diminished.  There  were  few  seriously  wounded,  but  on 
the  other  hand  many  maimed  men,  who  were  finishing 
their  treatment  and  trying  to  get  accustomed  to  doing 
without  the  missing  limbs  :  some  were  in  bed,  some 
sitting  up,  and  others  hobbling  about  on  crutches ;  and 
in  small,  low  invalid  chairs  some  poor  wretches  with  no 
legs  were  helping  themselves  along  with  their  hands 
and  appearing  to  take  pleasure  in  this  enforced  sport. 
We  went  through  all  the  wards,  and  when  we  returned 
to  the  visitors'  room,  we  began  to  talk  politics;  or 
rather  it  was  Mademoiselle  Milutin  who  talked  and  I — 
foreseeing  what  might  occur — who  only  listened.  My 
companion  began  to  try  and  convince  Madame  Karavelov 
of  the  necessity  of  giving  up  Southern  Macedonia  to  the 
Serbians.  It  was  interesting  to  see  the  emotion  and 
even  the  indignation  with  which  Madame  Karavelov 
was  seized  when  she  understood  what  the  speaker  was 
driving  at. 

"What?  Give  up  Macedonia  to  the  Serbians? 
Macedonia  which  was  given  to  us  by  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano  ?    Macedonia  which  has  been  the  goal  of  all  our 

^  Daughter  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  Nicolas  Milutin,  one  of  the  best 
known  men  at  the  grand  epoch  of  the  reforms  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander  II. 


I9I3]  IN   THE   MILITARY   HOSPITAL  167 

home  and  foreign  policy  for  more  than  thirty-five  years. 
But  that  is  impossible  !  Do  you  hear  me,  impossible  ! 
Children,  children,"  she  called  in  Bulgarian  to  the 
wounded  who  were  lying  in  the  ward,  "listen  to  what 
they  say  in  Russia  :  that  we  ought  to  give  up  Macedonia 
to  the  Serbians  !  Do  you  consent  ?  "  "  No,  no,"  about 
ten  voices  answered  in  chorus ;  the  cripples  hobbled 
towards  us  ;  the  men  in  the  invalid  chairs  crawled  along, 
all  calling  out :  "  No,  never  !  It  is  not  for  that  we  shed 
our  blood!"  Faces  began  to  display  emotion,  eyes  to 
flash.  .  .  .  Seeing  that  the  tumult  was  likely  to  increase, 
I  led  the  two  ladies  into  the  next  room — which  happened 
to  be  the  dispensary — and  there  I  thought  it  my  duty  to 
explain  in  a  few  words  to  Madame  Karavelov  the  true 
state  of  affairs.  She  calmed  down  a  little,  and  appeared 
to  understand  up  to  a  point  that  our  advice  was  well- 
founded  and  not  directed  against  the  real  interests  of 
Bulgaria. 

"  Now  you  can  see  whether  it  is  easy  to  convince 
Bulgarians?"  I  said  to  Mademoiselle  Milutin  when  we 
were  walking  from  the  hospital  to  the  Legation. 

"Yes,"  she  replied,  "it  is  not  easy!  But  how  in- 
teresting all  this  is  ;  I  shall  certainly  tell  Sazonoff  all 
I  have  seen  and  heard  when  I  return  to  St.  Petersburg." 
(Mademoiselle  Milutin  had  become  very  intimate  with 
M.  Sazonoff  during  the  years  when  they  were  both  in 
Rome.) 

"  Oh  yes !  tell  him,  do  tell  him,  that  always  does 
good!"  I  replied;  "but  do  not  be  too  much  impressed 
by  the  scene  you  have  just  witnessed.  Aniica  Kara- 
velov, sed  magis  arnica  Veritas.  Besides,  {{justice  is  not 
entirely  on  the  side  of  the  Serbians,  it  is  yet  imperative 
in  the  interests  of  truth  that  we  should  recognise  and 
reward  in  some  way  their  perfectly  correct  attitude 
to  us.  My  sole  fear  is  that  they  will  do  themselves 
immense  harm  some  day  by  setting  the  Bulgarians 
literally  against  them." 

Towards  the  middle  of  May,  as  every  one  had  been 


i68   QUARRKLS  BKTWKEN  THE  ALLIES   [en.  xi. 

expecting  for  some  time,  a  serious  collision  between 
Bulgarians  and  Greeks  occurred  in  the  southern  theatre 
of  military  operations. 

The   Bulgarians    declared   that   the  Eiizones  (Greek 
territorials)   had   attacked   some    Bulgarian   garrisons ; 
the  Greeks  swore  by  all  the  gods  of  Olympus  that  the 
initiative  of  the  attack  came  from  the  Bulgarians.    How- 
ever that   may   have  been,  the  collision  assumed   the 
proportions  of  a  real  battle,  during  which  the  Bulga- 
rians— as  they  asserted  and  firmly  believed  themselves 
— routed  an  allied  force  ten  times  larger  than  their  own. 
This  account,  extremely  exaggerated  if  not  completely 
untrue,  had  disastrous  consequences  a  few  weeks  later 
for  the   Bulgarians  themselves :   when  war  broke    out 
between  the  former  Allies  the  Bulgarian  Commander- 
in-Chief,  General  Savov,  only  left  a  very  small  force  to 
oppose  the  Greeks,  convinced  that  it  would  be  sufficient 
to  bar  the  way  to  the  entire  Greek  Army.      But  the 
Greeks,  superior  in  numbers  and  equipment,  and  ani- 
mated by  their  historic  hatred  of  the  Bulgarians,  beat 
them  completely  at  the  first   decisive  encounters  and 
obliged  them  to  retreat  across  the  mountains,  leaving 
their  guns  and  ammunition  behind. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  "inter-allied"  collision  of 
the  month  of  May.  A  few  days  after  it  had  taken  place, 
the  Emperor  of  Russia  went  to  Berlin  to  be  present 
at  the  marriage  of  William  H.'s  daughter  with  the  Duke 
of  Cumberland  (afterwards  Grand  Duke  of  Brunswick). 
King  Constantine  profited  by  this  meeting  of  his  two 
powerful  relations  to  submit  the  Bulgarian  aggression 
to  their  judgment,  and  to  beg  them  to  put  an  end  to 
these  very  regrettable  and  dangerous  incidents.  Fol- 
lowing these  complaints  from  the  King  of  Greece,  my 
German  colleague  and  I  received  identical  instructions 
from  Berlin  to  transmit  immediately  to  King  Ferdinand 
the  warnings  and  most  solemn  advice  of  both  Emperors. 
I  must  confess  that  it  was  not  without  a  distinct 
feeling  of  pleasure  that  I  insisted  on  having  an  audience 
of  the  King,  who  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  had 


I9I3]  PEACE   SIGNED   IN    LONDON  169 

so  persistently  avoided  all  opportunities  of  conversing 
with  the  Russian  Minister.  This  time  the  King  was 
forced  to  comply,  and  against  all  expectations  received 
me  with  a  great  deal  of  friendliness.  I  told  him  of  the 
communication  I  had  received  from  my  august  Master, 
but  I  avoided  anything  that  might  have  wounded  his 
pride;  I  availed  myself  also  of  this  opportunity  to 
touch  on  the  question  of  the  relations  between  Bul- 
garians and  Serbians.  On  this  Ferdinand  complained 
bitterly  that  the  Serbians  had  already  concluded  a  formal 
agreement  with  the  Greeks  which  was  directed  against 
Bulgaria — which  was  to  a  certain  extent  true.  In  answer 
to  that,  and  without  entering  into  an  examination  of  the 
Serbian  and  Greek  claims,  I  revealed  the  fears  I  enter- 
tained for  Bulgaria  herself  occasioned  by  the  tendencies 
of  some  of  her  politicians,  who  persisted  in  an  irre- 
concilable line  of  conduct.  I  was  alluding  to  certain 
generals  and  to  M.  Danev.  The  King  did  not  dispute 
my  point  of  view,  but  he  did  not  acquiesce  in  it  either. 
At  this  time  he  could  still  see  things  from  a  wholesome 
standpoint,  and  he  dreaded  a  collision  with  his  neigh- 
bours ;  but  as  ever  he  did  not  wish  to  commit  himself 
in  a  clear  and  precise  manner. 

The  month  of  April  and  half  the  month  of  May, 
during  which  an  armistice  had  put  an  end  to  hostilities 
between  Turkey  and  the  Allies,  were  spent  over  con- 
ferences and  difficulties.  At  last,  on  the  20th  May,  N.S. , 
a  definite  peace  was  signed  in  London.  In  Europe  the 
Turks  were  only  to  keep  the  hinterland  of  the  Straits 
up  to  the  line  Enos — Midia.  It  then  remained  to  divide 
between  the  Allies  the  territory  conquered  by  them. 
As  I  have  already  said,  the  Bulgarians  had  no  troops 
in  the  southern  and  western  part  of  Macedonia,  excep  t 
three  thousand  men  that  they  had  succeeded  in  getting 
into  Salonika.  This  town  and  district,  the  peninsula  of 
Chalcidice  and  a  few  other  places  east  of  this  peninsula, 
were  occupied  by  the  Greeks ;  the  rest  of  Macedonia, 
as  far  as  the  course  of  the  Bregalnitza,  was  in  the  hands 


170  QUARRELS  HKTWEEN  THP:  ALLIES   [ch.  xi. 

of  the  Serbians.  Hence  in  the  competition  that  was 
beginning  the  Serbians  and  the  Greeks  had  on  their 
side  the  argument  of  actual  possession :  Beati  possi- 
dentes ;  as  to  the  Bulgarians,  there  were  only  two 
alternatives  remaining  to  them — either  to  come  to  terms 
with  their  competitors,  or  to  take  from  them  the  dis- 
puted territories  by  force. 

I  spent  the  whole  of  May  in  conferences  with 
M.  Gueshov  on  one  side  and  Spalaikovitch  on  the  other. 
Both  sincerely  wished  to  prevent  the  violent  solution 
of  the  dispute  ;  Gueshov  through  a  spirit  of  prudence 
and  moderation,  Spalaikovitch  mainly  through  devotion 
to  the  cause  of  Slav  solidarity.  Our  mutual  efforts  ended 
in  the  arranging  of  an  interview  between  M.  Gueshov 
and  M.  Pachitch,  which  took  place  on  the  2nd  June  at 
Tsaribrod  (a  frontier  station  between  Pirot  and  Nish). 
The  two  Presidents  of  the  Councils  spent  a  whole  day 
there  conferring  in  a  saloon  carriage.  Both  men  of 
experience,  wise  and  inspired  by  the  best  intentions, 
they  succeeded  during  this  interview  in  establishing 
the  basis  of  a  friendly  solution ;  they  decided  to  meet 
again  and  to  convene  shortly  a  conference  of  the  four 
Prime  Ministers  of  the  allied  countries.  And  if  at  this 
conference  they  could  not  arrive  at  a  complete  under- 
standing, the  points  under  discussion  were  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  arbitration  of  Russia,  an  arbitration  which 
had  been  provided  for  in  the  text  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
treaty. 

I  remember  vividly  the  enthusiastic  frame  of  mind 
in  which  Spalaikovitch  returned  from  Tsaribrod. 

"All  is  settled!"  he  exclaimed,  clasping  me  in  his 
arms. 

A  few  days  before  the  interview  at  Tsaribrod,  Spa- 
laikovitch and  I  had  busied  ourselves  with  the  question 
of  Russian  arbitration.  As  I  have  just  said,  this  arbi- 
tration was  mentioned  in  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty, 
although  neither  the  Russian  Government  nor  its  re- 
presentatives  in    Belgrade    and    Sofia  had   taken   the 


I9I3]         TSAR   OFFERS  TO   ARBITRATE  171 

initiative  about  this  clause ;  it  was  well  known  in  our 
country,  but  we  had  not  formally  adhered  to  it.  Con- 
sequently it  was  necessary  above  all  things  to  ask  St. 
Petersburg  whether  the  Imperial  Government  would 
consent  to  become  the  arbitrator  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
litigation  if  the  case  arose.  But  Spalaikovitch  and  I 
went  further :  I  sent  M.  Sazonoff  a  telegram  ^  which  we 
composed  together,  and  in  which  I  suggested  to  our 
Government  that  it  should  itself  propose  to  arbitrate, 
and  not  propose  this  only  to  the  Bulgarians  and  the 
Serbians,  but  also  to  the  Greeks.  I  concluded  my 
telegram  by  expressing  the  opinion  that  such  a  step 
taken  by  Russia  would  be  the  best  means  of  preventing 
a  fratricidal  war  in  the  Balkans,  For  more  than  ten 
days  no  answer  to  my  suggestion  came  ;  then  I  received 
from  Moscow,  where  the  Court  was  at  the  moment,  the 
telegram  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  to  the  Kings  of 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia  which  I  was  to  transmit  imme- 
diately to  King  Ferdinand,  and  in  which  H.I.M.  the 
Emperor  proposed  to  both  sides  that  he  should  arbi- 
trate. I  was  told  later  that  this  telegram  of  the 
Emperor's  was  not  dispatched  on  the  initiative  of 
M.  Sazonoff,  who,  moreover,  had  already  returned 
to  St.  Petersburg,  but  on  that  of  the  Marshal  of  the 
Nobility  of  Moscow,  M.  Alexander  Samarine,  who  at 
the  moment  was  persona  gratissima  at  the  Court,  and 
who,  as  the  representative  of  the  best  traditions  of  the 
Russian  nobility  as  of  the  Slavophile  traditions  of  the 
Samarine  family,  thought  it  incumbent  on  him  to  suggest 
to  his  Sovereign  that  he  should  generously  offer  his 
arbitration  in  order  to  prevent  the  scandal  of  a  new 
war  between  people  of  a  common  origin  and  Orthodox. 
The  Emperor  at  once  approved  of  this  idea,  and  the 
telegram  was  sent  off.  That  would  show  that  my 
telegram  on  which  Spalaikovitch  and  I  were  building 
so  many  hopes  was  not  submitted  to  His  Majesty  at  a 
good  moment,  but  was  merely  put  away  in  the  archives 

*  If  my  memory  does  not  deceive  me,  it  was  on  the  15th  (28th)  May, 
or  the  i6th  (29th)  May. 


172   QUARRELS  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES   [en.  xi. 

of  the  Balkan  section  of  our  Foreign  Office.  It  is  a 
matter  for  sincere  regret,  for  the  generous  proposition 
of  the  Emperor  came  a  little  too  late :  M.  Gueshov  was 
already  on  the  point  of  resigning,  and  pending  the  early 
return  of  M.  Danev  the  vacillating  will  of  the  King  was 
guided  by  M.  Rizov,  who  had  been  sent  for  from  Rome 
on  purpose.  As  soon  as  Danev  returned  Rizov  took 
him  in  hand  also  and  bent  him  to  his  will,  until  the 
catastrophe  of  July,  1913. 

Of  course,  I  transmitted  His  Majesty's  telegram  to 
the  Palace  the  same  day,  and  I  also  informed  M. 
Gueshov  of  its  contents.  He,  however,  did  not  evince 
much  pleasure,  or  any  wish  to  impress  on  his  colleagues 
the  enormous  significance  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia's 
generous  step.  The  aged  President  of  the  Council, 
who  felt  that  the  King  wished  to  get  rid  of  him  at  all 
costs,  and  who  perceived  that  his  conference  with 
Pachitch  was  criticised  even  in  the  bosom  of  the 
Council,  was  only  awaiting  Danev's  return  from  London 
to  hand  in  his  resignation. 

Hence,  I  was  reduced  to  going  to  Todorov,  and  to 
the  King's  Secretary,  Dobrovitch,  to  insist  on  an 
immediate  answer  in  the  affirmative  being  sent  to  the 
Emperor's  telegram.  Todorov  at  once  realised  the 
gravity  of  the  matter ;  Dobrovitch  did  not  dare  to 
pronounce  any  private  opinion,  but  I  knew  that  he  had 
transmitted  most  accurately  to  the  King  all  that  I  had 
said  to  him.  As  regards  the  Bulgarian  Foreign  Office, 
every  one  there  was  apparently  waiting  to  know  what 
impression  the  telegram  had  made  on  the  Serbians,  and 
how  they  would  look  on  the  Russian  proposition. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Emperor  of  Russia's  telegram 
had  produced  dangerous  friction  in  Belgrade.  King 
Peter  hastened  to  answer  the  Emperor,  in  a  manner  as 
respectful  as  it  was  cordial,  that  personally  he  could 
only  thank  His  Majesty  for  this  fresh  proof  of  his 
solicitude  with  regard  to  Serbia  and  the  Slav  cause,  but 
that  the  constitution  of  the  country  did  not  allow  him 
to  answer,  with  respect  to  the  substance  of  the  question, 


I9I3]  FERDINAND'S  TELEGRAM  173 

without  the  previous  consent  of  the  Skupchtina.  If,  as 
was  much  to  be  hoped,  the  Skupchtina  gave  an 
affirmative  answer,  then  the  Royal  Government  would 
hasten  to  send  its  delegates  to  St.  Petersburg.  M. 
Pachitch  was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  accepting 
the  Russian  proposition  immediately,  and  without  any 
discussion ;  but  amongst  a  section  of  the  Skupchtina  he 
met  with  serious  opposition,  and  days  were  spent  in 
discussions  and  negotiations  wath  influential  members 
of  this  assembly,  for,  before  submitting  such  a  pro- 
position to  the  Skupchtina,  Pachitch  wished  to  be 
assured  that  it  would  pass  without  opposition. 

At  last,  after  two  or  three  days  spent  in  waiting  and 
in  taking  active  steps,  I  received  the  Bulgarian  answer 
in  the  form  of  a  draft  of  the  King's  telegram  to  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor.  In  it  the  Bulgarian  point  of 
view  on  the  Macedonian  question  was  expressed,  not 
without  dignity,  and  in  a  somewhat  explicit  manner, 

I  knew  later  that  the  King's  telegram,  thus  drav/n 
up,  had  aroused  displeasure  in  St.  Petersburg.  In  our 
country  every  one  was  so  accustomed,  when  addressing 
the  Monarch,  to  using  a  semi-biblical,  semi-servile 
language,  taken  from  the  litanies  of  the  Church,  that 
a  similar  style  was  expected  of  the  Slav  and  Orthodox 
clientele  of  the  Great  Empire  and  the  "White  Tsar" 
when  addressing  him.  I  never  could  enter  into  this 
style  of  thing,  and  so  I  found  nothing  to  criticise  in 
King  Ferdinand's  telegram,  except  perhaps  its  un- 
necessary length.  Hence,  it  was  thus  drawn  up  and 
dispatched  to  St.  Petersburg. 

I  was  profoundly  astonished  when,  a  few  months 
later,  and  after  the  Bulgarian  shipwreck.  King  Ferdinand 
began  to  circulate  the  report  that  his  telegram  to  the 
Emperor  had  been  suggested  to  him  by  me,  with  the 
perfidious  design  of  exciting  the  displeasure  of  the  Tsar 
and  of  Russian  public  opinion  against  the  Bulgarians, 
and  against  their  King !  This  fantastic  explanation  was, 
however,  believed  by  the  editorial  staff  of  the  RetcJi  (the 
organ  of  the/;/;//ors),  and  thus  presented  to  the  Russian 


174  QUARRELS  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES   [cii.  xi. 

public.  I  had  missed  the  article  in  the  RckJi  at  the 
time,  and  when  I  was  told  of  it,  it  was  too  late  to  have 
an  explanation  with  M.  Miliukoff,  who,  up  till  then, 
had  entirely  shared  my  point  of  view  on  the  subject  of 
Bulgarian  affairs.  Moreover,  I  did  not  see  Miliukoff 
after  Sofia  till  about  six  months  before  our  Revolution, 
that  is  to  say,  at  a  time  when  one  no  longer  had  leisure 
to  think  of  past  events  or  to  talk  about  them. 

The  Emperor's  telegram  to  the  King  was  soon 
followed  by  instructions  from  M.  Sazonoff  as  to  the 
way  in  which  the  generous  proposal  of  our  august 
Master  was  to  be  carried  out. 

The  Bulgarian  and  Serbian  Governments  were 
invited  to  dispatch  to  St.  Petersburg,  with  the  least 
possible  delay,  memoranda  presenting  their  arguments 
on  the  question ;  these  memoranda  would  be  carefully 
studied  by  our  Foreign  Office,  after  which  the  Prime 
Ministers  of  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece^  were  to 
come  to  St.  Petersburg;  the  respective  Russian 
Ministers  were  to  accompany  them.  I  transmitted 
these  conditions  to  M.  Todorov,  who  at  this  moment 
was  acting  ad  interim  for  the  Foreign  Secretary.  Two 
or  three  days  after  he  telephoned  to  beg  me  to  come  to 
the  Foreign  Office  to  confer  with  him  and  a  few  other 
people,  who  had  just  been  at  a  conference  convened  at 
the  Palace,  to  discuss  my  last  communication.  On 
arriving  at  M.  Todorov's  house,  I  found  General  Savov, 
whom  I  had  never  met  before,  M.  Rizov,  and  another 
member  of  the  Cabinet.  These  gentlemen  told  me  that 
it  had  been  decided  at  the  Palace  to  beg  me  to  telegraph 
to  St.  Petersburg  that  the  King  and  the  Bulgarian 
Government  gratefully  accepted  the  programme  of  the 
Russian  arbitration,  and  were  ready  to  dispatch  their 
delegates  to  our  country,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  wished  to  have  an  assurance  that  the  award  of  the 

^  Greece  had  in  the  meantime  expressed  the  desire  to  take  part 
in  the  Russian  arbitration,  and  we  consented  to  this  without  any 
difficulty. 


I9I3]  SATISFACTORY   OUTLOOK  175 

arbitration  would  be  given  not  later  than  six  days  from 
the  opening  of  the  conference;  the  explanation  of  this 
strange  demand  being  the  continued  arming  of  the 
Serbians  and  Greeks,  who  were  sending  all  their  armies 
into  Macedonia,  were  erecting  fortifications  there — 
which  was  true — and  were  profiting  by  each  day  that 
passed  to  make  the  scales  turn  in  their  favour. 

We  spoke  in  Russian,  which  was  the  only  foreign 
language  that  General  Savov  understood  and  spoke 
well.  I  replied,  addressing  the  General  in  particular, 
that  1  did  not  think  it  possible  to  pass  on  to  St. 
Petersburg  what  these  gentlemen  had  just  told  me.  In 
our  country  such  a  condition  would  be  considered  to 
be  incompatible  with  our  dignity.  Moreover,  as  a 
diplomat  of  some  experience,  I  could  not  even  imagine 
a  conference  limited  to  a  fixed  date ;  but  I  could  assure 
those  present  that  we  on  our  side  should  expedite 
matters,  and  should  wish  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory 
result  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.  In  conclusion, 
I  invited  these  gentlemen  to  assimilate  thoroughly  the 
idea  that  it  was  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  that  needed  our 
arbitration,  and  that  we  were  only  undertaking  it  for 
their  good ;  hence  it  would  be  our  place,  if  necessary, 
to  impose  conditions,  and  to  make  our  arbitration 
depend  on  them.  On  this  I  took  my  leave.  The 
following  day  Todorov  came  to  see  me,  and  told  me 
that  my  answer  had  had  the  desired  effect,  and  that  in 
all  probability  there  would  be  no  further  question  of  a 
time  limit;  concerning  the  journey  of  the  Bulgarian 
Prime  Minister  to  St.  Petersburg,  all  would  depend  on 
the  choice  of  the  person  entrusted  with  the  formation 
of  the  new  Cabinet. 


CHAPTER  XII 

BULGARIA   ATTACKS    HER   ALLIES 

M.  Danev  returned  from  London,  having  signed  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  Turkey  only  a  few  days  after  the 
interview  between  Gueshov  and  Pachitch  at  Tsari- 
brod,  and  the  reception  of  the  telegram  from  H.I.M. 
the  Emperor.  Meanwhile  I  had  a  long  interview  with 
M.  Gueshov,  in  the  course  of  which  I  pressed  him  to 
carry  out  as  quickly  as  possible  that  which  had  been 
agreed  on  between  him  and  M.  Pachitch. 

"  I  understand  perfectly,"  replied  he,  "  that  no  time 
must  be  lost.  But  I  do  not  know  yet  if  M.  Danev 
agrees  to  our  arrangement  with  Pachitch.  Do  not  for- 
get that  the  present  Cabinet  is  a  Coalition  Cabinet,  and 
that  I  do  not  possess  the  right  to  make  such  an 
important  decision  by  myself" 

"  But  if  Danev  does  not  agree  with  you  I  hope  that 
you  will  maintain  your  opinion  all  the  same,  and  will 
force  him  to  give  in." 

"No,  Monsieur,"  replied  Gueshov;  "I  warn  you 
quite  openly  that  I  have  already  handed  my  resignation 
to  the  King,  and  that  I  shall  only  withdraw  it  if  Danev 
comes  round  sincerely  to  my  opinion.  I  am  old  and 
I  have  worked  enough  for  my  country  and  my  people. 
I  could  not  participate  in  decisions  I  disapproved  of 
and  which  might  be  fatal  to  Bulgaria." 

Two  days  after  Danev  arrived,  at  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  By  half-past  seven  I  was  at  his  house  in 
order  to  find  him  alone,  and  before  he  had  come  in 
contact  with  all  sorts  of  friends  and  ardent  admirers 
of  his  extreme  and  "essentially  Bulgarian"  policy. 
Danev  was   somewhat    disagreeably  surprised    at   my 

176 


I9I3]  INGENUOUS  CLAPTRAP  177 

matutinal  visit ;  but  not  allowing  that  to  perturb  me  in 
the  least,  I  outlined  a  sketch  of  the  political  situation 
as  I  saw  it,  and  of  all  the  dangers  which  were  threatening 
Bulgaria ;  I  expressed  the  earnest  hope  that  Danev, 
who  always  described  himself  as  the  friend  and  proved 
admirer  of  Russia,  would  listen  in  this  solemn  hour  to 
our  most  benevolent  advice  and  would  above  -all 
approve  of  the  principles  of  the  entente  drawn  up  by 
Gueshov  and  Pachitch. 

Alas !  I  realised  on  the  spot  that  I  had  to  deal  with 
preconceived  ideas  and  irreconcilable  obstinacy ! 
Danev  would  not  perceive  the  dangers  that  his  country 
was  incurring.  According  to  him  nearly  all  the  pleni- 
potentiaries at  the  Conference  of  London  were  his 
personal  friends  and  sympathised  with  him.  The 
Rumanian  Minister,  M.  Misu,  the  Turkish  Plenipoten- 
tiary, Osman-Nizami  Pasha,  and  the  representatives  of 
the  Great  Powers — all  were  supposed  to  have  yielded 
to  the  irrefutable  arguments  of  Danev.  True,  the 
Greek  and  Serbian  Plenipotentiaries  held  opinions 
diametrically  opposed  to  his  —  but  what  did  that 
matter?  I  listened  in  blank  astonishment  to  this  more 
than  ingenuous  claptrap.  Through  the  dispatches 
forwarded  to  me  from  the  Foreign  Office,  and  through 
conversations  I  had  held  with  my  foreign  colleagues, 
I  knew  perfectly  well  that  poor  Danev  had  become 
the  bete  noire  of  the  whole  Conference  of  London,  and 
that  his  obstinacy  and  presumption  had  made  a  very 
unfavourable  impression  on  the  ambassadors  of  the 
Entente  with  regard  to  Bulgarian  policy.  Concerning 
the  Rumanian  and  Turkish  Plenipotentiaries,  these 
gentlemen  could  derive  no  advantage  from  reconciling 
the  Bulgarians  with  the  Serbians  and  Greeks,  and  con- 
sequently from  contradicting  their  Bulgarian  colleague. 
I  concluded  my  interview  with  Danev  by  warning  him 
that  at  the  present  moment  he  was  assuming  very  heavy 
responsibility  towards  his  country  and  the  whole  Slav 
cause,  and  that  the  day  would  dawn  when  he  would 
remember   the  conversation  he  had  just  had  with  me, 


178    BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES    [ch.  xii. 

and  when  he  would  regret  not  having  listened  to  my 
earnest  advice. 

Two  days  later  Gueshov's  resignation  was  accepted 
by  the  King,  and  a  short  ministerial  crisis  set  in. 

I  was  convinced  that  the  definite  turn  of  events 
depended  on  the  solution  of  the  ministerial  crisis,  by 
which  I  mean  as  to  whether  an  armed  collision  was  to 
take  place  between  the  Bulgarians  and  their  former 
allies,  or  whether  the  matter  could  be  settled  amicably. 
The  Bulgarian  National  Assembly  was  not  sitting  at 
the  moment,  and  besides,  according  to  the  laudable 
custom  of  constitutional  countries  such  as  Bulgaria, 
Greece,  Rumania,  no  one  dreamt  under  the  circum- 
stances of  taking  the  opinion  of  the  parliamentary 
majority  into  consideration.  The  King  could  calmly 
entrust  any  one  he  liked  with  the  formation  of  the  new 
Cabinet,  and  the  latter — in  the  event  of  the  opposition 
of  the  Chamber,  or  even  without  any  opposition — could 
just  as  calmly  dissolve  the  Chamber  and  proceed  to 
fresh  elections  in  the  complete  assurance  that  these 
elections  would  yield  a  crushing  Government  majority. 
Hence  the  choice  of  the  new  Ministers  depended  solely 
on  Ferdinand's  good  pleasure. 

From  the  day  following  Gueshov's  resignation  the 
report  spread  in  Sofia  that  Malinov  and  the  Radicals 
had  the  best  chance  of  returning  to  power.  I  expected 
this,  and  some  time  before  Gueshov's  resignation  I  had 
had  two  or  three  interviews  with  Malinov,  and  we  had 
discussed  the  serious  topic  of  the  hour — that  of  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  and  Greco-Bulgarian  demarcation. 

At  the  beginning  Malinov — ^just  like  Madame  Kara- 
velov,  whom  1  was  calling  on  again— gave  vent  to  very 
extreme  opinions.  But,  having  listened  to  all  my  argu- 
ments, and  further  weighed  all  the  dangers  which 
threatened  Bulgaria  from  all  sides  if  she  absolutely 
refused  to  make  certain  concessions,  my  two  friends 
came  round  to  my  opinion  up  to  a  point,  and  Malinov 
promised  me  that  if   he   came  into   power  he   would 


I9I3]  M.   DANEV'S  MISTAKES  179 

make  the  party  pay  the  greatest  attention  to  the 
advice  of  Russia  and  her  representative.  On  the  actual 
day  of  Gueshov's  resignation,  I  went  again  to  see 
MalinoV;  revealed  the  situation  as  it  had  developed  in 
the  past  few  days,  told  him  about  my  recent  conversa- 
tions with  Gueshov  and  Danev,  and  expressed  the  hope 
that  he  himself,  if  he  did  come  into  power,  would  begin 
by  approving  of  the  Tsaribrod  arrangement  and  would 
hasten  his  own  departure  for  St.  Petersburg  as  much  as 
possible.  Malinov,  who  at  the  moment  was  summoned 
to  the  Palace  by  the  King,  reiterated  his  promise  to 
influence  his  friends  in  favour  of  an  immediate  and 
reasonable  decision. 

Unfortunately  the  formation  of  a  Radical  Government 
came  to  nothing.  After  two  days  of  evasions  and  pro- 
crastinations the  King— under  whose  influence  is  not 
quite  clear,  but  most  probably  under  that  of  Rizov,  who 
was  very  much  agitated  at  this  time  and  continually 
engaged  in  conversation  with  the  Austrian  Minister — 
decided  to  entrust  the  formation  of  the  Cabinet  to  M. 
Danev,  in  other  words  to  leave  the  former  Government 
In  power,  but  excluding  Gueshov  and  two  or  three 
of  his  political  friends.  But  the  King  persuaded  M. 
Todorov  to  remain  in  the  Cabinet,  as  well  as  his  brother- 
in-law,  M.  Madjarov.  In  this  way  the  Government's 
link  with  the  "  Narodniak  "  party — the  Conservatives  of 
the  former  Eastern  Rumelia — was  not  severed ;  and  in 
the  person  of  M.  Todorov  I  was  assured  of  a  sincere 
advocate,  imbued  with  my  ideas,  in  the  bosom  of  the 
Council. 

But  the  direction  of  affairs  of  foreign  policy  belonged 
more  especially  to  M.  Danev,  and  I  noticed  with  in- 
creasing anxiety  that  he,  becoming  daily  more  influenced 
by  Rizov  and  the  military,  was  heaping  mistake  on 
mistake  and  multiplying  his  tactless  deeds,  till  his 
patriotic  petulance  seemed  bound  to  bring  Bulgaria  to 
grief. 

I  have  a  very  vivid  recollection  of  one  of  my  con- 
versations with    Danev  during  the   first    days    of   his 

N 


i8o    BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [ch.  xii. 

presidency.  When  I  was  laying  stress  on  the  dangers 
of  a  collision  between  the  former  allies,  Danev,  with  a 
sceptical  smile,  expressed  his  conviction  that  Serbia 
and  Greece  would  never  dare  to  attack  Bulgaria  or  to 
force  her  to  go  to  war,  because  the  Greek  Army  was 
practically  non-existent  and  the  Serbians  were  infinitely 
less  strong  than  the  Bulgarians.  "  But  you  are  forget- 
ting Rumania,"  I  remarked,  "and  her  claims  to  fresh 
territorial  acquisitions  in  the  Dobrudja — claims  which 
are  becoming  more  clearly  outlined  and  more  persis- 
tent every  day."  "  From  the  side  of  Rumania,  I  see 
no  danger,"  replied  Danev  sharply;  "you  know  how 
intimate  I  have  been  with  M.  Misu;i  and  we  have 
drawn  even  nearer  to  one  another  in  London,  and  from 
the  interviews  that  I  have  had  with  him  I  have  acquired 
the  firm  conviction  that  Rumania  has  not  entered  and 
will  not  enter  into  any  combination  with  Serbia  and 
Greece  which  would  be  directed  against  us.  What  I 
am  telling  you  is  a  fact.  I  have  seen  it  in  black  and 
white." 

It  was  quite  true  that  at  that  period  Rumania  was 
still  avoiding  the  conclusion  of  a  formal  agreement  with 
Serbia  and  Greece;  but  that  did  not  in  the  least  mean 
that  Rumania  would  not  present  her  claims  to  Bulgaria 
on  the  day  when  war  would  be  declared  between  the 
former  allies. 

"  And  what  are  you  doing  about  Turkey  ? "  I 
exclaimed.  "  Do  you  really  believe  that  Turkey,  in  the 
event  of  a  collision  between  her  late  conquerors,  would 
not  endeavour  to  take  back  Adrianople  and  the  whole  of 
Thrace  from  you  ?  " 

"  On  that  subject  I  feel  absolutely  easy,"  replied 
Danev,  and  he  continued  in  a  confidential  tone :  "  1 
became  very  intimate  in  London  with  the  second 
Turkish  Plenipotentiary,  Osman-Nizami  Pasha.^  We 
are  corresponding   at  the  moment,  and   quite   lately  I 

1  Formerely  Rumanian  diplomatic  agent  in  Sofia  ;  at  the  moment 
Rumanian  Minister  to  London. 

^  At  that  time  Turkish  Ambassador  to  Berlin. 


/ 


I9I3]  WARLIKE   PREPARATIONS  i8i 

received  a  letter  from  him  in  which  he  assures  me  most 
explicitly  that  in  Turkey  no  one  is  even  thinking  of  the 
possibility  of  a  fresh  war;  that  every  one  is  only  con- 
cerned with  one  thing — tending  the  wounds  inflicted  on 
the  Ottoman  Empire  by  the  disastrous  campaign  of  last 
year." 

"  But  do  tell  your  Osman-Nizami  Pasha  in  answer," 
I  exclaimed,  using  the  expression  so  common  in  the 
East,  "that  he  is  the  father  of  lies  !  If  he  writes  these 
kind  of  things  to  you,  it  is  solely  in  order  to  lull  your 
vigilance  and  to  encourage  you  to  a  collision  by  which 
the  Turks  would  most  certainly  profit ! " 

Danev  merely  tossed  his  head  and  his  face  assumed 
an  eminently  Bulgarian  expression  of  obstinate  in- 
credulity. 

As  I  said  above.  King  Ferdinand  in  his  telegraphic 
answer  to  the  Emperor  had  in  principle  accepted  the 
Russian  arbitration,  and  the  Bulgarian  Government  had 
sent  its  justificatory  memorandum  to  our  Foreign  Office. 
But  it  was  still  imperative  to  carry  out  the  arbitration, 
that  is  to  say  to  make  the  Bulgarians  and  Serbians  send 
their  plenipotentiaries  in  the  persons  of  their  two 
Prime  Ministers  to  St.  Petersburg  as  soon  as  possible. 
The  situation  in  Bulgaria  was  becoming  daily  more 
threatening.  The  troops  of  the  three  occupiers  of  the 
country  were  concentrated  at  certain  points,  fortifications 
were  hurriedly  erected  in  the  open  country.  The  former 
allies  took  up  their  positions  opposite  each  other,  pro- 
tecting themselves  by  outposts.  To  be  quite  impartial 
I  must  mention  that  the  Serbians  were  preparing  for 
the  eventual  collision  far  more  seriously  than  the  Bul- 
garians ;  they  covered  the  position  of  "  Ovtche-Polie  " 
with  concrete  fortifications  and  they  maintained  their 
Army  at  full  strength,  whereas  the  Bulgarians  released 
certain  classes  in  turn  so  that  these  could  return  to 
agricultural  labour.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that 
the  Serbians  wished  for  a  collision  more  than  the  Bul- 
garians did ;  occupying  nearly  the  whole  of  Macedonia 


i82     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [rn.  xii. 

they  had  no  reason  whatever  for  attacking  their  rivals, 
and  if  they  were  arming  so  thoroughly  it  was  because 
they  were  certain  of  being  attacked  by  them.  As  to  the 
Bulgarians,  they  continued  to  look  on  the  Greek  Army 
as  an  absolutely  negligible  quantity,  and  they  were  so 
sure  of  the  superiority  of  their  own  forces  over  those  of 
the  Serbians  that  they  allowed  themselves  the  luxury 
of  releasing  some  of  their  troops  for  agricultural 
purposes. 

Just  then  fate  seemed  to  be  sending  an  alarming 
warning  to  the  Bulgarians:  on  the  2nd  (15th)  June, 
towards  noon,  a  violent  earthquake  occurred  in  the 
central  part  of  the  Balkans.  Although  it  was  felt  very 
much  in  Sofia,  nothing  was  ruined  there.  But  at 
Tirnova  and  in  the  villages  and  small  towns  situated 
north  of  it,  there  was  a  terrible  amount  of  destruction 
and  a  considerable  number  of  victims.  Dreadful  scenes 
occurred  in  some  places,  as  for  instance  at  Tirnova 
itself,  where  about  fifty  children  were  buried  under  the 
ruins  of  a  school,  and  their  cries  and  groans  were  heard 
for  more  than  twenty-four  hours,  for  there  were  not 
enough  people  to  do  the  rescue  work :  half  the  town 
was  destroyed  and  all  the  eligible  men  were  with  the 
Army ! 

But  alas !  Bulgaria  paid  no  heed  to  this  warning. 

On  the  14th  (27th)  June,  M.  Todorov  informed  me 
that  in  the  evening  a  council  presided  over  by  the  King 
would  be  held  at  the  Palace  in  order  to  settle  definitely 
the  question  of  sending  the  Bulgarian  Plenipotentiary 
to  St.  Petersburg.  Todorov  promised  to  telephone  the 
result  of  this  conference  to  me  the  same  evening.  I  sat 
up  waiting  till  nearly  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and 
was  just  going  off  to  bed  when  at  last  the  telephone  bell 
rang;  then  I  heard  M.  Todorov's  voice  saying  :  "  I  have 
good  news  for  you  :  the  council  has  decided  to  send  a 
delegation  to  St.  Petersburg  immediately,  with  M.  Danev 
at  the  head  of  it.  I  will  come  round  the  first  thing  to- 
morrow morning  to   tell  you   the   details."    By  eight 


I9I3]    M.  DANEV  ORDERED  TO  PETERSBURG  183 

o'clock  in  the  morning  Todorov  was  with  me  and  he 
told  me  how  everything  had  gone  off!  At  the  King's 
wish  Todorov  had  spoken  first  and  advised  the  sending 
of  the  Bulgarian  Plenipotentiary  to  St.  Petersburg  at 
once.  Danev  did  not  contradict  him  in  the  main,  but  he 
observed  that  the  Serbians  had  not  yet  decided  to  send 
their  plenipotentiary  and  that  consequently  the  Bul- 
garian Government  might  find  itself  in  a  humiliating 
and  ridiculous  position  if  its  plenipotentiary  found  him- 
self all  alone  in  St.  Petersburg.  General  Savov  argued 
in  a  decisive  manner  against  the  sending  of  any  pleni- 
potentiary at  all ;  he  argued  that  the  Russian  arbitration 
could  be  entirely  dispensed  with ;  that  it  was  only 
necessary  to  make  the  Serbians  and  Greeks  see  that  the 
Bulgarians  were  not  in  the  least  afraid  of  them  and  were 
ready  and  quite  determined  to  occupy  at  once  and  by 
force  the  territories  which  were  theirs  by  right.  Serbia 
and  Greece  would  be  most  careful  not  to  face  such 
danger  and  would  end  by  yielding.  To  close  the  debate 
King  Ferdinand  declared  that  he  entirely  shared  M. 
Todorov's  point  of  view,  which  he  considered  to  be  the 
wisest  and  which,  moreover,  tallied  with  the  King's 
answer  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia's  telegram.  These 
words  of  the  King's  ended  the  discussion,  and  Danev's 
immediate  departure  was  decided  on  ! 

Two  hours  after  Todorov  had  left,  M.  Danev  came 
to  see  me  to  inform  me  officially  of  the  Government's 
decision.  Naturally  he  gave  me  to  understand  that  this 
decision  had  been  arrived  at  thanks  to  him.  I  was  care- 
ful not  to  let  him  see  that  I  knew  what  had  really 
occurred,  thanked  him  cordially,  and  then  asked : 
"Well!  M.  Danev,  then  when  are  we  going?  This 
evening  or  to-morrow  ?  I  have  already  ordered  my 
portmanteaux  to  be  packed." 

Danev  replied  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  start 
that  day,  but  that  he  would  try  to  be  ready  by  the 
following  evening;  he  warned  me  that  for  various 
reasons  he  did  not  wish  to  go  by  the  ordinary  way,  that 
is  to  say  by  Belgrade  and  Vienna.     There  only  remained 


i84     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES   [ch.xii. 

the  way  by  Bukharest,  which  was  far  longer  and  less 
convenient,  or  that  by  Varna,  the  Black  Sea  and  Odessa. 

Towards  mid-day  the  King's  private  secretary,  M. 
Dobrovitch,  came  to  see  me  to  convey  to  me  the  grate- 
ful thanks  of  his  master  for  all  my  efforts  which  had 
ended  in  the  wise  decision  arrived  at  by  the  Government 
the  evening  before.  The  King  added  that  he  hoped  that 
I  should  uphold  the  legitimate  rights  of  Bulgaria  in 
St.  Petersburg.  I  replied  to  Dobrovitch  that  I  was 
aware  of  the  decisive  part  the  King  had  played  at  the 
council  the  evening  before,  and  that  I  would  use  my 
best  efforts  to  make  the  conference  about  to  open  in 
St.  Petersburg  truly  beneficial  to  Bulgaria. 

The  following  day,  i6th  (29th)  June,  which  was  a 
Sunda}^,  I  had  several  talks  on  the  telephone  with 
Danev  about  our  departure.  Danev  asked  for  a  further 
respite,  and  suggested  going  by  Varna,  whence  the 
Russian  boat  was  leaving  for  Odessa  in  two  days.  I 
rebelled  at  such  a  delay  and  suggested  starting  for 
Varna  that  evening  and  embarking  on  a  Russian  torpedo- 
boat  which  had  been  stationed  there  since  the  war  and 
was  always  at  my  disposal.  But  Danev,  who — ^just  like 
his  colleague  of  the  Forum,  Cicero — was  terribly  afraid 
of  sea-sickness,  refused  my  proposal  and  ended  by 
promising  me  to  be  ready  to  start  on  the  Tuesday  by 
any  route  I  might  choose. 

To  induce  Danev  to  start  as  soon  as  possible,  I 
represented  to  him  that  as  soon  as  it  was  known  in 
Belgrade  that  our  departure  was  settled,  M.  Pachitch 
would  immediately  step  into  the  train  and  would  precede 
us  by  a  few  days  in  St.  Petersburg.  This  childish 
argument  had  a  great  effect  on  Danev !  However,  by 
Monday  morning  I  realised  that  Danev  was  escaping 
me  again,  and  that  his  beautiful  enthusiasm  had  given 
way  to  some  ulterior  motive  which  he  was  concealing 
from  me. 

Our  journey,  as  is  well  known,  never  came  off. 

On  Monday  morning,  towards  nine  o'clock,  two  of 


I9I3]       BULGARIANS  ATTACK  SERBIANS        185 

my  young  colleagues,  who  had  come  to  the  Legation 
to  write  in  cipher,  told  me  that  they  had  just  met  the 
military  attaches  of  Austria  and  Germany  (the  latter  was 
a  particularly  repulsive  specimen  of  the  Teutonic  race), 
and  that  these  worthies,  rubbing  their  hands  and  dis- 
playing exuberant  joy,  had  told  them  that  the  Bulgarians 
and  Serbians  had  been  fighting  since  the  evening 
before,  and  that  there  was  violent  firing  all  along  the 
Macedonian  front.  As  one  of  my  two  informants  was 
M.  Doubiagsky,  who  was  intelligent  and  eminently 
truthful,  I  was  bound  to  believe  the  report  he  brought, 
and  I  promptly  telephoned  to  M.  Danev  to  demand  an 
explanation.  Danev  replied  that  he  knew  nothing  for 
certain,  but  that  he  had  heard  something  about  an 
incident  between  the  Serbians  and  Bulgarians,  and  that 
at  the  moment  he  was  busy  talking  to  the  Palace,  and 
to  the  Minister  for  War,  in  order  to  arrive  at  what  had 
actually  happened.  Two  hours  later,  when  the  rumours 
had  been  confirmed  through  other  sources,  I  telephoned 
to  Danev,  and  entreated  him  most  earnestly  to  take 
immediate  steps  to  stop  the  firing  on  the  Macedonian 
front.  Towards  five  o'clock,  I  went  to  see  him  to  get 
news,  and  I  reiterated  my  entreaties  that  he  should  do 
all  in  his  power  to  stop  the  firing.  Danev  seemed  very 
much  upset,  and  avoided  looking  me  in  the  face;  he 
assured  me  that  what  had  occurred  was  not  serious, 
and  that  the  military  authorities  would  take  all 
necessary  measures  to  settle  amicably  the  "misunder- 
standing "  which  had  arisen  between  the  Bulgarian  and 
Serbian  troops. 

However,  by  the  evening  the  whole  town  knew 
that  Bulgarians  and  Serbians  were  fighting  on  the 
Bregalnitza,  and  telegrams  arrived  simultaneously  from 
Salonika  saying  that  there  also  the  Bulgarians  had  been 
attacked.  I  realised  that  events  were  taking  a  disastrous 
turn,  and  I  ordered  my  portmanteaux  to  be  unpacked. 
But  I  was  still  far  from  suspecting  that  the  Bulgarians 
alone  were  guilty  of  the  bloodshed. 

The  next  day — Tuesday  morning — Danev  came   to 


i86    BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [cii.xii. 

me  and,  much  disconcerted  but  more  sincere  in  his 
manner,  informed  me  that  on  Sunday  night,  a  collision 
had  actually  taken  place  between  a  section  of  the 
Bulgarian  and  Serbian  troops,  but  that  no  one  knew 
for  certain  what  had  caused  this  regrettable  incident; 
unfortunately,  the  collision  had  spread  along  the 
whole  front,  and  at  this  very  moment  the  Govern- 
ment was  dispatching  peremptory  orders  to  General 
Savov  to  stop  the  firing  at  once,  and  to  take  the  troops 
back  to  their  former  positions,  without  worrying  as  to 
whether  the  initiative  of  the  shots  fired  came  from  the 
Bulgarians  or  the  Serbians.  Of  course,  I  could  not  but 
approve  of  this  measure.  But  the  orders  of  the 
Bulgarian  Government  could  no  longer  stop  the  blood- 
shed. Military  operations  spread  still  further,  and  two 
or  three  days  later  no  one  any  longer  thought  of 
stopping  them. 

Meanwhile,  I  received  information  from  Belgrade 
that  the  Serbians,  having  taken  a  whole  Bulgarian 
regiment  prisoner,  had  found,  amongst  the  regimental 
papers,  the  order  to  attack  the  Serbian  outposts  during 
the  night  of  Sunday,  i6th  (29th)  June,  to  Monday,  17th 
(30th)  June,  to  destroy  them,  and  to  advance  on  such 
and  such  positions.  The  order  was  quite  authentic, 
and  there  could  be  no  doubt  whatever  about  it !  During 
the  first  three  days  of  the  hostilities  thus  begun,  the 
rumour  was  circulated  in  Sofia  that  in  Salonika  the 
Greeks  had,  in  the  night,  suddenly  attacked  the  Bul- 
garian brigade  and  had  massacred  it.  When  the 
document  which  the  Serbians  had  captured  from 
the  Bulgarians  was  made  public,  and  recognised  as 
authentic,  no  one  any  longer  believed  in  the  "  St. 
Bartholomew"  of  Salonika.  It  was  afterwards  con- 
clusively proved  that  there,  also,  the  initiative  of 
hostilities  came  from  the  Bulgarians. 

A  few  days  after  I  learnt  from  reliable  sources  how 
all  this  had  occurred. 

On  Saturday  morning,  I  had  not  been  the  only  one 


I9I3]  A  TREACHEROUS  ATTACK  187 

to  be  informed  of  the  decision  arrived  at  the  evening 
before  at  the  council  held  at  the  Palace.  The  same 
information  was  received  by  the  Austrian  and  German 
Ministers,  who  had  their  clients  in  the  bosom  of  the 
council.  The  whole  of  Saturday  was  spent  in  secret 
meetings  between  the  "Macedonians,"  the  military  of 
Savov's  camp,  and  the  agents  of  the  two  diplomats  in 
question.  The  next  day,  after  a  council  held  at  Count 
Tarnowski's,  the  "  Macedonians,"  Rizov,  Gennadiev, 
and  Colonel  Nerezov  (Chief  of  the  Headquarters 
Staff),  went  to  the  Palace  and  approached  the  King 
with  humble  prayers — which  sounded  sometimes  like 
threats— not  to  allow  Danev's  departure  for  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  to  force  the  Serbians  and  the  Greeks  to  make 
the  desired  concessions  by  immediately  commanding 
the  Bulgarian  troops  to  advance. 

"  But  this  is  war ! "  exclaimed  Ferdinand.  "  Not  at  all, 
sir,"  was  the  answer,  "we  have  a  right  to  occupy 
Macedonia  conjointly  with  the  Serbians  and  the  Greeks; 
neither  of  them  have  the  right  to  stop  our  army  of 
occupation  advancing  wherever  it  may  be  necessary. 
Yet,  nevertheless,  if  they  wished  to  oppose  it  by  force, 
we  should  overthrow  them,  and  should  occupy  such 
strong  positions  that  there  would  be  nothing  left  to 
them  but  to  submit  to  our  will.  And  then  the 
conferences  at  St.  Petersburg  might  begin." 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  it  was  this  inconceivable 
argument — that  such  a  treacherous  aggression  did  not 
constitute  an  opening  of  hostilities — which  had  a 
decisive  effect  on  Ferdinand's  mind.  This  subterfuge 
exactly  suited  his  character.  And  added  to  this 
there  were  the  thinly-veiled  threats  of  the  speakers. 
Ferdinand,  who  was  never  remarkable  for  much 
courage,  already  saw  revolvers  levelled  at  his  head 
and  bombs  strewing  his  path,  through  the  heads  of 
the  Macedonian  bands  who  were  infesting  his  capital, 
and  who  would  murder  him  without  pity  if  he  were 
inclined  to  give  up  certain  parts  of  Madedonia  to  the 
Serbians  and  Greeks. 


i88     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [ch.xii 

However,  before  giving  his  consent,  the  King  sent 
for  General  Savov  to  ask  him  his  opinion.  Savov  went 
at  once  to  the  Palace,  and  declared  to  the  King,  before 
his  accomplices,  that  he  entirely  shared  their  point  of 
view. 

"  In  that  case,"  said  Ferdinand,  "  I  authorise  you  to 
give  the  necessary  orders  to  the  Army."  But  the 
General,  who  had  never  sinned  through  excess  of 
ingenuousness,  told  the  King  that  he  did  not  think  it 
possible  to  give  such  an  important  order  without  a 
zvritteii  authorisation  from  His  Majesty.  After  much 
discussion  and  hesitation,  Ferdinand  was  at  last  obliged 
to  sit  down  at  his  writing-table,  to  write  and  to  sign  a 
document  in  Savov's  name,  in  which  he  authorised  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  take  all  necessary  measures  for 
the  advance  of  the  Bulgarian  troops  on  such  and  such 
positions.  The  General  put  this  document  in  his  pocket, 
but  he  did  not  keep  it  there  long:  very  soon  this  precious 
document  was  sent  to  repose  in  a  safe  in  a  bank  abroad. 
If  Savov  had  not  taken  this  precaution,  Ferdinand,  at 
the  first  reverse,  would  have  had  him  arrested,  and, 
having  obtained  possession  of  the  compromising 
document,  would  have  summoned  the  General  before 
a  military  tribunal  for  having  attacked  the  Allies  of 
Bulgaria  treacherously  and  without  authorisation ;  and 
finally  twelve  bullets  would  have  silenced  the  former 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Bulgarian  Army  for  ever. 

But,  thanks  to  the  wise  precaution  of  General  Savov, 
he  escaped  such  a  fate,  and  Ferdinand  could  not 
make  him  shoulder  the  whole  responsibility  for  the 
treacherous  deed  of  the  i6th  (29th)  June. 

The  King  thus  assumed  a  considerable  share  of 
responsibility  for  this  deed,  which  still  weighs  on  his 
conscience  and  marks  him  with  a  stain  of  blood  and 
felony. 

It  ought  to  be  mentioned  that  the  sudden  aggression 
directed  against  the  Serbians  assumed,  in  consequence 
of  the  preceding  circumstances,  a  particularly  odious 
character.      On    the    i6th    (29th)    June   the   news   was 


I9I3]  WAR  BEGINS  189 

circulated  on  both  army  fronts  that  the  two  Governments 
had  definitely  accepted  the  Russian  arbitration,  and  that 
in  consequence  all  danger  of  war  was  over.  This  news 
produced  the  most  joyful  impression  in  both  camps. 
Both  sides  began  to  fraternise,  officers  as  well  as  men. 
From  the  outposts  they  assembled  together,  drank 
together,  embraced  one  another.  After  the  curfew  each 
man  returned  to  his  post.  Yet  this  same  evening  General 
Savov's  order  to  advance  was  received  by  the  Bulgarian 
troops.  And  lo !  and  behold !  towards  dawn  the  Bul- 
garians suddenly  attacked  the  Serbian  outposts,  where 
the  men  were  peacefully  sleeping  under  the  influence  of 
the  fraternisation  of  the  day  before,  and  .  .  .  massacred 
their  would-be  brothers.  But  this  cowardly  attack 
availed  the  Bulgarians  nothing.  The  very  next  day  the 
Serbians  succeeded  in  concentrating  their  reserves;  and 
the  enemy  detachments  who  at  the  outset  had  made  a 
certain  advance  were  stopped  and  thrown  back  with 
serious  loss  after  two  days'  fighting.  It  was  then  that 
the  Bulgarian  Government  and  the  King  decided  to 
follow  my  earnest  advice,  and  on  the  19th  June  (2nd 
July)  they  sent  a  peremptory  order  to  the  whole  front 
to  regain  their  former  positions  immediately.  But  it 
was  too  late.  The  Serbians,  exasperated  at  what  had 
occurred,  did  not  allow  the  Bulgarians  to  retreat  quietly 
they  themselves  began  to  advance,  and  to  fall  on  any 
Bulgarian  detachments  that  were  retiring  without  fight- 
ing. It  was  in  this  way  that  almost  a  whole  Bulgarian 
regiment  was  taken  with  all  its  supplies  and  its  papers. 
Among  these  papers  was  found  the  famous  order-of-the- 
day  of  General  Savov. 

On  Sunday,  the  23rd  June  (6th  July),  the  Serbian 
and  Greek  Ministers  officially  broke  ofT  relations  with 
Bulgaria  and  left  Sofia.  At  the  same  time  the  pro- 
clamations of  the  Kings  of  Serbia  and  Greece  were 
issued  to  their  armies.  Thus  the  Bulgarians  were  at 
war  with  their  former  allies.  And  on  the  21st  June 
(4th  July)  mobilisation  was  ordered  in  Rumania. 


190    BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES    [ch.xii. 

In  Macedonia  the  plateau  of  Ovfclic  Folic  and  the 
bend  of  the  Vardar  near  Krivolak  were  already  the 
scene  of  sanguinary  battles.  At  Krivolak  the  Bulga- 
rians had  at  first  succeeded  in  surrounding  a  whole 
Serbian  division,  but  Prince  Alexander  arriving  at  the 
last  moment  with  a  portion  of  the  Serbian  First  Army 
retrieved  the  situation  and  freed  the  surrounded  division. 
And  from  that  moment  success  was  decidedly  on  the 
Serbian  side.  The  Bulgarians  were  forced  to  retire 
gradually  towards  their  former  frontier,  that  is  to  say, 
in  the  direction  of  Kustendil.  Two  weeks  later,  the 
Serbians  had  already  conquered  strong  Bulgarian  posi- 
tions on  the  frontier,  and  it  only  depended  on  them  to 
occupy  the  whole  district  of  Kustendil;  moreover,  by 
then  complete  demoralisation  had  set  in  amongst  the* 
Bulgarian  troops  ;  whole  companies  were  deserting  from 
the  front  with  their  arms,  and  were  going  into  the  in- 
terior of  the  country  and  in  the  direction  of  Sofia,  which 
might  become  very  dangerous  for  Ferdinand  and  the 
members  of  the  Government. 

Generally  speaking,  during  this  miserable  war  the 
Bulgarian  soldier  displayed  much  less  courage  and 
endurance  than  during  the  glorious  campaign  against 
the  Turks;  and  the  reason  is  quite  simple  and  quite 
natural.  Whereas  the  Bulgarian  officer  was  impelled 
by  the  ambitions  of  a  rigid  and  exaggerated  nationalism, 
the  soldier  vaguely  felt  that  he  was  being  exposed  to 
death  in  order  that  he  might  shed  the  blood  of  his 
Serbian  brothers  without  plausible  reasons  and  for 
unacknowledged  ends.  Besides,  in  going  against  his 
will  to  fight  his  former  allies,  the  Bulgarian  soldier's 
thoughts  were  centred  on  other  things :  he  was  per- 
petually thinking  of  his  native  village  left  at  the  mercy 
of  a  Turkish  or  Rumanian  invasion.  In  this  respect 
the  Bulgarian  peasant  showed  far  more  common  sense 
than  his  rulers,  who  seemed  utterly  unable  to  view 
matters  correctly. 

I  have  been  told  that  when  the  order  was  issued  to 
retire  the   Bulgarian   troops  who  were  occupying  the 


I9I3]        SOLDIERS    REFUSE   OBEDIENCE  191 

position  of  Bulair  (near  the  Dardanelles)  and  to  send 
them  to  Macedonia,  the  soldiers  of  several  regiments 
refused  to  obey.  They  answered  the  reproofs  and 
threats  of  their  officers  with  threats,  and  finally  drove 
the  officers  away.  Then,  to  persuade  them  to  obey, 
some  superior  officers  of  the  reserve  were  sent  to  them; 
among  them  was  the  colonel  who  told  me  all  this,  and 
who  formerly  had  been  an  artillery  officer  in  Russia.^ 
When  these  officers  began  to  persuade  the  mutinous 
soldiers  not  to  commit  such  a  breach  of  discipline  and 
not  to  dishonour  the  name — illustrious  all  the  world 
over — of  the  Bulgarian  soldier,  the  vo'iniks  (soldiers) 
replied,  "  But  how  can  we  retire  from  here  ?  The 
Turkish  Army  faces  us ;  we  know  perfectly  well  that 
it  is  not  being  disbanded :  on  the  contrary,  fresh  con- 
tingents are  arriving  daily.  If  we  leave,  the  Turks  will 
promptly  advance,  will  reoccupy  all  the  territories  and 
all  the  towns  which  we  have  wrested  from  them  with 
our  blood ;  then  they  will  go  to  us,  within  our  borders, 
will  burn  and  plunder  our  villages,  violate  our  women 
and  butcher  our  children.  And  meanwhile  we  shall  be 
amusing  ourselves  by  fighting  our  brothers  and  co- 
religionists the  Serbians  !  We  will  never  consent  to 
this."  The  soldiers  could  only  be  persuaded  to  obey 
and  to  consent  to  being  led  away  when  the  reserve 
officers  gave  their  word  of  honour  that  by  virtue  of  a 
formal  agreement  recently  concluded  the  Turks  were 
going  to  demobilise  their  Army.  And  this  agreement 
had  not  been  invented  by  the  reserve  officers;  they 
themselves  had  received  official  assurance  of  it  from 
their  superior  officers ! 

^  The  officers  on  the  reserve  were  far  more  highly  thought  of  among 
Bulgarian  soldiers  than  the  officers  on  the  active  list.  The  common 
people  looked  on  the  latter  as  janizaries  and  agents  of  Ferdinand's  that 
were  little  liked  and  generally  despised  in  the  field.  These  officers  had 
become  strangers  to  the  people,  whereas  the  officers  on  the  reserve,  who 
had  shown  themselves  to  be  quite  as  brave,  if  not  braver,  than  those  on 
the  active  list  during  the  Turkish  war,  belonged  to  classes  of  society 
which  the  Bulgarian  peasants  generally  esteemed :  rich  peasants,  lawyers, 
schoolmasters,  former  Russian  officers,  etc. 


193     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES   [rii.  xu. 

But  a  still  greater  disaster  overtook  the  Bulgarian 
troops  who  were  operating  against  the  Greeks.  The 
army  of  General  Ivanov  (the  victor  of  Adrianople), 
which  occupied  Southern  Macedonia  only,  consisted  of 
two  reduced  divisions,^  that  is  to  say,  of  about  30,000 
to  35,000  men.  The  Bulgarian  commander  considered 
this  number  quite  sufficient  not  only  to  hold  back  but 
even  to  defeat  the. Greek  Army,  which  the  Bulgarians 
treated  wuth  supreme  contempt.  They  were  cruelly 
mistaken.  King  Constantine  had  under  his  command 
80,000  men,  experienced  soldiers,  better  armed  than  the 
Bulgarians,  and  animated  by  innate  and  historic  hatred 
of  the  latter;  General  Ivanov's  army  was  completely 
beaten  and  he  had  to  retire,  without  his  artillery  and 
supplies,  across  the  mountain  range  of  Balachitza, 
already  famed  in  history  by  the  decisive  defeat  inflicted 
by  the  Emperor  Basil  II,,  tlie  Exterminator  of  the  Bul- 
garians^ on  the  last  armies  of  the  Bulgarian  Tsar,  John 
Samuel  Schischman, 

During  this  retreat  the  Bulgarian  second  division 
accomplished  feats  of  tenacity  and  courage  ;  but  at  the 
same  time  the  Bulgarians,  exasperated  by  defeat,  dis- 
graced themselves  by  deeds  of  savage  cruelty  towards 
the  Greek  population  and  prisoners  of  war.  The  Greeks 
repaid  them  in  their  own  coin,  and  the  war  between  the 
two  co-religionist  peoples  so  recently  allied  assumed  a 
thoroughly  odious  character. 

However,  at  the  close  of  this  brief  but  bloody  cam- 
paign the  Greeks  had  crossed  the  Bulgarian  frontier  in 
several  places  and  had  no  longer  any  important  barrier 
before  them. 

When  the  first  reverses  against  the  Greeks  were 
known  and  the  retreat  of  Belachitza  began,  Danev,  who 
now  came  to  see  me  nearly  every  day,  confessed  the 
Bulgarian  defeat  very  openly.     This  happened — if  my 

^  A  Bulgarian  division  usually  comprises  six  regiments,  hence  about 
24,000  bayonets. 


I9I3]  MY  ADVICE  TO   DANEV  193 

memory  does   not  fail  me — two  or   three   days  before 
the  Rumanian  troops  crossed  the  Danube. 

"Very  well,"  I  said  to  Danev,  "yon  are  undone  !    And 
here  is  a  friend's  advice  which  I  offer  in  all  sincerity : 
stop  the  Rumanians  immediately,  giving  them  all  the 
concessions  they  demand,  and  also  immediately  ask  for 
peace  in  Belgrade   and   in  Bukharest.     Otherwise   the 
Turks  will  soon  be  falling  on  you.     M.  de  Giers   has 
just   informed   me   that   whereas   the   Grand   Vizier  is 
repeatedly  assuring  him  that  Turkey  is  not  dreaming 
of  moving  or  of  joining  in   the  new  Balkan  war,   the 
Russian  Embassy  possesses   positive  information  that 
the  Turkish  troops  are  advancing  by  night  ever  nearer 
to  the   new  Bulgarian  frontier,  and  that  a  fairly  con- 
siderable force  is  already  concentrated  there.     Hence  I 
reiterate   my  most   earnest   advice  :    make  peace   with 
your  former  allies  at  once  and  at  any  cost,  otherwise 
you  will  suffer  the  worst  disasters ;  for  you  are  undonel' 
Danev  would   not  accept   my   extreme    but   strictly 
logical   deductions.      He   replied    that  the    Bulgarians 
would   not   oppose   any   resistance    to   the    Rumanian 
troops — that  had  been  decided  on  ;  they  had   only  to 
occupy  the  Dobrudja  and  a  part  of  Danubian  Bulgaria. 
The  present  object  of  the  Bulgarian  Army  was  to  hold 
the   Greeks,    and,   by   stopping    the    Serbians   on   the 
Bregalnitza,  to  enter  Serbia  from  the  other  side,  that  is 
to  say,  from  the  side  of  the  north-eastern  frontier,  where 
the  Bulgarians  to  this   end  had  mustered  special  and 
fairly  considerable  forces.     When  a  success  should  be 
apparent  on  this   new  side,  the    Rumanians  would  be 
forced  to  stop  and  to  become  more  conciliatory.     As  to 
the  Turks,  Danev  persisted  in  not   believing  in  their 
intention  to  re-take  Adrianople  and  Thrace.     I  did  not 
conceal   from    the    speaker  that   I   did   not   share    his 
opinion  in  any  way,  and  1  drew  his  attention  to  the  fact 
that  by  not  heeding  my  advice  he  was  assuming  a  very 
heavy  responsibility  towards  his  country. 

Two    days   after,  however,   the   Bulgarian  Govern- 
ment, in  view  of  the  crossing  of  the  Danube  by  large 


194     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES   [cii.  xii. 

Rumanian  forces,  addressed  to  me  and  directly  to  St. 
Petersburg  an  entreaty  to  stop  military  operations  by 
our  all-powerful  words,  and  conjointly  with  the  other 
Great  Powers  to  elaborate  the  conditions  of  peace. 
St.  Petersburg  recommended  the  two  sides  to  take  as  a 
basis  for  negotiations  a  frontier  passing  by  the  Bregal- 
nitza,  the  Vardar,  the  range  of  Belachitza  and  the  lower 
course  of  the  Struma— a  frontier  which  would  have 
left  to  Bulgaria  the  towns  of  Kotchana,  Petchovo, 
Drama,  and  Kavala.  At  the  same  time  we  suggested 
to  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the  Balkan  States  to  assemble 
at  Nish  and  to  begin  peace  negociations.  The  Bul- 
garians promptly  accepted  our  proposals,  and  through 
me  informed  Belgrade  that  General  Paprikov — former 
Minister  to  St.  Petersburg — was  going  to  be  sent  to 
Nish  to  enter  into  a  parley  about  an  immediate  armis- 
tice. Paprikov  was  to  be  accompanied  by  our  military 
agent,  Colonel  Romanowski. 

The  Serbian  Government  agreed  to  the  coming  of 
General  Paprikov  and  Colonel  Romanowski ;  but  when 
they  arrived,  having  submitted  to  all  the  formalities  of 
crossing  the  two  fronts  near  Pirot,  they  found  no 
Serbian  plenipotentiary  in  Nish,  and  in  the  meantime 
I  received  a  notice  from  Belgrade  that  the  Serbians 
could  not  begin  any  conversation  with  the  Bulgarian 
delegate  without  the  participation  of  Greek  and  Monte- 
negrin Plenipotentiaries,  who  were  expected  shortly  in 
Uskub  and  not  in  Nish;  I  was  informed  that  Greece 
would  be  represented  by  M.  Venizelos  himself.  All 
this  signified  that  the  adversaries  of  the  Bulgarians 
wished  directly  to  broach  the  peace  negociations  and 
not  parleyings  about  an  armistice.  This  exchange 
of  telegrams  between  me  and  Belgrade  took  four 
days,  during  which  Paprikov  and  Romanowski  were 
kept  waiting  about  in  a  hotel  in  Nish,  the  latter 
surrounded  by  every  care  and  attention,  the  former 
under  the  strictest  supervision.  On  the  fifth  day, 
Paprikov,  who  had  not  got  full  power  to  arrange  the 
peace  terms  with  the  heads  of  the  Serbian  and  Greek 


I9I3]        RUMANIANS   ENTER   BULGARIA         195 

Governments,    returned    to    Sofia    from    his    fruitless 
errand. 

I  must  mention  here  a  very  characteristic  detail  of 
General  Paprikov's  journey.  The  Serbians  complained 
that  the  Bulgarian  command  near  Pirot  had  profited  by 
the  short  opening  on  the  front  to  advance  the  troops 
in  certain  places  and  to  alter  the  disposition  of  the 
batteries.  And  Colonel  Romanowski  having  made 
inquiries  about  this  accusation  found  it  to  be  true. 

While  Paprikov  was  in  Nish,  the  military  position 
of  the  Bulgarians  became  still  worse  :  the  Serbians,  as 
I  said  before,  broke  through  their  enemies'  second  line 
of  defence  and  were  on  the  point  of  occupying  Kus- 
tendil ;  the  Greeks  had  taken  the  positions  of  Rilo- 
Dagh  and  were  hence  on  Bulgarian  territory,  with  all 
the  possibility  of  descending  the  Rilo  range  either  on 
the  Philippopolis  side  or  on  the  side  of  Samakov  and 
Sofia.  Meanwhile  the  Rumanian  Army,  not  at  all  con- 
tent with  the  occupation  of  the  Dobrudja,  having  made 
three  bridges  over  the  Danube,  occupied  the  whole  of 
Northern  Bulgaria  at  one  stroke,  crossed  the  Balkans 
by  the  Arab-Konak  Pass  —  the  way  taken  by  the 
Russians  in  December,  1877  —  and  began  to  descend 
into  the  plain  of  Sofia.  By  this  rapid  advance  the 
Rumanians  threatened  to  cut  off  the  Bulgarian  forces 
that  had  entered  Serbia  from  the  side  of  Belogradchik 
and  of  Trn,  so  that  there  was  nothing  left  to  the 
Bulgarian  command  but  hurriedly  to  recall  these  troops  ; 
one  division,  which  could  not  possibly  retire  in  time,  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Rumanian  Army  ;  the  soldiers 
cried  treason,  laid  down  their  arms  and  surrendered  to 
the  Rumanians;  complete  disorder  was  beginning  in 
the  Bulgarian  Army. 

On  the  1st  (14th)  July,  the  Turks  definitely  threw  off 
their  mask,  and  an  irade  of  the  Sultan's  ordered  the 
Ottoman  troops  to  cross  the  frontier  and  to  re-occupy 
Adrianople. 

Exactly  a  week  after  the  conversation  reported 
above,  Danev,  pale  and  upset,  came  to  see  me,  and  when 

o 


196    BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [cii.  xii. 

I  begged  him  to  sit  down,  he  threw  himself  into  an 
armchair,  exclaiming :  "  M.  Nekludoff,  we  are  done  for ! 
What  is  to  be  done?  Doubtless  you  already  know 
that  the  Turks  have  crossed  the  frontier  and  are 
marching  on  Adrianople,  where  we  have  only  1500 
soldiers." 

"  M.  Danev,  it  is  exactly  a  week  ago  to  the  day  that 
I  said  to  you  :  ^you  an  undone' ;  you  refused  to  believe  it 
and  you  only  half  listened  to  my  earnest  advice.  What 
can  I  say  to  you  now?"  Nevertheless,  I  comforted 
him  a  little,  and  I  proceeded  to  investigate  with  him 
the  steps  to  be  taken  to  obtain  an  armistice  as  quickly 
as  possible,  to  be  followed  by  peace.  I  was  truly  filled 
with  pity  for  this  man  at  bay  describing  his  country 
as  completely  shipwrecked!  As  concerning  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Turks  I  could  as  yet  say  nothing  to  Danev. 
I  felt  sure  that  in  St.  Petersburg  we  should  do  all  in 
our  power  to  stop  the  Turks,  but  I  also  knew  that  from 
Berlin  they  were  being  encouraged  and  urged  on. 

This  was  my  last  conversation  with  Danev.  The 
following  day  the  whole  Cabinet  resigned,  and  on 
the  7th  (20th)  July,  after  a  ministerial  crisis  lasting 
five  days,  Ferdinand  entrusted  the  formation  of  a  new 
Cabinet  to  the  Stamboulovists  with  Radoslavov  and 
Tontchev  at  their  head.  The  Foreign  Office  was  given 
to  Gennadiev,  a  "  Koutzo-Wallachian  "-Macedonian  by 
birth,  with  a  more  or  less  European  appearance,  intel- 
ligent, cunning,  rather  agreeable,  but  unfortunately 
labouring  under  the  onus  of  a  formal  accusation  of 
embezzlement.  It  was  clear  that  by  this  change  of 
Government  Ferdinand,  at  this  critical  moment,  thought 
he  could  buy  the  goodwill  of  Austria  and  her  inter- 
vention in  favour  of  the  Bulgarians,  an  intervention  he 
had  been  impatiently  awaiting  for  some  weeks,  in  fact 
ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  Bulgarian  reverses. 
My  French  colleague  and  I  attached  even  more  im- 
portance to  Ferdinand's  choice:  we  thought  it  signified 
an  intervention  by  Austria  already  agreed  on ;  but  we 


I0I3]  COLLAPSE  OF   BULGARIA  19; 

were  mistaken.  As  was  proved  later  by  Italian  revela- 
tions, Austria  did  in  fact  wish  to  intervene  and  to  attack 
Serbia,  but  she  was  stopped  firstly  by  Italy's  flat 
refusal  to  be  associated  in  such  a  policy,  and  secondly, 
and  more  especially  by  the  veto  of  Germany.  The  latter 
had  a  more  important  and  pressing  object  in  view — 
that  of  restoring  Thrace  to  the  Turks,  and  of  recon- 
quering her  own  former  influence  in  Stambul.  And 
from  Berlin  the  Austrians  were  told :  "  Wait.  The  time 
is  not  yet.    Our  day  will  come." 

The  day  came  exactly  a  year  later,  in  July,  1914. 

On  the  9th  (22nd)  July,  Adrianople  was  retaken 
without  a  blow  being  struck  by  the  Turkish  troops, 
who  after  that  never  thought  of  pausing,  but  advanced 
rapidly,  retaking  all  the  territory  which  the  Bulgarians 
had  taken  from  them. 

We  were  going  through  sad  times  in  Sofia  then. 
The  Rumanians  were  camping  only  15  kilometres  from 
the  Bulgarian  capital ;  driving  one  day  along  the  Ork- 
hanie  highroad  about  ten  kilometres  from  the  town,  with 
my  glasses  I  could  see  the  silhouettes  of  the  Rumanian 
patrols  in  the  plain  beyond  the  Isker.  During  the  day 
the  Rumanian  aeroplane  ^  flew  over  Sofia  and  threw  out 
harmless  pamphlets.  Alarming  news  came  from  Kus- 
tendil :  mutinous  soldiers  were  threatening  a  march  on 
the  capital.  And  meantime  the  Greeks  had  approached 
Samokov  and  were  proclaiming  reprisals  for  the 
Bulgarian  atrocities.  Finally  the  rumour  spread  that 
the  Turks  had  crossed  the  former  frontier  of  Bulgaria 
and  were  beginning  to  plunder  and  set  fire  to  the 
villages.  The  Bulgarians  belonging  to  the  leisured  and 
ruling  classes  lost  their  heads  and  sent  letters  to  us 
begging  for  refuge  if  necessary  in  the  foreign  legations. 
In  the  courtyard  of  the  Palace,  near  the  back  door,  two 
royal  motor  cars  stood  ready  day  and  night  to  take  the 
King  and  his  family  away  from  the  capital.  The  foreign 
Ministers  met  at  the  house   of  our   senior  to   discuss 

^  There  was  only  one  in  the  Rumanian  Army  ! 


198     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES   [ch.  xii. 

the  situation  and  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  preserve 
order  in  the  town.  After  a  short  discussion  we  agreed 
to  telegraph  to  our  respective  Governments  to  suggest 
that  they  should  beg  the  Rumanians  to  occupy  Sofia 
with  their  troops  if  the  town  was  really  threatened 
with  the  entry  of  the  Greeks  or  with  an  inroad  of 
mutinous  soldiers.  It  was  to  be  distinctly  understood 
in  this  case  that  the  Rumanians  were  to  confine  them- 
selves to  keeping  order,  without  interrupting  the 
working  of  the  Bulgarian  Government. 

The  day  after  this  meeting  we  were  invited  to  go 
and  see  the  King  in  the  evening.  Evidently  His  Majesty 
wished  to  review  the  situation  with  us.  Our  arrival  at 
the  Palace  was  originally  fixed  for  seven  o'clock  and 
then  postponed  till  ten.  The  night  was  dark ;  a  strong, 
cold  wind  was  blowing  from  the  Vitosch  Pass,^  when 
one  after  the  other  we  glided  like  conspirators  into  the 
dimly-lit  courtyard  of  the  Konak  of  Sofia  and  entered 
the  Palace.  Up  half-dark  staircases  and  corridors  we 
threaded  our  way  and  were  shown  into  a  room  just  as 
dimly  lit,  where  we  were  received  by  the  private 
secretary,  Dobrovitch,  with  his  customary  black  coat 
and  amiable  giggle,  who  begged  us  to  wait  patiently  for 
a  few  minutes  as  the  King  was  still  conferring  with  his 
Ministers.  We  were  all  disposed  to  be  indulgent,  and 
we  lit  cigarettes  and  began  to  talk  in  whispers.  The 
clock  struck  eleven,  then  twelve,  and  still  the  King  did 
not  send  for  us.  We  had  all  imagined  that  he  had 
summoned  us  so  as  to  receive  us  in  his  study,  and  there 
laying  aside  all  etiquette,  so  superfluous  at  such  a  time, 
to  discuss  with  us  the  critical  position  of  the  country 
and  the  capital  And  we  all  were  disposed  to  listen 
attentively  and  to  help  him  with  our  advice  and  our 
intercession  with  our  Governments.  But  this  protracted 
waiting  began  to  annoy  us;  we  considered  that  Ferdinand 

1  The  summer  of  191 3  was  in  general  extremely  cold,  and  this  was 
very  much  felt  in  the  high  plain  of  Sofia  where  the  summer  evenings  are 
always  cool. 


I9I3]  AN  ARTIFICIAL  SETTING  199 

was  being  too  high-handed  with  Ministers  to  whom  he 
would  soon  have  to  address  entreaties. 

"  Listen,  gentlemen  ! "  whispered  one  of  the  Ministers 
to  two  intimate  colleagues  in  a  corner:  "all  this  has  a 
truly  lugubrious  appearance.  First  that  door  will  open, 
then  another,  and  we  shall  be  led  into  an  inner  court  and 
there  by  torchlight  we  shall  see  either  Danev  or  Savov 
having  his  head  cut  off!  "  "  Or  else,"  replied  some  one 
else,  "the  door  will  open  and  dear  Dobrovitch  will  appear 
with  his  usual  amiable  giggle  to  inform  us  that  the 
King  has  bolted  and  that  we  shall  never  see  him  again  ! " 
At  last  the  famous  door  opened,  and  Dobrovitch  really 
appeared,  and  begged  us  to  follow  him.  We  went 
through  two  or  three  half-dark  rooms  and  suddenly 
found  ourselves  in  the  state  saloon,  which  was  brilliantly 
lit  up  and  quite  empty.  We  were  asked  to  stand  up  in 
order  of  seniority  and  we  did  so.  The  senior  at  this 
time  was  the  German  Minister  von  Below;  I  took  the 
second  place,  then  came  the  Minister  of  Great  Britain, 
then  the  others ;  we  were  placed  far  apart.  Two  or 
three  minutes  after  the  door  at  the  far  end  of  the  saloon 
opened  and  the  King  entered  in  full  dress  with  decora- 
tions (whereas  we  had  been  invited  to  come  in  morning- 
dress  !).  His  Majesty  was  preceded  by  his  Lord 
Chamberlain  and  his  aide-de-camp,  and  followed  at  a 
distance  of  ten  feet  by  his  new  Foreign  Secretary 
Gennadiev,  in  evening  clothes,  with  a  white  tie  and  all 
his  Bulgarian  and  Saxe-Coburg  decorations.  The  King, 
making  a  bow  which  included  every  one,  took  up  his 
position  in  the  middle  of  the  room  and  made  us  a  speech 
obviously  prepared  beforehand,  in  which  he  revealed  the 
critical  situation  of  Bulgaria.  Having  alluded,  somewhat 
pointedly,  to  the  so-called  hostility  of  the  Great  Powers 
towards  Bulgaria  as  being  the  cause  of  this  situation,  he 
entreated  us  to  transmit  to  our  Governments  his  earnest 
prayer  not  to  allow  the  total  shipwreck  of  the  country 
to  ensue. 

All  this  artificial  setting  and  this  pretentious  speech — 
somewhat  unseemly  from  Ferdinand's  lips — ended  by 


200    BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [cii.  xii. 

shocking  us  all  without  any  distinction  of  political 
camps:  on  each  face  surprise  and  displeasure  were 
depicted.  Having  finished  his  speech  the  King  went 
straight  up  to  the  French  Minister  and  talked  to  him  in 
a  low  voice,  then  he  came  up  to  me  and  in  a  voice  so 
low  as  not  to  be  overheard  by  my  neighbours  asked  : 

"What  do  you  think  of  the  situation,  M.  Nekludoff? 
Will  Russia  really  allow  the  Turks  to  plunder  Eastern 
Rumelia  and  to  enter  Philippopolis?  Will  she  reall3' 
not  come  to  our  assistance?  If  it  is  I  who  ought  to  be 
punished,  why  punish  the  whole  Bulgarian  people? 
What  have  you  to  say  to  that  ?  " 

These  last  words  exhausted  my  patience  and  instead 
of  answering  the  King  in  a  low  voice  as  etiquette 
demanded,  I  replied  quite  loud,  so  that  each  of  my 
words  could  be  heard  by  my  colleagues:  "Sir,  with 
respect  to  the  advance  of  the  Turks,  Your  Majesty 
may  rest  assured  that  we  shall  be  able  to  stop  the 
Ottoman  troops  and  shall  not  allow  them  to  trample 
that  soil  which  was  Bulgaria  before  the  war ;  concerning 
everything  else,  Your  Majesty  already  knows  my 
opinion :  that  Bulgaria's  sole  salvation  lies  in  the  con- 
clusion of  an  immediate  peace  with  her  former  allies 
and  with  Rumania ;  we  are  ready  to  co-operate  in 
this  good  work  with  all  the  means  in  our  power;  we 
cannot  do  more."  The  King  looked  at  me  with  an  evil 
expression  on  his  face,  was  silent  for  a  few  minutes  and 
then  asked : 

"And  you  feel  sure  that  you  will  stop  the  Turks?" 

"  Yes,  I  am  quite  sure  of  it,  sir,"  I  took  on  myself  to 
answer. 

The  King  bowed  to  me  and  then  turned  to  my 
neighbour,  the  Minister  of  Great  Britain,  and  asked  him 
what  he  thought  of  the  situation. 

"  I  share  the  opinion  of  my  Russian  colleague,  sir," 
was  the  answer. 

Ferdinand  exchanged  a  few  words  with  the  other 
Ministers,  but  he  treated  the  Austro-Hungarian  and 
German  Ministers  with  studied  coldness.     He  probably 


I9I3]  RUSSIAN    INPXUENCE  201 

knew  that  he  could  no  longer  count  on  active  support 
from  their  countries,  and  consequently  he  was  sulking 
with  them.  Having  talked  to  every  one  the  King 
returned  to  the  middle  of  the  room,  made  a  general  bow 
and  walked  away  with  the  same  ceremonial  towards  his 
private  apartments, 

PVom  this  day,  and  in  spite  of  my  abrupt  answer, 
Ferdinand  sent  for  me  repeatedly  during  the  succeeding 
weeks  and  consulted  me  about  all  the  questions  which 
were  being  discussed  at  the  peace  conference  of 
Bukharest.  I  had  returned  to  favour,  and  this  lastecl 
until  the  day  when  the  final  result  of  the  negotiations 
of  Bukharest  had  deprived  the  Bulgarians  and  their 
master  of  all  hope  of  improvement  in  the  situation  in 
which  they  had  placed  themselves  by  their  inordinate 
ambition  and  their  insane  obstinacy.  Moreover,  when 
this  lasciafe  ogni spcrauza  moment  arrived  Ferdinand  was 
already  preparing  to  leave  Bulgaria  for  a  time  and  to  go 
and  spend  a  few  weeks  on  his  Hungarian  property;  and 
I,  having  been  informed  of  my  early  transfer  to  Stock- 
holm, had  been  granted  a  holiday  and  was  starting  for 
Paris,  where  I  was  to  meet  M.  Sazonoff 

1  only  saw  Ferdinand  once  more,  at  the  end  of 
December,  O.S.,  when  I  returned  to  Sofia  for  a  few  days 
to  make  arrangements  for  my  departure  and  to  hand  in 
my  letters  of  recall.  At  this  interview  Ferdinand 
behaved  in  a  most  unseemly  manner  to  me  ;  I  will  relate 
this  further  on. 

The  efforts  of  Russian  diplomacy  checked  the  advance 
of  the  Turks  who  were  stopped  at  the  former  Bulgarian 
frontier,  and  thanks  to  our  prompt  action  in  Rumania, 
the  Rumanian  troops  left  the  town  of  Varna  which  they 
had  occupied. 

When  I  told  Sazonoff  about  the  Bulgarian  Govern- 
ment having  sought  our  help,  he  suggested  that  a  con- 
ference of  the  Prime  Ministers  of  Serbia,  Bulgaria, 
Montenegro  and  Greece  should  be  held  in  Nish,  in  view 
of  the  immediate  conclusion  of  peace.     But  as  Ferdinand 


202     BULGARIA  ATTACKS  HER  ALLIES  [ch.xii. 

had  not  confined  himself  to  entreating  our  intervention 
but  had  also  sent  an  imploring  telegram  to  King  Charles 
of  Rumania,  the  latter  proposed  convening  a  conference 
of  the  belligerents  at  Bukharest,  in  order  to  proceed  to 
the  simultaneous  conclusion  of  an  armistice  and  of  peace. 
Our  Foreign  Secretary  readily  agreed  to  the  change  of 
place  for  the  negotiations,  the  belligerents  also  agreed, 
and  on  the  17th  (30th)  Jul}^  the  first  sitting  of  the  peace 
conference  took  place  in  Bukharest  under  the  presidency 
of  the  Rumanian  Prime  Minister,  M.  IVLajoresco  ;  the 
next  day,  the  i8th  (31st)  July,  an  armistice  of  five  days 
was  signed.  All  the  efforts  of  the  Bulgarian  delegates 
to  make  the  peace  conditions  imposed  by  their  enemies 
less  hard  for  Bulgaria — efforts  in  which  we  supported 
them — met  with  no  success.  And  under  pressure  from 
Rumania,  who  absolutely  refused  to  prolong  the  armis- 
tice, the  Bulgarians  on  the  24th  July  (6th  August),  were 
forced  to  accept  the  peace  conditions  dictated  by  their 
adversaries. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    PEACE   OF   BUKHAREST 

The  stipulations  of  the  Peace  Conference  of  Bul^harest, 
to  be  properly  understood,  must  be  studied  with  due 
regard  to  the  conditions  of  the  peace  concluded  by  the 
Balkan  Allies  with  Turkey  in  London,  on  the  20th  May 
of  this  same  year,  191 3.  In  London,  Turkey  had  been 
obliged  to  abandon  all  her  territories  situated  north  and 
west  of  the  line  Midia — Enos,  and  to  renounce  her 
rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  island  of  Crete.  After 
which,  the  fixing  of  the  frontiers  of  the  future  in- 
dependent Albania,  as  well  as  the  question  of  the  islands 
of  the  Archipelago,  were  referred  to  the  decisions  of 
the  Great  Powers,  whereas  the  demarcation  between 
Serbia,  Bulgaria,  Montenegro,  and  Greece  was  left  to 
the  decisions  of  these  four  countries. 

There  was  another  clause  in  the  London  Peace 
Treaty  which  did  not  seem  to  evoke  any  controversy 
or  excitement,  but  to  which  I  personally  attached  a 
special  importance.  This  clause  stipulated  that  the 
territory  of  Mt.  Athos  should  become  an  independent 
state,  except  for  the  spiritual  supremacy  of  the  Uni- 
versal Patriarch.  "The  Republic  of  the  Twenty 
Monasteries" — as  this  original  agglomeration  of  Ortho- 
dox monks  has  been  described  for  centuries — was 
recognised  by  Europe,  and  declared  free  from  all 
temporal  supremacy.  The  idea  of  this  clause,  which 
I  greeted  with  sympathy,  was  entirely  M.  Sazonoff's. 
Strictly  Orthodox  by  education  and  having  learnt  during 
his  long  stay  in  Rome  not  to  neglect  anything  relative 
to  the  political  sphere  of  the  Church,  Sazonoff,  although 
not  possessing  personal  experience  of  the  Near  East, 

203 


204        THE   PEACE  OF   BUKHAREST    [chap.  xiii. 

understood  better  than  any  of  those  around  him  what 
the  "Monte  Santo"  represented  to  the  Orthodox 
populations  of  Russia  and  the  Levant. 

As  we  know,  Mt.  Athos  from  time  immemorial  had 
rejoiced  in  autonomy  and  special  privileges,  which  the 
Turks  had  respected.  The  twenty  oldest  monasteries, 
from  which  the  other  convents  depended,  each  sent  a 
representative  to  the  Protat,  that  is  the  Superior 
CouRcil  which  sat  at  Karea,  a  small  borough  built  around 
an  ancient  cathedral;  the  Protat  represented  the  high 
court  of  justice  for  all  the  convents  of  the  Monte  Santo, 
and  the  organ  through  which  the  republic  of  monks 
communicated  with  the  outside  world,  that  is  to  say, 
with  the  Patriarchate  of  Constantinople  and  the  Turkish 
authorities.  The  latter  were  represented  at  Karea  by 
an  Ottoman  official,  who  had  under  him  a  dozen 
soldiers,  who  possessed  a  mosque  but  could  not  bring 
their  families  with  them.  Besides  this  minute  armed 
force,  the  Protat  kept  up  a  score  or  so  of  armed  guards 
recruited  from  among  the  Greeks  and  Orthodox  Mace- 
donians. These  palikars,  chiefly  quartered  on  the 
narrow  isthmus  ^  which  connects  the  long  peninsula  of 
Mt.  Athos  to  Chalcidice,  protected  the  monastery-land 
from  the  incursions  of  wolves  and  bands  of  brigands ; 
women  are  strictly  forbidden  to  enter  this  territory  by 
all  the  statutes  of  the  Monte  Santo. 

But  if  the  cenobites  were  thus  protected  from  the 
ferocity  of  beasts,  the  violence  of  men,  and  the  charms 
of  women,  they  were  always  exposed  to  another  great 
temptation  of  monastic  life — internal  dissensions.  And 
during  the  last  few  years,  a  new  subject  for  discussion 
had  been  added  to  those  which  had  always  existed — 
political  questions. 

The  Greco-Bulgarian  ecclesiastical  conflict  was  the 
signal  for  the  first  serious  tension  in  Greek  and  Russian 
relations.  The  protection  accorded  to  the  Bulgarians 
by  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Constantinople,  General 

*  The  isthmus  which  Xerxes  originally  cut  through  ;  the  traces  of  the 
canal  can  still  be  seen. 


I9I3]  RUSSIANS  AT  MT.   ATHOS  205 

Ignatieff,  had  greatly  alienated  all  the  Greeks,  even 
those  who  up  till  then  had  remained  sincere  partisans 
of  Russia.  Since  this,  the  Greeks  of  Constantinople, 
like  those  of  Athens,  began  to  perceive  Russian  intrigues 
everywhere,  and  to  denounce  them  to  Europe.  As  one 
of  the  proofs  of  these  dangerous  intrigues,  they  liked 
to  quote  Mt.  Athos,  "  that  admirable  strategical  position," 
where  General  Ignatieff  kept,  in  monkish  garb,  a  whole 
division  of  Russian  troops!  Europe  half  believed  this; 
in  any  case,  the  Russian  monks  of  Mt.  Athos  were 
looked  on  with  a  somewhat  unfavourable  eye,  and  they 
were  recommended  to  the  vigilance  of  the  Porte.  The 
position  of  these  unfortunate  people  became  especially 
critical  during  the  last  Russo-Turkish  war,  and  at  the 
time  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 

But  there  is  no  calumny  that  does  not  die  out,  and 
there  are  no  difficulties  that  cannot  be  surmounted 
when  one  knows  how  to  set  about  it.  During  the 
sixteen  years  of  M.  de  Nelidoff's  memorable  time  as 
Ambassador  to  Constantinople,  the  position  of  the 
Russian  cenobites  of  Mt.  Athos  became  stronger,  and 
the  absurd  accusations  brought  against  them  died  down. 
Generally  speaking,  M.  de  Nelidoff's  work  and  that  of 
his  equally  wise  successor,  M.  Zinovieff,  cannot  be 
sufficiently  appreciated  in  the  history  of  our  relations 
with  the  Near  East.  In  spite  of  the  lack  of  a  ruling 
principle  in  St.  Petersburg,  in  spite  of  the  progressive 
increase  of  German  influence  on  the  shores  of  the 
Bosphorus,  these  two  eminent  diplomats  managed — 
first,  to  keep  intact  the  honour  and  prestige  of  the 
Russian  name  in  the  East,  and  then  to  restore  the 
confidence  in  us  of  all  the  Orthodox  nationalities  of 
the  Balkan  Peninsula.  This  confidence,  which  had  been 
shaken  for  some  time,  under  the  influence  of  the 
rivalries  and  conflicts  of  these  nationalities,  had  to  be 
regained  by  an  impartial  line  of  conduct — benevolent 
and  at  the  same  time  prudent — with  regard  to  their 
real  needs  and  their  just  rights.  The  two  Ambassadors 
had  also  managed  to  gain  the  personal  sympathies  and 


206        TIIK   PEACE  OE   BUKHAREST    [chap.  xui. 

the  deep  respect  of  the  TurKS,  and  that  was  naturally 
a  source  of  strength  to  them  in  their  mediations  and 
measures. 

During  the  course  of  M.  de  Nelidoff's  term  of  office, 
the  position  of  our  compatriots  at  Mt.  Athos  was 
strengthened,  as  I  said  before ;  and  the  monastery  of 
St.  Panteleimon  became,  with  the  support  of  the 
Russian  Embassy,  the  representative  and  recognised 
guide  of  all  the  Russian  monks  of  the  Monte  Santo. 
Excellent  relations  were  established  between  these 
monks  and  the  Universal  Patriarchate.  The  eminent 
Patriarch,  Joachim  III.,  a  personal  friend  of  M.  de 
Nelidoff's,  and  who  more  than  once  occupied  thelChair 
of  St.  John  Chrysostom,  and  in  the  interval  retired  to 
Mt.  Athos,  Vv^as  the  special  protector  of  the  Russian 
monks.  The  relations  of  the  latter  with  the  Turkish 
authorities  were  excellent.  Even  amongst  the  Greek 
monasteries,  several  kept  up  close  relations  with  the 
great  Russian  monastery,  especially  those  in  which 
the  cenobitic  rules  had  been  preserved  intact. 

The  faith  of  the  Russian  people  has  always  borne  a 
monastic  rather  than  hierarchical  stamp.  Frequently 
and  outrageously  deceived  in  his  trust  by  unworthy 
monks,  the  Russian  man  of  the  people  was  nevertheless 
perpetually  in  search  of  examples  of  true  cenobitism, 
and  of  monasteries  which  should  fulfil  his  ideals  of 
ardent  asceticism  and  constant  prayer. 

Mt.  Athos  attracted  the  thoughts  and  the  pilgrim- 
ages of  Russians  from  the  earliest  days  of  their  con- 
version to  Christianity.  And  when  in  the  last  fifty 
years  Russian  monastic  life  flourished  again  on  the 
Monte  Santo,  and  when,  at  the  same  time,  journeys  in 
the  East  had  become  infinitely  easier  and  possible  for 
the  most  modest  purse,  our  pilgrims  began  to  stream 
there  in  considerable  numbers.  They  found  in  our 
monasteries  of  Mt.  Athos  all  that  had  always  seemed 
to  them  to  be  the  ideal  of  monastic  life :  a  truly  frugal 
way  of  living,  severe  cenobitic  rules,  magnificent 
services,    and    more    especially   almost    incessant   and 


I9I3]  NATURE    OF  THE  TREATY  207 

strictly  conscientious  prayer  for  the  living  and  for  the 
dead. 

The  idea  of  profiting  by  events  which  had  developed 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  to  stipulate  for  the  independence 
of  Mt.  Athos  was  consequently  an  essentially  Russian 
idea.  It  offered  no  direct  political  advantages,  but  it 
constituted  a  striking  recognition  of  the  Russian 
religious  ideal,  and  should  yield  beneficial  results  of 
a  cultural  and  political  order.  From  the  time  of  Peter 
the  Great,  and  until  the  present  day,  Russian  policy  has 
striven  at  every  favourable  opportunity  to  enhance  and 
glorify  the  name  of  the  autocratic  monarch,  to  strengthen 
the  naval  and  military  power  of  the  Empire,  to  further 
the  interests  of  commerce,  and,  finally,  either  to  free  the 
Christian  nationalities  of  a  common  origin  of  the 
East  or  to  ameliorate  their  lot.  But  it  was  the  first 
time  that  our  diplomacy  had  thought  of  the  defence  and 
the  glorification  of  the  Russian  popular  ideal,  and  had 
recognised  the  importance  of  the  work  of  simple  men 
of  the  people,  who  had  brought  the  leaven  of  their  faith 
to  the  East,  and  had  accomplished  a  real  spiritual 
conquest  there. 

When  1  received  from  St.  Petersburg  the  account  of 
the  stipulations  of  the  Conference  of  London,  I  heartily 
congratulated  M.  Sazonoff  on  his  idea  concerning  Mt. 
Athos. 

The  peace  treaty  of  Bukharest  presents  quite  a 
different  structure.  It  does  not  constitute  a  definite 
settlement  of  the  troubles  of  the  Near  East,  but  only 
a  settlement  of  the  war  of  191 3  between  the  Christian 
nationalities  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Bulgaria,  as  the 
initiator  of  this  fratricidal  contest,  was  to  undergo  just 
punishment,  and  her  former  allies  had  a  right  to 
territorial  gains  at  her  expense,  gains  which  would 
have  made  them  more  powerful  and  less  exposed  to 
Bulgarian  greed  and  ambition.  But,  if  this  condition 
could  and  should  be  admitted  with  regard  to  Serbia, 
Greece,   and   even  Rumania,  it  was  in   no  way  to  the 


2o8         THE   PP:ACE   OF    BUKHARESl^    [chap.  xiii. 

interests  of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  and  of  Serbia, 
to  see  Bulgaria  deprived  of  nearly  all  her  conquests  in 
Thrace.  And  even  in  settling  the  demarcation  question 
of  the  Bulgarians  with  the  Serbians,  Greeks,  and 
Rumanians,  it  would  have  been  good  policy  to  spare 
the  self-esteem  of  the  Bulgarian  people  a  little,  and  to 
consider  their  real  interests. 

It  was  precisely  in  this  way  that  at  the  beginning  we 
viewed  the  task  of  the  Peace  Conference  of  Bukharest. 
In  the  first  place,  I  received  the  order  to  declare  to  the  Bul- 
garian Government  from  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  that  zve 
would  not  tolerate  any  humiliation  or  excessive  weakening 
of  Bulgaria.  Then  M.  Sazonoff  protested  most  vehe- 
mently against  the  advance  of  the  Turkish  troops  in 
Thrace  and  their  reoccupation  of  Adrianople,  Kirk- 
Kilisseh,  etc.  When  the  Ottoman  Ambassador,  Turkhan 
Pasha — in  parenthesis,  a  worthy  and  respectable  old 
diplomat — went  to  see  Sazonoff,  by  order  of  the  Porte, 
in  order  to  obtain  our  benevolent  consent  to  the  re- 
taking of  Thrace  by  the  Turks,  the  Minister  answered 
that  he  refused  to  discuss  that  question  with  him ;  that 
he  would  discuss  it  most  thoroughly  with  his  Russian 
colleagues  at  the  War  Office  and  the  Admiralty.  Finally, 
the  Russian  Minister  to  Bukharest,  M.  Schebeko,  when 
receiving  the  Bulgarian  delegates,  gave  them  some 
hope,  and  promised  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  secure 
to  Bulgaria  part  of  the  acquisitions  purchased  with  so 
much  Bulgarian  blood  in  1912.  During  the  nine  days 
that  the  Conference  lasted,  M.  Schebeko  played  a  pro- 
minent part  in  the  negotiations,  or  rather  the  attributes 
of  the  part  were  willingly  assigned  to  him  by  both  sides, 
who  frequently  applied  for  his  intervention,  but  who 
did  not  follow  his  advice. 

Shortly  before  the  Bukharest  Conference,  Russian 
diplomacy  had  suggested  taking  as  a  base  for  demar- 
cation between  the  former  allies  a  frontier  line  follow- 
ing the  course  of  the  Bregalnitza,  that  of  the  Vardar 
(to  a  certain  point),  then  the  chain  of  Belachitza,  and 
finally  the   lower  course  of  the   Struma,  a  line  which 


I9I3]  BULGARIAN   SACRIFICES  209 

would  have  left  to  Bulgaria  the  towns  Kotchana,  Rado- 
vitch,  Petchevo,  Drama,  and  Kavala.  But  in  Bukharest 
we  could  not  succeed  in  getting  this  line  accepted.  The 
frontier  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  crossed  the  line 
of  the  watershed  of  the  Vardar  and  of  the  Struma,  so 
that  Kotchana  and  Radovitch  returned  to  Serbia;  and 
the  frontier  between  Bulgaria  and  Greece  followed  the 
course  of  the  Mesta,  so  that  the  towns  of  Demir-Hissar, 
Seres,  Drama,  and  Kavala  returned  to  Greece.  It  is 
true  that  on  the  subject  of  Kavala  a  reservation  was 
made,  aiming  at  the  possibility  of  a  revision  of  that 
clause  in  the  treaty,  and  on  this  question  Russian 
diplomacy  was  on  the  Bulgarian  side.  But  when 
Austria-Hungary  began  to  demand  the  revision  of  the 
whole  Bukharest  treaty,  Russia  naturally  would  not 
support  such  a  proposal.  At  the  same  time,  and  in 
consideration  of  the  energetic  intercession  of  France 
in  favour  of  the  Greeks,  we  finally  abandoned  our 
intention  of  soliciting  the  return  of  Kavala  to  the 
Bulgarians. 

Concerning  the  occupation  of  Thrace  by  the  Turks, 
our  protests  became  rarer  and  feebler  day  by  day,  and 
soon  ceased  completely.  Bulgaria,  who  on  her  side  had 
persisted  for  ages  in  the  point  of  view  that  the  question 
of  Adrianople  and  of  Thrace  was  a  European  one,  and 
who  consequently  sought  the  intervention  of  the  Great 
Powers  to  settle  this  question,  ended  by  giving  in  on 
this  point  and  herself  began  negotiations  with  the  Porte. 
It  was  easy  to  realise  by  the  choice  of  the  Bulgarian 
negotiators  that  King  Ferdinand  and  his  Ministers  were 
now  only  counting  on  the  protection  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  that  of  Germany,  become  all-powerful  again  in 
Constantinople.  It  was  old  M.  Natchevitch,  former 
Stamboulovist,  long  since  retired  from  politics,  who 
was  persuaded  to  return  to  Constantinople,  where  he 
had  been  diplomatic  agent  of  Bulgaria  for  many  years, 
while  M.  Tontchev  and  General  Savov — reinstated  in 
Ferdinand's  good  graces — acted  as  special  plenipoten- 
tiaries to  conclude  the  definite  settlement  with  the  Porte. 


2IO         THE   PEACE   OF   BUKHAREST    [chap.  xiii. 

After  long  and  arduous  parleyings — during  which  the 
support  of  the  Russian  Embassy  was  nevertheless  lent 
to  the  Bulgarians — the  latter  had  to  give  up  all  Thrace 
situated  between  the  sea  and  the  left  bank  of  the 
Maritza,  and  the  district  of  Demotika  on  the  right  bank 
of  this  river.  Altogether  Bulgaria,  of  all  her  conquests, 
only  kept  that  part  of  Thrace  ending  at  the  port  of 
Dedeagatch  and  the  block  of  the  Rhodope  Mountains, 
which  are  more  of  an  obstacle  than  a  link  between 
Bulgaria  and  that  bit  of  coast  of  the  iEgean  Sea.  And 
the  Bulgarians  also  lost  a  large  portion  of  the  Dobrudja 
and  of  Deli-Orman,  with  the  towns  Tutrukan  and 
Dobritch,  and  the  ports  of  Kavarna  and  Baltchik  on 
the  Black  Sea. 

Finally,  neither  at  the  Conference  of  Bukharest  nor 
afterwards  was  one  word  said  about  the  independence 
of  Mt.  Athos,  which  had  been  proposed  in  London. 
The  Monte  Santo — "that  appanage  of  the  Holy  Virgin," 
as  the  local  legends  say — became  merely  the  appanage 
of  King  Constantine  XIV.  Even  the  canonical  rights 
of  the  Patriarchate  of  Constantinople  were  not  specially 
specified. 

I  was  deeply  astonished  at  the  time  that  M.  Sazonoff 
could  allow  such  complete  shipwreck  of  the  principles 
that  he  had  himself  propounded  with  so  much  fairness 
and  feeling  for  the  definite  arrangement  of  the  Balkan 
imbroglio.  I  knew  later  that  there  had  been  reasons 
for  this ;  some  of  which  had  real  weight,  but  others, 
in  my  opinion,  only  deserved  very  relative  con- 
sideration. 

Concerning  the  occupation  of  Adrianople  and  Thrace 
by  the  Turks,  M.  Sazonoff  met  with  stubborn  opposition 
from  Germany  in  all  attempts  to  reinstate  the  Bulgarians 
in  their  rights  of  conquest.  Our  Foreign  Secretary  was 
confronted  anew  by  the  humiliating  vista  of  a  semi- 
ultimatum  from  Berlin;  while  from  all  his  colleagues 
of  the  Council  he  heard  one  and  the  same  refrain  :  "  Do 
what  you  like,  as  long  as  we  do  not  have  war.  War 
would  be  the  undoing  of  Russia ! "    The  voice  of  the 


I9I3]  DIPLOMATIC    INFLUENCES  211 

President  of  the  Council,  M.  Kokovtzoff,  made  itself 
particularly  loudly  heard  in  this  chorus.  Subsequent 
events  have  proved  how  right  he  was ! 

As  to  the  demarcation  between  Serbians  and  Bul- 
garians, M.  Hartwig's  influence  was  very  discernible  in 
the  question,  as  were  also  our  very  natural  feelings  of 
special  sympathy  with  the  Serbians.  We  Russians  are 
generally  prone  to  prefer  the  soft  outlines  of  sentiment 
to  the  rigid  lines  of  justice.  Moreover,  one  must  allow 
that  the  events  which  occurred  later  and  the  noble 
behaviour  of  the  Serbians  have  completely  justified — 
from  a  historic  point  of  view — the  preference  we  showed 
for  them  in  1913. 

On  the  question  of  the  Greco-Bulgarian  frontier 
we,  with  good  reason,  adhered  to  the  principle  that, 
after  all  that  had  just  occurred  between  Greeks  and 
Bulgarians,  it  was  impossible  to  give  the  Bulgarians 
any  territories  and  towns  with  a  Greek  population. 
This  principle  alone  ought  to  have  been  sufficient  cause 
for  us  not  to  insist  on  the  idea  of  leaving  Kavala  to  the 
Bulgarians ;  but  in  addition  there  was  the  insistence 
of  our  faithful  friend  and  ally,  France,  who  was  guided 
in  the  matter  by  her  consistent  and  traditional  phil- 
hellenism. 

No  doubt  in  giving  in  to  the  somewhat  exaggerated 
territorial  claims  of  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Rumania,  our 
Foreign  Office  was  subject  to  certain  Court  influences. 
The  Royal  Family  of  Greece,  doubly  related  to  our 
Imperial  Family,  had  latterly  acquired  a  new  advocate 
for  Greece  in  the  person  of  the  captivating  Grand- 
Duchess  Helen — daughter  of  the  late  Grand-Duke 
Vladimir — who  had  just  married  Prince  Nicolas  of 
Greece.  The  Serbian  Court  had  as  a  delegate  in  St. 
Petersburg  the  intelligent  and  sympathetic  Princess 
Helen,  daughter  of  King  Peter,  lately  married  to  a 
prince  of  the  blood,  John  Constantinovitch.  Finally, 
at  the  Rumanian  Court  the  matrimonial  schemes  of 
M.  Sazonoff  seemed  to  be  thriving,  and  we  were  already 
anticipating  ties  of  relationship  with  Bukharest  in  the 


212  PEACE  OF   BUKHAREST        [chap.  xiii. 

near  future.  Nothing  of  this  sort  existed  in  Ferdinand's 
favour.  After  his  reprehensible  conduct  during  the  last 
Balkan  events,  none  of  us  dreamt  any  longer  of  the 
possibility  of  sacrificing  one  of  the  daughters  of  the 
Emperor  b}'  placing  her  under  the  despotic  3'oke  of  a 
hostile  and  extremely  disagreeable  father-in-law.  In 
this  matter  also  Ferdinand  had  lost  his  stake,  and  was 
once  again  the  cause  of  the  definite  check  to  Bulgarian 
ambitions. 

Far  less  comprehensible  were  the  reasons  by  virtue 
of  which  we  allowed  M.  Sazonoffs  project  and  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  Conference  of  London  on  the  subject  of 
Mt.  Athos  to  drop  completely.  In  our  country  the 
chief  reason  v/as  supposed  to  be  the  regrettable  dis- 
sensions that  broke  out  among  the  Russian  monks  of 
the  Monte  Santo  in  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  this 
same  year  1913.  These  dissensions,  which  arose  out  of 
a  theological  controversy  of  an  essentially  secondary 
and  unimportant  nature,  unfortunately  attracted  the 
exaggerated  attention  of  the  Universal  Patriarchate, 
and  even  drew  forth  cries  of  heresy !  I  have  no  doubt 
that  in  doing  this  the  Patriarchate  was  submitting  to 
the  influence  of  a  few  politicians  who  wished  Mt. 
Athos,  with  its  hallowed  spots  for  pilgrimages,  to 
become  simply  Greek  territory.  It  was  most  important 
for  the  intriguing  politicians— for  those  very  men  who, 
clustering  round  Constantine  XIV.  two  years  later, 
sold  Greece  to  William  II.— to  be  able  to  prove  the 
danger  there  would  be  in  allowing  the  monks  of  Monte 
Santo  a  complete  independence  without  precedent  in 
the  history  of  the  Orthodox  East.  And  the  disputes  of 
the  Russian  monks  happened  most  opportunely  to 
support  their  theory. 

All  this  game  was  so  apparent  that  even  now  I 
do  not  understand  how  our  Foreign  Office,  and  our 
Embassy  in  Constantinople,  could  have  been  taken  in 
and  have  attached  such  exaggerated  importance  to  the 
differences  of  opinion  of  a  few  cenobites  ! 


I9I3]  QUESTION   OF   MT.    ATHOS  213 

But  in  any  case  extraordinary  measures  were  taken 
on  our  side.  We  sent  to  Mt.  Athos  a  Russian  bishop, 
Mgr.  Nikon,  a  member  of  the  Foreign  Office,  M. 
Mansuroff,  known  for  his  great  piety  and  thorough 
knowledge  of  ecclesiastical  affairs  of  the  Orthodox  East, 
and  finally  our  Consul-General  to  Constantinople  as 
representative  of  the  "  executive"  power.  Proceedings 
opened  with  free  discussion,  then  came  canonical  and 
dogmatic  arguments ;  but  as  spirits  became  ever  more 
heated  and  as  the  dissentient  monks  gradually  exceeded 
all  the  limits  of  obedience  and  respect,  it  ended  in  the 
fire  hose  being  played  on  the  turbulent  cenobites  {argii- 
mentitm  ad  liominem,  arguinenhuii  ad  Deitin,  argumentum 
ad  baculum) ;  after  which  they  were  seized  and  sent  to 
Russia  under  an  escort  .  .  ,  there  they  were  received 
with  affection  and  respect  into  monasteries,  and  the 
ecclesiastical  authorities  found  no  taint  of  heresy  in 
their  opinions  ! 

It  would  seem  as  if,  after  such  an  essentially 
"spiritual"  peace-making,  one  might  feel  reassured 
as  to  the  uprightness  of  our  cenobites'  faith,  and  could 
take  up  M.  Sazonoff's  scheme  again.  But  the  carrying 
out  of  this  scheme  would  have  raised  endless  difficulties 
for  our  Foreign  Office  as  well  as  for  our  Embassy  in 
Constantinople.  So  it  was  infinitely  simpler  and  easier 
to  retire  from  the  field  definitely,  consoling  oneself 
with  the  thought  that  a  monastic  republic  at  Mt.  Athos 
might  all  the  same  have  held  disagreeable  surprises 
for  the  order  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Orthodox  Church. 

Thus  gradually  all  M.  Sazonoff^s  splendid  ideas 
collapsed  and  came  to  nothing,  and  finally  our  Balkan 
diplomacy  was  in  the  same  position  as  the  hero  of  the 
popular  tale,  who  had  exchanged  a  lump  of  gold  for  a 
saddle-horse,  the  horse  for  a  beautiful  milch  cow,  the 
cow  for  a  pig,  the  pig  for  a  goose,  and  the  goose  for  a 
grindstone  which  was  so  very  heavy  and  cumbersome 
that  when  it  fell  into  the  water  the  good  lad  was  in- 
ordinately relieved  and  intensely  happy  ! 


214  PEACE  OF   BUKHAREST        rrriAP.  xiii. 

The  Treaty  of  Bukharest,  in  place  of  all  that  had  been 
so  well  thought  out  and  drawn  up  by  M.  Sazonoff  at  the 
time  of  the  Conferences  in  London,  yielded  us  one  result 
only  as  a  consolation  :  the  one  I  mentioned  above  and 
which  at  the  beginning  had  been  so  contrary  to  M. 
SazonofT's  way  of  thinking.  This  result  was  the  alliance 
binding  Serbians,  Rumanians  and  Greeks  into  one  sheaf, 
and  directed  mainl}'  against  the  Bulgarians.  We  liked 
to  think  that  this  new  Balkan  league  would  mainly 
serve  as  a  curb  to  Austria's  designs  for  expansion,  and 
would  henceforth  obey  our  wise  guiding  hand.  This 
was  how  it  was  viewed  in  a  certain  set  in  our  Foreign 
Office.  Contemplating  the  punishment  of  the  guilty 
and  the  renewal  of  Russian  influence  in  Greece  and 
Rumania,  where  this  influence  had  been  in  jeopardy 
for  so  long,  some  young  and  impetuous  members  of  our 
Foreign  Office  proclaimed  the  great  victory  of  Russian 
policy  in  the  Near  East,  a  victory  gained  without  blood- 
shed yVcUkaya  hczkrovnaya  pobeda).  When  a  young 
colleague,  who  had  come  as  a  messenger  to  Sofia, 
reported  this  talk  to  me,  I  told  him  to  take  a  message 
from  me  to  all  those  who  had  indulged  in  it  to  the  effect 
that  either  this  triumph  would  not  last  and  we  should 
be  obliged  to  renounce  the  largest  share  of  our  illusions 
concerning  the  results  of  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest,  or 
that  blood  would  be  shed  and  in  such  quantity  as  had 
not  been  shed  since  the  conquest  of  the  Mongolians  and 
the  grave  disorders  of  the  smoiitnoye  vremia. 

When  the  terrible  events  of  the  world-war  came  to 
put  the  solidity  of  the  new  system  to  the  test  it  was 
found  that  the  Serbians  alone  remained  entirely  faithful 
to  the  moral  engagement  into  which  they  had  entered 
with  us.  In  Greece  and  Rumania  only  a  section  of  the 
politicians  considered  that  the  events  of  1913  bound 
these  States  to  Serbia  and  to  Russia ;  others  only  saw  in 
them  a  triumph  of  diplomatic  opportunism,  after  the 
recording  of  which  one  could  boldly  resume  former 
sympathies  and  former  engagements.  Indeed,  at  the 
moment  of  the  great  trial  neither  of  the  two  States 


I9I3]  PAN-GERMANS  AT  WORK  215 

thought  of  going  at  once  to  the  help  of  Serbia  when  she 
was  attacked  from  behind  by  the  Bulgarians ;  and  the 
desperate  efforts  of  conscientious  men  of  worth  in  both 
countries  were  required  to  lead  them  back  into  the  path 
of  honour  and  self-sacrifice  ! 

I  could  not  rid  myself  of  the  obsession  that  the 
two  Central  Empires  would  never  be  reconciled  to 
the  results  of  the  Balkan  War  and  of  the  Bukharest 
Treaty.  Germany  having  caused  Adrianople  to  be 
restored  to  the  Turks  and  having  herself  regained  all 
her  influence  in  Stambul,  now  had  to  fulfil  her  engage- 
ments to  Austria-Hungary,  that  is  to  say  she  had  to 
contribute  to  the  humiliating  and  weakening  of  Serbia, 
whose  victories  and  political  successes  were  making 
her  a  centre  of  attraction  to  the  Slav  populations  of  the 
Empire  of  the  Hapsburgs. 

[  From  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest  I  was 
daily  expecting  either  that  we  should  be  forced  to  enter 
into  conversations  —  most  humiliating  for  us  —  with 
Vienna  and  Berlin  and  to  allow  the  two  Central  Powers 
to  seize  advantages  on  the  political  ground  of  the  Balkans 
which  would  annul  all  the  successes  of  1912  and  1913,  or 
else  that  we  should  be  attacked  by  the  Central  Empires. 
As  far  as  I  know  Sazonoff  did  not  share  these  fears. 
Resolved  to  oppose  a  calm  and  dignified  resistance  to 
all  attempts  at  political  blackmail  on  Berlin's  part, 
reckoning  steadfastly  on  the  support  of  France  and 
England,  he  believed  that  this  attitude  and  this  support 
would  suffice  to  check  German  policy  on  the  dangerous 
slope  which  could  only  lead  to  the  formidable  abyss  of 
a  world-war.  Subsequent  events  proved  the  futility  of 
these  calculations.  The  Treaty  of  Bukharest  had 
singularly  reinforced  the  arguments  and  the  propaganda 
of  the  Pan-Germans.  And  at  the  same  time  the  active 
co-operation  of  Turkey  was  again  assured  to  Germany 
in  the  event  of  a  conflict,  and  to  this  co-operation  that 
of  Bulgaria  was  added  in  spe.  From  that  time  the 
military  party  in  Berlin  was  only  concerned  with 
precipitating  matters,  with  injecting  energy  and  courage 


2i6  PEACE   OF  BUKHAREST        [chap.  xiii. 

into   Austria,   and   causing   war   to    break    out   before 
Russia  had  got  on  with  her  armaments. 

The  fortnight  that  the  negotiations  of  the  Peace  of 
Bukharest  lasted  as  well  as  the  succeeding  days  were  a 
troublous  and  critical  time  for  the  capital  of  Bulgaria. 
The  reservists  returning  from  the  front  were  hurriedly 
taken  by  railway  lines  which  crossed  at  Sofia,  and  they 
were  often  guilty  of  undisciplined  and  disorderly  conduct 
on  the  way.  One  of  these  skirmishes  occurring  at  the 
station  of  Sofia  nearly  took  a  serious  turn.  Luckily 
most  of  the  reservists  were  so  glad  to  return  to  their 
fields,  their  vineyards  and  their  live-stock  that  they 
became  docile  at  once  when  the  train  that  was  to  take 
them  back  to  their  "home"  was  ready  for  them. 

In  Sofia  itself  one  felt  that  the  public  was  in  a  state 
of  ferment,  exasperation  even :  on  one  side  against  the 
King  and  on  the  other  against  Danev,  who  at  the  moment 
was  looked  on  as  the  chief  culprit  in  the  troubles  which 
had  befallen  Bulgaria.  For  a  few  days  it  was  to  be 
feared  that  the  crowd  might  gather  round  the  ex-Prime 
Minister's  house  and  attack  him.  Night  and  day  the 
police  guarded  this  house,  which  seemed  to  have  been 
deserted  by  every  one.  I  thought  it  my  duty — just  at 
this  dreadful  time — to  call  on  the  wretched  Danev. 
He  appeared  to  have  gone  all  to  pieces  and  it  was 
piteous  to  see  him.  The  gossip  in  town  was  that  he 
had  attempted  to  commit  suicide,  but  that  his  servants 
had  stopped  him  in  time.  Ferdinand,  of  course,  was  in  a 
terrible  state  of  anguish  and  always  had  motor  cars  in 
readiness  for  his  instant  flight  from  Sofia.  However, 
gradually  the  state  of  ferment  calmed  down,  and  when  I 
left  Sofia  at  the  beginning  of  October  the  King  had 
already  left  for  his  Hungarian  property. 

In  Russia  much  surprise  was  felt  that  the  defeats 
and  disasters  of  Bulgaria  should  not  have  served  as 
the  signal  for  the  downfall  of  Ferdinand.  The  fact 
that  after  all  that  had  occurred,  he  had  calmly  remained 
at  the  head  of  the  country  made  some — and  the  most 


I9I3]        BULGARIAN   OPINION   UNITED  217 

intelligent — people  believe  that  the  Bulgarian  nation 
had  been  so  accustomed  to  servitude  that  Ferdinand 
could  lead  it  whither  he  would.  But  I  have  always  con- 
sidered this  theory  absolutely  false.  Throughout  the 
events  of  1912  and  1913,  the  greater  number  of  the 
Bulgarian  people  were  as  completely  one  with  their 
King  as  the  German  people  of  to-day  are  with  William  II. 
The  whole  of  Bulgaria  at  this  period  was  seized  with 
an  ardent  desire  to  put  the  Treaty  of  San-Stefano  into 
force,  and  would  not  hear  of  anything  else.  The 
Bulgarian  people  knew  that  nearly  the  entire  Russian 
Press — in  other  words  Russian  public  opinion — had 
taken  the  part  of  the  Serbians,  the  Greeks  and  even 
the  Rumanians  against  Bulgarian  claims.  And  the 
Bulgarian  people  began  to  sulk  with  Russia,  like  a 
spoilt  and  naughty  child  sometimes  sulks  with  its  own 
mother. 

Ferdinand  had  never  been  popular  in  Bulgaria,  and 
one  of  the  causes  of  this  unpopularity  lay  in  the 
people's  deep  conviction  that  this  "  Szvabio-Latin  "  could 
not  rejoice  in  the  sympathies  of  the  "  Great  Mother 
Liberator "  (yclika  Ma'ika  Osvoboditelka).  Since  they 
thought  they  had  been  wronged  by  this  same  Ma'ika 
Osvoboditelka,  and  since  certain  politicians  and  "  in- 
tellectuals" had  dared  to  attack  her  publicly,  and  others 
in  the  inner  recesses  of  their  souls  criticised  her  bitterly, 
the  Bulgarians  by  that  self-same  fact  became  one  with 
their  dismal  master  and  were  inclined  to  submit  to  the 
direction  that  Ferdinand  henceforth  sought  to  give  to 
Bulgarian  policy.  Up  till  then  there  had  been  but  one 
Tsar  for  the  Bulgarians,  the  IVhite  Tsar,  Orthodox, 
Russian  ;  now,  indulging  more  and  more  in  their  worst 
sentiments,  the  Bulgarians  began  to  recognise  another 
"Tsar,"  he  who  personified  deep-rooted  and  ill-con- 
cealed vengeance. 

On  the  5th  (i8th)  August,  only  a  few  days  after  the 
signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest,  the  Bulgarian  capital 
celebrated  the  solemn  return  of  her  troops.  The  Bul- 
garian soldiers,  in  their  brown  service  uniforms,  spoilt 


2i8  PEACE  OF   BUKHAREST        [chap.  xiii. 

by  sun  and  rain,  wearing  their  opankas  (leather  sandals), 
bore  traces  of  extreme  fatigue  on  their  emaciated  and 
sunburnt  faces,  but  nevertheless  they  marched  with 
spirit  and  pride.  Behind  the  infantry  ghost-like  horses 
dragged  the  guns.  Most  of  the  generals  whose  names 
had  become  so  popular  in  1912  were  with  their  troops. 
And  the  population  of  the  town  greeted  them  calmly 
and  sympathetically,  recognising  that  they  had  done 
their  whole  duty,  and  had  deserved  well  of  their 
countr3^  Most  of  the  soldiers  taking  part  in  the  march- 
past  were  adorned  with  flowers,  and  so  were  King 
Ferdinand  and  his  two  sons,  who  headed  the  procession 
on  horseback,  and  who  were  greeted  by  the  crowd 
without  the  slightest  show  of  hostility.  A  Te  Deum  of 
thanksgiving  was  held  in  the  Cathedral,  to  which  the 
whole  Diplomatic  Corps  was  invited.  It  was  most 
painful  to  me  to  take  part  in  this  Tc  Deum  and  to 
witness  the  march-past  of  the  troops.  Whatever  the 
responsibility  of  Ferdinand,  and  of  the  majority  of  the 
Bulgarian  politicians  for  all  that  had  occurred,  I  could 
not  rid  myself  of  the  feeling  that  each  of  the  Bulgarian 
soldiers  passing  before  me  had,  by  his  ardent  patriotism 
and  undaunted  courage,  earned  a  less  piteous  result  for 
his  country,  and  deserved  a  really  triumphal  entry  into 
his  home.  1  knew  that  the  Bulgarian  people  had  their 
share  of  guilt  in  the  sad  events  which  had  occurred,  but, 
nevertheless,  I  could  not  help  wondering  whether  others 
should  not  bear  some  of  the  blame,  and  whether  I 
myself  had  done  all  I  ought  to  prevent  this  melancholy 
ending  to  our  influence  in  Bulgaria. 

A  few  days  later  I  sent  off  a  letter  to  Baron  Schilling, 
begging  him  to  tell  me  whether  the  question  of  my 
recall  from  Bulgaria  was  not  being  revived  at  the 
Foreign  Office.  I  added  that  I  thought  myself  that, 
after  all  that  had  occurred,  I  could  no  longer  render 
efficient  services  in  Sofia. 

I  promptly  received  the  reply  that  there  was  a 
question   of  making  me   exchange  with   M.    Savinsky, 


I9I3]  RUMOURS  OF  MY   RECALL  219 

whose    position    in    Stockholm    had    become    equally 
difficult. 

Being  thus  situated,  I  asked  for  a  holiday  of  a  few 
weeks,  and  at  the  end  of  September,  191 3,  I  went  to 
Paris  on  private  business,  and  to  meet  M.  Sazonoff,  who 
was  due  there  then. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

MY   TRANSFER   TO   STOCKHOLM 

When  I  left  Sofia,  communication  with  Belgrade  had 
not  yet  been  re-opened,  and  I  had  to  take  the  Orient- 
Express  at  Bukharest.  It  was  a  hot  autumn  day  when 
I  did  the  journey  between  Sofia  and  Rustchuk.  In  the 
evening,  when  I  reached  Rustchuk,  a  violent  storm 
occurred,  and  at  dawn,  when  my  travelling  companion 
and  I  went  on  board  the  small  steamer  which  was  to 
take  us  to  Giurgevo,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Danube, 
the  weather  had  suddenly  become  so  cold  that  we 
seemed  to  have  passed  unexpectedly  from  September  to 
December.  It  was  getting  light ;  above  the  grey  waves, 
and  under  a  leaden  sky,  a  cutting  north  wind  was 
blowing,  chasing  a  large  flight  of  cawing  crows.  "  What 
do  you  prognosticate,  you  birds  of  ill-omen?"  I  could 
not  help  thinking.  "  What  fresh  carnage  ?  What  new 
calamity?" 

On  the  short  trip  between  Giurgevo  and  Bukharest, 
we  enjoyed  the  pleasant  company  of  the  Prefect  of 
Giurgevo.  At  Bukharest  I  found  that  M.  Schebeko  had 
already  left  for  St.  Petersburg,  having  received  the 
notice  of  his  appointment  as  Ambassador  to  Vienna 
a  few  days  previously.  When  I  joined  the  Orient- 
Express  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  I  met  M. 
Majoresco,  then  still  President  of  the  Council  of 
Rumania,  and  I  had  a  long  talk  with  him  about  the 
political  events  that  had  just  occurred,  and  in  which  we 
had  both  taken  such  an  active  part.  From  the  few 
hours  that  I  thus  spent  with  Rumanians,  I  was  able  to 
gather  the  impression  that  we  enjoyed  great  popularity 
in    Rumania.      I    have    no    doubt   whatever    that    the 

220 


I9I3]        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM        221 

recollection  of  Russian  sympathy  in  1913,  and  of  the 
support  that  we  then  lent  to  Rumanian  policy,  greatly 
influenced  the  decision  taken  by  the  Rumanians  in  1916, 
when  they  finally  ranged  themselves  on  the  side  of  the 
Entente  against  the  Central  Empires.  Unfortunately, 
no  good  came  of  it,  at  least  as  far  as  Russia  was 
concerned ! 

The  following  day,  during  the  picturesque  journey 
between  Vienna  and  Munich,  the  sun  was  so  bright  and 
hot  that  I  forgot  my  flight  of  crows  and  the  gloomy 
thoughts  which  had  perpetually  assailed  me  during  the 
latter  part  of  my  stay  in  Sofia. 

Two  or  three  days  after  my  arrival  in  Paris,  I  called 
on  M.  Sazonoff,  who,  as  usual,  received  me  with  great 
friendliness.  The  Minister  appeared  tired  but  content, 
and  on  the  whole  optimistic.  This  optimism  spread  to 
those  around  him,  and  thence  naturally  reflected  itself 
back  on  him,  increasing  his  confidence  in  the  political 
situation.  M.  Sazonoff  questioned  me  at  some  length 
on  my  opinion  about  the  situation  in  Bulgaria;  never- 
theless, I  had  the  feeling  that  he  already  possessed 
fairly  precise  ideas  on  the  subject,  and  that  these  did 
not  agree  fundamentally  with  my  opinion  on  the  men 
and  affairs  of  the  post  that  I  was  leaving.  I  was  careful 
not  to  lay  any  stress  on  this,  and  our  conversation 
turned  naturally  to  questions  concerning  the  post  of 
Stockholm,  to  which  I  was  shortly  to  be  appointed.  It 
was  only  then  that  1  learnt  from  M.  Sazonoff's  lips  the 
reason  why  M.  Savinsky  could  no  longer  stay  in 
Sweden :  the  Grand-Duchess  Marie  (daughter  of  the 
Grand-Duke  Paul  of  Russia),  who  six  years  before  had 
married  Prince  William  of  Sweden  (second  son  of  the 
King),  was  on  the  eve  of  separating  from  her  husband. 
Profiting  by  a  journey  to  foreign  parts,  the  Grand- 
Duchess,  on  her  arrival  in  Berlin,  informed  her  husband 
that  she  did  not  wish  to  live  with  him  any  more,  and 
she  left  to  join  her  father  in  Paris.  There  was  no 
scandal,  no  romance  even,  to  cause  the  divorce  of  the 
Grand-Duchess  !    It  was  merely  that  this  young  Russian 


222       MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [ch.  xiv. 

Grand-Duchess,  familiar  from  her  earliest  youth  with 
the  sight  and  the  principles  of  the  free  and  unrestrained 
life  of  all  the  members  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Family, 
found  her  existence  too  narrow  in  the  rigid  environment 
of  the  Royal  Family  of  Sweden.     The  life  seemed  to  her 
petty,    boring,   and   finally  unbearable.     Her   husband, 
who   had   a  very  youthful   mind,  did  not   possess  the 
necessary  ascendancy  over  his  wife,  and  for  some  time 
the  young  couple  had  been  contemplating  the  possibility 
of  a  separation;  they  had  remained  "good  comrades," 
and   discussed   their   future  divorce   together.     Never- 
theless,   when    the    Grand-Duchess   actually    left    her 
husband,  he  was  much  vexed,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
sincerely  grieved.     The    Royal   Family  and   society  at 
the  Court  of  Stockholm  were  also  somewhat  hurt  in 
their  pride.    Savinsky,  who  during  the  eighteen  months 
that   he   stayed   in   Sweden   had   gained   the   complete 
confidence  of  the  young  Grand-Duchess,  and   become 
what    the    old    comedies    call    "  the    confidant " — but 
absolutely  nothing  more — and  who  was  aware  of  the 
project  of  the  divorce  long  before  it  took  place,  could 
not  decently  remain  at  the  Swedish  Court.     So  it  was 
considered  a  good  moment  to  send  him  to  Sofia  to  King 
Ferdinand,  who  had   always  liked   him  and   paid   him 
marked  attention.     There  were  people  in  our  country 
who  were  convinced  that  Savinsky  would  be  able  to 
accomplish  what  I  had  not  been  able  to  do,  that  is  to 
acquire  the  confidence  and  the  sympathies  of  Ferdinand, 
and  to  lead  him,  and  naturally  all  his  people  with  him, 
back  into  the  path  of  obedience  and  devotion  to  Russia. 
A  truly  childish  notion,  but  it  was  upheld  by  certain 
influential  persons  in  M.  Sazonoff's  set! 

It  was  agreed  between  the  Minister  and  me  that  I 
should  not  take  up  my  new  post  till  the  Royal  divorce 
had  actually  been  pronounced,  otherwise  my  position 
would  be  disagreeable  and  difficult  from  the  outset. 

Never  before  had  Paris  impressed  me  so  strongly  as 
the  town  of  pleasure  and  thoughtless  luxury  as  she  did 


1913]  M.    KOKOVTZOFF    IN    PARIS  223 

now.  It  was  the  time  of  the  appearance  of  the  famous 
tango,  of  "Persian  balls,"  etc.  There  were  "tango 
suppers"  at  Giro's,  and  "tango  teas"  all  over  the  place, 
at  which,  in  the  afternoons,  evenings,  and  nights, 
professionals,  amateurs,  cocottes,  women  of  the  world, 
Grand-Duchesses  even,  swayed  gracefully  or  fluttered 
comically  about  in  new  American  dances.  The  best 
St.  Petersburg  society  was  well  represented.  All  this 
Russian  society  filled  the  small  theatres,  the  smart 
restaurants,  and  the  new  dressmakers'  showrooms, 
where  modern  models  with  modern  manners  showed 
off  startling  toilettes,  simplified  and  shortened,  but  far 
more  expensive  than  the  former  trains  and  flounces ; 
and  the  Russian  painter  Bakst  gave  the  finishing 
touches  to  these  toilettes  by  decorating  them  with  weird 
flowers  and  arabesques,  which  were  usually  continued 
on  the  chest  and  back  of  the  charming  "patient."  It 
was  as  if  some  one  was  urging  on  all  these  people  by 
whispering  in  their  ear :  "  Hurry  up,  hurry  up,  and 
enjoy  yourselves;  these  are  the  last  months  of  your 
thoughtless,  brilliant,  and  luxurious  existence!" 

I  was  detained  in  Paris  by  private  business,  and 
stayed  there  over  six  weeks.  Some  time  after  the 
departure  of  Sazonoff  (who  stopped  in  Berlin  on  his 
way  back),  M.  Kokovtzoff  arrived  in  Paris.  I  went 
to  call  on  him,  of  course,  and  had  a  conversation 
with  him.  The  President  of  the  Council  gave  me  the 
impression  that  he  did  not  share  the  optimism  which 
seemed  to  reign  in  our  Foreign  Office.  He  seemed  to 
dread  complications  from  the  side  of  Germany.  On  his 
way  back  to  St.  Petersburg  he  also  stopped  in  Berlin, 
had  an  audience  of  the  Emperor  William,  and  interviews 
with  Bethmann-HoUweg,  Jagowand  his  colleague  at  the 
Treasury.  Reports  circulated  in  St.  Petersburg  society 
that  these  conversations  had  restored  serenity  to  the 
political  atmosphere  ;  but  I  should  not  at  all  like  to 
guarantee  the  authenticity  of  these  reports. 

From   Paris  I  went  by  Vienna  and  Odessa  to  Yalta 


224        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    \cu.  xiv. 

in  Crimea,  where  my  wife  and  daughter,  who  had  left 
Sofia  in  the  meantime,  were  visiting  my  father-in-law. 
The  Court  as  usual  was  spending  the  autumn  at  Livadia, 
and  I  meant  to  profit  by  my  stay  at  Yalta  to  request  an 
audience  of  the  Emperor. 

On  my  arrival  I  asked  my  wife  if  she  had  called  on 
the  Empress  Alexandra. 

"There  has  been  no  formal  calling,"  was  the  answer. 
"The  Empress  is  not  receiving  officially  at  Livadia; 
but  I  was  invited  to  a  dinner  party  followed  by  a  re- 
ception. We  dined  at  small  tables  presided  over  by  the 
married  Grand-Duchesses  who  are  staying  in  the  Crimea 
just  now.  After  dinner  the  young  people  danced.  The 
young  Grand-Duchesses  and  the  young  ladies  of  Yalta 
danced  gaily  and  without  any  formality  with  the 
young  men,  mainly  officers  from  the  Imperial  yacht." 
"  Was  the  Empress  amiable  ?  " 

"  Her  Majesty  did  not  say  a  word  to  any  of  the 
ladies  present;  she  remained  seated  all  the  time  with  a 
sullen,  almost  tragic  expression,  and  her  face  only  lit  up 
a  little  when  one  of  the  young  Grand-Duchesses  came  to 
talk  to  her  ;  as  to  those  delightful  young  girls,  they  were 
thoroughly  enjoying  themselves  !  " 
"  But  what  does  all  this  mean  ?  " 
"  Oh !  it  is  a  long  story,  alas  !  By  the  way,  here  is 
an  invitation  for  us  both  to  dine  next  Saturday,  but  I 
have  just  heard  that  the  dinner  will  not  take  place." 

Indeed,  next  day  a  messenger  from  the  Palace 
brought  a  note  cancelling  the  invitation  on  account  of 
the  indisposition  of  Her  Majesty  the  Empress. 

I  was  gradually  initiated  into  all  the  gossip  of  Yalta 
and  Livadia,  and  this  is  what  I  learnt : 

That  year  the  Emperor  and  his  family  were  de- 
lighting in  their  stay  in  the  Crimea.  All  were  enjoying 
good  health.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  lawn-tennis  and 
riding,  and  on  Saturdays  the  young  people  danced. 
For  a  brief  period  only  was  this  gay  life  saddened  by 
the  almost  sudden  death  of  Dedulin,  the  "  General  du^ 
jour  "to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor.     He  was  a  worthy, 


I9I3]  GENERAL   DUMBADZE  225 

honest  man,  not  distinguished  by  any  extraordinary 
ability,  but  who  had  never  abused  his  position  of 
intimate  association  with  the  Sovereign.^  He  was 
sincerely  mourned  ;  a  few  tears  were  shed  at  his  funeral, 
celebrated  with  all  military  and  official  honours;  but 
every  one  consoled^themselves  quickly,  and  his  succes- 
sor had  already  been  chosen.  .  .  . 

My  French  readers  will  doubtless  remember  Edmund 
About's  charming  tale  called  "  The  Man  with  the 
broken  Ear."  This  fantastic  and  amusing  story,  which 
verges  on  political  satire,  has  as  its  hero  a  gallant  colonel 
of  the  Napoleonic  armies  who  in  1812,  at  the  rout  of  his 
troops,  is  saved  from  certain  death  by  an  old  German 
wizard  who  turns  him  into  a  mummy  and  bequeaths 
him  to  a  learned  society,  with  a  description  of  the 
means  to  be  taken  to  restore  him  to  life.  The  mummy, 
after  many  vicissitudes,  ends  by  falling  into  the  hands 
of  a  French  great-nephew  ;  the  means  prescribed  are 
adopted,  and  the  hot-headed  officer  of  the  Grand  Army 
is  restored  to  life  at  the  age  of  thirty  in  the  midst  of 
the  Napoleonic  France  of  i860! 

I  remembered  "the  Man  with  the  broken  Ear' 
every  time  that  I  found  myself  in  the  presence  of  the 
worthy  General  Dumbadze,  who  since  1906  had  been 
the  military  governor  of  the  town  of  Yalta  and  its 
environs,  that  is  to  say  the  guardian  and  principal 
guarantee  of  the  safety  of  the  Emperor  and  his  family 
during  their  frequent  visits  to  Livadia.  Only  in 
Dumbadze's  case  the  old  German  wizard  had  not  cast 
his  spell  over  a  colonel  of  Napoleon's  Grand  Army, 
but  over  a  young  lieutenant  of  the  gallant  Caucasian 
troops  during  the  mountain  warfare  of  the  'thirties 
and  'forties,  a  period  which  has  been  described  by  the 
greatest  Russian  authors  (Puchkin,  Lermontoff,  Tolstoi). 
Georgian  by  birth,  of  brilliant  courage  and  unimpeach- 

^  I  have  never  understood  what  the  functions  were  of  the  "  G^ndral  du 
jour,"  a  barbarous  term  of  Prussian  survival.  I  believe  that  in  reality 
he  had  no  very  defined  functions,  which  meant  that  he  had  a  hand  in 
everything. 


226        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [en.  xiv. 

able  honesty,  almost  insanely  devoted  to  the  Tsar  and 
to  military  honour,  but  at  the  same  time  rather  unculti- 
vated and  recognising  no  curb  or  limits  to  his  despotism 
except  his  own  conscience,  tiiis  curious  specimen  of  a 
bygone  day  attracted  the  particular  attention  of  public 
opinion  and  of  the  Russian  Press.  Extraordinary 
stories  were  current  of  his  administrative  pranks,  which 
recalled  the  good  old  times  of  the  Kaliphat  of  Baghdad 
and  of  the  Persia  of  Nadir-Shah.  There  was  some 
truth  in  these  tales,  and  many  private  individuals  had 
cause  for  bitter  complaint  against  the  despotism  of  the 
Pasha  of  Yalta.  But  on  the  other  hand  they  affected  to 
ignore  the  highly  respectable  side — almost  legendary 
for  modern  times —  of  Dumbadze's  character  and  work. 
He  was  absolutely  inaccessible  to  considerations  of 
fortune  and  comfort.  Father  of  a  large  family,  he  was 
satisfied  during  the  long  years  of  his  despotic  rule  with 
a  more  than  modest  salary,  and  lived  in  four  miserable 
rooms  which  were  reserved  for  him  in  the  offices  at 
Livadia.  During  the  last  years  only  he  was  better  paid, 
and  received  an  apartment  in  keeping  with  his  rank  and 
functions.  But  during  the  whole  period  even  his  most 
inveterate  enemies  could  not  accuse  him  of  any  dis- 
honesty with  regard  to  money. 

This  was  the  man  who  was  about  to  be  appointed 
to  the  late  Dedulin's  post,  and  to  be  definitely  attached 
to  the  person  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor.  But  at  this 
moment  an  incident  occurred  which  no  one — except 
Caucasian  officers  of  the  'forties — could  have  foreseen 
or  understood. 

At  the  height  of  his  favour  at  Court,  Dumbadze,  who 
was  still  fulfilling  the  duties  of  military  governor  of 
Yalta,  heard  that  the  celebrated  "old  man,"  Gregory 
Rasputin,  had  just  arrived  at  one  of  the  most  modest 
hotels  in  the  town  ;  and  the  very  next  day,  by  the 
governor's  orders,  the  said  "  old  man  "  was  sent  away 
from  Yalta  and  its  environs  as  "a  person  of  no  occu- 
pations and  without  visible  means  of  subsistence," 
Given  the  small  "  state  of  siege  "  to  which  the  town  was 


1913]  RASPUTIN   AGAIN  227 

subjected  during  the  visits  of  the  Imperial  Family,  this 
expulsion  was  perfectly  legitimate.      But   imagine  the 
effect  produced !     The  Empress's   health   declined  im- 
mediately, and    her   good   temper,  resulting   from   the 
healthy  climate  of  Crimea  and  the  charming  family  life 
in  the  bosom  of  radiant  nature,  was  changed  to  gloomy 
and  nervous  anxiety.     The  Vyrubova  began  to  trot  to 
and  fro  between  Livadia,  the  church  of  the  diocese,  and 
the  modest  hotel  where  the  wife  (or  rather  one  of  the 
zvives)  and  one  of  the  daughters  of  Rasputin  had  remained. 
The  people  about  the  Court  when  they  met  Dumbadze 
stared  at  him  as  one  stares  at  a  lunatic  or  a  dangerous 
criminal.     Finally,  after  a  few  days  of  painful  indecision 
and  probably  in  consequence  of  violent  curtain-lectures, 
the  Emperor  sent  for  Dumbadze  and  asked  him  by  what 
right  he   had   considered  himself    authorised   to  expel 
from  Yalta  "the  excellent  old  man,  Gregory"?    Dum- 
badze replied  most  calmly  and  frankly  that  he  looked 
on  the  old  man  as  a  suspicious  and  dangerous  person, 
and  that  he  had  expelled  him  conformably  with  the  law 
and  duty  imposed  on  him  by  his  post. 

"But  all  the  same,  how  could  you  do  it,  knowing 
to  what  extent  the  Empress  and  I  love  and  esteem 
Gregory?  I  beg  of  you.  General,  if  it  is  possible,  to 
authorise  this  poor  man  to  rejoin  his  family  at  Yalta." 

"Sir,"  Dumbadze  then  replied,  to  end  this  painful 
discussion,  "Your  Majesty  is  well  aware  that  I  would 
shed  my  last  drop  of  blood  for  you  and  your  august 
family  ;  but  I  intend  to  preserve  my  honour  as  an  officer 
up  to  the  end,  towards  and  against  all.  Moreover,  Your 
Majesty  can  at  any  moment  relieve  me  of  the  post 
which  you  have  graciously  confided  to  me." 

The  Emperor  was  silent,  then  passed  to  another 
topic,  and  dismissed  the  General  with  his  usual  kind- 
ness. Dumbadze  remained  military  prefect,  and  of 
course  never  dreamt  of  allowing  Rasputin  to  return. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  was  no  more  mention  of  the 
General's  candidature  for  the  high  Court  appointment 
which  had  been  destined  to  him,  and  the  persons  of  the 

Q 


228       MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [en.  xiv. 

Emperor's  suite,  who  shortly  before  had  been  speaking 
of  Dumbadze  with  sympathy  and  respect,  were  one  and 
all  laughing  at  the  Oriental  methods  of  administration 
of  the  prefect  of  Yalta,  at  his  love  of  fine  speeches  and 
his  other  little  weaknesses. 

The  Empress  could  not  recover  from  the  blow  to 
her  dearest  feelings ;  she  ceased  to  receive  and  to  show 
herself  in  public  ;  one  only  saw  her  occasionally  driving 
in  a  closed  motor  with  her  daughters,  with  a  set  and 
sad  expression  on  her  face. 

In  spite  of  all  this  tribulation,  a  few  days  after  my 
arrival  at  Yalta  I  asked  the  Court  Minister,  Count 
Fredericsz,  to  obtain  an  audience  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  for  me,  and  I  soon  received  a  command  to 
go  to  the  Palace  of  Livadia^  on  the  2nd  (15th)  December 
at  noon. 

I  arrived  at  the  appointed  hour  at  the  new  Palace  of 
Livadia,  which  I  had  not  yet  seen,  and  then  had  to  wait 
for  my  audience  for  more  than  half  an  hour.  The 
Emperor,  contrary  to  his  usual  habits,  was  late,  as  he  was 
out  with  his  daughters.  The  Court  lived  most  simply 
at  Livadia.  The  Palace  did  not  possess  any  special 
waiting-room,  the  aide-de-camp  on  duty  usually  accom- 
panied the  Emperor  in  his  walks.  So  I  spent  half  an 
hour  in  the  pretty  and  fairly  spacious  hall  of  the  Palace, 
in  the  porter's  company  {f/ie  Sn'i'ss  as  we  still  call  him), 
an  old  and  friendly  servant  who  questioned  me  with 
great  interest  and  some  knowledge  of  the  subject  about 
the  events  that  had  just  occurred  in  Bulgaria.  This 
original  colloquy  between  the  porter  and  the  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  (and  yet  foreigners  dare  to  doubt  our 
democratic  ways!)  only  ended  with  the  arrival  of  the 
Emperor,  who  begged  me  to  follow  him.  His  Majesty 
received  me  graciously  and  addressed  a  few  common- 
places to  me  ;  "  as  to  business,"  he  added,  "  we  will  turn 
to   that  after  luncheon,  we  are   rather  late   as  it  is." 

'  During  their  Majesties'  stay  at  Livadia,  persons  of  a  certain  rank 
who  went  to  see  the  Emperor,  were  invited  at  the  close  of  their  interview 
to  the  family  lunch. 


I9I3]  AT   LIVADIA  229 

Besides  the  Emperor  and  the  four  young  Grand- 
Duchesses  there  were  only  about  a  dozen  of  the  people 
about  the  Court  at  luncheon,  among  others  the  celebrated 
Vyrubova  and  the  less  celebrated  Admiral  NilofF.  I 
was  placed  to  the  left  of  His  Majesty  between  the 
Grand-Duchesses  Tatiana  and  Anastasia.  The  four 
young  princesses  rivalled  one  another  in  charm  and 
beauty,  and  the  youngest,  Anastasia,  a  child  of  twelve 
years  of  age,  specially  pleased  me  by  her  bright,  in- 
telligent and  open  expression  ;  I  began  a  short  conversa- 
tion with  my  delightful  neighbour  and  was  charmed 
by  the  childish  and  yet  at  the  same  time  serious  vein  in 
all  she  said. 

As  I  write  these  lines  ^  nothing  is  known  in  the 
civilised  world—or  calling  itself  such — of  the  fate  of 
these  unfortunate  young  girls.  One  knows  that  their 
father  was  cruelly  and  brutally  assassinated  by  the  pack 
of  brigands  to  whom  Russia  is  obedient  at  the  present 
time.  Sinister  reports  are  circulating  as  to  the  fate  of 
these  four  delightful  young  girls,  torn  from  the  most 
brilliant  heights  of  an  existence  in  which  they  still  only 
breathed  an  atmosphere  of  beauty  and  virtue  and 
suddenly  plunged  into  an  abyss  of  treachery,  total 
desertion,  revolting  physical  and  moral  filth.  Have  they 
perchance  been  saved  and  hidden  in  some  obscure 
retreat  in  the  heart  of  the  Siberian  forests,  or  else — 
Iwryibile  dictu — have  they  also  undergone  a  terrible 
martyrdom  ?  No  one  in  Europe  knows  for  certain ; 
and  moreover  no  one  seems  much  concerned  with  this 
embarrassing  question  ;  there  are  so  many  other  things 
to  think  about  and  guard  against ! 

Alas !  who  could  have  evoked  such  lugubrious 
pictures  in  the  immediate  future ;  who  could  have  pre- 
dicted such  a  terrible  fate  for  those  who  on  this  beautiful 
December  morning  were  gathered  round  the  Imperial 
table  at  Livadia?  Through  the  large  bay-windows  of 
the  dining-room  one  saw  a  pretty  white  patio  full  of  late 
autumn  roses ;  every  one's  face  reflected  the  pleasure  of 

^  October,  191 8. 


230        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [cii.  xiv, 

exercise  taken  in  llie  vivifying  and  scented  air  of  the 
mountains  opposite  the  boundless  expanse  of  sea.  The 
charming  young  Countess  Hendrikoff  was  being  very 
much  teased  because  in  the  absence  of  her  elders  and 
betters  she  was  occupying  the  seat  of  the  Grand  Mistress 
of  the  Court.  Fresh  plans  v/ere  being  made  for  ex- 
peditions on  horseback.  Between  the  Emperor  and  his 
daughters  one  noticed  a  very  strong  current  of  affection, 
of  charming  intimacy,  almost  of  camaraderie. 

When  lunch  was  over  and  we  had  taken  our  coffee 
in  the  hall,  the  Emperor  went  round  talking  to  every  one 
in  turn,  and  then  coming  up  to  me  told  me  to  follow 
him.  The  Emperor  himself  opened  one  door  after 
another;  passing  through  the  big  saloon  he  turned  to 
me  and  said  :  "  The  Empress  is  generally  to  be  found  in 
this  saloon  when  we  come  out  of  the  dining-room  and 
then  we  have  coffee  in  here ;  but  just  now  unfortunately 
she  is  indisposed  and  does  not  come  downstairs."  He 
seemed  to  be  excusing  himself  to  me — the  guest  of  the 
hour — for  the  absence  of  the  mistress  of  the  house. 
When  we  reached  the  study  the  Emperor  installed  him- 
self in  an  armchair  and  begged  me  to  be  seated. 

"And  now  tell  me  everything,"  he  said. 

"  I  have  indeed  much  to  tell  Your  Majesty,"  I  replied  ; 
"  where  do  you  wish  me  to  begin  ?" 

The  Emperor  thought  for  a  moment  and  then  said 
with  a  subtle  smile  : 

"  What  were  your  relations  with  King  Ferdinand, 
and  what  do  you  think  of  him  ?  " 

I  disclosed  quite  frankly  to  the  Emperor  the  course 
of  my  personal  relations  with  Ferdinand  and  I  did  not 
conceal  the  unfavourable  opinion  I  had  formed  of  the 
King's  character.  Imperceptibly  I  passed  on  to  the  last 
Balkan  crisis.  When  speaking  of  the  negotiations  which 
had  ended  in  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  of  1912,  I 
allowed  myself  to  draw  His  Majesty's  attention  to  the 
fact  that  during  these  negotiations  I  had  repeatedly  laid 
stress  in  my  confidential  letters  to  M.  Sazonoff  on  the 
danger  of  a  Balkan  war  as  the  logical  consequence  of 


I9I3]         AUDIENCE  OE  THE   EMPEROR  231 

the  agreement  between  Serbians  and  Bulgarians,  directed 
in  substance  against  Turkey. 

"Yes,  yes,  I  know  that;  Sazonoff  showed  me  your 
letters,"  said  the  Emperor,  I  passed  on  to  subsequent 
events  and,  speaking  of  the  recent  Bulgarian  disaster, 
I  drew  an  accurate  picture  for  His  Majesty  of  the 
present  situation  in  Bulgaria,  not  concealing  that  not 
only  King  Ferdinand  but  also  the  majority  of  the  Bul- 
garian people  were  nursing  bitter  resentment  against 
Russia. 

"  And  yet,"  I  added,  "  among  the  larger  number  of 
Bulgarians,  this  feeling  has  not  completely  obliterated 
the  traditions  of  gratitude  and  devotion  towards  their 
Great  Liberator  and  the  '  White  Tsar.'  These  traditions 
are  dimmed,  but  they  could  and  should  revive.  I 
allow  myself  to  pronounce  frankly  the  opinion  that  at 
the  Peace  Conference  of  Bukharest  the  Bulgarians  were 
too  hardly  treated.  If  we  could  make  the  Bulgarians 
understand  that  at  the  first  favourable  opportunity  we 
would  cause  at  least  a  part  of  what  they  have  just  lost 
to  be  restored  to  them  they  would  live  on  that  hope. 
It  is  dangerous  to  denude  a  people  of  all  hope :  it 
humiliates  them,  depresses  them  and  exposes  them  to 
the  most  hateful  influences.  .  .  ." 

"  But  what  do  you  think  one  could  restore  to  the 
Bulgarians?"  interrupted  the  Emperor  rather  sharply. 

"Part  of  Macedonia,  sir,  if  the  Serbians  could  obtain 
the  access  to  the  Adriatic  that  has  been  so  unjustly 
taken  from  them.  But  more  especially,  and  above  all 
else,  Adrianople  and  Kirk-Kilisseh." 

The  Emperor  reflected  for  an  instant.  "  Yes,"  he 
said  finally,  "but  at  the  present  time  it  would  be 
extremely  difficult.  .  .  .  No,  no  !  just  now  it  cannot  even 
be  thought  of;  and  how  can  we  allow  them  to  nourish 
unrealisable  hopes?"  A  vein  of  sincere  regret  was 
apparent  in  this  reply.  After  a  slight  pause  I  resumed : 
"  I  still  have  to  crave  your  forgiveness,  sir,  for  not 
having  been  able  to  carry  out  Your  Majesty's  generous 
schemes  with  regard  to  Bulgaria." 


232        MY  TRANSFP:R  to  STOCKHOLM    [cii.  xiv. 

"  Not  at  all,  you  have  done  your  best ;  it  is  their  own 
fault!" 

"Yes,  sir,  but  perhaps  some  one  else  would  even  so 
have  been  able  to  influence  them  and  to  prevent  all  that 
has  occurred.  .  .  ." 

"No,  no,"  broke  in  the  Emperor  again,  "you  have 
done  all  that  was  in  your  power  to  do,  but  against 
fate"— he  immediately  corrected  himself:  ''against  the 
decrees  of  Providence,  one  cannot  struggle.  I  wish  to 
express  my  sincere  gratitude  to  you  for  all  your  services 
in  Bulgaria."  I  made  a  low  bow.  "And  now  go  to  the 
Swedes,"  he  added  with  a  merry  smile  as  he  rose  from 
his  chair.  For  a  few  minutes  still  the  Emperor  talked 
about  Sweden,  King  Gustaf,  and  the  Royal  Family, 
and  he  approved  highly  of  what  Sazonoff  and  I  had 
arranged  about  postponing  my  departure  for  Sweden 
until  the  Grand-Duchess  Marie's  divorce  had  been  defi- 
nitely pronounced.  I  noticed  that  His  Majesty  spoke  of 
Sweden  and  of  the  Royal  Court  with  much  sympathy. 
His  last  and  fairly  recent  visit  to  Stockholm  had  evidently 
left  a  good  impression  on  him.  I  was  very  graciously 
dismissed  after  an  audience  which  had  lasted  an  hour. 

A  few  days  later  I  left  the  Crimea  and  went,  vid 
Odessa  and  Vienna,  to  Sofia  in  order  to  make  the  final 
arrangements  for  my  removal  and  to  hand  my  letters  of 
recall  to  King  Ferdinand,  who  had  left  in  September 
before  my  appointment  to  Stockholm  was  settled, 
so  that  I  had  not  been  able  to  take  leave  of  him,  as 
is  customary  on  such  occasions.  I  spent  about  ten 
days  in  Sofia.  But  I  was  not  invited  to  go  to  the 
King  till  two  days  before  my  departure.  Ferdinand 
received  me  in  his  study ;  he  was  in  the  undress 
uniform  of  his  Russian  regiment  (I  had  been  told 
to  wear  morning  dress);  I  found  Prince  Boris  with 
the  King.  Having  invited  me  to  sit  down,  the  King, 
after  a  few  trifling  words,  stared  at  me  and  said, 
"Monsieur,  you  have  probably  read  the  pamphlet 
written    against    me    by   your  compatriot,    the    news- 


I9I3]         INTERVIEW   WITH    FERDINAND         233 

paper  correspondent/  So-and-so.  .  .  .  How  did  it 
please  you?"  The  King  spoke  in  French,  but,  as  his 
custom  was,  he  interlarded  his  sentences  with  Russian 
words  and  expressions ;  these  expressions  were  gene- 
rally apt  and  correctly  used,  but  pronounced  with  quite 
a  foreign  accent.  "  As  for  me,  I  have  read  the  vile  book 
attentively,  and  I  was  gloiiboko  vosmouchten?'  I  gave  it 
to  my  son  to  read,  and  he  will  tell  you  his  impression 
of  it,"  he  continued,  turning  to  Boris. 

The  latter,  with  an  expression  of  perfect  obedience 
on  his  face,  half  rose  from  his  chair,  and  turning  to  me 
stammered  out,  "Yes,  monsieur,  I  too  was  glouboko 
vosmoucJitcuy 

"  I  believe  you  know  the  gentleman  very  well  ? " 
continued  the  King,  turning  to  me  again. 

1  realised  that  the  King  wished  to  appear  to  believe 
that  the  pamphlet  in  question  had  been  inspired  by  me. 
I  parried  the  thrust  by  replying  in  my  most  cutting 
tones  that  I  did  not  know  the  correspondent ;  that  I 
had  once  refused  to  see  him,  and  that  he  had  published 
something  offensive  about  me  as  well — "a  fact  which 
Your  Majesty,  who  knows  all,  cannot  but  be  aware  of." 
This  was  the  absolute  truth.  I  had  actually  forbidden 
my  house  to  this  gentleman,  who  had  arrived  in  Sofia 
at  the  time  of  the  mobilisation,  and  who  had  sent  to  his 
newspaper  some  absurd  telegrams  abusive  of  the  Bul- 
garian Government  and  ill-natured  about  the  Russian 
Legation.  But  I  ought  to  mention  that  one  of  my  minor 
subordinates — a  contemptible  and  scheming  individual 
— had  allowed  himself,  unknown  to  me,  to  present  this 
journalist  to  Danev,  and  had  probably  supplied  him 
with  a  few  details  about  the  Court  of  Sofia,  details 
which  he  himself  had  obtained  through  his  intimacy 
with  the  servants  at  the  Palace.  This  same  individual 
spied  on  his  chiefs — the  Russian  Ministers — on  Ferdi- 
nand's behalf 

*  Such  an  insignificant  person  that  I  have  forgotten  his  name,  nor 
do  I  remember  to  what  second-class  newspaper  he  was  correspondent. 

2  Highly  indignant. 


234        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [cii.  xiv. 

My  answer  having  cut  short  the  topic  of  the  cor- 
respondent and  his  pamphlet,  Ferdinand  turned  the 
conversation  on  to  pohtical  ground,  and  began  in  a 
tone  of  bitter  sarcasm  to  ask  me  questions  about 
Russia's  ulterior  intentions  with  regard  to  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  Treaty  ot  Bukharest.  "  What  have  you 
decided  about  Kavala?  What  about  the  left  bank  of 
the  Vardar?"  and  how  were  we  going  to  reconcile  our 
manifest  desertion  of  Bulgaria  with  the  telegram  in 
which,  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  the 
promise  had  been  given  to  shield  Bulgaria  from  too 
much  humiliation  and  abasement?  This  time  the  blow 
struck  home,  and  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  parry  it 
with  really  plausible  explanations.  But  being  in  my 
turn  glouboko  vosmouchten  at  the  most  unseemly  tone 
which  the  King  allowed  himself  to  use  to  the  Imperial 
Minister  of  Russia,  I  replied  : 

"Sir,  the  Bulgarians  have  drawn  their  misfortunes 
on  themselves,  and  have  forced  Russia  to  give  up  all 
attempts  to  come  to  their  assistance.  And  Your  Majesty 
knows  better  than  any  one  when  the  irreparable  blow 
was  struck  at  Bulgaria's  interests :  it  was  on  the  i6th 
(29th)  of  June  last.  Your  Majesty  knows  as  well  as  I 
do  that  1  had  nothing  to  do  with  that  day  of  misfortune, 
of  which  I  was  the  first  dupe." 

Ferdinand  cast  his  most  evil  glance  at  me,  but  re- 
strained himself,  and  after  a  short  silence,  without 
raising  his  eyes,  he  said  :  "Yes,  that  was  a  great  mis- 
take." Then  he  rose  and  took  leave  of  me.  I  have  not 
seen  him  since. 

From  the  King's  study  I  was  led  to  the  apartments 
of  Queen  Eleanor.  There  quite  a  different,  but  no  less 
original,  welcome  awaited  me.  The  Queen,  almost  while 
the  customary  greetings  were  being  exchanged,  abruptly 
asked  me  :  "Do  tell  me,  monsieur,  how  has  all  this  hap- 
pened?" 

I  answered  Her  Majesty  quite  frankly  that  I  per- 
mitted myself  to  consider  that  the  King's  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  me  was   one  of  the  causes  of  the   political 


I9I3]     INTERVIEW  WITH  QUEEN  ELEANOR    235 

catastrophe  in  Bulgaria.  In  all  our  conversations,  in 
all  the  advice  which  I  had  felt  bound  to  give  him,  I  was 
guided  solely  by  the  real  good  of  Bulgaria.  From  the 
day  of  my  arrival  in  Sofia  I  had  always  and  absolutely 
refused  to  act  against  the  King;  and  during  this  time 
His  Majesty  was  working  behind  my  back  and  often 
against  me  personally.  .  .  . 

"But  in  whom  has  he  ever  had  confidence?"  ex- 
claimed the  Queen.     "  He  distrusts  even  me." 

I  no  longer  remember  what  my  answer  was,  but 
involuntarily  I  raised  my  voice  a  little. 

"  Hush  !  in  Heaven's  name,  speak  lower,"  interrupted 
the  poor  Queen,  casting  a  furtive  glance  towards  one  of 
the  doors  of  the  room  ;  "  this  is  the  most  dangerous  room 
in  the  Palace^ 

Eleanor  then  went  on  to  make  complaints  about  the 
conduct  of  the  Rumanians  in  the  environs  of  Varna, 
that  town  so  truly  dear  to  her. 

"  It  is  particularly  painful  to  me  on  account  of  Queen 
Elisabeth.  We  are  two  German  princesses  on  Balkan  thrones, 
and  in  spite  of  that  our  respective  people  have  become 
completely  hostile  to  one  another !  You  are  doubtless 
aware  of  the  horrors  committed  by  the  Rumanians  in 
the  environs  of  Varna  against  an  unfortunate  population 
that  I  know  and  love  so  well.  .  .  .  Some  young  girls, 
monsieur,  some  young  girls!  .  .  .  No,  if  now  we  were 
to  have  a  new  and  real  war  with  Rumania,  I  should  be 
capable  of  harnessing  myself  to  a  gun,  so  great  is  my 
indignation  against  them  ! " 

At  this  point,  in  spite  of  the  truly  tragic  tone  of  the 
Queen,  I  could  hardly  suppress  my  mirth  ;  I  pictured 
the  poor  speaker  in  the  entirely  new  role  of  an  artillery 
draught-horse,  and  from  the  opposite  side  I  could  see 
the  respectable  Carmen  Sylva  also  perhaps  obliged  to 
assist  in  the  transport  of  guns  or  ammunition.  ...  I 
hastened  to  make  the  Queen  turn  to  a  less  ticklish 
topic. 

"  When  you  see  the  Emperor,"  she  said  in  conclu- 
sion, "  pray  convey  to  him  my  sincerest  good  wishes. 


236        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [ch.  xiv. 

You  know  how  much  1  like  him  and  all  his  family;  and 
I  am  still  cordially  devoted  to  them  in  spite  of  all  that 
has  occurred." 

On  this  I  took  my  leave  of  Queen  Eleanor — and  for 
ever;  she  died  three  years  later. 

On  my  w^ay  back  to  Russia  I  spent  a  few  days  in 
Vienna.  I  used  to  know  this  city  very  well,  but  since 
my  long  stay  in  Paris  I  had  only  passed  through  it. 
This  time  the  gay  Austrian  capital,  where  the  season 
was  in  full  swing,  had  a  depressing  effect  on  me. 
There  was  an  atmosphere  of  uneasiness,  and  the 
ingenuous  and  gay  good  temper  which  has  always 
been  a  characteristic  trait  of  the  Viennese  of  all 
classes,  seemed  to  have  completely  disappeared.  I 
mentioned  this  impression  to  a  few  members  of  our 
Embassy. 

"  Is  it  really  so?  "  I  asked  them,  "  or  have  I  aged  so 
terribly  in  the  meantime  that  everything  seems  to  me 
aged  and  tarnished  around  me?" 

"Not  at  all,"  was  the  reply.  "One  can  no  longer 
recognise  Vienna,  and  the  cause  lies  in  the  profound 
anxiety  reigning  here.  No  one  is  sure  of  the  morrow. 
All  business  is  at  a  standstill,  and  heaps  of  people  have 
been  ruined  on  the  Bourse.  Every  one  is  afraid  of  war. 
This  began  already  in  1909,  but  now  it  has  reached  a 
state  of  paroxysm.  Several  great  financiers  say  openly 
that  it  would  be  better  if  war  actually  broke  out,  for 
this  awaiting  of  events  and  perpetual  uncertainty  are 
more  ruinous  than  anything.  But  on  the  whole  every 
one  fears  war." 

By  the  middle  of  January,  O.S.,  I  was  in  St.  Peters- 
burg, Never  had  the  rich  world  of  St.  Petersburg 
amused  itself  as  it  did  during  that  last  winter.  In 
society,  one  entertainment  succeeded  another.  Fancy- 
dress  balls,  balls  where  coloured  wigs  were  worn, 
parties  at  the  Embassies,  and  in  the  Grand-Dukes' 
palaces.  Theatres  and  restaurants  were  filled  every 
evening    with    a    brilliant    crowd.      There  was    much 


I9I4]  IN   ST.    PETERSBURG  237 

speculating  on  the  Bourse  among  all  ranks  of  society; 
all  stocks  were  rising;  the  public  generally  won  and 
anticipated  fresh  gains, 

I  still  remember  the  magnificent  fancy-dress  ball 
given  by  the  Countess  Kleinmichel,  the  rooms  filled 
with  the  most  brilliant  people  of  St.  Petersburg,  the 
beautiful  hall  with  columns  through  which  the  Persian 
quadrille,  the  chief  feature  of  the  evening,  made  its 
entry.  To  the  strains  of  a  fine  orchestra,  there  appeared 
on  the  staircase,  like  a  niany-hued  serpent,  the  "theory" 
of  sixteen  beautiful  young  women  and  as  many 
cavaliers  holding  hands,  and  showing  off  gorgeous 
brocades  and  beautiful  furs,  magnificent  jewels  and 
most  costly  Oriental  weapons.  The  Grand-Duchess 
Cyril  and  the  Grand-Duke  Boris  led  the  quadrille,  in 
which— chosen  from  amongst  the  best — the  prettiest  and 
most  graceful  representatives  of  that  set  of  young 
ladies  whom  I  had  nicknamed  "the  bayaderes  of  the 
Order  of  the  Grand-Dukes  "  took  part.  The  men  mostly 
belonged  to  the  smartest  regiments  of  the  Guard.  Six 
months  later,  half  these  fine  young  men — and  many 
others  who  were  dancing  and  enjoying  themselves  at 
this  ball — fell  dead  or  dangerously  wounded  on  the  first 
and  glorious  battlefields  of  Eastern  Prussia. 

As  I  was  admiring  this  brilliant  spectacle  I  found, 
on  turning  my  head,  that  I  was  standing  next  to  Count 
Witte,  whom  I  had  not  seen  since  1910. 

"  Ah  !     Good  evening ! " 

"Good  evening !" 

"When  did  you  arrive?" 

"A  week  ago." 

"  What  a  beautiful  sight !  " 

"Yes,  enchanting!  But  tell  me,  my  dear  Count,  do 
you  not  feel  as  if  you  were  assisting  at  the  '  Festivity 
during  the  Plague,'^  or  rather  'before  the  Plague'?" 
I  had  hardly  spoken  these  words  when  Witte's  face 
assumed  a  terribly  serious  expression.  .  .  .  He  seized 

^  A  very  well  known  dramatic  piece  in  verse  by  our  celebrated  poet, 
Puschkin. 


238        MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [cii.  xiv. 

me  by  the  arm,  exclaiming:  "Then  you  also  have  that 
impression  ?" 

"Most  certainly.  Ever  since  I  have  been  in  St. 
Petersburg,  I  cannot  get  rid  of  the  feeling.  .  .  ." 

"I  know!  I  know !"  returned  the  Count  excitedly. 
"We  are  going  God  alone  knows  where;  God  alone 
knows  to  what  abyss!  It  is  impossible  to  go  on  like 
this.  .  .  ." 

At  this  moment  the  mistress  of  the  house  came  up 
to  Witte,  and  asked  him  to  go  and  play  bridge  at  the 
table  of  one  of  the  Grand-Duchesses  present.  I  was 
put  at  another  table,  so  I  could  not  ascertain  what 
constituted  the  object  of  the  very  sincere  apprehensions 
of  the  celebrated  statesman  :  was  it  war  or  a  revolution? 
I  personally  dreaded  war.  This  was,  moreover,  my  last 
meeting  with  Count  Witte,  who  died  in  St.  Petersburg 
a  year  and  a  half  later. 

A  few  days  after,  a  lovely  ball  was  given  by 
Countess  Betsy  Schuvaloff  in  the  splendid  setting  of 
her  mansion  of  the  Fontanka,  former  palace  of  the 
famous  Marie  Narichkin,  nee  Czetwertynska,  recognised 
mistress  of  Alexander  L  ;  a  palace  full  of  works  of  art 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  combining  the  refined 
luxury  of  the  Narichkins  and  the  Schuvaloffs— the 
favourites  of  an  epoch  when  the  Russian  nobility, 
suddenly  become  European,  threw  themselves  heart 
and  soul  into  the  enjoying  of  the  art  and  luxury  of  a 
century  of  refinement  and  beauty  that  were  almost 
classical.  Alas !  What  has  become  of  this  beautiful 
mansion?  It  is  said  to  have  been  ransacked  and 
plundered,  like  so  many  other  palaces  in  St.  Petersburg, 
the  works  of  art  broken,  destroyed,  or  else  sold  to 
Germany  or  America.  The  insane  bet  made  by  Peter 
the  Great  seemed  to  have  been  won,  and  even  beyond 
the  dreams  of  this  greatest  of  barbarian  reformers. 
Midst  snow  and  ice,  in  a  marshy  desert  inhabited  by 
some  half-savage  Finns,  art  and  science,  all  the  beauties 
and  products  of  civilisation  held  a  rendezvous ;  cele- 
brated libraries  and  museums,  famous  theatres,  threw 


I9I4]       PRINCE   ALEXANDER   OF  SERBIA        239 

open  their  doors  in  a  majestic  and  magnificent  setting 
that  was  almost  unique.  .  .  .  And  suddenly  darkness 
set  in  over  all  this  beauty,  a  wind  blew,  an  earthquake 
which  seemed  slight  and  harmless  shook  the  country, 
and  we  do  not  even  know  what  will  still  exist  of  all  this 
wealth  of  culture  and  life,  when  at  last  a  new  day  shall 
dawn  on  the  desolation  so  often  predicted  and  never 
believed  in. 

But  I  hasten  to  leave  this  lugubrious  contemplation, 
set  in  the  charming  frame  of  such  recent  and  yet 
far-away  memories,  and  to  return  to  the  brilliantly 
illuminated  rooms  of  Countess  Schuvaloff.  Amongst 
the  august  personages  present  I  met  Prince  Alexander 
of  Serbia,  who  had  arrived  in  St.  Petersburg  a  few  days 
before.  The  Prince  drew  me  aside,  and  after  a  few 
genuinely  kind  words,  asked  me  the  following  question  : 
"  Pray,  Monsieur,  will  you  tell  me  your  honest  opinion  : 
after  all  that  has  happened,  can  one  still  hope  for  the 
renewal  of  friendly,  or  at  least  neighbourly,  relations 
between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria?  Or  will  the  Bulgarians 
for  some  time  still  remain  our  most  irreconcilable 
adversaries  ?  You  know  Bulgaria  better  than  any  one, 
and  that  is  why  I  am  particularly  anxious  to  know  your 
opinion." 

I  thanked  the  Crown  Prince  for  his  flattering  trust 
in  me,  and  I  told  him  very  frankly  that  I  thought 
that  relations  between  Serbians  and  Bulgarians  were 
radically  compromised  for  many  years ;  I  added  that 
Serbia,  in  carrying  out  her  policy,  must  not  for  one 
instant  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  she  had  beside  her  an 
irreconcilable  foe,  only  existing  in  the  hope  of  a  fierce 
revenge.  "  It  is  very  sad,  and  the  situation  ought  to  be 
gradually  remedied ;  but  it  is  a  fact,  and  in  politics 
everything  must  be  based  on  facts,"  I  concluded. 

"That  is  also  my  opinion,"  agreed  Prince  Alexander; 
"here  I  am  assured  on  all  sides  that  it  would  be  easy  to 
approach  the  Bulgarians  again  and  come  to  terms  with 
them ;  but  I  must  confess  that  I  do  not  believe  it,  and 
your  opinion  shows  me  that  I  am  right." 


240       MY  TRANSFKR  TO  STOCKHOLM    [ch.  xiv. 

When  I  recall  these  strange  and  significant  con- 
versations held  in  a  festive  setting,  and  to  the  strains  of 
dance  music,  I  say  to  myself  that  Madame  Bovary  was 
not  entirely  wrong  when  she  imagined  diplomats  to  be 
"people  who  with  a  smile  on  their  lips  and  death  in 
their  hearts  whispered  terrible  secrets  to  each  other, 
midst  feasts  and  festivities!" 

The  last  great  ball  at  which  I  was  present  was  the 
one  given  at  the  German  Embassy.  When  I  entered 
those  over-gilded  rooms,  full  of  valuable  marbles 
and  bronzes,  and  offering  the  most  ostentatious 
specimen  of  the  vilest  Berlin  taste,  I  could  certainly 
not  have  imagined  that  less  than  six  months  later  a 
furious  yelling  crowd  would  burst  in,  would  break  and 
shatter  all  these  luxurious  possessions,  would  stain 
the  well-polished  floors  with  blood,  and  would  wreck 
even  the  marble  facings  of  the  palace,  henceforth 
accursed. 

I  went,  of  course,  to  call  on  M.  Kokovtzoff,  and  found 
him  even  more  gloomy  than  at  our  last  interview  in 
Paris.  Moreover,  at  the  moment  questions  of  foreign 
policy  were  relegated — temporarily  at  least— to  the 
second  place,  because  of  the  burning  question  of  the 
spirit  monopolies  raised  in  the  bosom  of  the  Council  of 
the  Empire  by  Count  Witte  with  the  obvious  intent  to 
compass  the  downfall  of  Kokovtzoff,  and — who  knows — 
perhaps  to  get  his  post.  With  all  his  serious  and 
respectable  qualities  of  judgment  and  intelligence, 
Kokovtzoff  did  not  possess  the  adaptability  and  subtle 
mind  necessary  for  parliamentary  struggles  ;  he  was  too 
straight,  too  upright,  and  perhaps  also  too  susceptible 
for  this  see-saw  policy.  He  ought  to  have  addressed  to 
Count  Witte  the  insidious  question :  how  the  former 
Minister  of  Finance  proposed  to  make  good  the  loss  of 
revenue  from  the  spirit  monopoly  in  the  Budget ;  he  who 
had  been  the  author  of  this  monopoly,  and  who,  like  all 
his  predecessors,  had  based  a  third  of  the  Budget  of  the 
Empire  on  the  revenue  furnished  by  the  drunkenness 


I9I4]       M.    KOKOVTZOFFS   RESIGNATION       241 

of  the  people?  Instead,  Kokovtzoff  set  himself  to 
defend  the  very  system  of  the  monopoly,  and  thus 
injured  himself  in  public  opinion,  as  well  as  in  the  mind 
of  the  Emperor,  who  at  this  period  had  already  taken 
the  firm  resolution — alas !  far  too  late — to  put  an  end 
to  the  terrible  disease  of  Russia — the  alcoholism  of  an 
entire  people.  A  few  days  later  Kokovtzoff  had  to 
resign  the  posts  of  President  of  the  Council  and  of 
Minister  of  Finance.  On  leaving  he  received  the  title 
of  Count,  and  a  sum  of  300,000  roubles,  a  gratuity  which 
nevertheless  he  promptly  and  absolutely  declined,  in 
spite  of  an  almost  entire  lack  of  private  means.  He 
was  replaced  as  Minister  of  Finance  by  M.  Bark,  an 
intelligent  and  experienced  bank-manager,  but  nothing 
more. 

In  the  person  of  Kokovtzoff  the  Emperor  lost  a 
sincere  councillor,  moderate  and  scrupulously  truthful, 
and  the  State  lost  an  earnest  financier  and  a  Minister 
who  was  absolutely  upright  and  a  gentleman.  His 
departure  still  further  increased  the  internal  and  ex- 
ternal perils  of  Russia.  On  questions  of  foreign  policy 
Kokovtzoff  had  no  preconceived  system ;  if  he  had  had 
the  power  he  would,  I  think,  have  been  inclined  to 
subordinate  these  questions  as  much  as  possible  to  those 
of  the  economic  prosperity  of  Russia.  A  sincere  friend 
of  France  and  the  French,  Kokovtzoff,  however,  was 
often  obliged  to  turn  his  face  towards  Berlin,  first,  in 
view  of  the  immediate  financial  interests  of  the  State, 
and  then  because  of  the  fear  of  a  rupture  with  Germany. 
No  one  dreaded  war  for  Russia  so  much  as  Kokovtzoff, 
for  he  was  aware  both  of  our  lack  of  military  pre- 
paration and  of  the  revolutionary  ferment  which  was 
penetrating  ever  more  deeply  into  the  lower  classes 
and  gaining  ground  daily. 

Count  Kokovtzoff  was  replaced,  as  President  of  the 
Council,  by  M.  Goremykin.  Soon  after  his  appointment 
I  called  on  this  respectable  old  gentleman  and  his 
charming  and  worthy  wife.  M.  Goremykin  complained 
bitterly  of  not  being  allowed  to  end  his  days  in  peace. 


242       MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM    [cii.  xiv. 

He  and  his  wife  had  just  settled  themselves  very  com- 
fortably in  one  of  the  flats  in  a  house  they  owned  in  a 
quiet  and  fashionable  part  of  St.  Petersburg.  When 
taking  me  "round  \he  property,"  M.  Goremykin  drew 
my  attention  to  a  detail :  "  Here  is  my  bedroom,"  he 
said,  "there  is  my  wife's,  and  the  room  between  was 
meant  for  the  hospital  nurse  who  was  to  come  and 
stay  with  us  in  the  event  of  illness,  so  frequent,  alas  ! 
with  both  of  us.  You  will  understand  by  this  detail 
alone  how  difficult  it  is  for  me,  at  my  age  and  with  my 
infirmities,  to  take  up  again  work  that  I  know  so  well 
and  which  imperatively  demands  strength  and  unre- 
mitting toil."  And,  indeed,  during  the  two  and  a  half 
years  that  Goremykin  remained  in  power  this  time, 
until  this  honest  man  was  replaced  by  Sturmer,  he 
was  but  a  figure-head,  and  the  Government  machinery 
usually  worked  without  the  President  of  the  Council. 
This  exactly  suited  all  sorts  of  sharpers  and  shady  char- 
acters who  began  at  this  time  to  penetrate  even  to  the 
steps  of  the  throne,  and  who  were  delighted  to  find 
no  firm  hand  or  implacable  will  at  the  head  of  official 
power. 

I  went,  as  I  always  did  when  in  St.  Petersburg,  to 
pay  a  long  visit  to  our  former  Ambassador  to  Con- 
stantinople, M.  Zinovieff.  He  had  been  one  of  my 
predecessors  in  Stockholm,  and  I  felt  interested  to 
gather  his  impressions  and  opinions  on  men  and  matters 
in  Sweden.  He  had  liked  the  country,  and  he  had  been 
popular  and  much  appreciated  there. 

From  Sweden  we  passed  on  quite  naturally  to 
general  political  questions. 

"  Listen,  M.  Nekludoff,"  the  aged  and  distinguished 
diplomat  said  with  his  usual  frankness ;  "  what  are  we 
about  here  ?  We  are  going  straight  into  war !  They 
are  arming  in  Germany,  Austria  and  Turkey ;  they  are 
champing  their  bits  in  Sofia,  and  we  seem  not  to  notice 
it!  If  you  would  but  tell  i/iem  at  home  all  that  you 
have  just  told  me ;  they  must  listen  to  you  ! " 


I9I4]  M.  ZINOVIEFF  243 

"  In  the  first  place,"  I  replied,  "  I  have  said  it  and 
written  it  repeatedly  to  the  Foreign  Office.  And  then, 
do  not  forget,  my  dear  Ambassador,  that  at  the  present 
moment  I  am  the  man  who  has  suffered  a  reverse, 
rightly  or  wrongly  this  reverse  is  imputed  to  me  ; 
hence  I  have  less  credit  than  I  had  formerly.  Why 
do  you  not  confide  your  thoughts  and  worries  to 
M.  Sazonoff?  I  know  that  you  stand  high  in  his 
esteem." 

"I  have  spoken  to  him  repeatedly!  But  you  know 
how  it  is — these  young  people  will  not  listen  to  me." 
(The  young  people  were  well  over  fifty  at  this  time,  but 
one  must  admit  that  the  excellent  M.  Zinovieff  was 
nearly  eighty).  "  I  esteem  M.  Sazonoff  very  highly," 
continued  my  amiable  host ;  "  he  is  gifted  and  a  gentle- 
man, he  is  quick-witted  and  very  cultured,  and — in 
spite  of  his  youth — has  a  fair  amount  of  experience  ;  he 
judges  men  and  matters  remarkably  well,  especially 
when  he  judges  them  himself  and  by  himself ;  he  has  earned 
the  perfect  confidence  of  our  allies ;  he  is  particularly 
esteemed  in  England,  which  is  not  an  easy  thing  for  a 
Russian  Minister  to  be.  But  his  optimism  !  his 
optimism  !  That  is  the  only  thing  that  I  deplore  in 
him,  and  that  I  fear  for  him  and  for  us  all ! " 

"  You  have  just  said,  my  dear  Ambassador,"  I 
replied,  "  that  our  Foreign  Secretary  is  a  very  good 
judge  when  he  judges  things  himself  and  by  himself 
That  is  absolutely  true.  But  in  order  to  form  a  judg- 
ment on  the  general  situation,  he  must  weigh  the  advice 
of  our  agents  abroad,  beginning  with  the  ambassadors; 
if  the  latter  represent  things  in  a  favourable  light,  he 
is  bound  to  believe  them  unless  he  has  grave  reason  to 
distrust  their  opinion.  And  then  at  the  Minister's  side, 
there  are  always  the  Offices  .  .  .  that  must  not  be 
forgotten." 

"Ah,  yes!  the  Offices!  But  you  need  not  tell  me 
that!"  exclaimed  the  aged  Ambassador,  flinging  his 
arms  up  to  heaven. 

And,  as  a  fact,  the  reports  of  our   representatives 

R 


244      MY  TRANSFER  TO  STOCKHOLM      [cii.  xiv. 

abroad  were  not  at  all  alarming  at  this  time.  In  March 
— on  the  17th,  if  I  am  not  wrong — the  French  Ambas- 
sador to  Berlin,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  wrote  his  famous 
dispatch  which  was  a  cry  of  warning,  and  which  fore- 
saw all  that  was  about  to  happen ;  this  was  followed  by 
reports  from  other  French  representatives  which  were 
equally  prophetic.  All  these  dispatches  figure  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book  on  the  origin  of  the  war.  One 
would  search  in  vain  in  our  Orange  Book  for  anything 
on  the  same  subject.  There  was  nothing  either  in  the 
documents  communicated  to  the  Russian  representa- 
tives abroad.  Perhaps  there  may  have  been  some  very 
confidential  letters  which  have  not  been  printed.  But 
then  why  have  these  not  been  published  in  the  Orange 
Book  so  as  to  make  known  to  the  public  the  vigilance 
and  the  perspicacity  of  our  representatives  at  the  most 
dangerous  and  most  responsible  posts  ?  All  this  is 
even  now  a  riddle  to  me. 

At  last  the  divorce  of  the  Grand-Duchess  Maria 
and  Prince  William  of  Sweden  was  pronounced,  the 
pecuniary  questions  in  connection  with  it  were  settled, 
and  I  was  able  to  think  of  taking  up  my  post.  Before 
starting  I  called  again  on  the  Emperor,  who  received 
me  very  graciously,  but  did  not  detain  me  long.  At 
the  Foreign  Office  also  no  one  talked  seriously  to  me 
about  the  conditions  and  object  of  my  new  post.  They 
spoke  of  the  Court,  of  the  Grand-Duchess's  divorce,  of 
Savinsky,  but  not  a  word  about  our  relations  with 
Sweden  and  the  attitude  of  the  Swedes  towards  us. 
"  Oh,  well !  You  will  arrive,  you  will  see,  you  will  write 
to  us  " — that  was  the  viaticum  with  which  I  departed. 
I  had  as  usual  studied  the  record  of  the  dispatches 
of  my  predecessors;  I  could  add  to  this  most  meagre 
equipment  opinions  gathered  from  M.  Zinovieff  and 
interesting  information  that  I  obtained  in  my  private 
and  friendly  conversations  with  another  of  my  prede- 
cessors. Baron  Budberg,  a  man  of  judgment,  tact  and 
experience  who   had    managed  to   make   an  admirable 


i9i4|  ARRIVAL   IN    STOCKHOLM  -45 

position  for  himself  in  Sweden,  and  who,  from  there, 
was  appointed  Ambassador  to  Madrid. 

On  the  2nd  March,  N.S.,  after  twenty-four  hours 
spent  on  a  comfortable  and  pleasant  journey,  half  in  the 
train  and  half  on  a  steamer,  I  arrived  in  Stockholm  for 
the  first  time  in  my  life. 


CHAPTER  XV 

SWEDEN   IN    19 14 

Happy  is  the  nation  that  has  no  history.  For  a  hundred 
years,  from  1815,  Sweden  has  had  no  history  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  that  is  to  say  that  she  has 
sustained  no  wars  or  revolutions,  and  has  not  taken  an 
active  part  in  the  political  events  of  Europe.  Neverthe- 
less profound  changes  have  taken  place  during  this 
period  in  the  conditions  of  existence  of  the  Swedish 
people,  and  in  the  political  and  economic  structure  of 
the  country ;  and  these  changes,  contrasted  with  the 
curious  survivals  of  the  former  social  state  of  the  king- 
dom and  with  the  original  mentality  of  the  people, 
presented  and  still  present  a  spectacle  worthy  of  the 
earnest  historian's  attention. 

From  1700  and  until  1809  the  principal  enemy,  the 
hereditary  enemy  of  Sweden,  was  Russia — the  Imperial 
Russia  of  Peter  the  Great,  Elizabeth,  Catherine  and 
Alexander  I.;  and  the  home  policy  of  the  country  adapted 
itself  to  the  vicissitudes  of  this  perennial  struggle. 

The  aristocratic  regime,  headed  by  the  Oxenstiernas, 
had  in  the  seventeenth  century  placed  the  international 
power  of  Sweden  on  a  pinnacle,  and  shed  a  lustre  on  the 
justice  and  administration  of  the  kingdom  that  all  the 
other  countries  of  Europe  might  well  envy  ;  the  first  two 
Kings  of  the  Vasa-Zweibriicken  branch,  energetic  and 
authoritative,  wished  to  have  their  share  of  glory  and 
influence,  so  to  lucky  and  easy  conquests  they  added 
reforms  which  struck  a  blow  at  the  exclusive  ascendancy 
of  the  nobility,  and  enhanced  the  fame  of  Swedish  justice 
and  administration. 

246 


1914]  GUSTAF  III.  247 

Left  an  orphan  at  a  tender  age,  and  having  had  ever 
since  he  was  eighteen  a  struggle  with  a  formidable 
coalition  on  his  hands,  Charles  XII.  was  naturally  led  to 
reinforce  the  authority  of  the  Royal  power  and  to  ruin 
that  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  high  nobility  entirely. 
As  he  was  vanquished  in  the  fight  and  as  entire  provinces 
had  passed  to  his  great  antagonist,  from  the  moment  of 
the  King's  death  public  opinion  demanded  a  return  to 
former  systems  of  government.  The  aristocratic  regime 
re-instated  itself  in  Sweden  with  the  last  of  the 
Varangians,  and  the  first  of  the  Holstein-Hottorps,  but 
it  was  a  regime  that  had  lost  its  rigidly  Protestant  and 
Cromwellian  character,  revealing  daily  more  and  more 
of  the  sceptical  levity  of  the  century  of  the  Regent  and 
of  the  Pompadour.  This  regime  culminated  in  a  second 
war  with  Russia,  a  war  insanely  provoked  and  execrably 
managed,  and  Sweden  lost  another  considerable  portion 
of  Finland.  Decidedly  the  aristocracy  were  no  longer 
profitable  !  Hence  the  country  hailed  with  enthusiasm 
the  coup  d'etat  of  the  young  and  impetuous  Gustaf  III., 
who  steered  resolutely  for  enlightened  absolutism  ;  and 
about  fifteen  years  later  the  military  and  financial  power 
of  Sweden  increased  efi'ectually,  and  supplied  a  certain 
quota  to  the  balance  of  European  power. 

Gustaf  III.  awaited  and  chose  his  hour.  At  the 
moment  when  Russia  was  deeply  engaged  in  Turkey 
and  Poland,  the  King  of  Sweden  suddenly  threw  off  his 
mask  and  again  raised  the  cause  of  Charles  XII.  against 
his  powerful  neighbour.  The  struggle  that  ensued  was 
not  wanting  in  glorious  vicissitudes.  The  Swedish 
Fleet  once  suffered  a  crushing  reverse,  and  then  gained 
a  brilliant  victory ;  a  third  great  naval  engagement  was 
undecisive ;  the  contest  on  land  was  also  undecisive, 
and  after  two  years  of  war  the  two  countries,  by 
common  consent,  returned  to  the  status  quo  ante.  "  En- 
lightened absolutism"  was  apparently  not  capable  of 
reviving  the  former  power  of  Sweden.  Shortly  after- 
wards the  King  of  "the  Ballo  in  Maschera"  fell,  the 
victim    of   an    obscure    plot    in    which    old    nobiliary 


248  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

grudges  were  strangely  allied  to  new  revolutionary 
claims. 

His  successor,  the  weak,  hysterical,  and  imaginative 
Gustaf  IV.,  wished,  at  his  majority,  not  only  to  step 
into  the  elegant  shoes  of  his  father,  but  also  into  the 
legendary  boots  of  Charles  XII.  Breaking  insanely,  in 
the  name  of  legitimist  principles,  with  Sweden's  heredi- 
tary ally  France — the  France  of  Napoleon  I.  moreover — 
he  was,  at  one  sign  from  the  Corsican  Giant,  removed 
from  the  political  arena.  Alexander,  authorised  thereto 
by  his  ally  of  Tilsit,  took  possession  in  a  few  months  of 
all  the  rest  of  Finland,  who  greeted  her  new  master 
spontaneously  ;  and  a  pronunciamcnto  of  the  Swedish 
Army  excluded  Gustaf  IV.  and  his  direct  descendants 
for  ever  from  the  Swedish  throne.  His  uncle,  the 
prudent  Duke  of  Sudermania,  succeeded  him— /or  life — 
under  the  name  of  Charles  XIII. 

In  1810  the  election  of  a  new  successor  to  the 
Swedish  throne  in  the  person  of  Marshal  Bernadotte, 
Prince  of  Ponte-Corvo,  virtually  ends  the  annals  of  the 
dynasty  of  the  Vasas,  their  policy  of  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Holy  Empire,  their  wars  against  the  Danes, 
the  Poles  and  the  Russians.  The  country  ceased  to 
make  war.  In  18 15  Norway  joined  her  crown  to  that 
of  Sweden,  making  up  for  the  definite  loss  of  Finland, 
and  on  the  map  of  Europe  the  possessions  of  Bernadotte 
assumed  an  essentially  natural  and  substantial  shape. 

The  wise  policy  of  Charles-John  XIV.,  of  Oscar  I., 
and  of  Charles  XV.  resulted  in  Sweden  being  completely 
isolated  on  the  Russian  side;  the  narrow  band  of  open 
sea  which  separates  the  Aland  Islands  from  the  Swedish 
skdrgaard  really  seemed  to  stretch,  to  widen,  and  finally 
to  assume  the  proportions  of  an  ocean.  Russia  ended 
by  believing  in  this  marvellous  expansion,  and  thought 
no  more  of  Sweden — from  the  political  and  commercial 
point  of  view — than  she  did  of  Chile  or  Ecuador.  Far- 
away but  good  and  cordial  relations  between  the  Courts, 
the  appointment  to  the  post  of  Russian  Minister  to 
Stockholm  of  rather  "  ambassadorial  "  personages,  now 


I9I4]  UNION  WITH    NORWAY  249 

and  then  a  visit  from  a  scholar  or  inquiring  man  of 
letters  who  "  discovered  "  Sweden  and  then  forgot  her. 
And  that  was  all. 

The  united  kingdoms  of  Sweden  and  Norway  were 
naturally  bound  to  consider  Russian  interests  more 
than  Russia  had  to  consider  theirs.  In  1855,  Stockholm 
profited  by  the  Crimean  War,  and  by  the  presence  of 
English  and  French  ships  in  the  Baltic,  to  extract  from 
Russia  the  formal  promise — added  to  the  Treaty  of 
1856 — not  to  keep  up  any  military  establishment  in  the 
Aland  Islands ;  in  latter  days  Swedish  manufacturers 
occasionally  came  to  compete  in  Russia  with  those  from 
other  countries,  and  started  a  few  enterprises  which 
were  very  well  organised  and  most  successful,  but  as 
a  general  rule,  since  181 5,  Sweden  had  ceased  to  cast 
anxious  or  covetous  glances  perpetually  towards  the 
Baltic,  and  from  that  time  the  internal  development  of 
the  country  became  more  independent  and  regular; 
prosperity  began  to  increase  without  let  or  hindrance, 
obedient  to  the  natural  laws  of  production,  and 
strengthened  through  the  happy  dispositions  and  sterling 
qualities  of  the  Swedish  people. 

In  the  sixties,  under  Charles  XV.,  some  great  reforms 
completed  the  definitely  constitutional  and  modern 
character  of  the  political  structure  of  Sweden.  The 
former  Diet,  or  rather  the  old  Etats  Generaux,  were 
replaced  by  two  Chambers,  the  one  elected  by  universal 
suffrage,  the  other,  the  Upper  Chamber,  recruited  by  a 
very  complicated  system  of  election,  giving  the  pre- 
ponderance to  the  educated  or  leisured  classes,  which 
was  quite  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  age.  The 
nobility,  formerly  so  powerful,  definitely  lost  all  ex- 
clusive rights  in  politics  and  administration,  and  the 
famous  Riddarehuset,  which  for  so  long  had  been  the  real 
Forum  of  Sweden,  became  but  a  museum  consecrated  to 
the  glory  of  noble  families,  to  their  escutcheons  and 
their  trophies,  on  which  could  be  read  the  military  and 
political  history  of  the  kingdom. 


250  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

But  independently  of  these  changes  demanded  by 
the  spirit  of  age,  the  material  and  intellectual  develop- 
ment of  the  people  progressed.  The  peasant  became 
more  and  more  the  owner  of  the  soil.  The  education 
of  the  people  in  the  course  of  the  century  made  really 
extraordinary  progress.  It  is  as  successful  as  anywhere 
in  Europe.  The  popular  universities  in  the  country — a 
recent  creation  of  the  Scandinavian  mind — represent 
something  which  remains  to  be  created  in  other  European 
countries.  A  series  of  superior  lectures  are  given  for  a 
few  weeks  in  such  and  such  a  rural  district.  These 
lectures  are  better  and  better  attended,  and  are  con- 
scientiously paid  for  by  those  attending  them ;  every 
year  a  greater  number  of  persons — of  both  sexes — go  in 
for  the  optional  examinations,  and,  what  is  most  im- 
portant, no  one  afterwards  seeks  any  change  of  circum- 
stances, but  remains  quietly  on  his  farm  or  in  his 
workshop. 

Large  stretches  of  country  north  of  Dalsland  and  as 
far  as  Lapland  were  colonised  by  prosperous  enterprises 
in  connection  with  metallurgy  and  forestry.  The  rich 
iron  mines  of  the  country  were  more  and  more  exploited, 
and  wherever  it  was  possible  foundries,  steel-works, 
machine  factories  came  to  transform  the  famous  Swedish 
metal  into  machinery  and  tools,  setting  the  standard  for 
modern  civilisation.  And  all  around  flourishing  colonies 
of  workmen  arose,  everywhere  there  were  institutions 
for  securing  to  workmen  and  their  families  the  greatest 
possible  amount  of  material  well-being  and  of  intellectual 
and  moral  development.  Socialism,  as  a  political  doc- 
trine, has  lately  made  great  progress  among  Swedish 
workmen  and  peasants;  and  it  was  not  because  the  people 
were  embittered  that  they  sought  to  extend  their  rights  of 
participation  in  political  life,  but  simply  because  they 
desired  more  and  more  to  increase  the  benefits  from 
their  work  and  to  acquire  an  importance  which  flattered 
their  self-esteem  as  substantial  peasants  and  enlightened 
workmen. 

However,  up  till  quite  lately  there  existed  in  Sweden 


I9I41  SWEDEN'S   PROSPERITY  251 

very  apparent  remnants  of  the  former  organisation  of 
the  State :  very  strict  Court  etiquette ;  the  obvious 
preponderance  of  the  Upper  Chamber  recruited,  until 
the  recent  electoral  reform,  almost  exclusively  from  the 
noble,  financial,  ecclesiastical  and  academic  classes ; 
the  part  played  by  the  nobility  in  the  social  life  of  the 
capital  and  of  certain  provinces.  But  side  by  side  with 
all  this  a  thorough  metamorphosis  was  becoming  daily 
more  apparent  in  the  social  spirit  of  the  country.  In 
Sweden,  just  as  in  the  two  other  Scandinavian  States, 
one  looks  with  admiration  on  all  that  has  been  done 
and  effected  for  the  well-being  and  moral  raising  of  the 
people,  the  workmen,  the  urban  lower  classes:  schools 
admirably  organised  and  managed,  hospitals  almost 
luxuriously  equipped,  summer-colonies  for  poor  children, 
beautiful  gardens  and  parks  laid  out  in  the  most  thickly 
populated  areas,  in  short  all  works  of  really  public 
utility  carried  to  a  pitch  of  perfection  that  many  other 
countries  might  envy. 

When  I  was  starting  for  Sweden  some  one  said  to  me : 
"  Do  not  forget  that  it  is  the  most  aristocratic  country 
of  Europe."  I  found  this  to  be  true  up  to  a  point.  But 
if  instead  I  had  been  told  that  Sweden  was  the  most 
truly  democratic  country  in  the  world,  by  virtue  of  the 
care  and  moral  deference  shown  to  the  humblest,  and 
the  natural  feeling  of  dignity  reigning  in  all  the  lower 
classes,  I  should  have  agreed  to  that  also,  and  have  said 
that  many  of  the  countries  in  which  there  is  most  talk  of 
the  reign  of  democracy  have  done  less  to  safeguard  the 
rights  of  the  people  and  their  dignity  than  the  three 
Scandinavian  countries — more  especially  "aristocratic" 
and  monarchical  Sweden. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  balance-sheet  for  the  hundred 
years  of  the  Bernadotte  dynasty  and  of  a  constant 
policy  of  peace  shows  for  Sweden  truly  enviable  returns 
and  figures.  A  population  of  nearly  6,000,000  people, 
living  on  an  unfruitful  soil,  near  a  sea  containing  few 
fish,  with  a  harsh  climate — a  population  not  naturally 
possessing  anaval  orcommercial  spirit — livenevertheless 


252  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

a  free,  happy  and  comfortable  life,  allowing  them- 
selves the  luxuries  of  a  beautiful  capital  and  another 
large  commercial  town  in  the  west,  Gothenburg,  of  a 
pursuit  of  art  carried  to  a  high  degree,  of  an  elegant  and 
cultivated  society,  of  a  Court  in  which  the  setting  and 
ceremonies  do  not  lack  grandeur,  and  finally — more 
expensive  than  an3^thing — of  an  Army  of  which  the  real 
value  and  irreproachable  appearance  are  certainly  far 
superior  to  its  equipment,  but  which  nevertheless 
represents  an  appreciable  strength,  and  a  certain  weight 
in  the  political  balance  of  Northern  Europe. 

Naturally  all  this  is  not  entirely  the  result  of  the  wise 
Swedish  policy  of  the  last  hundred  years.  Many  of  the 
things  that  one  admires  at  the  present  time  in  Sweden 
owe  their  origin  to  far  older  historic  causes  and  to 
the  natural  qualities  of  the  people :  more  especially  to 
the  latter. 

Of  an  eminently  pure  race,  the  Swedes  fully  possess 
the  few  failings  and  the  great  advantages  of  a  people 
who  have  developed  in  freedom  on  a  land  belonging 
entirely  to  them  and  which  has  never  been  trampled  by 
other  nations.  And  they  fully  bear  the  stamp  of  their 
granite  soil  and  of  their  climate  with  its  icy  blasts. 
Slow  and  uncommunicative,  but  obstinate  and  sensitive, 
capable  of  strong  passions,  more  of  an  internal  than 
external  nature,  generally  ingenuous  but  full  of  good 
sense,  sometimes  genial  and  eminently  honest — these 
"  big  children,"  good-looking,  well  set  up  and  with 
naturally  graceful  movements,  carry  about  in  the  gaze  of 
their  blue  eyes  the  mirage  of  their  dense  and  rugged 
forests,  of  their  calm  lakes,  of  their  clean  wooden  houses 
always  of  the  same  dark-red  colour,  amidst  the  pretty 
landscapes  of  Sweden,  so  green,  so  peaceful,  so 
unchanging. 

First  and  foremost  the  Swede  prizes  his  freedom 
and  his  country.  Among  the  Swedish  nobility  the  feel- 
ing of  patriotism  is  particularly  strong  and  rules  all 
inclinations  and  arguments.     The  events  of  the  national 


I9I4]      THE  SPANIARDS  OF  THE  NORTH        253 

history  of  the  last  two  or  even  three  centuries  are  present 
in  the  memory  of  the  Swedish  nobility  as  if  they  had 
occurred  only  ten  or  twenty  years  ago.  And  among 
the  "intellectuals,"  among  those  who  have  been  to  a 
university,  among  the  substantial  middle-classes  of  the 
large  towns,  the  patriotic  feeling  assumes  the  same  form 
and  the  same  dimensions.  It  is  naturally  less  conscious 
and  particularly  less  "  historic  "among  the  lower  classes. 
The  man  of  the  people  who  understands  by  instinct  that 
Sweden  cannot  nourish  and  provide  decently  for  more 
than  a  certain  number  of  inhabitants,  and  who  at  the 
same  time  does  not  desire  or  know  how  to  limit  the 
birth-rate,  emigrates  fairly  readily  to  America.  He 
often  emigrates  merely  to  avoid  military  service.  But 
he  can  never  forget  his  country.  And  this  emigration, 
customary  and  accepted  though  it  be,  weighs  with  true 
though  unconscious  melancholy  on  the  existence  of  the 
Swedish  people. 

Centuries  of  stern  education  have  developed  among 
the  people  habits  of  honesty,  integrity  and  politeness ; 
but  by  nature  also  they  are  good  and  inclined  to  be 
generous.  During  the  three  years  that  I  spent  in 
Sweden,  I  never  saw  a  child  ill-treated  or  an  animal  ill- 
used — and  that  in  a  country  where  a  great  deal  of  strong 
drink  is  indulged  in  !  In  the  economic  sphere  the  Swede 
possesses  no  commercial  aptitude,  but  in  return  he 
often  displays  technical  skill.  Formerly  the  Swedes 
were  nicknamed  "the  Frenchmen  of  the  North"  because 
in  the  eighteenth  century  all  well-educated  Swedes 
spoke  French,  and  also  because  many  young  nobles  went 
to  serve  the  King  of  France.  But  one  might  far  more 
correctly  have  called  them  "  the  Spaniards  of  the  North," 
as  they  are  passionately  devoted  to  the  honour  and  glory 
of  their  country,  they  are  proud,  exclusive,  somewhat 
taciturn,  admirable  soldiers,  and  excel  in  the  sense  of 
national  dignity  and  of  the  nobleness  of  their  race. 
Such  have  they  shown  themselves  throughout  the  course 
of  their  history,  and  such  they  are  at  the  present  time. 


254  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

The  link  whicli  for  centuries  has  bound  Swedish 
poHcy  closely  to  France  is  of  historic  notoriety.  The 
foundations  of  this  close  alliance  were  laid  during  the 
events  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  Since,  throughout  the 
eighteenth  century,  Sweden  in  her  struggles  with  Russia 
has  nearly  always  been  able  to  look  to  the  protection  of 
French  policy.  The  puerile  rhodomontades  of  Gustaf 
IV. — as  I  said  before — cost  him  his  throne  and  cost 
Sweden  the  rest  of  Finland ;  but  these  events  did  not  in 
any  way  change  Swedish  sympathies  for  France,  Still 
less  were  these  sympathies  diminished  by  the  events  of 
1813  and  1814,  The  successor  to  the  Swedish  throne, 
leading  his  30,000  soldiers  against  his  former  master, 
proclaimed  openly  that  he  wished  to  save  France,  con- 
found the  ''  Usurper,"  and  give  back  to  his  former 
country  true  civil  liberty.  And  it  was  in  this  way  that 
the  Swedes  understood  their  participation  in  the  coalition 
of  1813,  Moreover,  at  the  Restoration  the  old  Franco- 
Swedish  friendship  flourished  again  intrinsically. 

This  friendship  was  lasting ;  there  was  a  renewal  of 
diplomatic  intimacy  during  the  Crimean  war,  an  intimacy 
which  bordered  on  an  alliance.  But  on  the  whole  at 
this  period  French  influence  in  Sweden  was  principally 
maintained  by  the  force  of  inertia.  The  chief  cause  of 
the  Franco-Swedish  alliance— the  perennial  struggle 
between  France  and  Austria— had  ceased  to  exist,  and 
the  military  power  of  Russia  had  meantime  increased  in 
such  a  formidable  way  that  Sweden  would  have  been  but 
a  feeble  asset  in  an  offensive  alliance  of  the  distant 
countries  of  the  West  against  the  Colossus  of  the 
North. 

Moreover,  from  18 15  onwards,  a  new  power  was 
arising  and  becoming  clearly  defined,  the  influence  of 
which  contributed  to  modif}''  radically  the  relations 
between  France,  Russia  and  Sweden.  This  power  was 
Prussia — no  longer  the  opportunist  and  venturesome 
Prussia  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  the  Prussia  of 
Hardenberg,  Stein  and  Arndt — who  was  rising  trium- 
phant from  her  disasters  of  1807,  and  who  with  obstinate 


1914]      GROWTH  OF  GERMAN  INFLUENCE       255 

perseverance  was  inaugurating  her  new  policy  :  that  of 
substituting  herself  for  the  former  Germanic  Empire  and 
of  raising  to  heights  as  yet  undreamt  of  the  name,  the 
might  and  the  wealth  of  the  German  race.  Pan-German- 
ism was  born  just  then,  issuing  ready  armed  from  the 
brain  of  Wotan.  The  University  of  Berlin  was  seized 
with  an  ardent  love  for  Scandinavian,  Flemish,  even 
Anglo-Saxon  mythology,  history,  linguistics,  juris- 
prudence. Literature  followed  science.  Pan-Germanism 
became  ultra-faithful  and  loyal  with  the  Prussian  squires, 
liberal  even  to  vehemence  with  the  men  of  1848,  pious 
and  unctuous  with  the  Protestant  pastors  while  waiting 
to  win  even  the  Catholic  padres  ;  but  it  chiefly  flattered 
the  "  sister  nations,"  extolling  their  virtues,  their  history, 
their  customs,  th£ir  Germanic  soul. 

For  a  long  time  Sweden  did  not  respond.  In  the  first 
place  Prussia  and  Berlin  were  not  popular  there ;  there 
had  been  many  fights  with  Brandenburg;  many  people 
still  regretted  the  possession  of  Pomerania,  particularly 
the  numerous  noble  families  natives  of  this  province 
who  at  the  present  time  felt  as  if  they  had  been  up- 
rooted ;  then  Prussia  was  the  intimate  friend  of  Russia, 
and  Russia  was  not  always  in  the  odour  of  sanctity 
according  to  Swedish  public  opinion;  Prussia  was  a 
"  parvenue "  who  by  her  present  might  wounded  the 
pride  of  a  kingdom  fallen  from  its  high  political  estate; 
finally,  Sweden  held  the  traditions  of  French  influence 
and  sympathies,  whereas  people  in  Berlin  feigned  to 
despise  the  light  French  mind  and  to  replace  its  simple 
logic  by  confused  and  pompous  metaphysics. 

All  the  same,  gradually  the  ice  between  Berlin  and 
Stockholm  began  to  break.  First  it  was  Europe's 
infatuation  for  the  scientific  proceedings  of  erudite 
Germany  :  the  less  her  science  was  understood  the  more 
it  was  esteemed.  Then  persistent  flattery  had  its 
natural  result.  A  Swede  would  take  up  a  German  book 
on  comparative  mythology  and  would  find  that  he  was 
a  direct  descendant  of  the  Azes^  the  gods  of  the  German 
Olympus;    or   he  would  open  a  popular  history  book. 


256  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

and  see  how  Swedish  virtues  were  extolled  in  the 
account  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  and  in  that  of  the  War 
of  the  North.  In  novels  the  hero  was  generally  some 
good-looking  youth  of  Dalecarlia,  and  the  heroine  a 
frank  and  loyal  Scandinavian  maiden  with  periwinkle- 
blue  eyes.  At  this  period  the  Swede  was  still  much 
attached  to  his  Protestant  religion ;  so  Pan-German 
theory  emphasised  the  fact  repeatedly  that  Reform  was 
the  quintessence  of  the  German  mind,  the  incarnation  of 
the  irresistible  German  flight  towards  truth  and  moral 
independence.  And  all  this  was  presented  in  a  very 
clever  way.  To  pedants  and  those  priding  themselves 
on  their  erudition — fat  volumes  full  of  propositions  and 
international  difficulties  ;  to  simple  men  and  youths  at 
school — popular  works  either  of  a  categorical  and 
almost  imperious  doctrine,  or  fanatical  and  vibrating.  I 
defy  a  young  Swede  to  read  the  so-called  history  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  by  Schiller — the  work  of  an  ardent 
imagination  aud  of  a  pathetic  Protestant  pietism — with- 
out feeling  himself  one  with  his  German  brothers  in 
religion,  without  communicating  with  them  in  the  person 
of  the  principal  hero  in  the  book,  King  Gustavus 
Adolphus  of  Sweden.  And  this  book  is  always  seen  in 
the  hands  of  every  Swedish  schoolboy. 

But  it  was  not  only  intellectual  influences  that  caused 
Sweden  and  Germany  to  draw  nearer  to  one  another; 
the  political  events  and  situations  of  the  last  third  of  the 
nineteenth  century  contributed  to  it  decidedly.  After 
the  defeat  of  France  and  the  enormous  increase  in  the 
power  of  Prussia,  now  become  the  German  Empire, 
Sweden  no  longer  had  any  reason  to  direct  her  policy 
towards  France.  Everything  in  the  North  depended  on 
the  trend  of  German  policy :  would  it  still  continue  to 
cultivate  the  former  friendly  relations  of  Berlin  with  St. 
Petersburg,  if  so  it  would  be  necessary  to  take  care  not 
to  incur  the  displeasure  of  either  of  these  all-powerful 
friends ;  if  Germany  should  separate  herself  from 
Russia  and  become  frankly  hostile  to  her,  then  it  would 


I9I4]  GERMAN    PENETRATION  257 

be  only  by  allying  herself  to  Germany  that  Sweden 
would  have  a  chance  of  gaining,  or  rather  of  regaining, 
anything. 

In  1870  the  sympathies  of  Swedish  public  opinion 
were  still  ostensibly  with  France.  From  1875  the  inti- 
macy with  Germany  begins  and  soon  obtains  a  firm 
footing  in  Sweden. 

All  secondary  countries,  but  particularly  the  countries 
geographically  eccentric  and  speaking  a  separate 
language,  need  to  link  themselves  to  the  central  civi- 
lisation of  Europe  through  the  medium  of  one  of  the 
greatest  participants  in  this  old  civilisation :  France, 
England,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain.  Sweden,  who  corre- 
sponds exactly  to  the  conditions  quoted  above,  had  thus 
always  had  need  of  a  "big-sister  initiator."  So  that 
when  this  sister  was  no  longer  France,  her  place  was 
naturally  bound  to  be  taken  by  Germany. 

Finally,  the  great  industrial  and  economic  progress 
made  by  Germany  in  the  last  fifty  years  helped  to 
establish  and  develop  her  influence  in  Sweden.  Sweden, 
generally  speaking,  does  not  possess  either  the  com- 
mercial spirit  of  Denmark  or  the  naval  spirit  of  Norway ; 
as  1  have  said,  the  Swedish  people  have  no  inclination  for 
commerce,  although  they  have  first-rate  technical  ability. 
With  the  development  of  the  resources  of  the  country, 
Germany  was  the  first  to  lend  the  asset  of  her  commerce 
to  this  development.  Sweden  imported  more  and  more 
German  wares  and  used  more  every  year.  Sweden 
developed  her  mineral  production  more  and  more ; 
Germany  was  there  to  draw  as  much  as  was  possible  of 
the  magnificent  Swedish  ore  into  the  enormous  and  in- 
satiable Krupp  steelworks ;  Sweden,  who  possesses  no 
coalfields,  was  more  and  more  in  need  of  coal.  Germany 
arranged  to  supply  her  with  one-sixth  of  the  coal  required 
(700,000  tons  on  5,000,000),  leaving  the  English  to  supply 
the  rest,  but  intending  to  increase  her  share  in  time. 
Finally,  the  great  German  Bank  was  willing  to  finance 
Swedish  enterprises,  and  soon  the  most  intimate  terms 
existed  between  the  financial  market  of  Sweden  and  that 


258  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [ciiap.xv. 

of  Berlin,  Hamburg  and  Bremen.  German  managers  and 
clerks  in  ever  increasing  numbers  came  to  establish 
themselves  in  Stockholm  or  Gothenburg;  very  soon 
German  was  the  foreign  tongue  which  was  the 
most  often  understood  and  spoken  in  Sweden — 
though  this  is  not  saying  much,  for  the  Swede  does  not 
care  about  speaking  any  but  his  mother-tongue.  But 
the  Germans,  on  the  contrary,  learnt  the  Scandinavian 
languages  quickly,  and  this  was  another  trump-card  in 
their  game.  Very  soon,  assisted  by  political  sympathies, 
the  German  academic  programme  was  integrally  adopted 
in  Sweden,  and  this  definitely  accentuated  the  drawing 
nearer  of  the  two  countries. 

People  have  often  been  surprised  that  all  this  work 
should  have  been  done  in  Sweden,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  country  had  at  its  head  a  French  dynasty — and 
PVench  only  recently.  To  that  we  would  reply  that  the 
influence  of  race  over  the  sympathies  and  capabilites  of 
sovereigns  has  always  been  greatly  exaggerated.  It  is 
not  blood,  it  is  environment,  education,  climate,  soil,  the 
air  they  breathe,  ideas  and  ways  of  thinking,  assimilated 
almost  mechanically,  and  unconsciously,  that  in  the  long 
run  constitute  the  intellectual  and  moral  physiognomy — 
I  would  even  say  the  ph3''sical  physiognomy — of  families 
and  individuals.  Examine,  for  instance,  the  sixteen  quar- 
terings  of  the  late  Emperor  of  Russia,  Alexander  III. 
There  2.X&  fifteen  German  quartermgs  and  one  half-Russian 
one — which,  moreover,  is  absolutely  hypothetical — the 
one  that  represents  the  unfortunate  Peter  III.,  the 
miserable  scion  of  the  once  powerful  Romanoff  race. 
Well!  there  has  never  been  a  Russian,  a  Russian 
sovereign,  so  typically /?//S5/«;/  as  Alexander  III.  It  was 
almost  as  if  the  former  Tsar  of  Moscow,  a  John  III.  or  an 
Alexis  Mikhailovitch,  were  re-incarnated  in  his  person. 
He  was  far  more  like  a  rich  starovere  merchant  of  the 
Volga  than  a  St.  Petersburg  aristocrat ;  and  his  aversion 
for  everything  German,  and  particularly  for  anything 
to   do   with   Berlin,   was   absolutely   sincere    and  only 


I9I4]  KING  OSCAR   II.  259 

tempered  by  a  kind  of  scornful  good-nature.  A  country 
— more  particularly  an  original  country— very  soon 
assimilates  a  foreign  dynasty. 

Charles  XV.,  the  eldest  of  the  grandsons  of  Bernadotte 
and  Mademoiselle  Clery  and  of  Eugene  Beauharnais,  was 
actually  the  last  of  the  line  in  which  the  influence  of 
French  blood  is  truly  noticeable  ;  his  brother,  Oscar  II., 
being  solely  and  entirely  Swedish,  it  is  precisely  in  his 
reign  that  the  force  of  circumstances  led  to  German 
influence  and  caused  it  to  bear  fruit. 

Moreover,  two  personal  causes  contributed  to  it : 
King  Oscar  II.  was  a  scholar,  a  man  of  letters,  a  seeker ; 
and  therefore  a  great  intimacy  sprang  up  between 
him  and  the  Crown-Prince  of  Prussia,  afterwards  the 
ephemeral  Emperor  Frederick  III.  who  also  dreamt 
about  philosophy  and  the  high  principles  of  humanity 
and  liberty.  German  public  opinion  did  not  omit  to 
profit  by  this  intimacy  between  the  popular  "  Kronprinz  " 
and  the  Monarch  of  the  brother-nation,  Sweden.  German 
scholars,  men  of  letters,  musicians  bowed  low  before 
the  king-philosopher,  the  true  connoisseur  and  sincere 
admirer  of  German  science  and  art ;  to  him  went  the 
praises,  the  flattering  dedications,  the  diplomas  of  the 
universities  and  academies.  And  it  is  all  very  well  to 
have  a  well-regulated  and  sincere  mind,  as  Oscar  II. 
had,  but  these  things  are  always  flattering  and  set  up — 
perhaps  involuntarily — sympathy  between  the  object 
and  the  authors  of  these  demonstrations. 

In  addition,  Oscar  II.  was  married  to  a  German 
princess,  a  Nassau.  Thte  young  German  princesses  of 
the  generation  to  which  Queen  Sophia  of  Sweden 
belonged  were  generally  brought  up  outside  the  narrow 
ideas  of  German  patriotism  ;  as  they  might  be  destined  to 
a  foreign  prince,  they  were  not  to  be  hampered  with  any- 
thing that  might  embarrass  them  in  their  new  country. 
But  after  181 5  there  were  some  exceptions,  and  Queen 
Sophia  was  one  of  them  ;  and  as  she  was  a  model  wife 
and  mother,  and  as  her  virtues  and  her  intelligence 
gained  for  her  the  sincere  affection  of  Stockholm  society 

s 


26o  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

and  of  the  Swedish  people,  her  Germanic  influence 
spread  quite  naturally  over  her  new  family  and  her  new 
country. 

She  married  her  eldest  son,  the  present  King,  to  a 
Princess  of  Baden,  daughter  of  the  respectable  Grand- 
Duchess  Louisa  and  grand-daughter  of  the  Emperor 
William  I. 

Even  under  present  circumstances,  when  so  many 
crimes  and  felonies  have  been  perpetrated  by  Germany 
against  my  unhappy  country,  I  should  consider  that  1 
was  lacking  in  fairness  if  I  did  not  mention  the  high 
qualities  of  the  House  of  Baden  and  its  courageous 
fidelity  to  the  ancient  traditions  of  behaviour,  charity  and 
justice.  The  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  was  the  only  place 
in  Germany  where  the  Court  dared  to  be  humane  to  the 
unfortunate  dependants  of  enemy  countries  who  became 
civil  prisoners;  and  Prince  Max  of  Baden  did  all  in  his 
power  to  make  the  work  of  the  German  Red  Cross  more 
consistent  with  the  recognised  principles  and  humani- 
tarian objects  of  this  great  international  organisation. 
The  Prince's  efforts  were  not  always  successful,  for  he 
had  to  struggle  against  the  blindness  of  an  entire  nation^ 
and  the  malignant  duplicity  of  a  powerful  portion  of  it. 
But  I  know  for  certain  that  he  did  make  efforts. 

Queen  Victoria  of  Sweden,  from  the  outset  of  the  war, 
frankly  supported  the  German  colours ;  she  rejoiced 
at  Germany's  victories  and  deplored  her  defeats ;  she 
did  not  curtail  by  one  hour  her  usual  long  visits  to 
Carlsruhe, — visits  which  were,  moreover,  necessary  on 
account  of  her  delicate  health,  which  cannot  stand  the 
severe  Swedish  winter ;  she  did  not  seek  to  escape  any 
of  the  ovations  given  to  her  at  this  time  in  Germany  ; 
and  yet,  side  by  side  with  all  this,  she  has  always  kept 
up  appearances,  she  has  always  remained  a  Queen.  She 
did  all  she  could  for  our  prisoners  and  for  the  badly- 
wounded  Russians  who  crossed  Sweden  in  thousands. 
She  took  a  real  interest  in  them.  I  only  had  the  honour 
of  meeting  her  twice  during  the  war,  and  then  she  ex- 
tended to  the  Russian  Minister  a  welcome  that  was  not 


I9I4]  GERMAN    INTRIGUES  261 

only  exempt  from  the  slightest  tinge  of  hostility  or 
coldness,  but  was  marked  by  graciousness  and  kindness. 
And  the  few  Russians  who  also  had  occasion  to  meet 
her  at  this  time  had  the  same  experience. 

Queen  Victoria's  health  and  her  prolonged  absences 
from  the  country  have  prevented  her,  more  than  her 
origin,  from  becoming  really  Swedish ;  but  her  in- 
telligence, her  deep  culture,  and  her  high  moral  qualities 
have  all  the  same  caused  her  to  gain  an  ascendancy  as 
much  over  her  new  family  as  over  Swedish  society  and 
— up  to  a  point — over  the  country. 

In  taking  possession  of  Sweden  little  by  little, 
German  policy  was  not  only  obeying  the  dictates  of  Pan- 
Germanism,  and  of  German  economic  interests.  It  was 
also  prcouring  a  desirable  ally  in  case  of  a  rupture  with 
Russia,  a  rupture  of  which  the  first  idea  dates  from  1875, 
and  from  the  help  given  that  year  to  France  by  the 
vigilance  of  Prince  Gortchakoff  and  the  generous 
intercession  of  Alexander  II. 

Since  then,  relations  between  Russia  and  Germany 
had  been  subject  to  many  fluctuations.  Sometimes  the 
old  traditions  of  the  Holy  Alliance  appeared  to  be 
renewed  ;  sometimes,  on  the  other  hand,  the  coldness 
between  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin  became  accentuated. 
Neither  the  Court  at  Potsdam  nor  Germany  generally 
really  wished  for  war  with  Russia;  they  would  much 
have  preferred  an  intimacy  and  an  alliance  based  on  the 
old  foundations  of  trickery  on  the  one  side  and  in- 
genuousness on  the  other.  But  as  they  had  begun  to 
work  in  Sweden  on  certain  lines,  they  continued  this 
work  from  Berlin  with  consistent  stubbornness,  without 
worrying  as  to  whether  at  the  moment  they  were  on 
distant  or  good  terms  with  Russia.  If  war  between  the 
two  powerful  Empires  was  to  break  out  all  the  same,  Ger- 
many would  possess  an  ally  that  was  not  to  be  despised 
in  the  shape  of  Sweden,  who  would  go  and  bite  the 
bear's  ear  on  the  Finland  side ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  the 
friendship   between    Tsarskoe-Selo   and    Potsdam    was 


262  SWEDEN   IN    1914  [chap.  xv. 

cemented  again,  then  it  would  only  be  necessary  to  tell 
the  Swedes  to  keep  quiet :  moreover,  they  would  under- 
stand this  themselves. 

Now,  to  prepare  the  Swedes  for  the  eventual  taking- 
up  of  arms  against  Russia  it  was  imperative  to  dazzle 
their  eyes  with  a  great  hope,  and  also  to  show  them  a 
great  danger. 

The  hope  was  the  recovery  of  Finland. 

In  the  centre  of  one  of  the  most  beautiful  squares  in 
Stockholm,  a  large  Charles  XII.  in  bronze,  treading  with 
enormous  boots  on  a  very  mean  pedestal,  points  out  to 
the  passers-by  with  a  fine  movement  of  arm  and  sword 
the  direction  of  the  rising  sun — that  of  oppressed 
Finland.  Every  good  squire  and  every  Swedish 
"intellectual"  is  impressed  by  this  gesture,  which 
evokes  in  him  memories  of  heroism  and  patriotic 
troubles.  But  intelligent  and  well-informed  Swedes — 
and  these  are  not  lacking — know  perfectly  well  that  for 
some  time  Finland  has  not  been  at  all  what  she  was 
under  the  Swedish  regime  and  up  till  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century;  that  the  Finns,  an  obstinate, 
taciturn,  vindictive  and  spiteful  race,  but  gifted  and 
eager  for  work  withal,  are  beginning  to  form  a  nation 
that  has  nothing  in  common  with  Sweden  nor  with  the 
traditions  of  the  Vasas ;  that  even  at  Helsingfors,  the 
"  sons  of  the  sun,"  the  descendants  of  the  Germanic 
Azes,  have  often  to  bow  before  the  prominent  cheekbones 
and  snub  nose  of  some  Finns,  distant  descendants  of 
those  Altaic  races  who  throughout  centuries  had  kept 
up  an  implacable  conflict  with  the  Aryans.  That  Fin- 
land might  one  day  become  independent,  that  the 
Swedes  readily  believe;  but  that  she  might  again 
become  an  integral  part  of  the  kingdom  of  Sweden — 
that  could  only  be  contemplated  seriously  by  shallow 
or  ignorant  minds.  Hence  the  "great  hope  "  was  but  a 
feeble  bait.  So  that  the  "  great  fear''  had  all  the  more 
influence. 

It  was  gradually  suggested  to  the  Swedes  that 
Russia  had   not  yet  finished   her  offensive  movement 


I9I4.1  FINLAND  AND   RUSSIA  263 

towards  the  Scandinavian  peninsula.  Deprived  of  out- 
lets to  the  quite  open  sea,  the  huge  Empire  made 
persistent  efforts  to  secure  such  an  outlet.  But  the 
route  of  the  Straits  was  barred  to  her  by  Europe ;  that 
of  the  Persian  Gulf  by  the  English ;  that  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean  by  the  Japanese ;  moreover,  the  last  two  outlets 
were  ex-tremely  far  away  from  the  Russian  centres  of 
production  and  consumption.  How,  then,  should  Russia 
not  covet  a  far  nearer  outlet,  that  of  the  ports — very  far 
north,  it  is  true,  but  magnificent  and  always  free  from 
ice — which  open  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean  through  the 
Norwegian  j^br</s?  Narwick,  Trondhjem,  Hammerfest, 
these  are  the  ports  that  Russia  ardently  wished  to 
possess ;  but  in  order  to  do  so,  she  would  first  have  to 
conquer  the  North  of  Sweden,  a  thinly  populated 
province,  in  which,  however,  huge  beds  of  splendid  iron 
ore  ^  have  lately  been  discovered.  The  existence  of  a 
more  or  less  autonomous  Finland,  indeed,  hampers  the 
expansion  of  the  Empire  on  this  side.  Hence  the  task 
of  Russifying  and  assimilating  this  "unfortunate" 
province  completely  has  already  been  begun,  and  as  soon 
as  this  has  been  accomplished,  Russia  will  seek  by  force 
to  extend  her  domination  over  the  North  of  Sweden  and 
of  Norway. 

This  theme,  constantly  repeated,  commented  on,  and 
recapitulated,  had  a  great  success  in  Sweden.^  Stockholm 
did  not  wish  to  consider  the  weak  sides  of  the  argument : 
the  great  distance  of  the  Norwegian  ports  from  the 
centre  of  Russia,  and  particularly  from  inhabited  parts 
of  Russia  itself ;  the  existence  on  the  Russian  Murman 
coast  of  excellent  ports  open  in  winter.  "  Fear  has 
enormous  eyes,"  says  the  Russian  proverb :  it  only  sees 
what  strikes  it  and  rarely  goes  into  details.  By  the 
years  1910-1913  the  theory  quoted  above  was  accepted 
by  the  whole  of  Sweden,  and  as  the  champion  and 
populariser  of  this  threatening  theory  at  this  period 
appeared  the  celebrated  Sven-Hedin. 

^  Yielding  in  the  smelting  up  to  80  per  cent,  of  metal. 
2  An  infinitely  smaller  one  in  Norway. 


264  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap.xv. 

As  we  know,  Sven-Hedin  owes  his  fame  to  his  travels 
in  Thibet.  The  Swedish  explorer  was  very  effectually 
assisted  by  Russia.  The  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  took 
a  personal  interest  in  his  explorations,  and  the  civil 
and  military  authorities  of  Russian  Central  Asia 
(whence  Sven-Hedin  crossed  over  the  Thibetan  borders) 
received  orders  to  grant  him  all  possible  facilities,  in- 
cluding an  armed  escort.  On  his  return,  he  was  most 
graciously  received  by  the  Emperor  and  welcomed 
by  the  Academy  of  Science  of  St.  Petersburg.  At  his 
last  visit  to  Stockholm  (in  1910),  the  Emperor  still 
remembered  his  protege,  sent  him  a  Russian  decoration, 
and  invited  him  to  go  and  see  him.  In  consequence, 
Sven-Hedin  was  looked  on  as  being  a  friend  of,  and 
under  an  obligation  to,  the  Russians,  And  so,  if  the 
"Russian  "  Sven-Hedin  himself  began  to  write  and  to 
preach  that  a  real  danger  for  Sweden  was  arising  on 
the  side  of  Russia,  then  one  had  to  believe  it  and  to 
seek  salvation  first  in  the  increase  of  Swedish  armed 
forces,  and  then  by  binding  Swedish  policy  closely  to 
that  of  the  power  who  alone  could  check  and  confound 
the  Colossus  of  the  North — to  Germany.  When  I 
arrived  in  Sweden  in  March,  1914,  I  thought  this  tale 
of  Russian  aspirations  to  Narwick  was  not  believed  by 
any  one,  or  else  was  only  a  pretext  for  obtaining  supplies 
from  the  Riksdag,  and  for  improving  Swedish  arma- 
ments, the  concealed  aim  being  Finland.  I  have  since 
had  to  change  my  opinion.  I  realised  that  the  fear  of 
Russian  aggression  existed  even  among  the  wisest  and 
most  well-balanced  Swedes.  It  was  not  until  much 
later,  and  when  the  World  War  was  in  full  swing,  that 
Swedish  public  opinion  gradually  recognised  its  mis- 
take; but  for  this  it  was  necessary  for  Russia  to  give 
an  absolutely  tangible  proof,  that  of  the  construction 
and  hurried  completion  of  the  railway  line  from  St. 
Petersburg  to  Murman.^ 

*  And  to  think  that  this  all -important  line  was  to  have  been  laid — 
but  was  not — already  in  1895,  when  the  port  of  Alexatidrovsk  was  in- 
augurated, and  the  line  sketched  out  by  Witte's  orders,  then  all-powerful 


I9I4]  SVEN-HEDIN'S  ACTIVITIES  265 

I  said  above  that  German  labours  in  Sweden  went 
on  independently  of  the  relations  existing  at  such  and 
such  a  moment  between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg. 
Nevertheless,  towards  1913,  a  recrudescence  of,  and 
an  added  activity  in,  these  labours  was  noticeable. 
Apparently  Berlin  felt  the  great  collision  to  be  at  hand — 
wished  it  to  be  at  hand,  I  ought  to  say — and  henceforth 
Sweden  must  be  "warmed  up,"  her  old  grudges  and  new 
fears  with  regard  to  Russia  must  be  stirred  up. 

In  September,  the  divorce  of  the  Grand-Duchess 
Marie  created  a  coolness  between  the  two  Courts,  and 
made  the  position  of  the  Russian  Minister,  the  elegant 
M.  Savinsky,  very  difficult.  In  November,  a  still  more 
disagreeable  incident  occurred.  The  Russian  military 
attache,  Colonel  Assanovitch,  was  accused  by  the  Press 
and  then  by  the  Swedish  Government  even,  of  being  a 
spy  or  at  least  of  being  in  close  touch  with  very 
suspicious  individuals  (Scandinavians,  moreover)  who 
were  arrested  on  a  charge  of  spying.  A  letter  was 
even  produced  from  the  imprudent  colonel  to  one  of 
these  individuals.  This  disagreeable  incident  served  as 
a  pretext  for  a  whole  campaign  by  the  Press  directed 
against  Russia.  Sven-Hedin  extracted  from  it  some 
fresh  arguments,  and  multiplied  his  writings  and  con- 
ferences on  the  theme  of  the  Russian  danger.  The 
public,  with  increasing  vehemence,  discussed  the  in- 
adequacy of  Swedish  armaments,  and  the  problems  of 
national  defence.  Never  before  had  Russian  diplomatic 
representation  in  Stockholm  been  in  such  a  painful 
position. 

The  Government,  at  that  time  belonging  to  the 
Liberal  Party  (Staaf  and  Baron  Ehrensvaerd),  did  all  in 
their  power  to  calm  people  down,  but  their  adversaries 
then  renewed  their  patriotic  apprehensions,  accused  the 
Liberals  of  not  being  aware  of  the  great  dangers  Sweden 

Minister  of  Finance.  This  construction  was  set  aside,  so  as  to  get 
on  with  the  Trans-Siberian  line.  Then,  the  system  still  obtained  of 
only  constructing  lines  by  the  State  and  out  of  the  ordinary  Budget  of  the 
Empire. 


266  SWEDEN    IN    1914  [chap,  xv 

was  incurring,  and  gave  way  to  extreme  agitation 
throughout  the  country,  in  favour  of  extraordinary 
measures  in  order  to  secure  the  safety  of  their  realm. 

This  agitation  ended  in  the  celebrated  Bondestog — 
the  peasants'  procession.  At  the  beginning  of  February 
thousands  of  peasants  from  the  old  and  famous  province 
of  Dalsland  (Dalecarlia),  in  their  beautiful  national 
costume;  students  from  the  two  universities  of  Sweden — 
Upsala  and  Lund — with  their  caps,  their  "colours,"  and 
their  flags  ;  ecclesiastics  from  different  parts  of  the  king- 
dom, and  other  persons  who  joined  in,  made  their  solemn 
entry  into  Stockholm,  were  put  up  there  by  the  middle- 
classes  and  the  nobility  of  the  town,  anci  the  next  day, 
accompanied  by  a  huge  crowd,  marched  past  the  Palace, 
cheering  when  the  King  and  his  family  appeared  on  the 
balcony;  the  heads  of  the  demonstration  harangued  His 
Majesty  in  vehement  terms,  assuring  him  of  the  devotion 
of  the  Swedish  people,  and  entreating  him  to  take  all 
measures  necessary  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  country, 
measures  which  the  country  would  be  delighted  to 
sanction,  whatever  sacrifices  they  demanded.  The  King 
then  spoke  and  promised  that  the  measures  should  be 
taken,  and  that  the  question  of  national  defence  should 
be  settled  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

This  answer  of  the  King's  to  the  processionists  of  the 
Bondestog  caused  a  difference  between  His  Majesty  and 
his  Ministers.  The  latter,  and  the  Press  of  their  party, 
alleged  that  from  the  constitutional  point  of  view  the 
King  had  no  right  to  speak  and  to  make  promises  to  the 
processionists  without  having  first  taken  the  advice  of 
the  Cabinet  and  discussed  his  speech  with  his  Ministers. 
The  King,  on  the  other  hand,  asserted  that  no  one  could 
prevent  him  speaking  to  his  people,  and  mentioning  his 
patriotic  convictions  to  them. 

This  difference  of  opinion  between  the  King  and  his 
Ministers  having  become  accentuated  and  having  got  into 
the  Press,  the  Liberal  Cabinet  resigned,  and  the  King 
accepted  the  resignation. 

According  to  the  constitutional  laws  of  Sweden,  when 


I9I4]  A   CHANGE   OF   MINISTRY  267 

the  King  and  the  Cabinet  differ  about  a  law,  a  govern- 
ment measure  or  a  principle,  the  King  has  the  right  not 
only  to  dismiss  his  Ministers  but  also  to  dissolve  the 
Riksdag.  Only  the  Riksdag  resulting  from  the  new 
elections  may  give  an  opinion,  solely  and  exclusively,  on 
the  subject  of  the  law,  measure  or  principle  which  had 
caused  the  difference  between  the  King  and  the  former 
Ministry.  The  question  under  discussion  once  solved, 
the  Riksdag  retires,  and  makes  way  for  fresh  elections, 
whence  issues  a  new  Chamber,  normal  this  time.  The 
Cabinet  appointed  by  the  King  must  also  resign  as  soon 
as  the  normal  Chamber  is  elected  and  convened. 

The  King  entrusted  the  formation  of  the  Cabinet  to 
M.  de  Hammarskiold,  professor  of  international  law,  and 
former  plenipotentiary  of  Sweden  at  the  Congress  of  the 
Hague,  who  was  made  Prime  Minister ;  and  M.  Knut 
Wallenberg  was  made  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.^ 
Both  were  at  that  time  far  from  realising  that  their  term 
of  office,  which  should  have  been  temporary,  would  be 
prolonged  for  three  years,  amidst  the  greatest  diffi- 
culties that  any  Swedish  statesman  should  have  had  to 
face  for  ages. 

The  new  elections  (shortly  after  my  arrival  in  Sweden) 
yielded  results  favourable  to  the  principle  of  the  increase 
in  the  Budget  for  national  defence.  This  last  question 
forming  the  crux  of  the  difference  on  which  the  new 
Chamber  had  to  give  an  opinion,  this  Chamber  as  usual 
received  the  name  of  Vorsvar-Riksdag  (the  Chamber  of 
"  national  defence  "),  and  the  Minister  that  of  Vorsvar- 
Rcgeringen  (Cabinet  of  National  Defence). 

Such  was  the  political  situation  in  Sweden  at  the 
time  when  I  disembarked  at  Stockholm,  and  took  up  my 
post  there. 

^  In  Sweden  there  are  really  only  two  actual  Ministers  (with  the  title 
of  Excellency)  :  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
It  is  they  who  give  the  tone  to  the  Cabinet,  the  rest  are  more  in  the  position 
of  secretaries  to  the  State. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ON   THE    EVE   OF   WAR 

Two  days  after  I  arrived  in  Stockholm,  I  was  received 
by  the  King  in  a  solemn  audience.  The  King  was 
going  off  the  very  next  day  to  shoot  elk  in  the  northern 
provinces — some  said  to  inspect  troops  and  forts  there — 
and  he  was  in  a  hurry  to  get  through  the  audience.  He 
had  been,  moreover,  seriously  indisposed  for  some 
months,  and  his  physical  sufferings,  added  to  political 
tribulations,  according  to  all  accounts,  made  him  nervous 
and  even  irritable  at  times.  I  did  not  notice  this  during 
my  audience,  but  I  was  struck  by  the  looks  of  His 
JMajesty,  who  appeared  to  be  really  ill.  As  is  known, 
his  journey  to  the  North  was  interrupted  by  an  acute 
attack  of  the  internal  malady  from  which  he  suffered. 
He  was  brought  back  to  Stockholm,  where  he  underwent 
a  very  serious  operation,  which  was  wonderfully 
successful,  but  which  left  His  Majesty  enfeebled  for  a 
long  time.  The  King  did  not  entirely  regain  his 
strength  for  a  year,  but  then  he  was  able  to  resume  his 
normal  life  and  the  sports  in  which  he  excels :  hunting 
and  tennis. 

The  reception  of  foreign  Ministers  who  come  to 
present  their  credentials  to  the  King  takes  place  in 
Stockholm  in  the  setting  prescribed  by  time-honoured 
etiquette.  At  the  appointed  hour,  a  master  of  the 
ceremonies  came  to  fetch  me,  and  conducted  me  and  my 
suite  in  gilded  coaches  to  the  Palace.  We  had  no 
escort;  but  instead,  at  the  Castle  of  Stockholm — 
majestic  in  its  simplicity  of  an  old  Roman  palace — the 
Dragoons  of  the  Guard  were  drawn  up  on  the  grand 
staircase  in  their  historic  uniforms  of  Charles   XH.'s 

268 


1914]       AN  AUDIENCE  OF  KING  GUSTAF        269 

time.  At  the  entrance  to  the  reception-rooms,  full  of 
beautiful  furniture,  pictures,  bronzes,  and  admirable 
Gobelin  tapestries  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  whole 
Court  awaited  me.  As  soon  as  the  introductions  had 
been  made,  the  doors  were  thrown  open,  and  I  was 
ushered  into  the  presence  of  Gustaf  V.  His  Majesty, 
in  cold  and  formal  tones,  exchanged  the  usual  compli- 
ments with  me,  greeted  the  members  of  my  suite  in  the 
same  manner,  and  then  begged  me  to  follow  him  into 
his  private  drawing-room ;  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  M.  Wallenberg  (whose  acquaintance  I  had  made 
the  day  before),  was  invited  to  accompany  us.  The 
King's  expression  and  his  tone  then  changed  completely. 
He  sat  down,  having  offered  us  chairs,  and  began  by 
asking  me  questions  about  the  health  of  the  Emperor 
and  that  of  his  family;  he  then  passed  on  quite  simply 
to  the  delicate  question  of  the  recent  divorce  of  his  son, 
and  expressed,  in  terms  which  one  felt  were  perfectly 
sincere,  his  regrets  at  having  for  ever  lost  the  young 
Grand-Duchess,  his  daughter-in-law,  whom  he  had  liked 
very  much.  I  appreciated  the  dignity  and  the  frankness 
of  these  words,  v/hich  at  once  put  me  at  my  ease  with 
the  King.  His  Majesty  then  questioned  me  about  the 
events  that  had  occurred  in  Bulgaria.  "  How  had  King 
Ferdinand,  who  had  the  reputation  of  being  such  a  subtle 
politician,  managed  so  completely  to  lose  the  game  in 
which  he  had  taken  part  ?" 

I  replied  by  a  few  comments  on  the  events  I  had 
recently  witnessed  and  on  Ferdinand  himself.  Amongst 
other  things  I  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  curiously 
undecided  character  of  the  King  had  had  a  great  deal  to 
do  with  his  mishap ;  if  from  the  outset  he  had  taken  up 
a  definite  line  and  had  stuck  to  it  throughout,  a  great 
many  things  would  never  have  happened.  But  Ferdinand 
was  always  changing  his  mind  and  his  direction.  .  .  . 
Here  the  King  interrupted  me.  "  Oh !  but,  monsieur," 
he  exclaimed,  significantly,  "do  not  judge  sovereigns 
too  harshly !  If  you  only  knew  how  difficult  it  is, 
how  painful  it  is  sometimes,  to  make  a  decision  amidst 


270  ON   THE    EVE   OF   WAR       [chap.  xvi. 

.idvice  and  contrary  opinions  that  are  clashing  in  the 
country!"  .  .  .  The  King,  doubtless,  was  alluding  to 
his  own  recent  troubles  over  the  Bondestog  and  the 
change  of  Ministry.  Perhaps,  also,  he  had  other  ob- 
sessions of  a  still  more  serious  nature  in  view,  which  I 
at  the  moment  had  no  idea  of.  However  that  may  be, 
His  Majesty's  sincerity — a  sincerity  piercing  through 
much  reticence — made  an  impression  on  me;  it  was  a 
decided  change  for  me  after  Ferdinand,  and  the  duplicity 
which  I  always  felt  was  underlying  all  the  effusions  and 
all  the  confidences  of  the  King  of  the  Bulgarians. 

From  the  King's  room  I  was  conducted  to  the  Queen's 
apartments,  where  I  found  myself  in  the  presence  of  a 
graude-dame  sovereign,  correct  and  kind.  The  following 
days  I  was  received  in  audience  by  the  other  members 
of  the  Royal  Family.  First  by  the  Crown-Prince  and 
his  wife,  nee  Princess  Margaret  of  Connaught.  He 
struck  me  as  being  a  serious  young  man,  serious  beyond 
his  years,  with  unaffected  manners,  very  guarded  in  his 
speech.  She— quite  charming,  and  also  thoroughly 
unaffected. 

Prince  Charles,  brother  of  the  King,  enjoys  the 
sympathy  and  the  respect  of  all  surrounding  him.  He 
is  tall,  good-looking,  and  in  his  appearance  has  some- 
thing typically  chivalrous— an  impression  which  in- 
creases when  one  gets  to  know  the  admirable  qualities 
of  his  character,  his  great  and  active  goodness,  his 
upright  mind.  His  wife,  nee  Princess  Ingeborg  of 
Denmark,  possesses  all  the  taking  and  real  charm  of  her 
own  family.  Pretty,  intelligent,  extremely  unaffected  in 
manner,  and  yet  "every  inch  a  princess,"  she  reminds 
me  forcibly  of  her  aunt,  the  Dowager  Empress  of 
Russia,  who  had  sent  many  messages  to  her  niece  by 
me.  Three  delightful  young  girls,  of  which  the  eldest 
made  her  debut  while  I  was  in  Stockholm,  and  a  fine 
little  boy,  made  up  the  family. 

The  King's  youngest  brother.  Prince  Eugene 
Napoleon,  the  only  one  of  the  family  in  whom  the 
French  type  is  still  very  apparent,  lives  almost  like  a 


I9I4]  M.  WALLENBERG  271 

private  person,  giving  himself  up  entirely  to  the  pursuit 
of  art.  He  is  a  very  good  landscape-painter,  and  has  a 
high  reputation  in  the  country.  He  can  without 
exaggeration  be  placed  among  the  very  good  painters 
of  Sweden — immediately  after  Zorn,  the  celebrated 
Liliefors  and  Carl  Larson. 

I  was  already  acquainted  with  Prince  William,  the 
ex-husband  of  the  Grand-Duchess  Marie;  he  was  tall 
and  good-looking,  and  confined  himself  almost  entirely 
to  his  naval  profession  and  the  society  of  his  friends ; 
but  he  was  very  popular  with  the  society  ladies  of 
Stockholm,  with  whom  he  had  always  been  a  favourite. 

As  I  said  above,  the  King  was  taken  seriously  ill  on 
his  journey  to  the  North.  For  weeks  he  hung  between 
life  and  death,  and  1  did  not  see  him  again  till  July, 
when  he  still  looked  terribly  pulled  down,  thin  and 
weak,  but  was  gradually  recovering  his  health  and 
strength. 

Two  days  after  my  solemn  audience  of  the  King,  I 
went  to  call  on  M.  Wallenberg,  with  whom  I  had  only 
exchanged  the  customary  commonplaces  on  my  arrival. 
The  new  Swedish  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  began  at 
once  to  talk  business  with  me,  and,  to  my  great  surprise, 
touched  on  a  subject  of  "  high  politics "  and  politics 
generally.  He  expressed  in  guarded — but  nevertheless 
very  frank — terms  his  apprehensions  on  the  subject  of 
the  European  situation,  and  even  his  fears  about  the 
preservation  of  peace.  Although  sharing  in  petto  the 
sentiments  of  the  speaker,  I  took  good  care  not  to 
endorse  his  opinion  or  even  to  follow  him  on  to  this 
ticklish  topic ;  on  the  contrary  I  expressed  the  firm 
hope  that  peace  would  be  in  no  way  threatened,  that  in 
our  country  everything  would  be  done  to  avoid  dangerous 
friction,  that  I  had,  in  the  course  of  my  long  diplomatic 
career,  become  accustomed  to  these  attacks  of  European 
uneasiness,  which  happily  never  led  to  disastrous  con- 
sequences, etc.  .  .  .  But  my  host  did  not  allow  himself 
to  be  discouraged.      "  You  come  from  the  Balkan  East, 


272  ON   THE   EVE   OF   WAR       [chap,  xvi- 

monsieur,  and  are  well  acquainted  with  the  situation 
there  ;  do  you  not  think  that  the  political  state  of  those 
countries  is  very  menacing?  Here  and  in  a  great  many 
other  places  people  think  that  it  is  just  from  there  that 
danger  might  come." 

Again  I  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  this  invitation  to  con- 
fidences. I  thought  to  myself:  "Now  here  is  a  banker 
who  has  just  become  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
who  considers  it  incumbent  on  him,  at  his  first  interview 
with  the  new  Russian  Minister,  to  converse  on  questions 
of  high  politics!"  If  I  had  known  M.  Knut  Wallenberg 
a  little  I  should  never  have  formed  such  an  incorrect 
judgment.  Since  then,  during  three  years  of  almost 
daily  intercourse,  amidst  events  of  exceptional  gravity, 
I  got  to  know  thoroughly  the  character  and  mentality 
of  the  distinguished  Swedish  statesman,  and  I  realised 
that,  although  not  lacking  in  frankness,  M.  Wallenberg 
weighed  his  every  word,  and  never  indulged  in  idle 
talk.  In  this  the  long  experience  of  a  great  financier 
was  apparent.  Moreover,  M.  Wallenberg  is  essentially 
Swedish,  and  all  Swedes  are  men  of  few  words ;  when 
they  speak  it  is  because  they  think  they  are  obliged  to. 
Hence,  if  the  new  Swedish  Foreign  Secretary  had 
thought  it  necessary  at  the  outset  of  our  intercourse  to 
converse  with  me  about  his  fears  on  the  subject  of  the 
political  situation  of  Europe,  he  must  have  had  grave 
reasons  for  doing  so. 

The  artificial  agitation  kept  up  in  the  country,  the 
clash  of  opinions  between  the  King  and  the  Staaf- 
Ehrensvaerd  Cabinet  and  the  demonstrations  that  had 
brought  about  the  dissolution  of  the  Chamber,  were  due 
— as  subsequent  events  proved — to  German  instigation. 
Sinister  schemes  were  ripening  in  Berlin ;  she  had  to 
attempt  to  reap,  from  Sweden,  the  fruit  of  the  persistent 
work  which  I  mentioned  above ;  she  had  to  secure 
finally  the  formal  alliance  of  Sweden. 

Doubtless  during  the  month  of  February,  1914,  the 
Swedish  Court  was  warned  by  Berlin  of  the  extreme 
tension  of  the  political  situation,  and  received  proposals 


I9I4]     M.  WALLENBERG'S   PREMONITIONS     273 

of  alliance.  Hence  the  importance  that  King  Gustaf  V, 
attached  to  the  question  of  the  national  defence  of 
Sweden;  hence  also  his  wish  to  surround  himself,  in 
the  great  crisis  which  was  forming,  with  people  whom  he 
considered  either  as  essentially  prudent  and  well-versed 
in  questions  of  general  politics,  or  as  personal  friends. 
In  the  King's  opinion,  M.  Hammarskiold  appeared 
especially  to  fulfil  the  first  condition ;  and  in  M.  Wallen- 
berg His  Majesty  recovered  a  tried  friend  of  strenuous 
days  and  a  counsellor  whose  good  sense  would  be  able 
to  face  the  exceptional  circumstances  which  were 
imminent.  For  M.  Wallenberg  was  truly  an  intimate 
friend  of  the  King,  who  had  complete  trust  in  him. 

Moreover,  as   soon   as   the   new  Ministers  were  in 
office,  Gustaf  V.  had  to  acquaint  them  with  the  situation 
and  to  confide  to  them — particularly  to  M.  Wallenberg 
— the  information  he  held  from  the  most  intimate  sources 
and  which  was  to  remain  hidden  from  all  those  whom 
he  could  not  trust  absolutely.     Knowing  M.  Wallenberg 
as  I  know  him  now,  I  can  imagine  the  gravity,  I  will 
even  say  patriotic  anguish,  with  which  this  intelligent 
and  circumspect  man  received  the  King's  confidences  on 
the  suggestions  which  came  from  the  side  of  Berlin,  and 
threw  His  Majesty  himself  into  the  most  cruel  perplexity. 
It  was   in   order   to   check   this    information    that   the 
Swedish  Foreign  Secretary  had  applied  to  me  at  our 
first  interview.     I  avoided  this  sounding  as  I  did  not 
know  my  partner.    And  also  what  should  I  have  replied  ? 
That  in  St.  Petersburg  and  in  our  Embassies  of  Berlin 
and  Vienna,  the  general  political  situation  was  considered 
to  be  perfectly  clear  and  free  from  danger ;  but  that  I 
myself  held  a  very  different  opinion  and  had  been  dread- 
ing the  great  collision  since  September,  1913  ?     These 
things  can  only  be  said  to  some  one  of  whom  one  is 
absolutely  certain.     And  I  repeat  that  I  did  not  know 
M.  Knut  Wallenberg  at  all.     I  knew  that  he  was  very 
rich,  that  he  was  at   the    head  of  the   most   powerful 
financial    group   of  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula,  which 
willingly    furnished    funds     for     the    great    industrial 


274  ON   THE   EVE  OF  WAR      [chap.xvi. 

enterprises  in  Sweden  and  in  Norway  (iron  mines,  water 
power,  nitrates,  etc.) ;  that  this  group  was  the  only  one 
which  was  in  close  touch  not  only  with  the  financial 
market  of  Berlin,  but  also  and  especially  with  that  of 
Paris  ;  that  M.  Wallenberg  had  been  the  real  initiator 
and  founder  of  the  "  Banque  des  Pays  du  Nord."  But 
there  ended  my  knowledge  of  the  person  whom  I  was 
to  have  as  a  partner  in  the  most  difficult  and  delicate 
circumstances. 

Before  my  time,  much  hospitality  had  been  displayed 
at  the  Russian  Legation  in  Stockholm  ;  at  the  receptions 
members  of  the  aristocracy,  personages  who  were  well 
known  in  society  and  at  Court,  and  the  princes  and 
princesses  of  Sweden  were  collected  together.  But 
there  was  not  time  to  get  to  know  and  to  see  the  great 
financiers,  the  great  manufacturers,  the  people  famed  in 
the  political  world.  Moreover,  a  legation  cannot  manage 
that  job  alone;  it  must  be  assisted — as  German  diplo- 
matic representation  always  has  been — by  its  colony,  its 
distinguished  travellers,  its  scientific  experts,  etc.  Now, 
when  I  arrived  in  Stockholm,  I  asked  to  be  made 
acquainted  with  the  leading  members  of  the  Russian 
colony  in  Sweden ;  I  was  told  in  reply  that  there  was 
one  very  amiable  old  Greek  who  was  the  centre  of  the 
sponge  trade,  but  that  in  the  course  of  the  last  winter, 
in  order  to  facilitate  his  trade,  the  worthy  man  had 
become  a  naturalised  Swede,  and  that  in  his  person  the 
whole  Russian  colony  had  disappeared  ! 

Soon  after  our  first  interview,  M.  Wallenberg  told 
me  that  he  was  going  abroad,  chiefly  to  Paris  and  Berlin. 
The  object  of  this  trip,  which  was  only  to  take  a  few 
days,  was  strictly  personal  and  had  to  do  with  the 
financial  business  of  the  Enskilda  Bank,  business  which 
M.  Wallenberg  desired  to  wind  up  before  handing  over 
the  management  of  the  Bank  to  his  brother.  Never- 
theless, he  would  profit  by  his  stay  in  Paris  also  to  see 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  a  few  political 
personages  with  whom  he  was  well  acquainted. 


I9I4]       MR.  HOWARD  AND  M.  THI^BAUD        275 

On  his  return  the  Foreign  Secretary  hastened  to  tell 
me  that,  having  seen  the  people  quoted  above  in  Paris 
and  having  also  called  on  M.  von  Jagow  and  M.  Zimmer- 
mann  in  Berlin,  he  had  derived  reassuring  impressions 
from  his  conversation  with  both  sides.  This  pertinacity 
in  acquainting  me  with  the  political  situation  of  Europe 
surprised  me  somewhat,  but  I  was  none  the  less  grate- 
ful to  M.  Wallenberg  for  the  courtesy  and  the  confidence 
which  he  showed  towards  me  on  this  occasion. 

The  conversation  with  my  new  colleagues,  especially 
with  the  British  Minister,  were  not  of  a  nature  to  revive 
exaggerated  apprehensions  in  me.     Sir  Esme   Howard 
(then  still  Mr.  Howard),  whose  eminent  qualities  of  mind 
and  character  I  was  able    to   appreciate    later — reflect- 
ing officially  the  profoundly  pacific  disposition   of  the 
Asquith-Grey  Ministry,  did  not  give  way  to  lugubrious 
prophecies  nor  to  considerations  which  might  have  put 
me  on  my  guard  against  the  Swedes  and  their  present 
policy;  Mr.  Howard  was  more  inclined  to  ridicule  the 
agitation  of  Sven-Hedin  and  his  followers,  and  did  not 
see  the  reflection  of  a  political  manoeuvre  preconceived 
in  Berlin.     My  French  colleague,  M.  Thiebaud,  took  the 
"  Russophobe  "  agitation  which  had  taken  possession  of 
Sweden  more  tragically.    He  warned  me  at  some  length 
against  the  repetition  of  faults  already  committed,  accord- 
ing to  him,  by  Russian  representatives,  and  especially 
against  any  action  that  might  appear  suspicious  to  the 
Swedes.     I  agreed  entirely  with  my  colleague.     I  heard 
later  that  M.  Thiebaud  had  at  this  period  begun  con- 
fidential parleyings  with  his  chiefs,  in  order  to  prepare 
a  sort  of  mediation  between  Sweden  and  Russia,  from 
the  President  of  the  Republic  himself    M.  Poincare  was 
soon  going  to  Russia  and  from  there  he  was  going  to  pay 
official  visits  to  the  three  Scandinavian  Courts,  and  on 
this  occasion  he  was  to  make  friendly  observations  about 
the  "  Assanovitch  affair,"  and  to  bring  back  to  the  King 
of  Sweden  reassuring  explanations  from  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor.   This  idea  was  adopted  ;  there  was  some 
good  in  it,  although  it  exaggerated  rather  too  much  the 

T 


276  ON    TIIIC   EVE   OF   WAR       [chap.  xvi. 

importance  of  the  Sven-Hedin  calumnies.  But  I  was 
extremely  astonished  that  my  French  colleague  should 
have  concealed  from  me,  from  the  beginning  and  until 
the  end,  his  idea  and  parleyings  with  Paris  on  this 
subject.  Later  on  and  during  the  tragic  years  we  went 
through  together  I  was  most  careful  not  to  imitate 
M.  Thiebaud's  example,  and  1  confided  to  him,  carefully 
and  from  the  very  first,  all  that  I  heard,  and  all  that  I 
intended  to  do  or  to  write. 

I  gradually  became  better  acquainted  with  my  other 
colleagues.      In  the  senior  member  of  the  Diplomatic 
Corps,  my  Portuguese  colleague  Castro-P'ejo,  I  found  a 
man  of  great  culture  and  of  wide  experience  of  Sweden; 
I  could  subsequently  congratulate   myself  on   the  ex- 
cellent  relations  which   existed   between   us  from  the 
outset.     Alas  !   two  years  later  his  wife — Swedo-French 
by  birth — beautiful,  bright  and  charming,  died  of  an  in- 
curable disease,  and  he  himself  soon  followed  her  to  the 
grave,  having  succumbed  to  paralysis  of  the  heart !   The 
Danish   Minister,  M.  Scavenius,  whose  acquaintance  I 
had  already  made  in  St.  Petersburg,  was  very  useful  to 
me  from  the  beginning  through  his  perfect  knowledge 
of  political  and  social  matters  in  Stockholm.     We  later 
became  very    intimate   with    him    and    with    Madame 
Scavenius,    and    often    had   cause   to  appreciate  their 
intelligence,  their  tact,  and  their  sincere  sympathies  with 
the   Entente.    The  Japanese   Minister,   M.   Uchida,  in- 
telligent and  correct,  and  Madame  Uchida,  as  charming 
as  she  was  cultivated;  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Amalfi, 
whom  we  ended  by  liking  most  cordially;  M.  Lagos,  the 
distinguished     Argentine    diplomat,    and    the    amiable 
Madame   Lagos ;    an    excellent  and   agreeable   French 
colleague.    Baron   Devaux,   and   the   equally  agreeable 
English  couple,  the  Clives;   our  subsequent  Norwegian 
colleagues,  all  most  amiable  and  reliable ;  finally — last 
but   not  least — the   satirical   M.    Tommazini    and    the 
fascinating  and  witty  Madame  Tommazini,  the  life  and 
soul  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  and  of  Stockholm  society, 
completed  the  friendly  circle  who  gathered  closely  round 


I9I4]  THE  MALMO   EXHIBITION  277 

us  and  whose  society  helped  us  to  bear  three  years  of 
constant  nervous  tension,  of  trials  and  of  misfortunes 
that  the  terrible  inexorable  war  brought  in  its  train. 

From  the  outset  there  was  a  coolness  between  us  and 
my  Austro-Hungarian  colleague,  Count  Hadik.  On  the 
other  hand,  my  German  colleague,  Herr  von  Reichenau, 
the  type  of  the  convinced  Prussian  and  belonging  to  a 
social  set  which  paraded  the  former  traditions  of  Russo- 
Prussian  friendship,  gave  me  a  warm  welcome  and 
sought  an  interchange  of  views  with  his  new  Russian 
colleague. 

During  the  month  of  April  I  had  to  busy  myself  with 
the  Russian  participation  in  an  exhibition  of  "  the 
adjacent  countries  of  the  Baltic,"  which  was  to  be 
inaugurated  at  Malmo.^  The  Imperial  Government, 
hurt  by  the  recent  Swedish  demonstrations,  did  not  wish 
to  take  any  part  in  the  exhibition.  But  thanks  to  the 
efforts  of  a  few  people  who  feared  that  this  holding 
aloof  might  be  misconstrued  in  Sweden,  M.  Emmanuel 
Nobel  was  allowed  to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a 
private  initiatory  committee  which  succeeded  more  or 
less  in  forming  a  Russian  section.  The  result,  from  the 
material  point  of  view,  was  very  meagre :  a  few  em- 
broideries and  laces  made  by  villagers,  much  appreciated 
abroad ;  an  exhibit  by  the  Nobel  petroleum  interests  at 
Baku,  another  by  the  rubber  manufacturers  of  Riga,  a 
cold-storage  section,  and  finally  an  art  section,  repre- 
sented by  the  Russian  painters  of  the  newest  school, 
in  which  side  by  side  with  a  few  excellent  portraits 
hung  some  pictures  which  would  have  made  the  dogs 
howl ;  these  made  up  the  Russian  exhibit  which  I 
thought  compared  disastrously  with  the  Swedish, 
Danish,  and  German  sections,  in  which  the  most 
interesting  and  the  best  specimens  of  the  industries  of 
those  countries  had  been  carefully  collected  together. 
Nevertheless,  later  on,  I  could  only  congratulate  myself 
on  the  efforts  of  those  who,  in  spite  of  opposition  from 
'  A  Swedish  port  opposite  Copenhagen. 


278  ON   THE  EVE  OF  WAR      [chap.  xvi. 

official  circles,  had  all  the  same  contrived  that  Russia 
should  be  represented  at  the  exhibition  of  Malmo  :  the 
Swedes  were  anyhow  grateful  to  Russia  for  having 
taken  part  in  it.  And  if  this  had  not  been  done  every 
one  in  Sweden  would  have  seen  tangible  proof  of 
Russian  hostility  and  of  her  sinister  schemes  with  regard 
to  the  peninsula  of  the  North  ! 

At  the  end  of  April  I  went  to  MalmO  to  see  how  the 
setting-up  and  the  arrangement  of  the  Russian  section 
were  getting  on.  About  the  15th  May  I  returned  there 
officially  to  take  part  in  the  opening  of  the  exhibition. 
The  King  still  being  ill,  it  was  the  Crown  Prince  and  his 
wife  who  presided  over  the  opening  ceremonies.  The 
customary  prayers,  inevitable  chants,  numerous  and 
lengthy  speeches  in  excellent  Swedish  (of  which  then  I 
did  not  understand  one  word),  a  grand  banquet  presided 
over  by  the  Royal  pair — at  which  I  made  acquaintance 
with  a  lot  of  people  I  never  saw  again — closed  the  first 
day's  proceedings.  The  next  day  there  was  a  great 
dinner  to  the  German  contingent  in  the  room  of  the 
beautiful  Berlin  china.  There  I  made  the  acquaintance 
of  Count  Brockdorff-Rantzau,  German  Minister  to 
Copenhagen.  The  Count  extended  to  me  a  particularly 
ready  welcome.  From  topical  commonplaces  we  pro- 
ceeded to  exchange  a  few  political  impressions,  and 
Count  Rantzau  appeared  to  jump  at  the  opportunity  to 
express,  with  striking  warmth  and  conviction,  some 
ideas  on  the  absolute  necessity  for  good  relations 
between  Russia  and  Germany,  and  on  the  terrible  con- 
sequences that  a  collision  arising  between  them  might 
have  for  both  countries.  I  acquiesced  very  sincerely  in 
this  point  of  view. 

"  It  is  a  great  pity  that  we  have  not  time  to  discuss 
this  more  fully,"  said  Rantzau.  "  But  you  are  certain  to 
come  to  Copenhagen  soon.  Come  and  see  me  when  you 
do  ;  we  shall  be  able  to  talk  more  freely  and  at  greater 
length  ;  do  come  !" 

1  did  go  to  Copenhagen  two  days  after,  but  I  did  not 
call  on  the  German  Minister.    I  considered  that  to  seek 


I9I4]    RIKSDAG  OF   NATIONAL  DEFENCE      279 

a  political  conversation  with  Count  Rantzau  there,  where 
he  was  alwa3''s  in  close  touch  with  his  Russian  colleague, 
Baron  de  Buxhoeveden,  would  have  been  an  indelicate 
proceeding  on  my  part  with  regard  to  the  latter.  I  have, 
however,  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  sentiments  and 
opinions  expressed  to  me  by  Count  Rantzau  were  not 
factitious.  As  a  diplomat  in  high  favour  at  his  Court,  he 
must  at  this  time  have  known  many  things  which  only 
revealed  themselves  two  months  later  to  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  I  know  from  a  fairly  reliable  source  that  the 
apprehensions  of  the  German  diplomat,  who  had  never 
lacked  intelligence,  were  absolutely  sincere. 

A  less  formal  dinner  to  the  Russian  section  closed 
the  series  of  festivities.  In  the  toast  which  I  proposed 
to  the  absent  King  and  to  the  Royal  couple  presiding  at 
the  dinner,  I  strove  to  make  the  thoroughly  friendly  and 
S3''mpathetic  sentiments  which  animated  Russia  towards 
all  the  Scandinavian  countries — her  Baltic  neighbours — 
stand  out  very  clearly,  and  I  expressed  a  wish  for  the 
development  of  close  commercial  and  industrial  relations 
between  my  country  and  Sweden.  The  Stockholm  Press 
quoted  and  approved  of  this  toast,  and  I  had  a  general 
impression  that  the  Swedes  who  came  to  Malmo  for  the 
inauguration  of  the  exhibition  had  gone  away  less  scared 
with  regard  to  Russia  than  they  had  been  on  their 
arrival. 

Towards  the  end  of  May,  the  Riksdag  of"  the  National 
Defence  "  assembled  in  Stockholm.  The  ceremony  of 
the  opening  took  place  as  usual  in  the  grand  hall  of  the 
Royal  Castle  and  with  the  usual  pomp.  The  King 
insisted  on  opening  this  parliament  himself,  although 
judging  by  his  looks,  his  walk  and  his  voice,  he  was  still 
suffering  from  the  effects  of  the  terrible  illness  and  of 
the  operation  he  had  recently  undergone. 

"  Gode  Herrar  och  Svcnsk  Man " ;  ^  he  began  his 
speech  from  the  Throne,  according  to  established 
custom  ;  and  I  remember  the  impression  that  this 
^  "  Good  Lords  and  Men  of  Sweden." 


28o  ON    THE    EVE   OF   WAR      [chap.  xvt. 

ancient  formula  made  on  me.  I  thought  to  myself: 
"When  will  the  day  come  on  which  the  Emperor,  my 
august  Master,  will  open  in  person  a  national  Duma 
reall}'^  worthy  of  the  name  and  will  with  confidence 
address  the  real  representatives  of  the  people,  strong  in 
their  rights,  conscious  of  their  duties,  and  especially 
feeling  themselves  to  be  the  sons  of  their  country  and 
the  authorised  mandatories  of  their  people?" 

The  Riksdag,  with  a  few  amendments,  consented  to 
the  expenditure  which  the  Government  asked  for,  for  the 
augmentation  of  the  Swedish  Army  and  its  equipment. 

While  this  Riksdag  was  sitting,  the  political  situation 
in  Europe  was  becoming  more  gloomy  every  day.  First 
there  was  the  milliard  in  free  gifts  previously  deducted 
by  the  German  Chamber  from  all  the  great  fortunes 
of  the  country;  then  there  was  continual  coming  and 
going  between  Berlin  and  Vienna;  the  heads  of  the 
Staffs  of  the  two  Central  Empires,  and  the  heads  of  their 
Fleets  conferring  together  ;  the  interview  of  Konopischt 
when  William  II.  went  to  put  the  finishing  touches  to 
the  manipulation  of  Austria-Hungary  in  the  person  of 
the  heir  to  the  throne,  the  warlike  Arch-Duke  Francis 
Ferdinand ;  finally,  the  enormous  sum  poured  into  the 
treasury  of  the  German  Red  Cross.  The  language  of  the 
Austro-German  Press  became  daily  more  chauvinistic, 
more  uncompromising. 

What  was  our  country  doing  in  view  of  all  these 
demonstrations,  all  this  work,  which  were  so  to  speak 
staring  us  in  the  face  ?  I  have  no  idea.  No  echo  reached 
me  from  St.  Petersburg  or  from  our  Foreign  Secretary. 
Our  Ambassador  to  Berlin,  M.  SverbeieiT,  went  on 
leave  towards  the  end  of  June — as  he  did  every  year  at 
the  same  time — to  superintend  farming  operations  on 
his  property  at  Tula.  The  Russian  Ambassador  to 
Vienna,  M.  Schebeko,  was  soon  to  follow  him,  and  did 
actually  start — two  days  before  the  sending  of  the  celebrated 
ultimatum  to  Serbia — for  his  property  at  Yaroslav.  (He 
had  to  retrace  his  steps  almost  as  soon  as  he  arrived  in 
St.  Petersburg.) 


I9I4]  M.  SVERBEIEFF  IN    BERLIN  281 

Whence  came  this  tranquillity,  this  confidence  in  the 
immediate  future?  I  have  often  wondered,  but  up  to 
now  have  never  been  able  to  frame  a  satisfactory 
answer.  The  French  representatives  in  Berlin  and 
Vienna  were  very  anxious ;  the  Yellow  Book  exists  to 
prove  this  in  black  and  white.  They  must  frequently 
have  imparted  their  anxieties  to  their  Russian  colleagues. 
Why  is  it  then  that  the  latter  should  have  attached 
so  little  importance  to  the  warnings  of  their  allied 
colleagues  ? 

In  M.  Sverbeieff's  case  I  am  not  much  surprised. 
This  most  distinguished  man  was  by  his  very  qualities 
averse  to  suspecting  dangers,  to  seeking  sinister  inten- 
tions. He  owed  his  whole  career  to  his  natural  tact,  to 
his  knowledge  of  the  world,  and  to  his  prudent  self- 
effacement.  He  was  appointed  to  Berlin  because  he 
was  the  intimate  friend  of  the  new  Foreign  Secretary, 
who  could  rest  assured  that  on  the  one  hand  Sverbeieff 
would  not  go  in  for  personal  politics  with  the  Emperor 
William  II.  (an  alluring  temptation  to  many  of  our 
diplomats),  and  that  on  the  other  he  would  cultivate  the 
best  possible  relations  with  the  Court  of  Berlin,  and 
would  not  be  the  cause  of  any  sort  of  conflict  between 
the  two  Governments  ;  in  short,  that  the  real  direction 
of  Russo-German  relations  would  remain  entirely  in 
the  hands  of  the  Foreign  Office,  of  which  the  new 
Ambassador  would  only  be  the  faithful  and  obliging 
mouthpiece.  All  this  was  quite  right ;  but  in  appoint- 
ing his  intimate  friend  to  the  post  of  Russian  Ambas- 
sador to  Berlin,  M.  Sazonoff  had  lost  sight  of  the  fact 
that  other  qualities  were  absolutely  indispensable  to 
the  diplomat  entrusted  with  such  an  exceptionally  im- 
portant post,  to  wit :  the  faculty  of  studying  and  solving 
the  political  situation  of  the  country  in  which  he  finds 
himself,  2i  flair  for  people  and  events,  and  the  authority 
of  a  superior  mind  capable  if  necessary  of  making 
himself  the  centre  of  a  political  current — in  this  case 
the  centre  of  the  partisans  of  peace. 

M.    Sverbeieff  only   possessed   these   qualities  to  a 


282  ON   THE   EVE  OF   WAR       [chap.  xvi. 

very  limited  degree.  After  having  been  for  two  years 
Minister  to  Athens,  where  the  whole  Royal  Family 
headed  by  the  wise  King  George  adored  him  ;  where 
every  one  was  enchanted  by  his  receptions,  as  fashion- 
able as  they  were  hospitable,  and  where  M.  Venizelos — an 
eminently  honest  politician  and  a  true  friend  to  Russia 
—found  in  him  an  ever  kind  and  attentive  partner,  M. 
Sverbeieff  was  inclined  to  believe  that  his  part  in  Berlin 
would  only  be  a  natural  extension  of  the  one  he  had 
played  at  the  foot  of  Mt.  Hymettus.  He  was  intensely 
absorbed  in  his  house  and  household,  in  his  new  social 
environment;  he  succeeded  in  making  himself  liked 
and  even  up  to  a  point  esteemed  by  his  German  official 
partners;  but  he  did  not  arrive  at  what  was  going  on  in 
Germany,  what  was  being  hatched  in  Berlin ;  he  did  not 
raise  the  alarm  in  time. 

This  alarm  had  been  raised  by  Count  Osten-Sacken 
in  a  masterly  letter  written  by  him  in  1907,  in  which  the 
eminent  diplomat,  so  firmly  attached  to  the  Court  of 
Berlin  and  surrounded  by  the  personal  attentions  of 
William  H.,  nevertheless  foretold,  with  the  absolute 
plain-speaking  of  an  exalted  patriot,  that  henceforth 
the  Kaiser  would  seek  to  injure  Russia  and  would  choose 
the  Near  East  as  the  theatre  in  which  to  inflict  serious  blows 
on  us.  The  deduction  was  logical :  if  we  did  not  wish  for 
war  with  Germany,  a  ground  for  mutual  understanding 
must  be  found.  This  letter  had  probably  been  forgotten 
since  1908.  New  ambitions  had  come  to  divert  the 
direction  of  Russian  foreign  policy,  and  the  question  : 
"  What  advantages  can  we  procure  for  ourselves  ?"  had 
relegated  the  question :  "What  immediate  perils  ought 
we  to  avoid  ?"  to  a  secondary  place. 

I  suppose  that  when  M.  Jules  Cambon  went  to 
impart  his  doubts  and  fears  to  his  Russian  colleague, 
the  latter  listened  to  him  attentively,  but  calmed  him- 
self by  thinking  that  on  the  French  side  every  one  was 
generally  inclined  to  exaggerate  the  German  peril  and 
the  agitation  of  William.  He  probably  also  thought 
that  one  of  the  best  ways  of  avoiding  dangers  was  by 


I9I4]  M.  SCHEBEKO   IN   VIENNA  283 

not  proclaiming  them  too  loudly,  and  by  not  delivering 
insufficiently-controlled  apprehensions  to  the  indiscre- 
tion of  Offices  and  Courts. 

Less  comprehensible  to  me  was  the  scepticism  of 
which  M.  Schebeko  showed  proof  (or  parade).  Perhaps 
he  thought  that  in  due  time  he  would  be  able  to  master 
the  situation.  In  Vienna  itself,  he  had  been  an  eye- 
witness to  the  ascendency  which  his  former  chief, 
Prince  Lobanoff,  had  been  able  to  gain.  He  had 
repeatedly  seen  the  latter  act  by  strength  of  character 
and  the  lucidity  of  his  arguments  on  the  vacillating 
minds  of  his  Viennese  partners,  and  draw  attention  at 
the  same  time  in  our  country  to  the  dangers  which 
were  arising  and  to  the  necessity  of  avoiding  them.  M. 
Schebeko  undoubtedly  possessed  this  same  strength  of 
character  and  temperament.  One  noticed  this  when, 
having  hastily  returned  to  Vienna  in  the  tragic  week 
that  preceded  the  rupture,  he  was  able,  in  two  inter- 
views with  Count  Berchtold,  to  extort  his  consent  to 
enter  into  conversations  with  Russia,  that  is  to  say  to 
abandon  the  uncompromising  attitude  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  had  adopted  from  the  first 
day.  William  II.  was  then  obliged  to  have  recourse  to 
extreme  measures  and  to  the  ultimatum  hurled  at  Russia, 
in  order  to  precipitate  events  all  the  same  and  to  drag 
Austria  in  her  train.  The  energetic  intervention  of 
the  Russian  Ambassador  had  unfortunately  come  a  few 
days  too  late. 

I  was  also  assured  that  the  very  journey  that  M. 
Schebeko  had  undertaken  had  had  as  its  chief  object  to 
discuss  the  situation,  which  was  becoming  serious  and 
the  events  which  were  developing,  with  M.  Sazonoff  by 
word  of  mouth.  In  this  case  it  is  most  regrettable  that 
our  Ambassador  to  Vienna  did  not  start  much  earlier, 
that  is  to  say,  on  the  assassination  of  the  Arch-Duke 
Francis  Ferdinand. 

It  was  through  inordinately  "  robust "  optimism  that 
our  whole   diplomacy  sinned    on   this  occasion,  and    I 


284  ON   THE    EVE   OF   WAR       [chap,  xvi 

am  still  wondering  whence  this  optimism  drew  its  source, 
when  the  whole  of  Europe  was  seized  with  indubitable 
uneasiness,  and  when  in  Russia  herself  the  awful  rum- 
bling of  the  revolution,  checked  but  not  settled,  had  been 
heard  since  1906? 

Yes,  the  revolution  was  always  present,  extending 
its  roots  over  the  soil  of  Russia.  We  diplomats  working 
abroad  might  have  been  mistaken  about  it ;  but  how  could 
those  who  in  St.  Petersburg  directed  Russian  politics 
and  were  in  daily  contact  with  the  terrible  reality  have 
failed  to  realise  it  in  all  they  did  and  schemed  ? 

In  one  of  the  early  chapters  of  these  reminiscences, 
I  sketched  one  of  the  causes  of  this  phenomenon.  I 
said  that  since  Stolypin's  disappearance  the  foreign 
policy  of  Russia  had  been  almost  completely  divorced 
from  the  home  policy.  But  there  was  more  in  it  than 
that.  At  the  period  when  the  terrible,  world-wide  con- 
flict occurred,  the  Russian  "Cabinet"  had  assumed  an 
aspect  as  strange  as  it  was  glaring.  There  were  two 
parties  who  had  nothing  in  common  and  who  quarrelled 
mutually.  On  one  side,  the  "reactionaries":  MM.  Mak- 
lakoff,  Casso,  Makaroff,  Sabler,  Prince  Schakhowskoi, 
and  to  a  certain  extent  the  President  of  the  Council, 
M.  Goremykin ;  on  the  other,  the  sincere  partisans  of 
indispensable  reforms  :  chiefly  MM.  Sazonoff  and 
Krivochein.  The  reactionary  Ministers  discerned  very 
clearly — far  more  clearly  than  their  colleagues — the 
dangers  of  the  internal  position  of  the  country  ;  only,  to 
obviate  them,  they  vaunted  and  made  use  of  methods 
which  only  increased  the  general  discontent  and  the 
nervous  tension  of  the  country;  and  in  order  to  retain 
their  places  and  cause  their  system  to  triumph,  some  of 
those  gentlemen  were  not  ashamed  to  flatter  the  vile 
Rasputin,  and  to  protect  his  most  intimate  friends.^ 
The  Ministers  belonging  to  the  opposite  camp  realised 
exactly  what  ought  to  be  done  :  that  is  to  say,  to  proceed 
to   immediate   reforms,   to  adopt  truly   the  representative 

'  M.  Goremykin  and  M.  Casso,  fortunately  for  their  reputations,  never 
compromised  themselves  by  these  degrading  attentions. 


I9I4]  DANGERS   IN    RUSSIA  285 

rbgimc  granted  in  October^  1905,  and  to  stop  the  Rasputin 
scandal,  which  was  deeply  humiliating  even  the  most 
faithful  servants  of  the  Throne,  and  beginning  to  dis- 
credit the  Sovereign  himself  amongst  the  lower  classes. 
But,  although  thoroughly  aware  of  the  remedies,  these 
gentlemen  thought  the  application  of  these  remedies 
would  at  once  remove  the  whole  trouble,  and  would 
restore  to  the  Dynasty  and  to  the  Imperial  Government, 
public  confidence,  which  at  that  time  was  absolutely 
lacking.  According  to  them,  none  of  the  foreign  prestige 
of  Russia  could  be  sacrificed;  it  would  suffice  that  a 
homogeneous  Ministry  composed  of  honest  and  wise 
men  like  themselves  should  be  entrusted  with  the 
governing  of  Russia,  for  the  internal  ferment  to  calm 
down  instantly,  giving  place  to  systematic  and  fruitful 
work,  which  in  its  turn  would  strengthen  the  inter- 
national position  of  the  country.  These  men,  although 
intelligent  and  well-meaning,  did  not  realise  that  the 
mistakes  accumulated  by  the  Government  and  the  un- 
bridled propaganda  of  the  opposition  parties  had  sapped 
the  very  foundations  of  national  existence  to  such  an 
extent,  that  the  entire  people  and  the  whole  country 
showed  symptoms  of  an  acute  and  serious  disease.  The 
State  so  grievously  afflicted  internally  could  not  live  a 
normal  life  externally.  Far  more  than  in  1856  had 
Russia  need  to  collect  herself}  That  is  what  was  not 
understood  in  our  country  for  several  reasons,  the 
principal  one  being  that  statesmen  of  the  stamp  of 
Prince  Gortchakoff  no  longer  existed,  or  else  were  not 
called  to  power. 

I  spent  the  summer  in  town,  having  to  buy  furniture, 
and  also  having  planned  to  take  a  cure  in  September, 
and  to  make  a  short  stay  in  Italy  with  my  family.  As  if 
on  purpose,  the  summer  promised  to  be  remarkably  fine 
and  hot,  and  we  ended  by  regretting  that  we  were  not 
spending  it  in  the  country. 

1  "Russia  is  not   sulking;    Russia   is  collecting  herself" — famous 
saying  by  Prince  Gortchakoff. 


286  ON   THE   EVE   OF   WAR       r<^iiAP.  xvi. 

One  of  ni}'  colleagues  had  already  established  him- 
self and  his  family  at  Nynas,  a  picturesque  seaside 
place,  where  I  and  his  other  colleagues  often  visited  him. 
On  u  -,  28th  June  we  were  expecting  some  members  of 
the  Legation  who  had  just  been  to  Nynas  for  the  day 
to  come  and  spend  the  evening  with  us.  Towards 
eleven  o'clock  they  came  in  very  much  upset  :  "  Do  you 
know,  Monsieur,  what  has  just  happened  ?  The  Arch- 
Duke,  the  Austrian  Heir,  and  his  wife  have  been  assas- 
sinated at  Serajevo.  Here  is  the  telegraphic  report 
that  is  being  sold  in  the  streets." 

"This  is  most  serious,"  I  replied. 

"  But  perhaps,"  hazarded  one  of  these  gentlemen,  "  it 
may  be  all  for  the  best  ?  Every  one  said  that  the  late 
Francis  Ferdinand  was  a  warm  partisan  of  war.  If  this 
is  true,  his  death  might  increase  the  chances  of  peace." 

"That  is  possible,"  I  replied ;  "but  in  the  first  place 
murder  is  murder,  that  is  to  say  a  revolting  thing ; 
and  then  the  occurrence  at  Serajevo  might  increase  the 
displeasure  of  the  Central  Empires  against  the  Serbians 
—and  against  us,  their  natural  protectors — and  might  set 
a  match  to  the  train." 

However,  during  the  days  that  followed,  these  appre- 
hensions hardly  appeared  to  be  justified.  In  Stockholm, 
as  everywhere  else,  we  assisted  at  the  Requiem  Mass 
to  the  memory  of  the  Arch-Duke  and  his  unfortunate 
wife.  There  was  much  mention  in  the  newspapers  of 
the  funeral  rites  of  the  murdered  couple  and  of  f/ie 
intentionally  simple  character  that  the  Court  of  Vienna 
gave  to  these  rites.  Then  one  heard — to  the  intense  satis- 
faction of  the  whole  world — that  this  mournful  event  did 
not  prevent  the  Emperor  William  taking  his  usual  cruise 
in  the  Norwegian  Fjords,  and  that  he  was  just  starting. 
In  short,  everything  seemed  to  have  calmed  down. 

A  few  days  later,  I  went  again  to  Malmo,  whither 
King  Gustaf  V.  came  for  the  first  time  since  his  re- 
covery, to  meet  the  King  of  Denmark.  The  weather 
was  fine  and  hot;  the  festivities  in  the  King's  honour 
were  marked  by  great  cordiality.     I  saw   my  German 


I9I4]  THE  AUSTRIAN   ULTIMATUM  287 

colleague  several  times,  and  he  was  very  attentive  to 
me,  although  he  was  much  occupied  with  a  big  deputa- 
tion of  German  officers  who  had  come  to  greet  the  King 
of  Sweden,  and  who  paraded  ostentatiously  ever3^where 
in  their  most  splendid  uniforms  and  fraternised  at 
perpetual  banquets  with  their  Swedish  comrades  from 
the  garrisons  of  central  Sweden. 

I  also  noticed — it  was  most  obvious — in  the  waters 
of  the  straits  which  divide  Malmo  from  Copenhagen  the 
presence  of  a  great  number  of  German  destroyers. 
When  I  was  going  to  Copenhagen,  after  the  King's 
departure  from  Malmo,  I  came  across  several.  One 
seemed  to  come  out  of  every  creek!  To  my  questions 
on  the  subject,  the  answer  given  was  that  it  was  a 
squadron  of  destroyers  commanded  by  Prince  Eitel- 
Frederick  who,  having  taken  a  cruise  in  the  straits,  was 
going  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  Swedish  Royal  couple  at 
the  Castle  of  TuUgarn  ;  a  visit  which  actually  took 
place  ten  days  later. 

Meantime,  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  was 
on  his  way  to  St.  Petersburg  by  sea ;  from  there  he  was 
due  in  Stockholm  on  the  25th  July  to  pay  his  official 
visit ;  great  preparations  were  being  made  to  receive 
him  with  the  customary  ceremonial. 

I  remember  that  on  the  22nd,  I  and  my  family  and  a 
fewmembersof  the  Legation  made  a  delightful  excursion 
in  the  "  skargaard "  of  Stockholm.  Beautiful  weather, 
pretty  scenery,  a  merry  lunch,  a  charming  day  spent 
entirely  in  the  open  air  !  Returning  in  a  motor-boat,  on 
one  of  those  soft,  clear  evenings  which  in  summer 
constitute  the  special  charm  of  those  regions,  I  gave 
myself  up  entirely  to  the  mere  joy  of  existing.  "  Well ! 
well ! "  I  soliloquised  out  loud ;  "  I  am  not  sorry  after 
all  to  have  had  to  exchange  Sofia  for  Stockholm  !  Sofia 
certainly  was  a  more  interesting  post,  and  above  all  a 
more  important  one  ;  but  here  in  exchange,  one  has 
some  repose ;  one  can  enjoy  life  without  being  perpetu- 
ally obsessed  by  political  preoccupations  .  .  .  ."  A  bad 
fairy  heard  me. 


288  ON   THE   EVE   OF   WAR       [chap.  xvi. 

This  happened  on  Wednesday,  the  22nd  July  ;  on  the 
evening  of  the  following  day,  the  evening  papers  brought 
the  first  news  of  an  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  and 
on  the  Saturday  morning,  a  few  hours  before  M.  Poincares 
arrival,  appeared  the  text  itself  of  this  ultimatum  which 
was  unexpected  and  of  unheard-of  violence.  The  tragic 
ivcck  was  beginning ;  the  week  in  which  the  future 
destinies  of  the  world  were  at  stake,  and  in  which  the 
world-war  was  decided,  which  in  its  turn  brought  about 
the  terrible  shipwreck  of  my  unfortunate  country! 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE   TRAGIC   WEEK 

The  first  day  of  the  "tragic  week"  coincided  in  Stock- 
holm with  the  official  reception  of  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic,  and  the  festivities  that  had  been 
arranged  for  this  reception. 

The  President  was  only  to  stay  one  day  in  Stockholm. 
As  the  armoured  cruiser  which  brought  the  Head  of  the 
French  State  could  not  berth  alongside,  but  had  to 
anchor  two  or  three  kilometres  outside,  King  Gustaf  V. 
embarked  at  the  hour  appointed  to  fetch  his  guest 
and  conduct  him  to  the  Royal  Castle  in  a  gondola  with 
twelve  pairs  of  oars,  dating  from  the  eighteenth  century 
and  richly  decorated  in  the  Louis  XV.  style. 

The  foreign  Ministers  were  to  be  presented  to  the 
President  during  the  day,  and  were  invited  to  the  great 
banquet  at  the  Palace,  where  all  the  political  and  social 
notabilities  of  Stockholm  would  be  gathered  round  the 
King  and  his  French  guests.  After  the  banquet  there 
was  a  concert  given  by  the  Swedish  choral  societies,  and 
late  in  the  evening  the  President  and  his  suite  left, 
escorted  by  torch-bearers.  As  the  Diplomatic  Corps  did 
not  take  part  in  the  actual  reception  of  the  President, 
all  the  members  of  the  Corps  and  all  distinguished 
foreigners  were  invited  to  watch  his  arrival  from  the 
garden  of  the  Castle.  The  reception  was  favoured  by 
splendid  weather. 

When  we  assembled  in  the  garden,  the  terraces  of 
which  overhang  the  arm  of  the  sea  by  which  the  State 
gondola  was  to  arrive,  one  was  immediately  concious  of 
the  great  constraint  which  the  news  of  the  day  before 
had  caused  among  the  assembly. 


290  THE  TRAGIC   WEEK         [chapxvii. 

All  faces  were  more  or  less  careworn.  The 
"Centrals"  held  themselves  aloof  and  talked  together 
in  low  tones.  The  members  of  the  French  Legation, 
taking  part  in  corpore  in  the  reception  of  the  President, 
were  not  among  the  spectators.  My  British  colleague 
had  the  serious  and  pale  face  that  I  got  to  know  so  well 
during  the  many  days  of  emotions  shared  in  common 
later  on.  He  asked  me  what  I  thought  of  the  ultimatum 
and  I  did  not  hide  from  him  that  I  considered  the 
situation  extremely  strained  ;  that  was  his  opinion  also. 
1  was  introduced  to  the  new  Spanish  Minister,  who  had 
arrived  two  days  before.  When  I  shook  hands  with  the 
amiable  and  sympathetic  Duke  of  Amalfi,  I  had  no  idea 
that  in  the  near  future  I  should  daily  have  recourse  to 
his  kindness  and  his  untiring  work  on  questions  relative 
to  the  Russians  left  in  Germany,  to  our  prisoners  of 
war,  etc. 

We  were  too  absent-minded  to  enjoy  the  delightful 
spectacle  before  our  eyes :  the  picturesque  shores  of  the 
arm  of  the  sea  below  us,  the  motley  crowd  gaily 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  French  guests,  the  pretty 
gondola  which  appeared  at  last  escorted  by  a  whole 
flotilla  of  launches,  bringing  the  King,  the  President  of 
the  French  Republic  and  their  respective  suites,  while  the 
guns  fired  a  salute  and  the  bells  of  the  ancient  churches 
in  the  old  town  pealed  merrily. 

When  I  returned  to  the  Legation,  and  re-read  and 
studied  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  in  the  French 
translation,  my  anxiety  increased  still  more.  Just  as  in 
1912,  in  the  cathedral  of  Sofia,  when  the  standard  of 
Samara  was  brought  in,  a  sudden  and  irresistible  thought 
flashed  across  my  brain  :  "  It  is  war  !  " 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  I  and  my  foreign 
colleagues  presented  ourselves  at  the  Castle  to  greet  the 
President  of  the  Republic.  We  were  shown  into  one  of 
the  drawing-rooms  adjoining  the  rooms  occupied  by  the 
President.  After  a  few  minutes  of  waiting,  the  door 
opened  and  M.  Poincare  came  in,  followed  byM.Viviani. 
He    talked    to    all   the  Ministers   in   turn.      "  It  is   not 


I9I4]  BANQUET  AT  THE   PALACE  291 

necessary  to  introduce  M.  Nekludoff  to  me!"  he  exclaimed 
amiably  when  my  turn  came ;  "  he  is  an  old  friend  of 
ours  ! "  Then  grasping  my  hand  and  lowering  his  voice, 
the  President  said  to  me  :  "  We  are  going  through  a 
truly  alarming  crisis;  I  have  no  time  to  discuss  it  with 
you,  but  I  hope  that  we  shall  have  a  little  talk  this 
evening."  M.  Viviani,  however,  pausedifor  a  few  minutes 
to  exchange  impressions  with  me.  "  What  do  you  say 
about  the  situation,  M.  Nekludoff?" 

"  Alas ! "  I  replied,  "  I  greatly  fear  that  it  means  war." 

"  It  is  terrible,  terrible,"  exclaimed  the  French 
President  of  the  Council ;  "/or  if  it  means  war  for  yon,  it 
most  certainly  also  means  war  for  us." 

"  I  did  not  expect  to  hear  anything  different  from  you," 
I  said  to  M.  Viviani  ;  "  but  let  us  still  hope  that  things 
will  settle  themselves  !" 

"  Yes,  yes,  we  will  hope  so  !  We  shall  have  an 
opportunity  of  talking  at  greater  length  this  evening," 
added  M.  Viviani,  taking  leave  of  me. 

The  banquet  served  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  in 
the  grand  state  gallery  of  the  Castle  was  stormy.  The 
guests  could  only  talk  of  the  ultimatum  and  of  the  perils 
of  the  hour.  At  the  foot  of  the  stairs  I  met  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  face  to  face;  he  had  left  for  his 
holiday  two  or  three  days  previously,  and  had  not  put  in 
an  appearance  either  in  the  morning  on  the  terrace  of 
the  Castle,  or  in  the  afternoon  at  the  presentations  to 
M.  Poincare. 

"Oh!  So  you  have  come  back,  Count  Hadik?"  I 
accosted  him. 

"Yes,  I  have  come  back,"  and  with  that  the  Count 
turned  his  back  on  me  and  disappeared  in  the  crowd. 

The  German  Minister  was  paler  than  usual,  and 
wore  an  expression  of  restrained  emotion.  He  insisted 
on  coming  up  to  me  to  exchange  a  few  commonplaces 
about  the  beauty  of  the  room  and  of  the  magnificent 
Louis  XVL  Sevres  dinner-service  on  the  long  table.  We 
took  our  seats  ;  the  music  began ;  at  a  given  moment, 
the  King  and  the  President  of  the  Republic  exchanged 

u 


292  THE   TRAGIC   WI-EK         [ruAP.xvii. 

cordial  toasts,  followed  by  the  "  Marseillaise,"  and  the 
Swedisli  National  Anthem.  In  short  the  setting  of  the 
banquet  bore  a  normal  aspect.  But  no  one  paid  any 
attention  to  what  was  going  on  around.  All  thoughts 
were  centred  on  the  dreaded  events,  relentless  and 
terrible,  which  were  to  be  foreseen  extending  their  fatal 
embrace  even  to  this  picturesque  town  flooded  with  the 
soft  light  of  the  sunset;  even  to  this  old  and  gorgeous 
palace  which  had  witnessed  so  many  tragic  events 
within  its  walls  ;  even  to  the  very  people  taking  part  in 
the  banquet  and  who  were  talking  amongst  themselves. 

In  Paris,  in  October,  1908,  I  was  present  at  a  party 
given  in  M.  Izvolsky's  honour  at  the  Russian  Embassy; 
it  was  the  day  after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia,  and  the 
proclamation  of  Bulgarian  independence  and  sovereignty. 
Then  also  the  atmosphere  was  stormy ;  many  foreign 
representatives  accosted  one  another  without  exactly 
knowing  whether  they  had  to  do  with  a  friend  or  a  future 
foe ;  at  the  end  of  the  great  saloon  M.  Izvolsky,  the 
centre  of  attraction  for  all,  was  good-naturedly  explain- 
ing his  diplomacy  and  the  situation  to  the  prettiest 
and  most  charming  political  women  of  the  Paris  of  that 
day :  Countess  Jean  de  Castellane,  Countess  Jean  de 
Montebello,  Countess  de  Greffulhe ;  while  on  the  other 
side  the  good-looking  and  elegant  Austrian  Ambassador, 
Count  Koewenhiiller,  who  had  just  been  made  a  Knight 
of  the  Golden  Fleece,  holding  a  little  court  of  yowng  and 
beautiful  women,  cast  sarcastic  glances  at  the  Russian 
Minister,  as  much  as  to  say:  "And  you,  my  frend,  you 
will  get  nothing  but  worries  out  of  this!" 

In  191 2  I  was  present  at  a  party  given  by  M.  Sazonoff 
which  I  described  above,  and  where  general  depression 
weighed  on  the  invited  guests.  But  nothing  was  to  be 
compared  to  the  tragic  banquet  of  the  25th  July,  1914,  in 
Stockholm.  It  was  fate  hovering  over  the  brilliant 
assembly ;  and  every  one  could  hear  the  flutter  of  its 
wings. 

Voluminous  telegrams  were  being  continually 
brought  to  the  King,  who  passed  them  on  to  M.  Poincare. 


I9I4]       PRESIDENT   POINCARE'S  ADVICE        293 

This  went  on  after  we  had  left  the  dining-room.  The 
King,  ordinarily  so  scrupulously  correct  and  amiable, 
did  not  even  think  of  going  round  and  talking  to  the 
notabilities  at  the  reception.  He  specially  avoided  any 
conversation  with  the  foreign  Ministers.  Standing 
quite  apart  at  the  uncrowded  end  of  one  of  the  large 
reception-rooms,  sometimes  he  talked  in  low  tones  to 
M.  Poincare  and  handed  him  the  telegrams  he  received, 
sometimes  to  M.  Viviani  or  to  M.  Wallenberg.  The 
President,  seeing  me  close  to  him,  came  up  and  said  to 
me :  "  Monsieur,  I  had  an  opportunity  this  morning  of 
communicating  to  King  Gustaf  something  that  the 
Emperor  Nicolas  II.  had  asked  me  to  convey  to  him, 
that  is  to  say,  the  most  formal  and  the  most  gracious 
assurance  of  his  good  and  unalterable  disposition  to- 
wards Sweden  and  the  Swedish  Court.  In  particular  I 
was  able  to  certify  to  the  King  that  the  Assanovitch 
incident  which  had  so  affected  Swedish  public  opinion, 
had  not  the  importance  attached  to  it  by  this  opinion. 
His  Majesty  the  King  received  this  communication  with 
sincere  pleasure,  but  he  expressed  the  hope  that  from 
henceforth  explicit  orders  would  be  issued  from  St. 
Petersburg  to  the  Russian  Legation  in  Stockholm,  and 
particularly  to  the  military  agent  who  is  to  succeed 
M.  Assanovitch,  to  take  the  greatest  care  to  avoid  any- 
thing that  might  appear  to  bear  the  stamp  of  clandestine 
or  irregular  proceedings.  What  I  am  telling  you," 
continued  the  President,  "  is  of  very  secondary  import- 
ance compared  to  the  political  events  of  the  moment ; 
nevertheless,  it  is  all  the  more  necessary  to  reassure  the 
Swedes  and  to  deprive  the  Central  Empires  of  all 
plausible  causes  for  intrigue." 

I  entirely  agreed  with  the  President's  point  of  view, 
and  I  assured  him  that  from  my  arrival  in  Stockholm  I 
had  planned  to  do  all  in  my  power  to  rectify  the  mistakes 
committed  by  us  latterly  in  Sweden.  We  went  on  to 
speak  of  the  political  situation  of  the  moment. 

"The  King  has  received  some  news  from  Berlin  this 
evening  that  has  reassured  him  a  little ;  according  to 


294  THE  TRAGIC   WEEK         [chap.  xvii. 

His  Majest}^  a  favourable  way  out  of  the  crisis  which 
has  arisen  may  still  be  found,  if  only  both  sides  will 
display  some  good  will.  May  he  be  right !  In  any  easel 
have  decided  to  leave  out  Copenhagen  and  Christiania, 
and  to  return  to  Paris  at  once.  I  hope  that  the  two 
Scandinavian  Courts  will  graciously  accept  my  excuses 
conveyed  to  them  by  General  Brugere,  and  will  not  bear 
me  a  grudge,  under  the  circumstances." 

I  replied  to  the  President  that  in  Denmark  and  in 
Norway  the  importance  and  the  gravity  of  what  was 
occurring  must  be  even  better  understood  than  in 
Stockholm,  and  that  they  would  be  particularly  anxious 
to  see  the  Head  of  the  French  Government  return  in 
safety,  and  with  all  speed  to  his  post.  I  then  talked  to 
M.  Viviani  on  the  same  subjects.  At  this  moment  the 
sound  of  beautiful  voices  was  heard,  and  the  King  and 
his  guest,  remembering  the  choral  societies'  part  in  the 
programme,  passed  into  the  adjoining  room  and  listened 
to  and  applauded  a  few  pieces.  But  all  the  same,  the 
pretty  popular  songs  and  the  beautiful  patriotic  chants 
of  Sweden  never  had  such  an  absent-minded  audience 
as  on  this  occasion.  Every  one  was  in  a  hurry  to  have 
done  with  the  conventions  and  fatigues  of  the  official 
festivity;  and  every  one  heaved  a  sigh  of  relief  when 
the  signal  for  departure  was  given.  A  quarter  of  an 
hour  later,  when  I  was  going  along  the  quay  opposite 
the  Castle  landing-stage  in  my  motor,  I  could  see  from 
afar  the  beautiful  sight  of  the  departure  of  the  French 
guests,  with  the  torchlight  illumination ;  the  red  lights 
were  reflected  in  the  water  and  made  it  look  like  blood. 
"  Here  indeed  is  the  torch  of  Bellona  ! "  I  thought,  with 
an  involuntary  shudder. 

The  next  day,  Sunday,  we  received  the  news  of  the 
Serbian  answer  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum, 
and  of  the  rejection  of  this  answer.  On  Monday,  when 
we  received  the  full  text  of  the  Serbian  Note  in 
Stockholm,  I  was  able  to  realise  the  gravity  of  the 
danger  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was  running.     In  spite 


I9I4]     GERMANS   DETERMINED  ON   WAR       295 

of  the  high  opinion  I  had  of  M.  Pachitch's  prudence,  I 
had  not  imagined  that  Serbia  could  have  displayed  such 
moderation  and  so  much  obedience  to  our  advice.  The 
unheard-of,  brutal  ultimatum  from  Vienna  was  accepted, 
except  on  one  point  only :  the  one  that  aimed  quite 
simply  at  replacing  the  national  police  in  the  kingdom 
by  Austro-Hungarian  police.  And  the  Serbian  reserva- 
tions on  this  one  point  had  sufficed  for  Austria  not  to 
accept  the  answer  and  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations 
with  her  neighbour!  It  was  as  clear  as  daylight  that  in 
Vienna — as  in  Berlin — the  execution  of  Serbia  had  been 
irrevocably  settled.  Now  as  I  foresaw  that  Russia 
could  not  tolerate  this  brutal  execution,  I  was  almost 
convinced  that  in  a  few  days  my  country  would  be 
involved  in  an  open  collision  with  the  two  Central 
Empires. 

The  negotiations  and  events  of  the  succeeding  days 
proved  that  these  two  Empires  did  not  look  on  the 
action  they  had  undertaken  quite  in  the  same  way. 
Whereas,  for  the  Austrians  it  was  chiefly  a  question  of 
punishing  the  Serbians,  of  avenging  the  events  of  1912 
and  191 3,  of  re-establishing  jjiajin  militari  the  influence 
of  the  Empire  in  the  Balkans  ;  whereas  in  Vienna  they 
hoped  in  petto  for  a  capitulation  of  Russia  which  would 
have  enabled  Austria  to  do  the  deed  without  having  to 
face  the  terrible  trials  of  the  great  war — in  Berlin  it  was 
just  this  war  that  was  wished  for;  it  had  been  decided 
on  after  long  subterfuges  and  an  underhand  but  violent 
struggle  between  the  preventive-war  party  and  the  peace 
party ;  and  once  it  had  been  decided  on,  they  wished  it 
to  break  out  at  a  chosen  and  apparently  pre-eminently 
propitious  moment.  I  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  in 
the  Wilhelmstrasse,they  were  prepared  for  the  following 
course  of  events :  (i)  the  bombardment  of  Belgrade  and 
occupation  of  Serbia  by  Austro-Hungarian  troops ;  (2) 
Russian  mobilisation  and  ultimatum  from  Russia  to 
Austria ;  (3)  counter-ultimatum  and  declaration  of  war 
by  Germany  on  Russia.  From  Tuesday,  the  28th,  when 
a    certain    hesitation    and    a    tendency   to   enter    into 


296  THE   TRAGIC   WEEK  [chap.xvii. 

conversation  with  Russia  were  apparent  in  Vienna, 
William  II.  and  his  advisers  decided  to  precipitate 
matters  and,  without  waiting  for  the  second  phase,  which 
might  miscarry,  hurled  their  ultimatum  and  their  declara- 
tion of  war  at  Russia,  under  pretext  of  the  Russian 
mobilisation. 

But  this  plan  was  not  revealed  in  all  its  cynical 
crudeness  till  later  on.  At  the  moment  one  could  still 
hope  against  hope  and  attempt  possible  solutions.  That 
is  what  would  have  been  done  in  our  country  if  Berlin 
had  allowed  us  a  few  days'  respite. 

In  all  my  previous  career  I  had  never  contemplated 
with  equanimity  the  possibility  of  an  armed  collision 
between  Germany  and  Russia.  I  had  never  been  an 
enemy  of  the  Germans  on  principle;  I  recognised  the 
good  and  respectable  sides  of  their  national  character 
as  these  sides  had  been  revealed  to  me  through  the 
study  of  German  history  and  literature,  and  through 
frequenting  a  certain  German  sympathetic  set.  On  the 
other  hand,  I  was  perfectly  aware  of  the  failings  of  our 
neighbours,  of  their  pride  which  had  blossomed 
spontaneously  and  inordinately,  of  their  intentional 
brutality ;  and  I  could  ill  bear  the  contempt  and  hatred 
which  every  one  in  Germany  paraded  for  all  the  Slav 
races  outside  Russia.  I  knew  that  the  Germans  had 
latterly  been  poisoned  by  the  writings  and  opinions  of 
a  whole  school  of  Pan-German  philosophers,  historians, 
and  men  of  letters;  but  I  had  not  realised  the  virulence 
of  this  poison,  which  had  gradually  paralysed  most  of 
the  good  qualities  of  the  German  nature. 

I  knew  that  Germany  was  very  strong,  and  my 
country  undermined  by  internal  trouble;  I  had  no 
confidence  in  our  economic,  political  and  military 
organisation,  no  confidence  in  our  Staff,  very  little 
even  in  our  soldiers  ;  the  recent  Japanese  war  with  its 
sad  pages  had  not  vanished  from  my  memory  as  it  had 
vanished  from  that  of  most  of  my  compatriots.  I  had  a 
high  opinion  of  French  courage  and  genius;  but  I  knew 


I9I4]        INTERVIEW  WITH   REICHENAU  29; 

that  France  was  very  ill-prepared  for  the  supreme 
struggle.  On  the  other  hand,  I  was  not  at  all  sure  of 
the  intrinsic  worth  of  a  Russo-British  alliance  (in  this  I 
was  mistaken),  and  I  feared  that  such  an  alliance  might 
rather  incite  Germany  to  attack  us.  In  short,  I  frankly 
dreaded  a  collision  with  Germany  and  held  the  opinion 
that,  given  the  present  state  of  Russia,  our  policy  ought 
carefully  to  avoid  anything  that  might  create  serious 
friction  between  us  and  our  powerful  neighbour.  I  had 
ever  before  me  the  threat  of  a  great  danger ;  I  thought 
this  danger  imminent;  but  I  did  not  think  it  in- 
evitable. .  .  . 

On  Tuesday,  28th  July,  as  the  telegrams  from  the 
agencies  revealed  a  slight  relaxation  in  the  tension,  I  went 
to  call  on  my  German  colleague,  Herr  von  Reichenau, 
in  order  to  probe  the  situation  with  him.  I  told  him 
quite  frankly  that  I  was  very  anxious  and  that  I  was 
profiting  by  what  might  prove  the  last  day  on  which  he 
and  I  should  be  allowed  to  talk  together.  "  Moreover, 
circumstances  are  such  that  we  must  tell  each  other  all 
without  any  reticence,  or  we  must  not  talk,"  I  added, 
when  Herr  von  Reichenau  expressed  his  great  pleasure 
at  seeing  me.  I  began  the  conversation  by  drawing  my 
host's  attention  to  the  fact  that  I  was  not  at  all  what 
they  called  "a  devourer  of  Germans";  I  had  family 
antecedents  and  traditions  that  prevented  me  regarding 
Germany  as  a  necessary  and  born  foe  ;  and  it  was  in  the 
name  of  these  old  memories  and  traditions  that  I  came 
to  talk  to  my  German  colleague  that  day.  "  What  are 
they  about  in  Berlin  at  this  moment  ?  They  are  on  the 
eve  of  letting  loose  the  most  terrible  events  that  have 
ever  occurred  in  Europe," 

"  But  we  in  no  way  wish  for  war,  I  assure  you," 
protested  Herr  von  Reichenau. 

"Now,  now!  quite  frankly,  my  dear  colleague,  it  is 
not  possible  that  you  should  think  it  is  we  who  wish  for 
war  ?  " 

"  No,  I  do  not  think  that ;  but  it  is  not  a  question  of 
war  or  peace.   We  are  absolutely  determined  this  time  to 


298  THE  TRAGIC    WEEK         [chap.  xvii. 

punish  the  Serbians — die  Friedcnstorer — as  they  deserve 
You  wish  to  prevent  this.  Very  well,  we  cannot  permit 
you  to  assume  this  role  of  forced  protectors  of  the 
Serbians  or  of  any  other  Balkan  nation  ;  that  gives  these 
small  States  a  pride  and  an  audacity  which  are  incom- 
patible with  the  dignity  and  the  vital  interests  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  of  Germany  herself  That  is 
what  we  wish  to  stop,  that  is  what  we  are  arming  for." 

"  But  how  can  we  entirely  abandon  our  role  of  pro- 
tectors of  the  Slav  and  Orthodox  nationalities  of  the  Near 
East  ?  It  is  an  historical  fact.  One  cannot  go  up-stream 
in  history  !  1  could  quite  understand  your  saying  to  us  : 
come  to  some  arrangement  with  Austria  to  maintain 
order  and  political  security  in  the  Balkans.  But  to 
undertake  armed  action  in  Serbia  and  then  to  say  that  it 
does  not  concern  us — that  our  public  opinion  could 
never  understand  nor  would  it  forgive  the  Imperial 
Government  if  it  agreed  to  such  a  thing  !  .  .  .  Just  think: 
during  the  last  five  years  this  is,  so  to  speak,  the  third 
ultimatum  that  you  have  virtually  presented  to  us  on  the 
subject  of  Balkan  affairs.  In  March,  1909,  you  ordered 
us  to  bow  to  the  fact  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia;  we 
did  bow  to  it.  In  1912  you  demanded  that  we  should 
make  the  Serbians  retire  from  the  northern  coast  of 
Albania  and  the  Montenegrins  abandon  Scutari;  we 
set  about  doing  this  honestly,  in  spite  of  the  protests 
and  cries  of  the  greater  portion  of  our  Press.  Now  you 
wish  us  to  be  passive  and  indifferent  spectators  of  the 
execution  of  Serbia,  without  our  even  knowing  how  far 
this  execution  will  go !  Come,  come !  do  you  consider 
it  possible  for  our  Foreign  Office,  for  His  Majest}^  the 
Emperor  himself  to  consent  to  this  third  capitulation  ?  " 

"Of  course,  I  realise  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  you, 
but  for  us  it  is  impossible  to  recognise  your  right  to 
protect  Serbia  against  us.  It  is  impossible,  quite 
impossible !" 

"  Listen,  Reichenau,"  I  said,  seized  with  deep  and 
sincere  emotion ;  "  think,  think  well  over  what  you  are 
doing.      You  are  unloosing  a  terrible  war,  a  struggle 


I9I4]    CONVERSATION   WITH    REICHENAU     299 

probably  unparalleled  in  history.  I  will  be  frank  with 
you  to  the  end  ;  I  fear  this  war,  I  dread  it  terribly  for 
my  country.  If  we  are  beaten,  Russia  will  be  ship- 
wrecked. But  calculate  carefully  what  the  result  for 
you  will  be?  You  may  be  quite  sure  that  in  the  country 
that  goes  under,  revolution  will  break  out,  and  it  will  be 
a  terrible  revolution  ;  but  we  are  far  too  near  neighbours  : 
our  interests,  our  economic  life,  our  history  even  are  far 
too  much  mixed  up  for  such  a  revolution  to  be  restricted 
to  one  country  without  hitting  the  other.  If  the  Emperor 
William  declares  war  on  Russia,  he  had  better  know 
what  the  result  will  be  :  he  will  deal  a  decisive  blow  at 
the  monarchical  principle  in  Russia,  Germany,  Europe  ! 
It  is  in  the  name  of  ancient  traditions,  in  the  name  of  the 
monarchical  principle  that  I  come  and  warn  you  that 
you  are  riding  for  a  fall !  Perhaps  by  to-morrow  we 
shall  not  be  able  to  see  one  another;  but  one  day  you 
will  remember  my  last  visit  and  my  last  words." 

I  had  probably  spoken  with  much  heat  and  conviction, 
for  at  one  moment  I  saw  Herr  von  Reichenau's  eyes 
filling  with  tears. 

"  Let  us  hope,  my  dear  colleague,"  he  said  in  con- 
clusion, "  that  we  shall  still  have  many  opportunities 
for  seeing  each  other  and  that  the  troubles  you  predict 
will  not  occur." 

"We will  hope  so,"  I  said,  and  on  that  I  took  leave  of 
my  German  colleague,  and  I  never  had  an  opportunity 
or  a  possibility  of  seeing  him  again. 

If  Herr  von  Reichenau  ever  sees  these  lines  I  feel 
sure  he  will  remember  our  last  conversation  and  that  he 
will  admit  the  absolute  accuracy  of  my  account. 

The  terrible  events  which  have  occurred  since  have 
exceeded  my  gloomiest  prognostications,  making  these 
appear  trifling.  It  was  not  only  the  dynasty  of  the 
HohenzoUerns  and  that  of  the  Romanoffs  that  were 
judged  and  condemned  in  the  hour  when  war  broke  out 
— it  was  the  monarchical  principle  itself  that  was  struck 
and  perhaps  irremediably.  The  monarchical  power  is 
the  preponderance  of  the  will  and  the  reason  of  one  man 


300  THE  TRAGIC   WEEK  [chap.  xvii. 

over  those  of  an  entire  nation ;  in  order  tliat  this  pre- 
ponderance should  be  justified  it  is  imperative  that  this 
will  and  this  reason  should  be  the  expression  of  a  high 
and  beneficial  idea,  which  would  be  lacking  in  the 
majority  of  the  country.  In  modern  times,  when  the 
spread  of  education  and  the  influence  of  the  Press  had 
replaced  the  rivalries  of  Governments  and  States  by  the 
conscious  rivalries  of  nations,  sovereigns  ought  to  inter- 
pose their  authority  against  the  nefarious  propaganda 
of  international  hatred  and  competition.  In  any  other 
matter  they  could  and  should  be  the  head  servants  of 
their  people;  in  questions  of  peace  or  war,  they  ought 
resolutely  to  constitute  themselves  the  champions  of  a 
mutual  solidarity  which  wowld  have  preserved  the  world 
from  the  worst  scourges.  Some,  like  William  II.,  have 
done  exactly  the  opposite ;  others  have  not  understood 
it  sufficiently,  hence  the  decay  of  the  monarchical 
principle  throughout  the  world. 

And  here  I  am  again  judging  sovereigns,  in  spite  of 
the  earnest  injunctions  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Sweden  ! 

On  Wednesday,  the  29th  July,  the  news  was  again 
much  worse,  and  violent  agitation  took  hold  of  Sweden. 
All  sorts  of  reports  began  to  circulate  in  the  town  and 
amongst  the  Diplomatic  Corps ;  it  was  affirmed  that 
Sweden  was  bound  by  a  secret  military  convention  to 
Germany  and  that  in  the  event  of  war  the  Swedes 
would  side  resolutely  with  her.  M.  Wallenberg,  whom 
I  saw  on  Wednesday,  confessed  to  me  that  the  situation 
was  making  the  Royal  Government  very  anxious ;  he 
then  said,  emphasising  his  words,  that  Sweden  was 
more  interested  than  any  one  in  the  preservation  of 
European  peace  and  that  a  collision  between  her  two 
neighbours  would  place  her  in  a  dangerous  position. 
"  But,"  he  added,  "the  King  has  not  lost  all  hope  that 
matters  may  yet  be  arranged." 

On  Friday  morning  the  new  military  attache  to  our 
Legation,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kandauroff,  arrived  from 


I9I4]         COL.  KANDAUROFF'S  TIDINGS  301 

St.  Petersburg;  I  had  been  informed  of  his  appointment 
a  few  days  previously.  The  first  question  1  asked  him 
was  how  matters  stood  when  he  left  St.  Petersburg. 

"All  that  I  can  tell  you  is  this,"  answered  the 
Colonel :  "  as  you  know,  I  was  discharging  the  duties  of 
assistant  to  the  Quarter-Master-General  at  Headquarters; 
as  there  was  an  enormous  amount  of  work,  I  only  left 
my  office  two  hours  before  the  train  left  for  Abo,  that 
is  to  say  yesterday,  Thursday,  at  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  Now,  all  through  the  night  I  was  busy  dis- 
patching peremptory  orders  to  commanding  officers  in 
Poland  and  on  the  Prussian  frontier  carefully  to  avoid, 
in  case  of  mobilisation,  anything  that  might  seem  to  the 
German  authorities  to  be  a  threat  of  military  action 
against  Germany.  All  the  frontier  posts  were  to  be 
moved  back  to  ten  or  fifteen  kilometres,  no  marching 
column  was  to  be  formed,  even  the  frontier  guards  were 
to  be  removed  so  that  there  could  be  no  collision  in  the 
event  of  German  troops  approaching  our  frontier  and 
even  crossing  it.  .  .  .  These  orders  came  from  His 
Majesty  himself;  they  reached  General  Headquarters 
very  late  on  Wednesday  evening,  and  yesterday, 
Thursday,  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  all  the  necessary 
telegrams  had  been  sent  off.  You  can  see  by  that. 
Monsieur,  that  in  our  country  all  hope  of  coming  to 
some  arrangement  with  Berlin  is  not  lost." 

This  news  restored  some  hope  to  me ;  but  not  for 
long ;  the  following  morning  the  news  of  the  German 
ultimatum  to  Russia  appeared,  and  then  I  realised  that 
all  hope  had  vanished. 

From  Friday  evening  a  real  panic  reigned  in 
Stockholm :  all  the  banks  were  closed  by  order  of  the 
Government,  and  outside  their  doors  were  enormous 
queues  of  people  who  wished  to  take  out  their  deposits 
and  their  money.  Prince  Eitel  Frederick's  squadron  of 
destroyers  had  left  two  days  before  for  an  unknown 
destination.  I  was  told  that  my  German  colleague  had 
said  at  a  meeting  that  he  was  sure  Sweden  would  side 
with  Germany. 


302  THE  TRAGIC   WEEK         [chap.  xvii. 

On  Saturday  morning  I  accompanied  the  members 
of  tlie  Russian  delegation  to  the  Spitsberg  Conference, 
which  was  just  over  at  Christiania,  MM.  Bentkowski  and 
Mandelstamm,  to  the  boat  which  was  leaving  for  Abo. 
With  them  went  my  eldest  son,  attached  to  the  Foreign 
Office,  who  had  just  come  on  leave  but  who  had  been 
hastily  recalled  on  account  of  the  enormous  amount  of 
work  at  the  Office.  I  entrusted  these  gentlemen,  but 
especially  M.  Mandelstamm  who  was  so  well  up  in  the 
position  at  Constantinople,  with  a  message  from  me  to 
M.  Sazonoff",  which  ran  as  follows  :  In  the  event  of  war 
breaking  out  and  if  Turkey's  attitude  became  threatening, 
1  was  taking  on  myself  to  advise  a  prompt  Russian 
descent  on  the  coast  of  Southern  Bulgaria  ;  this  descent 
should  be  effected  by  considerable  forces,  one  large  army 
corps  at  the  least ;  simultaneously  with  this  forcing  of 
the  gates  of  Bulgaria  a  proclamation  should  be  addressed 
to  the  people  and  to  the  Bulgarian  Army,  telling  them 
that  the  Russians  were  arriving  to  restore  to  them 
Adrianople,  Lozengrad  and  Thrace  that  the  Turks  had 
unjustly  taken  from  them,  profiting  by  the  misfortunes 
of  Bulgaria.  I  guaranteed  that  if  the  descent  was 
successful  the  Bulgarian  Army  would  place  itself  on  our 
side  and  that  King  Ferdinand  would  be  obliged  to 
submit  to  this  movement.  I  was  quite  aware  that  at  the 
Foreign  Office  no  one  would  pay  the  slightest  attention 
to  this  advice ;  that  it  would  be  looked  on  as  pre- 
sumptuous interference  on  my  part  in  matters  which 
were  no  longer  my  business.  But  I  thought  it  my  duty, 
at  this  solemn  hour,  not  to  keep  back  an  idea  which 
might  be  beneficial  to  our  cause.  A  few  days  later  I 
repeated  the  same  advice  in  a  letter  to  Baron  Schilling, 
the  only  person  in  Sazonoff"'s  set  whose  character, 
intelligence  and  patriotism  I  thoroughly  trusted. 

The  subsequent  events  of  the  terrible  war  have 
proved  that  I  was  not  wrong.  Bulgaria  did  play  the 
decisive  role  of  the  secondary  weight  which  finally 
upset  the  scales  ;  her  geographical  position  predestined 
her   to    this   role.     It  was    in   October,  191 5,  that,   by 


I9I4]         MY  ADVICE   ABOUT    BULGARIA  303 

Bulgaria's  entry  into  the  arena,  the  decided  superiority 
of  Germany  over  her  adversaries  became  apparent.  In 
September,  1916,  Rumania's  entry  into  the  war  was 
wasted  and  neutralised  because  we  could  not  realise  that 
the  first  advantage  to  be  derived  from  the  Rumanian 
alliance  should  have  been  to  attack  the  Bulgarians  with 
large  Russian  forces  and  to  beat  them,  on  which  the 
entire  Bulgarian  Army  would  have  come  over  to  us  with 
the  cry  that  Holy  Russia  was  invincible,  that  traitors 
alone  had  induced  the  Bulgarian  people  to  take  part  in 
a  sacrilegious  war  and  that  these  traitors  deserved 
death.  In  1918  when  the  Bulgarian  troops,  exhausted 
by  the  interminable  struggle,  were  duly  beaten  and 
overthrown,  the  defection  of  Bulgaria  that  ensued  caused 
the  defection  of  Austria  and  that  of  Turkey,  and  finally 
hastened  the  capitulation  of  Germany.  If  the  entry  of 
Bulgaria  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  Germany  could  have 
been  prevented — and  for  that  there  was  all  the  time 
between  August,  1914,  and  October,  1915 — the  war  would 
not  have  lasted  so  long,  that  is  to  say,  it  would  not  have 
assumed  the  proportions  of  a  world-wide  calamity,  un- 
paralleled in  history,  and  above  all  would  not  have 
brought  about  the  awful  shipwreck  of  Russia! 

I  have  heard  that  the  diplomatic  mistakes  committed 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  with  regard  to  Turkey 
and  to  Bulgaria  were  due,  amongst  other  causes,  to  the 
false  direction  of  English  diplomacy,  which  would  not 
perceive  the  danger  and  thought  it  possible  to  make  use 
of  evasions  and  mildness  there  where,  on  the  contrary,  a 
display  of  strength  and  decision  were  imperative.  As 
regards  Constantinople  I  have  no  grounds  for  believing 
or  disbelieving  these  assertions  ;  with  regard  to  Bulgaria 
I  personally  should  be  inclined  to  doubt  if  the  British 
Government  was  well  and  fully  informed  at  this  period 
of  the  political  situation  of  Bulgaria  and  of  the  true 
disposition  of  King  Ferdinand  and  his  people. 

On  Sunday,  the  2ndi  August,  I  was  awakened  at  seven 
o'clock  in  the  morning  to  read  the  telegrams  which  had 


304  THE   TRAGIC   WEEK         [ciiap.xvii. 

been  received  during  the  night.  The  first  one  1  opened 
was  a  telegram  in  which  M.  Sazonoff  informed  me  that 
the  evening  before,  at  seven  o'clock,  the  Ambassador  of 
William  II.  had  handed  him  Germany's  declaration  of  war. 

In  reading  this  awful  news  I  was  seized  with  in- 
describable anguish  ;  it  was  as  if  a  whirlwind  of  sinister 
visions  had  encircled  me ;  at  this  moment  I  had  absolutely 
clear  presentiments  of  the  troubles  which  were  to  over- 
take my  country,  my  relations.  ...  I  dashed  into  my 
wife's  room.  "  War  has  been  declared  ! "  I  exclaimed, 
bursting  into  tears.  .  .  . 

My  wife  immediately  helped  me  to  regain  my  self- 
control  by  saying:  "Stockholm  at  this  moment  is  one 
of  the  most  important  diplomatic  posts  for  Russia.  If 
the  Minister  occupying  this  post  gives  way  to  nerves, 
the  worst  may  happen.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  from 
the  very  first  to  keep  a  firm  hand  on  oneself  and  do 
one's  duty ! " 

I  choked  back  my  sobs  and  left  the  room.  "The  cup 
is  full,  we  must  drain  it  even  to  the  dregs  if  necessary." 
This  saying  gave  me  back  my  courage  and  powers  of 
action. 

Having  finished  dressing  I  went  to  the  office  at  the 
Legation  where  a  whole  crowd  of  fellow  countrymen — 
the  first  who  had  escaped  from  Germany— were  awaiting 
me. 

"  Gentlemen,"  I  said,  "  I  have  just  received  official 
information  that  last  night  a  declaration  of  war  was 
handed  to  our  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  by  the 
German  Ambassador.  Gentlemen,  Hurrah  for  Russia 
—and  for  H.I.M.  the  Emperor!" 

An  indistinct  murmur  greeted  this  little  speech.  A 
gentleman  with  a  red  beard  and  a  hooked  nose  then 
spoke  with  a  marked  Russian  accent :  "  Yes,  that  is  all 
very  well.  Monsieur,  Hurrah  for  Russia  and  the  Emperor; 
but  first  and  foremost  you  must  concern  yourself  with 
our  unhappy  position.  We  have  just  arrived  from 
Germany;  how  and  by  what  route  can  we  return  to 
our  own  country?"  etc. 


I9I4]  DECLARATION   OF   WAR  305 

"Always  the  same,  my  dear  compatriots,"  1  thought, 
with  a  bitter  feeling  of  the  reality  of  things ;  and  this 
feeling  restored  all  my  self-control  to  me.  It  was 
necessary  to  cope  with  the  most  urgent  matters  and 
leave  the  rest  to  the  will  of  God. 

Absorbing  work  for  every  day  and  all  hours  had 
begun  for  me  and  for  my  colleagues  gathered  round 
me  at  this  moment  in  the  office  of  the  Legation.  We 
strove  to  do  this  work  to  the  best  of  our  strength  and 
of  our  ability,  and  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  express  here 
the  gratitude  I  owe  to  all  those  splendid  and  faithful 
colleagues  who  up  to  the  end  did  their  whole  duty  and 
more  than  their  duty,  and  whose  friendship  and  advice 
sustained  me  during  three  long  years  of  labours,  trials, 
miseries  and  joys  shared  as  if  we  had  but  one  heart  and 
one  thought  only ! 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

SWEDISH   NEUTRALITY 

The  first  question— the  agonising  question  of  all  ques- 
tions for  me — was  that  of  the  side  Sweden  was  going 
to  take.  Would  she  remain  neutral  ?  Would  she  side 
definitely  with  Germany  as  Herr  von  Reichenau  an- 
nounced to  any  who  wished  to  listen  ? 

I  knew  which  were  the  elements  in  the  country  that 
advocated  an  active  and  immediate  alliance  with  Berlin. 
There  were,  first,  the  generals  and  the  officers  of 
the  Swedish  Army,  taken  principally  from  the  ranks 
of  the  nobility,  who  were  convinced  of  the  crushing 
superiority  of  the  German  forces  and  of  their  certain 
victory,  and  animated  by  old  grudges  against  Russia 
and  the  hope  of  at  least  taking  Finland  from  us.  Then 
there  were  the  nobility,  the  great  number  of  Lutheran 
clergy  (there  is  no  other  in  Sweden),  and  many  members 
of  the  universities. 

The  partisans  of  neutrality  were  the  Liberals,  who 
were  no  longer  in  power  and  who  were  retiring  some- 
what defeated  though  they  still  had  a  strong  position  in 
the  country,  and  the  Socialists  led  by  M.  Branting  and 
the  Baron  de  Palmstjerna.  I  knew  through  reliable 
sources  that  amongst  the  Swedish  lower  classes,  the 
people  were  averse  to  the  very  idea  of  war;  but  I  also 
knew  that  if  war  did  break  out  all  the  same  the  soldiers 
would  fight  splendidly  and  that  the  entire  population 
would  be  ready  for  any  sacrifice  for  the  good  of  the 
country. 

The  very  next  day  I  saw  M.  Wallenberg,  who 
informed    me     in     carefully    chosen    words    that     the 

306 


I9I4]         AUDIENCE  OF   KING  GUSTAF  307 

Government  hoped  to  safeguard  the  principle  of  Swedish 
neutrality. 

The  very  day  of  our  new  military  attache's  arrival, 
that  is  to  say  on  Friday,  the  31st,  I  had  taken  the 
necessary  steps  to  obtain  permission  to  present  him 
to  His  Majesty  the  King.  I  waited  an  answer  on  the 
subject  with  an  impatience  that  increased  as  events 
developed.  If  the  King  received  us,  it  would  be  a  good 
sign ;  if  he  refused  the  audience  one  would  be  jus- 
tified in  deducing  the  worst  auguries.  Finally,  on  the 
Monday,  towards  evening,  I  was  informed  that  we 
were  both  to  be  received  the  next  day,  Tuesday,  at 
eleven  o'clock. 

At  the  appointed  hour  we  were  shown  into  a  drawing- 
room  adjoining  the  King's  study ;  our  reception  was 
frigid,  the  King  hardly  spoke  to  Colonel  Kandauroif 
(the  Assanovitch  incident  was  of  too  recent  date  ! ).  But 
after  this  brief  interview  His  Majesty  begged  me  to 
follow  him  alone  into  the  next  room,  and  there — ^just  as 
on  the  day  of  my  solemn  audience — the  King's  manner 
changed  completely.  Inviting  me  to  sit  down  and  with- 
out hiding  the  deep  emotion  that  the  events  which  he 
described  as  "terrible"  were  causing  him,  he  said,  laying 
stress  on  each  of  his  words :  "  I  wished  to  see  you, 
Monsieur,  to  tell  you  that  Sweden  is  not  bound  to  any  one''' 
The  King  then  repeated  what  his  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  had  said  to  me  the  day  before,  that  is  to  say 
that  the  Swedish  Government  wished  to  maintain 
absolute  neutrality;  "provided,"  added  His  Majesty, 
"that  the  belligerent  countries  enable  us  to  carry  out 
this  resolution."  I  hastened  to  reply  that  as  to  Russia 
and  her  ally  (Great  Britain  had  not  yet  declared  her- 
self), Sweden  could  be  quite  sure  of  our  perfect  correct- 
ness with  regard  to  her  and  of  our  desire  to  facilitate 
her  neutrality.  On  that  I  was  very  amiably  dismissed. 
The  interview  had  only  lasted  a  few  minutes,  but  I  left 
the  King's  study  with  one  terrible  worry  the  less. 

Two  days  later  England  had  joined  the  ranks  of  the 

X 


308  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [ceiap.  xviii. 

Allies  and  from  now  onwards  I  had  the  opportunity  of 
working  in  concert  with  Mr.  Howard,  and  we  communi- 
cated to  each  other  everything  we  heard.  On  the  initiative 
of  the  French  and  British  Ministers  their  two  Govern- 
ments, from  the  first  days  of  the  war,  made  a  declaration 
to  the  Swedish  Government  to  the  effect  that  the  two 
Powers  guaranteed  Sweden's  integrity  and  her  complete 
sovereignty   on    condition   that   she   maintained    strict 
neutrality.     When  M.  Thiebaud  and  Mr.  Howard  trans- 
mitted  this   declaration   to   M.   Wallenberg,  the   latter 
thanked  them  warmly  and  added  :    "  Ah !    if  only    the 
Russian  Minister  would  bring  me  an  identical  declara- 
tion,   how  it  would    facilitate    my    task   at   the   King's 
Councils ! "     I  had  not  waited  for  this  allusion  to  take 
the  same  step   with   regard   to   St.   Petersburg   as   my 
colleagues  had  taken  in  Paris  and  London,   and  I  was 
awaiting  the  answer  somewhat  anxiously;  this  answer 
was    delayed,    and    the    activist    agitation    was    again 
becoming   more   acute  in  Stockholm,   and   all   sorts   of 
alarming  rumours  were  beginning  to  circulate.     At  last 
I  received  the  much-wished-for  answer  from  M.  Sazonoff : 
"You   are   authorised   to   make  a  declaration   identical 
with  that  of  the  Allied  Governments."     However,  next 
morning    another    telegram    from    the    Foreigh   Office 
begged  me  to  defer  the  declaration  a  little.     The  same 
day  my  two  colleagues  came  to  warn  me  that  the  absence 
of  the   Russian  declaration   was   greatly  agitating  the 
Swedish    Government   and    furnishing    arguments    to 
the  partisans  of  the  German  alliance.     "  I  felt  sure  of  it, 
and   I   have   already   sent   an   earnest   telegram   to   St. 
Petersburg  to  show  the  absolute  necessity  and  urgency 
for  our  declaration." 

I  realised  that  it  was  a  decisive  moment  and  that 
all  further  delay  might  have  disagreeable  consequences. 
Fortunately,  that  night  a  telegram  arrived  from  the 
Foreign  Office  authorising  me  afresh  to  make  the 
declaration.  For  fear  of  a  new  counter-order  I  hastened 
the  first  thing  in  the  morning,  to  beg  for  an  interview 
with  M.  Wallenberg,  and  I  handed  him  the  communication 


I9I4]  RUSSIAN  ASSURANCES  309 

he  so  impatiently  awaited.  The  Swedish  Foreign 
Secretary  did  not  conceal  his  intense  satisfaction : 
"  What  you  are  bringing  me  will,  I  hope,  definitely 
assure  the  neutrality  of  Sweden,  for  the  Russian  declara- 
tion will  reassure  many  amongst  us  as  to  your  supposed 
intentions."  Almost  immediately  afterwards  the  declara- 
tion of  the  absolute  neutrality  of  Sweden  did  appear, 
and  this  contributed  considerably  to  the  calming  of 
public  opinion. 

From  that  moment  there  were  two  absolutely  distinct 
currents  in  Sweden :  the  King,  the  Government  and  the 
majority  of  the  country  adhered  to  the  opinion  that 
Sweden,  as  far  as  possible,  ought  to  safeguard  her 
neutrality;  the  other  current,  that  of  the  activists,  on 
the  contrary,  at  every  favourable  opportunity,  upheld 
the  idea  of  an  alliance  with  Germany,  or  at  least  of  the 
expediency  of  using  firm  and  even  threatening  language 
to  Russia  and  her  allies  every  time  that  these  Powers 
should  be  tempted  to  restrict  or  injure  Sweden's  interests 
in  any  way. 

Thanks  to  King  Gustaf  V.'s  sincere  love  of  peace, 
to  the  intelligent  and  firm  policy  of  M.  Wallenberg,  and 
above  all,  to  the  perfect  integrity  displayed  under  all 
circumstances  by  the  Sovereign  and  his  Minister,  the 
first  current,  that  of  neutrality,  definitely  prevailed. 
It  is  only  now,  when  the  long  and  terrible  struggle  is 
ended,  that  one  can  appreciate  the  wise  and  loyal 
conduct  of  these  two  worthy  men  at  its  true  value  ;  and 
it  is  only  fair  to  add  a  third  name  to  theirs,  that  of  the 
leader  of  the  Swedish  Socialists,  M.  Branting.  Through- 
out the  course  of  events,  the  latter  behaved  as  a  Swedish 
patriot  rather  than  as  the  head  of  an  extreme  party,  and 
by  this  attitude  did  far  more  both  for  the  cause  of  peace 
and  for  his  own  authority  and  that  of  Swedish  Socialism 
than  if  he  had  wished  to  profit  by  circumstances  to 
extract  concessions  and  capitulations  from  the  Govern- 
ment. 

When  I  say  that  it  is  only  now  that  one  can  appreciate 


310  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [chap,  xviii. 

the  services  rendered  by  the  heads  of  the  neutrality- 
party,  I  am  of  opinion  that  it  was  not  at  all  the  assurance 
of  the  ultimate  victory  of  the  Entente  which  had 
inspired  them.  On  the  contrary,  every  one  in  Sweden, 
without  exception,  sincerely  believed  that  Germany  on 
the  whole  was  invincible.  At  the  end  of  the  first  eight 
months  of  the  struggle,  towards  March,  191 5,  when  in 
the  Entente  countries  they  began  to  calculate  the 
exhaustion  of  Germany  and  her  allies  in  soldiers, 
munitions,  and  especially  in  provisions,  the  Swedes  who 
were  the  most  friendly  to  the  Entente  (I  should  say 
rather  to  France  and  England,  for  the  prejudice  against 
Russia  still  continued)  contested  our  optimism  and 
never  ceased  saying  that  Germany  was  in  no  way  at  the 
end  of  her  tether,  that  she  would  manage  the  re-victual- 
ling in  some  way  or  other,  that  enormous  new  contingents 
would  be  called  up,  and  that  the  German  war  industry 
had  not  yet  given  its  all  and  was  reserving  many 
surprises  for  its  foes.  All  this  was  perfectly  true,  and 
the  ill-omened  year  191 5,  when,  in  spite  of  Italy's 
entry  into  the  war,  disaster  nearly  overtook  the 
arms  of  the  Entente,  proved  that  people  in  Sweden 
were  better  informed  than  we  were  about  German  re- 
sources. 

Hence,  then,  it  was  not  utilitarian  calculation  which 
guided  the  policy  of  the  guardians  of  Swedish  neutrality, 
but  rather  the  sincere  love  of  peace  and  the  feeling  of 
responsibility  towards  the  people  and  the  country.  The 
Swedes  have  been  quite  enough  disparaged  during  the 
war  not  to  do  justice  to  those  among  their  rulers  who 
were  so  well  able  to  hold  their  own  against  the  intentions 
and  the  allurements  of  the  agitating  section  of  the 
country. 

While  during  the  very  first  days  of  the  war  Sweden's 
attitude  was  becoming  clearer,  the  European  conflict 
was  assuming  a  definite  character  by  Great  Britain's 
entry  into  the  war.  I  remember  with  what  anxiety  we 
awaited  the  English  decision  during  these  same  early 


I9I4]  ENGLAND'S   DECISION  311 

days.  For  many  people  this  decision  appeared  to  be 
already  unquestionable  :  the  English  ought  to  side  with 
France  and  Russia.  But  I  did  not  share  this  assur- 
ance. I  remembered  the  political  conflict  caused  between 
Russia  and  the  Central  Empires  by  the  annexation  of 
Bosnia.  At  that  time  I  often  met  in  Paris  my  London 
colleague,  M.  Poklewski-Kozell,  a  man  as  intelligent  as 
he  was  sincere,  who  had  made  for  himself  an  exceptional 
position  in  the  London  world,  and  who  thoroughly 
understood  English  political  mentality.  I  asked  him 
once — it  was  in  February,  1909 — why  England  did  not 
earnestly  warn  Germany  that  if  her  provocative  policy 
led  to  a  conflict  with  Russia,  the  English  would  place 
themselves  resolutely  on  our  side  and  on  that  of 
France;  such  a  warning,  I  considered,  would  certainly 
moderate  the  claims  and  the  actions  of  Berlin.  M. 
Poklewski  replied  that  in  order  to  issue  such  a  warning, 
the  British  Government  would  have  to  look  on  the 
question  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  (without  the  con- 
sent of  a  European  Conference)  as  a  possible  casus  belli. 
Now  this  was  not  at  all  the  case  ;  the  Asquith-Grey 
Government  ivoitld  only  decide  on  war  if  Germany  touched 
one  of  the  primordial  principles,  of  which  the  infringement 
would  be  intolerable  to  England.  Remembering  these 
words,  which  were  completely  confirmed  by  subsequent 
events,  I  did  not  feel  at  all  sure  of  the  entry  of  the 
English  into  the  war  up  till  the  day  when  the  Germans 
invaded  Belgium  ;  on  that  day  I  said  to  myself  that 
Belgian  neutrality  being  undoubtedly  one  of  the  great 
principles  which  England  would  never  allow  to  be 
touched,  the  English  alliance  was  henceforth  assured  to 
us ;  and  in  fact  we  did  not  have  to  wait  one  day  for  it. 
This  was  an  enormous  relief  to  me  ;  without  the  co-opera- 
tion of  Great  Britain  I  felt  sure  of  our  defeat;  with  it, 
one  could  hope  for  much.  Alas !  I  was  still  too 
optimistic !  It  is  true  that  I  had  assessed  the  forces  and 
the  moral  of  Russia  far  too  low;  but  on  the  other 
hand,  like  most  people  in  Europe,  I  was  far  from  realis- 
ing the    magnitude   of   Germany's    resources   and  her 


312  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [chap.  xvni. 

mathematically-correct  preparation  for  the  terrible 
world-war  which  all  Germans  were  expecting,  and  most 
of  them  were  wishing  for. 

I  remember  the  effect  produced  during  the  first  days 
of  the  struggle  by  the  noble  resolution  of  Belgium  and 
her  King ;  by  the  first  encounters  between  the  Belgian 
Army  and  the  invaders,  by  the  short  but  sanguinary 
and  glorious  resistance  of  Liege.  One  talked  then  of 
the  ten,  or  perhaps  twenty,  thousand  men  that  the 
Germans  lost  during  these  first  fights,  and  said  that 
they  could  not  continue  to  sacrifice  so  many  men  daily  ; 
that  they  would  exhaust  themselves  quickly  at  that  rate. 
If  at  that  moment  any  one  had  foretold  that  eighteen 
months  later  the  Germans  would  still  be  in  a  position  to 
lose  300,000  men  in  a  fortnight,  in  not  taking  Verdun^  and 
that  this  terrible  reverse  would  not  even  constitute  a 
definite  defeat  for  them ;  that  war  would  continue  after 
that  for  another  thirty-three  months  without  decreasing 
for  an  instant  in  intensity  and  horror ;  if,  as  I  say,  some 
one  had  foretold  such  things  in  August,  1914,  he  would 
have  been  accused  of  insanity.  Every  one  felt  sure  that 
the  war  could  not  last  more  than  a  year  and  a  half,  and 
that  because  none  of  the  belligerents— except  perhaps 
Russia — could  bear  such  protracted  tension  of  efforts, 
such  terrible  cost,  and  such  complete  disturbance  of  all 
economic  and  social  life.  Yet  all  the  belligerents — 
except  just  Russia — have  borne  these  awful  conditions 
for  four  years  and  four  months. 

I  must,  however,  admit  that  during  the  first  two  or 
even  three  weeks,  I  had  no  time  to  consider  the  events 
of  the  war  either  as  a  whole  or  in  detail.  I  was  too 
much  absorbed  by  the  crushing  task  which  had  fallen 
to  the  Russian  Legation  in  Stockholm  in  connection 
with  the  enormous  numbers  of  compatriots  of  all  con- 
ditions who,  fleeing  from  Germany,  passed  through  the 
Scandinavian  countries  in  these  days  to  get  back  to 
their  homes.  I  have  already  related  how  from  the 
morning  of  Sunday,  2nd  August,   I  had  found  myself 


1914]  RUSSIAN   REFUGEES  313 

faced  with  the  first  group  of  these  refugees  at  the  office 
in  the  Legation.  From  that  moment  the  stream  of 
Russian  refugees  increased  day  by  day  and  hour  by 
hour.  I  should  never  have  thought  that  the  number  of 
Russians  who  went  to  take  waters  in  Germany  every 
summer  was  so  large;  moreover,  nine-tenths  of  these 
compatriots  were  Israelites.  All  these  people,  suddenly 
hustled  and  ill-treated  by  the  Germans,  herded  into 
cattle  trucks,  arrived  after  much  discomfort  at  Sassnitz 
(in  Pomerania),  and  thence  crossed  in  ferry-boats  to 
Malmo,  and  finally  reached  Stockholm.  They  were  a 
famished,  dirty  crowd,  with  no  money,  many  of  them 
without  passports,  which  the  German  militaryauthorities 
had  taken  from  them^ — a  crowd  seized  with  panic,  not 
feeling  safe  even  in  Sweden,  so  firmly  had  they  been 
told  that  Sweden  also  was  going  to  declare  war  on  us. 
Every  train  coming  from  Malmo  brought  a  fresh  lot  of 
refugees,  who  wandered  aimlessly  along  the  streets  of 
Stockholm.  They  had  all  to  be  lodged,  directed  towards 
the  Russian  frontier,  and  supplied  with  passports  and 
money  to  buy  food  on  the  way. 

The  Legation  and  the  Russian  Consulate-General 
had  no  funds  at  their  disposition.  I  managed,  not  with- 
out difficulty,  to  get  into  the  bank  where  I  had  some 
credit,  and  where  the}'^  paid  out  to  me  all  the  money  I 
had  there — a  few  thousand  crowns.  The  next  day  I  saw 
M.  Emmanuel  Nobel  arriving ;  he  was  the  head  of  the 
house  so  well  known  to  us  and  to  the  whole  world. 
This  excellent  man  immediately  placed  a  loan  of  50,000 
crowns  at  my  disposal,  and  advised  me  to  apply  for 
the  remainder  straight  to  M.  Wallenberg.  In  a  quarter 
of  an  hour's  interview  with  the  latter  the  necessary 
arrangements  were  made :  the  Swedish  Government 
gave  orders  to  supply  the  Russian  Legation  and  the 
Consulate  with  as  many  railway  and  steamer  tickets 
as  they  required.  At  the  railway  stations  Russian 
travellers  were  to  receive  food,  milk  for  the   children, 

*  Probably  to  furnish  some  for  the  German  spies  who  were  going  to 
Russia. 


314  SWEDISH   NEUTRALITY     [chap,  xviii. 

medical  attention  if  necessary;  in  Stockholm  itself  a 
public  building  was  to  be  fitted  up  for  lodging  the 
refugees  that  the  trains  and  steamers  could  not  convey 
away  at  once.  The  Russian  Government  was  to  repay 
Sweden  the  expenses  of  this  organisation ;  of  course  I 
pledged  myself  to  this ;  but  I  was  not  asked  for  any 
written  or  signed  note  on  the  subject;  the  word  of  the 
Russian  Minister  was  sufficient.  This  organisation 
worked  regularly  throughout  the  war,  and  we  had 
nothing  but  praise  for  the  attentions  that  the  Swedish 
local  authorities  and  the  railway  companies  lavished  on 
our  compatriots. 

All  the  same,  during  many  weeks  the  Legation  and 
Consulate  were  besieged  by  the  Russian  refugees.  The 
Consulate  had  to  issue  tickets,  and  to  give  permits  to 
those  who  had  no  passports.  The  first  days  the  confusion 
was  terrible.  The  street  in  which  the  Consulate  stood 
was  black  with  people,  and  the  Swedish  police  had  great 
difficulty  in  keeping  order.  Another  crowd,  though 
rather  less  dense,  besieged  the  Legation,  composed  of 
those  who  came  to  appeal  against  the  decisions  of  the 
Consul,  those  who  thought  themselves  entitled  to  ex- 
ceptional treatment  or  some  favour,  all  official  persons, 
all  those  with  whom  we  were  personally  acquainted. 
In  the  office  the  two  secretaries  to  the  Legation  ex- 
plained to  all  inquirers  the  route  they  ought  to  take, 
re-assured  them  about  Sweden's  entry  into  the  war, 
met  or  set  aside  their  complaints  and  their  claims. 
Meantime,  through  the  other  entrance  in  the  house  a 
stream  of  ladies  and  gentlemen,  of  friends,  acquaintances, 
of  people  we  knew  slightly  or  not  at  all,  filled  our  rooms 
and  were  received  by  my  wife,  my  sister,  and  my 
youngest  son.  There  were  complaints,  tears,  nervous 
attacks  even.  Every  one  had  arrived  in  a  lamentable 
state,  most  of  them  straight  from  the  train,  and  almost 
mad  with  fright.  There  were  some  tragico-comic 
situations.  One  fine  day  the  firing  of  guns  was  heard 
at  noon  (this  often  occurs  in  Stockholm  :  saluting  the 
colours,  or  at   festivals,  etc.).     At   once  the  visitors  in 


I9I4]  NOTABLE   REFUGEES  315 

the  drawing-room,  the  inquirers  at  the  office,  and  the 
crowd  gathered  in  front  of  the  Consulate,  were  all 
seized  with  panic.  "The  Germans!  The  Germans! 
The  Germans  are  coming  to  bombard  us!"  It  was 
almost  impossible  to  make  these  insanely  frightened 
people  listen  to  reason. 

As  I  have  said,  a  good  half  of  the  society  world  of 
St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow  whom  we  knew  came  to  the 
Legation.  Every  day  we  were  from  sixteen  to  twenty 
people  at  lunch  and  dinner.  On  day  it  was  Colonel 
Skoropadsky,  of  the  Horse  Guards,  who  was  hastening 
to  rejoin  his  regiment ;  who  would  have  guessed  in  this 
smart  and  correct  soldier  whom  we  had  so  often  met  in 
the  salons  of  St.  Petersburg,  the  future  "  Hetman  of 
the  Ukraine,"  going  to  ask  for  his  investiture  of  the 
Emperor  William  ?  At  the  same  time  we  also  saw 
seated  at  our  table  Prince  Nicolas  Radziwill,  one  of 
the  very  best,  whom  I  had  seen  the  year  before 
returning  from  the  disastrous  but  magnificent  retreat 
of  the  Bulgarian  troops  beaten  at  Belachitza,  and 
many  other  officers  of  the  Guard ;  a  few  months  later 
we  heard  of  the  glorious  death  of  most  of  these  young 
men. 

The  Minister  for  Education,  M.  Casso,  arrived  one 
evening  in  a  piteous  state  ;  he  had  nearly  been  lynched 
by  the  crowd  at  a  station  in  East  Prussia,  and  only 
owed  his  escape  to  a  concurrence  of  providential  cir- 
cumstances. We  made  him  sit  down  at  once,  and  gave 
him  a  plate  of  good  soup.  "The  first  soup  I  have  eaten 
for  ten  days  ! "  We  poured  him  out  some  good  claret. 
"  The  first  glass  of  claret  I  have  drunk  for  ten  days  !  " 
And  then,  comforted  and  consoled,  he  proceeded  to 
relate  his  tragic  experiences  with  irrepressible  humour. 
"  There  was  an  old  hump-backed  woman  that  I  shall 
never  forget ;  the  whole  time  she  was  worrying  the 
crowd  who  were  dragging  me  away  from  the  police  and 
hitting  me  with  their  fists.  '  Hang  him,  hang  him,' 
cried  the  old  witch;  'he's  a  Russian  spy!'     And  then 


3i6  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [chap.xvui. 

the  final  stafio  dolorosa  :  we  were  about  two  hundred 
Russians  of  both  sexes  and  all  classes,  surrounded  by 
soldiers  with  fixed  bayonets  ;  we  had  been  standing  for 
more  than  two  hours,  dropping  with  fatigue,  in  front  of 
our  wretched  trunks  open  in  order  to  undergo  a  tenth 
search.  Suddenly  an  old  non-commissioned  officer  of  the 
Laticisttirin,  fat  and  jovial,  appeared  and  began  to  make 
us  a  speech,  or  rather  preach  us  a  sermon  :  '  We  Germans 
are  a  good-natured  people  {ein  guimi'ithigcs  Volk) ; 
nevertheless  you  must  not  abuse  our  good-nature,'  and 
so  on,  and  so  on.  But  all  the  eloquence  of  this  worthy 
man  was  wasted ;  we  had  become  completely  insensible 
even  to  the  proof  of  the  good  nature  of  the  German 
people!" 

Poor  Casso  died  of  cancer  a  few  months  later.  He 
was  a  very  highly-educated  man  and  full  of  spirits  in 
private  life ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  universally 
disparaged  as  a  Minister. 

Then  the  staff  from  our  Embassy  in  Berlin  arrived 
after  a  halt  of  a  few  days  in  Copenhagen.  It  was 
grievous  to  see  poor  M.  Sverbeieff.  He  could  not  sleep, 
he  had  to  force  himself  to  eat.  "  And  yet  they  had 
always  been  so  good,  so  kind  to  me  during  the  whole  of 
my  time  in  Berlin  !  "  he  repeated  over  and  over  again. 
"  But  the  last  days  were  a  nightmare,  an  absolute  night- 
mare !  .  .  ."  Indeed,  recalled  hurriedly  from  a  delightful 
and  quiet  visit  to  the  country,  and  having  returned  to 
Berlin  just  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  upheaval  of  the 
last  days  before  the  declaration  of  v/ar,  he  must  have 
gone  through  a  terrible  time,  feeling  his  powerlessness 
to  avert  the  inevitable  !  The  day  after  the  arrival  of  the 
staff  from  the  Embassy,  on  going  into  our  office  I  noticed 
an  enormous  fire  burning  in  the  fireplace;  it  was  the 
Berlin  ciphers  that  were  being  burnt.  It  was  of  no 
importance,  but  I  remember  the  painful  impression  it 
made  on  me. 

The  members  of  the  Embassy  told  us  of  the  disgust- 
ing treatment  they  were  subjected  to — men,  women,  and 


I9I3]       TALES  OF  GERMAN    BRUTALITY         317 

children  ^ — when  they  were  getting  into  motor  cars  to 
go  from  the  Embassy  to  the  station  ;  a  hostile  crowd 
that  the  police  could  not,  or  would  not,  control  shouted 
insults  at  them,  and  spat  in  their  faces.  "  You  do  not 
know  how  horrible  it  was  when  they  actually  spat  in 
my  face !  "  said  a  young  and  charming  woman  wath  a 
shudder.  But  they  did  not  confine  themselves  to  spit- 
ting; three  or  four  people,  of  whom  two  were  ladies, 
received  violent  blows  from  sticks,  of  which  they  still 
bore  the  marks  after  ten  days.  "  But  who  hit  j' ou  ?  Did 
you' notice  what  the  individual  looked  like?"  I  asked 
the  lady  who  had  been  the  most  ill-used.  "Oh  yes!  I 
did.  It  was  an  old  gentleman  with  a  white  beard  and 
gold-rimmed  spectacles,  long  black  coat  and  soft  hat,  the 
real  type  of  the  Herr  Professor  !  " 

However,  all  these  tales  paled  before  those  told  by 
the  wretched  Russians  who,  on  the  eve  of  the  declaration 
of  war,  had  started  off  in  the  direction  of  the  Russian 
frontier,  had  been  stopped  within  half  an  hour  of  the 
frontier,  forced  to  turn  back,  and  subjected  in  East  and 
West  Prussia,  and  in  Pomerania  to  the  most  odious, 
the  most  revolting  treatment  for  days  and  days.  Some 
poor  wretches  were  shut  up  for  fifty  hours  on  end  in 
goods-trucks,  without  food  or  drink,  and  without  being 
allowed  to  get  out  even  for  an  instant.  Some  wretched 
women  were  confined  without  any  assistance  in  the  pig- 
styes  of  the  municipal  slaughter-houses,  where  "diese 
Russischen  Schweine  "  were  herded  for  the  night.  And 
a  great  many  unfortunate  people  were  shot,  especially 
those  who  were  caught  with  kodaks  ! 

All  these  tales  bore  a  stereotyped  resemblance 
to  each  other.  And  among  those  who  told  them  were 
people  whom  one  could  not  disbelieve:  intellectuals, 
men  of  serious  and  well-balanced  minds,  people  of 
our  world,  and  among  others  many  travellers  belong- 
ing to  the  Baltic  Provinces.  I  can  quote:  my  old 
friend  the  worthy  general  Baron  Kaulbars,  his  wife 
*  Except  the  Ambassador,  whose  motor  car  was  accompanied  by  a 
strong  escort  of  cavalry. 


3i8  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [chap,  xviii. 

and  daughter,  a  Princess  Lieven,  Count  Constantine 
Pahlen  and  his  sister  Mademoiselle  Marie  de  Pahlen, 
etc.,  etc. 

When  in  view  of  these  tales  one  read  in  the  news- 
papers the  accounts  of  the  burning  and  the  massacre 
at  Louvain,  and  the  butchery  at  Kalisch,  one  under- 
stood what  German  war  methods  were,  and  what  the 
struggle  just  beginning  represented  for  the  civilised 
world. 

1  repeat,  up  till  then  I  had  had  no  sort  of  hatred  for 
Germany  ;  but  from  the  first  weeks  of  the  war  I  under- 
stood what  the  propaganda  of  Nietzsche,  Treitschke, 
Bernhardi,  had  made  of  the  German  people ;  and  in 
addition  I  realised  perfectly  that  this  terrible  collision 
could  not  end  in  a  peace  of  compromise ;  that  it  was  a 
fight  to  the  death,  and  that  the  worst  disasters  :  revolu- 
tion, complete  moral  and  political  decay,;would  inevitably 
be  the  portion  of  the  vanquished. 

This  feeling  did  but  increase  when  one  terrible  month 
succeeded  another.  The  cruelties  practised  in  Germany 
upon  our  prisoners  of  war,  the  ghastly  deeds  perpe- 
trated in  the  occupied  provinces  of  Belgium,  France, 
Poland,  Serbia,  the  awful  Armenian  massacres,  the  use 
of  poison  gas,  the  sinister  exploits  of  the  submarines 
had  all  come  to  complete  the  list — or  so  it  seemed  to  me 
then — of  the  crimes  of  the  abettors  of  the  "fresh  and 
joyful  war,"  and  to  fill  me  with  loathing  of  the  whole 
German  nation ! 

Alas !  I  could  not  foresee  that  the  list  was  not  com- 
plete. That  three  years  later  Royal  Highnesses,  Minis- 
ters, exalted  dignitaries,  and  the  heads  of  German  and 
Austrian  armies  would  sit  round  the  green  table  with 
anarchist  Jews,  criminal  sailors  and  prostitutes  in  order 
to  dismember  my  miserable  country  after  their  agents 
had  strangled  her — all  that  was  too  horrible  to  have  been 
even  imagined  ! 

But  let  us  return  to  the  events  of  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  and  to  the  echoes  raised   by  these  events  in 


I9I4]  RUSSIAN   REVERSES  319 

Stockholm  amongst  the  Swedes  as  well  as  amongst  the 
foreigners. 

1  was  not  surprised  at  the  first  news  of  victories 
which  reached  us  from  East  Prussia.  I  knew  that  part 
of  the  Imperial  Guard  and  other  picked  troops  were  to 
attack  there  to  cover  our  necessarily  slow  mobilisation, 
and  to  free  France  a  little,  as  enormous  German  forces 
were  hurling  themselves  upon  her.  The  glorious  battles 
in  East  Prussia  cost  us  considerable  sacrifices.  The 
flower  of  the  "gilded  youth"  of  St.  Petersburg,  full  of 
undaunted  courage,  fell  there  to  prove  that  the  privileged 
and  petted  regiments  of  the  Guard  could  sacrifice  them- 
selves as  much  and  better  than  any  other.  Each  day 
news  reached  us  of  the  glorious  death  of  young  men 
we  had  known,  whom  we  had  witnessed  leading  a 
worldly  and  careless  life  midst  pleasures  and  palaces 
in  the  capital.  But  I  fully  realised  that  these  battles 
and  these  victories  were  but  the  beginning  of  the 
"dance." 

Indeed,  very  soon  after  terrible  news  reached  us  from 
East  Prussia.  General  Samsonoff's  army,  sent  to  sup- 
port and  complete  the  operations  of  General  Rennen- 
kampfs,  had  been  completely  beaten,  annihilated  by 
General  Hindenburg.  Nearly  80,000  men  had  perished, 
the  others  had  surrendered  in  a  mass  with  all  their 
artillery  and  supplies.  It  was  all  very  well  to  minimise 
the  extent  of  the  disaster  in  our  official  bulletins,  I  could 
read  between  the  lines,  and  I  promptly  realised  the 
extent  of  this  terrible  defeat,  all  the  more  because,  since 
the  Manchuria  campaign,  every  one  agreed  in  describing 
General  Samsonoff  to  me  as  one  of  the  best  and  most  con- 
genial of  our  commanders.  Then  how  had  the  disaster 
come  about?  Was  it  through  the  flagrant  inferiority  of 
our  regiments,  our  men,  our  officers,  and  our  generals 
compared  with  the  German  Army  ?  Was  it  on  account 
of  the  mania  for  skilful  manoeuvres  by  which  the  heads 
of  our  General  Staff"  were  possessed,  and  which  inspired 
them  with  the  mad  hope  of  cutting  through,  of  sur- 
rounding their  German  foes  by  their  grand  strategical 


320  SWEDISH   NEUTRALITY     [chap,  xviii. 

manceuvres  just  when  a  far  simpler  and  more  rudimen- 
tary conception  of  the  war  would  have  been  so  infinitely 
more  suitable  to  the  imperfect  mechanism  of  the  Russian 
armies  ? 

I  well  remember  the  painful  days  that  followed  this 
sad  episode  in  our  war.  I  had  to  put  a  good  face  on  the 
matter,  not  appear  to  be  downhearted,  to  distribute  the 
official  lies  knowing  them  to  be  such,  and  express  hopes 
I  was  far  from  sharing. 

Almost  at  the  same  time  sad  and  alarming  news 
reached  us  from  the  western  front.  In  spite  of  their 
valiant  efforts,  their  stubborn  resistance,  the  French 
Army,  the  remnants  of  the  brave  Belgian  Army  and  the 
"contemptible  little  Army"  of  the  British— a  handful 
of  heroes — were  steadily  retreating  before  the  for- 
midable advance  of  the  German  armies.  Charleroi, 
Maubeuge,  Arras,  the  German  outposts  extending  as 
far  as  Meaux  ...  to  those  of  us  who  still  remembered 
1870,  memories  rose  involuntarily  before  us,  in  spite  of 
the  difference  that  we  knew  existed  between  war  then 
and  now. 

Fortunately  a  few  days  later  quite  different  news 
arrived  to  give  us  fresh  courage :  "  the  Germans  have 
been  stopped,  the  Germans  are  beginning  to  retreat" ;  a 
few  more  days  of  great  manoeuvres  and  of  violent  fight- 
ing in  North- Western  France  and  the  invading  stream  is 
checked ;  the  line  from  the  Yser  to  Belfort  is  definitely 
established  and  the  interminable  trench-warfare  begins. 
I  wish  to  mention  here  that  the  glorious  battles  of  the 
Marne,  the  grand  and  skilful  manoeuvre  of  Joffre  and  the 
bold  stroke  of  Gallieni  were  not  at  all  described  as  a  real 
and  great  victory  in  the  French  bulletins ;  it  was  only 
through  the  explanations  of  our  military  agent  that  I 
realised  the  extent  and  importance  of  the  splendid 
French  success. 

In  Sweden  this  success  even  passed  quite  unper- 
ceived,  or  else  was  vehemently  denied  ;  the  good  Swedes 
could  not  imagine  that  the  Germans  could  suffer  a 
defeat ;  the  invincibility  of  the  German  arms  had  passed 


i9t4]  GERMAN    PROPAGANDA  321 

into  a  proverb;  and  every  one  still  sincerely  pitied  "la 
belle  France  "  who  had  made  such  a  false  step  in  allow- 
ing herself  to  be  drawn  into  political  combinations 
directed  against  Germany. 

Another  article  of  faith  was  that  Germany  had  been 
attacked  by  the  Entente,  particularly  by  Russia,  who, 
however,  had  not  acted  spontaneously  but  had  been 
incited  thereto  by  "la  perfide  Albion."  Indeed,  if  Eng- 
land had  warned  Germany  in  time  that  she  would  ally 
herself  to  the  enemies  of  the  latter,  Germany  would  not 
have  declared  war  and  peace  would  have  been  secured  ; 
but  the  crafty  English  on  the  contrary  had  made  Berlin 
believe  that  they  would  remain  neutral,  and  as  soon  as 
Germany,  taken  in  by  this,  had  declared  war,  England  at 
once  went  over  to  the  enemies'  side  !  This  rigmarole,  of 
which  the  second  part  completely  contradicted  the 
first  (for  if  Germany  had  been  the  party  attacked  she 
would  have  had  to  defend  herself,  whatever  Great 
Britain's  attitude  had  been),  this  rigmarole,  I  say,  which 
the  Germans  themselves  only  pretended  to  believe,  was 
sincerely  and  religiously  believed  by  the  worthy  Swedish 
public ;  the  entire  Swedish  Press  agreed  about  it,  even 
that  portion  of  it  that  was  not  particularly  well-disposed 
towards  Germany.  As  to  the  German  crimes  against  the 
rights  of  men  and  of  war  and  against  the  most  elementary 
principles  of  humanity,  the  Swedes  simply  did  not  believe 
them;  the  thing  was  impossible;  these  were  calumnies 
invented  by  Germany's  foes  who,  unable  to  conquer  her 
by  might,  were  slandering  and  abusing  her  in  every 
possible  way ! 

This  tone  of  the  Swedish  Press  and  this  attitude  of 
Stockholm  society  deeply  annoyed  and  irritated  my 
colleagues  of  the  Entente  and  my  Russian  collaborators. 
I  was  much  less  affected  by  it  all.  When,  side  by  side 
with  these  insanities,  I  saw  the  Stockholm  public  rush- 
ing to  the  central  station  to  receive  the  Russian  refugees, 
distributing  money,  milk,  delicacies  to  the  women  and 
children ;  when  in  my  personal  relations  with  Swedish 
society  I  noticed  that  the   people   the  most  cordially 


322  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [chap.xviii. 

devoted  to  the  German  cause  carefully  avoided  in  my 
presence  the  slightest  allusion,  the  least  word  which 
might  have  hurt  my  patriotic  feelings,  1  said  to  myself 
that  the  sentiments  of  the  Swedish  nobility,  of  the 
officers  of  the  Guard  and  of  the  ecclesiastical  and  lay 
members  of  the  University  were  really  not  aggressive. 
Their  sentiments  were  based  on  deep  conviction ;  the 
Swedes  expressed  their  convictions  openly;  they  did 
so  ingenuously,  but  also  without  any  ulterior  motive, 
without  malice  and  without  displaying  any  impolite- 
ness. 

But  if  this  Germanophile  disposition  of  Swedish 
public  opinion  did  not  irritate  me  inordinately,  yet  it 
inspired  me  with  a  certain  amount  of  anxiety.  Such 
constant  propaganda  of  affection  for  Germany  might 
gradually  accustom  the  Swedish  public  to  the  idea  of 
an  active  alliance  ;  in  our  country  mistakes  might  be 
made  and  measures  taken  which  might  revive  old 
suspicions  and  former  grudges  in  Sweden ;  and  finally 
Germany,  emboldened  by  the  proofs  of  sympathy  she 
was  constantly  receiving  from  the  northern  side  of  the 
Baltic,  might  have  rushed  Swedish  decisions  and  had 
recourse  to  coercive  measures,  even  to  sending  troops, 
as  she,  felt  certain  that  the  Swedish  Army  would  never 
use  its  arms  against  the  German  brothers.  In  short, 
Swedish  activism  and  German  actions  and  intrigues  in 
Sweden  appeared  to  me  to  present  a  certain  amount  of 
danger  which  I  was  careful  not  to  exaggerate,  but  which 
it  would  not  do  to  lose  sight  of. 

Almost  as  soon  as  we  had  heard  of  the  result  of  the 
battle  of  the  Marne,  the  great  Russian  action  in  Galicia 
began ;  and  this  advance  of  our  finest  army  corps  ended 
in  complete  success  in  the  course  of  a  month.  The 
Austro-Hungarians,  who  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
had  begun  the  offensive  and  who  having  before  them 
nothing  but  a  weak  screen  of  Russian  troops,  acclaimed 
their  victories  and  their  advance  into  Poland  loudly, 
were   first  stopped   and  thrown   back  out  of  Russian 


I9I4]       RUSSIAN    ADVANCE    IN    GALICIA        323 

territory  and  then  finally  beaten  in  Galicia.     Mikolajow, 
Lemberg,  all  the  country  as  far  as  the  Carpathians  fell 
into  our  hands  after  fierce  fighting  in  which  at  first  our 
enemies  displayed  stubborn  resistance.    But  the  hour  of 
the  overthrow  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army  struck  at 
last,  while  we  were  pushing  our  victorious  offensive  up 
to  the  immediate  environs  of  Cracow,  whole  regiments 
of  Austrians — Jugo-Slavs,  Czechs  and  Slovaks  principally 
— were  beginning  to  surrender.     A  telegram  was  seized 
from   the  Austrian    General    Headquarters    entreating 
Berlin  to  send  German  troops  to  Galicia,  otherwise  the 
Austro-Hungarian   Army    ivas    threatened    zvith    complete 
disaster,     Alas!     At   that   very   moment   our   offensive 
had  to  be  stopped.     The  reason  was  quite  simple :  our 
railway  system  was  quite  inadequate  for  the  conveying 
of  sufficient  numbers  of  fresh  troops,  of  provisions  and 
especially  of  ammunition.     The  physical  strength  of  the 
Russian  fighting  army  was  decreasing  and  supplies  were 
failing,  while  German  reinforcements  were  arriving  on 
the  scene  in  Galicia.      The  same  thing  occurred,  and  for 
the   same   reason,  in   General   Brussiloff's  magnificent 
offensive  in  1916.    All  the  same  the  whole  of  Galicia, 
the  Bukowina  and  part  of  Austrian  Poland  were  occupied 
by   us,   the  fortified   place   Przemysl,  which   had   been 
invested,  ended   by  surrendering  in   191 5    and   already 
in  November,  1914,  the  Russian   troops  had  begun  the 
ascent  of  the  Carpathians. 

Meantime  fierce  battles  were  raging  in  Poland,  where 
we  succeeded  in  checking  the  Prussian  advance  and  in 
keeping  Warsaw. 

The  manifesto  of  the  Grand-Duke  Nicolas  solemnly 
promising  to  the  Poles  a  wide  autonomy  within  the 
compass  of  the  real  frontiers  of  their  nationality,  as  well 
in  Russia  as  in  Austria  and  Germany,  produced  the 
best  effect  on  us  Russians.  Very  few  people  criticised 
this  act ;  the  large  majority  of  Russian  intellectuals 
greeted  it  with  joy ;  they  were  surprised  rather  that  the 
manifesto  did  not  come  from  the  Emperor  himself,  and 

Y 


324  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY    [chap,  xviii. 

expressed  fears  that  the  reactionary  party  might  one 
day  profit  by  this  to  go  back  on  the  promises  made  to 
the  Poles. 

What  effect  did  the  manifesto  produce  on  the  Poles 
themselves?     I  was  told   that  one  of  the  great  Polish 

nobles,  Count  Joseph  P ,  had  replied  to  some  one  who 

questioned  him  as  to  his  personal  impressions :  "  Not 
for  one  moment  did  I  believe  in  it ;  but  in  reading  the 
manifesto  I  wept  copiously  all  the  same  !  "  It  seems  to 
me  that  this  impression  was  shared  by  the  majority  of 
the  Polish  people :  they  wished  to  believe,  they  were 
stirred  to  the  depths  of  their  souls,  but  on  the  whole 
they  did  not  believe  us  !  It  was  not  that  they  suspected 
us  of  conscious  and  intentional  imposture ;  but  they 
dreaded  the  eternal  weakness,  the  eternal  instability  of 
our  best,  our  noblest  resolutions. 

Personally — indeed  there  is  nothing  Polish  about  me 
— I  was  less  sceptical,  for  I  ivished  to  believe.  At  last,  I 
thought,  a  first  decisive  blow  seems  to  have  been  struck 
at  that  mass  of  violence,  iniquity,  lying  and  mutual  hatred 
that  dishonour  my  country,  her  history  and  her  public 
life  !  For  it  was  chiefly  from  the  Russian  point  of  view 
that  I  considered  the  question.  The  subjection  and  the 
partition  of  Poland  had,  during  a  hundred  and  forty 
years,  been  the  cause  of  much  private  suffering  and 
trouble,  but  taking  the  Polish  nation  as  a  whole  this 
subjection  and  even  this  odious  partition  had  been  more 
beneficial  than  pernicious.  In  the  eighteenth  century 
there  was  no  longer  any  real  Polish  nation,  no  real 
Polish  State  ;  Poland  at  that  time  represented  obsolete 
feudal  chaos,  involved  in  progressive  decay.  The  mis- 
fortunes of  the  country  revived  an  ardent  patriotism, 
created  national  cohesion  and  finally  caused  astonishing 
economic  progress  ;  moreover  Russian  power  had  never 
been  wielded  in  Poland  to  the  detriment  of  the  purely 
material  interests  of  the  people  ;  on  the  contrary  ;  and 
the  definite  liberation  of  the  Polish  serfs  and  the  giving 
them  land  were  the  work  of  the  rtgime  of  the  Tsars. 

But  for  Russia  herself  the  subjection  of  Poland  and 


1914]  THE  QUESTION   OF   POLAND  325 

the  cruelties  and  injustices  without  number  which  were 
committed  after  every  Polish  rising  were  a  source  of 
opprobrium^  discredit,  and  zveakness.  And  how  could  one 
speak  of  a  Slav  policy  when  ten  million  pure-bred  Slavs 
were  being  down-trodden?  At  last,  I  thought,  this 
monstrous  state  of  affairs  is  going  to  cease  ;  if  only  there 
is  not  too  much  wrangling  over  the  question  of  the 
"  national  frontiers,"  and  if  only  they  will  keep  to  what 
they  have  promised.  In  this  sense  I  was  myself  much 
inclined  to  go  far  further  than  the  famous  manifesto. 
I  could  not  help  realising  that  the  uniting  of  all  the 
divisions  of  Poland — however  extensive  her  autonomy 
might  be — under  the  sceptre  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
could  not  be  truly  and  honestly  accepted  by  Europe, 
even  by  our  most  faithful  allies.  It  would  push  forward 
still  more  the  frontiers  of  the  mighty  Empire  of  the  North 
into  the  frightened  body  of  Western  Europe ;  the  mere 
sight  of  the  new  map  of  Europe  would  arouse  fears 
and  ideas  of  a  solidarity  against  us  of  all  countries,  all 
nations,  even  of  those  who  were  now  fighting  each 
other  fiercely.  And  then  between  Poles  and  Russians 
there  would  always  exist  the  irritating  question  of 
national  demarcation,  and  the  still  more  irritating  and 
difficult  question  of  the  limits  of  the  autonomy.  In  short 
I  greeted  the  manifesto  of  the  Grand-Duke  Nicolas  as  a 
happy  beginning,  but  I  hoped  from  the  bottom  of  my 
heart  that  our  country  would  have  the  courage  and 
intelligence  to  go  on  to  the  end,  that  is  to  say  to  consent 
to  the  complete  independence  of  resurrected  Poland. 

The  end  of  the  year  1914  was  a  historic  and  crucial 
moment  for  the  fate  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire.  For 
several  weeks  we  were  led  to  believe  by  confused 
rumours  which  reached  us  from  the  bosom  of  this 
Empire  that  a  sensational  change  was  taking  place  in  the 
policy  of  Vienna.  Indeed,  if  the  Austrian  Empire  wished 
to  be  saved  this  was  the  only  moment  in  which  that  was 
possible.  To  make  peace  with  Russia  immediately,  to 
grant  to  the  Jugo-Slavs,  Czechs  and  Slovaks  absolutely 


0 


26  SWEDISH   NEUTRALITY    [chap,  xviii. 


the  same  rights  as  those  received  by  the  Hungarians  in 
1867;  to  grant  serious  national  guarantees  to  the 
Rumanians  of  Transylvania,  and  finally  to  give  up 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  favour  of  the  Serbians — this 
was  the  policy  which  would  have  infused  new  life  into 
the  decaying  monarchy  and  which  might  have  disclosed  to 
it  other  prospects  of  grandeur.  But  this  arrangement 
could  only  be  made  to  the  detriment  of  the  Magyars, 
from  whom  Croatia  and  the  Slovak  country  would  have 
been  taken,  and  whose  claims  in  Transylvania  would 
have  been  nullified.  Now  the  Magyars  were  ardent  and 
energetic,  whereas  the  Viennese  Court — whence  alone 
salvation  could  come — was  vacillating  and  devoid  of  all 
creative  genius  ;  as  to  the  supreme  power,  it  was  repre- 
sented by  a  poor,  helpless  old  man.  Under  the  circum- 
stances the  desperate  efforts  of  the  Magyars,  backed  up 
by  those  of  Berlin,  triumphed  over  the  tendencies  to 
wisdom  which  for  an  instant  had  been  apparent  in 
Vienna.  A  change  did  occur,  but  it  was  an  entirely 
different  one.  MM.  Tisza,  Weckerle  and  Burian — all 
Magyars  and  obsequious  servants  of  Germany — obtained 
unlimited  power  over  the  two  sections  of  the  Monarchy, 
and  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  were  put  under  the 
Prussian  General  Headquarters  Staff  and  almost  amal- 
gamated with  the  German  contingents.  Hence  the 
struggle  in  Galicia  was  to  begin  again,  and  to  be  more 
bitter  than  heretofore. 

I  have  often  wondered  whether  anything  was  done  at 
this  moment  on  our  side  to  help  the  sound  and  reasonable 
elements  in  Austria  in  the  plans  which  they  had  outlined 
for  a  moment  ?  Without  knowing  the  mysteries  of  the 
Foreign  Office  I  can  answer  a  priori:  "No."  Once  war 
had  been  declared  and  had  led  from  the  first  months  to 
startling  successes  on  the  Austrian  front,  that  to  us 
meant  the  complete  triumph  of  the  simplest  political 
principles  which  had  been  preached  for  such  a  longtime 
by  our  patriotic  Press,  by  our  so-called  Slavophiles, 
reactionary  as  well  as  Liberal,  and  by  the  General  Staff 
party.     Austria-Hungary  dismembered  and  replaced  by 


I9I4]        AIMS  OF   RUSSIAN   DIPLOMACY         327 

an  agglomeration  of  independent  States  which  would  be 
obliged  by  the  force  of  circumstances  to  form  a  con- 
federation, naturally  under  the  auspices  and  presidency 
of  Russia;  this  confederation  extending  from  the  Car- 
pathians to  Constantinople  and  from  Danzig  to  the 
Adriatic,  embracing  Orthodox  countries — because  Russia 
is  Orthodox;  Slav  countries — because  Russia  is  Slav; 
and  finally  Ithe  Hungarians — because  they  could  not 
exist  otherwise.  That  was  the  programme!  How 
would  the  immense,  complex  and  somewhat  amorphous 
Russian  Empire  carry  out  this  new  and  grand  political 
duty  ?  How  would  she  bear  the  displacement  of  her 
centre  of  gravity  towards  the  south-west?  How  would 
the  whole  of  Europe  view  a  state  of  affairs  which  would 
give  Russia  political  domination  over  the  largest  half  of 
the  European  continent  ?  Such  questions  did  not  exist 
for  our  politicians  in  editorial  offices,  in  ministerial 
smoking-rooms,  in  political  boudoirs  and  archbishops' 
salons.  "  We  have  defeated  perfidious  Austria,  we  will 
now  defeat  domineering  Germany,  and  our  good  allies 
will  only  be  too  pleased  at  our  final  and  complete 
triumph  ! " 

Formerly  Russian  diplomacy — so  much  disparaged 
— would  have  gone  against  these  chimerical  hopes  and 
these  dangerous  illusions ;  and  the  Court  would  have 
upheld  it — though  secretly — conscious  of  the  hidden 
shoals  and  the  dangers  of  so  great  an  extension  of 
frontiers  and  of  such  a  sudden  upheaval  of  the  whole 
European  system.  But  now  our  diplomacy  had  changed 
and  had  acquired  a  new  mentality.  Having  been  for 
some  years  in  quest  of  the  support  of  the  Press  and  of 
public  opinion,  it  would  never  have  opposed  the 
aspirations  of  that  opinion  and  that  Press ;  nor  would  it 
ever  have  proposed  or  conceived  such  an  unexpected 
and  original  solution  as  that  of  an  immediate  and 
complete  agreement  with  Austria-Hungary.  And  even 
if  it  had  conceived  and  proposed  it,  it  would  never  have 
succeeded  in  obtaining  the  sanction  of  the  Monarch  to 
such  a  proposition. 


328  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY     [chap,  xviii. 

Convinced  of  the  infallibility  of  all  the  political  ideas 
of  his  father,  brought  up  by  a  General  of  the  Staff  him- 
self imbued  with  the  current  Slavophile  ideas,  Nicolas  II. 
in  regard  to  his  foreign  policy  was  entirely  in  unison 
with  the  opinions  prevailing  in  the  intellectual  circles  in 
Russia.  He  was  too  conscious  of  the  dangers  of  war  and 
of  his  responsibility  towards  the  lives  of  his  people  ever 
to  take  the  initiative  of  the  conflict,  but  once  war  had 
been  imposed  on  Russia  by  the  brutal  aggression  of 
William,  the  Tsar,  in  the  event  of  victory,  did  not  expect 
or  desire  any  solutions  other  than  those  he  read  of  in  the 
columns  of  the  Novoye  Vrcmya,  that  he  heard  praised  in 
his  own  set,  and  that  his  Ministers  themselves  offered 
him  as  a  natural  and  desirable  state  of  affairs.  A  scheme 
of  agreement  with  Austria  based  on  certain  concessions 
would  have  seemed  to  him  a  heresy  and  a  dangerous 
eccentricity ;  the  true,  the  natural  course  was  that 
approved  of  by  current  opinion,  and  that  was  the  one  to 
be  pursued.  It  was  not  in  the  unfortunate  Monarch's 
nature  to  rise  to  the  thought  that  it  was  precisely  and 
solely  in  the  sphere  of  foreign  policy  that  he  had  the 
possibility  and  the  necessity  of  separating  himself,  if 
need  be,  from  current  public  opinion,  in  order  to  preserve 
or  to  restore  to  Russia  the  benefits  of  an  assured  and 
established  peace.  Ah  well !  the  path  which  would  have 
seemed  extravagant  and  chimerical  to  him  would  have 
ended  the  war  promptly  and  gloriously,  and  would 
thus  have  given  the  Imperial  power  a  great  chance  of 
salvation ;  whereas  the  beaten  track  of  prevailing 
opinions  led  to  an  indefinite  prolonging  of  hostilities 
and  suffering  and  brought  nameless  and  unparalleled 
calamities  on  the  wretched  Tsar  and  unfortunate  Russia. 

Thus  peace  with  Austria  did  not  follow  in  consequence 
of  our  brilliant  campaign  in  Galicia.  During  the  winter 
1914-15  every  one  in  our  country  was  filled  with  triumph 
at  the  new  conquest,  and  in  Galicia  we  behaved  in  a  way 
that  definitely  alienated  the  sympathies  of  all  who  were 
not  radically  hostile  to  the  Hapsburg  regime;  and  we 


I9I4]  TURKEY   ENTERS  THE   WAR  329 

aroused  anger  and  fear  in  those  very  people  whom  we 
were  supposed  to  be  liberating.  The  stupid  persecu- 
tion of  the  Uniate  clergy;  numerous  cruelties  practised 
against  the  Jews  who  yet  could  not  change  their  nature  in 
a  day  and  cease  to  serve  a  regime  secretly  under  which 
they  had  prospered;  marked  malevolence  displayed  to- 
wards Polish  proprietors  and  employes — all  this  did 
not  secure  to  us  the  sympathies  of  the  "  Ruthenes " 
who  were  already  working  up  their  future  "  Ukrainian" 
exploits  and  who  hated  us  perhaps  quite  as  much  as  the 
Poles  and  Jews  did.  And  what  was  worse  :  the  fate  of 
Galicia  under  the  ephemeral  Russian  domination  served 
as  a  warning  to  the  other  Slav  countries  of  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy  who  began  to  dread  the  "  liberty "  which 
would  be  brought  to  them  by  the  Russian  Army,  followed 
by  the  troop  of  the  "Tchinovniks"  and  the  political 
bishops  with  the  famous  Eulogios  at  the  head  ! 

Towards  the  spring  of  191 5  the  general  situation  was 
as  follows :  the  Russian  armies,  victorious  everywhere, 
were  occupying  the  whole  of  Galicia,  and  in  the  high 
valleys  of  the  Carpathians  were  engaged  in  a  sanguinary 
but  still  undecided  contest  with  the  German  troops  which 
had  come  to  reinforce  their  weakening  allies.  In  Poland 
we  had  twice  repelled  the  advance  of  the  Germans  on 
Warsaw,  and  we  held  a  bit  of  East  Prussia  as  far  as  the 
shores  of  the  Masurian  Lakes.  In  the  Caucasus  we  had 
succeeded  in  thoroughly  beating  the  Turkish  Army 
which,  during  the  first  months  of  the  war,  had  at  one  time 
thought  of  invading  Georgia.  Meanwhile,  on  the  French 
front  the  war  had  decidedly  adopted  the  character  of 
trench-warfare,  and  the  trenches  extended  from  the 
North  Sea  to  the  Jura ! 

Stagnation  was  threatening  to  set  in  and  already 
every  one  quoted  the  words  of  Kitchener,  who  had  said 
that  the  war  would  last  from  three  to  five  years,  and 
more  likely  five  than  three. 

Turkey's  entry  into  the  war  increased  sfill  more  the 
importance  of  the  position  that  Sweden  was  taking  or 


330  SWEDISH    NEUTRALITY    [chap,  xviii. 

would  take  up  :  Russia  was  beginning  to  be  more  and 
more  cut  off  from  her  allies,  and  consequently  it  was 
necessary  for  her  to  secure  transit  for  goods  and 
passengers  across  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula. 

However,  after  the  first  few  months  of  the  war, 
Sweden's  behaviour  caused  us — on  the  spot,  at  least — far 
less  anxiety  than  at  first.  The  desire  for  the  preservation 
of  peace  became  more  and  more  apparent  in  the  country. 
When  the  Riksdag  of  "  national  defence"  had  served  its 
term,  it  was  dissolved,  and  another  Riksdag  resulted 
from  the  elections,  which  in  the  Upper  Chamber  gave 
the  majority  to  the  Conservatives,  and  in  the  Second 
Chamber  to  the  Liberals  and  Socialists.  This  Riksdag 
begged  the  Hammarskiold-Wallenberg  Ministry — due 
to  resign — to  remain  at  the  head  of  affairs  till  the  end  of 
the  war,  a  most  wise  resolution,  securing  under  extra- 
ordinarily difficult  circumstances  the  frank  collaboration 
of  the  Crown  with  national  representation. 

Personally  I  could  not  but  approve  of  this  solution. 
M.  Wallenberg  had  given  us  proof  of  great  honesty  of 
purpose  and  perfect  impartiality — through  this  impar- 
tiality we  could  sometimes  even  perceive  that  M. 
Wallenburg  was  framing  no  vows  for  the  German  cause  ; 
he  realised  that  German  victory  would  mean  the  end  of 
the  independence  of  Sweden,  and  that  Sweden  had  and 
would  always  have  need  of  the  good-will  of  France  and 
Great  Britain. 

One  of  M.  Wallenberg's  first  acts,  when  the  Cabinet 
had  agreed  to  the  extension  of  his  term  of  office,  was  to 
propose  to  the  King  that  there  should  be  a  meeting  of 
the  three  Scandinavian  Sovereigns.  This  would  be  the 
first  occasion  since  the  separation  of  the  Swedish  and 
Norwegian  Crowns  on  which  the  King  of  Sweden  would 
meet  the  new  King  of  Norway,  Haakon  VII.  Wallen- 
berg easily  gained  his  cause.  King  Gustaf  willingly — at 
this  solemn  hour — buried  his  personal  susceptibilities, 
if  he  still  had  any.  The  meeting  took  place  at  MalmO 
and  was  extremely  cordial.  A  programme  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  three  countries  with  regard  to  the  formidable 


19 


14]   MEETING  OF  SCANDINAVIAN  KINGS     331 


events  which  had  divided  almost  the  whole  of  Europe 
into  two  hostile  camps  was  drawn  up.  The  three 
Scandinavian  countries  affirmed  their  solidarity  and  their 
excellent  mutual  relations;  the  intrigues  of  the  Swedish 
Activists  in  favour  of  an  alliance  with  Germany  and 
against  the  Hammarskiold-Wallenberg  Cabinet  were 
frustrated.  It  was  a  master-stroke  of  the  Swedish 
Foreign  Secretary,  who  thus  acquired  a  new  and  solid 
basis  for  his  policy  of  open  neutrality  and  of  opposition 
to  all  sorts  of  adventures. 


CHAPTER    XIX 

SWEDEN   IN    191 5 

The  world  war,  of  which  the  economic  consequences  in 
the  long  run  were  disastrous  for  the  whole  of  Europe, 
began  with  a  sudden  increase  of  prosperity  for  certain 
neutral  countries.  Just  like  Holland,  Denmark  and 
Norway,  Sweden  suddenly  saw  the  prices  of  her  exports 
rising  in  a  dazzling  way.  Never  had  the  splendid 
Swedish  iron  ore  been  in  such.enormous  demand  ;  never 
had  pit-props  attained  such  formidable  prices.  It  was 
because  iron  was  needed  for  the  construction  of  in- 
struments— alas!  so  valuable — of  destruction  and  death, 
and  the  planks  were  indispensable  for  the  making  of 
thousands  of  kilometres  of  trenches  in  which  millions 
of  armed  men — like  modern  troglodytes — were  to  bury 
themselves  for  years.  But  other  possibilities  of  ad- 
vantageous exportation  were  developing  for  Swedish 
industry.  Her  steel  and  iron  goods,  her  agricultural 
machines,  her  turbines,  her  pit-props,  her  lathes  were 
more  and  more  in  demand  abroad  as  the  workshops 
of  the  belligerent  countries  specialised  in  the  making  of 
big  guns,  shells,  rifles,  submarines,  aeroplane  engines. 
Thanks  to  German  methods,  the  ancient  prophecies 
were  being  fulfilled  in  a  reverse  sense :  ploughshares 
were  being  turned  into  swords,  and  the  bronze  of  bells 
which  had  been  cast  to  peal  forth  to  heaven  prayers  of 
love  and  peace  was  to  be  found  in  awful  machines 
destined  to  spread  death  and  suffering  broadcast. 

But  Swedish  exportation  was  not  confined  to  metal, 
wood,  and  the  products  of  her  foundries  and  workshops. 
Seduced  by  the  enormous  prices  that  all  agricultural 

332 


.915]  TEMPORARY  PROSPERITY  333 

produce  had  been  fetching  in  Germany  from  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  the  southern  provinces  of  Sweden,  which 
up  till  then  had  supplied  the  country  almost  exclusively, 
began  to  send  to  the  other  side  of  the  Baltic  wheat, 
flour,  butter,  cattle,  pigs,  poultry.  At  first  the  profits 
were  fabulous ;  later  on  the  belligerents,  enemies  of 
Germany,  and  the  Swedish  Government  itself  put  a  stop 
to  this  traffic  :  Sweden  was  in  danger  of  starving  if  her 
agricultural  provinces,  situated  at  the  southern  end  of 
the  kingdom,  continued  to  send  off  to  Germany  all  the 
produce  that  she  had  hitherto  sent  up  north. 

In  this  case  the  demands  of  the  Powers  of  the 
Entente  coincided  with  the  well-understood  interests  of 
the  Swedish  Government.  But  the  world-war  gradually 
led  to  such  an  extension  of  the  idea  of  contraband  of 
war  that  the  trade  of  neutrals  and  finally  their  entire 
economic  existence  were  hampered  by  it  in  a  way  that 
could  not  have  been  imagined,  and  of  which  the  famous 
"continental  blockade"  was  but  a  feeble  prototype.  In 
January,  191 5,  the  lists  of  goods  and  commodities  which 
were  considered  contraband  of  war  were  so  large  that 
hardly  anything  was  left  for  the  neutrals'  trade  with  the 
belligerents;  and  the  longer  the  war  went  on,  the 
stricter  and  more  numerous  became  the  prohibitions. 
And  this  was  not  all :  the  belligerents  forbade  the 
exportation  out  of  their  countries  of  a  whole  category 
of  products,  some  because  they  were  necessary  to  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  (such  as  coal,  petrol,  etc.),  others 
because  if  they  had  been  bought  by  neutral  countries, 
they  might  have  found  their  way  from  there  into  enemy 
countries.  Finally,  partly  to  prevent  their  country  being 
deprived  of  commodities  absolutely  indispensable  for 
direct  or  industrial  consumption,  partly  to  bring  pressure 
to  bear  on  the  belligerents  and  to  extort  concessions 
from  them,  the  neutrals  themselves  drew  up  long  lists 
of  prohibited  exports. 

Sweden,  in  consequence  of  her  geographical  position, 
was  in   a  very  peculiar   situation.     As  the  Baltic   was 


334  SWEDEN   IN    191 5  [chap.xix. 

commanded  by  the  German  Pleet,  the  Swedes  virtually 
possessed  free  traffic  with  Germany.  Consequently 
German  influence  weighed  in  a  natural  manner — and 
irrespective  of  all  political  sympathy — on  the  com- 
mercial direction  of  Sweden.  And  this  caused  the 
Entente  countries  more  particularly  to  restrict  the  im- 
portation into  Sweden  of  all  produce  and  all  commodities 
which  might  somehow  or  other  take  the  road  to  Germany. 
Very  soon  certain  commodities  of  neutral  origin,  such 
as  American  wheat,  rubber,  tanning  materials  and 
nitrates  from  Chile,  were  not  allowed  to  be  imported 
into  Sweden.  Thinking  it  possible  to  starve  out  Germany 
and  to  deprive  her  of  certain  goods  indispensable  to  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  the  other  Powers  were  afraid 
that  Sweden — whose  pro-Boche  sentiments  were  much 
exaggerated — would  simply  serve  as  an  intermediary 
for  the  dispatch  of  these  goods  to  Central  Europe. 

These  restrictions  and  impediments  were  naturally 
very  prejudicial  to  the  economic  life  of  Sweden,  and 
they  irritated  the  public  opinion  of  the  country.  Through 
this  the  Swedish  Government  was  continually  faced 
with  difficulties  which  it  sought  to  solve  as  best  it  could, 
while  the  absolutely  contradictory  demands  of  the  two 
belligerent  parties  and  the  agitation  of  the  "  activists  " 
within  the  country  led  each  day  to  fresh  complications 
and  new  difficulties. 

Sweden's  principal  need  was  coal.  The  Scandinavian 
Peninsula  does  not  possess  one  seam.  All  the  six 
million  tons  of  coal  that  the  Swedish  kingdom  consumes 
for  her  industries,  her  railways,  and  her  navigation  have 
to  be  imported  into  the  country ;  before  the  war  England 
supplied  nearly  five  million  tons  and  Germany  the  rest. 
Then  come  corn,  other  vegetable  foodstuffs  and  forage 
(the  Swedish  production  does  not  cover  the  country's 
consumption),  petrol  and  its  by-products,  nitrates,  hides, 
tanning  materials,  sulphur  (absolutely  necessary  to  the 
production  of  paper-pulp — a  great  feature  of  Swedish 
rural  industry),  wool,  raw  cotton,  rubber.  All  these 
commodities   had   to  be  imported   from   outside,   from 


i9is]  THE  GRIP  OF  THE   ENTENTE  335 

North  and  South  America,  Russia,  the  British  colonies, 
Italy  (sulphur). 

Consequently  the  belligerent  countries  of  the  Entente 
had,  or  seemed  to  have,  more  of  a  hold  on  Sweden  than 
Germany  had,  for  the  vital  imports  of  the  country 
mainly  depended  on  their  good  will.  This  was  how 
the  matter  was  viewed  in  England,  and  in  191 5 
negotiations  were  opened  with  Sweden  through  a  com- 
mission of  English  specialists  who  came  to  Stockholm 
to  conclude  an  agreement  based  on  a  strict  regulation  of 
Swedish  imports  and  on  the  control  of  the  consumption 
of  the  imported  goods.  However,  these  negotiations 
ended  in  nothing,  the  principal  reasons  being  : 

(i)  As  concerns  the  importation  of  corn  and  forage, 
Russia,  in  spite  of  her  oft-repeated  promises,  could  only 
supply  a  small  quantity  of  what  Sweden  needed ;  the 
railways  of  Russia,  and  particularly  of  Finland,  were  so 
blocked,  and  possessed  so  little  rolling-stock  that  the 
quantity  promised  could  never  be  conveyed  to  Sweden. 
Wool  and  Russian  hides  were  becoming  more  and  more 
scarce,  even  for  home  use  and  that  of  the  Russian 
armies  ;  hence  none  could  be  subtracted  for  Swedish 
use. 

(2)  England  could  not  manage  to  supply  Sweden 
with  the  same  quantity  of  coal  as  she  supplied  before  the 
war.  Towards  1916,  the  importation  of  English  coal 
was  reduced  to  two  and  a  half  million  tons  and  an  equal 
quantity  came  to  Sweden  from  Germany,  who  for  the 
purpose  used  the  coal  pits  of  Poland  which  she  had 
seized  in  1914  and  1915. 

(3)  Italy,  far  from  being  able  to  threaten  Sweden 
with  cutting  off  her  delivery  of  Sicilian  sulphur,  was 
anxious  to  find  a  market  for  this  important  national 
production,  and  moreover  western  countries  were  in 
urgent  need  of  Swedish  wood-pulp,  so  that  in  their  own 
interests  they  could  not  restrict  the  output  of  this 
product,  of  which  sulphur  is  one  of  the  essentials. 

(4)  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  besides  her  coal,  had 
very  effectual  means  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on 


336  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [ciiap.xix. 

Sweden  and  of  claiming  the  supply  of  certain  com- 
modities. Sweden  could  never  have  borne  the  ces- 
sation of  the  exportation  of  her  iron  ore  and  of  the 
products  of  her  forests ;  that  would  have  spelled  ruin 
and  even  famine  for  the  entire  population  of  her  central 
and  northern  provinces.  Now,  the  ore  found  a  natural 
market  in  Germany  by  way  of  the  Baltic,  and  the  wood 
could  only  be  shipped  westward  by  this  same  way,  that 
is  to  say  with  the  tacit  authorisation  of  the  Germans. 

(5)  Finally,  if  the  Entente  countries  were  able  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Sweden  by  the  restriction 
of  imports,  Sweden  on  her  side  could  bring  pressure  to 
bear  on  those  countries  through  the  absolute  necessity 
for  one  of  the  members  of  the  group — Russia — to  have 
recourse  repeatedly  to  Swedish  assistance.  Cut  off  from 
her  allies  since  Bulgaria's  entry  into  the  war,  having  no 
outlet  open  except  on  the  Archangel  side — a  port  which 
is  ice-bound  for  more  than  five  months  of  the  year  and 
only  connected  to  the  rest  of  Russia  by  one  railway 
with  a  very  bad  service^  — Russia  had  an  imperative 
need  to  secure  transit  through  Sweden.  I  was  con- 
stantly obliged  to  entreat  the  Swedish  Government  to 
grant  free  passage  to  such  and  such  merchandise  not 
coming  in  the  category  of  actual  contraband  of  war. 
And  also  officers,  generals,  statesmen  and  scientists  on 
missions  were  perpetually  crossing  Swedish  territory 
going  from  Russia  to  the  West,  and  vice  versa.  Germany 
was  kept  informed  by  her  numerous  agents  of  all  this 
transport  and  all  these  permits  ;  she  did  not  omit  to 
make  them  a  subject  for  claims,  sometimes  even  for 
threats,  and  she  demanded  compensation  in  the  form  of 
certain  supplies  and  of  authorisation  for  a  stay  in  Sweden 
for  these  same  "  control  "  agents. 

(6)  Russian  orders  in  Sweden  became  daily  more 
numerous  as  the  war  continued.  They  comprised 
machines  of  all  kinds,  ball  bearings,  steel-plating,  tur- 
bines, steel  and  iron  pipes,  presses,  cables  and  above  all 

^  The  Murman  coast  was  only  connected  with  Petrograd  towards  the 
end  of  1916  by  a  railway  line  with  a  still  more  inadequate  service. 


lOI 


5]  A  STRANGE  TANGLE  337 


lathes,  so  absolutely  indispensable  to  the  making  of  all 
metal  things — munitions  amongst  others.  Now  as  soon 
as  a  Russian  order  of  the  kind  was  accepted  in  Sweden 
and  received  an  export  licence,  the  Germans  in  their  turn 
claimed  Swedish  products,  mainly  foodstuffs  such  as 
butter  and  pork,  but  sometimes  farm-horses.  Three 
times  Sweden,  in  spite  of  our  protests,  had  to  export 
thousands  of  horses  to  Germany,  horses  that  were  not 
suitable  for  the  Army,  all  of  them  more  than  ten  years 
old,  and  which  nevertheless  fetched  enormous  prices  (as 
much  as  2000  francs  per  horse).  But  every  one  knew 
that  these  old  Swedish  horses  went  to  German  farms  to 
replace  younger  horses  that  were  fit  for  the  Army. 

Such  was  in  outline  the  position  of  international  trade 
in  Sweden,  a  position  which  was  tangled,  confused,  and 
perpetually  complicated  by  the  political  and  military 
considerations  of  the  belligerents,  by  the  suspicions, 
denunciations,  accusations,  of  the  foreign  Press  and  the 
exaggerated  claims  of  the  local  Press. 

So   as    to    combine   our    efforts    satisfactorily,    my 
French  and  English  colleagues  and  I  decided  to  confer 
continually   on   all  political  and  commercial  questions. 
From    the   spring   of  191 5,    the    Italian    Minister,    M. 
Tommasini,  joined   us,  and  the  help  of  this  diplomat, 
gifted  with  such  keen  intelligence  and  such  remarkable 
aptitude  for  work,  was   most  valuable   to   us.     On   all 
questions  of  trade  and  transit,  the  tone  was  mainly  set 
by  the  British  Minister,  for  his  country  controlled  the 
relations   of  Sweden   with  Western   Europe   and  with 
America.     Luckily  for  me,    I  always    found   Sir   Esme 
Howard  to  be  a  man  with  a  fair  and  well-balanced  mind 
and  most  capable  of  realising  the  urgent  needs  which  I 
had  to  meet  and  which  were  often  in  contradiction  with 
the    principles    adopted   and   jealously    maintained   in 
London.     We  ended   by   settling  our   respective  roles. 
Every  time  that  I  had  to  ask  the  Swedish  Government 
for  a  licence,  an  exemption  or  a  permit  in  the  sphere  of 
transit  or  the  supplying  of  produce,  I  applied    to  my 


338  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [chap.xix. 

English  colleague.  He  made  a  note  of  my  request  and 
made  it  a  condition  of  compensation  for  the  licences 
demanded  by  Sweden.  Finally,  arrangements  for  general 
trade  which  passed  from  time  to  time  between  Sweden 
and  England  always  contained  clauses  in  our  favour :  a 
few  hundred  lathes  to  be  allowed  to  go  into  Russia,  the 
transit  of  such  and  such  commodities  to  be  allowed  to 
us,  etc. 

These  almost  daily  conferences  with  my  allied 
colleagues  have  left  me  the  pleasantest  memories.  We 
communicated  everything  we  knew  to  each  other,  and 
we  were  all  four  imbued  with  the  same  faith  and  the 
same  conviction — that  come  what  may,  the  war  must  be 
ended  by  the  complete  victory  of  the  Allies,  and  could 
end  in  no  other  way. 

The  complete  cohesion  of  the  Entente  Ministers  was 
all  the  more  fortunate  because  in  the  person  of  the 
German  representative  to  Stockholm  we  had  met  our 
match. 

A  few  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  dis- 
engaged German  Minister  to  the  71^;^/ of  Albania,  Baron 
von  Lucius,  was  sent,  by  Berlin's  order,  to  support  Herr 
von  Reichenau.  Up  to  1913  Baron  von  Lucius  had  held 
the  post  of  Counsellor  to  the  Embassy  in  St.  Petersburg, 
and  had  then  been  sent  to  the  Prince  of  Wied  who  was 
taking  up  his  royal  duties  in  the  land  of  the  Skipetars. 
It  was  then  that  I  drew  the  best  horoscope  for  the 
new  dynasty  by  predicting  that  there  would  always  be 
a  Wied  {vide)  on  the  Albanian  throne.  This  punning 
prophecy  was  not  long  in  being  fulfilled ;  from  the 
summer  of  1914  the  Mpret  and  Baron  von  Lucius  were 
both  disengaged  again. 

I  had  known  Lucius  in  Paris,  and  had  seen  him  again 
several  times  in  St.  Petersburg,  where  he  had  not  gone 
down  in  society.  He  was  accused  of  political  intrigues 
— which  was  quite  true — and  of  intrigues  against  his 
chief — which  was  possibly  untrue  ;  in  March,  1914,  when 
a  striking  and  much  commented-on  article  entitled  "  Der 


I9I5]  BARON  VON   LUCIUS  339 

preventive  Krieg  "  appeared  in  the  Cologne  Gazette,  this 
article  was  fathered,  amongst  us,  on  to  Baron  von  Lucius. 
The  article  advocated  making  war  on  Russia  and  France 
before  the  two  countries  should  have  completed  their 
armament  undertaken  with  the  obvious  intention  of 
attacking  Germany.  It  was  said  that  this  was  the 
opinion  of  the  Crown  Prince  and  of  the  exalted  military 
circles  of  Berlin,  and  Lucius  by  popularising  this  idea 
was  ingratiating  himself  beforehand  with  his  future 
Kaiser. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  as  soon  as  I  heard  that  Baron  von 
Lucius  was  being  sent  to  Stockholm,  I  predicted  to  my 
allied  colleagues  that  Herr  von  Reichenau  would  not 
long  remain  at  the  head  of  the  German  Legation.  In- 
deed, six  weeks  sufficed  for  the  newcomer  to  supplant 
Reichenau  gracefully,  and  to  instal  himself  in  his  place 
as  German  Minister. 

Quick,  intelligent,  shrewd,  and  essentially  cynical,  he 
did  not  take  long  to  collect  into  his  hands  all  the  threads 
of  German  intrigue  in  Sweden,  and  to  assume  the 
direction  of  this  intrigue.  He  possessed  all  the  means 
thereto.  A  huge  staff  of  assistants  and  specialists  was 
added  to  the  German  Legation  ;  five  counsellors  to  the 
Legation  found  themselves  at  the  head  of  five  separate 
offices  installed  in  vast  premises,  and  were  overburdened 
with  work ;  one  office  dealt  with  trade,  the  second  with 
purchases  and  orders  for  German  re-provisioning,  the 
third  with  the  Press  and  propaganda,  the  fourth  with 
spying  and  counter-spying  in  Sweden  and  Russia,  and 
the  fifth  assumed  the  general  direction  of  affairs. 

Meantime,  the  Russian  Legation  was  reduced  to  its 
pre-war  staff:  two  secretaries,  and  the  naval,  military 
and  commercial  attaches,  all  three  without  any  private 
assistants  or  even  any  typewriters  under  them.  It 
was  not  till  two  years  later  that  our  staff  was  some- 
what reinforced.  My  allied  colleagues  were  similarly 
situated;  Sir  Esme  Howard,  over-burdened  with  work, 
did  not  have  a  staff  large  enough  to  cope  with  the 
enormous  amount  of  work  at  the  British  Legation  till 


340  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [chap.  xix. 

about  1916  ;  and  my  French  and  Italian  colleagues  had 
but  one  secretary  to  help  them  up  to  the  end !  This  is 
one  of  the  numerous  examples  of  the  superiority  of 
German  machinery  over  that  of  the  Entente  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Berlin  realised  at  once  that  when 
they  were  spending  tens  of  millions  of  marks  per  day 
in  the  war  zone,  they  could  and  ought  to  spend  a  few 
hundreds  in  making  diplomatic  work  more  thorough 
and  more  profitable,  by  information  and  propaganda  in 
a  neutral  country  as  important  as  Sweden  from  her 
geographical  position. 

Thanks  to  the  untiring  work  of  our  collaborators, 
Howard,  Thiebaud,  Tommasini  and  I  were  just  able  to 
get  through  the  most  necessary  part  of  our  work  ;  all  the 
same,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  and  during  the  first 
two  years  I  greatly  felt  the  want  of  collaborators  in  the 
sphere  of  questions  concerning  the  Press.  It  was  not 
till  1916  that  the  Legation  ended  by  having  a  more  or 
less  adequate  service  in  this  respect. 

I  regretted  far  less  my  complete  powerlessness  in 
the  difficult  sphere  of  secret  intelligence  and  of  counter- 
spying.  These  two  important  branches  were,  with  us, 
entrusted,  just  as  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  to  the 
agents  of  the  famous  State  Police,  who  carried  it  on  by 
the  same  clumsy  and  prejudicial  methods  that  they  were 
accustomed  to  use  in  their  counter-revolutionary  work. 
Consequently,  I  was  glad  not  to  have  to  associate  with 
these  individuals  and  not  even  to  know  them.  And 
when  I  had  to  get  confidential  information  for  my  own 
guidance  I  could  always  apply  to  my  allied  colleagues, 
whose  agents  were  anyhow  more  honest  and  better 
informed. 

But  I  must  return  to  Baron  von  Lucius.  In  his  strictly 
political  work  he  displayed  more  shrewdness  than  his 
predecessor.  Whereas  the  latter  had  wished  to  press 
the  Swedes  at  all  costs  to  declare  war  on  Russia,  Baron 
von  Lucius  quickly  understood  that  the  greater  part  of 
Sweden,  and  even  of  Swedish  society,  did  not  care  to  be 
drawn  into  the  perils  and  the  enormous  risks  of  war. 


I9I5]     INTRIGUES  OF  GERMAN  LEGATION     341 

From  that  time  the  German  Legation  changed  its 
tactics ;  von  Lucius  only  asked  the  Swedes  for  friend- 
ship, sympathy,  and  services  of  an  economic  order  which 
vi'ould  enable  heroic  Germany,  whom  the  English  wished 
to  starve  ("  Gott  strafe  England  !  "),  to  save  her  wretched 
women  and  innocent  children  from  dying  of  inanition 
before  her  eyes.  As  the  war  continued  and  revealed 
ever  more  and  more  its  true  and  hideous  aspect,  as 
Swedish  public  opinion  was  leaning  more  and  more 
towards  the  idea  and  the  longing  for  a  good  European 
peace,  von  Lucius  revealed  himself  more  and  more  as  a 
friend  of  peace — of  an  "honourable"  peace,  of  course — for 
his  country.  He  suggested  to  the  Swedes  the  idea  of 
striving  for  this  peace  so  indispensable  for  humanity  at 
large ;  he  drew  a  picture,  most  attractive  to  their 
generosity,  of  Sweden  as  the  initiator  of  world-wide 
peace,  of  Stockholm  as  the  place  where  the  future  peace 
congress  would  be  held. 

Ah,  well !  in  spite  of  all  these  exertions,  all  this  clever- 
ness, von  Lucius's  term  of  office  in  Stockholm  was  not 
a  success.  He  was  too  excitable,  too  much  of  a  trickster. 
There  are  some  tendencies  which  at  first  are  not  under- 
stood by  certain  societies  or  by  certain  persons,  but 
which  end  by  shocking  their  natural  instincts  of  frankness 
and  noble-mindedness.  And  then  they  become  sus- 
picious. The  methods  of  the  German  Legation  could 
not  either  in  the  long  run  appeal  to  honest  people. 
Agitation  in  the  Press ;  attempts  at  extortion  ;  enticing 
away  of  young  people  to  serve  as  spies  in  Russia  or  to 
make  attempts  there  to  wreck  munition  factories  or 
means  of  communication — an  enticement  which  usually 
commenced  with  offers  of  honest  employment;  the 
keeping  up  of  active  relations  in  Stockholm  itself  and  in 
the  north  with  the  Finnish  revolutionaries,  not  at  all 
liked  in  Sweden;  perpetual  tales  about  contraband; 
finally,  a  plethora  of  German  agents  and  spies  of  both 
sexes  in  Stockholm  and  all  over  the  country ;  naturally 
all  this  made  the  Swedish  Government  anxious,  and 
shocked  public  opinion,  when  actual  facts  came  to  their 


342  SWEDEN    IN    191 5  [chap.xix. 

knowledge.     And  at  the  root  of  all  these  facts  one  saw 
the  hand  of  the  official  representatives  of  Germany. 

What  also  ended  by  harming  these  representatives 
was  the  agitation  of  Sven-Hedin  and  his  most  intimate 
friends.  When  the  "great  Thibetan"  accepted  the 
Kaiser's  invitation  and  went  to  the  German  Head- 
quarters, every  one  in  Sweden  thought  this  trip  quite 
natural,  and  the  correspondence  of  the  eminent  publicist 
and  political  agitator  was  read  with  enormous  interest ; 
but  Sven-Hedin  was  wrong  to  prolong,  and  above  all  to 
repeat,  his  visits  to  the  Kaiser's  armies ;  he  also  made 
the  great  mistake  of  praising  in  his  letters  the  "  fresh 
and  joyful  war  "  as  prosecuted  by  the  Germans,  of  show- 
ing himself  to  be  not  only  pro-German  but  imbued  with 
militarism,  and  ultra  warlike,  and  of  posing  as  a  liege- 
man of  Germany.  This  at  last  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
Swedes  as  to  Sven-Hedin,  and  the  more  their  inclination 
for  peace  and  tranquillity  in  Europe  increased,  the  more 
did  the  "personal  friend"  of  the  Kaiser  lose  ground. 
When  I  took  up  my  post  in  Sweden  in  the  spring  of  1914 
the  name  of  Sven-Hedin  was  on  every  one's  lips ;  when 
my  time  was  up  in  the  spring  of  1917,  one  heard  no 
mention  of  the  famous  explorer.  Sic  transit.  Moreover, 
the  overthrow  of  Sven-Hedin's  authority  and  that  of  his 
Activist  friends  had  an  undoubted  effect  on  the  position 
of  the  German  Minister. 

German  diplomatic  representation  in  Stockholm  had 
another  vulnerable  point  in  its  armour  which  could  not 
escape  the  notice  of  the  public  at  large.  Whereas  the 
best  personal  relations  united  the  representatives  of 
the  Entente,  and  at  all  receptions  and  in  public  places  I 
was  seen  to  seek  the  company  of  my  allied  colleagues,  it 
was  no  secret  from  any  one  in  Stockholm  that  Count 
Hadik  and  his  collaborators  could  hardly  bear  the  brag- 
ging, the  authoritative  tone  and  the  noiiveau  riche  men- 
tality of  their  "  grand  "  German  colleague.  The  Austrian 
diplomats  formed  a  separate  party  with  the  Turks 
and  the  Bulgarian  charge  d'affaires.  So  the  Germans 
in  their  social  relations  had  to  rely  on  those  elements 


i9is]  MY   OFFICIAL  ATTITUDE  343 

of  Stockholm  society  who  professed  and  paraded  Ger- 
manophile  sentiments.  But  soon  even  these  elements 
became  more  discreet, more  reticent;  the  unconventional 
methods  of  the  burschikos^  German  Minister  ended  by 
shocking  them  ;  they  decidedly  preferred  the  aristocratic 
good  style  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  representative. 

Not  having  at  my  disposal  the  means  of  propa- 
ganda of  the  German  Minister,  and  not  being  able,  like 
him,  to  rely  on  the  popularity  which  the  German  name 
enjoyed  in  Sweden,  I  carefully  avoided  any  emulation 
of  von  Lucius.  The  more  he  went  about  in  Stockholm 
society,  the  more  reserve  did  I  display  with  regard  to 
that  society  which  was  correct,  polite  but  not  much  in 
favour  of  anything  Russian ;  the  more  he  worried 
and  hustled  the  Swedish  Government,  the  more  I  en- 
deavoured to  be  conciliatory  and  to  guard  against  all 
misunderstanding  between  this  Government  and  that  of 
St.  Petersburg.  But  before  and  above  all  I  strove  to 
avoid,  in  my  relations  with  M.  Wallenberg,  anything 
that  might  seem  to  denote  a  lack  of  confidence  in  him. 
In  the  course  of  my  relations  with  the  Swedish  Foreign 
Secretary  I  learnt  to  esteem  his  frankness  as  much  as 
his  prudence,  and  to  respect  his  word ;  moreover,  our 
pesonal  relations,  which  began  by  being  merely  correct, 
became  more  and  more  intimate  and  confidential. 

When  I  review  in  my  mind  the  subsequent  phases  of 
my  relations  with  the  Swedes — official  and  political 
personages,  financiers  and  manufacturers,  journalists  and 
authors — I  can  prove  that  towards  the  end  of  my  stay  in 
Sweden  a  great  many  prejudices  against  Russia  had 
decreased  in  intensity,  while  new  sympathies  were  being 
aroused  and  fresh  relations  formed.  Certain  events,  the 
outcome  of  the  world  war,  were  of  use  to  me,  and  I  took 
care  to  seize  on  these  opportunities  to  do  away  with  the 
prejudices  which  had  taken  root  in  Sweden  about  the 
supposed  Russian  peril. 

'  An  untranslatable  German  expression  :   familiar  ;  bumptious  ;  free 
and  easy. 


344  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [chap.  xix. 

The  construction  of  the  railway  line  connecting  St. 
Petersburg  with  the  Murman  coast  and  its  ports,  which 
are  never  ice-bound,  was  the  first  fact  that  I  proclaimed 
loudly  in  Sweden  in  order  to  prove  to  what  extent  the 
tales  about  our  supposed  craving  for  Narwick  and 
Trondhjem  were  devoid  of  foundation.  For  a  long  time 
the  Swedes  remained  sceptical  with  regard  to  my 
efforts ;  a  deep-seated  prejudice  cannot  be  uprooted  in 
a  moment.  Had  the  line  to  Murman  really  been  laid  ? 
Did  it  really  lead  to  open  ports  ?  The  old  story  of 
the  village  scenery  placed  by  Potemkin  along  the 
Empress  Catherine's  route  reappeared  in  the  columns  of 
the  Scandinavian  newspapers :  perhaps  the  Murman 
railway  line  was  only  scenery  destined  to  put  Swedes 
off  the  scent?  But  in  the  end  they  had  to  yield  to 
evidence :  the  railway  line,  laid  in  a  hurry  and  some- 
what primitive,  was  nevertheless  open  towards  1917, 
and  conveyed  to  St.  Petersburg  guns,  ammunition  and 
other  goods  indispensable  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  which  our  allies  unshipped  in  the  open  and  well- 
sheltered  ports  of  Kola  and  Alexandrovsk.^  Once  the 
war  was  over  it  would  be  easy  to  improve  the  line, 
and  then  Russia  would  have  undisputed  and  ice-free 
outlets  to  the  sea,  outlets  situated  about  1200  kilometres 
from  the  capital. 

Another  consideration  which  helped  to  calm  Swedish 
minds  was  the  intention,  which  soon  became  known, 
to  hand  over  to  Russia  Constantinople  and  the  Straits 
by  her  allies  and  chiefly  by  England.  Henceforth,  if 
the  Entente  succeeded  in  beating  Germany,  the  whole 
attention  of  the  mighty  Russian  Empire  would  be 
directed  towards  the  south  beyond  the  Black  Sea.  The 
Baltic  problems  would  then  be  of  secondary  importance, 
and  the  Scandinavian  countries — beginning  with  Finland 
and  continuing  with  Sweden — would  no  longer  have  to 
fear  that  the  giant's  hand  would  turn  towards  the  north- 
west. 

Amongst   the   new   elements   which    helped    me   to 

*  Called  Murmansk  since  the  Revolution. 


xgis]  FEELING  TOWARDS   RUSSIA  345 

establish  better  and  more  trusting  relations  between 
Russia  and  Sweden  there  was  what  I  then  called  "  the 
case  of  M.  Perrichon."  All  my  contemporaries  probably 
remember  the  amusing  play  of  Labiche's  and  his  subtle 
moral  sense,  demonstrating  the  fact  that  one  is  more 
grateful  to  one's  neighbour  for  a  boon  that  one  has 
conferred  on  him  than  for  one  received  from  him. 
M.  Perrichon  sets  himself  to  adore  the  young  man  he 
thinks  he  has  saved  from  falling  over  a  precipice, 
whereas  he  ends  by  hating  him  who  effectually  saved 
his  life,  and  who  then  fancied  he  had  thereby  deserved 
the  hand  of  Mademoiselle  Perrichon. 

When  the  Swedes  behaved  so  kindly  and  with  so 
much  delicacy  towards  the  Russian  refugees  returning 
from  Germany  by  Sweden,  I  saw  that  the  feelings  of 
hostility  and  distrust  nursed  in  the  country  with  regard 
to  my  compatriots  were  anyhow  partly  melting  away. 
Later  on  this  phenomenon  became  accentuated.  The 
admirable  manner  in  which  Sweden  managed  the 
repatriation  of  our  seriously  wounded  men  was  not 
solely  the  work  of  the  Swedish  Red  Cross  and  its  noble 
President,  Prince  Charles  ;  the  whole  of  Sweden  seemed 
to  participate  in  it,  and  to  do  so  effectually ;  our  wounded 
men  carried  away  the  best  impressions  of  their  journey 
through  Sweden,  when  entire  populations  turned  out  to 
greet  and  pity  the  wretched  Russians  and  to  look  on  one 
of  the  saddest  and  darkest  sides  of  war.  "The  case  of 
M.  Perrichon"  assumed  more  and  more  its  highest  and 
deepest  meaning,  which  is  that  the  good  you  do  to  others 
cause  you  to  know  them  better  and  finally  to  like  them. 

When  I  saw  that  events  were  seconding  my  efforts 
and  warding  off  the  danger  of  an  immediate  collision 
between  Russia  and  Sweden  I  acquired  the  conviction 
that  one  could  and  should  build  for  the  future  and 
endeavour  to  form  closer  and  more  trusting  relations 
between  the  two  countries  than  had  existed  in  the  past. 
The  products  of  the  admirable  Swedish  metallurgic 
industry  might  replace  in  Russia  some  of  the  analogous 


346  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [chap.  xix. 

products  which  before  the  war  were  exclusively  imported 
from  Germany.  The  excellent  Swedish  engineers  and 
scientists — generally  accurate  and  honest — would  with 
advantage  replace  certain  representatives  of  German 
Ktilfier  who  came  to  make  fortunes  in  our  country.  In 
entire  branches  of  modern  progress — in  telephony  for 
instance — the  Swedes  could  initiate  the  Russians  into 
their  methods  and  their  wonderful  instruments. 

Besides  we  should  derive  real  profit  from  the  closer 
study  of  the  political  and  social  organisation  of  Sweden 
and  from  borrowing  certain  ideas  and  certain  institutions 
from  this  people  whose  country  has  so  many  analogies 
with  all  the  immense  North  of  Russia.  Peter  the 
Great  had  taken  the  administration  and  fiscal  organisa- 
tion of  Sweden  and  transplanted  it  in  bulk  into  his  empire, 
a  work  which  was  afterwards  spoilt  by  his  weak  and 
stupid  successors;  the  Swedish  nobiliary  constitution 
was  later  on  the  centre  of  attraction  for  the  enlightened 
minds  of  the  Russian  nobility — the  only  class  who  were 
at  all  cultivated  in  the  Russia  of  the  eighteenth  century; 
these  tendencies  ended  in  the  reforms  of  Catherine  II., 
reforms  which  might  have  been  the  beginning  of  the  true 
political  and  social  progress  of  Russia  if  the  Prussophile 
manias  of  the  great  Empress's  successors  had  not  come 
to  spoil  and  annul  her  work.  Undoubtedly  ever  since 
the  days  of  the  Varings  and  Rurik  there  has  been  an 
affinity  and  something  akin  to  a  mysterious  link  between 
the  Scandinavian  countries  and  the  North  of  Russia; 
and  the  periods  in  which  these  links  were  severed  and 
forgotten  were  not  exactly  the  happy  periods  of  Russian 
history. 

Such  were  the  plans  and  the  dreams  that  I  allowed 
myself  to  indulge  in  while  the  storm  of  the  war  was  still 
raging.  Awful  ruin  has  overwhelmed  Russia  since  then, 
and  seems  to  forbid  us  to  indulge  even  in  dreams  and 
hopes  for  the  future.  All  the  same,  I  still  believe  in  the 
correctness  of  the  impressions  that  my  stay  in  Sweden 
left  on  me.  And  that  is  why  I  allow  myself  to  look  with 
equanimity  on  one  of  the  consequences  of  our  present 


I9I5]  FINLAND    FOR  SWP:DEN  347 

downfall :  the  secession  of  Finland  so  hurriedly  recog- 
nised by  our  allies.  When  the  future  Russian  Constituent 
Assembly  has  to  settle  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire  I 
hope  that  she  will  ratify  the  complete  and  final  divorce 
of  Russia  from  the  Grand-Duchy  of  Finland.  From 
that  moment  there  would  be  nothing  to  hinder  a  sincere 
and  mutually  profitable  drawing  together  of  Russia  and 
Sweden,  of  which  the  first  political  object  would  be 
Finland  herself  For  if  the  Swedish  elements  in  Finland, 
elements  which  are  wholesome  and  eminently  honest, 
gain  the  influence  they  deserve  in  the  country,  Finland 
would  take  up  the  natural  and  beneficial  role  of  a  peaceful 
State,  interested  in  the  economic  welfare  of  her  great 
neighbour  in  the  East ;  whereas  the  preponderance  of 
the  Finnish  race,  inclined  to  cruelty  and  treachery,^ 
would  force  Russia  and  Sweden  to  unite  their  policy 
more,  and  together  to  guard  against  Finland  becoming 
what  she  nearly  became  in  1917 — a  German  base  for 
operations  in  the  Baltic  and  a  hotbed  of  Bolshevism. 

When  I  speak  of  the  change  taking  place  in  Swedish 

*  The  Ural-Altaic  race,  commonly  called  Finnish,  is  represented  in 
Europe  in  four  countries :  the  Tur-ks,  founders  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
belonged  to  this  race  ;  in  history  they  displayed  much  tenacity,  coupled 
with  great  cruelty  incorrectly  attributed  to  Mohammedan  fanaticism.  The 
Bulgarians,  a  Finnish  race,  conquered  the  vSlavs  and  the  aborigines  of 
Mesia  ;  they  adopted  the  Slav  language  and  Slavo-Byzantine  civilisation, 
but  they  preserved  in  the  Bulgarian  nation  strong  and  indelible  traces  of 
their  blood,  their  mentality  and  their  tendencies.  The  Magyars  after 
having  terrorised  Central  Europe,  were  merged  into  the  Slavs  of  Pannonia, 
and  were  subject  to  the  influence  of  Latino-Germanic  culture ;  the  physical 
type  of  the  people  improved,  but  the  Ural-Altaic  language  still  persisted, 
as  did  also  the  spirit  of  despotism  and  violence  towards  the  other  peoples 
of  St.  Stephen's  crown.  Finally  the  Finns  proper,  half  savage  only  two 
centuries  ago,  were  at  first  entirely  under  the  influence  of  Svvedo-Lutheran 
culture,  but  then  singularised  themselves  latterly  by  suspicious  and  narrow 
nationalism  tending  to  the  worst  excesses. 

There  is  a  fairly  important  strain  of  Finnish  blood  in  the  Russian 
peasa?it  population  of  Central  and  Eastern  Russia.  This  explains  certain 
traits  of  cruelty  and  treachery  which  one  sees  sometimes  among  these 
populations,  and  which  are  so  greatly  at  variance  with  the  Slav  frankness 
and  gentleness  so  often  apparent  in  the  history  of  the  Russian  people. 


348  SWEDEN    IN    191 5  [chap.  xix. 

public  opinion  with  regard  to  the  supposed  Russian 
peril,  I  am  somewhat  anticipating  events.  During  the 
first  twenty  months  of  the  war  the  Swedish  political 
horizon  was  not  always  free  from  cloud,  quite  as  much 
in  respect  to  Russia  as  to  the  Entente  in  general. 

The  Swedish  Activists  were  agitating  unceasingly, 
and  this  agitation  was  fed,  sometimes  by  the  events  of 
the  war,  sometimes  by  the  inconvenience  to  the  country 
caused  by  the  strict  blockade  kept  up  by  England, 
sometimes  finally  by  the  famous  question  of  the  Aland 
Islands  which  the  Activists  raised  as  soon  as  it  was 
necessary  to  warm  up  the  anxiety  of  the  country,  and 
which  the  Swedish  Government  itself  held  to  be  an 
important  question  demanding  a  clear  and  distinct 
solution. 

The  year  1915  began  with  a  general  impression  of 
successes  for  the  Entente.  In  Galicia  the  taking  of 
Przemysl,  and  the  vigorous  off'ensive  on  the  side  of  the 
Carpathians,  seemed  to  promise  us  at  no  distant  date 
the  possibility  of  carrying  the  devastation  of  war  and 
decisive  fighting  right  into  Hungary;  in  Poland  we 
were  still  struggling  fiercely  with  the  German  invader, 
and  Warsaw  felt  secure  behind  the  trenches  of  the 
Bzura,  and  the  unflinching  bulwark  of  our  troops ; 
finally,  in  East  Prussia  our  armies  were  still  holding 
their  own  on  the  shores  of  the  Masurian  Lakes,  that  is 
to  say  in  enemy  country.  Meanwhile,  in  the  Caucasus 
a  brilliant  and  unhoped  for  victory  of  General  Yudenitch's 
at  once  changed  the  situation  :  the  Turkish  troops,  badly 
beaten,  no  longer  contemplated  an  offensive  on  Tiflis 
and  Baku ;  they  themselves  were  attacked  near  the 
Turkish  fortress  of  Erzerum. 

This  military  position  of  Russia  was  certainly  not 
advantageous  to  the  propaganda  of  Swedish  Activists. 
"  This  was  the  fate  in  store  for  us  ! "  one  of  my  neutral 
colleagues  heard  an  earnest  member  of  the  Swedish 
Conservative  party  say  when  Stockholm  heard  of  the  de- 
cisive defeat  of  the  Turks  and  our  of  advance  in  Armenia. 
However,  the  friends,  or  rather  the  admirers,  of  Germany 


i9is]  RUSSIAN   REVERSES  349 

did  not  allow  themselves  to  be  downhearted:  the 
Germans,  they  said,  had  enormous  resources  in  men 
and  supplies  at  their  command ;  they  were  reorganising 
all  their  system  of  war,  and  were  animated  by  the 
resolve  to  win.  .  .  .  And  the  men  in  power  in  Sweden 
who  were  in  a  position  to  know  the  situation  of  the 
German  Empire  held  a  point  of  view  somewhat  similar 
to  that  of  the  Activists.  They  knezv  that  Germany  was 
still  very  strong,  and  thought  her  invincible.  The  months 
succeeding  the  taking  of  Przemysl  and  the  triumphal 
journey  of  the  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  to  Lwow  (January 
and  February,  191 5),  fully  confirmed  this  opinion. 

Towards  the  end  of  February  we  heard  of  the 
German  offensive  in  East  Prussia.  The  Russian  army 
operating  there  was  taken  by  surprise  at  the  very 
moment  when  two  army  corps  had  been  withdrawn 
for  the  Carpathians,  and  the  troops  to  replace  these 
had  not  arrived.  The  army  of  General  Sievers  was 
overthrown,  lost  many  prisoners  and  stores,  and  was 
forced  to  retire  in  haste  to  Grodno  and  Kovno,  where 
at  last  they  succeeded  in  stopping  the  German  advance. 
But  the  war  had  decidedly  been  carried  into  Russian 
territory,  and  fresh  vulnerable  points  were  being  dis- 
covered on  our  side  as  much  in  Northern  Poland  as  on 
the  borders  of  Courland. 

Moreover,  this  was  but  the  beginning.  Towards  the 
middle  of  May  of  this  same  ill-omened  year  191 5,  and  at 
the  very  moment  when  Italy  was  going  to  throw  her 
good  sword  into  the  scales,  we  heard  first  of  the  success- 
ful German  attack  at  Gorlice  ;  then  of  the  piercing  of 
our  front  between  the  San  and  Cracow,  and  of  the  capture 
of  entire  Russian  army  corps  in  the  passes  and  valleys 
of  the  Carpathians ;  in  short  it  meant  the  decisive  defeat 
of  our  armies  in  Galicia.  Nevertheless,  Italy  placed 
herself  on  the  side  of  the  Entente  and  began  the  struggle 
on  the  Isonzo  and  in  the  Dolomites ;  the  Russian  troops, 
ferocious  in  their  retreat,  still  held  their  own  for  some 
time  on  the  San ;  but  the  enormous  losses  sustained 
on   the   Carpathians  and   in   Galicia,   and  the  want   of 


350  SWKDEN    IN    1915  [chap.  xix. 

ammunition,  which  was  becoming  more  and  more  felt  on 
the  Russian  side,  ended  by  shattering  our  resistance. 
Gradually  Poland  and  Eastern  Galicia  were  evacuated, 
Warsaw  was  occupied  by  the  Germans,  and  towards 
October,  191 5,  the  Russian  retreat  abandoned  to  the 
enemy  Volhynia,  Lithuania  as  far  as  Baranovitchi. 
(former  G.H.Q.  of  the  Grand-Duke  Commander-in-Chief), 
and  the  whole  of  Courland  as  far  as  the  Dvina  and  the 
outskirts  of  Riga.  The  inconceivable  exodus  of  millions 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  invaded  provinces  plunged 
these  poor  wretches  into  awful  suffering  and  unheard-of 
calamities,  and  their  miserable  appearance  and  terrible 
tales  increased,  in  the  towns  of  Central  Russia,  the 
complaints  and  criticism  evoked  by  our  reverses,  by 
the  munition  crisis,  and  by  the  reactionary  policy  of 
exalted  Government  circles.  In  October  we  knew  or 
we  understood  that  the  Russian  army  in  Lithuania  had 
been  on  the  brink  of  a  disaster,  that  the  Guard  and  some 
army  corps  had  been  almost  annihilated,  and  that  only 
the  skill  of  Alexeieff  and  the  splendid  spirit  still  pre- 
vailing in  the  ranks  had  averted  the  catastrophe,  and  to 
a  certain  extent  re-established  the  balance  of  power. 

Of  course  all  these  events  encouraged  the  Swedish 
Activists,  and  gave  weight  to  their  propaganda :  German 
ardour  had  in  no  way  been  damped  by  the  reverses  of 
1914;  Germany  more  than  ever  appeared  invincible; 
henceforth  would  it  not  be  to  Sweden's  interests  to  side 
definitely  with  the  German  "  brothers  "?  The  agitation 
mainly  seized  the  Swedish  military  circles,  who  naturally 
were  enthusiastic  about  the  great  deeds  of  the  war. 
Sweden's  neutrality  seemed  to  be  in  question  again.  But 
mercifully  it  only  seemed  to  be  so. 

In  the  first  place,  in  the  country  itself,  beginning  with 
the  King  and  M.  Wallenberg  and  ending  with  the  good 
and  sturdy  agricultural  populations  of  the  interior  of 
Sweden,  the  same  aversion  to  the  risks,  horrors,  and 
devastation  of  war  was  apparent.  And  then  the  German 
military  command  itself,  although  celebrating  and  pro- 
claiming its  victories  aloud,  was  inwardly  aiming  at  one 


1015]  GERMAN    PEACE    PROPOSALS  351 

object  alone — that  of  saving  its  stake,  and  a  few  of  the 
successes  achieved,  by  the  immediate  conclusion  of  an 
"honourable"  peace.  Berlin  understood — although  this 
was  rigidly  kept  from  the  public — that  the  victories 
might  be  fleeting,  and  that  it  was  imperative  to  seize 
this  moment  to  act  on  that  portion  of  the  Allies  which 
Germany  considered  the  weakest  morally,  that  is  to  say 
on  Russia. 

In  June,  191 5,  before  the  surrender  of  Warsaw, 
I  had  held  in  my  hands  the  first  German  proposal 
of  peace.  A  Russian  merchant,  residing  at  the  time 
in  Stockholm,  had  had  a  visit  from  a  second-class 
German  financier  who  came  to  talk  to  him  about  the 
necessity  for  both  countries  of  putting  an  end  to  this 
disastrous  war,  and  "  suggested "  to  him,  by  dictating 
them,  the  conditions  to  which  the  parleyings  might  pledge 
themselves.  My  compatriot  brought  me  this  curious 
statement  at  once.  It  began  by  stating  that  Russia  had 
just  undergone  a  serious  reverse ;  that  such  reverses 
would  only  increase  in  the  course  of  the  summer ;  that 
Warsaw  and  Riga  would  inevitably  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  Germans,  and  that  it  would  be  better  to  seek  peace 
before  the  fall  of  these  two  capitals  obliged  the  German 
Government  to  offer  far  less  favourable  peace  conditions 
than  those  which  Russia  might  get  at  the  moment. 
Now,  these  favourable  conditions  were  the  following  : 

(i)  Russia  was  to  abandon  the  part  of  Poland  belong- 
ing to  her,  which  was  to  form  an  autonomous  state, 
economically  associated  ivith  Germany. 

(2)  Russia  was  to  consent  to  "  a  few  "  modifications 
of  her  frontiers  in  Courland  and  Lithuania,  to  Germany's 
advantage. 

(3)  Germany  and  Russia  were  together  to  exercise  a 
kind  of  condominium  in  Constantinople,  sharing  the 
influence  over  Turkey  and  keeping  out  the  other 
Powers.  This  condominium  would  have  as  its  object  to 
guarantee  to  Germany  free  penetration  into  Asia  Minor 
and  the  south  of  Persia  by  way  of  Bagdad,  and  to  Russia 
free  passage  through  the  Straits. 


352  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [ciiap.xix. 

(4)  Russia  and  Germany  were  to  conclude  a  political 
and  commercial  alliance  in  which  France  might  find  a 
place,  but  of  which  the  point  w^ould  be  specially  directed 
against  English  encroachments. 

(5)  In  the  event  of  these  proposals  being  favourably 
received,  Russia  was  to  send  two  or  three  first-class 
financiers  to  Malm5  to  meet  some  great  German  finan- 
ciers to  discuss  the  conditions  of  peace  together  in 
greater  detail. 

I  took  care  to  transmit  a  copy  of  this  statement  to 
our  Foreign  Office,  after  having  thoroughly  warned  the 
person  who  had  shown  it  to  me  that  I  felt  sure  and 
certain  beforehand  that  we  should  reject  all  proposals 
of  separate  negotiations  unknown  to  our  Allies.  As  I 
expected,  there  was  no  sequel  to  this  German  attempt, 
so  far  as  our  country  was  concerned.  I  heard  later  that 
at  the  same  time  Germany  had  made  overtures  to  the 
Danish  Court  to  bring  about  a  conversation  with  Russia. 
These  overtures  had  the  same  negative  result. 

From  this  moment,  according  to  what  I  gathered 
from  reliable  sources,  several  attempts  were  made  to 
bring  about  separate  conversations  first  with  Russia, 
then  with  England.  Attempts  were  also  made  by 
Turkish  representatives  with  their  Japanese  colleagues 
(whom  they  were  able  to  see  as  a  state  of  war  did  not 
exist  between  Turkey  and  Japan).  Then  Stockholm 
witnessed  the  arrival  of  the  famous  "  Ford  Peace 
Troupe." 

In  Sweden  the  pacificist  current  made  special  pro- 
gress from  1915  onwards,  and  the  Court  and  the  Royal 
Government  lent  it,  if  not  their  actual  help,  at  least 
their  most  sincere  sympathy.  M.  Wallenberg,  in  par- 
ticular, was  animated  by  the  impulse  to  put  an  end  to 
the  acute  state  of  Europe,  of  which  the  results  would  be  : 
the  exasperation  of  national  antipathies,  awful  material 
ruin,  and  the  placing  on  the  order  of  the  day  the  most 
dangerous  and  most  insolvable  social  problems.  It  was 
this  pacificist  current  that  checked  the  renewal  of  warlike 
tendencies  occasioned  by  the  German  successes  of  19 15. 


I9I5]  YUL-KLAPPOR  353 

I  have  already  alluded  to  the  difficulties  Sweden  had 
to  face  in  consequence  of  the  naval  blockade,  and  of  the 
numerous  other  hindrances  to  her  revictualling  and  her 
trade. 

These  difficulties  went  on  increasing,  and  German 
propaganda,  clever  and  admirably  carried  out,  did  not 
cease  directing  the  point  of  Swedish  public  displeasure 
at  England. 

The  Christmas  festivities  of  191 5  brought  on  a  curious 
attack  of  this  displeasure.  Christmas  presents,  the 
famous  Yul-Klappor,  are  an  almost  sacred  custom  in 
Sweden.  Custom  demands  that  even  the  Swedes  who 
had  emigrated  to  other  countries  should  exchange 
presents  at  Christmas  with  their  relations  and  friends 
at  home.  Hence  innumerable  postal  packets  arrived 
from  North  America  in  Sweden  towards  the  end  of 
December;  these  parcels  are  impatiently  awaited ;  they 
are  always  unpacked  in  the  presence  of  the  whole 
family.  And  behold!  at  Christmas,  191 5,  all  these  postal 
packets  coming  from  America  were  stopped  by  the 
English  naval  authorities,  and  Sweden  received  no 
Yid-Klappor  from  the  emigrants !  The  indignation  and 
agitation  were  indescribable.  Vehement  articles  in 
the  newspapers,  protest  meetings,  deputations  to  the 
Government  were  all  resorted  to.  King  Gustaf  V. 
ended  by  inviting  the  British  Minister  to  go  and  see 
him  ;  His  Majesty  complained  of  this  proceeding  which 
victimised  the  whole  Swedish  people  and  hurt  their 
most  cherished  feelings,  and  he  begged  Sir  Esme 
Howard  to  transmit  to  the  British  Government  an 
immediate  request  to  repeal  this  odious  measure. 

The  investigations  made  in  England  on  the  subject 
proved  that  the  Yul-Klappor  of  191 5  included  articles 
prohibited  by  the  blockade — for  instance,  pneumatic 
tyres ;  hence  it  was  supposed  that  these  articles  were 
destined  in  a  roundabout  way  for  Germany.  This  may 
have  been  true  in  a  few  isolated  cases  ;  all  the  same  it 
would  have  been  better  if  England  had  not  struck  this 
blow   at   the    most   cherished   feelings    of   the   worthy 


354  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [ciiap.xix. 

Swedes,  because  in  truth  a  few  hundred  tyres  or  a  few 
hundred  hams  smuggled  into  Germany  would  not  have 
materially  strengthened  her  military  position  ! 

However,  not  even  in  this  case  did  the  displeasure  of 
Swedish  public  opinion  go  so  far  as  to  evoke  dangerous 
tension  between  Sweden  and  the  Entente  countries; 
and  the  reason  for  this  lay  in  the  solidarity  which  became 
daily  greater  between  the  three  Scandinavian  countries, 
with  regard  to  everything  relative  to  current  events  and 
the  economic  situation. 

At  the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter,  1  mentioned 
M.  Wallenberg's  master-stroke  in  arranging  the  first 
meeting  between  the  three  Scandinavian  sovereigns  at 
Malmo.  Since  then  conferences  between  Swedish, 
Norwegian  and  Danish  statesmen  took  place  whenever 
circumstances  or  special  questions  demanded  them.  A 
new  solidarity  was  becoming  established — a  solidarity 
which  was  apparent  above  all  in  economic  and  com- 
mercial spheres.  The  three  Scandinavian  countries 
strove  to  supplement  mutually  their  resources  and  their 
needs.  They  made  reciprocal  concessions,  and  with 
regard  to  the  blockade,  the  interests  of  the  three  coun- 
tries collectively  replaced  their  individual  interests. 
Moreover,  as  Denmark  and  Norway  displayed  far  less 
impatience  with  regard  to  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Entente  Powers  than  Sweden  did,  this  conciliatory  spirit 
ended  by  influencing  Sweden's  conduct. 

Thus  the  dangers  which  threatened  the  maintenance 
of  Swedish  neutrality  in  consequence  of  the  success  of 
German  arms  and  the  miseries  of  the  blockade  were 
averted  or  at  least  mitigated.  A  third  source  of  danger 
remained,  that  of  the  Aland  Islands. 

The  question  of  the  Aland  Archipelago,  which  had 
remained  dormant  since  the  definite  conquest  of  Finland 
by  the  Russians  in  1809,  rose  up  at  the  sound  of  the  guns 
in  the  war  of  1853-55.  The  Anglo-French  squadrons 
took  then  the  fortress  of  Bomarsund,  situated  on  one  of 
the  islands  of  the  Archipelago ;  the  united  Kingdom  of 


1915]  PRINCE  GORTCHAKOFF  &  M.  DE  GIERS  355 

Sweden  and  Norway  profited  by  the  situation  to  derive 
a  few  advantages  in  the  tangled  question  of  the  reindeer 
forests  of  Finmark,  and  also  raised  the  question  of  the 
Aland  Islands.  By  a  clause  added  to  the  Treaty  of  1856, 
Russia  pledged  herself  not  to  keep  up  any  military 
establishment  on  these  islands,  which  constituted  a  fairly 
appreciable  guarantee  for  the  safety  of  the  Swedish 
capital,  situated  about  thirty  nautical  miles  from  the 
extremity  of  the  Aland  Archipelago. 

To  do  away  with  the  stipulations  disadvantageous  to 
Russia  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was,  as  we  know,  the  work 
of  the  whole  long  Ministry  of  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Empire,  Prince  Gortchakoff.  After  a  long  delay,  in  1871, 
at  the  Conference  of  London,  came  the  elimination  of  the 
clause,  untenable  for  Russia,  of  the  limitation  of  her  fleet, 
of  her  fortified  places,  and  of  her  dockyards  in  the  Black 
Sea;  in  1879,  the  portion  of  Bessarabia  adjacent  to  the 
Danube  which  France  and  England,  under  Austria's 
influence,  had  forced  us  to  give  up  to  the  Danubian 
Provinces,  was  restored  to  the  Empire.  But  the  wise 
and  subtle  Chancellor,  who  could  and  wished  to  act 
nobly,  and  was  not  instigated  by  restless  ambition ;  the 
grand  seigneur  Chancellor,  never  thought  of  retracting 
the  concession  made  to  Sweden  in  1856.  He  realised 
that  for  the  neighbouring  kingdom  this  concession  had 
a  vital  value  whilst  it  only  had  a  passive  one  for  Russia, 
and  he  preferred  to  keep  up  the  relations  of  excellent 
neighbours  with  Sweden  rather  than  to  enjoy  the  small 
triumph  of  the  elimination  of  the  last  and  insignificant 
restrictive  clause  of  the  Treaty  of  1856. 

The  prudent  M.  de  Giers  and  his  three  immediate 
successors  took  great  care  not  to  alter  our  policy  in  this 
respect.  But  in  1906,  matters  assumed  a  different  aspect. 
At  this  moment  the  separation  of  Norway  and  Sweden 
set  the  problem  of  the  international  regime  of  the  North 
Sea,  a  problem  solved  by  a  convention  between  England, 
France  and  Germany.  Analogically  one  might  raise  the 
question  of  the  regime  of  the  Baltic  Sea ;  and  M.  Isvolsky, 
newly   appointed  to  the   post  of  Minister  for   Foreign 

2    A 


35^  SWEDEN    IN    1915  [chap.xix. 

Affairs,  considered  it  a  propitious  moment  to  restore  to 
Russia  her  plenary  rights  in  the  Aland  Archipelago.  The 
Berlin  Government,  sounded  beforehand  on  the  subject, 
promptly  consented  to  support  the  Russian  proposal; 
it  was,  first,  one  more  means  of  arousing  the  suspicions 
and  fears  of  Sweden  with  regard  to  Russia;  and  then  it 
afforded  an  opportunity  of  separating  Russia — on  the 
Baltic  question  at  least — from  France  and  England,  who 
would  probably  still  maintain  their  point  of  view  of  1856. 

In  Sweden  every  one  at  once  became  most  anxious. 
Under  the  circumstances,  King  Gustaf  V.  made  a  per- 
sonal application  to  the  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  He  wrote 
a  letter  in  which  he  entreated  his  powerful  neighbour 
not  to  create  fresh  difficulties  for  the  Swedish  Crown — 
already  sorely  tried  by  the  separation  from  Norway — by 
rousing  the  apprehensions  and  the  anxiety  of  Swedish 
public  opinion  with  regard  to  the  Aland  Islands.  The 
Emperor  sent  a  very  correct  letter  in  answer,  announcing 
that  he  would  not  raise  a  question  so  delicate  for  the 
prestige  of  the  King  and  for  the  tranquillity  of  Sweden.^ 
This  exchange  of  letters  cleared  up  the  situation  for  the 
moment,  but  it  did  not  settle  the  matter  formally  and 
definitely.  Uneasiness  always  existed  in  Sweden  on  the 
subject  of  the  Aland  Islands,  and  the  war  of  course 
increased  this  uneasiness. 

In  the  first  place,  Russia  hastened  to  fortify  the 
Archipelago.  Sweden  could  easily  understand  that  we 
could  not  do  otherwise,  given  the  supremacy  of  the 
German  Fleet  in  the  Baltic.  But  once  the  fortifications 
were  erected  should  we  be  inclined  to  demolish  them  at 
the  end  of  the  war  ?  And  if  it  was  Germany  who  won, 
would  she  not  be  only  too  glad  to  profit  by  an  equivocal 
situation  to  establish  a  strong  naval  station  in  the 
Archipelago  and  thus  command  the  Swedish  coast  so 
close  to  Stockholm  ?  On  the  side  of  Russia,  Sweden 
dreaded  above  all  the  installation  in  the  Archipelago  of  a 
permanent    military   aviation   base,  whence  in  less  than 

^  I  never  actually  saw  the  letters,  but  their  contents  \\t.r&  related  to  me 
by  some  one  whom  I  consider  to  be  truthful. 


i9is]  THE  ALAND   ISLANDS  357 

half  aft  hour  aeroplanes  could  reach  the  Swedish  capital. 
In  general,  the  absence  of  international  stipulations  of  a 
clear  and  precise  nature  on  the  subject  of  the  Aland 
Islands  was  a  source  of  inconvenience  and  real  danger  to 
Sweden,  and  the  Royal  Government  thought  it  its  duty 
to  profit  by  the  occurrence  of  the  war  to  obtain  from 
the  two  parties  face  to  face,  beginning  with  Russia,  the 
definite  neutralisation  of  the  group  of  islands  separated 
from  Swedish  territory  by  the  Aland's  Haf,  which  is 
deep  but  not  more  than  thirty  miles  wide. 

The  question  of  the  Aland  Islands  was  of  great  use 
to  the  Swedish  Activists,  by  giving  them  a  plausible 
pretext  for  arousing  national  anxiety.  This  agitation 
lasted  throughout  the  year  191 5  ;  it  calmed  down  a  little 
towards  the  end  of  that  year,  in  view  of  the  assurances 
that  the  Swedish  Government  received  from  us  as  to 
the  absolutely  temporary  nature  of  the  fortifications 
erected  by  us  in  the  Archipelago.  But  at  the  first 
favourable  opportunity  this  agitation  would  revive,  and 
I  considered  that  it  was  to  our  interest  to  meet  this 
agitation  by  a  formal  and  frank  declaration,  which  would 
serve  as  a  basis  for  the  future  regime  of  that  part  of  the 
Baltic,  and  which  would  prevent  all  misunderstandings 
on  this  subject  between  Russia  and  Sweden. 


CHAPTER  XX 

WAR  SUFFERERS 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  have  endeavoured  to  describe 
briefly  the  work  imposed  on  the  Russian  Legation  in 
Stockholm  by  Swedish  policy  and  the  fluctuations  that 
this  policy  underwent  during  the  first  eighteen  months 
of  the  war.  But  besides  this  work,  we  had  to  place  our 
best  efforts  and  our  attention  at  the  service  of  our  very 
numerous  compatriots,  who  were  either  victims  of  the 
war,  or  brought  to  Sweden  by  the  claims  of  politics, 
public  duties,  or  business. 

In  Chapter  XVIII.  I  wrote  of  the  enormous  number 
of  Russians  who  fled  from  Germany  when  war  was 
declared,  and  who  arrived  at  the  Legation  in  a  state 
of  panic  and  destitution,  demanding  urgent  assistance. 
Our  staff  being  quite  inadequate  for  this  task,  we 
conceived  the  idea  of  enrolling  a  few  willing  people 
among  the  Russian  refugees  themselves,  who  would 
consent  to  stay  a  little  longer  in  Stockholm  and  come 
to  our  assistance.  A  few  of  these  people  were  kind 
enough  to  settle  down  for  several  months  amongst  us 
and  to  work  unceasingly — and  of  course  without  any 
remuneration — at  finding  accommodation  and  generally 
helping  our  unfortunate  compatriots.  A  committee  was 
formed  thus  under  the  auspices  of  my  wife  and  of 
my  sister,  who  had  just  joined  us  from  Paris.  Some 
good-natured  Swedes  came  spontaneously  to  help  us; 
amongst  these  noble  persons  I  should  like  to  mention 
the  Consul,  M.  Stromberg,  and  especially  Dr.  Lindberg, 
the  voluntary  consultant  physician,  who  up  to  the  end 
devoted  himself  to  our  poorer  compatriots,  and  whose 

358 


I9I5J        PRISONERS'  CORRESPONDENCE         359 

medical  skill  caused  him  in  the  long  run  to  be  consulted 
by  all  the  Russian  residents  in  Stockholm. 

Such  was  the  origin  of  our  committee  of  benevolence, 
which  soon  acquired  a  certain  notoriety  in  Russia  as 
well  as  abroad.  All  Russians  passing  through  Stockholm 
were  sure  of  a  ready  welcome  in  the  premises  of  the 
committee  situated  opposite  the  station.  The  invalids 
were  received  in  the  hospitals  of  Stockholm,  which 
means  that  they  were  admirably  cared  for.  Travellers 
were  looked  after;  they  were  told  how  to  direct  their 
correspondence  to  relations  and  friends  left  behind 
in  Germany ;  pecuniary  assistance  was  given  to  the 
poorest;  many  of  our  compatriots  who  did  not  know 
what  to  do,  and  who  were  fit  for  work,  were  employed 
and  paid  by  the  committee  itself;  others  offered  their 
services  free,  and  worked  thus  for  months.  The  clergy 
of  the  orthodox  Church  of  Stockholm  shared  in  our 
labours  with  real  self-devotion.  Many  members  of 
the  Legation,  and  above  all  Baroness  Rosen,  wilt  of 
the  Counsellor  of  the  Legation,  lent  intelligent  and 
untiring  aid. 

The  gradual  decrease  in  the  stream  of  Russian 
refugees  seemed  as  if  it  ought  to  diminish  the  labours 
of  the  committee.  But  another  task  claimed  the  self- 
sacrifice  of  the  members  ;  and  this  task,  good-naturedly 
undertaken,  ended  by  taking  up  the  greater  part  of 
their  time  and  efforts ;  it  meant  that  the  staff  of  the 
committee  was  perpetually  being  increased,  demanding 
new  workers,  an  entirely  new  office  organisation,  and, 
in  view  of  increasing  expenditure,  fresh  resources  to 
meet  this.  This  task  was  the  correspondence  with  our 
prisoners  of  war  in  Germany  and  partly  in  Austria, 
and  the  sending  of  money  and  provisions  to  these  poor 
wretches. 

The  Stockholm  committee  was  the  first  Russian  institution 
that  concerned  itself  with  our  prisoners.  We  received  a 
few  letters  from  officers  who  were  prisoners,  we 
answered  them,  and  thus  our  mutual  intercourse  started. 


36o  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.  xx. 

Gradually  these  relations  developed.  People  wrote  to 
us  from  Russia  for  news  of  those  who  were  supposed 
to  be  prisoners,  and  sent  us  letters  to  send  on  to 
them,  and  then  provisions  and  money.  The  accounts  of 
Russian  travellers  who  had  actually  seen  our  work 
had  made  this  popular  in  Russia.  It  soon  became 
necessary  to  increase  the  number  of  assistants  to 
the  committee,  to  enlarge  its  offices,  to  regulate  its 
various  duties,  which  were  :  the  correspondence  with 
the  prisoners  of  war — officers  and  men ;  the  transfer 
of  the  correspondence  addressed  to  prisoners  in  Russia 
and  vice-versa;  the  purchase  of  presents — provisions 
and  indispensable  necessaries — for  the  prisoners  and 
the  dispatching  of  the  same. 

On  all  questions  relative  to  the  situation  of  our 
prisoners,  civil  and  military,  in  enemy  countries,  we 
had  perpetually  to  have  recourse  to  the  kind  help  of 
the  Spanish  Minister,  because  it  was  the  Ambassadors 
of  His  Catholic  Majesty  who  protected  the  interests 
of  the  Russians  in  Berlin  and  Vienna.  The  daily 
intercourse  which  ensued  between  me  and  the  Duke 
of  Amalfi  will  remain  one  of  the  happy  memories  of 
my  long  career.  All  Russians  who  had  occasion  to 
apply  to  him  received  a  charming  and  cordial  welcome; 
and  anything  that  the  Spanish  Legation  could  do  for 
them  was  promptly  done  by  the  Minister  himself  or 
by  his  amiable  secretaries.  It  was  just  the  same  with 
any  service  that  the  Russian  Legation  asked  of  them ; 
moreover,  we  were  for  ever  troubling  them  by  demands 
for  information,  entreaties  for  protection,  claims  in 
favour  of  our  unfortunate  compatriots. 

Having  served  a  long  term  at  the  Foreign  Office 
in  Madrid  as  general  secretary,  the  Duke  of  Amalfi, 
historian,  writer,  and  delightful  poet,  in  accepting  the 
post  in  Stockholm  foresaw  pleasant  leisure  moments 
which  he  would  be  able  to  devote  to  his  literary 
pursuits.  And  now  instead—hardly  installed  in  his 
new  post  and  surprised  like  all  of  us  by  the  storm  of 
war — he  was  drawn  into  the  business  of  the  protection 


I9I5]  SPANISH    HELP  361 

of  Russians  in  enemy  countries,  and  had,  on  our  ac- 
count, to  resume  a  more  strenuous  daily  task  than  the 
one  he  had  just  left  in  Madrid.  Nevertheless,  each 
request  that  my  compatriots  or  I  addressed  to  him  was 
met  by  a  kind  and  charming  smile ;  entire  records, 
admirably  kept,  often  in  the  beautiful  handwriting  of  the 
Duke  himself,  prettily  tied  up  with  "ribbons,"  were 
perused  and  quickly  yielded  the  information  required. 
The  translator  of  the  sonnets  of  Heredia  into  Spanish 
verse — a  work  which  made  the  great  literary  reputation 
of  the  Duke  of  Amalfi— knew  quite  as  well  how  to  direct 
his  office  as  he  did  his  poet's  pen  ;  but  above  all  he  was 
capable  of  putting  his  whole  heart  into  everything  that 
he  did  for  our  unfortunate  compatriots. 

Two  years  later,  when  I  was  in  Madrid,  during  my 
brief  term  of  office  in  Spain,  I  noticed  that  this  noble 
way  of  doing  humanitarian  acts  was  truly  Spanish : 
under  the  orders  of  the  King's  private  secretary — the 
very  sympathetic  Sefior  de  Torres — there  was  an  entire 
department,  admirably  worked,  devoted  to  the  protection 
of  the  prisoners  of  war,  a  work  Spain  had  so  generously 
taken  over.  And  the  incentive  was  given  by  His 
Majesty  Alfonso  XHI.  himself,  who  took  great  interest 
in  this  humanitarian  work  and  imbued  it  with  a 
character  of  frankness,  energy  and  Christian  piety. 

How  many  persons  owe  their  life  to  the  King's 
intercession,  how  many  thousands  and  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  unfortunate  people  owe  to  him  the  gradual 
amelioration  of  their  miserable  condition !  When  the 
impartial  history  of  the  terrible  war  comes  to  light  the 
friends  of  humanity  will  be  able  to  rest  their  eyes, 
wearied  by  the  sight  of  so  much  hatred  and  so  much  un- 
necessary cruelty,  on  the, figures  of  King  Alfonso  XHI., 
of  Prince  Charles  of  Sweden  and  all  those  who  were 
their  assistants  and  agents  in  their  great  work  of  charity 
and  generous  protection. 

I  must  be  allowed  to  mention,  side  by  side  with  these 
princely  philanthropists,  the  characteristic  figure  of  one 
of   the    representatives    of   the   eminently   democratic 


362  WAR   SUFFERERS  [(iiap.  xx. 

organisation  of  the  American  Y.M.C.A.,  an  organisation 
which  from  the  beginning  did  so  much  moral  and 
material  good.  One  day,  in  Stockholm,  I  was  called 
on  by  the  principal  representative  of  the  Rockfeller 
organisation,  connected  to  the  Y.M.C.A. — the  Reverend 
Clinton  Harte.  He  had  just  come  from  Germany,  where 
he  had  had  access  to  the  prisoners'  camps,  and  was  on 
his  way  to  Russia  to  try  and  obtain  the  same  favour.  I 
gave  him  the  letters  of  recommendation  he  asked  for, 
and  later  on  I  heard  that  he  had  made  the  best  im- 
pression in  St.  Petersburg.  Mr.  Clinton  Harte  after- 
wards went  twice  from  Russia  to  Germany  and  from 
Germany  to  Russia,  and  in  both  countries  he  succeeded 
in  alleviating  the  lot  of  the  prisoners  of  war.  Each 
time  that  I  questioned  him  as  to  the  real  condition  of 
our  men  in  Germany  the  worthy  philan-thropist  avoided 
telling  me  of  the  cruelties  and  injustices  committed 
against  those  prisoners  ;  and  as  one  day  I  expressed  my 
surprise  at  this  reticence,  he  replied  quite  frankly  that 
he  had  made  it  a  rule  not  to  relate  the  bad  and  disagree- 
able things  he  had  seen,  but  on  the  contrary  to  commend 
the  good  sides  of  the  regime  which  the  prisoners  of  war 
were  under  in  each  of  the  two  countries.  "  In  this  way 
one  avoids  reprisals — which  are  the  worst  things  that  can 
happen— and  one  excites  a  spirit  of  emulation  towards 
right  and  justice,  an  emulation  which  ends  by  making 
the  lot  of  the  wretched  prisoners  a  little  less  hard." 
On  reflection,  I  think  Mr.  Harte  was  right. 

During  the  years  that  have  since  elapsed  Germany  has 
been  called  to  account  by  the  entire  Press  and  the  whole 
public  opinion  of  the  allied  countries  for  the  treatment 
inflicted  by  her  on  the  prisoners  of  war.  I  consider  that 
it  would  be  quite  futile  to  add  anything  to  what  has  been 
said  and  written  on  the  subject.  Moreover,  a  particu- 
larly painful  and  depressing  feeling  would  stop  me  at 
the  present  time.  The  Russian  soldiers,  prisoners  in 
Germany  and  victims  to  the  horrible  treatment  they 
complain  of,  have,  it  appears,  forgotten  all  they  suffered. 


I9I5]  GERMAN    BRUTALITIES  363 

A  little  improvement  in  the  regime  to  which  they  were 
subjected,  a  few  months  of  clever  propaganda  corro- 
borated by  the  news  that  arrived  of  Russia  and  the 
Russian  Army  in  a  state  of  dissolution,  sufficed  to  make 
these  same  men  accept  from  those  they  had  hitherto  re- 
garded as  their  tormentors  the  good  news  of  the  abroga- 
tion of  all  discipline,  of  the  integral  sharing  of  all  the 
goods  of  this  world,  of  the  Bolshevist  paradise  which 
appealed  to  their  native  heedlessness  and  their  vacillating 
minds.  Amongst  these  people  one  heard  of  astounding 
fraternisations,  of  inconceivable  confusion  of  ideas  ;  one 
did  not  hear  of  any  men  coming  out  of  these  German 
concentration  camps  with  the  wish  to  place  themselves 
at  the  disposal  of  their  unfortunate  country,  or  at  that  of 
the  Allies  who  had  just  opened  the  doors  of  their 
prisons. 

The  Russian  people  being  so  far  above  base  senti- 
ments of  indignation  and  reprisal,  in  whose  name  shall  I 
draw  up  accusations  and  quote  at  the  tribunal  of  history 
the  abettors  of  the  inhuman  treatment  inflicted  on  our 
prisoners  ? 

Speaking  generally  and  as  far  as  I  can  judge  by 
sifting  the  evidence  we  received  in  Stockholm,  this 
treatment  was  truly  detestable  during  the  first  year  of 
the  war.  The  conviction  disseminated  among  the 
German  people  that  the  war  was  due  to  an  attack  by  the 
Allies,  the  ravages  and  the  excesses  committed  by  our 
troops  in  some  areas  in  East  Prussia,^  the  opinion  pre- 
vailing in  the  German  High  Command  that  the  war  must 
be  ferocious  in  order  to  be  short — all  this  influenced  the 
fate  of  the  prisoners  of  war.  Moreover,  the  very  number 
of  these  prisoners,  larger  than  any  one  could  have  fore- 
seen, made  their  position  more  appalling  ;  herded  for  the 

^  Whereas  the  ravages  committed  by  the  German  armies  were 
systematic  and  due  to  orders  issued  from  high  places,  those  committed 
by  the  Russian  troops  were  sporadic  and  due  to  disorder  tolerated  in 
such  and  such  a  section  of  those  troops.  Thus  the  Guard  which  entered 
East  Prussia  first  with  Rennenkampff  behaved  with  exemplary  discipline. 
Most  of  the  excesses  were  committed  by  the  troops  of  the  reserve,  those 
very  ones  who  later  on  surrendered  in  a  body. 


364  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.xx. 

first  months  in  icy  cold  sheds,  vilely  fed,  they  died  by 
tens  of  thousands  of  spotted  typhus,  of  tuberculosis, 
scurvy,  or  else  became  invalids  for  life.  From  the 
second  year  there  was  an  improvement  in  their  lot,  an 
improvement  partly  due  to  the  action  and  censure  of  the 
neutrals,  partly  to  the  spirit  of  organisation  inherent  in 
Germany.  Spacious  sheds  were  built,  and  they  were 
light  and  airy,  if  not  warm.  Cleanliness  reigned  there. 
But  penury  and  the  bad  quality  of  the  food  continued  to 
play  havoc  among  the  prisoners,  and  the  German  iron 
discipline  always  bore  the  same  hostile  and  unfair 
character,  and  tried  to  degrade  the  poor  wretches  sub- 
jected to  it.  The  question  of  the  treatment  of  the 
prisoners  caused  some  conferences  to  be  held  in 
Stockholm  under  the  auspices  of  the  Swedish  Red 
Cross  between  representatives  of  the  Russian,  German, 
Austrian  and  Hungarian  Red  Cross  Societies.  Prince 
Charles  of  Sweden  presided.  Both  sides  desired  to 
effect  an  improvement  in  the  lot  of  the  prisoners ; 
the  Russian  delegates — moderate  bureaucrats — did  not 
refuse  their  consent  to  the  possible  amelioration  and 
especially  the  regulation  of  the  treatment  of  enemy 
prisoners  in  Russia;  on  the  German  side  Prince  Max  of 
Baden,  on  the  Hungarian  side  Count  Apponyi,  and  on 
the  Austrian  side  Slatin-Pasha,  all  displayed  undoubted 
good  will  at  the  conference.  A  whole  code  of  rules  and 
humanitarian  measures  was  agreed  on  and  drawn  up.^ 
Many  of  these  measures  were  carried  out  there,  where 
they  were  not  opposed  by  the  inflexible  cruelty  of  the 
German  military  command  or  the  incurable  disorder  of 
Russian  administration. 

From  the  autumn  of  191 5  the  prisoners'  camps  were 
visited  first  by  the  neutral  Red  Cross  delegates,  then  by 

*  A  special  agency  for  intercourse  with  the  prisoners  of  war  was 
established  in  Sweden.  The  Swedish  Red  Cross  centralised  this  work. 
The  indefatigable  humanitarian  activities  of  Prince  Charles  of  Sweden 
were  exercised  for  the  welfare  of  millions  of  unfortunate  men.  The 
Prince  had  as  his  principal  helper  M.  Diedring,  whose  untiring  work  was 
beyond  all  praise. 


i9is]        RUSSIAN    RED   CROSS  SOCIETY  365 

detachments  of  ladies  who  were  admitted  into  enemy 
countries  and  allowed  to  inspect  the  cells  and  the 
hospitals  of  the  prisoners  of  war — except  the  worst 
ones  of  course.  There  were  on  the  German  side  some 
infernal  regions  which  were  never  opened  to  Virgil  or  to 
Dante,  still  less  to  Beatrice.  These  were  the  reprisals 
camps,  and  especially  the  "  kommandos  "  of  "  voluntary  " 
workmen,  that  is  to  say,  the  camps  of  prisoners  working 
under  the  stick  of  German  corporals  at  military  works 
at  the  front,  often  under  the  fire  of  their  compatriots 
and  allies.  These  regions  of  unutterable  misery  and 
of  gnashing  of  teeth,  which  constituted  a  flagrant 
infringement  of  the  elementary  precepts  of  the  Geneva 
Convention,  were  never  opened  to  the  charitable  curiosity 
of  the  Russian  sisters. 

We  remember  with  pleasure  the  times  when  these 
detachments  of  ladies  of  the  Russian  Red  Cross  passed 
through  Stockholm  on  their  way  to  and  from  Germany 
and  Austria.  Their  energy  was  beyond  all  praise;  they 
were  very  guarded  and  cautious  in  their  accounts,  and 
yet  one  perceived  behind  all  they  said  the  deep  impres- 
sion made  on  them  by  all  they  had  seen  and  the  boundless 
compassion  they  felt  for  the  poor  officers,  the  unfortunate 
Russian  soldatiks  (the  little  soldiers)  that  they  had  just 
visited,  and  whose  sufferings  they  saw,  and  still  more 
guessed  at.  By  comparing  their  accounts,  one  gathered 
that  the  conditions  of  Russian  prisoners  in  Austria  and 
Hungary  were  infinitely  preferable  to  those  of  our 
prisoners  in  Germany. 

Far  less  guarded  and  moderate  was  the  conversation 
of  the  sisters  and  of  the  medical  staff  of  the  detachments 
of  the  Russian  Red  Cross  who  had  been  captured  in 
Germany  and  repatriated  by  virtue  of  the  Geneva  Con- 
vention, but  only  after  whole  months  of  strenuous 
negotiations.  These  doctors  and  sisters  were  very 
outspoken  when  they  told  of  all  they  had  undergone 
and  seen  during  their  enforced  stay  in  Germany.  For 
the  love  of  humanity  one  must  hope  that  their  account^ 
were  exa^geratecj. 


366  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.xx. 

The  summer  of  1915  saw  the  beginning  of  a  charitable 
work  which  helped  to  alleviate  the  most  terrible  suffer- 
ing imaginable — that  of  the  seriously  wounded  and 
incurables  among  the  prisoners.  On  the  initiative  of  the 
Holy  See — an  initiative  which  will  be  eternally  blessed 
by  thousands — what  was  commonly  called  "  the  exchange 
of  the  seriously  wounded"  was  started. 

Between  Russia  and  the  Central  Empires  the 
exchange  was  to  be  effected  through  Sweden.  The 
Swedish  Red  Cross  and  its  president,  Prince  Charles, 
set  to  work  to  organise  the  service  of  the  transfer  of 
the  seriously  wounded  :  by  sea  between  the  Pomeranian 
port  Sassnitz  and  the  Swedish  port  Trelleborg  (near 
Malmo),  and  by  the  Swedish  railway  between  Trelle- 
borg and  the  Finnish  frontier  at  Haparanda — Tornea. 
Swedish  hospital  ships  and  ambulance  trains  were  fitted 
up  with  all  possible  comforts.  A  sympathetic,  devoted 
and  well-trained  staff  of  doctors,  sisters  and  nurses 
was  attached  to  these  ships  and  trains  which  conveyed 
the  seriously  wounded  Russians  from  the  south  to 
the  north,  and  the  seriously  wounded  Germans  and 
Austrians  in  the  opposite  direction.  On  the  railway 
journey  fairly  long  halts  were  made  at  the  big  junctions, 
and  then  meals  were  served  to  the  invalids.  It  was 
then  that  the  population  of  the  neighbourhood  came — 
especially  at  first — to  greet  the  wounded,  to  bring  them 
flowers  and  show  them  little  kindnesses;  and  I  must 
mention  particularly  that  in  this  way,  as  moreover  in 
everything  else,  no  distinction  was  made  between 
German  and  Russian  invalids. 

The  members  of  the  Swedish  Red  Cross  who  had 
taken  part  in  this  organisation,  and  first  and  foremost 
Prince  Charles  himself  and  Princess  Ingeborg,  came 
several  times  to  visit  the  ambulance  trains  on  their  way 
through  Sweden,  and  brought  small  gifts,  and  spoke 
words  of  consolation  and  hope  to  the  wounded.  The 
Crown  Prince  and  his  wife  also  made  this  charitable 
pilgrimage  ;  they  visited  the  Russian  ambulance-train 
in  my  presence,  and  I  remember  the  Crown    Princess 


I9I5]  AMBULANCE  TRAINS  367 

saying  to  me :  "  Do  tell  these  poor  men  that  I  am  a 
cousin  of  the  King  of  England."  I  translated  this  into 
Russian  :  "  This  lady  is  the  cousin  of  the  English  Tsar, 
our  ally  ! "     And  every  one  was  delighted  ! 

Queen  Victoria  also  came,  of  course,  to  see  the 
wounded,  I  do  not  know  all  that  Her  Majesty  did  for 
the  Germans,  but  I  know  that  she  was  full  of  pity  and 
kindness  for  the  poor  Russian  wounded,  and  that  she 
entered  into  the  most  minute  details  as  to  the  fitting-up 
of  the  train  and  the  state  of  health  and  mind  of  those  in  it. 

The  Stockholm  committee  of  benevolence  took  an 
active  part  in  visiting  our  unhappy  compatriots.  My 
wife  especially  devoted  herself  to  this.  She  went  twice 
a  week  to  one  of  the  big  stations  nearest  to  Stockholm, 
where  the  train  stopped  for  three  or  four  hours  ;  when- 
ever the  train  service  allowed  of  it,  she  used  to  accompany 
them  to  the  next  stopping-place.  The  almoner  of  our 
church,  some  members  of  the  Legation  and  of  the  com- 
mittee, sometimes  some  foreign  colleagues  or  Swedish 
ladies,  went  with  her  on  these  pilgrimages.  They  took 
cigarettes,  delicacies  and  fruit  to  the  wounded,  but  above 
all  they  gave  them  their  first  sight  of  Russian  faces  after 
endless  months  of  captivity. 

Our  wounded  never  ceased  praising  the  care  be- 
stowed on  them  by  the  Swedish  sanitary  staff.  "  From 
the  moment  that  we  were  put  on  the  Swedish  boat,  we 
felt  as  if  we  had  reached  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven,"  these 
poor  men  kept  on  saying.  And  one  could  see  that  a  few 
hours  had  sufficed  to  establish  a  current  of  sympathy 
between  the  Swedish  staff  and  the  poor  men  they  tended 
with  so  much  kindness. 

And  yet  nothing  could  equal  the  joy  of  these  poor 
men  when,  at  the  station  of  Hallsberg  or  Krylbo ,  they 
saw  my  wife— in  her  sister's  uniform — arriving  with  the 
other  Russians.  ..."  Little  sister,  little  sister  {sestrifza), 
come  into  our  carriage  !  Little  sister,  sit  down  here  near 
me!  Do  you  think  I  shall  ever  reach  Russia?  Do  you 
think  I  shall  see  my  mother  once  more?"  These 
questions  were  often  asked  by  poor  wretches  who  were 


368  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.xx. 

nothing  but  skin  and  bone  and  who  looked  like  dying 
men  of  sixty,  whereas,  in  reality  they  were  young  men 
of  from  twenty  to  twenty-five  years  of  age  !  And  some- 
itimes  two  or  three  hours  later  my  wife  closed  the  eyes 
•of  these  same  poor  men  who,  as  death  cast  its  shadow 
•over  them,  became  gradually  calmer  and  resigned  to 
never  seeing  their  own  villages  and  their  families  again, 
and  who  died  quietly  and  without  a  murmur,  as  dies  the 
Russian  man  of  the  people.  For,  of  the  200  or  250 
wounded  that  each  train  carried,  there  were  always  some 
that  died  during  the  long  journey  in  spite  of  all  the  care 
bestowed  on  them. 

One  saw  all  kinds  of  awful  physical  suffering  in  these 
moving  hospitals :  blind  men  and  madmen  (a  great 
number  of  madmen !),  tubercular  and  maimed  men,  all 
had  the  same  wan  and  pinched  look,  and  were  scantily 
clothed  in  worn-out  garments.^  Emaciated  by  hunger 
(the  horrible  hunger  of  German  prisons  !)  and  suffering, 
by  cold  and  vile  treatment,  they  had  most  often  had 
their  limbs  amputated,  not  in  consequence  of  wounds 
received  on  the  battlefield,  but  on  account  of  frost-bite 
or  of  some  disease  contracted  in  the  dog-holes  of  the 
concentration  camps. 

And  all  these  poor  wretches  (except  the  madmen) — the 
blind,  the  tubercular  and  the  maimed— asked  one  and  the 
same  question,  which  seemed  to  cause  them  real  anguish  : 
"  Is  it  true  that  we  are  to  make  peace  with  Germany,  as 
we  have  been  told  ?  We  will  not  believe  it.  We  will  go 
on  to  the  end,  even  if  all  our  comrades  still  in  captivity 
must  perish  miserably.  The  Germans  are  at  the  end 
of  their  resources ;  they  often  confessed  as  much  to  us. 
A  few  more  months  of  effort  and  the  enemy  will  be 
beaten ! " 

And  it  was  wonderful  to  see  the  relief  of  all  these  poor 
men  when  I  replied  peremptorily  :  ''  We  shall  not  make 
peace,  we  shall  go  on  to  the  end ;  victory  is  already  in 
sight!" 

1  They  were  generally  clothed  in  old  Belgian  uniforms,  taken  by  the 
Germans  from  the  depots  of  the  heroic  country  they  had  invaded. 


,9is]  ODI  ET  AMO  369 

It  was  not  once  but  a  hundred  times  that  my 
wife,  my  colleagues,  and  I  heard  such  questions  and 
such  remarks  from  the  lips  of  these  simple  men,  and 
they  revived  our  own  courage  and  dispelled  our  own 
doubts.  How  can  one  reconcile  this  with  the  shameful 
phenomena  which  have  since  appeared  and  which  drew 
from  me — a  few  pages  back — expressions  of  bitter  irony  ? 
Is  it  really  the  same  people ;  that  which  spoke  through 
the  lips  of  the  martyred  wretches  in  the  ambulance 
train,  and  that  which  now  shamelessly  displays  the 
basest  selfishness  and  fraternises  obviously  with  its 
executioners  and  bitterest  foes  ? 

Oh  !  strange  and  disconcerting  people  that  no  one 
has  ever  known  well — not  even  those  born  of  your  flesh 
and  blood !  People  amongst  whom  gentleness  is  allied 
to  the  most  abject  cruelt}^,  incurable  distrust  to  the  most 
vapid  simplicity,  a  boundless  spirit  of  sacrifice  to  the 
most  violent  covetousness  !  People  who,  during  the 
course  of  six  centuries  of  suffering  and  unremitting  toil, 
were  able  to  erect  the  edifice  of  a  mighty  Empire,  and 
who  destroyed  this  Empire  in  six  months,'  as  a  child 
gleefully  shatters  a  complicated  and  precious  toy 
with  a  hammer !  Never  has  the  tragic  antithesis  of 
odi  et  amo  struck  me  so  forcibly  as  when  I  conjure 
up  your  image  on  the  ruins  of  what  was  once  my 
country  ! 

What  is  the  fate  reserved  for  you  ?  Will  you  perish 
through  disintegration,  after  having  been  subjected  to  the 
most  degrading  influences,  the  vilest  slavery?  Or,  having 
come  back  to  your  senses  and  become  weary  of  the 
increasing  disorder,  will  you  return  to  the  beaten  track 
of  your  former  existence,  colourless  and  passive,  and 
will  you  meet  without  too  many  curses  the  huge  bill  for 
your  attack  of  madness,  replacing  your  neck  under  the 
yoke  which  was  formerly  your  safeguard  against  others 
and  against  yourself?  Or  again,  suddenly  seized  with 
passionate  repentance,  and  taking  your  risorgiuiento  in 
hand  on  your  own  initiative,  will  you  be  capable  of 
giving  birth  to  new  men  and  a  fresh  system,  will  you 


370  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.  xx. 

reconstruct  a  new  Russia,  mighty,  glorious  and  respected, 
before  all  the  nations  of  the  world  ? 

I  shall  not  live  long  enough  to  see  the  future  God  has 
in  store  for  you.  Too  many  things  have  gone  for  ever,  too 
many  vanished  loved  ones  are  tailing  to  me,  for  me  even 
to  wish  to  await  the  final  verdict  on  events  that  are  now 
being  evolved.  But  something  tells  me  that  the  awful 
external  aspect  of  my  country  is  but  temporary  darkness, 
but  a  passing  nightmare.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to 
believe  that  sacrifices  such  as  those  made  during  this 
war  by  Russia,  that  the  brilliant  courage  and  heroic 
resignation  of  millions  of  her  sons  who  faced  death  on 
the  battlefields,  that  the  martyrdom  of  those  poor  men  of 
the  people  that  I  described  just  now — that  all  that  should 
be  lost  and  obliterated  from  the  pages  of  history.  These 
dead,  these  heroes,  these  martyrs,  are  the  seed  sown 
which  must  germinate,and  which  will  germinate,  so  that 
one  day  there  shall  be  a  glorious  harvest  in  the  fields  of 
Russia,  and  so  that  peace  shall  reign  in  town  and  village, 
in  the  conscience  of  the  people,  and  in  the  hearts  of 
men  ! 

The  officers  who  passed  through  in  the  ambulance 
trains  appeared  to  us,  generally  speaking,  to  be  less 
interesting  than  the  men.  Having  undergone  great 
suffering,  humiliated  by  captivity  and  bad  treatment,  shy 
by  nature,  they  were  very  reserved,  and  besides  appeared 
to  be  much  worried  by  their  piteous  appearance  and 
shabby  clothes,  bj^  the  very  fact  of  having  been  defeated 
and  made  prisoner.  There  were,  however,  some  excep- 
tions. We  were  often  questioned,  and  with  impatient 
curiosity,  about  the  events  of  the  war,  about  the  real 
state  of  affairs  in  Russia  and  among  the  Allies,  a  state  of 
affairs  which  the  German  gaolers  took  pains  to  describe 
to  our  of^cers  as  being  absolutely  compromised.  Some 
of  these  officers  owed  their  repatriation  to  deeds  denoting 
iron  energy,  to  subterfuges  placing  a  strain  on  all  their 
faculties  for  months  at  a  time.  Others  showed  proof  of 
supreme  contempt  for  their  condition  as  invalids  and  in 


I9I5]  AN   EPIC   HERO  371 

return  of  palpitating  interest  in  the  cause  that  they  had 
defended.  I  still  remember  a  tall,  good-looking  3'oung 
man,  with  an  aquiline  nose  and  an  energetic  expression. 
He  was  wounded  and  picked  up  for  dead  by  the 
Hungarians  at  the  Kozinvka,  that  corner  of  the  Carpa- 
thians where  more  than  50,000  Russians  covered  the 
ground  after  repeated  attacks.  He  was  admirably  nursed 
in  a  Budapest  hospital,  where  ladies  bearing  the  highest 
names  of  the  Hungarian  aristocracy  took  great  care  of 
him — he  admitted  this  with  sincere  gratitude.  Finall}^ 
having  had  one  arm  amputated,  the  other  arm  and  both 
legs  damaged  and  left  stiff,  and  both  eyes  almost  irre- 
trievably injured,  he  was  able  to  be  repatriated  as 
"  seriously  wounded,"  which  he  certainly  was  !  I  can  see 
him  still,  just  before  the  train  left,  standing  on  the  step 
of  the  carriage,  and  drawing  himself  up  with  undefeated 
energy.  "  Legs,  arms,  all  that  is  nothing ;  the  state  of 
my  eyes  worries  me,  but  perhaps  I  shall  be  able  to  see 
a  little  with  one.  In  any  case  1  shall  be  able  to  do 
something :  I  shall  ask  to  be  allowed  to  go  into  the 
schools  for  young  officers  ;  I  could  teach  them  heaps  of 
useful  things  about  actual  war  and  fighting;  but  above 
all  I  should  tell  them  how  necessary  it  is  for  them  to  be 
esteemed  by  their  men,  how  one  must  be  ready  to 
sacrifice  oneself  if  need  be,  and  how  happy  and  proud 
one  can  feel  at  having  done  one's  whole  duty  !  "  "  It's  an 
epic  !  a  perfect  epic  !  "  exclaimed  a  foreign  colleague  who 
was  with  me,  and  for  whom  I  was  translating  the  words 
of  my  compatriot.  Again  we  bowed  very  low  to  him, 
although  he  could  not  see  us  doing  so. 

His  name  was  Captain  Sergueieff,  ot  the  Siberian 
Tirailleurs. 

But  let  us  leave  the  ambulance  trains  to  continue 
their  journey  and  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  other 
compatriots  who  were  continually  passing  through 
Sweden  and  often  stopped  in  Stockholm. 

Very  few  days  after  we  had  seen  the  heroic  Captain 
Sergueieff  at  the  Krylbo  Station,  I  was  surprised  by  a 

2    B 


372  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap,  xx 

visit  from  Mademoiselle  Marie  Vassiltchikoff — the  famous 
Macha — whom  I  mentioned  incidentally  in  Chapter  V. 

"  What  fair  wind  has  brought  you,  and  how 
have  you  managed  to  leave  the  charming  but  enemy 
country?"  I  asked  her,  alluding  to  the  delightful 
environs  of  Semmering  where,  lodged  in  a  pretty  chalet 
between  the  villa  of  the  Szecenyis  and  the  castle  of 
the  Lichtensteins,  my  compatriot  led  a  wholesome  and 
charming  life,  made  up  of  long  walks  on  the  mountain, 
harmless  gossip  and  luxurious  tea  parties. 

"Oh!  it's  a  long  story!"  replied  Mademoiselle 
Vassiltchikoff.  "  I  was  allowed  to  leave,  but  on 
parole ;  I  am  to  go  back  there.  Also,  I  am  in  a  great 
hurry  to  start ;  I  shall  start  to-morrow.  And  I  have 
come  to  beg  you,  my  dear  Minister,  to  give  me  a  permit, 
or  else  to  affix  your  seals  to  one  of  my  handbags  so 
that  I  can  get  it  through  the  custom-house  at  Tornea 
easily."  "Dear  me!  dear  me!"  thought  I,  "and  what 
is  the  meaning  of  this  trip  on  parole  ;  and  what  is  this 
little  bag  that  must  be  safeguarded  from  indiscreet 
eyes  ?  Is  it  possible  that  our  mutual  good  friends  in 
Vienna  wish  to  employ  the  plump  Macha  as  the  dove 
out  of  the  ark  ?  I  should  have  thought  they  would 
have  had  more  sense!  "  Aloud  I  said  :  "And  is  it  long- 
since  you  left  Vienna?  Did  you  see  Prince  Lichtenstein 
before  you  left  ?  " 

"  Yes.  .  .  .  No."  .  .  .  the  face  of  the  speaker  became 
crimson  and  betrayed  intense  embarrassment.  "  You 
see,  I  left  Austria  four  months  ago."  And  then  with 
the  determined  expression  of  some  one  who  is  going 
to  jump  into  the  water,  she  let  herself  go  :  "I  have  been 
in  Germany  all  this  time ;  I  have  heard  and  seen  many 
interesting  things ;  I  was  shown  over  the  Russian 
prisoners'  camps ;  I  had  several  talks  with  the  Grand- 
Duke  of  Hesse.  .  .  .  You  understand  that  I  must  make 
haste.  One  thing  only  worries  me  :  shall  I  be  allowed  to 
go  back,  do  you  think  ?  For  I  have  given  my  word  that 
I  will  go  back." 

"  But  this  is  quite  a  case  of  Regulus  of  ever  blessed 


lois]  AN   OLD   ACQUAINTANCE  373 

memory  !  Come,  come !  all  this  is  most  interesting.  I 
absolutely  must  hear  more  about  it."  Upon  which  I  made 
my  amiable  visitor  promise  to  come  and  dine  and  spend 
the  evening  with  us.  Moreover,  I  already  saw  daylight 
in  this  affair  :  it  was  in  Berlin,  and  not  in  Vienna,  that 
the  idea  arose  of  sending  Macha  Vassiltchikoff  to  St. 
Petersburg  to  her  august  patroness;  she  certainly  must 
have  with  her  letters  written  to  the  Empress  Alexandra 
by  her  brother  the  Grand-Duke  of  Hesse  and  by  her 
sister  Princess  Henry  of  Prussia.  Hence  the  anxiety 
about  the  little  bag. 

At  eight  o'clock  Macha  Vassiltchikoff  arrived.  Besides 
her,  we  had  one  or  two  intimate  friends  to  dinner, 
amongst  others  M.  Alexander  Volkoff,  the  famous 
botanist  expert  and  painter  ^  in  water-colours,  and  at 
the  present  time  owner  of  a  fine  estate  in  Russia,  but 
above  all  and  always  a  brilliant  and  untiring  talker,  and 
one  of  the  cleverest  men  that  I  have  ever  met.  The  con- 
versation very  soon  and  most  naturally  turned  on  the 
events  and  the  situation  of  the  day.  We  talked  about 
the  prisoners  of  war  and  of  their  sufferings  in  Germany. 
"  I  do  not  know  what  is  being  said"  exclaimed  Made- 
moiselle Vassiltchikoff  sharply,  "  but  I  know  what  I  have 
seen  with  my  own  eyes.  I  was  shown  a  concentration 
camp  near  Berlin  "  (giving  the  name) ;  "  everything  there 
was  admirable  :  spacious,  airy  sheds,  well-dressed  men 
who  looked  perfectly  happy  ;  I  was  taken  into  the  bake- 
house ;  I  saw  a  huge  room  full  of  loaves  ;  I  tasted  one, 
it  was  quite  delicious!"  .  .  .  Mademoiselle  Vassiltchikoff 
was  not  quite  so  incorrect  as  we  thought  at  the  time ; 
we  discovered  later  that  there  was  a  famous  model 
prisoners'  camp  in  Brandenburg  (I  have  forgotten  the 
name),  which  was  shown  to  distinguished  neutrals  and 
to  ingenuous  persons  ;  the  number  of  prisoners  was 
limited;  they  were  very  well  lodged,  fairly  well  but 
sometimes  insufficiently  fed  ;  only  the  discipline  was  as 
hard  and  sometimes  as  cruel  as  in  the  other  camps.  The 
outburst  of  our  charming  guest  on  the  subject  of  the 
'  Under  the  pseudonym  of  Russoff. 


374  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.  xx. 

prisoners  of  war  raised  vehement  protests  and  a  general 
discussion  on  all  questions  relative  to  the  war.  We 
heard  Macha  Vassiltchikoff— as  I  expected — take  up  the 
well-known  German  arguments  on  the  origin  of  the  war, 
and  inveigh  against  crafty  Albion  ;  this  raised  a  storm 
of  protest,  and  the  conversation  had  nearly  turned  into 
that  useless  hubbub  where  every  one  talks  at  once  and 
no  one  listens,  when  old  M.  Volkoff  began  to  speak  :  by 
his  concise  and  scientific  reasoning  he  proved  to  his 
opponent  the  absolute  inanity  of  the  German  thesis,  and 
the  intellectual,  moral  and  even  material  superiority  of 
England  over  Germany  ;  and  he  knew  both  races  and 
both  countries  thoroughly;  he  took  great  care  not  to 
disparage  the  Germans  and  their  enormous  resources  ; 
but  the  German  cause  appeared  clearly  to  the  listeners 
as  perverted  from  the  outset  and  lost  in  advance.  At 
the  end  of  this  long  magisterial  peroration  there  was 
nothing  left  of  Macha  Vassiltchikoff  or  of  her  arguments. 
Before  taking  leave  of  her,  I  warned  her  that  the 
Legation  in  war-time  refrained  from  issuing  permits  for 
the  Russian  Custom  House,  and  were  still  less  inclined 
to  affix  their  seals  to  special  bags  ;  then  looking  straight 
into  her  eyes,  I  said  :  "  Mademoiselle  Vassiltchikoff''  (I 
emphasised  the  name— one  of  the  very  good  and  ancient 
ones  of  the  Russian  nobility  which  had  been  borne  in 
the  person  of  Macha's  nearest  relations  by  eminently 
respectable  people  specially  known  for  their  patriotism 
and  their  adherence  to  the  Slavophile  school),  "listen 
to  a  friend's  advice  :  you  have  not  been  in  Russia  for 
some  time ;  I  fear  that  you  do  not  realise  the  enormous 
change  the  war  has  wrought  in  the  dispositions  ol 
everybody.  On  arriving  in  St.  Petersburg  try  to  look 
and  listen  carefully  before  indulging  in  talk  such  as  we 
have  just  heard,  and  above  all  before  attempting  to  take 
any  steps  which  would  be  completely  at  variance  with 
the  name  you  bear."  The  plump  Macha  burst  forth  into 
protestations  of  her  perfect  patriotism,  and  swore  that 
she  was  not  being  sent  on  any  mission.  All  the  same 
we   heard  that   a   few   days   after    her    arrival    in    St. 


iQis]  OFFICIAL  PERSONAGES  375 

Petersburg  the  police  had  raided  her  house  and  seized 
her  papers,  on  which  she  was  expelled  from  the  capital 
and  sent  to  one  of  the  estates  of  some  relations  of  hers. 
Soon  after  I  received  from  the  Foreign  Office  a  large 
parcel  marked  "very  confidential,"  which  I  was  told  to 
dispatch,  through  my  Spanish  colleague,  to  the  Spanish 
Ambassador  in  Berlin.  It  contained  the  letters  still 
sealed  that  Macha  Vassiltchikoff  had  brought  from 
Germany  addressed  to  the  Empress  and  to  the  Emperor 
and  which  were  being  sent  back  to  the  senders.  This 
ridiculous  incident,  however,  sufficed — ^just  like  the 
incident  of  Protopopoff- Warburg,  which  I  shall  relate 
in  its  proper  place — to  wake  up  the  Russian  public  and 
to  cause  the  rumours  about  the  pro-German  intrigues, 
in  which  the  Empress  Alexandra  was  involved,  to  be 
believed. 

The  official  personages  who  passed  through  Sweden 
and  stopped  in  Stockholm  were  naturally  the  object  of 
the  special  attentions  of  the  Legation  and  its  members. 
In  the  first  place,  there  were  the  numerous  soldiers 
(engineers,  artillery  officers,  etc.)  who  were  going  to 
the  western  front  and  to  America,  or  returning  thence. 
The  principal  object  of  their  journey  was  arms  and 
ammunition  orders.  Professor  Gardner  also  came  twice, 
and  I  was  much  pleased  and  interested  to  make  his 
acquaintance  ;  he  was  a  distinguished  chemist,  sent  on  a 
very  special  and  important  mission.  It  was  shortly 
after  the  horrible  surprise  of  the  poison-gas,  used  for 
the  first  time  by  the  Germans  on  the  French  front. 
Since  then  they  had  used  it  constantly  on  the  Russian 
front.  Professor  Gardner  was  sent  to  the  west  to  find 
out  what  our  allies  had  done  in  order  to  fight  the 
Germans  henceforth  with  the  same  weapon.  He  told  us, 
amongst  other  things,  that  for  a  long  time  the  Emperor 
Nicolas  II,  could  not  be  persuaded  to  consent  to  the 
adoption  of  this  horrible  method ;  but  the  Russian 
soldiers  began  to  complain  :  "the  Germans  suffocate  us 
like  rats  in  our  trenches,  and  our  chiefs  dare  not  pay 


376  WAR  SUFFERERS  [cmap.xx. 

them  out  in  the  same  way!"  It  was  only  these  com- 
plaints and  the  increasing  anger  of  the  troops  that 
finally  induced  the  Emperor  to  yield. 

In  1916  I  was  much  pleased  to  see  M,  Peter  Struve 
the  head  of  the  service  of  economic  studies  connected 
with  the  war.  We  reminded  each  other  of  the  days 
when  I  held  the  post  of  First  Secretary  in  Stuttgart, 
and  he,  Struve,  eminent  economist  and  then  political 
exile  for  reasons  0/ opinion  (there  were  some  such  !),  had 
come  to  settle  in  the  same  town  in  order  to  edit  a 
Russian  "  revolutionary  "  organ,  the  Osvobojdenic,  which 
my  chief  (the  lamented  Prince  Gregory  Cantacuzene) 
and  I  used  to  read  with  enormous  interest  and  intense 
pleasure.  It  was  the  very  free  enunciation  of  sincere 
and  serious  opinions  on  what  was  going  on  at  the  time 
in  Russia.  The  first  numbers  were  of  palpitating  in- 
terest, for  Struve  had  brought  back  with  him  some 
unpublished  statements,  some  valuable  matter  which 
the  bureaucracy  of  the  day  was  concealing  most  care- 
fully. Whole  bales  of  the  "subversive"  gazette  then 
got  into  Russia  and  there  was  no  bureaucrat  who  had 
not  got  a  number  on  his  table.  Several  genuinely 
profited  by  it ;  others  delighted  in  reading  about  the 
blunders  and  "  indelicacies  "  therein  disclosed,  of  which 
the  authors  were  comrades  of  the  "  English  Club,"  or 
of  such  and  such  another  "commission."  Later  on  the 
Osvobojdenie  deteriorated,  for  really  interesting  matter 
became  scarce  as  its  director  lost  touch  with  Russian 
life. 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  M.  Struve  did  a 
patriotic  act  by  spontaneously  offering  his  services  in 
the  sphere  familiar  to  him,  that  is  to  say  in  economic 
affairs.  I  was  much  pleased  to  see  the  genial  Professor 
again;  the  information  gathered  by  the  commission 
over  which  he  presided  was  regularly  communicated 
to  the  Legation;  there  was  some  intensely  interesting 
matter,  which  threw  a  clear  light  on  the  economic 
situation  of  our  adversaries ;  there  were  no  precon- 
ceived opinions,  no  exaggeration.     The  conversation  of 


1916]  THE  POLES  m 

M.  Struve  was  quite  as  interesting  and  useful  as  tlie 
perusal  of  his  reports. 

Another  political  refugee  passed  through  Stockholm 
quite  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  This  was  the  celebrated 
Burtzeff,  the  counter-spy  of  the  Revolution.  He  was 
sufficiently  ingenuous  to  return  to  Russia,  and  offer  his 
services  to  the  allied  cause.  He  was  promptly  locked 
up.  It  was  obvious  that  the  men  who  had  supreme 
power  in  the  administration  of  Russia  at  that  moment 
could  not  allow  a  man  to  be  at  large  whose  doings  were 
particularly  unpleasant  to  them  and  who  knew  so  much ; 
one  can  hardly  blame  them.  But  all  the  same  it  would 
have  been  more  dignified  and  more  honest  to  close  the 
frontier  to  Burtzeff  or  to  send  him  abroad,  than  to 
respond  to  his  fine  act  and  his  honest  proposals  by 
putting  him  in  prison. 

Throughout  the  war  Stockholm  was  the  meeting-place 
of  a  considerable  number  of  Poles.  The  Scandinavian 
countries  offered  the  only  ground  where  Russian  Poles 
could  meet  their  kin  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  and 
Stockholm  was  the  nearest  place  to  Russia  and  also  the 
one  for  which  the  Germans  were  the  most  willing  to 
issue  permits.  Hence  the  hotels  of  the  Swedish  capital 
received  many  Poles,  mostly  landed  proprietors  of  noble 
birth. 

I  had  never  associated  much  with  Polish  society. 
This  afforded  me  an  opportunity,  by  which  I  willingly 
profited,  of  getting  to  know  it  better,  all  the  more 
because  the  manifesto  of  the  Grand-Duke  Commander- 
in-Chief  made  our  mutual  relations  far  easier  and  more 
natural.  My  memories  of  these  relations  are  essentially 
pleasant  ones.  I  became  better  acquainted  with  people 
amongst  whom  the  love  of  their  country — the  religion 
of  their  country,  I  ought  to  say — surpassed  all  other 
sentiment,  and  served  as  fountain-head  to  their  work, 
their  mentality,  their  sentimental  existence  even.  The 
very  natural  result  of  this  state  of  mind  was  a  marked 
development  of  the  political  sense,  and  I  would  even  say 


S7S  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.xx. 

of  the  practical  sense,  for  during  the  last  fifty  years, 
Polish  society  made  enormous  strides  in  the  economic 
and  financial  sphere.  I  had  frequently  noticed  and 
known  this  essentially  political  mentality  among  the 
Balkan  nations,  but  there,  owing  to  the  absence  of  other 
intellectual  interests,  one  ended  by  becoming  tired  of 
eternal  politics.  Here  the  national  tendency  was  allied 
to  a  refined  education  and  to  a  mind  open  to  the  most 
subtle  speculative  conceptions,  the  whole  supported  by 
the  old  ground-work  of  learning  and  classical  literature 
which  up  to  now  has  been  one  of  the  most  powerful 
elements  of  solidarisation  and  of  mutual  comprehension 
between  people  of  different  nations  and  different  faiths. 

I  shall  always  remember  my  very  pleasant  relations 
with  some  eminently  sympathetic  and  clever  persons, 
such  as  M.  Dobiecki,  Count  Sobanski,  the  two  brothers 
Wielopolski,  M.  Skirmunt  and  many  others,  including 
also  some  women  of  very  great  charm  and  lively 
intelligence.  Could  it  really  be  possible  that  through  a 
violent  craze  for  equality  the  flower  of  Polish  aristocracy 
should  entirely  disappear  and  have  no  more  influence 
on  the  future  development  of  the  beautiful  resuscitated 
country?  I  will  not  believe  it,  and  I  quote  Benjamin 
Constant's  saying,  "I'esprit  surnage." 

Some  LitJmaniaii  politicians  also  came  to  Stockholm, 
and  they  called  on  me. 

I  have  always  felt  interested  in  this  nationality, 
whose  history  is  so  closely  and  so  strangely  interwoven 
with  the  history  of  its  two  neighbours,  Russia  and 
Poland.  A  curious  language,  akin  to  Sanskrit,  a  still 
more  curious  historic  destiny  I 

Up  to  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century  the 
nation  lives  in  a  savage  and  curiously  druidical  state  in 
the  huge  virgin  forests  which  afford  shelter  to  the 
Lithuanian  and  with  him  to  the  "aurochs."  Then 
suddenly  warlike  enterprises  begin :  the  antique  race  is 
collected  together  under  the  rule  of  one  king;  the  neigh- 
bouring  Russian    pi-incipalitics— which    formerly  made 


I9I6]  THE   LITHUANIANS  379 

the  laws  for  these  forest-dwellers,  who  were  lacking  in 
resources  and  arms — are  conquered  one  after  the  other/ 
and  the  kings  of  Lithuania  in  a  few  decades  found  a 
State  which  extends  from  the  Baltic  to  the  banks  of  the 
Dniester.  At  once  a  great  preponderance  of  the  Russian 
language  and  civilisation,  of  the  Orthodox  faith  even, 
becomes  apparent  in  Lithuania,  who  in  spite  of  that — or 
rather  on  account  of  it — is  in  a  perpetual  state  of  war 
with  Moscow.  This  intermittent  conflict,  w^hich  lasts  for 
more  than  a  hundred  years,  assumes  the  character  of  an 
intestine  war — that  between  Eastern  Russia,  the  Russia 
of  iMoscow,  deeply  tinged  with  Tartar  influence  and  the 
Byzantine  autocratic  ideal,  and  Western  Russia,  in  which 
still  lives  the  memory  of  the  independence  of  the  towns, 
and  of  princely  raids,  and  where  elements  of  a  new 
European  civilisation  are  being  introduced.  It  is  a  fine 
and  glorious  time  for  the  kings  of  Lithuania  (still 
heathens),  who  at  last  stop  the  conquests  of  the  Teutons, 
treacherously  installed  in  Prussia,  and  who  on  the  famous 
day  of  Tannenwald  defeat  the  knights  in  armour  by 
bringing  against  them,  besides  the  Lithuanians  and  the 
Polish  allies,  a  whole  Russian  army  recruited  even  from 
within  the  old  walls  of  Smolensk.^  Then  a  great  change 
occurs  in  the  fate  of  Lithuania.  Jagellon,  her  King, 
espouses  Queen  Hedwig,  and  with  her  Poland  also  and 
the  Roman  Catholic  Faith.  A  union  becoming  closer 
and  closer  is  formed  between  Cracow  and  Vilna.  Vilna 
gradually  gives  the  precedence  to  the  capital  of  Poland, 
whereas  Kieff,  jealous  at  taking  the  third  place,  offended 
in  her  religious  faith,  sulks  at  first  at  the  new  state  of 
affairs,  then  champs  her  bit  and  finally  seeks  to  detach 
herself  from  the  "  Republic  of  the  magnates,"  and  ends 
by  uniting  herself,  with  the  whole  of  Little  Russia,  to 
the  great  Russian  Empire  of  the  North,  foreshadowing 
thereby  the  disaggregation  of  Poland. 

Meanwhile   there   is   less   and  less   mention   of  the 

^  It  is  true  that  the  whole  of  Southern  and  Western  Russia  had  just 
been  completely  ravaged  by  the  Mongolians. 

-  Even  the  Smolensk  militia  '^ained  the  honours  of  the  dav. 


38o  WAR  SUFFERERS  [chap.xx. 

Lithuanian  people,  of  the  Lithuanian  language.  The 
Grand-Duchy  of  this  name  still  exists,  of  course,  and  its 
colours  and  its  arms  still  proudly  wave  next  to  the 
Polish  White  Eagle ;  but  if  the  integral  form  has  been 
preserved,  the  contents  have  changed.  All  the  nobility 
of  the  country  has  been  Polonised ;  only  in  the  villages 
does  one  still  hear  the  old  language  which  has  remained 
neglected.  Mickiewicz,  the  greatest  poet  of  Lithuania, 
has  never  written  one  verse  in  Lithuanian. 

Yet  the  village  people  have  undeniable  virtues  ;  good, 
honest,  hard-working,  devoted  almost  to  fanaticism  to 
their  faith — the  Roman  Catholic — they  have  managed  to 
progress  during  the  last  century  by  small  but  sure  steps 
along  the  path  of  their  national  resurrection.  Prussian 
authority,  which  holds  a  purely  Lithuanian  fraction 
of  the  country,  is  hurriedly  trying  to  denationalise 
and  colonise  it,  and  is  partially  successful ;  Russian 
authority,  which  presides  over  the  destinies  of  the  rest  of 
the  Lithuanian  population,  does  nothing  either  for  or 
against  this  national  movement;  continuing  to  look  on 
the  Lithuanians  as  Poles,  it  embitters  them  from  time  to 
time  by  vexatious  measures  with  regard  to  what  this 
people  hold  most  dear — their  churches  and  their  creed. 
In  the  'eighties  there  was  even  a  disgraceful  incident  of 
the  kind,  which  ended  in  bloodshed ;  history  will  for 
ever  record  the  name  of  the  spot :  the  village  of  Kroze, 
and  the  names  of  the  authors  of  the  crime :  Governor- 
General  Orjevski  (son  of  a  Polish  renegade)  and 
Governor  Klingenberg  (of  German  extraction).  But 
this  sad  incident  roused  the  indignation  of  all  right- 
minded  and  honest  Russians  and  drew  the  attention  ot 
Russian  public  opinion  and  even  of  the  Government  to 
the  Lithuanians.  Stolypin,  who  knew  the  Lithuanian 
population  thoroughly — he  had  settled  down  on  a  large 
estate  bought  by  his  parents  in  the  province  of  Kovno — 
eventually  protected  these  good  and  honest  peasants 
whom  he  had  learnt  to  love  and  esteem.  Moreover,  at 
this  period,  the  national  awakening  of  the  Lithuanians 
had   already   made   notable    progress.     Their   constant 


i9i6]  M.   ITCHAS  381 

emigration  to  America  had  done  much  in  this  respect. 
At  the  present  time  more  than  a  million  Lithuanians 
inhabit  the  United  States  without  losing  any  of  the  links 
with  their  native  country;  100,000  reside  in  Chicago 
alone,  and  they  have  their  schools,  their  churches,  their 
newspapers,  and,  as  far  as  in  them  lies,  they  help  and 
support  their  compatriots  who  have  remained  on  the 
banks  of  the  large  national  river — the  Niemen. 

One  day  one  of  the  most  noted  Lithuanian  deputies 
to  the  Duma,  M.  Itchas,  arrived  in  Stockholm,  accom- 
panied by  a  Baron  Schilingas.  These  gentlemen  were 
going  to  the  Allies  in  order  to  interest  them  in  the  fate 
of  their  nationality ;  Itchas,  an  intelligent  and  open- 
minded  man,  did  not  in  any  way  conceal  from  me  the 
objects  that  his  compatriots  had  in  view :  the  reunion 
of  the  part  of  East  Prussia  still  inhabited  by  Lithuanians 
to  the  rest  of  the  country ;  and  a  wide  autonomy  of  the 
whole,  in  union  with  the  Russian  Empire — an  academic, 
administrative  and  judicial  autonomy — and  of  course 
absolute  religious  freedom. 

I  could  not  but  sympathise  with  this  programme. 
The  geographical  situation  of  Lithuania  links  her  unde- 
niably to  the  rest  of  the  Empire.  But  the  true  grandeur 
of  the  latter  would  consist  precisely,  according  to  me, 
in  guaranteeing  the  autonomous  development  of  the 
adjacent  small  nationalities,  drawing  them  to  her  by 
gentleness  and  interest,  and  in  return  lending  them  the 
protection  of  her  great  power. 

These  conversations  led  to  a  more  intimate  friend- 
ship and  sincere  mutual  sympathy  between  M.  Itchas 
and  me.  He  passed  through  Stockholm  again  on  his 
way  to  America,  and  then  came  back,  bringing  with  him 
a  young  wife,  a  Lithuanian  of  Chicago,  pretty,  intelligent, 
and  speaking,  besides  English,  her  old  native  tongue. 
The  provisional  Government  placed  Itchas  at  the  head 
of  the  Russian  Red  Cross.  I  have  completely  lost  sight 
of  him  since  the  "  Dictatorship  "  of  Kerensky  and  the 
infamous  triumph  of  the  Bolsheviks.  Has  he  returned  to 
Lithuania?      Is  he  taking  part  in  the  famous  Taryha,  or 


382  WAR  SUFFERERS  [chap.xx. 

has  this  national  assembly,  formed  by  the  Germans  with 
the  help  of  the  most  Radical  elements  in  the  country, 
rejected  the  workers  of  the  first  hour,  the  "  old-world  " 
patriots?  If  M,  Itchas  ever  sees  these  lines,  I  beg  him 
to  consider  them  a  very  natural  token  of  my  esteem  and 
of  my  sympathy. 

It  was  not  only  politics  that  brought  my  compatriots 
to  Stockholm.  As  the  war  went  on  and  St.  Petersburg 
became  more  and  more  gloomy,  Sweden  received  many 
charming  society  people  whose  sole  object  in  coming 
was  to  have  a  change  of  surroundings  and  ideas,  in  fact 
to  go  abroad,  a  habit  which  had  become  too  deeply  rooted 
in  Russian  society  to  be  permanently  dispensed  with. 
These  people,  intelligent  and  agreeable  for  the  most 
part,  brought  with  them  a  real  St.  Petersburg  atmo- 
sphere, a  whole  collection  of  gossip  and  stories,  and 
rumours  true  and  false.  Association  with  them  caused 
us  to  feel  far  nearer  to  Russia  in  Stockholm  than  we 
should  ordinarily  have  done.  As  other  travellers, 
belonging  to  other  worlds  and  often  very  interesting, 
came  amongst  us,  I  can  truly  say  that  at  no  other  post 
could  one  so  well  keep  one's  finger  on  the  pulse  of 
Russia  as  in  Stockholm.  Towards  1916,  this  pulse 
began  to  denote  high  fever. 

The  picture  of  "  Russia  transported  to  Sweden " 
would  be  incomplete  if  I  left  out  another  element— far 
less  sympathetic — that  of  the  numerous  traffickers  and 
adventurers  that  the  war  brought  from  the  four  corners 
of  Russia — more  especially  from  one  of  her  corners — 
into  the  Swedish  capital.  The  gradual  rise  in  price  of 
all  commodities  and  the  great  scarcity  of  some  of  them 
induced  all  people  having  any  aptitude  for  trade  to  begin 
to  buy  and  sell.  Musicians  bought  leather  and  candles, 
newspaper  correspondents  sold  medicines  and  eggs, 
dentists  and  hairdressers  specialised  in  coffee  and 
knitting  wool.  As  this  buying  and  selling  sometimes 
bordered  on  contraband,  unpleasant  stories  came  to 
light   from    time   lo    time,   generally    followed    by   the 


.6]  RUSSIAN   SILHOUETTES 


60j 


expulsion  of  the  delinquents.  Yet  among  this  crowd  of 
traffickers  there  were  some  men  who  possessed  money 
and  were  accustomed  to  trade.  These  people  quickly 
amassed  considerable  fortunes  without  indulging  in 
illegal  practices.  Later  on  one  heard  of  their  doing  a 
great  deal  of  good  for  their  compatriots  who  came  to 
take  refuge  in  Sweden  after  the  Revolution. 

Beside  these  "commercial  amateurs,"  and  often 
mingling  with  them,  there  were  other  groups  of  elegant 
gentlemen  who  hardly  ever  left  the  lounges  and  the 
restaurants  of  the  smart  hotels,  tossing  down  bottles  of 
champagne  and  proclaiming  loudly  that  they  were  com- 
missioners of  the  Russian  Government  for  the  purchasing 
or  ordering  of  such  and  such  goods.  But  it  hardl}'-  re- 
quired a  practised  eye  to  discover  in  them  the  agents 
of  our  famous  State  Police,  become  secret-service  and 
counter-spy  agents.  But  as  these  gentlemen  always 
ended  by  compromising  themselves  or  b}^  being  guilty  of 
some  knavish  trick  or  other — if  they  did  not  begin  that 
way — they  were  sooner  or  later  escorted  by  the  Swedish 
police  to  the  frontier  of  Finland.  In  two  or  three  cases 
— at  the  entreaty  of  those  who  were  interested  in  them 
and  on  the  recommendation  of  people  I  knew— I  thought 
it  my  duty  to  intercede  with  the  Swedish  Government 
and  to  solicit  the  repeal  of  the  sentence  of  expulsion. 
But  each  time  it  was  proved  to  me  by  evidence  that  the 
individual  in  question  was  either  a  rogue  or  a  thief  So 
that  in  the  end  I  did  not  interfere  anymore  in  these  cases. 

The  German  spies  that  swarmed  in  Sweden  were 
guilty  of  fewer  personal  "indelicacies."  But  they  in- 
fested the  hotels,  enticing  young  Swedes  into  doubtful 
callings ;  opening  what  were  in  effect  recruiting  offices 
in  the  north  into  which  Finns  were  lured,  who  were 
afterwards  sent  to  Germany  to  form  whole  battalions  ; 
arranging  expeditions  the  object  of  which  was  to  cut 
such  and  such  a  means  of  communication  in  Finland. 
And  they  did  all  this  under  the  benevolent  eye  of  sub- 
ordinate Swedish  officials— inaccessible  to  bribery,  but 
permeated  with  German  sympathies  ! 


384  WAR   SUFFERERS  [chap.  xx. 

All  this  atmosphere  of  trafficking,  adventure,  contra- 
band and  spying  ended  by  influencing  the  morality  of 
the  Swedish  people,  so  high  before  the  war.  Stealing  and 
swindling,  which  was  heard  of  so  rarely  before,  began  to 
increase  in  an  alarming  manner  at  the  time  when  1  left 
Sweden.  And  I  have  heard  it  said  that  it  has  increased 
still  more  since.  Let  us  hope,  for  the  good  of  the 
Scandinavian  countries  and  of  their  splendid  population, 
that  the  conclusion  of  the  war  and  the  departure  of  un- 
desirable foreign  elements  will  put  an  end  to  this 
regrettable  contamination. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

A  VISIT   TO   PETROGRAD 

From  the  beginning  of  1916,  everything  led  me  to 
believe  that  we  should  not  get  through  the  spring 
without  fresh  efforts  by  the  Swedish  Activists.  The 
object  would  be  the  same  one  as  before ;  that  of 
creating  discord  between  Sweden  and  the  Powers  of 
the  Entente,  and  thus  irrevocably  to  throw  her  into 
the  arms  of  Germany;  the  pretexts  for  this  campaign 
would  be  furnished  (i)  by  the  questions  relative  to 
the  revictualling  of  Sweden,  (2)  and  chiefly,  by  the 
question  of  the  Aland  Islands.  I  foresaw  that  this  time 
all  that  was  possible  would  be  done  by  Germany  and 
her  Swedish  friends  and  clients ;  hence,  we  should 
have  to  be  careful  and  make  it  our  business  to  support 
the  sensible  portion  of  the  Government  and  of  the 
Swedish  public  by  just  concessions.  I  felt  that  I 
should  overcome  these  difficulties  more  easily  by 
getting  into  direct  and  personal  touch  with  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  I  therefore  begged  permission  to  go  there  to 
discuss  the  present  situation  and  various  questions  in 
connection  with  Sweden  at  the  Foreign  Office  and  the 
War  Office.  In  answer,  I  was  told  that  they  would  be 
glad  to  see  me ;  only  they  begged  me  to  give  private 
affairs  as  the  reason  for  my  journey  to  every  one  in 
Stockholm.  This  was  not  difficult :  my  second  son  was 
about  to  get  his  commission  and  to  leave  Tsarskoe-Selo 
soon  after  to  join  his  regiment  at  the  front;  thus, 
naturally  I  was  going  to  bid  him  farewell. 

I  arrived  in  St.  Petersburg  (already  re-named 
"  Petrograd  ")  in  the  evening  of  the  12th  February,  after 
a  somewhat  tiring  journey  of  seventy-two  hours  across 

38S 


386  A   VISIT  TO    PKTROGRAD     [niAP.xxi. 

Sweden  and  Finland.  I  remember,  as  if  it  were 
3'esterday,  my  arrival  at  the  dark  and  gloomy  Finland 
station,  and  the  joy  that  filled  ni}'  heart  suddenly  when 
I  saw  my  two  sons  coming  to  meet  me,  both  of  them 
tall,  young,  charming,  the  younger  one  in  his  smart 
uniform  of  the  4th  Chasseurs  of  the  Guard.  Two 
years  and  a  half  later  these  two  splendid  boys  only 
existed  in  "the  silent  cemetery  of  our  memory.^  .  .  . 
The  snow  which  had  fallen  heavily  the  day  before  my 
arrival,  covered  the  ill-lighted  town  as  with  a  shroud, 
muffling  all  sounds.  Petrograd,  in  contrast  to  the 
brilliant  and  lively  St.  Petersburg  that  I  had  left  in 
March,  1914,  seemed  gloomy  and  sad;  it  is  true  that  it 
was  the  first  time  that  I  had  come  from  the  capital  of  a 
neutral  country  as  yet  almost  untouched  by  the  war,  into 
that  of  a  belligerent  country.  Paris  made  the  same 
impression  on  me  fifteen  months  later. 

The  next  morning  I  went  to  see  M.  Sazonoff.  When 
we  had  reviewed  all  the  questions  in  connection  with 
my  post  in  Sweden — transit,  exports,  exchange  of 
commodities,  and  finall^^  the  question  of  the  day,  the 
Aland  Islands — I  asked  the  Minister  if  he  thought 
it  advisable  for  me  to  go  and  see  the  Minister  for  War 
and  the  Head  of  the  General  Staff.  "  Most  certainly," 
replied  Sazonoff;  "go  first  to  General  Polivanoff,  he  is 
a  most  intelligent  and  distinguished  man  with  whom  I 
am  on  excellent  terms."  The  Minister  went  to  the 
telephone,  and  after  a  little  friendly  conversation  with 
the  Minister  for  War,  apprised  him  of  my  arrival.  The 
General  made  an  appointment  with  me  for  the  next 
morning.  The  Emperor  was  to  arrive  in  two  days'  time 
from  General  Headquarters,  and  M.  Sazonoff  promised 
to  solicit  an  audience  of  His  Majesty  for  me. 

*  My  younger  son,  Serge  Nekludoff,  fell  in  Volhynia  in  July,  1916. 
My  eldest  son,  Peter  Nekludofif,  secretary  (from  May,  1916)  to  the 
Embassy  in  Rome,  died  in  Paris,  in  September,  1918,  of  Spanish  influenza. 
Both  of  them  possessed— allied  to  great  nobility  of  character— a  true 
delicacy  of  feeling,  and  equalities  which  earned  for  them  the  sincere 
nflection  of  all  those  who  knew  them. 


t9i6]    GENERAL  POLIVANOFF  ON  RUMANIA   387 

I  thought  my  chief  rather  thin  and  tired,  but  full  of 
energy  and  hope.  The  black  time  of  191 5  seemed  to 
be  definitely  over.  The  day  of  my  arrival  the  news 
of  the  capture  of  Erzerum  had  come  through  ;  every 
one  was  most  hopeful  about  the  campaign  which 
was  to  open  in  the  summer  against  Germany  and 
Austria;  the  enormous  task  of  the  reorganisation  of  our 
military  forces  was  being  completed ;  munitions  were 
plentiful,  and  the  capital  was  swarming  with  troops  of 
splendid  appearance. 

M.  Sazonoff  entirely  approved  of  my  point  of  view  on 
the  questions  of  the  Aland  Islands  and  the  agitation  of 
the  Swedish  Activists  ;  there  was  no  immediate  or  very 
grave  danger,  but  it  was  necessary  to  make  reasonable 
concessions  to  the  Swedes. 

The  next  morning  I  went  to  see  General  Polivanoff. 
1  found,  as  ever,  a  charming  welcome  and  a  right  and 
clear  comprehension  of  the  questions  I  came  to  discuss. 
The  General  approved  of  all  my  suggestions  and  begged 
me  to  confer,  as  to  the  details,  with  General  Beliaieff, 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  General  Lukomsky, 
Director  of  Ordnance. 

When  we  had  thoroughly  discussed  the  Swedish 
question,  I,  relying  on  my  good  personal  relations  with 
Polivanoff,  put  the  following  question  to  him:  "Tell 
me,  General,  if  you  think  you  can  do  so,  what  stage 
have  our  parleyings  with  Rumania  reached  ?  Abroad, 
and  even  here,  every  one  seems  to  be  expecting 
Rumania's  immediate  entry  into  the  war  on  our  side. 
The  Emperor's  recent  journey  to  South  Russia  is  uni- 
versally looked  on  as  the  sign  of  an  approaching  alliance 
of  arms — and  possibly  of  a  family  one;  how  do  matters 
really  stand?" 

"  I  can  tell  you  quite  frankly,"  said  the  General, 
"  that  I  know  nothing  ;  one  day  every  one  is  for  the 
alliance ;  the  next  day  it  appears  to  be  out  of  the  ques- 
tion or  postponed  sine  die.  But  I  will  tell  you  quite  as 
frankly  that  for  my  own  part  I  am  not  at  all  keen  about 
this  alliance  which  every  one  desires  so  ardently." 

2  c 


388  A   VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD    [chap.xxi. 

"  And  why  is  that  ? "  I  asked,  somewhat  sur- 
prised. 

"  I  will  tell  you.  In  the  first  place,  we  know  nothing 
about  the  fighting  qualities  of  the  Rumanian  Army; 
1877  is  a  long  time  ago,  and  1913  was  only  a  military 
outing  in  Bulgaria.  On  the  other  hand,  what  we  do 
know  is  that  Rumania  does  not  possess  the  equipment 
necessary  to  modern  warfare,  nor  munitions  more 
particularly.  At  present  we  possess  both,  but  not  in 
sufficient  quantity  to  enable  us  to  share  them  with  a  new 
army  of  more  than  500,000  men.  I  shall  be  told  that  our 
allies  in  the  West  can  supply  Rumania ;  but  you,  who 
are  in  a  position  to  know,  are  perfectly  aware  of  the 
fact  that,  given  the  present  state  of  our  communications 
with  the  West,  everything  sent  to  the  Rumanians  would 
diminish  by  that  much  what  we  ourselves  ought  to 
receive ;  hence  it  would  always  be  a  case  of  sharing. 
Secondly,  if  Rumania  decided  to  come  into  the  war,  we 
ought  to  have  an  army  of  at  least  300,000  men,  perfectly 
equipped  and  supplied — under  the  command  of  an 
excellent  general — which  could  enter  Rumania  by  the 
Dobrudja  and  Tutrakan.  Now,  a  great  many  people  at 
General  Headquarters  think — and  I  entirely  share  their 
opinion — that  if  we  did  possess  such  an  army,^  it  would 
have  quite  enough  to  do  on  our  own  front,  already  a 
fairly  long  one,  in  the  event  of  our  deciding  to  make  a 
vigorous  offensive." 

"And  why  would  you  have  to  send  this  auxiliary 
army  to  the  Rumanians?"  I  asked. 

"  If  for  no  other  reason,  to  defend  them  against  the 
Bulgarians,"  replied  the  General  with  a  subtle  smile. 
"The  geographical  situation  of  Rumania,"  he  continued, 
"is  very  bad.  If  the  Rumanian  army  advanced  towards 
Transylvania  in  order  to  realise  national  aspirations  and 

1  This  reserve  army  already  existed  at  the  time  when  I  talked  with 
General  Polivanoff,  and  it  was  quartered  at  Odessa  and  in  Bessarabia. 
It  was  General  ScherbatchefPs  army,  and  at  the  time  of  Brussiloff's  great 
offensive,  it  conquered  the  Bukowina  by  a  series  of  brilliant  operations  ; 
but  it  could  not  after  that  be  sent  to  the  Dobrudja. 


I9I6]      RUMANIANS   DIFFICULT    PbSlTION 


3^'J 


to  threaten  the  Austro-Germans  in  the  flank,  the  Bul- 
gartans  would  immediately  dash  to  the  Dobrudja  and 
the  Danube;  and  then  think  what  an  enormous  frontier 
Rumania  would  have  to  guard  on  that  side.  And  we 
know  that  the  Bulgarian  troops  are  first-rate,  and 
what  is  more,  animated  by  ferocious  hatred  of  their 
neighbours." 

"  That  is  exactly  the  answer  I  expected,"  I  said  to 
the  General,  "and  I  entirely  share  your  opinion.  But 
have  we  not  sufficient  troops  both  to  strengthen  our 
Galician  front  and  to  attack  the  Bulgarians  ?  A  brilliant 
success  against  them  would,  in  my  opinion,  lead  to  a 
complete  and  immediate  change  in  the  Bulgarian  Army, 
to  the  downfall  of  Ferdinand  and  the  Boche  alliance ! " 

"  What  you  say  is  perfectly  true  ;  but  it  is  not  soldiers 
we  lack ;  it  is  means  of  communication  ;  our  railway 
system  is  only  capable  of  supplying  our  front,  which  con- 
sists of  a  given  number  of  divisions  ;  add  to  this  number 
another  800,000  men  (500,000  Rumanians  and  300,000 
Russians),  and  our  armies  will  not  be  properly  supplied 
either  with  men  or  provisions,  or,  above  all,  with  arms 
and  ammunition.  You  also  doubtless  know  that  on  the 
Rumanian  side  we  only  possess  two  railways,  and  both 
are  absolutely  ridiculous  ;  they  are  being  improved  at 
present  with  feverish  haste ;  but  it  is  much  too  late." 

I  took  leave  of  General  Polivanoff,  telling  him  that  I 
hoped  with  all  my  heart  that  his  most  sound  and  clear 
ideas  would  carry  the  day. 

The  two  Generals,  Beliaieff  and  Lukomsky,  whom  I 
went  to  see  soon  after,  made  a  very  good  impression  on 
me.  1  had  already  conferred  with  our  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  when  he  passed  through  Stockholm. 
This  time  in  a  pregnant  conversation  we  drew  up  a 
whole  programme  (which,  however,  was  never  carried 
out)  concerning  the  compensations  to  be  granted  to 
Sweden  in  return  for  the  transit  allowed  to  us  and  the 
supplies  that  we  could  obtain  from  her.  General 
Beliaieff  seemed  to  me  to  be  very  well  up  in  all  the 
questions  relative  to  his  department,  and  I  was  struck 


390  A   Visit  TO   PETROGRAD    [<iiai'.  xxi. 

with  the  number  of  subjects  that  we  treated  exhaust- 
ively during  one  hour's  conversation ;  this  denoted 
remarkable  conciseness  and  clear-mindedness  on  his 
part.  Later  on,  at  the  approach  of  the  Revolution, 
the  Press  spoke  very  badly  of  the  General.  He  was 
universally  accused  of  servility  towards  the  worst 
leaders  of  those  ghastly  months.  Alas !  I  fear  it  was 
true.  One  can,  moreover,  possess  a  very  clear  mind 
and  much  intellectual  power  and  yet  be  totally  lacking 
in  civic  courage  and  even  in  moral  honesty.  The 
opposite  is  unfortunately  just  as  common ;  we 
experienced  this  from  the  beginning  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, when  men  who  were  perfectly  upright,  pure, 
and  animated  by  the  best  intentions  found  them- 
selves absolutely  incapable  of  controlling  Government 
machinery  after  rude  reality  had  replaced  for  them  all 
generous  dreams  and  abstract  criticism  ! 

A  few  days  after  my  arrival  in  Petrograd,  I  heard 
that  M.  Savinsky  was  there,  recovering  from  rather 
a  serious  illness,  and  that  he  wished  very  much  to  see 
me.  I  found  my  colleague  pale  and  thin  and  animated 
by  that  feverish  wish  to  exonerate  himself  and  to  bring 
his  services  and  opinions  into  repute  which  is  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  every  man  who  has 
suffered  a  serious  reverse,  and  who  feels  that  he  is  a 
butt  for  the  accusations  of  his  enemies  and  the  gossip 
of  his  friends. 

He  told  me — and  was  able  to  prove— that  already  in 
April,  191 5,  he  had  warned  the  Foreign  Office  of  the 
imminence  of  the  Bulgarian  peril,  and  had  suggested  as 
the  sole  means  of  stopping  Bulgaria  the  restitution  by 
Serbia  of  the  part  of  Macedonia  annexed  by  virtue  of 
the  treaty  of  Bukharest.  In  Petrograd  they  could  not 
make  up  their  minds  to  force  the  Serbians  to  do  this, 
and  in  order  to  get  out  of  the  difficulty  they  persuaded 
themselves  that  the  danger  was  in  no  sense  pressing  and 
that  the  Russian  Minister  to  Sofia  exaggerated  the  perils 
of  the  situation ;   there  was  all  the  more  excuse  for  this 


i.;i6]     M.  SAVINSKY  ON  BALKAN  AFFAIRS     391 

attitude  as   the  British  Minister  in  Bulgaria — the  same 
one  that  I  had  had  as  colleague  during  the  years  191 1- 
1913 — did  not  take  at  all  a  gloomy  view  of  things,  and 
reassured  the  Foreign   Office  as   to  the   intentions   of 
Ferdinand  and  M.  Radoslavov.     In  July,  191 5,  when  the 
Bulgarian  loan  of  five  hundred  million  francs  negotiated 
in  Germany  was  effected  under  the  very  eyes  of  our 
Minister  who  had  predicted  it,  those  in  authority  at  last 
listened  to  the  cries  of  alarm  uttered  by  Savinsk}''  and 
his   French  colleague,  and  began  to  consult  as  to  the 
best  means  of  parrying  the  blow.     It  was  just  in  the 
middle  of  our  disastrous  retreat  from  Galicia,  Poland  and 
Lithuania;  coercive  military  measures  were  no  longer 
to  be  thought  of;  the  problem  was  how  to  please  the 
Bulgarians  without  wronging  the  Serbians  too  much  ; 
whilst  the  latter,  who   saw   the  storm   brewing,   were 
clamouring  to  be  allowed  to  attack  Bulgaria  before  she 
had  completed  her  mobilisation  and  her  concentration  of 
troops — against   which    London   protested  vehemently. 
The  Rumanians  did  not  appear  to  be  going  to  carry  out 
the  engagements  contracted  in  Bukharest ;    Greece  was 
passing  through  the  darkest  days  of  the  vassalage    of 
Constantine  XIV.  with  regard  to  his  Imperial  brother-in- 
law.     The  weeks  went  by ;   and  while   every   one   was 
still  engaged  in  evasions  and  hesitations  the  irreparable 
deeds  were  done  :    Bulgaria  mobilised  and  then  entered 
Serbia,   whilst  the  Centrals  attacked    this   unfortunate 
country  from  the  front. 

That  is  what  Savinsky  told  me  ;  and  as  a  general 
outline  it  was  the  absolute  truth.  Only  my  colleague 
omitted  to  inform  me  of  what  had  taken  place  in  Sofia 
between  his  arrival  in  January,  1914,  and  the  spring  of 
191 5.     I  think  I  ought  to  fill  in  the  gap  now. 

At  the  first  audience  that  my  successor  had  with  the 
King  of  the  Bulgarians,  Ferdinand  gave  him  a  touching 
welcome :  "  Your  arrival.  Monsieur,  is  as  healing  balm 
to  my  lacerated  heart ! "  However,  in  a  few  short 
weeks,  the  relations  between  the  Monarch  and  the 
Russian  Minister  showed  no  signs  of  being  particularly 


392  A   VISIT  TO    PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxi. 

intimate.  Ferdinand  simply  avoided  seeing  Savinsky 
and  hid  from  him,  just  as  he  had  hidden  himself  from  all 
the  diplomats  accredited  to  his  person.  My  successor 
had  absolutely  no  opportunity  of  pouring  his  healing 
balm  on  the  wounds  caused  by  my  "  bluntness,"  for 
Ferdinand  took  them  to  be  cured  by  the  exalted  person- 
ages of  Austria-Hungary  and  of  Germany.  Things 
became  worse  after  the  outbreak  of  the  World- War. 
A  prey  to  mad  agitation,  torn  between  ambition,  fear, 
a  thirst  for  vengeance  and  his  innate  irresolution,  the 
King  shut  himself  up  more  and  more.  Savinsky,  whose 
knowledge  of  Balkan  affairs  and  psychology  was  very 
superficial  but  who  had  never  been  lacking  in  shrewd- 
ness and  energy,  ended  by  grasping  the  situation  and, 
abandoning  all  hope  of  acting  on  Bulgaria  through  the 
person  of  the  Sovereign,  wished  to  outline  a  policy  of  in- 
fluence over  the  Bulgarians  themselves,  over  their  ruling 
classes,  even  over  those  Stamboulovists  who  were  the 
most  averse  to  Russophile  sentiments.  Unfortunately, 
from  the  first  months  of  his  time  in  Sofia,  my  successor 
came  under  the  influence  of  the  suspicious  individual 
that  I  mentioned  in  Chapter  XIV.  of  these  reminiscences. 
This  gentleman  became  the  political  inspirer  of  his  chief, 
and  when  it  was  necessary  to  influence  the  raen  in  power 
and  Bulgarian  public  opinion,  he  thought  out  a  great 
speculation  in  connection  with  the  purchase  of  wheat 
for  the  Russian  Government,  a  deal  which  was  to  change 
the  Bulgarian  disposition  by  the  bait  of  the  great 
benefits  accruing  to  the  country  at  large  and  to  private 
individuals.  Two  men  of  business,  a  certain  M.  Gruber 
and  a  M.  Polak  (junior)  were  sent  from  St.  Petersburg  to 
manage  the  transaction.  The  member  of  the  Russian 
Legation  whom  I  mentioned  above  made  himself  their 
intermediary  and  "  political  counsellor  "  ;  millions  were 
involved,  they  talked  of  pocketing  the  whole  of  Bulgaria ; 
they  ended  by  buying  a  few  thousand  tons  of  wheat 
(which  could  not  be  taken  away  when  war  broke  out), 
and  they  compromised  the  names  of  a  few  politicians, 
amongst  others  that — already  thoroughly  compromised 


I9I6]    M.  STIIRMER  PRESIDENT  OF  COUNCIL  393 

—of  M.  Gennadiev,  who  later  on  was  accused,  judged 
sentenced,  and  who  spent  the  period  of  the  Bulgarian 
war  on  the  damp  straw  of  a  prison  cell.  "The  poor 
man"  was  only  set  at  liberty  when  the  French  troops 
arrived  in  Sofia.  Hence  the  great  deal  in  wheat  ended  in 
nothing,  and  only  then  did  they  think  out  other  methods 
of  procedure,  less  crooked  and  more  fruitful.  But  much 
valuable  time  had  been  lost ;  the  victorious  offensive  of 
the  Germans  in  Galicia  and  Poland  had  begun,  and  those 
Bulgarians  who  were  our  enemies  were  encouraged  in 
their  attitude  by  the  events  of  the  war,  which  seemed  to 
be  turning  decidedly  in  favour  of  the  Central  Empires. 

My  arrival  in  Petrograd  almost  coincided  with  a 
significant  and  much-discussed  change  in  the  compo- 
sition of  the  Russian  Cabinet :  the  aged  M.  Goremykin 
was  at  last  allowed  to  retire,  and  his  place  was  taken 
by  M.  Sturmer,  an  old  member  of  the  Council  of  the 
Empire,  who  had  never  occupied  any  very  important 
post,  and  who  was  reputed  to  be  ultra-reactionary.  In 
the  more  or  less  Liberal  and  enlightened  circles  of 
Petrograd  this  appointment  was  sincerely  deplored,  as 
it  was  looked  on  as  a  challenge  thrown  by  the  Court 
at  public  opinion.  Subsequent  events  have  proved  that 
this  view  was  well-founded  ;  but  at  that  period  I  did 
not  entirely  share  the  pessimism  of  my  Petrograd 
friends.  I  had  incidentally  heard  of  Sturmer's  work  at 
the  outset  of  his  great  career,  which  was  spent  in  the 
province  of  Tver.  The  provincial  assembly  of  the 
Zemstvo,  reputed  "  red,"  saw  the  elections  of  the  pre- 
sident of  this  Zemstvo  wrecked  twice  running  by  the 
central  authority ;  the  third  time  the  Home  Secretary 
himself  appointed  a  president  (he  was  entitled  to  do 
this  by  law)  in  the  person  of  M.  Sturmer,  a  local  landed 
proprietor  and  an  eminently  Conservative  Councillor- 
General,  an  elective  post  which  he  combined  with  a 
Court  function  in  the  capital  equivalent  to  that  of 
deputy  head-clerk  to  the  Registrar.  In  Tver  every  one 
expected  that  the  new  president  would  persecute  all  the 


394  A    VISIT   TO    PKTROGRAI)     [ciiai'.xxi. 

functionaries  of  the  Zemstvo  tainted  with  liberalism  : 
doctors,  schoolmasters,  directors  of  co-operative 
societies,  etc.  To  the  intense  astonishment  of  every  one, 
Stiirmer  not  only  kept  all  these  "  reds"  in  their  places, 
but  he  also  made  himself  the  advocate  of  his  col- 
leagues in  Petrograd,  cajoled  them,  and  after  two 
3'ears  of  administration,  during  which  everything  went 
smoothly,  he  was  made  a  Provincial  Governor.  The 
Liberal  party  in  Tver  almost  gave  him  an  ovation  at  his 
departure.  It  is  true  that  a  few  3'ears  later,  this  same 
Sttjrmer,  again  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  Tver  b}-  an 
ultra-Conservative  Home  Secretary,  behaved  like  a  pro- 
consul there,  denounced  his  former  friends  of  the  "  Left," 
caused  some  to  be  deported,  and  broke  all  the  others. 
But  to  excuse  him  one  ought  to  mention  that  his  mission 
was  of  short  duration  and  that  when  it  was  over  he  was 
to  have  a  post  at  the  Home  Office  as  a  reward.  To  sum 
up,  I  had  a  poor  opinion  of  the  character  of  this  shady 
individual;  but  I  thought  him  clever  and  intelligent  and 
1  hoped  that,  as  he  might  find  himself  faced  by  an  almost 
impossible  situation,  he  would,  by  some  clever  stroke, 
be  able  to  change  the  dangerous  course  adopted  or 
submitted  to  in  high  places,  thereby  restoring  a  little 
popularity  to  the  person  of  the  Emperor. 

My  conjectures  appeared  to  be  coming  true  on  the 
spot.  His  Majesty  arrived  from  General  Headquarters 
and  during  a  very  brief  stay  at  Tsarskoe,  to  every  one's 
intense  astonishment,  he  announced  his  visit  to  the 
Duma  and  went  to  it  the  same  day.  It  was  a  most 
dramatic  stroke  :  the  first  time  that  national  represen- 
tation was  holding  a  sitting  at  the  Taurida  Palace,  the 
Tsar  deigned  to  attend.  He  had,  it  is  true,  opened  the 
session  of  the  first  Duma  in  perso« — the  revolutionary 
Duma  of  1906;  when  receiving  the  members  of  this 
Duma  at  a  memorable  ceremony  in  the  Winter  Palace, 
His  Majesty  had  made  them  a  speech  in  which  he  alluded 
to  the  representatives  of  the  nation  as  "the  best  men  of 
Russia,"  ^  but  this  did  not  prevent  him  sending  them  all 
^  ''  Lootchic  Rousskie  Ludi." 


iy.6]       THE  TSAK  ATTENDS  THE  DUMA         395 

back  to  their  homes  four  months  later!  But  since  then 
the  sessions  of  the  subsequent  Dumas  had  been  opened 
by  the  President  of  the  Council,  and  the  Emperor  him- 
self had  never  ventured  into  this  "cave  of  iEolus," 
whence  however,  since  1907,  nothing  but  soft  breezes 
and  zephyrs  had  issued  forth,  which  were  quite 
incapable  of  sweeping  anything  away  or  of  impeding  the 
course  of  the  governmental  ship. 

The  Emperor's  arrival  provoked  a  storm  of  en- 
thusiasm amongst  all  the  members  of  the  Duma  and  in 
the  large  crowd  which  had  gathered  at  the  news  of  the 
Imperial  visit.  There  was  no  session  in  the  presence  oi 
His  Majesty,  who  addressed  a  few  unimportant  words  to 
the  representatives  of  the  nation  in  the  Great  Hall ; 
there  was  as  usual  a  Te  Deimi  in  which  the  Tsar  and 
the  members  of  the  Duma  took  part ;  there  was  a 
stirring  speech  from  the  president,  M.  Rodzianko,  a 
speech  greeted  with  rousing  applause.  It  was  like 
an  electric  shock  throughout  Petrograd.  In  this  visit 
to  the  Duma  every  one  wished  to  see  a  token  of  recon- 
ciliation between  the  Court  and  public  opinion  ;  they 
anticipated  the  probable  consequences  of  the  event : 
change  of  certain  Ministers,  suppression  of  certain  odious 
and  ridiculous  measures,  cessation  of  the  Rasputin 
scandal.  Alas  !  all  these  hopes  were  doomed  to  prompt 
disappointment.  Even  I  had  soon  to  lower  my  tone.  I 
realised  that  M.  Sturmer,  with  advancing  years,  had  lost 
even  his  shrewdness  of  former  days  and  that  now  he 
was  only  capable  of  telling  clumsy  lies  and  indulging  in 
tricks  that  could  not  deceive  any  one.  From  henceforth 
a  whirlwind  of  madness  enveloped  the  Tsarskoe  Palace, 
a  madness  with  which  the  Emperor  was  infected  at 
every  visit  which  his  wife  paid  him  at  General  Head- 
quarters at  Mohilev.  There  were  some  changes  of 
Ministers,  but,  alas!  of  the  worst  description;  and  the 
Rasputin  scandal  reached  monstrous  proportions. 

On    the   very    day    that    the  Emperor  attended  the 
Diim^    I    went    to    call  on    Prince    Galitzyn,    recently 


396  A   VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD     [cii.m'.xxi. 

appointed  president  of  an  important  Commission  of  the 
Russian  Red  Cross.  For  some  time  the  directors  of  the 
Red  Cross  had  been  causing  trouble  with  our  Stockholm 
Committee  ;  they  allowed  us  the  very  small  grant  agreed 
upon  beforehand  and  at  the  same  time  they  wished  at 
all  costs  to  subject  us  to  scrupulous  control ;  I  knew  that 
they  really  wished  to  impose  on  us  the  collaboration  of 
some  "  tchinovniks  "  who  would  only  have  put  spokes 
in  our  wheel.  The  work  of  our  Stockholm  Committee 
had  become  so  popular  amongst  the  Russian  public  that 
all  those  who  were  about  to  make  their  career  through 
the  channel  of  the  Red  Cross  wanted  to  have  a  hand  in 
this  work  and  to  pretend  that  it  was  they  who  directed  it. 

I  had  known  Prince  Nicolas  Galitzyn  in  Tver, 
where  he  had  been  Governor  for  a  time.  Moderate, 
essentially  honest  and  a  gentleman,  but  idle  and  super- 
ficial in  the  discharge  of  his  duties,  he  presented  the 
pleasing  and  correct  type  of  a  man  of  the  world,  always 
dancing  attendance  on  one  of  the  local  beauties.  I 
found  the  dear  Prince  somewhat  aged  and  changed. 
He  received  me  with  his  usual  urbanit}',  but  during  the 
business-talk  that  I  started,  I  realised  at  once  that  the 
new  president  of  the  Red  Cross  had  no  other  ideas  than 
those  with  which  he  was  endued   by  the  factotum  of 

this  organisation,  a  certain  M.  T ,  an  insidious  man 

and  a  worker  who  for  some  years  had  entirely  managed 
the  Russian  Red  Cross  by  shelving  all  the  presidents  in 
succession. 

In  the  course  of  conversation  Galitzyn  mentioned  the 
Empress  Alexandra,  with  whom  he  had  had  to  do  as 
president  of  the  Special  Committee  of  Assistance,  and  I 
could  see  that  the  dear  Prince  was  a  complete  victim  to 
her  Majesty's  charms.  He  could  not  say  enough  about 
the  great  cleverness,  the  virtues,  the  wonderful  work  of 
his  august  patroness.  It  was  senile  and  unrestrained 
adoration, 

A  year  later  the  poor  Prince — suddenly  appointed 
President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  to  the  amazement 
of  the   public   and   by  virtue  of  his   devotion   to   the 


I9I6]   PRINCE  ALEXANDER  OF  OLDENBURG    397 

Empress — presided  as  a  figure-head  during  the  closing 
weeks  of  the  old  regime,  went  through  the  terrible  days 
of  the  Revolution  in  the  same  state  of  surprise  as  that 
in  which  he  had  submitted  to  his  appointment,  and 
finally  found  himself  in  a  cell  in  the  Peter  and  Paul 
fortress,  from  which,  however,  he  was  eventually 
released  as  a  guileless  and  irresponsible  person.  I  do 
not  know  what  has  become  of  the  poor  old  gentleman 
since. 

What  a  difference  between  this  dull,  lackadaisical 
man  and  Prince  Alexander  of  Oldenburg,  whom  I  had 
called  on  the  day  before  !  His  Palace  on  the  Quai  de  la 
Cour  looked  like  a  hive  in  full  activity,  where  doctors, 
scientists  and  sisters  collected  to  make  reports,  receive 
instructions,  exchange  opinions  with  this  energetic  man 
of  few  words,  who  had  a  blunt  manner,  but  who,  never- 
theless, was  full  of  kindness  and  true  pity  for  suffering 
humanity,  never  more  in  need  of  pity  than  now.  We 
had  a  pregnant  conversation  on  the  subject  of  the  trans- 
port of  the  wounded,  which  the  Prince  was  directing 
in  Russia,  and  of  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war. 
General  and  instructive  conversation  animated  the  lunch 
to  which  I  was  invited  after  the  interview,  and  at  which 
I  met  the  principal  assistants  of  the  indefatigable  host. 
One  felt  that  the  Prince  had  seen  everything  with  his 
own  eyes  during  his  constant  journeys  across  Russia, 
Europe,  Asia,  that  he  had  taken  part  in  the  experiments 
of  scientists,  the  distribution  of  clothing,  the  cooking  of 
food,  the  fumigating  of  wards.  Ah !  thought  I,  if  only 
Russia  had  more  such  untiring  men  of  action,  of  unfail- 
ing energy !  This  one  may  well  have  his  faults,  as  all 
mankind  has  ;  but  in  his  case  it  would  never  be  faults 
o{  omission,  which  are  the  very  worst  of  which  anj^  one 
can  be  guilty  at  a  time  demanding  above  all  else 
courageous  initiative  and  unremitting  toil ! 

On  leaving  Galitzyn  I  went  to  see  M,  Alexis  Neid- 
hart,  who  was  at  the  head  of  a  special  committee  in 
connection  with  our  prisoners  of  war.     1  had  not  seen 


39S  A   VISIT  TO    PKTROGRAD     [niAi-.  xxi. 

M.  Neidhart  since  Moscow,  when  he  was  a  schoolboy 
of  about  twelve  or  fifteen  years  of  age, ^  but  I  had  often 
heard  him  spoken  of  since  as  a  man  of  intellect,  tact  and 
merit,  who,  having  been  elected  a  member  of  the 
Council  of  the  Empire,  had  made  himself  the  head  of 
an  influential  group  of  moderate  and  intelligent  Con- 
servatives. In  the  course  of  an  hour  of  agreeable  and 
pregnant  conversation  all  business  relative  to  our 
work  for  the  prisoners  of  war  was  settled  with  M. 
Neidhart ;  I  received  the  kind  promise  of  a  sub- 
stantial grant — a  promise  carried  out  soon  after — and 
1  left  much  charmed  with  his  broad  and  open  mind, 
and  his  manner  so  entirel}-  devoid  of  Petrograd 
"tchinovism." 

During  the  last  years  of  Nicolas  II. 's  reign  there 
had  been  much  talk  in  Petrograd  of  the  possibility 
of  placing  M.  Alexis  Neidhart  at  the  head  of  affairs.  He 
was  a  firm  Monarchist  and  a  Conservative,  but  a  moderate 
Conservative,  taking  the  word  in  its  Western  sense,  that 
is  to  say  completely  exempt  from  that  tendency  to 
despotism  and  that  coarseness  of  behaviour  that  charac- 
terise the  Russian  reactionaries.  He  and  his  group, 
in  that  case,  would  probably  have  imposed  their  own 
conditions :  i.e.  they  would  have  demanded  the  genuine 
homogeneousness  of  the  Cabinet,  the  suppression  of 
the  despotic  rights  of  the  State  Police,  and  the  frank 
acceptation  by  the  Emperor  of  the  constitutional  system 
for  Russia,  if  not  of  an  integral  parliamentarianism. 
Moreover,  Neidhart  and  his  friends  were  not  the  only 
people  to  preach  such  a  programme;  they  had  eminent 
seniors  and  forerunners  who  sat  with  them  at  the 
Council  of  the  Empire;  these  included  old  M.  Andrew 
Saburoff,  one  of  the  most  European  and  cultivated  of 
statesmen  ;  M.  Koni,  a  distinguished  philanthropist,  and 
a  ready  help  in  all  trouble  and  in  all  good  causes ;  M. 
Alexis  Yermoloff,  Minister  of  Agriculture  for  a  time,  a 
thorough    expert    in    this    primordial    branch    of   the 

*  He  was  the  brother  of  Madame  Peter  Stolypin  ;  his  other  sister 
was  Madame  Sazonoff, 


i9i6]         AUDIENCE  OF  THE   EMPEROR  399 

economic  and  national  life  of  Russia ;  Prince  Sviato- 
polk-Mirsky,  for  a  short  time  Home  Secretary,  an  en- 
lightened man  and  a  firm  Liberal ;  M.  Kulomzin,  true 
type  of  the  superior  official  of  solid  learning  and  broad 
views,  who  had  grown  white  in  the  service  of  the  State, 
after  having  spent  his  scholastic  career  at  Cambridge  ; 
and  a  great,  great  many  others.  Most  of  these  men 
belonged  by  birth  to  the  best  society  of  Russia,  they  had 
all  worked  either  with  the  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  him- 
self or  with  his  father.  But  the  unfortunate  Emperor 
had  never  once  thought  of  summoning  them  to  the 
Palace  to  ask  their  advice  even  in  the  most  critical 
moments.  He  saw  them  on  official  occasions,  his 
manner  was  kindness  itself,  he  spoke  a  few  pleasant 
but  unimportant  words  to  them  and  dismissed  them 
with  a  charming  smile.  However,  swindlers  like 
Stiirmer,  acknowledged  lunatics  like  Protopopoff,  abso- 
lute nonentities  like  Galitzyn,  and  a  host  of  others, 
were  called  to  power.  And  meantime  individuals  of 
the  lowest  category  (Rasputin  was  only  the  most  promi- 
nent and  disreputable  one)  penetrated  into  the  Palace 
through  the  back-door;  every  one  talked  with  them 
and  allowed  themselves  to  be  influenced  by  the  wildest 
creations  of  the  brains  of  these  creatures.  Quern  dciis 
vidt  perdcre  I  .  .  . 

I  was  received  by  the  Emperor  the  very  day  that  he 
was  returning  to  Mohilev.  The  Emperor  gave  me  a 
welcome  which  touched  me  deeply.  In  his  kindest  tones 
he  thanked  me  for  my  services  in  Sweden.  I  made  a  low 
bow,  and  having  expressed  my  heartfelt  gratitude  for 
the  gracious  v/ords  of  the  Sovereign,  1  ventured  to 
remark  that  my  services  amounted  to  very  little  in 
comparison  with  those  of  the  innumerable  Russians 
who  had  given  their  blood  and  their  life  for  their  country 
and  their  Tsar. 

"  Yes,  Nekludoff,  but  you  also  have  fmly  upheld  the 
flag  of  your  country y  The  Emperor  passed  on  to  the 
question  of  Swedish  activism  and  the  Aland  Islands; 


400  A  VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxi. 

he  commanded  me  to  reassure  the  King  of  Sweden 
thoroughly  on  the  subject  of  Russia's  intentions  in  that 
quarter;  the  fortifications  erected  on  the  Aland  Islands 
were  a  necessity  of  war,  and  would  disappear  as  soon 
as  the  war  was  over,  etc.  I  then  offered  my  respectful 
congratulations  to  the  Emperor.  "But  what  on?" 
"  But  on  the  capture  of  Erzerum,  sir ! "  "  Ah,  yes,  yes  ! " 
he  started,  as  if  he  had  been  dreaming;  "certainly  it 
was  a  fine  performance  of  our  troops."  .  .  .  Then  the 
I^mperor  was  kind  enough  to  say  a  few  words  to  me 
about  my  son,  who  had  just  joined  the  regiment  of 
which  His  Majesty  was  the  virtual  commander,  and  the 
uniform  of  which  he  nearly  always  wore ;  and  then  I 
was  graciously  dismissed. 

At  this  audience  I  noticed  a  great  change  in  the 
Emperor.  These  two  years  of  terrible  trials  had  natu- 
rally aged  him  ;  his  hair  and  beard  were  streaked  with 
white,  his  eyes  were  sunken.  But  it  was  not  that  that 
impressed  me  most.  I  noticed  a  kind  of  weariness,  a  kind 
of  constant  preoccupation  which  seemed  to  prevent  him 
concentrating  his  whole  attention  on  the  conversation  on 
hand ;  the  vivacity  of  his  manner  and  of  his  mind  seemed 
to  have  vanished.  1  attributed  all  that  to  the  fatigue  of 
the  moment,  to  the  manifold  worries  of  the  situation. 
But  when  I  recall  those  memories  to-day  it  seems  to  me 
that  in  the  manner  and  appearance  of  the  Emperor 
Nicolas  II.  there  was  more  than  preoccupation,  more 
than  worry.  Perhaps  he  already  saw  the  abyss  opening 
at  his  feet  and  perhaps  he  knew  that  to  stop  was 
impossible,  that  he  must  pursue  his  way  towards  the 
inevitable  and  fatal  crash. 

I  never  saw  my  unfortunate  Emperor  again.  In  the 
course  of  this  book  I  have  often  had  to  deplore  the 
faults  committed  by  him — faults  which  he  expiated  in  a 
truly  ghastly  manner;  I  shall  still  have  occasion  to 
criticise  bitterly,  in  the  name  of  "  cold-eyed  justice,"  the 
last  actions  of  this  man,  fore-ordained  to  the  most 
appalling  catastrophes.  1  must  be  allowed  here  to 
tender  grateful   homage  to  the  kindness   that   he   had 


t9i6]  THE  GRAND-DUKE   PAUL  401 

always  shown  me,  to  his  universal  kindness,  to  liis  ardent 
patriotism  and  to  the  undeniable  nobility  and  sincerity 
of  his  personal  and  private  character. 

When  he  was  hurled  from  the  pinnacle  of  greatness, 
most  of  those  who  had  served  him,  fawned  on  him, 
flattered  him,  turned  against  him  and  no  longer  re- 
membered either  what  they  had  obtained  through  his 
generosity — or  his  weakness,  or  the  devotion  they  had 
heretofore  professed  to  the  person  of  the  Monarch. 
They  now  only  spoke  of  the  "country";  the  country 
must  be  saved  at  all  costs,  and  it  was  in  the  name  of  this 
sentiment — probably— that  they  abjured  their  former 
convictions  and  overthrew  their  former  idols.  Never- 
theless, in  saving  the  country,  they  intended  also  to  save 
their  interests,  their  position,  their  emoluments,  and 
it  is  that  side  of  the  case  which  has  always  appeared  to 
me  to  be  the  weak  point  in  all  the  fine  speeches  that  I 
heard,  from  the  outset  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  from 
the  lips  of  my  friends,  men  of  the  world,  men  in  office, 
who  from  one  day  to  another  had  become  the  staunch 
partisans  of  the  new  regime  and  the  assiduous  clients  of 
the  new  men,  the  dispensers  of  the  sportiila. 

The  next  day  I  returned  to  Tsarskoe-Selo  to  present 
myself  to  the  Empress  Alexandra. 

I  began  by  lunching  with  the  Grand-Duke  Paul  and 
Princess  PaleT  in  their  fine  palace  which  had  recently 
been  built.  I  found  myself  again  in  the  congenial 
atmosphere  of  the  informal  receptions  of  the  Grand- 
Duke  and  his  wife  in  Paris  at  their  charming  house  in 
the  "  Pare  des  Princes."  In  their  Tsarskoe  palace — 
built  and  decorated  by  French  experts  in  the  same 
Louis  XVI.  style,  but  larger  and  grander — there  were 
gathered  together  on  that  fine  winter's  morning  the 
same  people  I  had  seen  so  often  in  Paris  :  the  worthy 
Grand-Duke,  so  good,  so  simple  and  yet  so  refined ; 
the  beautiful  and  charming  Countess  of  Hohenfelsen 
(re-named  Princess  Palei  since  the  war  through  horror 
of  all  Boche  names) ;  their  two  daughters,  born  while  I 


402  A   VISIT  TO    PKTROGRAD    [chap.  xxi. 

was  in  Paris  in  1904  and  1905  ;  their  son,  whom  I  had 
watched  growing  up,  now  an  officer  in  the  Hussars  of 
the  Guard,  and  resting  at  Tsarskoe  after  having  been  a 
year  in  the  trenches;  one  or  two  intimate  friends  of  the 
family ;  suddenly  like  a  whirlwind  in  came  the  Grand- 
Duchess  Marie,  ex-Princess  William  of  Sweden,  in  her 
nurse's  uniform  ;  she  was  as  frank  and  simple  in  manner 
as  ever,  and  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour  she  and  I  talked  of 
Stockholm,  which  at  heart  she  still  loved  just  as  she  had 
been  loved  there. 

When  I  learnt  the  horrible  fate  of  the  Grand-Duke 
and  his  unfortunate  morganatic  son,  I  recalled  vividly 
that  last  luncheon-party  at  Tsarskoe ;  with  it  mingled 
other  memories — of  Paris,  Florence,  Constantinople — 
right  back  to  those  far-away  days,  so  far  away  that  they 
seemed  as  a  dream  or  as  a  tale  that  is  told,  when  in 
Moscow,  in  1866,  about  a  dozen  of  us  small  boys  used 
to  go  on  Sundays  to  share  in  the  games  of  the  little 
Grand-Dukes  Serge  and  Paul;  days  of  real  fun  and  wild 
pranks  in  the  big  park  and  the  fine  suburban  palace  of 
Neskutchnoye,  under  the  strict  supervision  of  the  old 
mentor  of  the  Grand-Dukes,  Khrenoff",  formerly  a  non- 
commissioned officer  of  the  Guards,  who  never  let  us 
out  of  his  sight  and  whom  we  all  adored.  The  Grand- 
Duke  Paul  was  then  a  very  attractive  child  of  seven 
years  of  age,  with  pink  cheeks,  lively  but  always  good  ; 
who  could  have  foreseen  for  him  that  ghastly  end, 
preceded  by  the  most  terrible  privations  and  the  vilest 
cruelty? 

But  I  must  return  to  Tsarskoe.  At  two  o'clock  I 
went  to  see  the  Empress  Alexandra,  who,  in  my  honour, 
had  discarded  her  usual  sister's  uniform  and  donned  her 
smartest  clothes  :  it  was  quite  the  Empress  receiving 
her  Minister  Plenipotentiary.  I  had  not  been  near  Her 
Majesty  since  February,  1911,  when,  beautiful,  charming 
and  good  tempered,  she  had  received  me  and  my  wife 
and  eldest  daughter  in  that  same  bright  drawing-room 
filled  with  flowers.  I  found  the  Empress  changed.  She 
had  a  deep  vertical  wrinkle  between  her  eyebrows  which 


I9I6]  THE   EMPRESS  ALEXANDRA  403 

gave  her  an  expression  of  morbid  tension.  Her  eyes 
were  intensely  sad.  Her  Majesty  spoke  to  me  first 
about  matters  relative  to  the  work  of  the  Red  Cross 
and  to  that  of  our  Stockholm  Committee.  Then  she 
asked  me  whether  I  had  taken  the  necessary  measures 
so  that  the  goods  sent  by  the  Red  Cross  to  our  prisoners 
of  war  should  not  be  indefinitely  delayed  at  Haparanda 
(the  Swedish  frontier).  "  Madam,  I  have  made  inquiries 
on  the  subject,  and  they  prove  that  the  Swedish 
Red  Cross  does  all  in  its  power  to  get  the  goods 
across  the  frontier  without  hindrance,  and  to  send  them 
further !  " 

The  Empress  took  up  a  photograph  lying  on  the 
table  and  passed  it  to  me  :  "  But  all  the  same,  Monsieur, 
here  is  a  photograph  showing  a  huge  stock  of  goods  from 
the  Red  Cross  piled  up  in  the  open  air  at  Haparanda." 

"  I  know  that  photograph,  Madam,  I  have  been  shown 
it  before ;  but  that  pile  of  cases  which  Your  Majesty 
sees  there  are  not  goods  from  the  Red  Cross,  but  postal 
packages  in  transit  that  Sweden  kept  back  for  months 
at  the  frontier  by  way  of  reprisal.  Your  Majesty  is 
well  aware  that  every  case  and  every  bale  from  the 
Red  Cross  is  marked  with  a  Geneva  cross  quite  large 
enough  to  come  out  in  this  photograph;  now  Your 
Majesty  will  be  good  enough  to  observe  that  it  is  not  to 
be  seen  on  the  cases  shown  here." 

The  Empress  took  the  photograph  and  examined  it 
carefully.  "That  is  true,"  she  said,  replacing  it  on  the 
table. 

After  that  she  turned  the  conversation  to  general 
questions  concerning  politics  and  the  war,  and  she  laid 
great  stress  on  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  which — 
abroad  as  well  as  at  home— called  for  the  greatest  and 
most  unceasing  straining  of  efforts.  "Alas!  So  few 
people  here  seem  to  realise  the  gravity  and  the  dangers 
of  the  hour ;  there  are  some  houses  in  Petrograd  where 
they  even  dance!  "  added  Her  Majesty,  emphasising  the 
words.  Soon  after  I  was  graciously  dismissed.  The 
audience  made  a  somewhat  unfavourable  impression  on 

2  D 


404  A   VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD        [chap.  xxi. 

me;  it  may  well  have  been  that  I  was  prejudiced  against 
my  august  hostess  ;  but  it  seemed  to  me  that  she  wished 
to  show  me  to  what  extent  she  shared  the  worries  of 
the  Government  and  of  the  High  Command,  and  to 
make  me  understand  that  when  one  came  to  Petrograd 
on  business  connected  with  one's  official  duties,  one 
ought  to  discuss  this  business  with  the  Empress.  The 
co-regency  had  begun. 

Two  days  later  I  called  on  the  Dowager  Empress. 
Her  Majesty  discussed  with  me  the  unprecedented 
sufferings  inflicted  by  Germany  on  our  prisoners  of  war  ; 
she  mentioned  the  insults  to  which  she  had  been 
subjected  in  Berlin  when  she  passed  through  Germany 
the  day  before  the  declaration  of  war,  on  her  way  from 
the  Belgian  frontier  to  Copenhagen.  The  dear  good 
Empress  did  not  conceal  the  feeling  of  profound  disgust 
inspired  in  her  by  German  cruelty  and  the  duplicity  of 
William  II. ;  the  terms  she  used  were  as  frank  as  they 
were  cutting. 

I  also  went  to  see  the  Grand  -  Duke  Nicolas 
Mikhailovitch,  whom  I  had  often  met  during  my  last 
years  in  Paris  and  in  Petrograd.  The  enemies  of  this 
man,  who  was  both  clever  and  cultivated,  liked  to 
compare  him  to  Philippe  Egalit^,  and  asserted  that  he 
intrigued  with  the  "Masonic"  party  against  his  august 
cousin,  the  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  Nothing  was  ever 
less  true.  A  very  sincere  Liberal,  the  Grand-Duke  did 
not  restrain  his  criticisms  of  a  regime  that  he  considered 
disastrous,  as  much  for  the  country  as  for  the  combined 
interests  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Imperial  Family;  he 
did  so  with  an  openness  that  precluded  all  idea  of 
intrigue ;  the  most  that  could  be  said  of  him  was  that 
he  had  the  characteristics  of  the  perpetual  fault-finder. 
Carefully  excluded  from  politics  and  the  government  of 
the  Empire,  he  had  taken  refuge  in  the  sphere  of 
historical  research.  The  studies  and  works  which  he 
wrote  himself,  and  which  were  brought  out  in  sumptuous 
editions  to  which  one  was  not  accustomed  in  Russia, 


i9i6j  IMPRESSIONS  OF   MY  VISIT  405 

are  of  undeniable  interest.  His  excellent  and  impartial 
history  of  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  I.  is  the 
work  of  a  true  historian,  and  was  very  well  received 
abroad.  Nicolas  Mikhailovitch  was  a  sincere  and  faithful 
friend  to  France;  he  had  some  intimate  friends  among 
French  contemporary  historians. 

The  Grand-Duke  received  me  in  his  magnificent 
study  filled  with  a  precious  collection  of  portraits- 
historical  miniatures.  What  has  now  become  of  this 
superb  collection?  Our  conversation  naturally  turned 
on  the  political  questions  of  the  day.  My  august  host 
did  not  restrain  his  criticism.  He  was  of  opinion  that 
we  were  making  for  a  revolution  which  would  probably 
not  break  out  while  the  war  lasted,  but  certainly  im- 
mediately after  the  conclusion  of  peace.  "  Alexander  III. 
did  not  like  me  very  much  ;  Nicolas  II.,  although  full  of 
kindness  for  me  as  a  private  individual,  has  a  holy 
horror  of  my  ideas.  Nevertheless,  I  have  served  them 
faithfully,  and  I  am  always  ready  to  serve  the  Emperor; 
only  I  cannot  conceal  from  him  that  first  and  foremost 
I  have  duties  towards  my  country  and  the  Russian 
people." 

The  impression  I  received  from  the  ten  or  twelve 
days  spent  in  Petrograd  was  frankly  bad.  Public  dis- 
pleasure could  not  be  hidden.  In  drawing-rooms,  in 
the  offices  of  journalists,  politicians,  scientists,  there  was 
violent  criticism  of  the  last  appointments,  the  actions  of 
the  Government,  the  perennial  conflict  in  the  very 
bosom  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  between  M.  Sazonoff, 
Krivocheine,  Count  Ignatieff,  General  Polivanoff  on  one 
side,  and  Stiirmer,  Trepoff,  Prince  Schakhovskoy,  pro- 
tagonists of  the  reactionary  party,  on  the  other.  Count 
Kokovtzoff,  whom  I  made  a  point  of  calling  on,  predicted 
the  worst  calamities.  Others  were  less  pessimistic,  but 
they  anxiously  wondered  how  far  the  blindness  of  the 
unfortunate  Emperor  would  go;  they  all  pitied  him; 
but  his  weakness  was  the  subject  of  the  bitterest 
criticism. 


4o6  A   VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxi. 

Concerning  the  war  itself  every  one  was  far  less 
gloomy.  They  were  hopeful  about  the  reorganisation 
of  the  Russian  forces,  and  were  confidently  awaiting 
the  offensive  which  was  to  take  place  in  the  spring.  I 
remember  a  dinner-party  composed  only  of  men  where 
this  question  was  much  discussed.  One  of  the  guests 
upheld  the  theory  that  from  the  purely  military  point  of 
view  one  could  not  hope  for  decisive  successes,  nor  need 
one  fear  fresh  reverses  ;  that  in  fact  it  would  be  a  draw. 
I  disputed  that  theory  hotly.  "  Either  zve  shall  do  for 
them  or  else  they  ivill  do  for  us,"  I  summed  up  my  opinion  ; 
"there  can  be  no  medium  between  complete  victory  and 
complete  disaster ;  and  the  final  result  will  be  seen  in 
the  autumn  of  1918  at  the  latest."  At  my  suggestion  a 
short  formula  of  the  two  opinions  was  drawn  up ;  my 
opponent  alone  signed  his  own ;  all  the  other  guests 
wrote  their  names  under  mine,  and  we  gave  the  document 
into  the  keeping  of  the  Italian  Ambassador,  Marquis 
Carlotti,  who  was  one  of  those  present. 

And  the  people  ?  At  first  sight  nothing  seemed  to 
reveal  their  frame  of  mind.  Externally  it  was  the  same 
colourless,  apathetic,  sleepy  mass.  But  the  persons 
who  came  most  regularly  in  contact  with  the  working- 
classes  of  the  capital  and  the  country,  with  the  lower 
orders,  did  not  conceal  their  anxiety. 

I  was  out  one  day  in  a  "izvostchik"  with  a  young, 
intelligent  and  well-educated  woman,  whose  modest 
income  and  occupations  brought  her  a  great  deal  in 
touch  with  the  masses.  We  passed  a  queue  which 
had  formed  outside  a  provision  shop.  Women  were  in 
the  majority,  but  both  men  and  women  walked  up  and 
down  the  frozen  pavement  with  the  same  air  of  gloomy 
indifference.  "  That  is  what  will  make  us  lose  the  war," 
said  my  companion,  pointing  to  the  queue. 

"  /«  Cauda  vencmtm  ?"  I  asked,  jokingly. 

"  Do  not  joke ;  what  I  tell  you  is  the  absolute  truth. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  was  enthusiasm 
among  the  lower  classes,  at  least  in  Petrograd,  which  I 


I9I6]         MUTTERINGS   OF  REVOLUTION         407 

have  never  left.  But  now  nothing  remains  but  weariness 
and  apathy.  It  has  lasted  too  long.  The  people  are 
deeply  displeased  at  the  privations  they  have  to  under- 
go ;  they  seize  eagerly  on  all  tales  about  malpractices 
that  are  being  indulged  in,  about  dissensions  in  the 
bosom  of  the  Government,  about  Court  scandals.  They 
comment  on  all  that  in  their  own  way.  When  one  goes 
about  a  great  deal  among  the  people  one  often  hears 
things  that  make  one  shudder!" 

"  But  the  workmen  are  getting  huge  wages  ? 
Drunkenness  has  been  abolished?  There  are  no  ragged 
people  to  be  seen  in  the  streets?  So  whence  comes  all 
this  discontent?" 

'*  From  our  reverses  of  last  year,  which  the  people 
felt  far  more  deeply  than  is  generally  believed ;  from 
the  propaganda  of  the  revolutionary  leaders,  which  is 
more  vehement  than  ever.  True,  a  workman's  family 
at  the  present  time  have  warm  clothes,  good  boots ; 
they  sometimes  even  buy  a  gramophone ;  but  the 
moment  any  discomfort,  any  disappointment  occurs  : 
a  rise  in  prices,  scarcity  of  provisions,  a  necessity  to 
spend  hours  on  the  pavement  in  order  to  buy  the  least 
thing,  brutality  on  the  part  of  the  police — and  all  the 
relative  comfort  is  forgotten,  and  one  hears  threats 
uttered  in  a  spirit  of  bitter  hostility." 

This  conversation,  like  other  somewhat  similar  ones, 
gave  me  food  for  deep  thought. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  I  had  heard  on  all 
sides  that  the  danger  of  a  revolution  had  been  tem- 
porarily warded  off.  All  the  parties  of  the  Left,  begin- 
ning with  the  "  cadets  "  and  ending  with  the  Socialist- 
revolutionaries,  had  pledged  themselves  not  to  undertake 
anything  that  might  hinder  the  progress  of  the  war;  all 
these  people  were  supposed  to  have  agreed  that  a 
German  victory  would  be  the  worst  blow  struck  at  the 
cause  of  liberty,  in  Russia  and  elsewhere ;  that  con- 
sequently it  was  first  and  foremost  necessary  to  win 
the  war. 


408  A  VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxi. 

But  when  the  representatives  of  Liberal  opinions  in 
Russia  agreed  thus  to  proclaim  a  kind  of  "  sacred 
union,"  and  declared  that  as  long  as  the  war  lasted  they 
would  prevent  a  revolution  from  breaking  out,  they 
were  reckoning  without  their  host,  that  is  to  say  with- 
out Germany. 

German  policy  had  reckoned  on  the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.  She  was 
counting  on  it  firmly.  Long  before  the  precipitation 
of  political  events  in  Europe  had  brought  about  the 
conflagration,  the  German  Government  had  begun  to 
knead  the  dough  in  Russia — dough  into  which  the 
leaven  of  revolutionism  was  worked.  In  1905  and 
1906  the  role  of  the  German  agents  with  regard  to  a 
Russian  revolution  was  an  ostensibly  negative  one.  At 
that  period  William  II.  thought  and  hoped  to  allure  the 
Tsar  afresh  through  the  support  he  lent  him  and  the 
favours  he  lavished  on  him.  But  when,  after  Bjoerkoe 
and  more  especially  after  the  tightening  of  Anglo- 
Russian  ties,  the  Kaiser's  hopes  had  faded  away,  then 
Berlin  entered  resolutely  into  relations  with  the  Russian 
revolutionaries,  and  sent  resolute  and  clever  agents 
amongst  the  working-classes  of  the  Empire.  These 
agents  were  rarely  recognised  revolutionaries.  There 
was  a  whole  category  of  people  who  could  further 
Germany's  schemes  without  having  to  write  themselves 
down  as  Socialists,  without  having  to  think  that  they 
were  engaged  in  a  work  of  pure  destruction  ;  especially 
without  arousing  the  suspicions  of  the  Russian  police. 

These  agents — often  unconscious  ones — were  the 
German  proprietors,  directors,  workmen,  of  the  numer- 
ous German  industrial  enterprises  in  Russia. 

Foreign  colonies  are,  always  and  everywhere,  in- 
clined to  criticise  the  country  in  which  they  find  them- 
selves. More  especially  does  this  apply  to  the  foreign 
colonies  established  in  Russia,  when  in  the  course  of 
their  work  they  are  confronted  by  the  malpractices 
and  venality  of  the  police,  the  dilatoriness  of  the 
administration    etc.      Nevertheless,    up    to    a    certain 


i9i6]  GERMAN   MACHINATIONS  409 

period   the    Germans   who    had   work    in    Russia   had 
received  the   word   of  command   to   show  themselves 
conservative,  loyal  to  the  Imperial  Government,  obedient 
to  the  authorities.    Towards  1907  the  word  of  command 
was  changed.     "  Russia  and  her  governors  were  worth 
nothing;  the  duty  of  the  Germans  established  in  Russia 
was  to  bring  to  the  unfortunate    Russian   people  the 
good  news  of  their  political  and  social  rights."     As  ever, 
when  it  is   a   question  of  German   action,   the   Berlin 
directions  were  carried  out  with  zeal  and  uniformity. 
Whole  bales  of  proclamations  and  revolutionary  litera- 
ture were   sent   from   Germany  to   Russia  under  the 
benevolent  eye   of  the  frontier-authorities   and  even — 
so  I  have  been  told — under  that  of  German  diplomats 
and  consuls.      A  remarkably  intelligent  Frenchwoman 
belonging    to    the    Diplomatic    Corps    of    Petrograd, 
Frau   von    L,  told   me   that  one   day,  in  her  draimng- 
room.  Baron  von  Lucius — at  that  time  Counsellor  to  the 
German   Embassy — had   announced   in  loud   and   clear 
tones  :  "What  is  all  this  about  Russia?     Russia  cannot 
and  dare  not  go  to  war.     And  if  she  dared,  the  very 
next  day  the  revolution,  fully  armed,  would  come  from 
there  "  (and  the  Counsellor  pointed  towards  the  work- 
shops and  foundries  on  the   other   side  of  the    Neva) 
"  and  would  hurl  itself  on  all  these  beautiful  palaces ! " 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as  I  have  said,  the 
Germans  were  awaiting  with  feverish  impatience  the 
outbreak  of  revolutionary  disturbances  in  Russia. 
These  disturbances  as  yet  showed  no  signs  of  occurring  ; 
on  the  contrary — miracle  and  malediction ! — the  entire 
Russian  people  seemed  seized  afresh  with  true  patriotic 
ardour.  But  in  191 5,  the  reverses  of  the  Russian 
armies,  the  grumbling  caused  by  the  lack  of  munitions, 
the  terrible  sufferings  of  the  populations  who  were 
fleeing  and  whose  flight  was  encouraged,  before  the 
German  invasion,  the  fatigue  of  the  working-classes, 
the  mistakes  made  by  the  Government — all  that  com- 
bined to  cause  Berlin  to  hope  that  the  ardently  wished- 
for  Russian  revolution— the  One  which  alone  could  save 


410  A  VISIT  TO   PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxi. 

Germany — was  at  last  becoming  visible  on  the  horizon. 
From  that  moment  everything  was  done  to  bring  about 
the  outbreak  as  soon  as  possible.  On  one  side  the 
agents  who  influenced  the  working-men  redoubled  their 
efforts;  on  the  other,  the  invisible  but  numerous  wires 
which  still — in  spite  of  the  war — connected  Russian 
society  with  Berlin  were  set  working.  Gossip,  false 
rumours,  exaggerations  were  disseminatedin  the  capitals, 
the  provinces,  even  in  the  ranks  of  the  Army.  The 
conscious  and  unconscious  agents  of  Germanic  influence 
incited  the  Court  and  the  rulers  of  the  hour  to  the  worst 
follies,  whilst  on  the  other  hand  public  displeasure  was 
skilfully  stimulated  and  exasperated. 

Nevertheless,  at  the  beginning  of  1916  the  principal 
forces  of  the  Russian  Opposition,  forces  which,  as  I 
have  said,  had  sworn  not  to  allow  the  revolution  to 
break  out  as  long  as  the  war  lasted,  still  remained 
loyal  to  their  pledge.  In  order  that  their  formula,  "  no 
revolution  in  war-time,"  should  be  abandoned  and  re- 
placed by  "a  revolution  to  save  the  war,"  it  was 
necessary  that,  by  a  series  of  actions  and  measures  of 
calamitous  absurdity  the  supreme  power  should  give 
them  the  illusion  that  the  reactionary  party  was 
contemplating  an  understanding  with  the  enemy ;  it 
was  necessary  that  rumours  cleverly  exaggerated  and 
disseminated  should  lead  even  the  allies  of  Russia  to 
doubt  the  fidelity  of  the  Russian  Monarchy  to  the 
common  cause.  All  this  was  necessary  and  all  this  was 
done  from  the  month  of  July,  1916,  through  the 
strenuous  efforts  of  the  agents  and  partisans  of 
Germany  in  Russia;  through  the  ingenuousness  of 
Russian  public  opinion — not  to  mention  foreign  public 
opinion;  finally  through  that  fatality  which  presides 
over  the  great  events  of  history,  setting  at  nought  all 
human  prophecies,  weighing  men  and  nations  in  the 
scales  of  destiny  and  hurling  into  the  abyss  all  those 
who  are  found  wanting. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


EVIL   OMENS    IN    PETROGRAD 


On  arriving  in  Stockholm,  I  took  care  at  once  to  solicit 
an  audience  of  King  Gustaf  V.,  in  order  to  transmit 
to  His  Majesty  the  words  of  the  Emperor. 

I  was  received  in  the  King's  private  study,  a  small 
room,  with  walls  covered  with  purple  brocade,  and  filled 
with  a  fine  collection  of  old  Swedish  silver.  The  King 
was  in  plain  clothes  (I  had  been  ordered  to  wear  the 
same)  in  order  the  better  to  accentuate  the  purely 
private  character  of  my  audience.  I  transmitted  to  His 
Majesty  the  message  entrusted  to  me  by  my  august 
Master.  The  King  first  asked  me  if  I  had  informed  his 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  all  that  I  had  just  told 
him.  My  answer  being  in  the  affirmative,  Gustaf  V. 
said  that  it  was  with  sincere  pleasure  and  gratitude  that 
he  received  the  message  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor. 
"  I  cannot  hide  from  you,"  continued  the  King,  "  that 
the  question  of  the  Aland  Islands  has  been  seriously 
preoccupying  the  Swedish  Government  all  this  time. 
Swedish  public  opinion  has  been  excited  about  it 
repeatedly.  In  a  few  weeks  a  new  session  of  the  Riks- 
dag will  open  and  my  Ministers  think  that  they  will  have 
questions— possibly  very  insistent  ones — to  answer  on 
that  subject."  The  King  then  alluded  to  the  alarm  that 
Sweden  and  he  himself  had  felt  in  1908  at  our  intention 
to  revise — in  consequence  of  the  separation  of  Sweden 
and  Norway — the  additional  treaty  of  1856  which  dealt 
with  the  Aland  Archipelago.  The  recent  events  of  the 
war  had  disclosed  possibilities  and  dangers  which  did 
did  not  exist  before ;  so  the  Swedish  Government  had 

411 


412      EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxii. 

a  legitimate  desire  to  settle  the  Aland  question  in  a 
definitive  manner  which  would  not  lend  itself  to  any 
ambiguity,  and  this  could  only  be  done  by  a  direct  and 
formal  conversation  between  the  two  Governments. 

In  answer,  I  told  the  King  that  M.  Wallenberg  had 
already  given  me  to  understand  that  the  Swedish 
Government  wished  to  make  the  question  of  the  Aland 
Islands  the  object  of  a  new  special  convention  between 
Russia  and  Sweden ;  that  I  had  not  omitted  to  transmit 
this  wish  to  M,  Sazonoff,  and  that  as  far  as  our  Foreign 
Office  was  concerned  there  was  no  objection  to  beginning 
such  a  conversation,  provided  that  it  only  applied  to  the 
peace  regime  and  not  to  that  of  the  present  war. 

The  King  then  asked  me — but  laying  great  stress  on 
the  fact  that  it  was  private  and  confidential — whether  in 
Petrograd  they  did  not  see  any  possibility  of  stopping 
the  war.  I  replied  that  I  had  received  no  indication  of 
anything  of  the  kind ;  that  on  the  contrary  we  at  home 
were  more  than  ever  resolved  to  continue  the  struggle 
till  it  led  to  victory. 

"  I  must  tell  you  quite  frankly,  M.  Nekludoff,"  said 
the  King,  "that  personally  I  do  not  see  a  possibility  of 
victory  for  either  side  ;  this  awful  carnage  has  now  lasted 
more  than  eighteen  months ;  there  is  no  reason  why  it 
should  not  last  another  two  years,  with  no  result  but 
death,  ruin,  misery  to  innumerable  people.  And  what 
would  be  the  state  of  Europe  if  the  war  did  last  another 
two  years  ?  One  can  hardly  picture  it !  That  is  why 
here  we  continue  to  utter  the  most  fervent  prayers  for 
the  restoration  of  peace."  Gustaf  V.  said  all  this  in 
short,  detached  sentences  which  seemed  to  be  escaping 
him  in  spite  of  himself.  He  made  no  allusion  to  the 
means  by  which  the  war  might  be  stopped,  still  less  did 
he  outline  any  scheme.  It  was  a  cry  from  the  heart, 
prompted  by  the  humanitarian  feelings  of  the  King  and 
by  the  very  sincere  dread  of  seeing  his  country  involved, 
if  not  in  the  sanguinary  vortex  of  the  war,  at  any  rate 
in  the  material  ruin  and  the  political  dangers  which 
the    continuation    of    the    world-wide    struggle    must 


I9I6]         RUSSIAN   PARLIAMENTARIANS         413 

inevitably  bring  to  the  neutrals  as  well.  This  was, 
moreover,  the  only  occasion  on  which  the  King  spoke  in 
this  strain  to  me. 

During  my  visit  to  Petrograd  I  had  been  informed 
that  a  delegation  of  Russian  "parliamentarians,"  i.e. 
members  of  the  Duma  and  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire, 
were  soon  going  to  pass  through  Sweden  on  their  way 
to  the  allied  countries. 

These  gentlemen  did  arrive  in  Stockholm  in  March ; 
a  few  of  the  members  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  were 
missing  and  were  to  join  their  colleagues  later  ;  but  the 
members  of  the  Duma — with  the  Vice-President  of  this 
assembly,  M.  Protopopoff,  at  their  head— were  all  there. 
Among  the  "  cadets  "  there  were  M.  Miliukoff,  whom  I 
had  known  for  a  long  time,  M.  Schingareff  and  M.  Itchas, 
a  Lithuanian  whom  I  had  also  met  before.     The  other 
delegates  were   "grandees  of  lesser   importance."     M. 
Protopopoff,    "Octobrist    of  the    Left,"    attracted    my 
curiosity ;  I  had  heard  him  spoken  of  as  a  particularly 
intelligent  man,  very  independent  with  regard  to  the 
Government,  although  he  did  not   nurse  any  "subver- 
sive" opinions  ;  he  was  also  quoted  as  one  of  the  very 
rare  members  of  the  Duma  having  any  practical  know- 
ledge of  great  industrial  enterprises.     During  the  few 
hours  that  I  was  able  to  talk  to  the  Vice-President  of  the 
Duma,  he  did  not  appear  to  me  to  belie  his  reputation  : 
a  frank  way  of  talking,  devoid  of  all  exaggeration,  a 
faculty  for  assimilating  new  ideas  quickly  and  thoroughly; 
absence   of  prejudices  and   of  pre-conceived  opinions. 
Side  by  side  with  that,  a  slight  tinge  of  affectation  and 
an  obvious  wish  to  be  very  much  the  recognised  head  of 
the  parliamentary  delegation. 

Having  received  these  gentlemen  at  the  station  and 
accompanied  them  to  the  hotel,  I  invited  them  to  come 
and  have  lunch  at  the  Legation  to  meet  my  colleagues. 
After  lunch,  I  gathered  my  guests  together  round 
a  green  table  so  as  to  give  them  the  opportunity  of 
asking  questions  on  alt  matters  relative  to  our  relations 


414     KVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxii. 

with  Sweden  and  in  which  they  were  interested.  My 
colleagues  and  I  answered  them  to  tiie  best  of  our  ability. 
The  deputies  appeared  to  be  much  pleased  with  this 
colloquy.  It  enabled  them  to  clear  up  certain  points 
which  had  remained  obscure  to  them  and  to  amend  their 
judgment  on  others,  which  they  did  with  a  very  good 
grace. 

The  sitting  terminated  on  the  arrival  of  my  allied 
colleagues  and  a  few  Swedish  personages  ^  whom  I  had 
invited  to  meet  our  delegation.  The  French  Minister 
brought  with  him  another  "delegation";  this  was  M. 
Albert  Thomas,  at  the  time  the  very  popular  Minister 
of  Munitions,  who  was  going  (for  the  first  time)  to 
Petrograd  to  confer  with  our  military  administration. 
A  few  Frenchmen  accompanied  him. 

Very  soon  the  drawing-rooms  of  the  Legation  were 
filled,  and  there  was  a  hum  of  conversation.  Proto- 
popoff,  who  spoke  with  great  volubility,  was  surrounded  ; 
Miliukoff  (a  distinguished  linguist)  with  the  airs  and 
graces  of  the  late  Mezzofanti  entertained  every  one  of  his 
listeners  in  his  mother  tongue;  Albert  Thomas,  with 
his  characteristic  head,  his  mop  of  hair  and  full  beard, 
and  the  energetic  and  uncommon  expression  of  his  face, 
attracted  the  attention  of  everybody. 

"  He  does  look  clever,  that  Albert  Thomas,"  said  one 
of  my  compatriots  of  the  Duma  to  me.  "  It  would 
interest  me  so  much  to  talk  to  that  tvorking  man,  that 
real  man  of  the  people  risen  to  a  post  as  Minister. 
Unfortunately,  I  can  hardly  speak  any  French." 

"  Ah,  yes  !  "  I  replied  ;  "  he  has  a  very  characteristic 
and  clever  head;  but  do  not  deceive  yourself:  he  is  no 
more  a  working-man  than  you  or  I ;  he  is,  like  most 
Western  politicians,  a  clever  lawyer." 

The  speaker  was  M.  Schingareff,  the  most  striking 
and  congenial  of  the  delegates  of  the  Duma;  unfor- 
tunately his  almost  complete  ignorance  of  foreign  lang- 
uages prevented  his  being  noticed  and  appreciated  at  his 
true  value  in  France  and  England. 

^  M.  Wallenberg  was  away  temporarily. 


I9I6]  THE  ALAND   ISLANDS  415 

The    very   next    day   the    delegates    pursued    their 
journey. 

Meantime  the  question  of  the  Aland  Islands  was 
examined  more  fully  between  M.  Wallenberg  and  me, 
and  I  asked  M.  Sazonoff  to  authorise  me  to  address  a 
note  to  the  Foreign  Secretary  of  Sweden,  in  which  the 
assurances  given  by  me  to  the  King  from  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  would  be  recorded.  I  had  an  impression 
that  we  ought  to  take  into  consideration  the  fears  which 
were  being  manifested  in  Sweden  and  which  were  kept 
up  by  Swedish  Activists  and  German  instigation.  If  we 
refused  to  explain  ourselves  explicitly  on  this  question 
and  to  give  formal  promises  to  Sweden  they  would  con- 
sider it  a  proof  that  we  were  only  intent  on  gaining 
time  and  contemplating  using  the  Aland  Archipelago 
eventually  as  a  naval  or  aviation  base,  which,  as  it  was 
about  thirty  nautical  miles  from  Stockholm,  would 
effectually  constitute  a  permanent  menace  to  our  neigh- 
bour. Whereas  if  on  the  contrary  we  accepted  the 
negotiations  proposed  by  the  Swedish  Government  we 
should  prove  by  that  the  absence  on  our  side  of  all 
ulterior  motives  and  of  any  scheme  prejudicial  to  the 
safety  of  Sweden. 

M.  Sazonoff,  without  committing  himself  as  yet  on 
the  question  of  the  parleys  demanded  by  M.  Wallenberg, 
authorised  me,  however,  to  record  in  a  note  addressed 
to  the  Swedish  Government  at  a  fitting  moment  the 
assurances  concerning  the  fortifications  which  we  had 
erected  on  the  Archipelago  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  Hence  I  awaited  with  more  confidence  the 
agitation  which  the  reopening  of  the  Riksdag  was  to 
bring  with  it. 

As  the  Swedish  Government  had  clearly  foreseen, 
the  Activists  and  the  whole  Conservative  party,  from 
the  first  sittings,  began  to  raise  the  question  of  the 
Aland  Islands  vehemently,  as  well  as  that  of  the  harm 
done  to  commerce  and  to  the  economic  existence  of 
Sweden  by  the  strict  blockade  maintained  by  the  Entente 


4i6     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

Governments  against  Germany.  Violent  speeches  were 
made  at  the  Riksdag,  and  the  Swedish  Press — without 
excepting  even  the  organs  of  the  moderate  Liberals  i — 
requested  the  Government  to  guard  the  interests  of 
the  country  in  a  more  effectual  and  stronger  manner. 

This  campaign  upset  our  Foreign  Office.  Whereas 
formerly  I  had  pointed  out  without  reticence  the  dangers 
of  too  great  a  feeling  of  security  with  regard  to  Swedish 
Activist  agitation,  I  now  thought  it  my  duty  to  dis- 
courage a  too  abrupt  "  turn  about,"  and  to  reassure  my 
Government  as  to  the  real  import  of  what  was  occurring 
in  Sweden.  As  ever,  the  instant  anything  even  rather 
unusual  happened  in  Stockholm — often  even  when 
nothing  extraordinary  was  happening — the  Ministers 
of  the  Entente  in  Norway^  uttered  loud  cries  of  alarm  ; 
five  or  six  times  during  the  war  our  Governments  were 
much  upset  by  news  coming  from  Christiania  announc- 
ing the  immediate  entry  of  the  Swedes  into  the  war  on 
the  side  of  Germany ;  my  colleagues  and  I  had  to  use 
all  our  faculties  of  persuasion  to  refute  these  fantastic 
rumours  circulated  with  an  assurance  which  might 
really  impress  our  Governments  and  our  General  Staffs. 
We  presumed  that  our  colleagues  in  Christiania  had  to 
do  with  informants  and  agents  who  were  particularly 
zealous  and  imaginative. 

It  was  exactly  the  same  this  time ;  and  after  having 
spent  some  weeks  in  corresponding  with  M.  Sazonoff 
on  the  subject  of  the  declarations  and  concessions  that 
we  ought  to  make  to  the  Swedes  on  the  Aland  question, 
I  now  had  to  calm  the  nervousness  displayed  by  our 
General  Staff  and  which  naturally  spread  to  our  Foreign 
Office. 

While  all  this  fuss  was  going  on  my  colleagues  of  the 
Entente  and  I  were  pressing  M.  Wallenberg  to  com- 
municate to  the  Riksdag  the  assurances  he  had  received 
repeatedly  from  us  on  the  subject  of  the  Aland  Islands. 
I   drew   up   a    thoroughly   explicit    statement    on    this 

^  As  to  anything  touching  the  Aland  question. 
2  I  ought  to  except  the  Russian  Minister. 


I9I6]    M.  WALLENBERG'S  CLEVER  POLICY    417 

subject  and  handed  it  to  the  Swedish  Foreign  Secretary, 
but  on  condition  that  he  was  to  communicate  it  to 
Parliament ;  in  the  event  of  his  considering  it  inoppor- 
tune to  do  so,  he  was  to  return  the  document  to  me  and 
look  on  it  as  a  verbal  communication.  M.  Wallenberg 
was  quite  satisfied  with  the  contents  of  the  document, 
which  he  showed — as  I  heard  later — to  all  the  influential 
members  of  the  Riksdag;  but  he  did  not  wish  to  com- 
municate it  officially  to  this  assembly  and  returned  it  to 
me  as  had  been  arranged. 

At  a  certain  moment  I  thought  it  incumbent  on  me 
to  address  a  private  and  very  friendly  but  most  serious 
letter  to  M.  Wallenberg,  dealing  with  the  dangerous 
activities  of  certain  parliamentarians  and  of  certain 
organs  of  the  Swedish  Press.  This  letter,  much 
approved  of  by  my  colleagues,  was  worded  so  that 
the  Minister  could  submit  it  to  the  King  and  to  the 
political  personages  in  view — which  Wallenberg  made  a 
point  of  doing. 

Finally  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Aff"airs  made  detailed 
declarations  at  the  Riksdag  with  respect  to  the  questions 
which  seemed  to  be  aff'ecting  the  Assembly  so  strongly. 
He  did  so  with  much  frankness  and  at  the  same  time 
very  cleverly,  for  he  persisted  in  not  communicating  the 
statements  coming  from  the  Entente  Governments  and 
which  would  have  proved  in  black  and  white  that  the 
fears  of  the  country  were  exaggerated,  to  say  the  least  of 
it.  At  the  time  my  colleagues  and  I  wondered  why 
the  Swedish  Government  thus  persisted  in  not  "  show- 
ing their  vouchers."  I  discovered  later  that  neither 
M.  Hammarskiold  nor  M.  Wallenberg  himself  wished  to 
create  a  precedent  by  virtue  of  which  the  Riksdag  might 
demand  the  communication  of  certain  statements  of 
German  origin.  Now  the  communication  of  the  latter 
might  excite  anger  in  Berlin,  and  as  I  have  said  the 
Swedish  Government  did  not  feel  sure  enough  of  the  final 
victory  of  the  Entente  to  risk  drawing  down  on  itself  the 
vengeance  of  Germany. 

M.   Wallenberg's  declarations  were  received  at  the 


4i8     EVIL  OMENS    IN    PETROGRAD    [niAP.  xxii. 

Riksdag  with  a  satisfaction  beyond  our  expectations. 
In  a  few  days'  time  the  tone  even  of  the  Press  had 
changed  and  by  the  ist  June  all  was  serene  again.  But 
M.  Wallenberg  owned  to  me  that  this  hostile  attitude 
of  the  Activists — which  he  trusted  would  be  the  last — 
had  been  the  strongest  that  had  occurred  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  and  that  at  one  moment  he  himself 
had  been  somewhat  frightened  about  it. 

It  was  during  this  crisis  that  I  had  an  opportunity 
of  improving  my  acquaintance  with  M.  Branting,  the 
recognised  head  of  the  Swedish  Socialist  party.  Know- 
ing that  he  was  frankly  opposed  to  the  intrigues  of  the 
Activists,  I  went  to  see  him  once  or  twice.  I  had  some 
heart  to  heart  talks  with  him,  and  I  amended  a  few  of 
his  judgments  on  Russia  and  gained  some  information 
for  myself  relative  to  the  programme  and  aspirations  of 
the  Swedish  Socialist  party. 

I  found  in  Hjalmar  Branting  a  distinguished  and 
eminently  honest  mind;  many  convictions  but  few  pre- 
conceived opinions.  He  was  the  true  head  of  a  school, 
not  the  head  of  a  sect.  I  have  often  said  to  myself  since, 
that  if  the  Socialist  party  throughout  the  world  had 
more  leaders  like  Branting  and  possessed  everywhere 
social  ground  as  relatively  wholesome  as  that  of  the 
Swedish  working-classes,  the  doctrine  of  Socialism, 
instead  of  rousing  well-founded  fears  and  irreconcilable 
opposition  on  the  part  of  those  who  hold  to  the  old 
and  tried  principles  of  world-wide  civilisation,  would 
find  useful  and  powerful  adherents  amongst  the  very 
people  who  desire,  not  the  downfall,  but  the  reforma- 
tion of  this  civilisation  and  the  victory  of  mind  and 
moral  principles  over  the  power  of  money  and  brute 
force. 

Soon  after  the  visit  from  the  members  of  the  Duma, 
we  began  to  receive  disquieting  news  from  Petrograd. 
M.  StUrmer  was  revealing  himself  more  and  more 
as  the  agent  of  an  absurd,  confused  and  suspicious 
policy,   and  was   surrounded   by   a  deplorable    set   of 


i9i6]    EMPRESS,  STURMER  AND  RASPUTIN     419 

people.  At  the  same  time  the  Ministers  who  had 
acquired  the  greatest  popularity  disappeared  one  by 
one — all  those  who  were  known  to  be  animated  by  the 
desire  to  work  in  with  national  representation  and  who 
were  sincerely  and  whole-heartedly  devoted  to  the 
common  cause  of  the  Entente.  M,  Klaritonoff,  Con- 
troller of  the  Empire ;  M.  Krivochein,  Minister  for 
Agriculture  and  a  continuator  of  the  wise  agrarian 
policy  of  Stolypin^;  Count  IgnatiefF,  the  congenial 
Minister  for  Education ;  finally  General  Polivanoff, 
whose  admirable  work  for  the  reconstitution  of  the 
armed  forces  of  Russia  in  the  very  midst  of  the  war  was 
to  bear  such  splendid  fruit  during  the  summer  of  1916 — 
were  all  dismissed  one  after  the  other.  All  these  changes 
were  explained  by  the  influence — increasing  day  by  day 
— of  the  Empress  Alexandra  who  leant  on  Stiirmer  and 
his  acolytes,  whilst  the  infamous  Rasputin  and  the 
Vyruboff  served  as  speaking-tubes  through  which  the 
most  harmful  and  most  suspicious  characters  obtained 
a  hearing  and  ruled  the  poor  hysterical  woman.  The 
disreputable  reactionaries,  the  worst  schemers,  were 
soon  brought  into  prominence  and  began  to  find  their 
way  into  the  Tsarskoe  Palace.  Amongst  all  sensible 
people  of  Russian  society  there  was  soon  a  general 
outcry.  What  was  Russia  being  led  into?  Where 
would  the  scandal  stop  ?  And  what  was  the  Emperor 
about  in  all  this  ? 

Alas !  it  was  becoming  clear  to  every  one  that  the 
unfortunate  Nicolas  II.  was  abandoning  his  real  power 
more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  his  wife.  In  October, 
191 5,  he  had  assumed  the  supreme  command  of  his 
armies  by  dismissing  the  Grand-Duke  Nicolas,  who  was 
appointed  Viceroy  of  the  Caucasus.  This  was  done  at  a 
time  when  our  armies  were  in  a  most  difficult  and 
dangerous  position,  the  Germans  having  just  advanced 
as  far  as  Courland,  White-Russia  and   Volhynia.     To 

1  This  consisted  in  decreasing  gradually  on  one  side  the  lati/iaidia, 
and  in  increasing  by  all  the  means  possible  that  class  of  peasants  who 
were  proprietors  on  their  own  account  and  not  as  members  of  the  mir. 

2   E 


420     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

assume  the  responsibility  of  commanding  under  such 
circumstances  might  seem  a  great  and  noble  sacrifice, 
and  many  Russians — I  amongst  them — considered  that 
the  Emperor  had  done  well  in  assuming  the  supreme 
responsibilit3^  Moreover,  one  hoped  that  this  decision, 
by  removing  him  from  the  unwholesome  and  mad 
atmosphere  of  Tsarskoe-Selo  and  by  bringing  him 
forcibly  into  closer  touch  with  his  generals — all  animated 
by  the  same  patriotic  anxiety  as  most  of  Russian  public 
opinion  was — would  have  a  beneficial  action  on  the 
home  policy  of  Russia.  But  the  men  who  understood 
the  situation  best  did  not  share  this  hope.  Hence  at  a 
Council  held  in  October,  191 5,  all  the  Ministers  who  were 
described  as  "Liberal"  had  spoken,  in  the  presence  of 
Nicolas  II.,  in  a  frank  and  explicit  way  against  the 
change  of  Generalissimo  and  the  Emperor's  departure 
for  Headquarters.  Sazonoff  and  General  Polivanoff 
were  the  most  vehement  on  the  subject. 

It  was  even  then  being  said  that  His  Majesty  was 
offended  with  the  opposers  and  had  decided  on  principle 
to  dismiss  them.  Towards  the  end  of  October,  191 5,  there 
was  much  persistent  talk  of  M.  Sazonoff's  retirement. 
The  President  of  the  Council,  the  aged  and  feeble  M. 
Goremykin,  was,  it  was  said,  to  be  appointed  Chancellor 
of  the  Empire,  with  M.  Schebeko  at  his  side  to  share  in 
the  part  of  director  of  Foreign  Affairs.  But  this  change 
did  not  take  place.  In  June,  1916,  M.  Sazonoff  was  still 
in  office,  whereas  all  his  former  friends  in  the  Cabinet 
had  been  dismissed  and  replaced  by  Sturmer's  creatures 
or  by  people  who  were  absolutely  inexperienced  and 
new  to  their  work.^ 

The  presence  of  Nicolas  H.  at  General  Headquarters 
and  his  absence  from  Tsarskoe  were  of  no  use — as 
well-informed  people  had  foreseen — either  to  the  affairs 
of  the  Empire  or  those  of  the  Army.  The  Empress 
Alexandra's     influence     was     becoming    greater    and 

^  With  one  exception :  M.  Klaritonoft's  successor  was  M.  Pokrovsky, 
a  man  of  undeniable  intellectual  worth  and  high  moral  qualities  ;  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  allude  to  him  again. 


I9I6]         THE  TSAR  AT   HEADQUARTERS        421 

greater ;  sometimes  the  Emperor  was  summoned  to  her, 
sometimes  she  herself  went  to  Mohilev,  occasionally 
accompanied  by  the  four  young  Grand-Duchesses. 
At  Mohilev  Nicolas  II.  continued  to  lead  his  usual 
life  side  by  side  with  the  strenuous  life  of  G.H.Q. 
The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Russian  armies, 
General  Alexieff,  assumed  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  whole 
direction  of  the  war;  the  Army  heads  and  the  heads 
of  departments  had  to  deal  with  him  alone,  and  he  gave 
daily  reports  to  the  Emperor  who,  plunged  in  the  study 
of  the  matter  supplied  to  him  by  the  General  Staff  and 
of  the  voluminous  papers  which  his  Ministers  brought 
to  Mohilev,  hardly  found  time  to  make  occasional  trips  to 
visit  the  troops  of  such  and  such  an  army,  in  order  to 
display  during  ordinary  reviews  the  same  imperturb- 
ably  benevolent  face  and  to  utter  the  same  few  and 
carefully  chosen  words.  There  was  no  intimacy  with 
the  generals  who  lived  at  or  came  to  G.H.Q.  ;  always 
the  same  surroundings  as  at  Tsarskoe ;  meals  were 
taken  with  the  same  uninteresting  set  of  people  and 
with  the  little  Tsarevitch,  whom  the  Emperor  had 
brought  with  him  and  whom  he  kept  with  him  until 
December,  1916. 

Among  the  people  who  passed  through  Stockholm 
during  the  year  1916,  I  saw,  with  the  sincerest  pleasure, 
the  worthy  M.  Odier,  Minister  of  the  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion to  Petrograd,  where  his  high  qualities  had  gained 
him  many  friendships.  During  our  conversation,  I 
asked  M.  Odier  whether  he  knew  the  tutor — a  young 
Swiss — ^just  engaged  for  the  Tsarevitch,  who  up  till  then 
had  only  had  an  old  sailor  to  look  after  him,  as  his 
august  parents  undertook  all  the  details  of  his  education 
themselves.  M.  Odier  replied  that  he  knew  the  tutor  in 
question  very  well,  that  he  was  a  cultivated,  conscientious 
and  distinguished  man,  and  that  he  had  already  succeeded 
in  gaining  the  affection  of  his  pupil ;  they  were  together 
at  Mohilev  and  both  shared  the  simple,  well-regulated 
and  studious  existence  of  the  Emperor,  who  found  time 
to  give  his  son  lessons  in  Russian  and  history  and  who 


422     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

liked  to  have  the  child  working  beside  him  whilst  he 
himself  pored  over  maps  and  the  reports  of  his  Ministers 
and  Generals.  The  young  Swiss  tutor,  according  to  M. 
Odier,  was  full  of  admiration  for  the  goodness,  the  kind- 
ness, the  simplicity,  the  calm  serenity  of  the  Emperor. 
And  now  when  one  conjures  up  that  touching  picture  of 
the  father  and  son — the  Sovereign  and  the  heir  of  a 
mighty  Empire — working  side  by  side  in  the  peace  of  a 
small  room,  and  when  one  is  then  seized  by  the  night- 
mare of  the  tales  of  the  appalling  butchery  of  Ekaterin- 
burg, of  the  father  clasping  in  his  arms  that  same  child 
who  had  fainted  at  sight  of  the  guns  levelled  at  them  by 
bloodthirsty  brutes,^  one  is  filled  with  grievous  and 
deep  pity,  such  as  no  other  drama  in  history  has  ever 
evoked  ! 

But  on  the  other  hand  what  a  curious  character,  that 
of  this  Sovereign  who,  at  a  time  of  the  supreme  straining 
of  all  the  forces  of  the  country,  of  imminent  perils, 
faced  by  death  which  was  hovering  over  millions  of  his 
subjects  and  above  all  over  him  and  his,  yet  possessed 
the  faculty  of  preserving  the  same  quiet  habits,  of 
cultivating  the  same  touching  and  eminently  domestic 
virtues,  just  as  if  all  personal  effort  was  forbidden  him, 
all  direction  of  events  impossible,  and  as  if  there  was 
nothing  left  to  him  from  henceforth  but  to  bow  to  destiny 
("to  the  decrees  of  Providence" — he  would  have 
corrected  me  !),  simply  accomplishing  his  daily  duties, 
and  having  his  share  of  innocent  pleasures ! 

"  II  y  a  des  lacs  limpides  dans  nos  for^ts  profondes  ; 
Couverts  d'une  fraiche  verdure  et  fleuris  sont  leurs  bords, 
Mais  cette  herbe  et  ces  fleurs  recouvrent  des  marais  sans  fond, 
Qui  engloutissent  le  patre  etle  troupeau  imprudents. 
Le  peuple  dit  que  ces  lacs  recouvrent  des  ^glises 

(Que  la  misdricorde  divine  fit  disparaitre  devant  des  hordes  sans  merci), 
Et  par  de  claires  et  calmes  soirdes  un  son  de  cloches  retentit  de  leur 

profondeur 
Et  des  cantiques  sacr^s. 

'  Pray  God  these  tales  be  not  true  ! 


I9I6]  PROPHETIC  VERSES  423 

Tel  m'apparait  le  Tsar  Theodore : 
Un  lieu  saint  mais  pas  sAr.  .  .  .  Dans  son  ame 
Qui  ne  salt  distinguer  I'ami  de  I'ennemi, 
Habitent  I'amour,  la  bontd  et  la  pri^re  ; 
Un  doux  son  de  cloches  semble  y  relentir.  .  .  . 
Mais  k  quoi  bon  toute  cette  bont^  et  toute  cette  saintet^, 
Lorsque  ni  I'empire  ni  ses  serviteurs  n'y  trouvent  un  ferme  appui  ? " 

It  is  in  these  terms  that  Alexis  Tolstoy  in  one  of  his 
historic  dramas  has  described,  through  the  lips  of  Boris 
Godunoff,  the  character  of  the  Tsar  Theodore,^  the 
pious  and  timid  son  of  John  the  Terrible.  These  verses 
appeared  in  1868,  the  very  year  in  which  the  future 
Emperor,  Nicolas  II.,  was  born,  and  it  is  as  if  the  poet— 
the  FaUs  as  Victor  Hugo  would  have  said— had  seen 
before  him  the  image  of  the  most  indulgent,  the  most 
mystical,  the  weakest  and  the  most  unfortunate  of  the 
Sovereigns  of  the  tragic  dynasty  of  the  Romanoffs.  And 
yet  it  is  this  Sovereign  who  clung  so  firmly  to  his 
mttocracy,  it  is  he  who  considered  it  a  crime  against 
history  and  against  his  people  to  renounce  his  empty 
privileges  of  omnipotence  and  who  intended  to  hand 
these  down  in  their  oi?iginal  integrity  to  this  same 
adored  son ! 

In  June,  1916,  the  offensive  in  Galicia  was  begun, 
commanded  by  General  Brussiloff,  and  the  heroic — and 

*  *'  The  Tsar  Theodore  Joannovitch,"  the  second  part  of  the  well-known 
trilogy.  Count  Alexis  Tolstoy,  lyrical  poet,  who  was  rather  popular  in 
Russia,  must  not  be  confused  with  his  cousin  the  famous  Count  Leo 
Tolstoy. 

"  There  are  some  limpid  lakes  in  our  dense  dark  forests,  covered 
with  green  reeds  and  flowers  near  their  banks  ;  but  these  reeds  and  these 
flowers  mask  bottomless  swamps  which  swallow  up  the  imprudent 
shepherd  and  his  sheep.  People  say  that  these  lakes  conceal  churches 
(which  Divine  Pity  wished  to  shield  from  merciless  hordes),  and  on  clear 
and  calm  evenings  a  sound  of  bells  echoes  from  their  depths,  and  sacred 
canticles.  Such,  meseems,  is  the  Tsar  Theodore  :  a  holy  shrine  but  not 
sure.  ...  In  his  soul,  which  cannot  tell  friend  from  foe,  dwell  love, 
goodness  and  prayer  ;  a  sweet  sound  of  bells  seems  to  echo  there.  But 
what  avails  all  this  goodness  and  all  this  holiness  if  n^ithe^  Empire  nor 
servants  find  in  them  a  tirrn  stay  ? " 


424     EVIL  OMENS   IN   PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxii. 

at  first  fortunate — incidents  of  this  offensive  drew  tlie 
attention  of  Russia  and  of  Europe  temporarily  away 
from  the  dangers  of  our  domestic  situation.  The 
operations  of  our  armies  had  been  originally  fixed  for 
the  month  of  July  and  were  to  have  coincided  with  an 
Allied  offensive.  But  the  Austrians'  attack  on  the 
Asiago  plateau,  by  placing  Italy  in  danger,  hastened  the 
Russian  offensive  by  a  month. 

The  operations  were  crowned  with  success  from 
the  outset.  It  was  during  a  dinner  which  we  were 
giving  to  some  colleagues  that  1  received  the  telegrams 
containing  the  communiques  from  our  G.H.Q.  on  the 
taking  of  Lutsk,  the  breaking  through  the  strong 
Austrian  lines,  the  capture  of  tens  of  thousands  of 
prisoners.  From  this  day  operations  developed  with 
increasing  success.  The  Russians  were  soon  occupying 
Eastern  Galicia  again,  and  the  army  of  General  Scher- 
batcheff,  hurriedly  leaving  their  quarters  in  Bessarabia, 
succeeded  in  reoccupyingthe  Bukowina  after  sanguinary 
fighting.  The  spoil  already  amounted  to  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  Austrian  prisoners  and  thousands  of  guns. 
Throughout  the  month  of  June  and  during  the  early 
part  of  July  the  general  political  atmosphere  appeared 
to  be  clearer.  Hopes  of  complete  victory  were  dawning 
for  all  the  Allies,  although  the  German  front  was  still 
intact  in  Volhynia  and  in  Courland,  and  although  the 
Anglo-French  offensive  was  beset  by  delays  and  diffi- 
culties. 

Such  was  the  position  when  our  parliamentarians 
who  had  passed  through  Stockholm  at  the  end  of  March, 
stopped  there  again  on  their  return  from  London,  Paris 
and  Rome. 

They  did  not  all  arrive  together.  First  came :  M, 
Protopopoff,  Vice-President  of  the  Duma,  and  two  elect 
members  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire,  Count  Dmitri 
Olsufieff  (of  the  Monarchist  Centre)  and  Professor 
Vassilieff  (of  the  Left).  Their  short  stay  in  Stockholm 
gave  rise  to  an  incident  which  was  subsequently  greatly 
commented  on, 


I9I6]    M.  PROTOPOPOFF  AND  THE  POLAKS    425 

The  very  day  of  their  arrival  I  invited  these  gentle- 
men to  dinner  at  the  summer-restaurant,  the  Hassel- 
baken,  where  they  were  to  meet  some  Swedish  financiers 
in  order  to  discuss  the  question  of  the  hour :  commercial 
exchanges  between  Sweden  and  Russia.  M.  Protopopoff 
replied  that  he  would  be  enchanted  to  come,  but  he 
begged  me  to  invite  also— if  I  thought  it  suitable— some 
travelling  companions  of  his,  M.  and  Madame  Polak. 
I  at  once  sent  them  an  invitation,  and  that  evening  at 
the  Hasselbaken  the  young  Polak  couple  were  amongst 
my  guests.  The  husband  was  that  same  Polak  whom  I 
mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter  and  who  had  been  en- 
trusted with  a  politico-commercial  mission  to  Bulgaria. 
His  wife,  nee  Achkenazi,  was  a  charming  young  woman, 
intelligent  and  lively;  she  was  wearing  two  rosettes  of 
St.  George,  tokens  of  courage  displayed  with  the  ambu- 
lances at  the  front.  It  did  not  take  me  long  to  discover 
that  M.  Protopopoff  was  a  complete  victim  to  the 
charms  of  his  delightful  and  fascinating  travelling- 
companion. 

The  next  day  I  was  to  take  my  three  compatriots  to 
see  M.  Wallenberg,  who  had  been  apprised  of  their 
presence  in  Stockholm,  After  an  excursion  and  a  lunch 
which  they  had  arranged  with  these  same  Polaks, 
M.  Protopopoff  and  Count  Olsufieff — a  pleasant  and 
intelligent  man  of  the  world — asked  me  to  meet  them 
and  Professor  Vassilieff  at  the  hotel  where  they  were 
staying.  When  we  arrived  there  Protopopoff  said  to 
me,  in  front  of  his  two  colleagues  :  "Monsieur,  I  must 
tell  you  that  after  our  visit  to  Wallenberg  I  am  going 
to  have  a  very  interesting  interview;  I  am  to  meet  a 
German  at  the  Polaks'  over  the  teacups.  It  is  a  certain 
Herr  Warburg,  a  great  Hamburg  trader  with  whom  the 
Polaks  were  connected  through  business  and  friendship 
before  the  war,  and  who,  having  met  them  here  by 
chance,  has  suggested  calling  on  them." 

"But,  M.  Protopopoff,"  I  said,  "I  could  tell  you 
straight  away  all  that  the  German  trader  will  say  to  you ; 
he  will  deplore  the  misunderstandings  brought  about 


426     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

by  the  war,  will  utter  fervent  prayers  for  the  restoration 
of  peace,  and  will  insinuate  that  zvitJi  a  few  small  con- 
cessions on  our  part  this  blessed  peace  could  be  at  once 
restored.  Is  it  worth  your  while  to  have  a  conversa- 
tion of  that  kind?" 

"  But,  my  dear  Minister,  it  would  interest  me 
enormously  all  the  same  to  see  for  myself  the  frame  of 
mind  of  a  German  at  the  present  time  when  we  are  on 
the  road  to  victory,  it  might  constitute  valuable  in- 
formation for  St.  Petersburg.  Moreover,  I  will  repeat 
to  you  all  that  this  German  says." 

"  In  that  case  I  can  make  no  objection,"  I  replied. 

Count  Olsufieff  also  manifested  a  desire  to  "meet 
the  Boche " ;  Professor  Vassilieff,  a  quiet,  thoughtful 
man,  preferred  to  keep  away.  I  was  somewhat  shocked 
at  this  meeting  to  which  Protopopoff  had  consented 
without  first  asking  the  advice  of  the  Russian  Minister; 
but  I  did  not  consider  myself  called  upon  to  guide  the 
head  of  our  parliamentary  mission.  And  what  is  more, 
he  would  not  have  listened  to  me. 

All  the  four  of  us  then  went  to  see  M.  Wallen- 
berg. There  my  impressions  were  disastrous  ones. 
Protopopoff,  who  the  evening  before  had  been  excited 
and  extremely  loquacious,  definitely  took  the  bit  be- 
tween his  teeth  as  soon  as  he  found  himself  in  the 
presence  of  the  eminent  Sw^edish  statesman.  Without 
allowing  M.  Wallenberg  or  his  own  colleagues  to  get  a 
word  in,  he  held  a  monologue  for  half  an  hour  with 
disconcerting  volubility  on  the  political  and  commercial 
questions  relative  to  our  relations  with  Sweden,  and  on 
the  impressions  he  had  formed  in  England  and  France. 
At  last,  recollecting  the  interview  awaiting  him,  the 
Vice-President  of  the  Duma  closed  his  monologue  and 
we  took  leave  of  M.  Wallenberg,  who  looked  at  me  with 
a  somewhat  dumbfounded  expression.  We  went  out. 
Protopopoff  promptly  disappeared. 

"Gentlemen,"  I  could  not  help  exclaiming  to  Olsufieff 
and  Professor  Vassilieff,  "  what  on  earth  is  the  matter 
with  your  colleague  to-day  ?     I  was  on  tenter-hooks  the 


I9I6]  M.  PROTOPOPOFF  AND  HERR  WARBURG  427 

whole  time!  Was  that  the  way  to  talk  to  a  foreign 
statesman,  above  all  to  a  Swede  ?" 

I  saw  a  bitter  smile  on  both  their  faces.  "  But  it 
has  been  like  this  during  our  whole  journey,"  replied 
Olsufieff;  "he  allowed  no  one  else  to  talk,  he  was 
always  thrusting  himself  forward." 

"  Always  is  perhaps  saying  too  much,"  amended  the 
cautious  M.  Vassilieff;  "but  latterly  he  has  certainly 
become  excited  and  loquacious  to  a  degree  !  " 

Three  or  four  hours  later  when  I  went  to  fetch 
these  gentlemen  in  a  motor-car  to  take  them  to  the 
station,  Protopopoff  related  to  Professor  Vassilieff  and 
me  (Count  Olsufieff  had  taken  part  in  the  Polak  tea- 
party)  his  conversation  with  Herr  Warburg ;  the  latter 
had  apparently  hastened  to  express — as  I  had  predicted — 
complaints  about  the  war,  and  his  desire  for  immediate 
peace-making. 

"  But  I  did  not  allow  him  to  talk  too  much  "  (I  believe 
you  !  thought  I).  "  I  told  him  how  clearly  assured  was 
the  ultimate  victory  of  the  Russians  and  Allies  which 
would  end  the  war.  Yes,  war  is  a  ghastly  thing,  but  it 
has  its  good  side.  It  has  taught  France  the  need  for 
prayer,  it  has  brought  compulsory  service  to  England, 
and  the  suppression  of  drunkenness  to  Russia."  Since 
the  day  before  this  was  the  third  time  that  I  heard  that 
aphorism,  of  which  Protopopoff  seemed  inordinately 
proud  (it  appears  that  he  had  given  vent  to  it  countless 
times  during  his  journey).  At  the  station  we  bade 
one  another  farewell,  and  the  three  gentlemen  left  for 
Petrograd.  The  Polak  couple  stayed  on  a  few  days  in 
Stockholm,  but  I  had  no  opportunity  of  seeing  them 
again. 

On  my  return  from  the  station  I  sent  for  the  one 
of  my  colleagues  who  knew  most  about  the  affairs  of 
Germany,  and  I  made  inquiries  about  this  Herr  Warburg 
whom  MM.  Protopopoff  and  Olsufieff  had  just  been 
meeting.  I  learnt  that  he  was  not  the  famous  Warburg 
of  Hamburg,  but  a  brother  or  a  cousin  of  his ;  that  he 
was  on  the  German  committee  for  revictualling,  and  at 


428      EVIL   OMKNS   IN    PKTROGRAD    [chap.  xxii. 

the  head  of  the  Scandinavian  section  of  that  committee; 
that  in  that  capacity  he  made  frequent  journeys  to 
Stockholm,  Christiania,  and  Copenhagen,  and  that 
although  he  did  not  figure  in  the  list  of  the  members  of 
the  German  Legation  in  Sweden,  he  often  saw  Baron 
von  Lucius. 

Later  on,  when  recalling  Protopopoff's  last  journey 
through  Stockholm,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
from  the  journey  to  our  western  Allies  that  must  date 
the  beginning  of  that  nervous  or  mental  state  of  the 
Vice-President  of  the  Duma,  a  state  which  eventually 
made  him  the  absolutely  irresponsible  factor  in  the 
worst  misfortunes  of  Russia.  It  was  decidedly  not  the 
same  man  as  the  one  with  whom  I  had  talked  in  March, 
and  who  seemed  intelligent  and  well-balanced,  although 
somewhat  of  an  actor  and  slightly  conceited.  This  time 
I  had  to  deal  with  an  excited  being,  inordinate!}' 
loquacious,  and  who  jumped,  without  apparent  reason, 
from  one  subject  to  another,  while  the  failings  inherent 
in  his  character  seemed  to  be  exaggerated  and  cari- 
catured. 

A  few  days  afterwards  the  Controller  of  the  Empire, 
M.  Pokrovsky,  arrived;  he  had  been  taking  part,  in 
London  and  Paris,  in  conferences  and  parleys,  the  object 
of  which  was  the  unification  of  the  economic  measures 
and  efforts  of  the  Allies.  I  knew  that  he  had  made  an 
excellent  impression  in  France  as  well  as  in  England  by 
his  tact,  his  cleverness,  the  clearness  of  his  ideas,  and 
his  thorough  knowledge  of  financial  matters.  For  many 
years  he  had  been  head  assistant  to  Kokovtzoff  at  the 
Treasury,  and  it  was  he  whom  Kokovtzoff  recommended 
as  his  most  appropriate  successor.  Pokrovsky  had  left 
the  Treasury  with  his  chief;  but  at  the  first  opportunity 
he  had  been  given  the  ministerial  post  of  Controller  of 
the  Empire,  a  post  to  which  his  eminent  services  gave 
him  every  right. 

I  had  the  honour  of  knowing  M.  Pokrovsky,  but  very 
superficially,  never  having  exchanged  ideas  with   him 


I9I6]  M.   POKROVSKY  429 

nor  discussed  any  questions.  Hence  I  was  most  agree- 
ably impressed  when  I  had  the  good  fortune  to  converse 
at  great  length  with  this  very  intelligent  and  eminently 
congenial  man.  1  disclosed  our  political  position  in 
Sweden  to  him,  and  the  economic  questions  (exchange 
of  produce,  technical  and  military  orders,  transit,  etc.) 
with  which  I  had  to  deal,  and  which  I  wished  to  settle 
as  quickly  and  as  satisfactorily  as  possible.  We  talked 
in  this  strain  for  two  good  hours.  I  admired  the 
lucidity  of  my  guest's  mind,  and  the  value  of  the  questions 
he  asked  me.  The  following  day  I  begged  his  per- 
mission to  present  him  to  M.  Wallenberg.  "This  will 
be  my  revenge  for  the  Protopopoff  visit,"  I  thought,  as 
I  accompanied  M.  Pokrovsky  to  the  Swedish  Foreign 
Office.  I  thought  it  quite  superfluous  to  take  part  in 
the  conversation.  "  Gentlemen,"  I  said,  when  I  had 
presented  them  to  one  another,  "  you  are  both  particularly 
well  versed  in  economic  and  financial  questions,  so  I 
will  not  disturb  you."    And  I  left. 

Two  hours  later  Pokrovsky  came  to  see  me.  "  Well ! " 
I  said,  "  and  what  are  your  impressions  ?  " 

"  Excellent !  We  have  reviewed  all  the  leading 
questions.  Thanks  to  the  imformation  and  matter 
supplied  by  you,  I  had  a  most  valuable  discussion 
with  M.  Wallenberg,  who  on  his  side  was  full  of  good 
sense,  and  also  most  friendly.  I  even  ventured  to  out- 
line with  him  a  scheme  or  rather  a  conventional  pro- 
gramme dealing  with  all  the  questions  which  we  dis- 
cussed verbally.  Here  is  the  little  statement;  do  you 
approve  of  it  ?" 

I  read  the  statement  carefully,  and  returned  it  to 
M.  Pokrovsky,  assuring  him  that  for  my  part  I  cou-ld 
only  thank  him  for  it,  and  wish  for  the  prompt  con- 
clusion of  an  arrangement  on  the  principles  which  he 
had  just  worked  out  with  M.  Wallenberg.  The  day 
after  M.  Pokrovsky's  departure  I  asked  Wallenberg 
what  he  thought  of  him.  "  Highly  congenial,  and 
possessed  of  deep  knowledge.  It  was  a  pleasure  to  me 
to  talk  with  him.      We    even    allowed    ourselves    to 


430     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD    [chap.  xxii. 

negotiate  without  your  being  present."  "  I  know,  and  I 
am  delighted  about  it ;  if  only  your  draft  of  the  arrange- 
ment could  be  accepted,  and  above  all  carried  out! " 

Besides  his  ability,  M.  Pokrovsky  had  impressed  me 
favourably  by  the  complete  absence  of  all  bureaucratic 
pomp.  Any  other  Minister  would  have  brought  with 
him  at  least  two  or  three  subordinates  mainly  occupied 
in  giving  their  chief  his  cue,  in  advertising  him  well 
amongst  the  natives  and  in  flattering  him  cleverly  at 
meals — which  is  a  tremendous  aid  to  digestion !  The 
Controller  of  the  Empire  onl}^  had  his  son  with  him,  a 
charming  young  man  who  had  just  completed  his  studies 
and  who  was  going  into  the  Army  ;  his  two  elder  sons 
had  been  at  the  front  since  the  outbreak  of  war, 

Pokrovsky  was  closely  followed  by  a  whole  group 
of  our  parliamentarians,  the  remaining  members  of  the 
Duma,  and  three  members  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire: 
Prince  Lobanoff,  Baron  Rosen,  and  Count  Sigismund 
Wielopolski.  The  Swedes,  on  their  side,  had  arranged 
beforehand  a  large  luncheon  party  in  honour  of  these 
guests  at  that  same  Hasselbaken  restaurant,  where  they 
were  to  be  received  by  the  most  notable  Swedish 
manufacturers  and  financiers,  also  by  representatives  of 
the  Press. 

The  day  before,  we  made  an  expedition,  with  MM. 
Miliukoff,  Schingareff,  Itchas,  and  a  Lithuanian  poet 
whose  name  I  have  forgotten,  to  that  beautiful  spot  Salt- 
sjobaden,  and  we  dined  at  the  restaurant.  The  expedi- 
tion was  thoroughly  successful  and  favoured  by  perfect 
weather.  Schingareff  and  one  of  his  colleagues  were 
rather  late  in  arriving  at  the  meeting-place,  but  they 
arrived  at  last,  and  were  profuse  in  apologies:  "At 
one  of  the  places  where  our  boat  stopped  we  were  told 
we  could  get  here  on  foot  through  the  forest,  and  we 
could  not  resist  the  pleasure  of  an  hour's  walk  in  this 
divine  weather.  It  was  truly  delightful;  it  reminded 
me  so  vividly  of  the  forests  of  Russia," 

I   can   still   recall   the  very   pleasant  and   typically 


I9I6]  M.  SCHINGAREFF  43i 

Russian  face  of  the  eminent  cadet  deputy,  liis  high  and 
intelligent  forehead,  his  rather  thick  lips,  and  his  smile 
showing  all  his  strong  white  teeth.  A  country  doctor, 
employed  by  the  "Zemstvo"  of  one  of  our  central 
provinces,  he  was,  from  the  beginning  of  the  Duma,  one 
of  the  most  prominent  and  most  esteemed  members  of 
his  party.  Scrupulously  disinterested  in  his  private 
life — a  noble  life  without  blot  or  stain — he  had  special- 
ised in  economic  questions,  more  especially  those  of 
rural  interest.  His  speeches,  always  admirably  padded 
and  always  a  little  too  long,  but  logical  and  sincere, 
provoked  rejoinders  which  were  quite  as  circumstantial, 
as  sincere  and  as  well  padded,  from  M.  Kokovtzoff. 
They  were  more  like  academic  than  political  encounters, 
discussions  of  two  schools  rather  than  of  preconceived 
opinions  ;  and  these  discussions  often  led  to  wise  and 
practical  "  decrees  of  the  Senate."  Steadfast  faith  in  the 
Russian  people,  intense  love  for  this  people  and  for  his 
country,  formed  the  basis  of  the  political  and  private 
character  of  this  good  man.  Turguenieff  sketched  some 
of  these  types  in  his  later  novels.  The  Bolsheviks 
murdered  him  as  soon  as  they  could.  Schingareff  and 
another  eminent  member  of  his  party,  M.  Kokochkin, 
were  lying  rather  seriously  ill  in  a  hospital  in  Petro- 
grad,  when  a  band  of  Red  Guards  broke  open  the  doors 
and  riddled  the  two  men  with  bullets  in  their  beds. 
MM.  Lenin  and  Trotsky  pretended  afterwards  that  it 
had  been  a  "mistake." 

The  banquet  at  Hasselbaken  was  most  successful. 
One  of  the  members  of  our  parliamentary  delegation 
made  a  very  well-turned  speech  in  which  he  advocated 
the  development  of  the  closest  economic  relations  and 
the  cultivation  of  feelings  of  friendship  between  Sweden 
and  Russia.  The  Swedes  replied  to  this  in  the  same 
strain.  Every  one  talked  quite  intimately,  and  some 
journalists  who  a  few  short  months  previously  had 
hurled  their  thunder-bolts  at  Russia,  were  the  first  to 
display  feelings  of  sympathy  towards  their  Russian 
guests.     At  this  banquet  I  could  prove  with  a  certain 


432      EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

amount  of  satisfaction  to  what  an  extent  Russo-Swedish 
relations  had  changed  to  the  advantage  of  both  countries 
since  the  days  when  I  took  up  my  post  in  Stockholm, 
and  that  in  spite  of  the  World  War,  at  the  outbreak  of 
which  Swedish  sympathies  had  seemed  to  be  all  on  the 
side  of  Germany,  and  notwithstanding  that  this  war  had 
brought  so  much  tribulation  and  so  many  trials  to 
commerce  and  to  the  economic  position  of  Sweden. 

Baron  Rosen  and  Count  S.  Wielopolski  remained 
on  a  few  days  after  the  departure  of  their  colleagues, 
and  naturally  we  saw  a  great  deal  of  them.  Rosen,  ex- 
Ambassador  of  Russia  to  Washington,  had  been  my 
chief  in  Belgrade  in  1895  and  1896,  and  since  then  I  had 
always  borne  in  mind  his  great  kindness  to  me  and  his 
broad  and  wise  political  views.  During  the  year  191 5  he 
caused  a  great  deal  of  talk  on  account  of  an  impromptu 
speech  he  made  at  the  Council  of  the  Empire,  and  in 
which,  without  any  regard  for  the  reactionary  breeze 
which  was  blowing  then  in  high  circles,  he  criticised 
the  policy  of  intolerance  of  the  Government  and  of 
Russian  public  opinion  towards  the  heterogeneous 
elements  of  the  Empire:  Poles,  Finns,  Israelites.  He  did 
not  touch  on  the  Baltic  question,  not  wishing  most  likely 
to  be  judge  and  plaintiff.  But  what  surprised  me  more 
was  that  he  did  not  say  one  word  on  the  subject  of 
the  constitutional  guarantees  of  Russia,  or  about  the 
despotism  of  the  State  Police,  which  still  continued  to 
make  itself  felt,  just  as  if  national  representation  had 
never  been  granted.  Now,  without  these  guarantees 
and  without  the  free  and  sovereign  exercise  of  justice 
over  the  whole  extent  of  the  Empire,  how  could  the 
question  of  the  autonomies  and  of  equality  in  the  eyes 
of  the  law  for  the  heterogeneous  nationalities  have  been 
solved  ?  In  Stockholm  I  heard  Baron  Rosen  say  some 
things  which  might  lead  one  to  believe  that  he  con- 
sidered the  immediate  conclusion  of  peace  essential  for 
Russia ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  lavished  the  highest 
praise  on  the  endurance  and  patriotism  of  the  English, 
for  whom  he  had  always  had  a  marked  predilection  and 


1916]  OPERATIONS   IN   GALICIA  433 

whom  he  had  just  been  seeing  at  work.  I  could  not 
make  out  what  was  at  the  back  of  his  mind  ;  I  under- 
stood later  on. 

Count  Sigismund  Wielopolski,  whom  I  had  seen  a 
great  deal  of  formerly,  was  very  much  upset  about  the 
Polish  question.  He  knew  that  from  various  sides  the 
Emperor  was  being  advised  to  solve  this  question 
promptly  by  supplementing  the  manifesto  of  the  ex- 
Generalissimo  of  the  Russian  armies  by  an  Imperial 
declaration  which  should  decide  in  a  more  definite 
manner  the  future  regime  of  Poland.  But  there  were 
many  controversies  on  the  subject  of  this  regime;  and 
Wielopolski  was  expecting  to  be  summoned  to  G.H.Q. 
to  submit  to  the  Emperor  the  point  of  view  and  the 
desiderata  of  the  Polish  party  who  accepted  the  neces- 
sity of  a  sensible  union  with  Russia  in  the  sphere  of 
foreign  policy  and  of  economic  interests. 

One  evening  when  we  were  talking  about  the  war, 
we  naturally  spoke  of  our  sons,  who  had  been  great 
friends  during  their  time  at  the  military  college,  and 
who  had  got  their  commissions  the  same  day  in  the 
Infantry  of  the  Guard.  He  was  expecting  the  Guards 
to  go  into  action  again,  and  the  thought  bound  us  by 
ties  of  mutual  sympathy. 

These  gentlemen  left  Stockholm  soon  after,  and  all 
the  interest  of  the  moment  was  concentrated,  as  far  as 
I  was  concerned,  again  on  the  military  operations  in 
Galicia.  These  were  not  proceeding  as  rapidly  as  at 
the  beginning  ;  the  Germans  having  thrown  large  forces 
into  Volhynia,  and  stubbornly  contested  the  railway 
centre  at  Kovel.  But  only  a  few  days  had  passed  and 
my  attention  was  again  distracted  from  the  events  of 
the  war  by  a  political  occurrence  of  a  very  serious 
nature. 

One  morning  towards  the  end  of  July  the  repre- 
sentative of  our  telegraphic  agency  came  to  me  very 
much  upset  with  the  news  that  Sazonoff  had  resigned 
and   had   been   replaced  by  .  .  .   Stiirmer!     At   first  I 


434     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

refused  to  believe  it,  but  I  soon  had  to  yield  to  evidence. 
1  was  sincerely  and  deeply  affected  by  the  news. 

In  the  course  of  these  reminiscences  I  have  often 
mentioned  my  former  colleague  and  chief.  The  policy 
adopted  by  us  in  1913  on  the  Bulgarian  question  could 
not  meet  with  my  approval  and  I  said  as  much  openly; 
1  also  could  not  refrain  from  criticising  the  lack  of  fore- 
sight with  regard  to  what  was  shaping  itself  in  Germany 
and  Austria,  and  I  was  astonished  at  the  imperturbable 
calm  of  M.  Sazonoff ;  but  this  criticism  did  not  prevent 
me  seeing  him  as  he  really  was,  that  is  to  say,  an 
essentially  honest  man,  and  a  judicious  and  sometimes 
even  perspicacious  diplomat,  when  he  formed  his  own 
judgments  and  did  not  allow  himself  to  be  influenced 
by  his  surroundings  and  his  intimate  friends,  of  whom 
only  one  or  two  at  the  outside  were  his  equals  in  intelli- 
gence and  character.  And  to  the  minds  of  those  who 
considered  that  the  World  War  was  inevitable,  and 
that  Russia  might  come  out  of  it  victorious  and  with 
valuable  acquisitions — /  was  not  among  the  number — 
M.  Sazonoff's  policy  must  have  appeared  absolutely 
impeccable,  at  least  in  its  broad  outlines.  He  had 
counted  on  the  absolute  fidelity  of  our  Allies  and  his 
hopes  were  completely  realised ;  as  soon  as  he  was  in 
office  he  had  sketched  out  an  agreement  in  spe  with 
Italy  in  the  sphere  of  Eastern  questions,  and  particularly 
that  of  the  Adriatic,  and  Italy  ended  by  abandoning  her 
former  alliances  and  siding  with  us ;  he  had  openly 
demanded  Constantinople  and  the  Straits  for  Russia  as 
the  price  of  our  sacrifice  in  the  World  War,  and  the 
Allies  had  ended  by  recognising  our  rights  to  this 
supreme  recompense  ;  ^  but  first  and  foremost  he  enjoyed 
the  complete  and  unlimited  confidence  of  our  Allies,  a 
confidence  he  fully  deserved,  for  from  the  outbreak  of 
war  he  had  considered  their  cause  and  their  interests 
just  as  sacred  as  those  of  Russia  herself.  To  sum  up  : 
one  might  criticise,  one  might  disapprove  of,  Sazonoff's 
pre-war  policy  ;  but  once  war  had  broken  out  he  became 

*  And  on  this  question  the  whole  of  Russia  was  then  with  Sazonoff. 


i9i6j       STURMER  succeeds  SAZONOFF        435 

the  right  man  in  the  right  place,  and  one  could  not  inter- 
fere with  him  without  endangering  the  result  of  the 
terrible  conflict  in  which  the  world  was  plunged. 

Hence  SazonofTs  retirement  was  in  any  case  a  sharp 
blow  struck  at  those  who  were  fighting  with  us ;  but 
to  replace  him  by  a  personage  as  suspicious  and  of 
such  a  bad  reputation  as  Stiirmer  might  seem  to  be  a 
blow  struck  at  the  alliance  itself.  This  is  how  it  was 
viewed  in  Paris,  London  and  Rome.  If  Sazonoff  had 
been  replaced  by  anotherl  diplomat,'  M.  de  Giers,  for 
instance,  or  even  M.  Schebeko  (of  which  there  had  been 
a  question  at  one  time),  our  allies  would  certainly  have 
greatly  regretted  his  departure,  but  they  would  not 
have  considered  that  the  cause  of  the  alliance  itself 
was  in  peril.  But  as  it  was,  Stiirmer's  appointment 
endorsed  the  legend  which  was  promptly  circulated 
(perhaps  by  German  agents  themselves)  and  spread 
abroad  in  Russia  and  in  Europe.  The  legend  ran  that 
the  Empress  Alexandra,  who  was  daily  taking  a  more 
active  part  in  the  affairs  of  the  State,  actuated  by  her 
Germanic  sentiments,  wished  to  save  her  former  country 
at  all  costs  by  bringing  about  a  separate  peace  between 
the  latter  and  Russia ;  that  M.  Stiirmer — of  German 
origin — was  her  agent  and  her  accomplice,  whilst 
Rasputin  was  in  receipt  of  Boche  money  to  keep  up  the 
Empress's  pacifist  sentiments.  This  legend  was  untrue. 
The  Empress  had  never  been  an  agent  of  the  Berlin 
Court ;  on  the  contrary  at  one  moment  her  sympathies 
had  been  frankly  English.  Rasputin — whose  mentality 
was  not  far  removed  from  that  of  the  Cossack  who,  on 
being  asked  by  a  friend  what  he  would  do  if  he  became 
Tsar,  replied  :  "  I  should  promptly  steal  a  hundred 
roubles  and  bolt ! " — Rasputin  accepted  a  hundred 
roubles  here  and  five  hundred  there  from  the  numerous 
people  who  solicited  his  protection  ;  he  did  not  hide 
himself  from  them  in  any  way  and  was  perfectly 
satisfied,  loaded  as  he  was  with  presents  and  supported, 
as  well  as  his  family,  at  the  expense  of  the  Court. 
Stiirmer  was  not  more  "  German  "  by  origin  than  many 

2   F 


436     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

other  Russians  who,  in  spite  of  their  foreign  name,  were 
often  unimpeachable  patriots.  But  in  himself  this  indi- 
vidual, of  a  low  class,  and  always  to  be  bought,  consti- 
tuted a  real  danger  to  those  most  weighty  interests 
which  had  been  confided  to  him.  Fortunately  he  had 
not  the  time  to  perpetrate  deeds  of  real  treachery,  but  his 
presence  in  the  Government  injured  to  a  certain  extent 
Russian  effort  in  the  war,  if  only  through  the  wide 
breach  which  the  promotion  of  a  Stunner  caused  between 
the  Emperor  and  the  public  opinion  of  the  country. 

I  had  not  recovered  from  the  emotion  which  the 
news  of  M.  Sazonoff's  departure  had  roused  in  me,  as 
in  my  allied  colleagues,  when  a  telegram  was  received 
at  the  Legation  begging  that  the  news  of  the  death  of 
our  youngest  son,  killed  in  action  on  the  28th  Jul}^, 
should  be  broken  to  us  as  gently  as  possible.  His  body, 
as  well  as  those  of  his  comrades  killed  in  the  battle, 
was  to  be  brought  to  Tsarskoe-Selo. 

We  were  utterly  unprepared  for  this  grievous  news  ; 
we  did  not  know  that  the  Imperial  Guard  had  been 
taking  part  near  Kovel  in  some  glorious  fighting,  but 
which,  alas  !  was  to  be  rendered  fruitless  by  the  marshes 
of  the  Stohed. 

Destined  by  fate  to  be  in  the  attacking  party,  my 
son,  who  was  under  the  terrible  fire  of  modern  warfare 
for  the  first  time,  did  his  whole  duty.  When  his  captain 
fell  he  took  command  of  his  company  and  led  it  to  the 
enemy  trenches.  He  was  shot  dead  at  once.  His  men, 
deprived  of  their  officers  and  having  had  all  their  non- 
commissioned officers  killed  or  wounded,  succeeded 
even  so  in  getting  into  the  enemy's  trench.  (And  one 
year  later  the  soldiers  of  the  same  regiment  were 
the  worst  rioters  in  the  Army  and  deliberately  left 
the  battlefields.)  "Your  son  died  like  a  hero,"  wrote  the 
colonel  of  his  regiment  to  me,  "leading  his  men  to  the 
attack  of  strong  enemy  positions.  He  died  during  a 
glorious  fight  which  will  remain  one  of  the  finest  pages 
in  the  history  of  his  regiment.  " 


I9I6]  A   BAND  OF   MALEFACTORS  437 

But  we  only  heard  all  these  details  when  we  arrived 
at  Petrograd.  Meanwhile  the  confusion  was  so  great 
in  our  Foreign  Office,  suddenly  deprived  of  its  head, 
that  I  had  had  to  wait  a  whole  week  for  permission 
to  come  and  attend  the  obsequies  of  my  son  ! 

We  paid  the  last  honours  to  his  mortal  remains  at 
an  imposing  and  never-to-be-forgotten  ceremony,  when 
we  realised  to  what  an  extent  a  regiment  is  a  real  family 
— a  family  that  the  blood  of  its  members  cemented  more 
firmly  every  day. 

Two  days  after  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  go  and  see 
Sazonoff,  who  was  still  residing  in  the  Foreign  Office. 
I  expressed  my  sincere  feelings  of  regret.  "  Our  reac- 
tionary party  is  really  mad ! "  I  said  amongst  other 
things.  "  How  can  they,  given  the  state  of  people's 
minds  and  the  very  comprehensible  suspicions  of  the 
Allies,  risk  an  appointment  like  that  of  Stiirmer?" 
"You  are  wrong,  my  dear  M.  Nekludoff,"  interrupted 
Sazonoff,  "the  reactionary  party  has  nothing  to  do  with 
it ;  it  has  ceased  to  exist  for  the  last  few  months,  having 
become  fused  in  the  moderate  Right.  There  is  a  band 
of  malefactors  who  at  the  present  time  are  endeavouring 
to  assume  the  reins  of  government;  and  Stiirmer  is  one 
of  the  heads  of  this  band."  M.  Sazonoff  went  on  to  tell 
me  that  almost  on  the  eve  of  his  enforced  resignation  he 
had  been  to  Mohilev,  where  the  Emperor  had  received 
him  most  graciously  and  had  approved  of  all  that  he 
had  submitted  to  His  Majesty's  decision. 

I  paid  no  other  visits.  We  stayed  with  an  intimate 
friend  of  my  wife's,  who  surrounded  us  with  the  most 
touching  care.  Only  relations  and  real  friends  were 
allowed  to  come  and  see  us.  The  first  person  my  wife 
wished  to  see  was  Count  S.  Wielopolski,  whose  son  had 
been  killed  the  same  day  as  ours.  We  had  a  long  talk  ; 
besides  the  sorrow  inflicted  on  him  by  the  death  of  this 
beloved  child,  the  Count  was  terribly  anxious  with 
regard  to  the  fate  of  Poland,  about  which  nothing  was 
settled.  He  was  still  awaiting  permission  to  go  and 
seethe  Emperor,  but  this  permission  did  not  arrive.    "  I 


438     KVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     fniAP-xxii. 

understand  your  state  of  mind,"  I  said  to  him.  "  /  know 
why  and  for  whom  my  son  has  died  ;  and  you  do  not 
even  know  if  the  death  of  yours  is  a  holocaust 
offered  to  your  countr}',  or  if  it  is  a  useless  sacrifice." 
Weeping  bitterly  the  poor  Count  pressed  my  hand. 

The  excellent  M.  Pokrovsky  also  hastened  to  visit 
us,  and  his  sincere  sympath}''  with  our  sorrow  touched 
us  deeply.  I  went  a  second  time  to  see  Sazonoff,  who 
was  staj'ing  temporarily  almost  next  door  to  us.  I 
told  him  about  Protopopoff's  last  journey  through 
Sweden  and  his  meeting  with  Warburg,  which  had  just 
got  into  the  papers  and  been  vehemently  criticised  by 
the  A^oz'Oj'C  jyotiya.  "But  Protopopoff  told  me  all  that 
on  his  return  here,  and  I  saw  absolutely  nothing  to 
object  to  in  it,"  said  Sazonoff.  "  He  has  brought  back 
on  the  whole  some  very  interesting  impressions  of 
his  journey,  and  the  last  time  that  1  was  at  G.H.O.  I 
earnestl}'  recommended  the  Emperor  to  send  for  him 
and  to  make  him  relate  these  impressions.  I  have  not 
heard  since  whether  His  Majesty  has  acted  on  my 
suggestion." 

In  spite  of  the  above-mentioned  opinion  of  Sazonoff's 
on  the  Protopopoff-Warburg  incident,  I  thought  it 
necessary — on  the  advice  of  an  experienced  friend — to 
go  and  see  the  Vice-President  of  the  Duma  and  to 
discuss  it  with  him.  Protopopoff  knew  nothing  of  the 
cruel  sorrow  which  had  befallen  us,  and  uttered  many 
expressions  of  sympathy. 

I  then  embarked  on  the  question  which  had  taken 
me  to  him.  "The  new^spapers,"  I  said,  "have  been 
making  such  a  fuss  about  your  meeting  with  Warburg 
that  I  consider  it  imperative — with  your  assistance — to 
refresh  my  memory  w-ith  regard  to  your  last  stay  in 
Stockholm."  I  recapitulated  all  that  he  had  said  and  all 
that  I  had  replied  to  him.  "  Is  that  right  ?  "  "  Perfectly  ; 
that  was  exactly  it,"  was  his  answer.  The  speaker  no 
longer  betrayed  any  of  the  same  agitation  as  in 
Stockholm.  He  rather  seemed  to  be  taciturn,  pensive 
and  absent-minded.     He  said  he  was  expecting  to  be 


1916]  I   CALL  ON   STURMER  439 

summoned  to  G.H.Q.,  and  it  was  probably  this  that  was 
making  him  dreamy. 

Although  we  were  seeing  very  few  people,  my 
impressions  of  Petrograd  were  frankly  unfavourable 
ones.  Our  offensive  was  dying  down.  The  Guard  and 
the  army  corps  which  had  started  the  attack  on  Kovel  so 
well  were  sinking  into  the  Volhynian  marshes,  and  their 
forces  were  reduced  by  more  than  a  third.  In  town 
every  one  appeared  more  then  ever  to  be  tired  of  the 
war ;  they  were  dozing.  One  evening  when,  from  the 
window,  I  was  admiring  the  extensive  view  of  the  quays, 
of  the  Neva  and  the  sky,  already  autumnal  and  lit  up 
by  the  soft  tints  of  sunset,  a  very  young  friend  who 
was  at  my  side  said:  "Are  you  looking,  as  I  am,  to 
see  if  a  Zeppelin  is  not  coming  over  Petrograd  ?  That 
would  really  do  some  good  !  that  might  wake  up  all 
these  people  here  and  restore  some  of  their  patriot- 
ism." "Alas!"  I  replied,  "you  are  voicing  a  feeling 
of  which  I  cannot  rid  myself  since  I  have  been  in 
Petrograd ! " 

The  day  before  our  departure  for  Stockholm,  I  at 
last  made  up  my  mind  to  call  on  the  new  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  I  was  received  in  the  big  office  where 
I  had  seen  M.  de  Giers,  Prince  Lobanoff,  Count 
Lamsdorf  and  others  seated,  where  I  had  talked 
at  great  length  with  Sazonoff  five  months  previously. 
I  saw  in  their  place  an  individual  with  a  common 
face  and  manners  which  were  completely  at  variance 
with  the  surroundings.  Everything  about  him  was 
sham,  one  felt  it  in  his  every  word,  in  his  every  move- 
ment. Sham  simplicity,  sham  good-nature,  sham 
courtesy,  sham  dignity.  We  had  known  his  white 
hair  as  red ;  his  backbone  now  stiff  and  straight  had 
formerly  been  servilely  bent.  I  felt  that  he  was 
worried  by  .his  new  role — which  spoke  rather  in 
his  favour,  and  by  my  presence — which  spoke  decidedly 
in  mine.  Nevertheless,  my  antipathy  was  in  no  way 
lessened  thereby.  He  gave  me  no  information  relative 
to    Swedish   affairs,  pleading   his    inexperience   in   the 


440     EVIL  OMENS   IN    PETROGRAD     [chap.  xxii. 

matter ;  but  he  did  not  question  me  either.  He  con- 
fined himself  to  a  few  patriotic  commonplaces,  and 
expressed  his  submission  to  the  will  of  the  Emperor 
who  had  imposed  on  him  these  functions — so  new  to 
him.  The  shades  of  the  famous  Boyar  Ordyn-Nastchokin, 
Chancellor  to  the  Tsar  Alexis  Mikhailovitch,  were  once 
more  evoked,  and  the  interview  terminated.  This  Ordyn- 
Nastchokin  was  quoted  to  all  comers  with  good  reason. 
All  who  wished  to  please  Nicolas  II.  compared  him  as 
frequently  as  possible  to  the  "  very  calm,"  the  "  very 
gentle  "  ^  Tsar,  the  father  of  the  fiery  and  cruel  Peter  the 
Great ;  hence  naturally  he,  M.  Stiirmer,  ought  to  figure 
as  the  reproduction  of  the  pious  and  enlightened  Boyar, 
the  intimate  friend  of  Alexis.  I  went  out  somewhat 
disgusted.  "  It  is  not  worth  while  to  get  upset  about 
it,"  I  said  to  one  of  the  exalted  functionaries  of  the 
Foreign  Office  whom  I  met  on  the  stairs  and  who  began 
to  "slate"  his  new  chief.  "That  individual  will  not 
remain  here  more  than  two  months.  Mark  my  words  ; 
it  is  now  the  ist  September,  by  the  ist  November 
he  will  have  left."  I  was  only  wrong  by  a  fortnight. 
And  I  learnt  meanwhile  that  my  prophecy  had  been 
faithfully  repeated  to  the  subject  of  it. 

During  my  short  stay  in  Petrograd,  I  had  an 
opportunity  of  getting  to  know  the  contents  of  the 
minute  that  M.  Sazonoff  had  presented  to  the  Emperor 
on  the  Polish  question.  It  was  a  scheme  for  the  new 
autonomous  Statute  of  Poland.  Wielopolski  and  his 
friends  who  had  read  it  were  not  pleased  with  it.  Accord- 
ing to  this  minute,  at  the  head  of  the  new  Poland  there 
was  to  be  a  Governor-General  appointed  by  the  Emperor, 
and  not  a  "  Lieutenant-General  of  the  Kingdom"  elected, 
or  at  least  recommended  to  the  Imperial  choice,  by 
Polish  national  representation.  This  was  the  principal 
point  on  which  the  opinion  of  Poles  of  Russian  persuasion 
differed  from  that  of  M.  Sazonoff;  there  were  also 
others.     On  the  whole,  the  scheme  in  question  gave  to 

*  "  Tishai'chi  Tsar." 


i9i6j     SAZONOFF'S  MINUTE  ON   POLAND     441 

Poland  the  autonomy  that  Finland  had  had  before  the 
reforms  denounced  by  the  Finns.  There  was  also  an 
intentional  gap  in  the  scheme.  The  Poles  asked  that 
in  the  provinces  of  White-Russia  and  the  Ukraine  their 
kinsmen,  whose  rights  had  been  subjected  to  considerable 
restrictions/  should  be  placed  on  an  absolutely  equal 
footing  with  their  Russian  fellow-citizens  ;  now  there 
was  no  mention  of  this  in  the  scheme. 

Considering  the  tremendous  stock  of  grievances 
which  for  more  than  a  century  had  been  accumulating 
in  Poland  against  the  Russians — and  vice-versa;  con- 
sidering also  that  the  former  Finnish  statute  had  not 
spared  us  either  the  hostility  of  certain  Finnish  parties 
or  the  temptation  to  infringe  this  statute  ourselves,  I 
was  not  at  all  satisfied  with  Sazonoff's  scheme.  I  heard 
later  that  the  latter  had  sketched  out  his  minute  on  far 
broader  and  more  liberal  lines,  but  that  having  given  it 
to  M.  Krzyzanowski — former  Secretary  to  the  Empire  ^ — 
to  correct,  the  latter,  under  pretext  of  co-ordinating  the 
future  Polish  constitution  with  the  general  principles 
and  the  necessities  of  the  Empire  and  of  specifying  the 
judicial  terms  of  this  constitution,  altered  the  whole 
spirit  of  the  scheme.  Now,  if  M.  Sazonoff  allowed 
himself  to  be  influenced  by  considerations  which 
demanded  the  restriction  of  the  future  liberties  of 
Poland,  what  opposition  would  a  M.  Stiirmer  not  raise 

1  These  were  mainly  large  landed  proprietors  belonging  to  the 
Polish  nobility.  The  restrictions  concerned  the  right  of  purchase  of 
land  and  tended  to  diminish  the  number  of  Polish  proprietors  in  favour 
of  Russian  purchasers  or  indigenous  peasants  (Ukranians,  White- 
Russians  or  Lithuanians). 

2  The  Secretary  of  the  Empire  was  the  Director  of  the  Chancellery 
and  the  Editor  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire,  who,  before  the  institution 
of  the  Duma,  alone  framed  and  elaborated  the  text  of  the  laws.  The 
post  of  Secretary  to  the  Empire  was  hence  a  most  important  one.  M. 
Krzyzanowski,  a  very  clever  and  experienced  lawyer,  was  of  Polish  origin, 
and  in  his  youth  was  looked  on  as  very  Liberal.  A  "  turncoat "  and  having 
passed  over  to  the  Conservative  camp,  he  had,  under  Stolypin,  an 
influence  which  -our  Liberals  condemned  as  fatal.  It  was  at  his  brother- 
in-law  Stolypin's  that  Sazonoff  became  intimate  with  Krzyzanowski. 


442     liVlL  OMENS   IN   PETROGRAD     [chap.xxii. 

to  these  liberties?  And  in  spite  of  all  the  honeyed 
assurances  of  the  latter,  the  Poles  who  were  the  most 
favourably  inclined  towards  Russia  and  towards 
Nicolas  II.  realised  that  for  the  time  being  nothing  good 
was  to  be  expected  for  their  country.  All  this  confirmed 
me  still  more  in  my  belief  that  there  was  in  reality  but 
one  way  only  of  solving  the  Polish  question  definitely, 
and  of  freeing  Russia  from  a  lot  of  internal  worries  :  i.e, 
to  grant  to  Poland,  within  the  confines  of  really 
Polish  territory,  absolute  independence  and  complete 
sovereignty. 

I  said  above  that  the  public  spirit  of  the  capital, 
with  regard  to  the  war,  was  not  at  all  what  I  should 
have  wished.  Quite  at  the  end  of  my  short  stay  in 
Petrograd,  there  was  a  semblance  of  movement  and  of 
enthusiasm  roused  by  Rumania's  entry  into  the  war; 
but  this  movement  was  hardly  perceptible. 

M.Ordyn-Nastchokin — alias  Stiirmer — having  become 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  naturally  wished  to  prove 
his  worth  from  the  outset.  With  this  object  in  view, 
he  took  care  to  dispatch  to  Bukharest  a  kind  of  ulti- 
matum, in  which  our  Cabinet  warned  the  Rumanian 
Government  that  if  Rumania  did  not  come  into  the  war 
at  once  Russia  would  withdraw  all  the  promises  she  had 
made  and  all  the  concessions  she  had  agreed  to.  As  for 
severaljmonths  already  Rumania  had  worked  on  the  lines 
of  "virile  decisions"  through  a  French  special  mission, 
and  as  our  advance  in  Galicia  and  in  the  Bukowina 
was  awaking  the  aspirations  of  Rumanian  patriotism, 
the  step  taken  by  M.  Stiirmer  was  not  long  in 
reaping  the  desired  result,  and  on  the  28th  August, 
1916,  the  Rumanian  troops  entered  Hungary.  On  this 
occasion  there  were  some  "popular"  demonstrations 
in  Petrograd,  but  they  were  meagre  and  half-hearted. 
Our  Minister  to  Bukharest,  M.  Poklewski-KozelV  a 
wise  and  clever  diplomat,  had  never  been  enthusiastic 
about  Rumanian  intervention,  although  he  cultivated 
'  I  mentioned  him  in  Chapter  XVIII. 


1916]        RUMANIA  JOINS   IN  THE  WAR         443 

the  best  relations  with  the  society  and  Government  of 
Bukharest.  With  regard  to  this,  he  was  even  the 
object  of  an  intrigue  got  up  by  a  kind  of  naval  agent, 
inclined  to  drink  and  very  bellicose,  and  by  the  Coun- 
sellor to  the  Legation.  This  intrigue  nearly  caused 
Poklewski's  fall ;  but,  as  a  former  comrade  and  personal 
friend  of  SazonofF's,  he  had  only  to  come  to  Petrograd 
to  frustrate  all  these  machinations  and  to  cause  the 
Minister  to  uphold  him  in  exalted  circles.  But  then, 
and  with  Stiirmer  in  office,  Poklewski  was  considered 
incapable  of  facing  the  fresh  situation,  and  a  new  Envoy 
Extraordinary  was  appointed  to  Bukharest,  in  the 
person  of  the  amiable  General  Mossoloff,^  head  of  the 
Lord  Chamberlain's  Office.  Nevertheless,  Sturmer  did 
not  make  up  his  mind  to  "shelve"  Poklewski  entirely, 
and  so  there  were  two  Russian  representatives  in 
Rumania.  Alas !  this  diplomatic  plethora  was  of  scant 
assistance  to  our  new  allies  in  the  campaign — disastrous 
to  them — which  was  about  to  open. 

On  the  28th  August,  towards  mid-day — it  was  the  eve 
of  my  departure  for  Stockholm — I  met  M.  Sazonoff, 
accompanied  by  Baron  Schilling,  in  the  Square  of  the 
Winter  Palace.  We  stopped  to  talk.  "  I  saw  you 
coming  out  of  the  Foreign  Office,"  said  Sazonoff  to  me; 
"what  have  you  heard  there  about  the  Rumanians? 
Can  one  consider  their  entry  into  the  war  an  accom- 
plished fact  ?  " 

"Yes,  yes!  the  deed  is  done,"  I  replied;  "it  will  be 
announced  in  the  papers  to-day." 

"Thank  God!  Thank  God!"  exclaimed  Sazonoff. 
As  I  could  not  help  evincing  a  great  deal  of  scepticism, 
Sazonoff  pressed  me  to  say  why  this  excellent  news  left 
me  cold.  I  then  related  to  him  the  interview  that  I  had 
had  six  months  previously  with  General  Polivanoff. 
"  That  is  curious,"  said  Sazonoff  in  a  hurt  voice ; 
"  Polivanoff  never  told  me  all  that  and  yet  we  were 
very  intimate."  This  time  it  was  my  turn  to  be  hurt, 
and  we  parted  somewhat  coldly. 

'  The  same  whom  I  mentioned  in  Chapter  VIII. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


RUSSIA   IN    DECLINE 


On  my  return  to  Stockholm  I  at  once  took  up  the 
threads  of  current  political  questions  and  of  the  daily 
round  again. 

At  our  very  first  meeting  M.  Wallenberg  asked  me 
if  I  considered  it  an  opportune  moment  for  formal 
negotiations  between  the  Russian  and  Swedish  Govern- 
ments concerning  the  Aland  Islands.  "  Most  decidedly 
not,"  I  unhesitatingly  replied ;  "  you  will  arrive  at 
nothing  owing  to  the  confusion  reigning  at  this  moment 
at  the  Foreign  Office.  And  then  it  is  hardly  worth 
while ;  in  two  months,  or  two  months  and  a  half  at  latest, 
M.  Sturmer  will  have  ceased  to  be  at  the  head  of  our 
Foreign  Office."  M.  Wallenberg  believed  me  and  took 
this  for  granted.  It  is  probable  that  the  Swedish 
Minister  to  Petrograd  had  meantime  confirmed  my 
opinion. 

My  allied  colleagues  cross-questioned  me  with  the 
deepest  interest  on  Rumania's  entry  into  the  war.  We 
agreed  that  the  whole  importance  of  this  entry  lay  in 
the  possibility  for  us  of  throwing  troops  into  Bulgaria 
and  of  showing  the  disloyal  aud  ungrateful  people  what 
it  cost  to  raise  their  hand  against  their  liberator  and 
benefactor,  Russia.  "  How  many  troops  have  you  sent 
to  the  Dobrudja?"  asked  my  colleagues.  I  did  not 
know  but  I  supposed  that  a  Russian  army  would  attack 
the  Bulgarians  on  that  side.  Just  then  the  French 
General  de  L.  arrived  in  Stockholm ;  he  had  been 
attached  to  our  G.H.Q.  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  He  came  to  see  me  and  I  asked  him  the 
same  question — that  of  the  number  of  our  contingents 

444 


I9I6]  BAD   NEWS   FROM   RUMANIA  445 

engaged   near   the    Lower   Danube.      "You   have   two 
divisions  and  a  half  there,"  he   replied,  "but  another 
one  is  to  be   sent."     "What,  not  more  than  that?"  I 
exclaimed.     "  I  know  what  you  mean,"  interrupted  the 
General;  "you  are  afraid   it   is   not  enough.      Well,   I 
can    reassure  you.      Several  generals  at  your  G.H.Q. 
had    thought   that    you    ought   to    send    at    least   four 
army  corps  to  the  Dobrudja,  and  Alexeieff  himself  was 
inclined  to  that  opinion.     But  on  due  deliberation  they 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  an  attack  by  all  the  best 
Rumanian   troops  on  the  Austrians'  flank  in  Transyl- 
vania would  have  such  a  disastrous  effect  for  the  latter 
that  it  would  only  be  necessary  to  concentrate  the  efforts 
of  the  Russian  armies  in  Galicia  and  the  Bukowina  to 
bring  complete  disaster  to  the  Austrian  Army.     Under 
the   circumstances   one   could   not   divide   the  Russian 
forces,  but  on  the  contrary  make  the  maximum  effort  on 
the   principal   front."     All   the   same   this   news  was  a 
great  blow  to  my  hopes  and  to  those  of  my  colleagues, 
and  very  soon  events  proved  that  our  fears  were  well- 
founded.     On  the  Lower  Danube  the   Rumanians  had 
only  got  territorials,  who  were  quite  unable  to  stand  up 
against  seasoned  troops  of  four  years'  standing  like  the 
Bulgarians,  so  that  ferocious  and  unequal  fighting  soon 
played  havoc  with  our  ten  regiments,  and  one  of  the 
most  disastrous  results  was  that  the  Bulgarians  had  the 
illusion    that    they   were   stronger    than    their    former 
protectors  and  masters  in  military  skill.     Hundreds  of 
Russian  prisoners  were  exhibited  in  Bulgarian  centres. 
It  was   Bulgaria  anew  and   irrevocably  linked  to  the 
Central  Empires. 

Soon  after  news  quite  as  bad  arrived  from  the  other 
parts  of  the  Rumanian  front;  the  Rumanian  and  Russian 
troops  evacuated  Transylvania,  then  bit  by  bit  the  whole 
of  Wallachia,  and  Mackensen  made  his  triumphal  entry 
into  Bukharest ;  the  Sereth  front  was  formed  on  which 
Russians  and  Rumanians  were  henceforth  to  con- 
centrate all  their  efforts  solely  to  hold  the  Germans 
and  their  allies.     The  Rumanian   campaign  was  lost. 


44^  RUSSIA   IN   DECLINE       [chap,  xxiii. 

I  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  this  bitter  deception, 
added  to  tlie  disastrous  memories  of  191 5,  had  a  great 
deal  to  do  with  the  exasperation  of  Russian  public 
opinion.  Revolutionary  machinations  were  certainly 
increased  thereby,  especially  in  the  Army. 

Whilst  all  this  was  going  on  in  the  war  area,  the 
internal  ferment  of  Russia  and  the  disorder  in  the 
Government  were  increasing  in  a  truly  alarming  manner. 
Each  day  we  received  grievous  news  through  the  news- 
papers and  from  Russian  travellers.  First  there  was 
Stiirmer's  private  secretary  and  factotum,  an  ex-agent 
of  the  State  Police  and  later  on  one  of  the  editors  of 
the  Novqye  Vremya,  who  was  arraigned  for  extortion 
of  a  considerable  sum  from  a  rich  trader.  And  M. 
Stiirmer  still  remained  at  his  post!  Then  one  heard 
that  the  Empress  Alexandra  received  the  official  reports 
of  the  Ministers  and  appended  her  decisions  thereto.  What 
one  heard  about  the  "good  old  man's"  exploits  almost 
exceeded  the  bounds  of  possibility;  I  feel  sure  that  a 
great  number  of  these  tales  were  untrue ;  but  what 
were  left  were  enough  to  make  every  good  Russian 
patriot  blush.  Our  Allies  soon  began  to  suspect  that 
Sturmer  and  his  acolytes,  whose  actions  at  first  sight 
appeared  to  be  absolutely  disconnected,  were  in  reality 
aiming  at  a  definite,  though  carefully  concealed  end,  that 
of  leading  Russia  and  the  Emperor  to  a  separate  peace 
with  Germany.  Were  these  suspicions  well  founded, 
or  did  they  emanate  from  the  side  of  the  Germans  and 
of  the  revolution  which  was  being  organised  ?  I  cannot 
say.     In  any  case  I  will  not  answer  for  M.  StOrmer. 

The  Duma  was  agitated  by  the  startling  defection 
of  Protopopoff.  Summoned  to  Mohilev  and  having 
succeeded  in  captivating  the  Emperor,  he  was,  two 
weeks  later,  appointed  Home  Secretary  and  as  such 
supreme  head  of  the  State  Police.  He  accepted  without 
even  asking  the  advice  of  his  party ;  at  first  he  made  a 
few  confused  declarations  at  the  Duma,  but  very  soon 
revealed   himself  in   his   new   post   as   an    out-and-out 


I9I6]  PROTOPOPOFF'S   INSANITY  447 

reactionary  and  what  is  more  an  incoherent  reactionary. 
There  was  a  stormy  meeting  at  which  his  former  political 
friends  called  on  him  to  resign  his  post  and  on  his 
refusal  struck  him  out  of  the  party.  He  had  many 
bitter  things  to  hear.  One  man  only  amongst  those 
concerned  really  understood  the  situation,  and  this  was 
Schingareff.  In  his  capacity  as  doctor  and  as  a  good 
and  charitable  man  he  made  an  urgent  appeal  to 
Protopopoff:  "Listen  to  me,  I  otopopoff;  you  are  ill, 
very  seriously  ill.  Give  up  all  your  occupations,  go 
home,  put  yourself  into  the  hands  of  good  doctors,  go 
into  a  nursing  home  if  necessary,  and  come  back  to  us 
cured ;  you  will  be  received  by  all  of  us  with  open 
arms."  This  voice  of  a  friend  went,  of  course,  unheeded, 
and  Russia  endured  the  shame  of  possessing,  for  five 
months  and  at  a  most  critical  hour,  a  Home  Secretary 
suffering  from  tabes  and  on  the  high-road  to  creeping 
paralysis.  The  wretched  man  was  completely  off  his 
head  when  he  was  executed  by  the  Bolsheviks  after  a 
few  months'  confinement  in  the  Peter  and  Paul  fortress. 

Abroad  people  have  often  been  surprised — in  Con- 
servative circles  especially — that  the  monarchical  regime 
and  the  good  and  honest  Emperor  himself,  did  not 
find  any  supporters  when  the  Revolution  broke  out ; 
that  all  Russia  should  in  a  few  hours  have  sided  with 
the  most  Radical  ideas,  the  most  violent  measures.  I 
myself,  as  I  said  above,  have  frequently  and  bitterly 
criticised  later  on  the  cJiameleonism  of  the  upper  classes 
of  Russian  society.  But  in  pronouncing  judgment 
one  ought  to  take  the  months  immediately  pre- 
ceding the  revolution  into  consideration.  The  most 
steadfast  partisans  of  the  monarchical  regime,  the 
most  devoted  servants  of  the  Sovereign  were  then 
dominated  by  one  feeling  only,  that  of  deep  and  bitter 
humiliation.  "Things  cannot  go  on  like  this;  in  some 
way  or  other  this  must  end  ! "  Such  were  the  words 
one  heard  on  all  sides. 

Now  if  this  was  the  state  of  mind  in  Russian  Con- 
servative circles,  what  must  the  excitement  have  been 


448  RUSSIA    IN    DECLINE       [chap,  xxiii. 

amongst  the  men  who  for  a  long  time  had  been  marching 
to  the  attack  of  the  former  regime,  of  its  manifold  in- 
consistencies and  original  blemishes?  Towards  the 
end  of  1916  one  can  assert  that  the  "  sacred  union," 
planned  since  the  war,  no  longer  existed  either  at  the 
Duma  or  elsewhere.  All  wishes  were  turning  towards 
a  radical  metamorphosis  of  things  ;  only  some  pictured 
this  metamorphosis  as  a  sort  of  coup  d'itat  or  palace- 
revolution,  like  those  of  the  eighteenth  century  in 
Russia,  which  would  set  the  Emperor  and  more  especially 
the  Empress  on  one  side,  and  place  the  little  Tsarevitch 
on  the  throne  with  a  firm  and  wise  regency  supported 
by  national  representation  ;  while  others  contemplated 
a  popular  and  complete  revolution  whence  would  spring 
a  new  order  of  things  strictly  in  accordance  with  their 
opinions  or  their  dreams.  As  I  said  above,  both  sides 
abjured  the  word  of  command  "  no  revolution  in  war- 
time," and  to  excuse  this  repudiation  of  a  principle 
agreed  on,  rumours,  becoming  daily  more  persistent, 
were  circulated  of  treachery  to  the  cause  of  Russia  and 
the  Allies  contemplated  by  the  Empress  Alexandra, 
Sturmer  e  tutti  quatiti. 

In  the  course  of  this  autumn  of  nightmares  I  was 
surprised  one  day  by  a  visit  from  Prince  Nicolas  of 
Greece  (married  to  the  daughter  of  the  Grand-Duchess 
Vladimir),  who  was  on  his  way  through  Germany 
to  Petrograd.  The  Prince,  who  omitted  to  explain 
whether  he  had  been  summoned  to  the  Russian  Court 
or  at  least  formally  authorised  to  go  there,  asked  me  to 
viser  his  passports.  During  our  conversation  he  did 
not  utter  any  categorical  complaint  of  the  doings  of  the 
Allies  in  Greece,  nor  did  he  seek  to  justify  the  conduct  of 
his  brother.  King  Constantine ;  nevertheless,  I  felt  that 
he  had  been  sent  by  the  latter  to  offer  the  King's  apology 
to  the  Court  of  Tsarskoe  and  to  explain  to  what  extent 
it  would  be  difficult  for  Greece  to  place  herself  resolutely 
on  the  side  of  the  Entente  and  to  declare  war.  After 
having  listened  attentively  to  the  Prince,   I  contented 


I9I6]  PRINCE   NICOLAS  OF  GREECE  449 

myself  with  recommending  him  not  to  lose  sight  of  one 
thing  only,  i.e.  that  Greece  had  no  enemies  more  bitter 
and  more  irreconcilable  than  the  Bulgarians,  and  that  if 
the  Bulgarians  got  the  best  of  the  struggle  which  was 
beginning  in  the  south  of  the  Balkans,  Greece  would 
lose  all  the  acquisitions  purchased  with  Greek  blood  in 
1912  and  1913.  Prince  Nicolas  replied  that  he  himself 
was  imbued  with  that  idea. 

I  visid  the  Prince's  passports,  but  I  considered  it 
necessary  to  warn  our  Foreign  Office  that  His  High- 
ness—as far  as  I  could  see — was  being  sent  by  King 
Constantine  to  make  his  defence  against  the  accusations 
of  our  Allies. 

A  few  weeks  later  Prince  Nicolas,  who  in  the  mean- 
time had  been  received  at  Tsarskoe  and  at  Mohilev, 
wrote  to  me  from  London  to  express  his  intense  surprise 
at  my  "  behaviour  "  to  him  ;  for  he  knew  from  "  reliable 
sources  "  that  I  had  represented  him  as  an  opponent  of 
the  Entente  and  of  Greece's  participation  in  the  war.  I 
answered  by  return  of  post  that  the  "  reliable  sources  " 
of  which  the  Prince  had  availed  himself  were  lying  ones, 
and  that  if  I  had  held  the  opinion  ascribed  to  me  about 
his  sentiments,  I  should  certainly  not  have  hesitated  to 
tell  him  so  quite  frankly  during  our  conversation  in 
Stockholm. 

I  realised  without  any  effort  that  it  was  from  our 
Foreign  Office — perhaps  from  M.  Sturmer  himself— that 
the  Greek  Prince  had  heard  what  he  asserted  in  his 
letter.  And  the  proceeding  did  not  surprise  me  in  the 
least. 

I  knew  perfectly  well  that  if  the  Sturmer  regime 
continued  I  should  sooner  or  latter  have  to  give  up  my 
post  in  Stockholm,  and  to  retire  from  the  service. 

Already  in  May,  1916,  two  months  before  Sazonoff 
retired,  the  Foreign  Office  had  sent  out  a  certain 
M.  E to  work  side  by  side  with  me  as  a  super- 
numerary counsellor.  I  was  well  aware  that  this  gentle- 
man,   who  was    very    intelligent,    was    the    worst    of 


450  RUSSIA   IN   DECLINE       [<  iiai'.  xxiii. 

intriguers  and  had  always  sought  to  injure  his  chiefs  or 
his  colleagues.     I  knew  later  that  the  idea  of  sending 

M.    E to   Stockholm  had  come  to    several    of  the 

leaders  of  the  Foreign  Office  when  the  success  of  my 
work  in  Sweden  became  accentuated.  At  any  cost  they 
had  to  guard  against  the  possible  promotion  of  a  man 
so  little  liked  in  the  departments  of  the  Foreign  Office 
as  I  was.  So  I  was  given  as  associate  an  individual 
who  promised  to  write  from  Stockholm,  that  is  to  say  to 
spy  on  my  words  and  actions  and  to  report  them — 
distorted  of  course — to  correspondents  eager  for  this 
kind  of  information.  In  the  present  case  these  corre- 
spondents were  two  officials  in  the  Foreign  Office  who 
played  a  somewhat  important  part  in  M.  Sazonoff's  set, 
and  who  remained  under  the  same  conditions  with 
M.  Stiirmer. 

As  long  as  Sazonoff  was  Minister,  I  thought  very 
little  of  all  this  intrigue;  moreover,  it  had  not  become 
very   apparent.      But   on    Sturmer's    appointment,    M. 

E ,  who  during  his  career  had  repeatedly  professed 

reactionary  principles,  felt  certain  of  supplanting  me; 
he  cast  off  all  dissimulation,  and  spoke  quite  openly 
about  my  approaching  "dismissal"  from  Stockholm. 
Towards  the  middle  of  October  rumours  of  the 
approaching  departure  of  Count  Benckendorff  from 
London,  and  of  M.  Isvolsky  from  Paris,  reached  us  from 
Petrograd  ;  and  a  fortnight  later  I  heard  from  several 
well-informed  quarters  that  I  was  going  to  leave 
Stockholm  without  receiving  any  other  post  abroad. 
M.  Stiirmer  had  already  chosen  my  successor;  only  it 
was  not  M.  E .  It  was  a  gentleman  quite  as  un- 
worthy of  esteem  and  adding  to  his  other  qualities  that 
of  being  a  thorough  good-for-nothing  as  regards  his 
knowledge  and  work. 

Sturmer's  retirement  in  November,  1916,  put  an  end 
to  all  these  rumours,  and  to  all  these  schemes.     And  a 

month  later  M.  E ,  implicated  in  a  society  scandal  of 

which  he  was  the  sorry  and  ridiculous  hero,  had  to  leave 
not  only  Stockholm  but  also  the  service  of  the  State. 


1916]  FALL  OF  STURMER  451 

The  fall  of  Stiirmer  was  due  to  intense  public  in- 
dignation, and  to  the  deep-rooted  suspicions  of  our 
Allies,  who  did  not  hide  these  suspicions  either  from 
the  Emperor  himself,  or  from  our  generals  and  politicians. 
In  November,  M.  Miliukoff,  in  a  speech  at  the  Duma 
which  made  a  tremendous  stir,  enumerated  one  after 
the  other  all  the  suspicious  or  obviously  pernicious 
deeds  of  the  Prime  Minister,  putting  in  each  case  the 
query:  "Say  now,  is  this  madness,  or  is  it  treason?" 
It  has  since  been  contended  that  the  Russian  Revolution 
dated  from  this  speech. 

I  have  already  quoted  the  words  of  M.  Sazonoff  about 
the  "  band  of  malefactors "  who  ruled  Russia  under 
Stiirmer  and  who,  although  priding  themselves  on  the 
designation  of  Conservatives  and  loyal  Monarchists, 
were  disowned  even  by  the  most  ardent  reactionaries 
when  these  reactionaries  were  honest  men. 

One  of  the  Ministers  of  the  Stiirmer  Cabinet  who 
with  his  two  brothers  was  amongst  the  pillars  of  the 
ultra-Conservative  party — M.  Alexander  Trepoff — be- 
came the  appropriate  author  of  the  resignation  of  the 
Premier.  The  Emperor,  whose  choice  had  fallen  on 
Stiirmer  because  the  latter  was  supposed  to  be  Conser- 
vative and  Monarchist,  was  much  affected  by  rumours 
of  "Bochephile"  intrigues  which  Russian  public  opinion 
and  that  of  the  Allies  ascribed  to  Sturmer,  and  most 
willing  to  get  rid  of  this  compromising  Minister  as  soon 
as  he  could  replace  him  by  such  a  universally  recog- 
nised Monarchist  as  Trepoff  Advantage  was  taken,  from 
different  sides,  of  a  rather  longer  stay  made  by  His 
Majesty  at  Mohilev  without  seeing  the  Empress,  to 
persuade  him  to  exercise  his  authority,  that  is  to  say  to 
replace  Stiirmer  by  Alexander  Trepoff  (Minister  of 
Ways  and  Communications).  This  was  done  very  sud- 
denly. I  was  told  that  the  Empress  was  furious,  but 
she  was  powerless  when  once  the  deed  was  done. 

Trepoff's  first  care  was  to  make  a  speech  at  the 
Duma  in  order  to  reveal  the  political  position  of  Russia 
•and  to  affirm  in  the  most  impressive  way  our  unswerving 

2  G 


452  RUSSIA   IN   DECLINE       [chap,  xxiil 

loyalty  to  the  Allies'  cause.  This  speech,  which  one  felt 
was  perfectly  frank,  made  the  best  impression  at  the 
Duma  as  well  as  abroad.  Nevertheless  the  Trepoff 
Ministry  could  not  succeed  in  calming  the  tremendous 
ferment  reigning  in  Russia.  First  there  were  the 
colleagues  of  M.  Trepoff:  a  certain  Dobrovolsky, 
appointed  Minister  of  Justice,  was  more  especially 
known  for  his  occult  exploits — one  knew  that  he  had  at 
once  become /'<:'r5o;/<T  grata  with  the  Empress  Alexandra, 
for  whose  benefit  he  arranged  spiritist  sittings  at 
Tsarskoe ;  and  then  there  was  Protopopoff  in  parti- 
cular, who  was  becoming  every  day  more  excited,  more 
enterprising  and  who  did  not  in  any  way  conceal  his 
ambition  to  play  the  leading  part  at  Court  and  in  the 
Government. 

And  in  view  of  such  an  unusual  Ministr}',  the  Duma 
called  loudly  for  the  formation  of  a  homogeneous  Cabinet 
responsible  to  national  representation.  The  institution 
of  a  responsible  Cabinet  became  the  watchword  of  all 
parties,  for  all  were  now  in  the  Opposition. 

I  have  already  alluded  to  the  sensation  caused  in 
the  Russian  Press  in  August,  1916,  by  the  news  of 
the  meeting  between  M.  Protopopoff  and  the  German 
Warburg  in  Stockholm ;  I  have  also  related  my  conver- 
sation with  Protopopoff  on  the  subject.  During  the 
month  of  November  this  story  reappeared  in  the  Russian 
Press  and  was  vehementlydiscussed. 

I  learnt  through  this  controversy,  that  towards  the 
middle  of  September,  that  is  a  fortnight  after  I  had  seen 
him  and  received  the  assurance  that  his  recollections 
tallied  perfectly  with  mine,  Protopopoff,  who  was  not  yet 
Home  Secretary  and  who  was  combining  his  mandate 
and  his  position  at  the  Duma  with  the  elective  functions 
of  Marshal  of  the  Nobility  of  the  Government  of 
Simbirsk,  went  to  Moscow  for  a  meeting  of  Marshals  of 
the  Nobility.  And  there  he  gave  a  truly  fantastic  version 
of  the  famous  Warburg  incident :  the  meeting  with  War- 
burg was  supposed  to  have  been  arranged  by  Baron  von 


I9I6]     PROTOPOPOFF- WARBURG  AFFAIR       453 

Lucius,  German  Minister  to  Stockholm  ;  it  was  he  him- 
self who  was  to  have  come  to  talk  to  Protopopoff,  but 
on  his  way  to  the  meeting-place  he  was  supposed  to 
have  sprained  his  ankle  on  the  stairs  and  so  had  had  to 
send  ^Varburg,  the  Counsellor  to  the  Legation,  in  his 
place  ; — and  so  on.     Protopopoff's  colleagues  must  have 
listened  open-mouthed  to  this  strange  confession.     They 
discussed  it  a  great  deal  amongst  themselves,  then  they 
told  their  friends  about  it.      Count  D.  Olsufieff,  whose 
reputation  was  involved,  was  obliged  to  intervene  and 
to   set  things  right  in  the  Press.    This  raised  a  fresh 
controversy ;     Protopopoff  himself,   who   was   already 
Minister,  was  appealed  to ;  and  he,  with  graceful  ease, 
gave  each  of  his  interviewers  a  different  version.     Mean- 
while public  opinion  was  vehemently  taking  note  of  the 
whole   incident,   which  seemed  to  prove   the  existence 
of  a  combine  between  the  Court,  Protopopoff  and  the 
Germans    to    bring    about    a   separate   peace   between 
Russia  and  Germany. 

A  few  days  after  Stiirmer's  retirement  I  received  a 
telegram  from  the  Director  of  the  Foreign  Office,  telling 
me  that  M.  Protopopoff  was  supposed  to  have  published 
amongst  other  things  that  his  interview  in  Stockholm 
with  Warburg  had  taken  place  not  only  with  the  consent 
but  at  the  express  request  of  the  Russian  Minister.  M. 
Neratoff  begged  me  to  furnish  all  necessary  information. 

I  replied  that  M.  Protopopoff's  assertion  was  abso- 
lutely untrue,  and  that  if  the  Home  Secretary  did  not 
retract  what  he  had  said  I  was  prepared  to  tender  my 
resignation. 

That  very  day  several  of  our  parliamentarians  were 
in  Stockholm  on  their  way  to  Petrograd :  M.  Itchas, 
Lithuanian  member  of  the  Duma ;  Baron  Meyendorff, 
ex-President  of  that  assembly  ;  M.  Zveguintzoff,  member 
by  election  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  ;  and  some 
others.  I  invited  these  gentlemen  to  come  and  see  me; 
I  gave  them  all  the  details  related  in  this  book  on  Proto- 
popoff's stay  in  Stockholm  and  on  his  interview  with 
Warburg,  and  I  begged  them  to  contradict  emphatically 


454  RUSSIA   IN    DECLINE        [chap.  xxii. 

in  my  name  amongst  their  colleagues  the  assertions  of 
the  Home  Secretary.  I  gave  M.  Itchas,  who  was  leaving 
first,  a  free  hand  to  make  my  contradiction  known  at 
once  and  in  any  way  that  he  deemed  best.  He  did  so 
almost  on  arrival  in  Petrograd  in  a  letter  published  in 
the  Russian  Press. 

At  the  same  time  I  wrote  a  letter  to  M.  Neratoff  in 
which  I  reiterated  that  in  the  event  of  M.  Protopopoff 
wishing  to  uphold  his  assertions,  I  should  insist  on 
being  recalled,  "for  it  was  inadmissible  that  abroad 
and  in  Russia  herself  any  one  could  remain  under  the 
impression  that  either  a  Russian  statesman  or  a  Russian 
Minister  in  a  foreign  post  could  be  a  liar.  In  con- 
sequence one  of  the  two  ought  to  retire  or  to  be 
dismissed."^ 

Naturally  I  kept  my  allied  colleagues  informed  of  the 
whole  incident,  and  on  this  occasion  they  gave  me  all 
their  sympathy. 

My  letter  to  M.  Neratoff  crossed  with  M.  Pokrovsky's 
appointment  to  the  post  of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
At  first  this  appointment  surprised  a  great  many  people. 
Pokrovsky  was  held  to  have  been  an  admirable  Minister 
of  Finance ;  he  had  never  concerned  himself  with 
questions  of  foreign  policy ;  he  did  all  he  could  to 
decline  the  post,  but  was  forced  to  yield  to  the  will  of 
the  Emperor  and  the  remonstrances  of  most  of  his 
colleagues  and  of  all  honest  men.  Because,  in  spite  of 
his  inexperience  in  diplomatic  matters,  M.  Pokrovsky's 
reputation  as  far  as  intelligence,  soundness  of  views 
and  uprightness  of  character  were  concerned,  was  so 
firmly  established  that  every  one  was  enchanted  to  see 
the  foreign  affairs  of  the  country,  above  all  its  relations 
with  the  Allies,  in  absolutely  safe  hands.  At  the 
Economic  Conference  of  the  Allies  which  had  just 
taken  place,  this  man,  thoroughly  versed  in  the  matter, 
calm,  modest,  and  speaking  French  well — which  facili- 
tated intercourse  with  him  tremendously — had  pro- 
duced the  best  impression.  As  far  as  I  personally  was 
^  Quoted  from  memory. 


i9i6]  RASPUTIN  AGAIN  455 

concerned,  1  was  delighted  to  have  once  more  as 
Minister  a  man  of  honour  and  one  whom  I  felt  to  be 
sincerely  disposed  in  my  favour  and  in  that  of  my 
work  in  Sweden. 

I  no  longer  considered  it  necessary  to  insist  on  my 
recall ;  moreover,  M.  Protopopoff  had  completely  re- 
linquished all  discussion  on  the  "Warburg"  case,  and 
the  Russian  public  had  also  more  or  less  forgotten  it, 
preoccupied  as  they  were  by  other  scandals,  more 
exciting  and  more  closely  connected  with  the  daily  life 
of  the  capital. 

During  the  month  of  December,  1916,  the  whole 
attention  of  the  Russian  public  was  centred  on  what 
was  going  on  at  "the  Court  of  Tsarskoe,"  that  is,  in  the 
Empress  Alexandra's  environment,  and  on  the  person 
of  Rasputin. 

Russian  travellers,  who  had  become  more  and  more 
numerous  in  Stockholm,  told  us  that  excitement  had 
overtaken  all  social  circles  in  Petrograd,  including 
the  Imperial  Family  itself.  One  heard  that  some 
members  of  the  family — notably  the  Grand-Duchess 
Cyril  ^  and  an  "  ally  "  of  the  Imperial  Family,  Princess 
Zenaida  Yussupoff,  who  was  universally  esteemed — 
had  tried  to  persuade  the  Empress  to  change  her  en- 
vironment, above  all  to  send  away  "  the  good  old  man," 
to  be  better  informed  as  to  the  frame  of  mind  of  the 
country,  as  public  opinion  was  exasperated  against  the 
men  in  power — the  Empress's  elect  and  intimate  friends. 
These  ladies  received  the  haughty  answer  that  they  did 
not  understand  anything  about  the  true  frame  of  mind 
of  the  country ;  that  as  they  exclusively  frequented  the 
aristocratic  circles  of  the  capital,  they  were  entirely 
ignorant  of  the  opinion  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
Orthodox  people,  of  the  poorer  classes,  of  the  peasants 
— who  would  remain,  as  in  the  past,  devoted  to  the 
Emperor  on  condition  that  he  protected  them  from 
the  exactions  of  the  great,  the  politicians,  etc.  The 
^  Sister  of  the  Queen  of  Rumania. 


456  RUSSIA    IN    DECLINE        [chap,  xxiii. 

unfortunate  Empress  acquired  this  information  from  her 
interviews  with  the  moujik  Rasputin,  and  from  the  notes 
and  telegrams  which  the  organisers  of  the  "  hundred 
Blacks  "  rained  on  Tsarskoe. 

There  were  then  many  conferences  in  the  bosom 
of  the  Imperial  Family,  much  coming  and  going  of 
Grand-Dukes  and  Grand-Duchesses.  "The  Grand- 
Duke  Nicolas  MikhaTlovitch  dined  with  the  Grand- 
Duchess  Vladimir,"  wrote  one  of  my  correspondents  to 
me;  "henceforth  all  is  possible."  These  august  person- 
ages—both of  them  particularly  clever — had  been  at 
variance  all  their  lives ;  hence  their  reconciliation  must 
be  the  precursor  of  extraordinary  events.  "  We  are 
not  living  now,  we  are  on  fire,"  wrote  another  of  my 
friends  from  Petrograd,  "  sugar  and  sensational  news — 
panem  et  cii'censes — this  is  the  cry  that  greets  you  on  all 
sides."  That  was  the  frivolous  echo  of  the  situation, 
but  there  were  also  more  serious  echoes.  A  Russian 
colleague  told  us  of  things  he  had  heard  straight  from 
the  lips  of  the  people.  When  he  was  returning  to 
Petrograd  from  his  property  in  Voronezh  he  could 
only  find  a  seat  in  a  third-class  carriage ;  the  compart- 
ment was  filled  with  well-to-do  peasants  :  millers,  rural 
traders,  etc.,  men  who  did  not  fail  to  cross  themselves 
each  time  the  train  passed  a  church.  Many  of  them 
were  acquainted  with  the  baritie,  and  greeted  him  most 
politely  ;  but,  in  no  way  constrained  by  his  presence, 
they  continued  their  conversation  on  what  was  occur- 
ring in  Petrograd  and  at  Court.  Rasputin  and  the 
Empress  Alexandra  were  the  chief  topics  of  this  con- 
versation, and  there  were  jokes,  some  truly  filthy  talk 
and  horse-laughs  without  end.  Now,  one  might  almost 
bet  that  several  of  the  speakers  belonged  to  organisa- 
tions called  "  Monarchist,"  or  "  true  Russian,"  and  that 
they  had  often  signed  those  professions  of  devotion 
of  which  Tsarskoe-Selo  was  so  proud  I 

At  last  there  was  a  thunder-clap  which  according  to 
the  Russian  public  would  purify  the  atmosphere,  but 
which  only  accelerated  the  dissolution  of  the  regime, 


I9I6]  MURDKR  OF   RASPUTIN  457 

and  upset  the  unsteady  equilibrium  on  which,  neverthe- 
less, the  whole  edifice  of  the  State  depended. 

Towards     the     end    of   December,    shortly    before 
Christmas,  O.S.,  we  learnt  through  the  newspapers  of 
the  assassination  of  Rasputin,  effected  in  the  Yussupoff 
Palace,  and  the  triumphant  joy  with  which  this  deed 
had  been  received  by  the  entire  Russian  public,  without 
distinction    of    parties.      As    soon    as    the    news    had 
spread  in  Petrograd  there  was  loud  jubilation  ;  in  the 
theatres  the  National  Anthem  was  played  and  sung;  if 
it  had  been  possible  thanksgiving-services  would  have 
been  held  in  the  churches.     The  names  of  the  principal 
authors  of  the  deed  were  on  every  one's  lips ;   these 
were  :  the  Grand-Duke  Dmitri  (son  of  the  Grand-Duke 
Paul);   Count  Felix  Sumarokoff-Elston,^  son-in-law  of 
one   of  the    Emperor's  sisters;   and  M.  Poushkevitch, 
the  hot-headed  deputy  of  the  Monarchist  extreme  Right 
of  the  Duma— a  sort  of  Russian  Paul  de  Cassagnac — 
whose  sallies,  violent  outbursts,  and  offensive  invectives 
hurled  at  the  Liberals  had  formerly  filled  the  scandal- 
records  of  the  Assembly.     Becoming  wiser  and  enrolled 
in  the  "  sacred  union  "  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  he 
had  devoted  himself  to  a  most  successful  organisation 
of  Russian   baths   and  of  canteens   for   supplying  the 
front  in  special  trains  ad  hoc. 

But  a  few  days  later  other  news  had  come  to  trouble 
all  minds  again:  the  Emperor  summoned  post-haste 
from  G.H.Q. ;  thorough  search,  by  his  orders,  for  Ras- 
putin's body,  which  was  found  under  the  ice  on  the 
Neva  ;  funeral  given  by  the  Emperor  and  Empress  to 
these  odious  remains ;  the  arrest  and  banishment  to  the 
army  operating  in  Persia  of  the  Grand-Duke  Dmitri ; 
the  appeal  against  this  sentence,  signed  by  the  whole 
of  the  Imperial  Family,  headed  by  Queen  Olga  of 
Greece  (grandmother  of  the  delinquent);  the  removal  of 

1  Son  of  the  Princess  Zenaida  Yussupoff  mentioned  above,  and  sole 
heir  to  the  enormous  fortune  of  the  Yussupoffs.  Count  Sumarokoff- 
Elston  got  his  name  from  his  father.  The  young  man  might  have  chosen 
some  other  place  than  his  mother's  palace  in  which  to  play  Lorenzaccio  ! 


458  RUSSIA   IN    DECLINE        [chap,  xxiii. 

the  Grand-Duke  Nicolas  Mikhailovitch  to  his  property 
in  the  south  of  Russia.  The  public  scandal  grew  from 
day  to  day. 

Then  there  was  the  resignation  of  Trepoff  and  the 
appointment  of  Prince  Nicolas  D.  Galitzin  (I  mentioned 
him  before)  as  Prime  Minister — an  absolutely  unexpected 
appointment,  which  could  only  be  explained  by  the 
personal  wish  of  the  Empress.  However,  with  regard 
to  this  appointment,  every  one  realised  that  henceforth 
the  principal  part  in  the  Government  would  be  played 
by  Protopopoff,  who  was  becoming  more  and  more 
excited,  and  heaping  folly  on  blunder  and  blunder  on 
want  of  tact.  He  arrived  at  the  Duma  in  the  military 
uniform  of  the  "head  of  the  police,"  a  costume  to  which 
he  had  a  vague  right  as  Home  Secretary,  but  which 
none  of  the  most  "  police-like"  of  his  predecessors  had 
ever  donned.  In  town  every  one  was  saying  that  he 
had  convinced  the  Empress  that  Rasputin's  soul  was 
reincarnated  in  him  ;  consequently  he  indulged  in 
prophecies  and  extravaganzas  which  deeply  impressed 
the  exalted  personages  to  whom  they  were  addressed. 

I  do  not  know  to  what  extent  these  tales  were  true. 
I  only  know  from  experience  of  one  fact  which  would 
appear  to  corroborate  them.  Just  at  that  time  a  kind 
of  American  spiritist  appeared  repeatedly  at  our 
Stockholm  Legation,  clamouring  to  have  his  pass- 
ports for  Petrograd  vised,  the  Consul-General  not  con- 
sidering his  position  quite  in  order.  The  American 
boasted  of  the  protection  of  M.  Protopopoff,  who,  he 
said,  was  impatiently  awaiting  him.  To  confirm  his 
words  he  showed  us  some  telegrams  from  his  powerful 
protector,  who  was  actually  inviting  him  to  come.  I 
caused  inquiries  to  be  made  about  this  individual  by 
the  police  of  my  allied  colleagues ;  it  was  discovered 
— as  moreover  was  to  be  expected — that  the  said 
American  was  a  German  who  quite  recently  had 
become  an  American  citizen,  that  he  passed  himself  off 
as  a  spiritist,  mesmerist,  medium,  and  I  know  not 
what  besides,  but  that  he  was  strongly  suspected  of 


1916-1917]        AN   AMERICAN   SPIRITIST  459 

being  merely  a  Boche  agent.  Upon  this,  I  received  a 
telegram  from  M.  Protopopoff  himself — a  telegram 
couched  in  the  most  friendly  terms — asking  me  "as 
a  personal  service "  to  viser  the  passports  of  the 
American.  Then  I  got  angry  and  I  wrote  immedi- 
ately to  the  Foreign  Office  to  relate  the  story  of  the 
"American,"  and  to  have  it  brought  to  the  notice  of 
our  military  police  at  Torneo,  in  case — our  refusal  not- 
withstanding— the  "  astral  body  of  the  medium  should 
wish  to  cross  the  frontier  provided  with  a  passport 
issued  by  the  spirit  of  the  late  Rasputin."  Well,  a 
fortnight  later  the  American  came  again  to  the  Legation, 
bringing  a  fresh  telegram  from  Protopopoff,  in  which 
the  Minister  expressed  his  keen  regret  at  not  being  able 
at  once  to  summon  the  spiritist  to  him,  in  order  to 
profit  by  his  excellent  "  advice,"  but  hoping  that  this 
would  soon  be  possible.    Obviously  this  was  madness. 

The  reader  may  perhaps  be  wondering  what  had 
happened  to  politics  in  all  this,  and  what  Russia's 
relations  to  Sweden  were  during  these  months.  My 
answer  is  that  no  one  thought  or  concerned  themselves 
about  those  matters  now.  The  Swedes  themselves 
appeared  to  consider  all  that  was  occurring  in  Russia 
to  be  so  serious  and  big  with  immediate  consequences 
that  all  steps  and  all  action  could  and  should  be  avoided 
until  the  internal  crisis  which  was  upheaving  the  mighty 
adjacent  Empire  had  been  settled  in  some  way  or  other. 
In  Stockholm  there  was  some  information  coming  from 
Swedish  sources  and  from  German  sources  which  repre- 
sented the  position  in  Russia  as  excessively  precarious. 
However,  for  a  short  time  my  attention  was  diverted 
from  my  worries  with  regard  to  the  internal  affairs  of 
my  country  by  an  entirely  unlooked-for  incident  or 
rather  apparition. 

One  morning  towards  the  middle  of  January  I  was 
rung  up  on  the  telephone.  A  voice  asked  me  in  Russian 
if  I  was  really  M.  Nekludoff  ?  "  Yes,  it  is  I ;  who  is  it 
speaking?"    "I  am   Rizov,  the  Bulgarian  Minister  to 


46o  RUSSIA    IN    DECLINE        [chap,  xxiik 

Berlin ;  I  want  very  much  to  talk  to  you.  Could  you 
receive  me,  and  when?"  I  took  a  few  minutes  to 
recover  from  my  surprise  and  to  think  out  my  answer ; 
then  I  said  that  I  could  not  tell  him  before  mid-day ; 
that  at  twelve  o'clock  he  might  ring  me  up  again  to 
know  my  decision. 

I  at  once  summoned  my  English,  French  and  Italian 
colleagues  and  submitted  the  case  to  them  :  should  I 
receive  Rizov  or  not?  M.  Tommasini  was  the  only 
one  of  my  three  colleagues  who  knew  Rizov ;  but  he 
knew  him  through  and  through.  Between  us  we 
arrived  at  the  following  conclusions  :  Rizov's  presence  in 
Stockholm  and  the  step  he  was  taking  must  be  perfectly 
well  known  in  Berlin ;  it  was  even  possible  that  Rizov 
had  telephoned  to  me  from  Baron  von  Lucius'  house. 
Nevertheless  it  would  be  as  well  for  me  to  receive 
Rizov,  if  onl}'  to  see  what  he  was  after.  Consequently, 
when  Rizov  rang  me  up  at  noon,  I  said  that  I  would 
receive  him  at  two  o'clock. 

Punctually  at  two  o'clock  Rizov  was  shown  into  my 
study.  I  did  not  put  out  my  hand  to  him,  but  I  begged 
him  to  be  seated  and  offered  him  a  cigarette.  "  What 
is  the  object  of  3-our  visit,  i\I.  Rizov?"  I  asked  after  a 
minute  of  mutual  silence.  Somewhat  abashed  by  m}' 
frigid  reception,  my  visitor  began  to  speak  with  obvious 
embarrassment.  He  said  that  the  step  he  was  taking  was 
entirely  of  a  private  nature,  that  he  was  coming  to  me 
to  tell  me  of  political  opinions  and  combinations  which 
were  within  the  sphere  of  his  personal  convictions ; 
and  that  he  was  in  a  position  to  know — having  recently 
visited  Sofia — that  the  opinions  of  the  Bulgarian 
Government  concurred  on  all  points  with  his.  Here  I 
interrupted  him  :  "  Tell  me,  M.  Rizov,  is  this  proceeding 
of  yours  known  to  Berlin  ?  It  seems  to  me  impossible 
that  it  should  not  be,  and  that  Baron  von  Lucius  should 
not  know  exactly  why  you  have  come  to  Stockholm." 
"  No,"  was  the  reply,  "  I  have  not  confided  this  matter 
to  the  German  Government.  The  avowed  object  of 
of  my  journey  has  been  to  form  closer  commercial  and 


I9I7]  MV   INTERVIEW   WITH   RIZOV  461 

political  relations  with  the  Scandinavian  countries  than 
have  existed  up  to  now ;  also  at  the  present  time  we 
are  in  need  of  many  commodities  which  Sweden  alone 
can  supply;  I  am  going  from  here  to  Christiania;  I 
have  just  come  from  Copenhagen  ;  I  am  travelling  under 
an  assumed  name  and  they  do  not  even  know  my 
address  at  the  German  Legation."  I  looked  at  the 
speaker  with  such  an  obviously  incredulous  expression 
on  my  face  that  he  began  to  stammer  and  to  become 
confused ;  then  he  resumed  his  political  thesis. 
He  said  absolutely  nothing  definite  ;  his  opinion  was 
that  the  present  war  between  Bulgaria  and  Russia 
was  an  absolutely  abnormal  thing  which  ought  to 
end  as  quickly  as  possible.  The  Bulgarians  had  had 
(I  am  still  quoting  Rizov;  plausible  reasons  to  bear 
malice  against  official  Russia ;  but  in  their  hearts  they 
nursed  unalterable  sympathy'  for  the  Russian  people  ; 
it  was  a  question  of  both  sides  facilitating  a  recon- 
ciliation ;  would  not  this  be  the  moment  to  begin 
entirel}'  confidential  conversations  which  might  end  in 
actual  negotiations? 

While  Rizov  was  retailing  all  this  I  kept  completely 
silent,  alwa3-s  in  expectation  of  some  concrete  sugges- 
tion which  did  not  come.  At  last,  disconcerted  b}'  my 
silence  and  my  expression,  Rizov  stopped  and  after  a 
short  pause  said:  "Could  I  hope,  Monsieur,  that  you 
will  transmit  to  Petrograd  all  that  I  have  just  told  you  ?  " 
"Listen  to  me,  M.  Rizov,"  was  my  reply;  "you  have 
been  in  the  diplomatic  service  long  enough  to  understand 
that  it  is  my  duty  to  inform  M.  Pokrovsky  of  your 
visit  and  of  all  that  I  have  heard  from  you ;  only  I  wish 
to  warn  you  that  I  shall  not  add  any  personal  opinion 
thereto."  ''  But  may  I  hope  that  in  Petrograd  they  will 
attach  to  my  proceeding  the  significance  it  de5er\'es,  and 
that  they  will  send  me  an  answer  through  you  ?  "  "  Ah  I 
as  to  that,"  I  replied,  "  I  can  make  no  promises  what- 
ever. You  yourself  informed  me  that  this  proceeding 
of  j^ours  is  a  personal  one.  Now,  however  interesting 
the   opinions   and   words   of  M.   Rizov   may   be,   it   is 


462  RUSSIA   IN   DECLINE        [chap,  xxiii. 

possible  that  in  our  country  it  may  not  be  considered 
necessary  to  reply  to  them.  It  is,  however,  more  than 
likely  that  I  shall  receive  some  answer  to  the  telegram 
which  I  shall  send  off  this  very  day."  "May  I  hope 
for  this  answer  within  the  next  four  days,  for  I  am  due 
in  Christiania  then,  and  could  not  defer  my  departure 
beyond  that?"  "Oh  no!  I  could  not  possibly  guarantee 
such  a  prompt  answer — if  answer  there  be!"  "Then 
will  you  inform  me  on  the  telephone  on  Tuesday  if  the 
answer  from  Petrograd  has  come?  My  number  is  .  .  ." 
"  No,  M.  Rizov,  I  shall  not  telephone  to  you ;  you  may 
telephone  to  me  a  few  hours  before  your  departure  for 
Christiania  and  I  will  answer  if  I  have  anything  to  tell 
you."  Rizov  got  up  to  go.  "I  see,"  he  said,  "that  you 
will  not  pay  attention  to  what  I  have  told  you,  nor  will 
you  speak  openly  with  me.  But  in  a  7nonth,  a  month  and 
a  half  at  latest,  events  will  occur  after  which  I  feel  sure  that 
on  the  Russian  side  they  imll  be  more  disposed  to  talk  with  us. 
Perhaps  you  will  see  me  again  then." 

That  evening  1  sent  Pokrovsky  a  telegram  in  which  I 
related  my  whole  conversation  with  Rizov  and  the 
opinion  of  my  allied  colleagues  on  the  subject  of  this 
step  taken  by  the  Bulgarian  Minister  to  Berlin.  I 
added  that  if  those  in  Sofia  really  did  wish  to  enter  into 
negotiations,  Rizov — by  virtue  of  his  present  position 
and  all  his  antecedents — would  be  the  person  the  least 
qualified  to  inspire  confidence  in  us.  In  that  case  it 
would  only  be  interesting  and  profitable  to  speak  with 
influential  Bulgarian  generals  or  with  their  mouthpieces  ; 
and  as  the  two  armies  were  face  to  face  on  the  Lower 
Danube,  it  would  be  quite  easy  for  the  Bulgarians  to 
arrange  an  interview  with  us  there. 

Four  days  later,  Rizov  rang  me  up  on  the  telephone. 
"  Have  you  received  an  answer,  Monsieur?"  "No,  not 
yet."  "  In  that  case  I  cannot  wait  any  longer.  I  am 
leaving  for  Christiania  this  evening.  Only  I  have  one 
more  request  to  make  to  you  :  I  trust  that  my  proceeding 
is  not  known  to  the  representatives  of  your  Allies." 
"  Listen,    Rizov,"    I    interrupted ;    "  I    avoid    all    such 


I9I7]        RIZOV'S   PROPHECY  FULFILLED         463 

conversations  on  the  telephone.  We  may  be  overheard. 
I  wish  you  good-bye.    S/ul/"'^  and  I  replaced  the  receiver. 

Two  days  after  Rizov's  departure  I  received  a  tele- 
gram from  the  Foreign  Office  instructing  me— in  the 
event  of  another  visit  from  Rizov — to  listen  attentively 
to  him  and  to  endeavour  to  make  him  formulate  more 
definite  propositions ;  the  same  instructions  were  being 
issued  to  my  colleague  in  Christiania. 

I  heard  later  that  my  colleague— it  was  M. 
Gulkevitch— in  accordance  with  these  instructions,  had 
more  pregnant  conversations  with  M.  Rizov  than  mine 
had  been.  But  these  conversations  ended  in  nothing.^ 
Rizov,  who  appeared  to  be  in  good  health  when  he 
came  to  see  me  in  Stockholm,  died  suddenly  very  soon 
afterwards. 

When  the  Russian  Revolution  had  broken  out  and 
was  in  full  swing,  I  recalled  the  words  uttered  by  Rizov 
as  he  was  leaving  my  study  in  Stockholm  :  "  in  a  month, 
a  month  and  a  half  at  latest,  events  will  occur  after 
which  I  feel  sure  that  on  the  Russian  side  they  will  be 
more  disposed  to  talk  with  us."  Hence  Rizov  had 
accurately  foreseen  our  revolution.  Now,  he^came  from 
Berlin,  and  the  steps  taken  with  regard  to  us  had  in  all 
probability  been  suggested  to  him  by  German  diplomacy, 
and  the  German  General  Staff.  And  in  my  eyes  this 
constitutes  one  more  proof  that  our  revolution  had  one 
of  its  main  sources  in  German  action.  The  wires  of  this 
political  cataclysm  converged  in  Berlin,  and  there  they 
calculated  in  January,  1917,  with  remarkable  accuracy, 
even  the  day  on  which  the  skilfully  laid  mine  would 
explode. 

*  Finis  ! 

^  The  Ttmes  published  in  its  issue  of  the  4th  October,  191 8,  an  article 
relating  the  episode  of  negotiations  which  were  supposed  to  have  taken 
place  between  Rizov  and  some  Russian  representatives  in  Christiania 
and  in  Stockholm.  I  hastened  to  correct,  in  a  letter  written  from  Nice 
to  the  Editor  of  the  Times,  the  account  in  this  newspaper,  as  far  as  I 
personally  and  Stockholm  were  concerned.  Unfortunately  the  limes 
did  not  think  it  possible  to  publish  my  correction,  alleging  as  an  excuse 
the  forced  economy — "  in  these  days  " — of  paper. 


464  RUSSIA   IN   DECLINE        [chap,  xxiii. 

What  had  passed  in  the  sphere  of  international 
politics,  and  in  Sweden  in  particular,  during  the  six 
weeks  which  preceded  the  Russian  Revolution  ?  To 
tell  the  truth  I  have  no  recollection.  There  are  spaces 
of  time  before  great  historic  events  which  appear  to 
one's  memory  later  as  blank  spaces,  like  those  minutes 
of  deadly  calm  preceding  the  first  violent  gust  of  wind 
and  the  first  clap  of  thunder  of  a  mighty  storm.  This 
must  come  from  an  illusion  of  "  retrospective  vision  "  ; 
the  events  themselves  are  so  colossal  that  anything  that 
immediately  preceded  them  seems  insignificant,  and 
vanishes  from  one's  memory. 

I  remember  that  the  season  was  beautiful  in  Stock- 
holm ;  bright  sunshine,  dazzling  snow,  moderate  frosts, 
beautiful  blue  sky,  the  town  enlivened  by  winter  sports 
and  a  busy  life  of  pleasure.  The  Russian  birds  of  passage 
were  more  numerous  than  ever.  Some  had  merely 
come  to  rest  and  divert  themselves  in  this  pleasant 
atmosphere,  and  under  this  kindly  sky,  after  the  icy  fogs 
of  Petrograd  and  the  political  nightmare  which  was 
oppressing  every  one. 

I  remember  taking  luncheon  in  the  sunlit  dining- 
room  of  the  Grand  Hotel  with  an  agreeable  and  witty 
compatriot  who  was  in  Stockholm  for  the  third  time, 
nominally  for  political  meetings,  but  really  and  above 
all  to  amuse  himself.  He  was  an  elected  member  of  the 
Council  of  the  Empire  who  formerly  had  had  a  brief 
moment  of  fame.  Always  a  Liberal,  and  airing  the 
most  independent  views  in  the  salons  of  Petrograd,  he 
was,  at  the  time  of  the  first  Duma,  one  of  the  three  or 
four  courageous  people  who,  without  abjuring  their 
political  convictions,  yet  opposed  the  outbursts  of  the 
assembly  and  founded  a  sympathetic — though  later  on  ab- 
solutely colourless — party  called  "the  pacific  renovation." 
Years  had  gone  by  since  then,  and  my  friend,  older, 
stouter,  and  more  or  less  ruined,  had  passed  from  the 
Duma  into  the  ranks  of  the  elected  members  of  the 
Council  of  the  Empire;  had  had  to  accept  a  post  on 
the  board  of  directors  of  a  large  banking  business,  a 


1917]  A  GREAT  ILLUSION  465 

post  which  enabled  him  to  have  his  customary  good 
time ;  and,  somewhat  unnoticed  in  the  legislative 
assembly  that  sheltered  him,  was  mainly  occupied  in 
finding  an  audience  amongst  the  young  and  pretty 
society  women  of  Petrograd,  to  whom  he  still  preached, 
in  a  deep  and  musical  voice,  generous  ideas  of  political 
liberty  and  of  sympathy  towards  the  humble. 

We  had  got  to  the  cheese,  and  the  second  bottle  of 
excellent  claret  (of  which  a  few  drops  were  still  glisten- 
ing in  the  flowing  beard  of  my  amiable  messmate)  was 
open  beside  him,  when  he,  with  heightened  colour  and 
animated  as  usual  towards  the  end  of  a  good  meal,  leant 
towards  me  and  said,  continuing  the  conversation  on 
current  events :  "  Ah,  well,  no,  my  dear  Nekludoff, 
latterly  we  all  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  there 
is  no  possible  remedy  for  the  situation  as  long  as  the 
Emperor  Nicolas  II.  is  at  the  head  of  Russia.  At  the 
present  time  every  one  is  decidedly  turning  against  him. 
It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  he  should  go.  The  rest 
would  then  be  quite  easy." 

This  confidence  impressed  me  at  first,  but  on 
mature  reflection  I  only  attached  slight  importance  to 
it.  What  does  one  not  say  after  a  good  luncheon  and 
two  bottles  of  good  wine  ?  And  besides  who  were 
these  '^zve"  who  had  decided  on  the  downfall  of  the 
Sovereign?  If  they  were  recruited  from  amongst  the 
same  good  fellows — friends  of  the  musical  world,  and  of 
charming  dancers,  of  good  cheer  and  unconstrained 
gossip — the  Emperor  could  sleep  peacefully. 

Infinitely  more  alarming  echoes  reached  me.  In  the 
Caucasus  big  parties  of  armed  "brigands  "were  begin- 
ning to  overrun  the  country  and  terrorise  whole  districts. 
On  the  Russian  north-western  front,  one  had  signalled  a 
clandestine  revolutionary  propaganda,  which  was  gaining 
more  and  more  adherents  among  the  soldiers.  The 
Government  of  Petrograd  was  beginning  to  take  police 
measures,  now  in  one  town,  now  in  another,  against 
clandestine  organisations  of  workmen.  It  was  always 
the  same  measures,  despotic  but  inadequate :  nocturnal 


466  RUSSIA   IN   DECLINE        [chap,  xxiii. 

perquisitions,  arrests  of  prominent  leaders,  incarcera- 
tions, internments  in  the  northern  provinces.  Persons 
who  were  at  the  head  of  the  "  organisations  of  the 
Zemstvo  and  of  the  towns  to  assure  military  supplies," 
protested  against  these  measures,  which  embittered  the 
working-class  circles  with  whom  they  had  to  do  business. 
As  usual  both  parties  were  in  the  wrong :  the  former 
because  their  police  measures  displeased  every  one 
without  stopping  anything;  the  latter  because  they  did 
not  see  that  the  mass  of  the  people,  the  workmen 
especially,  were  being  worked  by  clever  agents,  well 
guided  and  supplied  with  enormous  sums  of  money  in 
order  to  stir  up  a  revolution  at  all  costs,  and  to  make 
Russia  powerless  against  the  external  foe. 

On  Saturday,  the  loth  March,  some  telegrams  ap- 
peared in  the  Swedish  newspapers  announcing  that 
some  workmen's  demonstrations — peaceful  ones,  how- 
ever— had  taken  place  in  the  streets  of  Petrograd. 
Simultaneously  the  news  arrived  that  the  Government 
was  going  to  prorogue  the  Duma  sine  die.  On  Monday, 
the  1 2th,  in  the  morning,  the  representative  of  our 
telegraphic  agency  rushed  in  to  see  me  to  announce 
that  the  newspapers  were  going  to  publish  the  news 
that  on  Saturday  night  there  had  been  fighting  in  the 
streets  of  Petrograd,  and  that  there  had  been  masses 
of  victims  ;  this  news  had  come  from  Haparanda,  brought 
by  a  Swede  who  had  been  an  eye-witness.  The  repre- 
sentative requested  my  permission  to  contradict  it.  "  Do 
not  do  so,"  I  said,  "let  us  wait  for  the  evening  news."' 
In  the  evening  we  did  receive  news  of  rather  serious  dis- 
orders having  taken  place  in  the  Russian  capital.  And 
by  Tuesday  telegraphic  communication  with  Russia  was 
cut  off.     Things  were  decidedly  becoming  serious. 

And  then,  one  after  another,  between  Wednesday, 
the  14th,  and  Friday,  the  i6th,  consecutive  news  of  all 
the  events  in  Petrograd  reached  us:  street  fighting; 
the  reserve  regiments  of  the  Guard  going  over  to  the 
side  of  the  people  ;  the  Duma  refusing  to  dissolve— like 
the  Tiers  ktat  formerly  in  the  Hall  of  the  Jeu  de  Paume ; 


I9I7]  REVOLUTION   BREAKS  OUT         467 

the  regiments  arriving  to  guard  the  representatives  of  the 
people,  and  acclaiming  the  President  of  the  Duma,  who 
congratulates  them ;  the  Grand-Duke  Cyril  being  the 
first  to  bring  his  seamen  of  the  crew  of  the  Guard  ; 
the  last  strongholds  of  the  police  taken  by  the  people 
armed ;  finally  the  Emperor  abdicating  for  himself  and 
for  his  son,  and  passing  his  crown  on  to  his  brother  the 
Grand-Duke  Michael.  A  Provisional  Government  was 
being  installed,  at  the  head  of  which  names  as  universally 
respected  as  those  of  Prince  Lvoff,  Miliukoff,  Rodzianko, 
Gutchkofif,  were  allied  to  those  of  a  few  revolutionary 
Socialists  such  as  Kerensky,  Tseretelli,  Tchkeidze,  etc. 
The  entire  town  appeared  to  be  given  over  to  festivity, 
and  all  the  towns  of  Russia,  and  all  the  heads  of  the 
armies  gave  their  adherence,  their  homage  of  fidelity, 
their  spontaneous  admiration  to  the  new  Government! 
One  really  thought  one  must  be  dreaming.  But  news 
continued  to  pour  in,  one  bit  confirming  the  other, 
arriving  from  all  corners  of  allied  Europe ;  and  all  spoke 
ecstatically  of  the  generosity  of  the  people  in  the  struggle, 
of  their  moderation  in  victory,  of  the  unanimity  of 
public  feeling.  No  revolution  had  ever  been  so  easy,  or 
so  glorious  ;  one  could  be  proud  of  being  Russian ! 

And  all  that  contrasted  in  such  a  striking  manner 
with  the  humiliations,  so  bitterly  felt,  of  the  closing 
months  of  the  disastrous  former  regime.  Patriotic 
feeling  beat  in  unison  with  generous  sentiments  of 
liberty  and  justice.  The  country  was  saved,  victory 
definitely  assured ! 

Such  were  the  quite  sincere  illusions  of  the  enor- 
mous majority  of  Russians  living  abroad  during  the 
weeks  succeeding  the  triumph  of  the  Revolution  of 
Petrograd. 

When  I  received  the  telegram  from  the  official  agency 
announcing  the  abdication  of  the  Emperor  in  favour  of 
his  brother ;  the  refusal  of  the  latter  to  accept  power 
otherwise  than  from  a  constituent  assembly ;  and  the 
formation  of  a  responsible  Ministry  under  the  pre- 
sidenc}^  of  Prince    Lvoff',  appointed   to    this    post    by 

2    H 


468  RUSSIA   IN    DECLINE        [chap,  xxiii. 

the  Emperor  himself  on  the  eve  of  his  abdication,  then 
all  the  doubts  I  could  have  entertained  as  to  the 
legitimacy  of  the  new  regime  and  the  Provisional 
Government  were  dispelled ;  and  it  was  with  genuine 
satisfaction  that  I  sent  a  telegram  on  Friday,  the  i6th 
March,  to  M.  Miliukoff,  the  new  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  announcing  my  complete  and  sincere  adherence 
to  the  Provisional  Government. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

REVOLUTION 

Travellers  who  have  been  to  India  tell  strange  tales 
about  the  phenomena  which  certain  fakirs  can  produce. 
Although  meeting  these  tales  with  a  strong  dose  of 
scepticism,  yet  one  cannot  reject  wholesale  the  evidence 
of  so  many  honourable  people ;  the  illusive  "  ex- 
periences "  of  the  fakirs  have  been  really  seen  and 
observed  by  serious-minded  and  truthful  people ;  and 
it  is  only  when  one  submits  these  phenomena  to  a 
strictly  scientific  inspection  and  analysis  that  the  illusion 
vanishes.  But  then  how  is  this  illusion  to  be  explained  ? 
One  theory  which  seems  extremely  sound,  holds  that  the 
fakir  acts  on  the  spectator,  now  by  auto-suggestion, 
now  by  the  use  of  some  process  of  a  physical  nature. 
The  Indian  accomplishes  nothing  supernatural ;  at  the 
most  he  indulges  in  some  sleight-of-hand ;  but  the 
spectator,  swayed  by  suggestion  or  else  under  the 
influence  of  subtle  intoxication,  believes  he  sees  all  that 
the  fakir  wishes  him  to  see,  and  then  tells  the  tale  in 
all  good  faith. 

Exactly  in  the  same  way  do  1  explain,  at  the  present 
time,  the  impression  produced  on  the  world  at  large, 
except  in  the  camp  of  our  enemies,  by  the  Russian 
Revolution. 

In  the  first  place  this  revolution  was  desired  and 
called  for  by  the  conscience  of  the  whole  of  the  West. 
There  they  knew  that  the  Russian  people  were  deprived 
of  those  primary  rights  which  by  now  have  become 
indispensable  to  every  European.  This  idea  was  often 
exaggerated;   ancient   prejudices,  old  political  grudges 

469 


470  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

side  by  side  with  clever  and  tenacious  modern  propa- 
ganda had  fixed  in  Western  mentality  the  picture  of  a 
Russia  in  which  absolute  and  despotic  power,  an 
aristocracy  of  the  Court,  a  class  of  employes  who  were 
all  concessionaries,  uneducated  clergy,  all  weighed  on 
the  existence  of  the  country,  oppressing,  exploiting, 
purposely  brutalising  the  people  in  town  and  country, 
persecuting  and  exiling  to  the  frozen  deserts  of  Siberia 
all  people  whose  hearts  were  in  the  right  place,  above 
all,  those  young  people  who  dreamt  of  better  conditions 
for  their  country.  "  Tsarism"  was  the  monster  against 
which  all  upright  consciences  ought  to  revolt,  against 
which  loud  appeals  were  made  to  the  whole  of  European 
public  opinion.  And  yet  within  the  last  few  years,  first 
France,  then  England  and  finally,  since  the  war,  Italy 
and  Belgium,  had  concluded  a  close  alliance  with  this 
same  Tsarist  Russia,  with  this  same  criminal  Govern- 
ment. In  the  columns  of  one  and  the  same  newspaper 
one  could  read  flattery  addressed  to  the  Tsar,  impre- 
cations against  the  governmental  system  of  Russia, 
dithyrambs  on  the  'might  of  the  allied  Empire  and 
lamentations  over  the  fate  of  the  victims  to  its  odious 
regime.  The  public  conscience  of  the  West  must  in 
the  long  run  have  felt  the  anomaly,  I  would  even  say 
the  indignity,  of  such  proceedings.  The  Russian 
Revolution  occurred  in  the  nick  of  time  to  set  every- 
thing right :  Russia,  so  absolutely  indispensable  to  the 
welfare  of  Europe,  had  herself  thrown  off  her  fetters  ; 
there  was  no  longer  any  need  to  use  humiliating 
circumspection  towards  a  thoroughly  detested  regime  ; 
one  remained  closely  bound  to  the  Russian  people  and 
all  the  more  loyal  to  the  principles  and  aspirations  of 
liberty  and  integral  democracy.  Truly  a  considerable 
relief  to  one's  conscience  ! 

Then  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  during  the 
few  months  preceding  the  Revolution,  skilfully  cir- 
culated rumours  represented  the  existing  regime  as 
won  over  to  German  influence  and  striving  for  peace. 
The  tremendous    mistakes    of    the    Government,    the 


I9I7]  ILLUSIONS  471 

odious  choice  of  persons  whom  the  Emperor  placed  in 
power  and  who  could  not  inspire  any  confidence,  gave 
credence  to  these  suspicions  and  fears  in  Russian 
public  opinion  itself;  towards  the  end  of  1916  every  one 
believed  them  more  or  less.  The  Revolution  came  just 
in  time  to  scatter  all  this  dreaded  accumulation  of  Court 
intrigues.  It  gave  the  Russian  people  a  free  hand  for 
the  carrying  out  of  their  most  cherished  schemes  which 
were — the  continuation  of  the  fight  to  a  finish  with 
Germany  and  the  complete  victory  of  the  Allies  ! 
Consequently  the  latter  were  at  once  delivered  from 
the  agonising  nightmare  of  Russia's  possible  defection. 

Finally  Russian  military  action  would  derive  fresh 
life  from  the  renovation  of  the  country,  final  victory 
would  be  considerably  hastened,  and  in  this  victory 
itself  there  would  no  longer  be  any  fear  of  the  transports 
of  ambition  and  pride  of  an  autocratic  ally  and  the 
extension  of  a  regime  of  oppression  over  a  fresh  portion 
of  Europe. 

Such  was  the  point  of  view  of  our  Western  Allies 
which  was  shared  by  Russian  public  opinion.  In  our 
country,  what  is  more,  every  one  had  been  so  justly 
displeased  with  the  Government,  so  deeply  humiliated 
by  what  was  occurring  at  Court  that  a  change  was 
prayed  for  on  all  sides ;  and  when  this  complete  change 
occurred  in  consequence  of  the  days  of  the  loth  to  the 
15th  March  all  thinking  Russia,  beginning  with  the 
best  balanced  elements,  thought  in  all  good  faith  that 
it  was  they  who  had  brought  about  the  Revolution 
because  they  had  desired  it  so  ardently. 

Hence  one  can  hardly  wonder  that  all  that  occurred 
in  Petrograd  during  those  memorable  days  should 
have  assumed  a  dazzling,  glorious  and  triumphant 
appearance  in  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world.  Spon- 
taneous enthusiasm  appeared  to  have  seized  all  the 
inhabitants  of  the  capital;  every  one  fraternised;  from 
Moscow,  the  provinces,  and  finally  from  all  the  armies 
enthusiastic  adherents  arrived.  The  Novoye  Vremya 
wrote  articles   worthy   of  the  Phx  Duchesne,   and    M. 


472  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

Rodzianko  presided,  with  fine  gestures,  over  the  civil 
burial  of  the  noble  victims  of  the  splendid  March  days — 
an  imposing  and  brilliant  apotheosis  of  this  unique 
Revolution,  in  which  the  people  displayed  truly  admir- 
able moderation,  discipline  and  mildness. 

A  Monarchist  or  counter-revolutionary  current  ?  No, 
that  did  not  exist ;  that  had  never  existed.  A  few  re- 
actionaries still  considered  dangerous  and  the  members 
of  the  last  Government,  it  is  true,  were  arrested  and  took 
the  place  in  the  cells  of  the  Peter  and  Paul  fortress  of 
the  martyrs  to  liberty  triumphantly  set  free.  But  even 
these  reactionaries  and  these  fallen  Ministers  were  in  no 
way  opposed  to  the  new  principles ;  from  their  prison 
they  appealed  to  the  Provisional  Government  and  to  the 
Press,  assuring  them  that  they  had  always  been  friends 
to  liberty,  that  all  that  had  happened  was  but  a  mis- 
understanding and  that  they  were  prepared  to  serve  the 
people  with  the  same  devotion  with  which  they  had 
formerly  served  the  Monarch.  In  short  every  one  was 
of  one  mind,  every  one  rejoiced,  every  one  fraternised, 
and  what  is  more,  amongst  a  large  majority  these  senti- 
ments— at  first  anyhow — were  absolutely  genuine.  And 
this  frame  of  mind  spread  to  foreign  parts  and  returned 
thence  enlarged  and  developed  to  increase  Russian 
enthusiasm  still  more. 

The  fakir  having  shut  up  a  child  in  his  basket  had 
stabbed  it  repeatedly  through  the  wicker-work  with  a 
sword ;  piercing  shrieks  had  been  heard  and  streams  of 
blood  seen  ;  and  when  the  magician  opened  the  basket  it 
was  full  of  roses.  Innumerable  white  mice,  coming  out 
of  the  operator's  hand,  mounted  an  upright  pole  in  a 
spiral  curve  and  disappeared  one  by  one  into  the  blue 
sky.  Finally  a  silken  ladder,  thrown  with  a  skilful 
movement,  suspended  itself  in  the  air  and  the  fakir 
ascended  it — immaterialised  and  triumphant! 

We  existed  in  Stockholm  for  a  fortnight  under  the 
spell  of  these  admirable  illusions.  But  gradually,  alas  I 
the   deceptive    vapour   began   to    disperse    and   things 


I9I7]  A   DANISH   EYE-WITNESS  473 

appeared  in  their  true  liglit,  that  is  to   say  with  their 
repulsive  sides  and  their  very  real  threats. 

About  a  week  after  the  Emperor's  abdication  I 
received  a  visit  from  an  eminent  member  of  the  Danish 
Red  Cross  who  was  returning  from  Petrograd  and 
who  had  been  an  eye-witness  of  all  that  had  happened. 
Amongst  other  things  he  told  me  that  on  the  morning  of 
Tuesday,  the  13th,  summoned  to  Tsarskoe-Selo  to  be 
presented  to  the  Empress  Alexandra,  he  had  had  the 
greatest  difficulty  in  reaching  the  Tsarskoe  station  on 
foot.  The  rioters  appeared  to  have  got  the  upper  hand 
since  the  day  before,  and  on  his  way  sharp  firing  had 
begun  round  the  barracks  of  the  Semenovsky  regiment. 
When  he  arrived  at  Tsarskoe  and  into  the  Empress's 
presence  he  did  not  conceal  from  her  what  he  had  just 
seen.  The  Empress  listened  in  silence  and  without 
betraying  the  slightest  emotion,  then  she  passed  on  to 
the  object  of  the  audience,  talked  with  animation  for 
more  than  an  hour  on  subjects  relative  to  the  Danish 
gentleman's  mission  to  Russia,  went  over  plans  for  huts 
and  accounts  with  him  and  dismissed  him  gracefully. 
The  very  next  day  in  this  same  palace  she  and  her 
children  were  the  prisoners  of  the  rebel  soldiers  of 
the  Tsarskoe  garrison  ! 

Well,  this  same  Dane,  having  in  his  detailed  account 
mentioned  the  murder  of  several  officers  of  the 
Pavlovsky  regiment  (committed  on  Sunday  or  Monday 
night),  I  asked  him  with  surprise :  "  Then  there  were 
some  officers  murdered  after  all  ?"  "But  of  course,  did 
you  think  a  revolution  could  occur  without?  But  when 
I  left  Petrograd  all  recollection  of  these  sanguinary 
scenes  was  eff'aced ;  officers  and  men,  military  and 
civilians  were  all  one."  Other  eye-witnesses  made 
me  realise  that  in  any  case  the  revolutionary  days  had 
not  been  so  free  from  massacre  and  cruelty  as  I  had 
imagined,  relying  on  telegrams  from  agencies  and 
newspaper  articles. 

Finally  towards  the  end  of  March  a  distinguished 
compatriot  of  mine  passed  through  Stockholm   on  his 


474  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

way  to  England.  Eminent  professor  at  the  University 
of  Moscow  and  enlightened  jurist,  he  had  had,  some  time 
back,  to  give  up  teaching  because  of  difficulties  raised 
for  him  by  the  Board  of  Education,  which  was  intensely 
reactionary.  His  merits  gained  him  a  Chair  in  one  of 
the  oldest  and  most  celebrated  universities  in  Europe. 
He  had  continued  to  keep  up  close  relations  in  Russia 
with  the  heads  of  the  cadet  party  (constitutional-demo- 
cratic), particularly  with  Miliukoff,  Golovin,  and  Kokoch- 
kin.  It  would  seem  as  if  he  ought.to  have  been  pleased 
at  the  downfall  of  the  old  regime  and  at  the  favourable 
turn  that  the  Revolution  had  taken.  Nevertheless  he 
wore  a  worried  look  when  he  came  to  see  me.  To  my 
questions,  imbued  with  that  enthusiasm  which  we  were 
still  feeling  in  Stockholm,  he  replied  with  a  reticence  that 
surprised  me.  At  last,  as  we  were  going  into  luncheon 
(to  which  I  had  invited  him),  he  said :  "  It  would  take 
too  long  to  explain  everything  to  you  just  now;  I  will 
do  so  later ;  meanwhile  to  sum  up  :  there  will  infallibly 
be  some  Jourmesde  Jiiin  in  Russia,  which  would  be  very 
sad,  but  if  these  days  do  not  come  it  will  be  still  worse : 
Russia  will  be  done  for.  Do  you  understand  me?" 
"  Of  course  I  understand  you !  But  how  truly  grievous 
it  is!" 

After  luncheon  my  guest  added  a  few  details  to  the 
brief  prognostication  he  had  made  before.  The  Duma 
virtually  dissolved  and  its  premises  invaded  by  the 
"  Council  of  the  deputies,  by  soldiers  and  workmen  " ;  the 
Petrograd  garrison  increased  by  all  the  garrisons  of 
the  neighbouring  towns  and  so  to  speak  administering 
the  law  to  the  Government;  in  the  Government  itself 
— the  Socialists  and  Labour  members  with  Kerensky  at 
their  head  trying  to  seize  on  the  real  power.  I  rapidly 
dropped  down  from  the  clouds.  But  a  few  days  later, 
through  the  tales  of  compatriots  passing  through 
Stockholm  in  greater  numbers  than  ever  and  through 
what  I  could  read  between  the  lines  in  the  newspapers, 
I  was  able  to  form  a  clear  idea  of  what  had  really 
occurred. 


I9I7]       FIRST  ALARMING   REVELATIONS        475 

In  the  first  place  the  Revolution  had  been  infinitely 
more  bloody  than  any  one  would  acknowledge  :  all  the 
men  of  the  police  force,  even  those  who  had  not  taken 
any  part  whatever  in  the  repression  of  the  first  riots, 
were  massacred  in  the  most  brutal  way ;  there'  were 
savage  hunts  through  the  streets  followed  by  ghastly 
scenes.  Many  officers  and  generals  were  killed  long 
after  the  Revolution  had  triumphed  without  any  motive, 
merely  to  gratify  the  whim  of  a  band  of  demoniacs  or  of 
an  armed  and  drunken  soldier. 

It  was  not  only  the  cells  of  political  culprits  which 
were  thrown  open  by  the  triumphant  people.  All  prison 
doors  had  been  broken  open  and  all  the  criminals  of  the 
worst  order  infested  the  capital  dressed  as  soldiers  and 
mingling  freely  with  them. 

And  horrible  news — suppressed  for  some  time — 
came  through  at  last  as  to  what  had  taken  place  in  the 
Fleet  at  Cronstadt  and  then  at  Helsingfors  :  admirals 
treacherously  and  cruelly  assassinated,  officers  martyred 
— a  hell  of  blood  and  heinous  tortures.  And  finally 
Cronstadt  and  the  Fleet  forming  themselves  into  a  re- 
public of  savages,  with  which  the  Government  had  to 
treat  at  every  turn  ! 

What  also  made  me  very  anxious — on  account  of  the 
actual  fact  and  as  a  symptom — was  the  fate  reserved  for 
the  Emperor  and  his  near  relations.  According  to  the 
terms  of  the  parleys  which  had  preceded  the  abdication, 
the  Emperor  and  his  family  had  full  liberty  to  establish 
themselves  in  the  Crimea  or  in  some  other  residence  far 
removed  from  capitals  and  all  political  intrigue.  A  few 
days  later,  one  heard  that  the  Provisional  Government 
had  decided  to  make  them  merely  leave  Russia,  that  an 
arrangement  ad  hoc  had  been  made  with  London,  and 
that  ;they  were  to  go  by  Murman.  But  days  and  weeks 
went  by  and  the  Emperor  and  his  family  were  still 
prisoners  in  their  Palace  of  Tsarskoe,  exposed  to  the 
offensive  curiosity  of  the  crowd  and  to  insults  of  all 
kinds  from  their  guardians.  It  became  clear  that  the 
famous  "  Soviet "  was  against  the  removal  of  the  unhappy 


476  REVOLUTION  [chap.xxiv. 

family,  wishing  to  keep  them  as  hostages ;  and  I 
realised  perfectly  well  that  if  men  like  Rodzianko, 
Gutchkoff,  Prince  Lvoff,  Miliukoff  and  Schingareff 
tolerated  this  base  deed  and  this  breach  of  their  pledged 
word,  it  was  because  the^''  were  absolutely  powerless  to 
object ;  in  other  words  all  authority  was  entirely 
escaping  from  the  Government,  or  at  least  from  the  sane 
section  of  it. 

But  this  was  by  no  means  all.  I  remember  one 
morning  on  which  our  military  attache  came  in  like  a 
whirlwind,  his  face  crimson  with  emotion,  his  eyes 
starting  out  of  his  head.  "  Have  you  seen  this. 
Monsieur?  "  and  he  handed  me  the  famous  Prikase  No  i,^ 
settling  the  new  rights  of  the  Russian  soldier.  "Yes, 
I  have  just  read  a  short  summary  of  it  in  the  Swedish 
newspapers  of  yesterday.  It  appeared  to  me  to  be  a 
little  too  liberal,  especially  in  war-time :  there  are 
always  some  exaggerations  at  such  times.  Yet  you 
must  admit  that  it  was  high  time  to  replace  the  absurd 
discipline  imitated  from  the  Prussians  which  prevailed 
in  our  Army  by  discipline  similar  to  that  of  the  French 
or  the  British  ?  "  "  Ah  !  but  no,  Monsieur !  do  read  the 
prikase  itself;  read  it  carefully."  I  took  it  from  the  hand 
of  my  colleague  and  as  I  read  and  was  given  the  needful 
explanations  by  the  Colonel,  I  became  more  and  more 
aghast.  "It  is  madness!"  I  said  when  I  had  finished. 
"Yes,  it  is  madness !  but  above  all  it  means  the  end  of 
the  war  for  us.  In  the  state  in  which  our  troops  will  be 
after  a  few  weeks  of  such  proceedings  it  will  be  im- 
possible to  take  them  into  the  fighting  lines.  In  a  few 
months  we  shall  no  longer  exist  for  our  allies."  I 
could  find  nothing  to  oppose  to  this  mournful  verdict 
except  the  expression  of  a  few  vague  hopes  to  which 
I  clung. 

It    became   perfectly   clear   that    the   origin   of   the 
Revolution  had  been  quite  different  from  what  had  been 
supposed.    While  the  members  of  the  Imperial  Family 
^  Or       of  the  day  of  the  Army. 


I9I7]        ORIGIN    OF  THE    MARCH    DAYS         477 

were  becoming  alarmed  aud  holding  meetings,  while  the 
heads  of  the  Liberal  parties  were  conferring,  while  the 
public  was  getting  exasperated,  the  German  agents 
working  amongst  the  labouring  classes,  and  the  real 
leaders  of  these  classes — extreme  Socialists  and  Labour 
members — were  acting. 

A  scene  which  occurred  at  the  Duma  shortly  before 
the  Revolution  had  caused  much  comment :  the  orators 
of  all  the  parties  having  in  turn  attacked  the  Government 
and  demanded  explanations,  the  new  President  of  the 
Council,  the  aged  and  correct  Prince  Galitzyn,  at  last 
decided  to  ascend  the  tribune  and  make  a  so-called 
declaration,  but  it  was  weak,  toneless,  meaningless. 
Then  one  of  the  extreme  Socialists,  Tchkeidze,  jumped 
on  to  the  tribune  and  in  a  few  words  ridiculed  the 
declaration  and  rejected  it.  "  We  are  still  displaying 
patience ;  we  have  entreated  the  Government  to  speak 
out,  to  dispel  the  doubts  and  suspicions  that  its  actions 
are  raising  all  over  the  country.  And  now  '  an  old  man ' 
{odine  stank)  ascends  the  tribune  and  .  .  .  tells  us 
nothing  at  all.  Take  care !  "  continued  the  orator, 
making  a  threatening  gesture  towards  poor  Prince 
Galitzyn,  "you  will  repent,  but  it  will  be  too  late!" 
The  specifically  Caucasian  accent  of  Tchkeidze  and  the 
expression  "old  man"  applied  to  Galitzyn  roused  the 
laughter  of  the  assembly,  and  the  Government  was  once 
more  made  to  look  ridiculous.  It  was  a  duel  to  the  death 
which  was  beginning  between  the  police  power  of  the 
Empire  and  the  extreme  revolutionaries.  Protopopoff, 
daily  becoming  madder,  accepting  the  challenge  and 
taking  all  measures  to  provoke  i\iQ  outbreak  of  disorder 
in  the  capital  as  quickly  as  possible,  was  at  the  same 
time  organising  the  most  energetic  repression  which, 
according  to  him,  could  only  end  in  the  complete 
triumph  of  the  Government.  The  revolutionary  leaders, 
absolutely  sure  of  the  working  population,  hoping  much 
also  from  certain  military  elements,  and  counting  on  the 
neutrality  at  least  of  the  educated  classes  and  of  the 
majority  of  the  officials,  the  revolutionary  leaders,  I  say. 


478  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

and  the  German  agents  on  their  side  hastened  the  out- 
break of  the  riot.  The  victory  of  the  Revolution  was,  at 
the  vital  moment,  brought  about  by  some  of  the  reserve 
regiments  of  the  Guard  going  over  to  the  rioters ;  these 
regiments  having  been  recruited — in  defiance  of  the  rules 
strictly  observed  up  till  1916— a  few  months  before  the 
Rcvohition  from  amongst  the  ivoj'king  classes  of  the  capital. 
Naturally,  the  men  of  these  regiments,  not  yet  inured 
to  discipline  and  commanded  by  young  officers  who 
themselves  were  novices,  ended  by  going  over  to  the 
side  of  their  brothers  and  comrades. 

From  that  moment,  Petrograd  was  entirely  at  tlie 
mercy  of  a  soldiery  drunk  with  success,  with  the 
flattery  lavished  on  it  and  with  the  alcohol  seized  on  at 
every  opportunity.  M.  Alexander  Gutchkoff,  the  new 
Minister  of  War  (the  first  civilian  in  this  role  that 
Russia  has  ever  seen),  was  loudly  clapped  when  with  his 
own  hands  he  pinned  "  la  croix  des  braves  "  on  the 
breast  of  the  first  soldier  who  had  had  the  courage  to  kill 
his  officer  by  shooting  him  in  the  back.  This  same 
Gutchkoff"  was  scouted,  reviled  and  dismissed,  when  he 
wished  to  take  measures  to  dispatch  gradually  to  the 
front  the  useless  surplus  of  the  garrison  of  Petro- 
grad. The  Government  had  to  give  in  and  to  promise 
that  all  these  soldiers  should  remain  in  the  capital  as 
recognised  guardians  of  popular  rights  and  of  the 
Revolution.  On  that  day  the  Provisional  Government 
signed  its  own  death-warrant. 

Since  then  the  Soviets  and  those  who  were  secretly  direct- 
ing them,  i.e.  the  German  agents.,  had  become  the  actual 
masters  of  Russia.  All  those  who  had  greeted  the  fall 
of  the  Tsarinian  regime  with  enthusiasm,  and  who  from 
the  very  first  adopted  the  cause  of  the  Revolution ;  all 
those  who  rallied  to  it  to  increase  the  number  of  sane 
elements,  this  entire  coalition  of  the  best  intellectual 
forces  of  the  country  whence  came  the  majority  of  the 
Provisional  Government ;  all  these  men,  I  say,  found 
themselves  from  the  outset  on  the  edge  of  the  real  power. 
All  the  actual  power  was  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the 


I9I7]  THE  SOVIETS  SUPREME  479 

Soviets.  Even  the  hot-headed  and  obstructive  Kerensky 
and  his  acolytes  had  no  real  voice  in  the  matter ;  they 
possessed  influence  in  so  far  as  they  obeyed  the  Soviets. 

And  then  a  dramatic  dialogue  began  between  the  so- 
called  Government  and  the  so-called  "People," the  like 
of  which  history  has  never  yet  recorded. 

"We  give  in  to  you  on  all  the  principles  which 
we  have  always  cherished,"  said  Prince  Lvoff,  MM. 
Rodzianke,  Gutchkoff,  Miliukoff,  Generals  Alexeieff, 
Brussiloff,  Korniloff,  Ruzsky  and  others ;  "  we  give  up 
the  constitutional  monarchy,  we  abrogate  all  the  honorary 
prerogatives  of  the  officers,  we  abandon  for  ever  the 
right  to  own  land,  we  are  ready  to  welcome  with  open 
arms  and  to  accept  as  colleagues  and  collaborators  all 
the  revolutionaries  who  come  to  us  out  of  prisons,  from 
Siberia,  from  abroad,  including  Anarchists  and  Bolshe- 
viks— only  allow  us  to  preserve  the  minimum  of  order  in 
the  country  (and  the  Army),  and  above  all  leave  to  us 
the  direction  of  the  war  and  the  accomplishment  of  the 
recognised  objects  of  that  war.  Recognise  with  us 
the  great  principles  of  a  free,  undivided  and  powerful 
country — the  principle  of  Danton  and  Robespierre : 
will  you  ?  " 

But  the  "people"  who  scoffed  at  Robespierre  and 
Danton  answered  in  coarse  terms  and  finally  drove  away 
these  boring  personages  with  the  butt-end  of  their  rifles. 

"  We  surrender  to  you  the  few  principles  we  have 
recognised  up  to  now,"  said  M.  Kerensky  and  his  friends ; 
"  we  accept  the  formula  no  indemnities^  no  annexations^  we 
are  ready  to  guide  your  footsteps  towards  the  com- 
munist paradise,  we  joyfully  consent  to  the  most  broadly 
'federative'  dismemberment  of  what  up  to  now  has 
been  Russia;  only  permit  us  to  save  our  face  before 
strangers,  preserve  at  least  the  appearance  of  a  country 
faithful  to  its  allies,  persuade  your  brothers  at  the  front 
not  to  desert  the  trenches  entirely,  not  to  run  away  all 
in  a  body ! " 

But  the  "people"  of  the  soldiers,  of  the  criminal 
sailors,   of  the  workmen  and  of  the  peasants,  greedy 


48o  REVOLUTION  [chap.xxiv. 

for  gain,  replied  with  insults  and  finally  drove  out 
M.  Kerensky  and  his  friends  with  broomsticks,  installing 
Bolsheviks  in  their  places.  The  latter  at  last  made  the 
wished-for  speech  :  "  Comrades,  we  are  all  animated  by 
the  same  ideal  and  are  all  aiming  at  the  same  proximate 
objects  :  '  No  more  war !  Peace  at  any  price !  a  peace 
which  will  permit  us  immediately  to  enjoy  all  the  good 
things  that  you  have  won  and  that  you  are  still 
winning!'" 

This  speech  was  greeted  with  unanimous  applause, 
and  with  joyful  heart  they  left  for  Brest-Litovsk. 

The  origin  of  the  Revolution  had  warped  its  whole 
character  and  course  and  led  Russia  down  a  natural 
slope  to  the  abyss  in  which  she  is  still  struggling. 

If  the  sensible  elements  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment had  realised  this  in  time  they  might  perhaps  have 
been  able  to  check  the  rapid  progress  of  disorder  and 
political  corruption.  But  alas !  we  all  of  us  were, 
just  at  the  outbreak  of  the  great  cataclysm,  under  the 
influence  of  suggestion  and  of  strong  poisons.  We 
believed  in  all  good  faith  that  the  fakir  and  his  silken 
ladder  could  remain  suspended  in  the  air  ! 

It  was  quite  natural  that  after  the  Revolution  had 
triumphed  in  Russia  the  convicts  and  political  exiles  of 
note  should  have  agreed  to  meet  together  in  the  capital 
of  the  regenerated  country  and  should  have  enjoyed  an 
enthusiastic  reception  from  their  former  associates. 
But  it  was  difficult  to  understand — for  our  Allies  at  least 
— why  in  war  time  and  when  the  journey  between  the 
West  and  Russia  was  so  difficult,  so  long  and  so  costly, 
we  need  have  allowed  the  whole  body  and,  alas !  the  riff*- 
raff"  also,  of  our  revolutionary  emigrants  to  come  back  to 
us  from  France,  Switzerland,  Italy  ?  It  would  have  been 
so  easy  and  yet  so  rational  to  subsidise  them  liberally 
on  the  spot  until  the  end  of  the  war  and  the  resumption 
of  normal  communications. 

But  it  was  just  because  those  who  were  actually 
organising  the  Revolution  needed  to  reinforce  the  most 


I9I7]  PRINCE   KROPOTKIN  481 

detestable  elements  amongst  their  clients  and  zealots. 
And  above  and  before  all  things  they  wanted  to  welcome 
the  Zimmcnvaldians,  the  friends  of  the  German  Sozial- 
demokratie.  And  when  the  British  barred  the  way  to 
the  Lenins,  the  Trotskys  and  their  staff,  the  Provisional 
Government  was  constrained  to  tolerate  their  arrival  by 
Germany,  to  receive  them  ceremoniously  and  to  allow 
their  open  and  vehement  progaganda  of  peace  at  any 
price. 

I  saw  all  this  crowd  of  exiles  passing  through 
Stockholm,  I  made  the  acquaintance  of  a  few  amongst 
them,  I  heard  a  great  deal  of  talk  about  others. 

One  of  the  first  who  passed  through  and  stayed  for 
one  day  in  the  Swedish  capital  was  the  celebrated 
Prince  Kropotkin,  a  Revolutionist  of  the  old  stamp,  the 
spiritual  heir  of  Bakunin,  the  head  of  the  Anarchist 
school,  the  pillar  of  the  former  International,  and  with 
all  that  an  eminent  geographer  and  collaborator  with 
Elisee  Reclus. 

I  expected  to  find  a  peremptory,  intransigent  person- 
age,   airing    the    most    extreme    theories    with    great 
assurance.     I  saw  before   me   a  very  polite   old   man, 
with  the  courtesy  of  a  bygone  age,  exceedingly  simple 
in  manner  but  with  the  dignity  of  a  gentleman  of  the  old 
school,  and  the  impetuosity  of  youth  becoming  apparent 
occasionally — and  just   at   the  right  moment — through 
this  modest  exterior.    A  sympathetic  current  at  once  set 
in   between  us  and  we  talked   quite  openly.      At   one 
moment,   when   the   conversation    had    turned    to    the 
person  of  Nicolas  II.,  I  took  up  his  defence  as  a  fnan 
and  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  conceal  the  sincere 
sympathy  I  still  felt  for  him.     Kropotkin's  face  darkened. 
"  I  do  not  agree  with  you  in  the  least,"  he  said.     "  From 
us  he  has  only  earned  anger  and  contempt."     "  But  {ovyou 
it  is  quite  another  matter,"  I  broke  in;  "  'Thou  hast  not 
served  him.    From  thine  earliest  youth  thou  hast  thrown 
off  his  bloodstained  fetters.'^    And  I  have  served  him  all 

1  Celebrated  lines  of  Lermonteffs  on  the  death  of  the  Decembrist 
Prince  Odoievsky.    The  poet  speaks  of  the  "great  world"  and  of  its 


482  REVOLUTION  [ciiap.xxiv. 

my  life,  I  have  in  no  way  found  this  service  to  be  a 
reproach  ;  on  the  contrary  I  was  proud  of  it.  So  that 
if  1  did  not  take  up  the  defence  of  my  unfortunate  ex- 
Sovereign  now,  I,  too,  should  not  deserve  the  esteem 
of  the  Russian  people." 

The  old  Revolutionist  was  silent  for  a  few  minutes, 
then  allowed  that  from  my  point  of  view  I  was  right. 

A  respectful  crowd  of  Russian  exiles,  reporters,  etc., 
were  awaiting  their  turn  to  talk  with  the  "  great  man  "  ; 
meanwhile,  in  the  modest  room  he  was  occupying,  his 
wife,  so  good,  so  unaffected  and  such  a  perfect  lady  in 
her  dignified  simplicity,  was  busily  packing  into  a  small 
chest  some  remedies  which  might  be  needed  on  the 
journey  by  her  adored  man,  who  was  old  and  often  ailing 
after  his  long  career  of  work,  travels,  dangers,  prison. 

The  correspondent  of  a  prominent  Russian  news- 
paper came  to  talk  to  Kropotkin  in  front  of  me.  At 
one  moment  this  gentleman — who  seemed  sympathetic 
and  to  be  possessed  of  sound  principles — touched  on 
the  question  of  a  peace  "without  annexations  and  with- 
out indemnities"  which  had  just  been  raised  by  the 
Zimmerwaldian  clique  and  even  by  the  neutral  demo- 
cratic Socialists.  It  was  curious  to  see  how  the  old 
man,  with  such  a  calm  manner,  started.  "What?  so 
that  Germany  should  always  have  Alsace-Lorraine  in 
her  hands  ?  So  that  the  French  frontier  should  still  be 
as  near  Paris  as  it  was  before  the  war?  But  that 
is  inadmissible,  absolutely  inadmissible.  France  could 
never  breathe  freely.  And  who,  if  not  Germany  herself, 
is  going  to  pay  for  the  ruins  she  has  heaped  up  with 
joyous  heart  wherever  her  troops  have  passed  ?  She  is 
to  pay  for  them.  I  am  genuinely  sorry  for  the  German 
people,  but  they  also  have  their  share  of  responsibility 
and  they  must  contribute  by  their  work  and  by  their 
money  to  the  work  of  rightful  reparation." 

When  I  returned  to  see  Kropotkin  again  later  on  in 
the  day  we,  like  the  two  good  old  Muscovites  that  we 

chains  ;  but   he   clearly   means   the   whole   Tsarinian   rdgime   and  the 
somewhat  cruel  Emperor  Nicolas  I.  to  be  understood  by  that. 


1917]       EARLY  MEMORIES   OF   MOSCOW         483 

were,  ended  by  reviewing  our  recollections  of  Moscow, 
our  mutual  friends,  our  relations,  our  acquaintances. 
Those  who  have  read  the  very  vivid  memoirs  of  Prince 
Kropotkin  know  that  he  was  brought  up  by  a  grasping 
and  often  brutal  father  in  an  atmosphere  of  revolting 
abuse  of  the  serfdom  which  still  existed  then.  I  myself 
was  fortunate  enough  to  have  been  only  about  four 
years  old  when  the  ever-blessed  hand  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander  II.  swept  away  this  blemish  which  was 
disgracing  Russia  ;  my  parents  had  just  left  foreign  parts 
and  the  diplomatic  world,  and  they  sought  the  society  of 
people,  refined  like  them,  like  them  detesting  vulgarity 
and  coarseness,  having  like  them  intellectual  interests. 
Now  Moscow  society  at  that  period  possessed  many 
persons  and  many  families  with  similar  tastes.  Con- 
sequently my  memories  were  infinitely  brighter  and 
softer  than  those  of  my  host.  But  nevertheless  this 
recalling  of  the  past  in  its  setting — so  original,  so  dear  to 
every  really  Russian  heart — of  old  Moscow,  established 
one  more  link  between  me  and  the  old  Revolutionist, 
the  old  gentleman  who  had  become  an  Anarchist  through 
reaction  against  the  injustice,  the  cruelty,  the  exploita- 
tion which  had  embittered  his  soul  from  his  earliest 
youth.  I  was  sorry  to  part  from  this  sympathetic,  inter- 
esting and  sincere  man,  with  whom  I  had  a  greal  deal 
more  in  common  than  with  many  of  my  good  friends 
in  society  or  in  my  profession. 

But  other  revolutionaries  were  about  to  return  to 
Russia — via  Stockholm — in  quite  a  different  frame  of 
mind  from  that  of  Struve,  Burtzeff,  or  Kropotkin. 

I  have  a  most  vivid  recollection  of  my  first  encounter 
with  the  kind  of  people  who  have  since  become  so 
notorious  under  the  epithet  of  Bolsheviks  (majority 
party).  I  went  to  a  public  meeting  in  the  great  "Audi- 
torium "  of  Stockholm,  a  meeting  presided  over  by  M. 
Branting  and  at  which  Madame  Marika  Stjerrnstett,  the 
brilliant  and  congenial  Swedo-French  lecturer,  was  to 
speak  on  the  horrible  Armenian  massacres  and  to  rouse 

2  1 


4S4  REVOLUTION  [chap.xxiv. 

the  sympathy  of  the  Swedish  public  for  these  unhappy 
people. 

In  the  outer  hall  I  found  myself  by  chance  next  to  an 
individual  of  the  Armenian  type  ;  I  asked  him  in  Russian 
if  he  did  belong  to  that  nationality  and  on  his  answer  in 
the  affirmative  1  got  a  place  for  him  in  one  of  the  front 
rows  so  that  he  should  hear  the  lecture  well. 

Branting's  stirring  speech  and  then  the  brilliant 
account  of  the  lecturer  brought  home  to  a  much-moved 
audience  the  awful  scenes  of  massacres,  tortures,  whole- 
sale deportations — during  which  the  greater  number  of 
the  deported  died  from  privations — the  whole  thing 
having  been  skilfully  organised  so  as  to  extirpate  once 
for  all  the  whole  Armenian  race,  whose  existence  and 
misfortunes  were  leading  to  the  interference  of  Russia 
and  Western  Europe  in  Turkey.  I  walked  home  from 
this  meeting  and  the  Armenian  whom  I  had  befriended 
accompanied  me.  Very  naturally  we  discussed  what  we 
had  just  been  hearing.  But  my  companion,  without 
dwelling  much  on  the  misfortunes  of  his  fellow-country- 
men, passed  rapidly  on  to  general  political  questions  and 
ended  by  advocating  in  eloquent  terms  the  necessity  of 
stopping  all  carnage  as  soon  as  possible  and  the  present 
war  first  of  all ;  he  was  impudent  enough  to  draw  up — 
probably  in  order  to  tempt  me — a  picture  of  a  Russian 
diplomat  who  would  throw  off  current  conventions  and 
place  the  "  true  "  interests  of  the  Russian  people  above 
the  needs  of  the  Allies !  I  stepped  back  a  pace.  "  But 
are  you  really  Armenian  ?  And  if  you  are,  how  can  you 
speak  of  peace  so  long  as  your  unhappy  country  has  not 
been  freed  and  avenged  ?  Who  in  the  world  are  you?  " 
The  individual  was  beginning  to  reply  that  when  the 
ideals  of  those  who  thought  as  he  did  were  realised, 
there  could  no  longer  be  any  massacres,  any  national 
persecutions.  .  .  .  But  I  quickly  took  off  my  hat  to  him 
and  fled  as  from  some  noisome  beast.  I  heard  a  few 
days  later  that  he  had  left  for  Russia. 

I  also  remember  on  one  occasion,  when  I  had  gone 
to  the  station  to  see  some  one  off,  noticing  a  group  of 


I9I7]  THE  ARMY  OF  TREACHERY  485 

young  people — of  a  type  that  had  absolutely  nothing 
Slav  about  it — singing  and  dancing  the  trepak  very 
ostentatiously  on  the  platform  before  their  carriage 
door.  The  faces  of  the  dancers  were  completely  at 
variance  with  the  typically  national  Russian  dance 
and  the  whole  thing  looked  like  intentional  parade. 
At  that  minute  one  of  the  members  of  the  "Emigrants' 
Committee,"  with  whom  I  had  had  to  discuss  the  help 
lent  by  the  Legation,  came  up  to  me.  "  Do  you  see — 
those  are  all  our  young  people  who  are  rejoicing  over 
their  return  to  Russia,"  he  said  with  a  malignant  smile. 
"  Your  Excellency  may  rest  assured  that  they  are  going 
there  for  the  greater  well-being  of  the  Russian  people." 
And  the  smile  became  more  malignant,  more  triumphant. 

At  this  same  time  also  my  wife,  returning  from 
meeting  an  ambulance-train,  told  me  that  in  it,  besides 
the  usual  wounded  men,  there  were  some  very 
suspicious-looking  individuals,  well-fed,  well-dressed, 
and  who  passed  themselves  off  as  Ukrainian  medical 
officers.  The  wounded  complained  of  the  conversation 
of  these  men,  who  scoffed  at  all  that  they  held  dear  and 
who  foretold  a  good  peace  with  Germany  at  no  distant 
date.  The  real  wounded  wished  to  draw  the  attention 
of  the  military  authorities  at  the  frontier  to  these  people. 
Soon  after  and  little  by  little  the  Russian  ambulance 
trains  assumed  a  completely  different  aspect.  From  the 
German  side  they  were  making  use  of  them  to  pass  into 
Russia  not  wounded  men  but  soldiers  who  had  under- 
gone skilful  preparation  in  special  camps,  and  who 
were  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  "friends  of  peace"  in 
Russia. 

These  ranks  continued  to  swell.  The  army  of 
treachery  was  forming.  Only  the  headquarters  staff  was 
wanting.  That  arrived  at  last  from  Switzerland,  via 
Germany,  in  the  persons  of  MM.  Lenin,  Trotsky  and 
others.  When  they  passed  through  Stockholm — I  did 
not  see  them — they  did  not  conceal  from  the  Swedish 
Socialists  and  interviewers  their  intention  of  preaching 
the  conclusion'of  peace  at  any  price. 


486  REVOLUTION  [chap.xxiv. 

It  is  absolutely  futile  to  speak  of  the  tremendous 
mistake  made  by  the  Provisional  Government  in  con- 
senting to  their  entry  into  Russia  and  in  not  taking 
any  measures  against  their  pernicious  and  open  propa- 
ganda in  Petrograd  and  the  other  great  centres.  The 
Provisional  Government  could  neither  forbid  nor 
prevent  anything  against  the  will  of  the  great  Soviet  of 
Petrogad*  And  this  Soviet,  by  its  very  origin  and  from 
its  beginning,  was  the  organ  of  German  policy  and  the 
lively  and  perfectly-formed  embryo  of  the  future 
Bolshevist  republic. 

In  chronological  sequence  I  ought  here  to  mention 
an  incident,  or  rather  a  conversation,  which  has  but  a 
distant  connection  with  the  progress  of  the  Russian 
Revolution,  but  which  has  one  all  the  same  and  which  is 
of  special  interest  at  the  hour  in  which  1  write  these 
lines,  that  is  to  say  in  May,  1919. 

At  the  beginning  of  April  Sir  Esme  Howard  told  me 
that  he  had  had  a  visit  from  an  Esthonian  political 
agitator,  a  certain  M.  Keskula,  whose  views  had  ap- 
peared to  him  to  be  interesting;  that  consequently  he 
wished  that  I  would  check  his  impressions  by  having  a 
conversation  myself  with  the  gentleman.  My  English 
colleague  added  that  he  had  asked  Keskula  if  he  knew 
me  ;  but  that  the  latter  had  replied  that  although  he  was 
desirous  of  having  an  interview  with  me,  he  did  not 
consider  it  the  right  thing  for  him  to  take  the  initiative 
and  to  present  himself  at  the  Russian  Legation.  I  told 
Sir  Esme  that  I  saw  nothing  unseemly  in  my  meeting 
the  person  in  question  on  neutral  ground,  and  so  we 
arranged  that  on  the  appointed  day  I  was  to  go  to  the 
First  Secretary  to  the  British  Legation,  Mr.  Clive,  whose 
mind,  tact  and  judgment  had  always  impressed  me,  and 
who  in  addition  to  all  his  other  qualities  was  a  thorough 
master  of  the  German  language  ,  in  which  I  should 
probably  have  to  converse  with  my  Esthonian  "  com- 
patriot "  so  that  the  master  of  the  house  should 
understand  us. 


I9I7]  ESTHONIAN   ASPIRATIONS  487 

When  I  arrived  at  Clive's  house  at  the  appointed 
hour  I  found  myself  in  the  presence  of  a  correctly- 
dressed  gentleman  whom  the  master  of  the  house 
introduced  to  me  as  M,  Keskula.  We  began  to  talk  at 
once  in  German — as  I  had  foreseen. 

I  asked  M.  Keskula  about  his  antecedents.  He  replied 
with  perfect  frankness  that  he  had  commenced  his 
political  career  as  a  partisan  of  German  policy.  Son  of 
a  well-to-do  farmer,  he  began  his  scholastic  career  at 
the  gymnasium  of  Reval,  and  then  went  to  the  University 
of  Berlin,  where  he  remained  and  took  up  Esthonian 
national  politics. 

"  But  I  have  always  understood,"  I  observed,  "  that 
the  national  movement  in  Esthonia,  just  as  amongst 
the  Letts,  is  closely  bound  up  with  an  irreconcilable 
antagonism  towards  the  Baltic  Germans — especially 
towards  the  proprietors.  Thus  how  could  you  seek 
to  link  the  cause  of  your  nation  to  German  policy?" 

"  In  that  respect  there  is  a  great  difference  be- 
tween Letts  and  Esthonians,"  was  the  reply.  "  Where- 
as the  former  are  above  and  before  all  vehement 
nationalists  with  decided  leanings  to  the  most  extreme 
socialism,  we  others  hold  fast  to  Western  civilisation. 
The  police  order  which  reigns  in  the  country,  our 
prosperous  little  properties,  our  schools,  our  hospitals, 
our  good  roads — all  that  has  become  a  habit  with  us 
which  we  could  not  sacrifice;  then  from  the  national 
point  of  view  we  have  already  acquired  far  more  than 
the  Letts ;  we  have  bought  back  a  great  deal  of  land 
from  the  barons;  we  are  listened  to  and  sometimes 
coaxed  and  flattered  in  the  councils  of  administration, 
in  which  formerl})'  all  power,  all  influence,  belonged 
exclusively  to  the  Germans;  our  fellow-countrymen 
hold  most  of  the  rural  livings  ;  we  possess  a  pros- 
perous and  influential  national  Press.  For  this  reason 
in  Esthonia,  far  more  than  amongst  the  Letts,  we  have 
always  dreaded  having  much  recourse  to  Russian 
protection ;  we  dreaded  your  despotic  methods,  which 
would  be  the  ruin  of  our  local  civilisation." 


488  REVOLUTION  [chap.xxiv. 

"  But  it  seems  that  you  have  not  come  to  an  arrange- 
ment with  the  Germans  of  Berlin  ?  " 

"  No  ]  in  spite  of  my  labours  of  more  than  four  years 
I  have  not  arrived  at  any  positive  result.  It  was  not 
that  there  were  no  enlightened  minds  in  Germany : 
these  understand  that  Germany  could  not  but  gain  if  in 
the  Baltic  Provinces  two  little  States  were  formed, 
enjoying  complete  national  independence,  yet  permeated 
with  Germano- Western  civilisation  and  guarding  this 
independence  and  this  civilisation  against  the  attacks 
of  the  barbarian  power  which  threatens  them  in  the 
East — pray  forgive  me,  Monsieur!  But  with  regard  to 
Baltic  questions,  German  Government  circles  and  the 
Berlin  Press  were,  and  are  still,  completely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Baltic  "  emigrants,"  of  a  Kayserling  and  his  con- 
federates. Every  one  sees  everything  through  their 
eyes.  Thus,  realising  that  I  had  taken  the  wrong 
track,  I  sought  to  find  a  support  for  our  nationality 
from  another  side.  I  went  to  reside  in  Finland. 
You  are  aware  of  the  ties  of  origin  which  bind  the 
Esthonians  to  the  Finns ;  latterly  the  Pan-Finnish  idea 
has  made  remarkable  progress  ;  there  are  entire  popula- 
tions in  your  country — in  Northern  Russia,  on  the 
Volga,  in  Siberia — who  for  centuries  had  not  even  an 
idea  what  they  were,  and  Russified  themselves  ad 
libitum,  but  who  will  know  to-morrow  that  they  are 
Finns.  You  will  forgive  my  plain-speaking,  Mon- 
sieur? But  what  concerns  us  at  the  present  time  is 
only  the  western  and  civilised  agglomeration  of  the 
great  Finnish  race — Esthonia  and  Finland,  which,  in 
order  to  safeguard  their  liberty  and  their  civilisation, 
ought  first  to  unite  their  efforts  and  then  to  seek  a 
power  in  Europe  on  which  they  could  lean  if  necessary. 
This  power  might  well  be  that  of  the  Scandinavian 
States,  beginning  with  Sweden.  The  historic  ties  of 
Sweden  and  Finland  are  universally  recognised,  and 
even  much  exaggerated.  What  are  less  well  known  are 
the  ties  that  unite  Sweden  to  the  Baltic  Provinces.  .  .  ." 

"  I  have  often  heard  them  spoken  of,"  I  interrupted 


I9I7]     CONVERSATION  WITH  M.  KESKULA     489 

the  speaker.  "  During  the  hundred  odd  years  that 
Esthonia  and  Livonia  were  under  Swedish  domination 
the  people,  who  up  till  then  had  been  shamefully 
oppressed  by  the  German  conquerors,  their  lords  and 
masters,  knew  for  the  first  time  what  justice,  order, 
humanity,  and  good  administration  were.  At  that  time 
— the  period  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  of  the  Oxenstjernas, 
of  Charles  X.  and  Charles  XI. — Sweden  was  the  best 
governed  State  of  the  whole  of  Europe,  and  justice  in 
particular  was  studied  and  respected.  In  extending 
their  power  to  the  domain  of  the  Knights — Brothers 
of  the  Sword,  the  Swedish  laws  no  longer  tolerated  the 
crying  abuses  of  these  knights.  The  Lett  and  the 
Esthonian,  even  the  serfs  amongst  them,  found  pro- 
tection from  the  Royal  authorities.  Schools  were 
founded,  roads  made,  proprietors  who  abused  their 
power  too  much  were  judged  and  punished.  Later  on, 
under  Russian  domination  the  oppression  of  serfdom 
began  again.  Then  the  spirit  of  the  age  brought  its 
own  remedy.  Amongst  the  Baltic  nobility  itself  there 
were  humane  and  just  men  to  be  found  who  wished  to 
march  with  the  times,  and  who  advocated  extensive 
reforms  granted  by  Catherine  II.,  and  subsequently  by 
Alexander  I.  Serfdom  was  abolished  in  the  Provinces 
long  before  it  was  in  Russia.  Nevertheless,  the  recol- 
lection of  the  benefits  of  Swedish  domination  had 
never  been  effaced  from  the  memory  of  the  people 
of  the  Provinces,  and  even  now  the  Swedish  name  is 
very  popular  amongst  them — among  Esthonians  par- 
ticularly." 

"  You  are  perfectly  right.  Monsieur ;  that  is  exactly 
the  case." 

"Well,  then,  have  you  succeeded  this  time  in  your 
work  of  binding  Esthonia,  Finland,  and  Sweden  into  one 
sheaf?  "  I  asked. 

"  Not  in  the  least !  In  the  first  place,  Sweden  does 
not  really  understand  these  matters.  And  then  I  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  Finland  has  but  one  policy 
only — German  policy." 


490  R  EVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

"  Yes,  I  have  often  heard  that  the  Swedish  party  in 
Finland  sought  Germany's  support  long  before  the 
war." 

"Not  the  Swedish  party  only,  but  far  more  the 
Young-Finn  party,  even  to  its  most  extreme  elements. 
Finland  would  not  even  hear  of  a  Swedish  policy.  Sal- 
vation could  only  come  from  the  German  side.  Some 
time  before  the  war  an  agreement  was  made  between 
Helsingfors  and  Berlin  that  on  the  day  when  the 
Germans  should  occupy  Esthonia,  and  when  a  German 
military  governor  should  instal  himself  at  Reval,  and  it 
becomes  a  German  naval  base— the  Revolution  should 
break  out :  not  before.  This  arrangement  still  holds 
good.  But  in  that  case  what  would  the  fate  of  Esthonia 
be  between  Finland  where  a  German  prince,  son  or 
relation  of  William  II.'s,  would  reign,  and  the  Prussian 
'  Statthalter '  installed  at  Reval  ?  " 

"  I  understand  your  patriotic  anxieties  thoroughly. 
But  allow  me  to  ask  :  who  is  preventing  you — now  that 
the  Revolution  has  swept  away  the  old  tendencies  to 
Russification  amongst  us,  and  professed  the  principle  of 
national  autonomies — who  is  preventing  you,  I  say, 
from  turning  openly  towards  us,  and  from  seeing  the 
future  of  your  nationality  in  an  open  union,  based  on 
wide  autonomy,  with  Russia?" 

"  Be  good  enough  to  forgive  my  complete  frankness 
beforehand.  Monsieur :  in  the  first  place  I  must  confess 
that  we  have  no  great  confidence  in  your  present  regime, 
and  in  the  possibility  of  your  issuing  triumphant  from 
the  struggle ;  then  we  always  fear  that  even  the  new 
Russian  regime  might  easily  become  narrowly  nation- 
alist again  ;  such  things  have  occurred  before  in  history ; 
then  finally  and  chiefly  there  is  the  question  of  the 
future  frontiers  of  Esthonia." 

"  But  I  thought  that  those  were  as  perfectly  traced 
by  nature  as  by  history.  The  frontier  between  the 
Russian  nationality  and  the  Esthonian  nationality  is 
Lake  Peipus  (Pskoff)  and  the  course  of  the  river  Narova 
up  to  its  mouth  in  the  Gulf  of  Finland  near  Narva." 


»si7]  ESTHONIAN   AMBITIONS  491 

"Ah!  that  is  just  the  point,  Monsieur!  No,  no!  we 
take  a  very  different  view  of  our  national  frontiers.  In 
the  first  place,  south  of  Lake  Peipus  the  limits  of  your 
Government  of  Pskoff  do  not  coincide  at  all  with  the 
limits  of  Esthonian  nationality  ;  the  latter  predominates 
in  the  western  portion  of  the  Government  in  question. 
The  district  and  town  of  Isborsk,  in  particular,  must 
absolutely  belong  to  us." 

"What?  Izborsk?  But  from  the  legendary  begin- 
ning  of  Russian  history  Izborsk  appears  as  a  Russian 
town  ;  it  has  remained  one.  Listen  :  I  know  through  the 
genealogy  of  my  family  that  in  the  time  of  the  Tsar 
Theodore,  son  of  John  the  Terrible,  a  Nekludofif  was 
made  Lieutenant  of  the  Tsar  in  Izborsk,  and  was  given 
a  large  property  there  which  has  belonged  up  till 
latterly  to  his  descendants — distant  relations  of  mine — 
and  which  was  sold  quite  recently  to  the  local  peasants — 
good  and  true  Great-Russian  moujiks,  if  ever  there  were 
any!" 

"  I  must  renew  my  apologies  to  you.  Monsieur,  but 
this  only  proves  that  your  ancestors  figured  amongst 
the  oppressors  of  the  Esthonians,  and  established  Great- 
Russian  colonists  on  their  soil !  But  let  us  leave 
Izborsk  out  of  it.^  What  are  you  doing  with  the  whole 
of  Ingria?  Yet  from  time  immemorial  it  has  been 
inhabited  and  cultivated  by  Esthonians ;  now  Ingria 
extends  east  of  the  Narova  as  far  as  Lake  Ladoga,  that 
is  to  say  it  includes  the  whole  northern  half  of  what  you 
have  since  called  'the  Government  of  St.  Petersburg.' 
All  this  country  is  undeniably  ours." 

"  But,  then,  what  would  you  do  about  the  large 
agglomerations,  of  purely  Russian  population,  which 
constitute  large  villages,  or  rather  small  towns,  manu- 

^  An  Esthonian  infiltration  does  really  exist  in  the  province  of  Pskoff; 
but  only  since  1861.  The  noble  proprietors  having  sold  much  land,  it 
was  mainly  Esthonian  immigrants  who  bought  it,  divided  it  up  and 
settled  down  there.  The  instituting  of  the  "  Peasants'  Bank  "  caused 
this  colonisation  to  cease,  for  from  that  time  onwards  it  was  Russian 
peasants  who  bought  the  large  properties  which  were  for  sale. 


492  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

facturing  centres  numbering — as  at  Kolpino — tens  of 
thousands  of  purely  Russian  workmen  ?  And  above 
all,  what  should  you  do  about  the  great  town  of  St. 
Petersburg — now  Petrograd — the  capital  of  the  whole 
of  Russia,  with  its  two  million  inhabitants,  of  which 
barely  fifty  thousand  are  tchoahontzy  (Esthonians)  ?  " 

"Oh,  well!  the  Russians  would  enjoy  the  guarantees 
assured  by  modern  arrangements  to  minorities.  And 
as  to  Petrograd,  once  it  is  to  be  the  capital  of  the 
whole  of  Russia — that  is  to  say  of  a  federation  of  different 
nationalities — why  are  you  set  on  this  capital  being 
within  the  limits  of  the  Russian  part,  and  not  within 
those  of  the  Esthonian  part  of  this  great  federation  ?  " 

There  was  a  long  silence.  I  felt  that  I  had  gathered 
all  that  I  wanted  to,  and  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to 
set  any  further  questions.  On  his  side  M.  Keskula 
realised  that  he  had  said  quite  enough.  He  rose,  and 
we  bade  him  a  friendly  farewell.  When  he  had  left, 
Clive  and  I  went  to  the  drawing-room  to  beg  a  good 
cup  of  tea,  hot  and  strong,  from  charming  Mrs.  Clive ; 
it  was  decidedly  necessary  for  us— forme  in  particular — 
to  be  braced  up  after  the  astounding  things  we  had  been 
listening  to  for  over  an  hour ! 

Towards  the  end  of  April  I  received  a  telegram  from 
M.  Miliukoff,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  announcing  my  appointment  as 
Ambassador  to  Madrid. 

I  had  known  Miliukoff  for  a  long  time ;  he  had  passed 
through  Stockholm  three  or  four  times  before  the 
Revolution,  and  we  had  talked  at  great  length  then,  and 
these  conversations  had  led  to  a  common  point  of  view 
between  us  on  many  questions  of  home  and  foreign 
policy.  What  particularly  pleased  me  about  Miliukoff 
was  his  frankly  Western,  European,  .mentality,  his 
tremendous  energy  and  his  way  of  asking  questions 
plainly,  without  reticence  or  evasions.  I  have  reason 
to  believe  that  in  appointing  me  to  Madrid  Miliukoff 
was  actuated  by  the  wish  to  remove  me  from  a  country 


I9I7]      I   AM   TRANSFERRED   TO   MADRID       493 

too  near  Russia,  too  much  overrun  by  the  most  extreme 
Russian  elements;  he  was  aware  of  my  irreconcilability 
on  certain  principles,  and  he  feared  a  clash  of  opinions 
which  might  create  difficulties  for  the  Foreign  Office. 
My  appointment  as  Ambassador  to  Spain  constituted 
undeniable  promotion,  and  at  the  same  time  it  afforded 
me  a  haven  till  happier  days  should  dawn.  Moreover, 
the  post  in  Madrid  might  become  a  most  important  one 
in  the  event  of  negotiations  for  universal  peace.  I  fully 
appreciated  these  friendly  intentions.  As  to  the  post  in 
Stockholm,  Miliukoff  was  giving  that  to  an  intimate 
friend,  our  Minister  to  Christiania,  who  had  a  shrewd 
and  adaptable  mind  quite  capable  of  coming  to  terms 
with  all  the  Russian  elements  who  had,  or  thought  they 
had,  a  voice  in  the  matter  of  our  relations  with  Sweden. 
I  had  only  just  accepted  the  appointment,  and 
thanked  Miliukoff,  when  sad  news  arrived  from  Petro- 
grad,  the  taking  up  of  arms  of  the  Soviet  of  Petrograd — 
the  first  taking  up  of  arms  of  the  Bolsheviks  we  can 
now  say — directed  against  the  moderate  elements  of  the 
Provisional  Government  and  especially  against  their 
patriotic  point  of  view  on  the  questions  and  the  objects 
of  the  war.  The  garrison  of  Petrograd — already  called 
"  the  Red  Guard  " — held  an  armed  demonstration  against 
certain  Ministers  to  the  watchword  of  "  peace  without 
annexations  or  indemnities."  The  movement  was 
directed  more  particularly  against  Miliukoff,  who  on 
that  day  displayed  admirable  personal  courage  and 
went  down  to  the  Square  to  harangue  the  soldiery, 
loudly  upholding  his  principles  about  the  objects  of  the 
war — and  first  and  foremost  the  necessity  for  Russia  to 
possess  the  Straits.  The  demonstration  continued 
throughout  the  night,  and  the  next  day  the  Council  of 
Ministers  of  the  Provisional  Government  broke  up. 
The  majority,  with  Kerensky  at  the  head,  consented  to 
subordinate  their  policy  to  the  needs  of  the  "  people." 
Thus  Miliukoff  and  his  friends  were  turned  out.  General 
Korniloff — a  hero  sans  peur  et  sans  reproche,  and  a 
proficient  upholder  of  the  most  advanced  political  views 


494  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

(there  were  many  such!) — also  relinquished  his  duties 
as  head  of  the  Petrograd  garrison.  Prince  Lvofif  re- 
mained as  Prime  Minister  a  little  while  longer;  but  the 
real  and  almost  the  whole  power  passed  to  Kerensky, 
who  took  unto  himself  as  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
young  M.  Terestchenko — up  till  then  Minister  of 
Finance — and  who  replaced  Miliukoft's  friends  by 
revolutionary  Socialists  of  renown.  As  to  the  President 
of  the  Duma,  M.  Rodzianko,  and  a  few  officials  who 
with  him  were  supposed  to  represent  the  supreme  power 
— no  one  mentioned  them  any  more ;  they  had  been 
tacitly  suppressed  like  the  fourth  Duma  itself.  It  was  a 
decisive  day  which  really  decided  the  fate  of  the  Revolu- 
tion and  with  it  the  fate  of  Russia.  All  reasonable 
people  were  filled  with  dismay. 

However,  man  is  so  constituted  that  he  always  clings 
to  a  hope;  this  is  more  especially  true  of  the  Russian 
intellectual.     Now  in  this  case  the  hope  lay  in  Kerensky's 
personality.     Son   of  a  high   official   at   the    Board   of 
Education  (at  that  period  the  citadel  of  Russian  reaction), 
impetuous,   excitable,   not   altogether  reliable   in  some 
matters,   having   gone   in   for    revolutionary   Socialism 
like  others  go  in  for  Futurism  or  Cubism,  prosecuted 
and  interned  during  the  first  Revolution,  an  eloquent 
member — always  pushing  himself  forward — of  the  fourth 
Duma,  where  he   sat  at   the  head  of  the  Labour  mem- 
bers—this  lawyer  felt   his  hour  had   come   when  the 
Revolution  triumphed.     Whereas  all  the  other  members 
of  the  Duma,  even  the  most  advanced  ones,  had  lost 
their  heads,  he,  assisted  by  a  few  colleagues  from  the 
Socialist  revolutionary  camp,  promptly  placed   himself 
in  evidence,  harangued  the  people,  harangued  the  troops 
that  were  occupying  the  halls  and  lobbies  of  the  Duma, 
caused  the  former  civil  and  military  officials  who  were 
being  arrested  in  the  town  and  whom  the  emissaries  of 
the  revolutionary  party  were  conducting  to  the  Duma, 
to  be  brought  before  him,  and  decided  their  fate,  either 
setting  them  free  or  ordering  them  to  be  transported  to 
the  fortress ;  in  short,  he  and  his  friends  represented  a 


I9I7]  M.   KERENSl^Y,   DICTATOR  495 

kind  of  executive  power  even  before  the  Provisional 
Government,  in  which  he  became  Minister  of  Justice, 
was  formed.  There  is  a  Russian  proverb  dating  from 
the  eighteenth  century,  which  says  :  "  He  who  has  taken 
the  stick  becomes  corporal."  Kerensky  had  at  once 
become  this  corporal  or  rather  this  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Russian  Revolution.  At  least  it  appeared  so  to 
others.  As  a  matter  of  fact  he  had  never  been  either 
the  promoter  or  the  conscious  leader  of  this  Revolution, 
So  long  as  he  agreed  with  the  Soviets  he  had  some 
power,  the  moment  he  disagreed  with  them  he  was 
powerless.  Moreover,  he  realised  that  at  once,  and 
until  his  final  downfall  he  indulged  in  a  game  of  see-saw 
between  the  Soviets  and  their  adversaries. 

Not  at  all  bloodthirsty  (I  imagine  he  could  not 
have  killed  a  fly  himself),  very  much  inclined,  like 
Bonaparte  when  he  had  attained  supreme  power,  to 
protect  the  aristocrats  who  rallied  to  him,  he  had  at 
once  an  enormous  clientele,  for  who  did  not  rally  to 
him  in  Petrograd  ?  Families  well  known  for  their  un* 
disguised  sycophancy  had  hastened  to  bring  this  here- 
ditary servility  to  the  new  regime,  and  as  soon  as  it  was 
Kerensky  who  personified  this  regime,  they  adored  and 
fawned  on  M.  Kerensky.  The  "  Dictator,"  as  well  as 
his  new  colleagues  in  the  Ministry,  made  laudable 
efforts  to  save  innocent  people — even  generals  and 
officers — from  ever  dangerous  prisons  and  from  the 
fury  of  the  comrades.  There  have  never  been  so  many 
people  sent  abroad  on  special  missions,  civil  and 
military,  and  authorised  to  take  considerable  sums  of 
money  with  them,  as  during  Kerensky's  term  of  office ; 
in  this  way  those  officers,  officials  or  private  individuals, 
to  whom  a  longer  stay  in  Russia  would  have  been 
dangerous,  were  sent,  or  allowed  to  go,  away. 

Young  M.  Terestchenko  did  his  best  to  help  in  these 
masked  flights.  He  was  a  man  of  the  world,  very  well 
educated,  intelligent,  and  thoroughly  good  and  sincere. 
During  the  few  months  that  he  was  in  office  he 
represented  "Our  Lady  of  Perpetual  Succour"  to  all 


496  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

the  former  smart  world  of  Petrograd.  This  same  world 
will  probably  revile  him  later  on.  For  our  Foreign 
Office  staff  his  appointment  was  invaluable ;  all  kept 
their  posts  and  those  who  had  had  some  influence 
over  M.  Sazonoff  had  a  great  deal  more  over  the  new 
Minister,  who  had  no  experience  of  his  work.  Abroad 
all  Miliukoff's  appointments  were  adhered  to,  including 
mine.  There  were,  however,  a  few  victims  on  the  list, 
some  Consuls  were  sacrificed  to  the  spite  of  the  former 
political  exiles  suddenly  become  the  undisputed  heads 
of  Russian  colonies  abroad.  And  as  the  Socialist 
principle  is  as  a  rule  against  State  pensions,  these  poor 
functionaries,  of  whom  some  were  old  and  the  fathers 
of  families,  were  just  turned  into  the  streets  after 
twenty-five  and  thirty  years'  service  ! 

Kerensky's  attitude  towards  the  fallen  Emperor 
and  his  family  was  also  most  favourably  commented  on 
by  the  Press  and  by  rumours  in  circulation.  And 
when  the  unfortunate  family  was  sent  to  Tobolsk,  in 
Siberia,  every  one  thought  that  this  measure  had  been 
dictated  by  the  new  Government's — alias  Kerensky's — 
wish  to  save  Nicolas  II.  and  his  family  from  the  dangers 
which  might  arise  for  them  at  any  moment  from  the 
Soviet  of  Petrograd,  and  to  cause  them  to  be  as  it  were 
forgotten  through  absence  till  such  time  as  they  could 
be  surreptitiously  sent  abroad. 

But  above  and  before  all  Kerensky  proved  his  worth 
by  his  untiring  zeal  and  feverish  activity  in  favour  of 
the  cause  of  the  Allies  and  of  the  prosecution  of  the 
war.  In  fiery  speeches,  becoming  ever  more  numerous, 
and  during  propaganda  trips  which  he  made  to  the 
front,  to  Moscow,  to  Kieff  and  back  again  to  the  front, 
he  exhorted  "  the  soldiers  of  liberty  "  to  remain  loyal  to 
the  Allies,  to  fight,  to  conquer.  Through  the  telegraphic 
agencies  we  abroad  read  the  text  of  his  stirring  speeches, 
the  accounts  of  the  enthusiasm  of  the  "  revolutionary 
army,"  the  promises  of  an  early  renewal  of  the  most 
splendid  military  operations.  And  ever^/body — 
Russians   and   A\\\Q?>—wisJied  to   persuade    themselves 


I9I7]  INCREASING   DISSOLUTION  497 

that  this  little  man  with  the  clean-shaven  face  like 
Bonaparte — untiring  like  him,  and  thundering  out  his 
speeches  like  Danton — would  be  capable  of  changing 
the  spirit  of  the  Russian  soldier  completely,  and  of 
causing  the  troops  on  our  front,  so  passive  and  quiet 
since  the  triumph  of  the  Revolution,  to  take  up  the 
struggle  for  victory  once  more.  What  mattered  the 
principles  and  the  extreme  measures  adopted  by  the 
new  Government  in  the  interior  of  the  country,  and 
the  complete  disorder  which  seemed  to  be  reigning 
there?  What  mattered  the  watchword  "  peace  without 
annexations  or  indemnities "  which  had  definitely 
triumphed  on  the  Russian  side?  Let  us  save  Russia's 
honour  with  regard  to  the  Allies ;  let  us  fight  and 
conquer;  the  rest  can  be  arranged  afterwards  and  never 
mind  how. 

Such  were  the  hopes,  such  the  frame  of  mind  which 
prevailed  at  the  outset  of  the  Kerensky  r6gime.  Alas  ! 
it  soon  became  obvious  that  these  hopes  were  exag- 
gerated to  say  the  least  of  it !  News  began  to  arrive 
again  in  Stockholm,  representing  the  Russian  Army 
and  the  entire  country  as  being  involved  in  increas- 
ing dissolution.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  soldiers 
with  their  arms  were  deserting  in  a  body  and  returning 
to  the  interior  of  the  country  in  order  to  participate  in 
the  "  dividing  up  of  properties."  These  deserters  seized 
the  railways,  forced  any  trains  they  could  get  hold  of 
to  run,  plundered  and  burnt  private  properties,  formed 
themselves  into  bands,  infested  the  towns,  took  the 
prisons  by  assault  and  freed  the  prisoners,  who  formed 
themselves  into  other  bands  still  more  dangerous. 
Meanwhile  the  Ukraine  proclaimed  its  independence ; 
the  Caucasus  did  likewise ;  chaos  became  universal ; 
everything  was  at  a  standstill  except  the  printing- 
presses  for  bank  notes  and  the  fiery  eloquence  of 
Kerensky.  As  to  the  propaganda  of  the  Bolsheviks  it 
was  more  energetic  and  open  than  ever. 

When  I   was  preparing  to  leave  for  my  new  post 
in  the  beginning  of  June  I  had  almost  entirely  lost  all 


498  REVOLUTION  [chap.  xxiv. 

my  illusions.  I  did  not  conceal  from  any  one  that  I 
considered  the  continuation  of  my  public  duties  as  most 
precarious.  And  on  leaving  Stockholm  on  the  14th 
June  I  said  to  myself  and  to  my  friends  that  my  term  of 
office  would  in  all  probability  be  short-lived. 

When  I  left  Sweden  the  Hammarskiold-Wallenberg 
Ministry  had  ceased  to  exist,  having  been  replaced  by 
another  Cabinet,  Conservative  also,  but  which  was 
known  to  be  a  transition  Cabinet,  for  every  one  was 
expecting  that  the  next  elections  would  produce  a 
tremendous  Liberal  and  still  more  Socialist  majority. 

I  took  my  leave  of  King  Gustaf  V.,  who  on  this 
occasion  showed  me  the  same  kindness  as  he  had  done 
throughout  my  time  in  Sweden.  His  Majesty  was 
deeply  moved  when  he  talked  about  the  fate  of  the 
ex-Emperor  Nicolas  II.  and  his  family,  but  he  shared 
my  hopes  as  to  the  chances  of  safety  still  remaining 
to  them ;  more  especially  if  every  one  kept  quiet  about 
them  for  a  time. 

I  was  genuinely  sorry  to  leave  Stockholm.  In  spite 
of  the  terrible  events  of  the  war  and  of  the  Revolution, 
I  had  got  on  well  in  the  country ;  I  had  learnt  to  like 
and  esteem  the  Swedish  people.  For  myself  personally 
and  for  my  country  the  future  seemed  to  hold  nothing 
but  terrible  trouble. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE 

My  journey  from  Stockholm  to  Madrid  was  performed 
under  conditions  unavoidable  in  a  World-War.  At 
Bergen  I  had  to  submit  to  an  enforced  halt  of  a  few  days 
to  wait  for  the  English  boat  in  which  we  were  to  cross 
the  North  Sea,  and  of  which  the  day  and  hour  of 
departure  were  kept  strictly  secret,  on  account  of 
German  submarines.  At  last  the  old  Vulture,  dirty  and 
packed  with  passengers,  started,  escorted  by  two  fine 
British  destroyers  which  awaited  her  outside  Norwegian 
waters. 

On  board  I  met  a  few  French  Socialist  parliamen- 
tarians who  had  been  visiting  Russia  with  M.  Albert 
Thomas ;  I  had  made  their  acquaintance  when  they 
passed  through  Stockholm  on  their  way  to  my  country.^ 
At  that  time  they  were  loudly  proclaiming  their  intention 
to  talk  sense  to  our  extreme  Socialists  and  especially  to 
fight  the  propaganda  of  the  Bolsheviks.  I  was  some- 
what disagreeably  surprised  to  find  that  on  their  return 
from  their  mission  to  Russia  they  appeared  to  be  up- 
holding the  Soviets.  The  head  of  the  mission,  M.  Albert 
Thomas,  had  gone  on  board  a  French  destroyer  at 
Bergen. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  crossing  a  thick  fog  enveloped 
the  sea,  and  we  were  suddenly  stopped;  signals  were 
exchanged  between  us  and  our  escort ;  we  started  again, 
but  when  the  fog  lifted  it  was  discovered  that  we  were 
not  going  into  Aberdeen  but  into  Peterhead,  a  small 

^  This  was  M.  Albert  Thomas's  second  journey,  the  one  that  had  such 
an  indifferent  influence  on  our  internal  situation. 

499  2    K 


500  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.xxv. 

fishing-port  much  further  north.  The  commander  of 
one  of  the  destroyers,  friendly  Lieutenant  Lyon,  then 
came  on  board  the  Vulture  and  explained  to  me  what 
had  happened.  We  had  been  stopped  by  a  wireless 
message,  saying  that  the  Germans  had  laid  mines  during 
the  night  off  Aberdeen  (probably  aimed  at  Albert 
Thomas);  in  a  few  hours  the  flotilla  of  trawlers  would 
have  picked  up  those  mines  and  then  we  should  be 
able  to  resume  our  journey.  Towards  evening  we  did 
arrive  safe  and  sound  in  Aberdeen,  and  I  immediately 
took  the  train  to  London. 

When  I  arrived  in  Paris  two  days  later,  I  heard  the 
news  of  the  Russian  offensive  in  Galicia,  an  offensive 
due  to  Kerensky's  eloquence.  There  had  been  some 
brilliant  successes,  strong  enemy  positions  had  been 
taken,  etc.  All  the  Russians  who  were  in  Paris  were  in 
a  high  state  of  jubilation  :  at  last  one  could  look  the 
Allies  in  the  face  without  any  bitter  feeling  of  shame ! 
Moreover,  this  was  but  the  beginning;  fighting  was 
starting  again  on  the  Russian  front,  and  our  soldiers  had 
shaken  off  their  torpor. 

That  was  the  opinion  of  the  moment.  Two  or  three 
weeks  later  the  whole  truth  was  known  in  Paris :  the 
June  attack  had  been  due  solely  to  the  devotion  of  a  few 
battalions  of  officers  and  to  the  women's  battalion.  After 
losing  more  than  half  of  their  numbers,  these  enthusiasts 
of  duty  and  patriotism  had  succeeded  in  taking  strong 
enemy  positions,  but  no  help  came  to  them  from  the 
soldiers,  who  watched  the  attack  with  arms  crossed  and 
sneering  expressions,  when  they  were  not  shooting  the 
officers  and  heroic  women  in  the  back  ! 

But,  I  repeat,  this  ghastly  truth  was  only  known  a 
fortnight  later.  Hence  1  left  Paris  in  splendid  spirits, 
and  after  a  normal  journey  of  thirty-six  hours  I  arrived 
in  Madrid  very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  June. 

Two  days  after  my  arrival,  my  formal  reception  by 
the  King  took  place. 

This    is    the    third    time    in    the    course    of  these 


I9I7]  STATELY  CEREMONIALS  501 

Reminiscences  tliat  I  have  had  to  describe  an  audience 
of  reception.  This  may  perchance  astonish  the  reader ; 
but  who  knows  whether  in  the  near  future  some  one 
may  not  be  grateful  to  me  for  having  recounted  these 
Court  ceremonies — ceremonies  formerly  considered  so 
all-important  which  have  since  become  the  continuation 
of  a  traditional  custom,  now  only  of  interest  to  street- 
loiterers  and  Court  circles,  and  which  will  soon  fall 
completely  into  disuse  together  with  all  the  outward 
show  and  all  the  pomp  of  the  most  ancient  monarchies  ? 

Moreover,  Madrid  has  remained  the  capital  in  which 
the  solemn  audiences  of  the  Ambassadors  have  pre- 
served all  their  grandeur  and  take  place  in  a  singularly 
appropriate  setting  and  according  to  the  rites  religiously 
kept  up  since  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries. 
I  at  least  cannot  remember  any  Court  ceremony  more 
imposing  and  grander  in  its  every  detail  than  the  one 
held  for  me  on  my  arrival  in  Madrid. 

The  procession  through  the  streets  of  the  capital 
was  really  magnificent.  Each  of  the  gilded  coaches  was 
worthy  of  a  place  in  a  museum  and  in  history ;  I 
occupied  the  one  built  for  the  coronation  of  King  Joseph 
(Bonaparte),  which  was  simple  in  outline  with  the  most 
delightful  paintings  on  a  gold-lacquered  ground.  The 
harness  and  trappings  of  the  beautiful  horses  dated  from 
the  eighteenth  century;  the  liveries  of  the  postilions, 
heavily  embroidered  in  gold  and  silver  dulled  by  twenty 
decades  of  wear,  were  of  the  same  period ;  all  the  other 
liveries  have  not  changed  in  fashion  since  the  days  of 
Philip  V.  The  horses  of  the  escort,  of  Arab  breed  with 
glossy  coats,  were  all  beautiful,  and  admirably  ridden — 
Spanish  riders  are  undoubtedly  the  best  in  the  world. 

The  procession  at  last  reached  the  Royal  Palace,  the 
only  really  beautiful  and  majestic  building  in  Madrid, 
and  entered  the  great  courtyard  where  the  guard  of 
honour  was  drawn  up,  with  their  colours  hallowed  by 
warlike  memories,  to  salute  the  Ambassador.  In  the 
outer  hall  of  the  Palace  members  of  the  Royal  Court 
came  to  be  presented  to  the  Ambassador  and  to  precede 


502  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

him  up  the  magnificent  and  monumental  staircase  be- 
tween two  rows  of  halberdiers,  wearing  the  authentic 
gold-laced  costume  of  the  eighteenth  century.  To  the 
strains  of  the  National  Anthem  I  passed  through  the 
rooms  of  the  Palace,  magnificent  rooms  full  of  the  most 
beautiful  bronzes,  furniture,  brocades.  Gobelin  tapestries, 
representing  the  best  specimens  of  the  Louis  XIV.  and 
Louis  XV.  periods. 

After  a  few  minutes'  delay  I  was  shown  into  the 
presence  of  His  Majesty. 

The  Royal  throne,  on  which  His  Majesty  was  seated, 
was  approached  by  several  steps  flanked  by  four  life- 
sized  lions  in  gilded  bronze.  On  the  King's  left  stood 
the  Ministers,  the  Court,  the  Generals  and  military 
commanders  of  the  capital,  all  in  full  uniform  ;  on  his 
right  stood  the  Grandees  of  Spain.  It  was  pointed  out 
to  me  that  more  Grandees  than  usual  were  attending 
the  audience:  they  were  curious  to  see  a  "Muscovite 
revolutionary  "  being  presented  to  the  King.  They  were 
somewhat  disappointed  when  they  saw  me  appearing  in 
my  diplomatic  dress,  heavily  embroidered  in  silver,  and 
observing  all  the  traditional  precepts  and  rules  of 
etiquette ! 

After  the  usual  ceremonial  greetings  I  read  my 
speech  to  the  King,  who  listened  to  it  seated.  In  this 
speech  I  recalled  the  very  great  services  rendered  to 
humanity,  and  more  particularly  to  the  Russians,  by 
Spain  and  her  King  who  had  undertaken  the  protection 
of  our  civil  prisoners  in  enemy  countries,  the  protection 
of  military  prisoners,  and  also  the  task  of  the  possible 
alleviation  of  the  fate  of  the  victims  in  this  ghastly  war. 
As  I  was  still  labouring  under  the  impression  of  the 
good  news  received  in  Paris,  I  mentioned  with  great 
satisfaction  the  "ardent  patriotism,"  and  the  "un- 
swerving loyalty  to  alliances  "  which  constituted  one  of 
the  points  of  resemblance  between  the  Russian  popular 
soul  and  the  Spanish  one.  Alas !  how  promptly  was 
this  portion  of  my  oration  belied  by  events  ! 

My  speech  concluded,  I  handed   my   credentials  to 


I9I7]  KING  ALFONSO  XIII.  503 

the  King,  and  His  Majesty,  still  seated,  read  his  answer 
in  Spanish.  Then  he  rose,  descended  the  steps  of 
the  throne,  and  taking  me  by  the  hand,  bade  me 
welcome. 

Just  then  the  course  of  the  ceremony  was  interrupted 
by  an  unusual  pause  :  the  King  advanced  a  little  towards 
the  centre  of  the  room  so  as  to  be  able  to  speak  a  few 
words  to  me  without  any  formality,  and  said  :  "  Monsieur, 
in  your  speech  you  were  good  enough  to  allude  to  the 
help  we  have  been  able  to  render  to  your  prisoners. 
Allow  me  to  tell  you  of  the  deep  interest  I  take  in  the 
fate  of  other  'Russian  prisoners,'  I  allude  to  His 
Majesty  the  former  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  and  his  family. 
I  come  to  beg  you,  Monsieur,  to  transmit  to  your 
Government  my  fervent  prayers  for  their  liberation. " 

The  King's  words  touched  me  deeply.  "  Sir,"  I 
replied,  "will  Your  Majesty  permit  me  to  be  quite 
frank  in  my  answer  ?  " 

"  Not  only  do  I  permit,  but  I  desire  you  to  be  frank, 
Monsieur," 

"  You  see  before  you,  sir,  a  faithful  servant  of  the 
Russian  people  and  of  the  new  order  of  things  in 
Russia;  but  at  the  same  time,  by  virtue  of  all  my 
traditions,  all  my  antecedents,  the  person  of  him  who 
was  once  my  Sovereign  is  and  will  always  remain 
sacred  to  me,  without  speaking  of  the  feelings  of  personal 
gratitude  and  sympathy  which  bind  me  to  him.  If  any- 
thing on  earth  can  be  done  to  help  him  and  his,  you 
may  be  absolutely  sure  and  certain,  sir,  that  I  shall  be 
ready  to  lay  aside  my  interests,  my  career,  perhaps  even 
more.  So  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  transmit  to  my  Govern- 
ment the  words  that  Your  Majesty  has  just  spoken. 
But  I  would  beg  you  to  consider  one  thing  most  care- 
fully :  I  know  for  certain  that  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment has  but  one  wish  and  that  is  to  allow  the  Emperor 
and  his  famil}'  to  leave  for  foreign  parts  ;  if  it  does  not 
do  so,  it  is  on  account  of  the  extreme  elements.  Now, 
any  official  intercession  coming  from  abroad  would  not 
fail  to  excite  these  extreme  elements,  and  the  agitation 


504  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

which  would  ensue  would  only  harm  the  unfortunate 
exiles  of  Tobolsk." 

The  King  thought  for  a  minute.  "  But  tell  me, 
Monsieur,  something  that  I  do  not  quite  understand. 
IVho  is  really  at  the  head  of  the  Russian  Government  at  this 
moment  ?  " 

"Sir,  I  have  just  handed  my  credentials  to  Your 
Majesty ;  these  credentials  are  signed  by  the  President 
of  the  Council,  Prince  Lvoff,  and  countersigned  by  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs." 

"Then  it  is  Prince  Lvoff?  I  am  told  he  is  a  good 
and  honourable  man.  Very  well  then,  Monsieur,  please 
write  from  me  to  Prince  Lvoff  to  say  how  interested 
I  am  in  the  fate  of  the  Emperor  Nicolas  II.  and  his 
family,  and  that  I  should  be  intensely  happy  to  know 
they  were  in  complete  safety ! " 

"  I  will  do  so  to-morrow,  sir,  in  a  private  letter 
addressed  to  the  Prince." 

"  Yes,  yes,  please  do  so." 

The  King's  words  and  his  expression  denoted  so 
much  frankness,  so  much  nobleness  that  I  at  once  felt 
his  charm.  Moreover,  what  he  had  said  stirred  me 
deeply.  The  ceremony  then  concluded  by  the  pre- 
sentation of  my  suite  to  the  King.  On  which  His 
Majesty  withdrew  with  great  pomp.^ 

After  the  usual  presentations  and  a  few  minutes' 
waiting  in  another  room,  I  was  conducted  first  to  Her 
Majesty  Queen  Victoria,  and  then  to  Her  Majesty  the 
Queen-Mother  Marie  Christina. 

One  could  not  imagine  a  more  graceful  picture  than 
the  one  that  met  my  eyes  when  I  entered  the  audience- 
room  of  the  young  Queen.  Slim,  very  beautiful  (her 
photographs  do  not  show  the  great  charm  of  her  features), 
very  fair,  wearing  a  lovely  white  dress  which  still 
further  enhanced  her  beauty,  the  Queen  was  standing 

*  Alas  !  no  one  knew  exactly  ! 

-  Up  to  now  I  do  not  know  if  other  Sovereigns,  other  Governments- 
allied  or  neutral — have  ever  taken  any  similar  steps  in  favour  of  the 
unfortunate  Nicolas  II.  and  his  family. 


I9I7]  TWO  QUEENS  505 

up  surrounded  by  the  ladies  of  her  suite.  Her  Majesty's 
smile  and  her  gracious  welcome  did  but  confirm  my  first 
impression — that  of  being  face  to  face  with  some  one 
endued  with  transcendent  qualities,  moral  as  well  as 
physical. 

When  one  approaches  the  Queen-Mother,  Marie 
Christina,  who  was  Regent  of  the  Kingdom  for  many 
years,  one  at  once  receives  the  impression  of  a  person 
inured  to  supreme  power,  to  duty,  to  tribulation,  to  the 
claims  and  subtleties  of  politics.  Above  all  she  is 
grande  dame  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  term.  A  long 
line  of  ancestors  seem  to  rise  behind  her  image,  august 
personages  draped  in  the  imperial  purple,  heroes  of 
great  triumphs  or  of  great  trials  which  formerly  cast  their 
shadow  or  shed  their  lustre  over  the  whole  of  Europe. 
Often  the  vital  powers  of  a  race  are  not  equal  to  such 
exalted  destinies,  such  heavy  tasks  ;  the  descendants 
suffer  from  atrophy,  turn  into  idols  or  marionettes. 
But  sometimes  in  one  of  the  branches  of  the  ancient 
family  a  curious  atavism  revives  the  old  vitality,  the 
old  virtues.  When  one  is  in  the  presence  of  Queen 
Marie  Christina,  who  for  over  twenty  years  and  under 
the  most  difficult  circumstances  succeeded  in  governing 
Spain  and  consolidating  her  son's  throne,  one  naturally 
calls  up  the  historic  images  of  her  great-grandfather  the 
Archduke  Charles — the  sole  adversary  worthy  of  oppos- 
ing Bonaparte's  military  genius;  then  the  Archduke 
Albert,  an  admirable  army  leader  who  covered  himself 
with  glory  in  1866;  both  of  them  having  left,  besides 
their  military  fame,  the  memory  of  great  nobility  of 
character,  intelligence  and  enlightened  passion  for  art. 

The  Queen-Mother's  conversation  is  imbued  with 
frankness  and  intellectual  charm.  One  feels  at  once  that 
she  has  seen  much,  worked  much,  and  thought  much. 
As  during  the  disastrous  war  which  has  just  desolated 
the  world,  Austria-Hungary  has  been  the  loyal  and 
absolutely  inalienable  friend  of  Germany,  current  opinion 
has  ascribed  Germanophile  sympathies  to  Queen  Marie 
Christina.     Nothing  is  more  unfair  :  the  Queen,  by  her 


506  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

whole  nature  and  all  her  traditions,  belongs  to  the 
proud  Imperial  line  which  looked  on  the  Hohenzollerns 
as  parvenus,  as  born  foes  who  could  not,  and  should  not 
be  trusted.  It  was  when  these  historic  traditions 
were  abjured  at  Schoenbrunn,  when  Austria-Hungary 
definitely  gave  herself  into  Berlin's  keeping,  that  the 
death-warrant  of  her  Empire  was  signed !  But  in 
Austria  herself  and  in  the  Imperial  family  many  people 
still  adhered  to  the  ancient  traditions  and  had  foreseen 
the  misfortunes  inseparable  from  the  new  state  of  affairs. 
I  think  I  am  right  in  numbering  Marie  Christina  amongst 
these. 


When  I  returned  home  in  the  same  coach  and  sur- 
rounded by  the  same  pomp,  all  the  usual  ceremonies 
were  not  over.     A  few  minutes  later,  accompanied  by 
the  cordial   and  friendly  M.  de   Heredia,  whose   duty 
it  is  to  introduce  ambassadors,  I  got  into  another  coach, 
rather  less  gilded  and  with   no  escort  this   time,  and 
drove  to  the  palace  of  the   Gobernacioii  (Government), 
where  the  President  of  the  Council,  M.  Dato,  and  the 
Minister  for   Foreign  Affairs,   the   Marquis   de   Lema, 
awaited  me.    In  the  courtyard  of  the  palace  a  company 
of  the  famous  Gnardia  Civil ^  was  drawn  up  to  salute  me. 
In   the  great   reception-room   the  two  Ministers  who, 
like  me,  were  still  in  Court  dress,  greeted  me  with  the 
customary  civilities.    As  a  rule  during  this  ceremonious 
visit   only   the  merest    commonplaces   are  exchanged. 
On  this  occasion  I  thought  it  necessary  to  recapitulate 
to  the  two  Ministers  the  conversation  I  had  just  had 
with   the   King,  as   although   they  were  aware  of  the 
subject  of  it  they  could  only  partially  have  followed  it. 
I  explained  quite  frankly  the  position  of  the  Russian 
Government,  as  I  understood  it,  and  added  that  in  the 
interests    of   the   unfortunate    Royal    captives    it  was 

1  The  Guardia  Civil  is  undeniably  the  best  organised  gendarmerie  of 
Europe  ;  it  has  an  unblemished  reputation,  and  the  Spanish  people 
appreciate  and  esteem  it. 


.917]  SAD    REFLECTIONS  507 

imperative  to  mention  them  as  little  as  possible.  "So 
long  as  the  present  Government,  including  M.  Kerensky, 
is  in  power,  one  can  feel  assured  as  to  the  fate  of 
Nicolas  II.  and  his  family.  Heaven  forefend  that  all  the 
power  should  pass  to  the  Soviets  !  then  one  could  answer 
for  nothing ;  but  even  so  all  intercession  would  only  be 
fatal ! " 

The  two  gentlemen  were  sincerely  grateful  for  the 
complete  frankness  of  my  explanations ;  from  that  hour 
relations  of  sympathy  and  perfect  confidence  were 
established  between  us,  relations  of  which  I  allow 
myself  to  be  proud,  for  M.  Dato  and  the  Marquis  de 
Lema  can  rightly  be  considered  the  most  esteemed 
politicians  of  Spain — esteemed  even  by  their  opponents. 
A  quarter  of  an  hour  after  I  had  got  home,  I  received 
a  visit  from  the  same  two  Ministers — still  in  full  dress. 
Then  nimc  dimittis:  I  was  at  last  free  to  discard  my 
official  finery,  so  particularly  oppressive  on  these 
Madrid  dog-days,  and  to  rest. 

But  when  I  found  myself  alone  in  my  room,  with  the 
blinds  carefully  drawn  down,  I  was  struck  by  the  tragic 
contrast  between  what  I  had  just  seen  and  what  had 
just  been  said  to  me  so  nobly  and  humanely  by  King 
Alfonso  XI 11.  Over  there,  at  the  far  end  of  Europe, 
also  magnificent  palaces  stood  in  a  setting  of  power 
and  glory,  and  pompous  and  imposing  ceremonies  were 
held  of  which  the  centre  of  attraction  was  an  Imperial 
couple  surrounded  by  four  enchanting  princesses  and  a 
delicate  and  attractive  boy.  This  was  but  yesterday  .  .  . 
and  to-day  this  family,  before  whom  all  bowed  low,  who 
saw  no  one  and  nought  save  in  brilliant  array  and  in  the 
attitude  of  obedience — this  same  family  was  languishing 
in  the  solitude  of  distant  exile  in  some  mean  and 
common  dwelling,  and,  v/hat  is  far  worse,  exposed  to 
the  continual  supervision  and  the  insults  of  brutal  and 
dirty  keepers.  .  .  .  The  Royal  family  in  the  prison  of 
the  Temple;  the  two  children  of  Edward  V.  listening 
with  anguish  for  the  footsteps  of  the  assassins  on  the 
staircase  of  the  Tower  ;  the  wretched  John  Antonovitch 


5o8  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.xxv. 

in  his  prison  at  Schlusselburg^  ...  all  these  pictures, 
familiar  to  me  from  my  infancy,  and  so  many  more  besides, 
were  conjured  up  before  my  mental  vision,  ever  forming 
that  tragic  and  bitter  contrast  between  supreme  pomp 
and  supreme  misery,  of  the  innocent  paying  the  debt  of 
blood  of  the  guilty ;  a  state  of  things  so  terribly  over- 
whelming and  cruel,  unless  one  accepts,  in  deep  humility, 
the  idea  of  a  single  Will  who  rules  worlds  as  He  rules 
each  of  us,  and  who  at  the  appointed  hour  endues  us 
with  His  Spirit  and  His  Strength  to  endure  all,  to 
understand  all. 

The  very  next  day  I  sent  off  a  private  and  confidential 
letter  to  Prince  Lvoff,  thus  discharging  the  commission 
entrusted  to  me  by  the  King.  I  never  received  any 
answer.  Soon  after  my  letter  reached  Petrograd, 
Prince  Lvoff  disappeared  discreetly  from  the  scene,  as 
the  Duma  had  disappeared,  as  Rodzianko  and  the 
other  "  high  commissioners  "  had  disappeared,  leaving 
the  whole  quasi-dictatorial  power  to  Kerensky — 
President  of  the  Council,  then  Commander-in-Chief, 
then  President  of  the  Republic  which  he  had  proclaimed 
unaided,  but  first  and  foremost  the  plaything  of  the 
omnipotent  Soviets  ! 

'  Great-grandson  of  the  Tsar  John  V.  (the  weak-minded  brother  and 
co-regent  of  Peter  the  Great),  John  VI.  Antonovitch  came  to  the  throne 
at  the  age  of  six  months^  in  succession  to  his  great-aunt  the  cruel  and 
cynical  Anne  Joannovna.  A  few  months  later  he  was  dethroned  by 
Elisabeth  Petrovna,  torn  from  his  family  and  confined  in  the  strictest 
seclusion.  Having  reached  the  age  of  twenty-three,  without  ever  having 
seen  anything  but  his  gloomy  priso?t  walls,  w'lthowi  ever  experiencing  in 
his  infancy  the  endearments  or  the  care  of  a  woman,  he  was  killed  by  his 
gaolers  just  when  a  young  adventurer  was  striving  to  free  him  in  order 
to  proclaim  him  Emperor  (1764).  A  sadder  story  has  rarely  been 
recorded  in  history  ! 

Those  who  are  inclined  to  believe  in  Divine  vengeance  extending 
— according  to  the  Jews — down  to  the  seventh  generatio7i,  might  extract 
an  argument  in  support  of  their  thesis  from  the  fact  that  the  Emperor 
Nicolas  II.  represented  the  seventh  generation  starting  from  the  Empress 
Elisabeth  Petrovna,  and  the  little  Tsarevitch  Alexis  the  seventh  generation 
starting  from  Catherine  II.,  in  the  second  year  of  whose  reign  the  un- 
fortunate John  Antonovitch  perished  in  such  a  ghastly  manner. 


1917]  MY  COLLEAGUES  509 

The  Court  left  Madrid  for  La-Granja  immediately 
after  my  reception.  I  stayed  in  town  for  another  three 
weeks  in  order  to  become  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
the  duties  (as  few  in  number  as  they  were  simple)  of  my 
new  post  and  with  my  colleagues,  I  mean  more  especi- 
ally my  allied  colleagues.  France's  Ambassador  was 
M.  Geoffray,  a  very  distinguished  and  clever  man,  who, 
during  a  period  of  extreme  difficulty  for  the  representa- 
tion of  the  Republic  in  Spain,  managed  to  uphold  the 
French  flag  while  not  offending  Spanish  susceptibilities, 
which  the  Germans  would  have  been  ready  to  enflame 
at  any  favourable  opportunity.  Great  Britain's  Ambas- 
sador, Sir  Arthur  Hardinge,  had  been  a  colleague  of 
mine  in  Constantinople,  where  we  had  both  been 
Secretaries  to  the  Embassies ;  he  had  an  original  and 
quick  mind,  so  that  my  association  with  him  was  as 
pleasant  as  it  was  useful.  At  San  Sebastian  I  became 
very  intimate  with  my  Italian  colleague.  Count  Bonin- 
Longare,  a  true  diplomat,  whose  great  tact  and  broad 
views  I  have  always  admired.  Mr.  Willard,  United 
States  Ambassador,  with  his  sound,  upright  and  serious 
mind,  completed  the  quartette  of  my  congenial  colleagues. 
All  these  colleagues  hesitated  to  start  for  the  summer 
season  at  San  Sebastian,  for  revolutionary  movements 
were  expected  in  Barcelona,  Bilbao  and  even  Madrid, 
and  so  the  Government  remained  in  the  capital.  But  at 
last  we  had  to  flee  from  the  terrific  heat  of  Castile, 
quite  torrid  in  summer,  and  to  go  to  San  Sebastian 
about  the  20th  July.  And  a  few  weeks  later,  when 
the  Court  and  the  Government  were  in  Santander  and 
the  Diplomatic  Corps  at  San  Sebastian,  the  dreaded 
disorders  did  indeed  break  out.  Dato's  Government 
opposed  a  bold  front,  displayed  much  energy,  but  did 
not  resort  to  useless  reprisals,  so  that  order  was  soon 
restored,  except  in  Catalonia,  where  political  unrest  has 
become  chronic. 

But  I  will  refrain  from  formulating  judgments  on 
the  political  situation  of  a  country  to  which  I  paid  but 
a  fleeting  visit. 


510  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

I  went  from  Madrid  to  San  Sebastian  by  motor-car, 
and  the  country  I  passed  tiirough  left  a  deep  impression 
in  my  mind,  particularly  the  beautiful  old  town  of  Burgos 
with  its  splendid  cathedral,  and  the  ever  vivid  memories 
of  the  Cid.  The  corn  was  already  ripe  all  over  Old 
Castile ;  the  Basque  country  with  its  green  mountains, 
its  beautiful  groves  of  chestnut  trees,  its  large  square 
farms  surrounded  by  orchards,  its  magnificent  roads,  was 
most  restful  to  the  eye  after  the  sad  but  grand  aridity 
of  the  interior  of  the  country.  The  population  seemed 
to  me  to  be  dignified,  sober,  polite,  as  undaunted  in  work 
as  they  have  always  been  in  the  fight.  It  is  quite  usual 
to  describe  Spain  as  a  backward  country  and  her  popu- 
lation as  wretched.  In  any  case  this  does  not  strike  one 
at  first  sight.  But  well-informed  persons  have  explained 
to  me  the  difficult  position  of  the  Spanish  people — of 
the  peasants  and  workmen — due  to  the  very  small 
revenue  from  their  properties,  and  the  low  wages  paid 
for  labour ;  this  state  of  things  is  mainly  owing  to 
Spain's  difficulty  in  competing — as  regards  produc- 
tion—with the  other  European  countries  and  particu- 
larly with  America.  Centuries  had  been  wasted 
for  the  industrial  and  economic  organisation  of  the 
country :  Spain  is  behindhand  with  her  neighbours 
and  hence  in  an  inferior  position  in  the  general  com- 
petition. 

Moreover,  for  centuries  the  Spanish  nation  has 
chiefly  produced  devotion,  heroism,  moderation ;  a  time 
came  when  these  "  commodities  "  were  no  longer  market- 
able, because  the  preference  of  the  European  public  had 
been  given  to  great  industrial  effort,  and  to  the  rapid 
increase  of  material  needs.  The  events  which  have  just 
occurred  have  caused  many  long  forgotten  things  to 
become  fashionable  again,  and  will  force  the  entire 
world — if  it  does  not  wish  its  civilisation  to  perish  in 
terrible  convulsions— to  moderate  the  appetites  of  the 
few  and  the  many,  to  simplify  and  restrain  their  needs. 
This  evolution  will  be  advantageous  to  the  Spanish 
people    if  they   are    capable   of   preserving    their  old 


I9I7]        GRIEVOUS  NEWS   FROM   RUSSIA        511 

traditions,  their  old  virtues :  that  is  my  fervent  wish  for 
them. 

Meanwhile  the  news  arriving  from  Russia  was  be- 
coming worse  daily.  As  I  said  above,  the  famous 
offensive  in  Galicia  had  only  served  to  emphasise  the 
utter  demoralisation  of  the  Russian  soldier  ;  very  soon 
the  results  became  brutally  apparent :  the  Austro- 
German  Army  having  merely  planned  an  attacking  move- 
ment— at  once  there  was  a  general  disbandment  on  the 
whole  Russian  front ;  entire  divisions,  especially  those 
being  held  in  reserve,  began  to  flee,  dragging  their 
officers  with  them  by  force,  killing  those  who  tried  to 
stop  them  at  all  costs,  carrying  off  guns,  in  order  to 
resell  them  to  the  Germans  later  on.  Horrible  pogrom 
scenes,  the  victims  being  the  Galician  populations,  Jews 
of  the  large  villages  and  the  towns.  Orthodox  peasants 
of  the  villages  without  discrimination,  took  place  along 
the  line  of  retreat  of  the  "revolutionary  army."  The 
massacres  of  Kalusz  have,  alas  !  remained  famous. 

And  to  this  final  demoralisation  of  the  Army  cor- 
responded the  growing  dissolution  of  the  country.  A 
Ukrainian  rada  (assembly)  convened  by  no  one  and  of 
which  the  members  had  not  been  elected  by  any  one, 
assembled  at  Kieffand  set  itself  up  as  the  autonomous 
Government  of  the  whole  of  South  Russia ;  in  the 
country  the  peasants  took  possession  of  the  large  and 
medium-sized  properties  and  divided  the  land  and 
all  the  accessories  between  them  without  waiting  for 
any  legislative  sanction  and  without  heeding  the  local 
administration,  which  yet  had  been  elected  by  the 
people  themselves.  At  the  head  of  the  State  the  des- 
potism of  the  extreme  parties  worked  the  most  radical 
changes  without  awaiting  the  decisions  of  the  famous 
"  Constituent,"  which  nevertheless  was  on  every  one's 
lips.  Kerensky  first  became  Generalissimo  on  his  own 
authority ;  finally,  to  crown  everything,  he  and  four  of 
his  colleagues — a  kind  of  Council  of  Five — on  their  own 
authority  and  their  own  initiative  proclaimed  the  Republic, 


512  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

of  which  the  Generalissimo  naturally  became  the  Presi- 
dent. This  was  announced  throughout  the  country  by 
means  of  Government  circulars  and  posters,  whereas 
Russian  representatives  abroad  received  instructions  to 
defer  the  notification  of  this  important  change  to  the 
Governments  to  which  they  were  accredited ! 

On  two  occasions  during  the  summer  of  1917  circum- 
stances appeared  to  furnish  Kerensky  and  his  collabo- 
rators with  the  opportunity  and  the  means  for  restoring 
a  certain  amount  of  authority  to  the  Government  and 
for  confounding  the  propaganda,  more  brazen  day  by 
day,  of  the  Lenins  and  the  Trotskys.  The  first  of  these 
occasions  was  when  the  Bolsheviks  raised  their  shields 
and  resorted  to  violence  with  the  help  of  a  few  regiments 
of  the  Red  Guard  and  the  sailors  from  Cronstadt.  This 
pronunciamento  failed  lamentably  although  the  Govern- 
ment was  only  supported  by  a  few  hundreds  of  loyal 
soldiers  and  by  the  officers  present  in  the  capital,  who 
performed  feats  of  valour  and  energy.  The  Bolsheviks 
were  ignominiously  defeated  and  had  to  give  in.  It 
would  seem  as  if  after  that  the  Government  ought  to 
have  proceeded  to  arrest  the  Bolshevist  leaders  and  to 
break  up  the  greater  part  of  the  battalions  of  the  Red 
Guard,  the  ones  that  had  mutinied  in  any  case.  But 
Kerensky  did  nothing  of  the  kind.  Fearing  a  "counter- 
revolution "  he  did  not  wish  to  deprive  himself  of  the 
Soviet  and  the  Red  Guard,  which  he  still  hoped  to 
domesticate. 

The  second  occasion  was  when  the  members  of  the 
four  consecutive  Dumas  which  had  sat  in  Russia  since 
1906  and  up  to  1917,  held  a  meeting  in  Moscow.  Every 
one  thought  that  the  object  of  this  meeting  was  to 
reconstitute  a  provisional  assembly  composed  of  dele- 
gates of  all  parties  and  which  would  have  acted  until 
the  election  and  the  convocation  of  the  great  Constituent. 
But  the  sole  results  were  some  speeches  by  Kerensky,  a 
few  triumphal  processions  at  the  head  of  which  the 
Dictator-Generalissimo  marched  round  "  his  good  town 
of  Moscow,  "  and  a  few  solemn  sittings  in  the  Opera- 


I9I7]  MY   DIFFICULT   POSITION  513 

house  of  the  town.  Nothing  whatever  resulted  from 
these  sittings ;  and  as  to  the  fourth  Duma — the  one  for 
the  defence  of  which  the  people  had  so  to  speak  taken 
up  arms — it  was  simply  dissolved  by  a  governmental 
decree — a  decree  of  which  no  one  took  the  trouble  to 
inform  the  Russian  representatives  abroad.  I  at  least 
only  heard  of  this  dissolution  very  much  later. 

As  I  continued  to  receive  more  and  more  grievous 
news  I  began  to  wonder  whether  I  was  entitled  to  keep 
my  post  as  Ambassador,  in  view  of  the  radical  meta- 
morphoses undergone  by  the  Provisional  Government. 
When  1  had  sent  in  my  adherence  to  this  Government  in 
March  it  was  mainly  composed  of  men  whom  I  con- 
sidered respectable  and  suitable.  The  abdication  of  the 
Emperor — except  as  concerned  the  rights  of  the  little 
heir  to  the  throne — had  taken  place  in  a  regular  and 
legal  manner  ;  the  subsequent  act  of  the  selected  heir, 
the  Grand-Duke  Michael  Alexandrovitch,  referred  the 
question  of  the  succession  and  that  of  the  definite  form  of 
the  Government  of  the  Empire  to  the  decisions  of  the 
future  Constituent.  Speaking  theoretically  and  generally, 
I  had  no  objection  to  the  establishing  of  a  great  and 
sound  Republic  in  Russia ;  but  it  was  only  the  country 
itself — through  a  Constituent  Assembly  regularly  and 
calmly  elected — which  had  the  right  to  proclaim  such  a 
tremendous  change;  hence  the  decision  of  M.  Kerensky 
and  his  four  colleagues  was  stamped  with  flagrant 
illegality  in  my  eyes. 

Finally,  at  the  head  of  the  Government — instead  of 
Prince  Lvoff,  President  of  the  Council,  originally  ap- 
pointed by  the  Emperor,  and  of  M.  Rodzianko,  President 
of  the  Duma— there  was  a  Dictator  with  no  mandate, 
belonging  to  an  extreme  party,  surrounded  by  other 
protagonists  of  extreme  parties,  who  laboured  to  secure 
to  these  parties  a  crushing  majority  in  the  future  Con- 
stituent, and  meantime  the  support  of  an  armed  force 
which  had  lost  all  notion  of  discipline.  To  remain  in  the 
service  of  the  State  under  such  conditions  was,  especially 
for   an   Ambassador,  to   lend  one's  name  to  a  state  of 


514  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

affairs  which   was  absolutely   illegal   and   fatal   to   the 
country. 

Of  course  there  was  an  opinion  prevailing  that  honest, 
reasonable  and  expert  men  should  remain  all  the  same 
in  the  service  of  Russia  in  order  to  save  whatever  could 
be  saved ;  should  not  give  up  their  places  to  dangerous 
quacks  and  reserve  themselves — at  their  posts — for  the 
future.  This  opinion  was  justifiable;  only  in  order  to 
profess  it,  it  was  necessary  to  believe  firmly  that  matters 
might  still  be  arranged  and  relative  order  restored  in 
the  country.  That  is  what  I  aspired  to  do,  but  each 
day  I  lost  another  shred  of  hope. 

Towards  the  end  of  August  I  went  from  San 
Sebastian  to  Paris  on  private  business.  I  stayed  there 
ten  days.  My  impressions  were  truly  depressing.  Paris 
was  full  of  Russians,  all  official  personages,  charged 
with  some  mission  or  other,  having  work  to  do  either  at 
the  front,  or  with  the  Red  Cross,  or  on  some  financial  or 
economic  commission — in  short  drawing  salaries  from 
the  Russian  Exchequer  and  receiving  emoluments  on 
credit  still  granted  to  Russia  by  allied  France.  Among 
these  compatriots  I  noticed  some  metamorphoses  which 
would  have  made  the  fortune  of  a  Vauvenargues  and 
delighted  a  Pailleron  or  a  de  Flers.  A  young  but 
pompous  official  who  owed  his  early  career  to  the 
special  protection  of  the  Empress  Alexandra  and  the 
Vyrubova,  now  held  himself  carefully  and  earnestly 
aloof  from  people  whose  orthodoxy  in  Socialist  and 
revolutionary  matters  might  be  open  to  suspicion. 
Another  gentleman — plausible  but  rather  too  clever  at 
times — whom  I  had  overheard  a  few  years  ago  relating 
how  he  had  gone  down  on  his  knees  in  front  of  the 
little  Tsarevitch  so  that  the  delightful  child  could  play 
more  easily  with  his  decorations,  now  aired  the  views 
of  a  Brutus  and  was  always  in  the  company  of  those 
beloved  and  worthy  Russian  revolutionaries  come  back 
as  masters  to  that  same  Paris  where  they  had  formerly 
lived  as  poor  exiles.  The  beaming  and  radiant  smiles 
which  had  formerly  broken  out  at  the  mere  sight  of  a 


'^'■>J  I  GO  TO  PARIS  5,5 

dtcreetl/wTrt'h'''^'l'',  '^''''''  "'^  S'-^^^f"'  "ows,  the 
former  c^nvir^^  handshakes  were  now  all  bestowed  on 

and  the  ffvot  If  h    '  '""-P  '  '°"8'''  '^^  ^PP^obation 
visional  r°  "    'P^"^'  commissaries"  of  the  Pro- 

e    Zled  InT'"'  '"^  °^  "^^  ^""'^'^  ^ho  were  being 
them  elves  ofTuJ^^/rl'"  'V^""'  '^"^  ^°"'''  ^°"vincf 

Tar^s  ;r'S^^.^Ss  °  p- p"^'  and  so  :;:„! 

^^j  4.  J-nese      commissaries"    were    somefimpc 

anairs    but  there  were  also  some  curious   soecimen, 
rme~^t/T°T  "'  ^vatikoff  who^wr^^aS 
who   caused    al        j"'"-^'"^    ""'™i'^d    mandates, 

takinJof  R,V  '"  ^"1'  ^'''"  "'^  "^"^   -■"'■"ived  of  the 

h»j;     f  ^        ^"     '^^^'■y  minute  one  might  exoectTn 
hear    of   an    overwhelming    advance    hv   thl^P 
arm  es  on  Petroe-rad      u        aavance    by  the    German 
advpr«r;l        ^  .      "'^^  "°'  yet  known  that  our 

-that  of'l%rf'  contnving  a  very  different  conclusL 
rabbtl  "''^"'  """^'^  ^S'"^^'^  '°  "y  the  Bolshevis" 

declstrtn^  M  "h""^"   d^-  ^^P^^'^^^  from  Paris  my  pre- 
can   on   n^"  "^'  ^"""^  -'°hn  Kudascheff,  came   to 

what   waTeoL"''  ^°'''-      ^^   '^"^^^   mournfully   of 
What   was  going  on  ,n  our  country.     "  No,"  I  said  in 


2    L 


5i6  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

conclusion,  "  I  cannot  bear  it  any  longer,  I  shall  go,  I 
shall  leave  the  service  !  "  My  colleague  tried  to  dissuade 
me,  but  I  repeated  that  I  was  at  the  end  of  my  tether. 

A  few  days  after  my  return  to  San  Sebastian  the 
details  of  the  surrender  of  Riga  and  the  Island  of 
Moon  to  the  Germans  appeared  in  the  newspapers  :  the 
soldiers  had  bound  their  officers  with  ropes  and  given 
them  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy ;  other  heartrending 
news,  from  different  parts  of  Russia,  came  to  add  them- 
selves to  these  revolting  details.  It  was  obvious  to  me 
that  in  less  than  two  months  we  should  have  no  more 
power  and  should  not  even  exist  as  a  constituted 
State,  that  in  consequence  we  should  no  longer  exist 
for  the  Alliance.  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  impart 
this  gloomy  view  to  my  allied  colleagues,  who — if  I  am 
not  wrong — did  not  conceal  it  from  their  respective 
Governments. 

Personally  what  had  I  still  to  expect?  From  the 
very  beginning  of  the  Revolution  I  had  sacrificed  many 
habits  and  points  of  view— "many  prejudices"  let  us 
say — which  up  till  then  had  accompanied  me  in  my 
intellectual  existence  and  throughout  my  long  career ; 
then  later  I  had  consented  to  recognise  as  directors  of 
Russian  politics  men  whose  ideas  were  completely 
foreign  to  me  and  which  seemed  to  be  pernicious  for 
my  country  ;  I  am  speaking  of  M.  Kerensky  and  of  the 
extreme  revolutionary  Socialists  who  surrounded  him  ; 
I  received  orders  from  these  men  and  I  almost  en- 
deavoured to  put  myself  on  their  level.  In  the  name  of 
who  or  what  ought  I  to  continue  to  make  this  sacrifice 
of  my  dignity,  my  past,  my  most  cherished  convictions? 
In  the  name  of  your  countr}^  I  was  answered.  But 
Russia — I  could  see  it  clearly — could  no  longer  be  held 
back  on  the  slope  of  treachery  and  dissolution  on  which 
she  was  descending  lower  and  lower.  Besides  what 
could  I  do  in  Madrid  to  help  the  good  cause  and  fight 
the  bad?  My  position  there  was  becoming  an  otiuin 
cum  indignitate  which  I  could  not  and  should  not  endure. 


I9I7]  I  RESIGN  5^7 

Since  my  return  to  San  Sebastian  I  had  set  myself 
to  draw  up  the  telegram  which  I  should  send  to  M. 
Kerensky  as  soon  as  I  had  definitely  decided  to  leave 
the  service.  After  several  erasures  I  settled  on  the  word- 
ing, and  on  the  loth  and  nth  September,  I  imparted 
my  decision  to  my  colleagues  of  France  and  Italy,  with 
whom  I  was  living  in  proximity  and  intimacy  at  the 
Hotel  Marie-Christina.  They  both  pressed  me  to 
give  up  my  plan.  The  day  before  the  news  of  the 
taking  up  of  arms  by  General  Korniloff  had  appeared  in 
the  papers  ;  my  good  colleagues  wished  to  extract  from 
this  some  arguments  to  combat  my  decision  by  the 
hope  of  an  early  change  in  Russia  which  might  alter  the 
aspect  of  things.  I  replied  that  I  did  not  share  their 
hope ;  that  Korniloff's  attempt  had  come  too  late,  that  it 
would  not  succeed,  and  that  this  failure  would  bring 
about  a  still  further  dissolution  of  my  unhappy  country. 
On  the  morning  of  the  12th  September,  I  sent  off  the 
following  telegram  in  Russian  and  in  plain  language  to 
M.  Kerensky  : 

"The  latest  events  have  proved  that  the  Provisional 
Government,  as  at  present  constituted,  does  not  corre- 
spond either  to  legality  or  to  the  exceptional  circum- 
stances of  the  terrible  epoch  we  are  passing  through.  The 
Duma  has  been  virtually  abolished  ;  by  whom  no  one 
knows.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  of  the  deputies, 
soldiers  and  workmen,  of  an  absolutely  despotic  nature, 
acts  side  by  side  with  the  Government,  and  the  Govern- 
ment humbles  itself  before  it. 

"This  illegal  state  of  things  is  the  cause  of:  the 
shameful  flight  of  the  Rusian  soldiers  before  the  enemy, 
the  impunity  of  the  most  bare-faced  and  brutal  crimes, 
the  open  propaganda  of  treachery  to  the  country  and  to 
the  Allies,  the  destruction  of  all  the  vital  functions  of 
the  country,  the  threatened  dismemberment  of  the  sacred 
body  of  the  Russian  nation. 

"  I  have  long  awaited  some  bright  spot,  some  more 
favourable  turn  of  affairs,  but  all  my  hopes  have  been 
vain.     The  shame  and  the  misfortunes  of  Russia  only 


Si8  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.  xxv. 

grow  and  become  worse,  and  the  Government  is  power- 
less to  remedy  them,  for  it  personifies  the  tyranny  of 
an  extreme  party  and  only  pursues  the  ends  of  that 
party. 

"  Under  the  circumstances  I  consider  it  my  duty  as 
an  honest  man  to  tell  you  this  openly,  and  my  duty  as 
a  citizen  to  give  up  all  service  to  the  State  until  such 
time  as  a  lawful  state  of  things  is  established  in  Russia, 
that  is  to  say  until  the  Soviet  is  abolished,  the  Duma 
convened  and  the  Provisional  Government  returns  to 
power  such  as  it  was  constituted  at  the  beginning. 

"  From  to-day  I  no  longer  consider  myself  as  Russian 
Ambassador  in  Spain.  I  do  not  solicit,  nor  would  I 
accept  any  pension  from  the  present  Government. 

"  My  decision  will  be  communicated  by  me  to  the 
Spanish  Government,  and  the  contents  of  this  telegram 
to  the  allied  Ambassadors.— (Signed)  Nekludoff." 

Two  days  after  the  sending  of  the  above-quoted 
telegram,  to  which  of  course  I  received  no  reply,  His 
Majesty  Alfonso  XIII.  arrived  at  San  Sebastian  from 
Santander,  and  was  kind  enough  to  grant  me  an  audience 
of  farewell.  Although  he  did  not  conceal  his  displeasure 
at  my  abrupt  decision,  the  King  deigned  to  be  much 
interested  in  me,  and  to  show  me  much  kindness.  He 
kept  me  for  some  time,  and  I  was  able  to  explain  to  him 
all  the  reasons  which  had  forced  me  to  leave  the  service. 
We  discussed  what  was  happening  in  my  unhappy 
country,  and  I  had  an  opportunity  of  noticing  the 
fairness  of  the  King's  views,  his  moderation  and  great 
cleverness.  This  last  audience,  incorporating  itself  with 
the  recollection  of  the  first,  revived  my  regret  at  re- 
signing my  appointment  to  a  Sovereign  so  eminently 
congenial  to  me. 

Queen  Marie  Christina,  with  whom  I  had  had  the 
honour  of  talking  at  some  length  not  long  before,  also 
wished  to  receive  me  before  my  departure.  This  time, 
as  on  the  first  occasion,  I  was  charmed  by  the  conversa- 
tion of  the  ex-Regent,  by  her  thorough  knowledge  of 


I9I7]        LETTER  TO  M.  TERESTCHENKO         519 

political  matters  and  of  human  nature,  as  well  as  by  her 
extreme  affability. 

In  view  of  my  sincere  sympathies  with  regard  to  M. 
Terestchenko,  whom  I  had  known  when  he  was  not 
much  more  than  a  youth  at  his  worthy  mother's  house, 
I  wrote  him  a  private  letter  under  date  of  the  23rd 
September,  in  which  I  revealed  the  whole  origin  of  my 
resolution,  and  said,  amongst  other  things,  as  follows  : 

"  It  has  been  proved  to  me  that  M.  Kerensky,  what- 
ever his  enthusiasm  and  sincerity,  is  neither  a  statesman 
nor  a  fit  man  to  govern,  but  merely  the  leader  of  a  party. 
His  whole  past  grips  him,  and  does  not  allow  him  to 
view  the  position  frankly.  And  both  he  and  you  are 
surrounded  by  men  with  whom  I  can  have  nothing  in 
common,  and  whom  I  rightly  look  on  as  enemies  of 
our  country. 

"I  see  clearly,"  I  concluded,  "that  in  yielding  one 
position  after  another,  Kerensky  and  you  are  helping, 
though  involuntarily,  to  pile  up  the  monstrous  and  in- 
appropriate erection  of  an  anarchical  Russia,  an  erection 
which  will  end  by  falling  and  by  burying  you  under  the 
ruins ! " 

This  prophecy  was  fulfilled  exactly  six  weeks  later. 
If  I  had  been  able  to  foresee,  when  writing  those  lines, 
the  base  and  treacherous  role  that  M.  Kerensky  was  to 
play  so  soon  after  over  the  taking  up  of  arms  by  Korniloff, 
I  should  never  have  spoken  of  him  in  such  indulgent 
terms,  still  less  should  I  have  bracketed  his  name  with 
the  honourable  name  of  M.  Michael  Terestchenko. 

What  occurred  immediately  after  the  winding  up  of 
Korniloffs  hazardous  enterprise  in  the  bosom  of  the 
Provisional  Government  of  Petrograd  does  not  come 
within  the  scope  of  these  Reminiscences.  But  I  am 
still  wondering  how,  under  those  very  circumstances, 
honourable  men  professing  moderate  opinions,^  could 
have  consented  to  be  in  the  Government  and  sit  next 
the  "  Dictator,"  instead  of  keeping  carefully  away  from 

^  These  were  some  young,  very  rich  and  ambitious  merchants,  an4 
big  manufacturers  of  Moscow. 


520  IN   SPAIN   AND   IN   EXILE    [chap.xxv. 

him.  If  it  was  a  combination  of  opportunism  and  the 
wish  to  bring  a  counterpoise  to  the  pranks  of  the  party 
in  power,  this  combination  failed  miserably,  for  a  month 
later  the  whole  "erection"  crumbled,  and  MM.  Lenin 
and  Trotsky  took  over  the  power  and  the  destiny  of 
unfortunate  Russia.  There  are  occasions  on  which 
opportunism  becomes  either  pusillanimity  or  lack  of 
discernment. 

When  I  sent  my  telegram  to  Kerensky  the  Counsellor 

to    our    Embassy  in  Madrid,    M.  S ff,  was  absent. 

He  was  resting  at  Biarritz,  for  prior  to  my  arrival  he 
had  been  at  the  head  of  affairs  for  a  long  time.  Having 
arrived  at  San  Sebastian  and  taken  up  his  work  with  me, 
this  gentleman,  who  was  not  lacking  in  wit  or  charm, 
but  whom  I  had  always  considered  to  be  devoid  of  real 
intelligence  and  moral  distinction,  hastened  to  telegraph 
to  the  Foreign  Office  in  Petrograd  to  say  that  he  himself 
and  the  other  members  of  the  Embassy  (there  were  three 
altogether),  thoroughly  disapproved  of  my  telegram, 
"which,  moreover,  had  been  dispatched  by  their  chief 
when  he  was  in  a  state  of  acute  neurasthenia" ;  that  they 
professed  profound  esteem  and  unlimited  devotion  for 
the  Provisional  Government  and  for  M.  Kerensky,  and 
were  entirely  at  his  disposal,  etc. 

This  proceeding,  which  I  only  heard  of  much  later, 
did  not  have  the  desired  result  for  my  ex-colleague, 
i.e.  the  renewal  of  a  long  term  of  management  at  the 
Embassy.  The  post  of  "Ambassador  of  M.  Kerensky," 
which  I  had  resigned,  very  soon  found  a  candidate  in 
the  person  of  M.  Stahovitch,  who  had  just  given  up  the 
Governorship-General  of  Finland  after  three  months  of 
earnest  but  vain  efforts  at  conciliation.  The  new  Am- 
bassador hastened  to  take  up  his  post,  and  to  leave 
Russia,  where  things  were  becoming  far  too  hot.  But 
all  the  same  he  started  too  late :  a  week  after  his  de- 
parture the  Bolsheviks  were  already  masters  of  the 
Government,  and  his  credentials,  signed  by  M.  Kerensky, 
had  no  longer  any  value.  I  do  not  exactly  know  what 
position  has  been  allotted  to  him  in  Madrid. 


I9I7]  INTO   EXILE  521 

As  to  M.  S fif,  towards  the  spring  of  1918,  when 

every  one  in  Europe  was  beginning  to  fear  or  to  anticipate 
the  final  success  of  Germany,  he  paraded  his  German 
sympathies  so  obviously,  was  so  often  seen  in  public 
with  German  diplomats,  that  he  was  at  last  made  to 
leave  his  post  and  Spain  (his  supplies  were  probably 
cut  off).  Still  less  was  he  allowed  to  reside  in  France, 
he  only  passed  through  on  his  way  to  Switzerland ; 
from  there  he  went  to  Poland — under  German  domina- 
tion at  that  time — to  endeavour  to  save  a  property  he 
owned  there.^  I  do  not  know  what  has  since  become 
of  him. 

On  the  25th  September,  1917,  I  finally  left  San 
Sebastian,  bidding  farewell  to  the  beautiful  Kingdom  of 
Spain.  I  regretfully  took  leave  of  a  few  congenial 
Spaniards  whose  acquaintance  I  had  made  during  my 
short  stay,  and  of  the  four  allied  Ambassadors  with 
whom  I  had  had  such  pleasant  intercourse,  and  I  got 
into  the  motor-car  of  another  charming  colleague,  the 
Rumanian  Minister,  M.Cretzeano,  who  was  kind  enough 
to  take  me  as  far  as  Biarritz. 

By  leaving  San  Sebastian  I  was  giving  up — not  only 
my  post — but  my  long  diplomatic  career,  commenced  in 
1 88 1.  And  I  was  not  wending  my  way  homewards— I 
was  going  into  exile  ! 

^  A   Polish  patriot's   estate   confiscated   in    1863   and   given  to   M. 
S ff's  father,  at  that  period  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Poland. 


INDEX 


Abdul-Azis,  Sultan  of  Turkey,  39 

Abdul-Hamid,  Sultan  of  Turkey,  de- 
posed, 18,  22;  reception  of  King 
Ferdinand,  116 

Aberdeen,  500 

Abo,  301 

About,  Edmund,  The  Man  with  the 
broken  Ear,  225 

Adana,  massacre  of,  22 

Adrianople,  122,  128  note,  129 ;  siege, 
116,  122,  134  ;  annexation,  130  ;  cap- 
tured by  Turks,  146,  197,  208  ;  taken 
by  Bulgarians,  154;  outbreak  of 
cholera,  155  ;  advance  of  the  Turks, 

19s 

Adriatic,  the,  129 

vEgean  Sea,  121,  123,  124,  125,  132 

Aerenthal,  M.  d',  14  ;  interview  with 
M.  Isvolsky,  19  ;  title  of  Count  con- 
ferred, 20 

Aland  Islands,  248,  348,  354,  356,  412, 
415-417  ;  neutralisation,  357 

Ali)ania,  132;  autonomy,  129,  161 

Albanians,  relations  with  Greeks,  157 

Alexander  I,,  Emperor  of  Russia,  489  ; 
policy  to  Bessarabia,  151  ;  history  of 
his  reign,  405 

Alexander  II.,  Emperor  of  Russia,  40, 
261  ;  letter  to  Prince  Alexander  of 
Battenberg,  159;  reforms,  483 

Alexander  III.,  Emperor  of  Russia,  the 
sixtetfi  quarterhigs,  258  ;  aversion  for 
Germany,  258 

Alexander  Palace,  72 

Alexandra,  Empress  of  Russia,  gift  to 
King  Ferdinand,  62  ;  under  the  in- 
fluence of  Rasputin,  67,  73,419,  435  5 
at  St.  Petersburg,  72  ;  at  Livadia, 
224  ;  indisposition,  224,  227,  230 ; 
adoration  of  Prince  Galitzyn,  396 ; 
receives  M.  Nekludoff,  402-404 ; 
change  in  her  appearance,  402 ; 
under  the  influence  of  Sturmer,  419, 
435  ;  influence  over  the  Emperor,  419, 
420  ;  receives  official  reports,  446  ; 
refuses  to  stop  the  Rasputin  scandal, 
455 ;  prisoner,  473 


Alexandrovsk,  port  of,  264  note,  344, 
See  Murmansk 

Alexieff",  General,  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  350 ;  assumes  direction  of  the 
war,  421 

Alexis,  Tsarevitch  of  Russia,  73 ;  at 
Mohilev,  421  ;  tutor,  421 

Alfonso  XIII.,  King  of  Spain,  interest 
in  the  protection  of  prisoners  of  war, 
361  ;  receives  M.  Nekludoff",  500- 
504,  518;  wish  for  the  liberation  of 
Nicolas  II.,  503,  504 

Amalfi,  Duchess  of,  276 

Amalfi,  Duke  of,  Spanish  Minister  to 
Stockholm,  276,  290  ;  work  for  the 
protection  of  Russians  in  enemy 
countries,  360 

Anastasia,  Grand-Duchess,  31  ;  at 
Livadia,  229  ;  unknown  fate,  229 

Andrew,  Grand-Duke,  at  Sofia,  57,  74 

Andronnikoff",  Prince,  70 

Anne  Joannovna,  Empress,  508  note 

Apponyi,  Count,  at  the  Conference  at 
Stockholm,  364 

Arab-Konak  Pass,  195 

Archangel  port,  336 

Arda,  the,  123 

Armenia,  348  ;  condition,  22  ;  mas- 
sacres, 318  ;  lecture  on,  484 

Arras,  320 

Asiago,  attack  on,  424 

Asquith,  Rt.  Hon.  H.  H.,  policy  re- 
specting Serbia,  134 

Assanovitch,  Colonel,  Russian  military 
attache  in  Sweden,  265  ;  charges 
against,  265,  275,  293 

Athos,  Mount,  or  "The  Republic  of 
Twenty  Monasteries,"  203-207  ; 
position  of  the  Russian  monks,  205, 
206  ;  proposed  independence,  203, 
207,  210 ;  result  of  dissensions  among 
the  monks,  212  ;  sent  to  Russia,  213 

Austria- Hungary,  relations  with  Russia, 
18  ;  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, 19  ;  policy  to  the  Balkan 
States,  129  ;  opposes  Serbia's  claim 
to  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic,  134 


523 


524 


INDEX 


wish  to  attack  Serbia,  197  ;  demands 
revision  of  the  Bukharest  Treaty,  209 ; 
ultimatum  to  Serbia,  280,  288,  290  ; 
policy  against,  295  j  change  in  the 
policy,  326 

Austro-Hungarian  army,  advance  into 
Poland,  322  :  defeated,  323 ;  sur- 
render of  regiments,  323  ;  amalga- 
mated with  German  contingents,  326 ; 
attack  on  Asiago,  424 

Azes,  the,  255 


Baden,  Grand-Duchess  Louisa  of, 
260 

Baden,  Grand-Duchy  of,  260 

Baden,  Prince  Max  of,  260 ;  at  the 
Conference  at  Stockholm,  364 

Bakst,  the  painter,  in  Paris,  223 

Balkan  States,  18,  22;  climate,  115; 
demarcation  of  the  frontier,  1 29, 208, 
211;  solution  of  the  question,  161  ; 
relations  between,  162  ;  division  of 
territory,  169;  War,  91,  112,  130, 
189  ;  mobilisation  of  the  armies,  108  ; 
declaration  of  the  Powers,  109 ; 
armistice,  155,  169;  signed,  202; 
negotiations  for  peace,  194 ;  con- 
ditions of  peace  with  Turkey,  203 ; 
alliance  against  Bulgaria,  214 

Baltchik,  port  of,  210 

Baltic,  the,  379  ;  question  of,  355 

Baltic  Provinces,  488 

Baranovitchi,  350 

Bark,  M.,  Minister  of  Finance,  241 

Basil  II.,  Emperor,  192 

Battenberg,  Prince  Alexander  of  Bul- 
garia, 3  ;  abdication,  8  ;  letter  from 
Alexander  II.,  159 

Beauharnais,  Eugene,  259 

Belachitza,  range  of,  192,  194,  208 ; 
defeat  at,  315 

Belfort,  320 

Belgian  Army,  retreat,  320 

Belgium,  invasion  of  Germans,  311  ; 
atrocities,  318 

Belgrade,  49,  100 

BeliaiefF,  General,  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  387  ;  interview  with  M.  Neklu- 
doff,  389 ;  charges  against,  396 

Belogradchik,  195 

Below,  Herr  von,  145  ;  audiences  with 
King  Ferdinand,  146,  199 

Benckendorf,  Count,  Russian  Ambas- 
sador to  London,  134;  rumours  of 
his  departure,  450 

Bentkowski,  302 

Berchtold,  Count,  283 

Bergen,  499 

Berlin,  Congress  of,  20 


Bernadotte,  Marshal,  Prince  of  Ponte- 
Corvo,  elected  King  of  Sweden,  248 

Bessarabia,  ceded  to  Russia,  147  ;  an- 
nexation, 150;  privileges  conferred 
on,  151 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  Herr  von,  223 

Biberstein,  Baron  Marshal  von,  depar- 
ture from  Constantinople,  93  ;  death, 

93 
Bitolia,  112 
Black  Sea,  114,  121,  125,  344;  Fleet, 

34 
Bobrikoff,    Governor-General   of   Fm- 

land,  94 
Bolsheviks,  the,  commit  murders,  431  ; 

policy,    480  ;    at    Stockholm,    483 ; 

propaganda,  497  ;  defeated,  512 
Bomarsund,  fortress  of,  354 
Bondestog,    or  peasants'   procession  in 

Sweden,  266 
Bonin-Longare,    Count,    Italian    Am- 
bassador to  Madrid,  509 
Boris,  Grand-Duke,  237 
Bosdari,    Count,    Italian    Minister   to 

Sofia,  83 
Bosnia,  annexation  of,  14,  19,  20,  40 
Bosphorus,  the,  92 
Bostroem,  Vice-Admiral,  in  command 

of  the  Black  Sea  Fleet,  34,  36  ;  ship 

aground,  36 
Bovary,  Mdme.,  description  of  diplo- 
matists, 240 
Brandenburg,  prisoners'  camp  in,  373 
Branting,  Hjalmar,  head  of  the  Swedish 

Socialist   party,    306,   418  ;    policy, 

309  ;  at  the  Auditorium  meeting,  483 
Bregalnitza,  the,  169,  1S5,  194,  208 
British  Army,  in  Belgium,  retreat,  320 
Brockdorff-Rantzau,     Count,     German 

Minister  to  Copenhagen,  278 
Brugere,  General,  294 
Brunswick,  Grand-Duke  of,  marriage, 

168.     See  Cumberland. 
Brussiloff,  General,  in  command  of  the 

military   operations   in   Galicia,  388 

note,  423 
Buchlau,  ig 
Budberg,   Baron,  characteristics,  244  ; 

Ambassador  to  Madrid,  245 
Buhakoff,  General,  95 
Bukharest,  entry  of  Mackensen,  445  ; 

Treaty  of,  45  note,  86,  150,  214,  215, 

217  ;  Peace  Conference  of,  201,  202, 

207,  231 
Bukowina,  323,  388  note ;  reoccupied 

by  Russians,  424 
Bulair,  121 
Bulgaria,  relations  with  Russia,  20,  231 ; 

independence,   21  ;   payment  of  the 

debt   to  Russia,  27 ;  relations  with 


INDEX 


525 


Serbia,  38,  135,  137,  239;  principal 
phases,  39-43 ;  massacres,  40 ;  negoti- 
ations with  Serbia,  52-57  ;  demarca- 
tion of  the  frontier,  52,  53,  55,  125, 
203,  209,  211;  settled,  56;  agree- 
ment with  Serbia,  56,  64  ;  military 
convention  with  Russia,  74 ;  witla 
Serbia,  96,  98  ;  alliance  with  Greece, 
98 ;  celebration  of  the  feast  of 
veterans,  loi  ;  agreement  with 
Montenegro,  103  ;  mobilisation  of 
the  army,  108- 1 10 ;  war  with  Turkey, 
III;  condition  of  the  roads,  115; 
Bulbar- Vilayet,  116;  national 
anthem,  122;  instructions  on  the  rule 
of  the  "  prohibited  area,"  123  ;  Adria- 
nople  and  Thrace  ceded  to,  130,  210; 
relations  with  Greece,  135,  137  ;  with 
Rumania,  147  ;  claims  to  Dobrudja, 
147  ;  acquisition  of  Deli-Orman,  148  ; 
cession  of  territories,  153;  partition 
of  Macedonia,  164;  accepts  arbitra- 
tion of  Russia,  174  ;  constitutional 
custom,  178  ;  preparations  for  war, 
181  ;  war  declared,  189  ;  advance  of 
the  Allies,  195  ;  peace  conditions, 
202  ;  alliance  against,  214  ;  co-opera- 
tion with  Germany,  215  ;  return  of 
the  troops,  217  ;  result  of  the  entry 
into  the  war,  303,  336 

Bulgaria,  Prince  Alexander  of,  3 

Bulgaria,  Crown  Prince  Boris  of,  re- 
ceived into  the  Orthodox  Church,  9  ; 
at  KiefF,  30,  31  ;  appearance,  31  ; 
festivities  on  his  coming  of  age,  57, 
74  ;  at  Sofia,  232 

Bulgaria.  See  Eleanor,  Queen;  Ferdi- 
nand 

Bulgarian  Army,  occupy  Pirot,  41  ;  ad- 
vance on  Salonika,  113,  169  ;  short- 
age of  munitions,  114;  victory  of 
Lozengrad,  in  ;  march  on  Constan- 
tinople, 114,  120;  attack  on  Chat- 
aldja,  121;  on  Adrianople,  154; 
treatment  of  the  wounded,  160 ;  col- 
lision with  Greeks,  168 ;  defeated, 
168,  190,  192,  315  ;  attack  on  the 
Serbians,  185,  189  ;  refuse  to  be  sent 
to  Macedonia,  191  ;  officers  on  the 
reserve,  119  Jiote;  division,  192  note; 
surrender,  195  ;  entry  in  Sofia,  217  ; 
march-past  of  the  troops,  218 

Bulgarians,  the,  347  note;  flag  "of 
Samara,"  102  ;  characteristics,  102, 
138,  155)  156,  159  ;  relations  with 
Greeks,  114,  120;  religious  views, 
119;  cruelty,  155-157,  160,  192; 
treatment  of  Turks,  156;  result  of 
Turkish  domination,  157;  national 
hierarchy  abolished,    158 ;  national 


policy,  159  ;  relations  with  Serbians, 
161 

Burgos,  510 

Burian,  M.,  326 

Burschillos,  meaning  of  the  word,  343 

Burtzeff,  imprisoned,  377 

Buxhoeveden,  Baron  de,  at  Copen- 
hagen, 279 

Cambon,  M.  Jules,  Ambassador  to 
Berlin,  famous  dispatch,  244  ;  fears 
the  policy  of  Germany,  282 

Carlotti,  Marquis,  Italian  Ambassador 
to  St.  Petersburg,  406 

Carpathians,  the,  323,  329,  348 

Casso,  M.,  Minister  for  Education,  re- 
actionary policy,  284  ;  treatment  in 
Germany,  315  ;  death,  316 

Castellane,  Countess  Jean  de,  292 

Castro-Fejo,  M.,  Portuguese  Minister 
to  Sweden,  276 

Catalonia,  unrest  in,  509 

Catherine  II,,  Empress  of  Russia,  489, 
508  note ;  reforms,  346 

Caucasus,  the,  329,  348  ;  independence 
proclaimed,  497 

Cetigne,  88 

Chalcidice,  occupied  by  Greeks,  132, 
169 

Charleroi,  320 

Charles  Albert,  Archduke,  of  Austria, 

57 
Charles,  King  of  Rumania,  149  ;  pre- 
sented  with    the    b&ton   of  Russian 
Field-Marshal,  152 
Charles  X.,  King  of  Sweden,  489 
Charles  XI.,  King  of  Sweden,  489 
Charles  XII.,  King  of  Sweden,  247  ; 

statue  of,  262 
Charles  XIII.,  King  of  Sweden,  248 
Charles  John  XIV.,  King  of  Sweden, 

248 
Charles   XV.,  King  of  Sweden,   248, 

259  ;  reforms,  249 
Charles,   Prince,    of  Sweden,    charac- 
teristics, 270 ;  President  of  the  Red 
Cross,    345 ;  work  for  the  prisoners 
of    war,    361,    364   7iote ;   organises 
the  transfer  of  the  wounded,  366 
Chataldja,  29, 114,  120  ;  attack  on,  121 
Clementine,  Princess,  7  ;  death,  8,  12 
Clery,  Mdlle.,  259 
Clive,  Mr. ,  First  Secretary  to  the  British 

Legation  at  Stockholm,  486 
Clive,  Mrs.,  492 
Coburg,  Prince  Ferdinand  of,  7.     See 

Ferdinand 
Cologne  Gazette,  article  in  the,  339 
Connaught,  Princess  Margaret  of,  270 
Constant,  Benjamin,  saying  of,  378 


526 


INDEX 


Constantine  XIV.,  King  of  Greece,  210, 
212  ;  on  the  IBulgarian  aggression, 
168 

Constantine,  "  Diadoch,"  advance  on 

Salonika,  113 
Constantinople,  92  ;   palace  revolution 

in,   40  J  fire  at,  93;   panic  in,  114; 

solution  of  the  Straits  question,  117 
Constantinovitch,  John,  211 
Constanza,  34,  36 
Courland,  349  ;  invaded  by  the  German 

Army,  419,  424 
Cracow,  323,  349;  union  with  Vilna, 

379 
Crete,  island  of,  203  ;  restored  to  Greece, 

132 
Cretzeano,  M.,  Rumanian  Minister  to 

Madrid,  521 
Crimea,  the,  climate,  227 
Cronstadt,  insurrection  at,  35  ;  Fleet  at, 

475 
Cumberland,  Duke  of,  marriage,  168. 

See  Brunswick 
Cyril,  Grand-Duchess,  237  ;  effort   to 

stop  the  Rasputin  scandal,  455 
Czechs,  the,  surrender,  323 
Czetwertynska,  Marie,  238.  See  Narich- 

kin 

Dalmatia,  157 

Dalsland,  250,  266 

Danev,  M.,  policy,  23,  96  ;  Home 
Secretary,  26  ;  attack  on  King  Ferdi- 
nand, 27  ;  on  the  demarcation  of  the 
frontier,  53 ;  at  the  head  of  the 
"  Activist "  party,  82  ;  mission  to 
Livadia,  82 ;  at  the  Conference  in 
London,  128  ;  character  of  his  policy, 
164 ;  return  from  London,  176 ;  inter- 
views with  M.  Nekludoff,  1 76-181  ; 
obstinacy  and  presumption,  177,  181  ; 
entrusted  to  form  a  Cabinet,  179  ; 
foreign  policy,  180 ;  delegate  to  St. 
Petersburg,  183  ;  delays  in  starting, 
184  ;  advice  from  M.  Nekludoff,  193, 
196  ;  resignation,  196  ;  attempt  to 
commit  suicide,  216 

Danish  Red  Cross,  member  of  the, 
audience  with  Empress  Alexandra, 
473  j  witnesses  the  Revolution,  473 

Danube,  the,  193  ;  bridges  over,  195 

Danubian  Principalities,  151 

Dardanelles,  the,  121 

Dato,  M.,  President  of  the  Council, 
receives  M.  Nekludoff,  506 

Davos,  5,  44 

Dedeagatch,  123,  126,  129,  210 

Dedulin,  "General  du  jour,"  death, 
224  ;  funeral,  225 

Deli-Orman,  148,  210 


Demir-Hissar,  209 

Demotika,  210 

Denmark,  commercial  spirit,  257  ;  over- 
tures from  Germany,  352 

Denmark,  King  of,  meeting  with  King 
Gustaf  V.  at  Malmo,  286 

Denmark,  Princess  Ingeborg  of,  366 ; 
characteristics,  270 

Devaux,  Baron,  276 

Diedring,  M.,  work  for  the  prisoners  of 
war,  364  note 

Djavids,  the,  23 

Dmitri,  Grand-Duke,  at  the  murder 'of 
Rasputin,  457  ;  arrest  and  banish- 
ment, 457 

Dniester,  the,  379 

Dobiecki,  M.,  378 

Dobritch,  148,  210 

Dobrovitch,  M.,  90,  172,  184,  I98 

Dobrovolsky,  M.,  appointed  Minister  of 
Justice,  452  ;  occult  views,  452 

Dobrudja,  210;  population,  147  ;  recti- 
fication of  frontiers,  129 

Dogger  Bank  incident.  International 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  36 

Dolomites,  349 

Drama,  194,  209 

Dubassoff,  Admiral,  36 

Dubiagsky,  M.,  185 

Duma,  the,  members  of,  at  Stockholm, 
413;  refuses  to  dissolve,  466;  dis- 
solved, 474,  513 

Dumbadze,  General,  military  governor 
of  Yalta,  225  ;  characteristics,  226  ; 
despotic  rule,  226  ;  orders  Rasputin 
to  leave  Yalta,  226  ;  interview  with 
Nicolas  II.,  227 

Durazzo,  132 

Dvina,  the,  350 

E ,  M.,  supernumerary  counsellor 

to  M .  Nekludoff,  449  ;  intrigues, 
450  ;  dismissal,  450 

Economic    Conference  of  the   Allies, 

454 

Ehrensvaerd,  Baron,  265 

Eitel-Frederich,  Prince,  in  command 
of  destroyers,  287  ;  unknown  destina- 
tion, 301 

Eleanor,  Queen  of  Bulgaria,  12,  16 ; 
receives  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  at  Varna, 
34,  36  ;  interview  with  M.  Nekludoff, 
234-236 ;  death,  236 

Elena,  district  of,  158 

Elisabeth  Petrovna,  Empress,  508  note 

England,  negotiations  with  Sweden,  on 
the  control  of  imported  goods,  335  ; 
result   of  the  blockade  in  Sweden, 

353 
Enos,  123,  169,  203 


INDEX 


527 


Envor-Bey,  mlliUiy  agent  in  Berlin, 
23  ;  fronuticiamento,  130 

Epirus,  occupied  by  Greeks,  132 

Ergene,  125,  137 

Efcrum,  348  ;  capture  of,  387,  400 

Ei  -honia,  487-492  ;  frontiers,  490  ;  in- 
vaded by  Germans,  515 

Eugene  Napoleon,  Prince  of  Sweden, 
270;  landscapejpainler,  271 

Euxinograd,  34,  36 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Bulgaria,  policy, 
2,  164;  relations  with  M.  Sementov- 
sky,  2  ;  distrust  of  foreign  representa- 
tives, 2  ;  characteristics,  3,  7,  lO,  14, 
269  ;  parents,  7  ;  unpopularity,  7, 
217;  death  of  his  mother,  8  ;  marriage, 

8  ;  conferences  with  Prince  Lobanoff, 
9 ;  reception  of  his  son  into  the  Ortho- 
dox Church,  9;  reconciliation  with 
Russia,  9  ;  contempt  for  his  subjects, 

9  ;   school    for  officers,    1 1  j   second 
marriage,  12;  political  intrigues,  12; 
consolidation  of  his  throne  and  the 
career  of  his  subjects,  13  ;  tendency 
to  neurasthenia,  13;  indecision,  14, 
269  ;  suspiciousness,   14  ;    audiences 
with  M.   Nekludoff,   i6,  54,  62-65, 
106,   169,  232-234  ;  assumes  title  of 
Tsar,  21  ;   absence  from  Sofia,  27  ; 
Jubilee  celebrations,  29,  91, 105,  143  ; 
on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  negotiations, 
S3>   63-65  ;    the    coming  of  age   of 
Prince  Boris,  57,  74  ;  financial  difii- 
culties,   59 ;  a  mortgage  on  Vrana, 
59 ;    loan    advanced    to,    61  ;    art 
treasures,  62  ;  wish  to  get  rid  of  M. 
Nekludoff,  85,   173  ;   audience  with 
Shelking,    90 ;     relations   with    M. 
Nekludoff,   90  ;  dread  of  war,  105  ; 
ambition,    105,    125  ;    pride  in    the 
victories  of  the  Bulgarian  Army,  1 16  ; 
meeting    with    Abdul-Hamid,   116; 
the  Straits  question,  117-119;  on  a 
reconciliation  with  Rome,  119  ;  pre- 
parations for  the  entry  into  Constan- 
tinople,   120;     headquarters,    121; 
wish  to   possess  Rodosto,    126-128, 
130  ;  secret  schemes,  126-128  ;  inac- 
cessible   to   Ministers,    142-146  ;    at 
the  cathedral  service,  143-145  ;  audi- 
ences with  M.  Panofieu,  145  ;  with 
Herr  von  Below,  r46,  199;  treatment 
of  the  Serbians,  155  ;  postpones  entry 
into  Adrianople,    156  ;    telegram  to 
Tsar,  173  ;  power  to  appoint  Minis- 
ters, 178;  on  sending  a  delegate  to 
St.  Petersburg,  183  ;  instructions  to 
General  Savov,    188;    summons  his 
Ministers,  198-201  ;  on  the  critical 


situation,  199  ;  readiness  for  flight, 
216  ;  heads  the  procession  of  the 
troops,  218  ;  duplicity,  270  ;  audience 
with  M,  Savinsky,  391 

Fichev,  General,  Chief  of  the  Bulgarian 
General  Staff,  29  ;  reception  in  St. 
Petersburg,  29,  76  ;  protest  against 
the  advance  on  Constantinople,  115 

Finland,  262  ;  in  possession  of  Russia, 
248 ;  secession  from,  347  ;  autonomy, 
441  ;  policy,  4S9 

Finmark,  reindeer  forests  of,  355 

Finnish  or  Ural-Altaic  race,  347  note 

Finns,  the,  488  ;  characteristics,  262, 
347  "oie 

Fontanka,  mansion  of,  238 

"  Ford  Peace  Troupe,"  352 

France,  phil-hellenism,  211  ;  friendship 
with  Sweden,  254 ;  unpreparedness 
for  war,  297  ;  declaration  on  neutrality 
of  Sweden,  308 ;  atrocities  of 
Germans,  318;  trench-warfare,  329 

Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke  of 
Austria,  assassinated,  283,  286 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor  of  Austria, 
Jubilee,  19 

Frederick  III.,  Emperor  of  Germany, 
259  ;  friendship  with  King  Oscar  II., 

259 

Fredericsz,  Count,  Court  Minister,  228 
French  Army,  retreat,  320  ;  successes, 

320 
"  Fruschka-Goa,"  monasteries    of  the, 

157 

Gabrova,  district  of,  158 

Gagaiizi,  the,  147 

Galata,  92 

Galicia,  322 ;  occupied  by  the  Russian 
Army,  323,  329;  result  of  their  rule, 
329  ;  military  operations  in,  348,  423, 
424,  433,  500 ;  evacuated,  350 

Galitzyn,  Prince  Nicolas  D.,  395  ;  presi- 
dent of  Russian  Red  Cross,  396 ; 
characteristics,  396 ;  interview  with 
M.  Nekludoff,  396  ;  devotion  to 
Empress  Alexandra,  396  ;  President 
of  the  Council,  396  ;  imprisoned, 
397  ;  Prime  Minister,  458 ;  declara- 
tion, 477 

Gallieni,  General,  320 

Gallipoli,  peninsula  of,   121 

Gardner,  Professor,  at  Stockholm,  375 

Gennadiev,  M.,  prosecution,  26 ;  on 
the  advance  of  the  Bulgarian  troops, 
187;  Foreign  Secretary,  196,  199; 
characteristics,   196;     imprisonment, 

393 

Geoffray,  M.,  French  Ambasasdor  to 
Madrid,  509 


52S 


INDEX 


George,    King   of    Greece,    14I,    2S2 ; 

assassinated,  144 
German  agents,  influence  in  Russia, 
408-410,  463,  477,  478,  485  ;  Army, 
advance  in  Belgium,  320;  retreat, 
320;  reinforcements  in  Galicia,  323, 
329  ;  advance  on  Warsaw  repelled, 
329  ;  systematic  ravages,  363  note ; 
advance  on  Courland,  419  ;  take 
Kiga,  515,  516;  destroyers  in  the 
Sound,  287  ;  spies  at  Stockholm,  383  ; 
submarines,  500 

Germany,  loss  of  influence  in  Constanti- 
nople, 18;  policy  in  Balkan  States, 
no,  146,  197;  influence  in  Turkey, 
123,  215;  opposes  reinstatement  of 
the  Bulgarians,  210 ;  co-operation  of 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  215;  relations 
with  Sweden,  255-25S,  342 ;  trade 
with,  257,  337  ;  influence  over,  259- 
262  ;  relations  with  Russia,  261  ; 
attempts  to  secure  alliance  with 
Sweden,  272  ;  preparations  for  war, 
280,  295,  312;  ultimatum  to  Russia, 
282,  296  ;  declaration  of  war,  304  ; 
resources,  249,  310 ;  invasion  of 
Belgium,  311;  losses,  312;  treat- 
ment of  refugees,  313,  317 ;  war 
methods,  318  j  treatment  of  prisoners, 
318,  362-365,  368  ;  military  opera- 
tions in  East  Prussia,  319,  349 ; 
supply  of  coal  to  Sweden,  335  ; 
intrigues,  341 ;  invincibility,  350  ; 
proposals  of  peace  with  Russia,  351  ; 
overtures  to  Denmark,  352  ;  result 
of  propaganda,  363  ;  reprisal  camps, 
365  ;  revolutionary  literature  sent  to 
Russia,  409 

Giers,  Michel  de,  Russian  Ambassador 
to  Constantinople,  92,  104, 150,  355  ; 
on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance,  93  ; 
opinion  of  the  Turkish  Army,  94  : 
warning  to  the  Bulgarians  on  war 
with  Turkey,  105  ;  Minister  to 
Bukharest,  149 

Giurgevo,  220 

Godunoff,  Boris,  423 

Goremykin,  M.,  89;  President  of  the 
Council,  241  ;  infirmities,  242  ;  policy, 
284 ;  retirement,  393 

Gorlice,  attack  at,  349 

Gortchakoff,  Prince,  40,  48,  261,  355  ; 
famous  saying,  285 

Gottenburg,  252 

Gourko,  General,  loi 

Great  Britain,  entry  into  the  war,  307, 
311;  declaration  on  neutrality  of 
Sweden,  308 

Greece,  alliance  with  Bulgaria,  98 ; 
with  Serbia,  98,  163,  169  ;  mobilisa- 


tion of  the  army,  108  ;  war  with 
Turkey,  ni  ;  Crete  restored  to, 
132;  acquisition  of  territories,  132; 
relations  with  Serbia  and  Bulgaria, 
'35>  "37;  demarcation  of  the 
frontier,  140,  203,  209,  211  ;  wish 
for  the  arbitration  of  Russia,  174; 
relations  with,  204 

Greece,  Crown  Prince  of,  at  Sofia,  57 

Greece,  Prince  Nicolas  of,  marriage, 
211  ;  mission  to  St.  Petersburg,  448  ; 
accusations  against  M.  NekludoflF, 
449 

Greek  Armj',  advance  on  Salonika,  113; 
defeat  the  Bulgarians,  168,  192 ; 
occupy  Salonika  and  Chalcidice,  169  ; 
capture  Rilo-Dagh,  195  ;  advance  on 
Samokov,  197  ;  relations  with  the 
Bulgarians,  114,  129 

Greeks,  spiritual  hierarchy  over  Turkey, 
157 ;  relations  with  Turks  and 
Albanians,  157  ;  hatred  of  Bulgarians, 
158,  168 

Greffulhe,  Countess  de,  292 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  policy  regarding 
Serbia,  135 

Grodno,  349  ;  defence  of,  95 

Gruber,  M.,  392 

Gueshov,  M.,  Coalition  Ministry,  17, 
24  ;  character,  25  ;  attitude  towards 
Russia,  25  ;  Foreign  Secretary,  27  ; 
on  the  demarcation  of  the  frontier,  53  ; 
interviews  with  M.  Nekludofif,  66, 
141-143,  170,  176;  on  the  military 
Convention  between  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia,  98  ;  on  the  condition  of  the 
Turkish  Army,  104 ;  declaration 
from  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers,  109 ;  on  the  cession  of 
territory  to  Rumania,  153  ;  interview 
with  M.  Pachitch,  170,  172  ;  resigna- 
tion, 172,   178 

Gulkevitch,  M.,  463 

Gustaf  III.,  King  of  Sweden,  247 

Gustaf  IV.,  King  of  Sweden,  248,  254 

Gustaf  v..  King  of  Sweden,  232 ; 
promise  to  the  Bondesiog,  266  ;  opera- 
tion, 268,  27 1  ;  receives  M .  Nekludoff, 
269,  307,  411-413  ;  sincerity,  272  ; 
trust  in  his  Ministers,  273  ;  opens  the 
Riksdag,  279 ;  meeting  with  the 
King  of  Denmark  at  Malmo,  286 ; 
receives  Pres.  Poincare,  2S9  ;  banquet, 
291  ;  telegrams,  292,  293  ;  reception, 
293  ;  on  the  neutrality  of  S\\  eden, 
307,  309  ;  meets  King  of  Norway  at 
Malmo,  330  ;  letter  to  the  Tsar,  356  j 
message  from  him,4ri  ;  wish  to  stop 
the  war,  412 ;  takes  leave  of  M. 
Nekludoff,  498 


INDEX 


529 


Gustavus  Adolphus,  489 

Gutchkoff,  Alexander,  Minister  for  War, 
action  in  the  Revolution,  478 ;  dis- 
missed, 476 

Gutchkoft",  M.,  v\i  the  sinister  influences 
dominating  tjie  Court,  67  ;  interviews 
with  M.  Nekludoff,  78,  99  ;  duel 
with  Miassoiedoff,  78  ;  at  Sofia,  98  ; 
at  Belgrade,  100 ;  departure  from, 
100 

Haakon  VII.,  King  of  Norway,  meet- 
ing with  the  King  of  Sweden  at 
Malmd,  330 

Hadik,  Count,  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister,  in  Sweden,  277,  291,  342 

Hadji-Oglu  Bazardjik,  148 

Hallsberg,  367 

Hammarskiold,M.  de,  Prime  Minister, 
267,  273;  policy,  417 

Ilammerfest,  263 

Haparanda,  366 

Hardinge,  Sir  Arthur,  Ambassador  to 
Madrid,  509 

Harte,  Rev.  Clinton,  work  for  the 
prisoners  of  war,  362 

Hartwig,  M.,  39 ;  interview  with  M. 
Nekludoff,  46  ;  on  relations  between 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  46 ;  charac- 
teristics, 47,  50,  163  ;  career,  48 ; 
Director  of  the  Asiatic  Department, 
49 ;  Minister  at  Teheran,  49 ;  at 
Belgrade,  49 ;  knowledge  of  the 
Slavs,  49  ;  flaws  in  his  reasoning 
powers,  50  ;  Mayor  of  Belgrade,  loo  ; 
conferences  with  M.  Venizelos,  139  ; 
proposed  Balkan  alliance,  162  ; 
death,  163 

Hasselbaken,  425  ;  banquet  at,  431 

Iledwig,  Queen,  marriage,  379 

Helen,  Grand-Duchess,  marriage,  21 1 

Helen,  Princess,  marriage,  21 1 

Helsingfors,  475 

Hendrikoff,  Countess,  at  Livadia,  230 

Henricovitch,  Nicolas,  49 

Heredia,  M.  de,  506 

Herzegovina,  annexation,  19,  20,  40; 
insurrection,  40 

Hesse-Darmstadt,  Grand-Duke  of,  43 

Hindenburg,  General,  defeats  Russian 
Army,  319 

Hohenfelsen,  Countess  of,  401.  See 
Palei 

Holmsen,  General,  military  agent  in 
Constantinople,  94  ;  captivity  in 
Germany,  95 

Holstein-Hottorps,  the,  247 

Howard,  Sir  Esm^,  British  Minister  to 
Sweden,  275,  290,  308  ;  conferences 
with  M.  Nekludoff,  337  ;  staff  at  the 


Legation,  339  ;  on  the  views  of  M. 
Keskula,  486 
Hungary,  invaded  by  Rumanian  troops, 
442 

Ignatiekf,  Count,  Minister  for  Educa- 
tion, dismissal,  419 

Ignatieff,  Countess  Sophie,  69 

IgnatiefF,  General,  39  ;  Ambassador  to 
Constantinople,  39,  40  ;  protection 
of  the  Bulgarians,  204 

India,  fakirs  of,  469,  472 

Ingria,  491 

Ishtib,  massacres  at,  97,  104 

Isker,  the,  197 

Isonzo,  the,  349 

Isvolsky,  M.,  interview  with  M. 
d'Aerenthal,  19;  on  "healthy 
optimism,"  107  ;  party  in  his  honour, 
292  ;  appointed  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  355  ;  Ambassador  to  Paris, 
450  ;  rumours  of  his  departure,  450 

Italo-Turkish  war,  36,  95 

Italy,  policy  on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
agreement,  84 ;  entry  into  the  war, 
310,  349  ;  supply  of  sulphur  to 
Sweden,  335 

Itchas,  M,,  at  Stockholm,  381,  413, 
430»  453;  marriage,  381  ;  head  of 
the  Russian  Red  Cross,  381 

Ivanov,  General,  defeat  of  his  army, 
192 

Izborsk,  491 

jAGELLONjKing  of  Lithuania,  marriage, 

379 

Jagow,  M.  de,  233,  275 

Janina,  siege  of,  116  ;   surrender,  132 

Japanese  war,  2,  296 

Jilinsky,  General,  head  of  the  General 
Headquarters  Staff,  74 ;  on  the 
proposed  military  convention  with 
Bulgaria,  74 ;  interview  with  M. 
Nekludoff,  75 ;  Governor-General 
of  Poland,   76  ;  military  operations, 

77 
Joachim  III.,  the  Patriarch,  206 
Joffre,  Marshal,  320 
John    the   Terrible,    Tsar  of    Russia, 

423.  491 
John  v.,  Tsar  of  Russia,  508  noie 
John   VI.   Antonovitch,  story  of,    508 

no/e 
Jugo-Slavs,  the,  surrender,  323 

Kai.usz,  massacres  at,  318,  511 
Kandauroff,        Lieut. -Col.,        military 
attache  to  the  Russian  Legation  at 
Stockholm,  300  ;  orders  to  the  troops, 


530 


INDEX 


301  ;  interview  with  KingGustaf  V,, 

Karavelov,  Madame,  enthusiast  for 
liberty,  165 ;  head  of  military 
hospital  at  Sofia,  166  ;  meeting  with 
Mdlle.  Milutin,  166  ;  on  giving  up 
Macedonia  to  the  Serbians,  166,  178 

Karavelov,  Petko,  tortured  and  death, 

Karea,  Protat  or  Superior  Council  at, 

204 
Karlovo,  district  of,  158 
Karlovlzy,  157 

Katchaneh,  massacres  at,  97,  104 
Kaulbars,  Baron,  treatment  in  Germany, 

317 

Kavala,  121,  126,  194,  209 

Kavarna,  port  of,  148,  210 

Kazanlyk,  loi 

Kerensky,  A.  F.,  head  of  the  Socialists, 
474 ;  on  the  Revolution,  479 ; 
characteristics,  494 ;  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Revolution,  494  ;  efforts 
to  save  people,  495  ;  attitude  towards 
Nicolas  II.,  496;  speeches  on  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  496,  512  ; 
Dictator-Generalissimo,  511  ;  pro- 
claims the  Republic,  511  ;  telegram 
from  M.  Nekludoff,  517 

Keskula,  M,,  Esthonian  political 
agitator,  486 ;  interview  with  M. 
Nekludoff,  487-492 

Khlyst,  a,  meaning  of  the  word,  71 

Khrenoff,  402 

Kiamil  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier,  downfall, 

130 

Kieff,  30 ;  union  with  Russia,  379 ; 
Ukranian  rada  at,  51 1 

Kirk-Kilisseh,  III,  122;  occupied,  146, 
208 

Kitchener,  Lord,  prophecy  on  the 
length  of  the  war,  329 

Klaritonoff,  M.,  Controller  of  the 
Empire,  dismissal,  419 

Kleinmichel,  Countess,  fancy-dress  ball, 
237 

Klingenberg,  Governor,  380 

Koewenhiiller,  Count,  292 

Kokochkin,  M.,  illness,  431 ;  murdered 
431 

Kokovtzoff,  M.,  21  ;  President  of  the 
Council,  61,  78,  79,  80,  211;  in 
Paris,  223  ;  Berlin,  223 ;  interview 
with  M.  Nekludoff,  240  ;  character- 
istics, 240,  241  ;  defence  of  the 
system  of  the  spirit  monopoly  241  ; 
resignation,  241  ;  dread  of  war  for 
Russia,  241  ;  pessimism,  405 

Kola,  port  of,  344 

Kolpino,  492 


Koni,  M.,  member  of  the  Council  of 

the  Empire,  398 
Konopischt,  interview  of,  280 
Korniloff,      General,     head     of     the 
Petrograd  garrison,  493  ;  resignation, 
494  ;     attempt    to     take    up    arms, 

517 

"  Kossovo  Pole  Songs,"  1 12 

Kotchana,  194,  209 

Kovel,  fighting  at,  433,  436 

Kovno,  349 

Krasnoe-Selo,  manoeuvres  at,  29 

Krivochein,  M.,  80  ;  policy  of  reforms, 

284  ;  Minister  for  Agriculture,  419  ; 

dismissal  419 
Krivolak,  190 
Kropotkin,  Prince,  at  Stockholm,  481  ; 

interview  with  M.  Nekludoff,  481- 

483 
Kroze,  380 
Krupensky,   M.,  Ambassador    to   the 

Quirinal,  87 
Krylbo,  367 
Krzyzanowski,    M.,    Secretary   of   the 

Empire,     alters     minute      on     the 

Polish  question,  441 
Kudascheff,  Prince  John,  interview  with 

M.  Nekludoff,  515 
Kulomzin,  M.,  member  of  the  Council 

of  the  Empire,  399 
Kustendil,  190,  197 
Kulzo-Wallachians,  87 

L ,    General    de,    at    Stockholm, 

444 ;  on    the    number    of    Russian 
troops  in  Rumania,  445 

L ,  Madame  de,  409 

Ladoga  Lake,  491 

Lagos,  M.,  in  Sweden,  276 

Lagos,  Mdnie.,  276 

Lamsdorf,  Count,  48 

Landquart,  44 

Lapland,  250 

Larson,  Carl,  271 

La-Granja,  509 

Lema,  Marquis  de.  Minister  for  F"oreign 

Affairs,  receives  M.  Nekludoff,  506 
Lemberg,  323 
Lenin,  M.,  485,  520 
Leopold,  Prince,  of  Prussia,  at  Sofia, 

57  ;  military  rigidity,  58 
Leontieff,  Colonel,  75 
Lermonteff,  M.,  Lines  from,   481  note 
Letts,  the,  487 
Liaptchev,  M.,  99 
Lichnowsky,   Prince,    Ambassador    to 

London,  93 
Lichtenstein,  Prince  Francis  of,  journey 

to  Vaduz,  44 
Liige,  siege  of,  312 


INDEX 


531 


Licvin,  Princess,  irealnienl  in  Germany, 

318 

Liliefors,  M,,  271 

Lindberg,  Dr.,  358 

Lithuania,  350  ;  history,  378 ;  geo- 
graphical position,  381 

Lithuanians,  at  Stockhohn,  378  ; 
characteristics,  380  ;  number  in  the 
United  States,  381 

Livadia,  82,  224  ;  palace  of,  228 

Livonia,  invaded  by  Germans,  515 

Lobanoff,  Prince,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  9,  42  ;  conferences  with 
Prince  Ferdinand,  9  ;  on  the  decora- 
tions of  the  Winter  Palace,  44 ; 
strength  of  character,  283  ;  member 
of  the  Council  of  the  Empire,  430 ; 
at  Stockholm,  430 

London,  Conference  of,  128,  130,  177, 
203,  355  ;  clauses  of  the  peace 
treaty,  203 

Lou  vain,  massacre  at,  318 

Lozengrad,  122 ;  taken  by  the  Bul- 
garians, III 

Lucius,  Baron  von,  Counsellor  to  the 
Embassy  in  St.  Petersburg,  338, 
409 ;  Minister  lo  the  Mprei  of 
Albania,  338  ;  sent  to  Sweden,  338  ; 
intrigues,  338  ;  "  Der  Preventive 
Krieg,"  339 ;  appointed  Minister  to 
Stockholm,  339,  453  ;  tactics,  341 

Ludskonov,  M.,  character,  26 

Lukomsky,  General,  Director  of 
Ordnance,  387,  389 

Lulc-Burgas,  123  ;  defeat  of  the  Turkish 
Army  at,  1 12,  1 14 

Lund  University,  266 

Lutsk,  capture  of,  424 

Lvoff,  Prince,  President  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  467  ;  Prime 
Minister,  494  ;  President  of  the 
Council,  504 

Lwow,  349 

Lyon,  Lieutenant,  500 

Macedonia,      10,     43,     96,      132 ; 

administration,    17;    condition,   22; 

proposed   autonomy,  161  ;  partition, 

164;  battles  in,  190 
Mackenscn,  General,  entry  in  Bukharest, 

445 

Madjarov,  M.,  member  of  the  Cabinet, 
179 

Madrid,  500 

Magyars,  the,  policy,  326  ;  character- 
istics, 347  note 

Mahomet  IL,  conquest  of  Constanti- 
nople, 122,  129 

Majoresco,  M.,  Rumanian  Prime 
Minister,  president  of  the  Bukharest 


Peace     Ccmference,    202 ;  interview 
with  M.  Nekludoflf,  220 

Makaroff,  M.,  Minister  of  Justice,  81  ; 
reactionary  policy,  284 

Maklahoff.  M.,  reactionary  policy,  284 

Malinov,  M.,  14,  165  ;  President  of  the 
Council,  16  ;  resignation,  17  ; 
Radical  Cabinet,  23  ;  interviews 
with  M.  Nekludoff,  178 

Malmo,  313  ;  exhibition  at,  277-279  ; 
meeting  of  the  Scandinavian  Kings 
at,  286,  330 

Manassevitch-Manuiloff,  Isl.,  89 

Mandelstamm,  RL,  302 

Mansuroff,  RI.,  mission  to  Mount 
Athos,  213 

Manus,  M.,  70 

Margaret,  Crown  Princess  of  Sweden, 
visits  the  wounded,  366 

Maria,  Grand-Duchess,  31 

Marie,  Grand-Duchess,  divorce,  221, 
232,  244,  265  ;  at  Tsarskoe-Selo, 
402 

Marie  Christina,  Queen-Mother  of 
Spain,  receives  M.  Nekludoff,  504, 
518;  personality,  505  ;  charm  of  her 
conversation,  505,  518 

Marie  Feodorovna,  Dowager  Empress 
of  Russia,  at  Tsarskoe-Selo,  79  ; 
exhortations  to  the  Emperor  and 
Empress,  79  ;  resemblance  to  Princess 
Ingeborg,  270;  receives  M.  Neklu- 
doff, 404 

Marie  Louise,  Princess,  marriage,  8 ; 
character,  8  ;  death,  12 

Maritza,  the,  123,  210;  i^and,  out- 
break of  cholera,  156 

Marmara,  Sea  of,  92,  114,  121,  124, 
125 

Marne,  the,  battle  of,  320,  322 

Masurian  Lakes,  77,  329,  348 

Maubeuge,  320 

Meaux,  320 

Medua,  132 

Mehmed  Ali,  126 

Merrone,  Colonel,  Italian  military 
attache  at  Sofia,  83  ;  friendship  with 
Bulgarian  officers,  83  ;  informs  the 
Staflf  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agree- 
ment, 83  ;  aide-de-camp  to  the 
King,  85 

Mesta,  the,  209 

Meyendorff,  Baron,  ex-President  of  the 
Duma,  at  Stockholm,  453 

MiassoiedoflF.  M.,  duel  with  M.  Gutch- 
kofif,  78 

Michael,  Grand-Duke,  of  Russia, 
refuses  to  accept  power,  467 

Mickiewicz,  the  poet,  380 

Midia,  125,  129,  169 

2    M 


532 


INDEX 


Mikolajow,  323 

Milan,  King  ofSeibia,  41  ;  abdication, 
42  ;  loan  to,  60 

Militza,  Grand-Duchess,  69 

Miliukoff,  M.  P.  N.,  165,  174;  at 
Stockholm,  413,  414,  430  ;  criticism 
ofSlihmer,  451  ;  appointed  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  468  ;  character- 
istics, 492  ;  courage,  493  ;  demonstra- 
tion against,  493  ;  dismissed,  493 

Milutin,  Nicolas,  Secretary  of  State, 
166  fiote 

Milutin,  Pauline,  meeting  with  Mme. 
Karavelov,  166  j  friendship  with  M. 
Sazonoff,  167 

Ministry,  the  "Chancellor's  office," 
47  J  Asiatic  Department,  48 

Mir,  the,  25 

Misu,  M.,  at  the  Conference  of  London, 
177  ;  Rumanian  Minister  to  London, 
180 

Mohilev,  headquarters  of  the  Russian 
Army  at,  421 

Mongolians,  the,  ravages  in  Russia, 
379  7iote 

Montebello,  Countess  Jean  de,  292 

Montenegro,  agreement  with  Bulgaria 
and  Serbia,  103  ;  mobilisation  of  the 
army,  108 ;  demarcation  of  the 
frontier,  203,  209 

Montenegro,  Crown  Prince  of,  at  Sofia, 

57 
Moon,  island  of,  taken  by  the  Germans, 
^515.  516 
Moscow,  meeting  of  Marshals  of  the 

Nobility  at,   452 ;    recollections  of, 

483 ;   meeting    of  members   of  the 

Duma  at,  512 
Moscow,  Metropolitan  of,  gift  to  King 

Ferdinand,  62 
Mossoloff,  General,   85 ;    career,  86 ; 

appointed    Minister    to    Bukharest, 

86,  443 
^lurman,  construction  of  the  railway, 

264,  336  note,  344 
Murmansk,  port  of,  344  tiote 
MUrzsteg,  20 

Nabi-bey,  Turkish  Minister  at  Sofia, 
loi  ;  secret  negotiations,  lOi 

Napoleon,  Emperor,  formula  of,  1 17 

Narichkin,  Marie,  238.  See  Czet- 
wertynska 

"  Narodniak"  party,  179 

Narova  river,  490 

Narva,  490 

Narwich,  263 

Natchevitch,  M.,  return  to  Constanti- 
nople, 209 

Nazim  Pasha,  assassinated,  130 


Neidhart,  Alexis,  head  of  a  committee 
on  prisoners  of  war,  397  ;  character- 
istics, 398 ;  member  of  the  Council 
of  the  Empire,  398  ;  political  views, 
398 ;  sisters,  398  note 

Nekludoff,  A.,  Counsellor  to  the 
Embassy  in  Paris,  i  ;  Minister  to 
Sofia,  I  ;  audiences  with  Nicolas  H.j 
3-5.  74.  230-232,  399;  presents 
credentials  to  King  Ferdinand,  6, 
16 ;  interviews  with  him,  16,  54, 
62-65,  106,  143-145,  169,  201,  232- 
234  ;  negotiations  with  M.  Gueshov, 
27,  170;  Russian  Squadron  at 
Varna,  34-36  5  on  the  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  relations,  38-43,  45  ;  at 
Vienna,  43,  98,  100,  236  ;  meeting 
with  Macha  Vassiltchikofif,  43,  372- 
374 ;  journey  to  Davos,  43-4S  » 
interviews  with  M.  Sazonoff,  45,  7*. 
74,  77,  221,  386,  437,  438;  at 
Belgrade,  46  ;  interview  with  M. 
Hartwig,  46  ;  wedding  of  his 
daughter,  53 ;  on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
negotiations,  54-56,  93;  arranges 
loan  for  King  Ferdinand,  59-6 1  ; 
interviews  with  M.  Gueshov,  66, 
141-143,  170;  at  St.  Petersburg, 
67,  236,  385-410,  437-443  ;  inter- 
view with  General  Jilinsky,  75  ;  on 
the  proposed  military  convention, 
77  ;  interview  with  M.  Gutchkoff, 
78,  99  ;  present  at  an  evening 
reception,  69  ;  return  to  Sofia,  82, 
232  ;  intrigues  against,  86,  90-92, 
450 ;  calumnies,  87  ;  interview  with 
Shelking,  89  ;  relations  with  King 
Ferdinand,  90 ;  trip  to  Constanti- 
nople, 92-96 ;  telegrams  to  M, 
Sazonoff,  96, 171  ;  on  the  dangers  of 
a  war  with  Turkey,  103  ;  telegrams 
from  M.  Sazonoff,  125  ;  conversa* 
tions  with  M.  Spalaikovitch,  133, 
137,  170 ;  prediction  on  the  policy 
of  Bulgaria,  138  ;  interview  with  M. 
Venizelos,  1 39-141  ;  negotiations  on 
the  Conference  of  Ambassadors  in 
St.  Petersburg,  152  ;  solution  of  the 
Balkan  question,  161  ;  on  the  par- 
tition of  Macedonia,  164 ;  accusa- 
tions of  King  Ferdinand,  173  ; 
conference  with  General  Savov, 
1 74  ;  interviews  with  M.  Danev, 
176-178,  179-181  ;  with  M.  Ma- 
linov,  178 ;  advice  to  M.  Danev, 
193.  196 ;  summoned  by  King 
Ferdinand,  198-201  ;  transferred  to 
Stockholm,  201  ;  on  the  results  of 
the  Treaty  of  Bukharest,  214  ;  letter 
to  Baron  Schilling,   218  ;   journey 


INDEX 


533 


lo  faris,  iio ;  interview  with  M. 
Majoresco,  220 ;  impressions  of 
Paris,  223,  514;  al  Yalta,  223; 
entertained  by  Nicolas  II.,  228  ; 
letters  to  M.  Sazonoff,  230  ;  interview 
with  Queen  Eleanor,  234-236  j  last 
meeting  with  Count  Witte,  237  ; 
interview  with  Prince  Alexander  of 
Serbia,  239;  with  M.  Kokovtzoff, 
240 ;  with  M.  ZinoviefiF,  242  ;  at 
Stockholm,  245,  267,  411,  444; 
audiences  with  King  Gustaf  V.,  269, 
307,  411-413;  with  members  of  the 
Royal  Family,  270  ;  interviews  with 
M.  Wallenberg,  271,  308;  col- 
leagues, 275-277  ;  at  Malmo,  278, 
286;  excursion  in  the  "  skargaard," 
287;  interview  with  M.  Poincare, 
290,  293 ;  present  at  the  banquet, 
291-293  ;  interview  with  Herr  von 
Reichenau,  297-299 ;  advice  a^out 
Bulgaria,  302 ;  distress  on  news  of 
the  outbreak  of  war,  304 ;  help  from 
his  colleagues,  305  ;  work  for  the 
refugees,  313  ;  conferences  with  his 
colleagues,  337 ;  prediction  on  the 
Albanian  throne,  338 ;  staff  at  the 
Legation,  339 ;  relations  with  the 
Swedes,  343-345  ;  with  M.  Wallen- 
berg, 343  ;  with  the  Duke  of  Amalfi, 
360 ;  on  the  fate  reserved  for 
Russians,  369 ;  relations  with  the 
Poles,  377  ;  meeting  with  his  sons, 
386 ;  death  of  them,  386  mU,  436  ; 
interview  with  General  Polivanoff, 
387-389;  with  M.  Savinsky,  390; 
with  Prince  Galitzyn,  396  ;  at  Tsars- 
koe-Selo,  401  ;  received  by  the 
Empress  Alexandra,  402-404 ;  the 
Dowager-Empress,  404  ;  the  Grand- 
Duke  Nicolas,  404  ;  receives  mem- 
bers of  the  Duma,  413,  424,  430; 
on  the  question  of  the  Aland  Islands, 
415,  417  :  entertains  M.  Protopopoft, 
425;  interview  with  M.  Pokrovsky, 
429 ;    expedition    to    Saltsjobaden, 

430  ;  at  the  banquet  at  Hasselbaken, 

431  ;  on  M.  SazonofTs  policy,  434; 
interview  with  Stiirmer,  439 ; 
rumours  of  dismissal,  450;  on  the 
Protopopoff- Warburg  interview,  453; 
letter  to  M.  Neratoflf,  454  ;  interview 
with  M.  Rizov,  460-463 ;  telegram 
to  M.  Pokrovsky,  462 ;  adherence 
to  the  Provisional  Government,  468, 
513  ;  interview  with  Prince  Kropot- 
kin,  481-483  ;  first  encounter  with 
Bolsheviks,  483;  attends  lecture  on 
Armenian  massacres,  484  ;  interview 
with    M.    Keskula,    486-492;    ap- 


pointed Ambassador  to  Madrid,  492  ; 
leaves  Stockholm,  498  ;  journey  to 
Madrid,  499;  audiences  with  King 
Alfonso  XIII.,  500-504,  518;  pro- 
cession, 501  ;  interview  with  the 
Queen,  504 ;  with  the  Queen - 
Mother,  505,  518;  with  M.  Dato 
and  the  Marquis  de  Lema,  506  ; 
colleagues,  509  ;  at  San  Sebastian, 
509,  516  ;  telegram  toM.  Kerensky, 
517;  resignation,  518;  letter  to 
M.  Terestchenko,  519;  leaves 
Spain,  521 
Nekludoff,    Mdme.,    304;     visits    the 

wounded,  367 
Nekludoff,    Peter,    secretary    to     the 
Embassy    in   Rome,  386 ;    meeting 
with   his   father,   386 ;    death,   386 
note 
Nekludoff,    Serge,    commission,    385  ; 
meeting  with  his  father,  385  ;  killed 
in  action,  386  ?i0(e,  436 
Nelidoff,  M.  de,  34 ;  Ambassador  to 

Constantinople,  205 
Neratoff,  M,,  33,  453  ;  assistant  to  M. 
Sazonoff,  5  ;  letters  from  M.  Nek- 
ludoff, 55,  60,  454 
Nerezov,  Colonel,  adjutant,  29;  Chief 

of  Staff,  187 
Neskutchnoye,  palace  of,  402 
Neva,  the,  457 

Nicolas  II.,  Emperor  of  Russia, 
audiences  with  M.  Nekludoff,  3-5, 
74,  230-232,  399  ;  characteristics,  4, 
73,  401  ;  instructions,  4  ;  gift  to  King 
Ferdinand,  62  ;  dismisses  Rasputin, 
70,  81  ;  at  Livadia,  82,  224  ;  receives 
M.  Danev,  82  ;  at  Berlin,  168  ; 
result  of  his  telegram  proposing  to 
arbitrate  in  the  Balkan  question, 
171-174;  interview  with  General 
Dumbadze,  227  ;  affection  for  his 
daughters,  230  ;  interest  in  the  ex- 
plorations of  Sven-Hedin,  264 ; 
foreign  policy,  328  j  triumphal  jour- 
ney to  Lwow,  349;  letter  to  King 
Gustaf  v.,  356  ;  visit  to  the  Duma, 
394  ;  treatment  of  Ministers,  399 ; 
change  in  appearance,  400 ; 
criticism  on  his  weakness,  405  ; 
message  to  King  Gustaf  V,,  411  ; 
assumes  command  of  the  armies, 
419  ;  at  Mohilev,  420  ;  lessons  to 
his  son,  421  ;  curious  character,  422  ; 
receives  M.  Sazonoff,  437  ;  dismisses 
M.  Stiirmer,  451  ;  abdication,  467, 
473>  513}  prisoner  in  the  Palace  of 
Tsarskoe,  475  ;  sent  to  Tobolsk, 
486,  507 
Nicolas,  Grand-Duke,  152  ;  manifesto 


534 


INDEX 


to  the  Poles,  323-325  ;  receives  M. 
NekludofF,  404 ;  literary  works, 
404 ;  collection  of  portraits,  405  ; 
dismissal,  419 ;  appointed  Viceroy 
of  the  Caucasus,  419 ;  reconcilia- 
tion with  the  Grand-Duchess 
Vladimir,  456 ;  removal  from  St. 
Petersburg,  458 

Niemen,  the,  381 

Nikon,  Mgr.,  mission  to  Mount  Athos, 
213 

NilofF,  Admiral,  at  Livadia,  229 

Nish,  194  ;  valley,  41 

Nobel,  Emmanuel,  313  ;  at  the  Malmo 
exhibition,  277 

Novy-Sad,  157 

North  Sea  problem,  355 

Norway,  union  with  Sweden,  248 ; 
naval  spirit,  257  ;  separation  from 
Sweden,  355 

Novibazar,  40 

Novikoff,  M.,  Ambassador  in  Vienna, 
40 

Novoye  Vremya,  23,  28,  49,  56,  67, 
89  ;  articles  in  the,  471 

Nynas,  286 

Obolensky,  Princess,  maid-of-honour, 
resignation,  71 ,  relations  with  the 
Russian  Imperial  Family,  Si 

Obrenovitch,  Prince  Michael,  39 ; 
assassinated,  40 

Ochrida,  Lake,  52 

Octobrists,  the,  23 

Odier,  M.,  Minister  of  the  Swiss  Con- 
federation to  St.  Petersburg  at 
Stockholm,  421 

Odoievsky,  Prince,  lines  on  the  death 
of,  481  note 

Odrine,  annexation  of,  123 

Oesel,  island  of,  taken  by  the  Germans, 

Oldenburg,  Prince  Alexander  of, 
energy  and  unremitting  toil,  397 

Olga,  Grand-Duchess,  30 

Olga,  Queen  of  Greece,  457 

Olsafieff,  Count  Dmitri,  member  of 
the  Council  of  the  Empire,  at  Stock- 
holm, 424-427  ;  on  the  Protopopoff- 
Warburg  interview,  453 

"Opportunists,"  the,  69 

Ordyn-Nastchokin,  M.,  442.  See 
Stiirmer 

Orjevski,  General,  380 

Oscar  I.,  King  of  Sweden,  248 

Oscar  II.,  King  of  Sweden,  259; 
friendship  with  Emperor  Frederick 
III.,  259  ;  marriage,  259 

Osman  Pasha,  taken  prisoner,  152 

Osman-Nizami  Pasha  in  London,  177, 


180 ;    Ambassador   to   Berlin,    180 

note 
Osten-Sacken,  Count,  Ambassador  to 

Berlin,  21,  88,  150  ;  prophecy  on  the 

policy  of  William  II.,  282 
Osvobojdenie,  the,  376 
Ouroussoff,  Prince,  21 
Ovtche-Polie,  l8l,  190 
Oxenstjernas,  the,  246 


P ,  Count  Joseph,  324 

Pachitch,  M.,  100,  134,  135,  136,295  ; 
conferences  with  M.  Venizelos,  139; 
with  M.  Gueshov,  170  ;  on  the  pro- 
posal of  Russia  to  arbitrate  in  the 
Balkan  question,  173 

Pahlen,  Count  Constantine,  318 

Pahlen,  Mdlle.  Marie  de,  318 

Pale'i,  Princess,  401 

Palmstjerna,  Baron  de,  306 

Panafieu,  M.,  audience  with  King 
Ferdinand,  145 

Panas,  M,,  139 

Pan-Germanism,  birth  of,  255 

Paprikov,  General,  Bulgarian  Minister 
in  St  Petersburg,  63 ;  plenipoten- 
tiary for  peace,  at  Nish,  194 

Paris,  2,  17,  500  ;  impressions  of,  222, 
386,  514  ;  Treaty  of,  355 

Paul,  Grand-Duke,  221, 401  ;  character, 
401  ;  fate  of,  402 

Peipus,  Lake,  490 

Pera,  92 

Perisant,  M,,  60 

Perrichon,  M.,  case  of,  345 

Pelchevo,  194,  209 

Peter  the  Great,  346,  508  note 

Peter  III,,  Emperor  of  Russia,  258 

Peter,  King  of  Serbia,  64 ;  reply  to  the 
Emperor  of  Russia's  telegram,  172 

Peter  and  Paul  fortress,  incarcerations 
in  the,  465,  472 

Peterhead,  499 

Petrograd,  385  ;  impressions  of,  386 ; 
revolt  of  the  Soviet,  493 ;  demon- 
stration of  the  "  Red  Guard"  garrison, 
493.     See  St.  Petersburg 

Philippopolis,  123 

Pirot,  41,  194 

Plevna,  siege  of,  152 

Ploehve,  M.,  89 

Pocej,  Ignatius,  119 

Poincare,  M.,  elected  President,  145; 
visit  to  Russia,  275  ;  at  Stockholm, 
287  ;  official  reception,  289-294  ; 
banquet,  291 

Poklewski-Kosell,  M.,  311  ;  Minister 
to  Bukharest,  442  ;  intrigue  against, 
443 


INDEX 


535 


Pokrovsky,  M,,  Controller  of  the  Em- 
pire, 420  vote ;  at  Stockholm,  42S  ; 
characteristics,  428,  454 ;  interview 
with  M.  Nekludolf,  429 ;  with  M. 
Wallenberg,  429  ;  sons,  430 ;  sym- 
pathy with  M.  Nekludoff,  438 ; 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  454 ; 
telegram  from  M.  Nekludoff,  462 

Polak,  M.,  392  ;  at  Stockholm,  425 

Polak,  Mdme.,  at  Stockholm,  425 

Poland,  348 ;  atrocities  of  Germans, 
318  ;  military  operations  in,  322, 
323,  329  ;  result  of  the  partition,  324  ; 
evacuated  by  the  Russian  Army,  350  ; 
scheme  for  the  autonomy,  440 

Poles,  the,  promise  of  autonomy,  323- 
325  ;  in  Stockholm,  377  ;  character- 
istics, 377 

Polish  question,  433  ;  memoir  on  the, 
440;  alteration,  441 

Polivanoff,  General,  assistant  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  78  ;  M.  Sazonoff's 
reception,  81  ;  Minister  for  War, 
386  ;  interview  with  Nekludoff,  387- 
389 ;  work  for  the  reconstruction 
of  the  Army,  419  ;  dismissal,  419 

Pomerania,  255 

Poprikov,  General,  Bulgarian  Minister 
to  St.  Petersburg,  82 

Portsmouth,  Treaty  of,  2 

Potemkin,  mutiny,  35 

Poushkevitch,  M.,  at  the  murder  of 
Rasputin,  457 

Prisoners  of  war,  exchange  of  the 
seriously  wounded,  366-368 

Propper,  Mr.,  89 

Protopopoft",  M.,  Vice-President  of  the 
Duma,  at  Stockholm,  413,  424-427  ; 
characteristics,  413  ;  entertained  by 
M.  Nekludoff,  425  ;  interview  with 
M.  Wallenberg,  426 ;  volubility, 
426;  interview  with  M.  Warburg, 
427,  438,  452 ;  mental  condition, 
428  ;  Home  Secretary,  446  ;  reaction- 
ary policy,  447  ;  illness,  447  ;  exe- 
cution, 447  ;  ambitious  views,  452  ; 
at  Moscow,  452  J  blunders,  458  ; 
belief  in  the  reincarnation  of  Ras- 
putin's soul,  458  ;  measures  to  pro- 
voke disorder,  477 

Prussia,  254  ;  policy,  255 

Przemysl,  surrender  of,  323,  348 

Pskoff,  490 

Puschkin,  Festivity  during  the  Piague, 
237 

Radko-Dmitriev,  General,  114; 
victory  ol  Lule-Burgas,  127  ;  mission 
to  St.  Petersburg,  127  ;  instructions, 
127  J  ovation  in  his  honour,  154 


Radoslavov,  M.,  entrusted  to  form  a 
Cabinet,  196 

Radovitch,  209 

Radziwill,  Prince  Nicolas,  315 

Rasputin,  Gregory,  influence  over  the 
Empress  Alexandra,  67,  69,  73,  419  ; 
dissolute  life,  69-71  ;  a"  trezvennik," 
69;  sent  away  from  Court,  71,  81  ; 
return,  71,  81  ;  a  Khlyst,  71  fiote ; 
expelled  from  Yalta,  226  ;  flattered  by 
Ministers,  284 ;  scandal,  395,  455- 
457  ;  accepts  sums  of  money,  435  ; 
assassinated,  457  ;  funeral,  457 

"  Rasputin,"  meaning  of  the  word,  69 

Reichenau,  Baron  von,  German  Min- 
ister to  Stockholm,  277,  291  ;  inter- 
view with  M.  Nekludoff,  297-399 

Reichstadt,  20  ;  conference  at,  40 
j    Rennenkampf,  General,  319 

Retch,  article  in  the,  1 73 
]    Rhodope  Mountains,  113,  210 
i    I^ig^>    350  ;   taken    by   the   Germans, 

!    515.  516 

Rilo  range,  195 

Rilo-Dagh,  taken  by  the  Greeks,  1 95 
Ristitch,   M.,   the  Serbian  Plenipoten- 
I       tiary,  41 

I    Rizov,    M.,    hostility    to    Russia,    87  ; 
Diplomatic    Agent,    87 ;    marriage, 
I       87  ;  Minister  to  Rome,  88  ;  character- 
1        istics,  88  ;  influence  over  King  Ferdi- 
nand, 172,  174,  179;  interviews  with 
M.  Nekludoff,   174,   460-462;  Min- 
ister to  Berlin,  459  ;  death,  463 
Rodosto,  121,  126,  130 
Rodzianko,  M.,  President  of  the  Duma, 
81 ;  stirring  speech,  395  ;  suppression, 

494 

Roman  Catholicism,  power  of,  118 

Romanovski,  Colonel,  military  agent 
in  Sofia,  75,  82  ;  at  Nish,  194 

Rosen,  Baron  Leon  de,  secretary  to 
the  Russian  Legation  at  Stockholm, 
430  ;  political  views,  432  ;  speech  at 
the  Council  of  the  Empire,  432 

Rosen,  Baroness,  359 

Rosetli,  Mdme.,  149 

Rosetti-Solesco,  M.,  Rumanian  Minister 
to  St.  Petersburg,   149 

Russnoye  Slovo,  91 

Rumania,  rectification  of  the  frontiers, 
129  ;  relations  with  Russia,  149, 
151  ;  mobilisation  of  the  Army,  189  ; 
neutrality  in  the  Balkan  war,  147  ; 
relations  with  Bulgaria,  147  ;  claims 
to  Dobrudja,  147,  148,  180;  acquisi- 
tion of  territories,  153  ;  entry  into 
the  war,  303,  442,  444  ;  condition  of 
the  Army,  388  ;  geographical  posi- 
tion, 388 


53<^ 


INDEX 


Kiunania,  down  Prince  of,  at  v^ofia, 

57 
Rumanian  Army,   cross   the    Danube, 

193  ;  occupies  Northern  Bulgaria, 
^95>  ^971  aeroplane,  197;  leaves 
Varna,  201  ;  enters  Hungary,  442  ; 
evacuates  Transylvania,  445 

Rumelia,  23  ;  invasion  of,  41 

Russia,  Revolution,  2,  466 ;  relations 
with  Austria,  18  ;  with  Bulgaria,  20, 
231;  "moderanlism,"  23  ;  "Council 
of  Ministers"  or  "Cabinet,"  33; 
Asiatic  Department,  48 ;  proposed 
convention  with  Bulgaria,  74;  in- 
adequate preparations,  78,  1 00,  24 1, 
296 ;  possession  of  Constantinople, 
117;  rule  of  the  "prohibited  area," 
122,  125  ;  supports  Serbia's  claim, 
134 ;  cession  of  Dobrudja,  147 ; 
relations  with  Rumania,  149,  151; 
proposed  arbitration  in  the  Balkan 
question,  170-174;  checks  advance 
of  the  Turks,  201 ;  relations  with 
Greece,  204  ;  policy  in  the  Near  East, 
205,  207 ;  renewal  of  influence  in 
Greece  and  Rumania,  214;  spirit 
monopolies,  240  ;  relations  with  Ger- 
many, 261 ;  construction  of  the 
Murman  railway,  264,  336  note^  344 ; 
ultimatum  from  Germany,  283,  296, 
301 ;  "  robust"  optimism,  283  ;  policy 
of  Ministers,  284  ;  the  need  to  collect 
he>self,22>$  ;  on  neutrality  of  Sweden, 
309 ;  defeat  of  the  army,  319  ;  policy, 
327  ;  rule  in  Galicia,  329  ;  trade  with 
Sweden,  335,  336;  need  to  secure 
transit  through,  336  ;  secret  intelli- 
gence methods,  340;  relations  with 
Sweden,  343-345,  432  ;  secession  of 
Finland,  347  ;  negotiations  for  peace, 
351  ;  concession  to  Sweden  in  1856, 
355  ;  elimination  of  the  clause  at  the 
Conference  of  London,  355  ;  rights 
in  the  Aland  Islands,  356  ;  ravages 
of  the  Mongolians,  379  note ;  reorgan- 
isation of  the  Army,  387  ;  railway 
system,  389  ;  discontent  of  the  lower 
class,  406 ;  influence  of  German 
agents,  408-410,  477,  478 ;  result  of 
the  reverses,  409  ;  internal  condition, 
446,  447  ;  Provisional  Government, 
467 ;  illusions  on  the  Revolution,  469- 
472;  views 'of  the  Western  Allies, 
469-471 ;  massacres,  475  ;  action  of 
the  Fleet,  475  ;  origin  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, 476;  Government  and  the 
"  people,"  conflict  between,  479  ;  the 
trepak  or  national  dance,  485  ;  demon- 
stration of  "the  Red  Guard,"  493; 
Republic  proclaimed,  511 


Russian  Army,  condition,  95  ;  military 
operations  in  East  Prussia,  319,  349  ; 
in  Galicia,  322,  329,  348,  423,  424, 
500  ;  ascent  of  the  Carpathians,  323 ; 
forced  to  retire,  349 ;  evacuates 
Poland  and  Galicia,  350 ;  retreat, 
350  ;  captures  Lutsk,  424 ;  evacuates 
Transylvania,  445  ;  adherence  to 
Provisional  Government,  467,  471  ; 
Prikase  No.  1,476;  reserve  regiments 
of  the  Guard,  revolt,  478  ;  army  of 
treachery,  forming,  485  ;  dissolution, 
497  ;  behaviour  of  the  deserters,  497  ; 
refusal  to  fight,  500;  demoralisation, 
511;  flight,  511 

Russian  Fleet,  at  Varna,  34-36 ;  as- 
sassination of  the  Admirals,  475 

Russian  prisoners,  treatment,  362-365  ; 
result  of  German  propaganda,  363, 
368 ;  officers,  370 

Russian  refugees,  treatment  in  Germany, 
j  313,  317  ;  in  Sweden,  314,  321 ; 
I       Committee  formed,  358 

Russians,  monastic  faith,  206  ;  charac- 
I  teristics,  347  wo/c,  369 ;  future  of, 
I       369;  in  Paris,  514 

Russo-British  Entente,  2 

Rustchuk,  220 

Ruthenes,  the,  329 

!    Sabler,M.,  Counsellor  to  the  Legation, 

introduction  to  King  Ferdinand,  144  ; 

Procurator  of  the  Holy  Synod,  145  ; 

reactionary  policy,  284 
Saburoff,  M.  Andrew,  member  of  the 

Council  of  the  Empire,  398 
St.Alexander  Nevsky,  Cathedral  of,  154 
St.  Pantelaimon,  Monastery  of,  206 
St.  Petersburg,  i,  385 ;  Conference  of 

Ambassadors,    152;    entertainment'; 

in,  236 ;  destruction  of  the  German 

Embassy,  240;  impressions  of,  439; 

police  measures,  465  ;  disorders,  466  ; 

revolution,   466,    478 ;    reception  of 

convicts  and    political   exiles,   480 ; 

population,  492 ;  revolt  of  the  Soviet, 

493.     See  Petrograd 
St.  Sophia,  119 
Salonika,    41 ;    occupied    by    Greeks, 

132;  by  Bulgarians,   169 
Saltsjobaden,  430 
Samara,  standard  of,  290 
Samarine,  Alexander,  171 
Samokov,   197 

Samothrace,  island  of,  126,  130 
Samsonoff,   General,   77;  annihilation 

of  his  army,  319 
San,  the,  349 
San  Giovanni,    132 
San  Sebastian,  509,  521 


INDEX 


537 


San  Stefano,  122  ;  Treaty  of,  41,  42, 
217 

Santander,  509 

Sassnitz,  313,  366 

Savinsky,  M.  A.,  Minister  to  Stockholm, 
85  ;  to  Sofia,  86,  91  ;  removal  from 
Sweden,  222  ;  difficulty  of  his  posi- 
tion, 265  ;  illness,  390  ;  warnings  on 
the  Bulgarian  peril,  390  ;  audience 
with  King  Ferdinand,  391  ;  policy, 
392 

Savov,  General,  prosecution,  26  ;  Com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  Bulgarian 
Army,  168 ;  conference  with  M. 
Nekludoff,  174  ;  protest  against 
sending  a  delegate  to  St.  Petersburg, 
183 ;  instructions  from  King  Ferdi- 
nand, 188 ;  plenipotentiary  for  the 
settlement  with  the  Porte,  209 

Sazonoff,  Mdme.,  398  note 

SazonofF,  M.,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  I  ;  career,  i  ;  illness,  5  ;  at 
Davos,  5 ;  return  to  St.  Petersburg, 
5  ;  under  the  influence  of  Stolypin, 
32  ;  improvement  in  his  health,  39, 
45  ;  interviews  with  M.  Nekludoff, 
45.  71.  74.  77.  221,  386,  437,  438; 
on  an  alliance  between  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia,  45  ;  return  from  Davos,  55  j 
reception,  79 ;  telegrams  from  M. 
Nekludoff,  96,  171  ;  to  him,  125; 
presides  at  the  Conference  of  Am- 
bassadors, 152  ;  friendship  with 
Mdlle.  Milutin,  167  ;  on  the  inde- 
pendence of  Mount  Athos,  203,  207, 
213;  protest  against  advance  of  the 
Turkish  troops,  208 ;  his  foreign 
policy,  215,  434;  optimism,  221, 
243  ;  letters  from  M.  Nekludoff,  230; 
policy  of  reforms,  284  :  advice  from 
M.  Nekludoff,  302  ;  the  Aland 
Islands,  415  ;  remains  in  office,  420  ; 
resignation,  433,  437 ;  received  by 
Nicolas  II.,  437  ;  minute  on  the 
Polish  question,  440 ;  on  the  entry 
of  Rumania  into  the  war,  443 
Scandinavian  Sovereigns,  meeting    of, 

330 

Scavenius,  Mdme,,  276 

Scavenius,  M.,  Danish  Minister  to 
Stockholm,  276 

Schakhowsky,  Prince,  reactionary 
policy,  284 

Schebeko,  Nicolas,  career,  150  ; 
Counsellor  to  the  Embassy  in  Berlin, 
150  J  Minister  to  Bukharest,  150, 
208 ;  Ambassador  to  Vienna,  220 ; 
return  from  St.  Petersburg,  280 ; 
scepticism,  283  ;  delay  in  his  inter- 
vention, 283 


Scherbatcheff,  General,  in  command  of 
the  reserve  army,  388  ;  reoccupies  the 
Bukowina,  424 
Schiller,  J.  C.  F.,  history  of  the  Thirty 

Years'  War,  256 
Schilling,   Baron,  91,  443  ;  letter  from 
M.  Nekludoff,  218  ;  advice  from  him, 
302 
Schingareff,    M.,   at   Stockholm,    413, 
414,  430  ;  character,  431  ;  speeches, 
431  ;     murdered,    431  ;     advice     to 
Protopopoff,  447 
Schipka  Pass,  attack  on,  loi  ;  Veterans' 

Fete,  loi 
Schischman,  John   Samuel,    Bulgarian 

Tsar,  192 
Schuvaloft,  Countess  Betty,  ball  given 

by,  238 
Schuvaloff,    Count  Peter,  Ambassador 

in  London,  40 
Scutari,     siege     of,    116;     annexation 

vetoed,  129 
Sementovsky,  Mdme.,  88 
Sementovsky,  M.,  Russian  Minister  to 
Sofia,  death,  I,  3  ;  relations  with  King 
Ferdinand,  2 
Serbia,    relations    with    Bulgaria,    38, 
135.  '37.  161,  239;  principal  phases, 
39-43  ;  war   with  Turkey,  40,   1 1 1 ; 
negotiations    with    Bulgaria,   52-57 ; 
demarcation  of  the  frontier,  52,    53, 
55, 203,  209,  211;  settled,  56 ;  agree- 
ment  with    Bulgaria,    56,    64,    230 ; 
military    convention    with,   96,   98 ; 
alliance  with  Greece,  98,  163,  169  ; 
agreement   with    Montenegro,     103 ; 
mobilisation  of  the  Army,  108-II0; 
outlet  to  the  Adriatic,  128,  132-135  ; 
acquisition  of  territories,  132  ;  siege 
of  Adrianople,    134;    relations   with 
Greece,  135,  137  ;  with  Russia,  164; 
claims  in  Macedonia,  164 ;  prepara- 
tions    for     war,     l8l  ;     loyalty     to 
Russia,   214;    ultimatum   from  Ger- 
many,   280,   288,   290 ;   reply,   294 ; 
atrocities  of  Germans,  318 
Serbia,   Crown   Prince    Alexander   of, 
invasion  of  Eastern  Rumelia,  41  ;  at 
Sofia,  57  ;  tact,    58 ;  departure  from 
Belgrade,  loi  ;  at  Krivolak,  190  ;  at 
St.    Petersburg,    239 ;    on   relations 
between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  239 
Serbian  Army,  defeated    at  Slivnitza, 
41  ;  defeats  the  Turks,  112;  partici- 
pate in  the  taking  of  Adrianople,  155 
attacked   by   Bulgarians,    185,    189 
victory  over  them,  190 
Serbian  Mussulmans  in  Bosnia,  157 
Seres,  209 
Sereth,  the,  445 


538 


INDEX 


Serge  Mikhailovitch,  Grand-Duke,  78, 

402 
Sergueieff,  Capt.,  wounded,  371 
Sievers,  General,  forced  to  retire,  349 
Silistria,  147  ;  ced^d  to  Rumania,  153 
Skirmunt,  M.,  378 

Skoplie,  III  ;  occupied  by  Serbians, 
112 

Skoropadsky,  Colonel,  315 

Slatin-Pasha,  at  the  conference  at 
Stockholm,  364 

Slivnitza,  defeat  at,  41 

Slovaks,  surrender,  323 

Smolensk,  379 

Sobanski,  Count,  378 

Sobranjd,  the  Great,  convened  at 
Tirnova,  28 

Sofia,  school  for  officers,  II  j  festivities 
at,  57  ;  troops  from  Macedonia,  96  ; 
Schipka  Veterans'  Fete,  loi  ;  services 
in  the  Cathedral,  102,  145,  146  ; 
military  hospital,  165  ;  skirmish  of 
reservists,  216;  march  past  of  the 
troops,  2x8 

Solovieff,  M. ,  Counsellor  to  the  Russian 
Embassy  in  Madrid,  disapproval  of 
M.  Nekludoff  s  telegram,  520  j  dis- 
missed, 521  ;  in  Poland,  521 

Sophia,  Queen,  of  Sweden,  259 ; 
characteristics,  259 

Sound,  the,  German  destroyers  in, 
287 

Soviet,  the,  treatment  of  Nicolas  II., 
475  ;  power,  478  ;  organ  of  German 
policy,  486 

Spain,  the  Guardia  Civil,  506 

Spain,  Archduke  Albert,  505 

Spain,  Archduke  Charles,  505 

SpalaiTcovitch,  M,,  characteristics,  53  ; 
conversations  with  M.  Nekludoff",  133, 
I37i  170 ;  on  the  Serbian  claims  to 
territory,  133  ;  suggestion  to  Belgrade, 
136 ;  suspicions  of  the  Bulgarians, 
137  ;  at  Tsaribrod,  170 

Spaniards,  characteristics,  510 

Spitsberg,  Conference,  302 

Staaf,  M.,  265 

Stakovitch,  M.,  appointed  Ambassador 
to  Madrid,  520 

Stamboulov,  M.,  omnipotence,  8; 
resignation,  9  ;  assassinated,  10 

Stambul,  92 

Stana,  Grand-Duchess,  69 

Stara-Zagora  (Eski-Zagra),  battle  of, 
102 


Stjerrenstett,  Mdme.  Marika,  lecture  at 
the  Auditorium  meeting,  483 

Stock  Exchange  Gazette,  89 

Stockholm,  245,464  ;  Riksdag  of  "  the 
National  Defence,"  279 ;  Requiem 
Mass  for  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand, 286  ;  reception  of  M.  Poincar^, 
289-294  ;  banquet,  291  ;  panic,  301  ; 
work  of  the  committee  for  the 
prisoners  of  war,  359 ;  conferences  at, 
364 ;  commercial  amateurs,  382 ; 
Secret-Service  agents,  383  ;  German 
spies,  383  ;  members  of  the  Duma, 
413  ;  meeting  in  the  Auditorium,  483 

Stohed,  marshes  of  the,  436 

Stolypin,  Michael,  killed  in  a  duel,  31 

Stolypin,  Pelia,  assassinated,  31  ; 
characteristics,  31,  32  ;  attempt  on 
his  life,  31  ;  tendency  to  despotism, 
32  ;  foreign  policy,  32 ;  influence 
over  M.  Sazonoff,  32;  protection  of 
the  Lithuanians,   380 

Stolypin,  Mdme.  Peter,  298  note 

Stromberg,  M.,  358 

Struma,  the,  194,  208,  209 

Struve,  Peter,  at  Stockholm,  376 ; 
edits  the  Osvobojdenie,  376 ;  head  of 
the  service  of  economic  studies,  376 

Stiirmer,  M.,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  86,  433,  439 ;  President  of 
the  Council,  393  ;  President  of  the 
Zemstvo  at  Tver,  393 ;  Provincial 
Governor,  394 ;  mission  to,  394 ; 
characteristic,  394,  439;  policy,  418  ; 
influence  over  Empress  Alexandra, 
419.  435  5  bad  reputation,  435  ; 
German  origin,  435  ;  appearance, 
439 ;  interview  with  M.  Nekludoff", 
439 ;  ultimatum-writ  to  Rumania, 
442 ;  arraignment  of  his  private 
secretary,  446  ;  retirement,  450 

Sudermania,  Duke  of,  248.  See  Charles 
XIII. 

Sukhomlinoff",  General,  Minister  for 
War,  78,  80 

Sumarokoff-Elston,  Count  Felix,  at  the 
murder  of  Rasputin,  457 

Svatikoff",  M,,  515 

Sven-Hedin,  263  ;  explorations,  264  ; 
received  by  Nicolas  II.,  264  ;  on  the 
Russian  danger,  265  ;  result  of  his 
visits  to  the  German  armies,  342 

Sverbeieff',  M.,  at  Vienna,  95,  100  ;  Am- 
bassador to  Berlin,  98,  281  ;  on  leave, 
280  ;  characteristics,  281  ;  limitations, 
282  ;  treatment  in  Berlin,  316 

Sviatopolk-Mirsky,  Prince,  Home 
Secretary,  399 

Sweden,  history,  246-252  ;  enmity  to 
Russia,    246  ;  administration,    247  ; 


INDEX 


539 


naval  engagements,  247  ;  loss  of 
Finland,  248  ;  union  with  Norway, 
348  ;  Diet  replaced  by  two  Chambers, 
249 ;  the  Riddarehuset,  249  ;  educa- 
tion, 250  ;  iron  mines,  250  ;  Socialism, 
250 ;  aristocratic  and  democratic, 
251  ;  population,  251  ;  friendship 
with  France,  254;  relations  with 
Germany,  255-258  ;  trade  with,  257, 
337  ;  influence  of,  259-262 ;  fear  of 
aggressive  policy  of  Russia,  263  ;  the 
fiondestog  or  peasants'  procession, 
266 ;  resignation  of  the  Liberal 
Cabinet,  266  ;  Chamber  of  "National 
Defence,"  267  ;  dissolved,  330  ;  pro- 
posals of  alliance  from  Germany,  272  ; 
the  Russian  colony,  274 ;  policy  of 
neutrality,  306-316;  belief  in  Ger- 
many's invincibility,  310,  321  ; 
number  of  refugees,  313,  358;  treat- 
ment of  them,  314,  321,  358  ;  export 
trade,  332 ;  geographical  position, 
333;  restriction  of  imports,  333- 
336;  position  of  international  trade, 
334-337 ;  need  for  coal  and  other 
commodities,  334;  Russia's  need  to 
secure  transit  through,  336 ;  orders 
from,  336;  relations  with,  343-345, 
432  ;  work  of  the  Red  Cross,  345, 
364 ;  system  of  telephony,  346 ; 
political  and  social  organisation, 
346 ;  policy  of  the  Activists,  348, 
350  ;  aversion  to  war,  350  ;  pacificist 
current,  352;  result  of  the  blockade, 
353;  custom  of  Yui-Klappor,  353; 
concession  made  by  Russia  in  1856, 
355  !  separation  from  Norway,  355  ; 
work  for  the  prisoners,  359;  ad- 
ministration of  Esthonia,  489  ;  the 
new  Cabinet,  498 
Sweden,  Crown  Prince  of,  270 
Swedes,  the,  characteristics,  252,  253 ; 
patriotism,  252;  "Spaniards  of  the 
North,"  253 ;  belief  in  Germany, 
320-322 ;  danger  of  an  alliance, 
322  ;  relations  with  Germans,  343  ; 
treatment  of  refugees,  345 ;  con- 
tamination from  foreign  elements,  384 
Syria,  condition  of,  22 

M.,  396 


Talaats,  the,  23 

Tango,  the,  in  Paris,  223 

Tannenwald,  battle  of,  379 

Tarnowski,  Count,  109;  council,  187 

Tatar-Budjaks,  the,  147 

Tatiana,     Grand     Duchess,      30 ;     at 

Livadia,  229  ;  unknown  fate,  229 
TatischeflF,  Serge,  9 
Taube,  Baron,  36 


Tchkeidze,  M.,  Socialist,  467  ;  ridicules 
Prince  Galitzyn's  speech,  477 

Teheran,  49 

Terestchenko,  M.,  appointed  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  494 ;  charac- 
teristics, 495  ;  letter  from  M. 
Nekludoff,  519 

Thasos,  island  of,  1 26 

Theodore,  Tsar  of  Russia,  423,  491 

Theodorov,  M.,  25  note.     See  Todorov 

Thiebaud,  M.,  French  Minister  to 
Sweden,  275,  308  ;  work,  340 

Thomas,  M.  Albert,  Minister  of 
Munitions,  at  Stockholm,  414 ; 
appearance,  414  ;  mission  to  Russia, 

499 

Thrace,  129  ;  condition,  22  ;  military 
operations  in,  123;  cession,  130; 
occupied,  209 

Times,  the,  article  in,  463  nofe 

Tirnova,  28,  91  ;  Jubilee  celebrations, 
105  ;  earthquake,  182 

Tisza,  M.,  326 

Tobolsk,  496 

Todorov,  General,  expedition  against 
Salonika,  113 

Todorov,  M,,  172;  Bulgarian  Minister 
of  Finance,  25  ;  Serbo-Bulgarian 
relations,  38  ;  on  the  demarcation  of 
the  frontier,  53 ;  on  the  financial 
difficulties  of  King  Ferdinand,  59  ; 
journey  to  St,  Petersburg,  126; 
conference  with  M.  Nekludoff,  174  ; 
member  of  the  Cabinet,  179  ;  on  the 
decision  to  send  a  delegate  to  St. 
Petersburg,  182.     See  Theodorov 

Tolstoy,  Count  Alexis,  verses,  423 

Tolstoy,  Count  Leo,  423  note 

Tommasini,  M.,  Italian  Minister  to 
Sweden,  276  ;  characteristics,  337  ; 
work,  340 

Tommasini,  Mdme,,  276 

Tontchev,  M.,  member  of  the  Cabinet, 
196  ;  plenipotentiary  for  the  settle- 
ment with  the  Porte,  209 

Tornea,  366 

Torres,  Senor  de,  361 

Trans-Siberian  Railway,  265  note 

Transylvania,  evacuated,  445 

Trelleborg,  366 

Trench-warfare,  329 

Trepak  or  Russian  dance,  485 

Trepoff,  Alexander,  Minister  of  Ways 
and  Communications,  451  ;  appointed 
Prime  Minister,  451  ;  colleagues, 
452  ;  resignation,  458 

Trn,  195 

Trondhjem,  263 

Trotsky,  M.,  485,  520 

Tsaribrod,  conference  at,  170 


540 


INDEX 


Tsarskot-Selo,  5,  72,  401  ;  Palace,  72  ; 
rebel  soldiers  of  the  garrison,  473 

Tseretelli,  M.,  Socialist,  467 

TurgenefT,  Ivan,  "  On  the  Eve,"  165 

Turkey,  Christian  nations  of,  18 ; 
revolution,  18,  19;  policy  of  the 
Young  Turks,  22  j  war  with  Italy, 
37.  96  ;  with  Serbia,  40  ;  with  the 
i5alkan  States,  1 1 1  ;  German  influence 
in,  123  ;  frontier,  125  ;  negotiations 
for  peace,  128;  annulment,  130; 
armistice,  155,  169  ;  result  of  domina- 
tion over  the  Bulgarians,  157 ; 
relations  with  Serbians,  Greeks  and 
Albanians,  157  ;  peace  signed,  169  ; 
cession  of  territories,  203  ;  co-opera- 
tion with  Gemany,  215  ;  entry  into 
the  war,  329 

Turkhan  Pasha,  Ottoman  Ambassador, 
208 

Turkish  Army,  strength  and  equipment, 
94,  104;  defeated,  in,  112,  329, 
348  ;  surrender  to  the  Cheeks  and 
Bidgarians,  113;  demoralisation, 
114;  demobilisation  of  the  army, 
191  ;  advance  on  Bulgaria,  193, 
201  ;  on  Adrianople,  195  ;  retake 
Adrianople,  197,  208 

Turkish  prisoners  on  the  island  of 
Maritza,  156  ;  treatment  by  the 
Bulgarians,  156 

Turks,  the,  founders  of  the  Ottoman 
empire,  347  note;  characteristics, 
347  note 

Tutcheff,  Mdlle.,  maid-of-honour,  resig- 
nation, 71  ;  relations  with  the  Russian 
Imperial  Family,  81 

Tutrukan,  147,  210 

Tver,  province  of,  393 

Tziganes,  the,  147 


UcHiDA,    M.,    Japanese    Minister    to 

Sweden,  276 
Uchida,  Mdme.,  276 
Ukraine,  the,  independence  proclaimed, 

497 
Uniate  clergy,  persecution  of,  329 
United  States,  number  of  Lithuanians 

in,  381 
Upsala  University,  266 
Ural-Altaic  race,  347  7iote 
Uskub,  11^ 


Vaduz,  44 
Varangians,  the,  246 
Vardar,  the,  190,  194,  208,  209 
Varna,  147,  201  ;  Russian  Squadron  at, 
34-36 


Vassiltchikoff,  Alexander,  43 

Vassiltchikofif,  Mdlle.  Macha,  appear- 
ance, 43  ;  journey  to  Vaduz,  44  ; 
meetings    with    M.    Nekludoft,    44, 

372  ;   at   Stockholm,    372  ;    on   the 
treatment  of  prisoners  in   Germany, 

373  ;    advice    from    M.    Nekludoff, 
374;  expelled  from  St.  Petersburg, 

375 

Vassilieff,  Professor,  member  of  the 
Council  of  the  Empire,  at  Stockholm, 
424-427 

Venizelos,  M.,  282  ;  Prime  Minister  of 
Greece,  137  ;  conferences  at  Belgrade, 
139  ;  interview  with  M.  Nekludoff, 
139-I41  ;  characteristics,  139 ;  out- 
line (jf  the  frontier,  140 

Victoria,  Queen  of  Spain,  receives  M. 
Nekludoff,  504  ;  appearance,  504 

Victoria,  Queen  of  Sweden,  sympathies 
with  Germany,  260 ;  characteristics, 
261  ;  receives  M.  Nekludoff,  270; 
visits  the  wounded,  367 

N'ienna,  17,  98  ;  impressions  of,  236 

Vilna,  union  with  Cracow,  379 

Vitosch  Pass,  198 

Viviani,  M.,  at  Stockholm,  290 

Vladimir,  Grand-Duchess,  21  ;  gift  to 
King  Ferdinand,  62  ;  reconciliation 
with  the  Grand-Duke  Nicolas,  456 

Vladimir,  Grand-Duke,  211  ;  death, 
21 

Volhynia,  350,  386  tiote,  433 

Volkoff,  Alexander,  373  ;  on  the  origin 
of  the  war,  374 

Vrana,  59,  143,  145 

Vulture^  the,  499 

Vyrubova,  Anna,  69  ;  at  Livadia,  227, 
229 


Wallenberg,  M.  Knut,  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  267  ;  interview  with 
M.  Nekludoff,  271  ;  on  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace,  271,  300,  352;  friend- 
ship with  King  Gustaf  V.,  273 ; 
founder  of  the  "  Banque  des  Pays  du 
Nord,"  274  ;  visit  to  Paris  and  Berlin, 
274  ;  on  neutrality  of  Sweden,  306 ; 
character  of  his  policy,  309  ;  extension 
of  his  term  of  office,  330 ;  relations 
with  M.  Nekludoff,  343;  on  the 
question  of  the  Aland  Islands, 
417,  444;  interview  with  M.  Pro- 
topopoff,  426  ;  with  M.  Pokrovsky, 
429 

Wangenheim,  Baron  von.  Ambassador 
to  Constantinople,  93 ;  military 
instructor  of  the  Ottoman  Army, 
♦  20 


INDEX 


541 


Warburg,  M.,  interview  with  M. 
Protopopoff,  427,  438  ;  controversy 
on  the  meeling,  452 

Warsaw,  323,  329,  348 

Weckerlc,  M.,  326 

Wied,  Prince  of,  Mpret  of  Albania, 
338 

Wielopolski,  Count  Sigismund,  mem- 
ber of  the  Council  of  the  Empire,  at 
Stockholm,  430;  on  the  Polish 
question,  433  ;  death  of  his  son,  437 

Willard,  Mr.,  American  Ambassador 
to  Madrid,  509 

William  I.,  Emperor  of  Germany,  260 

William    II.,    Emperor   of  Germany, 
treatment    of   the    Bulgarians,    58 
marriage     of    his    daughter,     168 
audience  with  M.  Kokovtzoff,  223 
at  the  interview  of  Konopischt,  280 
extreme    measures    against     Russia, 
283 ;    cruise     in      the     Norwegian 
Fjords,  286 

William  Prince  of  Sweden,  divorce, 
221,  244;  popularity,  271 

Winter  Palace,  style  of  furniture,  43 

Witte,  Count,  21  ;  apprehensions  of 
the  future,  237  ;  death,  238 


Woian,  255 
Xerxes,  204  note 


Yalta,  223 

Yermoloff,  Alexis,  Minister  of  Agri- 
culture, 398 

Yser,  the,  320 

Yudenitch,  General,  victory  in  the 
Caucasus,  348 

Yjil-Klappor,  custom  in  Sweden,  353 

Yussupofi",  Princess  Zenaida,  effort  to 
stop  the  Rasputin  scandal,  455  ;  son, 
457  tiote 


ZiMMERMANN,  M.,  275 

Zimmenvaldians,  the,  481 

Zinovieff,  M.,  Ambassador  to  Con- 
stantinople, 21,  205;  interview  with 
M.  Nekludoff,  242 

Zorn,  M.,  271 

Zrny-Vrch,  assault  on,  112 

Zveguinlzoft',  M.,  member  of  the 
Council  of  the  Empire,  at  Stockholm, 
453 


THE  END 


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CI  39 

UCSD  Libr.