Diplomatic reminiscences before and during the world war, 1911-1917

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DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES

DIPLOMATIC
REMINISCENCES

BEFORE AND DURING THE
WORLD WAR, IgQ1I—1917
BY A. NEKLUDOFF
FORMERLY RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SOFIA AND AT STOCKHOLM

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
BY ALEXANDRA PAGET

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1920

PREFACE

My Diplomatic Reminiscences include the period
between February, 1911, when I was appointed
Russian Minister to Sofia, and September, 1917, when
I put an end to my ephemeral term of office in Madrid
by refusing my further services to M. Kerensky's
Government.

The first fourteen chapters deal with my work in
Bulgaria and with the two Balkan Wars, that of
1912 and that of 1913, which form the prelude to the
catastrophe of 1914. The succeeding chapters have
to do with Sweden, with the World-War and with
the Russian Revolution as I saw them from my post
in Stockholm.

In my Reminiscences I describe what came under
my notice, not disdaining small touches; I note what
I was able to gather; but as by virtue of my diplomatic
position my range of vision and my information were
limited, I in no way aspire to explain the whole of the
great drama which has just been performed. Moreover,
circumstances have obliged me to compile my work far
away from sources at which I might have refreshed and
verified my impressions,’ and consequently there are
a few inevitable gaps in the narrative, probably also a
few inexactitudes and some errors in dates. I tender
my apologies beforehand to the reader for these
involuntary errata, and I leave them to become the
prey of those who might wish to profit by them to
invalidate my testimony when this testimony does not
suit them.

1 My Reminiscences were written at Nice between June, 1918, and
July, 1919.

VI PREFACE

Nevertheless I venture to cherish the hope that the
faithful description of what I have been enabled to see,
to hear and to know, and even the judgments that I
pass—in all sincerity—on men and matters, will form a
contribution to the study of those events which have
destroyed an entire world, and which are inaugurating
a new and unknown order of things.

This order of things is greeted by some with
ecstasy; others view it with terror; others ‘again hope
to exploit it to their own advantage or to that of their
old moral and political conceptions which they are
striving to disguise as best they can.

I prefer to confess at once that—although sincerely
deploring the disappearance of a world to which I was
bound by my former habits, my mentality and my
work—I do not suffer from any illusion as to the
possible return of this old world, of this ancient order
of things. And more especially must I realise this —
where it is a question of Russia and of her future
destinies.

All of us who have taken an active part in the
tremendous events which have just occurred, belong
to an irrevocable past, and history is already preparing
to engrave our final sentence on its tables of bronze.

That is why—contrary to established custom—I
have allowed myself, in the course of these Reminis-
cences, to judge my contemporaries with complete
frankness, and to say all I think about them and the
part they have played, when I have observed them,
heard them or seen them act. And the dead—I
bury my dead as my conscience dictates: To some—
the pomp of a national funeral, the mournful chants of
Melpomene, the fumes of incense and of smouldering
torches; to others—the modest procession of relatives
and a few friends; to others again—the felon’s end.

A. N.
Feb. 16, 1920,

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA
; vs PAGES
My former relations with M. Sazonoff—Scheme for a Russo-Bulgarian
military convention—Question of relations with King Ferdinand—
Audience of the Emperor; H.I.M. gives me his instructions—Serious
illness of M, Sazonofi—I leave for Sofia . ; - : 3 » 1-6

CHAPTER II
KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA

His youth ; his sudden rise to power—First years of his reign—His recon-
ciliation with Russia—Relations between the King and the people;
the King’s janizaries—Moral and volitical portrait of Ferdinand; his
distrust ; his irresolution : : - ; 7-15

CHAPTER Ut

BULGARIA IN IQII

My audience of the King—Fall of the Malinov Cabinet ; its antecedents—
The Turkish Revolution of 1908—The crisis of the annexation of
Bosnia ; complete independence of Bulgaria ; we favour the new King-
dom in the settlement of the crisis—Ulterior Bulgarian ambitions
dictate the formation of a new Nationalist and essentially Russophile
Cabinet ; : : . : “ , ° : : 16-24

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN AND BULGARIAN RELATIONS

M. John Gueshov—M. Todorov—M. Danev; my first conversation with
him—My relations with Gueshov—The Great Sobranjé of Tirnova in
June, 1911—Visit to Russia of the Crown-Prince Boris ; matrimonial
schemes—Death of M. Stolypin ; his characteristics ; influence of his
disappearance on the foreign policy of Russia—Visit of the Russian
Squadron to Varna—Outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war . : 25-37

CHAPTER V
SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

Serbo-Bulgarian relations ; the Bulgarians enter on fresh parleyings with
the Serbians—Historical statement of Russian action with regard to
the Serbians and Bulgarians—My journey to Davos—An unexpected
meeting—Conversation with M. Sazonoff—Return by Belgrade; con-
versation with M. Hartwig; characteristics of the latter . : 38-51

Vill CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI
THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY. PAGES

Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations—Demarcation of the ‘‘ spheres of influence ”
in Macedonia—Fixing boundaries—Conversations with the King—I
warn St. Petersburg of the dangers which might result from a Serbo-
Bulgarian alliance—The alliance is concluded with our approval—
Festivities for the coming-of-age of Prince Boris—Personal service
rendered to King Ferdinand by H.I.M. the Emperor—Audience of the
King before my departure for St. Petersburg—Ferdinand’s perplexities
and suspicions . - s : : : : : 52-66

CHAPTER VII
RASPUTIN

Arrival in St. Petersburg; violent speech by M. Gutchkoff at the Duma—
Rasputin ; his peculiarities become a subject for scandal; his influence
—Mlle. Tutcheff—Audience of H.I.M. the Emperor—The Empress
Alexandra spends an afternoon in St. Petersburg —Conversation with
General Jilinsky, the Chief of the General Staff—Conversations with
MM. Kokovtzoff and Gutchkoff ; drawing-room gossip—Reception at
the Sazonoffs’ ; the ‘* Rasputin crisis” is successfully settled—I return
to Sofia < : F : : : : B : 5 67-85

CHAPTER VIII

INTRIGUES AT SOFIA

Bulgarian ‘‘ activist” party; M. Danev’s journey to Russia— Colonel
Merrone—Italian military circles know of the Serbo-Bulgarian agree-
ment—Intrigues directed against me; I fall into disfavour with
Ferdinand ; the King’s candidates for my post; M. Rizov enters the
arena—M. Schelking—A brother-in-law of my predecessor—My recon-
ciliation with the King—Rumours of my recall—Journey to Constanti-
nople ; conversations with M. de Giers and with General Holmsen ;
their opinion of the Turkish Army—Political ,ferment in Sofia and
Belgrade; my telegram of the 4th July; my warning disregarded ;
Kotchana and Ishtib incidents—M. Gutchkoff in Sofia and Belgrade—
Prince Alexander goes to inspect the army—The Schipka Veterans’
Féte; ‘Sit is war! ”—M. de Giers warns bulgaria—Europe does not
believe it—Jubilee for the twenty-five years’ reign of Ferdinand—M.
Sazonoff’s apathy . ; B a : : 5 ; : 82-107

CHAPTER Ix

THE BALKAN WAR, IQ1f2

Mobilisation of the Balkan allies; futile protests of the Cabinets; war
breaks out—First decisive successes of the Allies—Lozengrad taken
—Greco-Bulgarian incident at Salonika—Victory of Lule-Burgas;
Bulgarians and Greeks at Salonika; torrential rains alone stop the
Bulgarian advance—King Ferdinand’s elation ; his inordinate ambition ;
his dreams—Reverse of Chataldja—In St. Petersburg the question of
the ‘* prohibited area” in Thrace is raised ; I succeed in causing this
prohibition to be removed— Russian concessions—Ferdinand wishes to
have Rodosto at any cost—General Radko-Dmitriev’s mission to St.
Petersburg—The Bulgarians allow the propitious moment for the con-
clusion of peace to escape ‘ : ‘ 4 : i - 108-131

CONTENTS ix

CHAPTER X
THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 (continued) PAGES

The Serbians, having to renounce an outlet to the Adriatic, demand com-
pensations in Macedonia—My conversations on the subject with my
Serbian colleague—Serbtan claims—Visit of M. Venizelos to Sofia ;
our conversation—My advice to Gueshov; his powerlessness—Two
_ Meetings with Ferdinand ; the French Minister’s audience of the King ;

The German Minister’s audience—Bulgaro-Rumanian relations ; the
Dobrudja—Russo-Rumanian relations; M. Rosetti-Solesco; our
representatives at Bukharest; succeeded by M. Nicolas Schebeko ;
jubilee of the annexation of Bessarabia; commencement of the Russo-
Rumanian intimacy—Rectification of the Dobrudja frontier in favour

of Rumania . A : R 3 : = : : - 132-153

CHAPTER XI
QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES '

Capture of Adrianople—Quarrels with the Serbians—Bulgarian cruelties ;
the character of the Bulgarian people is a product of their history—I
advocate the creation of a small autonomous State, embracing those
parts of Macedonia which the Balkan Allies are contesting —Emperor
Alexander II.’s letter to Prince Alexander—My suggestion rejected—
Idea of an Anti-Bulgarian league ; this idea is carried out owing to the
Bulgarian faults ; the Serbo-Greek alliance is concluded—The Press in
St. Petersburg is against the Bulgarians—I am ordered to preach con-
ciliation to them—Madame Karavelov ; scene in the military hospital
in Sofia—Peace signed. in London—Interview between Gueshov and
Pachitch—My Serbian colleague and I begin to hope—The Emperor of
Russia offers himself as mediator ; telegrams exchanged—Conflict in
Sofia about the Russian proposal—King Ferdinand’s telegram attri-
buted falsely to me—Greece and Serbia continue to arm—Bulgaria
suggests a time limit —Satisfactory outlook - i : - 154-175

CHAPTER XII

BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES

Danev’s return spoils everything—Warlike preparations—An earthquake—
Gueshov leaves the Cabinet ; Danev remains alone at the head—The
King holds a Council ; our mediation is accepted ; I entreat Danev to
start at once for St. Petersburg—The Bulgarians treacherously attack
the Serbians—The shameful underhand play—War begins—Soldiers
refuse obedience—The Bulgarians beaten by the Greeks and by the
Serbians; my advice to Danev; Mission of General Paprikov and
Colonel Romanowski; the Rumanian Army enters Bulgaria and
approaches Sofia ; the Turks return to Adrianople—Fall of the Danev
Ministry—Collapse of Bulgarian Army—The King summons the
foreign representatives ; a ridiculous conference—Russian influence—
The Bulgarians forced to conclude the Peace of Bukharest - 176-202

CHAPTER XIII
THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST

Comparison of the conditions of the Peace of London (May, 1913) with
those of the Peace of Bukharest (September, 1913)—The question of
Mount Athos; the ‘Monte Santo” and its customs; the Russian
cenobites—Nature of the Treaty—Sacrifices imposed on Bulgaria at

x CONTENTS

PAGES
Bukharest—The Turks keep Adrianople and Eastern Thrace; enor-
mous signification of this restitution—Diplomatic influences—We do
not insist on the autonomy of Mount Athos—Pan-Germans at work—
Disquieting situation in Sofia—Why Ferdinand’s power was not
wrecked—Solemn reception of the Bulgarian troops on their return to
Sofia—I am intended for the post of Stockholm E - 203-210

CHAPTER XIV

MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM

Departure from Sofia for Paris—Bad omen—Arrival in Paris ; conversation
with M. Sazonoff—The Grand-Duchess Marie’s divorce—The Russians
enjoy themselves wildly—M. Kokovtzoff in Paris—I go to the Crimea
—General Dedulin’s death—General Dumbadze—Rasputin again—
Audience and luncheon at Livadia; I give the Emperor a detailed
report—Journey to Sofia and farewell audience of the King and Queen
—St. Petersburg in February, 1914; ‘‘ balls and festivities” ; very
serious conversations during the. parties—Count Witte—Prince
Alexander of Serbia—M. Kokovtzoff out of office—M. Goremykin—
Conversation with M. Zinovieff, our former Ambassador to Consianti-
nople—The ‘‘young people” continue to be optimistic—I leave for
Stockholm . : : E : 4 ‘ - 220-245

CHAPTER XV

SWEDEN IN 1914

Three ‘centuries of Swedish history—Gustaf III.—Struggles with Russia
—Change of dynasty—New aspect of Sweden—Union with Norway—
The people and their qualities—Sweden’s prosperity—The Spaniards
of the North—French influence replaced by German influence—Reasons
for this change—The Bernadottes—King Oscar II. and German
influences—Prince Max of Baden—German intrigues—Russian aspira-
tions—The Anti-Russian current—Sven-Hedin—The Sondestog—
Change of Ministry—Political situation in March, 1914. « 246-267

CHAPTER XVI
ON THE EVE OF WAR

Solemn audience of King Gustaf V—‘‘Do not judge Sovereigns too
harshly !”—Queen Victoria—The Royal Family—lInteresting conver-
sation with M, Wallenberg ; I draw erroneous conclusions—My foreign
colleagues—Mr. Howard—M. Thiébaud—Baltic exhibition at Malmo
—The Riksdag “of national defence ”»—Alarming symptoms every-
where—Our incomprehensible calmness—M. Sverbeieff in Berlin—
Our Ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna—Count Osten-Sacken’s warn-
ings—M. Schebeko in Vienna—Precarious situation in Russia—
The assassination at Serajevo—Another trip to Malmo; Count Brock-
dorf-Rantzau—Delightful expedition ; a bad fairy overhears me—The
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia : : . f - 268-288

CONTENTS xl

CHAPTER XVII
THE TRAGIC WEEK

The tragic week—President Poincaré’s arrival—Banquet at the Palace—
M. Poincaré’s advice—‘‘ The torch of Bellona”——Germans determined
on war—Last conversation with my German colleague, Reichenau ;
‘*the war will kill the monarchical principle”—Duties of a monarch
—Colonel Kandauroft’s tidings—The Emperor Nicolas wishes to
avoid war at all costs—Deep emotion in Sweden—I suggest, if neces-
sary, energetic action in Bulgaria— War is declared—* Let us drain the
cup to the dregs ” : ; . : : : : - 289-305

CHAPTER XVIII

SWEDISH NEUTRALITY

What will Sweden do ?—Audience of the King ; reassuring words of H.M.
—France and England offer guarantees to Sweden—We associate our-
selves with this declaration—Neutrality of Sweden ; pacificist sentiments
of most of the country—England’s decision—Russians fleeing from
Germany inundate Stockholm; tragico-comic scenes—Refugees of
note—Our Ambassador arrives from Berlin—Generous hospitality of
the Swedes—Tales of German brutality—First events of the war;
Russian reverses; the luck turns; the Marne victory ; German propa-
ganda—Our advance in Galicia—Grand-Duke Nicolas’ Manifesto on
the subject of Poland—Decisive hour for the Empire of the Hapsburgs
—Aims of Russian diplomacy—Neither Austria nor Russia profit by
this hour—Our mistakes in Galicia—Turkey enters the war—In spite of
the agitation of Germanophiles and Activists, the absolute-neutrality
party gains ground in Sweden—Interview of the three Scandinavian
Monarchs . - : . : : : A » 306-331

CHAPTER XIX
SWEDEN IN IQI5

Economic situation of Sweden duriug the war—Temporary prosperity—
The hold over Sweden possessed by the Entente Powers on one side
(the grip of the Entente) and by Germany on the other—Causes of the
economic ge nea of Germany—A strange tangle—Perfect co-opera-
tion of the Entente representatives in Stockholm—Baron von Lucius ;
intrigues of the German Legation—My official attitude—Decrease in
Swedish hostility to Russia; the Murman railway; the Straits; the
case of M. Perrichon—I wish to build for the future—Finland for
Sweden—Russian reverses in I915 encourage Sven-Hedin afresh—
German peace proposals—The Yud-X/appor and Swedish indignation—
Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Giers—The understanding between the
three Scandinavian countries counter-balances the efforts of the Activists
—The question of the Aland Islands s : 332-357

CHAPTER XX
WAR SUFFERERS

The Russians in Sweden during the war—The Russian committee of bene-
_ volence—Prisoners’ correspondence—The Duke of Amalfi and the
splendid work of the Spanish Legation—The Y.M.C.A.—Treatment
of prisoners of war in Germany—Conference of the Red Cross repre-
sentatives in Stockholm, and improvement resulting from it—The
ambulance trains—Humanity of the Swedes—Touching scenes; a

PAGES

Xl CONTENTS

PAGES
strange people ; odz et amo; an epic hero—An old acquaintance re-
appears—Ferreting out a secret—Russian official personages pass
through Sweden—M. Peter Struve—The Poles—The Lithuanians and
Lithuania—M. Itchas—Other typically Russian silhouettes - 358-384

CHAPTER XXI
A VISIT TO PETROGRAD

I go to Petrograd—Conversation with Sazonoff—General Polivanoff’s
opinion as to Rumanian help—Rumania’s difficult position—I see my
successor in Sofia again; M. Savinsky on Balkan affairs ; what he tells
me and what he does not tell me—M. Stiirmer appointed President of
the Council—The Emperor present at the Duma—Prince N. Galitzyn
—Prince Alexander of Oldenburg—M. Alexis Neidhart and the
‘¢ Moderates ’—Audience of the Emperor—The Grand-Duke Paul and
his family—Audiences of the Empress Alexandra and the Dowager
Empress—The Grand-Duke Nicolas Mikhailovitch—Impressions of my
visit—Misgivings in political and Government circles—In popular
circles—Mutterings of revolution—German machinations—The Ger-
mans increase their efforts to bring about a revolution in Russia. 385-410

CHAPTER XXII

EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD

Return to Stockholm—Audience of the King—Russian ‘‘ parliamentarians ”’
pass through Stockholm; I make Protopopofi’s acquaintance—The
Swedish Activists raise the Aland question—Wallenberg’s wise and
clever policy—M. Branting—All is serene—Bad news from Petrograd ;
Stiirmer, Rasputin, the Empress Alexandra—The Empress at General
Headquarters ; idyll and tragedy; M. Odier; prophetic verses—
Brussiloff’s offensive—M. Protopopoff and the Polaks—Protopopoft’s
talks with M. Warburg—M. Pokrovsky—The rest of the parliamentary
delegation returns by Stockholm—M. Schingareff—Russo-Swedish
banquet—Baron Rosen—Count S. Wielopolski—Operations in Galicia
—Stiirmer replaces Sazonoff—Sazonoff—A subaltern of the Guards has
done his whole duty; painful journey to Petrograd—Conversations
with Sazonoff ; a band of malefactors—Count Wielopolski with Proto-
popoff—I call on Stiirmer—Sazonoff’s minute on the Polish question—
The Rumanians come into the war—Odious impressions of Petrograd

411-443

CHAPTER XXIII
RUSSIA IN DECLINE

Return to Stockholm—Bad turn of affairs on the Rumanian front—Ferment
and disorder in Russia—Protopopoff, Home Secretary ; his vagaries ;
his madness—Prince Nicolas of Greece goes to Russia—I expect to
leave my post—Fall of Stiirmer ; succeeded by M. Trepoff—I retain my
post—The Protopopoff-Warburg incident begins to agitate the Russian
public—I emphatically contradict the Home Secretary—The Minister
for Foreign Affairs has again a perfectly honest man in view—Intense
agitation in all grades of Russian society—Murder of Rasputin—
Protopopoff’s increasing influence—The Trepoff Ministry is of short
duration—The situation becomes worse—Protopopoff and an American
spiritist—Rizov arrives from Berlin to talk to me ; his curious prophecy
—‘‘ The Emperor must go” and a great illusion—The Revolution breaks
out and triumphs—Every one is happy and content—I adhere to the
Provisional Government : : \ : ; d - 444-468

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER XXIV

REVOLUTION PAGES

The Hindu fakir; a theory of suggestion—The Revolution relieves the
conscience of our Allies and reassures them—Tllusions—First alarming
revelations—Report of a Danish eye-witness—The Prikase No. 1—
The real origin of those March days; the real situation in Russia—A
tragic dialogue—The Soviets supreme—Political exiles return to Russia
—Prince Kropotkin—‘‘ Madam demands her whole paraphernalia ”—
A revolutionist of the old stamp—Early memories of Moscow—
Bolsheviks—An Armenian throws off his mask—Some dancers—The
army of treachery—Lenin and Trotsky pass into Russia—M. Keskula
states the Esthonian case—I am appointed Ambassador to Madrid—
Bad news from Petrograd—M. Kerensky, Dictator—His praiseworthy
efforts—Increasing dissolution—I leave Stockholm with a heavy heart
and scant hopes for the future ‘ . - 2 : - 469-498

CHAPTER XXV
IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE

Journey from Stockholm to Paris—Brief revival of hopes and illusions—
Solemn reception of an Ambassador in Madrid—Stately ceremonies—
Generous step of King Alfonso XIII.—Two Queens—Reception by
the Marquis de Lema and M. Dato—Sad reflections—My colleagues—
Bird’s-eye view of Spain—Grievous news from Russia—I reconsider
my position—Journey to Paris; I am disgusted with all I see and hear
—TI return to San Sebastian and send in my resignation to Kerensky—
Letter to M. Terestchenko—A_ well-advised counsellor—I go into
exile. : : : “ : 3 : : en 4gg-52r

INDEX : : é - : : : : : sn 525-540

Se

DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES

CHAPTER 1
MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA

I was on leave in St. Petersburg in January, 1911, when
the news arrived there, first of the serious illness, and
then of the death, of M. Sementovsky, Russian Minister
in Sofia.

Having been for. more than six years Counsellor to
the Embassy in Paris, I had an indisputable right to pro-
motion, and having spent seventeen years as secretary
in Sofia, Constantinople and Belgrade, my professional
antecedents seemed to entitle me to one of the Balkan
posts. My appointment was talked of all over the town
and at the Foreign Office. I therefore was not surprised
when a few days after M. Sementovsky’s death, M.
Sazonoff, who had only been Minister for Foreign Affairs
for three months, sent for me, and informed me that my
appointment to Sofia had just received the Emperor's

approval, and that I was to prepare to take up my post
almost immediately.

I had been acquainted with M. Sazonoff for some
time, but it was only in Paris that I enjoyed the privilege
of seeing him frequently and of discussing political
affairs with him. In June, 1904, we had both been raised
on the same day to the dignity of Counsellors : he to the
Embassy in London and I to the Embassy in Paris. M.
Sazonoff remained in London three years; in 1907 he
was appointed Minister to the Holy See, and in 1909
assistant to the Minister in St. Petersburg. During his

I

2 MY APPOINTMENT TO: SOFTAy -fcuap. 1.

time in London he often came to Paris; times were
strenuous and interesting: first the Japanese war and
the Treaty of Portsmouth ; followed immediately by the
first Russian Revolution, with Dumas succeeding one
another and ending in the Stolypin régime, which
appeared to quell the great tumult; finally, the Russo-
British Entente. All this gave rise to much interchange
of opinions and ideas between two close colleagues.
These meetings in Paris cemented a certain intellectual
intimacy between us, and later on when M. Sazonoff
became assistant to M. Isvolsky, I often had the satis-
faction of noticing that he still took an interest in my
opinions.

In announcing my appointment to me, M. Sazonoff
said, amongst other things, that I was going to Sofia at
a particularly interesting moment: King Ferdinand
appeared to be directing his policy more and more
towards Russian sympathies and designs, and his
Government—composed of Radicals with Malinov at
their head—proposed to us to conclude a military con-
vention. This was amatter for mature deliberation, and
the Minister was confident that my knowledge of Balkan
affairs would enable me to study the proposal and to
give my advice on the expediency of such negotiations.
He advised me to try and be on good terms with
Ferdinand, who had the reputation of being very dis-
trustful and unreliable in his dealings with foreign
representatives, especially the Russian ones. My pre-
decessor had achieved notable success in this respect.
In 1909, at the outset of M. Sementovsky’s term of
office, King Ferdinand, on arriving in St. Petersburg, had
tried to get rid of the new Russian Minister, and to
secure the appointment to Sofia of some person belong-
ing to the smartest society in St. Petersburg. But the
Ministry, in the offices of which Sementovsky had spent
all his career, not being willing to part with him,
Ferdinand made haste to be reconciled with a repre-
sentative who he felt was well supported, and then tried

1911 | KING FERDINAND 3

to attract him, to make him, if possible, the instrument
of his political designs concerning Russia. It was just -
in the midst of these favours, always very uncertain,
that the Russian Minister fell ill and died, furnishing the
King with an opportunity of displaying his grief by
spectacular funeral ceremonies, which were to serve as
a proof of his Russophile sentiments.

Although I had no intention of having recourse -to
such extreme measures in order to collect proofs of
royal good-will, yet I entirely shared the Minister’s
point of view as to the necessity of establishing—zn/er
vivos—good personal relations with King Ferdinand.
One may have had a lurking feeling of distrust for him, but
it was all-important that this should not be perceived by
the public of Sofia, which is strongly addicted to intrigue
and feverishly busy with political tittle-tattle. I had
been a witness at the outset of my career of the troubles
and disappointments undergone by Russian policy
through the attitude which we had taken up with regard
to the first Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg.
In the very midst of the reaction prevailing in Russia
in the eighties, we had vehemently supported the
grievances of the Bulgarian Radical party against the
absolutist inclinations of the young Prince of Hesse;
we ended by quarrelling completely with him and with
the Bulgarian Radicals ; we succeeded in bringing about
the downfall of the Prince, but only in order to deliver
the country over to the Stamboulovists, to give birth in
Bulgaria to an entirely Russophobe party, and finally to
end in the kingship of Ferdinand of Coburg! He was
far more dangerous and a thousand times more crafty
than Battenberg, and yet we began to flatter him, after
having heaped insults and contempt upon him for years!
Certainly, I should not allow myself to fall into the same
mistakes again; I said as much quite frankly to M.
Sazonoff, who agreed entirely with my point of view.

A few days later I received an audience of H.I.M.
the Emperor. My reception was a particularly gracious
B

4 MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA [cnap. 1.

one, and the Emperor enumerated with me the principal
points of my programme of procedure in Bulgaria—a
programme which had been previously drawn up in
my conversations with M. Sazonoff: the question of
relations to the King, the Macedonian question, that of
the relations between the Bulgarians and the Serbians,
which one would wish to improve above all things,
and finally the question of the military convention pro-
posed by the Bulgarians. I noticed, however, that the
Emperor appeared to slur over this last point and not
to attach so much importance to it as Sazonoff did.

Since my appointment to Paris, I had several times
had business interviews with His Majesty, of course only
on matters coming within my sphere. Each time I had
carried away the impression of great kindness and
extreme personal foliteness, of a ready and subtle wit
slightly tinged with sarcasm, and of a very quick though
somewhat superficial mind. When I wished my august
questioner to give an opinion on such and sucha subject,
I tried to bring the conversation round to it. In this
case the Emperor would seize the opportunity—zf he
wished to—and pass in an almost imperceptibie manner
and as if on his own initiative to the subject in hand; if
he did not wish to give an opinion, he allowed my
allusion to pass unnoticed, showing plainly, however,
that he had understood it, but that he did not intend to
commit himself. On this, as on former occasions, the
Emperor displayed the same qualities in our interview.
He was obviously well prepared for the discussion, and
finally gave me some general instructions which were
fairly definite. He spoke in his usual urbane manner,
and whilst giving instructions which were really orders,
only appeared to be airing his opinions.

Once only in the course of the interview did the
Emperor assume a solemn and dictatorial manner;
after an intentional pause, stepping backwards and
fixing me with a penetrating stare, he said: “Listen to
me, Nekludoff: do not for one instant lose sight of the
fact that we cannot go to war. I do not wish for war as

1911] M. SAZONOFF'S ILLNESS 5

a rule; I shall do all in my power to preserve for my
people the benefits of peace. But at this moment, of all
moments, everything which might lead to war must be
avoided. It would be out of the question for us to face
a war for five or six years, in fact till 1917. .. . Though
if the most vital interests and the honour of Russia
were at stake, we might, if it were absolutely necessary,
accept achallenge in 1915, but not a moment sooner—in
any circumstances or under any pretext whatsoever!
Do you quite understand me ?”

I replied promptly that I had assimilated the royal
instructions, that I understood the situation perfectly,
and that during my time as Minister, I should not
ignore for one instant the orders [| had just received.

On this His Majesty resumed his light, good-
natured manner, and dismissed me, after a short con-
versation.

A few days after my interview at Tsarskoe-Selo,
M. Sazonoff was suddenly taken ill with septic inflam-
mation of the throat which afterwards attacked his lungs.
A fortnight later, as I was leaving for Sofia, the illness
was already consideredto beserious. During the month
of March the Minister’s condition became so bad that the
doctors hastily dispatched him to Davos, and society in
St Petersburg was already taking an inordinate interest
in the question of a successor. However, no appoint-
ment was made. Stolypin, still fairly powerful, did not
wish to abandon the hope that M. Sazonoff, his brother-
in-law and friend, would recover and return to his post.
This hope was realised. After a stay of a few months
at Davos and a very serious operation, the invalid’s state
of health improved to such an extent that in December
he was able to return to St. Petersburg to resume the
direction of his Ministry which during his absence had
been in the hands of his assistant, M. Neratoff, who had
just been promoted to this important post. Such a pro-
longed absence of M. Sazonoff’s—coming, too, at the
time when he was assuming the direction of affairs—

6 MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA [cuap. 1.

could not but be prejudicial to the foreign policy of
Russia.

At the end of February, I left St. Petersburg, vid
Vienna, and on the 17th of March, at a solemn audience,

I presented my credentials to King Ferdinand of
Bulgaria.

CHAPTER II
KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA

FERDINAND of Coburg was then in the twenty-fourth year
of his reign.

This scion of two races, the Coburgs and the
Orleans, who had played a distinguished part in the
great events of the eighteenth and of the first half of
the nineteenth century, had begun life under circum-
stances which did not enable one to form any idea of his
ultimate destiny. Son of a father who was almost a
nonentity and of a mother who was as intelligent as she
was ambitious (that famous ambition of the Orleans! ),
the young Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, youngest son
and Benjamin of the family, very much spoilt by his
mother but also carefully educated under her super-
vision, cut rather a strange figure at the Austrian Court
and in high Viennese society. Remarks were made
about his Bourbon nose, and every one laughed at his
effeminate manner, his exaggerated elegance, and his
love for jewels and knick-knacks; he was supposed to
possess inclinations which harmonised with his appear-
ance andmanner. Ina set which only cared for hunting,
riding, the society of light and frivolous:‘women, and was
only interested in the life in cavalry regiments,—the re-
finement and intellectual affectation of young Ferdinand,
his pretty speeches, his hatred of riding and all sport,
his learning even, served as a butt for the laughter and
sarcasms of the young archdukes and grand-dukes.
Moreover, he did not possess the gift of making himself
liked. His sly and suspicious expression prejudiced
people against him. The more he became aware of his
unpopularity, the more did he secretly indulge in veno-
mous and bitter thoughts, and yet nurse in his heart

-
/

8 KING FERDINAND [ CHAP. Ii.

ambitions and schemes which would have evoked shrieks
of laughter if he had ever dared to disclose them. It
was only from his mother that he got encouragement
and sympathy. And she was the only being that he
ever really loved, and who had any influence over him.
From the day of Princess Clementine’s death, a void was
created in Ferdinand’s heart which nothing could ever fill.

On the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg,
the European diplomatic world was astonished at the
proceedings of the young Prince of Saxe-Coburg, who
presented himself as a candidate. The Courts laughed
—ours especially, although Prince Lobanoff, our Am-
bassador in Vienna and an intimate friend of Princess
Clementine’s, had upheld to a certain extent the ambi-
tions of young Ferdinand, whom he represented in his
dispatches as possessing far more personality than
public opinion would have supposed. In Vienna they
were certainly glad to have at hand some one of no
importance who would be willing to embark on the
venture ; if he failed, it would not be a serious rebuff for
Austrian policy ; if he succeeded,—then there would be
at the head of Bulgaria a Catholic prince, related to the
Austrian Royal Family, and naturally prejudiced against
Russia, who at this very moment was declaring his
election and installation in Bulgaria to be illegal.

We are all acquainted with the beginning of Prince
Ferdinand’s reign and his complete effacement before
Stamboulov’s omnipotence. We know of his marriage
with a princess of Bourbon-Parma—a young lady en-
dowed with neither beauty nor health, but whose
intelligence and high moral qualities were indisputable.
She had a true affection for her husband, who finally re-
ciprocated it a little and who even deigned occasionally
to take her advice. The people around her loved her,
and even in her new country she succeeded in making
herself liked.

_ But Princess Marie-Louise’s virtues were not suffi-
cient in themselves to uphold the tottering throne of the

itt] RECONCILIATION WITH RUSSIA 9

Prince. Ferdinand felt that the dictatorship of Stam-
boulov could not last long, that the country was tired of
it, that plots would multiply, and that if he himself did
not forsake the dictator in good time, the downfall of
the latter would inevitably entail his own, and per-
haps even involve him and his family in a sanguinary
catastrophe.

At this moment the change of régime in Russia,
followed by the appointment of Prince Lobanoff as
Minister for Foreign Affairs, opened up to Ferdinand
vistas of salvation. By the interposition of Serge
Tatischeff, a publicist of great talent and an ex-diplomat,
confidential conferences took place between Lobanoff
and the Prince of Bulgaria. They led to startling
events: the resignation of Stamboulov ; the reception of
the eldest son and heir of the Prince—who had been
baptised as a Catholic—into the pale of the Orthodox
Church; and the reconciliation of the Prince with
Russia. There is an old fairy-tale in which an un-
natural lady in a castle, in order to preserve her youth
and beauty for ever, allows a horrible witch to plunge
her child at midnight into water which has been cursed,
and to turn him thereby into a were-wolf. Those who
are acquainted with the feelings of the old Catholic
families of Austria and Italy can readily understand that
to all Ferdinand’s relations—and especially to his wife—
the deed which he had committed with regard to his
child was almost equivalent to the infernal baptism in
the fairy-tale. He was selling the soul of his innocent
child in order to keep his throne. He himself was for
ever after haunted by feelings of shame and superstitious
terror; and he never forgave Russia for this sacrifice
which he had been obliged to make to our political and
religious exigencies.

Ferdinand has never been beloved by his people,
whom he hated and despised. He allowed this contempt
to be apparent to foreigners, especially to the members
of the diplomatic corps in Sofia. (“ Countess, allow me

10 KING FERDINAND [ CHAP. I.

time to put on my gloves: I have to shake hands with
my charming subjects, and J never risk that with a bare
hand.” ‘Madame, I am going to take you into the
great hall, where the élite of Sofia is assembled; you
will see dreadtul faces! Do not be alarmed!” These
are the kind of things that I myself have heard him say.
And he did so repeatedly.)

But Prince and subjects were agreed on other points
than those of personal relations and sympathies. In
politics, the Bulgarians considered Ferdinand an admir-
able tool for their national aspirations; his personal
ambition, his intelligence, his great cunning, his parent-
age and connections, were all great natural assets to the
Bulgarian cause. On his side the Prince knew that on
questions of foreign policy, he could always rely on
Bulgarian patriotism, stubbornness and artfulness, and
that in the event of war, officers and men would fight
with ferocious and even brutal courage, and would
display that tenacity, endurance and voluntary sub-
mission to iron discipline which would make the
Bulgarian army one of the finest in the world.

Since the downfall and assassination of Stamboulov,
and the reconciliation with Russia, the Prince had been
able to breathe more freely and to feel that he was at
last master of the country. But dangers and difficulties
still existed. Party quarrels, and passionate national
aspirations exploited first by one side and then by the
other ; the flagrant incompatibility between a decadent
prince of Franco-Austrian origin and a people composed
of “ peasants of the Danube”; Macedonia in a perpetual
state of ferment and hurling at Sofia her riff-raff who
were past-masters in the art of conspiracy—all com-
bined to keep alive the Prince’s fears and to sharpen his
instinct for intrigue. Ferdinand by his very nature
belonged to those men who, in order to compass their
ends, are far more inclined to bring into play the vices
than the virtues of those around them. His reignserved
to develop this tendency. He loved to stir up irreconcil-
able rivalries, he excelled in the art of keeping the fear of

torr | FERDINAND’S JANIZARIES ii

judgment ever before political men who had compromised
themselves by bribery and corruption, and in holding
them by the dread of punishment or by the necessity of
relying on his protection or forgiveness. In 1913 there
was at one time in Bulgaria a Cabinet composed
almost entirely of men who had either been sentenced
and forgiven, or who were on trial for malpractices and
abuse of power.

The military element, always dangerous in these
countries of pronunciamentos, became the object of
the Prince’s special attention. Ferdinand took great
trouble over, and spent his own money on building, an
enormous school for officers in Sofia, and supplied all
the necessary accessories. The young men are com-
pletely isolated from the world, and are under the
supervision of instructors possessing Ferdinand’s com-
plete confidence; their national feeling is intensified,
but at the same time they are taught to look on the
goodwill of the sovereign and supreme chief of the
army as the sole source of all welfare and promotion.
When the young men leave the school the vigilant eye
of the master is still on them. In order to isolate the
soldiers in their garrisons in civil surroundings, com-
fortable officers’ messes were inaugurated everywhere
at the Prince’s own expense. Good food and good wines
were provided at extremely low prices; officers passed
all their spare time there, and they learnt above all
things to be very guarded and discreet. They realised
that there were eavesdroppers about who repeated
to their superior officers and even to the Sovereign
things they had discussed amongst themselves, and they
discovered that capable and deserving officers had often
been arrested in the midst of a brilliant career, whilst
promotion had been given to others whose only claim
to it had been their talent in gaining access to the
master’s ear. Ferdinand, who is well versed in history,
knew that the Sultans, when raising janizaries, used to
take Bulgarian boys, convert them to Islamism, and
have them educated in special schools. He wished to

12 KING FERDINAND [CHAP. II.

have his own janizaries, and he succeeded up to a
point. .

At the time that I became acquainted with Ferdinand
and his Court, Princess Marie-Louise had been dead
some years; her death had caused sincere grief to all
around her, and had put an end to all family-life in the
Palace in Sofia. Princess Clementine had followed her
daughter-in-law to the grave, leaving a terrible void in
her son's life; he had married again, but his second
wife played no part whatever in his life, or in that of
his subjects. The King plunged into voluntary solitude,
absorbed completely in his plans, his dreams of grandeur,
his acute anxieties, his masterly political combinations.

If Ferdinand had lived in the very middle of the
“Quattro cento” as podesta either of Ferrara or Mantua,
he would have vacillated between the Pope, the King of
France, the Roman Emperor and the “Serenissima” ;
he would have pillaged orphanages and erected beauti-
ful buildings; he would have caused his enemies to be
stabbed at night in the streets, or he would have
poisoned them at his feasts ; he would have surrounded
himself with scholars and artists, and luxurious palaces,
with brocades and halberdiers covered in gold lace.
He would certainly have possessed that fine and true
artistic taste which now he only pretends to have. Born
four centuries too late, the King of the Bulgarians con-
tents himself with indulging in dreams of greatness,
with dressing-up as a Byzantine “ Basileus,” and with
being portrayed thus by third-rate painters ; instead of
erecting palaces, he is content to lay-out botanical
gardens, for, far from having become rich as a sovereign,
he has on the contrary ruined himself by presents, endow-
ments and pecuniary assistance destined to purchase
partisans ; being unable to exterminate his enemies by
poison or steel, Ferdinand endeavours to pit them one
against the other. But, exactly like his medieval proto-
types, he wields the weapon of political intrigue admir-
ably, preferring it to any other occupation or any other

1g1r| PORTRAIT OF THE KING 13

concern, displaying, however, more elasticity than perse-
verance, more audacity in conceiving his plans than
determination in carrying them out.

The portrait that I am drawing of the King of the
Bulgarians may appear to be very black and much
exaggerated. And yet, in passing judgment on this
complicated character and on this person so universally
disapproved of, I am ready to plead extenuating cir-
cumstances.

The exercise of the rights of sovereignty in a Balkan
country does not come within the category of callings
which ennoble the characters of those who pursue them.
More especially must one admit this when it is a question
of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians, a people already cursed
once by history—for it is they who brought the Turks
into Europe—and who then, during five centuries of a
particularly cruel yoke, being deprived of the slightest
vestige of national autonomy, became uncouth and less
civilised than any other nation of the Near East.

In a word, for thirty years Ferdinand and the
Bulgarians have mutually corrupted each other.

But we ought to place to the moral credit of the King
of the Bulgarians the fact that in the whole course of
his existence as prince, he has lived exclusively in the
political life of his people, interesting himself deeply
and solely in the problem of the raising of Bulgaria, and
consecrating himself to that at all hours and on all
occasions. This undoubtedly endued him with strength
in comparison with other sovereigns, especially with
those whose private life meant far more to them than
their public life and that of their subjects. Some were
mainly occupied in increasing their fortune; others gave
themselves up to sensual pleasures; others again sub-
ordinated everything—even their most sacred duties—
to the joys and cares of family life; Ferdinand had two
passions only: the consolidation of his throne and the
career of his people.

In Ferdinand’s defence one must also plead the fact
that he was born neurasthenic, and that the circumstances

14 KING FERDINAND [CHAP. II.

of his life and calling greatly aggravated this tendency.
To this is due his indecision, unsuspected by the public
at large, and also his suspiciousness, so patent to every
one. Ferdinand has never been able to come to a
decision unaided. He could evolve, and cleverly
elaborate the details of, a political combination; when
the moment came to carry it out he needed another will
to impose itself on his and to force him to act. Fora
long time his mother had furnished the necessary will-
power. With Princess Clementine’s death, Ferdinand’s
indecision assumed formidable proportions. In 1908,
when the annexation of Bosnia nearly set all Europe by
the ears, Ferdinand, warned in time by M. d’Aerenthal,
prepared to follow up the Austrian step by the pro-
clamation of Bulgarian independence and sovereignty.
Everything was carefully arranged and prepared; but
at the vital moment it was necessary for M. Malinov
and his colleagues to force themselves on him in his
saloon-carriage and to drag a decision from him—they
succeeded far more by threats than by persuasion. And
this is no solitary example.

Touching his deep distrust I must say that I have
seldom seen any one more suspicious than King
Ferdinand. Nearly every conversation that I had with
him began in a favourable manner; one was face to face
with an intelligent, cultivated and subtle questioner
willing to use his intellectual charm and entering to a
certain extent into one’s point of view; then all of a
sudden, without any apparent reason, a shadow would
cross his face, his expression became crafty, and the
King’s thoughts were abruptly hidden from one, and one
had to be content with a medley of evasions and
commonplaces. This was because at a given moment
the usual thought had crossed the King’s mind: “ Ah!
but who knows whether he is not laying a trap for me?
Whether he is not seeking an answer from me which
may compromise or bind me?” From that moment all
one’s arguments were futile.

1911 | MY NEW COLLEAGUE 15

This was the Sovereign to whom | came to present
my credentials, and whom I was to have as colleague
during the course of the most serious events that
Bulgaria has ever passed through, and which have had
a fatal effect on our relations to the Bulgarian people.

CHAPTER THI
BULGARIA IN IQII

Tue presentation of his credentials by a foreign Minister
takes place in Sofia with the usual ceremonial but with
a little more pomp than in other Balkan capitals.

On the appointed day, gala-coaches and an escort of
Hussars of the Royal Guard came to fetch me and my
suite, and thus in full uniform and accompanied by the
general aide-de-camp of the King, I crossed the short
space between the Russian Legation and the King’s
Palace, an unimposing building situated—just as in Abel
Hermant’s play—between the public gardens, the square
and ¢he four-storied house.

The King awaited me in the Throne Room, with
M. Malinov, President of the Council and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, at his side; I read my speech and
handed my credentials to the King, I listened to his
reply, after which he stretched out his hand to me with
a few words of welcome and invited me to his study,
the doors of which closed upon us without M. Malinov
being invited to accompany us. There the King begged
me to be seated, and we held a fairly long conversation
touching on political questions of the moment and the
news from the Russian Court,—a conversation of no
importance, but in the course of which the King was
pleased to show me a great deal of friendliness. When
we had exhausted these subjects, we returned to the
Audience Hall, where the King’s Court and the Prime
Minister were still waiting. Having been dismissed
with great ceremony by the King, I was taken to pay
my court to Queen Eleanor and the heir to the throne,
and then I left, surrounded by the same pomp.

16

r9tt | FALE OF MALINOV CABINET 17

The King’s treatment of his Prime Minister did not
altogether astonish me; I had often heard of the off-
hand manner with which he treated his Ministers;
moreover, during the customary interview which I had
had the day before with M. Malinov, the latter did not
conceal from me that the days of his Cabinet were
numbered, and that in all probability he would shortly
hand in his resignation and that of his colleagues to
the King. A few days after my audience I left for Paris,
in order to collect my establishment and to make the
necessary purchases for my new installation. I stayed
a couple of days in Vienna, and there I read in the
papers of the resignation of the Malinov Cabinet, and
of the formation of the Gueshov-Danev Coalition
Ministry, with the leaders of which I had had long
conversations before my departure.

The fall of the Malinov Cabinet was not due to
any acute political crisis. As always happens in parlia-
mentary countries, but more particularly in the Balkan
States, the Ministry was simply worn out by a fairly
long period of power, and then foreign political circum-
stances were assuming another direction which naturally
demanded other actors.

The Malinov Cabinet had witnessed a crisis as
strange as it was unforeseen in Macedonian affairs. As
is well known, during the first years of the century
European diplomacy had undergone high trials in
Macedonia. I mean the usual sequence, but becoming
year by year more complicated, of plots, provocations,
local massacres; and above all the vehemence of the
struggle between the rival Christian nationalities:
Serbiang Bulgarian, Greek; between the two latter,
particul@rly, deeds of ferocious cruelty were committed.

The situation gradually led to the direct interference
of Europe. The country was placed under the authority
of an Ottoman High Commissioner chosen by the
Powers; two civil commissioners—one Russian and one
Austrian—were added; European officers were placed

18 BULGARIA IN tori [ CHAP. III.

at the head of a gendarmerie which they strove to
reform; finally, an international financial commission
inaugurated in the province a system for controlling
and preserving the resources of the country from the
demands of the Ottoman Treasury.

It is worthy of note that relations between the
Russian and Austrian commissioners were not at all
strained, and that this good understanding reacted in a
favourable manner on the actions of the Consuls of the
two Empires in Macedonia. This latter state of things
was due to the modus vivendi existing between the two
rival diplomacies since 1897, which threw cold water on
the efforts of the Balkan States, especially those of
Bulgaria, to create friction between Russia and Austria,
and under cover of this friction to foment serious
trouble in Macedonia. With the year 1908 came the
overthrow of this scheme, which was partly artificial,
partly necessary and beneficial to the work of maintain-
ing the peace of the world.

In July of that year, at an inopportune moment for
every one, the Turkish Revolution broke out. Ina few
short weeks, Abdul Hamid’s régime and—more important
still—all the former autocratic Turkish régime were
destroyed, and at the same time the enormous influence
which Germany ‘had been able to acquire in Constan-
tinople seemed to be lost for ever. Under the influence
of spontaneous enthusiasm, the Christian nations of
Turkey believed ardently in the inauguration of a new
era of fraternity and progress, they threw themselves
into the arms of the sons of their former oppressors, and
wished to work out the salvation of their common
country. Armenians, Roman Catholic Syrians, Greeks
of the Archipelago, and Bulgarians of Macedonia forgot
their grievances and their old quarrels. Héads of
Macedonian bands fraternised with the members of the
Committee “Union and Progress”; Greeks and Bul-
garians embraced one another; and meanwhile the civil
commissioners, the officers of the gendarmerie, the
European members of the financial commission were

1911] THE TURKISH REVOLUTION 19

gradually disappearing like a useless appendage, in-
compatible with the unlimited moral credit which the
Powers vied with one another in assigning to Turkey in
her radical renovation.

Moreover, relations between the European Powers
themselves were becoming particularly complicated
during the same year 1908.

The act of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had
been prepared before the Turkish Revolution, which as I
said before had been a surprise to every one.

As the year 1908 coincided with the Jubilee of the
sixty years’ reign of Francis Joseph of Austria, a newly-
appointed and ambitious Minister—M. d’Aerenthal—
wishing to make his name from the outset, desired to
present the annexation as a Jubilee present to the aged
Monarch. In M. Isvolsky—also newly appointed, and
keen to make his country forget the recent disasters on
the shores of the Pacific and to replace Russian policy
in the historic groove of the Near East—M. d’Aerenthal
found a suitable partner, willing to listen to proposals
and to formulate some of his own. A friendly exchange
of views took place through the interposition of the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. The
Russian Foreign Office received the wishes of Vienna
fairly favourably, and suggested on their side that it was
necessary for Russia that the government of the Straits
‘should be improved in her favour. In the very midst
of these discussions, which were endorsed by a very
friendly exchange of views between St. Petersburg and
London on this same question of the Straits, the Turkish
Revolution broke out. This event, however, did not
check the plans of the two partners, and the interview
planned between M. Isvolsky and M. d’Aerenthal
took place all the same at Buchlau. But there all the
cards were shuffled. The ambitious and unscrupulous
Austrian Minister persisted with his schemes and, in
order to take Europe by surprise, hastened the act
of annexation, with. the result that Russia—supported
by England and France, who thought the moment had

c

20 BULGARIA IN to11 [CHAP. Il.

arrived to regain their former influence in Constantinople
—refused to demand the compensation of which she had
formerly dreamt, and also absolutely refused to recognise
the annexation.

The diplomatic negotiations which ensued did not
turn to our advantage, as is well known. Thanks to the
support which Germany;hastened to lend to Austria, the
annexation was first recognised by the Sublime Porte,
then by Russia and by the other Powers on Russia’s
representations. M. d’Aerenthal received the much
coveted title of Count; and Russian public opinion,
violently excited by the ultra-patriotic Press, felt and
displayed deep displeasure.

This displeasure was much exaggerated : the countries
annexed had been for a long time under the real power
of Austria-Hungary, and Russia herself, in her con-
fidential negotiations with Austria, had contemplated on
four separate occasions the possibility of the annexation
pure and simple of these provinces (firstly in 1875 at
Reichstatt, secondly in 1879 at a select and secret sitting
of the Congress of Berlin, thirdly in 1897 on the occasion
of the Emperor Francis-Joseph’s visit to St. Petersburg,
and fourthly at Mirzsteg); concerning the government
of the Straits, the right of passage through these for our
men-of-war belonging to the Black Sea Fleet—which
was all that we asked—did not constitute any very real
advantage for Russia, for in the event of political com-
plications the Porte could always close the Straits to us
de facto. Finally, the crisis due to the annexation had
brought us far nearer to England and had consolidated
the entente once for all.

Further, our relations with Bulgaria at the settle-
ment of the crisis of 1908-1909 assumed a particularly
favourable character. Looking on himself, especially at
the outset of his ministerial career, as a continuer of
Prince Lobanoff’s policy, M. Isvolsky inherited also the
Prince’s feelings of good-will towards the Bulgarians
and towards Ferdinand. Thanks to the efforts of our
Foreign Secretary—supported by the Grand-Duchess

itt] INDEPENDENCE OF BULGARIA 7a |

=

Vladimir, the sworn patroness of King Ferdinand at the
Imperial Court—the title of “ Tsar,” which the latter had
assumed under cover of the last European crisis, was
accorded to him by Russia before all the other Powers.
Ferdinand, when hastening to the funeral of the Grand-
Duke Vladimir, who had just died, was greeted in
St. Petersburg with the title of ‘“ Tsarinian Majesty ”
and royal honours were given to him.

The independence of Bulgaria was also recognised by
us without difficulty, and in order to facilitate a definite
arrangement between the new kingdom and its former
suzerain, our Foreign Office proposed the following
combination and succeeded in getting it accepted.
Turkey consented to transfer the arrears of the Bulgarian
contribution to the account of the war-contribution
which she had owed us since 1878 ; and Bulgaria, entirely
free of all liabilities to the Ottoman Empire, pledged
herself to indemnify us by adequate annuities. M.
Isvolsky liked to say in those days that Russia by her
benevolent actions had, as it were, freed Bulgaria for
the second time; and up to a point he was right, for our
attitude under these circumstances had effectually laid
the foundation of an extremely close Russo-Bulgarian
understanding which lasted till the end of 1912.

Such were the advantages accruing to Russian politics
from the crisis of 1908-1909.

It is true that some of our statesmen and of our
diplomats, such as Count Witte, M. Kokovtzoff, M.
Zinovieff, Count Osten-Sacken, Prince Ouroussoff1 and
others, sincerely regretted everything that had happened
since the interview at Buchlau, and saw in it a decided
step towards the universally dreaded European con-
flagration. But the opinions of these men had their
origin in a point of view directly opposed to that
prevailing amongst the bulk of Russian politicians and
intellectual people, and in consequence their critics had
nothing in common with the ordinary critics. Alas! The
terrible events which dismembered before our very

1 Our Ambassadors in Constantinople, Berlin, and Vienna.

22 BULGARIA IN tort (CH. III.

eyes our unhappy country, so ill-prepared to face
them, justified the apprehensions of these statesmen.
Altogether, the crisis of August, 1908 to March, 1900,
marked the end of a policy of compromise between
Russia and Austria, and accentuated the division of
Europe into two directly opposed camps, whilst compli-
cations were to be foreseen in the near future on the
Balkan question—henceforth to be a burning one.

The Balkan statesmen, ever practical and on the
alert, immediately took advantage of the new state of
affairs. They realised that Russian policy would most
certainly wish to avenge the Buchlau trap, and the
thinly disguised German ultimatum of March, 1909; and
that in consequence it was necessary to prepare for
events which might occur—or even to provoke them if
they did not occur with sufficient rapidity.

Moreover the evolution of the new Turkish Govern-
ment facilitated these schemes of the Balkan States and
gave fresh impetus to their national aspirations.

Two years had not gone by since the second taking-up
of arms by the Young Turks (in April, 1900, followed by
the final deposing of Abdul-Hamid) when the Ottoman
revolutionaries resumed towards their Christian fellow-
citizens the same policy as that pursued by the “ Red
Sultan.” First came the horrible massacre of Adana—
said to have been fomented by the partisans of the Old
Régime, but in the repression and punishment of which
the New Régime displayed rather too obvious a mild-
ness ; then by degrees the Young Turks imagined that
the Christians were becoming too grasping—which was
possibly fairly true—and to check this abuse of liberty
they sought to affirm the superiority, indispensable in
their eyes, of the believing Osmanlis. They did this so
unconstrainedly and with so much impatience that the
Christians were forced to guard their new rights by the
old means of plots and recourse to foreign protection.
Little by little the former state of chaos reappeared in
Macedonia and Thrace, then in Armenia and Syria.

And simultaneously with this metamorphosis of

191i | A NEW CABINET 23

Turkey, the Talaats, the Djavids and others who now
ruled the Ottoman Empire uncontrolled, were allowing
themselves to be more and more allured by the advances
made to them by German policy through the medium
of the “great and glorious Enver,” the promoter of the
Revolution, who was a military agent in Berlin, and
who lived there surrounded by Imperial .care and
flattery.

Towards the spring of 1911 the cycle of Turkish
evolution was complete, and a practically quo ante
political situation existed, except that instead of a
Europe ostensibly united, the East had to deal with a
Europe frankly divided into two camps and arming
herself with feverish haste.

Malinov’s Radical Cabinet had had its day; it had
profited by the crisis of 1908 to secure the complete
independence of the country, and to take over the section
of the Ottoman railways which still existed in Rumelia;
it had maintained intimate relations with the Bulgarian
revolutionaries in Macedonia before as well as after the
short-lived period of reconciliation and fraternisation
with the Turks; it had succeeded in securing the pro-
tection of the Russian representatives and had not
made unfair use of it. But times had changed, causing
a new situation to arise. For Bulgaria the key to this
situation lay in Russian protection and good-will. The
Bulgarian Radicals were on good terms with our
diplomacy and on excellent ones with our Liberal Party,
but Russian diplomacy was suspected of “ Moderantism”
and our Liberal Party was far less enthusiastic about
enterprises in the Near East than were the Nation-
alists who gathered round the NMovoye Vremja, the Octo-
brists of the Duma, etc.... It was these groups who
had to be conciliated; moreover, they had corre-
spondents in Bulgaria and special protégés amongst the
old Bulgarian Nationalists, commencing by the fure
Russophiles with M. Danev at their head as the recog-
nised successor of the old Dragan Tzankov. It was

24 BULGARIA IN toi11 | CHAP. IIL.

therefore necessary to comply with the newstate of affairs
and to present to Slavophile Russia, always impatient
of action, an “orthodox” Bulgarian Ministry, ze. a group
of people of ancient traditions, and whose very names
would be synonymous with devotion to Russia. This
was done by fusing the Danev party with that of
Gueshov; and King Ferdinand, who personally did not
like the one and detested the other, gave way for once
to the combination, and accepted the formation of the
“great National Ministry.” As to M. Malinov’s party,
it promised not to oppose his successors in matters of
foreign policy.

This was the meaning of the change of Cabinet which
took place in March, 1911, and this the political situation
in Bulgaria when I took up my post there.

CHAPTER. TV
RUSSIAN AND BULGARIAN RELATIONS

I nap been acquainted with M. Gueshov for a long time,
and I had a liking for this calm, self-possessed old man,
whom I held to be perfectly sincere in his feelings
towards Russia. Such he appeared to me during the
whole time that I had dealings with him. In the spring
of 1912, when I was in St. Petersburg, M. Sazonoff, to
whom I imparted my sentiments conceiving Gueshov,
simply remarked: “he is crafty”; he repeated this
in 1913 when Gueshov had already been out of office
for some months; but he would never explain his
words. I conclude that this opinion of Gueshov came
from a Bulgarian source. It is also true that since
1914 M. Gueshov’s newspaper, 7he Mir, has gone over
rather openly to the side of the enemies of Russia
and the Entente. Nevertheless, until I have proof to the
contrary I shall persist in asserting that during his
whole term of office his attitude towards us was perfectly
correct, and that he sincerely desired to act in accordance
with Russia’s views. After the catastrophe of 1913
Bulgarian feelings changed and became so hostile that
even the passing over of old Gueshov to the enemy’s
camp could be admitted as a possibility; but one ought
to know if this really ever took place, and whether
Gueshov, who has lived abroad a great deal since 1913,
really inspired the articles in Zhe Mir.

At one time also I had been acquainted with M.
Todorov,! who in the Gueshov-Danev Cabinet held the
post of Minister of Finance and in the “ Narodniak” party
the second place after M. Gueshov. He was a very

1 His name is now spelled Theodorov, and he is Bulgarian Plenipo-
tentiary at the Conference in Paris.

25

26 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. rv.

sincere man of moderate views, though a little too
excitable in conversation. No one, even amongst us,
ever doubted the sincerity of his feelings towards
Russia.

Among the Tzankovists, I knew M. Ludskonov very
well, the son-in-law of the old Tzankov who had died
in March, 1911. He was a perfectly honest and sincere
man; his feelings towards Russia—I should even say
his devotion to the Russian cause—were indisputable.
But a little weak and far too easy-going by nature, he
was not born to lead a party; therefore he gave up his
place to M. Danev.

I had never met the latter before I came to Sofia as
Minister. As soon as I returned from Paris, M. Danev, —
who in the meantime had been made Home Secretary,
called on me, and sketched out his ministerial pro-
gramme. I was not very favourably impressed by him.
With the experience | had acquired of Balkan politicians,
I seemed to recognise in him the typical characteristics
of the sworn Russophile—the political man who, whilst
not being hostile to us, considers that the Russian
representatives are forced to support him in all he does,
to hate all his enemies, even personal ones, and to see
eye to eye with him on all matters affecting his country.
Like most men of this type, Danev appeared to me to
be imbued with stubbornness even more than Bulgarian.

During his visit he announced—as if he was saying
something that would cause me special pleasure—that
the new Government was going to carry on the pro-
secution, already begun by the Malinov Cabinet, of M.
Ghennadiev, General Savov and the other shufflers who
had formerly belonged to Stamboulov’s camp and who,
as was universally known, had been guilty of financial
dishonesty when last in office. M. Danev apparently
thought that the Russian Minister ought to be delighted
at the imminent conviction of the “agents of Austria,”
which would render them harmless for ever. He was
much astonished at the indifference with which I received
the news. In the first place I had serious doubts as to

1911 | M. GUESHOV 27

whether Ferdinand would allow men to be completely
crushed who might be of use to him in the event of any
change of political system, and then I considered it to be
beneath the dignity of a representative of Russia to take
an interest in these internal quarrels and to mix up our
political interests with a case which only concerned the
penal laws and justice of the country. M. Danev then
spoke for some time about the necessity of strengthening
the present relations between Russia and Bulgaria by
the conclusion of a military convention, and he ended by
attacking King Ferdinand very violently. What he said
about him was quite true, but I refused to follow him on
to this dangerous ground.

I was far more satisfied with my first conversations
with M. Gueshoy, who I often saw in his capacity as
Foreign Secretary. In compliance with my orders from
St. Petersburg, I entered into practical negotiations with
him which aimed at securing definitely the use of the
sum lent by us to the Bulgarians in 1909, and at obtain-
ing at last the payment—by regular annuities—of the
Bulgarian debt of thirteen million francs, unliquidated
since the Russian occupation of 1877-79.

I succeeded in carrying these matters through, thanks
to the good-will of M. Gueshov and M. Todorov, who
had set their hearts on maintaining the commercial
integrity of Bulgaria.

King Ferdinand was away at the moment, as he
generally was, either when there were no dangers or
disturbances ahead in the country, or when he did not
wish to come to a decision—but to await developments—
ina difficult political situation. Hence, he was away a
great deal; moreover he was bored to death in his
Palace in Sofia.

However, the King returned rather early in the
summer. The new Cabinet, in agreement with the
King and the Radical members of the Opposition, had
just put a constitutional question: whether the Royal

28 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. rv.

Government should be granted the right to conclude
secret conventions with foreign countries before sub-
mitting them to the Sobranjé, a right which was not
mentioned in the existing constitution. Hence as it would
be necessary to add an additional clause to the organic
law of the country, the Great Sobranjé—z.e. aconstituent
assembly alone possessing the right to decide the
question—had to be convened. As I have just said, the
King, his Ministers and the Radicals who were not in
power were agreed on this point. The Radicals were
desirous of following up the conferences they had held
with us on the subject of a Russo-Bulgarian military
convention which they thought was on the eve of being
concluded. Moreover, at the Russian Legation it was
thought that this was the object of the new organic law.
In the country at large, opposition only came from
the Socialists and the “ Agriculturists”"—a new party
who preached the strictest economy in State expendi-
ture, and who were irreconcilable foes to war and
armaments. Much astonishment was created in Sofia
when the WNovoye Vremja and a few other Russian
Nationalist newspapers suddenly began to support the
Bulgarian Opposition, represented on this question by
elements with which these papers had, after all, nothing
in common. The Novoye Vremja, which led the campaign,
displayed a fear that if the Bulgarian Government
obtained the right to conclude secret treaties without
having to have recourse to the vote of the Sobranjé,
Ferdinand would be in a position to come to all kinds of
agreements with Austria! Our Foreign Secretary had
to intervene in order to persuade the Novoye Vrenya to
relinquish this ill-timed campaign.

In the month of June the “Great Sobranjé” was
convened at Tirnova, and the Diplomatic Corps was
invited to the formal opening. We had a special train
for the journey, as if we were going on a pleasure-trip,
The weather was beautiful, the political sky fairly clear,
and most of the Foreign Ministers were on pleasant
terms. The following summer we made the same trip

1911] GENERAL FICHEV IN RUSSIA 29

for the festivities marking the 25th anniversary of
Ferdinand’s reign. But how changed the situation had
become! and what fears haunted us!

On the very day of the opening, the Assembly passed
the proposed law by a large majority, in spite of a few
violent speeches made by the Socialist leaders.

Throughout the summer, my relations with Govern-
ment and Court were still very friendly. On mine and
our Military Attaché’s initiative, General Fichev, Chief of
the Bulgarian General Staff, was invited to the grand
manceuvres at Krasnoe-Selo, where he was to be pre-
sented to the Emperor and to meet our military chiefs.
Fichev, who had finished his military education at Turin,
had never been to Russia, and was looked upon as a
Stamboulovist and an enemy to Russian policy. Yet in
his relations with us he never showed any hostile feel-
ings, but appeared to be sincere and moderate. Acting
on the principle that one ought to attract people
possessing genuine qualities and not repulse them, we
took the necessary steps to insure a hearty welcome to
the Bulgarian General. He left St. Petersburg flattered
and delighted. Later on, in momentous circumstances,
General Fichev displayed a sincerity and prudence that
many Russophile leaders might well have envied. He
vehemently opposed the march of Bulgarian troops on
Constantinople, a move which ended in the bloody
and useless sacrifices of Chataldja, and provoked our
suspicion and displeasure. By his opposition to this,
Fichev fell into disgrace with his master; the Chief of
the General Staff was forced to apply for sick-leave and
to return to Sofia, leaving the direction of his Staff to
his adjutant Nerezov. The latter played a disastrous
part later on at the time of the Bulgarian attack on
the Serbians (June, 1913).

Fichev’s journey to Russia was followed by another
of far greater importance. At the wish expressed by
M. Gueshov, acting as the King’s spokesman, | readily
agreed to arrange the visit of the Bulgarian Crown-

30 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap.iv.

Prince to his godfather the Emperor. My suggestions
were favourable received, and Prince Boris was invited
to Kieff, where the Imperial Family passed the month of
August, and from there he was to accompany them to
Tsarskoe-Selo. The young Prince, who was seventeen
years of age, had never been to Russia and did not
know his august godfather.

In a conversation which I had had before leaving
St. Petersburg with M. Sazonoff, he had confessed to
me that he would very much like to marry one of the
Grand-Duchesses, daughters of the Emperor, to the
Crown-Prince of Rumania, and another to Prince Boris.
Only, as he wisely added, it would be necessary to be
extremely cautious, as he had not mentioned the matter
at Tsarskoe-Selo, and he knew that the Emperor and
Empress would never consent to arrange marriages for
their daughters which might be contrary to the feelings
and inclinations of the young Grand-Duchesses them-
selves.

Moreover, from a political point of view, anything
was preferable to a marriage missed by a refusal
from our side: these humiliations are never forgiven.
I agreed entirely with M. Sazonoff. Therefore one can
imagine how disagreeably surprised I was on my arrival
in Sofia to hear my assistants talking quite openly and
unconstrainedly about the future—and apparently settled
—marriage of Prince Boris with one of the Emperor's
daughters, the only point still unsettled being whether
he was to marry the Grand-Duchess Olga or the Grand-
Duchess Tatiana! The First Secretary to the Legation,
a young man with a great deal of assurance and a very
loud voice, even went so far as to mention it mm my
presence, at the salon of one of my foreign colleagues. I
immediately silenced my young and impetuous assistant
by asking him if he had received these confidences from
the Emperor himself, who had not deigned to honour
me with the same trust. The lesson was absolutely
imperative, but it drew down on me the irreconcilable
enmity of the gentleman in question.

rrr] MURDER OF M. STOLYPIN 31

As I had expected, Prince Boris was received with
the utmost friendliness; in consequence of his air of
extreme youth—he was small and puny, with a childish
face—he was treated as a boy and allowed to share
without any formality in the intimate family life of the
Emperor. The greatest care was taken of him, and
he associated quite informally with the two youngest
daughters of the Emperor, the Grand-Duchesses Maria
and Anastasie; the former was then only about fourteen
years of age.

The Crown-Prince’s visit to Kieff coincided unfortu-
nately with the assassination of the Minister-President of
Russia, Stolypin. The Prince was an eye-witness of
the foul deed, which occurred in the extracte of a gala
performance, and one feels sure that this sad and
horrible sight must have thoroughly spoilt the good
impressions which he would otherwise have brought
back from his visit.

I was deeply depressed by Stolypin’s death. It
proved that the Russian Revolution was far from being
over. Under cover of an apparent calm, the lava of
passion and violence was smouldering, ready to upset a
state of order which was really only due to the power
of the police and the force of habit.

I had known Stolypin as a youth in his parents’
house in Moscow. At that time I was very intimate
with his eldest brother Michael, since killed in a duel.
“Petia” Stolypin, as he was then called, was about
fifteen years old, and was noted for his good behaviour,
love of study, and deep feeling of honour, which more-
over was a distinguishing characteristic of the whole
Stolypin family. Such he remained through all the
vicissitudes of life and up to his death. I saw him
again, after the lapse of long years, at the Winter
Palace in St. Petersburg ; he was living there with his
family in 1908, in consequence of the criminal attempt
made on his life in the summer of 1906, in which some
of his children were injured. The President of the

32 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. rv.

Council gave me the impression then of being very
uncommunicative and, up to a point, very much
depressed; [ doubt very much whether, in his heart
of hearts, he had preserved unbounded confidence in
himself and his system. In an uncongenial atmosphere,
surrounded by the high dignitaries of St. Petersburg,
this country squire displayed an openness and straight-
forwardness which won universal esteem, but his task
was in no way made easier thereby. On the other
hand, his long rural career, more particularly his term as
governor of a province, had developed in him leanings
towards patriarchal despotism. These tendencies alien-
ated all truly liberal minds. The flattery heaped on him
by a certain portion of the Press, and the Octobrist
section of the Duma—which only existed through his
protection—all combined to dim his mental vision;
having commenced his ministerial career as a champion
of the “ Zemstvo,” ze. of provincial self-government, he
ended it—sad to say—as the unlucky head of the
political police of the old régime! All the same, in
spite of his errors, Stolypin preserved a perfect honesty
of purpose, and a strong and upright character. His
death deprived the Conservative party of a man who,
on going out of office, might have become an eminent
political leader. But even if he had remained at the
head of the Government, Stolypin would never have
allowed the Government machinery to get so completely
out of order and to reach a pitch of dilapidation which
made possible the new victorous thrust of the Revolu-
tionists. The Revolution was ill-timed and disastrous,
for in the midst of a world war it aimed at establishing
an ultra-Socialist Republic in Russia, and in the mad
attempt it destroyed all patriotic feeling in the country.

In the sphere of foreign policy, Stolypin played a
more important part than was generally supposed. He
undoubtedly possessed certain German sympathies,
while remaining intensely Slavophile and Nationalist,
and consequently firmly attached to the system of
the French alliance. The German Empire attracted

eis STOLYPIN’S INFLUENCE 33

him by the order which reigned there, by the national
patriotism which seemed to animate all classes of the
population, all political parties. Moreover, possessing
an intimate knowledge of the actual state of Russia, and
realising the internal dangers the Empire would have
to face if war broke out, Stolypin frankly dreaded a
war and consequently anything which might lead to
the collision so often predicted with Germany. As
long as he lived he had an indisputable influence on
M. Sazonoff’s policy and on that of his /ocum-tenens, M.
Neratoff. This influence showed itself in very early days
in the interviews which the new Russian Foreign
Secretary held with the Berlin politicians in November,
IQIO.

On his return to St. Petersburg and to business after
the death of his brother-in-law, Sazonoff had no longer
any reason or desire to be under the influence of that
incongruous group of men officially called the ‘ Council of
Ministers ” or “ Cabinet.” From the autumn of 1911 our
foreign policy was definitely divorced from the home
policy of the Empire, and remained solely within the
province of the Foreign Office. Sazonoff, who was above
all things a good comrade and a staunch friend, was from
henceforth entirely under the influence of his own en-
vironment, and all his decisions were arrived at in select
committees of a few collaborators, men who were mostly
intelligent and mentally distinguished, but who often
lacked practical experience.

During the years that followed, M. Sazonoff and the
Foreign Office became more and more cut off from the
rest of the Government.

We ought to note that in general during the years
immediately preceding the World War and the Revolu-
tion, there was a pecular change in the kind of people
who were called upon to govern Russia. Men of no
proved political reputation, lacking in experience, with
no marked ability, sprang up no one knew whence, and
gradually monopolised the power and influence over all
state affairs. Thus bank-notes of great value were

34 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. 1.

exchanged for small change, which rattled about in the
money-bags but only possessed one merit: that it was
easy to circulate and exchange.

The summer of 1911 ended for me by the visit of the
Russian Squadron to Varna. ‘The principal ships of our
Black Sea Fleet, under the new Vice-Admiral Bostroem,
came this year with great pomp to visit the harbours
of Bulgaria and Turkey, and the Rumanian harbour
Constanza. At Varna, whither I went with my suite to
meet our Squadron, the reception was exceedingly warm.
King Ferdinand was not there, of course: as soon as he
was free from the worries of the Great Sobranjé, he had
left for foreign parts. But Queen Eleanor, who was
spending the summer at Euxinograd near Varna, all alone
in the seclusion of a small ancient convent, hidden away
in one of the corners of the park, was delighted to preside
at the reception and to receive from our Navy the royal
honours which were so grudgingly bestowed on her at
the Court of the King her husband.

As is customary on such occasions, I received the
official visit of the Admirals, and then went the same day
with great ceremony on board the flagship and others
of the Squadron. Each time it was the usual naval recep-
tion: the cutter stopping at the ship’s side ; the thunder
of the salute, then on board, the reception by the
Admiral and the ship’s officers, with military honours,
and the introduction of the other officers on board;
finally the salute of the crew drawn up on deck, the
presenting arms, answered by the usual cheers. I had
witnessed these receptions several times at Constanti-
nople when I was in attendance on my eminent and never-
forgotten chief, M. de Nelidoff, and they had always
produced in me a pleasant feeling of emotion: they
evoked images of our country, represented by the
splendid ships, by the glorious flag of St. Andrew, by the
formidable guns, by the charming hospitality of the
officers. and last but not least by those tall, fair youths,
with open, almost child-like, expressions, who were

191] VISIT OF THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON _ 35

drawn up before us, and who later on, in the evening,
sang patriotic songs reminding us of loved ones far
away.

I felt the same emotion at first when I visited our
Squadron lying off Varna. The firing of the salute, the
going on board, the cordial shaking hands with the
officers .. . but when I was face to face with the men
drawn up in battle array, when I had said “ good luck,
my good fellows,” and had received the usual answer
from them, I felt a sudden and painful shock. It was
twenty years since I had seen our sailors, and good
gracious! what a change! Instead of a row of open
countenances, young and happy, looking at one with
ingenuous and gay expressions, I only saw surly faces,
with dark and suspicious looks, in which one seemed to
catch glimpses of ill-concealed hatred. It evenappeared
to me as if the physical aspect of the crew had changed ;
I seemed to remember them fair, with clear grey eyes,
and broad, bright faces; now they stood looking at me
with dark eyes that looked old and bilious. At first I
thought I was influenced by a preconceived idea; the
regrettable incidents of 1905 and 1906, the bloody mutiny
on board the Potemkin, the terrible insurrection at
Cronstadt had doubtless biassed my mind, and led me to
look at very ordinary faces with a prejudiced eye. But
no ; the more I observed our sailors during the few days
I was at Varna, the stronger my first impression became.
As to the officers, they had changed very little : they
seemed to have the same good qualities and the same
faults. They were the same good fellows who seemed to
answer one’s silent interrogation by : “ We realise what
threatens us, but we can do nothing. When the time
comes we shall know how to die, as our friends died at
Tsushima ; if necessary we shall bare our chests to the
- bayonets of our own men; but meanwhile let us lead our
ordinary daily life, come what may!”

The visit of our Squadron to Varna was marked by
official festivities which were very friendly; there was
the dinner I gave to the officers of the Squadron,

D

36 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. rv.

the Bulgarian authorities and the principal townspeople
of Varna; a reception given by Queen Eleanor in the
beautiful park at Euxinograd; Her Majesty’s visit to
the Squadron, when all the ships returned the royal
salute ; finally the “curfew-bell,” followed by a dance
on board the flagship, to which the townspeople of
Varna were invited.

Vice-Admiral Bostroem, who commandedéthe Squad-
ron and the whole of the Black Sea Fleet, was an
acquaintance of mine. We had often met in Paris
during the winter of 1904-5, while the International
Commission of Inquiry on the Dogger-Bank incident
was sitting. Holding at that time the post of Counsellor
to our Embassy in Paris, I was appointed delegate of
the Russian Government to the Commission; and
Captain Bostroem, then our naval-attaché in London,
often came to Paris to report to Admiral Dubassoff,
Baron Taube, our legal adviser, and to me the result of
the investigations he made in Hull and other English
seaports. Captain Bostroem was very zealous in his
investigations, but rather too credulous concerning the
information he gathered; this finally placed him in a
very false position, as two English witnesses, found
and presented by him, were convicted of perjury.

Alas! The command of the Black Sea Squadron
ended even more disastrously for poor Bostroem than
his zeal in the Hull incident. A few days after our
leave-taking at Varna, when the Russian Squadron,
after a series of festivities, was leaving the harbour at
Constanza, the Admiral had the bad luck to run his ship
aground ona sandbank. This incident put an end to
Bostroem’s brilliant but brief career.

Thus I spent my first summer in Sofia.) The summer
of 1911 will remain memorable in history through an
event which caused more surprise than emotion in
Europe, but which was the starting-point of fateful
events. I allude to the commencement of the Italo-
Turkish War.

1912 | ITALO-TURKISH WAR 37

Of course, neither of the two interested parties had
realised the importance and significance of their conflict
for the world at large. Anxious to secure to the re-
stored Ottoman Empire its complete independence of
the Powers up till then arbiters of its fate, the Young-
Turkish Government had selected Italy as being the
least dangerous of the Great Powers on which to impose
its claims. It felt certain, moreover, that Germany
would intervene at the crucial moment to prevent an
armed contest. In reasoning thus it had lost sight of
Italy’s privileged situation among the rival Powers, and
of the fact that Italian action in the East would not
arouse exaggerated fears or inclinations to interfere in
either of the two camps. As to Italy, she hoped that
her energetic attitude would ensure the immediate
success of her cause. Rome had not reckoned with the
slowness of a war in the desert, in which, as far as Italy
“was concerned, everything had yet to be organised,
whereas the Turks should come off fairly well with a
small array of forces, and a ready-made system of
- guerilla warfare.

By lasting for more than a year, the Italo-Turkish
War doubtless contributed to the ripening of the Balkan
events of 1912 and i913. And these most certainly
hastened, and up to a point prepared, the explosion of
the terrible World War.

CHAPTER. V.

SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

In my conversations with the principal members of the
Cabinet, I repeatedly had opportunities of touching on
the question of Serbo-Bulgarian relations; each time I
noticed the desire to improve these relations, but I
always found myself up against a feeling of distrust of
the Serbians, so I refrained from insisting too much.
However, towards the end of September, t911, when
paying a call on M. Todorov, who was taking the
place of M. Gueshov then on leave, 1 was very much
surprised to hear him broach the whole question.

“We have come to the conclusion,” said M. Todorov,
“that if we wish to guard our complete political and
economic independence from the encroachments of
Central Europe, and if we truly desire to improve the
lot of our kin in Turkey, we must as far as possible
make our national and economic policy one with that of
Serbia. We represent two nationalities very closely
related by blood, language, and even by our former
historic destinies. What prevents us from living in
perfect harmony together? Simply and solely, at this
moment, disagreement on the subject of our sphere of
action in Macedonia. We would therefore suggest to
the Serbians to go thoroughly into this question with
us, in order to arrive at a good and solid understanding.
I will not conceal from you that we wish to draw upa
settled agreement with Serbia. What do you think of
the idea, Monsieur ?”

I replied, of course, that speaking generally I could
not but approve of the reasons and feelings which

appeared to sway the Bulgarian Government. But that
38

oe JOURNEY TO DAVOS 39

as to knowing whether we should consider it an
opportune moment to start these delicate negotiations
between Sofia and Belgrade, I should first have to ask
the advice of our Foreign Secretary, and to confer also
with my colleague in Belgrade, M. Hartwig. I con-
tinued: “I have just received permission to go to Paris
for a fortnight on urgent private business. I could go
by Vienna instead of straight through by the Orient-
Express, and take the Zurich train, and branch off at
Landquart to Davos, where M. Sazonoff is still staying.
His health has improved so considerably that he will
shortly be able to return to St. Petersburg and to
business. On returning from Paris, I will stop for a
few hours in Belgrade so as to confer with Hartwig.
Then in three weeks from now, I could discuss the
question far more profitably with you.”

“Splendid!” said M. Todorov; “the King will
probably have returned by then, and so will M.
Gueshov; and if you bring back with you the approba-
tion of your Minister and the valuable co-operation of
M. Hartwig, I trust we might then succeed in carrying
through the negotiations which have been outlined
several times, but which up to now have begun and
ended there.”

Two days after I started, and during my journey I
had enough leisure to go over in my mind the vicissitudes
of Serbo-Bulgarian relations. I will limit myself here
to the enumeration of the principal phases.

I. Up to about 1870 there existed an almost complete
ignorance on the part of Russian policy of Bulgarian
nationality and aspirations. Serbia, under the noble
Prince Michael Obrenovitch, represented, as far as we
were concerned then, the whole Slav cause in the Near
East ; the enthusiasts of this cause looked on the Serbian
principality as a “ Balkan Piedmont.”

II. Between 1870 and 1875 General Ignatieff, the
omnipotent Russian Ambassador to the Sultan Abdul-
Azis, discovers Bulgaria, and espouses the Bulgarian

40 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. v.

cause at the time of the movement which founded the
Bulgarian National Church. The Bulgarian nation—
“ Bulgar-meleti’”—makes its appearance, as it were, in
the political world of the Balkans, with the representa-
tive of Russia as godfather. In the meantime Prince
Michael Obrenovitch had been assassinated, and during
the minority of Prince Milan, Serbian policy was
suffering from the want of a respectable and respected
Government.

III. Balkan troubles begin in 1875 with the Herze-
govinian insurrection, secretly supported, if not actually
fomented, by Austria. The Emperor Alexander II.
and Russian public opinion wish to obliterate com-
pletely the recollection of the Crimean campaign, to
cover Russian arms with new glory, and especially to
resume the illustrious part of Defenders of the Christian
Faith in the East. The influence of the aged Prince
Gortchakoff, who opposes these projects, is definitely on
the wane, and the Emperor frames his own policy—
allowing for that of his Chancellor—with his Am-
bassadors: Ignatieff in Constantinople; Count Peter
Schuvaloff in London; and M. Novikoff in Vienna.
Disorders break out in Bulgaria followed by massacres,
horrible as ever, but this time exaggerated rather than
suppressed by the Press and European diplomacy. A
palace revolution in Constantinople, and a_ heated
struggle for influence between the Embassies of Russia
and Great Britain. Serbo-Turkish War, and enormous
enthusiasm in Russia for the Serbian cause, which is
completely mistaken for the whole Slav cause.

IV. Conference at Reichstadt, at which, in order to
guarantee the neutrality, or even under certain con-
ditions the co-operation, of Austria in a war in the East
which we feel to be imminent, we consent beforehand to
the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and
even of the sanjak of Novibazar; in other words we
leave Serbia herself within the sphere of Austro-
Hungarian influence. Hence the absolute necessity for
our policy to found a new autonomous Slav State in the

1912 | RETROSPECT 4I

Balkans, which would constitute a sphere for Russian
influence.

V. War in the East and the creation of the Bulgaria
of San Stefano, the Bulgaria of General Ignatieff, in-
cluding the whole of Macedonia, closing Salonika, as an
outlet, to the Austrians, and the Nish Valley to the
Serbians. Revision of the Treaty of San Stefano in
Berlin, and considerable restrictions in the boundaries of
Bulgaria. Count Schuvaloff, in answer to the lamenta-
tions of M. Ristitch, the Serbian Plenipotentiary, advises
him to come to an understanding with Austria, and he
is perfectly right, in view of the concessions granted
by us to Austria-Hungary at Reichstadt. Impressed
by these warlike events and by these clauses in the
agreements, Serbia and her young King begin practically
to submit to the predominating influence of Austria. In
the meantime, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia appear to be
genuinely devoted to Russia and amenable to our advice.

VI. (1880-1886). Anera of internal political quarrels
in Bulgaria, in which we take an active part, begins to
disturb Russo-Bulgarian relations. Thechange of reign
in Russia, and the faults of Prince Alexander cause us
to dislike the latter. Abandoned by Russia, threatened
in Bulgaria, the Prince abruptly changes his policy,
discards his absolutist tendencies, calls a Radical
Government into power, seeks English protection, and
to satisfy national wishes, invades Eastern Rumelia.
King Milan of Serbia, under pressure from Austria,
turns against his neighbour and declares war on him.
This unfair and fratricidal blow does not succeed; the
Serbians are defeated at Slivnitza, the Bulgarians occupy
Pirot, and are only stopped before the gates of Nish by
European interposition. These events, however, con-
stitute a real misfortune for the Slav cause in the
Balkans, as they inaugurate a long era of distrust and
estrangement between the two adjacent countries.

VII. During the next few years and up till 1896 the
Serbians take advantage of the complete breach between
Russia and the Bulgaria of Stamboulov to enhance in

42 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cnap. v.

our eyes their national aspirations in Macedonia, where
they are fighting Bulgarian propaganda. Towards 1890,
on the abdication of King Milan and the formation of
the new and powerful national party of the Radicals, the
Serbians definitely supplant the Bulgarians in the good
graces of official and Slavophile Russia: the Treaty of
San Stefano is, as it were, tacitly revised by Russia,
and the Serbians benefit by the revision.

VIII. A new change of reign and the appointment of
Prince Lobanoff to the post of Foreign Secretary mark,
between 1895 and 1896, a new trend in Russian policy.
The Bulgarians return to favour, and very naturally
profit by it to attempt once more to place their
Macedonian aspirations under Russian protection. The
muddled state of Serbian home policy between 1896 and
1900 seems to facilitate this plan. And soon Bulgarian
activity redoubles in Macedonia.

IX. But Russian policy, taught by experience, will
not undertake to protect one of the competitors at the
expense of the other, nor allow itself to be forced into
separate action in favour of the populations of Mace-
donia. Meanwhile a modus vivendi is inaugurated with
Austria, and Macedonia gradually becomes, thanks to
Our initiative, a sphere for wise intervention by the
Powers, with the exception of Germany. The Foreign
Secretary and his Russian representatives in Con-
stantinople, Vienna, Belgrade and Sofia use their efforts
to bring about a reconciliation and more especially a
unification of interests between Serbia and Bulgaria.
These efforts are not altogether successful. A certain
strain of mutual distrust and jealousy always exists.
However, the tension is slightly relaxed, even on the
dangerous ground of Macedonia, where, during the
particularly troublous times of 1903-1908, the struggle
between Bulgarians and Serbians becomes less bitter,
and in any case never attains to that pitch of ferocity
which characterises during the same period the Bul-
garian exploits against the Greeks, and vice-versé. The
Turkish Revolution helps to check momentarily all

1912 | MACHA VASSILTCHIKOFF 43

rivalries in Macedonia. They are about to begin again
when the advent of the new Russophile Grand Ministry
in Sofia appears to facilitate our efforts to bring about
an understanding between Bulgarians and Serbians,
which would prevent a renewal of former hatred and
the repetition of former errors.

I only spent a few hours in Vienna; I did not
succeed in reserving a sleeping-carriage to Zurich, so
had to take a seat in the evening in a small first-class
carriage, where a lady was already installed, signifying to
me by her presence that I should spend the night sitting
bolt upright, and hence without sleep. My surprise was
great when I recognised this lady as a very old ac-
quaintance of mine, Mademoiselle Marie Vassiltchikoff—
Macha Vassiltchikoff, as she was commonly called—an
intelligent and cheerful old maid, of enormous size and
brilliant colouring, and very light and amusing in con-
versation. At one time she had been maid-of-honour,
with active duties, to the reigning Empress, and was in
high favour with her royal mistress. She was the
daughter of Alexander Vassiltchikoff, keeper and head
of the collections of the Imperial Hermitage, and laid
claim to artistic taste, and placed this taste at the
disposal of the Empress, assisting and advising her in
the furnishing of the sumptuous apartments of the
young Imperial couple in the Winter Palace in St.
Petersburg. I do not know whether it was a natural
inclination, or a desire to flatter the tastes of her mistress
that made the plump Macha go in so very much for the
‘secessionist ” and decadent style which had just sprung
into being in Germany, and which had found an august
patron in the person of the unbalanced Grand Duke of
Hesse-Darmstadt, brother of the Empress of Russia.
This style was utterly discordant with the old walls of
the Winter Palace, built by the best Italian and French
architects of the middle of the eighteenth century. But
naturally every one admitted to visit the new Imperial
apartments was lost in admiration and praise. Prince

44 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap v.

Lobanoff, then Foreign Secretary, who in art ostensibly
cultivated the principles of the great styles of the
eighteenth century, alone dared to be outspoken, and
each time that he accompanied the Empress into a
room in the Palace which had not yet been touched,
would exclaim: ‘“ Thank goodness, Macha Vassiltchikoff
has not been in here!”

Many years had elapsed since then, and Macha, who
had left the Court, was now living near Vienna, attracted
thither by some close friendships she had made in an
agreeable and sympathetic little set of the best Austrian
society.

My travelling companion explained that she was on
her way, accompanied by Prince Francis of Lichtenstein
(formerly Ambassador to St. Petersburg) and a few of
his guests, to the re-opening of the old castle of Vaduz
(capital of Lichtenstein), which had recently been restored;
she said that she like me had not been able to get a
sleeping berth. Having talked for a long time, we
settled ourselves as best we could, each in our corner;
we spent a most unpleasant night, and in the morning
dashed as soon as we could into the restaurant-car, to
solace ourselves with hot coffee. There we found
Prince Lichtenstein, who had known me for some time,
and a very gay party, in which I found some former good
colleagues. When they saw the two of us appear
together, after a night spent in a /éfe-d-téfe it was
naturally the signal for a running fire of witticisms : we
were treated as a newly-married couple, questioned as
to our first impressions, etc.,etc. Breakfast was ending
merrily when the train reached Vaduz, where my
travelling companions got out, and a few minutes later
I arrived at Landquart, where I was to take the little
mountain railway which goes to Davos.

I should have been greatly surprised if any one at
that moment had predicted that in a few years I should
meet the plump Macha Vassiltchikoff again, in Stockholm
on her way to St. Petersburg, vid Lapland, in order to

1912] CONVERSATION WITH SAZONOFF 45

play a brief politico-comic part, to her own disadvantage
and to her shame.

At Davos I had the pleasure of finding M. Sazonoff
really on the road to recovery, and the next day I was
able to relate and discuss with him the overtures recently
made to me by M. Todorov. M. Sazonoff listened most
attentively. “Well,” said he, when I had finished, “but
this is perfect! If only it could come off! Bulgaria
closely allied to Serbia in the political and economic
sphere ; five hundred thousand bayonets to guard the
Balkans—but this would bar the road for ever to German
penetration, Austrian invasion!” “Quite so,’ I replied;
“but there is also another side to the question which I ven-
ture to raise. In the first place,I personally do not greatly
dread an Austrian military invasion; I firmly believe
that Austria does not nurse such dangerous schemes.
Penetration by intrigues, economic stratagems and other
means—that I believe in; and also that such penetration
would be effectually checked by a sincere and lasting
Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation ; but in a direct attack
with armed forces, no! Ishall never believe in it, except
in acompletely new situation and under quite exceptional
circumstances!! But on the other hand, I cannot help
wondering whether Bulgaria and Serbia, having united
their forces (representing more than half a million
soldiers—and admirable soldiers, I assure you), are not
thinking much less of guarding against Austrian aggres-
sion than of attacking Turkey and of settling the
Macedonian question by the sword? The Italo-Turkish
war may well encourage them in this idea. That is
what I fear. The most serious events might well occur
at a time when Russia is not ready and she might have
to submit to many disagreeable things if she does not
wish to be drawn into the fray . . .”

1 I was wrong as it turns out. But one must allow that the general
political situation at the moment when I talked to Sazonoff at Davos was
quite different from what it was after the two Balkan wars, and more
especially after the Treaty of Bukharest.

46 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. v.

“Oh! but Russian diplomacy is there to prevent
matters taking such aturn,” replied the Minister sharply.
‘‘We must simply check all dangerous proclivities at once
in Sofia and in Belgrade. You tell me that the present
Bulgarian Government is quite sincere in regard to
Russia ; you also tell me that King Ferdinand seems to
you to be very cautious. We have the same impressions
about Belgrade. Under the circumstances, I repeat, we
shall make both countries listen to reason. You might
write to M. Neratoff and ask him for instructions ; for my
part, I firmly believe that a loyal agreement, putting an
end to all these sad misunderstandings between Serbians
and Bulgarians, is highly desirable, and that we ought
openly to encourage them to enter into it.”

This was briefly the pith of my conversation with the
Minister.

A fortnight later, on my return from Paris, I stopped
in Belgrade to talk with M. Hartwig.

He appeared to be very well versed in the overtures
made to me by M. Todorov, although he did not openly
admit this.

“The Bulgarians,” said my colleague, “have at last
understood that they can do nothing without the
co-operation of the Serbians. I expected this and I am
quite satisfied: if only the Government in Sofia will
display in the negotiations about to commence a true
conciliatory spirit, and will not ask the Serbians to give
up things which they cannot give up; for at the last
attempt to arrange and define the spheres of influence
in Macedonia, the Bulgarians would not even abandon
their claim to Uskub—the former Serbian capital—which
as you must admit was really insane on their part! But
I have reason to believe that this time the Bulgarians
will be obliged to be more reasonable. As to my
Serbians, I am quite sure of them.”

“But are you not afraid that, if they come to a
complete and formal agreement, the two Slav states may
be tempted to throw themselves immediately into the

1912] M. HARTWIG 47

fray and to attack Turkey, whose dissolution appears
to be setting in again?.. .”

“Qh! I feel sure that the Bulgarians would willingly
interpret the matter thus. But the Serbians would not
allow themselves to be drawn into such a venture, with
Austria inthe background! Moreover, they will always
listen to our good advice. King Peter is very prudent,
and you yourself know the wisdom of M. Pachitch. . . .”

We separated with great cordiality, exchanging the
promise to communicate with each other on the negotia-
tions doubtless about to commence between the two
countries.

M. Hartwig played such an important part in the
events which have occurred since, that | must here
attempt to sketch his political portrait.

Born and educated in Russia and in exclusively
Russian surroundings, this grandson of a German
doctor who had emigrated to Russia, had absolutely
nothing German about him, either in his appearance or
his way of thinking. To the end of his life he remained
typically Russian, a Russian student, an enthusiast for
certain ideas, devoted up to his death to certain political
conceptions, despising formality, and conventionality in
appearance, sometimes even in his intercourse with
others ignoring the conventions ; vehement and despotic
in his opinions, but a good fellow all the same, and
willing to forgive the wrongs he had done to others. (A
characteristic far more rare than might be supposed.)

Poor and lacking patrons, but with a brilliant
scholastic career behind him, and possessing the true
Russian powers of application and thoroughness,
Hartwig soon attracted attention in the Asiatic Depart-
ment of the Foreign Office, which he entered on leaving
the University of St. Petersburg.

At that time the offices of the Ministry were still
divided into two definite camps. On one side the
“Chancellor’s office’—or Minister's Cabinet—full of
young men-of-the-world, well connected, well educated,

48 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap.v.

and destined for careers in the Embassies and Legations
of the West; cleverness at once attracted attention, if
any one showed any true ability all the town talked
about it. Much stress was laid on good manners and
discreet behaviour generally, and scrupulous good-
fellowship ; personal intrigue was rigidly excluded, and
every young man who went through the successive
stages could be sure of promotion in his turn; ex-
ceptions were only made—and approved of among the
men themselves—in those cases of recognised striking
ability alluded to above.

On the other side, the Asiatic Department were
supplied from divers grades of society, to which the
former Directors had tried to attract the talent
and intelligence of the day. Those who were admitted
were destined to diplomatic and consular careers in
the Near East and in Persia. And as a matter of fact,
talents abounded in this profession between the forties
and eighties of last century. Later on the composition
of this Ministry, which had been so brilliant under
Prince Gortchakoff, deteriorated as he grew older and
feebler, and men of talent became more rare in the
Asiatic Department.

But all the same Hartwig had to push himself forward.
The ambitious young man became one of the informants
of the Novoye Vrenya, which at the time was pursuing the
Ministry with criticism and accusing it of lack of vigour
and patriotism, more especially in Eastern affairs ; he
also kept in touch with our General Staff, which indulged
in the same criticism of our diplomacy. But one must
admit that it was not personal views alone which
induced Hartwig to become the echo of these critics
and to furnish them with material; all his life he had
been a staunch adherent of a policy of action in the
Near East and in Central Asia; and he devoted his zeal
and his talents to this end. It was during the ad-
ministration of Count Lamsdorf that Hartwig’s career
received its true impetus. He promptly became the
right hand of the amiable and retiring Minister, who, an

1912 | HARTWIG’S EARLY CAREER 49

ardent worker himself, appreciated unceasing work and
devotion to duty in others. Moreover, without entirely
shelving his “ Activist” convictions in the sphere of
our eastern policy, Hartwig succeeded, as long as the
Lamsdorf Ministry lasted, in restraining his ardour and
in bowing to the wisely Opportunist views of his chief.
Appointed Director of the Asiatic Department, he soon
became known and recognised in High Places, and when
in 1904 Lamsdorf’s successor appointed him Minister to
Teheran, Hartwig left to take up the post rather as if
he were in disgrace, for he had aspired either to the
Embassy in Constantinople or to the post of Foreign
Secretary. After two years in Teheran, his relations
with his colleague of Great Britain became impossible ;
they no longer spoke to each other, they hardly even
bowed; as at the moment we were inaugurating the
entente with England, the two Ministers were recalled
by common consent, and Hartwig was appointed to
Belgrade.

Having spent all his life (with the exception of two
short visits to Montenegro and Burgas) in the offices of
the Asiatic Department specialising in the Slav question,
Hartwig had gained a knowledge not only of Balkan
questions and records, but up to a point of the people
themselves. To him were sent all the Slavs who came
to St. Petersburg: political exiles and refugees, ministers
on missions, young princes and princesses educated at
the expense of the Court in privileged schools and
institutions, etc. Amongst all these people, whom he
received with good-nature and in whose favour he
interceded with his chiefs, “Nicolas Henricovitch” was
deservedly popular. He found himself at once amongst
old acquaintances when he took up his post in Belgrade,
where he had access to everything, and where he might
flatter himself that-his advice would be listened to and
followed. On this score he experienced a few dis-
appointments. But with the innate adaptability of his
nature, he appropriated those very ideas which it was
his duty to fight, and made himself their authorised

so SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [cuap. v.

champion; so that they often were approved of by our
Foreign Office, where he had left a few fervent friends
and some devoted admirers. But one must allow that,
in order to have his support, every cause had to bear
the stamp of very orthodox Slavophilism, ze. of hostility
to Austria and devotion to Russia.

Very intelligent, as I said before, gifted with a
wonderful memory, and having read and studied much,
Hartwig had two flaws in his reasoning powers which
sometimes obscured his judgment and hampered his
actions. In the first place, he had too much confidence
in the might of his own pen, when writing minutes,
dispatches, etc.; his career had endued him with the
soul of the publicist and brilliant official writer. With
him, an apt syllogism often took the place of the
inexorable logic of facts. Secondly, this man, so near
the zenith of his career, had framed for himself a
political system which was absolutely arbitrary, in-
genuous even: Hartwig firmly believed—and said so
openly—that it was quite possible for Russia to remain
on the best terms with Germany, whilst striving to outdo
Austria in every possible way. In St. Petersburg he
had always endeavoured to be friendly towards the
German Embassy; in his two posts as Minister, he
maintained the best possible relations with his German
colleagues. Officially the Germans did the same, but in
their heart of hearts they did not like him; they saw in
him a fanatic and a muddler, and suspected him of
duplicity. I have always wondered how a man of
Hartwig’s intellectual worth could fail to see that in
Berlin for years they had thoroughly espoused the
Austrian cause in the East; that they had made it their
own; that they were driving Austria towards Salonika
whilst they were taking possession more and more of
Constantinople. To come toa friendly agreement with
Austria which should contain nothing disadvantageous
to Germany—that might be contemplated as a merely
opportunist and temporary policy! But to attempt to
cement a true friendship either with Germany to the

gig eis re aR

1912] HARUWIG'S CHARACTERISTICS 51

exclusion of Austria, or with the latter to the exclusion
of Germany—here was a policy doomed to failure and,
what is more, which might become extremely dangerous
at any moment!

I knew the character and the opinions of my colleague
of Belgrade long before I was appointed to Sofia. I
knew he was as popularin Bulgaria as he was in Serbia,
that he had much influence and commanded authentic
sources for private information. I was therefore pre-
pared beforehand to learn that when the Serbo-Bulgarian
negotiations began, Hartwig would wish to play a
prominent part in them. Personally I saw no objection
to this, and I should have been glad if my colleague had
been successful in certain cases in obtaining from the
Bulgarians from afar what I should not have been able
to obtain from them on the spot. But the continuation
of the negotiations proved that whenever it was a
question of national claims, all restraining action became
difficult in Belgrade, impossible in Sofia.

CHAPTER: VE
THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY

Tue Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations lasted from October,
1911, till February, i912. The place chosen was Sofia,
King Ferdinand being very persistent on this point:
he pretended that Belgrade, owing to its geographical
position, was infested with Austro-Hungarian spies;
but the fact of the matter was that it flattered his vanity
to see the Serbians coming, as it were, to him! The
negotiations were to be conducted with the utmost
secrecy, and only the respective Russian Ministers were
allowed to know what was going on. In point of fact,
Hartwig and I were the constant arbiters, continually
consulted, and referred to in each difficulty, however
small, by both parties.

The negotiations were soon concentrated almost
exclusively on the defining of the spheres of influence in
Macedonia, and finally four months were spent in fixing
the future frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria. In
' discussing the line of this frontier 7 spe, the two parties
showed such an entire lack of any conciliatory spirit
that I am still wondering how they ever arrived at any
agreement! After long preliminary debates they at last
agreed on the two extreme points of this famous frontier.
These were: in the north-east the spot where at that
period the frontiers of Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia
converged; in the south-west the northern point of
Lake Ochrida.

But then the line between these two points had to be
drawn. As it was manifestly impossible to send a com-
mission to work on the spot (the Turks might have taken
this amiss!), it was necessary to rely on the most
detailed maps of the Russian, Serbian and Bulgarian

52

1912] SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 53

General Staffs. The demarcation of the boundary-line
gave rise to endless discussions ; each elevation, each
village, each stream was bitterly disputed, and to solve
the question they sought now the interposition of the
Russian Ministers, now the topographical authority of
our military agents. Each side wished to mark the
frontier by a curved line, curving outwards as far as
possible into the future territory of the competitor ;
but by dint of arguing, a remarkably straight line was
arrived at—and this in spite of the very uneven surface
configuration of Macedonia—the result—well-known in
physics—of two equal efforts working in an inverse
sense !

On the Bulgarian side it was M. Gueshov and M.
Todorov who were the most amenable and the most
willing to arrive at a sincere agreement, whereas M.
Danev andthe military, as was moreover to be expected,
displayed inflexible obstinacy. So far as the principal re-
presentative of Serbian interests—the Serbian Minister
in Sofia, M. Spalaikovitch (later on Minister in St. Peters-
burg)—was concerned, his vehement nationalism was
tempered by the sincere desire to cause Slav solidarity
to triumph on this question. Very hasty and very
impressionable, M. Spalaikovitch had always been dis-
tinguished by his straightforwardness and sincerity, as
well as by his keen intelligence: on the whole it was
the quintessence of the Serbian nature; the bonds of
friendship which I kept up with him often enabled me
to have a soothing and restraining influence on him.

Throughout the conferences—more especially during
the first three months—King Ferdinand affected to hold
himself aloof from them and to give a free hand to his
Ministers. He only mentioned the subject to me two or
_ three times. The first time was at the end of November,
at the wedding of my eldest daughter, to which the
Court and the Diplomatic Corps came. That day, in a
brief aside, the King told me of the satisfaction he felt
about the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations; but he sug-
gested a few doubts as to the sincerity of the Serbians. |

64 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [cunap. vi.

hastened to assure His Majesty, by reason of information
received from Belgrade, that the Serbians truly desired
to arrive at the most complete agreement with Bulgaria.
The second time I went into the subject much more
thoroughly with the King. This was on the 6th (19th)
December, the birthday of His Majesty the Emperor.
It was customary on that day for the King to accept an
invitation to luncheon at the Russian Legation, and in
the evening for him to give a State dinner followed
by a grand receptiof\ at the Royal Castle. After
the luncheon, having held little formal conversations
with every one in :turn, the King came into my
study and we talked together for some time. In the
course of conversation the King, for the first time,
mentioned certain fears he entertained concerning the
actual fact of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations. His
Majesty expressed the rather justifiable thought that if
the substance of these conferences came to be known by
Vienna and Berlin, the Central Powers might bring for-
ward the whole Balkan question and raise difficulties
which primarily would not suit St. Petersburg. “That
is why,’ said the King in conclusion, “one cannot
possibly be too prudent either in the negotiations them-
selves, or as to the ends which these negotiations are to
attain.” This time Ferdinand seemed to me to be sincere ;
doubts and fears were always much more frankly ex-
pressed by him than any other sentiments or motives
of his complex mind. Up toa point I shared the opinion
of the august speaker. The Serbo-Bulgarian con-
ferences, in this respect, did most certainly present
certain dangers. Of course, the chief reason of Fer-
dinand’s fears lay in his desire not to break definitely
with Vienna; but at the same time, he sincerely dreaded
the risk of war, and he fully realised that this risk
existed as the result of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, based
solely on the partition of Macedonia. Bearing in mind
the words of the Emperor, and constantly remembering
my last conversation with Sazonoff in which he had ex-
pressed his conviction that the chief aim of Russian

aa) I WARN ST. PETERSBURG 5

diplomacy should consist in avoiding all conflict in the
Near East, I, as representative of Russia, was com-
pletely at one with King Ferdinand the moment it was
a question of avoiding the possibility of war. Con-
sequently, in the course of conversation I tried to induce
him to express more definitely his dread of a collision
with Turkey; but the King avoided doing this : he truly
dreaded war, but he was not going to have it said that
he dreaded it.

In the dispatches which I sent off every fortnight
to St. Petersburg, to M. Neratoff and then to M.
Sazonoff on his return from Davos, I related in detail
the progress of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations; but
each of my dispatches was accompanied by a private
and confidential letter in which I did not omit to point
out the danger of war which might be brought about by
the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, so much extolled and
desired by us. I laid great stress on the facts that the
negotiations were now exclusively concerned with
territorial demarcation and with the defining of a
frontier 7 spe between Bulgaria and Serbia; that
throughout the conferences I could not observe a desire
to arrive at a really cordial agreement between the two
countries; that these conferences were assuming a
character of mere political opportunism, and that the
Italo-Turkish war which was going on meanwhile
certainly incited the Balkan States to action. Each time
the answer from St. Petersburg was to the effect that we
certainly would not hear of an armed collision in the
Balkans, and that everything must be done to prevent
such a collision, but that, on the other hand, a Serbo-
Bulgarian agreement would be particularly welcome and
agreeable to us, because it would constitute an effectual
barrier against Austro-German penetration in the
Peninsula. In the following dispatch I expressed my
complete adherence to this point of view of the Ministry,
but at the same time I reiterated my apprehensions.
To which the answer was once more that “although on
the one hand one would... etc. .. . notwithstanding,

56 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [cnap. vi.

on the other hand, one perhaps etc., etc! ...” This
exchange of views lasted till the beginning of February,
1912, when the famous frontier-line was at last settled
and marked on the map of Macedonia, and nothing re-
mained to be done but to sign the agreement. At this
juncture I was informed from St. Petersburg that His
Majesty the Emperor, when receiving the Bulgarian
military attaché, had expressed to him in very precise
terms his desire to see the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement
concluded and signed. From that moment I no longer
felt myself justified in expressing doubts and fears as to
the agreement. toma locuta—causa finita.

The Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was signed by the
Serbian and Bulgarian Foreign Secretaries in the last
days of February, 1912, and ratified by the two
Sovereigns under date of March 13th, which in this
leap-year corresponded to February 29th, O.S. I have
often remembered, since, the superstitions attached in
the West to the number 13, and in Russia to the date of
February 29th, which is considered singularly unlucky.
But the fact that it had been possible to keep the
conclusion of the agreement a complete secret may have
consoled the interested parties for this. No one had
any idea of it, except Russia, and those to whom we
judged it fit and proper later on to confide the secret.
Turkey and the Powers of the Triple Alliance only
knew of the Serbo-Bulgarian compact when the Balkan
War broke out. It is true that our Foreign Secretary
had received from Belgrade some information as to the
secret of the agreement having been betrayed by
Ferdinand to the Austrian Court. Later on, in 1913,
this retrospective disclosure appeared in the Novoye
Vrenyja. Nevertheless it was quite untrue, and our
Foreign Secretary had an opportunity of proving to
himself zrrefutably that in Vienna, as in Berlin, there was
no idea of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement till shortly
before the Balkan War, and that the German Minister
in Sofia denied up to the end, that is till the mobilisation,
the very existence of the agreement. I consider it

—

1912] COMING OF AGE OF PRINCE BORIS © 57

necessary, however, in alluding to the ignorance of the
agreement on the part of the Powers of the Triple
Alliance to except the military spheres of Italy. But I
shall deal with this question later on.

The close of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations almost
coincided with the festivities held for the coming of age
of the heir to the Bulgarian throne, Prince Boris.

King Ferdinand wished to invest this anniversary
with all the pomp possible. Invitations had been issued
to related and neighbouring Courts, and for the 11th
(24th) of February members of the Royal Families and
ambassadors extraordinary arrived in Sofia, entrusted
with the congratulations and good wishes customary on
these occasions.

The Emperor of Russia, godfather to young Prince
Boris, sent as his representative to Sofia the Grand-
Duke Andrew (son of the Grand-Duchess Vladimir).
The Crown-Princes of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and
Rumania, the Archduke Charles Albert, the Prince of
Prussia, Leopold, completed the group of august person-
ages that King Ferdinand, accompanied by his two sons,
received at the station in Sofia with military honours
and all customary ceremonial. The Ambassadors of the
other European Powers, of the United States, and of
Turkey all enhanced by their presence the brilliancy of
the festivity, which was favoured with exceptionally fine
weather. For three days the streets of Sofia, usually
rather deserted, were enlivened by automobiles and
royal carriages conveying the King’s guests and their
suites to feasts in the Palace, to receptions and to
military parades. The Castle of Sofia, ordinarily so
dark and gloomy, was brilliantly illuminated, and filled
with the gay life of festivity and by a crowd of courtiers
in full dress. The Russian Grand-Duke, as the repre-
sentative of the godfather of Prince Boris, took the first
place at all ceremonies.

Among the princely guests, Prince Alexander of
Serbia was the one who made the best impression on

58 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY. [cuap. v1.

me. Serious and sincere in manner, he displayed much
tact during his stay in Sofia; he talked a great deal and
very willingly with the Bulgarian politicians, preserving
an attitude of official respect towards King Ferdinand ;
he treated Prince Boris with sincere good-fellowship ;
his manner was unassuming, yet perfectly dignified.

The Austrian Archduke, still quite young and
allowed for the first time in his life to go to foreign
parts—and on an official mission, too!—behaved with
exemplary modesty, always looking to his governor—
an ultra-correct Austrian General.

Finally Prince Leopold of Prussia presented the
really curious type of a Prussian officer half automaton,
half decadent. It seemed as if his every movement was
planned in order not to make creases in his extremely
well-cut uniform ; even his conversation—if a few short
sentences uttered in a perfectly monotonous voice can
be called “conversation”—seemed to belong to some
ingenious German machine. This Prussian Prince had
at one time found special favour in the eyes of the
Emperor William, who revived for him the grade of
Field-Marshal-Colonel, in disuse since 1800. But on
discovering that no real ability was concealed behind
the military rigidity of the Prince, William was dis-
illusioned about his protégé, and henceforth only em-
ployed him in formalities. The sending of Prince
Leopold to the solemnities in Sofia emphasised the
German Emperor's wish to show perfect coldness to-
wards Bulgaria and her Sovereign, though at the same
time displaying a great deal of correctness; William
desired nothing from the Bulgarians and offered them
nothing. In Berlin the choice of persons to whom
missions of etiquette and ceremonial were entrusted
was always influenced by ulterior motives and certain
ideas, and in no way by the desire to please those to
whom they were sent. Amongst us, unfortunately, this
was never noticed and never well understood.

The festivities for the coming of age of Prince Boris

1912] FERDINAND’S REQUEST so

and the ratification of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement
ended the first winter-season of my stay in Sofia; during
this winter my wife and I had given a series of dinners
and receptions to Bulgarian society, to the Court, and to
the Diplomatic Corps. Having successfully terminated
an important negotiation and fulfilled all my social
duties, I could think of undertaking my journey ad
limina, we. of going to St. Petersburg, to explain the
ulterior aims of our Balkan policy, and to discuss
certain questions of the hour with M. Sazonoff. Among
these questions, one in particular would have to be
discussed verbally and very secretly.

At the beginning of the winter which was just over,
the Minister of Finance, M. Todorov, with whom I was
on excellent personal terms, and in whom I had much
confidence, had come to see me one day to tell me ofa
very confidential and quite unexpected request made to
me by King Ferdinand. It was this: His Majesty was
in great financial difficulties, he was especially worried
by a debt of a million and a half francs (or Austrian
crowns, which amounted to about the same) which he
owed to the Laender Bank (Banque des Pays Autrichiens)
of Vienna, and the Bank for some time had been making
difficulties ; it demanded securities or mortgages which
the Bulgarian Court would not or could not give; it
refused further credit ; and meantime money was scarce
in the Palace, and Ferdinand was often reduced to
selling, not without difficulty, short-dated Court bonds
to the Sofia banks for trifling sums. In order to put an
end to this humiliating state of things, the King begged
me to arrange with one of our large financial houses in
St. Petersburg for a loan of two million francs, as a
mortgage on his property of Vrana, situated a few
kilometres from Sofia, a property small in area, where
the King was laying out a beautiful garden and building
a villa. His Majesty, according to M. Todorov, under-
stood perfectly well that no Russian bank would accept
such a mortgage without receiving supplementary
security on the part of the Russian Government; the

60 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [cuap. v1.

difficulties which latterly the Laender Bank was always
raising for the King were apparently mainly actuated
by the displeasure felt by the Austrians at the present
Bulgarian policy; evgo, it entered into our calculations
to liberate King Ferdinand from all pecuniary obligation
to Vienna, and thus to acquire fresh claims on his sincere
gratitude.

I answered Todorov by saying that while refusing to
enter into these latter arguments, I would at once fulfil
the King’s wish and would forward his request to St.
Petersburg and second it. I did this in a special and
very confidential letter to M. Neratoff, who was still
managing the Foreign Office. Amongst other things I
said that such a loan must most certainly not be
considered a means of buying Ferdinand ; that | remem-
bered perfectly, during my stay in Belgrade, how
our Government, on the entreaties of my chief,
M. Persiant, had paid King Milan, who had just
abdicated, a million francs on condition that he left
the country for ever and never interfered again in
the home or foreign policy of Serbia. Milan took the
money and left for Paris, but when the last few
thousand francs had been lost in gambling or spent
on women, he returned quite naturally to Belgrade, as
being the only place where he could exist decently, but
where his presence soon caused fresh trouble. And it
was we who were blamed by public opinion for having
given money to a father to enable him to desert his son
—aminor! Sol wrote to Neratoff that I wished frankly
to warn the Ministry against the erroneous idea that one
could dwy Ferdinand with those two millions. It was not
money that would secure to us a lasting influence in Bul-
garia, but systematic and laborious work. Nevertheless,
the moment the King was obliged to beg such a favour
of us, I considered that we ought to grant it frankly,
simply, and without any humiliating conditions. Sucha
course of action would bind Ferdinand up to a point,
and in any case would make our relations with him
more intimate. M. Neratoff promptly replied that he

1912] THE LOAN ARRANGED 61

shared my point of view; and that he would certainly
forward the King’s request to the right quarter. But
from that moment I had received no further information
on the subject, and decided to elucidate the question
personally in St. Petersburg.

I think it necessary to relate here the end of this
affair. Ferdinand’s request met with decided opposition
at first from M. Kokovtzoff, who as Minister of Finance
refused to give any security whatsoever to the society
which might be willing to advance the sum in question
to the King of Bulgaria. Speaking politically and as
President of the Council, M. Kokovtzoff had no objection
to granting the King this small favour and was willing
to recommend the affair to one of our large banks, but he
would not hear of a State guarantee; but without such
guarantee no bank would do business. The discussions
dragged on for a few months longer, and after renewed
entreaties on my part and fresh favourable intervention
from M. Sazonoft, the affair was arranged thus: the
two million francs were advanced to Ferdinand by the
Banque d’Escompte of St. Petersburg; but in reality
the money was supplied from the personal funds of His
Majesty the Emperor, at five per cent. interest, with
repayment spread over a certain number of years.
When I left Bulgaria towards the end of 1913, the Court
of Sofia had already paid the first instalment of this
debt. I do not know if it was as punctual in 1914; but
I should, above all things, be interested to know whether
King Ferdinand discharged this debt of honour (he
knew whence the two million came) before he definitely
passed over to the camp of our enemies, and before he
treacherously stabbed heroic Serbia in the back? If
Ferdinand did not do so, it is an additional stain on his
character.

But let us return to the month of March, 1912. Before
leaving Sofia for-St. Petersburg it was absolutely
necessary for me to see the King. However, Ferdinand
had had, asif purposely, an attack of his usual ailment—

62 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [cnap. v1.

the gout—and always kept on putting off my audience.
I learnt at last from a fairly authentic source that the
King’s illness was a diplomatic one, and that for special
reasons known to himself alone, he did not wish to see
me at the moment or to have the necessary politcal
interview with me. Thus forewarned I thought it
imperative to insist on my audience, by declaring that I
should not go on leave till | had seen the King. Two
days after | was invited to the Palace.

His Majesty received me in his study; he was half
lying on a wide leather sofa; one of his legs was
wrapped in a plaid rug, testifying to the attack of gout.
On a table next the sofa a few art treasures were littered
about: an antique Byzantine crucifix in carved wood
set in silver—the gift, if I am not wrong, of the Metro-
politan of Moscow; an old snuff-box in gold—the gift of
the Empress Alexandra; a box with artistic miniatures—
a souvenir of the Emperor Nicolas II. In his hand, white,
dimpled and well cared-for, the King held a crutch-stick
with a gold knob in the old Russian style, similar to
that with which John the Terrible was always armed;
only the steel point which ended the stick of the Tsar
of all the Russias and which the bloodthirsty autocrat
sometimes dug into the foot of an undesirable questioner
by leaning his whole weight on the knob, was replaced
on that of the Tsar of the Bulgarians—for the greater
wellbeing of his visitors—by a common rubber end;
the crutch had been given to the King by his cousin the
Grand-Duchess Vladimir.

“You see before you, Monsieur,” began the King,
“a poor invalid surrounded by a few of his treasures,
valuable by reason of their associations. Here is my
sole consolation in my sufferings,” he continued, point- —
ing to the old crucifix, “here, ...” and the King began to
show me the artistic treasures which consoled him on |
his bed of sickness, and to tell me about their Russian |
origin. This preamble over, Ferdinand came down to
facts.

He began by expressing his very vivid fears on the |

to12] FERDINAND’S PERPLEXITIES 63

subject of a possible disclosure of the Serbo-Bulgarian
treaty.

“They are so imprudent in the Palace of Belgrade ;
every one has access to it and they talk to every one.
Moreover, the whole of Belgrade is full of Austrian, and
especially Hungarian, spies. Hence what would my
position be if the old Emperor Francis-Joseph got to
know of the agreement that I have just signed, and which
has all the appearance of being chiefly directed against
the monarchy of the Hapsburgs? And I feel sure that
the Serbians will not fail to boast everywhere of their
friendship with Bulgaria, that they will allow it to be
understood in Vienna that henceforth they can depend
on us; and the Serbian irredentists, that King Peter’s
Government cannot keep in hand—as / can keep the
Macedonians—will not miss the opportunity to annoy
Austria in Bosnia and in Herzegovina. And finally, we
two, that is Bulgaria and Serbia, instead of profiting
by our agreement to guard the rights of our kin in
Macedonia, shall be forced to arms in all haste to uphold
our own integrity and our own independence. I would
entreat you most earnestly, Monsieur, to make my
apprehensions known in St. Petersburg and to explain
the true state of affairs. I shall await your return with
impatience. For my part, I have already given the
necessary instructions to General Papriskov” (at that
time Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburg).

I listened with some astonishment to the long-winded
explanations of the King, in which truth was mingled with
lies and clumsy fictions alternated with real opinions
and fears. King Ferdinand was sincere when he
acknowledged himself guilty towards the Emperor
Francis-Joseph. Accustomed from his early youth to
respect the aged monarch, he felt truly uneasy at the idea
that in the Castle of Schoenbrunn he might be looked
on as a traitor and an enemy. The fears which the
King expressed on the subject of the Serbian irredentists
were also well founded. But what he said about the

~ Palace of Belgrade bore the stamp of wilful exaggeration.

64 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [cuap. v1.

Most certainly the doors of this palace were thrown open
to all Serbians; King Peter did not shut himself up as
King Ferdinand did in his study, only admitting those
whom he wished to instruct on some point, or those from
whom he hoped to hear some interesting gossip. King
Peter, taking his rvéle of constitutional monarch very
seriously, talked freely with all the representatives of
Serbian democracy, interchanging ideas and information
with them ; but above all he was guided by the opinions
of his strictly constitutional Ministry. Though opening
his door to every one, he did not really open it wide, just
as he really only disclosed his thoughts and sentiments
to true Serbian patriots who were incapable of having any
dealings with the enemies of the country. King Peter
did not recruit his servants, informants and secret
counsellors from the ranks of those persons who were
compromised in the eyes of the nation and the law;
among /us satellites one did not find a Ghennadiev, a
Radoslavov, a General Savov and other doubtful
characters of this type!

As to the fact that the newly-signed agreement would
necessitate a fresh political situation for Bulgaria, the
King could not be unaware of it. The frequent warnings
that I had issued on the subject to M. Gueshov and the
other members of his Government throughout the course
of the negotiations were perfectly well known to him.

Taking advantage of the circumstances and of the
words that the King had just uttered, I considered it my
duty to repeat these warnings to His Majesty. “I am
afraid,” I said, “ that the entirely new situation arising
from the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement is not sufficiently
clearly understood in Bulgaria. By signing this agree-
ment Bulgarian policy has entered on a new course,
accurately outlined, and cannot now turn back; having
formed ties that cannot be broken with Serbia, Bulgaria
has bound herself, by that very fact, to us, and the two
Governments will have henceforth to listen very atten-
tively to our advice if they really wish to attain their
national aims. As to the apprehensions of your Majesty

“M
x
%
A
i

i912] I WARN HIS MAJESTY 65

on the subject of Austria, you may rely entirely on us.
My august Master does not wish for war, at all costs he
will avoid anything that might bring it about; and we
will warn the Serbians, in the most explicit manner,
against all dangerous impulses, against anything which
might justly irritate the Central Powers. On the other
hand, if the two Balkan countries, henceforth united,
were to be attacked without cause by Austria we should
doubtless look on such aggression as a challenge hurled
directly at us. Moreover, Your Majesty knows my
opinion and probably shares it, this opinion being that
Austria—under present conditions anyhow—would not
dare to risk an aggression without due cause. Finally,
touching the justifiable claim of Bulgaria and Serbia to
protect their kin in Turkey—for us the question resolves
itself thus : on the one hand, as Your Majesty knows so
well, we should not wish to do anything conducive
to an armed collision in the Near East, and I have
repeatedly informed the Royal Government that in
St. Petersburg everything will be done to prevent such
a collision. But on the other hand, we realise perfectly
well that the best way to prevent any untoward events
would be to resume and successfully to terminate the
international work so well started in Macedonia before
the Turkish Revolution. At that period one of the
stumbling blocks to the work had been Serbo-Bulgarian
rivalry. This rivalry once disposed of, our work will
become far easier, and Your Majesty may rest assured
that we shall avail ourselves of this improved situation.”

While I was unfolding these ideas of mine, Ferdinand’s
expression became more and more gloomy. He refrained,
however, from all controversy and, passing over to
personal subjects, soon dismissed me with the same
studied politeness and amiable words as heretofore.

But under this apparent amiability I thought I
detected signs of displeasure, coldness, even hostility!

I have since been told—and had, moreover, found it
out for myself—that the beginning of my personal
rupture with Ferdinand dated from this significant

66 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [cuap. v1.

conversation. The King realised that I had no intention
of becoming the blind interpreter of his opinions to the
Imperial Government ; he also understood that the Serbo-
Bulgarian treaty gave a certain hold over him to Russian
policy and consequently to the representatives of the
Tsar. Ferdinand felt that certain alleys were henceforth
closed to him: the feeling was unbearable and roused his
anger against the Russian Minister who contemplated
hampering the freedom of his political enterprises.

M. Gueshov, with whom] had a long interview on
the eve of my departure, did not display any apprehension
—in contrast to his master—on the score of the newly-
signed agreement, and repeated the opinion, already
_ expressed by him during the course of the negotiations
with Spalaikovitch, that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty,
concluded under the zgis of Russia, would necessarily
involve the conclusion of military conventions between
the two contracting parties as well as between both of
them and Russia. I had already imparted this suggestion
of M. Gueshov’s to M. Sazonoff, and added—as my
private opinion—that such conventions, drawn up, of
course, on strictly defensive lines, might furnish us with
further means of preventing ill-timed action on the part
of the two Balkan kingdoms. The answer was delayed,
and on taking leave of M. Gueshov, I promised him
that I would go into the question in St. Petersburg,
and would bring him back a definite answer from M.
Sazonoff.

CHAPTER VAL
RASPUTIN

I ARRIVED in St. Petersburg at the end of March, after an
absence of a year. I recollect as if it were yesterday,
the first impression of a political nature that I received:
the very morning of my arrival, on looking over the
Novoye Vremja, I noticed a short article in which the
speech made the evening before by M. Goutchkoff at
the Duma was quoted.

This speech was a brief but vehement diatribe against
certain sinister influences which were dominating the
Court and beginning to interfere in Government affairs.

I at once realised that this was aimed at the famous
Gregory Rasputin. But as up till then I had only heard
the strange influence of this individual at Tsarskoe-Selo
spoken of as a mystico-hysterical whim of the Empress
Alexandra’s, and as, on the other hand, the Emperor
was not in any case very devoted to Goutchkoff, I dis-
approved of this new philippic, which would cause
further estrangement between His Majesty and the
former President of the Duma: whereas I considered
that it would be advantageous to the affairs of the
country if the Emperor were occasionally to confer
with this influential and very well-informed member of
our Parliament, who with ardent patriotism and recog-
nised authority presided over the Commission of National
Defence. In short, I inwardly accused Goutchkoff of a
want of tact.

I was thinking all this over when I went to luncheon
with a near relation of mine. This relation was also
related to Goutchkoff and did not like him much, and in
our intimate conversations often alluded to him as an
ambitious man who had become embittered and restless.

67 F

68 RASPUTIN [CHAP. VII

On arriving at my relation’s house, I found him talking
at the telephone: “ Is that you, my dear? I ventured
to ring you up on the telephone to tell you how very
much I admired your excellent speech of yesterday at
the Duma. ... No, no! do not excuse yourself for a
good deed; you have only done your duty as a citizen:
it is very regrettable that every one else does not do the
same,” etc... . I could not believe my ears, and when
my relation had at last finished his conversation, I
exclaimed: “Is it really you talking ? How many times
have I quarrelled with you by standing up for Goutchkoff
when you were abusing him; and now you overwhelm
him with compliments, whereas I—I frankly admit—
considered his speech to be a want of tact. What does
this change mean ?”

“Listen,” replied my host, “do not let us lose time
in idle discussion: you see a great many more people
in St. Petersburg than I do; in three days from now
you will have seen and heard so much that there will be
nothing left for me to tell you. And then we shall see
what you will say!” My relation was only wrong
about the time-limit!. On the evening of the very next
day, I had only one remark to make to him: ‘“ You were
perfectly right ; but, good God! how sad it all is, and
what is more ow dangerous!” ;

I had heard the name of Rasputin mentioned in St. |
Petersburg for the first time in 1908. An intimate friend
of mine with whom I was discussing Court affairs—I
forget exactly why—said amongst other things: “ There
are strange rumours in circulation among the public, or
rather, among the people! Yesterday, my wife’s house-
keeper—you know the one we have had for more than
ten years—came into my study and said: ‘Pray excuse
me, sir, but I have something I wish to say to you. I
have often heard you complain that your son-in-law
could not get the post which had been promised to
him ages ago.... Well! I believe I can help you.’
‘You! my good woman; but in what way?’ ‘In
this way. My sister, who is also in domestic service,

1912] HIS ORIGIN 69

told me the other day that her master and mistress often
receive a certain “old man”—a man of the people, quite
simple: but he is received with a great deal of fuss; and
he has already been an enormous help to that family;
he has been able to help many others, as he is quite
intimate with the Tsar and Tsarina, who do everything
that he tells them. Allow me to beg my sister to speak
to the “old man” in your son-in-law’s favour!’ As you
may imagine,” continued my friend, “I did not consent to
this curious suggestion; but it is odd what rumours
there are about amongst the people! It is evidently a
question of a new Papus or of another M. Philip, only
of Russian origin and in the popular style!”

While I was spending the winter of 1g1o-11 in St.
Petersburg, rumours and inquiries on the subject of
Gregory Rasputin had been the rage in society. It was
relatively known that this “old man” or “ poor innocent”
was a native of Siberia, that he had formerly led a
particularly dissolute life (“ Rasputin” is derived from
“rasputny ” = dissolute person); that then suddenly he
became a “trezvennik,” z.e. a preacher of temperance and
piety, and that, henceforth protected by a few great
ecclesiastical dignitaries, he was summoned by them to
St. Petersburg. There, through the “ Montenegrins "—
the Grand-Duchesses Militza and Stana—and through
the salon—“ little parish ”—of Countess Sophie Ignatieff,
he finally worked his way up to the Court, where he finds
a patroness and so to speak an impresario in the person
of the divorced lady Vyrouboff, wée Taneieff. However,
as during this winter of 1910-11, the Empress Alexandra
did not shut herself up so completely as in former years,
and was apparently feeling quite well, which means that
she was behaving more or less normally, there was
much less open mention of Rasputin and the Vyrouboft ;
moreover, the influence of these persons had not yet
extended to Government affairs.

But matters had assumed a very different aspect
during the year that I had spent out of Russia. It appears
that in the meantime a group of low “ opportunists”

70 RASPUTIN [CHAP. VII.

had sprung up, who, aware of the ever-increasing
influence of the Siberian rogue over the august person-
ages of Tsarskoe-Selo, set themselves out to guide
Rasputin, and allied themselves to the Vyrouboff and
her relations in order to gain access to the public offices
of the State and particularly to the public funds. One
began to hear the names of a Prince Andronnikoff, of
a M. Manus, of a Miassoiedoff, and they- were spoken
of as people who were plotting great things and
influencing even the Government. The waiting-room of
the uncouth moujik Rasputin was filled every morning
by persons coming to ask favours, amongst whom one
met with people of position and of the upper classes ;
they showed each other notes scrawled by this same
Rasputin in a common style and an appailing hand-
writing, and in which he recommended some humble
protégé or some one in need of assistance to the good
graces of such and such a Minister.

One heard at the same time that the ecclesiastical
dignitary who had contributed the most to Rasputin’s
good fortune had just written a letter to the Emperor
in which he revealed the depravity of his ex-protégé, and
repented bitterly of having introduced him at the
Palace ; the honest but ingenuous bishop concluded his
epistle by entreating the Emperor to send Rasputin
away ; for himself, he implored permission to retire as a
simple monk into a monastery, in order to do penance
there to the end of his days. The story went that the

bishop received a very gracious reply from the Emperor, |

earnestly begging him to remain at the head of his
diocese : but Rasputin still continued in high favour.

- At one time, influenced by a few letters of this kind,
the statements of a few officials and some serious
warnings, the Emperor did make up his mind to send
Rasputin back to his Siberian village, where the
adventurer arrived loaded with magnificent gifts and
provided with a considerable sum of money; but by
the time I arrived in St. Petersburg all the town was
indignantly talking about the return of the “old man”

1912] A SUBJECE FOR SCANDAL 71

to the capital, and they quoted the names of such and
such a lady and of such and such an official, whose
houses, in the evening, were the scene of strange
religious rites conducted by Rasputin."

Much comment was also caused by the resignation
of two maids-of-honour, specially attached to the Palace:
Princess Obolensky, a person noted for her wit, tact,
and kindness of heart, who at one time was very
intimate with the Empress, and Mlle. Tutcheff, much
esteemed for her character and her intelligence, to which
she owed her position as governess to the Imperial
children. The latter had several times protested
vehemently against the repeated visits of the “old
man” to her august pupils, visits during which he
allowed himself to take liberties which were unnecessary
to say the least of it. Mlle. Tutcheff was promised that
this should not occur again, and Rasputin’s departure
brought the desired solution of the question. But now
the terrible scoundrel had reappeared at Tsarskoe-
Selo, the question revived with added acuteness and
Mlle. Tutcheff, foreseeing a return to former practices,
definitely left her charming pupils and the Court.

My first official visit in St. Petersburg was naturally
to our Foreign Secretary. Having discussed with him
all that had happened in Bulgaria since our last con-
versation at Davos, I begged M. Sazonoff, as was
customary, to procure me an audience of His Majesty
the Emperor.

“The Emperor will probably receive you during
this week. To-morrow is the day for my report to
Tsarskoe-Selo and I will take the opportunity to inform
His Majesty of your arrival.”

“And does the Empress Alexandra not receive?”

“Oh no! She has been ailing for a long time, and
in general things are not going well in that quarter.”

“ But what is wrong?”

1 Rasputin was in fact a KAdysz, z.eshalf “Shaker,” half Flagellant—
a strange sect which from time to time rises in Russia from the common
depths to the upper classes of society.

72 RASPUTIN [CHAP. VIL.

“Oh! You will soon hear of it; no one talks of
anything else in town.”

I let the matter drop, as in honour bound.

Two or three days later, I got out of the train at the
Tsarskoe-Selo station and got into a Royal carriage to
go to the Alexander Palace, the usual residence of the
Imperial family. The weather was beautiful, dry and
sunny. As we were nearing the palace, the footman
began to explain to me—with the usual familiarity of
those sort of people—why I was being taken to a
different entrance than usual.

“See, your Excellency, the Empress’s carriage
standing at the other door! Her Majesty is going out
for the first time for along while,” continued the footman
with a self-satisfied smile.

A few minutes later, preceded by another Royal
servant, I was making my way to the Emperor’s study
through the charming Louis XVI. rooms of the Palace,
and across the spacious library, all lit up by the sun-
shine, and I was admiring the fine and simple architecture
of this masterpiece of Guarenghi’s. And beyond the
grand colonade of the Palace, I could see the Empress’s
carriage disappearing on its way to the station... .
The following day the whole of St. Petersburg was
saying that the Empress, having gone unexpectedly into
the town to visit an institute for young ladies, then went
on to the house of one of Rasputin’s faithful followers,
and spent two hours there conversing with the “holy
man.” .

How many times since then have I recalled that
morning, and that Imperial carriage driving away
through the dazzling snow across the park at Tsarskoe.
How many times have I recalled that magnificent
dwelling, simple and grand in outline, with its ex-
quisitely-proportioned rooms, its beautiful works of art,
its admirable library, its beautiful bay-windows over-
Jooking the park, which is delightful even in winter; all
this setting which seemed to call for a royal existence,
not so much sumptuous as refined and distinguished ;

a oe.

t

1912| THE EMPRESS AND RASPUTIN 73

conversations with cultivated friends, scholars, poets,
and artists ; receptions, rather informal than otherwise,
but composed of the real élite of a society in which in-
telligent elements have never been lacking; political
discussions with the mén of yesterday and of to-morrow,
who would be flattered at being admitted into this
sanctuary of refinement and elegance. This dwelling, I
thought to myself, shelters a sovereign, powerful, but
prone to good-nature and simplicity, gifted with a quick
and inquiring mind made for the interchange of impres-
sions and opinions; four young girls, whose beauty and
charm will gradually be revealed to a respectfully-
admiring world, like the blooming of rare and lovely
flowers in our hot-houses ; an adored son, just weak and
sickly enough to bring a shade of melancholy into the
beautiful eyes of his mother. . .. And this mother, this
wife, this Empress, moving in this beautiful setting, with
all these sources of joy and happiness, teaves the beauti-
ful white palace, with its pictures, its sculpture, and its
beautiful books, the flowers which perfume it and the
delightful children who fill it with life; she leaves all
this with the eager joy of a convalescent going out for
the first time into the fresh air, and she goes to shut
herself up for hours in a wretched room in a common-
place apartment with a dirty and knavish moujik, seek-
ing from this creature—so immeasurably beneath her—
spiritual consolation, foretelling of the future, guidance
for a timid conscience and a sick mind. ... And then
she returns to this Tsarskoe palace, in which she has
succeeded in “sequestering” her husband, to this palace
whence nothing radiates to the adjacent capital and to
the country: neither noble refinement, nor mental

shrewdness, nor even political guidance—nothing save

an absurd and ridiculous legend—grieved over by the
friend and retailed triumphantly by the foe, and which
goes on growing and circulating till it becomes one of
the chief causes of a downfall and a catastrophe almost
unequalled in history !

74 RASPUTIN [CHAP. VII.

This time my audience with the Emperor was some-
what brief. His Majesty first expressed his sincere satis-
faction on the subject of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement.
I repeated to the Emperor my last conversation with
Ferdinand.

“Yes,” said the Emperor, “Ferdinand is terribly
suspicious and dreadfully afraid that we shall take him
altogether in hand. But you may reassure him on this
subject. I have no wish to direct Bulgarian policy
provided that Bulgaria behaves herself and does not
drag us whither we cannot and will not follow her.”

The Emperor then proceeded to speak of the festivities
held for the coming of age of Prince Boris, and charged
me to thank the King from him for the welcome extended
to the Grand-Duke Andrew Vladimirovitch. I gathered
from this audience the impression that His Majesty was
indeed very much pleased at the complete reconciliation
between Serbians and Bulgarians. When he spoke of
King Ferdinand one perceived in his words a sceptical
and even slightly scornful touch, but that in spite
of that he looked on the King of the Bulgarians
as a political factor who would have to be reckoned
with. This renewal of goodwill towards Ferdinand -
might also serve as a sign that the idea of a matri-
monial alliance between Prince Boris and one of
the Grand-Duchesses, daughters of the Emperor, had
grown to acertain extent. And, indeed, in intimate Court
circles, I heard great liking expressed for the young
Bulgarian heir—which proved relatively that Boris had
produced a good impression on the Imperial couple.

The next day I went to see M. Sazonoff and gave
him—as was fit and proper—an epitome of my interview
with his Majesty. I asked the Minister on this occasion
what his personal impression was on the subject of the
military convention—a question on which we had only
touched lightly at our first interview.

“Well!” said Sazonoff, “I wish you would be so
good as to go yourself to General Jilinsky (at that time

1912] GENERAL JILINSKY 75

head of the General Headquarters Staff) and endeavour
to find out whether he is really in favour of this
convention or not. [I am under the impression that the
matter is being settled at General Headquarters,
although the preliminaries are the work of our former
military agent in Bulgaria—Colonel Leontieff—and
although, as you say yourself, Lieutenant-Colonel
Romanowski endorses his predecessor’s point of view.”

On the appointed day, I went to see General
Jilinsky, with whom I had never discussed important
matters. At my first allusion to the convention, the
General became irritable.

“But why should it be necessary for us to conclude
a military convention with Bulgaria when one already
exists? Have you been told nothing of the convention
concluded by me personally in 1902? It is here in this
drawer, but of course I cannot read it to you as it
is a most secret convention; but you had better make
inquiries about it at the Foreign Office, and perhaps
you will be initiated into the circumstances relating to
the conclusion and terms of this arrangement.”

“Tread the convention, General, when I was appointed
Russian Minister to Bulgaria, and I re-read it to-day at
the Foreign Office before coming to you. I know it by
heart, and consequently I realise that it has a fixed object
and that the point was directed almost exclusively at
Turkey and Rumania. When Rumania had concluded
a special convention with Austria-Hungary, we thought
it expedient to conclude one with Bulgaria, promising
her effectual help in the event of her being attacked by
Turkey aided by Rumania. But now the political
situation has completely changed; it is no longer a
question of the possibility of an alliance—certainly not
an offensive one—between Turkey and Rumania; on
the contrary, we have to deal with the Serbo-Bulgarian
alliance, which brings quite different elements into the
G@iestion. ..:.”

“All this is quite likely,” interrupted the General ;
“but so long as the convention of which ! spoke, and

76 RASPUTIN [CHAP. VI.

which I myself concluded, exists, it is waste of time to
speak of any other.”

I understood that I had to deal with a pre-conceived
idea firmly fixed in an obstinate brain; so 1 abandoned
the principal object of my visit and passed to another
subject: the journey which the Chief of the Bulgarian
General Staff, General Fichev, had made to Russia a few
months previously.

“ General Fichev,” I said, ‘ was very much flattered
by the welcome which he received here, and has carried
away the best impressions of our military organisation.
Up till then he had never been to Russia and did not
know anything about the Russian Army. Colonel
Romanowski, who accompanied the General, told me
that atevery moment he uttered exclamations of genuine
surprise at the high standard of instruction of our
troops, their skill in manoeuvres, etc.... His foreign
masters (Fichev had been a pupil of the Military College
in Turin) had probably described the Russian Army as
a semi-Asiatic force.”

“So that is what M. Fichev told Romanowski, is
it?” interrupted the General, “and I happen to know
that he talked of our Army and of Russia generally in
exceedingly hostile terms!”

“Really ?” I exclaimed. ‘ But then be good enough
to quote your sources of information, General; the
matter ought to be thoroughly sifted, and we ought to
warn our military agent who, since his trip with Fichev,
has become very intimate with him and trusts him.”

“But I did not need any sources of information,”
replied Jilinsky, angrily. ‘Being a rabid Stambou-
lovist, he could not speak otherwise about Russia and
the Russian Army. It is as clear as daylight!”

After this there was nothing left for me to do but to
close our interview and to make my bow to the peppery
General.

Two years and a half after this interview—in
September, 1914—General Jilinsky, who in 1913 had
been made Governor-General of Poland, was also

1912 | OfHEK OFFICAL VISITS 77

commanding an armycorps. He was responsible for the
operations of General Samsonoff’s army in the region of
the Mazovian Lakes, operations which ended in the loss
ofthis army. The future historians of the War will have
to decide who was the real culprit in this catastrophe :
was it General Samsonoff who made mistakes, or was it
General Jilinsky who decided on the operations before
he had estimated the fighting strength of the army in
question, and without knowing exactly what forces the
enemy was opposing to it?

I went the next day to see the Foreign Secretary, to
repeat the conversation I had had with the Chief of the
General Headquarters Staff, and I frankly expressed my
conviction that under the circumstances the proposed
military convention could never be concluded.

“But what is your exact opinion as to the expedi-
ency of such a convention?” asked Sazonoff.

“To be quite frank,” I replied, “I am still in doubt
myself. On the one hand, you know my opinion about
the desire for conquest of the Bulgarians and Serbians :
having concluded with them a military convention of
which the point would be directed against Turkey, we
should appear to be encouraging their projects; by
making, per contra, this convention into a weapon against
Austria-Hungary, we should still further strain the chain
of our relations with the Central Empires: woe to us if
a link snaps! But on the other hand a military con-
vention, drawn up with skill and great caution, might
unite Serbians and Bulgarians and prevent them taking
up arms against our wish, or at a moment we might
consider inopportune. All this should be carefully
weighed, and it is most regrettable that the chief of our
General Headquarters Staff will not even allow a care-
ful and impartial examination of such an important
question.”

“Tn that case, let us wait,” said the Foreign Secretary,
in conclusion.

Besides my audience at Tsarskoe-Selo and my

78 RASP UTIN [CHAP. VII.

interviews with M. Sazonoff, I called on several members
of the Government, and amongst others on M.
Kokovtzoff—at that time already President of the
Council—to whom I was bound by pleasant recollections
of work shared in Paris at the time of our great loans
of 1906. I also did not omit to visit General Polivanoff,
then assistant to the Minister for War, to whom I
always enjoyed talking, and who stood high in my
opinion, for the thoroughness and impartiality which he
displayed in the examination of all business questions.
Moreover, I was bound to inform both these gentlemen
of matters relative to my work in Bulgaria.

I also visited M. Goutchkoff, and talked at great
length with him. Goutchkoff complained, amongst other
things, of our want of all military preparation.

“You cannot imagine,” he said, speaking of the
work of the Commission for National Defence for the
Duma, “ what it has cost us to make the War Office ask
Jor supplies to be voted for the making of big guns for the
artillery, of which we hardly possess any. At last the
first orders have been given, but they are quite inade-
quate.” In spite of its being against his principles that
grand-dukes should beat the head of public departments,
Goutchkoff appeared to be on fairly good terms with
the Grand-Duke Serge Mikhailovitch, who was still in
command of the artillery ; but he complained bitterly of
the Minister for War, Soukhomlinoff. I do not exactly
remember whether it was on this occasion or later on
that Goutchkoff gave me the full details of his collision
with General Soukhomlinoff on the subject of the retired
colonel of the gendarmerie, Miassoiedoff, who lived
permanently with the Soukhomlinoffs at the War Office,
as family friend and general factotum, and whom
Goutchkoff openly accused of being a military spy, on
behalf of Germany.

“Your principal will end at the gallows,” he said to
Miassoiedoff’s seconds when they presented themselves
at his house. This prophecy was fulfilled in 1915.
Nevertheless it is very regrettable that Goutchkoff

esse

1912 | DRAWING-ROOM GOSSIP 79

should have consented to fight a duel with this low
scoundrel. It was inconsistent on his part. But then
it is through inconsistency and superfluous generosity
that we Russians usually err.

It was not only Goutchkoff who spoke to me with
indignation about Soukhomlinoff. The President of the
Council, Kokovtzoff, who was always extremely guarded
in his conversation, spoke in very bitter terms, one day,
about his colleague of the War Office: ‘“ What can one
do,” he said, “when the Minister for War is a gentle-
man whose sole wish is to report to the Emperor, in his
most agreeable baritone voice, the things which please
His Majesty, but which he, Soukhomlinoff, knows
perfectly well to be untrue!”

On the other hand, Kokovtzoff did not like Goutchkoff
either ; he accused him of being ambitious and conceited,
and of causing unscrupulous political disturbances.

And it was between these three persons: Soukhom-
linoff, Goutchkoff, and Kokovtzoff, that questions re-
lative to our armament were to be discussed!

In the salons of St. Petersburg, which I frequented
fairly regularly, Rasputin was the sole topic of con-
versation. Some persons, who were in a position to
know, and who were very truthful, told me amongst
other things that the Dowager Empress Marie-
Feodorovna had been to Tsarskoe-Selo and had had a
heart-to-heart talk with her son and daughter-in-law.
“It is no question of you, of your affections, your
convictions or rather your religious manias,” she said,
addressing the Empress Alexandra; “it is a question of
the Emperor, of the Dynasty, of Russia! If you go on
in this way, you will be the undoing of us all!”

A fortnight after my arrival in St. Petersburg, I was
invited to an evening party given by the Foreign
Secretary—the first big reception held by the Sazonoffs
since their return from Davos. The beautiful “ Empire”
reception-rooms were brilliantly lit up, and gradually
filled with guests: members of the Cabinet, of the

80 RASPUTIN [ CHAP. VII.

Council of the Empire and of the Duma, foreign
diplomats, journalists, financiers, and society people of
St. Petersburg, like one sees at all receptions of this
kind. The men wore their orders and decorations, the
ladies their smartest evening-dresses; in one of the
rooms an excellent orchestra was playing, and in the
first drawing-room the host and hostess smilingly
received their guests, shaking them by the hand, and
exchanging friendly small-talk with them. In short
everything was done as it should be at such receptions.
Yet nevertheless, from the outset, one felt there was
something in the air, something which was depressing
all the brilliant assembly. Smiling faces suddenly
assumed a severe and anxious expression; some of the
guests with worried looks were whispering together in
corners; the Ministers, in particular, seemed to be in a
very nervous state, with the exception, however, of
General Soukhomlinoff, who walked through the rooms
like a conquering hero, with his over-dressed wife on
his arm. I went up to M. Kokovtzoff, who was leaning
against a doorpost with an expression on his face like
that of ajudge about to pass sentence of death. I begged
him to grant me an interview so that I could discuss
with him an important matter entrusted to me by the
King of Bulgaria (that of the loan mentioned above).

“Forgive me, my dear M. Nekludoff,” interrupted
Kokovtzoff, “but at this moment I really have not the
heart for that. We have such a situation to face... .
Besides, how can! make an appointment with you, when
I do not even know if by to-morrow I shall still be in
office? I tell you this quite confidentially, and beg that
you will not repeat it.”

After that there was nothing to be done, but to
leave the speaker to his gloomy thoughts. In the next
room I met Sazonoff who had left his post as master of
the house for a few minutes and was talking with
Krivocheine in a window; the official smile on my chief's
face had given way to a sad and worried expression.
What does it all mean? I wondered.

1912] RASPUTIN’S DISMISSAL AND RETURN 81

At this moment | came across General Polivanoff.
I drew him aside.

“ Look here, General, what 7s going on amongst you
all?” I asked him straight out.

“You do not know yet? but it is this,” ... and the
General told me that the next day the President of the
Duma—it was already Rodzianko—and Makaroff, at that
time Minister of Justice, were to go to Tsarskoe-Selo in
order to hand to the Emperor the whole revolting record
of Rasputin, and to endeavour to obtain the instant dis-
missal of this dangerous and infamous person.

“Tf the Emperor does not consent, all the Ministers
will resign.”

“ All, do you think?” I asked the General, glancing
at Soukhomlinoff, who was passing at the moment.

“Perhaps a//l is saying too much,” amended
Polivanoff, with a knowing smile, “but the majority will
go: Kokovtzoff, Krivocheine, Sazonoff and others . . .”

The next day towards evening the rumour spread in
town that the Emperor had favourably received the
reports of the President of the Duma and of the Minister
of Justice, and consented to the instant dismissal of the
“old man” Gregory to his native village. A few days
later, the Court left for the Crimea. Among the people
who came to see the Imperial Family off at the station,
one noticed Mlle. Tutcheff and Princess Obolensky, to
whom the Imperial couple were particularly friendly ;
this might betoken their early return to Court. In St.
Petersburg all the official world calmed down; all the
Ministers remained at their posts.

Six weeks later, Rasputin returned zcogiito from
Siberia, and took up his abode again in the capital !

Detained in St. Petersburg a little longer by some
business matters, I did not return to my post till the end
of April (N.S.).

CHAPTER. Will
INTRIGUES AT SOFIA

On my return to Sofia I perceived at once that the
situation there was much changed. I noticed that the
first result of the newly-signed agreement had been to
strengthen the “activist” party, at the head of which
M. Danev had of course placed himself; in my absence
he had become infinitely more intimate than before with
the King. Ferdinand had left for foreign parts a few
days before my arrival; but before leaving he had
decided to send M. Danev to Livadia and St. Peters-
burg, under pretext of presenting officially to His
Majesty the Emperor and to M. Sazonoff the text of
the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. Danev was to be
accompanied to St. Petersburg by our military agent in
Sofia, Colonel Romanovski. All this was related to me
on my arrival as a settled thing, and | learnt at the same
time that the discussions about this journey had been
confided to General Poprikov, Bulgarian Minister in St.
Petersburg. It was quite clear to me that Danev was
being dispatched to our country in order to entreat the
Emperor and M. Sazonoff to grant active and willing
support to Bulgaria in case of certain events and com-
plications in Macedonia. And at the same time Danev
was to use his best efforts to convince us that King
Ferdinand was at present behaving with perfect loyalty
towards Russia' and the Tsar, and that we might hence-
forth abandon all suspicion and distrust with regard to
him.

Danev left soon after my return to Sofia. He was
very graciously received at Livadia by H.I.M. the
Emperor, and perfectly well received in St. Petersburg

82

_— —.

1912 | COLONEL MERRONE | 83

by M. Sazonoff. On his return, however, he seemed
somewhat disappointed. I soon learnt the reason when
I received official information on the exchange of views
which had taken place between King Ferdinand’s envoy
on one side, and M. Kokovtzoff and M. Sazonoff on the
other. These two statesmen had given Danev to under-
stand in a very amiable but very firm manner that we
should not, under any circumstances, allow ourselves
to be drawn into an active policy in the Balkans. The
same thing was repeated to Danev at Livadia.

I heard later that Danev had been entrusted with
another mission for King Ferdinand ; I will speak of this
further on.

After my return to Sofia and during the succeeding
summer months, I noticed the increased activity of the
Italian military attaché, Colonel Merrone. During my
absence, the latter had formed a close friendship with
our military agent. In the summer these gentlemen
were already on thee-and-thou terms which evoked a
certain amount of astonishment inthe Diplomatic Corps
of Sofia, for such terms are not customary between
two foreign colleagues. Through Romanowskiand also
through General Fichev—a former Italian pupil—
Merrone managed to become acquainted and to be on a
friendly footing with several Bulgarian senior officers,
from whom there was much to be learnt. I am justified
in believing that Colonel Merrone—a tall, fat and jovial
Neapolitan, with a very friendly manner, but at the
same time intelligent and rather a Paul Pry—knew how
to use all these friendships, and that he ended by know-
ing of the existence of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement
and its contents. He hastened—as in honour bound—
to communicate this information to the Italian General
Staff. The Italian Minister in Sofia, Count Bosdari—
as I was able to prove conclusively later—was only
initiated into the secret some time afterwards. An
intelligent man, highly educated and of very moderate
views, he did not share the enthusiasm of a certain

G

84 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA — [cuap. vu.

number of Italian politicians who wished that a con-
flagration should break out in the Balkans in order to
assure to Italy a prompt and brilliant victory over
Turkey.

When Lieutenant-Colonel Merrone’s statements on
the subject of the alliance concluded between Bulgaria
and Serbia were received in Rome, the first question
asked must have been as to what Italy could gain from
the new situation. Should she approach Serbia and
Bulgaria, suggest an alliance with them, and with their
help finish the war in a brilliant manner by conquering
part of the coast of Asia Minor? Yes, but would
Germany and Austria countenance such a proceeding by
their ally ? And would the other Powers consent to the
balance of power in the Near East being thus upset in
Italy’s favour? No, this plan, however alluring it might
be at first sight, offered too many pitfalls and dangers.
Would it not be better, on the contrary, to transmit the
valuable information just received to Berlin and to
Vienna; and by warning the Allies thus of the danger
which threatened them, incite them thereby to energetic
intervention in Constantinople, an intervention which
would force the Porte to grant important concessions
in Italy’s favour, and would put an immediate end to
the war? But in the first place such a course of
action would not harmonise with the principles of
loyalty ; and then who could guarantee that the Central
Powers would set such a price on the information
furnished by Italy? It is quite possible that, having
warmly thanked the Ally King for the service rendered,
Berlin and Vienna might forge any kind of diplomatic
weapon with the information, without concerning them-
selves further with Italy’s interests, and would continue
to concentrate all their efforts on increasing German
influence in Turkey. But then how could one make use
of the information received and of the new political
situation? In this way: by allowing Bulgaria and
Serbia complete freedom of action, but by taking great
care at the same time not to lavish diplomatic favours on

112] IN DISFAVOUR WITH FERDINAND 85

them. If a Balkan war ensued, then either the Porte
would immediately accept all the Italian conditions and
the Italo-Turkish war, which was beginning to drag on
too long, would end very advantageously for Italy; or
some new path would be discovered, some new com-
binazione arise which Italy could profit by. By virtue
of these considerations of an essentially practical nature,
Lieutenant-Colonel Merrone was allowed to watch very
closely the patriotic inclinations of his Bulgarian
comrades-in-arms.

One must be fair to Merrone: he fulfilled this mission
with great cleverness and perfect tact, and fully deserved
the reward bestowed on him after the conclusion of the
Peace Treaty between Italy and Turkey, when he was
made aide-de-camp to the King, but allowed all the same
to keep his command in the regiment—a distinction very
rarely conferred in the Italian army.

I have already mentioned in the preceding chapter
that King Ferdinand had received unfavourably the
explanations which I gave him before my departure for
St. Petersburg in regard to my view of the scope of the
Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. A few of my dear colleagues
at the Russian Legation profited by my absence to
endeavour to exasperate Ferdinand still more against
me, by all the means in their power—some of them very
unscrupulous ones—and to show him that it was possible
to get rid of the Russian Minister who had ceased to
please him. The King jumped at these suggestions,
and shortly after my departure for St. Petersburg he
had already fixed his choice on two candidates for my
post. One was the former Chief of the Chancellery in
the Foreign Office, M. A. Savinsky, who had just been
appointed Minister to Stockholm, and who had twice
been recommended for the post in Sofia by M. Sazonoff’s
predecessor, as well as by the Grand-Duchess Vladimir
—Ferdinand’s chief patroness at the Russian Court.
The other candidate was General Mossoloff, formerly
an officer in the Horse Guards, who in his youth was

86 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [ CHAP. VIII.

aide-de-camp to Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and
who then went into the administration of the Imperial
Court, where he was finally given the rank of Lieu-
tenant-General, although he had never returned to the
Army. Very intimate with the Emperor, Mossoloff
was commissoned to accompany the Grand-Duke
Andrew Vladimirovitch to Bulgaria, to act as mentor to
His Highness in this country where he had so many
acquaintances. This flattering mission and the festivities
of Sofia awoke in the worthy General the sudden desire
to exchange his Court functions for the activity, the
honours, and the high salary of a Minister Plenipoten-
tiary. He seemed to have been predestined by fate
itself to the post of Sofia. All the same it was M.
Savinsky who became my successor, and that only at the
end of 1913. As to General Mossoloff, his diplomatic
career only began much later, during the celebrated
Stiirmer’s short term at the Foreign Office.

The spring of 1912, thus served as a starting point
for intrigues emanating from different sides, which aimed
at terminating my term of office in Sofia. The historic
events which occurred soon after prevented therealisation
of these intrigues, up till the moment when these same
events in their final development caused my departure
from Bulgaria to be almost opportune. I was trans-
ferred from Sofia to Stockholm after the Treaty of
Bukharest in 1913, and as | did not approve of the stipu-
lations in it, it would have been very painful to me to
remain in Sofia; although my presence in Bulgaria
during the beginning of the World War might have
been of some use to the cause of Russia and the Allies.

I received the first information on the subject of the
intrigues against me in June, 1912. I heard from St.
Petersburg that Danev had repeatedly insinuated there
and at Livadia that I had not succeeded in establishing
good relations with Ferdinand and that I had not even
got on well with the Bulgarians. Besides these accusa- )
tions of a purely academic nature, I got to know—on
good authority—that a great deal of gossip about me

1912 | M: RIZOV ENTERS THE ARENA 87

was circulated in the office, and lobbies of our Foreign
Office. Some of this gossip was merely ridiculous, but
some was of a fairly shameful nature. This gossip had
its origin in Sofia, came from one and the same source,
and aimed at one and the same object—that of getting
rid of a Russian representative who did not approve of
a policy of chance and who possessed some influence
over the greater part of the Bulgarian Government.
One of the vilest calumnies about me came from a most
unexpected source and chiefly through the medium of
the Bulgarian Minister in Rome, M. Rizov, who at the
moment enjoyed the closest friendship with our Ambas-
sador to the Quirinal, M. Kroupensky. This calumny
for one instant succeeded in upsetting M. Sazonoff. A
year later he begged me “to consign the incident to the
place for all noxious things”; but it had produced a
certain impression prejudicial to me all the same.

M. Rizov is too well known for it to be necessary
to say much about him. A schoolmaster in Macedonia
and a vehement Bulgarian agitator, he was one of the
first Macedonian Bulgarians who thought it useful to
the national cause to side with Stamboulov and to
declare himself openly an enemy of Russia. For about
ten years, between 1885 and 1895, Rizov was the
bugbear of our consuls in Macedonia and of our
Embassy in Constantinople, for he incited his fellow-
countrymen to the most bitter and vehement strife
against the partisans of the Universal Patriarchate,
and not only against the Greeks but also against the
Serbians and the Kutzo-Wallachians (Rumanians). In
1896, when a complete change occurred in the relations
of Bulgaria with Russia, Rizov gave up his Catilinarian
existence in Macedonia and entered the Bulgarian
Diplomatic Service. After long years spent in Cetigne
as Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent, Rizov, who in the mean-
time had married a young and beautiful Montenegrin,
had managed to insinuate himself into the good graces
of Prince Nicholas and his set, and to cause his former
hostility towards Russia to be forgotten ; he endeavoured

88 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [ CHAP. VIIL

to conciliate Russians in general, and his Russian
colleague in particular. From Cetigne he was appointed
Minister to Rome. At the beginning of the winter of
1912 he came from Rome to Sofia; we saw each other
several times and had some interesting interviews,
during which, as was only natural, Rizov tried very
hard tocaptivateme. He was undoubtedly an intelligent
and shrewd man, who had acquired a certain amount of
cultivation, and who knew how to adapt himself to the
diplomatic environment which seemed so inappropriate
to the poor Macedonian schoolmaster of former days.
But, violent, addicted to intrigue and devoid of all
principles, Rizov remained a conspirator all his life,
and at the crucial moment when Serbo-Bulgarian
relations were becoming strained, he played a bold but
fatal part. Later on I shall have occasion to mention
this remarkable but suspicious personage again.

Of course, if from the very beginning our Foreign
Office had met the step taken by King Ferdinand with
marked coldness, as they had done when he attacked M.
Sementovsky,! the intrigue would have fallen through
this time also, and the King would at once have realised
that it was better in his own interest to remain on good
terms with me. Butasit was, I received the impression
that the attacks directed against me from Sofia found a
very ready echo amongst a certain set in our Foreign
Office, amongst just those men who kept up close
relations with my colleague of Belgrade and who had
been connected in some way or other with my lamented
predecessor.

At about this same period a certain M. Shelking
arrived in Sofia. He was a brother of Madame Semen-
tovsky’s, the widow of my predecessor. Shelking was
formerly in the diplomatic service. Very intelligent,
good-looking, with agreeable manners and very insinuat-
ing, he had a fairly rapid career, and at one moment was
assigned to Berlin, specially supported by his respectable
chief, Count Osten-Sacken. But two failings have always

* See Chapter I.

ong

1912] > M. SHELKING 89

been baneful to Shelking: his love of intrigue and his
unhappy passion for gambling. The latter completely
wrecked his career and his life: it was the cause of a
very unpleasant story about money, when he was First
Secretary to the Legation at The Hague. His chief
would not screen him, and the numerous friends he had
in the offices of the Ministry could only mitigate for
him the consequences of his unpardonable frivolity.
He had to hand in his resignation, and from this
moment, with material ruin, began for him the hard life
of a journalist, coupled with that of “ correspondent” to
the state-police department—in short, the life of an
adventurer. However, through his sister he had some
fairly powerful protectorsin St. Petersburg: first it was
M. Ploehve, then M. Goremykin, and finally M.
Stiirmer. He wrote fairly often in the Movoye Vremja,
but he did not succeed in getting on the staff. In time
he succeeded in gaining the good will of M. Propper,
and became political editor of the Stock Exchange
Gazette. Before the Revolution of 1917, Shelking
became very intimate with the famous Manassevitch-
Manouiloff, and the moment the Revolution broke out,
he disappeared altogether from St. Petersburg, and was
on the point of fleeing to Japan through Siberia, but
he was arrested at the last moment, found to be in
possession of large sums of money, and thrown into
prison. At least, that is what one read about him inthe
Russian newspapers of the day. I do not know what
became of him eventually.

As soon as he arrived in Sofia, Shelking called
on me. Like a great many others of my profession,
I was weak enough to receive him with kindness, in
memory of former relations, and also by virtue of a
failing inherent in all good Russians, which consists of
looking on every individual who has made a slip or
transgressed the canons of good society, as a child of
misfortune ; moreover, Shelking knew how to captivate
one by his quick and ready mind and his bright
conversation. But during my interview with him I

90 INTRIGUES: AT -SOFTA [ CHAP. VIII

was, as ever, extremely cautious. The very next day
Shelking, who was provided with a letter ad hoc from
Madame Sementovsky, was received by King Ferdi-
nand in a prolonged audience. I learnt immediately
that I had been the principal subject of the interview.
Ferdinand was complaining about me, and Shelking
assured him, according to information received from an
authentic source and originating in our Foreign Office,
that it would be quite easy for the King to get rid of
me: that it was only necessary to press the spring a
little harder, that is, obstinately to demand of St. Peters-
burg my instant recall. I took great care not to show
Shelking that I was aware of his intrigues, and the
evening before his departure | invited him to dine at the
Legation. Shelking arrived to dinner charming as ever,
witty and agreeable, and after dinner he enchanted
every one by his delightful playing of the piano; then
with the young diplomats present he got up a game of
poker, lost promptly and good-humouredly several
hundred francs, and the next morning he set out on his
return to St. Petersburg, just forgetting to settle up his
little gambling debt!

Warned by the intrigue which had been formed
against me, I only took two measures to fight it. During
the month of July, | informed King Ferdinand, through
his private secretary, M. Dobrovitch, that if for any
reason His Majesty wished me to leave Sofia, he had
only to tell me so quite frankly, and then I would
myself beg St. Petersburg to give me another post, as
I considered it quite inadmissible that between the
King of the Bulgarians and the Russian Minister such
constant misunderstandings should exist. Some time
after I received, through the same M. Dobrovitch,
the answer that the King still appreciated, esteemed and
liked me very sincerely; that if some friction had
existed between him and me, it was due solely to mis-
understandings ; that the King considered the continua-
tion of my work in Sofia to be valuable for Bulgaria,
etc., etc. It is true that in the meantime the political

1912 | RUMOURS OF MY RECALL gI

situation had changed completely, and that Ferdinand
at the moment was inclined to view things in the same
light as I did. Soon after these mutual explanations,
the King, at his Jubilee celebrations at Tirnova, con-
versed at great length and very amiably with me in full
view of all present, and on his return to Sofia sent me
a signed photograph of himself.

Before all this I had already informed M. Gueshov
and M. Todorov of the intrigue against me, and, frankly
disgusted at it, they both entreated me earnestly not to
try to leave my post. i

A few months later, when the intrigue frustrated in
July began again, one read one day in the Rousskoye
Slovo that the Russian Ministers, Nekludoff in Sofia, and
Savinsky in Stockholm, were soon to be mutually ex-
changed. I wrote then to the man whom I esteemed
the most in M. Sazonoff's set, Baron Schilling, begging
him to tell me quite frankly if this news was true. | added
that having always judged people severely who clung to
their places, I had not the slightest intention of clinging to
the post in Sofia, important and interesting though it was,
because the person holding such a post ought above all
things to possess the complete confidence of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs. Schilling replied that the question
of my being transferred to an equivalent post had been
raised at ove moment at the Foreign Office, but that at
the present moment there was no question of it. All the
same, the news published in the Rousskoye Slovo was
not officially denied, as it ought to have been. Icameto
the conclusion from all this that at the present moment
(the Balkan War had just broken out) the Foreign

_ Office still considered my presence in Bulgaria to be
_ indispensable; but that when these serious events were

over, they would not scruple in St. Petersburg to send
me to another post, even to a far less important one.

If I dwell so much on these purely personal intrigues,
it is because they did have an indisputable influence over
the final course of events in Bulgaria. Towards the end
of 1912 every one in Sofia knew that the Russian

92 INTRIGUES:'AT SORTA < o([cHar. yim:

Minister’s position was insecure and that from hence-
forth one need not reckon much with his opinions or
advice. All this was known also to my foreign col-
leagues, and several of them gave me friendly warning
of what was being plotted and hatched against me.
But I am anticipating events. Let us return to the
spring of 1912.

During the month of May I succeeded in making
a trip to Constantinople which I had had in view for a
long time. I had left the Bosphorus twenty years ago
and I was delighted at the prospect of renewing my
glorious impressions of this unique spot. Moreover, I
wished to have a heart to heart talk to Michel de Giers,
recently appointed Russian Ambassador to Constan-
tinople, to Hartwig’s intense disappointment. I had
met M. de Giers in St. Petersburg in March, but we
had not had time to talk at great length, besides de Giers
lacked the most essential element of a political inter-
view—his own impressions of Constantinople, where
he was going for the first time.

During an enchanting week, I had again before my
eyes the marvellous panorama of the shores of the
Bosphorus and of the Sea of Marmara and all the well-
known pictures of Constantinopolitan life. I found few
changes. Only the wretched street curs no longer
existed ; the picturesque and crazy wooden bridge con-
necting Galata and Stambul, and lined with fruit stalls
and shops where Turkish delicacies were sold, had been
replaced by an ordinary iron bridge; and in the environs
of Pera Turkish soldiers, newly dressed in khaki, were
drilling without ceasing under the watchful eye of
German instructors, which in my day was a somewhat
rare sight. Everything else looked very much as usual.
During one of my visits to the Grand Bazaar of Stambul
a fire broke out in the adjacent quarter between St.
Sophia and the sea, and immediately assumed the pro-_
portions that a fire assumes in Constantinople alone, |
because of the accumulation of old wooden buildings |

1912 | IN CONSTANTINOPLE 93 *

made of dry old planks. A very familiar sight to me:
a motley crowd intent on rescuing its wretched garments,
the sinister double illumination of the fire on one side
and of the sun veiled and reddened on the other; swarms
of pigeons driven out of their nests by the fire, and
flying around at the same time as the burning brands in
clouds of white smoke; the touwloumbadjis (voluntary
firemen), half-naked, rushing to the fire and giving wild
Shrieks from time to time.... The fire lasted two
days, and delayed for a few hours the departure of the
train which was to take the German Ambassador, Baron
Marschall von Biberstein, who had been appointed to
London in the same capacity. I remember meeting the
aged diplomat on his way to the station. The carriage’
in which Baron Marschall, his wife and his daughter
were seated was preceded by an open carriage entirely
filled with bouquets and bunches of flowers, gifts, evi-
dently, of the German colony and the “ grateful Turks.”

“Do look,” I said to my companion, “it’s exactly like
a funeral: here is the carriage with flowers and wreaths
preceding the hearse, and behind, the long file of
carriages accompanying the deceased to his last resting-
place! Truly | should not have liked to leave my post
surrounded by that style of ceremonial!” :

My words were an involuntary prophecy. Two
months later Baron Marschall died suddenly in London,
carrying with him into the grave all the hopes centred
by Germany on their new Ambassador. Marschall was
replaced in London by Prince Lichnowsky, and in
Constantinople by the fiery Wangenheim.

M. de Giers, to whom I confided my impressions on
Bulgaria and my apprehensions as to the real aim of the
Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, expressed his own fears quite
as frankly. I even received the impression that in his
heart he was blaming me for having consented to serve
as intermediary in the negotiations between Bulgaria
and Serbia and for having taken such an active part
in them. I feel sure, however, that if he had been in
my place he would have done exactly the same, for

94 \ INTRIGUES: AT SOFIA: ficuar vue

it was not part of the duty of a Russian representative
inaSlav country to offer opposition to the reconciliation
or even the alliance of this country with another Slav
country. Of course our policy was bound to check
beforehand all the warlike tendencies of Bulgaria and
Serbia and was capable of doing so; but this 7éle
belonged to the central organ of our diplomacy, which
moreover had been warned in good time and repeatedly
by me.

Our new Ambassador to Constantinople in our inter-
views also emphasised—with the obvious intent that I
should pass the information on to Sofia—the enormous
danger that according to him war with Turkey would
present to the two Slav kingdoms themselves. Accord-
ing to M. de Giers the Ottoman Army was quite
different from what it had been in Abdul Hamid’s time.
Admirably equipped and perfectly trained, under the
command of German generals and senior officers and
of young Turkish officers, well trained and drilled, it
constituted a real power which might cause disagreeable
surprises to Serbian and Bulgarian optimists. The
Ambassador maintained this opinion till the actual war
of 1912, or rather till the first decisive defeat of the
Turks. Always concientious in his work as in the
expression of his opinions, M. de Giers usually placed
entire confidence in his professional collaborators in
any branch. His opinion of the Turkish Army was based
entirely on the reports and information of our military
agent in Constantinople, General Holmsen, an honest
Finno-Swede, married to the daughter of the former
Governor-General of Finland, Bobrikoff. Holmsen was
on very intimate terms with the military attaché and
the German senior officers, who were very attentive
to him and who furnished him with all sorts of informa-
tion on the Ottoman Army. And in representing to
their Russian colleague the state of this Army as a
truly brilliant one, the German officers were far from
displaying premeditated duplicity: they were simply
guided by that very natural feeling which consists in

1912 | GENERAL HOLMSEN 95

seeing one’s own: work through rose-coloured spec-
tacles.

Be that as it may, Holmsen himself was firmly
convinced that the Bulgarian and Serbian Armies were
infinitely inferior to the Turkish Army, and he maintained
this opinion with the straightforwardness and obstinacy
inherent in his Swedishnature. It isafact that the brave
general did not know the condition of the Serbian and
Bulgarian Armies.

I met General Holmsen four years later in Stock-
holm, on his return from captivity in Germany—he
was a physical wreck! From the beginning of the
war he commanded a brigade in the army corps of
General Buhakoff, which, at the time of our second
defeat in East Prussia in February, 1915, displayed heroic
courage in cutting through the hostile army which
surrounded it on all sides. General Holmsen told me
that there were neither guns nor shells left in some of
the battalions of the division of which he had become the
head on the battlefield, and half the bayonets were
twisted or broken by the continual shock of hand-to-
hand fighting. The soldiers, worn out by four days and
nights of continued fighting and marching, sometimes
fell down in the snow and went off into a leaden slumber
without paying any attention to death which was raging
round them—so terrible was their fatigue. At last the
remnants of the heroic army corps reached the first line
of defence of Grodno: alas! it was already occupied by
the enemy, so they had to surrender. They did not
know that Grodno was still held by Russian troops, and
that if they had advanced, these could have rescued
them. In listening to this heartrending account, I
naturally refrained from reminding the General of
our conversations in Constantinople and from pointing
out how mistaken he had been in his_ prognosti-
cations!

One of the things which struck me most in Constanti-
nople was the complete serenity, the indifference even,
with which every one seemed to look on the Italo-Turkish

96 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [CHAP. VII.

war; one really could not believe in the Italian Fleet
blockading the Dardanelles, and that quite recently the
Italians had tried to break through the Straits. The only
complaint heard—and that a bitter one—was of stagnation
in commercial affairs.

In May and June there appeared on the whole to be a
political lull in Sofia) The King was still abroad, and
M. Gueshov at some watering-place. But shortly after
my return from Constantinople, | learnt through several
sources that very important business was being trans-
acted at the Bulgarian Foreign Office, and more
especially at the War Office. My Serbian colleague was
also holding frequent interviews with the Bulgarian
Ministers and politicians. The tone of the Bulgarian
Press was becoming more and more nervous with regard
to Macedonia and what was going on there. In the streets
of Sofia one met more and more frequently brown and
sunburnt individuals with gloomy expressions, sometimes
armed to the teeth, who were the object of great curiosity ;
these were the heads of well-known troops arriving from
Macedonia. Finally I was informed in a more definite
manner that Serbia and Bulgaria were on the point of
concluding a military convention aimed exclusively at
Turkey. Having some slight knowledge of the psycho-
logy of Balkan nations, I soon possessed proof that my
fears of a conflagration were about to be realised. After
a little hesitation, on the 4th July, 1912, I dispatcheda
fairly long code-telegram to M. Sazonoff, in which |
mentioned all the alarming signs I had noticed, and I
concluded the telegram by expressing my deep-rooted
conviction that both on the Bulgarian and the Serbian
side, they were actively preparing for war, and that they
even intended to hasten events. I heard later that
my telegram produced an impression highly unfavour-
able to me.

“ Have you read Nekludoff’s hysterical telegram ?” the
heads of departments and the young secretaries of
Sazonoffs set were continually asking each other.

pais] MY WARNING DISREGARDED 97

Alas! This telegram proved to be /ustorical, not
hysterical !

During the month of July M. Gueshov and the other
Ministers who had been on leave returned to Sofia. At
the same time affairs in Macedonia were taking a more
and more alarming turn. It was quite clear that, setting
aside natural and logical causes, one was confronted by
the work of Serbo-Bulgarian agitators and abettors.
Two small towns in Macedonia, Ishtib and Katchaneh, in
particular became in turn the scene of bloody events of
the kind so common in Hamid times. In both these
places, on market day, bombs exploded close to the
bazaar; among the killed and wounded, naturally, Turkish
women and children were found: immediately, as at a
given signal, the Mussulman population fell on the
Bulgarian peasants who had come to market and began
to massacre them; they also attacked the houses of
Bulgarian patriots and leading men, and the usual
“atrocities” took place. In both cases the Turkish
garrison did nothing to stop the massacre; it was even
suspected of having aided and abetted. Certainly the
people who threw the bombs—and they never were
Turks—knew perfectly well what the result of their deeds
would be.

Such sad incidents were of frequent occurrence in
the days before the Turkish Revolution ; but then no one
thought of making them a casus belli; Bulgaria became
irritable, the Bulgarian newspapers published warlike
articles, the Great Powers cautioned the Porte, and then
everything resumed its normal aspect. That was why
the respective Governments of Western Europe did not
attach any extraordinary significance to the Macedonian
events of July, 1912. But our Foreign Secretary, who
was perfectly well aware of the true meaning of these
regrettable incidents, ought to have perceived a serious
warning inthem. That is how I understood them, and
consequently I did not fail to emphasise in my telegrams
and dispatches that the Balkan War was the order of
the day and was a perpetual menace.

98 INTRIGUES AT: SOPIAy it[cwan ven

On this occasion it is noteworthy that M. Gueshov, -

as soon as he returned from his holiday, was remarkably
frank and correct in his behaviour tome. He confirmed
the information that I had received from a private source
on the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian Military Con-
vention, and if my memory does not deceive me, the
actual text of this convention was communicated by
Colonel Romanowski to our General Headquarters
Staff.

M. Gueshov even went further in his confidences;
he confided to me that Bulgaria and Serbia had just
made an arrangement with Greece; this arrangement,
in contrast to the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, was not
concerned with the demarcation of boundaries in Mace-
donia, but it was a kind of military convention in case of
“Turkish aggression.”

There is one curious detail; whereas M. Gueshov
was displaying so much frankness towards me, the
Greek Government took great care not to communicate
this arrangement to our representative in Athens,
although he was much esteemed and very popular
there. At. the end. ‘of July J, went. to: Viennavie
meet M. Sverbeieff, to discuss some important private
matters with him. Sverbeieff, who had just left the
post of Athens and was on his way to Berlin, where
he had been appointed Ambassador, heard for the first
time from me that the Greeks had made an arrangement
with Bulgaria and Serbia.

In the first days of July I was more or less agreeably
surprised by the advent of my friend M. A. Goutchkoff
in Sofia. As managing director of one of our principal
insurance companies, he came to Bulgaria and Serbia
to assist at the inauguration of branches of this company.
At least that was the avowed object of his journey, but
in reality the journey was a kind of political inquiry.
In Russian activist circles in which Goutchkoff
possessed undoubted authority, they had got wind of
the events which were shaping in the Balkans, and

————

as GOUTCHKOFF IN SOFIA 99

Goutchkoff was commissioned—unless he was acting on
his own initiative—to verify de visu the rumours which
were circulating. Political circles in Sofia greeted the
eminent Russian guest with the most cordial reception.
The principal Ministers conversed at great length
with him; the members of the former Malinov Cabinet
met Goutchkoff at an evening party given by their
colleague, M. Liaptchev, a fiery and _ irreconcilable
Macedonian.

Under the influence of all that he had heard there,
Goutchkoff talked to me for a long time and appeared
desirous of convincing me that the events, apparently
imminent in Bulgaria and Sofia, were not only un-
avoidable but desirable.

“ But look here,” I replied, ‘‘was it not you yourself
who told me four months ago that Russia’s equipment
was absolutely inadequate, and that a war, taking us
unawares, might be fatal to us? And now you appear
to think it natural and almost desirable that the Balkan
States should declare war on Turkey! But what in
this case would Russia’s position be, forced to remain
a passive witness of these events, whatever their
result ?”

“Yes, that is true,” said Goutchkoff; “but then have
we ever been prepared for events during the whole
course of our modern history? and nevertheless we
have progressed considerably in the solution of our
historic problems in the Near East. Moreover, at this
moment, as | have satisfactorily proved, the Slav States
will not wait for the concentration of our forces. You
yourself, M. Nekludoff, who, by virtue of family
traditions and the whole of your earlier career, have had
Constantinople as a centre of attraction, would you not
be happy to have your name connected with the definite
solution of the Straits question in our favour?”

“Certainly, | should have felt the most intense and
legitimate pleasure. But onthe other hand, what heavy
responsibility | should have taken on myself if, seduced
by this mirage of personal ambition, I had allowed

H

100 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA | CHAP. VIII.

myself to be drawn into a game which might have ended
in cruel disappointments for Russia!”

Goutchkoff’s opinion that we often reaped success
in spite of our perpetual unpreparedness was shared by
our military agent, and it oftenled him, in his interviews
with the Bulgarian military, into making assertions
which I should have wished to be less encouraging and
less enthusiastic.

From Sofia Goutchkoff went to Belgrade, where he
was received with even more cordiality than in Sofia,
there was even an official tinge in the reception given
in his honour. A few days after I had taken leave of
him, I left to meet Sverbeieff in Vienna, and at the
Belgrade station I was an incognito witness of the
almost triumphal departure of Goutchkoff, who got into
my train. The royal waiting-rooms were brilliantly lit
up, a soft red carpet was laid down up to the door
of the wagon-lit; and after a somewhat long wait, [
perceived the excellent M. Goutchkoff, dressed for
travelling, accompanied by all the Serbian Ministers
headed by M. Pachitch, M. Hartwig, the Mayor of
Belgrade, and other political personages ; most of these
gentlemen were in evening clothes, for they had just
come from a grand banquet given to the eminent Russian
guest. At last all the good-byes were said, there was
much shaking of hands, some friendly tapping on the
back, cries of ‘“jivio,” and the train slowly steamed out
of the station, while Goutchkoff, touched by so much
cordiality, stood at the open window of his coupé waving
to his Serbian friends. He was slightly abashed when
I suddenly emerged out of the darkness of the corridor
and asked him: “ Well, my dear Goutchkoff, and what
have you been doing in Belgrade?” The following
morning, before we reached Vienna, he told me that the
public mind was much excited in Serbia, and _ that
Macedonian events were looked on as most serious ; he)
omitted to tell me what he himself had said and preached
to the Serbians. |

Three days after, on my return from Vienna, | was a

:
|
|

1912| THE SCHIPKA VETERANS’ FETE 101

witness at the same Belgrade station of another de-
parture : that of the heir to the throne, Prince Alexander,
who, with M. Pachitch, was going to inspect the troops
in the south-east of Serbia, that is near the Turkish
frontier. I could not help thinking that this journey
was rather significant.

Towards the beginning of August, Bulgaria’s dis-
quieting state of mind was already the constant topic at
the interviews of members of the Diplomatic Corps of
Sofia. I noticed that the representatives of the Triple
Alliance, and the new Turkish Minister, the intelligent
and shrewd Nabi-bey, had no idea of the complete
understanding between the Bulgarians and the Serbians,
and did not perceive, in the conduct of the two Govern-
ments, a direct preparation for war; but all the same
they were beginning to be anxious, and watched my
words and deeds with suspicious curiosity. Moreover,
Nabi-bey soon left for Switzerland, ostensibly to take a
cure, but in reality to begin secret negotiations, by order
of the Porte, with some Italian financiers, selected ad hoc.
These secret conferences were transformed into official
negotiations of peace as soon as the Balkan War had
broken out. [| have reason to believe that the pre-
liminaries of these negotiations had been laid down in
Sofia before Nabi-bey’s departure to Switzerland.

On the 11th (24th) August, the feast of the veterans of
the first Bulgarian militia was generally celebrated in
Sofia, and always with great pomp. During the days—
celebrated for ever in Bulgaria’s history—of the goth to
the 11th August (O.S.), 1877, when the Turks, pursuing
from Kazanlyk the weak detachment of General Gourko,
ascended the southern slope of the Balkans and tried to
take the Schipka Pass by assault—a position fiercely
defended by us—the Bulgarian militia, newly formed
into picked battalions, displayed heroic courage side by
side with regiments of Russian Chasseurs, and helped to
save Shipka and to bar the road to northern Bulgaria to
the Turks. Ever since, the anniversary of the 11th (24th)

102 INTRIGUES AT ‘SURE [ CHAP. VIII.

August has been celebrated every year by the illustrious
survivors of these battles. On the eve of this day, the
veterans gave a banquet to the representatives of the
Government and to the Russian Legation; on the day
itself a solemn service was held in the cathedral of Sofia,
and the historical colours of the first Bulgarian militia,
amongst which the flag called “of Samara” was _ par-
ticularly noticeable, were brought from the Palace to the
church; this was the flag embroidered and presented
to the Bulgarian militia by the Russian ladies of the
town of Samara; it was covered with Bulgarian blood in
the hand-to-hand fighting near Stara-Zagora (Eski-
Zagra), where the Bulgarian militia with their bayonets
succeeded in cutting through the Turkish lines and in
saving the precious flag.

The Bulgarians in general have not an expansive
nature. This people, reserved and taciturn, is almost
completely incapable of boisterous manifestations of
enthusiasm. So that the festival of the veterans usually
went off very calmly according to the programme
once drawn up; and the crowd gathered round the
cathedral appeared to watch with indifference the pro-
cession of the colours and the review of the veterans
and of the Sofia garrison which took place in the big
square.

On this occasion, that is in 1912, we received as usual
an invitation to the veterans’ banquet and to the service
in the cathedral. But on the eve of the banquet Gueshov
said tome: ‘Shall you go tothe banquet, Monsieur?” “I
was just going to ask you the same question,” I replied.

“T think,” said Gueshov, “that it would be better
for you and me not to go; every one is over-excited ;
at the banquet speeches may be made which would
place us in an embarrassing position. But I shall, of
course, go to the cathedral, and we earnestly beg of you
to come as usual.”

On arrival at the ¢athedral at the appointed time, we
were struck by the emotional atmosphere which per-
vaded the sacred edifice. One saw pale faces, shining

5 a ery ce a i el ee a a i ba

1912 | SEL IS WAR” 103

eyes, tears coursing down the cheeks of aged men...
and all of a sudden from the precincts of the cathedral,
where an enormous crowd was collected, a formidable
“hurrah!” resounded, buta “hurrah!” the like of which
I have not heard since my childhood, when in the large
square of the Kremlin in Moscow the crowd cheered the
Tsar-Liberator Alexander IJ. What can this mean? |
inwardly wondered. Is the King arriving at the
cathedral, and would they give /zm such an ovation?
At this moment the doors of the church were thrown
open, and there appeared: first the flag of Samara, then
theold colours of the militia,and then Macedonian colours
entwined in crépe. But all eyes were bent on the flag
of Samara; the veterans gathered round it; with tears in
their eyes they kissed the staff, the drapery, the St.
George streamers. A thought flashed like lightning
through my mind: it is war, | thought. Certainly and
undoubtedly, it is war!

The review passed off with every one still in the
same frame of mind, and when | drove to the Legation
I was cheered with cries of “hurrah!” and “Russia
for ever!”

Soon after Gueshov informed me of the agreement
concluded with Montenegro. In all my interviews with
Bulgarian Ministers I always tried to restrain the war-
like tendencies of some amongst them, by proving to
them the undoubted dangers to which Bulgaria and
Serbia would expose themselves if they allowed them-
selves to be drawn into a war with Turkey, even if they
were supported by Greece and Montenegro. I quoted
the excellent state of the Turkish Army reformed and
commanded by German generals, the possibility of an
attack on the Serbians from behind by Austria and the
utter impossibility of our doing anything to prevent
this; I did not conceal my doubts of the Balkan allies
maintaining close solidarity up to the end; but my
principal argument was that Russia was afraid of blood-
shed which might finally spread all over Europe—which

104 INTRIGUES*CAT: SOFIA | CHAP. VIII

would not help the cause of our Balkan kinsmen in the |
least.

My arguments on the subject of the strength and
perfect equipment of the Turkish Army were received
by my Bulgarian listeners with a sceptical smile.
Gueshov assured me repeatedly that the Bulgarian
Headquarters Staff possessed quite different information
on the state of the Ottoman Army, information based —
on systematic observation and absolutely reliable secret |
intelligence. And that concerning our wise desire to
prevent a war in the Near East, the only way to attain
that would be for Russia and Europe to resume their
former course of action and their work of organisation
and autonomy in Macedonia ; in short that Europe must
at last renounce her illusions on the subject of a new
state of affairs in Turkey. I entirely shared this last
point of view, and I remember that after the second

massacre which took place in Macedonia, | made the i

suggestion, in a dispatch to M. Sazonoff, that the
Powers should take Macedonian affairs in hand and |
immediately send their consuls to Katchaneh and |
Ishtib, to hold an inquiry on the massacres which had
taken place there, just as was done under the old
Turkish régime, which was exactly like the new one. —
I also communicated my views to our Ambassador in
Constantinople. In St. Petersburg it was not thought —

possible to carry out my idea. It is truethat it would be ~

difficult to change our relations with Turkey all at once, | |
and to reconquer a position voluntarily abandoned by —
European diplomacy nearly four years ago—four years | |
during which the Powers had vied with one another in |

good behaviour towards the Young Turks and had —

almost been obsequious to them. And even admitting
that we had decided to change our attitude towards |
Turkey abruptly, should we have been followed along |
this path by the other Powers, even those of the |
Entente?

M. de Giers was not long in replying to me from |
Constantinople; and he persuaded me to warn the

03] FERDINAND'S JUBILEE 105

Bulgarians in the most emphatic manner that they were
courting certain disaster if they declared war on Turkey.
M. de Giers—a serious-minded and straightforward
man—was absolutely sincere in his warning. He felt
much sympathy for the Slavs of the Balkans and dreaded
their defeat, which would have had as a consequence
either the considerable diminishing of the prestige of
Russia, or our being dragged into a collision with the
Central Empires.

I took care to impart to Gueshov the opinion of our
Ambassador in Constantinople, but I could only realise
afresh and more fully that arguments on the subject of
the military strength of the Ottoman Empire would not
produce any effect on the Bulgarians.

I heard besides that King Ferdinand, who in April
and May had seemed inclined for war, was much per-
plexed at this moment; he dreaded extreme measures
and would have liked things to drag on for some time.

In August, 1912, it was twenty-five years since
Prince Ferdinand of Coburg had been elected Prince of
Bulgaria and had set foot on Bulgarian soil, although he
was not recognised by Russia and a few other powers.
This anniversary was to be solemnly celebrated at
Tirnova in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps.
Given the circumstances and the activist fever which
had seized the Bulgarians, it was to be feared that the
Jubilee would not pass off without incident ; | foresaw
at the same time that at Tirnova all eyes would be fixed
on the Russian Minister and that the King himself
would pay me marked attention. By a concurrence of
strange and significant circumstances, the representative
of that Power which a quarter of a century earlier had
positively refused to recognise Ferdinand, now became
the most prominent acolyte—I might even say the
principal trophy—of his Jubilee!

The celebrations passed off well. There were no
political demonstrations; only in all the speeches
addressed to the King, beginning with the sermon of the

106 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA _ [cuap.vi. —

Metropolitan of Tirnova, the following note predomin-
ated: ‘ You, sir, have enhanced Your own prestige, won
the attention of the Powers, raised Bulgaria to the rank
of a sovereign State, and assumed for Yourself the title
of King; but You must remember that during these |
twenty-five years You have not furthered by a single
degree the real aims of Bulgaria, those which had been _
fixed by the Tsar-Liberator in the treaty of San Stefano !”
Russia and the Tsar-Liberator were repeatedly men-
tioned in the speeches.

After the banquet served in the municipal theatre, —
the King drew me aside and had a long talk with me.
He complained of his difficult position, assured me of
his sincere desire to avoid a collision with Turkey, but
at the same time alluded to the patriotic agitation which
had seized on the whole of Bulgaria and which would
only settle down in a peaceful manner if the rights
and the autonomy of the Bulgarians of Macedonia and
Thrace were truly and effectually realised.

“You have heard the speeches which have just been
made, and you have probably grasped their true mean-
ing. Hence you can judge the difficulty of my position.
Nevertheless I mean to act up to the last moment with |
the idea of preserving peace. I beg you to transmit this
to St. Petersburg, and at the same time to entreat them
earnestly to come to my assistance.”

This was my last interview with the King before
the Bulgarian mobilisation. Of course, I informed M.
Sazonoff of the purport of it, and added that, according
to my own opinion, events could still be checked by
energetic action respecting the Porte, but that ina few
weeks it would be too late.

I was inordinately astonished, and up to now! cannot
understand that, in spite of my warnings, our Foreign
Secretary could remain so calm about Bulgaria and
Serbia. When the mobilisation was announced, we like
all the other European Cabinets were aghast, and we pro-
ceeded to heap on Sofia, Belgrade, Athens and Cetigne

1912 | M. SAZONOFF'’S APATHY 107

threatening warnings and reproaches which were almost
ultimatums. But it was too late!

At the time I explained this impenitent optimism of
St. Petersburg to myself in the following way: our
Foreign Office was certain that without the help of
Serbia, the Bulgarians would never make up their minds
to move; moreover, no one in our country doubted the
obedience and good behaviour of the Serbians; and
M. Hartwig took great care not to report to the
Foreign Office what was really happening in Belgrade,
as it might shatter our illusions.

But later on I came to the conclusion that the
behaviour of my colleague in Belgrade did not repre-
sent so much a cause of ulterior events as one of the
symptoms of our way of tackling political questions.
Our diplomatic chiefs in St. Petersburg, simply, were
filled with what M. Isvolsky, in a speech made at the
Duma some time before, had called “ healthy optimism,”
and which had led Russia then to the brink of war!

CHA Pa Bak 1

THE BALKAN WAR, IQI2

Tue 17th (30th) September, 1912, the Bulgarian mobi-
lisation was ordered simultaneously with the Serbian,
Greek, and Montenegrin mobilisations, and from the
first moment all the members of the Diplomatic Corps
in Sofia without exception understood that this mobi-
lisation meant a determined war with no turning back.
But such was not the opinion of the European
Governments. For several days warnings, prayers, and
threats were abundantly poured on Sofia, Belgrade,
etc., but they produced no effect whatever on those
to whom they were addressed. Finally, on the fourth
or fifth day, the representatives of the Powers in Sofia,
Belgrade, etc., received from their respective Govern-
ments instructions to declare to the Government to
which they were accredited that the Powers were de-
termined to obtain from Turkey a régime of justice and
autonomy for all the people of a common origin of the
four Balkan States at present allied; but that if, on the
other hand, these States would not listen to the wise
advice offered them, and insisted on making war on
Turkey, the Powers, even in the event of victory by
the allies, would not permit any territorial change in
the Peninsula prejudicial to the Ottoman Empire. The
first part of this declaration was eminently sound, and
corresponded on all points with what I had suggested
and preached in June and July; but in October, and
after mobilisation had been ordered, the promises of
the Powers were arriving decidedly too late!

Having assembled at the house of our senior, we
decided to make the prescribed declaration the very

108

1912] FUTILE PROTESTS 109

next day to M. Gueshovy, one after the other, and in a
verbal form but strictly identical. To effect this we
drew our communication up together, and each of us
was to read the text to M. Gueshov. It is not difficult
to guess that not one of us expected any result from
this proceeding. The evening before, my French col-
league and I had confessed as much to one another.
The next day, when I was on my way to the Foreign
Office at the appointed hour, I met Count Tarnowski,
the Austro-Hungarian Minister, coming out of his
Legation.

“ Well, so we are going to take our famous step, are
we?” he asked with a sarcastic smile.

“Certainly,” I replied.

“ And you think that something will come of it ?”

“J doubt it.”

“And I am quite sure that nothing will,” replied my
colleague sharply; “Europe is simply placing herself
in a ridiculous position!”

I did not answer, but in my heart of hearts I could
not but agree that Tarnowski was perfectly right. A
few weeks later, when the final and brilliant success of
the Balkan States was clearly evident, the Powers com-
pletely forgot the declaration they had made during the
mobilisation ; every one in Europe began to court the
victors, more especially the Bulgarians. Such always
has been and such always will be the power of success.
But after this what must the Bulgarians, Serbians, etc.,
have thought of the august decisions of Europe, of her
warnings, her threats ?

The mobilisation went off splendidly in Bulgaria
and in Serbia. I should never have thought that a
people so reserved as the Bulgarians were capable of
the enthusiasm they displayed during those memorable
days. There were no drunkards: there never are in
Balkan countries. Everywhere exemplary order reigned,
except in a few railway stations where the reservists
who had been called up took the trains by assault, and
even climbed up on the roofs of the carriages in order

im fe) THE BALKAN WAR, i912 [ CHAP. IX.

to arrive more quickly at the rallying-point. My wife
and my youngest daughter, who were returning from
Russia vié Bukharest and passing through the whole of
northern Bulgaria exactly at this time, told me that at
each station there were crowds of women, old men, and
children escorting, with flowers, songs, and jokes, their
sons, husbands, and brothers who were joyfully going
off to the decisive conflict with the time-honoured enemy.
The same thing was told me by travellers who had
crossed Serbia. The day after the one on which the
mobilisation was ordered war became inevitable. If
the Bulgarian or Serbian Government had wished to
obey the injunctions of the Powers and—not to demo-
bilise—but only to check the course of events, it would
have inevitably provoked a revolution, and the armed
troops would have crossed the frontier on their own
initiative.

The die was cast. As to us, representatives of the
Great Powers in Sofia, we could only be spectators of
military deeds and of the first decisive encounters.

I often wondered at the time and afterwards how the
Central Empires could have allowed the Balkan States
to go to war without at least trying to prevent it by
more prompt and effectual means than the representa-
tions of united Europe and her platonic threats. I
explain the fact by the complete confidence possessed
by Berlin in the victory of the Turks over the Allies.
Such a victory would necessarily lead to diplomatic
negotiations between the Powers, and during these
negotiations the Central Empires would have the enor-
mous advantage of being on the side of the victor. The
unexpected, and what is more, rapid and decisive,
success of the Serbian and Bulgarian arms flabber-
gasted Berlin and Vienna to such a pitch that they had
not even time to agree together to prevent this success.
It became henceforth necessary to change the sphere
of action to that of the inevitable competition between
the victorious countries, and to postpone the decisive
blow to another day and a more propitious moment.

1912 | WAR BREAKS OUT Ii!

Germany waited for this moment for exactly twenty-
two months.

I must confess that from the moment war broke
out I was entirely and whole-heartedly on the side of
the Serbians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. I was
witnessing the accomplishment of all that had been
prepared by the efforts, the blood, and the thought of
several generations of Russian statesmen, soldiers, and
thinkers. The three small nations—of a common origin
and Orthodox—had become strong enough to risk a
contest with their time-honoured foe, alone and without
outside help; their victory would serve as a striking
justification of all our previous policy, of all the efforts,
all the sacrifices of the Russian people; hence any one
will realise the intense interest with which I followed
the military operations which had just begun.

{ knew through private sources that the Bulgarian
Army would advance boldly in Thrace, and that the key
to its final success would be the taking of Lozengrad
(Kirk-kilisseh), whilst the Serbian Army had reserved
Macedonia as its scene of action in the direction of
Skoplie (Uskub) and beyond. I was overjoyed the
morning that Gueshov telephoned to tell me that Lozen-
grad had been taken by two Bulgarian divisions which
crushed the Turks by a truly overwhelming advance.
From that moment the Bulgarians were threatening the
rear of the Turkish Army, which had to retreat hurriedly
before the principal forces of the Bulgarians. By the
afternoon all the town knew of the happy event, and
towards evening there was a procession of townspeople,
school children, Macedonians, and reservists marching
with torches through the principal streets, and stopping
to cheer lustily in front of the Palace and the houses of
Gueshov and Danev, and more lustily still in front of
the Russian Legation. This time I thought it my duty
to go out on to the corner balcony which overlooked
the Square, to listen to the excited speeches of the
leaders of the procession and to reply by a short but

112 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [ CHAP. IX.

stirring address. From that day and at each fresh
success of the Bulgarian arms up to the taking of
Adrianople inclusive, the like manifestations were re-
peated in front of the Russian Legation, but none of
them made such a lasting impression on me as the
first one, in honour of the taking of Lozengrad.

A few days later we heard that the Serbian Army,
after the sanguinary assault of the “Zrny-Vrch” positions,
during which the Serbians accomplished astounding
feats of valour, had completely beaten the Turkish Army
and was pursuing it across the elevated plain—so sadly
famed in the history of the Serbian people—which bears
the name of “ Kossovo Polé.” I was told later that when
the Serbians reached this place, hallowed throughout
centuries by immortal memories of heroism and mourn-
ing, and extolled in the three epic poems called the
“ Kossovo Polé Songs,” that each Serbian soldier bent
down to kiss the sacred soil and placed a handful of earth
in his bosom in a clean cloth... . Such moments are
indeed rare in the history of nations: all honour to
those amongst them who have purchased them by time-
honoured fidelity to the historic ideal, and with their
noble blood shed on the very spot and at the vital
moment tii.

Neither the Bulgarian nor the Serbian Army gave
the enemy time to recover. While the Serbians had
occupied their former capital Skoplie almost without
striking a blow, had advanced on Bitolia and there,
after four days’ ferocious and difficult fighting, had
utterly and completely beaten the last Turkish troops,
the Bulgarians were overtaking the Ottoman Army at
Lule-Burgas. After three days’ sanguinary fighting,
during which the positions were perpetually changing
hands, the Turkish resistance was finally overcome
and their Army forced to the most hurried retreat, which
at times degenerated into a flight. Such is the glorious
account of the first Balkan War (October, 1912).

But beside these glorious annals, an incident far less

1912] GRECO-BULGARIAN INCIDENT 113

flattering to the Bulgarians occurred at the very outset
of the War.

As I have already said, the principal operations in
Macedonia fell to the Serbian Army; but parallel to
the Serbian action and more to the south-east a large
Bulgarian detachment was operating, that of General
Todorov, who was sent across the Rhodope Mountains
straight in the direction of Salonika. In this quarter
there were but few Turkish troops, and only the town
and port of Salonika, constituting the base of opera-
tions of defence in Macedonia, were guarded by a fairly
large garrison. General Todorov’s detachment, having
crossed the mountains and routed the irregular detach-
- ments of native Mussulmans who courageously defended
the passes and defiles, at length emerged on the road
to Salonika. The Bulgarians advanced so quickly that
they hardly had time to set fire to the rich Turkish
villages, or to massacre many of the inhabitants. This
was because from another side the troops of the
_ “Diadoch” Constantine were advancing, or rather rush-
ing with giddy haste. Never before, since the days
when Achilles with the swiftness of a stag pursued ©
Hector round the walls of Troy, have the Greeks
marched with such rapidity as on this occasion, when
they had at all costs to reach Salonika before the Bul-
garians. And the Greeks were the first to get near
the town of St. Cyril and Methodius. When General
Todorov’s detachment got near Salonika the Greeks
had already been there two days, and the whole Turkish
garrison, discouraged by a series of defeats in Mace-
donia, and knowing that they were between two fires,
had already surrendered to the “Diadoch.” But this
did not suit the Bulgarians at all. Having arrived in
sight of the Turkish camp, they opened fire, and then
dispatched envoys to the Ottoman heads suggesting
they should surrender. The ’Turks, who had just
surrendered to the Greeks, hastened to surrender again
to the Bulgarians. But the Greeks would have none of
this. And when General Todorov’s troops began to

114 THE BALKAN WAR, i912 [ CHAP. IX.

surround the Turkish camp, the commander of the
Greek troops informed the Bulgarians that he would
resort to force if they did not cease immediately to
molest their Turkish prisoners and if they did not
abandon the idea of entering the town. A little more
and they would have come to blows, but fortunately
the young Crown Prince Boris was in Todorov’s de-
tachment, and this constrained the Bulgarian general
to prudence, and the “ Diadoch” Constantine, who had
been warned in time, to be a little more conciliatory.
The incident was at last settled. A Bulgarian brigade
was allowed to enter the town, and to garrison the
northern suburb, while the greater part of Salonika
remained in the power of the Greeks, who made their
headquarters there. The Turkish prisoners also were
left in Greek hands and sent to Greece. This beginning
augured no good. Throughout the duration of the war,
the Greeks and Bulgarians who occupied the southern
part of Macedonia were in a permanent state of feud.
Each side schemed to occupy more ground, and
shortly before the conclusion of peace a real collision
took place, which ended in bloodshed; I will refer to
this further on.

The complete defeat of the Turkish Army at Lule-
Burgas opened to the Bulgarians the road as far as
Constantinople, or rather up to the strongly fortified
line of Chataldja, which encircles the town north of the
shores of the Black Sea as far as those of the Sea of
Marmara. The demoralisation of the Turkish troops
and the state of panic in Constantinople were such
that if at this moment the army of Radko-Dmitriev
had risked an immediate march on Chataldja it could
have taken the Turkish fortifications at one stroke.
Unfortunately for the Bulgarians they were short of
munitions, and had to halt for three or four days await-
ing them. But at this moment a circumstance occurred
which, although quite natural, had not entered into the
Bulgarians’ calculations ; and Stambul was saved.

1912] RAINS STOP THE ADVANCE 115

Generally speaking, the autumn, or at least the
months of September and October, O.S., constitute the
most beautiful season of the year in the entire Balkan
Peninsula. During the seventeen years that I spent
there at the outset of my career I only once saw a wet
autumn; in the other years this season was fine, mild,
and sunny, except for a few stormy days now and then.
Such was also the previous autumn of 1911 which I
spent in Sofia. But in 1912, shortly before the battle
of Lule-Burgas, rain suddenly began to fall, and there
were continual downpours lasting for at least a month.
From the first, the bad Bulgarian roads and the execrable
Turkish ones became absolutely impassable; the heavy
clay soil of this part of the Peninsula turned into deep
and holding mud, and the military convoys stuck on the
road. A few days later all the draught-horses had died ;
then the bullocks succumbed, and only the buffaloes
still held out and managed to draw their heavy loads,
but at a snail’s pace. The doctors and sisters of one of
our Red Cross detachments who at this moment were
travelling between the Bulgarian frontier and Lozen-
grad told me later that their convoy only managed to
do from four fo six kilometres a day, and that only thanks
to the efforts of the robust Russian medical attendants,
and of the no less robust Bulgarians of the convoy,
who perpetually shovelled away the clay into which
the wheels of the waggons were sinking up to the axle.

Under these conditions the march of the Bulgarian
Army was becoming extremely difficult: the guns had
to be drawn by buffaloes, and as to the cavalry it simply

_ had to halt, as the horses, up to the hocks in mud, were
_ perpetually breaking their legs. Also the head of the

i

_ Bulgarian Headquarters Staff, General Fichev, and most

_ of the other generals protested firmly against the further

|
|
|
|
|

advance on Constantinople. But at this moment a new
factor in the development of events appeared on the
scene: the ambition, suddenly aroused and immeasur-
ably increased, of the King of the Bulgarians!
Knowing Ferdinand fairly well, | could easily picture
I

116 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 _ [cHap. Ix.

his terrible anguish during the fateful days of the mobi-
lisation and the first days of military operations.

But when at the King’s headquarters the news came
through; first of the brilliant victory of his troops
at Lule-Burgas and of the decisive successes of the
Serbians in Macedonia, when in a few short weeks
there was nothing remaining to the Turks in Europe
but Constantinople and its outskirts, Adrianople,
Janinaand Scutari in Albania surrounded and besieged,
and the peninsula of Gallipoli—then Ferdinand’s anguish
suddenly gave place to a violent outburst of pride and
ambitious hopes.

A Bulgarian lady, Russian by birth, who met the -
King just at this time, told me some amusing details
about Ferdinand’s behaviour; he did not conceal his
almost childish joy and his overweening pride in the
least. The King walked with her along the platform of
the station where his headquarters were, and the in-
credible elasticity of his movements were a great con-
trast to his usual heavy walk of a gouty and obese
person: His Majesty bounded in the air like an india-
rubber ball. “ Now then!” he exclaimed with a trium-
phant smile, ‘what have you to say about it, madame?
What do you say? Bulgar-Vilayet! Ehwhat? Bulgar-
Vilayet? Who would have thought it ?” and the King
went on repeating his Gulgar-Vilayet, accompanying the
words with his most malicious smile aimed at the
Padishah,

At this moment he was evidently remembering his.
first journey to Constantinople, when the Sultan was
holding an investiture ; he remembered his meeting with
the sly, obstinate, old Abdul-Hamid, and how he had to
bow before him and to kiss the hand of the Padishah,
his sovereign. Yes, he had gone through it all; he had
done it in an insinuating manner, as if it cost him
nothing; but in reality he had felt deeply humiliated,
and the memory had never been effaced from his heart.
It was at this period that at the Sultan’s Court Bulgaria
was always spoken of as Bulgar-Vilayet (the Bulgarian

1912] FERDINAND’S ELATION 117

province). And now “what a change of destiny by the
grace of God!” The fate of Turkey seemed to be in
Ferdinand’s hands as it had once been in the hands of
the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon, who approached the
walls of Constantinople with his army, with the
object of cutting a way through and being proclaimed
Emperor of the East. And Ferdinand with his vivid and
prompt imagination foresaw himself playing the part
of Simeon.

The objects assigned to the war with Turkey seemed
to him to have been left far behind, and all his thoughts,
all his projects were centred now on the town so near
at hand. He pictured himself making his entry into the
Imperial City, having obliterated the last traces of
Ottoman domination in Europe. And then on his skill,
his subtle diplomacy an unexpected solution of the
Straits question might depend—a solution in favour of
the Bulgarians, this people who forty short years ago
had been ignored by the whole world.

There is Russia, it is true, who for two centuries
has been aspiring to the possession of the Straits and
dreams of erecting the cross on the dome of St. Sophia.
But these political ambitions of the Tsars, these tradi-
tional aspirations of the Russian people have always
met with and will continue to meet with irreconcilable
opposition from the rest of Europe. Even in allied
France the Russians would scarcely find a handful of
politicians willing to accept the installation of the
Empire of the Tsars in Constantinople and in the
Dardanelles. The possession of the Straits by a Power
like Russia would increase her might to such an extent
that she would become a real danger to the balance of
power in Europe. The old formula of Napoleon I. that
the Power which possessed the Straits would acquire
world-wide supremacy has not yet lost its meaning.
For Austria it would be the signal for the disintegration
and the secession of her Slav dominions; for Germany,
the overthrow of all her projects of commercial and
“Kultur” supremacy in the Near East ; for England the

118 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 _ [CHApP, ix.

sharing of her supremacy in the Mediterranean ; finally,
for Italy the sudden approach of an alarming giant.
Russia in Constantinople would be the reconstitution of
the Rome of the Orient, but how far more powerful than
Byzantium ever was! And where in this case would
the Rome of the West be, where the second half of the
Roman Empire which counterbalanced the Oriental half?
One would most certainly not seek this Rome at Pots-
dam, and still less in Vienna or at the Quirinal!

There still exists one power, thought Ferdinand,
continuing his soliloquy, which has neither lost its
prestige nor abandoned its aspirations to universal
supremacy, and to which the extension of the Empire
of the Tsars as far as the shores of the Sea of Marmora
would be intolerable and almost fatal. This power is
Roman Catholicism. The triumph of the cause of Greek
Orthodoxy the day after the abrogation of the temporal
power of the Popes—for to the Church fifty years are
but a day--would furnish a palpable proof that the
Cesarian-papacy of the Orient is at least equal to the
power of the Roman Holy See.

Hence, concluded Ferdinand, all the vital forces in
Europe are hostile to the installation of the Russians in
Constantinople. But if the stupid domination of the
Turks in this capital of world-wide importance were
once broken and were to disappear, would it be possible
for Europe to restore it? No, that is out of the question !
Who then would replace the Turks on the shores of the
Bosphorus? Would Constantinople become an inter-
national free town, in other words the principal market
and seat of power of European bankers and Americans
of Jewish origin? Or would one give Turkey over to
that “Constantine XIV.” who with his tiny army had
just “ prigged” Salonika from the Bulgarians? Would
it not be infinitely more natural for the European Powers
to favour the installation on the Bosphorus of a State
powerful enough to guard the Straits, but not powerful
enough to bea menace to the balance of power in Europe,
ze. Bulgaria?

1912] KING FERDINAND’S REASONS 119

And how would the Holy See look on such a solution
of the question? But to this Ferdinand had an answer
ready, formulated during long years of meditation.

The Bulgarians, throughout the course of their history,
have represented one of the feeblest supports of Greek
Orthodoxy ; sometimes they fell under the influence of
Rome; sometimes the heresies of the Paulicians and
Albigenses triumphed all over the kingdom; and not
so very long ago, at the very first awakening of
the Bulgarian national conscience in the forties, this
awakening was already partly exploited by Roman
propaganda. The first preachers of Bulgarian liberty
did not issue only from the universities and seminaries
of Moscow and Kieff. Several of the striking personali-
ties of the future Bulgaria had received their education
either at Montpellier or in Constantinople under the
vigilant eye of the Lazarists and of the brothers of the
Christian Faith, until the English Robert College and
the Protestant work of American missions competed
against these. Given these precedents Ferdinand did
not think it would be so very difficult to guide his
people into the path of a reconciliation with Rome, a
path traced nearly four centuries ago by Ignatius Poce}
in Western Russia.

In imagination Ferdinand already drew the picture
of this reconciliation—under his egis—of the Western
Church with the Church of the East; the solemn Mass
in St. Sophia’s, celebrated strictly in accordance with
the Oriental ritual (Ferdinand had made a deep study of
this ritual), but during the course of which the name of
the successor to St. Peter would be mentioned before
and above that of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Then
only would they understand in Rome that by consenting
to his son’s conversion to the Greek Church, Ferdinand
had rendered one of the greatest services to Roman
Catholicism. And then not only would his excom-
munication be rescinded, but also his name would be
blessed and quoted side by side with those of the great
isapostolic monarchs.

120 THE BALKAN WAR, 109012 [cHapP. 1x.

There is no doubt that this hope of a reconciliation
with the Holy See (and with his own conscience into the
bargain) was one of the mainsprings which incited
Ferdinand to the taking of Constantinople. And there
is also no doubt that—from the moment that such in-
credible prospects unfolded themselves to the King of:
the Bulgarians—he at once realised that he had but one
real competitor and enemy, and that this enemy was
Russia.

Onward then! onward! whate’er the cost, towards
these sacred walls, while Europe has not yet realised the
whole importance of the success of the Serbian and
Bulgarian arms. The King’s headquarters sent off an
order to Sofia to dispatch at once all the grand uniforms
of the Royal Guard, the gala-coaches, and six white
horses: perhaps it would be as well to include even the
costume of the Byzantine Basileus in which, shortly
before, the King had posed to a French painter and a
Viennese medallist ; this costume would surely be found
in the Royal wardrobe! The ceremonial of the entry
into Constantinople of the new Tsar Simeon—for
Ferdinand intended to adopt this name in the event of
eventual success—was thought out in every detail.
“ Bulgar-Vilayet ! Eh what? Who would have thought
it? Bulgar-Vilayet!”

But the floodgates of heaven which were opening
over the Balkan Peninsula prevented, this time at least,
the realisation of all this phantasmagoria. It was not
till a week after the victory of Lule-Burgas that the
Bulgarian troops, by the King’s express order, resumed
their march on Constantinople, and a week went by
before they could approach the lines of Chataldja. In
the interval Berlin had pulled herself together, and so
had the German military instructors of the Ottoman
Army. The Baron von Wangenheim and the German
generals in Constantinople united their efforts to infuse
some energy into the broken and wavering spirits of
the Young Turks. The fortifications of Chataldja were

1912] REVERSE AT CHATALDJA 121

hurriedly armed, guns were brought in, the garrison
made up to strength, and on both sides of the fortified
line, in the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, the battle-
ships of the Ottoman Fleet with their guns prevented
the Bulgarians creeping along the shores. When the
Bulgarian Army began nevertheless to attack the line
of Chataldja, the enterprise was found to be too much
even for the indomitable courage of the Bulgarians:
one after the other the hosts of brave men who rushed
to the attack were mown down and littered the ground
with their corpses ; and after two days of deadly effort,
only one Turkish redoubt had been taken, only to be
lost the next day, for the Turks concentrated the fire
from their other forts on to it. No, the line of Cha-
taldja was absolutely impregnable without the assist-
ance of big guns or of ships of the line, if it were only
from the Black Sea side; and the Bulgarians possessed
neither.

Checked and thrown back at Chataldja, the Bulgarian
Army spread over the whole of Thrace, with the excep-
tion of the narrow peninsula of Gallipoli, where it also
was stopped by the formidable positions of Bulair;
moreover, the Bulgarians had no interest in occupying
the European shore of the Dardanelles. The Bulgarian
sphere established itself on the whole of the northern
shore of the Sea of Marmara, and Ferdinand had his
headquarters sometimes at Kavala on the A°gean Sea,
sometimes at Rodosto on the Sea of Marmara. But his
dreams about Constantinople were decidedly shattered.
Ferdinand realised this himself, and from that moment
all his efforts were concentrated on securing to Bulgaria
all the country just occupied by his Army, plus that
part of Macedonia which was due to the Bulgarians by
virtue of the agreement with Serbia.

It would be difficult to say to what extent the Bul-
garian people shared or did not share the dreams of
their master about Constantinople. On the one hand,
there existed in Bulgaria—and ever since the eighties

k22 THE BALKAN WAR, to912 _ [cHap. Ix.

—some extreme patriots who looked on Constantinople
as the natural portion of the Bulgarian people, and who,
like Ferdinand, dreamt of the times of the Tsar Simeon.
In the celebrated military song composed during the
Russo-Turkish War for the use of the Bulgarian militia,
and which has since become the national anthem of
Bulgaria, “Schoumi Maritza,” one already read the
line, “March, march—VTzarigrad [1.e. Constantinople]
is ours!” But I have always thought, and I still think,
that the greater part of the Bulgarian “ intelligence,”
and more especially the mass of the people, did not
dare, and did not even wish, to aspire to the possession
of the town, which was commonly considered the goal
and lawful portion of the Great Liberator—Russia.

Bulgarian public opinion—I would rather say the
opinion of the Bulgarian people—which was thoroughly
intractable on the subject of Macedonia and of the
famous frontiers of San Stefano, did not aspire to the
south-eastern part of the peninsula beyond Adrianople
and Lozengrad. But these two towns were considered
by the Bulgarians to be theirs by right, although
Adrianople was inhabited principally by Turks, and
Kirk-Kilisseh by Turks and Greeks. The latter had
been in the power of the Bulgarians from the first days
of the war, and Adrianople surrounded and besieged,
it was easy to see that the Bulgarians were determined
to take it at all costs, and to possess definitely this
ancient capital of the Osmanlis (before the conquest of
Constantinople by Mahomet I1.).

I knew, on the other hand, that amongst us—or at
least our Headquarters Staff—a rule existed about a
prohibited area round the Straits, within the limits of
which the aspirations of no matter which other country
would not be tolerated by us; and the Bulgarians had
been warned of this about 1909. Towards the end of
October, when all Russia—not excepting official Russia
—was hailing the Serbian and Bulgarian victories with
enthusiasm, and when the famous threat of the Powers
not to recognise any of the conquests of the Balkan

1912] THE PROHIBITED AREA 123

States had been completely forgotten by every one, I
received from St. Petersburg instructions to remind
the Bulgarian Government of the rule about the pro-
/ubited area, or in other words to warn it that Russia
would not allow the Bulgarians definitely to occupy
Adrianople and its environs.

These instructions placed the Russian representative
in Sofia in a very awkward position. Bulgarian public
opinion, as I said above, demanded the taking and the
annexation of Odrine. Moreover, the military opera-
tions which were developing in Thrace showed clearly
that if such a formidable fortress, situated at the junc-
tion of the Maritza and the Arda, were left in the hands
of the Turks, the establishment of the Bulgarians on
the shores of the A*:gean Sea would become very pre-
carious. Now, not only were we not opposed to this
establishment, but we even supported it up to a point.
Southern Bulgaria is separated from the A°gean Sea
by ranges of very high and impassable mountains:
the only practicable road from Philippopolis towards
the shores of the A°gean Sea follows the valley of the
Maritza in a south-eas¢ direction as far as Lule- Burgas,
and from there it turns abruptly to the south-west and
reaches the sea at Dedeagatch. One could, if necessary,
make the road from Dedeagatch end above Lule-Burgas
but not above Adrianople. During the war and so long
as Adrianople held out, the Bulgarians could not even
make a way round which would connect the two sections
of the Sofia-Constantinople line, as topographical con-
ditions were too difficult. I could well imagine what
an unfavourable impression our communication on the
subject of the prohibited area would produce, and how
all our enemies in Bulgaria would hasten to profit
by it.

But other reflections were added to this one. It was
evident to every one that the Turkish Revolution of
1908 had not caused the political scales in Constanti-
nople to turn in favour of England, of France, and still
less of Russia. German influence had issued triumphant

124 THE BALKAN WAR, tg12 _ [cHap. rx.

from this momentary trial, and had continued to reign
on the shores of the Bosphorus up till the day when
the Balkan war broke out. At this very moment the
fate of this influence, or rather of this taking possession,
was at stake. “If Turkey ended by losing all her Euro-
pean possessions, except Constantinople and the strip
of land absolutely indispensable to the defence of the
Straits, the Turks would be led by direct evidence to
understand how little they had reaped from German
influence and protection. The prestige of Germany in
the Near East would be for ever compromised. But
there would be more in it: seeing a Bulgaria, doubly
strong with her obstinate people and her immoderately
ambitious King, rising up so near her own capital,
Turkey would be inclined to seek the protection of
those who, in case of danger, could come to her assist-
ance directly and with no delay. Now, such help could
only be brought to the Turkish capital by the Fleet
that Russia kept in the Black Sea, and by the troops of
Russian origin which could be brought up in a few
days; on the Dardanelles side a like service could be
rendered to Turkey by the English and French Medi-
terranean Squadrons. Such a situation of the Powers
of the Entente in Constantinople would naturally not
constitute the definite solution of the Eastern question,
but it would hold enormous guarantees for us in the
event of Germany planning to provoke a collision with
Russia. In short, I] considered that the real diminution
of Turkish power on the European shores of the Straits
and of the Sea of Marmara would bring about the
downfall of German iufluence and the increase of our
own. The world-wide events of the last years have
confirmed the opinion I formed then. I am convinced
that if in 1913 the Turks had not been enabled almost
entirely to recover their former frontier with Bulgaria,
the Young-Turk régime would have promptly come to
an end, and Turkey, humiliated, disillusioned about
German benefits and constantly threatened on the Bul-

garian side, would never have dreamt of challenging”

1912] RUSSIAN CONCESSIONS 125

Russia, but on the contrary would have sought our
protection.

Inspired by these considerations I answered the
telegram of M. Sazonoff, who enjoined me to remind the
Bulgarians of our rule about the “prohibited area,”
by saying that I considered such a proceeding most
dangerous to our influence in Bulgariaand to our future
relations with the country. My arguments prevailed.
A few days later I received another telegram in which
I was told that Russia was rescinding her prohibition
on the subject of Adrianople, and was recognising
beforehand between Turkey and Bulgaria a frontier
going from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos on the
A‘ gean Sea; this frontier effectually gave full satisfaction
to the justifiable aspirations of the Bulgarians. I was
authorised to inform the Bulgarian Government of the
matter, and the good news was hurriedly made public.
“From this day forward there are no more Russophobes
in Bulgaria,” I wired to Sazonoff. And in fact the
Russian name has never enjoyed so much prestige in
Bulgaria as it did from this moment until the untoward
events of the summer of 1913.

But the line of the future Turko-Bulgarian frontier
still had to be drawn more accurately. I considered
that it ought to ascend slightly from Midia to the
environs of Lule-Burgas, and curve again southwards
as far as Enos, so as not to go too near the Sea of
Marmara. But our military agent, who, under the influ-
ence of Bulgarian victories, had arrived at a paroxysm of
Bulgarophile sentiments, thought we ought to consent to
the line which would follow the course of the Erghen,
and which the Bulgarian General Staff favoured. His
opinion prevailed in St. Petersburg, and our Head-
quarters Staff, who but a month before were insisting on
the “ prohibited area,” were now giving their consent
to a line which only left a strip of land about forty
kilometers in depth for the “hinterland” of the Straits.

But Ferdinand’s ambition was not satisfied with this

126 THE BALKAN WAR, i912 — [cuHap. 1x.

concession. Having had, with a heavy heart, to give
up the conquest of Constantinople, he: began from
December, 1912, obstinately to demand the extension of
the new Bulgarian territory to the shores of the Mar-
mara, the inclusion of the town of Rodosto, and the
annexation by Bulgaria of two islands in the A‘gean
Sea: Samothrace and Thasos. The island of Samo-
thrace, close to the exit from the Dardanelles, evidently
tempted Ferdinand by the divine classic lines of its
pearl-grey rocks rising out of the blue sea; thus it
met his gaze from Dedeagatch, but at the same time
this island is so near the Straits that if necessary it
could command the entry. The large island of Thasos,
separated from Kavala only by a narrow arm of the sea,
forms a natural complement of the Macedenian coast
where Bulgaria was going to establish herself; as it
possesses vast forests this island could be very useful
to its new owners. Unfortunately nearly the whole of
it is the private property of the family of the Khedives
of Egypt, direct descendants of the lucky native, the
celebrated Mehmed Ali. Hence the annexation of
Thasos could only be effected by virtue of a special
arrangement with the reigning Khedive and consequently
with England ; and the latter appeared in no way dis-
posed to deliver into the unscrupulous hands of the
Bulgarians the beautiful forests of Thasos and the
mineral riches with which the island was credited.
Ferdinand’s entreaties on the subject of Rodosto
assumed an acute character during the last months of
the war. The King repeatedly sent his confidants to

me, to persuade me to lend my help to the arranging of _

the affair; but each time I absolutely refused to touch
it. Then Ferdinand wished to profit by a journey which
the Minister of Finance, Todorov, was going to take to
St. Petersburg—on business connected with his depart-
ment—and he gave him a statement, which he hoped
would be passed on to M. Sazonoff, and which showed
the absolute necessity for Bulgaria to possess the town
of Rodosto as an outlet on the Marmara. The King

1912] GENERAL DMITRIEV’S MISSION 127

availed himself of this opportunity also to send letters
on the same subject to his friends and exalted patrons
in St. Petersburg, and Todorov himself was to endorse
the aspirations of his master in our country. As may
be supposed, all this was done behind my back; but
Todorov, who has always been sincere with me, confided
the secret to me, and in exchange | gave him the friendly
advice not to make himself the advocate of the King’s
claims on the subject of Rodosto in St. Petersburg, as
these claims could not fail to create an unfavourable
impression amongst us. As was to be expected, the
reply to the King from St. Petersburg was to the effect
that there could be no question of Bulgaria annexing
Rodosto or any other point on the Marmara.

The King, however, would not acknowledge himself
beaten. Some time after he dispatched to St. Peters-
burg the victor of Lule-Burgas, General Radko-Dmitriev,
who was considered by us—and rightly so—to be quite
devoted to Russia. The General was ordered to be
persistent with the Russian Government and even with
His Majesty the Emperor on the subject of Rodosto.
He was also told to be careful, when leaving Sofia, that
his journey and the object of this journey should not be
known to me. Tothis end, the General was not even to
have his passports vséd at the Russian Legation in
Sofia, but by our consul in Rustchuk, and from there
he was to travel by the Bukharest-Odessa line. Having
carried out these instructions with regard to “ Russian
diplomacy,” Radko-Dmitriev, however, did not think it
possible to conceal his journey and the object of this
journey from his comrade-in-arms, our military agent in
Sofia; and the latter naturally informed me of it.
Moreover, Radko-Dmitriev’s journey was no more
successful than the other steps taken by the King: in
St. Petersburg every one turned a deaf ear to the
subject of Rodosto.

When he had abandoned all hope, Ferdinand re-
solved to leave the town which had become so dear to
him and where he had stayed several times during the

128 THE BALKAN WAR, t912 — [cuap. 1x.

winter months of 1912-13. But befere his departure he
visited the cemetery where lie the bones of some of the
unsuccessful actors in the Hungarian insurrection of
1848, who after the failure of their efforts had taken
refuge in Turkey and were interned at Rodosto.
Ferdinand prayed fervently on the graves of the
Magyar national heroes. Sulking with Russia he
thought it a well-chosen moment to remember his
Kohary ancestors and his Hungarian possessions... .
For want of something better Rodosto at least gave
him an opportunity of parading his Magyar sympathies :
who knows but that he might derive some profit from
this parade ?

It is easy to realise that Ferdinand’s behaviour after
the battle of Lule-Burgas and his obstinate proceedings
on the subject of Rodosto should have aroused the
displeasure and distrust of the Russian Government :
his insatiable ambition and his secret schemes, incom-
patible with the historic problems and vital interests of
Russia, stood revealed. In mentioning all this political
intrigue here, I am anticipating events a little. The
journeys of M. Todorov and General Radko-Dmitriev
only took place in 1913, but Ferdinand’s intrigues and
the steps he took in St. Petersburg form the natural
sequel to the attitude adopted by him ever since
November, 1912.

From December, 1912, when the success of the allied
arms was Clearly proved, the Turks entered into negotia-
tions for peace. For this purpose, by common consent
of the belligerents and of the Great Powers, a Conference
was convened in London, at which Bulgaria was
represented by M. Danev. An armistice was decided
on, and concluded on most advantageous conditions
for the allies and particularly for the Bulgarians;?

Thus the Bulgarians were authorised to send trains full of provisions
by the railway line which goes through the fortified place Adrianople,
whereas the Turks could not obtain the right to provision the garrison,
which was already beginning to suffer from hunger !

1912] THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON 129

afterwards the clauses of the Peace were discussed.
The Turks consented to give up the whole of Thrace to
the Bulgarians, as far as the line of Midia, Adrianople,
Dedeagatch. The forts of Adrianople were to be razed
to the ground, and the Turks even yielded to the Bul-
garians the railway line and station situated three or
four kilometers from the town. In this way Adrianople
would only be nominally in the power of the Turks.
Nevertheless, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries clung
tenaciously to this nominal possession, being well
aware of the bitter humiliation which would be felt in
the Mussulman world if the ancient capital of the
Osmalis in Europe with its celebrated mosque and the
tombs of the Sultans, ancestors of Mahomet II., were to
be handed over to the giaours.

The negotiations in London coincided with the
reawakening, on the part of the Central Empires, of the
desire to limit as much as possible any territorial
acquisitions of the Balkan Allies. The idea of an
autonomous Albania was suggested and, in support of
this idea, Austria began to bar the outlet to the
Adriatic to the Serbians, an outlet which they had just
conquered at the cost of enormous sacrifices. She also
vetoed beforehand the annexation by Montenegro of
the town of Scutari, still being besieged and around the
walls of which streams of the noblest Montenegrin
blood had been shed. In Rumania an agitation was
setting in on the subject of the “rectification of
frontiers” in Dobrudja, and even amongst the Allies
dangerous dissensions had begun and were increas-
ing day by day. I am not speaking of the misunder-
standings between Bulgarians and Greeks; these had
broken out almost simultaneously with the war; the
question of Salonika was not yet settled and the
Bulgarian chauvinists upheld claims which enraged
the hearts of the Greek chauvinists. Even in Serbia
every one was agitating and laying down the principle
that the Serbians had a right to supplementary com-
-pensations in Macedonia in exchange for what they

130 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 _ [cnap. 1x.

were threatened with losing on the Adriatic; that Bul-
garia by laying a hand on the whole of Thrace had
received more than she expected to receive, and that in
return she ought to give up to Serbia a part of the
territory she had acquired by the treaty of February
29th, 1912. In short, one foresaw clearly and in the
immediate future a conflict of interests between the
Bulgarians on one side and the Serbians and the Greeks
on the other.

In view of this tangled situation I strongly advised
the Bulgarian ruling powers to moderate their demands
regarding the Turks, and to patch up a general peace
as quickly as possible. The Bulgarians could insist on
all their territorial claims in Thrace, but by allowing
the Turks free access to Adrianople, which would
represent an Ottoman enclave within the actual limits of
the town. At the moment the Turks would have been
glad to conclude peace on this condition. Gueshov
shared my opinion and acted on it, but without success. ,
He was confronted by the opposition of Danev, of the/
military, and of the King himself, who was willing to <
give up Salonika, but who wished for the whole of ¥
Thrace with its ancient capital and ardently coveted
Rodosto and Samothrace. At last the Turkish plenipo-
tentiaries in London were induced to resign themselves
and to yield. The Bulgarians received Adrianople and
the whole of Thrace up to the line Midia-Enos. But
alas! this diplomatic success was essentially ephemeral
and only existed on paper.

The intense humiliation undergone by Turkey at
the London Conference was the signal for a new pro-
nunciamento from Enver-Bey, for the assassination of
Nazim-Pasha, for the downfall of the Grand Vizier
Kiamil-Pasha, and for the annulment of the peace con-
ditions which the latter was already prepared to sign.

On the 21st January (4th February), 1913, the London
Conference paused in its labours and the Balkan War
broke out afresh. I had then a very strong feeling that
this foreboded no good either to Bulgaria or to the Slay

1913] FRESH OUTBREAK OF WAR 131

cause generally. The unbounded ambition of King
Ferdinand and the exaggerated claims of his subjects
were at this moment preparing the destruction of the
brilliant edifice of Bulgarian power, which had been
erected with the rapidity of a fairy-tale, and which was
to fall down just as rapidly.

CHAPTER X
THE BALKAN WAR, I9I2 (continued)

At the beginning of February, 1913, the situation was.
as follows: the war between Turkey and the Balkan
Allies had begun again, and the peace conference had
suspended its sittings; but the ambassadors of the
Great Powers in London continued to confer on the
questions relative to the future peace and to the definite
distribution of the Balkan territories.

In reality at that period only Bulgaria and Monte-
negro had any interest in the prolongation of the war.
The Bulgarians wished to take Adrianople, the Monte-

negrins Scutari. The two other allies had already |

gained the objects for which they had taken up arms.
Greece, with Crete restored to her, had laid hands on
all the islands of the Archipelago—except those taken
by the Italians in 19i11—and was occupying Salonika,
Chalcidice, part of Southern Macedonia, and Epirus, the
capital of which, Janina, surrendered to the Greek Army
shortly after the resumption of hostilities. The Serbians
held all the rest of Macedonia and Northern Albania with
the ports of San Giovanni, Medua and Durazzo; and
they knew perfectly well that the result of their efforts
and sacrifices did not depend on the prolongation of
the war and on Turkish demoralisation, but on Austrian
claims and chicanery. Already in December, 1912, when
the irreconcilable opposition of Austria, backed up by
Germany, to the establishment of the Serbians on the
shores of the Adriatic became apparent, Serbia began
to contemplate the possibility of an outlet on the A‘:gean
Sea; for that, it would be necessary to occupy the whole

of Western Macedonia, with Monastir, and to come to
132

1913] SERBIAN DEMANDS 133

an arrangement with the Greeks for absolutely free
transit to Salonika. Such acombination would naturally
constitute a violation of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement ;
but Belgrade justified this by saying to herself that the
Bulgarians would be compensated to a great extent by
the annexation of Adrianople and of the whole of Thrace,
as far as the Erghen, a conquest they had not dared to
dream of when they signed their agreement with the
Serbians.

I remember perfectly well the day on which, for the
first time, | heard my colleague Spalaikovitch state these
claims. It was a foggy afternoon in December, and I
was taking my usual walk along the highroad of Tsari-
grad, and near the “fourth kilometre”—the usual goal
of my walks—I met Spalaikovitch and we walked back
together towards the town. It was then that Spalaiko-
vitch, complaining bitterly of the behaviour of the
Bulgarians towards the Serbians, described the above-
mentioned combination to me. I was very unfavourably
impressed by it; I realised the fanaticism with which
the Bulgarians looked on and maintained their right to
that part of Macedonia allotted to them by the agree-
ment of 1912, and I could picture the storm of indigna-
tion which the new Serbian claims would raise in
Bulgaria, and how the relations of alliance between the
two countries would immediately change into bitter
hostility. Moreover, a treaty is a treaty, and to the one
signed by the Serbians and Bulgarians in February,
1912, Russia had morally set her seal; this agreement
had been made under our egis, and we had taken part
in it, if not formally, at least by lending the support of
our sympathies and consent. I mentioned all these
considerations to my Serbian colleague and entreated
him—and his Government—not to ‘start that hare.”
But Spalaikovitch did not appear to be too willing to
listen to reason. |

Some time after, when the coup d'état of Con-
stantinople had occurred and hostilities were beginning
again, the trend of opinion mentioned above became

134 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [CHAP. X.

more pronounced in Serbia. The Serbians had to
make fresh sacrifices in men and money for an object
to which they were supremely indifferent—for the siege
of Adrianople. The Bulgarians had hardly any heavy
artillery ; the Serbians, on the contrary, owing to the
wise foresight of M. Pachitch, were fairly well supplied.
The Bulgarians could not even think of taking
Adrianople without the help of Serbian artillery, and
without the co-operation of their troops, because the
Bulgarian Army was scattered between the positions
of Chataldja, Bulair, and the numerous garrisons in
Southern Macedonia, where they had to oppose the
Greek allies. Also, before the armistice the Serbians
had placed at the disposition of the Bulgarians before
Adrianople about 100 of their big Creusot guns and
two divisions of infantry, which held the trench against
the bastions north of the town, which were by far the
strongest of the whole defences. With the resumption
of hostilities, the question naturally arose as to whether
the Serbians would leave these forces before Adrianople.

At this moment the Serbians could realise clearly
that the outlet to the Adriatic would be barred to them
by the irreconcilable opposition of Austria-Hungary.
Russian diplomacy, which for a long time had sup-
ported the legitimate aspirations of the Serbians, and
at the London conferences had upheld Serbia’s right
to an outlet on the Adriatic, was forced at last to give
in to the hostile mood not only of Austria-Hungary,
but also of Germany. M. Sazonoff evidently did not
wish for a repetition of 1909, when a thinly-veiled
ultimatum from Berlin forced us to change our course
abruptly, and to recognise Austrian claims. In the
person of our Ambassador in London, Count Bencken-
dorf, Russia possessed a plenipotentiary who was
energetic as well as extremely well-informed. At the
conferences of the Ambassadors, for a long time the
Count stubbornly upheld the vital interests of Serbia;
but when he saw that affairs were taking an acute turn,
and that the Cabinet of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward

1913] SERBIAN CLAIMS 135

Grey, determined above all to maintain peace, was not
disposed to uphold to the end the just aspirations of
the Serbians—then he did not conceal from St. Peters-
burg that henceforth all his efforts in Serbia’s favour
would be futile. On which there was nothing left to
us but to persuade the Serbians themselves that it was
necessary to yield in the cause of universal peace.

The position of the Russian Minister in Belgrade
became almost impossible. Whatever his personal
influence over the Serbians, and his intimacy with the
Court and the party in power may have been, it was a
very arduous task to make the Serbians give up the
long-wished-for outlet to the sea—after the sacrifices
they had made, and the victories they had gained!
In such an undertaking M. Pachitch’s authority, firmly
established though it was, the popularity of the new
dynasty, and Russian influence in Belgrade might well
be shipwrecked. Therefore it would be unfair to
‘blame M. Hartwig too much if, in order to get out of
such a terribly difficult situation, he promised the
Serbians to uphold, by all the means in his power, their
schemes for obtaining an outlet to Salonika and the
f&gean Sea. It was then that Serbia’s stern resolve
took shape, to keep for herself Southern Macedonia,
and to remain on that side in close proximity to Greece.
One must also admit that during the whole period of
military operations, the Bulgarian authorities by their
greed, their lack of any conciliatory spirit, and their
domineering attitude, had roused the indignation, not
only of the Greeks, but also of the Serbians. The
latter had every reason to hope that, once masters of
Monastir, and neighbours of Greece, they would easily
obtain free and direct transit to Salonika; on the other
hand, if it was a question of establishing this same
transit through Bulgarian territory, one might justly
fear perpetual difficulties and quibbles. Hence, a com-
munity of interests and a natural solidarity bound the
Greeks and the Serbians with regard to Bulgaria.

Already, in the middle of January, that is to say

136 THE BALKAN WAR, tg12 [CHAP. X.

before the resumption of hostilities, Spalaikovitch had
come one day to tell me that he had made the following
Suggestion to Belgrade: the Serbian Government
should warn the Bulgarian Government that, having
no longer any interest in the continuation of the war,
Serbia would only consent to leave her troops and her
guns before Adrianople in return for supplementary
compensations in Macedonia. I must confess that this
suggestion pleased me enormously: such a warning
from the Serbian Government might force the Bul-
garians to make the necessary concessions, and thus
hasten the conclusion of peace. I foresaw already that
the prolongation of the war might become fatal to
Bulgaria first, and then to the Slav cause in general.

Such a prolongation would constitute a menace to
the peace of Europe. In the course of about six weeks,
the Balkan Allies, astounding Europe by the rapidity
of their successes, had managed—incredibile dictu—to
drive the Turks definitely out of Europe, with the
exception of Constantinople and a restricted hinterland
of the Straits. It was imperative to confirm these
results without delay: more especially because, during
the short space of time that the armistice had lasted,
Germany and Austria had pulled themselves together
and had presented, almost in the form of an ultimatum,
their demands, which were so unfair to Serbia and to
Montenegro. How would it be, then, if war broke out
afresh, and if the differences already existing in the
heart of the Balkan Alliance were to become more acute
and more palpable? No, it was high time to confirm
the results obtained, in comparison with which the
differences of the Allies appeared to me to take a
secondary place.

It was by virtue of these considerations that I
approved so thoroughly of Spalaikovitch’s idea, and I
awaited his answer from Belgrade with great im-
patience. A few days later my worthy Serbian
colleague, in a very unhappy frame of mind, came to
call on me: M. Pachitch did not approve of his idea

1913] M. SPALAIKOVITCH’S VIEWS 137

at all, and told him very emphatically not to mention
it to any one. Evidently Pachitch considered the taking
of Adrianople to be indispensable. This town, and
Thrace as far as the Ergene, to Serbian eyes apparently,
represented for the Bulgarians the equivalent of what
they would have to give up in Macedonia. [| concluded
from this that in Belgrade they had irrevocably decided
to obtain a modification of the demarcation agreement
of 1912, and especially to insist on the Serbian and
Greek frontiers joining.

News came very soon that M. Venizelos, then
omnipotent Prime Minister of Greece, was going to
Belgrade to confer with M. Pachitch. This news
caused great alarm in the political circles of Sofia,
because the relations between the Bulgarians and their
Greek allies were already very bad, and those between
the Bulgarians and Serbians were palpably changing
for the worse. Before Adrianople the Serbian and
Bulgarian soldiers still fraternised willingly enough;
but the officers already looked askance at one another,
and ended by forbidding their men to associate
mutually; but I ought to mention that the initial step
of this odious measure was taken by the Bulgarian
Headquarters Staff. At the same time, in Sofia,
Spalaikovitch no longer refrained from expressing his
displeasure and his suspicions with regard to the
Bulgarians. He was extremely outspoken on the
subject, especially when he was talking to the repre-
sentatives of the Entente. One of the conversations
I had with him at this period engraved itself deeply
on my memory. I was trying to persuade him that
it was not to the interest of the Serbians and that it
Was even very dangerous for them to be at daggers
drawn with the Bulgarians. ‘I admit,” I said to
Spalaikovitch, “that Serbia has been cruelly wronged
compared to Bulgaria. They have taken from her the
outlet to the sea, to which she had every right to aspire,
and which she purchased with her blood. I admit also
that the Bulgarians have made territorial acquisitions

138 THE BALKAN WAR, i912 [CHAP. xX.

in Thrace, which they did not even dare to hope for
when they took up arms. All that is quite true. But
one must also look to the future. The Bulgarians will
have nothing more to gain, whereas the Serbians will
have all their historic goals before them. These goals
are situated in the west. Sooner or later, the Serbians
will aspire to unite all Serbian lands, and then, if
successful, they will possess a splendid coast, inhabited
by Serbians of the purest race, and who have been
experienced sailors, from father to son, whereas, in this
respect, the Bulgarians have to depend on Greeks and
Turks. If at the present moment you contrive to
keep intact the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance—even at the
cost of real sacrifices—the achievement of your great
national aims is already half guaranteed.”

‘All that would be quite true,” replied Spalaikovitch
sharply, “if the Bulgarians were not Bulgarians and if
their Tsar was not Ferdinand. Do you seriously think
that, if we yield to them in everything to-day, they will
come to our assistance when the moment arrives for us
of a decisive national contest?” ‘No, that I could not
guarantee,” I agreed; ‘and it would be particularly
difficult to expect such noble behaviour on Ferdinand’s
part. Iti is as you say. But on the other hand, if to-day
you violate the agreement and if you succeed in keeping
Southern Mactdanis: to the detriment of the claims so
long matured by the Bulgarians, you may be quite
certain that at the moment of the supreme and decisive
contest, Bulgaria wll attack vou from behind. And in
doing so the Bulgarian people will be one with Ferdi-
nand, for you know the essentially vindictive character
of the Bulgarians.”

I had no idea at the time that my prediction would
come true so quickly.

I took care to inform M. Sazonoff of my conversa-
tions with Spalaikovitch, and to warn him of the
storm which was brewing and of the frame of mind
of the Bulgarians with regard to it.

During the first week in March M. Venizelos really

1913] M. VENIZELOS COMES TO SOFIA 139

went to Belgrade and held long conferences with
M. Pachitch, with Hartwig and with the members of
the Royal Family. From Belgrade the Greek President
of the Council, with the tact and courtesy for which he
is noted, announced his visit to Sofia, undertaken in
order to confer with Bulgarian statesmen. He was
only to stay exactly one day, from the morning to the
evening. I greatly wished to make the acquaintance of
M. Venizelos and to converse with him, but I foresaw
that the Bulgarians, under pretext of the too short
duration of the visit, would try to conjure away the
Greek President of the Council from the foreign repre-
sentatives, more especially from the Russian one.
Consequently I wrote a note beforehand to my worthy
Greek colleague, M. Panas, to beg him to arrange an
interview for me with Venizelos. We arranged that
after the luncheon that the Bulgarian Ministers were
going to give in honour of their guest at the club in
Sofia, Panas should escort Venizelos to the reading-
room of the club, where he would find me installed.
This was done. At the hour agreed on, the Greek
Minister led M. Venizelos up to me, introduced us to
each other, and then left us alone. We began our con-
versation without losing any time.

I have rarely seen a man who, at the first meeting,
has produced such a favourable impression on me as
M. Venizelos did. An astonishing simplicity, an abso-
lutely frank and open way of expressing his opinions
and convictions—which one feels to be deep—consti-
tuted and still constitute the strength and the prestige
of this true statesman. I felt at once that I was in the
presence, first, of a perfect gentleman and then of a
scrupulously honest politician. No phraseology, no
desire to deceive his questioner were apparent in the
clear, precise and modest expression of his thoughts.
The very fact that he, promptly and without any pre-
amble, broached the principal question—that of Greco-
Bulgarian demarcation—predisposed me enormously in
his favour.

140 THE BALKAN WAR, i912 [CHAP. X.

Venizelos began by telling me quite openly that he
had not yet concluded any separate alliance, nor any
convention with the Serbians. Such a convention
would only be necessary in the event of the Bulgarians
becoming unreasonable in their demands. Then ona
large map hanging on the wall of the room we began to
examine the possible line of the future frontier. In
discussing this frontier M. Venizelos laid stress only on
the absolute necessity for Greece to possess, north of
Salonika and of Chalcidice, a large enough hinterland
adapted to the efficacious defence of these new terri-
torial acquisitions; west of Salonika he thought it
would be fair to extend the Greek frontiers as far as
Florina, inclusive. Such a frontier was strategically
sufficient and had the advantage of forming a fairly
straight line. It is true that it left to Greece part
of the Slav population of Macedonia, south of Mona-
stir; but in return the Bulgarians, at Seres, Drama,
Kavala, etc, were taking over populations which
were entirely Greek, and their celebrated tobacco
plantations, which represented the great riches of those
parts.

I promised Venizelos to endorse as far as possible his
opinion among the Bulgarians, and more especially his
outline of the frontier ; but I made a few reservations on
the subject of some localities which it would be difficult
to persuade the Bulgarians to give up. “Oh! but that
can always be settled during negotiations,” remarked
Venizelos judiciously. ‘ What is bad, and what makes
me anxious, is the fact that nothing on earth will induce
the Bulgarians to enter into negotiations with us, as
we have repeatedly suggested they should do. They
always elude the subject, as if they were on the
watch for fresh occurrences or some new Situation ;
and yet amongst us public opinion is very much excited
over the tone of the Bulgarian Press, which even
disputes our possession of Salonika!”

All this was absolutely true. But on this we had to
close our interview, M. Venizelos being expected at

1913] MY ADVICE TO M. GUESHOV 141

the Palace. The meeting and conversation with this
eminent Greek statesman left not only an agreeable
impression on me, but also a tranquillising one.

The next day I went to see Gueshov, and had a long
conversation with him on the subject of what Venizelos
had said to me the evening before. I impressed most
emphatically on the Bulgarian President of the Council
the necessity of starting negotiations in due order as
soon as possible with the Greek Government, and of
responding to the wise moderation of Venizelos by
prudent concessions.

“Tf the policy pursued by you here at the moment is
continued for two or three months more, you will be sur-
rounded by irreconcilable enemies,” | said to Gueshov.
“You complain of the Serbian claims and of their inten-
tion to violate the treaty signed hardly a year ago. But
if you settle the demarcation question definitely and in a
friendly way with the Greeks, the Serbian claims will
naturally diminish ; in the opposite case you are actually
threatened with the danger of a defensive and even
offensive alliance between the Greeks and the Serbians,
an alliance not yet concluded, for I have complete trust
in Venizelos’ word—but which might be concluded in
the immediate future. Besides this, you seem to have
completely forgotten your relations with Rumania, who
looks on the increase of Bulgarian power as a real
menace to her. And you must surely realise that even
after the conclusion of peace, the Turks will bear malice
for ages, not against all their conquerors collectively,
but almost entirely against the Bulgarians, as being the
strongest and the nearest—hence the most dangerous of
their neighbours. Do try to divide the difficult political
problem with which you are faced into several parts,
and to solve at least ove definitely. It is lucky for you
that at the head of Greek policy at the moment there
should be a man so essentially moderate and wise as
Venizelos. You ought promptly to take advantage
of this good luck before Greece gets into such a state
of ferment that neither Venizelos nor King George

142 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [CHAP. X.

himself—also an essentially moderate man—will be able
to calm her.”

M. Gueshov, who was listening to me with bowed
head, was silent for a while, and then replied:
“M. Nekludoff, I have thought over all this myself
for a long time, and I must confess that I entirely

share your opinion. ...” “Then it is King Ferdinand
who is against an arrangement with Greece?” I
interrupted. “No,” replied M. Gueshov somewhat

sharply; “as far as I know, His Majesty would be very
willing to converse and to come to terms with Athens.
But Danev, whose attitude to London is so irrecon-
cilable; and some of his partisans here... and the
military. Do not forget that the present Cabinet is a
Coalition Cabinet. On such a serious question | cannot
dissociate myself from Danev.”

“But surely,” I exclaimed, “the question is so
serious that you have every right to appeal to the King,
as to a supreme authority. If His Majesty the King
and you, as President of the Council and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, can agree on this question, Danev will
be obliged to give in! As you know, I should be the
last person to encourage the perpetual and uncontrolled
interference of King Ferdinand in questions of the
Home and Foreign Policy of Bulgaria; but given the
exceptional circumstances an appeal to the King’s
decision would be quite natural; it is done in most
constitutional countries.”

“Tt is easy to talk, M. Nekludoff,” replied Gueshov
with a deep sigh, “but do you know that it is more
than six weeks since I have seen my constitutional
sovereign? Under one pretext or another he avoids
interviews and conversations with me. When he wants
anything, he writes me a little note, or even sends me
his question or his opinion verbally through his private
secretary, M. Dobrovitch, and I am expected to answer
in the same way. No business can be done like that,
and I am more and more inclined to send in my
resignation !”

eaal FERDINAND’S EVASIVENESS 143

I tried fervently to dissuade Gueshov from taking
such a step; but in my heart of hearts I could not help
agreeing that indeed things could not go on like that,
and that such an abnormal situation would finally lead
to disastrous consequences for the country.

King Ferdinand was not hiding himself only from
Gueshov at this period. I have already mentioned the
curious state of things existing at his headquarters,
which he hardly left at the beginning of the war.
During the month of December he began coming more
frequently to Sofia, but he remained invisible and in-
accessible there. More especially did he hide himself
carefully from the diplomats accredited to his person,
thinking—and not without foundation—that these latter
would endeavour to give him the advice of their Govern-
ments, which he was not at all inclined to listen to.

Since the King’s Jubilee and the festivities at Tir-
nova (in August, 1912) and up to April, 1913, I had the
honour of catching sight of the King twice only, and
both times in the cathedral; the French Minister saw
him once at the Palace, and the German Minister once
also at the Royal villa of Vrana (near Sofia); all the
other Ministers also saw him once in the cathedral, and
that is all. My two meetings with Ferdinand took place
as follows: on the rst (14th) January, 1913, I went to
the Sofia cathedral, according to the Orthodox custom,
to attend High Mass and the 7e Deum for the New
Year. In previous years all the Diplomatic Corps
appeared in full dress at the Ze Deum, by special invi-
tation from the Court; after the Ze Deum the King
came to talk to the foreign Ministers and to exchange
with them good wishes for the New Year; in the
evening a dinner at the Palace was given to the Diplo-
matic Corps, at which the senior member made a con-
gratulatory speech to the King. On this occasion there
was no invitation from the Court, and we were not even
certain if His Majesty was in Sofia.

Just before the 7e Deum began the King made his

144 THE BALKAN WAR, tog12 [CHAP. X.

entry into the cathedral in a khaki uniform, which, by
the way, did not suit him at all! The service over, he
hurried up to me, shook hands with me and said that
he greatly regretted not to see my colleagues.

“ We have received no official invitation, sir,” I said
to the King.

‘Oh! there has doubtless been some mistake,” replied
Ferdinand sharply. “Please tell all your colleagues
this, and convey to them my best wishes for the year
just beginning.”

Having exchanged congratulations and good wishes
with me, the King left the cathedral.

The second time I saw Ferdinand was at the Requiem
Mass for King George of Greece, who had been assas-
sinated at Salonika by an insane Greek anarchist on the
6th (rg9th) March. When this sad news was known, the
Court of Sofia ordered a Solemn Mass to be held in
the Sofia Cathedral, to which all the Diplomatic Corps,
in full dress, were invited. The service over, the King,
who appeared to be genuinely moved, went up to the
Greek Minister, and talked for some time with him,
expressing his condolences. Then passing the other
Ministers by, Ferdinand sprang towards me, seized
my hand, and keeping it in his, repeated: ‘“M. Neklu-
doff, it’s horrible! .... it’s horrible!... horrible! ...
horrible!”

Now, for some weeks and even months, I had tried
in vain to obtain an audience of the King, or at least
to seize an opportunity to present to his Majesty my
newly-appointed Counsellor to the Legation, M. Sabler.
Very little impressed by the King’s manner, I was not
going to allow the opportunity to escape of at last in-
troducing my chief collaborator to him: “ Sir, allow me
to present to Your Majesty the new Counsellor to the
Russian Legation, M. Sabler.”

The King, with an angry frown, drew his hand away
from mine and held it out to M. Sabler—who bowed
low—and went on repeating: “It’s horrible... hor-
mover. '. horrible:

ote FERDINAND'S AUDIENCES — 145

“M. Sabler is the son of the Procurator of our
Holy Synod”; I went on with my introduction without
allowing myself to be the least perturbed.

“Horrible! ... horrible! ... horrible!” continued
the King, casting at Sabler, who was much dis-
concerted at this reception, such stern glances that
one would have thought that he suspected him—or
even his pious and illustrious father—of having parti-
cipated in the abominable assassination at Salonika.
Then Soe out to me once more his “horrible! ..
horrible! . .. horrible!” the King hurriedly left the
cathedral.

In February, 1913, after the election of M. Poincaré,
the French Minister was to present to the King—
according to etiquette—an autograph letter from the
new President of the Republic. After three weeks of
negotiations and delays, M. de Panafieu was at last
granted an audience. I naturally was interested to
know what the King would tell him during this audience,
and my French colleague, with whom I was very
intimate, promised to call on me on leaving the Palace.

“Well, and how did your audience go off? What
did the King say to you?” I asked M. de Panafieu, who
came to me at the hour agreed on.

“His Majesty was excessively kind and amiable,”
replied my colleague, smiling. “He kept me for half
an hour, and this half-hour was taken up by a mono-
logue, bright and charming, from the King! He spoke
of his recent journey to Paris (in 1910), of M. Falliéres,
of the way in which he had made the acquaintance of
the present President, even of the scientific studies of
the President’s cousin, Poincaré the mathematician; in
short, he tried not to let me get in a word, afraid evi-
dently that I might try and put in a question or a remark
of a political nature. When the half-hour was over, he
dismissed me with the same studied friendliness; and
here I am!”

The German Minister, Herr von Below, was invited
by the King to a ¢éte-d-téte luncheon with him at Vrana,

146 THE BALKAN WAR, tog12 [CHAP. X.

his new country house near Sofia: this was in April, 1913.
My German colleague, who was on the best of terms
with me throughout our time in Sofia, told me about
this himself, adding that the object of his interview with
the King and of their conversation had been the affairs
and private concerns of Queen Eleanor, #ée Princess of
Reuss.

I think, however, that I am justified in asserting that
von Below’s interview with the King, which took place
at Vrana, on purpose so that the Sofia public should
not know about it or comment thereon—was of quite a
different nature from the forced meetings of His Majesty
with me and with M. de Panafieu. If the information I
received on the subject from a strictly confidential
source is true, Herr von Below received from Berlin
the order to communicate to the King that Germany
was willing to uphold the Bulgarian cause against the
Serbians and the Greeks, if only the Bulgarians would
consent to come to friendly terms with the Turks on
the subject of Adrianople, and would lessen, generally
and in a tangible way, their claims in Thrace. This is
what the German Minister had discussed with the King
after luncheon at Vrana. This proposition, coming
after the capture of Adrianople by the Bulgarians, was
declined by Ferdinand as well as by his Government,
who had been much startled at it. When the Bul-
garians were beaten by their former allies Germany
remembered this refusal of Ferdinand’s, and not only
prevented Austria from going to his assistance against
the Serbians, but further lent her most essential political
support to Turkey, who had just occupied Adrianople
and Kirk-Kilisseh without striking a blow. But the
information on the subject of this German step only
reached me long after it had been taken—that is to say,
during the winter of 1913-14.

As | said above, Bulgaria during the last months of
the year was the object of the suspicions and complaints
not only of her allies but also of Rumania. For the
Rumanians, the sudden rise and increase of power of

1913] RUMANIAN FEARS 147

Bulgaria not only constituted a sharp blow to their
amour-propre but also an undoubted menace. During
the whole Balkan war Rumania had unflinchingly per-
formed her duties as a neutral, allowing free passage
through her territory for all munitions which the
German and Austro-Hungarian works sent to Turkey
via the Black Sea, where the Bulgarians, whose naval
forces were inadequate, could not sink or seize the
Turkish transports. It can easily be imagined that such
a way of proceeding would not exactly predispose the
Bulgarians in Rumania’s favour, even if between the
two nations there had not been another cause for
rivalry and mutual displeasure. But this cause existed.

In 1878, at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish
Peace, the Bulgarian chauvinists had expressed their
displeasure at Russia giving part of the Dobrudja as
far as the forts of Silistria to the Rumanian Principality
in exchange for that part of Bessarabia close to the
Danube which had been taken from Russia by the treaty
of 1856. According to the Bulgarians, Russia, although
taking back all the southern part of Bessarabia, ought
to give the whole of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria and thus
become, across the mouths of the Danube, the imme-
diate neighbour of the Slav Principality which she had
just created. The Rumanians, on the contrary, were of
opinion that Russia ought to leave Southern Bessarabia
to them, adding to it, as a reward for having “ saved the
Russian Army at Plevna,” the whole of the Dobrudja with
Silistria and Tutrukan and nearly as far as Varna. The
two sides founded their exclusive claims to the Dobrudja
onethnographical principles. According tothe Bulgarian
version, nearly the whole of the Dobrudja is peopled with
Bulgarians ; according to the Rumanians it is inhabited
solely by Rumanians. In reality, this province repre-
sents the same motley mixture of population as Southern
Bessarabia: Turks, Gagaiizi, Tatar-Budjaks, Tziganes,
and—in the towns—Armenians, Greeks and Jews, make
up with Rumanians, Bulgarians and Russians of the
Old Faith, the population of the Dobrudja, which in its

i,

148 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [CHAP. X.

northern part suffers from scarcity of water and is very
thinly populated, but on its southern side possesses
beautiful fertile slopes and many forests. In 1879 the
Bulgarians received just this fertile part of the Dobrudja
—the forest of Deli-Orman—where there are a few
rich Turkish villages. Gradually, in consequence of
the usual migration of a Turkish population from
places where it has ceased to be the predominant caste
and in consequence of all kinds of administrative
trickery practised by the Bulgarians, the larger part of
Deli-Orman passed into the hands of Bulgarian peasants,
of which many had become fairly wealthy proprietors.
When this land passed into these grasping but hard-
working hands the fertility of the soil increased to such
an extent that about 1910 the department of Dobritch
(Hadji-Oglu-Pazardjik) produced nearly one-sixth of
the Bulgarian cereals. One can understand that, as
good neighbours, the Rumanians would in no way
have been against appropriating such fertile ground.
At the same time they considered that it would be only
fair if the Bulgarians—having in 1912 acquired such a
considerable portion of the coast with ports situated
not only on the Black Sea but also on the A*‘gean—were
to give up to Rumania a small part of their former
coast, if only up to the port of Kavarna inclusive. It
could not indeed be denied that Rumania did effectually
suffer from a lack of maritime outlets and had con-
sequently a natural desire to enlarge her coast line.
These were the reasons why the Rumanians in 1913
considered themselves morally authorised to present
claims to Bulgaria on the subject of the cession of
Silistria and of a strip of land as wide as possible in
the Dobrudja.

The fulfilment of the Rumanian wishes naturally
mainly depended on the attitude of the Great Powers,
for, since the convocation of the London Conferences,
the definite settlement of the Balkan imbroglio had
passed into the hands of Europe, and the further
successes of the Allies could only effect slight modifi-

1913] M. ROSETTI-SOLESCO 149

cations in the final results of the war. It was to the
interest of those amongst the Powers who displayed
goodwill to the Balkan Allies that the differences
between Bulgaria and Rumania should not culminate
in a collision which might rekindle the fire which
fortunately had been dying down. A great deal
depended on the position taken up by Russia on this
question.

During the last ten years which preceded the Balkan
War, our relations with Rumania had begun to change—
although in a way as yet imperceptible to the public at
large and to the Press—and to show steady improve-
ment.

Since the year 1890, the post of Rumanian Minister
to St. Petersburg had been held by M. Rosetti-Solesco
who, while still Secretary to the Legation, had married
the daughter of our former Foreign Secretary, M. N.
de Giers. Rosetti, an intelligent and energetic man
(although sometimes rather restless in his energy),
enjoyed the confidence and the protection of King
Charles, who had entrusted him with the task of im-
proving Russo-Rumanian relations as much as was
possible.

His wife, who was a Russian, did all in her power to
support her husband in this, and made great use of her
large circle of relations and friends. But this was not
all: in 1902 Madame Rosetti’s brother, M. Michel de
Giers (Ambassador to Constantinople since 1912 and at
the moment in Rome), was appointed Russian Minister
to Bukharest. During ten consecutive years the work
of M. de Giers—work which was persevering, silent and
earnest—was directed to the same object: that of the
improvement of Russo-Rumanian relations. Michel de
Giers, who throughout his career remained imbued with
feelings of absolute devotion to the person of the
Monarch (he had inherited these feelings from his
father), in return justly possessed the special goodwill
and confidence of Nicolas I]. Under these conditions

150 THE*BALKAN WAR to12 [CHAP. X.

it is not surprising that the opinions of our Minister in
Rumania were often adopted and towards the end of his
stay in Bukharest he could prove with legitimate satis-
faction that he had not laboured in vain.

At the beginning of 1912 M. Michel de Giers was
given the exalted post of Russian Ambassador to Con-
stantinople, and was succeeded in Bukharest bya young
and brilliant diplomat, M. Nicolas Schebeko. Schebeko,
who belonged to the most influential aristocratic circles
of St. Petersburg, had begun life in a regiment of
Guards, and then, entering the diplomatic service, had
been appointed Secretary to the Embasy in Vienna,
where Prince Lobanoff was then Ambassador. Un-
doubtedly gifted and possessing moreover the advantage
of very firm convictions, Schebeko, after a few years in
the diplomatic service spent in the capitals of Western
Europe, was appointed Counsellor to the Embasy in
Berlin, where our venerable and respected Ambassador,
Count Osten-Sacken, was now ending his career and his
days. The young Counsellor often had to replace his
chief for months at a time, and this gave him an
opportunity of proving his real capabilities. The
appointment of M. Schebeko to Bukharest, and more
especially the fact that he had accepted this appointment,
proved that St. Petersburg set a price on good relations
with Rumania and the Rumanian Court. The matri-
monial schemes of which Sazonoff had spoken to me had
evidently taken root in Rumania as well as in our country
and, in this case, no one could be of more use than
Schébéko and his charming wife as authorised and
discreet intermediaries between the two Courts.

The appointment of the new Russian Minister to
Rumania coincided, it is true, with a somewhat dis-
agreeable incident from the diplomatic point of view—
the commemoration of the Treaty of Bukharest of 1812
and of the annexation of Bessarabia. Amongst us, this
jubilee was only an occasion for a few local ceremonies
of an administrative character and for a few articles
in the newspapers. But in Rumania there were some

1913] ANNEXATION OF BESSARABIA, 1812. 151

fairly important patriotic demonstrations and _ the
Rumanian Press sounded its loudest trumpets to pro-
test against Russian spoliation which had deprived
Rumania of one of her most beautiful integral parts!
All this, to be sure, was rather far-fetched; in 1812
there was as yet no “Rumania,” but only “ Danubian
Principalities,” abominably governed, exploited and
often invaded by the Turks, and where the earlier
medieval patriotism had given place to complete
atrophy and demoralisation. In a word, the inhabitants
of the part of Moldavia annexed by Russia were con-
gratulating themselves very heartily on this change of
thraldom: the Russia of the beginning of the nine-
teenth century seemed to these poor people a real
paradise of political liberty, in comparison with the
yoke and despotism they had borne up till then. More-
over Alexander I., with his usual coquetry towards
every xew arrival, had heaped privileges on the annexed
Bessarabia: exemption from several taxes, complete
exemption from military service, nobility-rights, titles
in profusion and high official posts given to the govern-
ing classes of the country, etc., with the result that a
few short years had sufficed to make Bessarabia into
one of the Russian provinces which was the most
faithful and the most devoted to the Imperial auto-
cracy. The Rumanian chauvinist Press, of course,
ignored all these details. For their ends it was neces-
sary to describe this taking possession—accomplished
so peacefully and almost imperceptibly on the spot, as
every one was so accustomed to seeing the Russians
occupying the country—as a kind of Mongolian in-
vasion, or as the conquest of Gaul by the Franks or
(as we should say now) the Boche occupation of
Belgium.

Fortunately these demonstrations in no way affected
our relations with Rumania. Our Government and
particularly our Foreign Office pretended not to notice
all this fuss, knowing perfectly well that it was not
serious, and that after these chauvinist fireworks we

152 THE BALKAN WAR, to12 [CHAP. X.

could resume the cultivation of good and even intimate
relations between the two countries.

The new Russian Minister wrote and acted on these
lines, and was successful. During this same year,
H.I.M. the Emperor sent the Grand Duke Nicolas
Mikhailovitch (brother officer and intimate friend of
M. Schebeko’s) to King Charles of Rumania to present
to him the da/on of Russian Field-Marshal. The old
King was much flattered by this high distinction, which
carried him back to the glorious days when he was in
command at the siege of Plevna and made the celebrated
Osman Pasha prisoner.

This whole episode proves that in our country we
were quite capable of smoothing away. difficulties and
avoiding causes for discord based on exaggerated
nationalism, when we wished to. When we did not do so,
it was because we did not care to.

At the beginning of 1913, when the Rumanian claims
with regard to Bulgaria were taking shape, M. Sazonoff
thought it opportune not to contest fundamentally
the Rumanian point of view, but, on the contrary, to
support it up to a point, and then, taking the question
into our own hands, to solve it in a way which, while not
wronging Bulgaria too much, would procure some
compensations for Rumania. Consequently, I received
instructions to obtain the Bulgarians’ consent to the
action which the Rumanians were bringing against
them being examined in St. Petersburg by the Ambas-
sadors of the Powers, presided over by M. Sazonoff.
This was no easy task for me; the Bulgarians not
unreasonably retorted that no litigation existed between
them and the Rumanians; that Rumania, merely profit-
ing by the fact that the whole Bulgarian Army was in
Thrace, was claiming without any justification the
cession of a portion of the Bulgarian territory. Gueshov
alleged among other reasons the constitutional impos-
sibility for the Government—without the authorisation
of the Chamber, which was not sitting at the time—to

1913] RUSSIAN ARBITRATION ACCEPTED 153

enter into negotiations which might end in the meta-
morphosis of a portion,even though a minute one, of
the Bulgarian population into subjects of another State,
and that, moreover, without any wish on their part.

“One of the regiments which has distinguished
itself most in the present campaign,” said Gueshov to
me, “is the regiment of Silistria, composed of citizens
of that town and its environs. How could we suddenly
say to the soldiers of this regiment, which is before
Chataldja: ‘You are no longer Bulgarians, you are
Rumanians!’” Truly an unanswerable argument.

However, I employed my best efforts and all means
of persuasion to accomplish the object proposed by our
Foreign Office, and at the crucial moment when the
question was to be settled by a Council of Ministers
presided over by the King, I wrote Gueshov a letter
which he could and should show to His Majesty, and to
his colleagues, in which—in the name of the higher
interests of Bulgaria—I insisted on the necessity for
her to accept the Russian proposition and to refer the
question to the judgment of aconference of Ambassadors
in St. Petersburg. My arguments finally prevailed; the
Bulgarians bowed to our advice, and after a few sittings,
the conference, presided over by M. Sazonoff, announced
the result of the arbitration: Rumania was to receive
the town of Silistria and some territories along the
frontier, but these latter were so insignificant that as a
matter of fact they were not worth the trouble taken by
Rumania in raising this whole question. The two sides
accepted the award, but Rumania resolved im petto to
raise her claims afresh with regard to Bulgaria at the first
favourable opportunity. From this moment the Ru-
manian Government sought to draw closer to Belgrade
and Athens, estimating very judiciously that the
“allies” would end in coming to blows, and that then
Rumania would have the chance of obtaining from
Bulgaria far more substantial concessions than those
which had just been awarded to her.

CHAPTER XI
QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES

On the 12th (25th) March, M. Gueshov telephoned to me
in the morning to say that the attack on Adrianople
had begun, and that the Bulgarians had taken all the
advanced positions on the eastern side of the place. At
noon I heard that the operations had been successful,
and that the Bulgarians were already occupying several
of the principal forts. And at four o'clock, the beautiful
big Russian bells, which had been put up a few days
before in the belfry of the cathedral which was being
built—the cathedral of St. Alexander Nevsky—began
their deep and solemn pealing to announce the great
victory to the inhabitants of Sofia. The last rampart
of Ottoman domination in Thrace had fallen: the
Bulgarian and Serbian troops, who had vied with one
another in courage and self-sacrifice, had taken this
formidable fortified place by assault, thereby displaying
to the whole world what Slav patriotism was capable
of. From that moment one could consider the war
with the Turks to be ended, to the complete advantage
of our Slav kinsman and our Greek co-religionists.

Although latterly I had been a sorrowful spectator
of the rivalries and of the hostility which divided these
same kinsmen and co-religionists, yet I could not
repress a deep and joyful emotion when [| heard the
symbolic pealing of the Russian bells in honour of
the Slav victory. Likewise in Russia the taking of
Adrianople produced a profound impression. The
Duma was the scene of a great ovation in honour of
the Bulgarian hero, Radko-Dmitriev, who was in St.
Petersburg at the time.

The taking of Adrianople virtually concluded

154

1913] CAPTURE OF ADRIANOPLE 155

hostilities. For five weeks more the definite winding-
up of the war was discussed in London—with the help
once more of delegates of the belligerents—but an
armistice was soon concluded, and one foresaw clearly
that military operations would not begin again.
Henceforth the relations of the Allies with Turkey
took a secondary place, while the interest of the
moment was centred on the relations of the Allies
amongst themselves.

The capture of the powerful defences of Adrianople
will remain for ever one of the most glorious pages in
the military annals of Bulgaria. Just as they had done
throughout the war, the Bulgarians distinguished them-
selves by their courage, their sang-froid, and their will
to win at all costs. Unfortunately, side by side with
these admirable traits of the Bulgarian character, the
taking of Adrianople revealed some very ugly ones.

The Bulgarians generally appeared to deny any
Serbian participation in the taking of Adrianople,
whereas the Serbians had not only helped them with
their big guns, but had also finally carried the place by
a brilliant sally. If Ferdinand had had any true political
perception, he would have used all his efforts to clear
up these mutual misunderstandings. He should have
come to Adrianople, reviewed the Serbian and Bul-
garian troops collectively, have made a cordial speech
to the Serbian officers, have mentioned in dispatches
to both armies the courage of the Serbians, and the
enormous services they had rendered their allies, and
\a great many things would thus have been smoothed
over and forgotten. But Ferdinand was not con-
templating anything of the kind. He was preparing to
come from Sofia to Adrianople to make his triumphal
entry into the conquered town, leaving the Serbians
completely out of this exclusively Bulgarian festivity.
The festivity never took place: cholera having broken
out at Adrianople, Ferdinand—who is afraid of many
things, but particularly of all epidemics and infection—

156 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES [cu. x1

countermanded the triumphal entry into Adrianople,
and postponed it sie die. It was the Turks who
entered it four months later!

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians displayed another trait
of their national character in Adrianople—cold and
relentless cruelty. Forty thousand Turkish prisoners
had been put in a camp on an island, which is formed
by the two arms of the Maritza below the town; they
were to be taken from there into the interior of the
country. But when cholera broke out, the removal
was postponed. Huddled together in an almost in-
credible way on the island, which was encircled with
a network of barbed wire, and within range of the guns
on the other side of the river, the wretched Turks had
soon eaten all the bread they had with them, and began
to suffer from hunger. It should be mentioned that,
prior to the surrender of the town, the Turks had had
time to set fire to fairly large quantities of flour and
grain, which were still in the town} and the Bulgarian
military authorities, who bore a grudge against the
Turks for this destruction, could find no better means
of revenge than that of refusing, with heartless cruelty,
to supply provisions to the unhappy prisoners of war.
“But what can we do?” replied the Bulgarians to
those who came to plead the cause of these miserable
wretches, ‘‘it is the fault of the Turks. Why did they
set fire to their grain stores? Now we have nothing
to give them to eat.” And for eight or ten days one
heard the plaintive cries of thousands of famished men
coming from the prisoners’ camp on the island. To
keep body and soul together these poor wretches
gnawed the bark of the trees, and drank the water from
the river. As was to be expected, in a few days cholera
was raging among the prisoners, and the dead and the
dying lay next to those who were still immune. Finally,
rumours about this abominable behaviour with regard
to the Turkish prisoners of war reached Sofia, and from
there got through to Europe, and the Bulgarians were
forced to remove the poor wretches; but during the

1913] BULGARIAN CRUELTY 157

removal they were so inhumanly treated that more
than half of them died of cholera and of other diseases.

Yes, the Bulgarian is coldly cruel! All the same,
one must not see in this cruelty an inborn trait of the
Bulgarian character. It is the product of the whole
history of this unhappy people. One must not forget
that throughout the five centuries of Turkish domination,
the Bulgarian nation formed a human agglomeration
deprived of all representation of the people, and of all
governing classes.

The Serbians subjected to Turkey had their own
national clergy and their convents. On the other side
of the frontier they had brothers who were not subject
to the Turks, and centres of Serbian culture, such
as the towns on the coast of Dalmatia, and later
on Karlovtzy, Novy-Sad, and the monasteries of
the “Fruschka-Gora,” in the land of the Serbian
“Granitchars” of Austria.

The Greeks possessed a powerful spiritual hierarchy
extending over the whole Ottoman Empire, with the
Universal Patriarch at its head, who continued to reside
in Constantinople. The numerous and cultivated class
of the families of the archons shared with the clergy the
influence, not only over their kinsmen, but also over
the Turkish authorities.

In the provinces in normal times, Turks and
Albanians of distinction were often on a friendly footing
with Greek notabilities. The £mezes (heads of villages)
and kmefs (mayors of Serbian small towns) kept com-
pany and drank their “tzrno vino” with the local
Mussulmans, Serbians like them by birth and language,
but converts to Islamism. Up to to-day, the Serbian
Mussulmans remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina are
proud of their extraction and still speak the purest
Serbian. ‘So you also are a leaf out of our forest,” I
heard an old Bosnian Mussulman say to a young
Serbian to whom I was introducing him.

The Bulgarian people have existed for five centuries

18 QUARRELS! BETWEEN THE ALLIES {cu xr

without any moral or intellectual support; their
bojars (the nobility) were swept away or converted to
Islamism, or reduced to fleeing to Rumania. The
national hierarchy was abolished. All the higher clergy
had become Greek, and the Greeks, who from time
immemorial had had an organic hereditary hatred for
the Bulgarians, now literally trod them underfoot.
For centuries the Bulgarian pope was a being deprived
of all rights, completely unpolished, often illiterate,
whose business it was to extract pence from the peasant
in payment for certain religious rites, and then to pass
almost all these pence on to his inexorable master—the
Greek bishop. "

However, some localities existed in which the Bul-
garian inhabitants, by virtue of certain economic
conditions or of certain traditions, enjoyed relative
comfort and seemed to possess some rights. For
instance, in Southern Bulgaria there was a whole
district of which the male population from father
to son was employed in Constantinople and at
the Padishah’s Court as syces (grooms). Naturally
these people could save money, and having powerful
protectors among the domestics of the Palace, could
keep this money, which enabled them to live in comfort
at home. There were also a few villages and small
towns in the mountain, far removed from the Turks
and where local conditions favoured the development
of some small lucrative industry: these spots formed
oases in which up to a certain date the ancient
Christian and Slav culture was preserved. Such were
the districts of Gabrova, Elena, Karlovo, where the
native type is even now finer and purer than in the
rest of the country. If it had not been for these happy
and rare exceptions, the name even of the Bulgarian
people would have been lost in the course of the
centuries, for all the rest of the country showed such
an utter lack of culture, such degrading slavery, that it
is wonderful that even the consciousness of nationality
could exist there.

1913] STATE OF THE BULGARIANS 159

Thus amongst an enormous majority of the nation
there was no conscious religious feeling, no civilisation,
a complete absence of rights, and to all money was the
sole means of procuring a semblance of a decent exist-
ence; add to this, stubbornness and a certain strain
of materialism which had filtered into the blood of
the Slav population of the country with the blood of
the former Ugro-Finnish conquerors—the Bulgarians,
properly so-called—and no one can wonder that in the
modern Bulgarian soul there is hardly any room for
finer feelings and ideal aspirations.

During my first stay in Bulgaria at the outset of
~my diplomatic career, | had had an opportunity of see-
ing avery interesting document: the letter which the
Emperor Alexander II. had written to his nephew by
marriage, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, when the
latter was elected the first Prince of Bulgaria at the
Tsar's wish. This letter, very perfect on the whole,
concluded with touching and profoundly true words,
which ran something like this :—

“But above all things, my dear nephew, never forget
in your relations with your new people the complete
slavery in which they have lived for centuries. Be
generous and indulgent towards the failings which are
the natural consequence of this slavery. Be patient
with your people and endeavour by kind deeds to raise
them to your level and to draw them nearer to you.”

Prince Alexander of Battenburg did not appear to
have been created for such a beautiful mission—but
still less was Ferdinand of Coburg. During the thirty-
five years that Bulgaria had existed much had been
done to give her a surface polish, and to provide her
with modern State machinery, but nothing was done
for the souls of the people, to soften their natural
dispositions and their manners. On the contrary,
national fanaticism was encouraged and stimulated as a
virtue. And as no people can exist without religion
and without ideals, the Bulgarians in place of religion
had their national policy, and as supreme moral ideal

160 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES fcu. x1.

the work of the “Great Bulgaria”; the creed of this
religion was “the Bulgaria of San-Stefano.”

The roughness of the Bulgarian manners and the
absence of all humanitarian feeling among them became
strikingly apparent during the Balkan War. I do not
mean the cruelties inflicted on the Mussulman popula-
tion wherever the Bulgarian armies penetrated. These
cruelties, practised in cold blood and as “lawful ven-
geance,” were fortunately tempered by a certain fear
of the public opinion of Europe. But even for their
own people the Bulgarians demanded no mercy, no
pity. In no other army in the world is the work of
tending the wounded so neglected as it is in the
Bulgarian Army. Thousands of soldiers fell wounded
on the battlefield and lay there, without any one paying
any attention to them ; to pick them up during the fight
was considered a crime; but even when the battle was
over there was not much time to devote to them. The
wounded dragged themselves as best they could to the
ambulances near the front, where the Bulgarian military
surgeons hacked at them with the coolness of a butcher
or hurriedly bound up their wounds with dirty cloths,
and then sent them in buffalo waggons to the hospitals
in the rear. And these poor wretches never thought of
complaining of such treatment; according to their own
ideas a soldier, wounded and unfit to fight, is only a
burden to the Army and to his country; so that nothing
more need be done for him; much has already been
done when his wound has been bound up, and he has
been put on a waggon!

It was only when a Bulgarian wounded soldier had
the luck to get to a foreign hospital, especially a Russian
one, where he became the object of the refined and
tender care of the sisters and doctors, that the poor
wretch began to discover and understand a new world
of human solidarity and of Christian love, hitherto
completely sealed to him. “Yes, now we under-
stand what pity is, what charity is!” These were
the touching words that I often heard from the

1913] MY SUGGESTED COMPROMISE 161

lips of the wounded who were being nursed in our
hospitals.

Woe to the sovereigns! woe to the statesmen! who
have not understood that a people cannot live exclu-
sively for their material welfare and the aims of their
national policy unless at the same time their hearts are
opened to other feelings, more especially to those of
justice and of human solidarity !

I address these words to the Palace of Sofia, but
with the humble prayer to pass them on to German
Headquarters ! 3

As I said above, with the taking of Adrianople all
interest .was centred on the relations between the
Allies, and in the first place on the relations between
Bulgarians and Serbians. When in November, 1912,
the result of the war become fairly apparent and
negotiations between the Allies and Turkey were
already in sight, I twice submitted a project to our
Foreign Secretary which, in my opinion, might facili-
tate and accelerate the conclusion of peace and prevent
a clash of interests between the Allies, a clash that I
dreaded from that moment. ‘This project consisted in
the creation of a Macedonia which was to be completely
autonomous but of restricted dimensions, for it was
only to include just those districts which might be
disputed between the competitors. The remainder of
the territories conquered from the Turks would be
easily divided by the Allies. I foresaw at the same
time the creation of an autonomous Albania of which
the limits would be fixed by an agreement between
the Great Powers.

I realised perfectly that such a compromise would
in no way offer the definite solution of the Balkan ques-
tion; but in the first place I have never been able to
understand why one was to ask of the present genera-
tion the solution of a// the most difficult questions ; and
then I feared above all things that events would drag

' These lines were written in June, 1918.

162 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES {cu. x1.

on too long and would lead to acute differences
between the groups of European Powers. My idea,
however, was rejected without appeal: for our Foreign
Office, the temptation to have done once for all with
the Macedonian question, which had bored the whole
world to distraction, was far too great.

When military operations had begun again, and
especially after the fall of Adrianople, it would doubt-
less have been still more difficult to bring forward the
proposition of an autonomous Macedonia. But if this
combination could nevertheless have been accepted
and realised, we should have avoided the sad spectacle
of the fratricidal war of 1913; and Bulgaria certainly
would have been less accessible to Austro-German
intrigues. Unfortunately our Foreign Office would not
even go into these considerations; there optimism
reigned supreme under the influence of the victories of
the Slavs and Greeks; it already foresaw the failure of
German policy on the Bosphorus, the question of the
East reduced to that of the Straits, and all this without
any sacrifice on our part! How could one be anything
but joyful ?

About two months later a very distinct threat of a
clash between the Allies was apparent in the Balkans.
But everyone was still optimistic. At first a word from
Russia appeared to St. Petersburg to be sufficient to
obtain the necessary concessions from the Bulgarians ;
if they refused to listen to our kind advice, they would
have all the other Balkan States against them; and
then instead of a very precarious alliance between
Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, we should have to deal
with the far closer league between Rumania, Greece,
Serbia (with Montenegro), a league which would be
obliged to seek Russian direction and to listen to our
advice.

This idea of a Balkan alliance with an anti-Bulgarian
foundation certainly did not emanate from M. Sazonoff.
who was unaware of it at the beginning. It was
M. Hartwig who, in his sincere indignation against the

1913] THE SERBO-GREEK ALLIANCE 163

Bulgarian proceedings, made himself the initiator and
the champion of this new political combination. He
quickly found a sympathetic echo from our represen-
tative to Bukharest, to whose interest it was that our
good relations with Rumania—which he made his
own—should redouble in weight in the scales of our
policy. The Russian Minister to Athens naturally
followed his two colleagues; and as to the Foreign
Office—M. Hartwig took charge of that: his ascendency
over the friends he had left there—over those who
formerly, in the Asiatic Department, were “the shadow
of his shadow ”’—sufficed to alter completely the course
that M. Sazonoff had adopted at the outset of his term
of office. It is true that the Bulgarians and their august
master, on their side, contributed powerfully to this,
the former by their proverbial obstinacy, the latter by
his breach of faith.

Hartwig’s influence—exercised through the channel
of his friends and admirers at the Foreign Office—made
itself felt in Balkan affairs beyond the period of which
I speak. It only ceased at his sudden death, which
occurred only three weeks before the general conflagra-
tion of 1914. He was a true and faithful friend of the
Serbians; he was just as sincere and ardent a Russian
patriot ; he displayed in the service of Russian politics
and of the Slav cause, an intelligence above the average,
much learning and unremitting work ; but his vehement
and domineering character, his intolerance of any
opinion differing even slightly from his own, prevented
him from forming an equitable judgment on men and
matters, and from seeing the terrible dangers accumu-
lating on the horizon.

But let us return to the spring of 1913. Serbia and
Greece ended by concluding a formal alliance, directed
against the encroachments of Bulgaria; Montenegro
also acceded to this alliance; and Belgrade, like Athens,
conferred actively on the subject with Bukharest.

I was not at all surprised to receive, towards the
end of April, a voluminous telegram from the Foreign

M

1644 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES [cn. x1

Office ordering me to urge the Bulgarian Government to
make some concessions to the Serbians with respect
to the demarcation of Macedonia. All the arguments
used by the Foreign Office were cleverly constructed
and admirably expressed; but alas! I had good reason
to foresee that they would not produce the desired
effect, and that the actual fact of our taking this step
would cause a formidable outcry from Bulgarian public
opinion. It was perfectly well known to the public in
Sofia that our representatives in Belgrade, Athens and
Bukharest shared the prejudices of the countries to
which they were accredited against Bulgaria, and in
consequence were quite ready to lend their support to
all the Serbian and Greek claims in Macedonia and also
to those put forward by the Rumanians with regard to
the Dobrudja. From that moment the partition of Mace-
donia became for the Bulgarians not only a cause of
dispute with the Greeks and the Serbians, but it also
involved them in a struggle with a current in Russian
diplomacy at the head of which, according to Sofia, was
M. Hartwig, our Minister in Belgrade.

The Bulgarians were certainly mistaken in attributing
such exaggerated importance to the opinions and the
activities of my colleague of Belgrade. Hartwig’s in-
fluence was due to the fact that he was in Serbia at the
time and expressed the Serbian point of view in his
dispatches to St. Petersburg. Now, throughout the
course of these last Balkan events, the behaviour of
the Serbians with regard to Russia was marked by
perfect sincerity and deferential confidence in our advice.
Unfortunately one could not say the same of the Bul-
garians. King Ferdinand’s behaviour—as I said above—
was such as to inspire us with well-founded suspicions ;
and even the actions of the celebrated “ Russophile”
Danev.aroused justifiable displeasure amongst us and
amongst our allies.

When the situation became still more acute, that is
towards the end of May, 1913, the whole of Russian
public opinion had veered round to the Serbian side,

1913] MADAME KARAVELOV 165

with the sole exception of M. P. N. Miliukoff, who up-
held my point of view that a treaty is a treaty and that
the Serbians would be better advised to desist from
their new claims in Macedonia than to provoke senti-
ments of hatred in the Bulgarians by which all the
enemies of the Slav cause would immediately profit.

It was easy to write from St. Petersburg: “Try to
persuade the Bulgarians of the necessity to yield and to
make concessions to the Serbians,” but it was difficult
to do it on the spot!

I remember a scene I witnested in the large Bul-
garian military hospital which had been set up during
the war in the huge building of the Military School
of Sofia. From the beginning the head of this hos-
pital was Madame Karavelov, widow of the celebrated
Petko Karavelov; on the death of her husband she
had remained the recognised leader of the Radical
party, M. Malinov only taking a second place. In the
early eighties I had been well acquainted with both
M. Karavelov and his wife, who was young, beautiful,
and intelligent. Both of them Russian students, both
fiery enthusiasts for liberty, they gave one the impression
of having come to life out of the pages of Turgeneff’s
celebrated novel, “On the Eve.” Years had gone by
since then: Petko Karavelov having incurred the per-
secution of Stamboulov, was shut up in the “ Black
Mosque” of Sofia, underwent real tortures, and, his
health being completely ruined in this hell, died soon
after hisrelease. But his widow—guardian of the creed
of her martyred husband—had remained the same
enthusiast, the same political woman full of energy.
From our arrival in Sofia my wife and I had kept up
relations of mutual sympathy with Madame Karavelov.
But since the beginning of the war we only saw each
other at rare intervals; the reason being that this

1 The hero of this novel, the imaginary Bulgarian Insarov, has done
more to make the Bulgarian name and cause popular in Russia than all
his fellow-countrymen who really existed and who one met at this period
in our country ; hadent sua fata libelli.

166 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES (cu. x1,

energetic woman was entirely absorbed in the manage-
ment of the work she had undertaken and into which
she was putting her whole heart; she never left the
enormous hospital, and we often wondered whence she
drew the physical strength to bear all this unceasing
work.

Towards the middle of May an old acquaintance of
mine, Mademoiselle Pauline Milutin,) arrived in Sofia.
Always interested in politics and in good works,
Mademoiselle Milutin expressed the wish to make the
acquaintance of Madame Karavelov, and in order to
fulfil this wish I gladly escorted her to the large hospital
in the Military School.

Madame Karavelov received us amongst her invalids,
of which at this time the number had considerably
diminished. There were few seriously wounded, but on
the other hand many maimed men, who were finishing
their treatment and trying to get accustomed to doing
without the missing limbs: some were in bed, some
sitting up, and others hobbling about on crutches; and
in small, low invalid chairs some poor wretches with no
legs were helping themselves along with their hands
and appearing to take pleasure in this enforced sport.
We went through all the wards, and when we returned
to the visitors’ room, we began to talk politics; or
rather it was Mademoiselle Milutin who talked and I—
foreseeing what might occur—who only listened. My
companion began to try and convince Madame Karavelov
of the necessity of giving up Southern Macedonia to the
Serbians. It was interesting to see the emotion and
even the indignation with which Madame Karavelov
was seized when she understood what the speaker was
driving at.

“What? Give up Macedonia to the Serbians?
Macedonia which was given to us by the Treaty of San
Stefano? Macedonia which has been the goal of all our

1 Daughter of the Secretary of State, Nicolas Milutin, one of the best

known men at the grand epoch of the reforms of the Emperor
Alexander II.

1913] IN THE MILITARY: HOSPITAL 167

home and foreign policy for more than thirty-five years.
But that is impossible! Do you hear me, impossible!
Children, children,’ she called in Bulgarian to the
wounded who were lying in the ward, “listen to what
they say in Russia: that we ought to give up Macedonia
to the Serbians! Do you consent?” “No, no,” about
ten voices answered in chorus; the cripples hobbled
towards us ; the men in the invalid chairs crawled along,
all calling out: “No, never! It is not for that we shed
our blood!” Faces began to display emotion, eyes to
flash. .. . Seeing that the tumult was likely to increase,
I led the two ladies into the next room—which happened
to be the dispensary—and there I thought it my duty to
explain in a few words to Madame Karavelov the true
state of affairs. She calmed down a little, and appeared
to understand up to a point that our advice was well-
founded and not directed against the real interests of
Bulgaria.

“Now you can see whether it is easy to convince
Bulgarians ?” I said to Mademoiselle Milutin when we
were walking from the hospital to the Legation.

“Yes,” she replied, “it is not easy! But how in-
teresting all this is; I shall certainly tell Sazonoff all
I have seen and heard when I return to St. Petersburg.”
(Mademoiselle Milutin had become very intimate with
M. Sazonoff during the years when they were both in
Rome.)

“Oh yes! tell him, do tell him, that always does
good!” I replied; “but do not be too much impressed
by the scene you have just witnessed. Amica Kara-
velov, sed magis amica veritas. Besides, if justice is not
entirely on the side of the Serbians, it is yet imperative
in the interests of truth that we should recognise and
reward in some way their perfectly correct attitude
to us. My sole fear is that they will do themselves
immense harm some day by setting the Bulgarians
literally against them.”

Towards the middle of May, as every one had been

168 QUAKRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES: [ea ar

expecting for some time, a serious collision between
Bulgarians and Greeks occurred in the southern theatre
of military operations.

The Bulgarians declared that the Euzones (Greek
territorials) had attacked some Bulgarian garrisons;
the Greeks swore by all the gods of Olympus that the
initiative of the attack came from the Bulgarians. How-
ever that may have been, the collision assumed the
proportions of a real battle, during which the Bulga-
rians—as they asserted and firmly believed themselves
—routed an allied force ten times larger than their own.
This account, extremely exaggerated if not completely
untrue, had disastrous consequences a few weeks later
for the Bulgarians themselves: when war broke out
between the former Allies the Bulgarian Cormmander-
in-Chief, General Savov, only left a very small force to
oppose the Greeks, convinced that it would be sufficient
to bar the way to the entire Greek Army. But the
Greeks, superior in numbers and equipment, and ani-
mated by their historic hatred of the Bulgarians, beat
them completely at the first decisive encounters and
obliged them to retreat across the mountains, leaving
their guns and ammunition behind.

But let us return to the “inter-allied” collision of
the month of May. A few days after it had taken place,
the Emperor of Russia went to Berlin to be present
at the marriage of William II.’s daughter with the Duke
of Cumberland (afterwards Grand Duke of Brunswick).
King Constantine profited by this meeting of his two
powerful relations to submit the Bulgarian aggression
to their judgment, and to beg them to put an end to
these very regrettable and dangerous incidents. Fol-
lowing these complaints from the King of Greece, my
German colleague and I received identical instructions
from Berlin to transmit immediately to King Ferdinand
the warnings and most solemn advice of both Emperors.

I must confess that it was not without a distinct
feeling of pleasure that I insisted on having an audience
of the King, who since the beginning of the war had

1913] PEACE SIGNED IN LONDON 169

so persistently avoided all opportunities of conversing
with the Russian Minister. This time the King was
forced to comply, and against all expectations received
me with a great deal of friendliness. I told him of the
communication [ had received from my august Master,
but I avoided anything that might have wounded his
pride; I availed myself also of this opportunity to
touch on the question of the relations between Bul-
garians and Serbians. On this Ferdinand complained
bitterly that the Serbians had already concluded a formal
agreement with the Greeks which was directed against
Bulgaria—which was to a certain extent true. In answer
to that, and without entering into an examination of the
Serbian and Greek claims, I revealed the fears I enter-
tained for Bulgaria herself occasioned by the tendencies
of some of her politicians, who persisted in an irre-
concilable line of conduct. I was alluding to certain
generals andto M. Danev. The King did not dispute
my point of view, but he did not acquiesce in it either.
At this time he could still see things from a wholesome
standpoint, and he dreaded a collision with his neigh-
bours; but as ever he did not wish to commit himself
in a clear and precise manner.

The month of April and half the month of May,
during which an armistice had put an end to hostilities
between Turkey and the Allies, were spent over con-
ferences and difficulties. At last, on the 2oth May, N.S. ,
a definite peace was signed in London. In Europe the
Turks were only to keep the hinterland of the Straits
up to the line Enos—Midia. It then remained to divide
between the Allies the territory conquered by them.
As I have already said, the Bulgarians had no troops
in the southern and western part of Macedonia, excep t
three thousand men that they had succeeded in getting
into Salonika. This town and district, the peninsula of
Chalcidice and a few other places east of this peninsula,
were occupied by the Greeks; the rest of Macedonia,
as far as the course of the Bregalnitza, was in the hands

170 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES [cu. x1.

of the Serbians. Hence in the competition that was
beginning the Serbians and the Greeks had on their
side the argument of actual possession: Beati possi-
dentes; as to the Bulgarians, there were only two
alternatives remaining to them—either to come to terms
with their competitors, or to take from them the dis-
puted territories by force.

I spent the whole of May in conferences with
M. Gueshov on one side and Spalaikovitch on the other.
Both sincerely wished to prevent the violent solution
of the dispute; Gueshov through a spirit of prudence
and moderation, Spalaikovitch mainly through devotion
to the cause of Slav solidarity. Our mutual efforts ended
in the arranging of an interview between M. Gueshov
and M. Pachitch, which took place on the 2nd June at
Tsaribrod (a frontier station between Pirot and Nish).
The two Presidents of the Councils spent a whole day
there conferring in a saloon carriage. Both men of
experience, wise and inspired by the best intentions,
they succeeded during this interview in establishing
the basis of a friendly solution; they decided to meet
again and to convene shortly a conference of the four
Prime Ministers of the allied countries. And if at this
conference they could not arrive at a complete under-
standing, the points under discussion were to be sub-
mitted to the arbitration of Russia, an arbitration which
had been provided for in the text of the Serbo-Bulgarian
treaty.

I remember vividly the enthusiastic frame of mind
in which Spalaikovitch returned from Tsaribrod.

“All is settled!” he exclaimed, clasping me in his
arms.

A few days before the interview at Tsaribrod, Spa-
laikovitch and I had busied ourselves with the question
of Russian arbitration. As I have just said, this arbi-
tration was mentioned in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty,
although neither the Russian Government nor its re-
presentatives in Belgrade and Sofia had taken the

ee
—— SSS =

1913] TSAR ‘OFFERS TO: ARBITRATE 171

initiative about this clause; it was well known in our
country, but we had not formally adhered to it. Con-
sequently it was necessary above all things to ask St.
Petersburg whether the Imperial Government would
consent to become the arbitrator of the Serbo-Bulgarian
litigation if the case arose. But Spalaikovitch and I
went further: I sent M. Sazonoff a telegram! which we
composed together, and in which I suggested to our
Government that it should itself propose to arbitrate,
and not propose this only to the Bulgarians and the
Serbians, but also to the Greeks. I concluded my
telegram by expressing the opinion that such a step
taken by Russia would be the best means of preventing
a fratricidal war in the Balkans. For more than ten
days no answer to my suggestion came; then I received
from Moscow, where the Court was at the moment, the
telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to the Kings of
Bulgaria and Serbia which I was to transmit imme-
diately to King Ferdinand, and in which H.I.M. the
Emperor proposed to both sides that he should arbi-
trate. I was told later that this telegram of the
Emperor’s was not dispatched on the initiative of
M. Sazonoff, who, moreover, had already returned
to St. Petersburg, but on that of the Marshal of the
Nobility of Moscow, M. Alexander Samarine, who at
the moment was persona gratissima at the Court, and
who, as the representative of the best traditions of the
Russian nobility as of the Slavophile traditions of the
Samarine family, thought it incumbent on him to suggest
to his Sovereign that he should generously offer his
arbitration in order to prevent the scandal of a new
war between people of a common origin and Orthodox.
The Emperor at once approved of this idea, and the
telegram was sent off. That would show that my
telegram on which Spalaikovitch and I were building
so many hopes was not submitted to His Majesty at a
good moment, but was merely put away in the archives

1 If my memory does not deceive me, it was on the 15th (28th) May,
or the 16th (29th) May.

172 QUARRELS«BET WEEN THE ALLIES, [ens

of the Balkan section of our Foreign Office. It is a
matter for sincere regret, for the generous proposition
of the Emperor came a little too late: M. Gueshov was
already on the point of resigning, and pending the early
return of M. Danev the vacillating will of the King was
guided by M. Rizov, who had been sent for from Rome
on purpose. As soon as Danev returned Rizov took
him in hand also and bent him to his will, until the
catastrophe of July, 1913.

Of course, I transmitted His Majesty’s telegram to
the Palace the same day, and I also informed M.
Gueshov of its contents. He, however, did not evince
much pleasure, or any wish to impress on his colleagues
the enormous significance of the Emperor of Russia’s
generous step. The aged President of the Council,
who felt that the King wished to get rid of him at all
costs, and who perceived that his conference with
Pachitch was criticised even in the bosom of the
Council, was only awaiting Danev’s return from London
to hand in his resignation.

Hence, I was reduced to going to Todorov, and to
the King’s Secretary, Dobrovitch, to insist on an
immediate answer in the affirmative being sent to the
Emperor's telegram. Todorov at once realised the
gravity of the matter; Dobrovitch did not dare to
pronounce any private opinion, but I knew that he had
transmitted most accurately to the King all that I had
said to him. As regards the Bulgarian Foreign Office,
every one there was apparently waiting to know what
impression the telegram had made on the Serbians, and
how they would look on the Russian proposition.

As a matter of fact, the Emperor of Russia’s telegram
had produced dangerous friction in Belgrade. King
Peter hastened to answer the Emperor, in a manner as
respectful as it was cordial, that personally he could
only thank His Majesty for this fresh proof of his
solicitude with regard to Serbia and the Slav cause, but
that the constitution of the country did not allow him
to answer, with respect to the substance of the question,

1913| FERDINAND'S TELEGRAM 173

without the previous consent of the Skupchiina. If, as
was much to be hoped, the Skupchtina gave an
affirmative answer, then the Royal Government would
hasten to send its delegates to St. Petersburg. M.
Pachitch was convinced of the necessity of accepting
the Russian proposition immediately, and without any
discussion ; but amongst a section of the Skupchtina he
met with serious opposition, and days were spent in
discussions and negotiations with influential members
of this assembly, for, before submitting such a pro-
position to the Skupchtina, Pachitch wished to be
assured that it would pass without opposition.

At last, after two or three days spent in waiting and
in taking active steps, I received the Bulgarian answer
in the form of a draft of the King’s telegram to His
Majesty the Emperor. In it the Bulgarian point of
view on the Macedonian question was expressed, not
without dignity, and in a somewhat explicit manner.

I knew later that the King’s telegram, thus drawn
up, had aroused displeasure in St. Petersburg. In our
country every one was so accustomed, when addressing
the Monarch, to using a semi-biblical, semi-servile
language, taken from the litanies of the Church, that
a similar style was expected of the Slav and Orthodox
clientéle of the Great Empire and the “White Tsar”
when addressing him. I never could enter into this
style of thing, and so I found nothing to criticise in
King Ferdinand’s telegram, except perhaps its un-
necessary length. Hence, it was thus drawn up and
dispatched to St. Petersburg.

I was profoundly astonished when, a few months
later, and after the Bulgarian shipwreck, King Ferdinand
began to circulate the report that his telegram to the
Emperor had been suggested to him by me, with the
perfidious design of exciting the displeasure of the Tsar
and of Russian public opinion against the Bulgarians,
and against their King! This fantastic explanation was,
however, believed by the editorial staff of the Retch (the
organ of the juniors), and thus presented to the Russian

174 QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES [cu. x1.

public. I had missed the article in the Refch at the
time, and when I was told of it, it was too late to have
an explanation with M. Miliukoff, who, up till then,
had entirely shared my point of view on the subject of
Bulgarian affairs. Moreover, I did not see Miliukoff
after Sofia till about six months before our Revolution,
that is to say, at a time when one no longer had leisure
to think of past events or to talk about them.

The Emperor’s telegram to the King was soon
followed by instructions from M. Sazonoff as to the
way in which the generous proposal of our august
Master was to be carried out.

The Bulgarian and Serbian Governments were
invited to dispatch to St. Petersburg, with the least
possible delay, memoranda presenting their arguments
on the question; these memoranda would be carefully
studied by our Foreign Office, after which the Prime
Ministers of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece! were to
come to St. Petersburg; the respective Russian
Ministers were to accompany them. I transmitted
these conditions to M. Todorov, who at this moment
was acting ad interim for the Foreign Secretary. Two
or three days after he telephoned to beg me to come to
the Foreign Office to confer with him and a few other
people, who had just been at a conference convened at
the Palace, to discuss my last communication. - On
arriving at M. Todorov’s house, I found General Savov,
whom I had never met before, M. Rizov, and another
member of the Cabinet. These gentlemen told me that
it had been decided at the Palace to beg me to telegraph
to St. Petersburg that the King and the Bulgarian
Government gratefully accepted the programme of the
Russian arbitration, and were ready to dispatch their
delegates to our country, but that, on the other hand,
they wished to have an assurance that the award of the

' Greece had in the meantime expressed the desire to take part

in the Russian arbitration, and we consented to this without any
difficulty.

cara aly

1913] Sat ISPACTORY OUTLOOK 175

arbitration would be given not later than six days from
the opening of the conference; the explanation of this
strange demand being the continued arming of the
Serbians and Greeks, who were sending all their armies
into Macedonia, were erecting fortifications there—
which was true—and were profiting by each day that
passed to make the scales turn in their favour.

We spoke in Russian, which was the only foreign
language that General Savov understood and spoke
well. I replied, addressing the General in particular,
that I did not think it possible to pass on to St.
Petersburg what these gentlemen had just told me. In
our country such a condition would be considered to
be incompatible with our dignity. _ Moreover, as a
diplomat of some experience, I could not even imagine
a conference limited to a fixed date; but I could assure
those present that we on our side should expedite
matters, and should wish to arrive at a satisfactory
result with as little delay as possible. In conclusion,
I invited these gentlemen to assimilate thoroughly the
idea that it was Bulgaria and Serbia that needed our
arbitration, and that we were only undertaking it for
their good; hence it would be our place, if necessary,
to impose conditions, and to make our arbitration
depend on them. On this I took my leave. The
following day Todorov came to see me, and told me
that my answer had had the desired effect, and that in
all probability there would be no further question of a
time limit; concerning the journey of the Bulgarian
Prime Minister to St. Petersburg, all would depend on
the choice of the person entrusted with the formation
of the new Cabinet.

CHAPTER XII
BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES

M. Danev returned from London, having signed the
treaty of peace with Turkey only a few days after the
interview between Gueshov and Pachitch at Tsari-
brod, and the reception of the telegram from H.I.M.
the Emperor. Meanwhile I had a long interview with
M. Gueshovy, in the course of which I pressed him to
carry out as quickly as possible that which had been
agreed on between him and M. Pachitch.

“I understand perfectly,” replied he, “that no time
must be lost. But I do not know yet if M. Danev
agrees to our arrangement with Pachitch. Do not for-
get that the present Cabinet is a Coalition Cabinet, and
that I do not possess the right to make such an
important decision by myself.”

“ But if Danev does not agree with you I hope that
you will maintain your opinion all the same, and will
force him to give in.”

“No, Monsieur,” replied Gueshov; “I warn you
quite openly that I have already handed my resignation
to the King, and that I shall only withdraw it if Danev
comes round sincerely to my opinion. I am old and
I have worked enough for my country and my people.
I could not participate in decisions I disapproved of
and which might be fatal to Bulgaria.”

Two days after Danev arrived, at six o’clock in the
morning. By half-past seven I was at his house in
order to find him alone, and before he had come in
contact with all sorts of friends and ardent admirers
of his extreme and “essentially Bulgarian” policy.

Danev was somewhat disagreeably surprised at my
176

1913 | INGENUOUS CLAPTRAP 177

matutinal visit ; but not allowing that to perturb me in
the least, I outlined a sketch of the political situation
as I sawit, and of all the dangers which were threatening
Bulgaria; I expressed the earnest hope that Danev,
who always described himself as the friend and proved
admirer of Russia, would listen in this solemn hour to
our most benevolent advice and would above all
approve of the principles of the entente drawn up by
Gueshov and Pachitch.

Alas! I realised on the spot that I had to deal with
preconceived ideas and irreconcilable obstinacy!
Danev would not perceive the dangers that his country
was incurring. According to him nearly all the pleni-
potentiaries at the Conference of London were his
personal friends and sympathised with him. The
Rumanian Minister, M. Misu, the Turkish Plenipoten-
tiary, Osman-Nizami Pasha, and the representatives of
the Great Powers—all were supposed to have yielded
to the irrefutable arguments of Danev. True, the
Greek and Serbian Plenipotentiaries held opinions
diametrically opposed to his—but what did that
matter? I listened in blank astonishment to this more
than ingenuous claptrap. Through the dispatches
forwarded to me from the Foreign Office, and through
conversations I had held with my foreign colleagues,
I knew perfectly well that poor Danev had become
the béte noire of the whole Conference of London, and
that his obstinacy and presumption had made a very
unfavourable impression on the ambassadors of the
Entente with regard to Bulgarian policy. Concerning
the Rumanian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries, these
gentlemen could derive no advantage from reconciling
the Bulgarians with the Serbians and Greeks, and con-
sequently from contradicting their Bulgarian colleague.
I concluded my interview with Danev by warning him
that at the present moment he was assuming very heavy
responsibility towards his country and the whole Slav
cause, and that the day would dawn when he would
remember the conversation he had just had with me,

178 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cn. xn.

and when he would regret not having listened to my
earnest advice.

Two days later Gueshov’s resignation was accepted
by the King, and a short ministerial crisis set in.

I was convinced that the definite turn of events
depended on the solution of the ministerial crisis, by
which I mean as to whether an armed collision was to
take place between the Bulgarians and their former
allies, or whether the matter could be settled amicably.
The Bulgarian National Assembly was not sitting at
the moment, and besides, according to the laudable
custom of constitutional countries such as Bulgaria,
Greece, Rumania, no one dreamt under the circum-
stances of taking the opinion of the parliamentary
majority into consideration. The King could calmly
entrust any one he liked with the formation of the new
Cabinet, and the latter—in the event of the opposition
of the Chamber, or even without any opposition—could
just as calmly dissolve the Chamber and proceed to
fresh elections in the complete assurance that these
elections would yield a crushing Government majority.
Hence the choice of the new Ministers depended solely
on Ferdinand’s good pleasure.

From the day following Gueshov’s resignation the
report spread in Sofia that Malinov and the Radicals
had the best chance of returning to power. I expected
this, and some time before Gueshov’s resignation I had
had two or three interviews with Malinov, and we had
discussed the serious topic of the hour—that of the
Serbo-Bulgarian and Greco-Bulgarian demarcation.

At the beginning Malinov—just like Madame Kara-
velov, whom I was calling on again—gave vent to very
extreme opinions. But, having listened to all my argu-
ments, and further weighed all the dangers which
threatened Bulgaria from all sides if she absolutely
refused to make certain concessions, my two friends
came round to my opinion up to a point, and Malinov
promised me that if he came into power he would

1913] M. DANEV’S MISTAKES 179

make the party pay the greatest attention to the
advice of Russia and her representative. On the actual
day of Gueshov’s resignation, I went again to see
Malinov, revealed the situation as it had developed in
the past few days, told him about my recent conversa-
tions with Gueshov and Danev, and expressed the hope
that he himself, if he did come into power, would begin
by approving of the Tsaribrod arrangement and would
hasten his own departure for St. Petersburg as much as
possible. Malinov, who at the moment was summoned
to the Palace by the King, reiterated his promise to
influence his friends in favour of an immediate and
reasonable decision.

Unfortunately the formation of a Radical Government
came to nothing. After two days of evasions and pro-
crastinations the King—under whose influence is not
quite clear, but most probably under that of Rizov, who
was very much agitated at this time and continually
engaged in conversation with the Austrian Minister—
decided to entrust the formation of the Cabinet to M.
Danev, in other words to leave the former Government
in power, but excluding Gueshov and two or three
of his political friends. But the King persuaded M.
Todorov to remain in the Cabinet, as well as his brother-
in-law, M. Madjarov. In this way the Government's
link with the “ Narodniak” party—the Conservatives of
the former Eastern Rumelia—was not severed; and in
the person of M. Todorov I was assured of a sincere
advocate, imbued with my ideas, in the bosom of the
Council.

But the direction of affairs of foreign policy belonged
more especially to M. Danev, and I| noticed with in-
creasing anxiety that he, becoming daily more influenced
by Rizov and the military, was heaping mistake on
mistake and multiplying his tactless deeds, till his
patriotic petulance seemed bound to bring Bulgaria to
grief.

I have a very vivid recollection of one of my con-
versations with Danev during the first days of his

N

180. BULGARIA. ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cr xe

presidency. When I was laying stress on the dangers
of acollision between the former allies, Danev, with a
sceptical smile, expressed his conviction that Serbia
and Greece would never dare to attack Bulgaria or to
force her to go to war, because the Greek Army was
practically non-existent and the Serbians were infinitely
less strong than the Bulgarians. ‘ But you are forget-
ting Rumania,” I remarked, “and her claims to fresh
territorial acquisitions in the Dobrudja—claims which
are becoming more clearly outlined and more persis-
tent every day.” ‘From the side of Rumania, I see
no danger,” replied Danev sharply; “you know how
intimate I have been with M. Misu;1 and we have
drawn even nearer to one another in London, and from
the interviews that I have had with him I have acquired
the firm conviction that Rumania has not entered and
will not enter into any combination with Serbia and
Greece which would be directed against us. What |
am telling you is a fact. I have seen it in black and
white.”

It was quite true that at that period Rumania was
still avoiding the conclusion of a formal agreement with
Serbia and Greece; but that did not in the least mean
that Rumania would not present her claims to Bulgaria
on the day when war would be declared between the
former allies.

“And what are you doing about Turkey?” I
exclaimed. “ Do you really believe that Turkey, in the
event of a collision between her late conquerors, would
not endeavour to take back Adrianople and the whole of
Thrace from you?”

“On that subject I feel absolutely easy,” replied
Danev, and he centinued in a confidential tone: “I
became very intimate in London with the second
Turkish Plenipotentiary, Osman-Nizami Pasha.2 We
are corresponding at the moment, and quite lately I

1 Formerely Rumanian diplomatic agent in Sofia; at the moment
Rumanian Minister to London.

* At that time Turkish Ambassador to Berlin,

1913] WARLIKE PREPARATIONS 181

received a letter from him in which he assures me most
explicitly that in Turkey no one is even thinking of the
possibility of a fresh war; that every one is only con-
cerned with one thing—tending the wounds inflicted on
the Ottoman Empire by the disastrous campaign of last
year.”

“ But do tell your Osman-Nizami Pasha in answer,”
I exclaimed, using the expression so common in the
East, “that he is the father of les! If he writes these
kind of things to you, it is solely in order to lull your
vigilance and to encourage you to a collision by which
the Turks would most certainly profit!”

Danev merely tossed his head and his face assumed

an eminently Bulgarian expression of obstinate in-
credulity.

As I said above, King Ferdinand in his telegraphic
answer to the Emperor had in principle accepted the
Russian arbitration, and the Bulgarian Government had
sent its justificatory memorandum to our Foreign Office.
But it was still imperative to carry out the arbitration,
that is to say to make the Bulgarians and Serbians send
their plenipotentiaries in the persons of their two
Prime Ministers to St. Petersburg as soon as possible.
The situation in Bulgaria was becoming daily more
threatening. The troops of the three occupiers of the
country were concentrated at certain points, fortifications
were hurriedly erected in the open country. The former
allies took up their positions opposite each other, pro-
tecting themselves by outposts. To be quite impartial
I must mention that the Serbians were preparing for
the eventual collision far more seriously than the Bul-
garians; they covered the position of ‘ Ovtché-Polié”
with concrete fortifications and they maintained their
Army at full strength, whereas the Bulgarians released
certain classes in turn so that these could return to
agricultural labour. It does not follow, however, that
the Serbians wished for a collision more than the Bul-
garians did; occupying nearly the whole of Macedonia

182 BULGARTA“ATTACKS HER ALIEIES Ven,

they had no reason whatever for attacking their rivals,
and if they were arming so thoroughly it was because
they were certain of being attacked by them. As to the
Bulgarians, they continued to look on the Greek Army
as an absolutely negligible quantity, and they were so
sure of the superiority of their own forces over those of
the Serbians that they allowed themselves the luxury
of releasing some of their troops for agricultural
purposes.

Just then fate seemed to be sending an alarming
warning to the Bulgarians: on the 2nd (15th) June,
towards noon, a violent earthquake occurred in the
central part of the Balkans. Although it was felt very
much in Sofia, nothing was ruined there. But at
Tirnova and in the villages and small towns situated
north of it, there was a terrible amount of destruction
and a considerable number of victims. Dreadful scenes
occurred in some places, as for instance at Tirnova
itself, where about fifty children were buried under the
ruins of a school, and their cries and groans were heard
for more than twenty-four hours, for there were not
enough people to do the rescue work: half the town
was destroyed and all the eligible men were with the
Army!

But alas! Bulgaria paid no heed to this warning.

On the 14th (27th) June, M. Todorov informed me
that in the evening a council presided over by the King
would be held at the Palace in order to settle definitely
the question of sending the Bulgarian Plenipotentiary
to St. Petersburg. Todorov promised to telephone the
result of this conference to me the same evening. I sat
up waiting till nearly one o'clock in the morning, and
was just going off to bed when at last the telephone bell
rang; then I heard M. Todorov’s voice saying: “I have
good news for you: the council has decided to send a
delegation to St. Petersburg immediately, with M. Danev
at the head of it. I will come round the first thing to-
morrow morning to tell you the details.” By eight

Sais

1913] M. DANEV ORDERED TO PETERSBURG 183

o'clock in the morning Todorov was with me and he
told me how everything had gone off! At the King’s
wish Todorov had spoken first and advised the sending
of the Bulgarian Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg at
once. Danev did not contradict him in the main, but he
observed that the Serbians had not yet decided to send
their plenipotentiary and that consequently the Bul-
garian Government might find itself in a humiliating
and ridiculous position if its plenipotentiary found him-
self all alone in St. Petersburg. General Savov argued
in a decisive manner against the sending of any pleni-
potentiary at all; he argued that the Russian arbitration
could be entirely dispensed with; that it was only
necessary to make the Serbians and Greeks see that the
Bulgarians were not in the least afraid of them and were
ready and quite determined to occupy at once and by
force the territories which were theirs by right. Serbia
and Greece would be most careful not to face such
danger and would end by yielding. To close the debate
King Ferdinand declared that he entirely shared M.
Todorov’s point of view, which he considered to be the
wisest and which, moreover, tallied with the King’s
answer to the Emperor of Russia’s telegram. These
words of the King’s ended the discussion, and Danev’s
immediate departure was decided on!

Two hours after Todorov had left, M. Danev came
to see me to inform me Officially of the Government’s
decision. Naturally he gave me to understand that this
decision had been arrived at thanks to him. Iwas care-
ful not to let him see that I knew what had really
occurred, thanked him cordially, and then asked:
“Well! M. Danev, then when are we going? This
evening or to-morrow? I have already ordered my
portmanteaux to be packed.”

Danev replied that it was impossible for him to start
that day, but that he would try to be ready by the
following evening; he warned me that for various
reasons he did not wish to go by the ordinary way, that
is to say by Belgrade and Vienna. There only remained

184 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cu. xn.

the way by Bukharest, which was far longer and less
convenient, or that by Varna, the Black Sea and Odessa.

Towards mid-day the King’s private secretary, M.
Dobrovitch, came to see me to convey to me the grate-
ful thanks of his master for all my efforts which had
ended in the wise decision arrived at by the Government
the evening before. The King added that he hoped that
I should uphold the legitimate rights of Bulgaria in
St. Petersburg. I replied to Dobrovitch that I was
aware of the decisive part the King had played at the
council the evening before, and that I would use my
best efforts to make the conference about to open in
St. Petersburg truly beneficial to Bulgaria.

The following day, 16th (29th) June, which was a
Sunday, I had several talks on the telephone with
Danev about our departure. Danev asked for a further
respite, and suggested going by Varna, whence the
Russian boat was leaving for Odessa in two days. I
rebelled at such a delay and suggested Starting for
Varna that evening and embarking ona Russian torpedo-
boat which had been stationed there since the war and
was always at my disposal. But Danev, who—just like
his colleague of the Forum, Cicero—was terribly afraid
of sea-sickness, refused my proposal and ended by
promising me to be ready to start on the Tuesday by
any route I might choose.

To induce Danev to start as soon as possible, I
represented to him that as soon as it was known in
Belgrade that our departure was settled, M. Pachitch
would immediately step into the train and would precede
us by a few days in St. Petersburg. This childish
argument had a great effect on Danev! However, by
Monday morning I realised that Danev was escaping
me again, and that his beautiful enthusiasm had given
way to some ulterior motive which he was concealing
from me.

Our journey, as is well known, never came off.

On Monday morning, towards nine o'clock, two of

1913] BULGARIANS ATTACK SERBIANS _ 185

my young colleagues, who had come to the Legation
to write in cipher, told me that they had just met the
military attachés of Austria and Germany (the latter was
a particularly repulsive specimen of the Teutonic race),
and that these worthies, rubbing their hands and dis-
playing exuberant joy, had told them that the Bulgarians
and Serbians had been fighting since the evening
before, and that there was violent firing all along the
Macedonian front. As one of my two informants was
M. Doubiagsky, who was intelligent and eminently
truthful, I was bound to believe the report he brought,
and I promptly telephoned to M. Danev to demand an
explanation. Danev replied that he knew nothing for
certain, but that he had heard something about an
incident between the Serbians and Bulgarians, and that
at the moment he was busy talking to the Palace, and
to the Minister for War, in order to arrive at what had
actually happened. Two hours later, when the rumours
had been confirmed through other sources, I telephoned
to Danev, and entreated him most earnestly to take
immediate steps to stop the firing on the Macedonian
front. Towards five o'clock, I went to see him to get
news, and I reiterated my entreaties that he should do
all in his power to stop the firing. Danev seemed very
much upset, and avoided looking me in the face; he
assured me that what had occurred was not serious,
and that the military authorities would take all
necessary measures to settle amicably the “ misunder-
standing” which had arisen between the Bulgarian and
Serbian troops.

However, by the evening the whole town knew
that Bulgarians and Serbians were fighting on the
Bregalnitza, and telegrams arrived simultaneously from
Salonika saying that ¢here also the Bulgarians had been
attacked. I realised that events were taking a disastrous
turn, and I ordered my portmanteaux to be unpacked.
But I was still far from suspecting that the Bulgarians
alone were guilty of the bloodshed.

The next day—Tuesday morning—Danev came to

186 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES (cu. xu.

me and, much disconcerted but more sincere in his
manner, informed me that on Sunday night, a collision
had actually taken place between a section of the
Bulgarian and Serbian troops, but that no one knew
for certain what had caused this regrettable incident;
unfortunately, the collision had spread along the
whole front, and at this very moment the Govern-
ment was dispatching peremptory orders to General
Savov to stop the firing at once, and to take the troops
back to their former positions, without worrying as to
whether the initiative of the shots fired came from the
Bulgarians or the Serbians. Of course, I could not but
approve of this measure. But the orders of the
Bulgarian Government could no longer stop the blood-
shed. Military operations spread still further, and two
or three days later no one any longer thought of
stopping them.

Meanwhile, I received information from Belgrade
that the Serbians, having taken a whole Bulgarian
regiment prisoner, had found, amongst the regimental
papers, the order to attack the Serbian outposts during
the night of Sunday, 16th (29th) June, to Monday, 17th
(30th) June, to destroy them, and to advance on such
and such positions. The order was quite authentic,
and there could be no doubt whatever about it! During
the first three days of the hostilities thus begun, the
rumour was circulated in Sofia that in Salonika the
Greeks had, in the night, suddenly attacked the Bul-
garian brigade and had massacred it. When the
document which the Serbians had captured from
the Bulgarians was made public, and recognised as
authentic, no one any longer believed in the “St.
Bartholomew” of Salonika. It was afterwards con-
clusively proved that there, also, the initiative of
hostilities came from the Bulgarians.

A few days after I learnt from reliable sources how
all this had occurred.
On Saturday morning, I had not been the only one

. <a

1913] Ave RBACHEROUS ' ATTACK 187

to be informed of the decision arrived at the evening
before at the council held at the Palace. The same
information was received by the Austrian and German
Ministers, who had their clients in the bosom of the
council. The whole of Saturday was spent in secret
meetings between the “ Macedonians,” the military of
Savov’s camp, and the agents of the two diplomats in
question. The next day, after a council held at Count
Tarnowski’s, the ‘ Macedonians,” Rizov, Gennadiev,
and Colonel Nerezov (Chief of the Headquarters
Staff), went to the Palace and approached the King
with humble prayers—which sounded sometimes like
threats—not to allow Danev’s departure for St. Peters-
burg, and to force the Serbians and the Greeks to make
the desired concessions by immediately commanding
the Bulgarian troops to advance.

“ But this is war!” exclaimed Ferdinand. “ Not at all,
sir,’ was the answer, “we have a right to occupy
Macedonia conjointly with the Serbians and the Greeks ;
neither of them have the right to stop our army of
occupation advancing wherever it may be necessary.
Yet, nevertheless, if they wished to oppose it by force,
we should overthrow them, and should occupy such
strong positions that there would be nothing left to
them but to submit to our will. And then the
conferences at St. Petersburg might begin.”

Strange as it may seem, it was this inconceivable
argument—that such a treacherous aggression did not
constitute an opening of hostilities—which had a
decisive effect on Ferdinand’s mind. This subterfuge
exactly suited his character. And added to this
there were the thinly-veiled threats of the speakers.
Ferdinand, who was never remarkable for much
courage, already saw revolvers levelled at his head
and bombs strewing his path, through the heads of
the Macedonian bands who were infesting his capital,
and who would murder him without pity if he were
inclined to give up certain parts of Madedonia to the
Serbians and Greeks.

188 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cn. xu

However, before giving his consent, the King sent
for General Savov to ask him his opinion. Savov went
at once to the Palace, and declared to the King, before
his accomplices, that he entirely shared their point of
view.

“Tn that case,” said Ferdinand, “I authorise you to
give the necessary orders to the Army.” But the
General, who had never sinned through excess of
ingenuousness, told the King that he did not think it
possible to give such an important order without a
written authorisation from His Majesty. After much
discussion and hesitation, Ferdinand was at last obliged
to sit down at his writing-table, to write and to sign a
document in Savov’s name, in which he authorised the
Commander-in-Chief to take all necessary measures for
the advance of the Bulgarian troops on such and such
positions. The General put this document in his pocket,
but he did not keep it there long: very soon this precious
document was sent to repose in a safe in a bank abroad.
If Savov had not taken this precaution, Ferdinand, at
the first reverse, would have had him arrested, and,
having obtained possession of the compromising
document, would have summoned the General before
a military tribunal for having attacked the Allies of
Bulgaria treacherously and without authorisation; and
finally twelve bullets would have silenced the former
Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army for ever.

But, thanks to the wise precaution of General Savov,
he escaped such a fate, and Ferdinand could not
make him. shoulder the whole responsibility for the
treacherous deed of the 16th (29th) June.

The King thus assumed a considerable share of
responsibility for this deed, which still weighs on his
conscience and marks him with a stain of blood and
felony.

It ought to be mentioned that the sudden aggression
directed against the Serbians assumed, in consequence
of the preceding circumstances, a particularly odious
character. On the 16th (29th) June the news was

1913] WAR BEGINS 189

—_
circulated on both army fronts that the two Governments
had definitely accepted the Russian arbitration, and that
in consequence all danger of war was over. This news
produced the most joyful impression in both camps.
Both sides began to fraternise, officers as well as men.
From the outposts they assembled together, drank
together, embraced one another. After the curfew each
man returned to his post. Yet this same evening General
Savov’s order to advance was received by the Bulgarian
troops. And lo! and behold! towards dawn the Bul-
garians suddenly attacked the Serbian outposts, where
the men were peacefully sleeping under the influence of
the fraternisation of the day before, and . . . massacred
their would-be brothers. But this cowardly attack
availed the Bulgarians nothing. The very next day the
Serbians succeeded in concentrating their reserves ; and
the enemy detachments who at the outset had made a
certain advance were stopped and thrown back with
serious loss after two days’ fighting. It was then that
the Bulgarian Government and the King decided to
follow my earnest advice, and on the roth June (2nd
July) they sent a peremptory order to the whole front
to regain their former positions immediately. But it
was too late. The Serbians, exasperated at what had
occurred, did not allow the Bulgarians to retreat quietly
they themselves began to advance, and to fall on any
Bulgarian detachments that were retiring without fight-
ing. It was in this way that almost a whole Bulgarian
regiment was taken with all its supplies and its papers.
Among these papers was found the famous order-of-the-
day of General Savov.

On Sunday, the 23rd June (6th July), the Serbian
and Greek Ministers officially broke off relations with
Bulgaria and left Sofia. At the same time the pro-
clamations of the Kings of Serbia and Greece were
issued to their armies. Thus the Bulgarians were at
war with their former allies. And on the 21st June
(4th July) mobilisation was ordered in Rumania.

190 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cu. xu.

In Macedonia the plateau of Ovtche Polie and the
bend of the Vardar near Krivolak were already the
scene of sanguinary battles. At Krivolak the Bulga-
rians had at first succeeded in surrounding a whole
Serbian division, but Prince Alexander arriving at the
last moment with a portion of the Serbian First Army
retrieved the situation and freed the surrounded division.
And from that moment success was decidedly on the
Serbian side. The Bulgarians were forced to retire
gradually towards their former frontier, that is to say,
in the direction of Kustendil. Two weeks later, the
Serbians had already conquered strong Bulgarian posi-
tions on the frontier, and it only depended on them to
occupy the whole district of Kustendil; moreover, by
then complete demoralisation had set in amengst the
Bulgarian troops ; whole companies were deserting from
the front with their arms, and were going into the in-
terior of the country and in the direction of Sofia, which
might become very dangerous for Ferdinand and the
members of the Government.

Generally speaking, during this miserable war the
Bulgarian soldier displayed much less courage and
endurance than during the glorious campaign against
the Turks; and the reason is quite simple and quite
natural. Whereas the Bulgarian officer was impelled
by the ambitions of a rigid and exaggerated nationalism,
the soldier vaguely felt that he was being exposed to
death in order that he might shed the blood of his
Serbian brothers without plausible reasons and for
unacknowledged ends. Besides, in going against his
will to fight his former allies, the Bulgarian soldier’s
thoughts were centred on other things: he was per-
petually thinking of his native village left at the mercy
of a Turkish or Rumanian invasion. In this respect
the Bulgarian peasant showed far more common sense
than his rulers, who seemed utterly unable to view
matters correctly.

I have been told that when the order was issued to
retire the Bulgarian troops who were occupying the

1913] SOLDIERS REFUSE OBEDIENCE 19!

position of Bulair (near the Dardanelles) and to send
them to Macedonia, the soldiers of several regiments
refused to obey. They answered the reproofs and
threats of their officers with threats, and finally drove
the officers away. Then, to persuade them to obey,
some superior officers of the reserve were sent tothem;
among them was the colonel who told me all this, and
who formerly had been an artillery officer in Russia.
When these officers began to persuade the mutinous
soldiers not to commit such a breach of discipline and
not to dishonour the name—illustrious all the world
over—of the Bulgarian soldier, the voiniks (soldiers)
replied, “But how can we retire from here? The
Turkish Army faces us; we know perfectly well that
it is not being disbanded: on the contrary, fresh con-
tingents are arriving daily. If we leave, the Turks will
promptly advance, will reoccupy all the territories and
all the towns which we have wrested from them with
our blood; then they will go to us, within our borders,
will burn and plunder our villages, violate our women
and butcher our children. And meanwhile we shall be
amusing ourselves by fighting our brothers and co-
religionists the Serbians! We will never consent to
this.” The soldiers could only be persuaded to obey
and to consent to being led away when the reserve
officers gave their word of honour that by virtue of a
formal agreement recently concluded the Turks were
going to demobilise their Army. And this agreement
had not been invented by the reserve officers; they
themselves had received official assurance of it from
their superior officers!

1 The officers on the reserve were far more highly thought of among
Bulgarian soldiers than the officers on the active list. The common
people looked on the latter as janizaries and agents of Ferdinand’s that
were little liked and generally despised in the field. These officers had
become strangers to the people, whereas the officers on the reserve, who
had shown themselves to be quite as brave, if not braver, than those on
the active list during the Turkish war, belonged to classes of society
which the Bulgarian peasants generally esteemed: rich peasants, lawyers,
schoolmasters, former Russian officers, etc.

192 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cu. xn.

But a still greater disaster overtook the Bulgarian
troops who were operating against the Greeks. The
army of General Ivanov (the victor of Adrianople),
which occupied Southern Macedonia only, consisted of
two reduced divisions,! that is to say, of about 30,000
to 35,000 men. The Bulgarian commander considered
this number quite sufficient not only to hold back but
even to defeat the.Greek Army, which the Bulgarians
treated with supreme contempt. They were cruelly
mistaken. King Constantine had under his command
80,000 men, experienced soldiers, better armed than the
Bulgarians, and animated by innate and historic hatred
of the latter; General Ivanov’s army was completely
beaten and he had to retire, without his artillery and
supplies, across the mountain range of Balachitza,
already famed in history by the decisive defeat inflicted
by the Emperor Basil IL, the Exterminator of the Bul-
garians, on the last armies of the Bulgarian Tsar, John
Samuel Schischman.

During this retreat the Bulgarian second division
accomplished feats of tenacity and courage; but at the
same time the Bulgarians, exasperated by defeat, dis-
graced themselves by deeds of savage cruelty towards
the Greek population and prisoners of war. The Greeks
repaid them in their own coin, and the war between the
two co-religionist peoples so recently allied assumed a
thoroughly odious character.

However, at the close of this brief but bloody cam-
paign the Greeks had crossed the Bulgarian frontier in
several places and had no longer any important barrier
before them.

When the first reverses against the Greeks were
known and the retreat of Belachitza began, Danev, who
now came to see me nearly every day, confessed the
Bulgarian defeat very openly. This happened—if my

! A Bulgarian division usually comprises six regiments, hence about
24,000 bayonets.

r

= MY ADVICE TO DANEV 193

)

memory does not fail me—two or three days before
the Rumanian troops crossed the Danube.

“Very well,” I said to Danev, “you are undone! And
here is a friend’s advice which I offer in all sincerity:
stop the Rumanians immediately, giving them all the
concessions they demand, and also immediately ask for
peace in Belgrade and in Bukharest. Otherwise the
Turks will soon be falling on you. M. de Giers has
just informed me that whereas the Grand Vizier is
repeatedly assuring him that Turkey is not dreaming
of moving or of joining in the new Balkan war, the
Russian Embassy possesses positive information that
the Turkish troops are advancing by night ever nearer
to the new Bulgarian frontier, and that a fairly con-
siderable force is already concentrated there. Hence |
reiterate my most earnest advice: make peace with
your former allies at once and at any cost, otherwise
you will suffer the worst disasters; for you are undone.”

Danev would not accept my extreme but strictly
logical deductions. He replied that the Bulgarians
would not oppose any resistance to the Rumanian
troops—that had been decided on; they had only to
occupy the Dobrudja and a part of Danubian Bulgaria.
The present object of the Bulgarian Army was to hold
the Greeks, and, by stopping the Serbians on the
Bregalnitza, to enter Serbia from the other side, that is
to say, from the side of the north-eastern frontier, where
the Bulgarians to this end had mustered special and
fairly considerable forces. When a success should be
apparent on this new side, the Rumanians would be
forced to stop and to become more conciliatory. As to
the Turks, Danev persisted in not believing in their
intention to re-take Adrianople and Thrace. I did not
conceal from the speaker that I did not share his
opinion in any way, and I drew his attention to the fact
that by not heeding my advice he was assuming a very
heavy responsibility towards his country.

Two days after, however, the Bulgarian Govern-
ment, in view of the crossing of the Danube by large

194 BULGARTAJATTACKS HER ALLIES: (cx an

Rumanian forces, addressed to me and directly to St.
Petersburg an entreaty to stop military operations by
our all-powerful words, and conjointly with the other
Great Powers to elaborate the conditions of peace.
St. Petersburg recommended the two sides to take as a
basis for negotiations a frontier passing by the Bregal-
nitza, the Vardar, the range of Belachitza and the lower
course of the Struma—a frontier which would have
left to Bulgaria the towns of Kotchana, Petchovo,
Drama, and Kavala. At the same time we suggested
to the Prime Ministers of the Balkan States to assemble
at Nish and to begin peace negociations. The Bul-
garians promptly accepted our proposals, and through
me informed Belgrade that General Paprikov—former
Minister to St. Petersburg—was going to be sent to
Nish to enter into a parley about an immediate armis-
tice. Paprikov was to be accompanied by our military
agent, Colonel Romanowski.

The Serbian Government agreed to the coming of
General Paprikov and Colonel Romanowski; but when
they arrived, having submitted to all the formalities of
crossing the two fronts near Pirot, they found no
Serbian plenipotentiary in Nish, and in the meantime
I received a notice from Belgrade that the Serbians
could not begin any conversation with the Bulgarian
delegate without the participation of Greek and Monte-
negrin Plenipotentiaries, who were expected shortly in
Uskub and not in Nish;I was informed that Greece
would be represented by M. Venizelos himself. Ali
this signified that the adversaries of the Bulgarians
wished directly to broach the peace negociations and
not parleyings about an armistice. This exchange
of telegrams between me and Belgrade took four
days, during which Paprikov and Romanowski were
kept waiting about in a hotel in Nish, the latter
surrounded by every care and attention, the former
under the strictest supervision. On the fifth day,
Paprikov, who had not got full power to arrange the
peace terms with the heads of the Serbian and Greek

1913] RUMANIANS ENTER BULGARIA 195

Governments, returned to Sofia from his fruitless
errand.

I must mention here a very characteristic detail of
General Paprikov's journey. The Serbians complained
that the Bulgarian command near Pirot had profited by
the short opening on the front to advance the troops
in certain places and to alter the disposition of the
batteries. And Colonel Romanowski having made
inquiries*about this accusation found it to be true.

While Paprikov was in Nish, the military position
of the Bulgarians became still worse: the Serbians, as
I said before, broke through their enemies’ second line
of defence and were on the point of occupying Kus-
tendil ; the Greeks had taken the positions of Rilo-
Dagh and were hence on Bulgarian territory, with all
the possibility of descending the Rilo range either on
the Philippopolis side or on the side of Samakov and
Sofia. Meanwhile the Rumanian Army, not at all con-
tent with the occupation of the Dobrudja, having made
three bridges over the Danube, occupied the whole of
Northern Bulgaria at one stroke, crossed the Balkans
by the Arab-Konak Pass—the way taken by the
Russians in December, 1877—-and began to descend
into the plain of Sofia. By this rapid advance the
Rumanians threatened to cut off the Bulgarian forces
that had entered Serbia from the side of Belogradchik
and of Trn, so that there was nothing left to the
Bulgarian command but hurriedly to recall these troops ;
one division, which could not possibly retire in time, fell
into the hands of the Rumanian Army; the soldiers
cried treason, laid down their arms and surrendered to
the Rumanians; complete disorder was beginning in
the Bulgarian Army.

On the 1st (14th) July, the Turks definitely threw off
their mask, and an trade of the Sultan’s ordered the
Ottoman troops to cross the frontier and to re-occupy
Adrianople.

Exactly a week after the conversation reported
above, Danev, pale and upset, came to see me, and when

fe)

19% BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cnu. xu.

I begged him to sit down, he threw himself into an
armchair, exclaiming: ‘ M. Nekludoff, we are done for!
What is to be done? Doubtless you already know
that the Turks have crossed the frontier and are
marching on Adrianople, where we have only 1500
soldiers.”

“M. Danev, it is exactly a week ago to the day that
I said to you: ‘you are undone’ ; you refused to believe it
and you only half listened to my earnest advice. What
can I say to you now?” Nevertheless, I comforted
him a little, and I proceeded to investigate with him
the steps to be taken to obtain an armistice as quickly
as possible, to be followed by peace. I was truly filled
with pity for this man at bay describing his country
as completely shipwrecked! As concerning the ad-
vance of the Turks I could as yet say nothing to Danev.
I felt sure that in St. Petersburg we should do all in
our power to stop the Turks, but I also knew that from
Berlin they were being encouraged and urged on.

This was my last conversation with Danev. The
following day the whole Cabinet resigned, and on
the 7th (20th) July, after a ministerial crisis lasting
five days, Ferdinand entrusted the formation of a new
Cabinet to the Stamboulovists with Radoslavov and
Tontchev at their head. The Foreign Office was given
to Gennadiev, a “ Koutzo-Wallachian "-Macedonian by
birth, with a more or less European appearance, intel-
ligent, cunning, rather agreeable, but unfortunately
labouring under the onus of a formal accusation of
embezzlement. It was clear that by this change of
Government Ferdinand, at this critical moment, thought
he could buy the goodwill of Austria and her inter-
vention in favour of the Bulgarians, an intervention he
had been impatiently awaiting for some weeks, in fact
ever since the beginning of the Bulgarian reverses.
My French colleague and I attached even more im-
portance to Ferdinand’s choice: we thought it signified
an intervention by Austria already agreed on; but we

1913] COLLAPSE OF BULGARIA 197

were mistaken. As was proved later by Italian revela-
tions, Austria did in fact wish to intervene and to attack
Serbia, but she was stopped firstly by Italy’s flat
refusal to be associated in such a policy, and secondly,
and more especially by the veto of Germany. The latter
had a more important and pressing object in view—
that of restoring Thrace to the Turks, and of recon-
quering her own former influence in Stambul. And
from Berlin the Austrians were told: “ Wait. The time
is not yet. Our day will come.”
The day came exactly a year later, in July, 1914.

On the oth (22nd) July, Adrianople was retaken
without a blow being struck by the Turkish troops,
who after that never thought of pausing, but advanced
rapidly, retaking all the territory which the Bulgarians
had taken from them.

We were going through sad times in Sofia then.
The Rumanians were camping only 15. kilometres from
the Bulgarian capital; driving one day along the Ork-
hanie highroad about ten kilometres from the town, with
my glasses | could see the silhouettes of the Rumanian
patrols in the plain beyond the Isker. During the day
the Rumanian aeroplane’ flew over Sofia and threw out
harmless pamphlets. Alarming news came from Kus-
tendil: mutinous soldiers were threatening a march on
the capital. And meantime the Greeks had approached
Samokov and were proclaiming reprisals for the
Bulgarian atrocities. Finally the rumour spread that
the Turks had crossed the former frontier of Bulgaria
and were beginning to plunder and set fire to the
villages. The Bulgarians belonging to the leisured and
ruling classes lost their heads and sent letters to us
begging for refuge if necessary in the foreign legations.
In the courtyard of the Palace, near the back door, two
royal motor cars stood ready day and night to take the
King and his family away from the capital. The foreign
Ministers met at the house of our senior to discuss

1 There was only one in the Rumanian Army!

198 BULGARIA‘ATTACKS HER: ALLIES jicw a

the situation and the measures to be taken to preserve
order in the town. After a short discussion we agreed
to telegraph to our respective Governments to suggest
that they should beg the Rumanians to occupy Sofia
with their troops if the town was really threatened
with the entry of the Greeks or with an inroad of
mutinous soldiers. It was to be distinctly understood
in this case that the Rumanians were to confine them-
selves to keeping order, without interrupting the
working of the Bulgarian Government.

The day after this meeting we were invited to go
and see the King in theevening. Evidently His Majesty
wished to review the situation with us. Our arrival at
the Palace was originally fixed for seven o'clock and
then postponed till ten. The night was dark; a strong,
cold wind was blowing from the Vitosch Pass,' when
one after the other we glided like conspirators into the
dimly-lit courtyard of the Konak of Sofia and entered
the Palace. Up half-dark staircases and corridors we
threaded our way and were shown into a room just as
dimly lit, where we were received by the private
secretary, Dobrovitch, with his customary black coat
and amiable giggle, who begged us to wait patiently for
a few minutes as the King was still conferring with his
Ministers. We were all disposed to be indulgent, and
we lit cigarettes and began to talk in whispers. The
clock struck eleven, then twelve, and still the King did
not send for us. We had all imagined that he had
summoned us so as to receive us in his study, and there
laying aside all etiquette, so superfluous at such a time,
to discuss with us the critical position of the country
and the capital And we all were disposed to listen
attentively and to help him with our advice and our
intercession with our Governments. But this protracted
waiting began to annoy us; we considered that Ferdinand

1 The summer of 1913 was in general extremely cold, and this was
very much felt in the high plain of Sofia where the summer evenings are
always cool.

1913] A ARTIFICIAL: SETTING 199

was being too high-handed with Ministers to whom he
would soon have to address entreaties.

“Listen, gentlemen!” whispered one of the Ministers
to two intimate colleagues in a corner: “all this has a
truly lugubrious appearance. First that door will open,
then another, and we shall be led into an inner court and
there by torchlight we shall see either Danev or Savov
having his head cut off!” “Or else,” replied some one
else, “the door will open and dear Dobrovitch will appear
with his usual amiable giggle to inform us that the
King has bolted and that we shall never see him again !”
At last the famous door opened, and Dobrovitch really
appeared, and begged us to follow him. We went
through two or three half-dark rooms and suddenly
found ourselves in the state saloon, which was brilliantly
lit up and quite empty. We were asked to stand up in
order of seniority and we did so. The senior at this
time was the German Minister von Below; I took the
second place, then came the Minister of Great Britain,
then the others; we were placed far apart. Two or
three minutes after the door at the far end of the saloon
opened and the King entered in full dress with decora-
tions (whereas we had been invited to come in morning-
dress!). His Majesty was preceded by his Lord
Chamberlain and his aide-de-camp, and followed at a
distance of ten feet by his new Foreign Secretary
Gennadiev, in evening clothes, with a white tie and all
his Bulgarian and Saxe-Coburg decorations. The King,
making a bow which included every one, took up his
position in the middle of the room and made us a speech
obviously prepared beforehand, in which he revealed the
critical situation of Bulgaria. Having alluded, somewhat
pointedly, to the so-called hostility of the Great Powers
towards Bulgaria as being the cause of this situation, he
entreated us to transmit to our Governments his earnest
prayer not to allow the total shipwreck of the country
to ensue.

All this artificial setting and this pretentious speech—
somewhat unseemly from Ferdinand’s lips—ended by

200 BULGARIAIATTACKS TER AELIES {cu xit:

shocking us all without any distinction of political
camps: on each face surprise and displeasure were
depicted. Having finished his speech the King went
straight up to the French Minister and talked to him in
a low voice, then he came up to me and in a voice so
low as not to be overheard by my neighbours asked :

“What do you think of the situation, M. Nekludoff?
Will Russia really allow the Turks to plunder Eastern
Rumelia and to enter Philippopolis? Will she really
not come to our assistance? If it is I who ought to be
punished, why punish the whole Bulgarian people?
What have you to say to that ?”

These last words exhausted my patience and instead
of answering the King in a low voice as etiquette
demanded, I replied quite loud, so that each of my
words could be heard by my colleagues: “Sir, with
respect to the advance of the Turks, Your Majesty
may rest assured that we shall be able to stop the
Ottoman troops and shall not allow them to trample
that soil which was Bulgaria before the war ; concerning
everything else, Your Majesty already knows my
opinion: that Bulgaria’s sole salvation lies in the con-
clusion of an immediate peace with her former ailies
and with Rumania; we are ready to co-operate in
this good work with all the means in our power; we
cannot do more.” The King looked at me with an evil
expression on his face, was silent for a few minutes and
then asked:

“And you feel sure that you will stop the Turks?”

“Yes, | am quite sure of it, sir,” I took on myself to
answer.

The King bowed to me and then turned to my
neighbour, the Minister of Great Britain, and asked him
what he thought of the situation.

“T share the opinion of my Russian colleague, sir,”
was the answer.

Ferdinand exchanged a few words with the other
Ministers, but he treated the Austro-Hungarian and
German Ministers with studied coldness. He probably

1913] RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 201

knew that he could no longer count on active support
from their countries, and consequently he was sulking
with them. Having talked to every one the King
returned to the middle of the room, made a general bow
and walked away with the same ceremonial towards his
private apartments.

From this day, and in spite of my abrupt answer,
Ferdinand sent for me repeatedly during the succeeding
weeks and consulted me about all the questions which
were being discussed at the peace conference of
Bukharest. I had returned to favour, and this lasted
until the day when the final result of the negotiations
of Bukharest had deprived the Bulgarians and their
master of all hope of improvement in the situation in
which they had placed themselves by their inordinate
ambition and their insane obstinacy. Moreover, when
this /asciate ogni speranza moment arrived Ferdinand was
already preparing to leave Bulgaria for a time and to go
and spend a few weeks on his Hungarian property ; and
I, having been informed of my early transfer to Stock-
holm, had been granted a holiday and was starting for
Paris, where I was to meet M. Sazonoff.

I only saw Ferdinand once more, at the end of
December, O.S., when I returned to Sofia for a few days
to make arrangements for my departure and to hand in
my letters of recall. At this interview Ferdinand
behaved ina most unseemly manner to me; I will relate
this further on.

The efforts of Russian diplomacy checked the advance
of the Turks who were stopped at the former Bulgarian
frontier, and thanks to our prompt action in Rumania,
the Rumanian troops left the town of Varna which they
had occupied.

When I told Sazonoff about the Bulgarian Govern-
ment having sought our help, he suggested that a con-
ference of the Prime Ministers of Serbia, Bulgaria,
Montenegro and Greece should be held in Nish, in view
of the immediate conclusion of peace. But as Ferdinand

202 BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES [cu. x1.

had not confined himself to entreating our intervention
but had also sent an imploring telegram to King Charles
of Rumania, the latter proposed convening a conference
of the belligerents at Bukharest, in order to proceed to
the simultaneous conclusion of an armistice and of peace.
Our Foreign Secretary readily agreed to the change of
place for the negotiations, the belligerents also agreed,
and on the 17th (30th) July, the first sitting of the peace
conference took place in Bukharest under the presidency
of the Rumanian Prime Minister, M. Majoresco; the
next day, the 18th (31st) July, an armistice of five days
was signed. All the efforts of the Bulgarian delegates
to make the peace conditions imposed by their enemies
less hard for Bulgaria—efforts in which we supported
them—met with no success. And under pressure from
Rumania, who absolutely refused to prolong the armis-
tice, the Bulgarians on the 24th July (6th August), were
forced to accept the peace conditions dictated by their
adversaries.

Ae

CHAPTER XIII
THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST

THE stipulations of the Peace Conference of Bukharest,
to be properly understood, must be studied with due
regard to the conditions of the peace concluded by the
Balkan Allies with Turkey in London, on the 20th May
of this same year, 1913. In London, Turkey had been
obliged to abandon all her territories situated north and
west of the line Midia—Enos, and to renounce her
rights of sovereignty over the island of Crete. After
which, the fixing of the frontiers of the future in-
dependent Albania, as well as the question of the islands
of the Archipelago, were referred to the decisions of
the Great Powers, whereas the demarcation between
Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece was left to
the decisions of these four countries.

There was another clause in the London Peace
Treaty which did not seem to evoke any controversy
or excitement, but to which I personally attached a
special importance. This clause stipulated that the
territory of Mt. Athos should become an independent
state, except for the spiritual supremacy of the Uni-
versal Patriarch. “The Republic of the Twenty
Monasteries ”—as this original agglomeration of Ortho-
dox monks has been described for centuries—was
recognised by Europe, and declared free from all
temporal supremacy. The idea of this clause, which
I greeted with sympathy, was entirely M. Sazonoff’s.
Strictly Orthodox by education and having learnt during
his long stay in Rome not to neglect anything relative
to the political sphere of the Church, Sazonoff, although

not possessing personal experience of the Near East,
203

204 THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST [enap. xin.

understood better than any of those around him what
the ‘Monte Santo” represented to the Orthodox
populations of Russia and the Levant.

As we know, Mt. Athos from time immemorial had
rejoiced in autonomy and special privileges, which the
Turks had respected. The twenty oldest monasteries,
from which the other convents depended, each sent a
representative to the Prvofa/, that is the Superior
Council which sat at Karea, a small borough built around
an ancient cathedral; the Protat represented the high
court of justice for all the convents of the Monte Santo,
and the organ through which the republic of monks
communicated with the outside world, that is to say,
with the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Turkish
authorities. The latter were represented at Karea by
an Ottoman official who had under him a dozen
soldiers, who possessed a mosque but could not bring
their families with them. Besides this minute armed
force, the Protat kept up a score or so of armed guards
recruited from among the Greeks and Orthodox Mace-
donians. These palikars, chiefly quartered on the
narrow isthmus! which connects the long peninsula of
Mt. Athos to Chalcidice, protected the monastery-land
from the incursions of wolves and bands of brigands ;
women are strictly forbidden to enter this territory by
all the statutes of the Monte Santo.

But if the cenobites were thus protected from the
ferocity of beasts, the violence of men, and the charms
of women, they were always exposed to another great
temptation of monastic life—internal dissensions. And
during the last few years, a new subject for discussion
had been added to those which had always existed—
political questions.

The Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical conflict was the
signal for the first serious tension in Greek and Russian
relations. The protection accorded to the Bulgarians
by the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, General

1 The isthmus which Xerxes originally cut through ; the traces of the
canal can still be seen.

tgs RUSSIANS AT MT. ATHOS 205

Ignatieff, had greatly alienated all the Greeks, even
those who up till then had remained sincere partisans
of Russia. Since this, the Greeks of Constantinople,
like those of Athens, began to perceive Russian intrigues
everywhere, and to denounce them to Europe. As one
of the proofs of these dangerous intrigues, they liked
to quote Mt. Athos, “that admirable strategical position,”
where General Ignatieff kept, in monkish garb, a whole
division of Russian troops! Europe half believed this;
in any case, the Russian monks of Mt. Athos were
looked on with a somewhat unfavourable eye, and they
were recommended to the vigilance of the Porte. The
position of these unfortunate people became especially
critical during the last Russo-Turkish war, and at the
time of the Congress of Berlin.

But there is no calumny that does not die out, and
there are no difficulties that cannot be surmounted
when one knows how to set about it. During the
sixteen years of M. de Nelidoff’s memorable time as
Ambassador to Constantinople, the position of the
Russian cenobites of Mt. Athos became stronger, and
the absurd accusations brought against them died down.
Generally speaking, M. de Nelidoff’s work and that of
his equally wise successor, M. Zinovieff, cannot be
sufficiently appreciated in the history of our relations
with the Near East. In spite of the lack of a ruling
principle in St. Petersburg, in spite of the progressive
increase of German influence on the shores of the
Bosphorus, these two eminent diplomats managed—
first, to keep intact the honour and prestige of the
Russian name in the East, and then to restore the
confidence in us of all the Orthodox nationalities of
the Balkan Peninsula. This confidence, which had been
shaken for some time, under the influence of the
rivalries and conflicts of these nationalities, had to be
regained by an impartial line of conduct—benevolent
and at the same time prudent—with regard to their
real needs and their just rights. The two Ambassadors
had also managed to gain the personal sympathies and

206 . THE PEACE ‘OF (BUKHAREST® [cnap. Xiu,

the deep respect of the Turks, and that was naturally
a source of strength to them in their mediations and
measures.

During the course of M. de Nelidoff’s term of office,
the position of our compatriots at Mt. Athos was
strengthened, as I said before; and the monastery of
St. Panteleimon became, with the support of the
Russian Embassy, the representative and recognised
guide of all the Russian monks of the Monte Santo.
Excellent relations were established between these
monks and the Universal Patriarchate. The eminent
Patriarch, Joachim III., a personal friend of M. de
Nelidoff’s, and who more than once occupied theiChair
of St. John Chrysostom, and in the interval retired to
Mt. Athos, was the special protector of the Russian
monks. The relations of the latter with the Turkish
authorities were excellent. Even amongst the Greek
monasteries, several kept up close relations with the
great Russian monastery, especially those in which
the cenobitic rules had been preserved intact.

The faith of the Russian people has always borne a
monastic rather than hierarchical stamp. Frequently
and outrageously deceived in his trust by unworthy
monks, the Russian man of the people was nevertheless
perpetually in search of examples of true cenobitism,
and of monasteries which should fulfil his ideals of
ardent asceticism and constant prayer.

Mt. Athos attracted the thoughts and the pilgrim-
ages of Russians from the earliest days of their con-
version to Christianity. And when in the last fifty
years Russian monastic life flourished again on the
Monte Santo, and when, at the same time, journeys in
the East had become infinitely easier and possible for
the most modest purse, our pilgrims began to stream
there in considerable numbers. They found in our
monasteries of Mt. Athos all that had always seemed
/to them to be the ideal of monastic life: a truly frugal
way of living, severe cenobitic rules, magnificent
services, and more especially almost incessant and

1913] NATURE OF THE TREATY 207

strictly conscientious prayer for the living and for the
dead.

The idea of profiting by events which had developed
in the Balkan Peninsula to stipulate for the independence
of Mt. Athos was consequently an essentially Russian
idea. It offered no direct political advantages, but it
constituted a striking recognition of the Russian
religious ideal, and should yield beneficial results of
a cultural and political order. From the time of Peter
the Great, and until the present day, Russian policy has
striven at every favourable opportunity to enhance and
glorify the name of the autocratic monarch, to strengthen
the naval and military power of the Empire, to further
the interests of commerce, and, finally, either to free the
Christian nationalities of a common origin of the
East or to ameliorate their lot. But it was the first
time that our diplomacy had thought of the defence and
the glorification of the Russian popular ideal, and had
recognised the importance of the work of simple men
of the people, who had brought the leaven of their faith
to the East, and had accomplished a real spiritual
conquest there.

When I received from St. Petersburg the account of
the stipulations of the Conference of London, I heartily
congratulated M. Sazonoff on his idea concerning Mt.
Athos.

The peace treaty of Bukharest presents quite a
different structure. It does not constitute a definite
settlement of the troubles of the Near East, but only
a settlement of the war of 1913 between the Christian
nationalities of the Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria, as the
initiator of this fratricidal contest, was to undergo just
punishment, and her former allies had a right to
territorial gains at her expense, gains which would
have made them more powerful and less exposed to
Bulgarian greed and ambition. But, if this condition
could and should be admitted with regard to Serbia,
Greece, and even Rumania, it was in no way to the

208 THE ‘PEACE OF BUKHARESS® “[cHar. xr

interests of the Powers of the Entente and of Serbia,
to see Bulgaria deprived of nearly all her conquests in
Thrace. And even in settling the demarcation question
of the Bulgarians with the Serbians, Greeks, and
Rumanians, it would have been good policy to spare
the self-esteem of the Bulgarian people a little, and to
consider their real interests.

It was precisely in this way that at the beginning we
viewed the task of the Peace Conference of Bukharest.
In the first place, [ received the order to declare to the Butl-
garian Government from His Majesty the Emperor that we
would not tolerate any humiliation or excessive weakening
of Bulgaria. Then M. Sazonoff protested most vehe-
mently against the advance of the Turkish troops in
Thrace and their reoccupation of Adrianople, Kirk-
Kilisseh, etc. When the Ottoman Ambassador, Turkhan
Pasha—in parenthesis, a worthy and respectable old
diplomat—went to see Sazonoff, by order of the Porte,
in order to obtain our benevolent consent to the re-
taking of Thrace by the Turks, the Minister answered
that he refused to discuss that question with him; that
he would discuss it most thoroughly with his Russian
colleagues at the War Office and the Admiralty. Finally,
the Russian Minister to Bukharest, M. Schebeko, when
receiving the Bulgarian delegates, gave them some
hope, and promised to do all in his power to secure
to Bulgaria part of the acquisitions purchased with so
much Bulgarian blood in 1912. During the nine days
that the Conference lasted, M. Schebeko played a pro-
minent part in the negotiations, or rather the attributes
of the part were willingly assigned to him by both sides,
who frequently applied for his intervention, but who
did not follow his advice.

Shortly before the Bukharest Conference, Russian
diplomacy had suggested taking as a base for demar-
cation between the former allies a frontier line follow-
ing the course of the Bregalnitza, that of the Vardar
(to a certain point), then the chain of Belachitza, and
finally the lower course of the Struma, a line which

“OER

1913] BULGARIAN SACRIFICES 209

would have left to Bulgaria the towns Kotchana, Rado-
vitch, Petchevo, Drama, and Kavala. But in Bukharest
we could not succeed in getting this line accepted. The
frontier between Bulgaria and Serbia crossed the line
of the watershed of the Vardar and of the Struma, so
that Kotchana and Radovitch returned to Serbia; and
the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece followed the
course of the Mesta, so that the towns of Demir-Hissar,
Seres, Drama, and Kavala returned to Greece. It is
true that on the subject of Kavala a reservation was
made, aiming at the possibility of a revision of that
clause in the treaty, and on this question Russian
diplomacy was on the Bulgarian side. But when
Austria-Hungary began to demand the revision of the
whole Bukharest treaty, Russia naturally would not
support such a proposal. At the same time, and in
consideration of the energetic intercession of France
in favour of the Greeks, we finally abandoned our
intention of soliciting the return of Kavala to the
Bulgarians.

Concerning the occupation of Thrace by the Turks,
our protests became rarer and feebler day by day, and
soon ceased completely. Bulgaria, who on her side had
persisted for ages in the point of view that the question
of Adrianople and of Thrace was a European one, and
who consequently sought the intervention of the Great
Powers to settle this question, ended by giving in on
this point and herself began negotiations with the Porte.
It was easy to realise by the choice of the Bulgarian
negotiators that King Ferdinand and his Ministers were
now only counting on the protection of Austria-Hungary
and that of Germany, become all-powerful again in
Constantinople. It was old M. Natchevitch, former
Stamboulovist, long since retired from politics, who
was persuaded to return to Constantinople, where he
had been diplomatic agent of Bulgaria for many years,
while M. Tontchev and General Savov—reinstated in
Ferdinand’s good graces—acted as special plenipoten-
tiaries to conclude the definite settlement with the Porte.

210 THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST > fenar. xi.

After long and arduous parleyings—during which the
support of the Russian Embassy was nevertheless lent
to the Bulgarians—the latter had to give up all Thrace
situated between the sea and the left bank of the
Maritza, and the district of Demotika on the right bank
of thisriver. Altogether Bulgaria, of all her conquests,
only kept that part of Thrace ending at the port of
Dedeagatch and the block of the Rhodope Mountains,
which are more of an obstacle than a link between
Bulgaria and that bit of coast of the Axgean Sea. And
the Bulgarians also lost a large portion of the Dobrudja
and of Deli-Orman, with the towns Tutrukan and
Dobritch, and the ports of Kavarna and Baltchik on
the Black Sea.

Finally, neither at the Conference of Bukharest nor
afterwards was one word said about the independence
of Mt. Athos, which had been proposed in London.
The Monte Santo—“ that appanage of the Holy Virgin,”
as the local legends say—became merely the appanage
of King Constantine XIV. Even the canonical rights
of the Patriarchate of Constantinople were not specially
specified.

I was deeply astonished at the time that M. Sazonoff
could allow such complete shipwreck of the principles
that he had himself propounded with so much fairness
and feeling for the definite arrangement of the Balkan
imbroglio. I knew later that there had been reasons
for this; some of which had real weight, but others,
in my opinion, only deserved very relative con-
sideration.

Concerning the occupation of Adrianople and Thrace
by the Turks, M. Sazonoff met with stubborn opposition
from Germany in all attempts to reinstate the Bulgarians

in their rights of conquest. Our Foreign Secretary was

confronted anew by the humiliating vista of a semi-
ultimatum from Berlin; while from all his colleagues
of the Council he heard one and the same refrain: “Do
what you like, as long as we do not have war. War
would be the undoing of Russia!” The voice of the

1913] DIPEOMATIC. INFLUENCES 201

President of the Council, M. Kokovtzoff, made itself
particularly loudly heard in this chorus. Subsequent
events have proved how right he was!

As to the demarcation between Serbians and Bul-
garians, M. Hartwig’s influence was very discernible in
the question, as were also our very natural feelings of
special sympathy with the Serbians. We Russians are
generally prone to prefer the soft outlines of sentiment
to the rigid lines of justice. Moreover, one must allow
that the events which occurred later and the noble
behaviour of the Serbians have completely justified—
from a historic point of view—the!preference we showed
for them in 1913.

On the question of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier
we, with good reason, adhered to the principle that,
after all that had just occurred between Greeks and
Bulgarians, it was impossible to give the Bulgarians
any territories and towns with a Greek population.
This principle alone ought to have been sufficient cause
for us not to insist on the idea of leaving Kavala to the
Bulgarians; but in addition there was the insistence
of our faithful friend and ally, France, who was guided
in the matter by her consistent and traditional phil-
hellenism.

No doubt in giving in to the somewhat exaggerated
territorial claims of Serbia, Greece, and Rumania, our
Foreign Office was subject to certain Court influences.
The Royal Family of Greece, doubly related to our
Imperial Family, had latterly acquired a new advocate
for Greece in the person of the captivating Grand-
Duchess Helen—daughter of the late Grand-Duke
Viadimir—who had just married Prince Nicolas of
Greece. The Serbian Court had as a delegate in St.
Petersburg the intelligent and sympathetic Princess
Helen, daughter of King Peter, lately married to a
prince of the blood, John Constantinovitch. Finally,
at the Rumanian Court the matrimonial schemes of
M. Sazonoff seemed to be thriving, and we were already

anticipating ties of relationship with Bukharest in the
P

22 PEACE: OF BUKHAREST [CHAP. XII.

near future. Nothing of this sort existed in Ferdinand’s
favour. After his reprehensible conduct during the last
Balkan events, none of us dreamt any longer of the
possibility of sacrificing one of the daughters of the
Emperor by placing her under the despotic yoke of a
hostile and extremely disagreeable father-in-law. In
this matter also Ferdinand had lost his stake, and was
once again the cause of the definite check to Bulgarian
ambitions.

Far less comprehensible were the reasons by virtue
of which we allowed M. Sazonoff’s project and the stipu-
lations of the Conference of London on the subject of
Mt. Athos to drop completely. In our country the
chief reason was supposed to be the regrettable dis-
sensions that broke out among the Russian monks of
the Monte Santo in the spring and early summer of this
same year 1913. These dissensions, which arose out of
a theological controversy of an essentially secondary
and unimportant nature, unfortunately attracted the
exaggerated attention of the Universal Patriarchate,
and even drew forth cries of heresy! I have no doubt
that in doing this the Patriarchate was submitting to
the influence of a few politicians who wished Mt.
Athos, with its hallowed spots for pilgrimages, to
become simply Greek territory. It was most important
for the intriguing politicians—for those very men who,
clustering round Constantine XIV. two years later,
sold Greece to William IJ.—to be able to prove the
danger there would be in allowing the monks of Monte
Santo a complete independence without precedent in
the history of the Orthodox East. And the disputes of
the Russian monks happened most opportunely to
support their theory.

All this game was so apparent that even now I
do not understand how our Foreign Office, and our
Embassy in Constantinople, could have been taken in
and have attached such exaggerated importance to the
differences of opinion of a few cenobites!

1913] QUESTION OF MT. ATHOS 213

But in any case extraordinary measures were taken
on our side. We sent to Mt. Athos a Russian bishop,
Mer. Nikon, a member of the Foreign Office, M,
Mansuroff, known for his great piety and thorough
knowledge of ecclesiastical affairs of the Orthodox East,
and finally our Consul-General to Constantinople as
representative of the “executive” power. Proceedings
opened with free discussion, then came canonical and
dogmatic arguments; but as spirits became ever more
heated and as the dissentient monks gradually exceeded
all the limits of obedience and respect, it ended in the
fire hose being played on the turbulent cenobites (areu-
mentum ad hominem, argumentum ad Deum, argumentum
ad baculum); after which they were seized and sent to
Russia under an escort... there they were received
with affection and respect into monasteries, and the
ecclesiastical authorities found no taint of heresy in
their opinions !

It would seem as if, after such an essentially
“spiritual” peace-making, one might feel reassured
as to the uprightness of our cenobites’ faith, and could
take up M. Sazonoff’s scheme again. But the carrying .
out of this scheme would have raised endless difficulties
for our Foreign Office as well as for our Embassy in
Constantinople. So it was infinitely simpler and easier
to retire from the field definitely, consoling oneself
with the thought that a monastic republic at Mt. Athos
might all the same have held disagreeable surprises
for the order and the doctrine of the Orthodox Church.

Thus gradually all M. Sazonoff’s splendid ideas
collapsed and came to nothing, and finally our Balkan
diplomacy was in the same position as the hero of the
popular tale, who had exchanged a lump of gold for a
saddle-horse, the horse for a beautiful milch cow, the
cow for a pig, the pig for a goose, and the goose fora
grindstone which was so very heavy and cumbersome
that when it fell into the water the good lad was in-
ordinately relieved and intensely happy!»

214 PEACE OF BUKHAREST [CHAP, XIII.

The Treaty of Bukharest, in place of all that had been
so well thought out and drawn up by M. Sazonoff at the
time of the Conferences in London, yielded us one result
only as a consolation: the one I mentioned above and
which at the beginning had been so contrary to M.
Sazonoff’s way of thinking. This result was the alliance
binding Serbians, Rumanians and Greeks into one sheaf,
and directed mainly against the Bulgarians. We liked
to think that this new Balkan league would mainly
serve as a curb to Austria’s designs for expansion, and
would henceforth obey our wise guiding hand. This
was how it was viewed in a certain set in our Foreign
Office. Contemplating the punishment of the guilty
and the renewal of Russian influence in Greece and
Rumania, where this influence had been in jeopardy
for so long, some young and impetuous members of our
Foreign Office proclaimed the great victory of Russian
policy in the Near East, a victory gained without blood-
shed (Velikaya bezkrovnaya pobéda). When a young
colleague, who had come as a messenger to Sofia,
reported this talk to me, I told him to take a message
from me to all those who had indulged in it to the effect
that either this triumph would not last and we should
be obliged to renounce the largest share of our illusions
concerning the results of the Treaty of Bukharest, or
that blood would be shed and in such quantity as had
not been shed since the conquest of the Mongolians and
the grave disorders of the smoutnoye vremia.

When the terrible events of the world-war came to
put the solidity of the new system to the test it was
found that the Serbians alone remained entirely faithful
to the moral engagement into which they had entered
with us. In Greece and Rumania only a section of the
politicians considered that the events of 1913 bound
these States to Serbia and to Russia; others only saw in
them a triumph of diplomatic opportunism, after the
recording of which one could boldly resume former
sympathies and former engagements. Indeed, at the
moment of the great trial neither of the two States

1913] PAN-GERMANS AT WORK 215

thought of going at once to the help of Serbia when she
was attacked from behind by the Bulgarians; and the
desperate efforts of conscientious men of worth in both
countries were required to lead them back into the path
of honour and self-sacrifice !

I could not rid myself of the obsession that the
two Central Empires would never be reconciled to
the results of the Balkan War and of the Bukharest
Treaty. Germany having caused Adrianople to be
restored to the Turks and having herself regained all
her influence in Stambul, now had to fulfil her engage-
ments to Austria-Hungary, that is to say she had to
contribute to the humiliating and weakening of Serbia,
whose victories and political successes were making
her a centre of attraction to the Slav populations of the
Empire of the Hapsburgs.

From the signing of the Treaty of Bukharest I was
daily expecting either that we should be forced to enter
into conversations — most humiliating for us— with
Vienna and Berlin and to allow the two Central Powers
to seize advantages on the political ground of the Balkans
which would annul all the successes of 1912 and 1913, or
else that we should be attacked by the Central Empires.
As far as I know Sazonoff did not share these fears.
Resolved to oppose a calm and dignified resistance to
all attempts at political blackmail on Berlin’s part,
reckoning steadfastly on the support of France and
England, he believed that this attitude and this support
would suffice to check German policy on the dangerous
slope which could only lead to the formidable abyss of
a world-war. Subsequent events proved the futility of
these calculations. The Treaty of Bukharest had
singularly reinforced the arguments and the propaganda
of the Pan-Germans. And at the same time the active
co-operation of Turkey was again assured to Germany
in the event of a conflict, and to this co-operation that
of Bulgaria was added zu spe. From that time the
military party in Berlin was only concerned with
precipitating matters, with injecting energy and courage

216 PEACE OF BUKHAREST [CHAP. XIIL

into Austria, and causing war to break out before
Russia had got on with her armaments.

The fortnight that the negotiations of the Peace of
Bukharest lasted as well as the succeeding days were a
troublous and critical time for the capital of Bulgaria.
The reservists returning from the front were hurriedly
taken by railway lines which crossed at Sofia, and they
were often guilty of undisciplined and disorderly conduct
on the way. One of these skirmishes occurring at the
station of Sofia nearly took a serious turn. Luckily
most of the reservists were so glad to return to their
fields, their vineyards and their live-stock that they
became docile at once when the train that was to take
them back to their “home” was ready for them.

In Sofia itself one felt that the public was in a state
of ferment, exasperation even: on one side against the
King and on the other against Danev, who at the moment
was looked on as the chief culprit in the troubles which
had befallen Bulgaria. For a few days it was to be
feared that the crowd might gather round the ex-Prime
Minister’s house and attack him. Night and day the-
police guarded this house, which seemed to have been
deserted by every one. I thought it my duty—just at
this dreadful time—to call on the wretched Danev.
He appeared to have gone all to pieces and it was
piteous to see him. The gossip in town was that he
had attempted to commit suicide, but that his servants
had stopped himintime. Ferdinand, of course, was in a
terrible state of anguish and always had motor cars in
readiness for his instant flight from Sofia. However,
gradually the state of ferment calmed down, and when I
left Sofia at the beginning of October the King had
already left for his Hungarian property.

In Russia much surprise was felt that the defeats
and disasters of Bulgaria should not have served as
the signal for the downfall of Ferdinand. The fact
that after all that had occurred, he had calmly remained
at the head of the country made some—and the most

1913] BULGARIAN OPINION UNITED 217

intelligent—people believe that the Bulgarian nation
had been so accustomed to servitude that Ferdinand
could lead it whither he would. But I have always con-
sidered this theory absolutely false. Throughout the
events of 1912 and 1913, the greater number of the
Bulgarian people were as completely one with their
King as the German people of to-day are with William II.
The whole of Bulgaria at this period was seized with
an ardent desire to put the Treaty of San-Stefano into
force, and would not hear of anything else. The
Bulgarian people knew that nearly the entire Russian
Press—in other words Russian public opinion—had
taken the part of the Serbians, the Greeks and even
the Rumanians against Bulgarian claims. And the
Bulgarian people began fo su/k with Russia, like a
spoilt and naughty child sometimes sulks with its own
mother.

Ferdinand had never been popular in Bulgaria, and
one of the causes of this unpopularity lay in the
people’s deep conviction that this “ Swabio-Latin” could
not rejoice in the sympathies of the “Great Mother
Liberator” (velika Maika Osvoboditelka). Since they
thought they had been wronged by this same Maika
Osvoboditelka, and since certain politicians and “in-
tellectuals” had dared to attack her publicly, and others
in the inner recesses of their souls criticised her bitterly,
the Bulgarians by that self-same fact became one with
their dismal master and were inclined to submit to the
direction that Ferdinand henceforth sought to give to
Bulgarian policy. Up till then there had been but one
Tsar for the Bulgarians, the White Tsar, Orthodox,
Russian ; now, indulging more and more in their worst
sentiments, the Bulgarians began to recognise another
“Tsar,” he who personified deep-rooted and ill-con-
cealed vengeance.

On the sth (18th) August, only a few days after the
signing of the Treaty of Bukharest, the Bulgarian capital
celebrated the solemn return of her troops. The Bul-
garian soldiers, in their brown service uniforms, spoilt

218 PEAGE OF: BUKHAREST [CHAP. XIII.

by sun and rain, wearing their opankas (leather sandals),
bore traces of extreme fatigue on their emaciated and
sunburnt faces, but nevertheless they marched with
spirit and pride. Behind the infantry ghost-like horses
dragged the guns. Most of the generals whose names
had become so popular in 1912 were with their troops.
And the population of the town greeted them calmly
and sympathetically, recognising that they had done
their whole duty, and had deserved well of their
country. Most of the soldiers taking part in the march-
past were adorned with flowers, and so were King
Ferdinand and his two sons, who headed the procession
on horseback, and who were greeted by the crowd
without the slightest show of hostility. A Ze Deum of
thanksgiving was held in the Cathedral, to which the
whole Diplomatic Corps was invited. It was most
painful to me to take part in this Ze Deum and to
witness the march-past of the troops. Whatever the
responsibility of Ferdinand, and of the majority of the
Bulgarian politicians for all that had occurred, I could
not rid myself of the feeling that each of the Bulgarian
soldiers passing before me had, by his ardent patriotism
and undaunted courage, earned a less piteous result for
his country, and deserved a really triumphal entry into
his home. I knew that the Bulgarian people had their
share of guilt in the sad events which had occurred, but,
nevertheless, I could not help wondering whether others
should not bear some of the blame, and whether I
myself had done all I ought to prevent this melancholy
ending to our influence in Bulgaria.

A few days later I sent off a letter to Baron Schilling,
begging him to tell me whether the question of my
recall from Bulgaria was not being revived at the
Foreign Office. I added that I thought myself that,
after all that had occurred, I could no longer render
efficient services in Sofia.

I promptly received the reply that there was a
question of making me exchange with M. Savinsky,

1913] RUAOURS OF MY RECALL 219

whose position in Stockholm had become equally
difficult.

Being thus situated, I asked for a holiday of a few
weeks, and at the end of September, 1913, I went to
Paris on private business, and to meet M. Sazonoff, who
was due there then.

CHAPTER: AlV
MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM

Wuen I left Sofia, communication with Belgrade had
not yet been re-opened, and I had to take the Orient-
Express at Bukharest. It was a hot autumn day when
I did the journey between Sofia and Rustchuk. In the
evening, when I reached Rustchuk, a violent storm
occurred, and at dawn, when my travelling companion
and I went on board the small steamer which was to
take us to Giurgevo, on the other side of the Danube,
the weather had suddenly become so cold that we
seemed to have passed unexpectedly from September to
December. It was getting light; above the grey waves,
and under a leaden sky, a cutting north wind was
blowing, chasing a large flight of cawing crows. “ What
do you prognosticate, you birds of ill-omen?” I could
not help thinking. “What fresh carnage? What new
calamity ?”

On the short trip between Giurgevo and Bukharest,
we enjoyed the pleasant company of the Prefect of
Giurgevo. At Bukharest I found that M. Schebeko had
already left for St. Petersburg, having received the
notice of his appointment as Ambassador to Vienna
a few days previously. When I joined the Orient-
Express at two o'clock in the afternoon, I met M.
Majoresco, then still President of the Council of
Rumania, and I had a long talk with him about the
political events that had just occurred, and in which we.
had both taken such an active part. From the few
hours that I thus spent with Rumanians, I was able to
gather the impression that we enjoyed great popularity

in Rumania. I have no doubt whatever that the
220

713) MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM 221

recollection of Russian sympathy in 1913, and of the
support that we then lent to Rumanian policy, greatly
influenced the decision taken by the Rumanians in 1916,
when they finally ranged themselves on the side of the
Entente against the Central Empires. Unfortunately,
no good came of it, at least as far as Russia was
concerned !

The following day, during the picturesque journey
between Vienna and Munich, the sun was so bright and
hot that I forgot my flight of crows and the gloomy
thoughts which had perpetually assailed me during the
latter part of my stay in Sofia.

Two or three days after my arrival in Paris, I called
on M. Sazonoff, who, as usual, received me with great
friendliness. The Minister appeared tired but content,
and on the whole optimistic. This optimism spread to
those around him, and thence naturally reflected itself
back on him, increasing his confidence in the political
situation. M. Sazonoff questioned me at some length
on my opinion about the situation in Bulgaria; never-
theless, I had the feeling that he already possessed
fairly precise ideas on the subject, and that these did
not agree fundamentally with my opinion on the men
and affairs of the post that I was leaving. I was careful
not to lay any stress on this, and our conversation
turned naturally to questions concerning the post of
Stockholm, to which I was shortly to be appointed. It
was only then that I learnt from M. Sazonoff’s lips the
reason why M. Savinsky could no longer stay in
Sweden: the Grand-Duchess Marie (daughter of the
Grand-Duke Paul of Russia), who six years before had
married Prince William of Sweden (second son of the
King), was on the eve of separating from her husband.
Profiting by a journey to foreign parts, the Grand-
Duchess, on her arrival in Berlin, informed her husband
that she did not wish to live with him any more, and
she left to join her father in Paris. There was no
scandal, no romance even, to cause the divorce of the
Grand-Duchess! It was merely that this young Russian

222 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM [cu. xiv.

Grand-Duchess, familiar from her earliest youth with
the sight and the principles of the free and unrestrained
life of all the members of the Russian Imperial Family,
found her existence too narrow in the rigid environment
of the Royal Family of Sweden. The life seemed to her
petty, boring, and finally unbearable. Her husband,
who had a very youthful mind, did not possess the
necessary ascendancy over his wife, and for some time
the young couple had been contemplating the possibility

of a separation; they had remained “ good comrades,”
Pp y s

and discussed their future divorce together. Never-
theless, when the Grand-Duchess actually left her
husband, he was much vexed, and to a certain extent
sincerely grieved. The Royal Family and society at
the Court of Stockholm were also somewhat hurt in
their pride. Savinsky, who during the eighteen months
that he stayed in Sweden had gained the complete
confidence of the young Grand-Duchess, and become
what the old comedies call “the confidant”—but
absolutely nothing more—and who was aware of the
project of the divorce long before it took place, could
not decently remain at the Swedish Court. So it was
considered a good moment to send him to Sofia to King
Ferdinand, who had always liked him and paid him
marked attention. There were people in our country
who were convinced that Savinsky would be able to
accomplish what I had not been able to do, that is to
acquire the confidence and the sympathies of Ferdinand,
and to lead him, and naturally all his people with him,
back into the path of obedience and devotion to Russia.
A truly childish notion, but it was upheld by certain
influential persons in M. Sazonoff’s set!

It was agreed between the Minister and me that I
should not take up my new post till the Royal divorce
had actually been pronounced, otherwise my position
would be disagreeable and difficult from the outset.

Never before had Paris impressed me so strongly as
the town of pleasure and thoughtless luxury as she did

1913| M. KOKOVTZOFF IN PARIS 223

now. It was the time of the appearance of the famous
tango, of “Persian balls,” etc. There were “tango
suppers” at Ciro’s, and “tango teas” all over the place,
at which, in the afternoons, evenings, and nights,
professionals, amateurs, cocottes, women of the world,
Grand-Duchesses even, swayed gracefully or fluttered
comically about in new American dances. The best
St. Petersburg society was well represented. All this
Russian society filled the small theatres, the smart
restaurants, and the new dressmakers’ showrooms,
where modern models with modern manners showed
off startling toilettes, simplified and shortened, but far
more expensive than the former trains and flounces;
and the Russian painter Bakst gave the finishing
touches to these toilettes by decorating them with weird
flowers and arabesques, which were usually continued
on the chest and back of the charming “patient.” It
was as if some one was urging on all these people by
whispering in their ear: ‘Hurry up, hurry up, and
enjoy yourselves; these are the last months of your
thoughtless, brilliant, and luxurious existence!”

I was detained in Paris by private business, and
stayed there over six weeks. Some time after the
departure of Sazonoff (who stopped in Berlin on his
way back), M. Kokovtzoff arrived in Paris. I went
to call on him, of course, and had a conversation
with him. The President of the Council gave me the
impression that he did not share the optimism which
seemed to reign in our Foreign Office. He seemed to
dread complications from the side of Germany. On his
way back to St. Petersburg he also stopped in Berlin,
had an audience of the Emperor William, and interviews
with Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow and his colleague at the
Treasury. Reports circulated in St. Petersburg society
that these conversations had restored serenity to the
political atmosphere; but I should not at all like to
guarantee the authenticity of these reports.

From Paris I went by Vienna and Odessa to Yalta

224 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM (feu. xuv.

in Crimea, where my wife and daughter, who had left
Sofia in the meantime, were visiting my father-in-law.
The Court as usual was spending the autumn at Livadia,
and I meant to profit by my stay at Yalta to request an
audience of the Emperor.

On my arrival I asked my wife if she had called on
the Empress Alexandra.

‘There has been no formal calling,” was the answer.
“The Empress is not receiving officially at Livadia;
but I was invited to a dinner party followed by a re-
ception. We dined at small tables presided over by the
married Grand-Duchesses who are staying in the Crimea
just now. After dinner the young people danced. The
young Grand-Duchesses and the young ladies of Yalta
danced gaily and without any formality with the
young men, mainly officers from the Imperial yacht.”

“Was the Empress amiable ?”

‘Her Majesty did not say a word to any of the
ladies present; she remained seated all the time with a
sullen, almost tragic expression, and her face only lit up
a little when one of the young Grand-Duchesses came to
talk to her ; as to those delightful young girls, they were
thoroughly enjoying themselves!”

“ But what does all this mean ?”

“Oh! it is a long story, alas! By the way, here is
an invitation for us both to dine next Saturday, but I
have just heard that the dinner will not take place.”

Indeed, next day a messenger from the Palace
brought a note cancelling the invitation on account of
the indisposition of Her Majesty the Empress.

I was gradually initiated into all the gossip of Yalta
and Livadia, and this is what I learnt:

That year the Emperor and his family were de-
lighting in their stay in the Crimea. All were enjoying
good health. There was a great deal of lawn-tennis and
riding, and on Saturdays the young people danced.
For a brief period only was this gay life saddened by
the almost sudden death of Dedulin, the “Général du
jour” to His Majesty the Emperor. He was a worthy,

1913] GENERAL DUMBADZE 225

honest man, not distinguished by any extraordinary
ability, but who had never abused his position of
intimate association with the Sovereign! He was
sincerely mourned ; a few tears were shed at his funeral,
celebrated with all military and official honours; but
every one consoled;themselves quickly, and his succes-
sor had already been chosen... .

My French readers will doubtless remember Edmund
About’s charming tale called “The Man with the
broken Ear.” This fantastic and amusing story, which
verges on political satire, has as its hero a gallant colonel
of the Napoleonic armies who in 1812, at the rout of his
troops, is saved from certain death by an old German
wizard who turns him into a mummy and bequeaths
him to a learned society, with a description of the
means to be taken to restore him to life. The mummy,
after many vicissitudes, ends by falling into the hands
of a French great-nephew ; the means prescribed are
adopted, and the hot-headed officer of the Grand Army
is restored to life at the age of thirty in the midst of
the Napoleonic France of 1860!

I remembered “the Man with the broken Ear’
every time that I found myself in the presence of the
worthy General Dumbadze, who since 1906 had been
the military governor of the town of Yalta and its
environs, that is to say the guardian and principal
guarantee of the safety of the Emperor and his family
during their frequent visits to Livadia. Only in
Dumbadze’s case the old German wizard had not cast
his spell over a colonel of Napoleon’s Grand Army,
but over a young lieutenant of the gallant Caucasian
troops during the mountain warfare of the ’thirties
and ‘forties, a period which has been described by the
greatest Russian authors (Puchkin, Lermontoff, Tolstoi).
Georgian by birth, of brilliant courage and unimpeach-

1] have never understood what the functions were of the “ Général du
jour,” a barbarous term of Prussian survival. I believe that in reality
he had no very defined functions, which meant that he had a hand in
everything.

226 MY TRANSFER TQ’ SPOCKHOLM - chow,

able honesty, almost insanely devoted to the Tsar and
to military honour, but at the same time rather unculti-
vated and recognising no curb or limits to his despotism
except his own conscience, this curious specimen of a
bygone day attracted the particular attention of public
opinion and of the Russian Press. Extraordinary
stories were current of his administrative pranks, which
recalled the good old times of the Kaliphat of Baghdad
and of the Persia of Nadir-Shah. There was some
truth in these tales, and many private individuals had
cause for bitter complaint against the despotism of the
Pasha of Yalta. But on the other hand they affected to
ignore the highly respectable side—almost legendary
for modern times— of Dumbadze’s character and work.
He was absolutely inaccessible to considerations of
fortune and comfort. Father of a large family, he was
satisfied during the long years of his despotic rule with
amore than modest salary, and lived in four miserable
rooms which were reserved for him in the offices at
Livadia. During the last years only he was better paid,
and received an apartment in keeping with his rank and
functions. But during the whole period even his most
inveterate enemies could not accuse him of any dis-
honesty with regard to money.

This was the man who was about to be appointed
to the late Dedulin’s post, and to be definitely attached
to the person of His Majesty the Emperor. But at this
moment an incident occurred which no one—except
Caucasian officers of the 'forties—could have foreseen
or understood.

At the height of his favour at Court, Dumbadze, who
was still fulfilling the duties of military governor of
Yalta, heard that the celebrated “old man,” Gregory
Rasputin, had just arrived at one of the most modest
hotels in the town; and the very next day, by the
governor's orders, the said “old man” was sent away
from Yalta and its environs as “a person of no occu-
pations and without visible means of subsistence.”
Given the small “state of siege” to which the town was

1913] RASPUTIN AGAIN 227

subjected during the visits of the Imperial Family, this
expulsion was perfectly legitimate. But imagine the
effect produced! The Empress’s health declined im-
mediately, and her good temper, resulting from the
healthy climate of Crimea and the charming family life
in the bosom of radiant nature, was changed to gloomy
and nervous anxiety. The Vyrubova began to trot to
and fro between Livadia, the church of the diocese, and
the modest hotel where the wife (or rather one of the
wives) and one of the daughters of Rasputin had remained.
The people about the Court when they met Dumbadze
stared at him as one stares at a lunatic or a dangerous
criminal. Finally, after a few days of painful indecision
and probably in consequence of violent curtain-lectures,
the Emperor sent for Dumbadze and asked him by what
right he had considered himself authorised to expel
from Yalta “the excellent old man, Gregory”? Dum-
badze replied most calmly and frankly that he looked
on the old man as a suspicious and dangerous person,
and that he had expelled him conformably with the law
and duty imposed on him by his post.

“But all the same, how could you do it, knowing
to what extent the Empress and I love and esteem
Gregory? I beg of you, General, if it is possible, to
authorise this poor man to rejoin his family at Yalta.”

“Sir,” Dumbadze then replied, to end this painful
discussion, “ Your Majesty is well aware that I would
shed my last drop of blood for you and your august
family ; but I intend to preserve my honour as an officer
up to the end, towards and against all. Moreover, Your
Majesty can at any moment relieve me of the post
which you have graciously confided to me.”

The Emperor was silent, then passed to another
topic, and dismissed the General with his usual kind-
ness. Dumbadze remained military prefect, and of
course never dreamt of allowing Rasputin to return.
On the other hand, there was no more mention of the
General’s candidature for the high Court appointment
which had been destined to him, and the persons of the

Q

228 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM [cu. xiv.

Emperor's suite, who shortly before had been speaking
of Dumbadze with sympathy and respect, were one and
all laughing at the Oriental methods of administration
of the prefect of Yalta, at his love of fine speeches and
his other little weaknesses.

The Empress could not recover from the blow to
her dearest feelings ; she ceased to receive and to show
herself in public ; one only saw her occasionally driving
in a closed motor with her daughters, with a set and
sad expression on her face.

In spite of all this tribulation, a few days after my
arrival at Yalta I asked the Court Minister, Count
Fredericsz, to obtain an audience of His Majesty the
Emperor for me, and I soon received a command to
go to the Palace of Livadia' on the 2nd (15th) December
at noon.

I arrived at the appointed hour at the new Palace of
Livadia, which I had not yet seen, and then had to wait
for my audience for more than half an hour. The
Emperor, contrary to his usual habits, was late, as he was
out with his daughters. The Court lived most simply
at Livadia. The Palace did not possess any special
waiting-room, the aide-de-camp on duty usually accom-
panied the Emperor in his walks. So I spent half an
hour in the pretty and fairly spacious hall of the Palace,
in the porter’s company (‘ie Swiss as we still call him),
an old and friendly servant who questioned me with
great interest and some knowledge of the subject about
the events that had just occurred in Bulgaria. This
original colloquy between the porter and the Minister
Plenipotentiary (and yet foreigners dare to doubt our
democratic ways!) only ended with the arrival of the
Emperor, who begged me to follow him. His Majesty
received me graciously and addressed a few common-
places to me; “as to business,” he added, “ we will turn
to that after luncheon, we are rather late as it is.”

1 During their Majesties’ stay at Livadia, persons of a certain rank

who went to see the Emperor, were invited at the close of their interview
to the family lunch.

1913 | AT. LIVADIA 229

Besides the Emperor and the four young Grand-
Duchesses there were only about a dozen of the people
about the Court at luncheon, among others the celebrated
Vyrubova and the less celebrated Admiral Niloff. I
was placed to the left of His Majesty between the
Grand-Duchesses Tatiana and Anastasia. The four
young princesses rivalled one another in charm and
beauty, and the youngest, Anastasia, a child of twelve
years of age, specially pleased me by her bright, in-
telligent and open expression; I began ashort conversa-
tion with my delightful neighbour and was charmed
by the childish and yet at the same time serious vein in
all she said.

As I write these lines! nothing is known in the
civilised world—or calling itself such—of the fate of
these unfortunate young girls. One knows that their
father was cruelly and brutally assassinated by the pack
of brigands to whom Russia is obedient at the present
time. Sinister reports are circulating as to the fate of
these four delightful young girls, torn from the most
brilliant heights of an existence in which they still only
breathed an atmosphere of beauty and virtue and
suddenly plunged into an abyss of treachery, total
desertion, revolting physical and moral filth. Have they
perchance been saved and hidden in some obscure
retreat in the heart of the Siberian forests, or else—
horribile dicta—have they also undergone a terrible
martyrdom? No one in Europe knows for certain;
and moreover no one seems much concerned with this
embarrassing question ; there are so many other things
to think about and guard against!

Alas! who could have evoked such lugubrious
pictures in the immediate future; who could have pre-
dicted such a terrible fate for those who on this beautiful
December morning were gathered round the Imperial
table at Livadia? Through the large bay-windows of
the dining-room one saw a pretty white patio full of late
autumn roses ; every one’s face reflected the pleasure of

! October, 1918.

230 MY TRANSFER TO’ STOCKHOLM: (cu xv:

exercise taken in the vivifying and scented air of the
mountains opposite the boundless expanse of sea. The
charming young Countess Hendrikoff was being very
much teased because in the absence of her elders and
betters she was occupying the seat of the Grand Mistress
of the Court. Fresh plans were being made for ex-
peditions on horseback. Between the Emperor and his
daughters one noticed avery strong current of affection,
of charming intimacy, almost of camaraderie.

When lunch was over and we had taken our coffee
in the hall, the Emperor went round talking to every one
in turn, and then coming up to me told me to follow
him. The Emperor himself opened one door after
another; passing through the big saloon he turned to
me and said: ‘“The Empress is generally to be found in
this saloon when we come out of the dining-room and
then we have coffee in here; but just now unfortunately
she is indisposed and does not come downstairs.” He
seemed to be excusing himself to me—the guest of the
hour—for the absence of the mistress of the house.
When we reached the study the Emperor installed him-
self in an armchair and begged me to be seated.

“ And now tell me everything,” he said.

“T haveindeed much to tell Your Majesty,” I replied ;
“where do you wish me to begin ?”

The Emperor thought for a moment and then said
with a subtle smile:

“What were your relations with King Ferdinand,
and what do you think of him?”

I disclosed quite frankly to the Emperor the course
of my personal relations with Ferdinand and I did not
conceal the unfavourable opinion I had formed of the
King’s character. Imperceptibly I passed on to the last
Balkan crisis. When speaking of the negotiations which
had ended in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, I
allowed myself to draw His Majesty’s attention to the
fact that during these negotiations I had repeatedly laid
stress in my confidential letters to M. Sazonoff on the
danger of a Balkan war as the logical consequence of

1913] AUDIENCE OF THE EMPEROR 231

the agreement between Serbians and Bulgarians, directed
in substance against Turkey.

“Yes, yes, I know that ; Sazonoff showed me your
letters,” said the Emperor. I passed on to subsequent
events and, speaking of the recent Bulgarian disaster,
I drew an accurate picture for His Majesty of the
present situation in Bulgaria, not concealing that not
only King Ferdinand but also the majority of the Bul-
garian people were nursing bitter resentment against
Russia.

“And yet,” I added, “among the larger number of
Bulgarians, this feeling has not completely obliterated
the traditions of gratitude and devotion towards their
Great Liberator and the ‘White Tsar.’ These traditions
are dimmed, but they could and should revive. I
allow myself to pronounce frankly the opinion that at
the Peace Conference of Bukharest the Bulgarians were
too hardly treated. If we could make the Bulgarians
understand that at the first favourable opportunity we
would cause at least a part of what they have just lost
to be restored to them they would live on that. hope.
It is dangerous to denude a people of all hope: it
humiliates them, depresses them and exposes them to
the most hateful influences. .. .”

“But what do you think one could restore to the
Bulgarians ?” interrupted the Emperor rather sharply.

“Part of Macedonia, sir, if the Serbians could obtain
the access to the Adriatic that has been so unjustly
taken from them. But more especially, and above all
else, Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisseh.”

The Emperor reflected for an instant. “Yes,” he
said finally, “but at the present time it would be
extremely difficult... . No, no! just nowit cannot even

be thought of; and how can we allow them to nourish
unrealisable hopes?” A vein of sincere regret was
apparent in this reply. Aftera slight pause I resumed:
“T still have to crave your forgiveness, sir, for not
having been able to carry out Your Majesty’s generous
schemes with regard to Bulgaria.”

232 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM {cn. x1,

“Not at all, you have done your best; it is their own
fault 1”

“Yes, sir, but perhaps some one else would even so
have been able to influence them and to prevent all that
has occurred, . . .”

“No, no,” broke in the Emperor again, “you have
done all that was in your power to do, but against
fate”—he immediately corrected himself: “against the
decrees of Providence, one cannot struggle. I wish to
express my sincere gratitude to you for all your services
in Bulgaria.” I made alow bow. “And now go to the
Swedes,” he added with a merry smile as he rose from
his chair. For a few minutes still the Emperor talked
about Sweden, King Gustaf, and the Royal Family,
and he approved highly of what Sazonoff and I had
arranged about postponing my departure for Sweden
until the Grand-Duchess Marie’s divorce had been defi-
nitely pronounced. I noticed that His Majesty spoke of
Sweden and of the Royal Court with much sympathy.
His last and fairly recent visit to Stockholm had evidently
left a good impression on him. I was very graciously
dismissed after an audience which had lasted an hour.

A few days later I left the Crimea and went, wd
Odessa and Vienna, to Sofia in order to make the final
arrangements for my removal and to hand my letters of
recall to King Ferdinand, who had left in September
before my appointment to Stockholm was settled,
so that I had not been able to take leave of him, as
is customary on such occasions. I spent about ten
days in Sofia. But I was not invited to go to the
King till two days before my departure. Ferdinand
received me in his study; he was in the undress
uniform of his Russian regiment (I had been told
to wear morning dress); I found Prince Boris with
the King. Having invited me to sit down, the King,
after a few trifling words, stared at me and said,
“Monsieur, you have probably read the pamphlet
written against me by your compatriot, the news-

Se REO oye

1913] INTERVIEW WITH FERDINAND 233

paper correspondent,' So-and-so. . . . How did it
please you?” The King spoke in French, but, as his
custom was, he interlarded his sentences with Russian
words and expressions; these expressions were gene-
rally apt and correctly used, but pronounced with quite
a foreign accent. ‘As for me, I have read the vile book
attentively, and I was glouboko vosmouchten.2 1 gave it
to my son to read, and he will tell you his impression
of it,” he continued, turning to Boris.

The latter, with an expression of perfect obedience
on his face, half rose from his chair, and turning to me
stammered out, “Yes, monsieur, I too was glouboko
vosmouchten.”

“T believe you know the gentleman very well?”
continued the King, turning to me again.

I realised that the King wished to appear to believe
that the pamphlet in question had been inspired by me.
I parried the thrust by replying in my most cutting
tones that I did not know the correspondent; that I
had once refused to see him, and that he had published
something offensive about me as weil—‘‘a fact which
Your Majesty, who knows all, cannot but be aware of.”
This was the absolute truth. I had actually forbidden
my house to this gentleman, who had arrived in Sofia
at the time of the mobilisation, and who had sent to his
newspaper some absurd telegrams abusive of the Bul-
garian Government and ill-natured about the Russian
Legation. But I ought to mention that one of my minor
subordinates—a contemptible and scheming individual
—had allowed himself, unknown to me, to present this
journalist to Danev, and had probably supplied him
with a few details about the Court of Sofia, details
which he himself had obtained through his intimacy
with the servants at the Palace. This same individual
spied on his chiefs—the Russian Ministers—on Ferdi-
nand’s behalf.

1 Such an insignificant person that I have forgotten his name, nor

do I remember to what second-class newspaper he was correspondent.
2 Highly indignant.

234 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM {cu. xu.

My answer having cut short the topic of the cor-
respondent and his pamphlet, Ferdinand turned the
conversation on to political ground, and began in a
tone of bitter sarcasm to ask me questions about
Russia’s ulterior intentions with regard to the stipu-
lations of the Treaty ot Bukharest. “What have you
decided about Kavala? What about the left bank of
the Vardar?” and how were we going to reconcile our
manifest desertion of Bulgaria with the telegram in
which, in the name of His Majesty the Emperor, the
promise had been given to shield Bulgaria from too
much humiliation and abasement? This time the blow
struck home, and it was impossible for me to parry it
with really plausible explanations. But being in my
turn glouboko vosmouchten at the most unseemly tone
which the King allowed himself to use to the Imperial
Minister of Russia, I replied:

“Sir, the Bulgarians have drawn their misfortunes
on themselves, and have forced Russia to give up all
attempts to come to their assistance. And Your Majesty
knows better than any one when the irreparable blow
was struck at Bulgaria’s interests: it was on the 16th
(29th) of June last. Your Majesty knows as well as I
do that I had nothing to do with that day of misfortune,
of which I was the first dupe.”

Ferdinand cast his most evil glance at me, but re-
strained himself, and after a short silence, without
raising his eyes, he said: “Yes, that was a great mis-
take.” Then he rose and took leave of me. I have not
seen him since.

From the King’s study I was led to the apartments
of Queen Eleanor. There quite a different, but no less
original, welcome awaited me. The Queen, almost while
the customary greetings were being exchanged, abruptly
asked me: “Do tell me, monsieur, how has all this hap-
pened ?”

I answered Her Majesty quite frankly that I per-
mitted myself to consider that the King’s lack of con-
fidence in me was one of the causes of the political

i ee

1913} INTERVIEW WITH QUEEN ELEANOR 235

catastrophe in Bulgaria. In all our conversations, in
all the advice which I had felt bound to give him, I was
guided solely by the real good of Bulgaria. From the
day of my arrival in Sofia I had always and absolutely
refused to act against the King; and during this time
His Majesty was working behind my back and often
against me personally....

‘But in whom has he ever had confidence?” ex-
claimed the Queen. “ He distrusts even me.”

I no longer remember what my answer was, but
involuntarily I raised my voice a little.

“Hush! in Heaven’s name, speak lower,” interrupted
the poor Queen, casting a furtive glance towards one of
the doors of the room; “this is the most dangerous room
in the Palace.”

Eleanor then went on to make complaints about the
conduct of the Rumanians in the environs of Varna,
that town so truly dear to her.

“It is particularly painful to me on account of Queen
Elisabeth. We are two German princesses on Balkan thrones,
and in spite of that our respective people have become
completely hostile to one another! You are doubtless
aware of the horrors committed by the Rumanians in
the environs of Varna against an unfortunate population
that I know and love so well. ... Some young girls,
monsieur, some young girls! ... No, if now we were
to have a new and real war with Rumania, I should be
capable of harnessing myself to a gun, so great is my
indignation against them!”

At this point, in spite of the truly tragic tone of the
Queen, | could hardly suppress my mirth; I pictured
the poor speaker in the entirely new role of an artillery
draught-horse, and from the opposite side I could see
the respectable Carmen Sylva also perhaps obliged to
assist in the transport of guns or ammunition... . I
hastened to make the Queen turn to a less ticklish
topic.

“When you see the Emperor,” she said in conclu-
sion, ‘pray convey to him my sincerest good wishes.

236 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM [cu. xiv.

You know how much I like him and all his family ; and
I am still cordially devoted to them in spite of all that
has occurred.”

On this I took my leave of Queen Eleanor—and for
ever; she died three years later.

On my way back to Russia I spent a few days in
Vienna. I used to know this city very well, but since
my long stay in Paris I had only passed through it.
This time the gay Austrian capital, where the season
was in full swing, had a depressing effect on me.
There was an atmosphere of uneasiness, and the
ingenuous and gay good temper which has always
been a characteristic trait of the Viennese of all
classes, seemed to have completely disappeared. I
mentioned this impression to a few members of our
Embassy.

“Ts it really so?” I asked them, “or have I aged so
terribly in the meantime that everything seems to me
aged and tarnished around me?”

“Not at all,” was the reply. ‘One can no longer
recognise Vienna, and the cause lies in the profound
anxiety reigning here. No one is sure of the morrow.
All business is at a standstill, and heaps of people have
been ruined on the Bourse. Every one is afraid of war.
This began already in 1909, but now it has reached a
state of paroxysm. Several great financiers say openly
that it would be better if war actually broke out, for
this awaiting of events and perpetual uncertainty are
more ruinous than anything. But on the whole every
one fears war.”

By the middle of January, O.S., I was in St. Peters-
burg. Never had the rich world of St. Petersburg
amused itself as it did during that dast winter. In
society, one entertainment succeeded another. Fancy-
dress balls, balls where coloured wigs were worn,
parties at the Embassies, and in the Grand-Dukes’
palaces. Theatres and restaurants were filled every
evening with a brilliant crowd. There was much

1914] IN ST. PETERSBURG 237

speculating on the Bourse among all ranks of society ;
all stocks were rising; the public generally won and
anticipated fresh gains.

I still remember the magnificent fancy-dress ball
given by the Countess Kleinmichel, the rooms filled
with the most brilliant people of St. Petersburg, the
beautiful hall with columns through which the Persian
quadrille, the chief feature of the evening, made its
entry. To the strains of a fine orchestra, there appeared
on the staircase, like a many-hued serpent, the “theory”
of sixteen beautiful young women and as many
cavaliers holding hands, and showing off gorgeous
brocades and beautiful furs, magnificent jewels and
most costly Oriental weapons. The Grand-Duchess
Cyril and the Grand-Duke Boris led the quadrille, in
which—chosen from amongst the best—the prettiest and
most graceful representatives of that set of young
ladies whom I had nicknamed “the bayadéres of the
Order of the Grand-Dukes” took part. The men mostly
belonged to the smartest regiments of the Guard. Six
months later, half these fine young men—and many
others who were dancing and enjoying themselves at
this ball—fell dead or dangerously wounded on the first
and glorious battlefields of Eastern Prussia.

As I was admiring this brilliant spectacle I found,
on turning my head, that I was standing next to Count
Witte, whom I had not seen since 1910.

“Ah! Good evening!”

“Good evening!”

“When did you arrive?”

“A week ago.”

“What a beautiful sight!”

“Yes, enchanting! But tell me, my dear Count, do
you not feel as if you were assisting at the ‘ Festivity
during the Plague,’ or rather ‘before the Plague’?”
I had hardly spoken these words when Witte’s face
assumed a terribly serious expression. ... He seized

1 A very well known dramatic piece in verse by our celebrated poet,
Puschkin.

238 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM {cu. xiv.

me by the arm, exclaiming: “Then you also have that
impression ?”

“Most certainly. Ever since I have been in St.
Petersburg, I cannot get rid of the feeling. . . .”

“T know! I know!” returned the Count excitedly.
“We are going God alone knows where; God alone
knows to what abyss! It is impossible to go on like
GHIS. oa pa

At this moment the mistress of the house came up
to Witte, and asked him to go and play bridge at the
table of one of the Grand-Duchesses present. I was
put at another table, so I could not ascertain what
constituted the object of the very sincere apprehensions
of the celebrated statesman: was it war or a revolution?
I personally dreaded war. This was, moreover, my last
meeting with Count Witte, who died in St. Petersburg
a year and a half later.

A few days after, a lovely ball was given by
Countess Betsy Schuvaloff in the splendid setting of
her mansion of the Fontanka, former palace of the
famous Marie Narichkin, ée Czetwertynska, recognised
mistress of Alexander I.; a palace full of works of art
of the eighteenth century, and combining the refined
luxury of the Narichkins and the Schuvaloffs—the
favourites of an epoch when the Russian nobility,
suddenly become European, threw themselves heart
and soul into the enjoying of the art and luxury of a
century of refinement and beauty that were almost
classical. Alas! What has become of this beautiful
mansion? It is said to have been ransacked and
plundered, like so many other palaces in St. Petersburg,
the works of art broken, destroyed, or else sold to
Germany or America. The insane bet made by Peter
the Great seemed to have been won, and even beyond
the dreams of this greatest of barbarian reformers.
Midst snow and ice, in a marshy desert inhabited by
some half-savage Finns, art and science, all the beauties
and products of civilisation held a rendezvous; cele-
brated libraries and museums, famous theatres, threw

1914] PRINCE ALEXANDER OF SERBIA 239

open their doors in a majestic and magnificent setting
that was almost unique. ... And suddenly darkness
set in over all this beauty, a wind blew, an earthquake
which seemed slight and harmless shook the country,
and we do not even know what will still exist of all this
wealth of culture and life, when at last a new day shall
dawn on the desolation so often predicted and never
believed in.

But I hasten to leave this lugubrious contemplation,
set in the charming frame of such recent and yet
far-away memories, and to return to the brilliantly
illuminated rooms of Countess Schuvaloff. Amongst
the august personages present I met Prince Alexander
of Serbia, who had arrived in St. Petersburg a few days
before. The Prince drew me aside, and after a few
genuinely kind words, asked me the following question :
“ Pray, Monsieur, will you tell me your honest opinion:
after all that has happened, can one still hope for the
renewal of friendly, or at least neighbourly, relations
between Serbia and Bulgaria? Or will the Bulgarians
for some time still remain our most irreconcilable
adversaries? You know Bulgaria better than any one,
and that is why I am particularly anxious to know your
opinion.”

I thanked the Crown Prince for his flattering trust
in me, and [| told him very frankly that I thought
that relations between Serbians and Bulgarians were
radically compromised for many years; I added that
Serbia, in carrying out her policy, must not for one
instant lose sight of the fact that she had beside her an
irreconcilable foe, only existing in the hope of a fierce
revenge. “It is very sad, and the situation ought to be
gradually remedied; but it is a fact, and in politics
everything must be based on facts,” I concluded.

“That is also my opinion,” agreed Prince Alexander ;
“here I am assured on all sides that it would be easy to
approach the Bulgarians again and come to terms with
them; but I must confess that I do not believe it, and
your opinion shows me that I am right.”

240 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM [ceun. xiv.

When I recall these strange and significant con-
versations held in a festive setting, and to the strains of
dance music, I say to myself that Madame Bovary was
not entirely wrong when she imagined diplomats to be
“people who with a smile on their lips and death in
their hearts whispered terrible secrets to each other,
midst feasts and festivities!”

The last great ball at which I was present was the
one given at the German Embassy. When I entered
those over-gilded rooms, full of valuable marbles
and bronzes, and offering the most ostentatious
specimen of the vilest Berlin taste, I could certainly
not have imagined that less than six months later a
furious yelling crowd would burst in, would break and
shatter all these luxurious possessions, would stain
the well-polished floors with blood, and would wreck
even the marble facings of the palace, henceforth
accursed.

I went, of course, to call on M. Kokovtzoff, and found
him even more gloomy than at our last interview in
Paris. Moreover, at the moment questions of foreign
policy were relegated—temporarily at least—to the
second place, because of the burning question of the
Spirit monopolies raised in the bosom of the Council of
the Empire by Count Witte with the obvious intent to
compass the downfall of Kokovtzoff, and—who knows—
perhaps to get his post. With all his serious and
respectable qualities of judgment and _ intelligence,
Kokovtzoff did not possess the adaptability and subtle
mind necessary for parliamentary struggles; he was too
straight, too upright, and perhaps also too susceptible
for this see-saw policy. He ought to have addressed to
Count Witte the insidious question: how the former
Minister of Finance proposed to make good the loss of
revenue from the spirit monopoly in the Budget ; he who
had been the author of this monopoly, and who, like all
his predecessors, had based a third of the Budget of the
Empire on the revenue furnished by the drunkenness

1914) MM. KOKOVTZOFF’S RESIGNATION — 241

of the people? Instead, Kokovtzoff set himself to
defend the very system of the monopoly, and thus
injured himself in public opinion, as well as in the mind
of the Emperor, who at this period had already taken
the firm resolution—alas! far too late—to put an end
to the terrible disease of Russia—the alcoholism of an
entire people. A few days later Kokovtzoff had to
resign the posts of President of the Council and of
Minister of Finance. On leaving he received the title
of Count, and a sum of 300,000 roubles, a gratuity which
nevertheless he promptly and absolutely declined, in
spite of an almost entire lack of private means. He
was replaced as Minister of Finance by M. Bark, an
intelligent and experienced bank-manager, but nothing
more.

In the person of Kokovtzoff the Emperor lost a
sincere councillor, moderate and scrupulously truthful,
and the State lost an earnest financier and a Minister
who was absolutely upright and a gentleman. His
departure still further increased the internal and ex-
ternal perils of Russia. On questions of foreign policy
Kokovtzoff had no preconceived system; if he had had
the power he would, I think, have been inclined to
subordinate these questions as much as possible to those
of the economic prosperity of Russia. A sincere friend
of France and the French, Kokovtzoff, however, was
often obliged to turn his face towards Berlin, first, in
view of the immediate financial interests of the State,
and then because of the fear of a rupture with Germany.
No one dreaded war for Russia so much as Kokovtzoff,
for he was aware both of our lack of military pre-
paration and of the revolutionary ferment which was
penetrating ever more deeply into the lower classes
and gaining ground daily.

Count Kokovtzoff was replaced, as President of the
Council, by M. Goremykin. Soon after his appointment
I called on this respectable old gentleman and his
charming and worthy wife. M. Goremykin complained
bitterly of not being allowed to end his days in peace.

242 MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM [cen. xrv.

He and his wife had just settled themselves very com-
fortably in one of the flats in a house they owned in a
quiet and fashionable part of St. Petersburg. When
taking me “round the property,” M. Goremykin drew
my attention to a detail: “Here is my bedroom,” he
said, ‘there is my wife’s, and the room between was
meant for the hospital nurse who was to come and
stay with us in the event of illness, so frequent, alas!
with both of us. You will understand by this detail
alone how difficult it is for me, at my age and with my
infirmities, to take up again work that I know so well
and which imperatively demands strength and unre-
mitting toil.” And, indeed, during the two and a half
years that Goremykin remained in power this time,
until this honest man was replaced by Sturmer, he
was but a figure-head, and the Government machinery
usually worked without the President of the Council.
This exactly suited all sorts of sharpers and shady char-
acters who began at this time to penetrate even to the
steps of the throne, and who were delighted to find
no firm hand or implacable will at the head of official
power.

I went, as I always did when in St. Petersburg, to
pay a long visit to our former Ambassador to Con-
stantinople, M. Zinovieff. He had been one of my
predecessors in Stockholm, and I felt interested to
gather his impressions and opinions on men and matters
in Sweden. Hehad liked the country, and he had been
popular and much appreciated there.

From Sweden we passed on quite naturally to
general political questions.

“Listen, M. Nekludoff,” the aged and distinguished
diplomat said with his usual frankness; “ what are we
about here? Weare going straight into war! They
are arming in Germany, Austria and Turkey; they are
champing their bits in Sofia, and we seem not to notice
it! If you would but tell them at home all that you
have just told me; ¢iey must listen to you!”

os M. ZINOVIEFF 243

“In the first place,’ I replied, “1 have said it and
written it repeatedly to the Foreign Office. And then,
do not forget, my dear Ambassador, that at the present
moment I am the man who has suffered a reverse,
rightly or wrongly this reverse is imputed to me;
hence I have less credit than I had formerly. Why
do you not confide your thoughts and worries to
M. Sazonoff? I know that you stand high in his
esteem.”

“]T have spoken to him repeatedly! But you know
how it is—these young people will not listen to me.”
(The young people were well over fifty at this time, but
one must admit that the excellent M. Zinovieff was
nearly eighty). ‘I esteem M. Sazonoff very highly,”
continued my amiable host; “he is gifted and a gentle-
man, he is quick-witted and very cultured, and—in
spite of his youth—has a fair amount of experience; he
judges men and matters remarkably well, especially
when he judges them himself and by himself; he has earned
the perfect confidence of our allies; he is particularly
esteemed in England, which is not an easy thing for a
Russian Minister to be. But his optimism! his
optimism! That is the only thing that I deplore in
him, and that I fear for him and for us all!”

“You have just said, my dear Ambassador,” I
replied, “that our Foreign Secretary is a very good
judge when he judges things himself and by himself.
That is absolutely true. But in order to form a judg-
ment on the general situation, he must weigh the advice
of our agents abroad, beginning with the ambassadors;
if the latter represent things in a favourable light, he
is bound to believe them unless he has grave reason to
distrust their opinion. And then at the Minister’s side,
there are always the Offices... that must not be
forgotten.”

“Ah, yes! the Offices! But you need not tell me
that!” exclaimed the aged Ambassador, flinging his
arms up to heaven.

And, as a fact, the reports of our representatives

R

244. MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM.” [cu. mr:

abroad were not at all alarming at this time. In March
—on the 17th, if Iam not wrong—the French Ambas-
sador to Berlin, M. Jules Cambon, wrote his famous
dispatch which was a cry of warning, and which fore-
saw all that was about to happen; this was followed by
reports from other French representatives which were
equally prophetic. All these dispatches figure in the
French Yellow Book on the origin of the war. One
would search in vain in our Orange Book for anything
on the same subject. There was nothing either in the
documents communicated to the Russian representa-
tives abroad. Perhaps there may have been some very
confidential letters which have not been printed. But
then why have these not been published in the Orange
Book so as to make known to the public the vigilance
and the perspicacity of our representatives at the most
dangerous and most responsible posts? All this is
even now a riddle to me.

At last the divorce of the Grand-Duchess Maria
and Prince William of Sweden was pronounced, the
pecuniary questions in connection with it were settled,
and I was able to think of taking up my post. Before
starting I called again on the Emperor, who received
me very graciously, but did not detain me long. At
the Foreign Office also no one talked seriously to me
about the conditions and object of my new post. They
spoke of the Court, of the Grand-Duchess’s divorce, of
Savinsky, but not a word about our relations with
Sweden and the attitude of the Swedes towards us.
“Oh, well! You will arrive, you will see, you will write
to us”—that was the viaticum with which I departed.
I had as usual studied the record of the dispatches
of my predecessors; I could add to this most meagre
equipment opinions gathered from M. Zinovieff and
interesting information that I obtained in my private
and friendly conversations with another of my prede-
cessors, Baron Budberg, a man of judgment, tact and
experience who had managed to make an admirable

_ position for himself in Sweden, and who, from there,
‘was appointed Ambassador to Madrid.

=": On the 2nd March, N.S., after twenty-four hours
spent on a comfortable and pleasant journey, half in the
___ train and half on a steamer, I arrived in Stockholm for
the first time in my life.

CHAPTER XV
SWEDEN IN IQI4

Happy is the nation that has no history. Fora hundred
years, from 1815, Sweden has had no history in the
ordinary sense of the word, that is to say that she has
sustained no wars or revolutions, and has not taken an
active part in the political events of Europe. Neverthe-
less profound changes have taken place during this
period in the conditions of existence of the Swedish
people, and in the political and economic structure of
the country; and these changes, contrasted with the
curious survivals of the former social state of the king-
dom and with the original mentality of the people,
presented and still present a spectacle worthy of the
earnest historian’s attention.

From 1700 and until 1809 the principal enemy, the
hereditary enemy of Sweden, was Russia—the /mperial
Russia of Peter the Great, Elizabeth, Catherine and
Alexander I.; and the home policy of the country adapted
itself to the vicissitudes of this perennial struggle.

The aristocratic régime, headed by the Oxenstiernas,
had in the seventeenth century placed the international
power of Sweden on a pinnacle, and shed a lustre on the
justice and administration of the kingdom that all the
other countries of Europe might well envy ; the first two
Kings of the Vasa-Zweibriicken branch, energetic and
authoritative, wished to have their share of glory and
influence, so to lucky and easy conquests they added
reforms which struck a blow at the exclusive ascendancy
of the nobility, and enhanced the fame of Swedish justice
and administration.

246

1914] GUSTAF III. 247

Left an orphan at a tender age, and having had ever
since he was eighteen a struggle with a formidable
coalition on his hands, Charles XII. was naturally led to
reinforce the authority of the Royal power and to ruin
that of the Senate and of the high nobility entirely.
As he was vanquished in the fight and as entire provinces
had passed to his great antagonist, from the moment of
the King’s death public opinion demanded a return to
former systems of government. The aristocratic régime
re-instated itself in Sweden with the last of the
Varangians, and the first of the Holstein-Hottorps, but
it was a régime that had lost its rigidly Protestant and
Cromwellian character, revealing daily more and more
of the sceptical levity of the century of the Regent and
of the Pompadour. This régime culminated in a second
war with Russia, a war insanely provoked and execrably
managed, and Sweden lost another considerable portion
of Finland. Decidedly the aristocracy were no longer
profitable! Hence the country hailed with enthusiasm
the coup a’état of the young and impetuous Gustaf III.,
who steered resolutely for enlightened absolutism ; and
about fifteen years later the military and financial power
of Sweden increased effectually, and supplied a certain
quota to the balance of European power.

Gustaf III. awaited and chose his hour. At the
moment when Russia was deeply engaged in Turkey
and Poland, the King of Sweden suddenly threw off his
mask and again raised the causeof Charles XII. against
his powerful neighbour. The struggle that ensued was
not wanting in glorious vicissitudes. The Swedish
Fleet once suffered a crushing reverse, and then gained
a brilliant victory; a third great naval engagement was
undecisive; the contest on land was also undecisive,
and after two years of war the two countries, by
common consenf, returned to the sfatus quo ante. ‘“ En-
lightened absolutism” was apparently not capable of
reviving the former power of Sweden. Shortly after-
wards the King of “the Ballo in Maschera” fell, the
victim of an obscure plot in which old nobiliary

248 SWEDEN IN 1914 [CHAP. Xv.

grudges were strangely allied to new revolutionary
claims.

His successor, the weak, hysterical, and imaginative
Gustaf IV., wished, at his majority, not only to step
into the elegant shoes of his father, but also into the
legendary boots of Charles XII. Breaking insanely, in
the name of legitimist principles, with Sweden’s heredi-
tary ally France—the France of Napoleon I. moreover—
he was, at one sign from the Corsican Giant, removed
from the political arena. Alexander, authorised thereto
by his ally of Tilsit, took possession in a few months of
all the rest of Finland, who greeted her new master
spontaneously ; and a pronmunciamento of the Swedish
Army excluded Gustaf IV. and his direct descendants
for ever from the Swedish throne. His uncle, the
prudent Duke of Sudermania, succeeded him—/or life—
under the name of Charles XIII.

In 1810 the election of a new successor to the
Swedish throne in the person of Marshal Bernadotte,
Prince of Ponte-Corvo, virtually ends the annals of the
dynasty of the Vasas, their policy of interference in the
affairs of the Holy Empire, their wars against the Danes,
the Poles and the Russians. The country ceased to
make war. In 1815 Norway joined her crown to that
of Sweden, making up for the definite loss of Finland,
and on the map of Europe the possessions of Bernadotte
assumed an essentially natural and substantial shape.

The wise policy of Charles-John XIV., of Oscar I,
and of Charles XV. resulted in Sweden being completely
isolated on the Russian side; the narrow band of open
sea which separates the Aland Islands from the Swedish
skdrgaard really seemed to stretch, to widen, and finally
to assume the proportions of an ocean. Russia ended
by believing in this marvellous expansion, and thought
no more of Sweden—from the political and commercial
point of view—than she did of Chile or Ecuador. Far-
away but good and cordial relations between the Courts,
the appointment to the post of Russian Minister to
Stockholm of rather “ ambassadorial” personages, now

1914] UNION WITH NORWAY 249

and then a visit from a scholar or inquiring man of
letters who “discovered” Sweden and then forgot her.
And that was all.

The united kingdoms of Sweden and Norway were
naturally bound to consider Russian interests more
than Russia had to consider theirs. In 1855, Stockholm
profited by the Crimean War, and by the presence of
English and French ships in the Baltic, to extract from
Russia the formal promise—added to the Treaty of
1856—not to keep up any military establishment in the
Aland Islands; in latter days Swedish manufacturers
occasionally came to compete in Russia with those from
other countries, and started a few enterprises which
were very well organised and most successful, but as
a general rule, since 1815, Sweden had ceased to cast
anxious or covetous glances perpetually towards the
Baltic, and from that time the internal development of
the country became more independent and regular ;
prosperity began to increase without let or hindrance,
obedient to the natural laws of production, and
strengthened through the happy dispositions and sterling
qualities of the Swedish people.

In the sixties, under Charles XV., some great reforms
completed the definitely constitutional and modern
character of the political structure of Sweden. The
former Diet, or rather the old Etats Généraux, were
replaced by two Chambers, the one elected by universal
suffrage, the other, the Upper Chamber, recruited by a
very complicated system of election, giving the pre-
ponderance to the educated or leisured classes, which
was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age. The
nobility, formerly so powerful, definitely lost all ex-
clusive rights in politics and administration, and the
famous /tiddarehuset, which for so long had been the real
Forum of Sweden, became but a museum consecrated to
the glory of noble families, to their escutcheons and
their trophies, on which could be read the military and
political history of the kingdom.

250 SWEDEN IN 1914 [CHAP. XV.

But independently of these changes demanded by
the spirit of age, the material and intellectual develop-
ment of the people progressed. The peasant became
more and more the owner of the soil. The education
of the people in the course of the century made really
extraordinary progress. It is as successful as anywhere
in Europe. The popular universities in the country—a
recent creation of the Scandinavian mind—represent
something which remains to be created in other European
countries. A series of superior lectures are given for a
few weeks in such and such a rural district. These
lectures are better and better attended, and are con-
scientiously paid for by those attending them; every
year a greater number of persons—of both sexes—go in
for the optional examinations, and, what is most im-
portant, no one afterwards seeks any change of circum-
stances, but remains quietly on his farm or in his
workshop.

Large stretches of country north of Dalsland and as
far as Lapland were colonised by prosperous enterprises
in connection with metallurgy and forestry. The rich
iron mines of the country were more and more exploited,
and wherever it was possible foundries, steel-works,
machine factories came to transform the famous Swedish
metal into machinery and tools, setting the standard for
modern civilisation. And all around flourishing colonies
of workmen arose, everywhere there were institutions
for securing to workmen and their families the greatest
possible amount of material well-being and of intellectual
and moral development. Socialism, as a political doc-
trine, has lately made great progress among Swedish
workmen and peasants; and it was not because the people
were embittered that they sought to extend their rights of
participation in political life, but simply because they
desired more and more to increase the benefits from
their work and to acquire an importance which flattered
their self-esteem as substantial peasants and enlightened
workmen.

However, up till quite lately there existed in Sweden

1914 | SWEDEN'S: PROSPERITY 251

very apparent remnants of the former organisation of
the State: very strict Court etiquette; the obvious
preponderance of the Upper Chamber recruited, until
the recent electoral reform, almost exclusively from the
noble, financial, ecclesiastical and academic classes ;
the part played by the nobility in the social life of the
capital and of certain provinces. But side by side with
all this a thorough metamorphosis was becoming daily
more apparent in the social spirit of the country. In
Sweden, just as in the two other Scandinavian States,
one looks with admiration on all that has been done
and effected for the well-being and moral raising of the
people, the workmen, the urban lower classes: schools
admirably organised and managed, hospitals almost
luxuriously equipped, summer-colonies for poor children,
beautiful gardens and parks laid out in the most thickly
populated areas, in short all works of really public
utility carried to a pitch of perfection that many other
countries might envy.

When I was starting for Sweden some one said to me:
“Do not forget that it is the most aristocratic country
of Europe.” I found this to be true up toa point. But
if instead I had been told that Sweden was the most
truly democratic country in the world, by virtue of the
care and moral deference shown to the humblest, and
the natural feeling of dignity reigning in all the lower
classes, I should have agreed to that also, and have said
that many of the countries in which there is most talk of
the reign of democracy have done less to safeguard the
rights of the people and their dignity than the three
Scandinavian countries—more especially “aristocratic”
and monarchical Sweden.

Be that as it may, the balance-sheet for the hundred
years of the Bernadotte dynasty and of a constant
policy of peace shows for Sweden truly enviable returns
and figures. A population of nearly 6,000,000 people,
living on an unfruitful soil, near a sea containing few
fish, with a harsh climate—a population not naturally
possessing anaval orcommercial spirit—live nevertheless

252 SWEDEN IN 1o14 [ CHAP, XV.

a free, happy and -comfortable life, allowing them-
selves the luxuries of a beautiful capital and another
large commercial town in the west, Gothenburg, of a
pursuit of art carried to a high degree, of an elegant and
cultivated society, of a Court in which the setting and
ceremonies do not lack grandeur, and finally—more
expensive than anything—of an Army of which the real
value and irreproachable appearance are certainly far
superior to its equipment, but which nevertheless
represents an appreciable strength, and a certain weight
in the political balance of Northern Europe.

Naturally all this is not entirely the result of the wise
Swedish policy of the last hundred years. Many of the
things that one admires at the present time in Sweden
owe their origin to far older historic causes and to
the natural qualities of the people: more especially to
the latter.

Of an eminently pure race, the Swedes fully possess
the few failings and the great advantages of a people
who have developed in freedom on a land belonging
entirely to them and which has never been trampled by
other nations. And they fully bear the stamp of their
granite soil and of their climate with its icy blasts.
Slow and uncommunicative, but obstinate and sensitive,
capable of strong passions, more of an internal than
external nature, generally ingenuous but full of good
sense, sometimes genial and eminently honest—these
“big children,” good-looking, well set up and with
naturally graceful movements, carry about in the gaze of
their blue eyes the mirage of their dense and rugged
forests, of their calm lakes, of their clean wooden houses
always of the same dark-red colour, amidst the pretty
landscapes of Sweden, so green, So peaceful, so
unchanging.

First and foremost the Swede prizes his freedom
and his country. Among the Swedish nobility the feel-
ing of patriotism is particularly strong and rules all
inclinations and arguments. The events of the national

1914] THE SPANIARDS OF THE NORTH 253

history of the last two or even three centuries are present
in the memory of the Swedish nobility as if they had
occurred only ten or twenty years ago. And among
the “intellectuals,” among those who have been to a
university, among the substantial middle-classes of the
large towns, the patriotic feeling assumes the same form
and the same dimensions. It is naturally less conscious
and particularly less ‘‘ historic” among the lower classes.
The man of the people who understands by instinct that
Sweden cannot nourish and provide decently for more
than a certain number of inhabitants, and who at the
same time does not desire or know how to limit the
birth-rate, emigrates fairly readily to America. He
often emigrates merely to avoid military service. But
he can never forget his country. And this emigration,
customary and accepted though it be, weighs with true
though unconscious melancholy on the existence of the
Swedish people.

Centuries of stern education have developed among
the people habits of honesty, integrity and politeness;
but by nature also they are good and inclined to be
generous. During the three years that I spent in
Sweden, I never saw a child ill-treated or an animal ill-
used—and that in a country where a great deal of strong
drink is indulged in! In the economic sphere the Swede
possesses no commercial aptitude, but in return he
often displays technical skill. Formerly the Swedes
were nicknamed “the Frenchmen of the North” because
in the eighteenth century all well-educated Swedes
spoke French, and also because many young nobles went
to serve the King of France. But one might far more
correctly have called them ‘“ the Spaniards of the North,”
as they are passionately devoted to the honour and glory
of their country, they are proud, exclusive, somewhat
taciturn, admirable soldiers, and excel in the sense of
national dignity and of the nobleness of their race.
Such have they shown themselves throughout the course
of their history, and such they are at the present time.

254 SWEDEN IN 1914 [CHAP. XV.

The link which for centuries has bound Swedish
policy closely to France is of historic notoriety. The
foundations of this close alliance were laid during the
events of the Thirty Years’ War. Since, throughout the
eighteenth century, Sweden in her struggles with Russia
has nearly always been able to look to the protection of
French policy. The puerile rhodomontades of Gustaf
IV.—as I said before—cost him his throne and cost
Sweden the rest of Finland; but these events did not in
any way change Swedish sympathies for France. Still
less were these sympathies diminished by the events of
1813 and 1814. The successor to the Swedish throne,
leading his 30,000 soldiers against his former master,
proclaimed openly that he wished to save France, con-
found the ‘“Usurper,” and give back to his former
country true civil liberty. And it was in this way that
the Swedes understood their participation in the coalition
of 1813. Moreover, at the Restoration the old Franco-
Swedish friendship flourished again intrinsically.

This friendship was lasting; there was a renewal of
diplomatic intimacy during the Crimean war, an intimacy
which bordered on an alliance. But on the whole at
this period French influence in Sweden was principally
maintained by the force of inertia. The chief cause of
the Franco-Swedish alliance—the perennial struggle
between France and Austria—had ceased to exist, and
the military power of Russia had meantime increased in
such a formidable way that Sweden would have been but
a feeble asset in an offensive alliance of the distant
countries of the West against the Colossus of the
North.

Moreover, from 1815 onwards, a new power was
arising and becoming clearly defined, the influence of
which contributed to modify radically the relations
between France, Russia and Sweden. This power was
Prussia—no longer the opportunist and venturesome
Prussia of the eighteenth century, but the Prussia of
Hardenberg, Stein and Arndt—who was rising trium-
phant from her disasters of 1807, and who with obstinate

1914) GROWTH OF GERMAN INFLUENCE 255

perseverance was inaugurating her new policy: that of
substituting herself for the former Germanic Empire and
of raising to heights as yet undreamt of the name, the
might and the wealth of the German race. Pan-German-
ism was born just then, issuing ready armed from the
brain of Wotan. The University of Berlin was seized
with an ardent love for Scandinavian, Flemish, even
Anglo-Saxon mythology, history, linguistics, juris-
prudence. Literature followed science. Pan-Germanism
became ultra-faithful and loyal with the Prussian squires,
liberal even to vehemence with the men of 1848, pious
and unctuous with the Protestant pastors while waiting
to win even the Catholic padres; but it chiefly flattered
the “sister nations,” extolling their virtues, their history,
their customs, their Germanic soul.

For a long time Sweden did not respond. In the first
place Prussia and Berlin were not popular there; there
had been many fights with Brandenburg; many people
still regretted the possession of Pomerania, particularly
the numerous noble families natives of this province
who at the present time felt as if they had been up-
rooted; then Prussia was the intimate friend of Russia,
and Russia was not always in the odour of sanctity
according to Swedish public opinion; Prussia was a
“»arvenue” who by her present might wounded the
pride of a kingdom fallen from its high political estate ;
finally, Sweden held the traditions of French influence
and sympathies, whereas people in Berlin feigned to
despise the light French mind and to replace its simple
logic by confused and pompous metaphysics.

All the same, gradually the ice between Berlin and
Stockholm began to break. First it was Europe's
infatuation for the scientific proceedings of erudite
Germany : the less her science was understood the more
it was esteemed. Then persistent flattery had its
natural result. A Swede would take up a German book
on comparative mythology and would find that he was
a direct descendant of the Azes, the gods of the German
Olympus; or he would open a popular history book,

256 SWEDEN IN tor4 [ CHAP. XV.

and see how Swedish virtues were extolled in the
account of the Thirty Years’ War and in that of the War
of the North. In novels the hero was generally some
good-looking youth of Dalecarlia, and the heroine a
frank and loyal Scandinavian maiden with periwinkle-
blue eyes. At this period the Swede was still much
attached to his Protestant religion; so Pan-German
theory emphasised the fact repeatedly that Reform was
the quintessence of the German mind, the incarnation of
the irresistible German flight towards truth and moral
independence. And all this was presented in a very
clever way. To pedants and those priding themselves
on their erudition—fat volumes full of propositions and
international difficulties ; to simple men and youths at
school—popular works either of a categorical and
almost imperious doctrine, or fanatical and vibrating. I
defy a young Swede to read the so-called /zstory of the
Thirty Years’ War by Schiller—the work of an ardent
imagination aud of a pathetic Protestant pietism—with-
out feeling himself one with his German brothers in
religion, without communicating with them in the person
of the principal hero in the book, King Gustavus
Adolphus of Sweden. And this book is always seen in
the hands of every Swedish schoolboy.

But it was not only intellectual influences that caused
Sweden and Germany to draw nearer to one another;
the political events and situations of the last third of the
nineteenth century contributed to it decidedly. After
the defeat of France and the enormous increase in the
power of Prussia, now become the German Empire,
Sweden no longer had any reason to direct her policy
towards France. Everything in the North depended on
the trend of German policy: would it still continue to
cultivate the former friendly relations of Berlin with St.
Petersburg, if so it would be necessary to take care not
to incur the displeasure of either of these all-powerful
friends; if Germany should separate herself from
Russia and become frankly hostile to her, then it would

coral GERMAN PENETRATION 257

be only by allying herself to Germany that Sweden
would have a chance of gaining, or rather of regaining,
anything. F

In 1870 the sympathies of Swedish public opinion
were still ostensibly with France. From 1875 the inti-
macy with Germany begins and soon obtains a firm
footing in Sweden.

All secondary countries, but particularly the countries
geographically eccentric and speaking a _ separate
language, need to link themselves to the central civi-
lisation of Europe through the medium of one of the
greatest participants in this old civilisation: France,
England, Germany, Italy, Spain. Sweden, who corre-
sponds exactly to the conditions quoted above, had thus
always had need of a “big-sister initiator.” So that
when this sister was no longer France, her place was
naturally bound to be taken by Germany.

Finally, the great industrial and economic progress
made by Germany in the last fifty years helped to
establish and develop her influence in Sweden. Sweden,
generally speaking, does not possess either the com-
mercial spirit of Denmark or the naval spirit of Norway ;
as I have said, the Swedish people have no inclination for
commerce, although they have first-rate technical ability.
With the development of the resources of the country,
Germany was the first to lend the asset of her commerce

' to this development. Sweden imported more and more

German wares and used more every year. Sweden
developed her mineral production more and more;
Germany was there to draw as much as was possible of
the magnificent Swedish ore into the enormous and in-
satiable Krupp steelworks ; Sweden, who possesses no
coalfields, was more and more inneed of coal. Germany
arranged to supply her with one-sixth of the coal required
(700,000 tons On 5,000,000), leaving the English to supply
the rest, but intending to increase her share in time.
Finally, the great German Bank was willing to finance
Swedish enterprises, and soon the most intimate terms
existed between the financial market of Sweden and that

258 SWEDEN IN 1914 [ CHAP. XV.

of Berlin, Hamburgand Bremen. German managers and
clerks in ever increasing numbers came to establish
themselves in Stockholm or Gothenburg; very soon
German was the foreign tongue which was the
most often understood and spoken in Sweden—
though this is not saying much, for the Swede does not
care about speaking any but his mother-tongue. But
the Germans, on the contrary, learnt the Scandinavian
languages quickly, and this was another trump-card in
their game. Very soon, assisted by political sympathies,
the German academic programme was integrally adopted
in Sweden, and this definitely accentuated the drawing
nearer of the two countries.

People have often been surprised that all this work
should have been done in Sweden, in spite of the fact
that the country had at its head a French dynasty—and
French only recently. To that we would reply that the
influence of race over the sympathies and capabilites of
sovereigns has always been greatly exaggerated. It is
not blood, it is environment, education, climate, soil, the
air they breathe, ideas and ways of thinking, assimilated
almost mechanically, and unconsciously, that in the long
run constitute the intellectual and moral physiognomy—
I would even say the physical physiognomy—of families
and individuals. Examine, for instance, the sixteen quar-
terings of the late Emperor of Russia, Alexander III.
There are fifteen German quarterings and one half-Russian
one—which, moreover, is absolutely hypothetical—the
one that represents the unfortunate Peter IIL, the
miserable scion of the once powerful Romanoff race.
Well! there has never been a Russian, a Russian
sovereign, so typically Ausstan as Alexander III. It was
almost as if the former Tsar of Moscow, a John III. or an
Alexis Mikhailovitch, were re-incarnated in his person.
He was far more like a rich starovere merchant of the
Volga thana St. Petersburg aristocrat; and his aversion
for everything German, and particularly for anything
to do with Berlin, was absolutely sincere and only

1914 | KING OSCAR II. 259

tempered by a kind of scornful good-nature. A country
—more particularly an original country—very soon
assimilates a foreign dynasty.

Charles XV., the eldest of the grandsons of Bernadotte
and Mademoiselle Cléry and of Eugéne Beauharnais, was
actually the last of the line in which the influence of
French blood is truly noticeable ; his brother, Oscar II,
being solely and entirely Swedish, it is precisely in his
reign that the force of circumstances led to German
influence and caused it to bear fruit.

Moreover, two personal causes contributed to it:
King Oscar II. was a scholar, a man of letters, a seeker ;
and therefore a great intimacy sprang up between
him and the Crown-Prince of Prussia, afterwards the
ephemeral Emperor Frederick III. who also dreamt
about philosophy and the high principles of humanity
and liberty. German public opinion did not omit to
profit by this intimacy between the popular “ Kronprinz”
and the Monarch of the brother-nation, Sweden. German
scholars, men of letters, musicians bowed low before
the king-philosopher, the true connoisseur and sincere
admirer of German science and art; to him went the
praises, the flattering dedications, the diplomas of the
universities and academies. And it is all very well to
have a well-regulated and sincere mind, as Oscar II.
had, but these things are always flattering and set up—
perhaps involuntarily—sympathy between the object
and the authors of these demonstrations.

In addition, Oscar II. was married to a German
princess, a Nassau. The young German princesses of
the generation to which Queen Sophia of Sweden
belonged were generally brought up outside the narrow
ideas of German Patriotism ; as they might be destined to
a foreign prince, they were not to be hampered with any-
thing that might embarrass them in their new country.
But after 1815 there were some exceptions, and Queen
Sophia was one of them; and as she was a model wife
and mother, and as her virtues and her intelligence
gained for her the sincere affection of Stockholm society

Ss

260 SWEDEN IN 1914 [CHAP. XV.

and of the Swedish people, her Germanic influence
spread quite naturally over her new family and her new
country.

She married her eldest son, the present King, to a
Princess of Baden, daughter of the respectable Grand-
Duchess Louisa and grand-daughter of the Emperor
William I.

Even under present circumstances, when so many
crimes and felonies have been perpetrated by Germany
against my unhappy country, I should consider that I
was lacking in fairness if I did not mention the high
qualities of the House of Baden and its courageous
fidelity to the ancient traditions of behaviour, charity and
justice. The Grand Duchy of Baden was the only place
in Germany where the Court dared to be humane to the
unfortunate dependants of enemy countries who became
civil prisoners ; and Prince Max of Baden did all in his
power to make the work of the German Red Cross more
consistent with the recognised principles and humani-
tarian objects of this great international organisation.
The Prince’s efforts were not always successful, for he
had to struggle against the blindness of az entire nation,
and the malignant duplicity of a powerful portion of it.
But I know for certain that he did make efforts.

Queen Victoria of Sweden, ‘from the outset of the war,
frankly supported the German colours; she rejoiced
at Germany’s victories and deplored her defeats; she
did not curtail by one hour her usual long visits to
Carlsruhe,—visits which were, moreover, necessary on
account of her delicate health, which cannot stand the
severe Swedish winter; she did not seek to escape any
of the ovations given to her at this time in Germany ;
and yet, side by side with all this, she has always kept
up appearances, she has always remained a Queen. She
did all she could for our prisoners and for the badly-
wounded Russians who crossed Sweden in thousands.
She took a real interest in them. I only had the honour
of meeting her twice during the war, and then she ex-
tended to the Russian Minister a welcome that was not

1914 | GERMAN INTRIGUES 261

only exempt from the slightest tinge of hostility or
coldness, but was marked by graciousness and kindness.
And the few Russians who also had occasion to meet
her at this time had the same experience.

Queen Victoria’s health and her prolonged absences
from the country have prevented her, more than her
origin, from becoming really Swedish; but her in-
telligence, her deep culture, and her high moral qualities
have all the same caused her to gain an ascendancy as
much over her new family as over Swedish society and
—up to a point—over the country.

In taking possession of Sweden little by little,
German policy was not only obeying the dictates of Pan-
Germanism, and of German economic interests. It was
also prcouring a desirable ally in case of a rupture with
Russia, a rupture of which the first idea dates from 1875,
and from the help given that year to France by the
vigilance of Prince Gortchakoff and the generous
intercession of Alexander II.

Since then, relations between Russia and Germany
had been subject to many fluctuations. Sometimes the
old traditions of the Holy Alliance appeared to be
renewed; sometimes, on the other hand, the coldness
between St. Petersburg and Berlin became accentuated.
Neither the Court at Potsdam nor Germany generally
really wished for war with Russia; they would much
have preferred an intimacy and an alliance based on the
old foundations of trickery on the one side and in-
genuousness on the other. But as they had begun to
work in Sweden on certain lines, they continued this
work from Berlin with consistent stubbornness, without
worrying as to whether at the moment they were on
distant or good terms with Russia. If war between the
two powerful Empires was to break out all the same, Ger-
many would possess an ally that was not to be despised
in the shape of Sweden, who would go and bite the
bear’s ear on the Finland side; if, on the contrary, the
friendship between Tsarskoe-Selo and Potsdam was

262 SWEDEN IN rog14 [ CHAP. XV.

cemented again, then it would only be necessary to tell
the Swedes to keep quiet : moreover, they would under-
stand this themselves.

Now, to prepare the Swedes for the eventual taking-
up of arms against Russia it was imperative to dazzle
their eyes with a great hope, and also to show them a
great danger.

The hope was the recovery of Finland.

In the centre of one of the most beautiful squares in
Stockholm, a large Charles XII. in bronze, treading with
enormous boots ona very mean pedestal, points out to
the passers-by with a fine movement of arm and sword
the direction of the rising sun—that of oppressed
Finland. Every good squire and every Swedish
“intellectual” is impressed by this gesture, which
evokes in him memories of heroism and patriotic
troubles. But intelligent and well-informed Swedes—
and these are not lacking—know perfectly well that for
some time Finland has not been at all what she was
under the Swedish régime and up till the middle of the
nineteenth century; that the Finns, an obstinate,
taciturn, vindictive and spiteful race, but gifted and
eager for work withal, are beginning to form a nation
that has nothing in common with Sweden nor with the
traditions of the Vasas; that even at Helsingfors, the
“sons of the sun,” the descendants of the Germanic
A zes, have often to bow before the prominent cheekbones
and snub nose of some Finns, distant descendants of
those Altaic races who throughout centuries had kept
up an implacable conflict with the Aryans. That Fin-
land might one day become independent, shat the
Swedes readily believe; but that she might again
become an integral part of the kingdom of Sweden—
that could only be contemplated seriously by shallow
or ignorant minds. Hence the “great hope” was but a
feeble bait. So that the “ereat fear” had all the more
influence.

It was gradually suggested to the Swedes that
Russia had not yet finished her offensive movement

1914 | FINLAND AND RUSSIA 263

towards the Scandinavian peninsula. Deprived of out-
lets to the quite open sea, the huge Empire made
persistent efforts to secure such an outlet. But the
route of the Straits was barred to her by Europe; that
of the Persian Gulf by the English; that of the Pacific
Ocean by the Japanese; moreover, the last two outlets
were extremely far away from the Russian centres of
production and consumption. How, then, should Russia
not covet a far nearer outlet, that of the ports—very far
north, it is true, but magnificent and always free from
ice—which open on the Atlantic Ocean through the
Norwegian fjords ? Narwick, Trondhjem, Hammerfest,
these are the ports that Russia ardently wished to
possess; but in order to do so, she would first have to
conquer the North of Sweden, a thinly populated
province, in which, however, huge beds of splendid iron
ore! have lately been discovered. The existence of a
more or less autonomous Finland, indeed, hampers the
expansion of the Empire on this side, Hence the task
of Russifying and assimilating this ‘ unfortunate”
province completely has already been begun, and as soon
as this has been accomplished, Russia will seek by force
to extend her domination over the North of Sweden and
of Norway.

This theme, constantly repeated, commented on, and
recapitulated, had a great success in Sweden.2 Stockholm
did not wish to consider the weak sides of the argument :
the great distance of the Norwegian ports from the
centre of Russia, and particularly from inhabited parts
of Russia itself ; the existence on the Russian Murman
coast of excellent ports open in winter. ‘Fear has
enormous eyes,” says the Russian proverb: it only sees
what strikes it and rarely goes into details. By the
years 1910-1913 the theory quoted above was accepted
by the whole of Sweden, and as the champion and
populariser of this threatening theory at this period
appeared the celebrated Sven-Hedin.

1 Yielding in the smelting up to 80 per cent. of metal.
2 An infinitely smaller one in Norway.

264 SWEDEN IN 1914 [ CHAP. XV.

As we know, Sven-Hedin owes his fame to his travels
in Thibet. The Swedish explorer was very effectually
assisted by Russia. The Emperor Nicolas II. took
a personal interest in his explorations, and the civil
and military authorities of Russian Central Asia
(whence Sven-Hedin crossed over the Thibetan borders)
received orders to grant him all possible facilities, in-
cluding an armed escort. On his return, he was most
graciously received by the Emperor and welcomed
by the Academy of Science of St. Petersburg. At his
last visit to Stockholm (in 1910), the Emperor still
remembered his protégé, sent him a Russian decoration,
and invited him to go and see him. In consequence,
Sven-Hedin was looked on as being a friend of, and
under an obligation to, the Russians. And so, if the
“Russian ” Sven-Hedin himself began to write and to
preach that a real danger for Sweden was arising on
the side of Russia, then one had to believe it and to
seek salvation first in the increase of Swedish armed
forces, and then by binding Swedish policy closely to
that of the power who alone could check and confound
the Colossus of the North—to Germany. When I
arrived in Sweden in March, 1914, I thought this tale
of Russian aspirations to Narwick was not believed by
any one, or else was only a pretext for obtaining supplies
from the Riksdag, and for improving Swedish arma-
ments, the concealed aim being Finland. I have since
had to change my opinion. I realised that the fear of
Russian aggression existed even among the wisest and
most well-balanced Swedes. It was not until much
later, and when the World War was in full swing, that
Swedish public opinion gradually recognised its mis-
take; but for this it was necessary for Russia to give
an absolutely tangible proof, that of the construction
and hurried completion of the railway line from St,
Petersburg to Murman.?

1 And to think that this all-important line was to have been laid—
but was not—already in 1895, when the port of Alexandrovsk was in-
augurated, and the line sketched out by Witte’s orders, then all-powerful

1914 | SVEN-HEDIN'S ACTIVITIES 265

I said above that German labours in Sweden went
on independently of the relations existing at such and
such a moment between Berlin and St. Petersburg.
Nevertheless, towards 1913, a recrudescence of, and
an added activity in, these labours was noticeable.
Apparently Berlin felt the great collision to be at hand—
wished it to be at hand, | ought to say—and henceforth
Sweden must be “ warmed up,” her old grudges and new
fears with regard to Russia must be stirred up.

In September, the divorce of the Grand-Duchess
Marie created a coolness between the two Courts, and
made the position of the Russian Minister, the elegant
M. Savinsky, very difficult. In November, a still more
disagreeable incident occurred. The Russian military
attaché, Colonel Assanovitch, was accused by the Press
and then by the Swedish Government even, of being a
spy or at least of being in close touch with very
suspicious individuals (Scandinavians, moreover) who
were arrested on a charge of spying. A letter was
even produced from the imprudent colonel to one of
these individuals. This disagreeable incident served as
a pretext for a whole campaign by the Press directed
against Russia. Sven-Hedin extracted from it some
fresh arguments, and multiplied his writings and con-
ferences on the theme of the /tussian danger. ‘The
public, with increasing vehemence, discussed the in-
adequacy of Swedish armaments, and the problems of
national defence. Never before had Russian diplomatic
representation in Stockholm been in such a painful
position.

The Government, at that time belonging to the
Liberal Party (Staaf and Baron Ehrensvaerd), did all in
their power to calm people down, but their adversaries
then renewed their patriotic apprehensions, accused the
Liberals of not being aware of the great dangers Sweden

Minister of Finance. This construction was set aside, so as to get
on with the Trans-Siberian line. Then, the system still obtained of
only constructing lines by the State and out of the ordinary Budget of the
Empire.

266 SWEDEN IN 1914 [ CHAP. XV

was incurring, and gave way to extreme agitation
throughout the country, in favour of extraordinary
measures in order to secure the safety of their realm.

This agitation ended in the celebrated Bondestog—
the peasants’ procession. At the beginning of February
thousands of peasants from the old and famous province
of Dalsland (Dalecarlia), in their beautiful national
costume; students from the two universities of Sweden—
Upsala and Lund—with their caps, their “ colours,” and
their flags ; ecclesiastics from different parts of the king-
dom, and other persons who joined in, made their solemn
entry into Stockholm, were put up there by the middle-

Classes and the nobility of the town, ana the next day,
accompanied by a huge crowd, marched past the Palace,
cheering when the King and his family appeared on the
balcony; the heads of the demonstration harangued His
Majesty in vehement terms, assuring him ofthe devotion
of the Swedish people, and entreating him to take all
measures necessary to secure the safety of the country,
measures which the country would be delighted to
sanction, whatever sacrifices they demanded. The King
then spoke and promised that the measures should be
taken, and that the question of national defence should
be settled with as little delay as possible.

This answer of the King’s to the processionists of the
Bondestog caused a difference between His Majesty and
his Ministers. The latter, and the Press of their party,
alleged that from the constitutional point of view the
King had no right to speak and to make promises to the
processionists without having first taken the advice of
the Cabinet and discussed his speech with his Ministers.
The King, on the other hand, asserted that no one could
prevent him speaking to his people, and mentioning his
patriotic convictions to them.

This difference of opinion between the King and his
Ministers having become accentuated and having got into
the Press, the Liberal Cabinet resigned, and the King
accepted the resignation.

According to the constitutional laws of Sweden, when

1914 | A CHANGE OF MINISTRY 267

the King and the Cabinet differ about a law, a govern-
ment measure or a principle, the King has the right not
only to dismiss his Ministers but also to dissolve the
Riksdag. Only the Riksdag resulting from the new
elections may give an opinion, solely and exclusively, on
the subject of the law, measure or principle which had
caused the difference between the King and the former
Ministry. The question under discussion once solved,
the Riksdag retires, and makes way for fresh elections,
whence issues a new Chamber, normal this time. The
Cabinet appointed by the King must also resign as soon
as the normal Chamber is elected and convened.

The King entrusted the formation of the Cabinet to
M. de Hammarskiold, professor of international law, and
former plenipotentiary of Sweden at the Congress of the
Hague, who was made Prime Minister; and M. Knut
Wallenberg was made Minister for Foreign Affairs.’
Both were at that time far from realising that their term
of office, which should have been temporary, would be
prolonged for three years, amidst the greatest diffi-
culties that any Swedish statesman should have had to
face for ages.

The new elections (shortly after my arrival in Sweden)
yielded results favourable to the principle of the increase
in the Budget for national defence. This last question
forming the crux of the difference on which the new
Chamber had to give an opinion, this Chamber as usual
received the name of Vérsvar-Riksdag (the Chamber of
“ national defence”), and the Minister that of Vérsvar-
fegeringen (Cabinet of National Defence).

Such was the political situation in Sweden at the
time when I disembarked at Stockholm, and took up my
post there.

1 In Sweden there are really only two actual Ministers (with the title
of Excellency) : the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
It is they who give the Zoe to the Cabinet, the rest are more in the position
of secretaries to the State.

CHAPTER XVI
ON THE EVE OF WAR

Two days after I arrived in Stockholm, I was received
by the King in a solemn audience. The King was
going off the very next day to shoot elk in the northern
provinces—some Said to inspect troops and forts there—
and he was in a hurry to get through the audience. He
had been, moreover, seriously indisposed for some
months, and his physical sufferings, added to political
tribulations, according to all accounts, made him nervous
and even irritable at times. I did not notice this during
my audience, but I was struck by the looks of His
Majesty, who appeared to be really ill. As is known,
his journey to the North was interrupted by an acute
attack of the internal malady from which he suffered.
He was brought back to Stockholm, where he underwent
a very serious operation, which was wonderfully
successful, but which left His Majesty enfeebled for a
long time. The King did not entirely regain his
strength for a year, but then he was able to resume his
normal life and the sports in which he excels: hunting
and tennis.

The reception of foreign Ministers who come to
present their credentials to the King takes place in
Stockholm in the setting prescribed by time-honoured
etiquette. At the appointed hour, a master of the
ceremonies came to fetch me, and conducted me and my
suite in gilded coaches to the Palace. We had no
escort; but instead, at the Castle of Stockholm—
majestic in its simplicity of an old Roman palace—the
Dragoons of the Guard were drawn up on the grand
staircase in their historic uniforms of Charles XII.’s

268

m4] AN AUDIENCE OF KING GUSTAF 269

time. At the entrance to the reception-rooms, full of
beautiful furniture, pictures, bronzes, and admirable
Gobelin tapestries of the eighteenth century, the whole
Court awaited me. As soon as the introductions had
been made, the doors were thrown open, and I was
ushered into the presence of Gustaf V. His Majesty,
in cold and formal tones, exchanged the usual compli-
ments with me, greeted the members of my suite in the
same manner, and then begged me to follow him into
his private drawing-room; the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, M. Wallenberg (whose acquaintance I had made
the day before), was invited to accompany us. The
King’s expression and his tone then changed completely.
He sat down, having offered us chairs, and began by
asking me questions about the health of the Emperor
and that of his family ; he then passed on quite simply
to the delicate question of the recent divorce of his son,
and expressed, in terms which one felt were perfectly
sincere, his regrets at having for ever lost the young
Grand-Duchess, his daughter-in-law, whom he had liked
very much. I appreciated the dignity and the frankness
of these words, which at once put me at my ease with
the King. His Majesty then questioned me about the
events that had occurred in Bulgaria. ‘How had King
Ferdinand, who had the reputation of being such a subtle
politician, managed so completely to lose the game in
which he had taken part ?”

I replied by a few comments on the events I had
recently witnessed and on Ferdinand himself. Amongst
other things I expressed the opinion that the curiously
undecided character of the King had had a great deal to
do with his mishap; if from the outset he had taken up
a definite line and had stuck to it throughout, a great
many things would never have happened. But Ferdinand
was always changing his mind and his direction... .
Here the King interrupted me. “Oh! but, monsieur,”
he exclaimed, significantly, “do not judge sovereigns
too harshly! If you only knew how difficult it is,
how painful it is sometimes, to make a decision amidst

270 ON HE EVE -OF WAR? (fenap. xvi.

advice and contrary opinions that are clashing in the
country!” ... The King, doubtless, was alluding to
his own recent troubles over the Londestog and the
change of Ministry. Perhaps, also, he had other ob-
sessions of a still more serious nature in view, which |
at the moment had no idea of. However that may be,
His Majesty’s sincerity—a sincerity piercing through
much reticence—made an impression on me; it was a
decided change for me after Ferdinand, and the duplicity
which I always felt was underlying all the effusions and
all the confidences of the King of the Bulgarians.

From the King’s room I was conducted to the Queen’s
apartments, where I found myself in the presence of a
grande-dame sovereign, correct and kind. The following
days I was received in audience by the other members
of the Royal Family. First by the Crown-Prince and
his wife, mce Princess Margaret of Connaught. He
struck me as being a serious young man, serious beyond
his years, with unaffected manners, very guarded in his
speech. She—quite charming, and also thoroughly
unaffected.

Prince Charles, brother of the King, enjoys the
sympathy and the respect of all surrounding him. He
is tall, good-looking, and in his appearance has some-
thing typically chivalrous—an impression which in-
creases when one gets to know the admirable qualities
of his character, his great and active goodness, his
upright mind. His wife, mée Princess Ingeborg of
Denmark, possesses all the taking and real charm of her
own family. Pretty, intelligent, extremely unaffected in
manner, and yet “every inch a princess,” she reminds
me forcibly of her aunt, the Dowager Empress of
Russia, who had sent many messages to her niece by
me. Three delightful young girls, of which the eldest
made her début while I was in Stockholm, and a fine
little boy, made up the family.

The King’s youngest brother, Prince Eugene
Napoleon, the only one of the family in whom the
French type is still very apparent, lives almost like a

ene

1914 | M. WALLENBERG 271

private person, giving himself up entirely to the pursuit
of art. Heis avery good landscape-painter, and has a
high reputation in the country. He can without
exaggeration be placed among the very good painters
of Sweden—immediately after Zorn, the celebrated
Liliefors and Carl Larson.

I was already acquainted with Prince William, the
ex-husband of the Grand-Duchess Marie; he was tall
and good-looking, and confined himself almost entirely
to his naval profession and the society of his friends ;
but he was very popular with the society ladies of
Stockholm, with whom he had always been a favourite.

As I said above, the King was taken seriously ill on
his journey to the North. For weeks he hung between
life and death, and I did not see him again till July,
when he still looked terribly pulled down, thin and
weak, but was gradually recovering his health and
strength.

Two days after my solemn audience of the King, I
went to call on M. Wallenberg, with whom I had only
exchanged the customary commonplaces on my arrival.
The new Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs began at
once to talk business with me, and, to my great surprise,
touched on a subject of “high politics” and politics
generally. He expressed in guarded—but nevertheless
very frank—terms his apprehensions on the subject of
the European situation, and even his fears about the
preservation of peace. Although sharing 7m fetfo the
sentiments of the speaker, I took good care not to
endorse his opinion or even to follow him on to this
ticklish topic; on the contrary I expressed the firm
hope that peace would be in no way threatened, that in
our country everything would be done to avoid dangerous
friction, that I had, in the course of my long diplomatic
career, become accustomed to these attacks of European
uneasiness, which happily never led to disastrous con-
sequences, etc.... But my host did not allow himself
to be discouraged. “You come from the Balkan East,

272 ON THE EVE OF WAR _ [cnap. xv1.

monsieur, and are well acquainted with the situation
there ; do you not think that the political state of those
countries is very menacing? Here and in a great many
other places people think that it is just from there that
danger might come.”

Again I turned a deaf ear to this invitation to con-
fidences. I thought to myself: “Now here is a banker
who has just become Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
who considers it incumbent on him, at his first interview
with the new Russian Minister, to converse on questions
of high politics!” If I had known M. Knut Wallenberg
a little I should never have formed such an incorrect
judgment. Since then, during three years of almost
daily intercourse, amidst events of exceptional gravity,
I got to know thoroughly the character and mentality
of the distinguished Swedish statesman, and I realised
that, although not lacking in frankness, M. Wallenberg
weighed his every word, and never indulged in idle
talk. In this the long experience of a great financier
was apparent. Moreover, M. Wallenberg is essentially
Swedish, and all Swedes are men of few words; when
they speak it is because they think they are obliged to.
Hence, if the new Swedish Foreign Secretary had
thought it necessary at the outset of our intercourse to
converse with me about his fears on the subject of the
political situation of Europe, he must have had grave
reasons for doing so.

The artificial agitation kept up in the country, the
clash of opinions between the King and the Staaf-
Ehrensvaerd Cabinet and the demonstrations that had
brought about the dissolution of the Chamber, were due
—as subsequent events proved—to German instigation.
Sinister schemes were ripening in Berlin; she had to
attempt to reap, from Sweden, the fruit of the persistent
work which I mentioned above; she had to secure
finally the formal alliance of Sweden.

Doubtless during the month of February, 1914, the
Swedish Court was warned by Berlin of the extreme
tension of the political situation, and received proposals

1914] M. WALLENBERG’S PREMONITIONS 273

of alliance. Hence the importance that King Gustaf V.
attached to the question of the national defence of
Sweden; hence also his wish to surround himself, in
the great crisis which was forming, with people whom he
considered either as essentially prudent and well-versed
in questions of general politics, or as personal friends,
In the King’s opinion, M. Hammarskiold appeared
especially to fulfil the first condition; and in M. Wallen-
berg His Majesty recovered a tried friend of strenuous
days and a counsellor whose good sense would be able
to face the exceptional circumstances which were
imminent. For M. Wallenberg was truly an intimate
friend of the King, who had complete trust in him.
Moreover, aS soon as the new Ministers were in
office, Gustaf V. had to acquaint them with the situation
and to confide to them—particularly to M. Wallenberg
—the information he held from the most intimate sources
and which was to remain hidden from all those whom
he could not trust absolutely. Knowing M. Wallenberg
as I know him now, I| can imagine the gravity, I will
even say patriotic anguish, with which this intelligent
and circumspect man received the King’s confidences on
the suggestions which came from the side of Berlin, and
threw His Majesty himself into the most cruel perplexity.
It was in order to check this information that the
Swedish Foreign Secretary had applied to me at our
first interview. I avoided this sounding as I did not
know my partner. And also what should I have replied?
That in St. Petersburg and in our Embassies of Berlin
and Vienna, the general political situation was considered
to be perfectly clear and free from danger; but that I
myself held a very different opinion and had been dread-
ing the great collision since September, 1913? These
things can only be said to some one of whom one is
absolutely certain. And I repeat that I did not know
M. Knut Wallenberg at all. I knew that he was very
rich, that he was at the head of the most powerful
financial group of the Scandinavian Peninsula, which
willingly furnished funds for the great industrial

274 ON THE EVE OF WAR | [cnap. xvt.

enterprises in Sweden and in Norway (iron mines, water
power, nitrates, etc.); that this group was the only one
which was in close touch not only with the financial
market of Berlin, but also and especially with that of
Paris ; that M. Wallenberg had been the real initiator
and founder of the “ Banque des Pays du Nord.” But
there ended my knowledge of the person whom I was
to have as a partner in the most difficult and delicate
circumstances.

Before my time, much hospitality had been displayed
at the Russian Legation in Stockholm ; at the receptions
members of the aristocracy, personages who were well
known in society and at Court, and the princes and
princesses of Sweden were collected together. But
there was not time to get to know and to see the great
financiers, the great manufacturers, the people famed in
the political world. Moreover, a legation cannot manage
that job alone; it must be assisted—as German diplo-
matic representation always has been—by its colony, its
distinguished travellers, its scientific experts, etc. Now,
when I arrived in Stockholm, I asked to be made
acquainted with the leading members of the Russian
colony in Sweden; I was told in reply that there was
one very amiable old Greek who was the centre of the
sponge trade, but that in the course of the last winter,
in order to facilitate his trade, the worthy man had
become a naturalised Swede, and that in his person the
whole Russian colony had disappeared !

Soon after our first interview, M. Wallenberg told
me that he was going abroad, chiefly to Paris and Berlin.
The object of this trip, which was only to take a few
days, was strictly personal and had to do with the
financial business of the Enskilda Bank, business which
M. Wallenberg desired to wind up before handing over
the management of the Bank to his brother. Never-
theless, he would profit by his stay in Paris also to see
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and a few political
personages with whom he was well acquainted.

1914] MR. HOWARD AND M. THIEBAUD 275

On his return the Foreign Secretary hastened to tell
me that, having seen the people quoted above in Paris
and having also called on M. von Jagow and M. Zimmer-
mann in Berlin, he had derived reassuring impressions
from his conversation with both sides. This pertinacity
in acquainting me with the political situation of Europe
surprised me somewhat, but I was none the less grate-
ful to M. Wallenberg for the courtesy and the confidence
which he showed towards me on this occasion.

The conversation with my new colleagues, especially
with the British: Minister, were not of anature to revive
exaggerated apprehensions in me. Sir Esme Howard
(then still Mr. Howard), whose eminent qualities of mind
and character I was able to appreciate later—reflect-
ing officially the profoundly pacific disposition of the
Asquith-Grey Ministry, did not give way to lugubrious
prophecies nor to considerations which might have put
me on my guard against the Swedes and their present
policy; Mr. Howard was more inclined to ridicule the
agitation of Sven-Hedin and his followers, and did not
see the reflection of a political manceuvre preconceived
in Berlin. My French colleague, M. Thiébaud, took the
“Russophobe” agitation which had taken possession of
Sweden more tragically. He warned me at some length
against the repetition of faults already committed, accord-
ing to him, by Russian representatives, and especially
against any action that might appear suspicious to the
Swedes. I agreed entirely with my colleague. I heard
later that M. Thiébaud had at this. period begun con-
fidential parleyings with his chiefs, in order to prepare
a sort of mediation between Sweden and Russia, from
the President of the Republic himself. M. Poincaré was
soon going to Russia and from there he was going to pay
official visits to the three Scandinavian Courts, and on
this occasion he was to make friendly observations about
the “ Assanovitch affair,” and to bring back to the King
of Sweden reassuring explanations from His Majesty
the Emperor. This idea was adopted ; there was some

good in it, although it exaggerated rather too much the
i

276 ON THE EVE OF WAR _[cnap. Xvi.

importance of the Sven-Hedin calumnies. But I was
extremely astonished that my French colleague should
have concealed from me, from the beginning and until
the end, his idea and parleyings with Paris on this
subject. Later on and during the tragic years we went
through together I was most careful not to imitate
M. Thiébaud’s example, and I confided to him, carefully
and from the very first, all that I heard, and all that I
intended to do or to write.

I gradually became better acquainted with my other
colleagues. In the senior member of the Diplomatic
Corps, my Portuguese colleague Castro-Fejo, I found a
man of great culture and of wide experience of Sweden ;
I could subsequently congratulate myself on the ex-
cellent relations which existed between us from the
outset. Alas! two years later his wife—Swedo-French
by birth—beautiful, bright and charming, died of an in-
curable disease, and he himself soon followed her to the
grave, having succumbed to paralysis of the heart! The
Danish Minister, M. Scavenius, whose acquaintance I
had already made in St. Petersburg, was very useful to
me from the beginning through his perfect knowledge
of political and social matters in Stockholm. We later
became very intimate with him and with Madame
Scavenius, and often had cause to appreciate their
intelligence, their tact, and their sincere sympathies with
the Entente. The Japanese Minister, M. Uchida, in-
telligent and correct, and Madame Uchida, as charming
as she was cultivated; the Duke and Duchess of Amalfi,
whom we ended by liking most cordially ; M. Lagos, the
distinguished Argentine diplomat, and the amiable
Madame’ Lagos; an excellent and agreeable French
colleague, Baron Devaux, and the equally agreeable
English couple, the Clives; our subsequent Norwegian
colleagues, all most amiable and reliable; finally—last
but not least—the satirical M. Tommazini and the
fascinating and witty Madame Tommazini, the life and
soul of the Diplomatic Corps and of Stockholm society,
completed the friendly circle who gathered closely round

1914] THE MALMO EXHIBITION 277

us and whose society helped us to bear three years of
constant nervous tension, of trials and of misfortunes
that the terrible inexorable war brought in its train.

From the outset there was a coolness between us and
my Austro-Hungarian colleague, Count Hadik. On the
other hand, my German colleague, Herr von Reichenau,
the type of the convinced Prussian and belonging to a
social set which paraded the former traditions of Russo-
Prussian friendship, gave me a warm welcome and
sought an interchange of views with his new Russian
colleague. :

During the month of April I had to busy myself with
the Russian participation in an exhibition of ‘the
adjacent countries of the Baltic,” which was to be
inaugurated at Malmé.1 The Imperial Government,
hurt by the recent Swedish demonstrations, did not wish
to take any part in the exhibition. But thanks to the
efforts of a few people who feared that this holding
aloof might be misconstrued in Sweden, M. Emmanuel
Nobel was allowed to place himself at the head of a
private initiatory committee which succeeded more or
less in forming a Russian section. The result, from the
material point of view, was very meagre: a few em-
broideries and laces made by villagers, much appreciated
abroad; an exhibit by the Nobel petroleum interests at
Baku, another by the rubber manufacturers of Riga, a
cold-storage section, and finally an art section, repre-
sented by the Russian painters of the newest school,
in which side by side with a few excellent portraits
hung some pictures which would have made the dogs
howl; these made up the Russian exhibit which |
thought compared disastrously with the Swedish,
Danish, and German sections, in which the most
interesting and the best specimens of the industries of
those countries had been carefully collected together.
Nevertheless, later on, I could only congratulate myself
on the efforts of those who, in spite of opposition from

1 A Swedish port opposite Copenhagen.

278 ON THE EVE OF WAR | [cuap. xvi.

official circles, had all the same contrived that Russia
should be represented at the exhibition of Malmé: the
Swedes were anyhow grateful to Russia for having
taken part in it. And if this had not been done every
one in Sweden would have seen tangible proof of
Russian hostility and of her sinister schemes with regard
to the peninsula of the North!

At the end of April I went to Malmé6 to see how the
setting-up and the arrangement of the Russian section
were getting on. About the 15th May I returned there
officially to take part in the opening of the exhibition.
The King still being ill, it was the Crown Prince and his
wife who presided over the opening ceremonies. The
customary prayers, inevitable chants, numerous and
lengthy speeches in excellent Swedish (of which then I
did not understand one word), a grand banquet presided
over_by the Royal pair—at which I made acquaintance
with a lot of people I never saw again—closed the first
day’s proceedings. The next day there was a great
dinner to the German contingent in the room of the
beautiful Berlin china. There I made the acquaintance

of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Minister to_

Copenhagen. The Count extended to me a particularly
ready .welcome. From topical commonplaces we pro-
ceeded to exchange a few political impressions, and
Count Rantzau appeared to jump at the opportunity to
express, with striking warmth and conviction, some
ideas on the absolute necessity for good relations
between Russia and Germany, and on the terrible con-
sequences that a collision arising between them might
have-for both countries. I acquiesced very sincerely in
this point of view.

“It is a great pity that we have not time to discuss
this more fully,” said Rantzau. “ But you are certain to
come to Copenhagen soon. Come and seeme when you
do; we shall be able to talk more freely and at greater
length; do come!”

I did go to Copenhagen two days after, but I did not
call on the German Minister. I considered that to seek

—— ess

ae

me a

1914) RIKSDAG OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 279

a political conversation with Count Rantzau there, where
he was always in close touch with his Russian colleague,
Baron de Buxhoeveden, would have been an indelicate
proceeding on my part with regard to the latter. I have,
however, good reason to believe that the sentiments and
opinions expressed to me by Count Rantzau were not
factitious. Asa diplomat in high favour at his Court, he
must at this time have known many things which only
revealed themselves two months later to the rest of the
world, and I know from a fairly reliable source that the
apprehensions of the German diplomat, who had never
lacked intelligence, were absolutely sincere.

A less formal dinner to the Russian section closed
the series of festivities. In the toast which I proposed
to the absent King and to the Royal couple presiding at
the dinner, I strove to make the thoroughly friendly and
sympathetic sentiments which animated Russia towards
all the Scandinavian countries—her Baltic neighbours—
stand out very clearly, and I expressed a wish for the
development of close commercial and industrial relations
between my country and Sweden. The Stockholm Press
quoted and approved of this toast, and I had a general
impression that the Swedes who came to Malm for the
inauguration of the exhibition had gone away less scared
with regard to Russia than they had been on their
arrival.

Towards the end of May, the Riksdag of “ the National
Defence” assembled in Stockholm. The ceremony of
the opening took place as usual in the grand hall of the
Royal Castle and with the usual pomp. The King
insisted on opening this parliament himself, although
judging by his looks, his walk and his voice, he was still
suffering from the effects of the terrible illness and of
the operation he had recently undergone.

“Gode Herrar och Svensk Man”; he began his
speech from the Throne, according to established
custom; and I remember the impression that this

1 “Good Lords and Men of Sweden.”

280 ON THE EVE OF WAR | [cnap. xvi.

ancient formula made on me. _ I'thought to myself:
“When will the day come on which the Emperor, my
august Master, will open in person a national Duma
really worthy of the name and will with confidence
address the real representatives of the people, strong in
their rights, conscious of their duties, and especially
feeling themselves to be the sons of their country and
the authorised mandatories of their people?”

The Riksdag, with a few amendments, consented to
the expenditure which the Government asked for, for the
augmentation of the Swedish Army and its equipment.

While this Riksdag was sitting, the political situation
in Europe was becoming more gloomy every day. First
there was the milliard in free gifts previously deducted
by the German Chamber from all the great fortunes
of the country; then there was continual coming and
going between Berlin and Vienna; the heads of the
Staffs of the two Central Empires, and the heads of their
Fleets conferring together ; the interview of Konopischt
when William II. went to put the finishing touches to
the manipulation of Austria-Hungary in the person of
the heir to the throne, the warlike Arch-Duke Francis
Ferdinand; finally, the enormous sum poured into the
treasury of the German Red Cross. The language of the
Austro-German Press became daily more chauvinistic,
more uncompromising.

What was our country doing in view of all these
demonstrations, all this work, which were so to speak
staring usin the face? I havenoidea. No echo reached
me from St. Petersburg or from our Foreign Secretary.
Our Ambassador to Berlin, M. Sverbeieff, went on
leave towards the end of June—as he did every year at
the same time—to superintend farming operations on
his property at Tula) The Russian Ambassador to
Vienna, M. Schebeko, was soon to follow him, and did
actually start—/wo days before the sending of the celebrated
ultimatum to Serbia—for his property at Yaroslav. (He
had to retrace his steps almost as soon as he arrived in
St. Petersburg.)

1914 | VM. SVERBEIEFF) IN’ BERLIN 281

Whence came this tranquillity, this confidence in the
immediate future? I have often wondered, but up to
now have never been able to frame a satisfactory
answer. The French representatives in Berlin and
Vienna were very anxious; the Yellow Book exists to
prove this in black and white. They must frequently
have imparted their anxieties to their Russian colleagues.
Why is it then that the latter should have attached
so little importance to the warnings of their allied
colleagues ?

In M. Sverbeieff’s case I am not much surprised.
This most distinguished man was by his very qualities
averse to suspecting dangers, to seeking sinister inten-
tions. He owed his whole career to his natural tact, to
his knowledge of the world, and to his prudent self-
effacement. He was appointed to Berlin because he
was the intimate friend of the new Foreign Secretary,
who could rest assured that on the one hand Sverbeieff
would not go in for personal politics with the Emperor
William II. (an alluring temptation to many of our
diplomats), and that on the other he would cultivate the
best possible relations with the Court of Berlin, and
would not be the cause of any sort of conflict between
the two Governments; in short, that the real direction
of Russo-German relations would remain entirely in
the hands of the Foreign Office, of which the new
Ambassador would only be the faithful and obliging
mouthpiece. All this was quite right; but in appoint-
ing his intimate friend to the post of Russian Ambas-
sador to: Berlin, M. Sazonoff had lost sight of the fact
that other qualities were absolutely indispensable to
the diplomat entrusted with such an exceptionally im-
portant post, to wit: the faculty of studying and solving
the political situation of the country in which he finds
himself, a fair for people and events, and the authority
of a superior mind capable if necessary of making
himself the centre of a political current—in this case
the centre of the partisans of peace.

M. Sverbeieff only possessed these qualities to a

282 ON THE EVE OF WAR _ [cuap. xv1.

very limited degree. After having been for two years
Minister to Athens, where the whole Royal Family
headed by the wise King George adored him; where
every one was enchanted by his receptions, as fashion-
able as they were hospitable, and where M. Venizelos—an
eminently honest politician and a true friend to Russia
—found in him an ever kind and attentive partner, M.
Sverbeieff was inclined to believe that his part in Berlin
would only be a natural extension of the one he had
played at the foot of Mt. Hymettus. He was intensely
absorbed in his house and household, in his new social
environment; he succeeded in making himself liked
and even up toa point esteemed by his German official
partners ; but he did not arrive at what was going on in
Germany, what was being hatched in Berlin; he did not
raise the alarm in time.

This alarm had been raised by Count Osten-Sacken
in a masterly letter written by him in 1907, in which the
eminent diplomat, so firmly attached to the Court of
Berlin and surrounded by the personal attentions of
William II., nevertheless foretold, with the absolute
plain-speaking of an exalted patriot, that henceforth
the Kaiser would seek to injure Russia and would choose
the Near East as the theatre in which to inflict serious blows
onus. The deduction was logical: if we did not wish for
war with Germany, a ground for mutual understanding
must be found. This letter had probably been forgetten
since 1908. New ambitions had come to divert the
direction of Russian foreign policy, and the question:
‘What advantages can we procure for ourselves?” had
relegated the question: “What immediate perils ought
we to avoid ?” to a secondary place.

I suppose that when M. Jules Cambon went to
impart his doubts and fears to his Russian colleague,
the latter listened to him attentively, but calmed him-
self by thinking that on the French side every one was
generally inclined to exaggerate the German peril and
the agitation of William. He probably also thought
that one of the best ways of avoiding dangers was by

1914 | M. SCHEBEKO IN VIENNA 283

not proclaiming them too loudly, and by not delivering
insufficiently-controlled apprehensions to the indiscre-
tion of Offices and Courts.

Less comprehensible to me was the scepticism of
which M. Schebeko showed proof (or parade). Perhaps
he thought that in due time he would be able to master
the situation. In Vienna itself, he had been an eye-
witness to the ascendency which his former chief,
Prince Lobanoff, had been able to gain. He had
repeatedly seen the latter act by strength of character
and the lucidity of his arguments on the vacillating
minds of his Viennese partners, and draw attention at
the same time in our country to the dangers which
wele arising and to the necessity of avoiding them. M.
Schebeko undoubtedly possessed this same strength of
character and temperament. One noticed this when,
having hastily returned to Vienna in the tragic week
that preceded the rupture, he was able, in two inter-
views with Count Berchtold, to extort his consent to
enter into conversations with Russia, that is to say to
abandon the uncompromising attitude that the Austro-
Hungarian Government had adopted from the first
day. William II. was then obliged to have recourse to
extreme measures and tothe ultimatum hurled at Russia,
in order to precipitate events all the same and to drag
Austria in her train. The energetic intervention of
the Russian Ambassador had unfortunately come a few
days too late.

I was also assured that the very journey that M.
Schebeko had undertaken had had as its chief object to
discuss the situation, which was becoming serious and
the events which were developing, with M. Sazonoff by
word of mouth. In this case it is most regrettable that
our Ambassador to Vienna did not start much earlier,
that is to say, on the assassination of the Arch-Duke
Francis Ferdinand.

It was through inordinately “ robust” optimism that
our whole diplomacy sinned on this occasion, and |

284 ON THE EVE OF WAR | [cuap. xvi

am still wondering whence this optimism drew its source,
when the whole of Europe was seized with indubitable
uneasiness, and when in Russia herself the awful rum-
bling of the revolution, checked but not settled, had been
heard since 1906 ?

Yes, the revolution was always present, extending
its roots over the soil of Russia. We diplomats working
abroad might have been mistaken about it ; but how could
those who in St. Petersburg directed Russian politics
and were in daily contact with the terrible reality have
failed to realise it in all they did and schemed?

In one of the early chapters of these reminiscences,
I sketched one of the causes of this phenomenon. 1!
said that since Stolypin’s disappearance the foreign
policy of Russia had been almost completely divorced
from the home policy. But there was more in it than
that. Atthe period when the terrible, world-wide con-
flict occurred, the Russian “ Cabinet” had assumed an
aspect as strange as it was glaring. There were two
parties who had nothing in common and who quarrelled
mutually. On one side, the “reactionaries”: MM. Mak-
lakoff, Casso, Makaroff, Sabler, Prince Schakhowskoi,
and to a certain extent the President of the Council,
M. Goremykin; on the other, the sincere partisans of
indispensable reforms: chiefly MM. Sazonoff and
Krivochéin. The reactionary Ministers discerned very
clearly—far more clearly than their colleagues—the
dangers of the internal position of the country ; only, to
obviate them, they vaunted and made use of methods
which only increased the general discontent and the
nervous tension of the country; and in order to retain
their places and cause their system to triumph, some of
those gentlemen were not ashamed to flatter the vile
Rasputin, and to protect his most intimate friends.
The Ministers belonging to the opposite camp realised
exactly what ought to be done: that is to say, to proceed
to immediate reforms, fo adopt truly the representative

' M. Goremykin and M. Casso, fortunately for their reputations, never
compromised themselves by these degrading attentions.

Lo a A aoe aot

1914 | DANGERS IN RUSSIA 285

régime granted in October, 1905, and to stop the Rasputin
scandal, which was deeply humiliating even the most
faithful servants of the Throne, and beginning to dis-
credit the Sovereign himself amongst the lower classes.
But, although thoroughly aware of the remedies, these
gentlemen thought the application of these remedies
would at once remove the whole trouble, and would
restore to the Dynasty and to the Imperial Government,
public confidence, which at that time was absolutely
lacking. According to them, none of the foreign prestige
of Russia could be sacrificed; it would suffice that a
homogeneous Ministry composed of honest and wise
men like themselves should be entrusted with the
governing of Russia, for the internal ferment to calm
down instantly, giving place to systematic and fruitful
work, which in its turn would strengthen the inter-
national position of the country. These men, although
intelligent and well-meaning, did not realise that the
mistakes accumulated by the Government and the un-
bridled propaganda of the opposition parties had sapped
the very foundations of national existence to such an
extent, that the entire people and the whole country
showed symptoms of an acute and serious disease. The
State so grievously afflicted internally could not live a
normal life externally. Far more than in 1856 had
Russia need to collect herself} That is what was not
understood in our country for several reasons, the
principal one being that statesmen of the stamp of
Prince Gortchakoff no longer existed, or else were not
called to power.

I spent the summer in town, having to buy furniture,
and also having planned to take a cure in September,
and to make a short stay in Italy with my family. As if
on purpose, the summer promised to be remarkably fine
and hot, and we ended by regretting that we were not
spending it in the country.

1 “Russia is not sulking; Russia is collecting herself”—famous
saying by Prince Gortchakoff.

286 ON THE EVE OF WAR _ [cuap. xv1.

One of my colleagues had already established him-
self and his family at Nynds, a picturesque seaside
place, where I and his other colleagues often visited him.
On the 28th June we were expecting some members of
the Legation who had just been to Nynas for the day
to come and spend the evening with us. Towards
eleven o'clock they came in very much upset : “ Do you
know, Monsieur, what has just happened ? The Arch-
Duke, the Austrian Heir, and his wife have been assas-
sinated at Serajevo. Here is the telegraphic report
that is being sold in the streets.”

“This is most serious,” I replied.

“ But perhaps,” hazarded one of these gentlemen, “ it
may be all for the best? Every one said that the late
Francis Ferdinand was a warm partisan of war. If this
is true, his death might increase the chances of peace.”

“That is possible,” I replied; “but in the first place
murder is murder, that is to say a revolting thing;
and then the occurrence at Serajevo might increase the
displeasure of the Central Empires against the Serbians
—and against us, their natural protectors—and might set
a match to the train.”

However, during the days that followed, these appre-
hensions hardly appeared to bejustified. In Stockholm,
as everywhere else, we assisted at the Requiem Mass
to the memory of the Arch-Duke and his unfortunate
wife. There was much mention in the newspapers of
the funeral rites of the murdered couple and of the
intentionally simple character that the Court of Vienna
gave tothese rites. Then one heard—to the intense satis-
faction of the whole world—that this mournful event did
not prevent the Emperor William taking his usual cruise
in the Norwegian Fjords, and that he was just starting.
In short, everything seemed to have calmed down.

A few days later, | went again to Malmé, whither
King Gustaf V. came for the first time since his re-
covery, to meet the King of Denmark. The weather
was fine and hot; the festivities in the King’s honour
were marked by great cordiality. I saw my German

1914 | THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM 287

colleague several times, and he was very attentive to
me, although he was much occupied with a big deputa-
tion of German officers who had come to greet the King
of Sweden, and who paraded ostentatiously everywhere
in their most splendid uniforms and fraternised at
perpetual banquets with their Swedish comrades from
the garrisons of central Sweden.

I also noticed—it was most obvious—in the waters
of the straits which divide Malm6é from Copenhagen the
presence of a great number of German destroyers.
When I was going to Copenhagen, after the King’s
departure from Malmé, I came across several. One
seemed to come out of every creek! To my questions
on the subject, the answer given was that it was a
squadron of destroyers commanded by Prince Eitel-
Frederick who, having taken a cruise in the straits, was
going to pay a visit to the Swedish Royal couple at
the Castle of Tullgarn; a visit which actually took
place ten days later.

Meantime, the President of the French Republic was
on his way to St. Petersburg by sea; from there he was
due in Stockholm on the 25th July to pay his official
visit; great preparations were being made to receive
him with the customary ceremonial.

I remember that on the 22nd, I and my family and a
few members of the Legation made a delightful excursion
in the “skargaard” of Stockholm. Beautiful weather,
pretty scenery, a merry lunch, a charming day spent
entirely in the openair! Returning in a motor-boat, on
one of those soft, clear evenings which in summer
constitute the special charm of those regions, I gave
myself up entirely to the mere joy of existing. “Well!
well!” I soliloquised out loud; “I am not sorry after
all to have had to exchange Sofia for Stockholm! Sofia
certainly was a more interesting post, and above all a
more important one; but here in exchange, one has
some repose; one can enjoy life without being perpetu-
ally obsessed by political preoccupations... .” A bad
fairy heard me.

288 ON THE EVE OF WAR | [cuap. xv1.

This happened on Wednesday, the 22nd July ; on the
evening of the following day, the evening papers brought
the first news of an Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and
onthe Saturday morning, a few hours before M. Poincaré’s
arrival, appeared the text itself of this ultimatum which
was unexpected and of unheard-of violence. The ¢ragic
week was beginning; the week in which the future
destinies of the world were at stake, and in which the
world-war was decided, which in its turn brought about
the terrible shipwreck of my unfortunate country !

CHAPTER XVII
THE TRAGIC WEEK

THE first day of the “tragic week” coincided in Stock-
holm with the official reception of the President of the
French Republic, and the festivities that had been
arranged for this reception.

The President was only to stay one day in Stockholm.
As the armoured cruiser which brought the Head of the
French State could not berth alongside, but had to
anchor two or three kilometres outside, King Gustaf V.
embarked at the hour appointed to fetch his guest
and conduct him to the Royal Castle in a gondola with
twelve pairs of oars, dating from the eighteenth century
and richly decorated in the Louis XV. style.

The foreign Ministers were to be presented to the
President during the day, and were invited to the great
banquet at the Palace, where all the political and social
notabilities of Stockholm would be gathered round the
King and his French guests. After the banquet there
was a concert given by the Swedish choral societies, and
late in the evening the President and his suite left,
escorted by torch-bearers. As the Diplomatic Corps did
not take part in the actual reception of the President,
all the members of the Corps and all distinguished
foreigners were invited to watch his arrival from the
garden of the Castle. The reception was favoured by
splendid weather.

When we assembled in the garden, the terraces of
which overhang the arm of the sea by which the State
gondola was to arrive, one was immediately concious of
the great constraint which the news of the day before
had caused among the assembly.

289

290 THE TRAGIC: WEEK [CHAP XVII.

All faces were more or less careworn. The
‘“Centrals” held themselves aloof and talked together
in low tones. The members of the French Legation,
taking part 7 corpore in the reception of the President,
were not among the spectators. My British colleague
had the serious and pale face that I got to know so well
during the many days of emotions shared in common
later on. He asked me what I thought of the ultimatum
and I did not hide from him that I considered the
situation extremely strained ; that was his opinion also.
] was introduced to the new Spanish Minister, who had
arrived two days before. When I shook hands with the
amiable and sympathetic Duke of Amalfi, 1 had no idea
that in the near future I should daily have recourse to
his kindness and his untiring work on questions relative
to the Russians left in Germany, to our prisoners of
war, etc.

We were too absent-minded to enjoy the delightful
spectacle before our eyes: the picturesque shores of the
arm of the sea below us, the motley crowd gaily
awaiting the arrival of the French guests, the pretty
gondola which appeared at last escorted by a whole
flotilla of launches, bringing the King, the President of
the French Republic and their respective suites, while the
guns fired a salute and the bells of the ancient churches
in the old town pealed merrily.

When I returned to the Legation, and re-read and
studied the text of the Austrian ultimatum in the French
translation, my anxiety increased still more. Just as in
1912, in the cathedral of Sofia, when the standard of
Samara was brought in, a sudden and irresistible thought
flashed across my brain: “It is war!”

At four o'clock in the afternoon, I and my foreign
colleagues presented ourselves at the Castle to greet the
President of the Republic. We were shown into one of
the drawing-rooms adjoining the rooms occupied by the
President. After a few minutes of waiting, the door
opened and M. Poincaré came in, followed by M. Viviani.
He talked to all the Ministers in turn. ‘“Itis not

ea BANQUET AT THE PALACE 291

necessary to introduce M. Nekludoff to me!” he exclaimed
amiably when my turn came; “he is an old friend of
ours!” Then grasping my hand and lowering his voice,
the President said to me: “We are going through a
truly alarming crisis; I have no time to discuss it with
you, but I hope that we shall have a little talk this
evening.” M. Viviani, however, pausedifor a few minutes
to exchange impressions with me. ‘“ What do you say
about the situation, M. Nekludoff?”

“Alas!” I replied, “I greatly fear that it means war.”

“Tt is terrible, terrible,’ exclaimed the French
President of the Council ; “for tf tt means war for you, it
most certainly also means war for us.”

“T did not expect to hear anything different from you,”
I said to M. Viviani ; “but let us still hope that things
will settle themselves !”

“Yes, yes, we will hope so! We shall have an
opportunity of talking at greater length this evening,”
added M. Viviani, taking leave of me.

The banquet served at seven o'clock in the evening in
the grand state gallery of the Castle was stormy. The
guests could only talk of the ultimatum and of the perils
of the hour. At the foot of the stairs I met the Austro-
Hungarian Minister face to face; he had left for his
holiday two or three days previously, and had not put in
an appearance either in the morning on the terrace of
the Castle, or in the afternoon at the presentations to
M. Poincaré.

“Oh! So you have come back, Count Hadik?” [|
accosted him.

“Yes, I have come back,” and with that the Count
turned his back on me and disappeared in the crowd.

The German Minister was paler than usual, and
wore an expression of restrained emotion. He insisted
on coming up to me to exchange a few commonplaces
about the beauty of the room and of the magnificent
Louis XVI. Sévres dinner-service on the long table. We
took our seats ; the music began; at a given moment,
the King and the President of the Republic exchanged

U

292 THE: TRAGIC “WEEK FCHAP. XVIL.

cordial toasts, followed by the “ Marseillaise,” and the
Swedish National Anthem. In short the setting of the
banquet bore a normal aspect. But no one paid any
attention to what was going on around. All thoughts
were centred on the dreaded events, relentless and
terrible, which were to be foreseen extending their fatal
embrace even to this picturesque town flooded with the
soft light of the sunset; even to this old and gorgeous
palace which had witnessed so many tragic events
within its walls; even to the very people taking part in
the banquet and who were talking amongst themselves.

In Paris, in October, 1908, I was present at a party
given in M. Izvolsky’s honour at the Russian Embassy ;
it was the day after the annexation of Bosnia, and the
proclamation of Bulgarian independence and sovereignty.
Then also the atmosphere was stormy; many foreign
representatives accosted one another without exactly
knowing whether they had to do with a friend or a future
foe; at the end of the great saloon M. Izvolsky, the
centre of attraction for all, was good-naturedly explain-
ing his diplomacy and the situation to the prettiest
and most charming political women of the Paris of that
day: Countess Jean de Castellane, Countess Jean de
Montebello, Countess de Greffulhe ; while on the other
side the good-looking and elegant Austrian Ambassador,
Count Koewenhiiller, who had just been made a Knight
of the Golden Fleece, holding a little court of young and
beautiful women, cast sarcastic glances at the Russian
Minister, as much as to say: “And you, my frend, you
will get nothing but worries out of this!”

In 1912 I was present at a party given by M. Sazonoff
which I described above, and where general depression
weighed on the invited guests. But nothing was to be
compared to the tragic banquet of the 25th July, 1914, in
Stockholm. It was fate hovering over the brilliant
assembly ; and every one could hear the flutter of its
wings. Mie .
Voluminous telegrams were being continually
brought tothe King, who passed them on to M. Poincare.

194] PRESIDENT POINCARE’S ADVICE 293

This went on after we had left the dining-room. The
King, ordinarily so scrupulously correct and amiable,
did not even think of going round and talking to the
notabilities at the reception. He specially avoided any
conversation with the foreign Ministers. Standing
quite apart at the uncrowded end of one of the large
reception-rooms, sometimes he talked in low tones to
M. Poincaré and handed him the telegrams he received,
sometimes to M. Viviani or to M. Wallenberg. The
President, seeing me close to him, came up and said to
me: “ Monsieur, I had an opportunity this morning of
communicating to King Gustaf something that the
Emperor Nicolas II. had asked me to convey to him,
that is to say, the most formal and the most gracious
assurance of his good and unalterable disposition to-
wards Sweden and the Swedish Court. In particular I
was able to certify to the King that the Assanovitch
incident which had so affected Swedish public opinion,
had not the importance attached to it by this opinion.
His Majesty the King received this communication with
sincere pleasure, but he expressed the hope that from
henceforth explicit orders would be issued from St.
Petersburg to the Russian Legation in Stockholm, and
particularly to the military agent who is to succeed
M. Assanovitch, to take the greatest care to avoid any-
thing that might appear to bear the stamp of clandestine
or irregular proceedings. What I am telling you,”
continued the President, “is of very secondary import-
ance compared to the political events of the moment ;
nevertheless, it is all the more necessary to reassure the
Swedes and to deprive the Central Empires of all
plausible causes for intrigue.”

I entirely agreed with the President’s point of view,
and I assured him that from my arrival in Stockholm I
had planned to doallin my power to rectify the mistakes
committed by us latterly in Sweden. We went on to
speak of the political situation of the moment.

“The King has received some news from Berlin this
evening that has reassured him a little; according to

204 THE TRAGIC WEEK [ CHAP. XVII.

His Majesty, a favourable way out of the crisis which
has arisen may still be found, if only both sides will
display some good will. May heberight! Inany caseI
have decided to leave out Copenhagen and Christiania,
and to return to Paris at once. I hope that the two
Scandinavian Courts will graciously accept my excuses
conveyed to them by General Brugére, and will not bear
me a grudge, under the circumstances.”

I replied to the President that in Denmark and in
Norway the importance and the gravity of what was
occurring must be even better understood than in
Stockholm, and that they would be particularly anxious
to see the Head of the French Government return in
safety, and with all speed to his post. I then talked to
M. Viviani on the same subjects. At this moment the
sound of beautiful voices was heard, and the King and
his guest, remembering the choral societies’ part in the
programme, passed into the adjoining room and listened
to and applauded a few pieces. But all the same, the
pretty popular songs and the beautiful patriotic chants
of Sweden never had such an absent-minded audience
as on this occasion. Every one was in a hurry to have
done with the conventions and fatigues of the official
festivity; and every one heaved a sigh of relief when
the signal for departure was given. A quarter of an
hour later, when I was going along the quay opposite
the Castle landing-stage in my motor, I could see from
afar the beautiful sight of the departure of the French
guests, with the torchlight illumination; the red lights
were reflected in the water and made it look like blood.
“ Here indeed is the torch of Bellona!” I thought, with
an involuntary shudder.

The next day, Sunday, we received the news of the
Serbian answer to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum,
and of the rejection of this answer. On Monday, when
we received the full text of the Serbian Note in
Stockholm, I was able to realise the gravity of the
danger that the peace of Europe was running. In spite

1914] GERMANS DETERMINED ON WAR _ 298

of the high opinion I had of M. Pachitch’s prudence, I
had not imagined that Serbia could have displayed such
moderation and so much obedience to our advice. The
unheard-of, brutal ultimatum from Vienna was accepted,
except on one point only: the one that aimed quite
simply at replacing the national police in the kingdom
by Austro-Hungarian police. And the Serbian reserva-
tions on this one point had sufficed for Austria not to
accept the answer and to break off diplomatic relations
with her neighbour! It was as clear as daylight that in
Vienna—as in Berlin—the execution of Serbia had been
irrevocably settled. Now as I foresaw that Russia
could not tolerate this brutal execution, I was almost
convinced that in a few days my country would be
involved in an open collision with the two Central
Empires.

The negotiations and events of the succeeding days
proved that these two Empires did not look on the
action they had undertaken quite in the same way.
Whereas, for the Austrians it was chiefly a question of
punishing the Serbians, of avenging the events of 1912
and 1913, of re-establishing manu militari the influence
of the Empire in the Balkans; whereas in Vienna they
hoped 7 petto for a capitulation of Russia which would
have enabled Austria to do the deed without having to
face the terrible trials of the great war—in Berlin it was
just this war that was wished for; it had been decided
on after long subterfuges and an underhand but violent
struggle between the preventive-war party and the peace
party ; and once it had been decided on, they wished it
to break out at achosen and apparently pre-eminently
propitious moment. I have good reason to believe that in
the Wilhelmstrasse, they were prepared for the following
course of events: (1) the bombardment of Belgrade and
occupation of Serbia by Austro-Hungarian troops; (2)
Russian mobilisation and ultimatum from Russia to
Austria ; (3) counter-ultimatum and declaration of war
by Germany on Russia. From Tuesday, the 28th, when
a certain hesitation and a tendency to enter into

296 THE “TRAGIC WEER [ CHAP. XVII.

conversation with Russia were apparent in Vienna,
William II. and his advisers decided to precipitate
matters and, without waiting for the second phase, which
might miscarry, hurled their ultimatum and their declara-
tion of war at Russia, under pretext of the Russian
mobilisation.

But this plan was not revealed in all its cynical
crudeness till later on. At the moment one could still
hope against hope and attempt possible solutions. That
is what would have been done in our country if Berlin
had allowed us a few days’ respite.

In all my previous career I had never contemplated
with equanimity the possibility of an armed collision
between Germany and Russia. I had never been an
enemy of the Germans on principle; I recognised the
good and respectable sides of their national character
as these sides had been revealed to me through the
study of German history and literature, and through
frequenting a certain German sympathetic set. On the
other hand, I was perfectly aware of the failings of our
neighbours, of their pride which had blossomed
spontaneously and inordinately, of their intentional
brutality ; and I could ill bear the contempt and hatred
which every one in Germany paraded for all the Slav
races outside Russia. I knew that the Germans had
latterly been poisoned by the writings and opinions of
a whole school of Pan-German philosophers, historians,
and men of letters; but I had not realised the virulence
of this poison, which had gradually paralysed most of
the good qualities of the German nature.

I knew that Germany was very strong, and my
country undermined by internal trouble; I had no
confidence in our economic, political and military
organisation, no confidence in our Staff, very little
even in our soldiers; the recent Japanese war with its
sad pages had not vanished from my memory as it had
vanished from that of most of my compatriots. I hada
high opinion of French courage and genius; but I knew

1914 | INTERVIEW WITH REICHENAU 2097

that France was very ill-prepared for the supreme
struggle. On the other hand, I was not at all sure of
the intrinsic worth of a Russo-British alliance (in this I
was mistaken), and I feared that such an alliance might
rather incite Germany to attack us. In short, I frankly
dreaded a collision with Germany and held the opinion
that, given the present state of Russia, our policy ought
carefully to avoid anything that might create serious
friction between us and our powerful neighbour. I had
ever before me the threat of a great danger; I thought
this danger imminent; but ! did not think it in-
evitable:<..°.

On Tuesday, 28th July, as the telegrams from the
agencies revealed a slight relaxation in the tension, I went
to call on my German colleague, Herr von Reichenau,
in order to probe the situation with him. I told him
quite frankly that I was very anxious and that I was
profiting by what might prove the last day on which he
and I should be allowed to talk together. ‘“ Moreover,
circumstances are such that we must tell each other all
without any reticence, or we must not talk,” I added,
when Herr von Reichenau expressed his great pleasure
at seeing me. I began the conversation by drawing my
host’s attention to the fact that I was not at all what
they called “a devourer of Germans”; I had family
antecedents and traditions that prevented me regarding
Germany as a necessary and born foe; and it was in the
name of these old memories and traditions that I came
to talk to my German colleague that day. ‘ What are
they about in Berlin at this moment? They are on the
eve of letting loose the most terrible events that have
ever occurred in Europe.”

“But we in no way wish for war, I assure you,”
protested Herr von Reichenau.

“Now, now! quite frankly, my dear colleague, it is
not possible that you should think it is we who wish for
war ?”

“ No, I do not think that ; but it is not a question of
war or peace. We are absolutely determined this time to

298 FHE TRAGIC WEEK [ CHAP. XVII.

punish the Serbians—die Friedenstérer—as they deserve.
You wish to prevent this. Very well, we cannot permit
you to assume this role of forced protectors of the
Serbians or of any other Balkan nation; that gives these
small States a pride and an audacity which are incom-
patible with the dignity and the vital interests of
Austria-Hungary and of Germany herself. That is
what we wish to stop, that is what we are arming for.”

“But how can we entirely abandon our rdle of pro-
tectors of the Slav and Orthodox nationalities of the Near
East? It is an historical fact. One cannot go up-stream
in history! I could quite understand your saying to us:
come to some arrangement with Austria to maintain
order and political security in the Balkans. But to
undertake armed action in Serbia and then to say that it
does not concern us—¢hat our public opinion could
never understand nor would it forgive the Imperial
Government if it agreed tosuchathing!... Just think:
during the last five years this is, so to speak, the third
ultimatum that you have virtually presented to us on the
subject of Balkan affairs. In March, 1909, you ordered
us to bow to the fact of the annexation of Bosnia; we
did bow to it. In 1912 you demanded that we should
make the Serbians retire from the northern coast of
Albania and the Montenegrins abandon Scutari; we
set about doing this honestly, in spite of the protests
and cries of the greater portion of our Press. Now you
wish us to be passive and indifferent spectators of the
execution of Serbia, without our even knowing how far
this execution will go! Come, come! do you consider
it possible for our Foreign Office, for His Majesty the
Emperor himself to consent to this third capitulation ?”

“Of course, I realise that it would be difficult for you,
but for us it is impossible to recognise your right to
protect Serbia against us. It is impossible, quite
impossible!”

‘Listen, Reichenau,” | said, seized with deep and
sincere emotion; “think, think well over what you are
doing. You are unloosing a terrible war, a struggle

1914] CONVERSATION WITH REICHENAU 299

probably unparalleled in history. I will be frank with
you to the end; | fear this war, I dread it terribly for
my country. If we are beaten, Russia will be ship-
wrecked. But calculate carefully what the result for
you will be? You may be quite sure that in the country
that goes under, revolution will break out, and it will be
a terrible revolution ; but we are far too near neighbours:
our interests, our economic life, our history even are far
too much mixed up for such a revolution to be restricted
to one country without hitting the other. Ifthe Emperor
William declares war on Russia, he had better know
what the result will be: he will deal a decisive blow at
the monarchical principle in Russia, Germany, Europe !
It is in the name of ancient traditions, in the name of the
monarchical principle that I come and warn you that
you are riding for a fall! Perhaps by to-morrow we
shall not be able to see one another; but one day you
will remember my last visit and my last words.”

I had probably spoken with much heat and conviction,
for at one moment [I saw Herr von Reichenau’s eyes
filling with tears.

“Let us hope, my dear colleague,” he said in con-
clusion, “that we shall still have many opportunities
for seeing each other and that the troubles you predict
will not occur.”

‘““We will hope so,” I said, and on that I took leave of
my German colleague, and I never had an opportunity
or a possibility of seeing him again.

If Herr von Reichenau ever sees these lines I feel
sure he will remember our last conversation and that he
will admit the absolute accuracy of my account.

The terrible events which have occurred since have’
exceeded my gloomiest prognostications, making these ©
appear trifling. It was not only the dynasty of the
Hohenzollerns and that of the Romanoffs that were
judged and condemned in the hour when war broke out
—it was the monarchical principle itself that was struck
and perhaps irremediably. The monarchical power is
the preponderance of the will and the reason of one man

300 THE TRAGIC WEEK [ CHAP. XVI.

over those of an entire nation; in order that this pre-
ponderance should be justified it is imperative that this
will and this reason should be the expression of a high
and beneficial idea, which would be lacking in the
majority of the country. In modern times, when the
spread of education and the influence of the Press had
replaced the rivalries of Governments and States by the
conscious rivalries of nations, sovereigns ought to inter-
pose their authority against the nefarious propaganda
of international hatred and competition. In any other
matter they could and should be the head servants of
their people; in questions of peace or war, they ought
resolutely to constitute themselves the champions of a
mutual solidarity which would have preserved the world
from the worst scourges. Some, like William II., have
done exactly the opposite; others have not understood
it sufficiently, hence the decay of the monarchical
principle throughout the world.

And here I am again judging sovereigns, in spite of
the earnest injunctions of His Majesty the King of
Sweden!

On Wednesday, the 29th July, the news was again
much worse, and violent agitation took hold of Sweden.
All sorts of reports began to circulate in the town and
amongst the Diplomatic Corps; it was affirmed that
Sweden was bound by a secret military convention to
Germany and that in the event of war the Swedes
would side resolutely with her. M. Wallenberg, whom
I saw on Wednesday, confessed to me that the situation
was making the Royal Government very anxious; he
then said, emphasising his words, that Sweden was
more interested than any one in the preservation of
European peace and that a collision between her two
neighbours would place her in a dangerous position.
‘“ But,” he added, “the King has not lost all hope that
matters may yet be arranged.”

On Friday morning the new military attaché to our
Legation, Lieutenant-Colonel Kandauroff, arrived from

1914 | COL. KANDAUROFF'S TIDINGS 301

St. Petersburg ; I had been informed of his appointment
a few days previously. The first question I asked him
was how matters stood when he left St. Petersburg.

“All that I can tell you is this,” answered the
Colonel: “as you know, I was discharging the duties of
assistant to the Quarter-Master-General at Headquarters;
as there was an enormous amount of work, I only left
my office two hours before the train left for Abo, that
is to say yesterday, Thursday, at six o'clock in the
morning. Now, all through the night I was busy dis-
patching peremptory orders to commanding officers in
Poland and on the Prussian frontier carefully to avoid,
in case of mobilisation, anything that might seem to the
German authorities to be a threat of military action
against Germany. All the frontier posts were to be
moved back to ten or fifteen kilometres, no marching
column was to be formed, even the frontier guards were
to be removed so that there could be no collision in the
event of German troops approaching our frontier and
even crossing it... . These orders came from His
Majesty himself; they reached General Headquarters
very late on Wednesday evening, and yesterday,
Thursday, at six o'clock in the morning all the necessary
telegrams had been sent off. You can see by that,
Monsieur, that in our country all hope of coming to
some arrangement with Berlin is not lost.”

This news restored some hope to me; but not for
long ; the following morning the news of the German
ultimatum to Russia appeared, and then I realised that
all hope had vanished.

From Friday evening a real panic reigned in
Stockholm: all the banks were closed by order of the
Government, and outside their doors were enormous
queues of people who wished to take out their deposits
and their money. Prince Eitel Frederick’s squadron of
destroyers had left two days before for an unknown
destination. I was told that my German colleague had
said at a meeting that he was sure Sweden would side
with Germany.

302 THE “TRAGIC -WEEK [CHAP. XVII.

On Saturday morning I accompanied the members
ofithe Russian delegation to the Spitsberg Conference,
which was just over at Christiania, MM. Bentkowski and
Mandelstamm, to the boat which was leaving for Abo.
With them went my eldest son, attached to the Foreign
Office, who had just come on leave but who had been
hastily recalled on account of the enormous amount of
work at the Office. I entrusted these gentlemen, but
especially M. Mandelstamm who was so well up in the
position at Constantinople, with a message from me to
M. Sazonoff, which ran as follows: In the event of war
breaking out and if Turkey’s attitude became threatening,
I was taking on myself to advise a prompt Russian
descent on the coast of Southern Bulgaria; this descent
should be effected by considerable forces, one large army
corps at the least; simultaneously with this forcing of
the gates of Bulgaria a proclamation should be addressed
to the people and to the Bulgarian Army, telling them
that the Russians were arriving to restore to them
Adrianople, Lozengrad and Thrace that the Turks had
unjustly taken from them, profiting by the misfortunes
of Bulgaria. I guaranteed that if the descent was
successful the Bulgarian Army would place itself on our
side and that King Ferdinand would be obliged to
submit to this movement. I was quite aware that at the
Foreign Office no one would pay the slightest attention
to this advice; that it would be looked on as pre-
sumptuous interference on my part in matters which
were no longer my business. But I thought it my duty,
at this solemn hour, not to keep back an idea which
might be beneficial to our cause. A few days later I
repeated the same advice in a letter to Baron Schilling,
the only person in Sazonoff’s set whose character,
intelligence and patriotism I thoroughly trusted.

The subsequent events of the terrible war have
proved that I was not wrong. Bulgaria did play the
decisive role of the secondary weight which finally
upset the scales; her geographical position predestined
her to this role. It was in October, 1915, that, by

1914 | MY ADVICE ABOUT BULGARIA 303

Bulgaria’s entry into the arena, the decided superiority
of Germany over her adversaries became apparent. In
September, 1916, Rumania’s entry into the war was
wasted and neutralised because we could not realise that
the first advantage to be derived from the Rumanian
alliance should have been to attack the Bulgarians with
large Russian forces and to beat them, on which the
entire Bulgarian Army would have come over to us with
the cry that Holy Russia was invincible, that traitors
alone had induced the Bulgarian people to take part in
a sacrilegious war and that these traitors deserved
death. In 1918 when the Bulgarian troops, exhausted
by the interminable struggle, were duly beaten and
overthrown, the defection of Bulgaria that ensued caused
the defection of Austria and that of Turkey, and finally
hastened the capitulation of Germany. If the entry of
Bulgaria into the war on the side of Germany could have
been prevented—and for that there was all the time
between August, 1914, and October, 1915—the war would
not have lasted so long, that is to say, it would not have
assumed the proportions of a world-wide calamity, un-
paralleled in history, and above all would not have
brought about the awful shipwreck of Russia!

I have heard that the diplomatic mistakes committed
from the beginning of the war with regard to Turkey
and to Bulgaria were due, amongst other causes, to the
false direction of English diplomacy, which would not
perceive the danger and thought it possible to make use
of evasions and mildness there where, on the contrary, a
display of strength and decision were imperative. As
regards Constantinople I have no grounds for believing
or disbelieving these assertions ; with regard to Bulgaria
I personally should be inclined to doubt if the British
Government was well and fully informed at this period
of the political situation of Bulgaria and of the true
disposition of King Ferdinand and his people.

On Sunday, the znd!August, I was awakened at seven
o'clock in the morning to read the telegrams which had

304 THE TRAGIC WEEK [CHAP. XVII.

been received during the night. The first one I opened
was a telegram in which M. Sazonoff informed me that
the evening before, at seven o'clock, the Ambassador of
William II. had handed him Germany’s declaration of war.

In reading this awful news I was seized with in-
describable anguish ; it was as if a whirlwind of sinister
visions had encircled me; at this moment I had absolutely
clear presentiments of the troubles which were to over-
take my country, my relations.... I dashed into my
wife’s room. “War has been declared!” I exclaimed,
bursting into tears... .

My wife immediately helped me to regain my self-
control by saying: “Stockholm at this moment is one
of the most important diplomatic posts for Russia. If
the Minister occupying this post gives way to nerves,
the worst may happen. It is absolutely necessary from
the very first to keep a firm hand on oneself and do
one’s duty !”

I choked back my sobs and left the room. “The cup
is full, we must drain it even to the dregs if necessary.”
This saying gave me back my courage and powers of
action.

Having finished dressing I went to the office at the
Legation where a whole crowd of fellow countrymen—
the first who had escaped from Germany—were awaiting
me.

“Gentlemen,” I said, “I have just received official
information that last night a declaration of war was
handed to our Minister of Foreign Affairs by the
German Ambassador. Gentlemen, Hurrah for Russia
—and for H.I.M. the Emperor!”

An indistinct murmur greeted this little speech. A
gentleman with a red beard and a hooked nose then
spoke with a marked ‘Russian accent: “ Yes, that is all
very well, Monsieur, Hurrah for Russia and the Emperor;
but first and foremost you must concern yourself with
our unhappy position. We have just arrived from
Germany; how and by what route can we return to
our own country ?” etc.

1914 | DECLARATION OF WAR 305

‘“‘ Always the same, my dear compatriots,” | thought,
with a bitter feeling of the reality of things; and this
feeling restored all my self-control to me. It was
necessary to cope with the most urgent matters and
leave the rest to the will of God.

Absorbing work for every day and all hours had
begun for me and for my colleagues gathered round
me at this moment in the office of the Legation. We
strove to do this work to the best of our strength and
of our ability, and I consider it my duty to express here
the gratitude I owe to all those splendid and faithful
colleagues who up to the end did their whole duty and
more than their duty, and whose friendship and advice
sustained me during three long years of labours, trials,
miseries and joys shared as if we had but one heart and
one thought only!

CHAPTER XVIII
SWEDISH NEUTRALITY

Tue first question—the agonising question of all ques-
tions for me—was that of the side Sweden was going
to take. Would she remain neutral? Would she side
definitely with Germany as Herr von Reichenau an-
nounced to any who wished to listen ?

I knew which were the elements in the country that
advocated an active and immediate alliance with Berlin.
There were, first, the generals and the officers of
the Swedish Army, taken principally from the ranks
of the nobility, who were convinced of the crushing
superiority of the German forces and of their certain
victory, and animated by old grudges against Russia
and the hope of at least taking Finland from us. Then
there were the nobility, the great number of Lutheran
clergy (there is no other in Sweden), and many members
of the universities.

The partisans of neutrality were the Liberals, who
were no longer in power and who were retiring some-
what defeated though they still had a strong position in
the country, and the Socialists led by M. Branting and
the Baron de Palmstjerna. I knew through reliable
sources that amongst the Swedish lower classes, the
people were averse to the very idea of war; but I also
knew that if war did break out all the same the soldiers
would fight splendidly and that the entire population
would be ready for any sacrifice for the good of the
country.

The very next day I saw M. Wallenberg, who
informed me in carefully chosen words that the

306

ial + AUDIENGE OR KING GUSTAF 49

Government hoped to safeguard the principle of Swedish
neutrality.

The very day of our new military attaché’s arrival,
that is to say on Friday, the 31st, I had taken the
necessary steps to obtain permission to present him
to His Majesty the King. I waited an answer on the
subject with an impatience that increased as events
developed. If the King received us, it would be a good
sign; if he refused the audience one would be jus-
tified in deducing the worst auguries. Finally, on the
Monday, towards evening, I was informed that we
were both to be received the next day, Tuesday, at
eleven o'clock.

At the appointed hour we were shown into a drawing-
room adjoining the King’s study; our reception was
frigid, the King hardly spoke to Colonel Kandauroff
(the Assanovitch incident was of toorecent date!). But
after this brief interview His Majesty begged me to
follow him alone into the next room, and there—just as
on the day of my solemn audience—the King’s manner
changed completely. Inviting me to sit down and with-
out hiding the deep emotion that the events which he
described as “terrible” were causing him, he said, laying
stress on each of his words: “I wished to see you,
Monsieur, to tell you that Sweden is not bound to any one.”
The King then repeated what his Minister of Foreign
Affairs had said to me the day before, that is to say
that the Swedish Government wished to maintain
absolute neutrality ; “provided,” added His Majesty,
“that the belligerent countries enable us to carry out
this resolution.” I hastened to reply that as to Russia
and her ally (Great Britain had not yet declared her-
self), Sweden could be quite sure of our perfect correct-
ness with regard to her and of our desire to facilitate
her neutrality. Onthat I was very amiably dismissed.
The interview had only lasted a few minutes, but I left
the King’s study with one terrible worry the less.

Two days later England had joined the ranks of the
ae

308 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cuap. xvi.

Allies and from now onwards I had the opportunity of
working in concert with Mr. Howard, and we communi-
cated to each other everything we heard. On the initiative
of the French and British Ministers their two Govern-
ments, from the first days of the war, made a declaration
to the Swedish Government to the effect that the two
Powers guaranteed Sweden’s integrity and her complete
sovereignty on condition that she maintained strict
neutrality. When M. Thiébaud and Mr. Howard trans-
mitted this declaration to M. Wallenberg, the latter
thanked them warmly and added: “Ah! if only the
Russian Minister would bring me an identical declara-
tion, how it would facilitate my task at the King’s
Councils!” I had not waited for this allusion to take
the same step with regard to St. Petersburg as my
colleagues had taken in Paris and London, and I was
awaiting the answer somewhat anxiously; this answer
was delayed, and the activist agitation was again
becoming more acute in Stockholm, and all sorts of
alarming rumours were beginning to circulate. At last
I received the much-wished-for answer from M. Sazonoff:
“You are authorised to make a declaration identical
with that of the Allied Governments.” However, next
morning another telegram from the Foreigh Office
begged me to defer the declaration a little. The same
day my two colleagues came to warn me that the absence
of the Russian declaration was greatly agitating the
Swedish Government and furnishing arguments to
the partisans of the German alliance. “I felt sure of it,
and I have already sent an earnest telegram to St.
Petersburg to show the absolute necessity and urgency ©
for our declaration.”

I realised that it was a decisive moment and that
all further delay might have disagreeable consequences.
Fortunately, that night a telegram arrived from the
Foreign Office authorising me afresh to make the
declaration. For fear of a new counter-order I hastened
the first thing in the morning, to beg for an interview
with M. Wallenberg,and I handed him the communication

1914] RUSSIAN ASSURANCES 309

he so impatiently awaited. The Swedish Foreign
Secretary did not conceal his intense satisfaction:
“What you are bringing me will, I hope, definitely
assure the neutrality of Sweden, for the Russian declara-
tion will reassure many amongst us as to your supposed
intentions.” Almost immediately afterwards the declara-
tion of the absolute neutrality of Sweden did appear,
and this contributed considerably to the calming of
public opinion.

From that moment there were two absolutely distinct
currents in Sweden: the King, the Government and the
majority of the country adhered to the opinion that
Sweden, as far as possible, ought to safeguard her
neutrality; the other current, that of the activists, on
the contrary, at every favourable opportunity, upheld
the idea of an alliance with Germany, or at least of the
expediency of using firm and even threatening language
to Russia and her allies every time that these Powers
should be tempted to restrict or injure Sweden’s interests
in any way.

Thanks to King Gustaf V.’s sincere love of peace,
to the intelligent and firm policy of M. Wallenberg, and
above all, to the perfect integrity displayed under all
circumstances by the Sovereign and his Minister, the
first current, that of neutrality, definitely prevailed.
It is only now, when the long and terrible struggle is
ended, that one can appreciate the wise and loyal
conduct of these two worthy men at its true value; and
it is only fair to add a third name to theirs, that of the
leader of the Swedish Socialists, M. Branting. Through-
out the course of events, the latter behaved as a Swedish
patriot rather than as the head of an extreme party, and
by this attitude did far more both for the cause of peace
and for his own authority and that of Swedish Socialism
than if he had wished to profit by circumstances to
extract concessions and capitulations from the Govern-
ment.

When I say that it is only now that one can appreciate

310 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cwap. xvi.

the services rendered by the heads of the neutrality-
party, I am of opinion that it was not at all the assurance
of the ultimate victory of the Entente which had
inspired them. On the contrary, every one in Sweden,
without exception, sincerely believed that Germany on
the whole was invincible. At the end of the first eight
months of the struggle, towards March, 1915, when in
the Entente countries they began to calculate the
exhaustion of Germany and her allies in soldiers,
munitions, and especially in provisions, the Swedes who
were the most friendly to the Entente (I should say
rather to France and England, for the prejudice against
Russia still continued) contested our optimism and
never ceased saying that Germany was in no way at the
end of her tether, that she would manage the re-victual-
ling in some way or other, that enormous new contingents
would be called up, and that the German war industry
had not yet given its all and was reserving many
surprises for its foes. All this was perfectly true, and
the ill-omened year 1915, when, in spite of Italy’s
entry into the war, disaster nearly overtook the
arms of the Entente, proved that people in Sweden
were better informed than we were about German re-
sources.

Hence, then, it was not utilitarian calculation which
guided the policy of the guardians of Swedish neutrality,
but rather the sincere love of peace and the feeling of
responsibility towards the people and the country. The
Swedes have been quite enough disparaged during the
war not to do justice to those among their rulers who
were so well able to hold their own against the intentions
and the allurements of the agitating section of the
country.

While during the very first days of the war Sweden’s
attitude was becoming clearer, the European conflict
was assuming a definite character by Great Britain’s
entry into the war. I remember with what anxiety we
awaited the English decision during these same early

1914 | ENGLAND'S DECISION 311

days. For many people this decision appeared to be
already unquestionable : the English ought to side with
France and Russia. But I did not share this assur-
ance. [remembered the political conflict caused between
Russia and the Central Empires by the annexation of
Bosnia. At that time I often met in Paris my London
colleague, M. Poklewski-Kozell, a man as intelligent as
he was sincere, who had made for himself an exceptional
position in the London world, and who thoroughly
understood English political mentality. I asked him
once—it was in February, 1909—why England did not
earnestly warn Germany that if her provocative policy
led to a conflict with Russia, the English would place
themselves resolutely on our side and on that of
France; such a warning, I considered, would certainly
moderate the claims and the actions of Berlin. M.
Poklewski replied that in order to issue such a warning,
the British Government would have to look on the
question of the annexation of Bosnia (without the con-
sent of a European Conference) as a possible casus belli.
Now this was not at all the case; the Asquith-Grey
Government would only decide on war if Germany touched
one of the primordial principles, of which the infringement
would be intolerable to England. Remembering these
words, which were completely confirmed by subsequent
events, I did not feel at all sure of the entry of the
English into the war up till the day when the Germans
invaded Belgium; on that day I said to myself that
Belgian neutrality being undoubtedly one of the great
principles which England would never allow to be
touched, the English alliance was henceforth assured to
us; and in fact we did not have to wait one day for it.
This was an enormous relief to me ; without the co-opera-
tion of Great Britain I felt sure of our defeat; with it,
one could hope for much. Alas! I was still too
optimistic! It is true that I had assessed the forces and
the moral of Russia far too low; but on the other
hand, like most people in Europe, I was far from realis-
ing the magnitude of Germany’s resources and her

312 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY | [cnap. xvin.

mathematically-correct preparation for the terrible
world-war which all Germans were expecting, and most
of them were wishing for.

I remember the effect produced during the first days
of the struggle by the noble resolution of Belgium and
her King; by the first encounters between the Belgian
Army and the invaders, by the short but sanguinary
and glorious resistance of Liége. One talked then of
the ten, or perhaps twenty, thousand men that the
Germans lost during these first fights, and said that
they could not continue to sacrifice so many men daily ;
that they would exhaust themselves quickly at that rate.
If at that moment any one had foretold that ezghteen
months later the Germans would still be in a position to
lose 300,000 men in a fortnight, 7 not taking Verdun, and
that this terrible reverse would not even constitute a
definite defeat for them; that war would continue after
that for another thirty-three months without decreasing
for an instant in intensity and horror; if, as I say, some
one had foretold such things in August, 1914, he would
have been accused of insanity. Every one felt sure that
the war could not last more than a year and a half, and
that because none of the belligerents—except perhaps
Russia—could bear such protracted tension of efforts,
such terrible cost, and such complete disturbance of all
economic and social life. Yet all the belligerents—
except just Russia—have borne these awful conditions
for four years and four months.

I must, however, admit that during the first two or
even three weeks, I had no time to consider the events
of the war either as a whole or in detail. I was too
much absorbed by the crushing task which had fallen
to the Russian Legation in Stockholm in connection
with the enormous numbers of compatriots of all con-
ditions who, fleeing from Germany, passed through the
Scandinavian countries in these days to get back to
their homes. I have already related how from the
morning of Sunday, 2nd August, I had found myself

1914 | RUSSIAN REFUGEES 3E3

faced with the first group of these refugees at the office
in the Legation. From that moment the stream of
Russian refugees increased day by day and hour by
hour. I should never have thought that the number of
Russians who went to take waters in Germany every
summer was so large; moreover, nine-tenths of these
compatriots were Israelites. All these people, suddenly
hustled and ill-treated by the Germans, herded into
cattle trucks, arrived after much discomfort at Sassnitz
(in Pomerania), and thence crossed in ferry-boats to
Malmé, and finally reached Stockholm. They were a
famished, dirty crowd, with no money, many of them
without passports, which the German military authorities
had taken from them!—a crowd seized with panic, not
feeling safe even in Sweden, so firmly had they been
told that Sweden also was going to declare war on us.
Every train coming from Malmo brought a fresh lot of
refugees, who wandered aimlessly along the streets of
Stockholm. They had all to be lodged, directed towards
the Russian frontier, and supplied with passports and
money to buy food on the way.

The Legation and the Russian Consulate-General
had no funds at their disposition. I managed, not with-
out difficulty, to get into the bank where I had some
credit, and where they paid out to me all the money I
had there—a few thousand crowns. The next day I saw
M. Emmanuel Nobel arriving ; he was the head of the
house so well known to us and to the whole world.
This excellent man immediately placed a loan of 50,000
crowns at my disposal, and advised me to apply for
the remainder straight to M. Wallenberg. Ina quarter
of an hour’s interview with the latter the necessary
arrangements were made: the Swedish Government
gave orders to supply the Russian Legation and the
Consulate with as many railway and steamer tickets
as they required. At the railway stations Russian
travellers were to receive food, milk for the children,

1 Probably to furnish some for the German spies who were going to
Russia.

314 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY | f[cuap. xvm.

medical attention if necessary; in Stockholm itself a
public building was to be fitted up for lodging the
refugees that the trains and steamers could not convey
away at once. The Russian Government was to repay
Sweden the expenses of this organisation; of course I
pledged myself to this; but I was not asked for any
written or signed note on the subject; the word of the
Russian Minister was sufficient. This organisation
worked regularly throughout the war, and we had
nothing but praise for the attentions that the Swedish
local authorities and the railway companies lavished on
our compatriots.

All the same, during many weeks the Legation and
Consulate were besieged by the Russian refugees. The
Consulate had to issue tickets, and to give permits to
those who had no passports. The first days the confusion
was terrible. The street in which the Consulate stood
was black with people, and the Swedish police had great
difficulty in keeping order. Another crowd, though
rather less dense, besieged the Legation, composed of
those who came to appeal against the decisions of the
Consul, those who thought themselves entitled to ex-
ceptional treatment or some favour, all official persons,
all those with whom we were personally acquainted.
In the office the two secretaries to the Legation ex-
plained to all inquirers the route they ought to take,
re-assured them about Sweden’s entry into the war,
met or set aside their complaints and their claims.
Meantime, through the other entrance in the house a
stream of ladies and gentlemen, of friends, acquaintances,
of people we knew slightly or not at all, filled our rooms
and were received by my wife, my sister, and my
youngest son. There were complaints, tears, nervous
attacks even. Every one had arrived in a lamentable
state, most of them straight from the train, and almost
mad with fright. There were some _ tragico-comic
situations. One fine day the firing of guns was heard
at noon (this often occurs in Stockholm: saluting the
colours, or at festivals, etc.). At once the visitors in

seat NOTABLE REFUGEES 315

the drawing-room, the inquirers at the office, and the
crowd gathered in front of the Consulate, were all
seized with panic. ‘The Germans! The Germans!
The Germans are coming to bombard us!” It was
almost impossible to make these insanely frightened
people listen to reason.

As I have said, a good half of the society world of
St. Petersburg and Moscow whom we knew came to the
Legation. Every day we were from sixteen to twenty
people at lunch and dinner. On day it was Colonel
Skoropadsky, of the Horse Guards, who was hastening
to rejoin his regiment ; who would have guessed in this
smart and correct soldier whom we had so often met in
the salons of St. Petersburg, the future “ Hetman of
the Ukraine,” going to ask for his investiture of the
Emperor William? At the same time we also saw
seated at our table Prince Nicolas Radziwill, one of
the very best, whom I had seen the year before
returning from the disastrous but magnificent retreat
of the Bulgarian troops beaten at Belachitza, and
many other officers of the Guard; a few months later
we heard of the glorious death of most of these young
men.

The Minister for Education, M. Casso, arrived one
evening in a piteous state; he had nearly been lynched
by the crowd at a station in East Prussia, and only
owed his escape to a concurrence of providential cir-
cumstances. We made him sit down at once, and gave
him a plate of good soup. ‘The first soup I have eaten
for ten days!” We poured him out some good claret.
“The first glass of claret I have drunk for ten days!”
And then, comforted and consoled, he proceeded to
relate his tragic experiences with irrepressible humour.
“There was an old hump-backed woman that I shall
never forget; the whole time she was worrying the
crowd who were dragging me away from the police and
hitting me with their fists. ‘Hang him, hang him,’
cried the old witch; ‘he’s a Russian spy!’ And then

316 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY | [cnap. xvui.

the final statio dolorosa: we were about two hundred
Russians of both sexes and all classes, surrounded by
soldiers with fixed bayonets ; we had been standing for
more than two hours, dropping with fatigue, in front of
our wretched trunks open in order to undergo a tenth
search. Suddenly an old non-commissioned officer of the
Landsturm, fat and jovial, appeared and began to make
us a speech, or rather preach us a sermon: ‘We Germans
are a good-natured people (em guimiithiges Volk) ;
nevertheless you must not abuse our good-nature,’ and
so on, and so on. But all the eloquence of this worthy
man was wasted; we had become completely insensible
even to the proof of the good nature of the German
people!”

Poor Casso died of cancer a few months later. He
was a very highly-educated man and full of spirits in
private life; but on the other hand, he was universally
disparaged as a Minister.

Then the staff from our Embassy in Berlin arrived
after a halt of a few days in Copenhagen. It was
grievous to see poor M. Sverbeieff. He could not sleep,
he had to force himself to eat. “And yet they had
always been so good, so kind to me during the whole of
my time in Berlin!” he repeated over and over again.
“ But the last days were a nightmare, an absolute night-
mare!.. .” Indeed, recalled hurriedly from a delightful
and quiet visit to the country, and having returned to
Berlin just in time to take part in the upheaval of the
last days before the declaration of war, he must have
gone through a terrible time, feeling his powerlessness
to avert the inevitable! The day after the arrival of the
staff from the Embassy, on going into our office I noticed
an enormous fire burning in the fireplace; it was the
Berlin ciphers that were being burnt. It was of no
importance, but I remember the painful impression it
made on me.

The members of the Embassy told us of the disgust-

ing treatment they were subjected to—men, women, and

1913] TALES OF GERMAN BRUTALITY 317

children1—when they were getting into motor cars to
go from the Embassy to the station; a hostile crowd
that the police could not, or would not, control shouted
insults at them, and spat in their faces. ‘You do not
know how horrible it was when they actually spat in
my face!” said a young and charming woman with a
shudder. But they did not confine themselves to spit-
ting; three or four people, of whom two were ladies,
received violent blows from sticks, of which they still
bore the marks after tendays. “But who hit you? Did
you' notice what the individual looked like?” I asked
the lady who had been the most ill-used. “Oh yes! I
did. It was an old gentleman with a white beard and
gold-rimmed spectacles, long black coat and soft hat, the
real type of the Herr Professor!”

However, all these tales paled before those told by
the wretched Russians who, on the eve of the declaration
of war, had started off in the direction of the Russian
frontier, had been stopped within half an hour of the
frontier, forced to turn back, and subjected in East and
West Prussia. and in Pomerania to the most odious,
the most revolting treatment for days and days. Some
poor wretches were shut up for fifty hours on end in
goods-trucks, without food or drink, and without being
allowed to get out even for an instant. Some wretched
women were confined without any assistance in the pig-
styes of the municipal slaughter-houses, where “diese
Russischen Schweine” were herded for the night. And
a great many unfortunate people were shot, especially
those who were caught with kodaks!

All these tales bore a stereotyped resemblance
to each other. And among those who told them were
people whom one could not disbelieve: intellectuals,
men of serious and well-balanced minds, people of
our world, and among others many travellers belong-
ing to the Baltic Provinces. I can quote: my old
friend the worthy general Baron Kaulbars, his wife

1 Except the Ambassador, whose motor car was accompanied by a
strong escort of cavalry.

318 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY | [cuap. xvii.

and daughter, a Princess Lieven, Count Constantine
Pahlen and his sister Mademoiselle Marie de Pahlen,
ele, ete:

When in view of these tales one read in the news-
papers the accounts of the burning and the massacre
at Louvain, and the butchery at Kalisch, one under-
stood what German war methods were, and what the
struggle just beginning represented for the civilised
world.

I repeat, up till then I had had no sort of hatred for
Germany ; but from the first weeks of the war I under-
stood what the propaganda of Nietzsche, Treitschke,
Bernhardi, had made of the German people; and in
addition I realised perfectly that this terrible collision
could not end in a peace of compromise; that it was a
fight to the death, and that the worst disasters: revolu-
tion, complete moral and political decay,;would inevitably
be the portion of the vanquished.

This feeling did but increase when one terrible month
succeeded another. Thecruelties practised in Germany
upon our prisoners of war, the ghastly deeds perpe-
trated in the occupied provinces of Belgium, France,
Poland, Serbia, the awful Armenian massacres, the use
of poison gas, the sinister exploits of the submarines
had all come tocomplete the list—or so it seemed to me
then—of the crimes of the abettors of the “fresh and
joyful war,” and to fill me with loathing of the whole
German nation!

Alas! I could not foresee that the list was not com-
plete. That three years later Royal Highnesses, Minis-
ters, exalted dignitaries, and the heads of German and
Austrian armies would sit round the green table with
anarchist Jews, criminal sailors and prostitutes in order
to dismember my miserable country after their agents
had strangled her—all that was too horrible to have been
even imagined !

But let us return to the events of the beginning of
the war, and to the echoes raised by these events in

1914 | RUSSIAN REVERSES 319

Stockholm amongst the Swedes as well as amongst the
foreigners.

1 was not surprised at the first news of victories
which reached us from East Prussia. I knew that part
of the Imperial Guard and other picked troops were to
attack there to cover our necessarily slow mobilisation,
and to free France a little, as enormous German forces
were hurling themselves upon her. The glorious battles
in East Prussia cost us considerable sacrifices. The
flower of the “gilded youth” of St. Petersburg, full of
undaunted courage, fell there to prove that the privileged
and petted regiments of the Guard could sacrifice them-
selves as much and better than any other. Each day
news reached us of the glorious death of young men
we had known, whom we had witnessed leading a
worldly and careless life midst pleasures and palaces
in the capital. But I fully realised that these battles
and these victories were but the beginning of the
“ dance.”

Indeed, very soon after terrible news reached us from
East Prussia. General Samsonoff’s army, sent to sup-
port and complete the operations of General Rennen-
kampf’s, had been completely beaten, annihilated by
General Hindenburg. Nearly 80,000 men had perished,
the others had surrendered in a mass with all their
artillery and supplies. It was all very well to minimise
the extent of the disaster in our official bulletins, I could
read between the lines, and I promptly realised the
extent of this terrible defeat, all the more because, since
the Manchuria campaign, every one agreed in describing
General Samsonoff to me as one of the best and most con-
genial of our commanders. Then how had the disaster
come about? Was it through the flagrant inferiority of
our regiments, our men, our officers, and our generals
compared with the German Army? Was it on account
of the mania for skilful manceuvres by which the heads
of our General Staff were possessed, and which inspired
them with the mad hope of cutting through, of sur-
rounding their German foes by their grand strategical

320 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cuap. xvut.

manceuvres just when a far simpler and more rudimen-
tary conception of the war would have been so infinitely
more suitable to the imperfect mechanism of the Russian
armies ?

I well remember the painful days that followed this
sad episode in our war. I had to put a good face on the
matter, not appear to be downhearted, to distribute the
official lies knowing them to be such, and express hopes
I was far from sharing.

Almost at the same time sad and alarming news
reached us from the western front. In spite of their
valiant efforts, their stubborn resistance, the French
Army, the remnants of the brave Belgian Army and the
“contemptible little Army” of the British—a handful
of heroes—were steadily retreating before the for-
midable advance of the German armies. Charleroi,
Maubeuge, Arras, the German outposts extending as
far as Meaux ... to those of us who still remembered
1870, memories rose involuntarily before us, in spite of
the difference that we knew existed between war then
and now.

Fortunately a few days later quite different news
arrived to give us fresh courage: “the Germans have
been stopped, the Germans are beginning to retreat”; a
few more days of great manceuvres and of violent fight-
ing in North-Western France and the invading stream is
checked; the line from the Yser to Belfort is definitely
established and the interminable trench-warfare begins.
I wish to mention here that the glorious battles of the
Marne, the grand and skilful manceuvre of Joffre and the
bold stroke of Gallieni were not at all described as a real
and great victory in the French bulletins; it was only
through the explanations of our military agent that I
realised the extent and importance of the splendid
French success.

In Sweden this success even passed quite unper-
ceived, or else was vehemently denied ; the good Swedes
could not imagine that the Germans could suffer a
defeat ; the invincibility of the German arms had passed

sai GERMAN PROPAGANDA 321

into a proverb; and every one still sincerely pitied “la
belle France” who had made such a false step in allow-
ing herself to be drawn into political combinations
directed against Germany.

Another article of faith was that Germany had been
attacked by the Entente, particularly by Russia, who,
however, had not acted spontaneously but had been
incited thereto by “la perfide Albion.” Indeed, if Eng-
land had warned Germany in time that she would ally
herself to the enemies of the latter, Germany would not
have declared war and peace would have been secured ;
but the crafty English on the contrary had made Berlin
believe that they would remain neutral, and as soon as
Germany, taken in by this, had declared war, England at
once went over to the enemies’ side! This rigmarole, of
which the second part completely contradicted the
first (for if Germany had been the party attacked she
would have had to defend herself, whatever Great
Britain’s attitude had been), this rigmarole, I say, which
the Germans themselves only pretended to believe, was
sincerely and religiously believed by the worthy Swedish
public ; the entire Swedish Press agreed about it, even
that portion of it that was not particularly well-disposed
towards Germany. As tothe German crimes against the
rights of men and of war and against the most elementary
principles of humanity, the Swedes simply did not believe
them; the thing was impossible ; these were calumnies
invented by Germany’s foes who, unable to conquer her
by might, were slandering and abusing her in every
possible way !

This tone of the Swedish Press and this attitude of
Stockholm society deeply annoyed and irritated my
colleagues of the Entente and my Russian collaborators.
I was much less affected by it all. When, side by side
with these insanities, I saw the Stockholm public rush-
ing to the central station to receive the Russian refugees,
distributing money, milk, delicacies to the women and
children; when in my personal relations with Swedish
society I noticed that the people the most cordially

322 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cnap. xvi.

devoted to the German cause carefully avoided in my
presence the slightest allusion, the least word which
might have hurt my patriotic feelings, I said to myself
that the sentiments of the Swedish nobility, of the
officers of the Guard and of the ecclesiastical and lay
members of the University were really not aggressive.
Their sentiments were based on deep conviction; the
Swedes expressed their convictions openly; they did
so ingenuously, but also without any ulterior motive,
without malice and without displaying any impolite-
ness.

But if this Germanophile disposition of Swedish
public opinion did not irritate me inordinately, yet it
inspired me with a certain amount of anxiety. Such
constant propaganda of affection for Germany might
gradually accustom the Swedish public to the idea of
an active alliance; in our country mistakes might be
made and measures taken which might revive old
suspicions and former grudges in Sweden; and finally
Germany, emboldened by the proofs of sympathy she
was constantly receiving from the northern side of the
Baltic, might have rushed Swedish decisions and had
recourse to coercive measures, even to sending troops,
as she felt certain that the Swedish Army would never
use its arms against the German brothers. In short,
Swedish activism and German actions and intrigues in
Sweden appeared to me to present a certain amount of
danger which I was careful not to exaggerate, but which
it would not do to lose sight of.

Almost as soon as we had heard of the result of the
battle of the Marne, the great Russian action in Galicia
began ; and this advance of our finest army corps ended
in complete success in the course of a month. The
Austro-Hungarians, who at the beginning of the war
had begun the offensive and who having before them
nothing but a weak screen of Russian troops, acclaimed
their victories and their advance into Poland loudly,
were first stopped and thrown back out of Russian

—————— EEE

i

114] RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN GALICIA 323

territory and then finally beaten in Galicia. Mikolajow,
Lemberg, all the country as far as the Carpathians fell
into our hands after fierce fighting in which at first our
enemies displayed stubborn resistance. But the hour of
the overthrow of the Austro-Hungarian Army struck at
last, while we were pushing our victorious offensive up
to the immediate environs of Cracow, whole regiments
of Austrians—Jugo-Slavs, Czechs and Slovaks principally
—were beginning to surrender. A telegram was seized
from the Austrian General Headquarters entreating
Berlin to send German troops to Galicia, otherwise the
Austro-Hungarian Army was threatened with complete
disaster. Alas! At that very moment our offensive
had to be stopped. The reason was quite simple: our
railway system was quite inadequate for the conveying
of sufficient numbers of fresh troops, of provisions and
especially of ammunition. The physical strength of the
Russian fighting army was decreasing and supplies were
failing, while German reinforcements were arriving on
the scene in Galicia. The same thing occurred, and for
the same reason, in General Brussiloff’s magnificent
offensive in 1916. All the same the whole of Galicia,
the Bukowina and part of Austrian Poland were occupied
by us, the fortified place Przemysl, which had been
invested, ended by surrendering in 1915 and already
in November, 1914, the Russian troops had begun the
ascent of the Carpathians.

Meantime fierce battles were raging in Poland, where
we succeeded in checking the Prussian advance and in
keeping Warsaw.

The manifesto of the Grand-Duke Nicolas solemnly
promising to the Poles a wide autonomy within the
compass of the real frontiers of their nationality, as well
in Russia as in Austria and Germany, produced the
best effect on us Russians. Very few people criticised
this act; the large majority of Russian intellectuals
greeted it with joy; they were surprised rather that the
manifesto did not come from the Emperor himself, and

Be

324 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cnap. xvi.

expressed fears that the reactionary party might one.
day profit by this to go back on the promises made to
the Poles.

What effect did the manifesto produce on the Poles
themselves? I was told that one of the great Polish
nobles, Count Joseph P——, had replied to some one who
questioned him as to his personal impressions: “ Not
for one moment did I believe in it; but in reading the
manifesto I wept copiously all the same!” It seems to
me that this impression was shared by the majority of
the Polish people: they wished to believe, they were
stirred to the depths of their souls, but on the whole
they did not believe us! It was not that they suspected
us of conscious and intentional imposture; but they
dreaded the eternal weakness, the eternal instability of
our best, our noblest resolutions.

Personally—indeed there is nothing Polish about me
—I was less sceptical, for I wished to believe. At last, I
thought, a first decisive blow seems to have been struck
at that mass of violence, iniquity, lying and mutual hatred
that dishonour my country, her history and her public
life! For it was chiefly from the Russian point of view
that I considered the question. The subjection and the
partition of Poland had, during a hundred and forty
years, been the cause of much private suffering and
trouble, but taking the Polish nation as a whole this
subjection and even this odious partition had been more
beneficial than pernicious. In the eighteenth century
there was no longer any real Polish nation, no real
Polish State; Poland at that time represented obsolete
feudal chaos, involved in progressive decay. The mis-
fortunes of the country revived an ardent patriotism,
created national cohesion and finally caused astonishing
economic progress; moreover Russian power had never
been wielded in Poland to the detriment of the purely
material interests of the people; onthe contrary; and
the definite liberation of the Polish serfs and the giving
them land were the work of the régime of the Tsars.

But for Russia herself the subjection of Poland and

rote] THE QUESTION OF POLAND 325

the cruelties and injustices without number which were
committed after every Polish rising were a source of
opprobrium, discredit, and weakness. And how could one
speak of a S/av policy when ten million pure-bred Slavs
were being down-trodden? At last, I thought, this
monstrous state of affairs is going to cease ; if only there
is not too much wrangling over the question of the
“national frontiers,” and if only they will keep to what
they have promised. In this sense I was myself much
inclined to go far further than the famous manifesto.
I could not help realising that the uniting of all the
divisions of Poland—however extensive her autonomy
might be—under the sceptre of the Emperor of Russia
could not be truly and honestly accepted by Europe,
even by our most faithfulallies. It would push forward
still more the frontiers of the mighty Empire of the North
into the frightened body of Western Europe; the mere
sight of the new map of Europe would arouse fears
and ideas of a solidarity against us of all countries, all
nations, even of those who were now fighting each
other fiercely. And then between Poles and Russians
there would always exist the irritating question of
national demarcation, and the still more irritating and
difficult question of the limits of the autonomy. In short
I greeted the manifesto of the Grand-Duke Nicolas as a
happy beginning, but I hoped from the bottom of my
heart that our country would have the courage and
intelligence to go on to the end, that is to say to consent
to the complete independence of resurrected Poland.

The end of the year 1914 was a historic and crucial
moment for the fate of the Hapsburg Empire. For
several weeks we were led to believe by confused
rumours which reached us from the bosom of this
Empire that a sensational change was taking place inthe
policy of Vienna. Indeed, if the Austrian Empire wished
to be saved this was the only moment in which that was
possible. To make peace with Russia immediately, to
grant to the Jugo-Slavs, Czechs and Slovaks absolutely

326 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY fcnap. xvi.

the same rights as those received by the Hungarians in
1867; to grant serious national guarantees to the
Rumanians of Transylvania, and finally to give up
Bosnia and Herzegovina in favour of the Serbians—this
was the policy which would have infused new life into
the decaying monarchy and which might have disclosed to
wt other prospects of grandeur. But this arrangement
could only be made to the detriment of the Magyars,
from whom Croatia and the Slovak country would have
been taken, and whose claims in Transylvania would
have been nullified. Now the Magyars were ardent and
energetic, whereas the Viennese Court—whence alone
salvation could come—was vacillating and devoid of all
creative genius ; as to the supreme power, it was repre-
sented by a poor, helpless old man. Under the circum-
stances the desperate efforts of the Magyars, backed up
by those of Berlin, triumphed over the tendencies to
wisdom which for an instant had been apparent in
Vienna. A change did occur, but it was an entirely
different one. MM. Tisza, Weckerle and Burian—all
Magyars and obsequious servants of Germany—obtained
unlimited power over the two sections of the Monarchy,
and the Austro-Hungarian armies were put under the
Prussian General Headquarters Staff and almost amal-
gamated with the German contingents. Hence the
struggle in Galicia was to begin again, and to be more
bitter than heretofore.

I have often wondered whether anything was doneat
this moment on our side to help the sound and reasonable
elementsin Austria in the plans which they had outlined
fora moment? Without knowing the mysteries of the
Foreign Office I can answer a priori: “No.” Once war
had been declared and had led from the first months to
startling successes on the Austrian front, that to us
meant the complete triumph of the simplest political
principles which had been preached for such a long time
by our patriotic Press, by our so-called Slavophiles,
reactionary as well as Liberal, and by the General Staff
party. Austria-Hungary dismembered and replaced by

1914 | AIMS OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY 327

an agglomeration of independent States which would be
obliged by the force of circumstances to form a con-
federation, naturally under the auspices and presidency
of Russia; this confederation extending from the Car-
pathians to Constantinople and from Danzig to the
Adriatic,embracing Orthodox countries—because Russia
is Orthodox; Slav countries—because Russia is Slav;
and finally ithe Hungarians—because they could not
exist otherwise. That was the programme! How
would the immense, complex and somewhat amorphous
Russian Empire carry out this new and grand political
duty ? How would she bear the displacement of her
centre of gravity towards the south-west? How would
the whole of Europe view a state of affairs which would
give Russia political domination over the largest half of
the European continent ? Such questions did not exist
for our politicians in editorial offices, in ministerial
smoking-rooms, in political boudoirs and archbishops’
salons. ‘ We have defeated perfidious Austria, we will
now defeat domineering Germany, and our good allies
will only be too pleased at our final and complete
triumph!”

Formerly Russian diplomacy—so much disparaged
-—would have gone against these chimerical hopes and
these dangerous illusions; and the Court would have
upheld it—though secretly—conscious of the hidden
shoals and the dangers of so great an extension of
frontiers and of such a sudden upheaval of the whole
European system. But now our diplomacy had changed
and had acquired a new mentality. Having been for
some years in quest of the support of the Press and of
public opinion, it would never have opposed the
aspirations of that opinion and that Press; nor would it
ever have proposed or conceived such an unexpected
and original solution as that of an immediate and
complete agreement with Austria-Hungary. And even
if it had conceived and proposed it, it would never have
succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the Monarch to
such a proposition.

328 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cuap. xvi.

Convinced of the infallibility of all the political ideas
of his father, brought up by a General of the Staff him-
self imbued with the current Slavophile ideas, Nicolas I].
in regard to his foreign policy was entirely in unison
with the opinions prevailing in the intellectual circles in
Russia. He was too conscious of the dangers of war and
of his responsibility towards the lives of his people ever
to take the initiative of the conflict, but once war had
been imposed on Russia by the brutal aggression of
William, the Tsar, in the event of victory, did not expect
or desire any solutions other than those he read of in the
columns of the Novoye Vremya, that he heard praised in
his own set, and that his Ministers themselves offered
him as a natural and desirable state of affairs. A scheme
of agreement with Austria based on certain concessions
would have seemed to him a heresy and a dangerous
eccentricity; the true, the natural course was that
approved of by current opinion, and that was the one to
be pursued. It was not in the unfortunate Monarch’s
nature to rise to the thought that it was precisely and
solely in the sphere of foreign policy that he had the
possibility and the necessity of separating himself, if
need be, from current public opinion, in order to preserve
or to restore to Russia the benefits of an assured and
established peace. Ah well! the path which would have
seemed extravagant and chimerical to him would have
ended the war promptly and gloriously, and would
thus have given the Imperial power a great chance of
salvation; whereas the beaten track of prevailing
opinions led to an indefinite prolonging of hostilities
and suffering and brought nameless and unparalleled
calamities on the wretched Tsar and unfortunate Russia.

Thus peace with Austria did not follow in consequence
of our brilliant campaign in Galicia. During the winter
1914-15 every one in our country was filled with triumph
at the new conquest, and in Galicia we behaved in a way
that definitely alienated the sympathies of all who were
not radically hostile to the Hapsburg régime; and we

1914 | TURKEY ENTERS THE WAR 329

aroused anger and fear in those very people whom we
were supposed to be liberating. The stupid persecu-
tion of the Uniate clergy; numerous cruelties practised
against the Jews who yet could not change their nature in
a day and cease to serve a régime secretly under which
they had prospered; marked malevolence displayed to-
wards Polish proprietors and employés—all this did
not secure to us the sympathies of the “ Ruthenes”
who were already working up their future “ Ukrainian”
exploits and who hated us perhaps quite as much as the
Poles and Jews did. And what was worse: the fate of
Galicia under the ephemeral Russian domination served
as a warning to the other Slav countries of the Hapsburg
Monarchy who began to dread the “liberty” which
would be brought to them by the Russian Army, followed
by the troop of the “Tchinovniks” and the political
bishops with the famous Eulogios at the head !

Towards the spring of 1915 the general! situation was
as follows: the Russian armies, victorious everywhere,
were occupying the whole of Galicia, and in the high
valleys of the Carpathians were engaged in a sanguinary
but still undecided contest with the German troops which
had come to reinforce their weakening allies. In Poland
we had twice repelled the advance of the Germans on
Warsaw, and we held a bit of East Prussia as far as the
shores of the Masurian Lakes. In the Caucasus we had
succeeded in thoroughly beating the Turkish Army
which, during the first months of the war, had at one time
thought of invading Georgia. Meanwhile, on the French
front the war had decidedly adopted the character of
trench-warfare, and the trenches extended from the
North Sea to the Jura!

Stagnation was threatening to set in and already
every one quoted the words of Kitchener, who had said
that the war would last from three to five years, and
more likely five than three.

Turkey’s entry into the war increased still more the
importance of the position that Sweden was taking or

330 SWEDISH NEUTRALITY [cuap. xvi.

would take up: Russia was beginning to be more and
more cut off from her allies, and consequently it was
necessary for her to secure transit for goods and
passengers across the Scandinavian Peninsula.

However, after the first few months of the war;
Sweden's behaviour caused us—on the spot, at least—far
less anxiety than at first. The desire for the preservation
of peace became more and more apparent in the country:
When the Riksdag of “ national defence” had served its
term, it was dissolved, and another Riksdag resulted
from the elections, which in the Upper Chamber gave
the majority to the Conservatives, and in the Second
Chamber to the Liberals and Socialists. This Riksdag
begged the Hammarskiold-Wallenberg Ministry—due
to resign—to remain at the head of affairs till the end of
the war, a most wise resolution, securing under extra-
ordinarily difficult circumstances the frank collaboration
of the Crown with national representation.

Personally I could not but approve of this solution.
M. Wallenberg had given us proof of great honesty of
purpose and perfect impartiality—through this impar-
tiality we could sometimes even perceive that M.
Wallenburg was framing no vows forthe German cause ;
he realised that German victory would mean the end of
the independence of Sweden, and that Sweden had and
would always have need of the good-will of France and
Great Britain.

One of M. Wallenberg’s first acts, when the Cabinet
had agreed to the extension of his term of office, was to
propose to the King that there should be a meeting of
the three Scandinavian Sovereigns. This would be the
first occasion since the separation of the Swedish and
Norwegian Crowns on which the King of Sweden would
meet the new King of Norway, Haakon VII. Wallen-
berg easily gained his cause. King Gustaf willingly—at
this solemn hour—buried his personal susceptibilities,
if he still had any. The meeting took place at Malm6
and was extremely cordial. A programme for the con-
duct of the three countries with regard to the formidable

ac dnp

1914] MEETING OF SCANDINAVIAN KINGS 331

events which had divided almost the whole of Europe
into two hostile camps was drawn up. The three
Scandinavian countries affirmed their solidarity and their
excellent mutual relations; the intrigues of the Swedish
Activists in favour of an alliance with Germany and
against the Hammarskiold-Wallenberg Cabinet were
frustrated. It was a master-stroke of the Swedish
Foreign Secretary, who thus acquired a new and solid
basis for his policy of open neutrality and of opposition
to all sorts of adventures.

CHAPTER XIX
SWEDEN IN IQI5

Tue world war, of which the economic consequences in
the long run were disastrous for the whole of Europe,
began with a sudden increase of prosperity for certain
neutral countries. Just like Holland, Denmark and
Norway, Sweden suddenly saw the prices of her exports
rising in a dazzling way. Never had the splendid
Swedish iron ore been in such enormous demand; never
had pit-props attained such formidable prices. It was
because iron was needed for the construction of in-
struments—alas! so valuable—of destruction and death,
and the planks were indispensable for the making of
thousands of kilometres of trenches in which millions
of armed men—like modern troglodytes—were to bury
themselves for years. But other possibilities of ad-
vantageous exportation were developing for Swedish
industry. Her steel and iron goods, her agricultural
machines, her turbines, her pit-props, her lathes were
more and more in demand abroad as the workshops
of the belligerent countries specialised in the making of
big guns, shells, rifles, submarines, aeroplane engines.
Thanks to German methods, the ancient prophecies
were being fulfilled in a reverse sense: ploughshares
were being turned into swords, and the bronze of bells
which had been cast to peal forth to heaven prayers of
love and peace was to be found in awful machines
destined to spread death and suffering broadcast.

But Swedish exportation was not confined to metal,
wood, and the products of her foundries and workshops.
Seduced by the enormous prices that all agricultural

332

1915 | TEMPORARY PROSPERITY 333

produce had been fetching in Germany from the outbreak
of the war, the southern provinces of Sweden, which
up till then had supplied the country almost exclusively,
began to send to the other side of the Baltic wheat,
flour, butter, cattle, pigs, poultry. At first the profits
were fabulous; later on the belligerents, enemies of
Germany, and the Swedish Government itself put a stop
to this traffic: Sweden was in danger of starving if her
agricultural provinces, situated at the southern end of
the kingdom, continued to send off to Germany all the
produce that she had hitherto sent up north.

In this case the demands of the Powers of the
Entente coincided with the well-understood interests of
the Swedish Government. But the world-war gradually
led to such an extension of the idea of contraband of
war that the trade of neutrals and finally their entire
economic existence were hampered by it in a way that
could not have been imagined, and of which the famous
“continental blockade” was but a feeble prototype. In
January, 1915, the lists of goods and commodities which
were considered contraband of war were so large that
hardly anything was left for the neutrals’ trade with the
belligerents; and the longer the war went on, the
stricter and more numerous became the prohibitions.
And this was not all: the belligerents forbade the
exportation out of their countries of a whole category
of products, some because they were necessary to the
prosecution of the war (such as coal, petrol, etc.), others
because if they had been bought by neutral countries,
they might have found their way from there into enemy
countries. Finally, partly to prevent their country being
deprived of commodities absolutely indispensable for
direct or industrial consumption, partly to bring pressure
to bear on the belligerents and to extort concessions
from them, the neutrals themselves drew up long lists
of prohibited exports.

Sweden, in consequence of her geographical position,
was in a very peculiar situation. As the Baltic was

334 SWEDEN IN 1015 [ CHAP. XIX.

commanded by the German Fleet, the Swedes virtually
possessed free traffic with Germany. Consequently
German influence weighed in a natural manner—and
irrespective of all political sympathy—on the com-
mercial direction of Sweden. And this caused the
Entente countries more particularly to restrict the im-
portation into Sweden of all produce and all commodities
which might somehow or other take the road to Germany.
Very soon certain commodities of neutral origin, such
as American wheat, rubber, tanning materials and
nitrates from Chile, were not allowed to be imported
into Sweden. Thinking it possible to starve out Germany
and to deprive her of certain goods indispensable to the
prosecution of the war, the other Powers were afraid
that Sweden—whose pro-Boche sentiments were much
exaggerated—would simply serve as an intermediary
for the dispatch of these goods to Central Europe.

These restrictions and impediments were naturally
very prejudicial to the economic life of Sweden, and
they irritated the public opinion ofthe country. Through
this the Swedish Government was continually faced
with difficulties which it sought to solve as best it could,
while the absolutely contradictory demands of the two
belligerent parties and the agitation of the “ activists”
within the country led each day to fresh complications
and new difficulties.

Sweden’s principal need wascoal. The Scandinavian
Peninsula does not possess one seam. All the six
million tons of coal that the Swedish kingdom consumes
for her industries, her railways, and her navigation have
to be imported into the country ; before the war England
supplied nearly five million tons and Germany the rest.
Then come corn, other vegetable foodstuffs and forage
(the Swedish production does not cover the country’s
consumption), petrol and its by-products, nitrates, hides,
tanning materials, sulphur (absolutely necessary to the
production of paper-pulp—a great feature of Swedish
rural industry), wool, raw cotton, rubber. All these
commodities had to be imported from outside, from

1915 | THE GRIP Or THE -ENTENTE 335

North and South America, Russia, the British colonies,
Italy (sulphur).

Consequently the belligerent countries of the Entente
had, or seemed to have, more of a hold on Sweden than
Germany had, for the vital imports of the country
mainly depended on their good will. This was how
the matter was viewed in England, and in 1g15§
negotiations were opened with Sweden through a com-
mission of English specialists who came to Stockholm
to conclude an agreement based on a strict regulation of
Swedish imports and on the control of the consumption
of the imported goods. However, these negotiations
ended in nothing, the principal reasons being:

(1) As concerns the importation of corn and forage,
Russia, in spite of her oft-repeated promises, could only
supply a small quantity of what Sweden needed; the
railways of Russia, and particularly of Finland, were so
blocked, and possessed so little rolling-stock that the
quantity promised could never be conveyed to Sweden.
Wool and Russian hides were becoming more and more
scarce, even for home use and that of the Russian
armies ; hence none could be subtracted for Swedish
use.
(2) England could not manage to supply Sweden
with the same quantity of coal as she supplied before the
war. Towards 1916, the importation of English coal
was reduced to two anda half million tons and an equal
quantity came to Sweden from Germany, who for the
purpose used the coal pits of Poland which she had
seized in 1914 and 1915.

(3) Italy, far from being able to threaten Sweden
with cutting off her delivery of Sicilian sulphur, was
anxious to find a market for this important national
production, and moreover western countries were in
urgent need of Swedish wood-pulp, so that in their own
interests they could not restrict the output of this
product, of which sulphur is one of the essentials.

(4) Germany, on the other hand, besides her coal, had
very effectual means of bringing pressure to bear on

336 SWEDEN IN tors [ CHAP. XIX.

Sweden and of claiming the supply of certain com-
modities. Sweden could never have borne the ces-
sation of the exportation of her iron ore and of the
products of her forests; that would have spelled ruin
and even famine for the entire population of her central
and northern provinces. Now, the ore found a natural
market in Germany by way of the Baltic, and the wood
could only be shipped westward by this same way, that
is to say with the tacit authorisation of the Germans.

(5) Finally, if the Entente countries were able to
bring pressure to bear on Sweden by the restriction
of imports, Sweden on her side could bring pressure to
bear on those countries through the absolute necessity
for one of the members of the group—Russia—to have
recourse repeatedly to Swedishassistance. Cut off from
her allies since Bulgaria’s entry into the war, having no
outlet open except on the Archangel side—a port which
is ice-bound for more than five months of the year and
only connected to the rest of Russia by one railway
with a very bad service! —Russia had an imperative
need to secure transit through Sweden. | was con-
stantly obliged to entreat the Swedish Government to
grant free passage to such and such merchandise not
coming in the category of actual contraband of war.
And also officers, generals, statesmen and scientists on
missions were perpetually crossing Swedish territory
going from Russia to the West, and vice versa. Germany
was kept informed by her numerous agents of all this
transport and all these permits; she did not omit to
make them a subject for claims, sometimes even for
threats, and she demanded compensation in the form of
certain supplies and of authorisation for a stay in Sweden
for these same “control” agents.

(6) Russian orders in Sweden became daily more
numerous as the war continued. They comprised
machines of all kinds, ball bearings, steel-plating, tyr-

bines, steel and iron pipes, presses, cables and above all

1 The Murman coast was only connected with Petrograd towards the
end of 1916 by a railway line with a still more inadequate service.

— Es
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Sa a at es

ste iS a elspa ai taal Raa. 8 oS

1915 | A STRANGE TANGLE =- Ce ye

lathes, so absolutely indispensable to the making of all
metal things—smunitions amongst others. Now as soon
as a Russian order of the kind was accepted in Sweden
and received an export licence, the Germans in their turn
claimed Swedish products, mainly foodstuffs such as
butter and pork, but sometimes farm-horses. ‘Three
times Sweden, in spite of our protests, had to export
thousands of horses to Germany, horses that were not
suitable for the Army, all of them more than ten years
old, and which nevertheless fetched enormous prices (as
much as 2000 francs per horse). But every one knew
that these old Swedish horses went to German farms to
replace younger horses that were fit for the Army.

Such was in outline the position of international trade
in Sweden, a position which was tangled, confused, and
perpetually complicated by the political and military
considerations of the belligerents, by the suspicions,
denunciations, accusations, of the foreign Press and the
exaggerated claims of the local Press.

So as to combine our efforts satisfactorily, my
French and English colleagues and I decided to confer
continually on all political and commercial questions.
From the spring of 1915, the Italian Minister, M.
Tommasini, joined us, and the help of this diplomat,
gifted with such keen intelligence and such remarkable
aptitude for work, was most valuable to us. On all
questions of trade and transit, the tone was mainly set
by the British Minister, for his country controlled the
relations of Sweden with Western Europe and with
America. Luckily for me, I always found Sir Esme
Howard to be a man with a fair and well-balanced mind
and most capable of realising the urgent needs which I
had to meet and which were often in contradiction with
the principles adopted and jealously maintained in
London. We ended by settling our respective rdles.
Every time that I had to ask the Swedish Government
for a licence, an exemption or a permit in the sphere of
transit or the supplying of produce, I applied to my

338 SWEDEN IN 1o15 [ CHAP. XIX.

English colleague. He made a note of my request and
made it a condition of compensation for the licences
demanded by Sweden. Finally, arrangements for general
trade which passed from time to time between Sweden
and England always contained clauses in our favour: a
few hundred lathes to be allowed to go into Russia, the
transit of such and such commodities to be allowed to
us, etc.

These almost daily conferences with my allied
colleagues have left me the pleasantest memories. We
communicated everything we knew to each other, and
we were all four imbued with the same faith and the
same conviction—that come what may, the war must be

ended by the complete victory of the Allies, and could
end in no other way.

The complete cohesion of the Entente Ministers was
all the more fortunate because in the person of the
German representative to Stockholm we had met our
match.

A few weeks after the declaration of war, the dis-
engaged German Ministerto the pret of Albania, Baron
von Lucius, was sent, by Berlin’s order, to support Herr
von.Reichenau. Up to 1913 Baron von Lucius had held
the post of Counsellor to the Embassy in St. Petersburg,
and had then been sent to the Prince of Wied who was
taking up his royal duties in the land of the Skipetars.
It was then that I drew the best horoscope for the
new dynasty by predicting that there would always be
a Wied (vide) on the Albanian throne. This punning
prophecy was not long in being fulfilled; from the
summer of 1914 the Mfret and Baron von Lucius were
both disengaged again.

I had known Lucius in Paris, and had seen him again
several times in St. Petersburg, where he had not gone
down in society. He was accused of political intrigues
—which was quite true—and of intrigues against his
chief—which was possibly untrue; in March, 1914, when
a striking and much commented-on article entitled “ Der

a

1915 | BARON VON LUCIUS 339

preventive Krieg” appeared in the Cologne Gazette, this
article was fathered, amongst us, on to Baron von Lucius.
The article advocated making war on Russia and France
before the two countries should have completed their
armament undertaken with the obvious intention of
attacking Germany. It was said that this was the
opinion of the Crown Prince and of the exalted military
circles of Berlin, and Lucius by popularising this idea
was ingratiating himself beforehand with his future
Kaiser.

Be that as it may, as soon as | heard that Baron von
Lucius was being sent to Stockholm, I predicted to my
allied colleagues that Herr von Reichenau would not
long remain at the head of the German Legation. In-
deed, six weeks sufficed for the newcomer to supplant
Reichenau gracefully, and to instal himself in his place
as German Minister.

Quick, intelligent, shrewd, and essentially cynical, he
did not take long to collect into his hands all the threads
of German intrigue in Sweden, and to assume the
direction of this intrigue. He possessed all the means
thereto. A huge staff of assistants and specialists was
added to the German Legation ; five counsellors to the
Legation found themselves at the head of five separate
offices installed in vast premises, and were overburdened
with work; one office dealt with trade, the second with
purchases and orders for German re-provisioning, the
third with the Press and propaganda, the fourth with
spying and counter-spying in Sweden and Russia, and
the fifth assumed the general direction of affairs.

Meantime, the Russian Legation was reduced to its
pre-war staff: two secretaries, and the naval, military
and commercial attachés, all three without any private
assistants or even any typewriters under them. It
was not till two years later that our staff was some-
what reinforced. My allied colleagues were similarly
situated; Sir Esme Howard, over-burdened with work,
did not have a staff large enough to cope with the
enormous amount of work at the British Legation till

Z

340 SWEDEN IN tors [ CHAP. XIX.

about 1916 ; and my French and Italian colleagues had
but one secretary to help them upto the end! This is
one of the numerous examples of the superiority of
German machinery over that of the Entente from the
beginning of the war. Berlin realised at once that when
they were spending tens of millions of marks per day
in the war zone, they could and ought to spend a few
hundreds in making diplomatic work more thorough
and more profitable, by information and propaganda in
a neutral country as important as Sweden from her
geographical position.

Thanks to the untiring work of our collaborators,
Howard, Thiébaud, Tommasini and I were just able to
get through the most necessary part of our work ; all the
same, at the beginning of the war and during the first
two years I greatly felt the want of collaborators in the
sphere of questions concerning the Press. It was not
till 1916 that the Legation ended by having a more or
less adequate service in this respect.

I regretted far less my complete powerlessness in
the difficult sphere of secret intelligence and of counter-
spying. These two important branches were, with us,
entrusted, just as in the Russo-Japanese war, to the
agents of the famous State Police, who carried it on by
the same clumsy and prejudicial methods that they were
accustomed to use in their counter-revolutionary work.
Consequently, I was glad not to have to associate with
these individuals and not even to know them. And
when I had to get confidential information for my own
guidance I could always apply to my allied colleagues,
whose agents were anyhow more honest and better
informed.

But I must return to Baron von Lucius. In his strictly
political work he displayed more shrewdness than his
predecessor. Whereas the latter had wished to press
the Swedes at all costs to declare war on Russia, Baron
von Lucius quickly understood that the greater part of
Sweden, and even of Swedish society, did not care to be
drawn into the perils and the enormous risks of war.

1915] INTRIGUES OF GERMAN LEGATION 341

From that time the German Legation changed its
tactics ; von Lucius only asked the Swedes for friend-
ship, sympathy, and services of an economic order which
would enable heroic Germany, whom the English wished
to starve (“ Gott strafe England!”), to save her wretched
women and innocent children from dying of inanition
before her eyes. As the war continued and revealed
ever more and more its true and hideous aspect, as
Swedish public opinion was leaning more and more
towards the idea and the longing for a good European
peace, von Lucius revealed himself more and more as a
friend of peace—of an “honourable” peace, of course—for
his country. He suggested to the Swedes the idea of
striving for this peace so indispensable for humanity at
large; he drew a picture, most attractive to their
generosity, of Sweden as the initiator of world-wide
peace, cf Stockholm as the place where the future peace
congress would be held.

Ah, well! in spite of all these exertions, all this clever-
ness, von Lucius’s term of office in Stockholm was not
a success. He was too excitable, too much of a ¢rickster.
There are some tendencies which at first are not under-
stood by certain societies or by certain persons, but
which end by shocking their natural instincts of frankness
and noble-mindedness. And then they become sus-
picious. The methods of the German Legation could
not either in the long run appeal to honest people.
Agitation in the Press; attempts at extortion; enticing
away of young people to serve as spies in Russia or to
make attempts there to wreck munition factories or
means of communication—an enticement which usually
commenced with offers of honest employment; the
keeping up of active relations in Stockholm itself and in
the north with the Finnish revolutionaries, zot at all
liked in Sweden; perpetual tales about contraband ;
finally, a plethora of German agents and spies of both
sexes in Stockholm and all over the country; naturally
all this made the Swedish Government anxious, and
shocked public opinion, when actual facts came to their

342 SWEDEN IN 1o15 {CHAP. XIX.

~

knowledge. And at the root of all these facts one saw
the hand of the official representatives of Germany.

What also ended by harming these representatives
was the agitation of Sven-Hedin and his most intimate
friends. When the “great Thibetan” accepted the
Kaiser’s invitation and went to the German Head-
quarters, every one in Sweden thought this trip quite
natural, and the correspondence of the eminent publicist
and political agitator was read with enormous interest ;
but Sven-Hedin was wrong to prolong, and above all to
repeat, his visits to the Kaiser’s armies; he also made
the great mistake of praising in his letters the “ fresh
and joyful war” as prosecuted by the Germans, of show-
ing himself to be not only pro-German but imbued with
militarism, and ultra warlike, and of posing as a liege-
man of Germany. This at last opened the eyes of the
Swedes as to Sven-Hedin, and the more their inclination
for peace and tranquillity in Europe increased, the more
did the “personal friend” of the Kaiser lose ground.
When I took up my post in Sweden in the spring of 1914
the name of Sven-Hedin was on every one’s lips; when
my time was up in the spring of 1917, one heard no
mention of the famous explorer. Svc ¢ransit. Moreover,
the overthrow of Sven-Hedin’s authority and that of his
Activist friends had an undoubted effect on the position
of the German Minister.

German diplomatic representation in Stockholm had
another vulnerable point in its armour which could not
escape the notice of the public at large. Whereas the
best personal relations united the representatives of
the Entente, and at all receptions and in public places I
was seen to seek the company of my allied colleagues, it
was no secret from any one in Stockholm that Count
Hadik and his collaborators could hardly bear the brag-
ging, the authoritative tone and the nouveau riche men-
tality of their “grand” German colleague. The Austrian
diplomats formed a separate party with the Turks
and the Bulgarian chargé d’affaires. So the Germans
in their social relations had to rely on those elements

1915 | MY OFFICIAL ATTITUDE 343

of Stockholm society who professed and paraded Ger-
manophile sentiments. But soon even these elements
became more discreet,more reticent; the unconventional
methods of the durschikos1 German Minister ended by
shocking them ; they decidedly preferred the aristocratic
good style of the Austro-Hungarian representative.

Not having at my disposal the means of propa-
ganda of the German Minister, and not being able, like
him, to rely on the popularity which the German name
enjoyed in Sweden, I carefully avoided any emulation
of von Lucius. The more he went about in Stockholm
society, the more reserve did I display with regard to
that society which was correct, polite but not much in
favour of anything Russian; the more he worried
and hustled the Swedish Government, the more I en-
deavoured to be conciliatory and to guard against all
misunderstanding between this Government and that of
St. Petersburg. But before and above all I strove to
avoid, in my relations with M. Wallenberg, anything
that might seem to denote a lack of confidence in him.
In the course of my relations with the Swedish Foreign
Secretary I learnt to esteem his frankness as much as
his prudence, and to respect his word; moreover, our
pesonal relations, which began by being merely correct,
became more and more intimate and confidential.

When I review in my mind the subsequent phases of
my relations with the Swedes—official and political
personages, financiers and manufacturers, journalists and
authors—I can prove that towards the end of my stay in
Sweden a great many prejudices against Russia had
decreased in intensity, while new sympathies were being

‘aroused and fresh relations formed. Certain events, the

outcome of the world war, were of use to me, and I took
care to seize on these opportunities to do away with the
prejudices which had taken root in Sweden about the
supposed Russian peril.

1 An untranslatable German expression: familiar ; bumptious ; free
and easy.

344 SWEDEN IN 1915 [ CHAP, XIX.

The construction of the railway line connecting St.
Petersburg with the Murman coast and its ports, which
are never ice-bound, was the first fact that I proclaimed
loudly in Sweden in order to prove to what extent the
tales about our supposed craving for Narwick and
Trondhjem were devoid of foundation. For a long time
the Swedes remained sceptical with regard to my
efforts ; a deep-seated prejudice cannot be uprooted in
a moment. Had the line to Murman really been laid?
Did it really lead to open ports? The old story of
the village scenery placed by Potemkin along the
Empress Catherine’s route reappeared in the columns of
the Scandinavian newspapers: perhaps the Murman
railway line was only scenery destined to put Swedes
off the scent? But in the end they had to yield to
evidence: the railway line, laid in a hurry and some-
what primitive, was nevertheless open towards 1917,
and conveyed to St. Petersburg guns, ammunition and
other goods indispensable for the prosecution of the
war which our allies unshipped in the open and well-
sheltered ports of Kola and Alexandrovsk.! Once the
war was over it would be easy to improve the line,
and then Russia would have undisputed and ice-free
outlets to the sea, outlets situated about 1200 kilometres
from the capital.

Another consideration which helped to calm Swedish
minds was the intention, which soon became known,
to hand over to Russia Constantinople and the Straits
by her allies and chiefly by England. Henceforth, if
the Entente succeeded in beating Germany, the whole
attention of the mighty Russian Empire would be
directed towards the south beyond the Black Sea. The
Baltic problems would then be of secondary importance,
and the Scandinavian countries—beginning with Finland
and continuing with Sweden—would no longer have to
fear that the giant’s hand would turn towards the north-
west.

Amongst the new elements which helped me to

1 Called Murmansk since the Revolution.

1915 | FEELING TOWARDS RUSSIA 345

establish better and more trusting relations between
Russia and Sweden there was what I then called “the
case of M. Perrichon.” All my contemporaries probably
remember the amusing play of Labiche’s and his subtle
moral sense, demonstrating the fact that one is more
grateful to one’s neighbour for a boon that one has
conferred on him than for one received from him.
M. Perrichon sets himself to adore the young man he
thinks he has saved from falling over a precipice,
whereas he ends by hating him who effectually saved
his life, and who then fancied he had thereby deserved
the hand of Mademoiselle Perrichon.

When the Swedes behaved so kindly and with so
much delicacy towards the Russian refugees returning
from Germany by Sweden, I saw that the feelings of
hostility and distrust nursed in the country with regard
to my compatriots were anyhow partly melting away.
Later on this phenomenon became accentuated. ‘The
admirable manner in which Sweden’ managed the
repatriation of our seriously wounded men was not
solely the work of the Swedish Red Cross and its noble
President, Prince Charles ; the whole of Sweden seemed
to participate in it, and to do so effectually ; our wounded
men carried away the best impressions of their journey
through Sweden, when entire populations turned out to
greet and pity the wretched Russians and to look on one
of the saddest and darkest sides of war. ‘The case of
M. Perrichon” assumed more and more its highest and
deepest meaning, which is that the good you do to others
cause you to know them better and finally to like them.

When I saw that events were seconding my efforts
and warding off the danger of an immediate collision
between Russia and Sweden I acquired the conviction
that one could and should build for the future and
endeavour to form closer and more trusting relations
between the two countries than had existed in the past.
The products of the admirable Swedish metallurgic
industry might replace in Russia some of the analogous

346 SWEDEN IN rors (CHAP. XIX.

products which before the war were exclusively imported
from Germany. The excellent Swedish engineers and
scientists—generally accurate and honest—would with
advantage replace certain representatives of German
Kultur who came to make fortunes in our country. In
entire branches of modern progress—in telephony for
instance—the Swedes could initiate the Russians into
their methods and their wonderful instruments.

Besides we should derive real profit from the closer
study of the political and social organisation of Sweden
and from borrowing certain ideas and certain institutions
from this people whose country has so many analogies
with all the immense North of Russia. Peter the
Great had taken the administration and fiscal organisa-
tion of Sweden and transplanted it in bulk into his empire,
a work which was afterwards spoilt by his weak and
stupid successors; the Swedish nobiliary constitution
was later on the centre of attraction for the enlightened
minds of the Russian nobility—the only class who were
at allcultivated in the Russia of the eighteenth century ;
these tendencies ended in the reforms of Catherine I1.,
reforms which might have been the beginning of the true
political and social progress of Russia if the Prussophile
manias of the great Empress’s successors had not come
to spoil and annul her work. Undoubtedly ever since
the days of the Varings and Rurik there has been an
affinity and something akin to a mysterious link between
the Scandinavian countries and the North of Russia;
and the periods in which these links were severed and
forgotten were not exactly the happy periods of Russian
history.

Such were the plans and the dreams that I allowed
myself to indulge in while the storm of the war was still
raging. Awful ruin has overwhelmed Russia since then,
and seems to forbid us to indulge even in dreams and
hopes for the future. All the same, I still believe in the
correctness of the impressions that my stay in Sweden
lefton me. And that is why I allow myself to look with
equanimity on one of the consequences of our present

1915 | FINLAND FOR SWEDEN 347

downfall: the secession of Finland so hurriedly recog-
nised by our allies. When the future Russian Constituent
Assembly has to settle the frontiers of the Empire I
hope that she will ratify the complete and final divorce
of Russia from the Grand-Duchy of Finland. From
that moment there would be nothing to hinder a sincere
and mutually profitable drawing together of Russia and
Sweden, of which the first political object would be
Finland herself. For if the Swedish elements in Finland,
elements which are wholesome and eminently honest,
gain the influence they deserve in the country, Finland
would take up the natural and beneficial role of a peaceful
State, interested in the economic welfare of her great
neighbour in the East; whereas the preponderance of
the Finnish race, inclined to cruelty and treachery,!
would force Russia and Sweden to unite their policy
more, and together to guard against Finland becoming
what she nearly became in 1917—a German base for
operations in the Baltic and a hotbed of Bolshevism.

When I speak of the change taking place in Swedish

1 The Ural-Altaic race, commonly called Finnish, is represented in
Europe in four countries: the Z7urks, founders of the Ottoman Empire,
belonged to this race ; in history they displayed much tenacity, coupled
with great cruelty incorrectly attributed to Mohammedan fanaticism. The
Bulgarians, a Finnish race, conquered the Slavs and the aborigines of
Mesia ; they adopted the Slav language and Slavo-Byzantine civilisation,
but they preserved in the Bulgarian nation strong and indelible traces of
their blood, their mentality and their tendencies. The J/agyars after
having terrorised Central Europe, were merged into the Slavs of Pannonia,
and were subject to the influence of Latino-Germanic culture ; the physical
type of the people improved, but the Ural-Altaic language still persisted,
as did also the spirit of despotism and violence towards the other peoples
of St. Stephen’s crown. Finally the zs proper, half savage only two
centuries ago, were at first entirely under the influence of Swedo-Lutheran
culture, but then singularised themselves latterly by suspicious and narrow
nationalism tending to the worst excesses,

There is a fairly important strain of Finnish blood in the Russian
peasant population of Central and Eastern Russia. This explains certain
traits of cruelty and treachery which one sees sometimes among these
populations, and which are so greatly at variance with the Slav frankness
and gentleness so often apparent in the history of the Russian people.

348 SWEDEN IN 1o1s [ CHAP. XIX.

public opinion with regard to the supposed Russian
peril, 1 am somewhat anticipating events. During the
first twenty months of the war the Swedish political
horizon was not always free from cloud, quite as much
in respect to Russia as to the Entente in general.

The Swedish Activists were agitating unceasingly,
and this agitation was fed, sometimes by the events of
the war, sometimes by the inconvenience to the country
caused by the strict blockade kept up by England,
sometimes finally by the famous question of the Aland
Islands which the Activists raised as soon as it was
necessary to warm up the anxiety of the country, and
which the Swedish Government itself held to be an
important question demanding a clear and distinct
solution.

The year 1915 began with a general impression of
successes for the Entente. In Galicia the taking of
Przemysl, and the vigorous offensive on the side of the
Carpathians, seemed to promise us at no distant date
the possibility of carrying the devastation of war and
decisive fighting right into Hungary; in Poland we
were still struggling fiercely with the German invader,
and Warsaw felt secure behind the trenches of the
Bzura, and the unflinching bulwark of our troops;
finally, in East Prussia our armies were still holding
their own on the shores of the Masurian Lakes, that is
to say in enemy country. Meanwhile, in the Caucasus
a brilliant and unhoped for victory of General Yudenitch’s
at once changed the situation: the Turkish troops, badly
beaten, no longer contemplated an offensive on Tiflis
and Baku; they themselves were attacked near the
Turkish fortress of Erzerum.

This military position of Russia was certainly not
advantageous to the propaganda of Swedish Activists.
‘This was the fate in store for us!” one of my neutral
colleagues heard an earnest member of the Swedish
Conservative party say when Stockholm heard of the de-
cisive defeat of the Turks and our of advance in Armenia.
However, the friends, or rather the admirers, of Germany

,

re RUSSIAN REVERSES 349

did not allow themselves to be downhearted: the
Germans, they said, had enormous resources in men
and supplies at their command; they were reorganising
all their system of war, and were animated by the
resolve to win... . And the men in power in Sweden
who were in a position to know the situation of the
German Empire held a point of view somewhat similar
to that of the Activists. They kuew that Germany was
still very strong, and thought her invincible. The months
succeeding the taking of Przemysl] and the triumphal
journey of the Emperor Nicolas II. to Lwow (January
and February, 1915), fully confirmed this opinion.

Towards the end of February we heard of the
German offensive in East Prussia. The Russian army
operating there was taken by surprise at the very
moment when two army corps had been withdrawn
for the Carpathians, and the troops to replace these
had not arrived. The army of General Sievers was
overthrown, lost many prisoners and stores, and was
forced to retire in haste to Grodno and Kovno, where
at last they succeeded in stopping the German advance.
But the war had decidedly been carried into Russian
territory, and fresh vulnerable points were being dis-
covered on our side as much in Northern Poland as on
the borders of Courland.

Moreover, this was but the beginning. Towards the
middle of May of this same ill-omened year 1915, and at
the very moment when Italy was going to throw her
good sword into the scales, we heard first of the success-
ful German attack at Gorlice; then of the piercing of
our front between the San and Cracow, and of the capture
of entire Russian army corps in the passes and valleys
of the Carpathians; in short it meant the decisive defeat
of our armies in Galicia. Nevertheless, Italy placed
herself on the side of the Entente and began the struggle
on the Isonzo and in the Dolomites ; the Russian troops,
ferocious in their retreat, still held their own for some
time on the San; but the enormous losses sustained
on the Carpathians and in Galicia, and the want of

350 SWEDEN IN 1015 [ CHAP. XIX.

ammunition, which was becoming more and more felt on
the Russian side, ended by shattering our resistance.
Gradually Poland and Eastern Galicia were evacuated,
Warsaw was occupied by the Germans, and towards
October, 1915, the Russian retreat abandoned to the
enemy Volhynia, Lithuania as far as Baranovitchi
(former G.H.Q. of the Grand-Duke Commander-in-Chief),
and the whole of Courland as far as the Dvina and the
outskirts of Riga. The inconceivable exodus of millions
of the inhabitants of the invaded provinces plunged
these poor wretches into awful suffering and unheard-of
calamities, and their miserable appearance and terrible
tales increased, in the towns of Central Russia, the
complaints and criticism evoked by our reverses, by
the munition crisis, and by the reactionary policy of
exalted Government circles. In October we knew or
we understood that the Russian army in Lithuania had
been on the brink of a disaster, that the Guard and some
army corps had been almost annihilated, and that only
the skill of Alexeieff and the splendid spirit still pre-
vailing in the ranks had averted the catastrophe, and to
a certain extent re-established the balance of power.

Of course all these events encouraged the Swedish
Activists, and gave weight to their propaganda: German
ardour had in no way been damped by the reverses of
1914; Germany more than ever appeared invincible ;
henceforth would it not be to Sweden’s interests to side
definitely with the German “brothers”? The agitation
mainly seized the Swedish military circles, who naturally
were enthusiastic about the great deeds of the war.
Sweden’s neutrality seemed to be in question again. But
mercifully it only seemed to be so.

In the first place, in the country itself, beginning with
the King and M. Wallenberg and ending with the good
and sturdy agricultural populations of the interior of
Sweden, the same aversion to the risks, horrors, and
devastation of war was apparent. And then the German
military command itself, although celebrating and pro-
claiming its victories aloud, was inwardly aiming at one

|
|

1915 | GERMAN PEACE PROPOSALS 351

object alone—that of saving its stake, and a few of the
successes achieved, by the immediate conclusion of an
“honourable” peace. Berlin understood—although this
was rigidly kept from the public—that the victories
might be fleeting, and that it was imperative to seize
this moment to act on that portion of the Allies which
Germany considered the weakest morally, that is to say
on Russia.

In June, 1915, before the surrender of Warsaw,
I had held in my hands the first German proposal
of peace. A Russian merchant, residing at the time
in Stockholm, had had a visit from a second-class
German financier who came to talk to him about the
necessity for both countries of putting an end to this
disastrous war, and “suggested” to him, dy dictating
them, the conditions to which the parleyings might pledge
themselves. My compatriot brought me this curious
statement at onee. It began by stating that Russia had
just undergone a serious reverse; that such reverses
would only increase in the course of the summer; that
Warsaw and Riga would inevitably fall into the hands of
the Germans, and that it would be better to seek peace
before the fall of these two capitals obliged the German
Government to offer far less favourable peace conditions
than those which Russia might get at the moment.
Now, these favourable conditions were the following :

(1) Russia was to abandon the part of Poland belong-
ing to her, which was to form an autonomous State,
economucally associated with Germany.

(2) Russia was to consent to “a few” modifications
of her frontiers in Courland and Lithuania, to Germany’s
advantage.

(3) Germany and Russia were together to exercise a
kind of condominium in Constantinople, sharing the
influence over Turkey and keeping out the other
Powers. This condominium would have as its object to
guarantee to Germany free penetration into Asia Minor
and the south of Persia by way of Bagdad, and to Russia
free passage through the Straits.

352 SWEDEN IN :1ors [ CHAP. XIX.

(4) Russia and Germany were to conclude a political
and commercial alliance in which France might find a
place, but of which the point would be specially directed
against English encroachments.

(5) Inthe event of these proposals being favourably
received, Russia was to send two or three first-class
financiers to Malmé to meet some great German finan-
ciers to discuss the conditions of peace together in
greater detail.

I took care to transmit a copy of this statement to
our Foreign Office, after having thoroughly warned the
person who had shown it to me that I felt sure and
certain beforehand that we should reject all proposals
of separate negotiations unknown to our Allies. As I
expected, there was no sequel to this German attempt,
so far as our country was concerned. I heard later that
at the same time Germany had made overtures to the
Danish Court to bring about a conversation with Russia.
These overtures had the same negative result.

From this moment, according to what I gathered
from reliable sources, several attempts were made to
bring about separate conversations first with Russia,
then with England. Attempts were also made by
Turkish representatives with their Japanese colleagues
(whom they were able to see as a state of war did not
exist between Turkey and Japan). Then Stockholm
witnessed the arrival of the famous “Ford Peace
Troupe.”

In Sweden the pacificist current made special pro-
gress from 1915 onwards, and the Court and the Royal
Government lent it, if not their actual help, at least
their most sincere sympathy. M. Wallenberg, in par-
ticular, was animated by the impulse to put an end to
the acute state of Europe, of which the results would be:
the exasperation of national antipathies, awful material
ruin, and the placing on the order of the day the most
dangerous and most insolvable social problems. It was
this pacificist current that checked the renewal of warlike
tendencies occasioned by the German successes of 1915.

1915 | YUL-KLAPPOR 353

I have already alluded to the difficulties Sweden had
to face in consequence of the naval blockade, and of the
numerous other hindrances to her revictualling and her
trade.

These difficulties went on increasing, and German
propaganda, clever and admirably carried out, did not
cease directing the point of Swedish public displeasure
at England.

The Christmas festivities of 1915 brought ona curious
attack of this displeasure. Christmas presents, the
famous Yul-Klappor, are an almost sacred custom in
Sweden. Custom demands that even the Swedes who
had emigrated to other countries should exchange
presents at Christmas with their relations and friends
at home. Hence innumerable postal packets arrived
from North America in Sweden towards the end of
December ; these parcels are impatiently awaited; they
are always unpacked in the presence of the whole
family. And behold! at Christmas, 1915, all these postal
packets coming from America were stopped by the
English naval authorities, and Sweden received no
Yul-Klappor from the emigrants! The indignation and
agitation were indescribable. Vehement articles in
the newspapers, protest meetings, deputations to the
Government were all resorted to. King Gustaf V.
ended by inviting the British Minister to go and see
him ; His Majesty complained of this proceeding which
victimised the whole Swedish people and hurt their
most cherished feelings, and he begged Sir Esme
Howard to transmit to the British Government an
immediate request to repeal this odious measure.

The investigations made in England on the subject
proved that the Yul-Klappor of 1915 included articles
prohibited by the blockade—for instance, pneumatic
tyres; hence it was supposed that these articles were
destined in a roundabout way for Germany. This may
have been true in a few isolated cases; all the same it
would have been better if England had not struck this
blow at the most cherished feelings of the worthy

354 SWEDEN IN sors [ CHAP. XIX.

Swedes, because in truth a few hundred tyres or a few
hundred hams smuggled into Germany would not have
materially strengthened her military position!

However, not even in this case did the displeasure of
Swedish public opinion go so far as to evoke dangerous
tension between Sweden and the Entente countries;
and the reason for this lay in the solidarity which became
daily greater between the three Scandinavian countries,
with regard to everything relative to current events and
the economic situation.

At the end of the preceding chapter, | mentioned
M. Wallenberg’s master-stroke in arranging the first
meeting between the three Scandinavian sovereigns at
Malmo. Since then conferences between Swedish,
Norwegian and Danish statesmen took place whenever
circumstances or special questions demanded them. A
new solidarity was becoming established—a solidarity
which was apparent above all in economic and com-
mercial spheres. The three Scandinavian countries
strove to supplement mutually their resources and their
needs. They made reciprocal concessions, and with
regard to the blockade, the interests of the three coun-
tries collectively replaced their individual interests.
Moreover, as Denmark and Norway displayed far less
impatience with regard to the measures taken by the
Entente Powers than Sweden did, this conciliatory spirit
ended by influencing Sweden’s conduct.

Thus the dangers which threatened the maintenance
of Swedish neutrality in consequence of the success of
German arms and the miseries of the blockade were
averted or at least mitigated. A third source of danger
remained, that of the Aland Islands.

The question of the Aland Archipelago, which had
remained dormant since the definite conquest of Finland
by the Russians in 1809, rose up at the sound of the guns
in the war of 1853-55. The Anglo-French squadrons
took then the fortress of Bomarsund, situated on one of
the islands of the Archipelago; the united Kingdom of

1915] PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF & M. DE GIERS 355

Sweden and Norway profited by the situation to derive
a few advantages in the tangled question of the reindeer
forests of Finmark, and also raised the question of the
Aland Islands. By aclause added to the Treaty of 1856,
Russia pledged herself not to keep up any military
establishment on these islands, which constituted a fairly
appreciable guarantee for the safety of the Swedish
capital, situated about thirty nautical miles from the
extremity of the Aland Archipelago.

To do away with the stipulations disadvantageous to
Russia of the Treaty of Paris was, as we know, the work
of the whole long Ministry of the Chancellor of the
Empire, Prince Gortchakoff. After a long delay, in 1871,
at the Conference of London, came the elimination of the
clause, untenable for Russia, of the limitation of her fleet,
of her fortified places, and of her dockyards in the Black
Sea; in 1879, the portion of Bessarabia adjacent to the
Danube which France and England, under Austria's
influence, had forced us to give up to the Danubian
Provinces, was restored to the Empire. But the wise
and subtle Chancellor, who could and wished to act
nobly, and was not instigated by restless ambition; the
grand seigneur Chancellor, never thought of retracting
the concession made to Sweden in 1856. He realised
that for the neighbouring kingdom this concession had
a vital value whilst it only had a passive one for Russia,
and he preferred to keep up the relations of excellent
neighbours with Sweden rather than to enjoy the small
triumph of the elimination of the last and insignificant
restrictive clause of the Treaty of 1856.

The prudent M. de Giers and his three immediate
successors took great care not to alter our policy in this
respect. But in 1906, matters assumed a different aspect.
At this moment the separation of Norway and Sweden
set the problem of the international régime of the North
Sea, a problem solved by a convention between England,
France and Germany. Analogically one might raise the
question of the régime of the Baltic Sea; and M. Isvolsky,
newly appointed to the post of Minister for Foreign

2A

356 SWEDEN IN tors [ CHAP. XIX.

Affairs, considered it a propitious moment to restore to
Russia her plenary rights in the Aland Archipelago. The
Berlin Government, sounded beforehand on the subject,
promptly consented to support the Russian proposal;
it was, first, one more means of arousing the suspicions
and fears of Sweden with regard to Russia; and then it
afforded an opportunity of separating Russia—on the
Baltic question at least—from France and England, who
would probably still maintain their point of view of 1856.

In Sweden every one at once became most anxious.
Under the circumstances, King Gustaf V. made a per-
sonal application to the Emperor Nicolas II. He wrote
a letter in which he entreated his powerful neighbour
not to create fresh difficulties for the Swedish Crown—
already sorely tried by the separation from Norway—by
rousing the apprehensions and the anxiety of Swedish
public opinion with regard to the Aland Islands. The
Emperor sent a very correct letter in answer, announcing
that he would not raise a question so delicate for the
prestige of the King and for the tranquillity of Sweden.!
This exchange of letters cleared up the situation for the
moment, but it did not settle the matter formally and
definitely. Uneasiness always existed in Sweden on the
subject of the Aland Islands, and the war of course
increased this uneasiness.

In the first place, Russia hastened to fortify the
Archipelago. Sweden could easily understand that we
could not do otherwise, given the supremacy of the
German Fleet in the Baltic. But once the fortifications
were erected should we be inclined to demolish them at
the end of the war? And if it was Germany who won,
would she not be only too glad to profit by an equivocal
situation to establish a strong naval station in the
Archipelago and thus command the Swedish coast so:
close to Stockholm? On the side of Russia, Sweden
dreaded above all the installation in the Archipelago of a.
permanent military aviation base, whence 7x /ess than

1] never actually saw the letters, but their contents were related to me
by some one whom | consider to be truthful.

1915] THE ALAND ISLANDS 357

half an hour aeroplanes could reach the Swedish capital.
In general, the absence of international stipulations of a
clear and precise nature on the subject of the Aland
Islands was a source of inconvenience and real danger to
Sweden, and the Royal Government thought it its duty
to profit by the occurrence of the war to obtain from
the two parties face to face, beginning with Russia, the
definite neutralisation of the group of islands separated
from Swedish territory by the Aland’s Haf, which is
deep but not more than thirty miles wide.

The question of the Aland Islands was of great use
to the Swedish Activists, by giving them a plausible
pretext for arousing national anxiety. This agitation
lasted throughout the year 1915; it calmed down a little
towards the end of that year, in view of the assurances
that the Swedish Government received from us as to
the absolutely temporary nature of the fortifications
erected by! us) in’ the: “Archipelago. But: at’ the ist
favourable opportunity this agitation would revive, and
I considered that it was to our interest to meet this
agitation by a formal and frank declaration, which would
serve as a basis for the future régime of that part of the
Baltic, and which would prevent all misunderstandings
on this subject between Russia and Sweden.

CHAPTER XX
WAR SUFFERERS

In the preceding chapter I have endeavoured to describe
briefly the work imposed on the Russian Legation in
Stockholm by Swedish policy and the fluctuations that
this policy underwent during the first eighteen months
of the war. But besides this work, we had to place our
best efforts and our attention at the service of our very
numerous compatriots, who were either victims of the
war, or brought to Sweden by the claims of politics,
public duties, or business.

In Chapter XVIII. I wrote of the enormous number
of Russians who fled from Germany when war was
declared, and who arrived at the Legation in a state
of panic and destitution, demanding urgent assistance.
Our staff being quite inadequate for this task, we
conceived the idea of enrolling a few willing people
among the Russian refugees themselves, who would
consent to stay a little longer in Stockholm and come
to our assistance. A few of these people were kind
enough to settle down for several months amongst us
and to work unceasingly—and of course without any
remuneration—at finding accommodation and generally
helping our unfortunate compatriots. A committee was
formed thus under the auspices of my wife and of
my sister, who had just joined us from Paris. Some
good-natured Swedes came spontaneously to help us;
amongst these noble persons I should like to mention
the Consul, M. Stromberg, and especially Dr. Lindberg,
the voluntary consultant physician, who up to the end
devoted himself to our poorer compatriots, and whose

358

1915 | PRISONERS’ CORRESPONDENCE 359

medical skill caused him in the long run to be consulted
by all the Russian residents in Stockholm.

Such was the origin of our committee of benevolence,
which soon acquired a certain notoriety in Russia as
well as abroad, All Russians passing through Stockholm
were sure of a ready welcome in the premises of the
committee situated opposite the station. The invalids
were received in the hospitals of Stockholm, which
means that they were admirably cared for, Travellers
were looked after; they were told how to direct their
correspondence to relations and friends left behind
in Germany; pecuniary assistance was given to the
poorest; many of our compatriots who did not know
what to do, and who were fit for work, were employed
and paid by the committee itself; others offered their
services free, and worked thus for months. The clergy
of the orthodox Church of Stockholm shared in our
labours with real self-devotion. Many members of
the Legation, and above all Baroness Rosen, wiie of
the Counsellor of the Legation, lent intelligent and
untiring aid.

The gradual decrease in the stream of Russian
refugees seemed as if it ought to diminish the labours
of the committee. But another task claimed the self-
sacrifice of the members; and this task, good-naturedly
undertaken, ended by taking up the greater part of
their time and efforts; it meant that the staff of the
committee was perpetually being increased, demanding
new -workers, an entirely new office organisation, and,
in view of increasing expenditure, fresh resources to
meet this. This task was the correspondence with our
prisoners of war in Germany and partly in Austria,
and the sending of money and provisions to these poor
wretches.

The Stockholm committee was the first Russian institution
that concerned itself with our prisoners. We received a
few letters from officers who were prisoners, we
answered them, and thus our mutual intercourse started,

360 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP, XX.

Gradually these relations developed. People wrote to
us from Russia for news of those who were supposed
to be prisoners, and sent us letters to send on to
them, and then provisions and money. The accounts of
Russian travellers who had actually seen our work
had made this popular in Russia. It soon became
necessary to increase the number of assistants to
the committee, to enlarge its offices, to regulate its
various duties, which were: the correspondence with
the prisoners of war—officers and men; the transfer
of the correspondence addressed to prisoners in Russia
and wice-versd; the purchase of presents—provisions
and indispensable necessaries—for the prisoners and
the dispatching of the same.

On all questions relative to the situation of our
prisoners, civil and military, in enemy countries, we
had perpetually to have recourse to the kind help of
the Spanish Minister, because it was the Ambassadors
of His Catholic Majesty who protected the interests
of the Russians in Berlin and Vienna. The daily
intercourse which ensued between me and the Duke
of Amalfi will remain one of the happy memories of
my long career. All Russians who had occasion to
apply to him received a charming and cordial welcome;
and anything that the Spanish Legation could do for
them was promptly done by the Minister himself or
by his amiable secretaries. It was just the same with
any service that the Russian Legation asked of them;
moreover, we were for ever troubling them by demands
for information, entreaties for protection, claims in
favour of our unfortunate compatriots.

Having served a long term at the Foreign Office
in Madrid as general secretary, the Duke of Amalfi,
historian, writer, and delightful poet, in accepting the
post in Stockholm foresaw pleasant leisure moments
which he would be able to devote to his literary
pursuits. And now instead—hardly installed in his
new post and surprised like all of us by the storm of
war—he was drawn into the business of the protection

1915 | SPANISH) ;HEEP 301

of Russians in enemy countries, and had, on our ac-
count, to resume a more strenuous daily task than the
one he had just left in Madrid. Nevertheless, each
request that my compatriots or I addressed to him was
met by a kind and charming smile; entire records,
admirably kept, often in the beautiful handwriting of the
Duke himself, prettily tied up with “ribbons,” were
perused and quickly yielded the information required.
The translator of the sonnets of Heredia into Spanish
verse—a work which made the great literary reputation
of the Duke of Amalfi—knew quite as well how to direct
his office as he did his poet’s pen; but above all he was
capable of putting his whole heart into everything that
he did for our unfortunate compatriots.

Two years later, when I was in Madrid, during my
brief term of office in Spain, I noticed that this noble
way of doing humanitarian acts was truly Spanish:
under the orders of the King’s private secretary—the
very sympathetic Sefior de Torres—there was an entire
department, admirably worked, devoted to the protection
of the prisoners of war, a work Spain had so generously
taken over. And the incentive was given by His
Majesty Alfonso XIII. himself, who took great interest
in this humanitarian work and imbued it with a
character of frankness, energy and Christian piety.

How many persons owe their life to the King’s
intercession, how many thousands and hundreds of
thousands of unfortunate people owe to him the gradual
amelioration of their miserable condition! When the
impartial history of the terrible war comes to light the
friends of humanity will be able to rest their eyes,
wearied by the sight of so much hatred and so much un-
necessary cruelty, on the figures of King Alfonso XIII.,
of Prince Charles of Sweden and all those who were
their assistants and agents in their great work of charity
and generous protection.

I must be allowed to mention, side by side with these
princely philanthropists, the characteristic figure of one
of the representatives of the eminently democratic

362 WAR SUFFERERS —__ [cnap. xx.

organisation of the American Y.M.C.A., an organisation
which from the beginning did so much moral and
material good. One day, in Stockholm, I was called
on by the principal representative of the Rockfeller
organisation, connected to the Y.M.C.A.—the Reverend
Clinton Harte. He had just come from Germany, where
he had had access to the prisoners’ camps, and was on
his way to Russia to try and obtain the same favour. I
gave him the letters of recommendation he asked for,
and later on I heard that he had made the best im-
pression in St. Petersburg. Mr. Clinton Harte after-
wards went twice from Russia to Germany and from
Germany to Russia, and in both countries he succeeded
in alleviating the lot of the prisoners of war. Each
time that I questioned him as to the real condition of
our men in Germany the worthy philanthropist avoided
telling me of the cruelties and injustices committed
against those prisoners ; and as one day I expressed my
surprise at this reticence, he replied quite frankly that
he had made it a rule not to relate the bad and disagree-
able things he had seen, but on the contrary to commend
the good sides of the régime which the prisoners of war
were under in each of the two countries. “In this way
one avoids reprisals—which are the worst things that can
happen—and one excites a spirit of emulation towards
right and justice, an emulation which ends by making
the lot of the wretched prisoners a little less hard.”
On reflection, I think Mr. Harte was right.

During the years that have since elapsed Germany has
been called to account by the entire Press and the whole
public opinion of the allied countries for the treatment
inflicted by her on the prisoners of war. I consider that
it would be quite futile to add anything to what has been
said and written on the subject. Moreover, a particu-
larly painful and depressing feeling would stop me at
the present time. The Russian soldiers, prisoners in
Germany and victims to the horrible treatment they
complain of, have, it appears, forgotten all they suffered.

1915] GERMAN BRUTALITIES 363

A little improvement in the régime to which they were
subjected, a few months of clever propaganda corro-
borated by the news that arrived of Russia and the
Russian Army in a state of dissolution, sufficed to make
these same men accept from those they had hitherto re-
garded as their tormentors the good news of the abroga-
tion of all discipline, of the integral sharing of all the
goods of this world, of the Bolshevist paradise which
appealed to their native heedlessness and their vacillating
minds. Amongst these people one heard of astounding
fraternisations, of inconceivable confusion of ideas; one
did not hear of any men coming out of these German
concentration camps with the wish to place themselves
at the disposal of their unfortunate country, or at that of
the Allies who had just opened the doors of their
prisons.

The Russian people being so far above base senti-
ments of indignation and reprisal, in whose name shall |
draw up accusations and quote at the tribunal of history
the abettors of the inhuman treatment inflicted on our
prisoners ?

Speaking generally and as far as I can judge by
sifting the evidence we received in Stockholm, this
treatment was truly detestable during the first year of
the war. The conviction disseminated among the
German people that the war was due to an attack by the
Allies, the ravages and the excesses committed by our
troops in some areas in East Prussia,’ the opinion pre-
vailing in the German High Command that the war must
be ferocious in order to be short—all this influenced the
fate of the prisoners of war. Moreover, the very number
of these prisoners, larger than any one could have fore-
seen, made their position more appalling ; herded for the

1 Whereas the ravages committed by the German armies were
systematic and due to orders issued from high places, those committed
by the Russian troops were sporadic and due to disorder tolerated in
such and such a section of those troops. Thus the Guard which entered
East Prussia first with Rennenkampff behaved with exemplary discipline.

Most of the excesses were committed by the troops of the reserve, those
very ones who later on surrendered in a body:

364 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP. XX.

first months in icy cold sheds, vilely fed, they died by
tens of thousands of spotted typhus, of tuberculosis,
scurvy, or else became invalids for life. From the
second year there was an improvement in their lot, an
improvement partly due to the action and censure of the
neutrals, partly to the spirit of organisation inherent in
Germany. Spacious sheds were built, and they were
light and airy, if not warm. Cleanliness reigned there.
But penury and the bad quality of the food continued to
play havoc among the prisoners, and the German iron
discipline always bore the same hostile and unfair
character, and tried to degrade the poor wretches sub-
jected to it. The question of the treatment of the
prisoners caused some conferences to be held in
Stockholm under the auspices of the Swedish Red
Cross between representatives of the Russian, German,
Austrian and Hungarian Red Cross Societies. Prince
Charles of Sweden presided. Both sides desired to
effect an improvement in the lot of the prisoners ;
the Russian delegates—moderate bureaucrats—did not
refuse their consent to the possible amelioration and
especially the regulation of the treatment of enemy
prisoners in Russia; on the German side Prince Max of
Baden, on the Hungarian side Count Apponyi, and on
the Austrian side Slatin-Pasha, all displayed undoubted
good will at the conference. A whole code of rules and
humanitarian measures was agreed on and drawn up.*
Many of these measures were carried out there, where
they were not opposed by the inflexible cruelty of the
German military command or the incurable disorder of
Russian administration.

From the autumn of 1915 the prisoners’ camps were
visited first by the neutral Red Cross delegates, then by

1 A special agency for intercourse with the prisoners of war was
established in Sweden. The Swedish Red Cross centralised this work.
The indefatigable humanitarian activities of Prince Charles of Sweden
were exercised for the welfare of millions of unfortunate men. The
Prince had as his principal helper M. Diedring, whose untiring work was
beyond all praise.

1915 | RUSSIAN RED CROSS: SOCIETY 365

detachments of ladies who were admitted into enemy
countries and allowed to inspect the cells and the
hospitals of the prisoners of war—except the worst
ones of course. There were on the German side some
infernal regions which were never opened to Virgil or to
Dante, still less to Beatrice. These were the reprisals
camps, and especially the “ kommandos” of “voluntary”
workmen, that is to say, the camps of prisoners working
under the stick of German corporals at military works
at the front, often under the fire of their compatriots
and allies. These regions of unutterable misery and
of gnashing of teeth, which constituted a flagrant
infringement of the elementary precepts of the Geneva
Convention, were never opened to the charitable curiosity
of the Russian sisters.

We remember with pleasure the times when these
detachments of ladies of the Russian Red Cross passed
through Stockholm on their way to and from Germany
and Austria. Their energy was beyond all praise; they
were very guarded and cautious in their accounts, and
yet one perceived behind all they said the deep impres-
sion made on them by all they had seen and the boundless
compassion they felt for the poor officers, the unfortunate
Russian soldatiks (the little soldiers) that they had just
visited, and whose sufferings they saw, and still more
guessed at. By comparing their accounts, one gathered
that the conditions of Russian prisoners in Austria and
Hungary were infinitely preferabie to those of our
prisoners in Germany.

Far less guarded and moderate was the conversation
of the sisters and of the medical staff of the detachments
of the Russian Red Cross who had been captured in
Germany and repatriated by virtue of the Geneva Con-
vention, but only after whole months of strenuous
negotiations. These doctors and sisters were very
outspoken when they told of all they had undergone
and seen during their enforced stay in Germany. For
the love of humanity one must hope that their accounts
were exaggerated.

366 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP. XX.

The summer of 1915 saw the beginning of a charitable
work which helped to alleviate the most terrible suffer-
ing imaginable—that of the seriously wounded and
incurables among the prisoners. On the initiative of the
Holy See—an initiative which will be eternally blessed
by thousands—what was commonly called “ the exchange
of the seriously wounded” was started.

Between Russia and the Central Empires the
exchange was to be effected through Sweden. The
Swedish Red Cross and its president, Prince Charles,
set to work to organise the service of the transfer of
the seriously wounded: by sea between the Pomeranian
port Sassnitz and the Swedish port Trelleborg (near
Malm6), and by the Swedish railway between Trelle-
borg and the Finnish frontier at Haparanda—Tornea.
Swedish hospital ships and ambulance trains were fitted
up with all possible comforts. A sympathetic, devoted
and well-trained staff of doctors, sisters and nurses
was attached to these ships and trains which conveyed
the seriously wounded Russians from the south to
the north, and the seriously wounded Germans and
Austrians in the opposite direction. On the railway
journey fairly long halts were made at the big junctions,
and then meals were served to the invalids. It was
then that the population of the neighbourhood came—
especially at first—to greet the wounded, to bring them
flowers and show them little kindnesses; and I must
mention particularly that in this way, as moreover in
everything else, no distinction was made between
German and Russian invalids.

The members of the Swedish Red Cross who had
taken part in this organisation, and first and foremost
Prince Charles himself and Princess Ingeborg, came
several times to visit the ambulance trains on their way
through Sweden, and brought small gifts, and spoke
words of consolation and hope to the wounded. The
Crown Prince and his wife also made this charitable
pilgrimage; they visited the Russian ambulance-train
in my presence, and I remember the Crown Princess

iors | AMBULANCE TRAINS 367

saying to me: “Do tell these poor men that I am a
cousin of the King of England.” I translated this into
Russian: ‘“ This lady is the cousin of the English Tsar,
our ally!” And every one was delighted!

Queen Victoria also came, of course, to see the
wounded. I donot know all that Her Majesty did for
the Germans, but I know that she was full of pity and
kindness for the poor Russian wounded, and that she
entered into the most minute details as to the fitting-up
of thetrain and the state of health and mind of those in it.

The Stockholm committee of benevolence took an
active part in visiting our unhappy compatriots. My
wife especially devoted herself to this. She went twice
a week to one of the big stations nearest to Stockholm,
where the train stopped for three or four hours ; when-
ever the train service allowed of it, she used to accompany
them to the next stopping-place. The almoner of our
church, some members of the Legation and of the com-
mittee, sometimes some foreign colleagues or Swedish
ladies, went with her on these pilgrimages. They took
cigarettes, delicacies and fruit to the wounded, but above
all they gave them their first sight of Russian faces after
endless months of captivity.

Our wounded never ceased praising the care be-
stowed on them by the Swedish sanitary staff. “From
the moment that we were put on the Swedish boat, we
felt as if we had reached the Kingdom of Heaven,” these
poor men kept on saying. And one could see that a few
hours had sufficed to establish a current of sympathy
between the Swedish staff and the poor men they tended
with so much kindness.

And yet nothing could equal the joy of these poor
men when, at the station of Hallsberg or Krylbo, they
saw my wife—in her sister’s uniform—arriving with the
other Russians. .. . ‘‘ Little sister, little sister (sestritza),
comeinto ourcarriage! Little sister, sit down here near
me! Do you think I shall ever reach Russia? Do you
think I shall see my mother once more?” ‘These
questions were often asked by poor wretches who were

368 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP. Xx.

nothing but skin and bone and who looked like dying
men of sixty, whereas, in reality they were young men
of from twenty to twenty-five years of age! And some-
times two or three hours later my wife closed the eyes
of these same poor men who, as death cast its shadow
over them, became gradually calmer and resigned to
never seeing their own villages and their families again,
and who died quietly and without a murmur, as dies the
Russian man of the people. For, of the 200 or 250
wounded that each train carried, there were always some
that died during the long journey in spite of all the care
bestowed on them.

One saw all kinds of awful physical suffering in these
moving hospitals: blind men and madmen (a great
number of madmen!), tubercular and maimed men, all
had the same wan and pinched look, and were scantily
clothed in worn-out garments.!' Emaciated by hunger
(the horrible hunger of German prisons!) and suffering,
by cold and vile treatment, they had most often had
their limbs amputated, not in consequence of wounds
received on the battlefield, but on account of frost-bite
or of some disease contracted in the dog-holes of the
concentration camps.

And all these poor wretches (except the madmen)—the
blind, the tubercular and the maimed—asked one and the
same question, which seemed to cause them real anguish :
‘Ts it true that we are to make peace with Germany, as
we have beentold? We will not believe it. We will go
on to the end, even if all our comrades still in captivity
must perish miserably. The Germans are at the end
of their resources; they often confessed as much to us.
A few more months of effort and the enemy will be
beaten!”

And it was wonderful to see the relief of all these poor
men when I replied peremptorily : “ We shall not make
peace, we shall go on to the end; victory is already in
sight !”

' They were generally clothed in old Belgian uniforms, taken by the
Germans from the depéts of the heroic country they had invaded.

1915] ODI ET AMO 360

It was not once but a hundred times that my
wife, my colleagues, and I heard such questions and
such remarks from the lips of these simple men, and
they revived our own courage and dispelled our own
doubts. How can one reconcile this with the shameful
phenomena which have since appeared and which drew
from me—a few pages back—expressions of bitter irony ?
Is it really the same people; that which spoke through
the lips of the martyred wretches in the ambulance
train, and that which now shamelessly displays the
basest selfishness and fraternises obviously with its
executioners and bitterest foes ?

Oh! strange and disconcerting people that no one
has ever known well—not even those born of your flesh
and blood! People amongst whom gentleness is allied
to the most abject cruelty, incurable distrust to the most
vapid simplicity, a boundless spirit of sacrifice to the
most violent covetousness! People who, during the
course of six centuries of suffering and unremitting toil,
were able to erect the edifice of a mighty Empire, and
who destroyed this Empire in six months, as a child
gleefully shatters a complicated and precious toy
with a hammer! Never has the tragic antithesis of
odi et amo struck me so forcibly as when I conjure
up your image on the ruins of what was once my
country !

What is the fate reserved for you? Will you perish
through disintegration, after having been subjected to the
most degrading influences, the vilest slavery? Or, having
come back to your senses and become weary of the
increasing disorder, will you return to the beaten track
of your former existence, colourless and passive, and
will you meet without too many curses the huge bill for
your attack of madness, replacing your neck under the
yoke which was formerly your safeguard against others
and against yourself? Or again, suddenly seized with
passionate repentance, and taking your risorgimento in
hand on your own initiative, will you be capable of
giving birth to new men and a fresh system, will you

370 WAR SUFFERERS [CHAP. Xx.

reconstruct anew Russia, mighty, glorious and respected,
before all the nations of the world?

I shall not live long enough to see the future God has
instore for you. Too many things have gone for ever, too
many vanished loved ones are calling to me, for me even
to wish to await the final verdict on events that are now
being evolved. But something tells me that the awful
external aspect of my country is but temporary darkness,
but a passing nightmare. It is impossible for me to
believe that sacrifices such as those made during this
war by Russia, that the brilliant courage and heroic
resignation of millions of her sons who faced death on
the battlefields, that the martyrdom of those poor men of
the people that I described just now—that all that should
be lost and obliterated from the pages of history. These
dead, these heroes, these martyrs, are the seed sown
which must germinate,and which will germinate, so that
one day there shall be a glorious harvest in the fields of
Russia, and so that peace shall reign in town and village,
in the conscience of the people, and in the hearts of
men!

The officers who passed through in the ambulance
trains appeared to us, generally speaking, to be less
interesting than the men. Having undergone great
suffering, humiliated by captivity and bad treatment, shy
by nature, they were very reserved, and besides appeared
to be much worried by their piteous appearance and
shabby clothes, by the very fact of having been defeated
and made prisoner. There were, however, some excep-
tions. We were often questioned, and with impatient
curiosity, about the events of the war, about the real
state of affairs in Russia and among the Allies, a state of
affairs which the German gaolers took pains to describe
to our officers as being absolutely compromised. Some
of these officers owed their repatriation to deeds denoting
iron energy, to subterfuges placing a strain on all their
faculties for months at atime. Others showed proof of
supreme contempt for their condition as invalids and in

|
|
|

1915 | AN EPIC HERO 3/1

return of palpitating interest in the cause that they had
defended. I still remember a tall, good-looking young
man, with an aquiline nose and an energetic expression.
He was wounded and picked up for dead by the
Hungarians at the Koziuvka, that corner of the Carpa-
thians where more than 50,000 Russians covered the
ground after repeated attacks. He was admirably nursed
in a Budapest hospital, where ladies bearing the highest
names of the Hungarian aristocracy took great care of
him—he admitted this with sincere gratitude. Finally,
having had one arm amputated, the other arm and both
legs damaged and left stiff, and both eyes almost irre-
trievably injured, he was able to be repatriated as
“seriously wounded,” which,he certainly was! I can see
him still, just before the train left, standing on the step
of the carriage, and drawing himself up with undefeated
energy. ‘‘ Legs, arms, all that is nothing; the state of
my eyes worries me, but perhaps [ shall be able to see
a little with one. In any case I| shall be able to do
something: I shall ask to be allowed to go into the
schools for young officers ; I could teach them heaps of
useful things about actual war and fighting; but above
all I should tell them how necessary it is for them to be
esteemed by their men, how one must be ready to
sacrifice oneself if need be, and how happy and proud
one can feel at having done one’s whole duty!” “It’s an
epic! a perfect epic!” exclaimed a foreign colleague who
was with me, and for whom I was translating the words
of my compatriot. Again we bowed very low to him,
although he could not see us doing so.

His name was Captain Sergueieff, of the Siberian
Tirailleurs.

But let us leave the ambulance trains to continue
their journey and let us turn our attention to other
compatriots who were continually passing through
Sweden and often stopped in Stockholm.

Very few days after we had seen the heroic Captain
Sergueieff at the Krylbo Station, I was surprised by a

2B

a7 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP. XX.

visit from Mademoiselle Marie Vassiltchikoff—the famous
Macha—whom [| mentioned incidentally in Chapter V.

“What fair wind has brought you, and how
have you managed to leave the charming but enemy
country?” I asked her, alluding to the delightful
environs of Semmering where, lodged in a pretty chalet
between the villa of the Szecenyis and the castle of
the Lichtensteins, my compatriot led a wholesome and
charming life, made up of long walks on the mountain,
harmless gossip and luxurious tea parties.

“Oh! it’s a long story!” replied Mademoiselle
Vassiltchikoff. “I was allowed to leave, but on
parole; I am to go back ‘there. Also, I am in a great
hurry to start; I shall start to-morrow. And I have
come to beg you, my dear Minister, to give me a permit,
or else to affix your seals to one of my handbags so
that I can get it through the custom-house at Tornea
easily.” “Dear me! dear me!” thought I, “and what
is the meaning of this trip on parole; and what is this
little bag that must be safeguarded from indiscreet
eyes? Is it possible that our mutual good friends in
Vienna wish to employ the plump Macha as the dove
out of the ark? I should have thought they would
have had more sense!” Aloud I said: “And is it long
since you left Vienna? Did yousee Prince Lichtenstein
before you left ?”

“Yes. ..: No.” ..... the face of the speaker became
crimson and betrayed intense embarrassment. “ You
see, I left Austria four months ago.” And then with
the determined expression of some one who is going
to jump into the water, she let herself go: “I have been
in Germany all this time; I have heard and seen many
interesting things; I was shown over the Russian
prisoners’ camps; I had several talks with the Grand-
Duke of Hesse. ... You understand that I must make
haste. One thing only worries me: shall I be allowed to
go back, do you think? For I have given my word that
I will go back.”

“ But this is quite a case of Regulus of ever blessed

1915 | AN OLD ACQUAINTANCE ahs
memory! Come, come! all this is most interesting. I
absolutely must hear more about it.” Upon which I made
my amiable visitor promise to come and dine and spend
the evening with us. Moreover, I already saw daylight
in this affair: it was in Berlin, and not in Vienna, that
the idea arose of sending Macha Vassiltchikoff to St.
Petersburg to her august patroness; she certainly must
have with her letters written to the Empress Alexandra
by her brother the Grand-Duke of Hesse and by her
sister Princess Henry of Prussia. Hence the anxiety
about the little bag.

At eight o'clock Macha Vassiltchikoff arrived. Besides
her, we had one or two intimate friends to dinner,
amongst others M. Alexander Volkoff, the famous
botanist expert and painter! in water-colours, and at
the present time owner of a fine estate in Russia, but
above all and always a brilliant and untiring talker, and
one of the cleverest men that I have ever met. The con-
versation very soon and most naturally turned on the
events and the situation of the day. We talked about
the prisoners of war and of their sufferings in Germany.
“T do not know what is being sazd,” exclaimed Made-
moiselle Vassiltchikoff sharply, “but I know what I have
seen with my own eyes. I was shown a concentration
camp near Berlin” (giving the name) ; “everything there
was admirable: spacious, airy sheds, well-dressed men
who looked perfectly happy ; I was taken into the bake-
house; I saw a huge room full of loaves; I tasted one,
it was quite delicious!” . . . Mademoiselle Vassiltchikoff
was not quite so incorrect as we thought at the time;
we discovered later that there was a famous model
prisoners’ camp in Brandenburg (I have forgotten the
name), which was shown to distinguished neutrals and
to ingenuous persons; the number of prisoners was
limited; they were very well lodged, fairly well but
sometimes insufficiently fed; only the discipline was as
hard and sometimes as cruelas in the other camps. The
outburst of our charming guest on the subject of the

' Under the pseudonym of Russoff.

374 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP. Xx,

prisoners of war raised vehement protests and a general
discussion on all questions relative to the war. We
heard Macha Vassiltchikoff—as I expected—take up the
well-known German arguments on the origin of the war,
and inveigh against crafty Albion; this raised a storm
of protest, and the conversation had nearly turned into
that useless hubbub where every one talks at once and
no one listens, when old M. Volkoff began to speak: by
his concise and scientific reasoning he proved to his
opponent the absolute inanity of the German thesis, and
the intellectual, moral and even material superiority of
England over Germany; and he knew both races and
both countries thoroughly; he took great care not to
disparage the Germans and their enormous resources ;
but the German cause appeared clearly to the listeners
as perverted from the outset and lost in advance. At
the end of this long magisterial peroration there was
nothing left of Macha Vassiltchikoff or of her arguments.
Before taking leave of her, I warned her that the
Legation in war-time refrained from issuing permits for
the Russian Custom House, and were still less inclined
to affix their seals to special bags ; then looking straight
into her eyes, I said: “Mademoiselle Vassilichikoff” (I
emphasised the name—one of the very good and ancient
ones of the Russian nobility which had been borne in
the person of Macha’s nearest relations by eminently
respectable people specially known for their patriotism
and their adherence to the Slavophile school), “listen
to a friend’s advice: you have not been in Russia for
some time; I fear that you do not realise the enormous
change the war has wrought in the dispositions of
everybody. On arriving in St. Petersburg try to look
and listen carefully before indulging in talk such as we
have just heard, and above all before attempting to take
any steps which would be completely at variance with
the name you bear.” The plump Macha burst forth into
protestations of her perfect patriotism, and swore that
she was not being sent on any mission. All the same
we heard that a few days after her arrival in St.

1918] OFFICIAL PERSONAGES 375

Petersburg the police had raided her house and seized
her papers, on which she was expelled from the capital
and sent to one of the estates of some relations of hers.
Soon after I received from the Foreign Office a large
parcel marked “very confidential,” which I was told to
dispatch, through my Spanish colleague, to the Spanish
Ambassador in Berlin. It contained the letters sf//
sealed that Macha Vassiltchikoff had brought from
Germany addressed to the Empress and to the Emperor
and which were being sent back to the senders. This
ridiculous incident, however, sufficed—just like the
incident of Protopopoff-Warburg, which I shall relate
in its proper place—to wake up the Russian public and
to cause the rumours about the pro-German intrigues,
in which the Empress Alexandra was involved, to be
believed. |

The official personages who passed through Sweden
and stopped in Stockholm were naturally the object of
the special attentions of the Legation and its members.
In the first place, there were the numerous soldiers
(engineers, artillery officers, etc.) who were going to
the western front and to America, or returning thence.
The principal object of their journey was arms and
ammunition orders. Professor Gardner also came twice,
and I was much pleased and interested to make his
acquaintance ; he was a distinguished chemist, sent on a
very special and important mission. It was shortly
after the horrible surprise of the poison-gas, used for
the first time by the Germans on the French front.
Since then they had used it constantly on the Russian
front. Professor Gardner was sent to the west to find
out what our allies had done in order to fight the
Germans henceforth with the same weapon. Hetoldus,
amongst other things, that for a long time the Emperor
Nicolas II. could not be persuaded to consent to the
adoption of this horrible method; but the Russian
soldiers began to complain: “the Germans suffocate us
like rats in our trenches, and our chiefs dare not pay

376 WAR SUFFERERS [CHAP. XX.

them out in the same way!” It was only these com-
plaints and the increasing anger of the troops that
finally induced the Emperor to yield.

In 1916 I was much pleased to see M. Peter Struve,
the head of the service of economic studies connected
with the war. We reminded each other of the days
when I held the post of First Secretary in Stuttgart,
and he, Struve, eminent economist and then political
exile for reasons of opinion (there were some such!}), had
come to settle in the same town in order to edit a
Russian “revolutionary” organ, the Osvobojdenie, which
my chief (the lamented Prince Gregory Cantacuzene)
and I used to read with enormous interest and intense
pleasure. It was the very free enunciation of sincere
and serious opinions on what was going on at the time
in Russia. The first numbers were of palpitating in-
terest, for Struve had brought back with him some
unpublished statements, some valuable matter which
the bureaucracy of the day was concealing most care-
fully. Whole bales of the “subversive” gazette then
got into Russia and there was no bureaucrat who had
not got a number on his table. Several genuinely
profited by it; others delighted in reading about the
blunders and “ indelicacies” therein disclosed, of which
the authors were comrades of the “ English Club,” or
of such and such another “commission.” Later on the
Osvobydenie deteriorated, for really interesting matter
became scarce as its director lost touch with Russian
life.

From the outbreak of the war, M. Struve did a
patriotic act by spontaneously offering his services in
the sphere familiar to him, that is to say in economic
affairs. I was much pleased to see the genial Professor
again; the information gathered by the commission
over which he presided was regularly communicated
to the Legation; there was some intensely interesting
matter, which threw a clear light on the economic
situation of our adversaries; there were no precon-
ceived opinions, no exaggeration. The conversation of

1916 | THE POLES 377

M. Struve was quite as interesting and useful as the
perusal of his reports.

Another political refugee passed through Stockholm
quite at the beginning of the war. This was the celebrated
Burtzeff, the counter-spy of the Revolution. He was
sufficiently ingenuous to return to Russia, and offer his
services to the allied cause. He was promptly locked
up. It was obvious that the men who had supreme
power in the administration of Russia at that moment
could not allow a man to be at large whose doings were
particularly unpleasant to them and who knew so much;
one can hardly blame them. But all the same it would
have been more dignified and more honest to close the
frontier to Burtzeff or to send him abroad, than to
respond to his fine act and his honest proposals by
putting him in prison.

Throughout the war Stockholm was the meeting-place
of a considerable number of Poles. The Scandinavian
countries offered the only ground where Russian Poles
could meet their kin of Austria and Prussia, and
Stockholm was the nearest place to Russia and also the
one for which the Germans were the most willing to
issue permits. Hence the hotels of the Swedish capital
received many Poles, mostly landed proprietors of noble
birth.

I had never associated much with Polish society.
This afforded me an opportunity, by which I willingly
profited, of getting to know it better, all the more
because the manifesto of the Grand-Duke Commander-
in-Chief made our mutual relations far easier and more
natural. My memories of these relations are essentially
pleasant ones. I became better acquainted with people
amongst whom the love of their country—the religion
of their country, 1 ought to say—surpassed all other
sentiment, and served as fountain-head to their work,
their mentality, their sentimental existence even. The
very natural result of this state of mind was a marked
development of the political sense, and ] would even say

378 WAR SUFFERERS [CHAP. XX.

of the practical sense, for during the last fifty years,
Polish society made enormous strides in the economic
and financial sphere. I had frequently noticed and
known this essentially political mentality among the
Balkan nations, but there, owing to the absence of other
intellectual interests, one ended by becoming tired of
eternal politics. Here the national tendency was allied
to a refined education and to a mind open to the most
subtle speculative conceptions, the whole supported by
the old ground-work of learning and classical literature
which up to now has been one of the most powerful
elements of solidarisation and of mutual comprehension
between people of different nations and different faiths.

I shall always remember my very pleasant relations
with some eminently sympathetic and clever persons,
such as M. Dobiecki, Count Sobanski, the two brothers
Wielopolski, M. Skirmunt and many others, including
also some women of very great charm and lively
intelligence. Could it really be possible that through a
violent craze for equality the flower of Polish aristocracy
should entirely disappear and have no more influence
on the future development of the beautiful resuscitated
country? I will not believe it, and I quote Benjamin
Constant’s saying, “l’esprit surnage.”

Some Lithuanian politicians also came to Stockholm,
and they called on me.

I have always felt interested in this nationality,
whose history is so closely and so strangely interwoven
with the history of its two neighbours, Russia and
Poland. A curious language, akin to Sanskrit, a still
more curious historic destiny !

Up to the beginning of the fourteenth century the
nation lives in a savage and curiously druidical state in
the huge virgin forests which afford shelter to the
Lithuanian and with him to the “aurochs.” Then
suddenly warlike enterprises begin: the antique race is
collected together under the rule of one king; the neigh-
bouring Russian principalities—which formerly made

1916 | THE LITHUANIANS 379

the laws for these forest-dwellers, who were lacking in
resources and arms—are conquered one after the other,!
and the kings of Lithuania in a few decades found a
State which extends from the Baltic to the banks of the
Dniester. At once a great preponderance of the Russian
language and civilisation, of the Orthodox faith even,
becomes apparent in Lithuania, who in spite of that—or
rather on account of it—is in a perpetual state of war
with Moscow. This intermittent conflict, which lasts for
more than a hundred years, assumes the character of an
intestine war—that between Eastern Russia, the Russia
of Moscow, deeply tinged with Tartar influence and the
Byzantine autocratic ideal, and Western Russia, in which
still lives the memory of the independence of the towns,
and of princely raids, and where elements of a new
European civilisation are being introduced. It is a fine
and glorious time for the kings of Lithuania (still
heathens), who at last stop the conquests of the Teutons,
treacherously installed in Prussia, and who on the famous
day of Tannenwald defeat the knights in armour by
bringing against them, besides the Lithuanians and the
Polish allies, a whole Russian army recruited even from
within the old walls of Smolensk.2. Then a great change
occurs in the fate of Lithuania. Jagellon, her King,
espouses Queen Hedwig, and with her Poland also and
the Roman Catholic Faith. A union becoming closer
and closer is formed between Cracow and Vilna. Vilna
gradually gives the precedence to the capital of Poland,
whereas Kieff, jealous at taking the third place, offended
in her religious faith, sulks at first at the new state of
affairs, then champs her bit and finally seeks to detach
herself from the “ Republic of the magnates,” and ends
by uniting herself, with the whole of Little Russia, to
the great Russian Empire of the North, foreshadowing
thereby the disaggregation of Poland.

Meanwhile there is less and less mention of the

' It is true that the whole of Southern and Western Russia had just
been completely ravaged by the Mongolians.
* Even the Smolensk militia gained the honours of the day.

380 WAR SUFFERERS [ CHAP. XX.

Lithuanian people, of the Lithuanian language. The
Grand-Duchy of this name still exists, of course, and its
colours and its arms still proudly wave next to the
Polish White Eagle; but if the integral form has been
preserved, the contents have changed. All the nobility
of the country has been Polonised; only in the villages
does one still hear the old language which has remained
neglected. Mickiewicz, the greatest poet of Lithuania,
has never written one verse in Lithuanian.

Yet the village people have undeniable virtues ; good,
honest, hard-working, devoted almost to fanaticism to
their faith—the Roman Catholic—they have managed to
progress during the last century by small but sure steps
along the path of their national resurrection. Prussian
authority, which holds a purely Lithuanian fraction
of the country, is hurriedly trying to denationalise
and colonise it, and is partially successful; Russian
authority, which presides over the destinies of the rest of
the Lithuanian population, does nothing either for or
against this national movement; continuing to look on
the Lithuanians as Poles, it embitters them from time to
time by vexatious measures with regard to what this
people hold most dear—their churches and their creed.
In the ‘eighties there was even a disgraceful incident of
the kind, which ended in bloodshed; history will for
ever record the name of the spot: the village of Krozé,
and the names of the authors of the crime: Governor-
General Orjevski (son of a Polish renegade) and
Governor Klingenberg (of German extraction). But
this sad incident roused the indignation of all right-
minded and honest Russians and drew the attention oi
Russian public opinion and even of the Government to
the Lithuanians. Stolypin, who knew the Lithuanian
population thoroughly—he had settled down on a large
estate bought by his parents in the province of Kovno—
eventually protected these good and honest peasants
whom he had learnt to love and esteem. Moreover, at
this period, the national awakening of the Lithuanians
had already made notable progress. ‘Their constant

1916] M. ITCHAS 381

emigration to America had done much in this respect.
At the present time more than a million Lithuanians
inhabit the United States without losing any of the links
with their native country; 100,000 reside in Chicago
alone, and they have their schools, their churches, their
newspapers, and, as far as in them lies, they help and
support their compatriots who have remained on the
banks of the large national river—the Niemen.

One day one of the most noted Lithuanian deputies
to the Duma, M. Itchas, arrived in Stockholm, accom-
panied by a Baron Schilingas. These gentlemen were
going to the Allies in order to interest them in the fate
of their nationality; Itchas, an intelligent and open-
minded man, did not in any way conceal from me the
objects that his compatriots had in view: the reunion
of the part of East Prussia still inhabited by Lithuanians
to the rest of the country; and a wide autonomy of the
whole, in union with the Russian Empire—an academic,
administrative and judicial autonomy—and of course
absolute religious freedom.

I could not but sympathise with this programme.
The geographical situation of Lithuania links her unde-
niably to the rest ofthe Empire. But the true grandeur.
of the latter would consist precisely, according to me,
in guaranteeing the autonomous development of the
adjacent small nationalities, drawing them to her by
gentleness and interest, and in return lending them the
protection of her great power.

These conversations led to a more intimate friend-
ship and sincere mutual sympathy between M. Itchas
and me. He passed through Stockholm again on his
way to America, and then came back, bringing with him
a young wife, a Lithuanian of Chicago, pretty, intelligent,
and speaking, besides English, her old native tongue.
The provisional Government placed Itchas at the head
of the Russian Red Cross. I have completely lost sight
of him since the “ Dictatorship” of Kerensky and the
infamous triumph ofthe Bolsheviks. Has he returned to
Lithuania? Is he taking part in the famous Zaryda, or

382 WAR/SUPFERERS [ CHAP. Xx.

has this national assembly, formed by the Germans with
the help of the most Radical elements in the country,
rejected the workers of the first hour, the “ old-world”
patriots? If M. Itchas ever sees these lines, I beg him
to consider them a very natural token of my esteem and
of my sympathy.

It was not only politics that brought my compatriots
to Stockholm. As the war went on and St. Petersburg
became more and more gloomy, Sweden received many
charming society people whose sole object in coming
was to have a change of surroundings and ideas, in fact
to go abroad, a habit which had become too deeply rooted
in Russian society to be permanently dispensed with.
These people, intelligent and agreeable for the most
part, brought with them areal St. Petersburg atmo-
sphere, a whole collection of gossip and stories, and
rumours true and false. Association with them caused
us to feel far nearer to Russia in Stockholm than we
should ordinarily have done. As other travellers,
belonging to other worlds and often very interesting,
came amongst us, I can truly say that at no other post
could one so well keep one’s finger on the pulse of
Russia as in Stockholm. Towards 1916, this pulse
began to denote high fever.

The picture of ‘Russia transported to Sweden’
would be incomplete if I left out another element—far
less sympathetic—that of the numerous traffickers and
adventurers that the war brought from the four corners
of Russia—more especially from one of her corners—
into the Swedish capital. The gradual rise in price of
all commodities and the great scarcity of some of them
induced all people having any aptitude for trade to begin
to buy and sell. Musicians bought leather and candles,
newspaper correspondents sold medicines and eggs,
dentists and hairdressers specialised in coffee and
knitting wool. As this buying and selling sometimes
bordered on contraband, unpleasant stories came to
light from time to time, generally followed by the

b]

1916 | RUSSIAN; SILHOUETTES 383

expulsion of the delinquents. Yet among this crowd of
traffickers there were some men who possessed money
and were accustomed to trade. These people quickly
amassed considerable fortunes without indulging in
illegal practices. Later on one heard of their doing a
great deal of good for their compatriots who came to
take refuge in Sweden after the Revolution.

Beside these ‘‘commercial amateurs,” and often
mingling with them, there were other groups of elegant
gentlemen who hardly ever left the lounges and the
restaurants of the smart hotels, tossing down bottles of
champagne and proclaiming loudly that they were com-
missioners of the Russian Government for the purchasing
or ordering of such and such goods. But it hardly re-
quired a practised eye to discover in them the agents
of our famous State Police, become secret-service and
counter-spy agents. But as these gentlemen always
ended by compromising themselves or by being guilty of
some knavish trick or other—if they did not begin that
way—they were sooner or later escorted by the Swedish
police to the frontier of Finland. In two or three cases
—at the entreaty of those who were interested in them
and on the recommendation of people I knew—I thought
it my duty to intercede with the Swedish Government
and to solicit the repeal of the sentence of expulsion.
But each time it was proved to me by evidence that the
individual in question was either a rogue ora thief. So
that in the end I did not interfere any more in these cases.

The German spies that swarmed in Sweden were
guilty of fewer personal “indelicacies.” But they in-
fested the hotels, enticing young Swedes into doubtful
callings ; opening what were in effect recruiting offices
in the north into which Finns were lured, who were
afterwards sent to Germany to form whole battalions ;
arranging expeditions the object of which was to cut
such and such a means of communication in Finland.
And they did all this under the benevolent eye of sub-
ordinate Swedish officials—inaccessible to bribery, but
permeated with German sympathies !

384 WAR SUFFERERS [CHAP. XX.

All this atmosphere of trafficking, adventure, contra-
band and spying ended by influencing the morality of
the Swedish people, so high before the war. Stealing and
swindling, which was heard of so rarely before, began to
increase in an alarming manner at the time when I left
Sweden. And I have heard it said that it has increased
still more since. Let us hope, for the good of the
Scandinavian countries and of their splendid population,
that the conclusion of the war and the departure of un-
desirable foreign elements will put an end to this
regrettable contamination.

CHAPTER XXI
A VISIT TO PETROGRAD

From the beginning of 1916, everything led me to
believe that we should not get through the spring
without fresh efforts by the Swedish Activists. The
object would be the same one as before; that of
creating discord between Sweden and the Powers of
the Entente, and thus irrevocably to throw her into
the arms of Germany; the pretexts for this campaign
would be furnished (1) by the questions relative to
the revictualling of Sweden, (2) and chiefly, by the
question of the Aland Islands. I foresaw that this time
all that was possible would be done by Germany and
her Swedish friends and clients; hence, we should
have to be careful and make it our business to support
the sensible portion of the Government and of the
Swedish public by just concessions. I felt that I
should overcome these difficulties more easily by
getting into direct and personal touch with St. Peters-
burg, and I therefore begged permission to go there to
discuss the present situation and various questions in
connection with Sweden at the Foreign Office and the
War Office. In answer, I was told that they would be
glad to see me; only they begged me to give private
affairs as the reason for my journey to every one in
Stockholm. This was not difficult: my second son was
about to get his commission and to leave Tsarskoe-Selo
soon after to join his regiment at the front; thus,
naturally I was going to bid him farewell.

I arrived in St. Petersburg (already re-named
“ Petrograd ”) in the evening of the 12th February, after
a somewhat tiring journey of seventy-two hours across

385

386 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cuap.xx1.

Sweden and Finland. I remember, as if it were
yesterday, my arrival at the dark and gloomy Finland
station, and the joy that filled my heart suddenly when
I saw my two sons coming to meet me, both of them
tall, young, charming, the younger one in his smart
uniform of the ath Chasseurs of the Guard. Two
years and a half later these two splendid boys only
existed in “the silent cemetery of our memory.!...
The snow which had fallen heavily the day before my
arrival, covered the ill-lighted town as with a shroud,
muffling all sounds. Petrograd, in contrast to the
brilliant and lively St. Petersburg that I had left in
March, 1914, seemed gloomy and sad; it is true that it
was the first time that I had come from the capital of a
neutral country as yet almost untouched by the war, into
that of a belligerent country. Paris made the same
impression on me fifteen months later.

The next morning I went to see M. Sazonoff. When
we had reviewed all the questions in connection with
my post in Sweden—transit, exports, exchange of
commodities, and finally the question of the day, the
Aland Islands—I asked the Minister if he thought
it advisable for me to go and see the Minister for War
and the Head of the General Staff. “ Most certainly,”
replied Sazonoff ; “go first to General Polivanoff, he is
a most intelligent and distinguished man with whom I
am on excellent terms.” The Minister went to the
telephone, and after a little friendly conversation with
the Minister for War, apprised him of my arrival. The
General made an appointment with me for the next
morning. The Emperor was to arrive in two days’ time
from General Headquarters, and M. Sazonoff promised
to solicit an audience of His Majesty for me.

1 My younger son, Serge Nekludoff, fell in Volhynia in July, 1916.
My eldest son, Peter Nekludoff, secretary (from May, 1916) to the
Embassy in Rome, died in Paris, in September, 1918, of Spanish influenza.
Both of them possessed —allied to great nobility of character—a true
delicacy of feeling, and qualities which earned for them the sincere
affection of all those who knew them.

:
e
.
| if
3
|
i
y

1916] GENERAL POLIVANOFF ON RUMANIA 387

I thought my chief rather thin and tired, but full of
energy and hope. The black time of 1915 seemed to
be definitely over. The day of my arrival the news
of the capture of Erzerum had come through; every
one was most hopeful about the campaign which
was to open in the summer against Germany and
Austria; the enormous task of the reorganisation of our
military forces was being completed; munitions were
plentiful, and the capital was swarming with troops of
splendid appearance.

M. Sazonoff entirely approved of my point of view on
the questions of the Aland Islands and the agitation of
the Swedish Activists ; there was no immediate or very
grave danger, but it was necessary to make reasonable
concessions to the Swedes.

The next morning I went to see General Polivanoff.
I found, as ever, a charming welcome and a right and
clear comprehension of the questions I came to discuss.
The General approved of all my suggestions and begged
me to confer, as to the details, with General Beliaieff,
Chief of the General Staff, and General Lukomsky,
Director of Ordnance.

When we had thoroughly discussed the Swedish
question, I, relying on my good personal relations with
Polivanoff, put the following question to him: “ Tell
me, General, if you think you can do so, what stage
have our parleyings with Rumania reached? Abroad,
and even here, every one seems to be expecting
Rumania’s immediate entry into the war on our side.
The Emperor’s recent journey to South Russia is uni-
versally looked on as the sign of an approaching alliance
of arms—and possibly of a family one; how do matters
really stand?”

“T can tell you quite frankly,” said the General,
“that I know nothing; one day every one is for the
alliance; the next day it appears to be out of the ques-
tion or postponed sie die. But I will tell you quite as
frankly that for my own part I am not at all keen about
this alliance which every one desires so ardently.”

2G

388 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cuap. xx!.

“And why is that?” I asked, somewhat sur-
prised.

“T will tell you. In the first place, we know nothing
about the fighting qualities of the Rumanian Army;
1877 is a long time ago, and 1913 was only a military
outing in Bulgaria. On the other hand, what we do
know is that Rumania does not possess the equipment
necessary to modern warfare, nor munitions more
particularly. At present we possess both, but not in
sufficient quantity to enable us to share them with a new
army of more than 500,000 men. [shall be told that our
allies in the West can supply Rumania; but you, who
are in a position to know, are perfectly aware of the
fact that, given the present state of our communications
with the West, everything sent to the Rumanians would
diminish by that much what we ourselves ought to
receive ; hence it would always be a case of sharing.
Secondly, if Rumania decided to come into the war, we
ought to have an army of at least 300,000 men, perfectly
equipped and supplied—under the command of an
excellent general—which could enter Rumania by the
Dobrudja and Tutrakan. Now, a great many people at
General Headquarters think—and | entirely share their
opinion—that if we did possess such an army,’ it would
have quite enough to do on our own front, already a
fairly long one, in the event of our deciding to make a
vigorous offensive.”

“And why would you have to send this auxiliary
army to the Rumanians?” I asked.

“Tf for no other reason, to defend them against the
Bulgarians,” replied the General with a subtle smile.
“The geographical situation of Rumania,” he continued,
“is very bad. Ifthe Rumanian army advanced towards
Transylvania in order to realise national aspirations and

1 This reserve army already existed at the time when I talked with
General Polivanoff, and it was quartered at Odessa and in Bessarabia.
It was General Scherbatcheff’s army, and at the time of Brussiloft’s great
offensive, it conquered the Bukowina by a series of brilliant operations ;
but it could not after that be sent to the Dobrudja.

iit] RUMANIA’S DIFFICULT POSITION 389

to threaten the Austro-Germans in the flank, the Bul-
garians would immediately dash to the Dobrudja and
the Danube; and then think what an enormous frontier
Rumania would have to guard on that side. And we
know that the Bulgarian troops are first-rate, and
what is more, animated by ferocious hatred of their
neighbours.”

“That is exactly the answer I expected,” I said to
the General, “and | entirely share your opinion. But
have we not sufficient troops both to strengthen our
Galician front and to attack the Bulgarians? A brilliant
success against them would, in my opinion, lead to a
complete and immediate change in the Bulgarian Army,
to the downfall of Ferdinand and the Boche alliance!”

“What you say is perfectly true ; but it is not soldiers
we lack; it is means of communication; our railway
system is only capable of supplying our front, which con-
sists of a given number of divisions; addtothis number
another 800,000 men (500,000 Rumanians and 300,000
Russians), and our armies will not be properly supplied
either with men or provisions, or, above all, with arms
and ammunition. You also doubtless know that on the
Rumanian side we only possess two railways, and both
are absolutely ridiculous; they are being improved at
present with feverish haste; but it is much too late.”

I took leave of General Polivanoff, telling him that I
hoped with all my heart that his most sound and clear
ideas would carry the day.

The two Generals, Beliaieff and Lukomsky, whom I
went to see soon after, made a very good impression on
me. I had already conferred with our Chief of the
General Staff when he passed through Stockholm.
This time in a pregnant conversation we drew up a
whole programme (which, however, was never carried
out) concerning the compensations to be granted to
Sweden in return for the transit allowed to us and the
supplies that we could obtain from her. General
Beliaieff seemed to me to be very well up in all the
questions relative to his department, and I was struck

390 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cnap. xx1.

with the number of subjects that we treated exhaust-
ively during one hour's conversation; this denoted
remarkable conciseness and clear-mindedness on his
part. Later on, at the approach of the Revolution,
the Press spoke very badly of the General. He was
universally accused of servility towards the worst
leaders of those ghastly months. Alas! | fear it was
true. One can, moreover, possess a very clear mind
and much intellectual power and yet be totally lacking
in civic courage and even in moral honesty. The
opposite is unfortunately just as common; we
experienced this from the beginning of the Revolu-
tion, when men who were perfectly upright, pure,
and animated by the best intentions found them-
selves absolutely incapable of controlling Government
machinery after rude reality had replaced for them all
generous dreams and abstract criticism !

A few days after my arrival in Petrograd, I heard
that M. Savinsky was there, recovering from rather
a serious illness, and that he wished very much to see
me. I found my colleague pale and thin and animated
by that feverish wish to exonerate himself and to bring
his services and opinions into repute which is the
distinguishing characteristic of every man who has
suffered a serious reverse, and who feels that he is a
butt for the accusations of his enemies and the gossip
of his friends.

He told me—and was able to prove—that already in
April, 1915, he had warned the Foreign Office of the
imminence of the Bulgarian peril, and had suggested as
the sole means of stopping Bulgaria the restitution by
Serbia of the part of Macedonia annexed by virtue of
the treaty of Bukharest. In Petrograd they could not
make up their minds to force the Serbians to do this, |
and in order to get out of the difficulty they persuaded
themselves that the danger was in no sense pressing and
that the Russian Minister to Sofia exaggerated the perils
of the situation; there was all the more excuse for this

1916] M.SAVINSKY ON BALKAN AFFAIRS - 391

attitude as the British Minister in Bulgaria—the same
one that I had had as colleague during the years r191I-
1913—did not take at all a gloomy view of things, and
reassured the Foreign Office as to the intentions of
Ferdinand and M. Radoslavov. In July, 1915, when the
Bulgarian loan of five hundred million francs negotiated
in Germany was effected under the very eyes of our
Minister who had predicted it, those in authority at last
listened to the cries of alarm uttered by Savinsky and
his French colleague, and began to consult as to the
best means of parrying the blow. It was just in the
middle of our disastrous retreat from Galicia, Poland and
Lithuania; coercive military measures were no longer
to be thought of; the problem was how to please the
Bulgarians without wronging the Serbians too much ;
whilst the latter, who saw the storm brewing, were
clamouring to be allowed to attack Bulgaria before she
had completed her mobilisation and her concentration of
troops—against which London protested vehemently,
The Rumanians did not appear to be going to carry out
the engagements contracted in Bukharest; Greece was
passing through the darkest days of the vassalage of
Constantine XIV. with regard to his Imperial brother-in-
law. The weeks went by; and while every one was
still engaged in evasions and hesitations the irreparable
deeds were done: Bulgaria mobilised and then entered
Serbia, whilst the Centrals attacked this unfortunate
country from the front.

That is what Savinsky told me; and as a general
outline it was the absolute truth. Only my colleague
omitted to inform me of what had taken place in Sofia
between his arrival in January, 1914, and the spring of
1915. I think I ought to fill in the gap now.

At the first audience that my successor had with the
King of the Bulgarians, Ferdinand gave him a touching
welcome: “ Your arrival, Monsieur, is as healing balm
to my lacerated heart!” However, in a few short
weeks, the relations between the Monarch and the
Russian Minister showed no signs of being particularly

302 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cuap. xx.

intimate. Ferdinand simply avoided seeing Savinsky
and hid from him, just as he had hidden himself from all
the diplomats accredited to his person. My successor
had absolutely no opportunity of pouring his healing
balm on the wounds caused by my “bluntness,” for
Ferdinand took them to be cured by the exalted person-
ages of Austria-Hungary and of Germany. Things
became worse after the outbreak of the World-War.
A prey to mad agitation, torn between ambition, fear,
a thirst for vengeance and his innate irresolution, the
King shut himself up more and more. Savinsky, whose
knowledge of Balkan affairs and psychology was very
superficial but who had never been lacking in shrewd-
ness and energy, ended by grasping the situation and,
abandoning all hope of acting on Bulgaria through the
person of the Sovereign, wished to outline a policy of in-
fluence over the Bulgarians themselves, over their ruling
classes, even over those Stamboulovists who were the
most averse to Russophile sentiments. Unfortunately,
from the first months of his time in Sofia, my successor
came under the influence of the suspicious individual
that I mentioned in Chapter XIV. of these reminiscences.
This gentleman became the political inspirer of his chief,
and when it was necessary to influence the men in power
and Bulgarian public opinion, he thought out a great
speculation in connection with the purchase of wheat
for the Russian Government, a deal which was to change
the Bulgarian disposition by the bait of the great
benefits accruing to the country at large and to private
individuals. Two men of business, a certain M. Gruber
and a M. Polak (junior) were sent from St. Petersburg to
manage the transaction. The member of the Russian
Legation whom I mentioned above made himself their
intermediary and “ political counsellor” ; millions were
involved, they talked of pocketing the whole of Bulgaria ;
they ended by buying a few thousand tons of wheat
(which could not be taken away when war broke out),
and they compromised the names of a few politicians,
amongst others that—already thoroughly compromised

1916] M. STURMER PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL 393

—of M. Gennadiev, who later on was accused, judged
sentenced, and who spent the period of the Bulgarian
war on the damp straw of a prison cell. “The poor
man” was only set at liberty when the French troops
arrived in Sofia. Hence the great deal in wheat ended in
nothing, and only then did they think out other methods
of procedure, less crooked and more fruitful. But much
valuable time had been lost; the victorious offensive of
the Germans in Galicia and Poland had begun, and those
Bulgarians who were our enemies were encouraged in
their attitude by the events of the war, which seemed to
be turning decidedly in favour of the Central Empires.

My arrival in Petrograd almost coincided with a
significant and much-discussed change in the compo-
sition of the Russian Cabinet: the aged M. Goremykin
was at last allowed to retire, and his place was taken
by M. Stiirmer, an old member of the Council of the
Empire, who had never occupied any very important
post, and who was reputed to be ultra-reactionary. In
the more or less Liberal and enlightened circles of
Petrograd this appointment was sincerely deplored, as
it was looked on as a challenge thrown by the Court
at public opinion. Subsequent events have proved that
this view was well-founded; but at that period I did
not entirely share the pessimism of my Petrograd
friends. I had incidentally heard of Stiirmer’s work at
the outset of his great career, which was spent in the
province of Tver. The provincial assembly of the
Zemstvo, reputed “red,” saw the elections of the pre-
sident of this Zemstvo wrecked twice running by the
central authority; the third time the Home Secretary
himself appointed a president (he was entitled to do
this by law) in the person of M. Stiirmer, a local landed
proprietor and an eminently Conservative Councillor-
General, an elective post which he combined with a
Court function in the capital equivalent to that of
deputy head-clerk to the Registrar. In Tver every one
expected that the new president would persecute all the

304 A VISIT: TO PETROGRAD fcuap. xxi.

functionaries of the Zemstvo tainted with liberalism:
doctors, schoolmasters, directors of co-operative
societies, etc. To the intense astonishment of every one,
Stiirmer not only kept all these “reds” in their places,
but he also made himself the advocate of his col-
leagues in Petrograd, cajoled them, and after two
years of administration, during which everything went
smoothly, he was made a Provincial Governor. The
Liberal party in Tver almost gave him an ovation at his
departure. It is true that a few years later, this same
Sttirmer, again sent on a special mission to Tver by an
ultra-Conservative Home Secretary, behaved like a pro-
consul there, denounced his former friends of the “ Left,”
caused some to be deported, and broke all the others.
But to excuse him one ought to mention that his mission
was of short duration and that when it was over he was
to have a post at the Home Office as a reward. To sum
up, | had a poor opinion of the character of this shady
individual ; but I thought him clever and intelligent and
I hoped that, as he might find himself faced by an almost
impossible situation, he would, by some clever stroke,
be able to change the dangerous course adopted or
submitted to in high places, thereby restoring a little
popularity to the person of the Emperor.

My conjectures appeared to be coming true on the
spot. His Majesty arrived from General Headquarters
and during a very brief stay at Tsarskoe, to every one’s
intense astonishment, he announced his visit to the
Duma and went to it the same day. It was a most
dramatic stroke: the first time that national represen-
tation was holding a sitting at the Taurida Palace, the
Tsar deigned to attend. He had, it is true, opened the
session of the first Duma in person—the revolutionary
Duma of 1906; when receiving the members of this
Duma at a memorable ceremony in the Winter Palace,
His Majesty had made them a speech in which he alluded
to the representatives of the nation as “the best men of
Russia,” | but this did not prevent him sending them all

1 “ Lootchié Rousskié Ludi,”

me) toe: TSARGACEENDS THE DUMA: 395

back to their homes four months later! But since then
the sessions of the subsequent Dumas had been opened
by the President of the Council, and the Emperor him-
self had never ventured into this “cave of A®olus,”
whence however, since 1907, nothing but soft breezes
and zephyrs had issued forth, which were quite
incapable of sweeping anything away or of impeding the
course of the governmental ship.

The Emperor's arrival provoked a storm of en-
thusiasm amongst a// the members of the Duma and in
the large crowd which had gathered at the news of the
Imperial visit. There was no session in the presence of
His Majesty, who addressed a few unimportant words to
the representatives of the nation in the Great Hall;
there was as usual a Ze Deum in which the Tsar and
the members of the Duma took part; there was a
stirring speech from the president, M. Rodzianko, a
speech greeted with rousing applause. It was like
an electric shock throughout Petrograd. In this visit
to the Duma every one wished to see a token of recon-
ciliation between the Court and public opinion; they
anticipated the probable consequences of the event:
change of certain Ministers, suppression of certain odious
and ridiculous measures, cessation of the Rasputin
scandal. Alas! all these hopes were doomed to prompt
disappointment. Even I had soon to lower my tone. I
realised that M. Stiirmer, with advancing years, had lost
even his shrewdness of former days and that now he
was only capable of telling clumsy lies and indulging in
tricks that could not deceive any one. From henceforth
a whirlwind of madness enveloped the Tsarskoe Palace,
a madness with which the Emperor was infected at
every visit which his wife paid him at General Head-
quarters at Mohilev. There were some changes of
Ministers, but, alas! of the worst description; and the
Rasputin scandal reached monstrous proportions.

On the very day that the Emperor attended the
Duma I went to call on Prince Galitzyn, recently

396 A VISIT TO, PETROGRAD jficnap, xx.

appointed president of an important Commission of the
Russian Red Cross. For some time the directors of the
Red Cross had been causing trouble with our Stockholm
Committee ; they allowed us the very small grant agreed
upon beforehand and at the same time they wished at
all costs to subject us to scrupulous control ; I knew that
they really wished to impose on us the collaboration of
some “tchinovniks” who would only have put spokes
in our wheel. The work of our Stockholm Committee
had become so popular amongst the Russian public that
all those who were about to make their career through
the channel of the Red Cross wanted to have a hand in
this work and to pretend that it was they who directed it.

I had known Prince Nicolas Galitzyn in Tver,
where he had been Governor for a time. Moderate,
essentially honest and a gentleman, but idle and super-
ficial in the discharge of his duties, he presented the
pleasing and correct type of a man of the world, always
dancing attendance on one of the local beauties. I
found the dear Prince somewhat aged and changed.
He received me with his usual urbanity, but during the
business-talk that I started, I realised at once that the
new president of the Red Cross had no other ideas than
those with which he was endued by the factotum of
this organisation, a certain M. T——, an insidious man
and a worker who for some years had entirely managed
the Russian Red Cross by shelving all the presidents in
succession.

In the course of conversation Galitzyn mentioned the
Empress Alexandra, with whom he had had to do as
president of the Special Committee of Assistance, and |
could see that the dear Prince was a complete victim to
her Majesty’s charms. He could not say enough about
the great cleverness, the virtues, the wonderful work of
his august patroness. It was senile and unrestrained
adoration.

A year later the poor Prince—suddenly appointed
President of the Council of Ministers, to the amazement
of the public and by virtue of his devotion to the

1916] PRINCE ALEXANDER OF OLDENBURG 397

Empress—presided as a figure-head during the closing
weeks of the old régime, went through the terrible days
of the Revolution in the same state of surprise as that
in which he had submitted to his appointment, and
finally found himself in a cell in the Peter and Paul
fortress, from which, however, he was_ eventually
released as a guileless and irresponsible person. I do
not know what has become of the poor old gentleman
since.

What a difference between this dull, lackadaisical
man and Prince Alexander of Oldenburg, whom | had
called on the day before! His Palace on the Quai de la
Cour looked like a hive in full activity, where doctors,
scientists and sisters collected to make reports, receive
instructions, exchange opinions with this energetic man
of few words, who had a blunt manner, but who, never-
theless, was full of kindness and true pity for suffering
humanity, never more in need of pity than now. We
had a pregnant conversation on the subject of the trans-
port of the wounded, which the Prince was directing
in Russia, and of the treatment of prisoners of war.
General and instructive conversation animated the lunch
to which I was invited after the interview, and at which
I met the principal assistants of the indefatigable host.
One felt that the Prince had seen everything with his
own eyes during his constant journeys across Russia,
Europe, Asia, that he had taken part in the experiments
of scientists, the distribution of clothing, the cooking of
food, the fumigating of wards. Ah! thought I, if only
Russia had more such untiring men of action, of unfail-
ing energy! This one may well have his faults, as all
mankind has; but in his case it would never be faults
of omission, which are the very worst of which any one
can be guilty at a time demanding above all else
courageous initiative and unremitting toil!

On leaving Galitzyn I went to see M. Alexis Neid-
hart, who was at the head of a special committee in
connection with our prisoners of war. [| had not seen

308 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cuap. xx.

M. Neidhart since Moscow, when he was a schoolboy
of about twelve or fifteen years of age,! but I had often
heard him spoken of since as a man of intellect, tact and
merit, who, having been elected a member of the
Council of the Empire, had made himself the head of
an influential group of moderate and intelligent Con-
servatives. In the course of an hour of agreeable and
pregnant conversation all business relative to our
work for the prisoners of war was settled with M.
Neidhart; I received the kind promise of a sub-
Stantial grant—a promise carried out soon after—and
I left much charmed with his broad and open mind,
and his manner so entirely devoid of Petrograd
“tchinovism.” ‘
During the last years of Nicolas II.’s reign there
had been much talk in Petrograd of the possibility
of placing M. Alexis Neidhart at the head of affairs. He
was a firm Monarchist and a Conservative, but a moderate
Conservative, taking the word in its Western sense, that
is to say completely exempt from that tendency to
despotism and that coarseness of behaviour that charac-
terise the Russian reactionaries. He and his group,
in that case, would probably have imposed their own
conditions: ze. they would have demanded the genuine
homogeneousness of the Cabinet, the suppression of
the despotic rights of the State Police, and the frank
acceptation by the Emperor of the constitutional system
for Russia, if not of an integral parliamentarianism.
Moreover, Neidhart and his friends were not the only
people to preach such a programme; they had eminent
seniors and forerunners who sat with them at the
Council of the Empire; these included old M. Andrew
Saburoff, one of the most European and cultivated of
statesmen ; M. Koni, a distinguished philanthropist, and
a ready help in all trouble and in all good causes; M.
Alexis Yermoloff, Minister of Agriculture for atime, a
thorough expert in this primordial branch of the

' He was the brother of Madame Peter Stolypin ; his other sister
was Madame Sazonoff.

1916 | AUDIENCE OF THE EMPEROR 399

economic and national life of Russia; Prince Sviato-
polk-Mirsky, for a short time Home Secretary, an en-
lightened man and a firm Liberal; M. Kulomzin, true
type of the superior official of solid learning and broad
views, who had grown white in the service of the State,
after having spent his scholastic career at Cambridge ;
and a great, great many others. Most of these men
belonged by birth to the best society of Russia, they had
all worked either with the Emperor Nicolas II. him-
self or with his father. But the unfortunate Emperor
had never once thought of summoning them to the
Palace to ask their advice even in the most critical
moments. He saw them on official occasions, his
manner was kindness itself, he spoke a few pleasant
but unimportant words to them and dismissed them
with a charming smile. However, swindlers like
Stiirmer, acknowledged lunatics like Protopopoff, abso-
lute nonentities like Galitzyn, and a host of others,
were called to power. And meantime individuals of
the lowest category (Rasputin was only the most promi-
nent and disreputable one) penetrated into the Palace
through the back-door; every one talked with them
and allowed themselves to be influenced by the wildest
creations of the brains of these creatures. Quem deus
vult perdere!...

I was received by the Emperor the very day that he
was returning to Mohilev. The Emperor gave me a
welcome which touched me deeply. In his kindest tones
he thanked me for my servicesin Sweden. I madea low
bow, and having expressed my heartfelt gratitude for
the gracious words of the Sovereign, | ventured to
remark that my services amounted to very little in
comparison with those of the innumerable Russians
who had given their blood and their life for their country
and their Tsar.

“Yes, Nekludoff, but you also have truly upheld the
flag of your country.” The Emperor passed on to the
question of Swedish activism and the Aland Islands;

400 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD fcuap. xxi.

he commanded me to reassure the King of Sweden
thoroughly on the subject of Russia’s intentions in that
quarter ; the fortifications erected on the Aland Islands
were a necessity of war, and would disappear as soon
as the war was over, etc. I then offered my respectful
congratulations to the Emperor. ‘“ But what on?”
“But on the capture of Erzerum, sir!” “Ah, yes, yes!”
he started, as if he had been dreaming; “certainly it
was a fine performance of our troops.” ... Then the
Emperor was kind enough to say a few words to me
about my son, who had just joined the regiment of
which His Majesty was the virtual commander, and the
uniform of which he nearly always wore; and then I
was graciously dismissed.

At this audience I noticed a great change in the
Emperor. These two years of terrible trials had natu-
rally aged him; his hair and beard were streaked with
white, his eyes were sunken. But it was not that that
impressed me most. I noticed a kind of weariness, a kind
of constant preoccupation which seemed to prevent him
concentrating his whole attention on the conversation on
hand; the vivacity of his manner and of his mind seemed
to have vanished. I attributed all that to the fatigue of
the moment, to the manifold worries of the situation.
But when I recall those memories to-day it seems to me
that in the manner and appearance of the Emperor
Nicolas IJ. there was more than preoccupation, more
than worry. Perhaps he already saw the abyss opening
at his feet and perhaps he knew that to stop was
impossible, that he must pursue his way towards the
inevitable and fatal crash.

I never saw my unfortunate Emperor again. In the
course of this book I have often had to deplore the
faults committed by him—faults which he expiated in a
truly ghastly manner; I shall still have occasion to
criticise bitterly, in the name of “ cold-eyed justice,” the
last actions of this man, fore-ordained to the most
appalling catastrophes. I must be allowed here to
tender grateful homage to the kindness that he had

1916 | THE GRAND-DUKE PAUL 401

always shown me, to his untversal kindness, to his ardent
patriotism and to the undeniable nobility and sincerity
of his personal and private character.

When he was hurled from the pinnacle of greatness,
most of those who had served him, fawned on him,
flattered him, turned against him and no longer re-
membered either what they had obtained through his
generosity—or his weakness, or the devotion they had
heretofore professed to the person of the Monarch.
They now only spoke of the “country”; the country
must be saved at all costs, and it was in the name of this
sentiment—probably—that they abjured their former
convictions and overthrew their former idols. Never-
theless, in saving the country, they intended also to save
their interests, their position, their emoluments, and
it is that side of the case which has always appeared to
me to be the weak point in all the fine speeches that I
heard, from the outset of the Russian Revolution, from
the lips of my friends, men of the world, men in office,
who from one day to another had become the staunch
partisans of the new régime and the assiduous clients of
the new men, the dispensers of the sportula.

The next day I returned to Tsarskoe-Selo to present
myself to the Empress Alexandra.

I began by lunching with the Grand-Duke Paul and
Princess Palei in their fine palace which had recently
been built. I found myself again in the congenial
atmosphere of the informal receptions of the Grand-
Duke and his wife in Paris at their charming house in
the “Parc des Princes.” In their Tsarskoe palace—
built and decorated by French experts in the same
Louis XVI. style, but larger and grander—there were
gathered together on that fine winter’s morning the
same people I had seen so often in Paris: the worthy
Grand-Duke, so good, so simple and yet so refined;
the beautiful and charming Countess of Hohenfelsen
(re-named Princess Palei since the war through horror
of all Boche names); their two daughters, born while |

402 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cnap. xxt.

was in Paris in 1904 and 1905; their son, whom I had
watched growing up, now an officer in the Hussars of
the Guard, and resting at Tsarskoe after having been a
year in the trenches; one or two intimate friends of the
family ; suddenly like a whirlwind in came the Grand-
Duchess Marie, ex-Princess William of Sweden, in her
nurse’s uniform; she was as frank and simple in manner
as ever, and for a quarter of an hour she and J talked of
Stockholm, which at heart she still loved just as she had
been loved there.

When I learnt the horrible fate of the Grand-Duke
and his unfortunate morganatic son, I recalled vividly
that last luncheon-party at Tsarskoe; with it mingled
other memories—of Paris, Florence, Constantinople—
right back to those far-away days, so far away that they
seemed as a dream or as a tale that is told, when in
Moscow, in 1866, about a dozen of us small boys used
to go on Sundays to share in the games of the little
Grand-Dukes Serge and Paul; days of real fun and wild
pranks in the big park and the fine suburban palace of
Neskutchnoye, under the strict supervision of the old
mentor of the Grand-Dukes, Khrenoff, formerly a non-
commissioned officer of the Guards, who never let us
out of his sight and whom we all adored. The Grand-
Duke Paul was then a very attractive child of seven
years of age, with pink cheeks, lively but always good ;
who could have foreseen for him that ghastly end,
preceded by the most terrible privations and the vilest
cruelty?

But I must return to Tsarskoe. At two o'clock I
went to see the Empress Alexandra, who, in my honour,
had discarded her usual sister’s uniform and donned her
smartest clothes: it was quite the Empress receiving
her Minister Plenipotentiary. I had not been near Her
Majesty since February, 1911, when, beautiful, charming
and good tempered, she had received me and my wife
and eldest daughter in that same bright drawing-room
filled with flowers. I found the Empress changed. She
had a deep vertical wrinkle between her eyebrows which

i)

1916 | THE EMPRESS ALEXANDRA 403

gave her an expression of morbid tension. Her eyes
were intensely sad. Her Majesty spoke to me first
about matters relative to the work of the Red Cross
and to that of our Stockholm Committee. Then she
asked me whether I had taken the necessary measures
so that the goods sent by the Red Cross to our prisoners
of war should not be indefinitely delayed at Haparanda
(the Swedish frontier). ‘“ Madam, I have made inquiries
on the subject, and they prove that the Swedish
Red Cross does all in its power to get the goods
across the frontier without hindrance, and to send them
further !”

The Empress took up a photograph lying on the
table and passed it to me: “ But all the same, Monsieur,
here is a photograph showing a huge stock of goods from
the Red Cross piled up in the open air at Haparanda.”

“T know that photograph, Madam, I have been shown
it before; but that pile of cases which Your Majesty
sees there are not goods from the Red Cross, but postal
packages in transit that Sweden kept back for months
at the frontier by way of reprisal. Your Majesty is
well aware that every case and every bale from the
Red Cross is marked with a Geneva cross quite large
enough to come out in this photograph; now Your
Majesty will be good enough to observe that it is not to
be seen on the cases shown here.”

The Empress took the photograph and examined it
carefully. ‘That is true,” she said, replacing it on the
table.

After that she turned the conversation to general
questions concerning politics and the war, and she laid
great stress on the seriousness of the situation which—
abroad as well as at home—called for the greatest and
most unceasing straining of efforts. “Alas! So few
people here seem to realise the gravity and the dangers
of the hour; there are some houses in Petrograd where
they even dance!” added Her Majesty, emphasising the
words. Soon after I was graciously dismissed. The
audience made a somewhat unfavourable impression on

2D

404 A VISIT; TO PETROGRAD.: }-[emap. xx1.

me; it may well have been that I was prejudiced against
my august hostess ; but it seemed to me that she wished
to show me to what extent she shared the worries of
the Government and of the High Command, and to
make me understand that when one came to Petrograd
on business connected with one’s official duties, one
ought to discuss this business with the Empress. The
co-regency had begun. g

Two days later I called on the Dowager Empress.
Her Majesty discussed with me the unprecedented
sufferings inflicted by Germany on our prisoners of war ;
she mentioned the insults to which she had been
subjected in Berlin when she passed through Germany
the day before the declaration of war, on her way from
the Belgian frontier to Copenhagen. The dear good
Empress did not conceal the feeling of profound disgust
inspired in her by German cruelty and the duplicity of
William II.; the terms she used were as frank as they
were cutting.

I also went to see the Grand-Duke Nicolas
Mikhailovitch, whom I had often met during my last
years in Paris and in Petrograd. The enemies of this
man, who was both clever and cultivated, liked to
compare him to Philippe Egalité, and asserted that he
intrigued with the ‘“ Masonic” party against his august
cousin, the Emperor Nicolas II. Nothing was ever
less true. A very sincere Liberal, the Grand-Duke did
not restrain his criticisms of a régime that he considered
disastrous, as much for the country as for the combined
interests of the Emperor and the Imperial Family; he
did so with an openness that precluded all idea of
intrigue; the most that could be said of him was that
he had the characteristics of the perpetual fault-finder.
Carefully excluded from politics and the government of
the Empire, he had taken refuge in the sphere of
historical research. The studies and works which he
wrote himself, and which were brought out in sumptuous
editions to which one was not accustomed in Russia,

1916 | IMPRESSIONS OF MY’ VISIT 405

are of undeniable interest. His excellent and impartial
history of the reign of the Emperor Alexander I. is the
work of a true historian, and was very well received
abroad. Nicolas Mikhailovitch was a sincere and faithful
friend to France; he had some intimate friends among
French contemporary historians.

The Grand-Duke received me in his magnificent
study filled with a precious collection of portraits—
historical miniatures. What has now become of this
superb collection? Our conversation naturally turned
on the political questions of the day. My august host
did not restrain his criticism. He was of opinion that
we were making for a revolution which would probably
not break out while the war lasted, but certainly im-
mediately after the conclusion of peace. ‘Alexander III.
did not like me very much; Nicolas IL., although full of
kindness for me as a private individual, has a holy
horror of my ideas. Nevertheless, I have served them
faithfully, and I am always ready to serve the Emperor ;
only I cannot conceal from him that first and foremost
I have duties towards my country and the Russian
people.”

The impression I received from the ten or twelve
days spent in Petrograd was frankly bad. Public dis-
pleasure could not be hidden. In drawing-rooms, in
the offices of journalists, politicians, scientists, there was
violent criticism of the last appointments, the actions of
the Government, the perennial conflict in the very
bosom of the Council of Ministers between M. Sazonoff,
Krivocheine, Count Ignatieff, General Polivanoff on one
side, and Stiirmer, Trepoff, Prince Schakhovskoy, pro-
tagonists of the reactionary party, on the other. Count
Kokovtzoff, whom I made a point of calling on, predicted
the worst calamities. Others were less pessimistic, but
they anxiously wondered how far the blindness of the
unfortunate Emperor would go; they all pitied him;
but his weakness was the subject of the bitterest
criticism.

406 A VISIT ‘TO’ PETROGRAD [crap. xxi.

Concerning the war itself every one was far less
gloomy. They were hopeful about the reorganisation
of the Russian forces, and were confidently awaiting
the offensive which was to take place in the spring. I
remember a dinner-party composed only of men where
this question was much discussed. One of the guests
upheld the theory that from the purely military point of
view one could not hope for decisive successes, nor need
one fear fresh reverses ; that in fact it would be a draw.
I disputed that theory hotly. “Either we shall do for
them or else they will do for us,” 1summed up my opinion;
“there can be no medium between complete victory and
complete disaster; and the final result will be seen in
the autumn of 1918 at the latest.” At my suggestion a
short formula of the two opinions was drawn up; my
opponent alone signed his own; all the other guests
wrote their names under mine, and we gave the document
into the keeping of the Italian Ambassador, Marquis
Carlotti, who was one of those present.

And the people? At first sight nothing seemed to
reveal their frame of mind. Externally it was the same
colourless, apathetic, sleepy mass. But the persons
who came most regularly in contact with the working-
classes of the capital and the country, with the lower
orders, did not conceal their anxiety.

I was out one day in a “izvostchik” with a young,
intelligent and well-educated woman, whose modest
income and occupations brought her a great deal in
touch with the masses. We passed a queue which
had formed outside a provision shop. Women were in
the majority, but both men and women walked up and
down the frozen pavement with the same air of gloomy
indifference. ‘That is what will make us lose the war,”
said my companion, pointing to the queue.

“In cauda venenum ?” | asked, jokingly.

“Do not joke; what I tell you is the absolute truth.
At the beginning of the war there was enthusiasm
among the lower classes, at least in Petrograd, which |

1916] MUTTERINGS OF REVOLUTION 407

have never left. But now nothing remains but weariness
and apathy. It has lasted too long. The people are
deeply displeased at the privations they have to under-
go; they seize eagerly on all tales about malpractices
that are being indulged in, about dissensions in the
bosom of the Government, about Court scandals. They
comment on all that in their own way. When one goes
about a great deal among the people one often hears
things that make one shudder!”

“But the workmen are getting huge wages?
Drunkenness has been abolished? There are no ragged
people to be seen in the streets? So whence comes all
this discontent ?”

“From our reverses of last year, which the people
felt far more deeply than is generally believed ; from
the propaganda of the revolutionary leaders, which is
more vehement than ever. True, a workman’s family
at the present time have warm clothes, good boots;
they sometimes even buy a gramophone; but the
moment any discomfort, any disappointment occurs:
a rise in prices, scarcity of provisions, a necessity to
spend hours on the pavement in order to buy the least
thing, brutality on the part of the police—and all the
relative comfort is forgotten, and one hears threats
uttered in a spirit of bitter hostility.”

This conversation, like other somewhat similar ones,
gave me food for deep thought.

From the beginning of the war I had heard on all
sides that the danger of a revolution had been tem-
porarily warded off. All the parties of the Left, begin-
ning with the “cadets” and ending with the Socialist-
revolutionaries, had pledged themselves not to undertake
anything that might hinder the progress of the war; all
these people were supposed to have agreed that a
German victory would be the worst blow struck at the
cause of liberty, in Russia and elsewhere; that con-
sequently it was first and foremost necessary to win
the war.

408 A VISIT TO PETROGRAD [cuap. xx1

But when the representatives of Liberal opinions in
Russia agreed thus to proclaim a kind of “sacred
union,” and declared that as long as the war lasted they
would prevent a revolution from breaking out, they
were reckoning without their host, that is to say with-
out Germany.

German policy had reckoned on the Russian Revolu-
tion from the very beginning of the war. She was
counting on it firmly. Long before the precipitation
of political events in Europe had brought about the
conflagration, the German Government had begun to
knead the dough in Russia—dough into which the
leaven of revolutionism was worked. In 1905 and
1906 the role of the German agents with regard to a
Russian revolution was an ostensibly negative one. At
that period William II. thought and hoped to ailure the
Tsar afresh through the support he lent him and the
favours he lavished on him. But when, after Bjoerkoe
and more especially after the tightening of Anglo-
Russian ties, the Kaiser’s hopes had faded away, then
Berlin entered resolutely into relations with the Russian
revolutionaries, and sent resolute and clever agents
amongst the working-classes of the Empire. These
agents were rarely recognised revolutionaries. There
was a whole category of people who could further
Germany’s schemes without having to write themselves
down as Socialists, without having to think that they
were engaged in a work of pure destruction; especially
without arousing the suspicions of the Russian police.

These agents—often unconscious ones—were the
German proprietors, directors, workmen, of the numer-
ous German industrial enterprises in Russia.

Foreign colonies are, always and everywhere, in-
clined to criticise the country in which they find them-
selves. More especially does this apply to the foreign
colonies established in Russia, when in the course of
their work they are confronted by the malpractices
and venality of the police, the dilatoriness of the
administration etc. Nevertheless, up to a certain

1916 | GERMAN MACHINATIONS 409

period the Germans who had work in Russia had
received the word of command to show themselves
conservative, loyal to the Imperial Government, obedient
to the authorities. Towards 1907 the word of command
was changed. ‘“ Russia and her governors were worth
nothing; the duty of the Germans established in Russia
was to bring to the unfortunate Russian people the
good news of their political and social rights.” As ever,
when it is a question of German action, the Berlin
directions were carried out with zeal and uniformity.
Whole bales of proclamations and revolutionary litera-
ture were sent from Germany to Russia under the
benevolent eye of the frontier-authorities and even—
so I have been told—under that of German diplomats
and consuls. A remarkably intelligent Frenchwoman
belonging to the Diplomatic Corps of Petrograd,
Frau von L., told me that one day, im her drawing-
voom, Baron von Lucius—at that time Counsellor to the
German Embassy—had announced in loud and clear
tones: ‘“ What is all this about Russia? Russia cannot
and dare not go to war. And if she dared, the very
next day the revolution, fully armed, would come from
there” (and the Counsellor pointed towards the work-
shops and foundries on the other side of the Neva)
“and would hurl itself on all these beautiful palaces!”
From the beginning of the war, as | have said, the
Germans were awaiting with feverish impatience the
outbreak of revolutionary disturbances in Russia.
These disturbances as yet showed no signs of occurring ;
on the contrary—miracle and malediction!—the entire
Russian people seemed seized afresh with true patriotic
ardour. But in 1915, the reverses of the Russian
armies, the grumbling caused by the lack of munitions,
the terrible sufferings of the populations who were
fleeing and whose flight was encouraged, before the
German invasion, the fatigue of the working-classes,
the mistakes made by the Government—all that com-
bined to cause Berlin to hope that the ardently wished-
for Russian revolution—the one which alone could save

410 AOVISIT., TO PETROGRAD) ficuap. xx.

Germany—was at last becoming visible on the horizon.
From that moment everything was done to bring about
the outbreak as soon as possible. On one side the
agents who influenced the working-men redoubled their
efforts ; on the other, the invisible but numerous wires
which still—in spite of the war—connected Russian
society with Berlin were set working. Gossip, false
rumours, exaggerations were disseminatedin the capitals,
the provinces, even in the ranks of the Army. The
conscious and unconscious agents of Germanic influence
incited the Court and the rulers of the hour to the worst
follies, whilst on the other hand public displeasure was
skilfully stimulated and exasperated.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1916 the principal
forces of the Russian Opposition, forces which, as I
have said, had sworn not to allow the revolution to
break out as long as the war lasted, still remained
loyal to their pledge. In order that their formula, “no
revolution in war-time,” should be abandoned and re-
placed by “a revolution to save the war,” it was
necessary that, by a series of actions and measures of
calamitous absurdity the supreme power should give
them the illusion that the reactionary party was
contemplating an understanding with the enemy; it
was necessary that rumours cleverly exaggerated and
disseminated should lead even the allies of Russia to
doubt the fidelity of the Russian Monarchy to the
common cause. All this was necessary and all this was
done from the month of July, 1916, through the
strenuous efforts of the agents and partisans of
Germany in Russia; through the ingenuousness of
Russian public opinion—not to mention foreign public
opinion; finally through that /atality which presides
over the great events of history, setting at nought all
human prophecies, weighing men and nations in the
scales of destiny and hurling into the abyss all those
who are found wanting.

CHAPTER XXII

EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD

On arriving in Stockholm, I took care at once to solicit
an audience of King Gustaf V., in order to transmit
to His Majesty the words of the Emperor.

I was received in the King’s private study, a small
room, with walls covered with purple brocade, and filled
with a fine collection of old Swedish silver. The King
was in plain clothes (I had been ordered to wear the
same) in order the better to accentuate the purely
private character of my audience. I transmitted to His
Majesty the message entrusted to me by my august
Master. The King first asked me if I had informed his
Minister for Foreign Affairs of all that I had just told
him. My answer being in the affirmative, Gustaf V.
said that it was with sincere pleasure and gratitude that
he received the message of His Majesty the Emperor.
“T cannot hide from you,” continued the King, “that
the question of the Aland Islands has been seriously
preoccupying the Swedish Government all this time.
Swedish public opinion has been excited about it
repeatedly. In a few weeks a new session of the Riks-
dag will open and my Ministers think that they will have
questions—possibly very insistent ones—to answer on
that subject.” The King then alluded to the alarm that
Sweden and he himself had felt in 1908 at our intention
to revise—in consequence of the separation of Sweden
and Norway—the additional treaty of 1856 which dealt
with the Aland Archipelago. The recent events of the
war had disclosed possibilities and dangers which did
did not exist before; so the Swedish Government had

Alt

412 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxu.

a legitimate desire to settle the Aland question in a
definitive manner which would not lend itself to any
ambiguity, and this could only be done by a direct and
formal conversation between the two Governments.

In answer, I told the King that M. Wallenberg had
already given me to understand that the Swedish
Government wished to make the question of the Aland
Islands the object of a new special convention between
Russia and Sweden; that I had not omitted to transmit
this wish to M. Sazonoff, and that as far as our Foreign
Office was concerned there was no objection to beginning
such a conversation, provided that it only applied to the
peace régime and not to that of the present war.

The King then asked me—but laying great stress on
the fact that it was private and confidential—whether in
Petrograd they did not see any possibility of stopping
the war. I replied that I had received no indication of
anything of the kind; that on the centrary we at home
were more than ever resolved to continue the struggle
till it led to victory.

“T must tell you quite frankly, M. Nekludoff,” said
the King, “that personally I do not see a possibility of
victory for either side ; this awful carnage has now lasted
more than eighteen months; there is no reason why it
should not last another two years, with no result but
death, ruin, misery to innumerable people. And what
would be the state of Europe if the war did last another
two years? One can hardly picture it! That is why
here we continue to utter the most fervent prayers for
the restoration of peace.” Gustaf V. said all this in
short, detached sentences which seemed to be escaping
him in spite of himself. He made no allusion to the
means by which the war might be stopped, still less did
he outline any scheme. It was a cry from the heart,
prompted by the humanitarian feelings of the King and
by the very sincere dread of seeing his country involved,
if not in the sanguinary vortex of the war, at any rate
in the material ruin and the political dangers which
the continuation of the world-wide struggle must

1916] RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS A13

inevitably bring to the neutrals as well. This was,

moreover, the only occasion on which the King spoke in
this strain to me.

During my visit to Petrograd I had been informed
that a delegation of Russian “parliamentarians,” ‘.
members of the Duma and of the Council of the Empire,
were soon going to pass through Sweden on their way
to the allied countries.

These gentlemen did arrive in Stockholm in March;
a few of the members of the Council of the Empire were
missing and were to join their colleagues later; but the
members of the Duma—with the Vice-President of this
assembly, M. Protopopoff, at their head—were all there.
Among the “cadets” there were M. Miliukoff, whom I
had known for a long time, M. Schingareff and M. Itchas,
a Lithuanian whom I had also met before. The other
delegates were “grandees of lesser importance.” M.
Protopopoff, “Octobrist of the Left,” attracted my
curiosity ; I had heard him spoken of as a particularly
intelligent man, very independent with regard to the
Government, although he did not nurse any “subver-
sive” opinions; he was also quoted as one of the very
rare members of the Duma having any practical know-
ledge of great industrial enterprises. During the few
hours that I was able to talk to the Vice-President of the
Duma, he did not appear to me to belie his reputation:
a frank way of talking, devoid of all exaggeration, a
faculty for assimilating new ideas quickly and thoroughly;
absence of prejudices and of pre-conceived opinions.
Side by side with that, a slight tinge of affectation and
an obvious wish to be very much the recognised head of
the parliamentary delegation.

Having received these gentlemen at the station and
accompanied them to the hotel, I invited them to come
and have lunch at the Legation to meet my colleagues.
After lunch, I gathered my guests together round
a green table so as to give them the opportunity of
asking questions on all matters relative to our relations

414 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cnap. Xxll.

with Sweden and in which they were interested. My
colleagues and I answered them to the best of our ability.
The deputies appeared to be much pleased with this
colloquy. It enabled them to clear up certain points
which had remained obscure to them and to amend their
judgment on others, which they did with a very good
grace.

The sitting terminated on the arrival of my allied
colleagues and a few Swedish personages’ whom I had
invited to meet our delegation. The French Minister
brought with him another “delegation”; this was M.
Albert Thomas, at the time the very popular Minister
of Munitions, who was going (for the first time) to
Petrograd to confer with our military administration.
A few Frenchmen accompanied him.

Very soon the drawing-rooms of the Legation were
filled, and there was a hum of conversation. Proto-
popoff, who spoke with great volubility, was surrounded ;
Miliukoff (a distinguished linguist) with the airs and
graces of the late Mezzofanti entertained every one of his
listeners in his mother tongue; Albert Thomas, with
his characteristic head, his mop of hair and full beard,
and the energetic and uncommon expression of his face,
attracted the attention of everybody.

“He does look clever, that Albert Thomas,” said one
of my compatriots of the Duma to me. “It would
interest me so much to talk to that working man, that
real man of the people risen to a post as Minister.
Unfortunately, I can hardly speak any French.”

“Ah, yes!” I replied; “he has a very characteristic
and clever head; but do not deceive yourself: he is no
more a working-man than you or I; he is, like most
Western politicians, a clever lawyer.”

The speaker was M. Schingareff, the most striking
and congenial of the delegates of the Duma; unfor-
tunately his almost complete ignorance of foreign lang-
uages prevented his being noticed and appreciated at his
true value in France and England.

1 M. Wallenberg was away temporarily.

1916 | THEYALCAND ASLANDS AIS

The very next day the delegates pursued their
journey.

Meantime the question of the Aland Islands was
examined more fully between M. Wallenberg and me,
and I asked M. Sazonoff to authorise me to address a
note to the Foreign Secretary of Sweden, in which the
assurances given by me to the King from His Majesty
the Emperor would be recorded. I had an impression
that we ought to take into consideration the fears which
were being manifested in Sweden and which were kept
up by Swedish Activists and German instigation. Ifwe
refused to explain ourselves explicitly on this question
and to give formal promises to Sweden they would con-
sider it a proof that we were only intent on gaining
time and contemplating using the Aland Archipelago
eventually as a naval or aviation base, which, as it was
about thirty nautical miles from Stockholm, would
effectually constitute a permanent menace to our neigh-
bour. Whereas if on the contrary we accepted the
negotiations proposed by the Swedish Government we
should prove by that the absence on our side of all
ulterior motives and of any scheme prejudicial to the ~
safety of Sweden.

M. Sazonoff, without committing himself as yet on
the question of the parleys demanded by M. Wallenberg,
authorised me, however, to record in a note addressed
to the Swedish Government at a fitting moment the
assurances concerning the fortifications which we had
erected on the Archipelago since the beginning of the
war. Hence I awaited with more confidence the
agitation which the reopening of the Riksdag was to
bring with it.

As the Swedish Government had clearly foreseen,
the Activists and the whole Conservative party, from
the first sittings, began to raise the question of the
Aland Islands vehemently, as well as that of the harm
done to commerce and to the economic existence of
Sweden by the strict blockade maintained by the Entente

416 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxu.

Governments against Germany. Violent speeches were
made at the Riksdag, and the Swedish Press—without
excepting even the organs of the moderate Liberals 1_—
requested the Government to guard the interests of
the country in a more effectual and stronger manner.

This campaign upset our Foreign Office. Whereas
formerly I had pointed out without reticence the dangers
of too great a feeling of security with regard to Swedish
Activist agitation, I now thought it my duty to dis-
courage a too abrupt “turn about,” and to reassure my
Government as to the real import of what was occurring
in Sweden. As ever, the instant anything even rather
unusual happened in Stockholm—often even when
nothing extraordinary was happening-—the Ministers
of the Entente in Norway? uttered loud cries of alarm ;
five or six times during the war our Governments were
much upset by news coming from Christiania announc-
ing the immediate entry of the Swedes into the war on
the side of Germany; my colleagues and I had to use
all our faculties of persuasion to refute these fantastic
rumours circulated with an assurance which might
really impress our Governments and our General Staffs.
We presumed that our colleagues in Christiania had to
do with informants and agents who were particularly
zealous and imaginative.

It was exactly the same this time; and after having
spent some weeks in corresponding with M. Sazonoff
on the subject of the declarations and concessions that
we ought to make to the Swedes on the Aland question,
I now had to calm the nervousness displayed by our
General Staff and which naturally spread to our Foreign
Office.

While all this fuss was going on my colleagues of the
Entente and I were pressing M. Wallenberg to com-
municate to the Riksdag the assurances he had received
repeatedly from us on the subject of the Aland Islands.
I drew up a thoroughly explicit statement on this

1 As to anything touching the Aland question.
2 I ought to except the Russian Minister.

1916] M. WALLENBERG’S CLEVER POLICY 417

subject and handed it to the Swedish Foreign Secretary,
but on condition that he was to communicate it to
Parliament; in the event of his considering it inoppor-
tune to do so, he was to return the document to me and
look on it as a verbal communication. M. Wallenberg
was quite satisfied with the contents of the document,
which he showed-—as I heard later—to all the influential
members of the Riksdag; but he did not wish to com-
municate it officially to this assembly and returned it to
me as had been arranged.

At a certain moment I thought it incumbent on me
to address a private and very friendly but most serious
letter to M. Wallenberg, dealing with the dangerous
activities of certain parliamentarians and of certain
organs of the Swedish Press. This letter, much
approved of by my colleagues, was worded so that
the Minister could submit it to the King and to the
political personages in view—which Wallenberg made a
point of doing.

Finally the Minister for Foreign Affairs made detailed
declarations at the Riksdag with respect to the questions
which seemed to be affecting the Assembly so strongly.
He did so with much frankness and at the same time
very cleverly, for he persisted in not communicating the
statements coming from the Entente Governments and
which would have proved in black and white that the
fears of the country were exaggerated, to say the least of
it. At the time my colleagues and I wondered why
the Swedish Government thus persisted in not “show-
ing their vouchers.” I discovered later that neither
M. Hammarskiold nor M. Wallenberg himself wished to
create a precedent by virtue of which the Riksdag might
demand the communication of certain statements of
German origin. Now the communication of the latter
might excite anger in Berlin, and as I have said the
Swedish Government did not feel sure enough of the final
victory of the Entente to risk drawing down on itself the
vengeance of Germany.

M. Wallenberg’s declarations were received at the

418 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxu.

Riksdag witha satisfaction beyond our expectations.
In a few days’ time the tone even of the Press had
changed and by the 1st June all was serene again. But
M. Wallenberg owned to me that this hostile attitude
of the Activists—which he trusted would be the last—
had been the strongest that had occurred since the
beginning of the war and that at one moment he himself
had been somewhat frightened about it.

It was during this crisis that I had an opportunity
of improving my acquaintance with M. Branting, the
recognised head of the Swedish Socialist party. Know-
ing that he was frankly opposed to the intrigues of the
Activists, I went to see him once or twice. I had some
heart to heart talks with him, and I amended a few of
his judgments on Russia and gained some information
for myself relative to the programme and aspirations of
the Swedish Socialist party.

I found in Hjalmar Branting a distinguished and
eminently honest mind; many convictions but few pre-
conceived opinions. He was the true head of a school,
not the head of a sect. I have often said to myself since,
that if the Socialist party throughout the world had
more leaders like Branting and possessed everywhere
social ground as relatively wholesome as that of the
Swedish working-classes, the doctrine of Socialism,
instead of rousing well-founded fears and irreconcilable
opposition on the part of those who hold to the old
and tried principles of world-wide civilisation, would
find useful and powerful adherents amongst the very
people who desire, not the downfall, but the reforma-
tion of this civilisation and the victory of mind and
moral principles over the power of money and brute
force.

Soon after the visit from the members of the Duma,
we began to receive disquieting news from Petrograd.
M. Sttiirmer was revealing himself more and more
as the agent of an absurd, confused and suspicious
policy, and was surrounded by a deplorable set of

1916] EMPRESS, STURMER AND RASPUTIN 410

people. At the same time the Ministers who had
acquired the greatest popularity disappeared one by
one—all those who were known to be animated by the
desire to work in with national representation and who
were sincerely and whole-heartedly devoted to the
common cause of the Entente. M. Klaritonoff, Con-
troller of the Empire; M. Krivochein, Minister for
Agriculture and a continuator of the wise agrarian
policy of Stolypin!; Count Ignatieff, the congenial
Minister for Education; finally General Polivanoff,
whose admirable work for the reconstitution of the
armed forces of Russia in the very midst of the war was
to bear such splendid fruit during the summer of 1916—_
were all dismissed one afterthe other. All these changes
were explained by the influence—increasing day by day
—of the Empress Alexandra who leant on Sttirmer and
his acolytes, whilst the infamous Rasputin and the
Vyruboff served as speaking-tubes through which the
most harmful and most suspicious characters obtained
a hearing and ruled the poor hysterical woman. The
disreputable reactionaries, the worst schemers, were
soon brought into prominence and began to find their
way into the Tsarskoe Palace. Amongst all sensible
people of Russian society there was soon a general
outcry. What was Russia being led into? Where
would the scandal stop? And what was the Emperor
about in all this?

Alas! it was becoming clear to every one that the
unfortunate Nicolas II. was abandoning his real power
more and more into the hands of his wife. In October,
1915, he had assumed the supreme command of his
armies by dismissing the Grand-Duke Nicolas, who was
appointed Viceroy of the Caucasus. This was done at a
-time when our armies were in a most difficult and
dangerous position, the Germans having just advanced
as far as Courland, White-Russia and Volhynia. To

1 This consisted in decreasing gradually on one side the éatifundia,

and in increasing by all the means possible that class of peasants who
were proprietors on their own account and not as members of the mr,

a iE

420 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cnap. xxu.

assume the responsibility of commanding under such
circumstances might seem a great and noble sacrifice,
and many Russians—I amongst them—considered that
the Emperor had done well in assuming the supreme
responsibility. Moreover, one hoped that this decision,
by removing him from the unwholesome and mad
atmosphere of Tsarskoe-Selo and by bringing him
forcibly into closer touch with his generals—al] animated
by the same patriotic anxiety as most of Russian public
opinion was—would have a beneficial action on the
home policy of Russia. But the men who understood
the situation best did not share this hope. Hence at a
Council held in October, 1915, all the Ministers who were
described as “ Liberal” had spoken, in the presence of
Nicolas II., in a frank and explicit way against the
change of Generalissimo and the Emperor's departure
for Headquarters. Sazonoff and General Polivanoff
were the most vehement on the subject.

It was even then being said that His Majesty was
offended with the opposers and had decided on principle
todismiss them. Towards the end of October, 1915, there
was much persistent talk of M. Sazonoff’s retirement.
The President of the Council, the aged and feeble M.
Goremykin, was, it was said, to be appointed Chancellor
of the Empire, with M. Schebeko at his side to share in
the part of director of Foreign Affairs. But this change
did not take place. In June, 1916, M. Sazonoff was still
in office, whereas all his former friends in the Cabinet
had been dismissed and replaced by Stiirmer’s creatures
or by people who were absolutely inexperienced and
new to their work.!

The presence of Nicolas II. at General Headquarters
and his absence from Tsarskoe were of no use—as
well-informed people had foreseen—either to the affairs
of the Empire or those of the Army. The Empress
Alexandra’s influence was becoming greater and

' With one exception: M. Klaritonoft’s successor was M. Pokrovsky,

aman of undeniable intellectual worth and high moral qualities ; I shall
have occasion to allude to him again.

1916] THE TSAR AT HEADQUARTERS = 421

greater ; sometimes the Emperor was summoned to her,
sometimes she herself went to Mohilev, occasionally
. accompanied by the four young Grand-Duchesses.
At Mohilev Nicolas II. continued to lead his usual
life side by side with the strenuous life of G.H.Q.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian armies,
General Alexieff, assumed as a matter of fact the whole
direction of the war; the Army heads and the heads
of departments had to deal with him alone, and he gave
daily reports to the Emperor who, plunged in the study
of the matter supplied to him by the General Staff and
of the voluminous papers which his Ministers brought
to Mohilev, hardly found time to make occasional trips to
visit the troops of such and such an army, in order to
display during ordinary reviews the same imperturb-
ably benevolent face and to utter the same few and
carefully chosen words. There was no intimacy with
the generals who lived at or came to G.H.Q.; always
the same surroundings as at Tsarskoe; meals were
taken with the same uninteresting set of people and
with the little Tsarevitch, whom the Emperor had
brought with him and whom he kept with him until
December, 1916.

Among the people who passed through Stockholm
during the year 1916, I saw, with the sincerest pleasure,
the worthy M. Odier, Minister of the Swiss Confedera-
tion to Petrograd, where his high qualities had gained
him many friendships. During our conversation, I
asked M. Odier whether he knew the tutor—a young
Swiss—just engaged for the Tsarevitch, who up till then
had only had an old sailor to look after him, as his
august parents undertook all the details of his education
themselves. M. Odier replied that he knew the tutor in
question very well, that he was a cultivated, conscientious
and distinguished man, and that he had already succeeded
in gaining the affection of his pupil; they were together
at Mohilev and both shared the simple, well-regulated
and studious existence of the Emperor, who found time
to give his son lessons in Russian and history and who

222 EWE OMENS IN PETROGRAD [CHAP. XXII.

liked to have the child working beside him whilst he
himself pored over maps and the reports of his Ministers
and Generals. The young Swiss tutor, according to M.
Odier, was full of admiration for the goodness, the kind-
ness, the simplicity, the calm serenity of the Emperor.
And now when one conjures up that touching picture of
the father and son—the Sovereign and the heir of a
mighty Empire—working side by side in the peace of a
small room, and when one is then seized by the night-
mare of the tales of the appalling butchery of Ekaterin-
burg, of the father clasping in his arms that same child
who had fainted at sight of the guns levelled at them by
bloodthirsty brutes,’ one is filled with grievous and
deep pity, such as no other drama in history has ever
evoked !

But on the other hand what a curious character, that
of this Sovereign who, at a time of the supreme straining
of all the forces of the country, of imminent perils,
faced by death which was hovering over millions of his
subjects and above all over him and his, yet possessed
the faculty of preserving the same quiet habits, of
cultivating the same touching and eminently domestic
virtues, just as if all personal effort was forbidden him,
all direction of events impossible, and as if there was
nothing left to him from henceforth but to bow to destiny
(“to the decrees of Providence’—he would have
corrected me !), simply accomplishing his daily duties,
and having his share of innocent pleasures!

“Tl y a des lacs limpides dans nos foréts profondes ;
Couverts d’une fraiche verdure et fleuris sont leurs bords,
Mais cette herbe et ces fleurs recouvrent des marais sans fond,
Qui engloutissent le patre et le troupeau imprudents.
Le peuple dit que ces lacs recouvrent des églises
(Que la miséricorde divine fit disparaitre devant des hordes sans merci),
Et par de claires et calmes soirées un son de cloches retentit de leur
profondeur
Et des cantiques sacrés.

1 Pray God these tales be not true!

1916] PROPHETIC VERSES pe

Tel m’apparait le Tsar Théodore;
Un lieu saint mais pas str, . . . Dans son 4me
Qui ne sait distinguer l’ami de l’ennemi,
Habitent l'amour, la bonté et la priére ;
Un doux son de cloches semble y retentir....
Mais & quoi bon toute cette bonté et toute cette sainteté,
Lorsque ni l’empire ni ses serviteurs n’y trouvent un ferme appui?”

It is in these terms that Alexis Tolstoy in one of his
historic dramas has described, through the lips of Boris
Godunoff, the character of the Tsar Theodore,’ the
pious and timid son of Johnthe Terrible. These verses
appeared in 1868, the very year in which the future
Emperor, Nicolas II., was born, and it is as if the poet—
the Vates as Victor Hugo would have said—had seen
before him the image of the most indulgent, the most
mystical, the weakest and the most unfortunate of the
Sovereigns of the tragic dynasty of the Romanoffs, And
yet it is this Sovereign who clung so firmly to his
autocracy; it is he who considered it a crime against
history and against his people to renounce his empty
privileges of omnipotence and who intended to hand
these down in their original integrity to this same
adored son!

In June, 1916, the offensive in Galicia was begun,
commanded by General Brussiloff, and the heroic—and

- 1“ The Tsar Theodore Joannovitch,” the second part of the well-known
trilogy. Count Alexis Tolstoy, lyrical poet, who was rather popular in
Russia, must not be confused with his cousin the famous Count Leo
Tolstoy. .

“There are some limpid lakes in our densé dark forests, covered
with green reeds and flowers near their banks ; but these reeds and these
flowers mask bottomless swamps which swallow up the imprudent
shepherd and his sheep. People say that these lakes conceal churches
(which Divine Pity wished to shield from merciless hordes), and on clear
and calm evenings a sound of bells echoes from their depths, and sacred
canticles. Such, meseems, is the Tsar Theodore : a holy shrine but not
sure.... In his soul, which cannot tell friend from foe, dwell love,
goodness and prayer ; a sweet sound of bells seems to echo there. But
what avails all this goodness and all this holiness if neither Empire nor
servants find in them q firm stay?” ;

424 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxl.

at first fortunate—incidents of this offensive drew the
attention of Russia and of Europe temporarily away
from the dangers of our domestic situation. The
operations of our armies had been originally fixed for
the month of July and were to have coincided with an
Allied offensive. But the Austrians’ attack on the
Asiago plateau, by placing Italy in danger, hastened the
Russian offensive by a month.

The operations were crowned with success from
the outset. It was during a dinner which we were
giving to some colleagues that | received the telegrams
containing the communiqués from our G.H.Q. on the
taking of Lutsk, the breaking through the strong
Austrian lines, the capture of tens of thousands of
prisoners. From this day operations developed with
increasing success. The Russians were soon occupying
Eastern Galicia again, and the army of General Scher-
batcheff, hurriedly leaving their quarters in Bessarabia,
succeeded in reoccupying the Bukowina after sanguinary
fighting. The spoil already amounted to hundreds of
thousands of Austrian prisoners and thousands of guns.
Throughout the month of June and during the early
part of July the general political atmosphere appeared
to be clearer. Hopes of complete victory were dawning
for all the Allies, although the German front was still
intact in Volhynia and in Courland, and although the
Anglo-French offensive was beset by delays and diffi-
culties.

Such was the position when our parliamentarians
who had passed through Stockholm at the end of March,
stopped there again on their return from London, Paris
and Rome.

They did not all arrive together. First came: M.
Protopopoff, Vice-President of the Duma, and two elect
members of the Council of the Empire, Count Dmitri
Olsufieff (of the Monarchist Centre) and Professor
Vassilieff (of the Left). Their short stay in Stockholm
gave rise to an incident which was subsequently greatly
commented on.

1916] M. PROTOPOPOFF AND THE POLAKS 425

The very day of their arrival I invited these gentle-
men to dinner at the summer-restaurant, the Hassel-
baken, where they were to meet some Swedish financiers
in order to discuss the question of the hour : commercial
exchanges between Swedenand Russia. M. Protopopoff
replied that he would be enchanted to come, but he
begged me to invite also—if I thought it suitable—some
travelling companions of his, M. and Madame Polak.
I at once sent them an invitation, and that evening at
the Hasselbaken the young Polak couple were amongst
my guests. The husband was that same Polak whom I
mentioned in a previous chapter and who had been en-
trusted with a politico-commercial mission to Bulgaria.
His wife, 7ée Achkenazi, was a charming young woman,
intelligent and lively; she was wearing two rosettes of
St. George, tokens of courage displayed with the ambu-
lances at the front. It did not take me long to discover
that M. Protopopoff was a complete victim to the
charms of his delightful and fascinating travelling-
companion.

The next day I was to take my three compatriots to
see M. Wallenberg, who had been apprised of their
presence in Stockholm. After an excursion and a lunch
which they had arranged with these same Polaks,
M. Protopopoff and Count Olsufieff—a pleasant and
intelligent man of the world—asked me to meet them
and Professor Vassilieff at the hotel where they were
staying. When we arrived there Protopopoff said to
me, in front of his two colleagues: “ Monsieur, I must
tell you that after our visit to Wallenberg I am going
to have a very interesting interview; I am to meet a
German at the Polaks’ over the teacups. It is a certain
Herr Warburg, a great Hamburg trader with whom the
Polaks were connected through business and friendship
before the war, and who, having met them here by
chance, has suggested calling on them.”

“But, M. Protopopoff,” I said, “I could tell you
straight away all that the German trader will say to you;
he will deplore the misunderstandings brought about

426 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD {cnap. xxt.

by the war, will utter fervent prayers for the restoration
of peace, and will insinuate that with a few small con-
cessions on our part this blessed peace could be at once
restored. Is it worth your while to have a conversa-
tion of that kind?”

“But, my dear Minister, it would interest me
enormously all the same to see for myself the frame of
mind of a German at the present time when we are on
the road to victory. It might constitute valuable in-
formation for St. Petersburg. Moreover, I will repeat
to you all that this German says.”

“In that case I can make no objection,’ I replied.

Count Olsufieff also manifested a desire to “meet
the Boche”; Professor Vassilieff, a quiet, thoughtful
man, preferred to keep away. I was somewhat shocked
at this meeting to which Protopopoff had consented
without first asking the advice of the Russian Minister ;
but I did not consider myself called upon to guide the
head of our parliamentary mission. And what is more,
he would not have listened to me.

All the four of us then went to see M. Wallen-
berg. There my impressions were disastrous ones.
Protopopoff, who the evening before had been excited
and extremely loquacious, definitely took the bit be-
tween his teeth as soon as he found himself in the
presence of the eminent Swedish statesman. Without
allowing M. Wallenberg or his own colleagues to get a
word in, he held a monologue for half an hour with
disconcerting volubility on the political and commercial
questions relative to our relations with Sweden, and on
the impressions he had formed in England and France.
At last, recollecting the interview awaiting him, the
Vice-President of the Duma closed his monologue and
we took leave of M. Wallenberg, who looked at me with
a somewhat dumbfounded expression. We went out.
Protopopoff promptly disappeared.

“Gentlemen,” I could not help exclaiming to Olsufieff
and Professor Vassilieff, ‘what on earth is the matter
with your colleague to-day ? I was on tenter-hooks the

1916] M. PROTOPOPOFF AND HERR WARBURG 427

whole time! Was that the way to talk to a foreign
statesman, above all to a Swede ?”

I saw a bitter smile on both their faces. “ But it
has been like this during our whole journey,” replied
Olsufieff; “he allowed no one else to talk, he was
always thrusting himself forward.”

“ Always is perhaps saying too much,” amended the
cautious M. Vassilieff; “but latterly he has certainly
become excited and loquacious to a degree!”

Three or four hours later when I went to fetch
these gentlemen in a motor-car to take them to the
station, Protopopoff related to Professor Vassilieff and
me (Count Olsufieff had taken part in the Polak tea-
party) his conversation with Herr Warburg; the latter
had apparently hastened to express—as | had predicted—
complaints about the war, and his desire for immediate
peace-making.

“ But I did not allow him to talk too much” (I believe
you! thought I). ‘I told him how clearly assured was
the ultimate victory of the Russians and Allies which
would end the war. Yes, war is a ghastly thing, but it
has its good side. It has taught France the need for
prayer, it has brought compulsory service to England,
and the suppression of drunkenness to Russia.” Since
the day before this was the third time that I heard that
aphorism, of which Protopopoff seemed inordinately
proud (it appears that he had given vent to it countless
times during his journey). At the station we bade
one another farewell, and the three gentlemen left for
Petrograd. The Polak couple stayed on a few days in
Stockholm, but I had no opportunity of seeing them
again.

On my return from the station I sent for the one
of my colleagues who knew most about the affairs of
Germany, and I made inquiries about this Herr Warburg
whom MM. Protopopoff and Olsufieff had just been
meeting. I learnt that he was not the famous Warburg
of Hamburg, but a brother or a cousin of his; that he
was on the German committee for revictualling, and at

428 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cnap. xxu.

the head of the Scandinavian section of that committee ;
that in that capacity he made frequent journeys to
Stockholm, Christiania, and Copenhagen, and that
although he did not figure in the list of the members of
the German Legation in Sweden, he often saw Baron
von Lucius.

Later on, when recalling Protopopoff’s last journey
through Stockholm, I came to the conclusion that it was
from the journey to our western Allies that must date
the beginning of that nervous or mental state of the
Vice-President of the Duma, a state which eventually
made him the absolutely irresponsible factor in the
worst misfortunes of Russia. It was decidedly not the
same man as the one with whom I had talked in March,
and who seemed intelligent and well-balanced, although
somewhat of an actor and slightly conceited. This time
I had to deal with an excited being, inordinately
loquacious, and who jumped, without apparent reason,
from one subject to another, while the failings inherent
in his character seemed to be exaggerated and cari-
catured.

A few days afterwards the Controller of the Empire,
M. Pokrovsky, arrived; he had been taking part, in
London and Paris, in conferences and parleys, the object
of which was the unification of the economic measures
and efforts of the Allies. I knew that he had made an
excellent impression in France as well as in England by
his tact, his cleverness, the clearness of his ideas, and
his thorough knowledge of financial matters. For many
years he had been head assistant to Kokovtzoff at the
Treasury, and it was he whom Kokovtzoff recommended
as his most appropriate successor. Pokrovsky had left
the Treasury with his chief; but at the first opportunity
he had been given the ministerial post of Controller of
the Empire, a post to which his eminent services gave
him every right.

I had the honour of knowing M. Pokrovsky, but very
superficially, never having exchanged ideas with him

1916] M. POKROVSKY 429

nor discussed any questions. Hence I was most agree-
ably impressed when I had the good fortune to converse
at great length with this very intelligent and eminently
congenial man. I disclosed our political position in
Sweden to him, and the economic questions (exchange
of produce, technical and military orders, transit, etc.)
with which I had to deal, and which I wished to settle
as quickly and as satisfactorily as possible. We talked
in this strain for two good hours. I admired the
lucidity of my guest’s mind, and the value of the questions
he asked me. The following day I begged his per-
mission to present him to M. Wallenberg. “This will
be my revenge for the Protopopoff visit,” I thought, as
I accompanied M. Pokrovsky to the Swedish Foreign
Office. I thought it quite superfluous to take part in
the conversation. “Gentlemen,” I said, when I had
presented them to one another, “ you are both particularly
well versed in economic and financial questions, so I
will not disturb you.” And I left.

Two hours later Pokrovsky came to see me. ‘‘ Well!”
I said, “and what are your impressions ?”

“Excellent! We have reviewed all the leading
questions. Thanks to the imformation and matter
supplied by you, I had a most valuable discussion
with M. Wallenberg, who on his side was full of good
sense, and also most friendly. I even ventured to out-
line with him a scheme or rather a conventional pro-
gramme dealing with all the questions which we dis-
cussed verbally. Here is the little statement; do you
approve of it ?”

I read the statement carefully, and returned it to
M. Pokrovsky, assuring him that for my part I could
only thank him for it, and wish for the prompt con-
clusion of an arrangement on the principles which he
had just worked out with M. Wallenberg. The day
after M. Pokrovsky’s departure I asked Wallenberg
what he thought of him. “Highly congenial, and
possessed of deep knowledge. It was a pleasure to me
to talk with him. We even allowed ourselves to

430 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxu.

negotiate without your being present.” “I know, and |
am delighted about it ; if only your draft of the arrange-
ment could be accepted, and above all carried out!”

Besides his ability, M. Pokrovsky had impressed me
favourably by the complete absence of all bureaucratic
pomp. Any other Minister would have brought with
him at least two or three subordinates mainly occupied
in giving their chief his cue, in advertising him well
amongst the natives and in flattering him cleverly at
meals—which is a tremendous aid to digestion! The
Controller of the Empire only had his son with him, a
charming young man who had just completed his studies
and who was going into the Army; his two elder sons
had been at the front since the outbreak of war.

Pokrovsky was closely followed by a whole group
of our parliamentarians, the remaining members of the
Duma, and three members of the Council of the Empire:
Prince Lobanoff, Baron Rosen, and Count Sigismund
Wielopolski. The Swedes, on their side, had arranged
beforehand a large luncheon party in honour of these
guests at that same Hasselbaken restaurant, where they
were to be received by the most notable Swedish
manufacturers and financiers, also by representatives of
the Press.

The day before, we made an expedition, with MM.
Miliukoff, Schingareff, Itchas, and a Lithuanian poet
whose name | have forgotten, to that beautiful spot Salt-
sjObaden, and we dined at the restaurant. The expedi-
tion was thoroughly successful and favoured by perfect
weather. Schingareff and one of his colleagues were
rather late in arriving at the meeting-place, but they
arrived at last, and were profuse in apologies: “At
one of the places where our boat stopped we were told
we could get here on foot through the forest, and we
could not resist the pleasure of an hour's walk in this
divine weather. It was truly delightful; it reminded
me so vividly of the forests of Russia.”

[ can still recall the very pleasant and typically

OS. eS 2s 6 ee eS

1916] M. SCHINGAREFF 431

Russian face of the eminent cadet deputy, his high and
intelligent forehead, his rather thick lips, and his smile
showing all his strong white teeth. A country doctor,
employed by the “Zemstvo” of one of our central
provinces, he was, from the beginning of the Duma, one
of the most prominent and most esteemed members of
his party. Scrupulously disinterested in his private
life—a noble life without blot or stain—he had special-
ised in economic questions, more especially those of
rural interest. His speeches, always admirably padded
and always a little too long, but logical and sincere,
provoked rejoinders which were quite as circumstantial,
as sincere and as well padded, from M. Kokovtzoff.
They were more like academic than political encounters,
discussions of two schools rather than of preconceived
opinions; and these discussions often led to wise and
practical “ decrees of the Senate.” Steadfast faith in the
Russian people, intense love for this people and for his
country, formed the basis of the political and private
character of this goodman. Turguenieff sketched some
of these types in his later novels. The Bolsheviks
murdered him as soon as they could. Schingareff and
another eminent member of his party, M. Kokochkin,
were lying rather seriously ill in a hospital in Petro-
grad, when a band of Red Guards broke open the doors
and riddled the two men with bullets zz ther beds.
MM. Lenin and Trotsky pretended afterwards that it
had been a “ mistake.”

The banquet at Hasselbaken was most successful.
One of the members of our parliamentary delegation
made a very well-turned speech in which he advocated
the development of the closest economic relations and
the cultivation of feelings of friendship between Sweden
and Russia. The Swedes replied to this in the same
strain. Every one talked quite intimately, and some
journalists who a few short months previously had
hurled their thunder-bolts at Russia, were the first to
display feelings of sympathy towards their Russian
guests. At this banquet I could prove with a certain

432 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cunap. xxu.

amount of satisfaction to what an extent Russo-Swedish
relations had changed to the advantage of both countries
since the days when I took up my post in Stockholm,
and that in spite of the World War, at the outbreak of
which Swedish sympathies had seemed to be all on the
side of Germany, and notwithstanding that this war had
brought so much tribulation and so many trials to
commerce and to the economic position of Sweden.
Baron Rosen and Count S. Wielopolski remained
on a few days after the departure of their colleagues,
and naturally we saw a great deal of them. Rosen, ex-
Ambassador of Russia to Washington, had been my
chief in Belgrade in 1895 and 1896, and since then I had
always borne in mind his great kindness to me and his
broad and wise political views. During the year igs he
caused a great deal of talk on account of an impromptu
speech he made at the Council. of the Empire, and in
which, without any regard for the reactionary breeze
which was blowing then in high circles, he criticised
the policy of intolerance of the Government and of
Russian public opinion towards the heterogeneous
elements of the Empire: Poles, Finns, Israelites. He did
not touch on the Baltic question, not wishing most likely
to be judge and plaintiff. But what surprised me more
was that he did not say one word on the subject of
the constitutional guarantees of Russia, or about the
despotism of the State Police, which still continued to
make itself felt, just as if national representation had
never been granted. Now, without these guarantees
and without the free and sovereign exercise of justice
over the whole extent of the Empire, how could the
question of the autonomies and of equality in the eyes
of the law for the heterogeneous nationalities have been
solved ? In Stockholm I heard Baron Rosen say some
things which might lead one to believe that he con-
sidered the immediate conclusion of peace essential for
Russia; and at the same time he lavished the highest
praise on the endurance and patriotism of the English,
for whom he had always had a marked predilection and

oe STC eS | 8 OO ae SY ar

— om mo.

ee OPERATIONS IN GALICIA 433

whom he had just been seeing at work. I could not
make out what was at the back of his mind; I under-
stood later on.

Count Sigismund Wielopolski, whom [ had seen a
great deal of formerly, was very much upset about the
Polish question. He knew that from various sides the
Emperor was being advised to solve this question
promptly by supplementing the manifesto of the ex-
Generalissimo of the Russian armies by an Imperial
declaration which should decide in a more definite
manner the future régime of Poland. But there were
many controversies on the subject of this régime; and
Wielopolski was expecting to be summoned to G.H.Q.
to submit to the Emperor the point of view and the
desiderata of the Polish party who accepted the neces-
sity of a sensible union with Russia in the sphere of
foreign policy and of economic interests.

One evening when we were talking about the war,
we naturally spoke of our sons, who had been great
friends during their time at the military college, and
who had got their commissions the same day in the
Infantry of the Guard. He was expecting the Guards
to go into action again, and the thought bound us by
ties of mutual sympathy.

These gentlemen left Stockholm soon after, and all
the interest of the moment was concentrated, as far as
I was concerned, again on the military operations in
Galicia. These were not proceeding as rapidly as at
the beginning ; the Germans having thrown large forces
into Volhynia, and stubbornly contested the railway
centre at Kovel. But only a few days had passed and
my attention was again distracted from the events of
the war by a political occurrence of a very serious
nature.

One morning towards the end of July the repre-
sentative of our telegraphic agency came to me very
much upset with the news that Sazonoff had resigned
and had been replaced by... Stiirmer! At first I

434 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cnap..xxn.

refused to believe it, but I soon had to yield to evidence.
I was sincerely and deeply affected by the news.

In the course of these reminiscences I have often
mentioned my former colleague and chief. The policy
adopted by us in 1913 on the Bulgarian question could
not meet with my approval and | said as much openly;
I also could not refrain from criticising the lack of fore-
sight with regard to what was shaping itself in Germany
and Austria, and I was astonished at the imperturbable
calm of M. Sazonoff; but this criticism did not prevent
me seeing him as he really was, that is to say, an
essentially honest man, and a judicious and sometimes
even perspicacious diplomat, when he formed his own
judgments and did not allow himself to be influenced
by his surroundings and his intimate friends, of whom
only one or two at the outside were his equals in intelli-
gence and character. And to the minds of those who
considered that the World War was inevitable, and
that Russia might come out of it victorious and with
valuable acquisitions—/ was not among the number—
M. Sazonoff’s policy must have appeared absolutely
impeccable, at least in its broad outlines. He had
counted on the absolute fidelity of our Allies and his
hopes were completely realised ; as soon as he was in
office he had sketched out an agreement 7 sfe with
Italy in the sphere of Eastern questions, and particularly
that of the Adriatic, and Italy ended by abandoning her
former alliances and siding with us; he had openly
demanded Constantinople and the Straits for Russia as
the price of our sacrifice in the World War, and the
Allies had ended by recognising our rights to this
supreme recompense ;! but first and foremost he enjoyed
the complete and unlimited confidence of our Allies, a
confidence he fully deserved, for from the outbreak of
war he had considered their cause and their interests
just as sacred as those of Russia herself. To sum up:
one might criticise, one might disapprove of, Sazonoff’s
pre-war policy ; but once war had broken out he became

i And on this question the whole of Russia was then with Sazonoff.

—_ ov

Ss op -c™ 2 —- >

—S=— on™ CORD Oe oj ll

—_=

Tm BD cw lll Oo”

1916] STURMER SUCCEEDS SAZONOFF 435

the right man in the right place, and one could not inter-
fere with him without endangering the result of the
terrible conflict in which the world was plunged.

Hence Sazonoff’s retirement was in any case a sharp
blow struck at those who were fighting with us; but
to replace him by a personage as suspicious and of
such a bad reputation as Sttirmer might seem to be a
blow struck at the alliance itself. This is how it was
viewed in Paris, London and Rome. If Sazonoff had
been replaced by another diplomat,‘ M. de Giers, for
instance, or even M. Schebeko (of which there had been
a question at one time), our allies would certainly have
greatly regretted his departure, but they would not
have considered that the cause of the alliance itself
was in peril. But as it was, Stiirmer’s appointment
endorsed the legend which was promptly circulated
(perhaps by German agents themselves) and spread
abroad in Russia and in Europe. The legend ran that
the Empress Alexandra, who was daily taking a more
active part in the affairs of the State, actuated by her
Germanic sentiments, wished to save her former country
at all costs by bringing about a separate peace between
the latter and Russia; that M. Stiirmer—of German
origin—was her agent and her accomplice, whilst
Rasputin was in receipt of Boche money to keep up the
Empress’s pacifist sentiments. This legend was untrue.
The Empress had never been an agent of the Berlin
Court; on the contrary at one moment her sympathies
had been frankly English. Rasputin—whose mentality
was not far removed from that of the Cossack who, on
being asked by a friend what he would do if he became
Tsar, replied: “I should promptly steal a hundred
roubles and bolt!’”—Rasputin accepted a hundred
roubles here and five hundred there from the numerous
people who solicited his protection; he did not hide
himself from them in any way and was perfectly
satisfied, loaded as he was with presents and supported,
as well as his family, at the expense of the Court.
Stiirmer was not more “German” by origin than many

2F

436 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxm.

other Russians who, in spite of their foreign name, were
often unimpeachable patriots. But in himself this indi-
vidual, of a low class, and always ¢o be bought, consti-
tuted a real danger to those most weighty interests
which had been confided to him. Fortunately he had
not the time to perpetrate deeds of real treachery, but his
presence in the Government injured to a certain extent
Russian effort in the war, if only through the wide
breach which the promotion of a Stirmer caused between
the Emperor and the public opinion of the country.

I had not recovered from the emotion which the
news of M. Sazonoff’s departure had roused in me, as
in my allied colleagues, when a telegram was received

at the Legation begging that the news of the death of .

our youngest son, killed in action on the 28th July,
should be broken to us as gently as possible. His body,
as well as those of his comrades killed in the battle,
was to be brought to Tsarskoe-Selo.

We were utterly unprepared for this grievous news ;
we did not know that the Imperial Guard had been
taking part near Kovel in some glorious fighting, but
which, alas! was to be rendered fruitless by the marshes
of the Stohed.

Destined by fate to be in the attacking party, my
son, who was under the terrible fire of modern warfare
for the first time, did his whole duty. When his captain
fell he took command of his company and led it to the
enemy trenches. He was shot dead at once. His men,
deprived of their officers and having had all their non-
commissioned officers killed or wounded, succeeded
even so in getting into the enemy’s trench. (And one
year later the soldiers of the same regiment were
the worst rioters in the Army and deliberately left
the battlefields.) ‘“ Your son died like a hero,” wrote the
colonel of his regiment to me, “leading his men to the
attack of strong]enemy positions. He died during a
glorious fight which will remain one of the finest pages
in the history of his regiment.”

ie) A BAND OF MALEFACTORS 437

But we only heard all these details when we arrived
at Petrograd. Meanwhile the confusion was so great
in our Foreign Office, suddenly deprived of its head,
that I had had to wait a whole week for permission
to come and attend the obsequies of my son!

We paid the last honours to his mortal remains at
an imposing and never-to-be-forgotten ceremony, when
we realised to what an extent a regiment is a real family
—a family that the blood of its members cemented more
firmly every day.

Two days after I thought it my duty to go and see
Sazonoff, who was still residing in the Foreign Office.
I expressed my sincere feelings of regret. ‘Our reac-
tionary party is really mad!” I said amongst other
things. “How can they, given the state of people’s
minds and the very comprehensible suspicions of the
Allies, risk an appointment like that of Sttirmer?”
“You are wrong, my dear M. Nekludoff,” interrupted
Sazonoff, “the reactionary party has nothing to do with
it; it has ceased to exist for the last few months, having
become fused in the moderate Right. There is a band
of malefactors who at the present time are endeavouring
to assume the reins of government; and Stiirmer is one
of the heads of this band.” M. Sazonoff went on to tell
me that almost on the eve of his enforced resignation he
had been to Mohilev, where the Emperor had received
him most graciously and had approved of all that he
had submitted to His Majesty’s decision.

I paid no other visits. We stayed with an intimate
friend of my wife’s, who surrounded us with the most
touching care. Only relations and real friends were
allowed to come and see us. The first person my wife
wished to see was Count S. Wielopolski, whose son had
been killed the same day as ours. We had a long talk;
besides the sorrow inflicted on him by the death of this
beloved child, the Count was terribly anxious with
regard to the fate of Poland, about which nothing was
settled. He was still awaiting permission to go and
see the Emperor, but this permission did not arrive. “I

438 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD fenap. xxu.

understand your state of mind,” I saidto him, “/ know
why and for whom my son has died; and you do not
even know if the death of yours is a_ holocaust
offered to your country, or if it is a useless sacrifice.”
Weeping bitterly the poor Count pressed my hand.

The excellent M. Pokrovsky also hastened to visit
us, and his sincere sympathy with our sorrow touched
us deeply. I went a second time to see Sazonoff, who
was staying temporarily almost next door to us. I
told him about Protopopoff’s last journey through
Sweden and his meeting with Warburg, which had just
got into the papers and been vehemently criticised by
the Novoye Vremya. “ But Protopopoff told me all that
on his return here, and I saw absolutely nothing to
object to in it,” said Sazonoff. ‘He has brought back
on the whole some very interesting impressions of
his journey, and the last time that I was at G.H.Q. I
earnestly recommended the Emperor to send for him
and to make him relate these impressions. I have not
heard since whether His Majesty has acted on my
suggestion.”

In spite of the above-mentioned opinion of Sazonoff’s
on the Protopopoff-Warburg incident, I thought it
necessary—on the advice of an experienced friend—to
go and see the Vice-President of the Duma and to
discuss it with him. Protopopoff knew nothing of the
cruel sorrow which had befallen us, and uttered many
expressions of sympathy.

I then embarked on the question which had taken
me to him. “The newspapers,” I said, “have been
making such a fuss about your meeting with Warburg
that I consider it imperative—with your assistance—to
refresh my memory with regard to your last stay in
Stockholm.” I recapitulated all that he had said and all
that Ihad replied tohim. “Isthatright?” “ Perfectly ;
that was exactly it,” was his answer. The speaker no
longer betrayed any of the same agitation as in
Stockholm. He rather seemed to be taciturn, pensive
and absent-minded. He said he was expecting to be

1916] I CALL ON STURMER 439

summoned to G.H.Q., and it was probably this that was
making him dreamy.

Although we were seeing very few people, my
impressions of Petrograd were frankly unfavourable
ones. Our offensive was dying down. The Guard and
the army corps which had started the attack on Kovel so
well were sinking into the Volhynian marshes, and their
forces were reduced by more than a third. In town
every one appeared more then ever to be tired of the
war; they were dozing. One evening when, from the
window, I was admiring the extensive view of the quays,
of the Neva and the sky, already autumnal and lit up
by the soft tints of sunset, a very young friend who
was at my side said: ‘Are you looking, as I am, to
see if a Zeppelin is not coming over Petrograd? That
would really do some good! that might wake up all
these people here and restore some of their patriot-
ism.” “Alas!” I replied, “you are voicing a feeling
of which I cannot rid myself since I have been in
Petrograd!”

The day before our departure for Stockholm, I at
last made up my mind to call on the new Minister for
Foreign Affairs. I was received in the big office where
I had seen M. de Giers, Prince Lobanoff, Count
Lamsdorf and others seated, where I had talked
at great length with Sazonoff five months previously.
I saw in their place an individual with a common
face and manners which were completely at variance
with the surroundings. Everything about him was
sham, one felt it in his every word, in his every move-
ment. Sham simplicity, sham good-nature, sham
courtesy, sham dignity. We had known his white
hair as red; his backbone now stiff and straight had
formerly been servilely bent. I felt that he was
worried by :-his new rodle—which spoke rather in
his favour, and by my presence—which spoke decidedly
in mine. Nevertheless, my antipathy was in no way
lessened thereby. He gave me no information relative
to Swedish affairs, pleading his inexperience in the

440 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxu.

matter.; but he did not question me either. He con-
fined himself to a few patriotic commonplaces, and
expressed his submission to the will of the Emperor
who had imposed on him these functions—so new to
him. The shades of the famous Boyar Ordyn-Nastchokin,
Chancellor to the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovitch, were once
more evoked, and the interview terminated. This Ordyn-
Nastchokin was quoted to all comers with good reason.
All who wished to please Nicolas II. compared him as
frequently as possible to the “very calm,” the “very
gentle”? Tsar, the father of the fiery and cruel Peter the
Great ; hence naturally he, M. Stiirmer, ought to figure
as the reproduction of the pious and enlightened Boyar,
the intimate friend of Alexis. I went out somewhat
disgusted. “It is not worth while to get upset about
it,” I said to one of the exalted functionaries of the
Foreign Office whom I met on the stairs and who began
to “slate” his new chief. “That individual will not
remain here more than two months. Mark my words;
it is now the 1st September, by the 1st November
he will have left.” I was only wrong by a fortnight.
And I learnt meanwhile that my prophecy had been
faithfully repeated to the subject of it.

During my short stay in Petrograd, I had an
Opportunity of getting to know the contents of the
minute that M. Sazonoff had presented to the Emperor
on the Polish question. It was a scheme for the new
autonomous Statute of Poland. Wielopolski and his
friends who had read it were not pleased withit. Accord-
ing to this minute, at the head of the new Poland there
was to be a Governor-General appointed by the Emperor,
and not a “ Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom” elected,
or at least recommended to the Imperial choice, by
Polish national representation. This was the principal
point on which the opinion of Poles of Russian persuasion
differed from that of M. Sazonoff; there were also
others. On the whole, the scheme in question gave to

1 “ Tishaichi Tsar.”

1916] SAZONOFF’S MINUTE ON POLAND 441

Poland the autonomy that Finland had had before the
reforms denounced by the Finns. There was also an
intentional gap in the scheme. The Poles asked that
in the provinces of White-Russia and the Ukraine their
kinsmen, whose rights had been subjected to considerable
restrictions,! should be placed on an absolutely equal
footing with their Russian fellow-citizens ; now there
was no mention of this in the scheme.

Considering the tremendous stock of grievances
which for more than a century had been accumulating
in Poland against the Russians—and vice-versa; con-
sidering also that the former Finnish statute had not
spared us either the hostility of certain Finnish parties
or the temptation to infringe this statute ourselves, I
was not at all satisfied with Sazonoff’s scheme. I heard
later that the latter had sketched out his minute on far
broader and more liberal lines, but that having given it
to M. Krzyzanowski—former Secretary to the Empire 7—
to correct, the latter, under pretext of co-ordinating the
future Polish constitution with the general principles
and the necessities of the Empire and of specifying the
judicial terms of this constitution, altered the whole
spirit of the scheme. Now, if M. Sazonoff allowed
himself to be influenced by considerations which
demanded the restriction of the future liberties of
Poland, what opposition would a M. Stiirmer not raise

1 These were mainly large landed proprietors belonging to the
Polish nobility. The restrictions concerned the right of purchase of
land and tended to diminish the number of Polish proprietors in favour
of Russian purchasers or indigenous peasants (Ukranians, White-
Russians or Lithuanians).

2 The Secretary of the Empire was the Director of the Chancellery
and the Editor of the Council of the Empire, who, before the institution
of the Duma, alone framed and elaborated the text of the laws. The
post of Secretary to the Empire was hence a most important one. M.
Krzyzanowski, a very clever and experienced lawyer, was of Polish origin,
and in his youth was looked on as very Liberal. A ‘‘ turncoat” and having
passed over to the Conservative camp, he had, under Stolypin, an
influence which -our Liberals condemned as fatal. It was at his brother-
in-law Stolypin’s that Sazonoff became intimate with Krzyzanowski.

442 EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD [cuap. xxl.

to these liberties? And in spite of all the honeyed
assurances of the latter, the Poles who were the most
favourably inclined towards Russia and towards
Nicolas II. realised that for the time being nothing good
was to be expected fortheir country. All this confirmed
me still more in my belief that there was in reality but
one way only of solving the Polish question definitely,
and of freeing Russia from a lot of internal worries: 1.¢.
to grant to Poland, within the confines of really
Polish territory, absolute independence and complete
sovereignty.

I said above that the public spirit of the capital,
with regard to the war, was not at all what I should
have wished. Quite at the end of my short stay in
Petrograd, there was a semblance of movement and of
enthusiasm roused by Rumania’s entry into the war;
but this movement was hardly perceptible.

M.Ordyn-Nastchokin—ahas Stiirmer—having become
Minister for Foreign Affairs, naturally wished to prove
his worth from the outset. With this object in view,
he took care to dispatch to Bukharest a kind of ulti-
matum, in which our Cabinet warned the Rumanian
Government that if Rumania did not come into the war
at once Russia would withdraw all the promises she had
made and all the concessions she had agreed to. As for
several;months already Rumania had worked on the lines
of “virile decisions” through a French special mission,
and as our advance in Galicia and in the Bukowina
was awaking the aspirations of Rumanian patriotism,
the step taken by M. Stiirmer was not long in
reaping the desired result, and on the 28th August,
1916, the Rumanian troops entered Hungary. On this
occasion there were some “popular” demonstrations
in Petrograd, but they were meagre and half-hearted.
Our Minister to Bukharest, M. Poklewski-Kozell,) a
wise and clever diplomat, had never been enthusiastic
about Rumanian intervention, although he cultivated

1 I mentioned him in Chapter XVIII.

——

—So pm ewe PP Ss ee !LCUrC

a. =e ee ee

1916 | RUMANIA JOINS IN THE WAR 443

the best relations with the society and Government of
Bukharest. With regard to this, he was even the
object of an intrigue got up by a kind of naval agent,
inclined to drink and very bellicose, and by the Coun-
sellor to the Legation. This intrigue nearly caused
Poklewski’s fall; but, as a former comrade and personal
friend of Sazonoff’s, he had only to come to Petrograd
to frustrate all these machinations and to cause the
Minister to uphold him in exalted circles. But then,
and with Stiirmer in office, Poklewski was considered
incapable of facing the fresh situation, and a new Envoy
Extraordinary was appointed to Bukharest, in the
person of the amiable General Mossoloff,! head of the
Lord Chamberlain's Office. Nevertheless, Stiirmer did
not make up his mind to “shelve” Poklewski entirely,
and so there were two Russian representatives in
Rumania. Alas! this diplomatic plethora was of scant
assistance to our new allies in the campaign—disastrous
to them—which was about to open.

On the 28th August, towards mid-day—it was the eve
of my departure for Stockholm—I met M. Sazonoff,
accompanied by Baron Schilling, in the Square of the
Winter Palace. We stopped to talk. “I saw you
coming out of the Foreign Office,” said Sazonoff to me;
“what have you heard there about the Rumanians?
Can one consider their entry into the war an accom-
plished fact ?”

“Yes, yes! the deed is done,” I replied; “it will be
announced in the papers to-day.”

“Thank God! Thank God!” exclaimed Sazonoff.
As I could not help evincing a great deal of scepticism,
Sazonoff pressed me to say why this excellent news left
me cold. I then related to him the interview that I had
had six months previously with General Polivanoff.
“That is curious,” said Sazonoff in a hurt voice;
“Polivanoff never told me all that and yet we were
very intimate.” This time it was my turn to be hurt,
and we parted somewhat coldly. \

1 The same whom I mentioned in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER XXII
RUSSIA IN DECLINE

On my return to Stockholm I at once took up the
threads of current political questions and of the daily
round again.

At our very first meeting M. Wallenberg asked me
if I considered it an opportune moment for formal
negotiations between the Russian and Swedish Govern-
ments concerning the Aland Islands. “ Most decidedly
not,” I unhesitatingly replied; “you will arrive at
nothing owing to the confusion reigning at this moment
at the Foreign Office. And then it is hardly worth
while ; in two months, or two months and a half at latest,
M. Stiirmer will have ceased to be at the head of our
Foreign Office.” M. Wallenberg believed me and took
this for granted. It is probable that the Swedish
Minister to Petrograd had meantime confirmed my
opinion.

My allied colleagues cross-questioned me with the
deepest interest on Rumania’s entry into the war. We
agreed that the whole importance of this entry lay in
the possibility for us of throwing troops into Bulgaria
and of showing the disloyal aud ungrateful people what
it cost to raise their hand against their liberator and
benefactor, Russia. “How many troops have you sent
to the Dobrudja?” asked my colleagues. I did not
know but I supposed that a Russian army would attack
the Bulgarians on that side. Just then the French
General de L. arrived in Stockholm; he had been
attached to our G.H.Q. since the beginning of the
war. He came to see me and I asked him the
same question—that of the number of our contingents

444

1916 | BAD NEWS FROM RUMANIA 445

engaged near the Lower Danube. “You have two
divisions and a half there,” he replied, “but another
one is to be sent.” “What, not more than that?” I
exclaimed. “I know what you mean,” interrupted the
General; “you are afraid it is not enough. Well, |
can reassure you. Several generals at your G.H.Q.
had thought that you ought to send at least four
army corps to the Dobrudja, and Alexeieff himself was
inclined to that opinion. But on due deliberation they
came to the conclusion that an attack by all the best
Rumanian troops on the Austrians’ flank in Transyl-
vania would have such a disastrous effect for the latter
that it would only be necessary to concentrate the efforts
of the Russian armies in Galicia and the Bukowina to
bring complete disaster to the Austrian Army. Under
the circumstances one could not divide the Russian
forces, but on the contrary make the maximum effort on
the principal front.” All the same this news was a
great blow to my hopes and to those of my colleagues,
and very soon events proved that our fears were well-
founded. On the Lower Danube the Rumanians had
only got territorials, who were quite unable to stand up
against seasoned troops of four years’ standing like the
Bulgarians, so that ferocious and unequal fighting soon
played havoc with our ten regiments, and one of the
most disastrous results was that the Bulgarians had the
illusion that they were stronger than their former
protectors and masters in military skill. Hundreds of
Russian prisoners were exhibited in Bulgarian centres.
It was Bulgaria anew and irrevocably linked to the
Central Empires.

Soon after news quite as bad arrived from the other
parts of the Rumanian front; the Rumanian and Russian
troops evacuated Transylvania, then bit by bit the whole
of Wallachia, and Mackensen made his triumphal entry
into Bukharest; the Sereth front was formed on which
Russians and Rumanians were henceforth to con-
centrate all their efforts solely to hold the Germans
and their allies. The Rumanian campaign was lost.

446 RUSSIA IN DECLINE _ [cunap. xxu.

I have no doubt whatever that this bitter deception,
added to the disastrous memories of 1915, had a great
deal to do with the exasperation of Russian public
Opinion. Revolutionary machinations were certainly
increased thereby, especially in the Army.

Whilst all this was going on in the war area, the
internal ferment of Russia and the disorder in the
Government were increasing in a truly alarming manner.
Each day we received grievous news through the news-
papers and from Russian travellers. First there was
Stiirmer’s private secretary and factotum, an ex-agent
of the State Police and later on one of the editors of
the Novoye Vremya, who was arraigned for extortion
of a considerable sum from a rich trader. And M.
Stiirmer still remained at his post! Then one heard
that the Empress Alexandra received the official reports
of the Ministers and appended her decisions thereto. What
one heard about the “good old man’s” exploits almost
exceeded the bounds of possibility; I feel sure that a
great number of these tales were untrue; but what
were left were enough to make every good Russian
patriot blush. Our Allies soon began to suspect that
Stiirmer and his acolytes, whose actions at first sight
appeared to be absolutely disconnected, were in reality
aiming at a definite, though carefully concealed end, that
of leading Russia and the Emperor to a separate peace
with Germany. Were these suspicions well founded,
or did they emanate from the side of the Germans and
of the revolution which was being organised? I cannot
say. In any case I will not answer for M. Stiirmer.

The Duma was agitated by the startling defection
of Protopopoff. Summoned to Mohilev and having
succeeded in captivating the Emperor, he was, two
weeks later, appointed Home Secretary and as such
supreme head of the State Police. He accepted without
even asking the advice of his party; at first he madea
few confused declarations at the Duma, but very soon
revealed himself in his new post as an out-and-out

1916] PROTOPOPOFF’S INSANITY 447

reactionary and what is more an incoherent reactionary.
There was a stormy meeting at which his former political
friends called on him to resign his post and on his
refusal struck him out of the party. He had many
bitter things to hear. One man only amongst those
concerned really understood the situation, and this was
Schingareff. In his capacity as doctor and as a good
and charitable man he made an urgent appeal to
Protopopoff: “Listen to me, Protopopoff; you are ill,
very seriously ill. Give up all your occupations, go
home, put yourself into the hands of good doctors, go
into a nursing home if necessary, and come back to us
cured ; you will be received by all of us with open
arms.” This voice of a friend went, of course, unheeded,
and Russia endured the shame of possessing, for five
months and at a most critical hour, a Home Secretary
suffering from tabes and on the high-road to creeping
paralysis. The wretched man was completely off his
head when he was executed by the Bolsheviks after a
few months’ confinement in the Peter and Paul fortress.

Abroad people have often been surprised—in Con-
servative circles especially—that the monarchical régime
and the good and honest Emperor himself, did not
find any supporters when the Revolution broke out ;
that all Russia should in a few hours have sided with
the most Radical ideas, the most violent measures. I
myself, as I said above, have frequently and bitterly
criticised later on the chameleonism of the upper classes
of Russian society. But in pronouncing judgment
one ought to take the months immediately pre-
ceding the revolution into consideration. The most
steadfast partisans of the monarchical régime, the
most devoted servants of the Sovereign were then
dominated by one feeling only, that of deep and bitter
humiliation. “Things cannot go on like this; in some
way or other this must end!” Such were the words
one heard on all sides.

Now if this was the state of mind in Russian Con-
servative circles, what must the excitement have been

448 RUSSIA IN DECLINE — [cnap. xxm.

amongst the men who for a long time had been marching
to the attack of the former régime, of its manifold in-
consistencies and original blemishes? Towards the
end of 1916 one can assert that the “sacred union,”
planned since the war, no longer existed either at the
Duma or elsewhere. All wishes were turning towards
a radical metamorphosis of things; only some pictured
this metamorphosis as a sort of coup d'état or palace-
revolution, like those of the eighteenth century in
Russia, which would set the Emperor and more especially
the Empress on one side, and place the little Tsarevitch
on the throne with a firm and wise regency supported
by national representation ; while others contemplated
a popular and complete revolution whence would spring
a new order of things strictly in accordance with their
opinions or their dreams. As I said above, both sides
abjured the word of command “no revolution in war-
time,” and to excuse this repudiation of a principle
agreed on, rumours, becoming daily more persistent,
were circulated of treachery to the cause of Russia and
the Allies contemplated by the Empress Alexandra,
Stiirmer e ¢uttt quanti.

_ In the course of this autumn of nightmares I was
surprised one day by a visit from Prince Nicolas of
Greece (married to the daughter of the Grand-Duchess
Vladimir), who was on his way through Germany
to Petrograd. The Prince, who omitted to explain
whether he had been summoned to the Russian Court
or at least formally authorised to go there, asked me to
viser his passports. During our conversation he did
not utter any categorical complaint of the doings of the
Allies in Greece, nor did he seek to justify the conduct of
his brother, King Constantine; nevertheless, I felt that
he had been sent by the latter to offer the King’s apology
to the Court of Tsarskoe and to explain to what extent
it would be difficult for Greece to place herself resolutely
on the side of the Entente and to declare war. After
having listened attentively to the Prince, I contented

1916] PRINCE NICOLAS OF GREECE 449

myself with recommending him not to lose sight of one
thing only, ze. that Greece had no enemies more bitter
and more irreconcilable than the Bulgarians, and that if
the Bulgarians got the best of the struggle which was
beginning in the south of the Balkans, Greece would
lose all the acquisitions purchased with Greek blood in
1912 and 1913. Prince Nicolas replied that he himself
was imbued with that idea.

I viséd the Prince’s passports, but I considered it
necessary to warn our Foreign Office that His High-
ness—as far as I could see—was being sent by King
Constantine to make his defence against the accusations
of our Allies.

A few weeks later Prince Nicolas, who in the mean-
time had been received at Tsarskoe and at Mohilev,
wrote to me from London to express his intense surprise
at my “behaviour” to him; for he knew from “reliable
sources” that I had represented him as an opponent of
the Entente and of Greece’s participation in the war. I
answered by return of post that the “reliable sources”
of which the Prince had availed himself were lying ones,
and that if I had held the opinion ascribed to me about
his sentiments, I should certainly not have hesitated to
tell him so quite frankly during our conversation in
Stockholm.

I realised without any effort that it was from our
Foreign Office—perhaps from M. Stiirmer himself—that
the Greek Prince had heard what he asserted in his
letter. And the proceeding did not surprise me in the
least.

I knew perfectly well that if the Stiirmer régime
continued I should sooner or latter have to give up my
post in Stockholm, and to retire from the service.

Already in May, 1916, two months before Sazonoff
retired, the Foreign Office had sent out a certain
M. E—— to work side by side with me as a super-
numerary counsellor. I was well aware that this gentle-
man, who was very intelligent, was the worst of

450 RUSSIA. IN DECEINE hea cHap. xen,

intriguers and had always sought to injure his chiefs or
his colleagues. I knew later that the idea of sending
M. E—— to Stockholm had come to several of the
leaders of the Foreign Office when the success of my
work in Sweden became accentuated. At any cost they
had to guard against the possible promotion of a man
so little liked in the departments of the Foreign Office
as I was. So I was given as associate an individual
who promised ¢o wrife from Stockholm, that is to say to
spy on my words and actions and to report them—
distorted of course—to correspondents eager for this
kind of information. In the present case these corre-
spondents were two officials in the Foreign Office who
played a somewhat important part in M. Sazonoff’s set,
and who remained under the same conditions with
M. Stiirmer.

As long as Sazonoff was Minister, I thought very
little of all this intrigue; moreover, it had not become
very apparent. But on Stiirmer’s appointment, M.
E——, who during his career had repeatedly professed
reactionary principles, felt certain of supplanting me;
he cast off all dissimulation, and spoke quite openly
about my approaching “dismissal” from Stockholm.
Towards. the middle of October rumours of the
approaching departure of Count Benckendorff from
London, and of M. Isvolsky from Paris, reached us from
Petrograd ; and a fortnight later I heard from several
well-informed quarters that I was going to leave
Stockholm without receiving any other post abroad.
M. Sttirmer had already chosen my successor; only it
was not M. E——. It was a gentleman quite as un-
worthy of esteem and adding to his other qualities that
of being a thorough good-for-nothing as regards his
knowledge and work.

Stiirmer’s retirement in November, 1916, put an end
to all these rumours, and to all these schemes. Anda
month later M. E——, implicated in a society scandal of
which he was the sorry and ridiculous hero, had to leave
not only Stockholm but also the service of the State.

1916] FALL OF STURMER 451

The fall of Stiirmer was due to intense public in-
dignation, and to the deep-rooted suspicions of our
Allies, who did not hide these suspicions either from
the Emperor himself, or from our generals and politicians.
In November, M. Miliukoff, in a speech at the Duma
which made a tremendous stir, enumerated one after
the other all the suspicious or obviously pernicious
deeds of the Prime Minister, putting in each case the
query: “Say now, is this madness, or is it treason?”
It has since been contended that the Russian Revolution
dated from this speech.

I have already quoted the words of M. Sazonoff about
the “band of malefactors” who ruled Russia under
Stiirmer and who, although priding themselves on the
designation of Conservatives and loyal Monarchists,
were disowned even by the most ardent reactionaries
when these reactionaries were honest men.

One of the Ministers of the Stiirmer Cabinet who
with his two brothers was amongst the pillars of the
ultra-Conservative party—M. Alexander Trepoff—be-
came the appropriate author of the resignation of the
Premier. The Emperor, whose choice had fallen on
Stiirmer because the latter was supposed to be Conser-
vative and Monarchist, was much affected by rumours
of “ Bochephile” intrigues which Russian public opinion
and that of the Allies ascribed to Stiirmer, and most
willing to get rid of this compromising Minister as soon
as he could replace him by such a universally recog-
nised Monarchist as Trepoff. Advantage was taken, from
different sides, of a rather longer stay made by His
Majesty at Mohilev without seeing the Empress, to
persuade him to exercise his authority, that is to say to
replace Stiirmer by Alexander Trepoff (Minister of
Ways and Communications). This was done very sud-
denly. I was told that the Empress was furious, but
she was powerless when once the deed was done.

Trepoff’s first care was to make a speech at the
Duma in order to reveal the political position of Russia
and to affirm in the most impressive way our unswerving

2G

452 RUSSIA IN DECLINE | [cuap. xxii.

loyalty to the Allies’ cause. This speech, which one felt
was perfectly frank, made the best impression at the
Duma as well as abroad. Nevertheless the Trepoff
Ministry could not succeed in calming the tremendous
ferment reigning in Russia. First there were the
colleagues of M. Trepoff: a certain Dobrovolsky,
appointed Minister of Justice, was more especially
known for his occult exploits—one knew that he had at
once become fersona grata with the Empress Alexandra,
for whose benefit he arranged spiritist sittings at
Tsarskoe; and then there was Protopopoff in parti-
cular, who was becoming every day more excited, more
enterprising and who did not in any way conceal his
ambition to play the leading part at Court and in the
Government.

And in view of such an unusual Ministry, the Duma
called loudly for the formation of a homogeneous Cabinet
responsible to national representation. The institution
of a responsible Cabinet became the watchword of all
parties, for all were now in the Opposition.

I have already alluded to the sensation caused in

the Russian Press in August, 1916, by the news of |

the meeting between M. Protopopoff and the German
Warburg in Stockholm; I have also related my conver-
sation with Protopopoff on the subject. During the
month of November this story reappeared in the Russian
Press and was vehemently discussed.

I learnt through this controversy, that towards the
middle of September, that is a fortnight after I had seen
him and received the assurance that his recollections
tallied perfectly with mine, Protopopoff, who was not yet
Home Secretary and who was combining his mandate
and his position at the Duma with the elective functions
of Marshal of the Nobility of the Government of
Simbirsk, went to Moscow for a meeting of Marshals of
the Nobility. And there he gave atruly fantastic version
of the famous Warburg incident : the meeting with War-
burg was supposed to have been arranged by Baron von

i ee ei es

1916] PROTOPOPOFF-WARBURG AFFAIR — 453

Lucius, German Minister to Stockholm; it was he him-
self who was to have come to talk to Protopopoff, but
on his way to the meeting-place he was supposed to
have sprained his ankle on the stairs and so had had to
send Warburg, the Counsellor to the Legation, in his
place ;—and soon. Protopopoff’s colleagues must have
listened open-mouthed to this strange confession. They
discussed it a great deal amongst themselves, then they
told their friends about it. Count D. Olsufieff, whose
reputation was involved, was obliged to intervene and
to set things right in the Press. This raised a fresh
controversy; Protopopoff himself, who was already
Minister, was appealed to; and he, with graceful ease,
gave each of his interviewers adifferent version. Mean-
while public opinion was vehemently taking note of the
whole incident, which seemed to prove the existence
of a combine between the Court, Protopopoff and the
Germans to bring about a separate peace between
Russia and Germany.

A few days after Stiirmer’s retirement I received a
telegram from the Director of the Foreign Office, telling
me that M. Protopopoff was supposed to have published
amongst other things that his interview in Stockholm
with Warburg had taken place not only with the consent
but at the express request of the Russian Minister. M.
Neratoff begged me to furnish all necessary information.

I replied that M. Protopopoff’s assertion was abso-
lutely untrue, and that if the Home Secretary did not
retract what he had said I was prepared to tender my
resignation.

That very day several of our parliamentarians were
in Stockholm on their way to Petrograd: M. Itchas,
Lithuanian member of the Duma; Baron Meyendorff,
ex-President of that assembly ; M. Zveguintzoff, member
by election of the Council of the Empire ; and some
others. I invited these gentlemen to come and see me;
I gave them all the details related in this book on Proto-
popoff’s stay in Stockholm and on his interview with
Warburg, and | begged them to contradict emphatically

454 RUSSIA’ IN ‘DECLINE #3 ficuar. xxu.

in my name amongst their colleagues the assertions of
the Home Secretary. I gave M. Itchas, who was leaving
first, a free hand to make my contradiction known at
once and in any way that he deemed best. He did so
almost on arrival in Petrograd in a letter published in
the Russian Press.

At the same time I wrote a letter to M. Neratoff in
which I reiterated that in the event of M. Protopopoff
wishing to uphold his assertions, I should insist on
being recalled, “for it was inadmissible that abroad
and in Russia herself any one could remain under the
impression that either a Russian statesman or a Russian
Minister in a foreign post could be a diay. In con-
sequence one of the two ought to retire or to be
dismissed.” !

Naturally I kept my allied colleagues informed of the
whole incident, and on this occasion they gave me all
their sympathy.

My letter to M. Neratoff crossed with M. Pokrovsky’s
appointment to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.
At first this appointment surprised a great many people.
Pokrovsky was held to have been an admirable Minister
of Finance; he had never concerned himself with
questions of foreign policy; he did all he could to
decline the post, but was forced to yield to the will of
the Emperor and the remonstrances of most of his
colleagues and of all honest men. Because, in spite of
his inexperience in diplomatic matters, M. Pokrovsky’s
reputation as far as intelligence, soundness of views
and uprightness of character were concerned, was so
firmly established that every one was enchanted to see
the foreign affairs of the country, above all its relations
with the Allies, in absolutely safe hands. At the
Economic Conference of the Allies which had just
taken place, this man, thoroughly versed in the matter,
calm, modest, and speaking French well—which facili-
tated intercourse with him tremendously—had pro-
duced the best impression. As far as I personally was

1 Quoted from memory.

fe RASPUTIN AGAIN 458

concerned, | was delighted to have once more as
Minister a man of honour and one whom I felt to be
sincerely disposed in my favour and in that of my
work in Sweden.

I no longer considered it necessary to insist on my
recall; moreover, M. Protopopoff had completely re-
linquished all discussion on the “ Warburg” case, and
the Russian public had also more or less forgotten it,
preoccupied as they were by other scandals, more
exciting and more closely connected with the daily life
of the capital.

During the month of December, 1916, the whole
attention of the Russian public was centred on what
was going on at “the Court of Tsarskoe,” that is, in the
Empress Alexandra’s environment, and on the person
of Rasputin.

Russian travellers, who had become more and more
numerous in Stockholm, told us that excitement had
overtaken all social circles in Petrograd, including
the Imperial Family itself. One heard that some
members of the family—notably the Grand-Duchess
Cyril! and an “ally” of the Imperial Family, Princess
Zenaida Yussupoff, who was universally esteemed—
had tried to persuade the Empress to change her en-
vironment, above all to send away “the good old man,”
to be better informed as to the frame of mind of the
country, as public opinion was exasperated against the
men in power—the Empress’s elect and intimate friends.
These ladies received the haughty answer that they did
not understand anything about the true frame of mind
of the country; that as they exclusively frequented the
aristocratic circles of the capital, they were entirely
ignorant of the opinion of the great mass of the
Orthodox people, of the poorer classes, of the peasants
—who would remain, as in the past, devoted to the
Emperor on condition that he protected them from
the exactions of the great, the politicians, etc. The

1 Sister of the Queen of Rumania.

456 RUSSIA IN DECLINE — [cuap. xxu1.

unfortunate Empress acquired this information from her
interviews with the moujik Rasputin, and from the notes
and telegrams which the organisers of the “hundred
Blacks” rained on Tsarskoe.

There were then many conferences in the bosom
of the Imperial Family, much coming and going of
Grand-Dukes and Grand-Duchesses. “The Grand-
Duke Nicolas Mikhailovitch dined with the Grand-
Duchess Vladimir,” wrote one of my correspondents to
me; “henceforth all is possible.” These august person-
ages—both of them particularly clever—had been at
variance all their lives; hence their reconciliation must
be the precursor of extraordinary events. “ We are
not living now, we are on fire,’ wrote another of my
friends from Petrograd, ‘sugar and sensational news—
panem et circenses—this is the cry that greets you on ail
sides.” That was the frivolous echo of the situation,
but there were also more serious echoes. A Russian
colleague told us of things he had heard straight from
the lips of the people. When he was returning to
Petrograd from his property in Voronezh he could
only find a seat in a third-class carriage; the compart-
ment was filled with well-to-do peasants: millers, rural
traders, etc., men who did not fail to cross themselves
each time the train passed a church. Many of them
were acquainted with the Jarime, and greeted him most
politely ; but, in no way constrained by his presence,
they continued their conversation on what was occur-
ring in Petrograd and at Court. Rasputin and the
Empress Alexandra were the chief topics of this con-
versation, and there were jokes, some truly filthy talk
and horse-laughs without end. Now, one might almost
bet that several of the speakers belonged to organisa-
tions called “ Monarchist,” or “true Russian,” and that
they had often signed those professions of devotion
of which Tsarskoe-Selo was so proud!

At last there was a thunder-clap which according to
the Russian public would purify the atmosphere, but
which only accelerated the dissolution of the régime,

S|

nm aot cs

gE

~> oo

1916 | MURDER OF RASPUTIN 457

and upset the unsteady equilibrium on which, neverthe-
less, the whole edifice of the State depended.

Towards the end of December, shortly before
Christmas, O.S., we learnt through the newspapers of
the assassination of Rasputin, effected in the Yussupoff
Palace, and the triumphant joy with which this deed
had been received by the entire Russian public, without
distinction of parties. As soon as the news had
spread in Petrograd there was loud jubilation; in the
theatres the National Anthem was played and sung; if
it had been possible thanksgiving-services would have
been held in the churches. The names of the principal
authors of the deed were on every one’s lips; these
were: the Grand-Duke Dmitri (son of the Grand-Duke
Paul); Count Felix Sumarokoff-Elston,' son-in-law of
one of the Emperor’s sisters; and M. Poushkévitch,
the hot-headed deputy of the Monarchist extreme Right
of the Duma—a sort of Russian Paul de Cassagnac—
whose sallies, violent outbursts, and offensive invectives
hurled at the Liberals had formerly filled the scandal-
records of the Assembly. Becoming wiser and enrolled
in the “sacred union” since the beginning of the war, he
had devoted himself to a most successful organisation
of Russian baths and of canteens for supplying the
front in special trains ad hoc.

But a few days later other news had come to trouble
all minds again: the Emperor summoned post-haste
from G.H.Q.; thorough search, by his orders, for Ras-
putin’s body, which was found under the ice on the
Neva; funeral given by the Emperor and Empress to
these odious remains ; the arrest and banishment to the
army operating in Persia of the Grand-Duke Dmitri;
the appeal against this sentence, signed by the whole
of the Imperial Family, headed by Queen Olga of
Greece (grandmother of the delinquent); the removal of

1 Son of the Princess Zenaida Yussupoff mentioned above, and sole
heir to the enormous fortune of the Yussupoffs. Count Sumarokoff-
Elston got his name from his father. The young man might have chosen
some other place than his mother’s palace in which to play Lorenzaccio !

458 RUSSIA IN DECLINE _ f[enap. xxi.

the Grand-Duke Nicolas Mikhailovitch to his property
in the south of Russia. The public scandal grew from
day to day.

Then there was the resignation of Trepoff and the
appointment of Prince Nicolas D. Galitzin (I mentioned
him before) as Prime Minister—an absolutely unexpected
appointment, which could only be explained by the
personal wish of the Empress. However, with regard
to this appointment, every one realised that henceforth
the principal part in the Government would be played
by Protopopoff, who was becoming more and more
excited, and heaping folly on blunder and blunder on
want of tact. He arrived at the Duma in the military
uniform of the “head of the police,” a costume to which
he had a vague right as Home Secretary, but which
none of the most “ police-like” of his predecessors had
ever donned. In town every one was saying that he
had convinced the Empress that Rasputin’s soul was
reincarnated in him; consequently he indulged in
prophecies and extravaganzas which deeply impressed
the exalted personages to whom they were addressed.

I do not know to what extent these tales were true.
I only know from experience of one fact which would
appear to corroborate them. Just at that time a kind
of American spiritist appeared repeatedly at our
Stockholm Legation, clamouring to have his pass-
ports for Petrograd viséd, the Consul-General not con-
sidering his position quite in order. The American
boasted of the protection of M. Protopopoff, who, he
said, was impatiently awaiting him. To confirm his
words he showed us some telegrams from his powerful
protector, who was actually inviting him to come. |
caused inquiries to be made about this individual by
the police of my allied colleagues; it was discovered
—as moreover was to be expected—that the said
American was a German who quite recently had
become an American citizen, that he passed himself off
aS a spiritist, mesmerist, medium, and I know not
what besides, but that he was strongly suspected of

1916-1917] AN AMERICAN SPIRITIST 450

being merely a Boche agent. Upon this, I received a
telegram from M. Protopopoff himself—a telegram
couched in the most friendly terms—asking me “as
a personal service” to wiser the passports of the
American. Then I got angry and I wrote immedi-
ately to the Foreign Office to relate the story of the
“American,” and to have it brought to the notice of
our military police at Torneo, in case—our refusal not-
withstanding—the “astral body of the medium should
wish to cross the frontier provided with a passport
issued by the spirit of the late Rasputin.” Well, a
fortnight later the American came again to the Legation,
bringing a fresh telegram from Protopopoff, in which
the Minister expressed his keen regret at not being able
at once to summon the spiritist to him, in order to
profit by his excellent “advice,” but hoping that this
would soon be possible. Obviously this was madness.

The reader may perhaps be wondering what had
happened to politics in all this, and what Russia’s
relations to Sweden were during these months. My
answer is that no one thought or concerned themselves
about those matters now. The Swedes themselves
appeared to consider all that was occurring in Russia
to be so serious and big with immediate consequences
that all steps and all action could and should be avoided
until the internal crisis which was upheaving the mighty
adjacent Empire had been settled in some way or other.
In Stockholm there was some information coming from
Swedish sources and from German sources which repre-
sented the position in Russia as excessively precarious.
However, for a short time my attention was diverted
from my worries with regard to the internal affairs of
my country by an entirely unlooked-for incident or
rather apparition.

One morning towards the middle of January I was
rung up on thetelephone. A voice asked me in Russian
if I was really M. Nekludoff? “ Yes, it is 1; who is it
speaking?” “I am Rizov, the Bulgarian Minister to

460 RUSSIA IN DECLINE | [cuap. xxi.

Berlin; I want very much to talk to you. Could you
receive me, and when?” I took a few minutes to
recover from my surprise and to think out my answer ;
then I said that I could not tell him before mid-day ;
that at twelve o'clock he might ring me up again to
know my decision.

I at once summoned my English, French and Italian
colleagues and submitted the case to them: should I
receive Rizov or not? M. Tommasini was the only
one of my three colleagues who knew Rizov; but he
knew him through and through. Between us we
arrived at the following conclusions : Rizov’s presence in
Stockholm and the step he was taking must be perfectly
well known in Berlin; it was even possible that Rizov
had telephoned to me from Baron von Lucius’ house,
Nevertheless it would be as well for me to receive
Rizov, if only to see what he was after. Consequently,
when Rizov rang me up at noon, I said that I would
receive him at two o’clock.

Punctually at two o’clock Rizov was shown into my
study. I did not put out my hand to him, but I begged
him to be seated and offered him a cigarette. ‘ What
is the object of your visit, M. Rizov?” I asked after a
minute of mutual silence. Somewhat abashed by my
frigid reception, my visitor began to speak with obvious
embarrassment. Hesaid that the step he was taking was
entirely of a private nature, that he was coming to me
to tell me of political opinions and combinations which
were within the sphere of his personal convictions ;
and that he was in a position to know—having recently
visited Sofia—that the opinions of the Bulgarian
Government concurred on all points with his. Here I
interrupted him: ‘“ Tell me, M. Rizov, is this proceeding
of yours known to Berlin? It seems to me impossible
that it should not be, and that Baron von Lucius should
not know exactly why you have come to Stockholm.”
“No,” was the reply, “I have not confided this matter
to the German Government. The avowed object of
of my journey has been to form closer commercial and

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1917] MY INTERVIEW WITH RIZOV 461

political relations with the Scandinavian countries than
have existed up to now; also at the present time we
are in need of many commodities which Sweden alone
can supply; I am going from here to Christiania; I
have just come from Copenhagen ; I am travelling under
an assumed name and they do not even know my
address at the German Legation.” I looked at the
speaker with such an obviously incredulous expression
on my face that he began to stammer and to become
confused; then he resumed his political thesis.
He said absolutely nothing definite; his opinion was
that the present war between Bulgaria and Russia
was an absolutely abnormal thing which ought to
end as quickly as possible. The Bulgarians had had
(I am still quoting Rizov) plausible reasons to bear
malice against official Russia; but in their hearts they
nursed unalterable sympathy for the Russian people ;
it was a question of both sides facilitating a recon-
ciliation; would not this be the moment to begin
entirely confidential conversations which might end in
actual negotiations?

While Rizov was retailing al! this I kept completely
silent, always in expectation of some concrete sugges-
tion which did not come. At last, disconcerted by my
silence and my expression, Rizov stopped and after a
short pause said: ‘Could I hope, Monsieur, that you
will transmit to Petrograd all that I have just told you?”
“Listen to me, M. Rizov,” was my reply; “you have
been in the diplomatic service long enough to understand
that it is my duty to inform M. Pokrovsky of your
visit and of all that I have heard from you; only I wish
to warn you that I shall not add any personal opinion
thereto.” “ But may I hope that in Petrograd they will
attach to my proceeding the significance it deserves, and
that they will send me an answer through you?” “Ah!
as to that,” I replied, ‘I can make no promises what-
ever. You yourself informed me that this proceeding
of yours is a personal one. Now, however interesting
the opinions and words of M. Rizov may be, it is

462 RUSSIA IN DECLINE™ © {cuHar. xxut,

possible that in our country it may not be considered
necessary to reply to them. It is, however, more than
likely that I shall receive some answer to the telegram
which I shall send off this very day.” ‘May I hope
for this answer within the next four days, for I am due
in Christiania then, and could not defer my departure
beyondthat?” “Ohno! I could not possibly guarantee
such a prompt answer—if answer there be!” “Then
will you inform me on the telephone on Tuesday if the
answer from Petrograd has come? My number is.. .”
“No, M. Rizov, I shall not telephone to you; you may
telephone to me a few hours before your departure for
Christiania and I will answer if I have anything to tell
you.” Rizov got upto go. “I see,” hesaid, “that you
will not pay attention to what I have told you, nor will
you speak openly with me. Sutin a month, a month and
a half at latest, events will occur after which I feel sure that
on the Russian side they will be more disposed to talk with us.
Perhaps you will see me again then.”

That evening I sent Pokrovsky atelegram in which I
related my whole conversation with Rizov and the
opinion of my allied colleagues on the subject of this
step taken by the Bulgarian Minister to Berlin. I
added that if those in Sofia really did wish to enter into
negotiations, Rizov—by virtue of his present position
and all his antecedents—would be the person the least
qualified to inspire confidence in us. In that case it
would only be interesting and profitable to speak with
influential Bulgarian generals or with their mouthpieces ;
and as the two armies were face to face on the Lower
Danube, it would be quite easy for the Bulgarians to
arrange an interview with us there.

Four days later, Rizov rang me up on the telephone.
“Have you received an answer, Monsieur?” “No, not
yet.” “In that case I cannot wait any longer. I am
leaving for Christiania this evening. Only I have one
more request to make to you: I[ trust that my proceeding
is not known to the representatives of your Allies.”
“Listen, Rizov,” I interrupted; “I avoid all such

1917 | RIZOV’S PROPHECY FULFILLED 463

conversations on the telephone. We may be overheard.
I wish you good-bye. S/ut/”!and I replaced the receiver.

Two days after Rizov’s departure I received a tele-
gram from the Foreign Office instructing me—in the
event of another visit from Rizov—to listen attentively
to him and to endeavour to make him formulate more
definite propositions ; the same instructions were being
issued to my colleague in Christiania.

I heard later that my colleague—it was M.
Gulkevitch—in accordance with these instructions, had
more pregnant conversations with M. Rizov than mine
had been. But these conversations ended in nothing.?
Rizov, who appeared to be in good health when he
came to see me in Stockholm, died suddenly very soon
afterwards.

When the Russian Revolution had broken out and
was in full swing, I recalled the words uttered by Rizov
as he was leaving my study in Stockholm: ‘in a month,
a month and a half at latest, events will occur after
which I feel sure that on the Russian side they will be
more disposed to talk with us.” Hence Rizov had
accurately foreseen our revolution. Now, he,came from
Berlin, and the steps taken with regard to us had in all
probability been suggested to him by German diplomacy,
and the German General Staff. And in my eyes this
constitutes one more proof that our revolution had one
of its main sources in German action. The wires of this
political cataclysm converged in Berlin, and there they
‘calculated in January, 1917, with remarkable accuracy,
even the day on which the skilfully laid mine would
explode.

1 Finis !

* The Zimes published in its issue of the 4th October, 1918, an article
relating the episode of negotiations which were supposed to have taken
place between Rizov and some Russian representatives in Christiania
and in Stockholm. 1 hastened to correct, in a letter written from Nice
to the Editor of the Zzmes, the account in this newspaper, as far as 1
personally and Stockholm were concerned. Unfortunately the Zzmes
did not think it possible to publish my correction, alleging as an excuse
the forced economy—“ in these days ”—of paper.

464 RUSSIA IN DECLINE [cHap. XXII.

What had passed in the sphere of international
politics, and in Sweden in particular, during the six
weeks which preceded the Russian Revolution? To
tell the truth [ have no recollection, There are spaces
of time before great historic events which appear to
one’s memory later as blank spaces, like those minutes
of deadly calm preceding the first violent gust of wind
and the first clap of thunder of a mighty storm. This
must come from an illusion of “retrospective vision” ;
the events themselves are so colossal that anything that
immediately preceded them seems insignificant, and
vanishes from one’s memory.

I remember that the season was beautiful in Stock-
holm ; bright sunshine, dazzling snow, moderate frosts,
beautiful blue sky, the town enlivened by winter sports
and a busy life of pleasure. The Russian birds of passage
were more numerous than ever. Some had merely
come to rest and divert themselves in this pleasant
atmosphere, and under this kindly sky, after the icy fogs
of Petrograd and the political nightmare which was
oppressing every one.

I remember taking luncheon in the sunlit dining-
room of the Grand Hotel with an agreeable and witty
compatriot who was in Stockholm for the third time,
nominally for political meetings, but really and above
all to amuse himself. He was an elected member of the
Council of the Empire who formerly had had a brief
moment of fame. Always a Liberal, and airing the
most independent views in the salons of Petrograd, he
was, at the time of the first Duma, one of the three or
four courageous people who, without abjuring their
political convictions, yet opposed the outbursts of the
assembly and founded a sympathetic—though later on ab-
solutely colourless—party called ‘the pacific renovation.”
Years had gone by since then, and my friend, older,
stouter, and more or less ruined, had passed from the
Duma into the ranks of the elected members of the
Council of the Empire; had had to accept a post on
the board of directors of a large banking business, a

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1917] A GREAT ILLUSION 465

post which enabled him to have his customary good
time; and, somewhat unnoticed in the legislative
assembly that sheltered him, was mainly occupied in
finding an audience amongst the young and pretty
society women of Petrograd, to whom he still preached,
in a deep and musical voice, generous ideas of political
liberty and of sympathy towards the humble.

We had got to the cheese, and the second bottle of
excellent claret (of which a few drops were still glisten-
ing in the flowing beard of my amiable messmate) was
open beside him, when he, with heightened colour and
animated as usual towards the end of a good meal, leant
towards me and said, continuing the conversation on
current events: “Ah, well, no, my dear Nekludoff,
latterly we all have arrived at the conclusion that there
is no possible remedy for the situation as long as the
Emperor Nicolas II. is at the head of Russia. At the
present time every one is decidedly turning against him.
It is absolutely necessary that “e should go. The rest
would then be quite easy.”

This confidence impressed me at first, but on
mature reflection I only attached slight importance to
it. What does one not say after a good luncheon and
two bottles of good wine? And besides who were
these “we” who had decided on the downfall of the
Sovereign? If they were recruited from amongst the
same good fellows—friends of the musical world, and of
charming dancers, of good cheer and unconstrained
gossip—the Emperor could sleep peacefully.

Infinitely more alarming echoes reached me. In the
Caucasus big parties of armed “brigands” were begin-
ning to overrun the country and terrorise whole districts.
On the Russian north-western front, one had signalled a
clandestine revolutionary propaganda, which was gaining
more and more adherents among the soldiers. The
Government of Petrograd was beginning to take police
measures, now in one town, now in another, against
clandestine organisations of workmen. It was always
the same measures, despotic but inadequate: nocturnal

466 RUSSIA IN DECLINE _ [cuap. xxm.

perquisitions, arrests of prominent leaders, incarcera-
tions, internments in the northern provinces. Persons
who were at the head of the ‘organisations of the
Zemstvo and of the towns to assure military supplies,”
protested against these measures, which embittered the
working-class circles with whom they had to do business,
As usual both parties were in the wrong: the former
because their police measures displeased every one
without stopping anything; the latter because they did
not see that the mass of the people, the workmen
especially, were being worked by clever agents, well
guided and supplied with enormous sums of money in
order to stir up a revolution at all costs, and to make
Russia powerless against the external foe.

On Saturday, the roth March, some telegrams ap-
peared in the Swedish newspapers announcing that
some workmen’s demonstrations—peaceful ones, how-
ever—had taken place in the streets of Petrograd.
Simultaneously the news arrived that the Government
was going to prorogue the Duma sime die. On Monday,
the 12th, in the morning, the representative of our
telegraphic agency rushed in to see me to announce
that the newspapers were going to publish the news
that on Saturday night there had been fighting in the
streets of Petrograd, and that there had been masses
of victims ; this news had come from Haparanda, brought
by a Swede who had been an eye-witness. The repre-
sentative requested my permission to contradict it. “Do
not do so,’ I said, “let us wait for the evening news.”
Inthe evening we did receive news of rather serious dis-
orders having taken place in the Russian capital. And
by Tuesday telegraphic communication with Russia was
cut off. Things were decidedly becoming serious.

And then, one after another, between Wednesday,
the 14th, and Friday, the 16th, consecutive news of all
the events in Petrograd reached us: street fighting;
the reserve regiments of the Guard going over to the
side of the people; the Duma refusing to dissolve—like
the Tiers Etat formerly in the Hall of the Jeu de Paume;

1917] REVOLUTION BREAKS OUT 467

the regiments arriving to guard the representatives of the
people, and acclaiming the President of the Duma, who
congratulates them; the Grand-Duke Cyril being the
first to bring his seamen of the crew of the Guard;
the last strongholds of the police taken by the people
armed; finally the Emperor abdicating for himself and
for his son, and passing his crown on to his brother the
Grand-Duke Michael. A Provisional Government was
being installed, at the head of which names as universally
respected as those of Prince Lvoff, Miliukoff, Rodzianko,
Gutchkoff, were allied to those of a few revolutionary
Socialists such as Kerensky, Tseretelli, Tchkeidze, etc.
The entire town appeared to be given over to festivity,
and all the towns of Russia, and all the heads of the
armies gave their adherence, their homage of fidelity,
their spontaneous admiration to the new Government!
One really thought one must be dreaming. But news
continued to pour in, one bit confirming the other,
arriving from all corners of allied Europe; and all spoke
ecstatically of the generosity of the people in the struggle,
of their moderation in victory, of the unanimity of
public feeling. No revolution had ever been so easy, or
so glorious ; one could be proud of being Russian!

And all that contrasted in such a striking manner
with the humiliations, so bitterly felt, of the closing
months of the disastrous former régime. Patriotic
feeling beat in unison with generous sentiments of
liberty and justice. The country was saved, victory
definitely assured!

Such were the quite sincere illusions of the enor-
mous majority of Russians living abroad during the
weeks succeeding the triumph of the Revolution of
Petrograd.

When I received the telegram from the official agency
announcing the abdication of the Emperor in favour of
his brother; the refusal of the latter to accept power
otherwise than from a constituent assembly; and the
formation of a responsible Ministry under the pre-

sidency of Prince Lvoff, appointed to this post by
2H

468 RUSSIA IN, DECLINE [CHAP. XXIII.

the Emperor himself on the eve of his abdication, then
all the doubts I could have entertained as to the
legitimacy of the new régime and the Provisional
Government were dispelled; and it was with genuine
satisfaction that I sent a telegram on Friday, the 16th
March, to M. Miliukoff, the new Minister for Foreign
Affairs, announcing my complete and sincere adherence
to the Provisional Government.

CHAPTER XXIV
REVOLUTION

TRAVELLERS who have been to India tell strange tales
about the phenomena which certain fakirs can produce.
Although meeting these tales with a strong dose of
scepticism, yet one cannot reject wholesale the evidence
of so many honourable people; the illusive “ex-
periences” of the fakirs have been really seen and
observed by serious-minded and truthful people; and
it is only when one submits these phenomena to a
strictly scientific inspection and analysis that the illusion
vanishes. But then how is this illusion to be explained ?
One theory which seems extremely sound, holds that the
fakir acts on the spectator, now by auto-suggestion,
now by the use of some process of a physical nature.
The Indian accomplishes nothing supernatural; at the
most he indulges in some sleight-of-hand; but the
spectator, swayed by suggestion or else under the
influence of subtle intoxication, believes he sees all that
the fakir wishes him to see, and then tells the tale in
all good faith.

Exactly in the same way do I explain, at the present
time, the impression produced on the world at large,
except in the camp of our enemies, by the Russian
Revolution.

In the first place this revolution was desired and
called for by the conscience of the whole of the West.
There they knew that the Russian people were deprived
of those primary rights which by now have become
indispensable to every European. This idea was often
exaggerated; ancient prejudices, old political grudges

i 469

470 REVOLUTION [ CHAP. XXIV.

side by side with clever and tenacious modern propa-
ganda had fixed in Western mentality the picture of a
Russia in which absolute and despotic power, an
aristocracy of the Court, a class of employés who were
all concessionaries, uneducated clergy, all weighed on
the existence of the country, oppressing, exploiting,
purposely brutalising the people in town and country,
persecuting and exiling to the frozen deserts of Siberia
all people whose hearts were in the right place, above
all, those young people who dreamt of better conditions
for their country. “ 7sarism” was the monster against
which all upright consciences ought to revolt, against
which loud appeals were made to the whole of European
public opinion. And yet within the last few years, first
France, then England and finally, since the war, Italy
and Belgium, had concluded a close alliance with this
same Tsarist Russia, with this same criminal Govern-
ment. In the columns of one and the same newspaper
one could read flattery addressed to the Tsar, impre-
cations against the governmental system of Russia,
dithyrambs on the might of the allied Empire and
lamentations over the fate of the victims to its odious
régime. The public conscience of the West must in
the long run have felt the anomaly, I would even say
the indignity, of such proceedings. The Russian
Revolution occurred in the nick of time to set every-
thing right : Russia, so absolutely indispensable to the
welfare of Europe, had herself thrown off her fetters ;
there was no longer any need to use humiliating
circumspection towards a thoroughly detested régime ;
one remained closely bound to the Russian people and
all the more loyal to the principles and aspirations of
liberty and integral democracy. Truly a considerable
relief to one’s conscience !

Then it must be borne in mind that during the
few months preceding the Revolution, skilfully cir-
culated rumours represented the existing régime as
won over to German influence and striving for peace.
The tremendous mistakes of the Government, the

SS —

Lo po!

1917] ILLUSIONS Art

odious choice of persons whom the Emperor placed in
power and who could not inspire any confidence, gave
credence to these suspicions and fears in Russian
public opinion itself; towards the end of 1916 every one
believed them more or less. The Revolution came just
in time to scatter all this dreaded accumulation of Court
intrigues. It gave the Russian people a free hand for
the carrying out of their most cherished schemes which
were—the continuation of the fight to a finish with
Germany and the complete victory of the Allies!
Consequently the latter were at once delivered from
the agonising nightmare of Russia’s possible defection.

Finally Russian military action would derive fresh
life from the renovation of the country, final victory
would be considerably hastened, and in this victory
itself there would no longer be any fear of the transports
of ambition and pride of an autocratic ally and the
extension of a régime of oppression over a fresh portion
of Europe.

Such was the point of view of our Western Allies
which was shared by Russian public opinion. In our
country, what is more, every one had been so justly
displeased with the Government, so deeply humiliated
by what was occurring at Court that a change was
prayed for on all sides ; and when this complete change
occurred in consequence of the days of the roth to the
15th March all thinking Russia, beginning with the
best balanced elements, thought in all good faith that
it was they who had brought about the Revolution
because they had desired it so ardently.

Hence one can hardly wonder that all that occurred
in Petrograd during those memorable days should
have assumed a dazzling, glorious and triumphant
appearance in the eyes of the whole world. Spon-
taneous enthusiasm appeared to have seized all the
inhabitants of the capital; every one fraternised; from
Moscow, the provinces, and finally from all the armies
enthusiastic adherents arrived. The Novoye Vremya
wrote articles worthy of the Pére Duchesne, and M.

472 REVOLUTION [ CHAP. XXIV.

Rodzianko presided, with fine gestures, over the civil
burial of the noble victims of the splendid March days—
an imposing and brilliant apotheosis of this unique
Revolution, in which the people displayed truly admir-
able moderation, discipline and mildness.

A Monarchist or counter-revolutionary current? No,
that did not exist; that had never existed. A few re-
actionaries still considered dangerous and the members
of the last Government, it is true, were arrested and took
the place in the cells of the Peter and Paul fortress of
the martyrs to liberty triumphantly set free. But even
these reactionaries and these fallen Ministers were in no
way opposed to the new principles; from their prison
they appealed to the Provisional Government and to the
Press, assuring them that they had always been friends
to liberty, that all that had happened was but a mis-
understanding and that they were prepared to serve the
people with the same devotion with which they had
formerly served the Monarch. In short every one was
of one mind, every one rejoiced, every one fraternised,
and what is more, amongst a large majority these senti-
ments—at first anyhow—were absolutely genuine. And
this frame of mind spread to foreign parts and returned
thence enlarged and developed to increase Russian
enthusiasm still more.

The fakir having shut up a child in his basket had
stabbed it repeatedly through the wicker-work with a
sword; piercing shrieks had been heard and streams of
blood seen; and when the magician opened the basket it
was full of roses. Innumerable white mice, coming out
of the operator’s hand, mounted an upright pole in a
spiral curve and disappeared one by one into the blue
sky. Finally a silken ladder, thrown with a skilful
movement, suspended itself im ¢he air and the fakir
ascended it—immaterialised and triumphant!

We existed in Stockholm for a fortnight under the
spell of these admirable illusions. But gradually, alas!
the deceptive vapour began to disperse and things

Pm oe J

—“oo so S| Mo

ee ee Se ee

1917] A DANISH EYE-WITNESS 473

appeared in their true light, that is to say with their
repulsive sides and their very real threats.

About a week after the Emperor’s abdication I
received a visit from an eminent member of the Danish
Red Cross who was returning from Petrograd and
who had been an eye-witness of all that had happened.
Amongst other things he told me that on the morning of
Tuesday, the 13th, summoned to Tsarskoe-Selo to be
presented to the Empress Alexandra, he had had the
greatest difficulty in reaching the Tsarskoe station on
foot. The rioters appeared to have got the upper hand
since the day before, and on his way sharp firing had
begun round the barracks of the Semenovsky regiment.
When he arrived at Tsarskoe and into the Empress’s
presence he did not conceal from her what he had just
seen. The Empress listened in silence and without
betraying the slightest emotion, then she passed on to
the object of the audience, talked with animation for
more than an hour on subjects relative to the Danish
gentleman’s mission to Russia, went over plans for huts
and accounts with him and dismissed him gracefully.
The very next day in this same palace she and her
children were the prisoners of the rebel soldiers of
the Tsarskoe garrison !

Well, this same Dane, having in his detailed account
mentioned the murder of several officers of the
Pavlovsky regiment (committed on Sunday or Monday
night), I asked him with surprise: “Then there were
some officers murdered after all?” ‘But of course, did
you think a revolution could occur without? But when
I left Petrograd all recollection of these sanguinary
scenes was effaced; officers and men, military and
civilians were all one.” Other eye-witnesses made
me realise that in any case the revolutionary days had
not been so free from massacre and cruelty as I had
imagined, relying on telegrams from agencies and
newspaper articles.

Finally towards the end of March a distinguished
compatriot of mine passed through Stockholm on his

474 REVOLUTION [CHAP. XXIV.

way to England. Eminent professor at the University
of Moscow and enlightened jurist, he had had, some time
back, to give up teaching because of difficulties raised
for him by the Board of Education, which was intensely
reactionary. His merits gained him a Chair in one of
the oldest and most celebrated universities in Europe.
He had continued to keep up close relations in Russia
with the heads of the cadet party (constitutional-demo-
cratic), particularly with Miliukoff, Golovin, and Kokoch-
kin. It would seem as if he ought.to have been pleased
at the downfall of the old régime and at the favourable
turn that the Revolution had taken. Nevertheless he
wore a worried look when he came to see me. To my
questions, imbued with that enthusiasm which we were
still feeling in Stockholm, he replied with a reticence that
surprised me. At last, as we were going into luncheon
(to which I had invited him), he said: “It would take
too long to explain everything to you just now; I will
do so later; meanwhile to sum up: there will infallibly
be some Journées de Juin in Russia, which would be very
sad, but if these days do not come it will be still worse:
Russia will be done for. Do you understand me?”
“Of course I understand you! But how truly grievous
ifist?

After luncheon my guest added a few details to the
brief prognostication he had made before. The Duma
virtually dissolved and its premises invaded by the
“Council of the deputies, by soldiers and workmen”; the
Petrograd garrison increased by all the garrisons of
the neighbouring towns and so to speak administering
the law to the Government; in the Government itself
—the Socialists and Labour members with Kerensky at
their head trying to seize on the real power. I rapidly
dropped down from the clouds. But a few days later,
through the tales of compatriots passing through
Stockholm in greater numbers than ever and through
what I could read between the lines in the newspapers,
I was able to form a clear idea of what had really
occurred.

1917] FIRST ALARMING REVELATIONS = 475

In the first place the Revolution had been infinitely
more bloody than any one would acknowledge: ali the
men of the police force, even those who had not taken
any part whatever in the repression of the first riots,
were massacred in the most brutal way; there’ were
savage hunts through the streets followed by ghastly
scenes. Many officers and generals were killed long
after the Revolution had triumphed without any motive,
merely to gratify the whim of a band of demoniacs or of
an armed and drunken soldier.

It was not only the cells of political culprits which
were thrown open by thetriumphant people. All prison
doors had been broken open and all the criminals of the
worst order infested the capital dressed as soldiers and
mingling freely with them.

And horrible news—suppressed for some time—
came through at last as to what had taken place in the
Fleet at Cronstadt and then at Helsingfors: admirals
treacherously and cruelly assassinated, officers martyred
—a hell of blood and heinous tortures. And finally
Cronstadt and the Fleet forming themselves into a re-
public of savages, with which the Government had to
treat at every turn!

What also made me very anxious—on account of the
actual fact and as a symptom—was the fate reserved for
the Emperor and his near relations. According to the
terms of the parleys which had preceded the abdication,
the Emperor and his family had full liberty to establish
themselves in the Crimea or in some other residence far
removed from capitals and all political intrigue. A few
days later, one heard that the Provisional Government
had decided to make them merely leave Russia, that an
arrangement ad hoc had been made with London, and
that ‘they were to goby Murman. But days and weeks
went by and the Emperor and his family were still
prisoners in their Palace of Tsarskoe, exposed to the
offensive curiosity of the crowd and to insults of all
kinds from their guardians. It became clear that the
famous “ Soviet” was against the removal of the unhappy

476 REVOLUTION [CHAP. XxIV.

family, wishing to keep them as hostages; and I
realised perfectly well that if men like Rodzianko,
Gutchkoff, Prince Lvoff, Miliukoff and Schingareff
tolerated this base deed and this breach of their pledged
word, it was because they were absolutely powerless to
object; in other words all authority was entirely
escaping from the Government, or at least from the sane
section of it.

But this was by no means all. I remember one
morning on which our military attaché came in like a
whirlwind, his face crimson with emotion, his eyes
starting out of his head. “Have you seen this,
Monsieur ?” and he handed me the famous Prikase No 1,}
settling the new rights of the Russian soldier. “Yes,
I have just read a short summary of it in the Swedish
newspapers of yesterday. It appeared to me to be a
little too liberal, especially in war-time: there are
always some exaggerations at such times. Yet you
must admit that it was high time to replace the absurd
discipline imitated from the Prussians which prevailed
in our Army by discipline similar to that of the French
or the British?” “Ah! but no, Monsieur! do read the
prikase itself; read it carefully.” Itook it from the hand
of my colleague and as I read and was given the needful
explanations by the Colonel, I became more and more
aghast. “It is madness!” I said when I had finished.
“Yes, it is madness! but above all it means the end of
the war for us. In the state in which our troops will be
after a few weeks of such proceedings it will be im-
possible to take them into the fighting lines. Ina few
months we shall no longer exist for our allies.” I
could find nothing to oppose to this mournful verdict
except the expression of a few vague hopes to which
I clung.

It became perfectly clear that the origin of the
Revolution had been quite different from what had been
supposed. While the members of the Imperial Family

1 Or of the day of the Army.

1917 | ORIGIN OF THE MARCH DAYS 477

were becoming alarmed aud holding meetings, while the
heads of the Liberal parties were conferring, while the
public was getting exasperated, the German agents
working amongst the labouring classes, and the real
leaders of these classes—extreme Socialists and Labour
members—were acting.

A scene which occurred at the Duma shortly before
the Revolution had caused much comment: the orators
of all the parties having in turn attacked the Government
and demanded explanations, the new President of the
Council, the aged and correct Prince Galitzyn, at last
decided to ascend the tribune and make a so-called
declaration, but it was weak, toneless, meaningless.
Then one of the extreme Socialists, Tchkeidze, jumped
on to the tribune and in a few words ridiculed the
declaration and rejected it. ‘We are still displaying
patience ; we have entreated the Government to speak
out, to dispel the doubts and suspicions that its actions
are raising all over thecountry. And now ‘an old man’
(odine starik) ascends the tribune and... tells us
nothing at all. Take care!” continued the orator,
making a threatening gesture towards poor Prince
Galitzyn, “you will repent, but it will be too late!”
The specifically Caucasian accent of Tchkeidze and the
expression “old man” applied to Galitzyn roused the
laughter of the assembly, and the Government was once
more made to look ridiculous. It was a duel to the death
which was beginning between the police power of the
Empire and the extreme revolutionaries. Protopopoff,
daily becoming madder, accepting the challenge and
taking all measures to provoke the outbreak of disorder
in the capital as quickly as possible, was at the same
time organising the most energetic repression which,
according to him, could only end in the complete
triumph of the Government. The revolutionary leaders,
absolutely sure of the working population, hoping much
also from certain military elements, and counting on the
neutrality at least of the educated classes and of the
majority of the officials, the revolutionary leaders, I say,

478 REVOLUTION [CHAP. XXIV.

and the German agents on their side hastened the out-
break of the riot. The victory of the Revolution was, at
the vital moment, brought about by some of the reserve
regiments of the Guard going over to the rioters; these
regiments having been recruited—in defiance of the rules
strictly observed up till 1916—a few months before the
Revolution from amongst the working classes of the capital.
Naturally, the men of these regiments, not yet inured
to discipline and commanded by young officers who
themselves were novices, ended by going over to the
side of their brothers and comrades.

From that moment, Petrograd was entirely at the
mercy of a soldiery drunk with success, with the
flattery lavished on it and with the alcohol seized on at
every opportunity. M. Alexander Gutchkoff, the new
Minister of War (the first civilian in this réle that
Russia has ever seen), was loudly clapped when with his
own hands he pinned “la croix des braves” on the
breast of the first soldier who had had the courage to kill
his officer by shooting him in the back. This same
Gutchkoff was scouted, reviled and dismissed, when he
wished to take measures to dispatch gradually to the
front the useless surplus of the garrison of Petro-
grad. The Government had to give in and to promise
that all these soldiers should remain in the capital as
recognised guardians of popular rights and of the
Revolution. On that day the Provisional Government
signed its own death-warrant.

Since then the Soviets and those who were secretly direct-
ing them, i.e. the German agents, had become the actual
masters of Russia. All those who had greeted the fall
of the Tsarinian régime with enthusiasm, and who from
the very first adopted the cause of the Revolution; all
those who rallied to it to increase the number of sane
elements, this entire coalition of the best intellectual
forces of the country whence came the majority of the
Provisional Government; all these men, I say, found
themselves from the outset on the edge of the real power.
All the actual power was exclusively in the hands of the

1917 | THE SOVIETS SUPREME 479

Soviets. Even the hot-headed and obstructive Kerensky
and his acolytes had no real voice in the matter; they
possessed influence in so far as they obeyed the Soviets.

And then a dramatic dialogue began between the so-
called Government and the so-called “ People,” the like
of which history has never yet recorded.

“We give in to you on all the principles which
we have always cherished,” said Prince Lvoff, MM.
Rodzianke, Gutchkoff, Miliukoff, Generals Alexeieff,
Brussiloff, Korniloff, Ruzsky and others; “we give up
the constitutional monarchy, we abrogate all the honorary
prerogatives of the officers, we abandon for ever the
right to own land, we are ready to welcome with open
arms and to accept as colleagues and collaborators all
the revolutionaries who come to us out of prisons, from
Siberia, from abroad, including Anarchists and Bolshe-
viks—only allow us to preserve the minimum of order in
the country (and the Army), and above all leave to us
the direction of the war and the accomplishment of the
recognised objects of that war. Recognise with us
the great principles of a free, undivided and powerful
country—the principle of Danton and Robespierre:
will you?”

But the “people” who scoffed at Robespierre and
Danton answered in coarse terms and finally drove away
these boring personages with the butt-end of their rifles.

“We surrender to you the few principles we have
recognised up to now,” said M. Kerensky and his friends ;
“we accept the formula xo indemnities, no annexations, we
are ready to guide your footsteps towards the com-
munist paradise, we joyfully consent to the most broadly
‘federative’ dismemberment of what up to now has
been Russia; only permit us to save our face before
strangers, preserve at least the appearance of a country
faithful to its allies, persuade your brothers at the front
not to desert the trenches entirely, not to run away all
in a body!”

But the “people” of the soldiers, of the criminal
sailors, of the workmen and of the peasants, greedy

480 REVOLUTION [ CHAP. XXIV.

for gain, replied with insults and finally drove out
M. Kerensky and his friends with broomsticks, installing
Bolsheviks in their places. The latter at last made the
wished-for speech: ‘Comrades, we are all animated by
the same ideal and are all aiming at the same proximate
objects: ‘No more war! Peace at any price! a peace
which will permit us immediately to enjoy all the good
things that you have won and that you are still
winning !’”

This speech was greeted with unanimous applause,
and with joyful heart they left for Brest-Litovsk.

The origin of the Revolution had warped its whole
character and course and led Russia down a natural
slope to the abyss in which she is still struggling.

If the sensible elements of the Provisional Govern- |
ment had realised this in time they might perhaps have
been able to check the rapid progress of disorder and
political corruption. But alas! we all of us were,
just at the outbreak of the great cataclysm, under the
influence of suggestion and of strong poisons. We
believed in all good faith that the fakir and his silken
ladder could remain suspended 77 the air /

It was quite natural that after the Revolution had
triumphed in Russia the convicts and political exiles of
note should have agreed to meet together in the capital
of the regenerated country and should have enjoyed an
enthusiastic reception from their former associates.
But it was difficult to understand—for our Allies at least
—why in war time and when the journey between the
West and Russia was so difficult, so long and so costly,
we need have allowed the whole body and, alas! the riff-
raff also, of our revolutionary emigrants to come back to
us from France, Switzerland, Italy? It would have been
so easy and yet so rational to subsidise them liberally
on the spot until the end of the war and the resumption
of normal communications.

But it was just because those who were actually
organising the Revolution needed to reinforce the most

1917 | PRINCE KROPOTKIN 481

detestable elements amongst their clients and zealots.
And above and before all things they wanted to welcome
the Zimmerwaldians, the friends of the German Soztal-
demokratie. And when the British barred the way to
the Lenins, the Trotskys and their staff, the Provisional
Government was constrained to tolerate their arrival by
Germany, to receive them ceremoniously and to allow
their open and vehement progaganda of peace at any
price.

I saw all this crowd of exiles passing through
Stockholm, I made the acquaintance of a few amongst
them, I heard a great deal of talk about others.

One of the first who passed through and stayed for
one day in the Swedish capital was the celebrated
Prince Kropotkin, a Revolutionist of the old stamp, the
spiritual heir of Bakunin, the head of the Anarchist
school, the pillar of the former International, and with
all that an eminent geographer and collaborator with
Elisée Réclus.

I expected to find a peremptory, intransigent person-
age, airing the most extreme theories with great
assurance. I saw before me a very polite old man,
with the courtesy of a bygone age, exceedingly simple
in manner but with the dignity of a gentleman of the old
school, and the impetuosity of youth becoming apparent
occasionally—and just at the right moment—through
this modest exterior. A sympathetic current at once set
in between us and we talked quite openly. At one
moment, when the conversation had turned to the
person of Nicolas II, I took up his defence as a man
and did not think it necessary to conceal the sincere
sympathy I still felt for him. Kropotkin’s face darkened.
“T do not agree with you in the least,” he said. “From
us he has only earned angerand contempt.” “ But for you
it is quite another matter,” I broke in; “‘ Thou hast not
served him. From thine earliest youth thou hast thrown
off his bloodstained fetters.’! And I have served him all

1 Celebrated lines of Lermonteff’s on the death of the Decembrist
Prince Odoievsky. The poet speaks of the ‘‘ great world” and of its

482 REVOLUTION [ CHAP, XXIV.

my life, I have in no way found this service to be a
reproach ; on the contrary I was proud of it. So that
if I did not take up the defence of my unfortunate ex-
Sovereign now, I, too, should not deserve the esteem
of the Russian people.”

The old Revolutionist was silent for a few minutes,
then allowed that from my point of view I was right.

A respectful crowd of Russian exiles, reporters, etc.,
were awaiting their turn to talk with the “ great man” ;
meanwhile, in the modest room he was occupying, his
wife, so good, so unaffected and such a perfect /ady in
her dignified simplicity, was busily packing into a small
chest some remedies which might be needed on the

journey by her adored man, who was old and often ailing —

after his long career of work, travels, dangers, prison.
The correspondent of a prominent Russian news-
paper came to talk to Kropotkin in front of me. At
one moment this gentleman—who seemed sympathetic
and to be possessed of sound principles—touched on
the question of a peace “without annexations and with-
out indemnities” which had just been raised by the
Zimmerwaldian clique and even by the neutral demo-
cratic Socialists. It was curious to see how the old
man, with such a calm manner, started. ‘ What? so
that Germany should always have Alsace-Lorraine in
her hands? So that the French frontier should still be
as near Paris as it was before the war? But that

is inadmissible, absolutely inadmissible. France could |

never breathe freely. And who, if not Germany herself,
is going to pay for the ruins she has heaped up with
joyous heart wherever her troops have passed? She is
to pay for them. I am genuinely sorry for the German
people, but they also have their share of responsibility
and they must contribute by their work and by their
money to the work of rightful reparation.”

When I returned to see Kropotkin again later on in
the day we, like the two good old Muscovites that we

chains; but he clearly means the whole Tsarinian régime and the
somewhat cruel Emperor Nicolas I. to be understood by that.

axoibesita

tor

br]

19917] EARLY MEMORIES OF MOSCOW 483

were, ended by reviewing our recollections of Moscow,
our mutual friends, our relations, our acquaintances.
Those who have read the very vivid memoirs of Prince
Kropotkin know that he was brought up by a grasping
and often brutal father in an atmosphere of revolting
abuse of the serfdom which still existed then. I myself
was fortunate enough to have been only about four
years old when the ever-blessed hand of the Emperor
Alexander II. swept away this blemish which was
disgracing Russia ; my parents had just left foreign parts
and the diplomatic world, and they sought the society of
people, refined like them, like them detesting vulgarity
and coarseness, having like them intellectual interests.
Now Moscow society at that period possessed many
persons and many families with similar tastes. Con-
sequently my memories were infinitely brighter and
softer than those of my host. But nevertheless this
recalling of the past in its setting—so original, so dear to
every really Russian heart—of old Moscow, established
one more link between me and the old Revolutionist,
the old gentleman who had become an Anarchist through
reaction against the injustice, the cruelty, the exploita-
tion which had embittered his soul from his earliest
youth. I was sorry to part from this sympathetic, inter-
esting and sincere man, with whom I had a greal deal
more in common than with many of my good friends
in society or in my profession.

But other revolutionaries were about to return to
Russia—via Stockholm—in quite a different frame of
mind from that of Struve, Burtzeff, or Kropotkin.

I have a most vivid recollection of my first encounter
with the kind of people who have since become so
notorious under the epithet of Bolsheviks (majority
party). I went to a public meeting in the great “ Audi-
torium” of Stockholm, a meeting presided over by M.
Branting and at which Madame Marika Stjerrnstett, the
brilliant and congenial Swedo-French lecturer, was to
speak on the horrible Armenian massacres and to rouse

ait

484 REVOLUTION [ CHAP. XXIV.

the sympathy of the Swedish public for these unhappy
people.

In the outer hall I found myself by chance next to an
individual of the Armenian type; I asked him in Russian
if he did belong to that nationality and on his answer in
the affirmative I got a place for him in one of the front
rows so that he should hear the lecture well.

Branting’s stirring speech and then the brilliant
account of the lecturer brought home to a much-moved
audience the awful scenes of massacres, tortures, whole-
sale deportations—during which the greater number of
the deported died from privations—the whole thing
having been skilfully organised so as to extirpate once
for all the whole Armenian race, whose existence and
misfortunes were leading to the interference of Russia
and Western Europe in Turkey. I walked home from
this meeting and the Armenian whom I had befriended
accompanied me. Very naturally we discussed what we
had just been hearing. But my companion, without
dwelling much on the misfortunes of his fellow-country-
men, passed rapidly on to general political questions and
ended by advocating in eloquent terms the necessity of
stopping a// carnage as soon as possible and the present
war first of all; he was impudent enough to draw up—
probably in order to tempt me—a picture of a Russian
diplomat who would throw off current conventions and
place the “true” interests of the Russian people above
the needs of the Allies! I stepped back a pace. “ But

are you really Armenian? And if you are, how can you ~

speak of peace so long as your unhappy country has not
been freed and avenged? Who in the world are you?”
The individual was beginning to reply that when the
ideals of those who thought as he did were realised,
there could no longer be any massacres, any national
persecutions. ... But I quickly took off my hat to him
and fled as from some noisome beast. I heard a few
days later that he had left for Russia.

I also remember on one occasion, when I had gone

to the station to see some one off, noticing a group of

ed gan a =

OPES eS |. eae es ee ee Sa, ee oS es! ISS Oe ees HS

so =

1917] THE ARMY OF TREACHERY 485

young people—of a type that had absolutely nothing
Slav about it—singing and dancing the #epak very
ostentatiously on the platform before their carriage
door. The faces of the dancers were completely at
variance with the typically national Russian dance
and the whole thing looked like intentional parade.
At that minute one of the members of the “ Emigrants’
Committee,” with whom I had had to discuss the help
lent by the Legation, came up to me. “Do you see—
those are allour young people who are rejoicing over
their return to Russia,” he said with a malignant smile.
“Your Excellency may rest assured that they are going
there for the greater well-being of the Russian people.”
And the smile became more malignant, more triumphant.

At this same time also my wife, returning from
meeting an ambulance-train, told me that in it, besides
the usual wounded men, there were some _ very
suspicious-looking individuals, well-fed, well-dressed,
and who passed themselves off as Ukrainian medical
officers. The wounded complained of the conversation
of these men, who scoffed at all that they held dear and
who foretold a good peace with Germany at no distant
date. The real wounded wished to draw the attention
of the military authorities at the frontier to these people.
Soon after and little by little the Russian ambulance
trains assumed a completely different aspect. From the
German side they were making use of them to pass into
Russia not wounded men but soldiers who had under-
gone skilful preparation in special camps, and who
were to swell the ranks of the “friends of peace” in
Russia.

These ranks continued to swell. The army of
treachery was forming. Only the headquarters staff was
wanting. That arrived at last from Switzerland, via
Germany, in the persons of MM. Lenin, Trotsky and
others. When they passed through Stockholm—I did
not see them—they did not conceal from the Swedish
Socialists and interviewers their intention of preaching
the conclusion‘of peace at any price.

486 REVOLUTION [CHAP. XXIV.

It is absolutely futile to speak of the tremendous
mistake made by the Provisional Government in con-
senting to their entry into Russia and in not taking
any measures against their pernicious and open propa-
ganda in Petrograd and the other great centres. The
Provisional Government could neither forbid nor
prevent anything against the will of the great Sovzet of
Petrogad. And this Soviet, by its very origin and from
its beginning, was the organ of German policy and the
lively and perfectly-formed embryo of the future
Bolshevist republic.

In chronological sequence I ought here to mention
an incident, or rather a conversation, which has but a
distant connection with the progress of the Russian
Revolution, but which has one all the same and which is
of special interest at the hour in which I write these
lines, that is to say in May, 19109.

At the beginning of April Sir Esme Howard told me
that he had had a visit from an Esthonian political
agitator, a certain M. Keskula, whose views had ap-
peared to him to be interesting; that consequently he
wished that I would check his impressions by having a
conversation myself with the gentleman. My English
colleague added that he had asked Keskula if he knew
me ; but that the latter had replied that although he was
desirous of having an interview with me, he did not
consider it the right thing for him to take the initiative
and to present himself at the Russian Legation. I told
Sir Esme that I saw nothing unseemly in my meeting
the person in question on neutral ground, and so we
arranged that on the appointed day I was to go to the
First Secretary to the British Legation, Mr. Clive, whose
mind, tact and judgment had always impressed me, and
who in addition to all his other qualities was a thorough
master of the German language, in which I should
probably have to converse with my Esthonian “com-
patriot” so that the master of the house should
understand us.

1917] -ESTHONIAN ASPIRATIONS 487

When I arrived at Clive’s house at the appointed
hour I found myself in the presence of a correctly-
dressed gentleman whom the master of the house
introduced to me as M. Keskula. We began to talk at
once in German—as I had foreseen.

I asked M. Keskula about his antecedents. He replied
with perfect frankness that he had commenced his
political career as a partisan of German policy. Son of
a well-to-do farmer, he began his scholastic career at
the gymnasium of Reval, and then went to the University
of Berlin, where he remained and took up Esthonian
national politics.

“But I have always understood,” I observed, “ that
the national movement in Esthonia, just as amongst
the Letts, is closely bound up with an irreconcilable
antagonism towards the Baltic Germans—especially
towards the proprietors. Thus how could you seek
to link the cause of your nation to German policy ?”

“In that respect there is a great difference be-
tween Letts and Esthonians,” was the reply. “ Where-
as the former are above and before all vehement
nationalists with decided leanings to the most extreme
socialism, we others hold fast to Western civilisation,
The police order which reigns in the country, our
prosperous little properties, our schools, our hospitals,
our good roads—all that has become a habit with us
which we could not sacrifice; then from the national
point of view we have already acquired far more than
the Letts; we have bought back a great deal of land
from the Jarons; we are listened to and sometimes
coaxed and flattered in the councils of administration,
in which formerly all power, all influence, belonged
exclusively to the Germans; our fellow-countrymen
hold most of the rural livings; we possess a pros-
perous and influential national Press. For this reason
in Esthonia, far more than amongst the Letts, we have
always dreaded having much recourse to Russian
protection; we dreaded your despotic methods, which
would be the ruin of our local civilisation.”

488 REVOLUTION [ CHAP, XXIV.

“ But it seems that you have not come to an arrange-
ment with the Germans of Berlin?”

“No; in spite of my labours of more than four years
I have not arrived at any positive result. It was not
that there were no enlightened minds in Germany:
these understand that Germany could not but gain if in
the Baltic Provinces two little States were formed,
enjoying complete national independence, yet permeated
with Gerrmano-Western civilisation and guarding this
independence and this civilisation against the attacks
of the barbarian power which threatens them in the
East—pray forgive me, Monsieur! But with regard to
Baltic questions, German Government circles and the
Berlin Press were, and are still, completely in the hands
of the Baltic “ emigrants,” of a Kayserling and his con-
federates. Every one sees everything through their
eyes. Thus, realising that I had taken the wrong
track, | sought to find a support for our nationality
from another side. I went to reside in Finland.
You are aware of the ties of origin which bind the
Esthonians to the Finns; latterly the Pan-Finnish idea
has made remarkable progress ; there are entire popula-
tions in your country—in Northern Russia, on the
Volga, in Siberia—who for centuries had not even an
idea what they were, and Russified themselves ad
libitum, but who will know to-morrow that they are
Finns. You will forgive my plain-speaking, Mon-
sieur? But what concerns us at the present time is
only the western and civilised agglomeration of the
great Finnish race—Esthonia and Finland, which, in
order to safeguard their liberty and their civilisation,
ought first to unite their efforts and then to seek a
power in Europe on which they could lean if necessary.
This power might well be that of the Scandinavian
States, beginning with Sweden. The historic ties of
Sweden and Finland are universally recognised, and
even much exaggerated. What are less well known are
the ties that unite Sweden to the Baltic Provinces. .. .”

“T have often heard them spoken of,” I interrupted

1917] CONVERSATION WITH M. KESKULA 480

the speaker. ‘During the hundred odd years that
Esthonia and Livonia were under Swedish domination
the people, who up till then had been shamefully
oppressed by the German conquerors, their lords and
masters, knew for the first time what justice, order,
humanity, and good administration were. At that time
—the period of Gustavus Adolphus, of the Oxenstjernas,
of Charles X. and Charles XI—Sweden was the best
governed State of the whole of Europe, and justice in
particular was studied and respected. In extending
their power to the domain of the Knights—Brothers
of the Sword, the Swedish laws no longer tolerated the
crying abuses of these knights. The Lett and the
Esthonian, even the serfs amongst them, found pro-
tection from the Royal authorities. Schools were
founded, roads made, proprietors who abused their
power too much were judged and punished. Later on,
under Russian domination the oppression of serfdom
began again. Then the spirit of the age brought its
own remedy. Amongst the Baltic nobility itself there
were humane and just men to be found who wished to
march with the times, and who advocated extensive
reforms granted by Catherine I1., and subsequently by
Alexander I. Serfdom was abolished in the Provinces
long before it was in Russia. Nevertheless, the recol-
lection of the benefits of Swedish domination had
never been effaced from the memory of the people
of the Provinces, and even now the Swedish name is
very popular amongst them-——-among Esthonians par-
ticularly.”

“You are perfectly right, Monsieur ; that is exactly
the case.”

“Well, then, have you succeeded this time in your
work of binding Esthonia, Finland, and Sweden into one
sheaf?” I asked.

“Not in the least! In the first place, Sweden does
not really understand these matters. And then I have
come to the conclusion that Finland has but one policy
only—German policy.”

490 REVOLUTION [ CHAP, XXIV.

“Yes, I have often heard that the Swedish party in
Finland sought Germany’s support long before the
war.”

“Not the Swedish party only, but far more the
Young-Finn party, even to its most extreme elements.
Finland would not even hear of a Swedish policy. Sal-
vation could only come from the German side. Some
time before the war an agreement was made between
Helsingfors and Berlin that on the day when the
Germans should occupy Esthonia, and when a German
military governor should instal himself at Reval, and it
becomes a German naval base—the Revolution should
break out: not before. This arrangement still holds
good. But in that case what would the fate of Esthonia
be between Finland where a German prince, son or
relation of William II.’s, would reign, and the Prussian
‘Statthalter’ installed at Reval?”

“T understand your patriotic anxieties thoroughly.
But allow me to ask: who is preventing you—now that
the Revolution has swept away the old tendencies to
Russification amongst us, and professed the principle of
national autonomies—who is preventing you, I say,
from turning openly towards us, and from seeing the
future of your nationality in an open union, based on
wide autonomy, with Russia?”

“ Be good enough to forgive my complete frankness
beforehand, Monsieur: in the first place I must confess
that we have no great confidence in your present régime,
and in the possibility of your issuing triumphant from
the struggle; then we always fear that even the new
Russian régime might easily become narrowly nation-
alist again ; such things have occurred before in history ;
then finally and chiefly there is the question of the
future frontiers of Esthonia.”

“ But I thought that those were as perfectly traced
by nature as by history. The frontier between the
Russian nationality and the Esthonian nationality is
Lake Peipus (Pskoff) and the course of the river Narova
up to its mouth in the Gulf of Finland near Narva.”

1917 | ESTHONIAN AMBITIONS 4Q1

“Ah! that is just the point, Monsieur! No, no! we
take a very different view of our national frontiers. In
the first place, south of Lake Peipus the limits of your
Government of Pskoff do not coincide at all with the
limits of Esthonian nationality ; the latter predominates
in the western portion of the Government in question.
The district and town of /zborsk, in particular, must
absolutely belong to us.”

“What? Izborsk? But from the legendary begin-
ning of Russian history Izborsk appears as a Russian
town ; it has remained one. Listen: I know through the
genealogy of my family that in the time of the Tsar
Theodore, son of John the Terrible, a Nekludoff was
made Lieutenant of the Tsar in Izborsk, and was given
a large property there which has belonged up till
latterly to his descendants—distant relations of mine—
and which was sold quite recently to the local peasants—
good and true Great-Russian mousiks, if ever there were
any!”

“I must renew my apologies to you, Monsieur, but
this only proves that your ancestors figured amongst
the oppressors of the Esthonians, and established Great-
Russian colonists on their soil! But let us leave
Izborsk out of it". What are you doing with the whole
of Ingria? Yet from time immemorial it has been
inhabited and cultivated by Esthonians; now Ingria
extends east of the Narova as far as Lake Ladoga, that
is to say it includes the whole northern half of what you
have since called ‘the Government of St. Petersburg.’
All this country is undeniably ours.”

“But, then, what would you do about the large
agglomerations, of purely Russian population, which
constitute large villages, or rather small towns, manu-

1 An Esthonian zxfi/tration does really exist in the province of Pskoff ;
but only since 1861. The noble proprietors having sold much land, it
was mainly Esthonian immigrants who bought it, divided it up and
settled down there. The instituting of the “* Peasants’ Bank” caused
this colonisation to cease, for from that time onwards it was Russian
peasants who bought the large properties which were for sale.

4Q2 REVOLUTION [CHAP. XXIV.

facturing centres numbering—as at Kolpino—tens of
thousands of purely Russian workmen? And above
all, what should you do about the great town of St.
Petersburg—now Petrograd—the capital of the whole
of Russia, with its two million inhabitants, of which
barely fifty thousand are échouwhontzy (Esthonians) ?”

“Oh, well! the Russians would enjoy the guarantees
assured by modern arrangements to minorities. And
as to Petrograd, once it is to be the capital of the
whole of Russia—that is to say of a federation of different
nationalities—why are you set on this capital being
within the limits of the Aussian part, and not within
those of the Es/homan part of this great federation?”

There was along silence. I felt that 1 had gathered
all that I wanted to, and did not consider it necessary to
set any further questions. On his side M. Keskula
realised that he had said quite enough. He rose, and
we bade him a friendly farewell. When he had left,
Clive and I went to the drawing-room to beg a good
cup of tea, hot and strong, from charming Mrs. Clive;
it was decidedly necessary for us—for me in particular—
to be braced up after the astounding things we had been
listening to for over an hour!

Towards the end of April I received a telegram from
M. Miliukoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Pro-
visional Government, announcing my appointment as
Ambassador to Madrid.

I had known Miliukoff for a long time; he had passed
through Stockholm three or four times before the
Revolution, and we had talked at great length then, and
these conversations had led to a common point of view
between us on many questions of home and foreign
policy. What particularly pleased me about Miliukoff
was his frankly Western, European, mentality, his
tremendous energy and his way of asking questions
plainly, without reticence or evasions. I have reason
to believe that in appointing me to Madrid Miliukoff
was actuated by the wish to remove me from a country

17]. [ AM: TRANSPERRED ‘FO MADRID. 498

too near Russia, too much overrun by the most extreme
Russian elements; he was aware of my irreconcilability
on certain principles, and he feared a clash of opinions
which might create difficulties for the Foreign Office.
My appointment as Ambassador to Spain constituted
undeniable promotion, and at the same time it afforded
me a haven till happier days should dawn. Moreover,
the post in Madrid might become a most important one
in the event of negotiations for universal peace. I fully
appreciated these friendly intentions. As to the post in
Stockholm, Miliukoff was giving that to an intimate
friend, our Minister to Christiania, who had a shrewd
and adaptable mind quite capable of coming to terms
with all the Russian elements who had, or thought they
had, a voice in the matter of our relations with Sweden.

I had only just accepted the appointment, and
thanked Miliukoff, when sad news arrived from Petro-
grad, the taking up of arms of the Soviet of Petrograd—
the first taking up of arms of the Bolsheviks we can
now say—directed against the moderate elements of the
Provisional Government and especially against their
patriotic point of view on the questions and the objects
of the war. The garrison of Petrograd—already called
“ the Red Guard ”"—held an armed demonstration against
certain Ministers to the watchword of “ peace without
annexations or indemnities.” The movement was
directed more particularly against Miliukoff, who on
that day displayed admirable personal courage and
went down to the Square to harangue the soldiery,
loudly upholding his principles about the objects of the
war—and first and foremost the necessity for Russia to
possess the Straits. The demonstration continued
throughout the night, and the next day the Council of
Ministers of the Provisional Government broke up.
The majority, with Kerensky at the head, consented to
subordinate their policy to the needs of the “ people.”
Thus Miliukoff and his friends were turned out. General
Korniloff—a hero sans peur et sans reproche, and a
proficient upholder of the most advanced political views

494 REVOLUTION [CHAP. XXIV.

(there were many such!)—also relinquished his duties
as head of the Petrograd garrison. Prince Lvoff re-
mained as Prime Minister a little while longer; but the
real and almost the whole power passed to Kerensky,
who took unto himself as Minister for Foreign Affairs
young M. Terestchenko—up till then Minister of
Finance—and who replaced Miliukofi’s friends by
revolutionary Socialists of renown. As to the President
of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, and a few officials who
with him were supposed to represent the supreme power
—no one mentioned them any more; they had been
tacitly suppressed like the fourth Duma itself. It was a
decisive day which really decided the fate of the Revolu-
tion and with it the fate of Russia. All reasonable
people were filled with dismay.

However, man is so constituted that he always clings
to a hope; this is more especially true of the Russian
intellectual. Nowin this case the hope lay in Kerensky’s
personality. Son of a high official at the Board of
Education (at that period the citadel of Russian reaction),
impetuous, excitable, not altogether reliable in private
business, having gone in for revolutionary Socialism
like others go in for Futurism or Cubism, prosecuted
and interned during the first Revolution, an eloquent
member—always pushing himself forward—of the fourth
Duma, where he sat at the head of the Labour mem-
bers—this lawyer felt his hour had come when the
Revolution triumphed. Whereas all the other members
of the Duma, even the most advanced ones, had lost
their heads, he, assisted by a few colleagues from the
Socialist revolutionary camp, promptly placed himself
in evidence, harangued the people, harangued the troops
that were occupying the halls and lobbies of the Duma,
caused the former civil and military officials who were
being arrested in the town and whom the emissaries of
the revolutionary party were conducting to the Duma,
to be brought before him, and decided their fate, either
setting them free or ordering them to be transported to
the fortress; in short, he and his friends represented a

tory] M. KERENSKY, DICTATOR 495

kind of executive power even before the Provisional
Government, in which he became Minister of Justice,
was formed. There is a Russian proverb dating from
the eighteenth century, which says: “ He who has taken
the stick becomes corporal.” Kerensky had at once
become this corporal or rather this commander-in-chief
of the Russian Revolution. At least it appeared so to
others. As a matter of fact he had never been either
the promoter or the conscious leader of this Revolution.
So long as he agreed with the Sowets he had some
power, the moment he disagreed with them he was
powerless. Moreover, he realised that at once, and
until his final downfall he indulged in a game of see-saw
between the Soviets and their adversaries.

Not at all bloodthirsty (I imagine he could not
have killed a fly himself), very much inclined, like
Bonaparte when “e had attained supreme power, to
protect the aristocrats who rallied to him, he had at
once an enormous clientéle, for who did not rally to
him in Petrograd? Families well known for their un-
disguised sycophancy had hastened to bring this here-
ditary servility to the new régime, and as soon as it was
Kerensky who personified this régime, they adored and
fawned on M. Kerensky. The “ Dictator,” as well as
his new colleagues in the Ministry, made laudable
efforts to save innocent people—even generals and
officers—from ever dangerous prisons and from the
fury of the comrades. There have never been so many
people sent abroad on special missions, civil and
military, and authorised to take considerable sums of
money with them, as during Kerensky’s term of office ;
in this way those officers, officials or private individuals,
to whom a longer stay in Russia would have been
dangerous, were sent, or allowed to go, away.

Young M. Terestchenko did his best to help in these
masked flights. He was aman of the world, very well
educated, intelligent, and thoroughly good and sincere.
During the few months that he was in office he
represented “Our Lady of Perpetual Succour” to all

496 REVOLUTION [ CHAP. XXIV.

the former smart world of Petrograd. This same world
will probably revile him later on. For our Foreign
Office staff his appointment was invaluable; all kept
their posts and those who had had some influence
over M. Sazonoff had a great deal more over the new
Minister, who had no experience of his work. Abroad
all Miliukoff’s appointments were adhered to, including
mine. There were, however, a few victims on the list,
some Consuls were sacrificed to the spite of the former
political exiles suddenly become the undisputed heads
of Russian colonies abroad. And as the Socialist
principle is as a rule against State pensions, these poor
functionaries, of whom some were old and the fathers
of families, were just turned into the streets after
twenty-five and thirty years’ service !

Kerensky’s attitude towards the fallen Emperor
and his family was also most favourably commented on
by the Press and by rumours in circulation. And
when the unfortunate family was sent to Tobolsk, in
Siberia, every one thought that this measure had been
dictated by the new Government’s—alias Kerensky’s—
wish to save Nicolas II. and his family from the dangers
which might arise for them at any moment from the
Soviet of Petrograd, and to cause them to be as it were
forgotten through absence till such time as they could
be surreptitiously sent abroad.

But above and before all Kerensky proved his worth
by his untiring zeal and feverish activity in favour of
the cause of the Allies and of the prosecution of the
war. In fiery speeches, becoming ever more numerous,
and during propaganda trips which he made to the
front, to Moscow, to Kieff and back again to the front,
he exhorted “ the soldiers of liberty” to remain loyal to
the Allies, to fight, toconquer. Through the telegraphic
agencies we abroad read the text of his stirring speeches,
the accounts of the enthusiasm of the “revolutionary
army,” the promises of an early renewal of the most
splendid military operations. And everybody—
Russians and Allies—wshed to persuade themselves

1917] INCREASING DISSOLUTION 497

that this litthe man with the clean-shaven face like
Bonaparte—untiring like him, and thundering out his
speeches like Danton—would be capable of changing
the spirit of the Russian soldier completely, and of
causing the troops on our front, so passive and quiet
since the triumph of the Revolution, to take up the
struggle for victory once more. What mattered the
principles and the extreme measures adopted by the
new Government in the interior of the country, and
the complete disorder which seemed to be reigning
there? What mattered the watchword “peace without
annexations or indemnities” which had definitely
triumphed on the Russian side? Let us save Russia's
honour with regard to the Allies; let us fight and
conquer; the rest can be arranged afterwards and never
mind how.

Such were the hopes, such the frame of mind which
prevailed at the outset of the Kerensky régime. Alas!
it soon became obvious that these hopes were exag-
gerated to say the least of it! News began to arrive
again in Stockholm, representing the Russian Army
and the entire country as being involved in increas-
ing dissolution. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers
with their arms were deserting in a body and returning
to the interior of the country in order to participate in
the “ dividing up of properties.” These deserters seized
the railways, forced any trains they could get hold of
to run, plundered and burnt private properties, formed
themselves into bands, infested the towns, took the
prisons by assault and freed the prisoners, who formed
themselves into other bands still more dangerous.
Meanwhile the Ukraine proclaimed its independence ;
the Caucasus did likewise; chaos became universal ;
everything was at a standstill except the printing-
presses for bank notes and the fiery eloquence of
Kerensky. As to the propaganda of the Bolsheviks it
was more energetic and open than ever.

When I was preparing to leave for my new post
in the beginning of June I had almost entirely lost all

498 REVOLUTION [ CHAP. XXIV.

my illusions. I did not conceal from any one that I
considered the continuation of my public duties as most
precarious. And on leaving Stockholm on the 14th
June I said to myself and to my friends that my term of
office would in all probability be short-lived.

When I left Sweden the Hammarskiold-Wallenberg
Ministry had ceased to exist, having been replaced by
another Cabinet, Conservative also, but which was
known to be a transition Cabinet, for every one was
expecting that the next elections would produce a
tremendous Liberal and still more Socialist majority.

I took my leave of King Gustaf V., who on this
occasion showed me the same kindness as he had done
throughout my time in Sweden. His Majesty was
deeply moved when he talked about the fate of the
ex-Emperor Nicolas II. and his family, but he shared
my hopes as to the chances of safety still remaining
to them; more especially if every one kept quiet about
them for a time.

I was genuinely sorry to leave Stockholm. In spite
of the terrible events of the war and of the Revolution,
I had got on well in the country; I had learnt to like
and esteem the Swedish people. For myself personally
and for my country the future seemed to hold nothing
but terrible trouble.

Chee? ER ARV

IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE

My journey from Stockholm to Madrid was performed
under conditions unavoidable in a World-War. At
Bergen I had to submit to an enforced halt of a few days
to wait for the English boat in which we were to cross
the North Sea, and of which the day and hour of
departure were kept strictly secret, on account of
German submarines. At last the old Vulture, dirty and
packed with passengers, started, escorted by two fine
British destroyers which awaited her outside Norwegian
waters.

On board I met a few French Socialist parliamen-
tarians who had been visiting Russia with M. Albert
Thomas; I had made their acquaintance when they
passed through Stockholm on their way to my country.!
At that time they were loudly proclaiming their intention
to talk sense to our extreme Socialists and especially to
fight the propaganda of the Bolsheviks. I was some-
what disagreeably surprised to find that on their return
from their mission to Russia they appeared to be up-
holding the Sovets. The head of the mission, M. Albert
Thomas, had gone on board a French destroyer at
Bergen.

Towards the end of the crossing a thick fog enveloped
the sea, and we were suddenly stopped; signals were
exchanged between us and our escort ; we started again,
but when the fog lifted it was discovered that we were
not going into Aberdeen but into Peterhead, a small

1 This was M. Albert Thomas’s second journey, the one that had such
an indifferent influence on our internal situation.

499 2K

500 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cwap. xxv.

fishing-port much further north. The commander of
one of the destroyers, friendly Lieutenant Lyon, then
came on board the Vulture and explained to me what
had happened. We had been stopped by a wireless
message, saying that the Germans had laid mines during
the night off Aberdeen (probably aimed at Albert
Thomas); in a few hours the flotilla of trawlers would
have picked up those mines and then we should be
able to resume our journey. Towards evening we did
arrive safe and sound in Aberdeen, and I immediately
took the train to London.

When IJ arrived in Paris two days later, I heard the
news of the Russian offensive in Galicia, an offensive
due to Kerensky’s eloquence. There had been some
brilliant successes, strong enemy positions had been
taken, etc. All the Russians who were in Paris were in
a high state of jubilation: at last one could look the
Allies in the face without any bitter feeling of shame!
Moreover, this was but the beginning; fighting was
starting again onthe Russian front, and our soldiers had
shaken off their torpor.

That was the opinion of the moment. Two or three
weeks later the whole truth was known in Paris: the
June attack had been due solely to the devotion of a few
battalions of officers and to the women’s battalion. After
losing more than half of their numbers, these enthusiasts
of duty and patriotism had succeeded in taking strong
enemy positions, but no help came to them from the
soldiers, who watched the attack with arms crossed and
sneering expressions, when they were not shooting the
officers and heroic women in the back!

But, I repeat, this ghastly truth was only known a
fortnight later. Hence I left Paris in splendid spirits,
and after a normal journey of thirty-six hours I arrived
in Madrid very early in the morning of the 28th June.

Two days after my arrival, my formal reception by
the King took place.
This is the third time in the course of these

Bis fa pn et Eat eee SSE

1917 | STATELY CEREMONIALS 501

Reminiscences that I have had to describe an audience
of reception. This may perchance astonish the reader ;
but who knows whether in the near future some one
may not be grateful to me for having recounted these
Court ceremonies—ceremonies formerly considered so
all-important which have since become the continuation
of a traditional custom, now only of interest to street-
loiterers and Court circles, and which will soon fall
completely into disuse together with all the outward
show and all the pomp of the most ancient monarchies ?

Moreover, Madrid has remained the capital in which
the solemn audiences of the Ambassadors have pre-
served all their grandeur and take place in a singularly
appropriate setting and according to therites religiously
kept up since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
I at least cannot remember any Court ceremony more
imposing and grander in its every detail than the one
held for me on my arrival in Madrid.

The procession through the streets of the capital
was really magnificent. Each of the gilded coaches was
worthy of a place in a museum and in history; I
occupied the one built for the coronation of King Joseph
(Bonaparte), which was simple in outline with the most
delightful paintings on a gold-lacquered ground. The
harness and trappings of the beautiful horses dated from
the eighteenth century; the liveries of the postilions,
heavily embroidered in gold and silver dulled by twenty
decades of wear, were of the same period; all the other
liveries have not changed in fashion since the days of
Philip V. The horses of the escort, of Arab breed with
glossy coats, were all beautiful, and admirably ridden——
Spanish riders are undoubtedly the best in the world.

The procession at last reached the Royal Palace, the
only really beautiful and majestic building in Madrid,
and entered the great courtyard where the guard of
honour was drawn up, with their colours hallowed by
warlike memories, to salute the Ambassador. In the
outer hall of the Palace members of the Royal Court
came to be presented to the Ambassador and to precede

502 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cnap. xxv.

him up the magnificent and monumental staircase be-
tween two rows of halberdiers, wearing the authentic
gold-laced costume of the eighteenth century. To the
strains of the National Anthem I passed through the
rooms of the Palace, magnificent rooms full of the most
beautiful bronzes, furniture, brocades, Gobelin tapestries,
representing the best specimens of the Louis XIV. and
Louis XV. periods.

After a few minutes’ delay I was shown into the
presence of His Majesty.

The Royal throne, on which His Majesty was seated,
was approached by several steps flanked by four life-
sized lions in gilded bronze. On the King’s left stood
the Ministers, the Court, the Generais and military
commanders of the capital, all in full uniform; on his
right stood the Grandees of Spain. It was pointed out
to me that more Grandees than usual were attending
the audience: they were curious to see a “ Muscovite
revolutionary ” being presented to the King. They were
somewhat disappointed when they saw me appearing in
my diplomatic dress, heavily embroidered in silver, and
observing all the traditional precepts and rules of
etiquette !

After the usual ceremonial greetings I read my
speech to the King, who listened to it seated. In this
speech I recalled the very great services rendered to
humanity, and more particularly to the Russians, by
Spain and her King who had undertaken the protection
of our civil prisoners in enemy countries, the protection
of military prisoners, and also the task of the possible
alleviation of the fate of the victims in this ghastly war.
As I was still labouring under the impression of the
good news received in Paris, I mentioned with great
satisfaction the “ardent patriotism,’ and the “un-
swerving loyalty to alliances” which constituted one of
the points of resemblance between the Russian popular
soul and the Spanish one. Alas! how promptly was
this portion of my oration belied by events!

My speech concluded, I handed my credentials to

|
|

1917 | KING ALFONSO XIII. 503

the King, and His Majesty, still seated, read his answer
in Spanish. Then he rose, descended the steps of
the throne, and taking me by the hand, bade me
welcome.

Just then the course of the ceremony was interrupted
by an unusual pause: the King advanced a little towards
the centre of the room so as to be able to speak a few
words to me without any formality, and said: “ Monsieur,
in your speech you were good enough to allude to the
help we have been able to render to your prisoners.
Allow me to tell you of the deep interest I take in the
fate of other ‘Russian prisoners,’ I allude to His
Majesty the former Emperor Nicolas II. and his family.
I come to beg you, Monsieur, to transmit to your
Government my fervent prayers for their liberation.”

The King’s words touched me deeply. “Sir,” I
replied, “will Your Majesty permit me to be quite
frank in my answer?”

“Not only do I permit, but.I desire you to be frank,
Monsieur.”

“You see before you, sir, a faithful servant of the
Russian people and of the new order of things in
Russia; but at the same time, by virtue of all my
traditions, all my antecedents, the person of him who
was once my Sovereign is and will always remain
sacred to me, without speaking of the feelings of personal
gratitude and sympathy which bind me to him. If any-
thing on earth can be done to help him and his, you
may be absolutely sure and certain, sir, that I shall be
ready to lay aside my interests, my career, perhaps even
more. SoIshall not hesitate to transmit to my Govern-
ment the words that Your Majesty has just spoken.
But | would beg you to consider one thing most care-
fully : I know for certain that the Provisional Govern-
ment has but one wish and that is to allow the Emperor
and his family to leave for foreign parts ; if it does not
do so, it is on account of the extreme elements. Now,
any Official intercession coming from abroad would not
fail to excite these extreme elements, and the agitation

504 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

which would ensue would only harm the unfortunate
exiles of Tobolsk.”

The King thought for a minute. “ But tell me,
Monsieur, something that I do not quite understand.
Who ts really at the head of the Russian Government at this
moment ?”

“Sir, I have just handed my credentials to Your
Majesty ; these credentials are signed by the President
of the Council, Prince Lvoff, and countersigned by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs.”

“Then it is Prince Lvoff? I am told he is a good
and honourable man. Very well then, Monsieur, please
write from me to Prince Lvoff to say how interested
I am in the fate of the Emperor Nicolas IJ. and his
family, and that I should be intensely happy to know
they were in complete safety!”

“T will do so to-morrow, sir, in a private letter
addressed to the Prince.”

“Yes, yes, please do so.”

The King’s words and his expression denoted so
much frankness, so much nobleness that I at once felt
his charm. Moreover, what he had said stirred me
deeply. The ceremony then concluded by the pre-
sentation of my suite to the King. On which His
Majesty withdrew with great pomp.’

After the usual presentations and a few minutes’
waiting in another room, I was conducted first to Her
Majesty Queen Victoria, and then to Her Majesty the
Queen-Mother Marie Christina.

One could not imagine a more graceful picture than
the one that met my eyes when I entered the audience-
room of the young Queen. Slim, very beautiful (her
photographs do not show the great charm of her features),
very fair, wearing a lovely white dress which still
further enhanced her beauty, the Queen was standing

1 Alas! no one knew exactly!

* Up to now I donot know if other Sovereigns, other Governments—
allied or neutral—have ever taken any similar steps in favour of the
unfortunate Nicolas II. and his family. ,

1917 | TWO QUEENS 505

up surrounded by the ladies of her suite. Her Majesty’s
smile and her gracious welcome did but confirm my first
impression—that of being face to face with some one
endued with transcendent qualities, moral as well as
physical.

When one approaches the Queen-Mother, Marie
Christina, who was Regent of the Kingdom for many
years, One at once receives the impression of a person
inured to supreme power, to duty, to tribulation, to the
claims and subtleties of politics. Above all she is
grande dame in the highest sense of the term. A long
line of ancestors seem to rise behind her image, august
personages draped in the imperial purple, heroes of
great triumphs or of great trials which formerly cast their
shadow or shed their lustre over the whole of Europe.
Often the vital powers of a race are not equal to such
exalted destinies, such heavy tasks; the descendants
suffer from atrophy, turn into idols or marionettes.
But sometimes in one of the branches of the ancient
family a curious atavism revives the old vitality, the
old virtues. When one is in the presence of Queen
Marie Christina, who for over twenty years and under
the most difficult circumstances succeeded in governing
Spain and consolidating her son’s throne, one naturally
calls up the historic images of her great-grandfather the
Archduke Charles—the sole adversary worthy of oppos-
ing Bonaparte’s military genius; then the Archduke
Albert, an admirable army leader who covered himself
with glory ‘in 1866; both of them having left, besides
their military fame, the memory of great nobility of
character, intelligence and enlightened passion for art.

The Queen-Mother’s conversation is imbued with
frankness and intellectual charm. One feels at once that
she has seen much, worked much, and thought much.
As during the disastrous war which has just desolated
the world, Austria-Hungary has been the loyal and
absolutely inalienable friend of Germany, current opinion
has ascribed Germanophile sympathies to Queen Marie
Christina. Nothing is more unfair: the Queen, by her

506 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

whole nature and all her traditions, belongs to the
proud Imperial line which looked on the Hohenzollerns
as parvenus, as born foes who could not, and should not
be trusted. It was when these historic traditions
were abjured at Schoenbrunn, when Austria-Hungary
definitely gave herself into Berlin’s keeping, that the
death-warrant of her Empire was signed! But in
Austria herself and in the Imperial family many people
still adhered to the ancient traditions and had foreseen
the misfortunes inseparable from the new state of affairs.

I think I amright in numbering Marie Christina amongst
these.

When I returned home in the same coach and sur-
rounded by the same pomp, all the usual ceremonies
were not over. A few minutes later, accompanied by
the cordial and friendly M. de Heredia, whose duty
it is to introduce ambassadors, I got into another coach,
rather less gilded and with no escort this time, and
drove to the palace of the Gobernacion (Government),
where the President of the Council, M. Dato, and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis de Lema,
awaited me. Inthe courtyard of the palace a company
of the famous Guardia Civil! was drawn up to salute me.
In the great reception-room the two Ministers who,
like me, were still in Court dress, greeted me with the
customary civilities. Asa rule during this ceremonious
visit only the merest commonplaces are exchanged.
On this occasion I thought it necessary to recapitulate
to the two Ministers the conversation I had just had
with the King, as although they were aware of the
subject of it they could only partially have followed it.
I explained quite frankly the position of the Russian
Government, as I understood it, and added that in the
interests of the unfortunate Royal captives it was

1 The Guardia Civil is undeniably the best organised gendarmerie of

Europe; it has an unblemished reputation, and the Spanish people
appreciate and esteem it.

‘

1917 | SAD: REFLECTIONS 507

imperative to mention them as little as possible. “So
long as the present Government, including M. Kerensky,
is in power, one can feel assured as to the fate of
Nicolas II. and his family. Heaven forefend that all the
power should pass to the Soveds / then one could answer
for nothing ; but even so all intercession would only be
fatal!”

The two gentlemen were sincerely grateful for the
complete frankness of my explanations; from that hour
relations of sympathy and perfect confidence were
established between us, relations of which | allow
myself to be proud, for M. Dato and the Marquis de
Lema can rightly be considered the most esteemed
politicians of Spain—esteemed even by their opponents.

A quarter of an hour after I had got home, I received
a visit from the same two Ministers—still in full dress.
Then nunc dimittis: | was at last free to discard my
official finery, so particularly oppressive on these
Madrid dog-days, and to rest.

But when I found myself alone in my room, with the
blinds carefully drawn down, I was struck by the tragic
contrast between what I had just seen and what had
just been said to me so nobly and humanely by King
Alfonso XIII. Over there, at the far end of Europe,
also magnificent palaces stood in a setting of power
and glory, and pompous and imposing ceremonies were
held of which the centre of attraction was an Imperial
couple surrounded by four enchanting princesses and a
delicate and attractive boy. This was but yesterday...
and to-day this family, before whom all bowed low, who
saw no one and nought save in brilliant array and in the
attitude of obedience—this same family was languishing
in the solitude of distant exile in some mean and
common dwelling, and, what is far worse, exposed to
the continual supervision and the insults of brutal and
dirty keepers. . . . The Royal family in the prison of
the Temple; the two children of Edward V. listening
with anguish for the footsteps of the assassins on the
staircase of the Tower; the wretched John Antonovitch

508 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv,

in his prison at Schliisselburg!... all these pictures,
familiar to me from my infancy, and so many more besides,
were conjured up before my mental vision, ever forming
that tragic and bitter contrast between supreme pomp
and supreme misery, of the innocent paying the debt of
blood of the guilty ; a state of things so terribly over-
whelming and cruel, unless one accepts, in deep humility,
the idea of asingle Will who rules worlds as He rules
each of us, and who at the appointed hour endues us
with His Spirit and His Strength to endure all, to
understand all.

The very next day I sent off a private and confidential
letter to Prince Lvoff, thus discharging the commission
entrusted to me by the King. I never received any
answer. Soon after my letter reached Petrograd,
Prince Lvoff disappeared discreetly from the scene, as
the Duma had disappeared, as Rodzianko and the
other “high commissioners” had disappeared, leaving
the whole quasi-dictatorial power to Kerensky—
President of the Council, then Commander-in-Chief,
then President of the Republic which he had proclaimed
unaided, but first and foremost the plaything of the
omnipotent Soviets /

1 Great-grandson of the Tsar John V. (the weak-minded brother and
co-regent of Peter the Great), John VI. Antonovitch came to the throne
at the age of six months, in succession to his great-aunt the cruel and
cynical Anne Joannovna. A few months later he was dethroned by
Elisabeth Petrovna, torn from his family and confined in the strictest
seclusion. Having reached the age of twenty-three, without ever having
seen anything but his gloomy prison walls, without ever experiencing in
his infancy the endearments or the care of a woman, he was killed by his
gaolers just when a young adventurer was striving to free him in order
to proclaim him Emperor (1764). A sadder story has rarely been
recorded in history !

Those who are inclined to believe in Divine vengeance extending
—according tothe Jews—down to the seventh generation, might extract
an argument in support of their thesis from the fact that the Emperor
Nicolas II. represented the seventh generation starting from the Empress
Elisabeth Petrovna, and the little Tsarevitch Alexis the seventh generation
starting from Catherine II., in the second year of whose reign the un-
fortunate John Antonovitch perished in such a ghastly manner.

1917] MY COLLEAGUES 509

The Court left Madrid for La-Granja immediately
after my reception. I stayed in town for another three
weeks in order to become thoroughly acquainted with
the duties (as few in number as they were simple) of my
new post and with my colleagues, | mean more especi-
ally my allied colleagues. France’s Ambassador was
M. Geoffray, a very distinguished and clever man, who,
during a period of extreme difficulty for the representa-
tion of the Republic in Spain, managed to uphold the
French flag while not offending Spanish susceptibilities,
which the Germans would have been ready to enflame
at any favourable opportunity. Great Britain’s Ambas-
sador, Sir Arthur Hardinge, had been a colleague of
mine in Constantinople, where we had both been
Secretaries to the Embassies; he had an original and
quick mind, so that my association with him was as
pleasant as it was useful. At San Sebastian I became
very intimate with my Italian colleague, Count Bonin-
Longare, a true diplomat, whose great tact and broad
views I have always admired. Mr. Willard, United
States Ambassador, with his sound, upright and serious
mind, completed the quartette of my congenial colleagues.
All these colleagues hesitated to start for the summer
season at San Sebastian, for revolutionary movements
were expected in Barcelona, Bilbao and even Madrid,
and so the Government remained in the capital. But at
last we had to flee from the terrific heat of Castile,
quite torrid in summer, and to go to San Sebastian
about the 2oth July. And a few weeks later, when
the Court and the Government were in Santander and
the Diplomatic Corps at San Sebastian, the dreaded
disorders did indeed break out. Dato’s Government
opposed a bold front, displayed much energy, but did
not resort to useless reprisals, so that order was soon
restored, except in Catalonia, where political unrest has
become chronic.

But I will refrain from formulating judgments on
the political situation of a country to which I paid but
a fleeting visit.

510 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

I went from Madrid to San Sebastian by motor-car,
and the country I passed through left a deep impression
in my mind, particularly the beautiful old town of Burgos
with its splendid cathedral, and the ever vivid memories
of the Cid. The corn was already ripe all over Old
Castile; the Basque country with its green mountains,
its beautiful groves of chestnut trees, its large square
farms surrounded by orchards, its magnificent roads, was
most restful to the eye after the sad but grand aridity
of the interior of the country. The population seemed
to me to be dignified, sober, polite, as undaunted in work
as they have always been in the fight. It is quite usual
to describe Spain as a backward country and her popu-
lation as wretched. In any case this does not strike one
at first sight. But well-informed persons have explained
to me the difficult position of the Spanish people—of
the peasants and workmen—due to the very small
revenue from their properties, and the low wages paid
for labour; this state of things is mainly owing to
Spain’s difficulty in competing—as regards produc-
tion—with the other European countries and particu-
larly with America. Centuries had been wasted
for the industrial and economic organisation of the
country: Spain is behindhand with her neighbours
and hence in an inferior position in the general com-
petition. |

Moreover, for centuries the Spanish nation has
chiefly produced devotion, heroism, moderation; a time
came when these “ commodities ” were no longer market-
able, because the preference of the European public had
been given to great industrial effort, and to the rapid
increase of material needs. The events which have just
occurred have caused many long forgotten things to
become fashionable again, and will force the entire
world—if it does not wish its civilisation to perish in
terrible convulsions—to moderate the appetites of the
few and the many, to simplify and restrain their needs.
This evolution will be advantageous to the Spanish
people if they are capable of preserving their old

Se Ce et AE

1917 | GRIEVOUS NEWS FROM RUSSIA 511

traditions, their old virtues: that is my fervent wish for
them.

Meanwhile the news arriving from Russia was be-
coming worse daily. As I said above, the famous
offensive in Galicia had only served to emphasise the
utter demoralisation of the Russian soldier ; very soon
the results became brutally apparent: the Austro-
German Army having merely planned an attacking move-
ment—at once there was a general disbandment on the
whole Russian front; entire divisions, especially those
being held in reserve, began to flee, dragging their
officers with them by force, killing those who tried to
stop them at all costs, carrying off guns, in order to
re-sell them to the Germans later on. Horrible pogrom
scenes, the victims being the Galician populations, Jews
of the large villages and the towns, Orthodox peasants
of the villages without discrimination, took place along
the line of retreat of the “revolutionary army.” The
massacres of Kalusz have, alas! remained famous.

And to this final demoralisation of the Army cor-
responded the growing dissolution of the country. A
Ukrainian rada (assembly) convened by no one and of
which the members had not been elected by any one,
assembled at Kieff and set itself up as the autonomous
Government of the whole of South Russia; in the
country the peasants took possession of the large and
medium-sized properties and divided the land and
all the accessories between them without waiting for
any legislative sanction and without heeding the local
administration, which yet had been elected by the
people themselves. At the head of the State the des-
potism of the extreme parties worked the most radical
changes without awaiting the decisions of the famous
“Constituent,” which nevertheless was on every one’s
lips. Kerensky first became Generalissimo on his own
authority ; finally, to crown everything, he and four of
his colleagues—a kind of Council of Five—on their own
authority and their own initiative proclaimed the Republic,

512 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

of which the Generalissimo naturally became the Presi-
dent. This was announced throughout the country by
means of Government circulars and posters, whereas
Russian representatives abroad received instructions to
defer the notification of this important change to the
Governments to which they were accredited !

On two occasions during the summer of 1917 circum-
stances appeared to furnish Kerensky and his collabo-
rators with the opportunity and the means for restoring
a certain amount of authority to the Government and
for confounding the propaganda, more brazen day by
day, of the Lenins and the Trotskys. The first of these
occasions was when the Bolsheviks raised their shields
and resorted to violence with the help of a few regiments
of the Red Guard and the sailors from Cronstadt. This
pronunciamento failed lamentably although the Govern-
ment was only supported by a few hundreds of loyal
soldiers and by the officers present in the capital, who
performed feats of valour and energy. The Bolsheviks
were ignominiously defeated and had to give in. It
would seem as if after that the Government ought to
have proceeded to arrest the Bolshevist leaders and to
break up the greater part of the battalions of the Red
Guard, the ones that had mutinied in any case. But
Kerensky did nothing of the kind. Fearing a “counter-
revolution” he did not wish to deprive himself of the
Soviet and the Red Guard, which he still hoped to
domesticate.

The second occasion was when the members of the
four consecutive Dumas which had sat in Russia since
1906 and up to 1917, held a meeting in Moscow. Every
one thought that the object of this meeting was to
reconstitute a provisional assembly composed of dele-
gates of all parties and which would have acted until
the election and the convocation of the great Constituent.
But the sole results were some speeches by Kerensky, a
few triumphal processions at the head of which the
Dictator-Generalissimo marched round “his good town
of Moscow,” and a few solemn sittings in the Opera-

1917 | MY¥/BIPMICULT, “POSITION 513

house of the town. Nothing whatever resulted from
these sittings; and as to the fourth Duma—the one for
the defence of which the people had so to speak taken
up arms—it was simply dissolved by a governmental
decree—a decree of which no one took the trouble to
inform the Russian representatives abroad. I at least
only heard of this dissolution very much later.

As I continued to receive more and more grievous
news I began to wonder whether | was entitled to keep
my post as Ambassador, in view of the radical meta-
morphoses undergone by the Provisional Government.
When | had sent in my adherence to this Government in
March it was mainly composed of men whom I con-
sidered respectable and suitable. The abdication of the
Emperor—except as concerned the rights of the little
heir to the throne—had taken place in a regular and
legal manner ; the subsequent act of the selected heir,
the Grand-Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, referred the
question of the succession and that of the definite form of
the Government of the Empire to the decisions of the
future Constituent. Speaking theoretically and generally,
I had no objection to the establishing of a great and
sound Republic in Russia; but it was only the country
itself—through a Constituent Assembly regularly and
calmly elected—which had the right to proclaim such a
tremendous change; hence the decision of M. Kerensky
and his four colleagues was stamped with flagrant
illegality in my eyes.

Finally, at the head of the Government—instead of
Prince Lvoff, President of the Council, originally ap-
pointed by the Emperor, and of M. Rodzianko, President
of the Duma—there was a Dictator with no mandate,
belonging to an extreme party, surrounded by other
protagonists of extreme parties, who laboured to secure
to these parties a crushing majority in the future Con-
stituent, and meantime the support of an armed force
which had lost all notion of discipline. To remainin the
service of the State under such conditions was, especially
for an Ambassador, to lend one’s name to a state of

514 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

affairs which was absolutely illegal and fatal to the
country.

Of course there was an opinion prevailing that honest,
reasonable and expert men should remain all the same
in the service of Russia in order to save whatever could
be saved; should not give up their places to dangerous
quacks and reserve themselves—at their posts—for the
future. This opinion was justifiable; only in order to
profess it, it was necessary to believe firmly that matters
might still be arranged and relative order restored in
the country. That is what I aspired to do, but each
day I lost another shred of hope.

Towards the end of August I went from San
Sebastian to Paris on private business. I stayed there
tendays. My impressions weretruly depressing. Paris
was full of Russians, all official personages, charged
with some mission or other, having work to do either at
the front, or with the Red Cross, or on some financial or
economic commission—in short drawing salaries from
the Russian Exchequer and receiving emoluments on
credit still granted to Russia by allied France. Among
these compatriots I noticed some metamorphoses which
would have made the fortune of a Vauvenargues and
delighted a Pailleron or a de Flers. A young but
pompous official who owed his early career to the
special protection of the Empress Alexandra and the
Vyrubova, now held himself carefully and earnestly
aloof from people whose orthodoxy in Socialist and
revolutionary matters might be open to suspicion.
Another gentleman—plausible but rather too clever at
times—whom I had overheard a few years ago relating
how he had gone down on his knees in front of the
little Tsarevitch so that the delightful child could play
more easily with his decorations, now aired the views
of a Brutus and was always in the company of those
beloved and worthy Russian revolutionaries come back
as masters to that same Paris where they had formerly
lived as poor exiles. The beaming and radiant smiles
which had formerly broken out at the mere sight of a

1917] I GO TO PARIS S15
fold of a grand-duchess’s dress, the graceful bows, the
discreetly warm handshakes were now all bestowed on
former convicts—martyrs to that liberty at last trium-
phant! And all these people sought the approbation
and the favour of the “special commissaries” of the Pro-
visional Government and of the Sovets who were being
established in foreign parts so that they could convince
themselves of the fidelity and good behaviour of the
former “agents of Tsarism” who had become the ser-
vants of revolutionary Russia so promptly and so spon-
taneously! These “commissaries” were sometimes
sedate men quite capable of assuming the direction of
affairs, but there were also some curious specimens,
for instance, the famous M. Svatikoff who went abroad
armed—according to him—with unlimited mandates,
who caused ambassadors to tremble and dismissed
military agents, and who was finally disowned by the
Central Government for having abused his power,
which was extremely limited as a matter of fact.

When I saw this spectacle of human frailty before
me, I could not help cross-examining myself and
thinking: “Is it possible that I should really be like
those people? Should I fear so terribly for my personal
career and for the comfort I derive from it?”

I was still in Paris when the news arrived of the
taking of Riga and the islands of Oesel and Moon by
the Germans and of their invasion of Livonia and
Esthonia. The most fervent admirers of the Kerensky
régime bowed their heads and admitted that things
were going badly. Every minute one might expect to
hear of an overwhelming advance by the German
armies on Petrograd. It was not yet known that our
adversaries were contriving a very different conclusion
—that of a shameful treaty agreed to by the Bolshevist
rabble.

The day before my departure from Paris my pre-
decessor in Madrid, Prince John Kudascheff, came to
call on me in my hotel. We talked mournfully of
what was going on in our country. “No,” I said in

2L

516 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

_ conclusion, “I cannot bear it any longer, I shall go, I
shall leave the service!” My colleague tried to dissuade
me, but I repeated that I was at the end of my tether.

A few days after my return to San Sebastian the
details of the surrender of Riga and the Island of
Moon to the Germans appeared in the newspapers: the
soldiers had bound their officers with ropes and given
them into the hands of the enemy; other heartrending
news, from different parts of Russia, came to add them-
selves to these revolting details. It was obvious to me
that in less than two months we should have no more
power and should not even exist as a constituted
State, that in consequence we should no longer exist
for the Alliance. I thought it my duty to impart ,
this gloomy view to my allied colleagues, who—if I am
not wrong—did not conceal it from their respective
Governments.

Personally what had | still to expect? From the
very beginning of the Revolution I had sacrificed many
habits and points of view—‘“ many prejudices” let us
say—which up till then had accompanied me in my
intellectual existence and throughout my long career ;
then later I had consented to recognise as directors of
Russian politics men whose ideas were completely
foreign to me and which seemed to be pernicious for
my country; I am speaking of M. Kerensky and of the
extreme revolutionary Socialists who surrounded him ;
I received orders from these men and [| almost en-
deavoured to put myself on their level. In the name of
who or what ought I to continue to make this sacrifice
of my dignity, my past, my most cherished convictions ?
In the name of your country, I was answered. But
Russia—I could see it clearly—could no longer be held
back on the slope of treachery and dissolution on which
she was descending lower and lower. Besides what
could I do in Madrid to help the good cause and fight
the bad? My position there was becoming an ofium
cum indignitate which I could not and should not endure.

1917] . I RESIGN 517

Since my return to San Sebastian I had set myself
to draw up the telegram which I| should send to M.
Kerensky as soon as I had definitely decided to leave
the service. After several erasures | settled on the word-
ing, and on the roth and 11th September, I imparted
my decision to my colleagues of France and Italy, with
whom I was living in proximity and intimacy at the
Hotel Marie-Christina. They both pressed me to
give up my plan. The day before the news of the
taking up of arms by General Korniloff had appeared in
the papers; my good colleagues wished to extract from
this some arguments to combat my decision by the
hope of an early change in Russia which might alter the
aspect of things. I replied that I did not share their
hope ; that Korniloff’s attempt had come too late, that it
would not succeed, and that this failure would bring
about a still further dissolution of my unhappy country.
On the morning of the 12th September, I sent off the
following telegram in Russian and in plain language to
M. Kerensky :

“The latest events have proved that the Provisional
Government, as at present constituted, does not corre-
spond either to legality or to the exceptional circum-
stances of the terrible epoch we are passing through. The
Duma has been virtually abolished ; by whom no one
knows. On‘the other hand, the Soviet of the deputies,
soldiers and workmen, of an absolutely despotic nature,
acts side by side with the Government, and the Govern-
ment humbles itself before it.

“This illegal state of things is the cause of: the
shameful flight of the Rusian soldiers before the enemy,
the impunity of the most bare-faced and brutal crimes,
the open propaganda of treachery to the country and to
the Allies, the destruction of all the vital functions of
the country, the threatened dismemberment of the sacred
body of the Russian nation.

“T have long awaited some bright spot, some more
favourable turn of affairs, but all my hopes have been
vain. The shame and the misfortunes of Russia only

518 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

grow and become worse, and the Government is power-
less to remedy them, for it personifies the tyranny of
an extreme party and only pursues the ends of that
party.

“Under the circumstances J consider it my duty as
an honest man to tell you this openly, and my duty as

a citizen to give up all service to the State until such.

time as a lawful state of things is established in Russia,
that is to say until the Soviet is abolished, the Duma
convened and the Provisional Government returns to
power such as it was constituted at the beginning.

“From to-day I no longer consider myself as Russian
Ambassador in Spain. I do not solicit, nor would |
accept any pension from the present Government.

“My decision will be communicated by me to the
Spanish Government, and the contents of this telegram
to the allied Ambassadors.—(Signed) Nekludoff.”

Two days after the sending of the above-quoted
telegram, to which of course I received no reply, His
Majesty Alfonso XIII. arrived at San Sebastian from
Santander, and was kind enough to grant me an audience
of farewell. Although he did not conceal his displeasure
at my abrupt decision, the King deigned to be much
interested in me, and to show me much kindness. He
kept me for some time, and I was able to explain to him
all the reasons which had forced me to leave the service.
We discussed what was happening in my unhappy
country, and I had an opportunity of noticing the
fairness of the King’s views, his moderation and great
cleverness. This last audience, incorporating itself with
the recollection of the first, revived my regret at re-
signing my appointment to a Sovereign so eminently
congenial to me.

Queen Marie Christina, with whom I had had the
honour of talking at some length not long before, also
wished to receive me before my departure. This time,
as on the first occasion, | was charmed by the conversa-
tion of the ex-Regent, by her thorough knowledge of

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17] LETTER TO M. TERESTCHENKO 519

political matters and of human nature, as well as by her
extreme affability.

In view of my sincere sympathies with regard to M.
Terestchenko, whom I had known when he was not
much more than a youth at his worthy mother’s house,
I wrote him a private letter under date of the 23rd
September, in which I revealed the whole origin of my
resolution, and said, amongst other things, as follows:

“Tt has been proved to me that M. Kerensky, what-
ever his enthusiasm and sincerity, is neither a statesman
nor a fit man to govern, but merely the leader of a party.
His whole past grips him, and does not allow him to
view the position frankly. And both he and you are
surrounded by men with whom I can have nothing in
common, and whom I rightly look on as enemies of
our country.

“T see clearly,” I concluded, “that in yielding one
position after another, Kerensky and you are helping,
though involuntarily, to pile up the monstrous and in-
appropriate erection of an anarchical Russia, an erection
which will end by falling and by burying you under the
ruins!”

This prophecy was fulfilled exactly six weeks later.
If I had been able to foresee, when writing those lines,
the base and treacherous role that M. Kerensky was to
play so soon after over the taking up of arms by Korniloff,
I should never have spoken of him in such indulgent
terms, still less should I have bracketed his name with
the honourable name of M. Michael Terestchenko.

What occurred immediately after the winding up of
Korniloffs hazardous enterprise in the bosom of the
Provisional Government of Petrograd does not come
within the scope of these Reminiscences. But I am
still wondering how, under those very circumstances,
honourable men professing moderate opinions,! could
have consented to be in the Government and sit next
the “ Dictator,” instead of keeping carefully away from

} These were some young, very rich and ambitious merchants, and
big manufacturers of Moscow.

520 IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE [cuap. xxv.

him. If it was a combination of opportunism and the

wish to bring a counterpoise to the pranks of the party ©

in power, this combination failed miserably, for a month
later the whole “erection” crumbled, and MM. Lenin
and Trotsky took over the power and the destiny of
unfortunate Russia. There are occasions on which
opportunism becomes either pusillanimity or lack of
discernment.

When I sent my telegram to Kerensky the Counsellor
to our Embassy in Madrid, M. S——ff, was absent.
He was resting at Biarritz, for prior to my arrival he
had been at the head of affairs foralong time. Having
arrived at San Sebastian and taken up his work with me,
this gentleman, who was not lacking in wit or charm,
but whom I had always considered to be devoid of real
intelligence and moral distinction, hastened to telegraph
to the Foreign Office in Petrograd to say that he himself
and the other members of the Embassy (there were three
altogether), thoroughly disapproved of my telegram,
“which, moreover, had been dispatched by their chief
when he was in a state of acute neurasthenia” ; that they
professed profound esteem and unlimited devotion for
the Provisional Government and for M. Kerensky, and
were entirely at his disposal, etc.

This proceeding, which I only heard of much later,
did not have the desired result for my ex-colleague,
z.é. the renewal of a long term of management at the
Embassy. The post of “ Ambassador of M. Kerensky,”
which I had resigned, very soon found a candidate in
the person of M. Stahovitch, who had just given up the
Governorship-General of Finland after three months of
earnest but vain efforts at conciliation. The new Am-
bassador hastened to take up his post, and to leave
Russia, where things were becoming far too hot. But
all the same he started too late: a week after his de-
parture the Bolsheviks were already masters of the
Government, and his credentials, signed by M. Kerensky,
had no longer any value. I do not exactly know what
position has been allotted to him in Madrid. ~

1917] INTO EXILE 521

As to M. S——fi, towards the spring of 1918, when
every one in Europe was beginning to fear or to anticipate
the final success of Germany, he paraded his German
sympathies so obviously, was so often seen in public
with German diplomats, that he was at last made to
leave his post and Spain (his supplies were probably
cut off). Still less was he allowed to reside in France,
he only passed through on his way to Switzerland ;
from there he went to Poland—under German domina-
tion at that time—to endeavour to save a property he
owned there.t I do not know what has since become
of him.

On the 25th September, 1917, I finally left San
Sebastian, bidding farewell to the beautiful Kingdom of
Spain. I regretfully took leave of a few congenial
Spaniards whose acquaintance I had made during my
short stay, and of the four allied Ambassadors with
whom I had had such pleasant intercourse, and I got
into the motor-car of another charming colleague, the
Rumanian Minister, M. Cretzeano, who was kind enough
to take me as far as Biarritz.

By leaving San Sebastian I was giving up—not only
my post—but my long diplomatic career, commenced in
1881. And I was not wending my way homewards—I
was going into exile!

1A Polish patriot’s estate confiscated in 1863 and given to M.
S——ff’s father, at that period Under-Secretary of State for Poland,

INDEX

ABDUL-Azis, Sultan of Turkey, 39

Abdul-Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, de-
posed, 18, 22; reception of King
Ferdinand, 116

Aberdeen, 500

Abo, 301

About, Edmund, Zhe Man with the
broken Ear, 225

Adana, massacre of, 22

Adrianople, 122, 128 note, 129; siege,
116, 122, 134; annexation, 130 ; cap-
tured by Turks, 146, 197, 208 ; taken
by Bulgarians, 154; outbreak of
cholera, 155; advance of the Turks,

195

Adriatic, the, 129

figean Sea, 121, 123, 124, 125, 132

Aerenthal, M. d’, 14; interview with
M. Isvolsky, 19; title of Count con-
ferred, 20

Aland Islands, 248, 348, 354, 356, 412,
415-417; neutralisation, 357

Albania, 132; autonomy, 129, 161

Albanians, relations with Greeks, 157

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, 489 ;
policy to Bessarabia, 151 ; history of
his reign, 405

Alexander II., Emperor of Russia, 40,
261; letter to Prince Alexander of
Battenberg, 159 ; reforms, 483

Alexander III., Emperor of Russia, the
sixteen quarterings, 258 ; aversion for
Germany, 258

Alexander Palace, 72

Alexandra, Empress of Russia, gift to
King Ferdinand, 62 ; under the in-
fluence of Rasputin, 67, 73, 419, 435 ;
at St. Petersburg, 72; at Livadia,
224; indisposition, 224, 227, 230;
adoration of Prince Galitzyn, 396;
receives M. Nekludoff, 402-404 ;
change in her appearance, 402;
under the influence of Stiirmer, 419,
435 ; influence over the Emperor, 419,
420; receives official reports, 446 ;
refuses to stop the Rasputin scandal,

4555 prisoner, 473

Alexandrovsk, port of, 264 mote, 344,
See Murmansk

Alexieff, General, Chief of the General
Staff, 350; assumes direction of the
war, 421

Alexis, Tsarevitch of Russia, 73; at
Mohilev, 421 ; tutor, 421

Alfonso XIII., King of Spain, interest
in the protection of prisoners of war,
361; receives M. Nekludoff, 500-
504, 518; wish for the liberation of
Nicolas II., 503, 504

Amalfi, Duchess of, 276

Amalfi, Duke of, Spanish Minister to
Stockholm, 276, 290; work for the
protection of Russians in enemy
countries, 360

Anastasia, Grand-Duchess, 313; at
Livadia, 229 ; unknown fate, 229

Andrew, Grand-Duke, at Sofia, 57, 74

Andronnikoff, Prince, 70

Anne Joannovna, Empress, 508 zo¢e

Apponyi, Count, at the Conference at
Stockholm, 364

Arab-Konak Pass, 195

Archangel port, 336

Arda, the, 123

Armenia, 348; condition, 22; mas-
sacres, 318; lecture on, 484

Arras, 320

Asiago, attack on, 424

Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., policy re-
specting Serbia, 134

Assanovitch, Colonel, Russian military
attaché in Sweden, 265; charges
against, 265, 275, 293

Athos, Mount, or ‘‘ The Republic of
Twenty Monasteries,” 203-207 ;
position of the Russian monks, 205,
206 ; proposed independence, 203,
207, 210; result of dissensions among
the monks, 212 ; sent to Russia, 213

Austria- Hungary, relations with Russia,
18 ; annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 19; policy to the Balkan
States, 129 ; opposes Serbia’s claim
to an outlet on the Adriatic, 134

523

524 INDEX

wish to attack Serbia, 197 ; demands
revision of the Bukharest Treaty, 209 ;
ultimatum to Serbia, 280, 288, 290 ;
policy against, 295; change in the
policy, 326

Austro-Hungarian army, advance into
Poland, 322: defeated, 323; sur-
render of regiments, 323; amalga-
mated with German contingents, 326 ;
attack on Asiago, 424

Azes, the, 255

BADEN, Grand-Duchess Louisa of,
260

Baden, Grand-Duchy of, 260

Baden, Prince Max of, 260; at the
Conference at Stockholm, 364

Bakst, the painter, in Paris, 223

Balkan States, 18, 22; climate, 115;
demarcation of the frontier, 129, 208,
211; solution of the question, 161 ;
relations between, 162; division of
territory, 169; War, 91, 112, 130,
189; mobilisation of the armies, 108 ;
declaration of the Powers, 109;
armistice, 155, 169; signed, 202;
negotiations for peace, 194; con-
ditions of peace with Turkey, 203;
alliance against Bulgaria, 214

Baltchik, port of, 210

Baltic, the, 379 3 question of, 355

Baltic Provinces, 488

Baranovitchi, 350

Bark, M., Minister of Finance, 241

Basil II., Emperor, 192

Battenberg, Prince Alexander of Bul-
garia, 3; abdication, 8; letter from
Alexander II., 159

Beauharnais, Eugene, 259

Belachitza, range of, 192, 194, 208;
defeat at, 315

Belfort, 320

Belgian Army, retreat, 320

Belgium, invasion of Germans, 311;
atrocities, 318

Belgrade, 49, 100

Beliaieff, General, Chief of the General
Staff, 387; interview with M. Neklu-
doff, 389; charges against, 396

Belogradchik, 195

Below, Herr von, 145 ; audiences with
King Ferdinand, 146, 199

Benckendorf, Count, Russian Ambas-
sador to London, 134; rumours of
his departure, 450

Bentkowski, 302

Berchtold, Count, 283

Bergen, 499

Berlin, Congress of, 20

Bernadotte, Marshal, Prince of Ponte-
Corvo, elected King of Sweden, 248

Bessarabia, ceded to Russia, 147; an-
nexation, 150; privileges conferred
on, 151

Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von, 223

Biberstein, Baron Marshal von, depar-
ture from Constantinople, 93 ; death,

93
Bitolia, 112
Black Sea, 114, 121, 125, 344; Fleet,

34

Bobrikoff, Governor-General of Fin-
land, 94

Bolsheviks, the, commit murders, 431 ;
policy, 480; at Stockholm, 483;
propaganda, 497; defeated, 512

Bomarsund, fortress of, 354

Bondestog, or peasants’ procession in
Sweden, 266

Bonin-Longare, Count, Italian Am-
bassador to Madrid, 509

Boris, Grand-Duke, 237

Bosdari, Count, Italian Minister to
Sofia, 83

Bosnia, annexation of, 14, 19, 20, 40°

Bosphorus, the, 92

Bostroem, Vice-Admiral, in command
of the Black Sea Fleet, 34, 36; ship
aground, 36

Bovary, Mdme., description of diplo-
matists, 240

Brandenburg, prisoners’ camp in, 373

Branting, Hjalmar, head of the Swedish
Socialist party, 306, 418; policy,
309 ; at the Auditorium meeting, 483

Bregalnitza, the, 169, 185, 194, 208

British Army, in Belgium, retreat, 320

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count, German
Minister to Copenhagen, 278

Brugére, General, 294

Brunswick, Grand-Duke of, marriage,
168. See Cumberland.

Brussiloff, General, in command of the
military operations in Galicia, 388
note, 423

Buchlau, 19

Budberg, Baron, characteristics, 244 ;
Ambassador to Madrid, 245

Buhakoff, General, 95

Bukharest, entry of Mackensen, 445 ;
Treaty of, 45 mote, 86, 150, 214, 215,
217; Peace Conference of, 201, 202,
207, 231

Bukowina, 323, 388 zo¢e; reoccupied
by Russians, 424

Bulair, 121

Bulgaria, relations with Russia, 20, 231 ;
independence, 21 ; payment of the
debt to Russia, 27; relations with

ek iy ee

————

INDEX 525

Serbia, 38, 135, 137, 239} principal
phases, 39-43 ; massacres, 40; negoti-
ations with Serbia, 52-57 ; demarca-
tion of the frontier, 52, 53, 55) 125,
203, 209, 211; settled, 56; agree-
ment with Serbia, 56, 64; military
convention with Russia, 74; with
Serbia, 96, 98; alliance with Greece,
98; celebration of the feast of
veterans, IOI; agreement with
Montenegro, 103; mobilisation of
the army, 108-110; war with Turkey,
111; condition of the roads, 115;
Bulgar-Vilayet, 1163; national
anthem, 122 ; instructions on the rule
of the *‘ prohibited area,” 123 ; Adria-
nople and Thrace ceded to, 130, 210;
relations with Greece, 135, 137; with
Rumania, 147; claims to Dobrudja,
147 ; acquisition of Deli-Orman, 148 ;
cession of territories, 153; partition
of Macedonia, 164; accepts arbitra-
tion of Russia, 174; constitutional
custom, 178; preparations for war,
181 ; war declared, 189 ; advance of
‘the Allies, 195; peace conditions,
202 ; alliance against, 214 ; co-opera-
tion with Germany, 215; return of
the troops, 217 ; result of the entry
into the war, 303, 336

Bulgaria, Prince Alexander of, 3

Bulgaria, Crown Prince Boris of, re-
ceived into the Orthodox Church, 9 ;
at Kieff, 30, 31; appearance, 31;
festivities on his coming of age, 57,
74; at Sofia, 232

Bulgaria, See Eleanor, Queen; Ferdi-
nand

Bulgarian Army, occupy Pirot, 41 ; ad-
vance on Salonika, 113, 169 ; short-
age of munitions, 114; victory of
Lozengrad, 111 ; march on Constan-
tinople, 114, 120; attack on Chat-
aldja, 121; on Adrianople, 154;
treatment of the wounded, 160; col-
lision with Greeks, 168; defeated,
168, 190, 192, 315; attack on the
Serbians, 185, 189 ; refuse to be sent
to Macedonia, 191 ; officers on the
reserve, 119 ote; division, 192 xo¢e ;
surrender, 195 ; entry in Sofia, 217 ;
march-past of the troops, 218

Bulgarians, the, 347 mote; flag ‘‘ of
Samara,” 102; characteristics, 102,
138, 155, 156, 1593 relations with
Greeks, 114, 120; religious views,
119; cruelty, 155-157, 160, 192;
treatment of Turks, 156; result of

Turkish domination, 157; national |

hierarchy abolished, 158; national

policy, 159 ; relations with Serbians,
161

Burgos, 510

Burian, M., 326

Burschillos, meaning of the word, 343

Burtzeff, imprisoned, 377

Buxhoeveden, Baron de, at Copen-
hagen, 279

CAMBON, M. Jules, Ambassador to
Berlin, famous dispatch, 244; fears
the policy of Germany, 282

Carlotti, Marquis, Italian Ambassador
to St. Petersburg, 406

Carpathians, the, 323, 329, 348

Casso, M., Minister for Education, re-
actionary policy, 284; treatment in
Germany, 315; death, 316

Castellane, Countess Jean de, 292

Castro-Fejo, M., Portuguese Minister
to Sweden, 276

Catalonia, unrest in, 509

Catherine II., Empress of Russia, 489,
508 zote ; reforms, 346

Caucasus, the, 329, 348 ; independence
proclaimed, 497

Cetigne, 88

Chalcidice, occupied by Greeks, 132,
169

Charleroi, 320

Charles Albert, Archduke, of Austria,

57
| Charles, King of Rumania, 149 ; pre-

sented with the 4é@tonx of Russian
Field-Marshal, 152

Charles X., King of Sweden, 489

Charles XI., King of Sweden, 489

Charles XII., King of Sweden, 247;
statue of, 262

Charles XIII., King of Sweden, 248

Charles John XIV., King of Sweden,
248

einig XKV., King of Sweden, 248,
259; reforms, 249

Charles, Prince, of Sweden, charac-
teristics, 270; President of the Red
Cross, 345; work for the prisoners
of war, 361, 364 zote; organises
the transfer of the wounded, 366

Chataldja, 29, 114, 120 ; attack on, [21

Clementine, Princess, 7 ; death, 8, 12

Clery, Mdlle., 259

Clive, Mr., First Secretary to the British
Legation at Stockholm, 486

Clive, Mrs., 492

Coburg, Prince Ferdinand of, 7. See
Ferdinand

Cologne Gazette, article in the, 339

Connaught, Princess Margaret of, 270

Constant, Benjamin, saying of, 378

526

Constantine XIV., King of Greece, 210,
2 WA 3 on the Bulgarian aggression,
I

Constantine, ‘ Diadoch,” advance on
Salonika, 113

Constantinople, 92; palace revolution
in, 40; fire at, 93; panic in, 114;
solution of the Straits question, 117

Constantinovitch, John, 211

Constanza, 34, 36

Courland, 349 ; invaded by the German
Army, 419, 424

Cracow, 323, 349; union with Vilna,

379
Crete, island of, 203 ; restored to Greece,

Cretzeano, M., Rumanian Minister to
Madrid, 521

Crimea, the, climate, 227

Cronstadt, insurrection at, 35 ; Fleet at,

475

Cumberland, Duke of, marriage, 168,
See Brunswick

Cyril, Grand-Duchess, 237; effort to
stop the Rasputin scandal, 455

Czechs, the, surrender, 323

eta ae Marie, 238. See Narich-
<in

DALMATIA, 157

Dalsland, 250, 266

Danev, M., policy, 23, 96; Home
Secretary, 26 ; attack on King Ferdi-
nand, 27 ; on the demarcation of the
frontier, 53; at the head of the
Activist” party, 82; mission to
Livadia, 82; at the Conference in
London, 128 ; character of his policy,
164; return from London, 176; inter-
views with M. Nekludoff, 176-181 ;
obstinacy and presumption, 177, 181 ;
entrusted to form a Cabinet, 179 ;
foreign policy, 180; delegate to St.
Petersburg, 183; delays in starting,
184; advice from M. Nekludoff, 193,
196; resignation, 196; attempt to
commit suicide, 216

Danish Red Cross, member of the,
audience with Empress Alexandra,
473 ; witnesses the Revolution, 473

Danube, the, 193 ; bridges over, 195

Danubian Principalities, 151

Dardanelles, the, 121

Dato, M., President of the Council,
receives M. Nekludoff, 506

Davos, 5, 44

Dedeagatch, 123, 126, 129, 210

Dedulin, ‘General du jour,” death,
224; funeral, 225

Deli-Orman, 148, 210

INDEX

Demir-Hissar, 209

Demotika, 210

Denmark, commercial spirit, 257 ; over-
tures from Germany, 352

Denmark, King of, meeting with King
Gustaf V. at Malmo, 286

Denmark, Princess Ingeborg of, 366;
characteristics, 270

Devaux, Baron, 276

Diedring, M., work for the prisoners of
war, 364 note

Djavids, the, 23

Dmitri, Grand-Duke, at the murder’of
Rasputin, 457; arrest and banish-
ment, 457

Dniester, the, 379

Dobiecki, M., 3738

Dobritch, 148, 210

Dobrovitch, M., 90, 172, 184, 198

Dobrovolsky, M., appointed Minister of
Justice, 452; occult views, 452 :

Dobrudja, 210; population, 147 ; recti-
fication of frontiers, 129 ;

Dogger Bank incident, International
Commission of Inquiry, 36

Dolomites, 349

Drama, 194, 209

Dubassoff, Admiral, 36

Dubiagsky, M., 185

Duma, the, members of, at Stockholm,
413}; refuses to dissolve, 466; dis-
solved, 474, 513

Dumbadze, General, military governor
of Yalta, 225 ; characteristics, 226 ;
despotic rule, 226 ; orders Rasputin
to leave Yalta, 226; interview with
Nicolas I1., 227

Durazzo, 132

Dvina, the, 350

E——, M., supernumerary counsellor
to M. Nekludoff, 449; intrigues,
450; dismissal, 450

Economic Conference of the Allies,

454

Ehrensvaerd, Baron, 265

Fitel-Frederich, Prince, in command
of destroyers, 287 ; unknown destina-
tion; iO) 1s

Eleanor, Queen of Bulgaria, 12, 16;

receives the Black Sea Fleet at Varna,,

34,36 ; interview with M. Nekludoff,
234-236; death, 236

Elena, district of, 158

Elisabeth Petrovna, Empress, 508 vo/e

England, negotiations with Sweden, on
the control of imported goods, 335 ;
result of the blockade in Sweden,

353
Enos, 123, 169, 203

INDEX

Enver-Bey, military agent in Berlin,
23 ; promunciamento, 130

Epirus, occupied by Greeks, 132

Ergene, 125, 137

Erzerum, 348 ; capture of, 387, 400

Esthonia, 487-492; frontiers, 490; in-
vaded by Germans, 515

Eugene Napoleon, Prince of Sweden,
270; landscape;painter, 271

Euxinograd, 34, 36

FERDINAND, King of Bulgaria, policy,
2, 164; relations with M. Sementov-
sky, 2; distrust of foreign representa-
tives, 2; characteristics, 3, 7, 10, 14,
269 ; parents, 7; unpopularity, 7,
217 ; death of his mother, 8 ; marriage,
8 ; conferences with Prince Lobanoff,
9; reception of his son into the Ortho-
dox Church, 9; reconciliation with
Russia, 9 ; contempt for his subjects,
9g; school for officers, 11; second
marriage, 12; political intrigues, 12;
consolidation of his throne and the
career of his subjects, 13 ; tendency
to neurasthenia, 13}; indecision, 14,
269 ; suspiciousness, 14; audiences
with M. Nekludoff, 16, 54, 62-65,
106, 169, 232-234 ; assumes title of
Tsar, 21; absence from Sofia, 27 ;
Jubilee celebrations, 29, 91,105, 143 ;
on the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations,
53, 63-65; the coming of age of
Prince Boris, 57, 74; financial diffi-
culties, 59; a mortgage on Vrana,
59; loan advanced to, 61; art
treasures, 62; wish to get rid of M.
Nekludoff, 85, 1733 audience with
Shelking, 90; relations with M.
Nekludoff, 90; dread of war, 105 ;
ambition, 105, 125; pride in the
victories of the Bulgarian Army, 116 ;
meeting with Abdul-Hamid, 116;
the Straits question, 117-119; ona
reconciliation with Rome, 119g ; pre-
parations for the entry into Constan-
tinople, 120; headquarters, 121;
wish to possess Rodosto, 126-128,
130; secret schemes, 126-128 ; inac-
cessible to Ministers, 142-146; at
the cathedral service, 143-145 ; audi-
ences with M. Panofieu, 145; with
Herr von Below, r46, 199; treatment
of the Serbians, 155 ; postpones entry
into Adrianople, 156; telegram to
Tsar, 173; power to appoint Minis-
ters, 178; on sending a delegate to
St. Petersburg, 183 ; instructions to
General Savov, 188; summons his
Ministers, 198-201 ; on the critical

527

situation, 199; readiness for flight,
216; heads the procession of the
troops, 218 ; duplicity, 270 ; audience
with M. Savinsky, 391

'Fichev, General, Chief of the Bulgarian

General Staff, 29; reception in St.
Petersburg, 29, 76; protest against
the advance on Constantinople, 115

Finland, 262 ; in possession of Russia,
248; secession from, 347 ; autonomy,
441; policy, 489

Finmark, reindeer forests of, 355

Finnish or Ural-Altaic race, 347 note

Finns, the, 488; characteristics, 262,
347 vole

Fontanka, mansion of, 238

‘* Ford Peace Troupe,” 352

France, phil-hellenism, 211 ; friendship
with Sweden, 254; unpreparedness
for war, 297 ; declaration on neutrality
of Sweden, 308; atrocities of
Germans, 318; trench-warfare, 329

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke of
Austria, assassinated, 283, 286

Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria,
Jubilee, 19

Frederick III., Emperor of Germany,
259; friendship with King Oscar II.,
259

Fredericsz, Count, Court Minister, 228

French Army, retreat, 320 ; successes,

20
‘© Wruschka-Goa,”” monasteries of the,

157

GABROVA, district of, 158

Gagaiizi, the, 147

Galata, 92

Galicia, 322; occupied by the Russian
Army, 323, 329; result of their rule,
329 ; military operations in, 348, 423,
424, 433, 500; evacuated, 350

Galitzyn, Prince Nicolas D., 395 ; presi-
dent of Russian Red Cross, 396;
characteristics, 396; interview with
M. Nekludoff, 396; devotion to
Empress Alexandra, 396; President
of the Council, 396; imprisoned,
397 ; Prime Minister, 458; declara-
tion, 477

Gallieni, General, 320

Gallipoli, peninsula of, 121

Gardner, Professor, at Stockholm, 375

Gennadiev, M., prosecution, 26; on
the advance of the Bulgarian troops,
187; Foreign Secretary, 196, 199 ;
characteristics, 196; imprisonment,

393
Geoffray, M., French Ambasasdor to
Madrid, 509

528 INDEX .

George, King of Greece, 141, 282;
assassinated, 144

German agents, influence in Russia,
408-410, 463, 477, 478, 485; Army,
advance in Belgium, 320; retreat,
320; reinforcements in Galicia, 323,
329 ; advance on Warsaw repelled,
329; systematic ravages, 363 xo/e ;
advance on Courland, 419; take
Riga, 515, 516; destroyers in the
Sound, 287 ;spies at Stockholm, 383 ;
submarines, 500

Germany, loss of influence in Constanti-
nople, 18; policy in Balkan States,
110, 146, 197; influence in Turkey,
123, 215; opposes reinstatement of
the Bulgarians, 210; co-operation of
Turkey and Bulgaria, 215; relations
with Sweden, 255-258, 342; trade
with, 257, 337; influence over, 259-
262; relations with Russia, 261;
attempts to secure alliance with
Sweden, 272; preparations for war,
280, 295, 312; ultimatum to Russia,
282, 296; declaration of war, 304;
resources, 249, 310; invasion of
Belgium, 311; losses, 312; treat-
ment of refugees, 313, 3173 war
methods, 318 ; treatment of prisoners,
318, 362-365, 368; military opera-
tions in East Prussia, 319, 349;
supply of coal to Sweden, 335;
intrigues, 341; invincibility, 350;
proposals of peace with Russia, 351;
overtures to Denmark, 352; result
of propaganda, 363; reprisal camps,
365 ; revolutionary literature sent to
Russia, 409

Giers, Michel de, Russian Ambassador
to Constantinople, 92, 104, 150, 355 ;
on the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, 93;
opinion of the Turkish Army, 94;
warning to the Bulgarians on war
with Turkey, 105; Minister to
Bukharest, 149

Giurgevo, 220

Godunoff, Boris, 423

Goremykin, M., 89; President of the
Council, 241 ; infirmities, 242 ; policy,
284; retirement, 393

Gorlice, attack at, 349

Gortchakoff, Prince, 40, 48, 261, 355;
famous saying, 285

Gottenburg, 252

Gourko, General, 101

Great Britain, entry into the war, 307,
311; declaration on neutrality of
Sweden, 308

Greece, alliance with Bulgaria, 98;
with Serbia, 98, 163, 169 ; mobilisa-

tion of the army, 108; war with
Turkey, 111; Crete restored to,
132; acquisition of territories, 132;
relations. with Serbia and Bulgaria,
135, 1373; demarcation of the
frontier, 140, 203, 209, 211; wish
for the arbitration of Russia, 174;
relations with, 204

Greece, Crown Prince of, at Sofia, §7

Greece, Prince Nicolas of, marriage,
211; mission to St. Petersburg, 448 ;
accusations against M. Nekludoff,
449

Greek Army, advance on Salonika, 113 ;
defeat the Bulgarians, 168, 192;
occupy Salonika and Chalcidice, 169 ;
capture Rilo-Dagh, 195 ; advance on
Samokov, 197; relations with the
Bulgarians, 114, 129

Greeks, spiritual hierarchy over Turkey,
157; relations with Turks and
Albanians, 157 ; hatred of Bulgarians,
158, 168

Greffulhe, Countess de, 292

Grey, Sir Edward, policy regarding
Serbia, 135

Grodno, 349 ; defence of, 95

Gruber, M., 392

Gueshov, M., Coalition Ministry, 17,
24; character, 25 ; attitude towards
Russia, 25; Foreign Secretary, 27 ;
on the demarcation of the frontier, 53 ;
interviews with M. Nekludoff, 66,
141-143, 170, 176; on the military
Convention between Bulgaria and
Serbia, 98 ; on the condition of the
Turkish Army, 104; declaration
from the representatives of the
Powers, 109; on the cession of
territory to Rumania, 153; interview
with M. Pachitch, 170, 172 ; resigna-
tion, 172, 178

Gulkevitch, M., 463

Gustaf III., King of Sweden, 247

Gustaf IV., King of Sweden, 248, 254

Gustaf V., King of Sweden, 232;
promise to the Bondestog, 266 ; opera-
tion, 268, 271 ; receives M. Nekludoff,
269, 307, 411-413 ; Sincerity, 272;
trust in his Ministers, 273 ; opens the
Riksdag, 279; meeting with the
King of Denmark at Malmo, 286;
receives Pres. Poincaré, 289 ; banquet,
291 ; telegrams, 292, 293 ; reception,
293; on the neutrality of Sweden,
307, 309; meets King of Norway at
Malm6, 330 ; letter to the Tsar, 356 ;
message from him, 411 ; wish to stop
the war, 412; takes leave of M.
Nekludoff, 498

INDEX

Gustavus Adolphus, 489

Gutchkoff, Alexander, Minister for War,
action in the Revolution, 478; dis-
missed, 476

Gutchkoff, M., on the sinister influences
dominating the Court, 67 ; interviews
with M. Nekludoff, 78, 99; duel
with Miassoiedoff, 78 ; at Sofia, 98 ;
at Belgrade, 1003; departure from,
100

HAAKON VII., King of Norway, meet-
ing with the King of Sweden at
Malmo, 330

Hadik, Count, Austro-Hungarian
Minister, in Sweden, 277, 291, 342

Hadji-Oglu Bazardjik, 148

Hallsberg, 367

Hammarskiold, M, de, Prime Minister,
267, 273; policy, 417

Hammerfest, 263

Haparanda, 366

Hardinge, Sir Arthur, Ambassador to
Madrid, 509

Harte, Rev. Clinton, work for the
prisoners of war, 362

Hartwig, M., 39; interview with M.
Nekludoff, 46; on relations between
Bulgaria and Serbia, 463; charac-
teristics, 47, 50, 163; career, 48;
Director of the Asiatic Department,
49; Minister at Teheran, 49; at
Belgrade, 49; knowledge of the
Slavs, 49; flaws in his reasoning
powers, 50; Mayor of Belgrade, 100 ;
conferences with M. Venizelos, 139 ;
proposed Balkan alliance, 162;
death, 163

Hasselbaken, 425; banquet at, 431

Hedwig, Queen, marriage, 379

Helen, Grand-Duchess, marriage, 211

Helen, Princess, marriage, 211

Helsingfors, 475

Hendrikoff, Countess, at Livadia, 230

Henricovitch, Nicolas, 49

Heredia, M. de, 506

Herzegovina, annexation, 19, 20, 40;
insurrection, 40

Hesse-Darmstadt, Grand-Duke of, 43

Hindenburg, General, defeats Russian
Army, 319

Hohenfelsen, Countess of, 401. See
Palei

Holmsen, General, military agent in
Constantinople, 94; captivity in
Germany, 95

Holstein-Hottorps, the, 247

Howard, Sir Esmé, British Minister to
Sweden, 275, 290, 308 ; conferences
with M. Nekludoff, 337 ; staff at the

529

Legation, 339; on the views of M.
Keskula, 486
Hungary, invaded by Rumanian troops,

442

IGNATIEFF, Count, Minister for Educa-
tion, dismissal, 419

Ignatieff, Countess Sophie, 69

Ignatieff, General, 39 ; Ambassador to
Constantinople, 39, 40; protection
of the Bulgarians, 204

India, fakirs of, 469, 472

Ingria, 491

Ishtib, massacres at, 97, 104

Isker, the, 197

Isonzo, the, 349

Isvolsky, M., interview with M.
d’Aerenthal, 19; on ‘‘healthy
optimism,” 107 ; party in his honour,
292; appointed Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 355 ; Ambassador to Paris,
450 5 rumours of his departure, 450

Italo-Turkish war, 36, 95

Italy, policy on the Serbo-Bulgarian
agreement, 84; entry into the war,
310, 349; supply of sulphur to
Sweden, 335

Itchas, M., at Stockholm, 381, 413,
430, 453; marriage, 381; head of
the Russian Red Cross, 381

Ivanov, General, defeat of his army,

192
Izborsk, 491

JAGELLON, King of Lithuania, marriage,
379

Jagow, M. de, 233, 275

Janina, siege of, 116; surrender, 132

Japanese war, 2, 296

Jilinsky, General, head of the General
Headquarters Staff, 74; on the
proposed military convention with
Bulgaria, 74; interview with M.
Nekludoff, 75; Governor-General
of Poland, 76; military operations,

77

Joachim III., the Patriarch, 206

Joffre, Marshal, 320

John the Terrible, Tsar of Russia,
423, 491

John V., Tsar of Russia, 508 xoze

John VI. Antonovitch, story of, 508
note

Jugo-Slavs, the, surrender, 323

KALUuSZ, massacres at, 318, 511

Kandauroff, _Lieut.-Col., _— military
attaché to the Russian Legation at
Stockholm, 300 ; orders to the troops,

530

301 ; interview with King Gustaf V.,
3097

Karavelov, Madame, enthusiast for
liberty, 165; head of military
hospital at Sofia, 166 ; meeting with
Mdile. Milutin, 166; on giving up
Macedonia to the Serbians, 166, 178

oe hein Petko, tortured and death,
105

Karea, Prota¢ or Superior Council at,
204

Karlovo, district of, 158

Karlovtzy, 157

Katchaneh, massacres at, 97, 104

Kaulbars, Baron, treatmentin Germany,

17

ca 121, 126, 194, 209

Kavarna, port of, 148, 210

Kazanlyk, 101

Kerensky, A. F., head of the Socialists,
474; on the Revolution, 479;
characteristics, 494; commander-in-
chief of the Revolution, 494 ; efforts
to save people, 495 ; attitude towards
Nicolas Il., 496; speeches on the
prosecution of the war, 496, 512;
Dictator-Generalissimo, 511; pro-
claims the Republic, 511; telegram
from M. Nekludoff, 517

Keskula, M., Esthonian political
agitator, 486; interview with M.
Nekludoff, 487-492

Khlyst, a, meaning of the word, 71

Khrenoff, 402

Kiamil Pasha, Grand Vizier, downfall,
130

Kieth 30; union with Russia, 379;
Ukranian vada at, 511

oo III, 122; occupied, 146,
20:

Kitchener, Lord, prophecy on the
length of the war, 329

Klaritonoff, M., Controller of the
Empire, dismissal, 419

Kleinmichel, Countess, fancy-dress ball,

2

Rincabers, Governor, 380

Koewenhiiller, Count, 292

Kokochkin, M., illness, 431; murdered
431

Kebovtzoff, M., 21; President of the
Council, 61, 78, 79, 80, 211}; in
Paris, 223; Berlin, 223; interview
with M. Nekludoff, 240; character-
istics, 240, 241; defence of the
system of the spirit monopoly 241 ;
resignation, 241 ; dread of war for
Russia, 241; pessimism, 405

Kola, port of, 344 3

Kolpino, 492

INDEX

Koni, M., member of the Council of
the Empire, 398

Konopischt, interview of, 280

Korniloff, General, head of the
Petrograd garrison, 493 ; resignation,
494; attempt to take up arms,

517

‘* Kossovo Polé Songs,” 112

Kotchana, 194, 209

Kovel, fighting at, 433, 436

Kovno, 349

Krasnoe-Selo, manceuvres at, 29

Krivochéin, M., 80 ; policy of reforms,
284; Minister for Agriculture, 419;
dismissal 419

Krivolak, 190

Kropotkin, Prince, at Stockholm, 481 ;
interview with M. Nekludoff, 481-
483

Krozé, 380

Krupensky, M., Ambassador to the
Quirinal, 87

Krylbo, 367

Krzyzanowski, M., Secretary of the
Empire, alters minute on the
Polish question, 441

Kudascheff, Prince John, interview with
M. Nekludoff, 515

Kulomzin, M., member of the Council
of the Empire, 399

Kustendil, 190, 197

Kutzo-Wallachians, 37

L——, Generai de, at Stockholm,
4443; on the number of Russian
troops in Rumania, 445

L , Madame de, 409

Ladoga Lake, 491

Lagos, M., in Sweden, 276

Lagos, Mdme., 276

Lamsdorf, Count, 48

Landquart, 44

Lapland, 250

Larson, Carl, 271

La-Granja, 509

Lema, Marquis de, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, receives M. Nekludoff, 506

Lemberg, 323

Lenin, M., 485, 520

Leopold, Prince, of Prussia, at Sofia,
573 military rigidity, 58

Leontieff, Colonel, 75

Lermonteff, M., Lines from, 481 note

Letts, the, 487

Liaptchev, M., 99

Lichnowsky, Prince, Ambassador to
London, 93

Lichtenstein, Prince Francis of, journey
to Vaduz, 44

Liege, siege of, 312

INDEX

Lievin, Princess, treatment in Germany,
318

Liliefors, M., 271

Lindberg, Dr., 358

Lithuania, 350; history, 378; geo-
graphical position, 381
Lithuanians, at Stockholm, 378;

characteristics, 380; number in the
United States, 381

Livadia, 82, 224; palace of, 228

Livonia, invaded by Germans, 515

Lobanoff, Prince, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 9, 423 conferences with
Prince Ferdinand, 9; on the decora-
tions of the Winter Palace, 44;
strength of character, 283 ; member
of the Council of the Empire, 430;
at Stockholm, 430

London, Conference of, 128, 130, 177,
203, 355; clauses of the peace
treaty, 203

Louvain, massacre at, 318

Lozengrad, 122; taken by the Bul-
garians, III

Lucius, Baron von, Counsellor to the
Embassy in St. Petersburg, 338,
409; Minister to the JA/pret of
Albania, 338; sent to Sweden, 338 ;
intrigues, 338; ‘Der Preventive
Krieg,” 339; appointed Minister to
Stoekholm, 339, 453; tactics, 341

Ludskonoy, M., character, 26

Lukomsky, General, Director of
Ordnance, 387, 389

Lule-Burgas, 123 ; defeat of the Turkish
Army at, 112, 114

Lund University, 266

Lutsk, capture of, 424

Lvoff, Prince, President of the Pro-
visional Government, 467; Prime

Minister, 494; President of the
Council, 504
Lwow, 349

Lyon, Lieutenant, 500

MACEDONIA, 10, 43, 96, 132;
administration, 17; condition, 22;
proposed autonomy, 161 ; partition,
164; battles in, 190

Mackensen, General, entry in Bukharest,

445
Madjarov, M., member of the Cabinet,

179
Madrid, 500
Magyars, the, policy, 326; character-

istics, 347 note
Mahomet II., conquest of Constanti-

nople, 122, 129
Majoresco, M.,

Rumanian Prime

Minister, president of the Bukharest |

538

Peace Conference, 202; interview
with M. Nekludoff, 220

Makaroff, M., Minister of Justice, 81 ;
reactionary policy, 284

Maklahoff. M., reactionary policy, 284

Malinov, M., 14, 165 ; President of the
Council, 16; resignation, 17;
Radical Cabinet, 23; interviews
with M. Nekludoff, 178

Malmo, 313; exhibition at, 277-279 ;
meeting of the Scandinavian Kings
at, 286, 330

Manassevitch-Manuiloff, M., 89

Mandelstamm, M., 302

Mansuroff, M., mission
Athos, 213

Manus, M., 70

Margaret, Crown Princess of Sweden,
visits the wounded, 366

Maria, Grand-Duchess, 31

Marie, Grand-Duchess, divorce, 221,

232, 244, 265; at Tsarskoe-Selo,

O02

to Mount

4

Marie Christina, Queen-Mother of
Spain, receives M. Nekludoff, 504,
518; personality, 505 ; charm of her
conversation, 505, 518

Marie Feodorovna, Dowager Empress
of Russia, at Tsarskoe-Selo, 79 5
exhortations to the Emperor and
Empress, 79 ; resemblance to Princess
Ingeborg, 270; receives M. Neklu-
doff, 404

Marie Louise, Princess, marriage, 8 ;
character, 8 ; death, 12

Maritza, the, 123, 210; island, out-
break of cholera, 156

Marmara, Sea of, 92, 114, 121, 124,
12

Marne, the, battle of, 320, 322

Masurian Lakes, 77, 329, 348

Maubeuge, 320

Meaux, 320

Medua, 132

Mehmed Ali, 126

Merrone, Colonel, Italian military
attaché at Sofia, 83 ; friendship with
Bulgarian officers, 83 ; informs the
Staff of the Serbo-Bulgarian agree-
ment, 83; aide-de-camp to the
King, 8

Mesta, the, 209

Meyendorff, Baron, ex-President of the
Duma, at Stockholm, 453

Miassoiedoff, M., duel with M. Gutch-
koff, 78

Michael, Grand-Duke, of Russia,
refuses to accept power, 467

Mickiewicz, the poet, 380

Midia, 125, 129, 169

2M

532

Mikolajow, 323

Milan, King of Serbia, 41 ; abdication,
42 ; loan to, 60

Militza, Grand-Duchess, 69

Miliukoff, M. P. N., 165, 1743 at
Stockholm, 413, 414, 430; criticism
of Stiirmer, 451 ; appointed Minister
for Foreign Affairs, 468 ; character-
istics, 492 ; courage, 493 ; demonstra-
tion against, 493 ; dismissed, 493

Milutin, Nicolas, Secretary of State,

166 note

Milutin, Pauline, meeting with Mme.
Karavelov, 166; friendship with M,
Sazonoff, 167

Ministry, the ‘Chancellor’s office,”
47 ; Asiatic Department, 48

Mir, the, 25

Misu, M., at the Conference of London,
I 77 ; Rumanian Minister to London,
180

Mohilev, headquarters of the Russian
Army at, 421

Mongolians, the, ravages in Russia,
379 note

Montebello, Countess Jean de, 292

Montenegro, agreement with Bulgaria
and Serbia, 103 ; mobilisation of the
army, 108; demarcation of the
frontier, 203, 209

Montenegro, Crown Prince of, at Sofia,

57

Moon, island of, taken by the Germans,
515, 516

Moscow, meeting of Marshals of the
Nobility at, 452; recollections of,
483; meeting of members of the
Duma at, 512

Moscow, Metropolitan of, gift to King
Ferdinand, 62

Mossoloff, General, 85; career, 86;
appointed Minister to Bukharest,
86, 443 :

Murman, construction of the railway,
264, 336 note, 344

Murmansk, port of, 344 ode

Miirzsteg, 20

NABI-BEY, Turkish Minister at Sofia,
IOI ; secret negotiations, LOI

Napoleon, Emperor, formula of, 117

Narichkin, Marie, 238. See Czet-
wertynska

‘* Narodniak”’ party, 179

Narova river, 490

Narva, 490

Narwich, 263

Natchevitch, M., return to Constanti-
nople, 209

Nazim Pasha, assassinated, 130

INDEX

Neidhart, Alexis, head of a committee
on prisoners of war, 397; character-
istics, 398; member of the Council
of the Empire, 398 ; political views,
398; sisters, 398 xote

Nekludoff, A., Counsellor to the
Embassy in Paris, 1; Minister to
Sofia, I ; audiences with Nicolas II.,
3-5; 74, 230-232, 399; presents
credentials to King Ferdinand, 6,
16; interviews with him, 16, 545
62-65, 106, 143-145, 169, 201, 232—
234; negotiations with M. Gueshov,
27, 170; Russian Squadron at
Varna, 34-36; on the Serbo-
Bulgarian relations, 38-43, 45; at
Vienna, 43, 98, 100, 236; meeting
with Macha Vassiltchikoff, 43, 372-
3745 journey to Davos, 43-45 3
interviews with M. Sazonoff, 45, 71,
74, 77, 221, 386, 437, 438; at
Belgrade, 46; interview with M.
Hartwig, 46; wedding of his
daughter, 53; on the Serbo-Bulgarian
negotiations, 54-56, 93; arranges
loan for King Ferdinand, 59-61.;
interviews with M. Gueshov, 66,
141-143, 170; at St. Petersburg,
67, 236, 385-410, 437-443 ; inter-
view with General Jilinsky, 75; on
the proposed military convention,
77; interview with M. Gutchkoff,
78, 99; present at an evening
reception, 69; return to Sofia, 82,
232; intrigues against, 86, 90-92,
450; calumnies, 87 ; interview with
Shelking, 89; relations with King
Ferdinand, 90; trip to Constanti«
nople, 92-96; telegrams to M.
Sazonoff, 96,171 ; onthe dangers of
a war with Turkey, 103 ; telegrams
from M. Sazonoff, 125; conversas
tions with M. Spalaikovitch, 133,
137, 170; prediction on the policy
of Bulgaria, 138; interview with M.
Venizelos, 139-141 ; negotiations on
the Conference of Ambassadors in
St. Petersburg, 152 ; solution of the
Balkan question, 161; on the par-
tition of Macedonia, 164; accusa-
tions of King Ferdinand, 173;
conference with General Savov,
174; interviews with M. Danev,
176-178, 179-181; with M. Ma-
linov, 178; advice to M. Danev,
193, 196; summoned by King
Ferdinand, 198-201 ; transferred to
Stockholm, 201; on the results of
the Treaty of Bukharest, 214; letter
to Baron Schilling, 218; journey

INDEX

to Paris; 220; interview with M.
Majoresco, 220; i

entertained by Nicolas IL, 228 ;

letters to M. Sazonoff, 230 ; interview |

with Queen Eleanor, 234-236 ; last
meeting with Count Witte, 237;
interview with Prince Alexander of
Serbia, 239; with M. Kokovtzoff,
240; with M. Zinovieff, 242; at
Stockholm, 245, 267, 411, 444;
audiences with King Gustaf V., 269,
307, 411-413; with members of the
Royal Family, 270; interviews with
M. Wallenberg, 271, 308; col-
leagues, 275-277 ; at Malmé, 278,
286; excursion in the “ skargaard,”’
287; interview with M. Poincaré,
290, 293; present at the banquet,
291-293 ; interview with Herr von
Reichenau, 297-299; advice about
Bulgaria, 302; distress on news of
the outbreak of war, 304; help from
his colleagues, 305; work for the
refugees, 313 ; conferences with his
colleagues, 3373; prediction on the

Albanian throne, 338; staff at the |

Legation, 339; relations with the

Swedes, 343-345 ; with M. Wallen- |

berg, 343; with the Duke of Amalfi,
360; on the fate reserved for
Russians, 369; relations with the
Poles, 377; meeting with his sons,
386; death of them, 386 xo/e, 436;
interview with General Polivanoff,
387-389; with M. Savinsky, 390;
with Prince Galitzyn, 396; at Tsars-
koe-Selo, 401; received by the
Empress Alexandra, 402-404; the
Dowager-Empress, 404 ; the Grand-
Duke Nicolas, 404; receives mem-
bers of the Duma, 413, 424, 430;
on the question of the Aland Islands,

415, 417: entertains M. Protopopoff, |

425; interview with M. Pokrovsky,
429; expedition to Saltsjobaden,
430; atthe banquet at Hasselbaken,

431 ; on M. Sazonoff’s policy, 434; |
4393 |

interview with Stiirmer,
rumours of dismissal, 450; on the
Protopopoff- Warburg interview, 453;
letter to M. Neratoff, 454 ; interview
with M. Rizov, 460-463; telegram
to M. Pokrovsky, 462; adherence
tothe Provisional Government, 468,
513; interview with Prince Kropot-
kin, 481-483 ; first encounter with
Bolsheviks, 483; attends lecture on
Armenian massacres, 484 ; interview
with M.

impressions of |
Paris, 223, 5145: at Valta,< 229; |

Keskula, 486-492; ap- |

533

pointed Ambassador to Madrid, 492 ;
leaves Stockholm, 498 ; journey to
Madrid, 499; audiences with King
Alfonso XIII., 500~504, 518; pro-
cession, 501; interview with the
Queen, 504; with the Queen-
Mother, 505, 518; with M. Dato
and the Marquis de Lema, 506 ;
colleagues, 509; at San Sebastian,
509, 516 ; telegram to M. Kerensky,
517; resignation, 518; letter to
M. Terestchenko, 519; leaves
Spain, 521

Nekludoff, Mdme., 304;
wounded, 367

Nekludoff, Peter, secretary to the
Embassy in Rome, 386; meeting
with his father, 386; death, 386
note

Nekludoff, Serge, commission, 385 ;
meeting with his father, 385 ; killed
in action, 386 rote, 436

Nelidoff, M. de, 34; Ambassador to
Constantinople, 205

Neratoff, M., 33, 453 ; assistant to M.
Sazonoff, 5 ; letters from M. Nek-
ludoff, 55, 60, 454

Nerezov, Colonel, adjutant, 29; Chicf
of Staff, 187

Neskutchnoye, palace of, 402

Neva, the, 457

Nicolas II., Emperor of Russia,
audiences with M. Nekludoff, 3-5,
74, 230-232, 399; characteristics, 4,
73, 401 ; instructions, 4 ; gift to King
Ferdinand, 62 ; dismisses Rasputin,
70, 81 ; at Livadia, 82, 224 ; receives
M. Danev, 82; at Berlin, 168;
result of his telegram proposing to
arbitrate in the Balkan question,
171-1743; interview with General
Dumbadze, 227 ; affection for his
daughters, 230; interest in the ex-
plorations of Sven-Hedin, 264;
foreign policy, 328 ; triumphal jour-
ney to Lwow, 349; letter to King
Gustaf V., 356; visit to the Duma,
394; treatment of Ministers, 399;
change in appearance, 400;
criticism on his weakness, 405 ;
message to King Gustaf V., 411;
assumes command of the armies,
419 ; at Mohilev, 420; lessons to
his son, 421 ; curious character, 422 ;
receives M. Sazonoff, 437 ; dismisses
M. Stiirmer, 451; abdication, 467,
473, 5135; prisoner in the Palace of
Tsarskoe, 475; sent to Tobolsk,
486, 507

Nicolas, Grand-Duke, 152; manifesto

visits the

534

to the Poles, 323-325 ; receives M.
Nekludoff, 404; literary works,
404; collection of portraits, 405;
dismissal, 419; appointed Viceroy
of the Caucasus, 419; reconcilia-
tion with the Grand-Duchess
Vladimir, 456; removal from St.
Petersburg, 458

Niemen, the, 381

Nikon, Mgr., mission to Mount Athos,

213

Niloff, Admiral, at Livadia, 229

Nish, 194 ; valley, 41

Nobel, Emmanuel, 313; at the Malmo
exhibition, 277

Novy-Sad, 157

North Sea problem, 355

Norway, union with Sweden, 248;
naval spirit, 257; separation from
Sweden, 355

Novibazar, 40

Novikoff, M., Ambassador in Vienna,

40
Novoye Vremya, 23, 28, 49, 56, 67,
89 ; articles in the, 471
Nynis, 286

OBOLENSKY, Princess, maid-of-honour,
resignation, 71, relations with the
Russian Imperial Family, 81

Obrenovitch, Prince Michael,
assassinated, 40

Ochrida, Lake, 52

Octobrists, the, 23

Odier, M., Minister of the Swiss Con-
federation to St. Petersburg at
Stockholm, 421

Odoievsky, Prince, lines on the death
of, 481 soLe

Odrine, annexation of, 123

Oesel, island of, taken by the Germans,

395

515

Oldenburg, Prince Alexander of,
energy and unremitting toil, 397

Olga, Grand-Duchess, 30

Olga, Queen of Greece, 457

Olsufieff, Count Dmitri, member of
the Council of the Empire, at Stock-
holm, 424-427 ; on the Protopopoff-
Warburg interview, 453

‘*Opportunists,” the, 69

Ordyn-Nastchokin, M., 442. See
Stiirmer

Orjevski, General, 380

Oscar I., King of Sweden, 248

Oscar II., King of Sweden, 259;

friendship with Emperor Frederick
III., 259 ; marriage, 259
Osman Pasha, taken prisoner, 152
Osman-Nizami Pasha in London, 177,

|

INDEX

180; Ambassador 186
note

Osten-Sacken, Count, Ambassador to
Berlin, 21, 88, 150; prophecy on the
policy of William II., 282

Osvobojdenie, the, 376

Ouroussoff, Prince, 21

Ovtche-Polie, 181, 190

Oxenstjernas, the, 246

to Berlin,

P——, Count Joseph, 324

Pachitch, M., 100, 134, 135, 136, 295 ;
conferences with M. Venizelos, 139;
with M. Gueshov, 170; on the pro-
posal of Russia to arbitrate in the
Balkan question, 173

Pahlen, Count Constantine, 318

Pahlen, Mdile. Marie de, 318

Palei, Princess, 401

Palmstjerna, Baron de, 306

Panafieu, M., audience with King
Ferdinand, 145

Panag, M., 139

Pan-Germanism, birth of, 25§

Paprikov, General, Bulgarian Minister
in St Petersburg, 63; plenipoten-
tiary for peace, at Nish, 194

Paris, 2, 17, 500 ; impressions of, 222,
386, 514; Treaty of, 355

Paul, Grand-Duke, 221, 401 ; character,
401 ; fate of, 402

Peipus, Lake, 490

Pera, 92

Perisant, M., 60

Perrichon, M., case of, 345

Petchevo, 194, 209

Peter the Great, 346, 508 ote

Peter III., Emperor of Russia, 258

Peter, King of Serbia, 64; reply to the
Emperor of Russia’s telegram, 172

Peter and Paul fortress, incarcerations
in the, 465, 472

Peterhead, 499

Petrograd, 385 ; impressions of, 386 ;
revolt of the Soviet, 493; demon-
stration of the “ Red Guard” garrison,
493. See St. Petersburg

Philippopolis, 123

Pirot, 41, 194

Plevna, siege of, 152

Ploehve, M., 89

Pocej, Ignatius, 119

Poincaré, M., elected President, 145;
visit to Russia, 275 ; at Stockholm,
287 ; official reception, 289-294 ;
banquet, 291

Poklewski-Kozell, M., 311; Minister
to Bukharest, 442; intrigue against,

443

INDEX

Pokrovsky, M., Controller of the Em-

pire, 420 xole; at Stockholm, 428; |

characteristics, 428, 454; interview
with M. Nekludoff, 429; with M.
Wallenberg, 429; sons, 430; sym-
pathy with M. Nekludoff, 438;

Minister for Foreign Affairs, 454 ; |

telegram from M. Nekludoff, 462
Polak, M., 392; at Stockholm, 425
Polak, Mdme., at Stockholm, 425
Poland, 348; atrocities of Germans,

318; military operations in, 322, |

323, 329 ; result of the partition, 324 ;
evacuated by the Russian Army, 350 ;
scheme for the autonomy, 440

Poles, the, promise of autonomy, 323-
325; in Stockholm, 377; character-
istics, 377

Polish question, 433; memoir on the,
440; alteration, 441

Polivanoff, General, assistant to the
Minister of War, 78; M. Sazonoff’s
reception, 81; Minister for War,
386 ; interview with Nekludoff, 387-
389; work for the reconstruction
of the Army, 419; dismissal, 419

Pomerania, 255

Poprikov, General, Bulgarian Minister
to St. Petersburg, $2

Portsmouth, Treaty of, 2

Potemkin, mutiny, 35

Poushkévitch, M., at the murder of
Rasputin, 457

Prisoners of war, exchange of the
seriously wounded, 366-368

Propper, Mr., 89

Protopopoff, M., Vice-President of the
Duma, at Stockholm, 413, 424-427 ;

characteristics, 413 ; entertained by |

M. Nekludoff, 425 ; interview with
M. Wallenberg, 426; volubility,
426; interview with M. Warburg,
427, 438, 452; mental condition,
428 ; Home Secretary, 446 ; reaction-
ary policy, 447; illness, 447; exe-
cution, 447 ; ambitious views, 452;
at Moscow, 452; blunders, 458 ;
belief in the reincarnation of Ras-
putin’s soul, 458 ; measures to pro-
voke disorder, 477

Prussia, 254 ; policy, 255

Przemysl, surrender of, 323, 348

Pskoff, 490

Puschkin, Festivity during the Plague,

237

RADKO-DMITRIEV, General, 114;
victory of Lule-Burgas, 127 ; mission
to St. Petersburg, 127; instructions,
127; ovation in his honour, 154

535

Radoslavoy, M., entrusted to form a
Cabinet, 196

Radovitch, 209

Radziwill, Prince Nicolas, 315

Rasputin, Gregory, influence over the
Empress Alexandra, 67, 69, 73, 419 ;
dissolute life, 69-71 ; a‘‘ trezyennik,”’
69; sent away from Court, 71, 81;
return, 71, 81; a Ahlyst, 71 note;
expelled from Yalta, 226 ; flattered by
Ministers, 284; scandal, 395, 455-
457; accepts sums of money, 435;
assassinated, 457; funeral, 457

‘* Rasputin,” meaning of the word, 69

Reichenau, Baron von, German Min-
ister to Stockholm, 277, 291 ; inter-
view with M. Nekludoff, 297-299

Reichstadt, 20; conference at, 40

Rennenkampf, General, 319

Retch, article in the, 173

Rhodope Mountains, 113, 210

Riga, 350; taken by the Germans,
515, 516

Rilo range, 195

Rilo-Dagh, taken by the Greeks, 195

Ristitch, M., the Serbian Plenipoten-
tiary, 41

Rizov, M., hostility to Russia, 87 ;
Diplomatic Agent, 87; marriage,
87; Minister to Rome, 88 ; character-
istics, 88 ; influence over King Ferdi-
nand, 172, 174, 179; interviews with
M. Nekludoff, 174, 460-462; Min-
ister to Berlin, 459; death, 463

Rodosto, 121, 126, 130

Rodzianko, M., President of the Duma,
81; stirring speech, 395 ; suppression,

494

Roman Catholicism, power of, 118

Romanovski, Colonel, military agent
in Sofia, 75, 82; at Nish, 194

Rosen, Baron Leon de, secretary to
the Russian Legation at Stockholm,
430; political views, 432; speech at
the Council of the Empire, 432

Rosen, Baroness, 359

Rosetti, Mdme., 149

Rosetti-Solesco, M., Rumanian Minister
to St. Petersburg, 149

Russnoye Slovo, 9i

Rumania, rectification of the frontiers,
129; relations with Russia, 149,
151; mobilisation of the Army, 189 ;
neutrality in the Balkan war, 147 ;
relations with Bulgaria, 147 ; claims
to Dobrudja, 147, 148, 180; acquisi-
tion of territories, 153; entry into
the war, 303, 442, 444; condition of
the Army, 388; geographical posi-
tion, 388

536
Rumania, Crown Prince of, at Sofia,

7

Roe Army, cross the Danube,
193; occupies Northern Bulgaria,
195, 197; aeroplane, 197; leaves
Varna, 201 ; enters Hungary, 442;
evacuates Transylvania, 445

Rumelia, 23; invasion of, 41

Russia, Revolution, 2, 466; relations
with Austria, 18; with Bulgaria, 20,
231; ‘‘moderantism,” 23; ** Council
of Ministers” or “ Cabinet,” 33;
Asiatic Department, 48; proposed
convention with Bulgaria, 74; in-
adequate preparations, 78, 100, 241,
296; possession of Constantinople,
117; rule of the “ prohibited area,”
122, 125; supports Serbia’s claim,
134; cession of Dobrudja, 147;
relations with Rumania, 149, 151;
proposed arbitration in the Balkan
question, 170-174; checks advance
of the Turks, 201; relations with
Greece, 204 ; policy in the Near East,
205, 207; renewal of influence in
Greece and Rumania, 214; spirit
monopolies, 240; relations with Ger-
many, 261; construction of the
Murman railway, 264, 336 mo/e, 344;

ultimatum from Germany, 283, 296, |
301 ; ‘‘robust” optimism, 283 ; policy |

of Ministers, 284 ; the need to collect
herself, 285 ; on neutrality of Sweden,
309; defeat of the army, 319; policy,
327 ; rule in Galicia, 329 ; trade with
Sweden, 335, 336; need to secure
transit through, 336; secret intelli-
gence methods, 340; relations with
Sweden, 343-345, 432 ; secession of
Finland, 347 ; negotiations for peace,
351 ; concession to Sweden in 1856,
355; elimination of the clause at the
Conference of London, 355; rights
in the Aland Islands, 356; ravages
of the Mongolians, 379 zofe ; reorgan-
isation of the Army, 387; railway
system, 389; discontent of the lower
class, 406; influence of German
agents, 408-410, 477, 478; result of
the reverses, 409 ; internal condition,
446, 447; Provisional Government,
467; illusions on the Revolution, 469-
472; views of the Western Allies,
469-471; massacres, 475; action of
the Fleet, 475; origin of the Revolu-
tion, 476; Government and the
‘* people,” conflict between, 479 ; the
trepak or national dance, 485 ; demon-
stration of ‘the Red Guard,” 493;
Republic proclaimed, 511

|

INDEX

Russian Army, condition, 95; military
operations in East Prussia, 319, 349 ;
in Galicia, 322, 329, 348, 423, 424,
500; ascent of the Carpathians, 323;
forced to retire, 349; evacuates
Poland and Galicia, 350; retreat,
350; captures Lutsk, 424; evacuates
Transylvania, 445; adherence to
Provisional Government, 467, 471;
Prikase No. 1,476; reserve regiments
of the Guard, revolt, 478; army of
treachery, forming, 485; dissolution,
497 ; behaviour of the deserters, 407 ;
refusal to fight, 500; demoralisation,
511; flight, 511

Russian Fleet, at Varna, 34-36; as-
sassination of the Admirals, 475

Russian prisoners, treatment, 362-365 ;
result of German propaganda, 363,
368 ; officers, 370

Russian refugees, treatment in Germany,
313, 317; in Sweden, 314, 321;
Committee formed, 358

Russians, monastic faith, 206; charac-
teristics, 347 zofe, 369; future of,
369; in Paris, 514

Russo-British Entente, 2

Rustchuk, 220

Ruthenes, the, 329

SABLER, M., Counsellor to the Legation,
introduction to King Ferdinand, 144 ;
Procurator of the Holy Synod, 145;
reactionary policy, 284

Saburoff, M. Andrew, member of the
Council of the Empire, 398

St. Alexander Nevsky, Cathedral of, 154

St. Pantelaimon, Monastery of, 206

St. Petersburg, 1, 385; Conference of
Ambassadors, 152; entertainments
in, 236; destruction of the German
Embassy, 240; impressions of, 439;
police measures, 465 ; disorders, 466 ;
revolution, 466, 478; reception of
convicts and political exiles, 480;
population, 492; revolt of the Sovzer,
493. See Petrograd

St. Sophia, 119

Salonika, 41; occupied by Greeks,
132; by Bulgarians, 169

Saltsjobaden, 430

Samara, standard of, 290

Samarine, Alexander, 171

Samokov, 197

Samothrace, island of, 126, 130

Samsonoff, General, 77; annihilation
of his army, 319

San, the, 349

San Giovanni, 132

San Sebastian, 509, 521

2 arta aee! 2

INDEX 537

San Stefano, 122; Treaty of, 41, 42,
217

Santander, 509

Sassnitz, 313, 366

Savinsky, M. A., Minister to Stockholm,
85; to Sofia, 86, 91; removal from
Sweden, 222; difficulty ofi his posi-
tion, 265; illness, 390; warnings on
the Bulgarian peril, 390; audience
with King Ferdinand, 391 ; policy,
392

Savov, General, prosecution, 26 ; Com-
mander-in-chief of the Bulgarian
Army, 168; conference with M.
Nekludoff, 174; protest against
sending a delegate to St. Petersburg,
183; instructions from King Ferdi-
nand, 188; plenipotentiary for the
settlement with the Porte, 209

Sazonoff, Mdme., 398 ote

Sazonoff, M., Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 1; career, 1; illness, 5; at
Davos, 5; return to St, Petersburg,
5; under the influence of Stolypin,
32; improvement in his health, 39,
45; interviews with M. Nekludoff,

45, 71, 74, 77, 221, 386, 437, 4383

on an alliance between Bulgaria and |

Serbia, 45; return from Davos, 55;
reception, 79; telegrams from M,
Nekludoff, 96, 1713; to him, 125;
presides at the Conference of Am-
bassadors, 152; friendship with
Mdlle. Milutin, 167; on the inde-
pendence of Mount Athos, 203, 207,
213; protest against advance of the
Turkish troops, 208; his foreign
policy, 215, 434; optimism, 221,
243; letters from M. Nekludoff, 230;
policy of reforms, 284: advice from
M. Nekludoff, 302; the Aland
Islands, 415 ; remains in office, 420;
resignation, 433, 437; received by
Nicolas II., 437; minute on the
Polish question, 440; on the entry
of Rumania into the war, 443

Scandinavian Sovereigns, meeting of,
330

Scavenius, Mdme., 276

Scavenius, M., Danish Minister to
Stockholm, 276

Schakhowsky, Prince, reactionary
policy, 284
Schebeko, Nicolas, career, 150;

Counsellor to the Embassy in Berlin,
150; Minister to Bukharest, 150,
208; Ambassador to Vienna, 220;
return from St. Petersburg, 280;

scepticism, 283; delay in his inter- |

vention, 283

Scherbatcheff, General, in command of
the reserve army, 388 ; reoccupies the
Bukowina, 424

Schiller, J. C, F., history of the Thirty
Vears’ War, 256

Schilling, Baron, 91, 443; letter from
M. Nekludoff, 218 ; advice from him,

302

Schingareff, M., at Stockholm, 413,
414, 430; character, 431; speeches,
431; murdered, 431; advice to
Protopopoff, 447

Schipka Pass, attack on, ror ; Veterans’
Féte, 101

Schischman, John Samuel, Bulgarian
Tsar, 192

Schuvaloft, Countess Betty, ball given
by, 238

Schuvaloff, Count Peter, Ambassador
in London, 40

Scutari, siege of, 116; annexation
vetoed, 129

Sementovsky, Mdme., 88

Sementovsky, M., Russian Minister to
Sofia, death, 1, 3; relations with King
Ferdinand, 2

Serbia, relations with Bulgaria, 38,
135, 137, 161, 239; principal phases,
39-43; war with Turkey, 40, IIT;
negotiations with Bulgaria, 52-57;
demarcation of the frontier, 52, 53,
55,203, 209, 211 ; settled, 56; agree-
ment with Bulgaria, 56, 64, 230;
military convention with, 96, 98;
alliance with Greece, 98, 163, 169 5
agreement with Montenegro, 103;
mobilisation of the Army, 108-110;
outlet to the Adriatic, 128, 132-135 ;
acquisition of territories, 1325; siege
of Adrianople, 134; relations with
Greece, 135, 137 3 with Russia, 164;
claims in Macedonia, 164; prepara-
tions for war, 181; loyalty to
Russia, 214; ultimatum from Ger-
many, 280, 288, 290; reply, 294;
atrocities of Germans, 318

Serbia, Crown Prince Alexander of,
invasion of Eastern Rumelia, 41 ; at
Sofia, 57; tact, 58; departure from
Belgrade, 101 ; at Krivolak, 190 ; at
St. Petersburg, 239; on relations
between Serbia and Bulgaria, 239

Serbian Army, defeated at Slivnitza,
41 ; defeats the Turks, 112; partici-
pate in the taking of Adrianople, 155 ;
attacked by Bulgarians, 185, 189;
victory over them, 190

Serbian Mussulmans in Bosnia, 157

Seres, 209

| Sereth, the, 445

538

Serge Mikhailovitch, Grand-Duke, 78,
402

Sergueieff, Capt., wounded, 371

Shelking, M., characteristics, 88, 89 ;
failings, 88; forced to resign, 89;
journalism, 89; arrested, 8g; inter-
view with Nekludoff, 89;
audience with King Ferdinand, 90

Sievers, General, forced to retire, 349

Silistria, 147 ; ceded to Rumania, 153

Skirmunt, M., 378

- Skoplie, 111; occupied by Serbians,
112

Skoropadsky, Colonel, 315

Slatin-Pasha, at the conference at
Stockholm, 364

Slivnitza, defeat at, 41

Slovaks, surrender, 323

Smolensk, 379

Sobanski, Count, 378

Sobranjé, the Great,
Tirnova, 28

Sofia, school for officers, 11 ; festivities
at, 57; troops from Macedonia, 96 ;
Schipka Veterans’ Féte, ror ; services
in the Cathedral, 102, 145, 146;
military hospital, 165 ; skirmish of
reservists, 216; march past of the
troops, 218

Solovieff, M., Counsellor to the Russian
Embassy in Madrid, disapproval of
M. Nekludoff’s telegram, 520 ; dis-
missed, 521 ; in Poland, 521

Sophia, Queen, of Sweden,
characteristics, 259

Sound, the, German destroyers in,
287

convened at

259

Soviet, the, treatment of Nicolas I1., |

4753; power, 478; organ of German
policy, 486

Spain, the Guardia Civil, 506

Spain, Archduke Albert, 505

Spain, Archduke Charles, 505

Spalatkovitch, M., characteristics, 53 ;
conversations with M. Nekludoff, 133,
137, 170; on the Serbian claims to
territory, 133 ; suggestion to Belgrade,
136; suspicions of the Bulgarians,
137; at Tsaribrod, 170

Spaniards, characteristics, 510

Spitsberg, Conference, 302

Staaf, M., 265

Stakovitch, M., appointed Ambassador
to Madrid, 520

Stamboulov, M., omnipotence, 8;
resignation, 9; assassinated, 10

Stambul, 92

Stana, Grand-Duchess, 69

Stara-Zagora (Eski-Zagra), battle of,
102

INDEX

Stjerrenstett, Mdme. Marika, lecture at
the Auditorium meeting, 483

Stock Exchange Gazette, 89

Stockholm, 245, 464 ; Riksdag of ‘* the
National Defence,” 279; Requiem
Mass for Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand, 286 ; reception of M. Poincaré,
289-294 ; banquet, 291 ; panic, 301 ;
work of the committee for the
prisoners of war, 359; conferences at,
364; commercial amateurs, 382;
Secret-Service agents, 383 ; German
spies, 383 ; members of the Duma,
413 ; meeting in the Auditorium, 483

Stohed, marshes of the, 436

Stolypin, Michael, killed in a duel, 31

Stolypin, Petia, assassinated, 31;
characteristics, 31, 32; attempt on
his life, 31; tendency to despotism,
32; foreign policy, 32; influence
over M. Sazonoff, 32; protection of
the Lithuanians, 380

Stolypin, Mdme. Peter, 298 zo/e

Stromberg, M., 358

Struma, the, 194, 208, 209

Struve, Peter, at Stockholm, 376;
edits the Osvobojdenie, 376; head of
the service of economic studies, 376

Stiirmer, M., Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 86, 433, 439; President of
the Council, 393; President of the
Zemstvo at Tver, 393; Provincial
Governor, 394; mission to, 394;
characteristic, 394, 439; policy, 418 ;
influence over Empress Alexandra,
419, 435; bad reputation, 435 ;
German origin, 435; appearance,
439; interview with M. Nekludoff,
439; ultimatum-writ to Rumania,
442; arraignment of his private
secretary, 446 ; retirement, 450

Sudermania, Duke of, 248. See Charies

XIII.

Sukhomlinoff, General, Minister for
War, 78, 80

Sumarokoff-Elston, Count Felix, at the
murder of Rasputin, 457

Svatikoff, M., 515

Sven-Hedin, 263; explorations, 264 ;
received by Nicolas II., 264 ; on the
Russian danger, 265; result of his
visits to the German armies, 342

Sverbeieff, M., at Vienna, 95, 100 ; Am-
bassador to Berlin, 98, 281 ; on leave,
280 ; characteristics, 281 ; limitations,
282 ; treatment in Berlin, 316

Sviatopolk-Mirsky, Prince,
Secretary, 399

Sweden, history, 246-252; enmity to
Russia, 246; administration, 247 ;

Home

eit ad ~

INDEX 539

naval engagements, 2473; loss of
Finland, 248 ; union with Norway,
248 ; Diet replaced by two Chambers,
249; the Riddarehuset, 249 ; educa-
tion, 250 ; iron mines, 250 ; Socialism,
250; aristocratic and democratic,
251; population, 251; friendship
with France, 254; relations with
Germany, 255-258; trade with, 257,
337; influence of, 259-262; fear of
aggressive policy of Russia, 263; the
Bondestog ox peasants’ procession,
266; resignation of the Liberal
Cabinet, 266 ; Chamber of ‘‘National
Defence,” 267 ; dissolved, 330; pro-
posals of alliance from Germany, 272;
the Russian colony, 274; policy of
neutrality, 306-310; belief in Ger-
many’s invincibility, 310, 321;
number of refugees, 313, 358; treat-
ment of them, 314, 321, 358; export
trade, 3323; geographical position,
333; restriction of imports, 333-
336; position of international trade,
334-337; need for coal and other
commodities, 3343; Russia’s need to
secure transit through, 336; orders
from, 336; relations with, 343-345,
432; work of the Red Cross, 345,
364; system of telephony, 346;
political and social
346; policy of the Activists, 348,
350; aversion to war, 350; pacificist
current, 352; result of the blockade,
3535 custom of Vus/-Klappor, 353;
concession made by Russia in 1856,
355 separation from Norway, 355;
work for the prisoners, 359; ad-
ministration of Esthonia, 489; the
new Cabinet, 498

Sweden, Crown Prince of, 270

Swedes, the, characteristics, 252, 253;
patriotism, 252; ‘‘Spaniards of the
North,” 253; belief in Germany,
320-322; danger of an alliance,
322; relations with Germans, 343;
treatment of refugees, 345; con-
tamination from foreign elements, 384

Syria, condition of, 22

T———, M,, 396

Talaats, the, 23

Tango, the, in Paris, 223

Tannenwald, battle of, 379

Tarnowski, Count, 109; council, 187

Tatar-Budjaks, the, 147

Tatiana, Grand Duchess, 30; at
Livadia, 229; unknown fate, 229

Tatischeff, Serge, 9

Taube, Baron, 36

organisation, |

Tchkeidze, M., Socialist, 467 ; ridicules
Prince Galitzyn’s speech, 477

Teheran, 49

Terestchenko, M., appointed Minister
for Foreign Affairs, 494; charac-
teristics, 495; letter from M.
Nekludoff, 519

Thasos, island of, 126

Theodore, Tsar of Russia, 423, 491

Theodorov, M., 25 zotfe. See Todorov

Thiébaud, M., French Minister to
Sweden, 275, 308 ; work, 340

Thomas, M,. Albert, Minister of
Munitions, at Stockholm, 414;
appearance, 414; mission to Russia,
499 oe

Thrace, 129; condition, 22; military
operations in, 123; cession, 130;
occupied, 209

#imes, the, article in, 463 zore

Tirnova, 28, 91 ; Jubilee celebrations,
105 ; earthquake, 182

Tisza, M., 326

Tobolsk, 496

Todorov, General, expedition against
Salonika, 113

Todorov, M., 172; Bulgarian Minister
of Finance, 25; Serbo-Bulgarian
relations, 38; on the demarcation of
the frontier, 53; on the financial
difficulties of King Ferdinand, 59 ;
journey to St. Petersburg, 126;
conference with M. Nekludoff, 174 ;
member of the Cabinet, 179; on the
decision to send a delegate to St.
Petersburg, 182. See Theodorov

Tolstoy, Count Alexis, verses, 423

Tolstoy, Count Leo, 423 ote

Tommasini, M., Italian Minister to
Sweden, 276; characteristics, 337 ;
work, 340

Tommasini, Mdme., 276

Tontchev, M., member of the Cabinet,
196 ; plenipotentiary for the settle-
ment with the Porte, 209

Tornea, 366

Torres, Senor de, 361

Trans-Siberian Railway, 265 note

Transylvania, evacuated, 445

Trelleborg, 366

Trench-warfare, 329

Trepak or Russian dance, 485

Trepoff, Alexander, Minister of Ways
and Communications, 451 ; appointed
Prime Minister, 451; colleagues,
452; resignation, 458

Trn, 195

Trondhjem, 263

Trotsky, M., 485, 520

Tsaribrod, conference at, 170

540 INDEX

Tsarskoe-Selo, 5, 72, 401 3 Palace, 72 ;
rebel soldiers of the garrison, 4.73
Tseretelli, M., Socialist, 467
Turgeneff, Ivan, ‘‘ On the Eve,” 165
Turkey, Christian nations of, 18;
revolution, 18, 19; policy of the
Young Turks, 22; war with Italy,

37, 96; with Serbia, 40; with the |

Balkan States, 111 ; German influence
in, 123; frontier, 125 ; negotiations
for peace, 128; annulment, 130;
armistice, 155, 169 ; result of domina-
tion over the Bulgarians, 157;
relations with Serbians, Greeks and
Albanians, 157 ; peace signed, 169 ;
cession of territories, 203 ; co-opera-
tion with Gemany, 215; entry into
the war, 329

Turkhan Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador,
208

Turkish Army, strength and equipment,
94, 104; defeated, III, 112, 329,

348; surrender to the Greeks and |

Bulgarians, 1133 demoralisation,
114; demobilisation of the army,
I91 ; advance on Bulgaria, 193,
201; on Adrianople, 195; retake
Adrianople, 197, 208

Turkish prisoners on the island of
Maritza, 156; treatment by the
Bulgarians, 156

Turks, the, founders of the Ottoman
empire, 347 mote; characteristics,
347 note

Tutcheff, Mdlle., maid-of-honour, resig-
nation, 71 ; relations with the Russian
Imperial Family, 81

Tutrukan, 147, 210

Tver, province of, 393

Tziganes, the, 147

Ucuipa, M., Japanese. Minister to
Sweden, 276

Uchida, Mdme., 276

Ukraine, the, independence proclaimed,

497
Uniate clergy, persecution of, 329

United States, number of Lithuanians |

in, 381
Upsala University, 266
Ural-Altaic race, 347 ~ote
Uskub, III

VADUZ, 44

Varangians, the, 246

Vardar, the, 190, 194, 208, 209

Varna, 147, 201 ; Russian Squadron at,
34-36

Vassiltchikoff, Alexander, 43

Vassiltchikoff, Mdlle. Macha, appear-
ance, 43; journey to Vaduz, 44;
meetings with M. Nekludoff, 44,
372; at Stockholm, 372; on the
treatment of prisoners in Germany,
3733 advice from M. Nekludoff,
374; expelled from St. Petersburg,

375

Vassilieff, Professor, member of the
Council of the Empire, at Stockholm,
424-427

Venizelos, M., 282; Prime Minister of
Greece, 137 ; conferences at Belgrade,
139; interview with M. Nekludoff,
139-141 ; characteristics, 139; out-
line of the frontier, 140

Victoria, Queen of Spain, receives M.
Nekludoff, 504; appearance, 504

Victoria, Queen of Sweden, sympathies
with Germany, 260 ; characteristics,
261; receives M. Nekludoff, 270;
visits the wounded, 367

Vienna, 17, 98 ; impressions of, 236

Vilna, union with Cracow, 379

Vitosch Pass, 198

Viviani, M., at Stockholm, 290

Vladimir, Grand-Duchess, 21; gift to
King Ferdinand, 62; reconciliation
with the Grand-Duke Nicolas, 456

Vladimir, Grand-Duke, 211; death,
21

| Volhynia, 350, 386 sore, 433

Volkoff, Alexander, 373; on the origin
of the war, 374

Vrana, 59; 143, 145

Vulture, the, 499

Vyrubova, Anna, 69; at Livadia, 227,
229

WALLENBERG, M. Knut, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 267 ; interview with
M. Nekludoff, 271 ; on the preserva-
tion of peace, 271, 300, 352; friend-
ship with King Gustaf V., 2733
founder of the ‘‘ Banque des Pays du
Nord,” 274 ; visit to Paris and Berlin,
274 ; on neutrality of Sweden, 306 ;
character of his policy, 309 ; extension
of his term of office, 330; relations
with M. Nekludoff, 343; on the
question of the Aland Islands,
417, 444; interview with M. Pro-
topopoff, 426; with M. Pokrovsky,

429

Wangenheim, Baron von, Ambassador

to Constantinople, 93; military
instructor of the Ottoman Army,
120 ©

INDEX 541

Warburg, M., interview with M.
Protopopoff, 427, 438; controversy
on the meeting, 452

Warsaw, 323, 329, 348

Weckerle, M., 326

Wied, Prince of, Mpret of Albania,
338

Wielopolski, Count Sigismund, mem-
ber of the Council of the Empire, at
Stockholm, 430; on the Polish
question, 433; death of his son, 437

Willard, Mr., American Ambassador
to Madrid, 509

William I., Emperor of Germany, 260

William II., Emperor of Germany,
treatment of the Bulgarians, 58;
marriage of his daughter, 168;
audience with M. Kokovtzoff, 223 ;
at the interview of Konopischt, 280 ;
extreme measures against Russia,
283; cruise in the Norwegian
Fjords, 286

William Prince of Sweden, divorce,
221, 244; popularity, 271

Winter Palace, style of furniture, 43

Witte, Count, 21; apprehensions of
the future, 237 ; death, 238

Wotan, 255

XERXES, 204 note

YALTA, 223

Yermoloff, Alexis, Minister of Agri-
culture, 398

Yser, the, 320

Yudenitch, General, victory in the
Caucasus, 348

Yul-Klappor, custom in Sweden, 353

Yussupoff, Princess Zenaida, effort to
stop the Rasputin scandal, 455; son,
457 vole

ZIMMERMANN, M., 275

Zimmerwaldians, the, 481

Zinovieff, M., Ambassador to Con-
stantinople, 21, 205; interview with
M. Nekludoff, 242

Zorn, M., 271

Zrny-Vrch, assault on, 112

Zveguintzoff, M., member of the
Council of the Empire, at Stockholm,
453

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